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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 

CLIFTON WILLIAMS, : 4:08-cv-1915 

 : 

 Plaintiff, : 

 v. : Hon. John E. Jones III 

 : 

JEFFREY BEARD, et al., : 

 : 

 Defendant. : 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

May 18, 2016

I. INTRODUCTION 

 This matter is before the Court following a bench trial on Plaintiff Clifton 

Williams’ (“Plaintiff” or “Williams”) claim pursuant to the Religious Land Use 

and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. The 

parties have filed post-trial proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; thus 

the matter is ripe for our determination. For the reasons that follow, we find in 

favor of the Plaintiff. 

II. FACTS 

 Plaintiff Williams is an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional 

Institution at Mahanoy (“SCI-Mahanoy”). Williams is, and has been for at least 20 

years, a follower of the Muslim faith. Williams’ religious faith requires that he 

engage in prayer five times each day (dawn, noon, afternoon, sunset and evening), 

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attend Jumu’ah prayer (congregational worship) every Friday afternoon, fast for 

Ramadan, and give to charity within his means. 

 All capable inmates at SCI-Mahanoy are required to initially work in food 

services for a minimum of three months, and receive at least a satisfactory rating 

on their progress review before being considered for other job assignments. The 

institution has a policy of prohibiting inmates from indulging in any prayers that 

involve rituals or displays while working in the kitchen, nor may an inmate 

working in the kitchen pray in a prone position. However, during the Muslim 

holiday of Ramadan, Muslim inmates working in the kitchen are provided a space 

in the preparation room in the kitchen to pray in a prone position. 

 On October 23, 2006, while assigned to work in the kitchen at SCIMahanoy, Plaintiff was found praying in an unauthorized area of the kitchen, 

specifically between a wall and a hot box in the diet room. Food Services staff 

member Cheryl Stanitis ordered Williams to stop praying, but Plaintiff refused and 

continued his prayer to completion. The next day, Plaintiff was charged with 

misconduct for refusing to obey an order and for presence in an unauthorized area. 

A misconduct hearing was held. Plaintiff pled guilty to the charges, explaining 

that the noon prayer was due, he had commenced prayer, and once a formal prayer 

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has commenced, it is generally continued until completion. As a result of his 

misconduct, Williams lost his Food Services Department job.1

 

 Thereafter, on October 17, 2008, Plaintiff filed this civil rights action, pro 

se, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 

Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. (Doc. 1). Williams 

alleged that the institutional policies, practices, and procedures of the Food 

Services Department at SCI-Mahanoy unfairly infringe upon his practice of Islam 

in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the terms of 

RLUIPA. On August 30, 2010 we issued a Memorandum and Order granting the 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on both of Plaintiff’s claims. (Docs. 

44 and 45). Williams appealed our ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Third Circuit. On February 22, 2012, the Third Circuit issued an opinion 

affirming our grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Free Exercise claim but 

vacating our grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims and 

 

1 In their post-hearing submission, the Defendants raise the affirmative defense of failure to 

exhaust administrative remedies for the first time in this 8-year litigation. (Docs. 182 and 

183). To be sure, failure to exhaust was not raised in the Defendants’ Answer (Doc. 15) or 

summary judgment motion papers. (Doc.30). Nor was failure to exhaust raised or mentioned 

anywhere within Defendants many recent pre-trial submissions. It is well-established that 

“[f]ailure to raise an affirmative defense by responsive pleading or by appropriate motion 

generally results in the waiver of that defense.” Charpentier v. Godsil, 937 F.2d 859, 863 (3d 

Cir. 1991). Thus, we find that the Defendants waived the affirmative defense of failure to 

exhaust. Further, even assuming arguendo the Defendants did not waive the defense of failure to 

exhaust, it is our view that Williams did in fact exhaust his administrative remedies. To be sure, 

Williams pursued his administrative remedies relevant to the misconduct report to every level of 

appeal. In our view, Williams administrative remedies have been exhausted. Moreover, we shall 

not consider the Defendants’ attempt to raise the defense of qualified immunity at this late stage 

of the litigation because they have waived the opportunity to do so. 

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remanding this claim to us for further proceedings. See Williams v. Klemm, 450 

Fed. App’x 191 (3d Cir. 2011). 

 On remand, pro bono counsel was obtained for Williams and settlement was 

explored by the parties, but a settlement could not be achieved.2

 Accordingly, on 

December 15, 2015, we conducted a 1-day bench trial on Plaintiff’s RLUIPA 

claim. The parties were ordered to file post-trial submissions, which have been 

received and reviewed by the Court. (Docs. 181, 182, 183, 184-1). For the reasons 

that follow, we find in favor of the Plaintiff on the RLUIPA claim. 

III. DISCUSSION 

 A. Relevant Law and Jurisprudence 

Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 

provides, in relevant part: 

No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a 

manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of 

a person including a religious assembly or institution, unless the 

government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that 

person, assembly or institution . . . (A) is in furtherance of a 

compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive 

means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). RLUIPA protects any exercise of religion, 

whether or not compelled or central to, a system of religious belief. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000cc-5(7)(A). 

 

2

 We take this opportunity to thank Plaintiff’s pro bono counsel for their exemplary work on his 

behalf. 

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 Courts employ a burden-shifting framework to determine the viability of a 

RLUIPA claim. To establish a prima facie RLUIPA violation, a plaintiff must 

show 1) that the relevant exercise of religion is grounded in a sincerely held 

religious belief; and 2) that the government policy substantially burdens the 

exercise of religion. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 (2005); 

Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 2007). The Third Circuit has held 

that: 

For the purposes of RLUIPA, a substantial burden exists where: 1) a 

follower is forced to choose between following the precepts of his 

religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to other 

inmates versus abandoning one of the precepts of his religion in order 

to receive a benefit; or 2) the government puts substantial pressure on 

an adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to violate his 

beliefs. 

Id. at 280. In short, if a plaintiff has to choose between not doing religious 

exercise or discipline if he does engage in religious exercise, then the policy likely 

substantially burdens religious exercise. To be sure, the inquiry is not whether the 

plaintiff is able to engage in other forms of religious exercise but rather whether 

the government has substantially burdened religious exercise. Holt v. Hobbs, __ 

U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015). 

 If the first two elements of the prima facie case are met by the plaintiff, then 

the burden shifts to the government to show that its refusal to permit a religious 

exercise was both 1) in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and 2) the 

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least restrictive means of furthering the government interest. See Washington, 497 

F.3d at 282. “The least-restrictive means standard is exceptionally demanding,” 

requiring the government to “sho[w] that it lacks other means of achieving its 

desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by 

the objecting part[y].” Holt, 135 S.Ct. at 864 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 

Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)). With this framework in 

mind, we turn to an analysis of Williams’ RLUIPA claim. 

 B. Analysis of RLUIPA Claim 

There is no dispute among the parties that Williams is a devout Muslim who 

is required by his faith to offer five prayers a day, and that the prayers must be 

offered in a prone position on a clean area. (Doc. 135, ¶¶ 8-10). Where the parties 

diverge is on the question of whether SCI-Mahanoy’s policy prohibiting prone 

prayer in the kitchen substantially burdens Williams’ exercise of religion. We find 

that it plainly does. 

 At trial, Williams testified at length about the precepts of the Islamic faith as 

well as about the event giving rise to this litigation. It is beyond dispute that 

Williams was forced to choose between offering the noon prayer or violating SCIMahanoy policy pertaining to prone prayer in the kitchen. Thus, we can easily find 

that SCI-Mahanoy’s policy substantially burdened Williams’ exercise of religion. 

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 Having established that Williams’ exercise of religion was so impaired, we 

must consider whether the Defendants have met their burden of showing that the 

impediement was in furtherance of a compelling government interest and the least 

restrictive means of furthering that interest. In an attempt to meet that burden, 

Defendants have proffered that prohibiting prone prayer in the kitchen is in 

furtherance of “legitimate security, sanitary and penological” interests. (Doc. 182, 

p. 23). It can be inferred from the Defendants’ post-trial submission that their 

position is that the current prohibition is the least restrictive means of furthering 

their aforestated interests inasmuch as they contend that “[t]he only possible 

reasonable accommodation this Court should provide Plaintiff in this matter is to 

have him transferred to an institution which does not require inmates to work in the 

kitchen.” (Doc. 183, p. 22). While we agree with the Defendants that there are 

compelling interests in security and sanitation at SCI-Mahanoy that must be 

considered, we simply cannot find that a blanket prohibition on prone prayer in the 

kitchen is the least restrictive means of achieving those interests when we consider 

the uncontroverted fact that, during the high holy month of Ramadan, SCIMahanoy provides kitchen workers a place to pray in a prone position. This is the 

very relief that Williams seeks on a year-round basis. The fact that Defendants 

afford it on a temporary basis for an entire month gives lie to their argument that 

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Plaintiff cannot be accommodated. Thus, we find that the current policy at SCIMahanoy violates Williams’ rights under RLUIPA. 

C. Remedy 

Relief available under RLUIPA is injunctive and/or declaratory only – 

RLUIPA does not allow for the recovery of money damages. See Sharp v. 

Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 154 (3d Cir. 2012). 

 For his part, Williams has submitted five alternative proposed forms of relief 

that would accommodate his prayer. They are as follows: 

1) Permitting prayer at all times in the designated preparation room that had 

been previously offered to Muslim inmates in the Food Services Area at 

SCI-Mahanoy to offer evening prayer and sunset prayer during the month 

of Ramadan; 

2) Permitting prayer in the dining room, which is a secured area that 

inmates currently use during breaks; 

3) Permitting a leave and return policy used at other Pennsylvania 

institutions; 

4) Providing schedule flexibility such that inmates’ kitchen shifts would not 

conflict with Muslim prayer times; or 

5) Removing the policy requiring inmates to work in food services as a 

prerequisite for obtaining other work assignments. 

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In consideration of these options, the Court is not blind to the fact that we must 

also consider the security concerns of SCI-Mahanoy. Moreover, we are 

exceedingly reluctant to micromanage the protocols in all state prisons, and will 

thus fashion relief that is as narrowly tailored to SCI-Mahanoy as possible. 

Therefore, given the fact that SCI-Mahanoy already securely provides a space for 

Muslim inmates to pray in a prone position during the holy month of Ramadan, we 

shall issue an Order requiring that SCI-Mahanoy provide a clean and appropriate 

space for inmates working in the kitchen to offer prayer in a prone position during 

their shift all year round. Alternatively, we shall Order that if such a space cannot 

be created in the kitchen for year-round prayer, that Muslim inmates shall be 

permitted to offer prone prayer in the dining room while on kitchen duty. While 

we respect Defendants’ concerns about security and sanitation, they do not 

withstand the scrutiny that RLUIPA compels us to apply. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we shall issue an Order (1) declaring 

that the Plaintiff’s statutory rights under RLUIPA were violated, and thereby 

require the removal of the official misconduct violation in Williams’ prison record 

arising from his saying prayer in the kitchen area on October 23, 2006; (2) 

mandating an accommodation and an alternative accommodation, as described 

above and in the separate Order that follows, for Muslim prayer for Muslim 

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inmates working in the kitchen; and (3) requiring that Plaintiff either be reinstated 

to his position in the kitchen or, in the alternative, to another suitable job position 

within SCI-Mahanoy at the rate he would have been paid had he not been cited for 

the October 23, 2006 misconduct and subsequent loss of job. Further, given that 

Plaintiff has prevailed on his RLUIPA claim, Plaintiff’s counsel may appropriately 

submit a petition for attorneys’ fees. 

 A separate Order shall issue. 

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