UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOEL SNIDER, : CIVIL NO: 4:13-CV-01226

 :

Plaintiff, : 

 : (Judge Brann)

v. : 

 : (Magistrate Judge Schwab)

WARDEN JACQUELINE MOTTER, :

 :

et al., :

 :

Defendants. :

 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil action, proceeding via a second amended 

complaint, plaintiff Joel Snider (“Snider”), currently an inmate at SCI-Greene, 

raises claims against Clinton County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”). Snider 

claims that the defendants violated his rights guaranteed by the Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and also alleges that 

CCCF violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Currently before 

this Court are two motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. Based on the reasons set forth below, we recommend 

that the motions to dismiss be denied at this stage of the proceedings. 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 1 of 26
2

I. Facts and Procedural History.

This action was initiated on May 6, 2013, when Snider filed his initial

complaint, which named over sixty defendants. Then, on October 23, 2014, Snider 

filed an amended complaint against all of the defendants named in the first 

complaint. Finally, on December 19, 2015, Snider’s counsel filed a second 

amended complaint (doc. 222) which dropped many of the defendants named in his 

original complaint, and identified the following as defendants: (1) Warden 

Jacqueline Motter (“Warden Motter”); (2) Lieutenant Smith (“Smith”); 

(3) Correctional Officer Nolte (“Nolte”); (4) Correctional Officer Shearer

(“Shearer”); (5) Correctional Officer Goshorn (“Goshorn”); (6) Correctional 

Officer Grimes (“Grimes”); (7) Correctional Officer Gray (“Gray”); 

(8) Correctional Officer Walker (“Walker”); (9) Correctional Officer Hughes

(“Hughes”); (10) Correctional Officer Richards (“Richards”); (11) Nurse Rupert; 

(12) Nurse Andrus; and (13) CCCF. According to Snider, at all times relevant to 

the second amended complaint, the twelve individuals named as defendants were 

all employed by the thirteenth defendant, CCCF. Doc. 222 at ¶¶ 6-17. 

Per his second amended complaint, Snider was incarcerated at CCCF as a 

pretrial detainee from December 6, 2012, until May 7, 2013. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 19. 

Snider suffers from mental illness, depression, and chronic paranoid schizophrenia, 

all which have an adverse impact on multiple aspects of his daily life, and he 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 2 of 26
3

struggled with this mental illness throughout his incarceration at CCCF. Id. at ¶¶ 

20-21. Snider alleges that even though employees and administrators at CCCF 

were aware of his mental illness, they failed to take this into consideration when 

determining the amount of force to be utilized, failed to provide him with any 

accommodations with respect to the disciplinary process, and subjected him to 

ongoing retaliation and harassment related to both his mental illness and his 

religion. Id. at ¶¶ 22, 25-27. 

The series of events of which Snider complains began in February 2013. On 

February 28, 2013, thirteen days after Snider’s psychiatrist had increased his 

medication to combat the symptoms of his mental illness, Nolte entered into 

Snider’s cell while he was sleeping, awakened him, and yelled multiple 

“confusing” orders at him. Id. at ¶¶ 28-30. Later that day, Snider went to Smith’s 

office to complain that Nolte, Richards, and Shearer had stolen his religious 

materials and to complain of Nolte’s harassment from earlier that morning. Smith 

“laughingly” told Snider that he would “take care of it” and ordered him back to 

his block. Id. at ¶¶ 32-33. Shortly thereafter, Snider was called back to Smith’s 

office where he was presented with a misconduct written by Nolte for “refusing to 

obey all orders,” even though Snider alleges that he attempted to comport with 

Nolte’s earlier confusing orders to the best of his ability. Id. at ¶¶ 31, 34. 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 3 of 26
4

As punishment for the misconduct, Hughes, Richards, and Walker shackled 

Snider’s legs and arms behind his back in an “excessively tight manner” causing 

“extreme pain,” and they began to escort Snider to the L unit or “hole.” Id. at ¶¶ 

35-37. While transporting Snider down the hall, Hughes, Richards, and Walker 

moved and pushed Snider down the hall faster than he was able to walk, despite 

the fact that Snider informed them that the shackles were painfully cutting into his 

ankles; this ultimately caused Snider to fall. Id. at ¶¶ 38-40. After Snider fell, 

Hughes, Richards, and Walker “tackled” him, pulled on him by his handcuffs and 

shackles, and dragged him down the hall and stairs into a cell. Id. at ¶¶ 41-43. As 

a result of this incident, Snider alleges he suffered from painful and swollen wrists; 

numb thumbs; pain in his neck, ankles, and shoulders; and increased anxiety. Id. at 

¶ 44, 46. Despite describing many of his injuries to Nurse Rupert, she refused to 

provide Snider with any treatment, prompting him to later file a grievance against 

her on March 1, 2013. Id. at ¶¶ 44-45, 47. Three days after filing the grievance 

against Nurse Rupert, Snider was evaluated by another nurse, Nurse McGill, who 

evaluated him and prescribed Tylenol and ice for his injuries. Id. at ¶¶ 48-49.

On April 5, 2013, Snider visited with his psychiatrist, Dr. Calvert, who 

documented that Snider had been continuously hearing voices; suffering from 

hallucinations; and experiencing depersonalization, derealization, and symptoms of 

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Id. at ¶¶ 50-51. In addition to the medications 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 4 of 26
5

Snider was already taking, Dr. Calvert prescribed Risperdal, a powerful antipsychotic. Id. at ¶ 52. Later that evening, Shearer allegedly gave Snider a 

misconduct for failing to wear his nametag. Id. at ¶ 53. Shearer then entered 

Snider’s cell, yelled at him, and then left the cell taking Snider’s religious book of 

Hindu scripture with him. Id. at ¶¶ 54-55. In response, Snider then struck the door 

of the cell with his hand, prompting Shearer to issue Snider additional 

misconducts. Id. at ¶¶ 56-59. 

After Shearer issued such misconducts, unspecified corrections officers 

attempted to again transfer Snider to the L block, but Snider refused such transfer. 

Id. at ¶¶ 60-61. Snider repeatedly requested that the corrections officers summon 

Deputy Warden Bechtel, who allegedly acted frequently as a mediator on behalf of 

inmates experiencing difficulties with other corrections officers. Id. at ¶¶ 62-63. 

The corrections officers continued to yell at Snider as he sat back down in his cell 

and “began meditating to stay calm.” Id. at ¶ 64. Ultimately, a “cell extraction 

team” consisting of Smith, Nolte, Goshorn, Gray, Shearer, Grimes, and 

Corrections Officer Edgar was summoned to Snider’s cell. Id. at ¶ 65. Smith 

knocked on the cell door and ordered Snider to come to the door to be handcuffed, 

but Snider refused to do so, verbally expressing a fear that some of the corrections 

officers would steal his property. Id. at ¶¶ 67-69. In response, Smith opened 

Snider’s cell door, sprayed him directly in the face with pepper spray, and then 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 5 of 26
6

closed the door. Id. at ¶ 71-72. Snider remained seated in the back of his cell 

where he repeatedly yelled out in pain and repeatedly exclaimed, “Jesus.” Id. at 

¶¶ 73, 75. Subsequently, Smith opened the cell door once more and again sprayed 

Snider in the face with pepper spray. Id. at ¶ 76. In response, Snider “continued 

pleading to Jesus and begging the correctional officers to stop stealing his things.” 

Id. at ¶ 78. 

After Snider was sprayed with pepper spray the second time, the extraction 

team entered his cell, piled on top of him, and held his arms and legs down. Id. at 

¶ 80. Even though Snider was allegedly not resisting, some members of the 

extraction team punched and kneed him in the face and struck his head on the floor 

repeatedly. Id. at ¶ 81. Extraction-team members then dragged and lifted Snider 

into the air by his leg and wrist shackles, causing him to “call[] out to Jesus” and 

cry out in pain so severe that he thought his wrists had been broken. Id. at ¶¶ 83-

86. Although extraction-team members ordered Snider to “start walking,” Snider 

expressed that he was unable to see or keep his footing because his eyes were 

swollen from the pepper spray; thus, the extraction-team members again lifted him 

into the air to carry him to the L block. Id. at ¶¶ 87-90. Snider alleges that all the 

while he “continued to pray to Jesus” and did not fight or resist, despite being in 

severe pain and being choked at one point by the collar of his prison jumpsuit. Id. 

at ¶¶ 91-95. 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 6 of 26
7

When Snider and the extraction-team members arrived at a “shower cell,” 

Smith ordered Snider to remove his clothes, but Snider was in too much pain to 

comply. Id. at ¶¶ 96-97. Consequently, members of the extraction team undressed 

him and performed a strip search. Id. at ¶ 97. Then, Snider was placed into a 

shower, and even though CCCF staff was allegedly aware that a special solution 

was needed to neutralize and ameliorate the irritating effects of pepper spray and 

that water alone worsens the effects of pepper spray, he was not provided any soap 

or solution to wash off the pepper spray. Id. at ¶¶ 98-101. Thus, when Snider 

turned on the water, this caused the residue of the pepper spray to be reactivated 

and to run deeper into his eyes and down the rest of his body, including his genitals 

and anus. Id. at ¶ 102. As such, the pain and irritating effects from the pepper 

spray were exacerbated, and throughout the rest of the day and night, Snider’s pain 

was so severe that it caused him to shake, made it difficult to open his eyes or sit 

down, and prevented him from sleeping because his skin continuously felt like it 

was on fire. Id. at ¶¶ 103, 108-09. Additionally, as a result of the incidents that 

had occurred earlier that day, Snider sustained a swollen and blackened left eye; a 

swollen and cut nose; a cut ear; a large knot on his forehead; and swelling and 

redness of his ankles, wrists, and left arm. Id. at ¶ 104. Snider alleges that despite 

being aware of these injuries, Nurses Andrus and Rupert refused to treat him. Id. 

at ¶¶ 105-06. 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 7 of 26
8

The next day, April 6, 2013, Smith returned to Snider’s cell and laughingly 

commented on the intensity of the pepper spray used on Snider and the fact that 

Snider had not yet been allowed a “full shower.” Id. at ¶¶ 111-12. Smith then 

permitted Snider to exit his cell and take a shower with soap, which alleviated the 

burning of the pepper spray on Snider’s skin. Id. at ¶ 113. Subsequently, Goshorn 

and Shearer allegedly discussed the April 5, 2013, incidents with multiple inmates 

and told them that excessive force had been used on Snider because he “didn’t 

fight back.” Id. at ¶ 114. During these discussions with the inmates, Shearer also 

allegedly ridiculed Snider’s religion and made fun of him for repeatedly “calling 

out to Jesus” while he was being sprayed with the pepper spray. Id. at ¶ 115. On 

April 23, 2013, Snider still suffered from neck, wrist, and hand pain as well as 

numbness in this thumbs from the April 5 incident, and Nurse Edwards prescribed

him ibuprofen and analgesic cream for these injuries. Id. at ¶¶ 118-19. 

On May 7, 2013, Snider was transferred to SCI-Coal Township, where he 

was placed in solitary confinement with little access to the law library. Id. at 

¶ 120. On June 6, 2013, Snider attempted suicide by hanging himself in his cell. 

Id. at ¶ 121. After the suicide attempt, Snider was resuscitated, hospitalized, and 

spent a number of months in a mental health facility. Id. at ¶¶ 122. Snider is 

currently an inmate at SCI-Greene, where he has been housed since October 2014. 

See doc. 56. 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 8 of 26
9

In his second amended complaint, Snider raises five causes of actions 

against CCCF and various CCCF employees. Count I of the second amended 

complaint, which is raised against Hughes, Richards, and Walker, alleges use of 

excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in connection with the 

events which occurred at CCCF on February 28, 2013. Count II, which is raised 

against Smith, Nolte, Shearer, Goshorn, Grimes, and Gray, alleges excessive force 

in connection with the events that occurred at CCCF on April 5, 2013. Count III 

raises an excessive force claim against Warden Motter, alleging that she “enforced 

a policy or practice allowing the use of objectively unreasonable force in cell 

extractions against inmates with serious mental illness.” Count IV raises Eighth 

Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claims against Nurses Andrus and 

Rupert, alleging that these two nurses were deliberately indifferent to Snider’s

medical needs. Finally, Count V alleges that CCCF violated the ADA by 

discriminating against Snider and failing to provide him with reasonable 

accommodations for his serious mental illness. Snider seeks a declaratory 

judgment that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. He also seeks 

compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs.

On January 4, 2016, Nurses Andrus and Rupert filed a motion (doc. 224) to 

dismiss Snider’s second amended complaint for failure to state a claim. Then, on 

January 11, 2016, CCCF also filed a motion (doc. 226) to dismiss the second 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 9 of 26
10

amended complaint for failure to state a claim. This Court now considers these 

two motions. 

II. Discussion.

A. Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim – Standard of 

Review.

All defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are brought 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6) 

authorizes dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted.” Under Rule 12(b)(6), we must “accept all factual allegations as 

true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and 

determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff 

may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 

2009) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)). 

While a complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim,” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and detailed factual allegations are not required, Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a complaint must plead “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “The 

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more 

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[L]abels and 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 10 of 26
11

conclusions” are not enough, and a court is “‘not bound to accept as true a legal 

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoted 

case omitted).

In resolving a motion to dismiss, we thus “conduct a two-part analysis.” 

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. First, we separate the factual elements from the legal 

elements and disregard the legal conclusions. Id. at 210–11. Second, we 

“determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that 

the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Id. at 211 (quoted case omitted). 

While traditionally focused upon the allegations contained in a complaint, a court 

may also consider exhibits attached to a complaint, matters of public record, and 

“an undisputedly authentic document” relied upon by the plaintiff and attached as 

an exhibit to a defendant’s motion to dismiss. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. 

White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). 

B. Motion to Dismiss – Medical Defendants.

Snider alleges that Nurses Andrus and Rupert violated the Eighth 

Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause by refusing to treat him and, 

therefore, exhibiting deliberate indifference to the injuries he sustained at the hands 

of some of the other defendants on February 28, 2013 and April 5, 2013.

We note from the outset that according to Snider’s second amended 

complaint, he was a pretrial detainee at all times relevant to his factual allegations. 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 11 of 26
12

As a general rule, when considering a pretrial detainee’s complaint regarding 

prison conditions, an Eighth Amendment analysis is inappropriate for “determining 

if the conditions of confinement rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” 

Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir. 2010). Rather, when pre-trial 

detainees complain of a prison’s conditions, an analysis under the Fourteenth 

Amendment Due Process clause is more appropriate. See Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 

833 F.2d 468, 471 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Pretrial detainees are not within the ambit of 

the Eighth Amendment but are entitled to the protections of the Due Process 

Clause.”). Nonetheless, the courts “have found no reason to apply a different 

standard than the [Eighth Amendment] standard . . . when evaluating whether a 

claim for inadequate medical care by a pre-trial detainee is sufficient under the 

Fourteenth Amendment.” Sylvester v. City of Newark, 120 Fed.Appx. 419, 423 (3d 

Cir. 2005) (citing Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d 

Cir. 2003)). Thus, even though Snider was a pretrial detainee when all relevant 

events occurred, his claims against Nurses Andrus and Rupert shall be analyzed 

under the Eighth Amendment standard. 

In order for a plaintiff to establish an Eighth Amendment medical-care 

claim, he must establish that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to 

his serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); see also Groman 

v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Failure to provide 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 12 of 26
13

medical care to a person in custody can rise to the level of a constitutional violation 

under § 1983 only if that failure rises to the level of deliberate indifference to that 

person’s serious medical needs.”). Thus, “the standard enunciated in Estelle is 

two-pronged: ‘[i]t requires deliberate indifference on the part of the prison officials 

and it requires the prisoner’s medical needs to be serious.’” Monmouth Cnty. Corr. 

Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting West v. Keve, 

571 F.2d 158, 162 (3d Cir. 1978)). 

Deliberate indifference, the first prong of the Estelle test, is a subjective 

standard. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 840 (1994). “To act with 

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is to recklessly disregard a 

substantial risk of serious harm.” Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 

2009). To elaborate, the prison official must have known of the substantial risk of 

serious harm and must have disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable 

measures to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “[T]he official must both be aware 

of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id.

The Third Circuit has found deliberate indifference where a prison official: 

“(1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to 

provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; 

or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 13 of 26
14

treatment.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). The Third 

Circuit has also held that “[n]eedless suffering resulting from the denial of simple 

medical care, which does not serve any penological purpose, . . . violates the 

Eighth Amendment” and amounts to deliberate indifference. Atkinson v. Taylor,

316 F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir. 2003).

At the same time, it is also clear that the mere misdiagnosis of a condition or 

medical need, or negligent treatment provided for a condition, is not actionable as a 

constitutional claim because medical malpractice is not a constitutional violation. 

See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004); Singletary v. Pa. Dep't of 

Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 192 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2002) (claims of medical malpractice, absent 

evidence of a culpable state of mind, do not constitute deliberate indifference under 

the Eighth Amendment). Instead, deliberate indifference represents a much higher 

standard, one that requires “obduracy and wantonness, which has been likened to 

conduct that includes recklessness or a conscious disregard of a serious risk.” 

Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). 

“Indeed, prison authorities are accorded considerable latitude in the diagnosis and 

treatment of prisoners.” Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993) 

(citations omitted). Furthermore, if a plaintiff’s claims amount to a simple 

disagreement with medical officials as to the course of treatment, this does not 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 14 of 26
15

amount to deliberate indifference. See Douglas v. Hill, 1996 WL 716278, at *7 

(E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 1996) (citing Boring, 833 F.2d at 473). 

With respect to the second prong of the Estelle test, a prison official’s 

deliberate indifference constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation “only if it is 

directed toward a ‘serious medical need.’” Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 348. Generally, 

“a medical need is ‘serious’ . . . if it is ‘one that has been diagnosed by a physician 

as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily 

recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Id. at 347 (citation omitted). 

Additionally, a medical need may be considered “serious” by “reference to the 

effect of denying . . . treatment.” Id. Where denial or delay of medical care results 

in “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” or “causes an inmate to suffer a 

life-long handicap or permanent loss,” the medical condition is considered 

“serious.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Additionally, when a defendant fails 

to treat a plantiff at all, this Court has suggested that permanent injury or lasting 

effects need not be shown to qualify an injury as “serious;” rather, in assessing the 

“seriousness” of a plaintiff’s injury the nature of the injury sustained rather than its 

actual lasting effects may be considered. See Freeman v. Frimpong, 2007 WL 

570160, at *6 n.6 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2007) (“[F]ocusing on the outcome of a 

refusal to treat a serious illness rather than on the nature of the illness when a 

defendant chose not to treat it would allow defendants with the good fortune not to 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 15 of 26
16

cause permanent injuries to violate prisoner’s constitutional rights without being 

held accountable.”).

1. Non-Pepper-Spray Injuries.

Snider alleges that he sustained a multitude of physical injuries following 

both incidents of alleged excessive force recounted in his complaint. As a result of 

the February 28, 2013, incident, he suffered from painful and swollen wrists; numb 

thumbs; and pain in his neck, ankles, and shoulder. As a result of the April 5, 

2013, incident, Snider alleges he sustained a swollen and blackened left eye; a 

swollen and cut nose; a cut ear; a large knot on his forehead; and swelling and 

redness of his ankles, wrists, and left arm. Snider alleges that despite being aware 

of these injuries, Nurses Andrus and Rupert refused to treat him following these 

incidents. Thus, given the alleged complete refusal to treat Snider, it cannot be 

said at this point that Snider is merely disagreeing with the treatment provided or 

that he is alleging negligence in the treatment provided with respect to these 

injuries. Indeed, courts recognize that when knowledge of a need for medical care 

is accompanied by an intentional refusal to provide that care, this amounts to 

deliberate indifference. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235; see also Kennedy v. S.C.I 

Rockview Employees and Medical Employees, 2010 WL 4853959, at *4 (M.D. Pa. 

Nov. 22, 2010) (“Although ‘mere disagreement’ with treatment protocol does not 

support an Eighth Amendment claim, liability attaches when officials . . . withhold

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 16 of 26
17

treatment in deliberate indifference to medical needs.”) (emphasis added) (citation 

omitted). 

Even if their complete refusal to deny medical treatment does amount to 

deliberate indifference, Nurses Andrus and Rupert argue that Snider’s non-pepper 

spray injuries were merely “minor cuts, bumps, bruises, and swelling,” and that he 

has “not alleged any ongoing symptoms, physical limitations, disability, [or] 

permanent loss . . . .” Doc. 225 at 9. Thus, Andrus and Rupert contend that these 

injuries were not sufficiently “serious” to satisfy the second prong of the Estelle 

test. As alluded to before, however, when a plaintiff alleges a complete denial of 

medical treatment, it may be more appropriate for a court to look at the nature of 

an injury rather than the existence of the fact of permanent loss. Additionally, it 

should be noted that serious medical needs “range from those which if left 

untreated would produce ‘physical torture or lingering death’ to less serious cases

causing ‘pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological 

purpose.’” Winslow v. Prison Health Servs., 2008 WL 4722505, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 

Oct. 23, 2008) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105). Thus, just because Snider’s nonpepper-spray injuries did not pose a threat of imminent death, torture, or permanent 

injuries does not automatically warrant a conclusion that the injuries were not 

serious. 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 17 of 26
18

Snider further alleges that during both the February 28 and April 5, 2013, 

incidents between him and the officers, the officers pulled on his cuffs and 

shackles with such force that it caused him severe pain, pain so severe that he 

believed at one point his wrists had been broken. And at least following the 

February 28 incident, Snider alleges that subsequent to Rupert’s refusal to provide 

him with any treatment for his injuries, he endured suffering from painful wrists; 

numb thumbs; and pain in his neck, ankles, and shoulders. Following the April 5 

incident, Snider alleges that he suffered from a swollen and blackened left eye; a 

swollen and cut nose; a cut ear; a large knot on the forehead; and swelling of the 

wrists, ankles, and left arm—all which Rupert and Andrus refused to treat. Thus,

based on these allegations, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that the 

complete refusal to treat him resulted in unnecessary pain and suffering that did not

serve any penological interest, and at this early stage of the case, that is enough for 

Snider to survive a motion to dismiss. 

2. Pepper-Spray Injuries 

Snider also complains that Nurses Andrus and Rupert were aware of the pain 

he endured due to the pepper spray and that they failed to provide any treatment for 

his suffering. Nurses Andrus and Rupert argue that Snider was afforded the 

opportunity to take a shower after he was sprayed with the pepper spray, that this 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 18 of 26
19

constituted a “treatment,” and that Snider’s dissatisfaction with the shower 

amounts to nothing more than a disagreement with the treatment that he was 

provided, which cannot amount to deliberate indifference. From our reading of 

Snider’s second amended complaint, however, it does not appear that Andrus and 

Rupert were the individuals that provided Snider with the opportunity to take a 

shower. Snider’s allegations suggest that it was the extraction team of corrections 

officers that placed Snider in the shower without any soap or solution on April 5,

2013, and when Snider was afforded the opportunity to take a second shower with 

soap the next morning, it was Smith who gave him permission to do so, rather than 

any nurse. Consequently, even if the showers were proper “treatments” with 

which Snider merely disagreed, Andrus and Rupert seemingly were not the 

individuals to direct or permit Snider to take these “treatments,” and thus, this 

would not preclude a finding of deliberate indifference on the part of Nurse Rupert 

and Andrus.

The pepper-spray injuries, as alleged, are sufficient to rise to the level of a 

“serious” injury, as required by the second prong of the Estelle test. After the 

April 5, 2013, shower that Snider had to take without any soap or solution to 

neutralize the pepper spray residue on his skin, the effects of the pepper spray were 

exacerbated and despite this, Andrus and Rupert allegedly refused to provide any 

treatment to alleviate this problem. As a result, Snider experienced pain so severe 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 19 of 26
20

that it caused him to shake and prevented him from sleeping the night of April 5, 

2013, because he felt as if his skin was on fire. It was not until the next morning 

that Smith gave Snider permission to take a second shower with soap to wash off 

the remaining pepper spray residue and relieve his pain. Thus, it would not be 

unreasonable to conclude that the refusal of Andrus and Rupert to treat Snider after 

his April 5 shower caused him wanton and unnecessary pain. Furthermore, 

exposure to pepper spray has been found to be a “serious” medical need, sufficient 

to support a medical deliberate indifference claim. See Passmore v. Iannello, 2013 

WL 625409, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2013) (finding a serious medical need after 

exposure to pepper spray because “a lay person can readily recognize that an 

individual exposed to pepper spray is in need of some medical assistance to 

alleviate the effects of the spray.”); Cummings v. Smith, 2013 WL 5377376, at *2 

(E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2013) (noting that “the failure to decontaminate prisoners or 

otherwise provide medical treatment for prisoners exposed to pepper spray can 

support a claim for the violation of the Eighth Amendment” when such failure 

causes further injury or unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain). 

Thus, we find that Snider has alleged facts sufficient to state a claim of 

deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment, and we recommend that the 

medical defendants’ motion to be dismiss be denied. 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 20 of 26
21

C. Motion to Dismiss – CCCF.

Count V of Snider’s second amended complaint alleges that CCCF violated 

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by discriminating against 

Snider, failing to provide him with reasonable accommodations for his disability, 

and causing him to be excluded from participation in programs and denied services 

of a public entity. Specifically, Snider alleges that even though employees and 

administrators at CCCF were aware of his mental illness, they failed to take this 

into consideration when determining the amount of force to be utilized, failed to 

provide him with any accommodations with respect to the disciplinary process, and 

subjected him to ongoing retaliation and harassment related to both his mental 

illness and his religion. CCCF argues that Snider’s second amended complaint 

fails to establish that CCCF violated Title II of the ADA and, in the alternative, 

argues that Snider has not filed his ADA claim against CCCF within the relevant 

statute of limitations. 

1. The Merits of Snider’s ADA Claim.

Title II of the ADA states in relevant part that “no qualified individual with a 

disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or 

be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or 

be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Thus, in 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 21 of 26
22

order to state a claim under § 12132, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he is a 

qualified individual; (2) he has a disability; (3) he was excluded from participation 

in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, 

or was subjected to discrimination by any such entity; and (4) the exclusion or 

discrimination suffered was by reason of his disability. Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate 

Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 553 n.32 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Herman v. Cnty. of 

York, 482 F.Supp.2d 554, 566 (M.D. Pa. 2007). The Third Circuit has noted that 

“enforcing regulations [with respect to enforcement of the ADA] require public 

entities to ‘make reasonable modifications’ to their programs and policies in order 

to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.” Matthews v. Pa. Dept. of Corr., 

613 Fed.Appx. 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)). County 

prisons, such as CCCF, fall within the definition of the term “public entity” under 

the ADA. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998) 

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (1)(B)).

CCCF does not dispute that Snider is a qualified individual with a disability. 

Instead, it contends that Snider fails to plead facts that would establish that his 

mental disability prevented him from hearing, understanding, or obeying 

corrections personnel’s orders upon which his misconducts were based. Per 

CCCF, Snider has not alleged that he was excluded from participation in or denied 

the benefits of CCCF’s services, programs, or activities because of his disability or 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 22 of 26
23

that he was otherwise discriminated against, and thus he has fails to state an ADA 

claim. 

CCCF’s assertions, however, gloss over Snider’s allegations. Snider does 

allege that his “mental illness affects nearly every aspect of his daily life, including 

his ability to care for himself and other major life activities such as sleeping, 

learning, concentrating, thinking and communicating.” Doc. 222 at ¶21. He 

further alleges, among other things, that throughout the relevant time period he 

heard voices, had hallucinations, and experienced depersonalization, derealization,

and symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Id. at ¶¶50, 51. 

CCCF also appears to misread Snider’s claim. Snider concedes that he was 

not treated differently from the other inmates. Rather, he argues that by simply 

treating him the same as other inmates without disabilities and failing to consider 

his disability with respect to the disciplinary process, CCCF in fact acted 

discriminatorily by failing to make accommodations. Snider argues that the 

actions for which CCCF officials disciplined him, such as failing to wear his name 

tag, hitting a door, and being disruptive, were manifestations of his mental illness. 

By issuing him misconducts for these manifestations and by punishing him in the 

same way other non-mentally ill inmates would have been punished, CCCF failed 

to accommodate his disability, and, thus, discriminated against him. 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 23 of 26
24

At this early stage of the litigation, we conclude that Snider has sufficiently 

alleged a claim for discrimination under the ADA. See Parms v. Pa. Dept. of 

Corr., 2015 WL 1326323 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2015) (denying motion to dismiss on 

the basis that plaintiff had adequately alleged discrimination on the part of prison 

officials where disciplinary sanctions were alleged to have resulted from inmate’s 

alleged disability). We note that Snider does not specifically state what type of 

accommodation he was seeking from CCCF. This, however, is not fatal to his 

ADA claim because “[a]lthough [Snider’s] complaint is not as rich with detail as 

some might prefer, it need only set forth sufficient facts to support plausible 

claims.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211-12. As long as a complaint “pleads how, when, 

and where [defendant] allegedly discriminated against [a disabled plaintiff],” this is 

“sufficient to give [a defendant] notice of the basis for [a disabled plaintiff’s]

claim.” Id. at 212. Moreover, a plaintiff need not prove all elements of a prima 

facie ADA case in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Rather, (s)he must allege 

only material facts that, “in addition to inferences drawn from those factual 

allegations, provide a basis for recovery.” Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem'l Med. 

Ctr., 154 F.3d 113, 124 (3d Cir.1998). Thus, Snider’s ADA claim should be 

allowed to proceed, and we recommend that CCCF’s motion to dismiss the ADA 

claim be denied. 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 24 of 26
25

2. CCCF’s Statute of Limitations Argument.

In its motion to dismiss, CCCF argues that Snider’s ADA claim should be 

dismissed because he did not file it within the applicable two-year statute of 

limitations. In response, Snider contends that a four-year statute of limitations 

should apply to his claim rather than a two-year statute of limitations; thus, Snyder 

argues that his claim was filed within the applicable statute of limitations, or, in the 

alternative, he argues that he was entitled to equitable tolling. Because CCCF 

never replied to Snider’s contentions pertaining to the appropritate statute of 

limitations and because this issue was not briefed, we deem CCCF’s statute of 

limitations argument to be abandoned and will not consider it at this stage of the 

proceedings. If CCCF wishes to brief this issue for consideration at a later date, it 

may do so. 

III. Recommendation.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, WE RECOMMEND that the 

medical defendants’ motion (doc. 224) to dismiss and CCCF’s motion (doc. 226) 

to dismiss both be DENIED.

The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, 

recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter 

described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a 

recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a 

habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 25 of 26
26

served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of 

court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written 

objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the 

proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection 

is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing 

requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge 

shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the 

report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to 

which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in 

whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the 

magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new 

hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, 

and may consider the record developed before the magistrate 

judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that 

record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall 

witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with 

instructions.

Failure to file timely objections to the foregoing Report and 

Recommendation may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. 

 Submitted this 2nd day of June 2016.

S/ Susan E. Schwab

Susan E. Schwab

United States Magistrate Judge

 

 

 

Case 4:13-cv-01226-MWB Document 236 Filed 06/02/16 Page 26 of 26