13-3022-pr

Fischer v. Smith

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 2

3

August Term, 2013 4

5

(Argued: June 19, 2014 Decided: March 17, 2015) 6

7

Docket No. 13

‐ 3022 8

9

_____________________________________ 10

11

BRIAN FISCHER, Superintendent, 12

13

Respondent

‐ Appellant

, 14

15

v. 16

17

PATRICK SMITH, 18

19

Petitioner

‐ Appellee

. 20

21

_____________________________________ 22

23

Before: 24

25

CALABRESI, LYNCH, and 

### LOHIER

, Circuit Judges

. 26

27

Petitioner

‐ appellee Patrick Smith was convicted in State court of two 28

counts of second

‐ degree murder based largely on the testimony of a jailhouse 29

informant. The State Court denied Smith’s motion to vacate his conviction on 30

ineffective assistance grounds. Smith then filed a federal habeas petition, 31

which the District Court granted after determining that the State Court 32

decision was not an “adjudication on the merits” entitled to significant 33

deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 34

and that Smith’s counsel failed to provide effective assistance. We REVERSE

. 3513-3022-pr

Fischer v. Smith

2 L LOYD E PSTEIN

, Epstein & Weil LLC, 1

New York, NY, for Petitioner

‐ Appellee. 2

3

O RRIE A. L EVY (Joseph N. Ferdenzi, on the brief ), for 4

Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx County, 5

Bronx, NY, for Respondent

‐ Appellant

. 6

7

LOHIER, Circuit Judge : 8

9

The principal issue on appeal is whether the State Court decision 10

denying Patrick Smith’s application to vacate his conviction on ineffective 11

assistance of counsel grounds is an “adjudication on the merits” to which we 12

must defer under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 13

(“AEDPA”). The United States District Court for the Southern District of 14

New York granted Smith’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 15

U.S.C. § 2254 after determining that the State Court decision rested on 16

procedural grounds and that Smith’s trial counsel had provided ineffective 17

assistance when he failed to move to suppress the testimony of a jailhouse 18

informant. We conclude that the State Court decision was, to the contrary, an 19

adjudication on the merits entitled to AEDPA deference and not so lacking in 20

justification as to warrant habeas relief. Accordingly, we reverse the decision 21

of the District Court. 2213-3022-pr

Fischer v. Smith

3 BACKGROUND 1

In June 2002 Patrick Smith was charged in the Bronx with first

‐ and 2

second

‐ degree murder (among other crimes) for his role in a 1996 armed 3

robbery that resulted in the death of a payroll delivery worker. On the eve of 4

trial, the prosecutor informed the Bronx County Supreme Court that the 5

Government intended to call an incarcerated witness, William Ferguson, to 6

whom Smith had made incriminating statements while in jail awaiting trial 7

post

‐ indictment. The State Court asked the prosecutor whether Ferguson was 8

a government agent. The prosecutor said no. At trial, defense counsel 9

requested an offer of proof regarding Ferguson’s testimony and asked 10

whether he was a government agent. This time the prosecutor responded 11

that Ferguson had not been sent by the government to gather incriminating 12

statements from Smith, but rather that Ferguson had independently contacted 13

and relayed information to a Brooklyn detective named Danny Dellasandro. 14

The prosecutor agreed to get more information about Ferguson’s interactions 15

with government officials. 16

The next day, the prosecutor reported that Ferguson had reached out to 17

Detective Dellasandro and revealed the details of Smith’s robbery homicide. 18

The prosecutor acknowledged that Ferguson had provided information to 1913-3022-pr

Fischer v. Smith

4 law enforcement prior to contacting Detective Dellasandro but stated that, 1

according to Ferguson, the information had never been pursued. Based on 2

the prosecutor’s representations, the State Court determined that there was 3

no basis to believe that Ferguson was a government agent. 4

Ferguson thereafter testified that he met Smith four times on Rikers 5

Island and that each time Smith made inculpatory statements regarding the 6

crimes for which he had been indicted. On cross

‐ examination, Ferguson 7

admitted that he had served as a paid informant for another narcotics 8

detective, Jimmy Irving, who had not previously been mentioned by the 9

prosecutor. Defense counsel moved to strike Ferguson’s testimony, arguing 10

that the government had failed to provide any discovery relating to 11

Ferguson’s role as a paid informant. The court denied the motion but allowed 12

defense counsel to question Ferguson outside the presence of the jury about 13

his relationship with the government. Defense counsel did so while pressing 14

his position that the prosecution had to disclose more information about 15

Ferguson’s history and his relationship with Detective Irving. Nothing came 16

of the questioning or the demand for more discovery, and defense counsel 17

never moved pursuant to Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), to 18

suppress Smith’s incriminating statements to Ferguson. The jury ultimately 1913-3022-pr

Fischer v. Smith

5 returned a guilty verdict on two counts of murder in the second degree. 1

Smith was sentenced principally to two concurrent indeterminate terms of 2

twenty years’ to life imprisonment. 3

Following trial, Smith’s new defense counsel uncovered previously 4

undisclosed evidence that Ferguson had collaborated with law enforcement 5

for four years prior to Smith’s trial. In 2005 Smith, through counsel, filed a 6

direct appeal of his conviction, claiming that inadequate discovery abridged 7

his right to confront Ferguson at trial. As relevant here, the Appellate 8

Division affirmed the conviction, and Judge Graffeo of the New York Court of 9

Appeals denied leave to appeal. 10

In 2007 Smith, now proceeding pro se, filed a motion in the Bronx 11

County Supreme Court to vacate his conviction pursuant to New York 12

Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10. The State Court ultimately denied the 13

motion because his claims were unsupported by the record. 14

In 2009 Smith, through counsel, filed a second § 440.10 motion, arguing 15

for the first time that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move 16

pursuant to Massiah to suppress the incriminating statements made to 17

Ferguson. The State Court denied Smith’s § 440.10 motion on February 8, 18

2010. After extensively reciting Smith’s various claims of ineffectiveness of 1913-3022-pr

Fischer v. Smith

6 trial counsel, denial of a fair trial, and assorted trial errors, the court wrote the 1

following in its conclusions of law: 2

This court declines to reach the merits of 3

Defendant’s counsel claims. The People are 4

correct in their assertion that the instant motion is 5

procedurally barred and meritless. The 6

defendant was in the position to adequately raise 7

all issues he now makes in the previous motion 8

but chose not to. Moreover, defendant has 9

failed to establish sworn allegations supporting 10

defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of 11

counsel. In evaluating ineffective assistance of 12

counsel claims, New York’s Court of Appeals has 13

consistently applied a “flexible” approach. “So 14

long as the evidence, the law, and the 15

circumstances of a particular case, viewed in the 16

totality and as of the time of the representation, 17

reveal that the attorney provided meaningful 18

representation,” a defendant’s constitutional right 19

to the effective assistance of counsel will have 20

been met. Thus, the standard in New York has 21

long been whether the defendant was afforded 22

“meaningful representation”. The Court of 23

Appeals has clarified “meaningful 24

representation” to include a prejudice component 25

which focuses on the “fairness of the process as a 26

whole rather than [any] particular impact on the 27

outcome of the case”. 28

29

Moreover, the defendant’s bare claims of 30

ineffective assistance do not meet the Strickland 31

[standard]. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 32

688 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court 33

adopted a two

‐ part test for evaluating claims of 34

ineffective assistance of counsel. A “defendant 3513-3022-pr

Fischer v. Smith

7 must show that counsel’s performance was 1

deficient,” and “that the deficient performance 2

prejudiced the defense”. The first prong of the 3

Strickland test is a restatement of attorney 4

competence, which requires a showing that 5

counsel’s representation fell below an objective 6

standard of reasonableness. The second prong, 7

also known as the prejudice prong, “focuses on 8

whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective 9

performance affected the outcome of the plea 10

process”. In order to satisfy this prong, a 11

“defendant must show that there is a reasonable 12

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he 13

would not have pleaded guilty and would have 14

insisted on going to trial”. In the case at bar, 15

defendant has failed to provide any evidence 16

showing that counsel was ineffective. 17

18

Joint App’x at 12

‐ 13 (citations omitted). 19

After additional State court litigation, Smith filed a counseled habeas 20

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, reasserting the ineffective assistance claim 21

raised earlier in his counseled § 440.10 motion. The District Court initially 22

denied the petition, holding that Smith’s ineffective assistance claim was 23

procedurally defaulted. It then reconsidered the default and granted the writ 24

in light of Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012), which held that the 25

lack of counsel at a defendant’s first opportunity to appeal a conviction based 26

on a claim of ineffective assistance at trial may establish cause to excuse a 27

procedural default on that claim. The District Court read the Bronx County 2813-3022-pr

Fischer v. Smith

8 Supreme Court’s decision as resting on procedural grounds and applied de 1

novo review. Proceeding to the merits, the District Court held that Smith’s 2

trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to make a motion 3

under Massiah to suppress Ferguson’s testimony. It also held that Smith 4

would prevail even if AEDPA deference applied because the Bronx County 5

Supreme Court’s decision rejecting Smith’s ineffective assistance of counsel 6

claim involved an unreasonable application of Strickland. 7

This appeal followed. 8

D ISCUSSION 9

I. AEDPA Deference 10

Where a State court decision adjudicates a petitioner’s claim “on the 11

merits,” AEDPA demands that the decision be accorded substantial 12

deference. Dolphy v. Mantello, 552 F.3d 236, 238 (2d Cir. 2009). We have 13

described an “adjudication on the merits” as one that “(1) disposes of the 14

claim ‘on the merits,’ and (2) reduces its disposition to judgment.” Sellan v. 15

Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 312 (2d Cir. 2001). “To determine whether a state 16

court disposition is ‘on the merits,’ this Court examines (1) the state court’s 17

opinion, (2) whether the state court was aware of a procedural bar, and (3) the 1813-3022-pr

Fischer v. Smith

9 practice of state courts in similar circumstances.” Spears v. Greiner, 459 F.3d 1

200, 203 (2d Cir. 2006). 2

In Zarvela v. Artuz, we treated as an adjudication on the merits a State 3

court decision that determined “petitioner’s claim to be unpreserved, and, in 4

any event, without merit.” 364 F.3d 415, 417 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). 5

Here, the Bronx County Supreme Court initially stated that it “decline[d] to 6

reach the merits” of Smith’s ineffective assistance claim. Joint App’x at 12. 7

Had it stopped there, we would regard the decision as resting on procedural 8

grounds rather than the merits. But the court did not stop there. The very 9

next sentence described Smith’s claim as “procedurally barred and meritless.” 10

Id. (emphasis added). And the remainder of the decision clearly and in 11

considerable detail addressed the merits of Smith’s ineffective assistance of 12

counsel claim. See id. (“Moreover, [Smith] has failed to establish sworn 13

allegations supporting [his] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” 14

(emphases added)); id. at 13 (“Moreover, the defendant’s bare claims of 15

ineffective assistance do not meet the Strickland [standard].” (emphases 16

added)). Therefore, in the particular circumstances of this case, we view the 17

decision as addressing the merits of Smith’s claim in the alternative rather 18

than declining to reach them altogether. 1913-3022-pr

Fischer v. Smith

10 II. The Merits of Smith’s Ineffective Assistance Claim 1

We turn, then, to the State Court’s adjudication of the merits of Smith’s 2

ineffective assistance claim

— an adjudication which we accord significant 3

deference under AEDPA. 4

Where a State court decision adjudicates a petitioner’s claim on the 5

merits, a district court may grant habeas relief only if the decision was 6

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 7

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 8

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). 9

“Establishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable 10

under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The standards created by Strickland 11

and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, 12

review is doubly so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (citations omitted) (quotation 13

marks omitted). On habeas review “[a] federal court may reverse a state 14

court ruling only where it was so lacking in justification that there was 15

. . . [no] possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Vega v. Walsh, 669 F.3d 16

123, 126 (2d Cir. 2012) (second alteration in original) (quotation marks 17

omitted). 1813-3022-pr

Fischer v. Smith

11 As an initial matter, Smith pointed out at oral argument that in 1

discussing the prejudice prong of Strickland the State Court applied the 2

wrong standard, mistakenly suggesting that Smith had pleaded guilty rather 3

than been convicted after a jury trial. Because Smith has not raised this 4

argument in his briefing, it is not properly presented to us. See Vincent v. 5

Yelich, 718 F.3d 157, 175 (2d Cir. 2013). 6

In any event, the argument is unpersuasive. True, Smith’s case 7

obviously involved a trial, not a guilty plea. And insofar as the State Court 8

citations to plea bargain cases suggested otherwise, that suggestion was 9

simply wrong. But the State Court correctly cited the Strickland standard as 10

the rule of constitutional law governing Smith’s claim, and its elaboration of 11

the performance prong of that standard was fully applicable to the present 12

case. Moreover, the State Court’s reference to the guilty plea in the 13

conclusions of law appears to have been a clerical or drafting error rather 14

than a substantive or legal error. Indeed, prior to its conclusions of law, the 15

court detailed at length the procedural history of the case with explicit 16

references to the jury trial. See Joint App’x at 9

‐ 12. These references show 17

that the trial judge understood the claims Smith was actually making and did 18

not believe that the case concerned ineffective advice leading to a guilty plea. 1913-3022-pr

Fischer v. Smith

12 As for the underlying issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, we 1

would hope that most lawyers would spot the Massiah issue in this case. 2

Ideally, Smith’s trial counsel would have made a motion raising the issue. 3

However, Smith’s trial counsel could have reasonably determined that, based 4

on Ferguson’s testimony outside the presence of the jury and the prosecutor’s 5

representations, Ferguson was not acting as a government agent when he 6

elicited incriminating statements from Smith. If so, moving to suppress these 7

statements at the time could reasonably have been viewed as baseless. Even 8

if we thought counsel’s choice was not reasonable, we cannot say that it was 9

unreasonable for the State Court to take the contrary view. Because we 10

accord State court decisions a double measure of deference on Strickland 11

challenges, we are hard put to say on this record that there was “[no] 12

possibility for fairminded disagreement” that Smith’s trial counsel provided 13

ineffective assistance. Vega, 669 F.3d at 126. 14

CONCLUSION 15

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the decision of the District 16

Court. 17