Foreword

Although this is the second of a series covering the China-Burma-India

Theater of Operations during World War II, it is a story in itself and one full

of drama. The previous volume, Stilwell's Mission to China, recounts the early

efforts of the United States to improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese

Army. This second volume presents the problems of a commander, his staff,

and his troops in a position so irregular and complex as to be unprecedented in

U.S. Army history, and outlines the background of their position in Allied

policy, military and political. Their position was determined by an arrangement

among allies, one accepted with reservations by the War Department. There is

a saying: "There is but one thing more difficult than fighting a war with

Allies—this is to fight a war without them."

A history of the Allied effort in China and Burma, to be complete, must be

written in three dimensions, American-British-Chinese. The present volume

is based on a thorough study of the American records and a wealth of information in General Stilwell's papers not previously explored. The full story of the

war on the Asiatic mainland cannot be written until British studies are further

advanced and the records and the views of the Chinese, of which only a superficial knowledge is now obtainable, have been disclosed and compared with

those of their Western allies. Nevertheless, it seems desirable to tell the American story now. It is needed to round out the history of our Army's global effort

and to do justice to the Americans, high and low, who made their contribution

to victory in a vast and difficult but at the time little-known theater.

Washington, D. C.

30 January 1953

ORLANDO WARD

Maj. Gen., U.S.A.

Chief of Military History

vii
The Authors

From 1946 to 1953 the authors formed the CBI Section of the staff engaged

in writing the history of the U.S. Army in World War II.

Charles F. Romanus received the degree of Master of Arts in History at the

University of Illinois in 1937, and pursued his work for the doctorate at

Louisiana State University, where he was a teaching fellow in history. Entering

the Army in 1943 he was commissioned in March 1945 and became a historical

officer in the headquarters of the China Theater. He is now a historian in the

Historical Section of the Office of the Quartermaster General, and is a captain

in the USAR.

Riley Sunderland graduated from the University of Chicago in 1937. In

April 1942 he was called to active duty as a second lieutenant in the Field Artillery, and from July 1945 to May 1946 was in the Historical Section, Headquarters, India-Burma Theater, in New Delhi. He is now a senior operations

research analyst for Technical Operations, Incorporated, of Arlington,

Massachusetts.

viii
Preface

"When, in October 1943, Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell decided there was little

more he personally could do to improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese

Army, and decided to concentrate his efforts on the India-Burma scene, in

effect his decision marked a change from the role of a staff officer, advising

without the power to command, to that of a commander, giving orders. As

Commanding General, United States Army Forces, China, Burma and India

Theater of Operations, as acting Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, as Commanding General, Chinese Army in India, and as Commanding General, Northern Combat Area Command, Stilwell was charged with

many duties. He was responsible for the active conduct of a campaign in north

Burma, and for its immediate logistical support; for the execution of a number

of projects agreed to by the President, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and

the Generalissimo of China to aid China; for the execution of projects ordered

by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to reinforce U.S. operations in the Pacific, and

for their logistical support; and, as deputy commander, for playing an appropriate role in Southeast Asia Command should necessity demand. This multitude of roles, these often conflicting missions and requirements, meant that

Stilwell faced a variety of command problems. This volume relates his efforts

to solve them.

The narrative, like that in the first volume of the subseries, Stilwell's Mission

to China, is written at the level of the theater commander's headquarters or

command post. Under this inherent limitation, it offers a contribution to an

understanding of the American effort in China, Burma, and India in 1943 and

1944, and to the study of Sino-American relations in the same period; it is not

a definitive history of the war in Asia. The U.S. Air Force is telling its story in

many volumes, written from its own point of view. So are the technical services. A British official history is well advanced. The Chinese may someday tell

their story, and the beginnings of a Japanese official history are at hand. From

these several sources, some historian may ultimately produce a fairly complete

history of the war in Asia, which truly deserves to be called "the unknown

war." This volume only continues what its predecessor began, that is, a reconnaissance of part of the area the future historian must cross.

That the authors prepared the volume in this manner reflects primarily

ix
their mission—writing a history of the U.S. Army theater of operations in

China, Burma, and India. It also reflects the nature of the documentary sources

which the U.S. Army was able to open for them.

The events of 1943-44 in China, Burma, and India, great though they were,

were but the prelude to others. Looking back on 1943 and 1944, those who had

seen the later events saw the prelude through the glass of their own experiences, and interpreted the actions and motives of the men of 1943 and 1944

accordingly. But the men whose words and acts are recorded in these pages

were no better at foretelling the future than men have ever been. Sometimes

aware of what the future might hold, they were nonetheless preoccupied with

the problems of the day, rather than those of next year. Standing on their side

of the veil of the future, they saw through it dimly as men always see through

it, not as men see the recent past. It is the historian's task to recreate the scene

they saw, and let the reader judge them, as inevitably he will judge them, by

the understanding of his own day.

The volume has many references to disagreements between allies. Inevitably, the account of the disagreements takes up more space than the final

agreement, though it is the latter which is the more important. The differences

and disagreements are of interest to the student because they did happen, and

because they are an inevitable part of coalition war. But they should not be

magnified out of proportion.

The authors are greatly indebted to many participants in the events

described who were willing to offer comment and criticism on several drafts of

the manuscript: Lt. Col. Charles E. Beach, Maj. Gen. Haydon L. Boatner, Brig.

Gen. Frederic W. Boye, Brig. Gen. Waldemar F. Breidster, Col. Rothwell H.

Brown, Col. Harry A. Buckley, Brig. Gen. Robert M. Cannon, Maj. Gen. Gilbert X. Cheves, Lt. Col. George L. Converse, Maj. Gen. William E. R. Coveil,

Maj. Gen. Howard C. Davidson, Col. Joseph K. Dickey, Brig. Gen. Frank

Dorn, Lt. Col. Trevor N. Dupuy, Col. Ernest F. Easterbrook, Maj. Gen. Vernon

Evans, Brig. Gen. Benjamin G. Ferris, Lt. Col. John B. George, Capt. Shy S.

Greenspan, Maj. Gen. Thomas G. Hearn, Col. Francis Hill, Col. Charles N.

Hunter, Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, Lt. Col. George T. Laughlin, Brig. Gen.

Malcolm F. Lindsey, Col. Robert C. Lutz, Col. John E. McCammon, Lt. Col.

George A. McGee, Jr., Col. Edward J. McNally, Lt. Col. Harry L. Mayfield,

Maj. Gen. Frank D. Merrill, Lt. Col. William L. Osborne, Col. William R.

Peers, Lt. Gen. Lewis A. Pick, Brig. Gen. Frank N. Roberts, Lt. Col. Joseph

Rockis, General Brehon B. Somervell, Col. Carlos G. Spaht, Col. John H.

Stodter, Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, Capt. James L. Tilly, Col. Thomas F.

Van Natta, III, Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Brig. Gen. Theodore F. Wessels, Capt. Logan E. Weston, Lt. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler, and Col. Walter

S. Wood.

The authors have been aided by and are grateful for the opportunity to dis-
cuss the history of the China-Burma-India theaters with General Boatner, Lt.

Col. Dwight E. Brewer, Lt. Col. Charles F. Byars, Colonel Converse, Maj. Gen.

William M. Creasy, Mr. John P. Davies, Jr., General Dorn, Colonel Dupuy,

Colonel Easterbrook, General Evans, Maj. Gen. Francis W. Festing (British

36th Division), Colonel George, General Hearn, Col. Thomas J. Heavey,

Colonel Hill, General Hurley, General Lindsey, General George C. Marshall,

General Merrill, Colonel Peers, General Roberts, Colonel Rockis, Col. Robert

F. Seedlock, Colonel Spaht, Col. Joseph W. Stilwell, Jr., Colonel Stodter, Col.

Thomas F. Taylor, Captain Tilly, General Wessels, General Wedemeyer, and

Colonel Wood. They are of course not responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation in the pages following.

A great deal of assistance has been received from other historians. Maj. Gen.

S. W. Kirby, C.B., C.M.G., O.B.E., M.C., and Brigadier M. R. Roberts, D.S.O.,

of the Cabinet Office Historical Section, commented on a draft of the manuscript at very considerable length. Col. Allison R. Hartman and the staff of

former Japanese officers of the Historical Section, Far East Command, presented the authors with interpretations and corrections from the Japanese point

of view. Dr. Henry Lee Bowen of the Air Force historians gave generously of

his time and experience in commenting on Chapter III.

Within the Office, Chief of Military History, the authors were greatly aided

by Mr. Joseph Bykofsky, Transportation Section, himself a veteran of the North

Burma Campaign. Stilwell's Command Problems like its predecessor, Stilwell's

Mission to China, reflects much of the industrious research, judgment, and narrative skill of Mrs. Jacqueline Perry Griffin, research assistant. The section of

Chapter II entitled "SEAC Tries To Salvage Burma Operations" was written

by Mrs. Griffin, whose special field was the operations of Southeast Asia Command. Only Mrs. Griffin's departure in October 1950 kept her direct contribution to the text from being a larger one.

Mrs. Dorothy Campbell Liles prepared the manuscript of Chapters I

through VI in first draft, and prepared Part Two for circulation among participants in the campaign. Her successor, Miss Mildred Bucan, prepared the final

draft of the manuscript for publication. Their quick perceptions, sound common sense, and stenographic skill permitted the authors to concentrate on their

proper tasks of research and writing.

This volume, like its predecessor, was edited by Miss Ruth Stout, whose

skill, industry, and understanding of authors' ways greatly improved the original manuscript. Miss Gay Morenus, who copy-edited Stilwell's Mission to China,

has not only performed that exacting task most competently for the present

volume but has prepared an extremely helpful index.

Finally, though this volume and the others of the China-Burma-India

series are prepared and published under the auspices of the Office, Chief of

Military History, the reader must not assume they present an official point of

view on wartime events in China, Burma, and India. Indeed, the authors very

ix
soon learned that the witnesses to and participants in these events differed

among themselves as witnesses always do. The authors are not aware that there

exists in the Department of Defense anything that may be called an official

point of view toward the events described below. The point of view here presented is that of the undersigned. Responsibility for it, and for any errors the

reader may discover, is solely theirs.

Washington, D. C.

18 June 1954

CHARLES F. ROMANUS

RILEY SUNDERLAND

xii
Contents

PART ONE

Plans and Preparations for the North Burma Campaign:

October-December 1943

Chapter Page

I. THE LAST PREPARATIONS. ................ . 3

Combined Chiefs Order a North Burma Campaign ........ . 9

Improving the Lines of Communications ............ . 11

The B-29 Project Approved ................. . 15

Chennault's Operations ................... . 18

Chennault's Proposals for 1944 ............... . 22

Building an East China Army ............... . 26

The Allied Command Structure in North Burma ........ . 28

The Chinese Forces .................... . 32

The American Force .................... . 34

The Kachin Rangers .................... . 36

T he Battleground ..................... . 37

Planning the North Burma Campaign ............ . 39

The Campaign Begins ................... . 45

Summary ........................ . 4 8

II. SEXTANT: THE WATERSHED ............... . 49

Drafting SEAC's Proposals ................ . 49

The United States Prepares for the SEXTANT Conference .... . 52

The Chinese Prepare for SEXTANT ............. . 56

Presenting CHAMPION at Cairo .............. . 59

Trying To Reach Agreement ................. . 63

Over the Watershed: The Changed Attitude Toward China .... . 67

Stilwell's Search for Guidance ................ . 71

SEAC Tries To Salvage Burma Operations ........... . 75

A Changing U.S. Attitude ................. . 79

Summary ........................ . 8 2

III. THE INDIA-BASED AIR EFFORT .............. . 83

Command and Administration of the Air Forces ......... . 83

The Japanese Air Effort in Burma .............. . 85

Support of Ground Forces .................. . 88

Strategic Bombing...................... 91

Air Supply ....................... . 95

Allocation of Transport Aircraft ............... . 98

Administrative Problems .................. . 100

Techniques......................... 102

Problems of Air Supply .................. . 106

The B-29 Command Problem ................ . 109

Logistical Problems of the B-29's .............. . 114

Summary ........................ . 11 6

xiii
PART TWO

The North Burma Campaign: December 1943-August 1944

Chapter Page

IV. BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN NORTH BURMA ..... . 119

The Chiangs Visit Their Troops ............... . 122

Yupbang Ga ....................... . 12 4

The Opponents Shape Their Plans .............. . 129

Enveloping the Japanese Left Flank ............. . 131

The Capture of Taihpa Ga ................. . 134

Clearing the Taro Plain .................. . 136

The Allies Reorganize for the Next Effort ........... . 138

Logistical Support .................... . 13 9

Planning To Force a Decision ................ . 142

U.S. Infantry for the Second Phase .............. . 146

The Operation Begins ................... . 148

GALAHAD's Fight at Walawbum ............. . 151

The "Big Squeeze Play" .................. . 155

Summary ........................ . 15 9

V. THE BURMA CAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE ........ . 160

The SEXTANT Decisions Challenged ............ . 160

The Japanese Create More Command Problems ......... . 165

Mountbatten and Stilwell Meet ............... . 169

The Chiefs of Staff Reject CULVERIN ............ . 171

The Japanese Attack Forces Hump Diversions ......... . 172

Inkangahtawng: An Attempt That Failed ........... . 175

The Japanese Delay the 1st Battalion, 5307th .......... . 183

Delay at Jambu Bum ................... . 185

The Siege of Nhpum Ga .................. . 188

Air Supply Problem at Imphal ............... . 191

The Chindits Go Back to Burma ............... . 196

The Question of Myitkyina ................. . 200

Summary ........................ . 20 3

VI. THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA ............... . 204

The QUARTERBACK Calls an END RUN ......... . 204

The 22d Division and the Drive on Kamaing .......... . 207

The 38th Division: The Generalissimo and Stilwell ....... . 211

Turning Tanaka's Flank .................. . 213

The 112th Regiment's Stand at the Seton Block ......... . 215

Defeat of the 18th Division ................. . 218

Stilwell and the Chindits .................. . 220

The March to Myitkyina .................. . 223

MERCHANT OF VENICE! ................ . 226

The First Attempts To Take the Town ............ . 229

Japanese Build-up at Myitkyina ............... . 230

Command Problems at Myitkyina .............. . 238

The Attacks of Mid-June 1944 ................ . 244

Changes in Command ................... . 248

Hacking Out Small Gains ................. . 250

The Last Days ...................... . 252

Summary ........................ . 25 6

xiv
Chapter Page

VII. LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION ............ . 257

The Headquarters Reorganized ................ . 257

S OS Problems ...................... . 25 9

Negotiations ....................... . 26 0

Clearing the Port of Calcutta ................ . 263

Railway Problems .................... . 26 5

Military Railway Service Begins Its Work ........... . 266

Changes in Operating Procedure ............... . 267

Operations Under Military Railway Service .......... . 269

Physical Improvements on the Railway ............ . 271

A British Appraisal..................... 272

Attempts To Use Indian River Transport ........... . 273

Pipelines in India ..................... . 274

Supply Problems in India ................. . 276

New Agreements on Local Procurement ............ . 277

Housekeeping Problems ................... . 280

Chinese Lend-Lease .................... . 281

Medical Problems in the Rear Area .............. . 284

Logistical Problems in China ................ . 288

Summary ........................ . 29 3

PART THREE

Command Problems in China Theater

VIII. DECISIONS TO ATTACK .................. . 297

"Money Is the Root of All Our Trouble" ........... . 297

American Military Observers in North China .......... . 302

SEAC and Stilwell Obtain Pressure on Chiang ......... . 304

The Generalissimo Warns of Trouble ............. . 306

The President Demands Action ............... . 309

The Chinese Decide To Cross the Salween ............ . 312

Chennault Renews His Warnings .............. . 314

Operation ICHIGO .................... . 316

East China' s Defenders on the Eve of ICHIGO ......... . 320

Initial Reactions to ICHIGO ................ . 322

The East China Army Written Off .............. . 326

Summary ........................ . 32 7

IX. THE CHINESE TAKE THE OFFENSIVE ........... . 329

Battleground Above the Clouds: The Salween Front ....... . 331

The Chinese Plan for the Salween Campaign .......... . 333

The American Contribution ................. . 336

Beginning the Offensive .................. . 340

Pushing Through Ma-mien Pass ............... . 343

Clearing Ta-tang-tzu Pass, 11 May-12 June 1944 ........ . 345

Securing the Huei-jen Bridge Area, 11 May-14 June 1944 ..... . 349

Driving the Japanese Rear Guards From the Shweli Valley .... . 349

The Southern Flank, 11 May-30 June 1944 ........... . 352

71st Army and the Fight for Lung-ling, 28 May-15 July 1944 ... . 354

Summary ........................ . 36 0
Chapter Page

X. FACING THE COMMAND PROBLEM ............ . 361

Stilwell's Mission Laid Aside ............... . 362

Stilwell Called to China .................. . 364

Chennault Given 10,000 Tons ................ . 367

The Japanese Drive Rolls on in East China .......... . 371

Vice-President Wallace Suggests Stilwell's Recall ....... . 374

Stilwell Nominated for Command .............. . 379

The Generalissimo Agrees "in Principle" ........... . 384

The Ledo Road Project Reduced ............... . 387

Slow Progress Across the Salween .............. . 389

The Battle for Sung Shan .................. . 394

Summary ........................ . 39 8

XI. THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 ................ . 399

The Defense of Heng-yang ................. . 399

Japanese Successes and Chinese. Politics ............ . 401

The East China Crisis Grows ................ . 405

The Hurley-Nelson Mission ................. . 413

Washington Plans To End Stilwell's Lend-Lease Powers ..... . 418

The Talks Begin ..................... . 422

American Proposals, 12-13 September 1944 ........... . 426

Stilwell and the Question of the Communists' Role ........ . 430

Crisis in the East, Crisis in the West ............. . 433

"I Do Not Seek the Job" .................. . 436

The President Replies ................... . 439

Summary ........................ . 44 2

XII. THE END OF CBI THEATER ................ . 443

The Note Delivered .................... . 443

The Generalissimo's Wrath ................. . 447

Deadlock ........................ . 45 1

End of the Deadlock .................... . 456

The Generalissimo Places the Blame .............. . 460

Waiting for the Decision .................. . 464

The President Ends CBI Theater ............... . 468

Conclusion ........................ . 47 1

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . ................... . 473

GLOSSARY ........................... . 48 1

CODE NAMES .......................... . 485

BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS ................ . 487

INDEX ............................. . 49 1

xvi
Charts

No. Page

1. Stilwell in the CBI Chain of Command: December 1943-June 1944 ... 6

2. Organization of U.S. Forces, China, Burma and India: November 1943-

April 1944 ......................... . 7

3. Chih Hui Pu ......................... . 30

4. Japanese Organization and Dispositions: November 1943 ...... . 43

5. Tonnage Shipped From India to China by Air: 1944 ........ . 112

6. Schematic Order of Battle of the Chinese Expeditionary Force ... . 333

7. Tonnage Forwarded by USAF SOS CBI Advance Section to North Burma;

January 1944-May 1945 ................... . 39 0

8. Organization of the China Expeditionary Army: 15 September 1944 . . 406

Tables

1. Tonnages Shipped to Burma Over Burma-Siam Railway: November 1943-

August 1945 ........................ . 9 4

2. Average Daily Traffic at Terminals of Principal Branch Lines of JapaneseOperated Railways in Burma: January 1943-August 1945 .... . 96

3. Tonnage Delivered to Northern Combat Area Command by Air: April

1943-March 1945 ..................... . 10 5

4. Strength of U.S. Army Forces in the China-Burma-India Theater: January-September 1944 .................... . 25 8

5. Fourteenth Air Force Aircraft Inventory by Type of Aircraft: March

1943-December 1944 .................... . 37 0

Maps

1. India-China Communications System, October 1943-October 1944 ....... 11

2. The Battleground .................................................................................. 37

3. ALBACORE Plan, 8 August 1943 .............................................................. 40

4. Entering the Hukawng Valley, October 1943 ........................................ 44

5. Disposition of Forces, 1 December 1943................................................ 120

6. Operations in Northern Hukawng Valley, January 1944........................ 132

7. Advance to Walawbum, 23 February-4 March 1944............................... 144

8. Fight at Walawbum, 4-8 March 1944 .................................................... 151

9. Japanese Attack on Arakan Front, 4-7 February 1944 ............................ 166

10. Japanese Offensive on Imphal Front, March-April 1944 ........................ 173

11. Inkangahtawng, 12-23 March 1944......................................................... 179

12. Shaduzup and Nhpum Ga, 24-29 March 1944........................................ 184

13. Mogaung Valley, 1 April-27 May 1944 .................................................. 207

14. Mogaung Valley, 28 May-26 June 1944.................................................. 217

15. Advance to Myitkyina, 28 April-17 May 1944 ....................................... 224

16. Myitkyina, 18 May-End of July 1944...................................................... 231

17. Situation in China, 15 March 1944 ......................................................... 307

18. ICHIGO Plan ......................................................................................... 317

19. The Salween Campaign, 11 May-30 June 1944 ....................................... 330

xvii
Illustrations

Page

The Kweilin Infantry Training Center ............... . 27

A Squad of Kachin Rangers .................... . 37

Cairo Conference ......................... . 6 0

Chiang Kai-shek at Ramgarh ................... . 67

Bombing of Bridges ........................ . 93

Kickers Prepare to Drop Supplies .................. . 98

Packing Supplies for Airdrop ................... . 103

Parachute-Covered Foxhole .................... . 10 9

Attack on Yupbang Ga ...................... . 126

Japanese Fifteenth Army Commander and Staff ............ . 129

General Stilwell and General Sun .................. . 135

Drainage Culverts ........................ . 14 0

Pipeline Crossing a Stream ..................... . 141

General Stilwell and General Merrill ................ . 149

A Chinese Cook ......................... . 157

Troops of Merrill's Marauders ................... . 177

Damaged M3A3 Tanks ...................... . 186

Troops of the Chinese 22d Division ................. . 209

A British Antiaircraft Unit .................... . 227

Japanese Defensive Positions .................... . 232

Allied Casualties at Myitkyina Airfield ............... . 234

Japanese Trenches ......................... . 23 6

Artillery in Action at Myitkyina .................. . 246

General Stilwell and Colonel Hunter ................ . 249

The King George Dock Area .................... . 263

Railroad Operations in India .................... . 268

Supplies in Open Storage in India ................. . 282

Bridges Across the Yellow River .................. . 324

Gen. We i Li-huang ........................ . 334

An American Liaison Officer .................... . 337

American Engineers on the Burma Road .............. . 339

Chinese Troops Cross the Salween ................. . 342

Footbridge Across the Salween ................... . 344

Air-Supply Drops ......................... . 34 7

Chinese 2d Army Artillerymen ................... . 353

The Sung Shan Mountain Area ................... . 358

Evacuation of Kweilin ...................... . 373

Vice-President Wallace ...................... . 37 5

Chinese Infantrymen Rest on Lai-feng Shan ............. . 392

The Walled City of Teng-chung .................. . 393

Chinese Troops on Kung Lung-po Peak ............... . 396

Field Marshal Shunroku Hata ................... . 407

Gen. Yasuji Okamura ....................... . 407

Chungking Conference ...................... . 42 2

General Stilwell Entertains at Luncheon .............. . 425

The illustrations are from Department of

Defense files, except those on pages 129 and 407,

which are Japanese photographs.

xviii
PART ONE

PLANS AND PREPARATIONS

FOR THE NORTH BURMA CAMPAIGN

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1943

CHAPTER I

The Last Preparations

Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell's concern with command problems in China,

Burma, and India can be traced to the ARCADIA Conference in Washington,

December 1941, when Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and President

Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that

China's leader become Supreme Commander of a United Nations "China

Theater." The Generalissimo agreed and, in replying, asked that a high-ranking

U.S. Army officer be sent to China to be chief of staff of the Allied staff that the

Generalissimo proposed to organize to help him command China Theater. The

United States nominated Stilwell, and the Chinese agreed. This then was the

basic command structure of China Theater, which was geographically synonymous with China. The Generalissimo was Supreme Commander; all United

Nations forces in China Theater were under him, while he in turn was answerable to himself alone, in no way subject to any other officer or agency of the

United Nations. Gen. Ho Ying-chin was Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army

while General Stilwell was the Generalissimo's joint (Allied) chief of staff for

China Theater. The Chinese were not willing to let Stilwell have a staff to

help him carry out his duties as joint chief of staff to the Generalissimo, so

Stilwell tried to perform them himself with the aid of an interpreter and a

stenographer. And since Stilwell took this course, his American subordinates

were often not aware of his plans for China Theater.

Believing that the Chinese Army was not an effective fighting force, the

War Department ordered Stilwell "to assist in improving the combat efficiency

of the Chinese Army." In endeavoring to carry out this mission, Stilwell, after

he arrived in China in March 1942, met with little interest or co-operation

from the Chinese Government. An undeclared truce existed along the front,

broken occasionally when the Japanese forces advanced to break up Chinese

troop concentrations or to train their own troops. On such occasions, the

Chinese fell back, then reoccupied their former positions when the Japanese

retired. In September 1943 Stilwell told the Generalissimo that many of the 300

divisions on the Chinese order of battle had never been in combat. About thirty

Chinese divisions were commanded by officers whose loyalties were primarily

to the Generalissimo; the others were loyal to local war lords or provincial
4 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

governors. Of matériel, the Chinese said they had about 1,000,000 rifles, 83,000

machine guns, and 7,800 trench mortars. Artillery was so widely dispersed that

no division had enough, but there were about 1,330 cannon in China of diverse

calibers and origins. Units were far below strength; soldiers were unpaid, poorly

fed, and poorly clad; the diseases that accompany malnutrition and insanitary

camps were rampant. The Chinese had not succeeded in creating a services of

supply; consequently, troop movements were made only with the most extreme

difficulty, for trucks and motor fuel were almost nonexistent in China and

there was no organization for keeping up a steady flow of rations to troops on

the march. In his memorandums and staff studies Stilwell always described the

Chinese Army as "immobile."

After the Japanese occupied Burma in May 1942 and destroyed the last line

of communications between China and her Allies, Stilwell faced a problem that

required a multiple solution if he was to carry out his orders from Gen. George

C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, "to support China."

The solution that Stilwell proposed to the Chinese, British, and U.S.

Governments in May and June 1942 was to form within the Chinese Army an

elite force of full-strength, well-fed, competently led and well-trained divisions,

the gaps in whose equipment would be made good by lend-lease aid. To bring

artillery, small arms ammunition, shells, trucks, and spare parts into China,

Stilwell proposed to retake all Burma and reopen the line of communications

from Rangoon to Kunming. Once this had been done, and a powerful Chinese

Army, supported by an adequate line of communications, had been created,

then Stilwell (and Marshall) believed the time would be at hand for a powerful

air offensive against Japan that would deal punishing blows to the Japanese

homeland itself. While these proposals were being considered by the several

governments, Stilwell in July 1942 organized the U.S. air force and service

troops in China, Burma, and India into an American theater of operations,

"U.S. Army Forces in China, Burma and India."

From May 1942 to October 1943 Stilwell, with earnest support from General

Marshall and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, urged his proposals on the

Generalissimo. In Washington, Marshall and Stimson sought to enlist the

President's aid. The basic factor controlling the support that Stilwell's American

superiors would extend to his efforts to assist China was the American decision

to make the principal U.S. effort in the Atlantic area. Stilwell's theater, therefore, with the exception of transport aircraft, received little in the way of

supplies and manpower from the United States; to a great degree Stilwell was

left to carry out his mission with what resources he could conjure up in China

and India.

Some progress was made toward creating a better Chinese Army. Detailed

plans were made to assemble thirty reorganized and re-equipped Chinese divisions in Yunnan, and thirty more in east China. An infantry and artillery train-
THE LAST PREPARATIONS 5

ing program in Yunnan was begun in March 1943. The nucleus of an American

liaison staff was set up for the Yunnan divisions, or Y-Force as they came to be

called. But every step of the way Stilwell and his subordinates had to cope with

what they believed to be apathy and indifference on the part of the Chinese.

After a brief period in the fall of 1942, when it appeared that the Generalissimo might be actively interested in reforming a major portion of the Chinese

Army and joining in an offensive to retake Burma, he stated that operations in

Burma in March 1943 could not be undertaken and invited attention to what

might be done in China by a small, effective air force.

The commander of the Fourteenth U.S. Air Force in China, Maj. Gen.

Claire L. Chennault, believed that Stilwell, by concentrating on reform of the

Chinese Army and reopening of the ground lines of communications to China,

was compromising a great opportunity to deal heavy and immediate blows

against the Japanese by air. Chafing at the restrictions placed on him by the

small amount of supplies then being flown into China from India, General

Chennault in October 1942 finally put his case directly before the President. He

told Roosevelt that with 105 fighters, 35 medium bombers, and 12 heavy

bombers, he could open the way for the defeat of Japan. By March 1943 Roosevelt gave unmistakable indication that he supported Chennault rather than

Stilwell.

At the TRIDENT Conference in Washington during May 1943, the divergent

trends in U.S. policy finally came into the open. The Generalissimo as Supreme

Commander, China Theater, asked the President to give Chennault the logistical support that officer said would suffice. The President agreed, and Chennault received first priority on supplies flown into China. The War Department

advised against giving first priority to Chennault, because it feared that if the

Japanese were provoked by Chennault's air offensive they would sweep over the

east China bases from which the Fourteenth Air Force operated. The Generalissimo, however, gave Roosevelt his personal assurance that the existing Chinese

forces could defend the east China airfields.

The second major development at the TRIDENT Conference was that the

Combined Chiefs of Staff decided not to attempt the reconquest of all Burma

in the near future but rather to reoccupy north Burma only. Such a limited

campaign meant that in lieu of what might come through Rangoon and over

the old Burma Road, supplies for the Chinese Army and Chennault's air force

would be confined to what could be brought across north Burma—by air until

the campaign succeeded, by air, truck, and pipeline thereafter. After the

TRIDENT Conference it speedily appeared that Allied resources in ChinaBurma-India (CBI) were insufficient to support both Chennault's air offensive

and preparations to retake north Burma.

The need for a new approach to the problems of war in Asia and for

adequate logistical support of Allied operations there was by then obvious. The

solution put forward by the Prime Minister in June 1943 and agreed to by
6 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

CHART 1—STILWELL IN THE CBI CHAIN OF COMMAND :

DECEMBER 1943-JUNE 1944

American authority was the creation of Southeast Asia Command (SEAC)

under Vice Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten as Supreme Allied Commander with

Stilwell acting as his deputy. An ambitious program of engineering projects was

begun. When Mountbatten visited China in October 1943 to present his new

command to the Generalissimo, the latter requested that Stilwell be recalled.

Though Stilwell and the Generalissimo were not on good terms, though the

latter usually ignored Stilwell both personally and officially, this request came

immediately after a very brief period in which the Generalissimo had shown a

renewed interest in Stilwell's proposals for reform of the Chinese Army, and

therefore it surprised and angered Stilwell.

The Generalissimo's request climaxed about twenty months in which

Stilwell and his subordinates had sought to improve the combat efficiency of

the Chinese Army. Armies do not spring from the ground fully armed and

trained; months of time are required for the task of preparing them. The campaigning season was about to begin in the fall of 1943, and the months that

should have been used for China's preparation were sped. On the eve of its

greatest test the Chinese Army in China was little better than it had ever been,

and Stilwell was convinced there was little more he personally could do in

China. Henceforth, he gave most of his time and attention to command

problems in India and Burma. (Charts 1 and 2)

But the diplomatic aspect of Stilwell's presence in Asia remained. His

8 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

superiors, possibly fearing the diplomatic consequences if the Chinese learned

that the U.S. Government no longer attached importance to improving the

combat efficiency of the Chinese Army, never formally altered that as his primary mission. Instead, they tacitly acquiesced in his conclusion that there was

little more he personally could do in China to carry it out, and gave him a

whole series of added tasks which, as the Army Chief of Staff later admitted to

Stilwell, added up to what Marshall called a "paramount mission"—one that

interfered with, and bore no relation to, his existing primary mission.

Viewed as a whole, the war gave the United Nations grounds for confidence,

though much hard and bitter fighting lay ahead. In the Pacific, American and

Australian forces were battering through the outer Japanese defenses and by

2 November 1943 were halfway up the ladder of the Solomon Islands. Once

the island barrier of the Southwest Pacific was broken, Allied task forces could

range more freely among the Japanese island positions. In New Guinea, the

Allied advance was almost ready to turn the barrier represented by New Britain

Island. But New Britain was many, many miles from Tokyo, and at times it

may have seemed that the twenty-three months since 7 December 1941 had

done little to bring the Allies closer to Japan. The most immediately hopeful

augury lay in that night and day the dockyard crews at Pearl Harbor were putting oil and water, shells and fuel, into spanking-new aircraft carriers, destroyers,

and cruisers, on landing craft and transports; that Infantry and Marine officers

were intently studying maps of the central Pacific. Occupation of key points in

the Gilbert Islands, Operation GALVANIC, was imminent.

In the Mediterranean, Benito Mussolini, the creator of fascism, had been

ignominiously deposed on 25 July 1943, and a little more than a month later

Italy surrendered to the Allies. A powerful Allied force then landed at Salerno

(9 September). Eight days later southern Italy was firmly in Allied hands.

In Russia, the Germans were retreating. In the summer of 1941 and again

in that of 1942 the Germans had scored flashy victories without being able to

strike a decisive blow. On 5 July 1943, they opened their annual summer offensive on the central front in Russia. In ten days the offensive had been halted

and the Red Army seized an initiative it never thereafter lost. By November

1943 Russia could begin to look forward to the day when the last German

would be driven from Russian soil; remembering the Russo-German Pact of

1939, the British Commonwealth and the United States might wonder what

form Soviet policy would take in that event.

In northwestern Europe, there was as yet no action on the ground, but

night and day the bombing fleets flew from England to Germany, cascaded out

their tons of fire and steel, and returned less what toll the defense took. At sea

the submarine menace, which had so hobbled Allied strategy in 1941,1942, and

early 1943, was under control. So men and matériel were accumulating in England, and Anglo-American capabilities for a cross-Channel assault were steadily

improving.
THE LAST PREPARATIONS 9

Of the three enemy states—Germany, Italy, and Japan—only Italy had as

yet been invaded, and Germany and Japan still sheltered behind their outer

defenses. In the case of Germany, the bombers were flying over the defenses,

but in the case of Japan, systematic bombing of the Japanese homeland was as

yet only a project for the future. China's geographic position, China's assumed

resources in manpower, might still play a great, perhaps a decisive, role in the

forthcoming attacks on Japan. How these Chinese resources could be brought

to bear and the extent of British and American dependence on them for victory

in the Pacific were among the major problems requiring solution in October

1943.

Combined Chiefs Order a North Burma Campaign

Stilwell began concentrating on his command problems about 23 October

1943, when he and his immediate superior for operations in Burma, Admiral

Lord Louis Mountbatten, arrived in India after conferences with the Generalissimo in Chungking.1

 Stilwell's first task was to aid Mountbatten in the preparation of a plan for operations in Burma to carry out the directives of the TRIDENT

and QUADRANT (Quebec, August 1943) Conferences.2 With the lifting of the

monsoon rains in Burma, the campaign season was at hand, and the time had

come to break the blockade of China in the way prescribed by the Combined

Chiefs of Staff:

1. to carry out operations for the capture of Upper Burma in order to improve the air

route and establish overland communications with China. Target date: mid-February, 1944.

2. to continue to build up and increase the air routes and air supplies of China, and the

development of air facilities with a view to:

a. Keeping China in the war.

b. Intensifying operations against the Japanese.

c. Maintaining increased U.S. and Chinese Air Forces in China.

d. Equipping Chinese ground forces.3

The Myitkyina (pronounced myi-che-na)-Mogaung area of north Burma

acquired great importance because of this directive. In the first place, its geographic position at the southern tip of the hump of mountains over which the

transports flew from India to China meant that its capture would greatly

improve the air route to China. As long as the Japanese held the Myitkyina

airstrips, the threat of their fighters forced the U.S. aircraft to fly far to the

north, then to swing south to the Kunming air terminals. This increased fuel

1

 Report and Supplement for the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia, 1943-1946, Vice Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, New Delhi, India, July 30, 1947 (hereafter, Mountbatten Report), Pt. B, par. 8. 2

 Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), Chs. IX and X. 3

 History of the China-Burma-India Theater, 21 May 1942-25 October 1944 (hereafter, History of CBI), p. 161. OPD 314.7 CTO, A47-30. (See Bibliographical Note.)
10 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

consumption and cut the pay load. The air route itself was narrow, and its

saturation with transports sometime in the near future was predicted. "With

Myitkyina in Allied possession the transports would be able to use a much

wider, lower air route.4

Secondly, since fall 1942 the U.S. engineers had been building a road south

from Ledo, Assam, which was intended to cross north Burma and ultimately

link with the old Burma Road. The Hukawng and Mogaung valleys, down

which the Ledo Road was being constructed, enter the Irrawaddy valley, which

is the most habitable part of north and central Burma, within a few miles of the

Myitkyina-Mogaung area. Both towns are on the rail and road net of prewar

Burma, so when the Ledo Road reached them the engineering problem would

become one of improving existing facilities rather than constructing new ones

in the virgin wilderness. Therefore, taking the Myitkyina-Mogaung area was

the prerequisite to completing the Ledo Road and opening a ground line of

communications, with an all-weather road and a gasoline pipeline, to China.

The purpose of the projected ground line of communications to China was

not to supply the Chinese armies or sustain the Chinese economy; a road and

a pipeline cannot support 300 divisions in combat or sustain the life of several

hundred millions of people. A two-way, all-weather road to China, which was

then contemplated, would, the Army Service Forces believed in the fall of 1943,

permit the ultimate delivery of 65,000 tons a month to Kunming. Vehicles,

artillery, and small arms ammunition from this tonnage would enable Stilwell

to fill the gaps in the equipment of such Chinese divisions as the Generalissimo

might permit him to train and bring to full strength.s Once revitalized, these

divisions might, if the Generalissimo concurred, seize a port on the Chinese

coast and secure airfields from which Japan could be systematically and heavily

bombed.

Normally, planning precedes logistical preparation, and logistical preparation, fighting. One of the noteworthy aspects of the North Burma Campaign

of 1943-44 is that the logistical preparations, the planning, and the fighting

proceeded simultaneously. The troops moved forward before the commanders

agreed on their plans, and the logistical preparations were months in being

completed.

4

 (1) See remarks of Col Francis Hill, Min, Washington Conf, 9 Feb 44. ABC 384 (Burma),

8-25-42, Sec 5, A48-224. (See Bibliographical Note.) (2) See Stilwell's Mission to China re TRIDENT and QUADRANT. 5

 (1) The principal Army Service Forces and CBI Theater headquarters studies of the projected

capacity and requirements of the Ledo Road are discussed in a manuscript by Joseph Bykofsky, The History of Transportation Service in China, Burma, and India in World War II. (Hereafter, Bykofsky MS.) (See Bibliographical Note.) (2) The principal staff studies are: 1. Ltr, Col Frank

Milani, AG, Rr Ech, USAF CBI, to Marshall, 31 Jan 44, sub: Project TIG 1-C. Folder, AG (537)

Transportation Sec, SOS USFCT, KCRC. 2. Rpt, OCofT ASF, 10 Feb 44, sub: Proposed Motor Transport Service, CBI. Hist Br, QCofT. 3. History of Services of Supply, China, India, Burma

Theater, 28 February 1942-24 October 1944 (hereafter, SOS in CBI), App. 24, Sec. 2, Pt. 1. OCMH. (See Bibliographical Note for these references.)
THE LAST PREPARATIONS 11

Improving the Lines of Communications

The QUADRANT Conference, held at Quebec in August 1943, resulted in an

ambitious list of engineering projects for India and Burma to increase the

movement of supplies from Calcutta to China (Map 1)

1. An increase in the amount of air cargo being flown to China by the Air

Transport Command (ATC) to 20,000 tons a month by mid-1944

2. A road from India to China (the Ledo Road) with an initial (January

1945) capacity of 30,000 tons per month

3. A gasoline pipeline from Assam via Fort Hertz in northernmost Burma

to Kunming

4. A thin-walled 6-inch pipeline from Calcutta to Assam Province to supply

the Air Transport Command airfields there

5. A thin-walled 6-inch pipeline to China

6. An American-operated barge line on the Brahmaputra River to bring

supplies forward from the great port of Calcutta to the Allied bases in Assam

7. Improvement of the Bengal and Assam Railway6

Basic to this program was the realization that many of the difficulties

hobbling the Allied effort in Asia sprang from the fact that the line of communications from Calcutta to the airfields and storage depots of Assam could

not bring supplies forward in sufficient quantity to support a major effort in

the air and another on the ground. To General Headquarters (India), which

was responsible for logistical support of the British and India forces on the

border of Burma, Lt. Gen. William J. Slim, commanding the Fourteenth Army,

wrote on 30 October 1943:

The supply situation as regards certain commodities in the Army area is so serious that

I consider it will affect active operations and should, therefore, be brought to the attention of

the Commander-in-chief [Gen. Sir Claude J. E. Auchinleck] and the General Officer

Commanding-in-Chief 11 Army Group [Gen. Sir George Giffard]. . . . In general terms,

instead of holding a tonnage of 65,000 tons which is the target for the supply depot in the

area, only some 47,000 tons were held on 26 Oct 43, thereby giving an over-all [Slim's italics]

deficiency of 27%. . . .

Taking up the supply situation area by area, General Slim noted that in the

Arakan district of Burma there was no hay for animal transport or clarified

butter in forward areas. In the area forward of the Manipur Road British troops

had no meat, nor were authorized substitutes available. For Indian troops in

the same vicinity there was no meat, no milk, no butter, the latter two staple

items of the Indian diet. Moreover, when tinned foods did come forward, often

50 percent was spoiled. Therefore, "in 4 Corps area the medical authorities have

already reported that troops are suffering from malnutrition."7 Admiral

6

 Rpt, Col Frederick S. Strong, Jr., Chief Engr, SOS CBI, to Lt Gen Brehon B. Somervell, CG, ASF, 13 Nov 43. Somervell File, Vol IV, Hq ASF, Theaters of Opns, CBI 1944, A46-257. (Here- after, Somervell File ———.) 7

 Ltr, 3872/17/Q, Slim to GHQ (India), 30 Oct 43. SEAC War Diary. (See Bibliographical

Note.)

12 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Mountbatten was keenly aware of the intimate connection between the Assam

line of communications and the prospects of victory and placed improvement

of the Bengal and Assam Railway very high on his agenda.8

Vital though it was, the Bengal and Assam Railway was but part of the

Assam line of communications. The major factors lessening the efficiency of the

line of communications were (1) the congested port of Calcutta, through which

supplies for Assam and China entered India; (2) the inefficient rail lines and

barge lines which moved them forward; (3) the civilian agencies of the Government of India which controlled the flow of goods and personnel over the

line of communications. In point of time, the railway was considered first, but

ultimately each of the three factors above had to be appropriately handled, and

gasoline pipelines constructed, before a satisfactory solution could be reached.

As a depressing backdrop to the war effort in Bengal, famine racked that

great province, in which lay the all-important harbor of Calcutta. The rice crop

of 1943 had failed to meet the demands on it; the little skiffs and luggers that

plied the intricate Bengal waterways in peacetime had been destroyed by British

authority in 1942 for fear of a Japanese invasion, and the Japanese occupation

of Burma had effectively cut off a major source of Indian rice. Before the famine

ended, more than 1,000,000 Bengalis died. The famine held full and horrible

sway in the fall of 1943; it was a heavy added burden on the already strained

provincial and central authorities, whose reactions to the needs of war along

India's eastern frontier must be judged against the emergent needs of India

herself.

On 23 October when Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell visited India, the

American supply expert volunteered to provide U.S. railway troops to assume

some of the burdens of operating the Bengal and Assam Railway. His offer

began a discussion between interested agencies of the Government of India and

SEAC. As a result of the initial exchanges the director of transportation of

General Headquarters (India) and the general manager of the railway made a

rapid survey of the problems that would be created if Americans helped to

operate key sections of the line. Their report agreed to U.S. assistance. The

Government of India was guided accordingly, accepting it on 6 November, and

on 10 November CBI Theater told the War Department that accord had

reached the point at which details were being discussed.9

Anticipating such success, General Somervell, Maj. Gen. Charles P. Gross,

Chief of Transportation, Maj. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler, Commanding General, Services of Supply, CBI, and their staffs had earlier agreed on the nature of

the troops required. Wheeler alerted the War Department when the Government of India's acquiescence appeared reasonably certain, and so the actual

movement followed quickly on India's agreement. Orders were issued on

16 November to the 705th Railway Grand Division, the 758th Railway Shop

8

 Extract, SAC's Personal Diary, 30 Oct 43. SEAC War Diary. 9

 SOS in CBI, pp. 53-56.
THE LAST PREPARATIONS 13

Battalion, and the 721st, 725th, 726th, 745th, and 748th Railway Operating

Battalions. Each battalion was less its maintenance of way company, for the use

of Indian labor was contemplated. Col. John A. Appleton, former general

manager of the New York zone of the Pennsylvania Railroad, arrived in India

on 16 November as a member of the Appleton-Inglis Railway Mission. He

was known to be the War Department's choice for the post of director of the

proposed Military Railway Service.10

Therefore, as of mid-November 1943 it was agreed by all concerned that

American troops would assist in operating certain key sections of the Bengal

and Assam Railway. Exact definition of the sections and the conditions of

operation were being negotiated, and the troop movement was under way.

A factor in these negotiations was the report submitted by Col. Paul F.

Yount, of the Transportation Corps. Sent by Somervell from Iran, where he had

succeeded in increasing the amount of tonnage carried by the Iranian rail system

to 500 percent above prewar standards, Yount made a rapid reconnaissance of

the Bengal and Assam Railway. His report of 10 November strongly suggested

that more efficient and more vigorous operating methods, rather than the

tedious processes of rebuilding the railway, would bring a sharp and immediate

increase in the tonnage carried.11 The greatest deficiency, he believed, was lack

of an aggressive, adequate supervisory staff between management and actual

operating personnel.

Mid-November saw major personnel changes among the men guiding the

logistic effort. General Wheeler, chosen by Admiral Mountbatten to "push"

improvements in the transportation system, became principal administrative

officer of SEAC on 15 November. Lt. Gen. Sir Wilfred Lindsell, offered for the

same post by Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, became

instead principal administrative officer for Gen. Sir Claude J. E. Auchinleck's

India Command. General Wheeler was succeeded in command of the SOS,

CBI, by Maj. Gen. William E. R. Covell.12

At the extreme northeastern end of the vital railway line, construction of

the Ledo Road was resumed as the end of the rains and the gradual drying of

the ground permitted work to begin. The 849th and 1883d Engineer Aviation

Battalions and the 382d Engineer Battalion (Separate) had arrived in September

to reinforce the road builders. On 17 October Col. Lewis A. Pick assumed

command of the road project as commanding officer of Base Section No. 3.

Before coming to CBI, Colonel Pick had been division engineer of the Missouri

River Division, Omaha, Nebraska, and had drawn up the Pick Plan of Missouri

River flood control. Three more units arrived in November: the 45th Quarter- 10

 SOS in CBI, pp. 60-62. 11

 (1) Ltr, Yount to Wheeler, 10 Nov 43, sub: Capacity of Assam LOC; Ltr, Somervell to

Wheeler, 25 Oct 43. Somervell File, Vol IV, CBI 1944. (2) For Yount's work in Iran, see T. H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia. UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1952). 12

 (1) SOS in CBI, pp. 29-30. (2) Mountbatten Report, Pt. A, par. 39. (3) Ltr, Somervell

to Wheeler, 27 Oct 43. Somervell File, Vol IV, CBI 1944.
14 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

master Regiment, the 209th Combat Engineer Battalion, and the 1905th

Engineer Aviation Battalion.

From the end of October to the end of November, the lead bulldozer

advanced over twenty-two miles, to mile 82.35 from Ledo. To speed construction, three bulldozers left the village of Nawngyang on 28 August to make

their way over a trail, once used by the refugees fleeing Burma in 1942, to the

village of Namlip Sakan, which lay on the trace of the Ledo Road. Progress

was extremely difficult, but the dozer crews brought their machines through

the monsoon rains to their goal on 5 October 1943. From Namlip Sakan they

began cutting trail in both directions, back toward Ledo and forward into

Burma. With dry weather from late October, actual road construction, as

distinguished from clearing the way, made good progress. Anticipating that

the road would soon be through the mountain barrier into the Hukawng Valley,

Colonel Pick sent nineteen men ahead to the village of Shingbwiyang (mile 103

from Ledo on the southern end of the Patkai Range) to establish a supply

depot for the first truck convoy. At Shingbwiyang Pick's little supply detachment was about one third of the way to Myitkyina.13

Surveying the engineering projects on 1 November, the SOS chief engineer

told General Somervell that better progress would be made with the Ledo Road

once the men and machinery on requisition were deployed south of Shingbwiyang, but he warned, "Over-optimism on road construction, if more

evidence is needed than that furnished at Ledo, and on road capacity, would not

be indulged in if the true lessons of the Alcan and Pan American Highways

were generally known."

 14

 Somervell believed that the Ledo Road would reach

Pao-shan, China, by 1 November 1944, an estimate which was, of course, an

engineering one since no one could foresee just when the Japanese would be

driven from the trace of the Ledo Road.15

In November the construction of pipelines that would ultimately stretch

from India to China began. Shortly after the QUADRANT Conference theater

authorities had decided to abandon the Fort Hertz pipeline. Proponents of this

route had long argued that constructing a pipeline by this short route might be

enough when added to the Hump airlift to support the Fourteenth Air Force

on an ample scale. The mountainous terrain the Fort Hertz line would have to

cross was a powerful argument against the project.16 Four other reasons influenced abandoning the project for which such hopes had once been entertained:

(1) it was not possible to bring men and matériel to CBI Theater as early as

they would be needed; (2) the Assam line of communications was congested

and would not permit bringing matériel forward as rapidly as needed; (3) it

13

 (1) For background on the CBI engineering projects, see Stilwell's Mission to China. (2)

SOS in CBI, pp. 441-43. 14

 Rpt cited n. 6. 15

 Memo, Somervell for JCS, 24 Nov 43, sub: Progress Rpt on Bengal-Assam LOC. Somer- vell File, Vol IV, Pt I, CBI 1944. 16

 Ltr, Col Hill to Maj Gen Orlando Ward, Chief, Mil History, 2 Sep 52. OCMH.
THE LAST PREPARATIONS 15

was feared that unavailable heavy-walled pipe would be needed for the line;

and finally, (4) a parallel road would be necessary to maintain the line.

Instead of the Fort Hertz pipeline, a thin-walled 4-inch pipeline would be

built parallel to the Ledo Road. Thin-walled pipe was air transportable, and so

the line could be built from both ends toward a meeting somewhere in Burma.

As soon as possible a second line was to be laid from India, using heavier pipe

where advisable, so that ultimately there would be two pipelines from India to

China, one carrying aviation gas for the ATC and the Fourteenth Air Force and

one carrying truck fuel. Construction began in November.17

The 6-inch pipelines from tanker terminals in Bengal to Assam were

properly part of the Assam line of communications; their building presented no

particular engineering problem. Construction of the line by eight engineer

petroleum distribution companies assisted by 7,000 Indian laborers was contemplated. As 1943 ended, final preparations were being made to begin the

work in January 1944.18

The B-29 Project Approved

A new burden was added to the already overstrained China-Burma-India

logistical structure in fall 1943, the B-29's of the XX Bomber Command. In

August 1943 the Army Air Forces (AAF) planners had suggested bombing

Japan into submission with an enormous force of heavy bombers based in

China and supported by swarms of transports flying from Indian bases.19 Asked

to comment, Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, Headquarters, U.S. Army Air

Forces, India-Burma Sector, pointed out that in order to support the AAF plan

the port of Calcutta would require tremendous expansion, communications on

a grand scale would have to be installed, north Burma would have to be cleared

by 1 July 1944, and a variety of other Herculean projects would have to be

successfully completed by that early date. As a substitute plan Stratemeyer's

staff offered TWILIGHT.20

TWILIGHT assumed that north Burma would be free of Japanese by 1 July

1944 so that the Ledo Road might speedily go through to China, and further

that the Chinese and Fourteenth Air Forces could by 1 November 1944 be made

strong enough to hold the east China airfields against Japanese attack. TWILIGHT'S original contribution to the development of strategy in China-BurmaIndia was its suggestion that the B-29's be based in the Calcutta area and staged

through Chinese bases to attack Japan. Stratemeyer's planners believed that

412 transports could support 280 B-29's by hauling their supplies to the Chinese

bases, and that TWILIGHT would destroy Japan's ability to resist.

17

 (1) Rpt cited n. 6. (2) SOS in CBI, p. 108. 18

 SOS in CBI, pp. 111-13. 19

 Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. X. 20

 CM-IN 9027, Stratemeyer to Gen Henry H. Arnold, 11 Sep 43.
16 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Examining TWILIGHT, the Operations Division of the War Department

remarked that the concept of staging India-based bombers through China

offered the only hope of bombing Japan from Chinese bases in March and April

1944 without major interference with other operations in CBI and with a high

degree of security from a Japanese ground reaction. The Operations Division

understood that Cheng-tu in west China would be the B-29 China base. Consistent with the views it had expressed when the President was approving

Chennault's plans in May 1943, the Operations Division feared that a major

Japanese reaction would overrun the Kweilin-Changsha Fourteenth Air Force

bases in east China if the B-29's were based there. In the light of the foregoing

factors, the China-India Section of the Theater Group, Operations Division,

and the Strategy and Policy Group, Operations Division, both recommended

that the B-29 project for CBI be pushed to completion with bases at Cheng-tu

and Calcutta.21

TWILIGHT'S conception of the B-29's had been that of a club, bludgeoning

Japan into submission. In November 1943 the idea grew in Washington that

the air weapons could be used like a stiletto, striking the vital spots with a few

skilled blows. The Japanese coke ovens seemed to offer a wonderful target. If

they were destroyed, surely the Japanese steel industry would be crippled. In

the fall of 1943 the Foreign Economic Administration, the Committee of Operations Analysts, and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) agreed in believing

that the Japanese steel industry was producing to the limit of its capacity,

which the analysts set at about 13,690,000 tons annually, an accurate estimate,

for 13,970,000 tons was correct. However, they erred in believing Japan's steel

industry was producing at capacity, for it was not, by 5,138,000 tons. Shortage

of raw materials, not shortage of plant, was hobbling the Japanese. Therefore,

attacks on steel plant facilities had to destroy 5,000,000 tons capacity before

they cut current Japanese steel production.

Fourteenth Air Force attacks on Yangtze River iron-ore carriers were

directly cutting Japanese steel production, but this was not realized at the time.

The highly publicized attack on Japanese ocean shipping, for which such claims

had been made and such hopes entertained, was relatively minor in its effects,

while the routine missions against river shipping were hitting home. They were

mainly responsible for cutting down Japanese imports of iron ore from 2,200,000

tons in the first half of 1943 to 1,150,000 tons in the first half of 1944. But this

was not appreciated in Washington or in China.22

When the proposal to base the B-29's in India, stage them through China,

21

 Memo, Col Thomas S. Timberman, Chief, Asiatic Sec OPD, for ACofS, OPD, 2 Nov 43, sub: Bomber Offensive from China; Memo, Col Frank N. Roberts, Chief, Strategy and Policy Gp, OPD, for ACofS, OPD, 30 Oct 43, sub: Bomber Offensive from China. Case 192, OPD 381 CTO, A47-30. 22

 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey [USSBS], The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy (Washington, 1946), pp. 44-45, 76-77, App. Tables C-16, C-17.
THE LAST PREPARATIONS 17

and bomb Japan's coking facilities was laid before the President, he accepted it

with enthusiasm. Approving it in early November 1943, he at once sought the

co-operation of the British Commonwealth and China. Telling Churchill that

Japan's steel industry was strained to the limit, the President stated that the

B-29's could destroy half of the coke ovens supporting Japan's steel production

and so partially cripple the Japanese. Churchill was asked to give all possible

aid in building four airfields in the Calcutta area. To the Generalissimo, Roosevelt sent word that five airfields with limited facilities would be needed in the

Cheng-tu area by 1 March 1944. He offered to give the Chinese necessary engineering supervision, supplemented by lend-lease funds if the Chinese would

supply labor and materials.23

The President's initiative, regarded as "approval in principle," started the

wheels turning, though passage of the concept through the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(JCS) and Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) machinery was still to come. In

anticipation of JCS and CCS action, engineer aviation battalions and dump

truck companies which would be needed to build the Indian airfields were

alerted for shipment. Their movement orders were issued on 14 November, and

the first project personnel arrived in India on 24 November 1943. TWILIGHT

was reduced in scale by the provision that the B-29's would carry their own

supplies to China, thus eliminating the 400 transport aircraft. It was intended

that they should not be a burden on the Hump airlift. This then was the final

edition of the plan to defeat Japan that the AAF had offered at QUADRANT:

MATTERHORN—a self-supporting task force of B-29's, based on India, staged

through China, was to cripple Japan's steel industry.24

Learning of the B-29 project, Stilwell wrote: "FDR has undercut me again.

Told PEANUT [the Generalissimo] all about TWILIGHT, so I can't bargain on

that."

 25

The reference was to Stilwell's and the War Department's consistent view

that any American initiative in CBI should adopt a quid pro quo or bargaining

technique. The President's military advisers had urged that American aid be

given to the Chinese only to the degree that they agreed to help themselves.

In March 1943 the President explicitly rejected the bargaining approach to

China's problems. Stilwell believed that the President's rejection greatly handicapped him in dealing with the Chinese, and that it was one of the reasons he

could not persuade the Generalissimo to reform his Army.26

23

 (1) Rad, Air Ministry to ARMINDIA, 12 Nov 43. SEAC War Diary. (2) Rad WAR 3815, Marshall to Stilwell and Stratemeyer, 11 Nov 43. Item 1230, Bk 4, JWS Personal File. (See Bibliographical Note.) 24

 Memo, Arnold for Marshall, 12 Nov 43, sub: Early Sustained Bombing of Japan; Memo, Brig

Gen John E. Hull, Chief, Theater Gp OPD, for DCofS, 14 Nov 43, sub: Engr Units for CBI

Theater. Case 192, OPD 381 Security, A47-30. (2) History of CBI, Sec. II, Ch. VIe, (3) Min,

CCS 128th Mtg, 23 Nov 43. 25

 Stilwell Black Book, 12 Nov 43. (See Bibliographical Note.) 26

 For a fuller discussion of the question of bargaining with the Chinese, see Stilwell's Mission to China.
18 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Chennault's Operations

The autumn months of 1943 found the Fourteenth Air Force behind the

schedule set for it by the Chennault Plan of May 1943, because the plan had

been put into operation before its logistical requirements were on hand. General Chennault had proposed to gain air superiority in China in August 1943,

then to attack Japanese ocean shipping, and in the last phase to use B-24's for

strategic bombing of Formosa, the Shanghai-Nanking-Hankow triangle, and

Japan itself. To do this, which he thought would force the Japanese in six

months to begin abandoning their outlying Pacific holdings, he requested 150

fighters, 48 B-25's, and 35 B-24's, plus photo reconnaissance craft. For supply,

he asked 4,790 tons per month from July to September, and 7,129 tons monthly

thereafter. At TRIDENT, Washington, May 1943, the President gave him first

priority on Hump tonnage for a limited time.27

Events did not go as Chennault had hoped. Reinforcements were slow in

reaching him. Hump tonnage deliveries were not in the quantities contemplated at TRIDENT. The Japanese reacted vigorously, and flying weather was

often bad. Chennault felt profoundly discouraged as his long-sought opportunity seemed to be slipping from him.

Then in September 1943 the picture brightened. Hump tonnage (all carriers) improved from the 5,674 tons of August to 6,719 tons in September and

rose to 8,632 tons in October. From these monthly deliveries the Fourteenth

Air Force received 3,038 tons, 4,575 tons, and 4,225 tons, respectively. Reinforcements arrived for the Fourteenth Air Force, and it swiftly began to change

from the semiguerrilla force of earlier days to a powerful weapon, whose subordinate commands had area assignments. Arrival of the 25th and 26th Fighter

Squadrons in October reunited the 51st Group. Chennault was then able to put

fighters on a string of fields from Heng-yang to Kweilin in the Hsiang valley.

Some missions were on occasion staged through newer fields 200 miles east of

Kweilin. Sixteen P-51's, battered but still flyable, joined Chennault. Because

his air-raid net and newly formed radio intelligence teams were working better

than ever, Chennault found his fighter pilots spending more and more time

over the Japanese bases in central China. Air superiority was changing hands,

and perhaps, not too late in the day.28

Thanks to the arrival of B-25 pilots well schooled in skip-bombing tactics

(first publicly demonstrated in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, 2-6 March

1943) and the wide dissemination of the technique among Chennault's crews,

the 11th Bombardment Squadron (M) and the 2d Bombardment Squadron

(Chinese-American Composite Wing) intensified the antishipping campaign.

During October, the Fourteenth Air Force sank about 5,000 tons, and 17,372 27

 Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. IX. 28

 (1) Stilwell's Mission to China, Chart 6. (2) Lt Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer's Data Book, Item 8. OPD Copy, OCMH. (3) Ralph G. Hoxie, Frederick Ericson, and Robert T. Finney, History of

the Fourteenth Air Force, MS. (Hereafter, Fourteenth AF History.) USAF Hist Div.
THE LAST PREPARATIONS 19

tons in November. Simultaneously, the Japanese stirrings in northeast Burma

that preceded the enemy drive on India gave the 308th Bombardment Group

(H) a chance to drop bombs on Burmese targets while it engaged in its routine

ferrying of supplies.29

The Fourteenth Air Force was now just able to reach beyond China's borders for a few blows at Japan or Formosa. Heavy bombers and long-range

fighters were on hand. Staging fields near the coast were ready, and one of

them, Suichuan, was stocked to permit a mission or two to be flown from it

against Kyushu or Formosa. On 31 October a photographic reconnaissance aircraft from Suichuan photographed a major Japanese shipping concentration in

the Sasebo-Nagasaki area. Chennault at once asked Stilwell for permission to

strike it, and Stilwell as promptly relayed the question to Gen. Henry H.

Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces.30 Arnold congratulated Chennault on his aggressive spirit, but forbade attacks on Japan. Presumably, he did

not desire to alert the Japanese home defenses by a few sporadic attacks when

the B-29's were being prepared for a sustained effort.31

Though greatly disappointed because it was ordered to avoid Japan, and by

implication also ordered to omit Phase III of the Chennault Plan, the Fourteenth Air Force immediately settled on Shinchiku, Formosa, site of a bombermodification factory and a combat training center, as an alternate target. On

Thanksgiving Day, in a meticulously planned, precisely executed tactical

demonstration that lasted twelve minutes, 8 P-51A's, 12 B-25's, and 8 P-38's

scored 42 Japanese aircraft in one pass over the target. Exploiting the Japanese

embarrassment, B-25's, working in pairs, employed their skip-bombing tactics

to account for several cargo ships in the Formosa Strait during the next fortnight.32

By November the concentration of aircraft strength in east China brought

into sharp focus the long-neglected line of communications from Kunming

eastward to the Hsiang valley fields and beyond. November saw the Fourteenth

Air Force receive tonnage at a level (4,700 tons) that Chennault had hoped to

see achieved six months before. But tonnage at Kunming was just the beginning. The line of communications from Kunming to Chennault's forward

fields, the eastern line of communications (known in CBI as the ELOC), was

29

 (1) Fourteenth AF History. (2) Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army

Air Forces in World War II; IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944

(Chicago, 1950), Ch. 16, pp. 529-32. (3) Japanese Studies in World War II (hereafter, Japanese

Study ——), 116, The Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II, 1941-1945. OCMH. (See

Bibliographical Note.) 30

 (1) Fourteenth AF History. (2) Rad M 18NE, Chennault to Stilwell and Arnold, 4 Nov 43. Item 1181, Bk 4, JWS Personal File. (3) CM-IN 1668, Stilwell to Arnold, 3 Nov 43. 31

 (1) CM-OUT 1413, Arnold to Stilwell for Chennault, 4 Nov 43. (2) Compare the British

revelation of the tank in World War I by its use in penny packets in the Somme fighting; the comparable German blunder of introducing gas on a small scale. The combination of surprise and mass can be overwhelming, where the introduction of a new tactic or a new weapon in a small way

merely warns the enemy to prepare Countermeasures. 32

 (1) Fourteenth AF History. (2) Japanese Study 116.
20 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

a bottleneck. Currently operated by the Chinese—for it will be recalled the

Generalissimo was Supreme Commander, China Theater, and U.S. resources

in China were limited to what came over the Hump—the ELOC's estimated

capacity of 1,500 tons a month barely supported two fighter squadrons in east

China from May 1943 on. Now, with three more fighter and two medium

bomber squadrons in east China, the ELOC had to increase its capacity, and

Chennault commenced to stress its problems.33

Chennault's attack on Formosa had been made while several staff officers

from China Expeditionary Army, Lt. Gen. Shunroku Hata commanding, had

been visiting Imperial General Headquarters to prepare and co-ordinate future

plans. With the campaign in the Solomons and New Guinea running against

the Japanese, Imperial General Headquarters had rejected a plan to destroy the

Generalissimo's government that General Hata had proposed. Instead it had

told his representative about 17 October that beginning in December 1943 the

Japanese 3d, 13th, 52d, 22d, 35th, and 36th Divisions would be sent from China

to face the Americans in the Pacific, and that in the spring and summer of 1944

five more of Hata's divisions would assemble in their present occupational areas

to form Imperial General Headquarters' general reserve. Hata, as of 1 August

1943, had 620,000 men, formed into 1 armored and 25 infantry divisions, plus

12 brigades (of five infantry battalions each). Of the 25 infantry divisions,

5 were Class A, with three battalions of artillery (36 cannon), 5 were Class B,

with two battalions of artillery (24 cannon), and the remaining 15 divisions

had no artillery. The projected transfers would take away 4 of Hata's Class A

divisions, 1 Class B division, and 1 Class C division. This would cut deeply into

Hata's strength, for the replacements would be raw troops that he would have

to organize and train as units. So the mission Hata was now given probably

reflected an appraisal of his current situation. He was ordered in October 1943

". . . to maintain security in the occupied areas. Enemy air forces were to be

attacked at all times in order to prevent their making raids on the Japanese

mainland."

In November, Hata's liaison officers were told, by the Chief of the General

Staff among others, that the Allied air force in China was disturbing Japanese

sea communications and had to be neutralized or destroyed. Then came Chennault's Thanksgiving Day attack on Formosa. A staff officer of China Expeditionary Army, returning to his post in China 3 December 1943, told Hata that

Imperial General Headquarters was "very disturbed" by the attack on Formosa

and had begun to study the advisability of destroying the Allied airfields in east

China and reopening the Canton-Hankow railway.34

Imperial General Headquarters soon decided to call a halt to the current Japanese operations in China, which had been launched early in October. A few 33

 (1) A full treatment of the ELOC is in Bykofsky MS. (2) Ltr, Chennault to Wedemeyer,

6 Jul 45. WDCSA 091 China, 15 Aug 45. 34

 (1) Japanese Study 129, pp. 2, 11-13, 12, 17-18. (2) Ltr, Col Preston J. C. Murphy to

Ward, 22 Oct 52. OCMH.
THE LAST PREPARATIONS 21

weeks before the attack on Formosa the Japanese 11th Army had been moving

across the Tung-ting Lake area toward Chang-te. Its ostensible mission was to

disrupt Chinese troop concentrations in the VI and IX War Areas and to divert

Chinese forces from Yunnan, but the primary objective was to seize rice. Under

cover of bad weather, the 11th Army had completed its approach while the

Fourteenth Air Force was forced to remain on the ground. When the weather

cleared at the end of November, fighter squadrons at Heng-yang and Ling-ling

had been on constant call to support the Chinese divisions defending Chang-te.

On 4 December Chang-te fell, but apart from its value as a rice center the town

held no further attraction for 11th Army. Once the VI and IX War Areas had

been shaken up, the llth Army withdrew. Imperial General Headquarters had a

more important mission for it and wanted the 11th to take its place in the mass

of maneuver Tokyo now decided to assemble.

As the last shots were being fired around Chang-te, the highest officers in

Imperial General Headquarters, the War Ministry, and the Naval General Staff

were watching or actively participating in far-reaching map maneuvers, bearing the code name TORA. TORA was planned to test current hypotheses on

the intentions and capabilities of Japan's enemies, to suggest a strategy with

which to counter American plans in the Pacific, and to examine "the merits,

the planning, and the military strength" involved in taking Kweilin and Liuchow in east China. When TORA ended it was agreed to take the east China

air bases and thereby "check" Allied air attacks from China. Plans and preparations were soon under way.35

The battles around Chang-te were most significant in the Fourteenth Air

Force's analysis of its position in China. Operations over Burma in 1942 convinced the Fourteenth Air Force in May that air power had kept the Japanese

from crossing the Salween. It further believed that its later sweeps over Burma

had so disrupted their supply system that the Japanese were unable to prepare

an offensive across the Salween. However, the Japanese had not contemplated

crossing the Salween. In May 1943 the Fourteenth Air Force had supported

the Chinese troops along the I-chang Gorge. The Japanese had fallen back

from their most advanced positions, and Chennault had claimed a decisive victory. Again, the Fourteenth Air Force's intelligence had misread the Japanese

plans. Now, after Chang-te, the Fourteenth Air Force believed that it had

created a successful technique for tactical air support of Gen. Hsueh Yueh's IX

War Area troops. Close co-operation between the Fourteenth Air Force and

General Hsueh was important because his war area guarded the northern ap35

 (1) Statement of Col Takushiro Hattori, 21 Jul 49, in Statements of Japanese Officials in World War II, Vol. I, pp. 370-72. OCMH. (2) Japanese Studies 77, 78, 129. (3) Imperial

General Headquarters Army Order 921, 24 Jan 44 (hereafter, IGH Army Order ——), GHQ, Far East Comd, Mil History Div, Imperial General Headquarters Army Orders, Vol. II. OCMH. (See Bibliographical Note.) (4) Statement of Marshal Shunroku Hata, Aug 52, in Japanese Officers' Comments (hereafter, Japanese Officers' Comments), Incl 2. OCMH. (See Bibliographical

Note.)
22 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

proaches to Chennault's fields. The seeming success of combined Sino-American operations before Chang-te moved the Chinese to permit the Fourteenth

Air Force to expand its radio and intelligence net within the IX War Area.36

Chennault's Proposals for 1944

Chennault had been present in October 1943 when Mountbatten, Stilwell,

and the Generalissimo discussed the QUADRANT decisions on breaking the

blockade of China. It appeared to him that "no definite decisions had been

reached with respect to the Burma campaign." Such a campaign would, he

thought, make it very difficult to launch his 1944 China offensive and so he

again hastened to present his case to his Army superiors before, in his opinion,

the United Nations were firmly committed to the Burma campaign. Chennault also appealed to the President, telling him that it had been impossible

for the Fourteenth Air Force to launch an effective air offensive in 1943. Only

now were his reinforcements coming forward.37

The Chennault proposals of October 1943 were basically similar to those

of the previous April, but there was one interesting addition.38 If the Generalissimo was prepared to contemplate an offensive by the Chinese Army against

Hankow or Canton, the necessary tactical air support operations could be

meshed into the over-all plan. Where the April proposals had of necessity been

hastily drafted by Chennault en route to the TRIDENT Conference, those of

October showed a good deal of careful preliminary staff work. It was most

notable that the line of communications to the Fourteenth Air Force's fields

had been carefully studied, and that detailed suggestions for its improvement

were included. In April, this aspect had been omitted.

For operational purposes, Chennault divided China into eastern and western areas, on the line of the 108th meridian. Weather phases in the two areas

are markedly different and influence the timing of operations. From January

to June, weather is good in the west, then grows steadily worse in summer. In

the east, flying weather is good from July to December. Therefore, from January to June, Chennault proposed to fly most of his missions in west China in

support of the Burma campaign and in defense of the Hump airfields. From

July to December he would concentrate on the goals he had so often set forth,

36

 (1) See Stilwell's Mission to China, Chs. VIII and IX. (2) See Ch. X, below. (3) Claire L. Chennault, Way of a Fighter (New York, 1949), pp. 256-64. (4) Japanese Study 77. (5)

Chennault thought the Japanese retreat proved his contention that ''existing Chinese forces with

adequate air support can stop any Japanese advance which is not so great as to weaken their defense elsewhere." Ltr, Chennault to Hopkins, 27 Dec 43. Bk VII, Hopkins Papers. 37

 (1) For a discussion of Chennault's corresponding directly with the President, see Stilwell's

Mission to China, Chs. IX and X. (2) Ltr, Chennault to Roosevelt, 28 Oct 43. Bk VII, Hopkins Papers. Two days later, the Chinese Army in India engaged the Japanese 18th Division, opening

the North Burma Campaign. (3) Memo, Wedemeyer for Mountbatten, 10 Nov 43, sub: Chennault

Plan for Air Offensive From China. Attached is Chennault's plan, dated 17 October 1943. Folder, Chennault Air Plan, CT 39, Dr 1, KCRC. 38

 Chennault's April 1943 proposals are in Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. IX.
THE LAST PREPARATIONS 23

destruction of Japanese air power and merchant shipping. Perhaps, in these

provisions, Chennault was offering a compromise to Stilwell, in line with the

promise he made in October to support Stilwell's plans.

To supply his 1944 operations, Chennault asked for:

Eastern Area Western Area

(Tons) (Tons)

January.................................... 1900 6900

February................................... 2100 6900

March..................................... 2300 6900

April...................................... 2700 5400

May....................................... 4500 3400

June ..................................... . 6200 2700

In addition, Chennault wanted a reserve of 20,000 tons accumulated in east

China before his operations opened up in full scale, which was to be in July.

To acquire these supplies, Hump tonnage would have to average 12,000 tons in

the first six months of 1944, and the Fourteenth Air Force receive every pound

of it. The plan stressed the importance of insuring delivery of supplies to the

east China bases and gave a carefully worked out plan to insure this. Improvement of the eastern line of communications was estimated to require an initial

4,000 tons over the Hump in January 1944 plus 500 tons a month for the rest

of the year. For aircraft, Chennault wanted by fall of 1944 to have 6 fighter

groups, 2 medium bomber groups, and 3 heavy bomber groups.39

Chennault dismissed the possibility of a Japanese ground attack on his air

bases:

6. Previous proposals for a China Air Offensive have been objected to, on the grounds that

"in CHINA the Japanese can go anywhere and take any objective they want," and can therefore capture and destroy our airbases. This theory is not founded on fact, for the following

reasons:

A. The proponents of the theory think exclusively in terms of a time when the Japanese

domination of the air was rarely challenged by a single Chinese aircraft. In the event that

plans for a China Air Offensive are approved, the Allied armies will have air supremacy on

their side. Chinese troops have shown that with the encouragement of even a modicum of

air support, they are far better able to withstand the Japanese. It may be presumed that Japanese troops, suddenly confronted with the transfer of air supremacy to their enemies, will

also fight less well.

B. The proponents of the theory also forget that in the whole course of the war in CHINA,

the Japanese Armies have never successfully penetrated more than 100 miles beyond their

major supply lines. In the CHEKIANG campaign in the winter [sic] of 1942, air bases were in

fact captured. But the campaign was long, employed very considerable forces, and was fought

by the Japanese with the double advantage of complete domination of the air and proximity

to their supplies. Weakness of enemy supply enabled unaided Chinese troops, fighting without air support, to frustrate no less than five attempts to capture the line of railroad which

formerly connected CANTON and HANKOW. Two of these attempts were made from the

South and three from the North; all were in substantial and at least two were in great force.

39

 (1) Stilwell's Mission to China. Ch. X. (2) Plan cited n. 37(3).
24 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

C. Establishment of air supremacy by a China Air Offensive will further increase the Japanese weakness of supply. More than 95 per cent of the supplies of the Japanese Armies in

China from the YANGTSZE RIVER region Southward are carried inland on small, slow commonly unarmed river craft. As an experiment, traffic on the YANGTSZE RIVER has been almost totally interrupted for a period of a week with a force numbering not more than two

score aircraft. With sufficient forces, adequately supplied, this interruption can be consistently maintained, on other waterways as easily as on the YANGTSZE. The enemy has no

practicable substitute supply lines for operations on any scale.

Thus is it seen that a major enemy effort, both on the ground and in the air, would be

necessary to attempt to interrupt a China based Air Offensive. Ships carrying personnel and

equipment for such an effort into CHINA would be exposed to our land based bombardment.

And to make such an effort, the Japanese would be forced to abandon essential commitments

elsewhere.40

There were several mentions in the plan of possible ground operations by

the Chinese to reoccupy portions of China. It was suggested that in the last six

months of 1944 support might be given to Chinese troops in operations against

the Canton-Hong Kong and I-chang-Hankow-Nanchang areas. After remarking tersely that "adequate Chinese ground forces must of course be maintained

in the airbase areas" the plan went on to state that in the last half of 1944

"enemy garrisons in CHINA . . . will be gravely weakened" by air attacks on

Japanese supply lines in China. If the Generalissimo thought Chinese ground

forces "available" the Japanese garrisons in China might be attacked. If any

such operations were to be undertaken, then the Chinese should be given "certain key items of equipment which the Chinese Ground Forces now lack."4l

No document has been found to give Stilwell's reactions to Chennault's

October 1943 proposals. However, at the time he summarized his impressions

of the "net worth" of Chennault's 1943 efforts as "a few Jap planes knocked

down [but] Japs are still in China."42

Appraising the plan for Admiral Mountbatten, Maj. Gen, Albert C. Wedemeyer, as SEAC's deputy chief of staff, commented that it was "essentially the

same as one previously submitted by General Chennault several months ago."

Wedemeyer noted that the Chennault October 1943 proposals did not allot

any Hump tonnage for equipment of the Chinese armies that were to protect

the east China air bases. Wedemeyer believed that Chennault greatly underestimated the tonnage he would need for his operations and that his actual requirements were in excess of the "Air Transport Command capacity with

resources now in sight." In his conclusions, Wedemeyer advised Mountbatten

that a "practicable" increase of the Fourteenth Air Force was highly desirable

and should be supported after it had been weighed in connection with other

demands. He warned that "the ASSAM line of communications and the Air

Transport Command cannot support the air force visualized in the Chennault

40

 Plan cited n. 37(3). 41

 Ibid. 42

 Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 384.
THE LAST PREPARATIONS 25

plan and concurrently supplies for the rehabilitation of Chinese internal lines

of communication and for the Chinese ground forces." In Wedemeyer's opinion, the fastest way to begin intensive air operations in China was to open a

"land and/or sea route" to the Chinese airfields.43

What must be taken as the CBI Theater decision on Chennault's October

1943 proposals was the response of General Stratemeyer's headquarters, Army

Air Forces, India-Burma Sector, on 16 November 1943. Though he liked the

careful phasing of Chennault's plan, Stratemeyer in effect rejected it with the

remark that "we are not yet in a position logistically to support this plan at this

time [Stratemeyer's italics] from a stores or a POL [petrol, oil, lubricants]

standpoint." Stratemeyer raised two points which he believed would determine

the scope of Chennault's operations in 1944. Aware that Chennault's Hump

priority expired 31 October, Stratemeyer told the Fourteenth Air Force commander that he could not have the Hump tonnages he wanted, and that Stilwell was contemplating a division of Hump tonnage that would provide more

for the Chinese Army. Stratemeyer's second point reflected the implications of

bringing the B-29's to CBI, and practically assigned second priority in air operations to the Fourteenth Air Force.

The President has indicated that the TWILIGHT plan will be carried out and has cabled

Chiang Kai-shek to give it his fullest support. It is believed, therefore, that the greatest good

for the War effort could be obtained if our entire resources were thrown in gear to supplement the TWILIGHT plan (including increased weather service in China) and, in addition,

keep your operations rate in China against enemy shipping, defense of the air terminals and

support of the Chinese ground forces at the highest rate possible under these logistical

restrictions.44

Stilwell in September had wanted to readjust Hump priorities to give Chennault a flat 40 percent of Hump deliveries but Marshall had warned him to beware of the political implications of such an act.45

 Now, a few weeks later,

Stratemeyer signaled the end of Chennault's priorities by merely stating that

Stilwell "desires" to readjust Hump priorities without explaining whether this

was an order of the theater commander or had War Department sanction.46

The records available reveal no protest from Chennault or attempt to have

Stratemeyer overruled by higher authority. There had been significant changes

in the identity and status of those who supported Chennault's views, and the

airman may have considered that without support from T. V. Soong and

Madame Chiang Kai-shek he could not hope to repeat the coup of the

TRIDENT Conference.47

43

 Memo cited n. 37(3). 44

 Memo, Stratemeyer for Chennault, 16 Nov 43, sub: Operational Plan for Air Offensive in China, 1 Jan-31 Dec 44. Ltr cited n. 33(2), App. II, Item 21. 45

 (1) CM-IN 17227, Stilwell to Marshall, 24 Sep 43. (2) CM-OUT 12455, Marshall to Stilwell, 27 Sep 43. 46

 Memo cited n. 44. 47

 Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. X.
26 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Building an East China Army

No less than Chennault, Stilwell had a program for east China, and their

competing claims on Hump tonnage did much to explain the acrimony between the two men. Like Chennault's, Stilwell's program was begun in 1942, to

carry out his War Department orders to improve the combat efficiency of the

Chinese Army. As part of his over-all program to rebuild the Chinese Army,

Stilwell in early 1943 suggested to the Generalissimo that thirty reorganized

and re-equipped Chinese divisions should be placed in east China. Stilwell received War Department support for the project, and lend-lease for the thirty

divisions in east China (the "Second Thirty" they were sometimes called to

distinguish them from the "First Thirty" of the Thirty Division Program or

the Y-Force in Yunnan plus the Chinese Army in India). But the Chinese

waited many months, in fact until after the QUADRANT Conference (August

1943), before they would consider the project.48

On 1 September, General Ho, the Chinese Army's Chief of Staff, startled

Stilwell by proposing a tentative list of forty-five divisions, thinly spread from

the Yellow River to the Indochinese border, from which a "C-Force" (later

called ZEBRA Force) could be equipped, trained, and then shaped into a useful

force. Stilwell was jubilant, and wrote: "VICTORY! That commits them to the

training scheme. Subject to change, of course, but what a struggle that has

been. . . . If the Japs let us alone, we may put it over!" Stilwell saw the missions of ZEBRA Force as: (1) to defend the east China airfields; (2) to drive the

Japanese from the Yangtze valley; (3) to co-operate in any Allied plans to land

on the China coast.49

Attempts to create the ZEBRA Force quickly revealed basic differences between the Chinese and American approaches to the problem of creating a force

in east China. The Americans wanted to bring the chosen divisions up to

strength, weed out incompetent officers, train the soldiers, and then issue

shining new lend-lease equipment. The Chinese wanted to receive the equipment, then talk about training and reorganization. To Stilwell, this attitude

toward ZEBRA Force was exactly like that the Chinese had taken toward

the Yunnan divisions or Y-Force. Nevertheless, after the Generalissimo appeared more interested in Army reform and more co-operative in October 1943,

Stilwell was able to send Brig. Gen. Thomas S. Arms, of the Y-Force Infantry

Training Center, to establish a similar training center at Kweilin in east China.

To assist in training and liaison, 2,213 officers and enlisted men were sent to

CBI.50

48

 Stilwell's Mission to China, Chs. VII and X. 49

 (1) Z-Force Order of Battle, 30 Aug 43. AG (Z-FOS) 381, KCRC. (2) Theodore H.

White, ed., The Stilwell Papers (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948), p. 219. (3)

CM-IN 6110, Stilwell to Marshall, 2 Sep 43. (4) CM-IN 2881, Stilwell to Marshall, 5 Nov 43. 50

 (1) History of Z-FOS, 1 Jan-31 Oct 1944. OCMH. (2) Ltr, Stilwell to Arms, 8 Nov 43, sub: Activation of ITC at Kweilin. AG (Z-FOS) 320.2, KCRC. (3) History of India-Burma

Theater, 1944-1945, I, 55. OCMH.
THE LAST PREPARATIONS 27

THE KWEILIN INFANTRY TRAINING CENTER

At the time, Stilwell asked the War Department to review its 8 July 1943

program for Chinese lend-lease (as distinct from the 1944 supply program).

The July program assigned lend-lease to the First Thirty, but only 10 percent

of the equipment needed by the ZEBRA Force, which token shipments were to

be used for instructional purposes. Stilwell wanted a firm War Department

commitment to arm the ZEBRA Force in full. Faced with this request, the War

Department studied it in the light of the QUADRANT decisions, the limitations

on the capacity of the Assam line of communications and the Hump airlift, and

the emerging strategic concepts for the conduct of the war against Japan, which

were beginning to set a lower value on China's co-operation. After studying

the problem, the War Department decided that it would review its policy in

the light of the degree of co-operation Stilwell might in the future receive from

the Chinese, and reaffirmed its policy of confining its logistical support of

ZEBRA Force to the 10 percent figure.51

In November and December 1943 the Chinese gave evidence of being

genuinely interested in the ZEBRA Force project. The Kweilin Infantry Training Center was opened, with the Generalissimo and Gen. Pai Chung-hsi of the

National Military Council as its honorary commanders. The instruction, 51

 Memo for record, 30 Oct 43; Memo, Hull for ACofS, G-4, WDGS, 15 Nov 43, sub: Establishment of Policy of Supply of Combat Type of Lend-Lease Materials to China. OPD 400

CTO, A47-30.
28 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

which followed a course approved by the Chinese, was carried on by 107 U.S.

officers and 71 enlisted men. Several buildings were turned over to the training

center by the Chinese, and the Americans contracted for many more.

Though infantry and artillery training was stressed, engineering, veterinary,

medical, and signal courses were offered. Training equipment, initially flown

from Kunming, was furnished by the U.S. Army. The infantry course lasted six

weeks, of which the first three stressed weapons instruction and target practice.

The last half of the course was devoted to tactics, taking the individual officer

progressively to the regimental level. Eighty-nine interpreters gave invaluable

aid. The student officers were placed in training regiments, each with twelve

companies of 100 students per company.

After the first infantry class graduated on 15 December 1943, General Arms

estimated that by 1 May 1944, 4,800 infantry officers and 2,730 officers and men

from other arms and services would have graduated. Manifestly, this figure

would depend upon the continued willingness of the Chinese to send students

to the training center, a willingness that might not survive the War Department decision to keep equipment for ZEBRA Force at the 10 percent level.52

The Allied Command Structure in North Burma

Improvements in the Assam line of communications, the decision to place

a force of B-29's in CBI, and attempts to strengthen the Allied position in east

China, were, as it developed, both background and accompaniment to the premature and unscheduled opening of combat in north Burma. Certainly, the line

of communications had to be renovated before the Allies could be sure of

themselves, while the presence of the B-29's affected the course of things in

China, but the principal event in fall 1943 was the opening of the North Burma

Campaign. What had been contemplated were roughly simultaneous attacks

from India and China into Burma but this was not to be.

The Allied forces in north Burma operated under a very complicated system

of command. North Burma was within SEAC's boundaries, and therefore the

chain of command began with the Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral

Mountbatten. As acting Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Stilwell was second man in SEAC, but as Commanding General, Chinese Army in India, he

commanded a pair of Chinese divisions which had to be fitted into the organization. Normally, as a corps commander Stilwell would have been in the chain

of command which ran from Admiral Mountbatten to Gen. Sir George Giffard

(General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eleventh Army Group) to General

Slim (General Officer Commanding, Fourteenth Army) to Stilwell. (See Chart

I.) Though Stilwell's initial reaction to Mountbatten was very favorable, he had

no confidence in General Giffard and refused to occupy any place in the command structure that might permit Giffard to exercise control over his opera- 52

 (1) History cited n. 50(1). (2) Z-Force Journal. KCRC.
THE LAST PREPARATIONS 29

tions. Instead, Stilwell offered to serve as a corps commander under General

Slim, for whom he had the greatest faith and respect.

Stilwell's service under Slim was to continue until Stilwell's forces reached

the Kamaing area, at which point he was to regain independence of action. It

was assumed that when Stilwell's Chinese from Ledo reached Kamaing they

would be near a juncture with Chinese troops from Yunnan Province. On joining, the two Chinese forces would be under Stilwell, who in turn would be

directly under Mountbatten with no intervening echelons of command.

Informed a few weeks later of Stilwell's agreeing to forego rank and serve

under a junior he admired, General Marshall offered an interesting appraisal of

Stilwell on the eve of the latter's greatest triumphs as a field commander. Marshall wrote Mountbatten:

You will find, if you get below the surface, that he wants merely to get things done without delays and will ignore considerations of his own personal prestige or position so long as

drive and imagination are being given to plans, preparations and operations.

Frankly, I have found him uniformly through long years of personal command relations,

irritating and intolerant of slow motion, excessive caution, and cut-and-dried procedure. On

the other hand, he will provide tremendous energy, courage and unlimited ingenuity and

imagination to any aggressive proposals or operations. His mind is far more alert than almost any of our generals and his training and understanding are on an unusually high level.

Impatience with conservatism and slow motion is his weakness—but a damned good one in

this emergency.53

Stilwell's command relation to the Generalissimo in north Burma was obscure. In 1942 the Generalissimo's attitude had suggested that Stilwell would

command the Chinese Army in India only until operations began. By September 1943 the most probable Chinese commander was Lt. Gen. Chen Tung-kuo,

commanding the New First Army headquarters, of whom a memorandum in

Stilwell's personal file stated: "This officer may be capable, but he has not yet

demonstrated the fact ... no concern about the basic needs of training, which

he does not understand. He is not interested to learn from the bottom up. . . .

As a matter of fact, there is no need whatever for any army staff, as long as the

Chih Hui Pu exists. . . ."

 54

 The Chinese 38th, 22d, and 30th Divisions were

under the New First Army, but since that headquarters was regarded as superfluous by the Americans, Stilwell sought to have it removed from the scene.

(Chart 3)

The headquarters of the Chinese Army in India was potentially Stilwell's

field headquarters, though Brig. Gen. Haydon L. Boatner, chief of staff and

deputy commander of the Chinese Army in India, was in charge. The staff was

53

 (1) Opn Instr 1, Eleventh Army Group to Comdr, Fourteenth Army, sub: Opns in Burma, 1943.44. SEAC Info Bk, OCMH. (2) Rad CHC 1111, Stilwell to Maj Gen Daniel I. Sultan, 27

May 44; Rad RE 89, Sultan to Stilwell, 15 Jan 44. Items 188, 17, Bk 6A, JWS Personal File. (3) Ltr, Mountbatten to Marshall, 16 Jan 44; Quotation in Ltr, Marshall to Mountbatten, 26 Jan

44. Case 297, OPD 381 Security, A47-30. 54

 Memo [Brig Gen Haydon L. Boatner?], 24 Sep 43, sub: Personnel. Stilwell Numbered File

[SNF] 16. (See Bibliographical Note.)

THE LAST PREPARATIONS 31

American, but the headquarters was regarded legally and diplomatically as

Chinese. All orders to Chinese units initially went on Chih Hui Pu letterheads,

validated by Stilwell's chop at the bottom as commanding general. When the

38th Division moved up to the Ledo area in April 1943, Chih Hui Pu split into

a forward and rear echelon. The Forward Echelon was under General Boatner,

who relieved General Wheeler and the Services of Supply (SOS) of responsibility for the forward area. Brig. Gen. William E. Bergin took charge of the

Rear Echelon.55

Before General Boatner could play his part in the forthcoming campaign,

he had to survive a Chinese attempt in September to remove him, and a suggestion that Lt. Gen. Sun Li-jen, commanding the Chinese 38th Division, have

a free hand in the approaching operations. Whatever the abstract merit of having General Sun—one of the few Allied commanders to emerge from the First

Burma Campaign with enhanced reputation—practically in command of the

North Burma Campaign, General Sun's hint that he should take over was cast

in a form that made it unacceptable. Sun's letter to Stilwell took so dismal a

view of the campaign, referred with such gloomy relish to the Japanese strength

and the difficulties of the terrain, as to suggest he approached the fight with

extreme reluctance. Stilwell could hardly have entrusted the campaign to a man

who had gone on record as having very little faith in it. But Sun had the backing of the Generalissimo, at least for Sun's wish that Boatner go, and the Generalissimo ordered Stilwell to relieve Boatner. Stilwell replied that the commander's deputy, Boatner, must be able to command both the Chinese and the

U.S. service troops who would be supporting the drive. Stilwell knew of no

Chinese officer able to fill that role. If the Generalissimo did, let the officer be

named and a simple, practical test be given to determine the question. The

issue was dropped and Boatner kept his post.56

The American personnel of Chih Hui Pu were concurrently 5303d Headquarters and Headquarters Company (Provisional) Combat Troops. They functioned as an American headquarters for the American service and medical units

in the Chinese Army, which had few such units.57 As American, British, and

Indian combat and service units entered north Burma, they were attached or

assigned to the 5303d and its successor headquarters, with the exception of Stilwell's regiment of U.S. jungle-trained infantry (code name GALAHAD) which

on arrival was attached to the Chinese Army in India and later to the American

headquarters.58 There was no boundary between the communications and the 55

 (1) Ramgarh: Now lt Can Be Told (Ranchi, India, 1945), p. 14. (2) Ltr, Stilwell to Boatner and Wheeler, 6 Apr 43. Item 214, Bk 3, JWS Personal File. 56

 (1) Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. X. (2) Ltr, Sun to Stilwell, 17 Aug 43, quoted in Dr. Ho Yung-chi, The Big Circle (New York: The Exposition Press, 1948), p. 64. (3) Memo, Stilwell

for Generalissimo, 21 Sep 43, Item 233, Bk 3, JWS Personal File. (4) Rad BURSAM OT-11, Stilwell to Boatner, 21 Sep 43. Item 1027, Bk 4, JWS Personal File. Stilwell suggests that the

whole thing is an attempt to remove him from the campaign via Boatner. 57

 Ramgarh: Now It Can Be Told. 58

 (1) GOs 11, 12, 14, Hq Rr Ech USAF CBI, 29 Jan, 5 Feb 44. (2) GO 74, Hq USAF CBI, 17 Jul 44.
32 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

combat zones, with the result that SOS in the forward zone was duplicating the

work of the combat troops in supporting the Chinese.59 An important member

of Chih Hui Pu was Capt. C. E. Darlington, who before the war had been district commissioner of the Hukawng Valley for the Government of Burma. Darlington was completely familiar with that section of north Burma, had the

loyalty and respect of the Kachin tribesmen who inhabited it, and was an unfailing source of advice and information.60

The Chinese Forces

The Chinese 38th and 22d Divisions were commanded by General Sun and

Lt. Gen. Liao Yao-hsiang respectively. General Sun, a graduate of the Virginia

Military Institute, was appraised as: "A good field soldier, courageous and determined. Argumentative, insistent on doing things his way; but much concerned over the well-being of his unit. A capable commander." General Liao,

a graduate of St. Cyr in France, was judged: "A good field soldier, courageous

and determined. He has faithfully complied with all training directives, and as

a result his division is now fully as good as the 38th, which had a long start

ahead of him. A capable commander."6l

When the 22d and 38th completed their training at Ramgarh, the 38th

numbered 946 officers and 11,388 enlisted men, and the 22d, 857 officers and

10,439 men. (See Chart 3.) With service and army troops, the Chinese Army

in India totaled 2,626 officers and 29,667 enlisted men. Replacements were provided and the two divisions were actually slightly larger at the end of 1943.

The army and service troops included an "excellent" antiaircraft battalion, a

motor regiment which worked in the Ledo area, an engineer regiment which

built most of the Shingbwiyang airstrip, an animal transport regiment, and two

porter units to carry stretcher cases.62

The work horse of the campaign was the infantry regiment, with 129 officers and 2,642 enlisted men at Table of Organization (T/O) strength. It had

three battalions, each with three rifle companies and one machine gun company. The battalion had 27 Bren guns, 51 submachine guns, and 18 60-mm.

mortars.63 The machine gun company had 8 heavy .30-caliber machine guns. In

the regiment for fire support were a mortar company with 12 81-mm. mortars

and an antitank company with 8 37-mm. antitank pieces. There were two trans59

 Ltr, Hq 5303d (Prov) Combat Trs to CG, Fwd Ech USAF CBI, 2 Dec 43, sub: Responsibility

of Comd and Opns Within Combat Zone. AG (NCAC) 323.3, NCAC Files, KCRC. 60

 Wkly G-2 Rpt, App., Hq 5303d Combat Trs; Ltr, Maj J. W. Leedham, Hq Combat Trs. NCAC Files, KCRC. 61

 Memo cited n. 54. 62

 (1) Strength Rpt, G-1, Per Rpt, Hq Chih Hui Pu, 20 Jan 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. (2) Opn Rpt, 22d Div (Chinese), 8 Jan 44. ALBACORE Hist File, KCRC. 63

 Thanks to the initiative of Dr. Lauchlin Currie, administrative assistant to President Roosevelt, and to the generosity of Canada, the Chinese received from Canadian Mutual Aid programs Bren guns, Boys antitank rifles, Bren gun carriers, and other British-type ordnance. See Stilwell's Mission

to China, Ch. I.
THE LAST PREPARATIONS 33

portation companies (one a pack transport), a signal platoon, a special service

platoon, and medical and veterinary personnel. There were fourteen radios and

plenty of wire equipment.64 Division artillery was on the modest side because

of terrain conditions and was attached to regiments as the situation required.

As the campaign progressed, the demand for artillery support grew. As a result,

by June 1944, one battery of 155-mm. howitzers and one of 105-mm. howitzers

were firing in general support. Support by medium and fighter bombers was

available on an increasing scale. Allied air superiority in north Burma was

complete.

Because of the extremely difficult nature of the terrain in north Burma, extensive reliance was necessarily placed on animal transport, such as mules,

horses, and Indian ponies. Each division had about 1,000 animals. Forage for

the animals was regularly supplied by air.65

A solution to the replacement problem had been arranged in that the

Chinese Government had promised to supply replacements; the success of Stilwell in holding the Chinese to the promise would have a great deal to do with

the progress of the campaign. Stilwell's staff believed that much of what they

took to be the undue caution of Chinese commanders in the conduct of operations arose from the lack of a functioning replacement system. The Americans

believed that the Chinese commander whose force took casualties in battle suffered a proportionate loss of power and influence. Consequently, the Chinese

appeared reluctant to embark on combat operations. A steady flow of replacements from China would do a great deal to ensure aggressiveness by Sun and

Liao.66

To exercise command, Stilwell drew on his 1942 experiences and organized

an American liaison net down to and including the Chinese battalions. Each

Chinese division had a small staff of U.S. advisers, including supply, signal,

medical, motor, and veterinary officers, under a colonel, who kept in touch with

Chih Hui Pu through a division radio platoon and three radio teams. Chinese

regiments had a liaison officer of field grade, with radio team; each battalion

had a major or senior captain with radio team.

It speaks well for both Americans and Chinese that over a period of months

a modus vivendi was established, for liaison personnel were in a delicate situation. They had no powers of command, and their attempts at persuasion and

advice often jarred Chinese notions of face. Further, they were working with

good Chinese troops under commanders who had had experience of fighting

in Burma. It often must have been hard for young Americans on their first campaign to offer suggestions to seasoned veterans. Interpretation of Chih Hui Pu's

64

 T/O&E, Chinese Inf Regt, 16 Mar 43. AG (NCAC) 320.3, KCRC. 65

 (1) G-3 Rpt, Chih Hui Pu, 27 Jun 44. KCRC. (2) Capt. Edward Fisher, History of the Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC), CBI Theater and IB Theater, MS (hereafter NCAC

History), App. 6, History of Air Dropping. OCMH. 66

 (1) Ltr, Col Hill to Ward, 2 Sep 52. (2) For examples of Stilwell's efforts to obtain replace- ments, see Items 1601, 1619, Bk 5, JWS Personal File.
34 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

orders was a source of potential difficulty, not only interpretation in the narrow sense but in that of conveying the spirit as well. Important clauses, in

translation from English to Chinese, were always reinforced with parallel constructions, so that one clause at least might be understood. Though no worse

than what other Americans faced in the Southwest Pacific and a little better

than what the Chinese bore with cheerful fortitude, conditions in the field for

the liaison personnel were still hard and were a strain on those Americans who

bore them. There was lacking the sense of fraternity with and close support by

one's own people, supplies sometimes vanished, and hostile Chinese officers

could make life most unpleasant.67

The American Force

For the projected Burma operations, the War Department had at last supplied some U.S. infantry troops, though originally they were not intended to

operate under Stilwell's command, and in number were far from the corps of

which Stilwell had always dreamed. On 1 September 1943 General Marshall

had directed shipment of about 3,000 volunteers to Asia to form three longrange penetration groups on the model of those commanded by Brigadier Orde

Charles Wingate. The project was given the code name GALAHAD. Organization of GALAHAD began on 5 September and was complete on 20 September.

Given the designation of 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), the unit was

formed of volunteers from the continental United States, the 33d Infantry

Regiment on Trinidad, British West Indies, and from the Southwest Pacific.

The War Department did not think that GALAHAD could be restored after

action by receiving replacements. The War Department told theater headquarters its conception was that the unit was provided for one major mission

of three months' duration, whose close might find the unit so exhausted and

depleted that its survivors would require three months' hospitalization and rest.

Through rumor, this idea was conveyed to GALAHAD personnel in the somewhat different form that after three months' combat duty they would be

relieved.68

After disembarking at Bombay between 29 and 31 October 1943, GALAHAD

passed under SEAC's operational control, and SEAC began to train the men

according to Wingate's doctrines. This arrangement caused some protest from

CBI Theater staff officers, who thought it might be taken as an admission that 67

 (1) History of CBI, Sec. II, Ch. I, pp. 8-11. (2) Ltr, Lt Col Trevor N. Dupuy to Ward, 12

Sep 52. OCMH. (3) Records of incidents involving Chinese and Americans are to be found in NCAC Files, KCRC. 68

 (1) Memo, Marshall for Dill, 26 Sep 43. WDCSA (China), A45-466. (2) Rad WAR 3495, Marshall to Stilwell, 2 Oct 43. Item 1056, Bk 4, JWS Personal File. (3) Ltr, Office IG CBI to CG

USAF CBI, 12 Jul 44, sub: Investigation Re 5307th Prov Unit. AG 333, NCAC Files, KCRC. (4)

Min, JCS 107th Mtg, 18 Aug 43, Item 2. (5) Ltr, with Incl, Col Charles N. Hunter to Ward, 14

Aug 51. OCMH. Colonel Hunter's personal correspondence file was attached to his letter. (6)

Notes by Hunter on draft MS. (Hereafter, Hunter Notes.) OCMH. (7) Ltr, Lt Col George A. McGee, Jr., to Ward, 1 Sep 51. OCMH. (8) Notes by McGee on draft MS. OCMH.
THE LAST PREPARATIONS 35

Americans did not know jungle fighting. But General Marshall's answer to this

and other arguments of like tenor was the simple statement that all hands

would have to eat some crow if Japan was to be beaten.69 It may be surmised

that the Chief of Staff believed no coalition could endure if one partner always

prevailed.

That GALAHAD was under SEAC's operational control, rather than under

CBI Theater directly, caused administrative difficulties, for there was no prior

decision as to which headquarters would exercise administrative responsibilities. Nor was GALAHAD even activated as a unit until several months had

passed. Initially, OPD had ordered Lt. Col. Charles N. Hunter, as "Commanding Officer all Casual Detachments, shipment 1688," to prepare GALAHAD'S

personnel for their future duties.70 On 13 November CBI Theater headquarters

ordered Col. Francis G. Brink to be "officer-in-charge of training, GALAHAD

project." Brink was ordered to deal directly with Rear Echelon headquarters at

New Delhi on "all matters pertaining to administration and supply."

 71

 But

this letter did not activate the unit nor did it make Brink commanding officer.

As best he could under those uncertain conditions, Hunter discharged the

duties of commanding officer, while Brink and he trained the men under Wingate's general supervision. As it developed, circumstances permitted two

months in which to weld the GALAHAD volunteers into a homogeneous force.

In October, theater headquarters listed a block of numbers from which a

unit designation might be taken. Finally, in late December, Hunter cut the administrative tangle by activating the 5307th Regiment (Provisional), using one

of the block of numbers supplied by CBI Theater headquarters.72

As the unit took shape in India, it comprised three battalions, the 1st, commanded by Lt. Col. William L. Osborne, the 2d, by Lt. Col. George A. McGee,

Jr., and the 3d, by Lt. Col. Charles E. Beach. Each battalion was broken down

into two combat teams of 16 officers and 456 enlisted men. The combat team

had a rifle company of three rifle platoons and a heavy weapons section, a heavy

weapons platoon to support the rifle company, a pioneer and demolition

platoon, a reconnaissance platoon (I & R platoon), and a medical detachment.

The combat team had 306 Ml rifles, 52 submachine guns, 86 carbines, 4 81-mm.

mortars, 4 60-mm. mortars, 2 heavy machine guns, 2 light machine guns, and

3 2.56-inch rocket launchers.

Pack transport was provided for mobility in jungle and over rough terrain.

GALAHAD began its campaign with an animal strength of 700.73

69

 Rad AMMDEL 1850, Ferris to Stilwell, 20 Oct 43; Rad WAR 3837, Marshall to Stilwell, Ferris, and Wedemeyer, 13 Nov 43. Items 1097, 1257, Bk 4, JWS Personal File. 70

 Ltr, Gen Hull to Hunter, 10 Sep 43, sub: Ltr of Instr. OPD 370.5 CTO (10 Sep 43), A47-30. 71

 Ltr, Hq Rr Ech USAF CBI to Brink, 13 Nov 43, sub: Outline of Duties. Correspondence file cited n. 68(5). 72

 History of CBI, Sec. II, Ch. XIV, GALAHAD, pp. 5-7. (Hereafter this section of History of CBI will be cited as GALAHAD. ) 73

 GALAHAD, p. 8.
36 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

The ultimate source of GALAHAD'S strategic mobility, its contemplated

ability to operate against the flanks and rear of the Japanese, was to be air supply. So that there might be the highest degree of integration and co-ordination,

the unit had its own air supply section under Maj. Edward T. Hancock. Its

duties were to include preplanning airdrops, ready response to requisitions

from the field, packaging supplies in a manner to permit the safest delivery and

quickest use, and accurate and speedy delivery of supplies to the point

prearranged.74

There was a certain amount of debate on the proper use of long-range penetration groups. At the Quebec Conference, General Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had expressed the thought that the long-range penetration

groups should be worked in close co-operation with the units in contact with

the principal Japanese forces, rather than for dramatic penetrations deep into

Burma. There was some comment that the long-range penetration groups were

really wasted in milling about the interior of Burma, that their proper use,

given the circumstances of jungle terrain and air supply, was for short envelopments.75

 As events proved, this was Stilwell's idea too. But what use Stilwell

might make of GALAHAD was still in the future, in October and November

1943, and under Brink's and Hunter's guidance GALAHAD was busy rounding

itself into shape for the events to come.

The Kachin Rangers

Most powerful of the Burman peoples in the path of the projected North

Burma Campaign were the Kachins. They are a great fighting stock who have

cut their way into Burma from the mountains to the north. Expert woodsmen,

and uncannily adept at invoking the nats, or minor deities, of the surrounding

hills, the Kachins reminded some of those Americans who worked with them

of the American Indian in his greatest days. They had a trait that sometimes

amused and sometimes touched the Americans who sought to enlist them

against the Japanese: their culture did not recognize deceit in personal relations. "The Japanese have sent me to spy on you," said the Kachin as he

entered the camp. "Please, how do I begin?" The Kachins' potentialities as

scouts, guides, and irregulars were obvious, and so Detachment 101 of the Office of Strategic Services was organized in 1942. The force thus formed was

known as the Kachin Rangers.

Detachment 101 performed a variety of missions, using a mixed personnel

of Kachins, Burmese, and Americans. An intelligence net was set up in the Japanese communications zone in north Burma. Guerrilla forces were organized

around a cadre of trained Americans and Kachins to attack Japanese lines of

communications, working parties, and patrols, and to identify targets for

Eastern Air Command. 74

 GALAHAD, p. 12n, and App. 3. 75

 Min, CCS 107th Mtg, 14 Aug 43.
THE LAST PREPARATIONS 37

A SQUAD OF KACHIN RANGERS prepares for inspection.

Late in 1942 a training school for Detachment 101 was organized at Nazira,

Assam, under Capt. William R. Peers. By the middle of 1943, the school was

able to accommodate 150 students. The training included techniques of espionage and counterespionage, communications, weapons, woodcraft, and Japanese

organizations, methods, and order of battle.

After being trained, Burmese and Kachin agents and U.S. officers were

flown into north Burma behind the Japanese lines, where they proceeded to

recruit, train, and equip bands of Kachin warriors. Silver rupees, cloth, raw

opium, and medicines were used as payment. When the time for opening the

campaign drew near, Detachment 101 had an intelligence net established behind the Japanese lines, had numerous parties of armed and warlike Kachins

totaling several hundred, and was steadily expanding its operations.76

The Battleground

Separated from India, China, and Tibet by an inverted U-shaped bend of

great mountains, the Himalayas and their giant spurs, north Burma is divided

76

 (1) Intervs with Lt Col William R. Peers and Capt James L. Tilly. OCMH. (2) NCAC

History, App. 8, Brief Sketch of Detachment 101 in the NCAC Campaign.
38 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

by the Kumon Range into two compartments.77 (Map 2) West of the Kumon

Range, the headwaters of the mighty Chindwin River, flowing north, carved

out the Hukawng Valley. Directly south of the Hukawng Valley is the ridge

of Jambu Bum, which separates the watershed of the Chindwin from that of

the Irrawaddy, Burma's greatest river. South of Jambu Bum lies the long narrow Mogaung River valley, a natural avenue of approach to the great valley

of the Irrawaddy, which to its inhabitants is Burma proper. East of the Kumon

Range a tributary stream of the Irrawaddy points a long slim finger north from

Myitkyina to the Himalayas; at the head of this valley is Fort Hertz, whose

airstrip and garrison were the last Allied foothold in Burma in 1942 and which

had been held by the Allies ever since.

On the western mountain slopes of Burma are tropical rain forests. In the

Hukawng Valley proper the trees are smaller than the mountain giants, with

thick, hobbling underbrush about their feet. The occasional clearings more

likely than not were filled with elephant or kunai grass, tall as a man, and with

an edge like a samurai sword. Crossing bamboo clumps often involved cutting

a tunnellike path through the rank growth. The bush was not the tropical

forest of legend, with rich and exotic fruit growing in profusion. Little to eat

could be found, while the local people raised only enough rice for their own

needs.

The winter in north Burma is decidedly chill and a distinct ground mist

often cuts visibility sharply. Noontime is pleasant; then the night air brings

cold winds with it. The monsoon can come any time after April, and with it,

floods. The dry-weather road running from north to south down the Hukawng

and Mogaung valleys has several stretches which are submerged during the

rains. After February the temperature begins to rise. March is hot and humid,

and the weather grows progressively worse until the monsoon breaks, usually

in late May or early June.

The place names on the map of north Burma might signify as many as a

hundred bamboo huts, surrounded by a stockade, or might be just a clearing in

the jungle, like Inkangahtawng, scene of a sharp engagement in the campaign.

Myitkyina, the metropolis, had about 8,000 people.

Insect life of a most unpleasant sort is abundant in north Burma. Three

varieties of leeches lie in wait for their warm-blooded victims, animal and

human. Some drop from trees when their prey passes below; others, on the

trailside vegetation, brush off on skin or clothing. There are small black flies

whose bite is poison, and clouds of buffalo flies that can penetrate any net. The

ubiquitous malaria-bearing Anopheles mosquito lies in wait, and in the grassy

clearings lurks a deadly variety of typhus, at that time largely unknown to

scientist and soldier alike.

77

 This section is based on Merrill's Marauders (Washington, 1945). This popular account is one of the AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION series originally prepared for distribution in hospitals.

THE LAST PREPARATIONS 39

Planning the North Burma Campaign

Planning the Chinese Army in India's (CAI) share in the occupation of the

northern part of Burma was eased because of the great distance between the

CAI and the principal British concentration which was opposite central Burma.

The two campaigns would be far enough apart to permit the two commanders considerable freedom even though the operations were ultimately interdependent. Stilwell's New Delhi headquarters began to plan a north Burma

campaign in 1942, assuming use of an army corps. After the TRIDENT Conference, May 1943, and in compliance with its directive to reoccupy north Burma,

General Boatner, then commanding the Combat Troops, Ledo Sector, ordered

his G-3, Col. Robert M. Cannon, to prepare appropriate staff studies.

Colonel Cannon was directed to prepare a plan to accomplish the current

mission of protecting Ledo and the Ledo Road project, and the future one of

clearing the Japanese from North Burma. Boatner desired to make increased

use of aviation for tactical support and supply, to move the troops by successive

advances from one dominant terrain feature to another, and to use airborne and

parachute troops.

Boatner's directive focused staff attention on the Hukawng Valley, and its

adjacent terrain compartment, the Taro Plain. After crossing the Patkai Range,

the Ledo Road emerged from the mountains at Shingbwiyang, at the northwestern corner of the Hukawng Valley. About ten miles south of Shingbwiyang

is the Tanai Hka, whose course, though winding snakelike, still follows a

definite direction from southeast to northwest. So the road's trace would initially

run roughly parallel with the Tanai. The traveler who wishes to cross the Tanai

near Shingbwiyang does so at the Kantau ford. Since at the head of the Hukawng Valley the Ledo Road would run roughly parallel with the Tanai, the

latter's tributaries would offer the first water obstacle to the road's progress.

The first tributary the road builders would meet would be the Tarung Hka.

The western wall of the Hukawng Valley is the Wantuk Bum. Over the

eons of geologic time, the Tanai has broken through the Wantuk Bum south

of Shingbwiyang. The river bends sharply, flowing almost due south as it

enters the small valley of the Taro Plain. The Taro Plain, therefore, is like a

small closet adjacent to the long narrow room of the Hukawng and Mogaung

valleys. He who wishes to enter the long narrow room from its northern door

must be sure that no one is lurking in the closet.

Colonel Cannon complied with Boatner's directive by preparing a threephase plan calling for seizure of the line of the Tarung Hka from Sharaw Ga

(ga indicates village) to the confluence of the Tarung Hka and Tanai Hka. The

advance would begin either when the roadhead reached the village of Namlip

Sakan or when ordered. The 38th Division, supplied by airdrop which would

be supplemented by pack train and porter, would be used. When the roadhead

reached Chinglow Sakan, assumed to be 1 January 1944, the next phase would
Map 3
THE LAST PREPARATIONS 41

begin, seizure of the Jambu Bum ridge line, which, running east and west, separated the Hukawng and Mogaung valleys. The 22d Division would join the

38th Division. To carry the advance beyond the Jambu Bum, Colonel Cannon

suggested using Chinese airborne troops against either Myitkyina or Kamaing

and urged that all supply be by air.78 Approved by Stilwell, these preliminary

studies incorporated the elements of air supply and advance from terrain feature to terrain feature that marked the final plan.79

For the drive on Myitkyina, Stilwell's planners drafted ALBACORE, a development and refinement of the earlier Cannon suggestions. (Map 3) ALBACORE

ONE and ALBACORE Two provided for protecting the Ledo base and securing

the Shingbwiyang area on D minus 15, in that order. ALBACORE THREE unfolded in four phases, 3 A, 3B, 3C, and 3D. Phase 3A was to seize the Jambu

Bum; 3B, the Lonkin-Kamaing line; 3C, Mogaung and Myitkyina; 3D, Katha

and Bhamo. Phase 3A called for the 38th Division to advance from the Tarung

Hka line on D Day, or on 1 December 1943 if D Day had not been announced

by then. One regiment was to drive up the Tanai valley, adjacent to and east of

the Hukawng Valley, another was to take the line of the Nambyu River and

go south and occupy the Jambu Bum. The third regiment was held in reserve.

When the 38th was near the Jambu Bum, the 22d Division would move

into the Shingbwiyang area. One of its regiments would protect the 38th Division's right flank, the other would fly to Fort Hertz. This latter move bore the

waggish code name LEDO STRIPTEASE. Phase 3B called for the 38th Division

to advance from a line just below the Jambu Bum in two columns (one up the

Tanai Hka valley, the other along the dirt road to Kamaing). The 22d Division

would be in forward reserve.

In phase 3C the 38th Division would take Mogaung. The 22d Division

would follow in column until Mogaung was taken, then swing around the

Kumon Range to attack Myitkyina from the south while the regiment earlier

sent to Fort Hertz closed in from the north. In Phase 3D the 38th Division

would take Katha, the 22d Division, Bhamo. ALBACORE assumed the Japanese

were not in strength north of Kamaing.80

Stilwell, surveying the field as his staff put the final touches on the Chinese

and American share of the campaign, was quietly confident in a personal radio

to Marshall. Stilwell was satisfied with the Chinese Army in India, which was

well trained and in good condition. If the Japanese did not reinforce materially

78

 (1) Draft Plan, sgd Col Robert M. Cannon, ACofS, G-3 [probably May 43], sub: Plans for Offensive Opns Employing Para and Airborne Trs. NCAC Files, KCRC. (2) See Ch. III, below. 79

 Memo, CG, Combat Trs, Ledo Sector, for ACofS, G-3, 26 May 43, sub: Tactical plans;

Ltr, Cannon to CO, Base Sec No. 3, 12 Jun 43, sub: Tactical Plans. NCAC Files, KCRC. 80

 (1) Opn Plan ALBACORE, 8 Aug 43. Folder, ALBACORE, LEDO STRIPTEASE, NCAC Files, KCRC. (2) Growth, Development and Operating Procedures of Air Supply and Evacuation Sys- tem, NCAC Comd Front, Burma Campaign, 1943-45, prep by U.S. Mil Observers' Gp, New Delhi, India, MS (hereafter, NCAC Air Supply), p. 8-I. The authors' pagination form has been retained in citations of this manuscript throughout the present volume. OCMH.
42 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

in the Myitkyina-Pao-shan area, the operation had a good chance of success,

and if 4 Corps did its share by driving into Burma from Manipur State, the Japanese could not reinforce. He planned to take Shingbwiyang and build an airstrip there from which to supply one division to push toward Mogaung. When

the Ledo Road reached Shingbwiyang, two divisions driving south could be

supplied by air. With any luck, Stilwell expected that the Ledo Road would

reach Shingbwiyang by 31 December.81

Underlying these plans and hopes was Chih Hui Pu's estimate of Japanese

strength and dispositions. Chih Hui Pu believed that the Japanese in Burma

were commanded by Headquarters, Burma Area Army, at Rangoon, with field

command by Headquarters, 15th Army, at Maymyo, Burma. Under 15th Army

were four divisions, the 18th (Mandalay), 33d (Monywa), 55th (Akyab), and

56th (Lashio). Four Thai divisions were thought to be in the Shan States of

Burma. There were reports, as yet unverified, that four more Japanese divisions,

identified as the 14th, 16th, 23d, and 21st were in Burma. As of 30 October

1943, G-2 of Chih Hui Pu wrote: "There is no evidence of any enemy in

strength north of the fortified area of Kamaing nor is there any indication of

such a move in prospect. There are however troops available south of

Kamaing which can be moved up when and if needed." Adding faith to this

estimate were the circumstances of complete U.S. air superiority over the Hukawng-Mogaung valleys, which permitted unrestricted aerial reconnaissance,

and the host of friendly Kachin informants.82

Actually, Chih Hui Pu erred. The Japanese Burma Area Army had six divisions, the 18th, 31st, 33d, 54th, 55th, and 56th, of which the 31st and 54th arrived in 1943, and the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade, then being organized.

The 54th Division went to garrison the Arakan region against the feared amphibious descent by SEAC; the 31st Division, to central Burma opposite Manipur State in India.83

 (Chart 4) The Thai divisions may be disregarded for they

never met SEAC troops in battle and did not free any Japanese garrison troops

for service elsewhere, as the Japanese in Burma were not faced with civil unrest.

And the Japanese were north of Kamaing.

Appraising ALBACORE, General Boatner thought the scheme had flaws.

Though he knew of no Japanese north of Kamaing, he feared that a forward

displacement to the line of the Tanai followed by a pause might well attract

the Japanese, so he suggested holding the advance well north of Shingbwiyang

until 15 November and then going all out for the Jambu Bum. Stilwell agreed

and was willing to hold the advance until the 15th.

81

 Rad CK 36, Stilwell to Marshall, 30 Aug 43. Item 769, Bk 2, JWS Personal File. 82 (1) Wkly G-2 Rpt, Hq Chih Hui Pu, 30 Oct 43. KCRC. (2) Japanese Officers' Comments, Incl 4. OCMH. Lt. Gen. Shinichi Tanaka states that the Japanese order of battle did not include a 14th, 16th, or 23d Division. (3) A Japanese area army may be considered the equivalent of an American army and a Japanese army the equivalent of an American army corps. Therefore on the maps the symbols used for enemy units are those of the American equivalents. 83

 (1) Japanese Study 89, pp. 9-10, 30. (2) Japanese Officers' Comments, pp. 2-3. OCMH.
THE LAST PREPARATIONS 43

CHART 4—JAPANESE ORGANIZATION AND DISPOSITIONS:

NOVEMBER 1943

Brig. Gen. Benjamin G. Ferris, chief of staff of Stilwell's Rear Echelon theater headquarters at New Delhi, objected to General Boatner's proposal. Ferris

stated that the principal reason for the move forward was to occupy ground

within which to build an airstrip in order to receive road-building machinery,

which would be flown in to start construction back to the current roadhead. If

the Ledo Road did not reach Shingbwiyang by January 1944, said Ferris, all

hope of a link with China in 1944 was gone. Further, an advance would set the

precedent for a similar forward displacement by 4 Corps, whereas postponement would be highly contagious. In summarizing, General Ferris gave first

place to the argument that the advance would give Stilwell a potent argument

in urging an aggressive attitude on SEAC and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Stilwell initially agreed with Boatner, but he then discussed the matter personally with Ferris and the latter persuaded him to let the orders stand. Boatner

fared no better with a suggestion that the entire 38th Division be sent forward.

Brig. Gen. Frank D. Merrill tried to arrange it, but Stilwell could not agree,

because the supply aircraft to support such a move were not at hand.84

84

 (1) Rad RELOT G 240, Boatner to Stilwell, 4 Oct 43; Rad AD 2213, Stilwell to Boatner, 6 Oct 43; Rad AMMDEL 1728, Ferris to Stilwell, 6 Oct 43; Rad AD 2223, Stilwell to Ferris, 7 Oct

43; Rad B 134, Stilwell to Boatner, 6 Oct 43. Items 1062, 1060, 1064, 1065, 1063, Bk 4, JWS

Personal File. (2) Ltr, Frank [Merrill] to Haydon [Boatner], recd 4 Sep 43. Folder, Combat Rpts FE and Ln O's, ALBACORE Hist File, NCAC Files, KCRC.
Map 4
THE LAST PREPARATIONS 45

The Campaign Begins

ALBACORE Two called for a forward displacement of one regiment of the

Chinese 38th Division to cover the onward movement of the Ledo Road and

to reach the Tarung, which was the line of departure for the projected North

Burma Campaign. (Map 4) D Day, if previously unannounced, was to be 1

December 1943. The orders as received by General Sun for his 38th Division

left him very little scope for his own initiative. He was directed to send the

112th Regiment forward to shield the advancing road builders. The 2/112th

was to occupy the Tarung Hka villages of Sharaw Ga and Ningbyen, the

l/112th to occupy Yupbang Ga, also on the Tarung, and the 3/112th, Ngajatzup at the northern edge of the Taro Plain.85

 This deployment, which dispersed

the regiment, was designed to hold the line of the Tarung and the Tanai by

controlling the fords, and to bar Japanese excursions from the Taro Plain. Chih

Hui Pu expected that the 112th could readily brush aside the maximum expected resistance which was assessed as scattered parties of Burmans under Japanese leadership.86

General Sun received his orders on 5 October but hesitated over moving

forward. Boatner saw no good reason for Sun to delay, saying that air support,

both tactical and supply, was ample, and enemy opposition "certainly insignificant."

 87

 Finally, the Chinese battalions began to move out. As they trudged

ahead, they passed over portions of the trail by which the pathetic refugees of

1942 had fled Burma. The path was a ghastly sight; skeletons were seen about

every water hole and at the beginning of every slope. Huddled groups of bones

showed where small refugee camps had perished en masse. On his way back to

Burma, Dr. Gordon S. Seagrave, the Burma Surgeon of the first campaign, saw

"hundreds and hundreds" of skeletons as his colleague, Col. John M. Tamraz,

the SOS surgeon, had eight months before.88

Ordered by Chih Hui Pu to occupy Sharaw Ga and Ningbyen, the 2/112th,

38th Division, was a little task force as it moved deeper into Burma. It was

reinforced and supported by the 5th Company of the 114th Regiment, a Seagrave hospital unit, engineer, and quartermaster troops.89

 Two miles north of

85

 For economy of space and simplicity, a battalion is sometimes identified by giving first its numerical designation, followed by a slash, and then the name or the number of the parent

regiment, as in the example above, the 2/112th, or the 2d Battalion of the 112th Regiment. 86

 (1) NCAC History, pp. 25-28. (2) Lt Col Thomas F. Van Natta, History of the 38th

Div, CAI, 1 Oct 43-31 Aug 45, MS. NCAC Files, KCRC. (3) Ltr, Boatner to Stilwell, 29 Nov 43. Folder, Combat Rpts FE and Ln O's ALBACORE Hist File, NCAC Files, KCRC. 87

 Rad RELOT G 257, Boatner to Stilwell, 15 Oct 43. Item 1085, Bk 4, JWS Personal File. 88

 (1) Tamraz Diary, 19 Feb 43. SGO Hist Div, Washington, D.C. (2) Dr. Gordon S. Seagrave, Burma Surgeon Returns (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1946), pp. 27-28,

72-73, 60-63. 89

 Regimental designations of Chinese infantry divisions were obtained by multiplying the

division's number by three. The product designates the last regiment of the division. Thus, the three regiments of the 38th Division were the 112th, 113th, and 114th; of the 22d Division, the 64th, 65th, and 66th Regiments.
46 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Sharaw Ga and many weeks before D Day, the Chinese at about 1200, 30

October 1943, met an enemy outpost. The outpost was driven back, and the advance guard moved on to the Sharaw Ga clearing, where mortar and machine

gun fire held it until dark. On the next day the remainder of the battalion came

up, and the Chinese tried to take the village, which lay between two hills.

The hill to the north was lightly held. The Chinese quickly overran it, then

came under such heavy fire from the second hill that they had 116 casualties.

On 1, 2, and 3 November the Chinese attacked, achieving nothing and losing

fifty more men. Then they went on the defensive and dug in, but managed to

patrol and keep in touch with the regimental command post at Ningam Sakan.

The 1st Battalion had much the same experience at Yupbang Ga. Encountering

a well-entrenched and well-led force, it dug in and was quickly isolated by a

roadblock placed between Sharaw Ga and Ningbyen. (Map 1) That left the 3d

Battalion, which was similarly stalemated on the northern edge of the Taro

Plain.90 This well-led, well-entrenched enemy was not the expected rabble of

Burman levies, but elements of the Japanese 56th Regiment, 18th Division, under

Lt. Gen. Shinichi Tanaka.

The surprise caused by the presence of these excellent veteran troops was

complete. G-2 reports had given no hint that Japanese forces were in the area.

Compounding the intelligence and reconnaissance failure was the reluctance

of Chih Hui Pu to admit that the enemy was present in strength. As late as

20 November the weekly G-2 report dismissed the Japanese as having seventyfive to one hundred men at Yupbang Ga, with one hundred more pocketed

between Sharaw Ga and Ningbyen, and added that judging by road traffic a

battalion was moving up to reinforce.91

Drawn from the island of Kyushu, the men of the 18th Division considered

themselves authentic heirs of the martial traditions of the hot-blooded Kyushu

clans. A diploma of honor had been given them for their pre-eminent share in

storming the island of Singapore. Their commander, General Tanaka, had been

chief of operations of Staff Headquarters in Tokyo and had gone from there to

join the staff of Southern Army. From Southern Army he had taken command of

the 18th Division when Lt. Gen. Renya Mutaguchi moved up to command of

the 15th Army.

The 18th Division had moved forward to carry out its mission of garrisoning north Burma, to which was added in September that of supporting a

planned attack on India. Anxious to prevent interference with its offensive, the

Japanese headquarters in Burma, Burma Area Army, was improving its positions all around the perimeter of Burma. The 56th Division in October 1943

eliminated a Chinese bridgehead over the Salween, north of Teng-chung. In

late September, 15th Army in anticipation of the dry season ordered 18th Division to carry out, with its main force, a delaying action in the Hukawng Valley 90

 (1) Map Overlay, Hq 5303d (Prov) Combat Trs, 13 Nov 43. NCAC Files, KCRC. (2)

NCAC History, pp. 25-28. 91

 Wkly G-2 Rpts, Hq 5303d Combat Trs, Oct-Nov 43; Numbered Int Sums, summer and

early fall 1943, Hq Combat Trs, Folder, Int Sums, NCAC Files, KCRC.
THE LAST PREPARATIONS 47

against the expected Allied thrust from Ledo. Myitkyina was to be strongly

held to block any attack from China.

About 24 October a company of the 2/56th, 18th Division, had arrived in

the Tarung-Tanai area on reconnaissance. Not finding any Chinese immediately

to the north of them, they constructed defensive posts in and around Ningbyen.

Probably at the first clash the Japanese outposts appealed for help. A Japanese

concentration of unknown size was at Maingkwan and the remainder of the

2/56th was sent forward from there "in the earliest part of November." The

rest of the 18th Division was "a month's march" away, General Tanaka recalled

in 1948.92 It may be assumed that the 18th Division was reinforced as quickly

as possible and was soon present in a strength well able to meet the 112th

Regiment's three scattered battalions on more than even terms, especially since

at first the Japanese tactics were to place blocks across the trails and force the

Chinese to attack them.

The Tarung, which flows south through this area to enter the Tanai, is a

respectable river, two hundred yards wide in the dry season and much wider

during the rains. Firmly entrenched at Sharaw Ga and Yupbang Ga, the Japanese were holding the river crossings and thus the springboards for the offensive General Tanaka was speedily planning.93

Tanaka personally reconnoitered the area in early November. He decided

to adopt a plan which he described long after as being "to move the main

strength of the division from Ningbyen toward Shingbwiyang and the exit

of the mountain road on the India-Burma border to attack and destroy the

American and Chinese forces which would advance in a long column through

the tortuous Ledo Road in India." The operation was to begin on 15 December

1943.94

As the Japanese grew in strength, they became more aggressive, and the

112th Regiment, 38th Division, had a series of misfortunes in November. One

of its companies was annihilated on 2 November. The regimental command

post was overrun on the 3d as its guard was digging in for the night. The regimental commander, a Colonel Chen, and the junior U.S. liaison officer, Maj.

George T. Laughlin, escaped, but the chief liaison officer, Lt. Col. Douglas G.

Gilbert, was captured. A company of the 1/114th, rushed up to aid by reopening the trail to the 1/112th near Yupbang Ga, was halted by the Japanese well

short of its goal. Air supply brought rations to the besieged 150 survivors of

the l/112th, but the acute water supply problem had to be met in part by tapping jungle vines. A great banyan tree was ingeniously made into a fort defend- 92

 (1) Rpts cited n. 91, above. (2) Interrog, Gen Tanaka, 13 Jan 48. OCMH. (3) SEATIC

Bull 244, 3 Oct 46, sub: History of Japanese 33d Army, pp. 11-12. MID Library. (4) The diary of a Japanese officer indicates that he was in Taihpa Ga with his unit before 24 October 1943. He recorded that incoming soldiers were digging defensive positions, presumably on 25

or 26 October. General Tanaka thought that the Japanese arrived about 26 October. Folder, Misc Work Sheets of Captured Japanese Docs-1944; Int Sum 111, 6 Nov 43, Hq 5303d (Prov)

Combat Trs. Folder Int Sums, NCAC Files, KCRC. (5) Japanese Officers' Comments, p. 5. OCMH. 93

 Interrog cited n. 92(2). 94

 Japanese Officers' Comments, Incl 4. OCMH.
48 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

ing the west end of the dropping field and garrisoned by two squads with

heavy machine guns who put themselves in, around, and under the mighty

tree.95

The 38th's failure to advance brought vigorous exchanges between Generals

Sun and Boatner. Boatner believed there was only one Japanese battalion at

hand, that by passivity and bad tactics the Chinese had let themselves be surrounded and then proceeded to waste their ammunition. Sun thought the

whole 56th Regiment faced him along the Tarung and wanted reinforcements.

On 26 November Boatner told Maj. Gen. Thomas G. Hearn, Chief of Staff,

U.S. Army Forces, CBI, that the situation was "critical," that Sun wanted to

retreat, and asked if General Hearn could intervene. Since Stilwell was absent

on a highly secret and most important mission, Hearn had to handle the problem, which he did by telling Boatner to act strongly in Stilwell's name.96

One possible difficulty lay in the fact that Chih Hui Pu's orders to Sun had,

as noted before, allowed him very little initiative and even prescribed the location of his several battalions. Moreover, he had not been free to reinforce without Chih Hui Pu's approval. The situation slowly improved when Chih Hui

Pu began reinforcing the 112th Regiment, 38th Division. The 114th arrived

at the front in mid-November, and the remainder of the division was on the

way.97

Summary

As the campaigning season of 1943-44 began, the most important activity

took place on the lower levels of the theater. The problem of improving the

Assam line of communications to an acceptable standard was approached with

determination and vigor. In far-off Washington, the President introduced a

new element by his decision to send the B-29's to CBI. Then came the encounter between Chinese and Japanese in the Hukawng Valley which upset the

timetable for the campaign. D Day was to have been in December, leaving

time for SEAC to settle on a plan for the campaign which would provide a directive to the Chinese in north Burma and the British forces in Manipur and

the Arakan. In accord with that concept, the Chinese in north Burma moved

forward to screen the advance of the Ledo Road, well before D Day. They

stumbled on a strong force of Japanese, and on 30 October 1943 the fight

began with both sides reinforcing. The Burma campaign was under way though

the detailed plan for it was not yet approved by the CCS and the basic preparation, improvement of the Assam line of communications, had just begun.

95

 Comments by Col Dupuy on NCAC History, I, 29. (Hereafter Dupuy Comments.) OCMH. Colonel Dupuy was present throughout the North Burma Campaign and kept extensive notes. In writing this section, the authors are greatly indebted to him and Lt Col George T. Laughlin.- 96

 Rad RELOT G 323, Boatner to Hearn, 26 Nov 43; Rad RELOT G 322, Boatner to Hearn, 26 Nov 43; Rad OT 56, Hearn to Boatner, 30 Nov 43. Items 1286, 1285, 1290, Bk 5, JWS

Personal File. 97

 (1) Map Overlay cited n. 90(1). (2) Map Overlay, Hq 5303d (Prov) Combat Trs, 4

Dec 43. NCAC Files, KCRC.
CHAPTER II

SEXTANT: The Watershed

At the Casablanca, TRIDENT, and QUADRANT Conferences a strategy whose

successful execution would break the blockade of China had been roughly

shaped. Pledges had been given to the Chinese, notably that of TRIDENT: "No

limits, except those imposed by time and circumstance, will be placed on the

above operations, which have for their object the relief of the siege of China."

This statement had followed on a Chinese threat to seek a separate peace.

There was another question: how long could China survive blockade? Stilwell,

Chennault, the President, the Prime Minister, all agreed at TRIDENT that

China must have aid soon. Another powerful influence in shaping Allied

strategy had been the President's wish that China be treated as a Great Power,

that it join in the councils of the Great Powers as an equal.

To complete Allied plans for the relief of China, the President arranged for

the Generalissimo to meet with him and Mr. Churchill at Cairo in November

1943. Then and there the threads would be drawn together. The Generalissimo

would confer with his colleagues; the final details would be added to the plan

for China's relief; the dignitaries would approve it; and a CCS directive to

SEAC would be issued. The Cairo Conference was the high point, the watershed, that divided Sino-American relations. After Cairo, the currents flowed in

a very different direction.

Drafting SEAC's Proposals

When Admiral Mountbatten on 1 November 1943 formally opened his

headquarters as Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, one of

his first tasks was to prepare a plan to submit to his superiors, who if approving

it would provide the necessary additional resources, landing craft, principally.

To play his part in this planning was Stilwell's first duty on leaving Chungking

for India in October 1943. Independently, Mountbatten and Stilwell had come

to similar conclusions on the preliminary studies prepared by General Headquarters (India) in the last phases of that body's concern with Burma operations. When General Auchinleck in September 1943 proffered a plan calling for

the now-familiar converging attacks on Burma from Yunnan, Ledo, Assam, and

the Arakan, Stilwell had been critical. The scheduling of the proposed several

drives upset him, for he found them so separate in time as to open the prospect
50 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

of the Allies' being defeated in detail. And he added: "I understood the orders

to call for 'vigorous and aggressive action' and I don't find a hell of a lot of it

in the plan. However, we will proceed as indicated and perhaps our doubts will

be resolved when Admiral Mountbatten arrives."

 1

After examining the same plans Mountbatten, too, was critical, but where

Stilwell was characteristically blunt, Mountbatten was urbane: "There is also

no doubt that the climate and the antiquated and close methods used in India

have their effect on the keenness of officers after a year or two and so I have

found that the plans made by the Indian Staff are somewhat pessimistic and

unenterprising."

 2

When the work of preparing SEAC's proposals to the CCS, the President,

the Prime Minister, and the Generalissimo began, Stilwell submitted his views

as did General Headquarters (India) and the local combined planners.3

The proposals and decisions that began to form fell into two categories,

those for the first phases which SEAC could execute with its own resources,

and those which needed approval and support by higher authority. Almost

immediately Stilwell received his orders and approval of the opening phases of

ALBACORE THREE, which called for him to establish a bridgehead over the

Tanai. As for the Arakan, the SEAC minutes state that General Giffard was not

satisfied with the safety of Chittagong while his troops held their current positions, so he proposed that they make a twenty-mile advance to secure the

Buthidaung-Maungdaw road. (See Map 1—inside back cover.)

Neither Admiral Mountbatten nor General Slim was content with this

modest contribution. General Giffard according to the minutes "agreed that it

was mainly a defensive move." So Giffard's orders were changed to call for the

exploitation of any success, with Akyab the objective. It was further agreed in

SEAC that whatever the ultimate objective in Burma, 4 Corps, on the central

front, at some time would be obliged to advance through the noxious and

malarial Kabaw Valley. The Arakan advance might begin the second week of

January 1944; 4 Corps and the Chinese forces in Yunnan (Y-Force) would

move out in early March; and any airborne operation would be in mid-March.4

It is notable that Stilwell was thus directed to advance into hostile territory as

part of a larger operation whose objectives had not been defined and whose

resources were not at hand. However, none doubted that all would be provided

in due time.

Of the three courses seen as open to 4 Corps and the air-supplied light

infantry of the British Long-Range Penetration Groups (LRPG's or Chindits), 1

 (1) Ltr, Auchinleck to Stilwell, 7 Sep 43; Quotation from Ltr, Stilwell to Auchinleck, 16 Sep

43. Item 226, Bk 3, JWS Personal File. (2) Mountbatten Report, Pt. A, par. 7. 2

 Extract, SAC's Personal Diary, 30 Oct 43. SEAC War Diary. 3

 Stilwell's plan has not been found. Probably it is reflected in the views expressed in the memorandum cited in note 7, below. 4

 (1) SEAC Plan, SAC (43) 2, 28 Oct 43; Min, SAC's Mtg, 31 Oct 43; Rad 7, SEACOS to COS, 31 Oct 43. SEAC War Diary. (2) Rad AMMDEL 1963, Merrill to Stilwell, 3 Nov 43. Item 1162, Bk 4, JWS Personal File.
SEXTANT: THE WATERSHED 51

the SEAC planners under General Wedemeyer, SEAC's deputy chief of staff,

preferred TOREADOR, an airborne landing by two divisions in central Burma.

If successful in the operation's first phases, the divisions would exploit toward

Mandalay. The other alternatives considered were: (1) an overland advance

toward Ye-u; (2) TARZAN, an airborne landing at Indaw on the railway to

Myitkyina, a drive by the Ledo force on Myitkyina, and a bridgehead over the

Chindwin to be established by 4 Corps.

Observing the drift of the planning, Stilwell grew concerned and prepared

a critique on 27 October 1943 which he submitted on 3 November.5 The

critique stated that all SEAC plans to date had been closely based on estimates

of the logistic situation, that they had been "permeated by fear of failure or

reluctance to take the bold course." Singling out TARZAN, which Mountbatten

appeared to prefer, Stilwell remarked (giving an incorrect figure) that the operation comprised 80,000 troops in the Arakan,6

 limited to advancing on Akyab,

with nothing further contemplated; an advance from Imphal to the Chindwin

River; placing a division on the railway to Myitkyina and leaving it there; an

amphibious operation against the Andaman Islands, which he thought had "no

immediate bearing on the main problem"; Stilwell's Chinese forces, "left to

their own resources to effect a junction and open the Burma Road."

Stilwell believed that if Akyab was taken, this victory should be exploited

by a series of amphibious hooks down the coast aimed at the port of Bassein.

Success would give bases from which to dominate Japanese aviation in south

Burma. In central Burma, he suggested a two-pronged operation aimed at

Mandalay. "The Indaw operations should be cancelled." His Chinese forces

would do their best in conjunction with the above. Stilwell stated:

With the large air and naval units to be committed, nothing less than the above is justified.

Nothing less than this is either bold or aggressive. Nothing less takes complete advantage

of our position for concentric attacks. Nothing less threatens the enemy with serious loss.

I take exception to any trend in the planning which fails to use to advantage our

overwhelming strength, to any tendency towards vagueness in objectives, to any move which

does not absolutely require a strong enemy reaction to check it.

Under present plans, Burma could [Stilwell's italics] be ready to fall to a vigorous attack,

and for lack of trying, we might not even find this out. In other words, we are not even

making a reconnaissance in force, let alone a serious attack.7

TARZAN, the plan for SEAC's share in the campaign, was nevertheless

adopted by SEAC on 7 November. Behind the decision lay Mountbatten's

announced desire for a guaranteed victory, his admission that he would choose

the less desirable course if it promised success. TARZAN was urged by General

Headquarters (India) and by Mountbatten's three commanders in chief,

General Giffard, Admiral Sir James Somerville, and Air Chief Marshal Sir

5

 Stilwell Diary, 3 Nov 43. (See Bibliographical Note.) 6

 Actually present were the 5th and 7th Indian Divisions with three brigades each, and the 81st West African Division with two brigades. Mountbatten Report, Pt. B, pars. 34-37. 7

 Memo, Stilwell for SEAC, 27 Oct 43. SNF 215.
52 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Richard Peirse. General Wedemeyer commented that TARZAN would not

accomplish the objectives given to SEAC in its directive. Representatives of

CBI Theater headquarters at SEAC were equally critical. Even if all went well,

they remarked, the monsoon rains would find SEAC having only a bridgehead

over the Chindwin and an airborne division mired on the railway to Myitkyina.

This seemed little to show for a season's fighting. The only consolations were

that the dropping of an airborne division in Burma might open opportunities

and that SEAC agreed to study operations in Burma to follow TARZAN. From

the discussions that accompanied the adoption of TARZAN, CBI Theater liaison

personnel received the impression that Giffard, Somerville, and Peirse were not

aggressively inclined, placed no value on operations in Burma, and had staffs

who were too impressed by logistical difficulties and indifferent to what might

be done to improve the logistical situation. But, TARZAN it was, and the SEAC

secretariat began to prepare the papers on it and on the over-all plan for Burma,

now called CHAMPION, for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the

President, the Prime Minister, and the Generalissimo.8 (See Map 2.)

The United States Prepares for the SEXTANT Conference

The President's diplomatic preparations for a meeting with the Generalissimo, the Prime Minister, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff had been under

way since the TRIDENT Conference in Washington, May 1943. In June Mr.

Roosevelt told the Generalissimo of his anxiety to meet him, and a discussion

of times and places followed at once. Originally, the meeting was to have been

of just the two statesmen, and the Generalissimo suggested Alaska in August

or September. The course of events made the President feel ever more strongly

that he should meet with Marshal Joseph V. Stalin and, of course, Mr. Churchill,

and so the President began to consider co-ordinating the two meetings.

The foreign ministers' conference at Moscow in October marked further

progress toward the President's goal of having China accepted as a Great Power,

for Great Britain and the Soviet Union agreed to China's signing a Four Power

Declaration. This agreement greatly pleased Roosevelt, who told the Generalissimo that the ice had been broken, that he and the Chinese statesman had

now established the principle of China's Great Power position. To arrange a

meeting between the several statesmen remained, and from this innocent circumstance the Chinese insistence on making or keeping face under any and all

conditions led to great consequences. In so many words, the Generalissimo

insisted on seeing Mr. Roosevelt before the latter saw Marshal Stalin, or else

postponing the meeting indefinitely. Roosevelt agreed, and Brig. Gen. Patrick 8

 (1) Rad 22, Wedemeyer to Marshall for Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy, 6 Nov 43; Rad SEACOS

83834, Mountbatten to COS, 10 Nov 43; Extract, SAC's Personal Diary, 7 Nov 43. SEAC War Diary. (2) Rad AMMDEL 2008, Merrill to Stilwell, 8 Nov 43; Rad AMMDEL 2023, Merrill to Stilwell, 10 Nov 43; Rad AMMDEL 2036, Merrill to Stilwell 11 Nov 43. Items 1203, 1225, 1236,

Bk 4, JWS Personal File.
SEXTANT: THE WATERSHED 53

J. Hurley, who acted as the President's personal representative in the Middle

East, was sent to Chungking to arrange the details.9 Thus, the Generalissimo

sacrificed the strategic advantage of having the last word with the President.

Even as the next meeting (SEXTANT) of the Allied statesmen was being

convened, significant trends in U.S. strategy were depreciating China's importance as an ally against Japan. The increasing strength of the U.S. Navy's fast

carrier task forces and the realization of the B-29's potentialities were leading

the lower echelons of U.S. planners to an awareness that Japan could be

defeated without a major U.S. land campaign in China. In summer 1943 the

Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to use the fast carrier task forces and amphibious

troops against the Japanese positions in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. The

Gilberts were to be attacked in November 1943, the Marshalls, in January

1944.10 The decision to initiate action in the Central Pacific did not, of course,

by itself change China's role in the evolving strategy of the United States, but

the more the fast carrier task forces prospered in their advance across the Pacific,

the more islands that fell into U.S. possession, the less need there would be to

seek the Generalissimo's co-operation. The means for a major thrust across the

Central Pacific were coming to hand and so was the realization of China's

diminishing strategic importance.

The Operations Division observed:

Despite the agreements that the United Nations should direct their principal offensive

efforts against Germany and contain the Japanese by a series of relatively minor thrusts, it is

becoming increasingly apparent that operations against the Japanese are approaching major

proportions. Plans for the defeat of Japan are not yet firm. However, the degree of success

enjoyed thus far is indicative of the need of a short-term plan for operations against Japan

"upon Germany's defeat" with principal emphasis on approach from the Pacific rather than

from the Asiatic mainland.11

The QUADRANT Conference, Quebec, August 1943, ordered the combined

staffs to prepare a "short plan for the defeat of Japan." The planners complied

on 25 October 1943. They suggested four broad possible courses of action, all

of them bypassing the mainland of China. For operations in China, the Combined (i. e., Anglo-American) Staff Planners suggested only an eventual limited

B-29 offensive supported through north Burma by a line of communications

that would also be called on to support the Fourteenth Air Force and the

re-equipping of the Chinese Army.

Of the four proposed courses, the recommended one included taking

9

 (1) Msg, Roosevelt to Chiang, 30 Jun 43; Ltr, Soong to Hopkins, 21 Jul 43. Bk IX, Hopkins

Papers. (2) Memo, Hearn for Generalissimo, 1 Nov 43. Item 1139, Bk 4, JWS Personal File. (3)

Incl to Memo, Somervell to Hopkins, 5 Nov 43. Bk VII, Hopkins Papers. (4) Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, MS, IX-2-93. This manuscript quotes the President as aware of

China's weakness but as desiring to be friendly with her 400,000,000 people and so wanting

China to sign the Four Power Declaration. 10

 Min, JCS 97th Mtg, 20 Jul 43. 11

 Compilation of Background Material for SEXTANT, Table 4g, prep by Strategy and Policy Gp, OPD. ABC 337 (18 Oct 43) Sec 5, A48-224.
54 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Formosa in spring 1945, while retaining the option of taking Sumatra in spring

or autumn 1945 if the Formosa operation had to be postponed. The planners

concluded there was no prospect of defeating Japan by October 1945. The

Central Pacific course of action included capture of the Marshall, Caroline

(Truk area), Palau, and Mariana Islands. If Truk was bypassed, the advance

might reach the Marianas in July 1944; Truk, in November 1944; and the

Palaus, by early 1945. It was recognized that good bomber fields could be built

in the Marianas.

The recommendation to the Combined Chiefs noted that in response to the

Air Plan for the Defeat of Japan CBI Theater had suggested basing eight B-29

groups at Calcutta and staging them through Cheng-tu. The Combined Staff

Planners had not weighed this proposal in detail but thought it might well be

feasible. Their own plan called for sending 2,000 B-24's to India immediately

after Germany's defeat and with them flying supplies to China to begin

preparations for the reception of B-29's en masse.12

With the CCS advisers thinking of a major effort through the Pacific and

of bypassing China, criticism of existing strategy for the mainland of Asia

developed. As defined by the Strategy Section of the Operations Division

(OPD), the current plan called for keeping China in the war as an effective

ally in order to use Chinese bases to bomb the Japanese islands. A great converging attack from east and west was contemplated, to open the Hong KongCanton area as a base from which to launch a drive that would open a line of

communications to the North China Plain. This strategy seemed defective

because it was not co-ordinated with the major effort being planned for the

Pacific, which included bombing Japan from the Mariana Islands in January

1945 and launching the final air and amphibious assault on the Japanese homeland not later than mid-1946. The plan of securing Chinese bases seemed too

costly in men and matériel for the advantages it would yield, mainly, the chance

to bomb Japan. Using Chinese bases to the fullest extent would probably

require the conquest of all Burma in order to reopen the line of communications from Rangoon northward. The Strategy Section, OPD, considered that

the situation in Asia, despite all earlier efforts, continued to be bad. China was

still an ineffective ally, and Indian forces could not mount a major offensive.

The Assam line of communications was still no better. Japan was improving

her defensive position, while current U.S. strategy in Asia called for no effective

blow at Japan proper before 1946.

Therefore, the Strategy Section of OPD recommended that the present

approved undertakings to keep China in the war as an effective ally be fulfilled;

that a limited bomber offensive from China be mounted as insurance for the

Pacific effort; that no further commitments be made to CBI Theater; and that

no more than thirty Chinese divisions be trained and equipped, plus three more

divisional sets of equipment to be used in beginning the training of the Second 12 CPS 86/2, 25 Oct 43, sub: Defeat of Japan Within Twelve Months After Defeat of Germany.
SEXTANT: THE WATERSHED 55

Thirty Divisions in east China. The report was innocent of diplomatic considerations; its thought was that the goal of the Pacific war was the military defeat

of Japan.13

The next voices raised were those of the members of the Joint Strategic

Survey Committee (JSSC), placing their views before the JCS on the eve of

SEXTANT. A small group of distinguished senior officers, taking the broad

detached view, they spoke with the weight of long experience. Though they

were in general agreement with the QUADRANT decisions, they did think these

should be reappraised in the light of the recent studies of the problem of speeding Japan's defeat, which had shown the great importance of taking the

Marianas as bases for the B-29's. The JSSC stated:

We feel that without depreciating the importance of the effort against Japan by way of

China, the key to the early defeat of Japan lies in all-out operations through the Central

Pacific with supporting operations on the Northern and Southern flanks, using all forces,

naval, air, and ground, that can be maintained and employed profitably in these areas. We

believe that this principle and the related principle that operations from the West (via

Singapore) would be of a diversionary nature have not been sufficiently recognized and

emphasized.14

Therefore, by the time the SEXTANT Conference met, important agencies

among the United States' planners were counseling a reappraisal of the United

States strategy. Had the Chinese been zealous and industrious in preparations

for a campaign in Burma, had they accepted and carried out Stilwell's suggestions for a potent Chinese Army of sixty divisions, and had the Generalissimo

in March 1943, against whatever odds, crossed the Salween River into Burma,

the United States would have been morally obligated to support the Chinese in

projects it had persuaded them to undertake. Nor could India Command have

held back if Chinese troops tried to liberate a major portion of the Commonwealth. But the Chinese had not thought in those terms, the months had gone

past, and now American planners were beginning to conclude that they could

defeat Japan without Chinese bases and without a rejuvenated Chinese Army.

The recommendations which the Strategy Section of OPD made to arm thirtythree Chinese divisions, in November 1943, complemented the conclusions that

Stilwell had reached one month before. Stilwell's superiors were quietly discarding the mission they had given him in February 1942, "to assist in improving the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army"; by implication, other tasks

would be forthcoming.15

The U.S. advance across the Central Pacific began 20 November when U.S.

forces landed in the Gilberts group. After seventy-two hours of fighting, some

of it of the most desperate nature, the Marines had their objective. American

sea power had taken a giant stride closer toward Japan.

13

 Memo, Col Joseph J. Billo, Chief, Strategy Sec OPD, for Chief, Strategy and Policy Gp OPD, 4 Nov 43, sub: Reanalysis of Our Strategic Position in Asia. ABC 337 (18 Oct 43) Sec 5, A48-224. 14 JCS 533/5, 8 Nov 43, sub: Recommended Line of Action at Next U.S.-British Stf Conf. 15 Stilwell's Mission to China, Chs. II and X.
56 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

The Chinese Prepare for SEXTANT

Having expressed his opinions on the proposed plan for SEAC's share in

Burma operations, Stilwell left his liaison personnel to participate in the final

discussions and returned to Chungking to inform the Generalissimo of the

trend of SEAC's thinking and to prepare with him for the forthcoming meeting

between the President and the Generalissimo. The Generalissimo was markedly

pleasant and co-operative. After the events of October Stilwell was extremely

skeptical of the Generalissimo's sincerity, but work must be done before the

forthcoming conference, and Stilwell applied himself to it.16

At the suggestion of his friends, Mesdames Chiang Kai-shek and H. H.

Kung, Stilwell, as Joint Chief of Staff, China Theater, on 5 November 1943

prepared and submitted a report to the Generalissimo on SEAC planning and

Y-Force's progress in its preparations to attack from Yunnan. Telling the Generalissimo that no final SEAC plans had been made, Stilwell pointed out that

"it is certain" the Chinese would be expected to make a converging attack from

Assam and Yunnan into north Burma. "If for any reason the Y-force does not

attack, the British [military] will have an excellent argument for giving up any

plans for reopening communications with China. They have contended that the

Chinese army is incapable of fighting and that there is no use in trying to build

it up; failure to fight now will tend to prove them right. . . ." Then Stilwell

explained why the Y-Force was not ready:

3 (A) The long delay in furnishing replacements has left all divisions far below

strength. . . .

(B) The training has not yet reached the bulk of the men. . . .

(C) The equipment brought in from India has not been distributed. There has been

trouble in getting the Chinese supply agencies to take this equipment, and unusual delay in

getting it into the hands of the troops. Some divisions are so weak that they cannot take care

of their quota.

(D) The majority of the men are physically incapable of sustaining prolonged hardship. . . .

(E) The high-ranking officers generally have no offensive spirit. . . .

(F) Insufficient trucks and animals have been provided. [Stilwell asked that the Generalissimo issue the necessary corrective orders in the most forceful manner, and closed by

warning that] It is too late already for half measures, or further delays; where a few months

ago corrective measures could have been taken in an orderly manner, it is now too late for

any but the most drastic and thorough-going action.17

The Generalissimo took this candor in good part. He promised 50,000

replacements to bring the Y-Force up to strength, plus extra rations to meet

the problem of malnutrition. The Chinese leader's cordiality was marked.18 It

16

 (1) Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. X. (2) The Stilwell Papers, pp. 237-38. (3) In his Black

Book, 6 November 1943, Stilwell wrote: "Is this real cooperation, or am I going goofy? . . . The catch is probably that he's willing but the blocking backs in the War Ministry will throw us for a loss. But just now, we are all honey and sweetness." 17

 Memo, Stilwell for Generalissimo, 5 Nov 43. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. 18

 The Stilwell Papers, pp. 237-38.
SEXTANT: THE WATERSHED 57

extended to Stilwell's suggestions for the Chinese proposals to be offered at

SEXTANT. Possibly Stilwell hoped that if the Chinese leader offered such a program to the President and the Prime Minister, the Generalissimo himself

would be obliged to adhere to it. And, faithful to the "bargaining" policy that

he always wanted to follow, Stilwell spelled out what China should expect of

her Allies if she did her part.

MEMORANDUM: His Excellency, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

PROPOSALS FOR COMING CONFERENCE

The Generalissimo's program is to bring up to effective strength, equip, and train 90 combat

divisions, in 3 groups of thirty each, and 1 or 2 armored divisions.

1. The first group consists of the divisions in India, and those assigned to the Y-force in

Yunnan Province. These divisions should be at full strength by January 1, and by that date

satisfactorily equipped. . . .

2. The second group of thirty divisions has been designated [note that these are suggested proposals to be adopted by the Generalissimo, not a recital of accomplished facts] and

a school has been set up. . . . With a road to India open, [the second thirty divisions]

should be re-equipped and ready for the field in August of 1944.

3. A similar process will be followed with the third group of 30 divisions with target date

of January 1, 1945. After the reopening of communications through Burma, 1 or 2 armored

divisions will be organized.

4. All resources available in China will be used to produce effective combat units.

Trained men of existing units will be made available as fillers.

5. China will participate according to the agreed plan in the recapture of Burma by

attacks from Ledo with the X-force [Ledo force] and from Paoshan with the Yunnan force.

This operation will be supported by naval action in the Bay of Bengal. Before the operation,

British naval forces should be concentrated in time and fully prepared for action.

6. The training program will be followed and intensified.

7. Necessary airfields will be built and maintained.

8. In the event that communications are reopened through Burma and necessary equipment is supplied, an operation will be conducted to seize the Canton-Hongkong area and

open communication by sea.

The Generalissimo expects that:

1. Before the 1944 rainy season an all-out effort will be made by the Allies to re-open

communications through Burma to China, using land, air, and naval forces.

2. The U.S.A. will supply the equipment for the three groups of 30 divisions, and the

armored divisions.

3. The Fourteenth U.S. Air Force will be maintained as agreed and supplied sufficiently

to allow of sustained operations.

4. The Chinese Air Force will be built up promptly to 2 groups of fighters, 1 group of

medium bombers, 1 reconnaissance squadron, and 1 transport squadron, and maintained at

that strength. By August of 1944 a third group of fighters, and a group of heavy bombardment will be added and maintained thereafter.

5. Following the seizure of the Canton-Hongkong area, the U.S. will put 10 infantry

divisions, 3 armored divisions and appropriate auxiliary units into South China for operations against Central and North China. Contingent upon this allocation of troops, the

Generalissimo will appoint American command of those units of the combined U.S. Chinese

[sic] forces which are designated in the order of battle, under his general direction.
58 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

6. The U.S. will, at the earliest practicable time, put long-range bombing units in China

to operate against the Japanese mainland.

7. The ferry route will be maintained at a capacity of at least 10,000 tons a month.

8. Training personnel will be supplied as required.

9. Medical personnel will be supplied for the second and third groups of divisions.

For the Generalissimo,

JOSEPH W. STILWELL, Joint Chief of Staff for Generalissimo.19

Stilwell thus proposed that the Generalissimo ask the United States to train

and equip no less than ninety Chinese divisions. So imposing a force would

dominate Asia south of the Amur River. Only the Red Army in Siberia could

have faced it, and even then, the issue would have been uncertain. The Generalissimo was apparently favorably impressed by Stilwell's suggestions, for many

of them were offered on behalf of China at the SEXTANT Conference.20

Confirming the Generalissimo's cordiality, Madame Chiang telephoned

Stilwell that night. She told the American general that the Generalissimo was

"not only pleased but happy," over his conference with Stilwell.21 On

7 November Stilwell saw the Chinese Chief of Staff, Gen. Ho Ying-chin, who

was not encouraging about replacements, but presumably General Ho had not

yet received orders from the Generalissimo.22

Four days later, on 11 November, General Stilwell, General Hearn, and Col.

John E. McCammon, G-3, Chungking, met with General Ho and two of his

staff at the Chinese National Military Council to receive the Generalissimo's

formal answer to Stilwell's 5 November memorandum. The National Military

Council agreed to a converging attack on Burma by British and Chinese troops

but desired to hold their own advance until the British were actually attacking

Kalewa in Burma. On replacements, the Chinese said that 35,000 were en route

to Yunnan. In addition, 54,000 more men would be sent. To move them, the

Chinese would need motor fuel, which Stilwell promptly undertook to furnish.

The Chinese agreed to provide more food for the Y-Force. Their medical needs

were presented. The questions of interpreters, spare parts, artillery horses, and

7.92-mm. ammunition were all presented affirmatively and solutions speedily

agreed on by both sides.23 Simultaneously with these conferences on military

matters Stilwell found time to talk with General Hurley, now in Chungking on

behalf of the President to arrange for the Generalissimo's visit to Cairo. General Hurley made an excellent impression on Stilwell, who enjoyed Hurley's

anecdotes and his comments on Allied powers and personages. For his part,

19

 Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. 20

 That the Generalissimo returned a written answer is implied in The Stilwell Papers, p. 240.

However, the authors have not been able to find it. 21

 The Stilwell Papers, p. 236. 22

 Ibid., p. 238. 23

 Notes, Conf, NMC, 11 Nov 43. Marginal notes show action directed for Americans. Stilwell

Documents, Hoover Library.
SEXTANT: THE WATERSHED 59

Hurley liked the outspoken, acidly witty Stilwell, and the two men got on very

well.24 In speaking to the Generalissimo, Hurley gave a brief review of U.S.

policy, which included "belief in a "free, strong, democratic China, predominant

in Asia."

 25

Thus, on the eve of SEXTANT the opportunity of creating an effective SinoAmerican effort in Asia seemed to exist. In October Stilwell's diaries showed

the utmost skepticism about the Generalissimo's desire to reform his Army and

use it aggressively against the Japanese. But now the Generalissimo was again

receiving Stilwell's views, he was considering them favorably, and he was overruling his subordinates and ordering them to take action, a changed attitude

which can be seen in the great difference of General Ho's expressions of 7 November from those of 11 November. For his part, as the marginal notes on the

11 November minutes show, Stilwell was meeting every Chinese proposal and

promise with appropriate orders to his own people. If this atmosphere persisted, Stilwell and the War Department might be moved to re-examine their

conclusions of October and November 1943.

The issue of Sino-American relations was about to move out of Stilwell's

hands into those of his superiors, the President, the Prime Minister, and the

Generalissimo. At SEXTANT it would be up to the United States and the British

Commonwealth to abide by the pledge of TRIDENT that nothing would be left

undone to relieve the siege of China. If the President and the Prime Minister

made good on the plans for a major Allied operation in Burma, Sino-American

co-operation could flourish. If, however, the Generalissimo was given reason

to be dissatisfied with what he received from the President and the Prime Minister, then Stilwell's position would be compromised. If the bases of SinoAmerican co-operation were not present, Stilwell's personal efforts could do

little to remedy the situation.

Presenting CHAMPION at Cairo

With General Hurley in Chungking, the myriad details attendant on the

flight to Cairo of the Generalissimo, Madame Chiang, and their entourage

were speedily worked out. It was agreed among the powers that Mr. Roosevelt

and Mr. Churchill would meet the Chinese leader in late November and then

confer with Marshal Stalin in Tehran, Iran. The Combined Chiefs of Staff

would be present and so would Admiral Mountbatten and Generals Stilwell,

Chennault, and Wedemeyer.

Stilwell arrived at Cairo on 20 November. The following day he was able

to see General Marshall in company with General Hurley and General Somer24

 The Stilwell diaries of this period have several appreciative comments on General Hurley. Hurley's recollections of his first meetings with General Stilwell were given to the authors. Intervs with Gen Hurley, Jan 49, Feb 50. 25

 The Stilwell Papers, pp. 238-40.
60 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

CAIRO CONFERENCE participants were, left to right front, Generalissimo Chiang

Kai-shek, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Madame Chiang, and,

standing left to right, Gen, Shang Chen, Lt. Gen. Lin Wei, General Somervell, General

Stilwell, General Arnold, Field Marshall Sir John Dill, Admiral Mountbatten, and

Maj. Gen. Adrian Carton de Wiart.

vell of Army Service Forces. Stilwell was anxious to raise many points with

Marshall, presumably before the conferences began. His notebook records

them:

Min[ister] of War. (replace [Gen Ho Ying-chin]). U.S. command after Pacific port

[is opened]. 90 divisions. Offensive-defensive alliance. SEAC ambitions [to absorb CBI Theater]. Mountbatten wants me out. U.S. command of U.S. units. After CHAMPION? Future

[of] CBI. Louis [Mountbatten]: (1) Wants authority over ATC so as to "protect" it; (2) Wants

China air plans for '44 and '45; (3) Wants responsibility for operation of Burma Road; (4)

Liaison with Miles [U.S. Naval Observer Group in China]; (5) De Wiart [British liaison

to Generalissimo] in our hqs; (6) Liaison offs [officers] with Chinese [divisions]; (7)

Wants to absorb Rear Echelon; (8) Squadron of Spitfires to China; (9) Air staff mission;

(10) Medical mission.

Claims GCM [Marshall] and Arnold told him to integrate [the Anglo-American air

forces in India].

The plan for CHAMPION: Piece meal; indefinite objective; Indaw abortion. No problem.
SEXTANT: THE WATERSHED 61

UTOPIA [seizure of Andaman Islands] abortion, no bearing; leaves Chinese to hold sack;

no British troops—unreliable Indian troops.26

Whether Stilwell presented these points at one session, or how Marshall

reacted to them, is unknown. In his talk with Marshall, Hurley, and Somervell, Stilwell was warned that the President highly disapproved of his disrespectful references to the Generalissimo.27

The first plenary session of SEXTANT was set for 1100, 23 November 1943.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff met briefly with Stilwell and Wedemeyer before the

plenary session to receive their comments on CHAMPION, SEAC's plan for

Burma. No attempt was made to weigh the plan of CHAMPION, which had

been adopted over Stilwell's objections. Of the airborne operation, he remarked

that he saw no point in cutting Hump tonnage just to drop a division in the

jungle during the rains. Stilwell did not think the Japanese line of communications to Myitkyina a vital one and did not want it blocked at the expense of

Hump tonnage (which would embarrass his relations with the Generalissimo

and Chennault). However, Stilwell pledged that once CHAMPION began, he

would do his best to carry it out. Wedemeyer commented that while CHAMPION did provide attacks on all key points, he did not particularly care for the

Arakan situation, in which two divisions plus two brigades were given only

the most limited objectives, for he mistakenly believed they faced but two Japanese regiments. Actually, the Japanese 54th Division was then moving up to

join the 55th in the Arakan.

Stilwell's comments prefaced his presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

of the Generalissimo's and his proposals for China Theater, based on Stilwell's

paper, Proposals for the Coming Conference. The Generalissimo called for occupation of north Burma, intensive training of the Chinese Army, and improvement of the line of communications to China. He desired B-29 operations from China Theater in early 1944, air attacks in the Formosa-Luzon area

in October 1944 to support U.S. naval operations in that area, the taking of

Canton and Hong Kong in November 1944-May 1945, and an attack on Formosa from Chinese ports, if required. The paper was most significant because

it had the Generalissimo's approval. This was, so Marshall said, the first time

since the war began that the Generalissimo had shown an active interest in the

improvement and employment of his Army. General Marshall and Admiral

Ernest J. King, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, thought this attitude extremely

important and not to be discouraged if at all possible.28 After this session

26

 (1) These jottings are from one of Stilwell's notebooks of the type in which he kept his diary. This one is labeled Data, and is hereafter cited as Data Notebook. At the top of the page on which these entries begin, Stilwell wrote "GCM" in bold letters. (2) Stilwell's fears about

Mountbatten's attempts to whittle away his authority in India and China are also expressed in Rad

AGWAR 863, Stilwell to Marshall, 11 Nov 43. Item 1234, Bk 4, JWS Personal File. 27

 The Stilwell Papers, p. 245. 28

 (1) See pp. 57-58, above. (2) Min, JCS 128th Mtg, 23 Nov 43, Item 2. (3) CCS 405, 22 Nov 43, sub: Role of China in Defeat of Japan. (4) Japanese Study 89.
62 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

closed, the American service chiefs joined their colleagues and superiors for the

plenary session.

Admiral Mountbatten had expected CHAMPION to be first presented to the

British Chiefs of Staff by himself, and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by General

Wedemeyer. On their approving it, CHAMPION would go to the Combined

Chiefs of Staff, and if they concurred, be presented to the Generalissimo, the

President, and the Prime Minister as an agreed-on CCS proposal. This was the

usual practice in such cases, but at SEXTANT it was reversed. The Generalissimo was present, though unfortunately for security reasons his arrival was not

announced in advance, so neither the President nor the Prime Minister had

been at the airport to greet him and Madame Chiang. This was a blow

to Chinese pride.

Because the Generalissimo was at hand, and because Roosevelt and Churchill wanted him to enter immediately into military discussions, the SEAC plan

was laid before the Generalissimo at once, and therefore without its having

been considered by the CCS. Thus, the Generalissimo was being asked to approve CHAMPION in advance of its approval by the Allies.

As presented formally to the three Allied statesmen, to Harry L. Hopkins,

Madame Chiang, and the highest service advisers, CHAMPION'S first phase

called for the advance of the Chinese 22d and 38th Divisions from Ledo, an

operation then under way. In mid-January 1944, 15 Corps would move forward in the Arakan to take up an improved line, and would exploit any success that might be gained. At the same time 4 Corps would advance on Mawlaik, Minthami, and Sittaung, driving southeast as far as possible. In February

1944 three long-range penetration groups would attack. Paratroops would seize

Indaw in mid-March after which the 26th Indian Division would fly in to hold

it.29 A major amphibious operation would be staged in the Bay of Bengal. For

security reasons, the amphibious operation was not further described to the

Chinese. As for weather, Mountbatten hoped to end his advance by early April

when the monsoon rains would break. During the monsoon, the long-range

penetration groups would operate, and if the CCS gave the needed resources,

the advance would resume after the monsoon's end. The rains were expected

to prevent a Japanese reaction.30

The Chinese, apprised of CHAMPION weeks before by Stilwell, were immediately critical. The Generalissimo did not believe that 15 and 4 Corps were

intended to advance far enough into Burma; he wanted them to drive on Mandalay. He insisted that the advance must be synchronized with a naval operation. But the Generalissimo's argument for a naval operation was now affected

by a sovereign fact which he disregarded. The Japanese were known by the

SEXTANT conferees to have completed a railway from Thailand to Burma which

29

 (1) SEAC War Diary, 23 Nov 43. (2) Min, SEXTANT Conf, First Plenary Mtg, Villa Kirk,

23 Nov 43. (3) Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), p. 460. 30

 (1) Min, CCS 129th Mtg, 24 Nov 43, Item 5. (2) CCS Info Memo 166, 18 Dec 43.
SEXTANT: THE WATERSHED 63

made them independent of imports through Rangoon. The Generalissimo also

insisted that whatever the demands of Burma operations the Hump lift must

not fall below 10,000 tons a month. A day later Chennault gave the monthly

requirements of the Chinese Air Force and the Fourteenth Air Force, 10,000

tons a month. Asked by General Arnold what that would leave for the Chinese

Army in China, which had a major role to play in the reconquest of Burma,

General Chennault simply replied that 10,000 tons was what he needed.31

Trying To Reach Agreement

These viewpoints having all been expressed, the conferees had two delicate

tasks to handle simultaneously: to settle on a plan and to secure the Generalissimo's assent to it. Reversing the usual process by which plans were approved,

in order to spare the Generalissimo's feelings, was leading into ever more

tangled thickets. Mountbatten was sent to the Generalissimo's villa to explain

that if the offensive toward Mandalay which the Chinese leader desired was

carried out, it would entail diversion of all Hump tonnage. "Welcome change

from telling me to fix it up," wrote Stilwell.32

As Admiral Mountbatten tried to explain the situation, the Generalissimo

grew enthusiastic and announced he would press for both an airborne assault

on Mandalay and 10,000 tons a month over the Hump, which would require

an added 535 transports sent to India. Mountbatten finally escaped by saying

that he would lay the Generalissimo's wishes before the CCS to see if they

could find the 535 transports, which Mountbatten knew were nowhere to be

had. The CCS formally stated that the 535 aircraft could not be found, and in

view of the uncertainty surrounding the Generalissimo's attitude, Mountbatten was asked to obtain his formal agreement to go back into Burma.33

While Mountbatten, aided by Churchill, was essaying this task, Stilwell

went with Marshall on 25 November to confer with the President. Before the

interview Stilwell noted what he wanted to say to the President about the problems that faced him in China: "Ask FDR: Field chief of staff [to Generalissimo], can [have]: (1) Man power; (2) Executive authority; (3) U.S. troops;

(4) Chinese-American command. Keep X-force, add one corps [as a force directly under Stilwell's command]"

 34

Preparing for his interview with the President, Stilwell sketched a point he

wanted to make:

31

 (1) Min cited n. 29(2). (2) Min, CCS 129th Mtg, 24 Nov 43, Item 7. 32 (1) The Stilwell Papers, p. 246. (2) SEAC War Diary, 24 Nov 43. 33 (1) SEAC War Diary, 24 Nov 43. (2) Min, CCS 130th Mtg, 25 Nov 43, Item 1.

34

 Data Notebook. A little earlier in the Data Notebook, in the first version of his notes for the conference with the President, Stilwell put it: "FDR. Recommendations. Private army of one corps. Keep X-Force and add one in China. Recommend to Peanut more power for me. Field Chief of

Staff. Oust running dog. FDR. My mission complicated by not knowing what direct messages

[from Roosevelt to Chiang] contain No bargaining power. (TWILIGHT)."
64 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

No matter what Peanut agrees to, if something is not done about the Chinese high command the effort is wasted. I suggest stipulation of U.S. command, with real executive authority. If impossible over large group, then over composite Chinese-American corps. Lack

of real power and control of Gmo. He will order. Kan pu will block. Suggest new Minister

of War or thorough re-organization of [Chinese] War Department. Or American take over the

first 30 complete and operate them [Stilwell's italics].35

Stilwell and Marshall entered the President's room, and Stilwell began his

presentation. The President seemed to hear him with "little attention" and in

the middle of Stilwell's report broke in to talk about the Andaman Islands, on

which he wanted to put some heavy bombers. Trying to bring the discussion

back to China's problems, Stilwell pled for some U.S. combat troops in CBI.

In reply, the President offered to put a brigade of U.S. Marines in Chungking.

"Marines are well known," said the President. "They've been all over China,

to Peking and Shanghai and everywhere. The Army has only been in Tientsin."

Stilwell told the President that the Chinese had reneged on their agreements, that to carry out his mission he needed more power and executive authority over Chinese troops. Stilwell also dwelt on the "basic factors of our

presence" in China, that is, the Chinese were to supply the men while the

Americans supplied weapons and training. The President, though promising to

speak to the Generalissimo at once on these points, seemed to show little

interest.36

The President's attitude depressed Stilwell, but the conference was not all

negative. Mr. Roosevelt stated that the Generalissimo had agreed to CHAMPION.37

 Then came bigger news. An American corps was out of the question,

but the Chinese could have equipment for ninety divisions and could help occupy Japan. At the JCS meeting that day General Marshall had remarked that

there was pressure on the President to give the Generalissimo something to

show as a result of his trip, that the President had been spoken to about arming the third thirty divisions but had postponed any definite commitment,

though Roosevelt had made it clear the United States intended eventually to

equip ninety Chinese divisions.38 Now the President told the Generalissimo's

joint chief of staff of the ninety-division intention, and Stilwell duly listed it

among the "Cairo results."

 39

Returning to his quarters, Stilwell took the notes he had prepared for his

35

 Data Notebook. 36

 (1) Handwritten pages headed Story of J. Peene, Sr. (Hereafter, Story of J. Peene, Sr.) Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. (2) Joseph Peene was General Stilwell's maternal grandfather. Mr. Peene was famous in family tradition for paying his employees in gold pieces. Because the Gen- eralissimo later asked the President for $1,000,000,000 gold the event may have reminded the sometimes waggish Stilwell of this episode from the days of the gold standard. See letter, Mrs. Winifred A. Stilwell to Sunderland, 4 August 1952. OCMH. (3) The Stilwell Papers, p. 246. 37

 The Stilwell Papers, p. 246. 38

 (1) Story of J. Peene, Sr. The exact wording is: "What shall we give the Chinese? Equip.

for 90 XX [divisions]. But the American Corps is out, and we give them Japan. What a laugh

for the Japs." (2) Min, JCS 130th Mtg, 25 Nov 43, Item 6. 39

 Data Notebook.
SEXTANT: THE WATERSHED 65

talk with the President, drew a line diagonally across the page and wrote above

them: "NB: FDR is not interested."

 40

While Stilwell was preparing to meet with the President, Mountbatten and

the Prime Minister attempted to secure a firm assent from the Generalissimo to

CHAMPION. Initially, as the President told Stilwell, they succeeded. On the

early afternoon of 25 November the Generalissimo agreed to go into Burma

on two conditions: that the Royal Navy's Eastern Fleet command the Bay of

Bengal, and that an amphibious operation be mounted there. That evening

the Generalissimo met again with the President and reversed himself on every

point.

Mountbatten was again sent into action to restore the situation but found

the Generalissimo obdurate. So Mountbatten turned to Churchill, had lunch

with him, and the Prime Minister agreed that he with the President and

Madame Chiang would try to bring the Generalissimo round. The Allied leaders met the afternoon of the 26th at tea, unfortunately with neither secretaries

nor minutes. After tea the Prime Minister and Madame Chiang separately told

Mountbatten that the Generalissimo had agreed on every point. Such was the

situation when Churchill and Roosevelt with their key advisers departed for

Tehran, and the Generalissimo prepared to go to Chungking. For the first time

in the war, the Prime Minister, the President, and the CCS had met the Generalissimo and endeavored to secure a binding agreement from him. "They

have been driven absolutely mad," wrote Admiral Mountbatten, "and I shall

certainly get far more sympathy from the former in the future."

 41

With the dignitaries out of the way, Admiral Mountbatten called a meeting of the SEAC delegation on 27 November to clear up the loose ends. He

felt "staggered" when Stilwell came in to tell him that just before departing

that morning the Generalissimo had reversed himself again, rejected all his

previous agreements, and ordered Stilwell as the latter put it, to "stay and protest. I am to stick out for TOREADOR [the airborne assault on Mandalay] and

10,000 tons [a month over the Hump]."

 42

 Mountbatten thought quickly. He

had arranged to inspect the Ramgarh Training Center together with the Generalissimo in a few days and believed that if he had the elusive Chinese leader

to himself for a few minutes he might succeed in getting a binding agreement

from him. So he became diplomatically deaf, told Stilwell he had not understood him, and asked that a radio be sent to him at New Delhi.43

Summing up the SEXTANT Conference at that point, Stilwell asked himself: "So where are we? TARZAN? Tonnage? Command? Sure on equipment for

90 divisions. . . ."

 44

40

 Ibid. 41

 (1) Extracts, SAC's Personal Diary, 25, 26, 27 Nov 43; quotation from Extract, 27 Nov 43. SEAC War Diary. (2) The Stilwell Papers, p. 246. 42

 (1) SEAC War Diary, 27 Nov 43. (2) Stilwell Diary, 27 Nov 43. 43

 SEAC War Diary, 27 Nov 43. 44

 Stilwell Diary, 27 Nov 43.
66 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Thus, of the two delicate and simultaneous operations, the agreement and

the plan, one had not been brought off. Nor was there agreement between the

President, the Prime Minister, the CCS, and the JCS on future operations in

SEAC. Churchill early indicated his attitude by telling Admiral Mountbatten

on 21 November that he meant to have a landing on Sumatra or nothing, that

if there was no such operation, he would take away SEAC's landing craft for

an operation against the island of Rhodes in the Mediterranean.45 A few days

later Marshall remarked that Roosevelt had expressed his opposition to any

diversion of Royal Navy landing craft from BUCCANEER (now the code name

for the Andamans operation which was to meet the Generalissimo's longstanding demand for an amphibious operation). This expression also was the

view of the Joint Chiefs, who were strong for BUCCANEER. In a conference at

Tehran between the President and the JCS, it was observed that the British

would do all they could to cancel BUCCANEER for an operation against Rhodes.

The President quickly replied that the Allies were obligated to the Chinese to

stage BUCCANEER, an attitude which suggests that he was unaware of the Generalissimo's final reversal. However, at the first CCS session at Tehran the

British Chiefs of Staff urged the abandonment of BUCCANEER, and it remained

to be seen whose view would prevail.46

While the President was at Tehran, the Cairo Declaration was issued by the

President and the Prime Minister as a joint pronouncement of the United

States, the British Commonwealth, and China. In sharp contrast to the actual

course of events at SEXTANT, the declaration read: "The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three

Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their

brutal enemies by land, and sea. This pressure is already rising." The declaration went on to pledge the return of Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores

to China, and that Korea should be free and independent. It then concluded:

"With these objects in view, the three Allies, in harmony with those of the

United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious

and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of

Japan."

 47

While the President and Prime Minister were meeting with Marshal Stalin

at Tehran, the Generalissimo again changed his mind about Burma operations.

While inspecting the Chinese New First Army at Ramgarh on 30 November,

he again agreed to join in CHAMPION. He confirmed his resolve in a speech to

the Chinese soldiers, placing them under Mountbatten and Stilwell for the

coming operations.

45

 SEAC War Diary, 21 Nov 43. 46

 (1) Min, JCS 131st Mtg, 26 Nov 43, Item 3. (2) Min, Mtg of President and JCS, American Legation, 28 Nov 43. (3) Min, CCS 131st Mtg, 26 Nov 43, Item 4. (4) Min, CCS 132d Mtg, 30

Nov 43. 47

 U.S. Department of State, United States Relations With China (Washington, 1949) p. 519.
SEXTANT: THE WATERSHED 67

CHIANG KAI-SHEK AT RAMGARH. Accompanied by Madame Chiang and

Admiral Mountbatten the Generalissimo inspects the Chinese New First Army.

I feel greatly inspired today as I am here with you, officers and men, at this post. Being

able to speak to you in a friendly land, is indeed, a rare opportunity. You must pay full attention to every word I say and bear it firmly in your mind. It shall serve as a moral encouragement for your endeavor to glorify our nation by adding a glorious page to the history of our national army. Now that our National Army is enabled to come over to India as

a combined combat strength with our worthy allies, [it?] has already registered an illustrious page in our national annals.

It is also your good fortune that you are placed under the joint command of Admiral

Lord Louis Mountbatten and General Joseph W. Stilwell, respectively supreme commander

and deputy supreme commander of S.E. Asia Command. My expectation of the New First

Army is for you to accomplish this worthy mission. My meeting with you here today is just

like a family reunion which imparts profound attachment to both father and sons. It is therefore your duty to listen to my words as follows [here, the Generalissimo encouraged his

troops to fight well for China]. I exhort you to keep my words. Unitedly under the joint

command of Admiral Lord Mountbatten and General Stilwell you shall destroy the

enemy. . . .48

Over the Watershed: The Changed Attitude Toward China

At Tehran the President met Marshal Stalin for the first time. Explaining

his China strategy, the President spoke of converging attacks on north Burma, 48

 Address, Generalissimo to Chinese New First Army in India, 30 Nov 43. JWS Misc Papers, 1943. (See Bibliographical Note.)
68 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

and of amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal. The goal was to open the

road to China and supply China so that it would stay in the war and, also, to

put the Allies in a position to bomb Japan from Chinese bases. Marshal Stalin

expressed no opposition to this, and, indeed, repeated his earlier promises to

enter the war against Japan.49

After meeting and conferring with Marshal Stalin, the President, in the

opinion of Robert E. Sherwood, arrived at certain conclusions with regard to

the Soviet Union and its leader:

Roosevelt now felt sure that, to use his own term, Stalin was "getatable," despite his

bludgeoning tactics and his attitude of cynicism toward such matters as the rights of small

nations, and that when Russia could be convinced that her legitimate claims and requirements—such as the right to access to warm water ports—were to be given full recognition,

she would prove tractable and co-operative in maintaining the peace of the postwar world.

If, therefore, good relations could be established with the Soviet Union, all the

pieces of the postwar puzzle would fall into place. In the immediate present

there was no doubt of what the Soviet Union wanted—a cross-Channel assault

(OVERLORD) and a landing on the coast of southern France (ANVIL) as soon

as possible and on as big a scale as possible.50 The President, therefore, would

weigh operations in Southeast Asia in an atmosphere very different from that

of the first conferences in Cairo a few days before. Such was the situation when

the President, the Prime Minister, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff finished

at Tehran and returned to Cairo.

Mr. Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff immediately attacked BUCCANEER. Churchill took the Stalin promise to enter the war with Japan as a

stunning surprise that changed the whole strategic picture. He called it a decisive event. Soviet entry in the Pacific war would give the Allies better bases

than China ever could. In the light of Stalin's promise, operations in Southeast Asia lost much of their value. In this connection, he was astounded by

SEAC's requirements for BUCCANEER, which he understood to be 58,000 men

to oppose 5,000 Japanese. The other decisive event, said Churchill, was setting

the date for OVERLORD. Nothing anywhere should interfere with that great

operation. The proper course, the Prime Minister argued, was to cancel BUCCANEER and use its landing craft to reinforce the amphibious assault on southern France, ANVIL.51

The Prime Minister's pleased surprise at Marshal Stalin's promise to enter

the Pacific war and his argument that because of it the strategic picture in the

Pacific had changed since the first Cairo meetings were difficult to reconcile

with the circumstance that the Soviet Union originally promised to enter the

49

 (1) Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper &

Brothers, 1948) pp. 778-79. (2) CM-IN 1946, Ambassador W. Averell Harriman to Marshall, 4 Nov 43. 50

 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 788, 798-99. 51

 Min, SEXTANT Conf, Third Plenary Mtg, Villa Kirk, 4 Dec 43.
SEXTANT: THE WATERSHED 69

Pacific war in October 1943 at the Moscow Conference and repeated its promises in November.52

At some point during these post-Tehran discussions of BUCCANEER, a radio

from General Boatner in north Burma to theater headquarters in New Delhi,

detailing at length the command problems he had met with the Chinese, arrived at Cairo. By mischance, it had been so forwarded, and was then delivered

to the SEAC delegation. Circulated as an admission by Stilwell's own headquarters that even U.S.-trained Chinese troops were unreliable the radio was a

telling argument against any campaign that depended on the Chinese in any

capacity.53

Mr. Roosevelt with Admiral King and Admiral William D. Leahy, the

President's Chief of Staff, held that there was a definite commitment to the

Generalissimo, and that a whole train of unhappy consequences might follow

if China's allies broke their promise. He had a moral obligation to the Chinese,

Roosevelt remarked, and could not forego the operation without a great and

readily apparent reason. There the 4 December session ended, with a directive

from the President and Prime Minister to the Combined Chiefs to try to find

agreement on that basis.54 The JCS met at 0900 on 5 December and found

themselves still in accord on the need to execute BUCCANEER.

The Combined Chiefs met at 1030. General Marshall drew attention to a new

strategic factor which had arisen since TRIDENT. The blast of world-wide

publicity following SEAC's creation had attracted heavy Japanese reinforcements to Burma which would seize the initiative unless the Allies struck first.

Marshall feared that such a Japanese offensive would imperil the Hump route.

If it would be possible to abandon BUCCANEER and still carry out the North

Burma Campaign, Marshall would not be seriously disturbed, but he did not

think there would be a Burma campaign unless there was an amphibious operation. Admiral Leahy remarked briefly that canceling the amphibious operation

meant either the failure or the abandonment of the Burma campaign.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Brooke, and Air Chief

Marshal Sir Charles Portal repeated the arguments that BUCCANEER was a

diversion from the main effort in Europe and that the Chinese contribution was

a negligible factor. They also noted that the main effort against Japan was now

to be made in the Pacific, which was inconsistent with a heavy allocation of

resources to Burma. The meeting ended with a decision to present the various

points in dispute to the President and the Prime Minister.55

Mr. Roosevelt opened the plenary session by pointing out that BUCCANEER

was the dividing issue between the staffs. He acknowledged that the Gen- 52

 The original statement was made by Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov to Cor- dell Hull at Moscow and confirmed shortly after by Molotov to Harriman, who promptly relayed

it to General Marshall. (1) Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948) II, 1309. (2) Rad cited n. 49(2).

53

 (1) Story of J. Peene, Sr. (2) Ltr, Hill to Ward, 2 Sep 52. OCMH. 54

 (1) Min cited n. 51. (2) Min, CCS 134th Mtg, 4 Dec 43, Item 4. 55

 Min, CCS 135th Mtg, 5 Dec 43.
70 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

eralissimo had left Cairo believing an amphibious operation would be carried

out with TARZAN, the India-based portion of CHAMPION. The President was

dubious about staking everything on Russian good will, for he feared that the

Allies might sacrifice the esteem of the Chinese without later securing the aid

of the Russians. Admiral King rebutted the argument that BUCCANEER had to

be canceled to secure landing craft for ANVIL by stating that a two-division lift

for ANVIL was in sight and might even be improved upon. This, he went on,

would entail keeping back four months' production from the Pacific.

Though the intimate connection between BUCCANEER and Chinese participation in Burma operations was admitted by all, it was quite clear that many

of those present hoped the Generalissimo would perform his share of the bargain

even though his Allies reneged on theirs. The British were adamant in opposing BUCCANEER as a diversion from OVERLORD, and Churchill made it clear

that he felt no obligations to the Chinese. The meeting ended with an agreement to inquire of SEAC what it could do if the bulk of its landing craft were

taken away.56

So questioned, SEAC quickly replied that canceling BUCCANEER would, in

the light of the Generalissimo's known attitude, lead to the collapse of TARZAN.

In its stead SEAC suggested overland operations from Imphal toward Kalewa

and Kalemyo in Burma (which if successful would be a long step toward

Mandalay), continuation of the advance from Ledo, continuation of the current

operations in the Arakan, and an assault by the long-range penetration groups

at the proper time. SEAC acknowledged that this operation would not open the

land route to China.57 Admiral Leahy described SEAC's estimate of 50,000 men

for BUCCANEER as excessive, but General Wedemeyer replied that a smashing

victory was needed to restore the morale of SEAC's troops and added that all

the resources needed for BUCCANEER, except an added 120 carrier-based fighters,

were in sight. Admiral King immediately said that he might find four or six

escort carriers to fill the gap. But there was still no agreement on BUCCANEER,

and the case went back to the President and the Prime Minister.58

On the night of 5 December Mr. Roosevelt accepted Mr. Churchill's arguments and withdrew his support from BUCCANEER. In abandoning BUCCANEER,

the President overrode the very strongest protests of his service advisers. In his

memoirs, Admiral Leahy wrote:

I felt that we were taking a grave risk. Chiang might drop out of the war. He never had

indicated much faith in British intentions, but had relied on the United States. If the Chinese

quit, the tasks of MacArthur and Nimitz in the Pacific, already difficult, would be much

harder. Japanese man power in great numbers would be released to oppose our advance

toward the mainland of Japan. Fortunately for us, the courageous Chinese stayed in the fight.

56

 Min, SEXTANT Conf, Fifth Plenary Mtg, Villa Kirk, 5 Dec 43. 57

 Rad SEACOS 38, 6 Dec 43. Min, SEXTANT Conf, p. 312. 58

 Min, CCS 136th Mtg, 5 Dec 43, Item 1.
SEXTANT: THE WATERSHED 71

After the war, in writing his memoirs, Admiral King remarked that he had

been "distressed" by the breach of the long-standing promise to the Chinese,

and added that in his opinion this was the only time during the war when the

President had overruled the Joint Chiefs.59

After agreeing to cancel BUCCANEER, the President and Hopkins drafted a

radio to the Generalissimo telling him the bad news. The message was based

on SEAC's estimate that there could be no major amphibious operation if

BUCCANEER was canceled. The estimate was in error, as SEAC soon discovered,

but the two U.S. leaders naturally accepted it, and, consulting Churchill but

not the CCS, told the Generalissimo there could be no successful amphibious

operation simultaneously with TARZAN. They asked him if he would go ahead

without the amphibious operation (it will be recalled that the Chinese had

never been told exactly what sort of operation was contemplated), or would he

wait until November 1944 when there might be a major seaborne landing? In

the meantime, the President suggested, all air transport would be concentrated

on increasing the tonnage flown to China. Roosevelt and Hopkins held out

the "fair prospect of terminating the war with Germany by the end of summer

of 1944," which would release great resources for the Far East. (on the night of

6 December a poll of the CCS revealed that the earliest date any of them would

set for the end of the war in Europe was February 1945, with half of them

guessing it would be spring 1945).60

Stilwell's Search for Guidance

On 6 December Stilwell and his political adviser, John P. Davies, Jr., met

with the President and Hopkins. Stilwell had heard of unfavorable developments and was anxious to know what effect they would have on U.S. policy in

China. Thanks to the rapprochement with the Generalissimo in October, the

American soldier was still joint chief of staff for China Theater, was commanding two divisions of Chinese troops in India and Burma (one of them engaged

in combat), and was commanding general of the U.S. China, Burma and India

Theater. The President's radio could be expected to shock the Generalissimo,

and guidance for Stilwell in the radically changed situation was essential.

For two years the President's declared policy had been to treat China as a

Great Power and make of her a partner in a coalition with Britain, Russia, and

the United States. In the course of this period the President had deferred continually to the Generalissimo's wishes, sometimes against the advice of his

59

 (1) William D. Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950) pp. 213-14. (2) Ernest J. King and Walter Muir

Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1952), p. 525. (3) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 800. 60

 (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 800-801; quotation, p. 801. (2) Arnold, Global

Mission, p. 473.
72 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

service chiefs. Thus, in March 1943, and again in May 1943, he had overruled

them to back General Chennault, explaining his decision by the desperate

urgency of China's need, and the necessity of acknowledging the wishes of the

Generalissimo as Supreme Commander, China Theater.

The President had insisted on China's joining in the diplomatic councils of

the Great Powers and had carried his point just ten weeks before at Moscow.

In the course of the previous two years the United States had made a number

of commitments to China, of which the chief was that of TRIDENT, to break

the blockade of China at the earliest moment. Roosevelt had been a driving

force in these developments and had often expressed his appreciation of the

urgent character of China's needs.

Casablanca, TRIDENT, QUADRANT, had erected an imposing structure of

plans and decisions; an entire new Allied theater, SEAC, under an aggressive

commander, had been created. All these efforts had seemed to be building to a

grand climax, CHAMPION, the culmination of these diplomatic and strategic

efforts. CHAMPION would break the blockade of China, with all the momentous

ensuing consequences.

Now, the situation was changed, in a dramatic reversal, and it was essential

that Stilwell know how the President wanted to meet the situation. The President explained that the conference had come to an impasse and could not be

permitted to end in disagreement. Therefore, he would yield to the British point

of view. The United States and Russia had insisted on OVERLORD, and so, said

the President, Churchill had insisted on giving up TARZAN.61

So much was clear, and Stilwell asked: "I am interested to know how this

affects our policy in China." The President's reply was most indefinite. In

retrospect, it appears that he had not decided what to do about China, and so

Stilwell could not keep the conversation away from Roosevelt family history,

the postwar development of China, and the new, postwar Asia. Stilwell and

Davies prepared minutes of the conversation, and from them, Stilwell tried to

puzzle out just what the President wanted him to do.62

Stilwell concluded that the President's policy was: "Keep China in the war.

We must retain our flank position [vis-à-vis Japan]. If CKS flops, back

somebody else."

 63

But how was all this to be done in the face of BUCCANEER'S cancellation and

the inevitable compromising of Stilwell's position? "Only remarks pertinent to

question," wrote Stilwell, were "If TARZAN is out, we can boost the [Hump]

tonnage. VLR bombers [B-29's] can bomb Japan."

 64

 Several months later

61

 See Story of J. Peene, Sr., atchd illustration. 62

 The Stilwell Papers, page 251, has the text of the conversation. 63

 (1) Story of J. Peene, Sr. (2) Elsewhere, Stilwell gives his impression of the President's wishes as: "Policy: 'We want to help China.'—Period." Stilwell Undated Paper (SUP) 65. (See Bibliographical Note.) 64

 Story of J. Peene, Sr.
SEXTANT: THE WATERSHED 73

Stilwell told Marshall that he had sought guidance at Cairo but had found

none.65 Marshall did not challenge this statement.

Indeed, the President's remarks raised more questions than they answered.

If, under Japanese attack, or economic distress, the Nationalist regime began to

crumble, then, according to the President, the United States would "look for

some other man or group of men, to carry on."

 66

 Whom did the President

have in mind, a dissident war lord like Marshal Li Chi-shen or the Communists? At what point was Stilwell to begin dealing with such people?

Knowing that Stilwell's position in China would be almost impossible after

SEXTANT, Marshall offered him a high post in another theater. Stilwell declined

it.67 Talking with Marshall the day after his interview with the President,

Stilwell learned: "George hopeful about Germany. 'Hang on and keep going.'

Nothing else he could tell me. Everything dangling."

 68

One thing, arms for ninety divisions, might have kept the Generalissimo

from regarding SEXTANT as an utter disappointment. On 10 December Stilwell

attended a meeting to discuss the project.69 Three weeks later, after Stilwell

returned to CBI, Marshall was told by OPD: "The commitment regarding the

Lend-Lease equipping of Chinese divisions the President actually made at

SEXTANT is not known. We are proceeding on the assumption the President

made no commitment on the timing of the flow of equipment."

 70

 Stilwell was

informed accordingly. As for the landing craft that on Churchill's insistence

were taken from SEAC to reinforce ANVIL, several weeks later the British Chiefs

of Staff, supported by the Prime Minister, made the first of several attempts to

have ANVIL canceled for operations elsewhere in the Mediterranean.71

The Generalissimo's answer to the President's radio telling him of

BUCCANEER'S cancellation was awaited anxiously, for SEAC could have no CCS

directive on amphibious operations until it was known how the Chinese would

react to the disappointment. Discussion of future operations continued while

the CCS awaited his reply. General Marshall suggested that the land operations

outlined by SEAC might well be undertaken by the Chinese advancing from

Yunnan and screened by the U.S. long-range penetration groups directed at

Quebec, with some of the troops released by BUCCANEER forming a reserve.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff countered with the proposal that

Mountbatten's new mission should be to guard Assam by active offensive

operations.72

65

 CM-IN 4651, Stilwell to Marshall, 7 Mar 44.

66

 The Stilwell Papers, p. 252, quoting Roosevelt.

67

 Interv with Marshall, 6 Jul 49.

68

 Stilwell Diary, 7 Dec 43. 69

 Stilwell Diary, 10 Dec 43. 70

 Memo, Handy for Marshall, 31 Dec 43, sub: Equipping Chinese Divs, sent as CM-OUT

11706, Marshall to Sultan for Stilwell, 31 Dec 43. 71

 Ltr, Lt Gen Frederick E. Morgan, COSSAC, to Secy, COS, 6 Jan 44. COSSAC (44) 5, AFHQ

G-3 File, OCMH. Also published as CCS 446/1, 8 Jan 44, sub: Three Div Lift for ANVIL. ABC

384 (Europe) 1 Mar 43, Sec 2A, A48-224. 72

 Min, CCS 138th Mtg, 7 Dec 43.
74 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Meanwhile, Stilwell sent a radio to General Hearn in Chungking, ordering

Hearn to see the Generalissimo and urge him to go ahead with his share of the

campaign, regardless of BUCCANEER'S cancellation.73 This action was consistent

with Stilwell's often expressed view that seizure of the Andaman Islands contributed nothing to operations in Burma. His reasoning was supported by the

facts that the Japanese had opened a railway to Thailand, so that they no longer

depended on the port of Rangoon, and that airfields on the Andamans were

only 100 miles closer to Rangoon than those already in Allied hands, so that

their possession would not be decisive in air operations against Rangoon, even

if such were of vital importance.

When the Generalissimo's answer to the President arrived at Cairo on

9 December, it spoke in ominous tones:

I have received your telegram of December Sixth. Upon my return I asked Madame

Chiang to inform you of the gratifying effect the communique of the Cairo Conference has

had on the Chinese army and people in uplifting their morale to continue active resistance

against Japan. This letter is on the way and is being brought to you by the pilot, Captain

Shelton.

First, prior to the Cairo Conference there had been disturbing elements voicing their

discontent and uncertainty of America and Great Britain's attitude in waging a global war

and at the same time leaving China to shift as best she could against our common enemy.

At one stroke the Cairo communique decisively swept away this suspicion in that we three

had jointly and publicly pledged to launch a joint all-out offensive in the Pacific.

Second, if it should now be known to the Chinese army and people that a radical change

of policy and strategy is being contemplated, the repercussions would be so disheartening

that I fear of the consequences of China's inability to hold out much longer.

Third, I am aware and appreciate your being influenced by the probable tremendous

advantages to be reaped by China as well as by the United Nations as a whole in speedily

defeating Germany first. For the victory of one theater of war necessarily affects all other

theaters; on the other hand, the collapse of the China theater would have equally grave

consequences on the global war. I have therefore come to this conclusion that in order to

save this grave situation, I am inclined to accept your recommendation. You will doubtless

realize that in so doing my task in rallying the nation to continue resistance is being made

infinitely more difficult.

(1) Because the danger to the China theater lies not only in the inferiority of our military

strength, but also, and more especially, in our critical economic condition which may seriously affect the morale of the army and people, and cause at any moment a sudden collapse

of the entire front. Judging from the present critical situation, military as well as economic,

it would be impossible for us to hold on for six months, and a fortiori to wait till November

1944. In my last conversation with you I stated that China's economic situation was more

critical than the military. The only seeming solution is to assure the Chinese people and

army of your sincere concern in the China theater of war by assisting China to hold on with

a billion gold dollar loan to strengthen her economic front and relieve her dire economic

needs. Simultaneously, in order to prove our resolute determination to bring relentless pressure on Japan, the Chinese air force and the American air force stationed in China should be

increased, as from next spring, by at least double the number of aircraft already agreed upon,

and the total of air transportation should be increased, as from February of next year, to at

least 20,000 tons a month to make effective the operation of the additional planes.

73

 Rad AMSME 1720, Stilwell to Hearn, 7 Dec 43. Item 1502, Bk 5, JWS Personal File.
SEXTANT: THE WATERSHED 75

(2) In this way it might be possible to bring relief to our economic condition for the

coming year, and to maintain the morale of the army and the people who would be greatly

encouraged by America's timely assistance. What I have suggested is, I believe, the only way

of remedying the drawbacks of the strategy concerning the China and Pacific theaters. I am

sure you will appreciate my difficult position and give me the necessary assistance. I have

instructed General Stilwell to return immediately to Chungking and I shall discuss with him

regarding the details of the proposed changed plan and shall let you know of my decision

as to which one of your suggestions is the more feasible.

From the declaration of the Teheran Conference Japan will rightly deduce that practically

the entire weight of the United Nations' forces will be applied to the European front thus

abandoning the China theater to the mercy of Japan's mechanized air and land forces. It

would be strategic on Japan's part to (3) liquidate the China Affair during the coming year.

It may therefore be expected that the Japanese will before long launch an all-out offensive

against China so as to remove the threat to their rear, and thus re-capture the militarists'

waning popularity and bolster their fighting morale in the Pacific. This is the problem which

I have to face. Knowing that you are a realist, and as your loyal colleague, I feel constrained

to acquaint you with the above facts. Awaiting an early reply,

Chiang Kai-shek74

The Generalissimo's requests were not enough to bring agreement on a new

directive to SEAC for a major amphibious operation. For the time being SEAC

and Stilwell would have to be governed by the SEXTANT decisions, which were

sufficiently explicit. These ordered the occupation of upper Burma in spring

1944 (1) to improve the air route and (2) to open land communications with

China. An amphibious operation at the same time was approved. TWILIGHT,

the B-29 project, was also approved, and the Fourteenth Air Force, the Chinese

Army, and the Chinese Air Force would be improved for intensified operations

in and from China. The general concept of the SEXTANT decisions on the

Pacific and Asia was that "the main effort against Japan should be made in the

Pacific." What was attempted elsewhere in Asia would be in support of that

main effort. There would be first priority for ANVIL and OVERLORD, the

supreme operations for 1944.75

SEAC Tries To Salvage Burma Operations

Admiral Mountbatten was an aggressive commander, of proven desire to

close with the enemy. Moreover, he and his subordinates, of whom Stilwell was

one, were bound by the SEXTANT decision to clear north Burma. Lastly, fighting in the Arakan and in north Burma had been under way for weeks, with

both sides reinforcing. BUCCANEER'S demise left SEAC the alternatives of postponing an attempt at a major co-ordinated offensive for another year, which

would probably mean the end of operations to clear north Burma, or of staging

an amphibious operation smaller than BUCCANEER, with the hope that it would

74

 Rad AGWAR 919, Chiang to Roosevelt, 9 Dec 43. Item 1505A, Bk 5, JWS Personal File. 75

 (1) CCS 417, 2 Dec 43, sub: Plan for Defeat of Japan. (2) CCS 426/1, 6 Dec 43, sub: Rpt

to President and Prime Minister. (3) CCS 397 (rev), 3 Dec 43, sub: Specific Opns for Defeat of

Japan.
76 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

still be enough to meet the Generalissimo's stipulation for such an operation

in the Bay of Bengal, and so lead him to take active part in the Burma fighting.

Mountbatten's first reaction was hesitant, because the shipping requirement

would be the same if the attempt was large or small, and because no worthwhile objective could be seized with what shipping was at hand. When an

amphibious assault on the Arakan coast was first proposed, he did not see how

it could be presented as that previously promised the Generalissimo or how it

alone could fulfill SEAC's basic directive. However, since such would be a

starting point for the future, would enable the long-range penetration groups

to do their work, and would not commit him to an offensive in central Burma,

he directed his staff to study it.76

Since the amphibious operation promised the Generalissimo had never been

defined to him, and since his stipulation had been for a major one, if the SEAC

planners could somehow evolve a major amphibious effort the question of

Allied good faith would be answered, even if belatedly, and attention would be

focused on the Generalissimo's reaction. By adjusting the delicate balances for

a plan that might be imposing enough to satisfy the Generalissimo yet still fit

within SEAC resources, SEAC's planners evolved PIGSTICK. PIGSTICK called

for an assault on the Mayu peninsula aimed at Akyab. Two divisions plus two

brigades would be used in a southward advance down the peninsula and one

division in an amphibious assault aimed at surrounding and destroying not less

than 20,000 Japanese. One more landing like PIGSTICK, perhaps in the RamreeCheduba area, could take staging areas that would put 15 Corps within reach

of Rangoon.77 TARZAN was modified into GRIPFAST, an attack on north and

central Burma with an airborne landing at Indaw on the Japanese line of

communications to Myitkyina.

In the initial negotiations between Mountbatten and the Chinese on the

commitment to battle of the U.S.-sponsored Chinese divisions in Yunnan

(Y-Force) Stilwell entered enthusiastically. SEAC's new plan, thought Stilwell,

was almost the same as TOREADOR (the airborne landing in central Burma),

which had so appealed to the Generalissimo at SEXTANT.78 Mandalay itself was

now the objective of SEAC's efforts, while the amphibious operations were

enlarged.79

For whatever reasons, the Generalissimo was unimpressed with SEAC's

attempt to meet his demands for an amphibious operation before he would

move. Like a wary customer, he questioned the value of the substitute that

SEAC was offering. Since even in the genial atmosphere of Cairo he had been

conspicuously unwilling to commit himself, it was apparent that he would

drive a hard bargain, particularly since the President's radio from Cairo had

offered him an alibi. His final reply to the President's radio on 17 December

76

 (1) See Ch. I, above. (2) Rad, CCS to Mountbatten, 5 Dec 43; Rad, Wedemeyer to Mount- batten, 6 Dec 43; Rad, Mountbatten to COS, 11 Dec 43. SEAC War Diary. 77

 Rad, SEAC (RL) 19, 19 Dec 43. ABC 384 (Burma) 8-25-42, Sec IV, A48-224. 78

 Stilwell Black Book, 19 Dec 43. 79

 Memo, Stilwell for Generalissimo, 19 Dec 43. Item 1533, Bk 5, JWS Personal File.
SEXTANT: THE WATERSHED 77

stressed his need for money and air power but implied that a large enough

amphibious operation might even yet secure his co-operation.

My telegram of December 10th must have reached you by this time. I have discussed

with General Stilwell the proposed change in the plan of campaign and have come to the

following conclusions:

In case the original plan of concentrating warships and transports for landing troops

cannot be completely carried out, it would be better to defer the amphibious all-out offensive

till November next as you suggested so that the enemy in Burma may be annihilated once

and for all. In the meantime preparations for an offensive against Burma next spring should

proceed at full speed as originally planned, thus enabling us to launch an attack on land at

any moment which is deemed favorable, or at any time before next autumn if a sufficient

number of warships and transports can be concentrated to effect a grand scale landing on the

enemy's flanks, without waiting till the autumn of next year.

In this way the Burma front might be liquidated sooner than one could anticipate. I have

decided to accept your suggestion that the general offensive against Burma should be postponed to November next or sooner if the original amphibious operation could be launched.

At the same time I cannot but reiterate that in the intervening period of one year during

which there will be little hope of re-opening the Burma Road, the China theater of war will

be in a most critical situation. I therefore earnestly ask you to do all in your power to accede

to my request for financial assistance and for an increase of air force and air transportation as

stated in my telegram of December 10th, in the hope that the danger to the China theater

may be removed and the drawbacks in the strategy against Japan remedied in accordance

with your consistent friendly policy of rendering assistance to China. Awaiting an early reply.

Chiang Kai-shek80

Doing his best to meet the Generalissimo's requirements, Mountbatten

gave Stilwell for a further "talking point" information that the Chindit forces

in the proposed Burma operations would total 20,000 men, approximately half

of whom would be assisting the Chinese advance.81

In talks with the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang, Stilwell learned that

the Chinese expected the United States to pay the entire cost of constructing

the B-29 fields at Cheng-tu. The Generalissimo's request for a loan of one

billion dollars gold, the Chinese insistence on setting an official exchange rate

of 20 to 1 between their currency and the U.S. dollar when the black market

rate was 240 to 1, and rising rapidly, and now the President's alleged promise

to pay the whole cost of the B-29 fields introduced a new factor of importance,

the sheer monetary cost of attempting operations in China.

The Generalissimo estimated that the Cheng-tu fields would cost two to

three billion dollars of Chinese currency. "At 20 to 1, at least 100 million gold,

of which one-half will be squeeze. Appalling," wrote Stilwell. Stilwell protested

that his understanding was the United States would "help" with the project.

No, retorted Madame Chiang, the President had promised to pay for everything. Disgusted by what to him seemed a naive softness, Stilwell wrote: "One

more example of the stupid spirit of concession that proves to them that we are

suckers. 'We'll put in VLR bombers' (no bargaining). Then, 'we'll pay for the

80

 Rad AGWAR 941, Chiang to Roosevelt. 17 Dec 43. Item 1529, Bk 5, JWS Personal File. 81

 Rad COPIR 10, Mountbatten to Stilwell, 20 Dec 43. Item 1541, Bk 5, JWS Personal File.
78 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

fields' (no bargaining). Same on air freight—promise without bargain. Same on

equipment for army—promise without bargain. Same on Chinese Air Force.

Same on 14th Air Force. Same on everything."

 82

When the discussion came around to the current operations in Burma, the

Generalissimo's actions on 18 and 19 December baffled Stilwell. On the 18th

the Generalissimo gave Stilwell full command of the Chinese forces in India

and those now fighting in the Hukawng Valley. The next day he rejected

Mountbatten's proposals for a major attack on Burma, which made Stilwell

write: "[The Generalissimo] is afraid that even concerted attack by all available

forces has only one chance in a hundred and yet he'll sit back and let a small

force take on the Japs alone."

 83

 With the Generalissimo's promise in hand,

Stilwell prepared to leave to take command of the Hukawng Valley operations.

He believed that with the Ledo Force there was just a chance he might be able

to link with the Chinese Yunnan divisions somewhere near Myitkyina.84

Stilwell's decision to assume active command of the forces in north Burma

is not discussed or analyzed in his private or official papers. In the light of his

habit of analyzing every major step this circumstance suggests he thought the

move an obvious one. By December 1943 the post of chief of staff to the

Supreme Commander, China Theater, was simply a paper one, without staff,

directives, or duties. The Chinese had never agreed to set up the Sino-American

staff through which Stilwell was to have functioned as Joint Chief of Staff,

China Theater. After the Three Demands crisis of June 1942 the Generalissimo

had largely ignored both him and his suggestions. Therefore, Stilwell's post of

chief of staff to the Generalissimo would not require his presence in China.

There was Stilwell's still-existing mission of improving the combat efficiency

of the Chinese Army, but his superiors had not objected to his conclusion that

because Chinese delay had wasted two years there was little more he could do,

and were themselves coming to the very similar conclusion that little more

should be attempted than that which Stilwell had already begun, and which his

subordinates in China could carry out as a matter of routine.

Since October 1943 the only major development had been the SEXTANT

Conference, which had so obviously compromised Stilwell's position in China

that Marshall had asked him if he wanted to be recalled. Mountbatten, Stilwell's

superior, was actively soliciting the Generalissimo's aid in Burma operations,

thus relieving Stilwell of responsibility for that task.

There remained the operations in Burma, which had been under way since

30 October 1943. For two months the American officers of Chih Hui Pu had

been trying to achieve a satisfactory solution, but without success. General

Boatner, Stilwell's deputy in north Burma, who had been actively exercising

field command, was now a victim of pneumonia.85 General Sun, who might

82

 Stilwell Black Book, 18 Dec 43. 83

 (1) Stilwell Diary, 18 Dec 43. (2) Stilwell Black Book, 19 Dec 43. (3) Quotation from The

Stilwell Papers, p. 265. 84

 The Stilwell Papers, p. 266. 85

 Stilwell Diary, 21 Dec 43.
SEXTANT: THE WATERSHED 79

have commanded, had made it very plain that he wanted to retreat. The Chinese

were now heavily engaged, and the situation had been described to Stilwell as

critical. So Stilwell prepared to go to north Burma and assume command in the

jungle. He was then sixty years of age.86

The conduct of American military-diplomatic relations with China was

tacitly assumed by the President. In 1942 and 1943 Stilwell had presented many

memorandums to the Generalissimo, to which the Chinese had rarely replied.

In 1944, the President sent one message after another to the Generalissimo on

military matters, and these the Generalissimo could not ignore. As will be seen,

the role of CBI Theater headquarters in these exchanges was the humble and

mechanical one of delivering the text of these presidential proddings to the

Generalissimo.

A Changing U.S. Attitude

Once again in the history of the U.S. effort in China, Burma, and India, the

issues were about to be placed before the President, this time by Stilwell at

Madame Chiang's suggestion. Stilwell was not hopeful of the President's willingness to intercede, but he adopted the suggestion.87

 Manifestly, Stilwell did

not feel that the action of the President and the Prime Minister in reneging at

Cairo on the long-promised amphibious operation made it unnecessary or

inadvisable for the Generalissimo to take action in Burma or that it made

ungraceful any criticism of the Generalissimo's reluctance from within those

powers that had broken their pledges to him. So, Stilwell told Marshall that the

SEAC plan was now virtually what CBI Theater had been urging all along, that

if the President would exhort the Generalissimo to cross the Salween River

when his allies attacked Burma, the Chinese leader might play his part.88 If the

Generalissimo knew of this move, he could have reflected that his own message

to the President two days before had accepted one of the two choices the President had offered, and that in the past the President had extended credits,

lend-lease, and air support without asking anything in return.

Drafted by the War Department, the President's reply indicated that

Roosevelt had moved away from the Generalissimo's and Chennault's views

and was a great deal closer to Stilwell's. The President returned a qualified

negative to the Generalissimo's requests. Describing himself as fully aware of

the military and economic situation in China, the President said that the best

the United States could do was to aid in the immediate opening of a land line

of communications to China. The military actions involved in so doing would

afford greater protection to the Hump air route. Roosevelt told the Generalissimo of Mountbatten's planning the largest possible operation to retake

Burma and expressed his hope that the Generalissimo would do everything he

86

 The Stilwell Papers, p. 285. Stilwell's sixty-first birthday was on 20 March 1944. 87

 (1) Stilwell Black Book, 19 Dec 43. (2) The Stilwell Papers, p. 263. 88

 Rad AGWAR 947, Stilwell to Marshall, 19 Dec 43. Item 1537, Bk 5, JWS Personal File.
80 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

could to carry out the part reserved for China. Nothing whatever was said about

postponing active operations until November 1944. Roosevelt discounted what

could be done by more air power in China until the line of communications

had been improved. The Chinese might find comfort in the President's assurance that plans to increase Hump capacity to 12,000 tons a month were well

advanced, provided an advance by the Allied ground forces forestalled a

Japanese attempt to interrupt the airline. The message closed with the brief

comment that the Treasury Department was weighing China's request for a

billion-dollar (U.S.) loan.89

Thus, the President was suggesting that China act and was stressing action

on the ground rather than in the air. The Generalissimo had accepted one of

the alternate courses offered by the President, waiting until November 1944 to

advance into Burma, only to find that the President had quietly abandoned it.

Did the Generalissimo's linking the cancellation of BUCCANEER with a request

for one billion dollars anger the President? Whatever the reason, the changed

tone and shifts in emphasis of the President's reply, the ever stronger and more

demanding nature of its successors, suggest that the President had made up his

mind about China. At Cairo Roosevelt had been uncertain and unable to guide

Stilwell; after Cairo and a few weeks of consideration, the President was striking

out along the line of insisting that China take the offensive in return for the

lend-lease she had received.

Despite the President's urgings, the Generalissimo's reply was negative. It

even had overtones of the sardonic. He agreed to leave the Ledo forces at

Mountbatten's disposal but stated that the Y-Force would move only if the

Allies took the Andaman Islands, Rangoon, or Moulmein. If they succeeded in

taking Mandalay or Lashio, he would order his armies into Burma even if there

was no amphibious operation.90

General Hearn, to whom Stilwell had entrusted the American share of

negotiations with the Generalissimo, did not believe the Generalissimo's reply

was final but thought rather that he was bargaining for a bigger amphibious

operation or a pledge that the Burma campaign would definitely include capture of Rangoon. Nor did he believe the Generalissimo was aware of the size

of the effort that Mountbatten might be able to make. If the Generalissimo

agreed to commit Y-Force, 325,000 Allied combat troops would be involved in

the Burma operation.91

Though urged by Hearn and Stilwell to accept the Generalissimo's

Mandalay-Lashio offer, this was further than Mountbatten would go. Indeed, a

certain asperity was entering his references to the Chinese. Asking that the

89

 (1) Item 58, OPD Exec 10. (2) Rad WAR 4092, Roosevelt to Chiang, 20 Dec 43. Item

1546, Bk 5, JWS Personal File. 90

 (1) Rad, Lt Gen Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart, Prime Minister's and SAC's Personal Repre- sentative to Chungking, to Mountbatten, 23 Dec 43. SEAC War Diary. (2) Rad AM 2934, Hearn

to Merrill, 28 Dec 43; Rad AM 2372, Sultan to Stilwell, 30 Dec 43. Items 1571, 1587, Bk 5 JWS

Personal File. (3) CM-IN 1161, Hearn to Marshall, Handy, and Maj Gen Joseph T. McNarney,

2 Jan 44. 91

 CM-IN 14577, Hearn to Stilwell and Marshall, 23 Dec 43.
SEXTANT: THE WATERSHED 81

United States put pressure on the Generalissimo, Mountbatten remarked: "I do

not see why we should continue to supply him with munitions if they are to be

used solely for internal political purposes."

 92

Still determined on an offensive, Admiral Mountbatten went on with

preparations for PIGSTICK, the assault on the Mayu peninsula. He told the

British Chiefs of Staff that while PIGSTICK was within SEAC's capabilities, "if

any further resources are taken from me . . . I shall have to cancel the

operation."

 93

That the British Chiefs of Staff did not favor PIGSTICK became apparent

when they suggested to the CCS that if PIGSTICK was canceled three fast LST's

(landing ship, tank) and other landing craft could be released for a landing at

Anzio, Italy. After examining the landing craft situation in the Mediterranean

and considering the old promise to the Generalissimo to make an amphibious

operation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that plans and preparations for PIGSTICK continue with no further withdrawal of landing craft from SEAC. Moreover, Stilwell's initial attempts to advance in north Burma were meeting with

success and an operation to the south would divert some Japanese from him.

While these discussions between the Joint and British Chiefs of Staff were

under way, the British Chiefs of Staff told Mountbatten that they did not think

PIGSTICK could be carried out, and, although there was still no decision by the

CCS, ordered him to return the landing craft in question to the Mediterranean.

The departure of the craft, together with the warning by his commanders in

chief that they could not carry out PIGSTICK during the favorable weather

period of February 1944 unless it was ordered by 30 December at the latest,

forced Mountbatten to cancel the operation without awaiting CCS approval.94

Admiral Mountbatten canceled PIGSTICK with reluctance, for the action

meant to him the probability of no worthwhile offensive against the Japanese

for at least a year after SEAC's formation and would have an adverse effect on

morale. In a last attempt at an amphibious operation, Mountbatten ordered

preparations for BULLDOZER, a much smaller amphibious operation in the

Arakan. A message from Mr. Churchill to "mark time for a day or two till we

get matters cleaned up" was enough to end it, for even a day's delay would

affect the time to mount it before rough weather began in the Bay of Bengal.

Thus, the last hope of meeting the Generalissimo's demand for an amphibious

operation was gone.

These events were enough to dampen even the buoyant Mountbatten's

enthusiasm for a Burma campaign. Where a week before he had said: "I have

no intention of allowing operations in Northern Burma to fade on account of

abandonment of proposed operations elsewhere," he now told his staff: "The

92

 Rad SEACOS 53, Mountbatten to COS, 24 Dec 43. SEAC War Diary. 93

 Rad SEACOS 54, Mountbatten to COS, 27 Dec 43; Min, SAC's 37th Mtg, 27 Dec 43. SEAC

War Diary. 94

 (1) CCS 452, 30 Dec 43, sub: Cancellation of Opn PIGSTICK. (2) CCS 452/2, 6 Jan 44, sub: Cancellation of Opn PIGSTICK. (3) Rad, COS to Mountbatten, 29 Dec 43; Rad, Mountbatten to CCS, 6 Jan 44. SEAC War Diary.
82 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

quickest and most efficient way of taking supplies on a large scale into China

is through a port rather than by a long and uncertain land route."

 95

Reflecting the strategic developments of SEXTANT and the Generalissimo's

reluctance to engage in Burma operations, the Strategy and Policy Group,

OPD, on 8 January 1944 submitted its comments on the "future military value

of China Theater." The planners stated that since the main effort in the Pacific

would be made in the central and southwest areas of that great expanse, the

mission of Stilwell's CBI Theater should be to give air support to the main

effort. The bases from which this support was to come should be in areas

already secure, because to acquire any more territory would require of the

Chinese Army an efficiency not likely to be attained before 1946-47. No further

effort should be made, the paper went on, to equip Chinese ground forces

beyond enabling them to control areas they already had. Therefore, all available Hump airlift capacity should be devoted to building up air power in

China, which was believed to be the best way of preventing China's collapse,

as well as of aiding Pacific operations. Offensive operations in Burma to thwart

a Japanese threat to the existing India-China air line of communications were

still thought necessary.96

Summary

Before the SEXTANT Conference, the United States placed great emphasis on

major operations in Southeast Asia to break the blockade of China and divert

Japanese strength from the Southwest Pacific. President Roosevelt had been

most interested in the implications of this policy as it applied to Asia. At SEXTANT his attitude changed; the amphibious operation demanded by the Generalissimo as the price of his co-operation in Burma was canceled, and for a time

it seemed the President was willing to postpone Burma operations until

November 1944. The Generalissimo asked for a billion U.S. dollars and heavy

air reinforcements so that China might withstand another year's blockade. He

was not willing himself to make a major effort to break it. The President's

reply was drafted by the War Department and moved toward full support of

Stilwell. During these discussions, the British Chiefs of Staff withdrew certain

essential landing craft from Mountbatten, in effect ending his hopes of a major

amphibious operation. December ended with Stilwell taking his post in north

Burma to command the now heavily engaged Chinese New First Army, with

the President urging China to play a more active part in the war, and with

OPD suggesting that the mission of CBI Theater should be to give air support

to Allied operations in the Pacific. 95

 (1) Rad, Churchill to Mountbatten, 7 Jan 44; Extract, SAC's Personal Diary, 28 Dec 43;

Quotation from Min, SAC's Fifth Stf Mtg, 6 Jan 44. SEAC War Diary. (2) JPS 346, 2 Jan 44, sub: Cancellation of Opn PIGSTICK. (3) Notes by Brig. Gen. Frank N. Roberts on draft manuscript of

this chapter. OCMH. 96

 Memo, Gen Roberts, Chief, Strategy and Policy Gp, OPD, for ACofS OPD, 8 Jan 44, sub:

Future Mil Value of China Theater; Memo, Billo for Roberts, 13 Jan 44, sub: Future Mil Value of

China Theater. OPD 201 (Wedemeyer, A. C.), A47-30.
CHAPTER III

The India-Based Air Effort

On 21 December 1943, Stilwell arrived at Ledo to take over the North

Burma Campaign, "under better auspices than last time."

 1 No student of

classic antiquity, Stilwell probably did not have in mind the full definition:

"aus'pice. . . . 1. A sign, . . . used in augury, as the flight of birds, . . . or

phenomena in the sky." But if the omens were better in December 1943 than

they had been in March 1942, it was largely because of happenings in the skies

over India and Burma. Anglo-American air power, based on India, was approaching giant maturity, and was about to make possible a campaign of a type

never seen before, a campaign in which the customary Japanese tactic of encirclement was turned against its authors with devastating results. To understand the differences between the campaigns of 1942 and 1943-44, one must

understand techniques of air support and air supply evolved between March

1942 and December 1943, and the extent of Allied air superiority in Burma.

Command and Administration of the Air Forces

After SEXTANT, Mountbatten reached a firm decision that his command

must include an integrated (i.e., Anglo-American) air force. His earlier hints

of such a move to Marshall, Arnold, and the Generalissimo had been well received. He had been impressed by the work of an integrated air force in North

Africa, and felt he could not "accept a state of affairs where a subordinate Commander in my theatre had independent responsibilities for combat air operations." On learning of the project, Stilwell and General Stratemeyer,

commanding the Army Air Forces, India-Burma Sector, objected, for they believed that if there was to be no operation for retaking all Burma, and at this

time none seemed very likely, there was no need of an integrated air force. In

a way, this was a reversal by Stratemeyer, who had first rather liked the idea,

then had changed his mind after Mountbatten's October visit to Chungking.

Despite the opposition of the two senior U.S. commanders in SEAC,

Mountbatten thought it time to establish his authority in the theater and felt

sure that the CCS would not reverse him. Marshall approved, though he re- 1

 The Stilwell Papers, p. 267.
84 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

minded Mountbatten of the U.S. commitments to China and warned that the

time would come when the U.S. would have to move part of the Tenth Air

Force to China.2

On 12 December the Tenth Air Force and the Royal Air Force (RAF)

Bengal Command joined their combat strength to become the Eastern Air

Command (EAC), though preserving their administrative entities. Stratemeyer

assumed command 15 December. He had the Strategic Air Force under operational control of Brig. Gen. Howard C. Davidson, the Tenth Air Force's commander; the Third Tactical Air Force under operational control of Air Marshal

Sir John Baldwin of Bengal Command; the Troop Carrier Command under

operational control of Brig. Gen. William D. Old, and the Photographic Reconnaissance Group under Group Captain S. C. Wise. Third Tactical Air Force

was in turn composed of Northern Sector Air Force (AAF) in north Burma,

221 Group (RAF) in Manipur, and 224 Group (RAF) in the Arakan. Naming

Stratemeyer to command was a graceful gesture by Mountbatten, for the bulk

of EAC's aircraft, especially fighters, were British. Eastern Air Command began

operations in January 1944 with 576 fighters (141 AAF), 79 heavy bombers

(48 AAF), 70 medium bombers (37 AAF), 10 AAF reconnaissance aircraft, and

84 transports (51 AAF).3 This strength was cut a fortnight later when the 341st

Bombardment Group (M), less the 490th Squadron, was assigned to the Fourteenth Air Force in China.

In June 1944 the combat strength of the Tenth Air Force was reconstituted

as a tactical air force of two fighter groups and one troop carrier group plus

administrative and service elements to support the North Burma Campaign.

Experience had demonstrated that the North Burma Campaign was tactically

independent of operations in Manipur State and the Arakan and that operations in the three sectors did not require central direction of tactical air support. Troop Carrier Command was eliminated and its units split between Tenth

Air Force and Third Tactical Air Force. This then gave EAC five subordinate

air commands: Strategic Air Force (still an integrated Anglo-American force);

Third Tactical Air Force (mostly RAF plus the 12th Bombardment Group [M]

and the 459th Fighter Squadron); the Photographic Reconnaissance Group

(Anglo-American); the Tenth Air Force; and 293 Wing RAF, charged with defense of the Calcutta industrial area.4

2

 (1) Quotation from Extract, SAC's Personal Diary, 11 Dec 43. SEAC War Diary. (2)

Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. VIII. (3) Ltr, Mountbatten to Arnold, 27 Nov 43; Ltr, Marshall to

Mountbatten, 4 Jan 44. Item 676, Msg Bk 18, OPD Exec 9. 3

 Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, Despatch on Air Operations in Eastern Air Command (SEA)

Covering the Period 15 December 1943 to 1 June 1945, MS (hereafter EAC Despatch), App. 16, Incls 1, 2. OCMH. The heavy bombers were B-24's and Wellingtons with a few Lancasters and

Halifaxes; the mediums were B-25's; the fighters were mostly Hurricane IIc's, IId's, and P-40's. Five squadrons were so fortunate as to have Spitfires, while two others had P-38's and P-51's. The Vultee Vengeance dive bomber was used by five squadrons, Burma being one of the few areas in which it was to be found. The versatile and successful Beaufighters acted as night fighters and light

bombers. 4

 EAC Despatch, pp. 44, 7-8.
THE INDIA-BASED AIR EFFORT 85

The Japanese Air Effort in Burma

The senior headquarters for the Japanese Army air force in Southeast Asia

was 3d Air Army at Singapore. The defense of Burma was still charged to the

5th Air Division, veterans of the First Burma Campaign. Under 5th Air Division,

in late November 1943, were the 4th Air Brigade, with the 8th (light bomber),

34th (light bomber), 77th (fighter), and the 50th (fighter) Air Regiments; and

the 7th Air Brigade, with the 12th ("heavy" bomber), 98th ("heavy" bomber),

and 64th (fighter) Air Regiments. Also under 5th Air Division were the 21st, 33d,

77th, and 204th Air Regiments (fighter), and the 81st Air Regiment (reconnaissance). After the war, the Japanese estimated this force comprised about 129

fighters, 30 "heavy" bombers, 47 light bombers, and 15 reconnaissance aircraft.

The Japanese naval air force was also represented. It had been drained by the

fighting in the Southwest Pacific, but at least its 28th Air Regiment was present

in October 1943, with 30 fighters and 9 bombers.5

Eastern Air Command estimated Japanese strength at 277 aircraft, including

reconnaissance craft. Though outnumbered by EAC, 5th Air Division had a few

counterbalancing advantages. Its rear areas were well out of the reach of all but

the heavy bombers, which were too few to neutralize Japanese bases. The 5th

Air Division had scores of forward airstrips so that it could prepare its operations in the rear areas, stage them through any of the forward strips, then

quickly disperse on returning. Pilots and aircrews were good; their equipment,

adequate.6

Not waiting for their opponents, the Japanese airmen undertook to cripple

the anticipated Allied attack on Burma by genuine strategic bombing, a series

of attacks on Calcutta. The fanfare attendant on SEAC's creation, the appointment of an admiral as Supreme Allied Commander, and signs of Allied preparations around Ledo, Imphal, and Calcutta convinced the Japanese that a

major operation against Burma was imminent.7

Neutralization of Calcutta seemed advisable. Preparations began in October

1943. The 4th Air Brigade attacked RAF fields about Imphal in November to

divert attention and resources from the Calcutta area. Calcutta itself was attacked on 5 December by the 7th Air Brigade, with 94 fighters and 18 heavy

bombers from six air regiments, and 8 reconnaissance aircraft, plus 30 fighters

and 9 bombers of the Imperial Navy's 28th Air Regiment. "Considerable damage

5

 (1) The Japanese fighters were mostly single-engined 1941 model Oscars, with two 12.7-mm. guns and with a top speed of 334 mph at 16,400 feet, and twin-engined two-seated 1942-model

Nicks, with three 12.7-mm. and one 20-mm. guns and with a top speed of 340 mph at 13,000 feet.

The light bomber was the Lily, with a 57-foot wingspread and a 1,100-pound bomb load. The

"heavy" bombers were Sallys, with a maximum bomb load of 2,200 lbs. and with a wingspread of

70 feet. The Sally was a 1937 model; the Lily was a 1939 model. TM-E 30-480, Handbook on Japanese Military Forces, 15 September 1944, pp. 58-75. Japanese Officers' Comments, p. 8. (2)

Japanese Study 94. (3) SEATIC Bull 248, 22 Apr 47, pp. 24-25. MID Library. 6

 EAC Despatch, pp. 12-13. 7

 (1) Japanese Studies 89 and 94. (2) SEATIC Bull 242, 7 Aug 46, p. 12; SEATIC Bull 247, 22 Apr 47, pp. 110-11. MID Library.
86 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

was done to dock area," Eastern Air Command admitted later, and its dispatch

adds: "The Japanese Air Force, in fact, controlled the air over Burma and, while

maintaining a constant threat against the vital air route to China, was harassing

Allied ground and air installations in the Assam valley, the Arakan, and

Bengal."

 8

Though a second attempt at the strategic bombardment of India was thus

launched by the Japanese, and though this initial attempt was followed by a

Christmas Day attack on Chitagong by about fifty aircraft, nothing more was

done, and again the Japanese laid down a weapon to which northeast India and

the Assam line of communications were most vulnerable. After the war, the

Japanese explained that though they had fully appreciated the importance of

bombing Calcutta, they were handicapped by the lack of bombers. Of the four

Japanese bomber units in Burma, two were transferred to New Guinea in late

January 1944, leaving only fifteen light and nine heavy bombers. With the

bomber units went three fighter regiments. What remained was not enough

for sustained and effective operations.9

The interval before preparations began to stage for the proposed Japanese

offensive against India was used by the Japanese airmen for attacks on the

Hump airfields and on the transports themselves. Tinsukia airfield was attacked by about fifty fighters and eighteen bombers on 8 December, and Kunming on the 18th and 22d of December. Beginning mid-January 1944, Japanese pilots made an effort to attack ATC transports as they were spotted by

Japanese observers in and around Sumprabum in north Burma. The effort

seemed "a serious threat" to EAC, but it was short-lived because in May the

Japanese lost the Myitkyina airstrip from which the attacks had been made.10

When the third phase of the Japanese offensive began with a diversionary

attack in the Arakan, the 12th, 64th, and 204th Air Regiments co-operated by

making sweeps over the battlefields.11 Where classic air doctrine called for attacks on the hostile airfields and forces until air superiority had been attained,

the Japanese interpreted air-ground co-operation in the most literal sense by

ignoring the airfields in order to engage in fighter sweeps over the battlefields.

When the sound of the engines died away, the battle resumed as though the

Oscars had never passed above. "The period in which we [Japanese] held control of the air [the EAC] avoided us and after we had returned to our base

would appear in the air over the battlefields. As a result, they disrupted the

attacks of our ground army. Taking advantage of the unfavorable conditions

existing when we attacked the ground with our fighters, they would challenge

8

 (1) Japanese Study 94. (2) EAC Despatch, p. 11. (3) Japanese Officers' Comments, p. 8. 9

 (1) Bull cited n. 5(3). (2) USSBS, Japanese Air Power (Washington, 1946), p. 20. (3)

Japanese Study 94. (4) Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. IX. (5) Japanese Officers' Comments, p. 9. 10

 (1) Japanese Study 94. (2) EAC Despatch, p. 17. (3) Japanese Officers' Comments, p. 10. 11

 It will be recalled that the first phase was the elimination of the Chinese bridgehead across the Salween River in October 1943 and the second phase was the attempt by the 18th Division to occupy the upper Hukawng Valley. The purpose of these moves was to secure the flanks and rear

of the Japanese forces making the main effort. See Stilwell's Mission to China, pp. 353-54.
THE INDIA-BASED AIR EFFORT 87

us to an air battle. Thus, with the passing of time, battle became more difficult."

 12

 For February 1944, EAC claimed only 15 Japanese aircraft certainly

destroyed and 6 probably so, as against 25 of its own lost, but the Japanese attempt was a failure for day after day the transport aircraft flew in supplies for

the divisions trapped by the Japanese thrust.13 And, when the British commanders had stopped the Japanese offensive in the Arakan, they were able to

disengage the 5th and 7th Indian Divisions from the Arakan and rush them

north by rail and air to meet the next phase in the Japanese offensive. Thus, air

transport gave Generals Giffard and Slim an advantage in strategic mobility

which the Japanese could not match, and which the two British commanders

exploited to the utmost.14

The 5th Air Division's support of the main Japanese thrust on Imphal was

more skillfully handled. On 12, 15, 16, and 17 March, the Japanese attacked

the airfields from which EAC was supporting 4 Corps on the Imphal front.

They bombed the airstrips used for the flying in of an ambitious attempt by

Maj. Gen. Orde C. Wingate's Long-Range Penetration Groups on 10, 13, 16,

17, and 18 March. These operations were mixed with attacks on fields in the

Arakan, at Tinsukia, and at Ledo. March cost EAC fifty-seven aircraft destroyed

and missing. Eastern Air Command headquarters believed the Japanese lost

fifty-nine in the air and fifty-eight on the ground. The Japanese account is incomplete but suggests that EAC claims are exaggerated.

However, one Japanese operation was an utter fiasco and minor disaster.

The 62d Air Regiment, nine heavy bombers, was brought to Burma to attack the

Ledo area. With an escort of about sixty fighters, the 62d Air Regiment made its

attempt on 27 March 1944. Lacking radar bombsights, the Japanese loosed their

bombs at random through a heavy overcast. EAC fighters attacked the force on

its way home when it was low on fuel. Eight of the bombers were shot down

and the ninth made a forced landing.

Though the Japanese at the end of March had failed to prevent EAC from

maintaining whole divisions by air supply, a feat impossible against a foe that

has air superiority, they were still very much in the fight against an Allied opponent that, during March, had a daily operational average of 582 fighters. The

Japanese aircraft replacement system worked well from January to June 1944,

giving 3d Air Army from 100 to 150 aircraft a month, most of which went to

Burma. The trained aircrews were not replaced.15

If the Japanese in March did feel a certain satisfaction at having held their

own against very heavy odds, their complacence must have been short-lived,

for in March EAC was only beginning to hit its stride. After March, the balance tilted in its favor ever more rapidly. Eastern Air Command dispatched

8,353 sorties in January 1944 and 18,109 in March. By May the figure was up 12

 Japanese Study 94, p. 58. 13

 EAC Despatch, p. 18. 14

 Mountbatten Report, Pt. B, pars. 99, 106. 15

 (1) Japanese Study 94. (2) EAC Despatch, App. 1. (3) Bull cited n. 5(3).
88 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

to 23,490. EAC dropped a modest 1,513.4 tons of bombs in January 1944, 3,189

tons in March and 4,073.7 tons in May. American components of EAC expended 279,000 rounds of 50-caliber ammunition in January, 675,000 in March,

1,280,000 in April, and 867,989 in May. The RAF was proportionately active.

This steady acceleration of effort, reflecting among other things an increase

in the AAF components of the EAC from 297 aircraft in April to 444 in May,

weighed ever more heavily on the Japanese. After June their losses in fighters

forced them to cease attempts to intercept EAC's attacks, an admission of defeat. After the war, the Japanese considered that "well-planned aerial combat

tactics and superior planes always gave the enemy an upper hand in the engagements." Japanese sorties in support of the attack on Imphal, and against Wingate's Chindits, which had reached a peak of 570 sorties in April, fell to 423

in May, and plummeted to 115 in June.16

The drop in Japanese sorties was much sharper than that which the monsoon forced on EAC. Whatever the exact count of sorties made by the Japanese, their effort during the crucial month of their attack on India was but a

fraction of EAC's, and there was not a chance of their attaining the air superiority they held so often in 1941 and 1942. Indeed, EAC controlled the air

space over the battlefield, which meant that the Japanese could no longer

match the Allied ground forces in strategic mobility, nor was the most important Japanese tactic in jungle warfare, encirclement, the menace it had once

been. Now, thanks to EAC's air superiority, the Allies could fly whole divisions to the scene of action, while the Japanese struggled to bring troops forward over bomb-damaged rail lines or on foot over muddy trails. On the battlefield itself, the Japanese could surround Allied units still, for they had all their

old skill and aggressiveness in maneuver, but the success was an empty one, for

the air transports could always deliver supplies to the surrounded unit. This

was a grim omen, for when the Allies were on the offensive, air supply meant

that Chinese, Indians, British, and Americans could operate independently of

ground lines of communications, could move freely past the Japanese flanks

into the Japanese rear areas, and there block the roads that fed the Japanese.

When this happened the Japanese would have to cut their way out or starve,

for EAC's fighters and bombers would see to it that no Japanese transports appeared over the battlefield.

Support of Ground Forces

In the difficult terrain of Burma, where artillery was hard to bring forward

and tended to lessen the mobility of Allied units, EAC's fighters, fighter bomb16

 (1) EAC Despatch, Apps. 3-7. (2) Japanese Study 94, p. 67, Table, pp. 62-65. Japanese statistics give the number of aircraft dispatched by day. The 8th, 50th, 64th, and 204th Air Regiments supported the Japanese in north Burma, with about fifty-five fighters at the beginning of

March 1944, dropping to about thirty-two planes at the end. The table suggests each fighter averaged 4.2 sorties. That month EAC fighters averaged 21, over the whole of Burma. Even if the

Japanese fighters are credited with sorties along the Salween, and over Myitkyina and Ledo, 10

sorties a month would be a generous estimate, for in none of these other areas was 5th Air Division an active factor. Very probably the Japanese were greatly handicapped by maintenance problems.
THE INDIA-BASED AIR EFFORT 89

ers, and bombers of all types acted as substitutes. Suitable targets, according to

current local practice, were troop concentrations, bunkers, machine gun nests,

artillery, towns and villages sheltering the Japanese, and supply convoys. The

choice among types of bombs and ammunition was governed by the nature of

the target. Where possible, cover was used in the approach, and attacks were

made from medium or low altitude. Despite the seemingly obvious worth of

close tactical air support, it was not common or particularly effective before the

spring of 1944. Earlier, the priority demands for bombing transport, factories,

and air installations had absorbed most air resources. There had also been the

belief that fighter aircraft should confine themselves to missions of escort and

interception. Last of all, there had been no effective mechanism whereby the

ground forces could obtain air support on call.

By May 1944, Northern Sector Air Force, the AAF component of the Third

Tactical Air Force, had worked out a technique for air support in siege or mobile warfare. For the former, A-2 and A-3 were responsible for joint planning

with the task force G-2 and G-3. The latter two chose the targets, while the

air staff "planned the attack, determined the number and type of aircraft to be

used, the types of bombs, the techniques of attack, the selection of the units

. . . and the briefing of the crews." For mobile warfare, Northern Sector Air

Force provided the "air party":

Personnel of an air party consisted of a team of one or two officers with six to eight enlisted men. Their station was with an advanced brigade at the front. . . . They were in

[radio communication] with the air office, giving immediate information on targets selected

by the army and approved by the air party. They also served as guides to aircraft which were

making the air strikes. Sometimes, when it was impossible to observe the tactical situation

from the position of the air party, an L-5 was used for strike observation, which worked

through the air party.17

Radio and photography were vital in the air-ground support mechanism. Of

the several air elements in Burma, the Tenth Air Force reached the highest

point in air-ground radio communication, using high-frequency SCR-117 or

-118 for point-to-point transmission linking the air party with the air force's

signal center, and very high frequency radio for communication with the aircraft making the attack. "In cases of emergency, it took about twenty minutes

for communications to be sent from the air party to fighter group headquarters.

In some cases aircraft were over the target thirty minutes after the original request." The Tenth Air Force also made complete use of photographic facilities.

Low-level verticals, reconnaissance strips, obliques, and pinpoint shots were

used. Both air and ground personnel used photographs for target designation,

briefing, and aerial identification of targets.

Of equal importance in target designation were the efforts of the Kachins,

Burmese, and Americans working for the Office of Strategic Services in Detachment 101. Operating behind the Japanese lines, and well equipped with

17

 EAC Despatch, pp. 72, 79-80, 81; quotation on p. 82.
90 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

radios, these daring men sent a steady flow of data on the location of supply

dumps, rest areas, billets, command posts, and the like.18

About one third of the fighter sorties were in direct support of the infantry.

This meant 221 Group flew 9,000 such sorties between March and July 1944,

while their colleagues of 224 Group flew about 5,000. During siege operations

in north Burma, Northern Sector Air Force and successor commands averaged

thirty-three fighter sorties a day, a rather deceptive figure, for these sorties were

flown in monsoon weather so that good flying days saw many times the thirtythree figure flown. The RAF expended 25,000 rounds of 40-mm. ammunition

in ground support during the first six months of 1944. In the same period the

fighters dropped 9,327 tons of bombs.19

Air-ground co-operation was most marked in its effect on the Japanese 15th

Army's attack on India in spring 1944. To obtain surprise, the Japanese deliberately omitted much necessary preliminary engineer work on the dirt trails

from the Chindwin River forward that were to sustain their three divisions in

battle. The Japanese planned on a grand rush that would carry them over the

British supply dumps in a matter of weeks. The opening phases went well;

then the battle settled down to hard pounding. At this point the 4 Corps at

Imphal depended on air supply, 33 Corps driving to relieve it depended on the

Bengal and Assam Railway and Dimapur road, and 15th Army on the jungle

trails.

Allied fighters swarmed over the dirt trails all day long, bombing and

strafing. Japanese supplies could be moved only at night, a task fantastically

complicated when the monsoon rains began. As a result of the constriction of

the roads, from May 1944 on 15th Army quite literally starved. Looking back on

their experiences at Imphal, the Japanese commanders and staffs approached

eloquence in dilating on the importance of air-ground co-operation: "With a

good signals system and air supplies, the Allies were able to carry out their

operations freely and unhindered whereas the Japanese without air supplies and

with their only means of supply—ground transport—cut off, were in a paralyzed state. . . . The difference in ground-air cooperation between the Japanese

Army and the Allies was the difference between victory and defeat." To this

comment by Lt. Col. Iwaichi Fujiwara, sometime G-2 and G-3 of 15th Army,

could be added similar ones by Lt. Gen. Takazo Numata, Chief of Staff,

Headquarters, Southern Army.20

A form of air support most highly valued by the infantryman was the air

evacuation of ground casualties on the grand scale. Where previously the

wounded, in default of other means of transport, had jolted and swayed for

agonizing days in litters, ambulances, and trains on the long trip back to hos18

 (1) For a more detailed account of Detachment 101, see Chapter I, above. (2) NCAC

History, App. 8, Brief Sketch of Detachment 101 in the NCAC Campaign. 19

 EAC Despatch, pp. 84-86, 87-88; Apps. 5, 6. 20

 Col Fujiwara, SEATIC Bull 240, 9 Jul 46, pp. 23-24, 51; SEATIC Bull 242, 7 Aug 46, pp. 31-32; SEATIC Bull 247, 22 Apr 47, p. 25. MID Library.
THE INDIA-BASED AIR EFFORT 91

pital, now small liaison aircraft could land on a rough airstrip immediately

behind the lines, pick up the soldier, and fly him to a collecting point. There

an air transport with a flight nurse would receive him and fly him back to hospital. The worst part of the journey would be that to the first airstrip for if the

soldier was wounded in the hills it might take the litter bearers several days to

cover the seven or eight miles to the nearest airstrip. If the soldier in north

Burma happened to be wounded near the combat supply road which ran south

and east through the Hukawng and Mogaung Valleys, he could be taken by

ambulance to the clearing company, and by ambulance again to the American

field hospital. Evacuation of British and Indian units followed a similar pattern;

the same facilities served all Allied troops. Between December 1943 and August

1944, 18,256 casualties were evacuated from north Burma by air. From Burma

as a whole, EAC in sixteen months evacuated more than 106,000 casualties.21

Strategic Bombing

As noted before in this history, Burma is not an ideal subject for the

demonstration of strategic bombardment, for it is very large, and predominantly

agricultural. The Japanese Army depended on the Burmese economy for food,

oil, some clothing, and a few simple munitions and spare parts. After October

1943 and the opening of the Burma-Siam Railway almost everything else came

in by train. Of the targets found in Burma, the oil fields, the supply dumps, and

the rail lines seemed the most promising. The Japanese Army depended on its

infantry, so its oil needs were modest, and even sharp reductions in the capacity

of the Yenangyaung oil installations seem not to have hurt Burma Area Army's

supply position. Japanese dumps closer to the front suffered heavily in the allimportant Manipur area, but not elsewhere in spring 1944. The railroads, to

Allied target analysts, seemed clearly indicated as the most promising target,

though not an easy or fragile one. Against these several classes of targets for

strategic bombing, Strategic Air Force in January 1944 could pit 61 B-24's,

25 Wellingtons, and 32 B-25's. In June, the command had 53 B-24's, 13

Wellingtons, and 69 B-25's. Such was not an imposing force with which to

attack an area the size of Germany.22

"The main purpose of the Strategic Air Force . . . was to disrupt the

enemy's entire transportation system in the India-Burma Theater. . . ." The

initial EAC directives gave first priority to hostile air force installations, but in

practice this mission fell to the Tactical Air Force. Shipping was given second

priority, for its highly mobile nature made it a target of opportunity. The railroads were always present, and they had third priority. After the opening of the

21

 (1) EAC Despatch, p. 90. (2) NCAC Air Supply, Vol. I, App. 4. 22

 EAC Despatch, App. 2. These are daily operational averages. The RAF seems to have had

maintenance problems. Rarely was more than 50 percent of its contribution operational.
92 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Burma-Siam Railway Japanese shipping disappeared from the Rangoon area

and sea sweeps were not profitable. As of 31 March 1944 the 7th Bombardment

Group (H) had dropped only nineteen tons of bombs on shipping in the

Rangoon area. In practice, then, until June 1944 the railroads were the number

one target for Strategic Air Force. Then Operational Directive 10 gave first

priority to support of Fourteenth Army (the British formation on the Manipur

front) and second to attacks on shipping and railways.23

The Fourteenth Air Force was not an appreciable factor in isolating Burma

through destruction of Japanese shipping. On the other hand, its operations

did introduce the element of delay and uncertainty into the southward movement of Japanese supplies by sea. Eastern Air Command's antishipping operations by bomb and mine made the Japanese happy to leave the task of supplying the Burma Area Army to the Burma-Siam Railway. Up to spring 1944 the

Japanese maintained a limited traffic in small wooden ships between Singapore

and Rangoon. Then the increasing efficiency of the Allied bombers restricted

them to night operations along the coast line, and finally toward the war's end

reduced them to using luggers and farmers' skiffs ("country boats") between

Moulmein and Rangoon.24

In attacking land communications, Strategic Air Force followed four

principles: (1) to attack railways as the most important such target within reach,

(2) to pick bridges as the most vulnerable point on the railway, (3) to isolate

segments of line and destroy rolling stock and engines trapped therein, and

(4) to use diversity of attack to confuse the enemy.

Bombing the railways did not bring major results in the 1943-44 campaign

because the means at the airmen's disposal were inadequate, though they

attacked with devotion and skill. On New Year's Day, 1944, B-25's blew out

140 feet of the 400-foot Mu River span, vital for carrying supplies toward the

Chindwin area. The weather turned bad in January and 50 percent of the

missions were canceled. The 7th Bombardment Group was withdrawn for

special training in February. Its return in March, plus the addition of the 12th

Bombardment Group, made for a greater weight of attack. The 1,650-foot

Sittang Bridge, site of the 1942 tragedy, was crippled in April 1944 as soon as

the Japanese repaired it after months of effort. The 700-foot bridge just north

of Mandalay on the line to Myitkyina was successfully attacked. With these

bridges went more than a score of others. When the Japanese moved against

India, the bombers switched their attention to the roads west from Ye-u and

Wuntho and pounded them daily. Attacks were also made on the Yenangyaung

oil fields.25

The 7,348.3 tons of bombs dropped by the Strategic Air Force up to 30 June

23

 (1) Activities of the 7th Bomb Gp (H), Tenth Air Force, 1 Feb 43-31 Mar 44, MS, p. 1.

KCRC. (2) EAC Despatch, pp. 47-48. 24

 (1) For an analysis of Fourteenth Air Force claims see Stilwell's Mission to China, Chart 8. (2) Japanese Study 116. (3) SEATIC Bull 247, p. 28. MID Library. (4) EAC Despatch, pp. 53-58. 25

 EAC Despatch, pp. 58, 60-63.
THE INDIA-BASED AIR EFFORT 93

BOMBING OF BRIDGES such as this Mu River bypass bridge slowed the movement

of Japanese supplies to the Chindwin area.

1944 did not affect the campaign because they did not disrupt Japanese rail

traffic. Makeshift repairs and gangs of coolies could always carry supplies over

breaks in the lines. The four main sectors on which the Japanese fought in

Burma shared one common peculiarity in that each was separated from the

railhead by many miles of unimproved road. In the case of the 18th Division in

the Hukawng Valley 140 miles lay between it and the railway. The 15th Army

left its railhead even farther behind when it attacked toward Imphal, and

further complicated its supply problems by crossing a major river and a mountain range. When 15th Army failed to take the British supply dumps in the first

rush it simply thrust its head into a noose. The 28th Army in the Arakan

depended on a combination of dirt trails and coastal waterways. Only the 56th

Division on the Salween front had a good supply situation and it was significantly near the Lashio railhead. Until the 3d Indian Division was dropped

astride the railway to Myitkyina that line had no trouble in bringing supplies

to the 18th Division's railhead.

The ultimately crippling Japanese supply problems on the Arakan, Manipur,

and north Burma fronts began at railhead, with the inherent limitations of a

dirt road many times compounded by a steadily worsening truck shortage,
94 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

TABLE 1—TONNAGES SHIPPED TO BURMA OVER BURMA-SIAM RAILWAY:

NOVEMBER 1943-AUGUST 1945

Source: SEATIC Bull 246, Burma-Siam Ry, 3 Oct 45. MID Library.

monsoon rains, and the constant attacks of Allied fighters and bombers.26

Japan's principal supply route to Burma, the Burma-Siam Railway, was not

affected by air bombing in the first six months of 1944. Traffic over it increased

steadily. Allied prisoners of war later reported that on occasion they saw as

many as ten trains a day moving in each direction. After the war, the Japanese

claimed that traffic on the Burma-Siam Railway increased from a daily average

of one train in December 1943 to three trains in June 1944.27 (Table 1)

The coming of the monsoon rains and the diversion of some of the U.S.

B-24's to air cargo operations brought a sharp reduction in strategic bombing.

Tonnage dropped from the 2,069 mark of May to 285 in July and 206 in

26

 In the peak year, 1942, Japanese truck production was but 35,386 units. The shortage of

trucks was general in the Japanese Army. At the end of the war, the Army in the home islands had

but 8,900 trucks. USSBS, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy, pp. 65, 220. App.

Table C-158. 27

 Three sources were drawn on for the above appraisal. (1) Interrogations of Japanese senior officers conducted immediately after the war by SEATIC are in Bulletins 246 and 247, Military

Intelligence Division Library. Among the officers questioned were: Lt. Gen. Masaki Honda, Com- manding General, 33d Army; Lt. Col. Masayuki Taguchi, 56th Division staff; and General Tanaka, Commanding General, 18th Division. (2) Questionnaires, prepared by the authors, were answered

by the above Japanese officers in 1948, plus Lt. Gen. Kunomura Momoyo, 15th Army staff; Lt. Gen. Eitaro Naka, Chief of Staff, Burma Area Army; Lt. Gen. Tadashi Katakura, Chief of Staff, 33d Army; Col. Fujio Kawamichi, Chief of Staff, 56th Division; Maj. Iwao Takahashi, 15th Army

staff; and Lt. Col. Shinroku Iwakoshi, Chief, Imperial Headquarters Supply Section. All replies are in OCMH Files. (3) SEATIC Bull 246 has a wealth of information from prisoner-of-war and

Japanese sources.
THE INDIA-BASED AIR EFFORT 95

August, rising thereafter to 416 in September. Tonnages did not hit the 1,000

mark for the rest of the year.28

Because the U.S. combat effort in Burma was primarily in the air, an

appraisal of air operations cannot be omitted in a theater history. Not until the

fall of 1944 were there two U.S. regimental combat teams in Burma, while in

the air the United States contributed two air forces, the B-29's, and the

tremendous Air Transport Command effort. It is notable that an enormous

disparity of strength in the air could not prevent the Japanese from advancing

at will in the Arakan and Manipur sectors until they reached the point at

which the Indians and British planned to hold and fight it out.

When the battle on the ground was fairly joined, air supply, which is

possible only if the air space over the battlefield is controlled by friendly hands,

prevented the Japanese encircling tactic from defeating the Allies once more.

Allied control of the air permitted continual attacks on the roads supplying the

Japanese, thus making their supply situation on the Imphal front ultimately

impossible. In north Burma, the encircling tactics that Stilwell used against the

Japanese forced them, in the absence of their own air supply, to fight a series

of retreating actions with heavy losses in equipment and supplies, further

complicated by the deficiencies of their primitive line of communications.

It is noteworthy that the heaviest Japanese rail traffic coincided with the

heaviest EAC bombing effort, then fell off sharply in October 1944 when but

500 tons of bombs were dropped. (Table 2) The decline immediately followed

the monsoon rains in which bombing had been light and sporadic. The great

slump in Japanese rail traffic in Burma did not come until January 1945, when

tactical aviation was able to cover the rail net as in spring 1944 it had

interdicted the jungle trails, when Allied troops were progressively overrunning the railways, and when the Japanese shipping situation was approaching the catastrophic. The contrast between the relative futility of the strategic

bombing effort in the 1943-44 campaign and the success of air supply, indicates

that air supply, made possible by air superiority, is the key to Allied victory

in Burma.29

Air Supply

The nature of Burma's terrain and climate and the Japanese military system,

which had taken such clever advantage of them in the 1942-43 campaigns,

28

 EAC Despatch, App. 4. The B-24's carried 2,621 tons of cargo in September 1944. 29

 (1) Bull cited n. 27(3). USSBS, The Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground Army Logistics

(Washington, 1947), p. 57. The tonnage chart on the page cited was drawn by a Japanese officer in 1946. Page 32 in the text says that the decline in traffic is attributable to the monsoon's washing away the makeshift bridges which replaced those damaged by bombing. The chart shows in 1944

and, significantly, 1943 a sharp drop beginning in July-August, or one or two months after the monsoon began. The chart shows this seasonal dip to be an annual feature, falling to the same level every year. Whereas traffic in 1943 recovered sharply, it plummeted in 1944, for late in that year large segments of the rail net came under Allied control.

THE INDIA-BASED AIR EFFORT 97

impressed themselves strongly on the senior Allied ground force officers in

India and Burma. The geographic factors of heavily wooded jungle, rough

terrain, and monsoon climate greatly aggravated the problems of moving supplies on the ground. Roads, when made, had to be maintained, and a great deal

of the road's capacity was consumed by maintenance, thus reducing its pay

load. A more economical system for the supply of forward elements was

needed. In the light of these factors, by summer 1943 the American members

of the staff of the Chinese Army in India explicitly accepted the principle that

when the North Burma Campaign began, troops in the forward area would be

supplied by air.30

The experiments that finally led to this conclusion began with the airdrops

made to refugees fleeing Burma in May, June, and July 1942. That summer,

General Wingate organized his first Long-Range Penetration Group to operate

solely on air supply. Concurrently, a small unit of Australian troops, retreating

from the Japanese across New Guinea's Owen Stanley Mountains, was supplied

by air. When Allied strength in New Guinea permitted a counteroffensive, the

2d Battalion, 126th U.S. Infantry, was supplied by air on its way back over the

mountains. Wingate's February 1943 expedition was supplied by air.31

With these experiences in mind, Stilwell in late February 1943 resolved that

isolated troops in the Naga Hills, such as air-warning stations and Chinese

outposts guarding the Ledo Road, should be supplied by air. Details came from

laundry and ordnance personnel, the 51st Fighter Group supplied containers

and parachutes, the Ferry Command at Chabua assigned some C-47's, and a

junior officer, 1st Lt. Frederick L. Wood, Jr., of Ordnance, was put in charge.

The experiment worked so well that at the end of the year permanent

organization seemed advisable. This covered simply the warehousing, packing,

dropping, and receipt of supplies. By September 1943, the air supply of combat

in north Burma was accepted as a matter of course. G-4 of the Combat Troops,

Ledo Sector, was responsible for target designation and proper delivery. SOS

stored and packed. The air forces delivered. No one organization was charged

with sole responsibility. This division promised future administrative

difficulties.

When the Chinese Army in India opened the North Burma Campaign in

October 1943, the air supply resources committed to the effort were: 1st and 2d

Troop Carrier Squadrons; 518th Quartermaster Battalion (Mobile), charged

with procuring, warehousing, packing, and dropping; the 3841st QM Truck

Company, which did the hazardous and responsible work of kicking supplies

from the transports on schedule; and the 3304th QM Truck Company, which

received and distributed. These units were under Base Transportation Section,

30

 (1) Opn Plan ALBACORE, 8 Aug 43. Folder, ALBACORE, LEDO STRIPTEASE, NCAC Files, KCRC. (2) NCAC Air Supply, pp. 8-I to 16-I. 31

 (1) Frank Owen, The Campaign in Burma (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1946),

p 45. (2) Rpt, G-3 Section During Papuan, New Guinea Campaign, 2 Oct 42-24 Jan 43. AG

332-333.4. (3) Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. VIII.
98 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

KICKERS PREPARE TO DROP SUPPLIES in north Burma.

Base Section No. 3. The problems involved rapidly passed beyond its scope

and in October the base section S-4 took over.32

Allocation of Transport Aircraft

By the end of December 1943, air deliveries had increased from the 199

net tons of April 1943 to 1,391 tons. In percentage the increase was great, but

the greatest development lay in the future. As part of the integration of the air

forces, Troop Carrier Command was activated 15 December 1943 under General

Old, with headquarters at Comilla. Under him were the 1st and 2d Troop

Carrier Squadrons listed above, plus the 27th and 315th Troop Carrier

Squadrons, and 31, 62, 117, and 194 Squadrons of the RAF.33

Mountbatten was fully aware of the possibilities of airborne operations,

while his headquarters was coming to appreciate what might be done by stand32

 NCAC Air Supply, pp. 35-III, 5-III, 7-III, 10-III. Though the kickers shared every hazard

of the aircrew, they long performed their dangerous duties without Air Medals, Distinguished

Flying Crosses, flight pay, a fixed number of missions, or any of the recognition and perquisites given Air Forces personnel. Many kickers had more than 1,400 flying hours, while a considerable number had more than 1,000 hours. 33

 NCAC Air Supply, p. 11-III.
THE INDIA-BASED AIR EFFORT 99

ard infantry divisions on air supply. He sought energetically to increase the

allotment of transports for SEAC and saw the ATC as a source of aircraft for

the proposal to drop a division on the rail line to Myitkyina. The initial agreement was that Mountbatten could divert the equivalent of 1,100 tons a month

from the ATC to furnish air supply to his campaign. Later, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff suggested that while the CCS should recognize that SEAC must have

resources adequate to its tasks it was also necessary to have a firm commitment

to China over the next six months for ATC tonnage. Specifically, the JCS proposed that SEAC's transport allotment be increased from 11 C-47's or 8 C-46's

in February 1944 to 188 C-47's or 126 C-46's in the following month, when

major offensive operations were to take place. The CCS approved, but since

the expected major operations vanished when the Generalissimo refused to

cross the Salween, there were only seventy-six transports on hand for SEAC

when March began.34

Mountbatten did not regard seventy-six planes as adequate, and his representatives in Washington were asked to press for more, on the grounds that his

resources would not permit him to take and hold the Myitkyina area as the

JCS desired. He told them:

After seeing the performance of Stilwell's Chinese forces and hearing of the wonderful

show which Wingate and Cochran's No. 1 Air Commando have put up I am becoming

convinced that Allied Forces could march all over Burma provided they have adequate air

supply and air support and I hope that you will do all you can to emphasize the need for

more transport aircraft and yet more transport aircraft and the rapid formation of further Air

Commandos on Cochran's style both in England and America.35

To Mountbatten's request, thus relayed, General Arnold replied that he was

forming four transport groups totaling 400 aircraft. The first 100 planes went

to SEAC in May 1944. Thus SEAC began to acquire the great fleets of air transports which so changed the nature of war in Burma. The difficulty in the way

of Mountbatten's having the full complement that he requested lay in his

omitting to support his request with detailed plans for future aggressive operations. The Joint Planners, in default of such data, preferred to recommend that

SEAC have but 200 transports and Gen. Douglas MacArthur in the Pacific, the

balance.36

As for the type of transport aircraft used, the C-47 had qualities of stability

that resulted in its being assigned almost all airdropping missions. It was easy

to load and balance the C-47 so long as cargo was tied down as far forward as

possible. When the aircraft was in flight, cargo could be dragged to the door

34

 (1) CCS 411/1, 26 Nov 43, sub: Opns in SEAC. (2) Rad SEACOS 89245, 1 Dec 43. ABC

384 (Burma) 8-25-42, Sec IV, A48-224. (3) Min, CCS 138th Mtg, 7 Dec 43, Item 8. (4) CCS

411/5, 7 Dec 43, sub: Opns in SEAC. (5) Rad RE-240, Brig Gen Vernon Evans, DCofS, USAF

CBI, to Stilwell, 11 Feb 44. Bk 6A, JWS Personal File.

35

SAC for Wedemeyer (1) Mountbatte , 16n Ma Report r 44,. PtSEA. BC, pWa . 73r Diary , pr. 138 . . (2) Quotation from Minute SC4/440/W, 36

 (1) Min, CCS 151st Mtg, 24 Mar 44, Item 3. (2) JCS Memo for Info 302, 11 Sep 44, Incl

C, par. 5.
100 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

and kicked out without upsetting the transport's balance. In the case of the

C-46, cargo had to be arranged in the fuselage literally with slide rule precision

lest the craft's flying qualities be adversely affected. Nor could cargo be shifted

readily when the aircraft was in flight, for the same reason. Therefore the C-46

and the four-engined C-54 were most useful on the Hump, while the stable,

sturdy, and dependable C-47 was excellently adapted to dropping supplies from

low altitudes.37

Administrative Problems

In north Burma, the SOS continually altered and enlarged its organization

to keep pace with the expanding needs of the combat troops for air supply.

Base Section No. 3, under Colonel Pick, recognized that air supply had outgrown the stage at which a quartermaster battalion could meet the responsibility, and decided to activate a packing and airdropping unit on an ad hoc basis.

The 3962d and 3964th QM Truck Companies, of the 518th QM Battalion

(Mobile), plus kicking crews from the 3841st QM Truck Company began

operations on 1 December 1943 from the Sookerating Tea Factory, Sookerating,

Assam, near the airfield of that name. (See Map 1.) It is worthy of note that all

air-delivery equipment used in the CBI Theater was of British or Indian origin.

Not until GALAHAD'S air-supply personnel arrived at Dinjan airfield in late

January 1944 did the air-supply personnel have a chance to examine U.S.-made

airdrop equipment.38 At the front, matters were simplified by a decision to drop

directly to the troops, relieving the quartermaster personnel drawn from the

3304th QM Truck Company of their mission of receiving and distributing. In

February 1944, Base Section No. 3 set up an airdropping section under its S-4

to perform its share of the administrative work of air supply.

Within EAC, the mechanism initially set up by Troop Carrier Command to

apportion aircraft among the several fronts did not work well. Aircraft were

allocated on the basis of advance estimates of a month's requirements in terms

of air-supply tonnage. In practice, it proved impossible for any commander to

estimate the urgency of his needs fifteen to forty-five days in advance. The

result was an inflexibility wasteful of aircraft. G-4 of the Sino-American combat

troops in north Burma had to be forever appealing to Troop Carrier Command

to alter its schedules on the basis of a changed tactical situation, while

simultaneously informing SOS of the degree of priority attached to each

mission.39

The rigidity of this system of aircraft allocation was no doubt a partial cause

of the shortage of aircraft supporting the North Burma Campaign. Even the

37

 Notes of Joseph Bykofsky, Transportation Section, OCMH, on draft manuscript of this chapter. Mr. Bykofsky was in an air supply organization during the later phases of the North Burma Campaign. 38

 NCAC Air Supply, pp. 7-III to 10-III. 39

 NCAC Air Supply, pp. 6-III to 13-III, 17-III to 20-III.
THE INDIA-BASED AIR EFFORT 101

opening of a subdepot at Shingbwiyang airstrip in the Hukawng Valley,

January 1944, though it shortened turnaround time, did not relieve the

problem. General Boatner requested Base Section No. 3 to build the supply

levels in the forward area up to the required point. That his request, with its

implied demand on aircraft, went to SOS, implies the threefold nature of the

air-supply mechanism at that time. A fortnight later Boatner wrote to theater

headquarters, pointing out that he had 14,000 men in advance of the roadhead

and all dependent on air supply, and that a regiment, a tank group, and a

British brigade had been moved into his area with no increase in his air

resources. This recourse yielded nothing, and so finally Boatner wrote directly

to Stilwell.

The theater commander promptly interceded with Stratemeyer and Old. On

11 February Stilwell told Stratemeyer that the next few weeks would be critical,

after which, progress on the Ledo Road would ease the supply situation.

Stilwell understood that troop-carrier aircraft had been diverted, tonnage into

Fort Hertz increased without his consent, and aircraft diverted from air-supply

missions for secret tasks without prior notice. Over a six-day period his headquarters had asked for 158 planeloads and received only 98. Not intending to

be deprived of his resources, Stilwell was depending on Stratemeyer to see that

a failure in air supply did not interfere with his operations.40

The experience with this transport shortage, and the obvious effort to find

a responsible agency, were probably among the reasons for the decision to

reconstitute the Tenth Air Force as the organization supporting Stilwell's campaign. No criticism of the air forces was implied in Boatner's letters, for it was

recognized that the energy, skill, and valor of the pilots and crews in delivering

supplies through all sorts of weather, and meeting the demands of units that

were at times improvident in their use of air supply, often made good the errors

of the other agencies. It was an experimental period.

From January to May 1944, the combat headquarters in north Burma, the

SOS, and Troop Carrier Command argued among themselves over the administration of air supply to Stilwell's forces. Each had good reason for its claim

to be the co-ordinating agency. SOS could contend that supply of the troops

was its normal mission. The airmen considered that their possession of the

means made them logically responsible for delivery at the right time and place,

that SOS could well surrender the related ground operations. Stilwell's field

headquarters was not so active on its own behalf for it did not desire to be

responsible for SOS and AAF activities but it did insist on the needs of the

ultimate consumers. The solution finally settled on in May 1944 was that G-4

of Stilwell's field headquarters, Chih Hui Pu (later Northern Combat Area

Command) should institute and operate a system of priorities.41

40

 (1) NCAC Air Supply, pp. 13-III to 18-III. (2) File 97-1597, 11 Feb 44. Folder, Chinese 38th Div Rads-In, NCAC Files, KCRC. 41

 NCAC Air Supply, pp. 17-III to 20-III.
102 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Matched with the reactivation of Tenth Air Force, 20 June 1944, as Stratemeyer's Tactical Air Force supporting the North Burma Campaign, the decision

to give Stilwell's G-4 control over air-supply priorities meant that Stilwell

controlled his tactical air support and was free to use his air-ground team as

the needs of the campaign might suggest.42 There was the utmost flexibility in

the allocation of aircraft to meet G-4's priorities, and the requirements of the

ground forces in general. Thus, the 3d Combat Cargo Group, AAF, which

arrived in India 30 May, was attached to the Tactical Air Force by the order of

20 June 1944, but supported both the 4 Corps at Imphal and the Chinese

troops in north Burma with impartiality. The group's arrival lifted the total of

AAF transports on hand from 112 to 191. It was an experimental unit with 150

aircrews, some of them veteran ATC personnel.43

Techniques

The techniques worked out by trial and error began to yield remarkable

results by July 1944. Matters did not of course always run smoothly, either

before or after the priority system was set up. On 7 June 1944, the American

liaison officer with the Chinese 38th Division reported that unit had actually

received only twenty-five supply drops of the sixty that G-4 claimed were

delivered. The liaison officer was beginning to be annoyed. Willing though he

was to go hungry, he was profoundly irritated at being assured supplies had

been delivered when he was exceedingly well aware they had not. In November, his successor radioed that if the complete failure of the Chinese medical

supply system was his fault to let him know, but if, in fact, there was no medical supply system, would G-4 please create one. The soldiers at the front were

using parachutes for dressing wounds, and there were practically no drugs left

in the former hospital which was now but a rest camp.44 But if the machine of

air supply was not foolproof, it did ultimately feed, clothe, and arm five

Chinese divisions, one British division, an American brigade, and a host of

service troops.

G-4 of Stilwell's field headquarters changed its former Air Dropping

Section to an Air Control Section to inaugurate the priorities system in late

June. Ninety percent of all requests from units in the field were marked

"urgent" by the submitting unit; they were of course reviewed and reclassified

as "urgent," "first priority," or "second priority," by the airstrip or target

designation of the point to which delivery was requested, and by the air base

whence the load was to originate.

The priorities sheet was teletyped early at night to all interested agencies

42

 EAC Despatch, App. 17a. 43

 EAC Despatch, pp. 123-24. 44

 (1) Rad, Col Thomas F. Van Natta, III, U.S. Ln Off, 38th Div, to Cannon, 7 Jun 44. MTF

Msg Bk, NCAC Files, KCRC. (2) Rad 260-3155, 9 Nov 44. Folder, Chinese 38th Div Rads-In, NCAC Files, KCRC.
Packing supplies for airdrop. Drums of gasoline are prepared (above,)

and eggs are packed by the "country basket" method (below)
104 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

and was used as the daily operational orders on the basis of which SOS assembled and packed the loads, and the Air Forces delivered. G-4 kept complete

data on the supply status of all units supported, so as to equate it with the

progress of operations as reported by G-3. The priorities once set were then

followed up by G-4 to see that deliveries were made or to investigate failures

if any occurred. The priorities sheet in turn permitted operational economies.

Aircraft were loaded at night to be ready for a dawn take-off. Knowing what

loads were available at each field made it possible for aircraft that finished one

mission to go to a near-by field, pick up another load, and make another

delivery before returning to the base. Operation of the priority system brought

an immediate 50 percent increase in tonnage delivered without need for added

facilities.

SOS through study and experiment steadily improved its own methods of

loading aircraft and packing supplies. Generally, they reflected the adoption of

American industrial techniques familiar to many Army personnel through their

civilian experiences. Standardized loads, production line techniques in packaging, prepacking of loads, plant layout designed to speed the flow of material,

simultaneous loading, fueling, and crew briefing, round-the-clock operation of

facilities, all were adopted. Suggestions for improvement in this application of

advanced industrial techniques to jungle warfare came from all ranks, a full 50

percent of whom were Negro troops. In emergencies, air-supply personnel

worked twenty-four hours a day without sleep to get the loads out on time.

There were three methods of delivering supplies—by landing the cargo

aircraft at a forward strip, by parachuting supplies through the door of the

aircraft, and by "free-dropping," as the method of dropping supplies packed

simply in sacks came to be called. (Table 3) The simplest and most economical

procedure, given the existence of a safe and suitably located airstrip, was to

deliver supplies direct from the transport. When that method was possible, its

economy and convenience made it preferable. When airstrips were not available or practical, then free-dropping and parachuting were used, to which the

items most in demand—rations, forage, fuel, and ammunition—were well

adapted. Oil and gasoline were dropped in 55-gallon drums, protected by sacks

of rice husks as bumpers, and suspended from multiple parachutes.

Dropping supplies from the aircraft to the ground raised major problems

of packaging. Since air-supply techniques were being worked out on a local

basis in CBI, and no equipment came from the United States before late in

1943, Indian material had to be used, and proved extremely practicable. A

container that could withstand the impact of the ground—a considerable force

even when parachutes were used—was found in the "country basket." This

was a woven bamboo frame, covered tightly by hessian cloth, with a cradle of

heavy 3⁄4-inch rope fastened to the parachute. Experience revealed that the

baskets should not be too large, so that a number of them could be kicked out

of the aircraft on one flight over the drop zone. The basket proved so sturdy
THE INDIA-BASED AIR EFFORT 105

TABLE 3—TONNAGE DELIVERED TO NORTHERN COMBAT AREA COMMAND BY AIR:

APRIL 1943-MARCH 1945 a

a

 Excludes air supply to GALAHAD.

Source: NCAC History, App. 6, pp. 16-17.

and resilient that there was no need to pack rice husks or sawdust round its

contents. Made by Indian contractors, the country basket was a most useful

tool, and was used in great quantity. Parachutes, too, were of Indian

manufacture.
106 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Because parachutes and containers were relatively expensive and scarce,

free-dropping was used when possible. Rice, salt, animal forage, and various

ration items for Indian troops lent themselves well to being packed in 35-pound

burlap sacks which in turn were put into larger sacks. Once labeled with a

code symbol to indicate the contents, the sack was ready for dropping.

By ingenuity it was found possible to deliver items that would seem most

unlikely candidates for airdropping. Chinese units received live poultry and

pigs as rewards for distinguished action or to mark feast days. Eggs were safely

dropped. Radios, radio parts, high explosives, field ranges and small carts were

able, when carefully packed, to survive dropping.45

Initial operation of the priorities system tended to overload communications

facilities. In July 1944, the theater signal officer joined with the G-4 of

Stilwell's field headquarters to obtain better co-ordination of commercial, SOS,

and AAF lines. "Top priority for their use after 1500 hours was given to air

control." Code machines were obtained and used to send messages in the clear.

The form of messages was also improved. Initially, Signal Corps insisted on

use of its own style in the arranging of messages, with numbers spelled out and

the whole text given as one big paragraph with no indentations for numbered

subheads. As a result, messages on receipt had to be retyped to make them

usable. Repeated protests finally brought agreement to sending radios in any

logical readable form.46

Problems of Air Supply

The greater number by far of the troops supplied by air in north Burma

were Chinese, and Chinese cultural traits in contact with the latest Western

gadgets produced results which ranged from the sidesplitting to the tragic.

Americans and Chinese might not always agree on what was humorous and

what was not, but contacts between the two peoples produced a wealth of

anecdotes and a number of problems. On one occasion, a Chinese unit was first

at the drop field when some blood plasma was delivered. The plasma disappeared, and only later was it learned that the Chinese had made their pack

horses drink it. "But why?" they were asked. "Weren't your horses well?"

"Perhaps so," the Chinese admitted, "but the medicine made them better!"

Chinese troops were far easier to supply by air than were U.S. or British

soldiers. The individual Chinese required but three pounds of rations a day as

against the American's five pounds. He did not ask the variety in his diet that

the American demanded. The Chinese was not only extremely careful of his

possessions, in contrast to the habitually wasteful American soldier, but

Chinese units had a way of acquiring more, and more, and still more equipment, while American units could be trailed by what they discarded. Conse45

 NCAC History, App. 6, pp. 11-22. 46

 NCAC Air Supply, pp. 21-III to 31-III.
THE INDIA-BASED AIR EFFORT 107

quently, "once Chinese Units were fully equipped little was ever heard from

them except requests for ammunition, rations, medical supplies and certain

short-lived items of equipment."

But the Chinese had their failings. Every Chinese unit of any size had its

liaison unit of an American officer or two and some enlisted men. These

received their own rations, mail, and supplies by airdrop through the Chinese

division G-4. Somewhere between the Chinese staff officer and the liaison

team, American mail, packages, and supplies tended to vanish. In the classic

Chinese fashion, rations and ammunition were overordered on the grand scale.

Thus in December 1943, the Chinese 38th Division's requisitions were 280

percent in excess of its strength.

Naturally, there were times when even the extraordinary carrying powers of

the Chinese could not cope with this manna raining down. Supply dumps and

less formal caches were left behind, and there was great barter with the

Burmese. When the Yunnan border was approached, pack trains began to

carry American lend-lease to the Yunnan bazaars, as in the days when the

Burma Road was hailed as "China's life line."

Many American service units such as hospitals were attached to Chinese

units and shared the same dropping fields and airstrips. Sincerely grateful as

the Chinese were for the medical care they received, many Chinese failed to see

any connection between it and the food that was dropped for hospital personnel. Consequently, the medicos had to be vigilant, quick, and strong, to claim

their rations on the instant.

The Chinese seemed to find it hard to mark dropping fields correctly, and

having once marked a field were reluctant to mark it again, feeling that every

pilot in north Burma would know the spot once supplies had been dropped on

it. Occasionally, Chinese fired on transports coming in for a supply drop, and

were extremely careless about putting mortar or artillery fire through the air

space in which transports were flying. For their part the transport crews sometimes carried small arms and grenades and would use both against areas which

they believed held Japanese. They were sometimes mistaken in their beliefs.

Nor did the Chinese ever seem to realize that there was genuine danger in

the falling packages. The Chinese "stood on the field or rushed out from the

sidelines to catch parachuted supplies as they floated like manna from the skies.

Many of these were killed by free dropped rice bags, some crushed and not a

few actually beheaded."

 47

The basic cause of much of the Chinese soldiers' behavior probably lay in a

fear that some day this wonderful and incomprehensible flow would end, a fear

reawakened whenever supplies failed to arrive on time. No Chinese general

had ever been so mad as to pour out goods and wealth like this! Surely even

the American barbarians would someday realize that one did not use good iron

47

 (1) NCAC Air Supply, pp. 57-III to 63-III; quotation on pp. 61, 62. (2) Ltr, Dupuy to Ward, 12 Sep 52. OCMH.
108 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

to make a nail or a good man to make a soldier. But though the supply machine sometimes faltered, it never failed, and the Chinese soldier continued his

patient, valorous, enduring advance.48

Equipment for airdropping was sometimes in very short supply. During

November and December 1943 it was necessary to fly supplies of rope and hessian cloth from Calcutta to Assam since fresh stocks were not forthcoming

through regular channels. Investigation revealed that supplies which had been

dispatched some weeks before had been sent by river barges. These in turn had

been stranded during a period of low water. After this experience supplies were

sent by rail all the way. Parachute stocks on occasion fell so low as to cause

concern. Such emergencies were met by applying "extreme pressure" on the

troops to collect, preserve, and return parachutes, for normally no parachutes

were ever returned from the front.

Because delivery of the desired items to the proper point depended on adequate information, quick and accurate communications between the central

control point for air supply at Ledo and the airfields was necessary. One reason

lay in the fact that sometimes it was necessary to change the destination of a

plane while it was in the air. For another, a steady flow of data as to the requirements of troops was necessary for effective preplanning. Until a teletype

system was installed in May 1944, a telephone was used, and, because of inherent deficiencies in the Indian system of that date, was unsatisfactory.49

The supply effort was not without its price. From January to August 1944

inclusive, the AAF lost 32 transports destroyed or missing, and had 24 damaged.50

 The dollar cost was high, for air supply is an expensive operation,

whose economy is found in its speeding of victory. Even using equipment that

was of Indian manufacture and so less expensive, SOS estimated the cost of air

supply as:

$1,909.65 per ton parachuted

$ 94.07 per ton free-dropped

$ 49.61 per ton landed 51

The cost of parachuting supplies reflects the price of the parachute. To drop

a ton of supplies using American parachutes called for, among other things,

fourteen 24-foot parachutes at $72.00 each, a total of $1,012.00. Free-dropping a

ton of supplies called for $14.75 of drawstring bags and stencil equipment. Expenses could have been sharply reduced if troops and commanders had cooperated in salvaging parachutes, but less than 1 percent was ever reclaimed.

Parachutes were a great aid in softening some of the miseries of war in the

jungle, doing service as objects of barter with the Burmese, foxhole lining,

"tentage, bandages, target panels, towels, handkerchiefs, sheets, and pajamas."

48

 NCAC Air Supply, pp. 57-III to 63-III. 49

 NCAC History, App. 6, pp. 25-26. 50

 EAC Despatch, App. 10. 51

 NCAC Air Supply, p. 1-VII
THE INDIA-BASED AIR EFFORT 109

PARACHUTE-COVERED FOXHOLE in the Burmese jungle.

On its own initiative a drop team of the Chinese 50th Division salvaged 998

British and U.S. parachutes. The saving of $38,000.00 drew a letter of appreciation from the commanding general to the division commander and his drop

crew.

The cost to the Air Forces of one sortie was about $1,285.00. Total expense

of delivering 18,300 tons in one month was $12,688,742.25. The major item

was operating the aircraft, $7,760.00. Next was the expense of parachuting

2,394 tons, or $4,571,000.00. Landing 10,206 tons cost but $47,049.66, which

points an obvious moral, since dollars are the bookkeeping symbol for the expenditure of a given amount of energy, skill, and raw material by the economy

at a time of great strain.52

The B-29 Command Problem

The decision to place B-29's in China, Burma, and India injected yet another command problem into an already tangled situation. Chennault and

Mountbatten both wanted to command the B-29's, confronting Stilwell with 52

 NCAC Air Supply, pp. 1-VIIff.
110 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

a delicate problem of intratheater relationships. Brig. Gen. Edgar E. Glenn,

Chennault's chief of staff, told General Hearn, his opposite number in Stilwell's headquarters, that it was a "well known fact that the Chinese have applied for and have been refused representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff [sic],

the reasons being that the sphere of influence of the JCoS [sic] did not include

China." Because Glenn understood that the JCS were retaining ultimate control of the B-29's, he felt that under the circumstances the command arrangement would anger the Chinese. He further claimed it was unjust that Chennault should not be given command of the B-29's and informed Hearn that

the proposed operations "demand a complete unification of command for

proper co-ordination." Glenn demanded as well that that the B-29 project be

completely divorced from SEAC.53

Hoping to receive command of the B-29's and approval of his strategic

views by a presidential order overruling the Joint and Combined Chiefs of

Staff, Chennault in late January 1944 put his case before the President through

direct correspondence.54 He may have believed that events had provided the

answer to the objections Stratemeyer had raised to his plans in October 1943.

After SEXTANT, the Generalissimo had been offered the opportunity of delaying his portion of the Burma campaign until November 1944. This offer could

be taken as reason to divert Hump tonnage from the Chinese ground forces to

the Fourteenth Air Force. In December 1943, Hump tonnage had jumped from

the 7,300 tons of November to 13,450 tons as the TRIDENT decisions finally

bore fruit.

Basically, Chennault's memorandum and letter to the President were the

familiar Chennault Plan, but with considerable attention to the command

problem posed by the B-29's. Chennault recommended that the B-29's under

his command should attack Japanese industrial targets after air supremacy in

China had been won and Japanese ocean shipping decimated. Fourth priority

should go to attacks on Japanese Army installations in China proper, Formosa,

and Hainan. The Fourteenth Air Force's commander stated that if the Chinese

Army attacked the Japanese positions on the Yangtze River after the Fourteenth Air Force had vigorously bombed them and injured the Japanese line of

communications the Japanese would soon begin to withdraw. Consistent with

his earlier proposals, though he stressed the need for improving the line of

communications to his airfields and estimated the needs of that project in terms

of Hump tonnage, Chennault would provide no Hump tonnage for the Chinese Army. Accordingly he wrote:

8. The objection, that the Japanese ground forces can capture and destroy the East China

air bases, has always been made to previous proposals for a China air offensive of this type.

This objection is founded, however, on experience in a period when the Chinese armies were

entirely without air support. It also ignores the most striking fact of the war in China, that

53

 Rad M 27 JB, Glenn to Hearn, 8 Jan 44. Item 1606, Bk 5, JWS Personal File. 54

 Ltr, Chennault to President, 26 Jan 44. Hopkins Papers.
THE INDIA-BASED AIR EFFORT 111

Japanese forces have never succeeded in penetrating Chinese territory to a distance of more

than about 100 miles from a major supply line. This was so even when the Japanese enjoyed

air supremacy in China. The situation has now been radically changed by the transfer of air

superiority to the Chinese side. In the first place, as has been noted already, traffic on the

major Japanese supply line within China, the Yangtze River, has actually been interdicted

experimentally for a short period of time. Almost all Japanese supply lines within China

are water borne, and can no longer be considered dependable. In the second place, the recent

battle of Changteh, the first in which Chinese troops have had well organized air support,

showed that with this assistance the Chinese armies are quite capable of resisting and throwing back a serious Japanese advance.

9. It is not denied that the Japanese might perhaps capture certain of the East China air

bases if they organized a major offensive, employing large numbers of first class troops and

an overwhelming strength in the air. But organizing such an offensive would be self-defeating. By concentrating their effort in China, the Japanese would inevitably risk rapid loss of

their new empire in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.55

Chennault also pressed his claims with Arnold. He told Arnold that the

cost of B-29 operations from the Cheng-tu area would be prohibitive because of

radar-directed Japanese fighters. Again, Chennault insisted that "the commander

of the air forces in China must be given complete command and control of

all such air forces and supporting services as are based in or are operating from

China."

 56

 Whatever Arnold's views on command may have been, he was

wholeheartedly behind MATTERHORN, the plan for basing B-29's in India,

staging them through China, and using them to cripple Japan's steel industry.

This was apparent in his comments on a letter from Wedemeyer which questioned the possibility of a major bombing offensive from China. Wedemeyer

urged that all Hump tonnage go to the Fourteenth Air Force. On receiving

Wedemeyer's views, Arnold promptly passed them on to Marshall with the remark that they were just another attempt to discourage the long-range bombing of Japan, and reminded Marshall that not long before efforts had been made

to discourage "our" flying 10,000 tons a month over the Hump.57

It is not known whether the President replied directly to Chennault's January 1944 proposals. However, one may surmise that many things had happened since May 1943 to change Chennault's position vis-à-vis the President.

At the time of the TRIDENT Conference, May 1943, the President had been

paying much attention to China. China was an issue in American domestic

politics, as speeches in the Senate made clear. Now, in 1944, American attention was increasingly drawn towards Europe. Everyone in high position knew

that the cross-Channel assault was scheduled for spring and that the whole war

would revolve on it. Against this tremendous fact, even the colorful and dynamic Chennault could not compete. Since the President's personal attention

55

 Plan of Air Operations in China, 1 Jul-Dec 44. Folder, Chennault Air Plan, CT 39, Dr 1, KCRC. 56

 Ltr, Chennault to Arnold, 26 Jan 44, sub: MATTERHORN Project. Bk IX, Hopkins Papers. 57

 Memo, Lt Col George C. Cox for Col Frank McCarthy, 28 Jan 44; Memo, Arnold for Mar- shall, 29 Jan 44, sub: Bombing of Japan. Case 282, OPD 381 China, A47-30.
112 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

CHART 5—TONNAGE SHIPPED FROM INDIA TO CHINA BY AIR: 1944

was being given to pending operations in Europe, he was no longer desiring

to set Hump priorities.

What attention Roosevelt did spare to air matters in China went to the

B-29 project. By an irony of history, Chennault and his friends now occupied

the spot Stilwell and Marshall had filled in May 1943—that of arguing against

a project close to the President's heart.

Therefore, the whole of Chennault's October-January proposals for 1944

was not approved. It remained politic to give the Fourteenth Air Force approximately half of the Hump tonnage being received in China. (Chart 5) The

careful studies of the line of communications to the east China bases, made by

the Fourteenth Air Force and the SOS, bore fruit in a series of theater projects

to improve the eastern line of communications.58 Theater headquarters approved Chennault's proposals for the organization of the reinforcements arriving for him. In late December 1943, the 68th Composite Wing under Col.

Clinton D. Vincent was set up for operations in east China; the 69th Composite Wing under Col. John Kennedy, for operations in the west. In January,

eighteen P-40's and thirty-three B-25's arrived to reinforce, but bad weather

limited operations.59

Admiral Mountbatten was also concerned over the place of the B-29's in

the Allied command structure in Asia. Since his arrival in Asia, Mountbatten

58

 Joseph Bykofsky, The History of Transportation Service in China, Burma, and India, in World War II (Bykofsky MS). OCMH. 59

 Organizational structure of the Fourteenth Air Force is explained in Fourteenth AF History.
THE INDIA-BASED AIR EFFORT 113

had been confronted with delicate and involved command problems. There

was the problem of Mountbatten's relations with his three British commanders in chief, one of whom had been almost openly hostile; there had been the

problem of Mountbatten's relation to Stilwell, who was extremely sensitive

and highly suspicious of Mountbatten; there had been the problem of integrating the air forces into EAC. Mountbatten's remedy for this had been to

blend tact with firmness. Where it seemed advisable he asserted his authority;

on other fronts, he waited to see how the cards were falling.60

Now came the proposal to place still another command within SEAC, one

whose logistic needs would have to be met through the port of Calcutta on

which Mountbatten depended. Support of the B-29's could well mean a diversion of his resources to achieve ends that would contribute nothing toward

accomplishing his directives.61 Consequently, he objected to independent B-29

operations in his theater and offered suggestions to the CCS, which if accepted

would have placed the B-29's at his disposal. Agreeing that the B-29's should

operate under the general direction of the JCS, he suggested that missions be

assigned by the chiefs of staff organization responsible for the theater in which

the B-29's were based (for SEAC, the British Chiefs of Staff were responsible).

Orders from these would go to the commander of the B-29's and to the theater commanders in whose areas the missions would be executed. The B-29

commander would be required to co-ordinate each mission with each theater

commander concerned. In effect, under such an arrangement, each B-29 mission would require the JCS's obtaining the previous assent of the British Chiefs

of Staff, Mountbatten, and the Generalissimo. Mountbatten saw the justification for these suggestions in the probable clash in priorities between MATTERHORN and other projects in his theater.62

The initial CBI Theater orders setting the place of the B-29's in the theater

command structure directed that XX Bomber Command be placed under the

command and control of Stilwell, who in turn was designating Stratemeyer to

exercise it on his behalf.63 Stilwell did not want Chennault to command the

B-29's for fear he would base them at Kweilin and the other east China airfields to raid Japanese shipping. Stilwell believed such a move would provoke

an immediate Japanese reaction and feared the Chinese could not defend the

airfields. A successful defense, he now estimated, would call for fifty rebuilt

Chinese divisions, which were not at hand.64

60

 (1) Extracts, SAC's Personal Diary, 12, 22 Dec 43, 1 Jan, 16 Feb 44. SEAC War Diary. (2) Ltr, Mountbatten to Field Marshal Sir John Dill, 26 Jun 44; Ltr, Wedemeyer to Marshall, 9

Jul 44. Item 70, Folder 57, OPD Exec 10. 61

 Rad RE-338, Egan to Stilwell, 24 Feb 44. Item 48, Bk 6A, JWS Personal File. 62

 Rad DIAL 29, SEACOS, 25 Feb 44. SEAC War Diary. 63

 GO 13, Hq USAF CBI, 30 Jan 44. 64

 (1) CM-IN 8578, Stratemeyer to Arnold, 14 Jan 44. (2) Rad AQUILA 31, Stilwell to Mar- shall, 23 Jan 44. Item 1670, Bk 5, JWS Personal File. (3) Memo, Timberman for ACofS OPD, 2 Nov 43, sub: Bomber Offensive from China. Case 192, OPD 381 CTO, A47-30.
114 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Eleven days after Stilwell put the B-29's under Stratemeyer, Brig. Gen. Kenneth B. Wolfe, commanding the XX Bomber Command, called on Stilwell to

discuss the command problem. The two men agreed that command of the

B-29's should be kept from both Chennault and Mountbatten. Stilwell believed that Stratemeyer, because of the integrated nature of EAC, was vulnerable to pressure from Mountbatten, and even more, feared that Stratemeyer contemplated arrangements which would give Chennault practical control of the

XX Bomber Command. Therefore, with General Wolfe's concurrence and in

accord with a suggestion from Marshall, Stilwell set up a new command structure on February 15, 1944.65

The order Stilwell issued stated that "following general directives from the

United States Joint Chiefs of Staff" the XX Bomber Command would be under

Stilwell's "direct command and control." Logistical support, so far as it lay

within the capabilities of the local air force commanders, was split between

Stratemeyer and Chennault on a geographic basis, the former in India, the latter in China. Where B-29 operations in Southeast Asia and China were concerned, Stratemeyer was to consult with Wolfe, then offer his recommendations

to Stilwell. Chennault was to do the same for B-29 operations from bases in

China. In effect, this meant that Wolfe would direct the XX Bomber Command in operations along the lines laid down by general directives from the

JCS.

The manner in which these orders had been framed is most indicative of

the personal relations that obtained among several of the China-Burma-India

Theater commanders on the eve of the theater's most intense activity, and so

was significant. But on 28 March the JCS brushed aside the contentions of the

local commanders and decided that the China-based B-29's would be commanded from AAF headquarters in Washington. In effect, they would be commanded like a fleet at sea which might base now at this island, and now at that,

but would not be tied to any one theater.66 Stilwell and Chennault, therefore,

had their authority circumscribed in that this great new engine of war would

draw on their reserves, would affect events in their theater, for which they

would later be held responsible, but would not be at their disposal.

Logistical Problems of the B-29's

In retrospect, Maj. Gen. Vernon Evans, who had a wide and varied experience in CBI as Deputy Chief of Staff, Rear Echelon (the New Delhi headquarters), and later Chief of Staff and Theater Commander, India-Burma Theater,

remarked that the support of XX Bomber Command was among the major

logistical problems of CBI Theater.67 Since CBI Theater had built roads and

65

 (1) Stilwell Diary, 11 Feb 44. (2) Note, Stilwell's hand, titled Black Book, SUP 55. 66

 Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II: V, The Pacific: MATTERHORN to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 45-52. 67

 Interv with Gen Evans, Jul 46.
THE INDIA-BASED AIR EFFORT 115

pipelines across the jungle and the mountains, had equipped and supplied

Chinese troops, and nurtured two air forces, it is plain that General Evans was

comparing preparations for and support of the XX Bomber Command with

logistical problems of the first magnitude.

CBI Theater had to build five airfields in India for the B-29's, complete

with facilities, and link them to the oil tanker terminals by a pipeline; arrange

for the building of airfields in China; supply common-user and Air Forces

items, both in India and in China; furnish higher echelon maintenance; fly

gasoline and supplies over the Hump to Cheng-tu. The last was a tender point.

Though MATTERHORN was supposed to be fully self-supporting, from February to October 1944 ATC had to fly 17,931 tons over the Hump to Cheng-tu.

This tonnage was a very heavy drain on the meager resources available for U.S.

operations in China, and equal to the tonnage flown into China for the Chinese

Army from May 1942 to October 1944.68

CBI began its share in B-29 airfield construction in India by supplying

trucks and heavy equipment from other projects to supplement the Indian

forces extending the existing runways. The U.S. engineer battalions allotted to

the task were slow in arriving and it was necessary to divert two aviation engineer battalions from the Ledo Road. By 18 March, SOS, CBI, could report

that the fields at Kharagpur and Chakulia were "barely operational" and on

schedule. On 30 June four fields were ready, with the fifth, Kalaikundah, delayed because an engineer aviation battalion was diverted for forward airstrip

building.69 Because oil supply by tank car would have sorely strained transport,

it was decided to lay pipelines from the oil terminal at Budge-Budge to the

fields. (See Map 1.) By 23 February 1944, Indians and Americans working together strung 100 miles of pipe, and by 13 March pumping to the storage tanks

at Kharagpur and Chakulia could begin.70

In China, after initial difficulties over finance were overcome, the Chinese

Government went forward with a tremendous airfield construction program.

About 200,000 peasants were mobilized, some of them volunteers, most conscripted. To these were later added 100,000 more, plus 75,000 contract laborers.

American and Chinese engineers laid out the runway extensions, for as in India

the Cheng-tu B-29 fields were existing fields, extended and improved. Using

hand implements and pulling rollers by sheer muscle power, the peasants finished four B-29 fields and three fighter strips by 1 May 1944. The Chinese War

Area Service Corps furnished housing and food, for XX Bomber Command

tried to keep the number of Americans at Cheng-tu to a minimum to lessen

the burden on the Chinese economy.71

68

 History of CBI, Sec II, Ch. VIe. (2) Briefing Data Prepared for Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley. Hurley Papers. (See Bibliographical Note). 69

 Rpts, Gen Covell, CG, SOS USAF CBI, to Somervell, 4, 21 Jan, 23 Feb, 18 Mar, 17 Apr,

21 Jun, 19 Jul 44. OCMH. 70

 SOS in CBI, pp. 459-60. 71

 History of CBI, Sec. II, Ch. VIe.
116 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Summary

When Stilwell entered the field in December 1943, an important prerequisite of victory was at hand—control of the air. With care and foresight, he

had armed and trained two Chinese divisions, was preparing a third, and had

secured solemn guarantees of untrammeled command. The rapid growth of

U.S. air power, the increasing knowledge of what air power could do, gave

Stilwell by December 1943 an advantage that his adversary, General Tanaka,

could not hope to match. Hundreds of miles ahead of Stilwell the bombers

ranged, harassing Tanaka's supply lines. Unrestrained, the reconnaissance

planes peered up and down the valleys. The fighters came on call to blast machine gun nests and entrenchments. Endlessly, the transports sailed overhead,

cascading rice, bullets, and bandages to Stilwell's Chinese. Liaison planes now

evacuated the wounded from the jungle, where once their injuries would have

meant slow death.

In only one way did the new strength and potentialities of U.S. air power

positively handicap Stilwell and CBI Theater in the campaigns of 1943-44.

The XX Bomber Command's B-29's, with their demands on Hump tonnage

and theater facilities, conflicted directly with Stilwell's still unrepealed though

practically abandoned mission of reforming the Chinese Army. That the B-29's

were flying from China would be to the Japanese one more reason for a

major effort there, yet B-29 demands on Hump tonnage made it even more

unlikely that anything effective would be done to stop the Japanese once they

moved.

With the conclusion of this period of planning and preparation, which may

be taken as roughly October-December 1943, the Allied war in China, Burma,

and India proceeded by force of geographic circumstance in two very distinct

compartments. On the India-Burma side of the Hump, Stilwell was fighting

his own campaign, to break the blockade of China. For many months, events

in Burma and India proceeded without affecting those in China, and Stilwell

left the conduct of the war in China Theater to its Supreme Commander, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. As the campaign in Burma moved to its climax,

the center of interest shifted to China, where events began to crowd ever faster

on one another. But the two campaigns moved separately, on either side of a

gigantic mountain range. Though they affected one another, they were related

only at the highest level; the daily ebb and flow of battle might have been in

two separate wars. The campaign in Burma was the first to reach the critical

point.
PART TWO

THE NORTH BURMA CAMPAIGN

DECEMBER 1943-AUGUST 1944

CHAPTER IV

Breaking the Stalemate in

North Burma

A great semicircle of Allied forces stood around Burma in December 1943.

With the exception of Stilwell's forces, which had breached the mountain

barriers in north Burma, Allied forces were in positions that roughly conformed

to the natural defenses that ring Burma in a long Gothic arch with its apex

toward the north. The forces on the west or Indian side were under SEAC and

Mountbatten; those to the east or Chinese side, under the Chinese Expeditionary Force, Gen. Wei Li-huang commanding. In the southwest, in the

Arakan area along the Bay of Bengal, was the British 15 Corps (5th and 7th

Indian Divisions and 81st West African Division). Since November 1943 they

had been driving in the forward positions of the Japanese 55th Division in order

to seize an area from which, with amphibious support, they might take the

airfields and the port of Akyab on the Arakan coast. (Map 5*)

About 300 miles to the north, SEAC had its 4 Corps (17th, 20th, and 23d

Indian Divisions). Here there was only patrol activity, but in early 1944 the

corps was scheduled to take the offensive into Burma to keep Japanese forces

from moving north to stop Stilwell. 4 Corps faced the Japanese 33d and 31st

Divisions.

In the Hukawng Valley, Stilwell had the Chinese 38th Division, with

elements of the 22d Division coming forward. They were fighting the Japanese

55th and 56th Regiments, 18th Division, and were driving across north Burma to

break the blockade of China.

On the China side, on the long Salween River front, were the eleven

divisions of the Chinese Expeditionary Force. Opposite them the Japanese had

*For explanation of enemy unit symbols, see note 82(3), page 42, above.
Map 5
BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN NORTH BURMA 121

their 56th Division. The Japanese deployment left one Japanese division in

reserve, the 54th.l

The terrain feature on which the campaign, seen in its largest sense,

currently focused was the town of Myitkyina. Lying in the center of north

Burma, at the southern tip of the mountain range or Hump over which the

transports flew to China, and possessed of road and rail links with the rest of

Burma and with China, Myitkyina had strategic advantages to which the Joint

and Combined Chiefs attached great importance. Were Myitkyina and its airfields in Allied hands, the transports of the ATC could fly a lower, broader

route to China. Were Myitkyina in Allied hands, the Ledo Road and its companion pipelines could link with the prewar communications net of North

Burma, Myitkyina would become a great supply center, and the end of China's

blockade would be at hand.

In their current position around the obscure wrecked villages of Yupbang

Ga, Sharaw Ga, and Ningbyen, Stilwell's Chinese were on the Burman side of

the mountains that separate Burma and India. They were at the north end of

the long corridor of the Hukawng and Mogaung valleys whose southern exit

is within easy march of Myitkyina, and the Irrawaddy valley that forms so

much of central Burma. The principal barrier between Stilwell and Myitkyina

was the three regiments of the Japanese 18th Division. These skilled veterans

under the competent leadership of General Tanaka could be counted on to

make good use of the several dominant terrain features that lay between

Stilwell's troops and the streets, houses, bazaars, and temples of Myitkyina.

The SEXTANT decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in December 1943

required that Stilwell occupy upper Burma in spring 1944. To carry out this

order Stilwell would have to break the stalemate that had developed in the

northern end of the Hukawng Valley. These were the elements of the stalemate:

The three battalions of the 112th Regiment, Chinese 38th Division, had been

sent forward into the north end of the Hukawng Valley to hold the line of the

1

 (1) The strength of the Japanese forces during the winter of 1943-44 caused discussion among Allied leaders at the time, a discussion reflected in some postwar accounts. The Japanese took Burma with four divisions, the 18th, 33d, 55th, and 56th. In summer 1943 they added a fifth, the 31st Division. In December 1943, while trying to persuade the Chinese to attack across the Salween into Burma, Stilwell used the estimate of five Japanese divisions. He erred, in that the 54th Division had entered Burma in fall 1943, but had not yet been identified. The Generalissimo

in December told Stilwell that there were eight Japanese divisions present. As noted in Chapter I, above, reports were circulating in October 1943 that the original Japanese force of four divisions had been reinforced by four more; the Generalissimo's estimate may have reflected these reports. During the months of January and February 1944, the 2d Division entered Burma by rail, while the 15th Division arrived during the three-month period of January-March, moving by foot and truck over the Kengtung-Takaw road. This made a total of eight Japanese divisions in Burma by March

1944. The statement in the Mountbatten Report, Part B, paragraph 66, that "by January"—pre- sumably by 1 January 1944—the Japanese forces in Burma had been increased to eight divisions cannot be reconciled with the information in the SEATIC bulletins and Japanese studies. If one allows for the period of many weeks needed for a Japanese division to close at its Burmese station, the Mountbatten Report necessarily implies that leading elements of the 2d and 15th Divisions

entered Burma in October and November 1943. Statements to that effect do not appear in the Jap- anese sources used by the authors, Japanese Studies 89, 133, and 134. (2) SEATIC Bull 240. (3)

Mountbatten Report, Pt. B, pars. 32-53.
122 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Tarung Hka and Tanai Hka. The Tarung, flowing from north to south, enters

the westward-flowing Tanai about six miles southwest of the village of Yupbang

Ga. The rivers lay in the path of the engineers building the Ledo Road; it was

essential to hold their crossings. Moving forward on this mission, the battalions

of the 112th had met the outposts of the Japanese, elements of the 55th and

56th Regiments, 18th Division.

The Chinese battalions were soon cut off as the Japanese used their customary device of encirclement. The 1st Battalion at Yupbang Ga, the 2d

Battalion in the Sharaw Ga area (both on the Tarung), and the 3d Battalion at

Ngajatzup, about twenty-five miles southwest of Yupbang Ga in the Taro

Plain, were all surrounded, relying on air supply, and apparently powerless to

cut their way out. Nor had the initial attempts to relieve them been successful.

The commander of the 38th Division, General Sun Li-jen, had tried unsuccessfully in mid-December to relieve the 1st Battalion at Yupbang Ga. He used

reinforcements for whose presence he was in considerable measure indebted to

a visit by the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang two weeks earlier.2

The Chiangs Visit Their Troops

On 30 November 1943 the headquarters of the Chinese Army in India was

visited by Generalissimo and Madame Chiang on their way back from Cairo;

they still believed the Allies were in accord on Burma operations. While the

Generalissimo spoke with Generals Sun and Liao, Madame Chiang asked

General Boatner if the Chinese troops had not failed to bypass the Japanese

and go ahead. Boatner shared her impressions. Asked by Madame Chiang to

explain, Sun replied that he had no reserves available at the front. On Boatner's

asking if the arrival of these reserves would set him to enveloping the Japanese,

Sun concurred. Madame Chiang again raised the issue, and again Sun said yes.

Then the Generalissimo called Boatner before him to receive his views,

Madame Chiang interpreting. The Generalissimo asked that his expressions be

passed on to Stilwell. Boatner reported the Generalissimo as saying:

. . . our forces were at a big disadvantage, that supply was most difficult, that no road was

available for rapid troop movements and the Japanese had every advantage to include large

forces in our immediate front. He stated that we should not provoke a large-scale battle with

the Japanese and we should not cross the Tarung-Tanai River until February, because at that

time the British would move to the South and the Chinese would move from Yunnan. He

stated that the Chinese force used to hold the present river line should not exceed one

regiment. He explained that this force was desirable because we had only six regiments and

if two were cut off by the enemy we would have only four regiments left.3

General Boatner replied that at most two Japanese battalions faced the 38th

2

 Overlay, Hq 5303d (Prov) Combat Trs, 13 Nov 43; Overlay, 4 Dec 43. NCAC Files, KCRC. 3

 Memo, Boatner for Stilwell, 2 Dec 43, sub: Rpt on Conf with Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang, 30 Nov 43. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN NORTH BURMA 123

Division, that air supply kept the Chinese well fed and well armed, that the

movement forward was, properly speaking, not an offensive at all but made

necessary by the progress of the Ledo Road. Boatner also explained the system

of liaison and command—that he, Boatner, simply passed on Stilwell's orders.

Then the gathering paused for dinner.

The minutes of the conference suggest that in the light of the First Burma

Campaign's experiences Boatner was alarmed by the Generalissimo's statements

before Sun and Liao that the defensive should be adhered to and only one

regiment risked. As soon as the Generalissimo's party sat down to dinner, the

Generalissimo again stated that in his opinion only one regiment should

defend the river line. Asked what would happen if that regiment were not

enough, the Generalissimo replied: "Well, of course you will have to think up

a method (Hsiang I Ko Pan Fa)." Boatner acted at once, and:

. . . immediately told Madame Chiang that I considered the Generalissimo's statement in

reference to using only one regiment of the utmost importance; that if he told his division

commanders that only one regiment would be used and if thereupon he, the Generalissimo,

left the area, the situation might change abruptly and a catastrophe result before he could

make necessary changes in orders. I quickly added, again to Madame Chiang, that this was

of utmost importance and the Generalissimo must realize that many of his officers took his

views and wishes as explicit orders, and that such would severely handicap future operations

in this sector. Upon receiving Madame Chiang's interpretation, the Generalissimo quickly

replied that these were not orders, only his views, and that you [Stilwell] had complete

authority. I then asked Madame Chiang if she would make certain that the Generalissimo

would make this crystal clear to Generals Sun and Liao. The Generalissimo agreed.

After dinner the Generalissimo told Sun and Liao in a very formal manner

that his remarks on operations were simply his personal views and that Stilwell's orders were to be carried out in full. The meeting had been friendly and

cordial throughout, thought General Boatner, and he so reported.4

On learning of this conference, Stilwell told Madame Chiang that the stalemate had been caused by General Sun's failure to maneuver aggressively. (It

will be recalled that the tendency was to underestimate the number of Japanese

then present around Yupbang Ga.) The discussion, partly personal and partly

by radio, ended with Stilwell's assurance that reinforcements were coming, and

Sun's solemn promise to Madame Chiang that he would indeed bypass the

entrenched Japanese when his reinforcements arrived. Stilwell capped the

episode by writing a letter to Sun asking him to make his promise to Madame

Chiang a matter of record.5

Stilwell then told Boatner that Sun was free to use the whole 38th Division

and could move up a regiment of the 22d Division to a reserve position if he

4

 Memo cited n. 3. 5

 Ltr, Stilwell to Sun, 11 Dec 43, sub: Unsatisfactory Methods Employed During Present Opns;

Ltr, Stilwell to Sun, 9 Dec 43, sub: Accomplishment of Promise Made to Mme. Chiang 30 Nov 43. Folder, Combat Rpt Fwd Ech and Ln O's, ALBACORE Hist Files, NCAC Files, KCRC.
124 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

wished; the latter request Boatner had earlier refused because he wanted to

train the 22d Division for a few months more.6

Almost immediately, General Sun tried to relieve the beleaguered 1/112th

at Yupbang Ga. On 15 December the 1/114th, supported by the 6th Battery,

38th Division Artillery, attacked. Firing the first preparation of the campaign,

the battery was thought to have driven away the crews of three of the four

Japanese machine gun positions separating the two battalions. The Chinese

waited ten minutes, then gingerly probed the Japanese positions with a small

patrol. Fired on by the remaining machine gun, the Chinese withdrew to their

own lines. The Japanese then reoccupied and strengthened their positions so

that later attacks found them much more formidable.7

Yupbang Ga

Taking up his duties as Commanding General, Chinese Army in India, Stilwell arrived at Shingbwiyang, in the Hukawng Valley, on 21 December. That

day and the next he spent with General Sun and the several staffs in examining

the local situation. In the Yupbang Ga-Sharaw Ga-Ningbyen area, the serpentine Tanai Hka, flowing roughly from southeast to northwest, most shapes

the local topography. Almost immediately south and southwest of the Tanai

is the hill mass of the Wantuk Bum. Flowing almost due south until it meets

the Tanai is the Tarung. The two rivers thus form the eastern and southern

boundaries of a small terrain compartment. The traveler or the army that wants

to leave the compartment on the south must use the Kantau ford; the eastern

exits are the fords at Yupbang Ga and Ningbyen. To get his campaign under

way, Stilwell would have to pry the Japanese grip from the Chinese units at

the Tarung Hka crossings at Yupbang Ga and Ningbyen. Fortunately for him,

the Japanese had omitted to guard the Kantau ford, so that the exit to the

south across the Tanai was open. (See Map 4.)

The Japanese positions seemed to Stilwell and his staff to be along the

Tarung Hka with their left flank resting somewhere near the hills of the Wantuk Bum. Thus, their line ran north and south, roughly parallel to the Tarung,

and the unguarded Kantau ford seemed to open an obvious opportunity to attempt an envelopment of their left or southern flank. If the Chinese could

move a force across the Tanai at Kantau, then send it moving eastward along

the Tanai's southern bank, they might well succeed in placing themselves in

the Japanese rear and cutting off Tanaka's force north of the Tanai. Such a

stroke might well result in disaster for Tanaka's 55th and 56th Regiments and

decide the campaign in its first months.

6

 Sun had complained to Stilwell that the orders he received even specified the units he was to use. Rad, Stilwell to Boatner, 14 Dec 43; Rad RELOT G 335, Boatner to Ferris and Hearn, 6 Dec 43. Items 1518, 1504, Bk 5, JWS Personal File. 7

 Comments by Col Dupuy on NCAC History, 1, 29 (hereafter Dupuy Comments); Notes by

Col Dupuy on draft MS (hereafter, Dupuy Notes); Ltr, Dupuy to Ward, 24 Sep 51. OCMH.
BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN NORTH BURMA 125

Sun's initial proposals were to send the 3/114th, 38th Division, south

across the Tanai at Kantau ford to cut around the Japanese left, while two additional companies tried to swing around the northern end of the Japanese line

by crossing the Tarung north of Sharaw Ga. Stilwell objected that the proposed forces were too small. In lieu of the attempted envelopment of the Japanese northern flank by two companies, he substituted a strong attack toward

Yupbang Ga, which, after breaking the Japanese center and relieving the

1/112th, would hook north and envelop the northern fragment of the Japanese line. The force sent to move around the Japanese left was finally set at

a regiment.8

The commander of the Chinese 114th Regiment was put in command of

the operations around Yupbang Ga, since his unit had been chosen to make

the effort, with the 112th Regiment co-operating as best it could. Supported

by the 5th and 6th Batteries, the 1/114th deployed with companies in line.

Four Japanese strongpoints in a rough square barred them from the 1/112th.9

Preceding the attack, which was launched on 24 December, another artillery preparation was fired, with great accuracy, for only thirty yards separated

the two forces at some points. When the Chinese went in at 1000, the Japanese held stoutly, because this time there was no element of surprise. The

Chinese had waited five minutes after the fire lifted before attacking and had

blown a bugle in the accepted Chinese practice. The Japanese fought with their

accustomed stubbornness and counterattacked thirty minutes after the Chinese

companies in the attack at last made contact with each other at 1300 in the Japanese position. Small parties of Japanese held out in foxholes and dugouts.

At 1500 the Chinese battalion commander, Maj. Peng Ke-li, enveloped the

Japanese right flank, and at 1515 another element made contact with the besieged battalion, which had remained in its lines during the fight. By dark the

smallest Japanese pocket had been surrounded, and it was wiped out the next

morning though one dogged machine gunner was still firing at 1000. The survivors of the other pocket fought their way clear during the night. The enemy's

defense had been active. Every night patrols were out raiding, and the Japanese still held the west bank of the stream.

This little battle, bitterly fought at close quarters, made a great impression

on the men of the 38th Division. Many of them were new, had heard stories of

the 38th Division's successes in the First Burma Campaign, and now felt that

they too could beat the Japanese. The Chinese soldiers talked of it over and

over again during the rest of the drive on Myitkyina; the first victory is never

forgotten.10

8

 Note in Stilwell's hand, written between 8 and 11 January 1944. JWS Misc Papers. 9

 (1) Dupuy Comments. (2) The Stilwell Papers, pp. 273-74. (3) Stilwell Sketch, NCAC

History, I, 30B. (4) Dupuy Notes. 10

 (1) Photostat 203, Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. (2) Stilwell Sketch, NCAC His- tory, I, 30B. (3) Dupuy Comments. (4) Major Peng received the Silver Star for this action. GO

46, Hq USAF CBI, 15 May 44.

BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN NORTH BURMA 127

The Japanese, too, were impressed by Yupbang Ga: ". . . the unexpected

stubbornness of the Chinese troops in the fighting around Yupbang Ga led the

Japanese to believe that troops that faced them were far superior in both the

quality of their fighting and in their equipment to the Chinese troops they had

been fighting in China for years. Too, after witnessing a spectacular [supply]

airdrop of Allied forces the Japanese realized that the fighting power of the

American-Chinese forces was not to be underestimated."

 11

The success pleased Stilwell, but a warning of a major Japanese threat may

have spoiled his Christmas Day. Accepting at face value intelligence that he

was to be attacked by the Japanese 18th and 31st Divisions, he called General

Sun into conference and told the Chinese commander of his plans to meet so

grave a threat. Stilwell planned to seize Taihpa Ga with the 38th Division,

then fortify it, while the 22d Division did the same in the Taro Plain. Chih

Hui Pu was to speed the arrival of the 65th Regiment, 22d Division. Thus, for

the next few days Stilwell's intent was to seize good defense positions, "then

let Japs attack."

 12

The initial success at Christmas did not take Yupbang Ga from the agenda.

The Japanese between the 1/112th and the river still held, blocking the crossing. Three battalions were to be used in driving them out, the 1/114th,

2/114th, and 1/112th, supported by the 5th and 6th Batteries. Facing them

were at least the 4th and 6th Companies, 2/55th, with machine guns attached,

holding three strongpoints some 300 yards northwest of the river, and three

more along its bank.

Attacking from the north, the three Chinese battalions began the operation

at 1000, 28 December. By 1430 the 1/112th on the right flank had swept in

behind the three outer strongpoints to take one of those along the river. The

position forming the left flank of the Japanese outer defenses fell at 1400; then

the Chinese found that this point and its immediate neighbor were linked by

tunnels through which the Japanese freely moved. Little progress was made

until the Chinese who had assaulted these defenses bypassed the Japanese supporting position and went on to the river. This stroke seemed to force the

Japanese from the three outer positions. In the meantime the 1/114th broke

the resistance at one of the points on the river, which had been somewhat isolated from the other Japanese positions. A counterattack that night from one

of the two remaining strongpoints failed, and the point itself was wiped out

the next morning.

The survivors of the Japanese companies split into small groups which

held out for several days. There was a fluid situation, with "firing all around."

The last Japanese strongpoint, in a sort of anticlimax, held out till 13 January.

11

 Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. II. Draft chapters on the north Burma fighting were sent

to General Headquarters, Far East Command, to obtain Japanese comments. (See Bibliographical

Note.) The comments were returned in a manuscript, hereafter cited as Japanese Comments, which

is in OCMH. 12

 Stilwell Diary, 25 Dec 43.
128 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

In the first attempt to clear it on 5 January, the Chinese met land mines, which

inflicted forty casualties. On the next day an attempt with three companies following an artillery preparation failed when one company commander attacked

ahead of time. The position was penetrated but the Chinese suffered such

losses that they had to fall back. By good fortune, the last attack was made as

the Japanese were finally pulling back across the river and yielded an unexpectedly large dividend of casualties.

The Chinese units trapped to the north, in the Sharaw Ga area, were relieved by elements of the 113th Regiment on 31 December 1943, for with the

Chinese successes around Yupbang Ga the Japanese position to the north was

plainly untenable. The line of the Tarung Hka was now firmly in Chinese

hands.

At the south end of the line, in the area where the Tarung flows into the

Tanai, and where Sun planned to envelop the Japanese left, the envelopment

had not progressed with the speed Stilwell desired. The 3d Battalion of the

114th, later followed by the 2d Battalion, marched south to the Kantau ford

and crossed the Tanai in the second week of December, moving in column of

companies. Its 8th Company stayed at the Kantau ford; the 7th Company

halted at the second bend of the river from Kantau and dug in. To the very

skeptical Stilwell, Sun claimed that he had ordered the 6th Company to proceed and cut off the retreat of the two Japanese regiments to the north. The

6th Company stayed where it was until 9 January 1944.13

Unknown to Sun and Stilwell the Chinese in the Kantau area faced a Japanese raiding force of about forty men which Tanaka had sent to swing wide

round his left in order to cut behind the Chinese front-line positions and attack the truck parks, supply dumps, and command posts around Ningbyen and

Shingbwiyang. The 18th Division had not expected to meet the Chinese. These

latter posed so grave a threat to Tanaka's flank that their subsequent passivity

puzzled their opponents as much as it gratified them.14

The fighting had by the end of 1943 cost the 38th Division 17 officers and

298 enlisted men killed, and 20 officers and 409 enlisted men wounded. The

bulk of the casualties were suffered by the 112th Regiment, and 356 replacements for it left Ledo on 3 January 1944.15

Stilwell's role had not been easy. Analyzing the operation in his usual

fashion, he noted grave Chinese errors: "Dissipation of force. . . . Piece-meal

action. . . . Extreme caution and extreme slowness of movement. . . . Fear of

imaginary terrors. . . . Bad recon and security. . . . Fear of going around. . . .

13

 (1) Note cited n. 8. Stilwell doubted Sun's aggressiveness. (2) NCAC History, I, 31A. (3)

G-3 Per Rpts, Hq 5303d (Prov) Combat Trs, 4 Jan, 11 Jan 44; Sketch of Sharaw, Hq Fwd Ech, 5303d (Prov) Combat Trs, 28 Dec 43. NCAC Files, KCRC. 14

 (1) Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. II. (2) Japanese Officers' Comments, Incl 4, Tanaka. 15

 (1) Stilwell Sketch. Photostat 209, Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. (2) Overlay and

sketches, NCAC History, I, 30-32. (3) Dupuy Comments. (4) Overlay, Hq 5303d (Prov) Com- bat Trs, 28 Dec 43; Sketch, Disposition of Units of 1st Bn, 113th Regt as of 8 Jan 44, signed Capt

N. R. Lester. Folder, Overlays, ALBACORE Opns, Sitreps Hist, etc., 11 Jan 44, NCAC Files, KCRC.
BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN NORTH BURMA 129

JAPANESE FIFTEENTH ARMY COMMANDER AND STAFF. Seen left to

right, front row, are Lt. Gen. Genzo Yanagida, Commander, 33d Division, General

Tanaka, Commander, 18th Division, General Mutaguchi, Commander, Fifteenth Army,

Lt. Gen. Sukezo Matsuyama, Commander, 56th Division, and Lt. Gen. Kotoku Sato,

Commander, 31st Division.

Result—Loss of men. Loss of chance to bag Japs."

 16

 He felt that the 3/114th

was not pushing its envelopment, that it could have slipped up behind the

Japanese from the south. Stilwell found it difficult to get an accurate idea of

Japanese strength. One trusted staff officer thought them "awfully strong"

across the Tarung; another, that there were only 400 Japanese facing the 38th

Division. But his major problem was trying to make the Chinese more

aggressive.17

The Opponents Shape Their Plans

The warning of a Japanese offensive that had clouded Stilwell's enjoyment

of Christmas was an exaggeration but not an error, for General Tanaka had had

no intention of remaining on the defensive. He had planned to attack with his

16

 Handwritten note, 1943. JWS Misc Papers. 17

 (1) Stilwell Diary, 26-30 Dec 43. (2) Tanaka gives his strength in the engagement as 600 men. Japanese Officers' Comments, Incl 4, Tanaka.
130 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

55th and 56th Regiments, leaving the 114th Regiment to garrison Myitkyina, but

had been overruled in mid-December 1943 by General Mutaguchi of the 15th

Army. Since preparations were then actively under way for an attack on Imphal,

Mutaguchi believed he could not spare additional motor transport units to give

the necessary logistical support to the 18th Division. Tanaka therefore received

orders that severely restricted him. The 18th's commander was told that any

movement of reinforcements north of the Tanai must have Mutaguchi's personal approval. The 18th could counterattack in the area around Maingkwan,

near the south end of the Hukawng Valley; at the very least, it must hold

Kamaing, just south of the ridge line that separated the Hukawng and Mogaung valleys. Weighing his orders, Tanaka began to plan with the hope that

by the time the monsoon rains fell in May or June he would have created a

stalemate somewhere near the ridge line.18

Therefore General Tanaka planned a delaying action down the Hukawng

Valley, for which he had several advantages. The terrain was admirably suited

to such an attempt, and the Japanese had complete and detailed knowledge of

the Chinese order of battle. Moreover, the Japanese infantry were now supported by the 18th Field Mountain Artillery Regiment with twelve 75-mm.

mountain guns and four 150-mm. howitzers. Transport difficulties made it

necessary to leave the remainder of the regiment in the rear. The engineers

of the 18th Division were also present. After the war, Tanaka estimated his

strength in the Hukawng Valley at 6,300 men. These plus the 114th Regiment

stood between Stilwell and Myitkyina.19

Stilwell's plans immediately after the successful action at Yupbang Ga

remained fluid. Probably he still feared that attack by the 18th and 31st Divisions

of which he had been warned. Since his plans to meet that menace called for

moving ahead to the line of the Tanai, and since General Sun was contemplating an envelopment to trap the Japanese north of the Tanai, the operations

immediately under way could go on as Stilwell shaped his next move and

prodded Sun to move faster. To encourage the latter, and applying his bargaining technique of dealing with the Chinese, Stilwell told Sun on 3 January

that the 3/112th would be released from army control if Sun took the little settlement of Taihpa Ga on the Tanai in two days. Looking farther ahead, Stilwell also asked General Wingate to move the U.S. long-range penetration

group (GALAHAD) up to the Hukawng Valley. Wingate agreed.20

With the Generalissimo's refusal to cross the Salween, GALAHAD lost the

18

 Japanese Comments, Sec I. 19

 (1) Statement of Gen Tanaka, 5 Oct 51, Japanese Comments, Sec. I. (2) The Japanese strength estimate by Theodore H. White of 40,000 to 60,000 Japanese troops in the Hukawng and Mogaung valleys cannot be reconciled with what is known of the Japanese order of battle. The Stilwell Papers, p. 269. (3) Tanaka Interrog. OCMH. (4) Wkly G-2 Rpt, Hq 5303d (Prov)

Combat Trs, 12 Jan 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. The 55th Regiment was on the south of a boundary

line roughly Ningam Sakan-Yupbang Ga (both in the 55th Regiment sector); the 56th Regiment was on the north. Headquarters, 18th Division, was at Shingban. 20

 Stilwell Diary, 3 Jan 44.
BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN NORTH BURMA 131

mission for which it had originally been intended and was available for others.

On 6 January, General Merrill was assigned to command the regiment, vice

Colonel Hunter, who became second in command. GALAHAD'S designation

reverted to unit, perhaps because it would have been incongruous to have a

general officer command a regiment.21

Mountbatten offered British troops to spearhead the Chinese, but Stilwell

preferred GALAHAD because both it and the Chinese had been trained in the

American system of tactics.22 Stilwell's request, though later yielding major results in combat, placed a logistic burden on the Advance Section and the combat zone for which no preparations had been made, because GALAHAD was to

have operated under SEAC and Stilwell's decision reflected a last-minute inspiration two months after the campaign began. There was no replacement of

convalescent system for the American combat troops (since GALAHAD had

been provided by the War Department for one mission of three months' duration), while air support, both tactical and supply, had not previously been

allocated with a view to support of U.S. infantry in north Burma. Arrangements by Stilwell's combat headquarters to support GALAHAD were therefore

improvisations and many of them failed in combat.23

Seeking to give weight to the campaign from another direction, Stilwell

sent a radio to Marshall asking that pressure be put on the Generalissimo to

turn the Y-Force loose. Stilwell argued that the Generalissimo's inactivity

would give to SEAC "the very reason they wanted to give up the attack on

Burma." And he feared that if the Burma campaign was allowed to die away

the Japanese would then be free to strike at Kunming either via Pao-shan or

from Hanoi and French Indochina.24

Enveloping the Japanese Left Flank

General Sun's plan, as he finally settled on it after many talks with Stilwell,

called for a regimental combat team to continue the wide swing around

Tanaka's left flank while the rest of Sun's division attacked Tanaka's front. The

enveloping force, the 114th Regiment of the 38th Division plus the 6th Battery, was sent circling south to cross the Tanai at Kantau while the 113th Regiment and the 2/112th in the center would wheel to the south, coming down

from Yupbang Ga and reaching the Tanai, in the vicinity of Taihpa Ga. To the

extreme north the 1/112th would march eastward across the Tarung, then turn

south. The 4th and 5th Batteries would support the 113th Regiment. Far to

the west the 65th Regiment, 22d Division, was sent into the Taro Plain on a

wide envelopment calculated to cut into the Hukawng Valley well behind the

21

 (1) GALAHAD, pp. 5-7. (2) Rad CHC 1241, Stilwell to Marshall, 3 Jul 44. SNF 131. 22

 Ltr, Mountbatten to Marshall, 16 Jan 44. Case 297, OPD 381 Security, A47-30. 23

 Notes by Gen Boatner on draft MS. (Hereafter, Boatner Notes.) OCMH. 24

 Rad, Stilwell to Marshall, 9 Jan 44. Folder, Rads, Stilwell to Marshall, Oct 43 to 25 Mar 44, NCAC Files, KCRC.
132 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

MAP 6

18th Division. This wide swing was Stilwell's touch, the hallmark of a battle

fought Stilwell's way.25

Attempting to envelop Tanaka's left, the 3/114th had crossed the Tanai at

Kantau in the second week of December. It then encountered the Japanese

along two small creeks, the Sanip Hka and Mawngyang Hka. (Map 6) The

jungle made it hard for the Chinese to organize; the supporting 6th Battery 25

 (1) "The 65th made a good river crossing," noted Stilwell in his diary. ". . . good dis- cipline and no grenade fishing." Its colonel, Fu, swore he would get after the Japanese. It was the "first time in his life," added Stilwell, "Fu ever saw a real envelopment." Stilwell Diary, 6 Jan 44. (2) G-3 Per Rpt, Hq 5303d (Prov) Combat Trs, 11 Jan 44. NCAC Files, KCRC.
BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN NORTH BURMA 133

could not fire until fields of fire were cut, and while this was being done, infiltrating parties of Japanese surrounded the battery. Fighting for their guns

and their lives from 9 to 11 January, the Chinese cannoneers saved both. This

Japanese attempt was greatly aided by the faulty disposition of the 3/114th,

split into four fragments, no two of them in contact. Its commande r stayed

in his rear command post.26

The regimental commander, Col. Li Hung, now arrived and quickly restored the situation. The several portions of the 3/114th began to attack, thrust

the Japanese out from among themselves, and after the 2/114th arrived on 15

January the revitalized 3d Battalion was able to force the Sanip crossing on 16

January. This effort pushed a group of Japanese back into the first bend of the

Tanai east of its meeting with the Tarung. The 2/114th was now on the right

flank, where it faced perhaps one of the two Japanese companies present.27

Here the Chinese halted for a week, and when the 1/114th arrived General

Sun on 29 January sent the 3/114th back to rest and put the 1st Battalion to

the slow job of digging the Japanese from their holes in the river bank.

Stilwell thought this close to disobedience of orders, for he wanted Sun to

move quickly and cut behind the 18th Division. On 13 January he had spoken

very bluntly to Sun, asking him what orders he gave the 114th Regiment and

if there had been any word from Chungking to slow the operation. Stilwell

pointed out that Sun's 38th Division had gotten weapons, supplies, medicine

as no Chinese unit ever had before; Stilwell was going to bring up tanks, 4.2-

inch mortars, U.S. infantry, and flame throwers, but before (underlined in Stilwell's draft) Stilwell put them in, he wanted to know whether Sun would obey

orders.

Stilwell told Sun that if he (Stilwell) could not exercise the command that

the Generalissimo had given him, he would resign and report the whole affair

to the U.S. Government. "Regardless of what anyone else may say, I assure

you that my report will be fully believed in Washington." General Sun was

confronted with the prospect that Chinese lethargy in north Burma might

mean withdrawal of all U.S. help from China. Stilwell, Sun was told, had been

alone in his fight to convince the United States that the Chinese Army was

worth helping. "If I am double-crossed by the people I am trying to help I am

through for good and I will recommend very radical measures." Stilwell closed

by saying that he had done his part; would Sun reciprocate?28 But despite

Stilwell's arguments and threats, General Sun did not meet Stilwell's ideas of

how a dynamic field commander should conduct himself.

For his part, Sun in late January told an American liaison officer with the

26

 (1) Dupuy Comments. (2) Stilwell Sketch. Photostat 215, Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. (3) Overlay, Ln O, 38th Div, sub: Situation as of 8:00 PM, 16 Jan. Folder, Overlays, ALBACORE Opns, Sitreps, Hist, etc., 11 Jan 44, NCAC Files, KCRC. 27

 (1) Stilwell Sketch. Photostat 214, Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. (2) Overlay cited

n. 26(3). 28

 Memo, Stilwell for Sun at Ningam Sakan, Jan 44. SUP 7.
134 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

38th that he had never had a failure in his life, and did not propose to have one

now. His listener gathered that Sun would proceed with caution to avoid defeat, rather than accept risks to gain a victory.29

The 114th Regiment plugged away at its own pace, taking care to leave no

Japanese pockets behind, despite the obvious chance to clamp a roadblock

across the road which led from Kamaing to the Japanese positions between

the Tarung and the Tanai.30

At this point the 66th Regiment, 22d Division, was sent into action on the

right of the 114th Regiment. Finding no enemy, it began to make its way

toward the Kamaing Road. This action again opened the prospect of enveloping the Japanese. The regiment's move to the front had been delayed because

of a missed ration drop, which had brought the columns to a standstill and

greatly worried General Liao, who was having his first experiences with air

supply in combat.31

The Capture of Taihpa Ga

While the 114th Regiment was creeping through the jungle south of the

Tanai, the 112th and 113th Regiments converged on Taihpa Ga from the north.

The 1/113th crossed the Tarung near Yupbang Ga and sent patrols north to

occupy Tabawng Ga on 13 January, then moved southeast to reach Kaduja Ga

on the 15th. The 3/113th followed while the 2d Battalion stayed at Yupbang

Ga in reserve. The regiment went southeast and lost two days "probing" at a

Japanese delaying position. Then it bypassed on 17 January, left a company to

contain the Japanese, and headed for Taihpa. Its pace was perhaps 150-200

yards a day. Patrols from another unit, reconnoitering the banks of the Tarung

to its junction with the Tanai, and then swinging east along the Tanai almost

to Taihpa Ga, did not meet any Japanese in the area through which the 113th

Regiment was moving so cautiously.32

The battered 112th Regiment swung wide to the north and east to Warang

Ga, then halted and patrolled to the north, east, and south. The 113th Regiment at about this time (mid-January) extended its right until the 3/113th

closed in on the Japanese positions on the Tanai bank. Clearing the Japanese

from their footholds north of the Brangbram Hka and west of the Kamaing

Road, on 21 January it reached Ningru Ga, less than a mile downstream from

Taihpa Ga.33

29

 (1) Dupuy Notes. (2) Ltr, Dupuy to Ward, 12 Sep 52. OCMH. 30

 Stilwell Sketches, NCAC History, I, 34A-34D. 31

 Rad Y-23, Boatner to Col John P. Willey, 12 Jan 44. Fwd Ech CP Rads Out, NCAC File, KCRC. 32

 (1) Notes by Col Rothwell H. Brown on draft MS. (Hereafter, Brown Notes.) OCMH. (2)

Ltr, with Incl, Brown to Ward, 25 Aug 51. 33

 (1) Stilwell Sketches. Photostats 212, 213, 218, 220-23, Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. (2) Van Natta MS. (3) G-2, G-3 Overlays, 38th Div, 27 Jan 44; Overlay, 15 Jan 44, ALBACORE Opns, Sitreps; Rads 16-781, 21 Jan 44; Rads 14-77, 38th Div. NCAC Files, KCRC.
BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN NORTH BURMA 135

GENERAL STILWELL AND GENERAL SUN are shown in conference at General

Sun's headquarters. Col. Edward J. McNally, liaison officer with General Sun's troops,

is seated at left.

The 1/113th fought to within 1,500 yards of Taihpa Ga, then was ordered

back to counter an expected Japanese flanking movement. This gave it the

chance to clear a Japanese pocket previously contained along the Brangbram

Hka. Artillery support, the 4th and 5th Batteries, was then brought up. The

next 1,000 yards between the 1/113th and Taihpa Ga took two days to cross;

then the 113th spent a week in what it called "preparations for attack." General Sun's men were now approaching the Japanese strongpoint in the area,

and Japanese resistance was more freely offered, with heavy shelling by 75-

and 150-mm. pieces.

At Taihpa Ga, the Kamaing Road crossed the Tanai on a long gravel bar

which bullock carts could use quite well. At this point was the village itself,

a humble collection of bashas, long since burnt out. About 800 yards upstream

was a ferry across a stretch of fairly deep water. The Japanese used this ferry to

bring supplies across the Tanai, rather than the vulnerable and easily spotted

gravel bar. Here they had their strongpoint, well prepared and stubbornly

defended.

The 3/113th was reinforced for the attack on the strongpoint. It moved
136 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

through Taihpa Ga over 30 January-1 February and went on to attack the

strongpoint. The 2/112th came back into action to remove a Japanese pocket

on a line with, and three miles east of, Taihpa Ga, the advance bringing it up

level with the 113th Regiment. Now back to full strength, the 112th Regiment

gave security to the north, east, and west. The Japanese held stubbornly for

several days and then quietly withdrew about 4 or 5 February. While the drive

on Taihpa Ga had been under way, other Chinese units had been clearing the

Japanese from the Taro Plain on Tanaka's left, and the obvious threat to his

communications dictated his withdrawal, even though the Chinese did not

emerge from the Taro Plain beyond his flank for another fortnight. When the

Japanese yielded the north bank of the Tanai, a 4,500-foot airstrip was begun

at Taihpa Ga, though Japanese shelling initially made the engineers abandon

their work and their camp (to the delight of Chinese who promptly added to

their stores of lend-lease equipment).34

Clearing the Taro Plain

The Hukawng Valley is a corridor leading from north to south, and the

Taro Plain has been compared above to a closet opening off the corridor, just

inside the northern door. The Taro Plain is formed by the drainage system of

the Hukawng Valley which tilts to the northwest and toward the Chindwin, as

the Tanai is known in its southern stretches. About eight miles south of the

Kantau ford, the hill line that forms the western boundary for the Hukawng

Valley parts, and there the Tanai cuts a narrow, north-south gorge through the

hills, a gorge that widens abruptly into the circular Taro Plain, with the village

of Taro in its center.

Given the mission in October 1943 of clearing the Taro Plain of Japanese

so that the Ledo Road might safely pass to the east of it, the 3d Battalion, 112th

Regiment, and its commander, Major Chen, had never left Ngajatzup on the

extreme north edge of the plain. Stilwell's comment was:

Sorry performance. Arrived about November 1. Sent one company forward. Pulled it

back again. Thereafter did nothing. Maj. Ch'en cowered in dug-out. Terrific waste of ammunition. Told Sun to have him move or I would shoot or court-martial Maj. Ch'en. Sun

sent [name illegible] to investigate. Ch'en killed by British grenade in his dug-out on

December 27. (Report was during Japanese attack. There was none).35

Unknown to Stilwell's headquarters, Tanaka was making a real effort to stop

the unhappy Chen's battalion. When the 3d Battalion entered the Taro Plain,

Tanaka rushed the 3d Battalion, 55th Regiment, to reinforce the Japanese

"Pacification Unit" of eighty men stationed there. This battalion "made no

34

 (1) G-2, G-3 Overlays, 38th Div, 20 Feb 44; G-2. G-3 Overlays, Hq Fwd Ech (Prov)

Combat Trs, 24 Feb 44; G-3 Per Rpts, 31 Jan 44, 8 Feb 44, 20 Feb 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. (2)

NCAC History, I, 35-38. (3) Dupuy Notes. (4) Brown Notes. (5) Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. II. 35

 Stilwell Sketch. Photostat 210, Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN NORTH BURMA 137

headway" so Tanaka then sent a Colonel Yamasaki and the headquarters of the

55th, divisional units, and a second infantry battalion. Such a force was too

much for the 3d Battalion, 112th, to handle.36

After Chen's death, the 3d Battalion was sent back to rejoin the 38th Division; and the 65th Regiment, 22d Division, plus attached Chinese engineers

and the U.S. 46th Portable Surgical Hospital, was given the task of clearing the

Taro Plain, with the extremely important added mission of cutting back eastward into the Hukawng Valley to threaten Tanaka's flank. On reaching the

exit of the Hukawng Valley, the 65th's commander, despite means more than

ample for his mission, contracted the same lethargy that had hastened Chen's

demise. Stilwell was in no mood to delay a few more weeks with Colonel Fu,

and ordered Liao to relieve him. Stilwell's diary hints that his rhetoric rose to

the occasion for he recorded: "Told Liao this included division commanders

unless they watched their step. Also that Fu really should be shot. Liao took it

OK though it shook him up."

 37

On 22 January General Sun was told about this affair, the news softened

somewhat by presentation of a silk banner for the victory at Yupbang Ga, a

dramatic contrast of the respective awards for lethargy and vigor. Having made

his point, and hoping that he had given the Chinese a healthy shock, Stilwell

restored Fu to his command by 26 January. Fu's later performance in combat

was rated as excellent.38

The 65th Regiment moved forward immediately after Fu was relieved of

command. Some U.S. observers believed that the 22d Division, from Liao

down, looked upon itself as somewhat of a rival of the 38th, and wanted to

show itself to advantage. The 65th's progress was aided by that of the 38th

Division in the Hukawng Valley, for Tanaka was so concerned over his reverses

there that he withdrew the major portion of the 55th Regiment, leaving behind

only the badly weakened and poorly supplied 3d Battalion of the 55th. These

Japanese indulged in an ultimately fatal passivity which permitted the 65th to

encircle them completely between the 23d and 25th of January. When the last

shot was fired, the American liaison officers counted 323 enemy dead in a small

area about halfway down the gorge through which the Tanai enters the Taro

Plain.39

The next feature of importance was the Ahawk Hka, on whose far side was

a trail, the Ahawk Trail, which was the shortest route from Taro back into the

36

 Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec II. 37

 (1) Stilwell Diary, 20 Jan 44. The entry for the 19th makes it clear that Stilwell was angered

because the 65th Regiment was still "stalled," the attack was a "fizzle," and Fu was "petering

out." (2) Memo, Liao for Stilwell, 21 Jan 44, sub: Relief of Col Fu, 65th Regt. Item 266, Bk 3, JWS Personal File. 38

 (1) Stilwell Diary, 22, 26 Jan 44. (2) Boatner Notes. 39

 (1) Capt. Roy R. Van Dusen, Operations of the 2d Bn and 3d Bn, 65th Regt (22d Chinese Div), in the Battle for Taro, 29 Dec 1943-30 Jan 1944 (India-Burma Campaign). The Infantry

School, Gen Sec, Mil History Committee, 1946-47. Captain Van Dusen's monograph has interest- ing tactical detail but says nothing of Fu's relief. (2) Notes by Col Van Natta on draft MS. (3)

Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. II.
138 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Hukawng Valley—and to a point behind Tanaka's flank. The Ahawk Hka was

reached on the 26th and crossed on the 28th. The 3d Battalion of the 65th put

a block across the trail while the other two battalions went on to Taro. The 3d

Battalion then went on down the trail toward the Hukawng Valley, pursuing

the survivors of the Japanese Taro garrison, while its companions took Taro on

30 January.40

After the war, Tanaka concluded that the loss of the Taro Plain meant "the

failure of the whole division in its operations along the Tanai" and traced that

loss in turn to his having had to withdraw the main strength of the 55th in an

effort to redeem the situation around Kantau.41

The Allies Reorganize for the Next Effort

With the arrival in the battle area of Liao's 22d Division and the American

infantry of the GALAHAD force it was necessary to make appropriate changes in

the headquarters directing this enlarged force. The changes began on 29

January. Command of the service troops supporting the Chinese had been

exercised heretofore by the 5303d Headquarters and Headquarters Company

(Provisional) Combat Troops, whose members had been concurrently the staff

of Chih Hui Pu. On the 29th the 5303d became an "area command" and on 1

February 1944 the name was changed again to Northern Combat Area Command, or NCAC as it was ever thereafter called. Use of the adjective combat was

to insure its remaining under Stilwell, as by prior agreement line-ofcommunications areas in Burma were to be directly under SEAC.42

General Boatner was appointed Commanding General, NCAC, and kept

his old post as Chief of Staff, Chih Hui Pu. Under NCAC were: ". . . such

special and service units as may be placed in the Northern Combat Area Command, except for SOS units specifically engaged in road construction and the

auxiliary and service units necessary therefor. . . . Command of all combat

troops in the Northern Combat Area Command remains as heretofore under

the Commanding General, Chinese Army in India."

As American, British, and Indian combat units entered north Burma, they

were attached or assigned to NCAC, with the exception of the American longrange penetration group, GALAHAD, which on arrival was attached to the

Chinese Army in India and later assigned to NCAC.43 This brief initial attachment brought into focus some of the problems that arise when troops of

different nationalities work together. In north Burma, some officers of each

40

 (1) NCAC History, I, 34A-34D, 36. (2) G-3 Per Rpts, Hq 5303d (Prov) Combat Trs, 25, 26 Jan, 8, 15 Feb 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. 41

 Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. II. 42

 Boatner Notes. 43

 (1) History Ramgarh Training Center, 30 Jun 42-15 May 45, MS, p. 14. OCMH. (2) GOS

11, 12, Hq USAF CBI, 29 Jan 44; GO 14, Hq Rr Ech USAF CBI, 5 Feb 44; GO 74, Hq USAF

CBI, 17 Jul 44. (3) Memo, Stilwell for Wheeler and Boatner, 6 Apr 43. Item 214, Bk 3, JWS

Personal File.
BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN NORTH BURMA 139

force tended to feel that their men were being discriminated against in favor of

the others.44 The British headquarters in north Burma, Fort Hertz Area, under

Brigadier J. F. Bowerman, was attached to NCAC on 1 February.45

CBI personnel entered NCAC's area at the Tirap River bridge, mile 5.75 on

the Ledo Road. As of 2 December 1943 there had been no boundary between

the communications and combat zones with the result that SOS in the forward

zone was duplicating work of the troops under the 5303d in supporting the

Chinese. Matters were arranged to keep Ledo, its installations, and the building

of the Ledo Road under SOS while everything beyond the Tirap River went to

NCAC.46

Three motives underlay the publication of the orders activating NCAC:

to show the Chinese Government in writing that Stilwell was directly and

formally commanding the Chinese Army in India; to show General Headquarters (India) that the combat zone was well defined and commanded by

Boatner and thus forestall any attempts to absorb it; to mark the zone of

responsibility between SOS and combat troops, for it was considered "by all

concerned that conditions make it impossible to establish the orthodox LOC

Zone and Combat Zone."

 47

 To anticipate a later development, it may be

observed that by April the principle had appeared of removing any possibility

that the British and American combat units in north Burma might come under

Gen. Cheng Tung-kuo, the newly appointed vice-commander of the Chinese

Army in India, while on the other hand, it was desired to place absolute control

of the pay and supplies of the Chinese Army in India in the hands of the

Commanding General, NCAC. This was done by severing Ramgarh Training

Center from NCAC.48 As of 30 January there were 331 officers and 1,956

enlisted men of the U.S. Army in NCAC, and nine officers and 240 civilians

who were British subjects.49

Logistical Support

The engineers, the medics, and the supply men followed close on the heels

of the fighters. A complex line of communications, with airstrips, hospitals,

supply points, motor shops, ordnance repair plants, and gas stations, began to

44

 (1) Boatner Notes. (2) For charges that Stilwell discriminated against the Chinese, see Ho Yung-chi, The Big Circle. (3) For charges that Stilwell discriminated against the Americans, see letter from Colonel Hunter to General Ward, 14 August 1951. OCMH. 45

 Ltr, Hq 5303d (Prov) Combat Trs to Bowerman, 25 Jan 44, sub: Orders. AG 323.3, NCAC

Files, KCRC. 46

 Ltr, Hq 5303d (Prov) Combat Trs to CG, Fwd Ech, USAF CBI, 2 Dec 43, sub: Responsi- bility of Comd and Opns Within Combat Zone. AG 323.3, NCAC Files, KCRC. 47

 Ltr, Hq 5303d (Prov) Combat Trs to CG, Hq Rr Ech USAF CBI, 20 Jan 44, sub: Organiza- tion, 5303d Area Comd. AG 323.3, NCAC Files, KCRC. 48

 (1) Ltr, Hq NCAC to Deputy Theater Comdr, USAF CBI, 13 Apr 44, sub: Responsibilities

of CG, RTC, and CG, NCAC. AG 323.3, NCAC Files, KCRC. (2) Ramgarh Training Center pre- pared the Chinese Army in India for combat. The staff and instructors were American; logistical

support was from the Government of India; unit administration, discipline, and replacements were the responsibilities of the Chinese Army. 49

 Strength Rpt, G-1 Per Rpt, Hq 5303d (Prov) Combat Trs, 30 Jan 44. NCAC Files, KCRC.
140 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

DRAINAGE CULVERTS are installed on the Ledo Road.

twist its way south through the Hukawng Valley. The Red Cross clubmobile

scurrying down the road, the ambulance plane and its tragic cargo, the bulldozer driven by a Negro engineer masterfully thrusting aside the jungle, each

at its appointed time passed the samurai blade rusting in the undergrowth.

On 1 February 1944, the engineers began work on permanent road construction in the Hukawng Valley, and on a combat road to support the Chinese

divisions. The combat road, a hasty improvement of the existing Kamaing

Road plus Kachin and Naga trails, ran through Shingbwiyang, Yupbang Ga,

and Taihpa Ga, then south. The trace of the Ledo Road was moved to higher

ground on the north. Forward construction units were rationed from combat

supply points.

In building the Ledo Road, location parties up ahead cleared a trace the

width of a bulldozer and put in the center-line stakes. The final clearing

averaged 150 feet. The route of the Ledo Road in some cases followed existing

roads, a circumstance that did not greatly diminish the amount of clearing

needed. Most clearing was by bulldozer. Combat trails and access roads were

cleared to the necessary minimum that would permit heavy equipment to use

them. In the valleys, the road was generally built on embankments in order to

lift it above flood level. In mountainous regions, side-hill cuts were used.
BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN NORTH BURMA 141

PIPELINE CROSSING A STREAM by means of cable suspension.

The road itself had about seven culverts to the mile in the mountains and

five to the mile in the lowlands. These culverts were most necessary as the road

was a barrier to the normal runoff of water. Surfacing was with stream-bed

gravel in the valley sections and, so far as hauling permitted, natural gravel in

the mountainous sections. Surfacing was about ten inches thick on the average,

and from twenty to twenty-eight feet wide. Compaction was by the normal

road traffic. Two regiments of Chinese engineers did pioneer construction

work.50

On 27 December 1943 Colonel Pick had opened a military road to

Shingbwiyang and a convoy arrived that day. By 21 January 1944 General

Covell saw more vehicles in Shingbwiyang than he could count. A subdepot

was opened there in January with 21,600 cubic feet of storage space and

facilities for bulk gasoline storage. An all-weather airstrip was built. Medical

facilities were established.

Parallel with the road ran the pipelines. Generally they were in the right of

way and close to the road, but in some mountainous sections there were short

50

 (1) Rpt, Maj Gen Lewis A. Pick, CG, Hq Adv Sec USF IBT, to Lt Gen Raymond A. Wheeler, CG, USF IBT, 9 Aug 45, pp. 22-35. OCMH. (2) For background on the Ledo Road

project, see Stilwell's Mission to China.
142 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

cuts using cable suspension over deep ravines and paths through terrain unsuitable for road building. During the peak of construction on the pipelines 2,590

men from engineer petroleum distribution companies and 2,750 general

engineers were at work on them.51

Medical reinforcements arrived in early 1944, the 42d, 43d, and 46th

Portable Surgical Hospitals, the 13th Mountain Medical Battalion (less B and

C Companies), and the 25th Field Hospital. The medical history of the

campaign described the evacuation process of February 1944:

Casualties thus passed through the hands of Chinese battalion and regimental detachments to surgical teams, thence either to the Seagrave Hospital on the Brambrang Hka or to

the 25th Field Hospital at Ningam Sakan. Seagrave evacuated seriously-wounded to the 25th

Field Hospital on about a 10-day evacuation plan. Patients requiring general hospital treatment or who would require more than six weeks of care were evacuated from the 25th Field

Hospital to Ledo through the air clearing station at Shingbwiyang.52

Planning To Force a Decision

Given the fact that Stilwell's battle plans, as he strove with the 18th

Division, always included either a double or single envelopment, it seems possible to contend that Stilwell had in mind ending the campaign by a single

decisive victory over the Japanese 18th Division. A successful envelopment

would have been the speediest way of ending this part of the North Burma

Campaign, and of offering the Japanese commanders their choice of yielding

north Burma or canceling operations elsewhere in order to reinforce.

Totaling his assets in January, Stilwell found he had immediately at hand

the 38th Division, the 66th Regiment, 22d Division, and the Chinese 1st Provisional Tank Group (less the 2d Battalion), Col. Rothwell H. Brown, USA,

commanding.53 The Japanese he estimated as having a total of six divisions in

Burma. He concluded that the 56th and 55th Divisions were tied down in the

Salween and Arakan areas, respectively, that the 33d and 31st were contained

by 4 Corps in the Imphal area, and that the 54th Division was protecting

Rangoon and the Irrawaddy Delta against an amphibious attack. That left the

18th Division for him to deal with. Since that division's 55th Regiment had been

well worked over, it seemed unlikely the Japanese could muster more than five

battalions to face his four regiments.

51

 (1) Ltr, Covell to Somervell, 21 Jan 44. Somervell File, Vol IV, Hq ASF, TS of Opns, CBI 1944, A46-257. (2) Pick Rpt, pp. 15, 48, 51-58, 90-94, cited n. 50.

52

 U.S. Army Med Service in Combat in India and Burma, 1942-45, MS by 1st Lt. James H.

Stone, Medical Historian, IBT (hereafter, Stone MS), I, 122, 126, OCMH. 53

 The 1st Provisional Tank Group was then the only Chinese Army unit, under Stilwell, com- manded by an American. The group had an integrated Sino-American staff, a Chinese vice- commander (Col. Chao Chen-yu during most of the campaign), and an American medium tank

platoon in support. The number of Americans, both officers and enlisted men, increased steadily

from the initial component of 11 officers and 9 enlisted men, to a final peak strength of 29 officers and 222 enlisted men. Its equipment was American. See NCAC History, App. 5, First Prov Tank

Gp, Chinese-American, 8 Aug 43-9 Mar 45. OCMH.
BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN NORTH BURMA 143

The initial solution Stilwell reached took shape on 21 January. His decision

then was to thrust an armored spearhead straight down the Kamaing Road,

with a sizable infantry force following close behind. He expected an attack on

this axis of advance to take his troops diagonally across the Japanese rear

areas.54 One uncontrollable factor Stilwell did not list in his estimate—weather.

Dry ground would be essential. Orders were issued over the 21st and 22d.

A few days passed, and it began to appear that the plan for an armored

attack would have to be laid aside. January was all too plainly going to enter

the records as a very rainy month, while Sun's attitude did not inspire Stilwell

with confidence in his principal Chinese subordinate. A new plan would have

to be made.55 (Map 7)

In his usual manner, Stilwell carefully charted his new course:

February 4, 1944, it had become evident that the 38th Division could not be depended

on for any further serious effort. The 112th had been scattered and cut up in November and

replacements had arrived only at the end of January. The 114th, which had fought well, had

lost about 60% of its company officers, and enlisted casualties had been fairly heavy. The

113th was the only unit ready for further serious work, its advance to the Tanai having been

slow and cautious. The division commander was showing a strong inclination to delay operations interminably in the hope of avoiding more casualties; his failure to push the attack of

the 114th was the cause of allowing the Japs an open route to the south which could easily

have been closed. To operate seriously south of the Tanai it was necessary to establish a

bridge-head, which the 38th Division commander obviously was reluctant to attempt. The

plan had been to put the 1st Tank Battalion across the Tanai at night and jump off from the

bridgehead at dawn, objective, Maingkwan. The 1/66th was attached to the tanks and the

113th was to follow down the road to take over successive positions. The 114th was to

assemble at Taihpa in reserve and the 112th was to protect the flank east of the Tanai,

advancing on Mashi Daru.

The plan was altered on February 4 as follows: 22d Division, using 65th less one battalion

(Taro garrison) and 66th less one battalion (attached to tanks) was to seize and hold line

Yawngbang-Lakyen sending the 66th past the 114th, and the 65th over the Wantuk Bum.

The 114th was to clean up south of the Tanai and the remainder of the 38th was to clear the

area to the Tawang east of the Tanai. This was to be the first phase, followed as soon as

possible by an advance to the south, using the tanks and the 65th and the 66th, in the hope

of getting to Walawbum. By that time the 16th Brigade [of Wingate's Chindits] and the

American brigade [GALAHAD] could make themselves felt at Lonkin and Shaduzup

respectively. A plan was to be made to reduce Sumprabum and advance towards Nsopzup,

and to edge towards Htawgaw from Luhow [illegible].

Bad weather had retarded Road work and hampered supply. The change in plan should

give us time to build up a reserve in Shingbwiyang and Ningam, make progress on the

Road, and build a field at Taihpa. It was felt that even though the seizure of a bridgehead

might be delayed a few days, it would be a much better one and that the delay might well

be made up for by cutting out the projected stop at Maingkwan and pushing on to the limit

of our resources. A slower start, but a better organized one, with fresh troops eager to make

good, and chance to go much further in less time, and with the added threats of the

American and British LRPG's.56

54

 (1) Stilwell Diary, 21 Jan 44. (2) Paper, sub: Estimate of Situation. JWS Misc Papers, 1944. (3) The Japanese 2d Division was also now in south Burma. Japanese Officers' Comments, p. 12. 55

56 Stilwell Diary, 21-30 Jan 44. (1) JWS Misc Papers, 1944. (2) Stilwell Diary, 4 Feb. 44.
Map 7
BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN NORTH BURMA 145

"We can fight here instead of M[Maingkwan?] and can maybe get behind the

Japs and clean up," wrote Stilwell in his diary for 4 February. So it was to be

an attempt at a decision which if successful would mean that only Japanese

stragglers and the 114th Regiment would stand between two Chinese divisions

and Myitkyina.

The first phase of the revised plan, the enveloping hook from the Taro Plain

by the 22d Division, did not come off as planned. The 3/65th of the 22d Division had been pursuing the Japanese from Taro down the Ahawk Trail. The

2/65th was sent on from Taro to join it.57 The rains were annoyingly heavy, but

on the morning of 14 February Stilwell waited confidently for news that the

65th Regiment had joined with the 66th Regiment, which had been operating

in the Hukawng Valley, and had taken Yawngbang Ga, thus completing its

part of the envelopment. In twenty-four hours it was very clear something had

gone wrong. A Chinese officer of the 38th Division reported seeing the 1/66th,

which should have been five miles away from him. Stilwell spent all of 16

February waiting for news of what had happened: "Is the 66th in Yawngbang

or lost?" One set of American liaison officers reported the 66th Regiment was

in place; another, that the regiment was miles away from its proper course. By

noon of the 17th it was plain that the 66th Regiment had taken the wrong

trail and lost its way.

On the morning of 18 February Stilwell told General Liao that the 66th

Regiment's performance had cost a chance to trap some Japanese, then went

out personally to check on the regiment's location, with Liao accompanying

him. The whole 66th plus the 3/65th were in the neighborhood of the 66th's

command post. The main trail, Yawngbang Ga to Lakyen Ga, was found and

so was a captured Japanese document giving the Japanese withdrawal order. It

later appeared that the 66th Regiment had taken a nameless village on 16

February and thought it had taken Yawngbang Ga. The true Yawngbang Ga

was occupied by the 65th and 66th jointly on 23 February.58

"If the Chinese 65th and 66th Infantry Regiments operating in the vicinity

of Yawngbang had been prompt in closing in on our left rear flank on the 15th

or 16th, as predicted," wrote Tanaka in 1951, "the main force of the 18th

Division would have faced a grave crisis."

 59

Summing up the results of the attempted first phase, Stilwell told Marshall

that unseasonable rains and a mistake by the 66th Regiment, which had lost

its way, cost a chance to catch some Japanese near Yawngbang. He felt that

the 22d Division had done as well as the 38th Division and had been easier to

command. Supply was improving with truck convoys coming down the Ledo

57

 G-3 Rpts, 29 Feb 44; G-2, G-3 Overlays, 25 Jan 44. Hq 5303d (Prov) Combat Trs. NCAC

Files, KCRC. 58

 (1) Stilwell Diary, 9-18 Feb 44. (2) Overlays, Folder, X-RAY Force, NCAC Files, KCRC. 59

 Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. II.
146 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Road to Shingbwiyang and with transport aircraft using the Taihpa Ga airstrip.

The Chinese enjoyed winning, and their morale was excellent.60

U.S. Infantry for the Second Phase

Twice before Stilwell had tried to envelop the 18th Division, once along

the south bend of the Tanai and again at Yawngbang Ga-Lakyen Ga. Both

attempts had failed. Now, in accord with his plan of 4 February, he would try

to put U.S. infantry across the Kamaing Road at Shaduzup, while the 22d and

38th Divisions plus the armor pushed down from the north.

When GALAHAD was released from SEAC's operational control, Stilwell

ordered Merrill to "close in on Ledo by 7 February," not an easy task, for the

1,000-mile journey involved changes from a broad-gauge to a narrow-gauge

railroad and from that to river steamer. The last echelon arrived at Margherita,

near Ledo, on 9 February, and between 19 and 21 February the 5307th

assembled at Ningbyen, near the front. Stilwell's foot cavalry was ready for its

first mission. With it as far as Shingbwiyang went American newspapermen,

who christened it "Merrill's Marauders."

 61

Stilwell's orders called for GALAHAD and the 113th Regiment 38th Division, to envelop the 18th Division's east flank and block the Kamaing Road near

Shaduzup. The two units did not have a common commander and so lacked

something of being a task force. After the war, Merrill recalled that he and Sun

would have appreciated some sort of formal working arrangement but that

Chih Hui Pu had limited them to co-operation.

While the Americans and the 113th Regiment were cutting off the 18th

Division in the Shaduzup area, the remainder of Stilwell's force—the other

two regiments of Sun's 38th Division, the 22d Division, and the 1st Provisional Tank Group (-)—was to seize Maingkwan. Maingkwan had been a

respectable little town before the war with permanent buildings and several

thousand people, and Tanaka might elect to fight for it. So the attack on

Maingkwan was set up as a smaller-scale edition of the complete operation,

in that it was to be an envelopment, with the armor swinging around the

Japanese right flank. Tanaka was to be offered unpleasant alternatives, fighting

for the Maingkwan area at the risk of being surrounded, or fighting his way

out through GALAHAD and the 113th Regiment, and thus giving up the whole

of the Hukawng Valley. The remainder of the 38th Division, the 1st Provisional Tank Group (-), and the 22d Division were to push down from the

north. If successful, the operation would pen the Japanese on the Maingkwan

plain, and might well destroy the 18th Division, thus opening the way to

Myitkyina.

For the operation, the boundary line between the 38th and 22d Divisions 60

 Rad 74, Stilwell to Marshall, 25 Feb 44. Folder, Rads, Stilwell to Marshall, Oct 43-25 Mar 44, NCAC Files, KCRC. 61

 (1) The reference on page 276 of The Stilwell Papers is to the 16th Brigade of the 3d Indian Division, not to GALAHAD. Stilwell Diary, 9 Jan 44. (2) GALAHAD, pp. 1-8, 10, 16.
BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN NORTH BURMA 147

was changed. The line now followed the Tanai to the Nambyu Hka, thence

straight south to the Kamaing Road, giving the 38th Division the area to the

north and east.62

Meanwhile, on the Japanese side there had been a growth of confidence.

When the first shots were exchanged in October and November 1943, the

Japanese had been almost contemptuous of the Chinese. Then in December

they were sobered by contact with the material resources that the 22d and 38th

Divisions commanded. But, as the fighting went on into February 1944,

Tanaka several times saw a grave threat to his flank come to nothing because

the Chinese moved so slowly. That the Chinese repeatedly moved as though

to envelop, then let the opportunity slip because they did not exploit it, suggested to General Tanaka a way to defeat his powerful but lethargic opponents.

Since Stilwell was spreading his forces wide in order to envelop, Tanaka consequently was operating on interior lines. He decided that "though threatened

by enemy envelopment, we will exploit advantages of operations on interior

lines, and, by utilizing every opportunity, defeat in detail the slow-moving

Chinese forces without coordination on the exterior lines."

 63

Thenceforth, Tanaka waited his opportunity, which would arise when

Stilwell attempted his next envelopment. Tanaka's intentions and Stilwell's

plans meshed perfectly; a major trial of strength was inevitable. The engagement resulting took place around the little settlement of Walawbum, a

pathetic cluster of sagging uprights and fire scars where once a few Kachin

families had pursued their simple, inoffensive lives.

Walawbum is in the southern end of the Hukawng Valley. It is on the road

running through the Hukawng Valley south to Kamaing. Ten miles or so south

of Walawbum the traveler becomes aware that the ground is rising, for he is

approaching the Jambu Bum, the ridge line forming the southern end of the

Hukawng Valley. From Walawbum to the crest of the Jambu Bum it is about

13.7 air miles. Seven miles to the west of the village site is the valley's western

wall; the eastern boundary is from 10 to 14 miles away depending on the

azimuth taken.

The road to Kamaing, or Kamaing Road, takes a fairly straight course to

the south until it reaches a point opposite, and about 10,000 yards west of,

Walawbum. At this point it makes a 90-degree turn to the east, and runs

almost due east until it reaches Walawbum. Perhaps a little more than halfway

to Walawbum on this easterly course the road crosses the Nambyu Hka, at

Kumnyen. When it reaches Walawbum, the road makes another 90-degree

turn, this time to the south, and resumes its southward route to Kamaing.

The visitor to Walawbum itself notices that as the Numpyek Hka passes to

the east of the village, the ground to the east of the river is higher than on the

62

 (1) G-3 Per Rpt, Hq CAI, 29 Feb 44; G-3 Per Rpt, Hq 5303d (Prov) Combat Trs, 7 Mar 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. (2) Notes by Gen Merrill on draft MS. (Hereafter, Merrill Notes.) 63

 Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. II.
148 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

west. Thus a force in position just east of Walawbum has the advantage of

high ground and river moat in facing an enemy to the west, while its guns

command the Kamaing Road. All about the area, save for a clearing at

Walawbum, are the familiar trees and thick undergrowth, confining large units

to the trails.

Difficulties of terrain began to force alterations in Stilwell's plan even before

it was fairly launched. The armored force was to have enveloped Maingkwan

from the east but no suitable avenue of approach could be found so the tanks

were ordered to move generally southeast on a course intended to clear

Tanaka's eastern flank and permit them to join Merrill as an attached unit near

Walawbum.

The Operation Begins

The Chinese-American tankers, supported by a battalion from the Chinese

65th Regiment, got under way the morning of 3 March, from positions about

5,000 yards north of Maingkwan. The first light contact with the Japanese was

at 1300. By 1500 the tanks were about 5,000 yards northeast of Maingkwan, as

they sought to flank to the east. In this area they received heavy Japanese fire,

and Brown soon concluded that perhaps a regiment of Japanese faced him.

Warning Stilwell of this potential threat to his (Stilwell's) left flank, Brown

buttoned up for the night. During the darkness the Japanese made a number

of attacks on the armor's perimeter, which were beaten off. Next morning, the

Japanese were gone (for events near Walawbum were alarming them) and the

tanks moved about three more miles southeast, which put them in line with

Maingkwan. On 5 March, after a quiet night, they were ready to roll again, and

to try to join GALAHAD near Walawbum.64

The progress of Brown's tanks meant that one part of the ring Stilwell was

trying to clamp on the 18th Division was moving into place. The adjacent

segment of the ring's northern section, the 22d Division, was also moving

ahead, and so far was in step with the tanks and GALAHAD. On 3 March, the

64th Regiment was near Ngam Ga, east of the Kamaing Road. The 66th to the

west was in contact with the third regiment, the 65th, as it emerged from the

Taro Plain. The 66th bypassed Maingkwan on the west, moved south, then sent

its 3d Battalion cutting back north to enter Maingkwan from the south. The

Japanese yielded it; Tanaka was not going to waste his strength fighting for

real estate. For all that, capture of Maingkwan by the 66th on 5 March gave

that regiment the distinction of liberating the first major settlement in north

Burma to be reoccupied by the Allies. After taking Maingkwan, the 66th

moved south down the Kamaing Road, and with two battalions of the 64th

Regiment, began attacking a fortified Japanese position in the Kumnyen area,

to the west of Walawbum. The 65th on 6 March was several miles southwest

of Maingkwan, near the edge of the hills that mark the western boundary of

the valley. Thus by the night of 5-6 March the 22d Division and Brown's 64

 Brown Notes.
BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN NORTH BURMA 149

GENERAL STILWELL AND GENERAL MERRILL confer at Merrill's headquarters.

tanks were drawn up on a gently curving arc that ran through Maingkwan and

tilted toward the south and east.65

Oral orders for the movement that was to put the rest of the trap in place

were given Merrill on 22 February. He was ordered to cut the Japanese supply

line, the Kamaing Road, well south of Walawbum, and to seek out and attack

the 18th Division's command post, which was thought to be near Walawbum.

Except for orders to avoid unnecessary heavy combat, Merrill had great freedom

of action. At his disposal were the three battalions of GALAHAD, each in turn

broken down into two combat teams. The teams bore the code names Red and

White (1st Battalion), Blue and Green (2d Battalion), Khaki and Orange (3d

Battalion). Each team included a rifle company, heavy weapons platoon,

pioneer and demolition platoon, reconnaissance platoon, and medical detachment, with a combined strength of sixteen officers and 456 enlisted men.

On receiving orders to move to his forward assembly area, Merrill sent his

three intelligence and reconnaissance (I & R) platoons to check trails as far as

the Tawang Hka, the first of the three considerable streams that crossed the

line of march. At 0600, 24 February, the 5307th moved out, screened by the

I & R platoons. Next day two of them clashed with Japanese patrols and the 65

 (1) Rpts cited n. 62(1). (2) Stilwell Diary, 5 Mar 44.
150 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

point of one platoon, Pvt. Robert W. Landis of Youngstown, Ohio, was killed.

The fortunes of war were with the Americans on this march, for radio

communication between the 2d Battalion, 56th Infantry, and 18th Division headquarters broke down at this time, so that the 18th was unaware that a

semidetached American unit was operating off to its flank.

On the afternoon of 28 February a liaison aircraft brought orders to shift

the roadblock site to Walawbum itself. When the 5307th crossed the Tanai,

last of the three river barriers, it went into an assembly area on 2 March, and

Merrill called his staff and commanders together to get Chih Hui Pu's orders.

The orders called for cutting the road on either side of Walawbum, the 2d

Battalion (Colonel McGee) to the west, the 3d Battalion (Colonel Beach) to

the south, and the 1st Battalion (Colonel Osborne) to patrol along the

Nambyu Hka north of the Kamaing Road. Positions near Walawbum would

be held until the 38th Division relieved the 5307th. Merrill's own plans had

been to put his battalions at the Nambyu Hka, but Stilwell now believed

Brown's tanks could reach and hold the river line.66

All battalions were away by dawn of 3 March. Patrols clashed with the

enemy throughout the day, and the 3d Battalion had a sharp fight at Lagang

Ga, killing thirty Japanese in seizing the area needed for the building of a drop

field. One of the battalion's two combat teams, Khaki, stayed at Lagang Ga to

build and protect the dropping zone. Orange Combat Team kept on to the high

ground east of Walawbum and dug in, its heavy weapons commanding the

Kamaing Road. During the day, 3 March, the 1st and 2d Battalions were still

occupied in moving to their assigned positions. On 4 March the 2d Battalion

put itself across the Kamaing Road west of Wesu Ga, making a roadblock.

"This makes the net fairly good . . . ." wrote Stilwell.

On 1 March General Tanaka had been told that the Americans were at

Walawbum.67 It was premature, but this was the chance Tanaka had awaited.

Quickly analyzing his situation, he decided that the Chinese 22d and 38th

Divisions were moving so slowly that he could contain them with a small rear

guard while the main strength of the 18th Division hurled itself on the Americans. On 2 March he made his decision, and the movement back began on

3 March. The Americans had cut behind the 55th Regiment on Tanaka's east in

order to place themselves across the Kamaing Road, so the 55th in turn was to

hit them on their northern flank while the 56th drove for the place where the

Kamaing Road crosses the Nambyu Hka.68

66

 (1) GALAHAD, pp. 16-20. (2) Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. II. (3) Ltr, Merrill to Sunderland, 10 Apr 48; Ltr, Merrill to Ward, 26 May 52. OCMH. 67

 (1) GALAHAD, pp. 21, 23. (2) Memo, Hunter for Kent R. Greenfield, Chief Historian, OCMH, 11 May 45, sub: Comments on "Merrill's Marauders." OCMH. (3) Stilwell Diary, 4

Mar 44. 68

 (1) Lt. Gen. Shinichi Tanaka, The Fighting of the Japanese 18th Division in the Kamaing and Walawbum (Burma) Area, MS, May 1949. (Hereafter, Tanaka Narrative.) OCMH. (2)

Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. II.
BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN NORTH BURMA 151

GALAHAD's Fight at Walawbum

Small parties of Japanese blundered into the American lines on 3 March,

but there were no organized attacks until the 4th. (Map 8) The drop field at

Lagang Ga was attacked at dawn on the 4th but the garrison held. Orange

Combat Team opened the battle in its sector with mortar fire on Walawbum,

drawing mortar and 75-mm. fire in return from the 56th Infantry Regiment,

Map 8
152 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

which had been Tanaka's left flank, as it assembled for attack. When it moved,

the 56th tried to cross the river and work around the Americans' flanks, where

it met booby traps and ambushes thoughtfully prepared for just such a contingency. Some Japanese did cross to the east, but this failed to affect the course

of the action, and seventy-five dead Japanese were counted, as against one

American dead and seven wounded. These latter were evacuated by air the same

evening.69 The 2d Battalion, 5307th, to the west, received much heavier blows,

for it was closer to the main Japanese concentration. Beginning late on the

evening of 4 March the Japanese attacks lasted until the next day.70 Ammunition began to run low in the 2d Battalion, and during the last thirty-six hours

of the fight it was without food and water.

Orange Combat Team of the 3d Battalion was under no great pressure

during the day of the 5th, but the men believed Japanese reinforcements were

being brought up from Kamaing for an attempt to remove the roadblock. The

Americans from Stilwell on down were convinced they had trapped Tanaka; it

did not occur to any of them that Tanaka was trying to destroy the Americans.

Several times during the 5th the Japanese appeared to be forming for an attack,

but mortar fire seemed to be successful in breaking up such attempts. To the

south, Allied aircraft could be seen bombing and machine-gunning what

Orange Combat Team took to be Japanese reinforcements. One indication that

the Japanese were increasing their strength in the immediate area lay in their

being able to force Orange Combat Team's I & R Platoon back across the river

about noon of the 5th.

Meanwhile, to the north and east of where the 2d Battalion and Orange

Combat Team were fighting, heavy and constant pressure from Brown's 1st

Provisional Tank Group was forcing Tanaka to alter his plans. Brown's reconnaissance had found a good trail running south from Tsamat Ga, and on the

morning of the 5th the tanks moved out through the jungle. After the engineers had prepared a small stream for crossing, the tanks broke into a freshly

evacuated Japanese bivouac area. Jungle vines looping across the trail from

either side, and connecting masses of vegetation and trees, made effective

obstacles as they slowed down the tanks by catching their turrets; not until late

afternoon did the armor break out on the trail running east and west between

Maingkwan and Wesu Ga. Almost immediately the tanks encountered what

seemed to be a company of Japanese defending a small but marshy stream. The

stream did not seem fordable, so Brown attacked by fire alone. Unknown to

him, his tanks were firing on Tanaka's division headquarters, and now lay

squarely between the 18th's headquarters and its 56th Regiment.

Further compounding the Japanese commander's problems, Brown had

brought his tanks down the trail that the 55th Regiment was to have used for its 69

 GALAHAD, pp. 21-22. 70

 (1) Tanaka Narrative. (2) Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. II. General Tanaka claims the 3/56th captured the Nambyu river crossing with one rapid attack on 4 March, the one

major point at which his account differs from the American.
BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN NORTH BURMA 153

attack on GALAHAD. The 55th as a result had displaced westward so that

instead of coming up on line with the 56th for an assault on GALAHAD it had

in a sense fallen in behind the 56th in a sort of column formation. The 56th

itself was making little progress against GALAHAD.

Tanaka decided to give up his attempt to crush GALAHAD. Instead, he

decided to swing his force around the American roadblock, using a Japanesebuilt trail of whose existence the Americans were unaware, and then to

re-establish his front facing north in an east-west line across the Kamaing Road

once more. So resolved, Tanaka, or one of his staff, late on the 5th of March,

picked up a field telephone and began to give the necessary orders. The bypass

road over which the 18th was to withdraw had been built by the Japanese

engineers some days before:

The Engineer Regiment commander, Colonel Fukayama, had considered the possibility

of reversals in our position and, in order to facilitate the withdrawal of the division, he had

previously cleared a secret jungle trail about 20 kilometers long leading from the vicinity of

Lalawng Ga to Jambu Hkintang on his own initiative. This trail was used in the withdrawal

of the main body of the division.

Meanwhile, within the 2d Battalion's roadblock, Sgt. Roy H. Matsumoto

had been monitoring Japanese telephone conversations, for the 18th's wire

communications passed through the roadblock and had been tapped by the

Americans. Sergeant Matsumoto immediately picked up Tanaka's order, and in

a matter of minutes the American commanders knew of Tanaka's intentions.

In the light of this disclosure, and since the 2d Battalion lacked food and

water, the decision was reached to withdraw the 2d at nightfall. The 2d was

ordered to fall back on Wesu Ga, receive fresh supplies there, then march south

to join the 3d Battalion below Walawbum. Colonel McGee and his men

arrived at Wesu Ga at noon of 6 March, and went on to rejoin the 3d.71

Late on the next day, the 6th, the fighting reached its climax, as Tanaka

sought to move his division from between the 22d Division on the north of his

current positions and the American roadblock to the south. Supported by the

other combat team of its battalion, Orange Combat Team spent the morning

and early afternoon of the 6th in bracing itself for the expected supreme

Japanese effort. Shells from Japanese medium artillery suggested it might not

be long in coming. The pack animals suffered severely from this preparation,

but the men in their foxholes with overhead cover took few casualties. At 1715

an estimated two companies of Japanese in line of skirmishers, with heavy

supporting fire, crossed the river. The American mortars continued their work;

the automatic weapons held back until the Japanese were within fifty yards.

Two heavy machine guns, which had a clear field of fire along the river bank,

were especially effective. The Japanese failed, leaving many dead on the open

ground east of the river and on the river banks. Orange Combat Team found

71

 (1) GALAHAD, pp. 24, 27-28. (2) Tanaka Narrative, p. 2. (3) Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. II. (4) Brown Notes, p. 6.
154 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

its ammunition low, and so sent a request for more to Khaki Combat Team,

which was about one hundred yards downstream.72

From the Japanese point of view, withdrawal was begun just in time, for

the leading elements of the 113th Regiment, Chinese 38th Division, which

had been teamed with GALAHAD, met General Merrill about a mile northeast

of Walawbum at 1600 hours, 6 March. The arrival of the Chinese meant that

the outcome of the battle could not be an Allied defeat; the problem was now

to make the outcome a real and if possible a decisive victory.

There was an unfortunate incident when the remainder of the 38th Division

and an American patrol met near Walawbum on 7 March. The recognition

signal had been arranged as three bursts of three rounds each. This necessarily

meant there would be firing when the Chinese and Americans met. When the

tops of the American helmets, which looked not unlike the Japanese pot

helmet when their brims were invisible, appeared through and over the brush,

there was a brief exchange of fire in which three Chinese were wounded before

identity was established.

As soon as the Chinese were present in strength, Merrill by arrangement

with Sun but over the protests of his battalion commanders withdrew

GALAHAD on the morning of 7 March. His intent was to circle south and cut

the Kamaing Road again farther to the south. Merrill was very mindful of

Stilwell's order to keep his casualties down, and since he had held his position

until the 38th Division appeared, he believed he had complied with Stilwell's

orders. In effect, his decision removed GALAHAD from the battle of

Walawbum.73 In announcing his withdrawal from the Walawbum area,

Merrill told Colonel Brown, the tank commander, that he was relieved of

attachment to Merrill's headquarters and should radio Stilwell for further

orders.74

Apparently determined to make every moment count, Brown while waiting

his next orders attempted on the morning of 7 March to arrange a co-ordinated

tank-infantry attack toward Walawbum. He asked the commander of the

Chinese 113th Regiment to join him in a thrust direct at Walawbum, but the

Chinese officer was unable to agree because his orders were to hold at Wesu

Ga, about 4,000 yards north-northeast of Walawbum. Brown returned to his

own bivouac area and talked the situation over with staff members of his

attached Chinese infantry battalion and his own people. While the discussion

was under way a battalion commander of the 64th Regiment, Chinese 22d 72

 GALAHAD, pp. 27-28. 73

 (1) Merrill's Marauders. (2) The statement by Gen. Dr. Ho Yung-chi in The Big Circle,

page 86, that the 5307th broke and ran at Walawbum is denied by Hunter and Merrill. Some doubt

is cast on Dr. Ho's charge by his own claim that the 38th Division subsequently chased the Japanese "to the walls of Walawbum." Walawbum was half a dozen burned-out grass shacks on a dirt road. On page 44 of Merrill's Marauders is a picture of the Chinese moving in while the Americans moved out, which event may have given rise to the story. (3) The brief account

in Fred Eldridge's Wrath In Burma (New York: Doubleday Doran & Company, 1946), page 221, is not accurate. (4) Ltr to Sunderland, cited n. 66(3). (5) Merrill Notes. 74

 Ltr, Brown to Ward, 25 Aug 51. OCMH.
BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN NORTH BURMA 155

Division, appeared. Placed between two Chinese divisions which because of

communications difficulties were operating almost independently, Brown had

to make his own arrangements for a suitable role, so he turned to the newly

arrived battalion commander with his suggestion for an attack. This officer, as

it turned out, had no specific orders from his own higher headquarters, but he

did have an aggressive disposition, and promptly adopted Brown's suggestion

that tanks and infantry join to move south from their present site and place a

block across the Kamaing Road as it runs due east toward Walawbum.

About 1500 on 7 March, the tanks and the battalion of the 22d Division

placed themselves across the Kamaing Road in not one but two places, respectively one and two miles west of the Nambyu Hka. The infantry set up a

roadblock, while the tanks moved out aggressively along the road to east and

west.

One tank company moved west along the Kamaing Road and had bad

luck, for it met nothing but an impassible stream that halted further progress.

A second company went east along the Kamaing Road until it came to a bridge

that proved to be well covered by Japanese antitank guns. The lead tank was

almost across the bridge when it gave way, dumping the luckless vehicle into

the water. Antitank fire ripped through the thinly armored portions and killed

all but one of the crew.

The third tank company was the most successful. Its commander decided

to turn off the Kamaing Road onto a trail that showed signs of heavy traffic.

This may have been Tanaka's evacuation route, for the tanks encountered a

body of Japanese on the march and scattered them. Two weeks later a mass

grave of 200 dead Japanese was found in the area. On the evening of the 7th

the tanks reassembled after dark.75

The "Big Squeeze Play"

When dawn broke on the 8th, Stilwell's forces, with the already-noted

exception of GALAHAD, occupied areas forming a great arc whose several segments were seeking out the Japanese near them, the task of search no easy one

in the country around Walawbum. In order from west to east were two regiments of the 22d Division, the tanks, and the 113th Regiment of the 38th. The

22d's regiments were not arrayed neatly in line but had their elements over a

considerable area which included the ford over the Nambyu Hka at Kumnyen—

thus explaining how Brown's tankers met a battalion of the 22d near the

Nambyu Hka. Tanaka seems to have made his withdrawal from the area

through which elements of the 22d were moving but they did not keep pressure

on him, and to this he later attributed his escape from the Allied arc that might

have become a deadly ring: "The cautious movement of the Chinese forces

75

 Brown Notes, pp. 7-11.
156 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

engaged in the frontal attack made it possible for the 18th Division to save

itself."

 76

Back at his headquarters, Stilwell on 8 March checked over the situation as

it appeared to him on the basis of the information available at his headquarters.

He believed Merrill to be still in place along the Kamaing Road south of

Walawbum, Sun's 38th Division to be on the field, Brown's tanks to be in

action, Liao's 22d Division to be coming down from the north, and the 18th

Division to be withdrawing. Victory on a major scale appeared to be in sight,

so Stilwell issued orders for a "big squeeze play" of every unit he had to converge on the 18th Division and crush it. The 64th Regiment Stilwell thought to

be on the west of the Japanese position so the 64th was to attack towards the

east; Sun's 113th Regiment was to attack towards the southwest, and so on

round the arc.77 What followed illustrates how dependent the commander is

on forces and factors beyond his immediate control or even knowledge, for the

shortcomings of the radio net made Stilwell and Merrill unaware of each other's

intentions and movements. Moreover, the several units, Chinese and American,

often did not know of each other's locations and maneuvers, and so instead of

a co-ordinated assault on an encircled 18th Division what actually took place

was a battalion and regimental commanders' battle as units engaged what

Japanese they could find.78

In compliance with Stilwell's orders, the tanks and the 38th Division began

the moves that ultimately placed them in what was left of the village of

Walawbum. The tanks, which were on the Kamaing Road west of Walawbum

and separated from it by the Nambyu Hka, moved out eastward to seek a ford.

Japanese antitank fire covering the ford on the main road at a place called

Kumnyen Ga discouraged thoughts of crossing there so bulldozers covered by

infantry prepared a new crossing one and a half miles to the north. Once this

was done, Brown was ready to take his tanks across the stream and attack

Walawbum itself. The site itself had nothing of value but since the Japanese

had put up such a fight in the immediate vicinity Brown felt they must value the

location and so he resolved to make a determined effort to get it. To do this,

he decided to send two tank companies across the newly prepared ford to bypass

the Japanese position covering the old ford at Kumnyen Ga, and go on to

Walawbum, while one company of tanks made a frontal attack on the

Japanese.79

The envelopment went very smoothly, and as soon as the two tank

companies had cut behind the Japanese positions and were on the main road

they continued on toward Walawbum. Unfortunately, the tank company and

76

 (1) NCAC History, I, 63. (2) Unidentified overlay, showing Opns, 1-3 Mar 44. Folder, X-RAY Force, NCAC Files, KCRC. (3) Tanaka Narrative, p. 2. (4) Quotation from Tanaka,

Japanese Comments, Sec. II. 77

 Stilwell Diary, 8 Mar 44. 78

 For comments on the communication problem, see Merrill Notes. 79

 Stilwell's diary entry of 9 March describes Brown as having done his part.
BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN NORTH BURMA 157

A CHINESE COOK makes his way forward with his cooking equipment.

Chinese infantry which were making the frontal attack moved only as far as

Kumnyen Ga itself, which lay on the west of the ford. It was then 1600 and

the Chinese infantry refused to move farther. The appearance of Chinese

soldier cooks with rice kettles suggests one reason for the delay. But the

Chinese tankers were willing to keep on, and the tanks crossed the Nambyu

Hka at the main road. They soon rejoined the other two companies in

Walawbum. At dark, the tanks pulled back out of Walawbum to the Nambyu

Hka, where the Chinese infantry had halted, as Brown did not want the armor

to be without infantry support during the night. Next morning, the 9th, the

tanks and their accompanying battalion moved back to Walawbum and found

it, as Brown later recalled, "swarming with people from the 64th Infantry and

the 113th Infantry" who, to the tankers' great disgust, disputed the latter's

claim to have taken Walawbum.80

The largest share of the 38th Division's work at Walawbum had fallen to

the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 113th Regiment. It was the 2d Battalion that

had established contact with GALAHAD and relieved that unit. The 1st Battalion, which followed it, was kept in reserve. The 3d Battalion, which had 80

 Brown Notes, pp. 8-11.
158 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

moved up by forced marches, re-established the roadblock west of Walawbum

that GALAHAD'S 2d Battalion had been forced to yield several days before, and

kept its hold during the 8th and 9th after considerable fighting. Presumably it

was this battalion the tanks met in Walawbum on the 9th. General Sun used

the 112th Regiment to guard his rear and eastern flank lest the Japanese attack

him from across the hills which mark the eastern boundary of the Hukawng

Valley, the Kumon Range. The 114th, Sun kept in reserve.81

After GALAHAD was withdrawn from Walawbum and on its way to cut the

Kamaing Road again farther south, communications between Merrill and

Stilwell were finally re-established late on the evening of the 8th. Merrill was

ordered to halt, for Stilwell was now looking toward the next phase. Stilwell

recorded in his diary that he learned of GALAHAD'S maneuver only after issuing

orders for a co-ordinated action by the 64th, 113th, GALAHAD, tanks, artillery,

and the rest. Weighing the situation, Stilwell decided that his orders to Merrill

had not been clear enough. In saying, "use your discretion" he had meant to

keep casualties down, not "go roaming." Stilwell's conclusions and his willingness to assume responsibility for not making his orders more clear deserve

respect, but the communications difficulties that kept Stilwell in the dark as to

the movements and location of the several units, plus the extreme caution of

the Chinese 22d Division, seem major factors in Tanaka's successful withdrawal

from the Walawbum area. The 18th Division made good its escape from

Stilwell's trap, but in so doing it had yielded control of the greater part of the

Hukawng Valley to the Allies, and the Chinese Army in India could celebrate

a well-earned victory.82

Between the Hukawng Valley and the Mogaung River valley is the ridge

barrier of the Jambu Bum. Once Stilwell was fairly over the Jambu Bum, he

would be in a corridor, the Mogaung valley, which leads directly into the

Irrawaddy valley and Burma proper. The North Burma Campaign was beginning to yield results. For them, the 22d and 38th Divisions were paying a toll

in casualties. From fall 1943 to 18 March 1944, the campaign had cost 802

Chinese dead and 1,479 wounded, plus 530 undifferentiated casualties. Of the

dead, 539 were from the 38th Division.

Medical aid for the Chinese victors of Walawbum was provided by the U.S.

Army. The 42d, 43d, and 46th Portable Surgical Hospitals worked with the

22d Division. Surgical teams from the Seagrave Hospital Unit, the 25th Field

Hospital, and the 13th Mountain Medical Battalion were with the 38th Division. An ambulance shuttle up the Kamaing Road evacuated patients to the

25th Field Hospital at the new Taihpa Ga Airstrip.83

81

 G-3 Per Rpts, Chih Hui Pu, 7, 12 Mar 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. 82

 Stilwell Diary, 8, 9 Mar 44. 83

 (1) NCAC History, App. 5, History of 1st Prov Tank Gp, Chinese-American, 8 Aug

43-9 Mar 45, pp. 8, 14. (2) Rad Y-285, 26 Mar 44; Rads, Fwd Ech OUT. NCAC Files, KCRC. (3) Stilwell Diary, 4 Mar 44. (4) Stone MS, pp. 131, 133, 135.
BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN NORTH BURMA 159

Summary

The two-month stalemate around Yupbang Ga in November-December

1943 finally obliged Stilwell to leave CBI Theater headquarters and assume

command in the field. The arrival of reinforcements that gave the Chinese a

considerable numerical superiority, the constant air supply that gave them mobility unprecedented even in jungle warfare as the Japanese conducted it,

enabled Stilwell, Sun, and Liao to make a series of envelopments that forced

Tanaka to loosen his grip on the strategic area where the Tanai and the Tarung

join. The long stalemate was broken and a war of movement began. Stilwell

decided to use a fresh regiment of U.S. infantry for his next envelopment,

while Tanaka decided that because his opponent moved so slowly he could

safely mass his forces against the attempted envelopment and defeat his opponents in detail. A confused and stumbling clash around Walawbum followed, in which the Japanese were outfought and thrust to the south. This

was the first series of Allied victories in the North Burma Campaign and a

major slice of Burma was freed from the Japanese. But four months had gone

by since the first shots were fired. Progress forward had been slow, if victorious.
CHAPTER V

The Burma Campaign

in the Balance

When the soldiers of the Chinese Army in India entered Walawbum, deep

in Japanese-held Burma, they were for all practical purposes masters of the

Hukawng Valley and well on the way to Myitkyina. But their success did not

guarantee enthusiastic support of the Burma campaign by either SEAC or the

Chinese Government, while the Japanese at one point were within a few miles

of making the whole North Burma Campaign impossible. So far was SEAC

from favoring a campaign in north Burma, that Mountbatten sent a mission to

London and Washington to plead for cancellation of the campaign, while the

Americans in north Burma believed that on his part the Generalissimo was

ordering Generals Sun and Liao to go very slowly indeed. For some weeks the

campaign hung in the balance, while Stilwell did what he could to tip that

balance on the side of vigorous action to break the long blockade of China.

The SEXTANT Decisions Challenged

On 4 March 1944, when the fighting at Walawbum was moving to its

peak, Admiral Mountbatten visited Stilwell at the latter's invitation. The relation between the Supreme Allied Commander and his acting deputy was in

need of adjustment because of a chain of events stretching back to the preceding January.1

 The Generalissimo's unwillingness to cross the Salween and advance into Burma, plus the long-felt desire of Mountbatten's commanders in

chief to bypass Burma and to postpone major operations until after the defeat

of Germany, led SEAC's planners to revive, and Mountbatten to approve, the

old plan for an attack against the Netherlands Indies that had first been presented in May 1943. SEAC's staff argued that the clearing of north Burma to

break the blockade of China was out of step with global strategy because of the

now quickened pace of operations in the Pacific. They recommended that the

Combined Chiefs of Staff order SEAC to keep its resources out of the Burma

fighting and conserve them for a major offensive in the fall of 1944 or the

spring of 1945. The first phase of this operation should be the securing of a 1

 The Stilwell Papers, p. 282.
THE BURMA CAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE 161

foothold in Sumatra. Success in the East Indies should be exploited into the

South China Sea, with the goal of opening a port on the China coast. Germany's fall was expected to release the means for this.2

On learning of this development, the deputy CBI Theater commander,

Maj. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan, had promptly warned Stilwell of it. Telling Stilwell that Mountbatten was about to send a mission to Washington and London to present this plan, General Sultan had suggested that Stilwell counter

with a mission of his own. Stilwell was, as acting Deputy Supreme Allied

Commander, subordinate to Mountbatten; he was also Chief of Staff, China

Theater, with obligations to China and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. A decision to postpone any effort to relieve China until after Germany had been

defeated might have the gravest repercussions in China. As Chief of Staff,

China Theater, Stilwell therefore had decided to send his own mission to

Washington: Generals Boatner and Ferris, Colonels Francis Hill and Francis

G. Brink.3 Moreover, Stilwell was an officer in the service of the United States,

and there lay his first loyalty. As commanding general of a U.S. Army theater

of operations he had been charged with several missions, such as support of

the airline to China, which might be adversely affected by the strategy SEAC

was proposing. He also knew that the objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

to bypassing Burma had been placed on the record at the Washington conference of May 1943. Unhappily, he failed to inform Mountbatten of his decision to send the mission.

As soon as the situation around Taihpa Ga permitted, Stilwell had placed

his arguments directly before SEAC. At a Supreme Commander's meeting on

31 January, Stilwell stated flatly that the entire concept of attacking Sumatra

and bypassing Burma was wrong. While he fully realized the advantages of

opening a Chinese port that could ultimately result from the proposed operation, Stilwell believed this could be accomplished by an overland advance of

ten Chinese divisions in about one month, after the Ledo Road to supply them

had been opened. Stilwell believed that the road would be opened sooner than

the SEAC War Staff anticipated and wanted to know if account had been taken

of the existing road to Myitkyina, the Kamaing Road, from which he was then

only twenty miles away. As for the argument that a change in strategy was

necessary because of the faster schedule of Pacific operations, Stilwell did not

see how that made it necessary to wait six months to fight elsewhere instead

of fighting the Japanese at once in Burma.4

2

 (1) Rad AM 37, Sultan to Marshall, Stilwell, and Hearn, 6 Jan 44. Item 1602, Bk 5, JWS

Personal File. (2) CM-IN 5998, Sultan to Marshall, 9 Jan 44. (3) Rad, Mountbatten to COS and

Prime Minister, 8 Jan 44. SEAC War Diary. 3

 (1) Rad AMMDEL AG 13, Stilwell to Marshall, McNarney, and Handy, 2 Jan 44; Ltr and

Incl, Hearn to Mme. Chiang, 11 Jan 44. Item 263, Bk 3, JWS Personal File. (2) Rad RE 76, Sultan to Stilwell, 13 Jan 44. Item 16, Bk 6A, JWS Personal File. 4

 Min, SAC's 52d Mtg, 31 Jan 44. SEAC War Diary. Stilwell probably meant the motorable portion of the Kamaing Road.
162 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Stilwell's representations made no impression, for a clash of national policy

was involved far deeper than differing views on strategy. The United States

wanted to support China; the British Commonwealth, to liberate its prewar

territories in Burma and Malaya, and again raise the British flag over Singapore. In retrospect, British emotions and British policies should be fully understandable in terms of similar emotions and policies that resulted in the American effort to liberate the Philippines. As Admiral Mountbatten stated the

problem in his report:

The Americans, on the one hand, regarded Assam and Burma primarily as part of the air

and land line to China; the British, on the other hand, saw the liberation of Burma as an

end in itself, and as a step on the road to Malaya and Singapore. It seemed necessary to

establish the fact that, although the two conceptions were divergent in motive, in execution

they were complementary and inseparable.5

To the Prime Minister, viewing the war from the lonely summit of his position, all of Burma seemed far from Japan, and he feared that if the British

forces were mired in Burma they would not have their just share of victory in

the Far East. He "wished, on the contrary, to contain the Japanese in Burma,

and break into or through the great arc of islands forming the outer fringe of

the Dutch East Indies." As he wrote his memoirs several years later, Churchill

added: "It is against this permanent background of geography, limited resources, and clash of policies that the story of the campaign should be read."

 6

Unknown to Stilwell, the subject of a new directive for SEAC was an

urgent topic of conversation among War Department planners. Their conclusions, a reaffirmation of their May 1943 views, were reached before Stilwell's

mission to Washington could present his reactions to CULVERIN (SEAC's plan

for an attack on Sumatra). On 12 January the Asiatic Section, Operations Division, examined the proposed attack on Sumatra in response to Sultan's warning on the 6th. The section pointed out that President Roosevelt's 20 December 1943 message to the Generalissimo strongly indicated a land route to

China. Furthermore, as Japanese strength in Burma increased, the enemy's offensive capabilities were correspondingly improved, a factor to be weighed in

any consideration of operations against Sumatra.7

From north Burma Stilwell had been reporting successes against the Japanese and asking when 4 Corps would move forward from Manipur State to

engage them. In response, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the British Chiefs of

Staff to inquire of SEAC when it proposed to advance the 4 Corps, and what

its mission would be.8

5

 Mountbatten Report, Pt. B, par. 2. 6

 Winston S. Churchill, Closing the Ring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951), p. 561. 7

 (1) Memo, Col William H. Wood, Actg Chief, Asiatic Sec OPD, for Chief, S&P Gp OPD, 12 Jan 44, sub: Opns, SE Asia Theater. Case 228, OPD 381 Security, A47-30. (2) See p. 79,

above; pp. 297-98, below. 8

 (1) CM-IN 857, 2 Jan 44; Rad MS 37, 22 Jan 44; CM-IN 14766, 23 Jan 44. These radios were "Action Handy; Info Marshall, McNarney." (2) CCS 452/5, 25 Jan 44, sub: Opns in Burma 1944.
THE BURMA CAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE 163

The JCS, disturbed by the evident SEAC tendency to postpone operations

in Southeast Asia, and approving the Joint Staff Planners' view that the capture of Myitkyina in the current dry season was essential to the U.S. policy of

developing China into a base capable of supporting Pacific operations, warned

the CCS of their apprehension that further delay in issuing a CCS directive to

SEAC would result in very little being done before the monsoon began. The

Joint Chiefs went on to say that every means available for operations in north

Burma should be employed immediately. They recommended that SEAC be

ordered to seize and hold Myitkyina before the 1944 rains and that 4 Corps be

ordered to cross the Chindwin and move on to central Burma. To this view,

the British Chiefs of Staff replied that they did not agree with the proposed

directive, but that they were not prepared to advance counterproposals, pending

the outcome of conversations with Mountbatten's mission.9

The British Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed a SEAC assertion that SEAC was

making the maximum offensive effort that its line of communications could

support. They doubted whether the 4 Corps could seize or hold the ShweboMonywa area before the monsoon and whether the Ledo Force could advance

to Myitkyina in time to bring the Ledo Road forward before the monsoon. In

the opinions of the British Chiefs, if this could not be accomplished Myitkyina

could not be held.

Aware of these exchanges between the Joint and British Chiefs of Staff,

Admiral Mountbatten complained that the views of the Joint Chiefs were

based on Stilwell's representations, with all that implied of insubordination by

the latter. He accused Stilwell of inspiring a press campaign against CULVERIN

and asked that Stilwell's relief from SEAC duty be arranged. General Marshall

quickly pointed out to Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Chief of the British Joint

Staff Mission in Washington, that the JCS paper had been prepared before

Stilwell's staff officers had arrived in Washington and before the JCS had seen

Stilwell's objections to CULVERIN. Fully consistent with the previous course of

U.S. service opinion the JCS paper had stemmed from the OPD memorandum

of 12 January, and the latter was drafted before General Sultan suggested

Stilwell send his mission.10

 Therefore, Stilwell's mission on its arrival had no

need to present his views, for they were identical with the positions already

taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Roosevelt.

At this point Stilwell received concrete indication that the President's

attitude toward him was becoming more favorable. From Washington, General

Boatner radioed that the President revealed complete sympathy with Stilwell's

9

 (1) Memo, Wood for Chief, S&P Gp OPD, 9 Feb 44, sub: Opns, SEAC; Rpt (JCS 678/1), JPS, 16 Feb 44, sub: Opns in SE Asia, 1943-44. ABC 384 (Burma) 8-25-42, Sec 5, A48-224. (2)

CCS 452/6, 17 Feb 44, sub: Opns in SE Asia; CCS 452/7, 20 Feb 44. (3) CM-OUT 8897, 21

Feb 44. Case 297, OPD 381 Security, A47-30. 10

 (1) CCS 452/8, 26 Feb 44, sub: Opns in SE Asia. (2) Rad SEACOS 99, 21 Feb 44. Item 66, OPD Exec 10. (3) Ltr, Marshall to Dill, 23 Feb 44. Case 297, OPD 381 Security, A47-30. (4)

Ltr, Mountbatten to Wedemeyer, 20 Feb 44. SEAC War Diary. (5) Stilwell's Mission to China,

Ch. IX.
164 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

efforts to advance in Burma. Not since the spring of 1942 had Stilwell received

any evidence that the Commander in Chief was supporting him. Unimpressed,

Stilwell replied to Boatner that he would trade the sympathy for one U.S.

division.11

Reporting on his interview with the President, Boatner stated that Roosevelt said he was more dissatisfied with the progress of the war in Burma than

anywhere else. The two men discussed the role of the British and Chinese

ground forces in Burma. Boatner urged the President to aid in persuading

the British and Chinese to take a more aggressive role in Burma. The President agreed to address the Prime Minister and urge immediate aggressive

action in compliance with the SEXTANT decisions, but he said nothing about

similar representations to the Generalissimo.12

Lending point to Boatner's arguments was a widely circulated OPD estimate

of the strength of the contending parties in Burma. OPD believed that there

were in India 1,654,094 British and Indian troops, 44,036 U.S.-trained Chinese,

and 2,943 U.S. infantry, or 1,701,073 men, against a G-2 and SEAC estimate of

150,000 Japanese in Burma.13 The strength estimates made by OPD are, however, not a true picture. The Japanese strength in Burma, exclusive of naval

and air personnel, was approximately 252,000.14 As for the Indian forces, OPD

did not take into account the very considerable forces needed to restrain the

warlike and turbulent tribes of the North-West Frontier Province, the need of

garrisons to maintain internal security in an empire of some 400,000,000

peoples of diverse races, and the administrative establishments required for

support of the Indian divisions in the Mediterranean and Middle East, as well

as in Burma.

Colonel Hill of Stilwell's party underscored the relationship between taking

Myitkyina and increasing Hump tonnage above its current plateau of a

13,000-14,000-ton level. Hump tonnage was limited by the high density of air

traffic at the Assam gateway and by the lack of instrument let-down facilities

in China. As a result the Hump was rather closely confined to 10,000 tons a

month in bad weather, 12,500 tons in good. The ATC, said Hill, was suggesting that a more southerly route by way of Myitkyina would have to be flown

to lessen traffic density.15 However, so long as Japanese fighters could use the

Myitkyina airstrip, ATC's transports would have to stay well to the north.

The President, as he had promised Boatner, told Churchill that he was

expecting Stilwell to take Myitkyina by the end of the dry season, and that

he thought Stilwell could hold there if 4 Corps did its part. Roosevelt expressed grave concern over recent trends in SEAC's strategic thinking, which

favored Sumatra and Malayan operations. He concluded that advantageous as

11

 Rad RE 296, Sultan to Stilwell, 20 Feb 44. Item 44, Bk 6A, JWS Personal File. 12

 Rpt, Boatner, 18 Feb 44, on interv with Roosevelt. Item 245, Bk 15, OPD Exec 9. 13

 App. A to Rpt cited n. 9(1). 14

 Japanese Officers' Comments on third CBI MS. 15

 Min, Washington Conf, 9 Feb 44. ABC (Burma) 384, 8-25-42, Sec 5, A48-224.
THE BURMA CAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE 165

a successful CULVERIN might be, more could be gained by an all-out drive into

upper Burma to take Myitkyina and thus increase the airlift to China. This

would permit building air strength in China and insure essential support for

the projected cross-Pacific advance to the Formosa-China-Luzon area. Churchill

replied that SEAC would not withdraw or withhold any forces from the campaign in upper Burma for the sake of CULVERIN or any other amphibious

operation. This reply was reassuring, for General Sultan had heard gossip at

SEAC headquarters that troops would not be committed to current operations

lest such delay CULVERIN.16

The Japanese Create More Command Problems

While the lengthy radioed exchanges on the new directive for SEAC were

taking place, the Japanese seized the initiative in Burma, thus justifying the

apprehensions so often expressed by General Marshall. On 7 January, Imperial

General Headquarters had finally approved the major portion of the plan to

attack India so long urged by Burma Area Army, and had directed:

In order to defend BURMA, the Commander-in-chief of the Southern Army may occupy

and secure the vital areas of Northeastern INDIA in the vicinity of IMPHAL by defeating the

enemy in that area at the opportune time.17

Significant of the limited scope of the intended operation, which was given the

simple code name U, this directive was issued in accordance with an Imperial

General Headquarters basic order of summer 1942 which had given a defensive

role to the Japanese garrison of Burma.18

In the opinion of the former chief of the Operations Section, Imperial General

Headquarters Army Department, another order by that body would have had to

be issued for an advance into Assam Province beyond the Imphal area. All

things considered, so ambitious an operation by 15th Army did not seem

possible to the Japanese command. Some members of the 15th Army command,

including General Mutaguchi himself, did want to descend into Assam, and

expected that such a bold offensive would be permitted by Tokyo when the U

operation had been successful.19

16

 (1) Memo, Marshall for Leahy, 24 Feb 44, with Incl, sub: Proposed Msg from President to Prime Minister. Case 297, OPD 381 Security, A47-30. (2) Rad, President to Prime Minister on SEAC Strategy, 25 Feb 44. SEAC War Diary. (3) Rad 592, Prime Minister to President, 25 Feb

44. Folder, Prime Minister-President, OPD Exec 16. (4) The President's radio is quoted in

Churchill, Closing the Ring, page 561. 17

 (1) Imperial General Headquarters Army Directive 1776, 7 Jan 44 (hereafter, IGH Army

Dir — —), GHQ, Far East Comd, Mil Hist Div, Imperial General Headquarters Army Orders. OCMH. (2) SEATIC Bull 240, 9 Jul 46, pp. 3-5; SEATIC Bull 247, 22 Apr 47, pp. 3-4; Lt Gen Kitsuji Ayabe in Bull 247, p. 6; SEATIC Bull Special Int Bull, Pt. V, p. 22. MID Library. (3)

Japanese Study 89. 18

 (1) IGH Army Order 650, 29 Jun 42. (2) For a discussion of Japanese strategy in South- east Asia in the summer of 1942, see Stilwell's Mission to China, Chapter V. (3) Japanese Comments, Sec. I. 19

 Statement, Col Hattori, 5 Oct 51; Statement, Col Fujiwara, 5 Oct 51. Japanese Comments,

Sec. I.
166 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

These details were unknown to the Allied staffs and commanders, but on

4 February 1944 they saw the beginnings of the crucial stages of Operation U

when the 55th Division attacked in the Arakan to lure SEAC's reserves away

from Imphal.20 (Map 9)

The Japanese attack was not a surprise to SEAC, to CBI headquarters, or to

General Headquarters (India), though Stilwell, like Marshall, had always

feared an attack on Kunming. As early as 15 July 1943, Lt. Gen. Geoffrey

Scoones, 4 Corps commander, had predicted the Japanese move. In December

1943 the likelihood of such an attack was under active discussion in SEAC.

Wingate was advised of its probability on 16 January 1944. SEAC's joint

intelligence accepted the view that a Japanese offensive was imminent and

objected to a War Staff estimate which forecast a rather passive Japanese

attitude.

20

 Mountbatten Report, Pt. B, par. 68.

Map 9
THE BURMA CAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE 167

By 8 February 1944 Stilwell's mission to Washington could report that an

estimate of the situation by General Headquarters (India) suggested a major

Japanese offensive was about to begin. Almost immediately, CBI staff officers

began to study the implications of such an attack in terms of the air supply

needs of surrounded Allied units. On 14 February Admiral Mountbatten told

the British Chiefs of Staff that a Japanese attack on 4 Corps was planned to

follow a successful offensive in the Arakan. On 5 March he inquired of General

Giffard, the senior British Army commander in SEAC, how that officer

proposed to reinforce Imphal to meet the expected Japanese attack.21

The Japanese 28th Army in the Arakan had three divisions, the 2d, the 54th,

and the 55th. Convinced that SEAC contemplated an amphibious descent on

the Arakan coast, the Japanese employed the 2d and 54th Divisions in the

profitless tasks of building coastal defenses and keeping a sharp watch for

hostile landing craft, as well as the more useful work of forwarding supplies

to the veteran 55th Division, victors of the Battle of the Sittang Bridge, February 1942. The 55th Division's mission was to place the Indian divisions facing

it in such peril as to attract British reserves from the decisive point at Imphal.

The Japanese striking force made its way around 15 Corps' east flank without discovery and attacked on 4 February. So quickly and hard did the Japanese

strike that on 6 February they overran the headquarters of the 7th Indian

Division. Similar Japanese tactics had yielded very considerable results in

previous years. Here was a threat.

But General Slim, commanding Fourteenth Army, the headquarters

immediately controlling 4 and 15 Corps, saw the opportunity presented by the

Japanese move. Exploiting the advantages of air transport and air supply he

quickly massed a force that far outnumbered the Japanese by bringing up the

26th Indian Division and moving the British 36th Division into a supporting

position. A third division of two brigades, the 81st West African, was operating

in the Kaladan valley, parallel to the Arakan coast.

To meet the Japanese attack, the three brigades of the 7th Indian Division,

the brigade of the 5th Indian Division attached to it, and the division service

troops formed perimeters and went on air supply while the rest of 15 Corps

drove toward them. Called "baby tortoise" or "beehive" tactics by the baffled

Japanese, this type of operation was something new in Burma fighting. The

unit training, and equipment, of the Indian Army had greatly improved in the

past years. By cutting the Indians' supply lines, the Japanese had expected to

force them back in confusion. Instead, though the Japanese were carrying out

21

 (1) Rad 213, Stilwell to Bennett, 7 Dec 43; Rad, Stilwell to Marshall, 9 Jan 44. Folder, Rads, Stilwell to Marshall, Oct 43-25 Mar 44, NCAC Files, KCRC. (2) CM-IN 2094, Stilwell to Marshall, 4 Jan 44. (3) Note, Secy Plans on War Staff, 1944, p. 12; Note, Gen Wingate-Situ- ation in North Burma. Items 4, 16, SEAC Info Bk, OCMH. (4) Min, 1st Conf with Offs USAF

CBI, 8 Feb 44. ABC 384 (Burma) Sec 5, 8-25-42, A48-224. (5) Rad RE 240, Evans to Stilwell and Sultan, 11 Feb 44; Rad RE 260, Evans to Stilwell, 14 Feb 44. Items 34, 38, Bk 6A, JWS Per- sonal File. (6) Minute SC4/438/G, SAC for Giffard, 16 Mar 44; SAC Dir to CinC, 11 Army Gp, 5 Mar 44. SEAC War Diary. (7) British Comments, Serial 56.
168 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

their mission of containing superior forces, they themselves, depending on

what supplies could trickle to them over jungle trails, were effectively encircled

and were running out of supplies in a few days.22 In two weeks' time, 7th

Indian Division restored communications with its service elements and held

the initiative.

That these new Allied tactics involved air supply posed new problems for

Stilwell. On 13 January 1944, well before the Japanese struck, Stilwell's staff

warned him that the Arakan situation (where an African division was soon to

require air supply) might result in a request for diversion of Hump aircraft

and Hump tonnage at any time. A week after the battle began such a request

came from SEAC. The Arakan supply commitments strained Mountbatten's

resources to the limit, and as it would soon be time to fly Wingate's new

and ambitious long-range penetration group effort into Burma, Mountbatten

wanted to divert thirty-eight aircraft from the Hump. He wanted Stilwell's

concurrence before he radioed the CCS, but no reply came before the radio was

dispatched.

Stilwell's reply was a refusal for he had understood that only one Japanese

battalion was causing the trouble. How, he asked, could he justify a diversion

on those grounds to the Generalissimo? The CCS, however, agreed, providing

no more than thirty C-47's were taken off the Hump. Mountbatten could argue

that the spirit of the SEXTANT discussions with the Generalissimo contemplated Hump diversions in an emergency, and this was one.23

 Hump tonnage

fell from 14,431 tons in February to 10,954 tons in March, then rose to the

mid-13,000's in April and May. (See Chart 5.)

When the Arakan crisis ended in late February with the driving of the

Japanese from their key roadblocks, both sides could find cause for satisfaction.

Churchill proclaimed: "The enemy has been challenged and beaten in jungle

war-fare. His boastfulness has received a salutary exposure."

 24

 From all indications, the Japanese task force took very heavy casualties. But the men who

planned to meet again at Yasukuni Shrine expected this, and Burma Area Army

believed the sacrifices of its men had in fact mired Giffard's and Slim's reserves

in the Arakan while the decisive action was being fought out hundreds of

miles to the north. The Japanese had in effect sacrificed the 55th Division and

greatly weakened their defense of the Arakan, so much so as to make its future

loss inevitable. This meant the Japanese would have to win at Imphal to

make the Arakan sacrifice worth while. They did not perceive that Slim and

Giffard, by the rapid movement of their strategic reserves, had taken the first

major step toward defeating them in detail, for they did not realize that Slim

and Giffard could shuttle whole divisions by air.

22

 (1) Japanese Study 89. (2) Mountbatten Report, Pt. B, pars. 60-92. 23

 (1) Rad RE 248, Evans to Stilwell, 12 Jan 44; Rad RE 260, Evans to Stilwell, 14 Feb 44;

Rad, Stilwell to Evans. Items 15, 38, 47, Bk 6A, JWS Personal File. (2) Rad SEACOS, 18 Feb

44; Rad JSM to War Cabinet Office, 25 Feb 44. SEAC War Diary. 24

 Owen, The Campaign in Burma, p. 65.
THE BURMA CAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE 169

The principal concern of the Japanese staffs after the Arakan battle was the

slowness with which their 15th Division was moving into place for the attack

on Imphal. The drive on Imphal was to have begun on 22 or 23 February. The

Japanese D Day came and went and the 15th Division was still not ready to

move. Anxiously the Japanese staffs watched the time they had bought by

sacrificing the 55th Division slip through their fingers.25

Mountbatten and Stilwell Meet

On 2 March General Marshall told Stilwell to see Mountbatten at once and

re-establish cordial personal relations with him. Marshall referred to some press

indiscretions, which Mountbatten thought had been Stilwell's work, and told

Stilwell that he knew the latter bore no responsibility whatever for them, that

they originated with a U.S. naval officer. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister and

British Chiefs of Staff had at once concluded that Stilwell was responsible for

them. Their irritation had been increased by the mission Stilwell sent to

Washington without telling Mountbatten. Though Marshall had assured Dill

and Mountbatten that the Joint Chiefs had reached their views independently

of Stilwell, harm had been done. Hinting at great combined operations to

come, which made Allied unity essential, Marshall asked Stilwell to close the

rapidly widening breach between himself and Mountbatten.26

As was his custom, Stilwell carefully drafted what he wanted to tell

Mountbatten:

Mission to Washington was to inform War Department of my plans and arguments,

report on situation, and attempt to put China in proper perspective. I am CofS for CKS.

I command CBI Theater. I have a mission. My orders re SEAC are to use U.S. forces to best

purpose and I have done so. I am serving under Slim. I diverted Hump tonnage. I am

following orders. I have never been appointed as Deputy [Supreme Allied Commander,

SEAC]. Opinions differ. I have stated mine frankly. E.G., 'Ledo Road cannot be built or

held, nor can it carry any tonnage.' It is being built. It can be held—not of course if the

British leave the whole job to two Chinese divisions. It will carry tonnage. It is now carrying

20,000 tons a month without trying.

Burma can be taken. The Japs can be licked. (Slim's job. Our job.) The road can be

opened. All we need is pressure on CKS, which I have struggled to get. The problem in

front of us is Burma. That is what I am working on.

What are the objections to me? I have assured you that once a decision is made, I will

play ball. Am I supposed to sink my opinion before that time? And help to put over a point

of view I do not believe in? Why should I take the opinions of your staff and not my own?

Have I covered up to you on the Chinese? Have I withheld possible help? Do you

believe now what your experts said of the [Assam] LOC? Have I squawked about my status?

Have I talked for publication? (Indian Press). Have I meddled in politics? (Mr. Churchill

told me last May he understood my position and wanted to help).

25

 Japanese Comments, Sec. I. 26

 Rad WAR 4654, Marshall to Stilwell, 2 Mar 44. Item 2062, Bk 6, JWS Personal File.
170 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

TRIDENT, QUADRANT, and SEXTANT all bore down on opening up China. Why should

I be panned for trying to do it?

Have I mentioned publicity? (Show him the Road article.) Does that tend to create

suspicion or not? (Constant belittling [in the Indian and British press] of American effort

here with the Chinese). . . .

Army Commander did not have any remarks on military effort. I have no desire to mix

in political matters.

What is it? Do you want me to resign? I have never been appointed, so that is easy. Do

you want me to be relieved entirely from this Theater? Or do you want the CBI abolished?

(Have you political reasons for your attitude?) You asked me to be frank. I should like you

also to be frank. I can stand it.27

The meeting between Mountbatten and Stilwell passed off pleasantly and

successfully. Stilwell kept no notes on what he said but reported to Marshall

that he "ate crow" because he had not told Mountbatten of his mission. "We

are good personal friends," he went on, "and our relations have never been

stiff." Stilwell stated that he was carrying out Mountbatten's orders to the best

of his ability and would carry out future orders as soon as the decision was

made. At Cairo, he went on, he had tried to get a statement of the United

States China policy but this had not been vouchsafed him. Since this guidance

was lacking, he was trying to protect U.S. interests, carry out his original

mission, and comply with TRIDENT, QUADRANT, and SEXTANT decisions.28

Admiral Mountbatten was pleased by the meeting and told Dill of Stilwell's

apology. Mountbatten's letter to Dill suggests a certain reserve but he considered that he and Stilwell had settled their current problems and had effected

a personal rapprochement. However, Mountbatten added:

He really is a grand old warrior but only the Trinity could carry out his duties which

require him to be in Delhi, Chungking and the Ledo Front simultaneously, and I still think

Al. Wedemeyer or Sultan should be appointed as Commanding General for the American

SEA theater and that Stilwell's command should be confined to China though he could

certainly continue with the title of deputy SAC, SEA since he had never really done

anything about those duties during the whole time I have been out here.29

Later events showed that Stilwell was willing to focus his attention on China,

to be relieved of a post that was of purely symbolic significance, and to let

others cope with problems of administration and command south of the Hump.

The accord reached by Stilwell and Mountbatten did not include questions of

grand strategy, for differences there went beyond the competence of the local

commanders.30

Immediately after the interview, Mountbatten was seriously injured when

a bamboo splinter was rammed into his eye as he was driving in his jeep. He

was temporarily blinded, and had to spend many days in the hospital. The

27

 (1) Stilwell Diary, Notebook 101⁄2. (2) Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 379. 28

 CM-IN 4651, Stilwell to Marshall, 7 Mar 44. 29

 Minute SC4/439/D, SAC for Dill, 16 Mar 44. SEAC War Diary. 30

 Ltr, Mountbatten to Lt Gen Sir Henry Pownall, CofS, SEAC, 8 Mar 44. SEAC War Diary.
THE BURMA CAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE 171

accident was doubly unfortunate, for it immobilized SEAC's commander at a

time when the Japanese were expected to make their attack on Imphal.31

The Chiefs of Staff Reject CULVERIN

The mission (AXIOM) sent to Washington and London in February 1944 to

persuade Mountbatten's superiors of CULVERIN'S advantages, included Generals

Wedemeyer and Wheeler of SEAC's American component, and Maj. Gen.

M. W. M. MacLeod, Capt. M. G. Goodenough, RN, and Brigadier Geoffrey K.

Bourne. In London the AXIOM Mission found that the British Chiefs of Staff

and the War Cabinet had not settled on what British strategy in the Pacific war

should be. The military wanted to dispatch a powerful task force to co-operate

with the U.S. Navy in the Pacific. Mr. Churchill, for the Cabinet, wanted

British effort to concentrate on the Indian Ocean. The strategic concepts of

CULVERIN were most appealing to the Prime Minister but he complained of

SEAC's estimate of the resources needed. Churchill thought the estimates

inflated, a "terrific bill." The British Chiefs of Staff objected to the strategy

expressed in CULVERIN. They considered an attempt to mount it would postpone the defeat of Japan by six months. As a result of the London discussions,

the AXIOM Mission was told that in Washington they could speak for British

authority only to the extent that the Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff agreed

with Mountbatten's views on Burma operations. Beyond that, no decision had

been reached. They were also to assure their American hosts that no British

resources would be withheld from current operations in Burma to mount

CULVERIN.32

The mission's reception in Washington, March 1944, revealed the Joint

Chiefs' opposition to CULVERIN. General Marshall was so impressed with

Stilwell's objections to CULVERIN that, instead of just noting their outstanding

points for the President's consideration, he sent in the whole paper.33

The Joint Chiefs objected to CULVERIN because they believed that resources

for it would not be available until after the defeat of Germany. Therefore,

exploitation of a successful CULVERIN would not reach Singapore before the

middle of 1945 at the best. This date would be eight to ten months after U.S.

forces were expected to have cut the Japanese line of communications to that

area. The Joint Chiefs did not believe that the establishment of Myitkyina as

an air base would necessitate the recapture of all Burma. While General Wedemeyer, AXIOM'S chief spokesman, agreed that taking Myitkyina would increase

the Hump lift (in that it would make possible a lower, wider air route to

China), he added that the operation was too risky. As to north Burma opera31

 (1) Mountbatten Report, Pt. B, par. 97. (2) SAC's Personal Diary, 7 Mar 44. SEAC War Diary. 32

 Rpt of AXIOM Mission, 3 Apr 44. SEAC War Diary. 33

 Memo, Marshall for Leahy, 20 Feb 44. Item 251, Bk 15, OPD Exec 9.
172 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

tions in general, Wedemeyer stated: "Without full Chinese help it was impossible to deny Upper Burma to the enemy, though one of the subordinate

commanders in the area did consider that it would be possible to reach the

Myitkyina area. The Supreme Commander and his staff, however, believed this

to be very problematical, and even if accomplished, would not result in the

necessary degree of control of Upper Burma. . . ."

At the end of the SEAC mission's visit to Washington, the Joint Chiefs

presented a memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff stating they were

now more firm than ever in their belief that the greatest contribution SEAC

could make would be to provide timely support to a cross-Pacific advance to

the China-Formosa-Luzon triangle, and that Mountbatten's greatest accomplishment would be to secure Myitkyina and build up an immediate increase in

Hump traffic to China. They believed that successes in the Arakan and

Hukawng areas, plus improvement in the Assam line of communications,

indicated that difficulties previously emphasized in Burma operations might

have been considerably overestimated.34

A major change in Japanese naval dispositions supplied the final argument

against CULVERIN. In February 1944, the Japanese moved the bulk of their fleet

from Truk to Singapore. From Singapore it could quickly counter any attempted

amphibious attack on Sumatra, and the Japanese now had the strength at

Singapore to make their countermove a success.35

The Japanese Attack Forces Hump Diversions

The Japanese attack on Imphal had been anticipated, and Slim's plans had

been long ready. His intention was that 4 Corps should retire before the

Japanese attack, persuading the Japanese that 4 Corps was in retreat. The

Japanese would follow over the wild country between the Chindwin River and

the Imphal plain. There, at Imphal, 4 Corps would turn on the Japanese.

Heavy reinforcements would be flown in from the Arakan directly to Imphal,

while a fresh British corps, concentrating around Dimapur, would fall with

smashing weight on the Japanese flanks and rear. The plan assumed but one

Japanese regiment would attack Kohima, a town near the Bengal and Assam

Railway.36 (Map 10)

34

 (1) Mountbatten's understanding of why the JCS wanted Myitkyina taken is given as: "They had come to the conclusion that the air effort from China could best be supported by establishing air bases and a large staging area at Myitkyina, and by pushing ahead with opening the land

route into China as fast as possible." Mountbatten Report, Pt. B, par. 135. (2) Wedemeyer's quo- tation from Supplementary Min, JCS 154th Mtg, 21 Mar 44, Item 1. (3) CCS 148th Mtg, 3 Mar 44, Item 1. (4) JCS 774, 16 Mar 44, sub: Strategy in SEAC. (5) CCS 452/10, 21 Mar 44, sub: Strategy in SEAC. 35

 (1) Mountbatte 36 n Report, Pt. B, par. 277. (2) Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 575. (1) Ltrs, Col Clarence W. Bennett, Ln O, 4 Corps, to CG, 5303d Area Comd, 20 Mar, 4

Apr 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. (2) Mountbatten Report, Pt. B, par. 95.
Map 10
174 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

The Japanese offensive began on 8 March, a week earlier than had been

expected, and moved with stunning speed and weight. The Japanese used three

of their own divisions plus some units (later formed as a division) organized

among Indian prisoners of war. Four days before the Japanese began their

attack, Mountbatten had ordered the Manipur front reinforced.

On 14 March, Mountbatten was told that the 5th Indian Division had not

yet begun its move to reinforce 4 Corps at Imphal. He also concluded that the

Japanese attack, though it had been expected, was proceeding with a vigor and

a momentum thoroughly disturbing to the Fourteenth Army staff. He and his

staff had not been aware that the situation was thought to be deteriorating so

rapidly. Mountbatten believed that responsibility for the nonarrival of the 5th

Indian Division and for the failure to keep him informed of the situation lay

with General Giffard, and so informed him. In criticizing Giffard, Mountbatten

(perhaps because of his recent accident in north Burma) may have been

unaware that the 5th Indian Division had been launched on an attack on the

Arakan on 6 March and could not have been disengaged earlier than in fact it

was. The incident had its effect on the relationship between the two

commanders.

Mountbatten personally intervened to speed the reinforcement process, and

the 161st Indian Brigade was rushed forward. It arrived just in time to find the

whole of the Japanese 31st Division moving on Kohima. This Japanese action

was a serious affair, for near at hand, though a stretch of very difficult country

lay between, was the Bengal and Assam Railway, the line of communications

to the Hump airfields and Stilwell's campaign.37

This in turn created another complication for Mountbatten and for Stilwell,

because in order to fly reinforcements up to save Kohima Mountbatten had to

divert transports from the Hump, as earlier he had been obliged to do during

the peak of the Arakan fighting. This diversion of transports, which were the

sole line of communications of the Fourteenth Air Force, was a serious matter

for CBI Theater headquarters. Patently, if enough transports were diverted,

Chennault's position would be endangered, and there would be political repercussions all the way from Chungking to Washington. Stilwell's deputy, General Sultan, asked Mountbatten how three Japanese divisions could menace

Imphal when three Indian divisions had thought it impossible to advance from

that area. The answer was that the Japanese would take chances such as had led

to their recent setback in the Arakan, that they normally did not need much

supply and were entering an area where they could live off the country. Relaying this explanation to Stilwell, Sultan warned that Mountbatten would divert

ATC aircraft and place the burden of overruling him on the Combined Chiefs.38

37

 (1) Rad SEACOS 112, DIAL 46, Mountbatten to COS and JSM, 15 Mar 44; Minute SC/

486/G, SAC for Giffard, 16 Mar 44; Minute SC4/440/W, SAC for Wedemeyer, 16 Mar 44. SEAC

War Diary. (2) Ltr, Mountbatten to Dill, 26 Jun 44. Item 70, Folder 57, OPD Exec 10. (3)

British Comments, Serial 67. 38

 Rad RE 464, Sultan to Stilwell, 15 Mar 44. Item 70, Bk 6A, JWS Personal File.
THE BURMA CAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE 175

Mountbatten did order the equivalent of thirty C-47's off the Hump, and

the Joint Chiefs at the urgent request of the British agreed to a temporary

diversion to fly in reinforcements.39 These transports were a palliative, and on

25 March Mountbatten wanted to take seventy more C-47's from the Hump.

The original diversion was being used to fly the 5th Indian Division from the

Arakan to Imphal, to be followed by the 7th Indian Division. The request for

seventy more, made as it was five days before the Japanese cut the ImphalKohima Road, suggested acceptance of Japanese ability to surround the 5th,

17th, 20th, and 23d Indian Divisions on the Imphal plain with two divisions of

their own and to maintain themselves in that position long enough to exhaust

4 Corps' accumulation of stores and force 4 Corps to go on air supply. Generals

Sultan and Stratemeyer did not face the prospect of further diversions from the

Hump with equanimity, and the evident prospect that 4 Corps with 70,000

combat troops would be cut off by a force that was (mistakenly) believed to be

much smaller brought increasingly severe but perhaps unjustified criticism

of 4 Corps conduct of operations. Actually, the Japanese exhibited their

customary willingness to take chances with logistics by building up the two

divisions that fought at Imphal to 53,000—40,000 Japanese, the rest Burmese

laborers who freed the Japanese to fight.40 The outcome was that an Army Air

Forces troop carrier group of sixty-four C-47's was supplied on one month's

loan from the Mediterranean area as well as an RAF transport squadron of

fifteen aircraft more.41 This ultimately permitted return of the twenty C-46

aircraft diverted from the Hump, when Stratemeyer found they were not being

fully utilized.42

Inkangahtawng: An Attempt That Failed

Meanwhile, far to the north of Imphal, Stilwell in the Hukawng Valley was

resolved to try another envelopment of the 18th Division. He was willing to

accept less than a complete encirclement, for he seems to have contemplated

putting such pressure on Tanaka's line of communications that the Japanese

would be obliged to fall back. Merrill and his staff were ordered to make a plan

to put a roadblock behind the 18th. The orders to Merrill from Chih Hui Pu

39

 (1) Operational Dir 8, Mountbatten to Peirse and Stilwell, 16 Mar 44. Item 285, Bk 3, JWS

Personal File. (2) Min, SAC's 73d Mtg, 17 Mar 44. SEAC War Diary. 40

 (1) CM-IN 18058, Sultan to Arnold, 25 Mar 44. (2) COS (W) 1237, 26 Mar 44. SEAC

War Diary, 26, 27 Mar 44. (3) CM-OUT 14633, Arnold to Spaatz for Portal, 26 Mar 44. (4)

Folder, Wedemeyer-Mountbatten, 3 Sep 43-14 Apr 44, OPD Exec 10. According to U.S. calcula- tion, the British disposed of 219 transports in India and the Middle East; these appeared a better source than the Hump with all the consequences implied as to Fourteenth Air Force operations. (5) Estimated division strengths with attachments: 15th Division—23,400; 31st Division—34,000;

33d Division—30,000; service troops—52,000. Of these, the 15th and 33d were at Imphal, the 31st

at Kohima. Japanese Officers' Comments, 1951 and 1955. 41

 Mountbatten Report, Pt. B, par. 140. 42

 Rad ACC 876, Peirse to Mountbatten, 19 Apr 44; Rad SEAC 284, Mountbatten to Peirse

and Stratemeyer. SEAC War Diary.
176 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

prescribed a shallow envelopment, and also provided that as at Walawbum the

GALAHAD force would be supported by a Chinese regiment that would not be

under Merrill's command.43

Merrill and Sun, personal friends as well as colleagues, discussed these plans

and concluded they had the same weakness which in their opinion had caused

difficulties at Walawbum, that is, that the Chinese and American units which

were to work in the same area were under separate command. Some years later,

Merrill remembered Sun's offering to let Merrill have operational control of

any units of the 38th Division that Chih Hui Pu might designate for the

operation, so as to make effective co-operation possible. Colonel Hunter was

sent to Stilwell's headquarters to present Merrill's and Sun's recommendations,

which were to send Merrill's entire force, plus reinforcements from Sun, in a

wide sweep to set up one block near Shaduzup. Merrill felt that a wider

envelopment would have less chance of being detected.44 Meanwhile, the 22d

Division and the tanks would drive down the Kamaing Road from the north.

Hunter's embassy had only limited success. At the suggestion of his staff,

Stilwell approved a wider envelopment, but at the cost of splitting the enveloping force. The orders as finally put out called for the 1st Battalion of the 5307th,

followed at a day's interval by a regiment of the 38th Division, to make a

shallow envelopment and block the Kamaing Road south of the pass through

the Jambu Bum ridge line. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 5307th, followed by

another Chinese regiment, would make a wide swing to the east, then turn

back west and cut the Kamaing Road several miles south of the block that

would result from the shallow envelopment.45

In proffering their suggestions, GALAHAD'S staff had been unaware that

their march could be screened by Kachin irregulars raised by the Office of

Strategic Services and commanded in the lower Hukawng area by 1st Lt. James

L. Tilly, and that Lieutenant Tilly had most detailed and accurate information

of the whereabouts of the Japanese. Because of extremely faulty co-ordination

and what might be termed a hoarding of information GALAHAD'S staff were

actually unaware that Tilly's force existed. After the war, Merrill believed such

data might have permitted Hunter to offer conclusive arguments for the

GALAHAD proposals.46

Possibly because of concern over the Japanese offensive in the Arakan, the

Generalissimo attempted to slow Stilwell's advance.

1. It is believed that you have received my radio to you dated February 23rd.

2. You are requested to report the operational plans of New 1st Army in advance.

3. In view of the operations of British forces and the preparations of our forces, the New

1st Army should not advance until there are advances in Arakan by the British forces. Before

43

 (1) Ltr, Merrill to Ward, 26 May 52. OCMH. (2) Stilwell Diary, 21 Mar 44. 44

 Merrill Notes. 45

 NCAC History, I, 77. 46

 (1) Merrill Notes. (2) Interv with Tilly, 9 Jun 50. OCMH. (3) GALAHAD, pp. 49-54. (4)

FO 11, Hq Chih Hui Pu, 8 Mar 44. NCAC Files, KCRC.
THE BURMA CAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE 177

TROOPS OF MERRILL'S MARAUDERS rest on a mountain trail.

any advances are made by the friend [sic] forces, our army should stop at the present

positions, so that we will not be attacked individually.

4. Please send a reply on the above mentioned two points.47

The language was conditional, and Stilwell seemingly resolved to make no

immediate reply but take the matter up on his next trip to Chungking.

Stilwell did ask Marshall to have some pressure put on the Generalissimo

to attack across the Salween into Burma. The Chief of Staff was told that it was

time the Y-Force attacked, that if just Teng-chung and Lung-ling were taken

the effort would be worth while. "Just this once can't we get some pressure on

him?" In view of the performance to date by 4 Corps Stilwell did not think it

would be safe for him to go below Kamaing. Stilwell hoped that by attacking,

the Generalissimo might lessen the pressure on Slim and himself. Mountbatten agreed, and asked his superiors to make such a suggestion to the Chinese

"with great urgency."

 48

Stilwell also wanted another Chinese division flown to Burma. Mountbatten

47

 Memo, Generalissimo for Stilwell, 6 Mar 44. Item 278, Bk 3, JWS Personal File. 48

 (1) Rad MS 18, Stilwell to Marshall, 16 Mar 44. Item 72, Bk 6A, JWS Personal File. (2)

Rads, SEACOS 116, DIAL 52, 17 Mar 44. SEAC War Diary.
178 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

strongly supported Stilwell's request for it, and also his desire for another

American long-range penetration group. SEAC's commander asked that the

President and Prime Minister approach the Generalissimo for another Chinese

division.49

As for the Japanese in north Burma, thanks to the professional skill of General Tanaka, the foresight of his engineer, Colonel Fukayama, and the fighting

qualities of their men, the 18th Division had got away to fight another day. In

doing so, they had yielded a considerable stretch of north Burma to Stilwell,

and with every successful withdrawal they backed closer and closer to the Irrawaddy valley and Myitkyina. Once in the Irrawaddy valley, Stilwell would

be in a position to advance down the railroad and place himself behind the

Japanese 15th Army in its drive on Imphal. Consequently, Tanaka had orders

to hold the Kamaing area at all costs, which in the Japanese service meant just

that. So the time was coming when Tanaka would have to stand and fight it

out.50

The terrain in which the operation would take place was the most difficult

that had yet been encountered. So far the fighting had been in the narrow valley. Now, in order to make the wide swing, Merrill's force would have to climb

out of the valley into the hill mass on the eastern side. The hills defy any brief

description, for the rains have carved a drainage pattern as complex as can be

imagined. The result is a jumbled collection of hills most difficult to cross in

any direction. Only one feature offered what might be taken as an avenue of

approach, the incredibly narrow and steep little valley cut by the Tanai. In the

area near the Jambu Bum the Tanai flows from south to north, and over the

centuries has cut a narrow gash in the hills about fifteen miles to the east of

the Hukawng and Mogaung valleys and roughly parallel. (Map 11)

The first day's march of Hunter's two-battalion force went well, though

frequent rains provided an obstacle and hinted at an early monsoon. A day of

rest was taken on 18 March, and at dusk an added mission was received from

Stilwell, to block from the south the approaches to the Tanai valley. General

Merrill complied the following day by ordering the 2d Battalion plus Khaki

Combat Team of the 3d Battalion to move south through the hills on the

Warong trail, reconnoiter the trails toward the important Japanese base of

Kamaing, and block the Kamaing Road in the general vicinity of Inkangahtawng, while Orange Combat Team of the 3d Battalion stayed near Janpan in

the hills and patrolled to the north, south, and west. So sited, Orange Combat

Team could block the Tanai and still be ready to support the rest of the force

on the road. The 5307th stayed at Janpan the night of 20 March, received an

air drop the next day, and held a medical clinic for the Kachins of that vicinity.

A regular feature of the campaign, these clinics did much to build and hold

49

 Rad SEACOS 118, 17 Mar 44. Folder, Wedemeyer-Mountbatten, OPD Exec 10. 50

 (1) Tanaka Interrog. OCMH. (2) Tanaka Narrative, p. 4.
Map 11
180 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

the good will of the Kachins, on whom the Americans relied heavily for early

warning of the Japanese.51

On the afternoon of the 21st Hunter and his task force resumed the march

to Inkangahtawng and the Kamaing Road, with all concerned in the operation,

from Stilwell down, highly confident. Two days later Hunter was in position

and decided to put two blocks across the road and patrol to the north. About

this time, just when he was ready to profit by his march, Hunter learned that

the 1st Battalion of the 5307th and its Chinese support, which were to make

the shallow envelopment, had been seriously delayed.52 He thought it too late

to change plans and went ahead. Between 20 and 24 March Hunter, the force

commander around Inkangahtawng, would have liked to strike directly for

Kamaing itself with at least three combat teams. His force was at one time

only about five miles from Kamaing, he had received an air drop, and what he

learned of Japanese troop movements only confirmed his feeling that Kamaing

was wide open. But holding it was problematical to Hunter, for with the other

officers of GALAHAD he believed that the Chinese division commanders,

though formally under Stilwell, were in constant communication with the

Generalissimo, and that the latter had to approve every order of Stilwell's before the Chinese would execute it.53

 From this circumstance, in Hunter's opinion, stemmed what he regarded as a lack of aggressiveness on the part of the

Chinese, which would make them shy away. However, Hunter placed the attack on Kamaing before Merrill who replied that Stilwell would not approve

it.54

Merrill's unwillingness to approve such a project seems related to the conclusion he was gradually forming, that with the 22d Division's attack progressing so slowly there was a real possibility all three battalions of GALAHAD

might be immobilized around Inkangahtawng and take heavy losses while

accomplishing little that was commensurate.55 These views he placed before

Stilwell.

Meanwhile, on the scene of action, American patrols encountered the Japanese on 23 March and reported about a company entrenched at Inkangahtawng. The 2d Battalion went forward as far as possible in face of increasing

resistance to block the Kamaing Road while Orange Combat Team stayed on

the east bank of the Mogaung to protect the rear. Shortly after dawn on 24

March, two reinforced platoons sent to envelop Inkangahtawng found it too

strongly held and had to withdraw.

51

 (1) GALAHAD, pp. 49-54. (2) Interv with Tilly, 9 Jan 50. OCMH. 52 GALAHAD, p. 54, 55.

53

 Hunter Notes. Hunter actually wrote "Boatner" rather than Stilwell but Boatner had been several months in Washington, and as of late March was just returning to his post in north Burma. It seems safe to say Stilwell. Later in the campaign, the issue of whether the Generalissimo, despite his giving Stilwell command, was interfering in the conduct of operations became a major one and it will be discussed below. 54

 Hunter Notes. 55

 (1) Merrill Notes. (2) Stilwell Diary, 24, 25 Mar 44.
THE BURMA CAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE 181

The Japanese reaction to this attempt to block the road, beginning 24

March, was vigorous, and one Japanese counterattack followed on another.

These Japanese were a hastily assembled force drawn from a battalion gun

platoon, an engineer company, a medical company, and division headquarters;

they were given two 75-mm. guns, placed under command of the 18th Division's senior adjutant, and rushed south to Inkangahtawng. Within the U.S.

lines Japanese trucks could be heard, presumably with reinforcements; and ammunition was running low in the 2d Battalion. At this point, Merrill radioed

Hunter information coming from a captured Japanese map, that two Japanese

battalions were moving to outflank him. The message was heard by McGee,

commanding the 2d Battalion, but not by Hunter. Weighing it, McGee decided to pull out. He could not tell Hunter because the terrain masked his

radio. Late on the 24th McGee moved to the Manpin area.56

After the 2d Battalion had withdrawn across the river through Khaki Combat Team, Hunter's men moved to Ngagahtawng and bivouacked there, in the

area protected by trail blocks and booby traps.57 While the GALAHAD combat

teams were pulling back off the road to less exposed positions, Merrill received

word from Stilwell "leaving him discretion but telling him to hold back if possible."

 58

 On the afternoon of 26 March Hunter was told that an estimated

three Japanese battalions were moving north from Kamaing. He called for air

interception which hit the Japanese forces at 1730, five to eight miles away

from McGee's force at Manpin. This enemy force was the regimental headquarters and one battalion of the 114th Regiment, organized as two understrength battalions of about 800 men with four infantry guns, under Col.

Fusayasu Maruyama.59 His mission was to protect General Tanaka's right flank.

On the 26th Merrill reported to Stilwell and his staff that GALAHAD had

been withdrawn from the road, Merrill thus having exercised the option Stilwell gave him the day before. All morning long Stilwell's headquarters had

been seeking a way to give timely help but now that GALAHAD was withdrawn

Stilwell considered that his presence at the front was no longer required and

that he was free to visit the Generalissimo in China. He flew there on 27

March.60

Back at Stilwell's headquarters, a captured Japanese sketch suggested that

a reinforced Japanese battalion was moving north in the Tanai valley to attack

the flank of the Chinese driving toward Shaduzup. His staff were seriously

concerned and ordered General Merrill to block this thrust, stopping any move

56

 (1) Memo, Hunter for Greenfield, 11 May 45, sub: Comments on "Merrill's Marauders." OCMH. (2)Notes by McGee on draft MS. OCMH. (3) Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. II. (4)

The Japanese initially reported at Inkangahtawng are described by the Japanese as some soldiers passing accidentally. Japanese Officers' Comments, p. 15. 57

 GALAHAD, pp. 55-59. 58

 (1) Stilwell Diary, 25 Mar 44. (2) Merrill Notes. 59

 (1) Maruyama Interrog. OCMH. (2) Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. II. This left but one battalion at Myitkyina. 60

 (1) Stilwell Diary, 26, 27 Mar 44. (2) See Ch. VIII, below.
182 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

north of Nhpum Ga, for there was a good trail through Nhpum Ga and

Janpan to Shaduzup. This use of the 5307th in a static defensive role was a

radical change in the concept of its employment.

With the Japanese moving north from Kamaing, there was the possibility

that they might thrust themselves between GALAHAD and Nhpum Ga. Orange

Combat Team, of the 3d Battalion, under Colonel Beach, was the logical protection, as it was nearest the Kamaing Road. Therefore Beach was ordered to

guard the south flank, which he did with two platoons.61 McGee, with the 2d

Battalion and the remainder of the 3d, moved off from Manpin on the afternoon of the 26th. McGee set a stiff pace, and kept his men marching until long

after darkness had fallen. Next dawn they were up and on their way again.

So quickly and easily described in print, these marches in north Burma were

in reality exhausting struggles against every variety of obstacle. Staggering up

stream beds, clawing their way between jungle growths, clinging to hillsides,

their only respite a few hours on the sodden ground, their food a little K ration

gulped on the march—the infantry endured a continuous ordeal that language

is really inadequate to describe.62

A trail runs from Manpin to Auche, passing through Warong and Paokum

in an arc bulging to the south. From Warong and Paokum two trails lead

south; they would be logical avenues of approach. Another trail from Manpin

to Auche forms the chord of the arc, and by using it and putting a platoon at

Warong and Paokum respectively, the two battalions would have their southern flank well protected as they moved across the Japanese line of advance. At

noon, 25 March, 1st Lt. Logan E. Weston and his I & R Platoon were ordered

to Paokum. Lieutenant Weston arrived late that afternoon, set up his roadblock, and later was joined by a rifle platoon. From Paokum to Warong to

Auche, Weston, 2d Lt. Warren R. Smith, and their two platoons delayed the

Japanese on 26, 27, and 28 March, suffering no losses. Covered by Weston's

and Smith's skillful and well-fought action, the main body arrived at Auche on

the 27th and left the next morning.63

Later, enemy shellfire began and enemy infantry attacked soon after from

the south. Lieutenant Weston was ordered to fight another delaying action up

the trail to Nhpum Ga to give the 2d and 3d Battalions time to organize their

defenses. Shells also fell as the 2d Battalion headquarters and Green Combat

Team were leaving Auche, the 3d Battalion having gone on ahead. The trail

ran along a ridge, making it impossible to take cover or disperse, and during a

brief panic men cast away equipment. One American was killed and perhaps

five were wounded.64 The battalion collected itself and, despite the shaking-up

taken on the trail, quickly set up its perimeter on the hilltop at Nhpum Ga.

61

 GALAHAD, pp. 58, 59. 62

 Hunter Notes. 63

 Ltr, Weston to Col John M. Kemper, Chief, Hist Div SSUSA, 22 Jan 45. OCMH. 64

 (1) GALAHAD, p. 62. (2) Capt. J. E. T. Hopkins, Medical Study of the 5307th Composite Unit, MS. OCMH.
THE BURMA CAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE 183

General Merrill's decision was to split his force. He did not want to disperse his force strength in that fashion any more than he had wanted to concur with the original order to put two blocks across the Kamaing Road, but

in this case he felt the terrain forced dispersion on him. The 2d Battalion was

put on the hilltop at Nhpum Ga; and the 3d Battalion, three miles north at

Hsamshingyang to protect the airstrip there. Merrill had one hundred wounded

who had to be flown out, and Nhpum Ga commanded the airstrip, so it had to

be held. Both battalions were to patrol to keep the Japanese from bypassing on

the trail along the Tanai Hka.65

The Japanese Delay the 1st Battalion, 5307th

From bivouac areas in the hills northeast of Shaduzup, on the Kamaing

Road, the 1st Battalion of the 5307th, followed by the 113th Regiment, moved

out on the morning of 13 March to put the northern clamp across the Kamaing

Road just south of the Jambu Bum, in the vicinity of Shaduzup. (Map 11 and

12) The I & R Platoon followed some fresh footprints into an enemy bivouac

and stirred up a hornet's nest of Japanese. There was brisk skirmishing, and

though the Americans managed to cross the Numpyek Hka just beyond, the

Japanese had been alerted and proceeded to delay them expertly. Colonel Osborne, commander of the 1st Battalion, decided to cut a fresh trail around the

Japanese. This was painfully slow business, and waiting for an airdrop took

another day. On 22 March, when Colonel Hunter to the south was one day's

march from his goal, aggressive patrolling by Red Combat Team revealed that

the Japanese had blocked every trail in the area through which Osborne had

to pass, so again Osborne elected to make his own trail, this time over ground

so rough that the mules had to be unloaded. The maneuver succeeded, and no

Japanese were seen on 23 or 24 March. Osborne's march would have been

greatly aided had he known Tilly's Kachin Rangers were in the same general

area.

The 1st Battalion's arduous march had placed it close to the Chengun Hka,

a stream which runs approximately southwest into the Nam Kawng Chaung,

along whose banks the Kamaing Road runs, south of Shaduzup. Osborne

elected to follow the Chengun to its confluence with the Nam Kawng and

place his block across the Kamaing Road, where the chaung makes a U bend

to the north a few miles south of Shaduzup.

While the 1st Battalion and the Chinese bivouacked on the banks of the

Chengun, the I & R Platoon of White Combat Team explored the area where

Osborne planned to place the block. There they found two Japanese camps

comfortably placed between the river and the road. There were many Japanese

at hand, grenading fish, bathing, or loafing under the trees. Bashas filled with

supplies suggested the establishment was an advance supply depot. Fully in- 65

 Interv with Merrill, 26 Apr 48. OCMH.
184 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

formed by the I & R Platoon's skillful patrolling, Osborne decided to make

a surprise attack, sweep the Japanese from the immediate area, and set up his

block across the road.

The GALAHAD battalion and the Chinese 113th Regiment made their way

down the Chengun Hka on the 27th. Chinese march discipline was not perfect, but on the other hand Japanese security measures were nonexistent. During the night of 27-28 March the Allied force established itself along the Nam

Kawng Chaung. At 0300 White Combat Team slipped across the river onto

the west or Japanese side and crept up within easy reach of the camp. Lying

on their arms, the men waited for first light and the signal to attack. As the

Japanese began to build their cooking fires the attack order was given.

Surprise was complete and overwhelming. With fixed bayonets the combat

Map 12
THE BURMA CAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE 185

teams swept through the camp. The Japanese scattered in confusion, and the

area was quickly overrun. Thrusting beyond the camp site, the 1st Battalion

set up its roadblock, and consolidated its position. The process of consolidation yielded some dividends of practical value—Japanese rations and equipment.66

The subsequent reaction of the Japanese was much like that at Walawbum.

They could not risk the blocking of their line of communications while they

were heavily engaged with the 22d Division some four or five miles to the

north. The 1st Battalion did not budge, but the Japanese were primarily interested in bypassing it to the west and in extricating themselves from between

GALAHAD and the 22d Division. Later in the day on the 28th, the Americans

were relieved by the 113th Regiment, which in turn established contact with

the 22d Division about 30 March.67

After its relief the 1st Battalion rested two days, then retraced its route, for

it was under orders to rejoin the other two battalions which were thought to

be near Hsamshingyang. Late on 30 March radio orders to proceed to Janpan

by easy stages were received. The way was rough and the march was very slow.

Then on 1 April the radio was damaged and Colonel Osborne, worried by

being out of touch with headquarters, went to Shaduzup and there learned that

he was to go as quickly as possible to Hsamshingyang. On the 6th word came

that his help was badly needed. He and his men marched five and one half

miles that day and night under the worst conditions so far encountered, and

reached Hsamshingyang at 1700 on Good Friday, 7 April.68

Delay at Jambu Bum

While the GALAHAD battalions and the Chinese 113th Regiment had been

trying, with varying success, to set up their roadblocks across the Kamaing

Road and behind the Japanese positions, the 22d Division and the 1st Provisional Tank Group were attacking the 18th Division from the front. The

66th Regiment was operating to the west of the Kamaing Road, the 64th Regiment, to the east, the 65th (—) was in division reserve. Directly before the

22d Division was the Jambu Bum, which is about two miles in depth; Shaduzup is five or six miles south of it. To the north of the ridge line is an area of

paddy fields; to the south the road goes through the thick brush and tall trees

of the north Burma countryside. A third of the way down the reverse slope is

the rather considerable obstacle of the Hkawnglaw Hka.

On 15 March the tanks and the two regiments were about three miles north

of the ridge line. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 64th were sent wide round

66

 GALAHAD, pp. 39-44. 67

 (1) GALAHAD, pp. 45-47. (2) NCAC History, II, 140. (3) Ltr, Col Van Natta to Ward, 16 Jul 51. OCMH. (4) Notes by Van Natta on draft MS. (Hereafter, Van Natta Notes.) OCMH. 68

 GALAHAD, pp. 48-49.
186 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

DAMAGED M3A3 TANKS south of Jambu Bum.

the left flank. The march was opposed and at one time the lead battalion was

partly encircled and had to be extricated by a counterattack. Progress of the

frontal attack was very slow. It was difficult to co-ordinate infantry and tank

action, because the tankers found it hard to distinguish their countrymen from

the Japanese. A few such cases of mistaken identity and the 22d's men were

understandably reluctant to get too close to the tanks. Two days and a sharp

fight in an open paddy field just north of the crest were needed to reach the

north slope and crest.

Once over it, the 22d found the road down to be mined and blocked with

fallen trees. Two days were lost in clearing the road, and then three battalions

made a frontal attack, guiding on the road. Next day they tried a co-ordinated

tank-infantry attack and the leading tank platoon reached the Hkawnglaw Hka

about four miles south of Jambu Bum, destroying a few machine guns and

taking four antitank pieces. But the infantry would not follow the tanks and

dug in two miles short of the stream. The tanks patrolled till dark, then fell

back to their own lines.69

It was the 2/66th's turn to lead on 21 March. Again the tanks got well

ahead of the infantry. A combination of ambush and counterattack by the Jap- 69

 G-3 Per Rpts, Hq Chih Hui Pu, 22, 28 Mar 44. NCAC Files, KCRC.
THE BURMA CAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE 187

anese cost five tanks, and then the Japanese came on up the road, almost overrunning the battalion headquarters, which was saved by the courage of two

engineer platoons that had been clearing the road.70 That night the 1/64th,

which had been making the enveloping move, came in from the east and cut

the Kamaing Road, right in the segment held by the Japanese. A tank attack

on the 23d found Japanese antitank guns just south of a small stream (north

of the Hkawnglaw Hka) that prevented the tanks from outflanking the position. The guns knocked out the three lead tanks in quick succession, blocking

the road. After heavy fighting at the stream crossing, the tanks finally had to

withdraw, leaving the derelicts. In the afternoon the two flanking battalions

made their way up the road and joined the 66th.

Because he did not know of all these delays, the operation seemed to Stilwell to be going very well; he believed the 1/5307th was at Shaduzup, while

he knew the 2d Battalion was in place at Inkangahtawng. Unfortunately, the

meeting of the 64th and 66th Regiments did not signal the end of Japanese

resistance. Japanese and Chinese positions on the road were thoroughly intermingled, making movement in the immediate area extremely hazardous. An

attempt to break the deadlock with the tanks failed when the device chosen to

identify the Chinese infantry backfired. Both the Chinese and the Japanese

waved white cloths at the tanks. The armor moved blithely on into a nest of

Japanese antitank men, who destroyed five tanks with magnetic mines, effectively blocking the road. General Liao, the 22d Division's commander, now cut

a bypass road for the tanks around his west (right) flank. A tank platoon tried

it, could not cross a ravine improperly prepared for tank crossing, came under

artillery fire, and had to be withdrawn.

The decision was now reached to bring the 65th Regiment up from reserve.

With the 1/66th and the 3/64th attached, it leapfrogged the 64th and 66th

Regiments on 26 March and attacked. The Japanese held stoutly, counterattacking five times on 28 March. With the cutting of the Kamaing Road below

Shaduzup by the 1/5307th and the Chinese 113th Regiment, Japanese resistance softened, and on the 29th the 2/65th entered Shaduzup. In retrospect the

Chih Hui Pu staff considered, and their judgment seems correct, that their plan

to establish and exploit the two roadblocks had been thrown out of joint by

two of the Japanese reactions, the stubborn defense north of Shaduzup (whereas it had been thought that the Japanese would conserve their strength), and

the flanking move up the Tanai valley. There was a third factor, not mentioned

by Chih Hui Pu, but a sore affliction at the time—unseasonable and heavy

rains.71 Looking toward the future, Stilwell, who was highly pleased by the

70

 (1) Unidentified overlay. Folder, X-RAY Force, NCAC Files, KCRC. (2) NCAC History, Vol. II. 71

 (1) NCAC History, II, 131-40, and Stilwell Sketches H to K in Vols. I, II. (2) History of 1st Prov Tank Gp. OCMH. (3) G-3 Per Rpts, Hq Chih Hui Pu, 5 Apr 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. (4) Stilwell Diary, Mar 44. (5) Brown Notes.
188 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

work of the OSS's Kachin Rangers, ordered recruiting and training a force of

10,000 guerrillas.72

By 15 April 1944 the cost to the Chinese of the North Burma Campaign

was: 22d Division, 800 men killed, 2,000 men wounded; 38th Division, 650

men killed, 1,450 men wounded.73

The Siege of Nhpum Ga

As previously noted, the tangled jumble of hills that forms the eastern

boundary of the Hukawng and Mogaung valleys is cut from south to north by

the deep, narrow valley of the Tanai Hka. If the Japanese made use of this

valley for a counterstroke, it could lead them around Stilwell's left (eastern)

flank and into his rear areas. The Japanese force from Kamaing, which had

compelled the 2d and 3d Battalions of GALAHAD to yield their roadblock at

Inkangahtawng, was in a position to launch such a move. Consequently, when

a captured Japanese sketch had indicated that a reinforced Japanese battalion

was moving north in the Tanai valley to attack the flank of the Chinese forces

in the Hukawng Valley, Chih Hui Pu had been seriously concerned, and had

ordered the 2d and 3d Battalions to stop any Japanese movement north of

Nhpum Ga. The resulting march had been made just in time, apparently, for

the Japanese had followed close behind the 2d and 3d Battalions as they moved

to Nhpum Ga. A well-fought delaying action had given the 2d Battalion time

to set up a perimeter defense at Nhpum Ga, and the 3d Battalion to establish

itself at Hsamshingyang, three miles to the north, where it protected an airstrip for evacuation and resupply.74

 Their defenses established, the men of the

2d Battalion had just time to look about their positions before the Japanese

were on them.

Nhpum Ga is on a sharp, thin ridge at the northern end of a hill mass. The

elevation continues for half a mile past Nhpum Ga, then slopes downhill over

bamboo-covered ground to Hsamshingyang, a clearing in the jungle. To the

east, the ground drops rapidly to the Tanai, falling 1,400 feet in two miles. To

the west is the similar valley of the Hkuma Hka, which flows to the south. At

the northeast quarter of the perimeter established by the 2d Battalion a rocky

point dominates a water hole, the only local source. The initial perimeter included the water hole in an eastward-jutting salient.

Both at Walawbum and at Inkangahtawng, GALAHAD battalions had been

withdrawn from the roadblocks they occupied. However pertinent the reason

for these moves, they had not increased the prestige of American arms in the

eyes of the Chinese, who believed American troops were leaving dangerous 72

 NCAC History, App. 8, p. 1. 73

 Stilwell Diary, 6 May 44. 74

 See pp. 181-83, above.
THE BURMA CAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE 189

positions that the Chinese had to take over and maintain.75 Now, at Nhpum

Ga, the Americans had orders to stand and fight it out. Tired by their constant marches, racked by dysentery and malaria, and beginning to show the

effects of malnutrition, the Americans were now called on to show that they

too could hold a given patch of ground.

The Japanese besiegers included Maruyama's original task force and a considerable body of reinforcements, the main force of the 1st Battalion, 55th Infantry Regiment, which had been the 18th's right flank guard. Maruyama's

mission was not to attack the immensely superior Chinese force near Shaduzup

but rather to push the Americans back as far as possible along the Kumon

Range in order to protect General Tanaka's right flank.76 In the first phase,

28-31 March, the Japanese drove the American outposts on the Auche trail

back into the Nhpum Ga perimeter on the 28th, then after a brief preparation

attacked the American position from the south. The attempt failed. Harassing

fire that night failed to keep the exhausted men of the 5307th awake. Another

attack from the south came at 0600 on the 29th after an artillery and mortar

concentration had failed, as did two later efforts in the same direction. The 3d

Battalion at Hsamshingyang felt unable to help because the need to defend the

airstrip was vital, but did send a platoon twice daily to keep the trail to Nhpum

Ga open. On the 30th the Japanese were attacking, ominously from east and

north. The trail from Nhpum Ga to Hsamshingyang was still open when the

fighting died down, but next day, attacking from south, east, and northwest,

the Japanese succeeded in prying the water hole from the Americans' grasp and

in beating back an attempted counterattack. Moreover, the cumulative effect of

losses made it impossible to hold so large a perimeter even if the hole had been

retaken. That same day the patrol from Hsamshingyang found the trail

blocked, and neither the patrol nor a sortie from the hilltop could restore communications. Fortunately, the trapped battalion could go on air supply.77

Colonel Hunter now commanded at Hsamshingyang. General Merrill had

long had heart trouble and now was so weak that Stilwell, learning of his condition, ordered him evacuated over his protests. Merrill was flown out on 31

March. He did not lay down his responsibilities. On arriving at Ledo, he

ordered two 75-mm. howitzers sent to Hunter's 3d Battalion by airdrop, because Hunter had promptly begun to clear the trail and the forces at his disposal, Orange and Khaki Combat Teams of the 3d Battalion, needed artillery

support. Attempts by Orange Combat Team on 1 April failed. On 2 April, attacking with artillery support and some men from Khaki Combat Team to

make an envelopment, Hunter again made no progress. Then an attack was

75

 (1) For a sample of the Chinese reaction, see Ho, The Big Circle, p. 99. (2) Boatner, who at Chih Hui Pu could receive both Chinese and American points of view and had to deal with

both nations, believed that these withdrawals from the roadblocks embarrassed Chih Hui Pu in dealing with the Chinese. See Boatner Notes. 76

 (1) Interrogs, Tanaka, Maruyama. OCMH. (2) Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. II. 77

 (1) GALAHAD, pp. 62-70. (2) Interrogs, Tanaka, Maruyama. OCMH. (3) Tanaka Narrative.
190 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

made, with air support, by both combat teams and the garrison, but the Japanese did not budge.

The situation seemed serious. The Japanese were believed to be moving

ever more troops up the Tanai and it was believed that the 1st Battalion, which

had been ordered to aid, would not arrive for four more days at least. Hunter's

reaction was to attack on the 4th with everyone but the sick and the mule

skinners, with his large patrols called in and Kachins used to replace them. A

fake fight, using carbines (which sounded like the Arisaka rifle), was staged

to deceive the Japanese, and the air support made three passes at them. The

first two were genuine, the last a feint which made the Japanese take cover,

only to come out and find the American infantry on them. Hunter's force

gained that day and came within 1,000 yards of the besieged. About this same

time Capt. John B. George and a small party, sent north by Hunter to find the

Chinese regiment which Hunter understood would support him in this area,

met the 1/112th at Tanaiyang, about eight miles northeast. After an interval,

presumably used to obtain permission to do so, its commander moved toward

Hsamshingyang. His first element arrived at the airfield on 4 April and was

used to guard a trail junction. Despite this increasing pressure the Japanese

made a very heavy attack on the Nhpum Ga garrison, actually reaching the

foxholes at one point, and being driven out by two soldiers using hand

grenades.78

On its hilltop the garrison, though suffering no shortage of food or ammunition (aside from the monotony of diet which was itself a hardship), suffered

from an acute shortage of water. There were no plaster casts for the wounded,

and they took their sulfadiazine dry. The pack animals could not be protected

from the Japanese fire. When dead, their carcasses could not be buried, and

the stench and the carrion flies added more miseries to the battle. Sergeant

Matsumoto, who had played an important part at Walawbum, was a pillar of

strength to the garrison, constantly scouting between the lines, overhearing

Japanese conversations, and informing Colonel McGee accordingly.79 On one

occasion, when Matsumoto learned of plans to surprise a small salient at dawn,

the Americans drew back their lines, booby-trapping the abandoned foxholes.

Punctually the Japanese attacked, straight into the massed fire of the waiting

Americans. Throwing themselves into the foxholes for cover, they set off the

booby traps. Matsumoto completed the debacle by screaming "Charge!" in

78

 (1) GALAHAD, pp. 73-80. During the last two weeks of March and the first week of April

the 114th Regiment remained in reserve in the Maingkwan-Walawbum area. The 113th was supporting the 1/5307th. The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 112th spent some time in trying to find a large group of Japanese stragglers in the Lagang Ga area, failed, returned to Lagang Ga, and at the end of the period began to move to the Auche-Warong area. Only the 1/112th, re- lieved by a battalion of the 30th Division and sent from Pabum down the Tanai valley, took part

in the battles around the hilltop. (2) Per Rpts, Hq Chih Hui Pu, 28 Mar, 5, 11 Apr 44. NCAC

Files, KCRC. 79

 (1) Stone MS, p. 149. (2) Matsumoto received the Legion of Merit for his services in north

Burma.
THE BURMA CAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE 191

Japanese, causing a supporting platoon to throw itself on the American guns.80

The relieving force made no gains on the 5th, but the Japanese were beginning to have their own problems. That day there were only two Japanese attacks, at 0200 and 0430, which, thanks to Matsumoto, were anticipated and

stopped. Colonel Maruyama's force was finding its supply problems increasingly difficult, and Tanaka grew daily more concerned about the defenses of

Myitkyina.81 On the 6th Orange Combat Team gained another 200 yards. Two

key machine guns were knocked out by 2d Lt. William E. Woomer, who conducted mortar fire from twenty-five yards away. That was the story of the next

two days, grinding slow advances that gradually cut the gap between the battalions, and steadily weaker Japanese attacks.

The long-awaited 1st Battalion of GALAHAD arrived at 1700 on 7 April,

after an extended and exhausting march. Two hundred and fifty of its men were

still capable of exertion. On the 8th and on Easter Sunday they tried to seize

positions on the trails over which the Japanese moved supplies to their

positions.

On the afternoon of Easter Sunday, the Japanese vanished, leaving cooking fires and equipment. There was no pursuit, for Stilwell wanted no movement beyond Nhpum Ga. The battalion of the 114th made its way to Myitkyina, where General Tanaka, anxious about the town, added it to the garrison.

The attempted roadblock at Inkangahtawng, and the siege of Nhpum Ga,

which followed when the Americans abandoned the block on 24 March, had

cost the 5307th 59 dead and 314 wounded. A total of 379 were evacuated by

air for wounds or illness. The most serious result of Nhpum Ga was the exhaustion of troops.82

 The fighting edge of the most mobile and most obedient

force that Stilwell had was worn dull. From this fact were to flow consequences

of great magnitude. There was no compensating damage to the 114th, and it

bore the major burden of the defense of Myitkyina.

Air Supply Problem at Imphal

The consequences of Nhpum Ga were hidden by the veil of the future; at

the time, the engagement was seen from the point of view of a commander

whose theater stretched from the Indian Ocean to the Yellow Sea. After checking with Col. Henry L. Kinnison of GALAHAD, Stilwell wrote in his diary:

"GALAHAD is OK. Hard fight at Nhpum. Cleaned out Japs and hooked up.

No worry there."

 83

 Though one of the hardest-fought American engagements

in Burma, it was from the perspective of CBI Theater headquarters a battle be80

 (1) GALAHAD, p. 78. (2) Notes, Maj John Jones, sub: Burma—Notes on Merrill Expedi- tion, 1944, JICA SN 8623, JICA CBI SEA, New Delhi, 27 Sep 44. OCMH. 81

 (1) Maruyama and Tanaka comment on the 114th's ammunition supply problem. (2) Ltr, Merrill to Ward, 26 May 52. OCMH. 82

 (1) GALAHAD, pp. 80-84. (2) Merrill's Marauders, p. 94. 83

 Stillwell Diary, 11 Apr 44.
192 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

tween a few battalions. Farther south, around Imphal, whole divisions were

grappling for a prize that might change the course of the war in Asia, and the

trend of reports from that front was far from reassuring.

As one report after another on the Japanese advance to Imphal was laid

before Stilwell, he grew progressively more concerned. Allied defeat at Imphal

would sweep away everything that he had won. Japanese success in the center

would redeem every defeat suffered in the Arakan and in north Burma. Estimating his situation and weighing his resources, Stilwell concluded that he

could offer SEAC use of the 38th Division to guard his and its line of communications and to meet a Japanese thrust across the thirty miles that separated

Kohima from the Bengal and Assam Railway. At this time he had two of the

38th's regiments in reserve. To co-ordinate the defense of his line of communications he asked Admiral Mountbatten and General Slim to meet with him at

Jorhat on 3 April.84 (See Map 10.)

At this conference Stilwell was agreeably surprised to learn that General

Slim, though worried, felt himself master of the situation around Kohima.

Slim was deploying a new corps, the 33, for defense of that area. Granting that

the next five to ten days would be critical, Slim wanted no help at Dimapur

and favored Stilwell's going on to Mogaung and Myitkyina. So did Mountbatten, and with great relief Stilwell went back to his campaign. He did accept

responsibility for local defense of the line of communications from Tinsukia to

Nazira, with point defense at Jorhat. SOS personnel went through hasty training courses, while a striking force was organized. This was GASPER Force—the

89th Regiment of the Chinese 30th Division, the 2d Battalion, 1st Provisional

Tank Group, and a heavy mortar battalion.85

Soon after the Jorhat conference the Imphal operations made Mountbatten

fear that expiration of the thirty-day loan period for the Mediterranean aircraft

would find 4 Corps still dependent on air supply. Therefore, on 22 April he

radioed General Giffard asking about a request from Generals Slim and Stratemeyer to keep the transports until 1 July. Mountbatten found it "very difficult

to accept" the conclusion that land communications would not be opened before then. In reply, Giffard would not promise that communications to 4 Corps

would be open even by 1 July, and warned Mountbatten that withdrawal of

these aircraft on schedule would mean disaster for 4 Corps.86 Therefore, when

the promised time for their return arrived, Mountbatten was obliged to tell his

superiors that SEAC had to keep the transports. The CCS acquiesced to the

extent of extending the loan date to 15 June. By that time the first of a consid- 84

 (1) The Stilwell Papers, pp. 285-87. (2) Rad, Stilwell to AGWAR, 31 Mar 44; Rad TK

20, Stilwell to Marshall, 2 Apr 44. Items 98, 101, Bk 6A, JWS Personal File. 85

 (1) FO 12, Hq Chih Hui Pu, 5 Apr 44. (2) The Stilwell Papers, p. 287. (3) Secy Plans SAC

(44) 160, Hq SEAC; Min, Conf at Jorhat, 3 Apr 44. SEAC War Diary. (4) Stilwell Diary, 3

Apr 44. 86

 (1) See p. 168, above. (2) Rad SAC 1779, Mountbatten to Giffard, 22 Apr 44; Rad FE/3,

Giffard to Mountbatten, 23 Apr 44; Rad OPD 191, Giffard to Mountbatten, 4 May 44. SEAC War Diary.
THE BURMA CAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE 193

erable reinforcement of transport aircraft was expected to be on hand, and this

would permit return of the borrowed aircraft.87

Air supply was not a sovereign remedy for the situation created by Japanese

encirclement of 4 Corps because the transports could not bring in enough.

Half-rations were ordered, and as operations continued week after week, "it

was now [in May] calculated that if the rate of air supply could not be increased 4 Corps was likely to run out of essential supplies and certain supplies

of ammunition by the first week in July."

 88

 The outbreak of the monsoon rains

was imminent in late May, and if this forced a suspension of the airlift, 4 Corps

might well be forced to attempt a difficult and hazardous withdrawal. This was

deduced by the Japanese who clung desperately to their positions on the

perimeter of Imphal.89

Why 4 Corps should find itself so close to a defeat that would have incalculable effects in India and China appeared to require explanation, for Allied

intelligence agencies were not aware that the Japanese had succeeded in massing 155,000 men for their attack on India, and their superiors of course were

no better informed. Because of this error in intelligence, as early as 19 May

SEAC was calling on Giffard to tell "why with the large number of divisions

employed the fighting is characterized by company and platoon actions."

Giffard replied that his first objective was killing Japanese, and that this had

to be done by destroying each Japanese in his foxhole. Giffard's second objective was to break the Japanese encirclement, and his third, to guard the valuable installations on the Imphal plain. There were so many of these, Giffard

explained, that by the time the security of each had been provided for, the force

available for aggressive operations had been somewhat reduced.90

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff criticized the lack of offensive

action northward by 4 Corps to link with 33 Corps coming down from

Dimapur.91 Sharing the general underestimation of Japanese strength, SEAC's

deputy chief of staff, General Wedemeyer, commented:

With a superiority on the ground 21⁄2 to 1 on the Arakan and Imphal fronts and with

complete mastery of the air, we remain on the defensive and the enemy retains the initiative.

Apparently the 4th and 15th Corps have no concrete plans for aggressive and decisive operations. The battle in those areas may be described as being fought passively on a day-today basis, countering enemy blows and hoping to bag many Japs in the process.92

Wedemeyer believed that only air supply was preventing an ignominious de87

 Rad SEACOS 153, Mountbatten to JSM, and COS, 5 May 44; Min, SAC's 95th Mtg, 8 May

44; Rad SEACOS 162, Mountbatten to JSM and COS, 17 May 44. SEAC War Diary. 88

 Mountbatten Report, Pt. B., par. 196. 89

 (1) Rad ACG 953, Peirse to Mountbatten, 20 May 44; Rad 02393, Slim to Giffard and

Mountbatten, 25 May 44. SEAC War Diary. (2) SEATIC Bull 242, p. 29. MID Library. 90

 (1) Rad 533 OPS, Giffard to MGGS [Major General, General Staff], 19 May 44; Min, SAC's 96th Mtg, 9 May 44. SEAC War Diary. (2) Japanese Officers' Comments, p. 15. 91

 Rad SAC 2834, Mountbatten to Giffard, 27 May 44. SEAC War Diary. 92

 Memo, Wedemeyer for Mountbatten, 5 Jun 44. Case 14, OPD 201 (Wedemeyer, A. C.

[O]), A47-30.
194 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

feat at Imphal. He contrasted the vigorous efforts of 33 Corps to drive from

Dimapur with the defensive attitude of 4 Corps. To these comments, the observations of the NCAC liaison officer with 4 Corps added chapter and verse.93

It must be noted that the terrain around Imphal offered several advantages

to the Japanese. When on the tactical defensive they could occupy steep hills,

some forested, some grassy. With the antlike industry of the Oriental soldier

they quickly dug themselves into the hillsides, and soon formidable earth and

log bunkers faced the Imphal garrison. The Japanese, though on the strategical

offensive, lay across vital lines of communications; on many occasions they

could force the defenders to attack Japanese bunkers, while their own attacks

could be massed on objectives chosen from among a variety of important

installations.

Fortunately for SEAC, Stilwell, and Chennault, the 31st Division never went

past Kohima into the Brahmaputra valley. Having judged the Japanese by

European standards, Fourteenth Army had expected them to send only one

regiment against Kohima. The Japanese had thrown a full division against the

town with its small and hastily improvised garrison. Thanks to Mountbatten's

initiative, the whole of the 161st Brigade was in the area by 29 March. After

some initial changes in plan caused by an erroneous intelligence report, the

leading battalion of the 161st, the 4th Battalion Queen's Own Royal West

Kent Regiment, Lt. Col. H. J. Laverty commanding, succeeded in entering

Kohima to reinforce the garrison before the Japanese surrounded the town.

From the 4th of April until relieved on the 20th, the small garrison of Kohima

held off the Japanese 31st Division. It was a notable feat of arms, and the role

of the West Kents in the defense of Kohima reflected the greatest credit on the

regiment and Colonel Laverty. The time won by the gallant defense of Kohima

permitted 33 Corps to concentrate around Dimapur, to relieve Kohima, and

then advance to the relief of Imphal.94

Relief of Kohima left the Japanese still barring the road from Imphal north

to Kohima. They held desperately until 22 June when the road was reopened.

In that time the Japanese made a number of strong local attacks on Imphal,

which 4 Corps repelled. An offensive effort by 4 Corps was concentrated on

driving north to meet 33 Corps: ". . . the opening of this road now became

our main preoccupation."

 95

 With the opening of the line of communications

from Dimapur to Imphal, the enemy effort failed; the Japanese narrowly

missed a great triumph, but such was the nature of their gamble that their

failure resulted in disaster for them.

93

 (1) Ltrs, Col Bennett to CG, 5303d Area Comd, sub: Daily Int and Opns Sitreps. NCAC

Files, KCRC. (2) Japanese Officers' Comments, p. 15. 94

 (1) Maj. E. B. Stanley Clarke and Maj. A. T. Tillott, From Kent to Kohima, Being the History of The 4th Battalion the Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment (T.A.), 1939-1947 (Aldershot, England, 1951), Ch. XL (2) Operational Record of Eleventh Army Group and A.L.F.S.E.A., November, 1943-August, 1945, pp. 27-28. OCMH. (3) Japanese Comments, Sec. I. (4) Mountbatten Report, Pt. B, pars. 93-116. (5) Owen, The Campaign in Burma, Ch. 14. 95

 Mountbatten Report, Pt. B, Par. 192.
THE BURMA CAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE 195

The Japanese, with three divisions plus the Indian nationalist formations,

now found themselves at the end of muddy jungle trails with the monsoon

rains pouring down. The Japanese supply system had never brought up food to

the 31st Division at Kohima or to the 15th north of Imphal. Both relied on

what they could extract from the hill folk. Supply arrangements for the 33d

Division began to break down in May. Its food could be brought forward some

distance up the Japanese line of communications from the Chindwin, but the

condition of the trails, the rains, and the attentions of Allied aircraft made

distribution almost impossible.

In the last week of June, General Mutaguchi concluded that the breaking of

his blockade of Imphal on 22 June, the extremely bad Japanese supply situation, and the exhaustion of the fighting strength of his force left no hope for

success. His conclusions were presented to his superiors in Burma Area Army

and Southern Army. Perhaps ten days passed in arranging for the issuance of the

order to suspend operations.

The intent of the order that Gen. Masakazu Kawabe, Burma Area Army

commander, issued about 5 July, was not fully grasped by his subordinates, and

so 15th Army did not discontinue its attacks until 15 July. The monsoon rains

were then falling, and the state of the Japanese soldiers was soon tragic. The

Japanese were exhausted by malnutrition and malaria. Roads collapsed in mud.

Over 17,000 horses died. Morale broke, and the Japanese, who had done all

that soldiers could, now began to throw away their arms, quarrel, and fight for

food. Only the 33d Division kept its spirit and acted as a rear guard in the long

retreat back to the Chindwin.

Of the 155,000 Japanese combat and supply troops who engaged in the

drive on Imphal, 65,000 died. Deaths from sickness and hunger were far more

numerous than battle casualties, and many of the survivors were diseased. After

the war, the Japanese set the casualty rate in combat units at 85 to 90 percent.

The U operation was a debacle and ruined the officers who directed it. Relieved

were: the Commander in Chief, Burma Area Army, and his chief of staff; the

commanding general and chief of staff of the 15th Army with their senior staff

officers; the division commanders and their chiefs of staff.96 The battles around

Imphal were decisive for the Japanese in Burma. They could still delay, but

they could not hope to win.

Meanwhile, on the British side, the victors of Imphal were resolved to press

their hard-won advantages. The question facing Mountbatten, Slim, and

Giffard was that of choosing the better way to exploit success—whether to

96

 (1) Lt. Gen. Shibata Uichi, who assumed command of the 15th Division on 30 June 1944, remarked that in the retreat he had to abandon large stocks of food which he could not distribute.

His forward elements ate what was left of their original stores, supplementing their rations with

grass, and sometimes attacking 4 Corps positions to get the rations to be found in them. SEATIC

Bull 240, pp. 7, 10-13, 23-24, 51; SEATIC Bull 242, pp. 29, 31-32; SEATIC Bull 245, p. 7;

SEATIC Bull 247, pp. 23, 25, 26-28. MID Library. (2) Japanese Comments, Sec. I. (3) Japanese Officers' Comments, App. 2, Mutaguchi; App. 4, Kawabe.
196 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

undertake a close pursuit of the beaten Japanese to the Chindwin, or to request

from the CCS the air and amphibious resources for a stroke against some

strategic point in Japanese-held territory. The choice was not an easy one. Close

pursuit through the monsoon rains meant sending tired battalions, their ranks

thinned by wounds, death, and sickness, to force a way along the same sort of

muddy hillsides and half-drowned valleys that had contributed so heavily to

the Japanese defeat. On the other hand, waiting for amphibious resources

might give the Japanese time to repair the defeat. The alternatives were simple,

but immensely difficult to weigh.

The Chindits Go Back to Burma

While the Japanese were hurling themselves on Imphal, and while Stilwell

was gathering his Chinese to close on Kamaing and Myitkyina, a third active

front was opened in central Burma. Despite SEAC's belief that too deep an

involvement in Burma was unwise, and despite the changed situation caused

by the Japanese offensive, that portion of the old SEAC plans which called for

General Wingate and his men to be dropped into central Burma on the

Japanese lines of communications was put into operation on 5 March.

For his greatest experiment in long-range penetration Wingate had

assembled and trained a formidable force, largely drawn from the 70th British

Division, a veteran formation with long Middle East experience. This force was

given the cover name of 3d Indian Division though it included few Indian

troops. The division had six brigades, 14th, 16th, 3d West African, 77th,

111th, and 23d, each of four battalions. Because of the Imphal crisis 23d

Brigade was later detached, leaving five brigades. The Chindits had their own

pocket-sized air force, designated as No. 1 Air Commando, AAF, and including

fighter bombers, medium bombers, transports, and liaison craft.

The mission of Wingate's force changed not long after it entered Burma.

The personal intentions of the aggressive Wingate were in line with the

original SEAC plan chosen by Mountbatten so many months before: to

establish an airborne division at Indaw before the monsoon rains and link up

with it later. With the cancellation of BUCCANEER and the subsequent

anticipation of the Japanese drive on Imphal this plan had been forgotten by

all but Wingate.

General Wingate had the highest hopes, though he made no promises, that

by concentrating three brigades around Indaw, he might force the Japanese

to evacuate north Burma. He hoped to threaten Japanese communications

south of Wuntho, menacing the 15th Army and giving 4 Corps a chance to

turn the tables with a speedy advance to the Chindwin. Then "14 Brigade (less

two columns) can be introduced to Pakokku to sever the 33d Division's communications, and further exploit against divisions to the north. This should
THE BURMA CAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE 197

permit a bold advance by 4 Corps raftwise down the Chindwin to create a

bridgehead in the dry zone prior to the monsoon." If operations went well, 23d

Brigade would be put into the Meiktila area to exploit the situation generally.

This done, the Japanese at the beginning of the monsoon would face a front

stretching from Pakokku to Lashio with the Chindwin in British hands.

Wingate's aims were thus far different from Slim's plan to lure the Japanese to

Imphal and there defeat them. He saw them recoiling in confusion, stunned

and baffled by the conflagration at their rear, and then hotly pursued across the

Chindwin—all before the monsoon began in mid-May.97

The fly-in began late on 5 March. The whole of 77th Brigade was directed

onto one airstrip, BROADWAY, about fifty miles northeast of Indaw, as the

Japanese had blocked one of the other sites contemplated, and it was feared that

time did not permit briefing pilots for the third. Among the first in were U.S.

engineer personnel who, despite repeated glider crashes and pile-ups in the

confined space, shook themselves clear and had their strip ready for the transports. In came the rest of the 77th Brigade, soon followed by the 111th. The

fly-in was complete by 11 March, and the 9,250 Chindits proceeded to organize

themselves with their own airstrips for fighter cover and resupply, and their

own 25-pounder artillery. Moving over to the railway, 77th Brigade established

a stronghold near Mawlu, WHITE CITY,98 and cut the line of communications

supporting the 18th Division far to the north. This action was not, of course,

immediately decisive, for the 18th had been accumulating supplies for a year,

but it meant ultimate defeat for the 18th Division if the British could not be

driven away.99

The time chosen to drop the Chindits near his line of communications was

most embarrassing to General Tanaka. On 10 January 1944, Headquarters, 15th

Army, had suspended movement of supplies to the 18th Division in order to

accumulate stocks for the projected attack on Imphal. Shipment was to resume

as soon as the Imphal operation was under way. Then the Chindits cut the rail

line, and just when the supply movement was to have resumed, the 18th Division had to start living on what was at hand in north Burma. It was aided by

the 56th Division, which shipped about ninety tons of vital supplies to

Myitkyina via Bhamo, but Tanaka's supply position was fundamentally

compromised by the Chindit fighting along the railway to north Burma.100

The landings created panic among Japanese line of communications troops.

A scratch force was hastily gathered to deal with the Chindits, for the effort

97

 (1) See Ch. II, above. (2) Appreciation COS/24, Comdr Special Force at Imphal [Wingate]

for SACSEA, 10 Feb 44, sub: LRPG Opns, Exploitation of Opn THURSDAY; Memo, Comdr Spe- cial Force for SACSEA, 13 Mar 44, sub: Forecast of Possible Development of THURSDAY. SEAC

War Diary. 98

 So called both from the supply parachutes that festooned the trees, and after an amusement

park of that name. 99

 (1) Mountbatten Report, Pt. B, pars. 117-25. (2) Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. III. 100

 Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. III.
198 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

was underestimated. Then, when the first Japanese attempts to clear the

Chindits from the railway were unsuccessful (around 16 and 17 March), some

staff officers of the Japanese 15th Army were apprehensive and suggested ending

the offensive on Imphal, but General Mutaguchi resolved to continue it and

instead directed enough troops against the Chindits to deal with them. So odd

battalions came hurrying from all over, the 2/51st of the 15th Division, 3/114th

of the 18th Division, 1/148th of the 56th Division, and 1/213th of the 33d Division. Each was thus drawn away from a parent unit at a key sector, for example,

the 3/114th, which had just been released from army reserve to join the 18th

Division. The 24th Independent Mixed Brigade (less one battalion) was moved

north and opened headquarters at Indaw on 25 March. Farther back, the 53d

Division, then moving slowly into Burma, was ordered to march north and

engage as fast as its units arrived. All this, of course, was a diversion from the

main effort toward Imphal, and a great aid to Stilwell's operations. The 111th

Brigade paid its respects to the Imphal operation by harassing the Japanese

line of communications, Indaw-Tamu, from 10 March to 30 April, forcing the

Japanese to abandon its use.101

By mid-March the Japanese offensive seemed to SEAC to need stronger

measures, so the fly-in of the rest of 3d Indian Division, originally intended

to relieve the first wave, was accelerated. The 3d West African and 14th

Brigades were flown into a new stronghold (ABERDEEN) near Manhton, and

arrangements were made for the 16th Brigade which, against fantastic difficulties of terrain, had marched in all the way from Ledo, past the fighting in

the Hukawng-Mogaung valleys, without pause except for a diversionary

attack on Lonkin. General Wingate now had his five brigades deep in central

Burma; but before he could seize the rewards of his planning, thought, and

preparation, he was killed in an aircraft wreck on 24 March. His death was a

heavy blow. After the war the commander of the 16th Brigade explained the

unique difficulties in which Wingate's death placed his men:

General Wingate's death would have been a catastrophe whenever it happened, but it

could not have happened at a worse moment than it did. He was on his way out from a

conference with myself and another of his brigade commanders; the orders which he had

given us were unknown to his headquarters, and their ignorance of them was unknown to

us. His successor was in the field, and could not be reached; the headquarters themselves

were on the move from Imphal (which was nearly threatened by the Japs) to India, with

results to our communications which may be imagined; and a further blow to our radio

contact took the form of four days of violent thunderstorms. These days of confusion left a

legacy behind them which made its mark and contributed largely to the breach of two

principles of war which were all-important to us: those of concentration and maintenance

of the objective; though in the latter case, breach of principle was inevitable with the change

of plan.

101

 (1) SEATIC Bull 244, History of Japanese 33d Army, 3 Oct 46, pp. 19-20, 71-72; SEATIC

Bull 245, pp. 3-4; SEATIC Bull 247, pp. 11-13. MID Library. (2) Cyril N. Barclay, The History of the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) (London, 1947), pp. 147-48. (3) Japanese Comments, Sec. I.
THE BURMA CAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE 199

At the time, and indeed until I discussed this lecture with General Slim, I and all the

brigade commanders were under the impression that the change of plan happened at this

stage when the Japanese were developing their movement across the Chindwin. But now

I find that the plan was actually altered some weeks or months before, when the Japanese

intentions first became apparent. For reasons of his own this decision [fall back to Imphal]

was not communicated to us by General Wingate, perhaps in the hope that he might be

able to win such success as would justify the High Command into reverting to the original

plan.102

The next development in Stilwell's relation to the 3d Indian Division was

at the Jorhat conference of 3 April. There, it was agreed that as Stilwell continued to advance on Mogaung and Myitkyina two brigades would help his

advance by operating on the Japanese line of communications while two others

would head west across the Chindwin to harass the Japanese lines of communications to Imphal, if they could cross the Chindwin's escarpment. Thus,

instead of thirteen battalions operating vigorously behind 15th Army and

slicing its communications, the 3d Indian Division had its strength dispersed

among several forces with no clear-cut mission.

Shortly after the Jorhat conference the 3d Indian Division received a new

directive ordering it to devote its principal efforts to helping Stilwell, once it

had completed the successful evacuation of its initial strongholds and landing

strips. This employment of the 3d Indian Division speedily led to differences

between Stilwell and Maj. Gen. W. D. A. Lentaigne, Wingate's successor.

Stilwell wanted the LRPG's to hold firmly at Indaw, cutting the Japanese

line of communications to north Burma and keeping major Japanese forces

away from his right flank. Against this was SEAC's belief that the endurance

of the Chindits was limited to about ninety days, which meant taking them

out in mid-June and moving the division at a still earlier date to a place from

which it could be flown out. Proposals for their withdrawal from Burma would

therefore inevitably be made by the Chindit commanders sometime in June,

and maneuvering to an assembly area might well take them off the railroad.

Either would be bitterly opposed by Stilwell, who did not, as he told General

Sultan, relish the prospect of Lentaigne's men retiring on him and bringing in

their wake all the Japanese that they had attracted.

A British Broadcasting Corporation announcement that Stilwell and

Lentaigne were in perfect accord brought the matter before higher authority

when Stilwell denounced it to Mountbatten and Marshall as a fabrication. He

would accept the British leaving Mawlu, he said, since higher authority had

directed it, but he did not like the public proclamation that it was in accord

with his views.103

102

 B. E. Fergusson, "Behind the Enemy's Lines in Burma," Journal of the Royal United Service

Institution (August, 1946). 103

 (1) Papers cited n. 85(3). (2) Rad SH 40, 16 Apr 44; Rad SH 44, Stilwell to Sultan, 17

Apr 44; Rad SH 74, Stilwell to Sultan, 24 Apr 44. Items 117, 120, 140, Bk 6A, JWS Personal File. (3) Memo, Wingate for War Cabinet, 10 Aug 43. SEAC War Diary. (4) Fourteenth Army Opn Instr 60, 4 Apr 44. SNF 4. (5) Mountbatten Report, Pt. B, par. 165.
200 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

The Question of Myitkyina

While the British, Gurkhas, and West Africans of the 3d Indian Division

were cutting the Japanese line of communications to Myitkyina, and Stilwell's

Chinese were advancing on the town, the highest Allied authorities were

engaged in discussing whether Myitkyina's capture was worth while and should

be attempted. Following the visit of the SEAC mission to Washington and

London and the inability of the mission to secure approval of CULVERIN, the

question of a directive for SEAC was still unsettled. In late March 1944 the

Joint Chiefs again urged that the Combined Chiefs direct SEAC to undertake

vigorous operations in north Burma. Because militarization of the Bengal and

Assam Railway had greatly increased the capacity of the Assam line of communications, and because recent operations in the Arakan and the Hukawng

Valley had gone so well, the Joint Chiefs hoped SEAC would be more favorably inclined toward seizure of north Burma. Apprised of the JCS view through

channels, SEAC's planners asserted that nothing had happened to change their

belief that it was an extremely uneconomical use of manpower and resources to

become deeply involved in the Burmese jungles.104 The SEAC planners always

hoped that the CCS would assign to SEAC air and sea resources that would

permit the Allies to exploit successes at Imphal by airborne or amphibious

assault—which the Japanese would have been hard put to counter—against

vital points behind the Japanese defenses of Burma, such as Rangoon.

Admiral Mountbatten, basing his reply to the JCS recommendations on his

planners' views, stated that a preliminary examination of the possibility of

taking the Mogaung-Myitkyina area and dominating north Burma down to the

line Katha-Bhamo by December 1944 showed that two more infantry divisions, a parachute brigade, and a long-range penetration brigade should be on

hand in India, and two more divisions should arrive by the winter of 1944-45.

"My conclusion is that the conquest of Northern Burma down to the line

Katha-Bhamo is impossible to carry out by the given dates, and that even by

later dates it is unsound and should not be attempted." Rather than suggest

CULVERIN again, Mountbatten proposed an operation against the PromeRangoon area after the main thrust in the Pacific. References to holding a

perimeter in the Imphal area after the conclusion of current operations there

suggest that as of mid-April SEAC was not yet committed to exploiting victory

at Imphal by a major thrust across the Chindwin into central Burma, but

preferred an amphibious attack on Rangoon.105

Through CBI headquarters in Delhi, Marshall repeated to Stilwell the JCS

view that Myitkyina had to be seized and a buffer zone created to the south so

104

 (1) Rad, JSM to SACSEA, 24 Mar 44; Secy Plans SAC (44) 166/1, Hq SEAC, 10 Apr 44. SEAC War Diary. (2) CCS 452/10, 21 Mar 44, sub: Strategy in SEAC. 105

 Rad SEACOS 137, SACSEA to War Cabinet and JSM, 14 Apr 44. ABC 384 (Burma) 8-25- 42, Sec 6, A48-224. Also in JWS Misc Papers, 1944.
THE BURMA CAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE 201

that Hump tonnage could be increased. The build-up of Hump tonnage to

20,000 tons a month and completion of a two-way, all-weather road and a

4-inch pipeline to China seemed necessary and timely to Marshall so that the

maximum possible aid to projected U.S. operations in the Pacific might be

given by China-based air power in early 1945. Commenting on these orders

from Washington, General Stratemeyer pointed out to General Arnold that

Myitkyina as an oil head at which Hump transports could refuel was the key

to the sharp increase in Hump tonnage that was the prerequisite of any

ambitious plans in China Theater.

Both Stratemeyer and Sultan observed that plans for Burma operations

ultimately depended on a Combined Chiefs decision on strategy. Sultan stated

that there was an inclination in SEAC not to accept support of the main Pacific

thrust as its primary mission if such a mission required land operations in

north Burma, because SEAC thought such operations not worth the effort.

Sultan believed SEAC would propose Hump expansion without the commitment of any of its ground forces to Burma, in order that the campaign to secure

the Mogaung-Myitkyina area might resolve itself into a Sino-American effort

entirely. To support this thesis, Sultan pointed out that the current plans for

the Chindits called for their withdrawal through the Mogaung valley, which

would leave Stilwell without flank support.106

A new directive, foreshadowed by Marshall's recent radio to Stilwell,

arrived in CBI Theater on 3 May 1944 direct from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It gave CBI Theater a new mission, emphasized the importance of Myitkyina

in the plans of Stilwell's American superiors, and relegated to the past any

question of whether CBI Theater headquarters favored carrying out the

SEXTANT decisions or of how it reacted to Mountbatten's views. The JCS now

ordered CBI Theater to clear north Burma and take Myitkyina in order to carry

out the new mission of CBI—air support to forthcoming operations in the

western Pacific. Land-based air support from Chinese bases was declared to be

necessary for successful carrier aircraft operations against Formosa, the Ryukyu

Islands, the Philippine Islands, and the China coast. Stilwell was also ordered

to give what indirect support he could to attacks on Mindanao Island of the

Philippine group in November 1944, without prejudice to operations of greater

strategic importance, such as taking Myitkyina. The Joint Chiefs asked Stilwell

for an estimate of the effort he could make to support these Pacific operations

and to cover temporary reinforcement of the Fourteenth Air Force by the Tenth

Air Force. The JCS said they were aware that accumulating logistical support

for the projected air effort would require major curtailment of Hump support

for the Chinese ground forces in China and of other activities that did not

106

 (1) Rad SH 3, Stilwell to Sultan, 7 Apr 44; Rad CRA 1416, Sultan to Stilwell, 16 Apr 44. Items 111, 118, Bk 6A, JWS Personal File. (2) CM-IN 19350, Sultan to Marshall, 27 Apr 44. (3)

Rad CRA 2367, Sultan to Marshall, 30 Apr 44. SEAC War Diary.
202 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

directly support the air effort. The immediate and progressive stockpiling of

supplies in China was ordered.107

As Sultan had predicted, the SEAC planners on 6 May reported that the

Mogaung-Myitkyina area could be taken by accepting very grave risks elsewhere. Should these, which they tabulated at length, be unacceptable, then they

suggested the old plan of a less advanced oil head. But in the light of the JCS

directive these views could not be controlling on CBI Theater. The plan that

CBI promptly submitted to the Joint Chiefs and SEAC called for, as Phase I,

seizure of the Mogaung-Myitkyina area as soon as possible; Phase II, preparation of all-weather airfields there by 1 January 1945, and clearance of the trace

of the road from Myitkyina to Kunming in order to increase support for the

ground and air forces in China; and Phase III, completion of the India-China

line of communications before the end of 1945.108 When these radios were sent,

Stilwell's men were ten days' march from Myitkyina.

To capture the Mogaung-Myitkyina area Stilwell would have the use of five

Chinese divisions. Personnel of the 30th Division had been trained at Ramgarh

as they arrived at wide intervals from July 1943 on. The 88th Regiment of the

30th Division left Ledo for Shingbwiyang on 1 March 1944. By 24 March its

forward concentration was complete and it was on its way to Pabum to relieve

the 1/112th, 38th Division. The 89th Regiment, at Jorhat to guard against a

Japanese thrust past Kohima, would be ready as soon as 33 Corps was assembled

to relieve Kohima.109

When GALAHAD'S withdrawal from about Inkangahtawng rendered immediate encirclement of the 18th Division a remote possibility, Stilwell flew to

Chungking and asked the Generalissimo for reinforcements in order that the

success already gained might be exploited and Myitkyina seized. On 28 and

29 March Stilwell met with the Generalissimo. No conference minutes are in

Stilwell's files, but his diary records that the Generalissimo agreed that the

Chinese 50th Division might be flown to north Burma. Stilwell asked for

another division, but the decision was postponed for a few days. Then he was

offered the Chinese 14th Division. Stilwell's first reply was that only the 50th

Division could be airlifted to Maingkwan, where an airstrip had been built, and

he asked that the Chinese leader consider infiltrating the 14th Division through

the Kaoli-kung Mountains to attack Myitkyina from the China side. Then he

reconsidered and on 1 April asked General Hearn to have Gen. Ho Ying-chin

consent to fly both the 50th and 14th Divisions over the Hump. The Chinese

moved with commendable promptness. By 15 April 1944 almost all of the 50th

Division had been airlifted to Maingkwan, and that same week the 14th Divi107

 Rad CRA 2655, Gen Evans to Stilwell, 4 May 44. Item 102, Bk 6A, JWS Personal File. This radio was a relay of the JCS directive to Stilwell at the front. 108

 Revised Rpt, War Stf on WS (44) 29, 6 May 44; Rad CRA 2927, Sultan to Marshall, 7

May 44. SEAC War Diary. 109

 G-3 Rpts, Chih Hui Pu, 7-28 Mar 44. NCAC Files, KCRC.
THE BURMA CAMPAIGN IN THE BALANCE 203

sion began to arrive at the Hump airfields. These were of course transfers of

men, not of fully equipped units ready to fight.110

Thus, by mid-April 1944, of 316 Chinese divisions, five had been committed

to operations in north Burma. Opposing those five were three understrength

regiments of the Japanese 18th Division, soon to be reinforced by two regimental headquarters and three battalions. The arms, uniforms, food, pay, and

ammunition supplied to the five Chinese divisions in north Burma were U.S.

lend-lease and British reciprocal aid. The medical and service units supporting

them were from the U.S. Army. Air support—tactical, strategic, supply, and

evacuation—was given by the Army Air Forces.111

Summary

When, in May 1944, Marshall ordered Stilwell to take Myitkyina, there was

no longer any possibility that Stilwell's superiors might of their own initiative

order the North Burma Campaign to be canceled. When Kohima was relieved

on the 20th of the month the Japanese offensive, though still very menacing,

was no longer an immediate threat to the line of communications that supported operations in north Burma. On 29 March the Chinese had entered

Shaduzup, which meant they were over the Jambu Bum and had opened the

door to the Mogaung valley, at whose south end lay the Irrawaddy and the

Burma railway and, a few miles beyond, Myitkyina itself. The campaign was

no longer in the balance; both in the council room and on the field, the scales

had inclined.

110

 (1) Stilwell Diary, 28, 29 Mar 44. (2) G-3 Rpts, Chih Hui Pu, 5-18 Apr 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. (3) Rad CFB 15536, Dorn to Stilwell, 31 Mar 44; Rad SHC 1, Stilwell to Hearn, 1 Apr 44. Items 2152, 2154, Bk 6, JWS Personal File. 111

 For a detailed account of the organization, training, and equipping of the Chinese Army in India, see Stilwell's Mission to China, Chapter VI.
CHAPTER VI

The Drive for Myitkyina

While the Chinese Army in India had been edging up to Shaduzup the

thought had crossed Stilwell's mind that Shaduzup might be as far as his forces

could get before the rains began. Then the Japanese drive on Imphal began to

acquire a disturbing aspect, and the conference between Mountbatten, Slim,

and Stilwell was called at Jorhat on 3 April 1944. At the conference, Slim

expressed his confidence that he would win at Imphal. Perhaps as a result of

that confidence, Mountbatten confirmed the existing directives that called for

Stilwell to take the Mogaung-Myitkyina area. Meanwhile, in one radio after

another, SEAC's staff told the Joint and Combined Chiefs that Myitkyina

probably could not be taken without sending heavy added reinforcements to

SEAC, if taken probably could not be held, and even if held was not worth

taking.

The Japanese offensive on India, the slow progress of the North Burma

Campaign, the Generalissimo's reluctance to cross the Salween, and the steady

consumption of time, all registered on Stilwell's estimate of what he could do

in north Burma. His estimate of what he could do with the means his several

superiors had allotted him began to shrink drastically.

The QUARTERBACK Calls an END RUN

Time was pressing on Stilwell as he in turn was pressing on General

Tanaka; if he was to take Myitkyina he must take it with a quick bold stroke

before the rains began. The solution began to reveal itself to Stilwell immediately after the Jorhat conference. Over the next few days the solution became a

plan and was presented to his Chinese subordinates and to Merrill.

To seize the Mogaung-Myitkyina area as directed by Mountbatten at Jorhat,

Stilwell determined to drive down the Mogaung valley on Kamaing with such

vigor as to persuade General Tanaka that this was the principal effort. Meanwhile, a task force of GALAHAD'S survivors (END RUN Force) plus two Chinese

regiments and a Kachin screen would slip east over the Kumon Range, which

formed the eastern boundary of the Mogaung valley, and strike directly at
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 205

Myitkyina. Myitkyina's garrison would, Stilwell hoped, be depleted to help

defend Mogaung from the Chindits.1

In driving for Myitkyina, Stilwell's immediate objective was to increase

Hump tonnage. As of this moment, he did not believe that opening a land

line of communications to China, which he thought to be still the mission

given him by the TRIDENT, QUADRANT, and SEXTANT Conferences, was any

longer within his capabilities. The SEXTANT directives and the radios from

Marshall had stressed the connection between Myitkyina and the Hump.

Stilwell ordered Hearn to:

Make following report to the Generalissimo. Without holding Mogaung he will of

course realize that it will be impossible to build road and pipeline into Myitkyina and as a

result the anticipated increase in Hump tonnage will not materialize. If we had Myitkyina

and a pipeline into it, the Hump tonnage could be materially increased. In an effort to get

forward and make this possible I have issued orders for an advance to certain areas making

use of maximum force and effort. These orders are not being put into effect with the speed

and effort which in my opinion the situation requires. As a result, the chances of getting to

Mogaung are now slim and any increase in Hump tonnage will disappear, if these chances

dwindle further. I am reporting this so that the Generalissimo will know that I am not

satisfied with what the division commanders are doing to get forward and make our mission

a complete success.2

A few days later, in commenting on a plan for major airborne operations in

Burma the next fall, Stilwell observed that the decisions of the TRIDENT,

QUADRANT, and SEXTANT Conferences still held: ". . . to get enough of

No. Burma to reopen communications with China. . . . It could have been

done last fall, when there were only four Jap divisions in Burma. It could have

been done this spring, with one or two American divisions and the cooperation

of the Y-Force. It can still be done, with a reinforcement of U.S. ground troops

[which Stilwell later set at a corps plus engineers], at a much smaller cost than

is contemplated in proposed plans."

 3

As of 10 April, General Pick had only eight U.S. engineer companies

actually working on the Ledo Road. Two engineer aviation battalions had been

taken away from him, while the remainder of his engineers, save the eight

companies, were working on airstrips and maintenance.4

The drive on Kamaing had changed in concept. Initially, on 20 March the

112th Regiment, 38th Division, reinforced with elements of its two sister regi1

 The Stilwell Papers, p. 291. 2

 Rad SH 83, Stilwell to Hearn, 26 Apr 44. Item 2269, Bk 6, JWS Personal File. 3

 (1) Rad CHC 1019, Stilwell to Sultan, 1 May 44. Item 153, Bk 6A, JWS Personal File. (2)

Rad DTG 240240Z, Stilwell to Marshall, 24 May 44. Item 2740, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. (3)

Having studied Stilwell's radios, the Asiatic Section, OPD, concluded on 22 June 1944 that since

it could not give CBI Theater the U.S. corps plus engineers Stilwell said he would need to open ground communications to China, it was not in a position to direct him or Mountbatten to undertake operations with that in view. Therefore emphasis would be on increasing Hump tonnage, with

ground operations secondary. Memo for Record, 6/22/2170, Case 404-2, OPD 381 Security, A47-30. 4

 Ltr, Covell to Somervell, 17 Apr 44. Folder, Monthly Rpt to Somervell, OCMH.
206 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

ments, had been ordered to envelop the 18th Division by means of a roadblock

below Kamaing. A later order, 4 April, gave the 114th Regiment the mission

originally set for the 112th and defined the role of the 22d Division. Its 65th

and 66th Regiments were to hold in the Shaduzup area, while the 64th

Regiment enveloped the 18th Division's left flank. The final directive on 23

April, in "positive, written orders"

 5 to make the record clear, called for the

22d Division to attack, rather than hold, and to swing the 64th and 65th Regiments around General Tanaka's left (western) flank, while the 66th Regiment

fought down the road. Once again the 112th was told to block off Kamaing

from the south. The orders directed the "22d and 38th to be in Pakhren and

Lawa areas by April 27. Now I've shot my wad," wrote Stilwell. Generals Sun

and Liao at once came in to protest the orders, but to no avail.6

General Tanaka's mission, dating from 1943, was to hold the Kamaing area

to the end. In March 1944 he was told by Burma Area Army that when the 53d

Division (-) had driven the Chindits off the rail line it would be attached to

him for a counteroffensive, providing the attack on Imphal succeeded. While

Tanaka was waiting for the 53d Division to arrive, he was reinforced in April

and May by two very understrength regiments, the 146th Regiment, 56th Division, with one battalion, and the 4th Regiment, 2d Division, with two battalions.

Thus, at one time in May when the force from the 56th Division was attached

to the 18th, only two regiments plus a reinforced battalion of the 56th Division

faced the Chinese across the Salween. Elements of the 53d Division duly arrived

in the Mogaung area, but the Japanese headquarters for north Burma, then the

newly activated 33d Army, in Tanaka's opinion could not decide to commit

them toward either Kamaing or Myitkyina, and his hopes for a smashing

counterattack were lost. He therefore decided to hold above Kamaing until

the eve of the rainy season, then withdraw to prepared positions while the

Chinese and the Americans struggled in the floods that cover the valley during

the rains.7

Though Tanaka knew that the Americans and the Chinese would have to

take Myitkyina to open the way across north Burma, he estimated that there

would not be a direct attack on Myitkyina as long as the bulk of the 18th was

able to hold the Kamaing-Mogaung area. Analyzing his problem after the war,

Tanaka remarked that after the battle of Walawbum his divisional intelligence

section was increasingly handicapped, that he found it ever more difficult to get

good strategic intelligence.8

5

 Stilwell Diary, 23 Apr 44. 6

 (1) FO, 20 Mar 44, Folder, 38th Div Sitreps; FO 12, Hq Chih Hui Pu, 4 Apr 44; FO 14, Hq

Chih Hui Pu, 23 Apr 44; FO 13, Hq Chih Hui Pu, 21 Apr 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. (2) Stilwell

Diary, 23 Apr 44. 7

 (1) Tanaka's remarks, in Japanese Comments, Section III, are distinctly acid where 33d

Army's action is concerned; he accuses that headquarters of endless vacillation. (2) See also his remarks on other occasions, in Tanaka Narrative, pages 3 and 4, and the Tanaka Interrogation in

OCMH files. (3) See Ch. IX, below. 8

 Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. III.
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 207

The 22d Division and the Drive on Kamaing

When Stilwell issued orders on 23 April that the 22d Division was to try

to slip its 64th and 65th Regiments around Tanaka's left, Liao's 22d Division

was drawn up across the Kamaing Road in the vicinity of Warazup. (Map 13)

This meant that the division was firmly established in the Mogaung valley,

about ten miles south of the crest of the Jambu Bum. ("This war is just one

Map 13
208 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

damn valley after another!" wrote Stilwell to his wife.) On either side of the

long narrow valley—9,000 or so yards wide at Warazup—rose the hills now

familiar to the soldiers. The Kamaing Road lay in the center of the valley, and

along the road ran the stream by which nature had carved out the valley. This

was the Nam Kawng Chaung (the upper reaches of the Mogaung River),

whose tributaries arched out to right and left like the ribs of a fish's skeleton.

These streams offered a series of water barriers to troops fighting their way

down the valley; the Japanese took full advantage of them.

When the 22d began to move south, Stilwell's orders to it were among the

first casualties as the 22d's units attempted, not always as vigorously as Stilwell

wished, to get around the Japanese facing them (4th Regiment to the extreme

left of the Japanese line, across the Kamaing Road). Some of the 22d's units

were taken out of line to refit; others simply held back. From west to east,

General Liao had the 1/65th, the 64th, the 65th, and the 66th. The 64th Regiment, 22d Division, began cutting its way around the Japanese left flank and

occupied Hill 988, two miles west-southwest of Warazup, after the Japanese

abandoned it. The 64th then moved southwest and reached a point well to the

rear of the Japanese front-line positions along the Pangyu Hka.

About this time one of the senior Chinese armored force officers took

Colonel Brown, the tank group commander, aside and stated that both Sun

and Liao had received orders not to advance until the Generalissimo felt it was

safe for them to continue. The Chinese told Brown that he himself would

continue to attack if ordered but that such conduct would seriously embarrass

him were he (the Chinese) ever to serve under Sun or Liao. Brown reported the

conversation to Stilwell.

Next morning, Stilwell ordered Liao to move the 22d Division against

Inkangahtawng, which remained in Japanese hands after GALAHAD withdrew.

Liao soon moved his headquarters about a mile farther south. This move put

the division headquarters in line with Brown's armored force command post.

Amazed, Brown checked to see if there had been a general advance by the

Chinese. There had been none; Liao had simply advanced his headquarters.

Stilwell again ordered Liao to attack, and again Liao moved up his headquarters, this time till it was up with that of the 66th Regiment. Almost daily,

word would come to Brown that Liao was not going to attack until permission

came from the Generalissimo. Brown himself thrust forward time and again

with his tanks, without infantry support, losing several, but probably hoping

that considerations of face would induce Liao to make whatever adjustments

would permit him to obey Stilwell's orders and attack.9 Presumably permission

to attack was finally granted by the Generalissimo, possibly after he had had

time to weigh the implications of the relief of Kohima on 20 April, for in late

April the 22d Division again began to move.

A formidable obstacle barred its way to Kamaing. Just south and east of 9

 Brown Notes, p. 14.
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 209

TROOPS OF THE CHINESE 22D DIVISION move down the rain-soaked

Kamaing Road.

Nanyaseik is a range of hills, perhaps eight miles long, and rising to a 1,200-

foot peak. There were large caves in the hills, and in them the Japanese

emplaced four 150-mm. guns, far outranging the 155-mm. howitzers which,

supervised by Col. George W. Sliney, were the heaviest pieces the Chinese had.

The caves shielded the Japanese guns from bombardment and counterbattery,

and the hills gave them excellent observation. With these pieces the Japanese

blasted away at every profitable target that revealed itself, to as far north as

Warazup.10

The 65th Regiment plus the 3/66th, fighting down the Kamaing Road, met

Japanese resistance north and west of Inkangahtawng. The 64th stayed behind

the Japanese left flank, or what had been the Japanese left, until 3 May, when

it moved again, this time straight east, across the Kamaing Road. The 64th

Regiment cut this vital artery about five hundred yards south of the Hwelon

Hka, four days after its patrols first crossed it. The rest of the 22d Division

waited for clear weather to make a co-ordinated attack by air, armor, artillery,

and the dogged Chinese infantryman on Inkangahtawng. The 4th of May met

weather specifications and Inkangahtawng fell that day. The 64th Regiment 10

 Brown Notes, p. 15.
210 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

promptly linked up with the rest of the 22d Division. Then the 66th Regiment

was put in line to relieve the 65th.11 The 22d Division had gained perhaps five

miles down the road in these last few weeks of fighting, but the Japanese were

"sticking it out to bitter end." Stilwell's diary shows him tirelessly at work,

going from one Chinese command post to another to urge and exhort the

Chinese onward.12

The 22d Division stayed in this area for the next several weeks. During this

time, elements of the Chinese 50th Division (149th and 150th Regiments),

which had been flown into Maingkwan by 15 April, arrived at the front, and

were attached to the units of the 22d Division.

Along the Hwelon Hka, the 64th Regiment, 22d Division, was in contact

with the Japanese. General Liao moved the 65th Regiment into line on 19 May,

prolonging the right flank of the 64th, and the 66th Regiment was sent still

further west. The 1/66th and the 3/149th, the latter from the Chinese 50th

Division, plus two companies of division engineers, all attached to the 65th

Regiment, cut a trail over the ridge marking the western boundary of the

Mogaung valley and entered the small valley of the Lasi Hka. Moving south

with comparative speed, they were in the vicinity of Chishidu on 27 May and

about to cut back into the Mogaung valley. The Japanese company opposing

them was steadily pushed back toward Nanyaseik.

The 22d Division had thus successfully completed a maneuver which had

failed when a task force, code name PURPLE, composed of the 149th Regiment,

50th Division, plus a detachment formed from GALAHAD evacuees, had been

sent on the same task. Commanded by an American, PURPLE Force took the

wrong turn and, after being located by Lt. Col. Joseph W. Stilwell, Jr., in a

liaison plane, was forced to return to the Mogaung valley.13 On its march,

PURPLE Force encountered mountains too steep for its animal transport. Two

of the mules, loaded with medical equipment, fell over the side of the cliffs. The

American medical personnel had to send back the pack train and carry their

own supplies.14 That it was an American officer who had lost the way made a

bad impression on the 149th's commander, a very competent Chinese who may

well have thought that he should have led the force. Thereafter, he had little

use for Americans in any capacity. This was perhaps natural but was regrettable,

for the 149th was an excellent regiment and its commander respected by those

11

 The 22d Division combat order of 23 April called for the 64th Regiment to swing wide around the 18th Division and take Nsawgatawng, just north of Kamaing. (1) G-3 Rpts, Chih Hui

Pu, 26 Apr, 1 May, 8 May 44; Opns Rpt, 22d Div, 20 Apr 44; Daily Opns Map, 22d Div, 25 Apr 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. (2) Combat Rpts, Fwd Ech and Misc Ln Os, 22d Div, 26 Apr 44; Situ- ation Maps, 22d Div, 30 Apr-2 May 44, Combat Folder, 22d Div, 23 Apr 44. ALBACORE Hist File, KCRC. 12

 Stilwell Diary, 12 Apr 44. 13

 (1) NCAC History, II, 159. (2) Tanaka Narrative, p. 4. (3) Situation maps, 22d Div; G-3

Rpts, Chih Hui Pu, 24 May, 30 May 44; FO 15, Hq Chih Hui Pu, 17 May 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. (4) Stilwell Diary, 21 May 44. (5) Col Stilwell's Diary, 21 May 44. (See Bibliographical

Note.) 14

 Stone MS, p. 164.
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 211

who dealt with him.15 The presence of the 250 or so American infantry from

GALAHAD was agreed to between Stilwell and Merrill. Because of the tasks

known to lie ahead of GALAHAD, Stilwell discussed the attachment with Merrill

before ordering it. Years later, Merrill remembered telling Stilwell that

GALAHAD sorely needed the 250 men and that it was really not in shape for the

job ahead. But he was aware of the pressures and obstacles that Stilwell daily

faced, and resolved not to add to them.16

Thus, the southward progress of the 22d Division had been painfully slow

during May, but as the month drew to its end, the wide envelopment of the

65th Regiment and its reinforcing battalions suggested that Tanaka would soon

be pushed back on Kamaing itself. Stilwell and the Chinese would then be

deep into Burma and very close to the north-south corridor through which the

railway ran from Mandalay to Myitkyina; the corridor in turn would take them

behind the 15th Army.

The 38th Division: The Generalissimo and Stilwell

Gen. Sun Li-jen's 38th Division had the most difficult sector in which to

operate, the hill mass that formed the eastern boundary of the Mogaung valley.

It was in this area, incredibly difficult for troops to cross, that GALAHAD'S stand

at Nhpum Ga had been made a week or so before. The 38th had been moved

into the area within which Merrill's and Hunter's men had been operating. But

if the hills themselves were a formidable obstacle to troops, they did offer a way

around Tanaka's right flank. And, if Tanaka moved to halt the threat posed by

the 38th's movement south through the hills, he spread his forces thin down

in the valley. To Stilwell, the opportunities lying before the 38th were obvious,

so he kept constant pressure on Sun.

After a visit to the latter's command post on 11 April, Stilwell wrote in his

diary: "At least it looks like a start! The piled-up inertia is terrible. . . ."

 17

 On

the next day the 114th Regiment relieved the 113th on the line of three villages

all named Tingring. This move placed the 114th and 112th in line, the 112th

to the east forming with its lines a small salient about Nhpum Ga. The 114th

Regiment was operating in rugged terrain which was almost as much an

obstacle as the delaying positions directly about Kamaing defended so skillfully

by the Japanese. On at least one occasion the 114th lost its way and had to be

located by aerial reconnaissance.

The 1/114th was to have taken the eastern Tingring and worked round the

right flank of the 55th Regiment, but though it passed the line of the Tingrings,

the Japanese rear guard held stoutly on Hill 1725, while the 18th fell back to

the line Wala-Malakawng. Not until 20 April did the Chinese clear the hilltop.

Stilwell chafed and fretted over the 38th Division's slowness, which he blamed

15

 Dupuy Notes. 16

 Ltr, Merrill to Ward, 26 May 52. OCMH. 17

 Stilwell Diary, 11 Apr 44.
212 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

on General Sun. After Hill 1725 had been taken, the 114th came up against

the Lahkraw Hka, which was in open country with little cover and dominated

by the guns of the 18th Mountain Artillery Regiment. To the east, the 1/112th

moved from Tategahtawng on 23 April to relieve END RUN Force for the move

on Myitkyina. The force was then within a mile of Manpin and created a

salient whose tip at Manpin bulged ominously toward Kamaing and whose

sides ran generally north of the Lahkraw Hka and the Auche-Warang trail.18

The slow rate of the 38th Division's advance alarmed Stilwell. After the

First Burma Campaign he had always feared the Generalissimo might again

try to conduct the campaign from Chungking with emphasis on the defensive.

Stilwell surmised that again, as in 1942, the Generalissimo was corresponding

directly with Sun and Liao. On 15 April Stilwell received a radio from the

Generalissimo observing that the Mogaung valley was "good for attacking and

defending," so Stilwell should be careful. Stilwell promptly called the matter

to Marshall's attention. He told the Army's Chief of Staff that in his opinion

the hard core of Japanese resistance had been broken, that the Chinese with

little further trouble could go rapidly on to Kamaing. Stilwell concluded that

Sun's and Liao's conduct of operations could only be explained by secret orders

from the Generalissimo to slow their pace. He asked Marshall to keep the

President informed of this situation.19 To placate the Generalissimo, Stilwell

had Hearn present an optimistic appraisal of the Burma campaign with the

tactful statement that Stilwell would move cautiously by exploiting every

Japanese blunder.20

The 22d and 38th Divisions continued to plod along. Completely apprehensive, Stilwell asked General Liao bluntly if the Generalissimo had ordered

a slowdown. Liao replied that the Generalissimo did correspond with him

directly and assured Stilwell that the Generalissimo had ordered him to obey,

even when Stilwell was wrong. Far from reassured, Stilwell asked Hearn to

raise the issue with Madame Chiang, specifically, to ask whether the Generalissimo had sent a message encouraging Sun and Liao as Stilwell had requested.21

After the war, an officer of Sun's staff happened to meet with Col. Thomas

F. Van Natta, III, who had been the senior liaison officer with the 38th Division. They refought the campaign, and when the discussion turned to the long

delay above Kamaing, the Chinese stated that he personally had seen several

messages from the Generalissimo to Sun, as of this period, ordering him to

proceed with caution.22

18

 (1) Lt. Col. Thomas F. Van Natta, III, History of the 38th Div, CAI, 1 Oct 43-31 Aug 45,

MS. (Hereafter, Van Natta MS.) NCAC Files, KCRC. (2) G-3 Rpt, Hq Chih Hui Pu, 26 Apr 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. (3) Tanaka Narrative, App. (Overlay) II. (4) Stilwell Diary, Apr 44, 2 May 44. 19

 (1) Memo, Generalissimo to Hearn for Stilwell, 6 Apr 44. Item 2219, Bk 6, JWS Personal

File. (2) Rad SH 34, Stilwell to Marshall, 16 Apr 44. SNF 131. 20

 Memo, Hearn for Generalissimo, 16 Apr 44. Item 2221, Bk 6, JWS Personal File. 21

 (1) The Stilwell Papers, p. 290. (2) Rad SH 45, Stilwell to Hearn, 17 Apr 44. Item 2231, Bk 6, JWS Personal File. 22

 Van Natta Notes.
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 213

The Generalissimo's response to Hearn's and Stilwell's efforts was

dampening:

I am in receipt of reports through the kindness of General Hearn. It is gratifying to know

that if the situation in the Kohima area can be stabilized, the problem of supply and morale

of the units now fighting in northern Burma will not deteriorate.

I beg to express my deepest respect to you for your leadership and direction of the

progress we are making in northern Burma. Although I hold no responsibility in the combined operation of the present Burma campaign, I hope we will not cause unexpected

damage and failure to our friends and units. That's why I am so concerned with the general

situation in the Salween district.

We will exert to the fullest in doing whatever necessary to the attainment of our victory.

Please do not unduly worry.

The Chinese Expeditionary Force in the Salween district is now prepared for counteroffense, and is very attentive in watching for the most opportune moment to coordinate with

the campaign for Myitkyina. It is impossible now for us to directly reinforce northern

Burma. But I hope you will maintain the limited offensive strength now at your disposal,

and be judicious in its employment.

Generals Sun and Lieu [sic], under your brilliant leadership, have done valuable services

for which I have extended to them my personal congratulations.

Respectfully yours,

CHIANG CHUNG CHEN [chop]23

The passage that struck Stilwell with greatest force was the Generalissimo's

assurance that he would keep his friends and troops from undue losses. Stilwell

promptly relayed the message to Marshall. Analyzing his situation for the Chief

of Staff, Stilwell concluded that he could take no remedial action, for any new

division commanders would also get secret orders from the Generalissimo, and

that anything precipitate would "risk the loss of all the results we have gotten

to date." In effect, Stilwell would have to persevere in his exhortations and

hope that they would be enough to bring the Chinese into Mogaung and

Myitkyina.24

So the 22d and 38th Divisions continued as before. When on 26 April

General Sun came in with his plan to take Kamaing, Stilwell disapproved it,

"verbally, and in writing." Sun came back next day with another, and that, too,

Stilwell rejected. The 38th Division went ahead on the basis of existing orders.25

Turning Tanaka's Flank

To break the stalemate along the Lahkraw Hka, the 114th Regiment had to

clear away the Japanese observation posts in the hills. The 1/114th on the

regiment's east flank cut around the flank of the 55th Regiment on 28 April,

23

 Ltr 654, Generalissimo to Stilwell, 17 Apr 44. Item 2252, Bk 6, JWS Personal File. 24

 Rad SH 73, Stilwell to Marshall, 24 Apr 44. SNF 131. 25

 Stilwell Diary, 26, 27 Apr 44.
214 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

while the 2/114th pushed the same Japanese unit back a few hundred yards.

This bending process continued during the next two days, and the 114th Regiment was well south of the enveloped Japanese flank and within half a mile of

Wala. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 114th then began moving straight

south, leaving behind them pockets of determined Japanese who held up the

3/114th.

The 113th Regiment came back into line at the end of April to put frontal

pressure on the Japanese positions along the Lahkraw Hka and Tigrawm Hka.

Meanwhile, the 112th Regiment on the 38th Division's east flank was holding

its salient without attempting to move. The Japanese managed to stabilize

their lines on the creeks east and west of Wala and hold there until 6 May when

a company of the 114th crossed the Nawngmi Hka and started the advance

going again. Two days later the 114th's advance became general, while on the

east at Stilwell's order the 112th began to gather its companies to take Warong.26

East Wala and Hlagyi were taken on 9 May, and the 114th's penetration,

driving deeper into the Japanese lines, began to approach the 112th's outposts

just north of Manpin. By 12 May the 114th and 112th Regiments were able to

maintain communications, with very few Japanese between them. The 114th's

penetration weakened the position of the Japanese facing the 113th, and the

113th's line began to roll up slowly from east to west as the 1st and 2d Battalions went through what had been the center of the 55th's and 56th's positions

to press on to Wala and Maran.27

The whole right flank of General Tanaka's position in the Mogaung valley

was now crumbling. To bolster it, Tanaka ordered the 1/55th, which had been

his extreme right (east) flank detachment (and significantly, regarding his

casualties, was commanded by a captain) to be reinforced by the 146th Regiment,

56th Division. Command of this task force was given to Maj. Gen. Toshiji Aida,

Tanaka's infantry group commander.28 About this time, the officers of the 18th

Division learned that there was no chance of the Japanese counter offensive in

the Hukawng Valley on which so many hopes had been staked, for the U operation was failing "miserably." Their morale began to sag, and in Tanaka's later

opinion this realization marked the "turning point" for his division.29

The Japanese held desperately at West Wala, Maran, and Sharaw, temporarily stalemating the 113th Regiment. The 114th was sent hooking west

behind these Japanese strongpoints, and the two regiments took them one

after another between the 18th and 25th of May. To the east, in front of the

112th Regiment, the Warong position fell on 20 May. It had been stubbornly

defended, and a number of Japanese were cut off along the Auche-Warong

trail north of there. With the clearing of the Japanese from these strongpoints 26

 (1) Van Natta MS. (2) 38th Div Sitreps, 29 Apr-8 May 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. (3)

Stilwell Diary, 5 May 44. 27

 38th Div Sitreps, 8-19 May 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. 28

 Tanaka Narrative, p. 4. 29

 Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. III.
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 215

on the east side of the Mogaung valley, the right side of Tanaka's line seemed

to be dissolving, even though the Japanese were still falling back slowly before

the 22d Division on the center and left.30 According to Tanaka, his right was

in "a state of confusion." Part of the 55th Regiment still clung to a little piece of

the Wala heights, with Chinese infantry between the regimental headquarters

and the battalion position, and other Chinese to the rear of regimental

headquarters.31

The 112th Regiment's Stand at the Seton Block

On the night of 19 May, General Sun probably received the Generalissimo's

permission to take Kamaing, for the next morning at breakfast he told the

American liaison officer, Colonel Van Natta: "We go on to take Kamaing

now." Promptly, Sun and Van Natta called on Stilwell with Sun's plan to take

the town. The change in Sun's attitude "astonished" Van Natta. Previously,

Sun had been all difficulties, delays, complaints, and objections. Now, though

Stilwell could promise to airdrop only 50 percent of the supplies he needed, Sun

raised no objection.32 Sun's plan was simple and direct: send the 112th Regiment wide around the Japanese east flank to cut the Kamaing Road south of

Seton. The 114th would exploit the evident confusion and weakness of the

Japanese on the east by moving steadily down the Kumon Range to

Tumbonghka near the point at which the Mogaung valley merges with the

Irrawaddy valley. Its goal was Mogaung. This plan Stilwell approved.33

On the 22d Division front, the task force which had taken Chishidu kept

briskly toward the Kamaing Road several miles south of the Japanese position

at Mataing Sakan. The 22d Division was thus keeping Tanaka fully occupied.

Meanwhile, to the east, the 112th was cutting its way through the jungle,

unobserved by the Japanese. The commander of the Japanese right flank, Aida,

was watching events to the direct north, and the 112th slipped around him.34

On 25 May the 112th (-) emerged from the jungle well in the rear of

Tanaka's lines, and crossing the Mogaung River, burst into one of Tanaka's

major supply centers. The Chinese captured 35 Japanese trucks, a jeep, a sedan,

8 warehouses of food and ammunition, 100 horses, 4 pieces of artillery, a workshop, and a motor pool. It was a great coup for General Sun and the Chinese,

and a major crisis for Tanaka. If the 112th could keep its grip on the Kamaing

Road, the 18th Division would be in its last battle. General Aida, who had had

30

 The Japanese were feeling the drain of the last six months' fighting. The 6th Company,

2/56tb, was down to fifty men as of 15 April. (1) Statement, Superior Pvt Fujiyoshi Kawaguchi, 2 Oct 44. Folder 62J 41-50, NCAC Files, KCRC. (2) Van Natta MS. (3) 38th Div Sitreps, 15-22

May 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. 31

 Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. III. 32

 Van Natta Notes. 33

 (1) The Stilwell Papers, p. 297. (2) G-3 Rpts, Hq Chih Hui Pu, 30 May, 10, 13 Jun 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. 34

 Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. III.
216 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

strict orders from Tanaka to hold the village of Lawa, where several trails converge east of Kamaing, abandoned his position without authority, and the

whole of Tanaka's right rear flank was wide open.35

Tanaka stripped his division headquarters and service units of available

troops and attacked the 112th at once. From his left flank he called in the 4th

Regiment, 2d Division, under Col. Yusaku Ichikari to attack the Chinese from

the north. On the south, the 18th Division's service troops were hastily assembled and hurled at the block. Simultaneously, Tanaka ordered his chief engineer

to cut a secret escape route. With great relief the Japanese learned that such a

route had already been reconnoitered. The trail ran from the Noidaw Bum to

the Bumrawng Bum via Noidawyang.36

The Japanese battered in vain at the Seton Block. The Chinese fought

valiantly. Rain, floods, and constant Japanese attacks made the action one of

the most trying of the campaign; the Chinese stood up to it with fortitude and

devotion. Though Tanaka was withdrawing his forward elements from their

positions in the Mogaung valley, it was probably obvious to him that complete

withdrawal from the Kamaing area would find the 18th minus its artillery and

vehicles and so weakened as to need complete rebuilding. Moreover, he had

orders to defend Kamaing to the last. Therefore, he had every incentive to

break open the line of communications to the south, and his men did their best.

Attack after attack was hurled at the 112th, but the Japanese on both sides of

the Seton Block were suffering from malnutrition and disease; many of those

to the south were replacements, and the 112th held doggedly. At the end of its

ordeal, only two of the 112th's officers were on their feet.37

The success of the 112th Regiment in holding the Seton Block suggested

that the climax of the valley campaign was close at hand. The Chinese, now

that the Generalissimo had lifted all restrictions, drove in on Tanaka from all

sides. (Map 14) The 22d Division task force which had been moving toward

the Kamaing Road moved squarely across it on 1 June, cutting off the 55th,

56th, and 4th Infantry Regiments from the withdrawal route in the hills by which

Tanaka had planned to bypass Kamaing. Such was the current disorganization

of the Japanese that the commander of the 55th Infantry Regiment was in contact with but one company of his regiment. The 2d Battalion (-) of the 56th,

supported by six 75-mm. and two 150-mm. pieces, tried to force the 22d Division off the Kamaing Road, but failed. Since the Chinese barred the escape

route via the Noidaw Bum, the 56th had to make a crude trail to the southeast,

from the Pakhren Bum area, in the hope that, covering some 500 sick, the

artillery, and the motor transport, it might swing east around the 22d Division's

roadblock, and then back onto the escape trail.38

35

 Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. III. 36

 (1) G-3 Rpts, Hq Chih Hui Pu, 30 May, 10 Jun 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. (2) Tanaka Narrative, pp. 4-5. 37

 (1) Tanaka Narrative, p. 6. (2) Van Natta Notes. 38

 (1) Tanaka Narrative. (2) Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. III.
Map 14
218 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

With the 22d Division blocking him just southeast of Nanyaseik, and the

38th firmly holding the Seton Block, Tanaka was faced with the gravest tactical

problems. Nevertheless his skillful delaying action, greatly aided from December to May by Chinese tactics that to the Americans appeared willful delay, was

yielding results for the Japanese. His attempt to hold until the monsoon closed

down on the Chinese and on the American SOS showed acute appreciation of

the factors in his favor. By June about one inch of rain fell daily. Though

supply convoys could still move from Ledo to Shingbwiyang, the combat trail

from Shingbwiyang south was very difficult. The road was graded to Tingkawk

Sakan (mile 164) and metaled almost to Mile Post 138. However, rainfall had

blocked the road over the flats north of Tingkawk Sakan. At the end of June

the situation was unchanged. The Japanese stand at Kamaing and the heavy

rains immobilized the survey party and the road trace.39 As the flood waters

rose in the valley, they effectively barred armor from moving south to Mogaung

or Myitkyina.40

Defeat of the 18th Division

The condition of the 18th Division was now almost desperate. The rice

ration, normally 860 grams per day, had shrunk to 100 grams. Lack of gasoline

immobilized the Japanese trucks. Allied bombers had destroyed about 40 percent of the supply dumps. The artillery was rationed to four shells a day. The

18th's units were far understrength. Where in April they had had perhaps fifty

men to a company, now they were down to thirty.

The 56th Regiment in particular was in grave straits. Its commander reported

on 7 June:

The advance attack of the enemy from the north is unexpectedly swift; the enemy is

advancing southward, threading through the gaps in our lines by wading chest-high through

marshy zones. I am unable to contact the 1 and 3 Battalions, which are under my command,

and their situation is unknown. The platoon occupying the vicinity of Nanyaseik received

an enemy onslaught and all troops were annihilated. The enemy stormed into our main

artillery position, and with our motor trucks, artillery and other vehicles crowded together

in the vicinity of the narrow, forked road, there is much confusion. The transfer of most of

the patients has been completed. The regiment will cover the withdrawal of the main body

of the division at the sacrifice of our lives. I believe this will be our final parting. Please give

my best regards to the division commander.

The survivors of the 56th's infantry made good their escape to the southeast, then back to the sheltering hills, but the artillerymen died alongside their

six 75-mm. and two 150-mm. pieces as the Chinese 149th Regiment overran

them, while the motor transport was destroyed. The colors of the 56th Regiment

were safely conveyed to division headquarters in Kamaing.41 It was victory and

complete evidence of the high martial qualities of the Chinese soldier. 39

 SOS in CBI, pp. 451-52. 40

 Brown Notes, p. 15. 41

 (1) Tanaka Narrative, pp. 5, 6. (2) Dupuy Comments. (3) Tanaka, Japanese Comments,

Sec. III.
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 219

The 113th Regiment in its turn moved south down the foothills of the

Mogaung valley's east side. It took Lawa, then Zigyun, directly across the Nam

Kawng Chaung from Kamaing. The 113th began to probe for a crossing. To

the north and west of Kamaing, the 22d Division and the 149th Regiment

kept the Japanese under heavy pressure. As the Japanese began to shift their

forces west toward an escape route, they left a gap in their positions through

which the 3d Battalion of the 65th Regiment made a deep penetration, permitting a wide envelopment that placed the battalion south and west of Kamaing.

The remainder of the 65th poured on through. Meanwhile, the 149th made a

close-in envelopment of Kamaing. Kamaing was now encircled to the west,

north, and east, with the 149th due west. On 16 June the 149th moved out of

the bush, across the fields, and into Kamaing to take the settlement. With

Kamaing in Chinese hands, the 18th Division was pushed into the hills south

and west of Kamaing.42

On that same 16 June that Kamaing fell, the 114th Regiment which had

been sent south past the fighting around Kamaing met the Chindits at Gurkhaywa. Their meeting established a ground line of communications to the

Chindits and meant that the Allies were solidly established in Burma, just about

two years after the end of the First Burma Campaign.43

The experiences of the surgical team from the 43d Portable Surgical Hospital which accompanied the 114th Regiment illustrate the marching qualities

of the Chinese Army. By 28 May the terrain over which the 114th was making

its way was so bad that horses could not be used. The medics then took with

them only 100 pounds of supplies, carried by the Chinese. Unhappily, some of

the medics' scanty food stock was stolen, and their rations were exhausted

around 30 May. The inhabitants of the little village of Kawnan contributed

some pork and rice. From 1 to 4 June the Americans lived on a cup of rice and

water twice a day, which they obtained from the Chinese. Their operating table

was a litter on two bamboo trestles over which hung a little thatched roof.

Under these conditions, the surgical team performed 138 operations with but

three postoperative deaths. When they rejoined the parent unit on 16 June, the

members of the team had lost twenty-five pounds each on the average, and

staggered as they walked. The 114th Regiment was still battleworthy.44

On 22 June, Headquarters, 33d Army, ordered Tanaka to withdraw from the

Kamaing area to the area north of Sahmaw. Tanaka argued that he should stand

his ground while the 53d Division, which had done so little to restore the Japanese fortunes, pushed aside the Seton Block and reopened his line of communications. The 33d Army agreed, and for three days Tanaka and the 53d Division

tried to pry the Chinese away from their strangling hold. But the 112th

42

 (1) Dupuy Comments. (2) G-3 Rpt, Hq Chih Hui Pu, 10, 13 Jun 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. 43

 Stilwell Diary, 16 Jun 44. 44

 Stone MS, pp. 169-74.
220 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Regiment was now reinforced by the 113th, and they were too strong for the

Japanese.

Tanaka reported as much, and 33d Army ordered the 18th Division to withdraw to the hills north of Sahmaw, a village on the Burma railway south of

Mogaung. While the 4th and 146th Regiments made covering attacks, the

remnants of the 55th and 56th Regiments destroyed their artillery and heavy

equipment, then withdrew along the escape trail cut through the forest west of

the Seton roadblock, the same trail of which Tanaka had earlier learned with

such relief. The Japanese rear guard fell in behind the ragged survivors of the

elite division that had taken Singapore in 1942, and the starving, malaria-ridden

Japanese slowly trudged out of the Mogaung valley. The Chinese Army in

India, with vital assistance from the 3d Indian Division and GALAHAD, had

cleared the Japanese from the Hukawng and Mogaung valleys.

By keeping intact the blockade of China for yet another year, the 18th

Division and Tanaka may have profoundly affected the history of Asia. If Stilwell had won a speedy victory in north Burma, the position of the Generalissimo's government in China could have been greatly strengthened by the return

of good Chinese troops and the delivery of trucks and artillery to China in 1944.

But events did not fall that way.

The Japanese paid heavily to hold north Burma and prolong the blockade

of China. The 18th Division lost 50 percent of the strength with which it began

the action; the 4th and 146th Regiments, perhaps 33 percent. Of the 18th Division, 3,000 men succeeded in withdrawing; of the two regiments, about 1,000

men each.45

Stilwell and the Chindits

The meeting between Chinese and Briton, lao ping and Tommy, on 16 June

dramatized the work of the 3d Indian Division in cutting the Japanese line of

communications to Kamaing and Myitkyina and in containing substantial

Japanese forces. The role of the Chindits occasioned heated controversy at the

time, and some of the embers were still glowing after the war. A detailed

account is beyond the scope of this volume, for the exchanges were numerous

and bitter. The withdrawal of the Chindits from Mawlu and the belief, which

the Chindits shared with the men of GALAHAD, that "after 90 days we get out

of this epithet place," a belief in which SEAC concurred, led to strong differences between Stilwell and his staff on one side and Lentaigne, Mountbatten,

and SEAC on the other.46

45

 (1) Tanaka Narrative, p. 7. (2) Tanaka Interrog. OCMH. 46

 Stilwell Numbered Files 4 and 172 plus Folder, Memos and Operational Instructions (CAI, NCAC, 3d Indian Division, January-May 1944, NCAC Files, KCRC), contain many of the records in possession of American officers or agencies. The SEAC War Diary and Admiral Mountbatten's report give another point of view.
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 221

The officers of the 3d Indian Division and SEAC held as doctrine that when

soldiers had been ninety days behind the Japanese lines they were ipso facto

exhausted and should be withdrawn from the field. The belief was Wingate's,

drawn from his 1943 experience, and was known to the men in the ranks.

Moreover, the monsoon rains made the whole process of air supply most difficult, while the waters made cross-country marches extremely trying. Stilwell

objected that the simple presence behind Japanese lines of the Chindits was no

support to him, that they aided his operations only when they actually placed

themselves across the Japanese lines of communications. Stilwell feared that in

retreating to the north the Chindits would bring with them the swarms of

Japanese they had attracted. He also feared the effect on the morale of Chinese

who had been engaged since November 1943 if troops who entered the field

only in March 1944 passed through the Chinese lines on their way out.

On 17 May, 3d Indian Division came under Stilwell's operational control,

and Lentaigne placed his headquarters next to Stilwell's. Stilwell did not desire

operational control, for he did not believe his orders would be accepted. Moreover, he was under constant pressure from SEAC and the Chindit commanders

to agree to their early evacuation. While Stilwell and Lentaigne were conferring

on 25 May on holding a position (BLACKPOOL) near the railway in the vicinity

of Namkwin, and were agreeing that it should be evacuated only in case of

emergency, the block was being evacuated. Stilwell's anger at this course of

events, together with the steadily declining strength of the Chindits, created a

crisis which soon required the attention of the highest SEAC officers.

Then, Stilwell ordered the 77th Brigade of the Chindits to attack Mogaung.

Its capture would be a great aid to Stilwell's Chinese and would pull out the

keystone of the whole Japanese position in north Burma. Between 22 and 26

June, 77th Brigade attacked Mogaung with a dash and gallantry that drew

praise from U.S. observers, but it lacked the weight to overrun Mogaung in

one rush. The 114th Regiment, 38th Division, joined in the fight. Mogaung

fell on 26 June and both units claimed credit for the victory.

The commander of the 77th Brigade now insisted that his men be withdrawn as unfit for further service and soon after himself ordered them

withdrawn. Charges of bad faith were freely made on all sides and feeling ran

high. Stilwell believed the 77th Brigade had been withdrawn in disobedience

of written orders to hold its ground and prevent the Japanese from sending

heavy reinforcements to Myitkyina. Lentaigne assumed responsibility for the

act as necessary to preserve his troops.

There was still another clash between Stilwell and the Chindit headquarters

in June, when Stilwell asked Lentaigne to report why the 111th Brigade had

not complied with a series of orders issued between 8 and 17 June. These called

for the 111th to occupy positions in the rather large area between Pahok and

Sahmaw in order to guard the right, or western, flank of the 3d Indian Division.

The matter was aired at a meeting on 30 June between Mountbatten, Stilwell,
222 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Lentaigne, and members of Stilwell's staff. There it developed that Stilwell

had misunderstood the orders his staff had issued the 111th. These had called

for the occupation of an area, rather than of a point, Sahmaw itself, as Stilwell

had believed. The conference agreed on a further evacuation of the Chindits

after the southward advance of the Allies in north Burma had reached Sahmaw.

In the weeks that remained of the Chindits' campaigning the 111th Brigade

briefly seized Point 2171, a hill feature north of Taungni, which was a critical

terrain feature controlling approaches to the railway. The Japanese defended

it stubbornly; significant of the bitterness of the fighting was the posthumous

Victoria Cross awarded Maj. Frank G. Blaker. The 14th Brigade relieved the

111th and, reoccupying Point 2171 in the process, cleared the hills to the

western side of the railway.

Fortunately, the veteran British 36th Division was arriving in the forward

area to replace the battered Chindits; the steady success of the campaign in

north Burma made air space for evacuation available, and sober second thought

prevailed. In retrospect, it seems apparent that neither Stilwell nor Mountbatten

wanted to let so potentially grave a dispute develop further. After heated discussion, the charges made were simply dropped, and the flood of events began

to sweep over the episode, as the jungle closed over the paths and clearings

where the Chindits had fought and died.

As the Chindits were slowly coming out of Burma there was apparently

some disposition to disparage their accomplishments. SEAC considered they

had yielded 5 percent return instead of the hoped-for 15 percent—which latter

would have been generous indeed. Some considered that GALAHAD and 23d

Brigade (which had fought the 15th Army), with their tactic of close-in envelopment, had demonstrated the correct use of long-range penetration groups.47

A minute of Giffard's based on the view that GALAHAD and 23d Brigade had

been correctly used suggested forming six long-range penetration brigades for

the next campaign. When that campaign began, Fourteenth Army in its supply

arrangements and its tactics reflected many of the pioneering Chindits'

arrangements.

In assaying what Wingate and the Chindits had done, a group of former

Japanese officers wrote:

The Chindits interfered with the Imphal Operations from the very start and forced 15th

Army to divert one battalion each of the 15th and 33d Divisions, to deal with them. Also

diverted was the main force of the 53d Division which was to be the general reserve for the

Burma Area Army and was, if there had been no such emergency as the descent of the

Chindits, to have reinforced the 15th Army at Imphal. The 5th Air Division was obliged to

use half of its strength against the Chindits when its full strength should have been employed

to support the 15th Army.48

47

 (1) Telg 2739, Air Ministry to SACSEA, COS (RL) 206, 25 May 44; SAC (44) 307, 30 Jun 44, sub: Reconstruction of LRPG's by CinC, Eleventh Army Gp. SEAC War Diary. (2) Lt. Col. J. E. B. Barton, Special Force in Direct Support of C.A.I., draft monograph. Cabinet Office, Hist

Sec, London. 48

 Japanese Officers' Comments, p. 18.
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 223

As for the operations of the 18th Division, Japanese sources state that cutting

its supply line made its holding operation useless.49

The March to Myitkyina

The clearing of the Mogaung valley accomplished one half of Stilwell's

objective for the spring of 1944 and brought nearer the ultimate accomplishment of the other—the taking of Myitkyina, the goal of this campaign. His

aim, indeed, had been to take Myitkyina first, but events had not fallen that

way. On 21 April Stilwell set up a force to seize Myitkyina, and called it END

RUN (harking back to his college football days, as he often liked to do).

Wasting away as rapidly as were the Chindits, GALAHAD now had but 1,400

men of its original 2,997, and so they had to be combined with Chinese troops.

Three combat teams were created: H Force under Colonel Hunter (150th

Regiment, 50th Division, and the 1st Battalion of GALAHAD; 3d Company,

Animal Transport Regiment, and a battery of the 22d Division artillery);

K Force under Colonel Kinnison (88th Regiment, 30th Division, and 3d Battalion of GALAHAD); M Force under Colonel McGee (the 2d Battalion of

GALAHAD plus 300 Kachins). With them went surgical teams from the Seagrave Hospital Unit and from the 73d Evacuation Hospital, plus the whole of

the 42d Portable Surgical Hospital. Whatever prestige might accrue from the

swift seizure of Myitkyina might have been the Generalissimo's, for Stilwell

now urged him to send a Chinese division from China to Myitkyina via the

Hpimaw pass. The Generalissimo refused.50

Shortly after the siege of Nhpum Ga, Merrill from his sickbed sent a staff

officer to Hunter's headquarters to advise him that a thrust over the mountains

at Myitkyina was contemplated. This was a change from the original plan for

working down the Hukawng and Mogaung valleys, and terrain data plus staff

studies were obviously called for. Hunter at once put the GALAHAD staff to

work. From their studies they prepared a rough plan which was returned to

Merrill. Their plan appeared an improvement over Merrill's original ideas and

he drafted the final plan for Stilwell accordingly. (Map 15)

The version approved by Stilwell called for crossing the Kumon Range

with H and K Forces via the Naura Hkyet (a 6,100-foot pass), then turning

south on Ritpong. From there the two forces would take separate routes that

would later converge on Myitkyina. M Force would be in position to cover the

south flank, the most likely danger spot, though in such a march through

territory nominally in Japanese possession no one could guess from what

quarter the enemy might attack, and which force would actually have the

blocking role.

49

 SEATIC Bull 240, p. 9; SEATIC Bull 242, p. 20; SEATIC Bull 247, pp. 12-13. MID Library. 50

 (1) FO 14, Hq Chih Hui Pu, 21 Apr 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. (2) GALAHAD, pp. 87-88. (3) Stone MS, p. 182. (4) Rad SH 36, 16 Apr 44. Item 2228, Bk 6, JWS Personal File.
Map 15
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 225

Merrill, somewhat improved in health, again assumed command of the

force, with orders to take and hold the Myitkyina airstrips. In giving Merrill

his orders for the march, Stilwell stated that he knew he was calling on GALAHAD for more effort than could fairly be expected, but that he had no other

option. In the light of that, and the exhaustion of the unit, he authorized

Merrill to begin evacuating GALAHAD "without further order if everything

worked out as expected."

 51

After discussing the plan with his battalion commanders, Merrill said a few

words about what would be done for GALAHAD on completion of the mission.52

 Such a prospect was a tremendous incentive to the weary men of

GALAHAD, and Merrill believed many made the march as a last desperate effort

for a great prize.53 Capt. William Laffin was sent ahead with 2d Lt. Paul A.

Dunlap, thirty Kachin Rangers, and thirty coolies to make the trail negotiable.

K Force moved out on 28 April; H Force, on 30 April. The so-called trail

over the pass was more nearly a route used by the Kachins; in some places

there was no path. Twenty pack animals slipped and fell off the narrow, muddy

way. It was a grueling march for men who had already marched 500 miles and

fought several battles, most of the time on K ration. Before END RUN Force

reached Ritpong, it had only one contact with the Japanese. A few of the enemy

were flushed from cover by the 1/88th, but it was feared the Japanese held

Ritpong in strength.54

On 5 May, when the leading elements of K Force (3d Battalion of

GALAHAD and the 88th Regiment, 30th Division) were a mile from Ritpong,

Colonel Kinnison began an envelopment to hit the village from north and

south. The 3d Battalion managed to cut its way through the woods and place

itself across the southern approaches to Ritpong on 6 May. Meanwhile, the

89th Regiment tried to take Ritpong from the north but failed. Next day an

American reinforced company attacked Ritpong from the south but was stalled

by a machine gun nest.

Since the Chinese were attacking skillfully and well, Colonel Kinnison

decided to let them take Ritpong, while the Americans blocked the trail to the

south. During the night of 7-8 May Japanese breakout attempts were repulsed.

The Chinese attacked again on the 8th, and Ritpong fell on the 9th. The delay

at Ritpong permitted H Force to overtake and pass through K Force.

Meanwhile, M Force (2d Battalion of GALAHAD, plus 300 Kachins) had

had one skirmish with Japanese, routed them, and begun to cut its own paths.

The march was fatiguing in the extreme; fully half the animals died of exhaus51

 (1) Quotation is from Merrill Notes. (2) Hunter Notes. 52

 Ltr and Rpt, Office IG, CBI, to CG, USAF CBI, 12 Jul 44, sub: Investigation re 5307th

(Prov) Unit (GALAHAD) (hereafter, GALAHAD Investigation), pp. 10, 17, 21, 64. AG 333, NCAC

Files, KCRC. 53

 (1) Merrill Notes. (2) Hunter Notes. 54

 GALAHAD, pp. 87-91.
226 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

tion or fell into the gorges. The men were farther harassed by fevers and

dysentery, but they were only two days behind H and K Forces.55

Proceeding from Ritpong, K Force feinted toward Nsopzup, a Japanese

supply point on the trail from Myitkyina to Sumprabum, to attract the Japanese. While so engaged, K met a Japanese force near Tingkrukawng that was

strong enough to pin both of its combat teams to the ground and then to halt

the Chinese when they were committed. Attempts to envelop the Japanese

failed. Since H Force (1st Battalion of GALAHAD and the 150th Regiment, 50th

Division) was proceeding unmolested, Merrill told Kinnison to withdraw.

K Force then picked up H's trail and followed it to Myitkyina. Moving on,

Kinnison reached Hkumchet In on 17 May and paused to await an airdrop.

M Force was similarly engaged at Arang. During these strenuous days, Kinnison became ill of the deadly mite typhus, was evacuated, and died with shocking

speed. In all, 149 men contracted the little-known scourge. Many of them died.56

MERCHANT OF VENICE!

While K Force was fighting at Tingkrukawng, H Force kept on to a river

just south of the village of Namkwi on the Mogaung-Myitkyina railroad and

about two miles from the principal Myitkyina airstrip that lay almost due west

of Myitkyina itself. Despite the several brushes with the Japanese, Kachin

informants were sure that the Myitkyina garrison was not on the alert. To

ensure surprise, before Colonel Hunter and his force bivouacked for the night

of 16 May they rounded up the local Burmans and kept them under careful

watch. A patrol reported the airstrip lightly held. Hunter decided to attack at

1000, 17 May. The 150th Regiment was ordered to take the airstrip, while

GALAHAD personnel took the Irrawaddy ferry terminal at Pamati. The other

airstrip, north of the town, was left alone for the present.

The attack went like a service school demonstration, for though the Japanese

knew Myitkyina was in danger, the actual assault was a complete surprise.

Colonel Maruyama, the Japanese commander, had two understrength battalions

of the 114th Regiment in the town of Myitkyina and in its little suburb of

Sitapur. There were 100 more men of the 15th Airfield Battalion on the north

and south airstrips, 318 men from labor and service units on various details in

Myitkyina, and 320 patients in a military hospital. Perhaps 700 able-bodied

Japanese were present when the battle began.57

As soon as Colonel Hunter considered his hold on the major airstrip secure,

he sent the prearranged code signal, MERCHANT OF VENICE, which meant the

process of supply and reinforcement could begin. Previous code signals sent

55

 GALAHAD, pp. 91-97. 56 Ltr, Brig Gen Waldemar F. Breidster to Ward, 4 Sep 51. OCMH. 57

 (1) GALAHAD, pp. 97-101. (2) G-2 Per Rpt, Hq Chih Hui Pu, 24 May 44; PW History, Folder, Current Chronological PW File. (Hereafter, PW History.) NCAC Files, KCRC.
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 227

A BRITISH ANTIAIRCRAFT UNIT at Myitkyina airfield.

forty-eight and twenty-four hours in advance of the actual descent on the airstrip had alerted Stilwell's headquarters, and the process of reinforcement had

been prepared. It had been feared that the Japanese might have been able to

damage the airstrip. So the Air Forces had gliders with aviation engineers

standing by. Hunter reported by radio that the strip was in good condition,

word which by agreement with Merrill was to have begun a flow of food,

ammunition, and infantry.58

The process of reinforcement was a disappointment to the waiting troops.

A company of the 879th Engineer Aviation Battalion came in via glider; a

battery of .50-caliber antiaircraft was flown in; and then the 2d Battalion,

Chinese 89th Regiment, arrived before the weather closed in on the 17th.59

At this point General Stratemeyer, commanding the Army Air Forces,

India-Burma Sector, intervened and upset the planned schedule of resupply

58 Hunter tells, in his notes on the draft of this chapter, of his effort to prearrange through

Merrill for the immediate supply of food and ammunition, and for the arrival of infantry to exploit

the dazzling success that would be gained were the strip captured quickly in good condition.

59 (1) Stilwell Diary, 17 May 44. (2) The Stilwell Papers, p. 296. (3) G-3 Per Rpt, Hq Chih

Hui Pu, 24 May 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. (4) NCAC History, Vol. I, App. 2, The Siege of Myit- kyina, pp. 13-17. (Hereafter, this section of the NCAC History will be called Siege of Myitkyina.)

(5) Hunter Notes.
228 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

and reinforcement by ordering the W and X Troops of the 69th Light (Antiaircraft) Regiment, a British unit, to be flown in. When these arrived on the

18th, Merrill and Hunter were sorely disappointed to receive more antiaircraft

instead of the infantry and supplies so badly needed if the town was to be taken

quickly. There could be no quarrel with Stratemeyer's intent, for the precaution was a reasonable one, but the local commanders would have preferred the

arrangements they themselves had made.60

Back at his headquarters Stilwell was exultant. Again and again he had

been told that Myitkyina could not be taken, if taken could not be held, and if

held was not worth holding. Now his transports were landing on Myitkyina

airstrip, flying in the Chinese who would take the principal center of north

Burma and go on to lift the blockade of China. In six months his forces had

driven 500 miles into Burma and won engagements against seven Japanese

regiments, among them, the victors of Singapore. The brilliant seizure of the

Myitkyina airstrip was the height of Stilwell's career and the grand climax of

the North Burma Campaign.61

The seizure of the principal airstrip at Myitkyina on 17 May was a stunning

surprise to SEAC. The Prime Minister sent a radio to Admiral Mountbatten

asking if he had expected the sudden blow at Myitkyina. In reply, Mountbatten

pointed out that he had heard only incidentally that Stilwell planned to attack

Myitkyina. Since this attack might eventually involve the use of considerable

numbers of British troops, Mountbatten thought that he should have known

beforehand of the decision to attack Myitkyina and planned to send Stilwell a

personal letter explaining his position.62

Stilwell's coup cast a new light on the long-debated SEAC directive. As

the Allied columns drew ever closer to Myitkyina, the British and American

views on the North Burma Campaign had been approaching agreement. The

Strategy and Policy Group of OPD on 3 May had noted that the speed of the

American advance across the Pacific promised to outstrip any ground action

that might be undertaken in China, which suggested to them that Stilwell

should be told to concentrate on building up his air force in China to support

the U.S. offensive in the Pacific.63 The current position of the British Chiefs of

Staff was an acceptance of Mountbatten's view that SEAC's directive should be

to develop, maintain, broaden, and protect the air link to China with its current

resources, in time to support projected operations against Formosa.64

The Joint Staff Planners of the JCS on 16 May suggested adopting the

British position. That same day, the Army Service Forces, which had been

60

 (1) Ltr cited n. 16. (2) Hunter Notes. 61

 The Stilwell Papers, p. 296. 62

 (1) Min, SAC's 104th Mtg, 20 May 44. SEAC War Diary. (2) This letter cannot be found among Stilwell's papers, and perhaps was not sent. 63

 Memo, Roberts for ACofS, OPD, 3 May 44, sub: Memo for Gen Somervell Concerning Plan of Action Within China. Case 367, OPD 381 Security, A47-30. 64

 JPS 406/3, 16 May 44, sub: Strategy in SEAC.
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 229

energetic in support of the Ledo Road, argued that the Joint Planners were in

effect suggesting an end to offensive action in north Burma at a time when the

trace of the Ledo Road was virtually in Allied hands. Then came Stilwell's bold

stroke at Myitkyina. In response the planners decided to suggest that acceptance

of the British position be contingent on securing the Mogaung-Myitkyina

area.65

The result of these different points of view, powerfully affected by the blow

at Myitkyina, was a compromise CCS directive to SEAC, issued 2 June 1944.

Unlike the QUADRANT directive, which had taken no stand on ground versus

air operations in Burma, the new CCS directive gave first priority to building

up the Hump operation in order to provide the maximum flow of supplies to

the air force in China for support of Pacific operations. So far as was consistent

with the primary objective, SEAC was to press advantages against the enemy

by exerting the maximum ground and air effort, and in so doing be prepared to

exploit the opening of the Ledo Road.

Securing Myitkyina, conquering enough of north Burma to protect the

Allied hold on that key point, and building pipelines to China were viewed as

integral parts of building up air strength in China. By omitting ground operations save as they did not conflict with the Hump build-up, the CCS temporarily resolved the conflict over the location of a ground offensive. In this way

the controversy over operations in north Burma as against those in Sumatra

(Operation CULVERIN) was settled for the present, and perhaps for good.66

The Myitkyina airstrip was not long in proving its worth, and as the weeks

went on more and more troops, food, ammunition, artillery, and construction

equipment were flown in to carry on operations against the town of Myitkyina,

to build the line of communications across north Burma, and to support the

transports that made Myitkyina a base on the way to China. From May to

October 1944, about 14,000 transport flights into Myitkyina were logged,

carrying over 40,000 tons of cargo.67

The First Attempts To Take the Town

Initial attempts to take the town of Myitkyina were hampered by poor

intelligence and faulty organization. At Myitkyina the local intelligence

agencies gained the mistaken impression that they were faced by relatively few

Japanese, and plans were made accordingly. On 18 May the total of Japanese

was set at 300; on 15 June after a period of uncertainty G-2 of the Myitkyina

65

 Memo, Deputy Director, Plans and Opns, ASF, for ACofS, OPD, 16 May 44, sub: Strategy

in SEAC; Memo, Roberts for CG, ASF, attn Deputy Director, Plans and Opns, ASF, 19 May 44, sub: Strategy in SEAC; JCS 774/1, ABC 384 (Burma), 8-25-42, Sec 6, A48-224. JCS approved

this paper on 26 May 1944 as JCS 774/1. 66

 (1) Min, CCS 161st Mtg, 2 Jun 44. (2) CM-OUT 46159, Marshall to Stilwell, 4 Jun 44. 67

 EAC Despatch, p. 115.
230 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Task Force set the number at 500, a gross underestimate.68 There was much

confusion in the first few days at Myitkyina. It was aggravated by the fact that

the Chinese troops came from three separate divisions, the 30th, 14th, and 50th.

The toll it took was heavy.

On the afternoon of 17 May, after the airfield was cleared of Japanese, two

battalions of the 150th Regiment moved off on the first attempt to take

Myitkyina. (Map 16) Following the wrong road, they went toward Sitapur

instead; on encountering Japanese rifle fire, they lost direction completely and

engaged in fighting among themselves. Meanwhile, Colonel Hunter was calling

up K and M Forces, directing them to move at once. Although the men had

not eaten for several days, they abandoned all attempts at receiving the airdrop

they so badly needed, took up their packs, and set out for Myitkyina.69

As one GALAHAD company trudged on to the airstrip, Merrill noted that

hardly a man could walk normally, for fatigue, Naga sores, and skin diseases

("jungle rot") were making themselves pitifully evident. One platoon,

tormented by dysentery, had cut away the seats of their fatigues so as not to be

unduly hampered in combat. His "men were pitiful but still a splendid sight," wrote Merrill after the war.

On 18 May the rest of the 89th Regiment and a company of heavy mortars

were flown in. They were followed next day by the 3/42d of the Chinese 14th

Division. Stilwell arrived to watch operations. About noon of the 18th the 150th Regiment of the Chinese 50th Division

was sent toward Myitkyina and, repeating the mishap of the day before, became

confused, fought among themselves, and drove themselves right back out of

the town. In these episodes passed the opportunity of swiftly overrunning

Myitkyina. GALAHAD personnel were now fatigued and riddled with tropical

disease, just as the Chindits were, and no fresh regiment had been provided

from the United States for Myitkyina, on whose capture the JCS had placed

such emphasis. In the strain of these days Merrill suffered another heart attack

and had to be evacuated. An assault on 20 May carried the 150th Regiment to

the railroad yards, but then was stopped by heavy Japanese fire. The 150th, which by this time had taken 671 casualties since the campaign opened, had to

be withdrawn.70

Japanese Build-up at Myitkyina

The Japanese commanders at Myitkyina had been given the mission of

holding there until mid-August. They were soon winning the race to build up 68

 (1) GALAHAD, p. 103. (2) G-2 Roundup, Hq MTF, 15 Jun 44. AG 319.1, NCAC Files, KCRC. This document quotes GALAHAD Force officers to that effect, but the estimate was picked up by Headquarters, Chih Hui Pu, in their G-2 Daily Situation Report 33 of 30 June, and as late as 24 July Brig. Gen. Russell E. Randall, arriving at Myitkyina, was told there were only 500

Japanese there. (3) Rpts 470, 477, 478, JICA, 6 Sep 44. JICA CBI Br, Calcutta, India. OCMH. 69

 (1) GALAHAD, p. 98. (2) Siege of Myitkyina, p. 11. 70

 (1) Siege of Myitkyina, pp. 18-19. (2) Stilwell Diary, 18 May 44.
Map 16
232 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

JAPANESE DEFENSIVE POSITIONS in the railroad yards at Myitkyina.

enough strength to carry out their orders. As early as 1700 on 17 May Colonel

Maruyama had brought the main force of the 1/148th, 56th Division, in across

the Irrawaddy. Other Japanese hurried in at night through the gaps in the

Allied position about the city, so many that by 31 May there were about 2,500

Japanese in Myitkyina plus several hundred sick and wounded. From the 56th

Division on the Salween came the commander of its infantry group, Maj. Gen.

Genzu Mizukami, with his staff, the rest of the 1/148th, and two pieces of

artillery. Assuming command, General Mizukami ordered that Myitkyina hold

for at least three months and the surrounding area for thirty days more to keep

the Chinese and Americans from moving south into central Burma. Control of

Japanese operations at Myitkyina was assumed by 33d Army in early June, and

Tanaka was freed to concentrate on operations around Kamaing.71

Fortunately for the attackers, the Japanese grossly overestimated their

strength, as they seem to have done throughout the North Burma Campaign.

It was thought that the Myitkyina Task Force comprised 30,000 men. The

Japanese knew they inflicted heavy casualties but thought that replacements

71

 (1) Maruyama Interrog. OCMH. (2) Tanaka, Japanese Comments, Sec. III. (3) Japanese

Officers' Comments, p. 19.
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 233

were coming in at a corresponding rate.72 Many of the Japanese sick took their

places in the fortifications that were quickly built and fought with the traditional stubborn valor of their people. Equipped with plenty of machine guns

and mortars, and four mountain guns, they were well dug in, ready to die for

the Emperor. From beginning to end, at least 4,600 Japanese fought at

Myitkyina; the peak strength at any one time may have been 3,500 men. Their

morale was high and it was long before they stopped believing that relief

would soon arrive.73 Indeed, at one time a regimental combat team of the

53d Division under a Colonel Asano was actually under way to relieve

Myitkyina but the Allied advance on Mogaung forced its recall.74

So, this was no handful to be brushed aside, especially not by troops

fatigued by long exertion and privation, whose fire support was initially a

battery of pack howitzers plus what the fighter bombers could do. Perhaps

luckily, these steadily worsening odds were unknown to the attackers. On 19

May Merrill estimated there were two and one-half battalions of Japanese in

Myitkyina plus more coming up from the south. Stilwell's G-2, Colonel

Stilwell, was skeptical. Certainly on the 19th the organizational framework of

two and one-half Japanese battalions was in Myitkyina but the numerical

equivalent of such a force was not.75

Hoping for a quick seizure of the town, which would permit subsequent

operations against the rear of the Japanese forces on the Salween front, Stilwell

briefly considered asking that the British 36th Division be rushed in to take

Myitkyina. Giving no reason in his diary, he decided against this move and

instead resolved to order in some U.S. combat engineers from the Ledo Road.

"I will probably have to use some of our engineer units to keep an American

flavor in the fight," he told Marshall.76

GALAHAD took the suburban village of Charpate, north-northwest of

Myitkyina, and the 88th Regiment extended its lines south to the railway

tracks, which in this area run northwest before turning south to Mogaung.

Unfortunately, K Force did not occupy a small height which dominated

Charpate. M Force took the little settlement of Namkwi without opposition,

in order to shield the Allies against any Japanese attempt to relieve Myitkyina

by an attack from Mogaung. On 21 May the 3d Battalion of GALAHAD was

72

 Maruyama Interrog. OCMH. 73

 (1) GALAHAD, pp. 104-05. (2) PW History. (3) Statement, Sgt Maj Hirose Yutaka, 10

Aug 44. Folder 62J, 161-170. NCAC Files, KCRC. A code clerk, Yutaka was an excellent source

of information on the Japanese side. (4) Maruyama Interrog; Tanaka Interrog. OCMH. (5)

SEATIC Bull 247, pp. 18-19. MID Library. (6) A G-2, Myitkyina Task Force, memorandum,

9 August 1944, estimated that 4,075 Japanese were killed at Myitkyina. These, plus the several

hundred who escaped, come close to Tanaka's figure of 4,600. The garrison commander, Maru- yama, set his strength at 3,500, which can be reconciled with the above if Tanaka's figure is taken as the grand total. The G-2 estimate is in Wessels' File, OCMH. 74

 SEATIC Bull 244, p. 2. MID Library. 75

 Col Stilwell's Diary, 19 May 44. 76

 (1) Stilwell Diary, 22 May 44. (2) Rad CHC 1097, Stilwell to Marshall, 22 May 44. SNF 131.
Allied casualties at Myitkyina Airfield
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 235

ordered by the newly created Headquarters, Myitkyina Task Force, to seize the

auxiliary airstrip north of Myitkyina. Next day, Col. John E. McCammon was

put in command. At his disposal were the 88th and 89th Regiments of the 30th

Division, Gen. Hu Su commanding, an improvised division of the 150th and

the first echelons of the 42d Regiment, under Maj. Gen. Pan Yu-kun of the 50th

Division (who arrived 23 May), the survivors of GALAHAD, the Seagrave Hospital Unit, and the 42d Portable Surgical Hospital.77

 For the occasion, Stilwell,

stretching several points, told McCammon to assume the rank and insignia of

brigadier general and rushed off a recommendation for promotion to the War

Department. McCammon's assignment was a difficult one, doubly so for a man

just out of hospital. Keeping his stars in his pocket, and assisted by Hunter as

executive and commander of GALAHAD, McCammon took up his task.78

McCammon's command was a little island of precariously held territory,

which lay between Mizukami's garrison in Myitkyina and the Japanese forces

to the south, north, and west. Across the Irrawaddy to the east was a small force

of Chindits, Morris Force, with orders to block Japanese traffic from the east,

a task of which it proved incapable. McCammon's forces were completely

dependent on air supply, which in the early weeks kept them in about two

days' reserve supplies.

The main airstrip was tightly held by the 150th Regiment, whose lines

extended toward the Irrawaddy. North of it and to the west were the perimeter

defenses of two GALAHAD combat teams. The 88th and 89th Regiments were

on either side of the tracks of the Myitkyina-Mogaung railway, and the 3d

Battalion of GALAHAD was north of Myitkyina. All units were deployed into

strongpoints organized for all-round defense. There was much patrol activity

during the daylight hours to keep clear the trails over which oxcarts moved

supplies from the airstrip.

Gaps were numerous through which the Japanese could work their way

into Myitkyina, and Mizukami set up a regular ferry service across the

Irrawaddy by which supplies and individual replacements could be brought in.

The terrain was excellent for defense. The roads lay high above the surrounding rice paddies, and each was therefore an earthwall making a first-rate

obstacle. Clumps of trees were all about, and there were plenty of houses on

the outskirts of town which the Japanese used to advantage. The northern part

of the Japanese perimeter was well shielded by a crescent-shaped depression

77

 (1) GALAHAD, p. 106. (2) Siege of Myitkyina, p. 22, and App. (3) Stone MS, pp. 187-89. 78

 (1) Probably McCammon was given this rank to help him command the Chinese. Merrill

recalled suggesting to Stilwell that a Chinese officer be placed in command at Myitkyina. There is no evidence from which to reconstruct Stilwell's intentions, but McCammon's elevation marked

the sixth time Stilwell had used American officers to command Chinese troops in Burma, McCam- mon's predecessors being Boatner, Col. Rothwell Brown, Col. Campbell Brown, Colonel Sliney, and Colonel Dupuy. See Merrill Notes. (2) Notes by Col McCammon on draft MS of this chapter. (3) Ltr, Dupuy to Ward, 12 Sep 52. Colonels Sliney and Dupuy were authorized to give commands to Chinese artillery in Stilwell's name.
236 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

JAPANESE TRENCHES at the outskirts of Myitkyina.

which the monsoon rains quickly turned into a swamp. In effect, the Allies

and the Japanese were committed to position warfare. Though the operation

was called a siege, the Japanese received a steady trickle of supplies and

replacements until Mogaung fell.

The problem facing the Allied command was to overcome the combination

of machine guns and earthworks which had been so effective on the Western

Front in Europe in 1914-18. They would have to do it without tanks, with a

final maximum of fourteen artillery pieces, and with air support (the twelve

P-40's of the 88th Fighter Squadron, ultimately based on the airstrip itself)

which, though devoted and skillful, did not have the weight to drive the

Japanese from their positions. To make matters completely uncomfortable and

further complicated, after mid-May the rains grew steadily worse, which made

air supply very difficult. It was Cassino on a shoestring.

The first phase of the operation was an attempt to occupy the town by

moving in. It was dominated by the belief that Myitkyina was lightly held.

The 3d Battalion, GALAHAD, attacked southward on 21 May, but while still

far from the northern airstrip was forced to dig in at the Mankrin-Radhapur

road junction. That night it was attacked from the rear, or Mogaung, side and

the following day fell back to Charpate. The night of the 23d the Japanese
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 237

struck again, and the tired, fever-ridden men of the 3d Battalion repelled the

attack with difficulty. Another attack came the next morning, and the 3d was

pushed back. These were ominous signs of the shifting balance of strength.

There was yet another in GALAHAD'S evacuation rate, now running between

75 and 100 a day. At this time, from 15 to 30 men a day began to report sick

with symptoms of the lethal mite or scrub typhus, and about 80 percent of

GALAHAD suffered from dysentery in various forms.79

Colonel McCammon's first attempt at a full-dress assault was made on 24

May. The 88th and 89th Regiments were ordered to jump off at 0700 on the

25th and drive through Myitkyina to the riverbank. When the day ended, the

88th Regiment had succeeded in straightening its lines; the record does not

even mention its sister regiment. McCammon, who was in the early stage of

pleurisy, was depressed by the failure, and Stilwell flew in to check the situation.

While he was there, Hunter gave him a letter stating that GALAHAD was being

unfairly treated, and that under Boatner's influence Headquarters, NCAC, was

discriminating against GALAHAD in favor of the Chinese.80 After a brief return

to his headquarters near Shaduzup Stilwell went again to Myitkyina and made

a quick decision, relieving McCammon and replacing him with General

Boatner on 30 May.

While Stilwell was making these command changes, the earlier optimism

was replaced by a brief period of extreme alarm, caused by the rapid disintegration of GALAHAD and the Chindits' evacuation of the block they had placed

across the railway near Hopin. Only twelve men were left in the 2d Battalion of

GALAHAD, while the Chinese 150th Regiment was down to 600 men.81

American reinforcements of any men who could hold a rifle were rushed in

from every possible source. Between 26 May and 1 June, two engineer battalions, a group of replacements for GALAHAD (optimistically assembled as a

battalion), and evacuees of GALAHAD itself were flown in. With the situation

thus steadied and with Stilwell and Chih Hui Pu believing that Myitkyina was

held by only a few hundred Japanese, a plan was made for a co-ordinated

attack by two Chinese regiments plus the survivors of GALAHAD and the 209th

U.S. Engineers. In this operation, which was attempted on 31 May, the 42d

Regiment reached the Waingmaw ferry road. Built up twelve feet above the

neighboring paddy fields, the road gave the Japanese a magnificent defensive

position, which they exploited cleverly. The Chinese recoiled from this natural

fortification but were able to beat off a Japanese counterattack. The 150th Regiment reached the riverbank and drew up in an arc about a sawmill in which

the Japanese had a strongpoint. The 88th and 89th Regiments were not in79

 (1) GALAHAD, p. 106. (2) Siege of Myitkyina, p. 25. (3) Stone MS, p. 190. 80

 (1) Hunter Notes. (2) Boatner Notes. (3) Stilwell's only diary reference of this period to Hunter is for 26 May: "Hunter, Osborne, McGee, Beach—all fine soldiers. Guts, calm, confidence. They ooze it." (4) Ltrs, Boatner to Stilwell, Jun 44. SNF 207. The letters praise Hunter highly. 81

 Stilwell Diary, 30 May 44.
238 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

volved in this attack. The American attempt netted little, and it was apparent

that Myitkyina would not fall at once.82

The night of 31 May the Japanese attacked the 209th Engineer Battalion in

position near Radhapur, north of Myitkyina. After the war Colonel Maruyama

stated that on 30 May he tried to break out with three battalions. General

Tanaka recalled that such an attempt had been planned but canceled. Whatever

the mission of these particular Japanese, there was heavy, close-in fighting on

the Myitkyina side of the engineers' perimeter.83 When the day came, the

Chinese tried again to take Myitkyina but counted their gains in yards. The

236th U.S. Engineer Battalion, which on twenty-four hours' notice had been

taken from its road building and from the operation of gravel and ice plants

and rushed to Myitkyina, was sent to retake Namkwi, west of the auxiliary

airstrip.

The motive behind the 236th's attack of 1 June was to contain the Japanese

in the Namkwi area and introduce the battalion to combat under relatively

easy conditions. One company of the 236th did succeed in entering Namkwi

but instead of promptly consolidating to meet the inevitable Japanese counterattack fell out for a break. The Japanese counterattacked and drove the unwary

engineers right back out of the village.84

Next day, 2 June, the Chinese commenced formal siege operations in the

eighteenth century manner, tunneling toward the Japanese; in the virtual

absence of artillery there was nothing else to do. General Boatner was still

optimistic on 2 June, but after that time the Allied command again feared the

Japanese might yet turn the tables on their attackers. Reinforcing this

impression was the steadily graver aspect of local command problems.85

Command Problems at Myitkyina

The steady deterioration in the physical condition and morale of GALAHAD,

the cumulative effect of the fighting on the strength of Chinese units, the poor

combat performance of the engineers and the GALAHAD replacements, the bad

supply position, and the increasing aggressiveness of the Japanese brought

about a period in which the optimism of a few days before yielded to the fear

that the Japanese might overrun the airstrip and win a major victory. On 20

May the Allied forces had three days' rations on hand, very little mortar ammunition, and only 350 rounds of 75-mm. shells. Six days later nine disabled

transports on the airfield mutely added another reason for the supply pinch.

At the end of May the quartermaster had no U.S. rations, while 40 percent of

the rice and grain rations for the thousands of Burmese, Chinese, and refugees

from Myitkyina was spoiled by dampness. The effect of the supply situation

82

 (1) FO 12, Hq CAMELOT Task Force, 30 May 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. (2) Siege of

Myitkyina, pp. 30-31. 83

 Maruyama Interrog; Tanaka Interrog. OCMH. 84

 (1) Hunter Notes. (2) Siege of Myitkyina, p. 31. 85

 (1) Siege of Myitkyina, pp. 28, 31-32. (2) Stilwell Diary, 2 Jun 44.
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 239

was underscored when the force surgeon asked for some variety in the food

because the American troops were vomiting all but the breakfast part of the

K ration. Attempts were made to control ammunition expenditure, since the

Chinese often seemed extremely wasteful in the use of it. Captured Japanese

weapons were being turned against their former owners. By 1 June the food

supply was set at one day for Americans and two for Chinese. There were now

thirteen damaged transports on the airstrip.86

The GALAHAD situation became obviously critical around 19 or 20 May.

While Stilwell had been ordering the 3d Indian Division kept in Burma over

the protests of its commanders that their men were exhausted, the GALAHAD

evacuation rate had been steadily expanding up to 134 in one day. As set by

Hunter, who had received no directives and had to exercise his own best

judgment, GALAHAD policy required for evacuation a fever of 102 degrees for

three consecutive days, and approval of each case by a board of doctors. This

was a delicate situation.87

Boatner was under a certain handicap in his relations with the American

troops. He knew of Hunter's letter of 27 May, with its charges against him,

charges he felt would not have been made if it had been generally known that

he had been in the United States during most of the campaign. He believed that

GALAHAD enlisted personnel fully endorsed the charges made. After reflection,

he decided that his contacts with GALAHAD and Hunter should be through

his own chief of staff, Col. John P. Willey. A further argument was that Willey

spoke no Chinese, while Boatner knew the language and considered he would

be fully occupied in trying to exercise command over the Chinese, drawn as

they were from three divisions.88

With the growing realization that Myitkyina would not fall quickly, that

the Japanese might take the initiative, Stilwell ordered staff officers in the rear

area to send any GALAHAD personnel fit for duty back to the fight. This order

was in sharp contrast to the men's expectation that after reaching Myitkyina

they would have a long period of recuperation.

General Boatner gave four reasons why this unpleasant and difficult decision

was made:

1. GALAHAD was the only U.S. combat unit in the theater available for the

assault on Myitkyina.

2. The Chinese 88th and 150th Regiments that marched over the Kumon

Range with GALAHAD had had few evacuations for sickness or fatigue in spite

of their heavy casualties.

3. Since early May Stilwell had been resisting heavy pressure to evacuate 3d

Indian Division.

86

 Rpts, Maj Milligan Bethel, G-4, to Lt Col Joseph A. McNerney, Supply and Evacuation Off, G-4, 20 May-1 Jun 44, sub: Supply Rpts. NCAC Files, KCRC. 87

 (1) Memo, Boatner for Col Stanley F. Griswold, 25 Jun 44. Folder, Misc Corresp MTF, NCAC Files, KCRC. (2) GALAHAD Investigation. (3) For Stilwell's authority over the 3d Indian Division, see page 221, above. 88

 Boatner Notes.
240 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

4. The Japanese lines were only 1,500 yards from the airstrip which was the

only base and source of supply.

Stilwell, said Boatner, thought it necessary not to "let the impression be

created that we were withholding U.S. troops from combat in a sector where

as an Allied commander Stilwell was keeping British and Chinese troops in

combat."

 89

The exhaustion of GALAHAD personnel was appearing in combat. When

the Japanese counterattacked at Charpate, 27 May, Colonel McGee's men were

so tired that they kept falling asleep during the engagement. McGee himself

fainted three times during the battle but with iron determination commanded

his battalion from the aid station. McGee asked that his unit be relieved.90

Meanwhile, in the rear areas efforts were being made to round up GALAHAD

evacuees who were fit for combat. Extremely heavy moral pressure, just short

of outright orders, was placed on medical officers to return to duty or keep in

the line every American who could pull a trigger. In one group of 200 men

sent to Myitkyina many were not fit for duty, and ten were immediately

re-evacuated. This incident, plus the fact that still more GALAHAD survivors

were actually ill with malaria and dysentery, seemed to mark the exhaustion

of the moral as well as the physical reserves of GALAHAD. Summarizing this

unhappy episode, the inspector general wrote that the plans and assumptions

of the War Department plus unauthorized statements reached the enlisted men

and junior officers of GALAHAD as promises of what was in store. These never

materialized and, coupled with "the physical deterioration of the unit, after

months of arduous jungle combat and culminating in a rapidly growing feeling

that hospitalization procedures were not being carried out, resulted about

June 1st 1944 in almost complete breakdown of morale in the major portion

of the unit."

 91

 However, it should be noted that six Distinguished Service

Crosses went to GALAHAD veterans during the siege and GALAHAD itself was

awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation.

By 4 June, GALAHAD casualties were:

Casualty Number

Deaths.......................................................... 93

Nonbattle deaths................................................. 30

Wounded ....................................................... 293

Missing......................................................... 8

Amoebic dysentery ............................................... 503

Scrub typhus .................................................... 149

Malaria ......................................................... 296

Psychoneurosis................................................... 72

Miscellaneous..................................................... 950

89

 (1) Memo cited n. 87(1). (2) GALAHAD Investigation. 90

 GALAHAD, p. 108. 91

 GALAHAD Investigation, p. 3.
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 241

Figures for wounded in action are deceptively low because minor cases were

treated in the unit. This is also true of malaria, which in many cases was not

approved as a cause of evacuation. Other figures represent men actually evacuated. The average loss of weight per man was estimated at thirty-five pounds.

It was observed that chlorinating water with the means available for individuals

or small groups offered little protection against amoebiasis. The circumstances

were different with respect to malaria; the men could have taken atebrin. The

general appearance of malaria at Myitkyina meant a breakdown in morale.92

The engineers rushed to Myitkyina from their rear-area duties were no

substitute for the trained, organized, and experienced GALAHAD combat teams.

Their performance and that of the GALAHAD replacements who began to

arrive was what might be expected from raw troops not acquainted with each

other or their leaders. Following an incident in which a company of the 209th

Engineers broke and ran after being ambushed by a small force of Japanese, the

209th's companies were sandwiched between the GALAHAD units. Stilwell told

Marshall that the engineers ran on several occasions, "incidentally abandoning

wounded." On 8 June, the 209th and 236th were grouped as a provisional

regiment and, once shaken down, fought with great credit to themselves and

their corps.93

The GALAHAD "replacements" had greater potentialities than the engineers,

for the latter had not seen a rifle since their basic training days and had simply

been taken from their bulldozers and power generators to fight as infantry

combat teams. As of 28 May about 2,600 replacements were in India. Stilwell

ordered them rushed into action, for he feared that the Chindits' withdrawal

from the block they had put across the railway near Hopin would bring down

the Japanese in force. The War Department's opinion in October 1943 had

been that refilling GALAHAD by individual replacements would be impracticable. Instead, the War Department proposed to form new units in the United

States and ship them out intact. When they arrived in the theater, GALAHAD

veterans were to be assigned to key posts in the new units.

At Fort George G. Meade, Md., the replacements were set up (on the "four

platoons to a company" basis) as an infantry regiment less headquarters and

headquarters staff. The War Department intention behind this preliminary

step was apparently never made clear to the lower administrative echelons, for

the battalions and companies were never activated nor allowed to function as

such.

From the text of the call for volunteers that brought many men into the

body of replacements, many believed their destination to be Burma. Because of

the imminence of combat the advisability of letting the ad hoc companies

92

 Stone MS, pp. 197-98. 93

 (1) Rad CHC 1216, Stilwell to Marshall, 22 Jun 44. SNF 131. (2) Ltrs, Boatner to Stilwell, 3, 5, 7, 12, 14, 15 Jun 44. Folder, Misc Corresp MTF, NCAC Files, KCRC. (3) Leslie Anders, The Engineers at Myitkyina, MS. Engineer Hist Sec.
242 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

formed for shipping purposes function as bona fide infantry companies was

several times called to the attention of proper authority by individual officers at

Fort Meade, at the port of embarkation, and even on the transport, but the

several headquarters would not concur. For its part, theater headquarters in

May 1944 was unaware of these points.94

Of the 2,600 replacements, 400 formed two quartermaster pack trains. The

rest were mostly infantrymen, with some artillerymen. There was a generous

seasoning of experienced commissioned and noncommissioned officers who

had volunteered from the permanent cadre of the several replacement centers.

On arrival at Bombay on 25 May, the men were speeded by train to

Ramgarh. After an average stay of about one week (for some men were at once

flown to Myitkyina as individual replacements), the men were hastily formed

into two battalions, flown to Myitkyina, and placed in combat as the "New

GALAHAD." Unfortunately, filling the Table of Organization spaces of a battalion with men does not produce a fighting team until the men have had a

period of training together. The commanders at Myitkyina took what corrective

measures they could. Three battalions were formed of the survivors of the old

GALAHAD and the newcomers. Boatner listed them as the 1st GALAHAD (old),

2d GALAHAD (new), 3d GALAHAD (new). Officers and men were freely

exchanged among the battalions to spread the hard-won experience of the

GALAHAD veterans. The resulting strengths were: 1st Battalion, about 300

men; 2d, about 950; 3d, about 950.95

A training program was also set up. Lessons were given in the intervals

between combat. The men were also sent to the Namkwi area to shoot at live

targets:". . . the Japanese disposition there remained defensive and the replacements could be disengaged without being pursued. 9 6

 The shock of an introduction to combat under the conditions then prevailing at Myitkyina produced

about fifty psychopathic cases among the replacements, and some of the officers

were unfit.97

As a result of these circumstances, Boatner told Stilwell on 15 June:

Reports continue to indicate the complete disorganization and fear in U.S. units. They

are in many cases simply terrified of the Japs. We can expect time, experience, and casualties

to reduce their strength but make those that remain better soldiers. From GALAHAD'S rear

[echelon] in Dinjan I hear that 250 of Old GALAHAD men are being equipped and will be

flown back today. They will be of tremendous help. Rumor has it that they were moving

around the countryside and many AWOL's. Col. Osborne just saw me and spoke most

earnestly about how he felt these men are malingering and wants to go back to get a few

more officers and many men back here. If Hunter OK's I will send him back. On the face 94

 (1) Rad WAR 3495, Marshall to Stilwell, 2 Oct 43. Item 1056, Bk 4, JWS Personal File.

(2) Statement, Maj George L. Converse, 10 Jan 49. Major Converse was a member of the replace- ment shipment. (3) Rad CRA 4407, Sultan to Stilwell, 27 May 44. Item 185, Bk 6A, JWS

Personal File. 95

 Ltrs, Boatner to Stilwell, 7 Jun, 10 Jun, 44. SNF 207. These letters tell of the reorganizing

process of GALAHAD. 96

 (1) Siege of Myitkyina, pp. 31-35. (2) Statement by Converse cited n. 94(2). 97

 Rad CHC 1216 cited n. 93(1).
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 243

of it it might appear that we have plenty here on the field for protection. Such is not actually

the case—we in fact have only a prayer.98

Great though the endurance and devotion of the Chinese were, the steady

drain of casualties was reducing their strength to dangerously low levels. This

situation was called to General Boatner's attention on 7 June by the commanders of the 30th and 50th Divisions, who pointed out that the 150th and

89th Regiments mustered between them only 1,000 men. The 88th and 42d

could each find only one battalion for an attack. The accuracy of their statements was confirmed by an American liaison officer, who reported that the

regiment to which he was attached was down to 481 officers and men. Boatner

relayed this information to Stilwell, adding that the Chinese troops were taking

casualties (121 on a comparatively quiet day) while he was trying to make the

raw Americans battleworthy. Obviously, the two engineer battalions and the

GALAHAD replacements represented the margin of numerical superiority over

the Japanese garrison of Myitkyina. But because of the fixed belief that there

were only 500 Japanese in Myitkyina the full import of this was not realized;

nonetheless, there was disquietude.99

Across the Irrawaddy from Myitkyina was a group of Chindits, Morris

Force, that had been attached to Boatner's headquarters. Its experiences had

paralleled those of GALAHAD and its companions of the 3d Indian Division,

and like them it was disintegrating from the cumulative strains of the campaign. Commanded by Brigadier G. R. Morris, these 1,300 men were originally

ordered to cut the Japanese line of communications via Bhamo to Myitkyina.

On 25 May the orders were changed to clearing the Japanese from the east

bank of the Irrawaddy opposite Myitkyina. The Japanese garrison in Waingmaw

was a reinforced company, the terrain was flooded, and Morris's men were

tired. Boatner welcomed them enthusiastically: ". . . really believe you are just

in time for the kill." Morris did not take Waingmaw, and Boatner found it

increasingly difficult to keep in touch with his headquarters.

The tone of Boatner's communications grew ever stronger as he told Morris

that Mountbatten had ordered Myitkyina taken at all costs, which meant

having casualties in the effort. Eleven days later, on 14 June, Boatner told

Morris that the situation was "precarious," that Morris was to attack any way

he chose so long as it was promptly. Morris's replies then began to come

through. He explained that except for a few avenues of approach, well covered

by Japanese machine guns, the country was flooded chest high. His men were

wasting away at the rate of one third of a platoon a day, were exhausted, and

were falling asleep under Japanese fire.

98

 Ltr, Boatner to Stilwell, 15 Jun 44. SNF 207. 99

 Ltr, Gens Hu Su (30th Div) and Yu Pan-kum (50th Div) to CG, MTF, 7 Jun 44, sub: Recommendations for Opns (Urgent); Ltr, Gen Hu to CG, MTF, 7 Jun 44, sub: Rpt; Ltr, Boatner to Stilwell, 8 Jun 44; Ltr, Maj Edward H. S. Wilkie, Jr., to CG, MTF, 8 Jun 44. Folder, Misc Corresp MTF, NCAC Files, KCRC.
244 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

By 14 July Morris had only three platoons left, and Lentaigne asked for his

evacuation. Chih Hui Pu objected, saying Morris could still make an offensive

effort. A week later Lentaigne asked ironically if Morris Force could be evacuated when it was down to 25 officers and other ranks from the 1,301 it had on

19 May. Stilwell approved.100

The Attacks of Mid-June 1944

Coming to a head almost simultaneously, these difficulties and dangers

made General Boatner's position unenviable. Airborne assault and LRPG warfare have the vices of their virtues, among them that the attacker cannot fall

back and reorganize for a second try. Victory is the only solution to his problems. There were days in which a banzai charge by General Mizukami's

garrison or a determined push by the 53d Division (which had once been ordered

to send a regiment and lift the siege) would in all probability have swept right

over the airstrip. Even fairly accurate artillery practice by Mizukami's four

75-mm. pieces, at about 2,500 yards' range, could have destroyed transports at

a rate to make supply prohibitively expensive, while Boatner's headquarters

itself was only a mile from the Japanese lines.

Boatner made one more attack on 3 June with the 42d and 150th Regiments

plus the 1/89th. The two regiments took 320 casualties, but putting a good

face on matters, Boatner reported to Stilwell that if he had had air support

about noon he could have taken the town. Because of the Chinese casualties,

the fall of his 75-mm. ammunition stock to 600 rounds, and his .303 and belted

.30-caliber to one day's supply, Boatner reported that he would hold back until

his supplies were built up. He reaffirmed his position a few days later, saying

that the lack of an immediate Japanese threat, the need to cut Chinese casualties and to train U.S. troops inclined him to wait a few days more. He thought

that the Japanese garrison was in bad condition.101

100

 (1) Ltr, Hq Chih Hui Pu to CofS, 3d Ind Div, 16 Jan 44, sub: Addition to Dir for CG, 3d

Ind Div; Ltr, Hq Chih Hui Pu to CG, 3d Ind Div, 25 May 44, sub: Dir to CG, 3d Ind Div. Folder, Memos and Opnal Instr, CAI NCAC, 3d Ind Div, Jan-May 44, NCAC Files, KCRC. (2)

Ltr, Boatner to CO, Morris Force, 1 Jun 44, sub: Orders; Ltr, Boatner to Morris, 3 Jun 44, sub: Orders; Ltr, Boatner to CO, Morris Force, 7 Jun 44, sub: Orders; Rad M329, Boatner to Morris,

14 Jun 44. Folder, Orders MTF, 3d Ind Div, Jun 44, NCAC Files, KCRC. (3) Ltr, Boatner to Morris, 2 Jun 44; Rad M333, Boatner to Morris, 14 Jun 44; Rad, Boatner to Morris, 14 Jun 44;

Rad, Morris to Boatner, 14 Jun 44; Rad 49, Col to AMITY, 3d Ind Div, and KKO, 14 Jun 44; Rad, Wallace to Boatner, 14 Jun 44. Folder, Rads Wallace-Boatner, Morris Task Force, Jun 44, NCAC

Files, KCRC. (4) Ltr, Boatner to Stilwell, 6 Jun 44. Folder, Misc Corresp MTF, NCAC Files, KCRC. (5) Ltr, Morris to GO Commanding, Myitkyina, and 3d Ind Div, 2 Jul 44; Ltr 2/2/G, Lentaigne to Advance Hq CAI, 14 Jul 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. (6) Ltr, Hq Chih Hui Pu to CG, 3d Ind Div, 20 Jul 44, sub: Relief of Morris Force by Haswell Force; Ltr 7/4/G, Lentaigne to Advance Hq CAI, 20 Jul 44; Ltr, Hq CAI to CG, 3d Ind Div, 21 Jul 44, sub: Status of Comd, Morris Force and 26 Column. Folder, Radios—3d Ind Div, NCAC Files, KCRC. (7) Statement, Sgt Suyeyoshi Tokuda, Myitkyina PW Rpts. PW History. 101

 Ltrs, Boatner to Stilwell, 3, 4, 5 Jun 44. Folder, Misc Corresp MTF, NCAC Files, KCRC.
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 245

During the next few days the Allies pecked away at the Japanese lines,

while the staff prepared orders for an attack on 10 June. This operation called

for the 150th Regiment to take Japanese positions in the railroad yard running

due east from the engine shed; the 42d Regiment would go to the Irrawaddy;

and the 89th Regiment, which had a zone twice that of the 42d and 150th

together, would attack directly toward the river. Chinese units, lying west and

south of Myitkyina, were to move northeast into the town, then wheel east and

drive to the river. The Americans to the north would attack southwards. On

the south side of the city was the bulk of the infantry, but the mass of the

artillery supported the 30th Division (88th and 89th Regiments). Artillery

was arriving by air now. Two batteries plus one platoon of 75-mm. howitzers;

two 105-mm., and two 155-mm. howitzers, were ultimately present. All except

two pieces with GALAHAD were kept under headquarters control. During the

siege they fired 600 tons of ammunition, very rarely with massed fire.102

The attack jumped off as scheduled. Flying over the battlefield on 14 June,

Boatner reported to Stilwell that he did not see much "effort" being made,

though he found the scene a beehive of industry compared with the last week.

On the ground matters seemed lively enough at the infantry's level. On 13 June

the Japanese hit a platoon of K Company, New GALAHAD, so hard that the

company broke and re-formed on the L Company line. The portion of the

Japanese thrust that hit the perimeter next to the river made most of the men

"take off," but two stayed in place and repelled the Japanese with an automatic

rifle and a machine gun. To the west of this little break the Japanese worked

their way in close but were stopped by grenades and small arms fire.103

In the course of the action between 13 and 16 June, a number of men in the

small U.S. contingent distinguished themselves by their extraordinary bravery.

Lt. Col. William H. Combs, who had been liaison officer with the Chinese

150th Regiment, died of wounds received while attempting to warn units of

the 209th Engineers against a Japanese ambush. Pvt. Howard T. Smith took

command of his platoon when the platoon leader was killed and the attack

stalled by a Japanese pillbox. Smith assaulted the pillbox singlehanded and

silenced it with hand grenades. Pfc. Willard J. D. Lilly destroyed an enemy

machine gun firing into his own machine gun position. While under fire 1st Lt.

Melvin D. Blair rescued wounded and silenced an enemy machine gun. Smith,

Lilly, and Blair were veterans of GALAHAD. When his company was pinned

down by machine gun fire, T/Sgt. Richard E. Roe of the New GALAHAD

crawled forward and at the cost of his own life grenaded a Japanese machine

gun that was causing heavy casualties. Fatally wounded, he gave his life to save

102

 FO 14, MTF; Memo, Col Laughlin, 12 Aug 44, sub: Rpt on Artillery. NCAC Files, KCRC. 103

 (1) Ltr, Boatner to Stilwell, 14 Jun 44, SNF 207. (2) Rpt, Hunter, 13 Jun 44. Folder, Misc Corresp MTF, NCAC Files, KCRC. (3) For his valor on this occasion, Staff Sgt. Alvin O. Miller

of the 209th Engineers received the Distinguished Service Cross. GO 99, Hq USAF CBI, 17

Aug 44.
Artillery in action at Myitkyina. Above, the Chinese crew of a

105-mm. howitzer and below, a 75-mm. pack howitzer's GALAHAD crew firing on

Japanese positions.
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 247

his friends. Sgt. Fred N. Coleman of the 236th Engineers threw himself on a

Japanese grenade, and saved two comrades.104

Despite these efforts and setbacks the impression persisted that Myitkyina

was lightly held, with the Myitkyina Task Force G-2 Roundup circulating an

estimate by "GALAHAD officers" that the besiegers faced only 500 Japanese, the

remnants of two battalions.105

As a result of the attack, the 3d Battalion, GALAHAD, by 17 June, had cut

the Maingna ferry road and reached the Irrawaddy north of Myitkyina. The

150th Regiment in the same period finally took the sawmill and gained 200

yards, using flame throwers. The 88th Regiment gained 100 yards from positions in the old rifle range area of the Burma Frontier Force barracks. The

principal gain for the Americans was the capture of the Myitkyina-MogaungSumprabum road junction. The gains were not in proportion to the effort

expended, and Stilwell ordered the end of all infantry attacks. Boatner replied

that he would stop attacking Japanese positions until ". . . our troops are

steadied and a favorable opportunity presents itself."

 106

There was reason for the troops to need steadying. A and B companies,

209th Engineers, were cut off from their main body by infiltrating Japanese.

Trying to close in on them, Company C and Headquarters and Service Companies were in turn halted by Japanese. The condition of A and B Companies

became critical during 14 June, for they had only one meal with them. Two of

their men managed to work their way back to the block on the Sumprabum

Road with news of their plight, but enemy small arms fire prevented airdrops.

The isolated companies finally made their way back in small groups to the rest

of the battalion over 15 and 16 June. The 3d Battalion of GALAHAD reported

trouble in effecting reorganization and enforcing orders.107

The Americans were not alone in their problems. Two companies of the

Chinese 2/42d which had made a small penetration into the Japanese lines on

14 June were wiped out by counterattack that night. These setbacks emphasized the nature of the Myitkyina fighting. The Allies held a ring of battalion

and regimental strongpoints enclosing a similar Japanese system. Though the

Allied strongpoints were close enough for the troops in one to sortie to the aid

of another should that be needed, they were not so close that interlocking fire

could be put down to close the gaps. Consequently, there was plenty of room

for maneuver and ambush, and the inexperienced engineers and New GALAHAD

troops often suffered at the hands of General Mizukami's veterans.108

104

 These men, among others, received the Distinguished Service Cross. For the leadership, professional skill, and valor he repeatedly displayed during the early days of the operation, Colonel

Combs was posthumously awarded an Oak Leaf Cluster to the DSC. GO's 137, 78, 48, 131, Hq

USAF CBI, 20 Oct, 20 Jul, 21 Dec, 12 Oct 44. 105

 G-2 Roundup cited n. 68(2). 106

 Ltrs, Boatner to Stilwell, 10 Jun 44; G-3 Per Rpts, Hq Chih Hui Pu, 13, 20 Jun 44. NCAC

Files, KCRC. 107

 Siege of Myitkyina, pp. 46-51. 108

 Siege of Myitkyina, p. 48.
248 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

On 18 June Headquarters, Myitkyina Task Force, directed that, for the time

being, tunneling would be used to close with the enemy. Patrol skirmishes

continued, and energetic regimental and battalion commanders were occasionally able to carve out small gains, always against strong Japanese resistance. In

one of the patrol clashes of this period, Pfc. George C. Presterly of the Engineers won the Distinguished Service Cross by a lone assault on a Japanese

strongpoint. Moving out ahead of his patrol, he continued firing and advancing,

drawing all the Japanese fire from his patrol. Even after being mortally

wounded, Presterly continued his charge.109

On 18 June Stilwell made another quick trip to Myitkyina. Boatner had

reported that "U.S. troops are shaky," possibly referring to the incident involving the 3d Battalion of GALAHAD. Stilwell visited the lines at or opposite

Charpate, Sitapur, and Mankrin. After discussing the situation with Colonel

Hunter, now commanding the American forces under Boatner, Stilwell concluded that the "men looked good," that the picture Boatner had painted was

"not nearly that bad." Chih Hui Pu G-2 on 30 June was still reporting only

500 Japanese in Myitkyina and undoubtedly thought so a few days before.

Stilwell was also of the opinion that Boatner should have spent more of his

time with the troops. Adding these factors together, Stilwell ordered Brig. Gen.

Theodore F. Wessels to fly from SEAC headquarters to Myitkyina.110

Changes in Command

After General Wessels arrived, he spent about a week looking over the

situation while Stilwell debated Boatner's relief. On 25 June Boatner had a

severe recurrence of the malaria that had troubled him earlier in the campaign,

and this made inevitable a change in command.111 After a brief stay in the

hospital, Boatner returned to duty as Commanding General, Northern Combat

Area Command.

Boatner's successor, General Wessels, had been on the staff of the Infantry

School at Fort Benning, Ga., when he was sent to CBI as a part of Stilwell's

plans for training the Chinese Army. When it finally became apparent that the

Chinese did not accept these plans to an extent that would occupy all of the

2,213 officers and men sent to CBI to train the Second Thirty Divisions in east

China, Wessels was sent to SEAC headquarters.

The billet Wessels took over on 26 June was an uncomfortable one, but the

situation began to improve the day after he assumed command. Mogaung fell,

and the Chinese forces from the Mogaung valley began moving up the railroad

to connect with Wessels' forces. This was a great gift of fortune. It removed the

109

 GO 111, Hq USF IBT, 5 Jun 45, par. I. 110

 (1) Stilwell Diary, 13, 15, 17, 24 Jun 44. (2) The Stilwell Papers, pp. 304-06. (3) Daily

Sitrep 33, Chih Hui Pu, 30 Jun. NCAC Files, KCRC. 111

 The Stilwell Papers, p. 306.
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 249

GENERAL STILWELL AND COLONEL HUNTER talk to the leader of a patrol

which has returned from Myitkyina.

recurrent menace of a Japanese drive from Mogaung, guaranteed reinforcements

and the opening of a ground line of communications, and meant that Wessels'

men, instead of being an island in a hostile sea open to attack from 360°, could

concentrate their attention on the Japanese to their front. Moreover, General

Mizukami and his men lost one of the two bases (the other was Bhamo) from

which supplies had trickled in to the Japanese. Wessels made a point of visiting

each unit, talking with the men and trying to instill confidence and raise

morale.112 Under orders from Stilwell, Hunter on 29 June was placed in

command of all U.S. troops at Myitkyina.

Stilwell left Wessels a problem resulting from one of Stilwell's rare interventions in the siege. After a conference with Hunter he personally ordered

that a Chinese battalion of at least 400 men be sent to penetrate through the

Japanese positions to Sitapur roughly on a southeast azimuth, cutting off the

Japanese to the north from Myitkyina proper. The 1st Battalion, 42d Regiment,

of about 250 men, made a very considerable advance over 28 and 29 June. It

drove deep into the Japanese defense system, leading Stilwell to hope this was

112

 (1) Interv with Wessels, 19 Jul 48. OCMH. (2) History of India-Burma Theater, 1944- 1945, I, 55. OCMH.
250 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

the turning point; on receiving Japanese fire, it halted and dug in. Air supply

was necessary. Since Stilwell had given Wessels personal orders to support the

battalion, Company F of the 2d Battalion, New GALAHAD, was ordered to

join the 1/42d.

F Company, unaware it had lost its way and under an inexperienced

commander, proceeded with a small point almost directly ahead of the marching column. The company commander at the head of the point met a small

group of Orientals whom he took to be Chinese and who greeted him affably.

The strangers then suggested he and his party lay aside their guns. At this

point the commander realized that he had been ambushed and gave the alarm.

The Japanese machine guns opened on his trapped column, inflicting heavy

casualties. Some of his men made their way back to the Allied lines, but the

company was never reconstituted and was broken up and distributed among

the rest of GALAHAD. For his constant gallantry during a stubborn eight-hour

rear-guard action, which permitted the survivors to extricate themselves from

ambush, Pfc. Anthony Firenze of New GALAHAD received the Distinguished

Service Cross. On 2 July reports came of the approach of a strong Japanese

force from the north. Despite Stilwell's orders concerning the 1/42d, Wessels

thought his lines too thin and pulled back the 1/42d, to strengthen himself

toward the north.113

Hacking Out Small Gains

The only gains in the week of 25 June-2 July were a few hundred yards

taken by the 150th Regiment and the 236th Engineers. Monsoon rains, low

visibility, and high water turned much of the terrain into a swamp in which

men crawled, stumbled, waded, slipped, fell, and sometimes died. The few

hundred yards that looked so small on the map were an immense distance to

the men who had to crawl them under Japanese fire and keep them by beating

off the inevitable Japanese counterattack.114 Seen in retrospect, the prospect

appears to have brightened slowly in the next few weeks. With every passing

day experience improved the quality of the troops after the first shocks wore

off. A training program was instituted on 7 July. Units in reserve were taught

for eight hours daily; those in contact with the enemy trained four. The 3/88th

and 1/89th were put in reserve to prepare for a set-piece attack, to capture a

stretch of the Sumprabum Road.115

Wessels' first attempt at a major attack was made on 12 July. It was a

co-ordinated attack with the small amount of air support obtainable. Arranging

113

 (1) Siege of Myitkyina, pages 67-71, treats the episode very cautiously. (2) Wessels Interv cited n. 112(1). (3) Stilwell Diary, 29 Jun, 1, 2 Jul 44. (4) GO 131, Hq USAF CBI, 12 Oct 44. (5) A letter, Wessels to Ward, 3 October 1951, has as an inclosure a most interesting letter, 10

July 1944, by the liaison officer with the battalion, Capt. Paul L. Tobey. OCMH. 114

 G-3 Wkly Per Rpt, Hq MTF, 25 Jun-2 Jul 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. 115

 G-3 Per Rpts, Hq MTF, 2-9 Jul 44; FO 17, Hq MTF, 11 Jul 44. NCAC Files, KCRC.
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 251

this latter took time, and while the process was under way, a radio came from

Stilwell: when is the attack of the 12th going to be made? A staff officer drew

Wessels' attention to the hint in the radio, which he had missed, and the attack

plan was hastily completed. Maj. Gen. Howard C. Davidson of the Tenth Air

Force, who was consistently helpful and co-operative, on his own initiative

arranged a bombing by thirty-nine B-25's.

There was further support from the 88th Fighter Squadron. It gave 80

percent of the fighter-bomber support at Myitkyina and was commanded by an

officer who made a point of examining prospective targets from the front lines

and consistently went beyond the call of duty in his efforts to give the infantry

effective close-in support. From the beginning to the end of the siege, the Air

Forces dropped 754 tons of bombs, or 20 percent more than the artillery

effort.116

The attack on 12 July did not succeed. The intent was to have units in

forward positions fall back while the bombing was done to avoid casualties

from shorts, then advance immediately after. Air-ground liaison was ineffective;

the B-25's underestimated the bomb safety line, and 40 percent of their bomb

loads fell among the American troops north of Sitapur, causing some casualties

and quite a bit of confusion. The gains by the 88th and 89th Regiments were

again measured in hundreds of yards, and the attack simply petered out. However, the series of attacks made since 17 May had its cumulative effect. The

Allied lines were steadily constricting around Myitkyina. Units once separated

by intervals through which Japanese seemed to slip at will were now in close

contact. Of the Japanese garrison, 790 were dead and 1,180 wounded by

mid-July.117

When the attempt at a co-ordinated attack bogged down, Wessels' men

went back to their patient day-by-day advances, driving back the Japanese to

their immediate front. On 21 July, in one of the patrol clashes that erupted now

and again around the Allied strongpoints, Pfc. Marvin H. Dean, a GALAHAD

veteran, won the Distinguished Service Cross for taking out a Japanese machine

gun position that had stopped the patrol for which he was the lead scout.118

Stilwell came back on the 23d to check progress. The 149th Regiment joined

the 50th Division on 24 July and took its place in line relieving portions of the

42d and 150th Regiments. Next day the 1/90th took over a quiet sector. These

were substantial reinforcements. A day before they arrived, the first clear indications came that the Japanese were relaxing their grip on Myitkyina. Eight

rafts and a boat laden with Japanese were attacked on the Irrawaddy by Kachins

of the OSS Detachment 101. Twenty-four Japanese were killed, two captured,

116

 (1) Wessels Interv cited n. 112(1). (2) JICA CBI Rpts 470, 477, 484, 6 Sep 44, sub: Air Support on Capture of Myitkyina. OCMH. 117

 (1) Maruyama Interrog; Interrog, Gen Honda, CG, 33d Army, 9 Jan 48. OCMH. (2) Siege

of Myitkyina, pp. 84-85. (3) G-3 Per Rpt, Hq MTF, 9-16Jul 44. NCAC Files, KCRC. (4) PW

History. 118

 GO 131, Hq USAF CBI, 12 Oct 44.
252 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

and then it was learned these were hospital patients fleeing Myitkyina. Three

more Japanese seized by friendly Burmans revealed that hospital patients were

being evacuated by the simple expedient of letting them drift down the river

on rafts.119

On 26 and 27 July the 3d Battalion, New GALAHAD, waded across the

crescent-shaped swale which had effectively protected the Japanese positions to

the north and was finally on the northern airstrip which Mizukami's men had

held so long. The 209th and 236th Engineer Battalions, which had now taken

as heavy casualties as any American units in any theater (the former, 41 percent), were pulled out of line and put to defending the airstrip. In the last

week of July the daily gains began to stretch out, and since the area held by the

Japanese was steadily shrinking, began to reach deeper into their vitals. Japanese counterattacks were no longer so dynamic, the positions captured from

the enemy were no longer so well made, and many Japanese dead were found

to be badly wounded men returned to the line. As July ended, gains of several

hundred yards a day were frequent, though still costly. On the 28th, GALAHAD

veterans T/5 Russell G. Wellman and Pfc. Herman Manuel teamed to rescue a

wounded comrade from under "intense enemy machine gun and rifle fire."

Though they were wounded, Manuel and Wellman succeeded in their gallant

attempt, and won the Distinguished Service Cross.120

One of the siege's command problems was uncontrolled and seemingly

uncontrollable fire by the Chinese. With all ammunition coming in by air,

every wasted round was to be deplored, yet time and again Chinese units let fly

with all they had, and in every direction. The night of 30 July apparently was

especially memorable in this regard, and General Wessels ordered an investigation. In one Chinese battalion alone, ten men were wounded by this wild firing.

And one Chinese interpreter, though not classed as among the most reliable,

stated that the 89th Regiment was so angered by the firing that "it was ready

at any time to take on the 41st!" The report concluded:

4. All of the above-listed Liaison Officers are willing to testify, under oath, that their

lives were endangered by the throwing of hand grenades and by firing of automatic weapons

going in 3 directions, over and near their positions during the night; that the throwing of

hand grenades and firing was done by the Chinese.121

The Last Days

Within Myitkyina, General Mizukami made his last decisions. At the end

of July, Colonel Maruyama requested that his regiment be withdrawn. Mizu119

 Siege of Myitkyina, pp. 105-09. 120

 GO 131, Hq USAF CBI, 12 Oct 44. 121

 Ltr, Col Laughlin, ACofS, G-3, MTF, to Wessels, 31 Jul 44, sub: Rpt of Firing During

Night 30-31 July. Wessels File, OCMH.
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 253

kami's intention had been to fight to the last, but he agreed. Instructions were

issued accordingly, and Mizukami, having done his duty as a soldier, made his

apology to his Emperor and committed suicide on 1 August.122 This was, of

course, unknown to Wessels' headquarters, but the weakening of Japanese

resistance had become ever more obvious. Attacks on the 29th, 30th, and 31st

made ever deeper advances into the Japanese lines. Capts. Shields A. Brubeck

and John J. Dunn and 1st Lt. Donald W. Delorey, all of New GALAHAD, led

their units during these days with valor that brought them the Distinguished

Service Cross.123

Weighing the many evidences that control of the situation was rapidly

passing into their hands, Wessels and his colleagues drafted a new plan of

attack. It included an ingenious device, credited to General Pan Yu-kun of the

50th Division. A raiding party, formed into fifteen heavily armed sections, was

organized and briefed on infiltrating Japanese lines facing the 50th Division.

Having made its way through the Japanese lines in darkness, it was to remain

hidden until 0430 when the 50th would assault while the raiders spread confusion behind the Japanese lines. Meanwhile, air reconnaissance revealed many

rafts moored against the Irrawaddy within the Japanese lines.124

"At 0300 hours (3 August), when the moon went down and rain and

thunder set in, the raiding party of the 50th Division moved out. The approach

was detected only once and some shots were fired at the raiders, who hit the

ground. The Chinese did not return fire however, and after laying low for a

while, moved out again quietly and cautiously." Later the 50th Division

attacked and, thanks to the efforts of the raiders and the preliminary stages of

the Japanese evacuation, made rapid progress. The attack spread rapidly up the

Allied line as regiment after regiment moved forward with comparative speed.

Resistance by the Japanese rear guards was speedily overcome and at 1545,

3 August, Myitkyina was officially called secure. One hundred eighty-seven

Japanese prisoners were taken, most of them patients. Colonel Maruyama made

good his withdrawal with about 600 men.125

The direct cost of Myitkyina to the Allies was:

Killed Wounded Sick

Chinese ........................ 972 3,184 188

American....................... 272 955 980

Some of the Chinese shown as killed may well have been among the deserters

who after the war created something of a problem in the Myitkyina area; others

probably perished in the fighting among Chinese units during the first confused

122

 Japanese Officers' Comments, Incl 6, Col Masanobu Tsuji. Mizukami's adjutant was among

those evacuated, and reported later to Colonel Tsuji. 123

 (1) GO 131, Hq USAF CBI, 12 Oct 44. (2) GO 141, Hq USAF CBI, 24 Oct 44. 124

 Siege of Myitkyina, pp. 128-29. 125

 (1) PW History. (2) Tanaka Interrog. OCMH. (3) Siege of Myitkyina, pp. 130-32.
254 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

attempts to take Myitkyina. Of the U.S. sick, 570 were from GALAHAD;126 even

so, the discrepancy between the Chinese and American figures shows the virtues

of the Chinese insistence on drinking only boiled water and eating only cooked

food, as well as the very considerable resistance of the Chinese to a

contaminated environment.

The attack had been costly in suffering and losses, but the MogaungMyitkyina area in Allied hands was a great prize and marked an achievement

of which the end of the fighting at Myitkyina was the outward and visible

symbol. In the first instance, it helped increase Hump deliveries to China. As

the fighting moved ever southward down the Hukawng and Mogaung valleys,

it became safer for ATC transports to use the lower and more southerly routes

to China. When Stilwell's men stood on the main airstrip at Myitkyina on

17 May 1944, the wider, southern route over lower terrain was a reality. Almost

simultaneously with the taking of the airstrip the India-China Wing of ATC

began to reap the benefits of better maintenance and a steadily increasing allotment of aircraft. The combination of more and better transports, better maintained, flying a shorter, lower, safer route was a potent one, and was speedily

reflected in the Hump tonnage deliveries,127 which rose from 13,686 tons in

May to 18,235 tons in June, and 25,454 tons in July. (See Chart 5.) That in the

months to come Hump tonnage would be of such an order of magnitude meant

a great change for the better in the American position in China. American

officers there would in the future have resources that Stilwell and Chennault in

1942 and 1943, worrying over the distribution of a few thousand tons, would

have regarded as sheer opulence.

In the second place, occupation of the Mogaung-Myitkyina area meant that

as soon as the pipeline and Ledo Road reached it, the Allies would have a great

supply base squarely on the road and rail net of Burma, and within easy distance of China itself. About 1 May 1944, as noted above, Stilwell had concluded

that opening the line of communications to China was not within his capabilities and had so informed his superiors. Then the results of Slim's and Giffard's

decision to meet and break the Japanese 15th Army at Imphal began to be

apparent, together with the heavy casualties the Japanese were suffering around

Kamaing, Mogaung, and Myitkyina. Observing this, Stilwell changed his mind

about the possibility of taking the key points which controlled the line of

communications. He told Mountbatten in mid-July that the Japanese had

suffered very heavy losses, that it was doubtful if by November they could

recover two thirds of the effectiveness they had possessed in early 1944. He was

convinced that the Allies could now do better than just hold Myitkyina, and so

he assured Mountbatten that "with reasonable help from the Y-Force, the CAI

can get to the Bhamo-Shwegu area." The next step would be to take Lashio,

126

 Siege of Myitkyina, pp. 130-32. 127

 History of the India-China Division, Air Transport Command, I (1944), 39. Hist Div,

MATS, Andrews Field, Md.
THE DRIVE FOR MYITKYINA 255

terminal of the Burma Road and the prewar gateway to China. Plainly, to

Stilwell the end of China's isolation was near.128

Stilwell's renewed optimism was in complete accord with conclusions of

Slim and the latter's corps commanders. After visiting them at the front at this

same period of mid-July, Mountbatten recorded in his diary that "the thing

that struck me most was the absolute certainty that whatever else happened

we must start our offensive after this monsoon before the Japanese can start

theirs. . . ." The question that remained was to plan the offensive whose

execution would be begun in the fall of 1944.129

When it became apparent that Myitkyina was about to fall, Stilwell left

north Burma for SEAC's headquarters at Kandy, Ceylon. Mountbatten was

going to London to rearrange SEAC's command structure, and Stilwell was

happy that his position as acting Deputy Supreme Allied Commander made

it obligatory for him to visit the beautiful island and enjoy a brief respite from

field command.130 Since there were an army group and an army headquarters

to handle the land fighting, and since no major naval operations were contemplated, Stilwell was glad to let SEAC headquarters run itself while he

toured the island and rested.

The press took the opportunity of examining him on the North Burma

Campaign, and Stilwell on 5 August discussed it with candor:

We think there were approximately 1,000 [Japanese] in Myitkyina, when we struck it.

Various units got into Myitkyina because our cordon around the town had holes in it. Certainly more got in there than I calculated, and I admit underestimating the strength of the

Jap garrison. The situation was very confused.131

In Stilwell's opinion, the Chinese soldier best withstood the hardships of

the campaign. He saw no change in the high quality of the Japanese soldier.

Take a man from any Japanese service unit, said Stilwell, and he will get into a

hole with a light machine gun and stay there. Stilwell believed that the 18th

Division was destroyed. He did not know of any units that might have escaped

128

 (1) History of India-Burma Theater, 1944-1945, I, 81, 173. OCMH. (2) Memo, Stilwell

for Mountbatten, 18 Jul 44. SAC (44) 288. SEAC War Diary. (3) The pipeline reached Myitkyina on 2 October 1944, and a temporary combat road was opened to Myitkyina in early November.

The Ledo Road itself bypassed Myitkyina. 129

 (1) Personal Memo for C-in-C's on SAC's Visit to Burma Front, SCM/44, 6 Jul 44. SEAC

War Diary. (2) Allied Burma operations of 1944-45 are described in Volume III of this subseries. 130

 (1) The Stilwell Papers, p. 310. (2) When, if ever, Stilwell was formally appointed Deputy

Supreme Allied Commander is not fully clarified by the sources the authors have been able to con- sult. In March 1944, drafting notes for a conference with Mountbatten, Stilwell wrote that he had never been appointed Deputy. See page 169, above. A lengthy (seventeen-page) handwritten list of differences and difficulties between Stilwell and SEAC, which internal evidence indicates was written very near the close of Stilwell's stay in CBI, was found by Sunderland at Carmel, Calif., in May 1950, and filed with the JWS Miscellaneous Papers, 1944. It contains the statement that SEAC never issued orders appointing Stilwell as Deputy. On the other hand, Mountbatten's report always refers to Stilwell as Deputy. When Stilwell assumed command at Kandy in July 1944 it was his first exercise of authority as a Deputy, and he seems to have confined himself to cutting down the flow of minutes and staff studies (paper work of all kinds being one of Stilwell's phobias) and to presiding over meetings. 131

 Interv of Stilwell by press, Kandy, Ceylon, 5 Aug 44. SNF 172.
256 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

intact. A few men from the 55th and 56th Regiments might have escaped, but

he thought the 114th Regiment was gone, together with the division artillery

and vehicles. Stilwell did not know how many aircraft the crisis at Imphal had

diverted from the Hump but agreed that of course it had cut Hump tonnage.

That turned the conversation to China and to the situation there. It was

grave, Stilwell conceded. Because of his official position he could not comment

bluntly and said as much. What he did say was tactful and sympathetic toward

the Chinese in their time of sorrow. China was his next problem, and he was

soon to go there.

Summary

The taking of Myitkyina on 3 August, which successfully accomplished a

task many informed observers had termed impossible, marked a milestone in

the history of CBI. It could not be termed a successful carrying out of Stilwell's plans, for Stilwell's own plan, which he presented in the summer of

1942, called for a drive from Imphal with the Chinese Army in India, together

with a Chinese drive from Yunnan, aimed at taking Rangoon and reopening

the prewar line of communications from Rangoon to Kunming. These operations, Stilwell thought, should be launched during the dry season that began

in November 1942 and be completed sometime in 1943.

Stilwell's superiors, in successive conferences, whittled down some of these

conceptions and substituted others of their own, so that all the final plans had

in common with Stilwell's own proposals was that both envisaged a land

campaign in Burma. The manifold obstacles, political and military, that had

to be surmounted before the campaign opened postponed it until fall 1943, or

one year after the time Stilwell had sought to begin it.

But though Myitkyina was taken very late in the day, taken it was, and the

feat was a triumph for the man who had maintained it could be done. The

town was taken to make possible an intensified air effort from bases in China

in support of U.S. operations in the Pacific and it is against subsequent events

in China that the Burma campaign, and the decisions that resulted in postponing it from 1942 to 1943, must be weighed.
CHAPTER VII

Logistics and Administration

Behind the successes in north Burma and Manipur State lay successes in

the field of logistics. Probably the most important of these was the improvement in the Assam line of communications that followed its passing under

Anglo-American military control. There were also major administrative

changes in both SOS and theater organization. These may have contributed

to victory in the field, though with less obvious directness than did the increased flow of supplies to the front.

The Headquarters Reorganized

In India, responsibility for American supply, maintenance, and construction operations lay with the Commanding General, Services of Supply, save for

a few exceptions. In China, the situation was extremely complex and is treated

separately below. In CBI after 15 November 1943, General Covell commanded the SOS, while his predecessor, General Wheeler, became Principal

Administrative Officer, SEAC.1 General Covell, after surveying his new command in the light of the added resources that would come to CBI as a result

of the QUADRANT decisions and give him a freedom of action Wheeler had

never enjoyed, suggested certain major changes.

He proposed to reorganize the SOS along lines suggested earlier by the

War Department to meet the world-wide problem of an efficient division of

responsibilities between theater headquarters and SOS. Theater headquarters

approved generally, but preferred to keep Signals, Postal Service, Censorship,

Special Services, Military Police, and Malaria Control under its own jurisdiction. (Table 4) Covell at once moved to set up general depots and Engineer

and Transportation Services under SOS control. The American port activities

at Bombay became an exempted station under the Chief of Transportation,

SOS.

General Covell wanted to simplify the geographical setup by merging

Advance Section No. 1 (Gaya) with Base Section No. 2 (Calcutta,) but hesitated for a while because Calcutta was not working to his satisfaction. Covell

also wanted to merge Advance Section No. 2 and Base Section No. 3 into an

1

 Rpt, Covell to CG, USF IBT, 20 May 45, sub: Final Rpt, 15 Nov 43-20 May 45, pp. 1-2. (Hereafter, Covell Report.) OCMH.
258 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

TABLE 4—STRENGTH OF U. S. ARMY FORCES IN THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA

THEATER: JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 1944

a

 Data not reported.

Source: G-4 Personnel Rpt, quarter ending 30 Sep 44, Hq USAF CBI. OCMH.

Intermediate Section, but being anxious not to interfere with Colonel Pick,

who commanded Base Section No. 3, and the road-building effort, he contemplated waiting until Pick was ready to displace forward as the Ledo Road

progressed.2

In his own headquarters, Coveil set up a chief of administration and a chief

of operations, dividing the general and special staff functions between them.

His aim was to reduce the number of officers reporting to him. Ultimately,

SOS reverted from this organization to the customary general and special staff

organization.3

Once the Engineer Construction Service had been set up under Col.

Thomas F. Farrell, SOS chief engineer, Engineer Division No. 1 (Base Section

No. 1) and Engineer District No. 2 (Advance Section No. 2, Base Section No.

3, exclusive of the Ledo Road), plus Engineer Division No. 3 for the DelhiAgra area, were organized to take care of all the SOS major engineering

projects.4

Possibly feeling that with Covell changing the SOS the time had come for

a renovation of the theater's organization, General Hearn on 17 January suggested to General Sultan, Deputy Commander, CBI Theater, that theater headquarters itself should be established in New Delhi, and that Chungking headquarters should be redesignated Headquarters, Forward Echelon. (See Chart 2.)

2

 (1) Ltr, Covell to Somervell, 16 Dec 43. Somervell File, Vol III, Hq ASF, Ts of Opns, CBI

1942-43, A46-257. (2) Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol. I, Chs. I, III, V, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953). 3

 (1) SOS in CBI, p. 24. (2) GO 16, Hq SOS USAF CBI, 1 Feb 44. (3) GO 114, Hq SOS

USAF CBI, 11 Aug 44. 4

 Ltr, Covell to Somervell, 27 Jan 44. Somervell File, Vol IV, CBI 1944.
LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION 259

This would result in an administrative structure more closely related to existing circumstances. One circumstance was that since Stilwell had spent most

of his time in India and Burma, it would be appropriate for his principal headquarters to be on that side of the mountains. Another was that because of

geographic barriers, most of the American men and material in CBI were in

India and Burma, and there of necessity were the bulk, even if not the most

complex, of the theater's administrative problems. For Stilwell's brief visits to

Chungking, a small headquarters would serve very well.5

For whatever reason, Sultan did not take up Hearn's suggestions with Stilwell until March 1944. Stilwell promptly approved them. The general order

which announced the change on 31 March 1944 made plain that there was a

certain shift in the center of the theater commander's interest away from China.

Theater headquarters at New Delhi was made responsible for "formulating

general overall policies and announcing them to the Command, for planning

and for the administration of the Theater. . . ." Forward Echelon headquarters

was given strictly limited responsibilities:

a. Liaison and coordination with the Chinese Government on all matters of common interest to the United States Army Forces and the Chinese Government.

b. Securing and transmitting information from China as required by instructions from

Theater Headquarters.

c. Coordinating and supervising the execution within China Theater of orders, directives,

et cetera.

d. Assisting Theater Headquarters in the preparation of policies, conduct of planning,

and establishment of procedures concerning the operation and the administration of United

States Army Forces and supporting installations in China.6

When the order was put into effect, word of the change quickly spread

through higher Chinese social and governmental circles in Chungking, in the

distorted form that the United States Army was withdrawing from China. U.S.

Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss was disturbed by the rumor and took the matter up with Hearn. Hearn quickly reassured him, but the fact that reassurance

was necessary suggested that liaison between the Embassy and theater headquarters was not what it might have been.7

SOS Problems

On surveying his far-flung command, Covell noted that most of his problems came from two factors not under SOS control, the port of Calcutta and

the Assam line of communications. Despite the firm conviction of local author5

 (1) Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. X. (2) Rad CFB 12494, Hearn to Sultan, 17 Jan 44. Item 1635, Bk 5, JWS Personal File. 6

 GO 5, Fwd Ech, Hq USAF CBI, 31 Mar 44. 7

 (1) Rad CFB 15614, Hearn to Marshall, 2 Apr 44. Item 2160, Bk 6, JWS Personal File. (2)

CM-OUT 18999, Marshall to Hearn, 5 Apr 44. (3) Ltr, Gauss to Hearn, 2 Apr 44; Memo, Hearn for Gauss, 3 Apr 44; Ltr, Gauss to Hearn, 12 Apr 44. Items 292, 294, Bk 3; JWS Personal File.
260 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

ity that the Assam line of communications could not be improved in time to

support the projected operations in Burma, Covell had been told by Somervell

that the line could and must be substantially improved in a matter of weeks.8

The first problem Covell proposed to attack was that of the line of communications. Solution of this would permit the more rapid flow of supplies to SOS's

great engineering projects, and other major projects—the Ledo Road, the pipelines, and the airfields. It would also permit supplies in quantity to reach the

British forces on the Manipur and Arakan fronts, whose supply problems had

been so severe that in some areas troops had suffered from malnutrition.9

The most immediate problem, and the one with aspects of emergency, was

the supply situation in Assam. Because low water on the Brahmaputra River

impeded barge operations, and because the meter-gauge lines of the Bengal and

Assam Railway were clogged with traffic, stocks in Assam dwindled to a sevenday level. Since it then required sixty-seven days for supplies to go by rail from

Calcutta to Assam, it was possible to foresee a situation in which supplies

would be below the subsistence level, and in which timely replenishment

would be most difficult.10

To forestall this emergency, and to impress upon local authority the grave

situation resulting from the inefficient and lethargic operation of the line of

communications, requests were made for several complete trainloads of specified items to be made up and shipped to Assam on passenger-train schedules.

The Indian rail authorities and the Bengal and Assam Railway agreed, and the

emergency passed.11

Negotiations

Negotiations with the British to arrange military control of the port of

Calcutta and the line of communications began in a favorable atmosphere,

with the British and American military authorities soon finding themselves in

accord as to what had to be done to improve matters. Both sides wanted a

British port controller with a U.S. assistant to regulate and control port facilities and personnel; definitely assigned dock areas to permit each party to

concentrate its resources in its area; a central pool of dockside labor; pooling of

lighters.12 Putting a British officer with an American assistant in charge of the

entire line of communications seemed desirable to both parties.

The British and American supply authorities who engaged in the preliminary talks secured the assent of CBI and SEAC to their proposal for a port

controller and military control of the entire line of communications from

8

 Covell Report, pp. 1-2. 9

 Ltr 3872/17/Q, Slim to GHQ (India), 30 Oct 43. SEAC War Diary. 10

 Covell Report, pp. 27-28. 11

 (1) Ibid. (2) SOS in CBI, pages 425-26, has an excerpt from the Covell Report in a discussion of the general difficulties of supplying U.S. installations in Assam. 12

 (1) Ltr cited n. 2(1). (2) Ltr, Covell to Wheeler, 16 Jan 44; Ltr, Covell to Somervell, 1 Feb

44. Somervell File, Vol IV, CBI 1944.
LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION 261

Calcutta north. The lower echelons of the Government of India approved in

principle. Then the proposal seemed to encounter heavy weather. While SOS

waited for clearing skies, it urged Army Service Forces to have a supremely

well qualified man ready to represent the United States as assistant port

controller.

By 21 January, Covell was ready to write:

Probably our biggest headache has been with the L of C from Calcutta to Assam which

is in British civilian hands. We get all kinds of promises but nothing happens. As a result,

for the last two weeks I have been raising hell, but still feel that more drastic action may be

necessary.

In December with an approximate equal amount of tonnage allocated to the U.S. and

British military, the U.S. Army lost 14,981 tons while the British lost only 723 tons. As a

result of our vigorous protests we received the promise that this shortage would be made up

in January 1944 and the deficiencies divided equally thereafter. Now we have just learned

that the line is congested and we still will not get what was promised to us. The whole

situation looks bad to me, and I am having great difficulty in digging out necessary information. I get the impression that the Indian Civil Railway Administration is not much concerned about military traffic. I have been trying for two months to find out reliable total

figures over the broad gauge road north of Calcutta, but have been unable to get any true

figures on civilian traffic, but I am still trying.13

The drastic action Covell wanted was immediately forthcoming. General

Marshall put the matter before the President. Describing the situation on the

line of communications as "precarious," and pointing out that three of the ATC

airfields in which the President took such close interest were out of gas,

Marshall said that Anglo-American military control of the line of communications was the only solution, and asked that Roosevelt write to the Prime

Minister.14 The President agreed and, pointing out that the operations of the

ATC had been embarrassed by lack of vigorous management on the line of

communications and that the results of civilian administration had been disappointing, he urged that Churchill intervene in person to obtain full military

control of the line of communications from Calcutta to Assam. In reply, the

Prime Minister promised a personal investigation.15

A few weeks later, SOS learned that the War Transport Department of the

Government of India had been strongly opposing any move to place the port

of Calcutta under military control. The civilian authorities wanted a commissioner who had been prominently identified with the existing regime to

have charge of the port. The military, British and American, vigorously

opposed the suggestion. They swept the field when the Viceroy, that distinguished soldier, Field Marshal Lord Archibald P. Wavell, decided personally

13

 Ltr, Covell to Somervell, 21 Jan 44. Somervell File, Vol IV, CBI 1944. 14

 Memo, Marshall for President, 29 Jan 44, sub: Failure of Calcutta-Assam Line of Commu- nications. Somervell File, Vol IV, CBI 1944. 15

 Col. Charles K. Gailey, Exec Off, OPD, for Handy, 31 Jan 44. Item 55, OPD Exec 10. Attached to the memorandum is a draft radio, Roosevelt to Churchill, which Colonel Gailey says

was dispatched on 29 January. Colonel Gailey also reports Churchill's 30 January reply to the

President.
262 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

that there would be a complete change in Calcutta. Perhaps remembering how

his own operations in Burma had been hobbled by logistical problems that

were called insoluble, the Viceroy, "with the accompaniment of a little desk

pounding," made his wishes known. The civilian departments heard and

obeyed.16

The agreement on the line of communications that resulted on 6 February

provided that an outstanding man should control the entire working of the

port, and all agencies concerned with it. Under him would be two deputies, one

of them an American. To meet civilian objections, it was agreed the port

director would be a civilian, and responsible to the War Transport Department

of the Government of India.17

Another agreement, completed the same day, provided a new set of controls

for the line of communications. Responsibility was placed on the Calcutta

representative of General Headquarters (India), advised by the regional controller of traffic priorities for the Government of India, a representative of the

U.S. Army, and representatives of the railway and barge lines.

3. The mechanism for implementing the above decisions will be as follows:

(a) The total capacity of the L of C will be estimated periodically by D. D. Mov.,

CALCUTTA [Deputy Director, Movements], in conjunction with the Railway and Steamship

Companies concerned, and in consultation with the Officer Commanding U.S. Railway

Troops. This estimate of capacity will be telegraphed immediately to PAO (I) [Principal

Administrative Officer, India], and PAO (SEAC).

(b) Proposals as to the allotment on each sector and in both directions of this capacity

as between military, essential civil, and railway construction and maintenance requirements,

and the routing of three tonnages, will be prepared in CALCUTTA . . . by . . .

D. D. Mov., CALCUTTA

Representative of Commanding General, SOS

Representative of Army Group, S.E.A.

Regional Controller of Priorities, CALCUTTA NORTH

Representative of B & A Railway,

and submitted to DELHI where they will be agreed or amended by representatives of GHQ

(I), War Transport Department, H.Q., S.A.C., S.E.A.C. and the Railway Board, the

approved constitutional procedure being followed in the event of failure to agree.

(c) Responsibility for implementing the agreed allotments of (b) will be placed on a

panel constituted as in (d) below. . . .

(d) The panel . . . will consist of D. D. Mov., CALCUTTA, who will be chairman . . .

Regional Controller of Priorities, CALCUTTA NORTH

Commanding General, S.O.S.

B & A Railway

Rivers Steam Navigation Co.

India General Navigation Co.

Movement Control (Railway)

Movement Control (IWT [Inland Water Transport])18

16

 Ltr, Covell to Somervell, 11 Feb 44. Somervell File, Vol IV, CBI 1944. 17

 Incite Ltr cited n. 16. 18

 Ltr, Ferris to Marshall for OPD, 11 Feb 44, Incl, sub: Calcutta Port and Assam LOC. Somervell File, Vol IV, CBI 1944.
LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION 263

THE KING GEORGE DOCK AREA in Calcutta, India.

Clearing the Port of Calcutta

Clearing the congested port of Calcutta was unwittingly facilitated by the

Japanese. Submarine activity in the Bay of Bengal during December 1943

forced the convoying of ships from Ceylon to the mouth of the Hooghly River,

upon whose banks Calcutta is built. This threat slowed the arrival of cargo and

permitted the dispatch of much that had accumulated on the docks and in the

warehouses. For the Americans, the burden fell on two port companies of

Negro soldiers, the 540th and the 541st (Transportation Corps). For months

these men had worked like Trojans, sometimes right around the clock.19

During the winter months, British consent to SOS control of part of the

great King George Docks was obtained. In the week of 29 December 1943-

5 January 1944, seven companies (the 497th and 508th Port Battalions, TC) of

veteran longshoremen with complete equipment for unloading ships arrived.

In the month of January, the ten U.S. port companies then on duty unloaded

98,859 long tons, as against 42,325 long tons the month before.20

19

 (1) SOS in CBI, App. 3, History of Base Section No. 2. (2) Ltr, Covell to Somervell, 4 Jan 44. Somervell File, Vol IV, CBI 1944. 20

 App. cited n. 19(1).
264 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

In addition to the tripling of the U.S. force at hand and the leasing of the

King George Docks, other steps contributed greatly to faster movement of

cargo through the port.

1. The procurement of large floating cranes and other modern dock equipment.

2. The diversion of barge line equipment to augment port facilities.

3. The partial replacement of native labor with troops having stevedoring experience, the

training of other units along these lines and the pooling of native labor.

4. The establishment of a 24-hour work day with shifts to maintain it.

5. The more efficient use of transportation facilities in removing cargo from the docks.

6. The improvement in the Assam LOC.21

On 15 March 1944 the King George Docks were completely cleared for the

first time. During the next thirty days the dock workers handled 97,000

measurement tons of freight. By 20 April, General Covell could report: ". . . no

special concern need be given to the capacity of the port of Calcutta, nor has

any indication been given at this time that it has reached its saturation point."

 22

The port director, Mr. F. A. Pope, arrived 22 May 1944.

On 23 January Brig. Gen. Gilbert X. Cheves was assigned to the command

of Base Section No. 2, succeeding Brig. Gen. John A. Warden, who went to the

west coast of India to take command of Base Section No. 1 (Karachi). General

Cheves found a problem in relations between U.S. troops and the people of

Bengal. SOS personnel had not been well disciplined. The port of Karachi

under General Warden continued to work with smooth efficiency. Its rate of

discharging cargo never ranked below fifth among 110 ports in which the U.S.

Army operated.23

The steady flow of reinforcements to CBI after the QUADRANT Conference,

August 1943, made it desirable to bring troops in through Bombay. For one

reason, some of the transports were too large to use the Karachi facilities, and

for another, the rail connections out of Bombay were better. In 1943, 118,983

U.S. troops passed through Bombay, some of them intended for the Persian

Gulf Command.

Local authorities at Bombay were most co-operative in finding office space,

hospital accommodations, and staging area quarters for American use. As a rule,

troops remained on board their transports until the troop trains appeared. If it

was necessary for the ship to leave before the trains came, then the staging

areas were used. The principal drawback to this arrangement lay in the fact that

British rations as prepared by Indian kitchen personnel were not satisfactory to

American troops. Some relief was found in supplying the difference between

the two rations, close supervision of the kitchens, and the partial use of

21

 Covell Report, p. 8. 22

 Ltr, Covell to Somervell, 20 Apr 44. Somervell File, Vol IV, CBI 1944. 23

 (1) GO 10, Hq SOS USAF CBI, 23 Jan 44. (2) SOS in CBI, p. 35. (3) Rpt, Covell to Somervell, 26 May, 21 Jun 44. Somervell File, Vol IV, CBI 1944.
LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION 265

American mess personnel. An American staging area, initiated in February

1944, received its first troops on 24 July.24

Railway Problems

Restricting factors that affected tonnage moving up over the railway lines

of the Bengal and Assam Railway lay both in the physical structure of the line

itself and in the methods of those who operated it. The railway was partly of

broad gauge and partly of meter. The broad-gauge line seemed capable of hauling more traffic than the meter-gauge line could receive; bottlenecks lay in the

transshipment points, where coolies lethargically carried stores from broad- to

meter-gauge cars and vice versa. There was no bridge across the Brahmaputra

River, and the ferry between Amingaon and Pandu was an obstruction.

Together with the stretch of steep-gradient track between Lumding and

Manipur Road (near Dimapur), the ferry was regarded as a major obstacle.

(See Map 1.)

Remedial construction was under way. The double-tracking of the LumdingManipur Road section had been begun by Indian authority but the pace of the

work drew blistering comment from American railwaymen. Between July 1943

and April 1944, 3.25 miles had been completed.25 The Government of India had

made plans for a bridge across the Brahmaputra River, for double-tracking the

main line, and for new yard facilities. However, such projects would require

years to complete and would themselves be a major burden on the line of

communications.26

Signal communication along the Bengal and Assam Railway was lacking.

Daily traffic figures were therefore not available, and trains would be "lost"

four or five hours at a time.27

Operating methods seemed strange to American railwaymen. The railway

authorities of the Government of India thought it possible to analyze the existing facilities of a line of communications and from them determine its capacity.

This estimate in turn would be set as a target. When the target had been

reached, the mission would be regarded as accomplished. Moreover, the operating echelons on occasion took the target figure as literally indicating the limit

of the line and refused to go beyond it.28 A major element in attempts to set

target figures was the local belief that railway management had to keep the

number of loaded cars moving up to the front equal to the number of empties

returning from the front. The American approach, on the other hand, con- 24

 SOS in CBI, pp. 35-36. 25

 Ltr, Col Appleton, Director, MRS USAF CBI, to Brig Gen Thomas B. Wilson, CG, Trans- portation Service, 4 Apr 44. Somervell File, Vol IV, CBI 1944. Appleton thought there was a deliberate slowdown. 26

 Ltr, Appleton to Wilson, 25 Apr 44. Somervell File, Vol IV, CBI 1944. 27

 Ltr cited n. 25. 28

 (1) Ltr, Covell to Somervell, 12 Apr 44. Somervell File, Vol IV, CBI 1944. (2) Ltr cited

n. 25.
266 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

centrated on moving loaded cars to the front and accepted the resulting lack of

balance until the returning empties corrected the situation. To American railroadmen, the quantity movement of freight was most important; to Indian

railroadmen, the careful balancing of loaded and empty freight cars to avoid

even a temporary drain on the resources of other lines.29

Military Railway Service Begins Its Work

Anticipating a share of responsibility in operating the Assam line of communications, SOS established the Military Railway Service on 25 December

1943, under the Chief of Transportation, SOS, CBI. The main body of

American railway troops whose assignment to India had been agreed to in the

fall of 1943, arrived in India on 11 January 1944.30 Advance elements of the

railway troops had meanwhile engaged in reconnoitering the sections of line

that the U.S. was to assist in operating. Officials and officers of the Government

of India and of SOS framed a series of agreements under which the American

railwaymen would function.

The basic principle of the agreements was that American personnel to the

number of about 4,600 would be superimposed on the existing railway staff.

No employees of the Bengal and Assam Railway were to lose their jobs. The

Military Railway Service took over operation of 804 miles of main and branch

lines. At Parbatipur, the Military Railway Service transferred its traffic between

the broad- and meter-gauge lines and operated the bottleneck ferry at Pandu.

Military Railway Service did not affect commercial traffic which continued to

be completely under the Bengal and Assam Railway.

On the administrative side, the Military Railway Service and the Bengal and

Assam Railway were each responsible for discipline of their own personnel.

The railway management undertook to supply all expendable railway stores.

The current construction program continued. The Military Railway Service

agreed to ask for new construction through the existing railway channels.31

Headquarters of the Military Railway Service was set up at Gauhati, a

central location and close to the two principal bottlenecks, the Pandu ferry and

the Lumding-Manipur section of track. Headquarters personnel were members

of the 705th Railway Grand Division. Colonel Appleton, formerly general

manager of the New York Zone of the Pennsylvania Railroad, commanded.

The operating battalions deployed, and the Americans took up their work at

0001, 1 March 1944, on the eve of the Japanese invasion of India.32 The relation

between the two events was a coincidence, but it is interesting to speculate on

what might have happened had the Assam line of communications been unable

to meet the responsibilities soon thrust on it.

29

 Ltr cited n. 25. 30

 SOS in CBI, pp. 23, 63. 31

 SOS in CBI, pp. 90-93, Summary of Agreements for Opn of Portions of B&A Ry by USAF, MRS.

32

 SOS in CBI, pp. 63-66.
LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION 267

Changes in Operating Procedure

Colonel Appleton at once moved to break the bottleneck at the Pandu

ferry. Work was begun immediately by using two locomotives simultaneously:

one engine moved cars off the barge, and another, already coupled up, was

ready to move cars on the barge. Prior to taking over, the Military Railway

Service had agreed to a daily target of 305 cars eastward over the ferry; a daily

average of 327 cars was achieved. A movement of 350 cars plus construction

trains was projected for April. By 21 April the daily average was up to 413 cars

eastward, and still rising, as shown by the 540 cars moved on that day.33

For Parbatipur, the transshipment point from broad to meter gauge,

Appleton directed that the target figures be dispensed with, that cars be loaded

as fast as they were available. Appleton's directive plus the improvement of the

ferry operations meant that an increased number of loaded cars began moving

east. An increase in the operating efficiency of the railroad was called for.

Changes in operating procedure provided this. Train lengths were doubled,

permitting more efficient use of motive power. Hundred-car trains were not

uncommon. Train speeds were increased. U.S. locomotive engineers took the

throttle on difficult stretches (and eased the long "drags" over the high iron

on the approaches to the Naga Hills).

The Indian block system was retained, in conformance with the policy of

keeping Indian operating rules. The method was "not basically inefficient," but

slow, lackadaisical operation made it appear so. "Reports of numerous inspections of the lines invariably included reference to stops at all stations whether

necessary or not, halts of much longer than necessary duration to obtain clearance, inefficient methods of dispatching. . . . The placing of U.S. Army Station Masters at many of the dispatching points along the lines and close

supervision of all personnel resulted in considerable speed-up of traffic

movement."

 34

With the steadily increasing forward movement of freight, the number of

cars from other lines on the Bengal and Assam Railway inevitably increased.

On 1 March the debit balance had been 9,600 cars. As Appleton disregarded all

short-term considerations of balancing the movements of loaded and empty

cars, the debit balance rose steadily. This attracted local criticism, but Appleton

stood firm, for he expected that the cycle of return movement of empties would

soon appear and stabilize the situation at a much higher level of traffic. In late

April, the debit balance was 12,000 cars.

By the end of March it was apparent that the problems of meter-gauge

operations were well on the way to solution. Figures furnished by British

Movements Control revealed that military traffic from Pandu and Gauhati for

33

 (1) Rpt, Appleton to Wilson, 25 Apr 44, sub: Opns by MRS of B&A Ry (meter gauge). Somervell File, Vol IV, CBI 1944. (2) SOS in CBI, p. 70. 34

 SOS in CBI, pp. 68, 69.
Railroad Operations in India. The loading of cars on the Pandu ferry

shown, above. A loaded train moves toward the front, below.
LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION 269

March increased 44.6 percent over that for February, and that tonnages delivered

to the forward areas at Manipur Road, Ledo, and Chabua were up 43 percent,

or 34,568 tons. The meter-gauge lines now handled more traffic than the

broad-gauge line could bring forward from Calcutta.

The broad-gauge line from Calcutta north began as multiple track, reducing

to double track for a distance of 124 miles, and finally to a single track for the

last 108 miles to Parbatipur. Because of inefficient and indifferent operation, the

line was badly congested, and loading of cars actually had to be suspended.

Trains have been set off on sidings the length of the line definitely reducing the capacity

by the lack of passing sidings. Crews have drawn the fires on engines, have left originating

terminals after expiration of sufficient time to have reached final destination. Many reasons

have been given for such a condition, such as lack of communication, insufficient motive

power, and lack of tractive effort of power in service. It is hardly conceivable that a Broad

Gauge system would be incapable of moving tonnage in greater volume that could be

absorbed by a connecting Meter Gauge Railroad. But such has been the case. With proper

supervision and operation the picture can be reversed.35

Their attention directed to this state of affairs, the British took remedial

action. A director general of railways took over the Calcutta area, and Army

officers with experience in railroading were stationed along the line. A pool of

100 broad-gauge freight cars was provided at Parbatipur to handle sudden

increases in freight from the meter-gauge lines.36

Operations Under Military Railway Service

Because of the delay inherent in administrative communications the sharp

increases in meter-gauge traffic under the Military Railway Service were not

known in Washington until April 1944. General Arnold followed the situation

closely. The critical supply situation in Assam, alluded to earlier in this chapter,

moved him to tell Somervell on 17 March: "Unless the improvement of the

rail and river lines, and the construction of the Calcutta-Assam pipe line, is

given a more determined push, I shall be unable to furnish the service

demanded [from the ATC]."

 37

 Unaware that Covell was about to report a

34-percent jump in rail traffic for early March, Somervell at once sent him the

gist of Arnold's strong memorandum. Meanwhile, in Delhi, General Sultan on

21 March was taking a pessimistic view of the line-of-communications

problem. Delhi being a great deal closer to the scene, Sultan knew of

Appleton's progress, but even so he thought that "no matter how much they

do the communications will never be stretched to the point where they carry

all the stuff that the British and Americans want to send to Assam."

 38

35

 Rpt cited n. 33(1). 36

 Bykofsky MS. 37

 Memo, Arnold for Somervell, 17 Mar 44. Somervell File, Vol IV, CBI 1944. 38 Memo, Sultan for Stilwell, 21 Mar 44. Item 290, Bk 3, JWS Personal File.
270 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

The concern felt by Arnold and Somervell was speedily dissipated when

Covell's and Appleton's reports reached their superiors. The messages came

very close to crossing in passage. After March 1944, the Assam line of communications ceased to be a major problem; Arnold's memorandum was the last

of its kind.

From 1 March to 25 April 1944, or during the time when the Japanese were

on the flood tide of their drive into India, the Military Railway Service moved

all traffic offered to it. No restrictions on traffic were requested of higher

authority. Even more indicative of the swift change in the condition of the

line of communications was the fact that between 23 March and 18 April

sixty-four troop trains were moved in addition to scheduled traffic. "In fact

during the month of April . . . the average daily tonnage over the Assam

LOC exceeded the British estimate of 4,400 long tons for October 1944 made

by the Director of Transportation, GHQ (I). . . ."

 39

The War Department relieved Colonel Appleton on 27 April 1944 to send

him to another theater. On the occasion of his departure, General Lindsell,

Principal Administrative Officer (India), after stating that all traffic offered to

Military Railway Service had been accepted, added: "In addition to these

admirable technical results Col. Appleton gave us a fine example of inter-allied

cooperation and I know that all my officers who were privileged to work with

him will be full of regret at his leaving India." Lt. Col. Stanley Bray of the

Railway Grand Division acted as director until Colonel Yount took command

on 17 May 1944. There was one ugly little note. Covell reported that discipline

among the railwaymen was not good, that there had been considerable stealing

of military supplies.40

When tonnage bids were submitted by British and American authorities

asking for priorities on rail cargo space for the month of June, they were

accepted in full, just as March had marked the meter-gauge line's ability to

receive all the cargo brought to it. "In July allocations for military traffic

exceeded the target figure established at the Quebec Conference of 220,000

short tons per month for 1 January 1946." Indeed, the Military Railway Service

soon found the meter-gauge line had surplus capacity.

During August, an all time high of 16,439 wagons [freight cars] was handled eastward

over the Amingaon-Pandu Ferry which amounted to a daily average of 530 wagons. This

figure when compared with the average of 327 wagons per day handled in March gives an

idea of the steady increase in capacity achieved as operating experience was obtained.

Although more American supplies were moved forward to Assam during this month than

ever before, a part of the capacity previously allotted to the U.S. Army was turned back for

civilian use.

Military dispatches over the Assam LOC had grown to 6,537 long tons per day in

September although the total available capacity was not being used. The new wagon ferry

39

 SOS in CBI, p. 74. 40

 (1) Ltr, Lindsell to Covell, 26 Apr 44; Rpt, Covell to Somervell, 22 May 44. Somervell File,

Vol IV, CBI 1944. (2) Bykofsky MS.
LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION 271

between Amingaon and Pandu and completion of many construction projects on the system

began to be reflected in increased capacity sufficient to provide an excess of capacity often

percent over actual requirements. In October the capacity for movement of military stores

(exclusive of POL, personnel, and vehicles) exceeded demands by approximately 20 percent.41

Physical Improvements on the Railway

In the fall of 1943, floods had done so much damage to the Bengal and

Assam right of way as to cause serious concern in General Headquarters

(India).42 If the monsoon rains of 1944 did the same, Appleton's reforms might

literally be washed away, and the Burma campaign endangered by supply

failures. Thirty-odd streams cross the right of way and quickly flood during the

monsoon. With the monsoon approaching, flood-control measures were taken

in hand. Bridges were reinforced with heavy stone riprap to shield their piers

from the swirling currents.

One of the most sensitive points was the Mora Manas River bridge. It was

necessary both to strengthen the bridge and to keep the river from flooding the

right of way. Lt. Col. George Branch, commanding the 725th Railway Operating Battalion, decided to cut a diversion channel from the Mora Manas to the

near-by Bulkhadhoba River. The 725th Battalion completed the half-mile-long

channel in June 1944. Thanks to the several measures of flood control, for the

first time in thirty years the monsoon did not interrupt rail traffic. In October,

Brig. Gen. Paul F. Yount could report that Colonel Branch's channel had kept

flood waters from doing any more than cover the tracks for a brief period of

time, without stopping traffic.

The right of way itself was improved and its capacity increased. New ballast

was laid, kinky rails straightened, and low points lifted. In general, efforts were

consistently made to bring the right of way nearer to American standards. By

the end of 1944, the Government of India had double-tracked about 20 percent

of the line. Of more immediate importance was the construction of a number

of passing sidings and the enlargement of the main railway yards. Because it

was doubtful that the double-tracking could be completed in time to benefit

current operations, General Yount finally persuaded the Government of India

to concentrate its attention on improving the passing sidings to speed two-way

traffic. Though the burden of construction fell on local authority and resources,

in many cases it was possible to furnish American earth-moving equipment to

aid the long files of Indian laborers patiently carrying baskets of soil on their

heads.

The problem of rolling stock was attacked by improved maintenance and

the acquisition of U.S. equipment under lend-lease. On beginning its work,

Military Railway Service found the rolling stock badly run down, and the

41

 SOS in CBI, pp. 75-76. 42

 For this section, the authors drew heavily upon the Bykofsky MS.
272 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

758th Railway Shop Battalion was faced with a problem. The Bengal and

Assam Railway, under the operating agreement, was responsible for providing

necessary spare parts and repair facilities. Unfortunately, it had few parts at

hand. In practice, the Military Railway Service had to requisition matériel

through the Transportation Service. Until spares could arrive from the United

States, there was no alternative to cannibalizing engines and cars. Despite these

several handicaps, from 1 March to the end of 1944, the 758th Battalion repaired

47,044 cars.

A great portion of the Bengal and Assam's motive power was of U.S. origin

via lend-lease. When the Military Railway Service took over operations on

1 March 1944, 167 of the 396 locomotives on hand were War Department

engines. By 30 September, the number was 203, over half the total on hand, and

by the end of the year the figure was 238. With the engines came a steady flow

of American meter-gauge freight cars, adding up to some 6,500 by the end of

1944. These were the commodious American boxcars, with twice the capacity

of the little four-wheel cars used by the Bengal and Assam. Military Railway

Service estimated that the capacity of the lend-lease rolling stock was, by the

end of 1944, equal to that of the railway's own equipment.

Operation of the lend-lease boxcars was made more difficult because Indian

shops, in erecting them, omitted brakes and vacuum hose. This often caused

collisions and the breaking-in-two of trains. By the end of 1944 the shopmen

were able to equip a sizable number with proper brakes. The end of this problem was foreshadowed when, in October, the Railway Board of the Government of India promised that all cars assembled by them would be properly

equipped, and that they would provide 600 brake sets per month for cars

already in operation.

A British Appraisal

The quick and dramatic improvement in the operations of the Bengal and

Assam Railway was perhaps the outstanding example of successful application

of American technology to the logistical problems of war in the China, Burma

and India Theater. An editorial in the Indian press stated:

THE AMERICAN WAY

Railway communications in Eastern Bengal and Assam were never good. Difficulties of

terrain and climate had been taken as excuse for sloth. Defence needs were ignored in India's

north-east corner in odd contrast to its north-west one where there was lavish construction

of strategic railways and roads. When the Japanese threat developed in 1942, there ensued

sudden sharp deterioration in the efficiency of railways near the Eastern Frontier, particularly

in Assam, owing to the wholly unwonted and unforeseen increase of traffic. External pressure

and internal administrative stress on the communications system coming about just at the

time when the need for quick movement was imperative were moreover soon aggravated by

India's political disorders. The situation became insufferable; journeys took days; even deaths
LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION 273

en route were not infrequent. This state of affairs prevailed in the latter part of 1942 and

continued, little modified, throughout 1943; drastic action was obviously necessary.

This came at last in the beginning of 1944 when sections of the Bengal and Assam

Railway were turned over to American operational control. U.S. enterprise and hustle have

succeeded in this instance, most remarkable results being achieved which (according to

common report) British and Indian experts on the basis of much local experience had stoutly

predicted were impossible. What has been done must be most gratifying to Maj-Gen Covell

. . . completion of a job of extreme difficulty which must be regarded as a major contribution to the Allied victories in Burma. Both the Government of India's Railway Member and

the Manager of the B and A Railway have praised the work of the U.S. railway battalions,

first under Col. J. A. Appleton and later under Brig-Gen P. F. Yount. Thousands of Indian

railwaymen cooperated with the Americans and though difficulties were inevitable, they

were surmounted through a "remarkable degree of tolerance on both sides."

As the Railway Member said recently, the Americans "got their coats and shirts off to

the task" in Assam. That is their way and perhaps was the only way to have completed at a

critical juncture what the official statement . . . describes as the lifeline for the troops in

Burma.43

In his final report to the CCS, Mountbatten contented himself with remarking: "The immediate increase in deliveries to Assam over the railway was not

as great as Lieut.-General Somervell had hoped, but during the latter part of

1944 and the early part of 1945 the lift rose very rapidly; and the introduction

of military control was unquestionably justified by the results obtained."

 44

Attempts To Use Indian River Transport

Since the Assam line of communications lay in the valley of the Brahmaputra, one of the world's great rivers, the use of inland water transport to

supplement the rail line seemed an obvious approach, and a great deal of effort

was expended in trying to make the river a more efficient artery. Barge lines

under civilian operation were bringing up small quantities of supplies to the

various river ports—many of them little more than landing stages. After the

TRIDENT Conference (Washington, May 1943) decided not to attempt to

retake all Burma and reopen the line of communications from Rangoon north,

SOS planners suggested that barge equipment originally intended for use on

the Irrawaddy River be placed on the Brahmaputra. The project was approved

at the QUADRANT Conference, Quebec, August 1943, with the target date of

1 April 1944.

Over the six months' period September 1943-March 1944, experiments in

the United States and in the CBI Theater revealed that the tugs and barges

procured were not very well suited to their task. The question became one of

using them to best advantage somewhere in India. Meanwhile, the sharp

improvement in operation of the meter-gauge rail lines made the issue less

urgent.

43

 The editorial (Statesman, May 27, 1945) appears as an inclosure of the Covell Report. 44

 Mountbatten Report, Pt. A, par. 46.
274 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

By July 1944 Transportation Service concluded that the equipment and men

at hand, many of the latter highly skilled in barge-line operation, could best be

used for lighter and towing service around Calcutta, ferry and terminal service

on the Brahmaputra River, and moving POL (gasoline [petrol], oils, and

lubricants) and dry stores to airfields in East Bengal.45 Initial hauling of POL

by barge from Goal undo, on the broad-gauge rail line, and Dacca in East

Bengal was begun on 17 August. Hauling of dry stores from Khulna to Dacca

began soon after. In September, the peak month of fall 1944,1,934 long tons of

stores and 601,474 imperial gallons of POL were carried from Goalundo to

Dacca.

The civil barge lines on the Brahmaputra River came under the jurisdiction

of the Assam Line of Communications Panel, which integrated their operation

with that of the railway. The principle followed was that of cutting long barge

hauls from Calcutta to Assam to the minimum, using instead rail from Calcutta

to Sirajganj Ghat and Dhubri, ports on the Brahmaputra, thus cutting down

the barges' turnaround time.46

Pipelines in India

There were two major U.S. pipeline projects in India, one supplying the

B-29 bases around Calcutta,47 and one from the Budge-Budge oil terminal of

the Burma-Shell Co., about sixteen miles below Calcutta, to a tank farm at

Tinsukia in upper Assam. The latter line was an integral part of the Assam

line of communications.

For construction purposes, the line was divided into four areas, each under

an area engineer. The American portion of the construction work was done by

the 700th, 708th, 709th, 776th, and 777th Engineer Petroleum Distribution

Companies. Col. William C. Kinsolving was in charge of the project for Engineer Construction District No. 12. Because of the problems of labor recruiting,

land use, housing, and local procurement, a British garrison engineer and five

assistant garrison engineers were attached, and the project, as usual in India,

became a combined one. Approximately Rupees 4,000,000 worth of work was

contributed by agencies of the Government of India.

Following a period of reconnaissance and design on the 752-mile line, work

began 25 February 1944. Because the Assam line of communications was badly

congested at this time, deliveries of material were slow, and the work did not

really get under way until April. The material itself was a headache to the

construction crews. Pipe came in tons before couplings were delivered. Inexperienced port and freight personnel lost and damaged a good many pieces of

equipment. Very few standard spare parts ever arrived. To the pipe-laying crews,

45

 (1) Bykofsky MS, pp. 115-16. (2) SOS in CBI, pp. 96-98. 46

 (1) Bykofsky MS, p. 119. (2) SOS in CBI, p. 99. 47

 See Ch. III, above.
LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION 275

sweating away in the Indian heat, it must have seemed as though a malign

goblin was deliberately hiding the essential small parts, fittings, and screws

without which the imposing devices of modern industry will not work. But

the work went on, with the Indian artisan, ingenuity, and field expedients doing

their best to fill the gaps.

The first 300 miles of pipe north from Budge-Budge were on the Bengal

and Assam's track just outside the rails. The water table in that area is so high

during the monsoon that ditches were not practicable, and the local road net

was so poor that there was no other means of access. The staff of the railway

could not have been more co-operative. The Indian railwaymen scheduled work

trains so carefully that pipe was always in place along the tracks before the

pipeline crews arrived. Rivers were crossed by pulling prewelded sections of

line across them by tractor.

The fragility of the invasion-weight pipe used and the heavily populated

countryside offered serious problems of construction and operation. The "Westerner, and particularly the American, really does not comprehend the phrase

heavily populated until he has seen the Indian countryside, with village following

on village, sometimes only a mile or two apart, and the space between filled

with little plots like suburban gardens. Where the safety of the villagers seemed

to require it, the pipe was buried, and because of the dense population this

meant burying long stretches of pipe. This in turn created two more problems:

finding the labor to bury the pipe, and the rapid corrosion of the thin-walled

pipe once laid.

Coolies were hired by the garrison engineer and his assistants through

piecework contractors. The local contractors had never been faced with a job

of such magnitude, particularly since it involved keeping a labor force moving

forward. The laborers could not go far from their villages, for no surplus of

food or housing would be available in the countryside. And the contractors'

personnel policies, if they can be so dignified, were blends of inefficiency and

time-honored skulduggery. When the Calcutta area was left behind, it proved

best to put the laborers on the payroll directly, give them an identity token, pay

them daily, and supervise them with American noncommissioned officers. Construction of three pipeline plows by District No. 12 shops proved very successful. They equaled 1,000 laborers for digging ditches in which to lay the pipe.

The thin-walled pipe was not only an operating problem but a hazard.

Experience with 160 miles of it in West Bengal, in the B-29 supply system,

suggested that the loss would rise steadily as the pipe remained in the ground

and that it would not require many months to reach significant proportions in

a long line. Hundred-octane gasoline seeping ever farther through the soil of a

populated area is a deadly hazard.

On 26 June 1944 a leak was found where the pipe crossed the Hooghly

River near the village of Ulabaria. The crews began to repair the line, following normal operating and safety procedures. Water was pumped into the line
276 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

and all gasoline seemed to be clear. The odor of gasoline in the vicinity did not

seem heavy; moreover, a soldier was posted in the street warning the villagers

not to start any open fire. Everything appeared in order and the crew prepared

to test the pipe with compressed air for leakage. As the sergeant in charge

walked toward the open end of the pipe, there was a vapor explosion. There

was no subsequent vapor fire but the villagers' thatched huts promptly ignited.

In the resulting holocaust, seventy-one people were burned to death, and about

twenty buildings destroyed. After the Ulabaria tragedy it became customary to

use standard-weight pipe in dangerous areas.

The pipeline was complete from Budge-Budge to Tinsukia on 8 July and

testing began on the 13th. The entire system was in operation on 14 August,

though, as noted above, sections of it began operating earlier to relieve pressure

on the railway.

The same month, August, that saw completion of the first pipeline from

the Calcutta area to upper Assam also saw War Department approval of a 6-inch

line from the port of Chittagong to Tinsukia. Such a route would be shorter,

have no major river crossings, be flood-free during the monsoon, and give the

advantage of dispersal and extra facilities. Its capacity was estimated at 36,000

long tons a month. Construction began on 16 October with emphasis on

completing the section from Chittagong to Tilagaon to connect with the East

Bengal fields of the ATC.48

Supply Problems in India

After General Covell's reorganization of SOS, and until late 1944, there

were no major structural changes in the SOS. A War Department change in

the authorized supply levels was successfully complied with, thanks to the

improved Assam line of communications, and the supply of reciprocal aid from

India gave signs of approaching the maximum. It was a period of steady

improvement in efficiency of operations, in stocks on hand, and in ability to

carry out the SOS mission.

General Covell's reorganization plan called for Advance Section No. 2 to

become an Intermediate Section and expand northward to take over the Ledo

base. Covell had postponed implementing this project lest it interfere with

General Pick's building the Ledo Road. When in May 1944 the issue was raised

anew, Pick opposed the change on the ground that his organization, fully

extended in support of current operations, would suffer if such a major amputation was performed on it. His views prevailed, and though an order directing

the change was published 23 August 1944, shortly after Myitkyina fell, the

actual changes were not made until considerably later.49

48

 The above is based on: (1) SOS in CBI, Appendix 12, entitled Construction Service, which

contains a Report on Pipeline Program Carried Out by Engineer District No. 12. (2) SOS in CBI, pp. 115-16. 49

 SOS in CBI, pp. 335-56.
LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION 277

In January 1944 the War Department took on itself the responsibility of

determining supply levels. Immediately thereafter, it cut the maximum level of

supply in CBI for Class I and Class III supplies from 180 to 120 days, of which

30 were operating and 90, reserve. Theater headquarters protested that the

30-day operating level was insufficient because of the length of time it took to

move supplies from Calcutta to the front. Fortunately, the sharp increase in

deliveries over the Assam line of communications that ensued in March 1944

relieved concern on this point. Indeed, such was the over-all improvement in

the theater supply situation that in compliance with a War Department directive ordering periodic review of supply levels to reduce them where possible,

SOS recommended that authorized levels for Class II and IV supplies also be

cut from 180 to 120 days.50

New Agreements on Local Procurement

Because the U.S. forces in CBI had been directed to make the maximum use

of local resources, and because the Government of India was most co-operative

in supplying them as reciprocal aid, local procurement was a major interest

of SOS.

In the summer of 1942, SOS, CBI Theater headquarters, and the Government of India reached an agreement which worked so well that in fall 1942,

General Wheeler, then commanding SOS, could report to General Stilwell that

the U.S. forces were living off the land.51

A group of new agreements with the Government of India in spring 1943,

following the visit of a lend-lease mission from the United States, extended and

speeded the reciprocal aid process. The sometimes-debated question of the

scale on which India would issue supplies to U.S. troops was settled in June

1943 by India's agreement to issue supplies without reference to the British

scale. The SOS agreed not to ask for supplies in excess of the normal American

scale, and further, that save in emergency it would not requisition imported

stores from India, except for oil products, which had a special status. India

speeded the process of supply by permitting SOS to requisition rations from

the nearest Royal Indian Army Service Corps depots. SOS in turn promised not

to buy imported stores on the open market in excess of Rupees 10,000 without

permission from the Government of India. To keep this latter agreement by

SOS from hampering the American supply position in emergencies, the Government of India soon after agreed that the SOS could apply to the nearest

Indian Army depot for imported or domestic stores other than foodstuffs in

amounts up to Rupees 10,000.52

In February 1944, the process of liberalization reached a probable limit when

U.S. forces in the field were enabled to requisition certain items common to

50

 SOS in CBI, p. 344. 51

 Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. VI. 52

 SOS in CBI, pp. 144-47.
278 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Indian and U.S. Army use directly from the local Indian Army depot without

securing approval from SOS headquarters or General Headquarters (India). In

effect, this gave U.S. organizations the same status as that of neighboring

Indian units in drawing common-user items from Indian stocks.

During 1943 and 1944, reciprocal aid from India steadily increased until it

finally began to seem that the upper limit was being approached even though

various U.S. agencies took steps to improve Indian productivity. Indians were

trained in the United States. Teams of U.S. technicians toured Indian factories

to teach improved production methods. Raw materials, such as steel and

alkaline-reclaimed rubber, and capital goods, such as rolling stock and mining

equipment, were furnished where advisable and possible.53

Indian civilian employees, ranging from Anglo-Indian secretaries in headquarters installations to Indian technicians to unskilled Indian laborers were

an essential and invaluable reinforcement. Since the American effort in India

was primarily air and supply, employment of these Indian civilians meant that

fewer American troops were needed. These Indians were paid by the Government of India under reciprocal aid. By 30 September 1944, the SOS and AAF's

Air Service Command employed approximately 79,000, of whom 21,000 were

skilled and semiskilled, and 58,000 unskilled. Many of the skilled people

learned their trades while working for the U.S. Army. Training and supervising

them were added to the responsibilities of many U.S. Army enlisted men, so

that the advantage was not without its indirect cost.54

In 1944, SOS could only estimate the dollar value of the reciprocal aid

extended by the Government of India. That government claimed its administrative resources would not permit furnishing an appraisal of the dollar value

of reciprocal aid. The SOS therefore was obliged to set up its own system for

appraising reciprocal aid received so that it might have data both for current

operational purposes and for the anticipated postwar settlement of accounts.55

The SOS estimates for the period from January 1943 through October 1944 are

given below:

1943 1944

January-February. ..................... $5,710,370 $35,662,824

March-April.......................... 6,413,377 46,042,316

May-June ............................ 9,049,295 52,482,591

July-August.......................... 13,113,736 56,203,485

September-October. ................... 16,881,941 57,050,847

November-December. ................. 27,469,293 _ _ _ _ _

In February 1944, the Finance Member of the Government of India, by an

address to India's Legislative Assembly, gave clear warning that the Government of India was about to combat inflationary tendencies in the Indian

53

 SOS in CBI, pp. 149-50. 54

 G-4 Per Rpt, Hq USAF CBI, quarter ending 30 Sep 44, pars. 3i, 9g. OCMH. 55

 Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 209.
LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION 279

economy by cutting back military production. He hinted that if India was to

furnish more support to operations in Southeast Asia, then her commitments

for support of Middle Eastern and Mediterranean operations would have to be

reduced. At the same time, official circles of the Government of India commented that 1944 supply would not be greatly affected by the new policy but

that major cutbacks in military production could be expected in 1945.

Soon after, production of woolen cloth for military use stopped. All output

was reserved for civilians, and by the end of 1944 many types of cotton goods

were reserved for civilian use. Trying though this may have been for American

supply personnel, nevertheless, the Indian point of view should not be overlooked. The cash income of that statistical fable, the average Indian, was about

$20.00 a year (Rupees 60). From that sum, he had to buy such cash items as

cooking oil and salt, and supplement his meager diet. Very likely the peasant

family wardrobe included one set of garments per person. Thus, there was no

slack to be taken up, and the peasant counted on being able to replace clothing

as it wore out. If no cloth was available at the bazaar, the little spinning wheels

of the villages could hardly make up the difference. Sullenness in the villages,

whence comes the Indian soldier, could soon imperil the whole Indian war

effort, and the Government of India had to realize that there was a point

beyond which the patient farmer could not be overloaded.

In the light of the warnings referred to above, SOS could not have been

surprised to learn in July that 183 of 336 items previously available at Indian

depots on blanket sanction would be unavailable in differing percentages, some

as high as 100 percent. Similarly, the Government of India estimated that 246

items of 648 would be unavailable in 1945. Beginning 1 August 1944, the

quantity of dairy products, meat, sugar, and fish that India would supply was

cut back to the May 1944 level. Indian authorities said that they wanted to

cancel supplying steam-laundry facilities, office supplies, and printing. General

Covell personally interceded to have that action rescinded.56

In addition to applying pressure at the policy level, the Government of

India took unilateral action to cut the flow of reciprocal aid. General Covell

commented:

Commitments in India had come to have none of the firm connotation associated with

them in America. Promised delivery dates were ignored or quantities reduced without

advance notice, often months after promised delivery dates. Many commitments for supplies

were made but actual delivery was frequently late, often in quantities less than required,

making it difficult for SOS to plan future supply. Frequently emergency shipments from the

United States became necessary because last minute cancellations by Indian agencies would

not permit requisitions on the U.S. to be processed normally.57

The Indian attitude affected Sino-American relations because the United States

understood that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would

56

 SOS in CBI, pp. 153-55. 57

 Covell Report, pp. 31-32. Substantially the same passage is in SOS in CBI, p. 156.
280 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

supply the Chinese forces based on India through British lend-lease to China.

But, in "many cases" this had not been done, and approximately 33 percent of

the total value of supplies to the Chinese Army in India came from U.S. sources,

$9,000,000.00 worth.58

The situation was complex. Neither SOS nor the Government of India

desired to go beyond a certain point, and so there was room for compromise,

adjustment, and negotiation. SOS took full advantage of the diplomatic opportunities open to it, and succeeded in actually raising the dollar volume of

reciprocal aid as between the May-June 1944 period and that of SeptemberOctober. Examination of physical volume suggests that oil products increased,

subsistence held steady, and textile items dropped. Despite the present success

of its diplomacy, SOS felt concerned about the future.59

Housekeeping Problems

Difficulties in the movement of supplies to the forward areas in Assam,

further complicated by inadequate warehouse space, made stock control in

Assam very difficult in 1942 and 1943. Since the base depots automatically forwarded balanced stocks, the lack of proper stock control ultimately led to an

actual overstocking of certain items, particularly quartermaster supplies.

Because the quartermaster had to provide food for an extraordinary collection

of races and sects (Hindu, Moslem, Burmese, Chinese, hillman, British, and

American) each with different dietary requirements or regulations, it was necessary to keep an extremely varied inventory, with all the administrative problems involved. Beginning in September 1943, a stock record system for

quartermaster items was set up. It did not work well because the warehouses

were not well organized.

The War Department in September 1943 instituted a system of automatic

supply based on reports from overseas theaters, which in turn had to be an

accurate reflection of stocks on hand. This required changes in CBI procedures.

Stock control and inventory teams were sent out from the United States to

place the system in operation, a task of several months.

Another problem was that of securing an adequate supply of spare parts.

War Department procedure required spare parts to be requisitioned on a

formula basis. Unfortunately, the formula did not fit operating conditions in

Assam and Burma. Abrasive dust in the air wore down engine parts. Fungus

and rust attacked delicate instruments. Not until requisitions could be based on

usage factors as determined by actual experience in the theater, was it possible

to obtain adequate stocks of spare parts.60

58

 SOS in CBI, p. 156. 59

 (1) Covell Report. (2) SOS in CBI, tables facing p. 167. 60

 SOS in CBI, pp. 334-400.
LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION 281

Chinese Lend-Lease

For SOS, Chinese lend-lease was a housekeeping problem, for its responsibilities were executive, not policy-making. Housekeeping in the most literal

sense was badly needed for Chinese lend-lease, for as late as the fall of 1943,

4,200 tons of Chinese lend-lease were still to be seen lying in the Assam rice

paddies where the agents of China Defense Supplies, Inc., had dumped them

in the spring of 1942. They had lain there through three seasons of monsoon

rains and scorching heat. For example, there were in India 261,000,000 rounds

of 7.92-mm. ammunition for China. One hundred million of them were in

Assam. By February 1944, it was estimated that heat and moisture had oxidized

80,000,000 rounds. SOS asked General Headquarters (India) to renovate the

whole store in Indian arsenals.61 Not only was lend-lease not properly stored,

but the number and nature of items on hand were unknown.62

The process of honoring earlier lend-lease commitments to the Chinese

created what SOS knew as the stockpile problem. As the shipping situation on

the high seas eased, lend-lease for China began to move to India, there to wait

shipment to China. Since by Presidential decision, the bulk of Hump tonnage

was to go to the Fourteenth Air Force, the prospects of moving these stockpiles

to China were remote. Moreover, the International Division of Army Service

Forces had been shipping matériel as it was available, against General Stilwell's

requisitions for sixty Chinese divisions.63 This meant that the stockpiles were

out of balance, with critical items in short supply, and warehouse facilities

filled with less vital needs.

The ever-growing bulk of the stockpiles, evenly divided between military

and civilian goods, was a handicap in procuring items of current necessity

because the Munitions Assignments Board in Washington (which allocated

lend-lease in accord with directives from the Combined Chiefs of Staff) tended

to see the bulk of the piles rather than their composition. Moreover, SOS

officers could see little logic in their having to requisition items for the U.S.

Army from the United States, with all the delay involved, when identical pieces

of lend-lease equipment were on hand in India with their prospects of delivery

to China very remote.64

On 31 December 1943 Col. William S. Gaud, Jr., took up his duties in

Chungking as representative of the War Department in "all matters pertaining

to the assignment of military supplies and equipment to the Chinese Government." This arrangement made it possible for the Chinese Government to deal

directly with the War Department on the sensitive issue of lend-lease and 61

 SOS in CBI, pp. 465-67. 62

 Memo, Col William S. Gaud, Jr., WD Mil Aid Representative to China, for Director of

Materiel, Hq ASF, 10 Dec 43, sub: Lend-Lease to China, in Gaud Rpt 2, 4-10 Dec 43. (Hereafter Gaud Report — — —.) AG (ASF ID) 319.1, A46-299. 63

 (1) SOS in CBI, p. 470. (2) For a discussion of the origins of the sixty division program, see Stilwell's Mission to China, Chapters VII and VIII. 64

 SOS in CBI, p. 471.
Supplies in open storage in India included M3 tanks parked along

Hospital Road in Calcutta (above) and fuel drums at Ranaghat (below.)
LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION 283

freed CBI Theater headquarters of the unpleasant duty of commenting on

Chinese lend-lease requisitions.

Colonel Gaud's survey of the physical aspects of the lend-lease situation in

Assam disclosed some of the arguments against pouring lend-lease into a

command without the physical resources to handle it, and of shipping some of

it under the auspices of an organization, in this case, China Defense Supplies,

Inc., which did not function with administrative efficiency. Colonel Gaud

found that no one knew exactly how many tons of Chinese lend-lease were in

India nor exactly what was on hand. China Defense Supplies, Inc., did not always give adequate identification of what it shipped to India, nor did it always

furnish manifests or shipping lists. Once goods arrived in India, they were

handled by SOS, which was perennially short of American personnel and dependent on the Government of India for warehouse construction. Goods were

manhandled from ship to train to shed by coolies ignorant of what fragile or this

side up might mean. Once in the sheds, supplies were simply piled there, with

no attempt at physical inventory. Records showed only "CDS supplies" or

"spare parts." CDS storage areas in Assam were not fenced in, and were

guarded only during daylight hours by a few unarmed Chinese civilians. Colonel Gaud believed the basic cause of wastage was a shortage of American enlisted personnel. He found SOS fully aware of the problem, but completely

handicapped by the simple lack of men to do the work. Therefore, a situation

had arisen in which Headquarters, SOS, and the subordinate sections gave totals of lend-lease on hand that differed by as much as 50 percent.65

Since SOS was fully appreciative of the situation, the corrective measures

and proper storekeeping could be applied as reinforcements came to the theater in accord with the QUADRANT decisions to provide an adequate logistical

foundation for the Allied effort in Asia. Thus, SOS personnel strength increased from 31,074 on 30 November 1943 to 42,574 on 29 February 1944. (See

Table 4.) And so, on 28 February, Colonel Gaud could report to the War Department that the situation in Assam was "markedly different" from what it

had been in December.66 With the inventory problem being solved, Gaud

thought that the warehouse construction problem was the principal one to be

faced in handling Chinese lend-lease.

In spring 1944 the inventorying and proper storage of Chinese lend-lease

made diversions from it to fill U.S. supply needs administratively simple even

if diplomatically complex. Ever since the opening of the first U.S. base at

Karachi, the Chinese had been willing to permit diversion from their lendlease stocks to the SOS. With the decision of the War Department in the

spring of 1942 that General Stilwell should decide when and where title would

pass to the Chinese, there were no legal barriers to repossession of War Department-procured Chinese lend-lease that arrived in India after the summer

65

 Gaud Reports 1 and 2. 66

 Gaud Report 7.
284 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

of 1942. However, Stilwell knew what the effect of a policy of wholesale diversion would be on the Chinese. Therefore, until May 1944, SOS was ordered to

follow a policy of securing the consent of Chinese authorities before diverting

any lend-lease item to American use.67

In April, the Munitions Assignments Board in Washington ordered CBI

Theater to repossess all War Department-procured lend-lease vehicles, tires,

and spare parts in India beyond those needed for the Chinese Army in India,

for the U.S.-sponsored Chinese divisions along the Salween, and for Ramgarh

Training Center. The order specifically exempted nonstandard trucks and parts

ordered by the Chinese for use in China. The Munitions Assignments Board

further authorized the theater to divert any War Department-procured lendlease that might be used to advantage in the war effort.

Gen. Ho Ying-chin, Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army, was told on 3 May

that the Chinese would be informed of all diversions. The Chinese would be

allowed to requisition replacements, but the Munitions Assignments Board

reserved the right to pass on all such. The reason for the policy, General Ho

learned, was to make effective use of all supplies that could not be transported

to China.68

The Chinese asked that Headquarters, CBI Theater, promise to replace all

diverted lend-lease, and in Washington, T. V. Soong protested strongly. The

reply to Dr. Soong said:

There existing in the United States a growing aversion to idle stockpiles, especially in

view of spoilage and wastage, and an ever-increasing desire that all materials be used to the

best possible advantage in the war effort. . . . The State Department and Foreign Economic

Administration are in complete agreement that under the Master Agreements title to all

lend-lease material of whatsoever nature and to whatsoever country transferred remains with

the United States Government. . . .

The United States Government retains full authority for the diversion of such China

Lend-Lease supplies as are incapable of serving the end use for which they were originally

provided. . . .69

In compliance with the Munitions Assignments Board directive, SOS was

authorized to divert War Department-procured matériel to U.S. troops or issue

such to U.S.-sponsored Chinese divisions, without consulting the Chinese.

Initially, diversions under this policy were small, and until 1 July 1944 totaled

only $5,000,000 for medical, ordnance, signal, and engineer supplies.70

Medical Problems in the Rear Area

The medical problems of operations in India and Burma were potentially

grave. They reflected an environment that was either inherently unhealthful,

as in Burma, or one that had, as in India, become unhealthful through the un- 67

 SOS in CBI, p. 475. 68

 Ltr, Ferris to Ho, 3 May 44. Gaud Report 12, Tab A. 69

 Ltr, Walter W. Fowler, Special Representative, to T. V. Soong, 5 Jun 44. Gaud Report 14, Table B. 70

 SOS in CBI, pp. 475-76.
LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION 285

sanitary practices of the inhabitants. In India, fevers and alimentary disorders

were endemic. In Burma, the insect-borne diseases such as malaria and scrub

typhus were everywhere, while the difficulties of maintaining sanitation on

campaign in a hot, moist climate spread alimentary diseases. Fortunately, the

American medical authorities in the theater, who functioned as part of the

SOS, were able to draw on local experience and resources. Hospital space, supplies, and counsel were freely given by British and Indian medical organizations.

In October 1943 the SOS medical organization was deployed from Karachi

to Ledo. There were probably close to 10,000 beds available for patients. The

exact situation is obscure because hospitals operated more beds than their

T/O's provided—about 75 percent more on the average. At Ledo the 20th

General Hospital and the 14th, 48th, and 73d Evacuation Hospitals had 3,250

T/O beds. In central India, at Agra and Delhi, were the 97th and 100th Station

Hospitals, with 100 T/O beds each. At Karachi was the 181st General Hospital, with 1,000 T/O beds. In China, whose support was the aim of all American effort, was the 95th Station Hospital, 100 T/O beds, at Kunming.

Working with the 20th General and 14th, 48th, and 73d Evacuation Hospitals in the Ledo area was the 151st Medical Battalion. The function of the

151st was to link the combat area with base medical units. Initially, it established a clearing station and a chain of collecting stations, which were eventually outmoded by the growing practice of air evacuation. The most significant work of the medical units from Ledo forward was medical care for the

Chinese Army in India.71

The dispersal of American resources among the airfields of Assam and the

United Provinces (Agra and Oudh), along the line of communications from

Calcutta north, and in the port cities—a dispersal resulting in a great number

of small extemporized detachments—forced an equal dispersal of medical care.

Sixteen dispensaries were being operated in Calcutta and Karachi. Pipeline

construction crews, railway personnel, and Signal Corps crews were followed

by small provisional medical units. In early 1944 unauthorized provisional hospitals (not activated as T/O units) were operated at Kweilin, China, Kurmitola, Bengal, and Kanchrapara and Camp Angus, Bengal. Three more unauthorized hospitals were under construction. Personnel for these many ad hoc

installations came from the several hospitals which were correspondingly

strained when they needed facilities to care for the American and Chinese

troops in their vicinity. The necessity of providing hospitalization for the Chinese in medical installations whose facilities had been calculated by the number of U.S. troops on hand was a further severe strain. Hospitals, perhaps 50

percent of whose personnel were on detached service, had to cope with a

patient load far above their normal capacity.72

71

 SOS in CBI, App. 16, Medical Section, Sec. I, 1942-44, pp. 31, 47. 72

 App. cited n. 71, Sec. I, pp. 52-53.
286 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Theater authorities believed that the situation was not understood in Washington, for medical statistical reports reflected only the hospitalization provided

for U.S. personnel. In June 1944, the Tables of Organization for hospitals in

the theater provided 8,800 beds. Of these T/O beds, 7,787 were occupied, so

that, formally, the picture was comforting. Actually, there were 18,635 beds

available, or 212 percent of the T/O capacity. Of these, 12,530 were currently

in use, 7,130 by Americans and 5,400 by Chinese. Since medical personnel had

been allotted for only 8,800 beds, the strain was obvious. Energetic representations were made to the War Department, and the CBI Theater surgeon, Col.

Robert P. Williams, presented them in person.

While CBI Theater waited for these requests to bear fruit, a program of reorganization and redeployment was begun within the theater. For example, the

1,000-bed hospital at Karachi, a port declining in importance as Calcutta grew,

was reorganized as a 500-bed unit. The personnel and facilities thus released

were used to activate the 371st Station Hospital which, in turn, went to Ramgarh, there to operate a 750-bed hospital. Other static hospitals were enlarged.

The Surgeon General's Office agreed to send two 1,000-bed general hospitals, one 400-bed field hospital, and two 100-bed station hospitals to the theater, plus medical personnel to permit expanding units in CBI and activating

others. In the fall of 1944, the enlargement of six hospitals and the arrival of

others from the United States greatly eased the personnel shortage.73

The 1943 hospital admissions suggest the problems faced in India. There

were 8,136 admissions for malaria; 6,744 for alimentary disorders; 2,637 for

venereal disease, and 1,150 for dengue fever.74 The first malaria control and

survey units arrived in early 1943. A program of mosquito control was embarked on, but results were not satisfactory. In this connection, it must be recorded that DDT was not available in quantity in CBI until the end of 1944,

nor was atebrin suppressive therapy used in India proper. Only in the combat

zone (roughly, forward of Ledo) was atebrin used, and it was late 1943 before

the use of it was made general.75

Because theater medical authorities believed their attempts to control mosquitoes were effective, they were disappointed at the results obtained in 1944.

The CBI malaria rate in 1943 was 206 per thousand per year (250 in the Calcutta area).76

 In 1944 it dropped to 167 per thousand per year. This did not

seem to compare well with experience in the Southwest Pacific. The medical

men were therefore inclined to believe that there had been a failure in discipline and personal protective measures, by implication, a failure in command

and morale. In the light of this estimate, a campaign was undertaken in late

73

 App. cited n. 71, Sec. II, 1 Jul-24 Oct 44, pp. 13-18. 74

 App. cited n. 71, Sec. I, p. 46. 75

 (1) Stone MS, II, 381. (2) App. cited n. 71, Sec. II, pp. 37-38. 76

 App. cited n. 19(1), Sec. IIf.
LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION 287

1944 to indoctrinate all echelons of the theater in command responsibility,

malaria discipline, suppressive atebrin, and the use of DDT.77

The number of alimentary disorders admitted to hospitals was not a fair

index of the seriousness of that problem. In the hot season of April to August

1944, the time of the year when disease rates always rose sharply, there were

16,562 cases serious enough to be marked either hospital or quarters. The doctors estimated that three times that number of men were affected, but able to

stay on duty at whatever cost in discomfort and loss of efficiency. Nor can the

factor of lowered vitality and predisposition to other diseases be ignored. All

in all, perhaps 200,000 man-days were lost from this cause in 1944, a serious

matter in an undermanned theater. "It is believed that this high rate was caused

by poor mess sanitation, employment of native food handlers, inadequate refrigeration, inadequate water heating facilities, failure to control flies, insanitary

disposal of human excreta, contaminated water, eating at civilian restaurants,

and a defeatist belief among officers and men that such diseases were inescapable in this Theater and that the sanitary problem was unconquerable."

 78

That alimentary disorders were endemic in India was no secret and the first

American arrivals sought to meet the problem by radical measures. The base

section veterinarian at Karachi in 1942 surveyed the local abattoir, ice plant,

and dairy, and condemned them all. He recommended that the SOS build and

operate its own food-processing installations, a step that became standard at all

major U.S. troop concentrations. As American personnel were deployed across

India the burden on the Veterinary Corps grew apace. "In addition to food inspection, they supervised the operation of abattoirs; supervised the production

of dairy products; operated small farms; scoured the country for beef animals;

assisted in vaccination of local herds against rinderpest and anthrax; and assisted local Quartermasters in closing contracts for food, and in the overhauling of subsistence stores."

 79

 The Sanitary Corps took analogous precautions

with the water supply.

In addition to providing pure food and water, the medical authorities

sought to prevent later contamination of foodstuffs. The personnel shortage,

which made it hard to obtain kitchen help and waiters, made it necessary to

employ Indian civilians. So far as possible, they were assigned duties which

did not involve food handling. Attempts were made to provide adequate supplies of hot water, refrigeration, screening, garbage disposal facilities, and DDT

spray.

Unfortunately, these efforts did not bring the results desired. Admission

rates per thousand per annum for diarrhea and dysentery were, until August

1944, substantially higher than in 1943. Beginning in May 1944 the malaria

admissions rate showed improvement over the preceding year, but it was not

77

 App. cited n. 71, Sec. II, pp. 37-38. 78

 App. cited n. 71, Sec. II, pp. 34-35. 79

 App. cited n. 71, Sec. I, p. 15; quotation, p. 45.
288 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

great. Preventive medicine did not come into its own in this theater until the

winter of 1944-45.80

Logistical Problems in China

The logistical problems of operating in China and India had a family resemblance. Neither India nor China had a well-advanced industrial structure.

In both, the American forces were ordered by the War Department to make

the maximum possible use of local resources of all sorts. In both, the population weighed heavily on the land. In both countries the U.S. forces depended

on one major line of communications whose operation was perforce left in the

hands of local authority, since the War Department directed that local resources be used and American operation would necessarily involve a heavy

commitment of American resources of men and machines. Despite the family

resemblance, the logistical problems in China represented the ultimate development of their species.

India was isolated by distance, but China was blockaded. Inflation was a

grave concern of the Government of India, but it was out of control in China.

Indian industry was hard-pressed, but growing and making a major contribution to the Allied cause in the Middle and Far East. Chinese industry retrogressed under the pressure of isolation and inflation. The Assam line of communications had as its principal component a railroad whose capacity had

never been fully exploited; the eastern line of communications had a 500-milelong road, scratched out of the mountains and navigated by a collection of

dilapidated trucks. Until 1944, both arteries were the sole responsibility of

local authority. In India, the American forces drew their food and clothing

from the Government of India through the SOS. In China, the Americans

were in the most literal sense guests of the Chinese, for they lived in hostels

operated by the Chinese War Area Service Corps, known to every American as

WASC.

Three logistical problems beyond the control of SOS greatly affected its operations in China. The Hump may be mentioned first. Suffice it to say the SOS

problems diminished or increased as the amount of tonnage arriving from

India fluctuated. The second problem was inflation. Because the U.S. forces

were directed to live off the country and, in view of China's isolation, had no

option in the matter, the galloping inflation which steadily weakened the Chinese war effort made it ever less possible for SOS to obtain goods and services, for example, spare parts and building construction, in the open market.

The Chinese Government insisted that the exchange rate between Chinese

and American dollars should be $20 Chinese for $1 American. As of January

1944, the open or black market rate was 100 to 1. That was bad enough, but

80

 History of India-Burma Theater, 1944-1945, II, 298-300. OCMH.
LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION 289

prices were rising about six times as fast as the value of the dollar. Notably,

prices of items used by the Chinese, such as blue cloth and rice, rose far faster

than those used by Americans. In any event, there were too few Americans in

China to affect so great a market as the 200 million plus Chinese in unoccupied

China. The sophisticated and practical Chinese had long before discovered the

magic of credit, and had an elaborate and nationwide net of small banks or

"cash shops." Control of these myriad little banks was beyond the administrative resources of the central government. Speculators borrowed heavily from

the banks, then accumulated inventories which increased in value far more

rapidly than even the 9 percent a month the banks were charging by early 1944.

As a result, from July 1937 to June 1944, the expenditures of the Chinese Nationalist Government increased 120 times; the purchasing power of its currency decreased by 384 times. In terms of actual goods and services, the

Chinese Nationalist Government effort of 1944 was about one third that of

1937. Its budget was about 3 percent of the national income.81

The eastern line of communications from Kunming to Chennault's east

China air bases was not under American control. Consistent with the policy

followed in India, the American authorities had left the matter to the Chinese.

There were considerable stretches of railway in the eastern line of communications that functioned with reasonable efficiency and a high degree of safety.

The worst bottleneck was the Kutsing-Tushan Highway, a 500-mile stretch,

and therefore longer than the 483 miles from Ledo, Assam Province, India, to

Wanting, China. (See Map 1.)

The majority of the distance is characterized by rugged, mountainous terrain with a practically continuous series of hair-pin turns with grades as steep as 27%. The road-bed has a

crushed rock foundation with a clay soil surface. Much of the road is extremely rough and

caused a high incidence of spring failures and a rapid deterioration of chassis and bodies.

The clay surface made travel extremely hazardous during the rainy season. The route has a

large number of deep cuts and high fills and during the wet season, landslides and cave-ins

frequently completely blocked all movement for days until native crews could clear the

obstruction.82

In January 1944, the Southwest Highway Transport Administration, the

principal Chinese Government agency operating on the eastern line of communications, owned 1,196 two and three-ton trucks of which 183 were operable. The agency was able to contract for the services, at one time or another

during the month, of 2,958 privately owned vehicles. Maintenance was of the

most rudimentary sort. Because inflation steadily cut the salaries of the Chinese

81

 (1) The Chinese Government financed the bulk of its war expenditures by issuing paper money, as has been noted in Stilwell's Mission to China. (2) SOS in CBI, App. I, SOS in China, Sec. II; App. F, Incl 4, Economic Conditions in Free China and Their Effects on Army Procurement. (3) Ltr, Col Coke S. Matthews, Pres, Bd of Investigation, to CG, USFCT, 31 Oct 45, with Rpt,

sub: Housing and Construction for American Personnel and Installations in Kunming, China;

Exhibit N. CT 40, Dr 4, KCRC. 82

 SOS in CBI, App. I, SOS in China, Sec. II; App. C, p. 4.
290 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Government employees operating the trucks, they perforce loaded their vehicles with passengers and goods for private gain. There were no facilities for

the truck drivers along the route beyond the few little roadside inns. Therefore, in February 1944, an average of sixteen trucks a day was moving eastward,

when ninety should have been the minimum. Wrecked trucks dotted the highway. Not unnaturally, the Chinese trying to operate the eastern line of communications were thoroughly disheartened. The most hopeful sign was that

Chennault, his attention now fixed on the eastern line of communications, demanded remedial action.83

Though Chennault had been extremely skeptical of the worth of the Ledo

Road, he had not hesitated in May 1943 to place his air squadrons at the end

of the much longer eastern line of communications. Not until October 1943

did he begin to draw the attention of his superiors to the problem of increasing

its efficiency. The response of CBI Theater headquarters to his pleas and warnings may justly be compared to its response to the problems of the Assam line

of communications.84

As 1944 began, the SOS in China had a strength of 452 men, suggesting

the scale of the logistical effort in China. It was organized into Advance Section No. 3 with 354 men, working mostly in and around Kunming, and Advance Section No. 4 with 98 men stationed at Kweilin and Heng-yang. The

sharp disparity in strength reflected the circumstance that the Fourteenth Air

Force was largely supported by the Air Service Command (ASC). On 20 January

1944, the two SOS sections merged to become Advance Section No. 1, Col.

Lewis P. Jordan, commanding. At Kunming and Yun-nan-i were airfreight reception and discharge stations to handle Hump tonnage. The Ordnance people had a shop at Kunming for 3d and 4th echelon motor maintenance. The

shop had facilities for manufacturing a few spare parts. There were no ordnance facilities on the eastern line of communications. The 95th Station Hospital at Kunming and a hospital improvised by the SOS at Kweilin met

medical needs. Until March 1944 Chinese nurses were used. Because of the fact

that each American in China increased demands on Hump tonnage, it was Stilwell's policy to keep U.S. personnel in China to the absolute minimum. It was

believed that American women would need special types of housing and require allocation of Hump tonnage to certain modest luxuries such as cosmetics

which would be better devoted to the stuff of war.85

As for subsistence, the War Area Service Corps' support of U.S. operations

in China was a major project for the Chinese.86 In the Kunming area the

83

 Bykofsky MS. 84

 (1) See pp. 19-20, 23, above. (2) Memo, Chennault for Stilwell, 30 Dec 43, sub: Transpor- tation Facilities from Yunnan Eastwards. The Chennault-Wedemeyer Letter, Item 6. (3) Bykofsky

MS.

85

 SOS in CBI, App. I, SOS in China. 86

 (1) A fuller treatment of WASC is in History of CBI, Section III, Appendix XII, War Area

Service Command.
LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION 291

WASC operated thirteen hostels. The hostels were numbered consecutively,

with one exception. The sentiments of pilots who might find themselves assigned to Hostel No. 13 were respected. Consequently, the numbers ran 11,

12, and 14. Under U.S. supervision, the WASC operated an abattoir. The Chinese purchased cattle, hogs, and chickens, and delivered them to the abattoir.

There they were inspected, butchered, and dressed under supervision of U.S.

personnel and delivered to the several mess halls in U.S. trucks. The WASC

furnished butcher, coolies, ice, and everything else needed to operate the abattoir. In the Cheng-tu area, the XX Bomber Command's base, the hostels were

so far apart that WASC operated five abattoirs and a large co-operative market.

All laundering was done by WASC. Fresh vegetables and staple products were

purchased by WASC and delivered to the several mess halls in accord with

the ration strengths.

The arrangement was not entirely satisfactory to the United States. Chinese

intentions were good, but the WASC did not have the administrative ability to

meet its commitments. Food was often very bad, buildings were not maintained, and sanitary conditions were often below the acceptable minimum.

WASC padded the daily returns on U.S. personnel accommodated, presumably

with a view to postwar settlement. By February 1944, the situation appeared

"critical" to Stilwell.87 In February, conferences began to see if the United

States could not become a paying guest in China, with more control over the

accommodations. The Quartermaster Section did what it could to supplement

the WASC ration by supplying such items as butter, jam, coffee, powdered

milk, and sweets, which were flown in from India. Liaison and radio teams in

the field were given special rations of canned meats, fruits, and vegetables.

Transportation was hampered because operation of trucks in China was

most difficult, due to China's isolation, lack of developed oil resources, and

lack of an industry to supply spare parts in adequate quality and quantity. Replacement vehicles were bought on the open market. The trucks necessarily

used a locally compounded fuel that was 25 percent gasoline and 75 percent

alcohol. The alcohol formed acid compounds which attacked the bearings and

crankshafts, forcing frequent cleaning and repair. The washboard roads over

which the trucks operated subjected them to a terrible pounding which inevitably shook loose every joint and fitting.

Construction was principally a Chinese function. Until March 1944, the

SOS contracted directly with individual Chinese firms for nonoperational

construction. For operational construction, the SOS prepared plans and submitted requests to the Chinese Government. Such projects were paid for by

the Chinese as part of their contribution to the United Nations war effort. The

procedure was open to criticism because the Ministry of Finance was reluctant

to advance the funds even after other Chinese agencies had concurred in the

project. 87

 History of CBI, p. 215.
292 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

In February 1944 a division of responsibility between the SOS and the

Air Service Command was arranged that gave the latter almost complete

local responsibility in east China. The SOS would see to it that supplies came

to Kweilin after which the ASC would take over. That shift in responsibility

left construction for the instructors with the Second Thirty Divisions,

transportation operations, and Kweilin hospital the only SOS activities in east

China.

Very likely one of the major factors behind the new and clear-cut division of

responsibility was Chennault's representations. The poor operation of the

eastern line of communications so hampered his operations that in December

1943 he sent a sharp letter to Stilwell demanding either that the SOS set up an

adequate line of communications to east China or let him have control over his

own line of communications. In January 1944, Chennault flew to New Delhi

to present his case in person. This resulted in the assignment of Lt. Col.

Maurice E. Sheahan to be transportation officer of Advance Section No. 1.

Colonel Sheahan's arrival on 2 February marked the beginning of better times.

Soon after, Headquarters, SOS took more notice of problems in China. Since

his arrival, Covell's attention had been fixed on India. Not until 23 February

do his reports to Somervell mention the eastern line of communications, but

then he describes it as a real problem.

Surveying the eastern line of communications, Colonel Sheahan found it in

a depressing state and quickly proposed a series of remedies, dependent of

course on Hump tonnage. They were grouped together as TIGAR 26 A, or

TIG-26A. The mission of TIG-26A was to move supplies for the Fourteenth

Air Force over the line of communications Kunming-Chanyi-KweiyangTushan-Liuchow-Kweilin to be distributed around the east China airfields. The

target for the period July-December 1944 was set at 8,000 tons a month. From

the termini of Liuchow and Kweilin, Chinese agencies were to move the supplies. For means, Sheahan wanted to fly in 700 trucks (500 11⁄2-ton 4x2

Chevrolets and 200 6x6 General Motors) and spare parts, engines, tires, and

devices to convert gasoline-fueled engines to charcoal burning for the Chinese.

He also requested three quartermaster truck companies, a heavy automotive

maintenance company, and a military police platoon, plus overhead to supervise and control the American convoys Sheahan would operate. Simultaneously,

SOS contemplated TIGAR 26 B, bringing in 500 5-ton truck-trailer combinations from the Persian Gulf to China via the Soviet Union. Colonel Sheahan's

proposals began moving up the chain of command.88 Until they were approved

88

 (1) App. cited n. 85. (2) Bykofsky MS. (3) See Ch. I, above. (4) Implementation of

TIGAR 26 B was delayed by the refusal of the Soviet Union to allow vehicles to cross its terri- tory. Permission was not granted until fall 1944, and a convoy, code name LUX, was organized in the Persian Gulf Command. Uprisings in Sinkiang Province, China, resulted in last-minute changes in LUX plans. The LUX movement was changed to enter China via the Ledo Road. With

the arrival of the LUX convoy in China in March 1945, transportation problems were considerably

relieved.
LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION 293

and the means to implement them arrived in CBI, Chennault's operations

would be limited to what could trickle forward over the eastern line of

communications.

Summary

After twenty months' experience proved that the Assam line of communications was not efficiently run under civilian control, and after the

QUADRANT decisions resulted in service troops being allotted to CBI, it was

possible to place the control of the line of communications in the hands of an

Anglo-American military panel, and to use American personnel in key positions at Calcutta and on the Bengal and Assam Railway. The result was a great

increase in tonnage brought forward at a most opportune time, when the

Japanese were crossing the Indian border. Within the SOS, its administration

was simplified, and though the Government of India feared that inflation might

force it to cut back military production, the natural impact of such a move on

the supplies India could give the U.S. forces on reciprocal aid account (reverse

lend-lease) remained in the future. There was increasing dissatisfaction with

the health of the command, but as yet little improvement in the fight against

the effects of a contaminated environment. In India, the SOS picture in 1943-44

was a steadily brightening one.

In China, the picture remained one of problems and projects that outran

the logistical support at hand. China's isolation, the unchecked inflation that

was gradually but certainly wrecking her economy, and the extreme difficulties

of transportation all combined to hobble the U.S. effort. In 1943, the President

and the Generalissimo had defined the U.S. effort as being in the air, and had

set it at a level beyond the ability of the CBI Theater to support. That having

been done, there followed no co-ordinated effort to provide logistical support.89

As the spring of 1944 came to east China, the manifold consequences of the

President's and the Generalissimo's decision were about to unfold.

89

 See Stilwell's Mission to China.

PART THREE

COMMAND PROBLEMS IN CHINA THEATER

CHAPTER VIII

Decisions To Attack

North and east of Burma, diplomatic and military battles of great

significance for the future of Asia were fought in 1944. Both the Chinese and

the Japanese resolved on major operations in China Theater. So vast was the

arena of conflict that the two sides could make their offensive efforts many

hundreds of miles apart. Unfortunately for the Allies, as they attacked in one

area and tried to defend in another, they were divided among themselves on

national lines, and within each nation on lines of policy. The united, resolute

wholehearted effort that might aid a speedy victory did not exist.

The Chinese decision to take the offensive ensued upon a complete change

in the President's point of view. Though the United States and the British

Commonwealth at Cairo in December 1943 had gone back on their longstanding and oft-repeated commitments for a major amphibious operation in

the Bay of Bengal, the President now supported Marshall and Stilwell in taking

the line that China's self-interest required the Chinese to attack across the

Salween River into Burma. This change in Roosevelt's thinking meant support

for the thesis long advanced by the War Department, that the Chinese should

be asked to take definite aggressive action with the lend-lease, credits, and air

support they received from the United States. With Stilwell fully occupied in

north Burma, it was the President who took the lead in calling on the Generalissimo to act, and with messages that had clear echoes of the bargaining or

quid pro quo approach so long urged by Marshall, Stimson, and Stilwell.

"Money Is the Root of All Our Trouble"

The President's radio of 29 December 1943 was strong in tone, explaining

that considerable equipment and instructor personnel were scheduled for movement to China to assist in preparing the Y-Force for Burma operations. The

President told the Generalissimo that he wanted to "avoid at this time the use

of the restricted airlift in the employment of these resources in an effort, the

full impact of which upon the enemy will be delayed."

 1

With Stilwell in Burma, his own Chief of Staff, China, Burma and India

Theater, General Hearn, had the duty of delivering the President's messages to

1

 (1) Memo 103, Roosevelt for Generalissimo, 29 Dec 43 (delivered by Hearn). Item 1578, Bk 5, JWS Personal File. (2) See Chs. II and IV, above.
298 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

the Chinese. This, however, did not mean that General Hearn was in any sense

a staff officer of the Generalissimo's China Theater. Hearn informed Stilwell

of the contents of each of Roosevelt's messages and relayed Stilwell's occasional comments on them to whichever Chinese dignitary, usually Madame

Chiang, might accept them for the Generalissimo.

Noting the President's changed attitude, Stilwell told Hearn to impress on

the Chinese that if Y-Force did not co-operate in Burma operations, the President might lose interest, and might conclude that the Chinese themselves were

not really concerned about breaking the blockade of China. Stilwell also suggested the Chinese be told to weigh the effect on themselves of SEAC's

suggestion that Burma be bypassed.2

The President himself, on 14 January 1944, finally began to hint that lendlease to China might cease if it was not to be used against the Japanese.

Beginning with the remark that the opening of the Burma Road was ". . . the

next and most immediate solution to our present problem," Roosevelt went on

to tell the Generalissimo:

I am informed that the Ledo Road forces are trained, equipped and in position against

the enemy in North Burma, and that the progress of the Ledo Road secured by these troops

is making good headway. I am of the opinion therefore that all of us should concentrate our

efforts with the means at hand to push vigorously all military operations as will assist this

road project. Mountbatten's plan and extent of operations depend in large measure, as you

are aware, upon support from Yunnan. I know that you are in agreement therefore that it is

most important that all possible pressure with available means be exerted by your Yunnan

forces in coordination with Admiral Mountbatten's operations from India. If the Yunnan

forces cannot be employed it would appear that we should avoid for the present the movement of critical materials to them over the limited lines of communication and curtail the

continuing build-up of stockpiles in India beyond that which will be brought to bear against

the enemy.3

The President's messages and Hearn's comments on them made their

impression on Madame Chiang. On 7 January she remarked to Hearn that the

Generalissimo had not answered the President's December messages because

Roosevelt had not yet agreed to the Generalissimo's request that the United

States lend China one billion dollars in U.S. currency or pay for the Cheng-tu

airfields at the 20 to 1 rate. General Hearn at once concluded that the Chinese

were linking financial aid with operations in Burma.4

General Hearn was not alone in thinking so. In faraway Washington, the

memorandums that passed among the Treasury, War, and State Departments as

2

 (1) Ltr, Hearn to authors, 16 Feb 50. OCMH. (2) Rad RELOT OT 80, Hearn to Stilwell, 21

Dec 43; Memo 104, Hearn for Mme. Chiang, 29 Dec 43. Items 1552, 1585, Bk 5, JWS Personal

File. (3) Memo, Stilwell for Hearn, 11 Jan 44. Item 263, Bk 3, JWS Personal File. Hearn permitted

Madame Chiang to read this memorandum. 3

 CM-OUT 4277, Roosevelt to Generalissimo, 14 Jan 44. Item 1629, Bk 5, JWS Personal File. The text of this message was presented to the Generalissimo as Memorandum 118 on 15 January

1944. 4

 (1) See Ch. II, above. (2) Rad RELOT 9, Hearn to Stilwell, 9 Jan 44. Item 1608, Bk 5, JWS

Personal File.
DECISIONS TO ATTACK 299

they followed the negotiations of their Chungking representatives revealed

similar reactions, and disclosed a growing feeling among their authors that the

Chinese, by placing a dollar value on their share in the war, were overreaching

themselves. Many of these officials believed the President shared their views.5

The Generalissimo's response to Roosevelt's December messages (the

President's latest having crossed it in transmission) confirmed the impressions

mentioned above. In tone, it was a virtual ultimatum. The Generalissimo stated

that unless the billion dollars was forthcoming or unless the United States

agreed to finance the Cheng-tu project at the rate of 20 to 1, the Chinese would

no longer provide food and housing to the U.S. forces in China after 1 March

1944. The Generalissimo told the President that he had "even gone to the

length of delaying the reopening of the Burma route so that essential amphibious equipment should be diverted to the European theater, thereby disappointing

all classes of my countrymen."

 6

Sent to Washington through State Department channels, the Generalissimo's

message met a mixed reception in Washington. The first draft of the United

States answer, as prepared by Somervell, assured the Generalissimo that contrary to his charge the exchange transactions proposed by the United States

were not commercial in nature; that while the United States was prepared to

pay all expenses incurred by the U.S. Army it refused to do so at a fixed rate of

20 to 1 in a money market that was racing upward; that any such insistence by

the Chinese would not be understood by the American people nor by the

Congress; and that the President must insist on some reasonable arrangement

for Chinese currency, either by outright donation or some form of reverse

lend-lease.

The draft was shown to Marshall and Arnold on the ground that its dispatch

might well lead to a break in Sino-American relations and the withdrawal of

the United States forces from China. Marshall and Arnold approved the paper.

It then went to the President who also approved, subject to the later concurrence of the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull.7

 Hull demurred, urged the President to reconsider, and his more cautious approach carried the day. The

President and his advisers drew back from risking an open breach with China,

but that the highest political and military authorities in the United States were

5

 (1) Teletype Transcript, Conv between Morgenthau and Somervell, 15 Jan 44. Memo with

incls, Somervell for McNarney, 15 Jan 44; Rad, Morgenthau to Adler, Treasury Dept Representa- tive in Chungking, 15 Jan 44. Somervell File, Vol IV, CBI 1944. (2) Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 15 Feb 44, sub: Exchange Policy With China. Somervell China File, A47-81. In this memorandum, Somervell reviews problems of the exchange rate. 6

 (1) Rad STATE 105, Generalissimo to Roosevelt, 16 Jan 44 ABC 336 (China) 26 Jan 42, Sec 1A, A48-224. (2) Rad RELOT 26, Hearn to Stilwell, 18 Jan 44. Item 1640, Bk 5, JWS

Personal File. 7

 (1) Draft, Suggested Msg from President to Generalissimo, undated. Somervell China File, A47-81, and Somervell File, Vol IV, CBI 1944. (2) CM-OUT 8054, Somervell for Marshall

to Stilwell, 20 Jan 44. (3) CM-OUT 8256, Somervell to Stilwell, 21 Jan 44. (4) Memo, Lt

Col Paul G. Pennoyer, Asiatic Sec OPD, for Col Charles H. Caldwell, Asiatic Sec OPD, 20

Jan 44, sub: Chinese Currency Negotiations. ABC 336 (China) 26 Jan 42, Sec 1A, A48-224.

Colonel Pennoyer followed the financial negotiations for OPD.
300 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

willing to contemplate such action dramatically illustrated the change in

China's diplomatic position vis-a-vis the United States.

An anxious ten-day interval followed while the United States and China

considered their next moves. The silence was broken by Ambassador Gauss's

delivery of the U.S. reply to the Chinese ultimatum. In it, the President

remarked that he could not ". . . escape the feeling that because of the distance

between us there may be danger that we may fail adequately to work out our

common problems and may rush into decisions which would not be in the

interests of either of our peoples." Roosevelt suggested that the Chinese send

a representative to Washington to discuss the exchange rate with Treasury

officials. There was no mention of the billion-dollar loan. Then came an indication of the President's attitude towards China. Roosevelt flatly stated that

beginning 1 March 1944 U.S. Army expenditures in China would be limited

to U.S. $25,000,000 a month.8

As of 15 March 1944, the open-market rate for the U.S. dollar in Kunming

(rates varied from city to city) was 230 to 1. If the Chinese Government insisted

on making its dollars available at only 20 to 1, U.S. expenditures in March, for

example, would be equal to what would be permitted by purchasing U.S.

$2,000,000 worth of currency in the open market. Since the actual exchange rate

was working ever upward, Chinese insistence on 20 to 1 would ultimately force

American units limited to U.S. $25,000,000 a month to withdraw from China.

Conversely, if the United States acquiesced in the Chinese demand for the

20 to 1 rate, while the Chinese continued to finance their war by paper money,

and the Chinese banks continued to lend to speculators who drove up the price

level, the United States would ultimately be spending its dollars by the billion

merely to clothe and feed a few thousand Americans in China.9

When the Generalissimo replied to the President, his message of 2 February

linked China's financial and military problems:

I have received your message dated twenty-sixth January transmitted by Ambassador

Gauss and I am deeply appreciative of your efforts to help me and my government. I have

consulted with Dr. Kung [Minister of Finance] regarding the suggestions contained therein

and have requested him to acquaint the Ambassador and General Stilwell's representatives

with the decisions he and I have agreed upon [the Chinese were now offering 30 to 1]. I

8

 Messages exchanged during this ten-day period among State, Treasury, and War Depart- ment representatives in Chungking and officials in Washington, including the President, are in Somervell's China File, A47-81. The contents of Somervell's file suggest that it was his job

to co-ordinate all policy statements among the interested departments after they had received and circulated the Generalissimo's ultimatum of 16 January 1944. Though the President's reply was sent to Chungking on 20 January 1944 as CM-OUT 8054, it was subsequently altered and was given to the Generalissimo on 26 January by Ambassador Gauss. Two days later Gauss, Hearn, and Treasury representatives were received by H. H. Kung, who had been designated

by the Generalissimo to discuss the details of President Roosevelt's proposals. The 20 January

text of the President's message and subsequent changes are in CM-OUT 8054, Roosevelt to Generalissimo, 20 January 1944, and CM-OUT 9567, Somervell to Hearn, 24 January 1944. 9

 Memo, Dr. Edward C. Acheson, Financial Adviser to CG, USAF CBI, for Director of Material, Hq ASF, 20 Mar 44, sub: Course of Financial Negotiations in China, Rpts 3 & 4 (Feb-Mar 44). Somervell China File, A47-81.
DECISIONS TO ATTACK 301

trust that very shortly a solution satisfactory to both our countries may be reached. I wish

to assure you that Dr. Kung and I have exerted our utmost to meet your wishes short of

jeopardizing China's economic front to the breaking point, and short of endangering the

morale of our people in the prosecution of continued resistance.

I wish also to acknowledge your telegram sent through General Stilwell's headquarters

dated fifteenth January. I appreciate your desire to open up the Ledo Road, a desire which is

also my great concern since it is only through the opening of this land route that China may

quickly obtain the heavy equipment much needed by her army. You doubtless recall that at

Cairo I reiterated and emphasized the fact that I am ready to send the Yunnan troops to

Burma at any moment that large-scale amphibious landing operations can be effected at

strategic points. I stand ready to adhere to this decision, and hope that we can carry out

operations even before November of this year, which date you mentioned as possible and

probable for the diverting of the amphibious equipment to Burma.

I am leaving for the Hunan front tomorrow and shall be away for a fortnight. Any

message will forwarded. I know you realize that the year will prove a most critical period for

China both in the economic and military sense, but I am confident that with your help we

shall pull through. . . .10

The President's acknowledgement of this message was limited to assurances

that the United States would continue to study both exchange rates and U.S.

military expenditures in China.11

The foregoing communications from Washington had their effect within

the Chinese Government. Apparently on his own authority as Minister of

Finance, Dr. H. H. Kung undertook to advance Chinese National currency

(CN) $15,000,000,000 to CBI Theater headquarters to cover U.S. expenditures

for March, April, and May 1944. The credit was extended with no stipulation

as to the rate of exchange for repayment. Of this credit, Hearn received an

immediate grant of CN $500,000,000 for the Cheng-tu fields. There was, however, one obstacle to the prompt use of these funds. The actual currency

involved was Chinese paper money, engraved in the United States and stockpiled in India. It would have to be flown over the Hump, like everything else

the U.S. forces in China used.

The need of allocating Hump tonnage for these currency advances brought

now familiar repercussions in China. Where air cargo was concerned Chinese

currency was measured as tonnage rather than by dollar value. The bills in

India were of small denominations lest they add to the general inflationary

psychology. Experience revealed that a ton of currency might vary in value from

CN $7,000,000 to CN $100,000,000. The Fourteenth Air Force complained that

4,500 gallons of gasoline were used in one day's lift of Chinese currency. Hearn

tried to placate the Fourteenth by explaining that the chore was a necessity,

10

 Rad AGWAR 79, Generalissimo to Roosevelt, 2 Feb 44. Item 1697, Bk 5, JWS Personal

File. Hearn and Gauss doubted that the Generalissimo was touring the "Hunan front" since they

believed none existed. Hearn reported that the Generalissimo and his wife desired to vacate Chungking for Hunan for a short rest and to avoid decisions on the exchange rate. CM-IN

3024, Hearn to Somervell, 5 Feb 44. 11

 Rad WAR 4457, Roosevelt to Generalissimo, 7 Feb 44. Item 1714, Bk 5, JWS Personal

File.
302 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

that each haul had to be charged against operational tonnage. Casting his eye

on some of the less apparent aspects of war in China, he remarked to

Chennault: "Money is the root of all our trouble."

 12

American Military Observers in North China

On 9 February 1944, the President raised a point with the Generalissimo

which was part of an issue whose eventual outcome was possibly beyond the

power of any man then living to foresee. And it was to grow until it dominated

the diplomacy of the Pacific Ocean as once the problem of Japanese imperialism

had done. This was the Chinese Communist issue. The episode began quietly

enough, with a suggestion by Stilwell's political adviser, John P. Davies, Jr.

In 1943, on 24 June, Davies had suggested to the State Department that a

consulate general be opened in the territory of the Chinese Communists, and

that a military mission be sent to them.13 Stilwell's papers do not mention the

project; his attitude then is unknown.

At the SEXTANT Conference, Davies had been present when Stilwell

attempted to get some policy guidance from the President. It may be that

Davies remembered the President's reaction to Stilwell's warning that a repetition of the Japanese Tung-Ting Lake operations of May 1943 might overthrow

the Generalissimo: "Well, then we should look for some other man or group

of men, to carry on."

 14

 In any event, twenty-five days later Davies began to

send Hopkins a series of memorandums on Chinese domestic matters, which

Hopkins in turn relayed to the President.

In his first memorandum, of 31 December 1943, Davies began by observing,

"The Generalissimo is probably the only Chinese who shares the popular

American misconception that Chiang Kai-shek is China." He closed with the

recommendation: "A realistic policy towards Chiang would be based on (1)

recognition by us that the Generalissimo is highly susceptible to firm

co-ordinated American pressure, (2) stern bargaining (in consultation with

American representatives in China), and (3) readiness to support a strong new

coalition offering cooperation mutually more beneficial to China and the

United States."

 15

Davies a fortnight later returned to the suggestion he had made in June 12

 History of CBI, Sec. III, Ch. XI, China Exchange. 13

 Memo by Davies, Second Secy of Embassy detailed to Gen Stilwell, 24 Jun 43, sub: The American Stake in Chinese Unity: Proposals for Preliminary American Action. History of CBI, Sec. III, Ch. I, Item VI. 14

 (1) See Ch. II, above. (2) The Stilwell Papers, on page 252, quotes Roosevelt to that

effect. 15

 Memo, Davies, New Delhi, 31 Dec 43, sub: Chiang Kai-shek and China. On 7 February

1944 Hopkins sent the memorandum to the President with the note: "Here is another interest- ing letter I got from John Davies Jr., who was with our Embassy in China and is now with

Stilwell and Mountbatten." Bk IX, Hopkins Papers. Hopkins' note would suggest that Davies had written even earlier. However, such correspondence was not seen by the authors, and Davies' own covering letter suggests this is the first of a projected series. See Ltr, Davies to Hopkins, 31 Dec 43. Bk IX, Hopkins Papers.
DECISIONS TO ATTACK 303

1943, of a U.S. military mission to the Chinese Communists. After drafting his

suggestions on 15 January 1944, he made a visit to Stilwell's headquarters in

north Burma on the 20th. What Stilwell thought of the project Davies did not

record, but presumably he approved. On 23 January Davies suggested to

Hopkins that the President arrange for Stilwell's headquarters to send U.S.

observers to Communist China. Davies offered Hopkins several reasons for the

presence of such a mission in and around the Communist base at Yenan:

We need to despatch immediately while it is still welcome, a military and political

observers' mission to Communist China to collect enemy information, assist in and prepare

for certain limited operations from that area, obtain accurate estimates of the strength of

Communist Armies, report on Russian operations in North China and Manchuria should

Russia attack Japan, and assess the possibility of North China and Manchuria developing

into a separate Chinese state—perhaps even as a Russian satellite. Chiang's blockade of the

Communists and their consequent isolation, are forcing them toward dependence upon

Russia. An American observers' mission would break this isolation, reduce the tendency

toward dependence upon Russia and, at the same time, serve to check Chiang's desire to

attempt liquidation of the Communists by civil war. The Generalissimo will naturally be

opposed to the dispatch of American observers to Communist China. His permission cannot

be obtained through ordinary diplomatic and military channels. The request should come to

him directly from the President, who can overcome any initial refusal by exercise of our

ample bargaining power.16

A contemporary example of such a mission to a Communist faction within

an Allied state existed, for when Davies wrote his letter a British military mission under Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean had been for several months with Marshal

Josip Broz Tito in Yugoslavia, and Maclean had been at SEXTANT when Davies

was there.17

Apparently the President liked the suggestion, for on 9 February he asked the

Generalissimo if an American observer mission might go to north China.18 The

request arrived at an inauspicious moment. It nearly crossed a report from

Stilwell to Marshall that a crisis in Nationalist-Communist relations might be

at hand. Stilwell understood that the Nationalist armies facing the Communists

in north China had been built up to 500,000 men, that the Nationalists were

accumulating supplies for this force, while the Communists for their part were

reinforcing. Stilwell thought it unlikely that there would be a civil clash before

the end of the war with Japan. Reminding Marshall that this mutual hostility

in north China was hindering the war against Japan, he reported that for

obvious reasons the Japanese Domei News Agency was goading both sides.19

As predicted by Davies on 23 January, the Generalissimo refused the

16

 Ltr, Davies to Hopkins, 23 Jan 44, with Incl, Memo, 15 Jan 44, sub: Observers' Mission to North China. Bk IX, Hopkins Papers. 17

 Fitzroy Maclean, Escape to Adventure (Boston. Little, Brown & Company, 1950). 18

 (1) A copy of the original 9 February radio is in Book IX, Hopkins Papers. (2) In Chungking, the President's radio was copied as a memorandum from General Hearn to Madame Kung on 19 February 1944, and presented to her with the request that she give the President's radio to Madame Chiang for the Generalissimo. Item 1726, Bk 5, JWS Personal File. 19

 CM-IN 2373, Stilwell to Marshall, 4 Feb 44. (Probably originated by Hearn.)
304 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

President's request, in polite terms, by agreeing that such an American military

mission might visit any territory in north China which acknowledged the

authority of the Nationalist Government. The President accepted gracefully

and stated that such a mission would be dispatched in the near future to north

China.20 The President's reply did not mention the Generalissimo's limits on

such a mission's movements, and very tactfully he soon began to persuade the

Generalissimo to remove them.21

An indication of the attitude the Generalissimo's government might

contemplate adopting toward the Chinese Communists was offered when his

Chief of Ordnance, Gen. Yu Ta-wei, asked Hearn if lend-lease arms could be

used against the Communists. Hearn was understood by Ambassador Gauss to

have replied that the Chinese could not successfully explain such an action to

the people of the United States.22

SEAC and Stilwell Obtain Pressure on Chiang

Though after January 1944 there were several major points at issue between

them regarding Allied strategy for Southeast Asia, Mountbatten and Stilwell

agreed that Y-Force should hasten to join the Burma campaign, and both

wanted the President and the Prime Minister to put pressure on the Generalissimo to that end. Mountbatten and Stilwell had discussed their personal relationship on 4 March and patched up their differences. Then the long-expected

Japanese attack on India had begun. The diversion of Hump transports it had

caused and the obvious menace which it posed placed new strains on AngloAmerican strategy in Southeast Asia.

Stilwell responded to the situation by suggesting to Mountbatten that an

advance by Y-Force would create a major diversion in the Japanese rear area

which would be the answer to SEAC's problems, and, by implication, to

Stilwell's immediate troubles as well. Could not Mountbatten place the matter

before his superiors and ask them to use their good offices with the Chinese?23

A day later Stilwell sent a similar request to the Operations Division of the

War Department, with an information copy to General Marshall. Vividly and

strongly, he told the War Department that if ever he needed help, now, right

now, was the time. Pressure on the Generalissimo to move, pressure from the

highest quarters, was desired. If the Y-Force took the old jade center of Teng20

 Memo, Generalissimo to Hearn for President, 22 Feb 44; Memo, Hearn to Generalissimo for President, 2 Mar 44. Items 2023, 2054, Bk 6, JWS Personal File. 21

 Memo, Hearn to Generalissimo for President, 22 Mar 44. Item 2126, Bk 6, JWS Personal

File.

22

 Copy, Memo for Admiral Leahy, no date, sub: U.S. Observers Mission to North China. Initialed "VE" (Vernon Evans), this copy was in the G-3 files of Hq CBI Theater, and was brought back to OCMH with other miscellaneous documents by Col. Harry L. Mayfield, former India-Burma Theater Historian, in August 1946. KCRC. 23

 (1) See Ch. IV, above. (2) Rad FG 63, Stilwell to AMMDEL, 16 Mar 44. Item 71, Bk

6A, JWS Personal File.
DECISIONS TO ATTACK 305

chung, well north of the Burma Road, the Ledo Road could take that route and

bypass the heavy Japanese concentration on the Burma Road.24

Stilwell's suggestion met with Mountbatten's hearty approval. General

Sultan, Stilwell's deputy in New Delhi, was asked to relay SEAC's approval to

Stilwell, while down in Ceylon the SEAC staff began to prepare an appropriate

message to London and Washington.25 As sent, the SEAC radio placed

Mountbatten's command squarely behind Stilwell's views on Y-Force:

I have discussed with General Stilwell question of advance by Chinese forces in Yunnan.

We agree immediate advance would be of value because it will contain 56 Division and may

cause diversion of other troops which would otherwise be used against Wingate or Stilwell

or support offensive against 4 Corps front. We both feel that only a personal approach from

the Prime Minister and the President through their representatives in Chungking is likely

to succeed with Generalissimo. Line might be taken that Ledo Force is already achieving

great success, while presence in Burma of Wingate's forces opens up possibility of victory

in Imphal area where enemy may find himself committed to an offensive which he cannot

sustain with his rear threatened. Participation of Chinese from Yunnan in victory which it is

hoped to achieve would be of great value to morale of Chinese Army and people. Their

chance of success is considerable since they will initially only have to overcome one division,

at present holding a very extended front, and reinforcements can only be provided by Japanese at expense of forces already committed on other fronts. On the other hand position of

China in eyes of the world is bound to suffer if only Chinese force which has taken part in

victory is that trained and led by Americans. I should be most grateful if an approach could

be made with extreme urgency.26

Mountbatten's urgings brought a quick response, for the President

addressed the Generalissimo two days later, and used all of Mountbatten's

arguments. In sequence, Roosevelt reviewed the "magnificent" pounding the

Chinese Army in India was giving the Japanese 18th Division, the implications

of the Arakan and Imphal fighting in tying down the major portion of the

Japanese strength, and the Chindits' threat to the Japanese supply lines. The

President warned that if the Allies failed to seize the opportunity thus presented, the Japanese might recover and take the offensive. Showing his grasp

of the North Burma Campaign, the President predicted that the 18th Division

would require reinforcements and that they would be obtained by withdrawing

a regiment from the 56th Division along the Salween. The President wanted the

Generalissimo to have these views "at length and in considerable detail in the

hope that you will give orders to the commander of your Yunnan force to

cooperate in developing what appears to be a great opportunity."

 27

After presenting the President's message to the Chinese, Hearn urged

Stilwell to fly to Chungking because there appeared to be signs the Chinese

24

 CM-IN 11455, Stilwell to Marshall, 17 Mar 44. 25

 Rad RE 473, Sultan to Stilwell, 17 Mar 44. Item 75, Bk 6A, JWS Personal File. 26

 Rad SEACOS 116, Mountbatten to COS and JSM, 17 Mar 44. SEAC War Diary. 27

 CM-OUT 4762, Roosevelt to Generalissimo, 17 Mar 44. Hearn relayed this message as Memorandum 163 to the Chinese. Item 2109, Bk 6, JWS Personal File.
306 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

were willing to send two divisions to reinforce the Chinese Army in India.28

When he conferred with the Generalissimo on 28 March, Stilwell found the

Chinese had answered the President.

The Generalissimo Warns of Trouble

By coincidence, the Generalissimo had chosen to address the President on

17 March, and naturally his radio crossed the President's response to Mountbatten's pleadings. The Chinese leader told Roosevelt:

For your personal information, I should like to advise you of recent significant developments which are matters of grave concern to the prosecution of the war in the Far East. First, on the 11th instant while Chinese troops stationed at Sinkiang were engaged in

suppressing bandits at Hopan, a place situated between Chengkwa and Kitai about 70

kilometers from the borders of Outer Mongolia, they were bombed and machine-gunned

twice by planes which flew over from the direction of Outer Mongolia. The first batch consisted of two planes and the second ten. They all bore the soviet red Star insignia. On the

12th, planes bearing the same insignia came twice and dropped bombs. On the 13th, they

re-appeared and machine-gunned. This cannot be construed as a local incident, but is a very

significant indication of the Soviet Far Eastern policy both now and in the future.

Second, though the Chinese Communist party have outwardly professed support of the

Chinese Government's policy of resistance against Japanese aggression, since February they

have been secretly assembling their guerrilla units from various places and concentrating

them in North Shensi, evidently preparing for an opportune moment to rise in revolt and

take Sian [Hsian], the base of our operations in the Yellow River valley. The indications are

manifest. Considering the matter objectively, it does not seem likely that the Chinese Communist party would dare to make such a move without some understanding having been

reached between the Soviet and the Japanese.

Third, I have information that the Japanese in the near future will launch a large-scale

offensive in the Chengchow-Loyang area on the Hankow-Peiping railroad line. The enemy

is moving troops from Manchuria for this purpose.

Fourth, regarding definite intelligence reports of the Japanese navy, I shall shortly

forward same to you.29

Having dispatched this warning, the Generalissimo then found himself

obliged to answer the President's 17 March radio. This he did on the 27th. He

said bluntly that American observers could not visit Communist territory, and

said it was "impossible" to have an offensive from Yunnan. In his previous

discussion of affairs in China, the Generalissimo had referred to a Japanese

ground offensive in muted tones. Now, the topic disappeared into the general

assertion that China should not launch an offensive into Burma because she

was too weak:

The situation in China theater has recently become so grave that I deem it imperative to

acquaint you with it. The state of affairs in Sinkiang has become very tense since its invasion

by Soviet planes and Outer Mongolian troops about the middle of this month, with the

result that our army and people's belief in concerted action by the United Nations has been

28

 Rad CFB 15004, Hearn to Stilwell, 19 Mar 44. Item 2117, Bk 6, JWS Personal File. 29

 Rad AGWAR 184, Generalissimo to Roosevelt, 17 Mar 44. Item 2110, Bk 6, JWS Personal

File.
Map 17
308 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

somewhat shaken; in other words, our army and people are beginning to ask themselves

whether the United Nations' pledges and declarations still hold good.

At the present moment what China can possibly do to fulfill her obligation to the Allies

as well as to discharge her duty to herself are: (1) to devote all her energy and resources to

the maintaining of the various fronts in the China theater against any surprise attack by the

enemy, this theater being the only land base from which to bomb Japan Proper on a large

scale and with certain effect; and (2) To prepare herself for the day—may it not be distant—

when Allied land and naval forces can be dispatched to the China coast and the Chinese

Army can co-operate with them in consolidating our position in East Asia, which will be an

important base for the invasion of Japan. These are the most important tasks which have

devolved on China today and which constitute at the same time an obligation she has

assumed to the Allies.

In this connection it may be observed that seven years of war have taxed China's material

and military strength to such an extent that to insist upon her doing something beyond her

power would be to court disaster, the consequences of which would seriously affect not only

Yunnan and Szechwan, but also the whole situation in this theater of war. Should this

happen, the Japanese would invade Yunnan and Szechwan, the revolt in Sinkiang and the

communists activities in Shensi would assume a new aspect in furtherance of their plan of

bolschevizing [sic] this country so that our Government would not be in a position to do

its part in this global war, and the Allies in East Asia would be deprived of a base of

operations against Japan.

For these reasons, and bearing in mind our obligation to the Allies and our duty to ourselves, I am of the opinion that as long as our line of defences has not been adequately

strengthened, it is impossible for our main forces to undertake an offence from Yunnan. In

the course of our conversations at Cairo I told you that as soon as the British began large

scale amphibious operations along the Burma coast, our main forces would launch a vigorous

attack on Burma with all their might. That promise will be made good when the time

comes. I realize that reinforcements should be sent to Burma in view of the military situation

there and that although this does not fall within scope of our work, still we should do what

we can in compliance with your request. I have therefore decided to dispatch to India by air

as many of our troops in Yunnan as can be spared in order to re-enforce the troops in Ledo,

thus enabling the latter to carry on their tasks of defeating the enemy.

In conclusion I may add that so far as land operations in East Asia are concerned, China

bears a very heavy responsibility; and, appreciative of the kind and sympathetic assistance

you have been rendering her all these years, she is determined to discharge that responsibility

to the best of her ability. I have explained to you quite frankly the present situation in this

theater of war and the plan of coping with it, in the hope that you will continue to place

confidence in my country and in one who is your good friend. China, on her part, will not

fail to do her utmost in the discharge of her responsibility vis-a-vis the Allies.30

It must be noted that the Generalissimo's objections were of the most

general nature. Possibly he felt that his 29 April 1943 pledge to the President—

"The Generalissimo also wishes me [T. V. Soong] to transmit to you his personal assurance that in the event the enemy attempts to interrupt the air

offensive by a ground advance on the air bases, the advance can be halted by

the existing Chinese forces"—would cause an intolerable loss of face if for any

reason he hinted that he could not defend the east China airfields.31 Or again

30

 (1) CM-IN 21368, Stilwell to Marshall, 30 Mar 44. (2) Msg, Generalissimo to Roosevelt, 27 Mar 44 (sent as Rad CFB 15407, 29 Mar 44). Item 2145, Bk 6, JWS Personal File. 31

 Stilwell's Mission to China, Chapter IX, quotes the full text of the Generalissimo's 23 April

1943 pledge to Roosevelt.
DECISIONS TO ATTACK 309

it may be that he saw no specific reasons for alarm. Certainly a SEAC

amphibious assault on the Arakan coast could not remedy a crisis in east China.

Whatever his reasoning, the Generalissimo's radio was not well received

in Washington. The President had been following the course of the North

Burma Campaign with close attention in the White House map room. He saw

the pins that marked the Chinese Army in India move deeper into Burma. On

the far side of the map he saw the massed array of pins that represented the

Y-Force along the Salween. Facing the Y-Force were the few scattered red pins

that marked the Japanese 56th Division. The President saw a great strategic

opportunity, and simply could not understand why the Generalissimo was so

hesitant to attack one Japanese division.32

When in December 1941 Churchill had come to Washington, he found the

President and his closest advisers believing that China was a great military

power and classing her armies with the Russian.33 Now, in 1944, the Generalissimo was reluctant to send a whole group of these armies, which the President had rated on a par with the Russian, against the 56th Division.

What the map room pins did not show, but what the Generalissimo may

well have had in mind, was the current state of the Y-Force. In the last year,

considerable progress had been made in supplying artillery and ammunition to

that force, and by 20 April the Chinese had been given, for example, 244 75-

mm. pack howitzers. But the Chinese had never brought the Y-Force divisions

up to strength, either by supplying replacements or by merging understrength

units. With regard to the intangible but vital elements of training and morale,

the picture was uncertain. The Chinese staffs and services of supply did not inspire confidence in those Americans who worked with them, for they did not

appear up to their professional responsibilities. The underlying reality of the

situation was that the Generalissimo was being urged to attack about 11,000

well-trained and well-led Japanese and 36 guns with 72,000 Chinese of indifferent quality whose several headquarters had been issued 244 American cannon in addition to their Chinese ordnance.34

The President Demands Action

The first reaction from the President to the Generalissimo's excusing China

from any offensive effort was a mere formal acknowledgment. Then in the next

few days a message from Stilwell to Marshall arrived in Washington describing the situation created by the Japanese attack on India in somber tones to

prepare higher authority for a possible success of the Japanese offensive.35 In

32

 Marshall Intervs, 6, 13 Jul 49. OCMH. 33

 Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (Boston. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), p. 13. 34

 (1) A more detailed description of the Y-Force is given on pages 333-34, below. (2) SNF

215 has several rather disparaging reports on the Y-Force, dated October 1943. (3) The 56th

Division had seven and a half battalions in May 1944. (Japanese Officers' Comments.) Its strength

is given in Japanese Study 93, p. 41. 35

 (1) Rad CFB 15442, Stilwell to Marshall, 30 Mar 44. Item 2146, Bk 6, JWS Personal File. (2) Rad, Stilwell to Marshall, 31 Mar 44; Rad TK 24, Stilwell to Marshall, 4 Apr 44. Items 98, 103, Bk 6A, JWS Personal File.
310 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

all probability, the grave prospects for the Allied cause in Asia which this message placed before the Chief of Staff and the President led to the drafting of a

note from the President in language that showed Mr. Roosevelt's attitude had

completely changed from his complaisance of March 1943. His radio of 3 April

1944 said:

The present offensive by the Japs in the Imphal area is directed primarily against the line

of communication which makes possible the transportation of materials to China. If the

Japanese succeed in their intentions in this drive, they can then concentrate against and destroy the Ledo Force and turn against your YOKE Force at their leisure.

The British are ably meeting the strong Japanese threat to the line of communication to

China and the supply route which supports your troops in the Mogaung Valley.

While heavy fighting is in progress in West Burma and on the Arakan Coast, the Salween front has remained quiet and as a result the Japanese have been able to divert elements of the Fifty-sixth Division to meet Stilwell's thrust down the Mogaung Valley and the

threat of the Long Range Penetration Groups in North Burma. It is inconceivable to me

that your YOKE Forces, with their American equipment, would be unable to advance against

the Japanese Fifty-sixth Division in its present depleted strength. To me the time is ripe for

elements of your Seventy-first Army group to advance without further delay and seize the

Tengchung-Lungling areas. A shell of a division opposes you on the Salween. Your advance

to the west cannot help but succeed.

To take advantage of just such an opportunity, we have, during the past year, been equipping and training your YOKE Forces. If they are not to be used in the common cause our

most strenuous and extensive efforts to fly in equipment and to furnish instructual personnel

have not been justified. They should not be held back on the grounds that an amphibious

operation against the South Burma coast is necessary prior to their advance. Present developments negate such a requirement. The Jap has deployed the bulk of seven divisions in his

operations on the Arakan, the Chindwin, and in the Mogaung Valley.

I do hope you can act.36

In this radio the President did not refer to the question of the American

military mission to north China, and the subject was dropped for the time

being. The War Department believed it was far less important than persuading the Generalissimo to send his armies across the Salween and to permit the

Chinese Army in India to continue its advance down the Mogaung valley of

north Burma.37

When the President's strong message arrived in Chungking, the Generalissimo was ill, so Hearn gave it to Madame Chiang for delivery. At a tea party

in honor of U.S. Army Day, Madame Chiang called General Hearn to one side

and expressed her concern over the tone of the President's message. She feared

that such a communication from Roosevelt would jeopardize rather than improve the chances of moving the Y-Force across the Salween River. As

Madame Chiang continued, Hearn concluded that the message had not been

36

 (1) Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. VIII. (2) Rad WAR 17956, Roosevelt to General- issimo, 3 Apr 44. Item 2164, Bk 6, JWS Personal File. Hearn relayed this message as Memorandum 175 to the Generalissimo on 4 April 1944. 37

 (1) CM-OUT 25588, Marshall to Stilwell, 20 Apr 44. (2) The President renewed his proposals for a mission to north China during Vice-President Henry A. Wallace's mission in late June 1944. See Chapter X, below.
DECISIONS TO ATTACK 311

delivered. He so reported to Marshall who relayed Hearn's impressions to

Roosevelt.38 The President immediately ordered that future messages from him

to the Generalissimo were to be delivered in person to the Generalissimo by

the senior U.S. Army officer present in Chungking. The English text was to be

accompanied by a translation.39

Within a few days after the President had rejected the Generalissimo's protestations of 27 March 1944, fresh warnings of trouble in China were delivered,

this time by Chennault to Stilwell. Where the Generalissimo had spoken in

general terms, Chennault was specific. Sharing the general unawareness that

the Japanese since the summer of 1943 had moved five good divisions from

China to face the Allies elsewhere, and looking rather at the new and menacing Japanese concentrations to the north and south of Honan Province, Chennault put his warnings in the dramatic phrase that the disposition of the Japanese ground forces was the most menacing since Pearl Harbor. He believed

that they had planned two offensives, one to overrun the Honanese link of the

Peiping-Hankow railroad, the other to take Changsha. "In considering the

likelihood of effective resistance to these anticipated offensives," wrote Chennault, "I need not point out to you the underlying weakness of the Chinese

Armies." Chennault did not believe he could meet a determined Japanese air

offensive and still give proper air support to the Chinese Armies.

General Chennault argued that his problems were basically those of logistics. His supply level in east China was but 40 percent of that necessary, and

the eastern line of communications could deliver but 2,500 tons a month.

Chennault suggested the following steps: (1) deliver 8,000 tons of aviation

supplies to China in May 1944 and build up thereafter to 10,000 in July; (2)

give fullest support to improvement of the eastern line of communications;

(3) establish first reserves of 10 percent of total air strength in China and an

equal amount in India. If these steps, or a massive diversion of supply tonnage

from the B-29's, could not be taken, then there was nothing left but to tell

Washington the security of the China base was in doubt, and to tell the Generalissimo he could not have effective air cover for his armies.40

38

 Rad CFB 15828, Hearn to Stilwell, 7 Apr 44; Rad CFB 15835, Mme. Chiang to Stilwell, 8 Apr 44; Rad CFB 15917, Hearn to Marshall, 10 Apr 44. Items 2179, 2181, 2194, Bk 6, JWS Personal File. 39

 (1) Memo, Roosevelt for Marshall, 3 May 44; Memo, Gen McNarney for Roosevelt, 8

May 44, sub: Delivery of Msgs to Generalissimo from President. Item 58, Folder 1, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (GMO CKS), OPD Exec 10. (2) CM-OUT 33493, Marshall to Stilwell, 7 May 44. 40

 (1) Rad CAK 456, Chennault to Stilwell, 6 Apr 44. Item 2174, Bk 6, JWS Personal

File. (2) Ltr, Chennault to Stilwell, 8 Apr 44; Rad CAK 595, Chennault to Stilwell, 10 Apr 44. Ltr, Chennault to Wedemeyer, 6 Jul 45 (hereafter, The Chennault-Wedemeyer Letter), Items 25, 26. WDCSA 091 China, 15 Aug 45. (3) Gen. Yasuji Okamura differed with Chennault's estimate of the Japanese situation on the ground that between summer 1943 and April 1944

the Japanese transferred four good divisions from China to Pacific areas and replaced them only

with raw brigades. Okamura apparently forgot the 15th Division, which left China for Burma

in summer 1943. Japanese Officers' Comments, Incl 3, Okamura. (4) Japanese Study 129, map

facing page 30, shows the concentrations that Chennault referred to. Page 11 of the monograph

lists Japanese troop movements in China.
312 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Chennault's requests reached Stilwell at an awkward time. The Japanese

were placing heavy pressure on India, and Mountbatten, who was Stilwell's

superior, had diverted twenty transports from the Hump only three weeks

earlier. If the Japanese went on to Assam, all would be over in CBI. In his

reply, therefore, Stilwell stated that until the Imphal situation improved he

saw no possibility of increasing the flow of supplies to Chennault. In Stilwell's

opinion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would not give priority to meeting an

anticipated Japanese offensive in China when there was an actual and current

crisis in India. "You will simply have to cut down on activity to the point

where you can be sure of reasonable reserves for an emergency." Chennault's

8 April letter did not reach Stilwell until about 21 April. Meanwhile on 12

April, Stilwell warned Chennault (presumably because of the current attempts

by the President to persuade the Generalissimo to commit the Y-Force) not

to send a gloomy estimate of the situation to the Chinese leader.41

The Chinese Decide To Cross the Salween

No formal reply was ever sent by the Generalissimo to the President's final

demand that China attack. However, over the next ten days, the members of

the National Military Council argued the merits of crossing the Salween River

among themselves and with General Hearn. Hearn ordered Dorn, chief of staff

of the American personnel working with the Y-Force, to come to Chungking

to present the latest and most complete data on Y-Force's state. Dorn in turn

persuaded Gen. Wei Li-huang to include Gen. Hsiao I-hsu, chief of staff of the

Chinese Expeditionary Force, in a Chinese deputation.

During the first few days of the discussions it seemed obvious to the Americans that even the Chinese senior officers closest to the Generalissimo were

not familiar with the contents of the President's 4 April message. However, the

gist of a subsequent message of 10 April from Marshall to Hearn was given

to the Chinese staff. Making a logical extension of the President's views, the

radio from Marshall told CBI Theater authorities that unless the Y-Force

moved, lend-lease shipments for it should end. Stilwell instructed Hearn to

comply at once. Accordingly, Hearn told the War Department that he proposed to transfer the Y-Force's April allocation of Hump tonnage, 734 tons,

to the Fourteenth Air Force. Furthermore, he planned to cancel the China National Aviation Corporation's contract to fly lend-lease to China and return the

corporation's lend-lease aircraft to the Air Transport Command.42

41

 (1) See Ch. V, above. (2) Rad SH 7, Stilwell to Chennault, 9 Apr 44. Item 112, Bk 6A, JWS Personal File. (3) Rad SH 18, Stilwell to Chennault, 12 Apr 44. SNF 31. (4) Rad SH

19, Stilwell to Chennault, 12 Apr 44. Item 2205, Bk 6, JWS Personal File. Chennault received

Stilwell's message on 13 April 1944. 42

 (1) CM-OUT 20146, Marshall to Stilwell, 7 Apr 44. (2) Rad CRA 966, Sultan to Hearn, 8

Apr 44; Rad CFB 15917, Hearn to Marshall, 10 Apr 44; Rad CHC 192, Stilwell to Hearn, 11

Apr 44; Rad CFB 15985, Stilwell to Marshall, 11 Apr 44; Rad CFB 15986, Hearn to Chennault, 11 Apr 44; Rad CFB 16010, Hearn to Stilwell, 12 Apr 44; Rad CFB 16029, Hearn to Stilwell, 12

Apr 44. Items 2185, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2201, 2203, Bk 6, JWS Personal File.
DECISIONS TO ATTACK 313

Word of Hearn's intentions soon reached Gens. Ho Ying-chin, Lin Wei,

and Liu Fei, whom the members of Stilwell's staff had long believed to be opposed to the Burma campaign. Meanwhile, General Hsiao, who realized the

implications of Hearn's intended action, was urging the principal Chinese military personages, including the Generalissimo, to order an advance by Y-Force.

On 12 April, Gen. Lin Wei asked Hearn to hold back orders on the tonnage

cut for Y-Force because he was sure that there would be "positive action" on

the use of Wei's troops within forty-eight hours. Hearn of course agreed to

wait for two days, but, considering that the Chinese tended to vacillate and

delay, he meanwhile insisted that the Chinese agree among themselves on a

definite plan of attack, a command arrangement, and a date.43

On the evening of 12 April, Dorn held a dinner party for the various Chinese dignitaries present for these exchanges over the Y-Force. He may well

have had in mind the ancient practice of the Persian general staff, which, it has

been said, offered the advantage of combining the impetuosity of youth, the

genius of experience, and the caution of maturity by the simple device of considering a plan in all stages of intoxication and sobriety. As Dorn and Hsiao

moved about the room, the trend of the guests' comments was all toward an

offensive. At the end of the evening, General Ho was willing to confer with

the Generalissimo about the matter. Next morning, Ho was still sure that

matters could be arranged.

True to his promise, General Ho, as Minister of War and Chief of Staff,

gave formal approval to the Salween crossing on 14 April. In accord with Chinese custom, he gave the word before witnesses and made it binding by

stamping his chop on the order. But before he placed the irrevocable seal in

place, Ho made what Dorn thought a final attempt to block the operation.

At the last moment, Ho asked Dorn for his personal assurance that the

American Y-Force Operations Staff (Y-FOS) would assume four responsibilities during the early phase of the campaign: (1) to ferry 50,000 Chinese troops

across the Salween; (2) to give air support; (3) to co-ordinate the Americantrained artillery battalions; (4) to share Wei Li-huang's command responsibility of feeding and supplying munitions to the Chinese Expeditionary Force.

Dorn was intimately aware of the neglected state of Wei's forces, and he believed that he would have to act for Stilwell in agreeing. Dorn surmised that

Ho expected him, a junior staff officer, to decline, thereby excusing the Chinese

from the operation. Ho pressed his seal upon the paper; the operation was formally agreed to.44

Having promised to attack the 56th Division, General Ho hastened to assume

for China full responsibility for the decision to cross the Salween River. Ad43 (1) Rad CFB 16029, Hearn to Chennault and Stilwell, 12 Apr 44; Rad SH 23, Stilwell to

Hearn, 13 Apr 44; Rad 16021, Hearn to Stilwell, 13 Apr 44. Items 2203, 2209, 2210, Bk 6, JWS

Personal File. (2) Stilwell Diary, 12 Apr 44. 44

 (1) Ltr, Dorn to Stilwell, 16 Apr 44. SNF 35. (2) Interv with Dorn, May 48.
314 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

dressed to Marshall, his radio of 14 April was understood by the Americans to

be China's reply to the President's 4 April message:

China has been working on plans for offensive action against Japanese with full intention to put them into effect, using troops which have not received American equipment as

well as YOKE Force. China has always realized her position with regard to offensives by

United Nations, and it has only been because of time and lack of essential equipment that

such action has not taken place before this time. You can rely on China doing her share, but

it is hoped that you understand her difficulties. Decision to move part of YOKE Force across

Salween was made on initiative of Chinese without influence of outside pressure, and was

based on realization that China must contribute its share to common war effort.

Marshall acknowledged Ho's pledge, and promised to relay the good news to

Roosevelt at Warm Springs, Georgia. Meanwhile, Hearn restored Y-Force's

full tonnage allocations.45

Chennault Renews His Warnings

Immediately after the Chinese agreed to drive across the Salween toward

Burma, Chennault again warned that the Japanese were about to move in east

China, and by implication urged cancellation of the Salween offensive. On 15

April, at the Generalissimo's request, Chennault as Chief of Staff, Chinese Air

Force, submitted to the Generalissimo an estimate of the situation with respect

to the air war in China. Chennault's air estimate was very similar to his 8 April

letter to Stilwell, but with some significant additions. It will be recalled that

on 12 April Stilwell had ordered Chennault not to submit such a paper to the

Chinese leader.46

General Chennault wrote to the Generalissimo: "It is unnecessary to point

out that all the new military equipment brought into China in the past two

years has been assigned to the Chinese Armies on the Salween Front. Both

equipment and many tens of thousands of troops have actually been borrowed

for the Salween front from the Chinese forces which must meet the enemy offensives in Central and East China." In his next paragraph Chennault continued "In addition to resisting the two enemy offensives [which he was predicting], it is desired that the Chinese ground forces assume the offensive

themselves, with the objective of taking Ichang, Shasi, and perhaps Hankow."

 47

 Chennault therefore in mid-April 1944 set a very high rating on the

capabilities of the Chinese forces, for the Japanese held Hankow with eight

divisions. A Chinese attack on eight Japanese divisions was of a different order

of magnitude from one across the Salween on the 56th Division.

After listing for the Generalissimo the logistic difficulties that hobbled the

Fourteenth Air Force, Chennault closed with the warning:

45

 Rad CFB 16100, Ho for Hearn to Marshall, 14 Apr 44; Rad CFB 16145, Hearn to Marshall, 15 Apr 44; Rad WAR 23478, Marshall to Ho, 15 Apr 44; Rad CFB 16384, Ho for Hearn to Marshall, 21 Apr 44. Items 2214, 2220, 2225, 2250, Bk 6, JWS Personal File. 46

 (1) Ltr, Ferris to Chennault, 8 May 44, with 1st Ind, Chennault to Ferris, 14 May 44, sub: Info for Theater Comdr. SNF 31. (2) Stilwell's order is radio cited in note 41(4). 47

 Memo, Chennault for Generalissimo, 15 Apr 44, par. 4. SNF 31.
DECISIONS TO ATTACK 315

Under the circumstances, therefore, it is necessary to inform your Excellency that the

combined air forces in China, excluding the VLR [B-29] project, may not be able to withstand the expected Japanese air offensive and will certainly be unable to afford air support to

the Chinese ground forces over the areas and on the scale desired. In order to put the air

forces on a footing to accomplish these missions, drastic measures to provide them with adequate supplies and adequate strength must be taken. As the Japanese threat appears to be

immediate, such measures should be taken without further delay.48

On completing his study, Chennault tried to give a copy to General Hearn.

Hearn was ill, so without further delay, Chennault presented his estimate to

the Generalissimo. The following day a copy was left with General Ferris, who

was acting as chief of staff vice Hearn. Circulated among Stilwell's principal

staff officers in Chungking, Chennault's estimate drew emphatic dissents. G-2

stated that while officially the Chinese professed great fear of an offensive by

the Japanese, Chinese intelligence saw no indications and was unconcerned.

G-3 rejected Chennault's statement that the Chinese divisions in Yunnan had

been borrowed from other fronts in China, observing: "The implication of this

paragraph is that China will fall because the ground forces are employed in the

wrong place."

 49

 Apparently, Chennault's 15 April estimate was about three

weeks in coming to Stilwell's attention.

At this time, informational copies of the 8 and 10 April 1944 exchanges between Chennault and Stilwell were circulating among interested headquarters

all the way up to General Arnold of the AAF in Washington. Throughout

April, and indeed later, Chennault believed his warnings were being ignored.

Actually they caused serious concern all along the chain of command. General

Stratemeyer in India was alarmed because final preparations were being made

for reception of the B-29's in China. MATTERHORN would be useless if Stratemeyer and his staff read Chennault's radios correctly. Other echelons reacted

similarly. Headquarters, CBI Theater, considered curtailing Chennault's operations so that there might be ample fighter cover for MATTERHORN against

the Japanese air offensive Chennault was predicting. Arnold suggested that the

Fourteenth Air Force receive the major share of all Hump tonnage. Operations

Division was so alarmed that it persuaded the AAF to delay MATTERHORN

until Stilwell was sure the B-29's could be safely based in China. Stratemeyer

immediately queried Chennault on this point and suggested a conference at

Dinjan, India, to cover the entire matter with Stilwell.50

On 16 April Chennault declined to meet Stilwell and Stratemeyer. He as48

 Ibid. 49

 (1) Ind cited n. 46(1). (2) The comments of Stilwell's Chungking staff are on the covering

slip with which Ferris circulated Chennault's estimate to G-2, G-3, G-4, and the air officer. SNF 31. 50

 (1) Ltr and Rad cited n. 40(2). (2) Rad CAK 879, Chennault to Stratemeyer, 16 Apr 44; Rad SH 58, Stilwell to Chennault, 21 Apr 44; Memo, Stratemeyer for Chennault, 20 Apr 44, sub: VLR Opns from China; Rad CAK 1215, Glenn to Chennault, 24 Apr 44; Rad CAK

1284, Chennault to Stilwell, 26 Apr 44; Rad CHC 1016, Stilwell to Chennault, 30 Apr 44. The Chennault-Wedemeyer Letter, Items 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33. (3) Memo with Incls, Arnold for Handy, 17 May 44, sub: Opns of U.S. AAF Units from China. Case 375, OPD 381, A47-30.
316 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

sured General Stratemeyer that he could defend the Cheng-tu B-29 base.

Claiming that his 8 April letter had been misunderstood, Chennault explained

his "intentions were to acquaint and point out the increased danger of hostile

air attack if Peking-Hankow Railroad is held by Japs." Chennault, therefore,

saw grave danger, but now appraised it as "increased danger of hostile air

attack."

 51

Operation ICHIGO

The planning for Japan's 1944 offensive in China, an operation whose opening phases would form an ominous background to the Chinese offensive across

the Salween, began in the fall of 1943. Japanese staff studies then weighed the

advantages to be gained by taking the east China airfields and preventing air

raids on Japan, the disruption of Chinese activities in south China, the opening of secure land communications to Southern Army via Indochina, and the

overthrow of the Nationalist regime. Further study focused on one objective

that would satisfy the concern felt by Imperial General Headquarters about the

menace of the B-29's, and meet the situation that faced China Expeditionary

Army as a result of the Fourteenth Air Force's attacks on its lines of communications. This objective was the east China airfields, the current base for Chennault's tactical aircraft, and a potential base for the B-29's.52

 (Map 18*)

In the later opinion of General Okamura, who in January 1944 commanded

North China Area Army and subsequently assumed command of all the Japanese forces in China, the "extremely effective" attacks of the Fourteenth Air

Force made it very difficult to supply the Japanese forces in the Hankow area.

Because the Japanese air force was unable to check Chennault's airmen, the

Japanese had no alternative "but to plan to destroy Chennault's bases of

operation from the ground."

 53

On 17 January 1944 Imperial General Headquarters resolved to order China

Expeditionary Army, Gen. Shunroku Hata commanding, to seize the east China

airfields, and take the Hunan-Kwangsi, Canton-Hankow, and Peiping-Hankow railways. After the war, General Okamura recalled that the PeipingHankow line had to be taken over by the Japanese because the Fourteenth Air

Force attacks on Japanese river shipping along the Yangtze River were making

that line of communications "extremely unsafe."

ICHIGO, therefore, had its limits. It did not at any time aim at taking

China's capital, Chungking, or the Hump terminal, Kunming. Nor was there

any co-ordination between ICHIGO and the Japanese drive on Imphal. Looking back on the war years, Hata thought it unfortunate that Imperial General

51

 Rad CAK 879, Chennault to Stilwell and Stratemeyer, 16 Apr 44. The Chennault-Wedemeyer Letter, Item 29. 52

 (1) See Ch. I, above. (2) Japanese Study 45, p. 109. 53

 Japanese Officers' Comments, Incl 3, Okamura. *For an explanation of enemy unit symbols, see note 82(3), page 42, above.
Map 18
318 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Headquarters had given no instructions about co-ordination or co-operation between the two operations. Hata's staff paid little attention to Stilwell's operations in north Burma and did not consider that the Japanese offensive against

Imphal concerned them:

That is, it believed that the operational objectives of the U.S. forces were to reopen the

North Burma land route to support Chiang Kai-shek's forces and to check Japanese forces' advance on India and it thought very little of them. It did not have the acute perception to

see that the U.S. forces operations in Burma were a part of the India-Burma-China-Pacific

Operation.54

The reinforcements that Imperial General Headquarters sent to China seem

to have been planned to provide artillery and service troops for Hata's divisions, most of which had little of either and so were ill adapted to active campaigning. From Manchuria there came one division, the 27th, four battalions of

field artillery, four battalions of mobile antiaircraft artillery, two mortar battalions, three battalions of engineers, four field replacement units, six animal

transport companies, and fifteen motor transport companies. Three air regiments were also transferred. These were all to return to Manchuria by the beginning of 1945. From Japan Imperial General Headquarters sent one independent infantry brigade, two battalions of mobile antiaircraft artillery, two companies of antiaircraft machine guns, four field replacement units, plus signal,

road construction, transport, and medical units. In China Hata organized two

regiments of engineers, two battalions of artillery, and signal units.

Since a number of Hata's divisions were organized as Class C units, and

therefore had no artillery, Imperial General Headquarters intended to raise some

to B standard, with six batteries of artillery, and others to A, with three battalions.55

 It may be assumed the artillery reinforcements were for that end. But

since the 32d and 35th Divisions were to be sent out of China in the spring of

1944, obviously Hata was not going to receive major reinforcements for

ICHIGO. And, after the completion of ICHIGO, two more divisions were to

be sent from China to Manchuria, and three from China to French Indochina.56

Imperial General Headquarters also ordered Hata to make maximum use of

local resources. All that was sent to China to augment Hata's supplies were

10,560,000 gallons of gasoline for trucks and 2,640,000 gallons of aviation gasoline, plus enough ammunition, as a postwar Japanese account rather vaguely

put it, to sustain four divisions in one engagement. In 1943 Chennault and his

adherents had argued that the Japanese could find troops to overrun the east

China airfields only by withdrawing garrisons from the Pacific and thereby

54

 (1) Japanese Studies 78, 129. (2) Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. IX. (3) IGH Army Order 921, 17 Jan 44. (4) Japanese Officers' Comments, Incls 2, 3, Hata, Okamura. 55

 (1) Japanese Study 129, p. 22. (2) Contemporary U.S. divisions all had thirty-six 105-mm. howitzers and twelve 155-mm. howitzers as an organic part of the division. This was regarded as the absolute minimum for operations against a weak adversary. Normal practice, on entering

combat, was to attach added battalions of artillery. 56

 Japanese Study 29, p. 22.
DECISIONS TO ATTACK 319

sacrificing their conquests. But when the time came for their major effort in

China, the Japanese continued their policy of transferring veteran divisions

from China to face the Allies elsewhere.57

Beginning in early February 1944 the significant Japanese redeployments

for ICHIGO were made south of the Great Wall, within Hata's command.

Japanese units from north China moved south and east, leaving vacuums into

which it seems reasonable to assume Communist guerrilla units moved. Thus,

the Mongolia Garrison Army (Lt. Gen. Yoshio Kozuki) lost the 3d Tank Division. The North China Area Army (General Okamura) reassigned the 110th

Division. In all, 7 of the 23 divisions of the Japanese military establishment in

China were involved in such shifts. On the eve of its last offensive, China Expeditionary Army had 24 divisions, 12 independent mixed brigades, and 14 independent infantry brigades, plus 230 aircraft of the newly activated 5th Air

Army (Lt. Gen. Takuma Shimoyama). Total personnel numbered approximately 820,000 men.58

 From the above, fifteen divisions, four independent

mixed brigades, and one independent infantry brigade were ultimately to take

part in the ICHIGO operation.59

General Hata divided ICHIGO into two major parts. The first, KOGO, was

a preliminary to his major effort, TOGO. KOGO was to clear the Chinese off

the railway lines that ran north to the Yellow River from Hankow. For the

operation, North China Area Army, to drive south across the Yellow River,

would use the 12th Army (one armored and three infantry divisions, one independent mixed brigade, one cavalry brigade, and one independent infantry

brigade), under Lt. Gen. Eitaro Uchiyama, and would feint toward the west

with some elements of the 1st Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Teiichi Yoshimoto. About six weeks were allowed for the operation.

After KOGO had scattered the Chinese forces between the Yangtze and the

Yellow River, "particularly the Nationalist," cautioned Imperial General Headquarters, and had cleared the rail lines from Peiping to Hankow, TOGO would

unfold in three phases. Capture of Heng-yang was to be first. Kweilin and

Liuchow were to be taken in the second. Phase three would include capturing

Nan-ning, opening the Canton-Hankow railroad, and overrunning the Fourteenth Air Force's fields at Sui-chuan and Nan-hsiung. For TOGO, 11th Army

(Hankow) would have nine divisions, the 23d Army (Canton), under Lt. Gen.

Hisakazu Tanaka, would have two divisions for its drive north to meet the 11th

Army, and one or two divisions would be in central reserve. TOGO was to

begin in the summer and be completed in five months.60

To protect the great Japanese supply center at Hankow, General Hata

57

 Bks VII, IX, Hopkins Papers. (2) Japanese Studies 78, 82, 129. 58

 (1) Japanese Studies 78, 82, 129. (2) Japanese Officers' Comments, pp. 23-24. (3) IGH

Army Order 928, 1 Feb 44; Order 933, 5 Feb 44; Order 945, 15 Feb 44. (4) Ltr, Murphy to Ward, 18 Nov 52. OCMH. 59

 Japanese Officers' Comments. 60

 (1) Japanese Studies 78, 129. (2) IGH Army Dirs 1810, / Jan 44; 1830, 1 Feb 44.
320 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

formed the Wuchang-Hankow Defense Army, and to it allotted the 39th Division,

one independent mixed brigade, four independent infantry brigades, and three

field replacement units. Up the river from Hankow, in order to protect Chungking from a drive up the Yangtze, the Generalissimo had the V and VI War

Areas with forces that in October 1943 the Japanese had estimated at eleven

armies. The size of the garrison the Japanese left at Hankow suggests a high

degree of confidence that these eleven Chinese armies would not attack Hankow while ICHIGO was under way.61

East China's Defenders on the Eve of ICHIGO

The exact strength and quality of the Chinese forces that faced Hata were

unknown to either Stilwell's or Chennault's headquarters.62 In Hata's path lay

the IX War Area (Gen. Hsueh Yueh), and the IV War Area (Gen. Chang

Fa-kwei). In Kweilin was the headquarters of Li Chi-shen (who bore the honorary title of marshal). He held powers of command over the east China war

areas that the Americans believed to be nominal and purely honorary, though

they regarded him as a powerful politician. Kweilin was also important as the

headquarters of Gen. Pai Chung-hsi, who in the Nationalist Government

hierarchy held the post of head of the Board of Training. He was important in

his own right in that he commanded the loyalty of a group of divisions in east

China whose exact strength was unknown but whose ability was highly rated

by Americans and Chinese both. After the war the Japanese wrote they had expected to find the Changsha area held by 13 to 14 Chinese armies totaling perhaps forty divisions, and that about 20 Chinese armies numbering perhaps fiftyfive divisions had been committed to the defense of Heng-yang.63

These forces had been little improved by the ZEBRA Force project, Stilwell's

effort to build thirty good divisions in east China. As graduates of the Kweilin

Infantry Training Center had begun to rejoin their units, Stilwell had wanted

to capitalize on their training. By organizing Americans into traveling instructional groups and sending them into the field he hoped to create the beginnings of a liaison system such as that with the Y-Force on the Salween.

Accordingly, on 1 January 1944, a Z-Force Operations Staff, modeled on

the Y-Force Operations Staff, was organized. As he had with the Y-FOS American staff, Stilwell kept command of the little group of Americans and named

Brig. Gen. Malcolm F. Lindsey as chief of staff.64

61

 Japanese Studies 77, 78, 129, 130. 62

 See notes 64(2) and 84(2), below. 63

 (1) See section "The East China Crisis Grows," Chapter XI, below. (2) Japanese Study 78. 64

 (1) See Ch. I, above. (2) History of Z-FOS, 1 Jan-31 Oct 1944. (Hereafter, History of

Z-FOS.) OCMH. (3) Stilwell's keeping command of the Y-Force and Z-Force Operations Staffs was interpreted by Dorn as largely motivated by personnel problems within the American organization in CBI, not by any plans of personal advancement in China Theater. Moreover, correspondence from Dorn and Lindsey to the Chinese would then be by Brigadier Generals Dorn and Lindsey on behalf of Lieutenant General Stilwell so that the relatively junior Dorn and Lindsey would not be as it were directly addressing very senior Chinese officers.
DECISIONS TO ATTACK 321

General Lindsey set up a headquarters in Chungking, assembled his aides,

and began work. Discussions with General Ho and the Chinese General Staff

soon suggested to Lindsey and the Americans that the War Department decision to limit ZEBRA Force to 10 percent of its full complement of lend-lease

had had an adverse effect on the Chinese. As the weeks went by, Lindsey and

his staff received the very strong impression that so far as the Chinese were

concerned lend-lease in quantity must precede any action on their part. The

Chinese would not set up an over-all command structure for the ZEBRA divisions, and American hopes for an improved Chinese force in east China rapidly

faded.65

After weeks of conferring, Lindsey's G-4, Col. Frederic W. Boye, on 26

March 1944 in effect urged scrapping the plan to build a second thirty divisions

and accepting instead a Chinese suggestion:

1. As has been and as will be brought out at G-4 conference, equipment for both Chinese

and Americans will be meager. . . . It is to be noted however that we are getting some

equipment which can be put to immediate use. . . .

3. Personnel ordered to the [CBI] theater for Z Force has been cut on two occasions and

is being side-tracked on all sides with the approval of the Theater Commander [Stilwell was

using Z-Force personnel in Burma since the Chinese were not offering a great deal of cooperation to Z-Force]. In effect, therefore, we do not have sufficient for our initial essential

group for our second 30 divisional installation. . . .

5. The National Military Council has designated 30 divisions which are to comprise the

Z Force. [Boye's marginal notes located these as eight in the Kweilin area, six along the

Yangtze, and 16 near Hsian.] These divisions are so widely separated and so distant from

possible supply bases that it would be impossible to maintain supply and communications

to them under the limitations in this [China] theater. . . .

6. The Chinese are reluctant to have Americans go empty-handed to their units to take

over any training without equipment. If the equipment which will be available within the

next year [under the War Department's 10 percent policy] is divided into 30 parts each such

part will be practically zero. My information leads me to believe that in many divisions there

is no training going on at the present time. This fact the Chinese wish to conceal and it is

for that reason that they do not wish the Americans there.

7. If we concentrated our Chinese equipment in the hands of a smaller number of units

we would have something to work on with this fewer number. Likewise, the problem of turning equipment over to the Chinese would be solved in that we would retain American control along established routes to delivery to Army Headquarters. The Depot facilities at

Kweilin are adequate to handle the storage and distribution involved. . . .

Conclusion

It is my conclusion and recommendation that we accept the Chinese proposal on the

concentration of equipment now available and that we secure approval of the Theater Commander toward concentrating our immediate installations and training attentions to the four

Armies generally located at Luichow, Kukong, Hengyang, and Changsha; that as soon as

the basic essential equipment is in our hands we dispatch Army and Division teams by rail

to those places and otherwise proceed with our training plan; that until other equipment is

65

 (1) History of Z-FOS. (2) Z-Force Journal. KCRC.
322 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

forthcoming we supply no equipment to the other Armies and divisions in the river valley

areas and to those further to the north.66

The pressure of events eventually began to force American plans into the shape

Boye had recommended.

With the arrival in east China by the end of May 1944 of a very meager

amount of arms for ZEBRA, the Generalissimo sent Lt. Gen. Lo Cho-ying to

Kweilin to accept delivery. General Lo acted as a representative of the National

Military Council and was in no sense a commander for the divisions the National Military Council had earlier named. As the Japanese were moving to

their assembly areas, Lindsey in mid-April began preparing to move to Kweilin. He probably hoped that since a trickle of lend-lease was actually beginning

to flow to east China, Lo might arrange for Lindsey to send U.S. instructional

teams to the divisions designated by the Chinese for the ZEBRA project.67

On the night of 17 April, the Japanese 37th Division crossed the Yellow

River. Was it one more training expedition, or a rice raid? That day, Headquarters, CBI Theater, radioed G-2 in Washington that recently 239 Japanese

troop trains had been reported as passing through Hsinhsiang. Stilwell's staff

also reported that the Japanese were building their independent mixed brigades

into full-scale divisions, that there were ominous troop movements around

Hankow.68 On 19 April, the Japanese 110th and 62d Divisions began moving

south along the Peiping-Hankow railway, and the KOGO phase of ICHIGO

was under way.69

Initial Reactions to ICHIGO

While the Japanese waited in their assembly areas along the Yellow River,

Stilwell and Stratemeyer had been discussing the problem presented by

Chennault's warnings of a Japanese air offensive. Obviously, Stilwell took

Chennault's warnings at face value, for on 17 April Stilwell directed that

Chennault's primary mission be defense of the B-29 fields at Cheng-tu "even

at the expense of shipping strikes and support of the Chinese ground forces,

dependent upon Japanese reaction to operations from the Chengtu area." The

order reached Chennault about 26 April.70

Since the Japanese offensive was now under way, and was emphatically a

ground offensive, Chennault was startled by a directive that tied him to defense

of a remote area in west China. A strong force of fighters was based between

66

 Memo, Boye for Lindsey, 26 Mar 44, sub: Observations on Z-Force Problems. Boye's italics. OCMH. 67

 (1) History of Z-FOS. (2) Recordings of Diary of 1st Lt Dwight E. Brewer, Adjutant

Gen, Z-FOS. OCMH. (3) Extracts from Col Boye's diary. OCMH. (4) CM-IN 8737, Stilwell

to Marshall, 11 Jun 44. 68

 (1) Japanese Study 129. (2) CM-IN 13041, Hearn to MILID G-2 WDGS, 18 Apr 44. 69

 Japanese Studies 78, 129. 70

 (1) See pp. 314-16, above. (2) Memo, Stratemeyer for Chennault, 20 Apr 44, sub: VLR

Opns From China. The Chennault-Wedemeyer Letter, Item 30.
DECISIONS TO ATTACK 323

the Japanese and Cheng-tu. Weighing the problems of giving fighter cover to

Cheng-tu against those of helping the Chinese to stop the Japanese drive and

preparing to support the steadily approaching Chinese offensive on the Salween

front, Chennault assured Stilwell that the defense of Cheng-tu was "child's

play" in comparison and asked that Stilwell reconsider his directive.71

Stilwell replied:

I am glad to hear that the defense of Chengtu is child's play. I had gathered from your

letter of April eight that the security of China as a base for MATTERHORN and other military

operations against Japan might be in doubt. It is a relief to know that we have no problem

at Chengtu and under these circumstances of course the question of action in emergency will

not arise. Until it does, there is no intention of limiting the scope of your operations in any

way.72

Therefore, Chennault would have operational freedom in meeting the

Japanese threat. SOS in China went on with its plans to improve the eastern

line of communications to Chennault's bases and approved Colonel Sheahan's

recommendations.73 Attempts were made to make up the April shortfalls in

tonnage deliveries to the Fourteenth Air Force. However, Stilwell refused to

declare that there was an emergency under which he, as U.S. theater commander, could divert the B-29 stockpiles to the Fourteenth Air Force as

Chennault had requested on 8 April. Simultaneously, Roosevelt refused a bid

from the Generalissimo for command of the B-29's, giving him instead purely

honorific control as Supreme Commander, China Theater.74

The Japanese launched the KOGO phase of their offensive as the ChineseAmerican Composite Wing was establishing itself on the airfields at Hsian,

En-shih, Liang-shan, and Nan-cheng. The wing comprised six fighter and one

medium bomber (B-25) squadrons, and its mission was to protect the B-29

fields at Cheng-tu, to destroy the Yellow River bridges in Japanese possession,

and to neutralize the railway yards at Cheng-hsien and Kaifeng. The first mission against the Yellow River bridges was therefore flown by the Fourteenth Air

Force on 28 April by twenty-seven B-24's escorted by ten P-51's. They found

the bridges hidden under a low ceiling, and the mission was not effective. On

5 May a P-40 knocked out one span by dive bombing, but the Japanese quickly

repaired it and supplemented the regular bridges with two ponton bridges

across the silt flats of the river east of Kaifeng. Throughout the war the duel

71

 Rad CAK 1284, Chennault to Stilwell, 26 Apr 44. The Chennault-Wedemeyer Letter, Item 32. 72

 (1) Rad CMC 1016, Stilwell to Chennault, 30 Apr 44. The Chennault-Wedemeyer Letter,

Item 33. (2) Chennault, Way of a Fighter, page 286, quoted Radio CHC 1016 but eliminated

the passage: ". . . and under these circumstances of course the question of action in emergency

will not arise. Until it does, there is no intention of limiting the scope of your operations in any way." 73

 (1) See pp. 292-93, above. (2) Bykofsky MS. 74

 (1) Rad CFB 16169, Hearn to Marshall, 15 Apr 44. Item 2224, Bk 6, JWS Personal File. (2) Rad cited n. 72(1). (3) Rad CFB 16433, Generalissimo to Roosevelt, 22 Apr 44. Item 2253, Bk 6, JWS Personal File.
324 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

BRIDGES ACROSS THE YELLOW RIVER were repeatedly bombed by planes of

the Fourteenth Air Force.

between the airmen and the Japanese antiaircraft gunners continued, with the

Japanese successful in keeping the crossings open for operation.75

As April ended, defense of Honan Province seemed hopeless. The fear of an

attack by the Japanese toward Hsian, gateway to Chungking and Cheng-tu,

thoroughly alarmed the Generalissimo. His commanders along the Yellow

River were ordered to prevent a juncture by the Japanese in Tung-kuan (East

Gateway) Pass, whose capture would open the way to Hsian. In turn, Hsian's

fall might blow up a storm of dissatisfaction among the Generalissimo's war

area commanders south of the Yangtze, for many of them, the Americans

reported, were now hinting of their dissatisfaction with his conduct of the war.76

At this moment, Stilwell reacted to Chennault's sending the air estimate of

15 April to the Generalissimo. Considering that Chennault had acted in

defiance of his explicit orders not to lay such a paper before the Generalissimo,

Stilwell demanded an explanation in writing.77

75

 (1) Fourteenth AF History. (2) Japanese Study 82. 76

 (1) Japanese Study 78. (2) Rad 460, Lindsey to Stilwell, 13 May 44. Item 2534, Bk 7,

JWS Personal File. (3) General Okamura stated after the war that the Japanese did not have the resources to attack Hsian. Japanese Officers' Comments, Incl 3, Okamura. 77

 Ltr cited n. 46(1).
DECISIONS TO ATTACK 325

While Chennault drafted his answer, the Generalissimo began applying

pressure to bring more U.S. air power to bear against the Japanese. Calling

General Ferris, then acting as chief of staff for Stilwell, to meet with him, the

Generalissimo on 11 May asked that Stilwell order the fighter aircraft stationed

at Cheng-tu to protect the B-29's in moving to Nan-cheng to support the

Chinese forces in and around Loyang. He also asked that 500 tons of gasoline

from the B-29 stores be diverted to support the fighters. The Generalissimo

told Ferris that the next two weeks were vital, that he wanted the Fourteenth

Air Force and his armies in close co-operation to try to stop the Japanese.78

Promptly transmitted to Stilwell by Ferris, the Generalissimo's request

placed before Stilwell the problem of deciding when conditions in China

Theater would reach a point that would force him to divert supplies from the

B-29 project, MATTERHORN, to which the President attached such importance.

Stilwell's remark at TRIDENT that "air coverage over nothing is in my opinion

of little value" suggests he now hesitated to divert supplies from MATTERHORN

for a tactical air effort because he expected it to be futile in view of the low

quality of the troops for whom it was exerted. He may also have recalled

Chennault's statement that the greatest danger was from a Japanese air

offensive, which would surely strike at the menace to the Japanese homeland

which the B-29's presented. But other measures Stilwell could approve. He

approved Stratemeyer's suggestion that the B-24's of the 308th Bombardment

Group haul gas and oil to Chennault, and permitted Chennault to use the

Cheng-tu P-47's. Feeling little sympathy for the Generalissimo in a predicament that Stilwell believed the Chinese leader had brought on himself by

failing to reorganize his army, he thanked Stratemeyer for the suggestion, then

added: "We must remember that he [the Generalissimo] has been assured by

experts that air power can do the trick, and now he craves to see it done."

 79

On 12 May a radio from Chennault presented the Fourteenth Air Force's

reasons for its inability so far to stop the Japanese. Chennault told Stilwell what

he had been able to do to meet the Generalissimo's demands for more air support. Three hundred and seventy tons of gasoline had been given to the Chinese

Air Force and twelve P-51's had been sent to Liang-shan to reinforce the

fighters there. Lack of airfields, limited supplies, dust, and poor communications made it difficult for the Fourteenth Air Force to operate in the LoyangCheng-hsien area. Chennault concluded: "lack of tonnage for aviation supplies,

and a general disbelief in Japanese offensive plans" handicapped him in his

efforts to prepare for the Honan campaign.80

Then Chennault's reply to Stilwell's demand for an explanation arrived.

78

 Memo, Mme Chiang for Stilwell, 5 May 44; Rad CFB 17237, Ferris to Stilwell, 11 May

44. Items 2507, 2525, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. 79

 (1) Memo 197, Ferris for Generalissimo, 14 May 44. Item 2535, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. (2) Rad CHC 1054, Stilwell to Stratemeyer, 13 May 44. SNF 130. 80

 Rad CAK 1946, Chennault to Ferris for Stilwell, 12 May 44. Item 2531, Bk 7, JWS Personal

File.
326 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

In it Chennault pointed out that he was chief of staff of the Chinese Air Force,

which post gave him direct access to the Generalissimo. He had tried to present

the paper to Hearn before giving it to the Generalissimo but Hearn had been

ill. Such conflicts as this were perhaps implicit in his dual status as Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, and as Chief of Staff, Chinese Air Force,

Chennault continued, but he had left a copy of the study with Ferris so that

Stilwell would be informed. Weighing this answer, Stilwell found himself far

from satisfied with it. He concluded that Chennault had been insubordinate

and should be relieved.81

Looking over Chennault's radios to him and the air estimate to the Generalissimo, Stilwell concluded that Chennault was beginning to prepare a case to

which he might appeal in years to come. Taking up his pen, Stilwell poured

out the bitterness accumulated in the long feud that had so handicapped his

efforts to prepare an effective Chinese Army, and wrote his analysis of

Chennault's tactics:

Chennault [stated]: The Chinese ground forces can protect the bases with the help of

the 14th AF. . .

Chennault has assured the Generalissimo that air power is the answer. He has told him

that if the 14th AF is supported, he can effectively prevent a Jap invasion. Now he realizes

it can't be done, and he is trying to prepare an out for himself by claiming that with a

little more [Stilwell's italics], which we won't give him, he can still do it. He tries to duck the

consequences of having sold the wrong bill of goods, and put the blame on those who

pointed out the danger long ago and tried to apply the remedy.

He has failed to damage the Jap supply line. He has not caused any Jap withdrawals. On

the contrary, our preparations have done exactly what I prophesied, i. e., drawn a Jap

reaction, which he now acknowledges the ground forces can't handle, even with the total air

support he asked for and got.82

The East China Army Written Off

Soon after Stilwell angrily penned the analysis quoted above, Chennault

on 18 May asked that a directive be issued to meet the increasingly grave situation which threatened to involve loss of the east China bases, that adequate

supply tonnage be given the Fourteenth Air Force, that CBI Theater headquarters furnish information on what action it was taking to meet the threat,

and that information be furnished as to just what would constitute an emergency justifying Stilwell in using the B-29's and their supplies within China

Theater to stop the Japanese.83

81

 (1) Rad CFB 17552, Ferris to Stilwell, 19 May 44. Item 2542, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. (2)

Indorsement and Stilwell's handwritten notes attached to letter cited in note 46 (1). 82

 (1) The passage deleted for brevity's sake gives Stilwell's understanding that Chennault had

promised 100 fighters, 35 bombers, and 5,000 tons a month of supplies would be enough for him to drive the Japanese from central China. The paper, handwritten in ink, was found in SNF 31, clipped to a radio dated 14 May 1944 and just before a letter from Ferris dated 11 May 1944. (2)

Chennault, Way of a Fighter, p. 304. (3) Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. IX. 83

 Ltr, Chennault to Stilwell, 18 May 44, sub: Estimate of Enemy Intentions in China. SNF 31.
DECISIONS TO ATTACK 327

General Chennault supported his request for more supplies and a priority

overriding that of the B-29's with an intelligence estimate by his staff that

dismissed the Chinese Army as a factor in defending the east China airfields and

by clear implication left the Fourteenth Air Force as the only Allied force that

might save the situation. Estimating the strengths of the contending ground

forces, Chennault's Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Col. Jesse C. Williams, set the

Japanese strength in north China and in the Yellow River bend as eleven

divisions, four independent mixed brigades, four infantry brigades, and one

cavalry brigade. The Chinese, Colonel Williams went on, had not been willing

to reveal their strength but no less than thirty-four divisions had been mentioned in reports from the front, some of them units with a reputation of being

excellent troops.

Colonel Williams was not optimistic about the performance of the Chinese

soldiers. He told Chennault: "Only at Szeshui [Ssu-Shui, Honan] have these

troops offered advancing Japanese forces substantial resistance. Everywhere else

Japanese columns have moved virtually at will. The Chinese have shown only

slight evidence of either plan or capability to hamper Japanese movement or to

regain lost territory." For the first time, he wrote, the Chinese were faced with

Japanese divisions from Manchuria with plenty of mobile artillery and armor.

This estimate, as has been noted, was in error, for General Hata had but one

division (the 27th) from Manchuria. Because it was the first time since

December 1941 that the Japanese had put forth a major effort in China, the

contrast with their previous operations led Allied observers to explain it in

terms of massive reinforcements from Manchuria.84

The speedy initial successes scored by ICHIGO, the poor combat performance of the forces of the east China commanders, the acute supply problems of

the Fourteenth Air Force, and the discord among the local American

headquarters were a somber backdrop to the proposed Chinese effort along the

Salween.

Summary

After the conferences at Cairo and Tehran in December 1943, President

Roosevelt's attitude toward China changed greatly. The Generalissimo's conduct at Cairo, the Soviet promise to enter the war against Japan, the Generalissimo's linking his request for a loan of $1,000,000,000 with the cancellation

of the Andamans operation (BUCCANEER), Chinese insistence on making the

Americans literally pay to fight in China, the contrast between Stilwell's

defeating the Japanese 18th Division with three Chinese divisions and the

84

 (1) As a measure of the increased effort that they put forth, the Japanese military expenditures in China jumped 700 percent between 1943 and 1944. USSBS, Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy, Table B-2, p. 85. (2) Memo, Williams for Chennault, 18 May 44, sub: Estimate of Japanese Capabilities on the China Front. The Chennault-Wedemeyer Letter, Item

37 with Incl.
328 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Generalissimo's reluctance to engage the weakened 56th with twelve Chinese

divisions, all played their part in the President's appraisal of Chiang Kai-shek

as a soldier and as a statesman. The President's messages to the Generalissimo

grew steadily harsher in tone, culminating in a threat to cut off lend-lease if the

Generalissimo continued his refusal to attempt to break the blockade of China.

While the President's attitude was changing, and as he leaned more toward

support of Stilwell's views rather than the Generalissimo's, there were ominous

Japanese stirrings in China. The Generalissimo as Supreme Commander, China

Theater, had not organized an army able to meet eleven Japanese divisions on

even terms, and Chennault's east China bases were now the object of a major

Japanese effort. Unfortunately, Chennault blunted the effect of the Fourteenth

Air Force's warnings by stressing, now the danger of a Japanese air attack, now

the danger of a ground offensive, and by suggesting that the Chinese drive the

Japanese from central China. The Japanese opened their own attack in midApril, just after the Chinese, in response to the President's proddings, finally

agreed to attack across the Salween into Burma.
CHAPTER IX

The Chinese Take the Offensive

The Chinese decision of 12 April 1944 to attack across the Salween River

came at a time when the Japanese had begun their drive on India, when Stilwell

had decided to strike at Myitkyina, and when the Japanese had assembled along

the Yellow River. As described by the Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army,

General Ho, to General Hearn not later than 14 April, the Chinese plans had

for their first objective the city of Teng-chung; for the second, Lung-ling. Their

later actions and troop movements, the Chinese added, would depend on how

the situation developed.1 General Marshall, on receiving Hearn's message to

this effect, told General Ho that the Chinese move might well be the decisive

blow in the campaign to regain control of north Burma.2

The Chinese (and it must be remembered that this campaign would be

fought by Chinese armies in China Theater under Chinese leadership) therefore aimed at seizing two key points on the trace of the projected line of

communications to China. Teng-chung, an old jade marketing center, lies

almost due east and 124 miles from Myitkyina, on a rough but usable trail.

Lung-ling is on the old Burma Road. Its capture would split the Japanese

positions along the Salween. (Map 19*)

The specific objectives which Stilwell's officers, working with the Chinese

commanders of Y-Force, had recommended on 29 March and which presumably reflected Stilwell's views of that date, had been to "secure and hold the

general line: Mongmit-Lashio-Takaw-Monglen" while blocking any Japanese

invasion of Yunnan from the direction of French Indochina. The result of

success in such a move would be a grand converging attack of Stilwell's five

Chinese divisions from India and the Generalissimo's Y-Force from Yunnan

that would meet somewhere deep in north Burma south of the MyitkyinaBhamo area.3

 The trace of the Ledo Road would then be free of Japanese.

That the offensive was not ordered until mid-April robbed the decision of

some of the significance it might have had if the Chinese had made the decision

1

 Rad CFB 16100, Ho to Hearn for Marshall, 14 Apr 44. Item 2214, Bk 6, JWS Personal File. 2

 Rad WAR 23478, Marshall to Ho, 15 Apr 44. Item 2225, Bk 6, JWS Personal File. 3

 Plan RAINBOW, for the Salween operation, is contained in Incl 1 to Ltr 0, Col Richard M. Sandusky, Deputy CofS, Y-FOS to COs, Traveling Instructional Gps 1, 2, and 3, 29 Mar 44, sub: RAINBOW Opns Plan. OCMH. *For an explanation of Chinese unit symbols, see note 7(2) below.
Map 19
THE CHINESE TAKE THE OFFENSIVE 331

to cross the Salween in December 1943 or January 1944. At that time about five

months of good weather would have lain ahead. In February, Stilwell's mission

to Washington told OPD that Stilwell thought a bold attack might lead to the

enemy's yielding all Burma north of Mandalay. In that event, with the road

open to China, current plans called for adding 1,350 tons of equipment to that

already possessed by each Y-Force division. These munitions, mostly trucks

and 105-mm. howitzers, would have placed a most formidable group of divisions at the Generalissimo's disposal.4

 But the months had gone by and in

mid-April the monsoon rains were but thirty to forty days away.

In April 1944 the American leadership saw the Salween situation as an

opportunity created by the current state of the 56th Division, its strength

depleted by detachments and stretched over 100 air-line miles. A strong Chinese

blow at the thin line might crumble it and the Japanese grip on north Burma

would be broken.

Battleground Above the Clouds: The Salween Front

The Salween or Lu Kiang (the name Salween is of Burmese origin) has cut

for itself a deep gorge through land 9,000 feet above sea level. The river is

rarely more than 200 feet wide, but its waters race exceedingly swift, deep, and

cold through the lower extension of the Himalayas to win for it the Chinese

name of "Angry River." During the spring thaw and later in the monsoon

season the Salween swells into a torrent almost impossible to cross. During

their hasty retreat in May 1942 the Chinese had destroyed the two bridges then

crossing the Salween.

If the Japanese 56th Division was to be driven from its line along the Salween

and across the Burma Road, the Chinese would have to be ferried across the

Salween at several points. Then the Chinese would have to cross the grain of

the Kaoli-kung Mountains, their advance funneled into the mountain passes.

Once through the mountains, they would be moving toward their objective,

the Myitkyina-Bhamo-Lashio area. Apart from the Burma Road itself, four

usable passes through the Kaoli-kung Mountains offer as many gateways to

Chinese invaders of Burma. From north to south, these are: Hpimaw Hkyet at

9,000 feet, the northernmost extension of the 56th Division's front; Ma-mien

Kuan at 10,000 feet, thirty air-line miles south of the Hpimaw pass; Ta-tang-tzu

and Hung-mu-shu, both at 10,000 feet, are traversed by pack trails between

Pao-shan and Teng-chung.

Fifteen air miles west of the Salween and running parallel to it through a

valley of the Kaoli-kung Mountains is a similar but smaller stream, the Shweli,

whose mountain waters run 6,000 feet above sea level. Between Kaochiao, a

4

 Min, 4th Conf, USAF CBI Offs with OPD WDGS, Washington, 12 Feb 44. OCMH.
332 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

village at the western end of Ma-mien pass, and Chiang-chu, a small settlement

at the terminus of Ta-tang-tzu pass, the Shweli cuts through a narrow valley.

A secondary road, used for Japanese motor traffic in dry weather, links Kaochiao

and Chiang-chu. This road continues to the southwest to become a natural

avenue of approach to Teng-chung, the last large town on the China side of

the border. West of the Shweli valley the terrain is not so high as that between

the Shweli and Salween Rivers, but it is just as hard for any army to cross. A

good trail, which offered the possibility of being made into a military road, ran

between Teng-chung and Myitkyina, 124 miles north and west of Teng-chung.

While the general ruggedness of the Kaoli-kung area is unbelievable, and

the monsoon rains in their proper season greatly increased the difficulties and

miseries of the campaign, it was the veterans of the 56th Division with their

skillful deployment over the mountains and along the valleys who were the

principal obstacle to the Y-Force in meeting Stilwell near Myitkyina. Elements

of three regiments, the 113th, 146th, and 148th of the 56th Division, plus two

companies of the 114th Regiment, 18th Division, at Hpimaw pass watched the

long front. The commander, Lt. Gen. Sukezo Matsuyama, and 56th Division

headquarters were at Mang-shih on the Burma Road.5

Twelve miles northwest of Mang-shih on the Burma Road was Lung-ling,

strongly garrisoned since it controlled trails that branched north and south of

the Burma Road. Some forty miles north of Lung-ling, the 148th Regiment held

Teng-chung and turned that old town with its thick walls into a formidable

bastion of the Japanese line. From Teng-chung, patrols moved up and down the

Shweli valley, watched the passes through the Kaoli-kung, and frequented ferry

sites along the Salween. At the center of the Japanese line the 113th Regiment

thoroughly fortified Sung Shan, a multipeaked mountain, which dominated the

site of the destroyed Hui-tung Bridge over the Salween and the first twentyseven miles of the Burma Road west of the Salween River. South of Sung Shan,

detachments garrisoned Ping-ka and Hsiang-ta, cholera-plagued villages which

controlled trails reaching the first great bend of the Salween before it cuts the

Burma border. At Kunlong Ferry, sixty-five air miles away, where two years

before the Allies had worked on the Yunnan-Burma Railway, the 56th Division

placed three companies of its reconnaissance regiment to hold the southern end

of its line.

The 56th Division depended on the Burma Road and the trails branching

from it to link its forward elements with their principal supply base and headquarters at Lashio. The Japanese trucks were vulnerable to air attack, but

throughout 1943 and the first half of 1944 the Fourteenth Air Force was unable

to stop Japanese traffic along the Burma Road.6

5

 Although 56th Division was originally a part of 15th Army, it was placed directly under

the control of Burma Area Army on 15 February 1944. Japanese Study 93. 6

 Japanese Study 93.
THE CHINESE TAKE THE OFFENSIVE 333

CHART 6—SCHEMATIC ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE CHINESE

EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

The Chinese Plan for the Salween Campaign

The Chinese Expeditionary Force consisted of two group armies, the XI

and XX. (Chart 6) The XI Group Army, commanded by Maj. Gen. Sung

Hsi-lien, commanded the 2d, 6th, and 71st Armies. Headquarters, 6th Army,

remained in the rear while the army's two organic divisions were attached to

different group armies, the 2d Reserve Division to the 54th Army, and the 39th

Division to 2d Army.7 The XX Group Army, under Maj. Gen. Huo Kweichang, included the 53d and 54th Armies. Thus, at the start of the Salween

campaign, Gen. Wei Li-huang commanded twelve divisions. Unfortunately, the

Chinese Ministry of War had not brought these units up to strength, so that

Wei's actual strength of 72,000 men was 40 percent below what it should have

been.

By the end of February 1944 the five Y-Force armies had each been issued

540 .45-caliber submachine guns, 54 .55-caliber Boys antitank rifles, 162 60-mm.

mortars, 72 rocket launchers, 12 75-mm. pack howitzers, and 54 Bren guns. The

7

 (1) Of the five Chinese armies, the 2d was transferred from west Kweichow Province and

the 53d from Hunan. The rest had been stationed in Yunnan. See General Plan of ANAKIM, 19

May 1943, cited note 9(2). (2) A Chinese army may be considered, on the basis of its authorized

strength, to be the equivalent of an American army corps and is, therefore, indicated on the maps by a corps symbol. The actual numerical strength of a Chinese army, however, was closer to that of a U.S. division, which it resembled in organizational concept. Its divisions were organic to it, just as three infantry regiments are an organic part of the U.S. infantry division.
334 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

GEN. WEI LI-HUANG (seated, center), surrounded by his staff officers, observes the

result of Chinese artillery fire on enemy positions across the Salween.

ammunition for these weapons was ample to start the offensive and continued

supply presented no problem to Y-FOS supply members.8

Estimating that the 56th Division was firmly entrenched along the Burma

Road, and that it could easily bring reinforcements up the road to the Japanese

forward areas, the Chinese decided to strike first at the flanks of the long Japanese line. When their task forces had successfully made their crossings of the

Salween, they would move inland, then close in on the center of the Japanese

8

 (1) Min cited n. 4. (2) As of 20 April 1944 lend-lease weapons and ammunition issued

to the Y-Force by Y-FOS G-4 included:

Weapons

75-mm. pack howitzers................... . 244

37-mm. antitank guns.................... . 189

Boys antitank rifles (.55-caliber)............ . 536

60-mm. mortars......................... . 1,238

Rocket launchers M1A1................... . 395

Thompson submachine guns (.45-caliber)..... 5,631

Bren machine guns (.303-caliber) ........... . 603

Ammunition

75-mm. high-explosive. ............. . 378,334

75-mm. smoke. .................... . 4,910

37-mm. armor-piercing. ............. . 55,020

37-mm. high-explosive. ............. . 11,260

.55-caliber armor piercing. ........... . 623,980

60-mm. high-explosive mortar. ....... . 630,037

2.36-inch antitank. ................. . 2,880

.45-caliber ball..................... . 18,640,400

.303-caliber ball. ................... . 25,232,000

7.92-mm. ball. .................... . 164,551,500

In addition Y-FOS furnished 475 jeeps, 1,999 radio sets, and 420 pounds of napalm gasoline

thickener. Ltr AG (USAF CBI) 400.3591 and Incls, Gen Evans, Deputy CofS, to Stilwell, 15

May 44. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
THE CHINESE TAKE THE OFFENSIVE 335

position from north and south. When the envelopment was judged almost

complete, then the Chinese proposed to attack down the Burma Road. It was

expected the Japanese would then be forced to retire from Yunnan. In falling

back south and west, they would probably yield the town of Teng-chung,

opening trails to Myitkyina and Bhamo.9

The XX Group Army was assigned the sector north of the Burma Road;

the XI Group Army, the Burma Road and the Japanese positions to the south.

General Wei's plan called for the XX Group Army to send three reinforced

regimental combat teams across the Salween at as many points. When each had

made good its foothold, reinforcements would follow and that portion of the

attack would be under way.

The northernmost pass, the Hpimaw pass, was left by the Chinese to the

irregulars who had harassed the Japanese there since February; no effort

through it was scheduled. Twenty-five miles to the south was Ma-mien pass.

The Chinese ordered the 54th Army to send the 593d Regiment, 198th Division, across the Salween on D Day. The 593d Regiment was to filter through

the Ma-mien pass, using secondary trails to avoid Japanese patrols, and enter

the Shweli valley which, it will be recalled, was a north-south corridor behind

the main Japanese defenses. Once the 593d was in the Shweli valley, the

Chinese believed they would be safe from Japanese counterattacks in the

Ma-mien pass. Following the 593d Infantry would come the remainder of the

198th Division to clear the Japanese from the Ma-mien pass area and to drive

on into the Shweli valley. The 593d Infantry's crossing of the Salween would

be aided by the 2d Reserve Division which was to move south and seize the

village of Hai-po halfway down Ma-mien pass to the Salween's banks, and

thus prevent the Japanese from bringing up reinforcements to oppose the

593d's crossing.

Seventeen miles south of lofty Ma-mien pass, the main force of XX Group

Army was to clear the Ta-tang-tzu pass, the third gateway through the Kaolikung Mountains. This pass was held by the 148th Infantry (less the 1st and 2d

Battalions). At the western end of the pass was the principal Japanese stronghold in the immediate area, the fortified village of Chiang-chu. On D Day, the

36th Division of the 54th Army, plus one regiment of the 116th Division of

the 53d Army, was to make the Salween crossing. With the bridgehead established, the rest of the 53d Army would follow. Three Chinese divisions would

force their way through Ta-tang-tzu pass. This would place them in the Shweli

valley, ready to link with the 198th Division, and to drive south down the

Shweli valley as part of a great pincers on the Japanese. 9

 (1) Stilwell's Mission to China, Chart 8. (2) Y-Force, with the advice of Y-FOS, had begun planning for the Salween operation early in 1943. The product of its staff work was Plan RAINBOW. which the Generalissimo never approved. The General Plan of ANAKIM (Y-Force Project), 19

May 1943, OCMH, contains the general scheme for re-equipping the Y-Force divisions from Chinese and U.S. contributions and the initial plan for the conduct and objectives of the Salween operation. See Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. VIII. (3) Plan RAINBOW, Dec 43 and Feb 44

versions, AG (Y-FOS) 381, KCRC.
336 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

The shortest route from Pao-shan, the Chinese headquarters and communications center, to Teng-chung is that which crosses the Salween at the site of

the Huei-jen Bridge, but the pass on the Burmese side was so difficult that the

Chinese intended to confine themselves to preventing its use by the enemy,

rather than attempt to take it as part of their own attack. A regimental combat

team reinforced, from the New 39th Division, was ordered to cross the Salween

on D Day at three ferry sites three to five miles above the Huei-jen Bridge,

which was firmly held by a Japanese battalion, then swing south on the bridge

site. The rest of the New 39th Division would follow the combat team across.

Next in order of the gateways to Burma is that through which the Burma

Road passes, but since the Japanese were believed to hold it in force, the

Chinese plan called for postponing attack on it until the double envelopment

was well under way. Therefore the next Chinese assault was to cross the Salween

eleven miles south of the village of Ping-ka. Elements of the 71st and 2d Armies

would follow and converge on Ping-ka, whose capture was expected to open

the way up the Ping-ka valley into Burma. While Ping-ka was under attack,

other elements of the 71st and 2d Armies would bypass it and swing northwestward toward the Burma Road and the important towns of Mang-shih and

Lung-ling. Their capture would clamp a Chinese roadblock firmly on the Burma

Road, cutting off some of the strongest Japanese positions. Once these two

towns were under attack, the rest of the XI Group Army would cross the

Salween.

The success of the operations outlined above would precede General Wei's

commitment of his reserve to an attack directly down the Burma Road.10

Such then was the Chinese Expeditionary Force's plan for an offensive across

the Salween, a double envelopment that would scoop out the Japanese from

their fortified positions. The plan was good, but the hour was late and this

would be a great handicap. As far back as February 1943, the Chinese had

agreed to launch their attack in October 1943, thus insuring six months of good

weather. Over this same period, Stilwell and his subordinates in China had

worked closely with Y-Force to prepare it for its projected role in the North

Burma Campaign.11 But the Chinese had let the months slip by and now in

May 1944, on the eve of the monsoon rains, Y-Force would demonstrate the

extent to which it had profited from American advice and aid.

The American Contribution

The American contribution to China's offensive took two forms, advice and

logistical support. The Americans had no command functions in Y-Force, but

since April 1943 they had been advising in training, in supply, and in opera- 10

 (1) Japanese Study 93. (2) CM-IN 10243, Ho to Marshall, 14 Apr 44. (3) Rad 313, Dorn to Hearn, 19 Apr 44. Item 2244, Bk 6, JWS Personal File. (4) Ltr, Dorn to Stilwell, 19

Apr 44; Memo, Dorn for Stilwell, 9 May 44. SNF 35. 11

 Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. VIII.
THE CHINESE TAKE THE OFFENSIVE 337

AN AMERICAN LIAISON OFFICER studies Japanese positions across the Salween

River before the crossing.

tions. Studying the terrain, the Japanese positions, and the Chinese capabilities,

the American liaison and instructional groups since early 1943 had been urging

the Chinese commanders to accept certain basic principles. The first of these

reflected the fundamental weakness of the Japanese position, that no matter

how devoted the individual Japanese soldier or how skillfully he had fortified

his position, the 56th Division had to guard over 100 air-line miles. Therefore

the Americans had been urging the Chinese to prepare to infiltrate through the

inevitable gaps in the Japanese line. As the situation suggested, all Chinese

units should be prepared to break up into small, highly mobile, self-sustaining

combat teams. Each combat team should be prepared to operate independently

for several days. Each should be indoctrinated with the principle of moving

ahead regardless of Japanese attempts at envelopment. If the Japanese succeeded in placing themselves behind a Chinese unit, that unit should in turn

attack the Japanese rear and try to outlast them. In their advance, the Chinese

should keep themselves deployed in depth so that there would always be combat units in the rear able to deal with infiltrating Japanese elements.

Warfare on the mountain trails would, the American advisers stressed, limit

the Chinese Expeditionary Force to the use of infantry supporting weapons—
338 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

mortars, machine guns, and flame throwers—augmented by a few pieces of pack

artillery. Weapons and ammunition of this nature could be airdropped to keep

the advance under way. Few occasions would arise in which artillery would be

used as a battalion to support a Chinese division. This belief led to preaching

the use of individual batteries working with mortars and automatic weapons

as integral parts of small combat teams.

Pack animals and coolie labor, the Americans foresaw, would provide the

greater part of the supply transport in the early phases of the campaign. Carts

could assist, but motor vehicles would be confined to a few routes. The Chinese

were told that, because of the terrain and the probable possession of air superiority, troops must learn to co-operate with friendly aircraft attacking Japanese

positions and in receiving airdrops. The monsoon rains would of course hinder

air supply so the Chinese were urged to capture Japanese landing strips and

sites adaptable to airdrops.12

After General Ho formally undertook to cross the Salween, the American

operational staff with the Chinese divisions, or Y-FOS, had three weeks within

which to complete its preparations. In making these final arrangements, Dorn

stressed again and again the four responsibilities he had accepted. To meet them

plus his other missions he devised an organization which closely paralleled that

of the Chinese Expeditionary Force. On 21 April, General Wei outlined the

liaison mission that Y-FOS would have in relation to his Chinese troops. One

point was clear—no American had command over the Chinese. Y-FOS would,

however, continue to (1) assist in training, (2) assist in supply, (3) perform its

own administration, (4) exchange intelligence with the Chinese, (5) furnish

air-ground liaison, (6) report to the Chinese Expeditionary Force "the needs of

the Chinese front line troops so that CEF Headquarters may decide something

to assist them."

 13

On 29 April, Dorn established the Field Headquarters, Y-FOS, with a G-2,

G-3, G-4, and chief of staff. This group was to accompany General Wei's

headquarters. Meanwhile, Y-FOS teams, plus attached medical units, either

joined Chinese units or augmented American liaison groups already in the field.

Because most of his divisions already had U.S. traveling instructional groups

with them, Wei allowed Y-FOS to expand the teams in order to reach the regimental level. Each Y-FOS team varied in size from six to twenty Americans

and usually included infantry, artillery, engineer, ordnance, signal, quartermaster, and veterinary personnel. Some 100 signal communication enlisted personnel were among the Y-FOS teams. Portable surgical and field hospitals and

veterinary detachments were the major portion of U.S. table of organization

12

 (1) Hist Rpt, Y-FOS (1 Jan-24 Oct 44). (Hereafter, Y-FOS 1944 Hist Rpt.) AG

(Y-FOS), KCRC. (2) Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. VIII. (3) Memo, Dorn for Stilwell, 2 Feb

44. AG (Y-FOS) 381, KCRC. (4) Plan cited n. 9(2). 13

 (1) See Ch. VIII, above. (2) Quotation from Memo, Tsen 2114, Wei for Dorn, 21 Apr 44.

AG (Y-FOS) 319.1, KCRC.
American Engineers on the Burma Road supervise native laborers

(above) and operate heavy maintenance equipment (below).
340 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

units with the Chinese Expeditionary Force. U.S. antiaircraft batteries were

stationed at vital bridges and airfields.14

In rear areas, G-4 of Y-FOS and SOS expedited delivery of food, ammunition, and equipment. These were received at the Kunming and Yun-nan-i

depots, and brought forward from them by trucks along the Chinese portion of

the Burma Road, by pack and coolie train over the mountains, and later by

airdrop on the battlefield. Because there were no accurate maps of the Salween

area, the Fourteenth and Tenth Air Forces flew photo-reconnaissance missions

to produce aerial mosaics. American engineer troops, always convinced that the

D-Day crossings could be successfully made, planned to ferry the five assaulting task forces over the river and gave Chinese engineers intensive training in

the use of rubber boats. Daily practice was conducted across the turbulent

Mekong River.15

Reconstruction and improvement of the Burma Road from Kunming to

Pao-shan was a major preoccupation, and Y-FOS engineers were detailed to

co-operate with a Chinese agency, the Yunnan-Burma Highway Engineering

Administration, in planning the work. On 1 May SOS assumed this responsibility from Y-FOS, and on 15 June organized the Burma Road Engineers.

Enjoying its own table of organization, this unit was attached to SOS. General

Dorn gave strong support to every phase of the Sino-American effort to rebuild

the vital highway from Pao-shan to the Salween, including plans for reconstructing the destroyed Hui-tung Bridge which had carried the road over the

Salween's dramatic gorge. Dorn gave the Burma Road Engineers first priority

on Y-FOS personnel for its engineering staff. 1 6

In working out the details of tactical air support and air supply with the

Fourteenth Air Force, Y-FOS received complete co-operation. The 69th Composite Wing had the responsibility of supporting the China Expeditionary

Force's ground effort. Sergeant pilots of the 19th Liaison Squadron were

attached to Y-FOS for courier service in their little L-5's. Since he had felt

obliged to assure the Chinese that the United States would contribute the factor

of air supply to their offensive, Dorn asked Stilwell for a C-47 squadron plus

necessary personnel. Though the request could not be filled at once, the 27th

Troop Carrier Squadron joined the Fourteenth Air Force in late May.17

Beginning the Offensive

Following the preparations from afar, the Generalissimo telephoned General Wei on 27 April to make a few last-minute changes in the Chinese order

of battle and to set D Day. The Generalissimo also demanded that his com14

 (1) GO 3, Hq Y-FOS, USAF CBI. (2) Y-FOS 1944 Hist Rpt. 15

 Y-FOS 1944 Hist Rpt. 16

 (1) SOS in CBI, App. 1, SOS in China, Burma Road Engrs. (2) Interv with Col Robert F. Seedlock, former CO, Burma Road Engrs, Dec 1950. 17

 Y-FOS 1944 Hist Rpt.
THE CHINESE TAKE THE OFFENSIVE 341

manders "succeed—or else!" On 9 May Dorn notified Stilwell that the Salween

crossings were to be made on the night of 10 or 11 May, that hopes were high

of reaching Myitkyina before Stilwell did.18

The crossing of the Salween River, an operation the Chinese had regarded

with justified apprehension, since Japanese machine guns and artillery might

turn the Salween line into a most formidable obstacle, went with clocklike precision. The Japanese had decided not to defend the crossing sites, but to place

their main line of resistance along the main ridge line some ten miles west.

From decoded Chinese radio messages and from the forward movement of Wei's

headquarters, the Japanese had concluded the offensive was imminent, and

made their last-minute preparations, but these did not include contesting the

landings.19

Assembling ten miles east of the Salween, the 198th Division (Ma-mien

pass sector) received an army order on 9 May to move up to the crossing site.

During the night of 11 May, Chinese engineer companies, supervised by seventeen Y-FOS soldiers, commenced the ferrying operation. Throughout the

moonlit night and on until noon of the following day, engineers shuttled the

rubber boats, bamboo and oil-drum rafts, and similar expedients across the

Salween's swirling eddies and currents. So strong were the Salween's currents

that it took four engineers to paddle but four infantrymen and their impedimenta across the river at a time. Larger ferry boats carried pack animals and

artillery. During late afternoon of 12 May this force of Chinese attacked its first

objective.20

On 11-12 May, the three regiments of the 36th Division plus the 346th

Regiment of the 116th Division (Ta-tang-tzu pass sector) successfully crossed

the Salween at Meng-ka ferry. From D Day on, the ferrying operations went

smoothly, "elements behaved quietly and obeyed instructions . . . throughout."

 21

The regimental combat team assigned to hold the Huei-jen Bridge area,

which comprised the 115th Infantry Regiment, plus a battalion of the 116th

with artillery and service troops, was ferried across the Salween without incident on the night of 10-11 May. The Chinese did not receive heavy fire until

morning.22

The southernmost crossings, those near Ping-ka, were rather elaborate in

conception. Before D Day, four companies of the 9th Division, 2d Army,

slipped across the Salween and moved close to the village of Ping-ka to keep

Japanese patrols from leaving it to go to the river's edge. On D Day, the

18

 (1) Rad CYF 407, Dorn to Stilwell, 27 Apr 44. Item 2273, Bk 6, JWS Personal File. (2)

Memo, Dorn for Stilwell, 28 Apr 44. SNF 35. (3) Memo cited n. 10(4). 19

 Japanese Officers' Comments, p. 27; App. 1, Col Fujiwara. 20

 Y-FOS 1944 Hist Rpt, App. V, Rpt, U.S. Detachment, 54th Army Engr Co, 18 Aug 44. 21

 (1) Ltr, Col John H. Stodter, CO, U.S. Ln Gp, 53d Army, to CG, Y-FOS, 15 Oct 44, sub: Opns of 53d Army. (Hereafter, Stodter Report.) OCMH. (2) Interv with Col Stodter, 11 Apr 47. 22

 Rpt, Maj Lawrence W. Beilson to Dorn, 10 Aug 44, sub: Rpt on Opns of 39th Div. AG

(Y-FOS) 317.1, KCRC.
Chinese Troops cross the Salween, in rubber boats (above and by

means of a ferry constructed from oil drums (below).
THE CHINESE TAKE THE OFFENSIVE 343

Chinese made two crossings, one in the area eleven miles below Ping-ka, the

other, seven miles northeast. Below Ping-ka, the Chinese sent across the 228th

Infantry as a regimental combat team reinforced, from the 76th Division, 2d

Army. Above Ping-ka, the attack was begun by a similar combat team built

around the 264th Infantry, 88th Division, 71st Army. The two task forces were

to converge on Ping-ka from north and south. Here as everywhere else fighting

did not begin until the Chinese were well over the river.23

Pushing Through Ma-mien Pass

Fighting in Ma-mien pass, where the Chinese were trying to clamp the

northernmost part of their pincers in place, began on the afternoon of 12 May

when a battalion on the right flank of the 198th Regiment attacked the first

Japanese outpost. Making good progress, by dark the battalion had occupied

several Japanese pillboxes and part of the trench system. All that night, the

Japanese quietly filtered down from a nearby ridge and assembled near the

Chinese position. Attacking at dawn, they surprised the Chinese and almost

wiped them out before aid came. The Chinese battalion commander was killed,

also 2d Lt. Kirk C. Schaible, the first Y-FOS liaison officer to die in action.

Seeking to cover an exposed flank and find a better field of fire, Lieutenant

Schaible left cover and was instantly killed by a Japanese rifleman. Chinese

reinforcements restored the situation, and Japanese resistance in the immediate

area ceased on the next day, 13 May.24

The Japanese defenders at Ma-mien pass had been the 2d Battalion, 148th

Regiment, under a Colonel Kurashige. Kurashige had moved his men into the

pass in January. He had relied on patrols to watch the ferry sites, while small

garrisons in strongpoints held the mountain trails.25

The Chinese established their line of communications across the Salween

on 29 May, when a footbridge was repaired to permit supplies and pack animals

to cross the river. Telephone wire had been strung across the river two days

earlier. The Chinese were then no longer dependent on their first means of

communication with the rear, L-5 liaison aircraft operating from a landing strip

which Chinese engineers had hacked from the mountainside between 12 and

23

 (1) Memo cited n. 10(4). (2) U.S. liaison reports on 2d Army's role in the Salween cam- paign consist of the following: Rpt, Col Robert C. Lutz, CO, U.S. Ln Gp, 2d Army, to CG, Chinese Combat Comd, USFCT, 5 Feb 45, sub: Opns of 2d Army During Salween Campaign; Rpt, Capt

Eugene D. Hill, 2d Army Ln Gp, 26 Aug 45, sub: Brief History of 2d Chinese Army; Rpt, Maj

Thomas G. Maris, Jr., CO, U.S. 76th Div Ln Team, 16 Dec 44, sub: Opns of 76th Div; Rpt, Maj

William L. Lowry, CO, U.S. 9th Div Ln Team, 1945, sub: Opns of 9th Div. AG (CCC) 314.7, KCRC. 24

 (1) GO 69, Hq Chinese Combat Comd USFCT, 7 Nov 45. (2) The best U.S. Army source for a detailed combat story of the Salween offensive is a daily G-2, G-3 Journal kept by Headquarters, Forward Echelon Y-FOS, at Pao-shan between 11 May 1944 and 28 February 1945. The journal consists of two volumes. A carbon copy is filed with ZEBRA Force Records, KCRC. (Hereafter Y-FOS Journal.) 25

 Japanese Study 93.
344 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

FOOTBRIDGE ACROSS THE SALWEEN at the Hui-tung Bridge site.

20 May. Unfortunately the footbridge proved inadequate to sustain the Chinese

in Ma-mien pass, and air supply was required.

Having beaten off the first Japanese counterattack, the 592d and 594th Regiments of the 198th Division began clearing out Japanese strongpoints while

the 593d moved west over mountain byways to emerge into the Shweli valley

on 16 May, near the village of Kaochiao. Promptly, the Chinese attacked the

Japanese garrison of Chiao-tou-chieh which, surprised and momentarily panicked, took to its heels. But the Japanese panic was of brief duration, and

stouter resistance kept the 593d from moving farther south and down the

Shweli valley. The 593d Regiment halted, posted guards to close off the western

end of Ma-mien pass, and waited for the main strength of the 54th Army to

arrive.

Within Ma-mien pass itself, the survivors of the 2/148 fell back on the

fortified village of Chai-kung-tang. Already present were the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 113th Infantry, rushed north from Ping-ka and Bhamo as soon as the

56th Division had made its estimate of the Chinese intentions. Chai-kung-tang,

while the Japanese held it, would close the narrow Ma-mien pass to Chinese

traffic.

Well fortified, the Japanese resisted staunchly, and only desperate fighting
THE CHINESE TAKE THE OFFENSIVE 345

by the Chinese cleared them from the pass by 13 June. When the Chinese could

not take a bunker by their usual technique of frontal attack, they would request

the American air liaison officer to call up support from the 51st Fighter Group

of the AAF at Yun-nan-i. Y-FOS personnel taught the Chinese how to prepare

ground indicators to guide the P-40's on their target runs. Using rockets and

fragmentation and demolition bombs, Chennault's pilots acted as artillery for

the Chinese and flew close support missions as often as weather permitted.

The weather grew progressively worse as the monsoon rains closed in. In

those high altitudes the rains became blinding sleet and fog, an added misery

of war for the poorly clad Chinese soldiers. The rains threatened to wash away

the Chinese line of communications, and as the siege of Chai-kung-tang went

on day after day, the coolie pack trains proved incapable of keeping the 54th

Army's supplies from nearing the starvation level. Fortunately, the 27th Troop

Carrier Squadron arrived at Yun-nan-i on 26 May and was in action two days

later dropping tons of ammunition, rice, and much-needed raincoats. This was

a welcome relief, but a brief one, for the weather from 3 to 10 June was so bad

that flying was impossible. Chinese and Americans did what they could on what

was left of their rations, supplementing them by bamboo shoots and unwary

Burmese livestock. On one occasion, the American liaison team was able to

supplement its rations by shooting a mountain tiger and converting it into

steaks.

With TNT charges dropped by the 27th Troop Carrier's C-47's when the

weather cleared, the Chinese blew up the last pillboxes at Chai-kung-tang on

13 June. When the last shots had been fired and the Chinese farmer boys of the

54th Army reported the area secure, there was bewilderment at finding only 75

Japanese bodies in defenses that must have been manned by at least 300 men,

and shock and nausea when the Japanese kitchens revealed how the defenders

had been able to prolong their stay. Pitiful and ghastly evidence showed that

the Japanese had resorted to cannibalism when their rations failed.

With their food stocks exhausted, the defenders had been ordered by

Colonel Kurashige to escape at night and to fall back into the valley of the

Shweli. Annihilation was inevitable if the Japanese garrison clung longer to its

defenses, and Kurashige wanted its survivors to live and fight another day.

With Chai-kung-tang firmly in Chinese hands, with clearing skies permitting the C-47's to return again with their cargoes of food and bullets, the 54th

Army, victors of Ma-mien pass, began moving on into the Shweli valley.26

Clearing Ta-tang-tzu Pass, 11 May-12 June 1944

The mission of the 53d Army was to drive through Ta-tang-tzu pass and

unite with the 54th Army coming down from Ma-mien pass in the north. As 26

 (1) Y-FOS Journal. (2) Rpt, Capt Arthur M. Murphy, U.S. Ln Off, 592d Inf, 198th Div, 26

Jul 44. AG (Y-FOS) 371.1, KCRC. (3) Hist Rpt, Hq 69th Composite Wing, Fourteenth AF, 29

Jun 44. USAF Hist Div. (4) Memo, Col Frederick W. Hein, CO, U.S. Ln Gp, 54th Army, for CG,

Y-FOS, 17 Oct 44, sub: Ln Off Rpts on Salween Campaign. OCMH. (5) Japanese Study 93.
346 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

the 53d Army moved over the Salween, American liaison personnel with it

were dismayed to learn that XX Group Army had ordered no Japanese position

was to be bypassed. This meant that every Chinese unit north of the Burma

Road would be forced to dig the stubborn Japanese from their mountain

strongholds rather than move past them on into Burma. This order from XX

Group Army had grave implications for the success of the Chinese effort.

By dusk of 12 May the 36th Division had surrounded the Japanese outposts

in the eastern end of the pass. When darkness came, the 36th went into

bivouac. That night, the Japanese attacked vigorously, overrunning the division

command post and causing the flustered 36th Division to fall back to the

Salween. At dawn, the 53d Army commander, Maj. Gen. Chou Fu-cheng,

pushed a regiment across the Salween and restored the situation by attacking

the Japanese flank. General Chou was an aggressive and tenacious fighter,

whom his Manchurian soldiers had nicknamed Old Board-Back, and who had

the reputation of never having yielded an inch to the Japanese. But even Chou

could not immediately restore the morale of the 36th Division, which for some

weeks took no further part in the Ta-tang-tzu fighting, and the rest of the 53d

Army had to bear the burden of clearing the pass.

Though the smoothness with which the 53d Army brought its reinforcements across the Salween drew praise from American observers, its assaults in

the eastern part of the pass fortifications were praiseworthy only for the wasted

courage of its troops:

In view of the enemy's defensive attitude and our superior strength, American liaison

officers urged the use of a small continuing force and a strong encircling movement to cut

the trail . . . behind the Japs. Nevertheless orders were received for direct attacks on the

prepared positions . . . the 116th Div. to attack from the north and the 130th Div. from

the south. Several days were wasted and heavy losses incurred . . . in suicidal charges by a

succession of squads against enemy pillboxes. Teamwork in use of weapons and supporting

fires and the use of cover were conspicuously lacking . . . most casualties resulted from

attempts to walk or rather climb up through inter-locking bands of machine gun fire. As a

demonstration of sheer bravery the attacks were magnificent but sickeningly wasteful. Some

platoon leaders were killed within one or two meters of the enemy embrasures and several

of the best company and battalion commanders were killed and wounded in personal leadership of their troops. A general coordinated assault might have overrun the positions by sheer

esprit and weight of numbers but adjoining or supporting units would idly watch some

single squad or platoon get mowed down in a lone advance then try it on their own

front. . . .27

On days when the overcast disappeared the 51st Fighter Group struck at

the Japanese bunkers, but the aerial artillery was not too effective against the

Japanese bunkers of logs and concrete. Meanwhile, in order to support the

valiant Chinese frontal assaults, Y-FOS personnel radioed American depots at

Yun-nan-i for more ordnance matériel, for Chinese crews sometimes wrecked

their weapons through misuse or lack of maintenance. Because of Chinese

27

 (1) Stodter Rpt. (2) Interv cited n. 21(2).
THE CHINESE TAKE THE OFFENSIVE 347

AIR-SUPPLY DROPS like the one shown above were the key to success in Burma

operations.

advances some miles to the north, the Japanese decided to thin out their garrison and constrict their holdings in the Ta-tang-tzu pass area. Their withdrawal

on the night of 22-23 May permitted an eight-mile advance by the Chinese.

Over 28-31 May the 27th Troop Carrier Squadron replenished the 53d

Army's stocks. Deliveries were made at so fast a rate that the airdropping crews

were sometimes obliged to assist the packers, who found themselves unable to

keep pace.

To clear the remaining Japanese from Ta-tang-tzu pass, the 116th and 130th

Divisions continued the attack. The 36th Division, which had been so roughly

handled in the opening days of the campaign, was ordered to bypass the Japanese in the Ta-tang-tzu area, and to make its way sixteen miles northwest, to

where the 54th Army, after clearing Ma-mien pass, was stalemated in the upper

Shweli valley. The 36th Division found its way open because early in June

Colonel Kurashige had been ordered by the 56th Division to send the 3/148th

to the Japanese northern flank.

Behind the front, Chinese and Americans worked at communications and

supply. Chinese engineers laid lend-lease telephone wire to open communications with General Wei's Pao-shan headquarters. At the pace of the coolie's
348 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

slow climb, supplies and pack artillery began to filter through to the upper

Shweli. The efforts of the coolies, strenuous though they were, could not yield

results comparable to the thirteen C-47's, whose crews began to feel they knew

the Kaoli-kung peaks and valleys as well as they knew their hometown corner

drugstores. Numbered airdropping sites were now well past the twenty mark.

In addition to the obvious contribution of air supply, the Americans found

themselves making two other important contributions to the campaign. Liaison

radio teams forwarded considerable intelligence, air target, and supply data to

Pao-shan, helping Wei and Dorn co-ordinate the Sino-American effort. Y-FOS

liaison officers also reported tactical and logistical mistakes the Chinese made

so that Wei and Dorn could take remedial action. Gradually, Sino-American

co-operation in the field began to grow effective.

But at this early stage of the campaign, reports from the American liaison

teams were not always cheerful. Americans observing the Ta-tang-tzu and

Ma-mien actions found that Japanese fire was accurate and economical, and

that the enemy's use of camouflage and concealment approached perfection.

The Japanese revealed no disposition to surrender though they were heavily

outnumbered, often surrounded, and had neither air support nor air supply.

On the other hand, the Americans reported that the Chinese endlessly wasted

manpower and ammunition in costly frontal attacks. They reported that relations with the Chinese were not always as friendly as had been hoped, and

they believed there would have to be better co-operation between Chinese and

Americans if the Japanese were to be defeated. The Chinese were described as

merely tolerating the Americans' presence and as paying little attention to their

advice. The liaison personnel freely admitted their own shortcomings, and by

their reports suggested that patience was the most important quality for a

liaison officer to cultivate when dealing with the Chinese.

Most Americans liked the aggressive spirit and tenacity of General Chou,

the 53d Army's commander of picturesque nickname. To Chinese officers like

Chou, the offensive was theirs to plan and to fight, and the Americans were

merely guests to be shielded from harm. While liaison officers appreciated the

kindness of the Chinese in giving them the status of guests with all this implied of concern for their safety and comfort, they were appalled to observe the

degree to which these same Chinese commanders considered their soldiers expendable. Liaison officers were horrified to learn that a company commander

could execute a soldier but that it took a group army order to shoot a horse or

mule.28 A month's experience with the way the Chinese proposed to fight the

Salween campaign provided a clue to the difficulties the Chinese and Americans would have to face and surmount before General Wei's soldiers could

meet with General Stilwell's.

28

 (1) Hist Rpt, 27th Tr Carrier Sq, Fourteenth AF, May-Oct 44. USAF Hist Div. (2) Stodter Report. (3) Y-FOS Journal. (4) Ltr with atchd rpts, Col Harry A. Buckley, CO, U.S. Ln Gp, XX

Group Army, to CG, Y-FOS, 1 Nov 44. OCMH. (5) Japanese Officers' Comments, p. 29.
THE CHINESE TAKE THE OFFENSIVE 349

Securing the Huei-jen Bridge Area, 11 May-14 June 1944

The regimental combat team of the 115th Regiment reinforced by a battalion of the 116th Regiment, which was to take and hold the Huei-jen Bridge

area for the Chinese, made its crossing at sites five to nine miles above the

bridge. From the crossing site, the Chinese task force swung south to drive the

1/113, commanded by its regimental commander, from the immediate area of

the Huei-jen Bridge. Behind it came the rest of the New 39th Division. By 17

May advance elements of the combat team were in the village of Hung-mu-shu,

well behind the Japanese, and only twenty air-line miles from the key city of

Teng-chung.

The Japanese soon recovered from the initial surprise of the Chinese offensive and the 1/113 drove the Chinese from Hung-mu-shu. The Japanese

exploited their success and pushed the entire New 39th Division back against

the Salween. The Chinese collected themselves, renewed the attack, and by 27

May had one element back within five miles of Hung-mu-shu, while the 115th

Infantry took hill positions overlooking the enemy's defenses at the bridge

site and engaged the Japanese artillery. The monsoon rains seemed to the Chinese and American liaison officers to be confining both sides to their positions.

In reality, the Japanese, in line with their tactics of a mobile defense, withdrew

most of the 1/113 and sent it north to attack the Chinese 53d Army near

Ta-tang-tzu pass, leaving only a few men behind.

The pressure exerted by the 53d Chinese Army in the north in effect ended

the Japanese defense of the Huei-jen Bridge area, for the Japanese were not able

to return the 1/113. On 12 June the Chinese 115th Infantry was back in Hungmu-shu, after killing thirty of the Japanese rear guard. Pushing west, Chinese

patrols occupied a pass on the Hung-mu-shu-Teng-chung trail, opening a route

to the Shweli valley.

Instead of being directed on Teng-chung, the New 39th Division was sent

south on a trail paralleling the Salween. Its orders were to unite with elements

of the New 28th Division, 71st Army, that were attacking the Japanese stronghold of Sung Shan, which controlled the Hui-tung Bridge area.29

Driving the Japanese Rear Guards From the Shweli Valley

The Japanese withdrawal of several units from the northern flank in the

upper Shweli valley to bolster the southern flank near Lung-ling left Colonel

Kurashige's Japanese less able to hold the 53d and 54th Armies in the north.

As the Japanese positions at Chieh-tou, Chiao-tou-chieh, Wa-tien, and Chiangchu, along the upper Shweli, began to fall, prospects of a more speedy capture

of Teng-chung by the Chinese began to appear. On 1 June units of the 54th

29

 (1) Rpt cited n. 22. (2) Y-FOS Journal. (3) Japanese Study 93. (4) Japanese Officers' Comments, p. 31.
350 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Army, from the 2d Reserve and 36th Divisions, emerged in the Shweli valley

from Ta-tang-tzu pass to join the 593d Regiment from the Ma-mien pass. Next

day the Chinese occupied Chieh-tou village and invested Chiao-tou-chieh with

two regiments of the 36th. Once 53d Army patrols commenced operations in

the Shweli valley, they took the advice of Y-FOS officers and donned Burmese

clothes. So disguised, they found it easy to enter Japanese-held villages. When

taken by surprise, the Japanese were willing to abandon many of their outer

defenses. On 14 June the Japanese quit Chiao-tou-chieh, leaving many stores

to the 2d Reserve and 36th Divisions.

The garrison of Chiao-tou-chieh retreated in two columns, each pursued

by a Chinese regiment. One Japanese column crossed to the west of the Shweli

valley and marched westward to reach a trail that would take it to Teng-chung.

The other Japanese column, its strength raised to perhaps 500 by patrols and

outposts it picked up as it went, withdrew southward on Wa-tien, twenty-five

air-line miles above Teng-chung. The Chinese snapped at its heels until it

entered the defenses of Wa-tien, then began to prepare another siege.

At this point the 56th Division ordered the 2/148th to fight a delaying action

toward Teng-chung and to release the 3/148th to meet the growing Chinese

threat toward the 56th Division's southern flank. The next Chinese objectives

in the Shweli valley were Wa-tien and Chiang-chu, four miles southeast of

Wa-tien.

On 18 June the 36th Division opened the attack on Wa-tien as the 116th

and 130th Divisions arrived before Chiang-chu. While the 53d Army prepared

to attack Chiang-chu, the 4th Infantry marched southward toward Ku-tung on

the road to Teng-chung. Ku-tung fell on 19 June, and Wa-tien on the 20th.

Both Chinese and Japanese converged on Chiang-chu. Luckily for the Chinese,

monsoon rains that for a fortnight had greatly hampered air support now lifted.

The transports quickly completed airdrops to each Chinese division, while

fighter bombers pounded the Japanese around Chiang-chu. The Japanese

yielded Chiang-chu on 22 June, and the 51st Fighter Group profited by the

break in the weather to strafe and bomb a long column of Japanese with animal transport caught on the trail to Teng-chung.

With the fall of Chiang-chu, the Japanese had been forced to abandon the

upper Shweli valley, and were now moving in some disorder toward Tengchung over three excellent trails. In Chiang-chu, they left behind large quantities of ammunition and a few pieces of artillery, suggesting a disorganized

withdrawal. One hundred and fifty dead Japanese were found in Chiang-chu

itself; more than 300 Chinese gave their lives for the village. South of Chiangchu, the Japanese hastily destroyed their ponton bridge to slow the Chinese

pursuit.

On reaching the Chiang-chu-Wa-tien-Ku-tung line, XX Group Army had

wrested 4,000 square miles from Japanese control in forty days of fighting. The

advance had been made over the precipitous ranges of the Kaoli-kung Moun-
THE CHINESE TAKE THE OFFENSIVE 351

tains in an almost constant rain, a downpour sometimes heavy, sometimes

light, rarely abating, and always turning to fog and sleet in the higher altitudes.

More than 150 coolie supply porters fell to their deaths from the narrow, slippery trails that snaked precariously over the mountains.

Once solidly established in the Shweli valley, XX Group Army lost no time

in ordering an advance on Teng-chung. The 2d Reserve Division plus elements

of the 36th Division advanced southwest along the Ku-tung-Teng-chung trail.

Advance patrols of the 198th Division proceeded directly south from Wa-tien

while the rest of the division stayed to reorganize after its grueling advance

through Ma-mien pass. The 53d Army was ordered to move from Chiang-chu

and across the Shweli for an eventual concentration on the east side of Tengchung. By 25 June General Wei received a personal order from the Generalissimo to take Teng-chung. A few days later, XX Group Army, though delayed

by the need to rebuild bridges over each of the swift mountain streams that

crossed its advance, had pressed the Japanese rear guards back to the hills that

surrounded Teng-chung at a distance of two to three miles from the formidable

walled town itself. Meanwhile, the Fourteenth Air Force was trying to soften

Teng-chung by daily attacks with bomb and machine gun.

During the clearing of the Shweli valley and the approach to Teng-chung,

Y-FOS personnel with XX Group Army sent back a number of critiques of

that force in action, reports which suggested the Chinese advance might have

gone more swiftly and cheaply had American techniques and advice not been

disregarded by the Chinese on entering battle. Y-FOS observers wrote that

Chinese regimental commanders could not ask directly for support from their

attached artillery, but had to route their requests through division headquarters. When artillery support was granted, it was almost worthless. Targets were

not bracketed, and delay between rounds was often as long as five minutes. Artillery observers were sometimes two miles behind the front. The Chinese

gunners disdained cover and concealment, drawing on themselves accurate Japanese counterbattery. Chinese pack artillery did not march in orderly fashion

but straggled into position. Battery positions were occupied in daylight with

individual pack sections arriving at half-hour intervals. The Chinese neglected

to maintain their pieces, which quickly grew rusty during the rains.

To the Americans, the Chinese seemed equally indifferent toward proper

care and use of infantry supporting weapons. Chinese mortar crews dismissed

their American-taught techniques. The firing batteries in rocket launchers were

kept in place during the rains, which ruined them in twenty-four hours. The

Chinese infantryman raised the hair on the Americans' heads by casually using

the ring of the hand grenade to hang the weapon from his belt. Between all

units, wire laying was bad. At night, an entire Chinese regiment would open

up on a Japanese patrol. Ammunition was wasted endlessly, and weapons soon

grew unserviceable from constant use and lack of maintenance. Such practices

on a battlefield, far removed from supply depots and over 12,000 miles from
352 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

the makers of critical parts, reduced the righting power of General Wei's

72,000 men far below what it should have been. Y-FOS personnel recommended that a strict inspection system be established to make spot inspections and

corrections. They urged that a high-ranking Chinese officer be present at every

such inspection to follow through on recommendations and insure their performance.30

Gradually, the Chinese came to be more receptive to U.S. advice than they

had been. In retrospect, it might seem that Wei's troops had appeared to accept

U.S. teachings in the training centers only through Chinese courtesy, but with

no notion of losing face by actually applying what they had heard from a foreigner. Then came combat, and standing side by side American and Chinese

officers could see what results the Chinese attitude yielded. The senior U.S.

liaison officer with XX Group Army wrote:

As a result of the lessons of this campaign, I believe that Commanders of all ranks in the

20th Army Group [sic] are in the most receptive state of mind as pertains to American

supervised training. The fact that American and Chinese officers stood side by side and

watched excessive casualties pile up day after day, chiefly as a result of violations of proper

tactical and technical procedure, furnishes a common ground of ideas for improved training.

These same Chinese officers saw important objectives taken and held, at comparatively small

cost, by troops following American training doctrines. There can be no doubt but that the

American Liaison Team concept has been justified. The Chinese have acquired a new respect

for the American Liaison Officer who shared with them the dangers and hardships of campaign, and a new confidence and understanding of the American training methods that

proved their correctness in the final test—battle.31

The Southern Flank, 11 May-30 June 1944

To insure its hold on the key Burma Road towns of Lung-ling and Mang

shih, the 56th Division had occupied most of the larger villages lying south and

west of Lung-ling. Lung-ling was vital to the Japanese because a fair road ran

north from it to Teng-chung. If Lung-ling fell the whole Japanese position

would be unhinged and would have to move many miles west. This would

probably make Teng-chung untenable, while the momentum of the Chinese

coming into Burma along the Burma Road might be enough to carry them

into the vital area around Lashio. Lung-ling, therefore, was a prize worth striving for. When the Chinese first struck, the 56th Division judged the greatest

danger to be in the upper Shweli valley, and so weakened its southern flank to

aid Colonel Kurashige. Therefore in the opening phases of their operation the

two Chinese task forces of XI Group Army that were attempting to converge

on Ping-ka from the north and south made excellent progress.

Eleven miles below Ping-ka a task force of the 76th Division crossed the

30

 (1) Ltr with atchd rpts cited n. 28(4). (2) Rad CFB 18989, Ferris to Stilwell, 22 Jun 44. Item 2641, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. (3) Y-FOS Journal. 31

 Quotation from Col Buckley's ltr cited n. 28(4).
THE CHINESE TAKE THE OFFENSIVE 353

CHINESE 2D ARMY ARTILLERYMEN prepare to fire their 75-mm. pack howitzer

in the Ping-ka valley area.

Salween on D Day, while one from the 88th Division crossed seven miles

above. Three days after the crossings, the 76th Division met outposts of the

1/146 and forced them back to the heights overlooking Ping-ka. Meanwhile

the 88th Division from the north was righting through a series of fortified villages as it headed south to join the 76th Division. By 16 May thirteen villages

were occupied in the area northeast of Ping-ka, but the Japanese, as they withdrew, received reinforcements. Strengthened by the 2/113 the Japanese did not

attack the Chinese who were pursuing them, but moved south and hit the Chinese 228th Regiment south and west of Ping-ka. On 23 May the Chinese were

forced to yield hill positions. Next day the Chinese 226th and 228th Regiments

tried to force a way across the ridge which forms the southeastern edge of

Ping-ka valley. Not waiting to co-ordinate their efforts with the 88th Division

coming down from the north, and deprived of air support by inclement

weather, the Chinese found their efforts futile. The 1/146 had carefully selected

mortar and machine gun positions, and had cleared fields of fire by burning

away the brush. Each Chinese frontal attack failed with heavy losses.

After 25 May the 2d Army could not hope to co-ordinate its efforts with the

88th Division since the latter was ordered to rejoin the 87th and New 28th
354 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Divisions (71st Army) in a drive on Lung-ling. Therefore, 2d Army assumed

responsibility for the conduct of operations in the area Ping-ka-Hsiang-taMang-shih. It ordered the 76th Division to bypass Ping-ka, leaving the 226th

Regiment to besiege the valley. With only enough men to place forty to fifty

soldiers on every mile of the twenty-four-mile semicircular front, the 226th

Regiment remained before Ping-ka until the Japanese yielded the valley in late

September. Tragedy and comedy alternated in the long three months' trial of

endurance. The Chinese regiment faced a Japanese battalion, the 1/146, and

the Japanese easily filtered through the thin Chinese line. When, at night, the

Japanese found it hard to locate Chinese positions, they could stir the Chinese

into revealing themselves by uttering weird cries and slapping their rifle butts.

Then bursts of fire would spread back and forth across the front as the Chinese

blazed away at the noises. But the Japanese paid for their tenacity. Cholera and

malaria plagued the Ping-ka valley, and the Japanese twice had to reinforce the

1/146. Finally, on 22 September, the Japanese sent a rescue column to evacuate

Ping-ka and bring out what disease and malnutrition had left of a first-rate

fighting team.

On 1 June 2d Army brought two regiments of the 9th Division across the

Salween and sent patrols of the 76th Division probing toward the Burma

Road. The 9th Division isolated the Japanese in Ping-ka valley when it cut

supply lines running from the road junction town of Hsiang-ta that lay between Lung-ling and Ping-ka. Hopes of American liaison officers with the 2d

Army that a speedy victory on the Salween front might be in the making

soared when a unit of the 9th Division put a block across the Burma Road itself on 9 June, at a point four miles south of Mang-shih. These hopes promptly

foundered on the hidden rocks of Chinese Army politics. The 2d Army suspended its operations and complained bitterly that it was being discriminated

against in supply. Investigating the charge, Y-FOS found that there was an

old feud between Headquarters, XI Group Army, and Headquarters, 2d Army.

American attempts to point out the results that might flow from holding a

block on the Burma Road were not enough to close the breach. The 2d Army

took its block off the Burma Road and contented itself with holding what it

had and with brushing off Japanese patrols.32

71st Army and the Fight for Lung-ling, 28 May-15 July 1944

Aware that the 56th Division had withdrawn troops from its southern flank

to meet XX Group Army, Gen. Wei Li-huang decided to exploit the situation

by throwing in the rest of his forces. At the end of May he ordered the remainder of the 71st Army to cross the Salween below the Hui-tung Bridge to

32

 (1) Rpts cited n. 23(2). (2) Y-FOS Journal. (3) Rpt, 2d Lt Raymond D. Ashman, Jul

44, sub: Action of 226th Regt, 76th Div, at Ping-ka. AG (Y-FOS) 371.1, KCRC. (4) Japanese

Study 93.
THE CHINESE TAKE THE OFFENSIVE 355

seize Lung-ling while a containing force attacked the strong Japanese position

on Sung Shan. Thus, hoping to gain an early victory over the 56th Division,

Wei decided to commit his entire force, save the 8th Army then en route from

the Indochina border, on three widely separated sectors.

G-4, Y-FOS, had argued against the decision. G-4 questioned Sino-American ability to sustain a twelve-division offensive. It pointed out that the abandonment of the original concept of using small, highly mobile task forces and

the decision to reduce every Japanese position in turn was placing a heavy burden on the long-neglected Chinese services of supply. Moreover, the 27th

Troop Carrier Squadron was complaining about having to support four Chinese armies on a hundred-mile front with but thirteen C-47's. G-4 suggested

that attention should now be given to bringing forward replacements. The

methods of attack to which the Chinese had reverted were steadily reducing the

combat strength of their units. Replacing these losses was a major task requiring early planning and constant attention, for the nearest Chinese troop pool

was 516 miles from Lung-ling and Chinese transport to the front was not in

shape to move forward a mass of replacements on short notice. The Fourteenth

Air Force added its objections by stressing the difficulty in giving air support

to so many Chinese units with its few available aircraft.33

Stilwell, however, on learning of Wei's decision, joined Dorn in welcoming it. Current reports on the progress of the fighting at Myitkyina were most

encouraging, and so, addressing Dorn by radio on 3 June, Stilwell directed him

to encourage Wei. Stilwell was most anxious to join his forces with Wei's for

he wished then to move the Chinese Army in India and Wei's forces to east

China to meet the Japanese threat. "Impress on all concerned the vital importance of getting forward on your front. I refer to what may happen soon in

central and south China. It would be wise to establish early contact with

X-RAY [Chinese Army in India]. Then your boys could at least eat. You had

better arouse them to realization of future possibilities. How are you doing?"

 34

General Wei's decision to commit the 71st Army (less the 88th Division

which had already crossed near Ping-ka) came just as a sudden and heavy rain

caused the Salween to rise sharply. On 28 May the first elements commenced

preparations for the ferrying operations west of Shih-tien, eight miles south of

the Hui-tung Bridge. Three days later, the Y-FOS liaison team with XI Group

Army left Pao-shan to assist. Under the direction of Y-FOS engineers, 20,000

troops reached the west bank of the Salween by 5 June. Unopposed by the Jap33

 (1) Rpt, Col Walter S. Wood, CO, U.S. Ln Gp, XI Group Army, to Hq USAF CBI, Jan 45, sub: Salween Campaign. (Hereafter Wood Report.) OCMH. (2) Memo, Col Reynolds Condon, G-4, Y-FOS, for Dorn, 2 Jul 44, sub: Supply of Opns. Y-FOS 1944 Hist Rpt. (3) Memo, Dorn

for Stilwell, 23 May 44; Ltr, Col Clayton B. Claassen to Chennault, 17 Jul 44, sub: Rpt, Conf, Fourteenth AF Personnel with Dorn. SNF 35. (4) Memo, Dorn for Chennault, 13 Jul 44. AG

(Y-FOS) 381, KCRC. (5) Memo, CO 27th Tr Carrier Sq to CO, 69th Composite Wing, 22 Jun 44, sub: Air Supply Opns. AG (Y-FOS) 373, KCRC. 34

 (1) Rad CHC 1141, Stilwell to Dorn, 3 Jun 44. Item 198, Bk 6A, JWS Personal File. (2)

Ltr, Dorn to Ward, 2 Jun 52. OCMH. (3) Stilwell Diary, 2 Jun 44.
356 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

anese, 71st Army climbed up and out of the Salween gorge and started north

and west toward the Burma Road. Since its pack artillery was carried by coolies,

but few rounds of ammunition were with the pieces.

At La-meng village, four miles west of the Salween, the New 28th Division

attacked the outposts of the Sung Shan Defense Unit, forcing it to abandon the

village on 4 June and to fall back into the mountain fortress of Sung Shan.

While the New 28th Division deployed to contain the 900 effective troops of

the Sung Chan garrison, the 87th Division kept on toward Lung-ling. There

it would meet the 88th Division which, supplied by air during its march from

Ping-ka, had arrived outside the east gate of Lung-ling on 7 June. The Japanese

still held onto the Burma Road east of Lung-ling, but as of 7 June the 87th

Division had covered about two thirds of the distance along the Burma Road

from the river to Lung-ling. The Chinese had to deal with small Japanese

tanks, which had some moral effect but failed to halt the Chinese advance. Indeed, the latter had been fairly swift, for the Chinese had surprised the Japanese, and had been able to ease their supply problems by the capture of some

Japanese rice depots. The scale of the fighting down the road to that point is

suggested by the figure of known Japanese dead, 150 during the first week.

The 88th Division deployed its troops along the eastern and southeastern

heights overlooking Lung-ling and broke through the outer Japanese defenses

on 8 June. That same day its sister division, the 87th, reached Lung-ling's

North Gate. By sending the 261st Regiment off to the north, XI Group Army

took control of the Man-lao Bridge on the Teng-chung-Lung-ling road, thus

blocking that important Japanese supply route.35

If the Chinese could take Lung-ling and break the center of the Japanese

line on the Salween front, the five crack Chinese divisions under Stilwell and

the twelve under Wei would be very near to meeting. The whole Japanese position in north Burma might crumble, and the blockade of China would then

be broken. After a brief period for resting, refitting, and recuperating, the divisions of the Chinese Army in India could be flown to east China from the

Myitkyina air strips to stiffen the defense of that area, if the Generalissimo, as

Supreme Commander, China Theater, should so order, and if the local war

area commanders should desire the presence of central-government troops.36

Wei's twelve divisions would be in position to cover this airlift. When the

ground dried in October, a line of communications over existing and usable

roads would be open from the Myitkyina-Mogaung area to Kunming. Over

it, Wei's divisions could receive lend-lease equipment, and from Kunming, replacements, always assuming the Chinese Ministry of War so desired. Then,

35

 (1) Wood Report. (2) Notes, Maj Herbert E. Feldman, U.S. Ln Off, New 28th Div, 1944. OCMH. (3) Japanese Study 93. 36

 General Merrill was convinced that Stilwell would have airlifted the Chinese 38th Division to east China. One may speculate that others would have followed, as they were to do in late 1944- early 1945. Interv with Merrill, 20 Apr 48, OCMH.
THE CHINESE TAKE THE OFFENSIVE 357

if the military situation in Burma and the political situation in China permitted, units of the twelve divisions could be moved to east China, and there receive a measure of logistical support made possible by taking north Burma.

The intervention of any or all of Wei's divisions might have been ineffective,

for their performance against one Japanese division does not, in retrospect,

suggest they could have halted Hata's eleven divisions. But the five divisions

under Stilwell's command had proved their efficiency, and the opportunity to

move them to east China was a prize worth grasping. It was the only combat

force Stilwell could offer to defend Chennault's airfields. Therefore, a victory

at Lung-ling might offer the chance to save the day in east China.

From the body of a dead Japanese officer, the Chinese took a map showing

Lung-ling's defenses and the strength and composition of the garrison. Three

5,000-foot hills dominated the surrounding town and suburbs. A Japanese battalion held Lao Tung-po hill while a company of engineers and the garrison's

few artillery pieces were on Shu Tung-po. The remaining 800 troops manned

a central hill almost in the middle of town.

Personally led by Gen. Sun Hsi-lien, XI Group Army commander, the

youngest group army commander in the Chinese Army, 71st Army attacked

the two outer heights from three sides on 9 June, in accord with the classic

Chinese custom of leaving an escape route to a surrounded enemy.37 By 10

June, the 87th Division had greatly reduced the volume of Japanese fire from

Lao Tung-po, but despite some attacks by night the 88th was not able to

silence a lone battery on Shu Tung-po. Inclement weather prevented tactical

air support; 436 parachute loads dropped some 75-mm. ammunition for the

Chinese, little enough to reduce the Japanese positions. Nor were 600 pack

animals plying between the Shih-tien ferry over the Salween and Lung-ling

able to keep pace with the expenditure of ammunition. Four days of un-coordinated infantry attacks, with little artillery support, failed to carry the three

mountains inside Lung-ling, and there was nothing to show for the heavy drain

on the 71st Army's ammunition stocks.

Despite numerous reports that the 56th Division was gathering reinforcements for a counterattack, 71st Army did not consolidate and concentrate its

available forces. Early on 14 June, 2d Army elements south of Lung-ling were

attacked by Japanese patrols probing toward Lung-ling. That same morning,

400 Japanese of the 113th Regiment who had been rushed south from Tengchung crossed the Shweli west of the Chinese position at the Man-lao Bridge

and attacked the outposts of the 261st Regiment. At dusk, 200 more Japanese

ferried the Shweli, and at 1900 about one battalion of Japanese drove the Chinese off the bridge (which the latter did not destroy), and brought a small

motorized column across the river. The Japanese inside Lung-ling counterat37

 (1) Wood Report. (2) Ltr, Col John K. Sells to authors, 1 May 47. OCMH. Colonel Sells was Commanding Officer, U.S. Liaison Team, 71st Army. (3) Dr. Ho Yung-chi in The Big Circle,

page 130, explains the escape route device.
The Sung Shan Mountain area. Lao Tung-po hill is show above:

below American road building equipment moves past former Japanese defensive positions.
THE CHINESE TAKE THE OFFENSIVE 359

tacked vigorously, and when 16 June ended, the 87th Division had been pushed

back three miles from Lung-ling.

The following day, Gen. Sun Hsi-lien ordered the 88th Division to abandon its positions near Lung-ling and retire on a line with the 87th, eight miles

to the northeast. Repeated attempts by American liaison personnel with the

71st Army to learn how a small Japanese garrison could drive back a Chinese

group army only brought embarrassed smiles from Chinese officers. Knowing

by now what was prescribed by Chinese etiquette for facing the unpleasant,

the Americans feared the worst. The Chinese finally related on 25 June that the

261st Regiment had bolted, and that the commanding general of the 87th Division had attempted suicide. Hopes somewhat revived that same day when reports came that the Honorable 1st Division (8th Army)

 38

 was arriving to reinforce, but in fact it was too late. So passed a brilliant opportunity; General

Wei's attempt to exploit his initial successes by committing his reserves had

been shattered by Sun's withdrawal before the counterattack of 1,500 Japanese.

Meanwhile, in Burma, a major effort to take Myitkyina between 13 and 16

June had brought no gains of great importance.

When fuller details of the fighting around Lung-ling were available anger

and annoyance spread from Y-FOS to the Generalissimo himself. Y-FOS personnel considered the Chinese decision to withdraw from Lung-ling inexcusable because XI Group Army had sent forward no reinforcements to meet the

initial Japanese counterattacks. Of twenty-one battalions that XI Group Army

had in the vicinity of Lung-ling on 14 June, only nine took part in the fighting.39

 The Japanese thus had been able to drive back 10,000 Chinese effectives

by an attack with 1,500. In describing the defensive attitude of the 259th Regiment, as an example of the conduct that had cost the chance of a speedy breakthrough into Burma, one American liaison officer wrote: "From the time that

we crossed the river until we reached Lung-ling, the regimental commander

continually had his troops in the rear digging emplacements and trenches in

the fear that they would have to retreat."

 40

When later reports on the Lung-ling battle filtered in to Dorn they were

moderate in tone, and blamed faulty leadership and lack of training for the loss

of the Chinese grip on the vital communications center. The Generalissimo

was extremely angry when word reached him. Harsh orders from him, the arrival of the Honorable 1st Division, and a heavy raid by twenty-four B-25's on

Lung-ling were all instrumental in halting the Japanese attempt to exploit

their success. At Hwangtsoapa the Chinese forced the Japanese to fight for

38

 This division and one other, the Honorable 2d Division, received the honorific title of

Honorable because they were made up of men who had been wounded and then returned to battle. 39

 (1) Wood Report. (2) Y-FOS Journal. (3) Ltr cited n. 37(2). (4) Ltr, cited n. 34(2). (5) Japanese Officers' Comments, p. 32. (6) For details of the fighting at Myitkyina, see Chapter VI, above. 40

 Memo, Capt Frederick E. Van Tassell, CO, U.S. Ln Team, 259th Regt, for Dorn, 29 Jun 44. AG (Y-FOS) 319.1, KCRC.
360 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

every foot of ground, though they were handicapped by especially inclement

weather that interfered with air supply and air support. The Generalissimo intervened again with orders to General Wei to report all commanders who had

shown themselves incompetent, and to spare no effort in eliminating Tengchung and Sung Shan so that there might be a new effort from two directions

against Lung-ling.41 But the lost opportunity was past, and months of slow

battering against Teng-chung and Sung Shan could not replace it.

Summary

In mid-May, the Chinese crossed the Salween toward Burma. The crossing was unopposed, but hopes of a speedy break into Burma began to dwindle

when the Chinese insisted on reducing Japanese strongpoints in turn, and disregarded the long-standing American advice that they should infiltrate through

the scattered Japanese and move on into Burma. Nevertheless, considerable

progress was made, and in late May Gen. Wei Li-huang decided to commit his

central force to an attack straight down the Burma Road. After initial successes,

the Chinese were thrown back from the key point of Lung-ling by a counterattack of 1,500 Japanese and the middle of June found the Chinese with no

hopes of a speedy break-through into Burma, while in east China the Japanese seemed to be moving at will.

41

 (1) Wood Report. (2) Memo, Dorn for Ho Ying-chin, 5 Jul 44. AG (Y-FOS) 381. (3)

Rad cited n. 30(2).
CHAPTER X

Facing the Command Problem

The relationships of command within the Generalissimo's China Theater

had not been thoroughly explored by the President and the War Department

in concert since China Theater had been set up in January 1942, when the

United States feared China might make a separate peace. What attention had

been given to the command situation since then had been in the nature of

specific responses to specific pressures from the Chinese or Chennault. The lack

of harmony between the President and the War Department had not permitted

continuing attention and close supervision. Therefore, no agency of the U.S.

Government ever inquired as to why the Chinese had not been willing to set

up an Allied staff for China Theater, as they had pledged themselves to do in

1942, or, of course, sought to hold the Chinese to their promise. The issue of

whether the Chinese would let Stilwell command any Chinese troops in China

had been dropped by the Chinese as soon as he arrived in Chungking. The

Soong-Stimson accord of January 1942, and the Generalissimo's reply to the

inquiry of John J. McCloy, then Assistant Secretary of War, had implied such

an intent on the part of the Chinese, but the U.S. Government had never

pursued the matter.1

The impending Japanese offensive, threatening the Chinese Government

with defeat, revived the command question. The Generalissimo's China

Theater was an Allied theater, for two American air forces operated in it. Had

all gone well in China Theater, probably the command situation would have

stayed as it had for two years, with the question of Stilwell's exact powers and

duties in that theater undefined.

If the Generalissimo could hold east China, there would be no one to question his conduct of affairs. In 1937-38, when China's armies lost the Yangtze

valley, the sea ports, and the key centers of north China, the loss could be

ascribed to various causes beyond Chinese control, and since no American

forces were involved, the U.S. Government could not concern itself with the

quality of Chinese leadership. The events of 1944 followed on two years in

which one group of American officers had predicted them, and threatened to

affect the American effort in the Pacific. Moreover, they contrasted with the

1

 Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. V.
362 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

unbroken chain of successes in north Burma, where Chinese troops under

Stilwell's command had defeated some of the best units in the Japanese service.

Stilwell's Mission Laid Aside

At the Cairo Conference, Stilwell had sought for a directive from the

President on China policy, but had received none. After Cairo, the President in

effect took the conduct of American military relations with China in his own

hands, but on an improvised, ad hoc basis with no attempt to keep Stilwell

informed of the President's goals. Then came the 2 May 1944 JCS directive,

with its order that Stilwell stockpile supplies in China to support Pacific operations, at a time when Hump tonnage could not even support existing U.S.

activities in China.2 From SEAC, the AXIOM Mission had visited Washington

to urge Mountbatten's views. Moreover, on 1 May 1944, as noted above in

Chapter VI, Stilwell had told his deputy theater commander, General Sultan,

that he could not carry out his mission of opening a land line of communications to China unless CBI Theater was reinforced by U.S. combat troops.

As he was accustomed to do, Stilwell on 24 May turned to Marshall for

guidance, reviewing his missions as he saw them and asking Marshall to correct

him where he was wrong. Stilwell saw his duties with the British as being to

co-operate generally in furthering the war against Japan. As for the Chinese,

Stilwell said he understood:

My mission vis a vis the Chinese is to increase the combat efficiency of the Chinese

Army. The basic plan is to equip and train a first group of thirty divisions, followed by a

second group of thirty. To get this mission accomplished I have never had any means of

exerting pressure. I am continuing to work on the problem as I have from the beginning,—

by personal acquaintance and influence, by argument and demonstration. This is a slow

process, so slow as to require evaluation from the point of view of time available, and

possible results to be obtained.

Commenting on his relations with the British, Stilwell revealed how the

irritations and fatigues of the campaign in north Burma, then at its height,

were pressing on him, for he judged the British with extreme harshness. He

doubted that the help they were giving in the war against Japan was worth the

American logistical support currently being extended to SEAC. He rated the

RAF in India as far from impressive, and the Indian Army as being even less

so. Unless there was a wholesale shake-up in the British command in India,

Stilwell saw no chance of an effective attack on Burma from India in the fall of

1944. In his opinion, "The British simply do not want to fight in Burma or

reopen communications with China."

Turning to affairs in China, Stilwell revealed by his comments that he

wanted the President to apply the quid pro quo approach not only to the ques2

 CM-OUT 31202, JCS to Stilwell, 2 May 44. For details of the JCS directive, see pages 201-02,

above.
FACING THE COMMAND PROBLEM 363

tion of whether the Chinese should join in operations in Burma, as he had,

but also to the problems of making the Chinese Army a more effective fighting

force. Stilwell had well-nigh ended his personal share in this activity, but it was,

as this radio showed, still close to his heart:

CKS will squeeze out of us everything he can get to make us pay for the privilege of

getting at Japan through China. He will do nothing to help unless forced into it. No matter

how much we may blame any of the Chinese government agencies for obstruction, the

ultimate responsibility rests squarely on the shoulders of the G-Mo. If he is what he claims

to be, he must accept the responsibility. In spite of delays, evasions, broken promises and

double crossing, we have accomplished something. By fall we can have five fairly dependable

divisions, with corps troops, in the CAI [Chinese Army in India]. We have partially trained

and equipped twenty-six divisions in Yunnan. Some of these are now getting tested in combat, and we shall soon know how much good we have done them. We have conducted

schools at Ramgarh, Kunming, and Kweilin that have made a great impression on a large

number of Chinese officers of all grades. We have U.S. instructors in all divisions of the

Y-Force, and we are ready to start a similar system in the second group of thirty divisions.

This foundation could produce a big improvement in China's ground forces, if we could

deliver the necessary equipment and get the sincere cooperation of the G-Mo. Up to date we

have not had it, nor will we get it except through pressure.

So with the Chinese the choice seems to be to get realistic and insist on a quid pro quo,

or else restrict our effort in China to maintaining what American aviation we can. The latter

course allows CKS to welsh on his agreements. It also lays the ultimate burden of fighting

the Jap Army on the U.S.A. I contend that ultimately the Jap Army must be fought on the

mainland of Asia. If you do not believe this, and think that Japan can be defeated by other

means, then the proper course may well be to cut our effort here to the A.T.C. and the

maintenance of whatever air force you consider suitable in China. If on the other hand you

think it worth while for me to continue on my original mission of increasing the combat

effectiveness of the Chinese Army, that is still feasible, but it can be accomplished only if

and when we get on a realistic basis with the G-Mo, or whatever passes for authority in

China.

As to present and future possibilities, as I see them, the maximum that I can reasonably

hope to accomplish with the present British and Chinese high command working under

their present policies, and with the American resources now available to me, is to hold the

Myitkyina area as an air base, with supply by road, air, and pipe-line. To insure the reopening

of communications with China, I still need an American corps and more engineers.

I request your decision. Is my mission changed, or shall I go ahead as before?3

Marshall's reply on 27 May made it clear that Stilwell was primarily a U.S.

theater commander, made his mission to China for the present definitely subordinate to supporting U.S. operations in the Pacific, and stated that the United

States wished to avoid a major effort in Asia. Marshall did not mention the

crisis in China, nor the post of chief of staff to the Generalissimo in the latter's

role of Supreme Commander, China Theater.

Your mission with respect to the British as stated in your radio DTG 240240Z May

twenty-fourth is correct. Your mission with respect to the Chinese as stated by you is your

primary mission and has the President's approval. Decisions taken at QUADRANT and SEXTANT Conferences especially those contained in CCS 319/5, CCS 417, and CCS 397, set up

3

 Rad DTG 240240Z, Stilwell to Marshall, 24 May 44. Item 2740, Bk 7, JWS Personal File.
364 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

requirements for your accomplishment which for the time being interfere with your primary

mission.4 Decision has been made for example that operations in China and Southeast Asia

should be conducted in support of the main operation in the Central and Southwest Pacific.

Japan should be defeated without undertaking a major campaign against her on the

mainland on Asia if her defeat can be accomplished in this manner. Subsequent operations

against the Japanese ground army in Asia should then be in the nature of a mopping up

operation.

Timely support for Pacific operations requires that priority be given during the next

several months to a buildup of our air effort in China.

The heavy requirements for our operations against Germany and for our main effort in

the Pacific, preclude our making available to you the American corps you request to assist

you in the reopening of ground communications with China. We are forced therefore to

give first priority to increasing the Hump lift.

Accordingly the U.S. Chiefs of Staff are about to propose to the British Chiefs of Staff

that Mountbatten's directive be changed. . . .

Our view is that your paramount mission in the China Theater for the immediate future

is to conduct such military operations as will most effectively support the main effort

directed against the enemy by forces in the Pacific. In order to facilitate timely accomplishment of this mission, for the present you should devote your principal effort to support of

the Hump lift and its security, and the increase in its capacity with the view to development

of maximum effectiveness of the Fourteenth Air Force consistent with minimum requirements for support of all other activities in China. In pressing the advantages against the

enemy you should be prepared to exploit the development of overland communications to

China.5

Stilwell Called to China

As May melted into the hot, damp June of east China summer, Japanese

actions made it unmistakably clear that ICHIGO was not another foray, but a

major effort. Chennault and the Generalissimo grew steadily more alarmed. But

even as Stilwell moved to place what resources he had in China behind the

Fourteenth Air Force, he sought to end the long-standing differences between

himself and Chennault by asking Marshall to relieve the Fourteenth Air Force

commander. Concluding that Chennault's action in submitting his "air estimate" to the Generalissimo after Stilwell had specifically told him not to was

insubordination calculated to embarrass Stilwell in his relations with the

Generalissimo, he asked Marshall to relieve the air commander of all responsibility for the Fourteenth Air Force's operations and relegate him to training

and leading the Chinese Air Force.6

General Marshall was traveling when Stilwell's communications arrived,

and Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, answered for him.

4

 (1) CCS 319/5, 24 Aug 43, sub: Final Rpt [QUADRANT] to President and Prime Minister. See Stilwell's Mission to China. (2) CCS 417, 2 Dec 43, sub: Plan for Defeat of Japan. (3) CCS 397

(Revised), 3 Dec 43, sub: Specific Opns for Defeat of Japan, 1944. See p. 75, above. 5

 (1) For background on the JCS proposal to change Mountbatten's directive, see Chapter V, above. (2) Rad WAR 42202, Marshall to Stilwell, 27 May 44. Item 2562, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. 6

 (1) See Ch. VIII, above. (2) Japanese Study 129. (3) Ltr, Stilwell to Marshall, 27 May 44, sub: Discipline. SNF 31. (4) Rad CHC 1123, Stilwell to Marshall, 30 May 44. SNF 131.
FACING THE COMMAND PROBLEM 365

Because of the current situation in China and because of the political aspects of

the case, the War Department thought it best not to take action. McNarney

pointed out that if Chennault was removed and central China then lost to the

Japanese, responsibility for that loss would of course be placed on Stilwell. As

McNarney wrote this, the British and American forces under Gen. Dwight D.

Eisenhower were battling to make good their foothold in Normandy after

successfully crossing the Channel. Conceding the force of McNarney's advice,

Stilwell asked him to return the papers and forget the incident, for "with the

performance going on in the main tent you can't be bothered with side

shows."

 7

Just after Stilwell asked Marshall to relieve Chennault, the latter in a most

urgent radio followed by a clarifying letter warned that the Japanese were again

on the move, this time south from Hankow. This offensive was the second or

TOGO phase of Operation ICHIGO. Describing the situation as one of the

"utmost gravity" Chennault predicted the Japanese would take their objectives

in east China unless the Chinese were powerfully assisted. He believed that

given a minimum of 10,000 tons a month for operations in north China, east

China, and from Kunming, the Fourteenth Air Force could stop the Japanese.

Chennault asked again that he be allowed to draw on the MATTERHORN stocks

at Cheng-tu, and that he have almost all the ATC tonnage entering China.8

With Chennault's radio Stilwell received word that the Generalissimo wanted

him to come to Chungking as soon as possible.9 Stilwell felt the critical situation around Mogaung and Myitkyina, where the fighting was growing steadily

heavier, would not permit him to leave for a week or ten days.10

Chennault's warnings were immediately reinforced by others from the

Chinese and from Stilwell's own staff which confirmed the impressions given

by Chennault. On 31 May, as it began to seem Myitkyina would not soon fall,

Ho Ying-chin, the Minister of War and Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army,

called in General Ferris and Maj. Gen. Adrian Carton de Wiart (SEAC's liaison

with the Chinese). General Ho believed that a recently concluded RussoJapanese fishing pact had secret annexes, permitting the Japanese to withdraw

troops from Manchuria. Ho feared that the Russians, the Chinese Communists,

and the Japanese were working together. He warned that the Japanese manpower situation might permit the raising of thirty-five new divisions. General

Ho believed the Japanese held the great arc of their Pacific perimeter from

Burma through the Bonin Islands with forty-three divisions, and that they

planned to fight the decisive naval battle for mastery of the Pacific somewhere

along the line Kuril Islands-Hokkaido-Bonin Islands-Formosa.

7

 Rad WAR 47843, McNarney to Stilwell, 8 Jun 44; Rad CHC 1175, Stilwell to McNarney, 9

Jun 44. SNF31. 8

 (1) Rad CAK 2773, Chennault to Stilwell and Stratemeyer, 29 May 44. The Chennault- Wedemeyer Letter, Item 39. (2) Ltr, Chennault to Stilwell, 29 May 44. SNF 31. 9

 Rad CFB 17887, Ferris to Stilwell, 28 May 44. Item 2565, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. 10

 Rad, Stilwell to Ferris, 28 May 44. Item 2584, Bk 7, JWS Personal File.
366 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

General Ho entertained the liveliest fears in regard to China, for he told

Ferris and Carton de Wiart that the Japanese were trying to drive China out of

the war. To support this view Ho offered detailed information on Japanese

troop movements and construction projects in China. To meet the emergency,

Ho asked that the United States urge the Russians to contain the Japanese in

Manchuria, and that Chennault be given the means to attack the Japanese

supply centers in Hankow and the enemy's Yangtze shipping. Ferris relayed

the warning to Stilwell with the comment that the Chinese were definitely

concerned, that though they might have somewhat overestimated Japanese

strengths it was reasonable to assume that Chinese intelligence sources were

good.11

That same day of 31 May, Gen. Shang Chen, head of the Chinese Military

Mission in Washington, delivered a similar warning to the President on behalf

of the Generalissimo. The Generalissimo believed that the Japanese were

moving six divisions from Manchuria to China, and that they aimed to seize

the entire Hankow-Canton rail line and the airfields at Kweilin and Heng-yang.

To meet this threat the Generalissimo asked that:

(1) The 14th U.S. Army Air Force should be strengthened. With the exception of

whatever small amount that is absolutely necessary, the air tonnage between India and

Kunming should all be allocated for the shipment of gasoline and spare parts for the said Air

Force. It is therefore urgently requested that the total tonnage for shipment of supplies to

the 14th U.S. Army Air Force be increased to at least ten thousand (10,000) tons.

(2) . . . the entire stock of gasoline, spare parts and aircrafts [sic] stored in Chengtu [for

the B-29's] be immediately turned over to the 14th U.S. Army Air Force to be concentrated

for operation along the Peiping-Hankow Railway.

(3) It is also requested that the Chinese Air Force be strengthened, if possible.

(4) The ground troops should also be strengthened. Request is made to have eight

thousand (8,000) launcher rockets, each with one hundred (100) ammunition, delivered as

soon as possible in order that the fire power of the Chinese troops in the various war areas

may be effectively increased.12

The Generalissimo also called in Chennault and Stilwell for conferences.

In Chennault's 29 May warning to Stilwell, he mentioned that he had received

such an order. Probably as a result of this meeting, Chennault radioed Stilwell

that his June Hump allocation of 6,700 tons was "hopelessly inadequate," that

10,000 tons delivered was the minimum.13 A day or so later Stilwell received

direct word from the Generalissimo that his presence in Chungking was

urgently desired.14

11

 Rad CFB 17969, Marshall and Sultan from Ferris signed Stilwell, 31 May 44. Item 2571, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. The gist of Ho's warning was repeated by him in Ltr, Ho to Stilwell, 31 May 44. Item 2574, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. Ho added a prediction that the Japanese would

attack in India and Burma, at which Stilwell snorted: "Ask him for me how he intends to defend Changsha and Hengyang and I will tell him how we will defend Mogaung." Rad CHC

1136, Stilwell to Ferris, 2 Jun 44. Item 2581, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. 12

 Aide Mémoire to President Roosevelt (delivered by General Shang, 31 May 1944). China File (Hurley), Item 61, OPD Exec 10. 13

 Rad CAK 2981, Chennault to Stilwell, 2 Jun 44. Item 2583, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. 14

 Memo, Generalissimo for Stilwell, 3 Jun 44. Item 2584, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. The memorandum went out at once to Stilwell as an "eyes alone" radio.
FACING THE COMMAND PROBLEM 367

Probably the same day that he received the Generalissimo's request, Stilwell

had word from Ferris that the Japanese "move south from Hankow has actually

started."

 15

 It was time for Stilwell to visit China.

Chennault Given 10,000 Tons

On the eve of his departure from his Burma headquarters, Stilwell received

from Dorn a pessimistic account of how the Fourteenth Air Force and the

Chinese were reacting to the Japanese drive. Dorn reported that officers of the

Fourteenth Air Force were complaining to newspapermen of lack of support

from theater headquarters, and that Chennault was charging that supplies had

been diverted from him to support other U.S. activities. In that connection,

Dorn asked Stilwell to recall that in April 1944 two thirds of the Y-Force Hump

tonnage had gone to Chennault and in May more than half. Dorn charged

that of 30,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition allotted to the War Ministry in

November and December 1943, the Chinese had taken delivery of but 7,000,000

rounds and now stated they did not know where the 7,000,000 rounds were.

Radio sets and antitank rifles turned over to the Chinese at the end of 1943

were still in Chungking the last Dorn knew of them. Dorn reported that only

a few days before 4 June 1944 the Chinese had in Kunming equipment and

ammunition for five battalions of field artillery, plus considerable stocks of antitank ammunition. The only recent arms shipment to east China had been

equipment for a battalion of field artillery, which U.S. Army authorities had

sent to the Kweilin training center.16 This report, with others which came in

from American liaison personnel as the fighting progressed in east China, may

have reinforced Stilwell's conviction that merely giving arms and ammunition

to Chinese authorities was not the solution to China's military problems.

In writing to Mrs. Stilwell on 2 June, the general offered a brief analysis, in

language cryptic but still capable of translation in the light of Stilwell's relations with the Generalissimo and the President in 1942 and 1943. Stilwell wrote

that the Generalissimo had been offered "salvation," that is, a modernized and

re-equipped Chinese Army, but had rejected it. Now, with the Japanese driving

through east China, it was "too late" to create the powerful ground force which,

in Stilwell's repeatedly expressed opinion, was the only thing that could save

China. "This [the crisis in China] is just what I told them [the Generalissimo

and the President] a year ago," he added, "but they knew better."

 17

On 5 June 1944 Stilwell conferred with the Generalissimo. The Chinese

leader began by questioning Stilwell as to the progress of the Chinese Army in

India. He seemed dissatisfied with the performance of the Chindits but appeared

to accept Stilwell's reassurances. Then the Generalissimo turned to China,

15

 Rad CFB 18134, Ferris to Stilwell, 3 Jun 44. Item 2587, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. 16

 Rad, Dorn to Stilwell, 4 Jun 44. SNF 31. 17

 The Stilwell Papers, p. 301.
368 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

saying matters there were so serious that the entire air effort should be used to

stop the Japanese—"the situation was one to be solved by air attack." Stilwell

agreed with the Generalissimo that affairs were indeed serious but added that

all ground and air resources in China Theater should be used. The Generalissimo, consistent with his 31 May request to the President, then asked Stilwell

to give Chennault the B-29 supplies and to suspend transport of arms and

ammunition over the Hump.

Stilwell replied that he was diverting 1,500 tons a month from the B-29

share of Hump tonnage, that he had asked JCS permission to use B-24's as

flying fuel tankers. With these measures, the Fourteenth Air Force would get

the 10,000 tons a month that Chennault had said would be enough. This did

not satisfy the Generalissimo, who asked that the B-29 stocks at Cheng-tu be

turned over to Chennault. Stilwell demurred, saying that he thought instead

of suspending all Hump tonnage to Z-Force, to the unengaged portion of

Y-Force, and to the U.S. Navy personnel in China. In the light of this he

suggested that China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC) aircraft, which

were under contract to the Chinese Government, should devote their entire

capacity to Chennault's supplies. The Generalissimo objected, for he felt that

the paper money CNAC craft flew in was essential to the war. Stilwell replied

that Chiang could hardly ask for the B-29 tonnage if the Chinese did not use

all their resources. Stilwell was applying the bargaining technique that he

always sought to use with the Chinese. The Generalissimo then agreed to

consider use of the CNAC transports and Stilwell promised to ask for

permission to use the B-29 stocks if the situation grew worse.18

True to his word, Stilwell on 6 June shifted Hump allocations all across the

board, cutting all other activities to raise the Fourteenth Air Force's allocation

to 8,425 tons. With 1,500 tons from the B-29 allocation Chennault would

have his 10,000 tons.19 To Marshall, Stilwell radioed that the Generalissimo and

he had talked things over, listed the diversions he was making for Chennault,

and as an "ace in the hole" requested that he be granted permission to use the

B-29 stocks though he would not touch them save as a last resort.20 Then at

Kunming Stilwell met with Chennault and the latter's key staff officers.

Stilwell rather chilled his audience by saying he could spare only thirty

minutes for their problems, but as the meeting went on he appeared receptive

to Chennault's plan to use the B-29's against Hankow, and then stated that he

was, as Chennault's minutes put it, "willing and anxious to do everything

possible to assist." Stilwell described what he was doing to divert Hump tonnage to Chennault's support. But Stilwell was not optimistic over the east 18

 (1) Memo for Record, 5 Jun 44, sub: Conf between CKS and Stilwell. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. (2) The Stilwell Papers, p. 302. 19

 Rad CFB 18251, Stilwell from Ferris to Fwd Ech NCAC, Hq Rr Ech, Hq AAF India- Burma Sec, ATC Chabua, Humpco Chabua, Fourteenth AF, Kweilin Z-Force, Kunming Y-Force, Delhi SOS, Ramgarh, and Chabua SOS, 6 Jun 44. Item 2595, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. 20

 Rad CFB 18238, Stilwell to AGWAR for Marshall, 6 Jun 44. Item 2600, Bk 7, JWS

Personal File.
FACING THE COMMAND PROBLEM 369

China situation for he thought there was "nothing to stop" the Japanese.

"General Chennault countered with the statement that he felt confident that

with the help of the VLR [B-29's against Hankow] he could stop the drive,

but emphasized the necessity for immediate action." Chennault impressed

Stilwell with the need to use the B-29's at once, and Stilwell implied that it

would be done. When the meeting ended, Chennault presented Stilwell with

his plan for current operations, and Stilwell took it with him.21

The logistical aspects of Chennault's plan were the important ones from the

point of view of Headquarters, CBI Theater, for the airman was a free agent in

his tactics. The plan Chennault now gave Stilwell asked for 4,823 tons for north

China—of which the Chinese-American Composite Wing was to get 3,097

tons—4,283 tons for east China, and 2,546 tons for the Kunming area.22

The answer the War Department almost immediately returned to Stilwell's

request for permission to use the B-29 stocks in an emergency was a refusal in

terms that placed Stilwell effectively between the upper and nether millstones

of pressure from Chennault and the Generalissimo to use the B-29 stocks in

the current critical situation and the determination of General Arnold and the

Army Air Forces to use the B-29's only against Japanese industry.

With reference to your 18238 of 6 June regarding VLR stocks in China these are not to

be released to the Fourteenth Air Force without express approval from the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. It is our view that the early bombing of Japan will have a far more beneficial effect on

the situation in China than the long delay in such an operation which would be caused by

the transfer of these stocks to Chennault. Furthermore, we have positive evidence in Italy

of the limiting [sic] delaying effect of a purely air resistance where the odds were nearly

7,000 planes on our side to 200 on the German. Furthermore, the Twentieth Bomber Group

represents a powerful agency which must not be localized under any circumstances any more

than we would so localize the Pacific Fleet. Please keep this in mind.23

Surely here was faith in strategic bombardment at its highest pitch, while the

comment on the probable worth of Chennault's efforts suggests that Stilwell

had gone to the limit of his discretionary authority in giving Chennault such

priority on Hump tonnage. In reply, Stilwell said: "Instructions understood,

and exactly what I had hoped for. As you know, I have few illusions about

power of air against ground troops. Pressure from G-MO forced the

communication."

 24

At the time Stilwell replied to Marshall, the B-29's had just completed their

shakedown attack on railway workshops in Bangkok, Thailand. On 15 June

came the long-awaited attack on the Japanese homeland for which the President entertained such high hopes. About 221 tons of bombs were dropped on

the Imperial Iron and Steel Works' Yawata plant, on Kyushu Island. Before the

21

 Memo, sgd E.G., 6 Jun 44. The Chennault-Wedemeyer Letter, Item 44. 22

 (1) Plan for Defense of East China. The Chennault-Wedemeyer Letter, Item 45. (2) Table 5 shows Fourteenth Air Force aircraft inventory for this period. 23

 Rad WAR 47296, Marshall to Stilwell, 7 Jun 44. Item 2603, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. 24

 Rad CHC 1173, Stilwell to Marshall, 8 Jun 44. SNF 131.
370 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

TABLE 5—FOURTEENTH AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT INVENTORY BY TYPE OF AIRCRAFT:

MARCH 1943-DECEMBER 1944

a

Includes Photo, Liaison, Transport, Utility Cargo, and Trainer Planes.

Source: Black Book, prepared for Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, 1945, OCMH.

end of October 1944 attacks followed at intervals on the Showa Steel Works at

An-shan, Manchuria, again on Yawata, on the Plajoe Refinery at Palembang,

Sumatra, on the Okayama aircraft assembly plant, Takao harbor, and Heito

airfield on Formosa, and on the Omura aircraft factory on Kyushu. In 1944 the

China-based B-29's dropped a total of 3,623 tons, with no discernible effect on

the east China crisis. Of the attack on Japanese steel production, which it was

hoped the B-29's would cut in half, the Strategic Bombing Survey concluded:

"The reduction in ingot steel supply, excluding electric steel, was not over

2 per cent and in finished steel less than 1 per cent."

 25

25

 (1) Quotation is from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effects of Strategic

Bombing on Japan's War Economy, p. 45. (2) The figure on tonnage dropped is from the survey's The Strategic Air Operation of Very Heavy Bombardment in the War Against Japan (Washington, 1946), Chart 8. (3) The B-29 missions are listed in Chapter VI, Section Two, History of CBI.
FACING THE COMMAND PROBLEM 371

The Japanese Drive Rolls On in East China

The Japanese had been very pleased with the success of their Honan

operations, which had cost them but 869 dead and 2,280 wounded.26 Promoted

to field marshal on 2 June, Hata now aimed to take the two communication

centers of Changsha and Heng-yang. (See Map 18.) The initial attack would

be launched by the 40th, 116th, 68th, 3d, and 13th Divisions, which were

stretched along the south bank of the Yangtze in that order from west to east.

The 58th, 34th, and 27th Divisions would follow as a second echelon. The Chinese troops facing them were those of the IX War Area, mostly

southern Chinese divisions under a Cantonese, Gen. Hsueh Yueh. After the

war, the Japanese estimated Hsueh's strength at about forty divisions. In addition to Chennault's airmen, there were a few other American resources capable

of being committed to the campaign, namely, the personnel and the matériel

accumulated at Kweilin for the Infantry Training Center. As the Japanese

menace grew, the time for training seemed to Stilwell's headquarters to have

passed, while the need for accurate and timely information about the Chinese

and technical aid to them was steadily more acute. In the first weeks of June,

CBI Theater headquarters radioed that Chinese permission in principle had

been received to send observer teams to the IX War Area. A party under Col.

Woods King was promptly sent to join Hsueh Yueh and his XXVII and XXX

Group Armies. When the teams joined their respective Chinese units they

found that General Hsueh had established his headquarters at Lei-yang, 100

miles south of Changsha, and they understood that Hsueh would be directly

responsible for operations east of the Hsiang River. At Pao-ching (Shao-yang),

120 miles southwest of Changsha, Hsueh's deputy, Maj. Gen. Liu Chi-ming,

was reported to have control of operations against the Japanese west of the

river.27

The American observer group with Hsueh Yueh, which had been most

coolly received, radioed to General Lindsey that the Chinese badly needed arms

and ammunition. A special train was then dispatched on 13 June from Kweilin

to Heng-yang, with 9 37-mm. antitank guns and 3,000 rounds, 200 Boys antitank rifles and 6,080 rounds, 20 Chinese Maxim machine guns with 218,600

rounds, 26 Bren guns and 13,728 rounds, and 2 rocket launchers with 20

rounds. Their arrival cheered General Hsueh, and his attitude was more cordial.

Other observer and artillery teams went out, until by mid-July there were

sixteen with Chinese armies south of the Yangtze River.

U.S. Army liaison teams were sent to the headquarters of the IX and IV

War Areas, the XXIV and XXVII Group Armies, and the 31st, 37th, 46th, 62d,

64th, 79th, and 100th Armies. The three battalions of the Chinese 29th Field

Artillery Regiment were equipped with U.S. 75-mm. pack howitzers and aided

26

 Japanese Study 78. 27

 (1) Japanese Studies 78 and 129. (2) History of Z-FOS.
372 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

by American liaison teams. These three battalions were then attached to the

31st, 46th, and 64th Armies. Another battalion of Chinese artillery, supporting

the 10th Army at Heng-yang, also had U.S. pack howitzers and training.

The action of CBI Theater in giving arms and ammunition to General

Hsueh was strongly protested by the Generalissimo's representatives in

Kweilin. They said shipments to Hsueh Yueh might fall into the hands of

bandits who would use them against the central government. Z-Force Operations Staff headquarters interpreted these protests and warnings as hints that

the Generalissimo feared Hsueh Yueh might revolt.28

To meet the problem of giving effective tactical air support despite the

handicaps of language problems and poor communications, Chennault had

requested and obtained permission on 26 April to expand his air-ground liaison

net with General Hsueh's troops. When the Japanese drove for Changsha the

5329th Air Ground Force Resources Technical Staff (Provisional) (AGFRTS)

was in the field with thirty-five officers and sixty-five enlisted men.29

The 3d and 13th Divisions on the eastern side of the Hsiang River began

moving south 27 May, on a course that would permit them to cut off Changsha

from a Chinese force at Liu-yang. The next day the 40th, 116th, and 68th Divisions moved south, directly on Changsha. In the last Japanese drive on

Changsha, in December 1941-January 1942, the Japanese motive had been to

distract the Chinese from operations to relieve Hong Kong. The 1941 drive on

Changsha had been stoutly resisted by the Chinese, and when the Japanese,

their mission accomplished, began to pull back north, the Chinese and their

sympathizers concluded that a great victory for China had been won. Earlier

Japanese operations against Changsha had been to disperse threatening Chinese

concentrations, and Japanese withdrawals had been followed by claims of Chinese victories. So, to the Chinese and their friends, Changsha was a name with

which to conjure. In 1944 the Japanese were determined to hold what they

might win.

In the first days of the drive, the Japanese met resistance only in the Ta-mo

Shan hills, where the 99th Army held stubbornly on the west flank of the

Japanese advance. The Japanese finally contained it and resumed their southward drive. By 10 June, the 58th, 116th, 68th, 3d, and 13th Divisions were lined

up along the Liu-yang Ho, the last geographic barrier north of Changsha. Next

day they attacked. The 58th and 116th Divisions found little resistance in front

of them. The 3d and 13th Divisions, driving the Chinese from steep hillside

positions to take Liu-yang on 14 June, cut off Changsha from the east.

The key Chinese strongpoint at Changsha was a mountain just north and

28

 (1) Memo, G-4, Z-FOS, for CofS, Z-FOS, Jun 44. AG (Z-FOS) 337, KCRC. (2) History of Z-Force. (3) Hq Kwangsi Comd, Chinese Combat Comd (Prov), U.S. Forces, China Theater, Campaign in Southeastern China, MS in possession of Brig Gen Harwood C. Bowman, USA (Ret), Montgomery, Ala. (hereafter cited as Campaign of Southeastern China), p. 4. 29

 Summary of Data; Memo, Chennault for Stilwell, 20 May 44, sub: Activation of AGFRTS. The Chennault-Wedemeyer Letter, Incl I, par. 22, and Incl II, Item 4.
FACING THE COMMAND PROBLEM 373

EVACUATION OF KWEILIN. Refugees at the Kweilin railroad station wait for

transportation.

west called Yueh-lu Shan on which General Hsueh, IX War Area commander,

had massed his artillery. The 34th Division began attacking it on 16 June while

the 58th Division, which had so easily crossed the Liu-yang Ho, swung west to

attack Changsha itself that same day. Changsha's garrison, the 4th Army, abandoned the town over the 16th and 17th and marched toward Pao-ching to the

southwest. Changsha was occupied by the Japanese on 18 June.30

On 23 June an American liaison team attached to Hsueh's deputy met the

4th Army near Pao-ching. Some of the Chinese officers and men stated they had

been attacked by gas sprayed from Japanese aircraft, whose effects, as described

by them, seemed like tear gas, though none of the wounded showed signs of it.

The 4th Army's commander, a General Chin, was voluble in saying that gas

bombs and gas shells had forced them to yield Changsha. On the night of

23 June an American air force sergeant, who had been an air-ground liaison

radio operator at Changsha, walked into Pao-ching. He had awakened a few

days before to find the Chinese had quietly walked out of Changsha, and

hastily followed. Present in the town throughout the engagement, he had heard

nothing of gas attacks. The sergeant had observed some Japanese artillery fire 30

 Japanese Studies 78 and 129.
374 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

around Changsha; there had been quite a few Japanese air attacks, but he knew

nothing of any heavy fighting. Inspecting the 4th Army troops, the American

liaison team thought they were fresh, in good condition, and found nothing to

suggest that they had just emerged from a bitter defeat. The Japanese postwar

account makes no mention of any heavy fighting.31

With Changsha in Japanese hands, Stilwell's staff feared the Japanese might

enter Kweilin in another seven days, and so began moving British and American nationals from the Kweilin area. Hospital patients, missionaries, Red Cross

workers, and teachers began moving out by air around 21 June. Surplus

personnel of the Infantry Training Center and Z-FOS began leaving by truck

on 27 June. Obviously, CBI Theater headquarters thought the Japanese would

shortly take the key points in east China.32

Vice-President Wallace Suggests Stilwell's Recall

On 19 May, General Ferris had told Stilwell and General Sultan, Stilwell's

deputy theater commander in India, that he had learned from the U.S. Embassy

of a forthcoming visit of the Vice-President of the United States, Henry A.

Wallace, and that Wallace wanted to see something of the U.S. Army.33

Mr. Wallace arrived at Chungking on 20 June and was met by a suitable

delegation, including Generals Ferris and Chennault. On leaving for his Kunming headquarters, Chennault left behind him 1st Lt. Joseph W. Alsop to be

"air aide" to the Vice-President. Before the war, Lieutenant Alsop had been a

nationally syndicated columnist and had known Mr. Wallace both socially and

professionally. Stilwell's staff feared that Chennault had stolen a march on the

theater commander.34

A report from General Ferris, summarizing "the views of the American

Government to be communicated to President Chiang Kai-shek," gave an idea

of what the State Department thought the Vice-President should discuss with

the Generalissimo, and this seems to have been the only attempt by an agency

of the U.S. Government to effect any co-ordination between the Vice-President

and the CBI Theater commander. The suggestions for Wallace's guidance

referred several times to the desirability of the Nationalist and Communist

forces fighting the Japanese rather than one another, and hinted at the lifting

of the blockade that the Generalissimo maintained against the Communists.

The need for better Sino-Soviet understanding was stressed. The message struck

31

 (1) Rpt, Col Thomas J. Heavey, U.S. Observer, IX War Area, to Gen Lindsey, 26 Jun 44. AG (Z-FOS) 210.684, KCRC. (2) Japanese Study 78. 32

 (1) For details of the movement of U.S. personnel from the Kweilin area, see Z-FOS

Journal. KCRC. (2) Rad CFB 19135, Ferris to Stilwell, 26 Jun 44. The Chennault-Wedemeyer

Letter, Item 51. (3) Rad CFB 19119, Ferris to Sultan, 25 Jun 44. Item 2653, Bk 7, JWS Personal

File.

33

 Rad CFB 17559, Ferris to Stilwell and Sultan, 19 May 44. Item 2544, Bk 7, JWS Personal

File.

34

 Rad CFB 18945, Ferris to Stilwell, 21 Jun 44. Item 2634, Bk 7, JWS Personal File.
FACING THE COMMAND PROBLEM 375

VICE-PRESIDENT WALLACE is greeted on his arrival at Chungking by a delegation

of military and civilian dignitaries.

a chilling note, given emphasis by the current background of crisis in east

China, that "China must depend upon herself at the moment rather than to

look for major assistance from the outside," which latter would not be

forthcoming until after the defeat of Germany.35

Over the next few days, the Generalissimo in Chungking and Chennault

in Kunming absorbed Wallace's time and energies, so that Stilwell's staff found

little opportunity to present the theater commander's point of view, nor did

Wallace feel that he could spare the time to visit General Stilwell in Burma.

Reporting on his efforts to place Stilwell's case before the Vice-President,

Stilwell's political adviser, John P. Davies, wrote to Stilwell:

Now for the Jones-Davies conducted tours angle. It was a flop because (1) we arrived

late (2) we had no letter of introduction to Mr. W. saying we were Theater Commander's

Reception and Itinerary Committee until after Alsop had presented a letter from himself to

the VP stating that Chennault had appointed him Air Aide to the VP (3) in Kunming

Wallace was for three days Chennault's guest with the result that Jones and I were given the

best job of run-around I have ever been up against. It was done by two of Claire's boys. I

blew up with Chennault about it, uttering a few homely truths about the damage done by

35

 Memo, Ferris for Stilwell, 23 Jun 44. Item 299, Bk 3, JWS Personal File.
376 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

the Chennault-Stilwell feud. To his juniors I read the same line and added that I had as little

use for Chennault disciples who needled Chennault on Stilwell in the belief that they thereby won Claire's gratitude as I had for Stilwell enthusiasts who did the same thing to the

Theater Commander. It seemed to jar them somewhat so that on the night of June 26 when

Wallace, Chennault, Glenn, and the two stooges discussed with me the possibility of the

VP visiting you in the Valley, Chennault and Co. were very reasonable and decent, with the

exception of [individual's name deleted] who is, of course, congenitally conspiratorial. Decision by VP was against because of weather uncertainty and tight future schedule.36

In the conversations between Wallace and the Generalissimo, General

Ferris and John S. Service of the State Department, who was with the Chungking headquarters as a political adviser to General Ferris, were allowed to present themselves on 23 June to support the project of sending an observer group

to the Chinese Communists to collect Japanese order-of-battle and target information and to aid search and rescue of Air Forces personnel shot down over

north China. After stating the position of CBI Theater headquarters on this

matter they withdrew. Headquarters, CBI Theater, was not invited to join in

Wallace's discussions of the Communist problem, and Wallace did not try to

obtain General Stilwell's views on anything.37

Wallace's advocacy of the observer group project was successful. The Generalissimo agreed that a small party could go, that they could communicate

directly with theater headquarters, and that they would be free of Nationalist

control.38 The directive from theater headquarters ordered the commanding

officer, Col. David D. Barrett, to devote himself to ". . . intelligence concerning both our allies and the enemy, and affording assistance to downed pilots.

. . . (Under no circumstances will you engage in discussions or make commitments of any kind pertaining to political, economic, sociological, or military [sic]. All matters of policy and commitments remain responsibility of theater commander.)" The project received the code name DIXIE Mission. Personnel included sixteen officers and enlisted men, plus two U.S. Foreign Service

officers, John S. Service and Raymond P. Ludden, who had been assigned to

theater headquarters as political advisers.39

After weighing the Generalissimo's and Lieutenant Alsop's comments on

General Stilwell, Wallace decided to recommend that Stilwell be recalled.

Many years later, Wallace testified that his first impulse had been to suggest

Stilwell's replacement by Chennault, but that Lieutenant Alsop had persuaded

him that the War Department would not approve, and that Chennault could

not leave the campaign he was then directing. On the ground that the Generalissimo had stated that Stilwell could not grasp what the Chinese statesman

36

 Rpt, Davies to Stilwell, undated. SNF 31. 37

 (1) U.S. Department of State, United States Relations with China, pp. 556-57. (2) Wallace- Alsop Testimony, U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee, Senator Pat McCarran, Chm, 17-18 Oct 51. 38

 U.S. Department of State, United States Relations with China, pp. 556-57. 39

 Ltr O, Hq Fwd Ech USAF CBI to Barrett, 21 Jul 44, sub: Dispatch Observers Sec to Areas Under Control of Chinese Communists. DIXIE Mission, Vol. I, Sec VI, Item 73. OCMH.
FACING THE COMMAND PROBLEM 377

called "political considerations," Wallace told President Roosevelt that he

considered Stilwell unsuited to his post.

Wallace recommended that another general officer of the highest merit be

appointed who could win the Generalissimo's confidence, command all U.S.

forces in China Theater, and co-ordinate the Sino-American military effort in

China. He added that the Generalissimo had been favorably impressed by General Wedemeyer, who had recently visited Chungking on behalf of SEAC. As

an alternative, Wallace suggested the appointment to China of a presidential

representative with considerable independent powers, with the right to approach the President directly, and with an official position as Stilwell's deputy.

Wallace believed that the President should take determined steps to stop

the steady deterioration of the east China situation or be prepared to accept

the loss of China as a base from which to support U.S. operations in the Pacific. He stated that a Sino-American offensive, in its first phase primarily a

guerrilla attack, should be launched in east China to avert the loss of Chennault's fields. Wallace insisted that the military situation in China was not

hopeless and that the present crisis might even improve American prestige in

the Far East since the Generalissimo seemed very eager for military aid and

guidance, and, if wisely approached, would probably inaugurate reforms in

China's internal political structure.40

Far to the south and west of China, the steady progress of Stilwell's operations in Burma was affecting the command structure within SEAC. Ever since

March 1944 Mountbatten had been anxious to see Stilwell transferred from

SEAC to China Theater.41 Observing Mountbatten's problems with his subordinates, Wedemeyer told Marshall that SEAC's commanders in chief resisted

Mountbatten as Supreme Commander. It was notable, added Wedemeyer, that

Stilwell, though often "cantankerous," co-operated promptly as soon as he had

a clear-cut directive from Mountbatten.42 Moreover, when Stilwell had solved

the command problem presented by his having to act as a corps commander

in north Burma under operational control of General Slim, whom he outranked, Stilwell had stipulated that this arrangement would endure only until

his Chinese troops reached Kamaing. (See Chart 1.) At that point he would

insist on being released from Slim's control, to pass directly under Mountbatten, for he then could reasonably anticipate a speedy meeting with Chinese

troops from China and the reassembling of the Chinese Army in India and the

Y-Force into an elite force, the Thirty Divisions, under the Generalissimo, for

service in China. On 20 May Stilwell had given notice to SEAC that it would

soon be time for him to leave Slim's control. Mountbatten therefore thought

40

 (1) Rad New Delhi 472, Wallace to Roosevelt, 28 Jun 44. Item 58, OPD Exec 10. (2)

Wallace-Alsop Testimony, cited n. 37(2). 41

 (1) See p. 119, above. (2) Rad 155, F.M.D. [Field Marshal Dill], JSM to Mountbatten, 10

Mar 44; Rad SAC 1022. Mountbatten to COS and JSM, 13 Mar 44. Item 66, OPD Exec 10. 42

 Ltr, Wedemeyer to Marshall, 9 Jul 44. Item 57, OPD Exec 10.
378 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

it opportune to ask the British Chiefs of Staff to take up with the Joint Chiefs

of Staff the appointment of an officer to fill Stilwell's place in SEAC.43

Currently, Mountbatten was moving toward a complete rearrangement of

the higher officers in SEAC. From the time of his arrival in the Far East, he

had had trouble with his three commanders in chief. When the Imphal crisis

arose, Mountbatten was dissatisfied with Gen. Sir George Giffard's conduct

of operations, and when later the Supreme Allied Commander found Giffard

taking what Mountbatten considered a highly negative approach toward an aggressive conduct of operations he resolved to ask for Giffard's relief. Mountbatten's relations with Admiral Somerville had been equally difficult. Somerville had refused to treat him as a Supreme Commander and in Mountbatten's

opinion tried to make of him simply the chairman of a commanders-in-chief

committee. As for the RAF commander, Air Chief Marshal Peirse, Mountbatten was not seeking his relief because he did not wish to change all of his

principal subordinates simultaneously.44

In June 1944 General Marshall was in London. There were meetings of the

Combined Chiefs of Staff and after one of them General Brooke, Chief of the

Imperial General Staff, took Marshall aside, thanked him for his many kindnesses to Field Marshal Dill, who was very sick, then startled Marshall by

saying that Stilwell would have to be recalled because he did not get along

with Mountbatten's commanders in chief or the British in Burma.

General Marshall found this difficult to understand, and asked Brooke why

the only aggressive and successful commander in chief Mountbatten had

should be singled out for recall. Brooke replied that the British planned to relieve Giffard, Somerville, and Peirse, which to Marshall put a different light

on the situation. On Marshall's return to the United States the Joint Chiefs of

Staff began to study the question of sending Stilwell up to China Theater.45

No new CCS directives to SEAC resulted from those June meetings of the

Combined Chiefs of Staff. The CCS were satisfied that their current policy in

regard to Burma operations was clearly understood. The main object of current

operations was to send the maximum flow of supplies over the Hump. The

Kohima-Imphal road had to be cleared, Myitkyina taken, and a defensive position held in the Mogaung-Myitkyina area. There were no comments about

any exploitation of possible victory at Imphal by the Fourteenth Army.46

Advised by Marshall that the CCS talks at London had discussed the problems of obtaining the maximum flow of supplies to China, Stilwell commented

that such would not be realized by a defensive attitude at Myitkyina or anywhere else and that it would not be realized without bringing in most of it on

the ground. He thought it was too bad the Burma campaign had not been

43

 Mountbatten Report, Pt. B, pars. 171, 172. 44

 Ltr, Mountbatten to Dill, 26 Jun 44. Item 57, OPD Exec 10. 45

 Interv with Marshall, 6 Jul 49. 46

 CM-OUT 53610, 20 Jun 44. Case 404, OPD 381, A47-30.
FACING THE COMMAND PROBLEM 379

launched in October 1943, for he believed in that case the Allies would now

hold north Burma, and by implication a new line of communications to

China.47

Stilwell Nominated for Command

The situation within China Theater in June 1944 was such that the President was now ready to go beyond the positions he had taken in March and

April and put the full weight of his support behind Stilwell, accepting the

Joint Chiefs' analysis of the state of affairs in China and their suggestions for a

drastic remedy. Contributing to the choice of Stilwell rather than Chennault

was the Army Chief of Staffs conclusion that Chennault's air offensive and the

massive ATC structure erected to support it had been a waste of the nation's

resources. Marshall thought that "it was not yielding any dividends in China,"

and was hobbling the war in Europe. The Allies had been handicapped in exploiting the Rome break-through in June 1944 because transport aircraft

and crews were in India to support Chennault in his attempt to stop eight

Japanese divisions by tactical air.48

Explicitly facing the issues created by Mountbatten's proposal that Stilwell

be transferred to China and the Wallace suggestion that Stilwell be recalled,

Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy of OPD recommended to Marshall on 30 June

1944 that as "the most effective answer" Stilwell be promoted from lieutenant general to general. In supporting his suggestion, Handy presented an

eloquent eulogy of Stilwell's North Burma Campaign.

Handy wrote that no general of modern times had faced and overcome the

obstacles that Stilwell had. "Against the initial apathy on the part of both our

Allies, General Stilwell has welded an effective Chinese Army in Burma."

Chinese tactics under his command had been superb, and the campaign for

Myitkyina a masterpiece. "Beset by a terrific struggle with the jungle, the monsoons, the Japanese, logistics, to say nothing of mite typhus complications, he

has staged a campaign that history will call brilliant."

 49

After studying Handy's memorandum, Marshall on 1 July placed the matter before Stilwell for his comments, in a radio embodying many of Handy's

phrases. Saying that he had waited until Stilwell had consolidated the Mogaung-Myitkyina area before raising the matter, the Army Chief of Staff told

Stilwell that the British were pressing for a command rearrangement, and that,

of far greater importance to Marshall, things were steadily getting worse in

China. He asked Stilwell for a candid opinion on whether the latter thought

he could do some good by taking an active part in operations in central China.

Marshall remarked that "the pressure" was on to get more tonnage over the 47

 Rad CHC 1215, Stilwell to Marshall, 22 Jun 44. SNF 131. 48

 (1) Quotation from Interv cited n. 45. (2) See General Okamura's comments, p. 316, above, and Japanese Officers' Comments, Incl 3. 49

 Memo, Handy for Marshall, 30 Jun 44. Item 869, Msg Bk 20, OPD Exec 9.
380 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Hump to Chennault, "an immense effort in transportation" that possibly

would be completely wasted. He asked what Stilwell would think of transferring his principal efforts to "the rehabilitation and in effect the direction of the

leadership of the Chinese forces in China proper," with Sultan commanding in

Burma.50

Stilwell's reply began by surveying the India-Burma side of his several positions. He assured Marshall that his present position as acting Deputy Supreme

Allied Commander need not stand in the way of his going to China Theater.

There was need for a vigorous deputy to Mountbatten, but he doubted that

anyone would be allowed to go about SEAC as a trouble shooter for no one

would be permitted to dismiss any of SEAC's general officers, even for gross

incompetence.

Then Stilwell turned to the China problem, and in his discussion revealed

no enthusiasm for the role of field commander of the Chinese forces. After

explaining for Marshall some of the personnel problems involved in finding

someone to replace him as commander of the Chinese Army in India, Stilwell

offered his comments on the situation in China Theater:

Second, the China situation. If I go to China, I could detail Sultan to take over this command during my absence and I believe the Chinese would offer no objection. But if Sultan

is made deputy we have the same old situation as soon as he takes command here. Merrill

could, but he is physically out of the picture. . . . It is a difficult matter to find a man to

command US, British, and Chinese units acceptably. Supposing a steady, seasoned, senior

man can be found for this job, and I go to China. The G-Mo is scared, but he is still driving

from the back seat, both on the Salween and Hunan. If the President were to send him a

very stiff message, emphasizing our investment and interest in China, and also the serious

pass to which China has come due to neglect of the Army, and insisting that desperate cases

require desperate remedies, the G-Mo might be forced to give me a command job. I believe

the Chinese Army would accept me. Ho Ying-chin would have to step out as Chief of Staff,

or if he kept the title, give up the power. Without complete authority, over the Army, I

would not attempt the job. Even with complete authority, the damage done is so tremendous

that I can see only one chance to repair it. This is to stage a counter-offensive from Shansi,

and attacking through Loyang toward Chengchow and Hankow. There are units in West

Hupeh that could help. The Communists should also participate in Shansi, but unless the

G-Mo makes an agreement with them, they won't. Two years ago they offered to fight with

me.51 They might listen now. Time and space factors are against us, even if we had good will

and full cooperation. You can readily imagine what is involved in organizing and moving such

a scattered and loose-jointed force but outside of this one shot I see no chance to save the

situation. The units on the Salween should not be withdrawn and cannot be withdrawn in

time. The garrison on Indo-China border must stay there, or Kunming is open to attack. I

refrain from any comments about the efficacy of air power because you have heard them

before. The case is really desperate. The harvest of neglect and mismanagement is now being

reaped and without very radical and very quickly applied remedies, we will be set back a

long way. These matters must be put before the G-Mo in the strongest terms or he will

continue to muddle along and scream for help without doing any more than he is doing

now which is nothing. To sum up, there is still a faint chance to salvage something in China

50

 Rad WAR 59012, Marshall to Stilwell, 1 Jul 44. Item 2674, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. 51

 The authors could find no trace of the offer to which Stilwell refers here.
FACING THE COMMAND PROBLEM 381

but action must be quick and radical and the G-Mo must give one commander full powers.

If the President can get this idea across, we can at least try hoping that a weak and disjointed

effort, by dint of numbers and determination, might stop the Japs before they finish breaking up all resistance. The chances are definitely not good, but I can see no other solution at

the moment.52

Satisfied with Stilwell's answer, Marshall accepted Handy's suggestion that

Stilwell's promotion be recommended and fitted into the solution to China's

problem that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were about to propose to the President.

In drafting their proposal, the Joint Chiefs were candid almost to bluntness in

reminding the President of their own long-held views on China, which hitherto he had disregarded. As Marshall remarked later, the JCS placed Chennault's

promises in one column, then pointed out how Chennault had failed on each.

Against them they placed Stilwell's predictions and related the fulfillment of

each.53

4 July 44

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a proposed message to

Chiang Kai Shek are for your consideration.

We are in full agreement that this action is immediately necessary to any chance to save

the situation in China.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY

Admiral, U.S. Navy,

Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief

of the Army and Navy.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF:

The situation in Central China is deteriorating at an alarming rate. If the Japanese continue their advances to the west, Chennault's 14th Air Force will be rendered ineffective, our

very long-range bomber airfields in the Chengtu area will be lost and the collapse of China

must inevitably result. Whether or not there is a possibility of our exerting a favorable influence on the chaotic condition in China is questionable. It is our view, however, that drastic measures should be taken immediately in an effort to prevent disaster to the U.S. effort

in that region.

The Chinese ground forces in China, in their present state of discipline, training and

equipment, and under their present leadership, are impotent. The Japanese forces can, in

effect, move virtually unopposed except by geographical logistic difficulties.

From the beginning of the war, we have insisted on the necessity for building up the

combat efficiency of the Chinese ground forces, as the only method of providing the necessary security for our air bases in China. The pressure on us from the Generalissimo throughout the war has been to increase the tonnage over the Hump for Chennault's air in

particular, with the equipment and supply for the ground forces as incidental only. This

presents the problem of an immense effort in transportation, with a poorly directed and possibly completely wasteful procedure. Chennault's air alone can do little more than slightly

delay the Japanese advances. We have had abundant proof of this in our operations against

the German army.

52

 Rad CHC 1241, Stilwell to Marshall, 3 Jul 44. SNF 131. 53

 (1) Stilwell's Mission to China. (2) Interv cited n. 45.
382 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Our experience against both the Germans and the Japanese in theaters where we have

had immensely superior air power has demonstrated the inability of air forces alone to prevent the movement of trained and determined ground armies. If we have been unable to

stop the movement of German ground armies in Italy with our tremendous air power, there

is little reason to believe that Chennault, with the comparatively small air force which can

be supported in China, can exert a decisive effect on the movement of Japanese ground

forces in China. The more effective his bombing of their shipping and the B-29 operations

against Japan the more determined will be the Japanese thrusts in China.

Under the present leadership and organization of the Chinese armies, it is purely a question of Japanese intent as to how far they will advance into the interior of China. The

serious pass to which China has come is due in some measure to mismanagement and neglect of the Army. Until her every resource, including the divisions at present confronting

the communists, is devoted to the war against the Japanese, there is little hope that she can

continue to operate with any effectiveness until the end of the war.

The time has come, in our opinion, when all the military power and resources remaining

to China must be entrusted to one individual capable of directing that effort in a fruitful way

against the Japanese. There is no one in the Chinese Government or armed forces capable of

coordinating the Chinese military effort in such a way as to meet the Japanese threat. During this war, there has been only one man who has been able to get Chinese forces to fight

against the Japanese in an effective way. That man is General Stilwell.

The British are pressing for a readjustment of command relationships in the Southeast

Asia Command, maintaining that General Stilwell's position as Deputy Supreme Commander and that of the Commander of the Chinese Corps in India are incompatible. The

British would undoubtedly concur in the relief of General Stilwell from his present

assignment.

After full consideration of the situation in China, we recommend:

a. That you dispatch to the Generalissimo the attached message, urging him to place

General Stilwell in command of all Chinese armed forces.

b. That you promote General Stilwell to the temporary grade of General, not only in

recognition of his having conducted a brilliant campaign with a force, which he himself

made, in spite of continued opposition from within and without and tremendous obstacles

of terrain and weather, but in order to give him the necessary prestige for the new position

proposed for him in China.

We are fully aware of the Generalissimo's feeling regarding Stilwell, particularly from a

political point of view, but the fact remains that he has proved his case or contentions on

the field of battle in opposition to the highly negative attitudes of both the British and the

Chinese authorities. Had his advice been followed, it is now apparent that we would have

cleared the Japanese from northeast Burma before the monsoon and opened the way to effective action in China proper. Had his advice been followed the Chinese ground forces

east of the Hump would have been far better equipped and prepared to resist or at least delay the Japanese advances.

c. That in case Stilwell goes to China, we propose the following arrangements in the

Southeast Asia Command to the British Chief of Staff:

(1) Sultan to command the Chinese Corps in Burma under the general direction of

Stilwell.

(2) Wheeler, now senior administrative officer on Mountbatten's staff, to succeed Stil- well as Deputy to Mountbatten.54

The President accepted the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

54

 (1) Item 57, OPD Exec 10. (2) For details of use of superior air power in Italy, see Sidney

T. Mathews, The Drive on Rome, a volume in preparation for this series.
FACING THE COMMAND PROBLEM 383

and the message which they had prepared for his signature was quickly sent

to General Ferris for personal presentation to the Generalissimo. To Stilwell at

his jungle headquarters, Marshall sent extracts of the key passages from the

President's radio to the Generalissimo so that Stilwell would know what was

to come, then read him a homily on why, in Marshall's opinion, the President's

support, and that of the Generalissimo, had been so long withheld: ". . . the

difficulty has been the offense you have given, usually in small affairs, both to

the Generalissimo and to the President." At Cairo, Marshall had cautioned

Stilwell that the President disliked his frequent loosing of barbed shafts at the

Chinese leader. Now, Marshall warned him again that he must do all in his

power to avoid offending the Generalissimo. Marshall also remarked that had

Stilwell personally, or some member of his staff, devoted more attention to

establishing good relations with the President, Mr. Roosevelt's support would

have been forthcoming long before.55 Stilwell replied:

Your messages and instructions are unmistakably plain. If this new assignment materializes, I will tackle it to the best of my ability. I am keenly aware of the honor of the President's confidence and of yours, and I pledge my word to him and to you that I will "consistently and continuously avoid unnecessary irritations" and get on with the war. I fully

realize that I will have to justify that confidence, and I find it even in prospect a heavy load

for a country boy.56

The American attempt to persuade the Generalissimo to accept Stilwell as

his field commander began with a radio sent by the President on 6 July 1944.

As the President had directed in May 1944, after hearing that the Chinese

were rephrasing his messages to the Generalissimo to make them read more

agreeably to that dignitary, General Ferris, the senior American officer in

Chungking, delivered the message in person:

The extremely serious situation which results from Japanese advances in Central China,

which threaten not only your Government but all that the U.S. Army has been building up

in China, leads me to the conclusion that drastic measures must be taken immediately if the

situation is to be saved. The critical situation which now exists, in my opinion calls for the

delegation to one individual of the power to coordinate all the Allied military resources in

China, including the Communist forces.

I think I am fully aware of your feelings regarding General Stilwell, nevertheless I think

he has now clearly demonstrated his farsighted judgment, his skill in organization and training and, above all, in fighting your Chinese forces. I know of no other man who has the

ability, the force, and the determination to offset the disaster which now threatens China

and our over-all plans for the conquest of Japan. I am promoting Stilwell to the rank of full

general and I recommend for your most urgent consideration that you recall him from

Burma and place him directly under you in command of all Chinese and American forces,

and that you charge him with the full responsibility and authority for the coordination and

direction of the operations required to stem the tide of the enemy's advances. I feel that the case of China is so desperate that if radical and properly applied remedies are not immediately effected, our common cause will suffer a disastrous set-back.

55

 (1) See Ch. II, above. (2) CM-OUT 61514, Marshall to Stilwell, 7 Jul 44. 56

 CM-IN 7045, Stilwell to Marshall, 9 Jul 44.
384 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

I sincerely trust that you will not be offended at the frankness of my statements and I

assure you that there is no intent on my part to dictate to you in matters concerning China;

however, the future of all Asia is at stake along with the tremendous effort which America

has expended in that region. Therefore I have reason for a profound interest in the matter.

Please have in mind that it has been clearly demonstrated in Italy, in France, and in the

Pacific that air power alone cannot stop a determined enemy.

Matter of fact, the Germans have successfully conducted defensive actions and launched

determined counter-attacks though overwhelmingly outnumbered in the air.

Should you agree to giving Stilwell such assignment as I now propose, I would recommend that General Sultan, a very fine officer who is now his deputy, be placed in command

of the Chinese-American force in Burma, but under Stilwell's direction.57

As a concrete expression of the United States gratitude for the victories in

north Burma, as a sign of the special trust and confidence which the President

now reposed in him, and to give him a rank suitable for the great responsibilities which, it was confidently expected, would soon be his, Stilwell was promoted to full general on 1 August 1944.58

 He then shared the rank with only

Generals Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower, and Arnold.

The Generalissimo Agrees "in Principle"

After two years during which the United States for a variety of reasons had

been content to let Stilwell's position in China Theater be nebulous and illdefined, it was now moving to undo the decision of the ARCADIA Conference

of December 1941 and make Stilwell in effect responsible for the conduct of

operations against the Japanese in China Theater. One may doubt that this

development was pleasing to the Generalissimo. Stilwell's aggressiveness was

well known. If Stilwell took command, he would surely try to devote more of

the military resources of Nationalist China to the east China campaign. The

current Japanese offensive had been aimed at the east China airfields rather

than at the Generalissimo's strongholds of Kunming and Chungking, and the

Generalissimo's national troops, as distinguished from the troops of the war

area commanders, had taken no part in the east China fighting.59 If Stilwell as

field commander directed the Generalissimo's own troops against the Japanese

the enemy might well turn his attention to Chiang himself. Moreover, moving

major elements of Nationalist forces to east China would affect the Generalissimo's position in Chinese politics in relation not merely to the Communists

but also to the several war area commanders.

There may well have been a personal factor. Ever since 1937 propaganda

57

 (1) Received in Chungking as a radio, WAR 6080, Roosevelt to Generalissimo, 6 July 1944, this message was presented to the latter as Memorandum 214, Stilwell for the Generalissimo, on 6 July 1944. Item 2676, OKLAHOMA File, JWS Personal File. (2) See Ch. VIII, above. 58

 WD SO 109, 9 Aug 44, par. 1. Stilwell's date of rank in the Army of the United States was 1 August 1944. 59

 On 4 December 1944, the Generalissimo stated that national troops had taken no part in the east China fighting. Min, 12th Mtg, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo, 4 Dec 44. Bk 1, General- issimo Minutes, 1-69, 13 Nov 44-15 Jul 45, Job T49-20 CBI.
FACING THE COMMAND PROBLEM 385

had hailed the Generalissimo as a military genius who had kept the Japanese

at bay, who had outfought and outmaneuvered them and needed only modern

weapons to drive them into the sea. Now that eight Japanese divisions were

racing through east China, the United States was asking the Generalissimo to

drop his military role and let Stilwell, a foreigner whom he remembered as a

colonel riding perched on top of a boxcar with the humble Chinese soldiery—

the same Stilwell who called him "Peanut" and gibed at him as an incompetent

dilettante—take command under the Generalissimo of both the Generalissimo's

forces and those of his deadly enemies, the Communists.

Later events suggest that the Generalissimo resolved that Stilwell should

on no account hold command in China Theater, and that he rallied all his

diplomatic resources to the task of avoiding any such outcome of the crisis. At

first glance, a diplomatic struggle between China and the United States in 1944

would have seemed a most unequal one. The Generalissimo wanted lend-lease,

credits, and air support, and the United States was the only likely source. The

longer China was isolated, the more desperate would be her need for help. If

the United States was to insist on a quid pro quo, how could China refuse?

But the Generalissimo had advantages and allies of the greatest usefulness:

First, during 1944 the Generalissimo and T. V. Soong, who had quarreled in

the fall of 1943, had been reconciled. Soong's assistance brought his great

knowledge of the U.S. scene and his influential connections to the Generalissimo's side. Second, the Americans were not united among themselves. Harry

Hopkins, though no longer wielding the power he once did, was an intimate

friend of Soong's and had long opposed Stilwell.60 Lieutenant Alsop, of Chennault's staff, was Soong's adviser.61

 And third, the President was preoccupied

with many things and gave the China Theater command question only a fraction of his attention, whereas for the Generalissimo it was a matter that

received the fullest exercise of his diplomatic talents.

After weighing the President's message, the Generalissimo adopted a tactic

that he had used before, most notably in the winter of 1941-42 when the

American Military Mission to China was trying to integrate the American

Volunteer Group into the Tenth Air Force. The Generalissimo on 8 July agreed

in principle but found a major obstacle to carrying out the President's

suggestion at once:

Chungking

July 8, 1944.

My dear Mr. President:

I have much pleasure in acknowledging receipt of your telegram which came on July 7,

conveying to me your deep concern over the war situation in China and your effective suggestion to meet it. 60

 (1) Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. X. (2) For the Soong-Hopkins relationship, see Books

VII and IX, Hopkins Papers. 61

 In the Washington Post, July 25, 1951, Alsop stated: "[John P.] Davies was the political

adviser of Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell; I was the adviser of Dr. T. V. Soong and Maj. Gen. C. L.

Chennault."
386 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

While I fully agree with the principle of your suggestion that directly under me General Stilwell be given the command of all Chinese Army and American troops in this theater

of war, I like to call your attention to the fact that Chinese troops and their internal political

conditions are not as simple as those in other countries. Furthermore, they're not as easily

directed as the limited number of Chinese troops who are now fighting in north Burma.

Therefore, if this suggestion were carried out in haste it would not only fail to help the

present war situation here but would also arouse misunderstanding and confusion which

would be detrimental to Sino-American cooperation. This is the real fact of the situation

and in expressing my views on your exacting and sincere suggestion, I have not tried to use

any misleading or evasive language. Hence, I feel that there must be a preparatory period in

order to enable General Stilwell to have absolute command of the Chinese troops without

any hindrance. In this way I shall not disappoint you in your expectation.

I very much hope that you will be able to despatch an influential personal representative

who enjoys your complete confidence, is given with full power and has a far-sighted political

vision and ability, to constantly collaborate with me and he may also adjust the relations between me and General Stilwell so as to enhance the cooperation between China and America. You will appreciate the fact that military cooperation in its absolute sense must be built

on the foundation of political cooperation.

Our people have an unwavering faith in your friendship and sincerity towards China. I

had already explained in detail to Vice President Wallace on this subject and I trust he will

transmit my views to you.

I shall much appreciate it if you will discuss directly with Dr. Kung on any important

question of this nature whenever it should arise in the future. If you have any telegram for

me you can give it to him for transmittal.

With my warmest personal regards.

Yours truly, CHIANG KAI-SHEK 62

When the Generalissimo's answer came to Washington, the President was

preparing to visit General MacArthur and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz at

Honolulu, there to discuss major questions of Pacific strategy. The President

was apparently pleased with the Generalissimo's answer for he wrote to Admiral Leahy on 13 July: "Can you get this to the Joint Staff before we leave?

There is a good deal in what the Generalissimo says." OPD drafted an answer

for the President urging speed, but having been impressed by the Generalissimo's views, the President greatly modified it.

The President was happy to note that the Generalissimo agreed in principle. He urged the Chinese leader to have in mind the importance of speed

and remarked that "some calculated political risks appear justified when dangers in the overall military situation are so serious and immediately threatening." Roosevelt then said he accepted the Generalissimo's suggestion about

an American political representative in Chungking. The right man had to

be chosen for the job, the difficulties had to be explored, and "in the meantime I again urge you to take all steps to pave the way for General Stilwell's

assumption of command at the earliest possible moment."

 63

62

 Item 60, OPD Exec 10. 63

 (1) Memo, Roosevelt for Leahy, 13 Jul 44. Item 59, OPD Exec 10. (2) Rad WH 25, Roose- velt to Generalissimo, 13 Jul 44, presented as Memo 215, Ferris for Generalissimo, 15 Jul 44. Item 2677a, OKLAHOMA File, JWS Personal File.
FACING THE COMMAND PROBLEM 387

Thus in the President's answer Stilwell's assumption of command became

second to the careful choice of a political representative. Mr. Roosevelt then

departed Washington for a prolonged trip through the Pacific.

The Generalissimo's preparatory period, of unspecified length, would presumably be inaugurated with the arrival in China of a Presidential representative previously agreed on as satisfactory to both powers. The arrival of the proposed emissary, and the solution of the command question, were now postponed many weeks while the President visited San Francisco, Alaska, and

Hawaii. The Generalissimo had won the first skirmish.

The Ledo Road Project Reduced

In the four-week interim during which the command question awaited the

President's convenience, the carrying capacity of the great Ledo Road project

was finally set by the War Department at a point which revealed that it was

losing importance. General Pick was building the road as a two-way, graveled

highway. Its capacity would depend on whether it was brought to two-way, allweather standard all the way to China and whether enough men, vehicles, and

operating facilities were assigned to it to permit fullest exploitation of its

capacity. The QUADRANT Conference (Quebec, August 1943) had directed that

it be able to transport 30,000 tons a month by January 1945, with an ultimate

capacity of 96,000 tons a month.

As early as March 1944, the Asiatic Section of OPD had proposed that the

building of the road stop at Myitkyina and that traffic from there simply use

the existing road from Myitkyina to China after it had been brought to

one-way, all-weather condition with a gravel surface.64 The proposal was

shelved for the time being, but in July, with an American landing in the

Philippines an ever more likely possibility, Brig. Gen. Patrick H. Tansey, Chief,

Logistics Group, OPD, revived it, for he believed that by setting operation of

the Ledo Road at a lower level than that originally intended, 35,000 men would

be made available for use in the Philippines.

A variety of other arguments presented themselves to General Tansey. He

believed that the trucks operating on the Ledo Road would lower by some

26,000 tons the amount of gasoline and lubricants otherwise available to the air

force in China, that too many dry stores would be transported, that a great

amount of shipping space would be wasted, all of which could be avoided if

first priority went to maintaining and increasing air deliveries, building three

pipelines to China, and simply improving the existing road from Myitkyina to

Bhamo to permit movement of trucks and artillery.65

64

 (1) See Ch. I, above. (2) Memo, Chief, Asiatic Sec, Theater Gp, OPD, for Chief, Logistics

Gp, OPD, 25 Mar 44, sub: Opn Plan, Burma-Myitkyina-Kunming Road, Project TIG-IC. ABC

384 Burma (8-25-42) Sec 7, A48-224. 65

 Memo, Tansey for Handy, 16 Jul 44, sub: Projects TIG-IA and TIG-IC, Ledo Road—Construction and Opn Phases. ABC 384 Burma (8-25-42) Sec 7, A48-224.
388 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

The AAF informally approved Tansey's suggestion on the ground that the

principal advantage of the Ledo Road was that it permitted re-equipping the

Chinese Army, which in the light of current plans could not be done in time

for the Chinese to co-operate with the U.S. forces in the Pacific.66

These recommendations were strongly opposed by Army Service Forces.

Consistent with the support for the Ledo Road always expressed by General

Somervell, Maj. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, then Acting Chief of Staff, ASF, and Col.

Carter B. Magruder, Acting Deputy Director, Plans and Operations, ASF,

denied that the effort involved in bringing the road to two-way, all-weather

standard from Ledo to Kunming was out of step with Pacific strategy or would

waste American resources.

ASF's planners pointed out that strong Japanese resistance in the Pacific

could throw off the whole timetable of Pacific operations. They believed that

Japanese resistance on Saipan, where the Americans had landed on 15 June

1944, had already delayed contemplated operations by a month. If the American cross-Pacific advance was to be seriously delayed at any point, then the best

possible line of communications to China might be of urgent importance and

could not be improvised on the spur of the moment. Only 45,000 tons of

equipment remained to be shipped to India, they argued, while maintenance

personnel would be needed to keep even a passable trail from Myitkyina east.67

General Lutes doubted that any great savings in manpower would follow

from limiting the capacity of the road beyond Myitkyina to one-way traffic. He

believed that many of the men needed to build and operate the road at two-way

standard beyond Myitkyina would be required to protect and operate the pipeline even though the road was limited in capacity. There were already enough

troops allocated to CBI Theater, Lutes thought, to complete the road on the

basis originally contemplated.68

OPD did not adopt ASF's point of view but recommended to General

Marshall that the Ledo Road be strictly limited. Marshall's advisers told him

that if the Ledo Road was opened to one-way traffic enough equipment to meet

the minimum needs of the U.S.-sponsored Chinese divisions could be

delivered. OPD, though relaying ASF's fear that the Pacific operations timetable was too optimistic, did not share that view. It argued that by the end of

1945, which was the earliest date given for the completion of the road to a twoway standard, the United States would have either occupied Formosa or

bypassed it and be operating well beyond, in either case thus being free of any

great dependence on operations from Chinese bases.69

66

 Memo, Col Donald W. Benner, Chief, Air Services Div, Office Asst Chief of Air Stf, Matériel and Services, for Tansey, 25 Jul 44, sub: Projects TIG-IA and TIG-IC, Ledo Road—Construction

and Opn Phases. ABC 384 Burma (8-25-42) Sec 7, A48-224. 67

 Memo, Somervell (sgd by Magruder) for ACofS, OPD, 24 Jul 44. ABC 384 Burma (8-25-42) Sec 7, A48-224. 68

 Memo, Actg CofS, ASF, for ACofS, OPD, 29 Jun 44. ABC 384 Burma (8-25-42) Sec 7, A48-224. 69

 Memo, Handy for Marshall, 14 Aug 44. ABC 384 Burma (8-25-42) Sec 7, A48-224.
FACING THE COMMAND PROBLEM 389

Marshall approved the OPD study, and CBI Theater was told that it would

receive no increase in personnel to build the road. Therefore, the radio went on,

development of land communications to China should be limited to building

a two-way, all-weather gravel road to Myitkyina and opening the existing trail

from Myitkyina to China. Beyond Myitkyina it was thought desirable to

improve the one-way, dry-weather trail so far as practicable with minimum

essential permanent bridge construction and transport necessary to install and

maintain one 6-inch and two 4-inch pipelines to China and to deliver trucks

and artillery. The War Department would supply whatever CBI Theater lacked

in resources to meet these goals.70 Thus the War Department, to conserve men

for Pacific operations, sharply limited the tonnage that the Ledo Road would

ultimately deliver to China.

Within Burma, however, the Ledo Road during 1944, at the very beginning

of the year supporting the advance of the Chinese Army in India, carried

hundreds of thousands of tons, the bulk of them in vehicles belonging to

tactical and service units. In 1944 Advance Section received at Ledo 497,590

tons, and forwarded only 224,804 tons, the difference being carried by organizational vehicles. Of the 224,804 tons forwarded by Advance Section, about half

went by road and half by air, so that the Ledo Road was the means of

transporting about 75 percent of the supply tonnage for the North Burma

Campaign.71 (Chart 7)

Slow Progress Across the Salween

Whatever the War Department in Washington might contemplate in the

way of any future development of the Ledo Road, that development necessarily waited on driving the Japanese from north Burma. The Generalissimo's

resolution to continue his part in the attempt might not hold against a crisis in

east China. It was perhaps significant that he was not sending any replacements

to keep the Y-Force up to strength. As for Stilwell, from May to August, he

did not attempt to take any part in the Salween campaign, for as will be

recalled, he had no command powers over any Chinese troops in China; along

the Salween front Gen. Wei Li-huang might well resent any guidance from

Stilwell. But Stilwell could not escape the consequences of what happened on

the Salween or in east China, for events in those areas would be the background

to President Roosevelt's attempt to put Stilwell in command of the Chinese

Army.

After the Chinese fell back from Lung-ling in late June, XX Group Army

on the north and XI Group Armv on the south were faced by one minor and

two major strongpoints. (See Map 19.) Northernmost of these was the old

70

 CM-OUT 85479, OPD to Stilwell 23 Aug 44. 71

 Rpt, Gen Pick, CG, Advance Sec USF IBT, to Gen Wheeler, CG, USF IBT, 9 Aug 45; sub: Rpt on Stilwell Road, pp. 97-102. OCMH.
390 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

CHART 7—TONNAGE FORWARDED BY USAF SOS CBI ADVANCE

SECTION TO NORTH BURMA: JANUARY 1944-MAY 1945

walled city of Teng-chung, with some 20,000 inhabitants. The configuration

of the land would permit building a road from China to Myitkyina via Tengchung, and the Burma Road Engineers had such plans prepared. In the center

of the Salween front, Japanese artillery on Sung Shan, or "Pine Mountain,"

commanded the Burma Road's descent into the Salween gorge. In their initial

drive on Lung-ling the Chinese had bypassed Sung Shan and relied on air

supply. Failure to take Lung-ling had left a considerable Chinese force in an

uncomfortable position on the Japanese side of Sung Shan. If the Japanese

could be driven off Sung Shan, supplies could roll right down the Burma

Road. Twenty-five miles southeast of Lung-ling was Ping-ka, the obscure valley

where cholera lay in wait, and where a Chinese regiment and a Japanese battalion waited out the war in endless small bickerings. Ping-ka was obscure, but

the 56th Division had far fewer battalions than General Wei had regiments and

had committed one of these few to Ping-ka.

Since General Wei had left a containing force below Sung Shan while he

tried to take Lung-ling, there had been an artillery duel between the Japanese

guns on Sung Shan and the Chinese since early in the campaign, while the

Chinese had launched unsuccessful attacks in regimental strength. As June 1944

ended, this situation continued while Dorn and Wei considered the problems

presented by the setback at Lung-ling. To the north, at Teng-chung, a new
FACING THE COMMAND PROBLEM 391

phase in the campaign was clearly opening, for the Chinese patrols were closing

the exits from Teng-chung valley as XX Group Army deployed before the wall

of that strong city.72

The outer defenses of Teng-chung were pillboxes covering every avenue of

approach, supported and covered by the 6,500-foot-high, fortified mountain

peak of Lai-feng Shan, "The Place Where the Birds Come." Here were 600 or

more Japanese with most of the garrison's artillery. Teng-chung itself was

girdled by a massive wall of earth that in some places was forty feet high and

sixty feet thick at the base, faced throughout with great slabs of stone. Chinese

necromancers had carefully laid out the wall in a great square to cut the cardinal

points of the compass. Each side had a gate, and each gate now had a Japanese

command post, while Japanese machine guns and rifles swept the approaches

to the wall, its face, and its parapets. Within the city were about 2,000 Japanese.

In all, Colonel Kurashige, who had defended the Kaoli-kung mountains, had

about 1,850 Japanese, a heavily reinforced battalion combat team built around

the 2/148. Kurashige's orders were to hold Teng-chung until the Chinese threat

to Lung-ling passed.73

The XX Group Army's five divisions fanned out around Teng-chung by

occupying the heights. With them were the 40th, 47th, and 48th Portable

Surgical Hospitals of the U.S. Army. The attack began on 26 June when B-25's

of the 341st Bomb Group flew from Yun-nan-i in an attempt to breach the wall.

This and subsequent attempts at medium-level bombing, though wreaking

severe damage on the residential area—after a bombing on 14 July fires could

be seen for thirty-five miles—merely piled rubble around the Japanese positions

in Teng-chung. Secure in their dugouts, the Japanese were unshaken, and the

airmen turned to skip bombing, trying to hurl their bombs directly against the

face of the wall.74

The Chinese infantry attack began on 2 July, when the 116th Division

moved against the northwest side of the Japanese defenses. Making the assault

in a torrential monsoon downpour, the 348th Infantry, 116th Division, took

seven pillboxes on a height four and a half miles northwest of the city. From

here the 348th Regiment looked down on the Japanese positions between it

and the city. By the end of the first week of July the five Chinese divisions had

Teng-chung encircled. Several days later, when a Chinese patrol from XX

Group Army made contact with scouts from XI Group Army at the Man-lao

Bridge, Teng-chung was again cut off from the Japanese at Lung-ling. Off to

the northwest, Chinese guerrillas working for Y-Force occupied a village

72

 (1) See Ch. IX, above. (2) Y-FOS Journal. 73

 Japanese Study 93. 74

 Apart from using the Y-FOS Journal, Y-FOS 1944 Historical Report, and Japanese Study 93, this portion of the Salween campaign is based on the following sources: (1) War Dept Combat

Film 26, Signal Corps Film Library, Washington. (2) Stodter Report. (3) Hist Rpt, Hq 69th

Composite Wing, 27th Tr Carrier Sq, and 19th Ln Sq, Fourteenth AF. USAF Hist Div. (4) SOS in CBI, App. I, History of Burma Road Engineers.
392 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

CHINESE INFANTRYMEN REST ON LAI-FENG SHAN after an attack on

Japanese dugouts.

twenty-six miles from Teng-chung and only the same small distance from

Kachin tribesmen, fighting for Stilwell, who had occupied Fort Harrison

(Sadon) in Burma.

A week of perfect weather in mid-July permitted XX Group Army to seize

an airstrip southwest of Teng-chung, to restore its supplies by air delivery, and

to move its lines on the southeast up to easy pack howitzer range of the walls.

Here the advance was slowed by fire from Colonel Kurashige's howitzers atop

Lai-feng Shan. The Chinese turned to reconnoiter the mountain more carefully

and discovered the Japanese had sited their defenses on the slopes facing

Teng-chung. The reverse side had much defiladed ground and no entrenchments.

Since Gen. Huo Kwei-chang of XX Group Army had the bulk of his

strength on the high ground to the south of Teng-chung valley, he found it

comparatively easy to mass three divisions against the weak side of Teng-chung,

while one more division was to get a foothold in the city itself. Then the rain

closed in again and operations had to await clearing weather. In a week the

storms lifted, and at noon of 26 July the first of four waves of P-40's and

B-25's hit the northeast wall of Teng-chung and the summit of Lai-feng Shan.

The Chinese attack that followed revealed that previous experiences with
FACING THE COMMAND PROBLEM 393

THE WALLED CITY OF TENG-CHUNG after an air attack that breached the

wall (arrow).

Japanese positions had not been wasted. The Chinese infantry moved off

quickly, on time, and as whole regiments rather than squads committed piecemeal. Mortar and artillery fire was brought down speedily on suspected Japanese

positions, and the infantry took full advantage of it by advancing again the

minute it lifted. Having taken one pillbox, the Chinese infantry kept right on

going rather than stopping to loot and rest. At nightfall they were on top of

the mountain and had taken a fortified temple on the summit. After mopping

up the next day, the Chinese tallied about 400 Japanese dead. They themselves

had lost 1,200. Nevertheless, the speedy capture of Lai-feng Shan was a brilliant

feat of arms and dramatic evidence of the capabilities of Chinese troops when

they applied proper tactics.

The simultaneous attack on the southeast wall of Teng-chung did not carry

across the massive wall, but the Chinese had a firm foothold in the scraggly

collection of mud huts just outside the wall which an ancient Greek, a Roman,

or a medieval townsman would recognize at once as the sort of suburb so many

of his cities had. The Japanese fought stubbornly in defense of these tenements,

but making bold use of their lend-lease 37-mm. antitank guns the Chinese

knocked down one hut after another at point-blank range. Casualties mounted

in this bitter infighting; American medical aid was of great utility. The commander of the 130th Division, who had seen considerable action against the
394 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Japanese, remarked that at Teng-chung his men seemed to fight harder because

they knew they would have good medical attention if they were wounded.

Configuration of the ground suggested the southeast as the most logical

avenue of approach and the principal Chinese effort was now directed there.

On 2 August twelve B-25's breached the southeast wall in five places. Direct

hits hammered out a gap fifteen feet wide, but the displaced earth and rubble

were still a strong barrier and the Japanese did their best to mend the breach

and cover it with machine gun fire. The Chinese needed something more and

this was supplied by five waves of P-40's and P-38's which strafed the wall at

twenty-minute intervals. This permitted the Chinese to place their scaling

ladders against the wall. By this means, one company from the 107th and 348th

Infantry Regiments reached the top of the wall just east of the south corner at

1500 hours on 3 August. The Japanese strove to drive them out but the Chinese

clung to their advantage, and one lone platoon held fast all during the night.

Next morning, Chinese reinforcements moved through the breaches, entered

Teng-chung, and took a pillbox inside the city. Barring an attempt at rescue by

other elements of the 56th Division, or a change of heart by the Chinese, the

capture of Teng-chung was inevitable. The important question was, as General

Huo's men crossed the walls on 4 August, how long would it take to capture

Teng-chung?

The Battle for Sung Shan

Since the Chinese attempt to cut the center out of the Japanese position on

the Salween by taking Lung-ling had failed, the attention of the Chinese commanders had shifted from Lung-ling to Sung Shan.75

 The hill mass of Sung

Shan dominated the area where the Burma Road crosses the Salween and so

barred the direct approach from China down the Burma Road. The Chinese had

invested it with a containing force in their initial drive on Lung-ling. That drive

had been supplied by air, and now that the Chinese were stalled between

Lung-ling and Sung Shan, air supply was not too adequate, and clearing the

Japanese from Sung Shan appeared essential.

Sung Shan (the name Pine Mountain applies to its highest peak) is an

intricate hill-mass rising to 3,000 feet above the Salween gorge. It is roughly

triangular in shape. The Burma Road, in climbing out of the Salween gorge,

runs along the northeast side of the triangle, angles sharply round its northern

tip, then runs back down along the northwest side of the triangle. In all, thirty75

 In addition to the Y-FOS Journal, Y-FOS 1944 Historical Report, Japanese Study 93, and

Japanese Officers' Comments, sources consulted for this section are: (1) Rpt, Col Carlos G. Spaht, CO, U.S. Ln Gp, 8th Army, to Dorn, 29 Jul 44. AG (Y-FOS) 319.1. (2) Interv with Spaht, Baton Rouge, La., 1 Oct 48. (3) Of the six Chinese Armies to participate in the Salween campaign, the 8th Army prepared the only detailed and frank account of its role. This translated history, including tactical maps, is among the papers of Colonel Spaht. (4) Ltrs, Spaht to authors, 24 May, 29 Jul, 24 Sep, 2 Oct, and 28 Oct 47. OCMH.
FACING THE COMMAND PROBLEM 395

six miles of the Burma Road were dominated by the Japanese guns on Sung

Shan. Time did not permit building a cutoff road to bypass Sung Shan. The

Japanese defensive system, manned by some 1,200 men under Maj. Keijiro

Kanemitsu, was built around elements of the 113th Infantry, supported by a

battalion of mountain artillery, some transport troops, and some engineers. Of

the 1,200, only 900 were effective.

In June, during the containing phase, the Chinese had assembled seven

150-mm. howitzers, two 75-mm. howitzers, and two 76-mm. field guns. Later

joined by some pack artillery, and directed by an American artillery observer

in a liaison plane, the Chinese cannoneers dueled with Major Kanemitsu's

gunners. Finally, the Japanese howitzers ceased to fire on the Burma Road

Engineers and the Chinese who were preparing to rebuild the Burma Road

bridge over the Salween. Now safe, the engineers proceeded with their rebuilding. During this same containing phase, the Chinese New 28th and New 39th

Divisions had made attacks in regimental strength against Sung Shan. On 15

June, they succeeded in taking a peak at the southeast corner of the triangle,

but failed to take its twin at the southwest corner, two miles away. Other

Chinese attempts failed, though heavy casualties were taken in the attempt.

As the period of containment merged into one of preparation for all-out

attack, General Wei's hand was strengthened by the arrival of the 8th Army

(the Honorable 1st, the 82d, and 103d Divisions). Originally stationed on the

Indochina border, it had begun to arrive in battalion increments at the time of

the Chinese setback at Lung-ling. The 8th Army had some lend-lease equipment, but only two thirds of its officers had been exposed to Y-FOS training

efforts. The relief of the New 28th Division by the 3d Infantry, Honorable 1st

Division, on 27 June was not well co-ordinated, for the Japanese were able to

reoccupy the positions the New 28th Division had taken in June. Japanese also

filtered through the Chinese lines to reinforce Sung Shan, and as further

evidence of Japanese determination, on 28 June Japanese aircraft for the first

time appeared over the Salween front. A reconnaissance aircraft, three fighters,

and two transports circled Sung Shan and made a supply drop, some of which

fell in the Chinese lines.

Accompanied by Y-FOS personnel under command of Col. Carlos G. Spaht,

the 8th Army assembled east and south of Sung Shan and set 5 July for the

attack. The Chinese artillery fired a nightlong preparation, and at dawn of 5

July two Chinese regiments attacked but not in strength. A few positions were

overrun, the Japanese counterattacked, and at nightfall the Chinese were back

in their initial positions, minus seventy dead. Colonel Spaht reported to Dorn

that teamwork between the demolition squads and the assault teams had left

much to be desired, that further training was badly needed.

The 8th Army's next attempt was made by the 246th Regiment the night

of 7-8 July. It was directed against the southwest corner of the triangle and

surprised the Japanese defenders of Kung Lung-po peak. By midnight the
396 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

CHINESE TROOPS ON KUNG LUNG-PO PEAK

Chinese had all Japanese strongpoints in their hands, but shortly after midnight the Japanese counterattacked over what was for them familiar terrain and

drove off the 246th Regiment, inflicting more than 200 casualties. Y-FOS'

observers reported that the Chinese grew quite confused during the night fighting and often shot at one another. The 246th Regiment had to be replaced by

the 307th Regiment. The 307th faced what was for them a new Japanese

defensive tactic between 10 and 12 July. Since the Chinese in climbing up the

hills tended to bunch along the easiest routes to the top, the Japanese used

their machine guns to keep the Chinese huddled down in the natural cover the

hill afforded, then hurled grenades and mortar shells into the parties of Chinese.

Such tactics were of deadly efficiency, and so the 8th Army brought up another

regiment to reinforce the battered 307th.

Two weeks passed before the 8th Army again essayed an attack on Sung

Shan. This time, instead of piecemeal attacks by a regiment or two, 8th Army

prepared the attack by moving its howitzers up to pound Japanese positions at

from 1,500 to 3,200 yards with direct fire. When the Chinese attacked with

three regiments, on the morning of 23 July, the division commander of the

103d personally directed the 75-mm. fire, and on occasion placed shells twentyfive to forty feet in front of the assaulting Chinese. Captured Japanese diaries
FACING THE COMMAND PROBLEM 397

contained praise of the artillery and of the 103d Division's valiant infantry.

This well-led, co-ordinated attack succeeded and by dawn the Chinese were in

Japanese positions almost at the crests of the two peaks Kung Lung-po and

Tayakou. Alarmed by the successful Chinese artillery fire, Major Kanemitsu on

26 July pleaded for Japanese air support to attack the Chinese batteries, which

had been emplaced in the open to use direct fire. Japanese fighters promptly

responded, and machine-gunned the Chinese cannon and crews. The damage

plus the moral effect halted the Chinese attack for a week, until 3 August.

When the 308th Regiment resumed the advance on 3 August it had flame

throwers which it used with devastating effect to take the crest of Kung

Lung-po. There the Chinese found several Japanese tankettes, which had been

dug in for use as pillboxes. When the Japanese failed to make their usual

prompt counterattack Y-FOS personnel surmised they might be short of

ammunition. This was so, and Major Kanemitsu decided to raid the 8th Army's

artillery positions and supply dumps to replenish his supply. Seven parties of

Japanese volunteers struck during the night of 9 August, destroying several

howitzers and taking away all the light weapons and ammunition they could

carry.

At this time, Burmese civilians, who had been impressed into the Japanese

service as laborers and who were found hiding in Japanese dugouts, estimated

that Kanemitsu had 700 men, most of them wounded or starving. Actually, he

now had but 300, including sick and wounded.

Having tried attacks by night, during rainstorms, and by surprise, none of

which had quite succeeded and all of which had taken precious time, the

Chinese now decided on a return to more formal siegecraft. With technical

advice from Y-FOS engineers, the Chinese on 11 August began digging under

what seemed the key to the Japanese positions that remained in the Sung Shan

triangle. Significant of the closeness of the fighting, the tunnels needed to be

but twenty-two feet long to put the mines in place under the Japanese

pillboxes. One mine held 2,500 pounds of TNT, the other 3,500 pounds.

The mines were fired on 20 August at 0905 and the resulting destruction

was quickly exploited by engineers armed with flame throwers. In one pillbox

forty-two Japanese were buried alive, of whom five were rescued. The prisoners

stated that they had been asleep and had never suspected that they were being

undermined. At 0920 the 3d Regiment against light opposition took the few

strongpoints that remained on Sung Shan proper. Kanemitsu's men still held

out in scattered pockets about the triangle. These launched desperate counterattacks on 21 and 22 August. That of the 22d produced particularly bloody

fighting in which the Chinese lost many company grade officers.

After the failure of these counterattacks there was nothing left but mopping

up. Actually, since the completion of the new Salween bridge on 18 August

and the mine blast on the 21st, the rest was anticlimax, even Major Kanemitsu's

death on 6 September, and the macabre ceremony the next day when the
398 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Japanese burned their colors and slew their wounded. Of the 1,200 Japanese on

and around Sung Chan, 9 were captured, and 10 were believed to have escaped.

The significance of Sung Shan lay in that it had cost the Chinese 7,675 dead to

clear that block from the Burma Road, of which some 5,000 were from the 8th

Army, leaving it but two understrength regiments fit to fight for Lung-ling.

Summary

As August waned, the Generalissimo was committed "in principle" to

giving Stilwell command in China. Events along the Salween did not suggest

there would be any speedy relief for China by a victory on that front, while in

east China the Japanese had not as yet met effective resistance. Delay in breaking the blockade of China and in setting up an effective barrier to Operation

ICHIGO in east China meant still further deterioration in China's military and

political situation. Defeats in the field place great strain on coalitions; events on

the Salween and south of Changsha would be felt as far away as Washington.
CHAPTER XI

The China Crisis of 1944

The Generalissimo's agreement in principle that Stilwell should command

in China and the tenacity with which the Japanese clung to their grip on the

Burma Road meant that events in China would soon take the spotlight. The

Generalissimo's conditional agreement required that sooner or later a Presidential representative would arrive in Chungking for the delicate and historic

negotiations on Stilwell's assumption of command, while the continuing blockade of China suggested that the Japanese pressure in east China would put

more and more strain on the Sino-American alliance and on the Nationalist

regime itself. The President's request that Stilwell take command would therefore be an added factor in a scene both complex and alarming to the Americans.

The Defense of Heng-yang

After their easy capture of Changsha on 18 June, which so alarmed Stilwell's staff in Chungking, the Japanese sent the 116th and 68th Divisions

against the walled city of Heng-yang. Heng-yang airfield fell on the 26th, and

two days later the Japanese, confident and flushed with success, opened their

attack on the city itself.1 (See Map 18.)

Changsha had fallen like a ripe plum, but in Heng-yang General Hsueh

had a commander, Maj. Gen. Fong Hsien-chueh, and an army, the 10th, that

held firm. The Chinese fought well and a Japanese attempt to overrun Hengyang failed. Japanese casualties were heavy. The division commander and chief

of staff of the 68th Division were wounded in the first day's fighting. The commander of the 116th Division was placed in operational control of the Japanese

attack against Heng-yang. The Japanese tried again and failed.

After the war, Hata remarked that "supply conditions chiefly embarrassed

the Japanese Forces during the Ichi-go Operation." He explained that long

stretches of the railway south from Hankow had been torn up, and could not

be repaired because of the floods and attacks of the Fourteenth Air Force. The

Hsiang River, parallel to the Japanese advance, could not be fully exploited

because the Fourteenth Air Force limited travel on it to the hours of darkness.

One Japanese officer recalled that motor vehicles were the most successful

1

 (1) Japanese Study 78. (2) Rad CFB 19107, Ferris to Stilwell, 25 Jun 44. Item 2651, Bk 7, JWS Personal File.
400 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

means of transportation, though the combined efforts of all agencies produced

only a trickle of supplies.2

In concrete terms, this constriction of their supply lines meant that no supplies reached the Japanese forces before Heng-yang until the first series of Japanese attacks had failed. By 2 July a few items began to reach the front, and a

week later the Japanese were able to maintain daily average deliveries of ten

tons. This was a very meager allotment of ammunition, and as for food the

Japanese were obliged to live off the country.3

The tremendous supply problem faced by the Japanese reflected great

credit on the 68th Composite Wing, under Brig. Gen. Clinton D. Vincent.

Vincent's men drove the Japanese to cover during the day, for they were machine-gunning even individual Japanese soldiers. Daring pilots went out at

night to attack Japanese motor transport. Thanks to the impact of the efforts

of the Fourteenth Air Force on their supply lines, the Japanese were stalled

before Heng-yang.

Chennault and his staff had the liveliest appreciation of the Japanese

problems, and hoped the Chinese would make a stand that would force the

Japanese to attempt supply movements at a level greater than would be

permitted by the Fourteenth's steady attacks.4

When the fighting before Heng-yang died away, the Chinese waited apprehensively for it to resume. After several days had passed with no further

attacks, the Chinese and General Vincent's headquarters concluded the Japanese had stopped, and that their next move would be in retreat. Vincent issued an order of the day on 7 July, saying that victory was in sight, and all

hands joined to toast it. "Hissing sky rockets and fiery flares split the warm

gloom of Kwangsi nights," Chennault recalled after the war. "Merchants of

Kweilin loaded trucks with gifts of ivory, silk, jade, and lacquerware and drove

them to the airfields for presentation to American airmen." But all the while

the Japanese were moving up their artillery and ammunition. By 10 July their

preparations were complete, and the attack on Heng-yang was resumed the

next day.5

From within their walled city the defenders of Heng-yang resisted as

manfully as before, with what assistance the 68th Composite Wing could give

them. Pilot fatigue, accumulating maintenance difficulties further compounded

by lack of adequate facilities, and an ever-worsening fuel situation combined

to reduce that support steadily. But while his resources permitted, Vincent kept

his fighters over Heng-yang to hold the Japanese in their trenches during day2

 Japanese Officers' Comments, Incl 2, Hata; Incl 9, Maj Kanetoshi Mashida. 3

 Ibid.

4

 (1) Japanese Officers' Comments, Incl 7, Col Takeharu Shimanuki. (2) Japanese Study 129, pp. 42-43. (3) Japanese Study 130, pp. 3-8. (4) Chennault, Way of a Fighter, p. 296, (5) G-3

Rpt 6, 2-8 Jul 44. Z-FOS G-3 File, KCRC. 5

 (1) Fourteenth AF History, p. 439. (2) Chennault, Way of a Fighter, p. 299. (3) Japanese

Studies 78, 129.
THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 401

light hours. Fighter-bomber sorties pounded Japanese strongpoints. American

aircraft went up and down the Hsiang River, a major Japanese line of communications to the siege, to interdict Japanese supply movements. From 68th

Composite Wing's own meager ammunition stores, Vincent took 75-mm.

shells and .50-caliber ammunition and dropped them into Heng-yang.6

The combined efforts of the Chinese infantrymen and General Vincent's

gallant pilots again disrupted the Japanese plans: ". . . the subsequent combat

situation became confused and our operation did not progress according to

plan." Once again the Japanese had to halt and reorganize. But Chennault and

Vincent could not exploit the situation; from 17 to 24 July lack of fuel

grounded the bulk of the 68th Composite Wing.7 The Japanese reorganized

once more, brought up the 58th Division, and the siege of Heng-yang went on

into the third week of July. To 20 July, Japanese operations cost the enemy

3,860 dead, 8,327 wounded, and 7,099 sick.8

That ICHIGO had been stalled by the 10th Army opened several opportunities to the Chinese and their allies. Since the Japanese had bypassed major

Chinese troop concentrations, these latter could attack the lines of communications that fed the Japanese siege. The Chinese could gather reinforcements

and proceed to the relief of Heng-yang. The Japanese lines of communications

would give Chennault profitable targets, and since he had air superiority he

could supply the Heng-yang garrison until it was relieved. So might run an

armchair analysis. But events in China moved according to causes that lay

below the surface.

Japanese Successes and Chinese Politics

On 20 July, General Hearn, who had returned from medical treatment in

the United States to again become Stilwell's chief of staff, began to press the

east China situation on his commander's attention. Stilwell was then at his

headquarters in Burma. Hearn radioed that Gen. Pai Chung-hsi was predicting

that Heng-yang would fall in two days more. Through General Lindsey of

Z-FOS, General Pai was asking for six division sets of equipment on the YForce scale to prepare the 46th and 64th Armies to defend Kwangsi Province,

6

 (1) Thanks to the interchangeability of U.S. 75-mm. shells, ammunition for the 75-mm. gun M4 mounted in a few of Vincent's B-25's could be used in Fong's old French 75's, a type the U.S. Army had used as the 75-mm. gun, MI897. Interv with Dr. Constance Green, Ordnance Sec, OCMH, 15 Aug 51. (2) That Vincent dropped .50-caliber ammunition strongly suggests General

Fong had some U.S. lend-lease .50-caliber machine guns. No other nation made them; the ammu- nition could not have been used in another piece. Chennault, Way of a Fighter, page 300, describes the air supply, but charges on page 306 that Fong received no lend-lease aid. As noted above,

page 372, the manuscript Campaign of Southeastern China states that Fong was supported by a battalion of U.S.-equipped artillery. The apparent contradiction may reflect nothing more than the fact that Headquarters, Fourteenth Air Force, was not always kept informed on Stilwell's several

major projects. 7

 (1) Japanese Studies 78, 129. (2) Fourteenth AF History, p. 435. 8

 Japanese Study 78.
402 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Pai's own bailiwick. "These are all Chang Fah-Kwei's and Pai Chung-hsi's

favorite troops," noted Hearn, who suggested further that these two potent war

lords wished to hedge their own positions against the loss of Heng-yang. He

went on to say that Stilwell's headquarters now faced what he called an

"enigma"—whether to deny help to the ground forces in order to supply

Chennault to the utmost. Hearn had checked with Chennault who was willing

to give up tonnage to supply the troops covering his airfields. Hearn suggested,

therefore, a shipment of infantry weapons and three units of fire to Kweilin,

about 200 tons in all. Stilwell's chief of staff appraised it as a "piddling contribution" and a "token effort" to the troops defending the airfields, but

suggested it in the manner of one willing to grab at straws.9

Next day General Lindsey himself sent a radio to Stilwell illuminating the

tangled command and political situation in which the Generalissimo and the

east China war lords were involved:

Observer from Zebra Force to Ninth War Zone arrived this headquarters on 20 July to

present a request from General Hsueh Yueh that we assist him in reequipping and training

the 4th Army now in Chenhsien. This assistance to consist of using our influence to have

Chinese turn over the part of equipment which is now in Kweilin for this area and to obtain

additional equipment from you.

General Hsueh Yueh will not make this request of National Military Council as he states

it will be refused. This matter was discussed by me with General Pai Chung-hsi who stated

he would not transmit this request to Chungking and that, if the matériel were made available, it could not be sent to that area at this time. It is my opinion that Ninth War Zone is

not receiving equipment which is available to Chinese here. Information from reliable

sources is that there is a group consisting of Marshal Li Chi-sheng [Li Chi-shen], General

Chang Fa-kwei, Yu Han Mo, Hsueh Yueh, Governor Lung Yun [of Yunnan], and a group

of dissenters in Szechwan who have been negotiating to set up an autonomous government

in Southeast China if communications with Chungking should be cut off. Marshal Li would

head this government. I believe present difficulties on equipment are results of Central Government fear of this clique.10

Therefore, after 21 July 1944, Stilwell was in receipt of a warning from one

of his principal subordinates that the senior Chinese officers in east and southeast China, plus the authorities in Szechwan and Yunnan Provinces, whose

relative freedom from Chungking control was well known to Stilwell, were

contemplating revolt. Hearn's message may have presented an enigma, but

Lindsey confronted Stilwell with a dilemma.

Since 7 July, the United States Government had been on record as desiring that the Generalissimo appoint Stilwell to command the Chinese Army,

as Stilwell knew. If Stilwell was to defy the Generalissimo's order of 5 June

that all Hump tonnage should go to Chennault, and give arms to a subordinate

of one of the principal east China war lords, and these men were then to turn

against the Generalissimo, Stilwell would be in a position too obviously em9

 Rad CFB 20147, Hearn to Stilwell, 20 Jul 44. Item 2701, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. 10

 Rad CCA 71, Lindsey to Hearn, 21 Jul 44. Item 2703, Bk 7, JWS Personal File.
THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 403

barrassing to require elaboration. Stilwell approached the problem by referring

the question of tonnage distribution to the Generalissimo.

Stilwell's reply to his chief of staff on 22 July was characteristically terse

and left it to Chennault and the Generalissimo to arrange any supply of arms

to east China.

Here is my slant. QUADRANT and SEXTANT turned down help for ground forces and accepted Chennault's plan for beating Japs with air alone. Generalissimo was sold on this plan

and has insisted on full tonnage for air force. Chennault has stated that with ten thousand

tons he could stop the Japs. He had twelve thousand last month. If he now realizes he cannot do it, he should so inform the Gissimo, who can then make any proposition he sees fit.

Pai obviously cannot have equipment for six divisions, and as you say the allotment of

equipment proposed in lieu of it will have no appreciable effect. I do not see how we can

move until a certain big decision is made. You can tell the Chinese we are doing our best to

carry out the plan the Gissimo insisted on.11

When Hearn paraphrased the 22 July radio for the information of General

Sultan, the deputy theater commander in New Delhi, his text showed he clearly grasped Stilwell's point that if Chennault believed he could not stop the

Japanese by air power alone he should tell the Generalissimo, who could then

propose any revision of Hump tonnage allocations he desired to give tonnage

to the Chinese forces in east China.12 While Stilwell's radio was circulating

among his subordinates, he received a plea direct from Chennault to assign a

troop carrier flight to China for air supply of Pong's heroic garrison. Stilwell

refused on 23 July, saying: "As it would in any case set up precedent for further demands which would not be met, cannot stretch our present facilities to

include the proposed commitment."

 13

Then Stilwell's 22 July radio, with its significant proposal, was given to

Hearn's staff in Chungking to serve as the basis for CBI Theater policy on supplying arms to the east China commanders. But as written by the staff, the

radio that went to Chennault and Lindsey for action, and Stilwell and Sultan

for information, omitted any reference to Chennault's approaching the Generalissimo. The radio stated that at a recent conference the Generalissimo had

insisted that all eastbound tonnage must go to the Fourteenth Air Force, that

unless the Generalissimo reversed himself, no tonnage could be given to the

Chinese ground forces. The message paraphrased the Generalissimo's note to

the President of 29 April 1943 by remarking that the Chinese "contribution is

the ground forces as now organized and equipped; ours is the air force and such

aid as you are able to render the ground forces with practically no tonnage in

sight."

11

 (1) Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. VII. (2) Rad CHC 3019, Stilwell to Hearn, 22 Jul 44. Item 2704, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. 12

 Rad CFB 20274, Hearn to Sultan, 23 Jul 44. Item 2705, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. 13

 (1) Rad CAK 5180, Chennault to Stilwell, 20 Jul 44; Rad CHC 3023, Stilwell to Chennault, 23 Jul 44. The Chennault-Wedemeyer Letter, Items 53, 54. (2) Compare the text of radio CHC

3023 with Chennault, Way of a Fighter, lines 10 and 11 on page 300.
404 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

The radio went on to say that the problem of Headquarters, CBI Theater,

was to know how far the situation could be allowed to go before "pressing

CKS for more drastic and effective action." So Lindsey and Chennault were to

advise CBI Theater headquarters on what action to take if (1) Heng-yang held,

(2) Heng-yang fell and the Japanese advance resumed, or (3) Heng-yang held

and the Japanese drove north from Canton.14

Stilwell duly received his copy of the 24 July radio at his Burma headquarters. Almost all of his papers and diary entries for these days deal with the siege

of Myitkyina and the misunderstandings over the Chindits, which is suggestive of his major concerns, though not conclusive. If he noticed how his staff

had shifted the emphasis of the message from that in his basic radio of 22 July,

he did not object.15

Chennault's answer to the 24 July radio drifted still farther from the point

of Stilwell's 22 July radio. Replying to the question on the conditions under

which the Generalissimo should be approached, Chennault said that under any

conditions he should be asked to improve the efficiency of the eastern line of

communications to Chennault's advance bases. As for questions of tonnage

and allocations, Chennault said only that a minimum of 6,000 tons a month

had to be received by him every month in east China, after which all tonnage

above 6,000 should go to the ground forces. Thus in moving from one level

of staff and command to another, Stilwell's 22 July proposal was altered beyond

recognition and the moment passed.

The Chinese gathered considerable forces near Heng-yang, including the

XXVII and XXIV Group Armies (seventeen divisions). American observer

groups were with most of Hsueh's divisions but sensed that American matériel would have been regarded as preferable to their presence. Gen. Wang

Hou-wu, XXIV Group Army, made a good impression on the men of his

American team but they feared that General Wang's telephoned exhorting of

his subordinates to attack lost effect in the eighty miles that separated him from

the front.16

However, General Wang faced command problems. For example, the

Americans learned that Wang's 79th Army almost always broke communications with XXIV Group Army on the eve of an attack, and that Wang placed

no credence in reports from them.17 The American-equipped Chinese artillery

units were disappointing. Fearing the personal consequences if they lost their

fine new howitzers, Chinese artillery commanders took but a few forward into

action and left the rest miles to the rear.18

14

 (1) Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. IX. (2) Rad CFB 20318, Hearn to Lindsey and

Chennault, info Stilwell and Sultan, 24 Jul 44. Item 2710, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. The message form shows that Brig. Gen. Thomas S. Timberman wrote it for Hearn's signature. 15

 Stilwell's copy is in SNF 121. 16

 (1) Memo, Heavey for Lindsey, 30 Jul 44. AG (Z-FOS) 210.684. (2) G-3 Per Rpt 9,

23-30 Jul 44. Z-FOS G-3 File, KCRC. 17

 Memo, Heavey for CofS, Z-FOS, 10 Aug 44. AG (Z-FOS) 210.684. 18

 Memo, Col Albert G. Stackpole, CO TIG, 62d Army, for CofS, Z-FOS, 31 Jul 44. AG

(Z-FOS) 210.684.
THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 405

Chinese forces stood along the flanks of the long Japanese line of communications all the way back to the Yangtze River and pecked away at the Japanese intermittently. One attack even carried them into Changsha, but the

Japanese promptly expelled them. Around Heng-yang itself, the Chinese

armies were in a great semicircle, but the Japanese were able to keep them at

arm's length and proceed with the siege. On one occasion the Chinese 100th

Army moved to within five miles of Heng-yang, but the Japanese lines held

firmly. The American staff of Z-Force understood from liaison reports that the

62d, 79th, and 37th Armies and the New 19th Division took heavy losses in

the attempt to relieve Heng-yang; the 58th, 72d, and 20th Armies, in attacking

the Japanese line of communications.19

When July came to an end, the Fourteenth Air Force, looking back on its

efforts, tallied 4,454 sorties flown in support of General Hsueh's men between

26 May and 1 August 1944.20

The East China Crisis Grows

Heng-yang finally fell on 8 August. Immediately thereafter, the east China

crisis intensified for the Chinese and Americans. For the Japanese, victory at

Heng-yang brought no solution to problems that by the summer of 1944 were

growing ever worse. Both parties to the Heng-yang battle soon found their

local struggle part of a much larger crisis, which for Chinese and Japanese alike

seemed to involve the great issues of national survival. The summer of 1944 was a black one for the Japanese Empire. The island

of Saipan in the Mariana group, which lies within bombing distance of Japan, was invaded by American amphibious forces on 15 June. Japan's Combined Fleet,

which had been husbanded as jealously as the China Expeditionary Army, was

committed on 18 June in an effort to stop the American amphibious attack on

Saipan. The effort had failed with losses to the Japanese carrier air groups that

left them impotent. Having completed occupation of Saipan by 8 July, the

Americans proceeded to lay out B-29 bases. The long accumulation of Japanese defeats that began at the Battle of Midway in June 1942 finally brought

a cabinet crisis in Japan, and Gen. Kuniaki Koiso succeeded Hideki Tojo as

premier.

Events in Europe were also going badly for Japan's sole ally, Nazi Ger- many. OVERLORD had been a complete success, and on 23 June the Russian

summer offensive had begun. It went well, and a few days later the Red Army

was in Minsk. On 20 July there came unmistakable evidence of dissent in Germany, for an attempt was made to assassinate Chancellor Adolf Hitler. Five

days later the Americans broke out of the Normandy lodgment area and, while

the British sped up the Channel coast and into Belgium, began a sensational

sweep across France.

19

 (1) G-3 Per Rpts 8 and 9, 16 and 30 Jul 44. Z-FOS G-3 File, KCRC. (2) Fourteenth AF

History, pp. 444-45. (3) Japanese Study 78. (4) Campaign in Southeastern China, p. 3. 20

 Fourteenth AF History, p. 446.
406 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

CHART 8—ORGANIZATION OF THE CHINA EXPEDITIONARY ARMY :

15 SEPTEMBER 1944

Imperial General Headquarters, examining the critical situation, decided on

Operation SHÕ, a massive counterattack on the American forces making the

central Pacific offensive to be launched when the Americans attempted an attack within the area Philippines-Formosa-Ryukus-Japan-Kuriles. Since SHÕ

was to be the decisive operation, Marshal Hata and China Expeditionary Army

received new orders. Just as the JCS had ordered Stilwell to subordinate all

else to support of U.S. operations in the Pacific, so Imperial General Headquarters in late July ordered Hata to make preparations to support the first-priority

SHÕ operation. Two of Hata's twenty-four divisions, the 26th and 62d, were

earmarked for SHO,21 The 26th Division went to the Philippines, the 62d

to Okinawa. Most of the reinforcements for the SHÕ operation came from

Manchuria.22

ICHIGO was necessarily involved in the general examination of Japanese

strategy that preceded issuance of the directive for the SHÕ operation. Nothing

in the postwar Japanese studies and comments suggests that abandonment of

ICHIGO was considered, but China Expeditionary Army was given an added

21

 (1) Japanese Study 72, p. 135. (2) IGH Army Order 1050, 4 Jul 44. (3) See pp. 362-64, above. 22

 (1) Japanese Study 6. (2) Japanese Study 72, p. 148. (3) Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens, Okinawa: The Last Battle, UNITED STATES ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1948), p. 85.
THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 407

FIELD MARSHAL SHUNROKU HATA GEN. YASUJI OKAMURA

objective, "to establish an operational linking with French Indo-China by

opening a road network. By doing so, the Imperial General Headquarters hoped

to maintain only a liaison connection with the Southern Army forces to the

south. It did not plan to open a line of communication to the south by reopening the Hankow-Canton Railway as a substitute for sea transport. The reason

why the Imperial General Headquarters did not plan to reopen the Railway was

simply that Japan at that time had no railway material reserve for that

purpose."23

The Japanese command structure in China was reorganized. (Chart 8) To

conclude ICHIGO, in late August 1944, General Okamura was placed in command of a new headquarters, 6th Area Army, so that the former commander of

the North China Area Army became responsible for Japanese operations in east

China, while Hata was free to concentrate on the problems of meeting the

feared American landings on the China coast. Under 6th Area Army were placed

the 11th, 23d, and 34th Armies, plus the 27th, 40th, 64th, and 68th Divisions,

stretching from Hankow to Canton inclusive. Four independent infantry

23

 Japanese Officers' Comments, p. 34. The Japanese staff, Historical Section, Far East Com- mand, explicitly rejected a suggestion by the authors that opening a land line of communications to the south was contemplated by Imperial General Headquarters.
408 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

brigades were brought up to division strength as the 114th, 115th, 117th, and

118th Divisions. Organization of Okamura's new command was completed on

10 September. In mid-October, Headquarters 20th Army (Lt. Gen. Ichiryo

Banzai) was brought down from Manchuria to command the Japanese units

between Changsha and Heng-yang.24

After the Chinese lost Heng-yang, a lull of about thirty days followed in

east China. The Japanese had to stop their advance because the Fourteenth Air

Force was making their supply situation extremely difficult. To renew their

offensive, and attack Kweilin and Liuchow, the Japanese wanted to accumulate

the extremely modest sum of 400 tons of supplies in newly captured Hengyang. Though they made the most strenuous efforts to bring up supplies, and

though they halted for a month, they could not reach their goal. Some ammunition did come forward; the divisions to make the attack got from thirty to

fifty tons each. But clothing and food could not be brought up. In retrospect,

it would seem that if the Chinese had stood firm, and forced the Japanese to

expend their supplies, ICHIGO would have died of simple starvation.25

The fall of Heng-yang also marked a new phase in the complicated politics

of the Chinese defense of east China, no less than the beginning of a new phase

of ICHIGO. Perhaps the fall of Heng-yang on 8 August was the signal, or perhaps the timing was coincidence, but one day later a Chinese believed to be an

associate of Marshal Li Chi-shen walked into the American consulate in Kweilin with a request that a message from Marshal Li be forwarded "to the highest

American authorities concerned":

In order to cope with the critical situation with which China is confronted at present, a

provisional government known as the Southwestern Government of Joint Defense, will be

established in the near future. This Government will be participated in and supported by

the Provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan, Fukien, Anhwei, Szechwan, Yunnan, and

Sigang [Sikang], and a great number of military and political leaders. It will have the following aims: (1) To substitute the present one-party and one-man dictatorial government

at Chungking with a democratic form of government under the leadership of the Kuomintang; (2) to bring about the national unity, and to affect a general mobilization in order to

cooperate with the Allies in crushing the Japanese; and (3) to obtain a better understanding and a closer cooperation with the Allied countries. Simultaneously with the instigation

of this government, there will be sent out a telegram, jointly signed by all the leaders who

advocate this movement, demanding the resignation of President Chiang Kai-shek; it is expected that this can be obtained without armed conflict. The provisional government will

be headed by Marshal Li Chi-shen, President of the Military Advisory Council of Chungking, and former Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek when the latter commanded the revolutionary army in the famous Northern Expedition of 1926.26

24

 Japanese Studies 78, 129, and 130. 25

 Japanese Officers' Comments, App. 8, Col Imoto Kumao. 26

 (1) Rad CCA 205, Arthur R. Ringwalt, U.S. Consul, to Hearn, info American Embassy, sgd

Lindsey, 9 Aug 44. Item 2718, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. (2) Graham Peck, Two Kinds of Time

(Boston, 1950), pages 578-80, has a summary of the Li Chi-shen affair, which suggests it must

have been fairly common knowledge in Kweilin at the time.
THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 409

Stilwell's first reaction to this news, which he received while vacationing

in Ceylon, was joyful. "Hooray for crime!" he wrote in his diary, hoped that

perhaps now the Generalissimo would have to act, and added cryptically,

"Lucky I prepared the ground months ago." Seeking more information, Stilwell ordered Brig. Gen. Thomas S. Timberman to contact General Pai, and

there the topic disappears from his diaries.27

The immediate reaction from the American Embassy was cautious and discreet. On 9 August State Department personnel at Kweilin were ordered by

Ambassador Gauss to act with the utmost discretion and to deal with local

Chinese authorities simply as local Chinese authorities.28 As for General Stilwell's further and official reaction, after a day's reflection he made his stand

unmistakably clear. In December 1942, Foreign Minister T. V. Soong had

hinted that Stilwell might play a tremendous role in China Theater, and Stilwell had rejected the offer. Now, in August 1944, trouble was brewing in east

China, and if Stilwell intended to meddle in Chinese politics, here was his opportunity. But the orders he now sent Hearn were: "Our policy is to lay off the

internal affairs of China but we now have a big stake in this business and must

keep ourselves informed. Listen to any propositions that may be made, but do

not make any commitments nor even express any opinion. Just say you will

forward any messages proposed."

 29

 Stilwell meanwhile attempted to ascertain

the reaction of the Communists and the northern war area commanders to the

threatened coup.30

From Kweilin, Consul Arthur R. Ringwalt on 10 August relayed information which he presumably obtained from Marshal Li's clique, and which made

serious charges against the Generalissimo. Ringwalt reported that in April

1944 the Japanese and the Generalissimo had agreed on a line delimiting the

Japanese sphere of influence in China. The line was said to run from the Communist border region due south through Tung-kuan to the Yangtze River,

thence westward along the Yangtze through Tali to Burma. The Japanese were

said to have assured the Generalissimo he would not be molested west and

north of that line so long as he (1) did not compromise with the Communists

or any other dissident faction, (2) co-operated with the United States only to

such an extent as not to lose the support of that Government, (3) ordered his

personal forces outside his zone of influence to offer only token resistance to

the Japanese, and (4) gave no support to armies outside his territory. Ringwalt

reported further that in May the Generalissimo had become seriously concerned

27

 (1) Stilwell Diary, 10 Aug 44. (2) Rad TST 592, Stilwell to Hearn, 10 Aug 44. Item 2722, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. 28

 Rad CFB 20964, Hearn to Lindsey, 9 Aug 44. Item 2720, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. 29

 (1) Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. VIII. (2) Rad TST 591, Stilwell to Hearn, info Sultan, 10 Aug 44. Item 2721, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. The statement that "we now have a big stake in this business" probably refers to the pending command question. 30

 Rad TST 601, Stilwell to Hearn, 10 Aug 44. Item 2723, Bk 7, JWS Personal File.
410 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

at the attitude of Gen. Hsueh Yueh and had asked the Japanese to disperse

General Hsueh's troops.31

After the war, Marshal Hata denied that any such agreement existed, and

suggested that the report of such an agreement might have originated with the

Chinese Communists. Hata and his successor Okamura were quite familiar

with the intricacies of Chinese politics. In 1952 they discussed at some length

the relationships between the various war area commanders and the Generalissimo, as well as between several war area commanders plus one of the provincial governors with the Japanese. They also stated that Marshal Li was in

touch with the Japanese at the same time he was seeking U.S. aid.32

In compliance with Stilwell's orders, Hearn gave General Lindsey, who, as

the senior U.S. ground force officer in east China, would be deeply concerned

if the east China war lords revolted, clear orders on CBI Theater and U.S.

policy in regard to internal Chinese politics:

We have referred URAD CCA 205 to General Stilwell. This headquarters has no authority to enter into discussions or make arrangements for negotiation with any party except that

of the Central Government which has received for several years the backing of the United

States Government. Our concern in political factions is limited to the manner and degree in

which they affect our mission in China, viz., to promote the war against Japan. Therefore,

it is desired that you observe closely the situation and keep this headquarters informed of

developments especially those which affect our war effort. Be careful not to express any

opinions or make any comments which may be interpreted as an indication of our being for

or against such a movement. Work closely with Ringwalt and comment for our info only

on his messages where such is applicable.33

Ambassador Gauss believed that without substantial encouragement from

the United States Marshal Li would not go further. Gauss did not intend to

furnish such encouragement, but decided to adopt Stilwell's policy of listening

and saying nothing in reply.34

The next development was a report from an officer described to Stilwell as

being in close touch with Li's circle, and with Communist forces in south

China. This man said that Pai Chung-hsi had broken with Li, moved his family

from Kwangsi, and would have nothing to do with the proposed coup. He also

believed that Li had Communist support, which might soon reveal itself as a

Communist drive to link forces with Li. He went on to depict Marshal Li as

engaged in setting up his new government and named certain Chinese as

potential cabinet ministers.35

Stilwell promptly reported the projected coup to Marshall. He described it 31

 History of China Theater, Ch. II, The Political Scene in China, pp. 4, 8, citing, Rpt, Ring- wait, 10 Aug 44. OCMH. 32

 Japanese Officers' Comments, Incls 2, 3, Hata, Okamura. 33

 Rad CFB 20970, Hearn to Lindsey, info Stilwell and Sultan, 10 Aug 44. Item 2724, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. For text of Rad CCA 205, see p. 408, above. 34

 Rad CFB 21023, Hearn to Stilwell, 11 Aug 44. Item 2726, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. Hearn was keeping in close touch with Gauss and was relaying Gauss's point of view. 35

 Rad CFB 21092, Hearn to Stilwell and Sultan, 12 Aug 44. Item 2733, Bk 7, JWS Personal

File. In writing the radio Hearn was careful not to betray his source.
THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 411

as Ringwalt had reported it to Headquarters, CBI Theater, but deprecated any

attempt by Marshal Li to supplant the Generalissimo. Wrote Stilwell:

There is only one outstanding man in China who could handle the proposed transitions

without too much confusion. He is Pai Chung Hsi. Pai has character and ability as well as

common sense and has always been most cooperative with us. In case this matter reaches a

more serious stage, I strongly recommend that he be kept in mind as the one man best

suited to take over. We are trying to get more definite information and will transmit

promptly any news of development.36

A few days later Stilwell modified his 10 August radio by reporting that as

yet neither Pai Chung-hsi nor Gen. Li Tsung-jen was openly identified with the

movement. If they stayed loyal to the Generalissimo, Stilwell believed the Generalissimo had a chance and observed that since the same east China war lords

had betrayed Pai and Li in 1930 and 1936 the latter were probably waiting for

solid guarantees. Then came the topic always close to Stilwell's heart. He had

been informed that the Generalissimo had held an important conference where

sweeping reforms of the Chinese Army were considered, the sort Stilwell had

been urging for two years. If the report was correct, said Stilwell, it showed the

importance the Generalissimo attached to U.S. support.37

In compliance with Stilwell's order, Timberman had gone to Kweilin and

begun conversations with General Pai. Initially, Timberman received the impression that Pai knew nothing of the plot, and so did not discuss it with him

lest Pai inform the Generalissimo.38

Then General Pai became more communicative. A day or so later he told

Timberman that Marshal Li and three war area commanders, Gens. Hsueh

Yueh, Chang Fa-kwei, and Yu Han-mou, were contemplating a separatist

movement. Pai believed that the movement was largely the work of the Chinese Communists, that the east China war lords had little real support, and

that any coup they might attempt would fail. In the light of his talks with Pai,

Timberman reached an opinion which Hearn relayed to Ambassador Gauss in

Stilwell's name: "Li's group now control the area but it will take U.S. backing

to influence the overall picture. I believe this the reason for the approach to us.

CKS will be influenced by a local coup and undoubtedly know we have been

approached. The whole thing looks too small for us to do more than continue

our present policy of receptive observation."

 39

36

 CM-IN 8690, Stilwell to Marshall, 10 Aug 44. 37

 CM-IN 12022, Stilwell to Marshall, 13 Aug 44. 38

 Rad CCA 229, Timberman to Stilwell and Hearn, sgd Lindsey, 12 Aug 44. Item 2734, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. 39

 Memo, Hearn for Gauss, 15 Aug 44. This is a paraphrase of Timberman's last paragraph

which read: "If Li does take over out here, it will probably be bloodless as all partners to the crime (who have the troops) are running things as they please now. Such a local coup might conceivably

have beneficial effect on CKS particularly as he no doubt will know U.S. has been following same.

However, the potential of this group from overall point of view is so small it does not warrant that

U.S. go beyond maintaining constant touch with the movement." See Rad CCA 245, Timberman to Hearn, sgd Lindsey, 14 Aug 44. Item 2739, Bk 7, JWS Personal File.
412 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

In conversations between Timberman, U.S. Consul Ringwalt, and Marshal

Li himself, on 15 August, the Americans made it clear that the United States

was maintaining a "hands-off policy" but wanted to know what was happening

because of its great interest in the early defeat of Japan. Marshal Li was bitter

in his denunciations of the Generalissimo's regime, which had, he thought,

failed the defenders of east China. Li made no promises as to when his coup

would be launched but left the impression it would be within thirty days.

At the end of the meeting, Li asked Timberman point-blank if the United

States would support him and received the answer that such matters were for

Washington to decide, that Timberman could say nothing.40

In Yenan, headquarters of the Chinese Communists, Mr. Service, Hearn's

political adviser, made repeated attempts to learn whether the Chinese

Communists supported Marshal Li. Service concluded that if the Chinese

Communists knew anything of Li's plans, they were not interested. He also

decided that the northern war area commanders were solidly behind the

Generalissimo.41

While CBI Theater headquarters and the American Embassy were studying

Marshal Li's threatened coup in east China, Chennault on 17 August raised

anew the issue of American supplies for General Hsueh, whom so many reports had mentioned as one of Li's principal supporters. In his request, Chennault showed himself fully aware that Hsueh was not in the good graces of the

Generalissimo but suggested to Hearn that Stilwell ignore the Generalissimo's

government and give arms to Hsueh directly:

With Timberman in conference discussing ways and means of materially assisting the

Chinese ground armies in retaking Hengyang I stated that I would be willing to contribute

one thousand tons my tonnage for bringing light machine guns, grenades, demolitions and

so forth as would contribute to the effectiveness of General Hsueh Yueh's army. I would not

be interested in turning this over to the Minister of War because the chances are great that

it would never reach Hsueh Yueh whom I believe will fight if given the bare essentials.

Suggest that you discuss this with Timberman who gave me the impression that he was

convinced we must do something quick right.42

Hearn relayed the suggestion to Stilwell, who, weighing the matter in the

light of the still-pending command question, answered: "The time for halfway measures has passed. Any more free gifts such as this will surely delay the

major decision and play into the hands of the gang. The cards have been put

on the table and the answer has not been given. Until it is given, let them

stew."43

On the basis of Stilwell's reply, Hearn's staff prepared and sent the following answer to Chennault:

40

 Rad CCA 251, Timberman to Hearn, Stilwell, and Sultan, 15 Aug 44. Item 2742, Bk 7, JWS

Personal File. 41

 Memo, Hearn for Gauss, 17 Aug 44. Item 2745, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. 42

 Rad CAK 6394, Chennault to Hearn, 17 Aug 44. Item 2753, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. 43

 Rad TST 765, Stilwell to Hearn, info Sultan, 21 Aug 44. Item 2756, Bk 7, JWS Personal File.
THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 413

Your proposition to divert one thousand tons from air force allotment to ground force

supplies in order to retake Hengyang has been given the best treatment in the shop. We

find after investigation that one thousand tons is sufficient to equip only one army with a

very limited quantity of infantry weapons, two and one half units of fire for infantry

weapons, a small amount of signal and demolition equipment with sufficient transportation

to haul but one unit of fire.

Stilwell also sent us his views on your proposal. He agrees, in order to restore the situation in the east, an operation is required. He is working on a proposition which might give

this spot a real face lifting and is loath to commit himself to any definite line of action right

now.

Consequently we must hold off in making any proffers of help to the ground troops until

things precipitate a bit more.

Realizing the press of time sorry had to hold up on this non-committal answer until

heard from boss man.44

The exchange of radios between Chennault and Stilwell's headquarters

showed how the pressure of events since 1943 had persuaded Chennault to

change his views. In sharp contrast with his attitude then, Chennault was now

asking Stilwell to take Hump tonnage from the air arm so that the east China

ground forces might have supplies. That the loyalty to the Generalissimo of

the senior Chinese officers in east China was a matter for open speculation, and

that Stilwell in accord with his long-held bargaining approach was reluctant to

give arms to the Chinese without concrete evidence that they would be used

against the common foe rather than in domestic squabbles, combined to make

Stilwell refuse Chennault's suggestion. It is interesting to note that Chennault's

and the Generalissimo's views had so far diverged by spring 1944 that the Generalissimo was insisting that all supplies go to the Fourteenth Air Force while

Chennault was pleading for arms for the east China commanders.45

The Hurley-Nelson Mission

While Stilwell and Chennault were, in their separate ways, seeking an

answer to the east China crisis, the United States Government was about to

intervene directly to place responsibility for the solution on Stilwell's shoulders.

Whenever the President turned his attention again to the command problem,

44

 (1)Rad CFB 21565, Hearn to Chennault, info Sultan and Merrill for Stilwell, 23 Aug 44. Item 2763, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. This radio was drafted by Timberman. (2) Compare the text

above with Chennault, Way of a Fighter, p. 301. 45

 The question of the quantity of munitions China itself produced for the forces of the Chinese Nationalist Government during the China Incident, the Pacific war of 1941-45, and the subse- quent Chinese civil war has been the subject of intense discussion. In the first volume of this series, Stilwell's Mission to China, the authors, in commenting on one aspect of the problem—munitions production in Chinese arsenals in 1941—expressed the conclusion that the output of Chinese arsenals was a trickle. This opinion was based on the reports of the Magruder mission to China, in the fall of 1941.

As part of the program of lend-lease to China, nonferrous metals were flown into that country over the Hump. Possibly reflecting that effort, or perhaps other factors, Chinese arms production from the date of the lend-lease program to June of 1945 was a considerable national achievement

in view of the difficulties that confronted the Chinese arsenals.

A systematic survey of Chinese industry was made by an American economic mission under
414 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

he would find waiting for him a memorandum from the Generalissimo, dated

23 July 1944. In it, the Generalissimo again accepted "in principle" Stilwell's

command of "China's forces directly under the Generalissimo," then proceeded

to lay down three conditions which would have to be met before Stilwell could

take up his new duties. The provisions would be necessary, wrote the Generalissimo, because of the political circumstances in China and the psychology of

the Chinese Army and people.

The Generalissimo's three conditions were: (1) the Chinese Communists

could not be under Stilwell's authority until they agreed to obey the "administrative and military orders of the Chinese Government"; (2) Stilwell's functions, authority, title, and relationship to the Generalissimo should be clearly

defined; and (3) "The distribution and disposal of all military supplies under

the lend-lease arrangements should, in accordance with the spirit underlying

the Lend-Lease Act, be placed entirely under the authority of the Chinese

Government or its Commander-in-Chief. The Generalissimo, however, is prepared to delegate authority to certain officers of the United States Army to

supervise over the disposal of such supplies."46

To his agent in the United States, Dr. H. H. Kung, the Generalissimo sent

instructions for the conduct of the forthcoming negotiations, describing the

Generalissimo's political position in China as he himself saw it, and as he

feared Stilwell's proposed appointment might affect it. The Chinese leader said

that he himself was "responsible to the end for China," so that if transfer of

power over the Chinese Army to a foreigner was not carefully regulated, the

Chinese Army and people might think the Generalissimo no longer so

responsible. Japanese and "subversive elements" might then exploit the

resulting situation. He stressed the financial preconditions to Stilwell's having

command powers in China: China must control lend-lease and the United

States must give generous financial aid. That command over the Chinese Army

Donald M. Nelson, in 1944-45. Working with Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in China, under Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, the Nelson mission obtained data which General Wedemeyer used as the base of his programs. These figures on Chinese arsenal production, March 1941-June 1945, suggest that the Chinese themselves, had the situation between the central government and the east China commanders permitted, could have made a greater contribution to the defense of the

east China airfields:

Rifles .............................................................. 263,735

Light machine guns................................................... 33,076

Heavy machine guns.................................................. 11,642

60-mm. mortars. ..................................................... 5,150

82-mm. mortars. ..................................................... 5,242

7.92-mm. ammunition................................................. 609,000,000

60-mm. ammunition. ................................................. 1,110,000

82-mm. ammunition.................................................. 2,650,000

Hand grenades....................................................... 16,620,000

These figures cover a period beyond August 1944, but there is no reason to believe production increased substantially after that date. The sharp increase in Hump tonnage which began in August

1944 was used to support the U.S. forces in China. Hq U.S. Army Forces, China Theater, Historical Summary of Activities in G-5 Section, MS,

15 Dec 45, p. 3. OCMH. 46

 Memo, Generalissimo for President, 23 Jul 44, with Covering Ltr, Kung to President, 15 Aug

44. Bk IX, Hopkins Papers.
THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 415

which the Generalissimo had agreed in principle to give Stilwell was most

narrowly defined by the Chinese leader. Stilwell could command the troops

actually fighting the Japanese, but not those in reserve or in training. The

Communist forces would be discussed in special negotiations.47 In effect the

Generalissimo was proposing that Stilwell assume command of the Y-Force,

plus a few divisions of Gens. Hsueh Yueh and Chang Fa-kwei, and with them

stop Marshal Hata's offensive.

Pending the President's return the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, and

the Army's Chief of Staff did considerable spadework toward establishing the

post of Presidential representative on which first Vice-President Wallace and

then the Generalissimo laid such stress. The President had sent many special

emissaries to troubled spots overseas. Several had gone to China, and of them

it seemed to Stimson that only the commander of the Army Service Forces,

General Somervell, had been "truly helpful." So Stimson and Marshall sought

to find another Presidential emissary who might duplicate Somervell's success.48

Their thoughts turned to Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley. General Hurley had

had a long and distinguished career in politics, corporation law, and diplomacy.

After reaching the rank of colonel in World War I, Hurley had resumed the

practice of law. From law he entered politics and was Secretary of War in

President Herbert C. Hoover's administration, 1928-32. Returning to his law

practice in 1933, Hurley scored his greatest legal success by negotiating in 1940

an agreement between the Republic of Mexico and five American oil corporations regarding the latter's expropriated Mexican holdings. Though Hurley was

a corporation lawyer, his work on the Richfield Oil Company reorganization

and the Mexican oil tangle had led the public to think of him as an oil man.

Immediately after Pearl Harbor, Hurley had offered his services to the War

Department. By his efforts to run supplies through the Japanese blockade of

the Philippines, and by his later work as U.S. Minister to New Zealand in the

spring of 1942, he had won the confidence of the President, who thereafter

entrusted Hurley with a series of diplomatic missions, to the Soviet Union in

November and December 1942, and then to the countries of the Middle East.

While in Iran Hurley drafted the Declaration of Tehran and secured the signatures of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin.49

 In the fall of 1943 General Hurley

went to China to arrange the Generalissimo's presence at the Cairo Conference,

November-December 1943. He made an excellent impression on both the

Generalissimo and Stilwell.

Inviting Hurley to a conference in July 1944, Marshall and Stimson turned

the conversation to China and the problems of CBI. Years later Hurley recalled

Marshall and Stimson asking him if he thought that Chennault should be

47

 Telg 3, Generalissimo to Kung, 23 Jul 44. Item 5, Bk 1, Hurley Papers. 48

 (1) Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York:

Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 536. (2) See Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. X. 49

 For the text of the Declaration, see Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia, page 444.
416 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

theater commander. He answered in the negative and believed later that his

answer pleased the two men.50 Marshall for his part soon concluded that

Hurley would like to be the President's special envoy to China. Marshall asked

Stilwell's reactions to having Hurley sent to China to be the President's representative and act as a buffer between Stilwell and the Generalissimo, whose

personal relations had so sadly deteriorated during the years since January

1942.51

Stilwell was pleased with Marshall's nomination of Hurley, raised no

objection to the fact that Hurley as a Presidential emissary would be in some

respects his superior, and closed his reply with a jest: "It takes oil as well as

vinegar to make good French dressing."

 52

Acting for the President, Marshall then placed Hurley's name before the

Generalissimo on 10 August,53 and with it that of Donald M. Nelson, former

chairman of the War Production Board, as a Presidential agent to study China's

fast-deteriorating economy. Nelson's mission to China did not arise from the

command question, but rather reflected a situation which had arisen within the

Roosevelt administration, involving the War Production Board and the forthcoming Presidential election.54

 The Generalissimo accepted Hurley and

Nelson, with the now familiar stipulation that there had to be thorough

preparation and mature consideration before Stilwell was actually given

command.55

Therefore when the President returned to Washington on 17 August he

found H. H. Kung ready with the Generalissimo's detailed preconditions and

Marshall and Stimson with the Generalissimo's agreement to Hurley's mission.

The President talked to Kung, heard the Generalissimo's preconditions, and

brushed them aside. In answering the Chinese leader's memorandum and

several radios, the President urged the importance of speed in setting up

Stilwell's command, and said that Kung had informed him the Generalissimo

would take the administrative steps necessary to carry out his agreement to put

Stilwell in command.

General Hearn presented the message on 23 August:

I am glad that you find General Hurley and Mister Nelson acceptable for the important

missions they will perform for us. Now that my personal representatives to you have been

decided upon, I think we should proceed immediately to take the positive steps demanded

by the military situation. I urge that you take the necessary measures to place General

Stilwell in command of the Chinese force, under your direction, at the earliest possible date.

50

 (1) Interv with Hurley, Jan 49. (2) Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 538. 51

 CM-OUT 75342, Marshall to Stilwell, 4 Aug 44. 52

 CM-IN 3986, Stilwell to Marshall, 5 Aug 44. Stilwell's old Army nickname, dating back to his tour of duty at the Infantry School, was Vinegar Joe. 53

 Rad WH 39, Roosevelt to Generalissimo, 9 Aug 44. Item 59, OPD Exec 10. 54

 Bk IX, Hopkins Papers. Also see Sunderland notes on the Hopkins Papers. OCMH. 55

 Memo, Marshall for President, 12 Aug 44, with Incl, Ltr, Generalissimo to Roosevelt, 12 Aug

44. China File (Hurley), Item 61, OPD Exec 10.
THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 417

Extended deliberations and perfection of arrangements may well have fateful consequences

in the light of the gravity of the military situation.

In my position I can well appreciate your political problems and particularly the political

difficulty of installing an American officer in the desired command position. I feel certain,

however, that between General Hurley and General Stilwell there will be an adequate comprehension of the political problems you face. I am urging action in the matter of Stilwell's

appointment so strongly because I feel that, with further delay, it may be too late to avert a

military catastrophe tragic both to China and to our Allied plans for the early overthrow of

Japan.

As to matters of detail which Doctor Kung presented: I do not think the forces to come

under General Stilwell's command should be limited except by their availability to defend

China and fight the Japanese. When the enemy is pressing us toward possible disaster, it

appears unsound to refuse the aid of anyone who will kill Japanese.

I am not suggesting Stilwell's title but I think it ought to imply that directly under you

he commands the armed forces in China—that of the head of the state with his commander

in the field.

I feel sure that General Hurley will be highly useful in promoting relations which will

facilitate General Stilwell's exercise of command and his understanding of the related political problems, and that it will not be necessary to delay matters until each detail is considered

and settled.

I propose proposing a new arrangement for handling lend-lease matters, relieving

General Stilwell of his burden, and will communicate my proposal to you later.

Doctor Kung informs me that you will take the necessary administrative steps to implement our agreement. In this message I have been most frank, my sole effort being directed

toward the freedom of China and the complete defeat of Japan at the earliest possible

moment. General Hurley and Mister Nelson will leave here about August twenty-third.

I had a most successful inspection trip in Hawaii and the Aleutian Islands and Alaska.

I think we have Japan very much worried and that by continuing the pressure every day her

position will become still worse.

My warm regards,

ROOSEVELT 56

The President having accepted Hurley as his representative, the two men

proceeded to discuss his mission. The President ordered that Hurley's principal

mission be to promote efficient and harmonious relations between the Generalissimo and Stilwell and to facilitate Stilwell's exercise of command of the

Chinese armies to be placed under his direction.57 Hurley was ordered to

Chungking via Moscow, to discuss Sino-Russian relations with the Soviet

Government. During Vice-President Wallace's trip to Chungking, Mr. Wallace

and the Generalissimo had discussed the Chinese Communist issue, and the

56

 Memo, Hearn for Generalissimo, 23 Aug 44. Item 7, OKLAHOMA File, JWS Personal File. The original memorandum, initialed by Stimson and Marshall, and showing the two minor changes made by Roosevelt, is in China File (Hurley), Item 61, OPD Exec 10. 57

 (1) Memo, President for Hurley, 17 Aug 44. Item 6, Bk 1, Hurley Papers. (2) See also a letter, Roosevelt to Chiang, 19 August 1944, which states: "[Hurley's] principal mission is to coordinate the whole military picture under you as Military Commander-in-Chief—you being, of course, the Commander-in-Chief of the whole area—to help to iron out any problems between you and General Stilwell who, of course, has problems of his own regarding the Burma campaign and

is necessarily in close touch with Admiral Mountbatten." Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.: His Personal

Letters, 1928-1945 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), II, 1530.
418 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Generalissimo on other occasions had expressed to the President his concern

over the attitude of the Soviet Union. Having been ordered to concern himself

with the political aspects of military operations, Hurley would need the widest

understanding of the forces playing upon China if he were to obtain the

co-operation of the central government's forces with those of the Chinese

Communists.58

General Hurley received a briefing from the War Department which

presumably did not cover the evolution of the views of the Joint and Combined

Chiefs of Staff on the North Burma Campaign, for Hurley took up his mission

unaware that Stilwell had begun the North Burma Campaign in compliance

with orders from Southeast Asia Command based in turn on directives of the

Combined Chiefs of Staff approved by the President and the Prime Minister.59

Washington Plans To End Stilwell's Lend-Lease Powers

While Hurley and Nelson were en route to China, the Operations Division

of the War Department suggested that the China, Burma and India Theater be

split to create a U.S. theater of operations in each of the two geopolitical areas,

China and India-Burma, and that Stilwell be divested of his responsibilities for

lend-lease. Such an arrangement would go far to smooth Stilwell's path. Ever

since the summer of 1942, Chinese impatience with the lend-lease allocations of

the Munitions Assignments Board had taken the form of accusations that

Stilwell was somehow to blame, accusations which derived an air of reality from

the fact that he controlled the time and place of delivery. OPD's suggestion

would free Stilwell of concern for the major logistical problems of the CBI

Theater, and would give the Generalissimo's government a much greater voice

in lend-lease matters. Stilwell could then concentrate on troop command in the

field, and on support of the U.S. drive across the Pacific.

For the proposed India-Burma theater, OPD suggested that it be commanded by some other general, who would discharge his responsibilities in India

via a deputy while he served in person as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander

of SEAC. Command of the Allied forces in north Burma would be given to

another American officer directly under Admiral Mountbatten. OPD expected

that SEAC, in accord with the CCS June 1944 directive, would continue operations to secure the trace of the Ledo Road. The Commanding General, IndiaBurma Theater, who would probably be Lt. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan, Stilwell's

deputy, would inherit the delicate problem of co-ordinating American operations in India with those of the Government of India and India Command,

while at the same time he would be responsible for logistical support of Stilwell

58

 (1) CM-IN 6517, Hurley to Roosevelt, 8 Sep 44. (2) U.S. Department of State, United

States Relations with China, pp. 549-60. (3) For the Generalissimo's apprehensions of Soviet

intentions, see Chapter VIII, above. 59

 (1) Interv with Hurley, Mar 50. (2) See Stilwell's Mission to China, Chs. IX and X, and

Chs. I and II, above.
THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 419

in China and of the Allied forces in north Burma.60 The Joint Chiefs of Staff

would set broad policy on the allocation of airlifted tonnage to China, and in

so doing would be guided by Stilwell's wishes. As of 26 August, JCS policy on

Hump tonnage allocation gave first priority to the tonnage necessary to maintain, develop, broaden, and secure the air link to China to insure adequate air

bases there.61 The projected India-Burma theater would have the policy-making authority inherent in its role of logistical support. If the new theater and

Stilwell disagreed, then the matter would be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Acting for General Marshall, General Handy accepted the OPD proposal

and relayed it to Stilwell for his comment, ending his radio with the remark:

"As in the past most of the foregoing is an irregular arrangement, but between

the Government of India, SEAC, the Hump problem, the Chinese Ledo Road

Force, the Generalissimo's position and personality, and your dominating

mission to save the military situation in China, nothing less than the

complicated setup will meet the various requirements of the situation. . . ."

 62

Stilwell at first did not like the proposed command setup, saying that it

would be more complicated than the old. If the present arrangement was

continued, he thought the only irritating factor would be lend-lease:

If I have nothing to do with that, I will report with an empty satchel. At Cairo, the

President told Chiang Kai-shek, as I remember it, that he would equip 60 Chinese divisions,

and even 30 more if necessary. CKS will be looking for deliveries. We are now restricted to

30 divisions plus 10%. The question is: How do I play it? I can tell him that 30 plus 10% is

the limit, or that we will make good on the other understanding. In either case, it does not

make any difference who administers lend-lease because the Chinese will expect me to be

able to influence it. The basic question is whether or not we will make good, and this will

be very important in Chinese eyes. In brief, Sultan can handle everything except lend-lease

and I will be blamed for that anyway.

After offering some comments on command relations and assignments in

SEAC, Stilwell stated:

I should welcome a more definite and less complicated mission. Your proposal accomplishes this as far as I am concerned, but I believe it weakens our position here generally.

If you leave the present set-up in India, I can go to China with very little on my mind. If I

can get definite guidance on how far we are prepared to go with lend-lease I can do better

than if I shrug my shoulders and tell them someone else is responsible. The only concern

then is command of the CAI [Chinese Army in India]. . . .63

In reply, the War Department reminded Stilwell that SEAC might argue

that the Chinese were responsible for defending the trace of the Ledo Road

once it was opened. Therefore, were Stilwell to command the Chinese Army

60

 Sultan became a lieutenant general, AUS, on 2 September 1944. 61

 Memo for Record, citing WAR 87083, JCS to Stilwell, 26 Aug 44. Case 557/5, 21 Nov 43, OPD 381 Security, A47-30. 62

 (1) CM-OUT 89892, Handy (sgd Marshall) to Stilwell, 31 Aug 44. (2) See pp. 379-80,

above. 63

 Rad CRA 12616, Stilwell to Marshall, 2 Sep 44. SNF 218.
420 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

he would have to reach some agreement with SEAC on Chinese operations in

Burma. Concerning lend-lease, the reply stated that two problems faced the

War Department as it weighed the increase in shipments to China that would

follow the opening of a land route: (1) the commitments made at Cairo; (2)

administration of lend-lease to a Chinese Army which might include both

Nationalist and Communist troops, if the two did unite to war against Japan.

Captured German matériel would offer one source of supply. The Department

stated that it was exploring every possibility of creating a new arrangement that

would relieve Stilwell of all responsibility for the troublesome problems of

lend-lease so that he might devote his time to commanding troops. The War

Department had in mind establishment of a Sino-American board in Chungking making its requests direct to Washington. Once decisions were reached by

higher authority in Washington, the U.S. Army would deliver supplies to the

Chinese at the front. Such a procedure, the Department hoped, would give the

Chinese a status like that enjoyed by the Great Powers, while the United States'

interests would be safeguarded in that title would not pass until the arms were

literally in the soldiers' possession.64

After weighing the War Department's comments, Stilwell withdrew his

objections to the proposed split in the CBI Theater. If the War Department

could find good men to fill the new command posts that would be created,

Stilwell believed the solution would be sound. He believed too that the new

lend-lease arrangement (relieving him of responsibility) would be a great improvement over the old (under which he controlled time and place of delivery).

Though the use of captured German matériel would multiply the types of

weapons and ammunition in China, and create a new spare parts problem, as

a stopgap until U.S. matériel could be provided it would be acceptable.65

In none of these exchanges did Stilwell reveal any enthusiasm for essaying

the role of commander of the Chinese Army. The initiative had come from the

War Department, and he had responded dutifully, first from Burma, and then

from Ceylon, where as deputy he was substituting for Mountbatten. During

these latter weeks of pleasant interlude Stilwell had enjoyed himself immensely,

and his diaries suggest that his interests were those of any holiday seeker to

whom the telegram from the office comes as an interruption.

At this same time, his political adviser, John Davies, was of the opinion

that Stilwell would be skeptical of any command post he might receive in

China. On 4 September, in faraway Washington, Davies carefully recorded a

long discussion he had had with Harry Hopkins, who was an enthusiastic

partisan of Chennault's, and sent a copy to Stilwell.

After a few remarks about Madame Chiang, Donald Nelson, and H. H.

Kung, Hopkins turned to the command question. Davies recalled his saying:

64

 CM-OUT 25105, Marshall to Stilwell, 4 Sep 44. 65

 CM-IN 6882, Stilwell to Marshall, 8 Sep 44.
THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 421

The Generalissimo's latest messages seemed to indicate that he is willing for General

Stilwell to assume command of all Allied troops in China, including the Chinese. He

[Hopkins] suggested that it was felt that only a foreign commander such as General Stilwell

could command both Central Government and Communist troops. I remarked that in view

of his experiences in the first Burma campaign I found it hard to believe that General

Stilwell would not be skeptical of the degree of control which he could exert over Chinese

army commanders. I said that I foresaw his authority being undercut at every turn.

This comment apparently came as a surprise to Mr. Hopkins. He declared that General

Stilwell had not indicated any doubt of his ability effectively to command Chinese troops.

He asked whether or not the American command of Chinese forces in north Burma had not

been a success. I replied that it had been but that in India and Burma we had far more control over Chinese units than we have had or will have in China. I went on to say that

General Stilwell might successfully exert command but that all of the way it would be a hard

battle against Chinese recalcitrance, lethargy, and indifference, and that I was sure General

Stilwell would be the first to admit this. Nevertheless, full of pitfalls as such an arrangement

might be, it seemed to me that the alternative—which was to leave the Chinese to liquidate

the Japanese armies in China—was a pretty hopeless solution, and I thought that General

Stilwell felt the same way.

Mr. Hopkins stated that General Stilwell would have a great deal of power because the

White House would in this arrangement work directly through General Marshall to General

Stilwell.

In the course of this discussion Mr. Hopkins commented explosively on the inefficacy of

the Chinese army. He quoted the Russian criticism—if Tito with his small forces and

resources could perform effectively, why was Chiang Kai-shek unable to do likewise?66

The conversation left the command question, and both men agreed that

civil war in postwar China was inevitable; that if the Generalissimo did not

suppress the Communists, the Chinese Communists would remove him. The

conversation drifted to Europe, then back to China, more specifically, to the

Stilwell-Chennault feud.67

Apparently quite a few of General Chennault's boy colonels have called at the White

House. Mr. Hopkins was tremendously impressed by their youth, their adventures, and their

fanatical devotion to Chennault. He remarked that Chennault is one of the most remarkable

characters he has met, that the General is highly disliked within the Army but (and this he

said with vehemence) the Army does not dare and will not be able to purge Chennault. He

intimated that one reason is that Chennault will not remain in the Army after the war and

may be expected to speak frankly and publicly. He concluded that events, however, had

proved that General Stilwell's and not General Chennault's strategy with regard to China

was correct. Mr. Hopkins believed that Chennault's position with the Generalissimo and

leading Chinese officials had been impaired by their realization of this.68

On the same day that Davies and Hopkins talked together in Washington,

Hurley and Nelson arrived in India after a brief stay in Moscow. There the

Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, had assured General Hurley

that the Chinese Communists were not true Communists at all, an assurance

that Hurley accepted and relayed to Washington. Stilwell was waiting for the 66

 Memo of Conv, Hopkins with Davies, 4 Sep 44, Washington. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. 67

 See Stilwell's Mission to China, Chs. VIII and IX. 68

 Memo of Conv cited n. 66.
422 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

CHUNGKING CONFERENCE. Surrounded by Chinese officers, General Stilwell

is photographed with Donald Nelson (left) and General Hurley (right).

American emissaries in New Delhi, because on 26 August he had received word

that the Generalissimo wanted him to accompany Hurley and Nelson to

Chungking for "important discussions."

 69

 There were some informal,

unrecorded conferences on 4 and 5 September, then the Americans left for

Chungking to confer with the Generalissimo.70

The Talks Begin

Arriving at Chungking with a minimum of ceremony on 6 September,

Stilwell and Hurley conferred with Ambassador Gauss and discussed the

political crisis in China. Early the next day the Generalissimo's headquarters

called, summoning Stilwell to meet with the Generalissimo at 0930. Hurley and

Nelson were to see the Generalissimo at 1100. When Stilwell arrived, the

Generalissimo was pleasant in manner and businesslike in approach.

Remarking that in the past Stilwell's work had been 100 percent military,

69

 (1) Msg cited n. 58(1). (2) The Stilwell Papers, p. 314. (3) Rad CFB 21690, Hearn to Stilwell, 26 Aug 44. Item 2769, Bk 7, JWS Personal File. 70

 The Stilwell Papers, p. 314.
THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 423

the Generalissimo said that now as commander of the Chinese Army Stilwell's

work would be 60 percent military and 40 percent political, that Stilwell would

receive orders from him through the National Military Council. If Stilwell

used the Communists, those troops would have to acknowledge the authority

of the National Military Council.71

When Hurley and Nelson saw the Generalissimo at 1100, the Chinese

statesman told the American negotiators that he would give Stilwell full command of all Chinese forces in the field, and with it his full confidence. In reply,

Hurley said that the President proposed that Stilwell's new command be

modeled on the integrated Anglo-American command that General Eisenhower had set up in Europe, and that Stilwell must have the Generalissimo's

full authority and confidence in undertaking his new assignment.

The Generalissimo's comments suggested to Hurley that he did not understand how Eisenhower's headquarters functioned, but the Generalissimo was

emphatic in his desire for a new Chinese services of supply staffed by Americans.

The Chinese leader added that any Communists serving under Stilwell would

have to submit to Chiang's control.72

When Stilwell returned to his desk he found a radio from Lindsey's headquarters in east China, sketching the situation there in drab colors. A Z-FOS

observer, who had just returned from XXVII Group Army, reported that

XXVII, now whittled down to 8,000 effectives, was falling back steadily from

Heng-yang with no attempt to contact or delay the Japanese. Its automatic

weapons, small arms, and ammunition were described as "surprisingly adequate." This group army had two batteries of 75-mm. howitzers with American

liaison officers attached, but "their use of these guns has been tragically ineffective. Old story of using one gun with remainder kept back for safekeeping."

The 93d, 31st, and 46th Armies were appraised as comparatively well equipped

and supplied. The trouble, in American eyes, lay in the command situation,

which to Z-FOS appeared as follows:

46th Army is out of the picture because of its location. Similarly other armies on the

flanks of the salient [which the Japanese had driven through east China from north to

south] will not influence the situation because of their reluctance or inability to attack.

Armies listed above are under 4th War Zone control with Chang Fa-kwei in command.

Actually he has little or no control of them due to his persona non grata status with Chungking. Hsueh Yueh cannot or will not exercise command in 4th War Zone and he will stay

by 9th War Zone. An outsider from Chungking would be a figure head. . . . No one here

in power can tell us whether a stand will be made, who controls communications, when

demolitions are planned on routes, or where 14th Air Force should best be used. With no

real authority here we are just floundering. . . .73

There was also trouble on the Salween front. Unknown to the Allies, the

71

 Stilwell Diary, 7 Sep 44. 72

 (1) CM-IN 6498, Stilwell to Marshall, 7 Sep 44. (2) Msg cited n. 58(1). 73

 Rad Kweilin 40356, Lindsey to Stilwell, 7 Sep 44. SNF 30.
424 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Japanese Burma Area Army, after giving up the attack on India, planned a

limited offensive on the Salween front to re-establish a firm grip on the Burma

Road. The 2d Infantry Division and a regiment of the 49th Division were moved

to north Burma from the Irrawaddy Delta of south Burma.

On 23 August the Japanese commander at Lung-ling had notified the 56th

Division that his situation was hopeless. Next day the division commander sent

the 3/148 forward from Mang-shih to reinforce. On the 26th the 56th Division

intervened in strength to drive the Chinese off the Burma Road south of Lungling and save its besieged garrisons. Some 6,000 Japanese struck the roadblock the Chinese had set up below Lung-ling to isolate the town. The Chinese

began to fall back. Meanwhile, the 2d Division was hurrying toward the scene of

action.74

Because all of his immediate reserves had been drawn into the fight for

Lung-ling, and considering that the Chinese Government had ignored his

earlier pleas, Wei Li-huang asked General Dorn to present his further requests

for 20,000 trained replacements (Wei had not received one since the offensive

began); for two more divisions; for permission to use the 5th Army's tank

battalion; and for Pao-shan to be developed as a supply base. Dorn was partially

successful in that the National Military Council renewed its promises to send

replacements.

Meanwhile, in Burma, the Japanese were bringing up the 2d Division. On

5 September the 2d and 56th Divisions opened their counteroffensive, the DAN

operation, with 12,000 men. The 56th Division struck the northern arc of the

Chinese positions around Lung-ling on the 8th. The Chinese Honorable 1st

Division resisted stoutly, and the battle began to grow in intensity, the Chinese

greatly handicapped by the gaps in their ranks.75

On 8 September Hurley took up his role as negotiator. With Stilwell and

Nelson he visited a session of the National Military Council, and Stilwell

entertained Gen. Ho Ying-chin, Chinese Army Chief of Staff, and a group of

senior Chinese officers. From Gen. Yu Ta-wei, chief of Chinese ordnance, he

learned that the Generalissimo wanted the Chinese Army in India to leave at

once from Myitkyina, which the Chinese had held since 3 August, and attack

toward Lung-ling.

Hurley was closeted with the Generalissimo, and later with T. V. Soong.

Restored to the Generalissimo's favor after a long hiatus that followed the

abortive attempt to have Stilwell recalled in October 1943, Soong was now to

play a prominent part in the negotiations. Soong restated the Chinese conditions for Stilwell's actually taking up his new duties, among them, control of

lend-lease, and Hurley demurred emphatically. The Generalissimo made a

constructive suggestion, that Hurley and Stilwell prepare an agenda for the

74

 Japanese Officers' Comments, p. 36. 75

 (1) Y-FOS 1944 Hist Rpt. (2) Wood Report. (3) Japanese Studies 93, 148. (4) Japanese Officers' Comments, p. 37.
THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 425

GENERAL STILWELL ENTERTAINS AT LUNCHEON. Stilwell is shown with

Vice Adm. Yang Hsuan-cheng and General Hurley.

talks. The Generalissimo proposed to meet the Communist troop issue by

incorporating the Communists into the Chinese Army if they would submit to

his command.76

In compliance with the Generalissimo's suggestion, Hurley, after consulting

Stilwell, began drafting an agenda. The Generalissimo's 7 September hint, that

he would like his services of supply reorganized, also resulted in action, as

General Sultan and General Covell, Commanding General, SOS in CBI Theater,

arrived in Chungking. Over 9, 10, and 11 September, Stilwell, Sultan, and

Covell conferred with the Chinese military on supply matters, and Hurley

completed the agenda. With this preliminary spadework done, Hurley and

Stilwell returned to confer again with the Generalissimo on 12 September, and

the pace of the command discussions now began to quicken.

The agenda Hurley presented on 12 September covered ten points:

1. The paramount objective of Chinese-American collaboration is to bring about the

unification of all military forces in China for the immediate defeat of Japan and the liberation

of China.

76

 (1) Stilwell Diary, 8 Sep 44. (2) Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. X. (3) Rad CFB 22988, Hurley to President, 23 Sep 44. China File (Hurley), Item 61, OPD Exec 10.
426 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

2. To cooperate with China in bringing about closer relations and harmony with Russia and Britain for the support of the Chinese objectives.

3. The unification of all military forces under the command of the Generalissimo.

4. The marshaling of all resources in China for war purposes.

5. Support efforts of Generalissimo for political unification of China on a democratic

basis.

6. Submit present and postwar economic plans for China.

7. Definition of the powers of General Stilwell as Field Commander.

8. Definition of General Stilwell's powers as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo. 9. Prepare for presentation a diagram of command.

10. Discuss future control of lend-lease in China.

At Soong's suggestion, the phrase "on a democratic basis" was struck from

point 5. The Generalissimo agreed to the "objectives" in the first six points;

then, coming to Stilwell, said that Stilwell's powers would have to be defined

in an international agreement.77

After the conference, Stilwell recorded his understanding that the

Generalissimo would give him command:

Gmo, Hurley, and I. Gmo said: Reds must obey NMC. Have you (JWS) inspected the

Reds? In the past your work has been 100% military, now it will be 60% military and 40%

political [Stilwell's italics]. We must reorganize our SOS. ("Will appoint JWS to command

the field forces, and with the appointment goes my full confidence.")78

Therefore the time seemed ripe for Stilwell to suggest, and Hurley to frame, the

American proposals for Stilwell's command role.

American Proposals, 12-13 September 1944

The draft outlines of Stilwell's new powers, and for his exercise of those

powers, which Stilwell and Hurley shaped over 12 and 13 September fall into

three groups. First were those that Stilwell sketched for his own guidance, his

estimates of what he would do on assuming command. Second, were Stilwell's

suggestions to Hurley for the paper that Hurley would place before the Generalissimo. Third, and last, were the actual proposals as Hurley wrote them for

the Generalissimo's consideration.

For his own personal guidance, Stilwell roughly outlined a draft of a circular

telegram to be issued by him to all war area and group army commanders when

he assumed command:

To War Zone and Group Army Commanders:

G-Mo has — — — [dashes and blank space left by Stilwell]. Lacking in ability,

etc. My need for your assistance and cooperation is great. Without it can't accomplish anything. With your help we can do much. I hope you will look upon me as a true friend of

China. My only thought is to defeat the Japanese and have China take her place with the

Great Powers, strong and free. To do this we must make every effort to strengthen and

improve the Army. I am asking for your full support in this endeavor.

77

 Rad cited n. 76(3). 78

 (1) This brief note, in Stilwell's hand, is dated "12 Sept" in the upper right hand corner, and was in the command folder that Stilwell accumulated on the fall 1944 crisis. Stilwell Docu- ments, Hoover Library. (2) Stilwell Diary, 12 Sep 44.
THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 427

There may be some of you who say: "What is this foreigner doing here?" I ask you not

to think of me in that way. I have spent many years in China. I have travelled all over the

country, I respect the Chinese people and their character, I have seen the Chinese soldier

fight, and I have always stood up for him and the Chinese people. I hope that you will

believe I am China's true friend.

Now the G-mo has honored me by appointing me to command the Field Forces. This

great honor makes me very conscious of my shortcomings. The responsibility is great and

my ability small. To accomplish anything I must have the support and cooperation of you

all. Only in this way can I hope to tui te ch'i Kuo Chia, tui te ch'i [unify and save China for]

the Generalissimo.

As I see the situation, China is close to exhaustion after her long struggle of 71⁄2 years.

The Army needs supplies and weapons, and it is to open a road from India and get them in

that I have been working for 21⁄2 years. The air ferry is not enough. We must have a road

in order to bring in what we need. Even that will not be enough. We need a port on the sea

so that American ships can deliver to us by a shorter route in less time and in greater

quantity.

We cannot expect our Allies to do this unaided. We must still depend on ourselves. The

G-mo has said that the brunt of the effort in Asia must still be borne by China, and it is our

task to prepare for that effort. We have the means to do it. We have the manpower, and we

can get the weapons. I know the Chinese soldier. I have seen him fight, and he is as good as

any in the world. China's army can make her strong and keep her free. We must make every

effort to rebuild the Army. It is for this I need your support and ask your cooperation. It can

be done, but only if all of us work together in harmony with our eyes on our goal.79

The steps that Stilwell contemplated after formally assuming command he

listed as follows:

Gmo public announcement. Radios to WZ etc. JWS to WZ CG's, repeat Gp A's.

Conf. [with] Reds—Ch'en Ch'eng—Hsueh Yueh—Chang Fa-kwei.

Select training area and concentrate.

Orders to 14th AF.

Allocate tonnage and items.

Get money in rupees.

Set up med. estab. (Armstrong) [medical establishment under the theater surgeon].

Set up attacks on Ichang—Loyang—Shansi.

Planes to supply Reds from Chengtu. Dump at Chengtu.

US appts [appointments] as fu shih [temporary] changes.

ACTION in NMC.

Consolidation of Units.

Relief and appt, reward and punish, promotion and demotion.

Get the art. [artillery] together.

Replacement centers. Inspect and reorganize.

Pull in units from East.

Take over provincial troops.80

79

 JWS Misc Papers, 1944. 80

 Note in Stilwell's hand, undated, in manila envelope with September 1944 papers. Stilwell

Documents, Hoover Library. It seems safe to date this paper and the preceding as 12 or 13 September 1944 because earlier the Generalissimo was not sufficiently committed to Stilwell's assuming command to make it worth while for Stilwell to make such studies. On 13 September Stilwell flew to east China and was busy there for several days. On his return to Chungking he found the situ- ation so completely changed that the papers he then wrote, which he dated, are entirely different

from the earlier papers in subject, tone, and outlook.
428 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Writing to Hurley on 13 September, Stilwell pointed out that the title and

role of Joint Chief of Staff meant little until other Allied forces were in China

Theater. Therefore he suggested that his new title be Field Commander of the

Chinese Army with no reference to the chief of staff function. Then he added:

"If General Stilwell is to work satisfactorily he should get his orders direct from

the Generalissimo. A copy of these orders should go to the National Military

Council, and the Council should work with General Stilwell ways and means

of putting them into effect."

 81

On the several issues involved in command of the Chinese Army, Stilwell

offered six points which faithfully reflected the War Department's views as

expressed to him on 31 August and 4 September 1944:82

1. General Stilwell's function must be primarily command and operational with no

responsibility for administration beyond general supervision. The situation is too critical to

attempt any changes in procedure. The present machinery should not be disturbed. Any

malfunctioning should be corrected by changes in personnel rather than by changes in

organization.

This is true of all supply agencies. Different methods can perhaps be suggested to improve

the system, but the system itself should not be disturbed.

2. The National Military Council must give its full support and cooperation to General

Stilwell. He will not attempt anything beyond its capabilities, and will consult on plans.

3. All the Chinese Armed Forces, air as well as ground, are included in General Stilwell's

command.

4. General Stilwell must have the authority to support his responsibility. This must

include the right to reward and punish, to relieve and appoint officers, all in conformity with

Chinese law.

5. The Generalissimo must announce General Stilwell's appointment and authority and

direct all concerned to act suitably. The Generalissimo must give General Stilwell a suitable

authenticating seal and a written commission and directive, setting forth his powers and

limitations.

6. Lend-lease will be handled by an American commission sitting in Chungking, with a

Chinese representative. The assignment of matériel will be in conformity with accepted plans

for the first two groups of 30 Divisions each.83

In his comments on supply, Stilwell was reflecting the advice of his SOS

commander, General Covell. After conferring with the Chinese Covell had

recommended no material change in the Chinese SOS organization, but rather

a clearer definition of official responsibilities and centralized control of transport

and communications.84

In an earlier draft of the memorandum to Hurley, Stilwell indicated his

conception that any arrangements with the Chinese Communists should be

81

 One copy of this memorandum is Item 14, Book 1, Hurley Papers; the other is an unsigned

memorandum, dated 13 September 1944, in type and Stilwell's hand, in the Stilwell Command

File. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. 82

 Rads cited ns. 62(1) and 64. 83

 Memo, Stilwell for Hurley, 13 Sep 44. Stilwell Command File, Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. General Hurley's copy is Item 16, Book 1, in the Hurley Papers. 84

 Memo, Covell for Stilwell, 13 Sep 44, sub: SOS of Chinese Army, Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 429

purely military in nature and limited to the current crisis. He wrote: "3. The

18th Group Army (Reds) will be used. There must be no misunderstanding on

this point. They can be brought to bear where there will be no conflict with

Central Government troops, but they must be accepted as part of the team

during the crisis."

 85

 (Nowhere in the War Department files or in Stilwell's

private papers were there found any suggestions from Stilwell that the Chinese

Communists should enter the Generalissimo's Government, nor are there any

indications that he was ever given any orders to propose such an arrangement

to the Generalissimo.)

Hurley weighed Stilwell's suggestions and, with Stilwell's approval, drafted

two papers for the Generalissimo. One was an order of appointment, the other

a proposed directive from the Generalissimo to Stilwell. Both were in the

Generalissimo's hands before 16 September, probably a day or two before.

Hurley's proposed order of appointment ran:

I, Chiang Kai-shek, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President and Commander

in Chief of the armed forces of the Republic of China, with the advice and approval of the

National Military Council, do hereby appoint General Joseph W. Stilwell, Field Commander, of the Ground and Air Forces of the Republic of China. He will be responsible

directly to me for the operations of these forces.

The National Military Council will give its full support to operations of the Ground and

Air Forces of the Republic of China. General Stilwell will consult with the National Military

Council in the preparation of plans of operation, for coordination of supply and

administration.

General Stilwell is hereby authorized to reward and punish, to appoint and relieve officers,

all in conformity with Chinese law.

General Stilwell is hereby authorized to issue orders for the operations of the Ground

and Air Forces of the Republic of China over an authenticating seal, an impression of which

appears below.

This order will be published to all commanders and units of the Ground and Air Forces

of the Republic of China. . . .

The proposed directive from the Generalissimo to Stilwell said:

You will proceed at once with the reorganization and relocation of Ground and Air

Forces of the Republic of China and with the preparation of plans for a counter-offensive,

by the Allied Forces in the China Theater, to regain the areas of China now occupied by the

Japanese.

In carrying out this mission, you are authorized to activate and equip new units; to

disband old units; to transfer personnel from one unit to another and to transfer units from

one command to another and from one locality to another without regard to the jurisdiction

of commanders or of provincial and war area boundaries.

In the course of reorganization, surplus officers will be ordered to report to the

Commanding General, Officer Replacement Center, which will be established by the

National Military Council.

You will coordinate your plans for reorganization and operations with the National

85

 Memo in Stilwell's hand, undated, in SNF 30. Because of the changed situation after Stilwell

returned from Kweilin on 15 September this paper would appear to belong to the 12-13 September group.
430 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Military Council to insure that the necessary supply and administrative details are

coordinated with your plans.

You will initiate at once plans to improve the livelihood (living conditions) of the

officers and soldiers of the Ground and Air Forces of the Republic of China so that it will be

at least equal to that of the people in the rear areas.

You are authorized to requisition supplies for the Ground and Air Forces of the Republic

of China in the areas where they are stationed, giving a receipt for such supplies. Said

receipt will show the date and place of requisition, the name of the person from whom requisitioned, the name, quantity and current local price on each item. Receipts as given will be

redeemed by the National Military Council.86

In the proposed directive may be read what Stilwell thought was wrong

with the Chinese Army and what he proposed to do about it: amalgamate

units to bring the better ones up to Table of Organization strength, weed out

and dismiss surplus officers, move units from one war area to another as the

military situation might require, feed the soldier an adequate diet, and pay for

what the soldier ate. Here were the Army reforms that Stilwell had urged on

the Generalissimo in one memorandum after another in 1942 and 1943, memorandums to which, as a rule, the Generalissimo had not replied.87

 Now, in

September 1944, Stilwell through Hurley was asking for power to put them

into effect.

While the Chinese considered their response, Stilwell prepared to go to

east China. The military picture appeared gloomy to him, both there and on

the Salween, and Stilwell reported as much to Marshall on 12 September. On

the Salween, General Dorn was seriously disturbed by the steady Japanese

progress at Lung-ling, and Stilwell had come to share his concern. So Stilwell

told his superior that there could be a very serious setback at Lung-ling, after

which the Japanese might even go on to cross the Salween River itself. If they

attempted it, Stilwell did not at the moment know how they could be stopped.

As for negotiations with the Generalissimo, they were "dragging along," for

"the Gmo meanwhile is using up time in arguments over command and the

control of Lend-lease. I will keep you informed."

 88

Stilwell and the Question of the Communists' Role

By 13 September, when Stilwell was ready to visit east China, his American

superiors had somewhat clarified their own ideas on the role the Chinese Communists should play in China Theater, and had informed Stilwell accordingly.

During Wallace's visit the advantages of having both Communists and Nationalists turn their full attention to the war against Japan had been stressed.89

 The

86

 Rad cited n. 76(3). 87

 See Stilwell's Mission to China, Chs. IV, V, VII, X. The Generalissimo did answer two of

Stilwell's 19 September 1943 memorandums on Army reform. 88

 Rad CFB 22467, Stilwell to Marshall, 12 Sep 44. OKLAHOMA File, JWS Personal File. 89

 U.S. Relations With China, pp. 549-60.
THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 431

President had accepted and relayed to the Generalissimo the Joint Chiefs'

suggestion that Stilwell command both the Nationalist and Communist

forces.90 The War Department had told Stilwell it contemplated giving

lend-lease to a Chinese Army that might include Communists as well as

Nationalists.91

What the Chinese Communists thought of the prospect of Stilwell's

assuming command, which would mean orders to them to take the offensive

against Japan, was another question and one that would have to be answered.

Stilwell's diaries and papers show that he and his political advisers had only

begun to explore that question before the climax of the command crisis made

it irrelevant.92

On 27 July 1944, Chou En-lai, the Chinese Communist representative in

Chungking, invited John S. Service, Hearn's political adviser, to call on him

and gave him a long presentation of the Communist views on the whole

Chinese scene. After the talk, Service reported Chou as taking a line which

appears very reminiscent of that of the Generalissimo when questions of command and strategy arose, that is, that they should be discussed in detail after

U.S. lend-lease and U.S. troops were present in China in great quantity.

Manifestly, Chou would be prepared to drive a hard bargain on the command

question.

16. Having in mind [Communist commander in chief] Chu Teh's suggestion to

[Gunther?] Stein of an Allied Supreme Commander in China, I asked whether this would

be advisable or practical. He replied with a strong affirmative but qualified it by saying that

the time for suggestion had not yet come. We should wait until American supplies and men

are coming into China in significant magnitude and the counter-offensive is actually in sight.

The Commander should be American and would be welcome by the Communists, if agreed

to by the Central Government.

17. Regarding the possible enlargement of activities of the present Observer Section,

Chou said that such expansion toward active collaboration would of course be welcomed by

the Communists but would, unless there was a radical change, be opposed by the Central

Government. However, the door was now opened a crack and it might be possible, by following a slow and careful course, to move towards modified collaboration. For this reason

the granting of permission for the Observer Group was a milestone. (I was interested that

here, as well as in other parts of the conversation, Chou was careful to recognize the authority

of the Central Government and the at least potential leadership of the Generalissimo. He

obviously had no expectation that we were going to immediately start on a program of direct

support of the Communist forces.)

 93

90

 See pp. 381-83, 416-17, above. 91

 Rad cited n. 64. 92

 During the command crisis, John Davies was in the United States and was not in close touch

with Stilwell prior to 17 October 1944. Service, though in China, was kept out of the picture by

Stilwell, who confined knowledge of the September negotiations to himself and Hurley on the American side. There is no suggestion in the Stilwell papers that he discussed the negotiations with any of the other political advisers attached to the U.S. Army in China. 93

 Rpt, Service, 28 Jul 44, sub: Conv with Gen Chou En-lai. Item 17, Sec III, Vol I, DIXIE

Mission, OCMH.
432 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Then from Yenan, on 29 August, Service urged that a program for arming

the Chinese Communists with lend-lease weapons be set up. He told Stilwell:

The U.S. Army has made a start in cooperation with the military forces of the Chinese

Communists. So far this has been passive on our part—the tapping of Communist intelligence sources and the rescue of American air crews. The obvious success which this half-way

cooperation has had should lead logically to the consideration of more active measures.

Such military cooperation would begin with our furnishing basic military supplies now

desperately lacked by the Communist forces. It should be supported by training in the effective use of these supplies. It should be planned to lead, as the war in China develops into its

late stages, to actual tactical cooperation of Communist with air and other ground forces.

The physical difficulties of supplying the Communist forces admittedly will be great.

These difficulties can be overcome. But the decision to start this cooperation will involve

questions of both military and political policy. It is sure, to begin with, to meet the strong

and obstinate opposition of the Kuomintang. We must decide whether the gains we can

reasonably expect from aiding the Communists will justify the overcoming — or

disregarding—of this Kuomintang opposition.94

By coincidence, as this report was on its way to Stilwell so, too, were the

War Department radios of 31 August and 4 September which revealed that the

Department was prepared to contemplate giving lend-lease to a Chinese Army

that included Chinese Communists, much as it was currently giving arms to

the Yugoslav partisans. After Stilwell had had a few days to digest all these

matters, as part of his proposals to Hurley for the exact definition of his powers

as field commander in China Stilwell gave his views on the distribution of lendlease. He recommended that it be distributed in accord with "accepted plans for

the first two groups of 30 Divisions each," which made no provision whatever

for any Communist forces. With Stilwell recommending such priorities, it

would be a long time before the Communists received supplies in the

"significant" quantities at which Chou En-lai had hinted.95

Such was Stilwell's attitude when Communist emissaries visited him on

13 September, the day he left for Kweilin and east China. All that is recorded

of the meeting in his diary is that Stilwell told them he would go to Yenan,

that he would meet again with them after he returned from Kweilin, and that

they were much pleased. In the light of events, this suggests that after Stilwell's

position had been settled to the mutual satisfaction of the Generalissimo and

himself he would go to Yenan for the bargaining sessions that would precede

any exercise of command over Communist forces.96 A few weeks later, Stilwell

recorded his belief that it was "common knowledge" that all facts about "Communist trouble [were?] aired by Communists" as well as "their statement that

they would serve under me."

 97

 Possibly the Chinese Communists were seeking

94

 Rpt 16, Service to Stilwell, 29 Aug 44, sub: Desirability of American Mil Aid to Chinese Communist Armies. Item 21, Sec III, Vol I, DIXIE Mission, OCMH. 95

 (1) The War Department radios are discussed on pages 419-20, above. (2) The proposals to Hurley are on page 428, above. 96

 Stilwell Diary, 13 Sep 44. 97

 SUP 67. The grammatical construction of this fragment does not make it clear whether the Communists extended this assurance to Stilwell on 13 September, then made it public knowledge, or whether the assurance was given later and gratuitously to third parties.
THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 433

to improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis the Nationalists by such revelations; possibly the disclosure emerged as part of the gossip and rumor that

swirled through Chungking.

Had Stilwell visited Yenan, his stay might have coincided with a visit by

Japanese emissaries, for according to Marshal Hata, both Japanese and Americans were then thinking of reaching an understanding with the Communists.

Hata's recollection was that in the last six months of 1944 "the Japanese Forces

planned to use the Chinese Communist Forces to suppress the Nationalist

Forces. . . ."

 98

Crisis in the East, Crisis in the West

The Generalissimo's wish that the Chinese troops from Myitkyina intervene

in the fighting around Lung-ling on the Salween front had been conveyed to

Stilwell on 8 September, and repeated on the 11th. It could not be more than

a desire or request, because the Chinese Army in India was under Mountbatten's

command, by the Generalissimo's own order, and Myitkyina lay within

Mountbatten's theater, Southeast Asia Command.99

Nevertheless, it was an expressed desire of the Supreme Commander, China

Theater, to his joint chief of staff, and before departing for Kweilin Stilwell

replied.

Stilwell argued that rather than call upon the 38th and 30th Divisions from

Myitkyina, who were exhausted by siege, to attack the strongly fortified Japanese position at Bhamo, it would be better to fill the depleted ranks of Wei's

divisions. No replacements had reached Wei since the fighting began, and

Stilwell stated bluntly that it was the failure to keep the Salween forces up to

strength that was responsible for the trouble the Japanese were causing at

Lung-ling. He feared too that the Japanese would let their commander at

Bhamo meet the 38th and 30th Divisions with his own resources, while

continuing their counterattack at Lung-ling.100

In east China, phase two of ICHIGO was under way again, with the 11th

Army (seven divisions) driving south down the railway from Heng-yang, and

the 23d Army (two divisions and an independent mixed brigade) north from

Canton. A meeting of the two forces would pinch out the Fourteenth Air

Force's great bases at Kweilin and Liuchow. The 11th Army began its attack on

29 August with six divisions and about 1 September the Chinese began to

retreat. Ling-ling, the next big town south of Heng-yang, fell on 8 September.

The whole of the 23d Army was on the move by the 13th, and so the Japanese

were well on their way into Kwangsi Province which contained the air bases.101

98

 Japanese Officers' Comments, Incl 2, Hata. The field marshal disparaged Communist opera- tions against the Japanese, dismissing them by saying the "Chinese Communists merely resorted

to guerrilla warfare and planned the expansion of the area under their influence and the weakening and disintegration of the Nationalist Forces through the war against Japan." 99

 See Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. X, and Ch. I, above. 100

 Memo, Stilwell for Generalissimo, 12 Sep 44. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. 101

 (1) See p. 319, above. (2) Japanese Study 98.
434 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

After the war, in discussing the performance of the Chinese divisions

supposed to defend Kweilin and Liuchow, the political situation in east China,

and the attitudes of the east China commanders, Marshal Hata remarked that

in his opinion Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi had kept their forces out of

serious fighting in order to conserve them "for the future."

 102

Chinese resistance was light, but with its supply situation improved the

Fourteenth Air Force again did its best on the Salween as well as in east China.

In the week of 13-20 September it dropped 463 tons of bombs and flew 1,469

sorties.103 In all September the Fourteenth Air Force dropped 1,897.6 tons of

bombs and fired 1,281,382 rounds of machine gun ammunition, some of the

latter of course at aerial targets.104

In early September, Japanese fighter reinforcements from the homeland

entered combat. The Japanese were pleased at the performance of the latemodel fighters with one of the air regiments they sent to China. Thanks to the

air cover thus supplied, for the first time in the east China campaign they found

themselves able to move supplies regularly on the Hsiang River, which

paralleled their line of advance, and so thought their prospects "brightened."

 105

Arriving in Kweilin on the morning of 14 September, Stilwell summoned

Gen. Chang Fa-kwei, commander of the IV War Area. General Chang told

Stilwell that the Generalissimo had ordered him to defend Kweilin by placing

three divisions within that walled town, an order that Chang did not like.

Stilwell did not like it either, and hastily sketched out a plan for submission to

the Generalissimo when he returned to Chungking.106

It was necessary to reach painful decisions about the demolition of U.S.

installations at Kweilin. Stilwell's solution was to blow up all but one airfield,

and to keep it open until the last so that if the Generalissimo approved his plan

the means to carry it out might be flown in.

During his stay at Kweilin, Stilwell was told that there had been no

co-operation between Gens. Chang Fa-kwei and Hsueh Yueh during the east

China campaign, that units from Hsueh Yueh's IX War Area had not fallen

back into the IV War Area, and that the Generalissimo had tried to direct the

campaign by long distance from Chungking. Having no illusions about Chang

Fa-kwei's ability to stop General Okamura short of Kweilin, and hoping only

that Chang's troops would not be immured in Kweilin, Stilwell did not interfere with the evacuation of American installations from the area. His notes on

this visit record nothing about the political situation in east China.107

102

 Japanese Officers' Comments, Incl 2, Hata. 103

 Fourteenth AF History, p. 463-A. 104

 Year Book 1944 Covering Operations of Army Air Forces in India-Burma and China Theaters and Eastern Air Command, Statistics Compiled by 22d Statistical Control Unit. OCMH. 105

 Japanese Study 130, p. 13. 106

 The plan is the part of the diary entry of 14 September 1944 beginning with the word

Orders and was submitted to the Generalissimo on 18 September 1944. 107

 (1) Stilwell Diary, 14 Sep 44. (2) The loyalty to the Generalissimo of these commanders, notably Hsueh Yueh, seemed uncertain for many more months. See the Chennault-Wedemeyer radios on Hsueh Yueh's loyalty. Items 432-38, Bks 1 and 2, CG USFCT file 06104-B, CBIT

49-20, DRB AGO.
THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 435

General Stilwell received some good news on the morning of 15 September.

Teng-chung was finally in Chinese hands. With that heartening word he

returned to Chungking. On his arrival, Stilwell and Hurley were summoned to

confer with the Generalissimo.

In this conference it became apparent that the Lung-ling battle which had

so disturbed Stilwell was now alarming the Generalissimo, who told Stilwell

that if the Chinese divisions that had taken Myitkyina did not attack toward

Bhamo within one week, the Generalissimo would pull Wei's divisions back

across the Salween to protect Kunming. Stilwell was "appalled" and protested

strongly, for this was a major step that would end the North Burma Campaign.

It may be surmised that two events made the picture seem a good deal brighter

to Stilwell than it had been a few days earlier. One was the capture of Tengchung, which actually opened a usable route to Myitkyina known as the

"Teng-chung cut-off." The other was the fact that an infantry company, reinforced, moving due east from Myitkyina under orders of theater headquarters,

had established contact with the Y-Force after a nine-day hike. Moreover,

Stilwell believed the situation to be improving at Lung-ling, for just the day

before he had written in his diary: "Dorn's situation not so desperate. 36th

Division, 200th Division, plus 10,000 fillers may save it."

 108

Disgusted and angered, Stilwell said nothing more to the Generalissimo,

neither did he consult with Hurley after the conference, but as he had so often

done in the past hastened to acquaint General Marshall with the latest

development, and sent off his report at 1600 on 15 September:

Returned from Kweilin today. Arrangements made to safeguard American personnel.

Situation that area now hopeless. Only remaining reliable Chinese units will defend Kweilin

by getting inside city. The place will then become another rat trap, like Changsha and Hengyang. These dispositions are by personal order of Gmo. For defense of Liuchow, there remains the remnant of the 93d Army, which is unreliable, and two regiments of militia. The

jig is up in South China. We are getting out of Kweilin now, and will have to get out of

Liuchow as soon as the Japs appear there. The disaster south of the Yangtze is largely due

to lack of proper command and the usual back-seat driving from Chungking. The trouble

continues to be at the top. The Gmo called me in today and proposed a withdrawal from

Lungling to the east side of the Salween. I was appalled and protested strongly, pointing out

that we are fighting for a road to China, and that with Lungling in our possession we control the entire trace of that road. It made no impression on him. He is afraid the Japs will

advance to Kunming if we are beaten at Lungling, but he has failed utterly in keeping the

Y-Force supplied with fillers. It is now down to an effective combat strength of fourteen

thousand and we are making frantic efforts to get replacements flown in. The Gmo says that

if I do not attack from Myitkyina towards Bhamo within a week, he will withdraw the YForce, thus throwing away the results of all our labors. He will not listen to reason, merely

repeating a lot of cock-eyed conceptions of his own invention. I am now convinced that he

regards the South China catastrophe as of little moment, believing that the Japs will not

bother him further in that area, and that he imagines he can get behind the Salween and

there wait in safety for the U.S. to finish the war. Our conferences on command are drag108

 (1) Stilwell Diary, 14 Sep 44. (2) SUP 37. (3) Rad CFB 22638, Stilwell to Marshall, 15

Sep 44. Item 10, OKLAHOMA File, JWS Personal File.
436 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

ging, and tomorrow we are going to try some plain talk with T. V. Soong, in the hope of

getting to the Gmo some faint glimmer of the consequences of further delay and inaction.109

Ironically, on 14 September the Japanese headquarters in north Burma, 33d

Army, had halted the Japanese Salween counteroffensive because of the tenacious Chinese resistance at Lung-ling and the fall of Teng-chung and Sung

Shan. The 33d Army had not intended to cross the Salween; the counteroffensive was planned to relieve pressure on the 56th Division and to bring aid to the

Japanese garrisons of Lung-ling, Teng-chung, and Sung Shan. But communications were slow from the Salween front and Stilwell did not know of the

withdrawal for several days.110 There was further irony in the fact that the monsoon was about to lift, and that full-scale renewal of the Allied offensive in

north Burma was scheduled to begin in a few weeks.111

"I Do Not Seek the Job"

The Generalissimo's proposal to withdraw the Y-Force and give up the

fight to break the blockade of China, his demands to Hurley that China control the distribution of lend-lease, which to Stilwell suggested that only the

Generalissimo's own faction within the Kuomintang would receive arms, made

Stilwell believe the time had come for some "plain talk" to T. V. Soong.112 In

discussing the prospect of his assuming command with the War Department,

Stilwell's radios had revealed no enthusiasm for the role. The first negotiations

with the Generalissimo had been encouraging, then the Chinese leader's desire

to abandon the North Burma Campaign had come as a shock. Moreover, after

his experiences with the Generalissimo's system of command in 1942 and 1944,

Stilwell was anxious that there be no misunderstanding about Stilwell's powers

as a field commander and prepared to make it very plain that he would now

accept command only if his conditions as to freedom and full authority were

met by the Chinese. So Stilwell decided to tell Soong exactly how he felt about

the matter. As was his custom, he drafted his remarks beforehand, and gave a

copy to Hurley.113

Hurley, General Sultan, Stilwell, and Soong conferred on the afternoon of

16 September. The latter two were old acquaintances now, the indomitable,

rough-hewn Stilwell, and the glib, wily Soong, with friends high in the U.S.

administration. They had been allies in the winter of 1942-43; then Soong had

109

 Rad cited n. 108(3). 110

 (1) Japanese Study 93. (2) Stilwell Diary, 17 Sep 44. 111

 History of India-Burma Theater, 1944-1945, I, 90. OCMH. The NCAC field order, dated

10 October, set 15 October as D Day. 112

 The Stilwell Papers, p. 331. 113

 (1) Memo, Stilwell for Soong, 16 Sep 44. Item 24, Bk 1, Hurley Papers. The text was delivered orally to Soong at 1600 on 16 September. (2) A week later, Hurley reported to the President that Stilwell's "chief concern is to avoid having responsibility without adequate authority." Rad CFB 22988, Hurley to President, 23 Sep 44. Incl to Memo, Leahy for Marshall, 25 Sep 44. China File (Hurley), Item 61, OPD Exec 10.
THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 437

become a powerful advocate of General Chennault and in October 1943 sought

to have Stilwell recalled.114

During the conference, Stilwell again defined his conception of the powers

he must have as field commander.115 In his draft memorandum Stilwell called

it "nothing less than full power, including the right of reward and punishment—(summary punishment)—and of appointment and relief. He [the Generalissimo] must accept the appointment of foreigners in some positions. The

commander must be allowed to move units from one war zone to another,

combine units, inactivate units, activate new units, make drafts from one unit

to another, and change organization as he sees fit." Further, "The Generalissimo must refrain from any interference in operations." Stilwell also suggested

major changes in the Chinese military hierarchy, with Gen. Chen Cheng, War

Minister, and Gen. Pai Chung-hsi, Chief of Staff.116

After the conference, Stilwell noted that Soong had been taken aback by a

concept of command so utterly at variance with what the Generalissimo had

in mind. "I know the Generalissimo's mind," remarked Soong, who then told

Stilwell what, in Soong's belief, the Generalissimo wanted. Stilwell was indignant when he described it later that day: "What the Peanut wants is an overall stooge, apparently foisted on him by the US, with a deputy commander for

the Chinese Army! T. V. let that cat out of the bag."

 117

The frame of mind in which Stilwell received this information from T. V.

Soong is suggested by a paragraph from the draft memorandum for Soong:

6. . . . These [remedial steps] should include the appointment of Ch'en Ch'eng as Min.

of War, of Pai Chung-hsi as C/S, and of an over-all commander in whom he has confidence.

Who this is to be is immaterial, but whoever it is has my full sympathy, since he will have

to gather up the broken and dispirited remnants of a beaten army, and with antiquated machinery and inefficient personnel, organize a force to oppose a first-class military power. I

hope that the Generalissimo will realize that I do not seek the job; I have been delayed,

ignored, double-crossed, and kicked around for 21⁄2 years in my attempt to show the Chinese

how they can hold up their heads and regain their self-respect. I have looked forward for 44

years to getting a chance to command American troops, and I could have had it if I had not

been a real friend of China and the Chinese people. I am still ready to do anything I can,

but only under conditions that make a solution possible.118

Therefore Stilwell had told Soong that the Generalissimo's conceptions

"would not do—if I could not have authority, I could not accept responsibility.

And the Gmo would have to keep his fingers out of the pie. We gave TV quite

a shock."

 119

114

 See Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. X. 115

 SUP 37, probably written 16 September, since it is a partly chronological account that stops after the conference of that date. 116

 (1) Memo, Stilwell for Soong, 16 Sep 44. Item 24, Bk 1, Hurley Papers. (2) The Stilwell

Papers, p. 331. 117

 SUP 37. 118

 Memo cited n. 116(1). (2) In his diary for 16 September, Stilwell wrote: "Gave T. V. the works in plain words. I do not want the God-awful job, but if I take it I must have full authority." 119

 (1) SUP 37. (2) Apparently Hurley kept no minutes of this conversation.
438 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Stilwell's very recent experiences in attempting to command Chinese troops

in north Burma would be fresh in his mind and might well make him profoundly skeptical of any seals, orders, or commissions that the Generalissimo

might agree to give him. In December 1943 the Generalissimo had given Stilwell what was represented as unrestricted command of the Chinese Army in

India. The appropriate chop had been issued, together with a formal order

from the Generalissimo. Then in April and May 1944, the behavior of the Chinese 22d and 38th Divisions in north Burma had suggested to the Americans

that they were deliberately disobeying Stilwell's orders to advance. And, senior

Chinese officers of the 22d and 38th Divisions had told Stilwell's liaison officers

that the Generalissimo was giving secret direct orders to Sun and Liao not to

advance, despite his earlier promises that Stilwell could indeed command in

north Burma. These experiences, so like those Stilwell had undergone in Burma

in 1942, would very likely make him feel that unless the President and the War

Department kept constant pressure on the Generalissimo to honor his commitments, a fresh grant of authority from the Generalissimo would prove no more

significant than those which the Generalissimo had ostensibly made in

December 1943 and April 1942.120

Though Stilwell might express private indignation at the Generalissimo's

notions of command, and though he had given Marshall an alarming report

on the military situation, he proceeded on 18 September to submit to the Generalissimo a plan to save the day in east China. This suggests he had no intention of breaking up the current negotiations, and was ready to do what he

could in his dual role of joint chief of staff and U.S. theater commander, however hopeless he might feel. Based on the scheme he outlined in his diary after

conferring with Gen. Chang Fa-kwei on 14 September, Stilwell's plan read:

No. 3 Chialing Village

Chungking

September 18, 1944

MEMORANDUM: Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

For the consideration of the Generalissimo, the following possible plan is presented:

1. It is important to keep pressure on the Japs in South China, to coordinate with the effort in the Pacific. How can this best be done? If the last remaining units are surrounded in

Kweilin, it will only be a question of time before the city is taken. The Japs will then have

no opposition. General Pai Ch'ung-hsi thinks these units are capable of offensive action. If

they are, they could be used in a maneuver battle instead of a static defense, and then even

if unsuccessful, they could still be withdrawn towards Liuchow and continue the fight,

instead of being completely lost at Kweilin.

2. An alternative plan would be to have the 93d Army dig in at Hsing An and hold that

line, to have the 20th Army and any other available troops block off north-east of Kweilin,

and then move the Kweilin garrison out of the city to the west and northwest, and attack

to the east across the Chuan Hsien road. The move would be a surprise, because the Japs

expect a defense at Kweilin. It would protect the airfield at Kweilin, allowing supplies to

120

 (1) See Ch. V, above. (2) See Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. III.
THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 439

reach the troops. It would also gain time for a possible move of the 97th Army forward and

for assembling replacements drawn from Kwangsi province.

At the same time, the remnants of the troops that have been engaged north of Chuan

Hsien could be concentrated in the Kweiyang area, and there re-organized, filled up, trained,

and equipped for further use. This group would then safeguard the eastern approach to Kunming in case the Kweilin garrison has to withdraw on Liuchow.

For the Generalissimo's consideration.

JOSEPH W. STILWELL

Joint Chief of Staff

for the Generalissimo 121

The President Replies

General Stilwell's situation report of 15 September was addressed to General Marshall in Washington. The Operations Division of the General Staff

marked it for action by General Handy as head of OPD and for the information of General Marshall. A copy was promptly relayed to General Marshall

who was then at Quebec, where the President and the Prime Minister were

meeting with the CCS in the OCTAGON Conference, the first to be held after

the Cairo and Tehran Conferences.122

The impact of Stilwell's 15 September radio on the President and the Army

Chief of Staff was in all probability related to the trend of the discussions and

the nature of the decisions at OCTAGON. When the CCS at past conferences

had directed their attention to the problems of China, Burma, and India, they

had had to resolve differences between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British

Chiefs of Staff as to the intrinsic worth and difficulties of operations in Burma

to restore an overland line of communications to China. At the Washington

Conference of May 1943 and the Cairo Conference of December 1943 the reluctance of the British Chiefs of Staff to undertake operations in Burma or to

make a major commitment of British resources to any operations that might

be undertaken seemed apparent to the Americans.123

But the smashing defeats inflicted on the Japanese in May, June, and July

1944 along the Indo-Burmese border and in north Burma were steadily altering the points of view among the British and Americans. Mountbatten pointed

out to the British Chiefs of Staff that the British Fourteenth Army had been

steadily exploiting the Japanese defeat, and in the pursuit was being led into

executing the early phases of one of the then-projected plans for an ambitious

operation against central Burma (CAPITAL). He pointed out that to halt pur121

 Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. 122

 Stilwell's radio was received by the War Department Classified Message Center as CM-IN

14328, 15 September 1944. OPD's message center received it at 1400 on 15 September and gave it limited distribution to the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD (Handy), to the Theater Group, to the

Asiatic Section, to the Strategy and Policy Group, and to Message Center File. Handy's copy

became Item 13 in the Stilwell Special Command File, Item 60, OPD Exec 10. 123

 See Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. IX, and Ch. II, above.
440 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

suit of a beaten enemy would be misunderstood.124 Then, on 1 September, the

British Chiefs of Staff suggested to the CCS a plan earlier discussed between

the British and American chiefs of staff. It proposed an airborne and amphibious assault on the port city of Rangoon (Operation DRACULA). Here was

something much to the liking of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a very welcome compromise between the two differing points of view. It would minimize the

amount of jungle fighting, cut the Japanese line of communications to Burma,

and would be a long step toward reopening the prewar line of communications

from Rangoon north; at the same time it would advance British forces toward

Singapore, on whose capture Churchill placed such stress.125

Approval of DRACULA would necessitate a new directive to SEAC; in the

drafting Marshall and Arnold stressed amending it to emphasize development

of an overland line of communications to China, for they were most anxious

to bring in trucks to relieve the general shortage of transport in China. With

the CCS in such accord and with so hopeful an operation as DRACULA having

been proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff, a new directive to Mountbatten

was speedily agreed to on 14 September. Marshall promptly informed Stilwell

of its substance. Mountbatten was told that recapture of Burma at the earliest

date was his primary objective. Security of the airline to China, including

Myitkyina, and opening of the land line of communications across north

Burma were not to be prejudiced by operations to retake Burma. DRACULA and

those portions of CAPITAL needed to secure the air and land route to China

were approved. Vigorous prosecution of DRACULA and CAPITAL, with a target

date of 15 March 1945, was considered of the utmost importance.126

Into this situation of full agreement between the British and Joint Chiefs of

Staff on operations to retake Burma was now injected on the 15th the Generalissimo's desire to withdraw his forces across the Salween and end the campaign

in north Burma, completely upsetting the CCS strategy for Burma. Marshall's

current attitude was perhaps indicated by a promise he made on the 16th to

consider sending two U.S. divisions to Burma, an action which would mark

a great departure from the past policy of avoiding a major U.S. troop commitment in Southeast Asia. A reply from the President to the Generalissimo was

immediately prepared and sent to OPD for dispatch to Headquarters, CBI

Theater.

On 16 September, the President and the Prime Minister discussed the final

report of the CCS with its authors. The situation in Europe and the Pacific appeared as a bright background that might be taken as vindicating the soundness of earlier planning. On 11 September both U.S. and Russian troops had

124

 Rad SEACOS 227, SACSEA to COS, 13 Sep 44. SEAC War Diary. 125

 Rad SEACOS 266, 8 Sep 44. Papers and Minutes of Meetings, OCTAGON Conference, Office, U.S. Secretary of the CCS, 1944, p. 24. 126

 (1) Min, 1st Plenary Mtg, The Citadel, Quebec, 13 Sep 44. (2) Min, CCS 174th Mtg, 14

Sep 44, Item 4. (3) For the Prime Minister's opposition to a large-scale campaign in the Burmese jungles, see Rad TOO 302330Z, Churchill to Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, JSM, 30

Mar 45. Case 615, OPD 452.1, A47-30. (4) Rad OCTAGON 27, Marshall to Stilwell, 15 Sep 44. Item 2818, Bk 7, JWS Personal File.
THE CHINA CRISIS OF 1944 441

begun operations on German soil, and on the 15th the U.S. Marines had gone

ashore in the Palau Islands, within easy striking distance of the Philippines.

In their final report, the CCS agreed to define the over-all objective in the

war against Japan as forcing Japan's unconditional surrender by lowering Japanese will to resist through blockade and bombardment and ultimate invasion.

The CCS agreed to stress naval and air action and to avoid where possible any

commitment to costly land campaigns. Both B-29 and tactical air operations

would continue in China Theater, pursuant to which "the operations in the

Pacific Theater are being conducted to effect the reconquest of the Philippines

and the opening of a seaway to China." Indeed, at OCTAGON, the decision was

reached to advance the timetable of operations against Japan and to initiate

landing operations in the Philippines in late October 1944. Manifestly, American operations per se in China would continue to be in support of the main

advance across the Pacific.127

After the discussion of operations against Japan, the problem raised by the

Generalissimo's desire to withdraw the Y-Force from the Burma campaign

was brought before the CCS, the President, and the Prime Minister. The CCS

minutes state:

At the President's request, General Marshall outlined certain developments with regard

to the Chinese forces. The Generalissimo contemplated withdrawing the "Y" Force across

the Salween unless General Stilwell advanced on Bhamo with the Ledo Force. No replacements had been provided for the Salween Force, which had now dwindled to 14,000 men. A

note had been sent by the President to the Generalissimo pointing out the consequences of

the proposed action and stating that the Generalissimo must accept full responsibility

therefor.128

Arriving in OPD from the OCTAGON Conference, the President's radio

caused an immediate discussion of whether in the course of normal messagecenter procedure in Chungking Stilwell would see the contents of the President's note before delivering it to the Generalissimo. General Handy was most

anxious that Stilwell read the message. There was no discussion of the circumstance that the President had Hurley in Chungking as a personal representative

who might reasonably be expected to undertake such tasks, for only a week before Stilwell had been called on to deliver a Presidential note asking the

Chinese to send General Mac Arthur 50,000 labor troops.129 The discussion assumed that Stilwell would deliver the note in person: the only point at issue

was whether he would have a chance to read it before delivering it. Col. Lawrence J. Lincoln, Chief of the Asiatic Section of the Theater Group, OPD,

checked the issue with the War Department signal center and was told that

either Stilwell or one of his staff would see the message before it was delivered

to the Generalissimo. So Colonel Lincoln wrote to Maj. Gen. John E. Hull:

127

 (1) Min, 2d Plenary Mtg, Quebec, 16 Sep 44. (2) CCS 680/2, 16 Sep 44, sub: Rpt to

President and Prime Minister. (3) Memo, Marshall for Dill, 22 Sep 44; Ltr, Dill to Marshall, 4 Oct

44. Folders 57, 66, OPD Exec 10. 128

 Min, 2d Plenary Mtg, Quebec, 16 Sep 44, par. 26. 129

 CM-IN 10219, Stilwell to Marshall, 11 Sep 44. See copy in Item 59, OPD Exec 10.
442 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

"In view of the above, recommend no further action be taken. An acknowledgment of this message and statement from General Stilwell that he has

delivered it to CKS should be received here within forty-eight (48) hours

(1653Z, 18 September 1944)."

 130

The President's message itself was, in rough form, a typescript draft prepared

by the OPD team at OCTAGON, with penciled changes in General Marshall's

hand. Neatly retyped, a copy was sent to Mr. Stimson with the attached note

from General Handy dated 18 September: "General Marshall wanted you to

see the attached message which the President sent to the Generalissimo on

September the 16th. It was in effect an answer to General Stilwell's 'eyes alone'

message of the 15th of September."

 131

OPD also sent a message to Stilwell, telling him that the President's note

would be "in effect an answer to your CFB 22638 of 15 September."

 132

Summary

After taking Changsha with ease, the Japanese were stalled by a valiant

defense of Heng-yang. While the city was still under siege, Stilwell was warned

that the Chinese commanders in that area were contemplating revolt. At this

point, Chennault urged that his Hump tonnage be cut to fly arms to these

same Chinese commanders. Stilwell refused. Heng-yang fell, and Chinese

claiming to represent powerful and disaffected elements made overtures for

American support. Stilwell adhered to his policy of not intervening in Chinese

domestic politics, and contented himself with following the situation closely.

Returning from the Pacific, President Roosevelt turned his attention to

China and sent Hurley to China to negotiate the transfer of command. The

Generalissimo said he would give Stilwell command, and the complicated

question of defining that command was then taken up. While attempts were

being made to clarify Stilwell's proposed status and as Stilwell was growing

ever more suspicious that he was to be simply "an over-all stooge" for the Generalissimo, a setback on the Burma Road made the Generalissimo threaten to

withdraw his Yunnan force from the North Burma Campaign. Stilwell was

appalled and reported as much to Marshall.

Stilwell's message reached the President and Marshall at the OCTAGON

Conference. The President approved a reply, and it was sent to Stilwell for delivery. The contents of the note, and the Generalissimo's reception of it, would

greatly influence the future course of Sino-American relations. 130

 Memo, Lincoln for Hull, 17 Sep 44, with two incls, recorded telephone conv, Col George A. Lincoln and Col Kenneth W. Treacy, Exec Off, OPD, and copy of President's note. Item 59,

OPD Exec 10. 131

 (1) The rough draft is in Item 59, OPD Exec 10. (2) Memo, Handy for Stimson, with

atchd Note, President to Generalissimo. Item 14, Stilwell Special Command File, Item 60, OPD

Exec 10. Handy's copy of Stilwell's radio is Item 13. 132

 Rad WAR 32330, Marshall to Stilwell, 18 Sep 44. Item 2841, Bk 8, JWS Personal File. For the text of CFB 22638, see pp. 435-36, above.
CHAPTER XII

The End of CBI Theater

The issue of the wartime relation between China and the United States was

now in the hands of the two men who controlled the foreign relations of the

two powers, the Generalissimo and the President. Many weeks had gone by

since the Generalissimo had promised the President to place Stilwell in command, and now the President was addressing the Generalissimo directly. If the

Generalissimo accepted the President's message in good part, then the President could hardly avoid responsibility for what might follow in China Theater.

If the Generalissimo did not accept, his refusal, however skillfully executed,

would mean that the President was not directly involved in the future conduct

of affairs in the China Theater. Such being the case, Mr. Roosevelt might feel

under no particular obligation to advance the position and interests of the

Generalissimo and his government.

The Note Delivered

After the "plain talk" with Soong on 16 September, Hurley had continued

his task of trying to work out the details of the command position which the

Generalissimo had agreed, on 12 September, should be given to Stilwell. He

was with the Generalissimo a good deal of the time on 17 and 18 September

and believed that he had made steady progress toward persuading the Chinese

leader to accept the directive and letter of appointment that Hurley had drafted.

When they finished their discussion, Hurley arranged to meet again at the

Generalissimo's home on 19 September.

At 0945, 19 September, the code machines at CBI Theater headquarters

tapped out the last of two messages to the Generalissimo. One was from the

President and the Prime Minister, telling the Generalissimo of the plans just

made at Quebec. From it the Generalissimo would learn that that the American

offensive across the Pacific was aimed at opening a Chinese seaport. This combined message bore directions that Stilwell was to give it to the American and

British Ambassadors for joint presentation to the Generalissimo.1 The other

message was from the President alone to the Generalissimo. The radios went to

the code room, and by 1100 the President's radio had been decoded and was in

1

 (1) Rad WH 68, Roosevelt to Generalissimo, 18 Sep 44. Item 2850, Bk 8, JWS Personal

File. (2) See n. 6 below.
444 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Stilwell's hands. Glancing at it, Stilwell saw that he had an important message

that was as "hot as a firecracker."

 2 He also wondered whether he should

deliver it personally or whether he should give it to Hurley for delivery. A

variety of thoughts probably crossed his mind. Stilwell's analysis of his 16

September talk with Soong suggests a belief that the Generalissimo was

negotiating in bad faith. On 18 September he recorded in his diary that Gen.

Pai Chung-hsi had told him the Generalissimo's plan was to delay two months

at Kweilin until American pressure from the Pacific made itself felt in China,

and Stilwell had interpreted this as meaning that the Generalissimo was simply

stalling the negotiations. But this message was a very strong note, possibly a

turning point, so Stilwell asked counsel of his chief of staff, as to whether he

should deliver it. General Hearn six years later recalled saying he did not see

how Stilwell could stop a message from the President to the Generalissimo.

Hearn was not shown the message, for knowledge of the negotiations was

restricted to Stilwell and Hurley.3 The last message from the President to the

Generalissimo, only a week before, had been delivered through Stilwell, and

Stilwell had so reported to OPD. Such a practice was ordered by Mr. Roosevelt

in May 1944, and forty-four years in the Army predispose a man to obey the

orders of his superiors. So Stilwell decided to make the deliveries himself. The

message about the Quebec decisions he gave to U.S. Ambassador Gauss, at

1400, then drove to the Generalissimo's residence, Huang Shan.4

As Stilwell was approaching Huang Shan, Hurley was in conference with

the Generalissimo and a group of Chinese personages, including T. V. Soong,

Gen. Ho Ying-chin, Gen. Pai Chung-hsi, who had been Stilwell's choice as a

potential successor to the Generalissimo, Gen. Chu Shih-ming, and several

members of the National Military Council. On the table were the draft commission for Stilwell, the draft directive, and a simple draft diagram of command

channels. Hurley believed the Generalissimo was about to place his chop on

each in the presence of the gathering.

As General Hurley later recalled the course of events, at about 1730 an

orderly came in and spoke to the Generalissimo. Stilwell had arrived. He was

invited to come in but it appeared that he wished to see Hurley first. Fearing

that Stilwell brought news of a reverse in Burma, Hurley excused himself and

left the room.

On the veranda, Stilwell showed Hurley the President's message. Reading

it, Hurley remarked that in effect it was an ultimatum, and suggested that

2

 Stilwell Diary, 19 Sep 44. 3

 (1) Interv with Hearn, 17 May 50. General Hearn's recollection was that Stilwell said: "Tom,

I have a wire from the President to Chiang, and Hurley doesn't want me to give it to him. What

should I do?" This clearly implies that Stilwell saw Hurley before he saw Hearn, which cannot be reconciled with the chronology of Hurley's own recollections. It seems safer to assume that Stil- well and Hearn first discussed the matter at CBI Theater headquarters, after which Stilwell

departed for the Generalissimo's residence. (2) SUP 37. 4

 Stilwell Diary, 19 Sep 44.
THE END OF CBI THEATER 445

Stilwell let him paraphrase the message to the Generalissimo. Briefly, they discussed their respective roles. Stilwell stated that he considered he was under

orders to deliver the message personally, and the two men returned to the

conference room.

The tea-drinking rite was observed, then Stilwell arose, announced he had

a message from the President for the Generalissimo and gave it to Gen. Chu

Shih-ming to translate. General Chu prepared to read it to the Generalissimo.

This was a tense moment. One of the Generalissimo's greatest assets in Chinese

domestic politics was the support he had been able to command from the

United States. The President's message was a clear hint that this support might

end, and it was about to be read before a powerful Chinese who had impressed

Stilwell at least as a potential successor to Chiang Kai-shek.

Hurley remembers rising quickly, taking the note from General Chu, and

handing the Chinese portion of it to the Generalissimo with the excuse that it

would save time if the Generalissimo read it himself.5

Running his eye down the long columns of Chinese script the Generalissimo received the President's demand for action from China:

After reading the last reports on the situation in China my Chiefs of Staff and I are

convinced that you are faced in the near future with the disaster I have feared. The men of

your "YOKE" Forces crossing the Salween have fought with great courage and rendered

invaluable assistance to the campaign in North Burma. But we feel that unless they are

reinforced and supported with your every capacity you cannot expect to reap any fruits from

their sacrifices, which will be valueless unless they go on to assist in opening the Burma

Road. Furthermore, any pause in your attack across the Salween or suggestion of withdrawal

is exactly what the Jap has been striving to cause you to do by his operations in eastern

China. He knows that if you continue to attack, cooperating with Mountbatten's coming

offensive, the land line to China will be opened early in 1945 and the continued resistance of

China and maintenance of your control will be assured. On the other hand, if you do not

provide manpower for your divisions in north Burma and, if you fail to send reinforcements

to the Salween forces and withdraw these armies, we will lose all chance of opening land

communications with China and immediately jeopardize the air route over the Hump. For

this you must yourself be prepared to accept the consequences and assume the personal

responsibility.

I have urged time and again in recent months that you take drastic action to resist the

disaster which has been moving closer to China and to you. Now, when you have not yet

placed General Stilwell in command of all forces in China, we are faced with the loss of a

critical area in east China with possible catastrophic consequences. The Japanese capture of

5

 (1) Intervs with Hurley, Jan 49. (Hereafter cited as Hurley Interviews.) (2) Stilwell's writ- ings have no mention of the scene on the veranda. The theme of his diary entries and miscella- neous jottings is that he had simply delivered the President's note, and that responsibility lay with

the President. His diary for 19 September 1944 states: . . . Peanut at Huang Shan. Got the letter translated and took it across the river. 5:40 PM

handed it to him. The harpoon hit him right in the solar plexus, but, although he turned green,

he never batted an eye. He just turned to me and said: "I understand." What! No teapots? No, just a calm silence. I got out promptly and came home. Pretty sight, crossing the river, lights all on in Chungking. The other letter from FDR and Churchill for Gauss and Seymour . . . I delivered to Gauss at

2:00. GI Movie.
446 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Kweilin will place the Kunming air terminal under the menace of constant attack, reducing

the Hump tonnage and possibly severing the air route.

Even though we are rolling the enemy back in defeat all over the world this will not help

the situation in China for a considerable time. The advance of our forces across the Pacific is

swift. But this advance will be too late for China unless you act now and vigorously. Only

drastic and immediate action on your part alone can be in time to preserve the fruits of your

long years of struggle and the efforts we have been able to make to support you. Otherwise

political and military considerations alike are going to be swallowed in military disaster.

The Prime Minister and I have just decided at Quebec to press vigorously the operations

to open the land line to China on the assumption that you would continue an unremitting

attack from the Salween side. I am certain that the only thing you can now do in an attempt

to prevent the Jap from achieving his objectives in China is to reinforce your Salween armies

immediately and press their offensive, while at once placing General Stilwell in unrestricted

command of all your forces. The action I am asking you to take will fortify us in our decision

and in the continued efforts the United States proposes to take to maintain and increase our aid to you. This we are doing when we are fighting two other great campaigns in Europe and

across the Pacific. I trust that your far-sighted vision, which has guided and inspired your

people in this war, will realize the necessity for immediate action. In this message I have

expressed my thoughts with complete frankness because it appears plainly evident to all of

us here that all your and our efforts to save China are to be lost by further delays.

ROOSEVELT.

 6

After reading the message, the Generalissimo remarked quietly, "I

understand," and closed the gathering.7

The President's message was not immediately recognized as a turning point

in the negotiations. Having delivered the message, Stilwell recorded it as

evidence that the President's attitude had changed a great deal since 8 March

1943, when Mr. Roosevelt told General Marshall that one could not speak

harshly to the Generalissimo nor exact concessions from him. At last, thought

Stilwell, the President's eyes had opened.8

It may be surmised that Stilwell concluded the President had decided on a

new policy toward China, that of insisting on action by the Chinese in exchange

for U.S. support, which had long been urged by Stilwell and the War Department. That the President should take so firm a stand without advance warning

and with no attempt to tell Stilwell what he had in mind would not by itself

be a circumstance to disturb Stilwell, for the President had never made a practice of telling Stilwell what his China policy was. And if the President had

indeed begun such a course of action, Stilwell as his subordinate would interfere

with or undercut the President's new policy at the peril of later disciplinary

action.

6

 (1) Rad WH 64, President to Generalissimo, 16 Sep 44. Item 11, OKLAHOMA File, JWS Per- sonal File. Sent from Washington on 18 September 1944. (2) General Okamura comments that

the Japanese did not relate operations in Burma and China, as the President was assuming. In theory, said Okamura, it would have been "appropriate" to relate the two operations, but in actual

practice China Expeditionary Army and Southern Army had no close co-operation. Japanese Officers'

Comments, Incl 3, Okamura. 7

 Stilwell Diary, 19 Sep 44. 8

 The Stilwell Papers, p. 333.
THE END OF CBI THEATER 447

The Generalissimo's Wrath

Rightly or wrongly, the President and the War Department believed that

the Generalissimo's subordinates had carefully edited the President's messages

prior to May 1944 to make sure they would be pleasing to Chiang. Consequently, the Generalissimo may not previously have read anything over Mr.

Roosevelt's signature that would offend him. When he read the 18 September

note, his response was bitter wrath and indignation, and he was later reported

to have called in T. V. Soong and told him that the President's message

canceled his promise to give Stilwell command.9

The remarks of the Generalissimo's close advisers suggest that the Chinese

leader thought of another explanation which would square with his belief that

the President was his devoted friend who would never address him so harshly.

On 16 September Stilwell had spoken very bluntly indeed to Soong. The

Generalissimo may have concluded that after speaking to Soong Stilwell had

framed a harsh message, sent it to Washington, and arranged for it to be sent

back as though coming from the President.10

Hurley himself came to accept the same interpretation of events. Without

any liaison with the War Department, which had simply bypassed him in sending the 18 September note to Stilwell, and receiving no guidance from the

President, Hurley was severely handicapped in his efforts to straighten out the

tangle. He suspected that Stilwell had no desire to come in at the last minute

to take command of a beaten army, and was using this tactic to escape the

assignment. He, therefore, began to reach his own conclusions as to the origins

of the note and as to Stilwell's motives in delivering it in person. When a few

days later Soong asked Hurley point-blank if Stilwell had not arranged the

whole episode just to humiliate the Generalissimo, Hurley refused to ask

Stilwell.11

If the Generalissimo believed that Stilwell had deliberately engineered an

attempt at his public humiliation, this conclusion was some days in making

itself felt. Perhaps he hesitated to act on it at once, for on 20 September Gen.

Pai Chung-hsi called on Stilwell with good news. The Generalissimo and the

National Military Council had approved Stilwell's 18 September plan for the

9

 (1) See Ch. VIII, above. (2) Joseph W. Alsop, "Why We Lost China," The Saturday Evening Post, January 21, 1950, p. 111. The text suggests that Alsop received his data from Soong. 10

 (1) On 29 September, Soong asked Hurley if Stilwell had arranged for the President to send

the note: "The G-mo thinks I had it done and then tore his face off with it." The Stilwell Papers,

p. 338. (2) Hurley Interviews. General Hurley in 1949-50 believed Stilwell had been responsible for the radio, thereby defeating Hurley's diplomatic efforts. 11

 (1) Hurley Interviews. (2) The Stilwell Papers, p. 338. (3) When Hurley discussed the episode of the note with Mr. Roosevelt in February 1945, the President confirmed Hurley's sus- picions. Roosevelt, perhaps forgetting that his message had been discussed by the Combined Chiefs

of Staff in his presence at OCTAGON on 16 September 1944, disclaimed authorship of the note, and

said he had been taken by surprise when the press called it an ultimatum. He left Hurley with the impression that he had simply initialed the note when it was presented to him amid a group of

other official papers. Hurley Interviews.
448 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

defense of Kweilin. Stilwell at once sent appropriate orders to Timberman in

east China:12

Have prevailed on G-mo to change plans at Kweilin and order 31st Army to fight outside

of town. Pai is coming down tomorrow to put new plan into effect and promises to make

artillery commanders listen to American liaison officers. Be ready to get artillery liaison

officers back on the job if they have been withdrawn, and tell them to throw their weight

about. Good luck.13

The information was repeated to Marshall with the added word:

. . . Also the CG of the 93d Army was executed today, which should encourage the rest of

them. The Gmo is beginning to listen apparently, but he is moving slowly on the main

questions of command and the use of the Reds.14

Stilwell also ordered that G-4, Z-Force Operations Staff, fly about 200 tons

of ordnance to Kweilin and Liuchow.15

Not until 21 September did Stilwell learn that the Generalissimo was

genuinely angry, which struck Stilwell as being very, very funny. He marked

the occasion with a wry bit of doggerel, added a Biblical quotation, and mailed

both to Mrs. Stilwell.16

Being in close touch with the Generalissimo, Hurley knew of his anger, and

knew too that because of it the negotiations were now deadlocked. He met

with Stilwell on 21 September, which was when Stilwell learned of the Generalissimo's wrath, and during the next two days he and Stilwell began drafting

an initial progress report to the President. They also considered various ways

to get the negotiations moving forward again.17 To Marshall, Stilwell on 22

September expressed the opinion that the Generalissimo was simply delaying

in the belief that the U.S. advance in the Pacific would spare him further effort,

and permit him "to avoid taking the bitter pill of recognizing the Communists

and putting a foreigner in command of the Army." Hurley and he were standing firm, Stilwell reported, and when the shock of the President's radio wore

off results might be accomplished, though a relaxing of American pressure

would confirm the Generalissimo's belief that his policy of delay would

ultimately succeed.18

12

 Stilwell Diary, 20 Sep 44. 13

 Rad CFB 22920, Stilwell to Timberman, 20 Sep 44. Item 2854, Bk 8, JWS Personal File. 14

 Rad CFB 22921, Stilwell to Marshall, 20 Sep 44. Item 12, OKLAHOMA File, JWS Personal

File.

15

 (1) Z-FOS Journal, KCRC. (2) Ltr, Col Carl R. Dutton, Rr Ech, Z-FOS, to Timberman, 25 Sep 44. AG (Z-FOS) 319.1, KCRC. 16

 (1) The Stilwell Papers, p. 334. (2) Stilwell Diary, 21 Sep 44. (3) Many examples of chil- dren's verse, nonsense verse, short sketches, essays, stories, poems, and articles by General Stilwell

can be found in the Stilwell family papers. He wrote a great deal, but for the entertainment of him- self, his family, and a few intimates. 17

 (1) Stilwell Diary, 21 Sep 44. (2) Stilwell gave Hurley his suggestions for a new agenda on

the 23d, writing as he did in his diary: "Decided to try and break the deadlock." The Stilwell

Papers, p. 335. 18

 Rad CFB 22995, Stilwell to Marshall, 22 Sep 44. Item 14, OKLAHOMA File, JWS Personal

File.
THE END OF CBI THEATER 449

What Stilwell hoped to do in China if the Generalissimo could even yet be

persuaded to place him in command was indicated by a planning directive from

Stilwell to his staff on 22 September. An operation against the Canton-Hong

Kong area, with the Hanoi-Haiphong area as an alternate target, was to be

planned. The staff were to assume resources from within China Theater, such

as thirty Chinese divisions and the existing U.S. Army Air Forces and SOS in

CBI, and from without China Theater, such as a reinforced U.S. corps of

70,000 men. Possibly Stilwell had been informed of Marshall's agreeing on 16

September to consider sending a corps to CBI. Stilwell told his staff that he

planned to move the Chinese Army in India with its five crack divisions and

Wei Li-huang's Y-Force divisions to the Kweiyang area. The Canton-Hong

Kong area would be the next target. That vital point taken, and its major port

and rail facilities open, Stilwell would drive north up the Canton-Hankow

Railway, take Hankow, then pivot east and move down the Yangtze valley on

Shanghai. Manchuria was the ultimate goal.

Behind this directive lay months of effort by CBI theater planners,

beginning April 1944. Col. William M. Creasy and General Sultan of the New

Delhi headquarters had taken the initiative in launching staff studies of future

CBI operations in China so that there might be a guide for theater deployment

and projects. The planning focused on two objectives—establishing a secure,

efficient base at Kunming and opening a port in the Canton-Hong Kong area.

In June Stilwell's approval of the final draft was given to Colonel Creasy.

Meanwhile, in China, Col. Thomas F. Taylor was studying the problem of

effecting a lodgment on the southeast China coast. His paper complete, in midJuly Taylor brought a copy to the New Delhi staff, and returned to China with

their draft of plans for future operations in China. Taylor developed these

studies during August and September. His work called attention to the need

for a central reserve at Kunming, to the desirability of establishing areas of

Sino-American responsibility across the avenues of approach to Kunming, and

to the vital importance of Kweiyang. Stilwell had these studies before him in

September and they were discussed at length among his senior staff officers. As

noted above, Stilwell accepted the work of the CBI planners, but implementation waited on the Generalissimo's decision on Stilwell. The work of the CBI

planners laid the foundation of later China Theater planning.19

Hurley's report as it was finally written and dispatched on 23 September

took a more optimistic line than the situation as known to Hurley and Stilwell

actually warranted. It made only brief reference to the events of 19 September,

and said nothing of the manner in which the President's radio had been

delivered to the Generalissimo. There was a hint that the Generalissimo

19

 (1) Outline of Proposed Future Operations in China, prepared by Hq USAF CBI, 22 Sep 44.

Folder 10, Hq AAF IBS, USAF CBI, KCRC. (2) Ltrs, Col. Thomas F. Taylor (Ret.) to Maj. Gen. Albert C. Smith, Chief of Military History, 1, 9 Jun 54. OCMH. (3) Interv with Maj. Gen. William M. Creasy, Chief Chemical Officer, 9 Jun 54.
450 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

contemplated a very strong reaction to the President's message. The key

passages of Hurley's report were:

As early as the 8th of September the Generalissimo said to me that he was willing, for

the purpose of the unification of China, that the Communist troops should be incorporated

into the National Army but they should serve as components of the Chinese Army and not

as a separate or independent force and, finally, that they must submit to the command of the

Generalissimo. The Generalissimo has been working on this subject diligently since our

arrival here. Last week he caused to be published the terms submitted by the so-called

Communists, and he delivered an address on the subject to the People's Political Council.

All of which leads toward harmony with the so-called Communist troops. I am insisting

that the conference be shortened and that action be taken without delay. I am familiar with

the State Department message to the Generalissimo on the Communist question.20 I have

informed the Generalissimo that the so-called Communist troops in China are not considered real Communists by Molotov; Russia's attitude toward China is friendly and that

Russia is not attempting to use the Communist troops to prevent military unification of

China. Russia desires closer and more harmonious relations with China. I am familiar with

your message which General Stilwell delivered to the Generalissimo on September 19th.

I have been advising the Generalissimo not to make a response to your note which might

cause a deadlock. What is needed to save the situation in China is harmonious action, not a

deadlock. The Generalissimo realizes this.

The nature of General Stilwell's mission, the obstruction he has met due to jealousy and

concern for face of the Chinese Chief of Staff and others, the inherent dislike for any foreign

control on the part of the Chinese and in particular of the Generalissimo, the necessity for

safe-guarding American interests have put General Stilwell frequently in a position where he

has had to differ with the Generalissimo and stand alone in telling the truth. This has in the

past led to friction, due to the fact that the Generalissimo holds very decided views, in most

cases not subject to argument, and that Stilwell has to get on with his mission somehow or

other. I believe that in spite of the differences in their viewpoints, the situation will now

iron itself out. The extent to which General Stilwell has agreed to a reasonable allotment of

authority and the fact that his chief concern is to avoid having responsibility without

adequate authority and the fact that the Generalissimo has said he will give Stilwell field

command of the Ground and Air Forces and with it his complete confidence should indicate

to you that while the situation is difficult a harmonious solution is possible. General Stilwell

has read and approved this report.21

At Stilwell's urging, Hurley had deleted two paragraphs from his report.

One of them related Stilwell's suspicion that the Generalissimo's offer of command might be no more than a device to shift "the responsibility for collapse."

Hurley himself believed the situation could be saved and that American officers

should assume responsibility where offered, always providing responsibility was

matched with adequate authority. Hurley had also proposed saying that "as is

usual where two strong personalities are so intimately involved in the question

of distribution of authority, the Generalissimo and Stilwell appear to be personally and fundamentally incompatible. They appear to be mutually suspicious of

20

 See U.S. Relations with China, Annex 46. 21

 Rad CFB 22988, Hurley to President, 23 Sep 44. Incl to Memo, Leahy for Marshall, 25 Sep

44. China File (Hurley), Item 61, OPD Exec 10.
THE END OF CBI THEATER 451

each other." And then his draft had resumed: "The extent to which Stilwell has

agreed . . . ."

 22

In briefing Hurley's progress report, the Operations Division missed every

warning hint and presented the whole course of events to Handy and Marshall

in bright, affirmative tones.23

But optimism was unwarranted, for Stilwell and Hurley were fully aware

that the negotiations were now at a standstill.

Deadlock

After a routine conference that same 23 September, Gen. Ho Ying-chin,

Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army, took Stilwell aside for a private talk.

Apparently General Ho knew that something big was under discussion, but

had not been taken into the Generalissimo's confidence.24 Stilwell gave Ho a

general outline of the discussions and revealed that the negotiations were

stalled. Ho's reaction was that American control of lend-lease was the central

issue, that the Generalissimo resented the fact that the British Commonwealth

and Soviet Union could distribute lend-lease, after receiving it, without

American supervision. Stilwell agreed with Ho that such was the obstacle that

had stalled negotiations, which suggests he did not believe any act of his was

the major factor.25

Quickly expanding Ho's suggestion, Stilwell prepared an agenda for a

renewal of talks and gave it to Hurley that same day of 23 September:

Something must be done to break up this stalemate, and it is up to us to do it. CKS is

sulking, and the WD [War Department] expects us to handle it.

It is obvious that CKS is listening to our recommendations. He changed his plan at

Kweilin, he put Pai Chung-hsi back in, he executed the commander of the 93d Army, and

he is going to move six divisions down from the northwest [where they had been watching

the Communists]. Apparently he is ready to pass command, and will use the REDS, if they

will acknowledge the authority of the Central Government. What he is gagging at is L-L,

and it is a serious matter of face with him that Stalin and the Br. can handle the stuff and he

can't. The pros and cons are well known; the ques. remains. I propose that we go to the

GMO and take up the following items for his consideration.

1. That I be sent to Yenan to make the following propositions to the Reds:

a. The Reds to acknowledge the supreme authority of the GMO, and to accept command

through me.

b. The Red Forces to be employed north of the Yellow River, out of contact with the

Central Government Troops.

c. Equipment and ammunition to be furnished five divisions with supporting artillery.

d. Keep these Red Divisions at full strength at all times.

e. Both the KMT [Kuomintang] and the Reds to drop discussion of political matters

until the Japanese are beaten.

22

 Bk 1, Hurley Papers. 23

 Brief, Marshall to Handy, 25 Sep 44. China File (Hurley), Item 61, OPD Exec 10. 24

 Stilwell Diary, 23 Sep 44. 25

 The Stilwell Papers, p. 335.
452 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

2. That lend-lease materials (military) be turned over to the GMO on delivery in China

for distribution, with the understanding that:

a. The "X" and "Y" Forces have first priority.

b. That the remainder of the first 30 divisions, the Reds, and the Kweiyang Force (to be

formed [from the units in east China]) to have equal priority.

c. That no other units be equipped until after these units are fully outfitted. This

includes maintenance.

3. That the command question be settled by the publication of orders as suggested by

General Hurley.26

So far as is known, this is the first detailed proposal to supply arms to the

Chinese Communists made by General Stilwell to the Chinese and U.S.

Governments. He proposed to arm sixty Nationalist and five Communist

divisions, with first priority to the Nationalists.

Highly pleased with the new agenda, Hurley accepted it with characteristic

gusto and the remark: "This will knock the persimmons off the trees!"

 27

 He

took the agenda to the Generalissimo's residence on 24 September. There he

found that the Generalissimo had reached his decision; Hurley later wrote on

Stilwell's agenda: "Too late!"

The Generalissimo had decided he would not accept Stilwell. Diplomatically

refraining from objections to anything the President had said or done, the

Generalissimo placed his stand on the ground that because Stilwell had given

him the President's message, that, in the Generalissimo's opinion, made him

Stilwell's subordinate. Were Stilwell appointed, the Chinese Army might

mutiny.28 Then the Generalissimo gave Hurley an aide-mémoire, explaining his

refusal to appoint Stilwell, which he desired Hurley to forward to the

President. Reading the aide-mémoire, Hurley was startled to see it framed in

language which in his opinion was insulting to the President. Considering that

he had been sent to China to harmonize Sino-American relations, and believing

he held in his hand a paper that would snap them Hurley told the Generalissimo

the aide-mémoire would have to be redrafted, that not until the paper could be

read by the President without offense would he forward it.29

That afternoon and evening the Chinese worked on their state paper,

moderating and polishing it until finally Soong gave it to Hurley in a form

that Hurley considered could be sent to the President. With the aide-mémoire

Hurley sent his regrets that he had been unable to bring about harmony

between Stilwell and the Generalissimo, but believed that the two men were

incompatible. "The decision not to appoint General Stilwell," Hurley

remarked, "was not made by the Generalissimo until after General Stilwell, a

subordinate, handed the Generalissimo your message of September 18."

 30

26

 Memo, Stilwell for Hurley, 23 Sep 44. Item 31, Bk 1, Hurley Papers. 27

 Stilwell Diary, 23 Sep 44. 28

 The Stilwell Papers, p. 336. 29

 Hurley Interviews. 30

 Rad CFB 23212, Hurley to President, 25 Sep 44. Item 60, OPD Exec 10.
THE END OF CBI THEATER 453

In his aide-mémoire the Generalissimo repeated his agreement of 8 and 12

September on the choice of an American officer as commander-in-chief of the

"Chinese-American" forces fighting against Japan in China, agreed to place all

Chinese field armies and air forces under his command, and concurrently

appoint him chief of staff of China Theater. He would welcome Americans

taking over the Chinese SOS. He would make "such important changes"

among Chinese personnel as would be necessary for the "harmonious"

operations of the new American field commander. But Stilwell had to go.

Stilwell must go, the Generalissimo said, because:

. . . it was made manifest to me that General Stilwell had no intention of cooperating with

me, but believed that he was in fact being appointed to command me. If you will place

yourself in my position, I believe you will understand how in the future I can never direct

General Stilwell, or in all seriousness depend on General Stilwell to conform to my direction.

If ignoring reason and experience, I were to appoint General Stilwell as Field Commander,

I would knowingly court inevitable disaster.

3. In view of the many fine and soldierly qualities which General Stilwell has shown in

the past, it is with deep regret that I come to this decision. But my recent experiences with

him merely reinforce the experiences of the past two and one-half years, which have firmly

convinced me that General Stilwell is unfitted for the vast, complex and delicate duties

which the new command will entail. Almost from the moment of his arrival in China, he

showed his disregard for that mutual confidence and respect which are essential to the

successful collaboration of allied forces. I have repeatedly caused word of this fault in General

Stilwell to be conveyed to the President. Last October, I intended to ask for his recall, but

when General Stilwell solemnly promised that in the future he would unreservedly obey my

orders and would give me no further cause for disappointment, I withdrew my request.

Unhappily, General Stilwell's solemn promise has never been implemented. Far from leading

to an intensified effort against the common enemy, the appointment of General Stilwell as

Field Commander would immediately cause grave dissensions in the new command, and do

irreparable injury to the vital Chinese-American military cooperation.31

And the Generalissimo closed by pledging his support to any qualified

American officer who might be sent to China as field commander.

The Generalissimo's comments about Stilwell suggest his understanding

of what the role of an American field commander in China would be. The field

commander would receive the Generalissimo's orders, and the Generalissimo

would depend on him "to conform to my [the Generalissimo's] direction." In

suggesting that the Generalissimo appoint an American to command the

Chinese Army, the President had not proposed that the officer chosen be an

instrument for relaying the Generalissimo's directions, but had used such

phrases as "full responsibility and authority" (6 July), "absolute command

without any hindrance . . . delegating at once to one individual the powers to

take immediate military direction. . . ." (15 July), "directly under you [the

Generalissimo] he commands the armed forces in China" (23 August), and

31

 Memo, Comdr J. V. Smith, White House Aide, for Col Frank McCarthy, 27 Sep 44, with

Incl, Rad CFB 23212, Hurley to President, with Aide-Mémoire, Generalissimo for Hurley, 25 Sep

44. Item 16, Item 60, OPD Exec 10.
454 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

finally on 18 September, "in unrestricted command."

 32

 Manifestly, there was

as yet no agreement regarding either the powers and duties of the proposed

American field commander or his identity.

The Generalissimo's aide-mémoire went unanswered for nearly two weeks.

Several replies were prepared by General Marshall for the President's signature,

but were laid aside, some after informal talks at the White House. Certain

passages that Marshall repeated suggest his concept of the impact of operations

in China on the war in Europe. Marshall contemplated asking the President to

point out to the Chinese that the American effort over the Hump was badly

hampering the war in other theaters because so many transports were involved

in bringing supplies to Chennault for an effort that the Joint Chiefs had advised

the President on 4 July 1944 was a futile one. For example, the draft of

28 September which Marshall sent to the other members of the JCS said:

. . . General MacArthur's urgent requirements for air transport have not been met. General

Wilson in Italy has not had the transport planes he needs. The situation in Holland now

hangs in the balance, the outcome dependent largely upon adequate support by air for the

forces flown in to secure the Rhine crossing. . . . The United States effort exerted in your

theater if placed in other areas would undoubtedly have expedited and shortened operations

and resulted in saving many American lives. . . .

After the war, General Marshall considered that the heavy commitment of

transport aircraft to the Hump had prevented exploitation of the break-through

on the Italian front in the summer of 1944, and had prevented air supply of

Lt. Gen. George S. Patton's swift armored advance across France to the German

frontier in late summer of 1944.33

The proposed draft also offered an explanation by Marshall of the manner

in which the President's message had been delivered by Stilwell:

. . . The delivery of my message by Stilwell personally was a routine procedure which had

been in effect for more than a year due to difficulties encountered in the past in securing

prompt deliveries and in at least one instance of some evidence that the phrasing of my

messages to you had been tampered with. You have my apology for the procedure in the

present instance and I much regret that the transmitting agencies in the War Department

did not think to give instructions for the message to be presented by General Hurley.

Further, I have given instructions which will avoid any offense of this kind in the future.34

Stilwell himself reacted angrily to the Generalissimo's aide-mémoire. His

immediate response to Marshall was that the cause of the impasse might

possibly be a Japanese broadcast which claimed that Stilwell was plotting a

coup d'état that would make him czar of China. "In view of the character of

CKS, such stuff, silly as it is, is dangerous." Stilwell repeated his previous

contention that the Generalissimo was simply waiting out the war, and was

putting its entire burden on the United States. The Generalissimo had "no

32

 See pp. 383-84, 386, 416-17, 445-46, above. 33

 Interv with Marshall, Jul 49. 34

 Memo, Marshall for JCS, 28 Sep 44. Item 8, WDCSA 091 China.
THE END OF CBI THEATER 455

intention of instituting any real democratic reforms or of forming a united

front with the Communists."

 35

Stilwell charged that the aide-mémoire was a mass of false statements. Said

Stilwell, the Generalissimo had given to Hurley but one concrete example of

Stilwell's refusal to co-operate. This was the attack on Bhamo the Generalissimo

had desired. Stilwell stated that the Americans had actually paid to fly replacements to Yunnan, had been rushing munitions by air to units not included in

CBI Theater plans. "As to conduct, you may be sure I have made no breaks in

Chinese etiquette. His statement that I believe I was appointed to command

him requires no comment."

 36

 Marshall relayed the message to the White

House.

On 29 September, Stilwell reported to Marshall that he had discussed the

issue with Gens. Ho Ying-chin and Lin Wei and reported them as unable to

guess what the vague disasters were that the Generalissimo had prophesied

might follow Stilwell's assumption of field command. The Chinese told Stilwell

that the Generalissimo had discussed the issue in a meeting of the National

Military Council and no objections had been raised. After that meeting, the

Generalissimo had confided only in T. V. Soong, and it was then, said Stilwell,

that the Generalissimo had reversed himself.37

Wondering what the Generalissimo might fear from his assumption of

command, Stilwell told Marshall that since

. . . the Gissimo might have the notion that I am trying to arm the Communists against

him, I informed Ho and Lin that this matter of Communist participation might well be

deferred for the time being, if such a solution would let us proceed to face the crisis with the

other means available. In other words, work on the X and Y Forces, and salvage and

reorganize the remnants south of the Yangtze. They said that this should surely make it

possible to get going. I do not know how such a proposal fits in, but it was the only point

I could imagine that would explain the Gissimo's stand. It is significant that there was no

opposition to me in the Military Council, and that the GMO reversed himself only after

Soong moved in and the others were left out. The delay in replying to the GMO's last

message has had a marked effect on T. V. Soong who is in a highly nervous and disturbed

condition. The only other point that might bear on the situation is that the GMO may

believe that I asked the President to send the message in order to humiliate him.38

As he had so often done in the past, during this period of waiting for the

35

 (1) Rad CFB 23254, Stilwell to Marshall, 26 Sep 44. Item 16, OKLAHOMA File, JWS Per- sonal File. (2) Hata claimed to be unaware of the extent of the differences between Stilwell and

the Generalissimo. The Japanese were aware that "a minor dispute for the right of command" was

in progress between the two Allied leaders; the broadcast was intended to drive a wedge between

the United States and China. Given the general standard of living in China in 1944, the only

radios would be in possession of members of the Chinese elite, so the broadcast was aimed at Nationalist officialdom. It may be that Hata understates the information at his disposal, for disputes

over the right to command are hardly apt to be minor. 36

 (1) Quotation from radio, CM-IN 24721, Stilwell to Marshall, 26 Sep 44. (2) Memo,

Handy for Leahy, 28 Sep 44. Item 20, Item 60, OPD Exec 10. 37

 Rad CFB 23556, Stilwell to Marshall, 1 Oct 44. Item 18, OKLAHOMA File, JWS Personal File. 38

 CM-IN 27152, Stilwell to Marshall, 29 Sep 44. For the full text of Stilwell's proposal, see page 337 of The Stilwell Papers.
456 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

President's reply Soong himself turned to Harry Hopkins and asked him to

intervene.39

End of the Deadlock

September ended with the actors in the drama in suspense. Stilwell heard

nothing from Marshall, and Soong had no word from Washington.40 But

Soong did not have long to wait. Word from Washington came on 1 October,

and Soong immediately passed it on to Hurley:

October 1, 1944

Dear General Hurley:

The Generalissimo will see you at 5:00 p.m. tomorrow. I shall come to fetch you.

For your immediate information, the Generalissimo today received a significant telegram

from Dr. Kung. Dr. Kung stated that Harry Hopkins had told him at a dinner party that the

President had received the Generalissimo's Aide-Memoire and my accompanying letter; that

the President was glad of the Generalissimo's acceptance of an American Commander-inChief; and that since it concerned the sovereign right of China, the President intended to

comply with the Generalissimo's request for the recall of General Stilwell and his replacement by another American officer. At the same time, Mr. Hopkins also told Dr. Kung that

the President had not yet seen General Marshall.

According to Dr. Kung, the intention is for the President to discuss the problem of

General Stilwell's successor with General Marshall, and as soon as that has been solved, to

reply to the Generalissimo's message.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) T V. SOONG

(Typed) T.V.SOONG41

Next day, the Generalissimo told a meeting of the Central Executive

Committee of the Kuomintang that he had definitely declined to appoint

Stilwell as field commander of the Chinese forces but that he would appoint an

American to that post.42 The Generalissimo could hardly reverse himself after

such a statement without irrevocable loss of face. In effect, he cast the die after

Kung's cable from Washington.

Learning of these events, Stilwell accepted the apparently inevitable and on

2 October began to write farewell letters to officers of his command and to

Chinese personages.43

39

 Undated Cbl, Soong to Hopkins. Bk IX, Hopkins Papers. This is the cable quoted on pages 804-05, Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins. The author of Roosevelt and Hopkins, Robert E. Sherwood, may have mistaken the period of the cable, for he places it in the context of spring 1944. It

contains details of the September 1944 negotiations which place it in that month. Soong would not

have sent the message before 19 September, and events after 30 September 1944 left him no need

to send it. 40

 A Chronology of the Recall, SUP 5. 41

 Memo for record, Gen Hull, 4 Nov 44, initialed G.C.M. General Hull noted: "The attached

is a copy of a letter delivered to General Hurley and is self-explanatory." Item 59, OPD Exec 10. 42

 Rad CFB 23864, Hurley to Roosevelt, 6 Oct 44. Item 41-a, Bk 1, Hurley Papers. 43

 (1) The Stilwell Papers, p. 340. (2) Carbon copies of Stilwell's letters as finally sent are in OKLAHOMA File, JWS Personal File.
THE END OF CBI THEATER 457

What would be the reply from Washington when it did come? Some

indications of the attitude of Stilwell's superiors, rather different from those

volunteered by Kung, came from General Merrill, just back from the OCTAGON

Conference and Washington. Stilwell called him to Chungking, and Merrill

arrived on 3 October. Next day the two officers discussed the current situation.

Many years later, Merrill recalled Stilwell's telling him that he had (originally)

summoned Merrill to China to act as Stilwell's chief of staff if the latter became

field commander of the Chinese forces. Stilwell told Merrill of receiving the

President's 18 September message, remarking that he had questioned the

wisdom of his delivering it as it really should have gone through Hurley, but

that he had been given an order and had carried it out. Stilwell then gave

Merrill a number of "eyes alone" messages on the command crisis, saying as he

did so that Merrill was the only one besides Stilwell who had seen most of

them, and that they were not to be discussed with anyone.44

Then Merrill told Stilwell what he had learned in Washington, and shortly

after submitted his observations in memorandum form:

I was surprised to find a general willingness to tighten up and put some definite pressure

on the Chinese. [Marshall] is having much less trouble in getting agreement from the White

House on pressure than in the past. As regards planning for this Theater, I had a long

session with Generals Handy, Hull, and Roberts. Following this, as agreed, General Roberts

went into specific details. Points of immediate interest to us are:

a. Nimitz' repeated statements that we require bases on the China Coast are purely as a

cover for our real operations.

b. We have no interest in the Canton-Hong Kong area.

c. We would be interested in any operations conducted from the interior of China

towards the coast with Amoy being the southernmost limit and Tsingtao the northern limit

of the coastal strip in which we might possibly be interested in.

d. All plans for operations against the Japanese assume that China does nothing but

contain some Japanese.

e. We do not desire to get mixed up on the Continent with large U.S. forces.

f. We will probably not assist China more than already promised. (30 divisions plus

10% for 2d 30 divisions) thru India. War Department recognizes we may eventually have to

equip entire Chinese Army but intends to do this only when it can be done through a port

on east coast. . . .

General Handy admitted Stilwell mission was primarily political and that not much in

the way of real action by the Chinese was hoped for.45

The mood of the War Department, if Merrill assessed it correctly, was one

of detachment toward the military problems of China Theater. There was no

longer a military reason for a major U.S. effort in China Theater. If the War

Department felt that way, and since at Tehran Marshal Stalin had pledged that

the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan when Germany was

44

 (1) Stilwell's diary sets the date of Merrill's arrival as 3 October 1944. (2) Ltr, Merrill to Ward, 26 May 52. OCMH. 45

 Memo, Merrill for Stilwell, 5 Oct 44, sub: Matters Discussed in Washington. SNF 115.
458 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

defeated, then the Generalissimo's bargaining power vis-à-vis the United States

was rapidly diminishing. The China problem was becoming one of diplomacy

and personalities, while the stiffening of German resistance ended the possibility

of sending a corps to CBI.

The Secretary of War on 3 October recorded his impression that the scales

were inclining against Stilwell. In his diary he noted his belief that now as so

often in times past the President was preparing to side against Stilwell. And,

that same day, Marshall told Stimson that if the United States "had to remove

Stilwell he would not allow another American general to be placed in the

position of Chief of Staff and Commander of the Chinese armies, for it was so

evident that no American would be loyally supported."

 46

Stilwell's political adviser, who was still in the United States and was

unaware that Stilwell's recall appeared probable, believed that the War Department and the Joint Chiefs were losing interest in China, and submitted to

Stilwell a plan to be sent to the JCS in hope of recapturing their attention. Its

diplomatic implications were great. The plan proposed that the United States

in company with the Chinese Communists seize the Shanghai area, after which

large quantities of captured German arms would be given to the Chinese Communists. The whole operation was to be kept secret from the Generalissimo

and his government until it was executed, and the Chinese Communists were

to be treated as a sovereign power to the complete exclusion of the Central

Government. Stilwell made an identifying note on the cover of the plan and

dropped it in his file.47 From Merrill, Stilwell knew that his adviser had incurred

the displeasure of the War Department for what the Department thought a

breach of discretion in February 1944.48

When the President's reply to the Generalissimo's aide-mémoire arrived, it

indicated that the President was willing to compromise. As Stilwell recommended on 1 October, this Presidential message was sent to Hurley for

delivery.49 Hurley gave it to the Generalissimo on 6 October. Its terms suggest

that the President as well as the Generalissimo understood the uses of circumlocution. Though there had been no great change in the military situation in

China since 19 September when the President had insisted that the Generalissimo place Stilwell in command at once, the President now remarked that the

ground situation in China had so deteriorated since the summer that he did not

want the United States to assume responsibility. Possibly the President agreed

with Marshall that no American should command in China because none would

be "loyally supported" there:

46

 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 538. (2) Ltr, Dill to McNarney, 5 Oct 44. Folder

66, OPD Exec 10. (3) CM-OUT 42323, 6 Oct 44. Case 516, OPD 381 Security. 47

 Ltr, Davies to Stilwell, 2 Oct 44. SNF 115. Stilwell labeled the scheme "Plan DAVIES." No

references to the proposal could be found in Stilwell's papers. 48

 See Memo cited n. 45, above. 49

 CM-IN 665, Stilwell to Marshall, 1 Oct 44.
THE END OF CBI THEATER 459

Your message of September 25th has been carefully considered. I must state my surprise

and regret at the reversal of your agreement of August 12th to accept Stilwell for the command of all forces in China. The ground situation in China has so deteriorated since my

original proposal that I now am inclined to feel that the United States Government should

not assume the responsibility involved in placing an American officer in command of your

ground forces throughout China.

However, the maintenance of the Hump tonnage is of such tremendous importance to

the stability of your Government that the continuance of a reasonably secure situation

regarding operations over the Hump demands that Stilwell be placed in direct command

under you of the Chinese forces in Burma and of all Chinese ground forces in Yunnan Province, it being understood that adequate support in replacements and supplies be furnished

these armies by you. Otherwise I am convinced that the Hump tonnage will be interrupted

by Japanese action.

I accept your proposal that he be relieved as your Chief of Staff and I intend to relieve

him of further responsibility in connection with Lend-Lease matters.

I am willing in the present situation to continue General Chennault in command of the

14th Air Force and for General Hurley to continue as my personal representative with you regarding military affairs in China.

Tonnage over the Hump will be under the direction of General Sultan in Burma. There

are further details regarding American administrative responsibilities not pertaining to

Chinese personnel which will affect the arrangement of affairs in China but instructions

regarding these matters will be issued as soon as the various details can be carefully considered. This would include matters relating to the training by American officers of Chinese

units other than the forces of Yunnan Province and the Chinese forces in Burma. The training of these latter should of course be under General Stilwell. At an early date, I will

designate an officer to assume supply responsibilities for the U.S. forces in China and who

can serve as an advisor to you in similar matters for Chinese forces.

I hope that you will inform me by telegraph that the foregoing proposals are acceptable

because I feel that should we remove Stilwell from the Burma campaign the results would

be far more serious than you apparently realize.50

Reporting to the President his delivery of the message, Hurley informed

Mr. Roosevelt of the Kung-Hopkins exchange, on the strength of which the

Generalissimo had publicly committed himself to Stilwell's removal. Hopkins

hastened to deny any such statement as that credited to him by Soong: "I told

him . . . that I had no idea how the President would reply to the Generalissimo in regard to the latter's request for Stilwell's withdrawal."

 51

 The President's explanation, as given to Hurley in February 1945 and recalled by Hurley

in 1949, differed. The President stated he had told Hopkins that he would

appoint another American officer, presumably referring to a statement in the

Generalissimo's aide-mémoire that any of three Americans whom he listed would

be acceptable. Hopkins had relayed the statement to Kung, who drew the

conclusions Soong had reported to Hurley.52

50

 (1) Memo, Leahy for Hull, 5 Oct 44. Item 28, Item 60, OPD Exec 10. (2) Rad WH 77,

Roosevelt to Hurley for Generalissimo, 5 Oct 44. Item 38, Bk 1, Hurley Papers. This message was sent through Navy communications. 51

 (1) Rad CFB 23864, Hurley to Roosevelt, 6 Oct 44. (2) Rad WH 79, Hopkins to Hurley,

7 Oct 44. Item 41-b, Bk 1, Hurley Papers. 52

 Interv with Hurley, 26 Jan 49.
460 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

The Generalissimo Places the Blame

After the arrival of the President's new proposals, there was another lull,

though a brief one, while the Chinese weighed their answer. It was a weekend,

and the Generalissimo called Hurley to Huang Shan, his residence. That the

Generalissimo would insist on Stilwell's recall was evident at once; had not the

President stated through Hopkins that the Generalissimo had only to be firm

and the Americans would yield to China's sovereign right? But such a step had

to be justified, and the Generalissimo and Soong poured out their complaints

against Stilwell. Hurley listened, and answered where a defense of Stilwell

seemed necessary. He defended Stilwell as best he could, and finally reduced

the Chinese case to what seemed its hard core. But in his discussions Hurley

was handicapped by the hasty and inadequate briefing he had received before

his departure from Washington. Charge after charge was leveled against Stilwell,

and Hurley had no information to the contrary. Moreover, no liaison existed

between the War Department and Hurley, so that Hurley still knew nothing

of the antecedents of the President's 18 September radio. His reactions were

inevitably colored by these circumstances. The discussions at Huang Shan

ended with the Chinese seemingly resolved on what they presented to Hurley

as an irrefutable case and Hurley returned to his quarters.53

The formal Chinese reply to the President came in two parts. First was a

simple and dignified note from the Generalissimo, and then T. V. Soong presented Hurley with an aide-mémoire "covering his [Chiang's] weekend conversations with you."

 54

 The Generalissimo's note to the President assured

Roosevelt that the two men were in accord on all points, denied that there had

been reversal of policy on his part, but regretted that he could not confide the

execution of such important matters to so unqualified an officer as Stilwell. He

asked that Stilwell be immediately replaced.55

But the Generalissimo was not content to leave the matter at that. The

aide-mémoire denounced Allied strategy in Southeast Asia and toward China as

responsible for the loss of east China. Primary responsibility for the debacle

was placed on Stilwell, in that this Allied strategy was, according to Chiang,

his creation, and the aide-mémoire hinted that Stilwell had been deceiving the

President as to the situation in China. Stilwell, whose appointment the President had been urging since the previous July, seemed obviously incompetent

to the Generalissimo, a fact he now undertook to point out to Roosevelt:

To Major General Patrick J. Hurley.

In my telegram replying to the President which I have just handed to you, you will note

that in order to avoid what may be considered controversial matter, I have purposely limited

it to a simple statement of lack of confidence in General Stilwell and a request for his recall.

53 Ibid. 54

 Memo, Soong for Hurley, 9 Oct 44. Item 43, Bk 1, Hurley Papers. 55

 Rad CFB 24103, Hurley to President, 11 Oct 44. Item 33, Item 60, OPD Exec 10.
THE END OF CBI THEATER 461

So long as I am Head of State and Supreme Commander in China, it seems to me that there

can be no question as to my right to request the recall of an officer in whom I can no longer

repose confidence.

There are, however, certain essential points which I wish to make informally, with a view

to obtaining full and clear personal understanding between the President and myself. I am

anxious to secure such an understanding since the President's courageous and farsighted

leadership in the war against Axis aggression has won my unbounded admiration, and since

he has my lasting gratitude for his generous assistance to China in her struggle to win independence and her rightful place in the family of nations. The President has been a constant

inspiration to me and my people, so that any misunderstanding between us distressed me

most deeply.

Both the President and the War Department are dependent on General Stilwell for

information concerning the military situation in China. Thus the President may not be aware

that I not only have no confidence in General Stilwell, but also lack confidence in his military

judgment. I believe the record sustains my opinion, and I shall summarize it briefly.

General Stilwell and I have never agreed about the Burma campaign. I have most

naturally been anxious for a campaign in Burma which would reopen land communications

with China. At the same time, in view of the enemy's superior communications in that area,

and the difficult terrain, I have always insisted that the only strategically sound campaign in

Burma was one which included amphibious operations in south Burma to insure rapid

collapse of the enemy's resistance. From the first, I have repeatedly warned General Stilwell

that a limited offensive in north Burma would be most costly than could be justified by the

results and might even prove exceedingly dangerous. I have also given my opinion to the

President when we met in Cairo.

At the Cairo Conference, commitments were finally made by the representatives of the

United States and Great Britain which appeared to insure the kind of Burma campaign which

I could approve. Unhappily, those commitments were abandoned shortly after I left Cairo.

General Stilwell then came to me and announced that he proposed to proceed with a limited

offensive in north Burma. I again warned him of the consequences, stating specifically that

I feared the project would be difficult and costly, and would engage all of China's limited

resources at a time when this would be dangerous. He treated my warning lightly, and intimated that if I maintained my attitude, China would be suspected of wishing to withhold

any real contribution to the Allied cause. At length I consented to his employing the

Ramgarh troops which were entirely American trained and equipped and with the clear understanding that these forces were all that would be forthcoming.

It was not long before my warning was substantiated. The moment obstacles were

encountered in Burma, General Stilwell began to use every sort of pressure to induce me to

commit additional forces. I shall not enter into details. It is enough to say that by the beginning of May, the Burma campaign had drained off most of the properly trained and equipped

reserves in China. At the same time, it had greatly reduced the incoming supply tonnage so

that during critical ensuing months it was impossible to strengthen the military position in

any area within China. It was not until June that the Hump tonnage, exclusive of the B-29

project, again reached the January level.

As I had feared, the Japanese took advantage of the opportunity thus offered to launch an

offensive within China attacking first in Honan and then in Hunan. Owing to the Burma

campaign, no adequately trained and equipped reinforcements were available for these war

areas. Owing to the effect of the Burma campaign on the Hump tonnage, supplies were not

forthcoming for the Chinese armies stationed in Honan and Hunan. The forces brought to

bear by the Japanese in their offensive in east China were six times as great as those confronting General Stilwell in north Burma, and the consequences of defeat were certain to

outweigh in China all results of victory in the north Burma campaign. Yet General Stilwell
462 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

exhibited complete indifference to the outcome in east China; so much so that in the critical

days of the east China operations, he consistently refused to release Lend-Lease munitions

already available in Yunnan for use in the East China fighting. Prior to June 1944 with the

exception of the Yunnan Expeditionary Forces, the entire Chinese Army did not receive a

single rifle or piece of artillery from American Lend-Lease. It was not until the first week of

June 1944, that General Stilwell at last visited Chungking to discuss the east China situation

with me. When the enemy's offensive was already on the way to its objectives, General

Stilwell finally consented to give a small quantity of equipment to the Chinese armies in

east China, and to facilitate more effective air support. In all, excepting the Yunnan Expeditionary Forces, the Chinese armies have received 60 mountain guns, 320 anti-tank rifles and

506 bazookas.

In short, we have taken Myitkyina but we have lost almost all of east China, and in this

General Stilwell cannot be absolved of grave responsibility. Even now he appears to be

unaware of the implications of this fact and the grave damage to prestige and morale of the

Chinese Army. It is possible that this fact, fundamentally important as it is, had not been

pointed out to the President. Whatever my opinion of General Stilwell as a man may be, I

might bring myself to appoint him to command in China if I thought well of him as a

military leader. However, with all the facts before me I have come to the conclusion that he

is not competent to envisage or to deal with a problem of such range and complexity as now

confronts us.

From what I have said above it is also specifically evident that the various areas of war

in China cannot be divided into independent sectors. Already what has happened in Yunnan

and Burma has instantly and vitally affected all of China. To limit General Stilwell's

authority to Yunnan and Burma does not constitute a solution of the problem.

In his last telegram, the President asserts that the China situation has deteriorated so far

that he is now inclined to feel the U.S. Government should not assume the responsibility

involved in the appointment of an American commander of the Chinese forces. I do not

altogether understand this statement, for two reasons. First, no matter what happens, no

matter what command arrangements are adopted, I cannot personally escape ultimate responsibility for the future of the China Theater. Even the responsibility of General Stilwell's

errors must be borne by me since I allowed myself to be overpersuaded against my judgment

to countenance them. Second, I cannot feel that the deterioration is so serious as the President suggests. After long years of experience and first hand knowledge of Japanese methods

and strength, despite the defeats of east China, I cannot foresee any disaster fundamentally

incapacitating China.

The statement was also distressing to me in another sense. While I do not anticipate

disaster, the situation in China is indeed critical. Aid is most needed in an hour of crisis.

Yet the statement I have referred to appears to imply that aid will be withheld precisely

because this is an hour of crisis.

I am disturbed by the fact that the President has expressed regrets at my "reversal of

agreement" with respect to the appointment of General Stilwell in command of the Chinese

Forces. My telegram to the President dated August 12th, showed great readiness to meet his

wishes as far as humanly possible. Developments which I described in aide memoire of

September 25th, have, I trust, made it clear why it has become impossible to appoint General

Stilwell.

I am wholly confident that if the President replaces General Stilwell with a qualified

American officer, we can work together to reverse the present trend and achieve a vital

contribution to the final victory.

To this aide-mémoire Hurley added his own conclusion, which was that the

Generalissimo was the Chinese leader best qualified to execute a policy of
THE END OF CBI THEATER 463

Sino-American co-operation. To Hurley, Stilwell and the Generalissimo

appeared fundamentally incompatible. Therefore, the issue was narrowed down

to a choice between Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek. "There is no other issue

between you and Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek has agreed to every

request, every suggestion made by you except the Stilwell appointment."

 56

The Generalissimo's aide-mémoire was an extraordinary document to dispatch

to President Roosevelt, for as the President read it he may have wondered at

whom the Generalissimo's shafts were aimed, Stilwell or himself? The events

described by the Generalissimo must have been fresh in the President's memory,

for Mr. Roosevelt had been a principal actor in them within the last eighteen

months.

In response to heavy pressure from the Generalissimo and his associates,

pressure reinforced by Harry Hopkins, the President in May 1943 had agreed to

the Generalissimo's demand that Chennault receive the bulk of Hump tonnage.

In the course of this the Generalissimo had promised Mr. Roosevelt on 29 April

1943 that "in the event the enemy attempts to interrupt the air offensive by a

ground advance on the air bases, the advance can be halted by the existing

Chinese forces."

 57

 So the President had agreed to the Generalissimo's demands,

Chennault had received first priority, and now the Generalissimo was

complaining that no arms had gone to his ground forces in east China.

Concerning the North Burma Campaign, the President had sent radio after

radio to the Generalissimo urging him to take part. Action had finally come

after the President told the Generalissimo on 4 April 1944, "It is inconceivable

to me that your 'YOKE' Forces, with their American equipment, would be

unable to advance against the Japanese 56th Division in its present depleted

strength. To me the time is ripe. . . ."

 58

 Now the Generalissimo was blaming

the loss of east China on the North Burma Campaign. Did some concept of

etiquette impel the Generalissimo formally to state that the North Burma

Campaign was uniquely Stilwell's project, as though the latter's American

superiors bore no responsibility for him? But even so the President might

decide the attack was aimed at himself, for he could hardly have forgotten the

series of radios he had sent the Generalissimo five months before.

With the President's military advisers appearing indifferent to what China

might contribute to the war, the President could reasonably feel that the alliance with China was now primarily a sort of insurance policy to be drawn on

if anything went wrong with the central Pacific offensive, which currently

(mid-October) was within a few days of reaching the Philippine island of

Leyte. The policy should be kept in force, but there was no need to pay an

exorbitant premium.

56

 Rad CFB 24103, Hurley to President, 11 Oct 44. Item 61, OPD Exec 10. 57

 Incl to Ltr, Soong to Hopkins, 29 Apr 43. Bk. VII, Hopkins Papers. 58

 Rad WAR 17956, Roosevelt to Generalissimo, 3 Apr 44. Item 2164, Bk 6, JWS Personal

File. Quoted p. 310, above.
464 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

There remained the diplomatic aspects. The United States was China's only

champion among the Great Powers. That policy had been the President's own

concept and he had been forceful in its execution. Now at a time when China's

military importance was rapidly diminishing, the Generalissimo sent the President an aide-mémoire in which he sought to place the blame for China's

misfortunes, in terms the President might well regard as directed at himself.

Waiting for the Decision

That the future of CBI depended on exchanges of radios between the

President and the Generalissimo gave a curious rhythmic quality to events in

Chungking. A message would come from Washington, and there would be a

flurry of activity. The answer would be prepared, and then would come a period

of suspenseful waiting, while Washington in turn wrote a reply. In the current

period of suspense, Stilwell and Hurley each sent off radios, Stilwell to

Marshall and Hurley to the President, offering their solutions.

In his radio to Marshall, Stilwell accepted a suggestion of General Merrill's,

and revived an old (January 1943) proposal of his own, that a joint Sino-American committee of senior staff officers be set up in Chungking. "Such a plan,"

wrote Stilwell,

. . . would have effect of putting China on the same status as our other Allies and

increasing the prestige of the Generalissimo. It would permit him to win his point with

regard to me personally to the extent that I would not be anything but a field commander

executing orders which would come from the Generalissimo. However as field commander

I could ensure that orders were obeyed and that the plans and policies, which would be

largely created by the Joint Sino-American Military Committee, were actually executed and

that the maximum military effort was made.

Stilwell went on to say that in his opinion the situation was at a deadlock

because the Generalissimo did not want to make any voluntary military effort,

and was simply using Stilwell's removal as a step in his delaying tactics. Two

and one half years of struggle had convinced Stilwell, he told Marshall, that

the Generalissimo would not make an effort against the twenty-four Japanese

divisions Stilwell thought to be in China unless he was pushed into it. There

was a deadlock as a result of Kung's telegram, but if pressure was applied from

Washington, and the Generalissimo given a face-saving escape, Stilwell

thought the Generalissimo might even yet agree.59

Hurley's final comments were sent several days after Stilwell's and suggest

he was familiar with the contents of Stilwell's message to Marshall. By this

time, Hurley was in complete disagreement with Stilwell on the proper

approach to the problems of China. In language highly reminiscent of the

President's views of 8 March 1943, Hurley told the President that Stilwell's

fundamental mistake was the idea that he could subjugate a man who had led a

nation in revolution and who for seven years had led an ill-fed, poorly

equipped, practically unorganized army against an overwhelming foe. Not

59

 CM-IN 9592, Stilwell to Marshall, 10 Oct 44.
THE END OF CBI THEATER 465

attempting to place any responsibility for the state of the Chinese Army, Hurley

went on to say that if the President in the present controversy sustained Stilwell he would lose the Generalissimo and possibly China too. He did not agree

with the President's reason why the United States should not assume responsibility, for he believed that the very danger of a Chinese collapse was the

reason America should assume responsibility for the guidance of China's military affairs. Hurley was convinced that China could be kept in the war, that

the Chinese Army could be reorganized, and that this could be done through

the Generalissimo. It could not, he told the President, be done through

Stilwell.

Hurley saw nothing to be gained by a prolonged debate as to whether the

Generalissimo or Stilwell was responsible for the state of affairs in China.

He was also opposed to Stilwell's suggestion for a Sino-American policy

committee, thinking it would complicate a situation already complex enough.

Hurley concluded by urging that Stilwell be relieved and that another

American officer be appointed to command the Chinese Army. This man

should be willing to accept the responsibility the Generalissimo wished to

place on an American, that of command of the Chinese forces. Hurley said

that he respected and admired Stilwell but that he was simply not the man for

the job.60

Though expecting the final word from Washington would be an order to

return, Stilwell during the interval carried the burdens of command in full

measure, including two problems that involved General Chennault. On 13

August, one of Chennault's aircraft reconnoitered the Manila docks, presumably to prepare for an attack on them. The move angered Stilwell and embarrassed him in his relations with his neighboring theater commander, General

MacArthur. Stilwell wondered how Chennault could justify operations in

MacArthur's theater when he complained that he did not have enough supplies for effective operations in China. From MacArthur, Chennault's move

drew a frigid warning direct to the airman that under no circumstances was he

to bomb the Manila docks. MacArthur told Chennault that he had no authority to make the attack for he had not obtained from MacArthur permission to

operate in MacArthur's theater. Were Chennault to bomb the docks, it might

well provoke a premature uprising in the Philippines and seriously embarrass

MacArthur's projected operations.61

Stilwell sent a strong message to Chennault about this affair and received

in reply what he considered to be a false official statement from Chennault.

The matter was at once turned over to the theater inspector general, and on

13 October an investigation was opened at Kunming. Three days later the inspector general reported to Stilwell that there was no proof of the charge and

the matter was dropped.62

60

 (1) Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. VIII. (2) Rad NAVY 131200, Hurley to Roosevelt, 13

Oct 44. Item 51, Bk 1, Hurley Papers. 61

 CM-IN 11955, MacArthur to Chennault, 13 Aug 44. 62

 Stilwell Diary, 1, 13, 16 Oct 44.
466 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

The inspector general's inquiry was conducted concurrently with a bitter

dispute between Stilwell and Chennault as to whether the latter had made unauthorized use of the stockpile of gas accumulated for support of U.S. operations in the Pacific by China-based aircraft. In May 1944 the Joint Chiefs

ordered Stilwell to begin accumulating gasoline for support of Pacific operations, target date November 1944. Little could be done in the summer of 1944

because of the overriding necessity of supporting Chennault's efforts in east

China. Then, in August the JCS weighed the effect of the loss of the east China

airfields on the support that might be given U.S. operations in the western

Pacific and decided to hold Chennault's Hump tonnage allocation at the

10,000-ton level in order that CBI might begin building up the stockpile

ordered in May. If emergencies arose Stilwell could permit diversions from the

stockpile.

On 27 September, after his trip to Kweilin and east China, Stilwell

authorized Chennault to borrow 1,000 tons of gasoline from the stockpile. At

the end of the month, when the time came to take inventory of the stockpile

and prepare October Hump allocations, CBI Theater headquarters discovered

that the Fourteenth Air Force had overdrawn its account by 2,400 tons. Accordingly, theater headquarters decided to even the books by cutting Chennault's October allocation to 7,600 tons. Chennault at once protested, and the

matter was brought to Stilwell's attention. Chennault argued that Stratemeyer

had authority to divert 3,500 tons and that he had simply drawn on that in

order to stay in the fight.63

Stilwell's reply was an administrative admonition. He told Chennault that

the drain on the theater stockpile had hindered CBI in carrying out commitments for the support of MacArthur's and Nimitz' Pacific operations. Chennault was taken aback by this sharp response for he felt the matter had been

discussed with Stilwell in an atmosphere of friendliness, and so on 19 October

he asked further details that he might reply to Stilwell's charges.

The issue was rapidly being submerged in the flow of greater events;

Stilwell in effect finessed it by replying that his radio had been an admonition,

and so not a subject for discussion.64

B-29 missions in support of Pacific operations, one of the types of support

for which gasoline had been stockpiled, were flown on 14 and 16 October from

China. Since so much importance was attached to these operations, which were 63

 (1) CM-OUT 31202, JCS to Stilwell, 2 May 44. (2) CM-OUT 87086, Marshall to Stilwell, 26 Aug 44. (3) CM-IN 7032, Chennault to Arnold, 7 Oct 44. (4) Rad CRA 15931, Evans to Stil- well, 6 Oct 44; Rad CAK 9482, Chennault to Stilwell, 14 Oct 44. Items 2918, 2938, Bk 8, JWS

Personal File. 64

 (1) The Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army, 1928 (Washington, 1943), which was in effect when Stilwell sent his admonition, defines "administrative admonition" as a nonpunitive measure, more analogous to instruction than to punishment, which a commanding officer or officer in charge is authorized and expected to use to further the efficiency of his command or unit. (2)

Rad CFB 24389, Stilwell to Chennault, 17 Oct 44; Rad CAK 9733, Chennault to Stilwell, 19 Oct

44; Rad CFB 24556, Stilwell to Chennault, 20 Oct 44. Items 2935, 2950, 2953, Bk 8, JWS Personal

File.
THE END OF CBI THEATER 467

launched a few days before American forces landed on Leyte Island in the

Philippines, Stilwell flew to Cheng-tu to be on hand for the first attack. Attacking ground installations of the Japanese air force on Formosa, 120 B-29's

dropped 650 tons of bombs on the island. Examining photographic assessments

of the attack, Stilwell was not impressed by the results attained.65

In the midst of these problems at the highest level of strategy, Stilwell took

a quick trip to Myitkyina where he talked until late in the night with the survivors of GALAHAD, or Merrill's Marauders as they were now known to every

reader of the press. The grievances accumulated during the North Burma Campaign, whose most dramatic expression came during the siege of Myitkyina,

needed a hearing, and so Stilwell was advised by Lt. Col. Fred Eldridge, of his

public relations staff, to visit the unit. On 6 October, Stilwell spoke with the

survivors of GALAHAD, now organized as the 475th Infantry Regiment. First

he met with the regiment as a whole, then with officer and enlisted man

delegates from each battalion.66

On 14 October, Stilwell flew to east China. Since the Generalissimo had

accepted his 18 September plan, preparations had been made, and Gens. Chang

Fa-kwei and Pai Chung-hsi were getting ready to pass to the offensive. D Day

was set for 20 October, and the Chinese were optimistic.

The result of this effort belongs to a somewhat later period. The Chinese

finally decided on a limited-objective attack with one army to counter the Japanese drive north from Canton. With strong air and artillery support, the 64th

Army drove toward Meng-shan on 21 October. The Chinese took their initial

objective, Meng-hu, but a Japanese counterattack that night threw them back

out of the town. Shortly after, General Chang told the American liaison officer

assisting him, Col. Howard C. Bowman, that "the morale of the Chinese soldier was broken and he no longer had the will to fight." This estimate offered

slight hope of holding Kweilin and Liuchow.67

Though at the time he was mildly optimistic about the 64th Army attack,

for himself, Stilwell had no great hopes. John Davies, newsmen Brooks Atkinson and Theodore H. White, and General Hearn, all were told that recall was

imminent.68 In far-off Yenan, capital of Red China, John S. Service revealed his

detachment from events by drafting a long memorandum to Stilwell urging

"greater realism" in the United States' dealings with the Generalissimo. Service

recommended that the United States enter into diplomatic discussions with the

Yenan regime, and that the United States should make clear that it was considering withdrawing its support from the Generalissimo and its recognition

from the Nationalists. The language of the memorandum strongly suggests

65

 (1) CM-OUT 39817, Arnold to Stilwell, 1 Oct 44. (2) Stilwell Diary, 14 Oct 44. 66

 (1) Stilwell Diary, 6 Oct 44. (2) The Stilwell Papers, p. 341. (3) An impression of the meeting is given by Cpl. Ferdinand Staunch, in Ex-CBI Roundup, Vol. 6, No. 6 (November, 1952), p. 13. 67

 (1) Stilwell Diary, 14 Oct 44. (2) Campaign of Southeastern China, p. 5. 68

 Stilwell Diary, 11-18 Oct 44.
468 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Service was unaware that he was addressing it to a man whose farewell letters

had been written two weeks before Service mailed it.69

The President Ends CBI Theater

In Washington, the discussion about the next step was narrowing down.

On receipt of Hurley's 13 October message, the President briefly considered

appointing an American officer.70 The exact nature of the President's answer

was discussed between the White House and the War Department, and several

drafts were prepared and rejected by either one or the other. Giving increased

powers to Chennault was contemplated for a time.71 The Generalissimo was

asked to name three Americans who would be acceptable to him.72 In reply,

through Hurley, he listed Alexander M. Patch, Albert C. Wedemeyer, and

Walter Krueger.73

In the nature of things, the reply would be a complex one, for the

Generalissimo was still asking for an American general to assume the title of

commander of the Chinese Army and to wield powers which, in the light of

the Generalissimo's 25 September aide-mémoire, may have seemed to the President and General Marshall to offer as much chance for later controversy as

those which had seemed so clearly defined and so carefully negotiated when

Stilwell assumed them in January 1942. There was the further question of what

to do about the China, Burma and India Theater, whether it should be split,

or continued as one. There was also the question of the President's personal

reaction to the charges made by the Generalissimo in his 9 October aide-mémoire.

The President's decision, in his reply of 18 October 1944, was that Stilwell

would at once be recalled. For himself and the Prime Minister, he accepted

responsibility for the North Burma Campaign, and told the Generalissimo that

no American would command the Chinese Army in China. The Generalissimo

was also asked to continue the North Burma Campaign he had denounced so

strongly.

Your message of 9 October 1944 was transmitted to me through General Hurley. I am

issuing instructions to recall General Stilwell from the theater immediately.

General Stilwell was not responsible for the decisions with respect to attacking in North

instead of South Burma. This decision was made by the Combined British and American

Staff and was fully approved by the Prime Minister and myself. Our conclusions, which

were inescapable, were reached only after serious consideration of all pertinent facts. Your

decision to employ Yunnan forces on the Salween was sound in my opinion. The maintenance and the increased facilities for a supply route into China demanded the occupation of

Myitkyina and I am now informed that the vital gas supply and low level flying route are

assured by the opening of the pipeline at Myitkyina on September 29.

As stated in my October 6 message, I do not feel that an American should in the present

69

 (1) Rpt 40, Service to Stilwell, 10 Oct 44 (mailed the 16th—probably the day the courier aircraft departed). Item 48, Bk 1, Hurley Papers. (2) The Stilwell Papers, p. 340. 70

 Memo, McNarney for Marshall, 14 Oct 44, sub: Relief of Gen Stilwell. Item 36, Item 60,

OPD Exec 10. 71

 (1) Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 539. (2) Item 60, OPD Exec 10. 72

 Leahy, I Was There, p. 272. 73

 Rad, NAV 151825, NCR 4780, Hurley to President, 15 Oct 44. Item 60, OPD Exec 10.
THE END OF CBI THEATER 469

situation assume responsibility in a command position for the operations of Chinese forces

in China. However, I will furnish a qualified officer to serve as your Chief of Staff. General

Hurley informed me that you prefer either Generals Patch, Wedemeyer, or Krueger. General

Patch is commanding an army now attacking the Germans in the vicinity of Belfort, France,

and cannot be spared. General Krueger is commanding an army now launched in a most

difficult offensive operation. General Wedemeyer can be made available after confirmation

from you that he will become your Chief of Staff. I would also appoint him Commander of

all U.S. Forces in the China Theater.

The recall of General Stilwell and appointment of General Wedemeyer will necessitate

changes of which I will outline the most important. What has heretofore been the U.S.

China-Burma-India Theater will be separated into two theaters so far as American interests are concerned, of which China will be one and the India-Burma Theater under General

Sultan will constitute the other. The 14th Air Force will remain in the China Theater under

General Chennault who in turn will be under Wedemeyer as Commander U.S. Forces in

the China Theater. I assume that you desire that the Ramgarh training and the supply and

training the X Forces should be continued, otherwise the fighting power of these units will

inevitably and quickly dwindle away. I hope that the necessary replacements will be furnished to enable the X Force to continue on its present mission, and that you will delegate

control of Chinese forces in India-Burma to General Sultan. Please let me hear from you on

these points.

The offensive operations of the Y Forces will continue to be most important and I should

like your assurance that they will advance in conjunction with the offensive operations in

Burma of Admiral Mountbatten. Coordination between operations of the China-based

Yunnan forces and Chinese forces based in Burma could be effected by General Wedemeyer

as your Chief of Staff in communication with Sultan and Mountbatten.

I think all the above is the best solution and that it will expedite the solution of our

immediate joint problem. Let me hear from you as soon as possible.74

With receipt of the President's message in Chungking, the Generalissimo's

victory was an accomplished fact, though not of the dimensions at which he

and his advisers had aimed. Stilwell was now on orders to return to the United

States, but there was no American to take the responsibility for whatever

might happen in China. In retrospect, the Generalissimo's triumph acquires an

aspect it probably did not wear at the time. It was the last diplomatic victory

he was to win for many years. Moreover, the President's answers to the Generalissimo, progressively colder and less accommodating, suggest a corresponding alteration of attitude on Mr. Roosevelt's part toward the Generalissimo

and China. In May 1943, at the Washington Conference, Roosevelt had been

solicitous in his concern not only for China but for the personal position and

prestige of the Generalissimo. Not three months after the Generalissimo had

forced Stilwell's recall, Roosevelt met with the Prime Minister and Marshal

Stalin on Russian soil at Yalta, February 1945. The attitude the President there

adopted toward the territory and interests of China suggests that the Generalissimo's triumph of October 1944 was one of the steps that led to the

Manchurian partition of February 1945.

A personal radio from Marshall warned Stilwell that recall was coming, and

74

 Memo, McCarthy for Handy, 18 Oct 44, with Incl, Memo, President for Generalissimo. Item 39, Item 60, OPD Exec 10.
470 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Stilwell quickly made what few preparations for departure seemed necessary.75

He had rather expected to be recalled, and the mere fact did not overly disturb

him. As he prepared to leave the theater where he had spent two and one half

years, the question that troubled him was whether he would be made a scapegoat for the fracas that followed when he delivered the President's 18 September message to the Generalissimo. Stilwell did not want the American public

to think that nothing more was involved than a personality clash between

himself and the Generalissimo, and hoped that the War Department would

permit him to issue a statement explaining the issues as he saw them.

As Stilwell went about his last-minute preparations at Chungking, he

found time to sketch the record of his mission and his recall as he saw it then:

After CEC [Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang] disclosures and

knowledge of relief, informed W [Theodore H. White?], A [Brooks Atkinson?], and I

[Harold Isaacs?] 1) Confirmed relief. 2) Reasons given by Gmo. Incompetent, non co-op,

lack of respect, and disobedience of orders, unwarranted diversion of munitions and men to

Burma. Responsibility for disaster in South China. Explained orders to attack Bhamo.

Explained "trade of S. China for N. Burma." 3) Issue of CKS vs. JWS. Real issue China make

effort or not. 4) Offer of Burma and Yunnan command.

CEC. Refusal of US demands. JWS must go. (Hurley: CKS said I was trying to

subjugate him.)

Given a mission and no means. Hamstrung by "no bargaining." Three years of struggle.

Secret reports by Chinese, British, and special emissaries—Currie, Willkie, Wallace, Nelson,

Hurley. Command functions reduced by ATC, XX BC, 14th AF, Miles. Bucked by the

British. Bucked by the Chinese.

In spite of it all, just ready to blossom, and then made whipping dog for CKS. It was

September 19 radio that got CKS. He blamed it on me—FDR was his great friend. FDR

did not stand up to it. I was relieved on the arbitrary stand and false statements of Chiang

Kai-shek. Q. Will a statement be made to explain the relief? Will I be allowed to make a

statement?

The issue was not CKS vs. JWS. Hurley realized too late what he had done. Took CKS

at face value. Believed his promises. Said to me he had bitched it up. When radios came in

via Navy, and when Hurley did not show them to me, I knew I was the goat.

Asked for policy at Cairo. All I was told was: "We want to help China."

 76

Stilwell left India for the United States on 27 October 1944. The hope that

he would be able to explain his conduct of their affairs in China to his countrymen was never realized. On his return, he was told by the War Department

that he could not discuss Chinese matters with the press, and his death in 1946

prevented his completing the personal account he had begun several times.77

Never carried beyond an initial survey of Chinese culture and history, the

surviving fragments offer no guide to what he planned to say.78

The comment of the United States Government on Stilwell's work in

China, Burma, and India was spoken by Secretary of War Stimson on 10 Feb75

 CM-OUT 48285, Marshall to Stilwell, 18 Oct 44. 76

 Data Notebook. 77

 Stilwell Diary 3, 4 Nov 44. 78

 The Stilwell documents in the Hoover Library contain several tentative beginnings of such a work.
THE END OF CBI THEATER 471

ruary 1945, just over three years after Stimson had invited him to his home for

a conference on China. The occasion was a ceremony to decorate Stilwell with

another Legion of Merit and with the Oak Leaf Cluster to the Distinguished

Service Medal. Stimson, pinning the awards on Stilwell, later wrote in his

diary:

I was particularly happy to lay this encomium on Stilwell's hard and terrific work in

Burma and in China and so I read the two citations myself and made a few comments to

Stilwell which I think he appreciated. I said I thought he had had the toughest job of any

of our generals and that I had never conveyed one of these medals with such pleasure as I

had in doing this.79

Conclusion

When Stilwell left the CBI Theater, the situation in China appeared dark.

As far as the American contribution to China Theater was concerned, the most

hopeful factor was that the projects begun in the equally dark days of 1942

were about to yield results on a scale far beyond 1942 and 1943. The fastapproaching completion of the projects begun by Stilwell or under his command would give his successors resources far beyond any that Stilwell ever had.

The projects that were Stilwell's own were those coming from his War

Department orders to "improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army."

In attempting to carry out that mission, he had created in the Chinese Army

in India a force of five divisions that compared very favorably with any in the

Japanese Army. What seemed to him a lack of interest on the part of Chinese

authorities had limited the results he had achieved within China proper, but

even there something had been done. Service schools and training centers had

been set up, and the Y and Z Forces had been exposed to U.S. training.

The North Burma Campaign had not been fought at the time or in the

manner Stilwell had proposed to his superiors, but he had successfully executed

the directives of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff. Under Stilwell, the

Chinese Army in India had conducted the first sustained Chinese offensive

against a Great Power, taken the key centers of north Burma, and planted the

Chinese and American flags within forty miles of the Chinese border. The Chinese divisions now firmly gripped a part of the prewar Burmese road net,

which linked with the old Burma Road. Inevitably, the Japanese would be

driven from the last portion they held, and the existing road from Myitkyina

to Wanting in China could readily be brought to the desired standard. The

Japanese blockade of China was doomed.

The great line-of-communications projects in CBI were not Stilwell's in

conception or in primary concern, for he was a troop trainer and a tactician,

not an engineer; but the degree to which they were completed, or brought

close to completion, very nearly equals the difference between his successor's

problems and his own. By October 1944, the bottleneck of the Assam line of

79

 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 541.
472 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

communications, which had hindered all operations in CBI, was only a bad

memory. In May 1943, the month of TRIDENT, when Roosevelt had approved

the Chennault Plan, the Assam line of communications had brought 5,117

long tons of U.S. supplies, exclusive of gas and oil, to Assam. From this trickle

Stilwell had been expected to support the Fourteenth Air Force and the Generalissimo's 300-odd divisions, build the Ledo Road, prepare for the North

Burma Campaign, and support the Americans in the Assam base area. In

October 1944, 124,499 tons came forward over the Assam line of communications. The improvement was a remarkable feat of engineering and organization, and great credit is due the railwaymen, the engineers, and Generals

Wheeler, Covell, and Somervell.

The airline had significance in that the tonnage it brought to China was

the sum of the resources the U.S. theater commander could throw into battle

there. In all of 1942 the air force and the ATC flew 3,706 long tons to China.

In 1943, 61,151 tons were flown to China. And when Stilwell went home in

October 1944, in that one month 35,131 tons were flown to China by the ATC,

by the CNAC which by this time was under government contract, and by other

contract carriers. (See Chart 5.)

The Ledo Road was nearly complete on 24 October 1944. The two great

terrain problems, the Patkai Hills and the marshy lowlands, had been conquered. Trucks could now drive in eighteen hours from the Ledo base area to

Warazup, which in turn was only seventy miles from Myitkyina. The road survey was complete to the neighborhood of Kamaing. Before the monsoon

lifted, a great collection of road-building machinery had been assembled in the

high ground of the upper reaches of the Hukawng and Mogaung valleys, and

was put to work as soon as the ground was dry enough. The progress in completing the Ledo Road was making possible a significant change in the method

of supplying the forces in north Burma, for in October 1944 more tonnage was

delivered by truck than by air, and the difference was to increase sharply in the

months ahead.80 (See Chart 7.)

The pipeline had far outstripped the Ledo Road. On 2 October one of the

two pipelines was in operation from the Digboi refineries via Ledo to Myitkyina. Henceforth Myitkyina would become a great supply center fed by road,

by air, and by pipeline.

Therefore, with the Assam line of communications bringing up supplies

in a great stream, with the Hump airline at an all-time high in efficiency, with

a pipeline delivering fuel to Myitkyina, and the Ledo Road soon to reach Myitkyina, the stage was set for the last act in China's wartime drama, in which the

blockade would be broken. Thanks to Stilwell, his successors in 1945 would

have the means to carry on the work he had almost single-handedly begun in

1942 in compliance with Marshall's order: "Support China!"

80

 Rpt, Gen Pick to Gen Wheeler, 9 Aug 45, charts, pp. 97-98. OCMH.
Bibliographical Note

The sources for this volume are in three categories: official records;

collections of private papers; and published works.

Official Records: Identification and Location

Official records are the major source of information for this volume.*

(1) Papers and minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and their planners can be located by the number, date, and title

assigned by the CCS and JCS Secretariats. These papers are in the custody of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) The Army's set of JCS and CCS papers was kept by the Strategy and

Policy Group, Operations Division, WDGS, under the heading of ABC files.

ABC files are organized by subject and date of the first paper in the file and are

now located in the Departmental Records Branch, The Adjutant General's

Office.

(3) The central file of the Operations Division, WDGS, is identified by the

symbol OPD, preceded by the case number within that file and followed first

by a decimal number referring to the specific subject file, and second by a theater area. OPD papers are in the custody of Departmental Records Branch, The

Adjutant General's Office. The Executive Group file of OPD is an informal collection of papers which has been divided into ten major categories and assigned

an arbitrary serial number for each item (book, folder, envelope) in each

category. The abbreviation OPD Exec identifies these papers in footnotes.

(4) An Army office of record is the Departmental Records Branch, The

Adjutant General's Office. The Departmental Records Branch gave each major

block of records from a War Department agency an accession number by which

it can be located. Accession numbers cited in this volume, with the year of

retirement and numerical order of accession within that year, follow:

Accession Numbers Agencies that deposited files

A45-466. ...... . War Department, Chief of Staff, Army

A46-217. ...... . SEAC War Diary

A46-257. ...... . Headquarters, Army Service Forces (Somervell File)

A46-299. ...... . International Division, Army Service Forces (Lend-Lease to China)

A47-30........ . War Plans Division and Operations Division

A47-81........ . Headquarters, Army Service Forces (Somervell China File)

A48-102........ Stilwell Personal Radio Files

A48-224........ American-British Conversations—Papers from Plans and

Operations

*The date on all documents is determined by the time zone at the point of origin; the exception is classified messages, which are dated upon their receipt in Washington.
474 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Of particular interest to students of the CBI Theater are General Stilwell's

personal message books (A48-102, Record Group 800), which have been cited

arbitrarily in footnotes as JWS Personal File. There are nine of these books,

including the OKLAHOMA File, which relates to General Stilwell's recall. A

book of messages sent and received by General Stilwell at Forward Echelon,

Northern Combat Area Command, is cited as 6A and is located separately at

the Kansas City Records Center, The Adjutant General's Office, Kansas City,

Missouri.

Records of Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma and India, and

those of its subordinate commands are now filed in the Kansas City Records

Center. Records describing the combat in north Burma, along the Salween

Front, and in east China come from the files of Headquarters, Northern Combat Area Command, Headquarters, Y-Force Operations Staff, and Headquarters, Z-Force Operations Staff, all subordinate commands of CBI Theater.

CBI Theater lend-lease reports are in Col. William S. Gaud's reports to

Headquarters, Army Service Forces.

The SEAC War Diary is a chronological compilation of pertinent documents of Southeast Asia Command (A46-217).

(5) U.S. Army radiograms in this volume can be found either in the Staff

Communications Office, Office of the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army,

or in files of headquarters, USAF, CBI, and its subordinate commands. Location of the latter radios is given in the footnotes. Messages sent and received

through Staff Communications are identified according to their local reference

numbers and date, the CM-IN or CM-OUT numbers. Messages sent and received through CBI Theater agencies are identified by the call letters of their

various headquarters; for example, CAK, CRA, CFB, CHC, and SH.

(6) A variety of miscellaneous records collected overseas by CBI Theater

historians or obtained by correspondence with participants in an event are in

the possession of the Office of the Chief of Military History. Among these

miscellaneous records are a collection of reports and notes of the DIXIE

Mission, the U.S. observer group to Communist China.

(7) An extensive account of the Japanese side of the story is found in

Japanese Studies in World War II, a series prepared by former Japanese officers

in Tokyo, begun under the auspices of the G-2 Historical Section, U.S. Far East

Command, and translated by Allied Translation and Interrogation Section,

Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. These studies are

cited by the number assigned to each by the Far East Command. Most of the

basic directives and orders to Japanese Army commanders of continental commands as issued by Imperial General Headquarters are in volumes entitled

Imperial General Headquarters Army Directives or Orders. These volumes were

compiled by the military historians of the Military Intelligence Section,

General Headquarters, Far East Command. Copies of Japanese records are in

the possession of the Office of the Chief of Military History.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 475

Immediately after the war's end, Southeast Asia Command interrogated a

number of senior Japanese officers who had served in Burma or in southwestern Yunnan. The results were published in a number of mimeographed

bulletins, under the imprimatur of Southeast Asia Translation and Interrogation Center (SEATIC). They are in the Military Intelligence Division Library.

The interrogators directed questioning to the 1943-45 fighting in Burma. The

Japanese spoke freely and showed no particular disposition to flatter the victors.

Thanks to Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,

very useful information was obtained from Lt. Gen. Kitsuju Ayabe, Assistant

Chief of Staff, Southern Army; Lt. Gen. Tadashi Hanaya, Commanding General,

55th Division, later Chief of Staff, 18th Area Army; Col. Takushiro Hattori,

Operations Section, Imperial General Staff; Lt. Col. Taro Hayashi, staff officer, 56th

Division; Lt. Gen. Masaki Honda, Commanding General, 33d Army; Maj. Gen.

Tadashi Katakura, Chief of Operations, Burma Area Army; Lt. Gen. Momoyo

Kunomura, Chief of Staff, 15th Army, Commanding General, Guard Division;

Col. Husayasu Maruyama, Commanding Officer, 114th Infantry Regiment, 18th

Division; Maj. Gen. Yasuyuki Miyoshi, Chief of Staff, 5th Air Division; Lt. Gen.

Eitaro Naka, Chief of Staff, Burma Area Army; Lt. Col. Masaji Ozeki, staff

officer, General Headquarters (Tokyo); Lt. Gen. Shoichi Sato, Chief of Staff, 5th

Air Division; Maj. Iwao Takahashi, staff officer, 15th Army; Lt. Col. Masahiko

Takeshita, staff officer, 15th Army; Lt. Gen. Yutaka Takeuchi, Commanding

General, 55th Division; Lt. Gen. Shinichi Tanaka, Commanding General, 18th

Division; Lt. Col. Taro Watanabe, Operations Section, Southern Army; Col.

Motohisa Yoshida, staff officer, 15th Army.

The papers cited as Japanese Comments were prepared by the Japanese

Research Division, Military History Section, Special Staff, of Headquarters, Far

East Command, in reply to requests in 1951 and 1955 by the Office, Chief of

Military History, for comments on draft narratives of the second and third

CBI volumes. Included in this manuscript are statements by General Tanaka,

Cols. Takushiro Hattori and Ichiji Sugita, and Lt. Cols. Shiro Hara and

Iwaichi Fujiwara of the 15th Army staff. The manuscript cited as Japanese

Officers' Comments was also prepared by the Japanese Research Division

of Headquarters, Far East Command, in reply to a request of 9 April 1952

from the Office, Chief of Military History, for comments on a draft of this

volume. Included in these comments are statements by Marshal Shunroku

Hata, Supreme Commander, China Expeditionary Army; Generals Yasuji

Okamura, Commanding General, North China Area Army, later Supreme

Commander, China Expeditionary Army, Renya Mutaguchi, 15th Army Commander, Shinichi Tanaka, Commander, 18th Division, Masakazu Kawabe, Commander, Burma Area Army, Jo Iimura, Chief of the General Staff, Southern

Army; Colonels Kiyoo Nagai, Staff Officer, 56th Division, Masanobu Tsuji, Staff

Officer, 33d Army, Iwaichi Fujiwara, Staff Officer, 15th Army, Ichiji Sugita, Staff

Officer, Imperial General Headquarters, Takeharu Shimanuki, Senior Staff Officer,
476 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

11th Army, Kumao Imoto, Staff Officer, 11th Army, Hiroshi Hashimoto, Staff

Officer, 15th Army, and Maj. Kanetoshi Mashida, Staff Officer, 11th Army.

These manuscripts are in the files of the Office, Chief of Military History.

(8) Manuscript histories, prepared during or after the war, were consulted

in the preparation of this volume. The first attempt to prepare a CBI Theater

history was initiated by General Stilwell, then theater commander, when in the

summer of 1944 he created a Historical Section, Theater Headquarters, under

Col. Mason Wright. The section's mission was to prepare a comprehensive

history of the theater for General Stilwell. After General Stilwell's recall, the

manuscript prepared under Colonel Wright's supervision was reworked and

edited by General Stilwell at his home in Carmel, California. Much of the

political comment in the manuscript is a close paraphrase of the reports of John

P. Davies, Jr., Stilwell's political adviser. The manuscript was then submitted

to the War Department as General Stilwell's Report. The original copy is in

the custody of the Departmental Records Branch, The Adjutant General's

Office. A carbon copy is in the Hoover Library, Palo Alto, California.

While the Historical Section, CBI Theater Headquarters, was preparing a

history of the theater, the Historical Section, Headquarters, Services of Supply,

China, Burma and India, under Lt. Col. Harry L. Mayfield, was preparing a

history of that organization. The manuscripts prepared by the SOS and Theater

Historical Sections have certain physical similarities. Both have a basic narrative, surveying the years 1942-44, with a host of appendixes, many of them

reports by subordinate units. The two manuscripts are a rich source of material,

and the footnotes in this volume reveal how deeply the authors are indebted to

Colonel Wright, to his successor Lt. Col. John L. Mott, and to Colonel

Mayfield. The SOS history is in the custody of the Office, Chief of Military

History.

The American point of view of the fighting in north Burma is covered in a

manuscript by Capt. Edward Fisher, History of NCAC. The British side is in

Operational Record of Eleventh Army Group and ALFSEA, November 1943-

August 1945. These manuscripts are in the possession of the Office, Chief of

Military History.

Miscellaneous manuscripts are 1st Lt. James H. Stone's U.S. Army Medical

Service in Combat in India and Burma, 1942-1945; History of the Ramgarh

Training Center, 30 June 42-15 May 45; History of the First Provisional Tank

Group; and U.S. Army Transportation in China, Burma, India During World

War II, by Joseph Bykofsky, Historical Branch, Office, Chief of Transportation.

These histories are filed in the Office, Chief of Military History.

Giving the Army Air Force side of the CBI Theater are Despatch on Air

Operations in Eastern Air Command (SEA) Covering the Period 15 December

1943 to 1 June 1945, a manuscript prepared for Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer;

History of the Fourteenth Air Force; and Growth, Development, and Operating Procedures of Air Supply and Evacuation System, NCAC Front, Burma
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 477

Campaign, 1943-45, prepared by the Military Observer Group, New Delhi,

India. With the exception of the History of the Fourteenth Air Force, which is

now in the U.S. Air Force Historical Division, Air University Library, Maxwell

Air Force Base, Alabama, the above manuscript histories are in the custody of

the Office, Chief of Military History. The History of the India-China Division,

Air Transport Command, 1944, is in the Historical Division, Military Air

Transport Service, Andrews Field, Maryland.

(9) Because Southeast Asia Command was an integrated Anglo-American

organization, it seemed advisable to obtain a British point of view on those

sections of the manuscript dealing with the operations of British units and with

discussions of strategy between British and American officers. Brigadier M. R.

Roberts of the Cabinet Office Historical Section, who commanded the 114th

Indian Infantry Brigade in the 1944 Arakan fighting, very kindly commented

at length on the manuscript. His observations and criticisms are filed in the

Office, Chief of Military History. A draft narrative lent by Lt. Col. J. E. B.

Barton of the same office permitted a sharper and clearer description of Chindit

operations in 1944, within the restrictions imposed by the scope of this volume.

In July 1953 Sunderland was able to visit the British Isles following temporary

duty with the Historical Section, U.S. Army in Europe, and spent many hours

with Brigadier Roberts discussing the campaign in Burma.

Collections of Private Papers

A source of valuable information is the private papers of participants in the

China, Burma and India Theater. These include (1) Collections of personal

papers; (2) Diaries; (3) Letters and inclosures.

Personal Papers: Of primary importance are the records of the late Gen.

Joseph W. Stilwell, which consist of: his personal journal, cited as the Stilwell

Diary; essays and analyses kept in two copy books, cited either as Stilwell Black

and White (B&W) Book or Stilwell Black Book; a file of undated papers, cited

as Stilwell Undated Papers (SUP); and his collection of theater records and

official personal papers, cited as Stilwell Documents, Stilwell Numbered Files

(SNF), or Stilwell Miscellaneous Papers. The Stilwell collection is in the

Hoover Library, Palo Alto, California.

From the days of his boyhood, General Stilwell kept a diary. As the man

grew in maturity and responsibility, his diary kept pace with him. By January

1942 his diary was a tool of command. It acted as a little personal file to which

he could turn to refresh his memory. In the diary he summarized important

radios, telephone calls, conferences, after action reports, and other papers

important to a commander in the field or in the headquarters. In physical form,

the wartime diaries are small ring-bound notebooks that the general could slip

into his pocket. His family knew he kept a diary, but knew nothing of its contents until after his death, when the little notebooks were found among his

personal effects. They were not intended for publication.
478 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

In addition to the diaries, General Stilwell kept two copybooks, one with

a black cover about eight by ten inches in size, one black and white, such as

school children use. In his copybooks, Stilwell wrote his reflections on the

day's events, dating almost all of them. However, because he was prone to

worry over his problems, the entries tend to blur the clear, terse statements in

the diaries. Because the copybooks are more literary in style than the diaries,

Mr. Theodore H. White relied heavily on them in editing The Stilwell Papers.

Of similar nature is the collection of sketches and essays on pieces of paper

which the authors, following Mr. White's usage, have called the undated

papers.

The Stilwell Numbered Files and their contents fall into an entirely

different category. These are official papers, as distinguished from the purely

personal items in the diaries and copybooks. Some of them are official Chinese

documents, some are British, some are Stilwell's papers as Chief of Staff, China

Theater, most are American. These official papers were sealed by General

Stilwell before his death. Mrs. Stilwell in May 1950 permitted the footlockers

in which they had been sealed to be opened and the contents inspected by

Riley Sunderland. These five linear feet of documents are now in the Hoover

Library. For an understanding of the events in China Theater in the years

1942-44 their importance can hardly be overestimated.

Also of great importance are the private papers of the late Harry L.

Hopkins, which were temporarily in the custody of Mr. Robert E. Sherwood.

The Hopkins papers have now been retired to the Franklin D. Roosevelt

Library, Hyde Park, New York. As a personal friend of Dr. T. V. Soong, the

Chinese Foreign Minister, and, in effect, the lend-lease administrator, Mr.

Hopkins was actively concerned with Chinese affairs in 1941-44. There are

three major classes of papers regarding China, Burma, and India in Book VII

of the Hopkins Papers: letters from Soong to Hopkins, official correspondence

on lend-lease and Sino-American relations, and letters from Joseph W. Alsop

and Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault. In addition, Hopkins usually received

carbon copies of Chennault's letters to the President. A complete catalogue of

all Hopkins' papers was generously given to the Office, Chief of Military

History, by Mr. Sherwood. The authors also used Mr. Sherwood's manuscript

of Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History, as well as notes from his personal

files.

Material on the background of the Hurley-Nelson mission and Stilwell's

recall is in Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley's papers. Here, also, are the White

House messages as sent and received by General Hurley while acting as the

President's personal representative in Chungking. Notes and extracts from the

Hurley Papers are in the custody of the Office, Chief of Military History.

Material on the background and activities of GALAHAD is in the papers of

Col. Charles N. Hunter. Among the papers of Col. Carlos G. Spaht is a

Chinese unit history giving the Chinese 8th Army's part in the Salween
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 479

offensive. Scrapbooks of Col. Robert F. Seedlock contain engineering data on

rebuilding the Burma Road inside China.

Diaries: As G-2, NCAC, Col. Joseph W. Stilwell, Jr., kept a diary of his

activities in the north Burma fighting. A diary of Col. Walter S. Wood gives an

account of Chinese action along the Burma Road on the Yunnan front. Lt. Col.

(then 1st Lt.) Dwight E. Brewer, while adjutant general of Z-FOS, recorded

events as he saw them at Kweilin during the east China fighting. Extensive

notes or transcripts from these diaries are in the custody of the Office, Chief of

Military History.

Letters: On file with the Mail and Records Section, Office, Chief of Military

History, are a number of letters from other official historians of the war in Asia

and from participants in its campaigns. These letters, often including wartime

documents as inclosures, and a file of comments and criticisms on draft manuscripts of this volume which were submitted to informed persons, are a source

of valuable information. Of particular interest is the file marked HIS 330.14

CBI 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, and 1952 which will be eventually retired to

the Departmental Records Branch, The Adjutant General's Office.

Published Works

The following works cover the political aspects of the Far Eastern war for

1943-44.

Churchill, Winston S. The Hinge of Fate. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950.

— — —. Closing the Ring. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951.

Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. Vol. II. New York: The Macmillan Company,

1948.

Leahy, William D. I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt

and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time. New York: Whittlesey House,

1950.

Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History. New York: Harper &

Brothers, 1948.

Stimson, Henry L., and McGeorge Bundy. On Active Service in Peace and War. New York:

Harper & Brothers, 1948.

United States Department of State. United States Relations with China: With Special

Reference to the Period 1944-1949. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949.

Background on the Chinese Army in Burma, and on Chinese political

thinking and philosophy may be obtained from:

Ho Yung-chi. The Big Circle. New York: The Exposition Press, 1948.

Peck, Graham. Two Kinds of Time. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950.

On more strictly military matters are:

Appleman, Roy E., James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens. Okinawa: The

Last Battle, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Washington: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1948.
480 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Arnold, Henry H. Global Mission. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949.

Barclay, Cyril N. The History of the Cameronians. London: Siston Praed and Company,

1947.

Chennault, Claire L. Way of a Fighter. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1949.

Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II: IV,

The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944. Chicago: The University of

Chicago Press, 1950.

— — —. The Army Air Forces in World War II: V, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki,

June 1944 to August 1945. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953.

Eldridge, Fred. Wrath In Burma. New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1946.

Fergusson, B. E. "Behind the Enemy's Lines in Burma," Journal of the Royal United Service

Institution (August, 1946).

King, Ernest J., and Walter Muir Whitehill. Fleet Admiral King, A Naval Record. New

York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1952.

Maclean, Fitzroy. Escape to Adventure. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1950.

Merrill's Marauders, AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945.

Owen, Frank. The Campaign in Burma. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1946.

Ramgarh: Now It Can Be Told. Ranchi, India, 1945.

Report and Supplement for Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander,

South-East Asia, 1943-1946, Vice-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma. New Delhi,

India, July 30, 1947.

Romanus, Charles F., and Riley Sunderland. Stilwell's Mission to China. UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,

1953.

Seagrave, Gordon S. Burma Surgeon Returns. New York: W. W Norton & Company, Inc.,

1946.

Stanley Clarke, E. B., and A. T. Tillott. From Kent to Kohima, Being the History of the 4th

Battalion the Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment (T. A.), 1939-1947. Aldershot, England,

1951.

Stilwell, Joseph W. The Stilwell Papers. Arranged and edited by Theodore H. White. New

York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948.

Showing the economic effects of the war on Japan are:

United States Strategic Bombing Survey. The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War

Economy. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946.

— — —. The Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground Army Logistics. Washington: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1947.

— — —. Japanese Air Power. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946.

— — —. The Strategic Air Operation of Very Heavy Bombardment in the War Against Japan.

Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946.
Glossary

A-1

A-2

A-3

A-4

AAF

ACofS

Adv

AF

AG

AGFRTS

AMMDEL

ASC

ASF

ATC

Bomb Gp

Br

CAI

CBI

CCS

CDS

CEF

CG

Chindits

CinC

CM-IN

CM-OUT

CN

CNAC

CO

CofS

Comd

Comdr

Conv

COS

CPS

CT

CTO

DCofS

Dir

Div

Personnel section of air staff

Intelligence section

Operations and training section

Matériel and supply section

Army Air Forces

Assistant Chief of Staff

Advance

Air force

Adjutant General

Air Ground Force Resources Technical Staff (Provisional)

American Military Mission, Delhi. Code name for American Headquarters

at New Delhi, India

Air Service Command

Army Service Forces

Air Transport Command

Bombardment Group

Branch

Chinese Army in India

China, Burma, and India

Combined Chiefs of Staff

China Defense Supplies, Inc.

Chinese Expeditionary Force, a part of Y-Force

Commanding General

Troops of the British Long-Range Penetration Groups

Commander in Chief

Classified Message sent into Pentagon

Classified Message sent out of Pentagon

Chinese National Currency

China National Aviation Corporation

Commanding Officer

Chief of Staff

Command

Commander

Conversation

British Chiefs of Staff

Combined Staff Planners

China Theater

China Theater of Operations

Deputy Chief of Staff

Directive

Division
482 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

EAC

ELOC

Elms

Engr

Exec

FO

Fwd Ech

G-1

G-2

G-3

G-4

Gar

GHQ

GMO CKS

GO

GOC

Gp

Hist

Hq

Hump

I & R Platoon

IBT

IG

IGH

IIB

Ind

Inf

Int

Int Sum

Interrog

Interv

ITC

ICW

IMB

JCS

JICA

JPS

JSM

JSSC

JWS

KCRC

Ln O

LOC

LRPG

Eastern Air Command

Eastern line of communications

Elements

Engineer

Executive

Field order

Forward Echelon

Personnel section of divisional or higher staff

Intelligence section

Operations section

Supply section

Garrison

General headquarters

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

General order

General Officer Commanding

Group

Historical

Headquarters

The India-China air ferry route

Reconnaissance Platoon

India-Burma Theater

Inspector general

Japanese Imperial General Headquarters

Independent Infantry Brigade

Indian, indorsement

Infantry

Intelligence

Intelligence summary

Interrogation

Interview

Infantry Training Center

India-China Wing

Independent Mixed Brigade

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Joint Intelligence Collecting Agency

Joint Staff Planners

Joint Staff Mission (British)

Joint Strategic Survey Committee

Joseph W. Stilwell

Kansas City Records Center, Kansas City, Mo.

Liaison officer

Line of communications

Long-Range Penetration Group
GLOSSARY 483

MID

Mil

Min

(-)

MRS

Msg Bk

MTF

Mtg

NCAC

NMC

OCMH

OCofT

Off

OPD

Opn Instr

Opns

OSS

POL

Prov

QM

RAF

Rr Ech

Rs

RTC

S-1

S-2

S-3

S-4

S&P Gp

SAC

SACSEA

SEAC

SEATIC Bull

Sec

Secy

Sitrep

SNF

SOS

Sq

Stf

SUP

TC

Telg

TIG

Military Intelligence Division

Military

Minutes

Less detachments

Military Railway Service

Message Book

Myitkyina Task Force

Meeting

Northern Combat Area Command

National Military Council

Office, Chief of Military History

Office, Chief of Transportation

Officer

Operations Division, War Department General Staff

Operation Instruction

Operations

Office of Strategic Services

Petrol (gasoline), oil, and lubricants

Provisional

Quartermaster

Royal Air Force

Rear Echelon

Rupees

Ramgarh Training Center

Personnel section of regimental or lower staff

Intelligence section

Operations section

Supply section

Strategy & Planning Group

Supreme Allied Commander

Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia Command

Southeast Asia Translation and Interrogation Center bulletin

Section

Secretary

Situation report

Stilwell Numbered File

Services of Supply

Squadron

Staff

Stilwell Undated Paper

Transportation Corps

Telegram

Traveling instructional group
484 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Tng

T/O

Trs

USAF

USAF CBI

USAF Hist Div

USFCT

USF IBT

USSBS

VLR

WASC

WDCSA

WDGS

Wkly

Training

Tables of Organization

Troops

United States Army Forces or United States Air Force

United States Army Forces, China, Burma and India

United States Air Force Historical Division, Air University Library,

Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.

United States Forces, China Theater

United States Forces, India-Burma Theater

United States Strategic Bombing Survey

Very long range bombers

Chinese War Area Service Corps

War Department Chief of Staff, Army

War Department General Staff

Weekly
Code Names

ABERDEEN

ALBACORE

ALBACORE ONE

ALBACORE TWO

ALBACORE THREE

ANAKIM

ANVIL

AQUILA

ARCADIA

AXIOM

BLACKPOOL

BROADWAY

BUCCANEER

BULLDOZER

CAPITAL

CHAMPION

CULVERIN

DIXIE

DRACULA

END RUN

GALAHAD

GALVANIC

GASPER

GRIPFAST

ICHIGO

KIKU

KOGO

Chindit stronghold near Manhton, Burma

Operation plan of Chinese Army in India to retake north

Burma

Plan for defense of the Ledo Base

Plan providing for occupation of Shingbwiyang on D plus 15

and for sending patrols to the lines of the Tarung and Tanai

streams

Plan in four phases: Phase 3A—seizure of Jambu Bum; 3B—

seizure of the Lonkin-Kamaing line; 3C—seizure of

Mogaung and Myitkyina; 3D—seizure of Katha and Bhamo

Plan to retake Burma and open the line of communications to

China through the port of Rangoon

Amphibious assault on southern France

Code name for Task Force, Tenth Air Force, and Headquarters,

Tenth Air Force, New Delhi

Washington Conferences, December 1941-January 1942

Mission sent to Washington and London in February 1944 by

SEAC to urge CULVERIN

Chindit block on railway near Namkwin, Burma

Airstrip about fifty miles northeast of Indaw, Burma, used by

Chindits

Plan for amphibious operation in the Andaman Islands

Small-scale amphibious operation briefly pushed by Admiral

Mountbatten after cancellation of PIGSTICK

Offensive to recapture north Burma, 1944

SEAC's plan for Burma operations as of December 1943

Plan for an attack against Netherlands Indies

U.S. Army observer group sent to Communist China

Plan for airborne and amphibious assault on port of Rangoon,

1944

Task force of GALAHAD survivors used in drive for Myitkyina

Code name for American long-range penetration groups

Occupation of key points in the Gilbert Islands

Striking force for defense of Tinsukia-Nazira line of communications, April 1944

Plan for an attack on north and central Burma, a modification

of TARZAN

Over-all Japanese operation for east China, 1944

Japanese 18th Division's code name

Japanese plan to clear the Chinese off the railway lines north

of the Yangtze River
486 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

LEDO STRIPTEASE

MATTERHORN

MERCHANT OF VENICE

OCTAGON

OKLAHOMA File

OVERLORD

PEANUT

PIGSTICK

QUADRANT

QUARTERBACK

RAINBOW

ROCKBOTTOM

SEXTANT

SHO

TIGAR 1 C, TIG-1C

TIGAR 26 A, TIG-26A

TOGO

TORA

TOREADOR

TRIDENT

TWILIGHT

U Operation

UTOPIA

WHITE CITY

X-RAY Force

Y-Force

Y-FOS

ZEBRA Force

Z-FOS

Plan for 22d Division to move into Shingbwiyang area when

the Nambyu-Tawang river lines were secured. One of its

regiments would protect the 38th Division's right flank,

the other would fly to Fort Hertz

Plan to place B-29's in CBI

Code signal indicating capture of Myitkyina

Quebec Conference, September 1944

Stilwell's personal file of messages about his recall

Plan for the invasion of northwest Europe, spring 1944

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

Assault on Mayu peninsula aimed at Akyab

Quebec Conference, August 1943

General Stilwell

Y-FOS plan for Salween offensive

CBI Theater plan for Hump deliveries, fall 1943

Cairo Conference, November-December, 1943

Japanese plans for decisive operation, western Pacific, summer,

fall, 1944

Ledo-Myitkyina-Kunming Road project

Project to move supplies for the Fourteenth Air Force over

the line of communications Kunming-Chanyi-KweiyangLiuchow-Kweilin to be distributed among the east China

airfields

Japanese plan in three phases: capture of Heng-yang; capture

of Kweilin and Liuchow; capture of Nanning, opening of

Canton-Hankow railroad and overrunning of Fourteenth

Air Force's fields at Suichuan and Nanhsiung

Japanese map maneuvers designed to test intentions and capabilities of enemies in the Pacific and China area, winter, 1943

Airborne landing by two divisions in central Burma

Washington Conference, May 1943

Plan to bomb Japan through Chinese bases

Japanese attack on Imphal

Seizure of Andaman Islands

Chindit stronghold near Mawlu, Burma

Chinese Army in India

American sponsored Chinese divisions in Yunnan

Y-Force Operations Staff (American)

U.S.-sponsored Chinese divisions in east China

Z-Force Operations Staff (American)
Basic Military Map Symbols*

Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within

a triangle an observation post, and within a circle a supply

point.

Military Units—Identification

Antiaircraft Artillery .................................. .

Armored Command................................... .

Army Air Forces...................................... .

Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery ........... .

Cavalry, Horse ....................................... .

Cavalry, Mechanized.................................. .

Chemical Warfare Service.............................. .

Coast Artillery ....................................... .

Engineers ........................................... .

Infantry............................................. .

Medical Corps ....................................... .

Ordnance Department................................. .

Quartermaster Corps.................................. .

Signal Corps ......................................... .

Tank Destroyer....................................... .

Transportation Corps.................................. .

Veterinary Corps...................................... .

Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing

symbol with the arm or service symbol:

Airborne Artillery..................................... .

Airborne Infantry..................................... .

*For complete listing of symbols see FM 21-30, from which these are taken.
488 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Size Symbols

The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or

above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying

arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization:

Squad ............................................. .

Section.............................................. .

Platoon ............................................. .

Company, troop, battery, Air Force flight ................. .

Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron ......... .

Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation CT following identifying numeral) .......................... .

Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force

Wing............................................. .

Division or Command of an Air Force.................... .

Corps or Air Force .................................... .

Army. ............................................ .

Group of Armies.................................... .

EXAMPLES

The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the

unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent

unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below

boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines:

Company A, 137th Infantry ........................ .

8th Field Artillery Battalion......................... .

Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division........... .

Observation Post, 23d Infantry...................... .

Command Post, 5th Infantry Division ................ .

Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantry .......... .

Weapons

Machine gu n ........................................ .

Gun................................................ .

G u n battery ......................................... .

Howitzer or Mortar ................................... .

Tank ............................................... .

Self-propelled gu n .................................... .
United States Army in

World War II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War Department

Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945

The Army and Economic Mobilization

The Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground Forces

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops

The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service Forces

The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western Hemisphere

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense

Guarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in the Pacific

The Fall of the Philippines

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive

Victory in Papua

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls

Campaign in the Marianas

The Approach to the Philippines

Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

Triumph in the Philippines

Okinawa: The Last Battle

Strategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy

Salerno to Cassino

Cassino to the Alps
490 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

The European Theater of Operations

Cross-Channel Attack

Breakout and Pursuit

The Lorraine Campaign

The Siegfried Line Campaign

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge

The Last Offensive

The Supreme Command

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II

The Middle East Theater The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India Theater

Stilwell's Mission to China

Stilwell's Command Problems

Time Runs Out in CBI

The Technical Services

The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War

The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field

The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat

The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany

The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War

The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply

The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany

The Signal Corps: The Emergency

The Signal Corps: The Test

The Signal Corps: The Outcome

The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations

The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Special Studies

Chronology: 1941-1945

Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945

Rearming the French

Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt

The Women's Army Corps

Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors

Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces

The Employment of Negro Troops

Manhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb

Pictorial Record

The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Japan
Inde x

ABERDEEN: 198

Advance Section: 131, 389

Advance Section No. 1 (Gaya), SOS: 257,

290, 292

Advance Section No. 2, SOS: 257, 276

Advance Section No. 3, SOS: 290

Advance Section No. 4, SOS: 290

Aida, Maj. Gen. Toshiji: 214, 215

Air Commando, No. 1, AAF: 196

Air Control Section, G-4, Chih Hui Pu: 102

Air Dropping Section, G-4, Chih Hui Pu: 102

Air Force, Fourteenth. See Fourteenth Air

Force.

Air Force, Tenth. See Tenth Air Force.

Air Force integration. See Eastern Air Command.

Air forces, Japanese: 85-88

Air-ground co-operation. See Air support,

tactical.

Air Ground Force Resources Technical Staff

(Provisional) (AGFRTS), 5329th: 372

Air-ground liaison: 251, 372

Air groups, U.S. See Bombardment groups;

Fighter groups.

Air operations: 88, 88n, 322-26. See also Air

support, tactical; China-based air operations; Strategic bombing.

Air Plan for the Defeat of Japan: 54

Air power-ground forces controversy: 5, 325,

363-64, 367, 369, 379, 380, 381, 384, 403,

413. See also Chennault Plan; Stilwell,

Gen. Joseph W., and Chennault.

Air Service Command (ASC): 290, 292

Air squadrons, U.S. See Bombardment squadrons; Fighter squadrons.

Air superiority

Allied: 42, 83, 87-88, 95, 338

Japanese: 86

limitations: 369, 382

techniques of using: 338

Air supply: 87, 95-97, 100-109

administrative problems: 100-109

aircraft for: 98-101, 192-93

Air supply—Continued

and Chinese troops: 106-08

conditions necessary for: 87, 95, 394

cost: 108-09

enemy fire and: 247

Heng-yang defense: 401, 401n

at Imphal: 191-96

loading and packing: 104

at Myitkyina: 235, 238-39, 250

North Burma Campaign: 41, 87, 88, 95-98,

122-23, 127, 134, 180, 189

Salween campaign: 338, 340, 344-45, 347,

350, 392

significance: 87, 88, 95, 98-99, 167-68

for surrounded units: 87, 122, 167-68,

191-96

techniques: 97, 98n, 102-06

weather factor. See Weather, and air operations.

Air supply, Japanese: 395

Air support, strategic. See Strategic bombing.

Air support, tactical

east China defense: 21-22, 400-401

Japanese: 86-88, 88n, 397, 434

at Myitkyina: 236, 251

North Burma Campaign: 39, 84, 86, 87,

88-91, 95, 181

Salween campaign: 313, 340, 345, 350,

351, 355, 359-60, 391, 392

targets: 89

techniques: 89

Air transport: 98-100, 167, 168, 192-93, 229.

See also Air supply; Hump; Reinforcement

by air.

Air Transport Command (ATC): 11, 99,

115, 261, 276, 312, 470

Airborne operations: 51, 62, 202-03, 244.

See also Chindits; GALAHAD; Long-range

penetration groups.

Aircraft, Allied: 84, 84n, 91, 99, 112. See also

B-24's; B-25's; C-46's; C-47's; C-54's.

Aircraft, Japanese: 85n

Aircraft allocation: 98-100, 101-02, 192-93
492 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Aircraft losses, Allied: 87, 108

Aircraft losses, Japanese: 87, 88

Aircraft shortage: 100-101

Aircraft strengths, Allied: 84, 87, 91

Aircraft strengths, Japanese: 85, 86, 87

Airfield construction: 57, 77-78, 115, 136

ALBACORE: 41, 42

ALBACORE Two: 41, 45

ALBACORE THREE: 41, 50

Alsop, 1st Lt. Joseph W.: 374, 376, 385, 385n,

447n

American Military Mission to China: 385

American Volunteer Group: 385

Ammunition

Chinese production: 414n

expenditure: 90

lend-lease, for China: 281, 334n

shortages: 152, 181, 238-39

.50-caliber: 401, 401n

Amphibious operations. See Bay of Bengal,

proposed amphibious operation; CULVERIN.

Andaman Islands: 64, 66, 74. See also

BUCCANEER.

Animal transport. See Pack transport.

Animal Transport Regiment: 223

Antitank guns: 155, 187, 393

ANVIL: 68, 70, 73, 75

Appleton, Col. John A.: 13, 266, 267, 270, 273

Appleton-Inglis Railway Mission: 13

Arakan: 61, 76, 119, 166, 167, 168

ARCADIA Conference (Washington, December

1941): 3

Armor. See Tanks.

Arms, Brig. Gen. Thomas S.: 26

Armstrong, Col. George E.: 427

Army Air Forces (AAF): 15, 88, 388

Army Service Forces: 228, 261, 281, 388

Arnold, Gen. Henry H.: 19, 63, 99, 111, 269-

70, 299, 315, 369

Artillery, Allied

Chinese distribution and deployment: 4,

404, 423

Chinese weapons: 209, 245, 333, 334n, 393,

401n

counterbattery fire: 395

direct fire: 397

gunnery, Chinese: 351

in mountain warfare: 338, 395

Artillery, Allied—Continued

at Myitkyina: 233, 245

pack: 338, 356

preparation: 125, 128

for Salween campaign: 313, 340

support: 33, 135, 318n, 338

Artillery, Japanese: 135, 153

effectiveness of fire: 182, 209, 348

gun positions: 353

for ICHIGO: 318

Asano, Colonel: 233

Assam line of communications. See Lines of

communications, Assam.

Assam Line of Communications Panel: 274

Atebrin: 286-87

Atkinson, Brooks: 467, 470

Attacks, infantry

Chinese: 125, 127, 128, 230, 346, 353, 391,

392-93, 395-96

Chinese-American: 184, 225, 236-37, 245,

249-50, 253

Japanese: 189. See also Counterattacks,

Japanese.

U.S.: 236

Attacks, tank: 187, 208

Attacks, tank-infantry: 186, 209, 250-51

Auchinleck, Gen. Sir Claude J. E.: 11, 13, 49-

50

AXIOM Mission: 171-72, 362. See also Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis, mission to

London and Washington.

B-24's: 94, 368

B-25's: 19, 92, 251, 392, 394, 401n

B-29 airfields. See Cheng-tu airfields.

B-29 project: 53-54, 58, 72, 316, 381. See also

Bomber Command, XX; MATTERHORN.

command problems: 109-14

logistical problems: 114-15

plans: 15-17

question of diversions to meet ICHIGO:

367-70

summary of results: 369-70, 466-67

B-29's: 53

"Baby tortoise" tactics: 167

Baldwin, Air Marshal Sir John: 84. See also

Third Tactical Air Force.

Banzai, Lt. Gen. Ichiryo: 408

Barge lines, Brahmaputra River: 11, 260,

273-74
INDEX 493

Barrett, Col. David D.: 376

Base Section No. 1 (Karachi), SOS: 264

Base Section No. 2 (Calcutta), SOS: 257, 264

Base Section No. 3 (Ledo), SOS: 13, 98, 100,

101, 257

Battalion, 1st, GALAHAD: 149, 150, 176, 180,

183-85, 190, 191, 223, 242. See also

GALAHAD; Osborne, Lt. Col. William L.;

Red Combat Team, 1st Battalion, GALAHAD; White Combat Team, 1st Battalion,

GALAHAD.

Battalion, 2d, GALAHAD: 149, 150, 152, 176,

178, 180-81, 182-83, 188-91, 223, 242.

See also Blue Combat Team, 2d Battalion,

GALAHAD; GALAHAD; Green Combat

Team, 2d Battalion, GALAHAD; McGee,

Lt. Col. George A., Jr.

Battalion, 2d, GALAHAD (New): 250

Battalion, 3d, GALAHAD: 149, 150, 176, 182-

83, 188, 189, 223. See also Beach, Lt. Col.

Charles E.; GALAHAD; Khaki Combat

Team, 3d Battalion, GALAHAD; Orange

Combat Team, 3d Battalion, GALAHAD.

at Myitkyina: 233-37

re-formed at Myitkyina: 242

Battalion, 3d, GALAHAD (New): 247, 252

Battalion, 13th Mountain Medical: 142, 158

Battalion, 151st Medical: 285

Bay of Bengal, proposed amphibious operation: 57, 62, 65, 71, 75-77, 297, 308, 309,

461. See also BUCCANEER; BULLDOZER;

PIGSTICK.

Bayonets: 184

Beach, Lt. Col. Charles E.: 35, 182

Beaufighters: 84n

"Beehive" tactics: 167

Bengal and Assam Railway

conditions requiring correction: 260-61, 265-

66

improvement: 267, 271-72, 273, 275

Japanese threaten to cut: 90, 174

plans for improvement: 11, 12-13, 266

Bengal Command (RAF): 84

Bennett, Col. Clarence W.: 194, 194n

Bergin, Brig. Gen. William E.: 31

Bhamo: 433, 435, 455

"Big squeeze play": 155-58

BLACKPOOL: 221

Blair, 1st Lt. Melvin D.: 245

Blaker, Maj. Frank G.: 222

Blue Combat Team, 2d Battalion, GALAHAD:

149

Boatner, Brig. Gen. Haydon L.: 29, 39, 42-43,

69, 101, 122-23, 138, 139, 235n

attempt to remove: 31

commands at Myitkyina: 237, 238, 239-40,

242-43, 244-45, 247, 248

illness: 78, 248

relations with Sun Li-jen: 45, 48

Stilwell's mission to Washington, 1944: 161,

163-64

Bombardment groups

7th (H): 92

308th (H): 19

12th (M): 84, 92

341st (M): 84, 391

Bombardment squadrons

2d: 18

11th (M): 18

490th (M): 84

Bombay: 257, 264

Bomber Command, XX: 15, 113, 114, 115,

291, 369, 470. See also B-29 project;

MATTERHORN.

Bombing, strategic. See Strategic bombing.

Booby traps: 152, 181, 190

Bourne, Brig. Geoffrey K.: 171

Bowerman, Brig. J. F.: 139

Boye, Col. Frederic W.: 321-22

Brahmaputra River. See Barge lines, Brahmaputra River.

Branch, Lt. Col. George: 271

Bray, Lt. Col. Stanley: 270

Bridge demolition: 350, 351, 357

Brink, Col. Francis G.: 35, 161

British-American relations

controversy over north Burma operations:

162-63, 164-65, 171-72, 228-29

negotiations on control of Assam LOC and

Calcutta port: 260-62

British Broadcasting Corporation: 199

British Chiefs of Staff: 169, 171

and amphibious operation, Bay of Bengal:

66, 68, 73, 81

and Burma operations: 162-63, 439

on directive for SEAC: 228
494 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

British-Chinese relations: 304-06. See also

Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis, and

Chiang Kai-shek.

British and Commonwealth units, air: 84, 89,

98

British and Commonwealth units, ground.

See also Chindits.

Army, Fourteenth: 92, 167, 174, 222, 439

Corps

4: 42, 50, 62, 90, 119, 162, 163, 175, 177,

192-94. See also Scoones, Lt. Gen.

Geoffrey.

15: 62, 119, 167

33: 90, 193-94

Divisions

3d Indian: 93, 196, 198-99, 220, 221,

239

5th Indian: 87, 119, 167, 174, 175

7th Indian: 87, 119, 167-68, 175

17th Indian: 119

20th Indian: 119

23d Indian: 119

26th Indian: 167

36th: 167, 222

70th. See British and Commonwealth

units, Division, 3d Indian; Chindits.

81st West African: 167

Brigades

3d West African: 196, 198

14th: 196, 198, 222

16th: 143, 196, 198

23d: 196, 222

77th: 196, 197, 221

111th: 196, 197, 198, 221-22

161st Indian: 174, 194

Regiment, Queen's Own Royal West Kent:

194

British-Indian-U.S. co-operation: 274. See

also Calcutta; Supply, local procurement.

British role in Burma: 164, 193-94, 439. See

also Imphal.

BROADWAY: 197

Brooke, Gen. Sir Alan: 13, 36, 69, 73, 378

Brown, Col. Campbell: 235n

Brown, Col. Rothwell H.: 142, 152, 154-55,

156, 208, 235n

Brubeck, Capt. Shields A.: 253

BUCCANEER: 66, 68-71. See also Andaman

Islands.

BULLDOZER: 81

Burma

geography: 9-10, 37-38, 39, 95-97, 136

situation, December 1943: 119

Burma operations. See North Burma Campaign.

Burma Road: 298, 305, 332, 390, 394, 395.

424. See also Ledo Road.

Burma Road Engineers: 340, 390, 395

Burma-Siam Railway: 91, 92, 94

Burma Surgeon. See Seagrave, Dr. Gordon

S.; Seagrave Hospital Unit.

Bypasses: 127, 134, 148, 156, 390. See also

Envelopments.

C-46's: 100, 175

C-47's: 97, 99, 168, 175, 340

C-54's: 100

C-Force. See Z-Force (ZEBRA Force).

Cairo Conference. See SEXTANT Conference.

Cairo Declaration: 66

Calcutta: 85-86, 259, 260-62, 263-65

Camouflage, Japanese: 348

Canadian Mutual Aid: 32n

Cannibalism: 345

Cannon, Col. Robert M.: 39-41

CAPITAL: 439-40

Carton de Wiart, Lt. Gen. Sir Adrian: 365,

366

"Cash shops": 289

Casualties, British, at Myitkyina: 244

Casualties, Chinese

at Myitkyina: 230, 243, 244, 253

North Burma Campaign: 46, 128, 158, 188

Salween campaign: 350, 393, 396, 398

Casualties, Japanese

ICHIGO: 371, 399, 401

Imphal: 195

Myitkyina: 233n, 251

North Burma Campaign: 137, 215n, 220

Salween campaign: 350, 356, 393

Casualties, U.S.

Myitkyina: 240-41, 252, 253

North Burma Campaign: 182, 191

Caves, Japanese: 209

CBI Theater: 114

accomplishments summarized: 471-72

and B-29's: 113-14
INDEX 495

CBI Theater—Continued

Chungking staff: 315

command structure: 257-59

creation: 4

and east China crisis: 315, 371, 372

headquarters: 52, 54, 79, 166, 242, 257, 283

limited manpower and supplies: 4, 5, 64

logistical problems: 10, 11, 15, 114-15,

276-77, 280, 288-93, 311-12, 369, 418

mission: 201-02

planning for China operations: 449

planning for north Burma operations: 52,

202

relation of Chungking and New Delhi headquarters: 258-59

split into two theaters: 418-20, 468-69

Central Executive Committee, Kuomingtang:

456

Ceremonies, Japanese: 397-98

CHAMPION: 52, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 72

Chang Fa-kwei, Gen.: 320, 402, 411, 415,

423, 434, 438, 467

Changsha: 371, 372-74, 399

Chang-te: 21, 22

Chao Chen-yu, Col.: 385n

Chen Cheng, Gen.: 437

Chen, Colonel: 47

Chen, Major: 136

Chen Tung-kuo, Lt. Gen.: 29, 139

Cheng-tu airfields: 54, 77, 316, 322-25, 381.

See also Finance problems.

Chennault, Maj. Gen. Claire L.: 5, 18, 19, 22,

25, 26, 63. See also Chennault Plan.

and arms for east China commanders: 403-

04, 412-13

and B-29's: 109-12, 114

and Chiang Kai-shek: 314-15

command role in China Theater: 5, 376,

459, 468, 469. See also Chennault, Maj.

Gen. Claire L., and B-29's.

on effectiveness of Chinese ground forces:

22n

and ELOC: 290, 292, 311

gasoline stockpile incident: 466

given 10,000 tons a month: 365, 366, 367-

68, 403

Hopkins on: 421

Manila docks incident: 465

Chennault, Maj. Gen. Claire L.—Continued

meeting ICHIGO: 322-23, 325, 326-27,

368-69, 372, 400, 402, 403-04

relations with Chiang Kai-shek: 314-15

and Roosevelt: 22, 22n

Stilwell's administrative admonition: 466,

466n

and Wallace's visit: 374-75

warnings on Japanese offensive in east China:

311-12, 314-16, 322-23, 365

Chennault Plan: 5, 18, 19, 22-24, 110-11,

326, 326n, 472. See also Chennault, Maj.

Gen. Claire L.

Chennault-Stilwell controversy: 367, 376,

381, 421. See also Stilwell, Gen. Joseph

W., and Chennault.

Cheves, Brig. Gen. Gilbert X.: 264

Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo: 3, 5, 80,

205, 385

on Allied strategy: 460-63

amphibious operation for Bay of Bengal:

71, 76-78

and Burma operations: 5, 65, 66-67, 74-

75, 77, 80, 121n, 122-23, 202, 424, 461

468

on China's situation: 306-08

collaboration with Japanese charged: 409-

10

on Communist issue: 425

Davies on: 302, 303

delivery of Roosevelt's messages to: 383,

386, 441-42, 444-46, 444n, 445n, 447,

452, 454, 458

diplomatic tactics: 385-86

and east China crisis: 308, 324-25, 366,

413, 447, 461-63

and field command in China for Stilwell:

384-87, 413-15, 422-23, 425-26, 427,

430, 437, 443, 444, 448

intervention in military operations: 123,

180, 208, 215, 380, 434, 435, 437, 438

messages to Roosevelt: 74-75, 77, 80, 299,

300-301, 306-08, 366, 385-86, 414, 452-

53, 460-63

messages to Stilwell: 213

political problems: 324, 372, 384-85, 386,

402, 408, 417, 427-28, 445. See also Separatist movement in east China.
496 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo—Continued

and question of crossing Salween: 79, 130-

31, 176-77, 223, 297-98, 301, 304-08

requests for U.S. aid: 74, 77, 80, 298-99,

366

Roosevelt's 18 September message: 445-46,

447, 447n. See also Recall crisis.

and Salween campaign: 340-41, 351, 359-

60, 380, 389, 424, 433, 435, 440, 445-46

SEXTANT Conference: 52-53, 56-57, 58, 61,

62, 63, 69-70

on Stilwell: 453, 460-63. See also Stilwell,

Gen. Joseph W., and Chiang Kai-shek.

Stilwell's comments on: 362-63

Stilwell's recall. See Recall crisis.

and U.S. mission to Communist north

China: 303-04

U.S. officer to command Chinese armies:

452-54, 456. See also Chiang Kai-shek,

Generalissimo, and field command in

China for Stilwell.

and Wallace's visit: 375-77

Chiang Kai-shek, Madame: 25, 56, 58, 62,

65, 77, 79, 122-23, 212, 298, 298n,

303n, 310-11, 420

Chief of the Imperial General Staff (British):

193

Chief of Staff, Chinese Army: 450. See also

Ho Ying-chin, Gen.

Chief of Transportation, SOS, CBI: 257, 266

Chiefs of Staff Committee. See British Chiefs of

Staff.

Chih Hui Pu. See also Combat Headquarters;

Northern Combat Area Command.

command and organization: 31-32, 138

estimates of Japanese strength: 42, 45, 46

Forward Echelon: 31

G-2: 348

G-3: 104

G-4 and air supply: 100, 102, 104

and north Burma operations: 48, 78, 127,

146, 175-76, 187-88, 244

Chin, General: 373

China

in Allied strategy: 27, 49, 52, 71-73, 82,

228, 362-64, 388-89, 441, 443-44, 457,

463

British aid: 203

economy: 288-90, 416

China—Continued

geography, Salween area: 331-32

munitions production: 413n-14n

situation March 1944 stated by Chiang:

306-08

U.S. aid: 64, 77-78, 133, 203. See also

Lend-lease aid (U.S.) to China; Medical

services, U.S., to Chinese.

U.S. policy on internal matters: 410, 412,

413

China-based air operations: 201, 229, 308,

369-70, 441. See also B-29 project.

China Defense Supplies, Inc.: 281, 283

China Expeditionary Army: 20, 316, 319, 406,

446

China National Aviation Corporation

(CNAC): 312, 368

China Theater: 3, 297. See also Chiang Kaishek, Generalissimo.

Chindits: 50, 87, 367. See also British and

Commonwealth units, ground, 3d Indian

Division; Morris Force.

aims and operations: 196-99, 201, 219, 237

combat fitness: 230

evaluation of achievements: 222

and Stilwell: 199, 220-22

strength: 77

Chinese Air Force: 57, 75

Chinese-American Composite Wing: 323

Chinese Army: 3-4, 6, 75. See also Chinese

Army in India; Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W.,

Chinese Army, plans for; Tactics, Chinese,

combat fitness: 4, 56, 127, 219, 255, 311,

327

consolidation of units proposed: 427, 430,

437

discipline: 137, 230, 348, 351, 393

Hopkins on: 421

Hurley on: 464

Japanese on: 147

JCS on: 381, 382

lack of aggressiveness: 124, 125, 128, 134,

135, 136, 143, 155-56, 180, 205, 208, 359

leadership: 136-37, 346, 348, 359, 399, 404

march discipline: 184, 341

matériel: 4, 56, 423. See also Artillery, Allied,

Chinese weapons; Military production.

See Morale, Chinese.
INDEX 497

Chinese Army—Continued

national troops in comparison with war area

troops: 384, 384n

organization: 45n, 333n

politics: 354, 423

quality of troops: 393, 399, 427

reform plans: 411. See also Stilwell, Gen.

Joseph W., Chinese Army, plans for.

replacements: 33, 56, 58

supply: 4, 56, 145-46, 313, 423, 425, 426,

428, 430

training, U.S.: 4-5, 26, 27-28, 56, 57, 69,

321

Chinese Army in India (CAI): 138, 285, 367,

471. See also Infantry divisions, 22d

Chinese; Infantry divisions, 38th Chinese.

artillery: 33

combat fitness: 41, 471

command of: 29, 138, 139, 380, 419

headquarters and staff: 29-31

liaison. See Liaison, U.S., with Chinese.

North Burma Campaign: 39, 97, 220

organization and weapons: 32-33

question of shifting to China Theater: 356,

377, 433, 449

strength: 32, 471

Chinese Communists: 417, 421. See also U.S.

military observers in Communist north

China.

Chiang Kai-shek on: 306, 308, 423, 425, 426

and China field command for Stilwell: 414,

415

collaboration with Japanese charged: 365

Davies plan: 458

Hata on: 433, 433n

and Hurley: 421, 449-50

military role in China Theater: 374, 380,

385, 420, 421, 423, 425, 426, 427, 429,

430-33, 448, 451-52, 458, 467

and separatist movement in east China: 409,

410, 411, 412

Service, John S., on: 467

and Stilwell. See Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W.,

and Chinese Communist issue.

supplies for: 427, 431, 452, 455

Chinese courtesy and etiquette: 348, 352, 359

Chinese Expeditionary Force: 119, 312, 313,

333. See also Y-Force.

Chinese General Staff: 321

Chinese Government: 288-89, 289n, 291. See

Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo; National

Military Council.

Chinese units

Group Armies

XI: 333, 335, 354, 356-60, 389-90, 391

XVIII (Communist): 429

XX: 333, 335, 346, 350-52, 389-94

XXIV: 371, 404

XXVII: 371, 404, 423

XXX: 371

Armies

New First: 29

2d: 333, 333n, 343, 353-54

4th: 373-74, 402

6th: 333

8th: 359, 394n, 395-98

10th: 399-401

20th: 405

31st: 371, 423, 448

37th: 371, 405

46th: 371, 423

53d: 333, 333n, 335, 345-47, 348, 349-

50, 351

54th: 333, 345, 347, 349

58th: 405

62d: 371, 405

64th: 371, 401

71st: 333, 343, 354-60

72d: 405

79th: 371, 404, 405

93d: 423, 448

99th: 372

100th: 371, 405

Divisions

Honorable 1st: 359, 359n, 395, 424

2d Reserve: 333, 350-51

Honorable 2d: 359n

9th: 341, 354

14th: 202, 230

New 19th: 405

22d. See Infantry divisions, 22d Chinese.

New 28th: 353-54, 356, 391

30th: 29, 192, 202, 223, 230, 235, 243,

245, 433

36th: 335, 341, 346, 347, 350-51, 435

38th. See Infantry divisions, 38th

Chinese.

New 39th: 333, 336, 349, 395
498 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Chinese units—Continued

Divisions—Continued

50th: 202, 210, 223, 230, 235, 243, 251,

253

76th: 343, 352-54

82d: 395

87th: 353, 356, 357-59

88th: 343, 353, 356, 357-59

103d: 395

116th: 335, 341, 347, 350, 391

130th: 347, 350, 393-94

198th: 335, 341, 344, 351

200th: 435

Regiments

3d Infantry: 395

4th Infantry: 350

29th Field Artillery: 371

41st: 252

42d: 230, 235, 237, 244-45, 247, 249-50,

251

58th: 372-73

64th. See Infantry regiments, 64th

Chinese.

65th. See Infantry regiments, 65th

Chinese.

66th. See Infantry regiments, 66th

Chinese.

88th: 202, 225, 235, 237, 239, 247,

250-51

89th: 192, 202, 223, 227, 230, 235, 237,

243, 244-45, 250-51, 252

90th: 251

112th. See Infantry regiments, 112th

Chinese.

113th. See Infantry regiments, 113th

Chinese.

114th. See Infantry regiments, 114th

Chinese.

115th: 341, 349

116th: 349

149th: 210, 218-19, 251

150th: 210, 223, 226, 230, 235, 237, 239,

243, 244-45, 247, 250, 251

198th: 343

226th: 353-54

228th: 343, 353

246th: 395

259th: 359

261st: 356

Chinese units—Continued

Regiments—Continued

264th: 343

307th: 396

308th: 397

346th: 341

348th: 391

592d: 344

593d: 335, 344, 350

594th: 344

Tank Group, 1st Provisional: 142, 142n,

146, 148, 152, 155, 185, 192. See also

Brown, Col. Rothwell H.; Tanks.

Battalion, 1st Tank: 143

Batteries

4th: 131, 135

5th: 127, 131, 135

6th: 124, 127, 131-33

Chinese American Composite Wing. See

Bombardment Squadron, 2d.

Chou En-lai: 431, 432

Chou Fu-cheng, Maj. Gen.: 346, 348

Chu Shih-ming: 444, 445

Chu Teh: 431

Chungking: 259

Churchill, Winston S.: 3, 73, 169, 261

at OCTAGON: 439, 440

at SEXTANT: 62, 65, 66, 68, 70

on Southeast Asia operations: 66, 68, 70,

81, 162, 165, 168, 171, 440, 440n

Coleman, Sgt. Fred N.: 247

Combat Cargo Group (AAF), 3d: 102

Combat Engineer Battalion, 209th: 14

Combat Headquarters: 181

Combat teams: 337

Combat teams, GALAHAD: 35

Combat Troops, 5303d (Provisional): 31

Combat Troops, Ledo Sector: 39, 97

Combat zone: 131, 139. See also Northern

Combat Area Command (NCAC).

Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS): 163, 447n

and air transport allocation: 99, 168, 192-93

directives to SEAC. See Southeast Asia

Command (SEAC), directives for.

OCTAGON plans for CBI: 439-41

policy on Burma campaign: 9

policy on China: 9

and Salween situation: 441

at SEXTANT: 69, 71
INDEX 499

Combined Fleet, Japanese: 405

Combined Staff Planners: 53-54

Combs, Lt. Col. William H.: 245, 247n

Command problems. See also Command

structure, Allied Asiatic.

China Theater: 361-62, 413-18, 420-21, 426

Chindits. See Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W., and

Chindits.

Chinese and U.S. units: 176

at Myitkyina: 235, 235n, 238-39, 243-44,

248-50

SEAC: 377-78

Stilwell and Chiang: 436-39. See also Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W., and Chiang Kaishek.

within Chinese Army: 404, 423, 435

Command structure, Allied Asiatic: 3, 28-29,

138-39, 255

and B-29's: 109-14

CBI split proposed: 418-20

Headquarters, SOS, CBI: 257-58

Stilwell's field command in China: 422-23

theater headquarters—SOS relationship,

CBI: 257

Command structure, Japanese, in China: 407-

08

Committee of Operations Analysts: 16

Communications, Allied: 156, 158, 181, 347.

See also Radio.

Communications, Japanese: 153

Communications zone: 138, 139

Communists. See Chinese Communists.

Composite Wings

68th: 112, 400-401

69th: 112, 340

Chinese-American. See Bombardment

Squadron, 2d.

Concentration of forces, Chinese: 357, 393

Construction, U.S., in China: 291-92

Containment: 394-95

Coolies. See Native labor; Pack transport, by

native labor.

Co-ordination of effort, Chinese: 125, 128, 346,

353, 357, 395

Counterattacks, Japanese

Myitkyina: 238, 250

North Burma Campaign: 125, 127-28, 181,

186-87

Counterattacks, Japanese—Continued

Salween campaign: 343, 346, 349, 357-59,

396, 397, 398

Counteroffensives, Japanese. See also ICHIGO

operation; Japanese offensive on India;

SHO operation.

planned for Hukawng Valley: 129-30, 206,

214

Salween front: 423-24, 436

Coup attempt against Chiang. See Separatist

movement in east China.

Covell, Maj. Gen. William E. R.: 13, 141,

472. See also Services of Supply (SOS),

CBI.

and Assam LOC: 261, 269, 270, 273

and Chinese Army supply: 425, 428

and ELOC: 292

on port of Calcutta: 264

reorganizes SOS: 257-58, 276

Cover and concealment, Chinese: 351

Creasy, Col. William M.: 449

CULVERIN: 162, 163, 165, 171-72, 200, 229.

See also Sumatra.

Currency, Chinese paper: 301

Currency problems, Chinese: 368

Currie, Dr. Lauchlin: 32n, 470

DAN operation: 424

Darlington, Capt. C. E.: 32

Davidson, Brig. Gen. Howard C.: 84, 251.

See also Tenth Air Force.

Davies, John P., Jr.: 71, 72, 375, 385n, 420-21,

431n, 467

and Communist issue: 302-04, 302n, 420-21,

458

recommendations on China policy: 302-03

Days of supply. See Supply, levels.

DDT: 286, 287

Dean, Pfc. Marvin H.: 251

Deceptions: 190-91, 350

Decorations. See individual decorations.

Defense, Chinese: 373, 404, 434, 447-48

Defense, Japanese: 187 252, 343, 349, 396

Defenses, Allied: 235

Defenses, Japanese

Myitkyina: 233, 235, 237

north Burma: 135, 209

Salween: 346, 357, 391, 392, 397

Delaying action, Japanese: 213-18

Delaying action, U.S.: 182
500 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Delorey, 1st Lt. Donald W.: 253

Demolition of installations: 434. See also

Bridge demolition.

Deployment in depth: 337

Detachment 101, OSS: 89, 251. See also

Kachin Rangers.

Dill, Field Marshal Sir John: 163, 169, 170,

378

Dimapur road: 90

Discipline. See also Morale.

Chinese. See Chinese Army, discipline.

U.S.: 270, 286

Disease. See Medical problems.

Disguise: 350

Distinguished Service Cross: 240, 245n, 247n,

248, 251, 252, 253

Distinguished Service Medal: 471

Distinguished Unit Citation: 240

Diversionary attacks, Japanese: 167

DIXIE Mission: 376. See also Military observer

group in Communist north China.

Domei News Agency: 303

Dorn, Brig. Gen. Frank: 320n

on Chinese response to ICHIGO: 367

and decision to cross Salween: 312-13

and Salween campaign: 338, 340, 355, 424,

430

DRACULA: 440

Dump truck companies: 17

Dunlap, Lt. Paul A.: 225

Dunn, Capt. John J.: 253

Dupuy, Lt. Col. Trevor N.: 235n

Dysentery. See Medical problems, dysentery.

East China. See ICHIGO; Separatist movement in east China; Supply, for defense

of east China.

East China airfields: 5, 20, 21, 23, 26, 111, 113,

308, 316, 384

East China army. See Z-Force (ZEBRA Force).

East China crisis. See ICHIGO.

Eastern Air Command (EAC): 36, 83-84, 86,

87-88, 92, 100

Eastern line of communications (ELOC). See

Lines of communications, eastern (ELOC).

Eldridge, Lt. Col. Fred: 467

Encirclements: 137, 168, 208

END RUN Force: 204, 212, 223-26

Engineer aviation battalions: 17, 115, 205

849th: 13

Engineer aviation battalions—Continued

879th: 227

1883d: 13

1905th: 14

Engineer Battalion (Separate), 382d: 13

Engineer battalions: 115

Engineer combat battalions

209th: 237, 241, 245n, 247, 252

236th: 238, 241, 247, 250, 252

Engineer Construction District No. 12: 274,

275

Engineer Construction Service: 258

Engineer District No. 2, SOS: 258

Engineer Division No. 1, SOS: 258

Engineer Division No. 3, SOS: 258

Engineer petroleum distribution companies: 15

700th: 274

708th: 274

709th: 274

776th: 274

777th: 274

Engineer troops, Chinese: 341

Engineering projects: 258, 471-72. See also

Flood-control measures; Ledo Road; Pipelines; Road construction; Services of

Supply (SOS), CBI.

Engineers, Y-FOS: 355

Envelopments: 129, 131-34, 146, 148-52, 210,

213-15. See also Bypasses; Encirclements.

characteristic of Stilwell's tactics: 131, 142

close-in: 222

double: 176, 335-36

vertical. See Chindits; GALAHAD; Longrange penetration groups.

wide: 131, 176

EUREKA Conference. See Tehran Conference.

Evacuation of long-range penetration groups:

220-22, 225

Evacuation of noncombatants: 374

Evacuation of sick and wounded, Allied: 90-

91, 142, 152, 158, 183, 237, 285

Evacuation of sick and wounded, Japanese:

252, 354

Evans, Maj. Gen Vernon: 114

Exchange rate, China-U.S.: 298, 299-301,

301n

Expenditures, U.S. in China. See U.S. military

expenditures in China.

Famine, Bengal: 12
INDEX 501

Farrell, Col. Thomas F.: 258

Feints, air: 190

Fergusson, B. E.: 198-99

Ferris, Brig. Gen. Benjamin G.: 43, 161, 315,

325, 365, 367, 374, 376, 383

Ferry Command: 97

Ferry operations: 135. See also Pandu Ferry;

River-crossing operations.

Fields of fire, Japanese: 353

Fighter Group, 51st: 18, 346, 350

Fighter squadrons

25th: 18

26th: 18

88th: 251

459th: 84

Fighters, Japanese: 434

Finance problems: 77-78, 115, 298-302

Fire discipline, Chinese: 252, 351, 354, 396

Firenze, Pfc. Anthony: 250

First Thirty Divisions. See Y-Force.

Flame throwers: 247, 338, 397

Flank security, Allied: 136, 182

Flank security, Japanese: 181

Flanking movements, Chinese: 185-86

Flanking movements, Japanese: 135, 152, 167

181, 187

Flood-control measures: 271

Fong Hsien-chueh, Maj. Gen.: 399, 401n

Foreign Economic Administration: 16, 284

Formosa: 19, 20, 54, 370, 467

Fort George G. Meade, Md.: 241

Fort Hertz: 38

Forward Echelon, Chih Hui Pu: 31

Four Power Declaration: 52, 53n

Fourteenth Air Force: 18, 75, 301, 469, 470

Chang-te: 21-22

Heng-yang: 405

and ICHIGO: 364, 365, 366, 367, 368-69,

399-400, 408, 434

intelligence: 18, 21, 327

Salween campaign: 340, 351, 355, 434

strategic bombing: 16, 19, 92, 316, 323, 332

supply: 18, 19, 23, 63, 112, 174, 175n, 281,

290, 292, 311-12, 315, 323, 367, 368-69,

403, 413

tactical air support, theory of: 21

Fourteenth Army, British. See British and

Commonwealth units, ground.

Free-dropping. See Air supply, techniques.

Fu, Colonel: 132n, 137, 137n

Fuel, automotive: 291

Fujiwara, Lt. Col. Iwaichi: 90

Fukayama, Colonel: 153, 178

GALAHAD: 34-36, 220. See also PURPLE Task

Force.

air supply: 36, 100

casualties: 240-41

combat fitness: 189, 230, 239-40

command and organization: 31, 34-35, 138,

146, 149

creation: 34

decorated: 240

evacuees returned to action: 210, 239-40

morale: 34, 225, 239-41, 467

at Myitkyina: 233, 235, 237, 238-43

north Burma operations: 130-31, 143, 146,

149-50, 151-55, 175-76, 178-85, 188-91

replacements: 237, 238, 241-43. See also

New GALAHAD.

role: 34, 36, 182, 222

sickness: 239, 240-41

weapons: 35

withdrawals: 154, 154n, 181, 188-89, 189n

GASPER Force: 192

Gaud, Col. William S., Jr.: 281-83

Gauss, Ambassador Clarence E.: 259, 300,

300n, 301n, 304, 409, 410, 411, 422, 444

General Headquarters (India): 11, 51, 166

George, Capt. John B.: 190

Giffard, Gen. Sir George: 11, 28, 50, 51, 52

and Imphal operations: 167, 168, 174, 192,

193

and Mountbatten: 50, 174, 378

on proper use of LRPG's: 222

Gilbert, Lt. Col. Douglas G.: 47

Glenn, Brig. Gen. Edgar E.: 110

Goodenough, Capt. M. G.: 171

Government of India: 274, 283, 418

and port of Calcutta: 261, 262

and railway operations: 265, 271, 272

and reciprocal aid: 277-80

Green Combat Team, 2d Battalion, GALAHAD:

149, 182

Grenades: 190

GRIPFAST: 76

Gross, Maj. Gen. Charles P.: 12

Guerrillas: 188, 319, 391-92. See also Kachin

Rangers.
502 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

H Force, GALAHAD: 223, 225, 226

Hancock, Maj. Edward T.: 36

Handy, Maj. Gen. Thomas T.: 379, 419,

439, 441, 457

Hankow-Canton Railway: 407

Harriman, W. Averell: 69n

Hata, Lt. Gen. Shunroku: 20, 406, 407

on Chinese Communists: 433, 433n

and Chinese politics: 410, 434, 455n

ICHIGO operation: 316-18, 319-20, 371

Headquarters and Headquarters Company

(Provisional), 5303d: 138, 139

Hearn, Maj. Gen. Thomas G.: 48, 58, 110,

258-59, 300n, 301n, 315, 329

and currency problems: 301

and decision to cross Salween: 74, 80,

312-13

delivers President's messages to Chinese

authorities: 297-98, 298n, 310, 416

and east China crisis: 401-02, 403, 412-13

liaison between Stilwell and Chinese: 74, 80,

202, 205, 212-13, 305-06

and Nationalist-Communist relations: 304

and recall crisis: 444, 444n

and separatist movement in east China: 409,

410, 411

Heng-yang: 319, 371, 404

attempts to relieve: 404-05

fall: 405

plans to retake: 412-13

Hill, Col. Francis: 161, 164

Hill 988: 208

Hill 1725: 212

Ho Ying-chin, Gen.: 3, 26, 58, 202, 284, 321,

424

and decision to cross Salween: 313-14

estimates of Japanese capabilities and intentions, ICHIGO: 365-66, 366n

recall crisis: 444, 451, 455

and Salween campaign: 329

Stilwell on: 380-81

Ho Yung-chi, Gen. Dr.: 154n

Hong Kong-Canton area: 54, 57

"Honorable," honorific title: 359n

Hopkins, Harry L.: 62, 71, 385

and Chennault: 421, 463

and Chinese Communist issue: 302-03,

302n, 421

Hopkins, Harry L.—Continued

and recall crisis: 456, 459

and Stilwell: 420-21

Hospitals, 107, 285-86, 290. See also Seagrave

Hospital Unit.

Hospitals, evacuation

14th: 285

48th: 285

73d: 223, 285

Hospitals, field: 338

25th: 142, 158

Hospitals, general

20th: 285

181st: 285, 286

Hospitals, portable surgical: 338

40th: 391

42d: 142, 158, 223, 235

43d: 142, 158, 219

46th: 137, 142, 158

47th: 391

48th: 391

Hospitals, station

95th: 285, 290

97th: 285

100th: 285

371st: 286

Housing, U.S. in China: 291, 299

Hpimaw Hkyet (pass): 331, 335

Hsamshingyang: 188, 189, 190

Hsiao I-hsu, Gen.: 312, 313

Hsueh Yueh, Gen.: 21

meeting ICHIGO: 320, 371-72, 412, 415,

423, 434

and separatist movement in east China: 402,

410, 411, 434n

Hu Su: 235

Huang Shan: 444, 460

Huei-jen Bridge: 349

Hui-tung Bridge: 340

Hukawng Valley: 38, 39-41, 121, 136, 220

Hull, Cordell: 69n, 299

Hull, Maj. Gen. John E.: 441, 456n, 457

Hump: 205, 205n, 229, 288, 290, 292, 362,

461. See also Lines of communications, air

route to China.

diversions of aircraft: 168, 172-75, 175n,

256, 312

influence on war in other theaters: 454
INDEX 503

Hump—Continued

Myitkyina's importance to: 164, 171, 201,

205, 254

progress summarized: 472

tonnage allocations: 23, 25, 63, 301, 312,

315, 419, 463

tonnage figures: 18, 110, 164, 168, 254

tonnage needs: 23, 63, 65, 80, 115, 200-201

"Hunan front": 301

Hung-mu-shu pass: 331

Hunter, Lt. Col. Charles N.: 35, 131

Myitkyina: 223, 226-27, 227n, 235, 237,

239, 248, 249

North Burma Campaign: 154n, 176, 178-81,

180n, 189-90

Huo Kwei-chang, Maj. Gen.: 333, 392

Hurley, Maj. Gen. Patrick J.: 52-53, 58-59,

415-18, 422, 470

biographical material: 415

on Chiang Kai-shek: 462-63, 464-65

chosen President's special representative to

China: 415-16

mission in China: 417-18, 417n

in Moscow: 421

negotiations with Nationalist government:

422-23, 424-26, 436, 436n, 443, 448, 448n,

449-51, 452, 456

proposals to Chiang: 429-30

recall crisis: 444-45, 447, 447n, 448, 452,

458, 459, 460, 464-65, 470

report to Roosevelt, 23 September 1944:

449-50

on Stilwell: 58-59, 462-63, 464-65

ICHIGO operation. See also Japanese offensive

in east China; KOGO; TOGO.

Allied reactions: 322-27, 365-66, 367-68

and Chennault. See Chennault, Maj. Gen.

Claire L., meeting ICHIGO; Chennault,

Maj. Gen. Claire L., warnings on Japanese

offensive in east China,

Chinese counteroffensive: 467

Chinese warnings on: 365-66

Japanese plans for: 316-20

lull after Heng-yang capture: 408

offensive resumed, late August 1944: 433-34

opening moves: 322

progress of offensive: 371-74, 381

in relation to SHO operation: 406-07

Ichikari, Col. Yusaku: 216

Imperial General Headquarters: 20, 21, 165, 316-

19, 406-07

Imphal: 87, 165, 167, 168, 169, 172-74, 175,

178, 191-96, 310, 312, 378. See also

Japanese offensive on India.

India. See also Government of India.

economy: 279, 288

geography: 275

India-Burma Theater: 418-19

India-China Wing, ATC: 254

India Command: 13, 418

Indochina and Japanese strategy: 407, 407n

Infantry divisions

22d Chinese: 29, 223. See also Infantry

regiments, 64th Chinese; Infantry regiments, 65th Chinese; Infantry regiments,

66th Chinese.

advance down Hukawng and Mogaung

valleys: 41, 62, 119, 123-24, 155, 185,

215

drive on Kamaing: 206, 207-11, 216,

219

evaluation: 137, 145, 438

Jambu Bum: 185-88

Maingkwan: 146

medical aid, U.S.: 158

strength: 32

Taro plain: 127, 143-45

38th Chinese: 29, 102, 133, 192. See also

Infantry regiments, 112th Chinese; Infantry regiments, 113th Chinese; Infantry

regiments, 114th Chinese.

advance down the Hukawng and

Mogaung valleys: 39, 41, 62, 119, 142,

143, 211-14

evaluation: 137, 145, 211-14, 438

Maingkwan: 146

medical services, U.S.: 158

question of shifting to Salween: 433

strength: 32

Taihpa Ga: 127

Walawbum: 157

Yupbang Ga: 125

Infantry regiments

64th Chinese

drive on Kamaing: 206, 208, 209-10,

210n

Jambu Bum: 185-86, 187

Walawbum: 148, 154-55, 157
504 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Infantry regiments—Continued

65th Chinese: 127. See also Fu, Colonel.

advance down Hukawng and Mogaung

valleys: 143

drive on Kamaing: 206, 208, 209-10,

219

evaluation: 132n, 137-38

Jambu Bum: 185, 187

Taro plain: 131, 137-38, 145, 148

66th Chinese: 142

advance down Hukawng and Mogaung

valleys: 134, 143

drive on Kamaing: 206, 208, 209-10

Jambu Bum: 185-87

lost near Yawngbang Ga: 145

Maingkwan: 148

112th Chinese: 130

advance down Hukawng and Mogaung

valleys: 121-22, 131, 158, 190, 190n,

211-12, 214

drive on Kamaing: 205-06

evaluation: 136, 143

Myitkyina: 202

opening of North Burma Campaign:

45-46, 47, 48

at Seton Block: 215-18, 219-20

Taihpa Ga: 134-36

Taro plain: 136

Yupbang Ga: 124, 125, 127

113th Chinese

advance down Hukawng and Mogaung

valleys: 128, 131, 183-85, 190n, 211,

214, 219

evaluation: 143, 157-58

Seton Block: 220

Taihpa Ga: 134-36

Walawbum: 154, 155

114th Chinese

advance down Hukawng and Mogaung

valleys: 128, 131-33, 158, 190n, 211-

12, 213-15, 221

drive on Kamaing: 206

evaluation: 129, 143, 219

march of May-June 1944: 219

Yupbang Ga: 47, 48, 124, 125, 127

475th U.S.: 467

5307th U.S. (Provisional). See GALAHAD.

Infantry-artillery co-ordination, Chinese: 351,

393, 396-97

Infantry Training Center, Kweilin: 27, 320,

367, 374

Infiltration: 337

Inflation in China: 288-90, 289n, 300, 301

See also Exchange rate, China-U.S.

Inkangahtawng: 175-81, 181n, 209

Inspections: 352

Inspector General, CBI: 465

Instruction groups. See Traveling instructional groups.

Intelligence, Allied: 36, 127, 181, 229-30,

338. See also Kachin Rangers; Troop

strength, Japanese, Allied intelligence

estimates.

Intelligence, Chinese: 357, 366

Intelligence, Japanese

for ICHIGO: 320

north Burma operations: 130, 167, 206,

232-33

Salween campaign: 341

Intelligence, U.S.

on Chinese dispositions and command: 371

in Communist north China: 375-76

on ICHIGO: 315, 322

Interior lines: 147

Intermediate Section, SOS: 258, 276

Isaacs, Harold: 470

Jambu Bum: 185-88

Japanese Army. See also Japanese units.

combat fitness: 255-56

divisions classified A, B, C: 318

supply: 174, 191, 195. See also Lines of

communications, Japanese.

Japanese-Chinese Communist relations: 306,

433

Japanese offensive in east China: 74-75, 306,

311, 314-16, 327n, 384. See also ICHIGO

operation.

relation to Japanese Burma operations:

445-46, 446n

Wallace's views on: 377

Japanese offensive on India: 46-47, 86, 86n,

90, 165-69, 172-74, 270, 309-10, 316-18.

See also Arakan; Imphal.

Japanese propaganda broadcast: 454-55,

455n. See also Domei News Agency.

Japanese steel industry, as target: 16,

369-70
INDEX 505

Japanese units. See also China Expeditionary

Army; Imperial General Headquarters.

Area Armies

Burma: 42, 46, 165, 168, 195, 206, 332n,

424

North China: 319

6th: 407

Armies

1st: 319

3d Air: 85, 87

5th Air: 319

11th: 21, 319, 407, 433

12th: 319

15th: 42, 90, 93, 165, 178, 195, 197, 211

See also Mutaguchi, Lt. Gen. Renya.

20th: 408

23d: 319, 407, 433

28th: 93, 167

33d: 206, 206n, 219-20, 232, 436

34th: 407

Divisions

2d: 121n, 143n, 167, 206, 424

3d: 371, 372

5th Air: 85, 87

13th: 371, 372

15th: 121n, 169, 195, 195n, 198

18th: 42, 46-47, 93, 121-22, 121n, 128,

130, 130n, 142, 146, 149-50, 158, 178,

189, 197-98, 206, 211, 213-17, 218-20,

223, 255

26th: 406

27th: 318, 371, 407

31st: 42, 119, 121n, 142, 174, 194-95

33d: 42, 119, 121n, 142, 195, 198

34th: 371

39th: 320

40th: 371, 372, 407

49th: 424

53d: 198, 206, 219, 233, 244

54th: 42, 61, 121, 121n, 142, 167

55th: 42, 61, 119, 121n, 142, 166, 167,

168

56th: 42, 46, 93, 121, 121n, 142, 197, 198,

206, 232, 331-32, 332n, 337, 344, 347,

350, 390, 394, 424, 436

58th: 371, 372-73, 401

62d: 322, 406

64th: 407

68th: 371, 372, 399, 407

Japanese units—Continued

Divisions—Continued

110th: 322

114th: 408

115th: 408

116th: 371, 372, 399

117th: 408

118th: 408

Brigades

4th Air: 85

7th Air: 85

24th Independent Mixed: 42, 198

Regiments

4th Infantry: 206, 208, 216, 220

8th Air: 85, 88n

12th Air: 85, 86

18th Field Mountain Artillery: 130, 212

21st Air: 85

28th Air: 85

33d Air: 85

34th Air: 85

50th Air: 85, 88n

51st Infantry: 198

55th Infantry: 119, 122, 127, 130, 130n,

136-37, 138, 142, 150, 152, 189, 211,

213, 215, 216, 220, 256

56th Infantry: 46, 119, 122, 130, 130n,

150, 151-52, 152n, 153, 214, 216, 218,

220, 256

62d Air: 87

64th Air: 85, 86, 88n

77th Air: 85

81st Air: 85

98th Air: 85

113th Infantry: 332, 344, 349, 353, 395

114th Infantry: 130, 145, 181, 189-91,

198, 226, 256, 332

146th Infantry: 206, 214, 220, 332, 353

148th Infantry: 198, 232, 332, 335, 343,

347, 350, 391, 424

204th Air: 85, 86, 88n

213th Infantry: 198

Battalion, 15th Airfield: 226

Southern Army: 195, 407, 446

Sung Shan Defense Unit: 356

Wuchang-Hankow Defense Army: 320

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

and B-29's: 113, 114

and Burma operations: 162-63, 200, 439-40
506 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)—Continued

China policy: 381-83

directive for CBI Theater: 201-02

gasoline stockpile: 466

Hump allocations policy: 175, 419, 466

and Stilwell: 61, 161, 163, 382, 419

strategy, Pacific and Southeast Asia: 53,

61, 69, 81, 99, 171-72, 172n, 362

Joint Staff Mission, British: 163

Joint Staff Planners: 99, 163, 228

Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC):

55

Jordan, Col. Lewis P.: 290

Jorhat conference, 3 April 1944: 192, 199

K Force, GALAHAD: 223-26, 230, 233

K ration: 225

Kachin Rangers: 36, 176, 183, 188, 225. See

also Detachment 101, OSS.

Kachins: 36, 178-80, 392

Kamaing: 180, 206, 215, 216, 219

Kamaing Road: 143, 147, 149

Kanemitsu, Maj. Keijiro: 395, 397

Kantau ford: 124, 128

Karachi: 264

Kawabe, Gen. Masakazu: 195

Kennedy, Col. John: 112

Khaki Combat Team, 3d Battalion, GALAHAD:

149, 150, 154, 178, 189

''Kickers," air supply: 97, 98n

King, Admiral Ernest J.: 61, 69, 70, 71

King, Col. Woods: 371

King George Docks, Calcutta: 263, 264

Kinnison, Col. Henry L.: 191, 223, 225, 226

Kinsolving, Col. William C.: 274

KOGO operation: 319, 322, 323

Kohima: 172, 174, 192, 194

Koiso, Gen. Kuniaki: 405

Kozuki, Lt. Gen. Yoshio: 319

Krueger, Lt. Gen. Walter: 468, 469

Kung, Dr. H. H.: 300, 301, 386, 414, 416,

417, 420, 456

Kung, Madame H. H.: 56, 303n

Kung Lung-po; 395

Kurashige, Colonel: 343, 345, 347, 352, 391,

392

Kweilin: 319, 374, 400, 402, 408, 434, 435,

447-48

Kweilin Infantry Training Center. See Infantry Training Center, Kweilin.

Kyushu Island, as bombing target: 369-70

Labor, Chinese. See Native labor.

Labor, Indian. See Native labor.

Labor problems: 274, 275

Laffin, Capt. William: 225

Lai-feng Shan: 391, 392

Landing craft for Mediterranean: 68, 70, 73,

81

Landis, Pvt. Robert W.: 150

Laughlin, Maj. George T.: 47

Laundry service: 291

Laverty, Lt. Col. H. J.: 194

Leadership, Chinese. See Chinese Army,

leadership.

Leahy, Admiral William D.: 69, 70, 386

Ledo base: 276

Ledo Force: 51, 57, 163

Ledo Road: 10, 11, 13-14, 39, 42, 122, 136,

139, 140-41, 169, 205, 305, 418, 419. See

also Road construction.

in Allied strategy: 229

Chiang Kai-shek on: 298, 301

progress summarized: 472

project reduced: 387-89

QUADRANT Conference decision: 387

supplies North Burma Campaign: 389

weather affects progress: 13-14, 143, 218

LEDO STRIPTEASE: 41

Legion of Merit: 471

Lend-lease, reverse. See Reciprocal aid.

Lend-lease aid (British) to China: 280

Lend-lease aid (U.S.) to China: 136, 312,

413n. See also China, U.S. aid.

administration: 419-20

amount: 27, 280, 334n, 367, 457

Chinese attitude toward: 26, 321, 367

control over: 414-15, 417, 418-20, 424,

428, 436, 451

distribution: 432

diversions to U.S. forces: 283-84

for east China defense: 367, 371-72, 401n,

404, 448, 462

proposed for Chinese Communists: 432. See

also Chinese Communists, supplies for.

storage in India: 281-84

Lend-lease aid (U.S.) to India: 271, 272, 278

Lend-lease mission to India, 1943: 277

Lentaigne, Maj. Gen. W. D. A.: 199, 220-22
INDEX 507

Li Chi-shen, Marshal: 320, 402, 408, 410-12,

411n

Li Hung, Col.: 133

Li Tsung-jen: 434

Liaison, air-ground. See Air-ground liaison.

Liaison, CBI Theater-U.S. embassy: 259

Liaison, U.S. with British: 194

Liaison, U.S. with Chinese Army: 26, 33-34.

See also Observer groups, U.S.; Van Natta,

Col. Thomas F., III; Y-Force Operations

Staff (Y-FOS).

Chinese attitude toward: 348, 448

east China: 320, 371-72, 373-74

North Burma Campaign: 102, 133-34, 145,

243, 252

Salween campaign: 329, 336-40, 346, 348-

49, 359

Liaison Squadron, 19th: 340

Liao Yueh-shang, Lt. Gen.: 32, 122, 123,

134, 137, 145, 187, 206, 208, 210, 212,

213

"Lilys": 85n

Lincoln, Col. Lawrence J.: 441

Lin Wei, Gen.: 313, 455

Lindsell, Lt. Gen. Sir Wilfred: 13, 270

Lindsey, Brig. Gen. Malcolm F.: 320-22,

320n, 371, 401-02, 410

Lines of communications: 4, 5, 11, 121, 288,

468. See also Fourteenth Air Force,

supply; Ledo Road; Pipelines.

air route to China: 9-10, 75, 121, 419.

See also Hump.

Assam: 11-12, 15, 257, 259-62, 265-76,

277, 280, 471-72. See also Bengal and

Assam Railway.

to China by land: 10, 54, 57, 75, 79, 202,

205, 205n, 220, 254, 356, 362, 379, 435,

439-40

Chinese, across the Salween: 343-44, 345

eastern (ELOC): 19-20, 22-23, 110, 112,

288, 289-90, 292-93, 311, 323, 404

Japanese: 62, 74, 76, 88, 90, 92, 93-94,

95, 130, 136, 197-98, 199, 316, 401, 407,

407n, 434

north Burma: 139-40, 163. See also Ledo

Road.

summary of projects: 471-72

Liu Chi-ming, Maj. Gen.: 371

Liu Fei: 313

Liuchow: 319, 408, 433, 435, 448

Lo Cho-ying, Lt. Gen.: 322

Loan request, billion-dollar: 298, 299, 300

Local procurement of supplies. See Supply,

local procurement.

Logistical support: 114, 139-42, 418-19. See

also CBI Theater, logistical problems.

Logistics, Japanese: 174, 175, 318-19. See

also Japanese Army, supply.

Long-range bombing of Japan. See B-29

project.

Long-range penetration groups: 36, 62, 97,

178, 220-22. See also Chindits; Evacuation of long-range penetration groups;

GALAHAD.

LRPG's. See Chindits; Long-range penetration groups.

Ludden, Raymond P.: 376

Lung Yun, Governor: 402

Lung-ling: 332, 390, 398, 435-36

Chinese attack on: 354-60

importance: 177, 329, 352, 356-57, 430

Japanese counterattacks: 357-59, 424, 433,

435

Lutes, Maj. Gen. LeRoy: 388

Lux convoy: 292n

M Force, GALAHAD: 223, 225, 230, 233

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas: 99, 386, 465

McCammon, Col. John E.: 58, 235-37, 235n

McCloy, John J.: 361

McGee, Lt. Col. George A., Jr.: 35, 153, 181,

182, 190, 223, 240

Machine guns: 48, 124, 153, 225, 338

Maclean, Brig. Fitzroy: 303

MacLeod, Maj. Gen. M. W. M.: 171

McNarney, Lt. Gen. Joseph T.: 364

Magruder, Col. Carter B.: 388

Main line of resistance, Japanese: 341

Maingkwan: 146, 148

Maintenance

aircraft: 400

automotive: 290, 291

Malaria. See Medical problems, malaria.

Ma-mien Kuan (pass): 331, 335, 343-45

Manchuria. See Reinforcements, Japanese,

from Manchuria.

Mandalay: 76

Manuel, Pfc. Herman: 252

Marches: 182, 219
508 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Mariana Islands: 405

Marshall, Gen. George C.: 4, 83-84, 111, 114,

200, 297, 299, 304, 311, 364, 379, 442, 456

and Assam LOC: 261

and Burma operations: 177, 205, 329

and CULVERIN: 163, 171

on GALAHAD: 34, 35

guidance for Stilwell: 73, 362-64, 383

on Hump: 454

and Ledo Road: 388-89

on position of U.S. general in China: 458

and Presidential representative to Chiang:

415-16

recall crisis: 454

at SEXTANT (Cairo): 59, 61, 63, 69, 73

and Stilwell: 25, 29, 73, 169, 362-64

Stilwell reports to: 79, 131, 145, 212-13, 368,

430, 435-36, 448, 455, 464

and Stilwell's transfer to China: 378, 379

Maruyama, Col. Fusayasu: 181, 189, 191, 226,

232, 233n, 238, 252, 253

Matsumoto, Sgt. Roy H.: 153, 190-91, 190n

Matsuyama, Lt. Gen. Sukezo: 332

MATTERHORN: 17, 111, 315, 325. See also

B-29 project.

Mayu peninsula. See PIGSTICK.

Medical problems: 11, 38, 102, 189, 190, 219,

284-88. See also Evacuation of wounded.

alimentary disorders: 285, 286, 287-88

cholera: 354

diarrhea: 287

dysentery: 226, 230, 237, 240, 287

fevers: 226, 285, 286

malaria: 286, 287

at Myitkyina: 239, 240-41

psychoneurosis: 240, 242

skin diseases: 230

typhus, scrub (mite): 226, 237, 240, 285

venereal disease: 286

Medical problems, Japanese: 195, 354

Medical services, U.S.: 284-86. See also Hospitals.

to Chinese: 219, 285-86, 338-40, 393-94

to Kachins: 178-80

MERCHANT OF VENICE: 226

Merrill, Brig. Gen. Frank D.: 43, 146, 149-50,

154, 154n, 156, 158, 175-76, 178, 180, 181,

183, 189, 204, 211, 223-25, 233, 235n,

356n, 458

Merrill, Brig. Gen. Frank D.—Continued

assigned to command GALAHAD: 131

on GALAHAD troops: 230

illness: 189, 230

and recall crisis: 457, 464

and Sun: 146, 154, 176

Merrill's Marauders: 146. See also GALAHAD.

Miles, Commodore Milton E.: 470

Military observer group in Communist north

China. See U.S. military observers in

Communist north China.

Military production, Chinese: 413n-414n

Military production, Indian: 278-80

Military Railway Service, SOS, CBI: 13,

266-73

Miller, Staff Sgt. Alvin O.: 245n

Mines, Japanese: 128, 187. See also Booby

traps.

Mining operations: 397. See also Siege operations; Tunneling, Allied.

Minister of War, Chinese. See Ho Ying-chin,

Gen.

Ministry of Finance, Chinese: 291

Ministry of War, Chinese: 333

Mizukami, Maj. Gen. Genzu: 232, 235, 252

Mogaung: 9, 10, 204-05, 221, 248-49, 365

Mogaung valley: 207-08

geography: 38, 121

secured by Allies: 220

Molotov, Vyacheslav M.: 69n, 421

Monsoon. See Weather.

Morale

Chinese: 125, 146, 243, 346, 397

Japanese: 195, 214, 218, 233, 348

problems of combined-nationalities forces:

138-39

U.S.: 286-87. See also GALAHAD, morale.

Morris, Brig. G. R.: 243-44

Morris Force: 235, 243-44

Mortars: 151, 153, 338

Moscow Conference, October 1943: 52, 69,

69n

Mosquito control: 286

Motor transport, in China: 440

Motor transport, Japanese: 400

Mountain pass crossings: 335-36, 343-45

Mountain warfare: 337-38, 394-95. See also

Salween campaign.
INDEX 509

Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis: 6, 121n,

131, 160-62, 439. See also Southeast Asia

Command (SEAC).

air command problems: 83-84, 98-99, 109-

10, 112-13, 114, 168

on Burma operations: 81-82, 200, 254-55,

418

and Chiang Kai-shek: 63, 65, 77, 80-81

and Chiang's decision on crossing Salween:

177, 304-05

and Chindits: 220, 221-22

and Imphal operations: 167, 174-75, 192-93

injured: 170

and line of communications projects: 11-12,

13, 273

mission to London and Washington: 161,

163. See also AXIOM Mission.

and Myitkyina: 172n, 228

relations with subordinates: 377-78

Southeast Asia plans and operations: 49-50,

51, 62, 75-76, 77, 80-82

on Southeast Asia strategy: 162

and Stilwell: 163, 169-71

Movements Control (British): 267

Munitions Assignments Board: 281, 284, 418

Mutaguchi, Lt. Gen. Renya: 46, 130, 165, 195,

198

Myitkyina: 9-10, 38, 47, 121, 163, 164, 171-

72, 172n, 365, 468

and Allied Asia strategy: 200-203, 204, 228

Allied troop strength: 237

attacks on town: 229-30, 236, 237-38, 244-

48, 249-50, 251, 253-54

capture of town: 253

Japanese defense: 181n, 191, 226, 230-33

Japanese troop strength: 226, 229-30, 230n,

233, 247, 248, 255

march to, Allied: 223-26

seizure of airstrip: 226-29

siege: 230-52

Stilwell's plan to take: 204-05

terrain: 235-36

Myitkyina Task Force: 235, 248

Nanhsiumg: 319

National Military Council (NMC): 58, 321,

322, 402, 423, 444, 447

and proposed field command for Stilwell:

428, 429, 455

and Salween operations: 312, 424

Nationalist-Communist relations: 303-04. See

also U.S. military mission to Communist

north China.

Native labor: 13, 15, 115, 225, 265, 271, 275,

278, 283, 287, 338

Native labor, use by Japanese: 397

Native technicians: 278

Naval dispositions, Japanese: 172, 405

Naval operations, Allied planning. See AXIOM

Mission; Bay of Bengal, proposed amphibious operation; CULVERIN; Strategy, Allied.

Naval operations, Japanese planning: 21, 365.

See also SHO operation.

Negro troops: 13-14, 97, 100, 104, 263

Nelson, Donald M.: 414n, 416-17, 420, 424,

470

New Delhi: 258- 59

New GALAHAD: 242, 245, 253

Nhpum Ga: 182-83, 188-91

"Nicks": 85n

Night fighting: 396

Nimitz, Admiral Chester W.: 386, 457

Ninety-division arms plan: 64, 73

North Burma Campaign: 10, 28, 435, 468.

See also Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo,

and question of crossing Salween; Individual actions.

Allies firmly established in Burma: 219, 220

CCS and JCS orders: 418, 468-69

contact made between Myitkyina and Salween troops: 435

first action: 45-46

Handy on: 379

plans for: 9, 39-42, 49-52

slowdown: 212, 213

summarized: 361-62, 471-72

Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC):

138-39, 248. See also Chih Hui Pu.

Northern Sector Air Force (AAF): 84, 89, 90

Numata, Lt. Gen. Takazo: 90

Observer Groups, U.S.: 371-72, 404. See also

Military observer group in Communist

north China.

OCTAGON Conference (Quebec, September

1944): 439-41, 447n

Office of Strategic Services (OSS): 16, 176

Okamura, Gen. Yasuji: 311n, 316, 319,

324n, 410, 434, 446n
510 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Old, Brig. Gen. William D.: 84, 98, 101

Operations Division (OPD)

and B-29 project: 16, 315

and Burma operations: 164, 205n, 304

China policy: 54-55, 73, 82, 228, 386

and Ledo Road: 387

on Pacific and Southeast Asia strategy: 53,

54-55, 82, 162

and recall crisis: 442, 451

splitting of CBI: 418-19

Orange Combat Team, 3d Battalion,

GALAHAD: 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 178,

182, 189, 191

Ordnance. See Artillery; individual weapons;

Military production, Chinese.

Ordnance maintenance, Chinese: 346, 351

Ordnance maintenance, U.S.: 290

Osborne, Lt. Col. William L.: 35, 183-85

"Oscars": 85n

OVERLORD: 68, 75

P-38's: 394

P-40's: 394

Pack transport

by animals: 33, 35, 153, 190, 210, 225, 338,

357

by native labor: 345, 347, 348, 351, 356

Pack transport, Japanese: 93

Pai Chung-hsi, Gen.: 27, 320, 401, 402, 409,

434, 444, 467

and Kweilin defense: 447, 448

and separatist movement in east China:

410-11

Stilwell on: 411, 437

Pan Yu-kun, Maj. Gen.: 235, 253

Pandu Ferry: 265, 267

Parachutes: 102, 108, 109

Panic: 182

Patch, Lt. Gen. Alexander M.: 468, 469

Patrolling: 125, 134, 183, 184

Peers, Capt. William R.: 37

Peirse, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard: 52,

378

Peng Ke-li, Maj.: 125

Pennoyer, Lt. Col. Paul G.: 299n

People's Political Council, Chinese: 450

Perimeter defense: 188-91

Persian Gulf Command: 292, 292n

Photographic reconnaissance: 89, 340

Photographic Reconnaissance Group: 84

Pick, Brig. Gen. Lewis A.: 13, 14, 100, 141,

205, 258, 276, 387

Piecemeal attacks. See Concentration of

forces; Co-ordination of effort.

PIGSTICK: 76, 81

Ping-ka: 332, 341-43, 352-54, 390

Pipelines: 11, 14-15, 115, 141, 472

Budge-Budge-Tinsukia: 274-76

to China: 387, 389

Chittagong-Tinsukia: 276

construction methods: 275-76

Fort Hertz: 11, 14-15

Plans. See Strategy.

Plot against Chiang. See Separatist movement

in east China.

Pockets, Japanese: 125, 127, 134, 135

Point 2171: 222

POL (petrol, oil, lubricants): 274, 277, 280

Pope, F. A.: 264

Port battalions

497th, TC: 263

508th, TC: 263

Port companies: 263-64

540th, TC: 263

541st, TC: 263

Port operations. See Bombay; Calcutta.

Portal, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles: 69

Presidential election, U.S.: 416

Presidential representative (U.S.) to Chiang:

377, 386-87, 399, 415-18. See also Hurley,

Maj. Gen. Patrick J.

Presterly, Pfc. George C.: 248

Preventive medicine: 286-88

Psychoneurosis. See Medical problems, psychoneurosis.

PURPLE Task Force: 210

QUADRANT Conference (Quebec, August 1943):

11, 53, 170, 229, 257, 273, 283, 387

Quartermaster Battalion (Mobile), 518th: 97,

100

Quartermaster Regiment, 45th: 13-14

Quartermaster supplies: 280

Quartermaster truck companies

3304th: 97, 100

3841st: 97

3962d: 100

3964th: 100

Quebec Conference, August 1943. See QUADRANT Conference.
INDEX 511

Quid pro quo policy: 17, 64, 297, 312, 362-63,

368, 385

Radio: 89, 185. See also Communications.

Raids, Japanese infantry: 123, 397

Railway Board, Government of India: 272

Railway bombing: 91-95

Railway Grand Division, 705th: 12, 266, 270

Railway operating battalions

721st: 13

725th: 13, 271

726th: 13

745th: 13

748th: 13

Railway operation: 267-69, 271-72, 273-74,

289. See also Bengal and Assam Railway;

Military Railway Service, SOS, CBI.

Railway Shop Battalion, 758th: 12-13, 272

Railway troops, U.S.: 266, 270. See also

individual units.

Ramgarh Training Center: 139

Randall, Brig. Gen. Russell E.: 230n

Rangoon. See DRACULA.

Rations: 11, 291

problems due to dietary differences: 264, 280

procurement and processing: 287, 291

Rear Echelon, Chih Hui Pu: 31

Recall crisis: 464

Chiang asks Stilwell's recall: 460-63

Chiang rejects Stilwell as field commander:

452-53, 456

Chiang's reaction to Roosevelt's 18 September note: 447, 447n, 450

Hurley urges recall: 464-65

Roosevelt agrees to relieve Stilwell in China:

456-59

Roosevelt's 18 September message to Chiang:

441-42, 443-46, 444n, 445n

Stilwell recalled: 468-69

Stilwell's report, 15 September: 435-36,

439, 439n

Stilwell's role: 450, 451-52, 455, 457, 464,

467, 469-70

Reciprocal aid: 277-80

Recognition, failure of: 154, 186, 187, 250

Reconnaissance: 152. See also Intelligence;

Patrolling.

Reconnaissance, air: 253

Red Combat Team, 1st Battalion, GALAHAD:

149, 183

Refugee Trail: 45

Regiments, See Infantry regiments.

Reinforcement by air: 172, 175, 227, 237

Reinforcements, Allied. See also Replacements, Allied.

for CBI: 264-65

for Chinese in north Burma: 48, 122, 123

for Fourteenth Air Force: 112

at Myitkyina: 227, 237

Salween campaign: 343, 346

Reinforcements, Japanese: 69, 136, 152, 181.

See also Replacements, Japanese.

for ICHIGO: 318-19

from Manchuria: 318, 327, 365, 366, 406

for SHO: 406

Relief, co-ordination of: 395

Replacements, Allied. See also GALAHAD, replacements; Reinforcements, Allied.

for North Burma Campaign: 33, 128

Salween campaign: 355, 389, 424, 433, 435

Replacements, Japanese: 87. See also Reinforcements, Japanese.

Retrograde movements. See Withdrawals.

Ringwalt, Consul Arthur R.: 409-10, 412

River-crossing operations: 132n, 313, 335-36,

340-43, 355

River transport. See Barge lines, Brahmaputra River.

Road construction: 140-41, 218, 340. See also

Burma Road Engineers; Ledo Road.

Road transportation: 289-90, 291, 292. See

also Motor transport.

Roadblocks: 134, 138, 150, 153, 182

Chindit withdrawal from block: 221

GALAHAD withdrawal from: 188

Inkangahtawng: 175, 176, 178, 180, 181

Japanese: 183

Japanese reactions to: 185

Salween area: 336, 354, 424

Seton: 215-16

Shaduzup: 183-85

Roberts, Brig. Gen. Frank N.: 457

Roe, T/Sgt. Richard E.: 245

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 3, 52-53, 171, 386-87

and Assam line of communications: 261

and B-29 project: 17, 112

and Burma operations: 445-46, 468-69

and Chennault Plan: 5, 72, 79-80, 110, 111
512 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Roosevelt, Franklin D.—Continued

and Chiang Kai-shek: 79, 305, 309-11, 323,

386-87, 446, 453-54, 460-61, 463, 468-

69. See also Roosevelt, Franklin D.,

messages to Chiang Kai-shek.

and Chiang's crossing of Salween: 305, 309,

445-46, 468-69

and China field command for Stilwell: 383-

84, 386-87, 416-17, 453-54, 458-59

China policy: 17, 49, 52, 53, 69, 71-73,

72n, 79-80, 297-301, 309-11, 327-28, 362,

382-84, 385, 446, 457, 463-64, 469

and Churchill: 164-65

messages to Chiang Kai-shek: 79-80, 297-

98, 300, 300n, 301, 305-06, 310, 311,

383-84, 416-17, 443-44, 445-46, 447n,

458-59. See also Recall crisis.

at OCTAGON Conference (Quebec): 439,

440

at SEXTANT Conference (Cairo): 62, 63-64,

65, 66, 69-70, 71

on Southeast Asia operations: 67-68, 69,

70-71

and Stalin: 68

and Stilwell: 61, 163, 362, 383

Stilwell's recall. See Recall crisis.

and U.S. military mission to Communist

north China: 303-04

and War Department: 361

Royal Air Force (RAF): 91n. See also British

and Commonwealth units, air.

Royal Indian Army Service Corps depots:

277-78, 279

Russo-Chinese relations: 374-75, 450

Russo-Japanese relations: 365

Saipan: 405

Salween campaign: 329-60, 389-98. See also

Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, and

Salween campaign.

D Day: 340

decision to cross Salween: 312-14. See

also Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, and

question of crossing Salween.

Japanese counteroffensive: 423-24

plans: 334-36, 335n

terrain: 331-32

timing: 329-31, 336

transport: 338

"Sallys": 85n

Sanitary Corps: 287

Sanitary measures, Chinese: 254

Sanitary problems: 284-85, 287, 291

Schaible, 2d Lt. Kirk C.: 343

Scoones, Lt. Gen. Geoffrey: 166

Seagrave, Dr. Gordon S.: 45, 142

Seagrave Hospital Unit: 45, 158, 223, 235

Search and rescue: 376

Second Thirty Divisions. See Z-Force.

Security measures: 184, 226

Separatist movement in east China: 408-12,

408n, 411n

Service, John S.: 376, 412, 431-32, 431n, 467

Service troops. See individual service units.

Service troops, Japanese: 318

Service troops in combat: 233-35, 237-38,

241, 245-47, 255

Services of Supply (SOS), CBI: 31, 32, 115,

261. See also Wheeler, Maj. Gen. Raymond A.

and air supply: 97, 100, 101, 104

in China: 291-292

and Chinese lend-lease in India: 281-84

and local procurement of supplies: 277-80

medical organization: 284-88

personnel strength: 283

reorganization: 257-58

Services of supply, Chinese: 423, 425, 426

SEXTANT Conference (Cairo): 49, 61-66, 68-

75, 302, 415, 470

commitments to Chiang: 62, 64-66, 419,

420, 461

decisions: 75, 121, 160-65, 170, 205

plans for: 52-53, 56, 57-58, 59

Shang Chen, Gen.: 366

Sharaw Ga: 46, 47, 121

Sheahan, Lt. Col. Maurice E.: 292-93, 323

Shelton, Captain: 74

Sherwood, Robert E.: 68

Shimoyama, Lt. Gen. Takuma: 319

Shingbwiyang: 14, 42, 141

SHO operation: 406

Shortfalls: 251

Shortages

aircraft: 100-101

ammunition, Allied: 152, 181, 238

ammunition, Japanese: 218, 397

fuel, aircraft: 400, 401
INDEX 513

Shortages—Continued

fuel, Japanese: 218

rations, Allied: 152, 193, 238-39

rations, Japanese: 195, 218

shipping: 76

trucks, in China: 440

trucks, Japanese: 93

water: 47, 152, 190

Shweli river: 331-32, 349-52

Siege operations: 90, 391-94, 399-401. See

also Mining operations; Myitkyina, siege;

Tunneling, Allied.

Sino-American co-operation, problems: 348

Sino-American integrated staffs: 142n

Sino-American policy committee proposed:

464, 465

Sino-American relations. See U.S.-Chinese

relations.

Sino-Russian relations: 417-18

Sittang Bridge: 92

Skip bombing: 18, 19, 391

Slim, Lt. Gen. William J.: 11, 29, 50, 167, 168,

169, 192, 255, 377

Sliney, Col. George W.: 209, 235

Smith, Pvt. Howard T.: 245

Smith, 2d Lt. Warren R.: 182

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B.: 12, 13, 260,

269-70, 299, 299n, 300n, 388, 415, 472

Somerville, Admiral James: 51, 52, 378

Soong, T. V.: 25, 284, 385, 436

and China field command for Stilwell: 409,

424, 426, 436-37, 437n

recall crisis: 444, 447, 447n, 452, 455, 456,

456n, 460

Soong-Stimson agreements, January 1942: 361

SOS Chief Engineer: 14

Southeast Asia Command (SEAC): 72, 163,

166, 196, 305, 418. See also Mountbatten,

Admiral Lord Louis.

and air transport: 98-99

and BUCCANEER: 68, 70, 71

and Chindits: 220-21

directives for: 162-63, 200, 228-29, 378, 440

establishment: 5-6

and GALAHAD: 34-35

and Myitkyina: 202, 204, 228

and North Burma Campaign: 418

organization: 28, 138

Southeast Asia Command (SEAC)—Con.

plans for Burma operations: 49-52, 75-77,

160-61

and Stilwell: 255n

Southwest Highway Transport Administration:

289

Soviet-Chinese relations: 306

Soviet Union. See USSR.

Spaht, Col. Carlos G.: 395

Spitfires: 84n

Stalin, Marshal Joseph V.: 52, 67-68, 457

State Department: 284, 298, 300n, 374

Stein, Gunther: 431

Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W.: 3-4, 59, 64n, 76,

77-79, 83, 97, 101-02, 114, 139, 139n, 150,

163-64, 174, 181, 187-88, 235, 259, 291,

320n, 420, 448n. See also Command problems.

on air cover: 325

analyses of individual operations: 128-29,

145, 255

assumption of command in north Burma:

78-79

and B-29 project: 17, 113-14, 325, 368-70,

466-67

on British: 362, 470

and CBI command changes, proposed fall

1944: 419-21

and Chennault: 19, 23, 24, 26, 113, 292, 312,

314, 322-23, 323n, 324, 325-26, 364-65,

368-69, 465-66

and Chiang Kai-shek: 6, 29, 56, 56n, 57,

58, 59, 78, 161, 176-77, 205, 212-13, 325,

363, 367-68, 380-81, 385, 422-23, 435-36,

438, 447, 447n, 448, 450-51, 452-55, 460,

464-65, 469-70. See also Stilwell, Gen.

Joseph W., messages to Chiang.

and Chiang's decision on crossing Salween:

79, 131, 304-06, 312

Chief of Staff, China Theater: 3, 56, 78, 79,

161, 363, 428

and Chindits: 192-99, 220-23, 404

Chinese Army, plans for: 4-5, 10, 26-28, 58,

133, 248, 320, 362, 363-64, 426-29, 430

and Chinese Communist issue: 302-04, 380-

81, 428-29, 432-33

on Chinese soldier: 427

command relations with Chinese units: 136-

37, 137n, 145, 235n, 320n, 420-21, 436, 438
514 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W.—Continued

Commanding General, Chinese Army in

India: 28

death: 470

decorations: 471

Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, SEAC:

28, 169, 170, 255, 255n, 380, 420

and east China crisis: 322-26, 365, 366,

367-70, 430, 435-36, 438-39

field command in China: 379, 384, 402-03,

409, 413-15, 422-23, 426-30, 436-39. See

also Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W., plans and

views on taking command in China.

and GALAHAD: 131, 158, 178-80, 191-92,

467

Handy's statement on: 379

Hump policies: 25, 168

and Hurley: 58-59, 59n, 416. See also

Recall crisis.

and Imphal operations: 192

JCS on: 382. See also Joint Chiefs of Staff

(JCS), and Stilwell; Marshall, Gen. George

C., Stilwell reports to; Stilwell, Gen.

Joseph W., mission sent to Washington.

and lend-lease: 418-20. See also Lend-lease

aid (U.S.) to China, control over.

and Liao Yao-hsiang: 206, 208, 212-13

and Marshall. See Marshall, Gen. George

C., Stilwell reports to.

and Merrill: 176, 181, 189, 211

messages to Chiang: 56, 57-58, 430, 430n

mission in CBI: 3, 4, 8, 55, 78, 161, 169,

362-64, 419, 457

mission sent to Washington: 161, 163-64,

167, 169-70, 331

and Mountbatten: 28, 60-61, 61n, 113, 160-

61, 163, 169-71, 377-78

and Myitkyina: 202, 228-29, 230, 233, 237,

247, 248, 249, 251, 404

nickname: 416n

on North Burma Campaign plans: 41-42,

43, 49-50, 51, 61

and north Burma operations: 123, 124-25,

130, 136-37, 137n, 178-80, 204-05, 210,

211, 254-55

personnel policy, China: 290

plan for Sino-American policy committee:

464

Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W.—Continued

plans and views on taking command in

China: 380-81, 383, 420-21, 426-30, 432,

436-39, 436n, 437n, 449

political adviser. See Davies, John P., Jr.

promotion to full general: 379, 381, 382, 384

on quid pro quo policy: 17, 77-78, 362-63,

368, 413, 470

recall: 376-77. See also Recall crisis.

record in CBI summarized: 470, 471-72

and Roosevelt: 61, 163, 362, 383

and Roosevelt's messages to Chiang: 298,

444, 444n, 445, 445n, 446

and Salween campaign: 121n, 329-31, 355,

356n, 389, 430, 433. See also Stilwell,

Gen. Joseph W., and Chiang's decision on

crossing Salween.

and separatist movement in east China: 409,

410-12

at SEXTANT Conference (Cairo): 59-60, 61,

63-65, 63n, 64n, 71-74

and Soong: 436. See also Soong, T. V.,

recall crisis.

Stimson's views on: 470-71

strategy for defense of east China: 434, 438-

39, 449-50

strategy for North Burma Campaign: 125,

127, 132, 142-45, 146, 175, 204-05, 206, 256

on strategy for the Pacific and Southeast

Asia: 4, 161, 169, 363, 378-79, 426-27

and Sun Li-jen: 123, 128, 128n, 130, 133-

34, 206, 211-13

and supplies for east China defenders: 402-

04, 412-13

and Wallace's visit: 374-77

Wedemeyer on: 377

and Z-Force: 321

Stilwell, Lt. Col. Joseph W., Jr.: 210, 233

Stilwell, Mrs. Winifred: 208, 367, 448

Stimson, Henry L.: 4. 297, 415, 442, 458

Stockpiles

Chinese lend-lease in India: 281-83

gasoline, for Pacific operations: 466-67

Story of J. Peene, Sr.: 64n

Strategic Air Force: 84, 91-93

Strategic bombing, Allied: 91-95, 323, 369-

70, 466-67. See also B-29 project.

Strategic bombing, Japanese: 85-86, 87
INDEX 515

Strategy, Allied: 8, 27, 49, 53-55, 71-73, 75,

82, 162-63, 171-72, 172n, 228-29, 362-64,

378-79, 388, 439-41, 457-58. See also

Chennault Plan.

for China operations: 449

for meeting Japanese offensive on India: 172

for North Burma Campaign: 124-25, 131-

32, 176, 196-97, 215, 223-25

for Salween campaign: 329-31, 334-36,

335n

for Southeast Asia: 9-10, 39-42, 49-52, 58,

68-71, 73, 75-76, 80-82, 160-61, 200-203

Strategy, Japanese: 21, 47, 130, 150-52, 316-

18, 319, 405-08

Stratemeyer, Maj. Gen. George E.: 83, 101,

466

and B-29 project: 15, 113-14, 315

on Chennault Plan: 25, 110

commander of EAC: 84

and Hump diversions: 175, 192

and Myitkyina: 201, 227

Strengths. See Troop strengths.

Strong, Col. Frederick S. See SOS Chief

Engineer.

Submarine activity, Japanese: 263

Suichuan: 319

Sultan, Lt. Gen. Daniel I.: 199, 258, 269,

305, 362, 419n, 425, 449, 459

commander in India-Burma: 170, 380,

418, 469

and Hump diversions for Imphal: 174, 175

on north Burma operations: 201

and proposed attack on Sumatra: 161, 162,

165

Sumatra: 54, 66, 161, 172. See also CULVERIN.

Sun Hsi-lien, Maj. Gen.: 333, 357, 359

Sun Li-jen, Gen.: 31, 32, 45, 48, 78, 122-25,

124n, 127, 128, 128n, 130, 133-34, 137,

146, 154, 158, 176, 206, 208, 211-13, 215

Sung Shan: 332, 355, 356, 360, 390, 394-98,

436

Supplies, Classes I, II, III, and IV: 277

Supply. See also Air supply; CBI Theater,

logistical problems; Lines of communications; Logistical support; Logistics, Japanese; Supply, levels.

captured German matériel: 420

Supply—Continued

for defense of east China: 402-04, 412-13,

413n, 448

levels: 277

local procurement: 104, 277-80, 430

POL: 277, 280. See also Pipelines.

record keeping: 283

for Salween campaign: 340, 348, 354-55

spare parts: 280

stock control: 280

storage: 281-84

subsistence: 277, 280. See also Rations.

textiles: 279, 280

warehouses: 283

Supply, Japanese: 318, 399-400, 408. See

also Lines of communications, Japanese.

Suppressive therapy, for malaria: 286

Surgeon General's Office: 286

Surprise. See Deceptions.

Tactical Air Force: 91

Tactical Air Force, Third: 84, 89

Tactics, Allied. See "Baby tortoise" tactics;

Encirclements; Envelopments.

Tactics, Chinese. See also Chinese Army, lack

of aggressiveness; Concentration of forces,

Chinese; Containment; Co-ordination of

effort, Chinese; Encirclements; Envelopments.

critiques by U.S. observers: 346, 355, 359,

395, 423

escape route for enemy: 357, 357n

frontal attack: 345, 346, 348, 353

improved: 352, 392-93

infiltration: 349-50

refusal to bypass: 346

Tactics, Japanese: 174, 348

ambush: 152, 250

defensive: 396

encirclement: 83, 88, 95, 122

infiltration: 133, 395

maneuver and ambush: 247-48

roadblocks: 47

Taihpa Ga: 134-36

Tamraz, Col. John M.: 45

Tanaka, Lt. Gen. Hisakazu: 319

Tanaka, Lt. Gen. Shinichi: 46, 47, 47n, 121,

136, 146, 152n, 191, 197, 232, 233n

comments on Burma operations: 138, 145,

155-56, 206, 206n, 214-15
516 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Tanaka, Lt. Gen. Shinichi—Continued

plans for delaying action: 130, 206

plans for offensive action: 47, 147, 150

tactics in withdrawal: 152-53, 178, 214-15,

216, 218, 219-20

Tanks: 148-52, 154-55, 186-87, 356, 397

Tansey, Brig. Gen. Patrick H.: 387, 388

Targets, air. See Air support, tactical, targets;

Strategic bombing.

Taro Plain: 39, 45, 136-38

TARZAN: 51-52, 70, 76

Ta-tang-tzu pass: 331, 335, 345-48, 349

Taylor, Col. Thomas F.: 449

Tear gas: 373

Technicians, Indian: 278

Technicians, U.S.: 278

Tehran Conference: 59, 67, 75

Teng-chung: 329, 332, 335, 349, 351, 352, 360,

390-94, 436

importance: 177, 304-05

taken: 435

"Teng-chung cut-off": 435

Tenth Air Force: 84, 89, 101-02, 251, 385

Terrain

at Imphal: 194

Mogaung valley: 207

north Burma: 148, 178, 182, 183, 198, 211

Salween area, China: 331-32

Third Tactical Air Force: 84, 89

Thirty Division Program. See Y-Force.

Thirty Divisions: 377. See also Y-Force.

Thirty Divisions plus 10 percent: 27, 419, 457

TIGAR 26 A: 292

TIGAR 26 B: 292, 292n

Tilly, 1st Lt. James L.: 176, 183

Timberman, Brig. Gen. Thomas S.: 404n, 409,

411-12, 411n, 413n, 448

Tito, Marshal Josip Broz: 303, 421

TOGO: 319, 365

Tojo, Hideki: 405

TORA: 21

TOREADOR: 51, 65, 76

Trails, Allied: 152, 182, 183, 225

Trails, Japanese: 153, 216

Training

at Myitkyina: 250

U.S., for Chinese: 320, 321, 338, 352, 363

U.S., for Indians: 278

Transport. See Air transport; Pack transport.

Transportation Service, SOS, CBI: 274

Traveling instructional groups: 320, 322, 337,

338

Treasury Department: 298, 300n

TRIDENT Conference (Washington, May 1943):

5, 18, 49, 72, 111, 170, 273

Troop Carrier Command: 84, 98, 100, 101

Troop carrier squadrons

1st: 97, 98

2d: 97, 98

27th: 98, 340, 345, 347, 355

315th: 98

Troop dispositions, Allied

Burma: 119, 121, 133

China: 320

Troop dispositions, Japanese: 20

Burma: 42, 119, 142, 143n

east China: 311, 311n

for ICHIGO: 319

Salween campaign: 332

Troop staging: 264

Troop strength, Allied

east China: 327, 371

Imphal: 175

Lung-ling: 359

Myitkyina: 237

for north Burma operations: 80, 139, 164

Salween campaign: 333, 352

Troop strength, Japanese

Burma: 42, 164

China: 20, 464

for ICHIGO: 319, 365

Lung-ling: 359

Myitkyina: 226, 233

North Burma Campaign: 129n, 130, 130n

offensive on India: 175, 175n, 193

Sung Shan: 395, 397

Teng-chung: 391

Troop strength, Japanese, Allied intelligence

estimates

Burma: 42, 164

east China: 327

Imphal: 175, 193

Myitkyina: 229-30, 230n, 233, 247, 248, 255

North Burma Campaign: 45, 46, 129

Sung Shan: 397

Trucks, for ELOC: 292, 292n, 440

Tunneling, Allied: 248

Tunnels, Japanese: 127
INDEX 517

TWILIGHT: 15-16, 17, 25, 75

U operation: 165-66, 195, 214. See also

Japanese offensive on India.

Uchiyama, Lt. Gen. Eitaro: 319

Uichi, Lt. Gen. Shibata: 195n

Ulabaria tragedy: 275-76

U.S.-British relations: 260-62, 362-64. See

also Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W., and Mountbatten.

U.S.-Chinese relations. See also SEXTANT

Conference (Cairo).

field command in China for Stilwell: 383-87,

426-30, 431n, 443-71

lend-lease: 279-80, 281-83

loan request, billion-dollar: 298-300

Presidential representative to Chiang: 399

question of crossing Salween: 297-98, 304-06

U.S. command of Chinese troops: 235n. See

also Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W., field command in China.

U.S. Embassy, Chungking: 409

U.S.-Indian relations: 277-80, 285. See also

Government of India.

U.S. infantry for CBI: 164, 177-78, 205, 205n,

362, 363, 449. See also GALAHAD.

U.S. military expenditures in China: 300,

301-02

U.S. military observers in Communist north

China: 302-04, 302n, 306, 310, 310n, 376,

431

U.S. prestige with Chinese troops: 188-89, 210

U.S. troops and local civilians: 264

USSR: 68, 292n

air raid on Chinese troops: 306

promise to fight Japan: 68, 69, 69n

UTOPIA: 61

Van Natta, Col. Thomas F., III: 212, 215

Vegetation, effect on operations: 152. See also

Burma, geography.

Vengeance, Vultee: 84n

Vertical envelopment. See Chindits; GALAHAD; Long-range penetration groups.

Veterinary Corps: 287

Veterinary units: 338

Victoria Cross: 222

Vincent, Col. Clinton D.: 112

Walawbum: 147-48, 150, 151-58, 154n, 176

Wallace, Vice President Henry A.: 310n,

374-77, 415, 417, 430, 431

Walled city defense: 391-94, 400

Wang Hou-wu, Gen.: 404

War Area, IV: 320, 371, 423, 434

War Area, V: 320

War Area, VI: 21, 320

War Area, IX: 21, 22, 320, 371, 423, 434

War Area Service Corps (WASC): 288, 290,

291

War Cabinet, British: 171

War Department: 3, 79, 276, 280

China policy: 27-28, 298-99, 300n, 419-20,

428-29, 431, 432, 457-58

on diversion of B-29 stocks to meet ICHIGO:

369

and GALAHAD: 34, 241

Ledo Road: 389

policy on Chennault Plan: 5

on quid pro quo policy: 17

recall crisis: 447

on Stilwell-Chennault controversy: 365, 376

and Stilwell's return to U.S.: 470-71

War lords: 402. See also Chang Fa-kwei, Gen.;

Hsueh Yueh, Gen.; Li Chi-shen, Marshal;

Lung Yun, Governor; Pai Chung-hsi, Gen.

War Production Board: 416

War Production Mission. See Nelson, Donald

M.

Warden, Brig. Gen. John A.: 264

Washington Conference (May 1943): 469.

See also TRIDENT Conference.

Water. See Shortages, water.

Water hole at Nhpum Ga: 188, 189

Wavell, Field Marshal Lord Archibald P.: 261

Weapons. See Artillery; individual weapons.

Weather

and air operations: 92, 94, 193, 338, 345,

350, 353, 357, 360

Burma, general description: 38

and CHAMPION: 62

effect on Japanese lines of communications:

94, 95n, 195

effect on matériel: 280-81

and health: 287

at Myitkyina: 236, 250

North Burma Campaign: 143, 145, 163, 178,

187, 206, 209, 221, 436

and railway maintenance: 271, 275

and road construction. See Ledo Road,

weather affects progress.
518 STILWELL'S COMMAND PROBLEMS

Weather—Continued

Salween area: 329-31, 345, 349, 350, 351

Wedemeyer, Maj. Gen. Albert C.: 170, 377,

414n

appointment as chief of staff to Chiang

Kai-shek: 469

on Chennault Plan: 24-25

Chiang's attitude toward: 377, 468

and Hump allocations: 111

on Imphal operations: 193

member of AXIOM Mission: 171-72

and SEAC plans: 51, 52, 61, 70

Wei Li-huang, Gen.: 119, 312, 333, 335,

355, 359, 389, 390, 424, 433

Wellman, T/5 Russell G.: 252

Wessels, Brig. Gen. Theodore F.: 248-51, 253

Weston, 1st Lt. Logan E.: 182

Wheeler, Maj. Gen. Raymond A.: 12, 13,

171, 257, 277, 472

White, Theodore H.: 467, 470

WHITE CITY: 197, 197n

White Combat Team, 1st Battalion, GALAHAD:

149, 183, 184

Willey, Col. John P.: 239

Williams, Col. Jesse C.: 327

Williams, Col. Robert P.: 286

Willkie, Wendell L.: 470

Wingate, Maj. Gen. Orde Charles: 34, 87,

97, 130, 166. See also Chindits.

death: 198-99

objectives for Chindits' Burma operations:

196-97

on proper use of LRPG's: 221

Wire laying: 351

Withdrawals, Chinese: 359

Withdrawals, Japanese: 153-54, 195, 213-20,

253, 345, 353

Withdrawals, U.S.: 153

Wolfe, Brig. Gen. Kenneth B.: 114

Women, U.S. Army, in CBI: 290

Wood, 1st Lt. Frederick L., Jr.: 97

Woomer, 2d Lt. William E.: 191

X-Force: 469. See also Chinese Army in

India (CAI); Ledo Force.

Y-Force: 5, 50, 57, 58, 254, 415

condition in fall 1943: 56

condition in spring 1944: 309, 309n

and decision to cross Salween: 298, 312

possibility of shifting to defense of east

China: 356-57, 377, 449

question of using: 76, 131, 177, 304. See

also Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, question of crossing Salween.

Roosevelt on: 310, 469

in Salween campaign: 335n. See also Salween campaign.

weapons and ammunition: 333, 334n

Y-Force Operations Staff (Y-FOS)

critiques of Chinese tactics: 351-52, 359

organization: 338

part in Salween campaign: 313, 335n,

338, 343, 355, 395-96

Yalta Conference (February 1945): 469

Yamasaki, Colonel: 137

Yawngbang Ga: 145

Yenangyaung oil fields: 91, 92

Yoshimoto, Lt. Gen. Teiichi: 319

Yount, Brig. Gen. Paul F.: 13, 270, 271, 273

Yu Han-mou, Gen.: 402, 411

Yu Ta-wei, Gen.: 304, 424

Yunnan-Burma Highway Engineering Administration: 340

Yupbang Ga: 46, 47, 121, 122, 124-29, 137

Z-Force (ZEBRA Force): 320-22, 368

Z-Force Operations Staff (Z-FOS): 320, 372,

374, 401, 405, 448

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1987 O-189-905