U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

i 

28–244 2018

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–61] 

AVIATION READINESS: WHAT’S THE 

FLIGHT PLAN? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

NOVEMBER 9, 2017 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina, Chairman 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona, Vice Chair 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TRENT KELLY, Mississippi 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

A. DONALD MCEACHIN, Virginia 

SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California 

ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland 

STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida 

RO KHANNA, California 

MARGARET DEAN, Professional Staff Member 

BRIAN GARRETT, Professional Staff Member 

DANIELLE STEITZ, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 2 

Wilson, Hon. Joe, a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness ............................................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Gayler, MG William K., USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Aviation 

Center of Excellence and Fort Rucker, U.S. Army ............................................ 8 

Nowland, Lt Gen Mark C., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, 

Headquarters, U.S. Air Force .............................................................................. 3 

Rudder, LtGen Steven R., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, U.S. 

Marine Corps ........................................................................................................ 6 

Shoemaker, VADM Troy M., USN, Commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S. Navy . 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Gayler, MG William K. .................................................................................... 58 

Nowland, Lt Gen Mark C. ............................................................................... 28 

Rudder, LtGen Steven R. ................................................................................. 47 

Shoemaker, VADM Troy M. ............................................................................ 35 

Wilson, Hon. Joe ............................................................................................... 27 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 71 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Brown ......................................................................................................... 86 

Mrs. Hartzler .................................................................................................... 84 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 75 

(1) 

AVIATION READINESS: WHAT’S THE FLIGHT PLAN? 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, 

Washington, DC, Thursday, November 9, 2017. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:11 a.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Wilson (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON READINESS 

Mr. WILSON. Ladies and gentlemen, I call this hearing of the 

House Armed Services Committee Readiness Subcommittee on 

‘‘Aviation Readiness: What is the Flight Plan?’’ to order. A year 

ago, this subcommittee heard testimony from each of your services 

about the readiness levels of military aviation. Infrastructure challenges, underfunded spare parts, and depot backlogs were a consistent theme. 

Aviation readiness challenges do not stop at infrastructure—retention and training of critical skills from trained and experienced 

pilots to aviation maintenance personnel continues to plague the 

readiness recovery. 

All of these challenges are competing with no lessening of operational demand in the fight against global terrorism and with the 

increasingly aging and overused aircraft. 

Today I look forward to hearing about each service’s aviation 

readiness, readiness recovery plans, readiness impacts to safety, 

and where we continue to take risk; calculated in terms of both 

risk to the force and risk to the mission. 

I fully believe that the first responsibility of the national government is to provide for the national security of its citizens—and that 

is especially true of our sailors, soldiers, airmen, and marines; 

therefore, it is our responsibility as members of this subcommittee 

to continue to better understand the readiness situation and underlying problems across aviation and then for us to map a course 

which best assists in correcting any deficiencies and shortfalls. 

And I am grateful to turn to the distinguished gentlelady from 

the territory of Guam, our ranking member, Congresswoman Madeleine Bordallo, for any remarks she may make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson can be found in Appendix 

on page 27.] 
2 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE 

FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good 

morning to all the fine gentlemen that are here at the hearing 

today. And thank you for visiting with me so that I could become 

more acquainted with some of your challenges. 

I look forward to hearing about some of the problems that you 

face as an aviation community and hopefully an understanding on 

what the services are each doing and how Congress can support efforts to improve aviation readiness across the services. 

In 2016, we learned that shortfalls in our service aviation programs existed, from degraded maintenance capabilities to reduced 

training hours. And we began trying to address these in fiscal year 

2017, the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]. Just as 

these conditions developed over time, it will also take time to build 

back readiness since these issues, of course, did not arise overnight. 

What we are continuing to remedy in the fiscal year 2018 NDAA 

are the consequences of years’ worth of high operational tempo, 

aging airframes, degraded aircraft conditions, fewer experienced air 

crews, and fewer skilled military and civilian personnel to maintain 

the aircraft. 

The services have responded by identifying the deficits and 

prioritizing personnel, training, maintenance, infrastructure, and 

logistic needs. And the committee has tried to support these efforts 

through budget authorizations and policy initiatives in the fiscal 

year 2018 NDAA. 

However, this committee is keenly aware that these efforts are 

rendered less effective by the continuing impacts of sequestration 

and unpredictable funding through continuing resolutions. 

When coupled with reductions in skilled personnel at aviation depots, severe challenges in obtaining spare parts for legacy systems, 

late and unpredictable funding due to multiple continuing resolutions, and the unrelenting operational tempo required by today’s 

complex security environment, it is not surprising that we are dealing with readiness challenges. 

So the acquisition of newer aircraft and the modernization of our 

existing aviation systems may bring some relief to the stress of our 

high operational tempo. However, we must ensure there is an appropriate balance between rushing to buy new aircraft and ensuring that we continue investing in the operations and the maintenance of the legacy fleet. 

Providing more funding may help, but it is not always the answer. And it has become very clear that consistency and predictability in funding is more helpful than increased budgets. 

So I welcome this opportunity today to hear from each witness 

about the challenges that they face in their service to achieve and 

sustain aviation readiness and how we in Congress may be able to 

help. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Ranking Member Bordallo. 

In connection with today’s hearings, I welcome the members of 

the full committee who are not members of the subcommittee who 

are or will be attending. 
3 

For a unanimous consent request to permit non-committee members’ participation, I ask unanimous consent that a member who is 

not a member of the subcommittee on the Armed Services be allowed to participate in today’s hearing after all subcommittee members and then full committee members have an opportunity to ask 

questions. Is there any objection? 

Without objection, such members will be recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes. 

I would like to welcome all of our members and the distinguished 

panel of senior aviators present today. This morning we have with 

us Lieutenant [General] Chris Nowland, United States Air Force 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters United States 

Air Force; Vice Admiral Mike Shoemaker, the United States Navy, 

Commander, Naval Air Forces; Lieutenant General Steven Rudder, 

United States Marine Corps, Deputy Commandant for Aviation; 

Major General William Gayler, United States Army, U.S. Army 

Aviation Center of Excellence and Fort Rucker. 

General Nowland, we now turn to you for your opening remarks. 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN MARK C. NOWLAND, USAF, DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. 

AIR FORCE 

General NOWLAND. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Bordallo, 

and distinguished members of the Readiness Subcommittee, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify before you today on the state of 

aviation readiness across the United States Air Force and really 

this whole committee across the joint force. 

As I personally look back on this opportunity, I realize that only 

a privileged few get the chance to testify in front of our country’s 

lawmakers, people with the power to make a difference. And I am 

excited that I can be here today to talk about a subject I am very 

passionate about, regaining full-spectrum readiness for the United 

States Air Force. 

I look forward to discussing with you where we are today, steps 

we are taking to recover, and areas where you can support in order 

to regain full-spectrum readiness soonest. 

For 70 years, our 70th anniversary this year, the United States 

Air Force has provided decisive advantage to the warfighter in air, 

more recently space and cyber domains. Every hour of every day 

airmen support homeland defense, deter aggression from abroad, 

and provide a robust and reliable nuclear deterrent. 

However, we are quickly approaching an inflection point. Twenty-six years of continuous operations have taken a toll on the force 

and adversaries are beginning to close the technological gap. 

Today, our combat-coded units hover around 50 percent readiness rate to meet global demands, specifically for high-end conflict 

against near-peer adversaries. In short, the Air Force is too small 

for what the Nation expects of it. 

The Air Force received $5.6 billion in the fiscal year 2017 request 

for additional appropriation, and we spent it wisely. We were able 

to fund our top priority effecting readiness—growing the force. The 

funding allowed us to recruit 4,000 additional Active Duty airmen, 

which we are using to accelerate readiness recovery by getting our 

planes back in the air. 
4 

We made investments in pilot production to address our most 

critical shortfall, and we outfitted our battlefield airmen with the 

latest equipment to make them more lethal. 

We upgraded our fleet’s targeting capabilities and increased munitions production. Finally, we funded increased levels of accessions, enhanced network security, and repaired infrastructure serving as the backbone for readiness recovery efforts. These investments will arrest our readiness decline in several critical areas. 

But shortfalls remain in the near term. 

The President’s budget for fiscal year 2018 lays the foundation 

to restore readiness and increase joint lethality. But most importantly, an approved budget with stable, predictable funding levels 

will build the bridge to the future. 

Continuing resolutions and a return to the Budget Control Act 

measures will reverse all the progress we have made to this point. 

With predictable budgets we can finally set the conditions necessary for the multiyear process of regaining readiness. 

Since 1947, the Air Force has relentlessly provided America with 

unmatched, decisive combat power in times of peace, contingency, 

and conflict. However, our advantage over potential adversaries is 

shrinking. 

Our Nation requires a ready and lethal air, space, and cyber 

force now more than ever. America expects it, combatant commanders require it, and with your continued support, the United 

States Air Force will regain full-spectrum readiness to ensure our 

warfighters have an asymmetric advantage in any conflict against 

any foe. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of General Nowland can be found in the 

Appendix on page 28.] 

Mr. WILSON. General, thank you very much, and we appreciate 

your service so much. 

And we now proceed to Vice Admiral Shoemaker. 

STATEMENT OF VADM TROY M. SHOEMAKER, USN, 

COMMANDER, NAVAL AIR FORCES, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral SHOEMAKER. Good morning, Chairman Wilson, Ranking 

Member Bordallo, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

I am honored to be here along with my fellow senior aviators to update you on the state of naval aviation readiness. 

In the next few minutes I will reinforce what I know will be a 

consistent theme from the four of us and was already echoed in the 

chairman’s and ranking member’s opening statements. 

As we talk about readiness and what it will take to dig out of 

the hole we are in, we appreciate your support in making our aviation forces whole again and putting us on a better path to support 

SECDEF’s [Secretary of Defense’s] mandate to increase lethality 

and remain ahead of peer competitors around the world. 

In my written testimony I mention Lemoore, California, our West 

Coast master jet base, as a microcosm for our broader readiness 

challenges. And I would like to use our recent West Coast carrier 

deployments as a call to action. 

We are meeting the combatant commanders’ requirements for 

ready, lethal carriers and air wings forward, but at a tremendous 

cost to the readiness of our forces at home. 
5 

For example, to get Carl Vinson, Nimitz and Theodore Roosevelt 

ready to deploy in January, June, and October of this year, and 

equip their embarked air wings with the required number of mission-capable jets, 94 strike fighters had to be transferred to and 

from the maintenance depots or between F–18 squadrons on both 

coasts. 

This included pulling aircraft from the fleet replacement squadrons, where our focus should be on training new aviators. That 

strike fighter inventory management, or shell game, leaves non-deployed squadrons well below the number of jets required to keep 

aviators proficient and progressing toward their career qualifications and milestones, with detrimental impacts to both retention 

and future experience levels. 

Additionally, to get those air wings ready, several hundred parts 

had to be cannibalized from other Super Hornets across the force, 

further decimating the readiness of squadrons and adding significantly and unnecessarily to the workload of our maintainers. 

From a manning perspective, to fill gaps in those deploying 

squadrons and the 3 carriers, over 300 sailors had to be temporarily reassigned from other squadrons, have their orders changed 

or get extended beyond their normal sea tour lengths, which hurts 

our sailors and their families and has cascading effects on enlisted 

retention across the force. 

So what can we do to help improve readiness and quality of service? First, consistent, predictable funding that we can execute on 

1 October is absolutely required. 

Then we must buy back the readiness we have lost from years 

of resource-constrained budgets. Some of it can’t be recovered. It is 

corporate memory, like foundational flying experiences that we no 

longer have in a generation of pilots. 

Other readiness shortfalls, like the diminished stock of parts on 

our carriers and at our bases must be replenished. Pressurized 

budgets have forced us to make difficult tradeoffs to sustain the 

readiness of the current force, modernize that force to pace the 

threat, procure new aircraft with high-end capabilities and increased lethality, and add the critical manpower needed to operate 

and fight those forces and win, as our Nation expects us to do. 

My job as the Navy’s air boss is to work as hard as I can to give 

our commanders the resources they need to focus on warfighting 

first, be ready to operate forward, and be successful when we ask 

them to sail or fly in harm’s way. I hope I can count on your support to deliver that commitment. 

In closing, although we are carefully managing risks at home, I 

couldn’t be more proud of the way our incredible aviators and sailors are performing with quiet professionalism and excellence at sea 

and ashore around the world today. Their service is making a difference for our Nation and we must do all we can to keep them 

ready. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Shoemaker can be found in 

the Appendix on page 35.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Admiral. We appreciate so 

much your service. 
6 

General Rudder. 

STATEMENT OF LTGEN STEVEN R. RUDDER, USMC, DEPUTY 

COMMANDANT FOR AVIATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS 

General RUDDER. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Bordallo, 

distinguished members of the House Armed Services Subcommittee 

on Readiness and other distinguished members, I appreciate the 

opportunity to testify on the current state of Marine Corps aviation 

readiness. 

I would be remiss if I didn’t wish everybody in the room a happy 

Marine Corps birthday. The Marine Corps continues to be the Nation’s expeditionary force in readiness, and Marine Aviation is prepared to surge and fight anywhere you ask them to. 

As Deputy Commandant for Aviation, my focus is building readiness for combat. It is and it will continue to be my top priority. As 

we build readiness for combat, we will also balance modernizing 

the force, as well as fully investing in our maintenance base. 

We watch our ops [operations] tempo very carefully, and today 

we have multiple aviation units engaged around the globe. There 

are F–18s flying combat missions from the land, from aboard Navy 

aircraft carriers, and operating throughout Asia. 

Our V–22s stand ready for combat support of AFRICOM [U.S. 

Africa Command], CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command], and we 

have aviation combat elements operating on amphibious shipping 

throughout the world. We are also dedicated to helping our fellow 

Americans in time of need in support of disaster relief operations. 

This is in addition to our standing deployments and forward posture in the Pacific, where we currently stand ready to support our 

five allies and multiple partners. 

Since last year as our deployment-to-dwell has improved slightly 

from an average of 1:2 to 1:2.6, this means that last year and years 

prior we had marines deployed for 6 months, but they only had 12 

months at home to get ready to deploy again. 

This year we are able to keep marines home for approximately 

15 months, so they are able to gain about another 3 months of 

readiness time. Again, minor improvements, still short of our target, which would be 6 months deployed and 18 months at home to 

prepare for the next deployment. 

Thank you for your support for additional funds we received in 

fiscal year 2017. We have made moderate gains in readiness but 

still not where we want to be. Our readiness recovery strategy is 

built upon sustaining our legacy fleet while modernizing new aircraft, investing in our marines, and balancing funding into fully 

funding our readiness accounts. 

We are 43 percent complete with our transition of every squadron in the Marine Corps. In the past year, Marine Aviation has improved readiness by roughly 15 percent in our modern fleet and 10 

percent in our legacy fleet. 

We are slowly adding aircraft to our flight line. However, we are 

still about 115 aircraft or about 20 percent short of where we want 

to be. 

On average, hours per crew each month increased by almost 2 

hours this year. In 2016 we were flying at 13.5 hours, roughly aver-
7 

aging per pilot. This year we are 15.4. Not where we want to be 

at 16.9, but a slight improvement nonetheless. 

A key part of our readiness recovery is focusing on our marines. 

We are investing in our maintenance marines who make it all possible. Last year we identified experience gap at some of our maintenance supervisory levers. 

Through an update to our MOS [military occupational specialty] 

manual, we are now tracking prioritized, advanced qualifications 

essential to those positions. Tracking these marines within squadrons ensures we keep the right maintainer in the right squadron 

at the right place. 

To further reduce the experience gap, we are offering an aircraft 

maintainer retention bonus to qualified marines that have those 

higher designations. Maintainers who accept the bonus remain in 

the squadron flight line for 2 years supervising and growing the 

next generation. 

To date we have about 350 marines that qualify for this and 

about 130 have accepted. So that is 130 marines distributed 

throughout the Marine Corps that are actually going to stay—experienced marines that are going to stay in the squadron working on 

airplanes. 

Also this year for the first time since 2011, we are giving a pilot 

retention bonus. 

So now that we are adjusting our critical maintenance manpower 

we must invest in supply and depot throughput to support them. 

Our maintainers do not have enough parts on the shelves to sustain aircraft in the flight line. With Congress’ help in 2017, again, 

we funded spares to maximum executable levels. 

In the 2018 budget request that is sitting over here, we have 

again funded to unprecedented levels. In the past, in some cases 

we have funded 25 percent where we are supposed to be; this year, 

between the Navy and Marine Corps, funding at full levels. We 

plan to continue this through the FYDP [Future Years Defense 

Plan] for both our legacy as well as our new airplanes. 

Supply depot improvements allowed us to return 30 Marine F– 

18s to the flight line this year from the depot and reset 13 longterm-down CH–53s. That may not seem like a lot, but out of those 

13 airplanes came out we have flown over 2,000 hours in those airplanes. The 53s their hours have increased more than any other 

community in this past year. 

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to briefly address 

aviation mishaps. It is our commitment that every time we operate 

an aircraft that it is certified safe for flight and ready for the demands we place on it. 

Historically, our mishap rates have been flat, but there was an 

increase in fiscal year 2017. And while there is no direct link between low readiness rates and high Class A mishaps this year, it 

has my fullest attention. There is no question—no question that 

naval aviation is an inherently demanding discipline, and we cannot discount second- and third-order affects of low readiness and 

lack of training reps. 

Human factors and the pressure to be ready for the next deployment comes into play daily. Like any profession, the more you practice your trade the better you are at doing it. The true metric of 
8 

health in aviation is aircrew flight hours. While we have increased 

our average flight hours last year, we are still below what is required. 

Ten years ago, a pilot averaged 16 hours per month. Today it is 

15.4, but that is only part of it. Three years ago, typically 10 years 

ago during a 3-year rotation, typically a 3-year rotation, those pilots averaged 20 percent more hours during that 3-years rotation 

than the pilots are today. 

Consider the data and add that to the current operational tempo. 

That combined with the challenging environments marines operate 

in, there is a marked difference between being current and being 

proficient. 

Conclusion for me is thank you, again, to this committee for all 

the help you have done over the years. Marine Aviation, we continue to improve but it is fragile. 

We need, as you would imagine, stable, predictable funding over 

time, and we need your help as you have in the past to fund those 

readiness enabler accounts and flight air programs to sustain the 

current slight upward tick in readiness. 

Recovery of readiness also means transitioning in new aircraft 

like the F–35 and the CH–53K as fast as possible in a fiscally responsible manner. Simultaneously, we are working hard to sustain, 

as you appropriately put out, our legacy aircraft. 

Mr. Chairman, distinguished committee members, we look forward—the Marine Corps appreciates everything you have done. We 

look forward to taking your question. 

[The prepared statement of General Rudder can be found in the 

Appendix on page 47.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, General, and indeed, happy 

242nd birthday to the U.S. Marine Corps tomorrow. 

And we now proceed with General Gayler. 

STATEMENT OF MG WILLIAM K. GAYLER, USA, COMMANDING 

GENERAL, U.S. ARMY AVIATION CENTER OF EXCELLENCE 

AND FORT RUCKER, U.S. ARMY 

General GAYLER. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Bordallo, 

and distinguished members of the Readiness Subcommittee, thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before you today and address 

Army Aviation readiness. 

I am grateful to represent the Army leadership and the military 

and the civilian professionals and the courageous men and women 

of Army Aviation who steadfastly serve our Nation each day. 

Army Aviation has provided an unparalleled advantage to our 

Nation as a fundamental element of the joint force, and there is no 

doubt that aviation will remain an essential element of any combat 

in the future. However, force structure reductions, increased global 

requirements, funding uncertainty, and the requirement to train 

our forces to a higher level of preparedness raise concerns about 

the overall future readiness of Army Aviation. 

Aviation training is tough under any circumstances, however, to 

date, we assess that the fiscal environment, coupled with any atrophied maintenance skills or flight hours unexecuted have not manifested themselves as a result in aviation mishaps, which in fiscal 
9 

year 2017 remained below the both 5- and 10-year averages. However, we watch them very closely and are still concerned. 

If current trends do continue however, particularly with reduced 

flight hour execution or funding and combined with a requirement 

to enter into a high threat environment, historically we do see a 

rise in aviation mishaps. 

However, the current fiscal environment and high demand for 

aviation do pose those challenges. Today’s units are resourced to 

the platoon level proficiency, which is sufficient for the counterinsurgency operations that we have been in in the last decade and 

a half. 

However, to fight and win in increasingly complex environments 

against a more capable near-peer or a peer enemy, aviation units 

would be needed to be at a higher level of proficiency at higher echelons. 

As turbulence within aviation subsides we will ask for your continued support to assure sufficient resourcing to achieve that readiness. 

Readiness also has an equipping component. Aviation initiatives 

to sustain readiness and to meet global requirements have come at 

a cost to our modernization. Budget-driven force structure reductions and the current fiscal environment have significantly reduced 

our budget over the past 6 years and tests our ability to modernize 

our force and close key capability gaps with potential adversaries. 

In the near term, Army Aviation is working tirelessly to develop 

capabilities to ensure that we maintain a competitive advantage 

over any potential adversary. And in the midterm we must make 

very difficult decisions about our legacy fleet and about the future 

of vertical lift to ensure that we provide capability to ground commanders that they will need to fight and win on the future battlefield. 

The United States Army still retains the most modern and besttrained aviation force of its kind in the world, and our soldiers, 

noncommissioned officers, and our officers continue to serve this 

Nation faithfully. 

Army Aviation remains ready to meet any future challenge, no 

matter the complexity or the risk. Certainly stable, adequate, and 

predictable funding would enable us to transform into that more 

capable, lethal, and prepared force for the future. 

I thank each of you for your continued support to the outstanding men and women in uniform. And I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and equally look forward to your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Gayler can be found in the 

Appendix on page 58.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, General Gayler, and we appreciate your first appearance before this subcommittee, and best 

wishes on your continued success. 

And beginning with General Nowland, a question I have for each 

person on the subcommittee will have 5 minutes, strictly maintained by Ms. Dean. And so we will proceed. 

The latest projections for rebuilding readiness are based on setting the conditions for readiness recovery. Could you please provide 

examples of the fragility of the recovery efforts, how fiscal year 
10 

2017 funding has shown results in recovering readiness, and how 

the fiscal year 2018 will further readiness recovery? Where are additional resources still required? 

General NOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that great question. The 2017 RAA [request for additional appropriations] really 

helped the Air Force. We increased our spending in our flying hour 

program. We increased our spending in our weapons systems 

sustainment. 

We increased critical skills availability through people, through 

buying 4,000 more airmen that we could then put into it, and then 

the training resources, our ranges and simulators. We also increased spending in those areas. 

So those levers continue to move forward. The 2018 budget right 

now, if enacted, once we get the budget will be good for us. The 

Presidential budget continues to move it. 

The analogy that I would make is we have to grow the force. So 

along those paths, we still have areas of risk. We have a pilot-aircrew crisis. Our most highly stressed career field right now is AC– 

130 gunners. So it is just not a pilot crisis, but the pilots are our 

most critical shortage so we will continue to work through that. 

Our maintainers, we will continue to work to train our maintainers, to experience them so that they can go from three level to five 

level to seven level, which is from technician to apprentice to expert. And it takes a while to grow that force. 

Continued budgetary support will allow us to continue to close 

out in fiscal year 2019 and finish our maintenance and fill up our 

maintenance holes where we have there. 

Weapons systems sustainment, as we talked about just like the 

other flags told you, we have challenges. For the most part, our 

weapons systems sustainment is good. 

We are funded at 90 percent with a combination of base budget 

and OCO [overseas contingency operations], but we still need to 

improve, as you and I talked about, the delivery mechanism, the 

logistics is the key. How do we get our parts to the far-flung small 

fleets, such as RC–135s out at Kadena Air Base? 

Those would be the areas that the continued budget pressure will 

allow us to continue to move forward with, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. And Admiral. 

Admiral SHOEMAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As we look at— 

I think I will refer to Ranking Member Bordallo’s comments in the 

beginning when she said we didn’t get here overnight. It is gonna 

take some time to dig out of the readiness hole that we are in. 

As I look at fiscal year 2017, that was with the request for additional appropriations, that was a relatively good year for us in 

naval aviation in terms of the flying hour account and our readiness enabler accounts. But again, it was two-thirds of the year our 

hands were tied a bit while we were still under the continuing resolution. 

In fiscal year 2018 both our flying hour account or our flying 

hour account and every one of our enabler accounts is plussed-up 

to levels beyond where it was in fiscal year 2017. That is goodness. 

The one area I would continue to focus, and I mentioned it in my 

opening comments, is in the spares, the APN–6 accounts, a critical 

enabler for us to continue recovering readiness. 
11 

So the fragility you referenced, Mr. Chairman, I think we just 

have to have the continued sustained funding over time to get us 

out of the hole we have dug. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Admiral. And General Rudder. 

General RUDDER. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have, similar with our partners within the naval aviation enterprise, have 

fully funded a lot of our accounts to our executable levels. And to 

give you an idea what that looks like, you know, in fiscal year 2016 

for spares we are at 83 percent. 

For fiscal year 2017, with the additional money you gave us, we 

were able to get to 94, and with the budget that we have in now 

we are going to fund it at 96. 

Now, you know, predictable budget is always good because that 

allows our program managers to put those spares on contract. So 

the quicker we get the full budget, the quicker we can get those 

spares on contract. 

Some of the fragility of it is that as our ops tempo has not decreased, we must, one, balance our pilot production, which we are 

doing, and balancing our aircraft. 

And as an example, with our F–18 community, probably 2 or 3 

years ago, you know, we might have had five or six F–18s in the 

flight line, maybe 3 months before they were getting ready to deploy. And then we pull aircraft from the flight line, inject them into 

the squadron and deploy them. 

We reduced our squadron deployments down to 10 aircraft as a 

flight line entitlement. And recently to see some of the progress, although fragile, we deployed VMFA–251 into Asia with 12 aircraft, 

and they are doing quite well with 10 out of 12 up on a regular 

basis. 

So there is some progress being made. Fully funding those accounts has been the key to success. Thank you. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you very much. 

And General Gayler, you are finding out your first time here that 

time can be cut off, but for the record, we will give you that question and look forward to your response. 

But so that all of the members of the subcommittee can participate, we will proceed with Congresswoman Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General Nowland and Admiral Shoemaker, both the Air Force 

and the Navy have identified manpower shortfalls in the maintenance communities. Now, without a sufficient number of trained 

and experienced maintainers, you will have challenges generating 

ready aircraft to support pilot training and operations. 

So can you describe the actions that you are taking to address 

manpower shortfalls in the maintenance community? And assuming stable funding and how long will it take to fill these gaps? Do 

we see any of it presently or is it still in the future? 

General NOWLAND. Yes, ma’am. We are experiencing those problems. As I said, in our maintenance field we are growing 4,000 

maintainers in 2017 is what we are doing, and we expect to close 

out in 2019 to continue to fill those gaps. 

The other thing we are doing is we are moving maintainers 

where we can into combat-coded units. So for instance, as we stand 
12 

up F–35 units, our training units, we are using contract solutions 

so that we can move our maintainers into the combat-coded units. 

Then as we grow our maintenance and fill our maintenance manning, we will then come back and put blue-suit maintenance back 

into those organizations. 

But as they said, it takes a while to grow that capability to a 

three to a five to a seven level, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. Thank you. And also to you, Admiral 

Shoemaker? 

Admiral SHOEMAKER. Thank you, ma’am. So I think in the aviation ranks, at least in our overall accession program, in 2017 we 

increased those accessions 32,000 to 35,200. That will take a while 

to get to the fleet. 

We are living off, I think the largesse of a fiscal year 2013, a 

very good recruiting year. Those sailors are all now getting to the 

end of their initial tours and choosing to taking shore duty or 

choosing to separate. 

A couple things we have done to increase the experience level 

and the level of the maintainers in our fleet squadrons is a couple 

policy adjustments. 

One were contract extensions that we offered for sailors on sea 

duty. We had almost 1,000 take that for almost over a year each. 

So that is about 1,000 years of sea duty that we increased there. 

The other one was an extension to the high year tenure gates, 

the changes to the high year tenure gates. That also added about 

1,000 years of sea duty into our squadrons. 

As best we can, we are also trying to recycle and reutilize aviation experience in the same type/model/series. So we avoid the 

training requirements and costs as they show up and transfer between squadrons. That is an initiative that is getting traction in 

Millington in our Personnel Command. 

The last one is I know in our fiscal year 2018 budget, our request 

is for additional accessions, and I think that will help us. It may 

take a little while to get to the fleet, but we will continue to work 

those policies in the meantime. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, thank you very much. And my last question 

is to General Gayler. Can you share, General, with the committee 

how recommendations from the Holistic Aviation Assessment Task 

Force, which is directed by General Milley, has improved Army 

readiness? 

And can you highlight some of the recommendations that have 

been implemented or that you plan to implement in fiscal year 

2018 and how they will produce measurable readiness improvements? 

General GAYLER. Yes, ma’am, thank you very much for the question. So of course, General Milley tasked Lieutenant General 

Mangum to conduct a holistic aviation task force assessment. He 

came up with 63 recommendations, of which 30 of them are completed to date and/or have a plan of action to complete. The remainder will be completed by the end of fiscal year 2018. 

Most significantly, really, are in the areas of doctrine development where we have to align our doctrine to better stay linked 

with a potential future battlefield and with the greater Army. 
13 

Also in training we have made great strides in adjusting training 

to bring our forces to a higher level of collective training, which 

would be necessary on a future modern battlefield, to include UAS 

integration, unmanned aerial systems integration, and teaming 

with manned systems. 

Really a third area that is most significant is in the maintainer 

arena. We have some atrophied skills as a result of a few events 

in the past few years. 

So we are focusing very heavily on standardizing a maintainer 

training program, not only to get all maintainers to the requisite 

standard, but also to help further, kind of increase their maintenance knowledge. Certainly when they achieve a higher rank they 

would need that certain higher level of knowledge. 

So it has been very effective for us, and we look forward to completing it. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, General. And I yield back, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congresswoman Bordallo. 

And now we proceed to Congressman Austin Scott of Georgia. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Nowland, good to see you again. I talked with you a little bit about Moody Air Force Base and the A–29 Super Tucano 

training program, began there in 2015 with the Afghan Air Force, 

and I know it is been extended to 2020. Now we are training the 

Lebanese Air Force in a similar program. 

Can you explain how this program works within the overall 

strategy of the Air Force? 

General NOWLAND. Congressman Scott, great question, thank 

you, sir. This has been a model program, and this is in line with 

the Secretary of Defense guidance that our National Military Strategy is in, with, and through coalition partners and allies. 

So the Afghan A–29 program has been successful because what 

we have done is we have worked with our government to acquire 

those airplanes and the transfer those airplanes to the Afghan Air 

Force. 

Simultaneously, we brought Active Duty, Reserve, and Guard 

members in to train with the Afghan pilots to get them up to 

speed. And then we have supplemented them once they go into Afghanistan with air advisors who are with them taking them 

through their combat missions. We have seen it to be very effective 

in helping to train the Afghan Air Force. 

The Lebanese program is initiated right now. We have also done 

some work with the Lebanese Air Force to help them with facilities 

in Lebanon, and we are moving forward along the same model. Our 

chief believes this is a model of success for the future. We will try 

to continue to build on it. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. I agree with you. I mean, the coalition partners, the more assets that we can give them the better off we are 

gonna be. And some have asked how this actually helps with U.S. 

Air Force pilot training and the readiness for that. And could you 

hit on the point of how it decreases pressure on U.S. pilot capacity 

to carry out the sorties in these other countries? 

General NOWLAND. Well, great question again. So for instance in 

Afghanistan, if we have limited capability as we look across the re-
14 

gion, and if we have an Afghan Air Force that can talk to the 

kandak down to the battalion level and do that close air support, 

that doesn’t require F–16s overhead or an MQ–9 Reaper overhead. 

So therefore it is enabling them to be successful. 

We are also training their joint tactical air controllers so that 

they can control it so it becomes organic to the Afghan Air Force, 

which reduces the demand on our joint force. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, General. You know, I have to mention 

the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] and 

the C2ISR [command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capabilities. We have all heard that we don’t have 

enough of that capacity, and I just look forward to proceeding with 

the JSTARS recapitalization and certainly appreciate any support 

that any of you can give with us in filling that gap. 

General Gayler, graduate from North Georgia Military, I believe? 

Is that correct? The delayed risk in infrastructure has increasingly 

degraded aviation readiness. 

Last year, I had concerns about the aging maintenance hangars 

and support combat aviation units. We received the Army combat 

aviation hangar sustainment report, which detailed the get-well 

plan. Are we on track to meet the 80 percent adequate facilities 

rating no later than 2025? 

General GAYLER. Sir, it certainly depends on levels of funding between now and 2025. We currently have nine Active Duty installations that have infrastructure needs that we rate as significant. 

And even above hangar facilities we have facility requirements 

for the prevention of corrosion on repair parts. In fiscal year 2016 

we lost $16.2 million worth of repair parts just to corrosion alone. 

And so we are working that very hard to get a steady funding 

stream and priority to that infrastructure repair in all the installations, but also specifically for that corrosion prevention, which was 

another holistic task force review. And but we do have a lot of work 

left to do, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. General, I have just a few seconds left, but specifically with regard to Hunter Army Airfield, can you update us on 

the hangar repairs there? 

General GAYLER. I believe I can. We did have one hangar that 

was approved for improvement work beginning in 2022 to be complete by fiscal year 2024. The general support aviation battalion 

hangar that is part of that complex is the number one priority on 

FORSCOM’s [United States Army Forces Command’s] military construction priority list. So we are making some progress. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, General. Gentlemen, thank you for your 

service. And I yield the remainder of my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. WILSON. We now proceed to Congressman Anthony Brown of 

Maryland. 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start by saying 

that recently I visited with the 10th Combat Aviation Brigade from 

10th Mountain in Powidz, Poland, and what those young men and 

women are doing is phenomenal. 

They are working interoperability issues with their counterparts. 

They are understanding the terrain. And I think they are really 
15 

laying the groundwork for an enduring rotational, although one 

day I would like to see a permanent presence of Army Aviation in 

Europe. 

Doing a great job with the UH–60 and the AH–64. I graduated 

flight school in 1985. The Black Hawk had already been in the field 

for 6 years, and we were anticipating a year later the arrival of the 

AH–64. 

By 2030, the Black Hawk will have been in the field for 50 years 

and the Apache for 45. I am sure we will be looking at those airframes with the same endearing love and affection as today we look 

at the UH–1, which was the workhorse of Vietnam. 

So my concern is, and my question, General Gayler, is the need 

to shift or at least broaden our focus from what today is, you know, 

short-term readiness to what needs to be more on the modernization of the force. 

We haven’t heard much, I think, during this Congress, or at least 

I haven’t been in hearings where I have heard much about the Future Vertical Lift program. Can you talk to us a little bit about that 

replacing the aging helicopter fleet? 

I understand production will start in 2030. And what are the impacts to Army Aviation modernization plans and programs under 

the current level of funding? 

General GAYLER. So thank you, Congressman. First, in reverse, 

the current level of funding, we are certainly based on force structure that we now have as a result of budget realities, we are absolutely strapped to meet demand while simultaneously training for 

major combat operations at a higher level of readiness and then 

while balancing modernization. 

So it has kind of forced the Chief of Staff of the Army to prioritize readiness as the number one priority. So we will continue to 

ensure that we have ready forces now to meet the demand and for 

the future. 

You are correct. We have lost some modernization spending 

power over the next coming years. And we do have to make serious 

choices to invest in that capability. 

Where we have been left so far at the funding levels is incremental modernization. And there is a unique linkage between incremental modernization and readiness. 

In order to incrementally modernize our fleets, for example the 

AH–64s, we have to take existing airframes out of operational 

units to induct them into a remanufacture line to improve that airframe. 

That impacts readiness because we are taking aircraft from operational units on which they should be training. On average, across 

a 24-ship AH–64 battalion in authorization today, we average between 20 and 21 aircraft in the field because we are forced to incrementally modernize. 

We do have to change that. And the Future Vertical Lift program 

is looking at technologies right now that send a joint multi-role 

tech demonstrator that will conclude in fiscal year 2019. That will 

inform what technologies are feasible to meet a capability requirement that we have on a future battlefield. 

And then we will aggressively pursue those capabilities as we 

move forward because we do have to maintain the legacy fleet via-
16 

bility though, because, as you stated, sir, I mean, these Apaches 

and these Black Hawks will be in our force for a long period of 

time. And we have to keep them viable. 

That is why other parts of modernization are critical to us, the 

Improved Turbine Engine Program to buy back power in those airframes, both the Apache and the Black Hawk, are critical. 

Now, if we have any CRs [continuing resolutions], that overall 

hurts our ability to work development efforts. 

Mr. BROWN. And let me just—— 

General GAYLER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BROWN [continuing]. Take back my time, reclaim my time. 

Thank you very much. I am concerned about the increasing standoff that our forces are now facing, will be facing, and we need to 

make sure that we are improving both the lethality as well as the 

reach of our aviation assets. 

The next question, which I would expect I would get a response 

in writing because I am going to ask a question and I don’t think 

with my time remaining you will be able to answer it, General 

Nowland. 

And it is a parochial question. I am in the Fourth Congressional 

District of Maryland. Joint Base Andrews is in my backyard. 

I am concerned about the replacement program, the Huey replacement program, and if you could give this committee assurances that the program will not face further delays and that it is 

on track for award in third quarter of 2018? And if not, why not 

and when? 

It is an old fleet. The Huey—surprised that some of them are 

still in operation—they are having difficulty performing their continuity operations, other base missions at Andrews. So if you could 

just give us an update on that program back through the committee staff or however that is most appropriate, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you very much, Congressman Brown. 

And we now proceed to Congressman Steve Russell of Oklahoma. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you generals 

for being here today. I guess my question would really be for all 

of you. With respect to flight hours, and General Rudder, thank 

you for talking about last year and this year, but could you give 

us just a brief thumbnail trend of what the average flight hours are 

currently per month for your pilots? 

General NOWLAND. Congressman Russell, across the United 

States Air Force our flight hours per month are going in the right 

direction. We are increasing them. Across the multiple different series that I have—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, I know there are a lot of different airframes, 

but yes. 

General NOWLAND. It is hard. So but in our fighter community, 

trying to keep it apples-to-apples, we are averaging about 15.6 in 

our air superiority and right around 16 or so in our general purpose attack. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Okay. 

General NOWLAND. And that really goes back to our readiness 

aircrew program, which ties simulators and flight hours together 

for their training. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Interesting. Okay, thank you. Admiral Shoemaker. 
17 

Admiral SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir. So I would say we are very close 

to that in aggregate across all type/model/series. The strike fighter 

community is a couple hours below. So about 15 and a half across 

in aggregate and maybe a couple hours below that for VFA [strike 

fighter squadron]. 

In just general trends if I look over time for the annual amount 

of hours, our TACAIR [tactical aircraft] communities have come 

down from around 250 a year to about right around 190. So that 

is a drop from 2011 to 2017. 

Big wing, the MPRA [maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft], E–6s and P–8s are all have been fairly steady, same in our 

rotary force. So the trend is down on our TACAIR community. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Okay. Thank you. General Rudder. 

General RUDDER. Yes, thank you, Congressman. It is for our 

TACAIR community they are coming up. So for our F–18 community they are hovering around 12.7, not certainly at the 15-hour. 

Now, that is by the nature we do calculations, we take off one 

of our deployed squadrons over there. They are averaging from 40 

to 50 hours per pilot—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. Sure—— 

General RUDDER [continuing]. A month. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Operational deployment goes up. 

General RUDDER. Because there is just—but when you average 

in a squadron that maybe just returned it is kind of getting themselves backed up on maintenance step. So we are still shooting towards 15. As talked about throughout the Marine Corps it is 15.4. 

We still want to get up to 16.5 hours, but there are a couple really glimmers of hope out there. And certainly with the CH–53, you 

know, our heavy lift community, they went from 9 to 13 this past 

year. So that was a big step. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Better. 

General RUDDER. Yes. Thank you. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you. 

General GAYLER. Sir, for the Active Component it is 10.8 hours 

currently. For our National Guard it is around 6.4 and 7.8 for the 

Reserve Component. What we try to achieve is 14.5 hours per 

month per crew to reach a collective readiness level at the battalion 

level. 

We could achieve that in our UH and CH–47 fleets. The AH–64 

fleet is somewhat capacity limited because of shortages of the airframes and some of the pilots. Thank you. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you. And the other question I have is on 

pilot retention and pilot generation. I know there was a lot of hoopla made about maybe bringing retirees in, but really this authority 

was always available as I understand it to the services to recall 

folks that were retired if they needed to. 

Do you see an age gap developing because of accessions of new 

pilots and then trying to retain with incentives and other programs? If y’all could speak to that in the time I have remaining? 

General NOWLAND. Congressman Russell, we just received greater authorization to do it for a longer period of time. So we will be 

looking at that. I don’t anticipate necessarily an age gap. The retirees we intend to bring back, number one, we will try to fill staff 

positions—— 
18 

Mr. RUSSELL. Sure. Training—— 

General NOWLAND [continuing]. Which would then allow our—— 

Mr. RUSSELL [continuing]. Training base maybe also or? 

General NOWLAND. Yes, sir. And then at training bases, in which 

case when you look at your instructor pilot they all look old to you, 

so, you know. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes. Well, and I appreciate that because a lot of 

times, you know, you have captain instructors, which is not a bad 

thing. They are current. They are coming from the field. But I was 

curious on that, so thanks. 

Admiral Shoemaker. 

Admiral SHOEMAKER. So we heard about the Air Force initiative 

and actually looking at that in our production world as well, where 

we are trying to catch back up, certainly in T–45s. Most of you all 

are familiar with the operational pause we took. 

In the general trend across the force, though, I think, you know, 

other than a couple of targeted communities, be it the F–18 community and our Growler, advanced airborne electronic attack, we 

are meeting our department head requirements with quality. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you. General Rudder. 

General RUDDER. As we look across our fleet, we expect about a 

7 percent fleetwide departure rate on a yearly basis. 

Now, for our TACAIR community, much like Shoe just said, you 

know, we are up around 9.5, 9.9, with the average over the year 

about 9. So we have seen about a 1 percent, 11⁄2 percent increase 

in this departure. 

So we are approaching it from all angles. We are approaching it 

from our ops tempo, readiness. As you would imagine, pilots want 

to fly. And when they are not flying they are not happy so we are 

trying to increase the readiness out there. And again, we are trying 

to give incentives to keep people in. 

But it is a concern. Obviously, when the economy is doing good, 

airlines are doing good, I think to include all the helicopter guys 

and gals out there, they are being approached on a daily and regular basis because there is other shortfalls out there with our airline partners. 

Mr. RUSSELL. And Mr. Chairman, if I may with indulgence, I 

hate to leave my Army brother, you know, hanging in the wind. If 

he could answer that with your indulgence? Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON. Please proceed. 

General GAYLER. Thank you, sir, and I will be brief. Yes, sir. We 

have targeted specifically some of the more senior qualifications to 

remain in the operational fleet and we use heavily some Department of Army civilian-aged experienced in the institutions. So we 

watch it carefully. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you, Congressman Russell. 

We now proceed to Congressman Don McEachin of Virginia. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for 

being here. 

General Nowland, would you be kind enough to discuss the intent behind the Air Force enterprise range plan [ERP], the poten-
19 

tial benefits of the regional training range approach and what the 

Air Force hopes to achieve as the ERP process is completed? 

General NOWLAND. Congressman, great question, I would love to. 

We believe that the enterprise range plan will make us more efficient. So what we need to do is we need to look at our ranges holistically. Our ranges are national treasures, and so we have got to 

look. 

Right now the way we command and control them we don’t create as many efficiencies as we think we can. So we believe by creating an enterprise range plan and pooling it together regionally 

we will be better coordinators with our sister services as we look 

at how we can possibly expand the ranges and increase investment 

also in our ranges. 

We have limited investment dollars. Where do we put the highend simulators, into which ranges so we get the maximum training 

value out of every sortie we fly? 

Mr. MCEACHIN. Thank you. And that is a nice segue into my 

next question to Admiral Shoemaker and General Rudder. Can you 

discuss the potential benefits to your services of the Air Force consolidating its six regional training ranges? Is there a potential to 

better leverage these ranges to improve training across all services? 

And can you also discuss the challenges each of your services 

face in acquiring technologies like threat emitters that allow your 

respective service air components to simulate advanced threats? 

Admiral SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir, thank you very much. As we 

merge the enterprise plan that General Nowland just described, 

our premier training range is obviously Fallon, Nevada. 

And as we introduce new technologies, we are clearly figuring 

out that the airspace limits and the electromagnetic spectrum limits are not allowing us to fly our new platforms to their full capabilities. 

So it is driving us into a virtual and constructive world and we 

have—moving out with that with a couple of key facilities in Fallon 

right now that will link to all of our fleet concentration areas, but 

certainly tie into our Air Force counterparts. 

As I talk about Fallon, one of the things we do, we do require, 

and you mentioned this, sir, were emitters. And the ranges out 

there are working with some very dated systems. 

So when we bring on our new electronic attack airplanes and certainly the F–35 to be able to practice and train against something 

more representative of the threats we might see is essential. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. Thank you. General. 

General RUDDER. Yes, thank you, Congressman. I would make as 

a general statement, our ranges in our airspace that we are able 

to operate in on a regular basis should be considered a national 

treasure. 

And anytime that we can increase the efficiency we should 

produce that and protect what we have and when able, when it 

makes sense, expand airspace, even with the crowded airways as 

we know them today. 

There are challenges. We are fortunate to be able to participate 

in great exercises like Northern Edge and Red Flag and operate 

out of Fallon so we—or China Lake or other areas around where 
20 

we can take advantage of their first-rate threat systems that allow 

us to train at levels we need to train. 

And with the F–35 coming onboard on larger numbers, we will 

be challenged in the future to make sure that we have the amount 

of airspace to be able to train with that airplane, no doubt about 

it. 

And we have got to get very progressive on how we think about 

airspace and how we fight this airplane and how we fight the network within our range areas because there are competing, you 

know, communication bands out there we need to deal with and 

computing airspace requirements. 

So I would echo with all my counterparts here that range space 

is critical, and the more we think through this and make our 

ranges more complex and more progressive, it will help the joint 

force all the way around. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. I thank each of you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Congressman McEachin. 

We now proceed to Congressman Salud Carbajal of California. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all 

the witnesses here today. 

Marine pilots remain short on average about one-third of their 

required flight hours. One-third of the Army’s aviation force has 

been forward deployed at any one time over the past 15 years. The 

Navy has extended deployments and shortened, eliminated, or deferred aircraft maintenance and training periods. 

The Air Force does not have enough experienced maintainers to 

sustain good quality aircrafts, not enough available mission-capable 

aircrafts to conduct operations, and airmen and airwomen are 

meeting the minimum training requirements for their deployment 

missions. 

We are not doing our part to keep our service members safe it 

seems. We are sending our sons and daughters into theaters of war 

without fully functioning equipment and inadequate training. This is unacceptable, obviously. We are willing to spend $1.2 trillion modernizing our nuclear arsenal, and yet we are unable to 

take care of more imminent essential matters, such as fixing our 

aircrafts, providing more flight time, time-sensitive training, and 

modernizing aviation infrastructure. 

Are we really prioritizing readiness? Even under current budgetary constraints we should be providing our military with the 

most effective training, even if it means spending less or just not 

spending on something else. We can’t spend on everything. Training should be a top priority. 

To what extent are the services evaluating the effectiveness of 

training to ensure that completed training meets its expectations 

for quality? 

General NOWLAND. Congressman Carbajal, great question. So for 

the United States Air Force we have made training a priority. It 

is a Secretary of Defense, so regaining readiness soonest means rebuilding your operational training infrastructure and funding your 

training lines. 

In the A–3 [Air Staff Operations division] we have stood up a 

whole training division, operational training infrastructure, led by 

two-star Major General Scott Smith, whose sole job is to come in 
21 

and think about it every day and then advocate and work with our 

commanders to make sure we can improve our training capability. 

Admiral SHOEMAKER. Congressman, I think we have been fairly 

successful in at least what our CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] 

has talked about minimizing the extensions to deployments and 

trying to stay within his 7-month goal. And that has been the case 

so far, but obviously real world events will play into that. 

As we work our air wings and carriers up, we work through the 

Optimized Fleet Response Plan. And that right now, I think, is a 

good model for us to take the resources we are given, although we 

could certainly, as we have talked about earlier, do more as we are 

working up. But that gives us the ability with the resources given 

to generate the best capabilities for our forces moving forward. 

Now, we are accepting risk on the early parts of that workup 

cycle, but we make sure that as we get into the more integrated 

and advanced that we have got the resources they need, airplanes, 

people and flying hour dollars, ordnance to deliver so that our energies are focused on those next to deploy and on deployment. They 

are ready. They are certified. They are ready and certified forward. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you. 

General RUDDER. Yes, I would echo what Shoe just said. It is the 

Commandant’s priority to just to make sure that when forces go 

out the door on deployment that they are ready to go. And that 

may come at an expense of some of the remain-behind forces. That 

is where we get the challenge of a ready bench behind. 

But our forces before they go forward are given the appropriate 

workup time, and they do get certified before they go out each 

time. 

Back to another point you made, I think where we are trying to 

balance our readiness challenge is, you know, what we have done 

in the Marine Corps and I think all the services, we defer buying 

new airplanes or new stuff, if you will, to pull that money into our 

readiness account. 

So we are balancing both, the really new stuff for the capability 

we need for the future fight with making sure our readiness is 

right so when we do send marines and sailors out the door that 

they have the right gear at the right time at the right readiness 

level. 

General GAYLER. Sir, I would echo that it is a balance certainly 

to meet demand and train for the future, assess your readiness for 

both and then to modernize. We take it very seriously. 

Certainly every aviator that deploys is incredibly competent to 

the resource levels that they are trained to and resourced for. And 

as we look to assess ourselves and know where that risk is, we actually measure our training readiness to a higher battalion level 

level of readiness called Objective-T so that we can see where we 

need resourcing and we can see where the risk is. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you very much, Congressman Carbajal. 

And at this time we will proceed, and that is Admiral Shoemaker 

and General Rudder, I have a question for the record that I would 

like for you to get back to the subcommittee. 

In February, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Bill 

Moran, testified that 62 percent of F/A–18 aircraft were out of serv-
22 

ice. Over 50 percent of the out-of-service aircraft were simply 

awaiting maintenance or parts. 

In this committee report accompanying the House National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 there was express 

support for an alternative source contract for F/A–18 depot-level 

maintenance. 

Such alternative sourcing ensures competition, best value, and 

sustainment to be an effective competitive industrial base. We have 

also encouraged the Navy to meet the contract’s maximum authorization within each year of the contract. 

What assurances can you provide that the Navy plans to maximize the number of aircraft authorized by the existing alternate 

source contract for each year going forward and supported by this 

subcommittee in the NDAA report? What are the Navy’s plans to 

establish a multi-source competitive environment for the F/A–18 

depot-level maintenance? 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 71.] 

Mr. WILSON. And again, as we conclude, and it is always a delight to be serving with our Ranking Member, Congresswoman 

Bordallo. 

We want to thank General Nowland, Admiral Shoemaker, General Rudder, General Gayler. Again, congratulations on your first 

appearance here, for being with us today, and again, happy 242nd 

birthday. Thank you for your service and thank you for your personnel for your service to our Nation. 

And we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

NOVEMBER 9, 2017 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

NOVEMBER 9, 2017 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

NOVEMBER 9, 2017 

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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Admiral SHOEMAKER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] [See 

page 22.] 

General RUDDER. This response is a coordinated Navy/Marine Corps team effort 

and is closely aligned with VADM Shoemaker’s response. There is one additional 

depot effort to increase readiness not only for F/A–18 but also for all Marine Corps 

aircraft. The L–3 depot in Canada is being utilized to the maximum extent possible. 

There are currently 11 aircraft in-work at L–3 Canada. As of November 2017, one 

aircraft has been completed (Drive-In Mod work) and three high-flight-hour (HFH) 

aircraft are scheduled to complete in FY18. The assigned depot workload is coordinated between PMA–265 and CNAF (N421) and takes into account legacy requirements and the L–3 depot’s contractual capability. The Legacy divesture effort greatly reduced the number of legacy hornets required to go through the depot. The 

health of our strike fighter fleet is a top priority within the Navy and Marine Corps, 

and the health of our industrial base is key to enabling us to achieve our readiness 

objectives. Workload is assigned to the organic and commercial depots following 

close coordination with Commander, Naval Air Forces and HQMC, based on current 

requirements and the depots’ capacity to complete the work. Existing contracts with 

commercial depots have been performing as expected. There are currently 61 aircraft in work, and we expect approximately 77 completions throughout the remainder of those contracts. As a result, the backlog that previously existed (and which 

necessitated the use of commercial depot contracts) has been eliminated, with all 

aircraft inducted into the workflow. Recent reductions in the overall requirement, 

enabled by combining depot events (e.g. HFH inspections with Planned Maintenance 

Interval events), and the steady increase in capacity at organic Fleet Readiness Centers, have reduced the requirement for follow-on commercial contracts for F/A–18A/ 

B/C/D depot-level maintenance since the forecasted requirement can be covered 

within existing organic depot capacities. The Department of the Navy is pursuing 

several other efforts to increase readiness and retain a healthy industrial base, including: Preparation of a competitive depot support solicitation for Fleet Logistics 

Center, Yokosuka, Japan, to help meet the requirements of forward deployed units. 

With a planned fiscal year 2019 award, the contract will have a base year and four 

one-year options. The work scope will be to perform approximately 11 depot inductions per year, for any F/A–18 type/model/series aircraft, and will include Planned 

Maintenance Interval activities, In-Service Repair, and aircraft modifications. Utilization of a Multi-Service Management Agreement (MSMA) for Contract Field Teams 

(CFT), an Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (ID/IQ) contract managed by the 

Air Force. Under this competitive contracting approach, approved vendors compete 

for individual task orders, providing CFT to augment squadron and depot maintenance efforts to work down the backlog of aircraft awaiting maintenance and/or inservice repairs. CFT can provide on-site organizational, intermediate/field, and 

depot/sustainment level maintenance support at customer locations both in the continental United States, and abroad. This contract also includes Small Business setaside requirements. This effort will be competed among six large business offerors 

using the Fair Opportunity Notice methodology outlined in the basic contract. Task 

orders requiring more than 100 Full Time Equivalent personnel are awarded to 

large businesses. Engagement with the U.S. Army, Communications-Electronics 

Command (CECOM), to use their R2–3G ID/IQ contract. The R2–3G contract provides access to 18 prime contractors and 1,100 sub-contractors. The contractors provide services including: technology insertion; system integration and installation; 

fabrication and prototyping; testing and certification; studies and analyses; and engineering, logistics, and training support. These services can be utilized in support 

of operational maintenance, repairs, preservation, and depot maintenance, and are 

a potential force multiplier for our overall readiness activities. Supporting a new 

Depot Readiness Initiative (DRI). This initiatives objective is to aid in the ability 

to more quickly return post Phased Depot Maintenance (PDM) aircraft to a flyable— 

mission capable status after its return to the Squadron. To achieve this end-state, 

this effort will utilize the available Depot capacity to complete some tasks that are 

typically organizational level maintenance requirements, while the aircraft is in 
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their specific PDM event. We believe this initiative will save time, while increasing 

both efficiency and readiness. This effort will begin with F/A–18 (A–D) with the intent to expand to all type model series aircraft in the Marine Corps. In closing, the 

Marine Corps is committed to utilizing all options to ensure F/A–18 readiness to 

support our COCOM and MAGTF Commander requirements, and remain committed 

to retaining a healthy industrial base. [See page 22.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

NOVEMBER 9, 2017 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. It is my understanding that the Air Force intends to move its current government-owned contractor-operated (GOCO) J–85 engine repair facility from 

Laughlin AFB to a ‘‘to be determined contractor-owned contractor-operated (COCO) 

facility’’ in late 2019. Please explain the rationale for constituting a new J–85 repair 

facility at significant cost, during a pilot production crisis for an airframe that is 

scheduled to begin being taken out of inventory in 2024. Specifically, how does this 

solution address existing identified problems related to availability of government 

furnished parts and components, as well as ongoing engine transportation issues? 

Lastly, please let the committee know if the Air Force has studied the potential negative impacts of relocating the primary engine repair facilities for T–38s while it is 

confronted with significant pilot production shortfalls. 

General NOWLAND. Overview: The J85 engine has been plagued with low time removals and poor reliability, resulting in negative impacts to engine availability. The 

USAF’s acquisition strategy is based on securing the services of an experienced Engine Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) contractor to improve engine reliability and availability to meet current and future pilot production requirements. 

Extensive market research indicates performing the workload at a contractor 

owned facility will create a competitive environment amongst experienced engine 

MRO contractors resulting in the best value for the USAF’s requirement. Market 

research also indicates no competitive engine MRO contractor environment exists if 

the workload remains at Laughlin AFB. Historically, the vendors who have competed for the workload at Laughlin AFB are labor service providers—not engine 

MRO contractors. 

Q1. Please explain the rationale for constituting a new J–85 repair facility at significant cost? 

A1: Based on the USAF’s cost estimate for engine MRO services at a contractor 

owned facility, we anticipate the price per engine to be roughly double the cost of 

a labor services contractor at a government owned facility. This estimate includes 

the initial start-up costs, spread through the contract period of performance. Direct 

cost comparisons are misleading, however, as the requirements between the current 

and future contracts are not the same and the costs of the government owned facility are not included in the current contractor’s costs. Because the past strategy of 

using labor service contractors to conduct on-condition maintenance has resulted in 

extensive low time removals and poor reliability, the USAF developed the current 

strategy to use an MRO contractor with a focus on reliability centered maintenance 

to improve engine availability at a time of increased pilot production. Extensive 

market research indicates performing the workload at a contractor owned facility 

will create a competitive environment amongst experienced engine MRO contractors 

resulting in the best value for the USAF’s requirement. Market research also indicates no competitive engine MRO contractor environment exists if the workload remains at Laughlin AFB. 

Q2. Please explain the rationale for constituting a new J–85 repair facility during 

a pilot production crisis for an airframe that is scheduled to begin being taken out 

of inventory in 2024. 

A2: Air Education and Training Command (AETC) intends to fully divest the T– 

38 by the early 2030s. However, Air Combat Command, Air Force Materiel Command, NASA, and the USN will continue to fly beyond that date. Additionally, Foreign Military Sales countries, which represent the largest J85 users in the world, 

can also leverage this contract to address their engine overhaul requirements. Consequently, J85 engine support will be required beyond AETC’s divestment in the 

early 2030s. AETC’s intention to cease T–38 operations further substantiates the 

movement of this workload out of an AETC operated facility for the remaining J85 

user community. The USAF does not have a cost savings analysis but has considered cost in its strategy. Accordingly, competition, contract incentives, and increased 

engine reliability are elements in the USAF’s strategy to minimize costs. Further, 

direct cost comparisons are misleading as the requirements between the current and 

future contracts are not the same. Overall, the USAF’s objective is to improve engine reliability and availability to meet current/future pilot production requirements 
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at the best value. To ensure the most reliable, available, and affordable engine is 

made available for all warfighting customers, the USAF intends to secure the best 

value outcome from an MRO contractor through the power of competition. 

Q3. Specifically, how does this solution address existing identified problems related 

to availability of government furnished parts and components, as well as ongoing engine transportation issues? 

A3: Engine transportation scheduling issues are not adversely affecting production at the Engine Regional repair Center. However, market research indicates engine MRO service providers interested in competing for this workload are located 

in urban/industrial areas, where transportation is readily available. Further, the 

FY15–FY17 average J85 engine non-mission capable for supply (ENMCS) rate is 

5%, well below the Chief of Staff of the Air Force established requirement of no 

more than 20%. While supply can limit production, rates at this level do not explain 

the engine backlog or lack of production at the ERRC when compared to other comparably supply constrained fleets. Unlike labor service providers, engine MRO providers are well experienced in supply mitigation practices, including reuse and repair of parts, cannibalization of parts between engines, implementation of reliability 

centered maintenance, robust supply forecasting practices, etc. Additionally, requiring and incentivizing increased reliability from an engine MRO contractor will keep 

engines on wing and in the field longer, reducing the aggregate supply burden and 

ensuring current and future pilot production requirements are met. 

Q4. Lastly, please let the committee know if the Air Force has studied the potential 

negative impacts of relocating the primary engine repair facilities for T–38s while it 

is confronted with significant pilot production shortfalls. 

A4: To minimize transition risk, AETC has already increased the annual production requirement to provide additional spare engines, and alternative sources of engine repair will be used as needed. Additionally, the USAF’s strategy calls for the 

winning bidder to continue operations at Laughlin AFB for a year, allowing establishment of J85 expertise and an orderly transition of both equipment and personnel 

to the contractor facility without delaying repairs or impacting pilot production. 

The increase in reliability of J85 engines resulting from the use of an MRO contractor will enable current and future T–38 pilot production requirements to be met. 

Conversely, the past strategy of using labor service contractors to conduct on-condition maintenance has resulted in extensive low time removals and poor reliability, 

negatively impacting engine availability and driving USAF’s current strategy to use 

an MRO contractor with a focus on reliability centered maintenance. 

Mr. WILSON. Please discuss the current status of Class A, B, C mishap rates, underlying causes, trends observed in aviation safety and your observations on readiness impacts to mishaps? What steps are you taking to mitigate readiness impacts 

on aviation safety? Indications are that Class C/Ground mishaps are on a sharp incline, what actions is your service taking to address this increase and are there any 

early indications of common factors? 

General NOWLAND. Any damage or injury to Air Force equipment and personnel 

could have potential readiness impacts; however, lack of readiness has not been correlated to causality in aviation mishaps. Overall trends from FY13 through FY17 

highlighted compliance and decision-making as trend items in both Class A and B 

aviation mishaps. 

Mitigation strategies to address these trends include continuous messaging from 

HQ Air Force and Major Commands as well as targeted recommendations to improve guidance, technical orders, training, and oversight of flight and flight line operations. In addition, since FY13 the Air Force implemented 6,941 aviation safety 

investigation recommendations and is currently working towards implementing 

2,055 additional safety investigation recommendations. 

The following table illustrates the last 5 years of AF aviation safety mishaps: 
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The following tables illustrate the underlying causes of Air Force aviation Class 

A and B mishap investigations FY13–17 (note: mishaps may have more than one 

cause): 
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During the period FY 2013–2017, both on- and off-duty ground Class C mishaps 

actually decreased in the Air Force (see table below). Off-duty mishap counts decreased 21% and on-duty mishap counts decreased 24%. These decreases occurred 

steadily over the 5-year period, suggesting that the decrease is not due to any one 

factor, and is not a statistical fluctuation. 

Since both on- and off-duty mishaps are reportable, the causes and risk factors 

in ground mishaps vary greatly. The Air Force has pursued the following recommendations based on analysis of injury types and methods: 

• Head protection for maintenance personnel—first in hangars and then on the 

flight line 
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• Stronger fall protection at all locations • Buddy lifts, hoists and other mechanized lifts to decrease lifting injuries 

Mr. WILSON. Please discuss the current status of Class A, B, C mishap rates, underlying causes, trends observed in aviation safety and your observations on readiness impacts to mishaps? What steps are you taking to mitigate readiness impacts 

on aviation safety? Indications are that Class C/Ground mishaps are on a sharp incline, what actions is your service taking to address this increase and are there any 

early indications of common factors? 

Admiral SHOEMAKER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. WILSON. In July, a Marine Corps KC–130T crashed during a routine flight, 

killing fifteen Marines and one sailor. The Navy and Marine Corps immediately 

grounded all ‘‘T’’ model aircraft—23 Navy and 12 Marine Corps planes—while investigators determined the cause of the crash. I understand that most, if not all, of 

these aircraft are still grounded and that their return to operational status is being 

hindered in part due to limited maintenance capacity. It’s our understanding that 

the services have had to shift work among maintenance facilities and personnel to 

accommodate the introduction of the Joint Strike Fighter into their fleets. As a result, some older platforms—like the C–130—must rely on a single source for maintenance and repair work. While I understand that routine, planned and priority aircraft often receive adequate support, relying on a single source can understandably 

make it far more difficult to handle work of an unscheduled or unpredictable nature—particularly when the maintenance facilities and personnel are already facing 

a full load of regular-scheduled work under increasing operations tempo. Please provide a status update on maintenance and repair work for the Navy C–130 and Marine Corps KC–130 fleets. 

Admiral SHOEMAKER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. WILSON. In light of a situation wherein certain work can currently be performed at only one location, what steps is the Navy aviation community taking to 

ensure that unscheduled and unpredictable work can be completed as quickly as 

possible? If industry can offer additional capacity in times of great need, do you see 

opportunities for the Department of the Navy to leverage this capability to address 

unscheduled maintenance and repair work, which would in turn enable the current 

organic depots the ability to focus on its routine, planned and priority aircraft? 

Please address the current and forecasted impacts to Navy, Marine Corps, Navy 

Reserve, and Marine Corps Reserve aviation readiness due to the grounding of the 

C–130 fleet and timeline to effect the required repairs. 

Admiral SHOEMAKER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. WILSON. Please discuss the current status of Class A, B, C mishap rates, underlying causes, trends observed in aviation safety and your observations on readiness impacts to mishaps. 

General RUDDER. As I testified before the HASC-Readiness committee on 9 November 2017, while there is no single, direct link between low readiness rates and 

high Class A mishaps this year, it has my highest attention. There is no question 

that naval aviation is an inherently dangerous discipline, and we cannot discount 

the second and third order effects of low readiness and lack of training repetitions. 

Every mishap is unique. The Marine Corps conducts thorough investigations to 

learn from each mishap and attempt to prevent future mishaps. Our aircraft are 

safe and our training and readiness manuals are refined to ensure that aircrew 

meet prerequisites for demanding flights. 15 years of war has not led to a rise in 

severe mishaps. The Marine Corps averaged 12.6 class A mishaps per year (a rate 

of 3.3) from FY02–06, 7.5 class A mishaps per year (a rate of 1.9) from FY07–FY11, 

and 8.8 class A mishaps per year (a rate of 3.0) from FY12–FY17. Unpredictable 

funding, late budget allocations, and a habitual pattern of relying on Continuing 

Resolutions continue to have a significant negative impact on training, force generation, and readiness. Additionally, the effect of inconsistent funding will likely have 

an even greater toll on procurement of future systems, which creates uncertainty 

for future readiness. Gaps in funding require leaders to make hard choices to 

prioritize manning, equipment transfer, and application of training dollars. I 

prioritize support to the operationally deploying units to the detriment of force generation and unit level training. Lost training time, and regaining readiness genera-
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tion for skilled aircrew cannot be accomplished without additional resources in the 

future. Taking assets and funding away from other portions of the Fleet to ensure 

that deploying elements have everything they need creates preventable risk. Unpredictable funding creates a climate where commanders have to choose between requirements, rather than choosing the order in which to accomplish all requirements. 

As I testified to before, these risk choices have a ripple effect on many facets of 

readiness for units, which will continue for years. 

Mr. WILSON. What steps are you taking to mitigate readiness impacts on aviation 

safety? 

General RUDDER. Flight hours are the ultimate metric for a well-trained, disciplined, professional force. Flight hours are measured in hours per crew per month 

and form the foundation for aircrew to fly our training plan and be a ready force. 

A healthy squadron is able to build readiness for combat by properly maintaining 

aircraft, and by building aircrew proficiency through flight hours and realistic training. Flying anything less than the training requirement jeopardizes readiness. There 

are several prioritized initiatives Marine Aviation implemented as part of our comprehensive readiness recovery plan. 

Properly-funded enabler accounts: In PB18, the Marine Corps funded its readiness 

enabler accounts to the maximum executable and unprecedented levels. For example, from 2007 to 2016 our spares accounts were funded to 76%; in PB18 we increased this to 96%. However, CRs continue to prevent us from realizing the benefit 

of this increase—we can’t make long-term investments, increase production rates or 

start new programs until we have full-year funding. 

Manpower Initiatives: Healthy readiness is generated from properly resourced aircraft maintenance and sufficient aircrew flight hours. None of this is achievable 

without a well-trained and experienced aircraft maintenance force; therefore, we are 

heavily investing in enlisted maintainers to rebuild a healthy and effective maintenance base. Talent preservation is a critical part of this equation for Marine Aviation to improve readiness. Last year, we identified an experience gap at some of our 

maintenance supervisor levels as a byproduct of the most recent force reduction. In 

FY18 the Marine Corps, for the first time, has initiated an ‘‘Aircraft Maintainer 

Kicker’’ as part of a Selective Retention Bonus to retain our most highly-qualified 

and experienced maintainers. To date, 447 eligible Marines have accepted the retention bonus—that’s 447 highly-qualified aircraft maintainers who are on the flight 

line TODAY that otherwise would not have been (e.g. PCS move, separation, etc.). 

In addition to this, we are exploring an adjustment to the overseas tour lengths to 

ensure forward-deployed units have the right people in the right place. 

Maintenance Initiatives: A key initiative is to utilize the depot-level to help reduce 

the maintenance burden in our operational units. This initiative will help optimize 

the maintenance workload between the depot-level and unit-level maintenance 

schedule (beginning with the legacy F/A–18s) in order to allow the operational unit 

to focus their efforts on its properly apportioned aircraft inventory. Depots will 

begin performing more organizational-level maintenance (e.g. phase inspections, 

technical directives, etc.) at the depots to ensure when aircraft return from the 

depot the aircraft can be inspected and returned to the flight schedule sooner. The 

Marine aircraft maintainer will be the true benefactor of this initiative because this 

allows the unit-level maintainers to properly maintain their assigned aircraft on 

their flightline rather than devoting excessive maintenance-man-hours to a postdepot aircraft that typically takes many months to return back to the training 

schedule. 

Supply Initiatives: Supply of parts has been a challenge to Marine Aviation readiness. In an effort to make our process proactive and gain efficiency, we are adopting 

an Air Force supply program (Customer Oriented Leveling Technique/Proactive Demand Leveling—or COLT/PDL) that is designed to stock more parts in both depth 

and breadth. The current Navy/Marine system uses demand analysis for 

allowancing management, while COLT uses marginal analysis to determine the 

most advantageous composition of stock allowances to reduce total number of 

backordered parts over time. Using COLT/PDL, when a part breaks, it will generate 

an allowance increase for all end-use supply locations simultaneously—regardless of 

where the part was physically needed. In practice, when one supply center orders 

a specific part, that same part is preemptively ordered for ALL supply centers, rather than wait for the same part to break on a different aircraft in a disparate location. Performance-based logistics (PBL) contracts is another method being applied 

on a limited-basis for explicit repairable components (e.g. gearboxes, rotor blades, 

drive-train components) with certain type/model/series aircraft. In essence, we pay 

‘‘up-front’’ for a definite parts availability rate (e.g. 95%) from the vendor. PBLs benefit the customer by incentivizing the vendor to improve component reliability, or, 
81 

at a minimum, improve its availability in the system, thereby enabling increased 

readiness. 

Mr. WILSON. Indications are that Class C/Ground mishaps are on a sharp incline, 

what actions is your service taking to address this increase and are there any early 

indications of common factors? 

General RUDDER. These ground-related mishaps are preventable and require the 

attention of all professional aviators and maintainers. During FY17 there were more 

than 70 aviation mishaps reported to Headquarters Marine Corps. More than 50 of 

these were Class C mishaps, many of which were ground-related mishaps. Collectively, these mishaps resulted in the loss of mission capable aircraft available to 

contribute to combat readiness. This upward trend in Class C mishaps prompted us 

to initiate the Aviation Related Ground Mishap (ARGM) Independent Readiness Review. The ARGM IRR identified root causes and delivered actionable recommendations that enable Marine Corps Aviation to address and reduce the aviation ground 

mishap rate, preserve aviation assets, and fulfill its training and readiness requirements. The study found that the rise in aviation ground mishaps is a consequence 

of a less-than optimal maintenance culture shift engendered by post-9/11 high 

tempo operations and are one of many variables that are depressing Ready Basic 

Aircraft rates in Marine Corps aviation. The ARGM IRR identified 44 recommendations from which Marine Aviation developed 54 actionable initiatives to address the 

ARGM findings. To date, roughly 45% of these initiatives are either complete or ongoing, and we will continue to refine and implement the safety initiatives over the 

next 12 months. Examples include: 

Standardization of Aircraft Towing/Movement: Enhanced Wing-level aircraft towing training and supervision is required prior to the movement of any aircraft. We 

have implemented standardized ‘‘spot check’’ inspections across the Marine Aircraft 

Wings (MAWs). MAW inspections and grading criteria for standardization is under 

review and refinement. In addition, we have implemented a new standardized grading criteria for all maintenance programs to improve institutionalized program compliance across Marine aviation. 

Advanced maintenance management and compliance training: Marine Aviation 

developed the Advanced Aircraft Maintenance Officer’s Course (AAMOC) in FY16. 

The first two classes of Aircraft Maintenance Officers graduated the course during 

FY17. We have also developed the Advanced Aircraft Maintenance Management 

Training (AAMT) for our more senior enlisted maintenance Marines, along with the 

Aircraft Maintenance Management Center of Excellence at the Marine Aviation 

Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1 (MAWTS–1) Squadron. To summarize, we are 

evolving the maintenance community culture by refocusing our Marines on better 

supervision, standardization, advanced maintenance training and best practices. We 

are re-enforcing a mindset of maintaining and grooming aircraft as we build a 

healthy and experienced maintenance base capable of generating the required readiness for combat. 

Mr. WILSON. In July, a Marine Corps KC–130T crashed during a routine flight, 

killing fifteen Marines and one sailor. The Navy and Marine Corps immediately 

grounded all ‘‘T’’ model aircraft—23 Navy and 12 Marine Corps planes—while investigators determined the cause of the crash. I understand that most, if not all, of 

these aircraft are still grounded and that their return to operational status is being 

hindered in part due to limited maintenance capacity. It’s our understanding that 

the services have had to shift work among maintenance facilities and personnel to 

accommodate the introduction of the Joint Strike Fighter into their fleets. As a result, some older platforms—like the C–130—must rely on a single source for maintenance and repair work. While I understand that routine, planned and priority aircraft often receive adequate support, relying on a single source can understandably 

make it far more difficult to handle work of an unscheduled or unpredictable nature—particularly when the maintenance facilities and personnel are already facing 

a full load of regular-scheduled work under increasing operations tempo. Please provide a status update on maintenance and repair work for the Navy C–130 and Marine Corps KC–130 fleets. 

General RUDDER. Introduction of the Joint Strike Fighter and other new platforms 

have had minimal impact on the downing, repair and maintenance of the Marine 

Corps KC–130T Fleet. The Department of the Navy has an inter-service agreement 

with the Air Force to conduct all Navy and Marine Corps C/KC–130T propeller overhauls at Warner-Robbins Air Force Base (AFB). The Aircraft Mishap Board (AMB), 

which is ongoing, discovered inconsistencies within the maintenance process at Warner-Robins AFB. As a result, the U.S. Air Force initiated a pause in production and 

an overhaul of propellers. This is expected to last at least through mid-January 

2018. The Marine Corps’ ability to resume KC–130T flight operations is contingent 

upon the Air Force adequately resolving their process and quality issues in order 
82 

to resume propeller production and overhauls. The second subject is in regards to 

depot maintenance capacity at Hill AFB, Utah. The Air Force is dedicating Hill AFB 

to F–35 depot work and transitioning all C–130 depot activity to Warner-Robins 

AFB, Georgia, where Periodic Maintenance Interval (PMI) for Air Force C–130s is 

performed. This transition is scheduled to begin in FY18. However, there are multiple alternate locations that can perform unscheduled or unpredictable depot maintenance on C–130s. For example, unscheduled depot maintenance is performed by 

Cherry Point Fleet Readiness Center, Hill AFB artisans and Warner-Robins AFB 

expeditionary maintenance teams. 

Mr. WILSON. In light of a situation wherein certain work can currently be performed at only one location, what steps is the Navy aviation community taking to 

ensure that unscheduled and unpredictable work can be completed as quickly as 

possible? If industry can offer additional capacity in times of great need, do you see 

opportunities for the Department of the Navy to leverage this capability to address 

unscheduled maintenance and repair work, which would in turn enable the current 

organic depots the ability to focus on its routine, planned and priority aircraft? 

Please address the current and forecasted impacts to Navy, Marine Corps, Navy 

Reserve, and Marine Corps Reserve aviation readiness due to the grounding of the 

C–130 fleet and timeline to effect the required repairs. 

General RUDDER. We anticipate that it will take over a year to fully return all 

grounded Marine Corps KC–130T aircraft to service. The propeller overhaul process 

is the only process that is currently being performed at one location: Warner Robbins Air Force Base (AFB). Unscheduled maintenance and repair work is organic 

through the Warner Robins AFB Depot and contracted through Pacific Propeller 

International LLC (PPI). United Technologies Aerospace Systems (UTAS) is the sole 

manufacturer of new blades, which are sent to Warner Robbins AFB and PPI for 

assembly. UTAS has agreed to increase production until the Department of the 

Navy is able to return all aircraft to service. Consequently, the Department will use 

a combination of Warner-Robbins Depot work and PPI overhaul and production of 

new propeller blades to return the Fleet to operational capability. Addressing general Depot work, the Department utilizes all resources available to perform depot 

work both organically and commercially. As for the impact on operations of the Marine Corps Reserve KC–130T fleet, we currently have two operational aircraft and 

expect one more aircraft to be returned to flying status by December 12, 2017. For 

the remainder of the KC–130T fleet, we anticipate approximately six more KC– 

130Ts to be operational by May 1, 2018 and all USMC KC–130T aircraft (12 total) 

operational by February 2019. 

Mr. WILSON. The latest projections for rebuilding readiness are based on setting 

the conditions for readiness recovery. Could you please provide examples of the fragility of recovery efforts, how fiscal year 2017 funding has shown results in recovering readiness, and how the fiscal year 2018 will further readiness recovery. Where 

are additional resources still required? 

General GAYLER. For Army Aviation, force structure reductions as a result of the 

Budget Control Act and Sequestration require us to balance three difficult and often 

competing risks every single day—meeting today’s high level of global commitments, 

building and maintaining readiness for high intensity conflict scenarios, and modernizing the force for the future. Each of these competing risks impact Army Aviation readiness. For example, reduced force structure and today’s high commitment 

levels for Army Aviation significantly challenge our ability to incrementally modernize or upgrade aircraft for real-world requirements. This results in a reduction 

of aircraft available for training to operational units, which directly challenges our 

units’ ability to train and build readiness. Furthermore, reduced, unpredictable, or 

unavailable funding limits our ability to field units with updated equipment such 

as Aviation Survivability Equipment. This is due to our requirement to prioritize 

delivery to deploying units only, which hampers training with these systems across 

the operational force. While we are making progress in building readiness, it will 

take time and predictable and sustained resourcing to get us back on course. 

Fiscal Year 2017 funding and the Request for Additional Appropriations (RAA) 

did provide additional resources which were used to procure additional aviation 

platforms such as UH–60M, AH–64E, and Gray Eagle Unmanned Aircraft Vehicles. 

Additionally, we were able to commit resources to Assured Positioning, Navigation, 

and Timing and several Aviation Survivability Equipment needs for active theaters. 

However, operating under a continuing resolution for two-thirds of 2017 still hampered readiness efforts particularly in two areas: modernization and aviation maintenance. Funding via continuing resolutions continues to place major modernization 

programs largely on hold, as funds are not available for these critical modernization 

efforts. 
83 

Furthermore, continuing resolutions and incremental funding hamper our ability 

to maintain equipment readiness, as it often results in highly variable and unpredictable demand for aviation parts. This impact is felt at the unit level where limited funds can restrict the purchase of large dollar aviation parts, which results in 

deferred maintenance practices. Deferring maintenance directly reduces the number 

of aviation platforms available for training, which hampers readiness efforts. 

Lastly, while it is important to note that funding levels are important to Army 

Aviation’s rate of readiness recovery, a return to predictable and sustained 

resourcing is more essential to ensure that our recovery is continued and enduring. 

Fiscal Year 2018 accounts are programmed to receive increased funding from Fiscal Year 2017 levels, and this level of resourcing will improve our readiness recovery. Fiscal Year 2018 flying hour accounts are funded at 10.6 flight hours per crew 

per month for the Active Component, 7.0 hours for the Army National Guard, and 

6.5 hours for the U.S. Army Reserves. Of note, this fiscal year will bring the start 

of a three-year period of increased Aviation Warrant Officer accessions and flight 

school aviator qualifications to generate increased manning to the operational force. 

This critical effort will help alleviate the current shortages of Aviation Warrant Officers and enhance readiness over time. 

Current funding levels for Army Aviation flying hour programs are sufficient to 

produce platoon-level proficiency which is appropriate for counterinsurgency operations in relatively permissive environments. As we continue to build readiness and 

maintain a focus on potential adversaries, we will ask for your support to further 

resource flight hour programs to allow Army Aviation units to build and maintain 

proficiency at the company and battalion level—a level of proficiency that we must 

provide our Soldiers to remain prepared for potential large scale combat operations. 

Mr. WILSON. Please discuss the current status of Class A, B, C mishap rates, underlying causes, trends observed in aviation safety and your observations on readiness impacts to mishaps? What steps are you taking to mitigate readiness impacts 

on aviation safety? Indications are that Class C/Ground mishaps are on a sharp incline, what actions is your service taking to address this increase and are there any 

early indications of common factors? 

General GAYLER. Over the past four decades, the Army has dramatically reduced 

the major aviation accident rates. The Army Aviation Class A accident rate for Fiscal Year 2017 was 25% below the ten-year average rate with Class B and C accident 

rates consistent with ten-year averages. Human error remains the leading causal 

factor in aviation mishaps. In fact, consistent with accidents throughout the broader 

aviation community and historical averages, 76% of all Class A accidents in Fiscal 

Year 17 were determined to be a result of human error. Fiscal Year 2017 rates: 

Class A: .99 accidents per 100,000 flight hours; 10-year rate = 1.33 

Class B: 1.24 accidents per 100,000 flight hours; 10-year rate = 1.26 

Class C: 5.57 accidents per 100,000 flight hours; 10-year rate = 5.27 

In a continuous effort to mitigate risk to aviation operations, we identify and monitor several trends that have been prevalent in our recent aviation mishaps. The 

first mishap trend centers on an increase in flight training conducted at low altitudes, as these operations have inherently higher risk than high-altitude flight. Aviator proficiency maneuvering at low-altitudes is essential to defeating the significant radar threats we anticipate in any future high intensity conflict. Second, high 

intensity conflict scenarios require collective-level proficiency beyond platoon level— 

a level that was more appropriate for counterinsurgency operations. In shifting our 

training focus to high intensity conflict environments, we add complexity to mission 

training as it must be executed at echelons above the team and platoon level. 

We have not witnessed any direct correlation between readiness levels and aviation mishap rates. We have, however, experienced a decline in flight hours executed 

over the past several years. While we cannot draw a direct correlation between reduced flight hours and our current mishap rates, I share the sentiment recently expressed by Secretary Mattis when he commented that it would be ‘‘hard to believe 

that we could reduce flying hours and not have a less capable force.’’ 

Army Aviation units mitigate risk consistent with the manner practiced by the 

greater Army community—through engaged and decisive leadership. However, rigorous and realistic training conducted repeatedly is the single greatest risk mitigation that leaders can provide their Soldiers, as it results in improved aviator proficiency and confidence and produces higher readiness levels. We remain focused on 

several efforts that will enable units to more effectively train their formations and 

improve their overall readiness which, in turn, should positively impact unit safety. 

First and in line with recommendations made by the Holistic Army Aviation Task 

Force (HAATF) assessment, we are implementing several initiatives to improve 

Army Aviation maintenance. Institutionally, we have developed a standardized Avi-
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ation Maintenance training program and also refined the roles and requirements of 

aviation maintainers, two efforts that will positively impact aviation readiness. Additionally and also consistent with HAATF recommendations, we are improving our 

maintenance storage facilities to reduce corrosion effects on aviation parts. These efforts will translate into higher aircraft operational readiness rates over time and 

provide units with more aircraft available for training, thus improving readiness 

across the force. 

A second institutional effort to highlight centers on improving training throughput 

at Fort Rucker to increase the annual production of Army Aviation Warrant Officers 

(an over 25% increase over the next three years). This initiative will help reduce 

manning shortages across the operational force to better enable training and improve overall readiness across the force. 

2017 Army Aviation Class C mishap rates were slightly above the ten-year average. We did not, however, observe any significant common factors regarding these 

mishaps. As a branch, Army Aviation is mitigating this risk through executing rigorous and realistic training with increased frequency. 

Fiscal Year 2017 saw an increase in on-duty Class A ground mishaps from the 

previous year, while experiencing a decline in overall fatalities. Overall, Class A onduty ground mishap rates have remained relatively constant over the past five 

years, while Soldier on-duty ground fatalities were the lowest over the past five 

years. Operating or riding in a motor vehicle produces the highest number of Class 

A ground mishaps and also results in the most on-duty Soldier fatalities. We continue to mitigate this risk through engaged and decisive leadership at all leader levels throughout our formations. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Just last week it was reported that several drones were observed 

over Whiteman Air Force Base. Recently the A–C–C commander General Holmes 

stated the need for the authority to better defend against small drones. Even these 

small drones could cause significant damage or worse, the loss of one of our Airmen 

and the aircraft. I am wondering how the Air Force is perceiving and addressing 

this problem. 

a. Have there been any other instances of near collisions between small UAS and 

Air Force aircraft? 

b. Do you see this as a potential impact to flying operations and readiness? 

c. Do you think the Air Force has the proper authorities and equipment to detect, 

track, monitor, and mitigate this threat to our national assets? 

General NOWLAND. My counter small UAS team is available to meet with your 

staff to discuss any of these issues in greater detail in a classified environment. The 

Air Force perceives the emergence of small drones as both a force protection and 

a flight safety concern. As such we have stood up a team to examine, develop and 

coordinate solutions across the Air Force and in collaboration and coordination with 

our Sister Service and Interagency partners. 

Have there been any other instances of collisions or near collisions between sUAS 

and Air Force aircraft? 

Drone operations (small Group 1 or 2 unmanned aerial systems weighing less 

than 55 pounds, aka sUAS), remain a concern for Air Force operations and flight 

safety. Within the last year, we have taken measures to increase awareness and improve reporting through various public affairs initiatives and policy guidance. As 

such, we are seeing an increase in reports and sightings around airfields and air 

operations. We think this is a combination of increased proliferation throughout the 

general populace, ideal operating environments around airfields, and increased emphasis on reporting. As for specific instances of collisions with Air Force aircraft, 

we have been very fortunate not to experience any. However, our sister service 

(Army) had at least one collision incident with a helicopter that we know of in New 

York. There are several instances where drones have affected our ability to conduct 

operations. Although our interagency partners, especially the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), have been very supportive of the Air Force with the establishment of Special Security Instructions and Temporary Flight Restrictions over Air 

Force installations and Congress is supportive of the Air Force’s national defense 

functions, the legislative restrictions, authorities, and enforcement options have not 

completely curtailed incidents. The most recent incident was at Whiteman AFB, MO 

where a couple of drones were observed during a national level exercise which resulted in precautionary measures that delayed operations for several hours. Other 

incidents of drones impacting flight operations are at our flight training bases. 

Do you see this as a potential impact to flying operations and readiness? 
85 

Yes. The impact to flying operations is consistent across both the military and 

civil operations especially in vicinity of airports and airfields. The safety issue, although a FAA responsibility, impacts the most critical phases of flight, specifically 

takeoff and landing. Unfortunately, the ability to regulate and enforce the approach 

and departure corridors is a subject the interagency and the Department recognize 

as an important issue but we are awaiting FAA guidance on how to enforce and enhance airspace integrity and flight safety. The Air Force has been focused on protecting assets and resources within our installation boundaries. As such the FAA 

has effectively collaborated with the Air Force and Department of Defense as a 

whole to establish special security restrictions, prohibiting drone operations within 

military installation boundaries. 

Do you think the Air Force has the proper authorities and equipment to: detect, 

track, monitor, and mitigate this threat to our national assets? 

Authorities: The Air Force appreciates Congressional support to expand appropriate 10 USC 130i authorities to all of our installations and bases. We are thankful 

that Congress expanded Department of Defense authorities through the FY18 

NDAA by including additional covered missions such as Special Operations; Major 

Test and Range Facility Bases; Air Defense; Presidential Support; and Critical Infrastructure. However, there is still a gap that will need to be addressed, involving 

vital Air Force missions, such as airlift and training (at our pilot training bases, for 

example). The Air Force and the Department of Defense appreciates Congressional 

support to ensure ‘‘hobby drone’’ consumers and operations are aligned to meet more 

stringent FAA guidelines (such as revised definitions and delineations between 

manned and unmanned aircraft and those guidelines imposed on ‘‘commercial drone 

operators’’, such as Amazon) in order to ensure flight safety, especially in the vicinity of active flight operations. Our overseas locations are limited in similar, complex 

ways and that varies country to country based on international agreements and host 

nation policies. NOTE: Whiteman AFB is covered by current legal authorities under 

10 USC 130i. 

Equipment: Our Air Force is working to rapidly acquire commercial-off-the-shelf 

technologies to fill those equipment requirements. We have prioritized our most urgent missions at home and abroad to receive the first technologies and available systems. From there, we will continually evaluate industry innovations for scalable, 

cost-effective solutions that meet Air Force needs and can adapt to an evolving 

threat. Due to complex legal and policy restrictions at most installations at home 

and abroad, the technologies often required to accomplish tracking and mitigation 

could exceed our current ability to employ them, so we are taking a methodical approach to fielding systems. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. We talk frequently about the fighter pilot shortfall, but we don’t 

discuss the manning shortfalls in the bomber community. I am proud to have Whiteman Air Force Base in my district, which is the model example of the Air Force’s 

Total Force Integration. It is home to both active and guard bomb wings that work 

side-by-side on a daily basis. Despite the active and guard integration, they are still 

facing manning shortfalls. We see the shortfalls not only among the pilots, but 

among the maintainers. These are the individuals who work hard to ensure the B– 

2 maintains its L–O capability. In order to keep up with the high demand for the 

B–2, the men and women at Whiteman are working smarter and staying resilient. 

What is the Air Force doing to address this manning shortfall? 

General NOWLAND. Our pilot shortage is most severe in the fighter community 

(1,005 RegAF/1,276 TF). By comparison, we are short 135 bomber pilots (135 

RegAF/158 TF). That represents an overall RegAF manning of 73% (fighter pilot) 

and 85% (bomber pilot). Although bomber pilot manning is better than fighter pilot 

manning, we are concerned that bomber pilots experienced a more significant % 

drop in manning inventory in FY17 than the fighter pilot inventory. Whiteman AFB 

maintains pilot manning at 98–100% manning throughout the year, and do to the 

sensitive and unique nature of B–2 operations, typically enjoys better manning than 

other bomb squadrons throughout the Air force. 

Furthermore, to address the overall shortfall, the Aircrew Crisis Task Force has 

seven ongoing lines of effort working solutions that address pilot requirements, accessions, production, absorption, retention, sortie production, and industry collaboration to address what we believe is the leading edge of national pilot shortage. Specifically, the pilot shortage requires careful coordination across the service to increase our ability to produce more pilots without creating bottlenecks in the pipeline. In the near term, the Air Force must retain aviators to grow its future force, 

but the only way to recover from the pilot shortfall is to produce more pilots by increasing the capacity of the production pipeline. 
86 

Mrs. HARTZLER. What is the Air Force doing to ensure that we not only have 

enough bomber pilots and maintainers, but that we are able to retain these highly 

skilled individuals? 

General NOWLAND. Bomber pilots will benefit from the 66 different retention initiatives the Air Force is currently working to improve quality of service, work/life 

balance, and monetary compensation for aircrew members. For example, each 

Whiteman AFB bomb squadron gained 5 administrative contractors in November 

2017 to execute scheduling, deployment management, training, and other key functions that are critical to the mission but do not require pilot expertise to accomplish. 

This action decreases the amount of time the pilots have to remain at the squadron 

and allows them to recapture some of the white space on their calendar and make 

investments in personal development. We believe initiatives like these will allow us 

to improve upon the 44% FY17 bomber pilot aviation bonus ‘‘take rate’’ in the coming years. 

As for maintainers, we were approximately 4,000 aircraft maintainers short a couple years ago. Thanks to approval from Congress to grow our end strength, we’ve 

been able to largely recover from that deficit and are only short 400 maintainers 

today. Although it will take 3–5 years for these maintainers to achieve the desired 

experience levels to be considered ‘‘healthy’’ again, having more hands to do the 

work will have a dramatic impact on the retention of existing maintenance personnel. 

Despite our best efforts, retention of highly skilled personnel will continue to be 

a challenge due to the size of our force, the unrelenting demand for airpower around 

the world, and the draw of higher pay and stability that comes from civilian life 

in a good economy. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROWN 

Mr. BROWN. Joint Base Andrews supports contingency operations in the capitol 

region, including support of nuclear missile sites, using UH–1N helicopters. Majority of these aging Hueys are from the Vietnam era, and these aircraft do not meet 

the full scope of current requirements for range, payload, and speed for continuity 

operations (Andrews) or nuclear response (other base) missions. 

They should have been replaced long ago, and today we are dealing with critical 

threats to our national security. Can you tell us about the condition and state of 

readiness of the Hueys currently flying this mission? 

General NOWLAND. Summary: 

Readiness of the UH–1N community can be further addressed in a classified medium. In general, the UH–1N fails to meet mission (speed, payload, range) requirements and the community faces challenges due to pilot and special mission aviator 

shortages. 

a. Air Force Global Strike Command: 

The Air Force Global Strike Command retains 23 of the 63 UH–1Ns within the 

Air Force equating to 37% of the total aircraft inventory. It is expected that these 

aircraft will become increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain. United States 

Strategic Command deemed the current UH–1N not effective for many missions it 

supports and falls short of key operational requirements. The Department of Defense will continue to take action necessary to mitigate UH–1N capability shortfalls. 

b. Air Force District of Washington: 

The Air Force District of Washington concurs that the UH–1N does not meet requirements for range, payload, and speed. All questions regarding status of the UH– 

1N fleet are deferred to Global Strike Command as the lead Major Command for 

the UH–1N. The Air Force District of Washington retains 22 of the 63 UH–1Ns 

within the Air Force equating to 35% of the total aircraft inventory. 

Mr. BROWN. Also, could you provide an update on the Huey Replacement Program 

and give the committee assurances that the program will not face further delays 

and is on track for an award in the 3rd Quarter of 2018? 

General NOWLAND. The Air Force is currently in source selection for the UH–1N 

Replacement and expects contract award in the 3rd Quarter of fiscal year 2018. 

Æ