IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MICHEL CHALHOUB, 

Plaintiff 

v. 

COMMONWEAL TH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA; COLONEL 

ROBERT EVANCHICK, 

Commissioner of the Pennsylvania 

State Police; PENNSYLVANIA STATE : 

POLICE TROOPER LUKASZ OLSZAR;: 

COUNTY OF PIKE; and CRAIG A. 

LOWE, Warden Pike County 

Correctional Facility, 

Defendants 

No. 3:23cv592 

(Judge Munley) 

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MEMORANDUM 

Before the court are two (2) motions to dismiss Plaintiff Michel Chalhoub's 

amended complaint, one filed by Defendants Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 

and Colonel Robert Evanchick, Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police 

("PSP Defendants") and one filed by Defendants ("Pike County") and Craig A. 

Lowe, Warden Pike County Correctional Facility ("Warden Lowe")(collectively 

"Prison Defendants"). Having been fully briefed, these motions to dismiss are 

ripe for decision. 

Case 3:23-cv-00592-JKM Document 50 Filed 12/20/24 Page 1 of 17
Background 

On May 23, 2021 , Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Lukasz Olszar 

("Trooper Olszar") responded to plaintiff's residence in Dingman Township, Pike 

County, Pennsylvania for a report of a "physical domestic." (Doc. 40, Am. Campi. 

Prison Defs., Exh. A., Police Crim. Com pl. , Aff. of Prob. Cause, ECF p. 29). 1 Per 

Trooper Olszar's affidavit of probable cause, the police communications operator 

advised there was an active Protection from Abuse order ("PFA order") issued 

against plaintiff for the protection of another person at the residence. (~) 

On scene, Trooper Olszar and another officer interviewed the purported 

victim of physical abuse. (~) She indicated that plaintiff slapped her and threw 

an ashtray at her, which caused burn marks on the back of her shirt. (~) Per 

Trooper Olszar's narrative, the PFA Order was issued for the protection of that 

person in 2020, and he indicated in his affidavit that the order expired on August 

12, 2023. (~ at ECF p. 27, 29). After the burn marks on the alleged victim's shirt 

were reportedly observed and photographed, Trooper Olszar placed plaintiff into 

1 Plaintiff has filed two fragmented amended complaints, one against the PSP Defendants, 

(Doc. 39), and one against Prison Defendants, (Doc. 40). These background facts are derived 

from those pleadings and the attached exhibits. In ruling upon the instant motions to dismiss, 

the court reads both amended complaints together as it did with the claims in plaintiff's initial 

complaint. At this stage of the proceedings, the court must accept all factual allegations in the 

amended complaints as true. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). 

The court makes no determination, however, as to the ultimate veracity of these assertions. 

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custody and charged him with violating an active PFA order. (kt at ECF p. 29). 

The Affidavit of Probable Cause includes a protection order number and the 

origination court routing identifier number. (kt) 

According to plaintiff's amended complaint, however, he claims that a final 

PFA order had been entered on August 26, 2020 and expired six (6) months 

later, on February 26, 2021. (Doc. 39, Am. Com pl., PSP Defs. ,I 15). Plaintiff 

alleges that he told Trooper Olszar that the PFA order was no longer in effect, 

but Trooper Olszar accused plaintiff of lying and then placed him into custody. 

(kt ,I 18). 

According to the amended complaint, plaintiff appeared before Magisterial 

District Court Judge Deborah Fischer remotely from the Blooming Grove 

barracks. (kt ,I 21 ). He claims that facts surrounding the arrest were falsely 

stated to the state magistrate judge. (kt ,I 22). Also, he argued that a PFA order 

was not in effect. (kt ,I 23). Per plaintiff, his protests went unheard. (kt) Judge 

Fischer set bail at $40,000. (kt ,I 24). 

Plaintiff could not post bail. (kt ,I 25). As a result, he was committed to the 

Pike County Correctional Facility ("Pike CCF"). (kt ,I 21 ). Plaintiff spent three 

days at the facility. (kt ,I 27). On May 26, 2021 , a Pike CCF employee told 

plaintiff to gather his belongings without further explanation. (kt ,I 28). 

Authorities released plaintiff and gave him transportation to a train station where 

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he was provided with funds to go to his son's home in New Jersey. (kl ,r 29). 

Plaintiff avers that he was released from Pike CCF "because the personnel in 

charge of that facility determined that there was no basis for [plaintiff] being 

incarcerated." (Doc. 40, Am. Compl. , Prison Defs. ,r 34). 

Plaintiff also indicates that he had undergone open heart surgery in August 

2020. (kt ,r 6). During that surgery, plaintiff's ribs were wired together. (kt) He 

needed another surgery on May 8, 2021 , from the constant pain in his ribs. (kl ,r 

7). During the second surgery, plaintiff had metal plates placed in his chest and 

a drainage tube attached at the bottom of his chest. (kl ,r 8). Another procedure 

was scheduled to remove the tube the day after plaintiff's arrest, which could not 

occur due to his incarceration. (kl ,r,r 9, 36) 

The day after plaintiff's release from Pike CCF, he suffered severe pain and 

went to an emergency room. (kl ,r 36). As a result, plaintiff received an 

operation related to an infection. (kl ,r 35, 42). He further contends that the 

infection occurred because he could not attend the scheduled medical 

procedure. (kl ,r,r 9, 35-36). He spent approximately ten (10) days in the 

hospital and still requires treatment relative to that infection. (kl ,r 37). 

Based on the above allegations, plaintiff asserts one cause of action 

against the PSP Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") for 

alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. This claim is premised on a 

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failure to train state troopers regarding investigation into alleged violations of PFA 

orders. (Doc. 39, Am. Campi. , PSP Defs. ,m 36-46, 50-55). Plaintiff also 

asserts two causes of action against the Prison Defendants: Amended Count I -

a claim against Pike County pursuant to Section 1983 for alleged Fourth and 

Fourteenth Amendment violations; and Amended Count II - a state law claim for 

false imprisonment against Warden Lowe. (Doc. 39, Am. Campi., Prison Defs. 

,m 45-57). 

Defendants responded to the amended complaint with the instant motions 

to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The parties have briefed their respective 

positions, which brings this case to its present posture. 2 

2 In July 2024, the court granted the PSP Defendants' motion to dismiss/motion for summary 

judgment. Chalhoub v. Pa., No. 3:23CV592, 2024 WL 329648 (M.D. Pa. July 3, 2024). The 

court granted summary judgment in favor of Trooper Olszar on plaintiffs Section 1983 claim 

after determining that Trooper Olszar enjoyed qualified immunity from that claim. (&) 

Plaintiff also previously asserted a false imprisonment claim against Trooper Olszar. He has 

not raised that claim in the amended complaint. Under the law, "the most recently filed 

amended complaint becomes the operative pleading[]" in a civil action. Garrett v. Wexford 

Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019). Moreover, "an amended pleading supersedes the 

original pleading and renders the original pleading a nullity." & The filing of amended 

complaints thus effectively constitutes an abandonment of any prior complaints filed by a 

plaintiff. Kreis v. Northampton Cnty. Prison, 564 F. Supp. 3d 359, 361 (E.D. Pa. 2021 )(citation 

omitted). Consequently, the court concludes that plaintiff has abandoned his state law false 

imprisonment claim against Trooper Olszar. 

Furthermore, the court previously granted in part and denied in part the Prison Defendants' 

motion to dismiss. Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim against Warden Lowe was dismissed with 

prejudice for failure to allege personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations. 

Chalhoub v. Pa., No. 3:23CV592, 2024 WL 3295597, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 3, 2024). Moreover, 

the court determined that amendment of the Section 1983 claim against Warden Lowe would 

be futile based on his assertion of qualified immunity. & at *6-*7. In their initial motion to 

dismiss, Prison Defendants did not move to dismiss the state law false imprisonment claim 

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Jurisdiction 

Because this case is brought pursuant to Section 1983, the court has 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . ("The district courts shall have original 

jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 

the United States."). The court has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's statelaw false imprisonment claim against Warden Lowe pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1367(a). ("In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, 

the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that 

are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they 

form part of the same case or controversy under Article Ill of the United States 

Constitution."). 

Legal Standard 

Defendants filed the instant motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b )(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. The court tests the sufficiency of the complaint's allegations when 

considering a Rule 12(b )(6) motion. 

brought against Pike County in Count II of plaintiffs original complaint. Plaintiff, however, did 

not assert that claim against Pike County in his amended complaint. Consequently, the court 

concludes that plaintiff has also abandoned his state law false imprisonment cause of action 

against Pike County. 

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To survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must provide "a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Doe v. 

Princeton Univ. , 30 F.4th 335, 341-42 (3d Cir. 2022)(quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 

8(a)(2)). That means, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. 

l.9t@, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when factual content is pied that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 

the misconduct alleged. 19..: (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "Threadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice."~ (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts accept all 

factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the 

complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 

( citations omitted). 

Analysis 

1. PSP Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff asserts a Section 1983 claim against the PSP Defendants for 

violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. Colonel Evanchick is sued in his 

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official capacity as state police commissioner. (Doc. 39 at ,i 4 ). Because 

plaintiff's claims are asserted against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and a 

state employee sued in his official capacity, the PSP Defendants argue that 

plaintiff's claims are barred by sovereign immunity. The court agrees. 

The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United 

States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced 

or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by 

Citizens or subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Eleventh 

Amendment protections also extend to state agencies and officials of those 

agencies in their official capacities. See Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of N.J. , 588 F.3d 

180, 185 (3d Cir. 2009); Melo v. Hafer, 912 F .2d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1990). The 

Pennsylvania State Police and its employees, to the extent that they are sued in 

their official capacity, enjoy Eleventh Amendment protections. See Atkin v. 

Johnson, 432 F. App'x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State 

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). 

This immunity is not absolute. Three exceptions to sovereign immunity 

exist: (1) abrogation by an act of Congress; (2) waiver by state consent to suit; 

and (3) suits against individual state officials for prospective relief to remedy an 

ongoing violation. M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist., 344 F.3d 335, 

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344-45 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing MCI Telecomm Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 

503 (3d Cir. 2001 )). 

After review, plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims do not fit within these 

exceptions. Congress has not abrogated states' sovereign immunity by enacting 

Section 1983 and neither states nor employees acting in their official capacities 

are recognized as "persons" under that statute. See Will 491 U.S. at 66, 71. The 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has also expressly invoked its sovereign 

immunity under the Eleventh Amendment by statute. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 

8521 (b ). Additionally, plaintiff's amended complaint cannot be construed to seek 

prospective relief to remedy ongoing violations by the individual defendants since 

plaintiff seeks money damages for past alleged wrongs. (Doc. 39, Am. Com pl. , 

PSP Defs., ad damnum clause). As such , the court finds that the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Colonel Evanchick are entitled to sovereign 

immunity protection under the Eleventh Amendment and the amended complaint 

will be dismissed as to the PSP Defendants without leave to amend. 3 

3 Before dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a 

court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. 

See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245 (citing Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp. , 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d 

Cir. 2002)). Having determined that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Colonel 

Evanchick are immune based on the Eleventh Amendment, leave to amend would be futile. 

The court need not reach the other two arguments raised by the PSP Defendants in support of 

Colonel Evanchick's dismissal. 

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2. Prison Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 

Turning next to plaintiff's claims against the Prison Defendants, the 

amended complaint contains the following factual allegations specific to Pike 

County and Warden Lowe: 

• Pike County controls and operates Pike CCF "and is responsible for 

the orderly and legal operation of same, including ensuring that 

inmates are properly housed therein." (Doc. 40, Am. Compl. , Prison 

Defs. 114 ). 

• Warden Lowe "was responsible for overseeing the day-to-day 

operations" of Pike CCF, including the training and supervision of its 

prison guards. (!ft 115). 

• At the time of plaintiff's commitment to Pike CCF, plaintiff protested 

that he had not violated an outstanding PFA order and that no such 

order existed. (~ 1122). 

• Plaintiff's protestations were rejected by Warden Lowe, "who 

commanded the prison staff that the [p]laintiff should remain 

incarcerated, notwithstanding whether he violated an outstanding [PFA 

order] or not." (~ 1124 ). 

• The incarceration of the plaintiff was not based on a mistake; rather, it 

was the result of a decision by Warden Lowe. "who did not care if there 

was a legal basis for such incarceration[.]" (!ft 111127, 29). 

• Plaintiff was unlawfully detained at Pike CCF for three days. (!ft 1129). 

• On the third day, an unknown Pike CCF employee told plaintiff to 

gather up his belongings to leave the facility. (!ft 1129). 

• Plaintiff believes he was released from Pike CCF because "the 

personnel in charge of that facility determined there was no basis for 

the [plaintiff] being incarcerated" and that plaintiff "had been 

intentionally incarcerated in violation of his rights[.]" (~ 1134 ). 

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Plaintiff claims the above facts support a theory that Pike County violated 

his Fourth Amendment rights. 4 (l!t 1l1l 45-51 ). Plaintiff also uses these facts to 

support his state law false imprisonment claim against Warden Lowe. (l!t 1l1l 52-

55). Prison Defendants argue that the amended complaint again fails to state 

plausible claims. 

a. Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claim Against Pike County 

Plaintiff asserts that Pike County violated his Fourth Amendment rights and 

thus he proceeds with a Section 1983 claim for false imprisonment and unlawful 

detention. His theory of liability is premised upon the conduct of Warden Lowe 

and prison staff. A local government, however, may not be sued under Section 

1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Monell v. Dep't of 

Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Rather, liability 

extends when injuries are inflicted by "execution of a government's policy or 

custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may 

fairly be said to represent official policy[.]" .tsL "[A] municipality cannot be held 

4 Plaintiff's amended complaint asserts that Pike County also violated plaintiff's Fourteenth 

Amendment rights. The Prison Defendants moved to dismiss any Fourteenth Amendment 

claims asserted against Pike County in the amended complaint. (Doc. 47, Defs. Br. in Supp. at 

ECF p. 9-10). In response, plaintiff indicated that "inclusion of the Fourteenth Amendment in 

the claim against Pike County should simply be disregarded[.]" (Doc. 48, Pl. Br. in Opp. at 1, n. 

1 ). Accordingly, plaintiff's Section 1983 claim relative to alleged Fourteenth Amendment 

violations will be dismissed without additional discussion. 

1 1 

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liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." kl at 691. Furthermore, 

"proof of the mere existence of an unlawful policy or custom is not enough to 

maintain a § 1983 action." Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 

1990). A plaintiff must also demonstrate that the municipal practice was the 

proximate cause of the injuries suffered, which requires "a 'plausible nexus' or 

'affirmative link' between the municipality's custom and the specific deprivation of 

constitutional rights at issue." See kt (citations omitted). 

The court previously reviewed the principles of Pennsylvania law and 

criminal procedure involved in plaintiff's arrest and detention while discussing the 

serious deficiencies with plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against the Prison 

Defendants as originally alleged. Chalhoub, 2024 WL 3295597, *4-*7. Plaintiff 

responded with substantially similar allegations in his amended pleading. His 

new allegations only indicate that Warden Lowe was directly involved in the 

circumstances relative to plaintiff's incarceration at Pike CCF. (kl ,m 24, 27, 29). 

Additionally, plaintiff also now alleges that Warden Lowe possessed final 

policymaking authority at Pike CCF to decide whether plaintiff should remain 

incarcerated. (kl ,m 26-27). 

Nevertheless, the causation issues present in the original complaint 

remain. In an attempt to circumvent the issue, plaintiff asserts in his amended 

complaint that Magisterial District Court Judge Fischer "did not determine that 

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there was probable cause to arrest the [p]laintiff." (Doc. 39, Am. Campi., PSP 

Defs. ,I 14). At the same time, however, plaintiff has attached the police criminal 

complaint that indicates that Magisterial District Court Judge Fischer issued an 

arrest warrant. 5 (Doc. 40, Am. Campi. Prison Defs. , Exh. A., Police Crim. Campi., 

ECF p. 28). This means the state magistrate judge determined that there was 

probable cause for plaintiff's arrest. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 513(8)(2) ("No arrest 

warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by one or more affidavits 

sworn to before the issuing authority in person or using advanced communication 

technology. The issuing authority, in determining whether probable cause has 

been established, may not consider any evidence outside the affidavits."). 

Furthermore, per plaintiff's own allegations, Magisterial District Court Judge 

Fischer also determined that plaintiff should be committed to Pike CCF when he 

could not post the bail in the amount that she set. Although he has pied that no 

such PFA order was in effect and that Trooper Olszar lied about the order, 

plaintiff still has not cited any legal principle requiring wardens of county prisons 

to second-guess or override determinations made by judges as to whether a 

5 Even where an arrest warrant is not issued in the scenario plaintiff describes, a finding of 

probable cause must be made by a state magistrate judge. The Pennsylvania Rules of 

Criminal Procedure provide, in relevant part, that: "If the defendant was arrested without a 

warrant. .. unless the issuing authority makes a determination of probable cause, the defendant 

shall not be detained." PA. R. CRIM. P. 540(E). 

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person should be committed to prison in lieu of bail. For the second time, his 

Section 1983 claim against Pike County falls short. 

And even with amendment regarding the knowledge and authority of 

Warden Lowe and other Pike CCF staff, plaintiff's claim against Pike County is 

still self-defeating. Plaintiff has pied that he was released because "personnel in 

charge of [Pike CCF] determined there was no basis for the plaintiff being 

incarcerated; rather, that he had been intentionally incarcerated in violation of his 

rights, which should have been clear at the time of [p]laintiff's incarceration." 

(Doc. 40, Am. Com pl. , Prison Defs. ,I 34 ). But he has still offered no other facts 

about why it would be clear to the Prison Defendants at the time of his 

incarceration other than his word versus the determinations of Judge Fischer at 

the time of plaintiff's preliminary arraignment. Even when reading the allegations 

in the amended complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiff, he stopped being 

detained by Pike County when government officials determined there was a lack 

of probable cause for the PFA contempt charges. 

He has thus failed to state a plausible Section 1983 claim against Pike 

County. Rather, he has alleged a scenario where Pike County either did not 

cause the injuries he suffered or is immune from claims because its prison took 

custody of plaintiff based on a state magistrate judge's order. See Hamilton v. 

Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 783 (3d Cir. 2003)("action taken pursuant to a facially valid 

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court order receives absolute immunity from § 1983 lawsuits for damages"); 

Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 1969)("there exists an equally 

well-grounded principle that any public official acting pursuant to court directive is 

also immune from suit."); see also LeBeau v. Montgomery, No. CV 17-38, 2017 

WL 5885673, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2017)(dismissing Section 1983 claims 

"because [the prison] had no duty to investigate prisoner complaints of illegal 

detention without an existing court order mandating the prisoner's release"); 

Evans v. Cmty. Educ. Centers, Inc. , No. CV 13-1 642, 2015 WL 5334237, at *2 & 

n. 9 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 11 , 2015)(citing Lutz v. Lavelle, 809 F.Supp. 323, 327 (M.D. 

Pa. 1991 )("only a court has authority to release individuals from prison"). 

Consequently, Pike County's motion to dismiss plaintiff's Section 1983 claim will 

be granted without further leave to amend. 6 

b. Plaintiff's False Imprisonment Claim Against Warden Lowe 

Count 11 of the amended complaint against the Prison Defendants alleges 

that Warden Lowe is liable for false imprisonment. Under Pennsylvania law, 

6 Before dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a 

court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. 

See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245 (citing Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d 

Cir. 2002)). The court gave plaintiff a second opportunity to plead a Section 1983 claim 

against Pike County after alerting him to deficiencies with his initial complaint. If sufficient facts 

were available for plaintiff to state a plausible Section 1983 claim around the fact that he was 

committed to Pike CCF by a state magistrate judge, those facts would have been included by 

now. Consequently, it would be futile to grant plaintiff leave to file a third complaint. 

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"[t]he elements of false imprisonment are (1) the detention of another person, 

and (2) the unlawfulness of such detention." Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 

289, 293 (1994 ). 

Previously, the court granted plaintiff leave to amend his false 

imprisonment claim against Warden Lowe. Under the circumstances originally 

alleged, it was not out of the realm of possibility that plaintiff might have some 

more details to aver concerning the three days he spent at Pike CCF when he 

was in contact with prison staff. The court could not rule out whether such facts 

could support a plausible false imprisonment claim as authorities came to realize 

that no active PFA order justified the contempt charges. 

No new relevant facts appear in the amended complaint, however. Plaintiff 

still alleges that "personnel in charge," i.e., Warden Lowe, released him when it 

was determined that there was no basis for his incarceration. (Doc. 40, Am. 

Com pl. , Prison Defs. ,I 34 ). Thus, the analysis above regarding plaintiff's Section 

1983 claim against Pike County applies to his state law false imprisonment claim 

against Warden Lowe. At best, plaintiff only alleges that he was committed to 

Pike CCF based on a court order by a state magistrate judge after a finding of 

probable cause for the PFA contempt charge and he was released when it was 

determined that probable cause was lacking. Accordingly, the Prison 

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Defendants' motion to dismiss the false imprisonment claim against Warden 

Lowe will be granted without leave to amend. 7 

Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, the Prison Defendants' motion to dismiss 

(Doc. 41) and PSP Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 42) will be granted 

without further leave to amend. The Clerk of Court will be directed to close this 

case. An appropriate order follows. 

7 For similar reasons as stated in Footnote 6, amendment of plaintiff's false imprisonment claim 

would be futile. The court need not reach defendants' other argument that Warden Lowe is 

immune from suit pursuant to Pennsylvania's Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 PA. 

CONS. STAT. §§ 8541 -8542. Additionally, plaintiff did not pursue a false imprisonment claim 

against Pike County in his amended complaint as originally asserted . If he did, that cause of 

action would also be dismissed on similar grounds. 

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