[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-13504

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cv-01257-VMC-MCR

BRANDON E. HACIA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(February 2, 2015)

Before TJOFLAT, HULL, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Brandon Hacia appeals the judgment of the District Court affirming the 

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance 

benefits, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and supplemental security income, 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). The Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”) 

who adjudicated Hacia’s claim found that he had two severe impairments: primary 

generalized epilepsy and a cognitive disorder. The ALJ concluded that Hacia was 

not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), however,

and thus was not entitled to benefits under the Act because there were a significant 

number of jobs that he could perform despite his impairments. Hacia requested

administrative review of the ALJ’s decision but the Appeals Council denied his 

request. On judicial review, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the 

Commissioner’s decision denying benefits be affirmed. The District Court adopted 

the recommendation and affirmed the Commissioner’s decision.

On appeal, Hacia argues that the ALJ failed to give sufficient weight to (1) 

the opinion of his treating physician that he was unable to support himself due to 

his condition, and (2) the Department of Defense’s (the “DOD”) determination that 

he was entitled to medical coverage as an incapacitated adult child of a retired 

service member.

In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision to deny social security benefits in 

a particular case, the district court’s inquiry in the first instance, and ours on 

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appellate review, is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s findings 

are supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner applied the 

correct legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 

701 (11th Cir. 1988). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Hale v. 

Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987). “It is more than a scintilla, but less 

than a preponderance.” Id. “We may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the 

evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Phillips v. 

Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 & n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and 

alterations omitted).

To be eligible for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security 

income under the Act, a claimant must be disabled. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1), 

1382(a)(1)–(2). Disability is defined for the purposes of the Act as the inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death, or that has 

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A person will be found disabled only 

if his physical or mental impairments are so severe that he cannot engage in any 

kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). The claimant bears the burden of proving that he 

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is disabled, and thus it is his responsibility to produce evidence in support of his 

claim. Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003).

In evaluating the evidence put forward by the claimant, the ALJ must give a 

treating physician’s opinion substantial weight—unless good cause is shown to 

disregard the opinion. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583 (11th Cir. 1991). 

We have found good cause to exist where (1) the physician’s opinion was not 

bolstered by the evidence, (2) the evidence supported a contrary finding, or (3) the 

physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with his or her own medical 

records. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240–41. If an ALJ determines that the opinion of 

the treating physician is not entitled to substantial weight, he or she must clearly 

articulate the reasons for that conclusion. Id.

Here, the ALJ articulated several reasons supporting his decision not to give 

substantial weight to the opinion of Dr. Bozorg, Hacia’s treating physician. As the 

ALJ noted, the conclusions expressed by Dr. Bozorg in a Residual Function 

Capacity (“RFC”) questionnaire were not only internally inconsistent but they 

were also unsupported—even contradicted—by Dr. Bozorg’s treating notes in 

Hacia’s medical records. For example, the questionnaire states that Hacia was 

experiencing an average of one seizure a month without any precipitating factors, 

but Dr. Borzog noted in his treating records that Hacia’s seizures were controllable 

with medication and opined that the seizures were due to Hacia’s noncompliance 

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with his prescribed medication regimen. Upon reviewing the record, we cannot 

say that the ALJ’s conclusion that good cause existed to discount Dr. Bozorg’s 

opinion lacked substantial support.1

Hacia’s second argument fares little better. A finding of disability by 

another agency is not binding on the Commissioner, although we have held that it 

should be given great weight. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1241 (11th 

Cir. 1983); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1504, 416.904 (stating that a determination 

of disability by another agency is not binding on the Social Security 

Administration). Nor, if the other agency’s standard for determining disability 

deviates substantially from the Commissioner’s standard, is it error for the ALJ to 

give the agency’s finding less than substantial weight. Cf. Falcon v. Heckler, 732 

F.2d 827, 831 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding that an ALJ should have given great weight 

to a state agency’s disability standard because it had been construed similarly to 

the Commissioner’s disability standard). 

Here, the ALJ specifically considered the DOD’s determination that Hacia 

was an incapacitated adult child of a retired service member but found, albeit with 

little explanation, that the DOD’s standard was “more lenient” than the disability 

 1 Hacia argues that it is unreasonable to assume that a doctor would make false 

statements at his patient’s behest. We note in this regard that within one day of completing the 

RFC questionnaire at issue, Dr. Bozorg observed in his treatment notes that Hacia had been 

experiencing monthly breakthrough seizures but he and his mother had not been promptly 

reporting them to Dr. Bozorg because they were hoping Hacia would qualify for disability and 

did not think he would qualify unless he was having regular seizures. 

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standard imposed by social security law and thus gave it limited weight. Hacia 

appears to contend that the ALJ erred because he did not sufficiently discuss how 

the DOD’s standard differed from the Commissioner’s standard or support that 

conclusion with substantial evidence. 

Hacia fails to cite us to any binding precedent holding that an ALJ must 

make detailed findings in support of his conclusion that the relative disability 

standards differ. The ALJ’s decision reflects that he considered both standards, 

determined that the DOD’s disability standard was lower than that of the 

Commissioner, and thus assigned limited weight to the DOD’s determination. This 

was not error. See Pearson v. Astrue, 271 F. App’x 979, 981 (11th Cir. 2008) (per 

curiam) (affirming denial of benefits despite a finding by the Department of 

Veteran’s Affairs that claimant was disabled where ALJ “considered the rating in 

his decision and correctly explained that a claimant had to satisfy a more stringent 

standard to be found disabled under the [SSA]”).

Moreover, upon reviewing the record, we find substantial support for the 

ALJ’s determination that the DOD’s standard was more lenient than the 

Commissioner’s standard. Based on the evidence submitted by Hacia, it appears 

that to obtain continued insurance coverage as an incapacitated dependent under 

DOD regulations, a claimant need only submit a current physician’s statement to 

that effect. By comparison, the Commissioner evaluates a disability claim with an 

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in-depth five-step sequential process, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a), and 

reviews a variety of medical and non-medical evidence in making a final 

determination, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a)–(c), 416.912(a)–(c). Notably, a 

physician’s statement that an individual is incapacitated or disabled is not 

dispositive. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

In sum, we find that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards in reaching 

his decision that Hacia was not entitled to disability insurance benefits or

supplemental security income and that this conclusion finds substantial support in 

the record. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

 

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