1

07

- 04 18

- cv Fro m m ert v. C o nkri ght U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F OR THE S EC OND C IR C U IT

_______________ August Term, 2007 (Argued: J une 19, 2008 Dec ided: J uly 24, 2008) Docke t No. 07-0418-c v

_______________ P A U L J. F ROM M ERT , A L AN H. C LA IR , D ONAL D S. F OO TE , T H O M A S I. B ARNES , R ONAL D J. C A M PB ELL , F RAN K D. C O M M ESSO , W I L L I AM F. C OONS , J A M ES D. G AGN I ER , B R I AN L. G AI TA , W I L L I AM J. L ADUE , G ER AL D A. L EO NAR DO J R ., F RAN K M AWDES L EY , H AR OL D S. M I T CH ELL , W A LTER J. P ET RO FF , R I C HAR D C. S PR I NG , P ATR I C I A M. J OHNS ON , F. P ATR I C I A M. T O B IN , N ANC Y A. R EV ELLA , AN A T O LI G. P U SC H K IN , W I L L I AM R. P L UM MER ,

M I CH A EL J. M C C OY , L AR R Y J. G AL L AGH ER , N AP OL EO N B. B A RB O SA , A L EX ANDR A S PE AR MAN H A RRI CK , J A N I S A. E DE L MAN , P ATR I C I A H. J OHNS TON , KEN NE TH P. P AR NE TT , J OYCE D. C A T H CART , F L OYD S W A IM , J UL I E A. M C M I L L I AN , D EN N I S E. B AI NES , R UB Y J EA N M UR PH Y , M AT TH EW D. A LF I ERI , K ATHY F AY T HOMPS ON , M AR Y B ETH A L L EN , C R AI G R. S PENCE R , L I NDA S. B OUR QUE , T H O M A S M I CH A EL V AS TA , F RAN K C. D AR L I NG , C LARK C. D I NGMAN , C A RO L E. G ANNON , J OS EP H E. W R I GHT , D AVI D M. R OHAN , D AVI D B. R U D D O CK , C H A RLES H O BBS , C H A RLES Z A BI N SK I , C H A RLES J. M A D D A LO ZZO , J OYCE M. P R UE TT , W I L L I AM A. C RAVEN , M AUR EE N A. L OUGHL I N J ONES , KEN NE TH W. P I ET ROW SK I , B ONN I E C OHEN , L AWRENC E R. H OL L AND , G A I L A. N AS MAN , S TEVE N D. B ARL EY , D ONNA S. L I PA RI , ANDREW C. M ATTEL I ANO , M I CH A EL H O RROCKS , C AND I CE J. W HI TE , D EN N I S E. B AI NS , K ATHL EE N E. H UNT ER , J OHN L. C RI SA FU LLI , D EB OR AH J. D A V IS , B R EN DA H. M C C O N N ELL , K ATHL EE N A. B OWEN , R OB E R T P. C AR ANDDO , T ER ENCE J. K UR TZ , W I L L I AM J. C H ESL O CK , T H O M A S E. D AL TON , L YNN B A RN SD A LE , B RUCE D. C R A IG , G AR Y P. H A R D IN , C L AUD ETT E M. L ONG , D AL E P L AT TET ER , M AR Y ANN S ER GE ANT , M OL L Y W HI TE KEH OE , I R S HAD Q UE R S HI , D AVI D K. Y OUNG , L ES L I E ANN W U N SCH , E UGENE H. U PD Y KE , M I CH A EL R. B EN S ON , A L VI N M. A DA MS , R ONN I E K OL NI AK , J A M ES J. F A RR ELL , R OB E R T L. B R AC K HAHN , B EN J AMI N C. R OT H , R I C HAR D C. C ARTER , C AR MEN J. S O FIA , K ATHL EE N W. L EVEA , F RED ERI CK S C AC C HI TTI , P A U L D EF I NA , J A M ES G. W A LLS , G A I L J. L EV Y , J OHN A. W I L L I AMS , C RY ST A L T HOR TON , C H A RLES R. D RANNBAUER , W I L L I AM M. B UR R I TT , and J ANI CE R O SS H EI L ER , Plain tif fs- Ap pe lle es,

—v.—The Honor able William K. Sessions I I I , Chief J udg e of the United States District Court for the * District of Ve rmont, sitti ng by desig nation. 2 S AL L Y L. C ONK R I GHT , X ER OX C OR PO R ATI ON P EN S I ON P L AN A DMI NI S TR ATOR , P ATR I C I A M. N AZ E ME TZ , X ER OX C OR PO R ATI ON P EN S I ON P L AN A DMI NI S TR ATOR , L AWRENC E M. B EC KE R , X ER OX C OR PO R ATI ON P L AN A DMI NI S TR ATOR , X ER OX C OR PO R ATI ON R E TI R E ME NT I NCOM E G UARAN TEE P L AN , and X ER OX C OR PO R ATI ON , A N EW Y O RK C OR PO R ATI ON ,

De fe nd an ts- Ap pe lla nts , X ER OX C OR PO R ATI ON , De fe nd an t.

_______________ B e f o r e : S T RAU B and RAGGI , Circuit Judges , and S ES S I ONS , District Judge

. *

_______________ 1 Appea l from a January 24, 2007 order

of the United States District Court for the Western 2 District of Ne w York ( David G. L arimer , Judge ) c omp lyingwi th o ur Janu ary 6, 20 06 de c isi on

to 3 re mand

the c a se to t

he Di str ic t Co ur

t in or de r t o c ra ft

a re me dy to c a lc ulate Pla int if

fs -A pp e lle e s’ 4 pe ns ion

be ne fi ts i n li g ht o f t

he vio latio ns we ide nti fi e d o f t he Em plo y e e Re tir e me nt I

nc ome 5 Security

Act of 1974, 29 U .S.C. § 1001 et seq . We conclude that the District Court cra fted a 6 reme dy

consistent with our dec ision, applicable law , and the ter ms of the pension plan at issue. 7 Ho we ve r, we a lso c on c lud e that th e Di str ic t Co ur t e rr e d in re fu sin g to e nf

or c e the re le a se fo rm s 8 signe d by

sever al Plaintiffs-Appellee s in this l itigation. 9 Af

fi rm e d in pa rt , v a c ate d in

pa rt , a nd re mand e d f

or fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s c on sis te nt w ith 10 this opini on. 11

_______________ 12 13 R OB E R T H. J A FFE (Mar k B. Watson, Robert H. Jaffe & A ssociates, Spring field, Ne w 14 J erse y ; Georg e A. Sche ll, Schell & Schell, F airport, Ne w York; John A. St rain, Rodondo 15 Be ach, Ca lifornia, on the brief ), Robert H. Jaffe & A ssociates, Spring field, Ne w J erse y , for 16 Plaintif

fs-Appellee

s . 17 18 B R EN DAN S. M AHER , Stris & Mahe r L L P, Dallas, Texas, for Plainti ffs-Appellees

. 19Early

in this l itigation, the District Court dismissed Xerox as a pa rty , and Plaintiffs-Appe llees 1 did not challeng e this dismis sal in their appe al. See F rommert v. Conk

right , 433 F.3d 254, 256 n.2 (2d Cir. 2006). 3 1 M AR GA R E T A. C L EME NS , Nix on Peabody L L P, Rochester, Ne w York, for 2 De fe nd an ts- Ap pe lla nts

. 3 4 Maria G hazal, Business Roundtable, Washing ton, D.C.; J eff rey A. L amken, Rac hel 5 M. Mc Ke nzie , B ake r B ott s L L P, Wa sh ing ton , D .C. ; A lly so n N . H o, B ake r B ott s L L P, 6 Dallas, Te x as, for

Am ic us Cur iaeBu sin ess R ou nd tab le

. 7 8

_______________ 9 10 11 STRAUB, Circuit Judge: 12 13 Plaintiffs-Appellee s asserte d claims under the Employ ee Re tirement Income Sec urity Act 14 of 1974 (“ ERI SA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq ., ag ainst their cur rent or f ormer e mploy er, X erox 15 Corporation (“ Xer ox ”), the pension plan a dminist ere d for the be nefit of its employ ees, a nd 1 16 va

ri ou s in div idu a ls a sso c iate d w iththe a dmi nis tr a tio n o f t hat pl an. On

re mand fr om o ur fi rs t 17 decision in this lit iga tion, see From mert v. Conkright , 433 F.3d 254 ( 2d Cir. 2006), the District 18 Court cra fted a

reme dy to addre ss the ERI SA violations we had identified a nd conclude d that the 19 rele ase f

orms signe d by

sever al Plaintiffs-Appellee s did not bar their ERI SA claims, see 20 Frommert v . Conkright , 4 72 F . Su pp . 2 d 4 52 , 4 56 –5 9 ( W.D .N .Y . 2 00 7) . D e fe nd ants -A pp e lla nts 21 challeng e both aspe cts of the District Court’s de cision. For the rea sons set forth below, w e re ject 22 Def

endants-A

ppellants’ first c halleng e and a g ree with the second. A ccor dingly , we va cate a 2 3 p o rt i o no f t h e D i s tri ctC o urt ’s o rd er an d re m an d th e c as e t o th e D i s tri ctC o urt fo r p ro ce ed i n gs 24 consistent with this opi nion. 25 264 1 F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND 2 We p re sume fa mil iari ty wi th t he fa c ts a nd pr oc e dura l hi sto ry

of thi s c a se a s se t f

or th i n 3 our prior de cision, se e Fr om me rt , 433 F.3d at 257–62, and we r epeat them here only as re levant 4 to t

he iss ue s p re se nte d in

thi s a pp e a l. I n th a t de c isi on , w e c on c lud e d th a t D e fe nd ants -A pp e lla nts 5 had impermissibly amende d the ERI SA plan at issue throug h their method of de termining 6 retire ment benef

its for those bene ficiar ies who had pr eviously left the c ompany

only to be 7 rehire d later. Id . at 264–68. When these be nefic iaries lef t Xerox, they

all rec eived lump-sum 8 distributions of their then- acc rued pe nsion benefits. Id . at 257. 9 The pe nsion benefits of those who wer e subseque ntly rehire d by

Xer ox wer e g overne d by 10 a set of a

mbiguous provisions in the pension plan doc uments. The 1989 Xe rox R etireme nt 11 Income Gua

rante e Plan (“ RI GP” or “ Plan”) provide d that, “[i] n the eve nt any part or a ll of a 12 Member’ s acc rued be nefit is distributed to him prior to his Normal Retire ment Date, . . . a nd 13 such member

at any time therea fter r ecommenc es ac tive participation in the Pl an, the a ccr ued 14 be ne fi t of

su c h M e mbe r b a se d o n a ll Y e ars of Part ic ipatio n s ha ll b e of

fs e t by the a c c ru e d b e ne fi t 15 attr ibuta

ble to s uc h d istri butio n. ” 19 89 RI GP § 9. 6. Th e 19 97 ve rs ion of the Pla n p ro vid e d b oth 16 that “[n] o cre dit shall be g iven [to a participatingemploy ee] for a ny period with re spect to which 17 a lump sum pay

ment has bee n made . . .” and that “Cre dit for Yea rs of Participation prece ding 18 [such a payout] will be reinstated” in the event that suc h an employ ee r eturns to Xer ox .” 19 From me rt , 433 F.3d at 260. Thus, in determining these e mploy ees’ benef its, the plan 20 administrator wa s require d to acc ount, in a manner unspecifie d to employ ees, f or both an 2 1 e mp l o ye e ’ s t o t a l ye ar s o f s e r v i c e atX e r o x an d

th e f a c tth a tth e f

i n a l b e n e f i t s mu s tb e “ o f

f s e tb y” 22 an amount “attributable” to a pr ior lump sum dis tribution.5 1 Th e pla

n a dmi nis tr ator

re so lve d th is d if

fi c ult y by uti lizin g a

so -c a lle d “ ph anto m a c c ount” 2 offse t mechanism. The phr ase “ phantom acc ount” re fer s to the calc ulation of the cur rent va lue 3 of the e mploy ee’ s prior, lump-sum distributi on by adjusting that amount for “hy pothetical 4 investment g ains and/or losses attributable to the prior distribution, as if the money had bee n left 5 in [ the employ ee’ s] account[] ” instead of beingdistributed to the employ ee upon f irst leaving 6 Xer ox . Id . at 259 (quoting1995 “B enef its Update”) . In estimating the pension bene fit to which 7 that employ ee w ould be entitled upon his or her future r etireme nt (and thus sec ond separ ation) 8 from Xe rox employ ment, the plan administrator w ould both account f or the e mploy ee’ s total 9 y ear s of servic e and de duct an a mount based on the prior , lump-sum dist ribution, as aug mented 10 by

the “pha ntom account” offse t method. Se e id . at 259–61. 11 In o ur

fi rs t de c isi on , w e c on c lud e d th a t th e “ ph anto m a c c ount” of fs e t me c ha

nis m 12 constituted a “r etroa ctive cut- back” of anticipated pension bene fits in violation of 29 U.S.C . § 13 1054(g ), and that Defe ndants-Appe llants had impermissibly amende d the ERI SA Plan to include 14 that mecha

nism in vi olation of 29 U.S.C. § 1054(h). Se e id . at 266–68. We rema nded to the 15 District Court to fashion a re medy for these violations. Se e id . at 268. Specific ally , we 16 ins tr

uc te d th e Di str ic t Co ur

t a s f oll ow s: 17 On re mand, the re medy cra fted by

the district court for

those employ ees r ehire d 18 pr ior

to 1 99 8 s ho uld

uti lize an a

pp ro pr iate pr e -a

me ndme nt c a lc ulatio n to 19 de te rm ine the ir be ne fi ts. We r e c og nize the dif fi c ult y that th is t a sk

po se s b e c a

us e 20 of the ambiguous manne r in which the pr e-a mendment terms of the Plan 21 descr ibed how prior distributions were to be treated. As guidance for the district 22 court, we sug g est that it may wish to employ

equitable pr inciples when 2 3 d e t e r

m i n i n g th e a

p p r o p r i at e c a l c u l a t i o nan d f a s h i o n i n g th e a

p p r o p r i a t e r e m e dy. 24 25 Id . In addition, we re cog nized that the District Court could apply the “pha ntom account” offse t 26 me c ha

nis m to e mpl oye e s h ir e d a ft e r t he 19 98 ame ndme nt t o th e Pla n b e c a us e tho se ind ivi du a lsThe District Court pre sumed that the par ties would be able to ag ree on which employ ees ha d 1 full notice of the “ phantom acc ount offset” mecha nism because they

wer e re hired a fter the 1998 Summary Plan Descr iption (“SPD”) had be en issued. See F rommert v. Conk

right , 472 F. Supp. 2d 452, 459 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). 6 1 wer e on notice a s to the mecha nism’s ex istence. Id . at 268–69. But see M iller v. Xerox

Corp. 2 Retireme nt IncomeGuarantee Plan , 464 F.3d 871 ( 9th Cir. 2006) (holding that Plan’s “phantom 3 acc ount” methodolog y itself violates ERI SA), cert. de nied , 127 S. Ct . 1829 (2007). 4 Acknowle dg ing our g uidance to employ

“equitable principles” a

nd revie wing the 5 languag e of the Plan materials, the District Court conc luded that the appr opriate r emedy for 6 employ ees hire d befor e the 1998 a mendment was to dire ct the plan a dminist rator to pa y eac h of 7 the se ind ivi du a ls “ a lum p s um i n th e amou

nt o f t he dif fe re nc e be tw e e n th e amou nt o f b e ne fi ts 8 that [an employ ee] has re ceive d, and the amount of the rec alculate d benef it, without any 9 consideration of a ‘pha ntom account.’ ” From me rt , 472 F. Supp. 2d at 458 (inter nal quotation 1 10 marks omitted). The D istrict Court also stated that “it would not be unre asonable for the 11 administrator to subtrac t out the amount of the prior distribution” in order to preve nt such 12 employ ees f

rom rec eiving windfalls. Id . (alter ations and interna l quotation marks omitted). 13 In addition, the District Court concluded that the rele ase f orms signe d by

sever al 14 Pla int if

fs -A pp e lle e s in

e xch ang e fo r t

he ir re c e ivi ngse ve ra

nc e pa y fr om X e ro x did n ot r e le a se 15 Def

endants-A

ppellants from the ERI SA-based c laims asserted in this litigation. Se e id . at 16 46 0– 65 . O the r m atte rs a dd re sse d b y the Di str ic t Co ur

t on re mand are no t r e le va

nt t o th is a

pp e a l, 17 which timely

followed. 18 197 1 DI SCU SSIO N 2 On appe al, Def endants-A

ppellants raise two challeng es to the District Court’s dec ision. 3 First, De fenda

nts-Appellants ar g ue that the District Court fa shioned an improper reme dy for the 4 ERI SA v iol atio n a sso c iate d w iththe imp le me ntatio n o f t he “ ph anto m a c c ount o ff

se t” 5 mecha

nism. S econd, D efe ndants-Appe llants argue that the District Court er roneously decide d 6 that the re lease forms sig ned by cer tain Plaintiffs-Appellee s did not bar their ERI SA-based 7 c la ims . F or

the re a so ns that f

oll ow , w e a g re e wi th D e fe nd ants -A pp e lla nts that th e re le a se fo rm s 8 at issue bar

the sig natories’ ERI SA claims, but we will not disturb the District Court’s chosen 9 r e m e dy. 10 I. Rem edy 11 On

a pp e a l, D e fe nd ants -A

pp e lla nts c ha lle ng e the Di str ic t Co ur t’ s r e me dy

fo r t he ERI SA 12 violations we identified in our prior decision, i.e. , th e imp e rm iss ibl e ame ndme nt o f t he ERI SA 13 plan at issue to ca lculate Plaintiffs-Appe llees’ pe nsion benefits ac cordingto a “pha ntom 14 a c c ount” of

fs e t me tho d. As dis c us se d a bo ve , w e ins tr

uc te d th e Di str ic t Co ur

t a s f oll ow s: 15 On re mand, the re medy cra fted by

the district court for

those employ ees r ehire d 16 pr ior

to 1 99 8 s ho uld

uti lize an a

pp ro pr iate pr e -a

me ndme nt c a lc ulatio n to 17 de te rm ine the ir be ne fi ts. We r e c og nize the dif fi c ult y that th is t a sk

po se s b e c a

us e 18 of the ambiguous manne r in which the pr e-a mendment terms of the Plan 19 descr ibed how prior distributions were to be treated. As guidance for the district 20 court, we sug g est that it may wish to employ

equitable pr inciples when 2 1 d e t e r

m i n i n g th e a

p p r o p r i at e c a l c u l a t i o nan d f a s h i o n i n g th e a

p p r o p r i a t e r e m e dy. 22 23 From me rt , 4 33 F .3 d at 26 8. We r e vie w a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c ho se n r e me dy of an id e nti fi e d E RI SA 24 violation for an e x cess of allowable disc retion. See Chao v . Merino , 452 F.3d 174, 185 ( 2d Cir. 25 2006). 26 He re , th e Plan a c c ounts fo r a re tir inge mpl oy e e ’s tot a l y e ars of wo rk inga t X e ro x, but it8 1 a ls o p r o v id e s th at a ne mp lo y e e ’ s b e n e f

it s mu s t “ b e o f

f s e t b y th e a c c r u e d b e n e f it a tt r ib u ta b le to [a 2 prior distribution] .” RI GP § 9.6. Plainti ffs-A ppellees a ll rece ived ea

rlier, lump-sum 3 distributions of their pe nsion benefits whe n they first left their e mploy

ment at Xer ox , and the 4 basic que stion presented to the D istrict Court was how to ensure that these individuals rec eived 5 their due be nefits in light of the ambig uous non-duplication of be nefits provision. See 6 From me rt , 472 F. Supp. 2d at 457–58 (c onstruing a nd applying § 9.6 of

1989 Plan). On re mand, 7 the Di str ic t Co ur

t de c ide d th at th e a

pp ro pr iate re me dy

wa s to or de r t

he pla n a dmi nis tr a tor

to 8 re c a lc ulate the re le va nt P la int if

fs -A pp e lle e s’ be ne fi ts t o d e du c t on ly the no min a l va lue of

the ir 9 prior, lump-sum distributions , i.e. , without a “phantom ac count” a djustment reflec ting 10 hy

pothetical investment g ains or, appa rently , any

other a djustment to reflec t the inflation11 adjusted value s of the prior distributions. Se e id . at 458–59. 12 Def

endants-A

ppellants fail to establish that the District Court’s appr oach violate d either 13 the Plan terms or a ny law. Althoug h Def

endants-A

ppellants contend that the District Court 14 fa ile d to uti lize pr e -1 99 8 Pl an te rm s, the Di str ic t Co ur t e xplic itl y

did so but si mpl y

a pp lie d th os e 15 terms to Plaintiffs-Appellee s differ ently than Def endants-A

ppellants proposed. In advocating 16 the ir

pr op os e d “ ne w h ir e ” a

pp ro a c h in ste a d o f t

he re me dy

c ra ft e d b y

the Di str ic t Co ur

t, 17 Def

endants-A

ppellants argue that § 1.44(f ) of the 1989 Plan r equire s that a re hired e mploy ee 18 who then re tires is entitled only to a pension bene fit that acc ounts for his or her y ear s of servic e 19 since be ing r ehire d; the prior y ear s of servic e ar e re levant only for the pur

pose of “ vesting .” 20 Howeve r, in advoc ating this “new hire ” method, De fenda nts-Appellants ig nore the terms of the 21 1989 Plan, which is silent as to prior lump-sum distribut ions pursuant to § 8.2. To the extent that 2 2 th e 1 9 9 7 P l an ap p l i es t o ce rt ai nP l ai n t i ff s -A p p el l ee s , De fe n d an t s -A p p el l an t s i gn o re th e l an gu ageDef

endants-A

ppellants also ar g ue that the District Court’s r emedy confe rs a “ windfall” on 2 Plaintiffs-Appellee s in violation of equitable principles. See, e .g. , Prudential Ins. Co. v. S.S. American Lance r , 870 F.2d 867, 871 ( 2d Cir. 1989) (“[E]quit y , we be lieve, abhor s a windfa ll.”). Howeve r, in contra st to Prudential Insurance , we do not view the reme dy cra fted by

the District Court to b e “ wh oll y

un jus t” he re be c a

us e De fe nd ants -A

pp e lla nts wr ote the te rm s o f t

he ERI SA Plan in an ambig uous and occ asionally self-c ontradictory

fashion. Cf. L ifson v. INA Life Ins. Co. o f N

. Y. , 3 33 F .3 d 3 49 , 3 53 (2 d Ci r. 20 03 ) ( pe r c ur iam) (n oti ngthat, i n inte rp re tin g an E RI SA plan, a c ourt “c onstrue[s] ambig uities ag ainst the draf ter a nd in favor of

the bene ficiar

y ”). 9 1 of § 1.45(f

). Se e Fr om me rt , 433 F.3d at 258–60 (discussing suc h provisions in the various 2 versions of the Plan) . Def endants-A

ppellants have failed to de monstrate that the District Court 3 e xce e de d it s a llo wa ble dis c re tio n in

c ra ft ingits c ho se n r e me dy ins te a d o f a do pti ngDe fe nd ants

4 Appellants’ pr oposed appr oach. 2 5 Al te rn ativ e ly , D e fe nd ants -A pp e lla nts c on te nd

that th e Di str ic t Co ur

t e rr e d b y fa ili ngto 6 adopt the re medy

proposed by

the plan administrator or , at least, by failingto remand to the 7 a dmi nis tr ator

the ta sk of fa sh ion inga

re me dy . Re g ard ingthe fa ilure of the Di str ic t Co ur

t to 8 re mand

to t he pla n a dmi nis tr ator , it

do e s n ot a

pp e ar f ro m th e re c or d th a t D e fe nd ants -A pp e lla nts 9 actua lly

reque sted such re lief fr om the District Court. As such, they have w aived the issue f

or 10 appea l. See A llianz Ins. Co. v. Lerner , 416 F.3d 109, 114 ( 2d Cir. 2005) (“It is a well-esta blished 11 g ener al rule that an appe llate cour t will not consider an issue ra ised for the first time on appea l.” 12 (alter ations and interna l quotation marks omitted)). 13 Even if De fenda nts-Appellants had not wa ived the re mand issue, we w ould reviewthe 14 District Court’s decision to fashion a reme dy itself instead of r emandingto the plan 15 administrator for an excess of a llowable discre tion. See Zerv os v. Verizon N.Y ., Inc. , 277 F.3d 16 63 5, 64 8 ( 2d

Cir . 2 00 2) ; Kinek v. Param ount Commc’ns, Inc

. , 22 F.3d 503, 508 ( 2d Cir. 1994). 17 Th e Di str ic t Co ur t he re did no t e xce e d it s a llo wa

ble dis c re tio n in

thi s r e g ard . A lth ou g h w e did10 1 no t pr oh ibi t th e Di str ic t Co ur t f ro m r e mand ingthe c a se to t he pla n a dmi nis tr a tor , th e langua g e in 2 our prior opinion pre sumed that the District Court would cra ft the re medy itself. Se e From me rt , 3 466 F.3d at 268. 4 Moreove r, De fenda nts-Appellants had a

mple opportunity

to expl ain fully

the appr oach 5 proposed by

the plan administrator be fore the District Court, and did so, in their brief s and at 6 oral a

rgument, in a sworn a ffidavit fr om the plan administrator, a nd in a written re port and 7 acc ompanying te stimony from an inde pendent a ctuar y who ana ly

zed the plan administrator’s 8 approa ch. Indeed, D efe ndants-Appe llants identify nothing that mig ht have be en g ained by the 9 District Court’s rema nding the matter to the plan a dminist rator. See Kra us s v . O x for d H e alt h 10 Plans, Inc. , 5 17 F .3 d 6 14 , 6 30 (2 d Ci r. 20 08 ) ( statin g that pl a int if fs we re no t e nti tle d to 11 administrative re mand wher e doingso would have be en “f utile”); Miller v. United W elfare Fund , 12 72 F.3d 1066, 1071 ( 2d Cir. 1995) (statingthat rema nd to a plan administrator is not re quired 13 wher e such a dditional procee dings w ould be a “ useless for mality ” (inter

nal quotation marks 14 omi tte d) ). In a dd iti on , w e su g g e ste d, a s “ g uid a nc e fo r t he dis tr ic t c ourt ,” that it

“ may wi shto 15 employ

equitable pr inciples.” Se e Fr om me rt , 466 F.3d at 268. Defe ndants-Appe llants identify 16 no equitable pr inciples that a district cour t might be e mploy ing, immediate ly upon rema

nd from 17 a cir cuit court, in mere ly perf orming the ministerial function of then r emandinga ca se to an 18 ERI SA plan administrator. 19 Def

endants-A

ppellants rely

on Miller v. United W

elfare Fund

to a rgue that r e mand

is 20 appropr iate whe n “re asonable minds could differ a s to the outcome of the c ase.” Howeve r, we 21 direc ted the district cour t in Miller

to remand the case to the plan administrator to per mit the 22 plan administrator to g ather additional evidenc e re levant to the nursingcar e soug ht by the11 1 claimant. Se e id . Her e, we did not anticipate any compar able, e x tensive fa ct finding , and none 2 occur

red on r emand be fore the District Court. Indeed, the only “evide nce” considere d by the 3 District Court consisted of expert testimony reg ardingwhich of va

rious proposed r emedies w as 4 the most fair a

nd equitable. Give n the appa rent lac k of any

benef it to remandingthe ca se to the 5 pla

n a dmi nis tr ator

and the langua g e in o ur

pr ior de c isi on imp lyingthat th e Di str ic t Co ur t sh ou ld 6 fashion its own reme dy , se e id

. at 268–69, we c annot conc lude that the District Court exceede d 7 its allowable discre tion in actually doing so. 8 In th e a lte rn ativ e , D e fe nd ants -A pp e lla nts argue that th e Di str ic t Co ur t e rr e d in fa ili ngto 9 adopt the plan a dminist rator’ s proposed a pproac h, or at lea st consider it under a defe rential 10 standard of

revie w. We have he ld that where the ERI SA plan confe rs upon the plan 11 a dmi nis tr ator

dis c re tio na

ry a uth or ity to “ c on str

ue the te rm s o f t

he pla n, ” the dis tr ic t c ourt

sh ou ld 12 revie w a de cision by the plan administrator unde r an e x cess of allowable disc retion standar d. 13 See Nichols v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 4 0 6 F. 3 d 9 8 , 1 0 8 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Fi re

sto neTire 14 &Rubber Co. v. Bruc h , 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)). H oweve r, the District Court her e had no 15 decision to revie w bec ause the plan administrator ne ver r ender ed any decision other tha

n the 16 orig inal benef

it determinations, all of which w ere premised on the now -impermissible “phantom 17 acc ount” offse t mechanism. Se e id . (“[W] e may g ive def ere ntial reviewonly

to actual e x erc ises 18 of discre tion.”). De fenda nts-Appellants have identified no authority in support of the 19 proposition that a district court must affor d defe renc e to the mer e opinion of the plan 20 a dmi nis tr ator

in a c a se , s uc h a s th is, wh e re the a dmi nis tr ator ha d p re vio us ly

c on str ue d th e same 21 terms and we found such a construction to have violated ERI SA. 22 To the extent that Defe ndants-Appe llants argue that the District Court er red byThe District Court stated that twe nty -two of the na med Plaintiffs signe d rele ase f orms, but that 3 four of these amended their

forms to ca

rve out e x plicitly

their cla ims as members of the “F rommert lawsuit” f

rom the universe of cla ims to be covere d by the re lease

. Se e From me rt , 472 F. Supp. 2d at 460. On a ppeal, De fenda

nts-Appellants do not cha lleng e the District Court’s conclusion that these individuals’ r elea se for ms did not cover their ERI SA claims in this action. As a re sult, we will not dist urb the District Court’s c onclusion that the rele ase f orms do not bar the ERI SA claims asserte d by these four

Plaintiffs-Appellee s in this l itigation. 12 1 instructing the plan administrator to ca lculate be nefits by deductingthe nominal value of prior 2 dis tr ibutio ns de no min ate d in 19 80 s d oll ars fr om a c c ru e d b e ne fi ts d e no min a te d in c ur re nt d oll ars , 3 see Appellants’ Br. at 38 –4 1, we re je c t th e ir argume nt f

or re a so ns sim ila

r t o th os e a

pp lic a ble to 4 their ar g uments on behalf of their own pre fer

red “ new hire ” re medy . The District Court had 5 discretion to desig n a re medy to provide Plaintiffs-Appe llees with the prope r leve l of pension 6 be ne fi ts i n li g ht o f t he ERI SA v iol atio ns we ide nti fi e d in our p ri or de c isi on . A s D e fe nd ants

7 Appellants wrote a pension plan that addre sses the situation of a discha rg ed-a nd-then-r ehire d 8 employ ee w ith what can only be desc ribed a s ambig uity , contra diction or silence, w e see no 9 problem with the District Court’s selec tion of one re asonable approa ch amongsever al 10 rea sonable a lternatives. C f

. L i f s o n v . I N A L i f e I n s . C o . o f N

. Y. , 333 F.3d 349, 353 ( 2d Cir. 2003) 11 (per

curiam) (instructingthat a cour t should construes ambiguities in plan terms ag ainst the 12 draf

ter of the ERI SA plan). 13 14 II. Re leases of Certain Plainti ffs’ ERISA Claims 15 The fina l issue raised in this appea l is Defenda nts-Appellants’ a

rgument that the District 16 Court

e rr e d in ru lin g that th e re le a se fo rm s si g ne d b y se ve ra l Pla int if

fs -A pp e lle e s d id n ot a

pp ly 17 to the ERI SA claims asserte d in this l itigation. The re lease s at issue provided that the sig ning 3 18 employ ee “ rele ase[s] Xerox from any and all cla ims . . . based on any thing that ha s occur

red13 1 prior to the date [he or she] sign[s] this Release” in exchang e for up to fifty -two we eks of sa lary 2 c on tin

ua nc e . In a dd iti on , th e fo rm sp e c if ie s se ve ra l po te nti a l f

e de ra l c la ims , in c lud ingtho se 3 ba se d in

ERI SA, that th e re le a se c ov e rs . 4 As a thre shold matter, Plaintiffs-Appellee s argue, for the first time in this appeal, that 5 De fe nd ants -A

pp e lla nts may no t r e ly up on the re le a se fo rm s si g ne d b y se ve ra l Pla int if

fs

6 Appellee s beca

use F eder al Rule of Civil P roce dure 17( a) r equire s that an ac tion in federa l court 7 “be pr osecute d in the name of the re al par

ty in interest.” Althoug h Def endants-A

ppellants are 8 the pension plan at issue in this litigation and its administrators, Plaintiffs-Appe llees ar g ue that 9 only

Xer ox Corporation has a “suff icient stake in re versingthe trial cour t’s ruling that the Xer ox 10 g ener al re lease form constitutes a wa iver of E RI SA claims by the re lease e.” Ap

pe lle es’ Br

. at 11 39 . A s n ote d a

bo ve , th e Di str ic t Co ur

t di smi sse d X e ro x earl y

in t his lit ig a tio n, and

Pla int if fs

12 Appellee s did not appeal this ruling

. Se e From me rt , 4 33 F .3 d at 25 6 n .2 . M or e ov e r, Pla int if fs

13 Appellee s did not challeng e the a uthority of De fenda

nts-Appellants to rely

upon the re lease s 14 below and thus have wa ived this argument for pur poses of this appea l. See R ogers v. Same dan 15 Oi l Co rp ., 30 8 F .3 d 4 77 , 4 82 –8 4 ( 5th Cir . 2 00 2) (a ff

ir min g dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ru lin g that th ir d- pa rt y 16 defe ndant had wa ived re al-pa rty -in-intere st defense by

failingto assert it until the day befor e 17 trial); Richardson v. Edwards , 1 27 F .3 d 9 7, 99 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 7) (d e e min g re a l- pa rt y -i n- int e re st 18 defe nse wa ived when not r aised until appellate proce eding s). 19 Ev e n if

Pla int if fs -A pp e lle e s h a d n ot w a ive d th is a rgume nt, the ir

re a l- pa rt y -i n- int e re st 20 argument is meritless beca use the re lease form itself def ines its refe renc e to “Xe rox” to include 21 “‘the Xer ox employ ee be nefit plans’” in which the employ ee ha d participated or wa s then 22 participating. Se e Fr om me rt , 472 F. Supp. 2d at 460 n.2 (quotingrele ase f orms). More over,14 1 De fe nd ants -A

pp e lla nts are no t th e pa

rt ie s prosecuting

thi s a c tio n; t

hat r ole be lon g s to Pla int if fs

2 Appellee s. See6A Charles A lan Wright, Ar thur R. Mill er & Mary

Kay Kane , Fede ral Practice 3 &Procedure § 1 54 2 ( 2d e d. 19 90 ) ( “ [T]he re a l pa rt y in i nte re st p ri nc ipl e . . . d ir e c ts atte nti on to 4 wh e the r [the ] pla int if f h a s a signif ic ant i nte re st i n th e pa

rt ic ula r a c tio n h e ha s in sti tut e d, and Rul e 5 17(a) is lim ited to plaintiffs.”). Cf. Sti chting Ter Behartiging Van de Belange n Van 6 Oudaandee lhouders In He t Kapit aal Van Saybolt Int’l B.V. v. Sc hreiber , 407 F.3d 34, 49 ( 2d Cir. 7 20 05 ) ( ho ldi ngthat a Rul e 17 (a ) d e fe c t ma

y no t be c ur e d b y

the joi nd e r, a s n omi na l de fe nd ants , 8 of the re al par

ties in interest to the ac tion where those parties ha ve evinc ed no intention of 9 pr os e c uti ngthe a c tio n) . T hu s, Pla int if fs -A pp e lle e s’ re a l- pa

rt y -i n- int e re st a

rgume nt f a ils

. 10 As to the merits of De fenda nts-Appellants’ a

rguments reg ardingthe re lease s, “an 11 ind ivi du a l c an w a ive his or he r r ig ht t o p art ic ipate in a pe ns ion pla n g ov e rn e d b y

ERI SA o nly

if 12 his or her w aiver ‘is made knowing ly

and voluntarily .’” Finz v. Schlesinge r , 957 F.2d 78, 82 ( 2d 1 3 C i r. 1 9 9 2 ) ( qu o t i n g Laniok v. Advisory Comm. of Brainerd M fg. Co. Pension Plan , 935 F.2d 14 1360, 1365 (2d Cir. 1991)). We have ar ticulated seve ral fa ctors as r eleva nt to the determination 1 5 o f

w h e th e r s u c ha w a i v e r i s kn o w i n g an d

v o l un t a r y: 16 1) the plaintiff’ s education and business experience , 2) the amount of time the 17 pla int if

f h a d p os se ssi on

of or a c c e ss t o th e a g re e me nt b e fo re signin g it, 3) the ro le 18 of

pla int if f i n d e c idi ngthe te rm s o f t he a g re e me nt, 4) the c lari ty of the a g re e me nt, 19 5) wh e the r t he pla int if

f w a s r e pr e se nte d b y

or c on su lte d w ithan atto rn e y , [a s w e ll 20 as whe ther a n employ er e ncoura g ed the e mploy ee to c onsult an attorney and 21 whether

the employ ee ha d a fa ir opportunity to do so] and 6) whether

the 22 c on sid e ratio n g ive n in e xch ang e fo r t

he wa ive r e xce e ds e mpl oy e e be ne fi ts t o 23 which the e mploy ee w as alre ady entitled by

contra ct or law

. 24 25 . . . [T] his list of fa ctors [is] not exhausti ve . . . . 26 Id . ( int e rn a l c itatio n o mitte d) . Ac ourt sh ou ld c on sid e r t

he “ tot a lity

of the c ir c ums tanc e s” in15 1 deter

mining whe ther a

waiver of ERI SA rig hts is knowing and voluntar y . Id

. 2 Despite a cknowledg ing the expli cit and broa d languag e in the re lease form, the District 3 Court concluded that the instant ERI SA claims were not cover ed due to pe rce ived def iciencie s 4 related to “the c larity of the re lease and the c onsideration g iven by Xer ox in exchang e for

the 5 rele ases.” Fr om me rt , 472 F. Supp. 2d at 461–62. Specif ically , the District Court focuse d on one 6 pa ra g ra phin whic h th e signin g e mpl oy e e a g re e s th a t “ the c on sid e ratio n s e t f or th i n th is R e le a se 7 is in addition t o any thing of value to which I

am entitled by

law or X erox policy .” The District 8 Court

c on c lud e d th at th is l angua g e me ant t hat th e e mpl oy e e wa s n ot w a ivi nghis or he r E RI SA 9 c la im: 10 The import of pa ragraph 5 is that the sa lary continuance g iven to the employ ee 11 did not take the plac e of, but wa s in addition to, any benef its to which the 12 e mpl oye e wa s already entitled by law or X erox policy . This sugg ests that the 13 employ ee w as not waivinghis right to such be nefits. I f he w ere , it would make 14 littl e sense to describe his salary continuance as being“in addition to” such 15 be ne fi ts. 16 17

. . . 18 19 F ur

the rm or e , w hil e it m ig ht b e argue d th a t th e re is a dis tin c tio n b e tw e e n a

ri g ht t o 20 pe ns ion

be ne fi ts i n g e ne ra l and

a “ c la im” se e kin g to h ave tho se be ne fi ts 21 c a lc ulate d a c c or din g to a pa rt ic ula r f or mul a , th a t is a

dis tin c tio n w ith out a 22 dif

fe re nc e he re , b e c a

us e the Se c on d Ci rc uit

ha s n owhe ld t

hat, at le a st w ith 23 respe ct to employ ees r ehire d befor e 1998, Xe rox’s “reduc tion of justified 24 expectations of bene fits [ by using the phantom acc ount] took the form of a 25 retroa ctive cut- back in violation of” ERI SA. I n other wor ds, those employ ees 26 wer e “e ntitled by law” not simply

to rec eive some pe nsion benefits, but to have 27 the ir

be ne fi ts c a lc ulate d w ith out any re du c tio n attr ibuta

ble to a “ ph anto m” 28 a c c ount. 29 30 Id . at 462 (footnote omitted; emphasis in orig inal). 31 In rea chingthis conclusion, the District Court appea rs to have c onflated the exis tence of 32 consideration adequate to rende r a r elea se enf orce able with the sc ope of c laims therebyThe District Court also appe ars to have conclude d that the re lease s failed to comply with a 4 provision of the Older

Workers B enef

it Protection Act (“O WBPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) , and that such noncomplianc e has r eleva nce to the de termination of whe ther these Plaintiffs-Appellee s rele ased X erox from ERI SA-based c laims. Se e From me rt , 472 F. Supp. 2d at 463 n.5. Section 626(f) specifie s sever al fa cts that must ex ist in order to rende r wa iver of c laims asserted unde r the Ag e Discr imination in Em ploy ment Act (“ ADEA” ), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq ., both “knowing and voluntary .” We nee d not and do not decide whether the re lease forms complied with the require ments of the OWBPA be cause such noncomplianc e, eve n if proven, is irr eleva nt to the question of whethe r a r elea se of non- ADEA c laims was “knowingand voluntary .” Se e Cha pli n v. NationsCredit Corp. , 3 07 F .3 d 3 68 , 3 75 (5 th C ir . 2 00 2) (“ [T]he OWB PA .

. . a pp lie s o nly

to AD EAc la ims .” ); see also Tung v. Texac o Inc. , 150 F.3d 206, 208–09 ( 2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (conc luding that plaintiff’ s waiver of his Title VI Iclaims was knowingand voluntary despite the e mploy er’ s noncompliance with § 636(f) r equire ments applicable to his ADEA claims). 16 1 rele ased. The pa

ragraph on which the District Court foc used provided only that the 4 2 consideration for the re lease , i.e. , the salar y continuance , did not replac e any benef its, including 3 pension bene fits, to which the employ ee w as alre ady entitled. Howeve r, there is no alleg ation 4 that D e fe nd ants -A pp e lla nts vio late d th is t e rm

of the c on tr a c t by

de nyingthe se Pla int if

fs

5 Ap p e l l e e s an y an d a l l p e n s i o nb e n e f

i t s t o w h i c hth e y w o u l d

h av e b e e ne n t i t l e d

. T o th e c o n tr ar y, 6 counsel for

Def endants-A

ppellants repr esente d to this C ourt at ora l argument that sever al of 7 these Plaintiffs-Appe llees had a lrea dy rec eived pe nsion benefits, albe it calculate d under the 8 “phantom ac count” of fset method. 9 At bottom, neither the unce rtainty of such be nefits at the time of r elea se nor the f act that 10 hin ds ig ht h a s r e ve a le d th at su c h b e ne fi ts a re no w w or

th m or e tha

n th e signin g Pla int if

fs

11 Appellee s likely

expected at that time ca

n rende r these r elea ses unenf orce able. As the method 12 used to ca lculate pe nsion benefits for rehire d employ ees w as, and ha s continued to be, disputed 13 thr ou g ho ut t

his lit ig atio n, the pr e c ise amou nt o f b e ne fi ts t

hat an e mpl oy e e signin g a re le a se 14 wo uld

have re c e ive d in

the a bs e nc e of su c h a re le a se wa s a lw ay s in de te rm inate . Pl a int if fs

-17 1 Appellee s who signe d these re lease s did so before the District Court cra fted its reme dy for the 2 ERI SA v iol atio ns we ide nti fi e d. Th e me re fa c t th a t th e anti c ipate d r e c ov e ry a sso c iate d w ith 3 ong oing litig ation is uncerta in does not rende r an e mploy ee’ s relea se of c laims asserted in that 4 litigation unenf

orce able. Cf. Anita Founds., Inc. v. ILGW U Nat’l Ret. Fund , 902 F.2d 185, 189 5 (2d Cir. 1990) (“ [A] settlement pay ment, made whe n the law wa s uncer tain, cannot be 6 succe ssfully

attacke d on the basis of a ny subsequent re solution of the uncer tainty .”). 7 Applying the fac tors we ha ve ar ticulated as r eleva

nt to the issue of whethe r a w aiver of 8 ERI SA r ig hts wa s k no wi ngand

vo luntary

and re vie wi ngthe un dis pute d f a c ts p e rt a ini ngto t

he se 9 rele ases unde r the totality of the c ircumstance s, see Finz , 957 F.2d at 82, we conc lude that the 10 District Court erre d in holding that the r elea ses at issue we re une nforc eable . There appea rs to be 11 no dis pute that th os e Pla int if fs -A pp e lle e s w ho signe d th e se re le a se s h a d ampl e tim e (4 5 d ay s) to 12 decide whether

to sign the r elea se, that Xe rox encourag ed such individuals to consult an 13 attorney , and that the sig natories r ece ived salar y continuance s in consideration of their re leasing 14 claims. Some Plainti ffs-A ppellees e ven modified the te rms of the re lease forms with which they 15 had bee n prese nted bef ore sig ning the m. As to the lang uag e of the rele ases themse lves, we 16 cannot c onclude, a s the District Court did, that the express terms of these r elea ses wer e “at the 17 very

least ambiguous as to what the e mploy ee w as g iving up in exchang e for salary 18 continuance .” Fr om me rt , 472 F. Supp. 2d at 462. As the D istrict Court’s interpretation of the 19 rele ase f

orms is incorre ct, it cannot stand. Unle ss the rele ase f orm at issue spec ifically

exempted 20 this li tigation as noted above , the re lease s signe d by cer tain Plaintiffs-Appellee s are enfor cea ble. 2118 1 CO NC LU SION 2 For

the fore g oing r easons, we VACATE that portion of the order of the District Court 3 holding that e ighte en re lease forms ar e unenf orce able, AF FI RM that portion of the order cra fting 4 a re medy

for the ide ntified ERI SA violations, and REMAND the ca se for proce eding s not 5 inconsistent with this opinion.