### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ma y 6, 200 8

WILED McM ILLIAN v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Appeal from t he Circuit Court for D yer C ounty No. 05-395 Lee Moore , Judge

No. W2007-02280-C CA-R 3-PC - Filed Jul y 23, 2008

The pe titioner, Wiled McMillIan, plea ded guilty in t h e Dyer County Criminal C ourt to one count of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine. He rec eived a sentenc e of te n year s, to be serve d in the Dep ar tm e n t o f

Co rr e c ti o n ( T D O C) , a lth o u g h th e c o u r t n o te d th a t th e p e ti ti o n e r w o u ldb e a ll o wed to go to long-te rm drug re habilitation after he had served six months in the Dyer County jail. Prior to the petitioner’s serving six mont hs in the Dyer County jail, he wa s transfe rre d to TDOC to serve the re mainder of

his sentence . There afte r, t he petiti oner filed a petiti on for post-c onviction relief, alleging ineff

ective a ssistance of c ounsel. The tria l court denied the petition. On appea l, the petitioner asse rts that he re ceive d ineffe ctive assistanc e of co u n s el , t h at hi s guilty pl ea w as involuntary, and that the post-conviction court err ed in de nying his separate motion to set aside the gu ilt y p le a . W e a ff

ir m th e jud gme nt o f the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P. 3; Judgment of the C ircuit Court A ffirm ed

J A M ES C UR W OOD W I TT , J R ., J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D H. W ELL ES , J. and D AVI D G. H AYES , S R

. J., joined.

Trac ey A. Bre wer -Wa lker, Ripley, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Wiled Mc Milli an.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr ., Attorne y G e ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; La c e y W ilb e r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y G e ne ra l; C. Phi llip B ivens, District Attorney Ge nera l; and Kar en B urns, Assi stant District Attorney, for the appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

The pe titioner was indicted by a Dye r County Grand Jury on one count of the sale of 0.5 grams or moreof coc aine, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417( a)( 3), (c) (1) ( 2003). On January 31, 2007, the petitioner submitt ed a guilty plea , and the trial court sentenc ed him to ten year s in the Tenne ssee Depa

rtment of Correc tion. At the guilty plea he aring, the tria l court noted that the petitioner would be allowed to go to long- term drug reha bilitation after he se rved six months in the Dyer County jail. Howe ver, the trial court stressed that should the petitioner be transfer red f rom the Dyer County jail to T D O C f

o r a n y r e a s o n , th e c o u r t w o u ld n o t b e ab le to h e lp h im e n te r th e drug-2-

reha bilitation program. The pe titioner testified at the guilty plea he aring that he made his guilty plea kn ow ing ly, vo lun tari ly, a ndun derstan din gly , a ndthat he un de rs too d th e c on tin ge nc ie s o f h is proposed transfer

to a re habilitation program.

Prior to the petit ioner’s se rving six months i n the Dyer County jail, he was transf err ed to TDOC to serve the rema inder of his sente nce.

The pe tition for post-conviction relief was he ard on July 6, 2007. The State e ntere d the transc ript from the guilty plea he aring, noting that the beginning of the hearing was not transcribed due to a te chnica l malfunction.

Lieutena nt Robert Parish, Dyer County jail admini strator, testified that the petitioner
wa s tr a ns fe rr e d on Fe br

ua ry 26 , 20 07

. He a lso de sc ri be d th e ja il’ s tr a ns fe r p oli c y. Pr iso ne rs wi th sentenc es of less than f

ive yea rs usually stay in the county jail for the duration of their sentenc e. Pr iso ne rs wi th s e nte nc e s lo ng e r tha n f ive ye ars wi ll t yp ic a lly be tr a ns fe rr e d to TD OC wh e n th e ja il
rec eives noti ce of space available

. Lieutena nt Parish testified that in February 2007, TDOC notified him the re we re e igh t sp a c e s a va ila blea t th e priso n a ndthat th e pe tit ion e r wa s tr a ns fe rr e d b e c aus e he had a ten-ye ar se ntence

. The pe titioner’s trial counsel testified that his clients freque ntly entere d guilty plea agre ements with the possibilit y of attending a reha bilitation progra m and that he ha d been ma king such agreeme nts with the State “for a long time.” Counsel testified that he w as “shoc ked” to lea rn the petitioner ha d been tr ansfe rre d to TDOC, and he c alled Lieute nant Parish to find out the re ason for the tr ansfe r. It wa s only afte r t his phone call that he learned of the jail’s policy of transfer ring inmates with sentenc es l arge r than five year s. Counsel did not t hink his assistance wa s ineffe ctive fo r t e lli ng hi s cli e nts that a ple a a gr e e me nt w ou ld l ike ly a va il the m r e ha bil itatio n, the n p os sib ly rele ase to probation, because “that’s be en the pr actice fore ver.”

On cr oss examination, Counsel tes t ified that he ne gotiated for the petitioner to be

se nte nc e d a s a

Ra ng e I of

fend er ins te a d o f a

Ra ng e IIof

fe nd e r. InRa ng e II , th e pe tit ion e r w ou ld have be en sente nced in the range of 12-to-20 yea rs with rele ase e ligibil ity at 35 perc ent. Counsel discussed the plea ramifica tions with the petitioner for a long time, stre ssing that the re habilitation prog ram wa s not gua

rante ed and that he could still be forced to serve his entire sente nce a s order ed. Counsel believed the pe titioner to be intelligent and one who “[v]ery clea rly” understood the legal pr oc e ss. The pe titioner testified that h e p l ea d ed guil ty upon the advice of Counsel that he would be able to enter a rehabilitation progra m afte r si x months. He testified that he w ould not have pleade d guilty had he known that he could be transfe rre d to TDOC at any time for any

rea son . The petitioner was satisfied w ith Counsel’s repre sentation until he was tra nsfer red to TDO C ; however , he a dmi tte d th a t Co un se l w arn e d h im that th e fi nal de c isi on abo ut h is t rans fe r w a s u p to the ja il.
Betty Hicks testified that she wa s the rec ord cle rk for the Dy er County S heriff ’s Depa rtment. S h e t es t i fi ed that in the pre vious two years, moreinmates wer e re ceiving sente nces-3-

wi th the po ssi bil ity of go ing to re ha bil itatio n pr og rams. Th e pe tit ion e r wa s no t the fi rs t in ma te to be tr a ns fe rr e d to TDO C des pit e be ing e lig ibl e fo r re ha bil itatio n if the y re ma ine d in the c ou nty ja il. Ms. Hicks testified that she was not an employee of the Dye r County jail and could not speak to the petitioner’s be havior while inc arc erated in Dyer County.

Onapp e a l, the pe tit ion e r a sse rt s th a t th e tria l c ou rt e rr e d inde ny ing his c la im f or po stc on vic tio n r e lie f b e c aus e h er e c e i v e d i n e f f e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l, w hic h also re nd e re d h is g uil ty plea involuntary. To s u p p o rt t his claim, the petitioner ar gues that his counsel provide d defic ient repr ese n t at i o n by not effe ctively investigating the Dyer County S heriff ’s policy on transf erring inmates to TDOC. Furthermore , the petitioner a sserts that but for the de fi ci en cy i n his counsel’s repr esentation, he would have followed t hrough wit h his trial and that, there fore , his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily enter ed. Finally, the petit ioner a sserts that the trial c ourt err ed whe n it denied his separ ate motion to set aside the guilty plea. The S tate ar gues that the a ppeal should be dis mis se d b e c aus e the pe tit ion e r’ s n oti c e of app e a l w a s u nti me ly, a ndin the a lte rn a tiv e , tha t th e po stconviction court did not err in denying post-convic tion relief be cause the petitioner rec eived eff ective r epre sentation and e ntere d his plea vol u ntarily. Additionally, the State argue s that the de c isi on of

the low e r c ou rt

to d e ny the mot ionto s e t a sid e the gu ilt y ple a is not pr op e rl y b e fo re thi s
c ou rt

.
W e fi rs t turn ou r a tte nti on to wh e the r the pe tit ion e r’ s no tic e of app e a l wa s t im ely filed. The notice of appe al was filed on August 31, 2007, 52 days af ter the post-c onviction court’s order of dismissal. Even though this noti ce w as filed more than thirty days af ter e ntry of the judgment and there fore was untimely, we will waive the thirty-day require ment in this case in the interest of justice and rea ch the merits of the petitioner’s a ppeal. See Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a)

. The post-c onviction petitioner is o b liged to establish his claims by clear and convincing evide nce. See T.C.A. § 40-30-110( f) ( 2003). On appea l, the appellate court a ffor ds the trial court’ s findings of fact t he weight of a jury verdic t, and these findings are c onclusive on appe al unless the evidenc e pre ponderates aga inst them. He nle y v . S tat e , 960 S.W.2d 572, 578-79 (Te nn. 19 97 ); Bates v. State, 973 S.W.2d 615, 631 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)

.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitut ion and Article I , section 9 of the Tenne ssee Constitution bot h requirethat a def endant in a c riminal case rec eive e ffe ctive assistance of counse l. Ba x te r v . R os e , 5 23 S.W .2 d 9 30 (T e nn . 1 97 5). When a defe nd a nt c la ims ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, the standar d applied by the courts of Te nnessee is “[w] hether the advice given or the se rvice rende red by the attorney [is] within the range of compe tence demande d by attorneys in c riminal case s.” Summerlin v. State, 607 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980)

.

In Strickland v. Washington, the United Stat es S u p remeCourt outlined the require ments nece ssary to demonstrate a violati o n o f the Sixth Amendment right to effe ctive assistance of counse l. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Fi rst, the pe tit ion e r mus t sh ow that c ou ns e l’ s p e rf orma nc e fe ll b e low a n ob

je c tiv e stand ard of

re a so na ble ne ss under prevailing prof

essional norms and must de monstrate that counsel made err ors so serious that he was not f

unctioning as “c ounsel” gua rante ed by the Constitution. Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Second, the pe titioner must show that counsel’s per formanc e pre judiced him and that e rr o rs were-4-

so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial, ca lling int o question the reliability of the outcome. Id. ; Henley
, 960 S.W.2d at 579.

Th is t wo -p art

stand ardof

me a su ri ng ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of c ou ns e l als o ap pli e s to claims arising out of a guilty plea. Se e Hi ll v . Lo c k ha rt , 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S. Ct. 366 (1985). The pr e jud ic e c omp on e nt i s mo dif ie d s uc h to re qu ir e the pe tit ion e r t o “ sh ow that th e reis a re a so na ble probability that, but for c ounsel’s er rors, he would not have plea ded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. a t 59 , 1 06 S. Ct . at 37 0; se e als o H ic k s v . S tat e , 983 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

Th e c ou rt do e s not “s e c on d gue ss” ta c tic a l andstr a te gic c ho ic e s p e rt a ini ng to d e fe ns e matters and doe s not measure a defense attorney’s repre sentation by “20-20 hindsight.” Henley
, 960 S.W.2d at 579 (quoting Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982)). Rathe r, a c ourt revie wing counsel’s pe rformance should “eliminate the distorting eff ects of hindsight . . . [and] ev al u at e the conduct f rom counsel’ s perspe ctive at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct . at 2065. “The fac t that a par t i cu l ar s trategy or tactic f ailed or hurt the defe nse, does not, standing alone , establish unrea sonable re prese ntation.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996). On the other ha nd, “def

ere nce to matter s of strategy and tactica l choices a pplies only if the choice s are informed one s based upon a dequate prepa ration.” Id.

A t ri a l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio n o f an in e ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns el cla im pr e se nts a mixed question of law and fac t on appea l. Se e Fi e lds v . S tat e , 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001)

. This court re views the trial c ourt’s findings of fa ct with rega rd to the ef

fec tiveness of c ounsel under a de novo sta ndard, a ccompanied wi t h a pre sumption t hat those findings are corr ect unless the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e is oth er wi s e. See id. “ Ho we ve r, a tria l c ou rt ’s conclusions of law – such as whe ther counsel’s performanc e was defic ient or whether that def iciency w as pre

judicial
– are revie wed unde r a pur ely de novo standa rd, with no pres u m p t i o n of cor rec tness given to the trial court’ s conclusions.” Id.

Additionally, our supreme c ourt, in setting forth the standar d for ide n t i fy i ng a constitutionally valid gui lty plea, has noted that “bef ore a trial judge can acc ept a guilty plea, ther e must be an af

firmative showing that it was given intelligently and voluntarily.” State v. Pe ttus , 986 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Boyk in v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S. C t. 1709, 1711 (1969)) . Our h i g h co u rt further noted that “a

plea is not ‘voluntary’ if it is the product of ‘[i]gnor ance , incomprehe nsion, coerc ion, terror , inducements, [or ] subtle or blatant threats,’” Bl an ke ns hip v . S tat e , 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Boy k in , 395 U.S. at 242-43, 89 S. Ct . at 1712), or i f t h e def endant wa s “incompete nt or otherwise not in control of his mental fac iliti es” w hen the plea

was e ntere d. Id

.
Inthi s c a se , th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt c on c lud e d th a t c ou ns e l’ s f a ilu reto anti c ipate the petitioner’s likelihood of transfer did not amount to de ficient re prese ntation. After c onsidering the arg ume nts pr e se nte d to us on app e a l, w e lik e wi se c on c lud e that th e pe tit ion e r h a s f a ile d to de mon str a te that here c e ive d in e ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l.-5- Contrary to the pe titioner’s asserti o n s , co unsel did not provide def icient
re pr e se n t a t i o n

. W h e n a

p e t i t i o n e r ’ s c l a i mi s o n e o f i n a d e q u a t e a d v i c e , a s i ti s i n t h i s c a s e , c ou rt s gener ally distingui sh betwee n direc t and indirec t conseque nces of a fa i l ure to inform the guiltypleading petitioner. See B au ti st a v . S tat e , 1 60 S.W .3 d 9 17 , 9 21 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 20 04 ). As a gener al rule, an attorney’ s failure to inform a criminal defendant of t h e “d i re ct consequence s of a guilty plea may constitute ineff ective assistance of counsel,” although “failure to inform of indire ct conseque nces of a guil ty plea norma lly does not.” Id. ; se e als o A dk ins v . S tat e , 911 S.W.2d 334, 350 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)

. This distinction often “‘turns on whether the result represents a de finite, immediate and lar gely automatic e ffe ct on the range of the defe ndant’s punishment.’” Adkins , 911 S.W.2d at 350 (quoting Tor rey v. E ste lle , 8 42 F.2 d 2 34 , 2 36 (9 th C ir . 1 98 8) ). Furthe rm or e , th is court ha s held,
“Any f

ailure of counsel to advise a s to any collater al conse quence s of a plea do es n o t , u nder the se authorities, fa ll below the ra nge of competenc e demanded of attorneys in c riminal case s. Misadvice on the issue might have wa

rra nted r elief; a nd, while a f ine distinction, silence by c ounsel does not. In short, a sin of commission might merit relief

while the sin of omission does not.”

Ba uti sta , 160 S.W.3d at 921 (quoting Adkins , 911 S.W.2d at 350).

We de cline to hold t h at C o unsel’s failure to investigate the Dye r County Sheriff’s policy on transfe rring inmates to T DOC constitutes de ficient repr esentation. Initially, we note that the “f ailure” to advise on the c ollatera l conseque nces of his ple a was at most an omiss ion and not mi s in formation. See Ba uti sta , 160 S.W.3d at 921. Even more significantly, we c onclude that Cou ns e l’ s f

a ilu re to i nv e sti gate , a s we ll as his failu reto anti c ipate thea c tio ns of Dy e r C ou nty ja il, had “no de finite, immediate, and la rgely automatic eff

ect” on the petitioner’s punishment. Id. at 922. The c ollatera l conseque nces the petitioner fa ced w ere not automatic or de finite; the petitioner wa s selec ted for tr ansfe r base d on his sentence and th e ab i l i t y o f TDOC to receive new inmates. W e
c on c lud e that th e pe tit ion e r’ s c ou ns e l, a lth ou gh no t a dv isi ng him of the ind ir e c t, co llate ra l e ff e c ts of his plea, did not misinform the petitioner, and the ref ore w as not defic ient in his repre sentation.

Fin a lly , th e pe tition e r c on te nd s that the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d wh e n it de nie d h is m oti on to set aside the guilty plea. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f). Howe ver, this motion was filed a fter the petition for post-conviction re lie f was adjudicated, a nd the re cord c ontains neither the or der disposi n g o f

th e mo ti o n n o r

th e tr a n s c r ip t o f

a n y h e ar in g o n th e mo ti o n

. A tria l c o u r t’ s o r d er denying a motion to set aside a guilty plea must be brought be fore this Court on di rec t appea l. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b). Furthermore, the notice of appe al addr esses only the orde r dismissing t he po st- c on vic tio n p e tit iona nddo e s n ot m e nti on the Rul e 32 (f ) mot ion . U nd e r the se c ir c ums ta nc e s, the Rul e 32 (f

) i ssu e of wi thdra wi ng the gu ilt y p le a is n ot b e fo rethi s c ou rt

.
Acc ordingly, the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition is affirmed.

___________________________________-6- JAMES CURWOOD WI TT, JR., JUDGE