(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2021 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

SHINN, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS, REHABILITATION AND REENTRY v. 

MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 20–1009. Argued December 8, 2021—Decided May 23, 2022* 

Respondents David Martinez Ramirez and Barry Lee Jones were each 

convicted of capital crimes in Arizona state court and sentenced to 

death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed each case on direct review, and each prisoner was denied state postconviction relief. Each 

also filed for federal habeas relief under 28 U. S. C. §2254, arguing 

that trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to conduct adequate

investigations. The Federal District Court held in each case that the 

prisoner’s ineffective-assistance claim was procedurally defaulted because it was not properly presented in state court. To overcome procedural default in such cases, a prisoner must demonstrate “cause” to 

excuse the procedural defect and “actual prejudice.” Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 750. To demonstrate cause, Ramirez and 

Jones relied on Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U. S. 1, which held that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel may be cited as cause for the 

procedural default of an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. 

In Ramirez’s case, the District Court permitted him to supplement the

record with evidence not presented in state court to support his case to

excuse the procedural default. Assessing the new evidence, the court 

excused the procedural default but rejected Ramirez’s ineffective-assistance claim on the merits. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for more evidentiary development to litigate the merits of 

—————— 

*Together with Shinn, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, 

Rehabilitation and Reentry, et al. v. Jones (see this Court’s Rule 12.4), 

also on certiorari to the same court. 
 

 

 

 

2 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

Syllabus 

Ramirez’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. In Jones’ case, 

the District Court held a lengthy evidentiary hearing on “cause” and

“prejudice,” forgave his procedural default, and held that his state trial 

counsel had provided ineffective assistance. The State of Arizona petitioned this Court in both cases, arguing that §2254(e)(2) does not permit a federal court to order evidentiary development simply because 

postconviction counsel is alleged to have negligently failed to develop

the state-court record. 

Held: Under §2254(e)(2), a federal habeas court may not conduct an evidentiary hearing or otherwise consider evidence beyond the state-court 

record based on the ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel. Pp. 6–22.

(a) To respect federal-state dual sovereignty, see Printz v. United 

States, 521 U. S. 898, 918, the availability of federal habeas relief is

narrowly circumscribed, see Brown v. Davenport, 596 U. S. ___, ___– 

___. For example, only rarely may a federal habeas court hear a claim 

or consider evidence that a prisoner did not previously present to the 

state courts in compliance with state procedural rules. Pp. 6–13.

(1) Federal habeas review overrides the States’ core power to enforce criminal law—an intrusion that “imposes special costs” on the

federal system. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 128. Two of those costs 

are particularly relevant here. First, a federal order to retry or release 

a state prisoner overrides the State’s sovereign power to enforce “societal norms through criminal law.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 

538, 556. Second, federal intervention imposes significant costs on

state criminal justice systems. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 

U. S. 72, 90. Pp. 6–8.

(2) In light of these costs, this Court recognizes that federal habeas review is not “a substitute for ordinary error correction through 

appeal,” but is an “extraordinary remedy” that guards only against 

“extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 102–103. To ensure that federal habeas 

retains its narrow role, both Congress and federal habeas courts have 

set out strict rules requiring prisoners to raise all of their federal 

claims in state court before seeking federal relief. The Antiterrorism 

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires state prisoners to “exhaus[t] the remedies available in the courts of the State” 

before seeking federal habeas relief. §2254(b)(1)(A). And the doctrine 

of procedural default—“an important ‘corollary’ to the exhaustion requirement,” Davila v. Davis, 582 U. S. ___, ___—generally prevents 

federal courts from hearing any federal claim that was not presented

to the state courts “consistent with [the State’s] own procedural rules,” 

Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U. S. 446, 453. Together, exhaustion and 

procedural default promote federal-state comity by affording States 
 

 

 

 

 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 

Syllabus 

“an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of 

prisoners’ federal rights,” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U. S. 1, 3 (per curiam), and by protecting against “the significant harm to the States 

that results from the failure of federal courts to respect” state procedural rules, Coleman, 501 U. S., at 750. Pp. 8–10.

(3) Nonetheless, a federal court is not required to automatically 

deny unexhausted or procedurally defaulted claims. For instance, 

when a claim is procedurally defaulted, a federal court can forgive the 

default and adjudicate the claim if the prisoner provides an adequate 

excuse. And if the state-court record for that defaulted claim is undeveloped, the prisoner must show that factual development in federal 

court is appropriate. Pp. 10–13.

(i) Federal courts may excuse procedural default only if a prisoner “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a 

result of the alleged violation of federal law.” Coleman, 501 U. S., at 

750. With respect to cause, “attorney error cannot provide cause to 

excuse a default” “in proceedings for which the Constitution does not 

guarantee the assistance of counsel at all.” Davila, 582 U. S., at ___. 

But in Martinez, this Court recognized a “narrow exception” to that

rule, holding that ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel 

may constitute “cause” to forgive procedural default of a trial-ineffective-assistance claim, but only if the State requires prisoners to raise

such claims for the first time during state collateral proceedings. 566 

U. S., at 9. Pp. 10–11.

(ii) Excusing a prisoner’s failure to develop the state-court record faces an even higher bar. Section 2254(e)(2) applies when a prisoner “has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim,” i.e., is “at fault” 

for the undeveloped record in state court, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 

420, 432. If a prisoner is “at fault,” a federal court may hold “an evidentiary hearing on the claim” in only two limited scenarios not relevant here. See §§2254(e)(2)(A)(i), (ii). The prisoner also must show

that further factfinding would demonstrate, by clear and convincing

evidence, that he is innocent of the crime charged. Pp. 12–13.

(b) Although respondents do not satisfy §2254(e)(2)’s narrow exceptions, the Court of Appeals forgave respondents’ failures to develop the 

state-court record because, in its view, they each received ineffective 

assistance of state postconviction counsel. The Court of Appeals erred. 

Pp. 13–22. 

(1) Respondents primarily argue that a prisoner is not “at fault” 

for the undeveloped record if state postconviction counsel negligently 

failed to develop the state record for a claim of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel. But under AEDPA and this Court’s precedents, state

postconviction counsel’s ineffective assistance in developing the statecourt record is attributed to the prisoner. Pp. 13–19. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

Syllabus 

(i) A prisoner “bears the risk in federal habeas for all attorney

errors made in the course of the representation.” Coleman, 501 U. S., 

at 754. And, because there is no constitutional right to counsel in state

postconviction proceedings, a prisoner must ordinarily “bea[r] responsibility” for all attorney errors during those proceedings, Williams, 529 

U. S., at 432, including responsibility for counsel’s negligent failure to 

develop the state postconviction record. This Court’s prior cases make 

this point clear. See, e.g., Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U. S. 1; Williams, 529 U. S. 420; Holland v. Jackson, 542 U. S. 649 (per curiam).

Thus, a prisoner is “at fault” even when state postconviction counsel is

negligent. Pp. 14–15. 

(ii) Respondents propose extending Martinez so that ineffective 

assistance of postconviction counsel can excuse a prisoner’s failure to

develop the state-court record under §2254(e)(2). But unlike judgemade exceptions to procedural default, §2254(e)(2) is a statute, and 

thus, this Court has no power to redefine when a prisoner “has failed

to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings.” Nor 

is it plausible, as respondents contend, that Congress might have enacted §2254(e)(2) with the expectation that this Court would one day 

open the door to allowing the ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel to be cause to forgive procedural default. Finally, Martinez itself cuts against respondents’ proposed result. Martinez foreclosed any extension of its holding beyond the “narrow exception” to 

procedural default at issue in that case. See 566 U. S., at 9. That 

assurance has bite only if the State can rely on the state-court record. 

The cases here demonstrate the improper burden imposed on the 

States when Martinez applies beyond its narrow scope, with the 

sprawling evidentiary hearing in Jones’ case being particularly poignant. Pp. 15–19. 

(2) Respondents propose a second reading of §2254(e)(2) that supposedly permits consideration of new evidence in their habeas cases. 

First, they argue that because §2254(e)(2) bars only “an evidentiary

hearing on the claim,” a federal court may hold an evidentiary hearing

to determine whether there is cause and prejudice. Second, respondents contend that the habeas court may then consider that new evidence to evaluate the merits of the underlying ineffective-assistance 

claim. By considering already admitted evidence, respondents reason, 

the habeas court is not holding a “hearing” prohibited by §2254(e)(2).

But, in Holland, this Court explained that §2254(e)(2)’s “restrictions 

apply a fortiori when a prisoner seeks relief based on new evidence

without an evidentiary hearing.” 542 U. S., at 653 (emphasis deleted).

Therefore, when a federal habeas court convenes an evidentiary hearing for any purpose, or otherwise reviews any evidence for any purpose, it may not consider that evidence on the merits of a negligent 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 5 

Syllabus 

prisoner’s defaulted claim unless the exceptions in §2254(e)(2) are satisfied. Pp. 19–22. 

937 F. 3d 1230 and 943 F. 3d 1211, reversed. 

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 

and ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER and KAGAN, JJ., 

joined. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that 

corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 20–1009 

DAVID SHINN, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT 

OF CORRECTIONS, REHABILITATION AND 

REENTRY, PETITIONER v. DAVID 

MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

DAVID SHINN, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT 

OF CORRECTIONS, REHABILITATION AND 

REENTRY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 

BARRY LEE JONES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

[May 23, 2022]

 JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 

A federal habeas court generally may consider a state

prisoner’s federal claim only if he has first presented that

claim to the state court in accordance with state procedures.

When the prisoner has failed to do so, and the state court 

would dismiss the claim on that basis, the claim is “procedurally defaulted.” To overcome procedural default, the

prisoner must demonstrate “cause” to excuse the procedural defect and “actual prejudice” if the federal court were

to decline to hear his claim. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 

U. S. 722, 750 (1991). In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U. S. 1 

(2012), this Court explained that ineffective assistance of 

postconviction counsel is “cause” to forgive procedural default of an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, but 

only if the State required the prisoner to raise that claim 
 

 

2 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

Opinion of the Court 

for the first time during state postconviction proceedings. 

Often, a prisoner with a defaulted claim will ask a federal

habeas court not only to consider his claim but also to permit him to introduce new evidence to support it. Under the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA), the standard to expand the state-court record is

a stringent one. If a prisoner has “failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings,” a federal 

court “shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim” 

unless the prisoner satisfies one of two narrow exceptions, 

see 28 U. S. C. §2254(e)(2)(A), and demonstrates that the

new evidence will establish his innocence “by clear and convincing evidence,” §2254(e)(2)(B). In all but these extraordinary cases, AEDPA “bars evidentiary hearings in federal

habeas proceedings initiated by state prisoners.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U. S. 383, 395 (2013). 

The question presented is whether the equitable rule announced in Martinez permits a federal court to dispense

with §2254(e)(2)’s narrow limits because a prisoner’s state

postconviction counsel negligently failed to develop the 

state-court record. We conclude that it does not. 

I 

In this case, we address two petitions brought by the 

State of Arizona. See Ramirez v. Ryan, 937 F. 3d 1230 (CA9 

2019); Jones v. Shinn, 943 F. 3d 1211 (CA9 2019). 

A 

On May 25, 1989, David Ramirez fatally stabbed his girlfriend, Mary Ann Gortarez, and her 15-year-old daughter, 

Candie, in their home. 937 F. 3d, at 1234–1235; State v. 

Ramirez, 178 Ariz. 116, 119, 121, 871 P. 2d 237, 240, 242 

(1994). Ramirez stabbed Mary Ann 18 times in the neck 

with a pair of scissors, and Candie 15 times in the neck with 

a box cutter. Id., at 121, 871 P. 2d, at 242. Police also found 

physical evidence that Ramirez had raped Candie, and 
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

Ramirez later admitted that he had sex with the child on 

the night of the murders and four times before. Ibid. A jury 

convicted Ramirez of two counts of premeditated firstdegree murder. Ibid. The trial court sentenced Ramirez to 

death, ibid., and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed on

direct review, id., at 132, 871 P. 2d, at 253. 

Ramirez then filed his first petition for state postconviction relief. That petition raised myriad claims, but it did 

not raise the one at issue here: that Ramirez’s trial counsel 

provided ineffective assistance for “failing to conduct a complete mitigation investigation” or “obtai[n] and present 

available mitigation evidence at sentencing.” App. 402.

Ramirez did not raise this ineffective-assistance claim until 

he subsequently filed a successive state habeas petition, 

which the state court summarily denied as untimely under 

Arizona law. See ibid. 

Ramirez also petitioned the U. S. District Court for the

District of Arizona for a writ of habeas corpus under 28

U. S. C. §2254. As relevant here, the District Court held 

that Ramirez had procedurally defaulted his ineffectiveassistance claim by failing to raise it before the Arizona

courts in a timely fashion. See App. 402–403. Ramirez responded that the District Court should forgive the procedural default because his state postconviction counsel was

himself ineffective for failing to raise the trial-ineffectiveassistance claim and develop the facts to support it.

The District Court permitted Ramirez to file several declarations and other evidence not presented to the state

court to support his request to excuse his procedural default. See 937 F. 3d, at 1238. Assessing the new evidence,

the District Court excused the procedural default but rejected Ramirez’s ineffective-assistance claim on the merits. 

See id., at 1240. 

The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. Like the District Court, it held that Ramirez’s state postconviction coun-
 

 

 

4 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

Opinion of the Court 

sel’s failure to raise and develop the trial-ineffective-assistance claim was cause to forgive the procedural default. See 

id., at 1247–1248. The Ninth Circuit also held that 

Ramirez’s underlying trial-ineffective-assistance claim was 

substantial, and that Ramirez therefore had suffered prejudice. See id., at 1243–1247. But, unlike the District 

Court, the Court of Appeals declined to decide the merits of 

Ramirez’s claim. The court remanded the case for further 

factfinding because, in its view, Ramirez was “entitled to

evidentiary development to litigate the merits of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.” Id., at 1248. 

Arizona petitioned for rehearing en banc, arguing that

the Ninth Circuit’s remand for additional evidentiary development violated 28 U. S. C. §2254(e)(2). The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing over an eight-judge dissent by Judge

Collins. See 971 F. 3d 1116 (2020). 

B 

On May 1, 1994, Barry Lee Jones repeatedly beat his girlfriend’s 4-year-old daughter, Rachel Gray. See 943 F. 3d, 

at 1215–1216; State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 388, 391, 937 P. 2d 

310, 313 (1997). One blow to Rachel’s abdomen ruptured 

her small intestine. See id., at 391, 937 P. 2d, at 313. She 

also sustained several injuries to her vagina and labia consistent with sexual assault. Ibid. Early the next morning, 

Jones drove Rachel to the hospital, where she was pronounced dead on arrival. See ibid. Rachel died of peritonitis—“an infection of the lining of the abdomen caused by a

ruptured intestine.” Ibid. A jury convicted Jones of sexual 

assault, three counts of child abuse, and felony murder. 

Ibid. The trial judge sentenced Jones to death, ibid., and 

the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed on direct review, see 

id., at 401, 937 P. 2d, at 323. 

Jones then petitioned for state postconviction relief. He 

alleged ineffective assistance by his trial counsel, but not 

the specific trial-ineffective-assistance claim at issue here: 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

that his counsel “fail[ed] to conduct sufficient trial investigation.” 943 F. 3d, at 1218. The Arizona Supreme Court 

summarily denied relief. See ibid. 

Jones next filed a habeas petition in the U. S. District 

Court for the District of Arizona. The District Court held 

that Jones’ trial-ineffective-assistance claim was procedurally defaulted, so Jones, like Ramirez, invoked his postconviction counsel’s ineffective assistance as grounds to forgive

the default. Ibid. To bolster his case for cause and prejudice, Jones also moved to supplement the undeveloped 

state-court record. Ibid. The District Court held a 7-day

evidentiary hearing with more than 10 witnesses and ultimately decided to forgive Jones’ procedural default. See id., 

at 1219, 1225–1226. The court then relied on the new evidence from the cause-and-prejudice hearing to hold, on the

merits, that Jones’ trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance. See id., at 1219. 

Arizona appealed, arguing that §2254(e)(2) did not permit the evidentiary hearing. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, 

holding that §2254(e)(2) did not apply because Jones’ state

postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to develop 

the state-court record for Jones’ trial-ineffective-assistance 

claim. See id., at 1220–1222. 

 As in Ramirez, Arizona petitioned for rehearing en banc. 

And, also as in Ramirez, the Ninth Circuit denied Arizona’s 

petition over the dissent of Judge Collins, joined by seven 

other judges. Jones v. Shinn, 971 F. 3d 1133 (2020). 

C 

As noted above, Arizona petitioned for a writ of certiorari 

in both Ramirez and Jones. The State maintains that 28 

U. S. C. §2254(e)(2) does not permit a federal court to order 

evidentiary development simply because postconviction

counsel is alleged to have negligently failed to develop the 

state-court record. Respondents do not dispute, and therefore concede, that their habeas petitions fail on the state-
 

 

 

 

6 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

Opinion of the Court 

court record alone. We granted certiorari, 593 U. S. ___ 

(2021).* 

II 

A state prisoner may request that a federal court order 

his release by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus. See 

28 U. S. C. §2254. The writ may issue “only on the ground

that [the prisoner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” §2254(a).

To respect our system of dual sovereignty, see Printz v. 

United States, 521 U. S. 898, 918 (1997), the availability of 

habeas relief is narrowly circumscribed, see Brown v. Davenport, 596 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2022) (slip op., at 11–14). 

Among other restrictions, only rarely may a federal habeas

court hear a claim or consider evidence that a prisoner did 

not previously present to the state courts in compliance

with state procedural rules. 

A 

“From the beginning of our country, criminal law enforcement has been primarily a responsibility of the States.” 

Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 19). 

The power to convict and punish criminals lies at the heart 

of the States’ “residuary and inviolable sovereignty.” The 

Federalist No. 39, p. 245 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison); 

—————— 

*Ramirez alleges that Arizona forfeited any §2254(e)(2) argument 

in his case because it did not object to some evidentiary development in

the District Court or before the Ninth Circuit panel. But Arizona did 

object to further factfinding before the Ninth Circuit panel, see Respondents-Appellees’ Answering Brief in Ramirez v. Ryan, No. 10–99023 

(CA9), ECF Doc. 37, p. 58, and, in any event, the Ninth Circuit passed 

upon §2254(e)(2) when it ordered additional factfinding on remand, see 

United States v. Williams, 504 U. S. 36, 41 (1992). Further, because we 

have discretion to forgive any forfeiture, and because “our deciding the

matter now will reduce the likelihood of further litigation” in a 30-yearold murder case, Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U. S. 1, 14 

(2009) (plurality opinion), we choose to forgive the State’s forfeiture before the District Court. 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

see also Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. ___, ___–___ 

(2019) (slip op., at 9–10). Thus, “[t]he States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal 

law,” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 128 (1982), and for adjudicating “constitutional challenges to state convictions,” 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 103 (2011). 

Because federal habeas review overrides the States’ core 

power to enforce criminal law, it “intrudes on state sovereignty to a degree matched by few exercises of federal judicial authority.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).

That intrusion “imposes special costs on our federal system.” Engle, 456 U. S., at 128; see also Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S. 436, 453, n. 16 (1986); Davila v. Davis, 582 

U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 15). Here, two of those 

costs are particularly relevant. 

First, a federal order to retry or release a state prisoner 

overrides the State’s sovereign power to enforce “societal 

norms through criminal law.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 

U. S. 538, 556 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

That is so because habeas relief “frequently cost[s] society 

the right to punish admitted offenders.” Engle, 456 U. S., 

at 127; see also Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U. S. ___, ___ 

(2021) (slip op., at 6) (“When previously convicted perpetrators of violent crimes go free merely because the evidence 

needed to conduct a retrial has become stale or is no longer

available, the public suffers, as do the victims”). “Only with

real finality can the victims of crime move forward knowing

the moral judgment will be carried out.” Calderon, 523 

U. S., at 556. “To unsettle these expectations is to inflict a 

profound injury to the powerful and legitimate interest in

punishing the guilty, an interest shared by the State and 

the victims of crime alike.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted).

Second, federal intervention imposes significant costs on 

state criminal justice systems. It “disturbs the State’s sig-
 

 

8 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

Opinion of the Court 

nificant interest in repose for concluded litigation,” Harrington, 562 U. S., at 103 (internal quotation marks omitted), and undermines the States’ investment in their criminal trials. If the state trial is merely a “‘tryout on the road’” 

to federal habeas relief, that “detract[s] from the perception

of the trial of a criminal case in state court as a decisive and 

portentous event.” Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 90 

(1977). 

B 

In light of these significant costs, we have recognized that 

federal habeas review cannot serve as “a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” Harrington, 562 

U. S., at 102–103. The writ of habeas corpus is an “extraordinary remedy” that guards only against “extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.” Id., at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 633–634 (1993). To ensure 

that federal habeas corpus retains its narrow role, AEDPA

imposes several limits on habeas relief, and we have prescribed several more. See, e.g., Brown, 596 U. S., at ___– 

___ (slip op., at 11–13). And even if a prisoner overcomes 

all of these limits, he is never entitled to habeas relief. He 

must still “persuade a federal habeas court that law and 

justice require [it].” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 11) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As relevant here, both Congress and federal habeas

courts have set out strict rules requiring prisoners to raise

all of their federal claims in state court before seeking federal relief. First, AEDPA requires state prisoners to “exhaus[t] the remedies available in the courts of the State” 

before seeking federal habeas relief. 28 U. S. C. 

§2254(b)(1)(A). Ordinarily, a state prisoner satisfies this 

exhaustion requirement by raising his federal claim before

the state courts in accordance with state procedures. See 

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U. S. 838, 848 (1999). If he does 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

so, a federal habeas court may hear his claim, but its review 

is highly circumscribed. In particular, the federal court

may review the claim based solely on the state-court record, 

see Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. 170, 180 (2011), and the 

prisoner must demonstrate that, under this Court’s precedents, no “fairminded juris[t]” could have reached the same

judgment as the state court, Harrington, 562 U. S., at 102; 

see §2254(d). 

State prisoners, however, often fail to raise their federal 

claims in compliance with state procedures, or even raise 

those claims in state court at all. If a state court would dismiss these claims for their procedural failures, such claims

are technically exhausted because, in the habeas context,

“state-court remedies are . . . ‘exhausted’ when they are no

longer available, regardless of the reason for their unavailability.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U. S. 81, 92–93 (2006). But 

to allow a state prisoner simply to ignore state procedure 

on the way to federal court would defeat the evident goal of 

the exhaustion rule. See Coleman, 501 U. S., at 732. Thus, 

federal habeas courts must apply “an important ‘corollary’ 

to the exhaustion requirement”: the doctrine of procedural

default. Davila, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4). Under that 

doctrine, federal courts generally decline to hear any federal claim that was not presented to the state courts “consistent with [the State’s] own procedural rules.” Edwards 

v. Carpenter, 529 U. S. 446, 453 (2000). 

Together, exhaustion and procedural default promote

federal-state comity. Exhaustion affords States “an initial 

opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of 

prisoners’ federal rights,” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U. S. 

1, 3 (1981) (per curiam), and procedural default protects

against “the significant harm to the States that results from 

the failure of federal courts to respect” state procedural

rules, Coleman, 501 U. S., at 750. Ultimately, “it would be

unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal 
 

 

10 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

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district court to upset a state court conviction without [giving] an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation,” Darr v. Burford, 339 U. S. 200, 204 (1950), 

and to do so consistent with their own procedures, see Edwards, 529 U. S., at 452–453. 

C 

Despite the many benefits of exhaustion and procedural

default, and the substantial costs when those doctrines are 

not enforced, we have held that a federal court is not required to automatically deny unexhausted or procedurally 

defaulted claims. When a claim is unexhausted, the prisoner might have an opportunity to return to state court to 

adjudicate the claim. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 

509, 520 (1982). When a claim is procedurally defaulted, a 

federal court can forgive the default and adjudicate the 

claim if the prisoner provides an adequate excuse. Likewise, if the state-court record for that defaulted claim is undeveloped, the prisoner must show that factual development in federal court is appropriate. 

1 

“Out of respect for finality, comity, and the orderly administration of justice,” Dretke v. Haley, 541 U. S. 386, 388 

(2004), federal courts may excuse procedural default only if 

a prisoner “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal

law,” Coleman, 501 U. S., at 750. To establish cause, the 

prisoner must “show that some objective factor external to

the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the

State’s procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 

488 (1986). Then, to establish prejudice, the prisoner must

show not merely a substantial federal claim, such that “‘the 

errors at . . . trial created a possibility of prejudice,” but rather that the constitutional violation “worked to his actual 

and substantial disadvantage.’” Id., at 494 (quoting United 
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 170 (1982)).

With respect to cause, “[a]ttorney ignorance or inadvertence” cannot excuse procedural default. Coleman, 501 

U. S., at 753. “[T]he attorney is the petitioner’s agent when

acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and 

the petitioner must bear the risk of attorney error.” Ibid. 

(internal quotation marks omitted). That said, “if the procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the default be imputed to the State.” Murray, 

477 U. S., at 488. That is not because a constitutional error 

“is so bad that the lawyer ceases to be an agent” of the prisoner, but rather because a violation of the right to counsel

“must be seen as an external factor” to the prisoner’s defense. Coleman, 501 U. S., at 754 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “It follows, then, that in proceedings for which

the Constitution does not guarantee the assistance of counsel at all, attorney error cannot provide cause to excuse a 

default.” Davila, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6).

In Martinez, this Court recognized a “narrow exception”

to the rule that attorney error cannot establish cause to excuse a procedural default unless it violates the Constitution. 566 U. S., at 9. There, the Court held that ineffective 

assistance of state postconviction counsel may constitute

“cause” to forgive procedural default of a trial-ineffectiveassistance claim, but only if the State requires prisoners to 

raise such claims for the first time during state collateral 

proceedings. See ibid. One year later, in Trevino v. Thaler, 

569 U. S. 413 (2013), this Court held that this “narrow exception” applies if the State’s judicial system effectively

forecloses direct review of trial-ineffective-assistance 

claims. Id., at 428. Otherwise, attorney error where there

is no right to counsel remains insufficient to show cause. 

Martinez, 566 U. S., at 16. 
 

12 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

Opinion of the Court 

2 

There is an even higher bar for excusing a prisoner’s failure to develop the state-court record. Shortly before

AEDPA, we held that a prisoner who “negligently failed” to 

develop the state-court record must satisfy Coleman’s 

cause-and-prejudice standard before a federal court can 

hold an evidentiary hearing. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 

U. S. 1, 9 (1992). In Keeney, we explained that “little [could] 

be said for holding a habeas petitioner to one standard for 

failing to bring a claim in state court and excusing the petitioner under another, lower standard for failing to develop 

the factual basis of that claim in the same forum.” Id., at 

10. And, consistent with Coleman, we held that evidentiary 

development would be inappropriate “where the cause asserted is attorney error.” 504 U. S., at 11, n. 5. 

Four years later, Congress enacted AEDPA and replaced 

Keeney’s cause-and-prejudice standard for evidentiary development with the even “more stringent requirements”

now codified at 28 U. S. C. §2254(e)(2). Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U. S. 420, 433 (2000) (Michael Williams). Section 

2254(e)(2) provides that, if a prisoner “has failed to develop 

the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings,” a

federal court may hold “an evidentiary hearing on the

claim” in only two limited scenarios. Either the claim must 

rely on (1) a “new” and “previously unavailable” “rule of 

constitutional law” made retroactively applicable by this 

Court, or (2) “a factual predicate that could not have been

previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” §§2254(e)(2)(A)(i), (ii). If a prisoner can satisfy either of these exceptions, he also must show that further 

factfinding would demonstrate, “by clear and convincing evidence,” that “no reasonable factfinder” would have convicted him of the crime charged. §2254(e)(2)(B). Finally,

even if all of these requirements are satisfied, a federal habeas court still is not required to hold a hearing or take any 

evidence. Like the decision to grant habeas relief itself, the 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

decision to permit new evidence must be informed by principles of comity and finality that govern every federal habeas case. Cf. Brown, 596 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 13– 

14).

Even though AEDPA largely displaced Keeney, 

§2254(e)(2) retained “one aspect of Keeney’s holding.” Michael Williams, 529 U. S., at 433. Namely, §2254(e)(2) applies only when a prisoner “has failed to develop the factual

basis of a claim.” We interpret “fail,” consistent with 

Keeney, to mean that the prisoner must be “at fault” for the 

undeveloped record in state court. 529 U. S., at 432. A prisoner is “at fault” if he “bears responsibility for the failure” 

to develop the record. Ibid. 

III 

Respondents concede that they do not satisfy

§2254(e)(2)’s narrow exceptions. Nonetheless, the Court of 

Appeals forgave respondents’ failures to develop the statecourt record because, in its view, they each received ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel. We now hold 

that, under §2254(e)(2), a federal habeas court may not conduct an evidentiary hearing or otherwise consider evidence 

beyond the state-court record based on ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel. 

A 

Respondents’ primary claim is that a prisoner is not “at

fault,” Michael Williams, 529 U. S., at 432, and therefore 

has not “failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in

State court proceedings,” §2254(e)(2), if state postconviction

counsel negligently failed to develop the state record for a

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. But under 

AEDPA and our precedents, state postconviction counsel’s

ineffective assistance in developing the state-court record is

attributed to the prisoner. 
 

14 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

Opinion of the Court 

1 

As stated above, a prisoner “bears the risk in federal habeas for all attorney errors made in the course of the representation,” Coleman, 501 U. S., at 754, unless counsel provides “constitutionally ineffective” assistance, Murray, 477 

U. S., at 488. And, because there is no constitutional right 

to counsel in state postconviction proceedings, see Davila, 

582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6), a prisoner ordinarily must 

“bea[r] responsibility” for all attorney errors during those

proceedings, Michael Williams, 529 U. S., at 432. Among

those errors, a state prisoner is responsible for counsel’s 

negligent failure to develop the state postconviction record.

Both before and after AEDPA, our prior cases have made

this point clear. First, in Keeney, “material facts had not 

been adequately developed in the state postconviction

court, apparently due to the negligence of postconviction

counsel.” 504 U. S., at 4 (citation omitted). We required the

prisoner to demonstrate cause and prejudice to forgive postconviction counsel’s deficient performance, see id., at 11, 

and recognized that counsel’s negligence, on its own, was

not a sufficient cause, see id., at 10, n. 5. 

Second, in Michael Williams, we confirmed that “the 

opening clause of §2254(e)(2) codifies Keeney’s threshold 

standard of diligence, so that prisoners who would have had 

to satisfy Keeney’s [cause-and-prejudice] test . . . are now 

controlled by §2254(e)(2).” 529 U. S., at 434. In other 

words, because Keeney held a prisoner responsible for state

postconviction counsel’s negligent failure to develop the 

state-court record, the same rule applied under §2254(e)(2). 

For that reason, “a failure to develop the factual basis of a 

claim,” as §2254(e)(2) requires, “is not established unless

there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable 

to the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel.” 529 U. S., at 432 

(emphasis added). We then applied that rule and held that

state postconviction counsel’s “failure to investigate . . . in 

anything but a cursory manner trigger[ed] the opening 
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

clause of §2254(e)(2).” Id., at 439–440. 

 Third, in Holland v. Jackson, 542 U. S. 649 (2004) (per 

curiam), we again held a prisoner responsible for state postconviction counsel’s negligent failure to develop the statecourt record. Seven years after the prisoner’s conviction, 

and after he had already been denied state postconviction

relief, the prisoner found a new witness to provide impeachment testimony. See id., at 650–651. The prisoner claimed 

that he discovered the witness so late because “state postconviction counsel did not heed his pleas for assistance.” 

Id., at 653. Citing Coleman and Michael Williams, we rejected the prisoner’s claim. “Attorney negligence,” we held, 

“is chargeable to the client and precludes relief unless the 

conditions of §2254(e)(2) are satisfied.” 542 U. S., at 653. 

In sum, under §2254(e)(2), a prisoner is “at fault” even

when state postconviction counsel is negligent. In such a 

case, a federal court may order an evidentiary hearing or 

otherwise expand the state-court record only if the prisoner

can satisfy §2254(e)(2)’s stringent requirements. 

2 

Respondents dispute none of this. Instead, they rely almost exclusively on Martinez’s holding that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel can be “cause” to forgive 

procedural default of a trial-ineffective-assistance claim if a 

State forecloses direct review of that claim, as Arizona concededly does. See 566 U. S., at 9. Respondents contend that 

where, per Martinez, a prisoner is not responsible for state

postconviction counsel’s failure to raise a claim, it makes 

little sense to hold the prisoner responsible for the failure

to develop that claim. Thus, respondents propose extending 

Martinez so that ineffective assistance of postconviction

counsel can excuse a prisoner’s failure to develop the statecourt record under §2254(e)(2).

Congress foreclosed respondents’ proposed expansion of 

Martinez when it passed AEDPA. Martinez decided that, 
 

 

16 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

Opinion of the Court 

in the exercise of our “equitable judgment” and “discretion,”

it was appropriate to modify “[t]he rules for when a prisoner

may establish cause to excuse a procedural default.” Id., at 

13. Such “exceptions” to procedural default “are judgemade rules” that we may modify “only when necessary.” 

Dretke, 541 U. S., at 394. Here, however, §2254(e)(2) is a 

statute that we have no authority to amend. “Where Congress has erected a constitutionally valid barrier to habeas

relief, a court cannot decline to give it effect.” McQuiggin, 

569 U. S., at 402 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Ex parte 

Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 94 (1807) (Marshall, C. J., for the 

Court). For example, in McQuiggin, we explained that we 

have no power to layer a miscarriage-of-justice or actualinnocence exception on top of the narrow limitations already included in §2254(e)(2). See 569 U. S., at 395–396 

(majority opinion).

The same follows here. We have no power to redefine 

when a prisoner “has failed to develop the factual basis of a 

claim in State court proceedings.” §2254(e)(2). Before 

AEDPA, Keeney held that “attorney error” during state 

postconviction proceedings was not cause to excuse an undeveloped state-court record. 504 U. S., at 11, n. 5. And, in 

Michael Williams, we acknowledged that §2254(e)(2) 

“raised the bar Keeney imposed on prisoners who were not 

diligent in state-court proceedings,” 529 U. S., at 433, while

reaffirming that prisoners are responsible for attorney error, see id., at 432. Yet here, respondents claim that attorney error alone permits a federal court to expand the federal habeas record. That result makes factfinding more 

readily available than Keeney envisioned pre-AEDPA and

ignores Michael Williams’ admonition that “[c]ounsel’s failure” to perform as a “diligent attorney” “triggers the opening clause of §2254(e)(2).” 529 U. S., at 439–440. We simply

cannot square respondents’ proposed result with AEDPA or 

our precedents.

Respondents propose that Congress may have actually 
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

invited their judicial update. According to respondents, 

Martinez explained that Coleman left open whether ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel might one

day be cause to forgive procedural default, at least in an 

“initial-review collateral proceeding,” Martinez, 566 U. S., 

at 5, “where state collateral review is the first place a prisoner can present a challenge to his conviction,” Coleman, 

501 U. S., at 755. Respondents contend that Congress 

might have enacted §2254(e)(2) with the expectation that

this Court one day would open that door.

We do not agree. First, “[g]iven our frequent recognition 

that AEDPA limited rather than expanded the availability 

of habeas relief . . . it is implausible that, without saying 

so,” Fry v. Pliler, 551 U. S. 112, 119 (2007), Congress intended this Court to liberalize the availability of habeas relief generally, or access to federal factfinding specifically. 

Second, in Coleman, we “reiterate[d] that counsel’s ineffectiveness will constitute cause only if it is an independent 

constitutional violation,” and surmised that a hypothetical

constitutional right to initial-review postconviction counsel

could give rise to a corresponding claim for cause. 501 U. S., 

at 755; see also Martinez, 566 U. S., at 8–9. Since then, 

however, we have repeatedly reaffirmed that there is no 

constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings. See, e.g., Davila, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6). 

We also reject respondents’ equitable rewrite of 

§2254(e)(2) because it lacks any principled limit. This 

Court’s holding in Martinez addressed only one kind of 

claim: ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See 566 U. S., 

at 9. We limited our holding in that way to reflect our “equitable judgment” that trial-ineffective-assistance claims 

are uniquely important. Id., at 12–13. Respondents propose that we similarly should permit factual development 

under §2254(e)(2) only for trial-ineffective-assistance 

claims. But §2254(e)(2) applies whenever any state prisoner “failed to develop the factual basis of a claim,” 
 

18 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

Opinion of the Court 

§2254(e)(2) (emphasis added), without limitation to any 

specific claim. There would be no reason to limit respondents’ reconstruction of §2254(e)(2) as they propose. Unlike 

for procedural default, we lack equitable authority to

amend a statute to address only a subset of claims. Thus, 

if a prisoner were not “at fault” under §2254(e)(2) simply 

because postconviction counsel provided ineffective assistance, Michael Williams, 529 U. S., at 432, the prisoner’s 

blamelessness necessarily would extend to any claim that 

postconviction counsel negligently failed to develop. Not 

even Martinez sweeps that broadly. 

Finally, setting aside that we lack authority to amend 

§2254(e)(2)’s clear text, Martinez itself cuts against respondents’ proposed result. Martinez was “unusually explicit about the narrowness of our decision.” Trevino, 569 

U. S., at 431 (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting). The Court left no 

doubt that “[t]he rule of Coleman governs in all but the limited circumstances recognized here.” Martinez, 566 U. S., 

at 16 (emphasis added). “This aggressively limiting language was not simply a customary nod to the truism that

we decide only the case before us.” Trevino, 569 U. S., at 

432 (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “It was instead an important part” of the Court’s 

holding. Ibid. In short, Martinez foreclosed any extension 

of its holding beyond the “narrow exception” to procedural 

default at issue in that case. 566 U. S., at 9. 

To be sure, Martinez recognized that state prisoners often

need “evidence outside the trial record” to support their 

trial-ineffective-assistance claims. Id., at 13. But Martinez 

did not prescribe largely unbounded access to new evidence 

whenever postconviction counsel is ineffective, as respondents propose. Rather, Martinez recognized our overarching 

responsibility “to ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the finality and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our system of federalism.” Id., at 9. In particular, the Court explained that its 
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 19 

Opinion of the Court 

“holding . . . ought not to put a significant strain on state 

resources,” because a State “faced with the question

whether there is cause for an apparent default . . . may answer” that the defaulted claim “is wholly without factual

support.” Id., at 15–16. That assurance has bite only if the

State can rely on the state-court record. Otherwise, “federal 

habeas courts would routinely be required to hold evidentiary hearings to determine” whether state postconviction

counsel’s factfinding fell short. Murray, 477 U. S., at 487. 

The cases under review demonstrate the improper burden imposed on the States when Martinez applies beyond

its narrow scope. The sprawling evidentiary hearing in 

Jones is particularly poignant. Ostensibly to assess cause

and prejudice under Martinez, the District Court ordered a 

7-day hearing that included testimony from no fewer than

10 witnesses, including defense trial counsel, defense postconviction counsel, the lead investigating detective, three 

forensic pathologists, an emergency medicine and trauma

specialist, a biomechanics and functional human anatomy 

expert, and a crime scene and bloodstain pattern analyst.

See 943 F. 3d, at 1219, 1225–1226. Of these witnesses, only 

one of the forensic pathologists and the lead detective testified at the original trial. See id., at 1223–1225. The remainder testified on virtually every disputed issue in the 

case, including the timing of Rachel Gray’s injuries and her

cause of death. See id., at 1226–1228. This wholesale relitigation of Jones’ guilt is plainly not what Martinez envisioned. 

B 

Martinez aside, respondents propose a second reading of

§2254(e)(2) that supposedly permits consideration of new 

evidence in their habeas cases. Their interpretation proceeds in two steps. First, respondents argue that because 

§2254(e)(2) bars only “an evidentiary hearing on the claim,” 
 

20 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

Opinion of the Court 

a federal court may hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether there is cause and prejudice. In respondents’ 

view, a so-called “Martinez hearing” is not a “hearing on the 

claim.” §2254(e)(2) (emphasis added). Second, with that 

evidence admitted for cause and prejudice, respondents

contend that the habeas court may then consider the new 

evidence to evaluate the merits of the underlying ineffectiveassistance claim. By considering already admitted evidence, respondents reason, the habeas court is not holding 

a “hearing” that §2254(e)(2) otherwise would prohibit. Ibid. 

There are good reasons to doubt respondents’ first point, 

but we need not address it because our precedent squarely 

forecloses the second. In Holland, we explained that

§2254(e)(2)’s “restrictions apply a fortiori when a prisoner

seeks relief based on new evidence without an evidentiary 

hearing.” 542 U. S., at 653 (emphasis deleted). The basis 

for our decision was obvious: A contrary reading would have

countenanced an end-run around the statute. Federal habeas courts could have accepted any new evidence so long 

as they avoided labeling their intake of the evidence as a 

“hearing.” Therefore, when a federal habeas court convenes 

an evidentiary hearing for any purpose, or otherwise admits or reviews new evidence for any purpose, it may not

consider that evidence on the merits of a negligent prisoner’s defaulted claim unless the exceptions in §2254(e)(2)

are satisfied. 

Respondents all but concede that their argument

amounts to the same kind of evasion of §2254(e)(2) that we

rejected in Holland. They nonetheless object that Holland 

renders many Martinez hearings a nullity, because there is

no point in developing a record for cause and prejudice if a

federal court cannot later consider that evidence on the 

merits. While we agree that any such Martinez hearing 

would serve no purpose, that is a reason to dispense with 

Martinez hearings altogether, not to set §2254(e)(2) aside. 
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 21 

Opinion of the Court 

Thus, if that provision applies and the prisoner cannot satisfy its “stringent requirements,” Michael Williams, 529 

U. S., at 433, a federal court may not hold an evidentiary 

hearing—or otherwise consider new evidence—to assess 

cause and prejudice under Martinez. 

This follows from our decision in Schriro v. Landrigan, 

550 U. S. 465 (2007). There, we held that a federal court, 

“[i]n deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, . . . 

must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove . . . factual allegations [that] would entitle 

[him] to federal habeas relief.” Id., at 474. “This approach

makes eminent sense,” for if “district courts held evidentiary hearings without first asking whether the evidence

the petitioner seeks to present would satisfy AEDPA’s demanding standards, they would needlessly prolong federal

habeas proceedings.” Cullen, 563 U. S., at 208–209 

(SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). Here, holding a Martinez 

hearing when the prisoner cannot “satisfy AEDPA’s demanding standards” in §2254(e)(2) would “prolong federal 

habeas proceedings” with no purpose. 563 U. S., at 209 

(SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). And because a federal habeas 

court may never “needlessly prolong” a habeas case, ibid., 

particularly given the “essential” need to promote the finality of state convictions, Calderon, 523 U. S., at 555, a Martinez hearing is improper if the newly developed evidence 

never would “entitle [the prisoner] to federal habeas relief,” 

Schriro, 550 U. S., at 474. 

C 

Ultimately, respondents’ proposed expansion of factfinding in federal court, whether by Martinez or other means, 

conflicts with any appropriately limited federal habeas review. In our dual-sovereign system, federal courts must afford unwavering respect to the centrality “of the trial of a 

criminal case in state court.” Wainwright, 433 U. S., at 90. 

That is the moment at which “[s]ociety’s resources have 
 

22 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

Opinion of the Court 

been concentrated . . . in order to decide, within the limits 

of human fallibility, the question of guilt or innocence of one 

of its citizens.” Ibid.; see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 

390, 416 (1993); Davila, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8). 

Such intervention is also an affront to the State and its citizens who returned a verdict of guilt after considering the 

evidence before them. Federal courts, years later, lack the

competence and authority to relitigate a State’s criminal 

case. 

The dissent contends that we “overstat[e] the harm to

States that would result from allowing” prisoners to develop 

evidence outside §2254(e)(2)’s narrow exceptions. Post, at 

17. Not so. Serial relitigation of final convictions undermines the finality that “is essential to both the retributive 

and deterrent functions of criminal law.” Calderon, 523 

U. S., at 555; see also Engle, 456 U. S., at 126–127, and 

n. 32. Further, broadly available habeas relief encourages

prisoners to “‘sandba[g]’” state courts by “select[ing] a few 

promising claims for airing” on state postconviction review,

“while reserving others for federal habeas review” should

state proceedings come up short. Murray, 477 U. S., at 492; 

see also Wainwright, 433 U. S., at 89. State prisoners already have a strong incentive to save claims for federal habeas proceedings in order to avoid the highly deferential 

standard of review that applies to claims properly raised in 

state court. See §2254(d); Harrington, 562 U. S., at 105. 

Permitting federal factfinding would encourage yet more 

federal litigation of defaulted claims. 

* * * 

Because we have no warrant to impose any factfinding 

beyond §2254(e)(2)’s narrow exceptions to AEDPA’s “genera[l] ba[r on] evidentiary hearings,” McQuiggin, 569 U. S., 

at 395, we reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals. 

It is so ordered. 
 

 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 20–1009 

DAVID SHINN, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT 

OF CORRECTIONS, REHABILITATION AND 

REENTRY, PETITIONER v. DAVID 

MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

DAVID SHINN, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT 

OF CORRECTIONS, REHABILITATION AND 

REENTRY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 

BARRY LEE JONES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

[May 23, 2022] 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE BREYER and 

JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting. 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants

the right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial. This 

Court has recognized that right as “a bedrock principle”

that constitutes the very “foundation for our adversary system” of criminal justice. Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U. S. 1, 12 

(2012). Today, however, the Court hamstrings the federal 

courts’ authority to safeguard that right. The Court’s decision will leave many people who were convicted in violation

of the Sixth Amendment to face incarceration or even execution without any meaningful chance to vindicate their 

right to counsel. 

In reaching its decision, the Court all but overrules two

recent precedents that recognized a critical exception to the 

general rule that federal courts may not consider claims on

habeas review that were not raised in state court. Just 10 

years ago, the Court held that a federal court may consider 
 

 

2 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

a habeas petitioner’s substantial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel (a “trial-ineffectiveness” claim), even 

if not presented in state court, if the State barred the petitioner from asserting that claim until state postconviction

proceedings, and the petitioner’s counsel in those proceedings was also ineffective. See id., at 17; see also Trevino v. 

Thaler, 569 U. S. 413, 429 (2013). Martinez and Trevino 

establish that such a petitioner is not at fault for any failure 

to bring a trial-ineffectiveness claim in state court. Despite

these precedents, the Court today holds that such a petitioner is nonetheless at fault for the ineffective assistance 

of postconviction counsel in developing the evidence of trial

ineffectiveness in state court. The Court instead holds that 

a petitioner in these circumstances, having received ineffective assistance of trial and postconviction counsel, is barred

from developing such evidence in federal court.

This decision is perverse. It is illogical: It makes no sense 

to excuse a habeas petitioner’s counsel’s failure to raise a 

claim altogether because of ineffective assistance in postconviction proceedings, as Martinez and Trevino did, but to 

fault the same petitioner for that postconviction counsel’s 

failure to develop evidence in support of the trial-ineffectiveness claim. In so doing, the Court guts Martinez’s and 

Trevino’s core reasoning. The Court also arrogates power

from Congress: The Court’s analysis improperly reconfigures the balance Congress struck in the Antiterrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) between state

interests and individual constitutional rights.

By the Court’s telling, its holding (however implausible) 

is compelled by statute. Make no mistake. Neither AEDPA 

nor this Court’s precedents require this result. I respectfully dissent. 

I 

The majority sets forth the gruesome nature of the mur-
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

ders with which respondents were charged. Our Constitution insists, however, that no matter how heinous the crime, 

any conviction must be secured respecting all constitutional

protections. The history of respondents’ trials and their 

state postconviction proceedings illustrates the breakdown

in the adversarial system caused by ineffective assistance

of counsel, a violation of the Sixth Amendment. 

A 

Respondent Barry Lee Jones was charged with the murder of his girlfriend’s 4-year-old daughter, Rachel Gray.

The State argued that Rachel died as a result of an injury 

she sustained while in Jones’ care. Jones’ trial counsel 

failed to undertake even a cursory investigation and, as a 

result, did not uncover readily available medical evidence 

that could have shown that Rachel sustained her injuries

when she was not in Jones’ care. Having heard none of this

evidence, the jury convicted Jones and the trial judge sentenced him to death. 

Jones filed for postconviction review in Arizona state 

court. Under Arizona law, Jones was not permitted to argue on direct appeal that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance; accordingly, state postconviction review was his first opportunity to raise his trialineffectiveness claim. See State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 3, 

39 P. 3d 525, 527 (2002). At this stage, however, Jones was 

met with another egregious failure of counsel. Arizona 

state law sets minimum qualifications that attorneys must 

meet to be appointed in capital cases like Jones’, but the 

Arizona Supreme Court waived those requirements in

Jones’ case, and the state court appointed postconviction

counsel who lacked those qualifications. See Jones v. Ryan, 

327 F. Supp. 3d 1157, 1214 (Ariz. 2018) (citing Ariz. Rev.

Stat. Ann. §13–4041 (2019)). Jones’ new counsel conducted 

almost no investigation outside of the evidence in the trial 
 

 

 

 

4 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

record. In short, Jones’ postconviction counsel failed to investigate the ineffective assistance of Jones’ trial counsel.

Counsel moved for the appointment of an investigator, but 

did so under the wrong provision of Arizona law. The motion was denied. Counsel ultimately filed a petition for

postconviction relief that failed to advance any argument 

that Jones’ trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the State’s medical evidence. Arizona courts denied 

the petition. See ante, at 4–5. 

Jones then sought federal habeas relief, at last represented by competent counsel, and alleged that his trial

counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing adequately to investigate his case. The District Court held an 

evidentiary hearing at which Jones presented evidence that 

the injuries to Rachel could not have been inflicted at the

time the State alleged that Jones was with her, and that

this evidence would have been readily available to Jones’ 

trial and state postconviction counsel, had they investigated the case. The District Court concluded that Jones’ 

postconviction counsel had rendered ineffective assistance

in failing to raise this claim in state postconviction proceedings and therefore held that Jones could raise it for the first 

time in federal court under Martinez. The District Court 

also relied on this evidence to hold, on the merits, that 

Jones received ineffective assistance at trial. The court 

found that there was a “reasonable probability that the jury

would not have unanimously convicted [Jones] of any of the 

counts” if Jones’ trial counsel had “adequately investigated 

and presented medical and other expert testimony to rebut

the State’s theory” of Jones’ guilt. 327 F. Supp. 3d, at 1211. 

Arizona moved to stay the granting of the habeas writ by 

arguing that 28 U. S. C. §2254(e)(2), a provision enacted as

part of AEDPA, barred the District Court from considering

on the merits the evidence that Jones developed to satisfy 

Martinez’s requirements. The District Court denied the 

motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in relevant part. 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 5 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

Relying on Martinez’s recognition that “‘[c]laims of ineffective assistance at trial often require investigative work,’” 

the Ninth Circuit concluded that “§2254(e)(2) does not prevent a district court from considering new evidence, developed to overcome a procedural default under Martinez v. 

Ryan, when adjudicating the underlying claim on de novo

review.” 943 F. 3d 1211, 1222 (2019) (quoting Martinez, 566 

U. S., at 11). 

B 

Respondent David Ramirez was convicted for the capital

murders of his girlfriend and her daughter. At the sentencing phase, the state court appointed a psychologist to conduct a mental health evaluation. Ramirez’s counsel failed 

to provide the psychologist with evidence that Ramirez had

an intellectual disability and failed to develop a claim of intellectual disability to present in mitigation against the imposition of a death sentence and in support of the imposition 

of a sentence of life without parole. Ramirez was sentenced 

to death. 

As in Jones’ case, an Arizona state court appointed

Ramirez counsel for his state postconviction claim. And as 

in Jones’ case, state postconviction proceedings were

Ramirez’s first opportunity to raise a claim of trial ineffectiveness. Ramirez’s postconviction attorney, however, did 

not conduct any investigation beyond the existing trial record, despite being aware of indications that Ramirez might

have intellectual disabilities, including that his mother 

drank when she was pregnant with him and that he demonstrated developmental delays as a child. Nor did Ramirez’s 

postconviction counsel argue that Ramirez’s trial counsel 

provided ineffective assistance by failing to develop and 

present this mitigating evidence. Arizona courts denied 

Ramirez’s postconviction petition. 

Citing “‘concerns regarding the quality’” of Ramirez’s 
 

 

 

6 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

prior counsel, a Federal District Court appointed the Arizona Federal Public Defender to represent him in federal

habeas proceedings. Ramirez v. Ryan, 937 F. 3d 1230, 1238 

(CA9 2019). In his habeas petition, Ramirez raised a claim

concerning the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. In support of his claim, Ramirez submitted evidence from family

members, whom trial counsel and state postconviction

counsel had never contacted, revealing the depths of abuse 

and neglect Ramirez experienced as a child and the life-long

manifestations of his possible disability. The evidence 

showed that Ramirez grew up eating on the floor and sleeping on dirty mattresses in houses filthy with animal feces; 

that Ramirez’s mother would beat him with electrical cords; 

and that Ramirez displayed multiple apparent developmental delays, including “delayed walking, potty training, and 

speech” and inability to maintain basic hygiene or to use 

utensils to eat. Id., at 1239. In addition, the court-appointed psychologist who evaluated Ramirez during the 

sentencing phase of trial averred to the habeas court that if 

trial counsel had provided him with Ramirez’s school records and prior IQ scores, he would have thought they suggested intellectual disability and insisted on more comprehensive testing.1 Finally, Ramirez’s trial counsel submitted 

an affidavit stating that she had not been “prepared to handle ‘the representation of someone as mentally disturbed as 

. . . Ramirez’” and explaining that the evidence from 

—————— 1This evidence would have been relevant for the jurors’ penalty deliberations. Arizona law requires the penalty phase jury to consider, in deciding whether to impose a death sentence, certain “mitigating circumstances,” including the “defendant’s capacity to appreciate the 

wrongfulness of his conduct.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–751(G)(1). The 

Constitution guarantees convicted capital defendants the right to present mitigating evidence. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 

(1982). 
 

 

 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 7 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

Ramirez’s family members, had she uncovered it in an investigation, “‘would have changed the way [she] handled 

both [Ramirez’s] guilt phase and his sentencing phase.’” 

Id., at 1240. In light of this evidence, Ramirez sought an

opportunity to develop his trial-ineffectiveness claim further.2 

The District Court denied relief on Ramirez’s trial-ineffectiveness claim and declined to allow further evidentiary

development. On appeal, Arizona conceded that Ramirez’s 

postconviction counsel performed deficiently. The Ninth 

Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Ramirez had 

satisfied the requirements of Martinez because postconviction counsel had provided ineffective representation and

Ramirez’s trial-ineffectiveness claim was substantial. The 

Ninth Circuit directed the District Court to allow evidentiary development of Ramirez’s trial-ineffectiveness claim, 

recognizing that he had been “precluded from such development because of his post-conviction counsel’s ineffective 

representation.” 937 F. 3d, at 1248. 

II 

Martinez and Trevino afford habeas petitioners like

Jones and Ramirez the opportunity to bring certain trialineffectiveness claims for the first time in federal court. 

The question before the Court is whether Jones and 

Ramirez can make good on that opportunity by developing 

evidence in support of these claims, or whether AEDPA 

nevertheless requires them to rely on the state-court records, constructed by ineffective trial and postconviction 

—————— 2The District Court initially denied Ramirez’s petition, and Ramirez 

appealed. While his appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit, this Court 

decided Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U. S. 1 (2012), and the Ninth Circuit remanded Ramirez’s appeal to the District Court in light of that decision. 

See App. 452–453. On remand, the District Court ordered supplemental

briefing, and Ramirez submitted affidavits from his family members and

trial counsel in support of his trial-ineffectiveness claim. See id., at 454– 

455, 473–474. 
 

8 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

counsel, because they “failed to develop the factual basis of 

[the ineffective assistance] claim[s] in State court proceedings.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(e)(2).

Under this Court’s precedents, the answer is clear. Martinez and Trevino establish that petitioners are not at fault 

for any failure to raise their claims in state court in these

circumstances. Other precedents hold that AEDPA’s

§2254(e)(2)’s “failed to develop” language, too, incorporates 

a threshold requirement that the petitioner be at fault for

not developing evidence. A petitioner cannot logically be

faultless for not bringing a claim because of postconviction 

counsel’s ineffectiveness, yet at fault for not developing its 

evidentiary basis for exactly the same reason. 

A 

This Court’s precedents, culminating in Martinez and 

Trevino, explain the circumstances under which habeas petitioners are deemed accountable for their attorneys’ failures to present claims in state court. A petitioner who does

not properly present a claim in a state proceeding generally 

may not raise the claim in federal court, because the claim 

has been “procedurally defaulted.” See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 486 (1986). 

A federal court, however, can excuse a procedural default 

and permit a petitioner to raise a claim for the first time in

federal court if the petitioner can “demonstrate cause for

the procedural default in state court and actual prejudice

as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.” Maples 

v. Thomas, 565 U. S. 266, 280 (2012) (internal quotation 

marks and alterations omitted). This Court has held that 

“[c]ause for a procedural default exists where something external to the petitioner . . . that cannot fairly be attributed

to him impeded his efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks and alterations 

omitted).

As a general matter, attorney error does not constitute 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 9 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

cause to excuse procedural default because courts attribute 

attorneys’ errors to their clients. Coleman v. Thompson, 

501 U. S. 722, 753 (1991). In certain situations, however, 

attorney error will instead “be seen as an external factor” 

and therefore constitute cause. Id., at 754. In Maples, we 

held that where an attorney abandoned his client without 

notice, “principles of agency law and fundamental fairness” 

required finding cause to excuse a procedural default, as the

petitioner had been “disarmed by extraordinary circumstances quite beyond his control.” 565 U. S., at 289. In 

Coleman, we explained that “[a]ttorney error that constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel” similarly demonstrates cause to excuse procedural default in the context of

a direct appeal. 501 U. S., at 753–754. Coleman explained

that error that “constitutes a violation of petitioner’s right 

to counsel . . . must be seen as an external factor, i.e., ‘imputed to the State’” because the Sixth Amendment places

the burden of guaranteeing effective assistance of counsel

on the State. Id., at 754. 

Coleman left unanswered the question whether ineffective assistance of counsel at the postconviction stage, where

defendants generally do not have a constitutional right to

counsel, could also constitute cause to excuse default. See 

id., at 755. This question is critical in Arizona and other 

States that do not allow defendants to raise trial-ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal, where individuals are constitutionally entitled to effective counsel, and instead require them to raise these claims for the first time in

collateral proceedings, in which this Court has not recognized a constitutional right to counsel. 

Martinez, 566 U. S. 1, held that in these States, postconviction counsel’s failure to raise a substantial trial-ineffectiveness claim could constitute cause to excuse a procedural 

default. The Court observed that where a state collateral 

proceeding is the first time that a petitioner can press a

trial-ineffectiveness claim, the collateral proceeding is “the 
 

 

10 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

equivalent of a prisoner’s direct appeal,” and constitutes the 

petitioner’s “‘one and only appeal’” as to that claim. Id., at 

8, 11 (quoting Coleman, 501 U. S., at 756). Because this 

result was occasioned by the State’s “deliberat[e] cho[ice] to

move [such] claims outside of the direct-appeal process,

where counsel is constitutionally guaranteed,” the Court 

held that the general attorney-attribution rule did not apply where postconviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance, just as it would not if appellate counsel on direct review had done so. Martinez, 566 U. S., at 13–14, 16. 

Instead, Martinez held, for a habeas petitioner with a “substantial” underlying trial-ineffectiveness claim who also 

has the misfortune of being represented by ineffective postconviction counsel, the failure of postconviction counsel to

raise the trial-ineffectiveness claim is not properly attributable to the petitioner. Id., at 14. 

A year later, in Trevino, 569 U. S. 413, the Court reaffirmed and extended Martinez’s core holding. Trevino held 

that where a State does not offer “a meaningful opportunity

to present a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

on direct appeal,” a defendant whose collateral-review 

counsel renders ineffective assistance has demonstrated 

cause to excuse the procedural default of his trial-ineffectiveness claim. 569 U. S., at 428.3 

B 

There is no dispute here that respondents’ trial-ineffectiveness claims clear the procedural default hurdle under 

Martinez and Trevino. The question is whether a habeas

petitioner can be faultless for a procedural default under 

—————— 3 While Martinez analyzed a state statutory regime that expressly required defendants to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 

claim on collateral review, Trevino confronted a state statutory regime

that left open the theoretical possibility of raising such a claim on direct 

appeal, but made it “ ‘virtually impossible’ ” for defendants to do so. 569 

U. S., at 423. 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 11 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

Martinez and nonetheless barred by AEDPA’s §2254(e)(2) 

from seeking an evidentiary hearing in federal court, subject to exceptions not applicable here, because the petitioner

“failed to develop the factual basis of [the procedurally defaulted] claim in State court proceedings.”

Precedent establishes that §2254(e)(2) incorporates a

threshold, fault-based “fail[ure] to develop” standard that

must be understood in conjunction with the fault-based reasoning in Martinez. In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 420 

(2000), this Court examined what it means to have “failed 

to develop the factual basis of a claim” under §2254(e)(2). 

The Court concluded that this language imposes a faultbased standard, meaning that it erects a bar only to those 

who bear some responsibility for a lack of evidentiary development in state-court proceedings. The Court acknowledged that “fail” is “sometimes used in a neutral way, not 

importing fault or want of diligence.” Id., at 431. As a matter of ordinary meaning, however, the Court concluded that 

“fail” in §2254(e)(2) connotes “some omission, fault, or negligence.” Ibid. The Court explained that “a person is not at 

fault when his diligent efforts to perform an act are

thwarted” by an external force. Id., at 432. 

Williams found further support for its fault-based reading of “failed to develop” in pre-AEDPA cases that foreshadowed the language of §2254(e)(2). Specifically, Williams 

noted the similarity between the text of §2254(e)(2) and the 

language of the Court’s decision in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 

504 U. S. 1 (1992). The Williams Court reasoned that when 

it enacted AEDPA, Congress had “raised the bar Keeney imposed on prisoners who were not diligent” (i.e., those who 

were at fault) “in state-court proceedings.” 529 U. S., at 433 

(emphasis added). At the same time, however, “the opening 

clause of §2254(e)(2) codifies Keeney’s threshold standard of 

diligence.” Id., at 434. Phrased differently, under AEDPA,

“[i]f there has been no lack of diligence at the relevant

stages in the state proceedings, the prisoner has not ‘failed 
 

 

 

12 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

to develop’ the facts under §2254(e)(2)’s opening clause, and 

he will be excused from showing compliance with the balance of the subsection’s requirements.” Id., at 437. 

The reasoning of Martinez and Trevino applies with equal

force to the threshold diligence/fault standard of Keeney, 

Williams, and §2254(e)(2). Under Williams, whether petitioners who satisfy Martinez are nevertheless subject to

§2254(e)(2) turns on whether they were at fault for not developing evidence in support of their trial-ineffectiveness 

claims in state postconviction proceedings. All agree that a 

habeas petitioner is not at fault when the responsibility for 

an error is properly imputed to the State or to some other 

external factor. Martinez cases are among the rare ones in

which attorney error constitutes such an external factor.

That is because a State’s “deliberat[e] cho[ice]” to move trial 

ineffectiveness claims outside of direct appeal and into postconviction review “significantly diminishes prisoners’ ability to file such claims.” Martinez, 566 U. S., at 13. There is 

nothing nefarious about this choice, but it is “not without

consequences.” Ibid. Together, Martinez, Trevino, and Williams demonstrate that when a State both provides a criminal defendant with ineffective trial counsel and decides to 

remove his trial-ineffectiveness claim from appellate review, postconviction counsel’s ineffectiveness cannot fairly 

be attributed to the defendant, and he therefore has not 

“failed to develop the factual basis of [his] claim.”

§2254(e)(2).

Any other reading hollows out Martinez and Trevino. 

Martinez repeatedly recognized that to prove a trial-ineffectiveness claim (or even to show that it is “substantial”), habeas petitioners frequently must introduce evidence outside 

of the trial record. See, e.g., 566 U. S., at 13 (“Ineffectiveassistance claims often depend on evidence outside the trial

record”). Ineffective-assistance claims frequently turn on

errors of omission: evidence that was not obtained, wit-
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 13 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

nesses that were not contacted, experts who were not retained, or investigative leads that were not pursued.

Demonstrating that counsel failed to take each of these 

measures by definition requires evidence beyond the trial

record. See Trevino, 569 U. S., at 413 (observing that “‘the

inherent nature of most ineffective assistance’” claims 

means that the “trial court record will often fail to ‘contai[n]

the information necessary to substantiate’ the claim”); Brief

for Federal Defender Capital Habeas Units as Amici Curiae 

4–6. Indeed, the very reason States like Arizona might 

choose to reserve a trial-ineffectiveness claim for a collateral proceeding is to allow development of the factual basis

for the claim. Martinez, 566 U. S., at 13. To hold a petitioner at fault for not developing a factual basis because of

postconviction counsel’s ineffectiveness in the Martinez 

context, however, would be to eliminate altogether such evidentiary development and doom many meritorious trial-ineffectiveness claims that satisfy Martinez. Such a rule is 

not only inconsistent with the reasoning of Martinez and 

Trevino but renders those decisions meaningless in many, 

if not most, cases. 

C 

Applying this interpretation of §2254(e)(2) here makes

clear that Jones and Ramirez are not at fault for their attorneys’ failures to develop the state-court record. In Jones’ 

case, the District Court found, and the Ninth Circuit 

agreed, that Jones satisfied the demanding requirements of 

Martinez: Arizona appointed postconviction counsel who

did not meet the minimum qualifications for appointment 

and who failed to raise a substantial (indeed, meritorious)

trial-ineffectiveness claim. In Ramirez’s case, too, the 

Ninth Circuit held that postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate Ramirez’s upbringing (despite 

clear indications of his disability) and for failing to raise or

develop a substantial claim of trial ineffectiveness. The 
 

 

14 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

lower courts thus held that both respondents satisfied the

demanding requirements of Martinez, holdings that the

Court does not question.

By definition, Jones and Ramirez are not at fault for their

state postconviction counsel’s failures to develop evidence. 

Jones and Ramirez acted diligently, but their attorneys’ errors, paired with the State’s choice of how to structure their

review proceedings, constituted external impediments. As 

a result, Jones and Ramirez have not “failed to develop” the

factual bases of their claims, and AEDPA’s §2254(e)(2), 

properly interpreted, poses no bar to evidentiary development in federal court. 

III 

Rejecting the teachings of Martinez and Trevino, the 

Court adopts an irrational reading of §2254(e)(2). The 

Court begins with the uncontested proposition that, in the

ordinary case, a habeas petitioner “‘must bear the risk of 

attorney error.’” Ante, at 11 (quoting Coleman, 501 U. S., 

at 753). From there, the Court leaps to the conclusion that 

a petitioner is at fault for not developing the evidentiary

record on a trial-ineffectiveness claim even if that lack of 

development was the result of his postconviction counsel’s 

ineffective assistance. Ante, at 12. 

The Court’s analysis rests on two fundamental errors.

First, the Court eviscerates Martinez and Trevino and mischaracterizes other precedents. Second, the Court relies 

upon its own mistaken understanding of AEDPA’s policies 

and the state interests at issue, recycling claims rejected by

the Martinez Court and ignoring the careful balance struck 

by Congress. In doing so, the Court gives short shrift to the 

egregious breakdowns of the adversarial system that occurred in these cases, breakdowns of the type that federal 

habeas review exists to correct. 
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 15 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

A 

The doctrinal consequence of the Court’s distortion of 

precedent is to render Martinez and Trevino dead letters in 

the mine run of cases. As explained, those precedents are 

premised on the understanding that a habeas petitioner is

not responsible for a postconviction attorney’s ineffective

failure to assert a substantial trial-ineffectiveness claim in 

States that do not offer petitioners a meaningful opportunity to raise such claims on direct appeal. The Court, 

however, does not grapple with this logic on its own terms. 

Instead, the Court limits Martinez and Trevino to their 

facts, emptying them of all meaning in the ordinary case 

(where, as those precedents explain, a trial-ineffectiveness

claim will necessarily rely on evidence beyond the trial record). Tellingly, the Court relies on the dissent in Trevino to 

support its disregard of these cases’ reasoning. See ante, at 

18. 

The Court’s analysis also rests on a misplaced view of 

Williams. The Court fixates on Williams’ statement that 

§2254(e)(2) “raised the bar Keeney imposed on prisoners 

who were not diligent in state-court proceedings.” 529 

U. S., at 433; see ante, at 16. The Court emphasizes the 

first part of that statement while ignoring its qualification: 

that §2254(e)(2) raised the bar for “prisoners who were not 

diligent.” In other words, it is undisputed that the “bar for 

excusing a prisoner’s failure to develop the state-court record” is an onerous one, ante, at 12; the question is whether,

in this context, a habeas petitioner has failed to develop the 

record in the first place. Martinez and Trevino make clear 

that habeas petitioners in Jones’ and Ramirez’s position do 

not lack diligence and are not at fault for the failures of

their ineffective trial and postconviction counsel. 

The Court further charges that respondents’ interpretation of §2254(e)(2) “lacks any principled limit.” Ante, at 17. 

Here again, the Court resuscitates a complaint that previously was relegated to a dissent. See Martinez, 566 U. S., 
 

16 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

at 19 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[N]o one really believes that

[the holding of Martinez] will remain limited to ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel cases”). The complaint is just as 

unavailing now that it has captured a majority. Respondents’ interpretation only affects habeas petitioners raising

substantial trial-ineffectiveness claims in the subset of 

States that limit such claims to postconviction review, just 

as Martinez did. In that context, postconviction review is a 

prisoner’s “one and only appeal” of a trial-ineffectiveness

claim, Coleman, 501 U. S., at 756 (internal quotation marks 

omitted; emphasis deleted), and the ineffective assistance

of counsel at that stage forecloses review of a crucially important constitutional right. Any assertion that respondents’ interpretation of the statute would blow the door open

to myriad other claims is hyperbole that this Court, until

today, consistently has rejected.

Finally, the Court finds it implausible that Congress 

would have considered the threshold diligence inquiry under §2254(e)(2) to account for the Martinez context. Ante, 

at 16–17. But Congress legislated against the backdrop of 

Coleman. Coleman, in turn, made clear (decades before 

Martinez) that in certain circumstances where attorney error could be “seen as an external factor, i.e., ‘imputed to the

State,’” including the ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, the prisoner would not properly be deemed at 

fault. Coleman, 501 U. S., at 754. Moreover, it is not uncommon for Congress to adopt statutory language that incorporates an evolving judicial doctrine, see, e.g., Kimble v. 

Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 461 (2015), and 

there is no reason this Court should second-guess Congress’ 

choice to incorporate a judicially created diligence doctrine

here. 

B 

Much of the Court’s opinion focuses not on the text of 

§2254(e)(2), nor on the relevant precedents, but on what the 
 

 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 17 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

Court views as AEDPA’s unyielding purpose: ensuring that

federal courts “afford unwavering respect” to state court 

criminal proceedings. Ante, at 21; see also ante, at 6–9, 18– 

19, 20–21. The Court seriously errs by suggesting that

AEDPA categorically prioritizes maximal deference to 

state-court convictions over vindication of the constitutional protections at the core of our adversarial system. 

It is of course true that AEDPA’s rules are designed to

“ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the finality 

and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our system of federalism.” Martinez, 566 

U. S., at 9. The enacting Congress, however, did not pursue 

these aims at all costs. AEDPA does not render state judgments unassailable, but strikes a balance between respecting state-court judgments and preserving the necessary 

and vital role federal courts play in “guard[ing] against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 102–103 (2011)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “ ‘Congress

has recognized that federal habeas corpus has a particularly important role to play in promoting fundamental fairness in the imposition of the death penalty.’ ” Christeson v. Roper, 574 U. S. 373, 377 (2015) (per 

curiam). Absent that role, what this Court regularly calls 

“the Great Writ” hardly would be worthy of the label. See, 

e.g., Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631, 649 (2010).

The Court today supplants the balance Congress struck 

with its single-minded focus on finality. In doing so, it overstates the harm to States that would result from allowing

petitioners to develop facts in support of Martinez claims. 

See ante, at 18. Importantly, Martinez applies only where

the underlying claim is one of trial ineffectiveness, and only 

if a petitioner demonstrates that the claim is “substantial.”

566 U. S., at 14. The Court reaches to support its holding 

by yet again repackaging a dissenter’s warning, this time 
 

 

 

 

 

 

18 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

that Martinez would “put a significant strain on state resources.” Id., at 22 (opinion of Scalia, J.). Nearly a decade

of experience with Martinez, however, has proved this unfounded prediction false. In a 9-year sample of three States

(Florida, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina), federal courts 

adjudicated 1,200 habeas petitions raising Martinez claims. 

See Brief for Habeas Scholars as Amici Curiae 7–8. These 

courts held evidentiary hearings in less than two percent of 

these cases. Ibid. The lower federal courts, in other words, 

are perfectly capable of policing Martinez’s limits. There is 

no reason to expect that to change from an affirmance here. 

In the same vein, the Court bemoans the “sprawling evidentiary hearing” conducted by the District Court in Jones’ 

case. Ante, at 19. Of course, the scope of the District Court’s

hearing (including evidence from medical experts, forensic

experts, law enforcement personnel, and others) was necessary only because trial counsel failed to present any of that 

evidence during the guilt phase of Jones’ capital case. Far 

from constituting an inappropriate and “wholesale relitigation of Jones’s guilt,” ibid., the District Court’s hearing was

wide-ranging precisely because the breakdown of the adversarial system in Jones’ case was so egregious. 

The Court suggests that evidentiary hearings like Jones’ 

will “encourag[e] prisoners” to “‘sandba[g]’ state courts” by 

strategically holding back claims from state postconviction 

review to present them for the first time in federal court. 

Ante, at 22. That claim is odd, particularly in this context. 

It is a State’s decision to divert trial-ineffectiveness claims 

from direct appeal to postconviction review, and then to provide ineffective postconviction counsel, that results in the 

failure to raise or develop such claims before state courts. 

No habeas petitioner or postconviction counsel could possibly perceive a strategic benefit from failing to raise a meritorious trial-ineffectiveness claim in an available forum. 

Indeed, the whole thrust of Jones’ and Ramirez’s argument

is that their Sixth Amendment claims were so obvious that 
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 19 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

their state postconviction attorneys were ineffective in failing to assert them.

On the other side of the ledger, the Court understates, or 

ignores altogether, the gravity of the state systems’ failures 

in these two cases. To put it bluntly: Two men whose trial 

attorneys did not provide even the bare minimum level of

representation required by the Constitution may be executed because forces outside of their control prevented them 

from vindicating their constitutional right to counsel. It is 

hard to imagine a more “extreme malfunctio[n],” Harrington, 562 U. S., at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted),

than the prejudicial deprivation of a right that constitutes 

the “foundation for our adversary system,” Martinez, 566 

U. S., at 12. 

Nor will the damage be limited to these two cases. Even 

before Martinez, this Court recognized that a trial record is

“often incomplete or inadequate” to demonstrate inadequate assistance of counsel. Massaro v. United States, 538 

U. S. 500, 505 (2003). A trial record “may contain no evidence of alleged errors of omission,” like a failure sufficiently to investigate a case. Ibid. For a court to discern 

“whether [any] alleged error was prejudicial,” too, it is obvious that “additional factual development” may be required. Ibid. The on-the-ground experience of capital habeas attorneys confirms this commonsense notion. See 

Brief for Federal Defender Capital Habeas Units as Amici 

Curiae 3–4. The Court’s decision thus reduces to rubble 

many habeas petitioners’ Sixth Amendment rights to the

effective assistance of counsel. 

Contrary to the Court’s account, the fundamental fairness concerns that arise from this particular type of breakdown are not unconditionally eclipsed by the need to accord 

finality and respect to state-court judgments. Ante, at 18. 

Finality interests are at their apex when the “essential elements of a presumptively accurate and fair proceeding were

present in the proceeding whose result is challenged.” 
 

 

20 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 694 (1984). The 

effective assistance of counsel is one of those essential elements. See Martinez, 566 U. S., at 12. When the effective 

assistance of counsel is absent, leaving a severely diminished basis for presuming fairness and accuracy, “finality

concerns are somewhat weaker.” Strickland, 466 U. S., at 

694. Neither statute nor precedent supports the Court’s assertion that the virtues of finality override fundamental 

fairness to such a degree that meaningful review of life-ordeath judgments obtained through such deeply flawed proceedings should be foreclosed.

Ultimately, the Court’s decision prevents habeas petitioners in States like Arizona from receiving any guaranteed opportunity to develop the records necessary to enforce

their Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of 

counsel. For the subset of these petitioners who receive ineffective assistance both at trial and in state postconviction 

proceedings, the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee is now an 

empty one. Many, if not most, individuals in this position 

will have no recourse and no opportunity for relief. The responsibility for this devastating outcome lies not with Congress, but with this Court. 

* * * 

Text and precedent instruct that in States that limit review of trial-ineffectiveness claims to postconviction proceedings, habeas petitioners who receive ineffective assistance of both trial and postconviction counsel are not

responsible for any failure to raise their substantial claim 

of trial ineffectiveness, nor for any “fail[ure] to develop” evidence in support of that claim under AEDPA’s §2254(e)(2).

By holding otherwise, the Court not only extinguishes the 

central promise of Martinez and Trevino, but it makes illusory the protections of the Sixth Amendment. I respectfully 

dissent.