IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MICHEL CHALHOUB, 

Plaintiff 

V. 

COMMONWEAL TH OF 

PENNSYLVAN~;COLONEL 

ROBERT EVANCHICK, 

Commissioner of the Pennsylvania 

State Police; PENNSYLVANIA STATE : 

POLICE TROOPER LUKASZ OLSZAR;: 

COUNTY OF PIKE; and CRAIG A. 

LOWE, Warden Pike County 

Correctional Facility, 

Defendants 

No. 3:23cv592 

(Judge Munley) 

............................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................ 

MEMORANDUM 

Before the court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants County of Pike 

("Pike County") and Craig A. Lowe, Warden Pike County Correctional Facility 

("Warden Lowe"). Having been fully briefed, this motion is ripe for a decision.

1 

Background 

On May 23, 2021 , Defendant Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Lukasz 

Olszar ("Trooper Olszar") responded to Plaintiff Michel Chalhoub's residence in 

Dingman Township, Pike County, Pennsylvania for a report of a "physical 

1 The Honorable Robert D. Mariani transferred this case to the undersigned on November 7, 

2023. 

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domestic." (Doc. 1-2, Exh. A. to Pl. Compl. , Police Crim. Compl., Aff. of Prob. 

Cause, ECF p. 4 ).

2 Per Trooper Olszar's affidavit of probable cause, the police 

communications operator advised there was an active Protection From Abuse 

order ("PFA order") issued against plaintiff for the protection of another person at 

the residence. (kl) On scene, another trooper interviewed the purported victim 

of physical abuse, and she indicated that plaintiff threw an ashtray at her causing 

burn marks on the back of her shirt. (kl) Per Trooper Olszar's narrative, the PFA 

Order was issued for the protection of that person and he indicated in his affidavit 

that the expiration date of that order was August 12, 2023. (kl) After burn marks 

on the alleged victim's shirt were reportedly observed and photographed, 

Trooper Olszar placed plaintiff into custody and charged him with violating an 

active PF A order. (kl) 

Per plaintiff's complaint, however, the PFA order had expired months 

earlier, on February 26, 2021. (Doc. 1 ,I 20). Plaintiff alleges that he told Trooper 

Olszar that the PFA order had expired, but Trooper Olszar accused plaintiff of 

lying and still placed him into custody. (kl ,I 18). Trooper Olszar told the 

arraigning state magisterial district judge that the PFA order remained active, and 

2 These background facts are derived from plaintiffs complaint and exhibits. At this stage of 

the proceedings, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Phillips 

v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). 

2 

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the judge credited the trooper's incorrect statements and not the plaintiff's 

accurate statements. (kl ,i 22). 

The magisterial district judge set bail at $40,000, which plaintiff could not 

post. (kl ,i 24 ). Plaintiff was committed to the Pike County Correctional Facility 

("Pike CCF") based on Trooper Olszar's statements that plaintiff violated the PFA 

Order. (kl ,i 25). 

Plaintiff spent three days at Pike CCF. (kl ,i 28). On May 26, 2021 , a Pike 

CCF employee told plaintiff to gather his belongings to leave the jail without 

further explanation. (kl ,i 29). Authorities released plaintiff and gave him 

transportation to a train station. (kl ,i 30). Plaintiff avers that he was released 

from Pike CCF "because the personnel in charge of that facility determined that 

there was no basis for [plaintiff] being incarcerated." (kl ,I 31 ). 

Plaintiff also alleges that he had open heart surgery in August 2020. (kl ,i 

8). During that surgery, plaintiff's ribs were wired together. (kl) He needed 

another surgery on May 8, 2021 from the constant pain in his ribs. (kl ,i 9). 

During that surgery, plaintiff had metal plates placed in his chest. (kl ,i 10). 

When Trooper Olszar placed plaintiff into custody, a drainage tube was still 

attached to the bottom of plaintiff's chest from the most recent surgery. (kl) 

Upon release, plaintiff took the train to his son's house in New Jersey. (kl ,i 

30). The next day, plaintiff suffered severe pain and went to an emergency 

3 

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room. (ill ,i 35). As a result, plaintiff received an operation due to a "serious lifethreatening" internal infection, which continues to occur. (ill ,i 35, 42). He further 

alleges that the infection occurred because he could not attend the scheduled 

medical procedure to remove his drainage tube during his incarceration. (ill ,i,i 

11, 34-35). 

Based on the above allegations, plaintiff asserts two causes of action in his 

complaint: Count I - a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") for 

alleged Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations against all defendants; and 

Count II - a state law claim for false imprisonment against Trooper Olszar, Pike 

County, and Warden Lowe. (ill ,i,i 45-56). 

Defendants Pike County and Warden Lowe responded to the complaint 

with the instant motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 3 The parties have 

briefed their respective positions and this matter is ripe for disposition. 

3 Defendants Pike County and Warden Lowe also move to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) for improper service based on deficient proofs of service. A summons 

must be served with a copy of the complaint by a person who is at least 18 years old and not a 

party to the action within ninety (90) days of the complaint being filed. FED. R. CIv. P. 4(c)(1 )-

(2), 4(m). The Rules of Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania ("Local Rules") require 

affidavits of service to be filed within fourteen (14) days after service. M.D.PA. LR. 4.1 

Plaintiff filed this action on April 6, 2023. (Doc. 1 ). He also filed two affidavits of service 

collectively indicating that a copy of the summons and complaint were served on the "Pike 

County Commissioners" and the "Pike County Warden" by a Pennsylvania State Constable on 

April 28, 2023. (Docs. 15, 21). Although, plaintiff filed affidavits of service beyond the deadline 

set by Local Rule 4.1, (see id.), defendants were otherwise properly served according to these 

affidavits and the court will thus deny the Rule 12(b)(5) motion. 

4 

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Jurisdiction 

Because this case is brought pursuant to Section 1983, the court has 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ("The district courts shall have original 

jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 

the United States."). The court has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs statelaw false imprisonment claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). ("In any civil 

action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall 

have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims 

in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case 

or controversy under Article Ill of the United States Constitution."). 

Legal Standard 

Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b )(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. The court tests the sufficiency of the complaint's allegations when 

considering a Rule 12(b )(6) motion. 

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when factual content is pied 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

5 

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for the misconduct alleged. kl (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "Threadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice." kl (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts accept all 

factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the 

complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 

(citations omitted). Furthermore, courts may "generally consider only the 

allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and 

matters of public record" when deciding a Rule 12(b )(6) motion. Pension Ben. 

Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 

1993)(citations omitted). 

Analysis 

The complaint contains the following factual allegations specific to Pike 

County and Warden Lowe: 

• Pike County controls and operates Pike CCF "and is responsible for 

the orderly and legal operation of same, including ensuring that 

inmates are properly housed therein." (Doc. 1, Compl. ,I 6). 

• Warden Lowe "was responsible for overseeing the day to day 

operations" of Pike CCF (kl ,I 7). 4 

4 Per the complaint, Warden Lowe is sued in his "original capacity." (Doc. 1, 1J 7). Given the 

contents of plaintiffs pleading, the court construes this notation as one indicating that Warden 

Lowe is sued in his official capacity. 

6 

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• At the time of plaintiff's commitment to Pike CCF, plaintiff protested 

that there was no PFA Order, but the protests were rejected, and he 

was incarcerated by the guards of that facility despite being innocent. 

(Doc. 1, Compl. ,I 26). 

• Plaintiff was unlawfully detained at Pike CCF for three days. (19..:. ,I 27). 

• On the third day, an unknown Pike CCF employee told plaintiff to 

gather up his belongings to leave the facility. (19..:. ,I 29). 

• Plaintiff believes he was released from Pike CCF because "the 

personnel in charge of that facility determined there was no basis for 

the [plaintiff] being incarcerated." (19..:. ,I 31 ). 

Plaintiff claims the above facts support a theory that Pike County and 

Warden Lowe violated Section 1983 by falsely imprisoning him. (19..:. ,I,I 50-51 ). 

Plaintiff also uses these facts to support his state law false imprisonment claim 

against these defendants. (19..:. ,I 54 ). 

Pike County and Warden Lowe move to dismiss the complaint, arguing, in 

part, that plaintiff failed to state a viable Section 1983 claim against Pike County 

and Warden Lowe and failed to sufficiently plead a state-law false imprisonment 

claim against Warden Lowe. 5 The court will address the arguments relative to 

plaintiff's claims against Warden Lowe first. 

5 Plaintiff's complaint contains a claim for punitive damages, (Doc. 1, ad damnum clauses), . 

which Defendants Pike County and Warden Lowe also move to dismiss. (See Doc. 14, Br. in 

Supp. at 13). Plaintiff agrees with moving defendants' argument that he is not entitled to 

punitive damages with respect to his claims against Pike County. (Doc. 24, Br. in Opp, at 11-

12). Accordingly, plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against Pike County will be dismissed 

without additional discussion by the court. 

7 

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a. Whether Plaintiff's Complaint States a Section 1983 Claim Against 

Warden Lowe 

Plaintiff filed this action against the defendants pursuant to Section 1983. 

Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional wrongs 

committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it 

serves as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. 

See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002). To establish a claim 

under Section 1983, two criteria must be met. First, the conduct complained of 

must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law. Sameric 

Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 1998). Second, the 

conduct must deprive the plaintiff of rights secured under the Constitution or 

federal law. Id. 

Plaintiff specifically names Warden Lowe as a defendant, asserting that he 

and the other defendants "knew or should have known that there was no 

outstanding [PFA Order] against [p]laintiff and that the [p]laintiff had not violated 

any outstanding [PFA Order]." (kl ,I 47). But, in Section 1983 actions, a plaintiff 

must plausibly plead facts that demonstrate a defendant's personal involvement 

in the alleged misconduct and cannot rely solely on a respondeat superior theory 

of liability. See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020)(citing Rode v. 

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). Pleading personal 

involvement requires particular allegations of personal direction or of actual 

8 

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knowledge and acquiescence. kl; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (explaining 

that "[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must 

plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own 

individual actions, has violated the Constitution"). 

Plaintiff's complaint is silent as to the alleged action or inaction of Warden 

Lowe. There are no particular allegations of direct wrongful conduct. There are 

no allegations that Warden Lowe directed guards to do or not do anything related 

to plaintiff's claims. Likewise, the complaint does not contain allegations that 

Warden Lowe had any actual knowledge of plaintiff's circumstances. The facts 

of the complaint, even when assumed true and construed in a light most 

favorable to plaintiff, only set forth a Section 1983 claim against Warden Lowe 

under principles of respondeat superior. 6 Accordingly, the court must dismiss 

the Section 1983 claims against Warden Lowe in Count I of the complaint for lack 

of personal involvement. 

6 Plaintiff's brief in opposition argues that Warden Lowe is liable under Section 1983 for failure 

to train and supervise personnel so that they would not "imprison[] a person who had 

committed no crime." (Doc. 24 at 6-7). Plaintiff, however, has not made any factual allegations 

against Warden Lowe in the complaint that would support this argument. (See Doc. 1). The 

court will not address arguments by the parties that extend beyond the facts pied in the 

complaint. 

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b. Whether Plaintiff's Complaint States a Claim for False Imprisonment 

Against Warden Lowe 

Plaintiff's other claim against Warden Lowe is a state law claim for false 

imprisonment. Under Pennsylvania law, "[t]he elements of false imprisonment 

are (1) the detention of another person, and (2) the unlawfulness of such 

detention." Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (1994 ). False 

imprisonment is an intentional tort. See Gray v. Huntzinger, 147 A.3d 924, 927 

(Pa. Super. Ct. 2016); Little v. York Cnty. Earned Income Tax Bureau, 333 Pa. 

481 A.2d 1194, 1200 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984 ). 

Warden Lowe argues the complaint lacks facts to support a claim of false 

imprisonment against him since he does not determine probable cause to justify 

an arrest or incarceration and he does not conduct investigations into guilt or 

innocence. After careful consideration, the court will grant the motion to dismiss 

based on the facts pied in the complaint. 

As alleged and corroborated through exhibits attached to the complaint, 

this case involves a situation where plaintiff was arrested without a warrant for 

the violation of a PFA order. (Doc. 1, Campi. ,m 12-13, 16, Doc. 1-2, Exh. A, 

Police Crim. Com pl.). Plaintiff then appeared before a state magisterial district 

judge, who arraigned plaintiff and set monetary bail in the amount of $40,000. 

(Doc. 1, Campi. 1l1l 21-25). Plaintiff could not post bail and he was then 

committed to Pike CCF. (kl ,I,I 25-26). 

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Generally, under the Pennsylvania's Protection From Abuse Act ("PFA 

Act"), courts may grant protection orders to those alleging abuse from family or 

household members, or sexual or intimate partners. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 

6102(a) (definitions);§ 6107(b) (temporary orders);§ 6108 (relief);§ 6110 

(emergency relief from minor judiciary). The police are tasked with enforcement 

of PFA orders once a petitioner obtains relief. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6113. 

An arrest for a violation of a PFA order may be made by the police "without 

warrant upon probable cause" whether the violation is committed in the presence 

of the police officer or not. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6113(a). 

After an arrest for contempt of a protection order, the PFA Act directs that 

the defendant be taken by the police officer "without unnecessary delay" to the 

court or to a magisterial district judge if the court is unavailable. 23 PA. CONS. 

STAT. § 6113(c). Defendants are also entitled by statute to a preliminary 

arraignment "without unnecessary delay." 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6113(d). 

Hearings on contempt must be scheduled within ten days of the filing of the 

charge or complaint. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6113(f). 

Magisterial district judges in Pennsylvania have jurisdiction to preside at 

arraignments and fix bail. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 151 S(a). Under the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, where a defendant is arrested without 

a warrant, a defendant shall not be detained after a preliminary arraignment 

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unless the issuing authority, i.e. , the magisterial district judge, "makes a 

determination of probable cause." PA. R. CRIM. P. 540. 

Accordingly, plaintiff has alleged that by the time he was committed to Pike 

CCF, a magisterial district judge made a determination of probable cause and set 

bail. In opposition to the motion to dismiss, plaintiff has not cited any statute or 

case requiring wardens of county jails to second-guess or override 

determinations by magisterial district judges and the court's research has 

uncovered none. 

Additionally, assuming the facts in the complaint to be true, plaintiff has 

pied that he was released because "personnel in charge of [Pike CCF] 

determined there was no basis for the plaintiff being incarcerated." (Doc. 1, 

Compl. ,I 31 ). Thus, he has alleged that officials in charge of Pike CCF, i.e. 

Warden Lowe, released plaintiff without court order after independent factfinding. In this sense, plaintiff's false imprisonment allegations against Warden 

Lowe are self-defeating where he fails to allege that Warden Lowe was aware, 

before plaintiff's release, of the absence of legal authority to keep plaintiff in jail. 

Accordingly, plaintiff's state law false imprisonment claim against Warden Lowe 

will be dismissed.7 

7 Additionally, Warden Lowe also claimed statutory immunity pursuant to the Pennsylvania 

Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8541, et seq. in his motion to 

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c. Whether Plaintiff's Complaint States a Section 1983 Claim Against 

Pike County 

Regarding plaintiff's Section 1983 claim against Defendant Pike County, 

the municipality moves for dismissal pursuant to Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of 

City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) for failure to identify a policy or custom 

that led to plaintiff's allegedly unconstitutional commitment at Pike CCF. Plaintiff 

appears to counter with arguments that case law recognizes that the warden of a 

county prison has final decision-making authority to attach liability to Pike County 

and Warden Lowe determined that plaintiff should be kept incarcerated. (Doc. 24, 

Br. in Opp. at 9-10). As noted above, however, no specific factual allegations 

were made regarding Warden Lowe in plaintiff's complaint, and, in this regard, 

plaintiff's argument fails because it argues about facts not originally pled.

8 For 

the reasons set forth in this section and in section 1 a regarding Warden Lowe 

above, the motion to dismiss will be granted. 

dismiss. (Doc. 5, ,I 35). Warden Lowe failed to brief his statutory immunity arguments. (See 

Docs. 14, 29). The court considers this argument waived with regard to this motion. 

8 Plaintiffs complaint does contain an allegation that all defendants in this case had a "pattern, 

practice and custom of subjecting citizens, such as the [p]laintiff, to unlawful arrest and 

detention in the absence of probable cause." (Doc. 1, ,I 39). But given the sparse facts related 

to this allegation regarding the actions of Pike County (and Warden Lowe), this allegation is 

conclusory and insufficient to state a claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555). 

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d. Leave to Amend 

Before dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted, a court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend, unless 

amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245 (citing 

Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp. , 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002)). "In 

assessing futility [of amendment], the district court applies the same standard of 

legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6)." In re Burlington Coat Factory 

Sec. Litig. , 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997)(citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

Warden Lowe argues in the motion to dismiss that he is entitled to qualified 

immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials 

performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages "insofar as their 

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 

which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 

800, 818 (1982). The doctrine "protects 'all but the plainly incompetent or those 

who knowingly violate the law."' Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quoting 

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). 

The two-part test to determine whether government officials should receive 

qualified immunity is well settled. Montemuro v. Jim Thorpe Area Sch. Dist., 99 

F.4th 639, 642 (3d Cir. 2024) (citing Anglemeyer v. Ammons, 92 F.4th 184, 188 

14 

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(3d Cir. 2024)). Under the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, a court 

must decide whether the facts that plaintiff has alleged (under Rule 12(b )(6)) or 

shown (under Rule 56) make out a violation of a constitutional right. Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (citation omitted). Under the second prong, 

"the court must decide whether the right at issue was 'clearly established' at the 

time of the defendant's alleged misconduct." ill (citation omitted). To be clearly 

established, "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." 

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). In considering qualified 

immunity, the court may address the prongs of this test in any order. See 

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242. The defendant bears the burden of establishing that 

he is entitled to qualified immunity. Burns v. PA Dep't of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 176 

(3d Cir. 2011 )( citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819). 

"[l]f a person was arrested without probable cause, his or her detention 

may implicate the Fourth Amendment. If he or she was arrested with probable 

cause, the detention may amount to a deprivation of liberty without due 

process[,]" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown v. Stewart, 910 F. 

Supp. 1064, 1074 (W.D. Pa. 1996)(discussing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 

143-46 (1979); Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995)). 

In a separate memorandum and order, the court has determined that Trooper 

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Olszar is entitled to qualified immunity after concluding that plaintiff could not 

establish that the trooper lacked probable cause in making the arrest. 

Accordingly, the court considers whether plaintiff has alleged facts making out a 

Fourteenth Amendment violation. 

As stated: 

The Fourteenth Amendment does not protect against all 

deprivations of liberty. It protects only against deprivations 

of liberty accomplished "without due process of law." A 

reasonable division of functions between law enforcement 

officers, committing magistrates, and judicial officers-all 

of whom may be potential defendants in a § 1983 actionis entirely consistent with "due process of law." Given the 

requirements that arrest be made only on probable cause 

and that one detained be accorded a speedy trial, we do 

not think a sheriff executing an arrest warrant is required 

by the Constitution to investigate independently every 

claim of innocence, whether the claim is based on 

mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite 

intent. Nor is the official charged with maintaining custody 

of the accused named in the warrant required by the 

Constitution to perform an error-free investigation of such 

a claim ... 

Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights 

protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of 

care arising out of tort law. Remedy for the latter type of 

injury must be sought in state court under traditional tortlaw principles. Just as "[m]edical malpractice does not 

become a constitutional violation merely because the 

victim is a prisoner," Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 

97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), false 

imprisonment does not become a violation of the 

Fourteenth Amendment merely because the defendant is 

a state official. 

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Baker, 443 U.S. at 145-46. 

Plaintiff alleges that he spent three days in Pike CCF before being released 

based on a mistaken belief that he violated an active PFA order despite his 

protestations that the order had expired. While perhaps relevant to a tort claim of 

false imprisonment, a three-day detention based on the mistakes allegedly made 

here "does not and could not amount" to a deprivation of liberty without due 

process for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. The court finds 

that Warden Lowe would be entitled to qualified immunity if plaintiff were allowed 

to amend his Section 1983 false imprisonment claim and thus amendment of that 

claim would be futile. 

This qualified immunity determination does not apply to plaintiff's state law 

claim for false imprisonment against Warden Lowe. See El v. City of Pittsburgh, 

975 F.3d 327, 334, n. 3 (3d Cir. 2020)("Had the officers raised qualified immunity 

as a defense to the state-law claims, the argument would have failed, because 

qualified immunity is a defense only to violations of federal law under§ 1983. 

Immunity from state law claims is governed by the state's immunity doctrine."). 

As for that claim, the court will grant plaintiff leave to amend based on the 

allegation that plaintiff advised guards at Pike CCF at the time of commitment 

that the PFA order against him had expired. Plaintiff may be able to plausibly 

allege a state law false imprisonment claim against Warden Lowe and the court 

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cannot conclusively determine at this time whether such claims would be futile 

pursuant to the various statutory or common law immunity arguments that could 

be raised by Warden Lowe under Pennsylvania law. Furthermore, Pike County 

did not move to dismiss the state law false imprisonment claim brought against it 

in Count II of plaintiff's complaint and this claim would survive the motion to 

dismiss. 

Furthermore, while the complaint contains serious factual deficiencies 

regarding claims against Pike County, plaintiff may be able to plausibly allege a 

Section 1983 claim against Pike County with the pleading of additional facts. 

The best course of action is to afford plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended 

complaint within the next twenty (20) days. Plaintiff will be permitted to file an 

amended Section 1983 claim against Pike County. Plaintiff is also granted leave 

to amend his state law false imprisonment claim against Warden Lowe. 

Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, Pike County and Warden Lowe's motion to 

dismiss (Doc. 5) will be granted. Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim against Warden 

Lowe will be dismissed with prejudice without leave to amend based on Warden 

Lowe's qualified immunity. Plaintiff, however, will be afforded twenty (20) days to 

file an amended complaint as to his Section 1983 claim against Pike County and 

his state law false imprisonment claim against Warden Lowe. Should plaintiff fail 

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to file an amended complaint within that timeframe, the state law false 

imprisonment claim against Warden Lowe in Count 11 and the Section 1983 claim 

against Pike County in Count I will be dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate 

order follows. 

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