Foreword

As late as the beginning of 1940, with World War II several months old,

military liaison between Canada and the United States was so scant that they

had not even exchanged service attaches. Yet the two countries and their

armed forces were inevitably brought into extensive and intimate collaboration in the prosecution of World War II. This study is a historical record

of the military and politico-military aspects of this collaboration.

The impact of advancing technology since World War II on time and

space factors has demonstrated ever more forcefully that the defense problem

of the two countries is a continuing one requiring joint solutions. In consequence, the two countries have in recent years been drawn into even closer

co-operation.

This study is intended to provide background information to staff officers

currently involved in defense planning, to officers on exchange duty with the

Canadian armed forces, and to officers in the service schools preparing for

such duties. Since many of the current joint problems are similar to those

of World War II, these officers should find in the record of World War II

experience guidance which will help them achieve the optimum solutions to

their current problems.

From the analyses of the politico-military relationships between the two

countries, many lessons can be gleaned by Americans of both the military

and the diplomatic services, as well as by civilian scholars. The study will

perhaps be similarly useful to Canadians. In its broader aspects, the experience recorded herein may be applicable, with interpretation, to similar

arrangements between other pairs of neighboring countries or within a multilateral security arrangement.

The author of this volume, Col. Stanley W. Dziuban, began work on it

early in 1950 to satisfy the doctoral dissertation requirement of Columbia

University, from which he received a Ph.D. degree in 1955. Colonel

Dziuban, a 1939 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, is at present assigned

as Deputy Division Engineer, U.S. Army Engineer Division, New England.

vii
The subject of his book was selected upon recommendation of the Office of

the Chief of Military History and with the endorsement of the Director,

Plans and Operations Division, General Staff. Publication has been delayed

because the greater part of the work on the volume had to be done by the

author in his off-duty hours and because almost a year was consumed in obtaining the necessary clearances from the authorities concerned.

R. W. STEPHENS

Washington, D. C. Maj. Gen., U.S.A.

1 February 1958 Chief of Military History

viii
Preface

This study contains a detailed account of how the United States joined

with Canada to thwart the Axis threat to North America and how the two

nations together cast their resources in the balance to help tip the scales decisively against the Axis Powers. The common effort ranged from the prosaic growing of wheat to the climactic development of the atomic bomb. In

the defense of their homelands, North Americans accomplished epic feats and

experienced high adventure as they built roads, pipelines, telephone lines,

and air bases in the raw Arctic wilderness, in some instances in areas never

before penetrated by white man.

Canadian and U.S. armed forces undertook their strategic and logistical

operations initially to repel the advance of German and Japanese forces toward North America and subsequently to help drive the enemy to defeat.

In executing those operations, Canadians and Americans worked and fought

shoulder to shoulder on land and on sea and in the air, and together solved

in a spirit of co-operative friendship the countless problems that arose.

Prepared primarily as a doctoral dissertation in the field of international

relations, this study also strives to present a rounded military history of the

co-operation between the two countries. As a consequence it includes, on

the one hand, material such as that in Chapters IX and X which contributes

only marginally to an analysis of the politico-military collaboration. It

covers, on the other hand, a number of matters normally outside the scope of

a military history.

The political and military relationships that evolved between the two

North American neighbors are examined, as is the impact of the great disparity between them in size and resources. The influx of U.S. forces into

Canada posed many problems, one of the most significant of which was the

jurisdictional status of those forces. The need to protect Canadian sovereignty motivated Canada, which had had for decades carefully to nurture that

sovereignty, to guard against all encroachments. The two countries worked

out a variety of joint mechanisms and arrangements for the joint operations

of their forces, the joint construction and utilization of facilities, and the

ix
joint control of other enterprises of common interest. In these arrangements,

Canada's status as a British Commonwealth nation and the joint U.S.-United

Kingdom direction of global war strategy emerge as two basic complicating

factors.

As the bibliographical note indicates in detail, the study is based largely

on official records. Full access was given the author to the pertinent official

U.S. records. Within the limitations imposed by a few gaps in, and by the

character of, contemporary documentation, the factual record chronicled can

be considered authoritative. Because the source material included documents

still classified as secret, the study was submitted for and received military security clearance. The author was not required as a result of that review to

make textual changes. Such review constitutes no official endorsement of

the study, and where the author sets forth hypotheses, analyses, conclusions,

or recommendations, they are presented solely as his own views and upon

his own responsibility. They do not and cannot purport to represent the

views of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government.

Acknowledgment is due the Houghton Mifflin Company for permission

to reproduce material from The Second World War by Winston Churchill, and

to Messrs. Joseph C. Grew, McGeorge Bundy, and Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,

for access kindly provided to, respectively, the Pierrepont Moffat, Stimson,

and Morgenthau diaries.

No attempt has been made to use records of the Canadian Government,

excepting insofar as they were in the public domain or were to be found in

files of U.S. agencies. Even assuming that these records might have been

accessible to this researcher, their exclusion would have been dictated by considerations of time and labor. This omission imposes limitations on the

study, the full impact of which can be appraised when a comparable study is

presented from the Canadian point of view.

Many persons have contributed to the preparation of this study. Helpful

review and comment were generously offered by Brig. Gen. Paul M. Robinett

(retired), of the Office, Chief of Military History, Department of the Army;

Professor W. T. R. Fox and the late Professor J. Bartlet Brebner, of Columbia

University; Maj. Gen. Guy V. Henry (retired), U.S. Chairman of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States; the late Capt. Tracy B.

Kittredge, U. S. Navy; Maj. Gen. R. J. Wood and Col. Francis J. Graling, U.S.

Army; and Drs. Byron Fairchild and Rose Engelman, of the Office, Chief of

Military History. Substantive contributions through correspondence, personal interview, or review of portions of the study were made by many

officers who participated in the events chronicled. These officers are listed
in the bibliographical note. The author is also grateful for the help of other

individuals who must go unnamed.

Dr. Stetson Conn, Deputy Chief Historian of the Office, Chief of Military

History, and Helen McShane Bailey, editor of this volume, shared the burden

of reviewing and preparing the manuscript for publication in its present

form. Margaret E. Tackley, Chief of the Photographic Branch, Office, Chief

of Military History, selected the photographs. Franklin F. Marsh and Myrna

Thompson prepared the index. The author alone stands responsible, not

only for the analyses and conclusion drawn, but also for the scholarship and

workmanship of the study as a whole.

STANLEY W. DZIUBAN

Washington, D. C. Colonel, U.S. Army

1 February 1958

xi

Contents

Chapter Page

I. CHAUTAUQUA TO OGDENSBURG............................... . 1

Seeds of World War II Co-operation..................................... 3

Backdrop for Ogdensburg.............................................. 4

Initial Canadian Approaches. .......................................... 13

The Ogdensburg Declaration........................................... 22

II. THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE.................. . 31

Organization and Composition......................................... 33

Modus Operandi.................................................. . 38

Scope of Responsibilities. ............................................... 46

Collaboration Through the Board. ...................................... 52

III. PARTNERSHIP VERSUS TRIANGLE. .............................. . 55

The Roosevelt-Churchill Axis. ......................................... 55

North Atlantic Triangle. ............................................. 59

The Stresses of Partnership. ........................................... 69

Canadian Staff Representation in Washington............................. 71

The Combined Agencies............................................... 77

IV. JOINT DEFENSE PLANNING..................................... . 86

Initial Defense Plans................................................. 86

Early Supply Assistance............................................... 90

Strengthening the Garrisons............................................ 95

ABC-1 and ABC-22................................................ 101

Putting Plans Into Action............................................. 106

V. ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND............................... . 109

Unity of Operational Command. ....................................... 110

Local Command Arrangements......................................... 116

Organization for the Logistical Tasks.................................... .126

Organizational Chaos................................................ 131

VI. HEMISPHERE DEFENSE PROBLEMS. .............................. . 142

The Twenty-second Chair............................................. 143

Securing Greenland. ................................................. 149

The Defense of Iceland. ............................................... 155

St. Pierre and Miquelon.............................................. 158

Summary. ......................................................... 160

VII. OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN AREAS........................... . 162

The Lease and Construction of Newfoundland Bases. ...................... 162

Defending Newfoundland. ............................................ 170

North Atlantic Ferry Operations....................................... 181

Sault Sainte Marie.................................................. 193

xiii
Chapter Page

VIII. ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA .............................. . 199

The Northwest Staging Route......................................... 200

The American Construction Phase...................................... 207

Traffic Along the Staging Route. ...................................... 215

The Alaska Highway................................................ 217

The Canol Project................................................... 228

Communications and Weather. ......................................... 236

The Prince Rupert Port............................................... 238

IX. COMRADES IN ARMS............................................. . 241

Battle of the Atlantic. .............................................. . 242

Securing Alaska Against the Japanese .................................. . 252

The First Special Service Force.......................................... 259

Canadian Army Pacific Force. ......................................... 268

X. CO-OPERATION IN OTHER FIELDS. .............................. . 273

Administration and Personnel. ........................................ . 274

The Rush-Bagot Agreement. ........................................... 278

Miscellaneous Co-operation............................................. 280

Research and Development............................................. 284

Arsenals of Democracy. ............................................... 289

XI. PROBLEMS IN JURISDICTION.................................... . 296

Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Forces................................. 296

Airway Traffic Control. .............................................. 301

Military Air Services................................................. 306

Maintenance and Control of Bases...................................... 313

XII. MISSION ACCOMPLISHED......................................... . 317

Beginning the American Roll-up........................................ 317

The Northern Airfields Settlement. ..................................... 320

Disposals Under the Thirty-third Recommendation ........................ . 325

Special Dispositions................................................... 329

The 12 February 1947 Statement. ..................................... . 334

The Lessons of World War II. ......................................... 339

Appendix

A. Recommendations of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United

States, 26 August 1940-1 September 1945............................... . 347

B. First Report of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States. . 366

C. Extract of Journal of Discussions and Decisions for Meeting of Permanent Joint

Board on Defense, Canada-United States, on 26 February 1942............. . 370

D. Hyde Park Declaration by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie

King Regarding Co-operation in War Production........................ . 373

E. The 12 February 1947 Joint Statement on Defense Collaboration............. . 374

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.............................................. . 377

xiv
Page

CHRONOLOGY OF STATEMENTS IN THE CANADIAN HOUSE OF

COMMONS........................................................... . 39 3

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. ............................................ . 395

INDEX................................................................. . 39 9

Tables

No.

1. Membership of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States:

22 August 1940-1 September 1945...................................... . 36

2. Meetings of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense: 26 August 1940-31

December 1945....................................................... . 39

3. Combined Canadian-United States Production of Selected Munitions: 1 July

1940-31 August 1945 .................................................. . 290

4. United States Lend-Lease Aid: 11 March 1941-31 December 1955. ............ . 293

5. Canadian Mutual Aid Board Expenditures................................. . 294

6. Canada's War Production During the Mutual Aid Period: 1 September 1943-1

September 1945....................................................... . 295

7. Canadian-United States Expenditures on the Northern Airfields, Detailed by

Projects............................................................. . 32 4

Chart

1. United States Administrative and Logistical Organization in Canada and Newfoundland: 1 April 1943 ............................................... . 132

Illustrations

Members of the Permanent Joint Board Arriving in Newfoundland. ............ . 40

Quebec Conference, August 1943........................................... . 67

Meeting at Quebec, August 1943........................................... . 77

Brig. Gen. C. L. Sturdevant................................................ . 129

Maj. Gen. W. W. Foster. .................................................. . 138

Harbor Camp Area of the Greenland Base Command.......................... . 153

155-mm. Gun Emplacement................................................ . 176

Mayor Fiorello H. LaGuardia. .............................................. . 185

Flight Strips at the Watson Lake Airport.................................... . 208

U.S. Army Engineers Constructing a Pioneer Road. ........................... . 220

Sikanni Chief River Bridge.................................................. . 223

Train Plowing Through Deep Snow. ........................................ . 226

Retreat Ceremony at Fort William Henry Harrison........................... . 261

Canadian and U.S. Soldiers of the First Special Service Force. ................... . 263

All illustrations are from Department of Defense files.

xv
MILITARY RELATIONS

BETWEEN THE

UNITED STATES AND CANADA

1939-1945

CHAPTER I

Chautauqua to Ogdensburg

The twentieth century gave a new turn to the history of U.S.-Canadian

military relations. Up until that time the two neighbors had had no occasion jointly to prepare to defend North America against aggression from without. It was not too many years earlier, in fact, that the North American

military problems that arose found the peoples of the two countries not partners, but antagonists. The open fighting of the War of 1812 ended in

December 1814 with the Treaty of Ghent, but this treaty marked the end

only of formal hostilities.

While the Rush-Bagot Agreement, subsequently signed at Washington

in April 1817 to provide for naval disarmament on the Great Lakes, has been

repeatedly cited as a symbol of the friendly relations which have existed since

that date,1 sporadic border skirmishes and incursions continued for several

decades. These eruptions resulted from the mutual rivalries and suspicions

that remained alive on both sides of the border.2 But by the end of the

nineteenth century the two peoples had learned to live together peaceably,

if not fully to understand each other. In fact, an era of peaceful neighborly

relations, unexcelled in the history of any other pair of adjacent countries,

was by 1900 well established.

Prussian militarism and World War I first brought the two countries

shoulder to shoulder as wartime partners. Although they entered the war

for different reasons, and although Canada was then only a partially autonomous dominion of the British Empire, the two countries collaborated directly

to meet certain of their war requirements. Canadian recruiting staffs in the

United States accepted thousands of recruits for the Canadian Army. Canadian

pilots were trained in the southern United States under arrangements made

by the British Royal Flying Corps, and some American pilots were trained

in the Canadian training establishment. American munitions production

1

 For an example, see the 1946 exchange of notes published in Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS), 1836. For an account of the interpretations of the Rush-Bagot

Agreement made to meet World War II needs, see below, pp. 278-80. 2

 An excellent account of these border difficulties is given in Charles P. Stacey, "The Myth

of the Unguarded Frontier, 1815-1871," American Historical Review. LVI (October 1950), 1-18.
2 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

helped meet Canadian needs. When the United States entered the war, the

expanded Canadian aircraft industry was in turn able to supply some of the

training aircraft and flying boats needed to meet American requirements. The

value of Canadian munitions deliveries to the United States in World War

I totaled $32,785,000, while, as a result of the armistice, contracts in the

amount of $145,645,000 were canceled. During 1918 a U.S. Navy air unit,

commanded by Lt. Richard E. Byrd, flew antisubmarine escort and patrols

from Halifax and Sydney, Nova Scotia, while a Royal Canadian Naval Air

Service was being established with American assistance. But after Armistice

Day, 1918, many years were to pass before any joint consideration was again

to be given to common defense problems.3

Despite the foregoing accomplishments World War I relationships were

not without their unhappy aspect. From August 1914 until the U.S. declaration of war, bitter feeling in Canada developed because of U.S. neutrality

and isolationism. After the armistice, owing to the U.S. attitude on war

debts, this feeling increased, but it waned with the passing years.4

World War I did provide a demonstration that, by the beginning of the

twentieth century, Canada and the United States recognized several fundamental facts as the basis of their military policies. First, Canada shared with

the United States the geographic isolation of North America. In the case

of Canada, climate and topography heightened the isolation. The Arctic

wastes made a surface approach from that quarter virtually impossible. The

rugged coast and mountainous littoral of western Canada and the paucity of

developed transportation facilities rendered invasion there extremely difficult.

On the east coast, dominated by the Labrador headlands, only limited access

was possible through the St. Lawrence Valley and the Maritime Provinces.

Second, and more important perhaps than these natural barriers, was the

vital concern of the United States in the maintenance of Canadian territorial

integrity. This concern had found its basic political expression in the Monroe Doctrine. As early as 1902 a Canadian prime minister, Sir Wilfred

Laurier, had acknowledged the Monroe Doctrine as Canada's basic protection against enemy aggression.5

 The Monroe Doctrine in effect amounted

to a de facto security guarantee by the United States, having as its principal

3

 Canada at War, No. 31 (Dec 43), pp. 24-25; G. N. Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada

(Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1952), I, 256-60; Richard E. Byrd, Skyward (New York:

G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), pp. 64-76. 4

 Hugh L. Keenleyside devotes a chapter to the development of the Canadian attitude in

Canada and the United States (Revised edition by Keenleyside and G. S. Brown; New York:

Alfred A. Knopf, 1952). 5

 Charles P. Stacey, The Military Problems of Canada (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1940), p.

68. See this work for a full discussion of the pre-World War II strategic position of Canada.
CHAUTAUQUA TO OGDENSBURG 3

visible evidence during recent decades the U.S. Navy dominating the Pacific.

The U.S. Navy, together with the British Fleet similarly dominating the

Atlantic, rendered large-scale invasion of North America virtually impossible.

On the political side, the era of peaceful relations and friendly stability

had become so well recognized that the prospect of war between the United

States and Canada had in reality vanished. This framework of stability was

firmly welded to the broader framework of a by now well-established AngloAmerican friendship.

Within this strategic and political setting, Canada enjoyed a "privileged

sanctuary" position, leaving it free to spring to Great Britain's side in any

European war without concern over the need for home defenses and secure

in the knowledge that, even if by some remote chance Canada itself should

be attacked, the United States would step in to repel the invader.

Seeds of World War II Co-operation

The drums of war, with their portent for the future, had already been

heard in Ethiopia and China when, on 14 August 1936, President Franklin

D. Roosevelt gave his first public pledge of defense assistance to Canada.

Speaking at Chautauqua, New York, he said: "Our closest neighbors are

good neighbors. If there are remoter nations that wish us not good but ill,

they know that we are strong; they know that we can and will defend ourselves and defend our neighborhood."6

The significance of this declaration of defense solidarity was missed by

the Canadian public.7 Yet not long afterward, the first of a number of discussions on mutual defense problems took place between the President and

Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King. During a visit of King to Washington in March 1937, the two agreed on the need for military staff talks on

such problems some time in the future. Staff discussions on Pacific problems

took place in Washington in January 1938 as a result of the President's naval

visit to Victoria, British Columbia, in the preceding September.8

Almost two years to the day after the Chautauqua speech, President

Roosevelt gave an even stronger pledge of defense solidarity. On 18 August

1938, while speaking at Kingston, Ontario, he declared: "The Dominion of

Canada is a part of the sisterhood of the British Empire. I give to you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domi6

 Department of State Press Releases, XV, 168.

7

 F. H. Soward et al, Canada in World Affairs: The Pre-War Years (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 107. 8

 Canada, House of Commons Debates (Ottawa: King's Printer) (cited hereafter as H. C.

Debates) 12 Nov 40, p. 55.
4 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

nation of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire."9 Significantly,

this promise was inserted into the speech by the President himself while he

was revising a draft prepared by the Department of State.10

During this visit to Canada the President again discussed common defense

problems with the Prime Minister, with particular reference to Atlantic

coastal defense.11 Two days after Roosevelt's Kingston speech, Prime Minister King, during an address at Woodbridge, Ontario, responded: "We, too,

have our obligations as a good friendly neighbor, and one of these is to see

that, at our own instance, our country is made as immune from attack or

possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that, should

the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way

either by land, sea or air, to the United States across Canadian territory."

 12

Prime Minister King's visit to Washington in November 1938, on the

occasion of the signing of a bilateral trade agreement, furnished another opportunity for discussion of common problems of defense "at length and in

a more concrete and definite way."

 13

 Coincidentally, this discussion followed

by only a few days a declaration by the President that the United States

intended to make the American continents impregnable from the air and

that he believed Canada would co-operate in meeting such an objective.14

The outbreak of World War II altered the complexion of such conversations, which acquired new political implications, especially for the United

States, in the light of Canadian belligerency and U.S. neutrality. Nevertheless, when the two heads of state again met at Warm Springs, Georgia, in

April 1940, a month before the German blitzkrieg, they used the opportunity "for a careful review of the whole situation."

 15

 The prospect of attacks

of any consequence on Canada or of U.S. participation in the war still

appeared remote. But the events of the next two months were to move the

two countries quickly together into close collaboration in military planning.

Backdrop for Ogdensburg

The outbreak of World War II had found Canada with armed forces comprising active establishments of only 4,500 ground, 1,800 sea, and 3,100 air per9

 Department of Stare Press Releases, XIX, 124. 10

 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948),

I, 587-88. For examinations of the pledge in the light of the Monroe Doctrine, see Chas. G.

Fenwick, "Canada and the Monroe Doctrine," pp. 782-85, and Lionel H. Laing, "Does the

Monroe Doctrine Cover Canada?," pp. 793-96, American Journal of International Law, XXXII

(1938).

11

 H. C. Debates, 12 Nov 40, p. 55. 12 Ibid., 12 Feb 47, p. 346. 13 Ibid., 12 Nov 40, p. 60. 14 The New York Times, November 16, 1938. 15 H. C. Debates, 12 Nov 40, p. 60.
CHAUTAUQUA TO OGDENSBURG 5

sonnel. However, plans were ready for expansion of these forces, and on the

very day of Hitler's assault on Poland the Canadian Department of National

Defense authorized the organization of two infantry divisions and supporting

units. Similar plans for expansion of the Navy and Air Force were rapidly

placed in effect.16

On 3 September 1939 the United Kingdom declared itself to be in a state

of war with Germany. The Canadian Government also acted immediately

after the German initiation of hostilities and declared the existence of a state

of "apprehended war" as from 25 August. By this step the Canadian Government was able to assume the powers authorized under the War Measures

Act of 1914, still in force, which authorized such action when "war, invasion

or insurrection, real or apprehended," existed. In keeping with its status as

a fully self-governing dominion, Canada then proceeded independently, and

unfettered by any automatic commitment to the United Kingdom, to deliberate a declaration of war. With the approval of the Canadian Parliament,

a declaration of war on Germany was made on 10 September, a week after

the United Kingdom action.

Canada quickly acted to undertake an industrial production program and

other economic measures needed to support the planned mobilization effort.

The primary objective of the Canadian war program was, through consultation and co-ordination with the United Kingdom, to make the most effective

contribution to the conduct of the war. Representations from London indicated that most needed immediately were military and naval matériel, raw

materials and industrial goods, air, naval, and technical army personnel, and

the preparation of an expeditionary force for later use.17 While undertaking

to meet these requirements, the government also made provision for essential

home defense such as the deployment of forces to defend coastal areas and

vulnerable points.18

In proceeding with the formation of the two infantry divisions, Canada

found itself largely unprepared to provide them with modern equipment.

16

 The reader interested in accounts of prewar status and expansion of the Canadian armed

forces should consult Charles P. Stacey, The Military Problems of Canada and The Canadian

Army, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1948); Joseph Schull, The Far Distant

Ships (Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1950); and Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada. 17

 The question of the adequacy of the Canadian voice in the formulation of policy and

strategy for the conduct of the war and the use of Canadian resources subsequently became the

subject of some debate in Canada. It is discussed by Dawson, Canada in World Affairs: 1939-

1941, Ch. X, and by C. C. Lingard and R. G. Trotter, Canada in World Affairs, III, September

1941 to May 1944 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1950), 238. 18

 Canadian Department of National Defense statement of 20 September 1939, quoted in

Robert M. Dawson, Canada in World Affairs: 1939-1941 (Toronto: Oxford University Press,

1943), pp. 286-89.
6 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Such equipment was not on hand, nor was there production capacity for it

since Great Britain had in the past been the source of this material. Expansion of the Air Force was similarly handicapped. Having, however, a substantial industrial base and an adequate supply of raw materials and skilled

workers, Canada was able quickly to initiate expansion of its munitions industry from the single ammunition-producing arsenal that was in production

at the outbreak of war.

In the succeeding months the production requirements presented by the

United Kingdom proved to be much smaller than had been expected. The

result was that by May 1940 only a relatively modest expansion of the Canadian munitions industry had taken place, inadequate to meet by itself increased

Canadian requirements, let alone other needs, which arose after the fall of

France.19

United States preparations in the face of the worsened world situation

had, before the outbreak of war, also been modest. A Naval Expansion Act

approved in 1938 was a first, but small, step toward a powerful two-ocean

Navy. In April 1939 legislation was enacted to provide new aircraft and

other equipment for the Army and to expand the base of munitions production. The U.S. reaction to the actual outbreak of war was the Presidential

proclamation on 8 September 1939 of a limited national emergency. But

participation in the war seemed remote and, to most Americans, improbable.

No sense of urgency marked U.S. defense preparations.20

In this period preceding the German invasion of the Low Countries on

19

 H. C. Debates, 22 May 40, p. 128, and 11 Jun 40, pp. 656-57; R. G. Trotter and A. B.

Corey (eds.), Conference on Canadian-American Affairs: Proceedings at Queen's University, 23-26

June 1941 (Toronto: Ginn and Company, 1941), pp. 44-45. Several authorities have stated

that fear of postwar competition and the desire to conserve credits motivated the paucity of

British orders. See Dawson, Canada in World Affairs: 1939-1941, pp. 16-17, 114-17, and

H. Reginald Hardy, Mackenzie King of Canada: A Biography (Toronto: Oxford University

Press, 1949), p. 190. 20

 For accounts of pre-Pearl Harbor military preparations in the United States, see Mark S.

Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950); Wesley F. Craven and James L.

Cate (eds.), The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, Plans and Early Operations Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1948); Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, I, The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943 (Boston: Little,

Brown and Company, 1947); and The War Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall,

General of the Army H. H. Arnold, and Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947). Also related are Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning

for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), and the forthcoming volume in the same series by

Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense. An account of the

development of U.S. foreign policy from 1937 through August 1940 has been written by William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation (New York: Harper

& Brothers, 1952).
CHAUTAUQUA TO OGDENSBURG 7

9-10 May 1940, only isolated contacts in the field of politico-military co-operation took place between Canada and the United States. The RooseveltKing meeting in April has already been mentioned. In August 1939, when

the outbreak of war had not yet occurred but appeared imminent, Canadian

Minister of National Defense Ian A. Mackenzie and Chief of Air Staff Air

Marshal William Bishop had secretly approached the White House and the

War Department seeking the purchase of some sixty-five medium bombers,

trainers, and flying boat patrol aircraft. Their efforts were fruitless. In January 1940 the Canadian Government asked if there would be U.S. objection to

the purchase of yachts for conversion to armed vessels. A negative reply

was received, and in the next few months Canada carried out a complicated

scheme of purchase by Canadian civilians of suitable yachts that were in turn

requisitioned by the government. During this "phony war" period some

procurement of military equipment took place by direct contracting between

the Canadian Government and U.S. manufacturers.21

During the prewar and phony war periods, U.S. Army and Navy officers

in Washington took into account in their planning studies the national policy pronouncements of the President calling for defense of the hemisphere

from North Pole to South Pole. In these studies, they examined the defense

of the contiguous Canadian territory. The need for some sort of collaboration with Canada in this regard was recognized. Nevertheless, these studies

did not result in the development of any approved requirements for bases in

Canada or in any joint planning with Canadian staffs. The more serious

threats to the Americas were viewed as directed toward the Panama Canal,

the Caribbean Sea, and contiguous land areas. Emphasis was placed in the

planning studies on these areas, with secondary consideration being given

to northern North America. Although the planning studies did visualize

some need to utilize bases in Newfoundland, no requirement for rights there

was established by the War and Navy Departments in their over-all statements of requirements, which did include a number of sites in Latin America

and western Atlantic waters.

The German blitzkrieg of May 1940 undoubtedly startled Americans, to

whom the war was still a political issue and not a military reality. To Canadians, however, the Nazi successes meant that the war was but one step short

of Canada's threshold. By 17 June the German assault begun on 10 May

had forced the French to seek an armistice and had left, in the wake of

21

 Memo, L. Johnson for President, 25 Aug 39, Roosevelt Papers, Secy's File, Box 42; Cdn

Leg aide-mémoire, 18 Jan 40, D/S 195.2/3666; Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, II, 25-26.
8 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Dunkerque, a battered British Army evacuated safely, but only after the loss

of most of its heavy equipment.

The successful onslaught of the German blitzkrieg brought the Nazi

panzers to the English Channel, where they sat poised as if for invasion.

Behind them the Luftwaffe girded itself for the aerial assault which, it was

hoped, would further cripple England and make easy its subjugation. The

Battle of Britain did not start immediately, but it was certain to begin and

to rain death and destruction from the skies on the people, homes, and factories of Britain.

In this emergency, and in the face of such a dismal prospect, President

Roosevelt and his closest advisers acted without hesitation. From reserve

stocks, the United States during June 1940 shipped to the United Kingdom

a half-million Enfield rifles with 130 million rounds of ammunition, 975

artillery pieces with a million rounds of ammunition, 80,000 machine guns,

and other munitions.22 Canada, too, hurriedly made available to the United

Kingdom such additional military resources as could be scraped together.

Beyond this "scraping of the bottom of the barrel," there could be no significant augmentation of supplies of matériel to the English during the following months.

Yet if the major scenes of this Wagnerian tragedy were being played in

western Europe, overtones could easily be heard in North America. With

the invasion of an all but defenseless Britain seemingly an imminent possibility, to Canadians hardly less than to Britons, great consequences hung

on the answers to the questions: Would Hitler invade? Would he be successful? As early as 15 May, British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill

had at least entertained the possibility that the answers to both questions

might be affirmative, when he told U.S. Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy that,

even if England were completely destroyed, rather than give up, the government would move to Canada with the fleet and fight on. Again on 4 June,

when reporting to the House of Commons on the disasters on the Continent, Churchill, though disbelieving that Germany could conquer Britain,

proclaimed that such action would be followed by liberation by "our Empire

beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet."23

Consideration of this dire possibility, with its tremendous implications

for Canada, was the burden of a message from Churchill which was deposited

22

 Army Service Forces, International Division, A Guide to International Supply (Washington: 1945), p. 4. 23

 D/S 740.0011 EW 1939/2952; Hull, Memoirs, I, 765-66; Great Britain, Parliamentary

Debates, Vol. 361, col. 796.
CHAUTAUQUA TO OGDENSBURG 9

on Prime Minister King's desk on 5 June. In it Churchill discussed continued U.S. neutrality and alternate courses of action regarding the British

Fleet should the United Kingdom be defeated. He also pointed out:

We must be careful not to let Americans view too complacently prospect of a British

collapse, out of which they would get the British Fleet and the guardianship of the British Empire, minus Great Britain. If United States were in the war and England [were]

conquered locally, it would be natural that events should follow the above course. But

if America continued neutral, and we were overpowered, I cannot tell what policy might

be adopted by a pro-German administration such as would undoubtedly be set up.

Although President is our best friend, no practical help has [reached us] from the

United States as yet. We have not expected them to send military aid, but they have

not even sent any worthy contribution in destroyers or planes, or by a visit of a squadron

of their Fleet to southern Irish ports. Any pressure which you can apply in this direction would be invaluable.24

The implications for Canada of a German conquest of the United Kingdom were understandably overwhelming. Having sent one of its two partially trained and partially equipped divisions to England the preceding

December-January, Canada would find the war at its doorstep without an

adequate Army, Navy, or Air Force to defend it, and without a munitions

industry adequate to equip and supply such forces had they existed. Naval

base facilities and other resources needed to support the British Fleet were

insufficient or not available. A seat for the United Kingdom Government

would have to be provided, and Canada's modest means would have to support the war effort of both governments. Serious problems concerning the

relationship between King's government and Churchill's government-in-exile

would arise and have to be worked out.

The Canadian Government and its planning staffs took under urgent study

both the immediate and the longer-term problems arising from the impending fall of France. Prime Minister King reaffirmed the policy he had announced when Canada declared war, that of assisting Great Britain by contributing as far as possible to the defense of Newfoundland and the other

British and French territories in the Western Hemisphere. In June Canadian

Army troops were dispatched to Newfoundland and, at the request of London,

to the British West Indies and to Iceland.25

The Nazi blitzkrieg also resulted in a disruption of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan in Canada, to which Canada had been devoting a

24

 The full text of the telegram is given in Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War:

Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), pp. 145-46. 25

 H. C. Debates, 20 May 40, p. 47, and 17 Jun 40, p. 854; Stacey, The Canadian Army,

1939-194), pp. 24-25. For an examination of the shifts in emphasis in Canadian defense

policy from 8 September 1939 to the end of 1940, see Trotter and Corey (eds.), Conference on

Canadian-American Affairs, 1941, pp. 40-44.
10 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

substantial part of its war effort. In consequence of the urgent need for

strengthening the British air defense force, planes and pilots in Canada suitable for that purpose were rushed to England, while the flow of aircraft from

England for use in the training program was cut off. In an effort to sustain

the training plan, Canada scoured the United States seeking to purchase available used aircraft and supplies. As an alternate means of procuring pilots,

British Ambassador Lothian and Canadian Charge d'Affaires Merchant

Mahoney on 27 May 1940 sought an arrangement by which air trainees could

be sent to schools in the United States. The request was refused on the

grounds that such facilities were being fully utilized to meet U.S. needs and,

furthermore, that any such step would violate the Hague Convention.26

In the United States, too, the imminent fall of France and the possibility

of British defeat gave impetus to urgent actions in the War and Navy

Departments.27 The Joint (Army-Navy) Planning Committee dropped work

on other plans and hurriedly drafted RAINBOW 4, a plan based on the assumptions that Britain and France would be defeated and that the United

States would face a coalition of Germany, Italy, and Japan. The plan envisaged the defense of North America and the northern part of South America.

The military analyses made by the President and his service chiefs—General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Harold R. Stark,

Chief of Naval Operations—in consultation with Under Secretary of State

Sumner Welles, all were based on a primary effort in South America to forestall Nazi subversion or intervention. Such activities were to be countered

by occupation of British, French, Dutch, and Danish possessions in the

Western Hemisphere.

The planners in the War and Navy Departments had long recognized the

need for garrisoning additional bases in the Western Hemisphere as essential to adequate continental defense. However, even under the impact of

the fall of France, the staff planners had not until this time seriously considered that a need for military bases in Canada existed and had not envisaged a situation requiring arbitrary action toward Canada. The pre-World

War II RAINBOW 1 war plan approved in August 1939, for example set forth

a need for bases in British possessions and in Latin American areas but not

26

 Memo/Conv, British High Commissioner Sir Gerald Campbell and Jay Pierrepont Moffat,

15 Jun 40, Moffat Diary; Memo/Conv, Charge Mahoney and J. C. Green, 4 Jun 40, D/S

711.00111 Lic. Babb, Chas. H./71; Memo/Conv, Mahoney and Moffat, 4 Jun 40, D/S

811.22742/310. 27

 For an account of U.S. Army plans and measures during this period, see Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Ch. II.
CHAUTAUQUA TO OGDENSBURG 11

in Canada.28 After the major Allied reverses in the Low Countries and

France in May 1940, and at the direction of the President, the planners outlined steps to be taken in case Germany demanded cession of the strategically important British, French, and Dutch possessions in the Western Hemisphere. They concluded that, in the event of such demands, the United

States should "assert sovereignty" over the possessions, excepting Newfoundland, where they considered co-operation with Canada (which had already

garrisoned that island) would be practicable.29

The needs for bases in the Western Hemisphere were outlined in a joint

Army-Navy estimate that had been requested by President Roosevelt on 13

June 1940. Entitled "Basis for Immediate Decisions Concerning the National Defense," this estimate of the world situation had been prepared and

revised through ten editions by 27 June. All editions urged the necessity

for maximum co-operation with the Latin American republics and with Canada in the defense of their territories, and recommended initiation of diplomatic action toward that end. The 22 June version of the report was presented

to the President by General Marshall and Admiral Stark and was discussed

by the three. Although never formally approved by the President or the

War and Navy Departments, the conclusions and recommendations of this

joint estimate apparently accurately reflected U.S. policies and attitudes during the summer of 1940 as to its continental defense needs.30

Major emphasis in the joint estimate was placed on the strengthening

of hemisphere defenses through the provision of arms to the Latin American

republics and other measures in that area. Such measures had already been

considered in the executive departments. On 23 May the President had approved the dispatch of Army and Navy liaison officers to the South American

countries.31 Congress, too, had already considered, and on 15 June 1940

passed, House Joint Resolution 367 authorizing military and naval assistance

to the American republics, and planning with these republics for such assistance was started. In the following month the foreign ministers of the

American republics met at Havana, Cuba, to consult with respect to security

28

 Tracy B. Kittredge, U.S.-British Naval Co-operation, 1940-1945 (Unpublished monograph,

1947, copy in OCMH), Vol. I, Sec. II, n. 28. 29

 OCNO Memo, OP-12B-MCC, 28 May 40, states that WPD generally concurred, and

bears the notation that Under Secretary of State Welles had seen it; see also Watson, Chief of

Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, p. 477, for the more restrained concurrent recommendations

of General Marshall's planners for the acquisition or protective occupation of the possessions;

Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Ch. II. 30

 Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 110-13; Conn and Fairchild,

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Ch. II. 31

 Memo, L. Duggan for Welles, 21 May 40, D/S 810.20 Defense/21-3/5; Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Ch. VIII.
12 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

problems presented by the changed situation in Europe. By the end of July

the President had approved the policy for providing arms assistance to the

republics.32

While the U.S. Army and Navy staffs were placing principal emphasis in

planning for hemisphere defense on preparations in the Caribbean Sea, South

America, and contiguous areas, the forces that were to bring Canada and the

United States into a close defense collaboration were at work. In response

to the 5 June request from Churchill, which accompanied his suggestion that

the safety of the British Fleet would not be certain, King proceeded in his

own way to "apply . . . pressure" on the United States.33 Shortly after

receiving the message, King sent Hugh L. Keenleyside, an officer of the

Department of External Affairs, to Washington as a special emissary on a

highly secret mission known only to one other person in Ottawa and to five

persons in Washington. Keenleyside met with President Roosevelt and

Secretary of State Cordell Hull and discussed with them the Churchill telegram of 5 June. The telegram disturbed the President considerably, since

in it Churchill had given no assurances that he would not allow the British

Fleet to be surrendered and had suggested the possibility of a pro-German

administration in the United Kingdom.34

King interpreted the Churchill telegram as at least suggesting that his

pressure take the form of bargaining for U.S. entry into the war, using the

British Fleet as a lever. However, he apparently avoided this tactic and, instead, in replying to Churchill on 17 June, counseled against it on the basis

that some feeling was developing in the United States that the United Kingdom was in fact striving for such a bargain. At the same time King pressed

Churchill for an examination of the practical problems that would arise if

remnants of the British Fleet were to come to North America.35

Churchill's reply to Prime Minister King disclaimed any suggestion of

a bargain and recommended against dwelling on the possible consequences

of the defeat of Great Britain. On the one hand, he saw no need for practical preparations for possible transfer of portions of the fleet across the

Atlantic; on the other, he acknowledged that he could not guarantee the

course of events if Great Britain were defeated.36 For the public record, the

32

 Statement, Proposed National Policy re Supply of Arms to American Republics, dated

July 1940 and apparently approved and initialed by the President about 29-31 July, D/S 810.24/

123-4/21. 33

 See above, pp. 8-9. 34

 Memo/Conv, Moffat and President, 10 Jun 40, and Memo/Conv, Moffat and Prime

Minister King, 13 Jun 40, Moffat Diary. 35

 Memo/Conv, Moffat and King, 27 Jun 40, Moffat Diary. 36

 The reply, dated 24 June 1940, is quoted in Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 227.
CHAUTAUQUA TO OGDENSBURG 13

possibility of British defeat and surrender of the fleet were denied, as in the

forceful and vivid terms of Churchill's speech to the House of Commons on

4 June. Nevertheless, these contingencies found expression in secret discussions involving Prime Ministers Churchill and King, President Roosevelt

and Secretary of State Hull, British Ambassador Lothian and Canadian Minister Loring Christie, and the new U.S. Minister in Ottawa, Jay Pierrepont

Moffat.37

The emphasis on RAINBOW 4 planning testified to the serious consideration given these possibilities by the U.S. staff planners. The Canadian

Chiefs of Staff Committee, too, in its plan for the defense of Canada, revised

as of 9 July 1940, envisaged the possible loss of British Fleet supremacy in

the North Atlantic. In fact, by mid-July advance preparations were actively

being made in Canada for the possibility that all or part of the fleet might

fall back to base on Canada. These preparations included the installation

of anchorages, buoys, and nets and other protective devices.38 The problem

appeared to the Canadian Government to warrant exploration of new

solutions. Initial Canadian Approaches

On 14 June King and U.S. Minister Moffat, whose credentials the Canadian Prime Minister had accepted the preceding day, met and discussed the

many practical problems that the possible movement of the British Fleet, or

part of it, to Canada would present. King thought the time had arrived for

staff talks with the United States but wondered whether the suggestion would

embarrass, or be welcomed by, the President. The suggestion had not yet

been reported back to Washington two days later, when broader approaches

were made. In another meeting, on 16 June, Prime Minister King asked

the United States to provide Canada with matériel and training assistance,

and to supply troops in the event of an emergency.39

Similar approaches were made in Washington the next day, when the

Canadian charge handed Secretary Hull an aide-mémoire suggesting staff conferences "with respect to the naval, military and air defense of North America, having particular regard to the defense of the Atlantic Coast."40

 A sec37

 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 400 et passim; Memo/Conv, Roosevelt and Moffat, 10 Jun

40, and Memo/Conv, King and Moffat, 14 Jun 40, Moffat Diary; Memo/Conv, Hull and

Lothian, 24 Jun 40, Roosevelt Papers, Secy's File, Box 62; Memo/Conv, L. Christie and A. A.

Berle, Jr., 12 Jul 40, D/S 740.0011 EW 1939/4700. 38

 The Canadian plan of 9 July 1940 is at PDB 104-7; Memo/Conv, Moffat and Adm P. Nelles, 13 Jul 40, Moffat Diary. 39

 Ltr, Moffat to Secy State, 16 Jun 40, D/S 711.42/194. 40

 D/S 711.42/195.
14 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

ond aide-mémoire presented at the same time requested the sale to Canada of

forty-eight fighter and forty patrol aircraft.41

Coincidentally, a British request for staff talks was received at almost the

same time. On 11 June 1940 Ambassador Lothian laid before Secretary Hull

the suggestion that naval staff conversations take place. Hull expressed

doubts about their need but promised to pass the suggestion on to President

Roosevelt. Two weeks later, when Lothian again suggested military staff

talks for discussion of policies for future developments, Hull proposed, as

an alternative, exchange of information through diplomatic channels.42

The Canadian proposals fared only a little better. Secretary Hull's conclusion that it was not yet possible to give a definitive answer was transmitted to King on 27 June by Moffat. However, on the same day Moffat

received a letter from Under Secretary of State Welles, in which Welles and

Secretary Hull suggested, at President Roosevelt's instance, that Moffat

should ascertain in detail what the Canadians wished to discuss and should

bring this information to Washington. Welles considered that, after Moffat

had reported the information to General Marshall and Admiral Stark, it

would be possible for a Canadian officer to come to Washington secretly for

"technical conversations."43

Two days later, on 29 June, Moffat, at the suggestion of Prime Minister

King, met with newly appointed Minister of National Defense J. L. Ralston

and Minister of National Defense for Air C. G. Power. The Canadian officials stated that commitments would neither be sought nor given. The

agenda would include Newfoundland, where they thought the important air

base was vulnerable to air attack; St. Pierre and Miquelon, which they thought

should be occupied; and defense problems in the Maritimes, Greenland, and

Iceland. They discussed problems Canada faced in connection with the possible transfer of the British Fleet to Canada and with the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, which had been disrupted by the British failure

to supply promised aircraft. United States help was needed to meet critical

supply deficiencies, and, insofar as Canada's industry could meet them, Canada would wish to work closely with U.S. industry. Among the additional

suggestions that would be advanced for help from the United States were

the conduct of reconnaissance flights over the western North Atlantic and

41

 D/S 811.111 Canada/688. The action taken on this and subsequent supply requests is

recounted in Chapter IV, below. 42

 Memo/Conv, 11 Jun 40, Roosevelt Papers, Secy's Safe File, Lord Lothian Folder, and 24

Jun 40, Secy's File, Box 62. 43

 Ltr, Hull to Moffat, 25 Jun 40, D/S 711.42/194; Memo/Conv, King and Moffat, 27 Jun

40, Moffat Diary; Transcript of Discussion, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Marshall, Stark, et al., 3 Jul

40, Morgenthau Diary, Vol. 279, p. 149.
CHAUTAUQUA TO OGDENSBURG 15

the acquisition and development of air bases in the West Indies and Newfoundland through lease or purchase of land.44

 In a final conversation before

Moffat's departure for Washington, Prime Minister King entered an especial

plea for favorable action on the outstanding Canadian request for rifles, machine guns, and artillery, without which the troops to be called up shortly

could not be equipped, since Canada had sent nearly all such equipment to

the United Kingdom.45

In Washington, on 2 and 3 July, Moffat met in turn with General

Marshall and Admiral Stark, and with Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of

the Treasury, who had been charged by President Roosevelt with the conduct of arrangements for supplying matériel aid to the United Kingdom,

France, and others. For these officials, Moffat painted a very dismal picture

of the Canadian defense situation. Marshall, while indicating a readiness to

receive Canadian staff officers, feared that if they learned the true state of the

U.S. supply situation the effect might be more discouraging than helpful.

Furthermore, on 2 July an act of Congress was approved which made transfers from remaining stocks even more difficult. Stark, who was somewhat

more enthusiastic than Marshall about meeting some senior Canadian officers, suggested that the group could come to Washington ostensibly to consult the British Purchasing Commission but actually to meet at luncheon

with their U.S. colleagues. The meeting with Morgenthau brought out the

fact that British Commonwealth requests had always been received and acted

on as a unit, without questioning the allocations made by the United Kingdom within the Commonwealth. This procedure had apparently worked to

Canadian disadvantage.46

Morgenthau, Marshall, and Stark met on 3 July to discuss the perplexing

problems presented by Moffat, while the U.S. Minister in Ottawa continued

his discussions, meeting in turn with Hull and Welles of the State Department. Marshall felt that the U.S. supply situation was already so difficult

that, rather than weaken U.S. defense forces further by sending supplies to

Canada, a better alternative would be to plan to send U.S. forces to Canada

when the situation required it. He mentioned that the President had already

asked railroad officials how they would move 300,000 troops to the Maritime

Provinces. Apart from the obstacles in the way of furnishing matériel aid to

Canada, Marshall, and to a lesser degree Stark, did not see how a meeting

44

 Memo/Conv, 29 Jun 40, Moffat Diary. 45

 Ltr, Moffat to Secy State, 1 Jul 40, Moffat Diary. The Minister of National Defense "publicly reported on the difficult supply situation to the House of Commons later in July. (H. C.

Debates, 29 July 40, p. 2237.) 46

 Moffat Diary.
16 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

with Canadian staff officials could be held to discuss matters of substance,

since the basic policy decisions had yet to be taken by the United States with

regard to the problems that would have to be examined at such a meeting.

For instance, the U.S. military staffs had no policy guidance on what was

probably the major problem—the action to be taken if the British Fleet

moved to the North American east coast. Morgenthau pointed out, however, that the United States had something to gain from such discussions, for,

in the event war came to North American territory, a knowledge of Canadian

defense plans and capabilities would be helpful, not to mention the possibility of effecting some co-ordination of those defense plans with U.S. plans.

Later the same day President Roosevelt consulted with the officials who had

participated in the round of discussions and authorized informal staff talks,

which were to be secret and not to involve commitments.47

In preparation for the coming Canadian staff visit, the U.S. Army and

Navy staffs made a detailed examination of the statements of Canadian

requirements that had been presented in Ottawa and Washington. The recommendations of the staff planners were recorded in their hastily prepared

report dated 5 July 1940, "Decisions Required If Military Assistance Is To

Be Afforded to Canada in the Immediate Future."

 48

 The report considered

the three categories of Canadian requirements: matériel, training assistance,

and forces, the last having been requested in the event of emergency. The

U.S. planners concluded that the matériel requests, which included over

200,000 rifles, must have been based on the assumption of an attack in force,

whereas raids would probably be the largest German capability. The only

weapons they felt could be made available were 28,500 Enfield rifles, plus

20,000 earmarked for Eire if the latter were not sent. Ammunition for these

rifles would not be available until January 1941. As to training assistance,

they felt that the expansion of U.S. programs would require all available

training personnel and facilities, although they did feel that 1,200 personnel

could be accepted for "on-the-job" training with units.

The planners examined the desirability of immediate deployment of U.S.

troops to Canada and Newfoundland, rather than the emergency employment contemplated by the Canadians. The deployment of U.S. troops, they

said, would involve the neutral United States in the war. Furthermore, the

available forces could not be sent to those locations since they were inadequate even to occupy other Western Hemisphere possessions that might

soon need to be garrisoned. The staff planners recommended that troops be

sent only when attack was imminent and that planned reinforcements be

47

 Morgenthau Diary, Vol. 279, pp. 145-50; Moffat Diary; Hull, Memoirs, II, 834. 48

 The report is filed at WPD 4330-1.
CHAUTAUQUA TO OGDENSBURG 17

limited to one reinforced infantry division and a composite air group for

Newfoundland plus a second reinforced division with supporting corps and

army troops for the Maritime Provinces.

The recommendations were not acted upon formally, but they were apparently used as the basis of the U.S. position in the conversations that ensued.

On 12 July the Canadian staff officers — Brigadier Kenneth Stuart, Deputy

Chief of the General Staff; Captain L. W. Murray, Deputy Chief of the

Naval Staff; and Air Commodore A. A. L. Cuffe, of the Royal Canadian Air

Force (RCAF) Air Staff—arrived in Washington. The same day they met

and discussed Canada's defense problems with Brig. Gen. George V. Strong,

Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, and other officers of the War

and Navy Departments.49

The discussions were apparently inconclusive and left certain questions

incompletely considered. A few weeks thereafter written reviews of these

discussions and a restatement of the Canadian estimate of the situation were

transmitted to the War Department.50 They emphasized that reinforcement

by Canada of the meager Canadian garrison of one infantry battalion and one

flight of patrol aircraft already in Newfoundland would require equipment

assistance from the United States, for the Canadian equipment shortage was

most serious. The assistance immediately sought was equipment, and not

troops. In the event of an emergency need for U.S. intervention, it was estimated that three divisions in the Maritimes would probably suffice. The

study also suggested the possibility that it might be desirable for the United

States, after its entry into the war, to take over the entire defense of Newfoundland.51

The staff discussions in Washington appear to have had no significant

impact on the conclusions already reached by the U.S. staff planners in preparing for the 12 July meeting. Matériel assistance capabilities were estimated as before. However, the possibility of having to send reinforcements

to the Maritimes and Newfoundland was accepted as sufficiently good to

warrant the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff to

request the Intelligence Division to prepare the detailed information on those

areas that would be needed in the event troops were actually sent there.52

While exploration of this avenue of approach seemed to have reached a

dead end, pressures in Canada and elsewhere for some form of defense cooperation between the two countries continued to increase. Canadian pessi49

 Memo/Conv, Moffat and J. L. Ralston, 10 Jul 40, Moffat Diary. 50

 Ltr, Brig K. Stuart to Brig Gen G. V. Strong, 5 Aug 40, PDB 104-4. 51

 This suggestion is interesting in the light of the action the Canadian Government took

with respect to Newfoundland two weeks later. See below, pp. 29-30. 52

 Memo, 5 Aug 40, WPD 3845-3.
18 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

mism as to the future reached its lowest depths in the period after the

capitulation of France on 17 June. A week later U.S. Minister Moffat, in

summarizing the impressions of his first ten days in Canada, reported to

Washington that, as the rush of events had moved the war closer to North

America and disrupted the Canadian war program, the conviction was developing among Canadians that some form of concerted action was necessary.

When the isolationist Chicago Tribune on 19 June editorially advocated a

formal military alliance, Canadians were surprised and impressed, and their

conviction was strengthened.53

A group of influential people within and without the Canadian Government, viewing the quickened preparations of the partially aroused colossus to

the south, realized that new problems might present themselves from that

quarter, too, unless some means of collaboration on a basis satisfactory to

Canada could be established.54 This group reached conclusions along the

following lines: A United States bent on large-scale preparations for its own

defense and that of the hemisphere would be determined to take adequate

measures wherever they might be needed. If concerned about the inadequacy

of the meager Canadian defenses, it might and probably would insist on acting to augment them. Canada would have to co-operate voluntarily or

involuntarily. If, in considering the U.S. defense requirements in Canadian

territory, Canada unduly emphasized its independence of action, it might provoke the United States to a strong attitude that could threaten loss of Canadian national identity. It appeared that the best way to prevent such a turn

of events would be frankly to admit Canadian inability adequately to protect

its air, sea, and ground frontiers and to request U.S. co-operation in providing such protection on a continental or perhaps even hemispheric basis.

During the latter part of July Canadian opinion as to British ability to

withstand German attack became much more optimistic as a result of the success of the British air defenses, the German failure to launch an assault, and

other factors. But public favor in Canada for a consultative arrangement

with the United States continued to grow.55 In the Canadian House of

Commons the Prime Minister was asked on at least two occasions if defense

arrangements were being co-ordinated with the United States and if a formal

defensive treaty could be effected. King, keenly aware of the political implica- 53

 Ott Leg Telg 147, 23 Jun 40, D/S 711.42/193. 54

 On 17-18 July a group of twenty Canadians, including government officials, scholars, and

other influential people, met and drafted "A Program of Immediate Canadian Action." The rest

of the paragraph in the text reflects the tenor of the group's report. The group included Brooke

Claxton, Hugh Keenleyside, Alexander Skelton, R. A. MacKay, R. M. Lower, George Ferguson,

and others. This rather remarkable document is filed at WPD 4330. 55

 Ott Leg Desp 176, 26 Jul 40, D/S 740.0011 EW 1939/4900.
CHAUTAUQUA TO OGDENSBURG 19

tions in the United States of the latter step, pointed out that such a treaty

might be received differently in a neutral United States than in Canada, and

cautioned that, with the U.S. elections approaching, public discussion in

Canada of such a treaty might be inadvisable.56

Early in August 1940, when Canadian-U.S. negotiations were at a standstill, other developments moved to the front of the stage. Churchill's

efforts since May to obtain a number of U.S. destroyers was by July receiving the support of a group of citizens in the United States who called themselves the Century Group and who, on 11 July, advanced the proposal that

the destroyers be traded for bases in the British possessions in the Western

Hemisphere. The group widely publicized its proposals, which were circulated in a more detailed form to the President and other officials concerned

in the latter part of July.57

At a Cabinet meeting on 2 August, the decision was reached by the President and his advisers to seek a workable arrangement for effecting the trade.

The preceding day Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox had suggested to British Ambassador Lothian that the British desire for destroyers might be

usefully linked with an offer of bases. The suggestion bore fruit, and on 4

August Lothian advised Secretary Hull that Great Britain was prepared to

offer to the United States facilities for naval and air bases in the Caribbean

and Antilles areas, "as well as the use of the facilities for aircraft in Newfoundland which were constructed by the British Government at a cost of

three quarters of a million pounds." A memorandum transmitted the following day amplified the entire offer and stated that "United States aircraft

[would] ... be authorized to make occasional training flights to Newfoundland and to make use of the airport there."

 58

The 4 August conversation was the first specific interjection of a Newfoundland base into the destroyer-bases discussions, and it immediately made

the negotiations a matter of concern to Canada. Newfoundland, adjacent to

but not a part of Canada, had in 1934 yielded its government to a Royal

Commission, appointed in Great Britain, in order to obtain British assistance in solving its financial difficulties. Nevertheless, Canada had always

considered Newfoundland of vital strategic importance and counted the defense of the island a major responsibility in the event of war. The day

56

 The questioners were Messrs. M. J. Coldwell (Rosetown-Biggar) and Jean Pouliot

(Temiscouata), H. C. Debates, 31 Jul 40, pp. 2190-91, and 6 Aug 40, pp. 2539-40. 57

 For detailed accounts of the development of the destroyer-bases deal, see Langer and

Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, Ch. XXII, and Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of

Hemisphere Defense, Ch. II. 58

 Memo/Conv, Hull, Lothian, and others, 4 Aug 40, D/S 841.34/370-1/2; Ltr, Lothian to

President, 5 Aug 40, Roosevelt Papers, Secy's File, Box 59.
20 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

before he requested a declaration of war on Germany, Prime Minister King

had declared that "the integrity of Newfoundland and Labrador is essential

to the security of Canada," and had proposed that Canada aid in its defense.59

Shortly thereafter Canada sent some Lewis machine guns and rifles to Newfoundland. In June, after the defeat of France, Prime Minister King

announced that Canadian armed forces had arrived for duty in Newfoundland, where they were to defend the Newfoundland airport and other strategic

areas.60 In July 1940, when a new Canadian naval command for the Atlantic

coast was established, Newfoundland was included within its defense area, as

was also done for the Canadian Army Atlantic Command established on

1 August. Thus Newfoundland was for defense purposes affirmed to be a

part of Canada.61

Elsewhere developments were taking place with respect to British-U.S,

collaboration which appear also to have had a bearing on Canadian-U.S. cooperation, although, the extent of this bearing is not clear. Whereas the

June Canadian request for staff talks had initially received a more auspicious

reception than the concurrent British request, by early August the situation

had been reversed. The Canadian-U.S. talks were at a standstill. The British proposals for staff talks, initially rebuffed, were later accepted on a modified basis, and, in August 1940, senior U.S. Army and Army Air officers

joined with a Navy colleague already in London in informal talks.62

Prime Minister King had been a partner in the efforts to bring about a

closer U.S.-United Kingdom collaboration. Churchill, in his 5 June telegram, had specifically asked King to make such efforts.63

 However, it appears

likely that Canadian disappointment in the desultory progress of the CanadianU.S. staff talks was increased by the establishment of British-U.S, staff liaison

in London. With the German frontier upon the Atlantic coast, and with some

prospect of the war moving even closer to North America, the Canadian

Government probably viewed with some concern these developments for collaboration among the three countries. The over-all direction by His

Majesty's Government in London of Canada's war effort within a British

Commonwealth framework, and in close consultation with Ottawa, was acceptable and desirable when the battles were being fought in Europe. Under 59

 H. C. Debates, 8 Sep 39, p. 35. Newfoundland as a political entity comprises Labrador

and the island of Newfoundland. 60

 Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945, p. 43; H. C. Debates, 18 Jun 40, p. 854. King's

earlier statement on 20 May that "our troops are assisting in the defense of strategic areas in

Newfoundland" (H. C. Debates, p. 43) apparently referred to the matériel assistance provided

earlier, and not to a troop garrison. 61

 H. C. Debates, 29 Jul 40, p. 2093. 62

 A British-U.S. service liaison had been established as early as December 1937. The best

account of its development is given in the Kittredge monograph. A good account may be found

in Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations. 63

 H. C. Debates, 17 Feb 41, p. 813; Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 146.
CHAUTAUQUA TO OGDENSBURG 21

the same circumstances, a close British-U.S. liaison was acceptable. But as

those battles moved closer to its shores, Canada would understandably want

a stronger voice in the war councils and would feel that problems of North

American defense should be considered and decided in a Canadian-U.S. forum.

The projection of the United States into the Newfoundland defense scheme,

together with these developments in collaborative arrangements, apparently

increased the Canadian desire to effect a closer defense relationship with the

United States and motivated Canada to formalize its defense relationship with

the Newfoundland Government.

Subsequent to the decision made at President Roosevelt's 13 August Cabinet meeting to press the destroyer-bases agreement, the detailed U.S. proposals were transmitted to the British Prime Minister. On 15 August

Churchill acknowledged their receipt gratefully, and stated: "It will be necessary for us to consult the Governments of Newfoundland and Canada about

the Newfoundland base, in which Canada has an interest. We are at once

proceeding to seek their consent."

 64

Late on 13 August Loring Christie, the Canadian Minister in Washington, met with Sumner Welles, the Acting Secretary of State, and reported

that he was under instructions from his Prime Minister to seek an interview

with the President on the U.S.-United Kingdom destroyer negotiations.

Welles telephoned the White House to ask for an appointment on the next

day so that Christie could deliver an important message from King.65

King's message, which Welles delivered to the President on 14 August,

apparently included the suggestion that the two heads of government meet

in upper New York during a trip the President contemplated.66 On the 64

 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 407. The wording suggests the possibility that Ottawa

had approached London in this vein, although the point can be clarified only by consulting the

records in Ottawa or London. 65

 Memo/Conv, Christie and R. Atherton, 13 Aug 40, D/S 841.34/370; Memo, Brig Gen

E. M. Watson for President, 14 Aug 40, Roosevelt Papers, Secy's File, Box 62. Christie was

told that Welles could not be seen before 5:00 P. M. on the 14th, but he pressed the importance of an earlier meeting successfully. 66

 Memorandums by Welles recording the important conversations with Christie on the 13th

and the President on the 14th could not be found despite careful search. This gap in the documentation makes it impossible accurately to establish the nature of Prime Minister King's

representations and their bearing on the events of the next few days. Welles has stated it is

his "strong belief that King's message included the suggested meeting and that after discussion

with the President, he (Welles) informed Christie of the President's willingness to meet with

King as well as of the status of the discussions with Churchill. (Ltr to author, 25 Aug 53.)

Hugh Keenleyside, who was probably in a position to know, has stated in a manuscript that

Prime Minister King took the initiative in suggesting the Ogdensburg meeting. (The CanadaU.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defense, 1940-1945 [cited hereafter as Keenleyside MS], copy

filed at PDB 100-2.) If this statement is accurate, Prime Minister King's proposal may well

have been made in the message delivered orally to the President on the 14th. Alternatively, it

might have been advanced in a telephone conversation between King and Roosevelt, who fairly

frequently conversed in this manner. However, this possibility could not be explored since the

White House kept no record of such conversations and did not even record what important

telephone calls had taken place.
22 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

same day Moffat, the U.S. Minister in Ottawa, wrote Welles discussing at

length the growing demand in Canada for a joint defense understanding with

the United States. According to Moffat, all elements among Canadians were

now pressing for such an arrangement, though the Prime Minister realized

that any open initiative on his part might cause embarrassment or at least

controversy in the United States. Welles sent Moffat's report to the President on 16 August. With Prime Minister King's message and the Moffat

report before him, President Roosevelt was ready to act.67

Roosevelt was to leave Washington on the evening of 16 August by train

to proceed to Pine Camp in northern New York State to see Army maneuvers there the following day. The trip provided an excellent opportunity

for a meeting with Prime Minister King, and the President telegraphed King

suggesting that he come to Ogdensburg to meet him. On the same day,

and before receipt of a reply, Roosevelt acted on one of the points mentioned

in Moffat's report. At a White House press conference, he stated that conversations were going forward between the two governments on the defense

of the Americas. That evening King's acceptance reached the President

aboard his train a half-hour after its departure, and Roosevelt announced the

forthcoming meeting to press reporters aboard the train.68 Afterward he

again discussed the impending meeting at a press conference at the maneuver headquarters in Ogdensburg on 17 August before King's arrival. He

told reporters that the discussion with King would concern Pan American

defense and a specific course of action vis-à-vis Canada involving "greater

ties than we have had in the past."69

The Ogdensburg Declaration

Prime Minister King arrived in Ogdensburg by automobile shortly before

7:00 P.M. on 17 August. At President Roosevelt's request, Moffat accompanied King from Ottawa. The party boarded the President's train, which

67

 The Moffat letter and Welles' covering note of 16 August 1940 to the President are in

the Roosevelt Papers, Secy's File, Box 62.

Mayor LaGuardia of New York City, who was assigned an important position on the board

which was to be established by Roosevelt and Prime Minister King of Canada a few days later,

met in Washington with the President on 15 August. LaGuardia advised reporters they had

talked about problems of civil defense. Although the President may have been contemplating

the actions that followed in the next few days, it appears that they were touched off on the

16th by the Moffat letter and that the LaGuardia meeting was a coincidence. The meeting

apparently had no greater significance in regard to the Canadian situation than that it perhaps

put LaGuardia's name in the President's mind as a candidate for the U.S. chairmanship. When

the news of the designation reached LaGuardia a few days later, it was reportedly a complete

surprise to him. Unfortunately, as a matter of course no written record was made of the President's

White House interviews and consequently this point and many others must remain obscure. 68

 The New York Times, August 17, 1940. 69

 Roosevelt Papers, Press Conferences, Box 215.
CHAUTAUQUA TO OGDENSBURG 23

moved approximately eight miles to Heuvelton, New York, for the night.

That evening the President and the Prime Minister, together with Secretary

of War Henry L. Stimson, who had accompanied Roosevelt to the maneuver

area, dined together and continued to confer until after 11:00 P.M.

Several accounts of the discussions are available. Stimson recorded a firsthand account in his diary. Moffat similarly recorded the account rendered

by King during the course of their return drive to Ottawa, and King later

gave a summary report on the meeting in the House of Commons on 12

November.70

The meeting and discussions were a complete surprise to Secretary of

War Stimson. According to his account, President Roosevelt opened the

informal meeting by reciting the history of the destroyer-bases negotiations

and enumerating the different places in the British possessions where there

were to be naval and air bases. Then, according to Stimson, when the President "came to the Canadian matter, he pointed out that of course Canada

being a dominion, the negotiation must be with Canada, and that was the

purpose of the meeting that night." He went on to suggest establishment

of a joint board, composed of representatives from each country, which should

discuss plans for the defense of the northern half of the Western Hemisphere,

but particularly against attack by way of the St. Lawrence or the northeastern

coast of Canada. "He pointed out that he wanted to have a naval base and

an air base somewhere in that region. He mentioned specifically some place

like Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, or some place further along to the eastward

along the Nova Scotia coast."71

Additional light is cast on the discussions by Moffat's record of the

account given him by King. In describing the destroyer-bases negotiations,

Roosevelt indicated that, if Canada wanted any of the ships, this was a matter for United Kingdom-Canadian negotiation. As to the bases needed, these

fell into three groups —those to be selected by the United States and Great

Britain; those in Newfoundland, where Canada had an interest; and those

in Canada, which would be selected by the United States and Canada. King

felt that the Canadian base or bases would be granted by the Canadian Government under its war powers and without submission of the matter to Parliament. The practical arrangement would involve a limited free port where

the United States would establish docks and facilities. In order to avoid

hurting Canadian feelings, the United States would not object to the use of

70

 King was apparently in the habit of writing memorandums recording his conversations

with the President, and presumably such a record for the Ogdensburg discussions may be found

in Ottawa. 71

 Stimson Diary, 17 Aug 40.
24 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Canadian forces to defend such bases. As to the new board, Under Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal had been mentioned as the probable

head of the U.S. section, while it was thought tentatively that the other members would be the heads of the armed services.72

After spending the night on the train, Roosevelt and King reviewed a

display of military aircraft and, it being Sunday attended a military memorial

service. On returning to the train at Ogdensburg, the two drafted a joint

statement for issue to the press that embodied the agreement reached the

preceding day. The release, made shortly before King's departure for Ottawa

at 1:00 P.M. on 18 August, the second anniversary of Roosevelt's pledge at

Kingston, read as follows:

The Prime Minister and the President have discussed the mutual problems of defense

in relation to the safety of Canada and the United States.

It has been agreed that a Permanent Joint Board on Defense shall be set up at once

by the two countries.

This Permanent Joint Board on Defense shall commence immediate studies relating

to sea, land and air problems including personnel and material.

It will consider in the broad sense the defense of the north half of the Western

Hemisphere.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defense will consist of four or five members from each

country, most of them from the services. It will meet shortly.73

The outcome of the two-day meeting was eminently gratifying to its participants. Stimson told the others he "felt that it was very possibly the turning point in the tide of the war," and that from then on they could hope

for better things. He recorded, too, that King, who "was perfectly delighted

with the whole thing," told the President his "courage and initiative in

bringing [it] . . . out would be a most tremendous encouragement to the

morale of Great Britain and Canada." In reporting on the Ogdensburg

meeting to the House of Commons in November, King also called it the

most significant development in international affairs since the Parliament had

adjourned three months earlier, and said, "in ultimate importance, it far surpasses the formation of the triple axis."74

Moffat's subsequent analysis for the State Department noted that the joint

statement was the fruition of twenty years of work toward one of King's

three major goals, which were the establishment and maintenance of Canadian autonomy, support of the Commonwealth as a policy in the Canadian

72

 Memo/Conv, Moffat and King, 18 Aug 40, Moffat Diary. In his account of the discussion on leased bases, King mentioned that he had suggested such a trade to Churchill two

months earlier and regretted that this time had been lost. The reader will recall the similar

suggestion by Power to Moffat on 29 June. 73

 Canadian Treaty Series (CTS), 1940, No. 14; Department of State Bulletin, August 24,

1940, III, 154. 74

 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York:

Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 359; Stimson Diary, 17 Aug 40; H. C. Debates, 12 Nov 40, p. 54.
CHAUTAUQUA TO OGDENSBURG 25

interest, and the promotion of a close U.S.-Canadian friendship with the objectives of speeding Canadian development and bringing Great Britain and

the United States closer together as the best guarantee of peace. Despite

his constant efforts toward this third goal, King had probably not dared hope

for an arrangement as far reaching as that completed at Ogdensburg, and it is

likely that no one was more surprised by it than he.75

Prime Minister Churchill telegraphed King expressing the hope, but not

the conviction, that the Canadian public would approve the Ogdensburg

action. His estimate proved inaccurate, for with minor exceptions Canadians unanimously acclaimed it. Support from opposition elements included

that of the ultraconservative Tories, who saw the declaration as a step

toward U.S. alliance with the British Empire. Only minor notes of criticism were heard. These suggested that the United States would exact political concessions from a dependent Canada, or that the step appeared to be a

Canadian hunt for cover and a desertion of a Britain facing the possibility

of defeat. Nevertheless, these voices were small amidst the general acclaim,

and they served principally to evoke, in response, more numerous expressions

of approval that served to clear the air.76

The general Canadian reaction was matched by the U.S. response, indicated by a November 1940 public opinion poll. Of those queried about the

Permanent Joint Board on Defense, 83.8 percent approved its establishment,

while only 5.2 percent disapproved.77 This reaction approximated that of a

June 1940 poll, when 81 percent of the Americans interviewed were ready

to employ U.S. armed forces to aid Canada if it were attacked. The U.S.

attitude of community of defense interest with Canada was markedly divergent from the U.S. reaction to the European war. Months later, in April

1941, over two-thirds of those polled were unwilling to send either Army or

Navy units to Europe to help Great Britain.78

The arrangement embodied in the Ogdensburg statement was one masterfully designed to meet the needs of both leaders. Limiting the scope of

the arrangement to mutual defense problems made it generally acceptable

politically in the United States, where public opinion strongly opposed active

participation in the war. As if to reject completely any suggestion of aggressive intent, the word "defense" appeared five times in the 109 words of the

statement, once in each sentence but the last.

At King's suggestion, according to the President, the Joint Board on

75

 Ott Leg Desp, 21 Dec 40, D/S 842.00 P.R./192. 76

 Memo/Conv, Moffat and King, 13 Sep 40, Moffat Diary; Leg Ott Telg, to Department of

State, 20 Aug 40, D/S 810.20 Def/153; Leg Desp, to Secy State, 30 Aug 40, PDB 100-2. 77

 Public Opinion Quarterly, V (March 1941), 164. 78

 Ibid., (Fall 1941), 483, 496.
26 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Defense was designated as a "Permanent" one.79 By indicating a collaborative arrangement designed to outlast the war and to serve the two countries indefinitely, this designation also helped to counter any suggestion that

the arrangement would hasten U.S. participation in World War II.

The Permanent Joint Board, the declaration stated, was to comprise service representatives and civilians, and, on 22 August when the membership

was announced, the chairman of each of the two national sections was a

civilian. The inclusion of civilians raised the Board from the military staff

level to a higher politico-military level. This step also appears to have been

a concession to the still ardent desire of a neutral United States to avoid

actions that might speed its involvement in the war.

The Ogdensburg press release stated that the Board would make defense

studies, including problems of personnel and material. These terms of reference highlighted for the Board, as it embarked on its endeavors, two major

Canadian problems. The terms also limited the Board to an advisory function, with no executive powers, since the Board's recommendations would

be submitted to the two governments for their approval. In the Board the

vote of the great United States would count for no more than the vote of

Canada with one-tenth as large a population. The arrangement promised

to allow full expression of the Canadian view and to give Canada adequate

control over the defense measures that might be proposed for northern North

America. The President's stated purpose in arranging the Ogdensburg meeting—to obtain for the United States one or more bases in Canada—found

no expression in the joint press release. Geographically, the Permanent

Joint Board was given broad scope in its mandate to consider "the defense

of the north half of the Western Hemisphere."80

In establishing the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King followed, be it consciously or unconsciously,

79

 Ltr, John D. Hickerson to Lewis Clark, 27 Nov 44, D/S Office of Dominion Affairs file,

PJBD Membership. 80

 The use the Board made of the geographic rein given it will be discussed in Chapter II,

below.

A few years later an official Canadian publication stated that it was hardly a coincidence that

the Ogdensburg statement, with its geographic charter extending across South America to the

equator, was made less than three weeks after the meeting of inter-American foreign ministers

at Havana. "It also meant that for all practical intents and purposes Canada had underwritten

the Monroe Doctrine, a doctrine that had been extended to Canada" by President Roosevelt's

Kingston speech in 1938. (Canadian Wartime Information Board, "Canada and the InterAmerican System," Reference Paper 34 [Ottawa: 16 Feb 45].) No evidence has been found

showing a direct connection between the occurrence of the Ogdensburg meeting and considerations of Pan American defense planning. The foregoing statements should be viewed in the

light of the fact that Reference Paper 34, which was published to inform Canadians about the

inter-American system, argued strongly in favor of Canadian adherence.
CHAUTAUQUA TO OGDENSBURG 27

a fairly well-defined pattern for joint collaborative mechanisms between the

two countries. They could probably have chosen from a range of military

and/or political relationships, varying from something similar to the BritishU.S. Combined Chiefs of Staff committee established later to a purely informal and consultative liaison arrangement. Actually, the Board was similar

in composition and function to several other Canadian-U.S. agencies already

in existence.

In 1909 the United States and Great Britain had signed a treaty relating

to boundary problems between Canada and the United States.81 The treaty

provided for the establishment of an International Joint Commission, a fulltime body made up of six commissioners, three Canadian and three American. The commission was granted final authority over certain questions

relating to boundary waters, and was also to investigate and report upon

such other boundary questions as the two signatories might agree to refer

to it. The commission had been markedly successful in solving boundary

questions, which up to the time of its establishment had been a continuing

thorn in the relationships of the two countries.82

By 1940 this precedent had been followed in solving several other generally similar problems, all pertaining to jointly used fisheries, although the

authority and purposes of the bodies varied slightly in each instance. The

International Fisheries Commission performed certain advisory and operating

functions for the North Pacific and Bering Sea halibut fisheries; the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission made recommendations for

the preservation of the Fraser River salmon fisheries; and a Board of Inquiry

for the Great Lakes Fisheries performed similar functions for those waters.

It is probably a fair estimate that the successful work of the International

Joint Commission and of the other similar bodies suggested to the President

and Prime Minister the use of a similar mechanism to study common defense

problems.

The actions taken at Ogdensburg in August 1940 have been variously

referred to as the Ogdensburg Agreement and the Ogdensburg Declaration.

A few weeks after the meeting Prime Minister King, in a letter to the President, made a distinction between the two, expressing the opinion that the

"Ogdensburg Agreement" was reached on 17 August during the long evening discussion and should carry that date. The Ogdensburg Declaration,

81

 United States Treaty Series (TS), 548; British Treaty Series, 1910, No. 23. 82

 For a detailed study of the commission, see Chirakaikaran J. Chacko, The International

Joint Commission (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932). See also A. G. L. McNaughton,

"Organization and Responsibilities of the International Joint Commission," Engineering Journal.

XXXIV (January 1951), 2-4, 12.
28 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

made on the 18th, "was merely the statement of terms." King made the

same distinction in informing Moffat that he had asked the President for

his view, but he acknowledged the merit of using the 18th, which was the

anniversary of the President's Kingston speech. The President apparently

never responded to King's discussion of the choice between dates, and, in

reporting on the meeting to the House of Commons in November, the

Canadian Prime Minister stated that "the Ogdensburg Agreement was

reached on August 17" and the "joint statement with respect to the agreement which had been reached was, on August 18, released for publication."

 83

On the U.S. side, neither King's distinction nor any views of the President

thereon reached the staff levels concerned with implementation of the

arrangements. The joint statement of 18 August was published in the official Department of State Bulletin without use of a title. That date has been

generally accepted by U.S. agencies, and the predominant usage has favored

the Ogdensburg Declaration alternate, although the term "Agreement" has

also been applied.84 On the Canadian side, the predominant usage seems

to have been the Ogdensburg Agreement.85

The importance that each of the parties attached to the declaration can

probably not be measured by the degree of formality by which each subscribed

to it. Prime Minister King submitted to the Ministerial Committee of the

Privy Council his report, dated 20 August 1940, narrating his conversations

with the President and recommending that his actions be ratified and confirmed. King's Cabinet Ministers concurred in his recommendations and

submitted them to the Governor General, who approved them by a minute

of council on 21 August, thus formally ratifying and confirming the establishment of the. Permanent Joint Board on Defense.86

 In the United States,

the Ogdensburg Declaration was merely published in the Department of

83

 Ltr, King to Roosevelt, 7 Sep 40, Roosevelt Papers, Secy's File, Box 69; Memo/Conv, King

and Moffat, 3 Oct 40, U.S. Emb 715/710 Prime Minister; H. C. Debates, 12 Nov 40, pp. 54, 57.

By coincidence, 17 August (1874) was King's birthday. If this distinction is made, it is interesting

to note that the "Ogdensburg Agreement" was actually reached at Heuvelton. 84

 For example, it was used by the President in Samuel Rosenman (compiler), The Public

Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, XIII, Victory and the Threshold of Peace, 1944-45

(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), p. 589, and by Secretary of State Hull in his note dated

30 November 1942 published in Executive Agreement Series (EAS), 287. 85

 See the repeated references to the Ogdensburg Agreement by King in his 12 November

1940 report to Parliament, H. C. Debates, pp. 54-61; Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics,

The Canada Year Book, 1945 (Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1945), p. 705; and Canada

at War, No. 25 (Jun 43), p. 57, No. 30 (Nov 43), p. 39, and No. 32 (Jan 44), p. 56. The

last publication erroneously states in each instance, "Canada and the United States signed the

agreement." 86

 King described the procedure to the Parliament in these terms, which appear to exaggerate

the formality of the procedure of obtaining Canadian governmental approval. (H. C. Debates,

12 Nov 40, pp. 56-57.)
CHAUTAUQUA TO OGDENSBURG 29

State Bulletin. The President issued no written instruction directing implementation of the declaration, but he indicated this to be his desire during

the course of his telephone conversations from Hyde Park on 19 August to

the Departments of State, War, and Navy. Soon after its publication, the

State Department was queried by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg as to

whether the Ogdensburg Agreement should be submitted to the Senate for

its constitutional advice and consent. The Secretary of State replied that the

agreement hardly constituted a treaty, since it provided only for the study of

defense problems, and was "more properly to be denominated an Executive

Agreement." As an executive agreement, the President did not consider it

necessary formally to submit the Ogdensburg Agreement to the Senate.87

The Canadian Government formalized the declaration by publishing it in its

Treaty Series.88 Before taking this action Canada consulted the Department

of State as to its intentions regarding the publication of "certain agreements

between our two Governments, including the Ogdensburg Agreement."89

The Department of State replied that parallel U.S. action would not be taken,

since only signed or written agreements were printed in the Executive Agreement Series and since the text had already been published in the Department of State Bulletin.90

On the U.S. side, the Permanent Joint Board on Defense was, it is clear,

the personal creation of President Roosevelt. The War and Navy Departments were not consulted as to their views on the need for such a board or

on its composition and terms of reference, and were not even aware of the

President's intention to set up a board. The President had stated his purpose in meeting at Ogdensburg and in establishing the Board to be the

acquisition of one or more bases in Canada which his military advisers had

not considered necessary. Indeed, they were loath to contemplate the deployment of forces to eastern Canada, except when attack should become imminent. Nevertheless, the War and Navy Departments proceeded to implement

the President's undertaking and to carry out the declared objectives of the

Permanent Joint Board on Defense.

Of the chain of events set in motion in early August, one more should

be noted. The sudden projection of the United States into the Newfoundland defense picture during the destroyer-bases negotiations apparently motivated Canada not only to join readily in a collaborative arrangement with

87

 Congressional Record, Vol. 86, Pt. II, p. 12056. 88

 CTS, 1940, No. 14. 89

 Ltrs, H. Wrong, Cdn Leg, to Hickerson, 25 Jul and 11 Sep 41, D/S 842.20 Def/93 1/2

and/129. 90

 Ltr, Hickerson to Cdn Minister Counselor, 8 Oct 41, D/S 842.20 Def/91.
30 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

the United States but also to formalize its defense relationship with the

Newfoundland Government. On 18 August Prime Minister King and President Roosevelt issued the Ogdensburg Declaration announcing the intended

establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense. On 20 August, two

days later and before the first meeting of the Board, an official Canadian mission arrived in St. John's, the capital of Newfoundland. In this interim

period the mission carried out its task in St. John's.91 During its stay on

20 and 21 August the mission, headed by Mr. C. G. Power, Minister

of National Defense for Air, and including senior staff officers and commanders, fully considered the problems of Newfoundland defense and reached

agreement in broad detail with the Newfoundland Government on all questions of co-ordination of defense measures. Under the arrangements effected

Canada assumed responsibility for the security of Newfoundland.92

Thus by the eve of the first meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on

Defense, Canada could view with satisfaction two important achievements.

It had clearly established and formalized its defense interest in Newfoundland, and it had joined with the United States in a collaborative arrangement that promised to assist in meeting urgent Canadian defense requirements on an acceptable basis. For its part the United States, still ostensibly

neutral, had entered into a working partnership with a warring democracy.

91

 Dawson, Canada in World Affairs: 1939-1941, p. 214, conjectures as to whether this coincidence with the Ogdensburg Declaration and the destroyer-bases deal was accident or design. 92

 Montreal Gazette. August 21 and 22, 1940. Compare this action with Brigadier Stuart's

suggestion sixteen days earlier that, in the event of U.S. entry into the war, it might be desirable for the United States to take over the full defense responsibility in Newfoundland. Later

in August, the Canadian Army established a new Atlantic Command, which included Newfoundland as well as the Maritimes and most of Quebec. (Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945,

p. 43.)
CHAPTER II

The Permanent Joint Board

on Defense

The day after President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King announced

their agreement to form the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, the President directed the State, War, and Navy Departments to select members for

the Board in order to permit the announcement of their designation on 22

August and an initial meeting early in the week of 25 August. On 20

August the Canadian Minister in Washington suggested to the Department

of State that the Board meet initially in Ottawa on 22 August. He also

suggested that the agenda for the meeting include discussions of the sea, air,

and coastal defenses of Newfoundland and the eastern and western coastal

areas of Canada and the United States, and of the problem of procuring armament and ammunition.1

The United States was unable to be ready by the early date the Canadian

Prime Minister had proposed, and King arranged instead, by telephone conversation with President Roosevelt, for an initial meeting on the 26th. During the conversation King suggested that each section include a recording

secretary and indicated he would name Hugh L. Keenleyside of the Department of External Affairs, his special emissary to Washington the preceding

June, to that post. Roosevelt responded that he would fill the additional

position with a State Department officer of Welles' selection.2 Later the

same day, 22 August, the full membership of the new Board was announced.3

The Honorable Fiorello H. LaGuardia, president of the U.S. Conference

of Mayors and Mayor of New York City, was named chairman of the U.S.

Section. Its senior Army member was Lt. Gen. Stanley D. Embick, who

had been commanding the Third Army. Captain Harry W. Hill, assigned

to the War Plans Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,

1

 Ltr, Acting Secy State to SW, 20 Aug 40, PDB 100; The New York Times, August 20, 1940. 2

 Keenleyside MS; Memo/Conv, King and Moffat, 22 Aug 40, Moffat Diary. 3

 White House Press Release, 22 Aug 40. Although President Roosevelt during the Ogdensburg meeting had tentatively mentioned James Forrestal of the Navy Department for the chairmanship of the U.S. Section, the designation went to Mayor LaGuardia, who had met with the

President on the eve of his departure for Ogdensburg. The three Canadian service designees

were those who Had participated in the informal staff talks in July. (Memo/Conv, King and

Moffat, 18 Aug 40, Moffat Diary.)
32 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

was appointed as the Navy member. Two Air officers, Commander Forrest

P. Sherman of the Navy and Lt. Col. Joseph T. McNarney of the Army Air

Corps, were assigned to the U.S. Section, and John D. Hickerson, the

Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, Department of State,

was named secretary.

The Canadian Section was headed by O. M. Biggar, K.C., a distinguished

Ottawa barrister and retired Army colonel, as chairman. The Army member was Brigadier Kenneth Stuart, D.S.O., M.C., Deputy Chief of the

Canadian General Staff; Captain L. W. Murray, Deputy Chief of the Naval

Staff represented the Royal Canadian Navy; and Air Commodore A. A. L.

Cuffe of the Air Staff, Royal Canadian Air Force, was appointed Air member. Hugh L. Keenleyside, Counselor of the Department of External Affairs,

was named secretary of the Canadian Section.

Since the first meeting of the Permanent Joint Board came almost as precipitately as its establishment, there were few administrative preparations on

the U.S. side beyond the formulation of an agenda. Pondering their mission

and the broad terms of reference contained in the Ogdensburg Declaration,

General Embick, Captain Hill, and Mr. Hickerson met on 23 August to discuss the forthcoming meeting. As preparation for the discussions of military

matters, they had before them the record of the informal staff conversations

that had already taken place. Puzzled as to the role and specific duties Mayor

LaGuardia would have in the military discussions that were anticipated, they

concluded that the mayor would probably handle the mutual requirements

for materials and production output. Hickerson counseled the members of

the U.S. Section to consider the problems before the Board always in terms

of reciprocal and mutual measures. If they did so, even though in many instances the necessary resources might be contributed largely or entirely by

the United States, such an approach would naturally produce a more favorable reaction on the part of the Canadian Section.4

A meeting of the U.S. Section took place the next day with President

Roosevelt and Secretaries Stimson and Knox. The meeting, which Mayor

LaGuardia joined after the discussions had begun, provided the President an

opportunity to present his views on the duties of the Board and the question

of defending Canada and the United States from attack. He discussed the

action being taken to obtain bases in British territories in return for destroyers

and the bearing of this action on the question of getting bases in Canada.

There really was no relation, he pointed out, since the problem of securing

U.S. bases in Canada was one for discussion with Ottawa, not London.

4

 Summary of Preparatory Conference, PDB 100.
THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE 33

Knowing eastern Canada well, the President had some specific ideas as to

where U.S. bases should be located to defend the United States against attack through Canada, and he proceeded to outline his views. With this

guidance, the U.S. Section proceeded to Ottawa to meet with its Canadian

counterpart.5

The initial meetings of the Permanent Joint Board took place as scheduled

in Ottawa on 26-27 August 1940 and were most fruitful in terms of formal

recommendations. The Board adopted seven recommendations during these

meetings, more than one-fifth of the thirty-three made between the time of

the Board's establishment and V-J Day. This can be explained in part by

the fact that many problems had been urgently awaiting solution and some

preliminary work had already been done on them at the earlier military staff

talks.

Organization and Composition

The Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, was organized in two national sections, each with its own chairman and physically

separate and independent administrative machinery.6 Only on the occasion

of the Board's scheduled meetings did the two sections unite as a single corporate body with but a single purpose—the adequate joint defense of the two

countries.7 At other times the members of the Board operated from the

offices of the two sections, located in the respective capitals. At the Board

meetings the two chairmen sat side by side, and when meetings were held in

Canada the Canadian chairman presided, whereas at meetings in the United

States the U.S. chairman did so.8

Supplementing the joint meetings of the two sections of the Permanent

Joint Board was a continuous and substantial correspondence and telephonic

liaison between the pairs of corresponding members of the Board. Through

these means the Board followed up implementation of the conclusions and

recommendations decided on at its meetings, paved the way for new proposals, and in a variety of ways facilitated the joint defense measures of the

two countries.

Officially, the primary mission of the Board was to make recommendations, and its two sections had no executive authority or responsibility within

5

 Stimson Diary, 24 Aug 40. 6

 Although the past tense is used throughout this description of the Board, the organization

and functioning described remained substantially unchanged at the time of this writing. 7

 Address by Gen A. G. L. McNaughton, 12 Apr 48, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 48/18. 8

 Keenleyside MS. Keenleyside was the Canadian secretary from the time of the Board's

establishment until 1 September 1945. However, General McNaughton, who assumed Canadian

chairmanship in August 1945, has indicated that during his tenure the chairmen had been presiding jointly. (McNaughton address cited above, n. 7.)
34 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

their governments. One of the Canadian chairmen has stated that the strength

of the Board lay in this fact.9 Operating problems were, in theory, handled

through the military attaches and, after its establishment in 1942, the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington. In practice, the Board did not limit itself

to making policy recommendations, and in both Ottawa and Washington

the sections of the Board, through their members drawn from the military

departments and the Departments of State and of External Affairs, functioned

informally and unofficially as executive agencies. Additionally, the substantial volume of correspondence between the two sections of the Board, and

between the individual members and their counterparts, formed a major alternate channel between the military and political departments of the two

countries.

The responsibility of the sections of the Permanent Joint Board was to

the highest level of authority in each country. In the United States, formal

recommendations were presented directly to the President, usually by the

U.S. chairman or the secretary acting for him. Approval of a recommendation constituted the basis for the necessary implementing action by the appropriate executive departments. The Canadian Section of the Board reported

directly to the Cabinet War Committee, over which the Prime Minister presided.10

 Its approval of Board recommendations constituted a directive for

their execution.

The two civilian chairmanships of the Permanent Joint Board were filled

throughout the war by the men originally appointed. LaGuardia, who was

selected as chairman of the U.S. Section by the President personally, retained

his post until his death on 20 September 1947, at which time he was the last

of the original members still serving on the Board. Less than two months

before his designation, he had on 25 June 1940 addressed the U.S. Conference

of Mayors in Ottawa. In this speech he had emphasized the importance to

the United States of making secure all of the Western Hemisphere seaboard

and had pointed out the need for Canadian-U.S. co-operation for this security.

Biggar's tenure as chairman of the Canadian Section continued until shortly

after V-J Day, although a period of illness beginning about January 1944

forced his absence from subsequent Board meetings except for those held in

April 1945. During his absence the Canadian secretary, Hugh Keenleyside,

acted as chairman. (Table 1)

The Canadian Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives functioned in

two capacities—as Board members, and as staff officers dealing with the same

types of problems in their respective service staffs. When functioning in 9

 McNaughton address cited above, n. 7. 10

 Organization Chart, H. C. Debates, 21 Jun 48, p. 5828.
THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE 35

staff capacities they were, of course, responsible individually to their respective chiefs of staff. Such an arrangement made for close co-ordination between the Canadian Section and National Defense Headquarters.

In the United States, where the Air components were not independent,

the War and Navy Departments each furnished a senior non-Air officer. In

addition, an Air officer of lesser rank was provided from the war planning

staffs of each of the departments to permit inclusion of Air representation

without allowing one or the other department a stronger position. (See

Table 1.) As a general rule, the U.S. senior service representatives sat physically and organizationally outside the War Department General Staff and the

staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, although in close proximity thereto.

The lack of responsibility to these staffs had some advantages, but it necessitated a continuing liaison effort to insure that staff views were taken fully

into account.

The U.S. Section initially outnumbered the Canadian Section by one service member. This situation prevailed for only a few weeks. On 11 September 1940 Prime Minister King, who had intimated at the time of the original

announcement of the membership of the Board that an additional Canadian

member might be named later, sought and received the concurrence of the

President and Secretary of State Hull in such a step. On 11 October the

Canadian secretary accordingly advised the U.S. secretary that the Canadian

Government had appointed Lt. Col. George P. Vanier as an additional member. When the new member took his place on the Board, the members of

the U.S. Section conjectured that the step had also been taken to permit inclusion of a French-Canadian on the Board. When Vanier, then a brigadier,

resigned about the end of 1942 to accept a diplomatic post overseas, he was

not replaced.11

Both secretaries held additional positions in the Departments of State and

External Affairs during World War II. The U.S. secretary was immediately

responsible for Canadian affairs in the Department of State, and Keenleyside,

the first Canadian secretary, was initially a counselor in his department and

subsequently Assistant Under Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Appointments of members to the Canadian Section were made by the

11

 Ltr, Cdn Secy to U.S. Secy, 11 Oct 40, PDB 100; Ltr, Christie to Secy State, 14 Oct 40,

D/S 842.20 Def/35. At about the time of Brigadier Vanier's resignation, however, the Canadian Army member began to be accompanied by an assistant, who, although not formally designated a member, kept the Canadian Section numerically equal to the U.S. Section. Numerical

equality was formally achieved in 1947 when, as a result of the establishment in Washington

of a Department of the Air Force, U.S. service representation on the Permanent Joint Board

on Defense was limited to three officers, one Army, one Navy, and one Air Force.


38 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Privy Council through the medium of its Orders-in-council.12 On the U.S.

side, the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy submitted recommendations

for changes involving their personnel to the President, who apparently routinely accepted and approved the nominations.

The office of the U.S. secretary was nominally the office of record for the

U.S. Section. Actually, since the major part of the Board's work pertained

to the War Department, the office of the Senior U.S. Army Member

(SUSAM), who was also the senior U.S. service member, became the repository of the greater volume of records pertaining to the Board. Likewise, the

U.S. Navy members, located in still a third office, maintained an independent

set of records pertaining to naval matters.

Relationships between the members of the two sections were always frank

and cordial. Although, particularly in the first eighteen months of the

Board's existence, there were numerous occasions on which divergent views

were forcefully and forthrightly presented, a spirit of understanding and

friendliness was always in evidence. On the other hand, the Board in its

correspondence never reflected the "Dear Henry" informality of which World

War II officialdom was so fond. The chairmen addressed each other as

"Dear Mr. Mayor" and "My dear Colonel." The same restrained informality

marked exchanges between the senior Army members, who saluted each other

as "My dear General so-and-so." The careful selection of Board members

on both sides helped considerably in the development of the excellent spirit

of co-operation and high mutual esteem that prevailed during the Board's

wartime endeavors.

The wartime experience indicated, too, that the pattern of membership

embodying a civilian chairman over a predominantly military membership

was particularly well adapted to the situation. The properly selected civilian

chairman was able to consider the military requirements recommended by his

section and the practical realities of the domestic political and economic situation in the other country, and to bring the two into balance where necessary. In situations where those realities constituted a hurdle, the prospects

of favorable action on U.S. requirements were the greater because the Canadian Section was aware that the requirements had been screened and validated and were supported by a U.S. chairman fully aware of the significance

of those realities. Modus Operandi

Meetings of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense were the principal

medium of carrying out its primary purpose, that of making recommenda12

 For example, a letter of 11 February 1942 from the U.S. secretary to Mr. LaGuardia reported receipt of an order-in-council dated 3 February 1942, making a change in the Canadian

membership. (PDB 100.)

40 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

MEMBERS OF THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ARRIVING IN NEWFOUNDLAND,

September 1942. Front row from left: Hon. L. E. Emerson, Mr. J. D. Hickerson, Capt.

H. DeWolfe, Commodore E. R. Mainguy, Captain Bidwell, Mr. O. M. Biggar,

Mr. H. L. Keenleyside (in second row), Brigadier G. P. Vanier, Colonel Jenkins, Group

Captain R. S. Grandy, Air Commodore F. V. Heakes, Hon. C.J. Burchell, and Mayor

F. H. LaGuardia.

tions based on studies of the joint defense needs of the two countries. Joint

meetings of the two sections of the Board took place at irregular intervals,

as frequently as the Board considered them necessary to handle its work.

Thus the Board met monthly in 1940, but only eight times in 1941. (Table

2) United States entry into the war increased the number of meetings in 1942

to eleven. Thereafter, as the war moved farther from the Western Hemisphere and as fewer hemisphere defense measures were needed, the intervals

became greater. Seven meetings took place in 1943, five in 1944, and three

in 1945 up until 1 September.

Customarily meetings were held alternately in Canada and in the United

States. Except for the initial meetings in Ottawa and Washington, at which

there were official entertainment and publicity, Board meetings were not

publicized. Efforts to avoid publicity were usually successful except when

meetings were held in locations where the presence of the Board drew attention. On such occasions, press reports and speculation resulted from the

meetings. Especially during its first year, the Board held meetings at the
THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE 41

sites of proposed defense projects so that the members could study problems

at close hand. Such meetings were held in Boston, Halifax, San Francisco,

Victoria, Vancouver, Buffalo, St. John's, and while en route to and from

Alaska. At these and other meetings of the Board, participation by officials

concerned in the defense projects gave the Board full opportunity to explore

all the ramifications of the problems.13 In the later World War II years,

the Board usually met alternately in Montreal and New York, the latter location apparently as a matter of convenience to Mayor LaGuardia. The meetings themselves were held at a military establishment where one was available, or in a commercial facility, as for example the Hotel Windsor in

Montreal and the Waldorf-Astoria in New York.

Meetings were conducted informally. Ordinarily the Board preceded its

discussions of new problems by a review of the progress reports (six in all)

submitted by each of the services of the two countries. These reports reviewed the progress made on previously approved recommendations of the

Board and on other projects of joint defense interest. The Board would

then proceed to discuss problems remaining before it for consideration. No

voting procedure was used, and each problem was discussed until general

agreement was reached. When disagreements did develop, they were more

frequently along service lines than along national lines.14 All formal recommendations made by the Board were unanimously approved.15

Problems came up for discussion in a variety of ways. The Board might

take up a problem on its own initiative, perhaps as a result of its observation

of the need for new action or for changes in a previously approved project.

Alternately, an agency of either government might request one of the Board

members to present a problem to the Board for its consideration. The request might be in the form of a rudimentary idea requiring detailed study,

or in the form of a complete staff study with a specific course of action recommended. One item, the proposed highway to Alaska, had already been

approved by the President himself and in part by the Department of External

Affairs before it was considered and acted upon by the Permanent joint

Board on Defense. 13

 On 4 October 1940, Messrs. Emerson and Penson, Commissioners of Justice and Defense,

and of Finance, respectively, of the Newfoundland Government, took part in discussions in

Halifax; on 13 November 1940, the Board meeting in San Francisco, heard Lt. Gen. J. L.

DeWitt and Rear Adm. A. J. Hepburn, the senior U.S. Army and Navy commanders in that

area.

14

 Keenleyside MS. 15

 The Board did not quite achieve the record claimed by General McNaughton in his address

of 12 April 1948 (cited above, n. 7) of having reached every conclusion unanimously. At its

10-11 November 1941 meeting, the Board informally agreed "with the exception of the Canadian Air Force member" that certain measures were needed to hasten construction in Labrador

of the North West River air base. (Journal, PDB 124.)
42 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

In considering a problem or a recommendation, the Board members in

theory acted as free agents responsible only to the President and the Prime

Minister. Board approval of a recommendation gave it no status except assurance that the governments would consider it. As a practical matter, the

members all realized that adoption of the Board's recommendations was

usually continuent upon favorable reactions within the Departments of External Affairs and National Defense in Ottawa, and the State, War, and Navy

Departments in Washington. To the extent practicable, the members maintained such liaison as would insure their acting in accordance with the views

of those departments. However, such concurrence of views was not an essential condition of Board approval of a recommendation.16

 Likewise, the

Board members themselves might have doubts about the merits of a particular proposal but would recommend in its favor "for reasons of general

policy."

 17

The Canadian defense establishment and cabinet system probably lent

themselves to a more methodical processing of the recommendations of the

Board than did the U.S. machinery. Before recommendations were considered by the government, the views of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff were

obtained.18 Action by the Cabinet War Committee provided for integration

of the views of all the ministers whose departments were concerned.

In the U.S. Government no routine procedure or pattern was followed,

and, especially during the initial months of the Board's existence, the recommendations were processed rather haphazardly. A number of them were

apparently not submitted to the President at all. LaGuardia forwarded some

of them directly to the President without reference to the departments concerned, leaving it to the President to determine the views of those departments if he saw fit. Later, and more generally, the practice was for the

members of the Board first to get the concurrence of the interested departments, after which the recommendation was submitted to the President with

those concurrences indicated. Approval of a recommendation by both governments in effect constituted the necessary directive to the agencies involved.

Of the thirty-three recommendations adopted by the Permanent Joint

16

 For example, whereas the Twenty-third Recommendation, which envisaged the use of surplus Canadian air training capacity for training Americans, was approved by the Board and the

two governments, the War Department opposed any such arrangement. (Ltr, SW to Secy State,

13 May 42, PDB 119-6.) 17

 The Keenleyside manuscript cites this basis for Canadian approval of the Twenty-fourth

Recommendation, even though the Canadian Section questioned the strategic value of the proposed Alaska Highway. See also Lingard and Trotter, Canada in World Affairs, III, 67. 18

 Statement in "Canadian-United States Defense Collaboration," transmitted on 5 April 1948

by the Canadian Ambassador to the U.S. secretary of the Board, on file in the U.S. secretary's

office.
THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE 43

Board before V-J Day, twelve dated from 1940, eleven from 1941, four from

1942, five from 1943, and one from 1944.19 In addition, on 4 October 1940

the Board approved a First Report and submitted it to the two governments.

This report, later approved by both governments, included such portions of

the first eight recommendations as related to defensive deployments not yet

made. It included also extensive new recommendations for additional deployments to be made, facilities to be provided, and operational responsibilities to be undertaken.20

At least within the U.S. Section, procedures for obtaining and recording

governmental approval of the formal recommendations were apparently rather

loose during the early part of the Board's existence.21 The incorporation of

portions of the first eight recommendations in the First Report tends to confirm that those recommendations had not earlier been acted upon by the

governments. This omission is probably accounted for at least in part by

the fact that many of the actions recommended could be executed by the

services within existing authority and without reference to the governments,

and that, in instances where action was required by only one country, officials

in the other country probably considered reference to their government for

approval unnecessary.

In any event, almost all of the recommendations made by the Permanent

Joint Board were approved either tacitly or expressly.22 The Canadian Government did not approve the Twenty-ninth Recommendation, whereupon

the United States, which had actually completed its approving action, withheld report of its approval.23

 Canada also did not approve the Thirtieth

Recommendation as such, but it accepted the proposals in part so that the

Board was able to agree that the qualified action was a satisfactory response

to the original proposal.24

When most of these recommendations were made, they naturally con19

 Texts of the recommendations are reproduced below, Appendix A. 20

 Text of First Report is reproduced below, Appendix B. There were no further similar

reports approved by the Board, although a Second Report was drafted. (See Chapter V, below.) 21

 Until a review of the situation was initiated in 1951, files in the Departments of State

and the Army indicated no record of action by either government on the first eleven and certain

other recommendations except insofar as parts of the first eight were duplicated in the First

Report. Careful search of these files and those of the late President Roosevelt and of the U.S.

Section of the Permanent Joint Board revealed no evidence of submission to the President for

his approval of the Board's first twenty formal recommendations, except the Sixteenth, which

required his consideration of a Reconstruction Finance Corporation loan. 22

 Where express approval does not appear in the U.S. files examined, tacit approval is indicated by the subsequent correspondence concerning the implementation of the recommendations and by the progress reports rendered thereafter on each recommendation and appended to

the journals of the Board meetings. 23

 PDB 105-13. See also Appendix A, below. 24

 RCAF Progress Report, at meeting 8-9 Nov 43, PDB 124. See also Appendix A, below.
44 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

tained secret or restricted data and received no publicity, as was true of most

of the Board's work. A partial exception was the Twenty-fourth Recommendation concerning the highway to Alaska. Not only had there been

much interest in such a highway over a period of years but also, by its very

nature, information about this project could not remain restricted. The two

governments publicized their agreement concerning the construction of the

highway in an exchange of notes that quoted about two-thirds of the brief

recommendation.25 The only real exceptions were the Twenty-eighth and

Thirty-third Recommendations.26 Both of these pertained to the terms for

the disposition of United States property and installations in Canada, about

which there would inevitably be a great public interest, and there was no

need for security restrictions.

The policy of maintaining an official silence as to the work of the Permanent Joint Board received a strong impetus within the first few months

of its existence. When the First Report of the Board had been approved

by both governments in November 1940, President Roosevelt proposed that

the action be announced by simultaneous press statements in the two capitals. Prime Minister King demurred on the basis that such an announcement would give rise in Parliament to innumerable questions that he would

be unable to answer because of their military nature. The President deferred to this view, and the public remained unaware that such a broad program of joint defense measures had been co-ordinated.27

In its five years of life up to the end of hostilities, the Board probably

established a record for self-restraint in accumulating files. The total file of

records representing agreed documents of the Board as a whole aggregate

less than a cubic foot. These records comprise only the Journals of Discussions and Decisions prepared after each meeting, and, appended to the journals, the progress reports rendered to the Board by its members.

The journals are merely brief summary accounts of the discussions and

decisions at the meetings. They do not record the various positions taken

nor the arguments pro and con, but only the principal considerations involved

and the decisions reached.28 Initially, the journal was drafted at the end of

a meeting and circulated and amended thereafter through correspondence.

To shorten this procedure, the Board began to draft its journals during the

course of a meeting and to agree on its text in detail before adjournment.

In a number of instances the substance of the action of meetings lasting many

25

 EAS, 246; CTS, 1942, No. 13. See Chapter VIII, below, for the significance of the omission. 26

 Reproduced in their entirety in EAS, 391, and 444, and in CTS, 1943, No. 2, and 1944,

No. 35, respectively. 27

 Ltr, Welles to Roosevelt, 25 Nov 40, Roosevelt Papers, Official File, Box 4090. 28

 A sample journal extract is reproduced below, Appendix C.
THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE 45

hours over a two-day period was recorded on only two or three doublespaced legal-sized sheets of paper. To each journal was appended a series

of progress reports, usually six in number, for the Army, Navy, and Air Force

of each country. These were prepared before the meeting and submitted to

and edited by the Board as a whole. They, too, recorded an agreed understanding of action being taken or scheduled to be taken.

After each meeting the journal and progress reports were circulated within

the appropriate agencies of each government. They served the dual purpose

of providing information and of pointing the way for further planning. In

addition to those records of the Board as a whole, each national section

amassed a many times greater volume of intersectional and intracountry correspondence. Some of this was in execution of the Board's primary function,

that of study of and recommendation on broad defense problems. Problems

under consideration might be the subject of correspondence between the secretaries, or between other pairs of "opposite numbers" who would circulate

copies of the exchanges to the rest of the members to keep them advised.

The bulk of such additional correspondence was occasioned by the Board's

performing a wide range of operating functions, which apparently had not

been intended by its founders. Nevertheless, the channels available through

the Board seemed to fill a need and were used extensively for such purposes

as handling minor administrative matters not brought before the Board and

following up in detail the execution of approved recommendations.

The U.S. Section had no authority as an executive or operating agency

within the executive departments of the U.S. Government. Yet in efforts

to facilitate joint action the members of this section dealt with agencies of

the military departments on the operating and administrative level and, in

some cases, arrogated to themselves authority belonging to those departments.29

 Irregular as these procedures might have been, they were tacitly

accepted by the War Department and undoubtedly greatly aided the execution

of actions of joint interest.

The U.S. Section did not, during World War II, establish any regularized

working relationship of note with the Joint Board or the Joint Chiefs of

Staff (JCS), the joint organizations of the U.S. services. A few of the matters considered by the Permanent Joint Board were also acted upon by the

two U.S. joint agencies, but such instances were by far exceptions rather than

29

 An example of such an action is the SUSAM indorsement, dated 23 June 1945, of a basic

letter to the Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Forces in Central Canada, at Winnipeg. Such

an action was properly the responsibility of the War Department. Another example is an

acknowledgment, dated 2 June 1944, from Office, Chief of Engineers, to SUSAM which stated:

"Your instructions to this office require that the transfer of any improvement be cleared through

your office."
46 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

the rule. A notable exception before Pearl Harbor was the Joint CanadianUnited States Basic Defense Plan 2 (ABC-22), on which action followed the

same pattern as had the earlier action on the related United Kingdom-United

States plan, ABC-1. The ABC-22 plan was reviewed and approved by the

Joint Board, by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and then submitted to

the President for his approval. In June 1942 the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the U.S. plan for the North Atlantic Ferry Route CRIMSON bases,

which became the Twenty-sixth Recommendation of the Permanent Joint

Board. This review, however, was principally incident to Combined Chiefs

of Staff examination of the shipping requirements for the plan.30

The limited relationship before Pearl Harbor is explained in part by the

fact that the Joint Board considered only strategic and operational problems

requiring employment of U.S. military resources. The contemporary recommendations of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense often required action

only by Canada or were matters within the purview of the service departments. Additionally, the normal procedure of obtaining War and Navy

Department approval of the recommendations constituted, in effect, all but

formal approval by the Joint Board.

By the time the Joint Chiefs of Staff began to function, joint U.S.-Canadian defense plans had been completed and placed in effect. Similarly, twothirds of the World War II recommendations of the Permanent Joint Board

had already been made, while the remainder pertained mainly to administrative or other problems within the purview of the War and Navy Department staffs. Despite the lack of any formal or regularized link between the

U.S. Section of the Permanent Joint Board and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, no

serious problem of co-ordination existed. Since the service members of the

Board also functioned on, or in close liaison with the planning staffs of the

members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they were able to assure that their several planning projects were adequately co-ordinated and integrated.

Scope of Responsibilities

In establishing the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United

States, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King stated its mission and

responsibilities in only the most general terms. The Board was to "consider

in the broad sense the defense of the north half of the Western Hemisphere"

and to make "studies relating to sea, land and air problems including personnel

and material."

Undoubtedly the Canadian Section received from higher Canadian authority some guidance as to what it should seek to accomplish, much as President

30

 See below, Chs. IV and VII.
THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE 47

Roosevelt had oriented the U.S. Section. But the broad charter in the

Ogdensburg Declaration was never jointly amplified either by the founders

of the Board or on the initiative of the Board itself. When proposing the

first meeting of the Board, Canada suggested that initial discussions should

bear on the defense of Newfoundland and the Pacific coast and on questions

of reciprocal maneuvers and procurement of matériel. At the second meeting

of the Board, the Canadian Section made an attempt to clarify the over-all

terms of reference. The Canadian Section envisaged the scope of responsibilities of the Board as follows:

a. Disposition of Canadian forces and U.S. matériel needed in Canada

and Newfoundland to meet the threat of Axis attack.

b. Preparations needed in Canada and the United States to meet the

contingency of U.S. participation in defense against the threat, including

(1) physical facilities, (2) troop and matériel dispositions, and (3) plans for

co-ordinated action.

c. Long-term plans for the permanent security of North America including (1) military defenses, (2) raw materials stockpiles, (3) integration of

the production effort, (4) continuous revision of plans, and (5) research and

development co-operation.31

The Permanent Joint Board discussed this outline of its major duties but

did not consider it necessary to adopt it. Nevertheless, the Board recorded

that it "understood that the Canadian Section would use the outline for its

own guidance and for submission to the Canadian Government."

 32

 The

Board's views on the outline were not recorded. Points a and b are reasonable statements of urgent joint defense problems that faced the two countries.

Point c is somewhat puzzling, and unfortunately the journal for the meeting

records no clarifying discussion. It appears unlikely, in the light of the

gravity of the Allied situation, that the Canadian Section contemplated that

any resources could in fact have become surplus to the requirements of the

war against the Axis and available for long-term planning for post-World

War II permanent North American security. An alternate possible interpretation is that the offensive phase of World War II and the defeat of the Axis

were envisaged as bringing about the permanent security of North America.

But the word defenses would belie this interpretation. Another alternate perhaps envisaged long-term planning for projects to be undertaken only after

World War II was won. Still another possible thesis, in the light of the

fall of France and of Dunkerque and of the raging Battle of Britain, is that

31

 Ltr. Cdn Minister to Welles. 20 Aug 40. Roosevelt Papers, Secy's File, Box 77; Journal,

10 Sep 40 meeting, PDB 124. 32

 Journal, PDB 124.
48 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

point c was intended to cover the long-term defense requirements that would

have to be met if the United Kingdom were occupied. Fortunately, the passing months made this contingency more remote, and the Board was able to

address itself to limited scales of Axis capabilities and to the needs of

supporting the war overseas.

The President and Prime Minister gave the Board considerable scope

geographically. The northern half of the Western Hemisphere to the

geographer conventionally includes the area between meridians 20° west and

160° east, north of the equator. This area includes almost all of Greenland,

parts of Iceland and Siberia, all of North America, and all or parts of Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, and other adjacent South American lands. Significant

variations on the geographer's Western Hemisphere can, however, be found.

President Monroe in the message to Congress in 1823 that enunciated the

Monroe Doctrine referred to "this hemisphere" and "the American continents," apparently synonymously. The Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance

drafted by the Inter-American Conference in 1947 delineated an area embracing the two continents and Greenland. President Roosevelt, when weighing

the need for U.S. Navy patrolling and convoying in the Atlantic in July

1941, delineated for Harry Hopkins a hemisphere that included all of Iceland.33

The Permanent Joint Board followed a fairly narrow interpretation of the

general geographical bounds enunciated at Ogdensburg. Its first approved

over-all review of the defense problems facing it was the First Report of

October 1940.34 This report set forth the preparatory steps and allocation of

responsibilities recommended to provide for the defense of what might be

described as northern North America. The area embraced Canada, Newfoundland and Labrador, Alaska, and coasts of the United States adjacent to

the Canadian border. Greenland and Iceland were excluded, as were the

Caribbean islands, Central America, and the United States with the exception

of the coastal regions mentioned.

This narrower concept of the geographic scope of the Board's responsibility was also reflected in the Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense

Plan —1940, which was prepared by the service members of the Board, and

again in the Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan 2 (ABC-22),

prepared in 1941.35 This cannot be attributed to the lack of defense tasks 33

 TIAS, 1838; Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York:

Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 308-11. 34

 See Appendix B, below. 35

 The 1940 Plan is in PDB 122. Actually the First Report was based on drafts of the 1940

Plan prepared in September and discussed by the Board then. Large parts of the text were

common to both. ABC-22 is reproduced in its entirety in Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Hearings on Senate Concurrent

Resolution 27, Pearl Harbor Attack (hereafter cited as Pearl Harbor Attack), Pt. 15, pp. 1586-93.
THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE 49

in the areas not included. The United States-British Commonwealth Joint

Basic War Plan prepared during January-March 1941 set forth Army, Navy,

and Air Force tasks in other parts of the "north half of the Western Hemisphere" and recommended substantial deployments for the execution of those

tasks 3 6 In fact, the British Commonwealth forces then deployed in those

areas included a Canadian infantry battalion at Jamaica.

In effect then, the Permanent Joint Board limited itself to planning the

measures and the troop and material resources needed to defend northern

North America. It is probable that an approach of this scope was tacitly

accepted by both sections of the Board because it best met the needs of the

situation. The Canadian Section was able to assure itself that Canada and

Newfoundland would be reasonably well protected. It probably had no particular desire to participate in planning concerned with more remote portions

of the United States and North America. The United States Section was

able likewise to look after U.S. security interests in Canada without having

to give the Canadians full access to all the continental and hemisphere defense plans of the United States, which it probably could not have done

anyway.

In August 1940 President Roosevelt had made clear to Prime Minister

King, and to the U.S. Section of the Board, his desire to obtain a naval base

and an air base in the Maritimes, yet the U.S. Section seems to have made

no strong effort to carry out his desire. Some measures in that direction

were taken, but they fell far short of providing United States bases comparable to those obtained under the destroyer-bases agreement with the United

Kingdom. Under the Third Recommendation and the First Report, Canada

undertook to develop facilities to permit operation of four squadrons of U.S.

patrol aircraft and a composite wing of some 200 additional aircraft. Similarly, Canada undertook to complete the steps necessary to provide defended

harbors and "docking, repair and supply facilities capable of accommodating

the major portion of the United States or British fleets." Although Canada

did proceed to develop the necessary facilities, the United States was to utilize

them only when necessary and agreed, and it acquired no legal status thereat.

The United States made no use of the air facilities, but it was permitted the

use of Shelburne and Halifax as naval operating bases and of Sydney as an

emergency base after July 1941, when the U.S. Navy began active convoying

between the United States and Iceland.

The explanation of why the United States did not try to obtain more

may lie in the fact that the service members of the U.S. Section, reflecting

36

 The plan is Annex III to ABC-1, which is reproduced in Pearl Harbor Attack. Pt. 15, pp.

1485-1541.
50 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

the views of their services, probably had no real desire to obtain bases in the

Maritimes, which might have required commitment of forces that later would

have been badly needed elsewhere. In any event, the President on 19 November 1940 approved the more modest arrangements provided in the First

Report. By then, British stamina in the Battle of Britain had indicated that

the threat to North America was not as great as the prospect may

have appeared in August. Viewed in the light of the subsequent discussions

in the Permanent Joint Board, it appears to be a reasonable thesis that U.S.

effort to obtain lease-type bases in Canada might have met strong resistance

and imposed a considerable strain on the collaborative efforts of the Board.

Conspicuously absent from the list of defense problems considered by

the Board were those pertaining to Greenland. The islands of St. Pierre and

Miquelon also were discussed only briefly in November 1941, just before the

minor crisis precipitated by Free French occupation of the islands on Christmas Day, 1941. After this action, the journals were silent concerning any

discussion that may have taken place about the islands. Apparently the significant political problems involved in both cases made them patently problems for discussion on the political level. The occupation of Iceland by

British Commonwealth forces before the establishment of the Board eliminated the need for consideration of the defense problems of that island. Another notable, but not too surprising, omission was the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence seaway project. President Roosevelt's enthusiasm for the project understandably received no endorsement in the Permanent Joint Board, for Canada

did not consider the diversion of the necessary construction resources justified

during the war, and the War and Navy Departments had not yet been attracted by the military advantages of the project. Too, it was unlikely that

Mr. LaGuardia, mayor of the east coast's largest seaport, would press an

undertaking that was opposed by powerful railroad, port, and other interests

in his constituency.37

As the war progressed and the threat to North America receded farther

from it shores, the geographic scope of the work of the Permanent Joint

Board narrowed even further. The journals and progress reports indicate

that activities in Alaska gradually ceased to be considered. Throughout the

later war years, Board consideration was generally limited to projects or activities of mutual concern or interest in Canada and Newfoundland.

Another principle that established bounds for the problems of which the

Board took cognizance was the charge to consider only the defense of the

37

 See Chapter X, below. In the post-World War II period, the Permanent Joint Board

and the U.S. War and Defense Departments actively supported the seaway project on the basis of its military advantages.
THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE 51

northern half of the Western Hemisphere. The Board by and large succeeded in avoiding projects that did not have some relation to joint defense.

It is probably this fact that accounts, in part at least, for the absence from

the Board agenda of, for example, the First Special Service Force and the

Canadian Army Pacific Force, which were organized to fight in Europe and

the Pacific, respectively.38

On the other hand, several of the Board's recommendations did concern

themselves with projects whose primary role pertained to the war overseas,

although in each instance there was usually a secondary or partial role relating to joint continental defense. Examples are the Seventeenth and the

Twenty-sixth, concerning ferrying operations; the Twenty-third, relating to

the meeting of world-wide pilot training requirements; and the Twentyseventh, which was designed to facilitate the intercountry flow of all war

materials whether needed for the continental or world-wide war effort.

This situation became more general as the war receded from North American shores and a short-term defense requirement virtually ceased to exist.

Some projects that had been viewed by the Permanent Joint Board as purely

defensive measures, as for example the Northwest Staging Route, later played

a new and important role in the support of the general global war effort.

Toward the end of the war, practically all the joint projects and activities

that had been sponsored by the Board were in fact supporting the Allied war

effort cither in Europe or in the Pacific.

In the area of operating functions the Board's work was necessarily circumscribed by virtue of the existence of service attaches and their staffs in

both capitals, and the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington. With three

operating channels between the Canadian services in Ottawa and those of

the United States in Washington, there was understandably an overlapping

of effort and confusion as to responsibilities. Several efforts were made to

clarify these responsibilities and to delineate the types of matters which each

of the agencies should handle. For instance, an advice to the U.S. Section

of the Permanent Joint Board, intended to define the areas of responsibility

of the Canadian air attache and the Air member of the Canadian Joint Staff,

stated those of the former to include matters concerning U.S. Army Air

Forces (AAF) organization, Royal Canadian Air Force personnel in the

United States, visits, and American personnel in the RCAF.39 Those of the

latter included plans and operations, intelligence, communications, and aircraft and other equipment.

38

 See Chapter IX, below, for accounts of these organizations. 39

 Ltr, Air Member, Canadian Joint Staff, to SUSAM, 12 Oct 42, PDB 100-2. The division

of duties for the other services was probably comparable.
52 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

On several occasions the question of the role of the Board in operational

planning and in the direction of operations under the joint defense plan was

raised. In one case the head of the War Plans Division of the U.S. General

Staff indicated his belief that the Permanent Joint Board was exceeding its

competence in attempting to prepare strategic plans. On another occasion

the Senior Canadian Army Member pointed out to the Board that its service

members, and not the Board itself, had prepared plan ABC-22. Furthermore, the Board had not reviewed the plan, since this review, as well as the

execution of the plan, was a responsibility of the chiefs of staff of the two

countries.40 In regard to planning responsibility, it is apparent that, after

the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington was established, the Board had no

role beyond that of recommending preparation of plans or their revision when

necessary. Nevertheless, in its first year the Board clearly functioned in the

planning area—witness its First Report, which in effect constituted, in part,

a plan for the assignment of operating responsibilities.41

Functionally, the principal area in which the Permanent Joint Board

operated was in connection with construction of Army, air, and naval bases,

and of the auxiliary road, communication, weather, radar, and similar facilities required by the United States in Canada and Newfoundland. Collateral

subjects were the supply of materials and construction equipment, utilization

of air transport services, the operation of airways for such air traffic, the responsibility for the maintenance and operation of the bases and facilities, and

finally their disposition.

The most notable problem of this type not considered by the Board was

the Canol Project. The omission was apparently by design on the part of

the U.S. secretary, whose initial doubts as to the soundness of the project

were later shared by the U.S. Senate's Special Committee Investigating the

National Defense Program.42

Collaboration Through the Board

The important part played by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense in

U.S.-Canadian military co-operation before and after U.S. entry into World

War II is indicated by the scope and nature of its formal recommendations.

By the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, twenty-one such recommendations

40

 Memo/Conv, Brig Gen G. V. Strong and P. Moffat during latter's Washington visit 6-10

October 1940, Moffat Diary; Note, by Maj Gen M. Pope, CJS, 10 Aug 42, sub: ABC-22 and

the PJBD, PDB 135-3. See Chapter IV, below, for an account of the planning under discussion. 41

 See Appendix B. below. 42

 After this committee initiated its searching investigation, the U.S. secretary recalled to

Mayor LaGuardia that their hands-off position had been due to his foresight. (Ltr, 29 Dec 43,

U.S. Secy's file, PJBD 1943.) See Chapter VIII, below.
THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE 53

had been made that formed the basis for U.S.-Canadian military co-operation

throughout the war. Seven December 1941 found, as a result of the Board's

work, the requisite force dispositions already made, construction of the necessary bases, installations, and facilities under way, and defense plans complete.

Significantly, the Twenty-first Recommendation, the last approved before the

Pearl Harbor attack, was concerned with the establishment of arrangements

for maintaining facilities provided by one government for forces of the other,

as if to mark the ending of the preliminary phase of the joint relationship.

The more important subjects of the pre-Pearl Harbor recommendations

were as follows:

a. Exchange of information.

b. Forces and responsibilities for the defense of Newfoundland and the

Maritime Provinces.

c. Development of airfields in northwestern Canada for staging purposes.

d. Improvement of communications in the northeastern area, particularly the Newfoundland railroad and road systems.

e. Preparation of joint defense plans.

The entry of the United States into the war occasioned virtually no

change in the functioning of the machinery already in motion. It was necessary only for the military chiefs of the two countries to place the previously

prepared plans in effect. The volume and tempo of the detailed work of the

two sections of the Board increased, but the number of recommendations and

new projects diminished.

No real thought had been given to changes in the status of the Permanent Joint Board after the United States became a belligerent. Less than

three months before that event, the Canadian view was expressed "that if the

United States became a full belligerent the PJBD would go into abeyance, to

be resurrected at the end of the war."

 43

 Such a turn of events never materialized, and the Board continued to have a vigorous and useful wartime life.

After Pearl Harbor a few new projects were needed to meet additional

requirements, and recommendations were made accordingly. By and large,

however, the pattern of co-operation was well established and the Board's

principal effort was devoted to overseeing, expediting, and facilitating in

many detailed ways the execution of projects already in hand. The major

construction projects occasioned by entry of the United States into the war

and recommended by the Board were (a) the highway to Alaska, (b) the

northeast ferry routes across the Atlantic, and (c) the expansion of the air

43

 Memo/Conv, Moffat and Norman Robertson, 25 Sep 41, D/S 842.20/204.
54 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

staging route to Alaska. The Thirtieth Recommendation, approved by the

Board in April 1943, was the last to propose a new operational or logistical

project. The remaining three recommendations of the World War II period

related to the administration and disposition of facilities.

The Thirty-third and last wartime recommendation (in September 1944)

set forth the arrangements for the disposition of U.S. facilities and property

in Canada. Questions regarding termination of U.S. activities had arisen as

early as 1942 and had occasioned the adoption of the Twenty-eighth Recommendation in January 1943. The arrangements provided for by the modifying Thirty-third Recommendation proved adequate to cover the disposition

problem without further revision. But the execution of the disposition arrangements proved to be a substantial and administratively complex task

which fully absorbed the capacities of the U.S. Section of the Permanent

Joint Board throughout the remainder of the war and for some months

afterward.

Even in the spring of 1945, when victory was imminent in Europe and

only a matter of time in the Pacific, and throughout the balance of

the World War II period, the Board continued to limit its discussions and

actions to problems connected with the war. Problems of co-operation for

postwar defense were not raised in the Board, which apparently felt impelled

to let the pattern of postwar developments point the way to further collaboration. The usefulness of the Board had been proven, however, and, when

the two governments began their discussions of postwar security needs, it

became apparent that a role for the Permanent Joint Board in meeting those

needs would be assured.
CHAPTER III

Partnership Versus Triangle

During the months after the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board

on Defense and the initiation at about the same time of informal staff collaboration with the United Kingdom, the U.S. public continued to remain

cool to the idea of involvement in the European war. Nevertheless, preparatory measures for continental security were considered legitimate actions in

self-defense and had widespread public support. In this setting, the special

military relationship between Canada and the United States developed harmoniously without undue involvement resulting from Canada's membership

in the British Commonwealth and its participation in the European war.

The Roosevelt-Churchill Axis

The initial development of U.S.-British collaboration may have given

some impetus to Canada's desire to join with the United States in a mutual

defense scheme. The further development of that collaboration suggested

the possibility of even greater impact on the U.S.-Canadian relationship and

was therefore watched with interest from Ottawa.

The liaison established between the British services in London and the

visiting U.S. staff group in August 1940 became closer during the ensuing

months. With utmost secrecy and on an informal basis, the staffs explored

the actions the United States would have to take if it entered the war. These

were the first real steps in the direction of combined planning.

In the meantime, British Ambassador Lothian had presented to Secretary

of State Hull, on 5 October 1940, a proposal for the conduct of formal military staff talks on the Japanese threat in the Pacific. His proposal, which

was repeated later in October and again in November after the presidential

election, and which contemplated multilateral participation, was not found

acceptable in Washington. Yet it was probably this proposal that inspired

the broader U.S.-British staff talks that took place in January 1941.1

1

 For a discussion of these proposals and some interesting material on their relationship to

the elections, see Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

1950), pp. 126-27. As a matter of fact, after this rejection the Chief of Naval Operations

instructed his representatives in London and Manila secretly to explore the problem with the British naval staffs in London and Singapore.
56 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

During the autumn months of 1940 the war outlook changed substantially. British successes in defending against German air attacks in the

Battle of Britain, together with German failure to attempt the English Channel crossing during the most favorable periods, increased the conviction that

Great Britain would hold. In turn, the threat to North America was seen

as diminishing. In the War and Navy Departments, emphasis in planning

began to shift by the end of October from concern over hemisphere defense

toward the concept of supporting Great Britain.2

Immediately after President Roosevelt's re-election in November 1940,

Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, recommended that the President

authorize secret and exhaustive military talks with the British staffs. General Marshall concurred in the proposal, which the President approved. On

30 November Admiral Stark issued the invitation to the British Chiefs of

Staff in his own name.3

The staff group sent to represent the British Chiefs of Staff arrived in

Washington in January 1941. Between 29 January and 29 March, fourteen

plenary meetings with United States staff representatives took place. As

stated in the report of the conferees, the conversations had the following

purposes:

a. To determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the

United States and the British Commonwealth, with its allies, could defeat

Germany and its allies, should the United States be compelled to resort to

war.

b. To co-ordinate on broad lines the plans for the employment of the

forces of the associate powers.

c. To reach agreements as to the methods and nature of military co-operation, including the allocation of principal areas of responsibility, the major

lines of military strategy, and the strength offerees that might be committed.4

The United Kingdom representatives, on entering upon the talks, presented

themselves as the "United Kingdom delegation," which was to represent the

British Chiefs of Staff in their collective capacity as military advisers to the

War Cabinet of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. Both

the British Chiefs of Staff and the War Cabinet were parts of the United 2

 For a detailed account of the transition, see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare. 1941-1942, Ch. II. 3

 Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 43-44; Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor, pp. 138-39. 4

 Full text of the report, "United States-British Staff Conversations, Report, 27 Mar 41, Short

Title ABC-1," is reproduced in Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 15, pp. 1485-1541. Accounts of the

conduct of the staff talks are to be found in testimony recorded in Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 3,

pp. 991ff, 1053ff. More rounded accounts of the conversations are contained in Watson, Chief

of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch. XII, and Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for

Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, Ch. III.
PARTNERSHIP VERSUS TRIANGLE 57

Kingdom Government and not of any Commonwealth machinery. Consistently, the British group was referred to in British papers, and in papers

prepared by the joint secretariat that served the conferees, as the United

Kingdom delegation.5 However, the U.S. committee specifically examined

the question of nomenclature and concluded that it should refer to the United

Kingdom representatives as the "British delegation." This delegation indicated in its initial statement that it understood the object of the conversations to be the co-ordination of plans for the employment of forces of the

British Commonwealth, its present allies, and the United States. The records of the conversations do not indicate that the U.S. representatives in any

way questioned the authority of the United Kingdom group to speak for

the Commonwealth and its allies. The U.S. committee did consider the

question of participation of Canadian and Australian officers as observers,

and agreed that such participation was undesirable, although those officers

could remain available to the British delegation as technical advisers.

The conversations thus proceeded with, at best, only indirect representation through the United Kingdom delegation for Canada, other Commonwealth countries, and other allied belligerents. Despite this fact the British

and U.S. representatives in their talks and in the war plan prepared during

the talks made world-wide allocations of strategic responsibilities and of the

military resources available. The resources of Canada and the rest of the

Commonwealth were included and simply enumerated as part of the total

British resources. The war plan did take note of existing U.S.-Canadian defense planning by acknowledging that the measures needed for the defense

requirements of contiguous land and coastal areas of the two countries would

be covered in plans prepared by them. The report of the conversations,

dated 27 March 1941 and given the short title ABC-1, made provision for

methods of command and staff representation that proved unsatisfactory to

Canada. The report had, of course, a considerable bearing not only on the

form and substance of U.S.-Canadian co-operation but also on the role of

Canada and on the future conduct of the war.

As provided for in ABC-1, the British Chiefs of Staff undertook to secure

the concurrence of the dominion governments to relevant portions of the

report. They submitted ABC-1 to the Canadian Government for approval

but apparently had not yet received it at the end of July, four months after

completion of the report

 6 Earlier in July the Department of State had been

5

 Minutes of the plenary meetings and other papers prepared during the conversations are

filed in WPD 4402-89. 6

 The 28 July draft of ABC-22 merely states that ABC-1 had been submitted to the Canadian Government for concurrence.
58 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

notified that "the United Kingdom Government . . . [was] in general agreement with the report" on the staff conversations except for "certain subsidiary points—such as some of the proposals made in paragraph 6 of the

'Joint letter of transmittal,' " on which London had not yet made up its mind.7

In Washington, the Secretaries of War and the Navy approved ABC-1,

but the President merely noted it. Roosevelt's approval, tacit if not express,

was assumed, and the U.S. services used the plan as the framework for their

own global strategic planning.

On 27 May 1941, two months after the conclusion of the staff talks, President Roosevelt declared an unlimited national emergency. This date may

be said to mark the transition from the informal liaison in Washington and

London into a more-or-less formal and continuing combined U.S.-British

planning arrangement. In accordance with the provisions of ABC-1 but in

advance of the time specified in it, the United Kingdom had, in early April,

already established the British Military Mission (later designated the British

Joint Staff Mission) in Washington.8 On 17 June the first meeting of the

U.S. and United Kingdom representatives who were later to become the working members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff committee took place in Washington.9

As the United States intensified planning and preparation for possible

participation in the war against the Axis and increased collaboration with the

United Kingdom, its collaboration with Canada receded in relative importance. The work of the Permanent Joint Board continued unabated and

close interservice co-operation expanded. Since the foundations of U.S.-

British direction of the over-all war effort had been laid, Canada could but

watch the United States move into ever closer collaboration with the United

Kingdom.

Not long after Pearl Harbor the White House announced that military

staff meetings with the United Kingdom had been taking place regularly in

Washington and London. The announcement stated that the machinery for

joint planning would soon be expanded to include representatives of the

Soviet Union, China, the Netherlands, and other governments engaged in

7

 Ltr, Ambassador Halifax to Welles, 4 Jul 41, Roosevelt Papers, Secy's File, Box 74. It

appears not unlikely that one or more of the dominions may have objected to this paragraph,

which begins: "The High Command of the United States and United Kingdom . . . ." The

Canadian Government also indicated its dissatisfaction with the provisions of ABC-1 relating to

service liaison between Canada and the United Kingdom and United States in matters relating

to ABC-1. (See below, pp. 71-76.) 8

 The ABC-1 report provided for an exchange of missions after the United States entered

the war. 9

 Memo, BUS(J) (41)40, 4 Apr 41, WPD 4402-94; Kittredge Monograph, pp. 445-52;

Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, pp. 42-43.
PARTNERSHIP VERSUS TRIANGLE 59

the war. Secretary of State Hull urged President Roosevelt to establish a

supreme war council, with major power representation, along the lines of the

body that functioned in World War I. Hull opposed as an unwieldly arrangement the suggestion of Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, that the

dominion governments would probably have to be given the same status in

such a council as Great Britain. By early January 1942 the President had

concluded that a regional basis for co-ordination was best initially, and the

Hull proposal was dropped.10

While a supreme war council was being debated, arrangements were being

made for Prime Minister Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff to come

to Washington. They arrived in Washington for the ARCADIA Conference,

the first of the major U.S.-British politico-military conferences of World War

II, on 22 December 1941. Concurrently with the meetings of the political

leaders, the chief staff officers of the two countries met and prepared recommendations on military problems for the consideration of Roosevelt and

Churchill.11 No Canadian, or other third power, representatives participated

in the military conferences, although Prime Minister King and political figures from other countries participated in the political discussions with Roosevelt and Churchill.

From the ARCADIA Conference emerged the Combined Chiefs of Staff

(CCS) committee as a formally constituted body with an elaborate organization of subordinate planning and technical bodies. The U.S. members of

the committee were General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army;

Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations; Lt. Gen. Henry H.

Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces; and Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.12

 Since the British Chiefs of Staff could not

leave London for any protracted period, the British component of the Combined Chiefs of Staff normally consisted of senior representatives of the British

Chiefs of Staff who spoke for and consulted them as necessary.13

North Atlantic Triangle

The culmination of the informal British-U.S, staff collaboration in the

establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff raised for Canada, and for 10

 Department of State Bulletin. December 20, 1941, V, 541; Hull, Memoirs. II, 1121-24. 11

 For an account of the ARCADIA staff meetings, see Craven and Cate (eds.), Plans and

Early Operations, pp. 237-45. 12

 Stark, after attending only a few meetings, left Washington in March and Admiral King

assumed the duties of Chief of Naval Operations in addition to those of Commander in Chief,

U.S. Fleet. Admiral William D. Leahy, when he became chief of staff to the President in the

summer of 1942, joined Marshall, King, and Arnold as a member of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of

Staff and the U.S.-British Combined Chiefs of Staff. 13

 For an account of the development of the CCS organization and its functioning, see Ray

S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division. UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), Ch. VI.
60 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

other governments as well, the question of the adequacy of its representation in this new strategic council.14

 Ottawa had already learned that not all

arrangements worked out between Washington and London, and involving

Canadian matters, accorded with the Canadian desires.

Difficulties had first been experienced in the field of matériel procurement. At the outbreak of war Canada had been obtaining such of the equipment for its armed forces as was procured from the United States by direct

purchase from U.S. manufacturers.15 This procedure gave Canada full freedom of action as to items that were not in short supply. But even before

the fall of France, the expanding needs of the United States and Great Britain

were competing for an ever-increasing list of products. British and French

supply and procurement activities in the United States were being co-ordinated through the Anglo-French Purchasing Board. Canada joined this

arrangement, apparently as a means of improving its position in procuring

competitive items, and on 5 March 1940 notified the Department of State

that the board, then under the chairmanship of Arthur B. Purvis, a Canadian,

was "acting for the Canadian War Supply Board in respect of purchases in

the United States for Canadian defense service."

 16

The fall of France caused the dissolution of the Anglo-French Purchasing

Board and its replacement by the British Purchasing Commission.17 It also

greatly increased both British and American demands on the U.S. output of

military matériel. Canada was not completely satisfied with the system of

procuring U.S. matériel either through the board or through the commission

because the United Kingdom was favored in allocations of the available

matériel made by the commission, especially after the fall of France.18

Moffat had reported the Canadian difficulties to Morgenthau during his

discussions in Washington on 2-3 July 1940, and had informed Prime Minister King, on his return to Canada, that henceforth the United States might

break down the Empire requests by country and act on the requests piecemeal. To King, it appeared that such a procedure would make supply to

Canada easier, since matériel for Canada would contribute more directly to

the defense of the United States.19

14

 For a historical survey of the interplay of Canada, the United States, and Great Britain,

see John B. Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle (Rev. ed.; Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1947). See

also J. B. Brebner and R. G. Trotter, "Relations of Canada and the United States," Canadian

Historical Review, XXIV (1943), 117-35. 15

 Dawson, Canada in World Affairs: 1939-1941. p. 220. 16

 Cdn Leg Note 82, to Secy State, 5 Mar 40, D/S 841.24/208. 17

 British Emb Note 315, to Secy State, 9 Jul 40, D/S 851.24/187. 18

 Summary of Meeting of U.S. Section, PJBD, 23 Aug 40, PDB 100-4; Morgenthau Diary,

3 Jul 40, Vol. 279, p. 146. 19

 Memo/Convs, Moffat and Morgenthau, 3 Jul 40, and Moffat and King, 5 Jul 40, Moffat

Diary.
PARTNERSHIP VERSUS TRIANGLE 61

Months later, in November 1940, the Canadian Section of the Permanent

Joint Board on Defense was trying to improve this situation and proposed

to the Board that Canadian matériel needs be divided into two categories:

those for North American defense, and those for the European war. Orders

for matériel in the latter category, the proposal stated, should properly be

placed through the British Purchasing Commission for allocation from the

quantities excess to U.S. needs, but matériel requirements for North American defense, the Canadian Section felt, should be met on the same basis as

U.S. defense needs and without passing through the British commission.20

Another measure apparently designed, at least in part, to improve the

Canadian position in the procurement of matériel was the establishment in

January 1941 of a British Supply Council in North America to deal with

"issues of policy concerning supply, including representations to be made to

the United States Administration."

 21

 Mr. C. D. Howe, Canadian Minister

of Munitions and Supply, became a member of the new council. That

Canadian efforts in this direction did not adequately fulfill Canadian needs

is indicated by the fact that the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint

Board, which had at the November 1940 meeting reported its lack of success

in obtaining through the British machinery a number of American flying

boat patrol aircraft, had to report two months later that Great Britain had

not yet agreed to this urgent Canadian request.22

Insofar as practicable Canada continued to purchase equipment directly

from U.S. manufacturers. For items in competitive supply, the Canadian

requests were placed through the British Supply Council and assigned an

agreed priority. In turn, the British Commonwealth requests were considered by the U.S. Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board Priorities Committee, which assigned priorities in relation to U.S. requirements. After U.S.

entry into the war, it became necessary for Canada to place virtually all requirements before the appropriate new combined agencies that were established in which allocations were made on the basis of world-wide operational

requirements and priorities. 2 3

The field of matériel procurement was not the only area in which Canada

had experienced difficulties as a result of arrangements worked out between

Washington and London. In some instances the United Kingdom and the

20

 Journal, PDB 124. 21

 British Emb Note 22, to Secy State, 14 Jan 41, D/S 841.24/425. The new council had

been proposed some weeks earlier and had been discussed in the interim. 22

 Journals, November 1940 and January 1941 meetings, PDB 124. 23

 Dawson, Canada in World Affairs: 1939-1941, p. 220; Canada, Department of National

Defense, Report for the Year Ending March 31, 1942 (Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer), p.

15.
62 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

United States took actions in which the Canadian Government felt that it

had been inadequately advised or consulted. One such instance was the conclusion, in March 1941, of the leased-bases agreement between the United

Kingdom and the United States. During the later stages of the negotiations

leading to the signing of the preceding destroyer-bases agreement of 2 September 1940, Prime Minister King had been consulted by both Roosevelt

and Churchill, and had approved the arrangements embodied in the preliminary agreement.24

 Although King had apparently expected to be a principal in the negotiation of the detailed agreement relating to the bases in

Newfoundland, the negotiations were virtually completed before Canada was

invited to participate and, even then, only in the role of observer at the conclusion of the leased-bases agreement, which was signed on 27 March 1941.

At Canadian instance the three countries simultaneously signed a protocol

clarifying the Canadian interest in the defense of Newfoundland.25 Prime

Minister King felt so strongly about this case of bilateral U.S.-United Kingdom negotiation of a matter of direct concern to Canada that he complained

to both the President and the Secretary of State.26

A similar situation was to develop within a few months. In August 1941

the first wartime meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill took place aboard ship

off Argentia, Newfoundland. Roosevelt, in planning his secret voyage to the

rendezvous, considered a route through Ottawa to Quebec, where he would

embark on a cruiser. He rejected this route on the ground that it would be

difficult either to explain his failure to take Mr. King along, or to take Mr.

King, in the absence of the leaders of other interested states, to what became

known as the Atlantic Conference. The conferees did discuss questions of

over-all policy, such as the Atlantic Charter and the situation in the Pacific.

Important decisions concerning the Canadian war role were also taken, yet

no Canadian official participated in the discussions.27

The establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and other combined

United Kingdom-U.S. agencies subsequent to formal U.S. entry into the war

24

 See Ch. I, above; Journal, 27 Aug 40 PJBD meeting, PDB 124. 25

 See Ch. IV, below; Dawson, Canada in World Affairs: 1939-1941, pp. 213-17; D/S Telg

973, to London, 22 Mar 41, PDB 107-9; Trotter and Corey (eds.), Conference on CanadianAmerican Affairs, 1941, p. 49. 26

 Memo/Conv. Hull and King, 17 Apr 41, D/S 711.42/214; Memo/Conv, Robertson and

Moffat, 12 May 41, Moffat Diary. 27

 "Memorandum of Trip to Meet Winston Churchill, August 1941," 23 Aug 41, prepared

by President Roosevelt, Roosevelt Papers, Atlantic Charter meeting file. See Ch. V, below.

According to Dawson, Canada in World Affairs: 1939-1941, p. 209, the Argentia meeting was a decided shock to King, who forthwith journeyed to London for several weeks of consultations. The meeting may have been a shock, but it is clear from correspondence in the

Roosevelt papers that King had planned his trip to London before he was aware of the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting.
PARTNERSHIP VERSUS TRIANGLE 63

brought new occasions for Canadian dissatisfaction. In addition to creating

the Combined Chiefs of Staff committee, Roosevelt and Churchill announced,

on 26 January 1942, the establishment of the Munitions Assignments Board,

the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, and the Combined Raw Materials Board. The bilateral membership of these agencies accorded with the

Churchillian concept that the "most sure way to lose a war" was to put every

power contributing forces "on all the councils and organizations which have

to be set up and [to require] that everybody is consulted before anything is

done."

 28

President Roosevelt, while agreeing to the creation of the British-U.S.

agencies, recognized the need for dominion and Dutch participation in the

over-all conduct of the war, particularly in respect to the Southwest Pacific,

where dominion and Dutch forces were engaged. Accordingly, the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered outline proposals formulated by the President and accepted the recommendations thereon of the British members.

These proposals provided that political questions should be discussed in

London, since the principal political representation of the countries concerned was centered there, and that strategic questions should be considered

in Washington by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who would hold the British Joint Staff Mission responsible for evolving a co-ordinated British Commonwealth point of view. Although staff representatives of the participating

countries could maintain normal contacts with the U.S. staffs and attend

Combined Chiefs of Staff discussions on matters of concern to them, the

responsibility for making final recommendations to the British and U.S. Governments was to remain with the Combined Chiefs of Staff since they had to

considered "the strategy of the war as a whole, the interests of their two

Nations being world-wide."

 29

The British-U.S. organizational arrangements growing out of the ARCADIA

Conference left the Canadian Government feeling that the Canadian position

relative to the war direction boards was confused and unsatisfactory and that

Canada had been pushed aside, even in fields where it had a direct interest.

As a result, a Department of External Affairs officer, Lester B. Pearson, was

sent to Washington on 19 February to clear up a situation that had apparently developed not only because of the natural desire to keep the directing

bodies as small as possible, but also because of Churchill's "personal predilection for speaking in the name of the entire Empire and trying to reverse the

process of recent years and integrate it more closely." Canadians felt that

28

 Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates. Vol. 377, cols. 610, 616. 29

 CCS 21/1, 3 Feb 42. The CCS recommendations received governmental approval on 10

February 1942.
64 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Churchill had been ably abetted in this effort by the U.S. services, "whose

attitude throughout had been that Canada was a nuisance and had much better be treated as a part of Britain," rather than as an independent country,

which was in fact the true status of Canada and the other dominions.30

In March Prime Minister King himself came to the United States to discuss Canadian exclusion from the war direction agencies. Although by this

time the Canadian Government had accepted its exclusion from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, it still sought representation in the raw materials and

munitions assignments agencies. Arrangements were worked out to keep

Canadian representatives better informed so that, upon the occasion of King's

next visit to Washington in April 1942, he was satisfied to press only for

membership on the Munitions Assignments Board.31

Nevertheless, the question of Canadian participation in the direction of

the war continued to be a vexatious one for Prime Minister King. Selfinterest demanded that he vigorously protest cavalier treatment by either

Great Britain or the United States and seek a strong Canadian voice in the

war councils. Before the United States entered the war it had been his view

that Canada had a special role to play in the promotion of British-American

friendship and harmony of sentiment. One of the reasons he had given for

his unwillingness to sit in an Imperial War Cabinet in London was his belief

that his availability for personal contact with President Roosevelt "in critical

situations affecting the relations between the United States and British Commonwealth" might easily be more important than any service he could render

in London.32

Canadians as a whole had taken pride in the Canadian role as connecting

link, or hinge, between the two major English-speaking countries. Some of

the developments that had taken place might understandably have made

Canadians wonder whether at times the role had not more nearly resembled

that of a nut between the two jaws of a nutcracker. Nevertheless, King followed a policy of taking such positions in regard to Canadian representation

as "would best serve to bring about co-operation among all the governments

concerned." He accepted the "arrangement under which the war . . . [was]

being carried on, on behalf of the United Nations and which . . . [recognized]

at the head as the combined command, the Prime Minister of Great Britain

and the President of the United States." Where Canadian interests were likely

to be prejudiced, he was prepared to, and did, make strong protests to get

30

 Memo/Conv, Robertson and Moffat, 19 Feb 42, D/S 711.42/237. 31

 Memo/Conv, Welles and Moffat, 3 Mar 42; Notes on conversation between Welles and

Moffat during latter's Washington visit 4-11 April 1942; both in Moffat Diary. 32

 H. C. Debates, 12 Nov 40, pp. 58-59, and 17 Feb 41, p. 813.
PARTNERSHIP VERSUS TRIANGLE 65

representation. Otherwise, he recognized that the problem of representation by the many nations was only one of the difficulties facing Roosevelt

and Churchill and endeavored not to add to an already complex situation.33

Arrangements for the strategic direction of the war followed the basic

concept established in the ABC-1 report. A U.S.-British high command

provided over-all direction, while the earth's surface was divided, with one

exception, into three areas of responsibility—the first British, the second

American, in which each government provided strategic direction through a

senior national commander, and the third comprising the land areas in which

joint U.S.-British offensive operations would later be launched under jointly

agreed unity of command arrangements. The single exception provided that

Canada could assume responsibility for the strategic direction of forces in

such waters and territories of the Atlantic Ocean areas as might be defined

by joint U.S.-Canadian agreements. The joint U.S.-Canadian defense plan,

ABC-22, prepared in correlation with the ABC-1 plan, did provide for such

assignments of responsibility to Canada. The net effect was that Canada

alone of all the other powers was singled out for such an assignment

of strategic responsibility.34

Insofar as the rest of the war areas were concerned, Canada and other

powers participated in the deliberations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff only

when the problems under consideration related to them. This participation

comprised in part informal and continuous liaison between Canadian service

representatives in Washington and members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

committee and its working subcommittees. Alternately, these representatives

were invited to participate in the formal sessions of the Combined Chiefs of

Staff. Canadian participation at formal meetings took place on several

occasions.35

In time, Canada achieved membership on three of the subcommittees of

the Combined Chiefs of Staff committee. By the spring of 1944, the United

Kingdom half of the Combined Communications Board and the Combined

Meteorological Committee had been expanded on a Commonwealth basis to

include Canadian and other dominion representatives. In September 1944

33

 H. C. Debates, 27 Jan 42, pp. 58-59, 25 Mar 42, pp. 1632-33, and 21 Apr 42, p. 1791.

In addressing the President on 16 June 1944 on the relationship of the Canadian Government and armed forces to the CCS, Prime Minister King again stated that Canada had "recognized that the higher direction of the war should be exercised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff,

under Mr. Churchill and the President," but he also pointed out that the Canadian Government had never "been requested to recognize the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the source of

authority of the Supreme Allied Commanders." (JCS 808/1, 19 Jun 44.) 34

 See Ch. IV, below. 35

 Representatives of third powers participated in approximately 25 of the 200 CCS meetings

that had been held by 14 July 1945.
66 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

independent Canadian representation on the Combined Civil Affairs Committee was approved, thus making this committee tripartite in nature.36

Two of the eight wartime politico-military conferences took place in

Canada—QUADRANT (First Quebec Conference) in August 1943, and OCTAGON (Second Quebec Conference) in September 1944. At each of these conferences three general categories of meetings took place—those of the

Combined Chiefs of Staff, those of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, and the political meetings

between Roosevelt and Churchill and, when invited, the representatives of

other powers. Only the British and U.S. staffs participated in the first two

categories of meetings, although informal and formal meetings and discussions did take place between the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, on the one hand,

and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff or the British Chiefs of Staff, on the other.

The Canadian Chiefs of Staff visited Washington in May 1943 concurrently

with the TRIDENT Conference and discussed mutual problems in a similar

manner. Mr. King participated in Roosevelt-Churchill discussions at

TRIDENT, QUADRANT, and OCTAGON and also met with the President and

British Prime Minister separately. Thus, although no formal Canadian participation took place at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings, there was

frequent opportunity to discuss and concert policies and measures of mutual

interest.37

The three members of the North Atlantic triangle also participated in

other bodies established to provide co-ordinated direction to the war effort.

Pursuant to the ARCADIA discussions, Mr. Churchill had, on 27 January 1942,

announced the proposed establishment of a Pacific War Council on the ministerial level in London to provide co-ordinated political guidance on the

Pacific war to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It held its first meeting on 10

February, with Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the Netherlands, and

36

 CCAC 143, 29 Sep 44, and 143/1, 16 Oct 44. 37

 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Closing the Ring (Boston: Houghton

Mifflin Company, 1951), p. 66; William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: Whittlesey

House, 1950), p. 174; Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada. II, 442-44, 466; CCS Conference

Books, passim; "The Log of the President's Visit to Canada: 16 August-26 August 1943,"

Roosevelt Papers, H. Hopkins file, Box 24; R. K. Carnegie, "The Quebec Conference," Canadian Geographical Journal, XXVII (September 1943), 96-105; Wilson Brown, "The Allies at

Quebec," Queens Quarterly, LVI (Winter 1949-1950), 465-78; Lingard and Trotter, Canada in

World Affairs, III, 131n, 238, 257-58; Canada at War, No. 25 (Jun 43), p. 17, and No. 41

(Oct 44), p. 11; Samuel Rosenman (compiler), The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin

D. Roosevelt, XII, 1943 Volume: The Tide Turns (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 363-

64. For a general account of the international conferences, see Cline, Washington Command Post:

The Operations Division, Ch. XII. The other international conferences were ARCADIA (Washington, December 1941-January 1942), in which Mr. King participated, SYMBOL (also called

ANFA, Casablanca, January 1943), SEXTANT-EUREKA (Cairo-Tehran November-December 1943),

ARGONAUT (Malta-Yalta, January-February 1945), and TERMINAL (Potsdam, July 1945).
PARTNERSHIP VERSUS TRIANGLE 67

QUEBEC CONFERENCE, AUGUST 1943. Seated are the President of the United States,

Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the Governor General of Canada, the Earl of Athlone,

Standing are Prime Minister Mackenzie King of Canada and Prime Minister Winston

Churchill of Great Britain.

India participating.38 Subsequently Canada requested, and was granted, representation on the London council. On 30 March President Roosevelt announced establishment of a Washington body with the same name and similar functions and composition. This body, which met first on 1 April 1942

and included representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, China, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the Philippine Commonwealth, met frequently during 1942 and 1943. The London

council, with somewhat narrower representation, continued to meet, but less

frequently. Both bodies furnished a formal forum, on the ministerial level,

38

 Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates. Vol. 377, col. 611; H. C. Debates, 10 Feb 42, p. 598.
68 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

in which the smaller countries could express their views and recommendations.39

A parallel staff agency, the Military Representatives of the Associated

Pacific Powers, was also established at Washington in the spring of 1942 and

included, in addition to the Washington members of the Combined Chiefs

of Staff committee, representatives of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the

Netherlands, and China. This body met about once a month. In January

1943 French and Polish representatives were admitted, and in April the word

"Pacific" was dropped from the title. Apparently by common consent, meetings of this group, which heard reports and exchanged views on a wide range

of military problems, were not held after June 1943.40

Thus Canada, after some initial concern as to its role vis-à-vis the United

Kingdom-U.S. machinery for the broad policy and strategic direction of the

war, succeeded in developing satisfactory relationships which seemed adequate to its needs. In due course Canada also participated to varying degrees

in other Anglo-American combined bodies.41

Canadian dissatisfaction over participation in the Anglo-American combined organizations was by no means the only occasion for resentment directed at the United States. Numerous incidents occurred on the point of

the relationship of Canada to the British Empire that led Canadians to conclude that Americans still considered Canada a nonautonomous part of the

Commonwealth. President Roosevelt had in September 1939 set a precedent

in this regard that he himself failed to follow on several occasions. The

United Kingdom had declared a state of war with Germany on 3 September.

The Neutrality Act of 1937 required issuance of a U.S. neutrality proclamation involving an embargo on arms deliveries to belligerent states. Associates of the Secretary of State argued that, since the United Kingdom was

at war, the dominions were also, unless they formally seceded from their association under a common sovereign. Hull recommended a contrary view

to the President, who immediately telephoned Prime Minister King for his

opinion. King stated that he did not regard Canada as being at war. Accordingly, Canada was not included in the U.S. neutrality proclamation of 5

39

 Ltr, L. McCarthy to Welles, 28 Mar 42, D/S 740.001 PW/2190-4/5; Department of State

Bulletin, January 16, 1943, VIII, 186; H. C. Debates, 21 Apr 42, p. 1791; Sherwood, Roosevelt

and Hopkins, pp. 509-10; Canada at War, No. 25 (Jun 43), p. 17; Lingard and Trotter,

Canada in World Affairs, III, pp. 135-37; Canada, Annual Report of the Secretary of State for

External Affairs, 1943 Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1944), p. 11. 40

 Papers relating to these meetings are filed in ABC 334.8 M.R.P. (5-26-42). The ninth

and last meeting was held on 18 June 1943. 41

 See below, pp. 77-85.
PARTNERSHIP VERSUS TRIANGLE 69

September but in a separate proclamation issued on 10 September, the day of

the Canadian declaration of war.42

Yet in drafting a proposed list of signatories to the Atlantic Charter in

August 1941, the President initially grouped the dominions in a listing under

the United Kingdom, although he later revised the list to place all the countries in alphabetical order. In January 1942 the State Department not only

proposed a listing of signatories for the Joint Declaration by the United Nations in which Canada appeared as one of a British Empire group of nations,

but it also compounded this maladroitness by presenting the document to

Canada through the British Embassy, thereby occasioning a formal Canadian

objection.43 Incidents such as these led some Canadians to conclude that

both service and civilian elements of the U.S. Government believed Canada

to be a nuisance, much better treated as a part of Great Britain.44

The Stresses of Partnership

Not all the difficulties that arose in U.S.-Canadian politico-military dealings during World War II can be ascribed to the North Atlantic triangle

relationship or to Canada's position in the British Commonwealth. Naturally, in the course of years of close collaboration subsequent to the Ogdensburg meeting, many disagreements developed. Although it was not always

possible to reconcile divergent fundamental points of view, representatives

of the two countries always succeeded in amicably working out solutions

which, if not the solution preferred by both sides, at least met the essential

requirements of the situation. Despite the number of disagreements, large

and small, disagreement was far from the norm for U.S.-Canadian wartime

42

 Hull, Memoirs. I, 678-79; Dawson, Canada in World Affairs: 1939-1941, p. 6. The

proclamations are 2349 (4 FR 3819), and 2359 and 2360 (4 FR 3857). Similarly, in telling

King at Ogdensburg of his reasons for wanting a defense board, the President acknowledged

the need for negotiating for bases in Canada with Ottawa, since Canada was an autonomous

dominion, rather than with London, where the trade of destroyers for leased bases in British

territories was being worked out. 43

 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 452; Memo/Conv, Wrong and Berle, 31 Dec 41 and

1 Jan 42, D/S 740.001 EW1939/18384 and /18454. 44

 Memo/Conv, Moffat and Under Secy State for External Affairs, 19 Feb 42, D/S

711.42/237; Memo, for Secy State, 20 May 43, D/S 711.42/255.

It is interesting to speculate on the extent to which this attitude on the part of U.S. officials was a reflection of the Department of State organization for handling British and Canadian

affairs. The Canadian-desk officer throughout the World War II period sat in the Division of

British Commonwealth Affairs, which in turn was a part of the Office of European Affairs. In

addition to providing a governmental pattern for considering Canada within a British framework, this organization had the effect of placing Canadian problems for review and consideration before one officer whose responsibility was for the British Commonwealth as a whole, and

before another whose responsibility was for European affairs. State Department officers queried

on the point expressed divergent views to the author as to whether this organizational arrangement did in fact influence the handling of Canadian problems in the State Department.
70 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

co-operation. The many great joint wartime achievements deny any such

conclusion. The areas of harmonious co-operation far overshadowed those

in which disagreements needed to be worked out. Nevertheless, the record

of these disagreements is a necessary and useful one, for their existence and

causes should be noted and should serve as guideposts in the future.

Often the difficulties were the result of the manner in which the United

States consulted and negotiated with Canada. On one occasion a communication to the RCAF member of the Permanent Joint Board in August 1941

tactlessly advised him that, as a result of discussions between the President,

Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, and Lord Beaverbrook concerning Atlantic aircraft ferrying, General Arnold desired Canadian authorization for the United

States to establish three weather and emergency stations in Canada, and that

it was "mandatory that definite decision be received promptly" as delay

might defeat the entire project. This message reached a Cabinet War Committee meeting, where it was read and provoked a strong reaction not only

to the use of the term "mandatory" (with the flavor of a British-U.S. ukase)

but also to the use of military, rather than diplomatic, channels for presentation of the request. Canada promptly approved the request, but the incident was not as promptly forgotten.45

Similar lapses occurred on the part of the State Department. To cite an

important instance, the United States had, throughout most of 1941, actively

discussed with the other Pacific powers questions relating to the possibility

of war with Japan. During the summer some consultation with Canada

took place, although it was necessary for Canada not only to request that it

be kept advised but also that this be done directly and not through the

British Government. As the situation regarding Japan became critical, the

United States after September 1941 carried on extensive political discussions

with Japan in an effort to achieve a modus vivendi. During the talks the

United States considered itself a trustee for the other governments concerned.

On occasion during November, as the situation approached a crisis, the diplomatic representatives of the United Kingdom, China, the Netherlands, and

Australia were consulted on the negotiations.46 Despite the clear Canadian

interest in the political and security problems of the Pacific, Canada was not

consulted. Mr. King expressed concern and regret on this score, and, al45

 Memo, Lt Col C. Bissell for Brig Letson, 20 Aug 41, WPD 4262-7; U.S. Leg Ott Desp

1867, to Secy State, 22 Aug 41, D/S 811.9243/27; Memo for Record, by Moffat, 22 Aug 41,

Moffat Diary. 46

 U.S. Leg Ott Telg 200, to Secy State, 5 Aug 41, D/S 840.51 Frozen Credits/2882; Telg

203, 6 Aug 41, D/S 701.4294/21; Memo/Conv, Moffat and Robertson, 29 Sep 41, D/S

742.94/13. For accounts of these negotiations and consultations, see Feis, The Road to Pearl

Harbor, passim, and Hull, Memoirs, II, 1073, 1076.
PARTNERSHIP VERSUS TRIANGLE 71

though Pearl Harbor soon made the question academic, for many weeks "the

failure to include Canada among the powers invited to discuss the Pacific

problems in late November continued, despite all explanations, to rankle."47

Many of the difficulties that arose after Pearl Harbor were the result of

fundamental differences in the approaches of the two countries to mutual

problems. Americans would attack each problem vigorously and impatiently,

and in terms of the short-term military need, with only secondary consideration to long-term aspects or to the concurrent impact on other conditions in

Canada. Canada, usually the grantor in all the requests presented, was interested, too, in "getting the job done," but it was also prone to give more

consideration to the broader implications of the U.S. requests.

The initial U.S. request after Pearl Harbor evoked a response that exemplified this difference in approach. On receiving a U.S. request, transmitted

to Ottawa by the State Department on 8 December, the Cabinet War Committee on the next day considered authorizing the United States to establish

a radio direction finding installation in British Columbia involving some fifty

personnel. The authorization was granted with several conditions relating

to the relationship between the detachment and Canadian commanders and

financial and procurement provisions that had been recommended by the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board. One of these called for a

commitment to leave the radar set in Canada if the U.S. requirement for an

installation at that site ceased to exist. State Department officers reacted

strongly to these conditions and declared them unacceptable, forecasting major

reactions if such conditions were indicative of the Canadian idea of a basis

for wartime co-operation. Needless to say, the problem was satisfactorily

resolved, as were many others that followed it. As the fundamental points

of view on each side became better understood and approached a common

denominator, the handling of similar requests became routine and perfunctory.48

Canadian Staff Representation in Washington

Until the start of World War II, neither Canada nor the United States

maintained service attache representation in the other country. On Canadian initiative in February 1940, Air Commodore W. R. Kenny was assigned

47

 Memo/Conv, Wrong and Welles, 25 Nov 41, D/S 711.94/2559; Moffat, Notes on Washington Visit, 1-4 December 1941, Moffat Diary. The explanations offered were the great rapidity of the November events, the lack of interest shown by the Canadian Legation in Pacific

problems, and Hull's assumption that King was being kept advised by the President during

their "constant and close contact." During this period Canada considered itself sufficiently

concerned with the Pacific situation to send two infantry battalions to reinforce the British garrison at Hong Kong. They arrived just before Pearl Harbor and shared the defeat of that

garrison by Japanese forces. (Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945, pp. 273-88.) 48

 Memo-for Record, Moffat, 10 Dec 41, Moffat Diary.
72 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

to Washington as the first Canadian air attaché there, and was followed in

August and September by Commodore V. G. Brodeur and Col. H. F. G.

Letson, as naval and military attaches, respectively.49 The War Department

sent its first attache, an Air officer who served as both military and air attache,

to Ottawa in April 1940, while the Navy Department first assigned a naval

attaché there in August 1940. This nominal and routine attache liaison was

supplemented, after the Ogdensburg Declaration, by liaison through the

Permanent Joint Board on Defense.

Two types of liaison between the United States and the dominions were

provided for in the ABC-1 report of March 1941: Canada, Australia, and

New Zealand were to be represented by their service attachés on the British

military mission to be established in Washington, and the United States

might exchange liaison officers with the dominions for direct co-operation.50

These arrangements were not, from the Canadian point of view, enough.

Canadian desire for liaison through a mission similar to the British mission,

which was established during April 1941, were apparently first indicated in

a Canadian working-level draft of an operational plan at the time of the joint

drafting of defense plans.51 The operational plan provided for an exchange

of military missions between Ottawa and Washington at the time that it was

put into effect. In March, at least on the service working levels, the War

Department had seemed willing to accede to the Canadian desire, but Canadian efforts to establish a staff mission in Washington were to travel a rocky

road for many months.52

The Canadian Government on 1 July 1941, after consulting with the

United Kingdom, formally requested U.S. approval of the establishment of

a military mission in Washington and stated that it felt "very strongly" that

the recommendations concerning Canadian representation in Washington

made in the ABC-1 report were inadequate. "Problems of joint action in

the western Atlantic and possibly in the eastern Pacific," could, in the Canadian view, "best be handled by the establishment of a separate organization

rather than by any method of Canadian representation on the United Kingdom Mission." Pending approval of the Canadian mission, the Canadian

Government asked that its service attaches be allowed to attend joint meetings of the British Joint Staff Mission and the U.S. service departments. At

49

 Canada. Annual Report of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1940, p. 10. 50

 Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 15, p. 1500; BUS(J) (41)24, WPD 4402-94. 51

 Draft, Joint Operational Plan 1, United States Army-Canada Army and Air Force, 14 Apr

41, PDB 133. 52

 A U.S. Army draft of a joint Canada-U.S. Army defense plan, transmitted to SUSAM on

20 March 1941, provided for liaison between the War Department and Canadian War Office

and Air Ministry through the exchange of missions between Washington and Ottawa. (PDB

133.)
PARTNERSHIP VERSUS TRIANGLE 73

such meetings, it was to be understood that "the Canadian Service Attaches

. . . [were] acting in their capacity as such, and not as members of the

British Mission."

 53

Both the War and Navy Departments in July opposed a Canadian mission on the grounds that representation through the Permanent Joint Board

on Defense and the British Joint Staff Mission met all the Canadian needs

for liaison, and that an undesirable precedent would be established for similar requests by other dominions and the American republics.54

 The Department of State replied to the Canadian aide-mémoire on 25 July, taking the

position that, although as a matter of general policy a mission would be welcome, the matter was primarily a military one and the case made by the service departments seemed convincing.55

During the period that the United States was considering the formal

Canadian request, the service members of the Permanent Joint Board were

completing the drafting of the 1941 Canadian-U.S. defense plan (ABC-22).

The final draft, dated 28 July 1941, provided for the establishment, when

the plan became effective, of officers of each country as representatives of

their chiefs of staff vis-à-vis their opposite numbers in the other country.

Thus the joint drafters were able to go somewhat further than the provisions

of ABC-1 in meeting the Canadian desires but were unable at this time to

repeat the War Department's willingness' to agree to an exchange of missions, even if their establishment were to await the time when the plan would

be put into effect.

Soon afterward, on 18 August 1941, Prime Minister King informed U.S.

Minister Moffat that the prolonged refusal of Washington to approve a military mission was the only aspect of U.S.-Canadian relationships that seriously

troubled him. King felt not only that Canadian contacts with the War and

Navy Departments were being funneled through British channels, but also

that the British were consciously sidetracking the Canadians. He accordingly

urged that the proposal be reconsidered in the light of its political implications and of the greater confidence that would be engendered in the Canadian public mind by direct military representation at Washington.56

While the War and Navy Departments re-examined the request, Moffat

discussed with Department of State officers the true significance of the continued Canadian pressure for a military mission. The decision to continue

the pressure had been taken at the highest political levels, and was a manifestation of dissatisfaction with the way the Canada-United States-United 53

 Cdn Leg aide-mémoire. 1 Jul 41, WPD 4543. 54

 Ltr. Secy Navy to Secy State, 21 Jul 41, PDB 111-6. 55

 Memo/Conv, Hickerson and Wrong, 25 Jul 41, WPD 4543-1. 56

 U.S. Leg Ott Telg 218, 18 Aug 41, D/S 842.20/197.
74 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Kingdom relationship had developed during the preceding year. Although

resentment was greatest against the British, there was disappointment that

the United States should have allowed Canada to be pushed aside. A solution to the mission problem was psychologically important to prevent a

transfer of active resentment to the United States. Moffat also surmised that

considerations of domestic politics were a motivating force in the Canadian

insistence on a mission.57

The political considerations relative to the mission did not weigh heavily

in War and Navy Department deliberations. The Chief of Staff and the

Secretary of War agreed "that foreign political considerations inimical to our

military interests should not be allowed to determine the attitude of the War

Department," and they approved a recommendation that the request should

again be rejected. The substantially identical responses of the Secretaries of

War and the Navy proposed, as an alternate solution, the establishment in

Washington of a permanent office for the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense. This proposal, which had already been explored in informal diplomatic discussions, had been rejected by Canadian

officials on the grounds that the subject matter for discussions contemplated

did not belong to the Board, and that the personnel making up the Canadian

Section were not considered suitable for this purpose.58

The reason for the U.S. planners' reversal of position, from their initial

working-level acceptance of the idea of a mission to their subsequent opposition when advising their chiefs in connection with the formal Canadian

requests, is not clear. The answer may be that the question of command

relationships under the 1941 defense plan came under joint discussion in the

interim. Despite intermittent U.S. pressure beginning in March 1941, and

lasting for over a year, the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board

and Canadian service planners vigorously opposed, as a general principle,

assignment of parts of Canada and Newfoundland, or of Canadian forces

located in either, to U.S. strategic or operational command.59 This Canadian position may well have led U.S. service personnel to use the mission

question as a quid pro quo.

United States entry into the war provided the occasion for the next

Canadian approach, for no longer would acceptance by the United States of

57

 Ltr, Moffat to Hickerson, 5 Sep 41, D/S 842.20/203; Memo/Conv, Moffat and Robertson,

25 Sep 41, D/S 842.20/204. 58

 Memo/Conv, Moffat and Pearson, 5 Sep 41, PDB 111-6; Ltrs, SW to Secy State, 8 Oct

41, and Secy Navy to Secy State, 30 Sep 41, WPD 4543. Despite the Canadian view on the

U.S. counterproposal, Maj. Gen. M. A. Pope, who was designated chairman of the Canadian

Joint Staff upon its establishment, had been a member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense

for over a year, and served in the dual capacity for approximately two years. 59

 See Ch. V, below.
PARTNERSHIP VERSUS TRIANGLE 75

a mission from a belligerent necessarily establish a precedent to be followed

for nonbelligerent American republics. Action on this renewed Canadian

request was apparently delayed pending the outcome of the ARCADIA meetings and the command and liaison arrangements that emerged therefrom.

On 10 February 1942 the Combined Chiefs of Staff received the approval of

Roosevelt and Churchill on their recommendations for representation of the

dominions and other powers. These recommendations envisaged the establishment of "staff missions" in Washington. As an intermediate step and

pursuant to a Combined Chiefs of Staff invitation announced in March,

Canada notified the United States that Maj. Gen. Maurice A. Pope was being

sent to Washington as the military representative of the Cabinet War Committee to maintain, with the aid of alternates from the Navy and Air Force,

continuous contact with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.60

After making this advance, Canada had not much longer to wait before

reaching more important goals. By July 1942 U.S. service views on this and

other points at issue had changed. The Canadian Government was able to

advise the U.S. Secretary of State that informally it had found officers of his

department and of the services in agreement on the establishment of a Canadian Joint Staff mission, and formally to propose this step.61

 Canadian efforts of over a year were at last rewarded with success. Concurrently, the

U.S. attitude on the command question had relaxed considerably. By 1 June

1942 the U.S. service members of the Permanent Joint Board had concluded

that forcing acceptance of "unrestricted unity of command" not only would

be resisted by the Canadian services and Cabinet but also would result in a

diminution of Canadian co-operation.62 This conclusion, in turn, reflected

changes wrought by Pearl Harbor. Where close Canadian co-operation had

not always been sought before the United States entered the war, Canadian

co-operation in making available its strategic resources, be they air-base sites,

highway right of way, or something else, to the United States was now

essential and to be courted.

The record of negotiations for establishment of the mission, with its

undertone of acrimony, is one of the least happy aspects of the U.S.-Canadian World War II relationship. Canadian aspirations were understandable

enough. The special geographic and historical relationships of the two

countries would seem to have been adequate justification for a mission that

60

 U.S. Leg Ott Telg 307, 15 Dec 41, D/S 842.20/206; Cdn Leg Note 203, 25 Mar 42,

WPD 4543; CCS 21/1, 3 Feb 42. Pope actually arrived in Washington on 6 March. 61

 Cdn Leg Note 459, 2 Jul 42, WPD 4543. In addition to General Pope as Canadian Army

member and chairman, the initial Royal Canadian Navy and RCAF members were Rear Adm.

V. G. Brodeur and Air Vice Marshal G. V. Walsh. 62

 Memo, SUSAM for CofS, 1 Jun 42, PDB 135-2.
76 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

need not have become a precedent for acceptance of missions from other

countries. Too, the desire of a sovereign state, both for practical reasons and

for political reasons at home, to speak to representatives of another government with its own voice and not through a third party should have been

understandable. The importance of considerations of national pride, prestige,

and sensitivity should also have been apparent.

Shortly after the Canadian Joint Staff was formally established in Washington, it raised the question of direct exchange of information with the

U.S. services. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the principle that the

U.S. and Canadian chiefs of staff should deal directly on matters relating to

joint U.S.-Canadian forces and spheres of activity, and the U.S. Joint Staff

Planners committee was assigned responsibility for maintaining continuous

liaison with the Canadian Joint Staff.63

The Canadian Joint Staff was the third and last type of wartime Canadian

service liaison established with the War and Navy Departments in Washington, the others being liaison through the service attaches and the service

members of the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board. The general responsibility of the Canadian Joint Staff was to exchange information

and co-ordinate strategic planning, deployments, and joint operational matters with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and its subordinate committees, and

with U.S. counterparts in the Joint Chiefs of Staff committees.

The United States never attempted to establish similar representation in

Ottawa. In January 1944 the U.S. Section of the Permanent Joint Board

considered whether there might be military advantage in adopting the repeated suggestion of the U.S. Ambassador in Ottawa that the military

attache be placed in a position comparable to that of the chairman of the

Canadian staff mission. The Senior U.S. Army Member concluded that there

would be none. The Canadian mission was useful because the Combined

Chiefs of Staff organization was located in Washington. No comparable

need existed in Ottawa

 64

Subsequent to the establishment in Washington of the Canadian Joint

Staff, one more development in connection with the problem of representation served further to smooth ruffled waters. On 11 November 1943 Prime

Minister King announced that the two countries were raising their diplomatic missions in the respective capitals to embassy status. This step was

gratifying to Canadians, and was a logical one in light of Canada's increasingly important international stature.65

63

 JCS 82, approved 18 Aug 42. 64

 Memo, Hickerson for SUSAM, 25 Jan 44, and Reply, 29 Jan 44, PDB 109-7. 65

 U.S. Emb Ott Desp 389, 1 Dec 43, D/S 124.42/69.
PARTNERSHIP VERSUS TRIANGLE 77

MEETING AT QUEBEC, AUGUST 1943. From left: Vice Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten, Adm. of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, Air Chief

Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Air Marshal L. S. Breadner, Lt. Gen. Sir H. L. Ismay,

Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Adm. E. J. King, Gen. H. H. Arnold, Adm. W. D.

Leahy, Lt. Gen. K. Stuart, Vice Adm. P. W. Nelles, and Gen. G. C. Marshall.

The Combined Agencies

The establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, CanadaUnited States, and the initial informal United Kingdom-United States military staff discussions in London in August 1940 were only the first steps in

the creation of the complex international co-ordinating machinery for the

conduct of all aspects of the war. As the European war expanded, agency

after agency was established to meet the unprecedented needs for co-ordination of total war on a global scale. The United States played a major role

or participated in practically all of them. Canada also played a role in certain of them, as a member as well as a contributor of resources with which

the agencies were concerned. In other instances the direction of agencies

had been assumed by the United States and the United Kingdom, and Canada

stood outside along with other powers.66

When the Combined Chiefs of Staff committee was established in 1942, 6 6

 Two excellent works bearing on the subject of the U.S.-Canadian role in the BritishAmerican agencies are Robert W. James, Wartime Economic Co-operation: A Study of Relations

Between Canada and the United States (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1949), and S. McKee Rosen,

The Combined Boards of the Second World War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951).
78 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

the term "combined" was employed to distinguish this international agency

and all its subordinate committees from the national interservice staff organizations that were called "joint" agencies. The term "combined" was thereafter generally applied to subsequent international co-ordinating war agencies

established by the United Kingdom and the United States, whether military

or civilian organizations.

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King had, in the prior naming

of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, established

a contrary pattern, which was followed for most of the U.S.-Canadian co-ordinating agencies established thereafter. Both Canadian and U.S. officers

who served in the various Canadian-U.S. agencies have indicated that a certain amount of confusion resulted from the "joint" terminology. Workinglevel proposals for adjustments to produced uniformity of usage of the word

"joint" were made but were never advanced to the levels required for decision.

After the Permanent Joint Board on Defense was created, five additional

U.S.-Canadian agencies were established, three of them before U.S. entry into

the war and before the establishment of any of the United Kingdom-U.S.

bodies. All were civilian agencies set up to meet needs arising from the

conduct of the war.

The first of these, the Joint Economic Committees, was established as

the result of a Canadian proposal on 17 March 1941 for the appointment of

joint committees of inquiry, which would make studies, after "a great deal

of research and analysis," for the dual purpose of effecting a more economic,

more efficient, and more co-ordinated utilization of the combined resources

of the two countries in the production of war requirements, and of minimizing the probable postwar economic disequilibrium consequent upon the

changes the economy in each country was then undergoing.67

Some of the detailed subjects proposed for exploration were supplies and

use of raw materials, co-ordination of production programs, use of transportation and power resources, and exchange of information in these areas.

The United States accepted the proposals, and the agreement completed 17

June 1941 established the following committees:

United States Committee Canadian Committee

William L. Batt R. A. C. Henry

Harry D. White W. A. Mackintosh

Alvin H. Hansen D. A. Skelton

E. Dana Durand J. G. Bouchard

A. A. Berle, Jr.—as desired H. L. Keenleyside—as desired

L. D. Stinebower—liaison with To be designated—liaison with

Department of State Department of External Affairs

67

 EAS, 228; Privy Council 4500, 20 Jun 41.
PARTNERSHIP VERSUS TRIANGLE 79

The establishment of the Joint Economic Committees actually was the

second step taken by the two countries in the area of economic co-operation,

the first step having been the Hyde Park Declaration of 20 April 1941, issued

while the agreement on the committees was being worked out.68 The Joint

Economic Committees made many recommendations on diverse subjects. A

typical recommendation was one, approved by the President and Prime Minister on 10 April 1942, providing for increased U.S. production of oil-bearing

crops and Canadian production of oats, barley, and flax.69 Another, approved

simultaneously, provided for easier movement of agricultural machinery and

laborers across the boundary. Co-operation in this matter continued on into

postwar years.70 Still another recommendation, of 9 August 1941, called for

equal consideration of civilian and defense shipping requirements of the two

countries.71

During 1941 the establishment of a Material Co-ordinating Committee,

United States and Canada, was announced by William S. Knudsen, Director

General of the U.S. Office of Production Management, with the primary

purpose of making possible the free exchange of vital information relating

to supplies of strategic raw materials required for defense production.72

Although officially designated the Material Co-ordinating Committee, the

title was in some documents prefixed by the word "Joint."

 73

 Membership

comprised two men of Knudsen's staff—William Batt, who was concurrently

designated to serve on the Joint Economic Committees, and Howard Sykes—

together with Canadian counterparts from the Wartime Industries Board.

The U.S. members were later to assume additional duties as U.S. member

and executive secretary, respectively, of the Combined Raw Materials Board,

upon its establishment.

By 19 September 1941 the Joint Economic Committees had concluded

that the existing agencies did not adequately provide for the co-ordination

of the defense production capacities of the two countries, and recommended

establishment of a Joint Defense Production Committee "to the end that, in

mobilizing the resources of the two countries, each country should provide

for the common defense effort the defense articles which it is best able to

produce." This purpose was a reaffirmation of one of the objectives of the

Hyde Park Declaration and was generally similar to the objectives designated

for study by the Joint Economic Committees. However, the objective of

68

 See Ch. X, below. 69

 Department of State Bulletin, April 11, 1942, VI, 313-15. 70

 Ibid.; CTS, 1947, No. 42. 71

 Rosen, The Combined Boards, p. 85. 72 Department of State Bulletin, January 16, 1943, VIII, 76. 73

 For an example, see Department of State Bulletin, November 8, 1941, V, 360.
80 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

minimizing postwar economic disequilibrium was now to be sought only

"as far as possible and consistent with the maximum defense effort."

 74

The President and Prime Minister approved the recommendation, and

the new committee was set up with the following membership:

 75

United States

Milo Perkins, Executive Director, Economic Defense Board, Chairman

J. V. Forrestal, Under Secretary of the Navy

W. A. Harrison, Director, Production Division, Office of Production Management

R. P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War

E. R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease Administrator

H. L. Vickery, Vice Chairman, U.S. Maritime Commission

Canada

G. K. Sheils, Deputy Minister, Department of Munitions and Supply, Chairman

J. R. Donald, Director General, Chemicals and Explosives Branch

J. H. Carmichael, Director General, Munitions Production Branch

R. P. Bell, Director General, Aircraft Production Branch

H. R. MacMillan, President, Wartime Merchant Shipping, Limited

Walter Gordon, Department of Finance

Redesignated the Joint War Production Committee after Pearl Harbor,

the committee, which did not hold its first meeting until 15 December 1941,

functioned principally through ten technical subcommittees made up of U.S.

and Canadian production and procurement officers. The ten subcommittees

were designated tank-automotive, artillery, artillery ammunition, small arms

and ammunition, chemicals and explosives, communications, conservation,

aircraft, naval vessels, and merchant vessels.76

United States entry into the war was also the occasion for a joint declaration calling for an all-out war production effort. Approved by the Canadian

Cabinet War Committee and by President Roosevelt, who directed appropriate U.S. agencies "to abide by its letter and spirit so far as lies within their

power," the declaration stated:

1. Victory will require the maximum war production in both countries in the shortest possible time; speed and volume of war output, rather than monetary cost, are the

primary objectives.

2. An all-out war production effort in both countries requires the maximum use of

the labor, raw materials, and facilities in each country.

3. Achievement of maximum volume and speed of war output requires that the production and resources of both countries should be effectively integrated, and directed

towards a common program of requirements for the total war effort.

74

 Ibid.; Privy Council 8441, 31 Oct 41. 75

 Ibid. 76

 Privy Council 22, 2 Jan 42.
PARTNERSHIP VERSUS TRIANGLE 81

4. Each country should produce those articles in an integrated program of requirement which will result in maximum joint output of war goods in the minimum time.

5. Scarce raw materials and goods which one country requires from the other in order

to carry out the joint program of war production should be so allocated between the two

countries that such materials and goods will make the maximum contribution toward the

output of the most necessary articles in the shortest period of time.

6. Legislative and administrative barriers, including tariffs, import duties, customs,

and other regulations or restrictions of any character which prohibit, prevent, delay, or

otherwise impede the free flow of necessary munitions and war supplies between the two

countries should be suspended or otherwise eliminated for the duration of the war.

7. The two Governments should take all measures necessary for the fullest implementation of the foregoing principles.77

It may be noted that this joint declaration of production policy objectives, issued after U.S. entry into the war, did not express concern over the

need to minimize postwar economic disequilibrium as had earlier joint declarations. This shift in emphasis is perhaps another indication of one of the

differences between the U.S. and the Canadian approach to wartime problems.

Short-term wartime need was the primary U.S. motivation, while Canada

tended to give weight as well to long-term aspects.

A detailed examination of the operations and achievements of these joint

agencies is outside the scope of this study. It should be noted, however,

that during 1941 neither the committees nor the Hyde Park Declaration had

been successful in achieving their objectives. The several announcements

had in turn restated the same objectives or added committee on top of committee with overlapping responsibilities, as if seeking the catalytic restatement of objectives or that combination of committee members which would

produce the desired results. It appears probable that Canada, which provided

the initial impetus to collaboration in the production and procurement areas,

had not thus far been able to attain the objectives it sought.78 Apart from

their accomplishments, these prewar committees and their efforts were important in that they were the precursors of similar U.S.-United Kingdom

"combined" organizations set up after Pearl Harbor.

The U.S.-United Kingdom combined boards and committees did not

replace any of the joint U.S.-Canadian committees, which not only continued

their work but also were augmented by the creation of two more agencies.

In March 1943 a Joint Agricultural Committee was established to keep under

continuous study and review joint food production and distribution, in order

to further developments that might be of help in solving wartime agricultural and food problems. The enactment by the Canadian Parliament of a

77

 Department of State Bulletin, December 27, 1941, V, 579. 78

 For data concerning results achieved under the Hyde Park Declaration, see below, Chapters

X and XII.
82 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

mutual aid program generally similar to the U.S. lend-lease program motivated establishment of the last wartime joint committee. During the 1943

Quebec Conference, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King established a Joint War Aid Committee, United States and Canada, as a means

of co-ordinating the two arms assistance programs and of eliminating duplication of requests and deliveries.79

In addition to these joint U.S.-Canadian committees, Canada and the

United States collaborated in varying degrees through a number of the combined agencies. On the purely military side there was the Combined Chiefs

of Staff committee. One of its nominally subordinate bodies, the (Combined) Munitions Assignments Board, enjoyed a special status. Segments

of this board sat in London and in Washington, and both groups came within the framework of the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization. The Munitions Assignments Board in Washington had as its chairman the President's

special assistant and confidant, Harry Hopkins. This board recommended

allocation policies and priorities, which, after review by the Combined Chiefs

of Staff and approval by the President (as to U.S. resources), became the basis

for matériel allocations made by the board.80

Canada, which became the third largest munitions producer among the

United Nations (exclusive of the Soviet Union), sought direct representation

on the board in May 1942. The request was taken up by Mr. King with

the President, and, in the Canadian view, his approval was obtained. Yet

when the proposal came to Hopkins' attention, he succeeded in rejecting it,

and Canadian participation did not materialize.81

A full pooling arrangement under which the Washington and London

bodies allocated from the total output of the United States and the British

Commonwealth never materialized. Later in 1942 Munitions Assignments

Committees were established in Canada, Australia, and India, and, in practice, each of the five bodies allocated from the residue available after the producing country's own requirements were met. Under such a procedure

Canada's prime interest in the Washington body was to be heard as a claimant, and Canada was able to work out informal arrangements under which

Canadian representatives appeared before the Munitions Assignments Board

subcommittees to submit and defend Canadian bids. Both U.S. and British

members sat on the Munitions Assignments Committee in Ottawa. In addi79

 Privy Council 2044, 15 Mar 44; Elizabeth H. Armstrong, "Canadian-American Co-operation in War and Peace, 1940-1945," Department of State Bulletin, October 28, 1945, XIII, 676. 80

 Department of State Bulletin, January 31, 1942, VI, 87-88. Lord Beaverbrook was chairman

of the London agency. 81

 Memo, Cdn Leg to Hopkins, 2 Jul 42, D/S 800.24/609; Memo/Conv, Moffat and Pearson,

29 May 42, Moffat Diary; James, Wartime Economic Co-operation, p. 234.
PARTNERSHIP VERSUS TRIANGLE 83

tion, War Supplies, Limited, the government corporation established to

receive U.S. production orders and place them in Canada, also acted as a

claimant in behalf of the United States before the Ottawa committee.82

Four other combined boards, civilian in composition, were established to

meet wartime needs. The Combined Raw Materials Board and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, both created in January 1942, comprised

only United Kingdom and U.S. personnel. No Canadians were included,

although the U.S. member of the Combined Raw Materials Board was also

a member of the United States-Canadian Material Co-ordinating Committee.

Canada made several applications for formal membership on the Combined

Raw Materials Board, but they were not successful.83

In June 1942 the last two boards were created by the United States and

the United Kingdom. Neither included direct Canadian representation

initially, but both did ultimately. The joint statement issued on 9 June 1942

by Roosevelt and Churchill established the Combined Production and Resources Board and charged it with combining the production programs of the

United States and the United Kingdom into a single integrated program,

adjusted to strategic guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. On 7

November 1942 Canada was made a member of the Combined Production

and Resources Board, and the revamped board was assigned the same task

with regard to the pooled production resources of all three countries. The

joint statement also established the Combined Food Board. Its purpose was

to consider, investigate, inquire into, and formulate plans concerning the

supply, production, transportation, disposal, allocation, and distribution of

food. The Combined Food Board was also to work in collaboration with

others of the United Nations toward the best utilization of their food resources. This board had had a predecessor in the Anglo-American Food

Committee, which emerged in May 1941 after passage of the Lend-Lease Act.

The Combined Food Board worked through ten Commodity Supply and

Allocation Committees, seven of which included Canadian representatives,

although Canada was not then formally a member of the food board itself.

Another subordinate agency of the board was the London Food Committee,

which comprised representatives of most of the British Commonwealth countries, but not Canada. The London Food Committee was the mechanism

through which Commonwealth resources and requirements were reported

to the board and board recommendations were transmitted to the Commonwealth members. 82

 Army Service Forces, International Division, A Guide to International Supply, pp. 13-14,

28-29, 46; Lingard and Trotter, Canada in World Affairs, III, 236-37. 83

 James, Wartime Economic Co-operation, pp. 236-37. Rosen, The Combined Boards, has been

the main source for the remainder of this chapter.
84 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

According to one authority, United Kingdom partnership in this Combined Food Board rested, in the view of some Americans, on dubious grounds.

Not itself a contributor of significant food resources, the United Kingdom

was a major claimant for U.S. and other supplies, yet it had the prerogative

of sharing equally in the decisions as to supply allocations.84 On the other

hand, Canada, a major producer of food resources, was not a formal member

of the Combined Food Board. Formal Canadian efforts to become a member were made in July, when the board was only a little over a month old.

Both the United States and the United Kingdom looked unfavorably on

these efforts. After several months of discussion, Canada accepted as a solution formal membership on several of the commodity committees and

participated effectively on this level in the work of the board. Nevertheless,

Canada continued to press for formal membership in the board itself.85

Formal Canadian membership finally materialized in October 1943. In

August the U.S. War Food Administrator recommended admission of

Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to the Combined Food Board in the

light of the large food resources contributed by those countries. The proposal was approved by President Roosevelt and, for Canada only, by the

United Kingdom. At London's request, Australian and New Zealand representation continued through the London Food Committee. On 29 October,

Canadian acceptance of the Roosevelt-Churchill invitation was announced.86

With the exception of agencies established to deal with relief and postwar problems, the foregoing steps were the last involving the establishment

of the international machinery for the conduct of the war and providing for

Canadian representation in the various agencies.87

Throughout the greater part of World War II, the problem of Canadian

representation in the war councils was a major irritant in U.S.-Canadian

politico-military relations. On the U.S. side, Churchill's view that it was

impossible to admit each of the other associated powers was shared. It was

not a simple problem of Canada's being the third vertex of a "North Atlantic

triangle," for many other participating allies were anxious to hold a corner

of this polygon. Obviously the more voting members in the war councils,

84

 Rosen, The Combined Boards, p. 225. 85

 Cdn Leg Note 491, 15 Jul 42, D/S 800.5018/22-1/2; James, Wartime Economic Co-operation, pp. 332-39. 86

 See Rosen, The Combined Boards, pp. 232-33, for a more detailed account of the negotiations. 87

 The committees in which Canada participated in some degree were dissolved as follows: Joint

War Production Committee and Material Co-ordinating Committee, 31 December 1945; Joint

Economic Committees, 14 March 1944; Joint War Aid Committee, 25 October 1945; Joint

Agricultural Committee, not formally dissolved; Combined Food Board, 1 July 1946; Combined

Production and Resources Board and Combined Raw Materials Board, 31 December 1945 (except

for certain commodity committees).
PARTNERSHIP VERSUS TRIANGLE 85

the more difficult became the direction of the war effort. There was merit

in this view, yet the matter of some appropriate relationship to the war

councils was one of great import to Canada. Canada soon became a major

contributor of resources among the Allies, and as such, and apart from considerations of pride and prestige, merited some means of regularly expressing its views. The long struggle for real recognition of Canadian sovereignty had made Canadians particularly sensitive on this score, especially to

attempts to treat Canada as a not fully autonomous member of the British

Commonwealth. Maintaining an exclusive U.S.-United Kingdom arrangement was essential for the directing bodies only. There was no valid reason

why Canada and the other powers could not join in pairs with the United

States, or collectively, in consultative and similar arrangements lacking

powers of decision. This was finally done, and met the needs of Canada and

the other powers reasonably well without interfering with the agencies for

strategic direction of the war.

The U.S. reluctance to accept such arrangements until the fruit of Canadian resentment was overripe unfortunately was matched by an unnecessary

maladroitness in dealings of interest to Canada within the North Atlantic

triangle. In some instances matters clearly of interest to Canada were resolved by the United States with the United Kingdom without consultation

with Canada. Where such consultation took place, a plain lack of tact

occasionally occurred to the irritation of Canadians. Another irritation to

Canadians was the U.S. tendency to deal with the United Kingdom on matters relating to the Commonwealth as a whole, as in the allocation of U.S.

arms production, at the same time permitting the United Kingdom to ignore,

override, or inadequately consider Canadian needs. In such situations the

United States in failing to insure adequate consideration of the Canadian requirements shared with the United Kingdom the Canadian resentment. It

is probable that the minor savings to the United States in administrative

effort and convenience resulting from the too-long and too-rigid insistence

on exclusive U.S.-United Kingdom arrangements were more than offset by

the development, in Canadian dealings with the United States, of a Canadian

wariness whose mark on postwar joint collaborative efforts was apt to be

indelible.
CHAPTER IV

Joint Defense Planning

The Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, made its

initial studies on 26-27 August 1940 and submitted seven formal recommendations based thereon. These recommendations, which set forth the

action needed to meet the most urgent joint defense problems facing Canada

and the United States, were sufficiently comprehensive so that, by and large,

additional recommendations were needed thereafter principally to solve "spot"

defense problems that arose.1 The first called for a full and complete exchange

of information. Other recommendations provided for certain troop deployments and defensive installations needed to insure adequate defense of Newfoundland and the Maritime Provinces. As slightly longer-range measures,

the Board recommended steps to assure adequate allocations of matériel, to

improve transportation and communication facilities in the more threatened

areas, and to stimulate matériel production. The last recommendation of

the seven provided that the "Service Members of the Board should proceed

at once with the preparation of a detailed plan for the joint defense of Canada

and the United States and keep the Board informed of the progress of the

work."

The Board's adoption of the first six recommendations in effect prejudged

the content of such a plan, since the requirements set forth in those recommendations for operational and logistical facilities should, in theory at least,

have emerged from the forces and operations that the plan set forth as needed

to carry out the assumed defense tasks. But awaiting the completion of an

approved plan would have delayed work in the field at least several weeks,

and the urgency of the situation induced the Permanent Joint Board to recommend appropriate measures on the basis of informed estimates of the

situation.

Initial Defense Plans

At the request of the Board, the service members undertook the drafting

of the defense plan, working closely with the Board as a whole. Work was

advanced considerably during the 9-11 September 1940 Board meeting. At

1

 For texts of all the wartime recommendations of the Permanent Joint Board, see Appendix

A, below.
JOINT DEFENSE PLANNING 87

the session on 9 September the Canadian members presented a paper entitled

"Defense of the Northern Half of the Western Hemisphere." The study,

whose geographic scope conformed to that of the terms of reference of the

Board, concluded that the defense of the area must provide, inter alia, for

"important strategic areas such as the Panama Canal Zone." The Board

referred the Canadian paper to its service members for use in connection

with their planning.2

By the time the Board met on 11 September, a joint draft based on an

initial U.S. draft was ready.3 The Board considered the draft and concluded

that further revision was necessary. The service members completed a second

joint draft on 25 September 1940, and the final joint draft on 10 October

1940.4 There was no significant difference in the basic assumptions, general

concept, or defense tasks set out in each of the three drafts. In the successive drafts, however, more detailed aspects of the plan were augmented and

refined. They pertained to the allocation, by country and service, of the

responsibilities connected with each task, and to the logistic, garrison, and

defense facilities to be provided by each country.

The Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan —1940, dated 10

October 1940 and frequently called the 1940 Plan, proposed to "provide for

the most effective use of Canadian and U.S. Naval, Military and Air Forces

for the joint direct defense of Canada, Newfoundland and the United States

(including Alaska)." The plan was what U.S. planners called a "capabilities"

plan (as opposed to a "requirements" plan), since it was based on the use

only of forces actually available. The joint mission of those forces was "to

defend Canada and the United States against direct attack by European and/or

Asiatic Powers." In the situation assumed, British forces had been either destroyed or neutralized, thus permitting German and Italian offensive operations

in the western Atlantic. Alternately or concurrently, Japan was assumed to

have initiated hostilities in the Pacific.5 The plan was designed for a war in

which enemy capabilities were conceived as including seizure of a base in

northeastern North America; hit-and-run submarine, surface, or air attacks;

feints or minor attacks anywhere from Greenland to eastern Brazil; fomenting of internal disturbances in Latin American countries; sabotage and subversion; surface or submarine attacks on shipping in the Pacific; and raids on

Pacific coastal objectives.6

2

 PDB 133-1. 3

 Copies filed at WPD 4330-5 and PDB 133-3. 4

 Copies at PDB 133-5 and -7, respectively. 5

 PDB 133-7. 6

 Ibid.
88 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

The joint mission was to be carried out through execution of the following joint tasks:

a. Insure the safety of Canadian, United States, and friendly shipping

on the high seas.

b. Defend Newfoundland and protect its vital sea communications.

c. Defend the east coast of Canada and the northeastern United States

and protect vital sea communications.

d. Defend Alaska and protect its vital sea communications.

e. Defend British Columbia and the northwestern United States and

protect vital sea communications.7

For the execution of each of these tasks, certain responsibilities were allocated

to the Army, Navy, and Air arms of each country. The plan, in addition,

set forth the base and defense facilities that were to be provided by each

country.8

From the statement of joint defense tasks, it is readily apparent that the

geographic scope of the 1940 Plan was narrower than either the terms of the

Ogdensburg Declaration or the approach of the Canadians in the initial

planning paper they presented at the Board meeting on 9 September 1940.

Even the statement of the over-all joint mission, "to defend Canada and the

United States," was overambitious. As one adviser to the U. S. Army Chief

of Staff pointed out, although the joint mission was so written "out of deference to the feelings of the Canadian members of the Board, actually, there

can be no serious acceptance of the idea that the defense of other portions of

the United States than the areas immediately contiguous to Canada can be

considered a joint mission in the execution of which Canada could be

expected to afford material contribution."

 9 The plan as finally drafted provided for the defense of Newfoundland, Canada, adjacent portions of the

United States, and Alaska. Greenland, which had already been the subject

of U.S.-Canadian discussions at the political level, was, at the request of the

U.S. planners, excluded from the plan.10

The last (10 October) draft of the 1940 Plan contained a number of glaring planning gaps. No statement of availability of forces or allocation of

detailed tasks was provided. The plan thus failed to show the correlation,

if any, between the tasks to be carried out and the forces available for the

7

 Ibid.

8

 Ibid. These responsibilities and base requirements appear in the First Report of the Permanent Joint Board (reproduced below at Appendix B) substantially as they were stated in the

1940 Plan. 9

 Memo, WPD for CofS, 17 Sep 40, WPD 4330-5. 10

 See Ch. VI, below.
JOINT DEFENSE PLANNING 89

purpose. A second omission presaged a major planning difficulty that was

to plague the joint planners many times in the future. This was the question of organization and command, which went completely unmentioned.

In reviewing the plan in the War Department General Staff, the War Plans

Division viewed the absence of such provisions as its greatest weakness. It

proposed the addition of specific provisions, one of which would have vested

over-all direction of forces in Newfoundland and Canadian areas in the

United States. Another would have vested local military command of troops

in Newfoundland and the Maritime Provinces initially in Canada but subsequently in the United States when its forces became preponderant.11

Neither the service members of the Permanent Joint Board nor the Board

itself seems to have been particularly concerned with the proposed additions,

or with further revision of the 1940 Plan. During early 1941 the planners

did draft an operational plan based on the concepts of the 1940 Plan, but as

a consequence of the British-U.S. staff talks they soon devoted themselves to

the preparation of a new plan based on new assumptions. The 1940 Plan

was apparently not formally acted upon by the service departments of the

two governments, and it remained neither approved nor disapproved. However, the 1940 Plan did retain a recognized status in the Permanent Joint

Board on Defense as the initial joint plan and the plan designed for the contingency of British collapse. As time passed this contingency became more

remote, and the planners occupied themselves with plans designed to meet

new situations.

While the 1940 Plan as such was not approved or otherwise acted upon, the

substance thereof was approved by both governments through a separate action.

The heart of the 1940 Plan was its statement, for each of the five joint tasks, of

the allocation of specific defense responsibilities to each country. The specific

defense responsibilities, such as those of the Canadian Army to "provide

ground, anti-aircraft and coastal defenses in the Maritime Provinces and the

Gaspé Peninsula," were to become effective when the joint plan was placed

in effect "by joint direction by the responsible heads of the Canadian and

United States Governments."

 12

In order for the 1940 Plan to be put into effect when required, the plan

pointed out, it would "be necessary to initiate at once the preparation and

provision of the various facilities and resources as set forth."

 13

 These facilities involved construction of air bases, installation of harbor defenses, and

similar measures. When the Board met on 2-4 October 1940, it found that

11

 Memo, WPD for SUSAM, 9 Nov 40, WPD 4330-5 12

 PDB 133-7. 13

 Ibid.
90 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

its service members had already produced two joint drafts during the preceding month but had yet to reach full agreement on the plan. When the

service members could produce an agreed joint draft of the plan, there still

remained the need for its approval by the service departments and then by

the two governments before the recommendations could be acted upon.

Review and examination of controversial questions, such as the command

problem, could be prolonged.

At the October meeting of the Permanent Joint Board the Canadian Section proposed, as a means of shortening this procedure, that the Board draft

a report to the two governments embodying the recommendations of the

plan under consideration by the service members of the Board. This proposal was adopted, and on 9 October Mr. LaGuardia presented the First Report of the Board to President Roosevelt, while Mr. Biggar took similar

action in Ottawa. At the Board meeting of 14 November 1940, the Canadian Section was able to report approval by the Canadian Government.14

President Roosevelt approved the report on 19 November.15 These actions

in effect approved the provisions of the 1940 Plan for implementation by the

two countries, since the report had incorporated them practically verbatim.

The U.S. action on the First Report pointed up a situation fraught with

potential difficulties for the War and Navy Departments. The report was

submitted to the President by the U.S. chairman without reference to the

two departments. Fortunately, through their review of the drafts of the 1940

Plan, it was apparent that the War and Navy Departments were substantially in accord with the contents of the First Report. Direct access by the

U.S. chairman to the President permitted a quick cutting of red tape. On

the other hand, unless such actions were first fully explored by the service

members within their departments, unsound recommendations lacking the

support of the departments could go forward to the President. Approval of

recommendations made them binding on the departments and would necessitate the awkwardness and complication of an appeal if the departments

deemed them unworkable. Continuing close co-ordination by the service

members with the War and Navy Department staffs minimized the dangers

of this situation.

Early Supply Assistance

Shortly after Dunkerque and the fall of France, and even as the United

States was in the midst of denuding itself of military equipment drawn from

reserve stocks to aid the United Kingdom, Canada turned to the United

14

 Journal, PDB 124. 15

 WPD 4330-12. For text of the First Report, see Appendix B, below.
JOINT DEFENSE PLANNING 91

States for help in meeting its greatly increased matériel requirements. The

initial Canadian approach, made through diplomatic channels in June 1940,

was followed up by the presentation on 12 July in Washington by the visiting Canadian staff officers of a list of requirements. This list included the

following items:

 16

280,500 Enfield M1917 rifles

20 37-mm. antitank guns

200 Machine guns, caliber .30

600 Lewis machine guns

500 Submachine guns, caliber .45

20 155-mm. field guns

Ammunition for the above

Later the same month a request was made for over a thousand naval guns of

calibers up to four inch. At the Ogdensburg meeting on 18 August Prime

Minister King presented President Roosevelt with another "List of Urgent

Requirements Which It Is Understood May Be Available," on which

appeared these items:

 17

150 3-inch antiaircraft guns

250 Light tanks

150 75-mm. field guns

24 155-mm. field guns

10 8-inch railway guns

15 Flying boats

Ammunition for the above

At the first meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on 26-27 August 1940,

a restatement of the more urgent Canadian needs was also discussed. Priorities were listed in the following order: antiaircraft artillery, coast and harbor

defense matériel, and mobile artillery for the Canadian Army, and patrol and

fighter planes for the Royal Canadian Air Force. New requirements, added

to the previous lists, included sixty-six searchlights and sixty-six sound

locators.

The Canadian Section of the Board was informed at the next meeting, 9

September, of the nature of the available matériel. Thirty-six 3-inch antiaircraft guns were reported to be available, but the Canadian request for these

guns was withdrawn later when it was found they were so obsolete as to be

virtually useless and had no ammunition. By November the only transfers

the United States had been able to make from its depleted stocks totaled

16

 PDB 103-3. 17

 D/S 842.24/72A.
92 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

80,000 Enfield rifles, 250 obsolete 6-ton M1917 light tanks, and a few aircraft. Also, Canada had received from the United Kingdom six of the fifty

destroyers transferred by the United States under the destroyer-bases agreement. A few other items, notably naval and coast defense guns, were under

discussion. But most of the items requested by Canada bore the notation

on the consolidated request that had been compiled in the War Department:

"no surplus" or "none available."

 18

 In the light of the limited assistance

received from the United States, Prime Minister King was generous in his

appreciation when he told the House of Commons, on 12 November 1940,

"how much . . . the Canadian war effort owes to the co-operation of the

United States. Aircraft and tanks for training purposes, and destroyers for

active service, are outstanding among the many essentials of warfare."

 19

The meagerness of U.S. assistance was due, in some measure, to legislative obstacles. An act of Congress of 2 July 1940 had authorized the Secretary of War to dispose of deteriorated, unserviceable, obsolescent, or surplus

matériel in a manner that would permit its replacement by other needed matériel.20

 However, an act of 28 June 1940 required that, before any matériel

could be disposed of in any manner, the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief

of Naval Operations must "first certify that such matériel is not essential to

the defense of the United States."

 21

The manner in which the United States overcame these barriers was evidenced during the augmentation of the defenses of Newfoundland and the

Maritime Provinces. On 28 November 1940 the Canadian Government

presented, through the British Purchasing Commission, a request for eight

10-inch disappearing-mount coast defense guns that had been reported at the

September Board meeting as being surplus and available. These guns were

to be mounted in pairs as part of the defenses at St. John's, Botwood, Shelburne, and Gaspé.22

 Since these guns were considered surplus, the necessary

certificate was readily made by Chief of Staff Marshall, and a directive was

issued on 14 January 1941 authorizing the transfer.23

Attempts at about the same time to augment antiaircraft artillery defenses

in Newfoundland did not as easily clear the legal hurdles. Having found

it necessary to cancel its request for the thirty-six available 3-inch M1918

18

 Journals, PDB 124 and 103-3. 19

 H. C. Debates, 12 Nov 40, p. 53. Another United States measure, the sale of machine

tools to Canada, has been credited by one Canadian authority as alone making possible the

rapid expansion of Canadian defense production during 1940. (Dawson, Canada in World Affairs:

1939-1941, p. 61.) 20

 PL 703, 76th Congress. 21

 PL 671, 76th Congress. 22

 Memo, for President's Liaison Committee, WPD 4323-15. 23

 Memo, SW for USW, WPD 4323-15.
JOINT DEFENSE PLANNING 93

antiaircraft guns because of their obsoleteness and lack of ammunition,

Canada sought modern guns of the same type. Such guns were in short

supply in the United States, and their transfer would have been in clear violation of Public Law 671. Fortunately, the U.S. Army was concurrently

sending its initial garrison of troops to defend the new base at St. John's,

and this garrison was to include a battery of antiaircraft artillery. On

6 December 1940 the Chief of Staff approved the recommendation that the

equipment of this battery be augmented by the balance of the equipment for

an antiaircraft artillery regiment. The additional equipment, which included

eight guns, twenty .50-caliber machine guns, ten searchlights, ammunition,

directors, and other auxiliary equipment, was loaned to the Canadian Army

"for training" and only technically remained in the custody of the handful

of U.S. soldiers that accompanied it.24

This precedent proved useful, for soon afterward, on 8 January 1941, the

Canadian Army member of the Board made an "unofficial suggestion" that

the equipment going to Newfoundland also include "a couple of ... 155-

mm. guns and a spot of ammunition" to fill the gap at St. John's while the

10-inch coast defense guns were being installed.25 Two days later, on 10

January 1941, he was informed that the equipment would include four 155-

mm. guns and the ammunition. Such incidents indicate how, within the

limits of severe shortages and legislative restrictions, the United States made

sincere efforts to accede to Canadian requests.

A similar procedure was effective in providing U.S. matériel to augment

Canadian defenses at the Juan de Fuca Strait in the Puget Sound boundary

waters area, but in this case an additional problem required solution. On

22 November 1940 Canada informally requested the transfer of four 8-inch

railway guns. General Marshall considered this request in conjunction with

the one for antiaircraft matériel for Newfoundland. Since no American

troops were to be sent to the Canadian west coast, the dispatch of an armed

detachment by the neutral United States to a belligerent Canada as custodian

for the guns presented complications that did not exist in the Newfoundland

situation. Marshall's advisers recommended a declaration of obsolescence.

But the Chief of Staff felt that, for the guns in question, such a certificate

would be dishonest and asked instead if legal transfer could not be made on

the basis of a certificate that such transfer was "in the interest of National

Defense of the United States."

 26

 Since his legal advisers declared this would

24

 WPD 4323-9. This matériel was returned near the end of 1942, by which time it had

been replaced by Canadian equipment. 25

 Ltr, to SUSAM, 8 Jan 41, PDB 104-4. 26

 Longhand Note, on Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 27 Nov 40, WPD 4323-8.
94 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

not be legal, the only feasible solution appeared to be the dispatch of U.S.

soldiers as custodians. On 18 December 1940 General Marshall and Secretary Stimson approved this solution, which Canada after some discussion

accepted. Meanwhile, as a result of U.S. planning for installation of a 16-

inch battery whose field of fire would cover part of the Canadian waters,

Canada formally requested only two guns.27 They were shipped soon afterward, accompanied by a few U.S. soldiers acting ostensibly as instructors but

actually as custodians.

After Pearl Harbor, when Canada desired further to improve its west coast

defenses, a second pair of 8-inch railway guns was loaned for the defense of

Prince Rupert, British Columbia. The urgency of the new situation, with the

United States now a belligerent and the war expanded into the Pacific, had

made for speedy action on the request with a minimum of red tape. On 15

March 1942, two days after the request, the guns were en route.28

The scale of U.S. assistance in the pre-Pearl Harbor period and immediately thereafter would appear small unless one considers that the United

States was trying to fill tremendous deficiencies in its own rapidly mobilizing

Army. At the same time it was trying to meet some of the urgent priority

needs of the United Kingdom in order to help the British survive the Battle

of Britain. Among additional items supplied to Canada during 1941 were

the following:

20,000 M1917 Enfield rifles

25 37-mm. M1916 guns

50 4-inch naval guns

34 3-pounder naval guns

16 155-mm. artillery howitzers

Ammunition, accessories, and spare parts

Within the limits of a more stringent supply position, Canada reciprocated with assistance where possible. After Pearl Harbor the U.S. Army

found serious deficiencies in its radar installations at the vital Panama Canal.

At the suggestion of Mr. Watson-Watt, a visiting British scientist, Secretary

of War Stimson requested of Canadian Minister of National Defense Ralston four early-warning and ground-controlled interception radar sets from

Canadian production as a matter of the greatest urgency.29 The four sets

were supplied and installed soon afterward.

27

 Memo, SUSAM for ACofS WPD, 16 May 41, WPD 4323-9. 28

 Ibid. 29

 Ltr, 13 Feb 42, PDB 123-1.
JOINT DEFENSE PLANNING 95

Strengthening the Garrisons

After the fall of France had brought the Axis threat appreciably closer to

North America, Canada in the summer of 1940 initiated the steps it could,

consistent with its commitments and involvement in the European war, to

improve defenses in North America. As an early step an infantry battalion,

the Black Watch of Montreal, was deployed to Newfoundland Airport (later

redesignated Gander Airport) in June 1940 to protect that operational transatlantic ferry base. This measure was the first significant overt expression

of the natural Canadian vital concern in the defense of Newfoundland, an

interest that before the first Permanent Joint Board meeting was to mature

into a general agreement with the Newfoundland Government on questions

of defense co-ordination.

Part of the initial Canadian garrison at Newfoundland Airport was a

flight of five Digby reconnaissance aircraft. By August a pair of 4.7-inch

guns was en route to Bell Island for manning by Newfoundland personnel,

and plans were in hand for the establishment of an advanced naval operating

base at St. John's. At its 27 August 1940 meeting the Permanent Joint

Board on Defense reviewed these dispositions and concluded that they were

inadequate. To correct the situation, the Board agreed on its Second Recommendation calling for an increase in the strength of the Newfoundland

garrison, an augmentation of its patrol and fighter aircraft forces, the preparation of air bases for garrison by U.S. air units "when and if circumstances

require," and such additional measures as examination showed to be necessary.30

 It is significant that the Board did not recommend immediate reinforcement by U.S. forces. The next day the Canadian Government, pursuant

to the Board's recommendation for augmentation of the Newfoundland garrison, decided to send an additional infantry battalion and to install 4.7-inch

batteries at St. John's and Botwood.31

From its inception the Permanent Joint Board was aware that negotiations were in hand for the leasing of bases in Newfoundland to the United

States. It took no official notice of them other than in the Second Recommendation until the 11 September meeting, after the signing of the destroyerbases agreement. The Eighth Recommendation, approved at that meeting,

asked the United States expeditiously to initiate such measures under the

Second Recommendation as fell "within the limits of the bases . . . being

acquired by the United States."

 32

30

 Text at Appendix A, below. 31

 Journal, 9-11 Sep 40 PJBD meeting, PDB 124. 32

 Appendix A, below.
96 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

At the 2 October 1940 Board meeting the decision of the United States

to send a regiment, less one battalion of infantry, with supporting troops to

Newfoundland was made known to the Canadian Section. Winter weather

handicapped construction of quarters, and the initial force of 58 officers and

919 enlisted men that arrived at St. John's on 29 January 1941 was quartered

aboard the USAT Edmund B. Alexander (formerly the America) until May

or June. By that time tent camps had been completed, barracks construction was under way, and the Fort Pepperrell garrison, consisting of the 3d

Battalion, 3d Infantry, a battery of the 57th Coast Artillery (Harbor Defense), and a battery of the 62d Coast Artillery (Antiaircraft), came ashore

to stay.

The U.S. Navy had meanwhile begun construction of the naval air station at Argentia in December 1940, and, on 25 January 1941, a detachment

comprising 3 officers and 108 men of the 3d Provisional Marine Company

landed there. The Argentia facility, which was presently expanded to include a naval operating base, was commissioned on 15 July 1941. As early

as two months before that date, two seaplane tenders and four destroyers

were based at Argentia.

The U.S. Army had also desired to establish an air garrison in Newfoundland, but was faced with the difficulty of doing so before the construction of an airfield could be completed on one of the leased sites. Although

the President had earlier rejected the Air Corps' plea to include Gander Airport as one of the leased areas, the War Department with the support of

Mayor LaGuardia renewed its request on 28 November 1940, this time for

the lease of land adjacent to the airport so that it could be used for urgently

needed training of a composite group of U.S. Army aircraft. At the urging

of the President the War and Navy Departments restudied the problem and,

on 30 January 1941, recommended that a lease not be sought but that an

informal basis for stationing an air unit at Gander be worked out with

Canada through the Permanent Joint Board. The President approved this

recommendation and the suggestion that appropriate language be included

in the leased-bases agreement to provide for the status of forces stationed

outside the areas of the leased bases. This action was apparently the genesis

of Article XIX of the leased-bases agreement.33

Although the informal arrangements worked out provided that Canada

would make available facilities for two U.S. squadrons by 1 May 1941 and

33

 Ltr, SW to President, 28 Nov 40, WPD 4351-9; Ltr, LaGuardia to President, 29 Nov 40,

and Memos, President for SW and Secy Navy, 30 Nov 40, all in Roosevelt Papers, Official File

4101; Ltr, SW and Secy Navy to President, 30 Jan 41, Roosevelt Papers, Secy's File, Box 78;

JPC Rpt, 8 Jan 41, WPD 4404-2; Ch. VII, below.
JOINT DEFENSE PLANNING 97

the balance of the facilities by early autumn, it soon became evident that

these facilities would not materialize on schedule. The delay appeared to be

connected with the unanswered question of responsibility for the defense of

Newfoundland.

The first joint effort to resolve the question of defense responsibilities in

Newfoundland had been in the First Report of the Permanent Joint Board,

approved at the 2-4 October 1940 meeting. In the report, Canada had been

assigned the responsibility for the "initial" defense of Newfoundland "except

insofar as the United States . . . [might] be in a position to participate in

such initial defense."

 34

 Subsequent discussions of the command question

revealed that U.S. willingness to accept the assignment of the "initial" defense responsibility to Canada was based on the expectation that, as soon as

U.S. forces outnumbered Canadian forces, the responsibility would pass to

the United States.

On 27 March 1941, the same day that the detailed leased-bases agreement

between the United Kingdom and the United States was signed, a protocol

was signed at Canadian instance by these two governments and Canada delineating the Canadian role in the defense of Newfoundland. According to

the protocol, the signatories (a) recognized that Newfoundland defense was

an integral part of the Canadian defense scheme, (b) agreed that Canadian

defense interests would be respected, (c) continued in effect existing arrangements made through the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, and (d) provided for inclusion of Canada in certain consultations under the leased-bases

agreement.35 Canada in requesting that the protocol be signed signified its

unwillingness to have the defense of Newfoundland become a U.S. responsibility or to allow the United States to assume the leading role in that

defense.36

The United States, on the other hand, was apparently not entirely satisfied with the defensive scheme and with the progress of the Gander Airport

arrangements. Immediately after the leased-bases agreement was signed, the

United States under the authority of Article XIX asked the United Kingdom

to approve the dispatch of U.S. air forces to Gander Airport on a temporary

basis until such time as U.S. air-base construction was completed. The

United Kingdom gave its approval on 8 April 1941 and undertook to inform

the governments of Canada and Newfoundland.37

34

 Appendix B, below. 35

 EAS, 235; CTS, 1941, No. 2. 36

 D/S Telg 973, to London, 22 Mar 41, PDB 107-9; H. C. Debates, 27 Mar 41, p. 1904;

Dawson, Canada in World Affairs; 1939-1941, p. 217. 37

 WPD Memo/Conv, Col Crawford and Hickerson, 11 Apr 41, which cites telegram of 9

April from London, PDB 107-9. The United States request also sought authority for similar

emergency deployments to Bermuda and Trinidad.
98 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

The arrangement came as a surprise to Canada, and at the 16-17 April

1941 meeting of the Permanent Joint Board the U.S. Section explained the

"sequence of events which led to the decision," pointing out that the arrangement made by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt envisaged that the action would be taken in consultation with the Board.38

The arrival in Newfoundland on 1 May 1941 of the reinforcements, the 21st

Reconnaissance Squadron of six B-18 medium bombardment aircraft, two

8-inch guns, and miscellaneous small units, raised the garrison by 646 to a

total of 1,666 officers and enlisted men.39

In keeping with the tripartite protocol, the mission and responsibility

of the U.S. garrison (designated the Newfoundland Base Command) was

defined to include the defense of the U.S. bases, co-operation with Canadian and British forces in defending Newfoundland and adjacent Canada,

the support of U.S. Navy forces, and the destruction of any German or

Italian forces encountered.40 Although the assigned missions of U.S. and

Canadian forces technically did not overlap, had enemy attack on Newfoundland actually occurred, operations by the two sets of forces would have been

substantially the same in nature and scope. A critical need for co-ordinated

command would have existed. The need was recognized and was long a

preoccupation of the commanders in Newfoundland and of higher-level

staffs.41

The United States continued to reinforce its ground and air garrison in

Newfoundland, which had reached a strength of 2,383 by 1 December 1941.

In August the 4lst Reconnaissance Squadron of eight B-17B Flying Fortress

aircraft had replaced the 21st Squadron, and on the eve of Pearl Harbor another squadron of B-17B aircraft was preparing to move to Newfoundland.

The first attack by these units on Axis submarines had occurred on 27 October 1941, two days after the initial RCAF attack. With the intensification

of submarine warfare in the western Atlantic after 7 December, air attacks

on submarines became more numerous.42

The Canadian Army defense garrison in Newfoundland by mid-July 1941

had increased to 2,389, and included two infantry battalions and antiaircraft

and coast defense artillery units. Additional deployments totaling 1,298

38

 Memo/Conv, Robertson and Moffat, 10 Apr 41, Moffat Diary; Journal, PDB 124. 39

 The Canadian Government had itself increased the RCAF garrison by moving to Newfoundland on 11 April, apparently as a countermove upon learning of the U.S. plan, No. 10

Bomber Reconnaissance Squadron, which had had a flight of five aircraft in Newfoundland since

June 1940. 40

 Craven and Cate (eds.) Plans and Early Operations, p. 156. 41

 See Ch. V, below. 42

 Craven and Cate (eds.), Plans and Early Operations, p. 157; Memo, E. M. Watson for

President, 27 Oct 41, Roosevelt Papers, Secy's File Box 78.
JOINT DEFENSE PLANNING 99

were planned by 1 September 1941 in order to increase the Canadian infantry garrison to three battalions — Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke at St. John's,

the Lincoln and Welland Regiment at Gander Airport, and the Prince Edward Island Highlanders at Botwood. The Royal Canadian Air Force concurrently operated a bomber reconnaissance squadron of B-18 aircraft from

Gander Airport.

The Maritime Provinces, according to the Permanent Joint Board's Third

Recommendation, had a strategic importance "similar to that of Newfoundland."

 43

 Here, too, the defenses were designed to meet enemy capabilities

which, until such time as Britain might fall, were estimated to include bombardment by one or two naval vessels, minor submarine or surface raids, and

occasional nuisance air attacks. The Maritime Provinces were more heavily

defended than Newfoundland. The garrisons there, unlike those in Newfoundland, included not only the operational defensive deployments of the

Canadian Army Atlantic Command and the Royal Canadian Air Force

Eastern Air Command but also additional units in various states of mobilization and training. The Royal Canadian Navy Atlantic Coast command was

also based on ports in the Maritime Provinces. As the Second Recommendation indicates, the required additions to the Maritime Provinces defenses

were not infantry or artillery ground defense forces but special harbor defense

and similar measures.

In February 1941 Canadian Army Atlantic Command forces in the Maritime Provinces included the 3d Infantry Division and four infantry and two

machine gun battalions, while substantial additions to the coastal defense

establishments were under way. The Eastern Air Command concurrently

based approximately three bomber reconnaissance squadrons in the Provinces,

plus a number of other units in varying states of formation and equipment.

Ten months later, on 17 December 1941, the Canadian Army Atlantic Command garrisons included the following numbers and units: 4 4

Total........................................................ . 27,628

Maritime Provinces................................................. . 10,839

5 infantry battalions

2 machine gun battalions

14 coast and antiaircraft artillery batteries

4 searchlight batteries

Newfoundland..................................................... . 3,975

3 infantry battalions

3 artillery batteries

General reserve..................................................... . 12,814

1 infantry division (less certain units)

43

 Appendix A, below. 44

 Memo, SUSAM for ACofS WPD, 27 Jan 42, PDB 135-2.
100 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

The United States provided no part of the garrisons in the Maritime Provinces, but it had been given the responsibility of reinforcing them in the

event of a major attack.45

On the North Pacific littoral, the defense of Alaska was primarily the

concern of the United States. For more than a year Permanent Joint Board

recommendations with regard to Alaska were limited to two relating to the

air staging route. This is probably a reflection of the state of affairs up until

Pearl Harbor. During this period Canada, which was using the recommendations made in the Board as a means of achieving its immediate military

objectives, had only a secondary interest in Alaska. However, the 1940 Plan

and the First Report based thereon both included provisions for Alaskan defense. These provisions were probably the result of the necessarily over-all

approach of the strategic planning studies. Through the medium of the

Board, Canada maintained an active interest in U.S. defensive preparations in

Alaska, and these preparations were reported on regularly at Board meetings.

Naturally, interest was intensified after the beginning of the war with Japan.

The fall of France had given impetus to the development of U.S. defensive installations in Alaska, but considerable time was required before appropriations could be converted into facilities and garrisons. At the time of the

establishment of the Permanent Joint Board, U.S. Army forces in Alaska

numbered about 1,200 officers and enlisted men.46

The First Report of the Board charged Canada with the development of

air staging facilities between Alaska and the United States and the United

States with the completion of Army bases at Anchorage and Fairbanks, Navy

bases at Sitka, Kodiak, and Dutch Harbor, and air bases at Ketchikan,

Yakutat, Cordova, Anchorage, Bethel, Nome, and Fairbanks. The United

States was assigned the responsibility of providing the necessary defense

forces, while Canada was to support these forces if required. Unlike the

Permanent Joint Board recommendations for the east coast, those for the

west coast did not specify the strength of the Alaska garrisons. But the

Board did monitor regularly the reports submitted at Board meetings on the

progress of construction and the reinforcement of the garrisons. By the end

of 1940, reinforcements had increased the strength of U.S. Army units in

Alaska to over 4,000.

During 1941 a build-up of the garrisons at the U.S. bases in Alaska

occurred as rapidly as the construction of facilities permitted. By 30 No45

 First Report, Appendix B, below. 46

 For accounts of the pre-Pearl Harbor development of Alaskan defenses, see Watson, Chief

of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 454-58; Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, pp.

163-65; and Craven and Cate (eds.), Plans and Early Operations, pp. 166-70.
JOINT DEFENSE PLANNING 101

vember 1941 an Army and Air Forces strength of 21,945 was reached, of

which the major elements were two infantry regiments, four infantry battalions, one pursuit squadron, and two bomber squadrons.47

The pre-Pearl Harbor story was generally the same for the Canadian

Pacific coast and the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The formal recommendations of the Permanent Joint Board virtually ignored the defensive

requirements of these areas. The broader approach of the 1940 Plan, and of

the First Report framed thereon, had made some provision for these areas:

a. On the Atlantic coast, the United States was to reinforce the Maritime Provinces in case of major attack and to develop the transportation facilities necessary to permit such action.

b. On its Pacific coast, the United States was to provide coast defense

and air bases in the boundary waters area, to control and protect shipping,

and to provide a one-division mobile reserve for employment in the boundary

area.

c. Canada, on its Pacific coast, was to provide coast and air defense

facilities, naval and coastal defense in selected areas, and the initial ground,

antiaircraft, coast, and air defense of British Columbia.48

The U.S. drafters apparently attached the same significance to the word

"initial" in the requirements for British Columbia as they did in the case of

Newfoundland.

Ten days after Pearl Harbor the strength of the Canadian Army Pacific

Command garrisons on the west coast totaled 9,473 and included three infantry battalions, eight artillery battalions, and a general reserve of one

infantry brigade, one field artillery regiment, and one reconnaissance battalion. Although the United States nominally established Northeast and

Western Defense Commands for its east and west coasts on 17 March 1941,

the defense requirements of the western portions of both countries remained

in a lower priority than the eastern portions until after the Japanese attack

on 7 December.

ABC-1 and ABC-22

When the service members of the Permanent Joint Board prepared the

first joint draft of the 1940 Plan on 11 September 1940, they based it on

"strength actually existing" and indicated a need for subsequent plans, including a 1941 plan based on the estimated strength as of 1 May 1941.49

 By

the time of the 20 January 1941 meeting, the Board noted that the 1940 Plan

47

 Western Defense Command, History of the Western Defense Command, Vol. I, Annex D, OCMH. 48

 See Appendix B, below. 49

 First Joint Draft of 1940 Plan, WPD 4330-5.
102 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

was obsolete and that a 1941 plan was already being discussed by the service

members. But the planning process was complicated by events that were

taking place. The first of the British-U.S, staff meetings was held a few days

after the January Board meeting, and these meetings continued during the

next two months.50

During this period work on a new U.S.-Canadian plan marked time, and

on 27 February the Board was informed at its meeting in Buffalo that preparatory work on the 1941 plan had not progressed sufficiently far for a meeting of the service members to be useful. Nevertheless, the Board, in the

absence of General Embick who was the senior U.S. Army representative in

the British-U.S, conversations, discussed at length the need for further plans.

It recognized that in addition to planning for the contingency of a British

collapse, a plan was needed that would provide for the contingency of U.S.

entry into the European war.51 This recognition was probably the initial

impact on the views of the Board of the U.S.-British conference, whose entire

effort was devoted to planning for that contingency.

Between 27 February and 27 March the British-U.S, planners drafted their

report at informal sessions on the basis of the exchange of views during the

preceding plenary sessions. The report stated that Canadian military representatives were associated with the United Kingdom delegation throughout

the course of these conversations but were not present at joint meetings.52

Neither the minutes of the joint meetings nor pertinent U.S. working papers

cast any light on the character of the association.53

Whatever the nature of the United Kingdom-Canadian association during

the conversations, the report thereon had several significant effects on the

development of U.S.-Canadian planning:

a. The conference agreed that the "High Command of the United

States and United Kingdom . . . [would] collaborate continuously in the

formulation and execution of strategical policies and plans which . . .

[should] govern the conduct of the war." The fuller significance of this

assumption of supreme direction is apparent in the word "Command." whose

singular form was a change from the plural of an earlier draft.54

b. The strategic concept and the principal policies for achieving the

objective of "the defeat of Germany and her Allies" were offensive in nature,

although the detailed war plan provided for the many defensive tasks that

50

 See Ch. III, above. 51

 Journal, PDB 124. 52

 Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 15, p. 1485. 53

 These minutes and papers are filed in several folders in WPD 4402-89. 54

 BUS(J) (41)22, OPD Exec 4, Item 11.
JOINT DEFENSE PLANNING 103

would also need to be performed. United States-Canadian planning had been

entirely defensive in its approach.

c. Upon entering the war, the United States was to assume responsibility for the strategic direction of U.S., British, and other associated military

forces in the Western Hemisphere except "the waters and territories in which

Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of military forces,

as may be defined in the United States-Canada joint agreements."55

d. The report agreed on "principles of command" that envisaged a superior commander of one country commanding troops of other countries

through their own national commanders.

The final editing of the report took place on 27 March 1941, although

the minutes of the fourteenth and last meeting on 29 March record formal

approval as of 29 March. At this meeting the short title "ABC-1" was assigned to the document, whose full title was "United States-British Staff

Conversations, Report." There appears to be no evidence to support a theory

that Canada alone among the other associated powers was singled out for

inclusion in the short title, in which the letters A and B stood for American

and British, despite the fact that the ABC usage was soon adopted by the

United States and Canada, which gave the short title ABC-22 to their next

defense plan.56

By the time the British-U.S, meetings ended, the service members of the

Permanent Joint Board had prepared two distinct joint draft plans. Plan 1,

which had already passed through several joint drafts, was an implementation of the 1940 Plan and was based on the concept of a joint U.S.-Canadian

war effort without outside aid. Plan 2 was based on a different concept and

different assumptions and envisaged the contingency of U.S. entry into the

war alongside Great Britain, as contemplated in ABC-1.57

The Senior U.S. Army Member of the Permanent Joint Board submitted

the draft of Plan 1, which was in the more advanced state, to the War Plans

Division of the War Department General Staff. In commenting on this

draft the War Plans Division, by that time apparently confident of British

success in the Battle of Britain, expressed the principal criticism that a greater

55

 Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 15, p. 1485 et passim. 56

 The "C" in ABC stood for conversations or conference (or possibly Commonwealth).

The statement of General of the Army H. H. Arnold, wartime commander of the Army Air

Forces, in Global Mission (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), p. 255, that the ABC plan

referred to America-British-China is inaccurate. Besides ABC-22, another offspring of ABC-1

was the ADB report of the American-Dutch-British conversations in Singapore in April 1941.

This detailed plan for the conduct of Far East operations is reproduced in Pearl Harbor Attack,

Pt. 15, pp. 1551-84. 57

 Memo, SUSAM for CofS, 31 Mar 41, PDB 135-2.
104 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

need existed for a plan based on the hypothesis that the United States might

find it necessary to enter the war and fight with Great Britain. The War

Plans Division also felt that matters of strategic direction and command were

not adequately covered.58

As a result of lack of War Department support for further planning based

on Plan 1, no more work was done on it. A few days after War Plans Division criticized Plan 1, the Senior U.S. Army Member of the Permanent Joint

Board was able to respond by submitting a new draft of Joint CanadianUnited States Basic Defense Plan 2, dated 10 April 1941 and bearing the

short title "ABC-22."

 59

 Although this draft was based on the pertinent

assumptions in ABC-1, War Plans Division also took exception to Plan 2,

again because of the provisions on strategic direction and command.60

By this time the questions of command and strategic direction had become a major issue in the Board, the service departments, and to some extent, the political departments of the two countries.61

 United States service

proposals for vesting in the United States the strategic direction of forces

in Newfoundland and certain Canadian areas were not acceptable but were

argued for over a month while planning ceased. Agreement in principle was

reached in the Board at the 28-29 May 1941 meeting. This agreement permitted the service members on 4 June to agree on a revised joint draft of

ABC-22. The War Plans Division still considered the command arrangements defective but was willing to interpose no objection to the acceptance

of the new draft.62 On 11 June the Senior Canadian Army Member of the

Board submitted a number of amendments to Plan 2, one of which called for

the establishment of a Canadian military mission in Washington. This new

proposal was followed on 1 July by a formal Canadian request for a mission,

and, from that time until the United States replied on 25 July, ABC-22 planning languished.63

 Thereafter, although Canada failed to get its military

mission in Washington and the United States failed to get the arrangement

it desired for strategic direction of forces in Newfoundland and certain Canadian areas, the questions were resolved, at least for the time being, and at

the 29-30 July 1941 Board meeting the service members could report agreement on Plan 2.

58

 Memo, for SUSAM, 7 Apr 41, WPD 4330-21. 59

 This was the first use of the designation ABC-22. The meaning of the number "22"

and its relation, if any, to the numbers assigned to the two reports of the ABC conversations,

ABC-1 and ABC-2, are not recorded in U.S. files. 60 Memo, for SUSAM, 2 May 41, WPD 4330-22. 61

 A full account is contained in Chapter V, below. 62

 1st Ind, to SUSAM, 17 Jun 42, PDB 135-2. 63

 See Chapter III, above, for an account of the negotiations and their bearing on the question

of command.
JOINT DEFENSE PLANNING 105

ABC-22 was formally reviewed in the U.S. War and Navy Departments

and was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on 16 August and by the

Secretary of War on 18 August 1941. The two Secretaries transmitted the

plan to President Roosevelt on 20 August 1941 recommending that he approve it, and he did so on 29 August. The President's action on ABC-22

contrasted sharply with that on ABC-1, which he saw fit only to note and

to instruct that it be returned for approval if the United States should enter

the war.64 Review of the plan proceeded more slowly in Canada, where "supplementary questions" were still being asked in early October. On 15 October 1941 the Cabinet War Committee finally gave the government's approval

to ABC-22.65

In its broad outlines ABC-22 differed only slightly from the aborted Plan

1 and its predecessor, the 1940 Plan. The ABC-22 tasks were those required

for the defense of northern North America (less Greenland) in an offensive

war against Germany. Whereas the 1940 Plan called for protection of only

such overseas shipping as was on the high seas when the plan was put into

effect, ABC-22 included as a major task the continuing protection of overseas shipping throughout the western Atlantic and the Pacific areas. The

defensive tasks were otherwise substantially the same. Naturally, under the

different assumptions of the two plans, different estimates of enemy capabilities called for different defensive deployments and strengths. Both plans

were capabilities plans, rather than requirements plans, and set forth only the

forces actually available for execution of the necessary tasks.

Command, which had not been specifically touched upon in the 1940

Plan, was in ABC-22 to be co-ordinated through mutual co-operation, except where special agreements were made for unified commands. With one

exception, the defense responsibility, in each land area, and presumably the

command responsibility as well, was assigned to the sovereign country. In

Newfoundland, where neither Canada nor the United States was sovereign,

the defense was made a common task of the U.S. and Canadian Armies and

the Royal Canadian Air Force. In the only other area where the two countries had equal juridical status, the defense responsibility was assigned, in

consonance with the status quo, to the United States. This was on the high

seas, in the northern portions of the Pacific and western Atlantic Ocean

areas, where the United States was made responsible for the protection of

shipping. One clause in the plan provided that, if circumstances warranted,

64

 Memo, Secy GS for CofS, 29 Aug 41, PDB 135-2; Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning

for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, p. 46. The memorandum is contained in Pearl Harbor Attack,

Pt. 3, p. 997; see also pp. 993-96. 65

 Ltr, Pope to Embick, 16 Oct 41, PDB 135-2.
106 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

the forces of one country might temporarily extend their operations into the

other country.

The plan was to go into effect when directed by the two governments. As

a war plan, most of its provisions would be acted upon only when it was

placed in effect. Like the 1940 Plan, ABC-22 included a statement of the

facilities to be provided by each country. In the Annex to ABC-22, the

planners had found it necessary only to list these facilities, since arrangements

for their provision had already been agreed upon in the First Report of the

Permanent Joint Board or in subsequent recommendations. ABC-22 was

the last joint U.S.-Canadian defense plan prepared by the service members of

the Permanent Joint Board on Defense during World War II.

Putting Plans Into Action

Even before ABC-22 was completed the preparation of the subordinate

plans necessary to translate its broad allocations of missions into detailed

operating plans for field commands had already been begun. In the United

States, the joint Army-Navy RAINBOW plans provided the approved basis for

detailed service planning. While ABC-22 was being drafted, the U.S. Joint

Planning Committee was given new direction in its work on Joint Army and

Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW 5, which was now to be based on ABC-1

and ABC-22.66 As a matter of fact, when ABC-22 was completed, it was

appended as Annex II to RAINBOW 5, which had been approved by the Secretaries of War and the Navy on 2 June and 28 May 1941, respectively. The

joint Army-Navy plan RAINBOW 5 became the basis of the more detailed

War Department Operations Plan—RAINBOW 5, and the Navy Basic War

Plan —RAINBOW 5. These in turn were the basis for plans of the defense

commands, departments, naval coastal frontiers, and other subordinate Army

and Navy commands. All of these plans therefore reflected the basic allocations and provisions of ABC-22. In a few instances implementation of

ABC-22 took the form of preparation of local joint U.S.-Canadian plans in

boundary areas of mutual interest. But in the area in most urgent need of

such a plan, Newfoundland, no co-ordinated planning took place until after

Pearl Harbor.

The first local plan had been drafted for the Puget Sound-Juan de Fuca

Strait area in Washington State and British Columbia many months before

the drafting of ABC-22. The problem of co-ordination of defenses there

occasioned an inspection trip to the area in September 1940 by Brigadier

66

 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, pp. 40-46. For

an account of RAINBOW planning, see Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division,

pp. 55-59, and Matloff and Snell, Ch. I.
JOINT DEFENSE PLANNING 107

Stuart, the Canadian Army Board member, and Colonel McNarney, the U.S.

Army Air Corps officer on the Permanent Joint Board. After conferring with

the harbor defense commanders of the two countries in the area, Stuart and

McNarney recommended to their departments that a joint plan for the area

be prepared. Accordingly, the War Department on 28 September 1940 directed the Commanding General, Fourth Army, to initiate the planning.67

On 21-22 October a joint board of five U.S. and Canadian officers made a

complete study of the problem on the ground, discussed it with the local

commanding officers, and drafted an International Joint Defense Plan for

Strait of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound Area.68 The conclusions and recommendations of this plan called for installation of certain additional armament,

improvement of communications, preparation of joint codes, exchange of

liaison officers, and other measures. Most of the recommendations, modified

in some instances after review in Washington and Ottawa, were placed in

effect and became the first co-operative measures between commands of the

two countries on tactical levels.

Subsequent to the U.S. approval of ABC-22, a joint area plan based thereon

was prepared for all of the U.S.-Canadian west coast, including Alaska, as a

result of War Department instructions issued on 29 September 1941.69 A

defensive plan, with short title "ABC(Pacific)-22," was completed and approved as of 22 January 1942 (for the United States) by the Commanding

General, Western Defense Command, and the Commander, Pacific Northern

Naval Coastal Frontier, and (for Canada) by the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Pacific Command; Commanding Officer, Pacific Coast (Royal

Canadian Navy); and the Air Officer Commanding, Western Air Command.

The real and more important implementation of ABC-22 was the action

on the measures it set forth as necessary to permit the carrying out of the

plan. These measures called for construction or installation of certain defensive works, operational bases, and logistical facilities. Although ABC-22

was presumably not in effect until so ordered, work on these essential measures listed in the plan was put under way at once, long before the plan was

officially placed in effect.

Once the Canadian Government had, on 15 October 1941, matched the

earlier action of the U.S. Government in approving ABC-22, this plan had

not long to remain on the shelf of war plans before it was put into effect.

The Japanese struck Pearl Harbor at 1:25 P.M. (Washington time) on 7

December 1941. At 10:25 A.M. the next morning, General Embick, the

67

 WPD 4330-9. 68

 Copy filed at WPD 4330-9. 69

 History of the Western Defense Command, I, 10.
108 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Senior U.S. Army Member of the Permanent Joint Board, telephoned Brigadier Pope, his opposite number in Ottawa, that the United States had placed

ABC-22 in effect "as it applies to Japan," and requested similar action by

the Canadian Government. A telephone call the same afternoon between

these two officers reported that the same action had been ordered by the Canadian Minister of National Defense.70

 At 4:10 P.M. that afternoon President Roosevelt approved the joint resolution of Congress declaring the

existence of a state of war between the United States and Japan. Canada,

already at war with two of the Axis Powers, formalized the existence of a

state of war with Japan by an order-in-council of 7 December.71

On 11 December Congress passed, and the President approved at 3:05

P.M., similar joint resolutions regarding Germany and Italy.72 Four hours

earlier the Chief of Staff had issued orders to his subordinate field commanders

placing Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW 5, and the corresponding War Department Operations Plan, in effect. The ABC-22 plan,

as Annex II to RAINBOW 5, went into general effect at that time. The comparable Canadian action was reported on 22 December, when the U.S. Section of the Board was advised that the Canadian Government had instructed

the Canadian Chiefs of Staff "to place ABC-22 in effect without qualification.73

70 Confirming Memos, 8 Dec 41, PDB 135-2. 71

 PL 328, 77th Congress; Privy Council 9592. 72

 PL 331, and 332, 77th Congress. 73

 Ltr, Pope to U.S. Section, PDB 135-2.
CHAPTER V

Organization and Command

The several joint strategic defense plans whose preparation was undertaken pursuant to the Seventh Recommendation of the Permanent Joint

Board on Defense necessarily concerned themselves with problems of co-ordination and command jurisdiction. Divergent U.S. and Canadian points of

view regarding the solution of these problems were intensified after Pearl

Harbor had brought the war to the threshold of the United States. This

was due to U.S. unwillingness to leave in the hands of another power the

defense of contiguous border areas whose adequate defense was vital to the

security of the United States.

Other factors added to the complexity of the problem of U.S.-Canadian

co-ordination after Pearl Harbor. Until then the joint relationship involved

a common defense problem to be worked out on a mutual basis using newly

developed patterns and precedents. After 7 December 1941 certain important

continental defense requirements continued to exist, but the principal foci of

U.S. military interest shifted from North America to Europe and North

Africa, and to Alaska and the mid-Pacific islands. Canada thus became to

the United States primarily a territory astride or bordering on essential ground,

air, and sea lines of communications to the areas in which the major engagements with the Axis forces were to take place.

Within Canadian territory a vast complex of logistical facilities became

necessary for the support of friendly forces in combat zones. The United

States, with its preponderance of resources, undertook the development of

the greater part of the logistical facilities required in Canada and in the North

American areas. The development work took on, to a large extent, the appearance of a U.S.-directed unilateral operation on Canadian territory, with

Canada providing rights of way, auxiliary facilities, and the like. Logistical

tasks, although of joint interest, did not lend themselves to joint direction

as did defense tasks, since they were undertaken primarily by the United

States and principally with its own resources.

As more logistical tasks were undertaken, the movement into Canada of

U.S. construction, communications, and other organizations mushroomed

rapidly. The functioning of this quickly growing establishment presented

many new problems of co-ordination, political and military, from the governmental level to the lowest operating echelons.
110 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Unity of Operational Command

Disagreements between Canada and the United States over the command

question had begun when the first joint defense plan, the 1940 Plan, was

drafted. No direct command provisions were incorporated in it, although

allocations of territorial responsibilities were made that presumably included

command responsibility. The 1940 Plan set forth the following allocation

of defense responsibilities:1

a. All Canadian territory, to Canada.

b. All U.S. territory, including Alaska, to the United States.

c. Newfoundland—to Canada, the "initial . . . defenses, except in so

far as the United States . . . [might] be in a position to participate in such

initial defense"; to the United States, the defense of U.S. bases.

d. Control of shipping in the Atlantic approaches to North America,

to Canada. (The Royal Canadian Navy was already handling the task.)

e. Canadian coastal waters, to Canada.

f. United States coastal waters and all North American offshore sea approaches, to the United States, except for air patrol of approaches to Newfoundland and eastern Canada by the Royal Canadian Air Force.

In U.S. and Canadian territorial waters and land areas, the assignment of

responsibilities was strictly along lines of national sovereignty. In Newfoundland, governed by the United Kingdom through a Royal Commission

and soon to be garrisoned by U.S. as well as Canadian forces, the responsibilities overlapped. In addition, the provision of the plan allocating initial overall defense responsibility for Newfoundland to Canada implied subsequent

allocation of the responsibility to the United States.

The allocation of responsibilities in the North Atlantic approaches to

North America reflected the close liaison that was developing among the

naval services of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. A

big factor in the agreement on command arrangements based on military

principles that U.S. officers considered soundest was the fact that arrangements on the high seas were not inhibited by considerations of national

sovereignty or by historic U.S. and Canadian psychological attitudes.2

The U.S. service members of the Permanent Joint Board had foreseen the

need for guidance on the command question immediately after the first

Board meeting and before the drafting of the 1940 Plan. The Chief of Staff

on 9 September agreed that the United States should propose to assume pri1

 The 1940 Plan is filed at PDB 133-5. 2

 For a brief account of the joint naval operations in the North Atlantic, see Chapter IX,

below.
ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND 111

mary responsibility for the defense of the Maritime Provinces through their

inclusion in the New England Sector of the frontier coastal defense system.

For the time being, no defense or command responsibility was to be sought

in Newfoundland or British Columbia.3 Actually, as each of the drafts of

the 1940 Plan was prepared, including the last (10 October 1940), no command provisions whatever were included.

The War Department General Staff, in reviewing the plan in November

1940, felt that the lack of provisions as to organization and command should

be corrected, since the task of co-ordinating the five separate forces involved

(two armies, two navies, and one air force) by mutual co-operation would

present "a most difficult problem." The War Plans Division proposed that

the Maritime Provinces, Newfoundland, and British Columbia be included

as sectors of the U.S. North Atlantic and Pacific Coastal Frontiers. The sectors would remain under Canadian tactical command except that the United

States would assume command in the Maritime Provinces or Newfoundland

sectors when its forces in either had reached certain levels that would make

them preponderant.4

There were several other requirements for command and co-ordination

arrangements for which the 1940 Plan failed to provide:

a. Co-ordination of the U.S. and Canadian garrisons in Newfoundland

and of their overlapping responsibilities.

b. Establishment of a unified defense command in the Strait of Juan de

Fuca area, where the boundary divided into two parts, and thereby weakened,

a defense that was militarily a single entity.

c. Co-ordinated direction of forces on adjacent sides of the boundaries

in other border areas.

d. Some means of over-all direction or co-ordination of the multiplicity

of commands involved in the defense of northern North America.

With the establishment of the U.S. Army defense commands in 1941, the

principal commanders whose co-operation and co-ordination were required

were as follows:5

Canada United States

East Coast

Commodore Commanding Newfoundland Commander in Chief, United States AtlanForce (Royal Canadian Navy) tic Fleet (U.S. Navy)

Commanding Officer, Atlantic Coast Task Force Commander, United States

(Royal Canadian Navy) Atlantic Fleet (U.S. Navy)

3

 Memo, SUSAM for CofS, 7 Sep 40, approved by the Chief of Staff 9 Sep 40, WPD 4330-4. 4

 Memo, WPD for SUSAM, 9 Nov 40, WPD 4330-5. 5

 The commanders are listed in ABC-22, reproduced in Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 15, p. 1588.
112 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Canada United States

East Coast

Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal

Command (Royal Canadian Air Force) Frontier (U.S. Navy)

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Commanding General, Northeast Defense

Atlantic Command (Canadian Army) Command (and the subordinate Newfoundland Base Command) (U.S. Army)

Commanding General, General Headquarters (U.S. Army)

West Coast

Commanding Officer, Pacific Coast (Royal Commander in Chief, United States Pacific

Canadian Navy) Fleet (U.S. Navy)

Air Officer Commanding, Western Air Task Force Commander, United States

Command (Royal Canadian Air Force) Pacific Fleet (U.S. Navy)

General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Commander, Pacific Northern Naval

Pacific Command (Canadian Army) Coastal Frontier (U.S. Navy)

Commanding General, Western Defense

Command (and the subordinate Alaska

Defense Command) (U.S. Army)

In the conversations between United Kingdom and U.S. service representatives in early 1941, it was agreed that in any given area unified direction

of all forces should be exercised by whichever of the two countries was assigned responsibility for the area. This agreement was not intended to prejudice such arrangements as Canada and the United States might make in

their joint plans, but it undoubtedly strengthened the U.S. resolve to press

for what it considered a sound military solution of the command question.

When joint planning with Canada was resumed in March 1941, the U.S.

service members of the Permanent Joint Board incorporated the U.S. views

on command and organization in a draft U.S.-Canadian joint defense plan

for ground and air operations.6 The provisions of the plan called for the

addition to the U.S. Northeast and Western Defense Commands of three

sectors, comprising the Maritime Provinces, Newfoundland, and British

Columbia. United States officers were to control the defense commands and

the U.S. sectors thereof. The three sectors to be added would be commanded

by Canadian officers, and command of the Newfoundland sector would pass

to the United States when prescribed levels had been reached by U.S. forces.

Liaison between the two countries in regard to the strategic direction of the

two defense commands would be effected through military missions to be

exchanged between Ottawa and Washington.

In their first counterproposal, of 14 April, the Canadian planners proposed that instead of control by defense commanders, the strategic direction 6

 Prepared in WPD and forwarded to SUSAM by Memo, 20 Mar 41, PDB 133.
ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND 113

of the sectors be vested jointly in the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and the Canadian Chiefs of the General and Air Staffs. This direction would be exercised through the missions to be exchanged.7

The following day, 15 April, the service planners of the two countries

met and produced a "Montreal Revise" of the Canadian draft. The agreed

revision contained the following changes:

a. Responsibility for strategic direction of the three sectors was to be

vested in the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, who would be required to consult

with the Canadian chief of staff concerned before issuing a directive affecting

the Canadian forces.

b. Canada would retain command of the Newfoundland sector regardless of the strength of U.S. forces stationed there.8

The revised draft appeared to satisfy U.S. desires and to give the Canadians

the military mission in Washington which they sought. Within a week of

the planners' agreement on the draft, the Canadian Chiefs of the General and

the Air Staffs approved it, subject to minor additions.9 But the command

debate, to all appearances settled, was soon to become more active than ever.

During the Permanent Joint Board meeting on 16-17 April, immediately

after the service members had reached agreement on the Montreal Revise,

progress made in planning had been discussed. The command arrangements

of the plan, even though they were to be approved a few days later by the

Canadian Chiefs of the General and the Air Staffs, had been considered unsatisfactory by Mr. Biggar, the Canadian chairman. Subsequently, in a letter

of 29 April to Mr. LaGuardia detailing his views, he objected to the uncertainty as to (a) the scope of the strategic direction to be exercised by the

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and (b) the character of the prior consultation.

He transmitted at the same time a draft report embodying his views and proposed that, after it had been refined, the Permanent Joint Board submit it to

the two governments for approval as its Second Report.10 From the U.S.

point of view, his proposals represented a step backward, for they not only

failed to provide some means of higher strategic co-ordination but also definitively assigned the defense responsibility for Newfoundland to Canada.

LaGuardia replied that he would have the proposals studied but that he

feared, frankly, they were "getting dangerously apart." The War Department General Staff, after studying the proposals, found them unacceptable

and recommended that the United States stand firm on the agreed Montreal

7

 Draft Plan, PDB 133. 8

 Montreal Revise, PDB 133. 9

 Ltr, Pope to Bissell, 21 Apr 41, WPD 4330-24. 10

 Ltr, 29 Apr 41, WPD 4330-25.
114 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Revise. LaGuardia then addressed the President on 7 May, outlining the

problem. He cited the command principle that had been accepted in ABC-1

and stated his "personal conviction that the situation . . . [had] been created

for political reasons" as a result of discussions in the Cabinet War Committee. The U.S. chairman recommended that the President personally lay before Prime Minister King the need for vesting strategic direction in the

United States.11

After an exchange of memorandums with the Secretaries of War and the

Navy, the President advised LaGuardia that he agreed with his position and

suggested that he outline the matter of responsibility to the Canadians along

the following lines:

a. Although not a belligerent, the United States was virtually ready to

undertake the defense of eastern Canada and Newfoundland.

b. Canada had neither the men or the matériel for this task except as a

participant on a smaller scale than the United States.

c. The Canadian war effort was designed primarily to send men and

materials overseas.

d. Since the defensive effort would fall nine-tenths to the United States,

the strategic responsibility should be vested in that country.12

LaGuardia, in turn, informed the Canadian chairman that the U.S. Government completely supported the U.S. chairman's insistence on the need for

U.S. strategic control and proposed an early Board meeting to resolve the

issue.

At this point the air began to clear, and Mr. Biggar replied to Mr. LaGuardia by recounting a parable of how two good-natured superintendents

employed by touchy owners of two farms of disproportionate sizes and resources worked out means of joint supervision of an attack on a common

problem.13 At the 28-29 May Permanent Joint Board meeting the "goodnatured superintendents" and their assistants discussed, during three half-day

sessions, the preparation of a new plan and command relationships under it.

A terse twelve-line Journal of Discussions and Decisions covered all three

sessions and merely reported that "as no mutually acceptable solution of the

problem of command relationships was found after a full discussion of this

subject, it was agreed that it would be desirable for the question of command

11

 Ltr, 2 May 41; Memo, WPD for SUSAM, 7 May 41; Ltr, 7 May 41; all at PDB 135-3.

The last letter does not state the basis of LaGuardia's conviction. 12

 Memos, 14, 15, and 16 May 41, PDB 135-3. The memorandum dated 14 May to the

Secretaries of War and the Navy is reproduced in Elliott Roosevelt (ed.), F. D. R., His Personal

Letters, 1928-1945 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), II, 1155-56. The four-point

answer had been suggested by the President to the Secretaries of War and the Navy and was

endorsed verbatim by them in their reply. 13

 Ltr, 21 May 41, PDB 135-3.
ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND 115

relationship under Plan No. 2 to be considered on the basis of command by

co-operation.14

Although the action is not recorded in the journal, the Permanent Joint

Board apparently approved, at least in part, a draft Second Report on the

subject of command arrangements.15 This draft, as had Biggar's, differentiated between the command requirements for the 1940 Plan (premised on

British collapse) and for Plan 2 (ABC-22, which assumed U.S. entry into

the war alongside the United Kingdom).16 In regard to the 1940 Plan, the

draft report provided for strategic direction by the United States, with full

consultation between the two governments on matters of joint war policy

and with Canadian representation on the agency that might be created for

that purpose. Several drafts were proposed for the portion of the report that

concerned Plan 2, as were amendments to the portion of the draft that had

been tentatively approved. Although the report was never completed and

command arrangements for Plan 2 (ABC-22) were eventually embodied in

the plan itself, the agreed portion of the draft Second Report, which covered

command arrangements for the 1940 Plan, apparently continued tacitly to be

accepted by the Permanent Joint Board as a valid agreement.17

Soon after the 28-29 May 1941 Board meeting, a draft of ABC-22 was

agreed upon at staff level. The plan, as subsequently approved, included

the following command arrangements:

a. Assignment to the forces of each country of tasks that lent themselves to execution by the forces of a single country.

b. Co-ordination of military effort by mutual co-operation, with each

country retaining strategic direction and command of its own forces.

c. Establishment of unified commands where required, upon agreement

by the chiefs of staff concerned or upon agreement by local commanders

and confirmation by the chiefs of staff.

d. Exchange of liaison officers between commanders at the various

levels.

The War Department accepted these arrangements reluctantly, since it

continued to believe that command by co-operation was inadequate and ineffective. In recommending approval to the Chief of Staff, the War Plans

Division stated: "Considering the difficulties the United States representatives experienced in arriving at an agreement with the Canadian representa14

 Journal, PDB 124. 15

 Ltr, Pope to Keenleyside, 9 Jun 41, PDB 135-3, refers to "that portion of the draft 2nd

Report of the Board which was agreed to at its meeting in Washington on the 29th May." 16

 See Ch. IV, above. Copy of draft is filed at PDB 135-3. 17

 Memo, SUSAM for CofS, 1 Jun 42, PDB 135-2, reports that, if the 1940 Plan became

effective, unity of command would be exercised by the United States.
116 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

tives . . . [the plan is] the best that could be evolved . . . [and] should

be accepted."

 18

Local Command Arrangements

Although Washington and Ottawa during the latter half of 1941 were of

necessity reconciled to the "co-ordination by mutual co-operation" concept

of ABC-22, the question of unity of command continued to plague commanders in the field. The problem was probably most complicated in Newfoundland, where forces of both Canada and the United States were disposed.

Plan ABC-22 had charged both garrisons with the same responsibility—to

defend Newfoundland in co-operation with the other country's forces. But

the United States, in line with the allocation of initial responsibility for Joint

Task Two (the defense of Newfoundland) in the 1940 Plan, had yielded

the over-all responsibility for Newfoundland defense to Canada. Five commands were involved in the local defense problem: the U.S. Newfoundland

Base Command (Army and Air); U.S. Navy Task Force 4, Argentia; Royal

Canadian Navy Newfoundland Force; Canadian Army Force, Newfoundland;

and Royal Canadian Air Force No. 1 Group. The mission actually assigned

to the U. S. Newfoundland base commander charged him with (a) the defense of only the U.S. military installations there, and (b) co-operating with

Canadian forces in the defense of Newfoundland.19 Although this mission

in theory separated defense responsibilities, an actual attack on the island

would probably have found the five commands attempting, in the same general area, to counter the enemy through the same types of operations. Lack

of co-ordinated direction would have produced confusion, dissipation of resources, and hazard to the un-co-ordinated defenders. As a basic measure,

the exchange of liaison officers between commands as provided for under

ABC-22 was readily arranged, but little success was achieved in effecting,

pursuant to that plan, local arrangements for unity of command.

The harbor defense of St. John's was a narrowly local problem where

divided responsibility existed as a result of U.S. installation of an 8-inch battery after Canada had installed a 10-inch battery supplied by the United

States. On 5 September 1941, the Canadian Army commander advised the

U.S. Newfoundland base commander that he considered "divided responsibility in this matter unsound." He suggested, as a more satisfactory arrangement, transfer of the manning responsibility for the U.S. battery to the Canadian force.20

 When the United States did not respond to the suggestion,

it was dropped. 18

 Memo, WPD for CofS, 14 Aug 41, PDB 135-2. 19

 1st Ind, TAG to GHQ, 13 Nov 41, PDB 111-6. 20

 PDB 103-12.
ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND 117

Not long after Pearl Harbor, U.S. units stationed at Gander Airport complained about the unsatisfactory defense co-ordination there. Air units of

both countries were stationed at the same base, yet no delineation of air

defense responsibility had been possible, although urgently needed, particularly for the air warning services.21

 The U.S. Section of the Board found it

necessary to reply that the situation could not be altered by action through

the Permanent Joint Board, for Gander was a Canadian base and the defense

responsibility was therefore Canadian.

A new avenue for effecting co-ordination was opened shortly after Pearl

Harbor when the Board agreed on its Twenty-second Recommendation.22

This recommendation, on the decentralization of functions to local commanders, authorized the commanders named in Paragraph 12 of ABC-22 to

work out "by mutual agreements any arrangements they deem necessary for

the perfection of preparations for the common defense." The wording gave

broad scope to the measures that might be taken under the aegis of this recommendation.subject to the requirement—and this from the U.S. point of

view was the fly in the ointment—that the local commanders involved

mutually agree to the measures.23

With the United States unwilling to press for more satisfactory co-ordination arrangements on higher levels, it remained for the operating echelons in

Newfoundland to provide such co-ordination through co-operative measures

insofar as application of the Twenty-second Recommendation would permit.

Efforts were made through the drafting of joint defense plans, through establishment of local joint defense committees and joint operations centers, and

through the exchange of liaison officers. Local joint planning had been

initiated as early as November 1941, when the U.S. commander drafted a

Joint Defense Plan 1, Newfoundland. He later reported success in getting

the support of all the commands involved, except for the RCAF command.24

In December the three Canadian commanders and the U.S. Newfoundland

base commander, all stationed at St. John's, joined to form the Local Joint

Defense Committee to review all existing plans and recommend changes,

and to function under its senior member. Initially the senior member was

the U.S. commander, Maj. Gen. Gerald C. Brant.

Immediately after the establishment of the joint committee at St. John's,

the Canadian Army member was replaced by Maj. Gen. L. F. Page, who was

senior to General Brant by two weeks. He thus displaced the latter as senior

member of the committee. This, in the opinion of the Newfoundland base 21

 Memo, GHQ for WPD, 26 Jan 42, WPD 4330-35. 22

 Memo, for WPD, 7 Feb 42, WPD 4330-35. 23

 Text at Appendix A, below. 24

 Informal Rpt, NBC, 1 Dec 41, PDB 104-5.
118 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

commander, was the purpose of the Canadian move.25 To the U.S. consul

general at St. John's, it appeared that the move was part of Canadian policy

to keep its political and military representatives ahead of the Americans in

relative rank. In support of his thesis the consul general cited the earlier

appointment of a Canadian high commissioner to St. John's and the promotion of the naval commander to a rank senior to that of the U.S. Navy sta--

tion commander at Argentia.26

An atmosphere reflecting such U.S. suspicions was not improved by

reported differences among the Canadian commanders involved. According

to the U.S. Army commander, the RCAF commander was "non-co-operative"

and barely on speaking terms with the Canadian Army commander and British Air Ministry representatives at Gander Airport; very little co-operation

between forces existed; bitter feeling was rampant; and the situation was far

from satisfactory.27 These differences were complicated further by the fact

that the Canadian Army and RCAF commanders could not act without consulting their superior authorities, located outside Newfoundland. This requirement, coupled with a communications system whose inadequacy was

compounded by meteorological and other failures, presented a serious barrier

to the attainment of a high degree of operational effectiveness.

Despite repeated urging from the U.S. Army commander that unity of

command be arranged, the War Department declined to act, even after the

Canadian chairman of the Permanent Joint Board had suggested that the

United States renew its request for a unified command. Remembering the

prolonged and unproductive discussions on the subject during the course of

earlier U.S.-Canadian planning, the U.S. Section declined to raise the matter

on the ground that such a U.S. proposal, in the absence of a substantially

increased threat to Newfoundland, would be unsuccessful and only impair

what co-operation existed.28

Some measure of unification of the Newfoundland commands was

25

 Third Informal Rpt, CG NBC, 28 Dec 41, PDB 104-5. 26

 Rpt, 28 Feb 42, PDB 104-5. Dawson expresses a somewhat similar view in Canada in

World Affairs: 1939-1941, p. 279. 27 Ltr, CG NBC to DCofS Eastern Theater of Operations, 29 Oct 41, PDB 104-5. In his

dealings with the Newfoundland Government, the U.S. commander found its members generally

most co-operative and anxious to assist in the defense of the island. (Ltr, Maj Gen G. C.

Brant (Ret.) to author, 12 Aug 52.) 28

 Memo, SUSAM for WPD, 28 Feb 42, PDB 135-2. This reluctance may have been motivated, in part, by the fact that the U.S. armed services' own house was not entirely in order.

Although Army-Navy antisubmarine air operations from Newfoundland had earlier been unified

under the U.S. Navy commander, the over-all Army-Navy wrangle on the subject of unity of

command throughout the North American coastal frontiers with respect to operations for protection of shipping was resolved for the time being on 26 March 1942 after several months of

deadlock.
ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND 119

achieved in March 1942, apparently as a result of initiative on the part of the

Newfoundland Government. In February 1942 it submitted to the Canadian

and U.S. commanders in Newfoundland a proposal for the formation of a

joint defense council to include representation of the Newfoundland Government. At about the same time it expressed strong dissatisfaction to the

Canadian Government with the existing method of co-ordinating command

by co-operation and with the lack of unified command.29 On 18 March

Prime Minister King advised the Canadian House of Commons that, upon

the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff, the Cabinet War Committee had

approved establishment of unified Canadian commands on the Atlantic and

Pacific coasts, and in Newfoundland.30 General Page was designated commander of the Canadian forces in Newfoundland and was charged with

strategic direction of those forces. In each unified command, the operations

rooms of the three services were to be combined into a joint operations

center.

Six days after this announcement, the Canadian Government transmitted

to the United States, through the Board, extracts from the Newfoundland

Government's demand for a unified command. The Canadian Government

stated that it had invited Newfoundland authorities to attend the next Board

meeting for a discussion of the problem.31 The journals of the next meeting and of the succeeding meetings do not indicate that such discussions

took place. Short of unification of the U.S. and Canadian commands, which

Canada had vigorously opposed, the Canadian action went as far in the direction of improving co-ordination as was possible. For reasons that are not

clear, the Newfoundland Government apparently chose not to press for

further action.

By the end of 1942 co-ordination between the forces of the two countries

in Newfoundland had improved considerably. The U.S. Newfoundland

Base Command joined the new Canadian operations center at St. John's.

The appropriate military authorities of the two countries, including the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, prepared and approved a Canadian-U.S. Joint Defense

Plan, Newfoundland. Joint field exercises involving all the forces were held,

as were command post and communications exercises for the staffs. On 1

October 1942 the U.S. chairman of the Permanent Joint Board, Mr.

LaGuardia, was able to report after a visit to Newfoundland that the command arrangements were satisfactory but that this was so only because of

29

 Extracts quoted in Ltr, Cdn Secy PJBD to U.S. Secy, 24 Mar 42, PDB 135-2. The date

of the communication from the Newfoundland Government was not given. 30

 H. C. Debates, 18 Mar 42, p. 1411. 31

 Ltr, 24 Mar 42, PDB 135-2.
120 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

the excellent co-operation between the individuals involved (Generals Page

and Brant). Should they be replaced, he felt that there might be danger to

U.S. defense interests in Newfoundland.32

Whereas the United States after it entered the war did not feel impelled

to force the issue of unity of command in Newfoundland, consideration of

possible developments on the Pacific coast as a result of Pearl Harbor motivated such action in the command arrangements for British Columbia.

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, the War Department urged President Roosevelt

formally to propose to Prime Minister King that the defense of British

Columbia be placed under U.S. strategic direction. The President preferred

that initial overtures be made through other channels before he approached

the Prime Minister.33 LaGuardia on 2 January 1942 then wrote to Mr. Biggar, Canadian chairman of the Permanent Joint Board, proposing that British

Columbia come under U.S. strategic direction in the interests of greater

security and better integration of forces, particularly since the U.S. Western

Defense Command was already responsible for the defense of Alaska and the

western United States.34 He proposed also that suitable limits be placed on

the authority of the over-all commander in Canada.

Biggar replied that the Canadian Section of the Board deemed such a

recommendation to the Canadian Government inadvisable since under

ABC-22 questions of the kind were now in the province of the Canadian

Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Biggar's reply also hinted at renewed Canadian dissatisfaction with U.S. unwillingness to accept a Canadian staff mission in Washington when he pointed out that lack of Canadian Chiefs of Staff representation in Washington had made it more difficult for the Canadian Chiefs to

weigh the question.35 In subsequent correspondence the Canadians expressed

the view that the co-operation provisions of ABC-22 were adequate, and asked

if there had been any evidence of lack of co-operation. They drew attention to

the fact that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff had just conferred with the U.S.

Chiefs of Staff and had gained the impression that the latter were satisfied

with the present organization. Finally, and apparently in response to intimations of a request on the President-Prime Minister level, the Canadians

pointed out that in a parliamentary government the Prime Minister would

not be able to ignore the contrary advice of his war ministers.36

The U.S. Section of the Permanent Joint Board made a last effort to

32 Memo, LaGuardia for CG EDC, PDB 135-2. 33

 Undated Memo, Hopkins for Marshall, PDB 135-2. 34

 Ltr, LaGuardia to Biggar, 2 Jan 42, PDB 135-2. 35

 Ltr, Biggar to LaGuardia, 3 Jan 42, PDB 135-2. For the Canadian efforts to establish a

military mission in Washington, see Chapter III, above. 36

 Correspondence in PDB 135-2.
ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND 121

obtain the desired unity of command at the 20 January 1942 Board meeting.

While it was willing to consider the U.S. proposal, the Canadian Section,

being of the opinion that major land operations or invasion in British

Columbia were unlikely, displayed no readiness to accept U.S. strategic direction there.37

 No further efforts were made by the United States to obtain

unity of command on the west coast.

The United States had hardly stilled its requests for unity of command

on the Pacific coast when that area was subjected to enemy attack. On 23

February 1942 a Japanese submarine fired some twenty rounds at coastal

targets near Santa Barbara, California. Two days later, on 25 February, the

"Battle of Los Angeles" took place, in which some 1,440 rounds of antiaircraft ammunition were fired at apparently imaginary enemy aircraft. Alarm

mounted among Pacific coast residents in both the United States and Canada.

The mounting feeling was a factor in a Canadian Cabinet War Committee decision to establish Canadian unity of command over coastal defense

forces. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff reluctantly recommended such a plan

on 10 March 1942, despite their belief that co-ordination through the existing Joint Service Committee was adequate. When Prime Minister King on

18 March announced the establishment of unified Canadian commands on

both coasts, Maj. Gen. R. O. Alexander became the Commander in Chief,

West Coast Defenses.

Throughout the war U.S.-Canadian operational co-ordination between

the field commands on the Pacific coast was limited to the exchange of liaison

officers. Such an exchange had been effected in April 1941, between the

headquarters of the Canadian Army Pacific Command and the U.S. Army

Ninth Corps Area, with officers serving on a part-time basis. In early March

1942, on request of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Pacific Command, a permanent liaison officer was attached to his command from the

headquarters of the U.S. Western Defense Command.38

Fortunately, the sporadic and insignificant Japanese attacks on the Pacific

coast did not test the adequacy of either U.S.-Canadian co-ordination or intraCanadian co-operation. Canadian steps to establish the latter were for many

months hardly more successful than the U.S. efforts to establish unity of

command in the field. Despite the Canadian Prime Minister's announcement of 18 March 1942 that a unified Canadian command was to be set up

on the Pacific coast, it was more than a year before the joint service head37

 Journal, PDB 124. 38

 Ltr, CG WDC to Maj Gen R. O. Alexander, 11 Mar 42, cited in History of the Western

Defense Command, I, Ch. 7, 1.
122 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

quarters was actually established and even then its effectiveness seemed

doubtful to U.S. observers because of un-co-operative service attitudes.39

During World War II only one unified command was established for

Canadian and U.S. forces performing a joint task under ABC-22. This was

for Joint Task One, the protection of overseas shipping. At the time ABC22 was drafted in the spring of 1941, units of the British and Canadian

Navies under the over-all direction of a United Kingdom Commander in

Chief, Western Approaches, shared the convoy escort task in the North Atlantic. A few months later, in a reorganization effective on 13 June 1941, an

independent Canadian command, Royal Canadian Navy Newfoundland

Escort Force, was created with a semiautonomous responsibility for the escort

task in the western North Atlantic, under the over-all strategic direction of

the Royal Navy.40

In drafting ABC-1 early in 1941, the British and U.S. representatives had

envisaged that the United States would, when that plan was placed in effect

(presumably upon U.S. entry into the war), assume responsibility for control

and protection of shipping in the western Atlantic except "the waters . . .

in which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces, as may be defined in United States-Canada joint agreements."

 4l

Subsequently the Canadian and U.S. planners in the joint plan ABC-22

assigned to the United States responsibility for routing and protecting shipping in all western Atlantic waters except within the coastal zones of Canada

and Newfoundland. Besides furnishing the necessary vessels in the coastal

zones, Canada was to allocate five destroyers and fifteen corvettes to the U.S.

Navy escort forces when the plan was put into effect.

In extension of the ABC-1 and ABC-22 planning, representatives of the

United Kingdom and Canadian Navies were stationed in the U.S. Navy Department in Washington in June 1941 for further planning and discussions.

These representatives participated in discussions of Navy Hemisphere Defense

Plan 3 (WPL-50) as it was completed, and reviewed drafts and commented

on Navy Hemisphere Defense Plan 4 (WPL-51), which was promulgated

on 11 July.42 Other officers primarily concerned with convoy protection

were exchanged between Ottawa and Washington, and they maintained close

39

 Intelligence Rpt, U.S. Navy Liaison Officer, Vancouver, 4 Aug 43, ONI Serial 8-43. The

only World War II attack on the Canadian Pacific coast took place on 20 June 1942, when a

Japanese submarine fired some twenty shells on Vancouver Island. The next night a submarine

shelled Fort Stevens in Oregon. 40

 Schull, The Far Distant Ships, p. 65. 41

 For text of ABC-1, see Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 15, pp. 1485-1541. Annex V of ABC-1

set forth the details of the arrangements for control and protection of shipping. 42

 Kittredge Monograph, I, Sec. V, 538-45.
ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND 123

contact with each other and with their British counterparts in an intimate

and cordial relationship.

After the promulgation of WPL-51, discussions continued among the

naval representatives as to its execution when it became effective. In consequence of the urgings of Prime Minister Churchill and others and of the

need for better protection for U.S. shipping, WPL-51 was placed in effect

on 26 July 1941, but only with respect to U.S. and Icelandic flag vessels plying between North America and Iceland. United State Atlantic Fleet Task

Force 1, established on 19 July, assumed this responsibility and was accorded

the use of the Royal Canadian Navy bases at Shelburne and Halifax for service and repair.43

The Atlantic Conference between Roosevelt and Churchill and their staffs

on 9-13 August 1941 led to a major change in the assignment of convoy

responsibility in the western Atlantic. Churchill, Hopkins, and others impressed upon President Roosevelt the need for relieving the United Kingdom of part of the burden of its naval responsibility in the western Atlantic.

As a result, the two leaders, apparently without further reference to the Canadian Government, agreed that the United States would assume the entire

convoy task for vessels of any flag by placing WPL-51 fully in effect, and

that the Canadian forces involved would pass to U.S. Navy command.44

Although Canadian Government representatives did not participate in the

conference, the plans were the outgrowth of the earlier Washington discussions among U.S., British, and Canadian naval staff officers.45

On 13 September 1941 the U.S. Navy Hemisphere Defense Plan 4

(WPL-51) went into full effect. Before the end of September a broader

plan, Navy Hemisphere Defense Plan 5 (WPL-52), had been promulgated,

and under it the United States assumed command of North Atlantic convoy

operations west of the 30° west meridian.46 Seventy-five ships of the Royal

Canadian Navy Newfoundland Command came under U.S. direction. Bitter

feeling could have existed in the situation. After two years of active participation as a belligerent in the Battle of the Atlantic, these Canadian units

43

 Ibid., 547-51; Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 5, p. 2294; U.S. Navy Atlantic Fleet, Administrative History of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet in World War II, II, 60, 64. For a fuller narrative account of U.S.-British collaboration in the Battle of the Atlantic in the western Atlantic, see

below, Chapter IX. This section is addressed primarily to the joint organizational and command

aspects. 44

 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton

Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 441. 45

 Kittredge Monograph, I, Sec. V, 538-42. Canadian participation at the Atlantic Conference was supplied by HMCS destroyers Restigouche and Assiniboine. These Canadian ships together

with a United Kingdom destroyer escorted the Prince of Wales, which carried the United Kingdom

party.

46

 Kittredge Monograph, I, Sec. V, 553.
124 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

passed to the command of an officer of a nominally nonbelligerent country.

However, excellent relations existed and were further developed between the

commanders and staffs of the commands involved—Task Force 1 of the U.S.

Atlantic Fleet and Royal Canadian Navy Newfoundland Force.47

In the ensuing anomalous situation in which a commander of nonbelligerent forces had authority over a commander of belligerent forces in a

war situation, the former exercised caution and restraint in administering his

command functions. On 13 September 1941, the Commander in Chief, U.S.

Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANT), who was also Commander, Task Force 1, forwarded a personal letter to Commodore L. W. Murray of the Royal Canadian Navy, who had already received a copy of plan WPL-51. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, thought it inappropriate to forward a

formal instruction to the Newfoundland Force or to include it in his operating plan, and he hoped the draft instruction he had transmitted to Commodore Murray would be useful in effecting the necessary co-ordination between

the two forces. Other operational matters were taken up in similar informal

correspondence that followed.48

United States Navy Task Force 1 under Navy Hemisphere Defense Plan

5 (WPL-52) became Task Force 4, with its own commander, Rear Adm.

A. L. Bristol, to whom CINCLANT delegated "co-ordinating supervision of

the operations of Canadian escort units." Admiral Bristol continued the

practice of carrying on informal correspondence on operational matters, but

he included the Royal Canadian Navy units in his operational plans. His

Op-Plan 14-41 of 29 October 1941 included, as Task Group 4.11, the Newfoundland Escort Force which, under Commodore Murray, provided escort

services in the Canadian coastal zone, while Task Group 4.19 comprised the

U.S. Navy and Royal Canadian Navy escort units on the ocean leg to the

longitude of Iceland.

The co-ordination of operations was facilitated by the exchange of liaison

officers. A U.S. Navy observer was dispatched to Halifax in August 1941 as

a result of prompt Canadian approval of the U.S. request for such an arrangement. Subsequently, as a result of world-wide U.S.-British Commonwealth

naval liaison arrangements which were worked out, a U.S. Atlantic Fleet liaison officer was stationed at St. John's in October 1941, while a Royal Canadian Navy officer joined the staff of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet Support Force in

January 1942.

Although the unified direction of the naval forces of the two countries

under the U.S. Navy materialized simply and directly as a result of the con47

 Schull, The Far Distant Ships, pp. 96-97. 48

 Administrative History of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet in World War II, II, 78-82.
ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND 125

ference at Argentia, the integration of the air forces available for the air patrol

missions did not occur so easily. By November 1941 appropriate instructions had been issued directing the U.S. Army Air Forces in Newfoundland

to operate under the U.S. Navy in the execution of Joint Task One.49 The

U.S. Section of the Permanent Joint Board requested that similar instructions

be issued to the RCAF forces available for patrol duty.50 At the next Permanent Joint Board meeting, in December, the Board members concluded

that the problem arose from the lack of independent command authority of

the RCAF unit in Newfoundland, No. 1 Group, which could not independently and without reference to the Eastern Air Command headquarters at

Halifax take immediate action to support the Atlantic Fleet task force when

requested to do so. The Board therefore concluded that a decentralization

of command was needed to permit local operational control and full co-operation.51

 The necessary decentralization was authorized by Canada, effective 20 January 1942, and the U.S. Navy task force commander at Argentia

finally achieved the unified operational control of all the air and naval

resources of the two countries available for his task.52

After U.S. entry into the war, U.S. Navy strategic direction of the Canadian and United Kingdom forces assigned to Task Force 4 for the execution

of Joint Task One continued, despite the fact that all the U.S. ships involved

in escorting the merchant convoys were withdrawn except for two Coast

Guard cutters. The withdrawals were necessary in order to permit reinforcement of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and to make available escorts for the increasing number of U.S. troop convoys to the United Kingdom. A reorganization

effected in February 1942 continued strategic direction of the western North

Atlantic under the U.S. Navy but met the situation partially through organization of the British and Canadian ships involved into the Royal Canadian

Navy-commanded Western Local Escort and the Newfoundland Escort Forces,

which now provided the necessary escort forces for the trade convoys under the

over-all command of U.S. Navy Task Force 4.53

United States strategic direction of an escort task being executed by forces

predominantly Canadian and British continued until 1 March 1943, when the

Atlantic Convoy Conference, meeting in Washington, reorganized the command system. The United States withdrew its authority, except for over-all

strategic responsibility, from the area north of a line east from New York

49

 U.S. Navy Progress Rpt, at 10-11 Nov 41 PJBD meeting, PDB 124. 50

 Ltr, U.S. Section to Biggar, 11 Nov 41, PDB 135-2. 51

 Journal, PDB 124. It was at this meeting that the Board made its Twenty-second

Recommendation. 52

 Journal, 20 Jan 42 meeting, PDB 124. 53

 Schull, The Far Distant Ships, pp. 100-101.
126 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

City and west of the 47° west meridian, and Canada took over the operational responsibility for this area.54

 At this time Canada was also assigned

operational control of the air elements being employed by the United States

from Newfoundland for convoy protection and antisubmarine operations,

although apparently no similar assignment was made of U.S. air units in the

New England states.55

Thus materialized the only instance of unified command under ABC-22.

It might never have been realized had not Roosevelt and Churchill acted

with characteristic vigor and without consulting the Canadian Government.

Undoubtedly, the fact that questions of sovereignty were not present, as was

the case in land areas, allowed the arrangement to be accepted without serious difficulty. That the task was executed efficiently is ample testimony to

the excellent spirit of co-operation and good will that existed between the

Canadian and U.S. Navies.

Organization for the Logistical Tasks

Whereas the major operational command and co-ordination problems

arose early in the war and were soon disposed of, those connected with

logistical tasks mushroomed rapidly after Pearl Harbor and continued to increase in 1942 and 1943. Their solution, one by one, resulted in a complex

U.S. military organization whose existence, in turn, gave rise to additional

problems. The mission of this organizational machinery was, briefly, to construct, operate, maintain, and service the installations, bases, and facilities

needed by the United States in the conduct of the war overseas. Canada

constructed certain of these facilities for U.S. account, but the United States

provided the greater part of the facilities from U.S. resources.56

Throughout Canada the post-Pearl Harbor task of the U.S. Army took

the form of providing the necessary facilities on wartime standards for use

only for the duration of the war. This was not the case in Newfoundland,

where the status of the forces engaged in the logistical task differed as

a result of the destroyer-bases agreement signed with the United Kingdom

on 2 September 1940, long before Pearl Harbor, and the ninety-nine-year

lease which made permanent-type construction desirable.

In Newfoundland, the U.S. Army organization for administration, except

for construction and associated real estate matters, was parallel to that for

operations. The Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command, ap54

 Ibid., pp. 166-67. An account of the Atlantic Convoy Conference is given in Chapter IX,

below. 55

 Canada at War, No. 24 (May 43), pp. 3-4. 56

 See below, pp. 000-00, for discussion of Canada's method of co-ordinating the construction of facilities for use by the United States.
ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND 127

pointed in December 1940, was initially directly subordinate to the War

Department; after July 1941 he was subordinate to General Headquarters,

U.S. Army, at Washington; and after December 1941 to Headquarters, Eastern Theater of Operations, in New York City. In Newfoundland, the base

commander exercised command through his own staff at St. John's and

through the commanders of the U.S. Army leased bases, Forts Pepperrell and

McAndrew, and Harmon Field.

Since in the U.S. Army the Corps of Engineers had generally been responsible for construction activities overseas, the construction operations in Newfoundland were handled through a different chain of command. This

passed from the War Department to the Chief of Engineers (through- the

Commanding General, Services of Supply, after the reorganization of the

War Department in March 1942), to the North Atlantic Division Engineer

at New York, and finally to the Newfoundland District Engineer at St.

John's, who directed and supervised the contractors engaged for the construction projects. An additional subordinate district of the North Atlantic

Division, the Hudson Engineer District, was established on 19 December

1942 to carry out CRIMSON program construction in eastern Canada.57

A roughly parallel situation existed in the U.S. Navy establishment at

Argentia. The operational Navy air and sea forces based there were under

the command of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. The naval

base itself operated under the Commander, North Atlantic Coastal Frontier,

while the U.S. Navy Department Bureau of Yards and Docks directed the

base construction activities.

The U.S. logistical organization in western Canada began with the establishment in March 1942 of a Headquarters, U.S. Army Construction Forces

for the Alcan Highway, which operated through two subordinate headquarters at Fort St. John and Whitehorse established soon afterward. In the

latter part of May these two headquarters were made independent and designated the Northern and Southern Sectors, with each commander reporting

directly to the U.S. Army Chief of Engineers in Washington. Soon after,

when work was begun on the Canol Project, its commander, who established

the headquarters of his Task Force 2600 at Edmonton on 26 May, became a

third commander in Canada directly subordinate to the Chief of Engineers.

In March, shortly after initial steps were taken for the construction of the

Alcan Highway (later designated the Alaska Highway), the Chief of Engineers enlisted the assistance of the U.S. Public Roads Administration, which

undertook to handle the engineering, contracting, and supervision of parts of

57

 OCE GO 52, 19 Dec 42.
128 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

the highway. The Public Roads Administration established a district office

in Edmonton, which also reported to Washington.

As the approaching completion of the pioneer road in late 1942 foretold

the need for expansion of the U.S. logistical establishment in northwest

Canada, steps were taken to reorganize the commands. A Headquarters,

Northwest Service Command, under Col. James A. O'Connor, was established on 10 September 1942 at Whitehorse, subordinate to Headquarters,

Services of Supply, at Washington. This service command was made responsible for U.S. supply, service, and administrative operations, including

support of the Army Air Forces, but excluding construction, maintenance,

and repair, in that part of Canada comprising British Columbia, Alberta,

Yukon Territory, and the Mackenzie District of the Northwest Territories,

and in parts of Alaska. Construction, maintenance, and repair of facilities

(including both the Alaska Highway and the Canol Project) remained the

responsibility of the Chief of Engineers through a new Northwest Engineer

Division under Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., established on 14 November

1942 at Edmonton.58

These two major U.S. commands exercised their functions independently,

but co-operatively, through separate organizations. Northwest Service Command operated through the posts of Edmonton, Dawson Creek, Whitehorse,

and Skagway. The Northwest Division Engineer operated through the District Engineers of the Whitehorse, Fairbanks, Skagway, Dawson Creek, and

Edmonton Districts.

On 18 February 1944 the two organizations were consolidated as the

Northwest Service Command, with headquarters at Edmonton, under Brig.

Gen. Ludson D. Worsham, who had been the Division Engineer. The post

organization of the Northwest Service Command was dropped in favor of a

district organization comprising the Fairbanks, Skagway, Whitehorse, Dawson Creek, and Edmonton Districts. The logistical organization in northwest Canada retained this form until the end of hostilities. Its functions

included the operations of U.S. supply, transportation, medical, communications, and other administrative facilities in the area, with the major tasks

including several construction projects, and the operation of the Alaska Highway, the White Pass and Yukon Route railway, and the Canol Project.

In addition to the U.S. Army organizations established in Newfoundland

and northwestern Canada, a third organizational structure was developed in

Canada east of the 103° west meridian and in Labrador. This structure was

created after the two governments approved the Permanent Joint Board's

58

 WD GO 44, 4 Sep 42; OCE GO 42, 14 Nov 42.
BRIG. GEN. C. L STURDEVANT (left) and Col. James A. O'Connor ready to board

a plane for an inspection flight over the southern section of the Alaska Highway, 1942.
130 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Twenty-sixth Recommendation, which called for the construction of air bases

and auxiliary facilities to provide routes suitable for ferrying short-range aircraft from the United States across Canada to Greenland and thence to the

United Kingdom. The Canadian Government approved the Twenty-sixth

Recommendation on 12 June 1942, and five days later Brig. Gen. Harold

L. George of the U.S. Air Corps Ferrying Command was appointed officer

in general charge of the project, which was named the CRIMSON Project.59

General George's over-all responsibility, which was exercised from Washington, did not displace any part of the normal command structure that had

gradually developed. The initial garrisons arrived at Churchill, Manitoba,

between 15 and 26 July 1942, and as a result of a directive issued on 27 July

a Headquarters, CRIMSON Project, was established subordinate to the War

Department.60

In Canada the commander of the CRIMSON Project, Col. G. K. Hobbs,

who was also the commander of the 330th Engineer Regiment which was to

initiate the construction work, was made responsible, for construction operations, directly to the Chief of Engineers in the War Department. The initial

organization was further complicated somewhat since the new command did

not perform its own supply functions. For these functions, two U.S. Army

field logistical agencies had occasion to operate in Canada and Labrador—

the Sixth Service Command for the supply of the installations at The Pas,

Churchill, and Southampton Island; and the Boston Port of Embarkation for

the supply of those at Fort Chimo, Frobisher Bay, Padloping Island, and at

Goose Bay in Labrador.61

As plans were developed for the displacement of the Engineer troops

engaged in the construction of bases by civilian contractors and workers,

the Division Engineer of the North Atlantic Division (with division offices

located in New York City) of the Corps of Engineers was made responsible

for all engineer and construction operations under the CRIMSON Project.

This responsibility he exercised through a District Engineer, Hudson District.

Under this assignment of responsibilities, the project commander retained

responsibility for the administration and operation of the military garrisons

at these stations.

The command of the bases in Labrador, Quebec, and on Baffin Island

from the project headquarters at Churchill proved to be geographically unsuitable in terms of control and communications. The pattern of available

59

 Ott Leg Desp 3198, 22 Jun 42, PDB 149-1. 60

 TAG Ltr 320.2, 27 Jul 42, sub: Command, Supply and Administration, CRIMSON Project. 61

 TAG Ltr 320.2, 2 Aug 42, sub: Amendment No. 1 to Command, Supply and Administration, CRIMSON Project.
ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND 131

communications had already dictated a split of the supply responsibilities

between the eastern and western halves of the project. On 9 March 1943

the CRIMSON Project was divided by the 80° west meridian into Western

and Eastern Sectors, with headquarters for the latter at Goose Bay. The

Eastern Sector headquarters joined the Churchill headquarters in becoming

directly responsible to the War Department. The engineer construction and

the supply responsibilities remained as before.62

The organizational pattern in the Western Sector, CRIMSON Project, did

not subsequently undergo significant change. On 1 July 1943 the command

was redesignated the U.S. Army Forces in Central Canada, and soon afterward the headquarters location was moved to Winnipeg, where it remained

until the command's inactivation on 1 October 1945.63

The 1 July 1943 reorganization, which reflected the general drastic curtailment of CRIMSON Project, included a disbandment of the Headquarters,

Eastern Sector, CRIMSON Project, and the interim transfer of the responsibilities for the installations in that area to the Commanding General, North

Atlantic Wing, Air Transport Command, with headquarters at Presque Isle,

Maine. This commander, who was normally responsible, in turn, to the

Commanding Generals, Air Transport Command, and Army Air Forces, for

his air transport functions, became directly responsible to the War Department for the administration of these installations. A Headquarters, U.S.

Army Forces in Eastern Canada, was soon activated at Presque Isle and

existed for a few months, until 15 October 1944. On that date its responsibilities were transferred back to what had now been redesignated the Headquarters, North Atlantic Division, Air Transport Command. This arrangement remained unchanged throughout the rest of World War II.64

Organizational Chaos

The main elements of the U.S. logistical and administrative organization

in Canada and Newfoundland as of 1 April 1943 are shown in Chart 1. This

chart reveals the considerable number of separate agencies in Washington and

elsewhere in the United States to which the numerous U.S. headquarters in

Canada and Newfoundland reported for various purposes. The lack of any

focal point through which all communications, or perhaps even all responsibility, might have been channeled inevitably made it more difficult for the

host governments to effect co-ordination with the United States on matters

of common interest. Many problems concerning channels of communica62

 TAG Ltr 320.2, 9 Nov 43, sub: Command, Supply and Administrative Order, NAF Projects. 63

 TAG Ltrs 322, 25 Jun 43 and 5 Jul 43, sub: Modification of the CRIMSON Project. 64

 Air Transport Command, The CRIMSON Route, p. 56.

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND 133

tions and field co-ordination of activities arose and required solution. The

situation would have been sufficiently complex if the organization presented

in Chart 1 told the entire story. This is far from so. In addition to the

main agencies shown thereon, many other command and staff agencies had

occasion to operate in Canada and Newfoundland and/or to maintain offices

there. In northwest Canada, some of these were the Alaskan Wing, Air

Transport Command, U.S. Army Air Forces; Naval Air Transport Service,

U.S. Navy; U.S. Army Air Forces contract carriers for Air Transport Command, which included United Airlines, Pan American Airlines, and Western

Airlines; Army Air Forces aerial photography mission; Army Air Forces 16th

Weather Region (meteorological services); Army Airways Communications

Service; Alaska Communications System; Prince Rupert Subport of Embarkation; Quartermaster Market Center and Transportation Corps Regulating

Station at Edmonton; and a large number of U.S. civilian contractors on U.S.

projects, some of whom established substantial offices in Canada.65

Most of these agencies had additional channels of command and communication to other headquarters in the United States. The situation was

most complex in northwest Canada, where the major U.S. projects were undertaken. Here, too, American personnel, civilian and military, were introduced in far greater numbers and were necessarily stationed in many instances

in populated localities. The situation also existed on a smaller scale in the

rest of Canada and in Newfoundland. The North Atlantic Wing, Air Transport Command, operated at air-base facilities in those areas in providing air

transport services independently of the Newfoundland Base Command, and

was supported by appropriate elements of the AAF communications and

meteorological services. In central and eastern Canada, facilities at Montreal

and Quebec were used as subports by the Boston Port of Embarkation, and

an ordnance testing center was established at Camp Shilo by the U.S. Army

Ordnance Department.

Chart 1 and the foregoing additional listings of operating agencies still

do not present the full complexity of the American organizational structure

in Newfoundland and Canada, or of the patterns of its command and communications channels. Many other agencies of the War Department, although not having a directly subordinate operating agency in those areas,

had a responsibility for the technical staff supervision of certain operations

there. For example, the Chief Signal Officer of the War Department had 65

 The references in Air Transport Command historical monographs to the lack of co-ordination among the extremely numerous agencies in northwest Canada include the following: Alaskan

Division, Historical Record Report, II, 198; History of the Northwest Air Route to Alaska:

1942-1945, p. 83; The Northwest Route Under the Ferrying Division: 16 June 1942-1 November

1942, p 49.
134 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

responsibility for the technical supervision of the Alaska Communications

System. The execution of this type of staff responsibility necessitated some

supervisory and operating activity in Canada and Newfoundland by personnel

of his staff, and likewise by numerous other U.S. staff agencies on similar

grounds.

The problems of co-ordination and of channels of communications took

several forms:

a. Clearing U.S. requests for construction permits and real estate.

b. Co-ordinating Canadian construction on U.S. account to meet U.S.

requirements and standards.

c. Co-ordinating U.S. construction on U.S. account to meet conditions

and criteria established by Canadian authorities.

d. Co-ordinating competing requirements for the use of construction

and transportation facilities, and for labor and materials resources.

e. Co-ordinating disciplinary and other administrative problems arising

from the large numbers of American military and civilian personnel stationed

in Canada.

On the Canadian side, arrangements for channels of communications and

co-ordination were less complex but still involved. A half dozen or more

departments of the government in Ottawa, and their field agencies, were concerned with the execution of the construction projects, with their use or

arrangements therefor, or with the auxiliary administrative problems that

arose. The last category of problems, on matters such as taxes, jurisdiction

over and discipline of American personnel, and labor competition and conditions, also concerned in many instances the provincial and local governments.

The situation was not improved by the considerable number of parallel

channels of communication that existed between Washington and Ottawa.

A reasonable system of mutual co-ordination operated for certain of these

channels, particularly those involving the Permanent Joint Board members.

Nevertheless, this multiplicity of channels could not help but make more

difficult the co-ordination of matters involving Canada and the United

States.66 Many ad hoc channels were established, principally between the

War Department and the departments in Ottawa, which supplemented the

more normal and routine channels that existed throughout the war. The

principal routine channels were between:

66

 Of the wartime members of the U.S. Section of the Permanent Joint Board who reviewed

this study, two commented on this point, agreeing that such a problem existed. One felt its

magnitude had been overdrawn, while the other averred that it was "one of the most vexatious

problems" of U.S.-Canadian collaboration. (Ltr, Maj Gen G. V. Henry (Ret.) to author, 2

Jan 52; Ltr, Rear Adm J. P. Whitney to author, 10 Nov 52.)
ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND 135

a. Washington War and Navy Department agencies and Ottawa service agencies through the service attaches in Ottawa.

b. The same agencies through the service attaches in Washington.

c. The same agencies through the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington.

d. The pairs of opposite numbers of the Permanent Joint Board sections, that is, the chairmen, the secretaries, and the Army, Navy, and Air

members.

e. The Department of State and the Department of External Affairs

through the Canadian Legation (later Embassy) in Washington.

f. The same agencies through the U.S. Legation in Ottawa.

The questions of co-ordination and command channels first came up for

discussion immediately after the initiation of work on the Alaska Highway

and as a consequence of the resulting increase of U.S. agencies in Canada.

At the beginning of April 1942, J. A. Wilson of the Canadian Department

of Transport discussed with U.S. Minister Moffat the need for centralized

control of U.S. operations. Wilson felt that "the utmost good will . . .

[was] being shown, but difficulties . . . were bound to crop up and multiply." He suggested that one of the U.S. service attaches in Ottawa "act as

co-ordinator and contact man with the Canadians."

 67

 Two months later

the situation was still unsatisfactory, and the Canadian Government appointed C. D. LeCapelain of the Department of Mines and Resources as liaison officer with the U.S. Army forces constructing the Alaska Highway.68

By the spring of 1943 the Canadian Government had expanded this liaison

arrangement to include four officers:69

a. C. D. LeCapelain at Whitehorse, for the Alaska Highway and other

projects in the vicinity.

b. J. S. Stewart, for the Canol Project.

c. Mr. Urquhart, the district agent at Fort Smith, for projects in that

vicinity.

d. L. E. Drummond, with the Northwest Division Engineer at

Edmonton.

In the meantime, the Canadian Government complemented this field liaison arrangement by establishing in Ottawa a panel charged with collecting

and presenting to the Cabinet War Committee periodic progress reports on

the projects under construction. Mr. J. Baldwin of the Privy Council office

acted as secretary and as a center for distributing information within Cana67

 Ltr, U.S. Secy PJBD to SUSAM, 3 Apr 42, PDB 105-3. 68

 Ltr, U.S. Leg Ott to Hickerson, 2 Jun 42, D/S 842.154 Seattle-Fairbanks Highway/409. 69

 Ltr, Moffat to Hickerson, 22 Jan 43, D/S 811.24542/B.
136 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

dian Government circles in Ottawa. At that time Canadian responsibilities

for the various projects were assigned as follows:70

Project Canadian Agency

North Atlantic Ferry Routes......... . Department of National Defense for Air

Alcan Highway..................... . Department of Mines and Resources

Canol Project....................... . Northwest Territories Council

Alaska railway survey............... . Department of Transport

Aerial mapping project.............. . Department of Mines and Resources

Weather and communications stations. . Department of Transport

By the spring of 1943 the Canadian liaison system was not fulfilling its

purpose because the "frequent changes in ... personnel and fields of responsibility . . . [of the] four or five United States authorities . . . operating

in the Northwest . . . [made it] increasingly difficult to distinguish the

actual sources of authority in the United States organizational setup." The

Department of External Affairs requested that it be furnished a chart showing the organization and the various responsibilities and lines of authority

for U.S. activities in Canada.71

The request, its handling by the United States, and the data furnished the

Canadians in reply involved a confusion within the U.S. Government that

illustrates the over-all complexity and lack of understanding of the situation.

Mr. Hickerson, secretary of the U.S. Section, Permanent Joint Board, referred

the request to the Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Army construction agency.

This agency was concerned with only part of the U.S. activities in northwestern Canada and was two staff levels below the War Department General

Staff, which should have been called upon for an over-all presentation of the

U.S. organization. As a result, the reply to the Canadian request constituted

an exposition, during meetings in Ottawa 17-18 May, of authorization and

construction procedures for "Corps of Engineers Construction Division

Activities in Canada." Only indirectly during the exposition did the Canadians learn anything of the responsibilities and organization of the Air Transport Command, Northwest Service Command, and other U.S. agencies

operating in the area.

Concurrently, the Canadian Government took several steps designed to

resolve certain of the problems of co-ordination that existed. The first of

these was the establishment on 19 February 1943 of a crown company, North

West Purchasing Limited, whose object was to facilitate the acquisition of

supplies in Canada by the various U.S. agencies there in such a manner as

70

 Ott Leg Desp 3198, 22 Jun 42, PDB 149-1. 71

 Ltr, Hickerson to Maj Gen Thomas M. Robins, OCE, 21 Apr 43, PDB 111-12.
ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND 137

to minimize interference with Canadian price controls and controlled materials measures. Initially, U.S. Army procurement officers and contractors

avoided the use of the new crown company because of their conviction, to

some extent fostered by local merchants, that the company was merely a

profit-making organization for the Canadian Government.72 With the realization that the failure fully to utilize the company was costing the United

States considerable sums of money, and, after other demonstrations of the

value of the company's services, the antagonism to it disappeared. By

August 1943 U.S. procurement regulations required that all supply contracts

be made with the company.73

During the early weeks of the company's life, when its services were

being used hesitantly if at all, the Canadian Government considered another

mechanism for co-ordinating the use not only of materials but also of labor

resources. The Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board proposed

for discussion at the 1-2 April 1943 meeting a "Joint Authority in the Northwest Area on Labor and Supplies." Before the meeting took place, this

agenda item was withdrawn, the Canadian Government apparently having

decided to accomplish the same ends by means other than a joint authority.74

In an effort harmoniously to satisfy the competing U.S. and Canadian demands for labor resources, the government appointed a Western Labor

Board at Edmonton and gave it "jurisdiction over wage and employment

conditions on defense projects (Canadian and U.S.) in Alberta, British Columbia, Yukon Territory, and the Northwest Territories."75

A third Canadian action was the establishment of the office of Special

Commissioner for Defense Projects in Northwestern Canada, within the

Privy Council office.76 To head the office, which was located at Edmonton,

the Canadian Government appointed Brigadier (later Major General) W. W.

Foster, who was made responsible to the Cabinet War Committee. The

creation of a Special Commissioner was intended to provide a focal point

and single channel for Canadian co-operation and co-ordination with U.S.

72

 Privy Council 2082, 16 Mar 43; John de Navarry Kennedy, History of the Department of

Munitions and Supply: Canada in the Second World War (Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer,

1950), I, 380. 73

 Ltr, U.S. Charge Lewis Clark to Hickerson, 23 Jun 43; Kennedy, History of the Department of Munitions and Supply, I, 381-82; Chapter XXXI contains a full account of the work of

the company. Food purchases during 1943 averaged $750,000 monthly, while other purchases

added $500,000 to that amount. 74

 Ltr, Hickerson to SUSAM, 9 Apr 43, PDB 108-6. 75

 Progress Rpt, 1-14 Jul 43 PJDB meeting, PDB 124. The report cites the establishment

as under the authority of Privy Council 3870, 17 May 43. 76

 Privy Council 3758, 6 May 43. Other Orders-in-council relating to the staff of this office

are Privy Council 4224, 21 May 43, and 5465, 7 Aug 45.
138 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

MAJ. GEN. W. W. FOSTER (left) with Col. J. P. Glandon at Dawson Creek, British

Columbia, January 1944.

authorities in northwest Canada, to centralize the authority of Canadian field

agencies, and to decentralize certain authority from Ottawa through its delegation to that office.77

 This action apparently helped satisfy the Canadian

requirement for closer co-ordination with U.S. activities in northwest Canada.

By this time the situation was also improved by the increased stability of

the U.S. organizational structure. Delegation by the Canadian Government

to General Foster, whom U.S. commanders found to be most co-operative,

of certain authority was also responsive to the U.S. desire for such an arrangement, which had found expression some weeks earlier in a Permanent

Joint Board recommendation. The office of the Special Commissioner was

to prove particularly useful in prosecuting the expanded program of construction on the Northwest Staging Route that the United States initiated in

July 1943.78

No further deficiencies were noted or adjustments of significance occa77

 Progress Rpt, 1-14 Jul 43 PJBD meeting, PDB 124. Lingard and Trotter, Canada in

World Affairs, III, 71, call General Foster's office a "Canadian military command." However,

he apparently neither reported through military channels nor exercised such command over any

Canadian military field agencies except in regard to certain administrative and logistical measures. 78

 Par. 10, Twenty-ninth Recommendation, text at Appendix A, below. See Ch. VIII, below.
ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND 139

sioned in this over-all co-ordination machinery in northwestern Canada. One

development of interest did occur in March 1944. By that time a number of

precedents had established a pattern for consideration of problems concerning U.S.-Canadian co-operation through joint committees. At a meeting

held on 20 March, under the chairmanship of General Foster, to consider

co-ordination of the services operating along the Northwest Staging Route

and Mackenzie River air route, joint committees of representatives of the agencies concerned were set up for construction and engineering, communications,

security of communications, weather, transportation, supply, and flying control. These U.S.-Canadian committees met from time to time to discuss and

agree on solution of problems within their spheres of interest.79

Not only were the organizational structures complicated, but the procedures by which projects were reviewed within those structures were often

equally or more complicated. The procedures followed for authorization and

construction of U.S. projects in Canada are an excellent example. Until the

beginning of 1943, all projects were approved on the governmental level.

The Permanent Joint Board felt that it should review such projects before

governmental action was taken. But approvals were in fact being granted as

a result of recommendations based on Board reviews of the projects, direct

arrangements on the service level, direct arrangements on the diplomatic level

usually involving an exchange of notes, or a combination of these actions.80

By early 1943 it became apparent that a requirement for Permanent Joint

Board review of all projects was impractical, and the Board concluded that

decisions on minor projects, particularly those related to approved projects,

could be effected between local commanders.81

On 17-18 May 1943 meetings were held in Ottawa in response to a Canadian request for clarification of the U.S. organization and responsibilities in

Canada. At the meeting the procedures for authorizing and constructing

major U.S. projects were outlined in detail and accepted. The meeting was

attended by the Permanent Joint Board members, Canadian Government representatives, including General Foster, the Special Commissioner, and by Maj.

Gen. Thomas M. Robins, Assistant Chief of U.S. Army Engineers for construction, and Brig. Gen. L. D. Worsham and Brig. Gen. Beverly C. Dunn,

Division Engineers, respectively, of the Northwest Engineer Division and the

North Atlantic Engineer Division.82

79

 Progress Rpt, 12-13 Apr 44 PJBD meeting, PDB 124. 80

 Journal, 3 Nov 42 PJBD meeting, PDB 124. 81

 Journals, 24-25 Feb and 6-7 May 43 meetings, PDB 124. 82

 Minutes, PDB 111-12.
140 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

To illustrate the complexity of the procedures, the agencies that needed

to act in connection with the authorization and initiation of construction of

a U.S. Army Air Forces project in Canada were as follows:

 83

Authorization for the project

War Department General Staff

U.S. Section of the Permanent Joint Board

Permanent Joint Board

Canadian Government

Permanent Joint Board secretaries

War Department General Staff

Site selection and approval

Army Service Forces

Chief of Engineers

Division Engineer

Chief of Engineers

Permanent Joint Board secretaries

Canadian Government

Permanent Joint Board secretaries

Chief of Engineers

Directive to construct

Division Engineer

District Engineer

Civilian contractor

For other projects in Canada, the procedures were slightly modified. It

should be noted that the procedure included none of the steps involved in

the formulation of a project, or in its co-ordination during construction.

Additionally, the simple one-line entry shown only for the Canadian Government as a whole undoubtedly involved review by the Special Commissioner for projects in his area and by one or more departments or other

agencies.

The development of the U.S. logistical and administrative organization in

Canada and the problems of co-ordination that confronted Canada suggest that

the early establishment of a unified U.S.-Canadian logistical and administrative

command would have been to the advantage of Canada. In such a command, the fact of Canadian sovereignty would have justified an adequate

Canadian role. But a unified command might have been objectionable to

the United States in that it could have meant less freedom of action.

83

 Minutes, 17-18 May 43 meeting, PDB 111-12.
ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND 141

It is not apparent that Canada took any direct action along this line, perhaps because it would have been inconsistent with the earlier stand on unity

of operational command. In fact, in the step-by-step effort to produce order

from the organizational chaos, Canada moved, insofar as it could unilaterally,

in the direction of unified co-ordination and direction. The joint committees established by the Special Commissioner give support to this hypothesis

as do other joint control and staff agencies that were established, as for example the Joint Travel Control Board and the JAN-CAN Committee.84

 The

early establishment of a unified logistical command would have paid additional dividends in eliminating some of the duplicate services the two countries developed within Canada such as communications, weather, and airway

control facilities.

An alternate solution might have obviated Canadian difficulties with

organizations, responsibilities, and channels. This solution would have required the United States to establish a single communications zone type

logistical headquarters similar to those the U.S. Army set up overseas to support combat commanders. Such a headquarters could have been charged

with the responsibility for all U.S. military activity in Newfoundland and

Canada. An integral Canadian office comparable to that of the Special Commissioner would have provided a focal point for contacts with Canadian

agencies. A command of such scope might have been inherently unacceptable to the Canadians because of their sensitivity to anything remotely resembling encroachment on Canadian sovereignty. In any event, apparently

neither government ever broached such a scheme. Instead, the patterns of

U.S. administrative organization developed largely in geographic extension

of those already existing within the adjacent establishments in the continental

United States. From simple origins the organizations grew "like Topsy"

and soon became a Hydra-headed monster.

84

 See below, pp. 224, 302-03.
CHAPTER VI

Hemisphere Defense Problems

The Ogdensburg Declaration directed the Permanent Joint Board on

Defense to make studies of the military problems involved in "the defense

of the north half of the Western Hemisphere." As has been pointed out, a

strict interpretation of this phrase would have resulted in planning embracing Central America, the Caribbean area, and South America to approximately

the Amazon River. But in practice the Permanent Joint Board declined to

take cognizance of the defense problems of any of Latin America and of much

of the United States. Its studies were in fact limited to about that part of

North America, excluding Greenland, north of a line through New York

City and Portland, Oregon. Common military problems in other parts of

the Western Hemisphere were discussed and acted upon in other forums and

through other channels.

In the U.S.-Canadian diplomatic discussions soon after the fall of France

but long before the United States entered the war as a formal belligerent,

Prime Minister King took up with U.S. Minister Moffat the need to prevent

Germany from establishing bases in Greenland, Iceland, and the West Indies

and the possibility that U.S. action might be desirable. Canada had already,

as a consequence of the disastrous events of May 1940, sent forces to Iceland

and an infantry battalion, the Winnipeg Grenadiers, to Jamaica. At the

time of these discussions the United Kingdom was pressing for more Canadian troops to reinforce Iceland and to replace the British troops that had

been sent to the Dutch oil-refining island of Aruba, off the coast of Venezuela. King was dubious about the latter action and proceeded to clear it

with Washington, but he was even more concerned about the idea of sending so much of Canada's military strength out of Canada. Nevertheless, in

accordance with the United Kingdom request, King was at first prepared to

send troops to Aruba by transferring the Canadian battalion from Jamaica.1

On 5 July Moffat, who had just returned from Washington, reported to

King on the Aruba matter. The United States, he said, was developing a

method for establishing trusteeships over territories in the Western Hemisphere that might be threatened with transfer from one non-American state

1

 Memo/Conv, Moffat and King, 27 Jun 40, Moffat Diary; Cdn Leg aide-mémoire. 28 Jun 40

D/S 856B.01/43.
HEMISPHERE DEFENSE PROBLEMS 143

to another. The trusteeship plan was to be considered by the conference

of foreign ministers of the American states which was to be held later in

July at Havana to consider the needs of the new situation in Europe. King

welcomed the trusteeship plan, for it promised to relieve Canada of the need

to provide garrisons such as that for Aruba.2 Canada thus looked with interest to the proceedings at Havana, and after the conference it limited Canadian garrisons in the Caribbean to those in British possessions.

The Twenty-second Chair

At the beginning of World War II, the Pan American Union included

twenty Latin American republics and the United States. Traditionally, the

Pan American Union had long anticipated the possibility of Canadian membership and, for the reason, had maintained in storage a twenty-second chair,

identical with the other twenty-one chairs, to seat the Canadian representative. In addition, when the Pan American Union Building in Washington

was constructed in 1910, a frieze bordering the patio was installed that included the coat of arms of Canada with those of the twenty-one member

states.

Proposals for Canadian membership in the Pan American Union made

before World War II were unsuccessful at least in part because of U.S. opposition. The U.S. delegation to the 1928 international conference of American

states had been instructed to oppose membership for Canada or any European

dependency or colony on the ground that it would inject the influence and

policies of a European state into a forum devoted to problems of the Western

Hemisphere.3 At the 1933 conference, Canadian membership had been proposed and approved in subcommittee, but the proposal was dropped after

the U.S. delegation asked for a reconsideration.4 For the same reasons advanced in 1928, the United States continued to oppose Canadian membership

up until, and after, the beginning of World War II.5 Canadian interest in

membership, which persisted until the eve of World War II, appears to have

been based largely on geographical grounds and on the increasing importance

of Canadian-Latin American trade relations.

2

 Memo/Conv, Moffat and King, 5 Jul 40, Moffat Diary.

Secretary of State Hull had been disturbed by the earlier British action in occupying Curaçao

and Aruba after the invasion of the Netherlands. (Hull, Memoirs, I, 814.) He feared such

actions would encourage similar steps in the Pacific by an aggressive-minded Japan, which could

cite the actions as precedents. 3

 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942), I, 583. 4

 Policy Recommendation, to Norman Armour, 2 Oct 44, D/S 710.001/10-244. 5

 Ltr, Welles to Armour, 24 Feb 36, and Ltr, Clark to Hickerson, 6 Dec 43, both in D/S

710.001/1068-1/2.
144 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

With the outbreak of war the inter-American organization became vitally

concerned with defense measures. In September 1939 the foreign ministers

of the American republics met at Panama and acted on measures relating to

defense and neutrality. After the fall of France a second similar conference

was scheduled at Havana.

Announcement of the Havana Conference aroused anew discussions in

Canada of proposals for Canadian membership in the Pan American Union.

Despite Canada's desire to attend the meeting, the United States discouraged

Canadian participation in the Havana Conference. When questioned about

it in the House of Commons, Prime Minister King frankly stated his belief

that official Canadian participation "would be embarrassing to the United

States and to the South American republics" and would be construed as a

sign of Canadian weakness.6 Canada sent Professor Percy Corbett to the

Havana meetings as an unofficial observer, and he discussed the possibility

of Canadian membership with many of the officials present. Corbett found

a sympathetic attitude among those officials but no feeling that formal Canadian participation in inter-American proceedings was important. On the

other hand, he encountered considerable comment on Canada's status as a

belligerent and a member of the British Commonwealth.7

Although the United States had opposed Canadian membership in the

Pan American Union, President Roosevelt and State Department officers during 1941 urged Canada to play a greater role in Latin America. They encouraged Canada to co-operate in the war effort by extending Canadian

diplomatic representation in that area and by taking other measures. Between September 1941 and January 1942 Canada exchanged diplomatic

missions with Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, and it also signed trade agreements with those countries in the interest of expanding trade relations in the

postwar period.8

When a third meeting of the foreign ministers of the American states to

be held at Rio de Janeiro in January 1942 was announced, considerable Canadian press comment in favor of formal Canadian participation appeared.9

6

 H. C. Debates, 31 Jul 40, p. 2195, and 6 Aug 40, pp. 2540–41. For an excellent account

of wartime Canadian press and political party attitudes on the Pan American Union, and of the

political, military, geographic, and economic aspects of proposals for Canadian participation, see

Eugene H. Miller, "Canada and the Pan American Union," International Journal, III (Winter

1947-48), 24-39. 7

 Memo/Conv, Moffat and Corbett, 7 Aug 40, Moffat Diary. Corbett's appraisal of the situation is presumably set forth in his article "Canada in the Western Hemisphere," Foreign Affairs,

XIX (July 1941), 778-89. 8

 Memo/Conv, King and Moffat, 23 Jun 41, Moffat Diary; H. C. Debates, 27 Feb 42, pp.

893-95. 9

 Miller, op. cit., pp. 31-32.
HEMISPHERE DEFENSE PROBLEMS 145

The Canadian Government clearly indicated to the United States on several

occasions during December and January its desire to participate or, alternately, to become a member of the Pan American Union. Several of the

other American republics had offered to propose that Canada be invited to

participate, but the Canadian Government first wished to be assured of U.S.

support. Despite his recent encouragement of closer Canadian-Latin American relations, President Roosevelt told Mr. King that he felt bringing in a

member of the Commonwealth would be a mistake. The Prime Minister,

who had hoped that the United States would welcome Canadian participation, accepted Roosevelt's decision.10

As to the attitude of other American states, Sumner Welles reported as

the consensus of his discussions with all of the key delegates at Rio de

Janeiro the conclusion that nothing official should be done until the end of

the war.11 Yet two months later Canada again raised the question of closer

Canadian collaboration with the inter-American machinery, on the ground

that it was continuing to receive expressions of interest, particularly from the

larger Latin American countries, in seeing such collaboration. United States

officials could only explain the contradictory reports by suggesting that the

Latin American countries were talking differently to Canada and to the United

States.12

It was at their January 1942 meeting that the foreign ministers established

the Inter-American Defense Board, to comprise service representatives of the

twenty-one member countries. This board was to have its seat in Washington and was to study and make recommendations concerning necessary

defense measures.13 In military as well as in other collective measures in the

prosecution of the war effort, the hemisphere machinery was to continue to

lack the cog representing one of the most important American states.

Sections of the Canadian press took the government to task for what they

concluded was Canadian reluctance or outright refusal to accept membership

10

 U.S. Leg Ott Telg 4, 7 Jan 42, D/S 851A.01/40; Ltr, Moffat to Duggan, 6 Jan 42, D/S

710.001/953; D/S Telg, to Welles, 13 Jan 42, D/S 710 Consultation (3)/312B; Memo/Conv,

Moffat and King, 16 Dec 41, Moffat Diary; Memo/Conv, Welles and Wrong, 18 Dec 41,

Roosevelt Papers, Secy's File, Box 75. 11

 Memo, Welles for Duggan, 17 Feb 42, D/S 710.001/957-1/2. 12

 Memo, Duggan for Welles, 3 Apr 42, reporting on inquiry of Hume Wrong, D/S 710.001/

971; Memo, Moffat visit to Washington 4-11 Apr 41, Moffat Diary. Welles, who was apparently opposed to Canadian entry, makes only guarded reference to the question of Canadian

participation in the Pan American system in his lectures printed as Co-operation Between Canada

and the United States in the Search for World Peace (Winnipeg: J. W. Dafoe Foundation. 1946),

p. 16.

13

 "Final Act of the Third Meeting of Foreign Ministers," Department of State Bulletin,

February 7, 1942, VI, 137.
146 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

in the Pan American Union.14 The Prime Minister hinted at the truth when

he informed the House of Commons: "There have been times quite recently

when we might have expected invitations but were given reasons why it

would not be advisable to have an invitation extended. That position still

exists to a certain extent, for reasons which I cannot publicly explain."

 15

United States policy both before and after the Rio de Janeiro meeting

apparently was based on concern over the possible intrusion of the United

Kingdom into Pan American affairs through a Canada subservient in foreign

policy matters. The Department of State could cite a number of incidents

that appeared to support such a possibility. In one instance, after the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, a senior Canadian Army

officer had suggested that British representatives should participate in the

Board, since the Canadian Government had no secrets from the British Government.16

 In another, the St. Pierre-Miquelon affair, Canada more or less

openly agreed that the suggested United Kingdom solution would be acceptable.17

 United States concern over United Kingdom intrusion into Pan

American affairs may have also been strengthened by the offer, made

by British Ambassador Halifax to Sumner Welles, of assistance through the

British diplomatic missions in South America in helping the United States

to realize its objectives at the Rio meeting. Welles received the offer coolly,

stating that he would notify Lord Halifax if British assistance appeared useful.18

 Whatever the intended purpose of the approach to Welles, it appears

likely that it did not encourage a favorable U.S. attitude on the question of

Canadian participation.

After the Rio de Janeiro Conference the question of Canadian participation in inter-American affairs remained dormant for over a year, until the

latter half of 1943. At that time several speeches by Canadian officials suggested that the Canadian people would like to see Canada in the Pan

American Union and pointed out that Canada's position in the Commonwealth should not be a barrier since her policy was no longer determined in

Downing Street.19 In analyzing the speeches, the U.S. charge d'affaires

agreed that Canadian policy was not determined by the British where questions affected vital Canadian interests, but he felt that, when this was not the

case, Canada still tended to follow British guidance.20

14

 Miller, op. cit., p. 32. 15

 H. C. Debates, 1 Aug 42, p. 5146. 16

 Memo/Conv, Moffat and Lt Gen H. D. G. Crerar, 12 Oct 40, D/S 842.20 Def/42. 17

 Ltr, Clark to J. G. Parsons, 3 Sep 43, D/S 710.001/1054-1/2. 18

 Memo/Conv, 27 Dec 41, D/S 710 Consultation (3)/368. 19

 Miller, op. cit., p. 33. 20

 Ltr, Clark to Parsons, 3 Sep 43, D/S 710.001/1054-1/2.
HEMISPHERE DEFENSE PROBLEMS 147

In view of the speeches by Canadian Government officials and of the

increasing press interest in Canadian membership in the Pan American

Union, especially in Quebec, newly accredited Ambassador Ray Atherton

initiated a redefinition of the U.S. position at the beginning of 1944.21 On

the advice of Secretary of State Hull, the new ambassador outlined to Prime

Minister King the U.S. Government's doubt as to the feasibility of bringing

up the question in the light of wartime conditions and its conclusion that

the question could be discussed fully after the war. King confirmed these

views as exactly his own, since it appeared to him to be a time for considering global rather than regional problems.22

 The flurry of speeches by Canadian Government officials had nevertheless indicated a real interest in Latin

America, for during 1944 Canada resumed the expansion of Canadian diplomatic representation in that area.23

During the last year of the war the Department of State seemed somewhat more sympathetic toward Canadian membership in the inter-American

system. Also, the necessary support from the Latin American countries appeared assured.24

 But during the inter-American conference held at Mexico

City in February-March 1945, when Chile sponsored a resolution calling for

Canadian admission to the Pan American Union, it was transformed, at U.S.

instance, into a resolution (XXII of the Final Act) that paid tribute to the

Canadian war effort and expressed the wish that Canadian collaboration with

the Pan American system should become ever closer.25

By that time the tide of Canada's Pan American aspirations was ebbing.

A public opinion poll taken in Canada in January 1944 had indicated that

only 28 percent of those polled knew what the Pan American Union was,

although the great majority of them favored Canadian membership. As

21

 Ltr, Atherton to Hull, 12 Jan 44, D/S 710.001/1106. For a study on Pan American

sentiment, see Iris S. Podea, "Ran American Sentiment in French Canada," International Journal,

III (Autumn 1948), 334-49. 22

 Ltr, Atherton to Hull, 28 Jan 44, D/S 710.001/1102. Hull in his Memoirs, II, 1481,

states that the Pan American Union question was not much discussed or specially urged by

either government, since both had in mind that Canada got into war if the United Kingdom did.

He felt that the co-operation that existed was to every practical extent the same that would

have occurred had Canada been a member. 23

 Canada, Department of External Affairs, "Canada and Latin America," External Affairs, I

(May 1949), 26. 24

 A lengthy study resulted in a "Policy Recommendation," dated 2 October 1944, that the

United States should assist in bringing about Canadian membership, but the recommendation

was apparently not approved. (D/S 710.001/10-244.) A subsequent survey of the United

States diplomatic missions in ten American republics confirmed that a broad basis of support

existed, subject to assurances as to Canada's position in the British Commonwealth. (Memo,

by L. J. Halle, Jr., 23 Nov 45, D/S 710.001/11-2345.) 25

 Ltr, Under Secy State Joseph C. Grew to President, 8 Mar 45, Roosevelt Papers, Secy's

File, Box 150; Report of the U.S, Delegation (Department of State Publication No. 2497 [Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946]), p. 95.
148 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

official Canadian interest cooled, King was able to cite the need for wider

general appreciation in Canada of the purposes and responsibilities of the Pan

American Union as a condition precedent to active Canadian interest in

membership.26

The adoption of the Act of Chapultepec at Mexico City in March 1945

may have helped produce a further change in the Canadian attitude. In the

light of the new obligations that Canada would assume under the United

Nations charter, the additional obligations entailed under the Act of

Chapultepec received careful study. Opinions in government and other informed circles in Canada were widely divided on the question of Canadian

participation in the inter-American system. Press comment on the question

diminished considerably after March 1945, and it ceased to be a political

issue.27

The question of Canadian admission to the Pan American Union during

World War II seems to have been considered by both countries primarily

in terms of considerations other than military. The U.S. War and Navy

Departments never urged Canadian participation as advantageous in dealing

with hemisphere defense problems, and the Permanent Joint Board on Defense recorded no discussions on the subject. As for Canada, a 1949 official

publication cited the growth of Canadian interest in Latin America as one

of the significant developments in the expansion of Canada's international

relations. This publication described the wartime growth of direct Canadian

diplomatic representation replacing the earlier representation through United

Kingdom representatives. It pointed out the very considerable increase in

the volume of trade and the emphasis that had been placed upon cultural

relations. Insofar as security problems were concerned, it made no comment

on Canadian interest in the over-all defense requirements of the hemisphere.

In the postwar period, the article stated, Canada should keep under review

the defense requirements of the northern part of the hemisphere through the

Permanent Joint Board on Defense and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Through the United Nations, Canada could keep in close contact and

regularly exchange views with Latin American delegations on problems

affecting their security.28

26

 Public Opinion Quarterly, VIII (Spring 1944), 146; H. C. Debates, 4 Aug 44, p. 5912.

Months later, in February 1945, a government publication was to refute the importance of the

poll results as a reason why Canada should not be a member. (Department of External Affairs,

Information Division, Reference Paper 34, p. 16.) 27

 U.S. Emb Ott Desp 2884, 1 Aug 45, D/S 710.001/8-145; U.S. Emb Ott Desp 2886, 7

Aug 45, D/S 710.001/8-745. 28

 Canada, Department of External Affairs, "Canada and Latin America," External Affairs, I

(May 1949), 25-34.
HEMISPHERE DEFENSE PROBLEMS 149

Although the available evidence is far from complete, it suggests that

Canadian interest in participating in the inter-American system during World

War II was based on economic and political motives, rather than on the possibility of a greater or more effective Canadian contribution to over-all hemisphere security. Partly because it had discouraged a greater Canadian defense

contribution in Latin America before Pearl Harbor, the United States found

it necessary to supply most of the defense needs that could not be met by

the Latin American countries themselves.29

Securing Greenland

In May 1939, when the U.S. Senate considered a resolution calling for

initiation of negotiations with Denmark for the purchase of Greenland, the

War Department in commenting on the proposal stated that any "strategic

advantage as would accrue . . . would be negligible, and in any event unnecessary." It also held that Greenland was so undeveloped and so far on

the flank of sea and air routes that its possession by a hostile power would

not constitute a significant threat.30 Events were not to support the War

Department's appraisal, and before long both Canada and the United States

became actively interested in Greenland on three counts:

a. Protection of the cryolite mines at Ivigtut. These mines represented

the only important natural source of cryolite, which was essential in the production of aluminum.

b. Use of air-base and weather and communications stations there in

connection with ferrying aircraft across the North Atlantic.

c. Denial of its use, for weather and communications purposes, to the

Germans.

The German occupation of Denmark on 8-9 April 1940, after the many

months of lull in the "phony war," focused attention on the fate of Greenland. Secretary of State Hull, on 13 April, informed Canadian Minister Loring Christie (and the British Embassy as well) that the United States did not

recognize the right of any third government, even Canada or the United

29

 Apart from forces in Newfoundland and Labrador, the Canadian Army deployments at

the end of the war included a battalion (786 strong) in Jamaica, 163 troops in the Bahamas,

and 181 in Bermuda. In addition, a detachment of the Veterans Guard of Canada had served

in British Guiana, protecting bauxite shipments. (Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-194), p.

43n.) Of interest is the fact that the U.S. deployments included forces sent just after Pearl

Harbor to Aruba, the Dutch possession that had been the subject of proposed similar action by

Canada in June 1940. The U.S. deployments to Aruba and neighboring Curaçao had been

arranged with the United Kingdom in March 1941 as part of the ABC-1 report arrangements. 30

 Ltr, Harry H. Woodring, SW, to Bureau of Budget, 16 May 39, WPD 4173-7, Sec. 1.

The above comments, prepared at staff level, were reviewed and approved by the head of War

Plans Division and by Chief of Staff Malin Craig, as well as by Woodring.
150 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Kingdom, to occupy or otherwise interfere in Greenland. A few days later

the Canadian Government, which had been requested to do so by the United

Kingdom, advised the United States that it was concerned over the security

of the cryolite mines, the danger that Germany might establish bases in

Greenland, and the relief needs of the Greenland inhabitants, who had been

deprived of their export markets. Canada, Ottawa told Washington, was

therefore considering dispatch of a small defense force for the duration of the

war, during which time Canada would act "as a trustee for a restored and

independent Danish Government." Canada gave assurance that it would not

send the force without notifying, or before receiving the views of, the United

States. But it would not commit itself not to send the force if such action

appeared necessary.31

The U.S. Government was extremely anxious that no action of this kind

be taken by Canada since it might offer an excuse to other large countries for

taking over colonial territories of occupied European countries. Canada accepted the U.S. view on the condition that the United States would assume

the responsibility of meeting the threats that might arise. The American

Red Cross at the same time began a study of the relief problem in Greenland.32

Concurrently, the Danish Minister in Washington, Henrik de Kauffmann,

was suggesting to Secretary Hull that a U.S. protectorate be established over

the island. Hull opposed the action on the same grounds he had voiced to

Canada. The local governments in Greenland, the Greenland Councils, were

likewise concerned over the security of the island and, on 3 May 1940, also

sought U.S. protection. The United States declined to furnish it but instead

arranged for the installation of a consul and vice consul at Godthaab.33

The worsening military situation in Europe, together with conflicting U.S.

views on the defense responsibility for Greenland, impelled the Canadians to

act. Whereas Department of State representatives had stated that the United

States would take any action needed in Greenland, President Roosevelt had

told Prime Minister King that he expected the British Navy to repel a German attack.34

 Still confused as to U.S. policy after a further inquiry, Canada

31

 Memo/Conv, Hull and Christie, 13 Apr 40, D/S 859B.01/140; Memo/Conv and aidemémoire, 16 Apr 40, D/S 859B.01/155; Memo/Conv, Hickerson and Escort Reid, 17 Apr 40,

D/S 859B.01/147. Repeated requests from London reportedly pressed Canada to take prompt

action to prevent Greenland from falling into German hands. (Memo/Conv, J. K. Penfield and

Dunbar, 27 Dec 41, D/S 859B.00/64.) See also Langer and Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, pp. 429-33, 683-87, for an account of discussions concerning Greenland. 32

 Memo, J. C. Dunn to Secy State, 19 Apr 40, D/S 859B.01/152. 33

 Memo/Conv, 19 Apr 40, D/S 859B.01/154; Hull, Memoirs. I, 756; Ltr, Secy State to

Minister Kauffmann, 7 Apr 41, EAS, 204; Department of State Bulletin, May 4, 1940, II, 473. 34

 Memo/Conv, Christie and Berle, 1 May 40, D/S 859B.01/193.
HEMISPHERE DEFENSE PROBLEMS 151

on 19 May informed the United States of the dispatch of a Hudson's Bay

Company ship, the RMS Nascopie, to call in Greenland and land a Canadian

consul there.

The Nascopie had arrived at Ivigtut when, on 3 June, the Governments of

North and South Greenland, already disturbed by this event, learned of the

approach of the Danish vessel Julius Thomsen under control of a British prize

crew and formally requested the United States to establish a garrison at

Ivigtut to protect the cryolite mines. In discussions with the United States,

Canada, too, indicated its concern over the vulnerability of the mines to attack by raiding parties and offered assistance in defending them.35

To some U.S. officials, the Canadian interest in Greenland seemed to be

related, at least in part, to a desire to expand the Canadian economic position

in Greenland and to oust U.S. commercial interests at Ivigtut in favor of the

Aluminium Company of Canada. Meetings for the purpose of working out

an equitable arrangement for disposition of the output of cryolite had already

been held in New York City by representatives of the Departments of State

and External Affairs, the Greenland Governments, the Aluminium Company

of Canada, and the Pennsylvania Salt Manufacturing Company, the American

processor of the cryolite. It was the conduct of these meetings that had

served to arouse U.S. suspicions.36

In any event and in response to the Greenland request, the USS Campbell

was dispatched to Greenland. Its arrival on 7 June apparently served to allay

the concern of the authorities in Greenland, where no change in the status

quo took place. A few months later Secretary of State Hull nevertheless considered it necessary, because of British operations designed to eliminate and

insure against German activities on the east coast of Greenland and in adjacent

waters, to reaffirm to Canada and the United Kingdom the position he had

stated on 13 April.37

By the summer of 1940, interest was developing in air-base sites in Greenland for use in transatlantic flight operations. Definite proposals were

initially made in August 1940. During that month, Capt. J. K. Lacey of the

U.S. Army Air Corps made a survey seeking suitable sites. On 27 August

the Canadian Government informed the United States of a British desire to

establish an air base for use in ferrying short-range aircraft and asked if there

35

 U.S. Consulate Godthaab Telg 22, 3 Jun 40, D/S 859B.01/199; Cdn Leg Note, to State

Department, 27 May 40, D/S 859B.20/49. 36

 Memo/Conv, Berle and Mahoney, 3 Jun 40, D/S 859B.01/210. Months later, a Canadian official stated that the Aluminium Company of Canada had originally proposed and practically organized "the unfortunate Nascopie expedition." (Memo/Conv, 27 Dec 41, D/S 859B.00/

64.) Memo for Record, 21 May 1940 meetings in New York City, D/S 859B.01/206. 37

 Ltrs, Hull to Christie and Lothian, 23 Sep 40, D/S 859B.01/293A.
152 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

was any objection to an approach to the Greenland authorities for approval

of a survey by Canada. Although the War Department had no objections,

the Department of State suggested that the Canadian survey be delayed until

the U.S. Army survey report was completed. This had the practical effect

of delaying a Canadian survey until the following spring.38 During October

1940, the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Northland made an additional survey of

potential air-base sites.

In January 1941 the Canadian Government renewed the British and Canadian proposal, stating that it was prepared to construct the desired facilities,

to have the United State construct them, or to have the Greenland authorities

construct them with U.S. assistance.39 In presenting the problem to the President and the Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle,

Jr., expressed the conviction that Canada would seize the Greenland sites

unless the United States acted. His recommendation that the Greenland

authorities be asked to establish the facilities needed with U.S. assistance

was approved.40

The United States advised Canadian authorities of this decision and of its

relation to the Monroe Doctrine, to the neutral status of Greenland, and to

inter-American defense. Since Canada was a nation of the Western Hemisphere and provided a vital part of the hemisphere's defenses, facilities that

would be built could be used by that country under the usual neutrality rules.

The Canadian officials, when informed also that the problem was already

under discussion with the Greenland authorities, expressed their satisfaction

with the solution.41

While the necessary arrangements were being negotiated with the Danish

and Greenland authorities, U.S. interdepartmental committees studied the

problem. They concluded that, because of the complexity of considerations

of defense, jurisdiction, and operation and maintenance of the facilities, construction by the Greenland authorities was impracticable and should be

undertaken by the United States.42 The Department of State presented to

and discussed with Greenland authorities a draft agreement based on that

approach. It was signed in Washington on 9 April 1941 by Secretary of

State Hull and Minister Kauffmann, who, although he had been repudiated

38

 Memo, H. Cumming for Berle, 27 Aug 40, D/S 859B.7962/2; Memo, G. C. Marshall for

Secy Navy, 28 Aug 40, WPD 4330-3. 39

 Memo/Conv, Cumming and Reid, 6 Jan 41, and Cumming and F. R. Hoyer Millar, 13

Jan 41, D/S 859B.7962/3. 40

 Memo, 7 Feb 41, D/S 859B.7962/18. 41

 Memo/Conv, Berle and Mahoney, 13 Feb 41, D/S 859B.7962/13. 42

 Summary of Points Respecting the Establishment of Landing Fields in Greenland Agreed

Upon at a Meeting Held on March 5, 1941, WPD 4173-11.
HEMISPHERE DEFENSE PROBLEMS 153

HARBOR CAMP AREA OF THE GREENLAND BASE COMMAND. Photograph taken

June 1943.

by the new Danish Government after the German occupation of Denmark,

was still recognized by the United States as the representative of the King of

Denmark. In the agreement, the United States related its acceptance of

responsibility for the status of Greenland to the Act of Havana of 30 July

1940. Declaration XX of the Act of Havana had authorized emergency

action by any of the American republics to forestall threatened transfer of

territory in the Western Hemisphere.43 The agreement also provided for

use of the facilities to be constructed by "airplanes and vessels of all

the American Nations for purposes connected with the common defense of

the Western Hemisphere." The use of the term "American Nations," rather

than the usual Pan American Union usage of "American Republics," brought

Canada within the scope of this provision.44

43

 EAS, 199. Mr. Hull's note of 7 April also made reference to the Monroe Doctrine and

"the traditional policies of this Government respecting the Western Hemisphere," but the

agreement signed made no mention of them. It is also of interest to note that the ABC-1

report on the British-U.S. military staff meetings, signed 27 March, had made the defense of

Greenland east of 30° west longitude a responsibility of the United Kingdom. 44

 The agreement and notes exchanged before its signing are in EAS, 204. For an examination of the unusual circumstances attending the conclusion of this agreement, see Herbert W.

Briggs, "The validity of the Greenland Agreement," American Journal of International Law,

XXXV (1941), 506-13.
154 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

In announcing the agreement, the Department of State revealed that

German bomber reconnaissance aircraft had flown over the east coast of

Greenland on several occasions not two weeks before the signing. German

activity on the island had on the whole diminished after the British seized

the German-controlled but Norwegian-manned weather stations in the summer of 1940. Nevertheless, sporadic air reconnaissance thereafter had

indicated continued German interest.45

In anticipation of the signing of the agreement a South Greenland Survey Expedition had left Boston on 17 March to make the detailed surveys.

The Secretary of War had received an allocation of $5 million from

the President's emergency fund to permit work to be started at the beginning

of the short construction season.46 As a result of the work of the South

Greenland Survey Expedition, the U.S. Army dispatched a force of 473 officers and men, mostly Engineer construction troops, which arrived on 8 July

1941. By the end of 1941 the garrison totaled approximately 700, and the

airfield at Narsarssuak was usable by all types of aircraft. Eventually, military development included five installations on Greenland's east coast and

eight on its west coast.47

Prompted by the Bismarck affair and other enemy activity in the Greenland area, Canada made one more approach to the United States, in May

1941, requesting immediate consideration of the need for reinforcement of

the defenses at the cryolite mines. The Canadians indicated that, as before,

they were ready to provide a Canadian garrison immediately and in other

ways to co-operate in strengthening the defenses. The United States declined

the Canadian offer of assistance with appreciation and made arrangements to

disclose the military measures planned by the United States to Canadian

officials through military channels.48

The arrival in Greenland of the initial U.S. garrison and its subsequent

reinforcement apparently allayed Canadian concern. Other developments

served to reduce the security requirements for Greenland. The strengthened

Allied military position in the North Atlantic, at least insofar as German

45

 Department of State Bulletin, April 12, 1941, IV, 444. For an account of the continuing

German activities in Greenland throughout the war and of U.S. countermeasures, see U.S. Coast

Guard, The Coast Guard at War: Greenland Patrol (Washington: 1945). 46

 Memo, Acting CofS for SW, 10 Apr 41, WPD 4173-25. 47

 The east coast facilities were given the code designations of BLUIE EAST (or BE) 1 to 5;

those on the west coast, BLUIE WEST (or BW) 1 to 8. BW-1 and BW-8, the airfields at

Narsarssuak and Søndre Strømfjord, became the major bases. See Morison, The Battle of the

Atlantic, pp. 60-62; Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 486-90. 48

 Cdn Leg aide-mémoire, 21 May 41, WPD 4173-72. A proposal to provide the information in the PJBD was rejected since the Canadian Section had "been given to understand that

the defense of Greenland . . . [was] not a matter for consideration by that Board." (Memo,

WPD for G-2, 17 Jul 41, WPD 4173-99.)
HEMISPHERE DEFENSE PROBLEMS 155

surface operations were concerned, reduced the German threat. By mid-1942

the U.S. domestic output of synthetic cryolite had reached the rate of 35,000

tons annually, which about equaled the U.S. share of the annual cryolite output in Greenland. Although increasing needs fully absorbed the additional

amounts, at least total Allied dependence on the sole natural source was

ended.49

The Defense of Iceland

German occupation of Denmark after the 8-9 April 1940 invasion raised

the question of what action Germany might take vis-à-vis Iceland, which

under the Act of Union of 1 December 1918 was a sovereign kingdom joined

with Denmark through their common sovereign, His Majesty the King of

Iceland and Denmark. The Department of State, in studying courses of action

possible if Germany were to lay claim to Iceland and/or Greenland, examined

the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine to these and other European territories. A study by one of the State Department's experts concluded that the

doctrine could be considered applicable, since it had referred to "this Hemisphere" and since it was "held by authoritative geographers" that the part of

the island west of the 20° west meridian was "definitely in the Western

Hemisphere."

 50

 The United States did not find it necessary to take any

military steps, for in May 1940 the United Kingdom occupied Iceland and

established a garrison of several thousand troops there. This garrison was

steadily increased until a year later it exceeded 25,000.

The British garrison had been in Iceland only two months when the

Icelandic Government, which had established direct relations with the United

States in April 1940, asked on 12 July "whether the United States would include Iceland in the Western Hemisphere and put it under the protection of

the Monroe Doctrine." This request received no encouragement, nor did a

similar request made in September.51

When the Permanent Joint Board on Defense initiated its studies of the

"north half of the Western Hemisphere," it either excluded Iceland from its

purview or found no need, in the light of the British garrisons already established there, to consider the defense of Iceland. Whatever the case, the records of the Permanent Joint Board do not mention Iceland. The agreements

reached by the U.S.-United Kingdom planners during January-March 1941, in

49

 Although aluminum production is feasible using only synthetic cryolite, the process is

more efficient and economical if a certain proportion of natural cryolite is used. 50

 Study by H. Notter, Applicability of the Monroe Doctrine if Germany Should Lay Claim

to the Possessions of Denmark in the Western Hemisphere, 9 Apr 40, D/S 859.01/43. 51

 Memo/Conv, Berle and Consul General V. Thor, 12 Jul 40, D/S 710.11/2551; Memo/

Conv, Hull and Thor, 5 Sep 40, D/S 859A.014/9.
156 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

which the defense of Iceland was assigned to the United Kingdom, further

moved Iceland from the area of Western Hemisphere problems that might

be solved jointly by the United States and Canada.

Although the initial garrison was British and the defense of Iceland was

a United Kingdom responsibility, there was some indirect U.S.-Canadian collaboration in meeting the security requirements of Iceland during World

War II. On 10 May 1940, when the defenses of France were crumbling,

Canada invited British suggestions as to action it might take to be of assistance. As a result of the British reply, Canada offered an infantry brigade of

the 2d Canadian Division as part of the garrison for Iceland. Designated

Z Force, the initial Canadian elements reached Iceland on 16 June. By 17

July three Canadian battalions, the Royal Regiment of Canada, Les Fusiliers

Mont-Royal, and the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, formed part of the

British garrison.52 The Canadian garrison reached a peak strength of about

2,700. Around the first of November two battalions left for England, leaving in Iceland the third battalion and a small detachment of special troops.

By the spring of 1941 the United Kingdom was encouraging the United

States to provide forces for the defense of Iceland in order to release the substantial British forces there. On 25 March Hitler declared Iceland to be in

the war zone, and U.S. interest in that island began to increase. Its usefulness for air bases and convoy protection was pointed out to President Roosevelt, who authorized a reconnaissance of the island. An initial survey was

completed in early April. Further surveys were planned but were delayed,

and no further action took place until early June.53

On 2 June 1941 Harry Hopkins, the Secretaries of War and the Navy,

and General Marshall and Admiral Stark met to discuss recommendations of

Ambassador John G. Winant brought from London as to ways and means of

relieving the pressures on the United Kingdom. They considered a proposal,

among others, for U.S. replacement of the garrison in Iceland. In interdepartmental discussions during the next few days the proposal received general

support. On 5 June the President decided to send a force to Iceland as soon

52

 Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945, pp. 24-25. Colonel Stacey states that the British

War Office wanted the entire 2d Canadian Division in Iceland, although the Canadian Government would have preferred to keep the bulk of the division in Canada. Churchill had still

another plan and was surprised to learn from Lt. Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton that the whole

2d Canadian Division was destined for Iceland. "No one was told anything about this. We

require two Canadian divisions in England to work as a corps as soon as possible." (Memo,

7 Jul 40, quoted in Churchill, Their Finest Hour. p. 268.) Canada, too, preferred to have the

entire division concentrated in the United Kingdom, rather than split between Iceland and some

other place, and the Churchill plan was carried out. General McNaughton became the Canadian Corps commander. 53

 Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, p. 57.
HEMISPHERE DEFENSE PROBLEMS 157

as the government there requested U.S. protection, and he ordered a Marine

force made ready within fifteen days.54

The British Government suggested that for military and tactical reasons

Iceland be given no advance notice of the dispatch of U.S. troops, and that

the United States instead present the Icelandic Government with a fait

accompli. President Roosevelt rejected this suggestion as inconsistent with

the basic U.S. hemisphere nonaggression policy and insisted that a request

from the Icelandic authorities would be necessary.55 Despite efforts of the

British Minister in Reykjavik, who had been virtually instructed to see to it

that a request was made, the Icelandic Government refused explicitly to

request or invite U.S. protection because a majority of the Parliament had

recently opposed such a request. In the end, the Icelandic Government

admitted that the introduction of U.S. troops was in the interest of Iceland

and therefore entrusted the protection of that country to the United States.56

In anticipation of a satisfactory arrangement President Roosevelt, on 16

June, had ordered the Chief of Naval Operations to carry out Operation

INDIGO for the relief of the British garrison. On 7 July about 4,000 troops

of the 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional) landed in Iceland and joined British

forces in the Iceland garrison. No Canadian troops were present at that time

since their transfer to the British Isles had just been completed. At the end

of 1941, approximately 10,000 U.S. Army and Marine troops were in Iceland.

During early 1942 the U.S. Marines and most of the British forces were withdrawn and replaced by U.S. Army troops. Command of the island garrison

passed in April 1942 from the British to Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel,

U.S. Army, who had arrived the preceding September.57

54

 Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, pp. 121-29. 55

 Memo, Halifax for Secy State, 16 Jun 41, D/S 859A.20.17; Memo/Conv, Welles and

N. M. Butler, 18 Jun 41, D/S 859A.20.20-1/12. Although the President indicated that he

was willing to provide a garrison because of American determination to defend the Western

Hemisphere, he was not convinced, despite the counsel of some of his advisers, that Iceland

should be considered in that hemisphere. Dr. Isaiah Bowman had examined the point for him

and concluded it should be excluded since only a doubtful case could be made. A few years

later Roosevelt stated, in toasting the President of Iceland, that he had steered clear of a proposition to put Iceland in the Western Hemisphere. (Memo, Bowman for President, 19 Mar

41, Roosevelt Papers, Secy's File, Box 77; Rosenman (compiler), The Public Papers and Addresses

of Franklin D. Roosevelt, XIII, 236-37. 56

 Memo/Convs, Welles and Halifax, 26 and 28 Jun 41, D/S 859A.20/20-3/12 and /20-

4/12. Message, Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, 1 Jul 41, EAS, 232. 57

 Accounts of the garrisoning of Iceland are to be found in Morison, The Battle of

the Atlantic, pp. 74-78, and Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 487-90.

The most detailed account including the reasons for the inability of the United Kingdom to

reduce its garrison during 1941, is given in Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron

Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts, a volume in preparation for the series

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
158 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

St. Pierre and Miquelon

One of the most widely publicized international tempests during World

War II involved St. Pierre and Miquelon, two small islands just off the

southern coast of Newfoundland. Subsequent to the fall of France, control

of the two islands had remained with the Vichy Government. The existence

on St. Pierre of a high-powered radio transmitter capable of transmitting

meteorological and other information that could be of great value to Germany constituted a serious danger to Allied operations in the Atlantic.

As early as July 1940, the Newfoundland Government had requested

Canada to occupy the islands or take other action. Canada discussed the

matter with the United States and indicated that it would consult the United

States before taking any action.58 Nothing was done, and the problem

remained quiescent until the spring of 1941, when the convoy loss rate in the

northwest Atlantic began to climb sharply.

During May 1941 Prime Minister King told Pierrepont Moffat, the U.S.

Minister in Ottawa, that Newfoundland had renewed its request on several

occasions and that President Roosevelt himself had also asked King what he

intended to do. The Canadian Government concluded that the only action

needed was to send a Royal Canadian Mounted Police officer to confer with

the island's authorities and render a report. Canada also reaffirmed its promise not to act without consulting the United States. The State Department

was particularly sensitive to the situation because of its bearing on U.S. policy

with respect to administration of European colonies in the Western Hemisphere. In addition, the State Department did not wish to jeopardize the arrangement under which Vichy French fleet units, notably the aircraft carrier

Beam, remained neutralized at Martinique. Moffat was accordingly instructed

to make clear in Ottawa the need for Canadian co-operation in the matter.59

Beginning in July 1941 the United Kingdom made repeated suggestions

to Canada that Free French forces be allowed to proceed to St. Pierre and

Miquelon to induce them to align themselves with the Free French movement and General Charles de Gaulle. London did not approach the State

Department with these proposals, which the Canadian Government had

discouraged.60

At its 10-11 November 1941 meeting the Permanent Joint Board on Defense reviewed the problem of St. Pierre and Miquelon and agreed that "the

58

 Memo/Conv, Moffat and King, 5 Jul 40, Moffat Diary. 59

 Memo/Convs, Moffat and Robertson, 12 and 28 May 41, 15 and 31 Jul 41, Moffat

Diary; Ott Leg Telg 188, 17 May 41, D/S 851A.01/10; Ott Leg Desp 1731, 16 Jul 41, D/S

851A.014/8. 60

 Memo/Convs, Moffat and Robertson, 15 and 31 Jul 41, 3 Nov 41, Moffat Diary.
HEMISPHERE DEFENSE PROBLEMS 159

existence on the Islands of an uncontrolled and high-powered wireless transmitting station constituted a potential danger to the interests of Canada and

the United States."61 The problem was also being discussed through diplomatic channels, and the Canadians suggested joint U.S.-Canadian sponsorship of a team of civilian technicians that would proceed to St. Pierre to

monitor the radio station operations. Canada solicited the views of both

Washington and London. King's query to the British Prime Minister remained unanswered by Churchill, who advanced an alternate plan. General

de Gaulle himself, heading the French Committee of National Liberation,

had by now also proposed to Churchill that the Free French seize the islands.

Churchill saw no objection but asked the Canadian Government to ascertain

the attitude of the United States. Roosevelt strongly disapproved the proposed Free French action and asked instead that the proposal to send a small

group of civilian technicians be carried out by Canada alone. On learning of

the U.S. objections, the United Kingdom asked the French Committee not

to take action.62

De Gaulle nevertheless ordered his commander of the Free French naval

force at Halifax to act without informing the Allies. Ostensibly sailing for

St. John's, the force of three corvettes and the giant submarine Surcouf instead proceeded to St. Pierre, where it established control on 25 December

1941. The same day a plebiscite produced a 98 percent vote in favor of

rallying to the Free French in preference to collaboration with the Axis.63

The U.S. Army Newfoundland base commander recommended on 28

December that the islands be left in Free French control. But on the day

of the seizure Secretary of State Hull had issued a statement condemning as

arbitrary, contrary to the agreement of the parties concerned, and without

prior knowledge or consent of the United States, the action of the "so-called

Free French" ships.64 Hull took up with Canada the feasibility of restoring

the status quo ante through establishment of a commission of Canadian experts to supervise the radio traffic and the withdrawal of the Free French.

Canada was unwilling to challenge the Free French action and suggested

that the United States and United Kingdom agree on a solution. Canada

would be willing to co-operate in the execution of any agreement reached

61

 Journal, PDB 124. 62

 Ott Leg Telg 282, 3 Nov 41, D/S 851A.74/4; Memo/Conv, Moffat and Keenleyside, 14

Nov 41, Moffat Diary; Memo, Wrong for Secy State, 5 Dec 41, D/S 851A.74/12-541; Memo/

Conv, Moffat and Robertson, 16 Dec 41, Moffat Diary; Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 667. 63

 The U.S. consul estimated that even a more neutrally worded choice would have given

the Free French a 75 percent majority. (Desp 79, 26 Dec 41, D/S 851A/00/48.) 64

 Informal Rpt, NBC, 28 Dec 41, PDB 104-5; Department of State Bulletin, December 27,

1941, V, 580.
160 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

by them.65 Churchill, then in Washington, said he would be agreeable to

any arrangement that would be acceptable to General de Gaulle. But

Churchill's attitude, as exemplified by his speech in Ottawa on 30 December

extolling de Gaulle's followers, did not appear to be designed to induce cooperative concessions from de Gaulle. After President Roosevelt let it be

known that he would not back up State Department demands that the Free

French be evicted and the status quo ante be restored, a solution acceptable

to Churchill, Hull, and de Gaulle appeared impossible.66

Secretary Hull's attitude and his reference to the "so-called" Free French

came under heavy public attack, even in the United States. In Canada it

evoked considerable unfavorable publicity. In part, this was due to an accumulation of resentment over the U.S. attitude on a number of questions

including U.S. failure to discuss Pacific problems with the Canadian Government before the Pearl Harbor attack and U.S. opposition to Canadian participation at the Rio de Janeiro inter-American meeting.67

Although the Canadian Government was embarrassed by the Free French

action, for the contrary assurances given by the Free French commander in

Ottawa had been relayed to Washington through the Department of External Affairs, it took no positive position. To State Department officers, the

Canadian attitude appeared to be casual and unconcerned. As for King, he

had had nothing to do with the matter and only wanted it settled. By the

end of January Hull had decided that the wisest course was to let the matter

rest.68

Summary

Despite the hope of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie

King, as expressed in the Ogdensburg Declaration, that defense problems

could be jointly examined on a hemisphere basis, such joint examination

was faced with complications in regard to the defense needs of the two countries themselves, let alone the contiguous areas of North and South America.

There were several reasons for these complications. One was the simple

fact that before Pearl Harbor Canada was a belligerent while the United

States was a neutral. A second was Canada's membership in the British

Commonwealth, which would not permit an unqualified allegiance to a

hemisphere standard.

65

 Memo/Conv, Moffat and Dunn, 25 Dec 41, Moffat Diary; Memo/Conv, Hull and King,

27 Dec 41, D/S 581A.00/50. 66

 See Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Ch. VII. 67

 Ott Leg Telg 4, 7 Jan 42, D/S 851A.01/13. 68

 Ott Leg Telg 313, 25 Dec 41, D/S 851A.01/17; Memo/Conv, Berle and McCarthy, 3

Jan 42, D/S 851A.01/65; Hull, Memoirs, II, 1137. A number of accounts of this problem are

available. See Hull, Memoirs, II, 1127-38; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, Ch. XXI; Langer

and Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, pp. 212-26; Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 666-67.
HEMISPHERE DEFENSE PROBLEMS 161

Before Pearl Harbor the United States' front line of defense was the coast

line of the Americas and their offshore waters. With Canadian troops deployed overseas, Canada considered its front line to be in Europe. From the

military point of view, the United States saw merit in efforts designed to

increase the military strength and programs of the Latin American countries.

In considering the wishes of the United States that Canada join in encouraging these efforts, Canada was inclined to view expenditures of military

resources in Latin America as diversions of critical means to a secondary

area. Only from a political and longer-range economic point of view could

the development of Canada's relations with the Latin American states make

sense to Canada.

The neutral United States also considered Canadian and Commonwealth

defensive measures in the Western Hemisphere in terms of their impact on

the U.S. policy of neutrality, whereas British and Canadian plans vis-à-vis

areas such as Greenland, St. Pierre and Miquelon, and other European possessions in the Western Hemisphere were based on the needs of their

belligerent status. Because of this fundamental pre-Pearl Harbor split, it

was impossible for the two countries to unite in the establishment of a common policy that would motivate jointly desired actions throughout the

hemisphere.

After Pearl Harbor the encouragement of closer Canadian relations with

Latin America ceased to be useful to the United States, which could either

offer to Latin America the material support needed to carry out the desired

military measures or take them itself. Under these circumstances, and from

the longer-range point of view, the growth of Canadian and Commonwealth

interest in Latin America would not accord with U.S. political and economic

objectives, and it was therefore not encouraged.
CHAPTER VII

Operations in the Eastern Areas

In the pre-Pearl Harbor period the primary focus of military co-operation

between the United States and Canada was on Newfoundland and adjacent

northeastern North America. Although the Japanese threat was not disregarded, the operational requirements of the European war and the Battle of

the Atlantic after the fall of France were immediate and absorbed most of

the modest ground and air forces available to the two countries. For Canada

this meant that forces had to be deployed to coastal areas, Iceland, and Great

Britain. For the United States it meant that mobile reserves had to be held

in readiness to meet and repel the first signs of aggression anywhere in the

Western Hemisphere.

The defense needs of the British territory of Newfoundland, the North

American outpost on the sea and air approaches to eastern Canada and the

adjacent United States, were a matter of great concern to Canada. On the

eve of Canadian entry into the European war Prime Minister King told the

House of Commons that the integrity of Newfoundland and Laborador was

essential to the security of Canada and that he had already obtained British

agreement to Canadian participation in the defense of Newfoundland. Not

long after the Canadian declaration of war on 10 September 1939, Canada

took initial steps to aid in Newfoundland's defense.1

Although U.S. joint war plans had earlier recognized the need for offshore bases in the Caribbean and other Atlantic areas, U.S. interest in the

Newfoundland area developed only after the fall of France. During the

summer and fall of 1940 the British-American destroyer-bases negotiations

resulted in the interjection of the United States into the Newfoundland defense scheme.2

 The fall of France also gave considerable impetus to the scope

of Canadian participation in the defense of Newfoundland.

The Lease and Construction of Newfoundland Bases

While the French and British armies on the Continent were crumbling

before the German blitzkrieg and the British defensive situation was deteriorating rapidly, Prime Minister Churchill on 15 May began his efforts to

1

 H. C. Debates, 8 Sep 39, p. 35. See Ch. IV, above. 2

 See Ch. I, above.
OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN AREAS 163

induce the United States to transfer some of its World War I destroyers to

the British. During the next few months, as Britain and its Atlantic lines

of communications lay exposed to the German war machine, repeated requests were to be made by Churchill to U.S. Ambassador Kennedy in London and to President Roosevelt himself. The question whether or not the

destroyers should be loaned or transferred was debated at length in the

United States.3

One arrangement examined at the suggestion of President Roosevelt, and

of particular interest to this study, would have provided for sale of the destroyers to Canada on condition that they be used only in the Western

Hemisphere. This arrangement would have aided Britain since it would

have released Commonwealth ships for other purposes. In addition, it would

have relieved the United States of some of its naval patrol responsibilities.4

The fall of France also resulted in more active consideration in U.S. military and political circles of the need for Atlantic bases in the defense of the

Western Hemisphere. On 29 May 1940 Army Chief of Staff Marshall discussed with Under Secretary of State Welles the desirability of quickly establishing U.S. forces in the British possessions of the Western Hemisphere,

"exclusive of Canada and Labrador," should the German victory threaten

their surrender or cession. He proposed that the matter be discussed with

Great Britain.5 On 24 June General Marshall, accompanied by Chief of

Naval Operations Stark, presented a joint estimate of the situation to President Roosevelt that reiterated the need for strategic bases in the Caribbean

and Latin American areas. Even at this time the War and Navy Departments did not foresee the need for U.S. bases in Newfoundland or Canada.

With the services pressing for bases on the one hand and Churchill pleading for destroyers on the other, President Roosevelt at the beginning of

August decided to tie the two propositions together. A renewed plea by

Churchill on 31 July for the destroyers gave the President the opportunity to

propose a trade to the British Prime Minister and in addition to seek new

assurances concerning the British Fleet as part of the arrangement. Churchill

responded favorably and expressed a willingness to grant limited rights to

3

 For accounts of negotiations and debates, see Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Ch. II, and Langer and Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation. Ch. XXII. See

also Kittredge Monograph, Vol. I, Sec. II, and Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease: Weapon

for Victory (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944), pp. 33-43. Mr. Churchill's account is

in Their Finest Hour, pp. 24-25, 188-89, and 401-14. 4

 Memo, for Secy Navy, 22 Jul 40, in F. D. R., His Personal Letters, II, 1049. 5

 The quotation is from WPD Memo, 27 May 40, WPD 4175-9, on which General Marshall noted: "Proposed to Mr. Welles in person, GCM." See also Ch. I, above.
164 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

utilize portions of selected air and naval bases.6 On 13 August the President

met with Mr. Welles and Secretaries Stimson, Knox, and Morgenthau and

worked out a detailed plan, which was sent to Churchill, proposing the transfer

of fifty destroyers and other matériel in return for the right to (a) acquire

land by purchase or ninety-nine-year lease for the establishment of bases, and

(b) utilize the bases at once for training purposes and, in event of attack on

the Western Hemisphere, for operational purposes.7 Two days later, on 15

August, Churchill indicated his agreement to ninety-nine-year leases subject

to consultation with Newfoundland and Canada about the Newfoundland

base, in which he said, Canada had an interest.8

The proposals continued to be studied in London and Washington while

the necessary consultations took place. In Washington, some of the President's close advisers again suggested an initial transfer of the destroyers to

Canada rather than directly to the United Kingdom, but Secretary of War

Stimson pushed aside this idea as a discreditable subterfuge. In London, the

Prime Minister discussed the provisions of the arrangement in the Parliament

and with his Cabinet. On 22 August Churchill advised the President that

his government wished to offer the base facilities without strings, and not as

a trade for the destroyers. Since Roosevelt felt he had no authority to give

the destroyers without compensation, discussions continued for a few days

on this point until a formula satisfying both governments was found. The

final agreement, embodied in an exchange of notes on 2 September 1940,

provided that the base rights in Newfoundland and Bermuda were given

"freely and without consideration." The other base rights, in the Caribbean

area, were granted in exchange for the fifty over-age American destroyers.9

Another aspect of the transaction involved the U.S. request for assurances

that, should the waters surrounding the British Isles become untenable, the

British Fleet would in no event be either surrendered or sunk but would be

sent overseas for the defense of other parts of the British Empire. The

Prime Minister had already given such a pledge in Parliament on 4 June, and

he objected initially, for psychological reasons, to a public reiteration.

Nevertheless, since Roosevelt felt that concurrent assurances were a necessary

adjunct to the arrangement, the British gave them by answering in the

6

 Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 33-34; Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 403-06;

Memo, Lothian for Secy State, 8 Aug 40, D/S 811.34544/1-6/12. 7

 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 356; D/S Telg 2316, to London, 13 Aug 40,

D/S 811.34544/1-6/12. 8

 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 406-07. 9

 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 357; Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 408-13.

The exchange of notes is in EAS, 235. According to Secretary of State Hull, the successful

formula was proposed by Green H. Hackworth, his legal adviser.
OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN AREAS 165

affirmative the U.S. inquiry as to whether Churchill's 4 June statement represented "the settled policy of the British Government."

 10

The delivery of the destroyers began at once. British crews took over

the first eight at Halifax on 6 September. The fifty 1,200-ton destroyers

plus ten "Lake" class Coast Guard cutters well suited for escort work were

delivered by 10 April 1941. Shortly after delivery began, it was announced

that six of the destroyers would be commissioned in the Royal Canadian

Navy. Named after rivers along the U.S.-Canadian border (Annapolis, Columbia, St. Croix, St. Clair, St. Francis, and Niagara), they brought the strength

of the Canadian destroyer fleet to thirteen. A seventh destroyer, the Hamilton, was transferred to the Royal Canadian Navy after some service with the

Royal Navy.11

Concerning the bases, the 2 September agreement provided that

a. The Newfoundland bases would be on the southern coast and on

the Avalon Peninsula.

b. The bases would be on land leased for ninety-nine years free from

all rent and charges except for compensation of private property owners.12

c. The exact location and bounds of the bases and the adjustment of

the U.S. jurisdiction within the leased areas with that of the Newfoundland

Government would be worked out by common agreement.

d. The United States would have all the rights and authority, within

the bases and the adjacent waters and airspace, necessary to provide access

thereto, and defense and control thereof.13

Before the exchange of notes, the consultations between London, Ottawa,

St. John's, and Washington had gone into the question of the locations of

the Newfoundland bases. United States service planners had recommended

the lease of existing naval air facilities at Botwood and Gander Lake, naval

facilities at St. John's, and the Newfoundland (Gander) Airport, plus sites

at St. John's, and on the southeast coast for an Army and a Navy base re10

 Department of State Bulletin, September 7, 1940, III, 195. The assurances were sought

by the President to help make the strongest case for the destroyer transfer since he was being

severely criticized by many as having exceeded his authority. Sherwood (Roosevelt and Hopkins,

p. 274) believes that the President considered impeachment to be a possible consequence. Some

of the pro and con views on the transaction are set forth in the following articles in the American Journal of International Law. XXXIV (1940): Edwin Borchard, "The Attorney General's

Opinion in the Exchange of Destroyers for Naval Bases," 690-97; Herbert W. Briggs,

"Neglected Aspects of the Destroyer Deal," 569-87; and Quincy Wright, "The Transfer of

Destroyers to Great Britain," 680-89. 11

 Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 34-36; Schull, The Far Distant Ships, p. 56. 12

 In August 1943 the British Government offered to assume even these costs as a reverse

lend-lease charge, and the offer was accepted. 13

 EAS, 235; Department of State Bulletin, August 14, 1943, IX, 97.
166 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

spectively. As a result of British and Canadian representations, Newfoundland Airport, already garrisoned by a Canadian Army infantry battalion and

an RCAF flight of reconnaissance aircraft, was specifically excluded by President Roosevelt, who instead designated the areas that appeared in the agreement.14

 The Canadian and Newfoundland Governments approved the proposed locations and arrangements, although the Newfoundland Government

actually granted approval on the day after the exchange of notes, 3 September.

By this time a board of U.S. service officers headed by Rear Adm. John

W. Greenslade had been organized to work out with British experts the

exact locations at all the ninety-nine-year-lease base sites. The Greenslade

Board proceeded to Newfoundland, arriving there on 16 September, made its

broad survey, and submitted its recommendations to Vice Adm. Walwyn,

Governor of Newfoundland, on 20 September. It recommended a joint

Army-Navy base on Placentia Bay, naval facilities and an Army base at St.

John's and an air base near Stephenville for staging aircraft through the

Maritime Provinces to eastern Newfoundland. The Greenslade Board also

recommended that the lease agreement authorize the United States to use all

harbors, anchorages, and airfields in Newfoundland. Admiral Walwyn accepted the proposals in principle, with generous reservations to meet British

and Canadian observations that might be forthcoming.15 On the recommendation of the Greenslade Board a team of thirty engineers of the U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers, designated the Newfoundland Engineer District

Office, arrived at St. John's on 13 October to make the detailed hydrographic

and topographic surveys of the designated base sites.

By the beginning of 1941 the surveys, general and detailed, had been

completed in Newfoundland and at all the other base sites, and a team of

U.S. officials proceeded to London to work out the technical aspects of the

leases. The technical discussions began on 25 January. During the ensuing

weeks it was necessary for the negotiators to bridge an initially wide gulf.

The approval of the Lend-Lease Act on 11 March had a beneficial effect on

the negotiations, which were concluded on 27 March by the signing of a

second leased-bases agreement setting forth the details of the leases.16

The agreement granted the United States, inter alia,

a. All the rights, power, and authority within (1) the leased areas

14

 JPC Rpt, 28 Aug 40, sub: Base Sites and Facilities, WPD 4351-5; Memo, SUSAM for

ACofS WPD, 28 Feb 42, WPD 4351-9; Note for Record, 8 Jul 41, PDB 107-17. 15

 Journal, 27 Aug 40 PJBD meeting, PDB 124;Telg, from U. S. Consul General, St. John's

4 Sep 40, D/S 811.34544/14; Rpt, Board of Experts to Secy Navy, 24 Sep 40, WPD 4351-9;

Ltr, to Greenslade, 21 Sep 40, WPD 4351-9. 16

 For an account of these negotiations, see Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the

United States and Its Outposts.
OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN AREAS 167

necessary for the establishment, use, operation, and defense thereof, or appropriate for their control, and (2) the limits of territorial waters and adjacent

airspaces necessary to provide access to and defense of the leased areas, or

appropriate for control thereof.

b. When at war or during other emergency, all such rights, power, and

authority as might be necessary for conducting military operations throughout Newfoundland and surrounding waters or airspaces.

c. Jurisdiction over all persons committing military offenses within the

areas and over non-British subjects committing such offenses outside them.

d. Miscellaneous corollary rights as to the use of public services, conduct of surveys, immigration customs and other duties, postal facilities, and

taxation.

e. The same rights and status for U.S. forces outside the leased areas

under the agreements enjoyed by forces within these areas.

f. The right to acquire such additional areas as necessary for the use and

protection of the bases.17

Pursuant to the 2 September 1940 and 27 March 1941 agreements, the

Commission of Government for Newfoundland on 14 June 1941 leased to

the United States 3,392 acres at Argentia (this parcel was to become Fort

McAndrew and the adjacent naval base); 198.36 acres at Quidi Vidi, adjacent to St. John's (Fort Pepperrell); 27.57 acres at White Hills (near Fort

Pepperrell for a radio tower area); 2.5 acres on St. John's harbor for a U.S.

Army supply dock; and 867 acres at Stephenville (Harmon Field).18

Even before the leases were signed, construction at the Newfoundland

bases had been initiated under authority granted by the United Kingdom on

11 November 1940. As a matter of fact, the U.S. Army, using local labor,

had begun in October the construction of temporary housing, including barracks for 1,000 troops, and of administrative facilities at Fort Pepperrell.

Permanent construction was begun on 30 December 1940 under the direction of the District Engineer. On 8 February 1941 the U.S. Army concluded

a contract with Newfoundland Base Contractors, a company comprising three

U.S. concerns as joint contractors, which assumed the responsibility for the

Fort Pepperrell work on 19 May. Temporary construction was started at

Harmon Field and Fort McAndrew on 10 and 18 March 1941, respectively,

and the Newfoundland Base Contractors took over the work at these bases

on 7 April and 5 May 1941.19

17

 EAS, 235; CTS, 1941, No. 2. 18

 The data in this and the next few paragraphs are from Corps of Engineers, North Atlantic 19

 Ltr, Neville Butler to Knox, 11 Nov 40, Roosevelt Papers Secy's File, Box 59. Division, U. S. Army Bases: Newfoundland.
168 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

The initial plan for the three Army bases called for accommodations for

garrisons of 3,500 troops at Fort Pepperrell, 2,000 at Fort McAndrew, and

250 at Harmon Field where an emergency landing field was to be built.

The cost of the planned housing, auxiliary buildings, and utilities was estimated in 1940 as approximately $28,000,000. In early 1942 the plans were

changed to provide accommodations for 5,500, 7,500, and 2,800 troops respectively, and to include a permanent landing field at Harmon Field comprising three concrete runways 150 feet wide and from 5,000 to 6,000 feet

long. A large part of the augmentation was the result of the decision to retain and utilize the temporary housing that had been constructed. Work

was completed at Fort Pepperrell on 15 March 1943, at Fort McAndrew on

3 March 1943, and at Harmon Field on 1 March 1943. The actual final cost

of construction for the Army bases (including Harmon Field) totaled

$60,300,212.

On 1 September 1943 Harmon Field entered upon a new phase. On

that date the airfield passed to the jurisdiction of the Air Transport Command, which began to use it as a major base for its North Atlantic operations. A new development program was undertaken that lasted through

most of 1944, the principal features of which were construction of two large

hangars and extension of the existing runways. The enlarged base played a

prominent role in Air Transport Command operations.

At Argentia, adjacent to Fort McAndrew, the U.S. Navy Department had

begun construction of a naval air station on 29 December 1940.20 Civilian

contractors completed the air station in early 1942, when the decision was

made to construct a complete naval operating base. Until housing could be

erected for the 1,500 Americans and 4,000 Newfoundlanders who were ultimately to be engaged on this project, the SS Richard Peck, after its arrival on

9 January 1941, had housed some of the former, while the initial local labor

force had lived in fishing schooners anchored in the harbor. In October

1942 a Navy construction battalion was sent to Argentia, and, after an additional battalion had arrived, the civilian contractors were relieved in May

1943. The major facilities developed at Argentia included three airfield runways 5,000 feet long (later lengthened), storage for 15,000,000 gallons of

gasoline and oil, over 2,000 feet of wharf, a 7,000-ton floating dry dock,

hangars, workshops and supply storage buildings, and the housing and other

administrative facilities required for the garrison.

Construction undertakings of such magnitude naturally had a major im20

 For a full account of the development of the U. S. Navy facilities in Newfoundland, see

U. S. Navy Department, Bureau of Yards and Docks, Building the Navy's Bases in World War

II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947), II, 47-54.
OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN AREAS 169

pact on the native Newfoundlanders and their economy. Some effects were

adverse. One early unhappy effect was the need in the fall of 1941 to evacuate the civilians occupying the Harmon Field base to permit runway construction to proceed. Other effects were beneficial. To the limited extent

permitted by the relatively undeveloped state of Newfoundland resources

and industry, materials were procured locally. The projects did provide extensive employment for Newfoundlanders, principally in the common labor

category. At the peak of Army base construction, 82 percent of the workers

were Newfoundlanders. They were paid at lower rates than the Americans,

the pay scales having been established in co-operation with the Newfoundland Commissioner of Public Works and in conformity with the prevailing

local rates. From the contractor's point of view, local labor was less satisfactory than U.S. labor for several reasons. Newfoundlanders were less

skilled, and also made work scheduling difficult through their proclivity for

long week ends and their unwillingness to work during the summer fishing

season and the bad winter weather. Nevertheless, their employment at the

lower pay scales resulted in lower costs for the construction. By August

1941 the rate of additional income for the island was estimated at $3,000,000

per month.

The establishment of the bases and the influx of almost 10,000 Americans brought other problems, too. Difficulties arose in the application of

the jurisdiction and customs and taxes provisions of the bases agreement.

These difficulties were worked out with the Newfoundland Government

Commissioners in good spirit. Some excesses on the part of Americans took

place as well as some price gouging by Newfoundlanders. But on the whole

excellent relationships prevailed. The Americans participated and co-operated in the social and cultural activities of St. John's and established many

friendships with local families. The activities of U.S. Public Health Service

officers, together with those of medical officers of the Canadian and U.S.

forces, contributed to a rise in the general health level, which had suffered

from widespread dietary deficiencies, tuberculosis, and other factors.

As U.S. requirements at the bases became clearer, advantage was taken of

Article XXVII of the 27 March 1941 agreement to obtain additional land

areas through supplemental leases. The negotiations were carried on between Washington, London, and the Newfoundland Government in St.

John's, with Canada playing only a minor and indirect role. A first supplement, filed in early 1941 and signed on 14 July 1942, added 2,142 acres to the

original 4,487. The United States submitted a second supplement providing

for approximately 10,000 additional acres just before the first supplement was

signed. Because of introduction of changes and differences between State
170 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

and War Department officers as to the scope of the supplement, the U.S. requirement did not become firm until early 1944. Thereafter negotiations

languished for numerous reasons, including criticism by the Newfoundland

Government of the 1 October 1944 ninety-nine-year lease arrangement with

Canada and the postwar uncertainty as to the status of Newfoundland. The

second supplement was finally approved on 21 August 1948. With this approval, wartime negotiations in connection with the leased-bases agreement

ended and no further changes were required.21

Defending Newfoundland

In the pre-Pearl Harbor period when Canada and the United States deployed forces to Newfoundland the troops of both countries became, in

effect, tenants on the territory of a third state. This fact presented some

complications, at least from the U.S. point of view, in the timely establishment of the garrisons and provision of operating facilities. The Canadian

military position in Newfoundland had developed progressively from the

outbreak of the European war until August 1940, when informal but broad

arrangements were worked out by Canadian authorities with the Newfoundland Commission. Under these and the earlier arrangements, Canada had

disposed forces in Newfoundland and had undertaken the construction of

such facilities as were necessary. Since the Canadian forces were stationed

at locations such as Newfoundland Airport and St. John's harbor, where the

major essential installations like runways and docks were already in existence,

they could immediately become operational, and the construction requirements were largely in augmentation of the existing basic facilities.22

21

 With the addition of Newfoundland to Canada as a new province on 1 April 1949, the

provisions of the leased-bases agreement and the supplemental leases were after that date to

become the subject of extensive discussions between Ottawa and Washington. 22

 Subsequent Canadian construction in Newfoundland included a naval base at St. John's

and a subsidiary naval repair base at Bay Bulls, a short distance to the south, the latter on land

leased for ninety-nine years. Title to the St. John's base, which was built at Canadian expense

and administered by the Royal Canadian Navy, was vested in the British Admiralty. Under

the Air Bases Agreement concluded on 17 April 1941, Canada built a fighter base at Torbay,

near St. John's, seaplane bases at Botwood and Gleneagles, and additional facilities at Newfoundland Airport. Under the postwar agreement disposing of the air facilities, Canada transferred control and operation of Botwood, Gleneagles, and Newfoundland Airport to the

Newfoundland Government. Canada was paid one million dollars for the facilities constructed

at Newfoundland Airport, and it retained the right to recapture this base in event of hostilities.

Canada retained title in fee simple to the Torbay fighter base, as had been provided in the April

1941 agreement, with a view to using it as a commercial airport between Canada and Newfoundland. (See CTS, 1946, No. 15, and Heather J. Harvey, Consultation and Co-operation in

the Commonwealth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 373-78). The 1946 postwar disposition ceased to have significance after the union of Newfoundland with Canada on 31

March 1949. Goose Bay Airport, whose construction was undertaken by Canada in August

1941, was covered by arrangements other than the Air Bases Agreement of 1941. The Goose

Bay arrangements are discussed later in this chapter.
OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN AREAS 171

Since President Roosevelt had acquiesced in the Canadian and British requests that none of the available facilities be included within the U.S. leased

areas, the sites leased to the United States were completely undeveloped. In

order to garrison and utilize the leased bases the United States had first to

construct the operational and administrative facilities required. Because of

construction difficulties, the development of the air and naval facilities would

require one to two years or more, thus denying to the United States the

operational use of the bases for that period. Even before the base-agreement

notes had been signed in September 1940, the Permanent Joint Board on

Defense had on 27 August approved its Second Recommendation, which included provisions for construction of facilities for use by U.S. forces that

would be deployed to Newfoundland only when and if circumstances required.

Under these provisions, which accorded with the Canadian concept as to the

need for U.S. forces in Newfoundland, Canada was to undertake to prepare

facilities for forty-eight U.S. patrol seaplanes and seventy-three land planes.23

At the time the Board approved its First Report on 4 October 1940, no

action had been initiated pursuant to the provisions of the Second Recommendation, and it therefore incorporated similar provisions in the report.24

Although the First Report had been approved, action had not yet been taken

toward preparing base facilities when, on 30 November, the Secretary of

War requested that the base sites under negotiation with the United Kingdom be increased to include land adjacent to the Newfoundland Airport for

the purpose of deploying a tactical air group, with a strength of seventythree aircraft, as soon as facilities could be constructed.25

This arrangement was discussed at the Permanent Joint Board meeting

on 17 December 1940, together with the alternative (preferred by Canada)

of having Canada (a) provide the facilities, and (b) allow their use on an

informal basis for operational training. When advised by U.S. Chairman

LaGuardia that this alternative was acceptable, President Roosevelt approved

it and directed the War Department to submit its requirements. The facilities

requirements, submitted to and discussed with RCAF officers in the latter half

of January 1941, comprised twelve hangars, twenty 136-man barracks, and auxiliary construction, the estimated cost of which totaled $4,569,670 (U.S.). The

Canadian authorities estimated that housing for two squadrons would be

available by 1 May 1941 and the balance of the facilities by early autumn.26

23

 Appendix A, below. 24

 Appendix B, below. 25

 Ltr, SW and Secy Navy to President, 30 Jan 41, WPD 4404. 26

 Ibid.; Memo, Bissell to Embick, 26 Dec 40; Ltr, SW to LaGuardia, 17 Jan 41; Ltr, Lt

Col H. L. Clark to ACofS WPD, n.d., reporting on conferences 26-31 Jan 41; all in WPD

4404.
172 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

The circumstances of the actual deployment of U.S. air elements to Newfoundland Airport have already been recited.27

 By autumn 1941, the facilities constructed by Canada for the United States exceeded the requirements

of the U.S. forces actually there. A minor hiatus occurred when Canada expressed a desire to use these surplus facilities until they were needed by the

United States. The latter replied that they could not be made available

since additional forces were being readied for dispatch to the airport and

would require the facilities upon arrival. Nevertheless, according to the

U.S. commander, the RCAF not only converted many such buildings to its

own use but also gave the remaining construction for the United States a

low priority. The Permanent Joint Board at its November meeting considered the situation and acted to rectify it. Having agreed that the international situation made it desirable that the United States reinforce its air garrison at Gander Airport (as Newfoundland Airport had been redesignated),

and having noted that the United States was prepared to do this, the Board

concluded that Canada should make available without delay the completed

facilities that had been constructed for the United States and should expedite

the uncompleted construction. The United States suggested the employment of Army Engineer units to assist in completing the construction, but

the RCAF on the advice of labor experts strongly advised against it, and the

proposal was dropped.28 After Pearl Harbor the discussions became academic, since the new situation resulted in the diversion of the squadron of

B-17B aircraft originally destined for Gander and in the revision of plans for

dispatching additional units to Newfoundland.

In approving the Permanent Joint Board's First Report in the fall of 1940,

Canada had also undertaken to provide facilities in Newfoundland for three

squadrons of U.S. patrol seaplanes. In January 1941 the Board had recommended that the provision of facilities for at least one squadron at Botwood

should be given the most urgent priority. In the following months this

work was initiated, and by the summer of 1941 clearing had been completed

and construction was in progress. Finally, the Board had, in its First Report, indicated that a new fighter base would be required in the vicinity of

St. John's to meet the joint defense needs in Newfoundland. Work had

been begun in the spring of 1941 at Torbay, and by the end of that year the

airport was operational. Canada extended the use of this airport to the

27

 See Ch. IV, above. 28

 Memo, ACofS WPD for SUSAM, 21 Oct 41, PDB 107-9; Ltr, CG NBC to DCofS, 29

Oct 41, PDB 104-5; Journal, 20-21 Nov and 20 Dec 41 PJBD meetings, PDB 124;

Memo/Conv, Moffat and Keenleyside, 12 Aug 41, Moffat Diary. A letter of 25 November

1941 (Heakes to Bissell, PDB 107-9) outlined the measures being taken to make five hangars

available to the U.S. Army by the end of December.
OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN AREAS 173

United States as expedient and necessary as an alternate airport and for

servicing purposes.29

Shortly after Pearl Harbor the U.S. Section of the Permanent Joint Board

asked if the United States could permanently station its own servicing detachment at Torbay. However, in line with the Canadian determination to

retain the predominant role on the Newfoundland defense scene and to limit

the U.S. role, the proposal was coolly received; it was made clear that Canada

did not wish U.S. personnel stationed there. This position was later modified, and in May 1943 the Canadian Government approved U.S. construction

of servicing facilities there, provided that they were placed on land acquired

by Canada and that the contracts were approved by the RCAF. These provisos were apparently not to U.S. liking, for the United States withdrew its

request, citing as the reason (and thereby contradicting a statement on the

subject made one month earlier) the fact that the facilities were no longer a

wartime necessity since the U.S. AAF antisubmarine force in Newfoundland

would be reduced in the near future.30

In the period immediately after Pearl Harbor both Canada and United

States continued to enlarge their garrisons in Newfoundland as the construction of facilities and the availability of forces permitted. Canada augmented

the infantry defenses of each of the RCAF bases by a special airdrome defense platoon equipped with tracked carriers for high mobility. The Canadian Army likewise provided antiaircraft defense for St. John's and for Torbay and Gander Airports and harbor defenses at St. John's, Bell Island, and

Botwood. These augmentations brought the Canadian Army strength to a

1943 peak of approximately 5,700.

During 1942 the U.S. Army added an infantry battalion, four harbor defense artillery batteries, and six antiaircraft gun batteries. Platoons of two

155-mm. guns each were stationed at Harmon Field and Fort McAndrew,

those at the latter site augmenting the two 6-inch gun batteries installed by

the U.S. Navy. The infantry garrison was principally divided between Forts

Pepperrell and McAndrew, with one reinforced company stationed at Harmon.

The U.S. Army garrison (including air units) reached its peak strength of

10,882 in 1943.

A draft agreement negotiated after Pearl Harbor provided that the following U.S. forces might be made available on the call of the commander

of Canada's Atlantic Command upon approval of the Commanding General,

Eastern Defense Command, for reinforcing Newfoundland and the Maritime

29

 Appendix B, below; ABC-22. 30

 Ltr, Bissell to Brant, 30 Dec 41; Ltr, Hickerson to SUSAM, 20 May 42; Ltr, ACofS OPD

to SUSAM, 14 Jun 43; all in PDB 107-3.
174 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Provinces: one composite bombardment group and one pursuit squadron for

Newfoundland and/or Nova Scotia; one infantry division, reinforced and

motorized, and one mobile antiaircraft regiment for eastern Canada.31 Although the agreement was not formally approved, it at least furnished a

planning basis for reinforcing Newfoundland and the Maritime Provinces

should such action become necessary. Some minor local liaison and administrative co-operation was carried out, but there was no significant operational co-operation between Canada and the United States in regard to the

ground and air defense of the Maritime Provinces, or of New England. Pursuant to the Third Recommendation and the First Report of the Permanent

Joint Board, the two countries undertook to develop certain defense and related facilities in this area, including the expansion by Canada of airfields in

the Maritimes, so as to provide for the operations of forty-eight patron seaplanes and a composite wing of 200 land planes. Both countries proceeded

with the execution of appropriate projects, rendering progress reports thereon

at the meetings of the Permanent Joint Board. Insofar as they were planned

for joint use in emergency operations in the Maritimes, the projects never

came into use.

Enemy activity in the immediate vicinity of Newfoundland and its territorial waters never exceeded nuisance proportions. As the German submarine offensive moved closer to North American shores in the spring of

1942, the patrol and bomber aircraft based on Newfoundland began to

assume an increasingly important role in the Battle of the Atlantic, but the

rest of the Newfoundland garrisons were not called upon for an active defense role. As early as the spring of 1942, it was believed that German

submarines not only were using inlets for night surfacing and battery charging but also making reconnaissances of Conception, Placentia, and St.

Georges Bays and adjacent installations. Several attacks on enemy submarines were made by destroyer and aircraft, but no positive successes could

be reported.32

The vulnerability of the city of St. John's was always a source of concern

to the U.S. commander there. The predominantly wooden dwellings and

the congestion of shipping in the harbor and of materials and supplies on the

docks and in adjacent warehouses presented an excellent target for an in31

 Memo, ACofS OPD for SUSAM, 8 Apr 42, PDB 135-2. 32

 It was during this period that German submarines penetrated the mouth of the St. Lawrence River, and, in the five months following May 12, torpedoed 23 ships with the loss of 700

lives and 70,000 tons of shipping. For a full account of these forays, which had a substantial psychological impact on the communities along the river banks, see Jack MacNaught, "The

Battle of the St. Lawrence," Maclean's Magazine, LXII (15 October 1949), 7, 68-70, and (1

November 1949), 22, 47-49.
OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN AREAS 175

cendiary attack. Fortunately an attack never materialized. In March 1942

the enemy fired two torpedoes which detonated on either side of the harbor

entrance. In September and December of the same year a German submarine ventured into Conception Bay and on each occasion sank two ore

boats. A year later, in October 1943, the enemy mined the approaches to

St. John's harbor, presumably by submarine, necessitating minesweeping

operations over a period of several weeks. One of the effects of enemy

activity in adjacent Atlantic waters was the loss through sinkings of construction materials having a value of $550,000 and representing 3 percent

of the materials imported for U.S. construction projects.

In mid-1943, with the beginning of a clear trend toward the reduction

of German capabilities in the vicinity of Newfoundland, both Canada and

the United States began to reduce their garrisons. By the end of 1943, the

U.S. force, which had six months earlier exceeded 10,000, was reduced to

5,000. The major unit withdrawn was the 3d Infantry Regiment. Canada,

too, on a smaller scale, made initial withdrawals reducing the Canadian

Army force from 5,700 to 5,000.

Preparations for the defense of Newfoundland had involved the development and construction of facilities other than the main military bases. As

the U.S. garrisons were established and as base construction got under way

during the early months of 1941, the Canadian and U.S. commanders acting

both unilaterally and jointly carried out reconnaissance of the island. The

reconnaissance indicated additional defense needs that included (a) field

fortifications for the ground garrison, (b) an aircraft warning system, (c) extensive improvement of the Newfoundland Railway, and (d) construction

of a road from St. John's to Argentia.33

During the ensuing months the ground garrisons, both Canadian and

U.S. proceeded to construct the machine gun nests, strong points, and other

field fortifications needed to augment the defense of the principal areas

around St. John's and Conception Bay. Alternate and reserve firing positions for mobile 155-mm. guns were prepared at various possible landing

beaches. In addition, the permanent works necessary for emplacement of

coast defense guns and searchlights, together with the necessary housing,

power, and communications facilities, were built. The United States built

a bombproof command post at Fort McAndrew.

Arrangements between U.S. and Canadian commanders for the establishment of an integrated radar air warning system had to be worked out before

actual construction and installation of the stations could begin. It would

33

 Journal, 29 Jul 41 PJBD meeting, PDB 124.
176 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

155-MM. GUN EMPLACEMENT at Fort McAndrew, Newfoundland, May 1943.

have been sounder to operate a single system as an integrated unit. But

each country desired to operate and control the system, particularly Canada,

which wanted to integrate the system with that for the Maritime Provinces. A

complicating factor was the fact that, by agreement, the air defense of the

north half of the island was a Canadian responsibility, and that of the south

half was a U.S. responsibility. The RCAF considered a nine-station net

necessary, but it could not immediately provide the required equipment. The

United States desired for its purposes a five-station net, of which two stations would be in the RCAF area.34

The Air members of the Permanent Joint Board considered the problem

and on 13 May 1942 agreed that the United States should install and man

its five-station net, with stations at Fogo Island, Cape Bonavista, Cape Spear,

Allans Island, and St. Bride's, until such time as the RCAF could make

Canadian sets available. The RCAF was to install its available sets in what

would make up the balance of the Canadian net. After the installations

were made, the RCAF command's No. 1 Group and the U.S. Newfoundland Base Command each operated independent filter centers and operational

control organizations, with both systems receiving data from all stations on

34

 Journal, 21 Apr 42 PJBD meeting, PDB 124; Memo, SUSAM for ACofS OPD, 30 Mar 42, PDB 123.
OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN AREAS 177

the island.35 By the end of the summer the Canadian radar equipment had

become available, but the U.S. commander, loath to yield operation of his

warning net to the RCAF, requested reconsideration of the arrangement previously worked out. No action was taken and the existing arrangement

continued until the spring of 1944.

The United States in May 1944 expressed a desire to transfer the stations

to Canadian control in order to release U.S. personnel for service in more

active theaters. Acceding to the request, Canada assumed control during

the succeeding few months under an arrangement whereby the U.S. equipment was retained and the United States supplied the spare parts needed.

This arrangement continued throughout the war and into the immediate

postwar period, since the system continued to be useful during the demobilization period for air rescue and movement control purposes.36

Major deficiencies in transportation facilities in Newfoundland were

recognized in the initial surveys of the Greenslade Board in September 1940.

Adequate road and rail nets were lacking, and the existing railroad was reported as having small capacity and needing extensive replacement of rolling

stock and rehabilitation of repair facilities. Although the roadbed of the

707-mile narrow-gauge railroad, which was owned and operated by the Newfoundland Government, was in good condition, its predominantly 50-pound

rail and limited bridge capacities would probably be inadequate for heavy

haulage.37 The scope and condition of the island's transportation facilities

became a matter of early concern, since they not only would be a handicap

during the time the bases were under construction but also would place

definite limitations on the mobility of the defensive garrison.

Early in 1941 steps were initiated in different quarters to improve the

condition of the railroad. In January the general manager of the Newfoundland Railway discussed with the U.S. consul general in St. John's the

possibility of financing the materials and equipment needed under the pending lend-lease legislation as being related to the construction of the air and

naval bases. The U.S. officials who considered the proposal concluded that

a sufficiently broad interpretation of the proposed law would not be

possible.38

35

 Journal, 9 Jun 42 PJBD meeting, PDB 124; Agreement, 12 Sep 42, PDB 123. 36

 Memo, ACofS OPD to CofS, 10 Oct 42; Memo, SUSAM for Cdn Air Member, 15 May

44; both in PDB 123. 37

 Greenslade Rpt, 24 Sep 40, WPD 4351-9. For an account of U. S. Army transportation

difficulties to and within Newfoundland, see Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 9-11. 38

 Ltr, U.S. Consul General, St. John's, to Hickerson, 23 Jan 41; Reply, 15 Feb 41; both in

D/S 740.0011EW 1939/7919-3/9.
178 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

In April 1941 a representative of the Newfoundland Government appeared before the Permanent Joint Board at one of its meetings to outline

the railroad problem and the requirements for its solution. The Board took

cognizance of the importance of the rehabilitation work to adequate supply

of the U.S. bases and forces in agreeing on its Sixteenth Recommendation.

This recommendation called for financial assistance by the United States to

Newfoundland as needed for rehabilitating and augmenting the railroad's

rolling stock by the amount necessary to meet U.S. military requirements.

The rehabilitation requirements were also incorporated into the joint defense

plan, ABC-22, which was being drafted concurrently.39

In approving the Sixteenth Recommendation, President Roosevelt directed the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to work out the financial

arrangements and made $1,250,000 from his emergency fund available for

procurement of the rolling stock for the U.S. Army. During the ensuing

months several surveys were made in which the cost of railroad rehabilitation to be undertaken with U.S. financial assistance was variously estimated

at from $5.5 to $7.0 million (U.S.). Reconstruction Finance Corporation

officials conducted an independent survey and discussed the problem with

the Newfoundland authorities during August 1941. As a result, a U.S. loan

was worked out in principle for $2.1 million, which covered the "absolutely

necessary improvements"—five, new locomotives, 150 cars of various types,

work equipment, and augmentation of repair facilities.40 The formalities

for the loan were completed on 24 November 1941, and the final barrier was

cleared with the enactment by the Newfoundland Government on 4 December of the Railway Loan Act.

By this time the U.S. Army had already procured and delivered for operation by railroad authorities the one hundred flat and tank cars it had agreed

to provide over and above the rolling stock being obtained under the loan.

Title to these cars, and to the five locomotives that were delivered shortly,

was retained by the United States. An additional direct U.S. contribution

to the railroad rehabilitation was the replacement of the 50-pound rail on

the Argentia Branch (supplying Fort McAndrew and the naval base) with

70-pound rail, a project that had been dropped from the curtailed rehabilitation program being financed by the U.S. loan.

Except within the base areas, U.S. forces undertook only one major piece

of highway construction in Newfoundland. Harmon Field in southwestern

Newfoundland was connected with the Avalon Peninsula by the cross-island

39

 Appendix A; Journal, 23 Apr 41 PJBD meeting, PDB 124. 40

 Ltr, President to SW, 23 Apr 41, PDB 117; Ltr, Commissioner of Defense L. E. Emerson

to Hickerson, 23 Aug 41, Department of State Office of Dominion Affairs, PJBD 1941.
OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN AREAS 179

railroad. The Argentia-Fort McAndrew base was connected with St. John's

by both rail and highway, but the fifty-four miles of highway between the

base and Holyrood was inadequate for military purposes. At a meeting of

the Permanent Joint Board on Defense on 30 July 1941, Newfoundland

Defense Commissioner L. E. Emerson discussed with Board members the

highway requirements of Canadian and U.S. forces and possible arrangements for meeting them. Of particular concern to the Newfoundland Government was the maintenance burden being imposed by the heavy military

traffic on the island's roads. At the meeting, the Board adopted its Twentieth Recommendation, embodying arrangements suggested by Emerson,

which in part authorized both Canada and the United States to construct

and maintain such roads as either required. Under the recommendation, the

maintenance of such of the roads as the two countries did not see fit to

maintain was to be a responsibility of the Newfoundland authorities.

Despite the renewed efforts of Newfoundland during the succeeding few

months to get Canada and the United States to accept a greater responsibility for maintenance, the positions of the two countries remained firm.41

Under the arrangements set forth in the Twentieth Recommendation, the

United States proceeded to reconstruct the fifty-four-mile Holyrood-Argentia

highway. In the period 1 May-15 December 1942, fourteen miles of highway was relocated and the road was paved with gravel to a 24-foot width

along its entire length. The improvements allowed the St. John's-Argentia

drive, which formerly required six to eight hours, to be made in two hours.

Communications presented the last major auxiliary facility requirement

outside the base areas. By mid-1941 it was apparent to the U.S. authorities

that the existing wire line, which paralleled the cross-island railroad, would

be inadequate. Even when supplemented by radio networks, the communications were unable to meet the administrative and operational needs of

the garrisons. Of particular importance was adequate communications service for the aircraft warning network.

No action had been initiated before the end of 1941, when winter storms

began to demonstrate the vulnerability of the wire-line system. Two

months of bad weather during January and February 1942 caused extensive

breakdown of the wire lines, but the difficulty was climaxed by the damage

of a "glitter" storm, involving very heavy ice loads. On the main line

some three hundred poles and five hundred cross arms were broken, and

hundreds of wire breaks occurred. Two weeks was required to restore telephone service between St. John's and Argentia.

41

 Appendix A, below; Journal, 30 Jul 41 PJBD meeting, PDB 124; Ltr, Hickerson to Emerson, 21 Nov 41, Department of State Office of Dominion Affairs, PJBD 1941.
180 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

The United States decided to install a telephone cable line adequate to

meet the requirements of the several users—the railroad, local officials and

police, and the military garrisons of Canada and the United States. The

costs were to be borne by the United States, which in turn would be reimbursed on a suitable basis by the users. The telephone cable was expected

to be less vulnerable than wire lines. Using a $3.5-million appropriation

made available for the purpose, the Newfoundland Base Command in June

1942 contracted with the Bell Telephone Company of Canada for installation of a telephone cable line along the Newfoundland Railway between

Whitbourne and Stephenville, the materials to be supplied by the U.S.

Army. This project also included the necessary repeater stations and other

auxiliary features, and an open wire line from Shoal Harbor to the radar

station at Bonavista. Concurrently, a contract was let to the Western

Union Telegraph Company for a smaller project involving the construction

of a telephone cable between Forts Pepperrell and McAndrew at a cost of

$213,000.

In effect, during World War II Newfoundland had two independent sets

of defense installations, each with its own defense garrison and under its

own defense command. Through the media of joint planning and maneuvers, and of co-ordination of operations on the basis of co-operation between

the commanders, a reasonable degree of success was achieved in integrating

the garrisons of the two countries. But it was evidently Canadian policy

to restrict the scope, or at least the character, of the U.S. defense role in

Newfoundland.

Canada's wartime policy toward Newfoundland may have been motivated

by both military and political considerations. To Canadian eyes, Newfoundland was a key element of the Canadian defense problem, in the solution of

which Canada desired to maintain the predominant position. Likewise, with

an eye to the future and a possible revision of the political status of Newfoundland, Canada might naturally be inclined to prevent the development

of a situation in which political association with the United States might

appear more desirable to Newfoundlanders than other possible courses, such

as joining the Canadian Confederation. During the World War II and

postwar years, a significant amount of consideration was given by Newfoundlanders in public discussion and the local press to the desirability of

political association with the United States as a possible solution to the

problem of Newfoundland's political status. To many, this solution

promised a brighter economic future than other solutions such as association with Canada. Any encouragement by U.S. officials would probably

have increased the sentiment favoring a link to Washington. No such
OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN AREAS 181

encouragement was offered, and, in consequence of this attitude, Newfoundland became increasingly interested in union with Canada, which saw this

step as politically and strategically desirable.

North Atlantic Ferry Operations

One of the major missions of the air bases in Newfoundland was that

of supporting the ferrying of aircraft across the Atlantic from North America

to the European battle zones. Throughout the war years an ever-increasing

number of airplanes staged through these and other bases in eastern Canada

and the North Atlantic to help meet the requirements of the Allied air

forces. At its full development this operation represented an important

joint U.S.-Canadian contribution to the war effort, for the movement of

aircraft eastward utilized an integrated network of bases constructed and

manned by personnel of both countries.

The first step in building this "Atlantic bridge" was taken in July 1940

when the British Ministry of Aircraft Production arranged with the Canadian Pacific Railway Company for the operation of a ferry service between a

western terminal at Dorval Airport near Montreal and an eastern terminal

at Prestwick, Scotland. Aircraft were to be delivered by civilian pilots to

Dorval from plants of U.S. aircraft manufacturers in California. The first

delivery, seven Lockheed Hudsons, took place on 11 November 1940, and

involved a 2,100-mile hop from Newfoundland Airport to the United Kingdom. By February 1941 Boeing Flying Fortresses (B-17's) and Consolidated

Liberators (B-24's) were also being flown over the route.42

On 15 July 1941 the ferrying operation was taken over by the British

Ministry of Aircraft Production itself through its ATFERO (Atlantic ferrying organization), and the Canadian Pacific Railway agreement was terminated. At this time 59 percent of the pilots were American, 10 percent

Canadian, and 28 percent British. ATFERO was short-lived, for on 1

August the responsibility was assumed by the Royal Air Force Ferry Command, which had been established on 20 July.

United States participation in the ferrying of aircraft produced for the

United Kingdom began shortly after approval of the initial lend-lease appropriations on 27 April 1941. In early May 1941 U.S. Army Air Corps and

British officials discussed a plan for U.S. assumption of the transcontinental

portion of the ferrying. The arrangement appealed to the Air Corps since it

would provide additional training opportunities in the coast-to-coast operation of the latest types of aircraft. The British anticipated a reduction in

42

 More detailed accounts of the ferrying operations are to be found in Craven and Cate

(eds.), Plans and Early Operations, and Great Britain, Central Office of Information, Atlantic

Bridge (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1945).
182 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

the cost of delivery of the aircraft and the release of large numbers of civilian ferry pilots who could then be employed on the transatlantic leg of the

delivery route. On 28 May President Roosevelt assigned to the War Department the responsibility for delivery of lend-lease aircraft to the point of

ultimate take-off from the United States for the United Kingdom. The

next day, 29 May, the Air Corps Ferrying Command came into existence by

an order that was formalized on 5 June.43 In the six months preceding

Pearl Harbor, the command ferried 1,350 aircraft to the eastern seaboard for

further movement by air or water, financing these operations with over

$60,000,000 from lend-lease funds. The scope of the ferrying operation was

enlarged during the pre-Pearl Harbor period by a Presidential directive of

3 October 1941, which authorized delivery to any territory within the

Western Hemisphere, and by one of 24 November, which expanded the

delivery authority "to such other places ... as may be necessary to carry

out the lend-lease program."

 44

Several months before the United States began actively to participate in

the transatlantic ferrying operation, the U.S. Army had conducted preparatory studies and discussed the airfield requirements of an expanded operation

with British and Canadian officials. It had concluded that additional bases

would be needed to permit the ferrying of short-range aircraft, and that because of congestion at the Newfoundland Airport other facilities would have

to be provided for long-range aircraft.

Short-range aircraft were to be ferried to the United Kingdom over a

route through Greenland and Iceland. In Iceland, the British had constructed airfields at Reykjavik and Kaldaharnes after they established a garrison there in 1940. In Greenland, owing to British and Canadian interest

in 1940 and early 1941 in airfields for ferrying operations, the United States

proceeded to garrison the island and develop air bases.45 Construction was

begun in Greenland in early July 1941 at Narsarssuak, near Julianehaab, on

an airfield having the code designation BLUIE WEST ONE (simplified to

BW-1), and in late September 1941 on BW-8 on the Søndre Strømfjord.

The need for airfield facilities to augment those at Newfoundland Airport was first examined by U.S. and Canadian authorities at an Ottawa

meeting on 20 March 1941. Canada was asked to survey Labrador for possible sites for staging fields near the village of North West River and also

43

 Army Air Forces, Air Transport Command, Administrative History of the Ferrying Command, 29 May 1941-30 June 1942, pp. 2-8; Ltr, President to SW, 28 May 41, Roosevelt Papers,

Secy's File, Box 74. 44

 Administrative History of the Ferrying Command, 29 May 1941-30 June 1942, pp. 58-59. 45

 See Ch. VI, above. On Iceland, additional air-base development was carried out by the

U.S. armed forces after their arrival there.
OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN AREAS 183

at points farther north. The United States authorities expressed a readiness

to undertake surveys as well as development of bases. Canadian authorities

after subsequent discussion undertook to make the survey for a site in the

vicinity of North West River, Labrador. The United States received

authority to make, and concurrently initiated, its own surveys, which it

wished to extend northward for possible sites at Hebron, Labrador, and on

Baffin Island.46

The U.S. surveys were made by a party headed by Capt. Elliott Roosevelt, son of the President and intelligence officer of the 21st Reconnaissance

Squadron based at Newfoundland Airport. Its mission was to locate a site

in the vicinity of North West River, as well as sites in northern Labrador

and on Baffin Island. The latter sites, together with a site to be located in

eastern Greenland, would complete the ferry route for short-range aircraft.

In late June, after several weeks' search, the Canadian survey party, under

Eric Fry of the Dominion Geodetic Survey, located an eminently suitable

airfield site near North West River. On 1 July Captain Roosevelt located

the same site and reconnoitered it from the air. The two parties joined at

a suitable landing site some distance away and proceeded on foot for a joint

ground survey on 4 July 1941.47 Both parties then returned and rendered

favorable reports.

In mid-July the United States proposed, in a letter from Mayor LaGuardia

to Colonel Biggar, that an airfield be constructed at once at the North West

River site (later designated Goose Bay), and obtained British service support

in Washington for urgent action on the proposal. On 28 July word was

received in Washington that the RCAF had concluded that development

of an airfield would not be possible that summer. The United States then

offered aid as a means of expediting construction, and the North West River

airfield project was further discussed on 29 July at the meeting of the Permanent Joint Board. As a result, the Board approved its Seventeenth Recommendation, which called upon Canada urgently to construct an air base

and auxiliary facilities near North West River. If Canada were unable to

do so, construction by the United States was to be arranged.48 The Cabinet

War Committee approved the recommendation on 13 August 1941.

46

 Minutes of Conference, WPD 4173-80; Memo for Record, Conference With General

Arnold on 17 Jun 41, WPD 4173-77; Memo, ACofS WPD for SUSAM, 23 Jun 41, WPD

4506-4. 47

 Ltr, Capt Elliott Roosevelt to TAG, 6 Jul 41, WPD 4506-10. For an account of how

the data from a 1935 timber survey led Fry to this site, see Kenneth Wright, "How Goose Bay

Was Discovered," The Beaver, Outfit 277 (June 1946), pp. 42-45. 48

 Appendix A, below; Journal PJBD meetings 29 Jun and 10-11 Nov 41, PDB 124; Ltr,

Maj Gen H. H. Arnold to Air Marshall A. T. Harris, 17 Jul 41, and Reply, 28 Jul 41, both

in WPD 4506-4.
184 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

The Canadians worked rapidly to get construction of the Goose

Bay base under way. Detailed surveys were completed by 20 August, a

contract was let in early September by the Department of Transport to a

Canadian contractor, and the first ship arrived at the site on 19 September.

Work was pressed on a twenty-four-hour basis. By 16 November three

7,000-foot runways could receive aircraft, and the following month the airfield was in use. With the closing of the water navigation season, the U.S.

Army Air Forces furnished an airplane for transport of materials to the site

to permit construction to continue through the winter.49

In the meantime, the Roosevelt party had continued its surveys farther

north. During the last half July 1941, potential airfield sites were found at

Fort Chimo in the Province of Quebec and at upper Frobisher Bay

and Cumberland Sound on Baffin Island. Padloping Island was later substituted for Cumberland Sound.50

 The United States soon concluded that

the season was too far advanced to undertake airfield construction, but it

requested and received, on 22 August, Canadian approval for the establishment of weather stations at the three sites. On 20 September 1941 a ship

carrying the weather detachments and construction materials left New York

for the three sites, which received the code designations CRYSTAL I (Fort

Chimo), CRYSTAL II (upper Frobisher Bay), and CRYSTAL III (Padloping

Island). The detachments reached their destinations in October and by the

end of the year had constructed the necessary shelter and facilities and were

in operation.51

The early months of 1942 found major difficulties developing in connection with North Atlantic ferrying operations. As a result of U.S. entry into

the war, plans were being laid for the movement of large numbers of tactical

aircraft in formations to the United Kingdom. Then, too, the mounting

tide of defense production was making increasing numbers of aircraft available for delivery to Great Britain. As if to compound the congestion that

would result at Gander and Torbay Airports, spring thaws would render

the Goose Bay runways unusable until they could be stabilized or paved for

year-round use. Additional, suitably spaced airfields were still needed to

permit ferrying of short-range aircraft.

49

 For an account of the development of the base, which was designated Goose Bay, see

"Stepping Stone to Europe," Canada at War, No. 25 (Jun 43), pp. 3-6. An unofficial account

by the senior Royal Canadian Navy officer stationed at the base is to be found in William G.

Carr, Checkmate to the North (Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1945). 50

 On 9 August, during the Atlantic Conference at Argentia, the development of these sites

as a short-range ferry route was discussed by the President with General Arnold, Captain Roosevelt, and other officers. 51

 Journal, 9 Sep 41 PJBD meeting, PDB 124; Arnold, Global Mission, p. 250. An account

of the difficulties encountered in transporting materials to those sites is contained in Bykofsky

and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 11-13.
OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN AREAS 185

MAYOR FIORELLO H. LAGUARDIA (second from left) in Newfoundland, September

1942. With him are Hon. L. E. Emerson (left), Brigadier G. P. Vanier, and Capt.

Harry DeWolfe (far right).

The Permanent Joint Board discussed the problem of additional staging

airfield requirements at its 27 April and 26-27 May 1942 meetings. At the

first of these meetings, the Canadian Section suggested, tentatively and subject to further study, that Canada would be prepared to develop an airfield

at Fort Chimo and perhaps at other sites. By the time of the second of the

two meetings the War Department had approved a detailed plan, later designated the CRIMSON Project, which the Senior U.S. Army Member outlined

to the Canadian Section on 27 May. The Board then recessed to permit its

thorough examination.52

52

 The ebullient LaGuardia reported to the President on the meeting: "I consider this meeting the most important we have had . . . . The plan itself challenges imagination. It is so

gigantic and dramatic. It took our Canadian colleagues by surprise and frankly they have not

yet recovered." (Ltr, 28 May 42, Roosevelt Papers, Official File 4090.) A Canadian appraisal

of the task had been informally given the U.S. minister a few days earlier by C. D. Howe, who

thought that the United States was underestimating the difficulties, such as the long nights

and high winds, involved in constructing and operating a base such as the one proposed for

Baffin Island. Howe indicated that he would be unwilling to accept such a responsibility for

Canada for fear that heavy losses would be incurred. (Memo/Conv, 23 May 42, Moffat Diary.)
186 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

The Board on reconvening on 9 June reviewed at length a U.S. AAF

presentation on the future requirements for movements over the North

Atlantic Ferry Route. The increased traffic was seen as reaching, in 1943, a

peak as high as one hundred combat and forty transport aircraft each day.

To meet these requirements, a series of airfields 400 to 500 miles apart along

three alternate routes was proposed:53

a. Eastern route—Fort Chimo, Baffin Island, east coast of Greenland,

and Iceland.

b. Western route—Regina, The Pas, Churchill, Southampton Island,

thence joining the eastern route at Baffin Island.

c. Central route—Moose Factory, Richmond Gulf, thence joining the

eastern route at Baffin Island.

The airfields proposed would not only be adequate to meet foreseeable

immediate requirements and provide alternate routes for flexibility to overcome adverse weather conditions but would also be suitable for expansion

to meet increased requirements that might arise.

The Permanent Joint Board, after concluding that the aircraft to be

ferried over the proposed routes might have a decisive effect in shortening

the war, approved its Twenty-sixth Recommendation, calling for the construction by Canada and the United States of nine air bases in Canada and

Greenland. The recommendation specified that all existing airfield facilities

for ferrying aircraft located in Canada and Newfoundland, including Labrador, were to be considered a part of the project and increased in capacity

wherever necessary. Each country was to bear the costs of the airfields it

undertook to construct, but all the facilities in Canada were to become the

property of Canada six months after the end of the war.54

While the two governments were considering the recommendation, the

Combined Chiefs of Staff also studied the proposals, the shipping requirements of which would have an impact on those for the build-up of forces in

the United Kingdom for the invasion of the European continent. The impact was so great that a Combined Chiefs of Staff committee recommended

in mid-June that the project be rejected unless it could be acceptably modified. On 2 July the Combined Chiefs of Staff were able to approve a

modified plan requiring water movement of only half the tonnage of the

earlier plan. The new plan called for three permanent airfields—at The Pas,

Churchill, and Southampton Island — and for airfields with snow-compacted

53

 Journal, PDB 124; U.S. AAF, Appreciation of the North Atlantic Ferry Routes, 6 Jun 42,

appended to the journal. 54

 Appendix A, below; Appreciation of the North Atlantic Ferry Routes, cited n.53.
OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN AREAS 187

runways, for winter use only, at CRYSTAL I, CRYSTAL II or III, and on the

east coast of Greenland. The curtailment involved elimination of the central route and of one airfield on Baffin Island and substitution of winter

airfields for permanent airfields at three of the remaining sites.55

By the time the Permanent Joint Board on Defense met on 6 July 1942,

both governments had approved the Twenty-sixth Recommendation. A

week later the Canadian Government reported that, in light of its construction commitments at Goose Bay and elsewhere in Newfoundland and Canada,

it could undertake to construct and defend only the airfield at The Pas.56

Within the U.S. War Department a special North Atlantic Ferry Route

Project Committee, established on 3 June, was at work on an urgent construction program under a directive from the Chief of Staff that the CRIMSON Project "must be thought of in terms of weeks and not years."

Although by the latter part of August substantial cargo unloadings were

taking place at the airfield sites, the committee found the problem of water

transportation and its limitations to be one of the major handicaps to rapid

construction. Ice conditions permitted vessels to reach CRYSTAL I (Fort

Chimo) only between 10 August and 1 October. Open water was available

for a slightly shorter period at CRYSTAL II (upper Frobisher Bay). CRYSTAL

III (Padloping Island) was open to shipping only about one month. In

varying but usually lesser degrees, a similar handicap was met at all the other

sites, including Goose Bay. Where the necessary supplies and equipment

could not be landed during the open-water season, the limited capabilities

of aerial supply presented the only alternative.

By the end of 1942 remarkable progress on the CRIMSON Project had

been made. A civilian contractor under the Canadian Department of Transport had completed a usable 200- by 400-foot snow-compacted runway at

The Pas, and two more runways were partially cleared. Housing was 80

percent complete. A U.S. civilian contractor on 1 December took over the

work initiated at Churchill on 12 August by U.S. Engineer troops (the 330th

Engineer General Service Regiment), and by the end of 1942 a 160-

by 6,000-foot concrete runway had been completed, while the grading of two

additional runways was more than half finished. Progress at Fort Chimo,

Southampton Island, and Frobisher Bay, which were not served by railroads,

was slower. Work under U.S. civilian contractors began in late August on

all three bases. By 1 January 1943 usable but unpaved runways were available at the three sites and housing was about 50 percent complete.

55

 CCS 81, 14 Jun 42; CCS 81/1, 28 Jun 42, approved 2 Jul 42; Minutes, 30th CCS meeting; Journal, 6 Jul 42 PJBD meeting, PDB 124. 56

 Journals, PDB 124.
188 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

During 1942 additional facilities were added to the CRIMSON Project.

To meet the need for an emergency airfield between Presque Isle, Maine, the

principal U.S. "jump-off" point for the eastern route, and Goose Bay, the

United States on 20 October 1942 requested permission to construct a field

at Mingan, Quebec. The possibility that the RCAF base at Seven Islands,

eighty miles westward, might meet the need was discussed, and a CanadianU.S. team made a joint survey of the Mingan site. A conclusion in favor

of a separate airfield on the direct route was reached, and on 30 October the

United States was notified of the approval granted two days earlier by the

Cabinet War Committee. The U.S. Army awarded a contract for the work

to the McNamara Construction Company, Limited, a Canadian contractor

that had released personnel and equipment from the work completed at

Goose Bay.57

At the Goose Bay base some additional facilities were constructed during

the summer and fall of 1942. In April 1942 when a small U.S. detachment

had been installed at Goose Bay, it shared the facilities constructed for the

RCAF, and minor frictions inevitably developed. To eliminate these frictions, the U.S. garrison sought authority to construct a separate establishment on the opposite side of the airfield. The Canadian Government

approved the U.S. request in July, and in November the U.S. garrison,

which numbered 325 by the end of the year, moved into its new facilities.

In constructing the new facilities, the main elements of which comprised

three hangars and housing for 1,000 permanent and 1,200 transient personnel, the U.S. Army Engineer authorities charged with the task had

employed the Canadian contractors then at work at Goose Bay.58

Canada provided the local defenses for the Goose Bay base, and by March

1943 a Canadian Army garrison of 1,300 was stationed there for that purpose. Three concrete runways, all 200 feet wide by approximately 6,000 feet

long, were constructed, together with comparable appurtenant installations,

making the Goose Bay base one of the major bases in the area.

The Goose Bay air base enjoyed a special status among the northeastern

North American defense installations. Canada, in accordance with the

Seventeenth Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board, had undertaken

the construction of the base. In March 1942, as a result of the 1940 and

1941 understandings on defense between Canada and Newfoundland, it had 57

 Ltr, Moffat to Secy State, 31 Oct 42, PDB 105-2. See Table 7, below, p. 324, for the

amounts expended by Canada and the United States on the CRIMSON bases. 58

 Journal, 6 Jul 42 PJBD meeting, PDB 124.

With the construction of separate facilities, a large degree of co-operation prevailed between

Canadian and U.S. forces at Goose Bay. It extended to official functions, such as the sharing

of control tower and radio direction finder and similar facilities, and to unofficial functions, such

as the exchange of groups of entertainers and athletic activities.
OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN AREAS 189

officially become an RCAF station, on which the U.S. and British detachments were tenants. The Canadian Government in late 1941 had initiated

steps to obtain a long-term lease for the base, and discussions with the Newfoundland Government took place over a period of almost three years. On

10 October 1944, a ninety-nine-year lease agreement between the two governments dating from 1 September 1941 was signed at St. John's.59

 It provided

that the facilities at Goose Bay would be available for use by U.S. and

United Kingdom aircraft "for the duration of the war and for such time

thereafter as the Governments agree to be necessary or advisable in the

interests of common defense." The provisions of the lease were, on the

whole, not as far reaching as the U.S.-United Kingdom lease agreement.

One significant difference was that the Goose Bay lease provided that the

laws of Newfoundland would remain applicable within the leased area.60

In the spring of 1943 changing conditions had caused the War Department planners to reappraise the requirements for the ferrying route. Largely

because of the greatly increased range of aircraft and the improved situation

in connection with water transportation of aircraft, there was virtually no

need for the western ferrying route, and the need for eastern-route airfields

had also diminished. At the 6-7 May 1943 meeting of the Permanent Joint

Board, the U.S. Section proposed that

a. The airfields at Churchill, Southampton Island, and The Pas be

turned over to Canada.

b. The programs at Mingan, Fort Chimo, and Frobisher Bay be

expanded to develop these bases more fully as emergency airfields.

c. Meteorological services be curtailed.

d. Canada assume defense responsibility for the base at Southampton

Island.61

The U.S. proposals were discussed at the May and July meetings of the

Board, after which the U.S. Section submitted a modified proposal on 29

July 1943. Under the proposal, which was approved by the Canadian Government, the United States retained the caretaker and defense responsibility

for the installations until the end of hostilities.62 Construction programs at

59

 Canada at War, No. 25 (Jun 43), pp. 3-6. The State Department, which was surprised

when it learned of the negotiations in October 1943, after they had been in progress for about

two years, was apparently .unenthusiastic about receiving treatment similar to that given Canada

during the negotiations leading up to the March 1941 Newfoundland base agreement signed

in London. (D/S Telg 100, to Ottawa, 26 Oct 43, D/S 842.7962/111.) 60

 CTS, 1944, No. 30. 61

 Journals, PDB 124. 62

 Ltr, SUSAM to Keenleyside, and Reply, 8 Sep 43, PDB 150-1. The air bases at

Churchill and The Pas were actually transferred to Canadian control before V-J Day. (See Ch.

XI, below.)
190 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

the sites were meanwhile curtailed, and only the work already under way

was completed at Churchill and Southampton Island. At Mingan, Fort

Chimo, and Frobisher Bay, the expanded programs provided for the paving

of runways that were originally only to be graded.

The development of the air-base system required the parallel creation of

a far-flung network of weather and communications stations, of particular

importance in northern Canada and over the North Atlantic because of the

hazards to flying and to maintenance of communications presented by the

arctic and subarctic weather phenomena. The arrival on 9 March 1941 of a

weather and communications detachment at Gander Airport had preceded

by two months the establishment of the first U.S. air unit in Newfoundland.

Even at that early date, the implications for peacetime weather forecasting

were appreciated and occasioned some discussion as to the proper role of the

U.S. weather services. In April 1941 Canada suggested, through diplomatic

channels, that consultations be held among the civilian and service agencies

concerned with a view to co-ordinating weather services. At the continuous

urging of the Canadian Controller of Meteorological Services over the next

two months, an arrangement was worked out under which the Canadian

station at Gander Airport provided the official forecasting services for the

garrisons of both countries.63

The Canadian reluctance to permit the U.S. military to operate a fullscale weather service in Canada and Newfoundland next manifested itself

in August 1941 when the United States requested authority to establish the

CRYSTAL weather stations. After some discussion as to the scope and details

of the U.S. request, Canada granted the authority on 22 August, reserving

the right to replace the three U.S. stations with Canadian stations when it

was in a position to do so.64

A greatly expanded meteorological network was needed for the CRIMSON

Project, and under the Twenty-sixth Recommendation of the Permanent

Joint Board on Defense the two countries agreed to collaborate in providing

it. The requirements for additional service, as presented in a U.S. plan of

7 September 1942, exceeded Canadian capabilities, and on 17 October Canada

authorized the United States to establish weather stations at the following

points:65

63

 Army Air Forces, History of the Army Air Forces Weather Service, III (1941-1943), 212-18. 64

 Ott Leg Desp 1867, 22 Aug 41, D/S 811.9243/27. An account of the early development of the U.S. communications and weather services in Newfoundland and Canada is found

in Louis Shores, Highways in the Sky: The Story of the AACS (New York: Barnes & Noble,

1947), pp. 33ff., 51ff. 65

 List, U.S. Defense Projects in Canada, 6 May 43, PDB 150-1.
OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN AREAS 191

Coral Harbour Cape Dorset, Hudson's Herchmer

Amadjuak Lake Bay Company Repulse Bay

Northern Indian Lake Churchill Winter Outpost

East Hope Lake, Hud- Nueltin Post York Bayson's Bay Company Baker Lake Etawney Lake

Padloping Island Douglas Harbour Thicket

Bowman Bay Cormoran Tavani

Lake Harbour, Hud- Eskimo Point Stanley

son's Bay Company Sandy Lake Rat River

Le Pensie Cape Low Wager Bay

Ilford Sherridon Nuwata

The curtailment of the CRIMSON Project in 1943 produced a corresponding reduction in the meteorological program, most of which had not been

put into effect. By an exchange of letters in mid-1943, the authorization for

a meteorological network was withdrawn except for the following stations

which had actually been put into operation or were still considered necessary: observing and forecasting stations at The Pas, Churchill, Coral Harbour,

Frobisher Bay, and Fort Chimo; observing stations at Brochet, Duck Lake,

Eskimo Point, Gillam, Hudson Bay Junction, Island Falls, Lake Harbour,

River Clyde, Wabowden, Mecatina, and Padloping Island; and additional

stations at Foxe Basin, Indian House Lake, Stillwater Lake, and York Bay.66

Throughout the war the North Atlantic Ferry Route bases in Newfoundland, including Labrador, and in eastern Canada made possible a large flow

of aircraft to the United Kingdom and Europe. Initially, this flow involved

principally the delivery of aircraft from the factories of Canada and the

United States to the fighting units of the pre-Pearl Harbor Allied Powers.

Aircraft deliveries to the United Kingdom via this route increased each year—

26 in 1940, 722 in 1941, 1,163 in 1942, and 1,450 in 1943. The 1943 figure

was part of a total of 3,280 aircraft ferried for delivery in Europe. The total

increased in 1944 to 8,641.67

With U.S. entry into the war, the ferry route had assumed a new strategic

importance in the staging of U.S. tactical units to the United Kingdom in

the preparatory build-up for the planned operations against the European

continent. The earliest movements took place in June 1942, when fighter

aircraft of the U.S. Eighth Air Force staged from Presque Isle, Maine, to the

66

 Exchange of Ltrs, SUSAM and Keenleyside, 23 Jul-7 Aug 43, PDB 150-1. The existing

AAF network, in addition, included stations in Labrador at Hebron and Cape Harrison which

were not covered by the exchange with Canada. 67

 Great Britain, Central Office of Information, Atlantic Bridge, p. 30; Army Air Forces, Air

Transport Command, History of the North Atlantic Division, II (1 Jan 43-1 Apr 44), 131.

Additional deliveries were of course made by water transportation and via other air routes.
192 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

United Kingdom via Gander or Goose Bay and Greenland and Iceland. By

the end of 1942, 920 aircraft had attempted the crossing and 882 had reached

their destinations.68

The air transport operations of the Air Transport Command, which had

their beginnings in 1942, in 1943 reached major proportions. A fleet of some

thirty-five four-engine and thirteen two-engine aircraft, mostly operated by

civilian contract carriers, during 1943 carried over 7,600 tons of cargo eastward and 2,200 tons westward, in addition to 15,235 passengers. After 1 September 1943 the transatlantic operations were staged principally through

Harmon Field at Stephenville, with Gander and Goose Bay Airports used as

alternates. On V-E Day the Air Transport Command's North Atlantic fleet

numbered approximately one hundred four-engine and sixteen two-engine

transports.69

After V-E Day in May 1945, two major movements of aircraft to the

United States from Europe took place over the ferry route. The AAF White

Project, for the return of tactical aircraft for redeployment to other theaters, involved the movement by 15 July of 3,004 aircraft, which incidentally returned

over 50,000 personnel with the loss of only one aircraft and no lives. The

Green Project called for the air transport to the United States of personnel

eligible for discharge from military service. Under this project, in a ninetyday period ending in Mid-September, 160,000 passengers were transported

without a fatality, and by mid-September passengers transported under the

White Project had exceeded 80,000.70

Throughout these movements the major burden was borne by the main

bases at Stephenville, Gander Lake, and Goose Bay, since the increase in

range of tactical, as well as transport, aircraft had eliminated the need for the

intermediate CRIMSON bases except for emergency purposes. During 1943

and 1944 a total of eighty-five and eighty-seven aircraft landings, respectively,

took place at CRYSTAL I (Fort Chimo), and about two-thirds of these landings were the result of Coast Guard PBY (Catalina) ice patrol operations.

CRYSTAL II (upper Frobisher Bay) recorded 323 aircraft arrivals in 1943. At

68

 An authoritative account of these operations is to be found in Samuel Milner, "Establishing the Bolero Ferrying Route," Military Affairs, XI (Winter 1947), 213-22. 69

 History of the North Atlantic Division, II, 308-10, and IV (1 Oct 44-1 Oct 45), 368.

Reginald M. Cleveland, Air Transport at War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946), contains authoritative accounts of the AAF ferrying and air transport operations through the eastern

Canada and North Atlantic air bases. Graphic descriptions of difficulties encountered in these

operations are to be found in Hugh B. Cave, Wings Across the World: The Story of the Air

Transport Command (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1945), Ch. II. 70

 History of the North Atlantic Division, IV, 205, 337. Return of U.S. personnel by water

at the same time was taking place at the rate of 350,000 per month.
OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN AREAS 193

Southampton Island, periods varying from fifty to eighty days occurred during

which no aircraft landed at the air base. An insignificant number of ferry

aircraft passed through these bases, and air supply, aerial photography, and

other miscellaneous operations accounted for most of the aircraft arrivals.71

Sault Sainte Marie

The joint U.S.-Canadian defense plans prepared in 1940 and 1941 paid

scant attention to defenses for North America except for the coastal areas.

It was only in these coastal areas, proximate to the sea power of the enemy

and most likely to be reached by air attack, that the U.S. and Canadian planners

considered that the Axis Powers had capabilities of any consequence for

offensive action. Nevertheless, because of the pressures of public opinion

and legislative clamor, the military in both countries were forced to consider

measures for the defense of interior locations and areas. The defense of some

of these areas, along the U.S.-Canadian boundary, necessitated study and

recommendation by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense.

The major interior defense problem along the boundary was protection of

the locks, canals, and navigation channels of the Saint Marys River, connecting Lakes Superior and Huron. Through the Sault Sainte Marie locks in the

average year passed tonnages exceeding those passing through the Suez,

Panama, and Kiel Canals combined. This inland water movement, which

was concentrated in the eight months of the year during which the channels

were not frozen, was particularly important because it included the transportation of the bulk (90 percent in 1941) of the total iron ore utilized in the

United States, as well as large shipments of grain. If through sabotage or

conventional attack the enemy could have succeeded in stopping movement

of lake traffic through Sault Sainte Marie for a significant portion of the navigable season, major damage might have been done to the Canadian and U.S.

military production programs. The nondelivery of ores would have curtailed

output of steel and iron or, alternately, the movement by rail of the tonnages

of ores involved would have imposed a burden on the already overtaxed rail

transportation systems that could only have disrupted other portions of the

over-all military support programs.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defense took note of the defense problem

as early as 20 January 1941, when it submitted its Thirteenth Recommendation. Approved by the two governments, the recommendation provided

for centralization of responsibility for the safety of navigation in a single

authority in each country. Each authority was to be adequately empowered

71

 Army Air Forces, Air Transport Command, North Atlantic Division, History of CRYSTAL

I, pp. 93-94, and Historical Data: CRYSTAL II, p. 20.
194 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

to co-operate in all the necessary precautionary measures with its counterpart.72

In addition to sabotage, conventional attack was considered a possibility,

however small. Such an attack was usually envisaged as taking the form of

submarine penetration of Hudson and James Bays for the purpose of rendezvous with, and resupply of, seaplanes, which could then easily reach Saint

Marys River. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff appreciated the U.S. concern over

the safety of the locks but felt that the risk of enemy action was slight. Not

long after the Board had taken action, President Roosevelt himself expressed

fears that the Germans would penetrate Hudson Bay by submarine or raider.

Secretary of the Navy Knox was able to reassure him that joint plans for the

defense of the Sault Sainte Marie were in preparation and that Canada was

watching the Hudson Bay area. The Chief of Naval Operations also pointed

out that the Canadians had indicated they would resent any U.S. proposal to

patrol Hudson Bay, which they firmly considered to be Canadian territorial

waters.73

United States entry into the war brought an intensification of interest in

the Sault Sainte Marie defense problem. At the 20 January 1942 Permanent

Joint Board meeting, it was agreed that each country should review the security situation at the canals and the adequacy and state of the defenses. As

a result of the War Department review, the U.S. Section of the Board announced at the next meeting (25-26 February) that a regiment (less one gun

battalion) of antiaircraft artillery, equipped with twelve 90-mm. guns, thirtytwo 37-mm. guns, and twelve .50-caliber machine guns, and a battery of

barrage balloons would be sent to augment canal defense. A general officer

72

 Appendix A, below. 73

 Ltr, to Knox, 23 Apr 41, reproduced in F.D.R., His Personal Letters, II, 1145; Undated

Memorandum of reply from Secy Navy bearing notation "came to file 28 Apr 41," Roosevelt

Papers, Secy's File, Box 77; CNO Memo, for President, 25 Apr 41, same file. Apparently

neither the President's suggestion that naval patrols were needed in Hudson Bay nor other deliberations on the problem developed into an occasion for further examination of the question of

maritime jurisdiction over these waters, which Canada declared in a statute enacted in 1906 to

be Canadian territorial waters. Although the question had not been adjudicated and other countries had not protested the licensing required by the statute, the Department of State privately

indicated in the same year that the United States would not accept such a position. (See Green

H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940) I,

701.) For examinations of the question reaching divergent conclusions, see V. K. Johnston

(who takes the Canadian view), "Canada's Title to Hudson Bay and Hudson Strait," British

Year Book of International Law, XV (1934), 1-20, and Thomas W. Balch, "Is Hudson Bay a

Closed or an Open Sea," American journal of International Law, VI (1912), 409-59, and "The

Hudsonian Sea Is a Great Open Sea." American Journal of International Law, VII (1913), 546-

65. A recent comprehensive study, which examines Canada's Arctic claims in general, including

the Hudson Bay question, is the unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Columbia University, 1952)

by Gordon W. Smith, The Historical and Legal Background of Canada's Arctic Claims.
OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN AREAS 195

was to be placed in command of the Sault Sainte Marie Military District and

charged with the defense responsibility. In addition, Army Engineers were

to take steps to assure prompt repair of any damage.74 The Canadian Section

pointed out that an attack was not possible until mid-July, when the navigation season on Hudson Bay normally opened. At the suggestion of the U.S.

Section, the Board made its Twenty-fifth Recommendation for measures to

complement those already taken by the United States. The recommendation

called for (a) a full RCAF study of enemy capabilities for such attack, (b)

the deployment of a Canadian antiaircraft battery, and (c) the placing of the

Canadian battery under the control of the U.S. military district commander.75

Much progress had been made by the time of the Board meeting on 7-8

April 1942. The Canadian Section reported that organization of the Canadian 40th Antiaircraft Battery (Heavy) for the canal defenses had been

authorized. By midsummer the unit was in place on the Canadian side and

under the operational command of the U.S. military district commander.

Until the latter part of 1942, when its own 3.7-inch guns became available,

the battery used four 90-mm. guns loaned by the United States. Also, the

U.S. Section reported at the same meeting the arrival in the canal area on the

U.S. side of the U.S. 100th Coast Artillery Regiment (Antiaircraft) (less one

battalion) and the 702nd Military Police Battalion for security duty. United

States plans called for the replacement of the military police battalion by the

131st Infantry Regiment, as well as the establishment of a restricted airspace

zone over the canals, which would require clearance in that zone of all aircraft movements and would subject unidentified aircraft to interception. The

Board noted these plans and agreed that an aircraft warning system should

be established at the earliest practicable time with a common system of

operational control.76

The aircraft warning service requirements in Canada were discussed at a

meeting of Canadian and U.S. representatives at Sault Sainte Marie on 5-6

May. The resulting plan for a Central Canada Aircraft Detection Corps was

approved by the Canadian Government, and the organization of the corps

was put under way by the end of May. By 1 September 266 observation posts,

including 215 fire towers plus railway telegraphers and telephone operators,

were functioning. Filter rooms were located at Fort Brady, Ottawa, and

Winnipeg, in addition to a jointly manned information center at the Sault.

By the following summer the system had been expanded to 700 observation

points in Canada, manned by 4,740 observers. During November 1942, an

74

 Journals, PDB 124. 75

 Appendix A, below. 76

 Journals, PDB 214.
196 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

average of 600 flight plans per week were filed, and 400 observer reports were

received.77

Although unable to deploy any fighter aircraft to the Sault Sainte Marie

canal area because of more urgent requirements in coastal zones, the United

States during the summer of 1942 prepared three airfields to receive fighter

aircraft in 1943. In furtherance of arrangements approved by Canada on 7

August 1942, the United States also proceeded to establish five radar stations

in Canada, at Kapuskasing, Cochrane, Hearst, Armstrong, and Nakina. These

stations, along the northernmost route of the Canadian National Railways,

provided a screen across the Province of Ontario between the canals and

Hudson and James Bays. In addition to providing the sites for this U.S.

radar system, Canada also furnished housing facilities for use by portions of

the U.S. garrison in the canal area for upward of 50 officers and 2,000 men.78

The Permanent Joint Board reassessed the Sault Sainte Marie defense

requirements at its July and September 1942 meetings. To Canada, the Sault

canals' defense was not of direct and prime importance. Although the Canadians had earlier agreed to watch the Hudson Bay area, they felt that no special

patrols should be provided in the bays because of higher priority needs and

because existing operations over these waters and Hudson Strait would probably not permit a surface vessel to pass unobserved. Attempt by submarine

would offer considerably greater success of penetrating the bays. But if the

Canadians had no intention of providing special patrols, they did not encourage the United States to do so. The Canadian Section of the Permanent

Joint Board had, in April 1941, made evident a lack of enthusiasm for U.S.

Navy patrols in Hudson Bay, which it regarded as Canadian inshore waters.

It was the U.S. Section, more sensitive to the possibility, however small, of

a Pearl Harbor-type, "long-shot" surprise attack on the canals, that was

usually urging a larger scale of defenses in that area. The U.S. Section finally

accepted the Canadian view that additional naval patrol in the Hudson Bay

would not be justified.79

Similar discussion took place on the question of antiaircraft defense, with

similar considerations involved. The Canadian Section reported the provisions made for antiaircraft defenses at the Sault canals and at the aluminum

plant at Arvida, Province of Quebec. Many other requests for defense of

77

 Journal, 9 Jun 42 PJBD meeting, PDB 124. 78

 Ltr, Air Commodore F. V. Heakes to Douglass, 7 Aug 42, PDB 123-6; the Twentysecond and Twenty-fifth Recommendations were cited by Canada as the basis for the provision

of housing facilities for these units. Canadian Rpt, U.S. Defense Projects in Canada, 6 May

43, PDB 150-1. The radar system, operated by the 671st Signal Aircraft Warning Reporting

Company with headquarters at Kapuskasing, was manned by nearly 1,000 U.S. troops. 79

 Journals, PDB 124.
OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN AREAS 197

similar facilities along the boundary had been made. The Board concluded,

in the light of the small prospect of attack at such points, that assignment

of defenses thereto was not justified.80

As the 1943 navigation season approached, the two countries continued

the development of the defenses for the Sault canals. The German submarine menace in the western Atlantic had not yet reached and passed its

peak, and the possibility of attack, however small, would be greater in 1943

than in 1942. The United States had already, on 29 September 1942, established the Central Air Defense Zone, a belt some 100-150 miles deep on the

U.S. side of the border from the north shore of Lake Superior to 45° north

latitude in Lake Huron. Except for local flights, flight plans were required

for aircraft movements. By the time of the opening of the 1943 navigation

season, Canada had established a prohibited flying zone in Canada with a

radius of 100 miles from the canal locks.81

By the beginning of 1943 the War Department had also developed plans

for the establishment of a military area, pursuant to Executive Order 9066, as

had already been done in the U.S. Eastern and Western Defense Commands.

By proclamation, the commander of such a military area would become responsible for all defense and internal security activities in the area, including

the control of aliens and undesirables, use of radios, codes, and cameras, lighting, and similar activities. The U.S. Section of the Permanent Joint Board

suggested that Canada might wish to take similar action. Joint conferences

between the officials concerned took place over several months. On the U.S.

side, Public Proclamation 1 established the Sault Sainte Marie Military Area

effective 22 March 1943. As to similar action by Canada, the question was

pursued as far as a joint conference at Toronto on 12 April 1943, when the

Canadian conferees presented their conclusions that existing powers were

adequate for attaining comparable objectives in Canada and that the establishment of a similar area in Canada was not necessary.82

With the passage of the 1943 navigation season, the tide of German naval

and air power in the Atlantic, which had already turned, continued to ebb

rapidly. The Sault canal defenses were rapidly dismantled. In November

1943 the Permanent Joint Board approved the disbandment of the aircraft

detection organizations in the area. The Canadian Observer Corps, then

numbering 9,000, was disbanded on 3 January 1944, and the Canadian antiaircraft battery was transferred. In January also, the War Department

initiated the inactivation of the Central Air Defense Zone, the withdrawal of

80

 Journal, 1 Sep 42 PJBD meeting, PDB 124. 81

 WD Unnumbered Circular; Journal, 24-25 Aug 43 PJBD meeting, PDB 124. 82

 Journal, 6-7 May 43 PJBD meeting, PDB 124.
198 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

the radar stations in Canada, and the redeployment of the ground defenses

elsewhere. The security of the canals was left in the hands of the Royal

Canadian Mounted Police on the Canadian side and of a military police

company on the U.S. side.

Apart from the coastal border areas whose defense was provided for in

ABC-22 and the Sault Sainte Marie defense system, only one other border

defense problem of major consequence was considered by Canada and the

United States jointly. Toward the end of 1942 U.S. Eastern Defense Command planners envisaged the need for siting defense installations such as

radar stations and other antiaircraft defenses north of the border in order

adequately to defend the defense command sector. In February 1943 a request was forwarded to Ottawa for authority to make reconnaissances and

deploy antiaircraft weapons on Canadian territory near Buffalo. The Canadian reply expressed concern that such a deployment would inspire numerous

similar demands at other points and suggested that the matter first be discussed in the Board, which had a few months earlier taken a position against

such deployments.83

From the exchange emerged a U.S. request that (a) the Twenty-second

Recommendation be interpreted by the Board as providing authority for

joint planning as well as actual emergency action, and (b) appropriate Canadian authorities join in planning for the defense of the Great Lakes-St.

Lawrence River valley. The Board agreed to this interpretation, subject to

the understanding that such plans would not constitute commitments. On

31 March 1943 Canadian and U.S. officers met at the headquarters of the

Eastern Defense Command in New York City and after discussion reached

some broad but oral understandings. On the basis of these understandings,

Eastern Defense Command planners formulated a plan envisaging a radar

network of twenty-three stations and appropriate interception aircraft units

and headquarters. The plan was to be placed in effect only when frequent

air raids into the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River valley area became a definite

possibility.84 The U. S. plan, based on the joint discussions, was forwarded

in May to Ottawa for review and comment by the Canadian Army and

RCAF staff there. It was never revised. By midsummer of 1943 with

German capabilities becoming weaker the possibility of such air raids became

most unlikely.

83

 Memo, Maj Gen Sanderford Jarman, EDC, for SUSAM, 7 Feb 43, and Reply, 19 Feb 43,

both in PDB 126-7. 84

 Memos, ACofS WPD for SUSAM, 15 Feb and 11 May 43, and Reply, 1 Mar 43, all in

PDB 135-2.
CHAPTER VIII

Activities in Western Canada

Before 7 December 1941 the Canadian and U.S. military effort in North

America reflected an almost complete absorption in the defense problems of

the eastern seaboard. This was a natural consequence of the fact that a

shooting war was in progress in the Atlantic. The Pearl Harbor attack and

the resulting Japanese menace to the west coast and Alaska produced a reorientation of U.S. military effort in North America. Alaska, whose needs

had until then been subordinated to the needs of the Atlantic war and of

advanced Pacific bases, found itself enjoying a much higher priority for U.S.

military resources. Within a matter of months, a substantial reinforcement

of the Alaskan garrison had taken place.

Simultaneously a force of U.S. personnel, both military and civilian, poured

into northwest Canada to build the logistical facilities needed to support the

defense of that quarter of the continent. United States military strenght in

northwest Canada in late 1942 exceeded 15,000, and in the next year, when

some of the troops had been replaced by civilian workers, U.S. civilians alone

exceeded that figure. On 1 June 1943 the total strength of the American

personnel in northwest Canada was over 33,000. In some instances the

United States was able to utilize existing air-base and other facilities, expanded by either or both countries to meet wartime requirements. Other

projects were carved out of the virgin wilderness, in some cases in areas never

before surveyed. It was here in western Canada that the joint U.S.-Canadian

war effort left its biggest and most lasting imprint.

It was in western Canada, too, that joint efforts produced the biggest

administrative headaches. Shortages of men, materials, and machines were

inevitable. Dislocations caused by rapidly changing requirements could not

always be avoided. In order to curb competition for available materials, as

already noted, the Canadian Government incorporated a crown company,

North West Purchasing Limited, on 19 February 1943. Purchases by this

company in northwest Canada to meet the requirements of both Canadian

and U.S. forces amounted to more than one million dollars a month at the

height of construction activity. When the high wage scales paid by U.S.

contractors threatened to undermine Canadian wage and price ceilings, the

Canadian Government on 17 May 1943 established a Western Labor Board
200 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

at Edmonton and invited the United States to name a representative to act

as a special consultant to the board.1

The addition of large numbers of Americans, sometimes less concerned

with the amenities of international and human relations than with the compelling urge to get the job done, to communities already overcrowded could

not help but produce occasional friction and misunderstanding. However,

when the tide of the U.S. influx had receded and the fog of friction and misunderstanding had been dispelled, the solidity of the accomplishments of

Canadians and Americans working side by side in the spirit of friendly

co-operation gave testimony to the relative insignificance of the discordances.

Throughout most of the war the activities in northwest Canada remained

free from any real threat from enemy operations. Except for the planning

and other defense measures, Canadian-U.S. co-operation until the end of 1944

related largely to logistical activities. After the first of the "free" Japanese

balloons was recovered in California on 4 November 1944, Canada and the

United States began to co-operate in measures to meet the new threat. The

balloons, 331⁄2 feet in diameter, carried incendiary and antipersonnel bombs

in suspended baskets. By the war's end, more than 9,000 had been launched

from Honshu Island, although only a small fraction of that number were

known to have reached North America.2 As the flow of balloons increased

in early 1945, full co-ordination between the two countries was established.

Information was exchanged in the field on sightings and recoveries, and U.S.

military officers at conferences attended by Canadian representatives examined

the problem and arranged countermeasures. On the Washington-Ottawa

level, too, a full exchange of operational and technical intelligence was maintained, as a part of which the results of the extensive U.S. studies of the

balloon equipment were made available to Canada.

The Northwest Staging Route

Of the major wartime logistical projects in northwest Canada, only the

Northwest Staging Route was a joint one in the sense chat it was developed

through the full and active participation and co-operation of the two governments. Unlike the Alaska Highway, the Canol Project, and other projects

undertaken after Pearl Harbor, the staging route owed its initial development

to Canadian initiative and foresight.3 Since the early 1920's bush pilots had 1

 H. C. Debates, 21 Mar 44, p. 1701; Lingard and Trotter, Canada in World Affairs, III, 72;

Privy Council 3870, 17 May 43. See also Ch. V, above. 2

 Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts, Ch. III. 3

 The fullest public account of the development of this route is to be found in the historical

monograph, History of the Northwest Air Route to Alaska: 1942-1945, which is in the files

of the Headquarters, Military Air Transport Service. This official monograph was completed by

Maj. Edwin R. Carr and submitted by him to the University of Minnesota as a doctoral dissertation under the title "Great Falls to Nome: The Inland Air Route to Alaska, 1940-1945."
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA 201

been pioneering airways in the general area, and in 1935 the Canadian Department of Transport initiated a survey of alternate air routes to Alaska. A

partial, if not immediate, object of the survey was to seek an air route that

might one day form part of the great circle route to the Orient. As a result

of the survey, the air route from Edmonton to Alaska was selected as the most

favorable.4

In 1939 detailed engineering work was authorized and airfields were

planned at Grande Prairie, Fort St. John, Fort Nelson, Watson Lake, and

Whitehorse. At the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, survey

parties were in the field. In view of the airfield construction that would

thereafter be required for the RCAF training program, Ottawa gave some

consideration to terminating the surveys. The Canadians concluded that upon

U.S. entry into the war, which was a possibility, this air route would attain

real strategic importance and the surveys should therefore be pushed to completion. When the surveys were completed in January 1940, the preparation

of detailed plans and specifications was initiated in Ottawa.5

The next steps in the development of the air route were not taken until

after the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, when the

United States began to show an interest in the project. The several drafts

of the 1940 defense plan, beginning with the very first joint draft prepared

by the service members of the Board on 11 September 1940, stated that, in

order to execute essential defense tasks, the additional installations that would

be needed included aircraft staging facilities between Alaska and the United

States.6

 On 4 October 1940 the Board itself, in approving its First Report

to the two governments, recommended that Canada develop these facilities as

soon as possible.7

The First Report was under consideration and had already received Canadian but not U.S. approval when, at the request of its Canadian chairman,

Colonel Biggar, the Board was briefed on the Canadian development plans

by Squadron Leader A. D. McLean, who earlier as a civilian had been the

Canadian Superintendent of Airways. At this meeting, held at Victoria,

British Columbia, on 14 November 1940, the Board adopted its Tenth Recommendation, which stated that Canada should provide, as soon as possible,

airfields at specified locations and essential facilities to permit rapid move4

 H. C. Debates, 29 Feb 44, p. 979. For fuller accounts of the pre-Pearl Harbor development of the route, see J. A. Wilson, "Northwest Passage by Air," Canadian Geographical Journal, XXVI (March 1943), 107-29, and Lingard and Trotter, Canada in World Affairs, III, 30-

34, 73-74. 5

 Wilson, op. cit., p. 123n. 6

 Draft Plans at PDB 133-3, -5, and -7. 7

 Appendix B, below.
202 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

ment of tactical aircraft to Alaska and northwestern Canada. In addition to

the airfields on the staging route to Alaska, the recommendation called for

airfields at Prince George and Smithers to facilitate reinforcement of the

Prince Rupert-Ketchikan area.8 The Canadian Government approved the

project and on 18 December 1940 released funds for it.

Moves into the field to initiate work on the airfields began on 9 February

1941. The movement of machines and supplies to some of the selected sites

was no small task. Whitehorse, Grande Prairie, and Fort St. John, all at or

near rail facilities, posed no problem. Materials moved to Fort Nelson from

Dawson Creek over a 300-mile frozen winter trail by tractor trains. Materials for Watson Lake moved by steamship to Wrangell, Alaska, thence by

boat via the Stikine River to Telegraph Creek, by portage over seventy miles

to Dease Lake, and by boat on the Dease River to Lower Post. From the

last point they moved over a newly constructed road to Watson Lake.

The Permanent Joint Board on 29 July 1941 in adopting its Nineteenth

Recommendation took steps to spur construction. The changed situation in

the Far East, the recommendation stated, made early completion of the route

a matter of extreme importance. As a result, the tasks of clearing, grading,

and paving the runways were pressed during the 1941 summer construction

season. Work advanced most rapidly at Whitehorse, where an airfield had

already existed, and at Grande Prairie. By the end of the construction season

the airway to Whitehorse was usable by daylight in good weather. Radio

range stations were in operation at 200-mile intervals from Edmonton to the

Alaska boundary by the end of the year.9

In Alaska, too, where in 1940 only the airfields at Anchorage, Fairbanks,

Juneau, and Nome (on a limited basis) were suitable for military use, the

U.S. Civil Aeronautics Authority pushed an airfield program intended to meet

military as well as civilian needs. Progress on the Alaskan airfields and the

extensions of the staging route was not entirely satisfactory because of difficulties of transportation and operations on the frozen ground. But by the

end of 1941 runways had been completed at Nome, Big Delta, Northway,

and Juneau; runways were under construction but usable at Gulkana, Bethel,

Cordova, Galena, McGrath, and Naknek. In addition, the Alaska Defense

Command had improved its fields at Anchorage and Fairbanks and had constructed new ones at Yakutat and Annette Island.

After the Pearl Harbor attack the staging route was sufficiently far advanced to permit its use, and Canada extended the use of its facilities to the

United States. In early January 1942 the 11th Pursuit (twenty-five P-40 air8

 Appendix A, below. 9

 "Canada's Northern Airfields," The Canada Year Book, 1945, p. 706. Pages 705-12 of

this volume contain a brief account of the wartime development of all of the northern airfields.
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA 203

craft) and 77th Bombardment (thirteen B-26 aircraft) Squadrons were dispatched to Alaska. A month after their dispatch, thirteen P-40's had arrived, five were still en route, and the rest had crashed; only eight of the

B-26's arrived, the balance also crashing at points en route. Causes contributing to this performance were inadequate training of personnel for the

winter weather conditions encountered and the limited scale of airway facilities available on the route. The AAF elements en route to Alaska found the

route as a whole "usable under optimum conditions," but, since such conditions had not been prevalent during the winter of 1941-42, they made the

journey only with considerable difficulty.10 Throughout the same winter

Canada continued the movement of supplies and further developed the route.

During the early months of 1942 a small flow of U.S. tactical aircraft continued to Alaska, and a military transport aircraft began regular supply operations between Edmonton and Fairbanks. To augment the limited military

transport operations, the AAF turned to the use of commercial airlines on a

contract basis, and during the remainder of 1942 contract operations constituted

the major U.S. use of the Northwest Staging Route.11

In order to clarify the U.S. need for buildings and facilities on the Canadian, portion of the Northwest Staging Route, initial discussions took place

in Ottawa between representatives of the two governments on 11-12 March

1942. Short-term (thirty-day) as well as longer-term needs were discussed on

a general basis and were then submitted in detail to the Canadian authorities

in early April. Under the arrangements made, the Department of Transport

was to construct hangars for use by the AAF at Edmonton and Whitehorse,

and barracks, fuel storage, and miscellaneous facilities at all the main airfields, while the AAF would assist in the movement of personnel and materials. Meetings in Ottawa on 10 April reviewed and gave approval to the

arrangements.12

New methods for financing Canadian construction for U.S. use, which

had been discussed informally in Washington on 3 March at a meeting between C. D. Howe and Brig. Gen. Robert Olds, came under consideration

at the 10 April meeting. Heretofore, Canada had been financing all construction costs on the Canadian portion of the Northwest Staging Route under

an arrangement whereby each country took care of the work within its own

territory.13 The Canadian authorities indicated that Canada would in the 10

 See Craven and Cate (eds.), Plans and Early Operations, pp. 303-04, 357. 11

 A full account of these contract air services and of the lengthy U.S.-Canadian discussions

relating thereto will be found in Chapter XI, below. 12

 History of the Northwest Air Route to Alaska, 1942-1945, pp. 105-07. 13

 H. C. Debates, 25 Feb 41, p. 1016; Carr, Great Falls to Nome: The Inland Air Route to

Alaska, 1940-1945, p. 109. The United States had already taken cognizance in the exchange

of notes on the Alaska Highway (EAS, 246; CTS, 1942, No. 13) of the contribution to overall continental defense by such Canadian expenditures.
204 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

future want payment from the United States for certain of the construction

to be performed by Canada. The actual decision, taken by the Cabinet War

Committee on 22 April, provided that Canada would pay for facilities of continuing value to the route, while the United States should pay for such facilities as were over and above Canadian standards and requirements and needed

solely for U.S. military purposes. Regardless of the source of financing, title

to all improvements was to be retained by Canada.14

Not long afterward, in June 1942, the Japanese penetration of Alaskan

defenses brought the staging route into spectacular play. On 3-4 June a

Japanese carrier task force attacked Dutch Harbor, and on 9 June it became

known that the Japanese had occupied Kiska. To speed urgently needed

troop reinforcements and supplies to Alaskan bases, the War Department on

13 June requested eleven U.S. commercial airlines to rush every aircraft that

could be made available to Edmonton. Over the next few weeks an emergency airlift of almost fifty aircraft operated around the clock to deliver men

and materials to Alaska. Many of the aircraft available were also used to

some extent for airlifting materials with which to speed up the work on the

Northwest Staging Route.15 With the emergency over, the more routine air

transport operations of the U.S. Army expanded in northwest Canada.

During the first half of 1942 no subordinate field command of the Air

Corps Ferrying Command was charged with responsibility for the conduct

of transport operations over the Northwest Staging Route. The need for

such a step was apparent, and on 16 June the Domestic Wing was charged

with the conduct of U.S. ferrying operations. Since the U.S. organization in

the field was to be manned by 15 July, personnel movements began at once

and detachments arrived at Edmonton and Whitehorse before the end of

June. As a consequence of the reorganization of the Air Corps Ferrying

Command into the Air Transport Command, and of the completion of plans

for ferrying aircraft to Siberia, a new headquarters at Great Falls, Montana—

the Northwest Route, Ferrying Division—was established on 14 August

1942. On 17 October in a further organizational change, the Alaskan Wing

of the Air Transport Command was activated at Edmonton and assumed the

transport responsibility on 1 November, superseding the headquarters at

Great Falls. Although further minor organizational changes occurred, the

basic pattern remained unchanged and the Alaskan Wing proceeded to

14

 Alaskan Division, Historical Record Report, Nov 42-Dec 43 volume, p. 220; The Canada

Year Book, 1945, p. 708. 15

 Accounts of the emergency operation are to be found in Craven and Cate (eds.), Plans

and Early Operations, p. 358; Cleveland, Air Transport at War, pp. 163-66; and Cave, Wings

Across the World, pp. 116-19.
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA 205

expand to a strength of 1,231 on 1 January 1943, and to a peak of 9,987 in

November 1944.

In midsummer 1942 the Army Air Forces was expressing dissatisfaction

with the progress of the construction work on U.S. facilities in Canada. At

the end of April construction of U.S. facilities had not been started, and a

month later little progress toward completion of the thirty-day program had

been reported. On 25 June representatives of the two countries met and

revised the construction requirements to reflect the new program for ferrying

aircraft to the USSR and agreed that both the new and the earlier construction programs should be completed by the end of August. Only two weeks

later, on 9 July 1942, Mr. Wilson of the Department of Transport acknowledged that it was doubtful whether even the revised programs could be

completed as scheduled.16

There were many factors that contributed to the lack of progress.

Among them were insufficient transportation and the shortage of competent

labor. The need to refer plans to Ottawa, which made U.S. officers chafe,

occasioned delays. Overoptimistic or unrealistic construction schedules also

appear to have contributed to the situation. Time-consuming organizational

and procedural complexities added greatly to delays.17 Alterations in construction requirements may also have been a factor—for example, U.S. needs at

Lethbridge and Calgary, stated on 26 August, were canceled three weeks

later. As a matter of fact, the U.S. planners had great difficulty in estimating future needs for aircraft movements over the route. Estimates in 1942

ran as high as 5,000 aircraft per month, in contrast with the planning figures

of from 250 to 300 used in May 1943. During the year 1943 a monthly

average of over 440 aircraft actually traversed the route.

The War Department would have liked to carry out its own construction

program on the Northwest Staging Route, but since it was precluded from

doing so by the policy announced in March 1942 by the then Minister of

Transport, C. D. Howe, that it was "in the highest degree desirable

that . . . [construction of additional facilities needed by the United States]

should be undertaken by the Department of Transport rather than by the

United States Government," it sought other means to speed up the work.18

On 25 July 1942 at a conference in Great Falls, Montana, Canadian authorities considered and rejected as impracticable the use of three labor shifts or

of overtime work because of the predominance of middle-aged men in the

16

 History of the Northwest Air Route to Alaska: 1942-1945, p. 108; Ltr, to U. S. Military

Attache, 9 Jul 42, reproduced in Alaskan Division, Historical Record Report, II, 42. 17

 See above, pp. 131-41. 18

 Ltr, to Brig Gen Olds, 7 Mar 42, PDB 126.
206 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

labor force. The U.S. representatives urged that U.S. Army Engineer troops

be used. Canada granted authority in August, and U.S. Engineer troops

were assigned to the projects. However, because of protests from labor

groups, the troops were withdrawn from the projects the same month. In

September, when the strength of the Canadian civilian labor force had fallen

off considerably, the U.S. Engineer troops were put back on the construction work, only to draw additional protests and be withdrawn.19

During these same months the War Department did obtain authority

to construct a number of airstrips, in addition to those on the staging route,

as an adjunct to the military highway being constructed. There is some

evidence that this program was an effort on the part of the AAF to overcome the unsatisfactory situation on the staging route. About 1 June 1942

the U.S. Public Roads Administration, which was preparing to undertake

construction tasks on the Alaska Highway, suggested that plans be included

for flight strips patterned on a similar program under way along many highways in the United States. In requesting approval of the project, the AAF

suggested that the flight strips "would permit the movement of Air Transport Command equipment on a much more dependable basis than . . . [has

been] possible with the . . . [existing] system of airports."

 20

 Canada

agreed, on 10 September, to the formal request of 26 August 1942 for the

construction of eight flight strips by the United States at points along the

Alaska Highway:

 21

Mile

Number Point Number

1 Dawson Creek.................................... . 0

2 Sikanni Chief River.............................. . 137

3 Prophet River. .................................. . 245

4 Liard River. ..................................... . 508

5 Pine Lake....................................... . 723

6 Squanga Lake.................................... . 843

7 Pon Lake........................................ . 1,013

8 Burwash........................................ . 1,095

19

 History of the Northwest Air Route to Alaska: 1942-1945, pp. 114-15.

This situation aptly exemplified the disparity between the manpower situations of the two

countries. Canada, in its fourth year of war, was already plagued by a tight manpower situation occasioned by the requirements of the armed forces, industry, agriculture, and merchant

marine. The United States, which in 1942 could pour the flower of its youth into Canada, was

not until 1944 faced with manpower difficulties and even then on a lesser scale. The resultant

political climate in Canada was not improved by the unwillingness of the Canadian Government

to introduce conscription for fear of a repetition of the unhappy experience in World War I,

when violent opposition arose in French-Canadian Quebec and elsewhere. 20

 Memo, for CG SOS, 29 Jul 42, Exhibit 4 in Appendix E, House Committee on Roads,

79th Congress, 2d Session, House Report 1705, on House Resolution 255, The Alaska Highway, p. 98. 21

 EAS, 381; CTS, 1942, No. 26; House Report 1705, 79th Congress, 2d Session, p. 100.
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA 207

The flight strips were not to prove of appreciable value to the Air Transport Command as an augmentation of Northwest Staging Route facilities.

Because all available construction facilities were being used to push completion of the Alaska Highway, work on the flight strips was begun during

1942 at only one site, Dawson Creek, in late September. The first plane

landed on the cleared and graded strip on 29 October, but more work remained to be done in 1943. Work on the other sites did not begin until

the late summer and autumn of 1943, by which time the highway had been

substantially completed. Flight strips 3, 5, and 6 were completed by the

end of 1943, and 2, 4, 7, and 8 were completed in early 1944.

The American Construction Phase

United States dissatisfaction with the progress of construction continued

throughout 1942, and by the beginning of 1943 the Commanding General,

Army Air Forces, felt that drastic action was necessary to improve the

"deplorable" condition of the staging route. He recommended that, in order

to prevent serious delays in movement of aircraft to and through Alaska, the

U.S. Army take over completion of the work being done by Canada to meet

U.S. needs. Maj. Gen. Guy V. Henry, newly appointed Senior U.S. Army

Member of the Permanent Joint Board, proceeded cautiously in acting on

the request and first sought elaboration of the purported difficulties.22

On 12 February 1943 the U.S. Government informally proposed that the

United States take over certain unfinished construction at Edmonton, Grande

Prairie, Fort St. John, Fort Nelson, Watson Lake, and Whitehorse (Plan A)

and be authorized to construct additional facilities at Edmonton and Whitehorse (Plan B). The preliminary Canadian reaction was favorable and included the suggestions that the proposal would be strengthened if the Permanent Joint Board endorsed it, and that a meeting should be held to work

out the details.23

Meetings of representatives of the RCAF, AAF, and Department of

Transport took place in Ottawa on 18, 19, and 20 February. The labor

problems arising from the shortage of labor, the competition between Canadian and U.S. contractors, and the different rates paid Canadian and U.S.

laborers played a prominent part in the discussions. The conferees agreed

that the Department of Transport should complete construction already

under way with assistance from U.S. Engineer troops wherever practicable.

This included the work at the five original staging route airfields and

22

 Ltr, CG AAF to SUSAM, 7 Jan 43, and Ltr, CG ATC to SUSAM, 5 Feb 43, both in

PDB 105-13. 23

 Memo/Conv, Hickerson and Clark, 13 Feb 43, PDB 105-13.
208 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

FLIGHT STRIPS AT THE WATSON LAKE AIRPORT constructed by U.S. Army Engineers.

Edmonton, and at certain intermediate strips and facilities that Canada had

undertaken to construct at Snag, Aishihik, Teslin, Smith River, Beatton

River, and Calgary. Subject to approval of detailed plans and to certain

conditions as to the use of U.S. labor, the United States was to be authorized to execute the Plan B construction at Whitehorse and Edmonton.

During the meetings the U.S. representatives outlined tentative additional

requirements (Plan C) emerging from plans being developed for the defeat

of Japan. These requirements included an expansion of facilities at Whitehorse, Watson Lake, Fort Nelson, Fort St. John, Grande Prairie, and a new

airfield at Namao, near Edmonton, to relieve possible congestion at the

Edmonton airfield. The conferees agreed that subject to similar conditions

the United States could initiate the additional construction, even the development of new airfields.24

The Permanent Joint Board on Defense at its 24-25 February 1943

meeting considered the recommendations of the conferees and adopted the

Twenty-ninth Recommendation, which substantially embodied them.25

24

 Minutes of meetings and joint recommendation, 20 Feb 43, by the senior conferees to the

PJBD, PDB 105-13. 25

 Appendix A, below.
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA 209

President Roosevelt approved the Board recommendation on 1 April, but

Canadian action was not immediately forthcoming. In addition to pondering the question of whether to depart from the policy of having Canada

accomplish all work on the Northwest Staging Route, the Canadian Government was engaged in studies and discussions designed to clarify the intergovernmental procedures for processing project requests, co-ordinating

activities, and solving labor and similar problems.

On 27 April the newly designated commanding officer of the Air Transport

Command's Alaskan Wing, Col. D. V. Gaffney, met with Department of

Transport officers in Ottawa and stated that because of changes made in

U.S. development plans, his requirements were being restudied and a revised

program would be submitted in place of the one then under discussion.26

On 18 May 1943, with Canadian approval not yet given to the Twentyninth Recommendation, Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Robins of the U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers met in Ottawa with C. D. Howe, Minister of Munitions

and Supply. They worked out an understanding under which the United

States was to take over the work already initiated by Canada on Plan B and

at other sites, to continue to utilize the contractors already on the job, and

to add others to permit faster execution of the work.27 The United States

on 24 May submitted its proposals to Canada for formal approval, at the

same time indicating the possible need for considerable additional expansion

of the facilities.

The formal Canadian reply to the U.S. proposals, received on 3 June,

appeared to counter the understandings reached at the May meeting since it

approved the projects but specified that all work of a permanent character

would continue to be done by the Canadian Government using Canadian

labor.28 Somewhat dismayed by the apparent change in policy and concerned over its impact on the supplementary Plan C, which had been

developed and awaited submission to the Canadian Government, the U.S.

authorities sought informally to clarify the situation. They were advised

that some confusion within the Canadian Government was the cause of the

reversal, and that the matter could probably be straightened out during consideration of the new Plan C.

The United States on 11 June 1943 submitted the new plan to Canada

for approval, and the Cabinet War Committee on 18 June approved it subject to the following provisions:

a. All unfinished construction under Plans A, B, and C, except in the

26

 Minutes of meeting, PDB 105-13. 27

 Minutes of meeting, PDB 111-12. 28

 Ltr, Keenleyside to Clark, 3 Jun 43, PDB 105-13.
210 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Edmonton area, could be completed with U.S. labor. Canadian contractors

and labor on such work were to be withdrawn.

b. The United States could complete the work in the Edmonton area,

but could use only Canadian contractors and Canadian labor.29

The Canadian Government officially notified the United States of the approval on 22 June and a few days later modified the first provision to exclude

the work Canada was carrying out at Beatton River, Smith River, Teslin,

Aishihik, and Snag, since the projects at these intermediate facilities were

almost complete.30 Except for the limitations on construction work in the

Edmonton area, the revised authority conformed to the understandings

reached at the 18 May meeting. On the U.S. side, the authorities were willing to give the modified arrangement a trial to see if the solution was

adequate.31

The tentative departure from the 18 May understandings had apparently

been the result of confusion compounded with Canadian reluctance to turn

over construction tasks to the United States. There were a number of reasons for the Canadian position. First, although the bulk of the unfinished

work was on Plan B projects, over and above the basic U.S. requirements, a

transfer of the construction responsibility might make it appear that Canada

had failed in its undertakings. Second, Canada naturally preferred to do all

permanent work itself and thereby maintain full control rather than risk

any trend toward the establishment of a vested U.S. interest. Nevertheless,

Canada, when convinced that its construction capabilities were not equal to

the expanded requirements for facilities at all points on the staging route,

was ready to agree to the use of U.S. troops and labor except in the Edmonton area. In this area the labor situation in general and wages and other

difficulties inherent in the operations of Canadian and U.S. contractors side

by side were especially complicated. This remaining exception was a logical

outgrowth of the local political and economic situation and, in the light of

the release of Canadian contractors from other airfields, did no violence to

the time limits for the work to be done in the Edmonton area.32

The Canadian Government took other concurrent action to help insure

that the new arrangement would not allow the United States to intrude unduly upon Canadian sovereignty. On 7 July 1943 the Cabinet War Committee decided that the Canadian Government should (a) take over all 29

 Ltrs, Clark to Hickerson, and Keenleyside to Clark, 22 Jun 43, both in PDB 105-13. 30

 Ibid.; Ltr, Keenleyside to Clark, 26 Jun 43, PDB 105-13. 31

 Memo, Robins for Hickerson, 26 Jun 43, D/S 811.24542/51-1/2. 32

 Ltr, Clark to Hickerson, 22 Jun 43, PDB 105-13. For a discussion of criticism in Canada

of the government's failure to undertake even greater construction responsibilities than it had,

see Lingard and Trotter, Canada in World Affairs, III, 72.
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA 211

existing leases for land used by the U.S. Government, (b) assume the costs

of all properties acquired for the United States and make the properties

available without charge for the duration of the war, and (c) acquire any

additional land required for U.S. Government use. The decision was communicated to U.S. officials in Ottawa on 7 September.33

The Canadian Government, having virtually completed the program of

construction to meet the basic Canadian and U.S. requirements at the main

airfields of the Northwest Staging Route, closed out its contracts and withdrew its construction forces on 12 July 1943. United States Army Engineers

undertook a further program of expansion and development of the airfields

to meet the increasing volume of air traffic. The major task of this program was the construction of the satellite field at Namao, seven miles north

of Edmonton, the contract for which was let to a Canadian company.34

With the exception of the completion of work at a few intermediate facilities, construction at the six existing main airfields and at Namao continued

throughout the remainder of 1943 under U.S. Army control. In general,

Plan C, which had been reduced in scope, included repair and expansion of

runways, taxiways, and parking aprons and the construction of housing and

service and other facilities necessary to raise the capacity of the route to 100

transport and 350 ferried aircraft per month. By the end of the year the

work was substantially complete, except at Namao, where the development

had started from scratch.

In early 1944 the Air Transport Command desired to expand the capacity

of the staging route to 110 transport and 425 ferried aircraft per month.

For this purpose, and to provide adequate accommodations for the necessary

increase in personnel, a Plan D was advanced and Canadian approval was

requested. Construction under the plan consisted of items such as warehouses, gas stations, turnarounds, and warm-up aprons. In addition, approval was requested for a program of repairs to the runways of the main

airfields of the route. 3 5

These requests reached the Canadian Government shortly after it had

33

 Privy Council 6998, 7 Sep 43. The U.S. officials were able to report in March 1944 that

the arrangements were acceptable. (D/S Desp 241, to Ott, 10 Mar 44, D/S 811.24542/76;

Privy Council 3869, 23 May 44.) The mechanics of transfer of existing leaseholds and of acquisition of new ones were worked out with U.S. Army representatives at a meeting in Ottawa

on 20 October 1944. The conclusions of the meeting, which provided that Canada would

assume the payment of rentals dating from 7 September 1943, were formalized in an exchange

of notes on 28 and 30 December 1944. (CTS, 1944, No. 34.) Apparently the notes were not

published by the Department of State in its Treaties and Other International Acts Series. 34

 Canada, Wartime Information Board, Defense Projects in Northwest Canada (Ottawa: 1944,

mimeographed), p. 2. 35

 Ltrs, SUSAM to Cdn Air Member, PJBD, 17 Jan 44, 14 and 21 Feb 44, OPD 580.82

Can (27 Jan 44).
212 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

again revised its policies with regard to the facilities on the staging route.

On 18 December 1943 Canada had notified the United States of its decision

to finance all work of permanent value on the northwest route, which embraced work done by or at the request of the United States on items that

had originally been considered to be over and above Canadian standards and

requirements.36 The Canadian Government had also decided to reinstitute

the use of Canadian contractors and labor in future development work. Its

reply to the U.S. requests, while approving the projects, specified that all

future construction of a permanent nature would be done by the Canadian

Government not only at its expense but also through use of Canadian contractors and labor to the fullest extent possible.37

Canada apparently considered the U.S. requests a practicable opportunity

to achieve several ends. First, it could re-establish more complete control

over the development of the airfields, an objective that was politically desirable for the work to be done at Canadian expense. Second, it could

insure employment for Canadian contractors and labor as they were being

released from other projects. Too, the execution by Canada of the additional projects would provide useful experience for the postwar development

of civil aviation in Canada.

The War Department sought reconsideration of the Canadian reply on

the grounds that, since the change-over to Canadian labor would involve

loss of at least two months, only prompt action would prevent the airports

from being inoperative during the coming summer. Canada reaffirmed its

position, although it authorized the United States to complete all work at

Whitehorse and Fort St. John.38

With the United States at least officially resigned to the new arrangements, the Northwest Service Command found their implementation not

entirely to its liking. When that headquarters learned that the design

specifications for the repair and rehabilitation work had been changed by the

Canadian Department of Transport, it requested opportunity to review and

analyze them, citing prior Canadian agreement to consult on any changes

that were made to the U.S. plans. On analyzing the Department of Transport specifications, the U.S. Army Engineers took issue with the Canadian

plans for work at all four airfields — Grande Prairie, Fort Nelson, Watson

Lake, and Edmonton. The report of the U.S. analysis criticized the tech36

 EAS, 405; CTS, 1944, No. 19. The policy was announced by Canada on 29 February 1944.

(H. C. Debates, p. 980.) For data on the expenditures by each country on Northwest Staging

Route improvements, see Chapter XII, below. 37

 Ltr, Cdn Air Member, PJBD to SUSAM, 17 Mar 44, OPD 580.82 Can (27 Jan 44). 38

 Ltr, Atherton to Department of External Affairs, 28 Mar 44, and Reply, 3 Apr 44, PDB

105-27.
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA 213

nical adequacy of the proposed rehabilitation designs and forecast runway

failures at three of the sites.39

As it turned out, the dire consequences of a change-over to Canadian

responsibility predicted by the War Department for the summer of 1944

failed to materialize to the extent of having a serious impact on flight operations, although the technical discussions as to design criteria for the rehabilitation work by Canada at the four airports continued to the end of 1944 and

into the spring of 1945. On V-E Day arrangements were in hand for completion of field tests for evaluation of the design criteria, but with the

arrival of V-J Day the matter was dropped.

The initial conception of and much of the construction on the Northwest Staging Route were Canadian accomplishments, and only the programs

of construction at the main airfields executed from July 1943 into 1944, plus

some temporary and limited permanent construction thereafter, were undertaken by the United States. But the U.S. construction programs carried

out during the one working season comprised a substantial portion of the

total construction at the main bases. United States expenditures on the

staging route project of approximately $40 million were about twice the

amount of Canadian expenditures on the route during the wartime period.

That so much construction could be carried out in the one season was the

result of careful planning during the preceding months and of the mobilization of extraordinary resources. The use of construction facilities on a lavish

scale was to some extent uneconomical, and therefore the two-to-one ratio

of expenditures does not accurately measure the relative accomplishments.

Nor does this ratio reflect the handicaps suffered by the Canadians in the

earlier years because of the severely limited transportation facilities available.40

 The eight flight strips proposed originally as adjuncts to the Alaska

Highway and built by the United States came in practice to fill the need for

emergency and alternate landing fields on the staging route. Except for

these flight strips and minor construction at the Calgary and Prince George

airfields, all facilities supplemental to the main airfields were also developed

by Canada.

The wartime construction of another air route in northwest Canada was,

on the other hand, almost entirely a U.S.-sponsored contribution to the

expansion of the airways system of that area. As with the Northwest Staging Route, U.S. expenditures for improvements of lasting value were repaid

by Canada. The development of this route, the Mackenzie River air route,

39

 Ltr, CG NWSC to Foster, 4 May 44, and Ltr, SUSAM to Cdn Air Member, PJBD, 20

Sep 44, PDB 105-27. 40

 For details of expenditures by both countries, see Table 7, below, p. 324.
214 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

began in September 1942 soon after the initiation of the Canol Project and

the construction of facilities for the operation of the water route from

Waterways to Norman Wells.

The project was born in a slight fog of misunderstanding. Col. Theodore Wyman, the U.S. Army commander of the Canol Project, initiated the

construction of fourteen landing strips during the summer of 1942 without

having secured specific authorization from the Canadian Government. Upon

learning of the project, the Canadian Government on 17 September asked

about the accuracy of reports that the United States intended to construct

and operate a chain of airports in the area. The inquiry pointed out that

the work had been neither foreseen nor provided for in the diplomatic

agreement covering the Canol Project and that the Canadian Government

had not been officially informed of the project.41

In reply, the United States notified Canada that the fourteen installations

would in fact be only landing strips whose construction was incidental to

the prosecution of the Canol Project. No special authorization had been

considered necessary since it was felt that the original agreement had encompassed essential supply lines and means of communication. The United

States pointed out that special authorization had not been necessary for the

developments on the water route to the Norman Wells airfields, nor had

one been contemplated for the development and use of the winter roads to

the same point. The United States indicated a willingness to arrange an

agreement if one was considered necessary. Apparently the Canadians

accepted the U.S. explanation, for they made no reply and the exchange

of correspondence was later cited as the authority for the project.42

The airstrips formed a route parallel to the water route from Waterways

to Norman Wells. A cutoff from Peace River to Fort Providence paralleled

the winter road from the railhead at the former. All were equipped with

lighting, and six with radio range beacons. The main strips were at Waterways, Fort Smith, Fort Simpson, and Norman Wells. Those at Peace River,

Mills Lake, Wrigley, Embarras, Fort Resolution, Hay River, Fort Providence,

and Camp Canol were essentially for emergency purposes. At Waterways

and Peace River, the existence of landing facilities reduced the work necessary to develop the sites to the required standards. The work of clearing

and grading the strips was for the greater part accomplished by U.S. Army

Engineer troops, although civilian contractors did all or part of the work

at a few of the sites. Little work was done beyond the clearing and grading

41

 Ott Leg Desp 3614, 17 Sep 42, PDB 110-11. 42

 Ltr, Moffat to Keenleyside, 5 Oct 42, PDB 110-11. See below, pp. 228-35.
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA 215

and the installation of minimum flying aids. As a result, the expenditures

at all sites totaled only $1,264,150.

Proposals to develop part of the Mackenzie River air route and extend it

to Fairbanks to provide an alternate air route to Alaska were discussed in

Ottawa at the 18-19 February 1943 meeting called to consider the construction program on the Northwest Staging Route. The new route, called the

Low-level Route, would originate at Fort Nelson and proceed via Fort

Simpson, Wrigley, Norman Wells, Fort Good Hope, Fort McPherson, Old

Crow, and Fort Yukon to Fairbanks. Advantages of the new route were

that it would provide (1) a means of preventing congestion at Whitehorse,

where expansion was limited by physical conditions, (2) an alternate route if

the existing route was interrupted at Whitehorse or some other point in

close proximity to the coast, (3) facilities capable of handling extraordinary

transport operations, (4) alternate weather conditions, and (5) a route for

carrying out night operations, which were virtually impossible in winter on

the existing route.43

The Permanent Joint Board on Defense considered the proposals a few

days later. The Board did not adopt a recommendation on the subject, but

the Canadian Section undertook to obtain governmental approval of the

project.44 The matter dragged until early April, when Canadian authorities

in Washington sought more information on the project. By then it appeared that the Cabinet War Committee, although unenthusiastic about the

project, would probably agree to it. At the same time it became evident on

the U.S. side that the Army Air Forces had made no definite plans for carrying out the project but had only intended that preliminary inquiries be made

of Canada. After re-examining the need for the Low-level Route, the War

Department concluded that the Northwest Staging Route would be able to

handle all requirements. In consequence, the U.S. Section withdrew its

request in the Permanent Joint Board for approval of the project and asked

Canada to postpone indefinitely consideration of it.45 The Canadian Government nevertheless proceeded with a survey of the route with a view to

its possible future development.

Traffic Along the Staging Route

From the U.S. point of view, the Northwest Staging Route provided

facilities serving three main purposes: (a) the movement of tactical aircraft

43

 Minutes, 18-19 Feb 43 PJBD meeting, PDB 105-13; Memo, ATC for SUSAM, 9 Apr 43,

PDB 110-11. 44

 Journal, 24-25 Feb 43 meeting, PDB 124. 45

 Memos, SUSAM for Hickerson, 16 and 19 Apr 43, PDB 110-11; Journal, 6-7 May 1943

PJBD meeting, PDB 124.
216 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

to the defense garrisons in Alaska, (b) the delivery of aircraft for the USSR

at Fairbanks, whence they continued to the Soviet Union via Siberia, and

(c) the administrative and logistical support of the Alaskan garrison and of

the U.S. projects in western Canada. The numbers of aircraft delivered over

the Northwest Staging Route in the first two categories were as follows:46

The great bulk of these aircraft were fighter and other short-range types that

could not have been delivered to Alaska by air in the absence of the staging

airfields.

As is readily apparent from these figures, the movement of aircraft over

the route for ferrying to the USSR represented a much greater operation

than the movement of aircraft to the Alaskan defense garrison. The ferrying arrangement had first been discussed on 4 August 1941, when Secretary

of War Stimson and Soviet Ambassador Constantine Oumansky agreed in

principle on the plan. The Russians were not enthusiastic about use of the

Siberia route, and it was not until March 1942 that a detailed plan was presented. In April President Roosevelt in a personal message urged Premier

Stalin to accept the plan, which he did in July. Under it the Ferrying Division of the Air Transport Command delivered the aircraft to a Soviet detachment at Ladd Field, Fairbanks, Alaska. There Russian pilots tested and

accepted the aircraft and then staged them through Nome into Siberia.

The first aircraft were delivered to Soviet representatives in Fairbanks on 4

September. Pilots to fly the aircraft away did not arrive until 24 September.

Once the program was fully organized, aircraft deliveries took place in

steadily increasing numbers.47

United States air transport operations to Alaska were largely carried out

by the Alaskan Wing of the Air Transport Command, although the Naval

Air Transport Service also operated over the route. From mid-1943 on,

from thirty-five to forty aircraft were assigned to the Alaskan Wing for these

46

 Special Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, 79th Congress, 2d

Session, Hearings on Senate Resolution 46, 80th Congress, extending Senate Resolution 71, 77th

Congress, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Pt. 39, p. 23470. 47

 For fuller accounts of the arrangements, see History of the Northwest Air Route to Alaska,

1942-1945, and Admiral William H. Standley, "Stalin and World Unity," Collier's June 30,

1945. Other sources are The Northwest Route Under the Ferrying Division: 16 June 1942-

1 November 1942, and Organizational History of the Ferrying Division: 20 June 1942-1 August

1944.
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA 217

operations, most of them commercial aircraft operating under contract. The

air transport accomplishments of the Alaskan Wing are indicated in the

following table:48

The number of total arrivals at the main airfields, including Edmonton,

perhaps gives a better layman's appreciation of the scale of activity along

the route:

 49

The Alaska Highway

Of the logistical projects undertaken by the United States in Canada during World War II, two stand out far above the others in magnitude, the

complexity of the problems met, and the size of the construction organizations assembled to execute them. These projects were the construction of

the Alaska Highway and the related Canol Project.50 United States governmental agencies had several times since 1930 examined proposals for a highway between the United States and Alaska. Before Pearl Harbor the War

Department in commenting on such proposals could find little or no immediate military utility in such a highway. When the proposals of the joint

Alaskan International Highway Commission for a highway between British

Columbia and Alaska were discussed by the Permanent Joint Board on

Defense on 15 November 1940, the Board unanimously agreed that the military value of a road following either of the two routes then proposed would

be negligible. The Board, it may be noted, did not rule on the merits of a

road to Alaska but only on the two proposed routes, which lay west of the

Rocky Mountain Range. At the same meeting the Board did adopt its

Tenth Recommendation, calling for the construction of the air staging facili48

 Alaskan Division, Historical Record Report, Nov 44-Sep 45 volume, p. 395. 49

 PDB 105-28. These figures include the tactical aircraft deliveries tabulated on page 216.

RCAF arrivals for the week 14-20 August 1943 include those incident to operations of No. 2

Air Observers School and Aircraft Repair, Ltd.

Some data on Air Transport Command operations on the route may be found in Cave, Wings

Across the World; Cleveland, Air Transport at War; and Oliver LaFarge, The Eagle in the Egg

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949). 50

 A fairly voluminous literature on the highway is included in the bibliography. By far the

most detailed account is contained in House Report 1705, 79th Congress, 2d Session.
218 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

ties between the United States and Alaska, and this action held real

significance for the future routing of the Alaska Highway.51

During 1941 general interest in a highway to Alaska grew. In January

1941 Dr. Vilhjalmur Stefansson, famous Arctic authority, recommended to

the War Department the construction of a highway to Alaska via the

Mackenzie and Yukon River valleys.52 Officials of Alaska, British Columbia,

Alberta, and the several U.S. adjacent border states urged routes favoring

their own geographic interest.53 In April 1941 Secretary of State Hull sought

the support of Prime Minister King for a highway. King "was not entirely

favorable in holding out hope for immediate co-operation," since the Permanent Joint Board had believed the construction of facilities on the air

route to Alaska to be more important. In July Mayor LaGuardia, U.S.

chairman of the Permanent Joint Board, joined the proponents of a highway,

and by October the War Department had declared itself in favor of a highway "as a long-range defense measure."

 54

The Pearl Harbor attack and the subsequent Japanese menace to west

coast shipping radically altered the picture. Members of the President's

Cabinet at a meeting on 16 January 1942 discussed the possibility that sea

communications to Alaska would be interrupted and the desirability of constructing a highway through Canada. The President appointed a committee, comprising the Secretaries of War, the Navy, and the Interior, to study

the need for a highway. While this study went forward, Roosevelt took up

with General Marshall and Admiral King possible enemy intentions toward

Alaska and the state of the defenses there, which the President considered

unsatisfactory. Marshall and King anticipated a Japanese raid on Alaska

and were troubled by the difficulty of providing air reinforcements.55

Although Admiral King admitted the vulnerability of the coastal shipping

route, he would not agree that it was necessary to construct a highway to

Alaska on the basis that the U.S. Navy could not adequately protect coastal

shipping, nor would he categorically commit the Navy to insuring uninterrupted sea communications to Alaska under all circumstances. The Army

considered Admiral King's position equivocal and unsatisfactory.

51

 Journal, PDB 124; see above, pp. 200-207. 52

 House Report 1705, 79th Congress, 2d Session, p. 7. 53

 For a comparison of the various routes proposed, see House Report 1705, 79th Congress,

2d Session. Dr. Vilhjalmur Stefansson supports his proposal in "The North American Arctic,"

Compass of the World, eds. V. Stefansson and H. W. Weigert (New York: The Macmillan

Company, 1944), pp. 233-40. 54

 Memo/Conv, 17 Apr 41, D/S 711.42/214; House Report 1705, 79th Congress, 2d Session,

p. 8.

55

 Memos, Roosevelt for Marshall and Adm King and for Capt McCrae, 20 Jan 42, Memo,

Marshall for President, 21 Jan 42; all in Roosevelt Papers, Secy's File, Box 1. See above, pp.

200-207.
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA 219

On 2 February the Cabinet committee met with War Department officials and concluded that a highway was needed and that it should follow

the line of airports of the air staging route to Alaska. From the military

point of view, this alignment had the merits of providing a land route to

Alaska, a means of supplying the air bases on the Northwest Staging Route,

and a ground guide for pilots flying aircraft over this route. The Army

Chief of Staff endorsed the plan, and on 11 February the President approved

it, allocating an initial $10 million from his emergency fund and directing

that arrangements be made with Canada through the Permanent Joint Board

on Defense.56

Arrangements with Canada were initiated the next day without awaiting

a Board meeting. Minister Moffat in Ottawa, who had warned the Canadians of the impending decision a week earlier, was instructed by the State

Department on 12 February to request authority for the dispatch of U.S.

survey detachments and for construction of the road. The next day Canada

readily granted permission for the "proposed survey," and Moffat reported

that Canadian approval of a survey included authority for construction of

a pioneer road such as would be needed in connection with the survey.57

On the basis of the partial approval received, and in anticipation of approval

of the entire project, the War Department on 14 February ordered the Chief

of Engineers to undertake construction of a pioneer road from Fort St. John

to Boundary, Alaska.

The Permanent Joint Board at its 25-26 February 1942 meeting considered

the U.S. proposal for the construction of the Alaska Highway.58 Some of

the Canadian members were not entirely satisfied that the project was of

sufficient value to justify the diversion of resources needed elsewhere, particularly since by 1 January 1944, the estimated date of completion, they

assumed that U.S. sea and air communications to Alaska would be secure.

Canadian Department of Mines and Resources officials were even skeptical

of the feasibility of constructing a road along the line of airports because of

the muskeg areas and winter survey difficulties that would be encountered.

Nevertheless, "for reasons of general policy," the Canadian Section supported

the Twenty-fourth Recommendation proposed by the U.S. Section.59 The

56

 House Report 1705, 79th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 9-11, 88-89; Memo, CofS for Adm

King, 4 Feb 42, and Reply, 5 Feb 42, WPD 4327-27. 57

 Ott Leg Desp 2592, 14 Feb 42, D/S 842.154 Seattle-Fairbanks Hwy/359. 58

 Department of State Bulletin. March 21, 1942, VI, 237. 59

 Keenleyside MS; Memo/Conv, Moffat and Hickerson, 7 Feb 42, and Moffat and Robertson, 6 Mar 42, Moffat Diary.

The journal for the Board meeting does not record these Canadian doubts, but only the

agreement reached by the Board as a whole on the need for a highway on the basis of a number of military considerations that were discussed in detail.
220 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

U.S. ARMY ENGINEERS CONSTRUCTING A PIONEER ROAD to Alaska through virgin

forests, May 1942.

U.S. Section informed the Board that the United States was willing to

assume the responsibility for and the whole cost of constructing and maintaining the highway. In undertaking to meet the cost of constructing the

road, the U.S. Section told the Board, the U.S. Government acknowledged

the financial burdens Canada had borne since it entered the war in September

1939, especially in connection with the construction on the Northwest Staging

Route. The Board then, as its Twenty-fourth Recommendation, proposed

that, "as a matter pertaining to the joint defense of Canada and the United

States," a highway be constructed along the line of staging route airports

and connecting with the existing road systems in Alaska and Canada.60

The two governments were not long in approving the Twenty-fourth

Recommendation. The Canadian Government approved it on 5 March, and

the next day, 6 March, Prime Minister King informed Parliament of the

60

 Extract of Journal at Appendix C, below; see also Appendix A, below. Mayor LaGuardia

reported this background to the President in picturesque language: "We encountered more difficulty in giving something to somebody' than in collecting a war loan from an ally. . . .

The Canadians . . fear a terrific political backfire. ... I am sure you will agree that all hell

will break loose when our Washington and Oregon friends learn of the route." (Ltr, 27 Feb

42, Roosevelt Papers, Official File, Box 1566.) In apparent reflection of the Canadian attitude

manifested at the PJBD meeting, the phrase quoted in the text was not included when the

recommendation was embodied in the diplomatic notes exchanged later.
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA 221

project. President Roosevelt on 9 March formally approved the recommendation covering the project to which he had given informal approval

several weeks earlier.61

In the diplomatic notes exchanged by Canada and the United States on 17

and 18 March 1942 detailing the terms of the agreement, the United States

undertook to (1) make the necessary surveys, (2) construct a pioneer road

using Engineer troops, (3) arrange for the completion of the highway under

civilian contractors, (4) maintain the highway until six months after the

termination of the war, and (5) release the highway at that time to become

an integral part of the Canadian highway system. On its part, Canada agreed

to (1) provide the right of way, (2) waive import duties, taxes, and charges

on shipments through Canada and on all equipment and materials to be used

in construction and maintenance of the highway, (3) remit income tax of

U.S. residents employed on the project, (4) facilitate entry of construction

personnel, and (5) permit use of local timber, gravel, and rock for the project.62

Only one U.S. proposal occasioned discussion. Canada would not agree to

guarantee postwar use of the highway to U.S. military vehicles under conditions to be recommended by the Board. It offered, as an alternative, to "give

due consideration" to any recommendation which the Board might make along

these lines. The point was simply omitted from the agreement.

Several other points were agreed on or clarified at a later time. In an

exchange of notes between Canada and the United States on 4 and 9 May

1942, the Canadian Government agreed that it had been the intent of the

Board that the southern terminus of the highway be Dawson Creek, despite

the fact that Fort St. John was the southernmost point mentioned in the

Twenty-fourth Recommendation. Nearly a year later notes exchanged on 10

April 1943 authorized U.S. use of the highways between Fort St. John and

the U.S. border as being in keeping with the language and intent of the

original agreement. Finally, at the suggestion of Mr. Anthony Dimond,

Alaskan delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives, the highway was

officially named the Alaska Highway on 19 July 1943.63

61

 House Report 1705, 79th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 91-92. 62

 EAS, 246; CTS, 1942, No. 13. Ltr, Clark to Hickerson, 29 Mar 42, D/S 842.154 SeattleFairbanks Hwy/522. The regulations subsequently issued as to exemptions from import duties

and taxes are contained in Department of National Revenue order WM No. 75, 9 Oct 42,

published in Canada, Privy Council, Canadian War Orders and Regulations, III (1942), 155-58. 63

 EAS, 380; CTS, 1942, No. 22. EAS, 381; CTS, 1943, No. 17. EAS, 331; CTS; 1943,

No. 10. Concern had been occasioned in Ottawa and in the Department of State by the possibility that the highway might be christened by unilateral U.S. action through Congressional

approval of House Joint Resolution 105, introduced by Mr. Dimond on 24 March 1943, rather

than by a joint and simultaneous announcement in the two capital cities. However, the announcement was made while the resolution was awaiting committee action. (Memo/Conv,

J. G. Parsons and M. Wershof of the Canadian Legation, 30 Apr 43, D/S 842.154 SeattleFairbanks Hwy/542-1/2.
222 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Construction on the pioneer road began about a week after President

Roosevelt formally approved the Alaska Highway project and after the arrival

of the initial contingent of troops at the Dawson Creek railhead on 16 March

1942. The force of Engineer troops was soon built up to seven regiments,

reinforced by ponton, survey, and other units, totaling 394 officers and

10,765 enlisted men.64 On 25 October 1942 the pioneer road was completed,

and its 1,523 miles between Dawson Creek and Fairbanks were passable and

in use for supply purposes. During succeeding months the pioneer road was

developed into a well-graded and well-drained two-lane road 26 feet wide.

In the latter half of 1942 the Engineer troops were reinforced by a construction organization (totaling approximately 7,500) under the U.S. Public Roads

Administration, which, through arrangements worked out with the Chief of

Engineers, undertook to assist in the pioneer road construction and to develop the pioneer road into the final-type highway. The construction of the

final-type road by seventy-seven contractors and four management contractors

under the Public Roads Administration continued through most of 1943. The

work involved a civilian force totaling as high as 15,950 using as many as

11,100 pieces of road-building equipment. By 1 November 1943 construction on the Alaska Highway was 96 percent complete, and, except for certain

bridge construction, the remaining work and the maintenance of the highway

was taken over by the Army Engineers.

The completed highway between Dawson Creek and Big Delta, Alaska,

was a permanent, all-weather road, 1,428 miles long and 26 feet wide, except

for the southernmost 75 miles which was 36 feet wide. The link with Fairbanks was provided from Big Delta by the Richardson Highway, which ran

from Valdez to Fairbanks. Construction involved 133 bridges 20 feet or more

in length. About half the footage was steel bridging. The 2,130-foot suspension bridge over the Peace River was the major structure, and a 2,300-

foot, one-lane, pile-trestle bridge over the Nisutlin River was the longest.

The finished highway permitted speeds in safety from 40 to 50 miles an

hour and had an estimated normal capacity of 400,000 tons annually, which

might be increased to a maximum of 720,000 tons for emergency military

purposes. For use as part of a through-road system between the United

States and Alaska, the highway capacity was limited by the fact that the road

facilities south from Dawson Creek were poor-quality highways, unusable at

certain seasons of the year. This limitation could of course be circumvented

by use of railroad shipments to Dawson Creek.

64

 With passenger shipping in critical supply, Canada contributed to this troop movement

by making available between 1 and 19 April, for nine trips between Seattle or Prince Rupert

and Skagway, Prince Rupert, Prince George, Princess Norah, and Princess Charlotte.
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA 223

SIKANNI CHIEF RIVER BRIDGE, one of the first bridges to be completed on the Alaska

Highway. Photograph taken in 1943.

The construction of the Alaska Highway was a tremendous engineering

achievement and a tribute to U.S. and Canadian co-operation. Few projects

could match the complexity and enormity of the task of putting the highway

through virgin forests within established time schedules and in the face of

transportation handicaps, muskeg and ice, and thaw, washouts, landslides,

freezing temperatures, and other weather handicaps. The cost of the construction work performed on the highway proper was almost $116 million,

exclusive of the costs of wartime maintenance, of many auxiliary installations,

and of the final job inventory of materials, supplies, and equipment. These

two additional categories totaled about $23.5 million. In addition, it has

been conservatively estimated that the cost of the Engineer troop labor

involved, not included in the above figures, was $8 million.65

With the completion of highway construction and the replacement of the

initial temporary timber bridges by permanent structures, the required maintenance was easily carried out and was facilitated by the excellent design and

construction standards. A steady flow of supplies continued over the highway both in support of the construction operations and of the numerous other

U.S. and Canadian activities in northwest Canada. In late 1943 a U.S. Army 65

 House Report 1705, 79th Congress, 2d Session, p. 22.
224 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

fleet of over 1,500 trucks (ranging from 21⁄2- to 10-ton capacity) and 27 crosscountry-type passenger buses was operating on the highway, and during 1943

moved 134,000 tons of cargo and 42,000 passengers. Hauling for U.S. activities alone totaled over 36,700,000 ton-miles in 1943, and over 30,900,000 in

1944. These figures decreased in 1945 with the closing out of construction

activities and the operation of the pipeline along the highway for supply of

gasoline to the air bases and other facilities.66 As early as the spring of 1943

the flow of civilian traffic over the highway had become so heavy that a Joint

Travel Control Board was established at Edmonton. The board included

representatives of the U.S. Northwest Service Command and of the Canadian

Special Commissioner for Defense Projects in Northwestern Canada, who

met to deal with applications for civilian travel.67

In September 1944, with U.S. need for use of the highway diminishing,

the United States suggested in the Permanent Joint Board on Defense the

transfer of administration and maintenance responsibility to Canada and indicated its willingness, pursuant to the original agreement, to share the cost

of the maintenance operations. The Canadian Section pointed out "certain

difficulties which would confront the Canadian Government in accepting this

proposal," and, after study and further report, the Board agreed to defer a

recommendation on the subject. In notifying the War Department of the

action of the Board, the Senior U.S. Army Member thereof stated that the

position of the Canadian Section was in line with the previously known

attitude of the Canadian Government, which did not desire to assume maintenance responsibility for the Canadian portion of the highway, either with

or without U.S. financial assistance.68

Upon the termination of hostilities, the United States again sought to

transfer the responsibilities to Canada. Canada agreed to assume the responsibility for maintenance and operation of the Canadian portion of the

Alaska Highway on 1 April 1946. On that date transfer was effected with

appropriate ceremony at Whitehorse, amid general agreement that the highway would be an important factor in the further exploitation of the potential

of northwestern Canada.69

66

 For an account of transportation operations on the highway, see Bykofsky and Larson, The

Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 57-65. The authors point out that of the total

supplies moved along the highway, a net of only 57 tons of supplies had been delivered to the

Alaska Defense Command by the end of the campaign in the Aleutians. However, this figure

is consistent with the situation in which ocean shipping was the primary means of transportation, with the highway intended for use as an emergency facility. 67

 Journal, 1-14 Jul 43 PJBD meeting, PDB 124. 68

 Journal, 6-7 Sep and 7-8 Nov 44 PJBD meetings, PDB 124. Memo, 15 Nov 44, House

Report 1705, 79th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 246-47. 69

 Canada soon redesignated the Alaska Highway as the Northwest Highway System. (Lester

B. Pearson, "Canada Looks 'Down North,' " Foreign Affairs, XXIV (July 1946), 641.)
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA 225

The need for road and rail facilities over which to bring freight for the

construction of the Alaska Highway involved the U.S. and Canadian Governments in additional negotiations. Freight for the highway was delivered at

three points—Dawson Creek, Whitehorse, and Fairbanks. The railhead at

and the connecting highway net to Dawson Creek have already been mentioned. For the Alaskan portion of the highway, freight was delivered to

Fairbanks principally by the Alaska Railroad after water shipment to either

Seward or Whittier. Some freight was transported over the Richardson

Highway, which connected the port of Valdez with Fairbanks and also linked

the Alaska Highway terminus at Big Delta with Fairbanks. The Glenn

Highway, between the Richardson Highway and Anchorage, also linked

Anchorage to the Alaska Highway. Another avenue to the northern portion of the Alaska Highway was provided by the Tok cutoff connecting the

Alaska and Richardson Highways.

A vital link to the center section of the Alaska Highway was the White

Pass and Yukon Route railway, connecting Skagway and Whitehorse and

having its origins in 1901 in the Klondike gold rush. Over that railway had

passed the supplies for the air base at Whitehorse long before the Alaska

Highway was planned. As construction of the Alaska Highway began, the

use of this railroad permitted the movement of troops and supplies to a middle

point on the proposed highway, from which point construction could advance

in two directions. Still later, large rail shipments were to be made to

Whitehorse in connection with the Canol Project.70

In the fall of 1942 the U.S. need for use of this narrow-gauge (36-inch)

railroad made it desirable for the U.S. Army to take over its operation. Of

the three segments making up the White Pass and Yukon Route, the two in

Canada were owned by companies incorporated in Canada. Arrangements

for U.S. lease of these two segments for the duration of the war were worked

out in a meeting in Ottawa on 16 October 1942. On the basis of these arrangements, the Canadian Government issued an order-in-council establishing

the legal foundation for U.S. lease and operation of privately owned Canadian

common carriers. An exchange of notes at Ottawa in February 1943 formalized

the agreement.71

Operation of the White Pass and Yukon Route railway had been taken

over by the U.S. Army Military Railway Service by 19 October 1942. Dur70

 The system known as the White Pass and Yukon Route comprises three companies owning the three segments of railroad in Alaska, British Columbia, and the Yukon Territory, and

a fourth company operating shipping on the Yukon River and its tributaries. All four companies have but one bank account and common officials and shareholders. (See Carl A. Dawson

(ed.), The New North-West (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1947), pp. 193-98.) 71

 EAS, 390; CTS, 1943, No. 3. The Canadian note also contains the order-in-council, Privy

Council 10067, 6 Nov 42.
226 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

TRAIN PLOWING THROUGH DEEP SNOW on the White Pass and Yukon Route

railroad.

ing the ensuing months, the railway battalion assigned to the task completely

reconstructed 20 miles of the 111-mile railway, added much new equipment,

and rehabilitated the property as a whole. During 1943 the narrow-gauge

railway carried up to 40,000 tons of freight per month.72

Although the White Pass and Yukon Route offered an excellent means

of transportation to Whitehorse, U.S. Army Engineers had examined the need

for an alternate transportation route as early as April 1942. At the meeting

of the Permanent Joint Board that month, the U.S. Section requested authorization for construction of a highway between Haines, on the Lynn Canal

near Skagway, and a point on the Alaska Highway between Kluane and

Champagne. The Canadian Section of the Board replied that the Canadian

Government would have no objection to a survey but suggested that the

question of actual authorization be deferred to a later date. After several

months had elapsed, the War Department on 14 October 1942 asked for im72

 Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, contains a fuller account

of the U.S. Army operations over this railway. The peak figure of 47,000 tons was achieved in

August 1943, while the total for 1943 was 284,532 tons in addition to 22,000 passengers.
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA 227

mediate approval for a survey, and it was granted. Less than a month later

the United States requested Canadian approval for construction of the

Haines-Champagne cutoff, and the Cabinet War Committee granted it on 18

October. The exchange of notes formalizing the agreement provided that

the new section would be considered an integral part of the Alaska Highway

and would be constructed under the same arrangements that had been agreed

upon for the highway.73

Construction was carried forward the same winter by the Public Roads

Administration and, beginning in March 1943, by civilian contractor to the

U.S. Engineer District. In November 1943 the 159-mile cutoff was completed, but to standards below those of the Alaska Highway proper. Responsibility for the part in Canada passed to Canada on 1 April 1946 along

with that for the rest of the Alaska Highway. As in the case of the Alaska

Highway, Canada was under no obligation to continue to maintain the Haines

cutoff.

Apart from the road construction undertaken in connection with the Canol

Project, the road system described was the extent of the highway construction completed in northwestern Canada during World War II. Other highways were proposed but did not materialize. A link between Prince George

and Fort St. John was suggested by the Canadian Section of the Permanent

Joint Board on Defense at the 7-8 April 1942 meeting, which followed the

one at which the Alaska Highway was recommended. After examining a

study on this highway link submitted by the Canadian Section, the U.S. Section at the next Board meeting on 27 April reported its view that such a road

would have so slight a military value that a sufficiently high construction

priority would not be warranted. One other proposal never got past the

preliminary survey stage. In December 1942 the United States sought and

received authority to undertake a survey for a road from the Mackenzie River

near Aklavik to the Yukon River. The road, which never materialized,

would have followed the route Peel River-Rat River-Macdougall Pass-Dell

River-Porcupine River.74

The War Department also examined the feasibility and desirability of

constructing a rail route to Alaska. A survey for a route between Prince

George and Fairbanks was authorized by Canada in April 1942 and undertaken during the summer. The route surveyed in general followed one of

the two that had been proposed by the Alaskan International Highway Commission for a highway. On the basis of the survey the War Department

73

 EAS, 382; CTS, 1942, No. 21. 74

 Journals, 27 Apr and 14 Dec 42, and 13 Jan 43 PJBD meetings, PDB 124.
228 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

concluded that a railroad adequate for military purposes could be constructed

for $112 million. Although informal discussions between the countries took

place in September and October 1942, the War Department in December

announced that a military necessity for the railroad did not exist at that time

and filed the survey "for possible future wartime use."75

The Canol Project

The Canol (from "Canada" and "oil") Project, if not the most spectacular

wartime military undertaking in Canada, was surely the most debated and

controversial enterprise. The oil was to come from the Mackenzie River

field at Norman Wells, where the first oil-producing well had been drilled in

1920. Oil seepages in that vicinity had been reported by Alexander Mackenzie

over a hundred years earlier. At the time of the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense in August 1940, four of seven wells drilled in

the general area were producing, and a small refinery was meeting the

petroleum products needs of the lower Mackenzie valley.76

With Pearl Harbor only a few weeks past, the War Department in January

1942 undertook its initial investigations of the feasibility of using the oil

resources at Norman Wells to meet military requirements in Alaska and

northwest Canada. At a Cabinet meeting on 16 January 1942, the President

indicated to the Secretaries of War and the Navy his concern over the vulnerability of the sea routes to Alaska as well as the critical tanker situation facing the Allies. In the War Department intermittent discussion of the Canol

Project took place in the early months of 1942, while tanker losses mounted,

the Dutch East Indies oil fields were lost, and Caribbean facilities were shelled

by German submarines. On 29 April 1942 War Department representatives

outlined the project to officials of the Imperial Oil Company, Limited, of

Canada, which owned and operated the oil fields. Action followed quickly.

The same day James H. Graham, a technical adviser to Lt. Gen. Brehon B.

Somervell, Commanding General, Services of Supply, recommended and received approval for the project. The next day, 30 April, General Somervell

directed the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, to carry out the project, which

at this stage called for the drilling of nine additional wells, the erection by

1 October 1942 of a refinery with a 3,000-barrel daily refining capacity at

75

 WD Press Releases, 4 July and 10 Dec 42; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 81st

Congress, 1st Session, Senate Report 1131 to accompany H. R. 2186, Providing for a Location

Survey for Railroad Facilities Between the United States and Alaska, p. 2. 76

 For an account of the prewar development of the Norman Wells field, see Oliver B. Hopkins,

"The 'Canol' Project," Canadian Geographical Journal, XXVII (November 1943), 238-49. For a

detailed account of its wartime development, see Trevor Lloyd, "Oil in the Mackenzie Valley,"

Geographical Review, XXXIV (1944), 275-307.
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA 229

Whitehorse, and the construction by 15 September 1942 of a 4-inch pipeline

between Norman Wells and the refinery. On the following day, 1 May, a

contract was let to the Imperial Oil Company for the drilling and operating

of the additional wells.77

The decision immediately evoked expressions of doubt and criticism.

Officers within the War Department and elsewhere in the U.S. Government

questioned the soundness of the project as a whole or of parts thereof.

Representatives of the Standard Oil Company of California, which the War

Department had hired as a consultant on the project, and of the Imperial Oil

Company commented unfavorably on the project. The Department of State,

in forwarding instructions to the legation in Ottawa, pointedly noted that it

had made no examination of the merits of the Canol Project.78

Despite the contemporary expressions of doubt, the U.S. decision to

undertake the project stood. The United States presented its request for

Canadian approval of the project to the Canadian Government informally on

1 May and formally on 8 May. Prodded for a reply on 15 May at the instance of the U.S. Army Engineers who were anxious to utilize the full

summer construction season, Canadian officials informally indicated that they

were not declining assistance but had serious doubts about the soundness of

the proposition. They suggested that the United States give the project additional consideration. The War Department on 18 May reaffirmed its request

to the Department of State and indicated that the reconsideration of the

Canol Project at Canada's suggestion had confirmed the decision to undertake it, and that the risk involved was justified in terms of the critical situation. The State Department immediately informed Canada of the War

Department position, and the same day the Canadian Government signified

its approval, which had actually been granted by the Cabinet War Committee

on 16 May 1942.79

Discussion of the formal diplomatic arrangements followed, and the 77

 An extensive list of literature on the Canol Project is included in the bibliography. The

most authoritative and fully documented data result from the investigation by the Senate Special

Committee Investigating the National Defense Program. They are contained in Special Senate

Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, 78th Congress, 1st Session, Hearings

on Senate Resolution 6, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Pt. 22; Investigation of the

National Defense Program, Pt. 39 (cited above, n. 46); and Special Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, 78th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Report 10, Investigation

of the National Defense Program Pursuant to Senate Resolution 71, 77th Congress, and Senate Resolution 6, 78th Congress, Pt. 14, Additional Report, The Canol Project. Minutes of the late

April meetings, the recommendation and approval, and the contract are reproduced in Investigation of the National Defense Program, Pt. 22, as Exhibits 1095, 1096, 1097, and 1087. 78

 Investigation of the National Defense Program, Pt. 22, Exhibits 1097, 1101, and 1141. 79

 D/S Telg 71, 1 May 42, D/S 811.248/486; Memo/Conv, Moffat and Keenleyside, 8 May

42, D/S 842.6363/162; U.S. Leg Ott Telg 80, 18 May 42, D/S 842.6363/168-1/5; Ltr, SW to

Secy State, 18 May 42, D/S 842.6363/175.
230 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

agreement was effected in an exchange of notes signed in Ottawa on 27 and

29 June 1942. Under the agreement, by which Canada was to provide assistance similar to that for the Alaska Highway, the facilities were to be built

by the United States, remain its property during the war, and be disposed of

subsequently under an agreed procedure.80

Even before the agreement was finalized, the War Department had come

forward requesting approval of a supplemental project. This project, suggested by Harold L. Ickes, who as U.S. Petroleum Co-ordinator for War had

objected to the original project and had sponsored the new one as an alternative, called for construction of 4-inch pipeline with a 5,000-barrel daily

capacity between Skagway and Whitehorse along the White Pass and Yukon

Route railroad and of storage and loading facilities at Prince Rupert. The

supplemental project, which could be completed in a shorter time, would

permit transportation of gasoline to Whitehorse from the United States via

the relatively protected and shorter tanker haul along the inside passage from

Prince Rupert to Skagway. Canadian approval was given informally in one

day, 27 June, and later formalized in an exchange of notes dated 14 and 15

August 1942.81 The provisions of the earlier agreement were applied to the

new one.

Other associated projects were planned and undertaken with the result

that the original project became known as Canol 1 and the supplementary

project as Canol 2. Canol 3 provided for a 2-inch gasoline pipeline between

Carcross, a point on the Canol 2 pipeline, and Watson Lake, with associated

storage and other facilities. This line would permit deliveries from Skagway

or Whitehorse to installations southward as far as Watson Lake. Canol 4

called for a 3-inch gasoline pipeline from Whitehorse to Fairbanks and related

facilities.82 Canol 5, a gasoline pipeline extension from Fairbanks to Tanana,

Alaska, was to be wholly a U.S. project, but it was later abandoned.

None of the proposals in connection with the several Canol programs was

processed through the Permanent Joint Board. However, the agreements for

Canol 1 and 2 provided that if, at time of disposition of the facilities, there

was no purchaser, the problem would be referred to the Board for recommendation. This provision resulted from a War Department suggestion

80

 EAS. 386; CTS, 1942, No. 23. 81

 EAS, 387; CTS, 1942, No. 24. 82

 Canols 3 and 4 had not been specifically authorized before work on them began. They

were noted in an exchange of letters in Ottawa, dated 22 September and 5 October 1942, which

was the result of Canadian inquiry concerning reports about these projects. They were formally

approved for the record on 7 June 1944. (List, U.S. Defense Projects and Installations in

Canada, 12 Jan 44 [Canadian origin], PDB 150-1; EAS, 416, and CTS, 1944, No. 16.)
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA 231

designed to insure against dismantling where such action would be contrary

to foreseeable future war needs.83

Major logistical tasks faced the U.S. Army even before work at Norman

Wells could begin. On 4 June 1942 the vanguard of Task Force 2600 began

arriving at Waterways, Alberta, the northernmost railhead in the area, to

establish the transportation system to Norman Wells over which could move

the civilian construction organization and supplies needed for construction of

the pipeline from Norman Wells to Whitehorse. The 1,171-mile route,

open only from May to October, involved a 285-mile passage down the

Athabasca and Slave Rivers, a 16-mile portage at Fort Fitzgerald, and additional passages of 195, 125, and 550 miles on the Slave River, Great Slave

Lake, and Mackenzie River, respectively. By the end of June 1942 a force of

over 2,000 troops was constructing the wharfage, warehousing, housing, and

other facilities needed at the various terminal and storage points. Available

river boats were purchased or hired, others were brought in, and large numbers

of prefabricated barges were assembled on the rivers.

By the summer of 1943 more than 39,000 tons of supplies had been moved

over this water route. The greater part of the freight moved was delivered

by the marine transportation facilities of the Hudson's Bay Company, which

carried 50 percent of the tonnage between Waterways and Fort Fitzgerald and

60 percent between Fort Smith and Norman Wells. After mid-1943 an increasing portion of these accomplishments was the result of augmentation of

the force operating the route by the civilian organization, Marine Operators,

at Edmonton. Pursuant to a contract arranged in February 1943, Marine

Operators made extensive preparations for the task, which it took over during the summer of 1943. Task Force 2600 was then withdrawn. By the

close of the river navigation season in early October, virtually all the supplies

that had been assembled for movement to Norman Wells had reached that

destination.84

With the waterways frozen during the winter months, alternate routes

were sought to permit movement of supplies. Although a network of air

bases was constructed which permitted movement of men and supplies by

air, the principal means of winter transportation were tractor roads built over

the frozen ground, rivers, and lakes.85 The U.S. Army built such a route

during the winter of 1942-43 from the railhead at Peace River to Norman

Wells via Hay River and Fort Providence. The 1,000-mile route, sometimes

83

 Memo, by Hickerson, 12 Jun 42, D/S 842.6363/168-4/5. 84

 For an account of the Hudson's Bay Company operations, see "Oil for the Planes of Alaska," The Beaver, Outfit 274 (September 1943), pp. 4-14. 85

 See above, pp. 207-15.
232 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

referred to as Canol 6, was constructed between 23 October 1942 and 25

February 1943. A shift of the base of operations from the railhead at Waterways to that at Peace River was made because the winter road from the Peace

River railhead could to a large extent utilize existing wagon roads and trails

as far as Hay River. A route from Fort Smith joined the first at Hay River.

A third, from Fort Nelson on the Alaska Highway, joined the first near Fort

Simpson. The winter road operation was not successful. An estimated $7.5

million was expended on construction and operation. Of 18,222 tons of supplies that left the Peace River railhead, only 5,293 tons were delivered to

Norman Wells. Consumed in the operation were 3,567 tons, while the

balance was left along the route, to be delivered by water after the waterway

was open. The winter roads were not used after the winter of 1942-43.86

The construction of the several pipelines and the erection of the refinery,

which were well under way in early 1943, were accomplished by civilian contractor organizations, both Canadian and U.S. The largest of these was

Bechtel-Price-Callahan of San Francisco. The Skagway-Whitehorse pipeline,

Canol 2, had gone into operation in late 1942. Gasoline reached Watson

Lake via Canol 3 on 24 July 1943 and Fairbanks via Canol 4 on 23 February

1944. The crude-oil line from Norman Wells was completed on 16 February 1944, and the first oil was delivered through it on 16 April. Two weeks

later, on 30 April 1944, the formal dedication of the refinery at Whitehorse

took place and refinery operations began. The construction of the 595-mile

pipeline and service road, which at two points reached elevations exceeding

5,000 feet, over the uncharted Mackenzie Range between Norman Wells and

Whitehorse was the most difficult of the pipeline tasks, and its execution

was a significant step in taming the northwest Canadian wilderness.

At the end of 1942 the War Department in the hope of making available

new supplies of oil had decided that additional exploratory well drilling in

northwest Canada was desirable. In an exchange of notes dated 28 December

1942 and 13 January 1943, Canada acceded to a U.S. request for a wildcatting

program in which exploratory wells would be drilled to seek sources capable

of producing from 15,000 to 20,000 barrels of oil daily. Canada authorized

the program in the area specified, which included all of the Yukon Territory

and that portion of the District of Mackenzie on the mainland and west of

the 112° meridian.87

Under the initial Canol 1 agreement, producing wells drilled at U.S.

expense on land held under prior lease by the Imperial Oil Company became

86

 Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 64-65. 87

 EAS, 388; CTS, 1943, No. 18. The area was reduced in size by a subsequent agreement

published in EAS, 389, and CTS, 1943, No. 19.
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA 233

the property of that company, which was also to be reimbursed an agreed

price for oil delivered to the United States from those wells and from wells

already producing at the time the agreement was made.88 Under the wildcatting program the United States assumed all the costs of the exploratory

work, which was carried forward by Imperial Oil Company and by a U.S.

company, Noble Drilling Corporation. All the exploratory drilling took

place on land for which permits were issued by the Canadian Government to

Imperial Oil. Under new regulations issued by the Canadian Government,

one-half of any location upon which oil was discovered, together with the

wells or other improvements thereon, would remain or become property of

the Canadian Government. Imperial Oil Company, as the permittee, became

owner of the remaining half of the improvements on crown property, and

the two would share equally from the proceeds of oil produced under the

new regulations.89 This arrangement was also applicable to the drilling done

under Canol 1 in the Norman Wells area but on ground for which additional

permits were needed by and issued to Imperial Oil.90

As a result of the exploratory work, new producing wells with a daily

output of 3,900 barrels were drilled, and as many as 4,000 barrels of crude

oil per day, even in the coldest month of the year, moved through the pipeline to the Whitehorse refinery. The Canadian Government estimated that

this proven field contained from thirty to sixty million barrels of oil; U.S.

authorities estimated that the oil resources discovered at U.S. expense totaled

from sixty to one hundred million barrels, although they admitted that not

all of this oil might be obtainable since part of the oil-bearing structure lay

under the Mackenzie River. Approximately one-third of the proven field

was covered by the old Imperial Oil leases, while the remainder was covered

by the new regulations, which gave the crown a one-half interest.91

In September 1943 the U.S. Senate Special Committee Investigating the

National Defense Program (then commonly referred to as the Truman Committee, after its chairman) began an extensive investigation of the Canol

Project. On 26 October the hearings delved into the arrangements effected

by the United States with Canada and with the Imperial Oil Company. The

committee report, released on 8 January 1944, severely criticized the initial

88

 Investigation of the National Defense Program, Pt. 22, Exhibit 1087. 89

 Privy Council 1138, 12 Feb 43; Privy Council 2447, 26 Mar 43; Regulations under Privy

Council 742, 28 Jan 43, in Canada, Wartime Information Board, Defense Projects in Northwest

Canada, pp. 44-64; Investigation of the National Defense Program, Pt. 22, Exhibits 1088, 1145,

and 1146-A; H. C. Debates, 5 May 44, pp. 2721-22. 90

 Privy Council 4140, 18 May 42. 91

 H. C. Debates, 5 May 44, p. 2722; WD Press Release, 8 Mar 45; Memo for Record, 20

Nov 43 meeting in War Department, D/S 842.6363/267-4/23.
234 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

decision by the War Department to develop the Canol Project. It also

criticized subsequent decisions, some made as late as October 1943, to carry

the project to completion despite the changing circumstances of the war and

the contrary recommendations of the U.S. Petroleum Administrator for War

and others, who considered the project to be unsound and excessively costly.

The report concluded that the contracts and agreements were unfair and unreasonable, since the question of postwar rights and other U.S. interests had

not been properly safeguarded, despite the expenditure of $134 million for

the entire project. This failure to safeguard U.S. interests the committee too

attributed to improvidence on the part of the War Department, which had

prepared the documents. The report also noted that Canada had accepted

the U.S. proposal without modification or reservation and that there was no

indication that it would not have been possible to obtain a more equitable

arrangement from Canada.92

Soon after the Truman Committee began to inquire into the Canol contracts and agreements, the War Department, with the cognizance of the

committee, initiated action to revise them. As a result of War Department

representations to the Department of State a few days earlier, the U.S.

Ambassador in Ottawa on 23 November 1943 broached the subject of the

renegotiation of the contracts and agreements and arranged a meeting with

the Canadians on 2 December. The meeting found Canadians amenable to

the idea of making minor adjustments but opposed to any revisions premised

on a major oil discovery.93

At a second meeting, on 31 January 1944, specific alternate U.S. proposals

were discussed. Since the relationship between the Canadian Government

and Imperial Oil Company established by an order-in-council had a direct

bearing on any changes in the arrangement, it was necessary that this relationship also be amended. The three-way discussions continued at some

length, and the arrangements finally worked out were announced publicly on

5 May 1944, five days after the refinery at Whitehorse began operations.

During the period between 1 December 1943 and 30 April 1944, while

renegotiation discussions were in progress, the War Department expended

$17 million of the $99 million that was the cost of that part of the Canol

Project involved in producing and refining oil in Canada. Vigorous War

Department action in pushing the project to completion and the protracted

92

 Senate Report 10, 78th Congress, 1st Session, Pt. 14. The report did not criticize that

part of the project which called for delivery of petroleum products through Prince Rupert to

Skagway and thence through the pipelines to points between Fairbanks and Watson Lake. This

portion of the project cost $35 million. 93

 Memo for Record, Hickerson, 30 Nov 43, D/S 842.6363/267-4/23; Minutes, 2 Dec 43

meeting, D/S 842.6363/267-11/23; H. C. Debates, 5 May 44, p. 2722.
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA 235

discussions made it impossible to carry out the Truman Committee recommendation that this project not be completed unless new and equitable

arrangements could be worked out with Canada and the Imperial Oil

Company.94

The Canadian Minister of Mines and Resources explained the arrangements

to the House of Commons on 5 May 1944 when he announced the order-incouncil, dated 27 April, that established the new relationship between the

Canadian Government and the Imperial Oil Company. The new arrangements gave the United States an option to purchase for its own use, at cost

plus twenty cents per barrel, an amount up to one-half of the oil recovered

in the proven area, not exceeding thirty million barrels.95

The agreement formalizing the new arrangements was signed by the two

governments on 7 June 1944. As a result of the agreement, the United States

gave up all its rights to explore for oil in Canada. The agreement also met

the Truman Committee criticism about safeguarding of U.S. interests by providing for (1) application of the disposition arrangements for the SkagwayWhitehorse pipeline to the distribution lines to Watson Lake and Fairbanks,

and (2) extension to the postwar lessees or owners of the installations of the

rights of way and other rights necessary for their satisfactory utilization.96

When it went into operation, the Canol refinery was able to process 3,000

barrels of crude oil per day and produce from this crude 479 barrels of aviation gasoline, 1,018 barrels of motor gasoline, and 525 barrels of fuel oil.

This output reflected changes made in the plans to accord with the "anticipated peacetime demand in the territory to be served by it" and still to allow

the facilities to "make an important contribution to the wartime demand in

the North Pacific region."97

The oil-producing and -refining facilities of the Canol Project had not

long to operate, for less than a year later, before V-E and V-J Days had arrived, the War Department on 8 March 1945 announced discontinuance of

operations as of 30 June. The War Department cited as reasons for its action the improved tanker situation and the improved military situation in

Alaska. The system of distribution lines for delivery of petroleum products

from the port at Skagway to points between Fairbanks and Watson Lake was

not affected and continued to supply that area with petroleum products

until after the war ended.98

94

 Senate Report 10, 78th Congress, 1st Session, Pt. 14. 95

 Privy Council 2904; H. C. Debates, 5 May 44, pp. 2722-24; WD Press Release, 5 May 44. 96

 EAS, 416; CTS, 1944, No. 16. 97

 WD Press Release, 5 May 44. 98

 WD Press Release, 8 Mar 45.
236 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Communications and Weather

A major problem for both Canada and the United States in northwest

Canada was posed by the extremely limited scale of communications facilities

in a region whose size and attendant physical phenomena, such as the aurora

borealis, made communications particularly difficult. The need for adequate

meteorological data for safe air operations also presented a problem.

As the U.S. troop units and detachments and the civilian elements involved

in the construction projects deployed throughout northwestern Canada, the

task of maintaining communications for command and administrative purposes was a formidable one. During the initial months of work on the

Alaska Highway and Canol projects, the three commands involved (two for

the highway, Northern and Southern Sectors) operated independent radio

nets. The three networks were also independent of the Canadian facilities

serving the airfields of the Northwest Staging Route and other principal locations, except for a brief initial period during which the commanders of both

the Northern and Southern Sectors of the highway were linked to Edmonton

only by the Department of Transport radio system or by the telegraph line

to Edmonton.99

Upon the establishment of the Northwest Service Command on 10

September 1942, the need for integrating these three networks and adapting

them to new requirements arose. The backbone of the system developed

was the telephone and telegraph land line parallel to the Alaska Highway.

The construction of this line was considered by the United States to be part

of the over-all Alaska Highway project, but it also received specific authorization by the Canadian Government.100

Although perhaps dwarfed by other projects under way in that area, the

construction of the telephone system was itself no small field engineering

feat. Work was begun by the U.S. Army Chief Signal officer with a civilian

organization in the late summer of 1942. In November the 843d Signal

Service Battalion joined the construction forces on an emergency basis.

Reinforced by crews recruited from Canadian and U.S. telephone companies,

this battalion by 1 December 1942 had completed the 442-mile line between

Edmonton and Dawson Creek, following the highway right of way. Canadian and U.S. contractors continued construction into 1943, and by 1 May

they had opened another 900 miles, to Whitehorse; on 14 October the full

99

 Since the Radio Act, 1938, prohibited radio broadcasting except by licensed operators who

had to be British subjects, authority for the operation of the U.S. Army stations was furnished,

as a war measure, under Privy Council 3363, 28 April 1942. 100

 Ltr, Department of External Affairs to Moffat, 16 Oct 42, cited in List, U.S. Defense

Projects in Canada, 6 May 43, PDB 150-1.
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA 237

line between Edmonton and Fairbanks was open. An additional 102-mile

line linked Skagway to the system, while 830 more miles was needed to tie

in the various air bases, flight strips, and other installations. The line, with

a capacity of six voice and thirteen teletype circuits, required the setting of

95,000 poles, the stretching of over 14,000 miles of wire, and the establishing

of twenty-three booster stations at from 70- to 100-mile intervals.

With radio communications frequently blacked out, the wire network

provided an essential complementary communications link for the many installations in the area. Through its use Fairbanks could be linked directly

with Washington, D. C. The system was connected to Helena, Montana,

and thence to U.S. commercial networks by Canadian and U.S. commercial

circuits leased for military use, and could be linked, through its Edmonton

switching center, to Canadian commercial facilities.

Because the wire network was subject to frequent interruption by falling

trees, thaws and floods, and fire and winds, radio networks were required not

only to link points not served by the line, such as those in the Mackenzie

River valley, but also to insure continuous service to points on the line. In

June 1943 all U.S. radio nets were consolidated into a single network comprising sixty-five fixed, semifixed, and mobile radio stations that served the

Northwest Service Command and the operational and meteorological needs

of Air Transport Command operations. Canadian needs for communications

continued to be provided independently, through the radio net for the airfields and intermediate fields of the Northwest Staging Route.

Although there was virtually no integration of the communications

services by the agencies of the two countries operating in northwest Canada,

some such co-ordination was developed in the provision of meteorological

services. The Department of Transport had maintained, before the U.S.

tenancy on the Northwest Staging Route, a weather system that included

hourly observations from each of its radio stations and forecasts every six

hours from forecast centers at Edmonton and Whitehorse. The initial U.S.

weather services were provided by detachments of Northwest Airlines personnel for the contract transport services that began in March 1942. As the

Army Air Forces expanded its air operations along the route in 1942 and

1943, it established its own weather service, which replaced that of the Northwest Airlines and to some extent duplicated that of the Canadian Department of Transport. United States observation stations were established at

a number of points along the staging route, only a few of which duplicated

Canadian observations. Meetings were held and arrangements worked out

for co-ordinating the Canadian and U.S. observation networks so that by and

large they supplemented each other. This was also done when Mackenzie
238 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

River air operations necessitated the establishment of a reporting system in

that area. The Royal Canadian Corps of Signals operated an observing and

radio-reporting net of eleven stations, while the AAF operated a net of stations

located at the landing strips developed by the United States.

The two countries further collaborated in the collection and dissemination of weather reports. The AAF operated a teletype circuit between

Edmonton and Whitehorse to which the Department of Transport stations

were linked. Over this circuit were transmitted the reports collected hourly

by both Canadian and U.S. stations, in the Mackenzie River valley as well

as along the staging route, making all reports available to all agencies.

The U.S. Army saw fit to operate its own forecasting services and established stations at Whitehorse, Calgary, Edmonton, Fort Nelson, Fort St.

John, Prince George, and Watson Lake. There undoubtedly was room for

economy of operations through better co-ordination of the weather services.

However, fundamental differences on the question of airway control and

operation made fuller co-ordination infeasible.101

The Prince Rupert Port

Although many of the major logistical projects carried out in the Canadian northwest were fully publicized, one of these, the utilization of Prince

Rupert as a U.S. Army Subport of embarkation, remained officially secret

until after the Japanese surrender. Naturally this secrecy was to some extent

circumscribed since the operation of the port involved several thousand people and the movement of nearly a million measurement tons of supplies

through the port and over the Canadian National Railways line to it.102

Surveys of the possible utility of the port in the event of a war had been

made by the U.S. and Canadian Armies as early as 1937. As the pre-Pearl

Harbor build-up of U.S. bases in Alaska and the Pacific increased the pressure on the ports of Seattle and San Francisco, the desirability of using the

port was re-examined. After a survey was made in March 1941, Prince

Rupert was declared to be a potentially satisfactory port for the supply of all

of southeastern Alaska and for partial supply of western Alaska.103

Prince Rupert was desirable for port operations for reasons other than

that it would ease the pressures on other west coast ports. The northernmost west coast railhead, the port had rail connections to Vancouver and

the west coast industrial areas and through Edmonton to the rest of Canada 101

 See Ch. XI, below. 102

 A summary history of the role of the port in World War II was made public by a War

Department press release of 7 September 1945. The Canadian National Magazine, XXXI

(November 1945), contains an article, "Prince Rupert—Secret City of the War," which expands

upon the press release. 103

 Ltr, Commandant 13th Naval District to CNO, 10 Mar 41, Com 13 Serial 122209.
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA 239

and the United States. Since the port is located 500 miles north of Seattle,

a round trip to the Anchorage area would involve only 2,000 miles as opposed to about 3,000 miles from Seattle. In a critical shipping situation the

same tonnage of vessels could thus carry 50 percent more cargo by using

the shorter route.

At the 20 December 1941 meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on

Defense the Canadian Section sought information, on behalf of the Minister

of Transport and the Canadian National Railways, on U.S. plans for use of

the port.104 The successful emergency operation of lightering to, and reshipment from, Prince Rupert of the cargo of a grounded U.S. Army Transport

Service vessel on 13 January 1942 sparked additional U.S. interest in the port.

By the end of the month both U.S. Army and Navy commanders on the

Pacific coast had recommended immediate use of the port.105 The Canadian

Government authorized trial shipments, which were handled by the U.S.

Army port of embarkation staff at Seattle.

At the 25-26 February 1942 meeting of the Permanent Joint Board, the

U.S. Section presented the War Department's request for authority to use

the port for supply of Alaska with an estimated daily movement of 2,500

tons and suggested the working out of plans by the local staffs. Canadian

willingness to approve the use of the port was indicated at a Board meeting

in April.106 The War Department, apparently anticipating Canadian approval on the basis of the earlier discussions, had on 20 February ordered

activation of the port as a Subport of the Seattle Port of Embarkation. The

port officially opened on 5 April 1942.

The Prince Rupert harbor is rated one of the world's best, but the port

facilities were to require considerable augmentation. Canada, with U.S.

matériel assistance, assumed responsibility for reinforcing the harbor defenses. The United States expanded the Prince Rupert port facilities to

provide a capacity of 50,000 cubic tons of freight per month. Facilities constructed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers included 400,000 square feet

of warehousing, 54,000 square feet of office space, and a 1,000-ton-capacity

cold storage plant. The existing waterfront wharfage was doubled. A complete temporary housing project, which would provide quarters for the

majority of the 3,500 military and civilian personnel employed at the subport, was constructed nearby and included theater, gymnasium, medical, and

similar facilities. The construction program lasted over the two years from

March 1942 to March 1944.

104

 Journal, PDB 124. 105

 Ltr, Commandant 13th Naval District to CNO, 14 Jan 42, Com 13 Serial 123003; Ltr,

WDC and Fourth Army to ACofS WPD, 28 Jan 42, WPD 323.91. 106

 Journal, PDB 124; Memo, SUSAM for ACofS WPD, 27 Feb 42, PDB 116-1.
240 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

The Corps of Engineers constructed two other major facilities near

Prince Rupert. A personnel staging area, accommodating 2,500 personnel,

with its own port and rail facilities, was constructed at Port Edward, some

ten miles from Prince Rupert. Through this staging area, beginning in

March 1943, passed the bulk of the military and civilian personnel en route

to or from the U.S. Army projects and garrisons to the north. The other

principal operating facility was at nearby Watson Island, which was used as

a backup storage dump for ammunition. Shipment of ammunition from

this dump was made to bases throughout the Pacific that were supporting

the Pacific war.

When the construction in the Prince Rupert area, which was accomplished by civilian contractors under contract to the U.S. Army Engineers,

was first initiated, the question arose whether the United States had secured

the necessary authority for it. The U.S. Section of the Permanent Joint

Board cited the Board's Twenty-second Recommendation. Canada initially

questioned whether that recommendation provided the authority but subsequently agreed that it did.107

As a result of the U.S. Army construction activities, the population of

Prince Rupert increased from a pre-Pearl Harbor 4,700 (excluding 2,300

Japanese that were evacuated) to over 11,000. The Subport, which came

under the direction of the U.S. Army Seattle Port of Embarkation for port

operations, was supported by and reported to the Northwest Service Command for personnel, communications, fiscal, medical, construction and maintenance, and similar purposes.108

 By the time of the Japanese surrender

almost a million tons of freight had passed through Prince Rupert.

After V-E Day the War Department sought ways of supplementing the

capacity of the Prince Rupert and other west coast ports to permit increased

shipment of supplies to the Pacific. In June 1945 U.S. Army authorities

initiated investigations and inquiries concerning the use of Ballantyne Pier

in Vancouver as an additional Subport. They found that the available labor

supply would allow the handling of six ships per month at the pier, but

that if additional labor were brought in this number could be increased to

twenty. The United States formally sought approval of the project in

Ottawa in July and readily obtained it.109 The welcome surrender of Japan

prevented fruition of the project.

107

 Appendix A, below; Ltr, Cdn Secy PJBD to U.S. Secy, 24 Apr 42, PDB 147-1. 108

 For a more detailed account of U.S. Army operations at Prince Rupert, see Bykofsky and

Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 41-46. Tucker, The Naval Service of

Canada, II, 233-41, contains an account of the role of Prince Rupert in Royal Canadian Navy

operations. 109

 Ltr, SUSAM to Military Attache, 14 Jul 45, and Reply, 20 Jul 45, both in PDB 126-21.
CHAPTER IX

Comrades in Arms

Although mention of World War II military co-operation between the

United States and Canada may first bring to mind the Ogdensburg Declaration and the Permanent Joint Board on Defense or well-publicized projects

such as the Alaska Highway and the Canol Project, that co-operation was by

no means limited to politico-military and strategic planning or to logistical

enterprises carried out in the Canadian northland. On battlegrounds in different quarters of the globe, Canadians and Americans fought and died

together as North American brothers-in-arms.1

Military units of the two countries inevitably found themselves co-operating on various occasions as the scope and scale of operations in the European

theater grew larger. Canadian and U.S. divisions fought side by side in

Sicily, in Italy, and during the advance from Normandy. In fact, the U.S.

XVI Corps was assigned to the First Canadian Army, commanded by General Henry D. G. Crerar, to assist him in clearing the west bank of the

Rhine of the enemy in March 1945.

In the air war, RCAF fighter squadrons teamed up to protect U.S. Eighth

Air Force Flying Fortresses on many missions from the United Kingdom

against continental targets during 1942 and 1943. Many of the aircraft of

Royal Air Force squadrons, furnishing fighter escort in the same way, were

manned by RCAF personnel serving in Royal Air Force units. The AAF

was able to repay these courtesies many times in Sicily and Italy, where its

fighter-bomber and light and medium bomber groups flew hundreds of

sorties in direct support of Canadian ground forces.

Still other circumstances found large numbers of Canadians and Americans fighting side by side. Long before Pearl Harbor, a steady stream of

Americans had started moving northward across the border to join the Canadian armed forces. By the beginning of 1941 some 1,200 Americans com1

 Symbolic of this brotherhood-in-arms was the selection of the sonnet "High Flight" for

wide circulation throughout the schools of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. This

sonnet, which has been viewed as ranking with John McCrae's "In Flanders Fields" and Rupert

Brooke's "The Soldier," was penned by an American, Pilot Officer John Gillespie Magee of the

RCAF. Magee, who was killed at age nineteen in December 1941, was one of the large number of Americans who enlisted in the Canadian armed forces while the United States was still

a neutral. The sonnet begins and ends: "Oh, I have slipped the surly bonds of earth ... .

Put out my hand and touched the face of God."
242 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

prised about 10 percent of RCAF officer strength and 3 percent of the other

ranks.2 A U.S. influx totaling about 10 percent of RCAF recruitment continued until, at the time of Pearl Harbor, over 6,000 U.S. citizens were serving in the RCAF, of whom 600 were instructors in the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. By the same time nearly 10,000 Americans were

serving in the Canadian Army. 3 After Pearl Harbor a reverse movement

resulted in the absorption of over 26,000 Canadians into the U.S. armed

forces during World War II.

Battle of the Atlantic

On 16 September 1939, scarcely two weeks after the beginning of World

War II, the first convoy departed Halifax, Nova Scotia, for the United

Kingdom.4 Many others followed, escorted by units of the British and

Canadian Navies. The first loss to the submarine enemy did not occur

until 14 February 1940, and at the time of the fall of France in June 1940

losses were still few.

The availability of French bases after the fall of France greatly increased

German submarine warfare capabilities, and this advantage, coupled with

Admiral Karl Doenitz' "wolf-pack" technique, caused losses to mount

steadily. Although the U.S.-British destroyer transfer alleviated the situation, by the end of 1940 about 70 percent of the British destroyer fleet was

laid up for repairs.

In 1941 the United States took additional steps to support the British.

Soon after the approval of the Lend-Lease Act on 11 March 1941 the United

States began to finance repairs to British naval vessels in U.S. ports. The

U.S.-United Kingdom armed forces liaison, established on an informal basis

before August 1940, gradually developed and produced the formal staff conversations that took place in Washington in January-March 1941. From

these staff conversations emerged a U.S. undertaking to protect shipping in

the western Atlantic, which was to be a U.S. over-all strategic responsibility

in the event of U.S. entry into the war.5 Of greater immediate importance

was the fact that the U.S. Navy through this liaison obtained the benefits 2

 Memo for Record, SUSAM, 12 Mar 41, PDB 129-1. 3

 Canada at War. No. 8 (Nov 41). p. 46. 4

 For full and authoritative British, Canadian, and U.S. accounts, see Great Britain. Central

Office of Information, The Battle of the Atlantic (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office,

1946); Schull, The Far Distant Ships; Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic; Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, X, The Atlantic Battle Won,

May 1943-May 1945 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956); Craven and Cate (eds.),

Plans and Early Operations; and Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate (eds.), The Army Air

Forces in World War II, II, Europe—TORCH to POINTBLANK (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1949). The account presented here is limited to the U.S.-Canadian co-operation in the discharge of

the convoy escort and antisubmarine responsibilities. 5

 See Ch. IV, above.
COMRADES IN ARMS 243

of British experience in convoy and antisubmarine operations. This, in turn,

permitted the U.S. Navy to accelerate U.S. preparations to undertake such

operations. Thanks in part to these benefits, the U.S. Navy, even with its

forces deployed for the hemisphere neutrality patrol begun in the fall of

1939, was able to report to the President on 20 March 1941 that it would

soon be ready to convoy merchant shipping and lend-lease cargoes across

the Atlantic. Surveys had already been made for the necessary naval bases

in the British Isles.6 The next major U.S. step to aid the British was taken

on 11 April 1941 when President Roosevelt notified Prime Minister

Churchill that the neutrality patrol was to be extended to 26° west longitude, and invited notice of British convoys so that warnings of enemy submarines in the area might be transmitted to them.

Despite the steps taken by the United States, British losses continued to

be heavy. In May a convoy lost nine ships well within the patrolled zone.

In consequence of such losses, which reached 590,000 tons in June 1941,

Great Britain decided to provide convoy escort for the full length of the

crossing. To this end, the British Admiralty on 23 May asked Canada to

assume the responsibility for protecting convoys in the western zone and to

establish the base for its escort force at St. John's in Newfoundland. On 13

June 1941 Commodore L. W. Murray, Royal Canadian Navy, assumed his

post as Commodore Commanding Newfoundland Escort Force, under the

over-all authority of the United Kingdom Commander in Chief, Western

Approaches, whose headquarters was at Liverpool. Six Canadian destroyers

and seventeen corvettes, reinforced by seven destroyers, three sloops, and

five corvettes of the Royal Navy, were assembled for duty in the force,

which escorted convoys from Canadian ports to Newfoundland and from

there to a meeting point south of Iceland, where British convoys took over.7

During these months both the war and the scale of U.S. precautionary

preparations grew at an accelerated pace. In April and July 1941 arrangements were made for dispatch of U.S. garrisons to Greenland and Iceland,

respectively.8 On 27 May, the day on which the German battleship

Bismarck was sunk, the President declared an unlimited national emergency.9

6

 For a detailed account of the development of U. S. policy as to participation in the Battle

of the Atlantic, see William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War (New

York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), pp. 419-64, 742-50. 7

 Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 138-42; Schull, The Far Distant Ships, pp. 65-75;

Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 291-92. 8

 See Ch. VI, above. 9

 While the Bismarck roamed in northwestern Atlantic waters out of range of Canadian aircraft, the RCAF informally proposed to neutral Washington the borrowing of twelve Flying

Fortresses, to be ostensibly manned by Canadians, to attack her. War Department officers,

including General Marshall and Mr. Stimson, appeared sympathetic but agreed that this would

be an act of war and decided against the request. (Note for Record, 24 May 41, WPD 4330-

27.)
244 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

On 22 June 1941 Germany invaded the USSR. On 15 July the U.S. Navy

air and naval base at Argentia was commissioned. It was in this setting

that the Argentia meeting of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister

Churchill took place on 9-13 August 1941, from which emerged the Atlantic

Charter.

Roosevelt and Churchill and their naval chiefs at the Atlantic Conference

agreed on new arrangements for convoy escort operations.10 To the United

States, a nonbelligerent, was assigned the convoy escort responsibility in the

northwestern Atlantic west of the 30° west meridian. The United Kingdom

immediately withdrew its naval vessels from the area, except for a few armed

cruisers which it withdrew in October. The Royal Canadian Navy Newfoundland Command was charged with the convoy task in the coastal zone

of the new U.S. sector, where it employed five destroyers and ten corvettes.

Eight Canadian destroyers and twenty corvettes passed to the direct command of Rear Adm. Arthur L. Bristol, commanding the Support Force of

the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, for employment in the escort groups on the ocean

leg of the U.S. sector. Where possible each of the escort groups, which

usually numbered two destroyers and four corvettes, was made up entirely

of ships of one country.11

The necessary orders were issued in early September and staff arrangements were completed with British and Canadian naval officers who had

established close operational liaison in the Navy Department in Washington in anticipation of an expansion of the U.S. role in convoy escort work.

While these preparations were in hand, President Roosevelt on 11 September 1941 issued his "shoot on sight" warning to Germany and Italy, stating

that when men-of-war entered waters "the protection of which is necessary

for American defense they do so at their own peril."

 12

The first transatlantic convoy to be escorted by the U.S. Navy sailed

from Halifax on 16 September 1941, accompanied by a Royal Canadian

Navy escort group acting under over-all U.S. direction. The next day,

escort of the convoy was taken over by a U.S. Navy group at the

"Westomp" (western ocean meeting place), a designated point south of

Argentia. The fifty merchant ships, which sailed under a variety of flags

and comprised types varying from a 1,500-ton cargo ship to the 17,000-ton

Empress of Asia, were met at the "Momp" (mid-ocean meeting place) by a

British escort group. Here, part of the convoy split off to proceed to Ice10

 See also Ch. V, above. 11

 Kittredge Monograph, I, Sec. V, 376n; Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 78-79. 12

 Department of State Bulletin, September 13, 1941, V, 196.
COMRADES IN ARMS 245

land under U.S. escort, while the remainder proceeded to the United Kingdom under Royal Navy escort.13

Within the next month convoy escort arrangements were stabilized on

the following pattern:

a. Eastbound slow (designated SC) convoys out of Sydney, Nova

Scotia, were escorted to the Momp by Canadian escort groups, which on

their return voyage escorted westbound slow (ONS) convoys.

b. Eastbound fast (HX) convoys and westbound fast (ON) convoys

were escorted to and from the Momp by U.S. Navy escort groups.

c. All convoys proceeding between the Momp and the United Kingdom were escorted by Royal Navy escort groups under the control of the

Commander in Chief, Western Approaches.

By the beginning of 1942 naval officers of the three countries had

worked out a procedure for routing and controlling convoys. The British

Admiralty proposed a convoy route to the Navy Department in Washington, which accepted it after adjustment if necessary. The Navy Department

then gave notice of the agreed route to the British Admiralty; the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; the British Commander in Chief,

Western Approaches; the commander of the U.S. task force that would supply the escort from the Westomp to the Momp; the Commanding Officer,

Atlantic Coast command, at Halifax, Nova Scotia; Canadian Naval Staff Headquarters at Ottawa; the Flag Officer, Royal Canadian Navy Newfoundland

Command; and the Canadian port director concerned. The Navy Department also notified the port director, who in turn advised the convoy commodore, of the escort arrangements. The convoy departed under its Royal

Canadian Navy local coastal escort, to be met at the Westomp by the U.S.

Navy ocean escort, which then turned over the escort task and command of

the convoy to a Royal Navy escort group at the Momp. West of the midocean meeting place convoys were controlled from Washington, east of it

from London. Control from these points was found necessary because of

the numbers of convoys often making simultaneous crossings.14

The procedures and allocations of responsibilities worked out in the

period following the Argentia conference required substantial revision after

Pearl Harbor, when the demand for U.S. Navy ships elsewhere became so

great that U.S. participation in the escort of merchant ships in the North

Atlantic was reduced to two Coast Guard cutters. Under continuing overall U.S. strategic direction, the Royal Canadian Navy now began to provide

13

 Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 85-87. 14

 Ibid., pp. 101-02.
246 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

the escort groups not only for the coastal leg but also for the ocean leg

between the Westomp and the Momp, where, as before, United Kingdom

escorts took over.15

Canada was able to make other contributions that helped to meet the

urgent U.S. need, immediately after Pearl Harbor, for naval vessels for escort

and other purposes. In addition to assuming a larger part of the merchant

convoy task, the Royal Canadian Navy made twenty-four antisubmarine

trawlers available to the U.S. Navy. These trawlers arrived at New York

in March 1942, after which they were deployed along the Atlantic coast to

assist in escorting the heavy coastal traffic which had become the target of

an intensified German submarine effort.16

Even when the U.S. Navy was later able to reconstitute its strength in

the western Atlantic, it was faced with an ever-increasing demand for escorts

for troop convoys to the United Kingdom. These convoys enjoyed a prior

claim on the U.S. Navy forces available. Consequently, it remained for the

Royal Canadian Navy to provide the bulk of the escort forces for merchant

ship convoys in the western Atlantic, although a few U.S. Navy ships were

assigned to this duty.

By mid-1942 convoy escort was furnished by escort groups as follows:

a. In the Western Local Area, to a Westomp in locations varying from

45° to 52° west, by eight escort groups of United Kingdom and Canadian

destroyers and Canadian corvettes based on Boston and Halifax.

b. In the Mid-ocean Area, to a Momp near 22° west, by fourteen (later

eleven) escort groups. The destroyers in three of these groups were U.S.,

and the three groups were under U.S. command. Seven other groups under

United Kingdom command comprised United Kingdom, Canadian, and two

Polish destroyers, and Canadian and a few Free French corvettes. The remaining four escort groups were under Canadian command. Ships in all

these groups were based on Argentia or St. John's, Newfoundland, and

refueled at Londonderry in Ireland.

c. In the Eastern Local Area, by United Kingdom escort groups as

before.

d. For the shuttle between Iceland and the Momp, by U.S. escort

groups.17

The burden of North Atlantic convoying during 1942, in terms of the

15

 Ibid., p. 117; Schull, The Far Distant Ships, p. 98. 16

 Canada, Naval Service Headquarters, Royal Canadian Navy Monthly Review, No. 2 (Feb

42), p. 6, and No. 3 (Mar 42), p. 7. 17

 Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 318-20; Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada,

II, 133.
COMRADES IN ARMS 247

approximate ratio of ships convoyed to the scale of each nation's escort contribution, was being borne about equally by the United Kingdom, Canada,

and the United States, with the Canadian share being somewhat less than

one-third.18 Toward the end of the year the U.S. contribution was reduced

sharply by the new demands for convoy escort to North Africa and by other

requirements. As a result, as of 27 November 1942, only 3 of the 147 vessels comprising the Western Local Escort and Mid-ocean Escort Forces were

U.S., the remainder being contributed about equally by Canada and the

United Kingdom.

With the intensification of Nazi submarine warfare in the western

Atlantic, air cover from North American and adjacent bases became an important element in the protection of convoys. Although involved with the

U.S. Navy in a prolonged jurisdictional dispute over the responsibility for

aerial aspects of antisubmarine warfare, the AAF collaborated with the U.S.

Navy Atlantic Fleet task force commander at Argentia by placing its air

units in Newfoundland at his disposal to augment the U.S. Navy patrol

squadron deployed there after Pearl Harbor for the convoy protection task.

After discussion of a proposal for similar collaboration by the RCAF, suitable arrangements were finally worked out shortly afterward.19

By the spring of 1942 enemy submarines had extended their operations

into North American coastal waters and were causing heavy losses. The

United States temporarily resolved its own interservice dispute over the control of antisubmarine air operations on 26 March 1942 by making them the

responsibility of the U.S. Navy, exercised in U.S. coastal waters by the

Eastern Sea Frontier. Immediately thereafter officers of the air and naval air

services of Canada and the United States conferred at St. John's, Newfoundland, to improve the co-ordination of air operations for the protection of

Allied convoys.

Under the plans worked out, air cover in the ocean convoy sectors was

provided as follows:

a. Western Local Area —U.S. Army, Navy, and Civil Air Patrol aircraft based in New England; RCAF aircraft based at Yarmouth, Halifax, and

Sydney; and U.S. Navy aircraft based at Argentia.

b. Mid-ocean Area—U.S. Navy aircraft based at Argentia and in Iceland; and RCAF aircraft based at Torbay and Gander Lake, Newfoundland.

18

 Statement by Minister of National Defense for Naval Services A. L. Macdonald, H. C.

Debates, 1 May 42, p. 2248; Canada, Naval Service Headquarters, Royal Canadian Navy Monthly

Review, No. 9 (Sep 42), p. 64. 19

 See Ch. V, above.
248 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

c. Eastern Local Area—RAF aircraft based in the British Isles.

d. Iceland Shuttle—U.S. Navy aircraft based in Iceland.20

Throughout 1942 Allied losses to enemy submarines had continued at a

high rate despite intensified countermeasures. Germany had stepped up its

submarine production so that it was able in spite of Allied countermeasures

to increase steadily the number of submarines at sea on patrol duty.

In January 1943, while meeting with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Casablanca, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that "the

defeat of the U-boat must remain a first charge on the resources of the

United Nations."

 21

Ways and means to this end had already been under discussion, and the

Combined Chiefs of Staff took action to improve the situation. The longrange patrol force from Newfoundland comprised four B-17 Flying Fortress

aircraft of the Newfoundland Base Command reserve striking force, the 421st

Bombardment Squadron, which performed patrol missions for U.S. Navy

Task Force 24 as a secondary task. In February 1943 the unit was redesignated the 20th Antisubmarine Squadron, reinforced to a strength of seven

B-17's, and assigned to patrol duty as its primary mission. On its part,

Canada sought to comply with a request from Prime Minister Churchill that

it contribute to the long-range air patrols, as well as to the coastal air patrols,

but neither Canada nor the United Kingdom was able to provide the aircraft

for enlargement of Canadian responsibility. The Canadian Joint Staff in

Washington inquired of the AAF in January 1943 whether fifteen B-24

Liberator aircraft could be supplied for this purpose, but General Arnold,

the AAF commander, found it necessary to disapprove the request on the

basis that none could be spared.22

At the Atlantic Convoy Conference, held in Washington between 1 and

12 March 1943 at the suggestion of Canada, naval officers of the three countries continued to seek solutions to convoying problems. As a result of strong

Canadian representations at the conference, a reassignment of the responsibility

for the western Atlantic was made. Since September 1941 this area had been

under U.S. strategic direction despite the fact that for most of the period the

escort of North Atlantic merchant shipping in that sector was being performed in the main by the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Navy. As

U.S. naval strength in the Atlantic had gradually increased, the requirements

for troop convoys and for merchant convoys to the Mediterranean had

20

 Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 319-20. 21

 CCS 155/1, 22 Jan 43. 22

 AAF Reference History 7, The Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, file AAFRH-7,

U.S. Air Force Air University, pp. 147-48.
COMRADES IN ARMS 249

absorbed the additional forces available.23 Under the new arrangement,

which became effective 30 April 1943, the United States retained the broad

strategic responsibility for the western Atlantic, but Canada took over the

full operational responsibility for surface escort of merchant convoys in an

area north of the parallel through New York City and west of the 47° west

meridian, except for convoys to Greenland, which remained a U.S. responsibility. The United States and the United Kingdom continued to be

responsible for the remainder of the Atlantic convoy task.

Newly promoted Rear Adm. L. W. Murray carried out the Canadian

responsibility as Commander in Chief, Canadian Northwest Atlantic. Canadian naval forces were augmented by the transfer of six overage Royal Navy

destroyers, by the return of seven corvettes which had been on loan to the

U.S. Navy since 1942 for use in the Caribbean, by the return of ships from

operations in North African waters, by the commissioning of new ships

built in Canada, and by assistance from U.S. escort vessels. Air antisubmarine operations were the responsibility of the Eastern Air Command under

Air Vice Marshal George Johnson, and for this task the U.S. military and

naval antisubmarine aircraft stationed in Newfoundland were put under his

command.24

The conference, chaired by Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief,

U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, also agreed on several measures

to bring to bear the demonstrated effectiveness of aircraft against submarines.

Small escort aircraft carriers were made available in sufficient numbers so

that almost every convoy was able to be accompanied by its own air umbrella of twelve carrier aircraft. In response to the conference recommendation that the strength of the land-based VLR (very long range) patrol aircraft covering the ocean legs of the Atlantic crossing be increased, the

Combined Chiefs of Staff late in March approved a number of expedients that

would allow the assignment of greater numbers of planes and trained personnel to antisubmarine duty. Under these arrangements the British and

U.S. services undertook to provide 255 aircraft, by 1 July 1943 if possible:

 25

United States Army Air Forces............................................ . 75

United States Navy...................................................... . 60

Royal Air Force......................................................... . 105

Royal Canadian Air Force. ............................................... . 15

23

 The best public account of the Atlantic Convoy Conference and of the events leading up

to it is contained in Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, II, Ch. 14. 24

 Schull, The Far Distant Ships, pp. 166-68; Canada at War, No. 24 (May 43), pp. 3-4;

Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, II, 138-39. 25

 CCS 189/2, approved 29 Mar 43; Minutes, 78th CCS meeting. The fifteen VLR aircraft

for the RCAF were to be provided by the Royal Air Force with subsequent attrition made good

by the U.S. AAF.
250 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Still another air measure was adopted to reduce the vulnerability of convoys in the mid-ocean region which has been outside the range of landbased aircraft. The conference worked out a plan for shuttle service of the

VLR aircraft of the three countries between bases in Newfoundland, the

United Kingdom, and Iceland. With the eventual receipt of its Liberator

aircraft in June 1943, the RCAF VLR squadron stationed in Newfoundland

could now patrol to Iceland or the United Kingdom, refuel, and make the

round trip flight. Improved antisubmarine equipment and techniques made

the air cover even more effective.

In partial fulfillment of its commitment, the United States in April

added two antisubmarine squadrons, the 6th and 19th, to its air forces at

Gander, while a headquarters detachment of the 25th Antisubmarine Wing

was established in the combined Royal Canadian Navy-RCAF control room

at St. John's. In consequence of a decision taken at the Atlantic Convoy

Conference, operational control of these forces passed on 30 April to Canada,

which exercised a general control through the designation of missions without prescribing tactics and techniques.26

Aided by the improvement in flying conditions that came with the spring,

the expanded air effort was able to assist in turning the tide of the

submarine war by the middle of 1943. The Battle of the Atlantic was by

no means over, but the main German submarine effort had shifted away

from the North American coastal waters. At the end of August 1943, when

the United States had already partly moved its air antisubmarine units from

Newfoundland to the United Kingdom, the aircraft based on Newfoundland

and Nova Scotia for patrol purposes, both very long range and coastal,

numbered as follows:

 27

Very long Long and medium

range range

United States Army Air Forces ......................1 2 0

United States Navy............................... . 7 0

Royal Canadian Air Force......................... . 14 142

Another factor contributing to the shift was the employment, beginning

in the spring of 1943, of naval support groups which also contained escort

carriers. These groups operated independently of the convoys and their

escort groups. Aided by the search capabilities of their aircraft, they could

rove at will to seek out enemy submarines, establish and maintain contact

26

 The Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, pp. 150-51. 27

 Ibid., pp. 150, 255.
COMRADES IN ARMS 251

with them, and destroy them. Five such United Kingdom groups, which

included U.S. escort carriers, were operating in the spring of 1943. By the

end of the year, Canada was contributing the greater part of two such support

groups.

Other events in 1943 favored the Allies. The surrender of Italy in September 1943 released additional naval vessels for operations in the Battle

of the Atlantic. The following month Portugal agreed to permit establishment of U.S. and British air and naval bases in the Azores. Operations

from these bases permitted full air coverage of a mid-Atlantic zone in which

enemy submarines had operated with relative impunity.

In early 1944, as a result of the Allied successes of 1943 and the need to

assemble and re-equip the naval forces to be employed in the landings in

France, operational policies changed. The merchant convoys were made

fewer and larger by measures such as the combining of fast and slow convoys. All non-Canadian and some Canadian escort vessels were withdrawn

from convoying duty in the North Atlantic and allocated to other tasks.

The Royal Canadian Navy assumed in its entirety the task of providing

escort groups for the merchant convoys crossing the North Atlantic. In

addition, the Royal Canadian Navy assigned two more support groups to

the North Atlantic area, making a total of four. By this time, too, RCAF

antisubmarine squadron dispositions had been expanded to include a

squadron in Iceland.28

Canada continued to bear this enlarged convoy escort responsibility until

V-E Day. It also took over an increasingly large part of the air antisubmarine effort. At the close of the Battle of the Atlantic, Canada was

providing the bulk of the air units engaged, and Canadian commanders and

staffs controlled the North Atlantic antisubmarine operations based on the

North American mainland, Greenland, and Iceland.29

In the course of discharging these and other tasks the Royal Canadian

Navy grew from six destroyers and a handful of small craft manned by less

than 4,000 active and reserve personnel in August 1939 to a force of over

94,000 personnel and 939 ships of all types. The ships included two cruisers,

two escort carriers, and seventeen destroyers. But the core of the naval

force, over 200 vessels, consisted of Canadian-built frigates, corvettes, and

other miscellaneous craft of the types that made up the major Canadian

naval contribution to victory in the Battle of the Atlantic.

28

 Royal Canadian Navy Progress Report, 12-13 Apr 44 PJBD meeting, PDB 124; H. C.

Debates, 29 Feb 44, p. 1032. 29

 Speech by Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton, 12 Apr 48, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 48/18.
252 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Securing Alaska Against the Japanese

Months before the Japanese actually penetrated the Aleutian Islands, in

1942, Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, Commanding General, Western Defense

Command, which included the western states and Alaska, sought means of

reinforcing the inadequate air defenses of Alaska. On 29 March 1942, after

earlier preliminary meetings, he conferred with the senior Canadian commanders in western Canada, who had also formulated proposals for

strengthening Pacific air defenses. At this meeting the conferees recommended that the Permanent Joint Board consider the deployment of three

additional RCAF squadrons to the area. Two were to be stationed at

Smithers in British Columbia, and the third at the U.S. base on Annette

Island at the southern tip of the Alaskan panhandle, until such time as a

U.S. unit could replace it. From the Canadian viewpoint, the squadron at

Annette Island would not only strengthen Alaskan defenses but also those

of the Prince Rupert area.30

The Permanent Joint Board considered the report on 7 April, and was

informed of RCAF plans to increase the Western Air Command from ten

to twenty-four squadrons. Concurrently, the War Department approved

deployment of a RCAF squadron to Annette Island. The Board also discussed the need for more extensive air reinforcement of Alaska in the event

of Japanese attack. A little over a month later, on 26 May, the RCAF

member was able to report to the Board that plans for such an eventuality

had been completed.31

Royal Canadian Air Force No. 115 Fighter Squadron, consisting of fourteen Bolingbroke aircraft, completed its movement to Annette Island on 5

May, the first Canadian forces to enter U.S. territory to assist in its defense.

Since the stationing of the unit at Annette Island made it available for the

defense of Prince Rupert, the squadron remained under the Canadian operational control of the Officer Commanding, Prince Rupert Defenses. Small

detachments of light and heavy antiaircraft and an airdrome defense company of the Canadian Army were later added to the Annette Island force

for the protection of the RCAF squadron.32

30

 History of the Western Defense Command, II, Ch. 7, 4; Journal, 7 Apr 42 PJBD meeting, PDB 124. For authoritative accounts of U.S. AAF and Navy operations in the Aleutians,

see Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate (eds.), The Army Air Forces in World War II, IV,

The Pacific—Guadalcanal to Saipan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), and Samuel

Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, VII, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951). 31

 Journals, 7 and 27 Apr, and 26 May 42 PJBD meetings, PDB 124. 32

 Journals, 9 Jun and 1 Sep 42 PJBD meetings, PDB 124. In June 1942 the Bolingbrokes

were modified for bombing work and No. 115 Squadron was redesignated Bomber Reconnaissance.
COMRADES IN ARMS 253

In late May 1942 a Japanese attack on the Aleutians was believed to be

imminent. General DeWitt discussed with Maj. Gen. R. O. Alexander,

commanding the Canadian forces in western Canada, the need for RCAF

help in the more forward areas of Alaska. On the basis of this and subsequent discussions, DeWitt believed that a request from him for the

deployment of two additional RCAF squadrons to help meet the anticipated

attack in the Aleutians would receive Canadian approval. The two squadrons were to be stationed in Alaska at Yakutat, near the southwestern

corner of the Yukon Territory, while still another RCAF squadron was to

join the one already at Annette Island. As the anticipated time of attack

approached, DeWitt, who had presented a firm request to Alexander for the

additional squadrons, was informed they could not be made available. The

refusal was apparently the result of an Air Force Headquarters conclusion

that Canadian aircraft should not be sent north of Annette Island, since to

do so would reduce the air forces available for the defense of Prince Rupert.

The Air Force Headquarters conclusion also had the support of the Chief

of the Army General Staff, Lt. Gen. Kenneth Stuart, who on 30 May arrived

in western Canada to assume additional duties as the commander of the

Canadian Army Pacific Command and of the triservice West Coast Defenses

command.33

The disappointed General DeWitt telephoned the War Department and

asked it to intercede in Ottawa for loan of the two squadrons for Yakutat at

least until 8 June. On 1 June an exchange of telephone calls between the

War Department and National Defense Headquarters in Ottawa obtained

the approval, and two RCAF squadrons were ordered to proceed to

Yakutat.34

The RCAF No. 8 Bomber Reconnaissance Squadron of Bolingbrokes

landed at Yakutat on 3 June after a 1,000-mile movement from Sea Island,

British Columbia, and was after a few days transferred to Anchorage. Detachments were sent to Kodiak and Nome for various periods. Canadian

No. 111 Fighter Squadron of P-40's followed by shorter hops from Patricia

Bay to Anchorage. Both units undertook patrol missions immediately upon

their arrival.

The AAF units had meanwhile moved forward to meet the Japanese

task force sighted on 2 June, and engaged Japanese forces which attacked

Dutch Harbor on 3 and 4 June. The concentration of the U.S. air units

in the critical area had been facilitated by the expected arrival of the RCAF

33

 History of the Western Defense Command, II, Ch. 7, 4; Memo, ACofS OPD for SUSAM,

31 May 42, PDB 106-9; Interview, author with Lt Gen DeWitt, 24 Jan 52. 34

 History of the Western Defense Command, II, Ch. 7, 4.
254 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

squadrons in the areas that had been stripped of their U.S. defenses. The

emergency over, the two Canadian squadrons moved to Anchorage. In the

meantime, the Annette Island force has been reinforced during June by the

addition of No. 118 Fighter Squadron so that this force too comprised a

fighter and a bomber reconnaissance squadron. During June RCAF "X"

Wing Headquarters was established at Fort Richardson, Alaska, and control

of the RCAF squadrons in Alaska was assigned to it.35

The movement of RCAF squadrons to, and continued support in,

Alaska created a problem as to the payment of customs duties on their

equipment and supplies. The problem was neatly solved by Secretary of State

Hull, who designated all personnel of the Canadian units as "distinguished

foreign visitors," thereby granting them free entry of goods.36

Canada's No. 111 Fighter Squadron, less a rear base element, was moved

in July 1942 from Anchorage to Umnak, the advance AAF base in the

Aleutian chain. The base echelon moved to Kodiak in October. Flying

elements operated from Umnak and, beginning in late September, from an

advance base at Adak. From Adak, elements of this squadron were participating as part of the AAF Alaskan fighter command in strikes against the

Japanese garrison at Kiska, 200 miles beyond Adak. The operations of the

squadron consisted mainly of bombing and strafing missions against ground

targets, since the Japanese air force had evacuated the Aleutian chain, and

only occasionally was a submarine sighted. When operating from advance

bases without their ground echelons, RCAF elements were furnished the

necessary ground support by AAF units. Such operations continued well

into the winter.

Shifts took place in the RCAF force late in 1942 and early in 1943. The

No. 111 Fighter Squadron in October 1942 moved from Umnak and Anchorage to Kodiak for the defense of that installation, which had also become the

rear RCAF base in Alaska. The No. 8 Bomber Reconnaissance Squadron returned to Canada in February 1943. It was replaced by No. 14 Fighter

Squadron, which accompanied by its own ground echelon established a main

base at Umnak. The No. 14 Fighter Squadron also operated as two echelons,

which alternated between Umnak and Amchitka, the advance base the United

States had developed only seventy-five miles from Kiska and its Japanese gar35

 This and succeeding paragraphs draw upon D. F. Griffin, First Steps to Tokyo: The Royal

Canadian Air Force in the Aleutians (Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1944), a brief narrative

account of the RCAF role in the Aleutians by a public relations officer attached to units stationed there. 36

 Ltr, SUSAM to CG Alaska Defense Command, 23 Jun 42, PDB 126-7; Hull, Memoirs,

II, 1182.
COMRADES IN ARMS 255

rison. By May 1943 the forward element of the RCAF squadron was based

at Amchitka and was participating in the strikes against Kiska whenever the

weather permitted. Pilots of No. 111 Squadron were also sent forward to

participate in these strikes. Both RCAF squadrons were integrated into Task

Unit 16.1.1, which as a part of the North Pacific Force of the U.S. Pacific

Fleet was commanded by Maj. Gen. William O. Butler of the Army Air

Forces. The RCAF force in Alaska thus comprised four squadrons—two

fighter squadrons in the Aleutians, and the fighter and bomber reconnaissance

squadrons at Annette Island—well into the summer of 1943.

After the successful assault and capture of Attu from the Japanese in the

latter half of May 1943, No. 14 Fighter Squadron continued to participate in

strikes on Kiska, the lone remaining Japanese garrison in the Aleutians.

Since an amphibious force containing Canadian Army units was preparing for

the assault of Kiska, the RCAF attacks were supporting not only U.S. forces

but also Canadian ground forces. Of the August 1943 invasion of Kiska and

of the Canadian participation, more will be said shortly. Aircraft of the

RCAF made preinvasion attacks right up to D Day for the amphibious assault. Immediately after the occupation of Kiska by U.S. and Canadian

assault forces, the advance party of the Canadian air squadron was withdrawn

from Amchitka to Umnak.

When the Japanese had been cleared from the Aleutians, Canada withdrew its air forces. The four RCAF squadrons returned to Canada during

August and September 1943. Although the two squadrons at Annette Island

were replaced in August by No. 149 Bomber Reconnaissance and No. 135

Fighter Squadrons, by the end of the year these squadrons, too, together with

the accompanying Canadian Army defensive detachments, had returned to

Canada.

The Royal Canadian Navy was the next of the Canadian armed services

to join with U.S. forces in meeting the Japanese threat to Alaska. In May

1942, anticipating the possible need for additional repair facilities as a result

of the expected Japanese naval offensive into North Pacific waters, the Royal

Canadian Navy placed its Pacific coast base facilities at the disposal of the

U.S. Navy. The June 1942 Japanese occupation of Attu and Kiska and the

threat of further penetrations toward Alaska and western Canada were soon

met by a substantial build-up of U.S. naval forces in Alaskan waters. These

U.S. forces were joined by five Royal Canadian Navy vessels which sailed

from Esquimalt, Vancouver, for Kodiak on 20 August and participated as

part of Task Force Tare, under Rear Adm. Robert Theobald, U.S. Navy, in
256 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

operations for the occupation of Adak on 30 August. Through September

and October 1942, these five Canadian vessels—the armed merchant cruisers

Prince Robert, Prince Henry, and Prince David, and the corvettes Dawson and

Vancouver—continued to operate under U.S. Navy command in convoy escort

operations between Kodiak, Dutch Harbor, and intermediate points.37

Although these Canadian naval forces encountered no enemy units, few

Canadian ships during World War II encountered such severe conditions of

fog and gale as did these forces in the poorly charted, treacherous Aleutian

waters. Soon after the return of the five vessels to Canadian Pacific waters,

the three merchant cruisers were transferred to the Atlantic. Dawson and

Vancouver remained in the Pacific and made a further contribution to Alaskan

operations by aiding in the convoying of forces building up for the Attu and

Kiska operations in the spring of 1943.

Meanwhile, the Japanese foothold in the Aleutians was gradually strengthened until in May 1943 enemy forces on Attu numbered 2,500 and on Kiska

5,400. The United States had reacted quickly to this threat of deeper penetrations into northwestern North America. Reinforced air and naval forces

bombarded the Japanese garrisons and attempted to cut off their support and

prevent reinforcement. United States forces then assaulted Attu, at the end

of the chain of islands, on 12 May 1943 and achieved full control of it on 28

May after bloody and bitter fighting. The success of the Attu assault made

the isolated Japanese position on Kiska more difficult. But aided by fog and

bad weather, the enemy was able to support the garrison, which was strongly

established in fortified positions reinforced with mines and wire obstacles.

It was for the reduction of Kiska, the last major enemy foothold in

North America, that Canada and the Canadian Army prepared to make major

contributions. Canadian participation in the assault operations was first discussed in April 1943 by General DeWitt of the Western Defense Command

and Maj. Gen. G. R. Pearkes, commanding the Canadian Army Pacific Command. On 10 May the desirability of such a contribution was informally

considered in Washington by the Senior Canadian Army Member of the

Permanent Joint Board, Maj. Gen. Maurice Pope, and its U.S. secretary,

John Hickerson. The next day, 11 May, Hickerson, in turn, expressed to

the Senior U.S. Army Member of the Board his belief that, since the Canadians had as yet had little opportunity to fight, an invitation to participate

would be gratefully received. Definite proposals were made and accepted,

37

 Office of Naval Intelligence Combat Narrative, The Aleutian Campaign (Washington:

1945), pp. 19, 21; Canada, Naval Service Headquarters, Royal Canadian Navy Monthly Review,

No. 5 (May 42), p. 8; Schull, The Far Distant Ships, pp. 122-23.
COMRADES IN ARMS 257

and before the end of the month the senior U.S. and Canadian commanders

on the Pacific coast were preparing detailed plans.38

The plans called for two Canadian forces. The first, comprising an

infantry battalion and a light antiaircraft battery, would move to Amchitka

or Attu in mid-June for garrison duty. The second would consist of a

brigade group (regimental combat team) suitable for amphibious assault

operations. Ottawa on 3 June approved the employment of the brigade

group in the Kiska operation. The plan for the other force was dropped.

Brigadier Harry W. Foster returned to Canada from the United Kingdom to

assume command of the Canadian 13th Infantry Brigade, which was reorganized and given the code name GREENLIGHT. The force comprised four

infantry battalions (Canadian Fusiliers, Winnipeg Grenadiers, Rocky Mountain Rangers, and Le Regiment de Hull), the 24th Field Regiment, Royal

Canadian Artillery, and engineer and machine gun companies and a medical

detachment. The battalion Le Régiment de Hull was reorganized and

equipped to provide the amphibious engineer support needed.39

The original plan for movement of forces for the assault on Kiska, Operation COTTAGE, had called for departure of the 13th Brigade from Vancouver

on 1 August, but the entire schedule was advanced a month. The necessary

reorganizations and intensive training were urgently pressed. Brigade headquarters adopted the U.S. Army staff patterns. The Canadian weapons of

the force were augmented by U.S. 81-mm. mortars and 75-mm. pack

howitzers. All other equipment—engineer, signal, medical, and quartermaster, including vehicles—was supplied by the United States. To avoid the

Canadian customs difficulties involved in shipping U.S. matériel across the

border into Canada for the Canadian brigade, shipment and delivery were

made to the U.S. liaison officer with the force, who then turned it over to

the Canadians.

Before the Canadian force could leave Canada, the status of many of its

members had to be clarified. Large numbers of men in the force had been

compulsorily called up for training and home defense military service under

the National Resources Mobilization Act of 1940, and they could be employed outside of Canada and its territorial waters only on a voluntary basis

38

 Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945, p. 289; Ltr, Hickerson to SUSAM, 11 May 43,

D/S Dominion Affairs Office file, PJBD 1943. Until the invasion of Sicily in July 1943, the

Canadian Army force built up in Europe had taken part only in the Dieppe and other smaller

raids. For a statement by Minister of National Defense Ralston on this problem, see H. C.

Debates, 15 Feb 44, pp. 516-18. 39

 The remainder of this account is based on Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945, pp.

233, 289-91; History of the Western Defense Command, II, Ch. 7; and Alaskan Department,

Official History of the Alaskan Department, pp. 117-45.
258 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

unless the Canadian Government took special action.40 An order-in-council

of 18 June 1943 authorized the use of such personnel in the Aleutian Islands.

The Minister of National Defense, in turn, made the order applicable to the

conscripted personnel serving in the 13th Brigade.41

The brigade sailed from Vancouver Island on 12 July 1943 in four U.S.

Army transports, and upon its arrival at Adak on the 19th continued its

training, specializing in amphibious operations. Here its staff was thrown

into intimate contact with American staffs and planners. The differences in

organization and terminology were so great that at times the two groups

seemed hardly to speak the same language. Upon its arrival in Alaska for

the Kiska operation, the GREENLIGHT force totaled 4,800.

At about the same time that this force departed from Vancouver, another

component of the Kiska assault force, also representing a Canadian contribution to the operation, sailed from San Francisco. The First Special Service Force, the unique formation whose three combat regiments were composed

of Canadians and Americans intermingled without regard to nationality, was

also earmarked to play an important role in the assault.42

The combined Canadian and U.S. ground forces for the assault numbered

over 34,000 and were organized as Amphibian Training Force 9 under U.S.

Maj. Gen. Charles H. Corlett. Units assigned to the Northern Sector were

the U.S. 184th Infantry Regiment, the Canadian 13th Infantry Brigade, and

the 3d Regiment of the First Special Service Force. Assigned to the Southern Sector were the U.S. 87th Mountain Infantry Regiment, the U.S. 17th

Infantry Regiment, and the 1st Regiment of the First Special Service Force.

The U.S. 53d Infantry Regiment and the First Special Service Force (less two

regiments) comprised the floating reserve. On 13 August, with training and

briefing of troops completed and D Day set for 15 August, the force sailed

for Kiska. In both sectors, First Special Service Force units had been selected

to lead the assaults. In the Southern Sector, the 1st Regiment reached the

island at 0120 on 15 August and quickly occupied all objectives. By noon,

the southern portion of the island had been scoured and found devoid of the

enemy. However, the possibility remained that the Japanese were holding

out on the northern half of the island and Northern Sector operations there40

 The conscription issue was as much debated in Canada in World War II as in World

War I. For accounts thereof, see the volumes on Canada in World Affairs by Dawson, Lingard and Trotter, and Soward, particularly the last. 41

 H. C. Debates, 11 Feb 44, p. 383. This action added fuel to the conscription debate,

since the opposition charged that Kiska was outside the area, that is, "Canada and Canadian

territorial waters," intended for employment of National Resources Mobilization Act personnel.

Orders-in-council passed during 1942 and early 1943 had already extended such employment

to include Newfoundland, Labrador, and Alaska. 42

 The story of this special unit is more fully narrated below, pp. 259-68.
COMRADES IN ARMS 259

fore proceeded as planned. With the initial objectives achieved, both forces

moved out to establish full control over the twenty-five-mile-long island.

When all objectives had been achieved and operations had ended, the

reason for the silence that had greeted the initial landings and subsequent

operations was apparent. The Japanese had succeeded in evacuating their

garrison without detection on 28 July, three weeks before the assault. Fog,

coupled with a withdrawal from the area of U.S. Navy forces for refueling,

had given the Japanese the opportunity they needed to evacuate their troops.

After the intensive preparations that had been made, the assault had proved

to be a major anticlimax. Nevertheless, the troops involved were spared

what would undoubtedly have been bitter fighting at the cost of many

casualties.

The First Special Force immediately returned to the United States, arriving before the end of August, but the Canadian 13th Infantry Brigade was

subjected to the bitter Aleutian weather for almost four months. Not until

12 January 1944 did the 13th Brigade depart for British Columbia.

It was particularly fitting that Canada, which had engaged in the defense

of North America for twenty-five months preceding Pearl Harbor, should

join in the operations that rid North America of its last enemy garrison.

Fortunately, Canadian casualties in Alaska were light, numbering 2 killed

and 4 wounded in the Canadian Army units and 17 dead or missing and 3

wounded in the RCAF units.

The First Special Service Force

A remarkable facet of Canadian-U.S. military collaboration during World

War II was the creation of the First Special Service Force.43 Unique in its

composition, training, equipment, and organization, and outstanding in its

fighting ability, the force was an experiment without parallel in the history

of the Canadian and U.S. Armies. It had its beginnings in the spring of

1942 when Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, British Chief of Combined Operations, succeeded in interesting General Marshall (who was in

London to discuss a cross-Channel operation) in a diversionary operation

called PLOUGH. The concept underlying PLOUGH was that a force specially

trained and equipped to operate over snow could, by its superior capabilities

in this "fourth element" of warfare, achieve major strategic gains through

sabotage raids on Norwegian and Alpine hydroelectric and Rumanian oilproducing installations, as well as divert German forces from the projected

cross-Channel invasion. Since the British were unable to produce in suffi43

 For a full history of the force, based on its records and written by one of its officers, see

Robert D. Burhans, The First Special Service Force (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947).
260 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

cient time the principal matériel requirement, an oversnow vehicle of superior

mobility, Mountbatten offered the entire project to General Marshall, who

accepted it.

The War Department, on Marshall's return to Washington, arranged with

other government agencies for development work on the snow vehicle. The

U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development and the War Production

Board made rapid progress in the design and production of the vehicle,

which was named the Weasel.44 The U.S. agencies also recruited the services

of the Canadian National Research Council to assist in the work.

As the officer most familiar with the project, Lt. Col. Robert T. Frederick,

who had carried out the War Department studies thereon, was directed on

16 June 1942 to assume responsibility for organizing and commanding the

First Special Service Force. His directive contemplated that the force might

comprise United Kingdom, Canadian, and Norwegian personnel, as well as

American.45 United Kingdom or Norwegian participation in the force did

not materialize, although the expert services of a few ski instructors and

intelligence specialists, mostly Norwegian, were used in planning PLOUGH

and preparing the force.

Canada began to consider participating in the PLOUGH project during

June 1942. Mountbatten, who had been sent by Churchill to Washington

in early June, and Frederick had flown to Ottawa to discuss the matter with

General Stuart, Chief of the General Staff, and other Canadian officials. On

20 June the Canadian military planning representative in Washington reported to Ottawa the suggestion of Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, U.S.

Army Deputy Chief of Staff, that a request might be made to Canada to supply 500 officers and other ranks for the PLOUGH force. Prime Minister King

endorsed Canadian participation, and on 14 July provision of a contingent of

47 officers and 650 other ranks was approved.

While the PLOUGH force was being organized, detailed planning for its

employment continued. A decision was reached in favor of an operation in

Norway, but it was never to materialize. The plan for a Norway operation

received its death blow during a September trip to London of the force commander. There Colonel Frederick learned that lack of aircraft for transporting equipment had required cancellation of the operation.

The Canadian Army General Staff, on being advised on 8 October 1942

of the cancellation of the Norway operation, considered withdrawing the

Canadian personnel from the PLOUGH force. But because of a request from

44

 For an account of the Canadian role in the development of the Weasel, see Wilfrid Eggleston, Scientists at War (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1950), pp. 97-100. 45

 Text of the directive is reproduced in Burhans, The First Special Service Force, p. 11.
COMRADES IN ARMS 261

RETREAT CEREMONY AT FORT WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON, Montana, for members of the First Special Service Force, 1943.

General Marshall, who now visualized employment of the force in the

Caucasus and pointed out the disruptive effect that withdrawal of the Canadian element would have on this highly trained and specialized unit, Canada

decided to continue to participate. A condition of Cabinet War Committee

approval of continuing participation was the right to review any operational

project that might be contemplated.46

The First Special Service Force had meanwhile been activated at Fort

William Henry Harrison, Helena, Montana, on 19 July 1942. A rapid inflow

of Canadian and U.S. personnel had begun, after a careful screening of

volunteers from Canadian and U.S. camps had taken place. A WashingtonOttawa press release on 6 August 1942 made public the activation of this

unique Canadian-U.S. force of hand-picked volunteers.47 Each member had 46

 Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945, p. 297. 47

 Canadian officials, who looked upon the force as a joint undertaking, considered as unfortunate the statement in the War Department press release that this was "the first time in history that Canadian troops have served as a part of a U.S. Army unit."
262 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

to meet rigid physical requirements, and was to receive specialized training

for offensive warfare, including parachute, amphibious landing, and mountain

and desert warfare training. The mention of desert warfare in the press

release was apparently designed to obscure the real planned role in the

Norwegian snows.

The force was organized into a combat element of 108 officers and 1,167

enlisted men, and a service battalion of 25 officers and 521 enlisted men.

The service echelon was made up wholly of Americans and provided all supply, administrative, messing, and similar facilities, leaving the combat echelon

entirely free of these housekeeping duties. The combat echelon comprised

force headquarters and three regiments of two battalions each. Each battalion was divided into three companies, each company into three platoons,

and each platoon into two sections, the basic fighting units of nine men each.

Within the combat echelon, Canadians and Americans were integrated

without regard to nationality. Officer and noncommissioned officer appointments were initially allotted on a proportionate basis to personnel of both

countries. Thereafter, promotions were made on the basis of ability, without

regard to nationality. This system proved highly successful and resulted in

an approximately equal division of promotions.

When assembled, the conglomeration of former cowhands, miners, and

woodsmen who had been recruited for the force undertook an accelerated

training program, which included a rigorous program of physical hardening.

After early parachute qualification, each member of the force was given intensive training in the use of all types of weapons the force carried, in operation of the Weasel, and in demolitions, rock climbing, skiing, and hand-tohand combat. Throughout the training process in Montana, a substantial

rate of transfers from the force was maintained as individuals showed lack of

will, stamina, or other essential qualifications. On 11 April 1943 the force

proceeded to Camp Bedford, Virginia, to complete its preparation with a

program of amphibious training.

The equipment of the force was as unusual as its composition. After

cancellation of the Norway operation, the force's weapons and equipment

were augmented so that they included the Weasel, the Browning light

machine gun, the submachine gun, the then new 2.36-inch antitank rocket

launcher (bazooka), the Johnson automatic rifle, the 60-mm. mortar, and the

flame thrower. The additions reflected the change in concept for employment of the force from sabotage to powerful and sustained combat assault.

The two governments in January 1943 formally confirmed the over-all

administrative arrangements drafted by the military staffs when the force was

formed. The Canadian Government undertook to provide pay for its per-
COMRADES IN ARMS 263

CANADIAN AND U.S. SOLDIERS OF THE FIRST SPECIAL SERVICE FORCE at bayonet

practice, Fort William Henry Harrison.

sonnel and transportation costs for their initial move to Helena, and to repay

the United States the cost of the rations issued to Canadian personnel. The

U.S. Government undertook to house, equip, and clothe the force (less the

outfit worn to Helena by Canadian personnel), and to provide the transportation and medical services required.

The matter of the relative pay scales, which favored the Americans, was

apparently the only unhappy aspect of the relationship of the force to its two

sponsoring governments. Repeated efforts were made to place the Canadian

personnel on the same pay scale as the Americans. Every effort was disapproved by the Department of National Defense in Ottawa, which saw no

more justification in this situation than in others where Canadians served

alongside Americans. Fortunately the different rates, though a source of

typical soldier griping, did not affect force morale seriously even when the

force moved overseas and U.S. pay scales were augmented by 10 percent for

officers and 20 percent for enlisted men.

Administrative details posed no particular problem for the U.S. component, for the force trained and operated within the framework of the logistical and supporting U.S. Army establishment. When the force later moved

to Europe, the logistical arrangement increased the administrative complica-
264 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

tions for the Canadian component, which for Canadian administrative

purposes had been designated the 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion.

The commander of this formation was the senior Canadian officer present

(initially the force executive and later one of the regimental commanders).

Until the First Special Service Force moved from North America, the

Canadian component was administered by the Department of National

Defense in Ottawa through the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington. Since

there would be no guarantee that the force would serve within easy communication of any other Canadian unit after the move from North America,

it became necessary to authorize the Canadian battalion to issue certain types

of orders, maintain field documents, and perform other functions normally

assigned to a higher echelon. On the force's arrival in Italy, where the

Canadian Army administrative facilities were available, the Canadian battalion yielded these functions to the higher echelons normally responsible,

although the channel of communication continued to run from these echelons

directly to Ottawa, instead of through Canadian Military Headquarters in the

United Kingdom as was normal for Canadian units in Europe. Use of this

channel of communication caused difficulties through considerable delays in

reporting casualties and other matters. In August 1944 the personnel

records of the battalion were transferred from Ottawa to Canadian Military

Headquarters, thus restoring administrative channels of communication to a

more normal basis. These administrative complications were in the over-all

so small and were handled so competently by the Canadian administrative

personnel that they were hardly apparent to U.S. members of the force staff,

and they had no practical impact on the force's fighting capabilities.

The thorough integration of Canadians and Americans within the force

presented special problems in the exercise of command and administration of

discipline. To solve certain of these, an order-in-council authorized (1) every

Canadian officer in the force to exercise the disciplinary powers of a detachment commander with respect to Canadian personnel, (2) Canadian personnel to be commanded, but not disciplined or punished, by U.S. personnel of superior rank, and (3) detention of Canadians, if placed under

arrest, in places provided by the United States.48 Disciplinary powers within

the Canadian battalion thus remained vested in its Canadian officers. The

Canadian commanding officer was given broader powers than those normally

granted a battalion commander.

The impending departure of the force from the United States necessitated

a grant of the power to convene field general courts-martial and, subject to

48

 Privy Council 629, 26 Jan 43.
COMRADES IN ARMS 265

certain limitations, to confirm the findings and sentences imposed by them.

After the Kiska operation was completed and while the force was preparing

to depart for Italy, the powers of the commanding officer were further enlarged by granting him authority to mitigate, commute, or remit punishments and by removing most of the limitations on his power to sentence.

In practice, a pattern of uniformity developed in the handling of all but the

more serious offenses so that Canadian and U.S. members of the force were

hardly aware that they were being disciplined under two different codes of

military law.

An additional Canadian administrative difficulty arose from the need to

supply trained parachutists from time to time as replacements, once the force

was in an advanced state of training. Since there was no other source of

trained parachutists, a request in December 1942 for one hundred replacements was filled by taking them from the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion,

with a consequent undesirable effect on its operational readiness and morale.

As a result of a recommendation by the Chief of the General Staff on 20 April

1943, the decision was reached to furnish no further replacements on the

grounds that the agreed Canadian share had been furnished and that, once

committed to a special mission, no reinforcement whatsoever would take

place. Nevertheless, a portion of the Canadian deficiency in September 1943

was supplied after the Kiska operation and before the force's departure for

Italy.

Once the force was in Italy and committed operationally, the question of

Canadian replacements again arose. While the U.S. component drew easily

on the U.S. personnel replacement system, the Canadian policy of nonreinforcement in the theater caused the Canadian strength to fall almost 40 percent below normal by May 1944. Because of this situation, the First Canadian

Army commander, General Kenneth Stuart, had recommended in January

1944 that the Canadian component be withdrawn. Before a final decision

was reached the force became heavily engaged at Anzio, and, in addition,

General Dwight D. Eisenhower expressed the opinion that it would be a

mistake to withdraw the Canadian component. General Stuart then recommended that Canadian participation be continued but that the U.S. practice

of using ordinary infantry replacements be adopted. This practice was

followed for the remainder of the time the force was in existence.

A minor element of administrative discord in regard to the Canadian

component arose over the matter or awards and decorations. Canadians in the

First Special Service Force had been awarded twenty-nine U.S. decorations by

October 1944, whereas not a single British award had been received. The

difficulty stemmed from the fact that Canadian members of the force com-
266 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

peted on the same basis as U.S. troops of the U.S. army to which the force

might be assigned for the very small number of British decorations awarded

within that army. In October 1944 the Canadian battalion was placed on

the same basis for British awards as other British and Canadian personnel in

the theater so that its personnel ultimately received seventeen British awards

in addition to a total of seventy U.S. decorations.

Only the highlights of the excellent combat record of this unit can be

mentioned here.49 By early June 1943, a number of Canadian and U.S.

training inspections had rated the force ready for combat. On 9 June 1943

the War Department directed movement of the force to San Francisco and,

on 12 June, obtained the approval of the Canadian Department of National

Defense for its use on Kiska. The over-all and broader Canadian participation in the Kiska assault, which unexpectedly found the enemy departed, has

already been recounted.

Having returned to San Francisco by 1 September 1943, the force a few

weeks later sailed from Hampton Roads, Virginia, for North Africa on 28

October as a result of a request from General Eisenhower, who contemplated

using it for raids, sabotage, and guerrilla operations in Italy, southern France,

or the Balkans. After only a few days in North Africa the First Special Service Force sailed for Italy to join the Fifth Army. The baptism of fire occurred

on 3 December in the Mignano sector in Italy, where the force was engaged

for six days in difficult operations to capture Monte la Difensa and Monte la

Remetanea. Force casualties totaled 80 killed or missing and 350 wounded.

Committed again on Christmas Day, 1943, the force remained engaged until

10 January 1944, capturing several critical hill masses at great cost.

After a move by sea from Naples to Anzio, the force on 2 February took

over an 11,000-yard sector along the Mussolini Canal on the east flank of the

beachhead. Here, until its relief on 9 May 1944, the force using highly effective raiding tactics played an important role in the beachhead defense. In

action again at the breakout, a detachment of the 1st Regiment was, on 4

June, one of the first Allied elements to make a permanent entry into Rome.

Two days later, on 6 June, after its brief but costly participation in the

breakout operations, the force was relieved to ready itself for operations in

southern France as part of the U.S. Seventh Army, which comprised U.S. and

French troops.

In the invasion of southern France the First Special Service Force easily

accomplished its D-Day task of capturing the two easternmost of the Iles

49 See Burhans, The First Special Service Force.
COMRADES IN ARMS 267

d'Hyéres on 15 August 1944.50 After transferring to the mainland a few

days later, the force advanced rapidly eastward along the Riviera coast and by

9 September had taken up a position behind the Franco-Italian boundary.

The force held this position until 28 November, when it was withdrawn to

a rear area for inactivation.

Although the possibility that the First Special Service Force might be

disbanded had been weighed earlier in 1944 in Ottawa, where by that time

Canadian participation was considered an unnecessary dispersion of Canadian

resources, serious consideration was not given to the matter until Ottawa on

12 October 1944 received an indication from the War Department that inactivation was being contemplated by the United States. The War Department notified the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington on 28 October of its

decision to disband the force, and the Minister of National Defense concurred. Inactivation of the First Special Service Force took place near

Villeneuve-Loubet in France on 5 December 1944 with a farewell parade and

memorial service. After the force flag was furled, the Canadian component

withdrew from the force to form its own battalion and march past the U.S.

component. The next day the Canadian battalion of 37 officers and 583

other ranks quit the force bivouac area, and its parachutists were sent to the

United Kingdom as reinforcements for the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion.

A month later a large part of the U.S. component moved to northern France

as replacements for the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions. The remaining

personnel were assigned to the concurrently activated 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate), which when brought to strength had little resemblance to

the original force.

Throughout its combat history, the First Special Service Force engaged

but little in the highly specialized types of operations for which it had been

trained. Despite its special equipment and training, the force never made a

parachute assault or operated in snow country, and, of its two amphibious

operations, one was unopposed. Nevertheless, it had proved itself in battle

in difficult assault and raiding operations. On the other hand, the force represented a costly expenditure of resources and a complex administrative effort,

particularly to Canada because of the force's distance from Canadian administrative machinery. Furthermore, the very nature and status of the force

required frequent attention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to proposals for

employment of this group of less than 2,000 men, as well as diplomatic exchanges to obtain Canadian acceptance of proposals—all in all an inordinate

50

 Two Canadian troopships Prince Henry and Prince Baudouin carried part of the force

in the Hyéres landings.
268 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

amount of high-level consideration in relation to the size of the force. But

from the point of view of Canadian-U.S. relations, the unique experiment

was a remarkable success.

Canadian Army Pacific Force

During the last year of the war Canada planned and began to implement

a substantial participation in operations against Japan in close association

with U.S. forces. During the Second Quebec Conference of the political and

military leaders of the United States and United Kingdom in September

1944, the Chief of the Canadian General Staff made known to the visiting

chiefs of staff of both countries the desire of the Canadian Government to

have its armed forces participate in the war against Japan after the defeat of

Germany, not in more remote areas such as Southeast Asia, but in the Central and North Pacific, where they could share in the final assault on Japan

proper. Prime Minister Churchill's advocacy of the Canadian aspirations at

the last session of the conference won the approval of the President and the

Combined Chiefs of Staff, and a brief statement accepting Canadian participation in principle was added to the final report of the conference.51

Two months later, on 20 November, the Canadian Cabinet War Committee approved a plan for a force of one division, with supporting troops,

to be integrated into the U.S. military commands. The chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff on 9 December 1944 advised General Marshall of the Cabinet

War Committee action and of the probable readiness of the force for dispatch from Canada for active operations six months after V-E Day. During this period the force would be organized in Europe, returned to North

America, granted a month's leave, equipped, and trained. The Canadian

Joint Staff sought the views of the War Department on the strength, composition, and organization of the force and on operational and logistical

aspects of its contemplated employment.52 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to

whom General Marshall referred the Canadian plan, on 21 December 1944

accepted it with the understanding that the force would be available for use

in any of the operations to be mounted in the Pacific. In so notifying the

chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff, the U.S. Joint Chiefs stated that uncertainty as to the availability date of the force precluded a decision as to its

employment.53

51

 Aide-mémoire, given to General Marshall by the Chief of the Canadian General Staff, 16

Sep 44, ABC 384 Canada (15 Sep 44); CCS 680/2, 16 Sep 44; Minutes, 2d Plenary Meeting,

OCTAGON Conference Book; H. C. Debates, 4 Apr 45, p. 434. The Canadian decision was

taken in Cabinet on 6 September 1944. 52

 Ltr, 9 Dec 44, ABC 384 Canada (18 Sep 44). 53

 JCS 1198, 21 Dec 44.
COMRADES IN ARMS 269

Three months later, on 28 March 1945, Maj. Gen. H. F. G. Letson, head

of the Canadian Joint Staff, called on U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff

General Thomas T. Handy to ask what the next step should be and to suggest a general discussion of the problems arising in connection with the proposed force. As a result of the interview, the Canadian Joint Staff presented

specific proposals to General Handy on 23 April. The Canadian Government felt that the force should be organized along U.S. Army lines to facilitate staff arrangements for movement, maintenance, and operation.54

 As a

means of expediting the reorganization and training, it was suggested that

Canadian cadres be first trained in the United States. These cadres would

in turn carry out the necessary training within the force, which would not

be trained for amphibious operations. Canada preferred to use its own

equipment, but it was prepared to utilize U.S. equipment, except for the

distinctive Canadian uniform, to the extent that the War Department considered necessary. Expenses connected with equipping and maintaining the

force were to be borne by Canada. The Canadians asked for U.S. views on

these proposals in order that their plans might go forward, and they also

offered to furnish a planning team to work with the appropriate U.S.

authorities.55

The War Department outlined the Canadian proposals to General of

the Army Douglas MacArthur, who was engaged in planning for the invasion of Japan, and suggested that a Canadian infantry division be accepted

for use as a follow-up unit in Operation CORONET, the invasion of Honshu

Island. General MacArthur gave his concurrence, and the Canadian plan

was then considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 15 May the Joint

Chiefs notified General Letson that the following basis was considered suitable for Canadian participation:

a. The force should comprise a reinforced infantry division totaling

30,000, possibly to include armor, to be employed as a follow-up unit in the

invasion of Japan itself.

b. The force should train in the United States and be organized along

U.S. lines unless this would delay employment.

c. Equipment, except for uniforms, should be of U.S. types and the

force should be supplied in the same manner as the U.S. troops.

54

 General A. G. L. McNaughton, Minister of National Defense from November 1944 to

August 1945 and a postwar Canadian PJBD chairman, in 1948 stated that a primary reason

for this step was to obtain experience with the U. S. system of organization "in view of the

obvious necessity for the future to co-ordinate the defense of North America." (Department

of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches No. 48/18, 12 Apr 48.) 55

 JCS 1198/1, 15 May 45.
270 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

d. The force would be returned from the Pacific in a priority consistent with that applied to all forces.56

On 21 May 1945 General Letson was able to report to the Joint Chiefs of

Staff not only the agreement of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff but also the

fact that a planning team was already at work in Washington.57

Immediately after the German surrender on 8 May 1945, Canadian forces

in Europe were canvassed for volunteers. Although over 78,000 had

volunteered by mid-July, only some 39,000 were accepted as of age and category suitable for the force. This number was far short of the total needed since

it had been estimated that, in addition to the 30,000-man force, 33,600 personnel would have to be trained as replacements.58

The formation of the 6th Canadian Infantry Division had meanwhile

been approved in Ottawa on 1 June 1945, as was a special Pacific campaign

pay bonus for members of the force when they departed Canada. Training

cadres for the force, which was to assemble at Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky, in early September, were enrolled in appropriate U.S. Army schools

and numbered about 325 officers and 1,300 other ranks by mid-August.

When Japan surrendered, plans were well in hand to convert the Canadian

"brigades" to "regiments," field artillery "regiments" to "battalions," and

otherwise mold the Canadian force to the U.S. pattern.59

Immediately after the Japanese surrender, the chairman of the Canadian

Joint Staff advised the War Department that Canada was canceling the

movement of further personnel but would formally notify the United States

of its intention to drop plans for the force only when it was certain that

hostilities would not be resumed. On 31 August 1945 the formal notification was given.60

 Although the Japanese surrender forestalled participation

by Canadian forces in the operations against Japan, Canada expressed no

desire to have those forces participate in the occupation that was undertaken

immediately by U.S. forces. Nor did Canada join the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, established in Japan the following year, comprising Australian, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and Indian units.61

Long before V-J Day Canada also made efforts to have RCAF units participate in the Pacific war in collaboration with the U.S. Army Air Forces.

After touring the Pacific combat areas, RCAF Air Vice Marshal L. F. Steven56

 Ibid. The 30,000 figure comprised the division with supporting and service units and an

initial increment of replacements. 57

 JCS 1198/2, 22 May 45. 58

 Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945, p. 292. 59 Ibid.; H. C. Debates, 18 Feb 48, p. 1350. 60

 Memo for Record, 18 Aug 45, OPD 336.2 (18 Aug 45); JCS 1198/4, 4 Sep 45. 61

 Department of State Bulletin. February 10, 1946, XIV, 220-22.
COMRADES IN ARMS 271

son returned reportedly unimpressed by British operations and determined to

recommend that the RCAF operate with U.S. forces. As a result of informal discussions between the U.S. military attache in Ottawa and Air Marshal R. Leckie, the U.S. Ambassador in Ottawa suggested to Washington

that here was an opportunity to have the RCAF adopt U.S. equipment if

the problem of Canadian inability to purchase the aircraft could be solved.62

The Ambassador's suggestion was studied in the War Department, where

General Arnold, commanding the Army Air Forces, approved the proposal

as being in line with AAF long-range policy to get all the countries of the

Western Hemisphere to standardize on U.S. equipment. In replying to the

Secretary of State, the Secretary of War suggested that the Canadians submit

a formal request for U.S. air force matériel. After the Department of State

informally advised the War Department that the RCAF could not, for

political reasons, formally submit a request, the two departments sought

other means of solving the problem.63

On learning that AAF officials were interested in discussing the scheme,

Air Marshal Leckie came to Washington in mid-March 1945. There the

AAF offered him enough Boston medium bomber (A-20) aircraft to equip

several squadrons. Leckie stated he was not interested in equipping RCAF

units destined for the Pacific with an outmoded type of aircraft, and the discussions ended.64

 To the Canadians, the offer, almost inevitably doomed to

rejection, seemed to be evidence that the AAF wanted to run the air war

in the Pacific without any outside help.65

Canadian officials discontinued efforts to participate with the AAF and

proceeded with plans for a Pacific air effort in co-operation with the RAF.

At the time of the Japanese surrender, plans were going forward for the formation of a TIGER Force of eight RCAF heavy bomber squadrons. But

with the signing of the act of Japanese surrender, these plans, like those for

the Canadian Army Pacific Force, were dropped and the units disbanded.

In the final stages of the Japanese war, Canadian Army participation

comprised two small special units and a number of individual observers,

while the RCAF was supporting two transport squadrons in Burma and

a coastal squadron in Ceylon. The Royal Canadian Navy alone of the Canadian armed forces engaged the enemy in the closing stages of the war

62

 Ltr, 22 Nov 44, to Hickerson, D/S 740.0011 P.W./11-2244. 63

 Ltr, SW to Secy State, 29 Jan 45, D/S Office of Dominion Affairs file, PJBD 1945. 64

 Memo for File, J. G. Parsons, 6 Apr 45, D/S Office of Dominion Affairs file, PJBD 1945. 65

 Memo/Conv, Lewis Clark and Deputy Minister for Air Herbert Gordon, 14 May 45, OPD

336.2 Canada (24 Jun 45). With the RCAF by that date planning to operate with the RAF,

Gordon indicated that the Canadian preference still would have been to operate with U.S. forces.
272 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

against Japan in what had become a predominantly U.S. theater of operations.66

At the time of the Second Quebec Conference and its endorsement of

Canadian participation in the Pacific war, the Royal Canadian Navy had

plans in hand for a Pacific force of two cruisers, two light fleet aircraft carriers, appropriate smaller vessels, and 22,000 personnel. In the next month

the Cabinet War Committee approved a somewhat modified program which

eliminated the carriers and some of the smaller ships.67 The modified program, calling for sixty ships and 13,500 personnel, was by early 1945 in the

early stages of implementation.

Of the Canadian naval forces operating against the Japanese, HMCS

Uganda, a cruiser, was the only ship actually to take part in the fighting

alongside U.S. and other Allied vessels. Having arrived in Australian waters

on 9 March 1945, Uganda left the forward base at Leyte in the Philippines

on 6 April to join British Task Force 57, which was operating under the

command of the U.S. Fifth Fleet during the assault on Okinawa. It did

picket duty in a force that included four British Fleet aircraft carriers. In

subsequent operations against the Japanese, Uganda bombarded a Miyako

Island airfield and Truk, and participated in strikes against Kure, Kobe, and

Nagoya on the main Japanese island of Honshu. Scheduled for duty with

the Canadian forces preparing to assist in the final assault on the Japanese

home islands, Uganda departed western Pacific waters for Canada on 27 July

to be remanned by volunteers for Pacific duty. On V-J Day Uganda was

at Esquimalt, Vancouver Island, and two other Royal Canadian Navy ships

were en route to the British Pacific Fleet—Ontario in the Red Sea and Prince

Robert at Sydney, Australia.68 The war with Japan ended just as Canada's

plans for large-scale participation were nearing fruition.

66

 Two Canadian infantry battalions that arrived at Hong Kong shortly before Pearl Harbor

were part of the valiant British garrison overrun there at the very beginning of the Pacific war.

For this story, see Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945, pp. 273-88. 67

 Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, II, 99-102. 68

 Schull, The Far Distant Ships, pp. 408-13; Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, II, 464-

67.
CHAPTER X

Co-operation in Other Fields

The web of U.S.-Canadian co-operation during World War II spread its

threads throughout many fields other than the activities of the armed services, which themselves involved, over and beyond co-operation in operational

and logistical matters, the working out of many common problems in the

fields of military administration, discipline, training, and supply. Research

and development programs enjoyed a degree of collaboration which guaranteed that the discoveries and advances of each nation were shared by the

other in the many fields of investigation. And, as a partner in the combined

program for atomic energy research, Canada made significant contributions

to the development of the atomic weapon. In the field of arms production,

the two countries worked out extraordinary arrangements to see not only

that the full Canadian production potential was realized but also that the

Canadian economy received enough support to prevent the Canadian war

production effort from having harmful effect.

Extensive co-operation also took place on many matters only indirectly

related to the main military programs of Canada and the United States, some

of which are recorded by other authors or elsewhere in this study.1 A few

examples may be cited. Beginning in 1941, the two countries agreed, for

the duration of the war, to permit increased diversions of the waters of the

Niagara River, above the Falls, as a means of increasing the electric power

supply.2 For a similar purpose, agreement was reached and repeated annually to provide for the raising of the level of the Lake of St. Francis on

the St. Lawrence River.3 Several measures provided for more effective use

of transportation facilities available on the Great Lakes. The two countries

agreed in 1941 reciprocally to relax their load-line regulations in order to

permit lake shipping to carry increased amounts of ores and other materials.4

1

 James, Wartime Economic Co-operation; R. Dougall, "Economic Co-operation with Canada,

1941-1947," Department of State Bulletin, June 22, 1947, XVI, 1185-92, 1246. 2

 EAS, 209, and CTS, 1941, No. 7; EAS, 223, and CTS, 1941, No. 15; Exchange of Notes,

3 May 44, Department of State Bulletin, May 13, 1944, X, 455. 3

 EAS, 291; CTS, 1941, No. 19; and CTS, 1942, No. 18; EAS, 377, and CTS, 1943, No.

15; EAS. 424, and CTS, 1944, No. 26. The last extended the agreement for the duration of

the emergency, subject to annual review. 4

 CTS, 1941, No. 20; Privy Council 5581, 24 Jul 41.
274 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

The United States later lifted its restrictions on the transportation of ores

between U.S. lake ports by Canadian vessels, thus permitting over-all improvement of the ore transportation situation through use of shipping

resources made available by Canada.5

One perennially discussed project, the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence seaway,

is notably missing from the catalog of joint undertakings of Canada and the

United States during World War II. On the eve of Pearl Harbor an executive agreement on the oft-studied project awaited action on the floor of the

House of Representatives. Although a similar treaty signed in 1932 had

been rejected by the Senate in 1934, the 1941 technique of approval of an

executive agreement by simple majorities in the Congress and Parliament

offered promise of success. Although the seaway and power project had

been strongly supported by President Roosevelt as a defense measure before

Pearl Harbor, with U.S. entry into the war Congress deferred consideration

of the project in favor of more urgent undertakings.6

Administration and Personnel

Initially, U.S. citizens who enlisted in the Canadian armed forces before

Pearl Harbor lost their citizenship by being required to take an oath of

allegiance to the British crown. President Roosevelt considered the question

and concluded that U.S. citizens could enlist in the Canadian forces without

loss of citizenship if they were not obliged to take the oath of allegiance.

When this conclusion was conveyed informally to the Canadian Government, it ceased to require the oath from U.S. enlistees.7

Immediately after U.S. entry into the war, U.S. authorities received large

numbers of requests from U.S. citizens and former citizens serving with

Canadian forces for transfer to the armed forces of the United States. The

Permanent Joint Board on Defense discussed the problem on 20 December

1941. Although the Canadian members fully agreed that such transfers

were desirable from a morale standpoint, they expressed concern over the

adverse effects of such a step. For one thing, the instructor staff of the

British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, which included several hundred

5

 PL 90, 416, and 695, 77th Congress. 6

 From the extensive literature on this project, only two official sources are cited as briefly

covering the background and World War II consideration thereof: Department of State Bulletin, November 4, 1945, XIII, 715-19; Department of External Affairs, External Affairs, I, No.

2 (February 1949), 3-11. 7

 Hull, Memoirs, I, 775; Privy Council 2399, 7 Jun 40; 3294, 20 Jul 40; 3511, 30 Jul 40.

At the outbreak of World War II, only British subjects could be enlisted or commissioned in

the Canadian forces. By an order-in-council of 14 September 1939 (Privy Council 2677), Canada created the RCAF Special Reserve, which could accept aliens who were, however, required

to take an oath of allegiance. A few months later, the Canadian Army made similar provi- sions to permit the enlistment of Americans and other aliens.
CO-OPERATION IN OTHER FIELDS 275

Americans, would be disrupted. For another, several thousand Americans

were in the course of being trained, and Canada had already expended many

millions of dollars in training them. The active units from which those

who had completed training would be transferred would also be impaired.

These prospects were not bright ones for Canada, which was already faced

with the virtual drying up of the flow of U.S. enlistees as a result of Pearl

Harbor.8 The Permanent Joint Board was unable to agree on a recommendation on the subject at that meeting. A few days later U.S. Chairman

LaGuardia obtained President Roosevelt's approval of the U.S. Section's

point of view. Canada and the United Kingdom shortly thereafter agreed

in principle to a transfer arrangement, and on 17 January 1942 the President

announced publicly that arrangements were being made. He pointed out,

however, that the need to minimize the impact of transfers on the effectiveness of British and Canadian units would preclude immediate action and

necessitate considerable delays.9

The armed forces in both Canada and the United States continued to

study the technical and administrative problems involved in the transfer.

In March 1942 the United States proposed an agreement based on arrangements tentatively worked out for effecting the transfers. Under the

proposals, U.S. enlistees were to be given the opportunity to apply for transfer between 6 and 20 April 1942. The United States would then send boards

of officers to Canada to interview the applicants, with power to appoint or

enlist them. Similar Canadian boards would discharge or release the personnel but would be empowered to postpone transfers "if in their opinion

immediate transfer would prejudicially affect the common war effort." The

Canadian Government undertook to give effect to the agreement proposed

by the United States.10

A Canadian-American Military Board, headed by Maj. Gen. Guy V.

Henry (retired) who was later to become Senior U.S. Army Member of the

Permanent Joint Board on Defense, visited thirty-three Canadian cities between 5 May and 3 June 1942. The board effected the transfer of 2,058 of

the approximately 5,000 Americans stationed in Canada of the total of

16,000 Americans in the Canadian forces. The AAF received 1,444 of those

transferring, of which 665 were pilots. The transfer of 51 pilots was deferred so as not to interfere with the RCAF training program. Since only

a fraction of those eligible made the transfer, the impact on the Canadian

8

 Journal, PDB 124; Ltr, Hull to Roosevelt, 15 Jan 42, D/S 841.2221/305a. 9

 Journal, PDB 124; Department of State Desp, 20 Jan 42, to U.S. Diplomatic and Consular

Officers in Canada and Newfoundland, D/S 841.2221/306a. 10

 EAS, 245; CTS, 1942, No. 5.
276 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

war effort was smaller than had been anticipated, although the training of

those who did transfer represented a Canadian investment of about $25

million.11

The Canadian-American Military Board on 31 July 1942 became the

Inter-Allied Personnel Board and thereafter handled similar matters with

other countries. The new board soon developed a voluminous correspondence relating to many of the approximately 3,000 Americans in the Canadian

armed forces serving in Canada who claimed lack of opportunity to make

the transfer. As a result, transfers from the Canadian Army were reopened

in October 1943 and from the RCAF in March 1944. Under the supplementary arrangements, 463 were transferred from the RCAF to the AAF, 137

from the Canadian Army to the U.S. Army, and 338 from the U.S. Army

to the Canadian Army.12

In early 1942 while examining the problem of transferring these Americans, the authorities of the two countries also discussed the application of

compulsory military service requirements of one country to resident nationals

of the other country. In the interests of individual morale and each country's war effort, the United States proposed that a Canadian national residing

in the United States who had not declared his intention of becoming a U.S.

citizen could, if drafted for service under the U.S. Selective Training and

Service Act of 1940, elect to serve in the Canadian armed forces instead.

Canada was to grant reciprocal treatment to U.S. citizens living in Canada.

Canada agreed to this arrangement on 6 April 1942, and in the following

months established at seven points in the United States military personnel

centers for the purpose of enlisting such of the 91,000 nondeclarant male

Canadians who, in place of being drafted into the U.S. armed forces, might

choose to serve with the Canadian forces.13 A few months later, after

Canada had amended its compulsory military service regulations to include

the conscription of aliens, the arrangement became applicable to U.S. citizens

residing in Canada. Since the number of U.S. citizens that might be

drafted by Canada was small, the United States did not establish enlisting

offices in Canada but adopted a simplified procedure for enlisting these

individuals.14

Many administrative problems of lesser importance arose and were solved

11

 Department of State Bulletin, August 22, 1942, VII, 711-13; Canada at War, No. 27

(Aug 43), p. 41; Memo, Maj Gen G. V. Henry for Maj Gen B. K. Yount, 16 Jun 42, AG

336.4 Cdn-American Mil Bd (6-11-42). 12

 Memo, Chairman Inter-Allied Personnel Board for CofS, 15 May 46, AG 334 Inter-Allied

Personnel Bd (15 May 46). 13

 EAS, 249; CTS, 1942, No. 7; H. C. Debates, 28 May 43, p. 3139, and 1 Jun 43, p. 3216. 14

 CTS, 1942, No. 14.
CO-OPERATION IN OTHER FIELDS 277

by the two countries in a spirit of friendly co-operation. When in June

1942 Canada suggested that the payment of its forces in Alaska in Canadian

dollars presented administrative difficulties and put Canadian soldiers at a

disadvantage because of the need to sell their currency at a discount, the

United States made arrangements whereby Canadian paymasters were supplied with U.S. currency.15

 In May 1943 a reciprocal arrangement was made

under which service personnel of either country could obtain free medical

and dental service at a service facility of the other country if facilities of

their own were not available.16 When a requirement arose during the summer of 1944 for hospital facilities for the Canadian armed forces in Edmonton, and empty beds were available in the U.S. Army hospital there,

seventy-five beds were made available to Canada.17 In another instance, to

improve the delivery of mail to Canadian forces in Sicily and Italy, the U.S.

Army agreed in 1943 to carry some 800 to 1,000 sacks weekly in U.S. ships

and invited Canada to place personnel in the U.S. Army Post Office in New

York City to assist in handling the mail. Canada, for its part, in 1943

accorded the United States the right to operate six military radio broadcasting stations in Canada for morale and recreation purposes.18

 At the end of

the same year, when insufficient shipping was available to return U.S. personnel from Alaska, Canada loaned to the United States the SS Princess

Louise for use in troop movements.19

Personnel of visiting forces who deserted or were absent without leave

were a problem in both countries, although the problem was greater in

respect to U.S. forces in Canada. The United States established procedures

for apprehending, detaining, and transferring Canadian deserters and

absentees in the United States. The Canadian Government, at the request

of the United States, provided similar arrangements for U.S. deserters and

absentees in Canada.20

The two governments also made arrangements that effected major savings in administrative effort with respect to claims arising from collisions

between government vessels and between vehicles. In several exchanges of

notes, the two governments agreed that, in cases where such a collision took

place, each government would bear all the expenses arising directly or indirectly from the damage to its own vessel or vehicle and would not make

15

 Disposition Form, to CofS, 20 Jun 42, PDB 111-10. 16

 Canada at War, No. 25 (Jun 43), p. 60. 17

 Journal, 6-7 Sep 44 PJBD meeting, PDB 124. 18

 EAS, 400; CTS, 1944, No. 1. 19

 Memo, SUSAM for Chief, Overseas Troop Branch, ASF, 26 Nov 43, PDB 114-6. 20

 WD Cir 258, 1944; Privy Council 6577, 23 Oct 45.
278 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

any claim against the other government.21 Each government quickly made

provision for settling claims made by residents of the other country arising

from accidents involving vehicles or aircraft of the first. Under the authority of an act of Congress of 2 January 1942, the War Department in 1943

constituted a number of claims commissions within its various commands

in Canada to settle such claims. Canada took reciprocal action soon thereafter under authority of an approved minute of the Treasury Board.22

Questions of taxation were worked out to the satisfaction of the United

States, the government mostly concerned.23 In the agreements that authorized the two major U.S. projects, the Alaska Highway and the Canol

Project, Canada waived (1) the duties, taxes, fees, and similar charges connected with the equipment and supplies or their movement, (2) the income

tax of the U.S. residents engaged on the projects, and (3) the royalties on

the oil produced by the Canol Project.24 Canada went even further and

agreed that the United States should not be taxed by provincial or municipal

authorities. In those instances where it became necessary for the United

States to pay such taxes, Canada undertook to make reimbursement for the

payments.25

Another administrative arrangement agreed upon by the two governments had as its object the simplification of procedures for disposing of

prizes captured by the forces of the two countries. Under the agreement,

which was reciprocal, a prize captured by the United States in Canadian territorial waters, or captured on the high seas and then brought into Canadian

territorial waters, was disposed of through the exercise of jurisdiction by

district courts of the United States.26

The Rush-Bagot Agreement

One of the cornerstones of Canadian-U.S. friendship, the Rush-Bagot

Agreement of 1817, was stretched to its elastic limit through interpretation

21

 EAS, 330, and CTS, 1943, No. 12; TIAS, 1581, and CTS, 1944, No. 10; TIAS, 1582,

and CTS, 1946, No. 42. 22

 PL 393. 77th Congress; Army Regulation 25-90, 22 Apr 43; Privy Council 71/3711, 5

May 43. 23

 For a general examination of the problem of taxation of foreign forces, by authors who

participated in the development of the U.S. positions, see Chas. Fairman and Archibald King,

"Taxation of Friendly Foreign Armed Forces," American Journal of International Law, XXXVIII

(1944), 258-77. 24

 EAS, 246, and CTS, 1942, No. 13; EAS, 386, and CTS, 1942, No. 23. See also Department of National Revenue WM No. 75 and WM No. 75 (Revised), published under authority

of Privy Council 53/8097. The revised order is in Canadian War Orders and Regulations, I

(1944), 369-72. 25

 EAS, 339; CTS, 1943, No. 11. 26

 EAS, 394; CTS, 1943, No. 13. Privy Council 6092, 3 Aug 43; Proclamation 2594, 8 FR

13217.
CO-OPERATION IN OTHER FIELDS 279

designed to meet World War II needs. Its limitation of three vessels of

not more than one hundred tons each on the Great Lakes had hindered

World War I programs, and, although modification was studied shortly

thereafter, no changes were made.

Even before the start of World War II, the limitation began to hamper

the naval training and construction programs of the two countries. Secretary of State Hull was determined to preserve the agreement, which over

one hundred twenty years had achieved a symbolic importance. Whereas

changes in ship design, the construction of the Welland Canal, and other

circumstances had outdated the underlying hypotheses of the treaty, Hull

considered the spirit of the agreement to be its essential element. So long

as they did no violence to the spirit of the agreement, interpretations that

took account of conditions in 1939 would, in his view, better serve the needs

of the day. Accordingly, on 9 June 1939, Hull proposed that the following

arrangements should, in accordance with this approach, be acceptable:

a. Vessels could be constructed for movement to tidewater immediately

on completion, but no armament could be installed until after they had left

the Lakes.

b. Five outmoded U.S. Navy vessels of from 1,000- to 2,000-ton displacement could be maintained for training purposes.

c. Armament could be mounted somewhat in excess of the treaty

limitations and used for target practice.27

These proposed arrangements were accepted by the Canadian Government

and made effective.

A year later, with Canada embroiled in the war in Europe and its

Atlantic shipyards congested, the Canadian Government sought further

liberalization of the agreement. It proposed that installation of armaments

on ships be permitted on the Lakes provided that such armaments be

rendered incapable of use on the Lakes and that the ships be moved from

the Lakes promptly on completion. Each government was to keep the other

fully informed as to the nature of its construction program. These proposals were accepted by the United States on 2 November 1940.28

The next liberalization of the Rush-Bagot Agreement was proposed in

February 1942 by the United States, by then a belligerent, in order to eliminate handicaps imposed by even the 1940 interpretation of the agreement.

In order that vessels constructed on the Lakes might be combat ready upon

reaching the open sea, the U.S. Government suggested that, for the duration

27

 TIAS, 1836; CTS, 1940, No. 12. 28

 TIAS, 1836; CTS, 1940, No. 12; H. C. Debates, 24 Mar 41, pp. 1777-79.
280 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

of hostilities, the complete installation and test firing of all armaments on

vessels constructed on the Lakes should be permitted there. With the intensification of the German submarine offensive in the northwestern Atlantic

putting a burden on the seaboard shipyards, Canada readily acquiesced.29

This additional interpretation of the agreement adequately met the needs

of the wartime situation, and no further arrangements were sought. After

V-J Day the 1942 interpretation became ineffective.

In 1946 the two governments again examined the 1817 agreement.

They reaffirmed its historic importance as a symbol of the friendly relations

between the two countries. In keeping with discussions that had taken

place in the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada suggested that the

use of vessels for training purposes should be considered within the spirit

of the agreement, provided each country kept the other fully informed concerning such training activities. The United States found the proposal

acceptable and the Rush-Bagot Agreement, reinvigorated through the new

interpretation, continued its role as a symbol of U.S.-Canadian friendship.30

Miscellaneous Co-operation

The foundation for a full and complete exchange of military information

between Canada and the United States had been laid in the very first recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense. Procedures for

exchanges were developed immediately, the principal mechanism being the

Board and the planning teams that drafted the 1940 and 1941 defense plans.

The establishment of the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington in July 1942

led to a Canadian request for an improvement in the arrangements for

exchange of information. Upon the recommendation of the Joint Staff

Planners, the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the former as its liaison with

the Canadian Joint Staff. This liaison was primarily related to strategic

planning and military operations.31

The mechanics for exchange of intelligence (data concerning the enemy),

as distinguished from general military information, had been established long

before Pearl Harbor, and in this area actual exchanges of staff officers improved the effectiveness and completeness of the arrangement. These

exchanges continued satisfactorily throughout the war except for a period

of months in the latter part of 1944, when, because of the heavy turnover

of personnel in the War Department, the liaison deteriorated. It soon

improved.32

29

 TIAS, 1836; CTS, 1942, No. 3. 30

 TIAS, 1836; CTS, 1946, No. 40. 31

 JCS 82, 18 Aug 42. 32

 Ltr, Maj Gen H. F. G. Letson to Maj Gen J. E. Hull, 6 Feb 45, and Reply, from Maj

Gen H. A. Craig, 12 Feb 45, OPD 336 Canada, Sec. 1-A (7-15-42).
CO-OPERATION IN OTHER FIELDS 281

Throughout 1941 the flow of information increased through interchange

of observer groups that visited the activities and facilities of the other country. Significant numbers of Canadian personnel also attended U.S. Army

motor maintenance, tank techniques and tactics, motorcycle operation, and

similar formal training courses.

Reciprocal training assistance took other forms. In October 1941 the

United States authorized Canada to use U.S. territorial waters in Puget

Sound for an aerial torpedo range. Later the same year, just after Pearl

Harbor, Canada offered use of some of its air training facilities to the United

States, anticipating that with the cutting off of the flow of U.S. trainees into

the RCAF the facilities would be idle. The United States did not avail

itself of this offer. It did, however, make use of Canadian facilities at Camp

Shilo, Manitoba, during the winter of 1942-43. A detachment of some 900

personnel was sent to Shilo to conduct cold weather tests in the use of tanks

and other combat vehicles, trucks, guns and ammunition, and other ordnance. The Shilo arrangement was part of a reciprocal agreement under

which Canada sent 600 men to Fort Benning, Georgia, for parachute training, to prepare them for service in the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion.

Other co-operative training ventures were the cold weather exercises

ESKIMO (a 150-mile move by a composite force in the dry cold of central

Saskatchewan) and POLAR BEAR (a similar move across the coastal mountains in British Columbia from the interior dry cold to the coastal wet cold)

conducted during the winter of 1944-45. In the early spring of 1945 a

third similar joint exercise, LEMMING, was carried out near Churchill for the

purpose of testing the operation of various types of oversnow vehicles on

the "barren grounds" of northern Canada and on the Hudson Bay sea ice.

The forces involved were basically Canadian and Canadian equipped, and the

United States contributed and benefited by providing observers and assisting

specialists and also tractors and other matériel.

One major Canadian proposal for training co-operation was studied over

a period of months but failed to materialize. It involved the use by the

United States of surplus training facilities of the Canadian-operated British

Commonwealth Air Training Plan. The schools established in accordance

with the plan, which had been agreed upon in December 1939 by the governments of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand as a result of proposals

advanced from London in September 1939, began operation in June 1940.

A large proportion of the Americans joining the Canadian forces before

Pearl Harbor passed into the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan

either as students or as instructors.33

33

 See above, pp. 241-42.
282 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

United States entry into the war threatened to disrupt the Air Training

Plan. Not only did many U.S. instructors indicate a desire to transfer to the

U.S. armed forces, but also it appeared likely that the flow of U.S. recruits

into the system would dry up at a time when the plan had been budgeted

for on the basis of an increasing flow of U.S. recruits. As early as 8 December informal suggestions were advanced through diplomatic channels that

perhaps Canada could, in consequence, lend some of the excess training

plant to the United States, which could operate some of its training centers

at such Canadian installations.34

The general proposition was discussed on 20 December by the Permanent

Joint Board, which adopted the recommendation (the Twenty-third) that

the two countries should consider a U.S.-United Kingdom-Canadian meeting to study co-ordination of the training programs being conducted in

North America. The recommendation was approved by both governments,

but it received only desultory consideration by the U.S. military officers

during the ensuing months.35

In April 1942 Prime Minister King discussed the project with President

Roosevelt in Washington and the two announced on 17 April that, at King's

invitation, a conference would be held in Ottawa in early May of those

Allied nations that had air training programs under way in North America.36

As conference plans moved forward, the War Department became concerned

at the scope of the agenda suggested by Canada, feeling that subjects such as

the allocation of U.S.-made training aircraft were outside the competence of

the conference. In addition, discussion of subjects such as exchange of air

crews between nations and the training of members of the AAF in Air

Training Plan schools was precluded by the fact that the War Department,

principally at the instance of the Army Air Forces, was firmly opposed to

such measures. In the War Department view, the solution to the problem

of British Commonwealth Air Training Plan surplus capacity was to concentrate under the plan such training of British Commonwealth air crews

as was being done elsewhere, as for example in the United States.37 On the

Canadian side, King was disappointed that the U.S. delegation would include

only service representatives. Apparently through his intercession with

Roosevelt, the composition of the U.S. delegation was changed on the eve

of its departure so that it was headed, not by Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, as

34

 Memo/Conv, Moffat and Robertson, 8 Dec 41, Moffat Diary. 35

 Text at Appendix A, below. The status of action was discussed at the February and 8

April 1942 PJBD meetings. 36

 Department of State Bulletin, April 18, 1942, VI, 336-37. 37

 Ott Leg Telg 64, to Department of State, 22 Apr 42, and Ltr, SW to Secy State, 13 May

42, both in PDB 119-6.
CO-OPERATION IN OTHER FIELDS 283

had been planned, but by Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert

A. Lovett.38

The conference took place in Ottawa from 19 to 22 May 1942, with representatives of fourteen nations present. In an initial speech, Lovett

transmitted a glowing tribute from President Roosevelt, in which he had

called Canada the "Airdrome of Democracy." The U.S. delegation nevertheless stood fast in its position against commitments for co-ordinated

exchange of training capacity. As its final action, the conference recommended establishment of a Combined Committee on Air Training in North

America. This committee was to have advisory functions only and concern itself with problems such as the standardization of training methods

and most effective use of the air training capacity in North America.39

Arrangements for formation of the committee moved slowly. The

United States advised Canada of the names of its members in September,

but by 1 April 1943 a meeting had not yet taken place. Some discussions

did take place within the framework of the committee later in 1943, but

these had only minor significance. On the original proposal that the United

States utilize Air Training Plan capacity, the War Department position in

opposition prevailed.40

Except in Alaska and in northeastern United States where the Royal Canadian Navy made use of naval facilities, the Canadian services had only a

limited need for use of U.S. installations. When Canadian requests for use

of U.S. facilities were made, the United States was able, at least in small

measure, to reciprocate for Canadian assistance. In the fall of 1943 the

RCAF requested the authority to station a five-man detachment at Millinocket, Maine, and the use of hangar facilities there to assist in handling

Canadian service traffic across northern Maine. Instead of constructing a

new hangar that would have been needed at Millinocket, the United States

provided the needed facilities at nearby Houlton. Similarly, during the

summer of 1944, the United States readily granted approval to RCAF training

operations at the air base at Bellingham, Washington, under an arrangement that did not involve the provision of any services to the RCAF at the

inactive air base.

Internal security of U.S. activities in Canada posed a number of problems that were readily solved through the co-operation of the Canadian au38

 Memo/Conv, Moffat and Robertson, 11 May 42, Moffat Diary; WD Press Release, 18

May 42. 39

 Ottawa Air Training Conference, May 1942, Report of the Conference (Ottawa: E. Cloutier,

King's Printer, 1942), pp. 13, 24-25. 40

 Ott Leg Desp 4306, to Secy State, 1 Apr 43, D/S 800.248/55, and Desp 384 30 Nov

43, D/S 800.248/64.
284 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

thorities. In Canada, as well as in the United States, an evacuation of west

coast Japanese took place after Pearl Harbor. Beginning in the spring of

1942 U.S. authorities raised the question of the security of the Canadian National Railways, along which internee camps were located at a number of

points. To minimize the threat of sabotage, Canada closed certain of the

camps and took additional police measures at others.

Another security problem arose after the construction of the air base at

Churchill was initiated as a restricted project. The United States proposed

that, in view of the isolated character of the site and of its military activities,

travel thereto should be restricted to official purposes. In April 1943 the

Canadian authorities acceded to this request and declared the area along the

railroad from The Pas to Churchill to be a "controlled area," to which the

provisions of the Defense of Canada Regulation 5 applied. At almost the

same time, Canada offered to designate all premises in Canada occupied by

the U.S. armed services "protected places," thereby excluding unauthorized

persons, and it did so upon acceptance of the offer.41

A significant U.S. wartime contribution toward the development of the

potentialities of northern Canada was the charting of the area by the AAF.

The larger part of that area had not previously been photographed aerially,

and maps and charts were incomplete and inaccurate. During the summer

of 1943 extensive aerial photography projects were executed by AAF aircraft

operating from Churchill and Fort Chimo in the east, and Fort McMurray

and Norman Wells in the west. The United States shared with Canada the

photographs and data obtained.

One of the most spectacular instances of Canadian-U.S. co-operation was

the rescue of the personnel of the Hudson's Bay Company post at Fort Ross,

Somerset Island. Since the RMS Nascopie had been unable to resupply the

post for two navigation seasons, it was decided in October 1943 to try to

evacuate the personnel by air. The RCAF could not supply an aircraft for

the purpose since all suitable aircraft were occupied with urgent patrol work

in the Atlantic. The AAF volunteered to provide an aircraft. On 13 November the rescue, which had been regarded by many as impossible since

there was no landing strip, was successfully completed.

Research and Development

Participation in the atomic energy development project that produced

the atomic bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima was perhaps the

most spectacular, if not the most important, Canadian contribution in the

field of research and development. But other less spectacular Canadian

41

 Canadian War Orders and Regulations, II (1943), 184.
CO-OPERATION IN OTHER FIELDS 285

scientific contributions to the Allied military effort in World War II also

represented substantial Canadian accomplishments.42

Canadian-U.S. scientific collaboration was a by-product of a visit to North

America, at the suggestion of the United Kingdom, of the British Scientific

Mission headed by Sir Henry Tizard in August and September 1940. As a

result of the Tizard Mission's visit, the United States, though still a neutral,

obtained access to British development work in certain fields such as radar

that had far outstripped U.S. research. In return, the United Kingdom

gained benefits from the further refinement and production of the new matérie-l 

States. The fruits of further research by U.S. scientists also became available

to the United Kingdom. Canada had provided three members (Brigadier

Kenneth Stuart, Air Commodore E. W. Stedman, and Dr. C. J. Mackenzie)

of the Tizard Mission, and through this membership was drawn into the tripartite scientific co-operation that resulted. Included in the data brought

to the United States by the British scientists was full information on advanced radar developments, and, during the mission's visit, programs of further research in the radar and other fields were laid out and responsibilities

were allocated to each country.43

An urgent need existed for an effective radar in the microwave length

band, for only in this band could equipment be made sufficiently small to

be readily portable either by aircraft or by motor truck. In October 1940

the Canadian National Research Council began work on a microwave fire

direction radar, the GL (gun-laying) Mark III C, and the following month

U.S. microwave research began at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Radiation Laboratory. A staff of six Canadians worked there, and a full exchange of information was maintained between the two projects. By June

1941 the joint effort had resulted in a successful demonstration of the complete GL Mark III C equipment. Canada produced five sets during the rest

of 1941, the third of which was furnished to the U.S. Army at its request.

Canada then proceeded to mass produce this set, the first of its type to get

into large-scale production. Concurrently, the United States developed a

similar set, the SCR-584. Both sets incorporated research and design advances worked out in both countries.

42

 Eggleston, Scientists at War, gives a full and authoritative account of co-operation on these

projects. 43

 For further details on radar development, see two volumes in the series UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, Dulany Terrett, The Signal Corps: The Emergency (Washington:

Government Printing Office, 1956), and George Raynor Thompson, Dixie R. Harris, Pauline

Oakes, and Dulany Terrett, The Signal Corps: The Test (Washington: Government Printing

Office, 1957).
286 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

In 1942 other advantages in the use of microwave radar induced Canada

and the United States to turn to these wave lengths for development of fixed

early warning aircraft detection sets. Here, too, close collaboration between

the staffs of the two countries by the spring of 1943 had produced a MEW

(microwave early warning) radar set of excellent performance. In the field

of airborne radar, Canada led the United States. The first radar set mass

produced in Canada had been the ASVC (air-to-surface-vessel, Canadian),

based on a British prototype. The set was in mass production by the early

summer of 1941, and some of the early sets were furnished to the United

States for use as models by U.S. manufacturers. The U.S. Army SCR-521

was a close copy of this Canadian set.

Canadians also had a part in the research, engineering, and production of

the radio proximity fuze. In its development the Carnegie Institute in

Washington, D. C, and the Toronto Group, which attacked the problem

in September 1940, maintained close co-ordination. Many features of the

fuze represented the integration of the best ideas developed in both Canada

and the United States. A particular Canadian contribution was the wet battery idea, in which the electrolytic liquid was contained in an ampoule that

broke when the shell was fired, thus completing a live, charged-battery power

source, yet one that presented no problem as to self-life during storage.

Another significant contribution Canada made to wartime research was in

connection with the military explosive RDX, which has up to twice the

power of TNT. The explosive had been known since 1899, but despite its

attractive features it had not been used for military purposes because of the

high cost of production and other disadvantages. Canada undertook to overcome these disadvantages in the spring of 1940 and soon discovered a new

process for producing RDX, which proved to be not fully satisfactory. After

the Tizard Mission visited North America, a tripartite RDX Committee was

established, and the Canadian data was shared with the U.S. scientists who

went to work on the project. As a result of the closest possible collaboration in this committee, a new production process was developed which embraced important contributions of both Canadian and U.S. personnel. Largescale production of RDX was first initiated in Canada in July 1942.44

While the research and development work of Canadian scientists during

World War II in other fields was important, it was overshadowed by the

significance of Canadian research in the field of atomic energy. When the

European war began in September 1939, a few Canadian scientists were en44

 The United States and Canada later agreed by an exchange of notes to the mutual interchange of patent rights in connection with RDX and other explosives that had been jointly

developed during the war. (TIAS, 1628; CTS, 1946, No. 51.)
CO-OPERATION IN OTHER FIELDS 287

gaged in nuclear research in furtherance of the discoveries of Fermi and

others relating to the fission of the uranium atom. During 1940 experiments at Ottawa, under sponsorship of the National Research Council, produced encouraging progress toward a chain reaction. By the following year,

informal exchanges of technical information on these experiments had taken

place with U.S. scientists.45 On 2 December 1942 the U.S. experiments at

the University of Chicago produced the first chain reaction, or self-sustaining

pile. As a result of this success, the United States embarked on a full-scale

effort to produce the atomic bomb. During these same months in 1942, the

Canadian effort also expanded.

With research efforts in the United Kingdom oriented to meet more immediate operational needs and British laboratories threatened with destruction from aerial bombardment, the British Government proposed to the Canadian Government the establishment of a joint atomic energy research

project in Canada. The joint effort got under way in September 1942, when

a group of British scientists arrived in Montreal. The joint group, financed

largely by Canada and administered by the Canadian National Research

Council, proceeded with work on a heavy-water pile. United States research

was. largely utilizing the graphite types.

One factor alone assured Canada a place of importance in the development of atomic energy. In 1930 a large deposit of radium and uranium ores

had been discovered on the shores of Great Bear Lake in the Northwest Territories. Important in prewar years as a source of radium, the mine had

come to rank in production second only to the source in the Belgian Congo.

However, market conditions had forced the mine to close in June 1940. In

January 1942 the Canadian Government sought market assurances from the

United States as a means of improving the financial condition of the owning

company so that it could resume operations. Failure to reopen the mine

during the spring of 1942 might have resulted in its permanent impairment

because of ground water conditions, and this eventuality nearly materialized,

for the Canadian inquiry elicited only a noncommittal reply. Fortunately,

the progress of intensified experimentation in the atomic field soon created

a substantial demand for uranium ore, and in August 1942 the mine was reopened. The Great Bear Lake mine soon became a critical element in the

entire atomic energy development project.46

45

 For a fuller account of the Canadian role in the development of the atomic bomb, see

Eggleston, Scientists at War, especially Chapter V. The most authoritative account of the American effort in this field is H. G. Smyth, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1945). 46

 Memo, Cdn Leg to Department of State, 19 Jan 42; Reply, 28 Jan 42, both in D/S

842.6344/4. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 614.
288 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

By mid-1943 it became evident that the various atomic research programs,

in the interest of economy of effort, needed to be co-ordinated more closely.

As a result of informal discussions during the First Quebec Conference

(August 1943), President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill established

a Combined Policy Committee, on which they invited Prime Minister King

to provide Canadian representation. The committee—Secretary of War

Henry L. Stimson, Dr. Vannevar Bush, and Dr. James B. Conant, for the

United States; Field Marshal Sir John Dill and Colonel J. J. Llewellin, for

the United Kingdom; and Minister of Munitions and Supply C. D. Howe,

for Canada—was charged with the broad direction of the programs as between the countries. A technical committee comprising Maj. Gen. L. R.

Groves (United States), Sir James Chadwick (United Kingdom), and Dr.

C. J. Mackenzie (Canada) was also set up to co-ordinate and correlate the

policy decisions and the joint programs.47

The importance of the uranium ores at Great Bear Lake was by then fully

apparent. In January 1944 the Canadian Government therefore expropriated

the stock shares of the company, which was renamed Eldorado Mining and

Refining Limited, and began operating it as a crown company. In the following months the shaft was enlarged and deepened and the plant expanded

to a capacity of one hundred tons of ore per day. This vital ore source,

which was operated on a twenty-four-hour basis, continued to be second in

importance only to the Belgian Congo among sources available to the United

States and Great Britain. The Combined Policy Committee allocated the

ore produced.48

By the beginning of 1944 an apportionment of research effort had been

made that assigned the heavy-water moderator project to Canada. A site

was chosen near Chalk River, Ontario, and the construction of the facility,

whose cost together with other costs of the project was to be borne by

Canada, moved ahead quickly. Experimentation at Chalk River also progressed rapidly, even while the new laboratories were being completed and

the transfer from Montreal was taking place. On 5 September 1945, the

Canadian experimental pile was put into operation, the first pile outside of

the United States to produce atomic energy. Despite the close tripartite cooperation in atomic research and development, Canada made no attempt to

47

 H. C. Debates, 17 Dec 45, p. 3633. 48

 Privy Council 535, 27 Jan 44; H. C. Debates, 3 Jun 46, pp. 2106, 2125. Canada consulted the United States as to the desirability of obtaining control of the mines as early as June

1942 and received President Roosevelt's encouragement. (Roosevelt Papers, Secy's Safe File,

Dr. V. Bush Folder.) For an account of operations at the uranium mines and of their role in

the atom bomb project, see Kennedy, History of the Department of Munitions and Supply, Ch. 25.
CO-OPERATION IN OTHER FIELDS 289

manufacture the atomic bomb, nor did it seek the necessary information to

do so.49

When hostilities ended, the three partners in atomic development collaborated in a proposal for international action to prevent the use of atomic

energy for destructive purposes. Meeting in Washington on 15 November

1945, President Harry S. Truman and Prime Ministers King and Clement

Attlee signed an agreed declaration advancing this proposal and the offer to

share information concerning the practical applications of atomic energy as

soon as effective safeguards against its use for destructive purposes had been

established.50 Tripartite co-operation was not to continue on any significant

scale, however, for the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 enacted by the U.S. Congress necessitated the elimination of Canadian and British participation in

the U.S. project except in limited areas of technical co-operation.51

The Canadian undertaking in the atomic energy field involved, up to the

time of completion of the Chalk River Project, expenditures of approximately $27 million. By comparison with those of the United States in developing the atomic bomb, these Canadian expenditures were modest. But

they did produce important results in the heavy-water moderator project,

which in turn became the springboard for significant advances in the unilateral Canadian research program initiated in the postwar years.

Arsenals of Democracy

Although the full story of the achievements and contributions to victory

of the two countries in the field of munitions production would require a

volume in itself, this account would not be complete unless it took brief

notice of them. When President Roosevelt on 29 December 1940 labeled

the United States an "Arsenal of Democracy," he originated a term that was

equally applicable to Canada, whose war production record was all the more

remarkable in the light of the industrial base from which it developed.52

From the mighty arsenals of Canada and the United States poured forth a

stream of munitions that supplied Allied forces on seas and battlegrounds

49

 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 81st Congress, 1st Session, Hearings, Investigation

Into United States Atomic Energy Project, July 6, 1949, Pt. 19, p. 792; H. C. Debates, 14 Jun 46,

p. 2490. 50

 TIAS, 1504; CTS, 1945, No. 13. 51

 PL 585, 79th Congress. 52

 For full official accounts of these production accomplishments, see Canada, Department of

Munitions and Supply, The Industrial Front (Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1944), U.S.

War Production Board, Industrial Mobilization for War, I, Program and Administration (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947), and H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply

(History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Civil Series [London: Her Majesty's Stationery

Office, 1955]).
290 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

TABLE 3—COMBINED CANADIAN-UNITED STATES PRODUCTION OF SELECTED

MUNITIONS: 1 JULY 1940-31 AUGUST 1945

[Unit-each, or as designated]

a

 Includes conversions; 147 patrol vessels, 104 mine craft, and 349 cargo vessels.

Source: U.S. Civilian Production Administration, Official Munitions Production of the United States (Washington, 1947).

This report contains a combined U.S.-Canadian supplement.

the world over. The quantities of military items produced, as shown in

Table 3, are enough to challenge the imagination.

To reach that level of achievement, Canada and the United States were

required to carry out extensive expansion of plant and production capacity.

In Canada this expansion was proportionately greater than in the United

States and was achieved through the assistance of the United States. The

fall of France marked the beginning of the real acceleration of munitions

production on both sides of the border. The Canadian production effort was

initially severely limited by the available production capacity, and in order

to expand capacity there was a critical need for machine tools. Although a

large world-wide demand existed, Canada was able to make substantial purchases of machine tools in the United States. Without these tools the expansion of Canadian military production that occurred would not have been

possible. Even when U.S. export of machine tools was made subject to
CO-OPERATION IN OTHER FIELDS 291

licensing by the Act of Congress of 2 July 1940, Canada was still able to obtain the tools it needed without encountering any difficulties.53

 The Canadian production effort also received assistance in other ways, one of which

was that U.S. companies having Canadian branches provided the technical

experts needed to assist in Canadian expansion.54

While Canada and the United States had taken preliminary steps to assist

each other in 1940, the real basis for production co-operation was established

at Hyde Park on 20 April 1941 by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister

King. King and other Canadian officials had earlier been unsuccessfully

exploring with U.S. officers in Washington ways and means of meeting the

increasing demands for U.S. dollars of Canada's growing production program.

By the spring of 1941 these demands had reduced the Canadian holdings of

U.S. dollar exchange to dangerously low levels. Just three days after an inconclusive discussion of the problem with Secretary of State Hull, King

found the opportunity to present it to the President during a visit to Hyde

Park. The two agreed to an arrangement which the President named the

Hyde Park Declaration.55

The basic purpose of the Hyde Park Declaration was to make it possible

for Canada to obtain the U.S. dollar exchange it needed to permit essential

purchases from the United States. This was to be accomplished by coordinating the production programs of the two countries so that Canada

would manufacture, and sell to the United States, the munitions and materials that the Canadian economy was in a better position to supply. This

arrangement would permit the United States to delete such items from its

production program and to meet its needs through purchases from Canada.

In order to facilitate the execution of the co-ordinated program, the United

States granted to Canada equal priorities in the assignment of scarce machine

tools, raw materials, and shipping allocations.56

53

 Dawson, Canada in World Affairs: 1939-1941, pp. 34, 61, 246. 54

 The Canadian Geographical Journal, Vols. XXIV and XXV, contains excellent and authoritative accounts of the development of various of the munitions industries. 55

 Ltr, King to Roosevelt, 24 Apr 41, Roosevelt Papers, Secy's file, Box 74; Memo/Conv,

Hull and King, 17 Apr 41, D/S 842.24/110. Full text of the declaration is contained in

Appendix D, below.

King rendered an interesting account of the meeting and the formulation of the declaration

to the U.S. Charge d'Affaires, Lewis Clark. King said that during his pleasant visit the two

were driving around the Hyde Park estate. Suddenly King remembered a memorandum his

financial people had given him, pulled it out of his pocket, and showed it to the President.

The President read it and declared that he could agree to it without difficulty. King insisted

that he had been taught from childhood that papers involving money should be signed, upon

which the President took the memorandum and scribbled on it: "Signed, Franklin and Mackenzie."

(Ltr, Lewis Clark to author, 15 Oct 42.) For another version of the meeting, see Bruce Hutchinson, The Incredible Canadian (Toronto: Longmans, Green and Company, 1952), pp. 288-89. 56

 Dawson, Canada in World Affairs: 1939-1941, passim. See also James' full account of

Wartime Economic Co-operation.
292 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

The dollar exchange objectives of the Hyde Park arrangement were

easily achieved. Under the agreement, the United States proceeded to place

production orders in Canada in the amounts necessary to cover the Canadian exchange needs. These orders allowed the growing Canadian demands

for imports from the United States adequately to be met. The Canadian

exchange situation was further improved by a provision of the Hyde Park

Declaration that permitted Great Britain to obtain, under lend-lease procedures, component parts the Canadians had theretofore been purchasing in

the United States for assembly into equipment being produced in Canada for

Great Britain.

The arrangement served its intended purpose perfectly, and, by the end

of 1942, new and unexpected sources were supplying U.S. dollar exchange

well in excess of Canadian needs. A great expansion of exports, together

with large U.S. capital expenditures in Canada, accounted for the unexpected

accumulations. In fact, within two years the influx of U.S. dollars into

Canada had become so great that it became necessary to put into effect an

arrangement to control the size of Canadian holdings of U.S. dollars.57

The sale of Canadian-produced matériel to the United States was handled

by a crown company, War Supplies, Limited, established on 13 May 1941 to

negotiate and receive the U.S. orders expected under the Hyde Park Declaration and to place them in Canada. This company immediately undertook

an intensive selling campaign in the War, Navy, and Treasury Departments,

War Shipping Administration, Metals Reserve Corporation, and other U.S.

agencies. In less than three months, contracts totaling approximately $200

million had been obtained. Initially, purchases were made of types of matériel suitable for transfer to the United Kingdom under the U.S. lend-lease

program, but after Pearl Harbor large orders were placed for types of equipment used by the United States.58

By 31 March 1946 Canadian cash receipts from U.S. purchases of Canadian matériel under the program amounted to $1,118 million. In addition,

over $100 million in orders had been canceled in 1943 as a means of reducing Canadian accumulations of U.S. dollars, and $200 million in contracts

had been terminated after V-J Day. The most serious and most criticized

57

 See Ch. XII, below. The U.S. dollar expenditure goals of the Hyde Park Declaration

were easily achieved. The volume of sales in each of the years from 1942 to 1944, inclusive,

was respectively $275, $301, and $314 million. Canada, Foreign Exchange Control Board, Report to the Minister of Finance, March 1946 (Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1946), p. 26.

F. A. Knox, in "Canada's Balance of International Payments, 1940-45," Canadian Journal of

Economics and Political Science, XIII (August 1947), 345-62. 58

 This and the following paragraphs are based on Kennedy, History of the Department of

Munitions and Supply, Ch. 42. For Canadian use of Lend-Lease Act procedures under this

program, see James, Wartime Economic Co-operation, pp. 31-42.
CO-OPERATION IN OTHER FIELDS 293

TABLE 4—UNITED STATES LEND-LEASE AID: 11 MARCH 1941-31 DECEMBER

1955

a

 Of this total, $2,343,871,637 of aid was provided during the period 2 September 1945 through 31 December 1955. b

 The principal contributions, in thousands of dollars, were Belgium $191,216, British Commonwealth $6,752,073, and

France $867,781. c

 This term is apparently intended to embrace those Commonwealth nations that were aid recipients. Canada was

the notable exception.

Source: Twenty-seventh Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956).

aspect of the program was the repeated Canadian failure to meet delivery

schedules. After the enactment of U.S. contract renegotiation legislation,

Canada and the United States agreed on profits to be allowed under the U.S.

contracts. United States contracts let to Canadian Government agencies

provided for no profit, although amortization of government-owned facilities

was allowed at a maximum rate of 25 percent annually. Contracts let to

private corporations allowed a profit of 10 percent of cost.

The United States from its war production supplied arms to certain nations through the Lend-Lease Act of 11 March 1941, which provided the

authority for ultimate delivery of a net of over $40 billion of munitions and

services to countries throughout the world. (Table 4) Canada was a
294 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

TABLE 5—CANADIAN MUTUAL AID BOARD EXPENDITURES

(Thousands of Canadian dollars)

a

 These figures include supplies that were not delivered because of the cessation of hostilities and that were later declared

surplus.

Source: Canadian Mutual Aid Board, Final Report, 1946 (Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1947), p. 9.

notable exception from the list of recipient countries. It felt that as a nation

in a favored position, free from the ravages of war, it should meet its own

needs and indeed share with the United States in aiding the less fortunate of

the Allies.59

In line with this policy, Canada adopted a similar program of aid to the

Allies. Throughout 1941 and part of 1942, Canadian help initially took

the form of loans and other measures which provided the United Kingdom

with Canadian exchange in the amount of $1,700 million needed to pay for

the munitions the British were procuring from Canada. During 1942

Canada made an outright grant of one billion dollars to the United Kingdom, raising to a total of $2,700 million the Canadian exchange made available to the British. A stream of Canadian supplies, financed by these funds,

flowed to the British Commonwealth nations and the USSR through the

distribution machinery operated by the United Kingdom.

On 20 May 1943 the "War Appropriation (United Nations Mutual Aid)

Act, 1943" was approved and became effective. Under the Mutual Aid Act,

Canada proceeded to make arrangements directly with the ultimate recipients

of Canadian aid and took the decisions as to what supplies would be provided the countries on the basis of their aid requests. Under the provisions

59

 PL 11, 77th Congress; H. C. Debates, 2 Apr 44, p. 2227.
CO-OPERATION IN OTHER FIELDS 295

TABLE 6—CANADA'S WAR PRODUCTION DURING THE MUTUAL AID PERIOD:

1 SEPTEMBER 1943-1 SEPTEMBER 1945

(Millions of Canadian dollars)

a

 Of this figure, 38 percent was financed by mutual aid, and 19 percent was purchased for cash by the United Kingdom.

The remaining 43 percent was divided between Canada's own armed services (29 percent) and purchases by the United

States (14 percent).

Source: Canadian Mutual Aid Board, Final Report, 1946, p. 16.

of this act and subsequent appropriations, Canada granted additional aid

totaling $2,482 million (Canadian) to the Allies during World War II.

(Table 5) Aid provided under the Canadian Mutual Aid Act differed from

lend-lease aid in that, as a general rule, the former was not subject to arrangements for repayment or redelivery. Canada did retain title to the ships

it provided. The bulk of U.S. lend-lease aid was also, under the final settlements, provided on a grant basis.60

Of particular interest is the fact that, during the period Canada was furnishing assistance under the Mutual Aid Act, only 29 percent of Canadian

war production went to meet Canadian needs. As Table 6 indicates, 57

percent went to mutual aid countries; the remaining 14 percent was purchased by the United States. The relationship of the total aid expenditures

of the two countries to the total military cost of World War II is also

interesting. Canada's total war aid, including mutual aid and the billiondollar grant to the United Kingdom, amounted to $3,482 million as compared with the estimated total military cost of World War II to Canada of

$15,580 million. For the United States, the net lend-lease aid, excluding

reverse lend-lease, amounted to $42,389 million, while the total military

cost of World War II to the United States was estimated at $330,030 million.

It is apparent that Canada like the United States made contributions to Allied

victory generally proportionate to its national capabilities.

60

 For a complete account of Canadian aid arrangements, see Canadian Mutual Aid Board,

Final Report, 1946 (Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1947).
CHAPTER XI

Problems in Jurisdiction

The deployment of large numbers of U.S. troops and associated civilians

to Canada during World War II inevitably gave rise to many complex problems vis-à-vis Canadian authorities and the general public. The fact that

the areas in which the U.S. personnel operated were never seriously threatened by hostile action added to the complexity of the problems. Had a

real threat existed, it would probably have inspired a will to co-operate that

would have caused many of the issues which arose to pale into insignificance.

The U.S. forces stationed in Canada understandably considered themselves a

cog, however remote from the combat zones, in the machine created to fight

the enemy. Many Canadians, also understandably, took the view that, since

the major combat zones were remote and hostilities were not taking place

in Canada, the situation did not call for cessions of Canadian sovereignty or

grants of limitless rights and privileges to the U.S. forces.

Canadian attitudes were conditioned by the history of relations with the

United States. From 1776 to 1871 Canadians were threatened with annexation, particularly in two actual wars and two long periods of filibustering,

and thereafter were promised this fate at intervals by many Americans in

responsible positions. Throughout the history of Canadian-U.S. relations

most Canadians, and especially French Canadians, have also feared and resisted cultural absorption by the United States. The Canadian Government

therefore found it necessary, in considering its position on the various problems that came up for discussion with the United States during World War

II, to weigh not only the military needs of the situation but also the force

of public opinion, the desires of the provincial governments, and the impact

on the position and strength of the Dominion Government itself. Under

these circumstances it was a notable achievement that the numberless questions bearing on jurisdiction arising during the war years were all worked

out in a manner acceptable to, if not to the full satisfaction of, both

countries.

Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Forces

Although the United States deployed troops to Newfoundland a year

before the Pearl Harbor attack, it did not send U.S. forces into Canada in
PROBLEMS IN JURISDICTION 297

significant numbers until after that event. While Canada apparently never

issued a clear-cut invitation for the entry of U.S. troops, such entry took

place in execution of joint defense projects approved by the Canadian Government after approaches had been made through the Permanent Joint Board

on Defense, or through diplomatic or service channels. Although Canadian

permission may not have been explicitly stated in the correspondence relating to projects such as the Northwest Staging Route, the Alaska Highway,

and the Canol Project, it was implicit in the broader authority granted in

each instance. By April 1942 the need for an agreement on questions of

jurisdiction over U.S. troops had been informally discussed within the Permanent Joint Board on Defense. Although the Legal Adviser of the

Department of External Affairs had recommended such an agreement, the

Board members did not feel that one was necessary and no action was taken.1

Clarification of the jurisdiction to be exercised by U.S. military authorities over their forces in Canada was accomplished by unilateral Canadian

action. The Canadian Government had on 15 April 1941 issued an orderin-council, the Foreign Forces Order, 1941, which provided for limited

exercise of jurisdiction in Canada by forces of certain designated countries

and of such other countries as might later be designated.2 On 26 June 1942

Canada issued another order-in-council, "as an interim measure," which made

the provisions of the Foreign Forces Order, 1941, applicable to the United

States. Before Canada took this step, U.S. service courts, according to the

Canadian view, had no right to carry their sentences into effect in Canada.

This order stated that U.S. service courts and authorities were empowered

to exercise in Canada, in matters concerning discipline and internal administration, all such powers as were conferred by the laws of the United States,

except for the offenses of murder, manslaughter, and rape. However, the

order also stated that the Canadian civil courts retained concurrent jurisdiction of offenses committed by U.S. military personnel against any law in

force in Canada.3

Even before this interim step was taken by Canada, the authorities of the

two countries had discussed the nature of the U.S. wishes in the matter. The

1

 Ltr, Hickerson to LaGuardia, 22 Apr 42, PDB 104-22. 2

 Privy Council 2546. 3

 Privy Council 5484. For an account, from the point of view of international law, of the

handling of jurisdictional questions between the United States and Canada and other states during World War II, see Archibald King, "Further Developments Concerning Jurisdiction Over

Friendly Foreign Armed Forces," American Journal of International Law, XL (1946) 257-79.

See also the following articles in the British Year Book of International Law: G. P. Barton,

"Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity From Supervisory Jurisdiction," XXVI (1949), 380-414,

and "Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity From Criminal Jurisdiction," XXVII (1950), 186-235;

and M. E. Bathurst, "Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces," XXIII (1946), 338-41.
298 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

United States was then in the process of negotiating an agreement with the

United Kingdom providing for the exclusive jurisdiction by each country

over such of its forces as might be stationed in the other. United States

authorities indicated that they would like a similar agreement with Canada,

the making of which would have resulted in the abandonment of Canada's

claim to exclusive jurisdiction of murder, manslaughter, and rape, and to

concurrent jurisdiction of other offenses. For their part, the Canadian

authorities in early July 1942 indicated a willingness to negotiate for a new

agreement along these lines when the U.S.-United Kingdom agreement had

been concluded.4 A short time later the agreement with the United Kingdom was concluded by an exchange of notes dated 27 July 1942, and on

6 August the British Parliament enacted the United States of America

(Visiting Forces) Act, 1942, to give effect to the agreement.5

During the ensuing months the Canadian Government considered a U.S.

request that Canada, too, grant the United States complete criminal jurisdiction over its military personnel serving in Canada. By the beginning of

1943, Canada was contemplating rejecting the request. However, as a result

of U.S. argument that Canada should be willing to conclude arrangements

similar to those already effected with other nations in the British Commonwealth (Australia and New Zealand, as well as the United Kingdom), joint

discussions looking toward an acceptable solution were initiated.6 The

Canadian Government moved cautiously toward satisfying the U.S. requests,

for Canadian public opinion was slow to accept the notion of U.S. courtsmartial sitting on Canadian soil, especially if the offense to be tried was one

against the person or property of a Canadian. This gave the governments

of some of the western provinces opportunity to embarrass the Dominion

Government by attempting to exercise the concurrent jurisdiction claimed

by Canada over U.S. soldiers.7

As a result of the discussions with the U.S. authorities, Canada took two

steps toward meeting the U.S. requests:

a. It issued a new order-in-council excepting the United States from

4

 Ltr, Hickerson to SUSAM, 16 Jul 42, PDB 104-22. 5

 The notes are to be found in EAS, 355, and also as addenda to the Act, which is 5&6

Geo. 6, c. 31. For an account of the development of this agreement and for an examination

thereof in terms of World War I and other World War II practice, see Archibald King, ' 'Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces," American Journal of International Law, XXXVI

(1942), 539-67. 6

 Memo/Conv, Hickerson and Pearson, 2 Feb 43, D/S 811.203/252. 7

 For example, in the case of Pvt. William Evans, which aroused public indignation in Dawson

Creek, the Attorney General of British Columbia issued a warrant for the arrest of Evans, but his

commanding officer refused to surrender him. (Memo/Conv, Hickerson and Clark, 13 Feb 43,

PDB 104-22.)
PROBLEMS IN JURISDICTION 299

the provision of the Foreign Forces Order that reserved to Canada jurisdiction over the offenses of murder, manslaughter, and rape.8

b. It sought an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court of Canada

on two questions that looked toward a more liberal attitude on the part of

Canada:

1. Are members of the military or naval forces of the United States of America

who are present in Canada with the consent of the Government of Canada for purposes

of military operations in connection with or related to the state of war now existing exempt from criminal proceedings prosecuted in Canadian criminal courts and, if so,

to what extent and in what circumstances?

2. If the answer to the first question is to the effect that the members of

the forces of the United States of America are not exempt from criminal proceedings or

are only in certain circumstances or to a certain extent exempt, had Parliament or the

Governor General in Council acting under the War Measures Act, jurisdiction to enact

legislation similar to the statute of the United Kingdom entitled the United States of

America (Visiting Forces) Act, 1942.9

The Attorney General of Canada filed a factum (brief) urging that both

questions be answered in the affirmative. Since the court action was a

domestic Canadian matter, the United States could not participate as a party

of interest. However, at the request of the Canadian Government, the U.S.

officers concerned prepared two unsigned memorandums which examined,

from the U.S. point of view, the principles of law involved. These memorandums were printed and laid before the court, as were briefs by four of

the nine provinces (Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia) that

opposed grants of broader jurisdiction to the United States.10

On 3 August 1943 the five justices who considered the case presented

four separate opinions, none of which represented that of the court. Concerning the first question, two justices, Kerwin and Taschereau, reached conclusions generally in accord with the U.S. view. The opinion of Chief

Justice Duff, concurred in by Justice Hudson, concluded that unless specific

legislation so provided, friendly forces visiting Canada enjoyed no exemption

from criminal court jurisdiction. The other justice, Rand, took a middle

position.11 As to the second question, all the justices agreed that both the

Parliament and the Governor General in Council, acting under the War

8

 Privy Council 2813, 6 Apr 43. 9

 The reference to the Supreme Court was made by Privy Council 2931, 9 Apr 43. 10

 The factum and an accompanying case book by the federal Attorney General of Canada

were published by E. Cloutier, King's Printer, Ottawa, in 1943 under the title "Jurisdiction of

Canadian Criminal Courts Over Members of the Armed Forces of the United States." Memo/

Conv, Clark and R. T. Yingling, 24 Apr 43, D/S 811.203/246-5/6. 11

 The opinions are contained in Reference re Exemption of U.S. Forces From Canadian Criminal

Law (1943), Canadian S.C.R. 483. For a synthesis of these opinions, see King, "Further Developments Concerning Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces," pp. 272-74.
300 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Measures Act, had the authority to enact legislation similar to the United

States of America (Visiting Forces) Act, 1942, enacted in the United

Kingdom.

These court opinions established both an adequate juridical basis and a

suitable political framework in Canada for the next step. In December

1943, in response to repeated U.S. inquiries as to when the action might be

forthcoming, the Governor General in Council issued an order which provided that the service courts of the United States would have "jurisdiction

to try all members of its forces in Canada in respect of every offense committed by any of its members in Canada." This order met in full the requirements for which the U.S. authorities had been negotiating. The order

also authorized various administrative measures, such as the compulsory attendance of Canadian witnesses before U.S. courts-martial in Canada, and the

release, upon request, of a member of the U.S. forces detained by any Canadian authority.12

Certain points not fully clarified by the order-in-council were discussed

in notes exchanged during the ensuing months. In the first of these notes,

the Canadian Government stated its assumption that any persons surrendered

to the United States by Canadian authorities would be tried. The United

States in reply took the position that such persons would be brought to trial

only if investigation warranted. However, in the event of a negative finding, the United States agreed to confer with Canadian authorities and to

proceed with a trial if they considered one necessary. Other similar questions were harmoniously and satisfactorily worked out.13

To the full extent permitted by its system of government, the United

States granted to Canada the privileges the Dominion had conferred upon

the United States. The United States considered the basic privileges already

to be available to Canada without agreement or legislative or other action,

since Canadian forces, in the U.S. view, possessed such privileges under international law, which was deemed to be a part of the law of the United

States. Apart from the basic privileges of exclusion from the local criminal

jurisdiction, certain auxiliary arrangements necessitated enactment of legislation by the Congress. In order to carry out its undertakings to Canada and

other governments, the executive branch sought and obtained such legislation. An act of Congress approved on 30 June 1944 provided that, upon

12

 Ott Leg Desp 103, to Secy State, 4 Sep 43, D/S 811.203/324; Ltr, Atherton to Hickerson, 5 Oct 43, D/S 811.203/341; Department of State Desp 95, to Ott Leg, 25 Oct 43, D/S

811.203/341; Privy Council 9694, 20 Dec 43. 13

 Department of External Affairs Notes 160 and 26, 27 Dec 43 and 9 Mar 44; U.S. Emb

Ott Note 95, 10 Feb 44; all in D/S 811.203/392.
PROBLEMS IN JURISDICTION 301

suitable proclamation by the President, arrangements as follows could be

effected with designated countries:

a. Arrest and delivery of persons of a foreign force upon request of the

commanding officer of that force.

b. Compulsory attendance at courts-martial of friendly forces subject to

their having the same privileges and immunities as if before a similar U.S.

court.

c. Confinement of prisoners sentenced by a foreign court in a U.S.

place of detention.14

On 11 October 1944 the President of the United States by proclamation

made the provisions of the act of Congress applicable to Canada and the

United Kingdom.15

On the whole, the arrangements worked very satisfactorily. In Canada,

isolated incidents involving Canadian civilians took place in which the

Canadian public expressed concern as to the adequacy of the punitive action

taken by the U.S. service courts, but such incidents were lost in the over-all

pattern of co-operation in handling these problems. In the United States,

where the proportion of Canadian service personnel was negligible in comparison to U.S. service personnel in Canada, no problem of any significance

arose regarding jurisdiction over criminal offenses.

Airway Traffic Control

As the scope of U.S. activities and the network of U.S. installations in

Canada and Newfoundland expanded both before and after Pearl Harbor,

and as the volume of U.S. military air traffic in those areas increased, questions quickly arose as to the control of air traffic and airways. In all areas

there existed the basic need for co-ordinating the systems employed by the

services of the two countries for the regulation of their traffic. There also

existed within Canada the fundamental question of sovereignty involving

the extent, if any, to which control should be yielded to another government or its agencies over Canadian airways and aircraft movements in the

Canadian airspace.

The problem first arose in the latter part of 1941 in Newfoundland,

where not only U.S. and Canadian service aircraft but also those of the Royal

Air Force operated in connection with Atlantic ferrying operations. By

December 1941 the U.S. Newfoundland base commander, Maj. Gen. Gerald

C. Brant, had worked out standardized regulations for air traffic control ap14

 PL 384, 78th Congress. 15

 Proclamation 2626, 8 FR 12403.
302 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

plicable to U.S. Army Air Forces and U.S. Navy aircraft operating in

Newfoundland. During December he also submitted proposed regulations

to control all aircraft movements in the Newfoundland area.16 During 1942

the proposal was discussed and reworked by Canadian and U.S. authorities.

The RCAF desired to include in the proposed agreement a provision requiring that all aircraft movements be cleared from a central RCAF control

station. According to the U.S. base commander, such an arrangement was

unacceptable, not only to U.S. Army and Navy units but also to the RAF

command in Newfoundland. A protracted controversy took place between

the Canadian and U.S. Air commanders concerned, who were unable to agree

on standardized regulations. Members of the Permanent Joint Board on

Defense discussed the subject briefly in September 1942 and again at their

meeting in November. As a result of the latter discussion, an informal

meeting of representatives of the two countries took place in Washington

on 12 January 1943, but no significant progress materialized from any of

these discussions and the problem of co-ordinating airway traffic in Newfoundland and Labrador went, for the time being, unsolved. As a consequence, the air units of each country continued to use their own procedures.17

The problems of co-ordinating or controlling airway traffic and of standardizing communications and other procedures in western Canada were examined

by the military commands there in early 1943. As a result of U.S.-Canadian service-level discussions at a meeting on 8 January 1943, a joint agreement was concluded for the purpose of establishing "procedures, methods

and communications to be used jointly to provide the best exchange of information" on all flights in the area and thus to reduce the number of

unidentified aircraft in the air defense zones of western Canada and the adjacent United States.18

The procedures governing the movement of aircraft to and from Alaska

were re-examined and revised at frequent intervals. At scheduled meetings,

the next two of which were held on 15 April and 23 June 1943, representatives of the numerous Canadian and U.S. military commands conducting air

operations met and agreed on the revised techniques and procedures to be

employed. At the second of these two meetings, at which the agreement

acquired the title JAN-CAN (for Joint U.S. Army, Navy-Canadian Agree16

 Ltr, CG NBC to CG Eastern Theater of Operations, 23 Feb 42, PDB 104-5. 17

 Memo, E. W. Hockenberry for SUSAM, 11 Mar 43, PDB 126-6. 18

 Appendixes, to Alaskan Division, Historical Record Report, Nov 42-Dec 43 volume, p.

325. The agreement, essentially one for co-ordination and standardization, was effected between

representatives of RCAF Western Air Command; Alaskan Wing, ATC; Western Defense Command; and Northwest Sea Frontier. The RCAF had taken over the airway traffic control functions on this route from the Department of Transport in September 1942.
PROBLEMS IN JURISDICTION 303

ment), the commands represented were the Western Air Command, RCAF,

and six U.S. commands—Western Defense Command, U.S. Army; Alaskan

Wing, Air Transport Command, U.S. AAF; Northwest Sea Frontier, U.S.

Navy; Naval Air Transport Squadrons, West Coast; Alaska Defense Command; and Fourth Air Force.19

 Similar meetings took place during the rest

of 1943, and at the meeting held on 11 November a permanent JAN-CAN

Committee, comprising a representative of each of the commanders signatory

to the agreement, was established. The RCAF provided a nonvoting secretary for the committee, while the U.S. Navy Northwest Sea Frontier provided office space and administrative assistance.

While the foregoing arrangements were being worked out, the postwar

planners of both countries had apparently begun to look at the relationship

of the numerous new air bases in northern North America to possible postwar civil air transport operations. This relationship and the wartime impetus

given to transport aviation, particularly intercontinental operations, presaged

an important Canadian role in international civil aviation. For one thing,

the great circle air routes from the United States to northern Europe and

to the Orient passed over Canadian territory. For another, bases such as

those at Gander in Newfoundland and Goose Bay in Labrador promised to

be important stations in the network of postwar civil airports for transoceanic operations. Interest in postwar civil aviation was quickened on the

southern side of the boundary, too, where statements and press comment on

the subject gave rise to suspicions in Canada that the United States perhaps

intended to utilize its wartime position in Canada to its own advantage in

the field of civil air transport. The United States, in turn, wondered if

Canada was not thinking of gaining a postwar advantage through the Canadian air bases and operations in Newfoundland.20

 In any event, the statement of Prime Minister King in Parliament on 2 April 1943 on the civil

aviation policy of the Canadian Government acknowledged publicly the

19

 Progress Rpts, at PJBD meetings of 1-2 Apr and 1-14 Jul, PDB 124. 20 U.S. Leg Ott Telg 28, 17 May 43, D/S 842.00/690; Memo, Parsons to Hickerson, 5 Apr

43, D/S 840.50/2092; Journal PJBD meeting, 13 Jan 44, PDB 124. See also the exchange of

correspondence that took place in October 1943 when the State Department first learned of the

Canada-Newfoundland negotiations, which had been in progress about two years, for a ninetynine-year lease to Canada of Goose Bay air base. (D/S 842.7962/111.) The first comprehensive study on the role of air transportation as a force in national policy had been published

only a few months earlier and was indicative of, and perhaps even contributed to, the quickening interest in the subject. See Oliver J. Lissitzyn, International Air Transport and National

Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1942). The Canadian Government had by

the end of 1942 set up an interdepartmental advisory committee on international air transport.

The United States set up a similar body in January 1943, and some exploratory talks took place

subsequently between the two groups.
304 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

decision of Canada to act to take full advantage of Canada's strategic location

and to seek a leading place in postwar civil aviation.

The completion of the Alaska Highway and the Canol Project provided

the breathing spell that enabled Canada to clarify the question of control of

the northern airports and airways constructed and used in collaboration with

the United States.21 Canada had as its objectives (a) to regain full control

over the airways and air traffic on them, (b) to establish controls over operations of U.S. civil airlines providing military transport services under contract to the U.S. Army, and (c) to establish adequate controls over the air

bases themselves.22 The initial attack on the problem took the form of raising from the service level to the governmental level discussions on the

question of co-ordinating air traffic.

The joint U.S.-Canadian policy was provided by the Thirty-second Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense agreed upon at its

24-25 August 1943 meeting. This recommendation, which was approved

by the two governments within a month, provided for the allocation of control, as between the two countries, of the wartime air bases of joint interest

in Canada and of the airway traffic through them. Canada was assigned

control of air traffic through all the airports in northwestern Canada except

for the flight strips of the Alaska Highway and Canol Project, which

promised to be of little significance to postwar civil aviation except as emergency fields. In the east, Canada yielded control of the more northern of

the ferry route bases in Canada, most of which also promised to have no

significant place in postwar civil aviation. The air bases of Newfoundland

and Labrador were not covered by the recommendation.23 The recommendation in addition provided that any airway traffic regulations issued

should be prepared jointly by the using services.

A joint U.S.-Canadian committee first met in Ottawa on 19 August 1943

to consider the problems emerging from the Thirty-first Recommendation

and the Thirty-second then under consideration in draft form. This main

committee met again at Ottawa on three subsequent occasions, in December

1943 and in April and October 1944, to work out in detail the many questions that arose in implementing these two recommendations.

A Joint Subcommittee for Canadian Air Traffic Regulations, constituted

21

 H. C. Debates, 2 Apr 43, pp. 1776-78; The Canada Year Book, 1945, p. 703. 22

 Associated objectives of the Canadian program included the execution of all construction

on the more important bases by the Canadian Government and the acquisition of title or the

leases to land occupied by official U.S. agencies and installations. They are treated above in

Chapter VIII. See also Alaskan Division, Historical Record Report, Nov 42-Dec 43 volume,

pp. 214-17. 23

 Appendix A, below.
PROBLEMS IN JURISDICTION 305

by the main committee, met in Washington on 23 September 1943. It prepared recommendations as to air traffic regulation in Canada, which were

reviewed and approved by the U.S. agencies concerned. The recommendations were then promulgated by Canada in November 1943 in RCAF publication CAP 365, entitled "RCAF Regulations for Control of Aircraft

Movement in Canada." CAP 365 was "intended to provide standard regulations for the movement and flight of aircraft on routes and airways through

the Royal Canadian Air Force operational areas in the Dominion of Canada,

Newfoundland and Labrador, for the purpose of defense. All aircraft which

. . . received right of entry to any of the concerned countries . . . [were to]

be subject to and governed by these rules and regulations." The regulations

were made applicable on the Northwest Staging Route, in Newfoundland

and Labrador, and in eastern Canada east of a line twenty-five miles west of

Blissville, New Brunswick, and north of a line twenty-five miles north of

Quebec City.24 The over-all flying control plan included (a) airway traffic

control on designated airways, (b) route traffic control on certain other

RCAF routes, (c) airport traffic control at all airports, and (d) general supervision of all flying in the operational areas to permit integration of the

complete traffic pattern.25

Canada proceeded to establish the organization required to exercise the

airway traffic control envisaged in CAP 365. In western Canada, the JANCAN Agreement and Committee were dissolved as of 29 February 1944. To

discharge the airway traffic control responsibility on the Northwest Staging

Route, a new RCAF command, the Northwest Air Command, was established on 1 June 1944 at Edmonton under Air Vice Marshal T. A. Lawrence.

During 1944 thirty-six RCAF officers undertook a course of training at the

U.S. Civil Aeronautics Administration School of Airway Traffic Control. As

matériel and trained personnel became available, airway traffic control centers were established at Halifax, Vancouver, Edmonton, Prince George, and

St. John's.

On the Northwest Staging Route, the inauguration of airway traffic control operations by the RCAF was delayed by the shortage of land-line communication facilities. The AAF had made a through teletype circuit between

Edmonton and Whitehorse available to the RCAF, but the circuit was unsuitable for this purpose. The U.S. Army agencies in northwest Canada felt

unable, in the light of their own communications requirements, to release

24

 Privy Council 9792, 24 December 1943, declared those portions of Canada through which

the Northwest Staging Route passed to be a prohibited area, under the Defense Air Regulations, 1942, thus subjecting them to military control. 25

 Minutes, 15-16 Dec 43 PJBD meeting, PDB 126-10; CAP 365, PDB 126-10.
306 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

additional facilities to the RCAF. As a result of discussions of ways and

means of meeting the RCAF needs, the U.S. Army at the beginning of 1944

undertook a $2-million project for the installation of the additional voice

and teletype circuits and construction of the additional facilities needed by

the RCAF. Although construction of these additional facilities which the

RCAF had been urging for many months was to be financed as a War Department project, the Morgenthau-Ilsley discussions concurrently in progress

provided that Canada would reimburse the United States for the entire landline project, as well as for other construction in Canada.26

By midsummer 1944 the installation of the wire circuits was well advanced, but difficulties in procuring certain of the essential signal equipment

had been encountered. Despite the best efforts of Canadian and U.S. signal

officers, the equipment had not yet been secured by the spring of 1945.

Although the RCAF was able to establish full airway traffic controls south

and west of Edmonton and along the so-called Interior Staging Route in

British Columbia, and partial controls on the Northwest Staging Route, full

controls on the latter route were not established after the terminations of

hostilities.27

Similar equipment deficiencies were encountered for airway traffic control

at Gander and Goose Bay air bases. Upon the assumption by the RCAF

of airway traffic control in Newfoundland, the AAF proceeded to remove its

control tower equipment from the two bases. Since Canada was unable to

duplicate the equipment, it requested that the United States sell the equipment to Canada. The removal order was then canceled.28

Despite the difficulties encountered in the actual inauguration of control

operations Canada succeeded, through the Thirty-second Recommendation

and subsequent efforts, in establishing the principle of Canadian control of

airway traffic. As hostilities terminated and the U.S. intention to withdraw

from Canada as rapidly as possible became fully apparent, the Canadian fears

that had been aroused concerning U.S. intentions were completely allayed.

Military Air Services

An early by-product of the Ogdensburg Declaration was the simplification of procedures governing the travel of public vessels and service aircraft

of the two countries. An initial agreement, arranged by an exchange of

notes in September 1940, gave blanket authority for U.S. service aircraft to

fly over Canadian territory and waters between the United States and Alaska

26

 See below, pp. 320-25. 27

 Memo, SUSAM for CG AAF, 20 Sep 44, PDB 105-16. 28

 Journal, 7-8 Nov 44 PJBD meeting, PDB 124.
PROBLEMS IN JURISDICTION 307

upon prior notification in each instance to the RCAF Western Air Command and subject to the requirement to avoid prohibited areas. More

extensive arrangements worked out in December 1940 provided, upon local

notification, for (a) passage by U.S. public vessels through Canadian waters

between the United States and Alaska or U.S. bases in Newfoundland and

by service aircraft over Canadian territory, (b) exchange visits on joint defense

matters, (c) Canadian flights over Maine on the Quebec-Maritime Provinces

route in connection with joint defense matters, and (d) U.S. flights between

points in the United States over the Ontario peninsula.29

The arrangements for local notification were worked out in detail over

the succeeding eight months and provided authority adequate for the need

for travel of military aircraft between the two countries throughout 1941

and for the first few months after Pearl Harbor. Commercial operations by

civilian airlines were covered by a separate agreement that defined the routes

over which duly licensed airlines of each country could operate.30

By the end of February 1942 a new element had been introduced into

the problem of travel by military aircraft. The AAF had for some time

planned to use commercial airline aircraft on a contract or charter basis to

meet military requirements.31 Not long after Pearl Harbor, the Canadian

Government granted authority for such contract service by Northeast Airlines to the U.S. garrisons in Newfoundland and at Goose Bay. The AAF

needed a similar service on the Northwest Staging Route and proceeded on

20 February 1942 to make contract arrangements with Northwest Airlines

for the desired military transport services. The U.S. Section of the Permanent Joint Board, at the request of the AAF sought authority at the 25-26

February meeting for an arrangement under which "traffic would be strictly

limited to United States Government personnel directly connected with the

prosecution of the war" and to military cargoes, and would exclude transportation of commercial passengers or cargo for hire. The Canadian Section

undertook to process the request and stated that a favorable reply would

probably be received from the Department of Transport.32

Before a reply was received from the Canadian authorities, a Northwest

Airlines survey aircraft, presumably acting upon instructions, landed at Ed29

 Memo, Berle for Christie, 18 Sep 40, and Reply, 19 Sep 40, D/S 811.2342/732 and /738.

The exchange of diplomatic notes on 16 December 1940 is in PDB 126-10. 30

 EAS, 186; CTS, 1940, No. 13. 31

 For an excellent account of such operations during World War II, see Cleveland, Air

Transport at War. 32

 Journal, PDB 124; Memo, Brig Gen Olds for SUSAM, 23 Feb 42, PDB 126; Carr, Great

Falls to Nome: The Inland Air Route to Alaska, 1940-1945, p. 26, cites War Department contract No. DA W535ac1763, dated 20 February 1942 and approved 27 February 1942.
308 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

monton on 27 February without authority and without undergoing customs

processing. The aircraft was detained by the Canadian authorities while the

question was examined by Brig. Gen. Robert Olds, commanding the Air

Corps Ferrying Command, with Minister of Munitions and Supply C. D.

Howe, who chanced to be in Washington. On 2 March the latter orally

granted authority for the projected Northwest Airlines operations, and the

survey aircraft, which had returned to Minneapolis on 1 March, proceeded

to make its survey flight. A few days later Howe in a letter dated 7 March

confirmed the grant of authority for use of all airfields and facilities of the

Department of Transport by both military aircraft and civilian contract carriers, stating that it was his understanding in regard to the contract carriers

that the United States would, "as soon as possible, either enlist the pilots

in the Air Corps or replace them by Air Corps personnel."

 33

Northwest Airlines completed its survey flights in March and initiated

operations the same month. By mid-May company personnel in Canada

and Alaska numbered eighty-eight, mostly located at Edmonton. Until the

end of May, the operations were of little consequence and about half the

410 tons of cargo carried (in addition to 889 passengers) comprised Northwest Airlines supplies and equipment. During April two more civilian contract carriers initiated operations for the AAF —Western Airlines from the

United States to Edmonton, and United Airlines from the United States

through Edmonton to Fairbanks.34

The unauthorized Northwest Airlines landing on 27 February had a

permanent and unhappy effect on Canadian-U.S. relations locally, and events

of the following months produced no improvement. Northwest Airlines

employees apparently deliberately emphasized and flaunted the civilian complexion of their operations. Personnel, aircraft, and facilities bore company

identifications, and the employees identified their work as a company rather

than U.S. Army task. During this period the company operated virtually

autonomously and with no local supervision, since the AAF began the

gradual introduction of cadres for its organization in Canada only in the

latter half of 1942.35

The situation displeased Canadians, who saw the Northwest Airlines

33

 The letter to General Olds is in PDB 126. Howe's account of the Edmonton episode is

to be found in H. C. Debates, 15 May 42, p. 2486. His letter was thereafter cited as the basic

authority for U.S. military air operations in Canada. 34

 Carr, Great Falls to Nome: The Inland Air Route to Alaska, 1940-1945, pp. 30-36. 35

 These paragraphs are based on the Carr manuscript and on Alaskan Division: Historical

Record Report, II. The president of Northwest Airlines believed that the United States should

get its airlines firmly established in Canada and apparently conducted his own company operations with this objective. (Memo/Conv, Moffat and C. Hunter, 14 Dec 42, D/S 811.79642/

291.)
PROBLEMS IN JURISDICTION 309

actions as designed to create and advertise a privileged position that could

be exploited after the war in commercial operations. Misunderstandings

developed over the carrying out of agreements for the exchange of meteorological data between the Department of Transport and U.S. Army agencies

at the air bases. Reports that Northwest Airlines was carrying passengers

for hire were circulated and did not improve the atmosphere.

Finally, at an AAF-RCAF meeting in Ottawa on 25 June 1942, the conferees heard Canadian protests. The Canadians had understood, at similar

meetings in Ottawa in March and April as well as in the Howe-Olds exchange, that the AAF had agreed to militarize the civilian contract carriers

and to assume ownership of their aircraft.36 The AAF officers acknowledged

this to be so and promised efforts to carry out the Canadian wishes, including the full militarization of the communications and weather personnel.

The AAF took appropriate steps immediately thereafter. It instructed

Northwest Airlines to replace its own markings and insignia with those of

the Air Transport Command. Personnel were to wear the same uniform as

U.S. Army personnel. Army Air Forces personnel were gradually introduced

with a view to taking over the communications and weather functions of

Northwest Airlines. The change-over to military communications and

weather personnel moved slowly and in the face of opposition from Northwest Airlines employees, who resisted relinquishing their jobs. At the

beginning of 1943 the transfer was finally effected. A short time earlier the

establishment of a Headquarters, Alaskan Wing, Air Transport Command,

effective 1 November 1942, had projected military control into the scene of

operations over the Northwest Staging Route.

The Canadian Government still remained dissatisfied with the character

of the Northwest Airlines operations. In early 1943 Canada claimed that

the company was not only continuing to employ its title and conduct its

operations as if independent of the AAF, but it was also carrying passengers

for hire. To support the last charge, the Canadian Government formally

transmitted evidence indicating that the Northwest Airlines had carried personnel for hire and reiterated other grievances.37

The Canadian complaints were thoroughly investigated and a comprehensive report was forwarded to Ottawa on 30 March. The report concluded

that, although the general Canadian complaints might have been true sev36

 Extracts of Canadian reports of the meetings are quoted in Memo, SUSAM for CG ATC,

17 Mar 43, and in Ltr, from Hickerson, 27 Mar 43, both in PDB 110-8. 37

 Memo, SUSAM for CG ATC, 17 Mar 43, PDB 110-8. On the other hand, the AAF

must have had some degree of success, for the president of Northwest Airlines expressed himself as unhappy about the status of his company and desirous of regaining his company's identity

in its operations in Canada. (Memo/Conv, Moffat and Hunter, 14 Dec 42, D/S 811.79642/291.)
310 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

eral months earlier, the corrective action pressed continuously by the U.S.

Army had eliminated most of the grievances such as the use of airline markings. Although not all the aircraft had become U.S. Government property,

most of them had and the others were indistinguishable. Not all the personnel had been militarized, but the civilian employees wore uniforms

rendering them almost indistinguishable from military personnel. The Air

Transport Command explained the circumstances of the transport-for-hire

charges and gave assurances of its earnest desire to extract full compliance

from its contract carriers with their instructions in these matters.38

Another aspect of the operations of U.S. military air services in Canada

that troubled the Canadian Government was their Topsy-like growth. The

Northeast and Northwest Airlines contracts had been followed by additional

separate grants of approval for similar operations by several other U.S. companies in eastern and northwestern Canada. In addition, the AAF was itself

operating military air transport aircraft over a number of routes, some of

which had been specifically authorized, others of which had not. During

March 1943, as part of its broader program to reassert full Canadian control

over air operations and air installations in Canada, the Canadian and U.S.

Governments initiated a re-examination of the civilian air transport contract

service operations of the AAF. After reviewing its continued dissatisfaction

with the character of the operations, the Canadian Government pointed out

that some of the operations appeared to have no authority except possibly

the December 1940 exchange of notes or the Twenty-second Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board, both of which appeared to cover only

occasional or emergency flights.39 Canada accordingly proposed to re-establish the authority for all U.S. military transport services in a single over-all

agreement to replace the existing piecemeal agreements. Where no specific

authority existed, the Canadian Government felt that authorization should

first be applied for by and granted to the United States, as a preliminary step

to being placed within the framework of the new over-all agreement. The

proposal contemplated that the conditions under which the civilian contract

services would henceforth be provided could be set forth and made public,

thus eliminating misunderstandings which might exist in Canada. An

important objective of the proposal was to prevent the U.S. commercial airlines from appearing to have a vested interest in routes that would have postwar commercial significance.40

38

 Memo, SUSAM for Cdn PJBD Secretary, 30 Mar 43, PDB 110-8. This memorandum

replied to a note from the Canadian secretary, acting in his capacity as Under Secretary of State

for External Affairs, to the U.S. Chargé d'Affaires, in Ottawa through the diplomatic channel. 39

 Memo, Under Secy State for External Affairs for U.S. Chargé d'Affaires, 16 Mar 43, PDB

126-10. 40

 Memo, Hickerson for SUSAM, 26 May 43, PDB 126-10.
PROBLEMS IN JURISDICTION 311

The proposed over-all agreement, to be effective for the duration of the

war, would provide (a) that service aircraft of one country could use the

airway facilities of the second on a reciprocal basis for traffic limited as follows: There would be no traffic for hire; goods were to be owned by an

Allied government; only diplomatic mail would be carried except in cases

where other mail was for delivery outside the second country; and only

armed services and other governmental officials and Allied personnel traveling in connection with the war effort would be transported. It also provided

(b) that authority would first have to be obtained by appropriate U.S.

officials for service aircraft to use routes other than those then in effect, and

(c) that commercial aircraft operated on behalf of one country could use airway facilities of the second on a reciprocal basis on routes already approved.

Traffic was to be limited as for (a). In addition, commercial aircraft operations were to be replaced within six months by service aircraft operations

employing service personnel.41 The Newfoundland Government, upon

Canadian inquiry, stated that it had no objection to inclusion of airway facilities operated by Canada or the United States in Newfoundland territory

within the scope of the agreement.42

After the War Department had studied a preliminary draft of the Canadian proposal, it prepared a counterproposal for submission to the Canadian

Section of the Permanent Joint Board on the occasion of the 6-7 May 1943

meeting. United States diplomatic officials during conversations with their

Canadian colleagues had meanwhile obtained the impression that Canada had

decided not to press for the agreement inasmuch as the proposal had probably already served its purpose in getting the United States to curb

the objectionable commercial airline practices. The U.S. counterproposal

was not presented and the matter was not discussed at the Permanent Joint

Board meeting.43

At the beginning of June Canadian authorities inquired concerning a

reply to the Canadian proposal. Three months later Canadian officials

again queried the U.S. Section and expressed a hope for an early reply. In

the interim, additional Northwest Airlines practices of a kind inconsistent

with the intent of the proposed agreement had been reported.44

Upon receipt of the June inquiry, State, War, and Navy Department

officers had conferred at the working level and had prepared a revised version of the counterproposal drafted earlier. United States reconsideration of

41

 Memo cited above, n. 39. 42

 Ltr, Keenleyside to Chargé d'Affaires Clark, 17 Apr 43, PDB 126-10. 43

 Unused Memo, SUSAM for Keenleyside, 5 May 43; Memo, Hickerson for SUSAM, 12

May 43, both in PDB 126-10. 44

 Memo, Hickerson for SUSAM, 20 Sep 43; Memo, SUSAM for CG ATC, 2 Aug 43, both

in PDB 126-10; Ltr, Clark to Hickerson, 4 Jun 43, D/S 811.79642/6-443.
312 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

the Canadian proposal moved at a leisurely pace, and the counterproposal,

forwarded to the Department of State on 1 October, was further considered

there until late November 1943 but was not changed.45 The counterproposal, finally forwarded to Ottawa on 24 November 1943 for submission to

the Department of External Affairs, was an extensive revision of the Canadian proposal, incorporating changes that met the substantive U.S. objections

by (a) eliminating the requirement for militarization of commercial contract

aircraft as undesirable, and substituting controls designed to meet the Canadian

objections, and (b) broadening the categories of traffic to be carried to

include, for example, mail for U.S. troops.46

Canada undertook a protracted study of the counterproposal. On 17

March 1944 it presented a new draft to the U.S. Embassy at Ottawa. In

the main, the suggested changes represented a tightening and clarification

of the provisions of the U.S. draft. The major change was the broadening

of the definition of U.S. territory to include Hawaii as well as the United

States proper and Alaska, looking to the time when the shifting of aircraft

to the Pacific after V-E Day might "raise practical problems concerning

military air routes across the Pacific."

 47

The United States continued to study this latest draft until early August

1944, when a new aspect of the problem arose. Transoceanic aircraft of the

Air Transport Command had begun carrying, on a fill-up basis, fare-paying

passengers traveling in connection with the war effort. The U.S. authorities felt that this practice of selling fill-up spaces should be authorized by

the agreement, since it was a practice of the British Overseas Airways Company, a crown company operating over the same transatlantic route, and

since they considered an intermediate country (Canada) should not dictate

terminus to terminus traffic policy. Because Canada opposed such a provision, in late September the United States was prepared to accept a text omitting it.48

But before final agreement an the text was reached, the issue was again

raised when President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9492 on 25 October

1944. By this order the President authorized the Air Transport Command

to carry passengers for hire under certain conditions. Since it was necessary

to take cognizance of this action in the proposed Canadian-U.S. agreement,

45

 Memo, SUSAM for Hickerson, 1 Oct 43; Department of State Desp 123, to U.S. Emb

Ott, 18 Nov 43, both in PDB 126-10. 46

 Department of State Desp 123, to U.S. Emb Ott, 18 Nov 43, PDB 126-10. 47

 Department of External Affairs Memo, 17 Mar 44, PDB 126-10. 48

 Memos, Parsons for Berle, 3 and 21 Aug 44, D/S 811.79642/8-344, and /8-2144; Department of State Desp, to U.S. Emb Ott, 26 Sep 44, D/S 811.79642/9-2644.
PROBLEMS IN JURISDICTION 313

and Canada considered the carrying of passengers for hire illegal and in violation of Canadian law and treaty provisions, discussions on the problem

continued on into January 1945. Finally, at a meeting in New York City

in late January, an article in the proposed agreement was redrafted to permit

traffic for hire through, but not into or away from, Canada, in connection

with Air Transport Command transatlantic operations. With this last point

of disagreement resolved, the exchange of notes was effected at Ottawa on

13 February 1945.49

When the agreement was made, it included a confidential attachment

that listed in detail the routes being operated by each country (a) through

use of commercial carriers under military contract, and (b) by its armed

forces. Canada operated no route under (a), and only one under (b), the

route originally authorized under the 12 December 1940 agreement. The

United States was authorized thirteen routes in the first category and seventeen in the second.50

Contrary to the originally stated Canadian intention to publish the agreement, it was not made public. Instead, an official press release was issued

on 19 February 1945, announcing the substance of the agreement. Actually,

the negotiations themselves, lasting over almost two years, had produced the

required corrective action on the part of the U.S. authorities so that the

Canadian objectives were largely achieved long before complete agreement

was reached.51

Maintenance and Control of Bases

The establishment of a U.S. Army air garrison at Newfoundland (Gander)

Airport in May 1941 using housing and other facilities provided by Canada

gave rise to problems that were rapidly to become more numerous and complex as the scale of U.S. activities in Newfoundland and Canada enlarged.

The division of responsibility for maintaining and servicing, as well as for

operating and defending, the facilities in which there was a joint U.S.-Canadian interest was the subject of negotiations lasting into 1944.

To meet the initial situation, the Permanent Joint Board on Defense on

10 November 1941 adopted the Twenty-first Recommendation, which was

promptly approved by both governments. Under it the forces of one country occupying buildings provided by the other were charged with maintaining

49

 Memo, from Parsons, 18 Jan 45, D/S 811.79642/1-1845. The agreement is TIAS, 2056;

CTS, 1945, No. 1. 50

 TIAS, 2056; CTS, 1945, No. 1. 51

 Department of State Bulletin, February 25, 1945, XII, 307. In 1950, when the attachment listing the authorized routes was no longer considered confidential, the text of the agreement was published.
314 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

them, as well as the appurtenant buildings within the assigned area, where

it was feasible to delineate such an area. Utilities and services were to be

provided by the host government on an equitable basis. Where a separate

area was assigned and lent itself to the use of an independent system of

services and facilities, they could be provided by the occupying forces. The

arrangement was to be applicable reciprocally in both countries.52

At Gander Airport a separate U.S. area was not delimited. Before long

the U.S. Newfoundland base commander concluded that an arrangement by

which he was dependent on the Canadian forces for fire and police protection was not desirable. Because of this and the frictions that he cited as

being inevitably generated by an arrangement with "two families living in

the same house," he continued to press unsuccessfully, during the following

months, for designation of a physically separate U.S. area within which responsibility need not be divided.53

The same problem soon arose at Goose Bay Airport in Labrador, where

forces of both nations also occupied facilities constructed by Canada during

the fall and winter of 1941-42. The construction of facilities did not, for

diverse reasons, keep abreast of the demand, and, not long after the base was

officially established as an RCAF station in March 1942, Canada permitted

the U.S. Army to construct an independent group of facilities on the opposite side of the air base from the facilities tenanted by the Canadian and British elements.

The formula embodied in the Twenty-first Recommendation also proved

suitable for application to the problems of joint occupancy at the principal

bases of the Northwest Staging Route, where U.S. forces used facilities provided by Canada. But it did not cover the air-base facilities constructed by

the United States itself in Canada in connection with the North Atlantic

Ferry Route and along the Northwest Staging Route and Mackenzie River

valley.54 As these facilities built up and for the United States became operational beginning in the latter months of 1942, new arrangements were

needed, since the Twenty-first Recommendation had provided only for

tenancy by one country of facilities provided in and by the second country.

The broader questions of control, maintenance, and operation of bases

occupied in their entirety by the tenant forces came under discussion at the

24-25 February 1943 meeting of the Permanent Joint Board. The Board

agreed that the following arrangement would be suitable:

52

 Appendix A, below. 53

 Ltr, CG NBC to Bissell, 16 Dec 41, PDB 107-3. 54

 See Ch. VIII, above.
PROBLEMS IN JURISDICTION 315

a. Canada would be responsible for administration, security, traffic conb. The United States would assume these responsibilities at air bases

used exclusively or mainly by its own forces. Canada might post a liaison

officer to each such air base.55

The Board agreement was not cast in the form of a recommendation. Shortly

after the Board consideration, the Canadian Government asked that the agreement be held in abeyance pending further discussion. At the 1 April 1943

Permanent Joint Board meeting, the Canadian Section withdrew its support

of the earlier proposal and submitted one that assigned to Canada control

of bases which it used substantially and to the United States only those where

it was the sole user.56 The Permanent Joint Board did not settle the matter

until its next meeting, on 6-7 May. At this time the Board adopted its

Thirty-first Recommendation, which assigned responsibility to the United

States for bases of which its forces were the principal or exclusive user. It

also provided that defense standards at such bases should be acceptable to

the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and that, should Canada desire to assume control of such an airfield, "the necessary arrangements . . . [should] be concerted between the two Governments."

 57

 The Canadian Government, in

reviewing the recommendation, would have preferred that it conform to the

Canadian proposal of 1 April. Nevertheless, since the recommendation called

for a specific schedule allocating the air-base responsibilities and incorporation of this schedule into a further Board recommendation, the Canadian

Government approved the Thirty-first Recommendation.58

During the succeeding months the Air members of the Permanent Joint

Board worked out on the basis of the Thirty-first Recommendation the allocations of air bases and the details of responsibilities. The results were

adopted by the Board on 24-25 August 1943 as the Thirty-second Recommendation. To the United States were allocated the Canol Project and Alaska

Highway flight strips; the North Atlantic Ferry Route air bases it had constructed; the air base at The Pas, where it was the principal user; and the

Edmonton satellite air base, which was the only one of the major Northwest Staging Route air bases developed from its inception by the United

States. Both governments approved the recommendation in September. Approval of the Thirty-second Recommendation represented another step in the

55

 Journal, PDB 124. 56

 Memos, SUSAM for CG AAF, 10 Mar and 5 Apr 43, PDB 113-2. 57

 Appendix A, below. 58

 Alaskan Division, Historical Record Report, Nov 42-Dec 43 volume, p. 225.
316 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Canadian program to reassert Canadian authority over Canada's airways, air

bases, and air traffic.59

The four meetings of the joint U.S.-Canadian committee that studied

problems arising from the Thirty-first and Thirty-second Recommendations,

mentioned earlier in the chapter, were also the means for working out further

details of the application of the Thirty-second Recommendation. As a matter

of fact the greater portions of those meetings were devoted to problems of

this type. During the meetings an excellent spirit of co-operation and understanding prevailed, as a result of which suitable arrangements and adjustments were effected as to work specifications, division of labor, and similar

questions in a manner best reflecting the availability of resources and the

needs of the forces of the two countries.

The Thirty-first Recommendation provided the basis for appropriate shifts

of control of air bases to accord with changing circumstances before the general transfer to Canada of control of the entire U.S. system of bases at the

end of the war. Control of the Mackenzie River valley flight strips of the

Canol Project was transferred to Canada before the end of 1944. Between

V-E and V-J Days, it became fully apparent that the air bases at Churchill

and The Pas would have no appreciable role in the support of the U.S. effort in either Europe or the Pacific. Since Canada was prepared to take them

over and integrate them completely into the Canadian network of civil airports, the transfers were effected on 1 and 2 August 1945, respectively. With

Canadian assumption of control and responsibility for these air installations,

the general transfer of the entire U.S. air-base system to Canadian control

was well under way.60

59

 Appendix A, below. Despite the provision in the Thirty-first Recommendation for stationing of liaison officers, Minister of Munitions and Supply C. D. Howe revealed a year after

approval of the schedule of allocations that there were one or two bases that to his knowledge

no Canadian had yet seen, indicating that Canada apparently had not made use of this provision. (H. C. Debates, 8 Aug 44, p. 6084.) 60

 See Ch. XII, below.
CHAPTER XII

Mission Accomplished

The tasks assigned to U.S. forces in Canada and related Canadian activities changed frequently as the battle lines receded farther from North America

and as the broader logistical requirements and situations shifted accordingly.

Certain of the tasks were finished and others were canceled even before the

necessary facilities had been fully completed and long before victorywas

won on the fighting fronts. Still other tasks arose only upon the termination of hostilities in the combat zones. The reduction of the U.S. establishment was thus not an immediate consequence of V-J Day but began long

before that date and lasted over a period of years. The arrangements for disposing of U.S. installations and equipment during the U.S. withdrawal differed markedly from the arrangements initiating the activities. Whereas in

the early wartime years the military considerations were overriding, many

other factors needed to be taken into account in working out the disposal

arrangements. This complicating element was compensated for by the fact

that, in place of having to reach decisions quickly, those working out the

disposal arrangements could take adequate time to study thoroughly the

problems involved.

Beginning the American Roll-up

The year 1943 saw the transition from a situation in which northern North

America was vulnerable to enemy attack to one of relative security and the

use of northern North America principally as a logistical base for overseas

operations. By the end of the year the Allied position had improved substantially. The Japanese had been evicted from the Aleutians, the Axis submarine menace was being reduced, and the Allies had seen major successes

in the Mediterranean and on the eastern European fronts.

During the latter half of 1943 the United States reduced its garrison in

Newfoundland from about 10,000 to half that number. Canada also began

to reduce its garrison in Newfoundland. In Canada, Canadian antiaircraft

and coastal defense forces were scaled downward. The 7th and 8th Canadian

Divisions were disbanded, while the 6th was partially reduced in strength.

Similarly, Canadian air base defense detachments were withdrawn from the

Northwest Staging Route and other bases. This progressive reduction of
318 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

the defensive garrisons begun in 1943 continued throughout the remainder

of the war.

In the changing situation parts of the U.S. logistical organization and

system of installations in Canada for support of the overseas effort became

surplus. By mid-1943 the United States was prepared to abandon the uncompleted western route of the CRIMSON Project, together with the supporting meteorological and communications networks, and to curtail the work at

other bases of that project. On the Pacific coast, the elimination of 1943 of

the Japanese threat to Alaska and the Aleutians reduced certain of the missions and operations of the logistical facilities in that area. Likewise, the

completion of the military phase of the construction of the Alaska Highway

and Canol Project resulted in the withdrawal, beginning in early 1943, of a

large part of the Engineer troop construction force, which had reached a

strength exceeding 10,000.

These withdrawals were largely offset by two new developments. The

task of completing the projects from which these troops were withdrawn

passed to the hands of civilian contractors whose employees had gradually

been increased for the purpose. In September 1943 the number of U.S. civilians employed on the Alaska Highway alone reached a peak exceeding 10,000.

Throughout the rest of 1943 the civilian force, too, was drastically reduced

as the projects neared completion. The second development was the establishment in September 1942, and continued expansion thereafter, of the Northwest Service Command, the logistical organization charged with operating

the various U.S. installations, facilities, and services as they were completed

or established. By August 1943 the strength of this command exceeded

10,000.

Other circumstances militated against reductions of U.S. forces in the

Canadian northwest. The United States assumed an active role in air-base

construction during 1943 and 1944 which absorbed a large part of the construction force released from the completed projects. Then, too, operations

for ferrying lend-lease aircraft to Alaska for the USSR reached their peak

during 1944. Concurrently, the strength of the Alaskan Wing of the Air

Transport Command reached its peak of 9,987 in November 1944, and still

amounted to 7,032 on V-J Day.1

Victory in Europe brought new missions for the forces and facilities in

Canada. The North Atlantic Ferry Route was scheduled to play a new role

in the movement of air units and personnel in the general redeployment of

forces from the European to the Pacific theaters. The Prince Rupert port,

1

 Carr, Great Falls to Nome: The Inland Air Route to Alaska, 1940-1945, pp. 97-98.
MISSION ACCOMPLISHED 319

on the Pacific coast, was slated to perform a vital function in stepping up

the movement of tonnages required in the Pacific area for the intensification

of operations against Japan. The early surrender of Japan caused both of

these operations to be dropped. In a slightly different form, operations over

the North Atlantic Ferry Route did figure importantly in demobilization by

speeding return from Europe of Canadian and U.S. fighting forces.2

In anticipation of the adjustments and reductions that would be necessary

in the U.S. logistical structure in Canada, some consideration had been given

to the problem of disposition of surplus property before the end of 1942.

The facilities fell naturally into two groups—the fixed and immovable facilities, and the movable facilities, equipment, and supplies. Neither category

included such facilities as the Alaska Highway and the Canol Project, for

which appropriate arrangements as to disposition had been included in the

original agreements.

Shortly after the Canadian Government suggested that the disposition of

items not already provided for be arranged, the Permanent Joint Board on

Defense examined the problem, at its 3 November 1942 meeting. The Canadian Section of the Board presented a draft recommendation on the subject

in furtherance of the Canadian desire that governmental agreement be based

upon a formal recommendation by the Board.3 Why Canada desired the

Permanent Joint Board to take up the matter the Canadian Section did not

state. The reason may have been that because the disposal operation would

undoubtedly be closely examined by the public and legislatures of both

countries a background of Permanent Joint Board consideration would minimize the impact on each of the governments. Although the Board unquestioningly accepted the task, the matter of working out disposal procedures

appears to have been an administrative problem, to a large extent free of

defense considerations, and perhaps properly outside the purview of the Board.

In some instances the question of residual military and defense value needed

to be considered, but this aspect was only a small part of the larger problem.

One purpose the Canadian Government had in pressing for a Board recommendation on postwar disposition of facilities was the desire to present a

recommendation to the House of Commons when it met on 20 January 1943.

The Canadian purpose was illuminated on 1 February, when the Prime

Minister laid the recommendation before the House. The recommendation

and his accompanying statement were an effective method of allaying growing Canadian concern as to the status of U.S. activities in Canada in the

2

 See above, Ch. VII. 3

 Journal, PDB 124; Ltr, Hickerson to Robins, 11 Nov 42, PDB 150-2.
320 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

postwar period. After pointing out that, as a purely wartime arrangement,

the United States had provided materials for, or defrayed the cost of, the

construction of a number of projects in Canada, he stated:

It is not contemplated that the contribution which the United States is thus making to the common defense will give the country any continuing rights in Canada after

the conclusion of the war. Indeed, with regard to most of the projects that have been

undertaken in this country by the United States, agreements have already been made which

make the postwar position completely clear.4

The Permanent Joint Board's Twenty-eighth Recommendation, based on

the Canadian draft and approved on 13 January, was approved by the two

governments in an exchange of notes on 27 January. It provided, for facilities or matériel for which no other disposition had been made, that (a) immovable installations would become the property of Canada or of the province,

unless other arrangements were agreed within one year after the cessation

of hostilities, and (b) movable facilities could be removed from Canada or

be offered for sale to Canada during the same period. If these options were

foregone, the United States could sell the facilities on the open market, any

sale to be subject to approval by both governments.5 On the surface this

arrangement seemed to favor Canada. Unless it agreed to some other arrangement, all immovable installations covered by the recommendation automatically became Canadian property when the year following the termination

of hostilities expired. As it turned out, the Twenty-eighth Recommendation

was not to be applied in the initial detailed disposition arrangements concluded after its adoption, and, in fact, its provisions were to be amended

before it had ever been applied.

The Northern Airfields Settlement

During the first months after Pearl Harbor, when Canada undertook to

construct facilities on the Northwest Staging Route at the request of and

for use by the United States, it followed the policy set forth in the recommendations of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense by which each government financed the work within its own geographic jurisdiction. In April

1942 Canada modified this position and agreed to pay for the construction

of all work requested by the United States when the work was of continuing

value to the air route, while the United States was to pay for facilities over

and above Canadian standards and needed solely for U.S. military purposes.6

This policy prevailed for about a year.

4

 H. C. Debates, 1 Feb 43, pp. 20-21. 5

 Appendix A, below. The exchange of notes is in EAS, 391, and CTS, 1943, No. 2. 6

 See above, Ch. VIII.
MISSION ACCOMPLISHED 321

In the face of ever-expanding U.S. construction requirements for facilities

on the staging route, the Canadian Cabinet War Committee in late March

1943 initially considered reimbursing the United States fully for its payments,

but in the next month it decided to withhold such action. After further consideration, the Canadian Government on 31 May 1943 advised the United

States that it would no longer submit claims for payment and proposed

instead that the whole matter of the settlement of the construction accounts

be postponed and worked out at the end of the war.7 The United States

accordingly suspended its payments to Canada on the construction account.

Seven months later, on 18 December 1943, the Canadian Government advised

the United States that it had again revised its decision. Canada would henceforth bear the cost of construction of all permanent facilities or improvements carried out on airfields in northwest Canada at the request of and for

the account of the United States and would reimburse the United States for

its expenditures for such construction.8 The United States would continue

to finance such of its projects as had no permanent value.

One factor influencing the decision was the importance Canada attached

to the northern airfields. Minister of Munitions and Supply C. D. Howe,

in reporting the Canadian decision to the House of Commons on 29 February 1944, pointed out that the Northwest Staging Route was "one of the

most important in the world ... as part of an international air route." Execution of the new policy would make the staging route and its permanent

facilities wholly Canadian property, constructed by Canada with the co-operation of the United States but financed entirely by Canada. Still later, in

reporting on the final arrangements to the House of Commons, Prime Minister King stated that "it . . . [had been] thought undesirable that any other

country should have a financial investment in improvements of permanent

value, such as civil aviation facilities, for peacetime use in this country." He

cited this factor, together with the Canadian desire to finance the facilities

as part of the Canadian contribution to the war effort, as the two considerations prompting Canadian action.9

Another factor entering into the Canadian decision was its rapidly mounting U.S. dollar balance, which had by the end of 1942 almost been restored to

the September 1939 level and had during 1943 jumped from $319 to $649

million. Because of the rapid rate at which Canada had been accumulating

U.S. dollars, the United States in early 1943 had considered it necessary to

7

 Alaskan Division, Historical Record Report, Nov 42-Dec 43 volume, p. 222; Cdn Leg

Note 288, to Secy State, 31 May 43, PDB 126. 8

 Cdn Leg Note 643, to Secy State, 18 Dec 43, D/S 842.7962/121. 9

 H. C. Debates, 29 Feb 44, pp. 980-81, and 1 Aug 44, pp. 5706-08.
322 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

work out an informal arrangement with Canada which would put a limit on

Canadian holdings of U.S. dollars. Under the arrangement, called the Morgenthau-Ilsley agreement, the U.S. dollar balance was to be kept within an

agreed range through control of the flow of production orders to Canada

and other measures. The continued rapid build-up of Canada's exchange

position which took place during 1943 prompted the United States to invoke

the provisions of the agreement in early 1944. Accordingly, Minister of

Finance J. L. Ilsley and Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau jointly developed a program of measures designed to reduce Canada's current holdings

and future receipts of U.S. dollars. Payment to the United States for its expenditures on permanent airport improvements became an important element

of the arrangement. Fortunately, this large dollar expenditure was feasible

and even desirable at a time when Canada wished to assure its control of

the northern airfields. On the U.S. side, no responsible official had envisaged

a position of special privilege for the United States in Canada as a result of

the wartime operations there, and therefore the offer of unanticipated payment for U.S. expenditures was readily gratefully accepted.10

During the months after the December 1943 decision, additional discussions took place between Canada and the United States as to the scope, form,

and other details of Canadian payments for construction on the northern airfields. The United States proposed a lump-sum settlement that could be

adjusted upon termination of hostilities. Canada preferred to itemize expenditures insofar as possible, leaving a relatively small amount of uncompleted construction for the adjustment process. The United States also

requested that, at an appropriate time, discussions take place concerning post10

 Ltr, Ilsley to Morgenthau, 24 Mar 44, cited in "Report of Meetings in Washington, D. C.

on 25-26 April 1944," PDB 150-4. For the Morgenthau-Ilsley agreement on the dollar balance

question, see F. A. Knox, "Canada's Balance of International Payments, 1940-45," Canadian

Journal of Economics and Political Science, XIII (August 1947), 345-62. Lingard and Trotter,

Canada in World Affairs, III, p. 215, speculate that the concurrent investigation by the Special

Senate (Truman) Committee Investigating the National Defense Program (see above, pp. 233-35)

rendered the United States amenable to the Canadian proposition. This appears to be unlikely

since in northwest Canada that committee investigated only the Canol Project. Of the total

Canol expenditure of about $135 million Canada brought within the airfield agreement only

the Mackenzie River flight strips at a cost of $1,264,150, which represented less than 2 percent

of the amount finally transferred under the airfield agreement. The validity of the theory is

further challenged by the fact that, despite a strong contrary Truman Committee recommendation, the War Department proceeded in the early months of 1944 to expend an additional $19

million on the Canol Project. For Canadian policies and statistics on its U.S. dollar position,

see Canada, Foreign Exchange Control Board, Report to the Minister of Finance, March 1946.

United States figures are to be found in Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, International Transactions of the United States During the War, 1940-45

(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 122-31.
MISSION ACCOMPLISHED 323

war use of these and other fields on a reciprocal basis, and Canada acceded

to this request.11

During the discussions of the airfield settlement and as a consequence of

the Morgenthau-Ilsley arrangement, the scope of the proposed agreement

was broadened to include (a) the airfields in eastern Canada as well as those

in northwestern Canada, (b) the telephone land line that had been constructed as part of the Alaska Highway, (c) Canadian construction on U.S.

account at the Goose Bay air base in Labrador, and (d) certain additional

construction on the Northwest Staging Route by Canada for U.S. account.

The final agreement was embodied in an exchange of notes dated 23 and 27

June 1944.12 It provided among other things that existing arrangements for

the maintenance, operation, and defense of the facilities would continue in

effect for the duration of the war. Upon relinquishment of facilities, all

items at the installations, nonpermanent as well as permanent, were to be

turned over to Canada.

Table 7 presents a summary of the expenditures on the northern airfields

by both countries. Of the total U.S. expenditures of $90,683,571 at the installations covered by the agreement, the United States was reimbursed

$76,811,551 by Canada for improvements having permanent value. The

Canadian expenditures authorized at the same installations amounted to

$29,600,643, to which Canada added funds estimated at $5,161,000 to cover

the completion of additional construction work desired by the United States.

Not long after the June settlement was concluded the United States began to transfer facilities covered by it to Canada. The Canadian Department

of Transport took over the flight strips of the Mackenzie River route on 1

November 1944. In late August and in September the United States had

reported its desire to relinquish its facilities at Calgary, Grande Prairie, Fort

St. John, Watson Lake, Namao, and Prince George. During October the

transfer of facilities at these points began and was completed by the end of

1945. At that time U.S. personnel remained only on the airfields at Edmonton, Fort Nelson, and Whitehorse; the U.S. facilities at these places, together

with the telephone land line, were turned over to Canada at a ceremony at

11

 Note, Berle to Cdn Ambassador, 24 Feb 44, and Reply, 20 Mar 44, D/S 842.7962/121

and /134. 12

 EAS, 405, and CTS, 1944, No. 19. Only the latter contains the appendixes that list in

detail the Canadian and U.S. expenditures on the facilities covered by the agreement. Accounts

of the negotiation are to be found in The Canada Year Book, 1945, pp. 705-12, and Canada

at War, No. 40 (Sep 44), pp. 28-37, as well as in the statement of the Prime Minister, H. C.

Debates, 1 Aug 44, pp. 5706-08. The statement is also published in Department of State

Bulletin, August 6, 1944, XI, 139-41. On the broadening of the settlement pursuant to the

Morgenthau-Ilsley arrangements, see statement of Ilsley in H. C. Debates, 21 Apr 44, p. 2227.
324 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

TABLE 7—CANADIAN-UNITED STATES EXPENDITURES ON THE NORTHERN

AIRFIELDS, DETAILED BY PROJECTS

a

 Additional construction work undertaken by Canada in 1944 on the Northwest Staging Route at the request of the

United States is estimated to have cost $5,161,000 in Canadian funds as follows: Edmonton $1,250,000, Grande Prairie

$1,500,000, Fort Nelson $1,803,000, Watson Lake $608,000.

Source: Canada at War, No. 40 (Sep 44), p. 37. Details of the above expenditures are to be found in CTS, 1944,

No. 19.
MISSION ACCOMPLISHED 325

Whitehorse on 3 April 1946, at which each government was represented by

its chairman on the Permanent Joint Board on Defense. The United States,

which had been training Canadian personnel for the land-line operation since

November 1945, retained personnel for this purpose with that facility until

1 June 1946.13 The airfields in eastern Canada, which had been largely constructed, financed, maintained, and controlled by the United States, were

released beginning in August 1945.14

Disposals Under the Thirty-third Recommendation

The dispositions effected by the June 1944 settlement, together with those

provided for specifically as part of project authorizations, reduced considerably the facilities and matériel to which the principles of the general settlement set forth in the Twenty-eighth Recommendation might be applied. In

early 1944 questions arose as to the application of the provisions of the recommendation that led to the working out of new arrangements. Canadian

authorities had expressed the view that, under the Twenty-eighth Recommendation, within one year after the cessation of hostilities all remaining

U.S. immovables would become Canadian property. United States authorities differed with this view on the basis that the recommendation provided

for the conclusion of agreements to provide suitable reimbursement for

selected facilities and that such agreements had been anticipated for certain

of the facilities.15

To clarify the disposal arrangements, the U.S Section of the Permanent

Joint Board on Defense introduced a new draft recommendation on the subject at the 28-29 June 1944 meeting. At the subsequent Board meeting on

7-8 September, the new recommendation, the Thirty-third and the last agreed

upon during the wartime years, was approved.16 The Canadian and U.S.

Governments approved the recommendation in September and November

1944, respectively, and thereafter it was confirmed through an exchange of

notes.17

13

 To meet its continuing requirements for telephone and telegraph communications services

in northwest Canada and to Alaska, the United States arranged to lease some of the available

channels at a rental of $271,000 annually. (TIAS, 1966; CTS, 1948, No. 6.) 14

 The airfields in eastern Canada were released on the following dates:

Churchill..................................................... . 1 August 1945

The Pas...................................................... . 2 August 1945

Southampton Island......................................... . 7 September 1945

Mingan...................................................... . - October 1949

Fort Chimo.................................................. . - October 1949

Frobisher Bay. .............................................. . 1 September 1950 15

 Memo, Parsons for Hickerson, 11 Jul 44, D/S 842.20 Defense/7-844. 16

 Journals, PDB 124. 17

 EAS, 444; CTS, 1944, No. 35. See Appendix A.
326 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

According to the recommendation, the United States was to supply within

three months after its approval a list of the immovable facilities not already

provided for, for which it desired to be reimbursed. The fair market value

of these facilities was then to be determined by a joint appraisal, in which

an agreed third appraiser was to fix the value if the joint appraisers could

not agree. The agreed fair market value was to be paid by Canada to the

United States. The remaining facilities not so listed by the United States

were to become Canadian property automatically one year after the termination of hostilities. The revised arrangement gave the United States a free

hand to determine the immovable facilities for which it should be reimbursed, whereas the Twenty-eighth Recommendation had permitted a reimbursement only when Canada was willing to agree thereto. The new

arrangement relieved Canada of the onus of determining the installations for

which the United States should be paid, and instead put upon the United

States the burden of stating its wishes.

As to movables, Canada had been somewhat concerned over the provision of the Twenty-eighth Recommendation that would under certain

circumstances have put the United States into the business of selling surplus

property in Canada. This possibility was eliminated by arranging that property not removed from, or purchased by, Canada was to be transferred to a

Canadian Government agency for disposal and reimbursement to the United

States. To safeguard U.S. interests, a U.S. officer was to have a voice in the

disposal of such property. The Canadian Government soon designated the

Crown Assets Allocation Committee and the War Assets Corporation, Limited, two governmental agencies, as its agents for carrying out the provisions

of the Thirty-third Recommendation. Declarations of surplus were made

to the Crown Assets Allocation Committee, and, when portions of such

surplus were declared also surplus to the needs of Canadian governmental

agencies, they were transferred to the War Assets Corporation, Limited, for

sale or other disposition.18

Immediately after the governments had agreed to this recommendation,

the question was raised as to payment of customs duties on surplus property

sold in Canada. Canadian authorities had earlier expressed the view that

these duties should be paid and should be assessed on the basis of the value

of the property when sold. The U.S. view was that, since the property had

18

 War Assets Corporation, Limited, was established under authority of the Dominion Companies' Act by Privy Council 9108, 29 November 1943, which also authorized establishment of

the Crown Assets Allocation Committee. The former agency was succeeded by a new War

Assets Corporation established on 12 July 1944 under the statutory authority provided in the

Surplus Crown Assets Act, which came into effect 30 June 1944.
MISSION ACCOMPLISHED 327

been used for the mutual benefit of both countries in the prosecution of the

war, the amount recovered by the United States should not be diminished

by any duties that would accrue to Canada. At the January 1945 Permanent Joint Board meeting, U.S. Chairman LaGuardia strongly urged that the

levies be waived in the interest of good U.S.-Canadian relations. The next

month Canada accepted the U.S. view.19

The United States, as required by the Thirty-third Recommendation, on

11 February 1945 submitted the list of immovable facilities for which it desired reimbursement on the basis of the jointly agreed fair market value.

Even before final agreement had been reached on the Thirty-third Recommendation, the United States had already reported as surplus to its needs the

railroad depot at Dawson Creek, and Camp 550 and the Jesuit College at

Edmonton. In general, the facilities listed included all U.S. weather stations, command installations, storage and water facilities, and similar

installations throughout Canada. The following major items appeared on

the list:

Camp 550, Edmonton

Jesuit College, Edmonton

Depot and appurtenances, Dawson Creek

Bechtel-Price-Callahan Building, Edmonton

Military hospital, Edmonton

Railhead and appurtenances, Edmonton

Railhead and appurtenances, McCrae, Yukon Territory

Weather and communications facilities, at 57 sites throughout Canada

Alaska Highway relay stations (14)

Headquarters and base facilities, Whitehorse

Standard Oil Company office and housing facilities, Whitehorse

Prince Rupert Subport of Embarkation, including the Port Edward

staging area and Watson Island ammunition storage facilities

An American and a Canadian appraiser proceeded to place valuations upon

the immovable facilities that had been listed by the United States. In no

instance was it necessary to use a third appraiser, since the two were in each

instance able to reach agreement on a fair market value.

Disposition of movable equipment and facilities proceeded concurrently.

Large quantities of U.S. equipment and supplies were returned to the United

States. Where such matériel was surplus to U.S. needs and was desired by

one of the Canadian governmental agencies, transfers were made on a reim19

 Journal, PDB 124; Ltr, Hickerson to Pearson, 20 Dec 44, D/S 842.20 Def/12-2044, and

Reply, 9 Feb 45, D/S 842.20 Def/2-945.
328 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

bursable basis. When there was neither U.S. nor Canadian official need for

the surplus matériel, it was put up for public sale with corresponding reimbursement to the United States.20

By the beginning of 1946 transfer of a considerable part of the total list

had been completed. The United States had been reimbursed $770,000

(U.S.) for the first four items—Camp 550, Jesuit College, the Dawson Creek

depot, and the Bechtel-Price-Callahan Building.21 Disposition of a small

number of the minor facilities had also been arranged. Appraisal of the

immovable facilities had been substantially completed even though some of

the more complex ones, such as the McCrae railhead and the facilities in and

near Prince Rupert, had only been declared surplus by the War Department

in October 1945.22

In early March 1946 Canadian authorities suggested that all remaining

U.S. property, movable and immovable, be disposed of under a single agreement at the governmental level, in order to permit completion of the transaction by 31 March, the end of the Canadian fiscal year. This timing would,

in turn, permit use of funds available in the old fiscal year, whereas doubt

was expressed that funds would be available for the purpose in the new

fiscal year. Such an over-all settlement promised greatly to simplify for

Canada the task of appraising and taking over the remaining U.S. Government property, which involved, besides the War Assets Corporation, the

Departments of National Defense for Air, National Defense (Army), and

Transport. In this task Canadians had been encountering administrative

difficulties and a considerable duplication of work.23 Both sides had to

make some broad estimates in order to work out an agreement within the

time available, but by and large most of the needed basic data was compiled.

The notes effecting the agreement were signed on 30 March 1946. The

20

 Privy Council 3432, 15 May 45. 21

 Camp 550 was so designated because it was a housing facility having a capacity for 550

persons. The headquarters of the Northwest Division of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers

was located at the Jesuit College, which had been improved and enlarged for that purpose.

The Bechtel-Price-Callahan Building had been used for office space by the prime contractor for

the Canol Project. 22

 Responsibility for disposition of U.S. property in foreign areas had, by Executive Order

9630, 27 September 1945, been transferred from the War and Navy Departments and the ArmyNavy Liquidation Commissioner to the Department of State as of 20 October 1945. The responsibility was discharged by the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, who established a field

organization that included a Deputy Field Commissioner in Ottawa. The actual physical custody of property and administration of the disposal arrangements continued to remain with

the U.S. service agencies in Canada. See Department of State, Office of the Foreign Liquidation

Commissioner, Report to Congress on Foreign Surplus Disposal, April 1946, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946), and Department of State Bulletin, March 3, 1946, XIV, 350. 23

 Memo/Conv, R. M. Macdonnell and Parsons, 7 Mar 46, PDB 150-2; Privy Council 1189,

29 Mar 46.
MISSION ACCOMPLISHED 329

arrangement, according to the notes, was based on the underlying principles

of the Thirty-third Recommendation, yet it permitted a speedy and expeditious closing out of the bulk of the outstanding disposal problems. By the

agreement, the United States was reimbursed $12 million (U.S.) for installations and matériel whose original cost had been as follows:

 24

Under the agreement U.S. forces could recapture or continue to use such

facilities and matériel as they needed, subject to the provision that appropriate reimbursement would be made to Canada for any property recaptured.

For its part, the United States was not to abandon any property until Canada

had been given a reasonable opportunity to arrange for its custody. Under

this and earlier agreements, all immovable facilities awaiting disposition had

been accounted for.

The 1946 agreement proved a useful tool to Canada in another connection. The Canadian armed forces desired to purchase certain surplus U.S.

matériel from stocks outside of Canada. Through use of the agreement and

some of the funds available in fiscal year 1945-46, Canada deposited $7

million (U.S.) with the U.S. Government to be used for this purpose. The

amount proved to be in excess of the funds needed for the available surplus

matériel of the types desired, and of the amount the Canadian Government

later decided should be expended for the purpose. On 10 October 1947

Canada requested the return of $1 million of the deposit and, on 24 January

1948, the return of an additional $2.2 million, thus reducing the account to

$3.8 million.25

Special Dispositions

Separate arrangements were made for two major U.S. undertakings, the

Alaska Highway and the Canol Project, in accordance with the terms of the

original agreements with Canada authorizing these projects. In the case of

the Alaska Highway project, the United States had agreed that it would

maintain the highway for at least six months after the termination of the

war, and that the portion of the highway in Canada would become an in24

 TIAS, 1531; CTS, 1946, Nos. 12 and 31. Lists appended to the notes set forth in detail

the facilities and supplies included under this settlement. Canadian Government approval of

the transaction was granted in Privy Council 1189, 29 Mar 46. 25

 TIAS, 1981; CTS, 1948, No. 8.
330 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

tegral part of the Canadian highway system. No provision was made for

reimbursement to the United States for its expenditures.26

The terms of the Alaska Highway agreement were applied to other agreements connected with the road. When the construction of the HainesChampagne cutoff road was authorized, it came under the terms of the basic

agreement. Eight flight strips had been authorized and constructed under

still another agreement, which also made the strips subject to the terms of

the basic Alaska Highway agreement. Constructed under the basic authority

of the original Alaska Highway agreement, although not mentioned in the

notes exchanged, were many other immovable facilities such as relay stations,

construction and maintenance camps, convoy parking sites, and the like.27

Insofar as disposal arrangements were concerned, auxiliary facilities that were

associated with the construction of the highway, such as the construction

and maintenance camps, were treated as being covered under the highway

disposal plan. Others, which were operational adjuncts to the highway such

as the relay stations, were disposed of under the procedures of the Thirtythird Recommendation and the 30 March 1946 exchange of notes.

Arrangements were made for transfer to Canada of the Canadian sections

of the Alaska Highway and the Haines cutoff on 1 April 1946. In accordance with the terms of the original agreement, Canada made no reimbursement to the United States, which had expended over $100 million on the

highway construction. Perhaps because of policy considerations that were

applicable to the northern airfields settlement as a whole, Canada had

already elected to bring the eight flight strips of the highway project under

the airfields settlement. Accordingly, the United States was reimbursed

$3,262,687 (U.S.) for its expenditures on the strips, which would presumably have been transferred to Canada gratis had it insisted on the application

of the original highway agreement. The decision probably reflected, in part,

the Canadian attitude that the northern airfields would undoubtedly be a

significant adjunct to the transportation resources of northwest Canada,

whereas no such general conviction then existed about the highway.

Although under no legal obligation to do so, Canada decided to continue

to maintain the highway, which was part of the road net redesignated the

Northwest Highway System. The Canadian Army was assigned the maintenance responsibility for the system, and it established an organization with

headquarters at Whitehorse for the purpose. In December 1946 the Canadian Government decided against further work and maintenance on the

26

 EAS, 246; CTS, 1942, No. 13. 27

 EAS, 381; CTS, 1942, No. 26, and EAS, 382; CTS, 1942, No. 21.
MISSION ACCOMPLISHED 331

Haines cutoff road, although it proceeded to consult with the United States

as to its view in the matter.28

The other major unilateral U.S. undertaking in Canada, the Canol

Project, had also been covered by special disposal arrangements embodied in

the original agreement authorizing the project. This agreement had provided that on the termination of hostilities the pipeline and refinery should

be appraised at their current commercial value by two appraisers, one selected

by each country, and by an umpire to resolve disagreement if necessary. If

the Canadian Government did not act within three months to purchase the

facilities, they were to be offered for sale to private companies with the

appraised value as the reserve price. In the event that no private company

desired to purchase the facilities, their disposition was to be referred to the

Permanent Joint Board on Defense for recommendation. That body was

also to be consulted in the event either government wished to dismantle the

facilities, or to allow them to be dismantled.29

As agreements were reached for the construction of the supplementary

Canol facilities, somewhat more flexible disposal provisions were incorporated. These arrangements provided only that, upon termination of hostilities,

either government could initiate discussions with a view to agreeing to the

manner of disposition of the supplementary facilities, which comprised the

Prince Rupert storage and loading facilities and the Skagway-Whitehorse,

Carcross-Watson Lake, and Whitehorse-Fairbanks distribution pipelines.

As with the basic project, no dismantlement of the facilities was to be permitted unless the Permanent Joint Board recommended such action.30

The first step in disposing of U.S. Canol installations was taken in April

1944 when the United States negotiated a new contract with the Imperial

Oil Company, which was accepted by the two governments in an exchange

of notes in June. Under the new contract the United States transferred to

the Imperial Oil Company all its facilities, movable and immovable, together

with all equipment, machinery, and spare parts in the Norman Wells area

and along the Mackenzie River valley transportation routes to that area.31

When hostilities terminated, Canada displayed no interest in acquiring

the refinery and pipeline installations of the Canol Project, whose wartime

utility had been questioned and whose peacetime capabilities were far in

excess of foreseeable needs. As a means of simplifying disposal of the Canol

28

 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Alaska Study Mission, Committee Print (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 7. See also H. C. Debates, 13 Mar 47, p. 1326,

and 17 Mar 47, p. 1409. 29

 EAS, 386; CTS, 1942, No. 23. 30

 EAS, 387; CTS, 1942, No. 24, and EAS, 416; CTS, 1944, No. 16. 31

 EAS, 416; CTS, 1944, No. 16. See also Ch. VIII, above.
332 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

facilities at Prince Rupert, the United States suggested in December 1945

that they be treated together with the Prince Rupert port and staging facilities, which were being processed under the Thirty-third Recommendation

and without reference to the Permanent Joint Board. Canada agreed to

this proposal.32

The remaining Canol facilities were not to be disposed of so easily.

Operation of the refinery and the crude-oil line from Norman Wells had

been discontinued in March 1945. The United States, desiring to dispose

of facilities no longer needed, proposed in February 1945 that the two governments proceed with the appraisal of the commercial value of the facilities,

as had been contemplated in the initial agreement on the Canol Project.

Canada agreed to the proposal, and the substantial task of inventory, inspection, and appraisal was begun.33

 However, by midsummer the Canadian

Government had concluded that it did not desire to exercise its option to

purchase the facilities. It consequently suggested to the United States that,

since a joint appraisal no longer appeared useful, plans for continuing this

appraisal should be dropped. Canada also waived the provision that would

then have offered the facilities for sale to private companies with the appraised value as a reserve price. In taking these actions Canada expressed

the hope that they would aid in the disposition of the Canol facilities.34

On 30 June 1946 the last facility of the project still in use, the SkagwayWhitehorse-Fairbanks distribution line, was placed in a nonoperating

standby status. But neither this nor the Watson Lake distribution pipeline

had yet been declared surplus, so that the only facilities in the surplus category were the refinery and the crude-oil pipeline from Norman Wells. As

of 30 June 1946, no disposition of any of the Canol facilities, other than

those at Prince Rupert, had been arranged.

In November the United States presented new proposals to facilitate the

disposal operation:

a. Since the facilities no longer had defense value, any restrictions as to

dismantlement should be lifted.

b. Canada should guarantee such riparian and other rights as might be

required by a purchaser for operation of the facilities and waive payment of

duties and taxes by a purchaser.

c. The United States or a purchaser could remove any of the facilities

from Canada. 32

 TIAS, 1565; CTS, 1946, No. 1. See above, pp. 325-29. As a matter of fact, the five

storage tanks had been removed by the United States in November 1944. leaving only the loading dock and other minor facilities. 33

 TIAS, 1695; CTS, 1945, No. 3. 34

 TIAS, 1696.
MISSION ACCOMPLISHED 333

d. Any facilities not disposed of during a two-year period following

agreement on the proposals could be left in place and considered as of no

value.

Canada agreed to the proposals, which were made effective 1 March 1947.35

Armed with the proposals, the United States, which had by this time concluded that dismantlement would be necessary to obtain the maximum

monetary return, proceeded energetically through its Foreign Liquidation

Commissioner to arrange a disposition.36

In August 1947 the refinery and related equipment at Whitehorse, having

an original matériel cost of approximately $6 million, were sold to the

Imperial Oil Company, Limited, of Toronto, for $1 million. In November

the crude-oil pipeline between Norman Wells and the refinery, the parallel

telephone line, and road-repair equipment scattered along the pipeline were

sold for $700,000 to the L. B. Foster Company of Pittsburgh and the Albert

and Davidson Corporation of New York City.37

The distribution pipelines from Skagway to Fairbanks and Watson Lake

remained under the ownership of the U.S. Government, without being declared surplus. In fact, as the other Canol dispositions were being completed, postwar requirements for fuel deliveries to Alaska began to increase

and to justify restoration of the Skagway-Fairbanks pipeline to operational

status, which was later done.38

One transaction remained to complete the disposal settlements. Under

the Thirty-third Recommendation, quantities of surplus movable property

had been transferred to Canada for sale by the War Assets Corporation and

reimbursement to the United States. Negotiations throughout most of 1948

to settle this account were finally completed as of 31 December. Under the

settlement, Canada paid $576,562 for property sold for the United States

and purchased a small unsold residue for an additional $4,437.39

The final balance sheet for the government-to-government transactions,

exclusive of the foregoing final settlement follows:

 40

35

 TIAS, 1697; CTS. 1946, No. 41. 36

 Department of State Bulletin, February 9. 1947, XVI, 256. 37

 H. C. Debates, 18 Feb 48, pp. 1348-49; House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Alaska

Study Mission, p. 10. 38

 H. C. Debates, 18 Feb 48, p. 1439; Department of the Army Press Release, 21 Jan 48. 39

 Report to Congress on Foreign Surplus Disposal, January 1948, p. 23, and January 1949, p.

16; TIAS, 2352; CTS, 1949, No. 16. 40

 Report to Congress on Foreign Surplus Disposal, April 1946, pp. 20-21, and July 1946, pp.

25-26. On the basis of the tabulated data, these and other of the quarterly reports cite a

return on the order of 40 percent of the cost value of the surplus property. However, if the

airfields settlement under which Canada voluntarily paid 100 percent of the cost of permanent

facilities is extracted, it would appear that the return in the negotiated settlements was on the

order of 13 percent for these transactions.
334 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

All in all, the disposal operation was carried out to the satisfaction of

both countries. All U.S.-built or -financed installations were transferred to

Canadian control or otherwise disposed of by the United States in a manner

that with minor exceptions eliminated the United States as a titleholder to

real property and facilities in Canada. Through the disposals and settlements Canada acquired numerous airfields, structures, and facilities, in some

instances at only a fraction of their original cost. These capital acquisitions

represented a substantial augmentation of the transportation and other

resources of northern Canada. The United States also fared well in that it

obtained reimbursement on a larger scale than had been anticipated under

the original authorizing agreements.

The 12 February 1947 Statement

The collapse of Hitler's Germany in May 1945 signaled the approach of

a new phase in the military co-operation between the United States and

Canada. Japan had yet to be defeated, but plans for the final operations

against Japan were in an advanced state of preparation. And, as the war

entered its closing stages, it was apparent that it would be necessary to determine the nature and scope of postwar military co-operation between the

two countries. Yet the new situation and the requirements for co-operation

in the posthostilities period had not been examined, either by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense or by any other official machinery. Such an

examination soon became a matter for active consideration by the Board.

At the June 1945 Permanent Joint Board meeting, not long after V-E

Day, General Henry, the Senior U.S. Army Member, outlined his views of

the future of defense collaboration. To General Henry, who as a result of

his additional responsibilities in the field of military co-operation between

the United States and the American republics had had considerable experience with the difficulties stemming from the great diversity of types of

matériel, organizational and training methods, and the like, it appeared that

Canada should become a member of the "military family of American nations" envisaged in the Act of Chapultepec. Although he recognized that

Canadian public opinion might not yet be ready for postwar steps toward
MISSION ACCOMPLISHED 335

standardization of Canadian and U.S. forces and that Canada's Commonwealth ties presented complications, General Henry felt that such steps

would have inescapable merit and should be explored. He also recommended that the Board examine the continuing value to continental defense

of the facilities developed in northwest Canada during the war.41

General Henry's presentation provided the springboard for a full discussion of these problems at the next meeting of the Permanent Joint Board,

held in early September soon after the Japanese surrender. On this occasion, the personal and tentative views of the Canadian Section of the Board

on the points raised by General Henry were in turn outlined and discussed.

As for Canadian participation in inter-American military collaboration, this

appeared to be, in the Canadian view, a political question. As to northwest Canada, many of the facilities developed there would certainly have

some continuing defense value, the extent of which would be apparent when

a military estimate of the situation for northern North America could be

prepared.

In the view of the Canadian Section, as outlined by General A. G. L.

McNaughton who had succeeded Mr. Biggar as Canadian chairman, a real

case for standardization of matériel and organization between the forces of

the two countries could not be made. On the other hand, standardization

as well as fuller co-ordination of military supply operations between the

United States and the British Commonwealth as a whole would be a substantial step toward the common security and international peace. Canada

would in the future exert such influence as it could to that end. Thus the

Canadian Section made explicitly clear that the dual and sometimes

dichotomous position of Canada as a North American state and as a member of the British Commonwealth would continue to be a factor to be taken

into account.

On one point the two sections of the Board were agreed. The authors

of the Ogdensburg Declaration had used the term "permanent" in the title

of the Board advisedly. Military co-operation should be continued within

the framework of that declaration. There was no reason why a new appreciation or estimate of the joint defense situation should not be prepared as a

step preliminary to revising ABC-22, the basic defense plan, to meet the

requirements of the new situation. The Canadian Section suggested that the

chiefs of staff of the two countries might on some occasion meet to survey

the situation.42

Although the Canadian response indicated some receptivity to the pro41

 The memorandums are appended to the Journal, 4-5 Sep 45 PJBD meeting, PDB 124. 42

 Journal, 4-5 Sep 45 PJBD meeting, PDB 124.
336 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

posals of the U.S. members of the Board, its tone was cautious and deliberate.

Nevertheless, the designation of General McNaughton to chair the Canadian

Section of the Board indicated that Canada did not expect the Board to lapse

into a subsidiary role. With the addition of this eminent and experienced

soldier-statesman-scientist, the Canadian Section was prepared to deal with

the highest questions of politico-military policy.

On the U.S. side, the proposal to revise ABC-22, the 1941 plan that had

met adequately the requirements of World War II, received the approval

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In examining the procedure for drafting the new

estimate of the situation (appreciation, in Canadian parlance) which would

provide the basis for drafting the new joint defense plan, the Permanent

Joint Board on Defense and chiefs of staff of both countries felt that the

former needed to be supplemented by a similar body on the service level.

Whereas the Board, responsible to the President and Prime Minister, was a

suitable forum for policy deliberations, a mechanism more closely tied in

with the defense departments was needed to co-ordinate the increased amount

of consideration that would be necessary. Accordingly, a Military Co-operation Committee was established in February 1946 comprising representatives

of the service departments, but also including officers from the Departments

of State and External Affairs, and, in addition, the Secretary of the Canadian

Cabinet Defense Committee. The sections of the Military Co-operation

Committee were made responsible to their respective chiefs of staff. Dayto-day liaison between service authorities was to be maintained through the

service attaches in the two capitals and the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington, which continued to operate in the postwar period.43

At its very first meeting, held in Washington 20-23 May 1946, the Military Co-operation Committee considered drafts of (a) a study of the requirements for Canadian-U.S. security and (b) a security plan. During the course

of succeeding months these documents were finalized and approved and subsidiary plans initiated. These plans were undertaken under the guidance

of the Military Co-operation Committee as part of its assigned responsibility

of preparing, continuously revising, and submitting recommendations for

implementation of the basic security plan and its subsidiary plans.44

Concurrently with this joint strategic planning, the earliest measures of

practical postwar collaboration were being taken. Exercise MUSKOX, the

movement of a mechanized force some 3,000 miles through Arctic Canada

43

 JCS 1541, approved 19 Oct 45; Canada, Department of National Defense, Canada's Defense Program (Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1949), p. 38. 44

 U.S. Department of Defense, Organization Manual, Office of the Secretary of Defense

(Washington: 1952, Processed.), p. 11.15.
MISSION ACCOMPLISHED 337

during the early months of 1946, was carried out with participation of U.S.

observers and use of some U.S. matériel. The experience and test observations obtained on all equipment were made equally available to both countries. During the same period experiments authorized by Canada were carried out by U.S. B-29 aircraft over Arctic Canada in the use of the loran

(long range) radio navigation system, which was similar to that which had

been used so successfully over ocean areas during the war.45

Although the mutuality of the security problem common to the two

countries appeared to justify such joint measures, military co-operation with

the United States had not yet become a clear-cut facet of contemporary Canadian foreign policy. This policy was fundamentally one of full support for

the search for security through the United Nations, and one of minimizing

bilateral or multilateral regional arrangements as detracting from the maximum potential of the United Nations for peace. However, during the immediate postwar period, this policy was implemented not actively but

passively, and until early 1947 Canada played a retiring role on the international stage.

During 1946 the United States and the USSR came to be increasingly

recognized as the protagonists and antipoles of a developing bipolar world

situation. A significant body of Canadian public opinion was expressing the

view that it was unwise for Canada to act jointly with the United States in

measures that might antagonize the USSR. This view had received expression as early as December 1943 at the Montebello Conference of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, when a substantial number of those

present felt that Canada should abandon the Permanent Joint Board in the

postwar period as constituting an irritant in relations with the USSR.46

Canadian attitudes in the postwar period on this point were not improved

by occasional injudicious press releases on the part of the U.S. military services in connection with their activities in Canada.

Nevertheless, the undeniable merit and self-evident necessity of further

military co-operation prompted official approval of continuing forward planning and modest steps in that direction. As joint strategic planning got

under way, the Permanent Joint Board began to consider the areas in which

postwar collaboration might be useful, together with the adequacy of the

existing mechanisms for that purpose. A recommendation by the Perma45

 For a full account of actions in the field of defense co-operation in the period immediately after V-J Day, see F. H. Soward, Canada in World Affairs, IV, From Normandy to Paris,

1944-1946 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1950), Ch. IX. 46

 Grant Dexter, Canada and the Building of Peace (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1944), pp. 165-67.
338 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

nent Joint Board on the principles for continuation of defense collaboration

was first considered at the 29 April 1946 Board meeting. During the ensuing

months the statement of principles was reviewed and revised, emerging on

20 November as the Board's Thirty-sixth Recommendation. Not long afterward, the approval of the two governments was made known through the

release on 12 February 1947 of an agreed statement. The release declared

that limited defense collaboration based on the following principles had been

authorized:

a. Interchange of personnel.

b. Co-operation in maneuver exercises and development and tests of

new matériel.

c. Encouragement of standardization.

d. Reciprocal availability of military facilities.

e. No impairment of control by each country over all activities in its

own territory.47

Although the principles established could be utilized to provide a basis

for broad co-operation, their wording indicated that such broad co-operation

could develop only within the limits and restrictions that either country

might wish to impose. On the Canadian side particularly, these limitations

provided a flexibility that might be used to meet the needs of the domestic

and international situations. In presenting the arrangement to be House

of Commons, Prime Minister King pointed out that collaboration of this

type had long existed between the nations of the British Commonwealth

and that Canada's geographical position made it important that such measures should be undertaken with both the United States and the United

Kingdom.48

The U.S.-Canadian Military Co-operation Committee established a year

earlier became the principal mechanism for co-ordinating the actions worked

out pursuant to the principles of the 12 February 1947 statement. By this

time the revised estimate of the situation and the new security plan had been

completed and the committee was able to relate the practical measures to

be taken to the detailed requirements, immediate and longer term, that

emerged from the plan. These arrangements proved eminently suitable in

the light of the contemporary international climate. In addition, they provided a flexibility that allowed for increasing amounts of collaboration as the

two countries began to accept the inescapable conclusion that the Soviet

47

 Full text at Appendix E, below. 48

 H. C. Debates, 12 Feb 47, pp. 345-48.
MISSION ACCOMPLISHED 339

strategy left no alternative but to broaden the defensive collaboration designed to guard North America from Soviet aggression.

The Lessons of World War II

With the Allied victory in World War II important changes took place

in the power positions of the major nations of the world. The two leading members of the World War II Axis were for the time being eliminated

from their positions as foremost military powers. The USSR emerged as

the unchallenged single contender against the United States for primacy as

the world's most powerful nation. The United States and Canada, despite

substantial expenditures of men and treasure, came out of World War II

stronger and more vigorous than ever. Other nations, such as the United

Kingdom and France, lost in relative power and position. Technological

advances, particularly in the fields of electronics and weapons such as the

atomic bomb, made far-reaching changes in the military capabilities of the

world's powers. But other fundamental factors changed little or not at all.

A salient feature of the relation between the United States and Canada

during World War II was the wide disparity in their resources in manpower,

material, and productive capacity. From this disparity often flowed U.S.

notions that the needs of the United States should be accepted without challenge since the U.S. interests at stake were so much greater, and that the

U.S. view should predominate when differences arose. Such a position would

of course be unacceptable to the smaller of any pair of sovereign states professing adherence to the tenets of international law. And Canada was free to

take an unyielding and divergent stand because it was secure in the knowledge that the United States would never, except under near-catastrophic circumstances, employ forces to impose its will. So long as Canada could, in

the given situation, withstand the political, economic, and psychological

pressures that might be applied, it remained a free agent.

On the other hand, where Canada was the seeker its relative size left it

in a poor bargaining position. Canadian efforts to gain a stronger place in

the war councils, for example, could only be successful to the extent that

the United States, in consultation with the United Kingdom, would allow.

In the case of a problem relating to one of the major war theaters, the Canadian position was even weaker, for the United States considered the United

Kingdom to be the principal partner and Canada only a subsidiary of the

partner. This stemmed from Canada's position in the British Commonwealth, in which the United Kingdom was exercising war leadership not

only because of its historical and material pre-eminence but also because the

events of the war had placed it in the most forward positions on the diplo-
340 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

matic and military fronts. Canada's relative size and resources also made

it dependent on the United States or the United Kingdom for the supply of

much of the matériel with which to equip Canadian forces and for equipment to expand its production base. Finally, the disproportion between the

war efforts of the two North American partners sometimes provided occasion

for query whether the junior partner was pulling its weight, and for embarrassment in instances where Canadian lack of skills or other resources

necessitated a one-sided effort in a project of joint interest.

A second major element of the Canadian experience in North American

co-operation in World War II was the extent of the U.S. intrusion on Canadian soil in an area remote from the combat theaters and peopled by Canadians engaged in reasonably normal pursuits. The substantial U.S. garrison

operated in Canada independently of Canadian control and legal jurisdiction

to an extent considered unwarranted by many Canadians. This garrison constructed, maintained, and operated bases and facilities as if they were on U.S.

soil. Command organizations with their independent signal communications

systems were established over segments of Canadian territory. Strenuous U.S.

efforts were made to have Canadian forces placed under U.S. command on

Canadian soil. All these arrangements presented to Canadians serious questions of domestic policy, which were aggravated by sundry accompanying

complications—occasional lapses of soldier discipline that outraged the Canadian citizenry, competition for scarce housing and rationed supplies, and concern as to whether U.S. commercial construction, air transport, and similar

enterprises might not gain a postwar advantage. Too often it seemed to

Canadians that U.S. requests for arrangements that resulted in these intrusions into Canada, as well as U.S. motivations in other dealings, were based

exclusively on military requirements, without adequate consideration of the

political factors involved.

A perennial state of affairs that conditioned the nature of the U.S.-Canadian

relationship was the common amiable ignorance and disinterest on the part

of Americans toward Canada. The impact of this ranged from the annoying,

when exhibited by individuals in responsible positions, to the serious. There

were surely many Americans who failed, or perhaps chose not, to understand

that Prime Minister Churchill could in no wise speak for the Canadian Government, and that Canada was fully autonomous and coequal with the United

Kingdom within the British Commonwealth. Lack of understanding of the

nature of the British Commonwealth, of the nature of the Canadian Confederation, and of some Canadian historical, geographical, and similar background could not fail to introduce errors, discords, or irritations in the policy
MISSION ACCOMPLISHED 341

consideration or operational handling of problems concerning U.S. activities

in Canada. Too frequently, such lapses were compounded by an ineptitude

on the part of U.S. officials in even the highest positions who violated the

basic rules of the "how to win friends and influence people" technique.

A basic factor influencing postwar U.S.-Canadian military collaboration

was the impact of advanced weapons and techniques on the Canadian "privileged sanctuary" position. By the end of World War II the development

of aircraft, guided missiles, submarine warfare, airborne techniques, and the

atomic weapons had advanced warfare to the threshold of a new era. In this

new era North America ceased to be relatively immune from assault from

other continents. The H-Hour ground assault in Europe could be matched

by an H-Hour atomic bombing of Detroit and Windsor or of Washington

and Ottawa. The mastery of the Atlantic and Pacific and the barrenness of

the Arctic no longer prevented penetration of these barriers, and their value

as buffers of time and space had been drastically reduced.

Under these circumstances the utilization of North American resources

for and the role of Canada in the defense of the Western Hemisphere as a

whole, within the framework of a joint U.S.-Canadian arrangement, assumed

increasing importance to Canada. For some time before it entered World

War II the United States had a well-developed interest in the defense

of Latin America and visualized the danger of military action there as greater

than in North Atlantic territories such as Newfoundland, Greenland, and

Iceland. After Pearl Harbor the United States allocated substantial military resources to several of the larger Latin American nations. To Canada,

the U.S. preoccupation with Latin America and use of resources there probably did not appear warranted by the military situation. Canada learned,

too, that dependence on sources of military equipment outside of Canada

made dubious the availability of essential supplies in an extreme emergency,

such as that resulting from the 1940 German blitzkrieg, when the sources

of military equipment for Canada dried up.

Theoretically, two choices were available to Canada in 1940: it could

attempt to become self-sufficient in military supplies; or, it could continue

to draw upon outside sources for certain items. Within the production base

established in Canada by the end of World War II, the first choice might

have been feasible. But in 1940, as a practical matter, it was out of the question, and Canada necessarily elected the second choice. In fact, in the working out of the Hyde Park Declaration, Canada strove for adoption and implementation of a concept under which Canada and the United States would

correlate their production programs so that each would be completely de-
342 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

pendent upon the other for items assigned each country for production. Such

an arrangement visualized a balanced mobilization effort with joint production collaboration in the interest of efficient specialization and would, in effect,

have bound Canada and the United States into a closely integrated security

union at least for the duration of the war.

Actually, the arrangement as conceived by Canada was never carried out.

The United States strove to develop the production capacity needed to supply at least some of its requirement of all items, and it utilized Canadian

capacity quantitatively to augment its supply of selected items. Canada also

departed from the Hyde Park concept. Although it purchased much of its

military matériel from the United States and the United Kingdom, Canada

broadened its production base and technical know-how until it was producing items in almost every category of military equipment. But with the end

of World War II, Canada still remained faced with the question of how it

should plan to procure its military equipment in peace and in war, and from

what countries the equipment not manufactured in Canada should be procured.

The failure on the part of the United States to take into account political,

psychological, economic, and similar factors in dealing with problems relating to Canada made for decisions and actions that were not always in the

best U.S. or joint interest. Two examples were the questions relating to

unified command and to the Canadian staff mission in Washington. This

failure was a basic weakness in the over-all U.S. politico-military conduct of

its relations with Canada in World War II.

More problems would have arisen had it not been for the civilian chairmanship of the two sections of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense. This

arrangement interposed a civilian between the military of either section and

the other government and its Permanent Joint Board representation. Properly selected civilians were competent to act as interpreters and moderators

of the needs of their military colleagues and to insure that some account was

taken of political and other nonmilitary factors. The civilian chairmen could

thus make a useful contribution toward seeing that project requirements were

brought within the limits of feasibility. In addition to exerting a moderating influence on the military of his own section, each chairman was in a

better position than the military to press the other section harder for acceptance of some project in terms of the nonmilitary as well as the military

urgency.

On the other hand, it does not appear from the World War II record

that the civilian chairmen of the Permanent Joint Board and other civilian

leaders were more inclined than military leaders to commit the two coun-
MISSION ACCOMPLISHED 343

tries to intimate collaboration. To be sure, the basic impetus to U.S.-Canadian military collaboration was given by the civilian heads of the governments when they joined in making the Ogdensburg Declaration. But in

practice thereafter civilian officials took the lead in pushing only one major

project, the plan backed by Canada for co-ordinated North American aviation

training, and then with only indifferent success.

The record of U.S.-Canadian wartime military collaboration shows that

the Permanent Joint Board on Defense established at Ogdensburg proved

useful beyond the expectations of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister

King. It was born more out of political considerations than of military

necessity, at least from the U.S. point of view, for neither the War nor the

Navy Department was consulted before its establishment, nor had either department indicated a need for such a body. Nevertheless, the Board proved

itself an excellent forum for a continuous and informal exchange of views

and exploration of common problems, as well as for the conduct of broad

studies as contemplated by Roosevelt and King. Through the give-and-take

and mutual confidence that marked the functioning of the Board, many problems were solved harmoniously and effectively. Moreover, the Board became useful in handling the day-to-day operational details of a large number

of field projects, thereby performing an essential staff function not otherwise

provided for.

The problem of integration of the intricate pattern of U.S. activities in

Canada and of their co-ordination with the Canadian authorities was a persistent thorn. By dint of continuing adjustment of such organizations as

were established, and of extensive liaison between the Canadian and U.S.

officials concerned, the problem was kept within manageable bounds. It

had several aspects. The foci of the co-ordinating authorities for the numerous U.S. activities in Canada were in Washington and not only physically

removed from Canada but also separated by several echelons of command.

At few if any of these levels was there an adequate appreciation of Canadian

political and other problems that should have been taken into account in

reaching decisions and molding troop attitudes.

For lack of better machinery, the Permanent Joint Board on Defense came

to have a substantial operational function in the co-ordination of arrangements between the two countries and among the various U.S. agencies involved. The scope of this function was limited, since the U.S. Section could

exercise no command authority. Nevertheless, in handing a multitude of

routine and administrative details, the Board seemed to fill an essential need

in providing some co-ordinated direction to the U.S. projects in Canada.
344 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

The Canadian Government, too, experienced such a need and met it by

creating the office of Special Commissioner for Defense Projects in Northwestern Canada. Except in the area of major policy, his office provided a

Canadian focal point for that part of Canada in the co-ordination of matters

of joint interest. This experience suggests that the establishment of a U.S.

theater-type headquarters, charged with the conduct of all U.S. activities in

Canada and Newfoundland, would have been very useful to both countries.

Such a headquarters could have dealt with a single Canadian commissioner

for defense projects, and could have provided integrated direction to and

supervision of the U.S. activities.

An alternate solution might have been the establishment of a joint U.SCanadian theater-type headquarters, with appropriately balanced representation from both countries. Such a headquarters, located in or near Ottawa,

would have provided a single focus of policy and operational control for the

related U.S. and Canadian activities in Canada. Such integrated direction

would have made these activities more responsive to the requirements, military and otherwise, of the situation on a continuous basis and would have

provided a ready means for joint review of project requirements and implementation of programs. Some faltering steps were taken in this direction.

From the Canadian point of view, there were probably as good arguments

against as for such an arrangement. On the U.S. side, the many agencies

operating in the field in Canada were naturally content without the interposition of such an authority over them. That the need for such a headquarters did not become urgent was probably only the result of the fact that,

except in a narrow sense in Newfoundland, the wartime activities in Canada

were all of a logistical and not an operational nature. And, although the

conduct of those activities involved co-operation between the two countries,

the majority thereof were fundamentally unilateral U.S. projects, rather than

joint ones in the sense that they were jointly developed and executed to meet

a common requirement.

The foregoing conclusions tend somewhat to obscure the full compass

of the successful collaboration between the two countries and should not

be allowed to do so. For both Canadians and the Americans stationed in

Canadian territory the situation was sometimes an awkward one. Both were

serving the war effort of their countries, yet within the sphere of their activities, they were far removed from the battle fronts. The many engineering works of permanent value carried out through joint efforts give ample

testimony to the success of wartime military co-operation.

There were other and more significant accomplishments that were realized
MISSION ACCOMPLISHED 345

through the efforts of the two partners. Canada is today on the threshold

of becoming a world power. In part this emergence is due to the tremendous postwar development of Canadian natural wealth and resources. This

development undoubtedly received a major stimulus during World War II

as a result of the extensive U.S. operations in Canada, which broadened the

knowledge of Canada's northern territories, improved the transportation facilities there, and opened up areas that had been infrequently penetrated by

white man. Canada's productive capacity received a substantial boost from

the Hyde Park Declaration, which not only generated a flow of orders but

collaterally provided for Canadian acquisition of the machine tools and other

equipment necessary to fill those orders.

The United States, and to a lesser extent Canada, can take credit for the

economic rehabilitation of Newfoundland. In addition, as the question of

Newfoundland's political future came to the forefront, the United States and

U.S. officials maintained a perfectly correct attitude. Canada was prepared

to welcome Newfoundland to the Canadian Confederation. In Newfoundland, there was sentiment for union with the United States, which had been

the major fountainhead of its economic well-being, as well as for union with

Canada. In no way did Americans try to influence public opinion or take

a part in the solution of the problem, which was resolved in favor of admission of Newfoundland to Canada as a new province.

The history of wartime collaboration between the United States and

Canada was a record of solid accomplishment with only minor notes of discord. The best testimony to the success of Canadian-U.S. wartime military

co-operation is the fact that both countries were prepared, in the immediate

postwar period when peace appeared to be a reality and demobilization was

proceeding apace, to continue their military co-operation on a revitalized

basis.

Appendix A

Recommendations of the Permanent Joint Board on

Defense, Canada-United States, 26 August 1940-

1 September 1945 1

FIRST RECOMMENDATION 26 August 1940

Exchange of Information

It was agreed that there should be a full and complete exchange of military, air and

naval information between the two Sections of the Board, with the understanding that

each Section would be free to convey to its government any information they received.

Action by U.S. Government: There appears to be no specific evidence in the files of the U.S.

Section of approving or disapproving action. However, in the Progress Reports annexed to the

Journal of Discussions and Decisions for the 20 21 January 1941 and subsequent meetings, members of the U.S. Section of the Board reported on the progress of action under this recommendation.

It is apparent that at least informal approval was implied, or that approval had been taken for

granted. This lack of evidence may be accounted for by the fact that the board at its early meetings attacked a large number of substantive problems without concerning itself adequately with

procedural and administrative problems.

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 5 September 1940.2

SECOND RECOMMENDATION 27 August 1940

Defense of Newfoundland

A. The Island of Newfoundland occupies a commanding position at the entrance of the

St. Lawrence-Great Lakes waterway and on the flank of the sea route between the Atlantic

seaboard of North America and Northern Europe. It is on the direct air route between

the East Coast of the United States and Northern Europe. It is the point in North

America, nearest to Europe, from which, if occupied by an enemy, further operations

against the North American continent might be effectively initiated. As such it should

be adequately defended.

B. The forces in Newfoundland now consist of one battalion of infantry for the defense

of Botwood and the Newfoundland airport, a battery of two 4.7-inch guns now being

1

 Texts of recommendations and dates on which they were made are to be found in the

appropriate Journal of Discussions and Decisions for the meeting held on the date indicated.

These journals are to be found in file PDB 124. 2

 Memo, Secy, U.S. Section, for Acting Chairman, U.S. Section, 12 Dec 51, PDB 124-1.

This list tabulates the dates of approval of the various recommendations by both governments

as determined through a co-ordinated study made by the two secretaries in 1951 of the files

kept since 1940. It is hereafter cited as the 12 Dec 51 List. At least in regard to action by

the U.S. Government, this list is not always accurate, and it is cited only when more authoritative data could not be found.
348 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

installed at Bell Island, and a flight of five Digby (Douglas) land planes operating from

Newfoundland airport. These forces are considered inadequate for the defense of the

island at the present time and the security of Canada and the United States is thereby

endangered.

C. The Board considers that the defense of Newfoundland should be materially strengthened by:

(a) Increasing the strength of the Canadian defensive garrisons immediately;

(b) Establishing as soon as practicable, and not later than the spring of 1941, a force

of aircraft of suitable types adequate for patrolling the seaward approaches to Newfoundland and Canada and for the local defense of the Botwood area;

(c) Selecting and preparing, as soon as practicable, bases permitting the operation of

United States aircraft, when and if circumstances require, in numbers as follows:

(1) A minimum of four squadrons of patrol planes (48 planes).

(2) A minimum of one composite group of land planes (73 planes).

(d) Completing, as early as practicable, and not later than the spring of 1941, the installation of appropriate defense for the port of St. John's, Newfoundland, for

Botwood, and for other points as required.

(e) Taking such additional measures as further examination of the defense problem

and local reconnaissance show to be necessary.

Action by U.S. Government: See comment on First Recommendation. Insofar as portions of the

first eight recommendations related to troop and matériel dispositions which had not been made by

2 October 1940, they were approved as a result of their incorporation in the First Report of the

Board to the two governments. This report, reproduced at Appendix B, received formal approval

on 19 November 1940. Apparently, because of this action, the 12 December 1951 List arbitrarily

assigns that date as the date of United States approval of the first eight recommendations. Such

an assignment is not entirely accurate since the First Report encompassed only limited portions of

the first eight recommendations.

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 5 September 1940.3

THIRD RECOMMENDATION 27 August 1940

Defense of Maritime Provinces

A. The strategic importance of the Maritime Provinces is similar to that of Newfoundland. However, in addition to providing bases for the operation of aircraft and light

patrol craft, the Maritime Provinces must provide secure bases from which major naval

operations can be projected.

B. This will require harbors secure from underwater attack, with docking, repair and

supply facilities capable of accommodating the major portion of the United States or

British fleets; operating facilities for military and naval air forces; and harbor defenses

supported by the necessary troop concentrations.

C. The Board finds that some of these requirements have already been met and that steps

have been initiated for the accomplishment of others.

D. It is apparent that the following should be undertaken by the Canadian Government:

(a) Early completion of the present projects for underwater defenses at Halifax,

Sydney, Gaspe and Shelburne.

3

 12 Dec 51 List.
APPENDIX A 349

(b) Early completion of harbor defenses at these bases.

(c) Early expansion of aircraft operating facilities to include provision for four squadrons of patrol planes (48 planes) and one composite wing of approximately 200

planes.

(d) Such additional measures as further examination of the defense problem and local

reconnaissance show to be necessary.

E. The Board also recommends the preparation in Canada and in the United States of

adequate strategic reserves of men and materials for timely concentration in the Mari-

.time Provinces if, and when, the need arises.

Action by U.S. Government: See comments on First and Second Recommendations. Portions of

this recommendation were included in the First Report.

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 5 September 1940.4

FOURTH RECOMMENDATION 27 August 1940

Allotment of Materials

It was agreed that arrangements concerted between the United States and Canadian

representatives of each Service with regard to this material should be passed through the

proper channels in order that the proper allocation of the material should be promptly

made. It was further agreed that material provided to implement the recommendations

of the Board shall not be used for any other purposes. As at present advised, the Board

regarded the following classes of material as of special importance, their relative importance being in the order indicated for each Service:

Ground Forces

(a) A.A. armament and ammunition.

(b) Harbor defense armament and ammunition.

(c) General equipment of mobile defense.

Air Force

(a) Patrol planes.

(b) Fighter or pursuit planes with, in each case, armament, ammunition and radio

equipment.

As to the Naval Forces the position as reported was that there have already been discussions which have led to arrangements under which it is expected that all present requirements are to be satisfied. These arrangements relate to:

(a) 4" guns.

(b) .5 machine guns.

(c) Destroyers.

The Board approved of the carrying out of these arrangements for the purpose of the

attainment of the objects covered on the Board's previous decisions.

Action by U.S. Government: See comments on First and Second Recommendations.

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 5 September 1940.5

FIFTH RECOMMENDATION 27 August 1940

Improving Communications in the Northeast

That the subject of communications between Newfoundland, the Maritime Provinces,

4

 Ibid.

5

 Ibid.
350 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Eastern Canada and the United States, is of high importance, the following subjects requiring to be examined:

(a) Railway facilities.

(b) Water transport.

(c) Roads.

(d) Air transport and communications.

That the establishment of additional commercial airways, complete with landing facilities and aids to air navigation, between these important areas, would be essential to the

defense plan.

Action by U.S. Government: See comments on First and Second Recommendations. Portions of

this recommendation were included in the First Report.

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 5 September 1940.6

SIXTH RECOMMENDATION 27 August 1940

Production Data

That the Service Members undertake to assemble information on the production in

each country of particular items of military equipment in their respective countries, not

readily available in the other country, and to exchange information on this subject as data

becomes available.

Action by U.S. Government: See comments on First and Second Recommendations.

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 5 September 1940.7

SEVENTH RECOMMENDATION 27 August 1940

Joint Defense Plan

That the Service Members of the Board should proceed at once with the preparation

of a detailed permanent plan for the joint defense of Canada and the United States and

keep the Board informed of the progress of the work.8

Action by U.S. Government: See comments on First and Second Recommendations.

Action by Canadian Government: Approved. 5 September 1940.9

EIGHTH RECOMMENDATION 11 September 1940

Defense of Newfoundland

That the United States initiate as expeditiously as practicable such portions of the

increased defense of Newfoundland, covered by the Second Recommendation of the Board

approved in Ottawa on August 26 and 27, as may be found to fall within the limits of

bases now being acquired by the United States.

Action by U. S. Government: See comments on First and Second Recommendations.

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 7 October 1940.10

6

 Ibid.

7

 Ibid.

8

 As reproduced here from the journal for the meeting, the recommendation contains the

word "permanent." All U.S. compilations of Board recommendations omit the word "permanent," as do the various drafts of the 1940 Plan, which quote the recommendation as a directive. This omission probably reflects subsequent informal Board agreement to delete the word

as inappropriate. Such a plan could hardly have been expected to have been permanent. 9

 12 Dec 51 List. 10

 Ibid.
APPENDIX A 351

NINTH RECOMMENDATION 4 October 1940

German Prisoners

The Board learned from Messrs. Emerson and Penson that the Government of the

United Kingdom is now arranging to send approximately one thousand captured German

airmen to Newfoundland for imprisonment there and that the Newfoundland Government is now beginning the construction of barracks for this purpose about five miles

inland from the shore of Conception Bay.

The Board feels strongly that the incarceration of German prisoners in Newfoundland

would present a serious military hazard which might jeopardize the Defense Scheme for

Newfoundland which the Board is now preparing and thus menace the safety of Canada

and the United States.

In these circumstances, the Board earnestly recommends to the Canadian Government

that discussions be initiated with the Governments of Newfoundland and the United

Kingdom with a view to bringing about an alteration in this plan by the diversion of

these German prisoners to some less dangerous destination.

Action by U.S, Government: See comment on First Recommendation.

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 8 October 1940. 11a camp in Canada, and this fact was reported at the 20-21 JanuaryThe 1941 prisoners meting. were diverted to

TENTH RECOMMENDATION 14 November 1940

Air Staging Facilities—Western Canada

The Board recommends that, to implement the recommendation contained in its First

Report to the respective governments regarding the development of air staging facilities

across Western Canada between the United States and Alaska, suitable landing fields,

complete with emergency lighting, radio aids, meteorological equipment and limited housing for weather, communication, and transient personnel be provided at the earliest possible date by Canada at Grand Prairie, Fort St. John, Fort Nelson, Watson Lake, Whitehorse, Prince George and Smithers.

This development will provide means for rapid movement of light bombers and fighter

aircraft into Canada, into Central Alaska via Whitehorse, and into the Ketchikan-Prince

Rupert area via Smithers and is considered essential to the defense of Western Canada,

Alaska and the United States. Such means are vital to the effective use in joint continental defense of both the rapidly expanding air forces of the United States and the extension of air operating facilities in Alaska.

Action by U.S. Government: See comment on First Recommendation. The First Report of the

Board, which contained a less detailed recommendation for the development of such facilities, was

approved by the President on 19 November 1940. (See Appendix B.)

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 28 January 1941. 12

ELEVENTH RECOMMENDATION 15 November 1940

Ucluelet Airdrome (Vancouver Island)

The Board now recommends that another airdrome be constructed at Ucluelet for the

following purposes:

(a) To extend the operational ranges and areas of fighter aircraft and provide more

advanced defense to our vulnerable positions.

11 Ibid. 12

 Ibid.
352 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

(b) To provide bomber and fighter support to the north airdromes and towards the

Queen Charlotte Islands and the West Coast up towards Prince Rupert.

(c) To provide an alternative landing place for bombers and fighters in a very variable weather area.

Action by U.S. Government: See comment on First Recommendation.

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 28 January 1941. 13

TWELFTH RECOMMENDATION 17 December 1940

War Industry Member

That a war industry member be appointed to the Board by each of the two

Governments.

Action by U.S. Government: Approved, 26 December 1940. 14

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 20 January 1941. 15

THIRTEENTH RECOMMENDATION 20 January 1941

Sault Ste. Marie

In view of the vital military importance of the Sault Ste. Marie Canals and the St.

Mary's River to the defense program of the United States, and the vulnerability of the

navigation channel, the Board agreed that each Government should constitute a single

authority to be responsible for the safety of navigation through these waters, and that

each such authority be clothed with the necessary powers and required to cooperate with

the other in taking all measures necessary for the purpose.

Action by U.S. Government: Approved. 16

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 27 March 1941. 17

FOURTEENTH RECOMMENDATION 21 January 1941

United States Air Units for Newfoundland

That most urgent priority should be given to the provision of facilities for at least

one United States squadron of patrol planes at Halifax and one United States squadron

in the Botwood area.

Action by U.S. Government: No record of action. See comment on the First Recommendation.

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 27 March 1941. 18

FIFTEENTH RECOMMENDATION 16 April 1941

Newfoundland Fuel Storage

The Board reviewed the problem of fuel supply required for aerial operations from the

1 3

 Ibid.

14

 Memo, SUSAM for Bissell, 26 Dec 40, PDB 100. This recommendation was never

implemented. 15

 12 Dec 51 List. 16

 On date unknown according to file PDB 124-1. The President on 17 March 1941 issued a

directive to U.S. executive agencies directing co-operation with the War Department in this

matter. 17

 12 Dec 51 List. 18 Ibid.
APPENDIX A 353

Newfoundland Airport and in the Lewisporte-Botwood area. Previous estimates contemplated storage for 1,600,000 gallons (of which 600,000 gallons, one month's supply,

would be located at Newfoundland Airport) premised on continuous supply by rail from

St. John's. It has now been determined that reliance on continuous rail supply during

the winter is unsound. Facts were adduced to show that a minimum storage capacity

of 2,600,000 gallons will be essential before the close of navigation in the Botwood area

next winter. Discussion clearly exposed the urgency of providing the increase in capacity.

It was also pointed out that not only is the increase essential for defense operations

but is equally necessary for overseas ferrying of aircraft.

It is recommended that Canada provide the increased storage capacity in accordance

with the responsibility accepted by the Canadian Government.

It is further recommended that the United States Government assist in the procurement of the necessary priorities to permit this recommendation to be carried out within

the time specified.

Action by U.S. Government: Approved, 22 April 1941 19

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 14 May 1941. 20 SIXTEENTH RECOMMENDATION 17 April 1941

Rehabilitation of the Newfoundland Railroad

The Board, after consultation with Newfoundland Commissioner; after determination

that the present condition and rolling stock (on hand or order) of the Newfoundland

railroad are barely adequate for civilian requirements; and after full consideration of the

great urgency of adequate supply prior to the winter of 1941 of United States bases and

United States forces stationed outside base areas in Newfoundland recommends:

That the United States procure and retain title to such railroad rolling stock as is

necessary for its military requirements in Newfoundland including possible operations

from the Newfoundland Airport.

That the Newfoundland Government continue to operate the Newfoundland railroad

and undertake at once the construction of additional facilities and necessary rehabilitation

of the railroad outside of areas leased to the United States.

That necessary arrangements for essential financial assistance be immediately worked

out between the United States and Newfoundland Governments.

That both Canada and the United States assist in the procurement of the necessary

priorities required to permit this recommendation to be carried out in the time specified.

Action by U.S. Government: Approved, 22 April 1941. 21

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 14 May 1941. 22

SEVENTEENTH RECOMMENDATION 29 July 1941

Northwest River Landing Field

In order to facilitate the ferrying of long and medium range aircraft across the Atlantic, to enhance the effectiveness of plans for hemisphere defense, to prevent congestion

at the Newfoundland Airport and to provide greater security for crews and equipment,

the Board recommends:

That the Canadian Government should undertake the construction of an air base in

19

 Memo, SUSAM for Brig Maurice Pope, 29 Apr 41, PDB 107-3. 20

 12 Dec 51 List. 21

 Ltr, President to SW, 23 Apr 41, PDB 143-1. 22

 12 Dec 51 List.
354 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

the vicinity of Northwest River, Labrador, and provide the following facilities as quickly

as possible.

(a) At least two runways, minimum 150 x 5000 feet, to enable take off and landing

into prevailing winds.

(b) Storage facilities for 450,000 gallons aviation gasoline, for 11,250 gallons aviation

oil, and for other supplies.

(c) Seven 100 gallon per minute gasoline pumping units for servicing aircraft.

(d) Technical housing and equipment as follows:

1. A direction finder station.

2. An aircraft radio range station.

3. Instrument landing equipment.

4. An airways radio station capable of communication with stations in the U.S.,

Canada, Newfoundland, and Greenland and with aircraft in flight, for purposes of aircraft control, forwarding and receiving weather data and airplane

movement communications.

5. A meteorological station.

6. A maintenance hangar (heated), minimum dimensions 150 x 200 feet.

(e) Housing for personnel.

That if the Canadian Government should decide for any reason that it will not undertake the desired construction immediately, this decision should be made known at once

to the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and Newfoundland and that

the Government of the United States be invited to provide the necessary facilities in the

area under reference.

That Governments of Canada and the United States should cooperate to make provision for the necessary priorities to permit the earliest possible completion and that the

Government undertaking the project should also immediately initiate the necessary measures to insure provision of an installation suitable for safe operations from the ice in the

Northwest River area during the winter of 1941-42.

Action by U.S. Government: No evidence of approval in U.S. files.

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 18 September 1941.

 23

EIGHTEENTH RECOMMENDATION 29 July 1941

Underwater Defenses for Argentia

That the United States proceed with the installation of underwater defenses in the

Argentia-Ship Harbor area.

Action by U. S. Government: See comment on First Recommendation.

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 18 September 1941. 24

NINETEENTH RECOMMENDATION 29 July 1941

Canadian-Alaskan Staging Fields

On the consideration of the report as to the progress being made with the construction of the Canadian Airway between Edmonton and Whitehorse, attention was directed

23

 The 12 December 1951 List records 18 September 1941 as the date of Canadian governmental approval, although approval was given by the Cabinet War Committee on 13 August

1941.

24

 12 Dec 51 List.
APPENDIX A 355

to the recent change in the Far Eastern situation the effect of which is to make the completion of the airway to Alaska of extreme urgency. It was pointed out that the urgent

needs for air strength in Alaska may suddenly increase beyond those heretofore anticipated, that the preparation of airdromes in Alaska is being expedited by the United States

as much as possible, but that large numbers of aircraft if sent there would at present be

relatively isolated. In view of this, the Board decided to invite attention to the fact that the completion

of both the Canadian and the United States sections of the airway to a point which would

permit its use at the earliest possible moment had become of extreme importance and to recommend that other considerations should give way to that of completing as quickly as

possible the air route which will permit the rapid reinforcement of the air strength in

Alaska.

Action by U.S. Government: See comment on First Recommendation.

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 18 September 1941. 25

TWENTIETH RECOMMENDATION 30 July 1941

Newfoundland Roads

(a) That improvement and maintenance of road communications is recognized as essential for effective military operations in the defense of Newfoundland.

(b) That the Newfoundland Government should, without cost to the United States or

the Canadian Government, make available the rights of way necessary for such roads

as the United States or the Canadian Governments consider must be constructed for

military purposes.

(c) That the United States and Canada should be given the right to construct and maintain such roads as each individually requires in Newfoundland for military purposes

without obligation either to construct or maintain any roads.

(d) That Newfoundland, Canadian and United States vehicles would have use without

tolls of any roads constructed by the United States or Canada in Newfoundland outside of base areas.

(e) That all necessary road maintenance in Newfoundland other than as provided for above

should be a responsibility of the appropriate Newfoundland authorities.

Action by U.S. Government: See comment on First Recommendation.

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 18 September 1941. 26

TWENTY-FIRST RECOMMENDATION 10 November 1941

Maintenance of Facilities

Attention was directed to the question of the maintenance of the structures, etc., provided by Canada at Gander Lake for occupation by United States Forces and it was recognized that the course of events may make it convenient to permit the use by United States

Forces of like facilities in both Newfoundland and Canada and also permit the use of

facilities in United States by Canadian Forces. Consideration was accordingly given to

the general principles which should govern the responsibilities of each country in respect

of the maintenance of structures, etc., built by the Government of either which are occupied by the Forces of the other, and the Board decided to make the following 21st Recommendation:

The Board recommends that when facilities are provided by the Government of either

25 Ibid. 26

 Ibid.
356 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

country for the occupation of Forces of the other the following principles should apply

to the maintenance, upkeep and servicing of such facilities, subject to such local definition

and if necessary modification as the circumstances require:

1. Any building constructed by the Government of one country and wholly occupied by Forces of the other should be maintained by the occupying Forces and at the termination of the occupation turned over to the Government of the country by which it

was provided in the same condition as when the occupation commenced, ordinary wear

and tear, act of God, enemy action, riot, insurrection or fire excepted.

2. The same rule should apply to structures appurtenant to buildings when these

are included in an area capable of delimitation and occupied by the Forces concerned which

should in these circumstances undertake the policing of the area.

3. The occupying Forces should also be responsible for the heating, lighting and

other services relating to any building or area occupied by them in all cases in which the

service is derived from a source adapted exclusively to take care of the building or area

in question but in other cases the services should be provided on an equitable basis by

the Government of the country by which the occupation is permitted.

4. No occupying Forces should make any structural change in existing facilities

without the approval of the service by which the area is set aside for occupation or the

occupied buildings are provided.

Action by U.S. Government: Approved, 14 November 1941. 27

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 26 November 1941 28

TWENTY-SECOND RECOMMENDATION 20 December 1941

Decentralization of Functions to Local Commanders

That the United States and Canadian Governments now authorize the Commanders

named in paragraph 12 of ABC-22, or their duly authorized representatives, to effect by

mutual agreement any arrangements they deem necessary for the perfection of preparations for the common defense including but not limited to, the installations of accessory

equipment in the territory of either, the transit of armed forces, equipment or defense

materials into or through the territory of either, and the utilization by either nation of

the base and military facilities of the other.

Action by U.S. Government: Approved, 24 December 1941. 29

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 14 January 1942. 30

TWENTY-THIRD RECOMMENDATION 20 December 1941

Co-ordination of Aviation Training Programs

That the Canadian and United States Governments should consider the advisability of

arranging for a meeting of appropriate representatives of Great Britain, Canada and the

United States to make appropriate recommendations for co-ordination of the entire aviation training programs to be conducted in Canada and the United States.

Action by U.S. Government: Approved, 24 December 1941. 31

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 14 January 1942. 32

27

 Photostatic copy of text of recommendation bearing the initials "FDR," PDB 107-9. 28

 Ltr, Group Captain Heakes to Lt Col Bissell, 27 Nov 41, PDB 107-3. 29

 Approval reported in Journal, 20 Jan 42 PJBD meeting. See also PDB 135-9. 30

 Ibid. 31

 Approval reported in Journal, 20 Jan 42 PJBD meeting. See also PDB 119-3. 32

 Ibid.
APPENDIX A 357

TWENTY-FOURTH RECOMMENDATION 33 26 February 1942

Military Highway to Alaska

As its Twenty-Fourth Recommendation, the Board accordingly, as a matter pertaining

to the joint defense of Canada and the United States, recommends the construction of a

highway along the route that follows the general line of airports, Fort St. John-Fort

Nelson-Watson Lake-Whitehorse-Boundary-Big Delta, the respective termini connecting

with existing roads in Canada and Alaska.

Action by U.S. Government: Approved, 9 March 1942. 34

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 5 March 1942. 35

TWENTY-FIFTH RECOMMENDATION 25-26 February 1942

Defense of Sault Ste. Marie Against Air Attack

(a) That the Royal Canadian Air Force undertake to make an immediate and comprehensive further study of the data available regarding the danger of air attack to the

Sault Ste. Marie area.

(b) That the Canadian Army assign a 4-gun, heavy, antiaircraft battery to Sault Ste.

Marie, to protect the Canadian Locks and to tie in with the United States force in

order that all-round zone defense may be established. In the event of Canada being

unable to provide this equipment within the near future, the United States Army

endeavor to lend the necessary guns and stores for manning by the Canadian Army

until such time as Canada can meet this commitment from her own production.

(c) That the said Canadian antiaircraft battery come under the operational command of

the Commanding General, Sault Ste. Marie Military District, (Michigan).

Action by U.S. Government: Approved, 9 March 1942. 36

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 26 March 1942. 37

TWENTY-SIXTH RECOMMENDATION 9 June 1942

Northeast Short-Range Ferry Routes to United Kingdom

(a) That the airfields in Canadian territory on the ferry routes outlined in the Army Air

Forces appreciation dated June 6th be constructed with such variations as the detailed

survey, now under way, may determine to be advisable.

(b) That the Canadian Government construct or authorize the United States Government

to construct these fields and inform the United States Government as promptly as

possible what fields, if any, Canada will construct.

(c) That the existing ferry airdrome facilities in Canada and Newfoundland, including

Labrador, form a part of the proposed ferrying project and be increased, wherever

necessary, to appropriate capacity.

33

 This recommendation, together with other pertinent extracts of the journal of the 25-26

February 1942 meeting, is printed as Exhibit 16, App. C, House Report 1705, 79th Congress,

2d Session, pp. 89-91. 34

 Memo, U.S. Chairman for President, 7 Mar 42, initialed "OK FDR" two days later. This

memorandum is printed as Exhibit 17, House Report 1705, 79th Congress, 2d Session, p. 91. 35

 Memo, Stimson for President, 7 Mar 42, printed as Exhibit 18, House Report 1705, 79th

Congress, 2d Session, pp. 91-92. 36

 Memo, SUSAM for ACofS WPD, 10 Mar 42, sub: Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Recommendations of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, PDB 125-2. 37

 12 Dec 51 List.
358 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

(d) That such additional radio weather reporting facilities for these routes be provided

and maintained as may be agreed upon by the United States and the Canadian

Governments.

(e) That all costs of constructing air fields and other installations in connection with this

project be borne by the Government which agrees to undertake that part of the

project.

(f) That suitable arrangements be made in Washington and Ottawa to insure the proper

centralization of responsibility for and control over the work of construction, and to

provide the maximum facilities for instant and effective contact and cooperation

between the appropriate authorities of the two countries.

(g) That the proposals relating to defense, to the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty

and the postwar disposition of the new installations as outlined in the memoranda

under reference be accepted by the two Governments.

(h) That these airfields and facilities be made available for the use of the Royal Air Force

Ferry Command.

Action by U.S. Government: Approved, 3 July 1942. 38

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 12 June 1942. 39

TWENTY-SEVENTH RECOMMENDATION 6 July 1942

Flow of Materials to Canada

That the Governments of Canada and of the United States take immediate steps to

eliminate or suspend for the duration of the war every possible formality of customs,

import duties, tariffs, and other regulations which prohibit, delay or otherwise impede the

free flow between the two countries of munitions and war supplies and of the persons

or materials connected therewith.

Action by U.S. Government: Approved, 8 August 1942. 40

Action by Canadian Government: No formal approval. 41

TWENTY-EIGHTH RECOMMENDATION 13 January 1943

Postwar Disposition of U.S. Projects in Canada

The Board recommends the approval of the following formula as a generally fair and

equitable basis to be used by reference whenever appropriate in the making of agreements

in the future and to cover such defense projects, if any, the postwar disposition of which

has not previously been specifically provided for:

A. All immovable defense installations built or provided in Canada by the Government

of the United States shall within one year after the cessation of hostilities, unless otherwise agreed by the two Governments, be relinquished to the Crown either in the right of

Canada or in the right of the Province in which the same or any part thereof lies, as may

be appropriate under Canadian law.

B. All movable facilities built or provided in Canada by the Government of the United

States shall within one year after the cessation of hostilities, unless otherwise agreed by

the two Governments, at the option of the United States Government:

38

 Memo, CofS for President, 3 Jul 42, bearing the notation "OK FDR." Certified copy

filed at PDB 149-1. 39

 Ltr, U.S. Secy PJBD to U.S. Chairman, 13 Jun 42, PDB 105-2. 40

 Ltr, Secy State to Secy Treasury, 8 Aug 42, PDB 148. 41

 12 Dec 51 List.
APPENDIX A 359

(1) be removed from Canada: or

(2) be offered for sale to the Government of Canada, or with the approval of the

Government of Canada, to the Government of the appropriate Province at a price

to be fixed by a Board of two appraisers, one to be chosen by each country and

with power to select a third in the case of disagreement.

C. In the event that the United States Government has foregone its option as described

in B (1), and the Canadian Government or the Provincial Government decides to forego

its option as described in B (2), the facility under consideration shall be offered for sale in

the open market, any sale to be subject to the approval of both Governments.

D. In the event of no sale being concluded the disposition of such facility shall be referred for recommendation to the Permanent Joint Board on Defense or to such other

agency as the two Governments may designate.

The principles outlined above shall reciprocally apply to any defense projects and

installations which may be built in the United States by the Government of Canada.

All of the foregoing provisions relate to the physical disposition and ownership of

projects, installations, and facilities and are without prejudice to any agreement or agreements which may be reached between the Governments of the United States and Canada

in regard to the postwar use of any of these projects, installations, and facilities.

Action by U.S. Government: Approved, 21 January 1943. 42

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 21 January 1943. 43 TWENTY-NINTH RECOMMENDATION 24 February 1943

United States-Alaska Air Route

1. That the Department of Transport (Canada) be responsible for the completion of all

facilities on this route presently in process of actual construction by contractors under

contract to the Department of Transport, but that wherever possible and in order to expedite

construction, United States Engineer troops be used to assist in such construction.

2. That the construction of the following facilities be approved by the Canadian Government, subject to the submission to the Department of Transport of a detailed plan showing the location of such facilities at the respective airports:

EDMONTON PRIORITY

4 Barracks—68-man capacity each.......................................... . A

1 Transient Officers Quarters—40-man capacity.............................. . B

1 Mess Hall—1,000-man capacity. .......................................... . C

1 Laundry—3,000 capacity................................................. . D

2 Hangars—150' x 200'. ................................................... . E

2 Warehouses-50' x 400'................................................. . F

1 Garage—70' x 200'..................................................... . G

1 Recreation Hall & Gymnasium.......................................... . H

Doors on north end of present #1 Hangar. ............................... . I

WHITEHORSE PRIORITY

4 Barracks—68-man capacity each.......................................... . A

2 Transient Officers Quarters—40-man capacity. ............................. . B

1 Mess Hall — 500-man capacity............................................ . C

42

 By exchange of notes signed at Ottawa. The notes are contained in EAS, 391, and CTS,

1943, No. 2, and include the recommendation in full. 43

 Ibid.
360 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

1 Laundry—2,000 capacity................................................. . D

1 Hangar and 20,000 sq. ft.—220' x 200' office space. .......................... . E

1 Warehouse—40' x 200'.................................................. . F

1 Garage-70' x 200'..................................................... . G

1 Recreation Hall and Gymnasium......................................... . H

3. That the United States Army Air Forces be responsible for the construction of

all facilities set forth in 2: (construction to be accomplished by United States Engineer

troops or by contract with Canadian or United States contractors, except that at Edmonton airport no construction shall be undertaken by a United States contractor except with

the prior approval of appropriate Canadian authorities. If United States contractors are

employed, Canadian and United States civilian labor will not be used on the same specific

project at Edmonton).

4. That, inasmuch as speed of completion of these projects is of the highest importance,

it be understood that contracts with Canadian contractors may require the employment of

Canadian labor on a basis of three shifts daily.

5. That if, in the course of construction of the various projects at Edmonton airport, it

becomes apparent that United States Engineer troops, or Canadian contractors, or both,

are unable to complete any project within the time required, or are unable to undertake

the construction of necessary additional facilities, upon appropriate representation the

Canadian Government authorize the use of United States contractors, employing United

States labor.

6. That the United States Forces be authorized further to expand the facilities, including

airports, on this route as may be required subject to the following conditions:

a. The submission of a detailed plan showing the location of the proposed facilities

and the approval thereof by appropriate Canadian officials.

b. No United States contractor or labor other than the United States Engineer troops

shall be employed at Edmonton without the prior approval of the Canadian Government.

7. That in the construction of any such additional facilities, including airports, at any

point north of Edmonton, United States Engineer troops, or Canadian or United States

contractors employing United States labor may be employed, except that Canadian and

United States contractors be not engaged in the same specific project. (At Edmonton,

work to be performed by United States Engineer troops or Canadian contractors, within

the limit of the ability of such contractors to perform the services required.)

8. That in all cases where civilian labor is employed, if Canadian contractors are available, their services shall be utilized, within the limit of their abilities, in the construction

of these projects.

9. That in any case where Canadian contractors are employed by the United States Forces

in the construction of any projects, the United States Forces be responsible for the

administration and supervision of the contract.

10. That the Department of Transport (Canada) designate a responsible official to be

stationed on this route with authority to make decisions with respect to location of buildings and any other matter which properly may be brought to his attention.

Action by U.S. Government: Approved, 1 April 1943. 44

44

 Ltr, Roosevelt to Chairman, U.S. Section, 1 Apr 43, PDB 105-13. However, this approval apparently was not communicated to the Canadian Government and the recommendation was carried by the U.S. Section as not approved.
APPENDIX A 361

Action by Canadian Government: Not approved. However, construction of the projects of this

recommendation was approved, subject to certain conditions, by separate action of the Canadian

Government on 5 June 1943. 45

THIRTIETH RECOMMENDATION 1-2 April 1943

Use of Non-Rigid Airships, Eastern Canadian Waters

That the Governments of the United States and Canada, having a mutual interest in

the proposal to utilize non-rigid airships in antisubmarine activities in Eastern Canadian

waters at the earliest practical date, appoint a Joint Canadian-American Board of officers to

investigate, consult and report on the proposal, and on the selection of suitable base sites

and facilities, in that area, to support the operation of not more than twelve airships

commencing about May, 1944.

Action by U.S. Government: Approved, 13 April 1943. 46

Action by Canadian Government: Not approved.47 Although the Canadian Government was

not prepared to approve the recommendation in the form submitted, it had no objection to appointment of the board of officers or to examination of the problem. At its subsequent meeting, 6-7

May 1943, the Board agreed that this qualified action met the essence of the original proposal.

 48

THIRTY-FIRST RECOMMENDATION 6-7 May 1943

Maintenance and Control of Airdromes in Canada

1. In cases in which the airfield is used principally or exclusively by U.S. forces the

United States shall normally be responsible for defense, maintenance and control.

2. In all other cases, unless some special arrangement has been made, Canada shall be

responsible for defense, maintenance and control.

3. Provision for the defense of airfields shall, in all cases, be of a standard acceptable to

the Canadian Chiefs of Staff.

4. The assignment of responsibilities in respect of any airfield shall remain unchanged

during the war except by mutual agreement; provided that should Canada inform the

United States that it is prepared to assume such responsibilities in respect of any airfield

previously controlled by the U.S. the necessary arrangements shall be concerted between

the two Governments.

5. The United States Government may station a liaison officer at any airfield in Canada

used by United States forces; and the Canadian Government may station a liaison officer

at any airfield in Canada the control of which is exercised by the United States.

It was agreed that upon the acceptance of this Recommendation the Air Members of

the Board shall prepare a schedule showing the application of the principles to the airfields affected for submission to the Board as a basis for a further recommendation.

45

 See correspondence at PDB 105-13. 46

 Ltr, ACofS OPD to SUSAM, 13 Apr 43, sub: Thirtieth Recommendation, Permanent Joint

Board on Defense, Canada-U.S.; and Ltr, Senior U.S. Navy Member to SUSAM, 6 Apr 43,

PDB 142-5. This recommendation apparently was not, probably because of its narrow military application, submitted to the President. The date recorded for U.S. approval in PDB 124

is the date on which both War and Navy Department approvals had been submitted. 47

 12 Dec 51 List. 48 Ltr, Secy Canadian Section to Secy U.S. Section, 23 Apr 43, PDB 142-5.
362 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Action by U.S. Government: Approved, 3 June 1943.

 49

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 2 June 1943. 50 THIRTY-SECOND RECOMMENDATION 24-25 August 1943

Maintenance and Control of Facilities

PART I

Definitions

That for the purposes of this Recommendation, the following definitions apply:

1. Control:

Control of airport and airways traffic, and airport administration, provided that regulations applicable to airway and airport traffic control shall be prepared jointly by the using

services, and shall be limited to those matters essential to the orderly control of traffic

movement, and shall not include ceiling and visibility limitation for take-off and landing.

Note: Airport administration, in the military sense, consisting of those functions pertaining to command.

2. Maintenance:

a. Airfields:

Maintenance of airfield surfaces including runways, taxiways, parking areas, hardstandings, and snow removal according to the standard of the principal user. The priority of

such snow removal shall be as prescribed by the principal user.

Maintenance of access roads used solely, or nearly so, for the servicing of the airport

and of roads and drainage ditches within and adjacent to the airport area, including snow

clearance.

b. Other Facilities:

Maintenance of local airport landline communication systems, power, heating, lighting, water, fire-fighting and sewage systems, with the exception of that part of these

systems installed in buildings.

c. Responsibility of Using Service:

Proper maintenance of all buildings and facilities installed therein is the responsibility

of the using service. When facilities are provided by the Government of one country for

the occupation of forces of the other, the principles set forth in the Twenty-First Recommendation of the Board apply to the maintenance, upkeep and servicing of such facilities.

d. Responsibility of Officers Commanding:

In the discharge of the above responsibilities, Officers Commanding will be authorized

to make such definitions or modifications as local circumstances may require.

3. Defense:

Defense of the airport area in conformance with standards acceptable to the Canadian

Chiefs of Staff.

49

 Apparently not submitted to the President. A letter dated 17 June 1943 from SUSAM

to the U.S. secretary asked him to notify the Canadian Government of U.S. approval since the

War and Navy Departments—"the only two agencies concerned"—had approved it. (PDB

113-2(a).) 50

 Ltr, Secy Canadian Section to Secy U.S. Section, 4 Jun 43, PDB 113-2(a).
APPENDIX A 363

Note: Local security of aircraft, technical installations and building areas is the responsibility of the using Service.

PART II

Schedule of Responsibility

1. Northwest Staging Route:

a. That Canada be responsible for the control, maintenance and defense of the following airports:

Feeder: Prince George, Kamloops, B.C.; Lethbridge and Calgary, Alta.; Regina,

Sask.

Main: Edmonton, Alta.; Grande Prairie, Alta.; Fort St. John and Fort Nelson,

B.C.; Watson Lake and Whitehorse, Y.T.

Intermediate: Beatton River and Smith River, B.C.; Teslin, Aishihik and Snag, Y.T.;

(Whitecourt, Alta. when constructed).

b. That the U.S. be responsible for the maintenance, local airport control and defense of the following airports:

Main: Edmonton Satellite

Note: Edmonton Satellite will be subject only to airways traffic control

by Canada under mutually acceptable regulations.

2. That the United States be responsible for the control, maintenance and defense of the

following flight strips:

a. Canol Project (N.W.T.)

(i) Canol #1A

Waterways, Alta.; Embarras, Alta.; Fort Smith, Providence, Resolution, Hay

River, Fort Simpson, Wrigley, Norman Wells, Canol Camp, N.W.T.

(ii) Canol #1 East and West

Goodland Lake and Twitya River, N.W.T.; Sheldon Lake, Pelly River and

Quiet Lake, Y.T.

b. Alaska Highway

Dawson Creek, Prophet River, Sikanni Chief River, Trout River and Pine

Lake, B.C.; Squanga Lake, Pon Lake and Burwash, Y.T.

3. Northeast Short-Range Ferry Route to U.K.:

a. That the United States be responsible for the control, maintenance and defense of

the following airports:

Western Sector: The Pas, Churchill, Man.; Southampton Island, N.W.T.

Eastern Sector: Fort Chimo, P.Q.; Frobisher Bay, N.W.T.

Others: Mingan, P.Q.

Note: Mingan will be subject only to airways traffic control by Canada

under mutually acceptable regulations.

b. That Canada be responsible for the control, maintenance, and defense of the followairports:

Moncton, N.B.; Dorval, P.Q.
364 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Action by U.S. Government: Approved, 24 September 1943

 51

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 22 September 1943.

 52

THIRTY-THIRD RECOMMENDATION 53 6-7 September 1944

Postwar Disposition of U.S. Projects in Canada

The Permanent Joint Board on Defense recommends that the following formula be

applied to the disposition of all defense facilities constructed or provided in Canada by

the United States (and mutatis mutandis to any defense facilities constructed or provided

in the United States by Canada) which have not already been dealt with.

Immovables

A—The Government of the United States shall, within three months from the date of

the approval of this Recommendation, supply the Government of Canada with a list

of immovables (hereinafter referred to as facilities) which it desires to make subject

to the provisions of this Recommendation;

B—In the case of each of the facilities included in the list referred to in A the Canadian

Government and the United States Government will each appoint one qualified appraiser whose joint duty it will be to appraise such facility in order to determine the

fair market value thereof at the time and place of appraisal. If the two appraisers

cannot agree on the fair market value, they will select a third appraiser to determine

this value. The amount set by the appraisers shall be paid to the United States Government by the Government of Canada:

Provided that the foregoing paragraphs A and B shall not apply to any facilities

heretofore specifically provided for.

C—Any existing facility not included in the United States list shall, within one year after

the cessation of hostilities, be relinquished, without cost, to the Crown either in the

right of Canada or in the right of the Province in which the same or any part thereof

lies, as may be appropriate under Canadian law.

Movables

A—The Government of the United States shall remove from Canada all those items

which it desires.

B—The Government of Canada shall arrange through the appropriate governmental

agencies for the purchase from the United States of such remaining items as it desires

to obtain for its own use or disposition.

C—All other movables shall be transferred to a designated agency of the Canadian Government and shall be sold or disposed of by such agency, the proceeds to be paid to

the Government of the United States,

provided that, in connection with the items referred to in Paragraph C, the United

States Government shall be represented by an officer designated by it for that purpose, who shall have an equal voice in the setting of prices, the allocation

of priorities, the assessment of legitimate sales costs and other details of the sale

or other disposal of the items concerned; and provided further that any such items

remaining unsold at the end of two years from the time they are transferred to the

51

 Telg, Secy U.S. Section to Secy Canadian Section, 28 Sep 43, PDB 113-2(b). 52

 Ltr, Secy U.S. Section to SUSAM, 28 Sep 43, PDB 113-2(b). 53

 Text also contained in EAS, 444, and CTS, 1944, No. 35.
APPENDIX A 365

Canadian agency concerned shall either be declared of no value and the account

closed or, at the option of the United States, shall be removed from Canada by the

United States authorities.

Action by U.S. Government: Approved, 11 November 1944, including the Canadian proviso. 54

Action by Canadian Government: Approved, 27 September 1944, with the following proviso:

That, as there are certain facilities whose disposal would entail expenses such as custody

and demolition, any expense of such a character would be taken into consideration in the

final accounting.55

54

 Ltr, Secy U.S. Section to SUSAM, 13 Nov 44, PDB 150-2. Both governments confirmed

their approvals in a subsequent exchange of notes, published in EAS, 444, and CTS, 1944,

No. 35. 55

 Ltr, Secy U.S. Section to SUSAM, 3 Oct 44, PDB 150-2. See also n. 54, above.
Appendix B

First Report of the Permanent

Joint Board on Defense,

Canada-United States

 1

1. The Board has met on three occasions, namely (a) at Ottawa on August 26th, and

27th; (b) at Washington on September 9th, 10th and 11th; and (c) at Boston and Halifax on the 2d, 3rd, and 4th of October 1940.

2. At the first of these meetings the Board made recommendations as to—

(a) The exchange of information.

(b) The strengthening of the forces in Newfoundland.

(c) Certain steps to be taken in respect to the direct defense of the Maritime

Provinces.

(d) The allotment of matériel.

(e) Communications.

(f) The collection of information as to facilities for production.

(g) The preparation of a detailed plan for the defense of North America.

Such of the foregoing recommendations as relate to dispositions for defense still to be

made are incorporated in the appropriate place in this report.

3. In the interval between the first and second meeting of the Board, announcement

was made of the arrangement between the Governments of Great Britain and the United

States for the establishment by the United States of bases in Newfoundland, the Bermudas, the Caribbean Area. In the interval between the second and third, the tripartite

arrangement between Germany, Italy, and Japan was announced.

4. The present report is directed to indicating the allotment of responsibility as between Canada and the United States for the direct defense of North America so far as

that defense may require joint or concerted operations by the two countries and also the

steps which should be taken by the two Governments in advance of such joint or concerted operations.

5. In order that joint or concerted operations may be promptly and effectively proceeded with when they become necessary and are ordered to be taken, the Board recommends that each Government should independently, and as soon as possible, take the

following steps.

1

 This report was approved by the Board on 4 October 1940. It was approved by President

Roosevelt on 19 November, and its approval by the Canadian Government was reported at the

14 November 1940 Board meeting. (Journal, PDB 124; Ltr, Acting Secy State Welles to SW,

20 Nov 40, PDB 127.)
APPENDIX B 367

EAST COAST

CANADA

(a) Provide facilities in Newfoundland for the operation of United States aircraft

in numbers as follows:

(i) A minimum of three squadrons of patrol planes (36 planes),

(b) Provid (ii) A minimu e radio anm od othe f 73 lan r facilitie d planes s a.t Sydney and Newfoundland Airports, for

land plane staging.

(c) If physically possible, provide a fighter aerodrome near St. John's.

(d) Complete defenses for the port of St. John's and for Botwood.

(e) Complete the harbor defenses (including underwater defenses) at Halifax,

Sydney, Gaspé, and Shelburne.

(f) Expand the aircraft operating facilities in the Maritime Provinces, so as to provide for the operation of United States aircraft in numbers as follows:

(i) Four squadrons of patrol planes (48 planes),

(ii) One composite wing of approximately 200 planes.

UNITED STATES

(g) Select and complete a base or bases in Newfoundland sufficient to permit the

operation of at least one squadron of patrol planes (12 planes),

(h) Provide staging facilities in Newfoundland for short-range aircraft between

Sydney and the Newfoundland Airport, these to include radio facilities,

(i) Develop airways and other transportation facilities in New England so as to

permit the rapid reinforcement of the Canadian Forces in the Maritime

Provinces.

(j) Provide ground, anti-aircraft and harbor defenses of United States bases in

Newfoundland.

WEST COAST

CANADA

(k) Develop air staging facilities for aircraft en route between Alaska and the

Continental United States.

(l) Complete the highway from Terrace to Prince Rupert.

(m) Complete the harbor defenses at Prince Rupert, Vancouver, and EsquimaltVictoria, including underwater defenses at Esquimalt and Prince Rupert.

(n) If a suitable area can be found, provide an aerodrome at the north end of

Vancouver Island so as to permit the operation of defending aircraft

therefrom.

UNITED STATES

(o) Complete army bases at Anchorage and Fairbanks, Alaska.

(p) Complete land plane bases at Ketchikan, Yakutat, Cordova, Anchorage,

Bethel, Nome, and Fairbanks.

(q) Complete the naval stations (including fixed defenses) at Sitka, Kodiak, and

Dutch Harbor.

(r) Complete airways between Ketchikan and Dutch Harbor and between Nome and Bethel.

(s) Provide coast defenses in the Juan de Fuca Straits so as to tie in with the

Canadian fixed defenses at Esquimalt.
368 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

(t) Complete aircraft operating facilities at Seattle, Aberdeen, Bellingham, Everett,

Olympia, Spokane County, Port Angeles, and Tongue Point.

6. In addition to the foregoing, the Board recommends that

(a) The appropriate civil and military authorities in the two countries make and

put into immediate effect reciprocal arrangements from the prompt and continuous exchange of all necessary meteorological information collected by any

of them.

(b) The aircraft detection organizations of the two countries on the east coast and

on the west coast, respectively, make and put into immediate effect reciprocal

arrangements for co-operation between them in their respective areas.

(c) The Governments of Canada and the United States bring about an arrangement to simplify the procedure in connection with the travel of public vessels and service aircraft of the two countries, to include provision for the

following:

(1) Passage, upon local notification, of United States public vessels through

Canadian Waters and United States service aircraft over Canadian territory while en route between United States ports and Alaska or United

States bases in Newfoundland.

(2) Visits of public vessels and service aircraft of either of the two countries

to ports of the other country, upon local notification, when engaged on

matters connected with the joint defense of Canada and the United States.

(3) Upon local notification, flights of Canadian service aircraft over that part

of the State of Maine which lies upon the route between Quebec and the

Maritime Provinces when such flights are on matters pertaining to the

joint defense of Canada and the United States.

(4) Upon local notification, flights of U.S. service aircraft between points in

the United States over the Ontario peninsula, including the prohibited

area.

7. The Board recommends that, when joint or concerted operations are directed

by the two governments to be undertaken, the responsibilities to be allocated to each

country and to be discharged by each through its appropriate land, sea, and air forces,

should be as follows:

EAST COAST OPERATIONS

CANADA

(a) To exercise initial control of Canadian, British and friendly shipping on the

Atlantic and to inform the United States immediately of the location and routes of all important units.

(b) To undertake the initial ground, anti-aircraft, coast and air defense of Newfoundland and its harbors, except insofar as the United States may be in a

position to participate in such initial defense.

(c) To provide for the surface and air patrol of Belle Isle Strait and the initial

security of the sea communications between the mainland and Newfoundland.

(d) To provide initial air patrol over other sea approaches to Newfoundland.

(e) To provide for the ground, anti-aircraft, and coast defenses of the Maritime

Provinces and the Gaspé Peninsula and the initial air defense of these areas.

(f) To provide for the naval air defense of:

(i) Gaspé and Maritime Provinces harbors;

(ii) The Gulf of St. Lawrence to the line Sydney-Port aux Basques;
APPENDIX B 369

(iii) The Bay of Fundy to the line United States-Canadian Border to Yarmouth; and

(iv) The sea area within a thirty-five mile radius from the entrance to Sydney,

Halifax, Shelburne, St. John's, Botwood, and any other naval bases operated by Canada.

(g) Provide facilities in aid of the movement, by water, of United States forces

from the Maritime Provinces to Newfoundland.

UNITED STATES

(h) To augment its forces in Newfoundland to one reinforced division and a composite air group (73 planes).

(i) To establish off-shore surface and air patrols to seaward of waters to be patrolled by Canada, also in-shore patrols of Placentia Bay.

(j) To control shipping in areas patrolled by the United States.

(k) To augment the mobile ground and air defense of the Maritime Provinces

in the event of a major attack.

WEST COAST OPERATIONS

CANADA

(l) To provide for the initial ground, anti-aircraft, coast and air defense of British

Columbia.

(m) To provide for the naval defense of Esquimalt-Victoria, Vancouver and Prince

Rupert.

(n) To provide naval and air defense for British Columbia coastal waters and naval

patrols for such parts of these waters as are enclosed by a line drawn from the

Canada-Alaska boundary to Cape Muzon—thence to 3 miles west of Langara—

thence 3 miles off the west coast of the Queen Charlotte Islands to Cape St.

James—thence to Cape Scott—thence 3 miles off the west coast of Vancouver

Island to the meridian of Race Rocks—thence to a position 40° 20' north 123°

west—and thence north along the meridian of 123° west to the shore line in

Boundary Bay.

(o) To control shipping in the area in which Canada provides surface patrols.

(p) To concentrate land forces in British Columbia for the initial support of

United States garrisons in Alaska, including air support for these, if required.

(q) To provide facilities in aid of the movement by water and air of United States

forces to Alaska, including the provision of staging facilities for seaplanes.

UNITED STATES

(r) To provide forces necessary for the defense of Alaska.

(s) To provide for off-shore surface and air patrols to cover the sea approaches

south-eastern Alaska, British Columbia, Washington and Oregon, and for

protection of shipping in the Gulf of Alaska.

(t) To control shipping in the area patrolled by United States forces,

(u) To provide a mobile reserve of at least one division, with necessary aircraft,

for cooperation with Canadian and United States coast defense forces in the

British Columbia-Puget Sound region.
Appendix C

Extract of Journal of Discussions and Decisions

for Meeting of Permanent Joint Board on Defense,

Canada-United States, on 26 February 1942

 l

The Board considered the increasing gravity of the military situation in the Pacific

and possible developments therein affecting Alaska. The Board was informed that the

United States Government believes that the construction of a land route to Alaska as an

alternative to the sea route is imperative for the defense of North America and that the

United States Government, for military reasons, favors the route that follows the general

line of the Canadian airports, Fort St. John-Fort Nelson-Watson Lake-WhitehorseBoundary-Big Delta, the respective termini connecting with existing roads in Canada and

Alaska. The Board shares this belief for the following reasons:

(1) That the effective defense of Alaska is of paramount importance to the defense

of the continent against attack from the west, since Alaska is the area most exposed to

an attempt by the enemy to establish a foothold in North America.

(2) That sea communications with Alaska in the future may be subject to serious interruption by enemy sea and air action.

(3) That construction of the highway will provide a secure inland route not exposed

to attack from the sea, will alleviate the shipping situation, and will provide an alternate

route for use in case sea communications are interrupted.

(4) That the air route to Alaska and the defense facilities in Alaska cannot be fully

utilized without adequate means of supply for the air route. This can best be provided

by a highway along this route.

(5) That the additional line of communications via the inland route will be of great

value in the event of an offensive against Japan projected from Alaska.

(6) That there is already on this continent a sufficient supply of land transport vehicles to enable the road to be used to its full capacity for the rapid reinforcement and supply of the forces in Alaska, without adding to the burden of industry, and that the

machinery for the construction of the road is already in existence.

(7) Air Transport Service does not offer a practicable substitute for the proposed road

because of the shortage of aircraft and of aircraft constructional facilities.

(8) That the use of Skagway as a sea terminal with a road only from Whitehorse to

Fairbanks would not be a satisfactory solution of the problem. (It is understood that

the Whitehorse-Fairbanks section of the highway would probably be given first construction priority.)

The proposed highway would have its southern terminus on the Edmonton, Dunvegan, and British Columbian Railway, which has available carrying capacity substan1

 This extract was published as Exhibit 16, Appendix C, of House Report 1705, 79th Congress,

2d Session, pp. 89-91.
APPENDIX C 371

tially in excess of the possible carrying capacity of the road. Its northern terminus would

be at a point about 60 miles south of Fairbanks on the Richardson Highway, which connects Fairbanks with Valdez. From Fairbanks there is also a railway connection with

Seward. According to information furnished by General Sturdevant of the United States

Army Engineers, the estimated approximated length of the road is 1,600 miles of which

about 1,200 miles would be in Canada and 400 miles in Alaska; that the cost of a 24-foot

gravel road capable of carrying heavy traffic during both summer and winter is likely to

average in the neighborhood of $50,000 to $60,000 a mile; and that the total cost might

conceivably exceed $100,000,000 and probably would not be less than $75,000,000. The

information of the Canadian members in respect to costs was to the same effect.

As its twenty-fourth recommendation, the Board accordingly as a matter pertaining

to the joint defense of Canada and the United States, recommends the construction of a

highway along the route that follows the general line of airports, Fort St. John-Fort Nelson-Watson Lake-Whitehorse-Boundary-Big Delta, the respective termini connecting

with existing roads in Canada and Alaska.

The Board was informed by the United States members that the United States Government, appreciating the burden of the war expenditure already incurred by Canada since

her entry into the war in September 1939, and in particular on the construction of the air

route to Alaska, and being convinced of the necessity of the road and the urgency of its

construction, would be prepared to meet the whole of the cost of its construction, and

of its maintenance during the war, without asking Canada to do more than provide certain facilities as indicated below. If this offer on the part of the United States Government were accepted, that Government would—

(A) Carry out the necessary surveys for which preliminary arrangements have already been made and construct a pioneer road by the use of United States engineer

troops for surveys and initial construction. (It would expect to complete this work

during the current year and is advised that the pioneer road should be sufficiently advanced to be capable next winter of carrying a small amount of emergency traffic.)

(B) Arrange for the highway's completion under contracts made by the United

States Public Roads Administration and awarded with a view to insuring the execution of all contracts in the shortest possible time without regard to whether the contractors were Canadian or American. (It expects that the road should be able to carry

traffic to its full capacity not later than the end of 1943.)

(C) Maintain the highway until the termination of the present war unless the Government of Canada prefers to assume responsibility at an earlier date for the maintenance of so much of it as lies in Canada.

(D) Agrees that at the conclusion of the war that that part of the highway in Canada shall become in all respects an integral part of the Canadian highway system subject to the understanding that there shall at no time be imposed any discriminatory

conditions in relation to the use of the road by Canadian or United States civilian

traffic.

In the event of this proposal being accepted, the United States Government would

ask the Canadian Government to agree—

(A) To acquire rights-of-way for the road in Canada, the title to remain in

the Crown, in the right of Canada or of the province of British Columbia as appears

most convenient.

(B) To waive import duties, transit, or similar charges on shipments originating

in the United States and transported over the highway to Alaska, or originating in

Alaska and transported over the highway to the United States.
372 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

(C) To waive import duties, sales taxes, license fees, or other similar charges on

all equipment and supplies to be used in the construction or maintenance of the road

and on personal effects of the constructural personnel.

(D) To take the necessary steps to facilitate the admission into Canada of such

United States citizens as may be employed in the construction or maintenance of the

highway, it being understood that the United States will assume the expense of repatriating any such persons if the contractors fail to do so.
Appendix D

Declaration by President Roosevelt and

Prime Minister Mackenzie King

Regarding Co-operation in

War Production

 l

Hyde Park, New York

20 April 1941

Among other important matters, the President and the Prime Minister discussed measures by which the most prompt and effective utilization might be made of the productive

facilities of North America for the purposes both of local and hemisphere defense and

of the assistance which in addition to their own programs both Canada and the United

States are rendering to Great Britain and the other democracies.

It was agreed as a general principle that in mobilizing the resources of this continent

each country should provide the other with the defense articles which it is best able to

produce, and, above all, produce quickly, and that production programs should be coordinated to this end.

While Canada has expanded its productive capacity manyfold since the beginning of

the war, there are still numerous defense articles which it must obtain in the United States,

and purchases of this character by Canada will be even greater in the coming year than

in the past. On the other hand, there is existing and potential capacity in Canada for

the speedy production of certain kinds of munitions, strategic materials, aluminum, and

ships, which are urgently required by the United States for its own purposes.

While exact estimates cannot yet be made, it is hoped that during the next 12 months

Canada can supply the United States with between $200,000,000 and $300,000,000 worth

of such defense articles. This sum is a small fraction of the total defense program of the

United States, but many of the articles to be provided are of vital importance. In addition, it is of great importance to the economic and financial relations between the two

countries that payment by the United States for these supplies will materially assist Canada in meeting part of the cost of Canadian defense purchases in the United States.

Insofar as Canada's defense purchases in the United States consist of component parts

to be used in equipment and munitions which Canada is producing for Great Britain, it

was also agreed that Great Britain will obtain these parts under the Lend-Lease Act and

forward them to Canada for inclusion in the finished article.

The technical and financial details will be worked out as soon as possible in accordance with the general principles which have been agreed upon between the President and

the Prime Minister.

1

 The official text was published in Department of State Bulletin, April 26, 1941, IV, 494,

and CTS, 1941, No. 14.
Appendix E

Joint Statement on Defense

Collaboration

 l

12 February 1947

Announcement was made in Ottawa and Washington today of the results of discussion which have taken place in the Permanent Joint Board on Defense on the extent to

which the wartime cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries should be

maintained in this postwar period. In the interest of efficiency and economy, each Government has decided that its national defense establishment shall, to the extent authorized by law, continue to collaborate for peacetime joint security purposes. The collaboration will necessarily be limited and will be based on the following principles:

1. Interchange of select individuals so as to increase the familiarity of each country's

defense establishment with that of the other country.

2. General cooperation and exchange of observers in connection with exercises and

with the development and tests of material of common interest.

3. Encouragement of common designs and standards in arms, equipment, organization, methods of training and new developments. As certain United Kingdom standards

have long been in use in Canada, no radical change is contemplated or practicable and the

application of this principle will be gradual.

4. Mutual and reciprocal availability of military, naval and air facilities in each country; this principle to be applied as may be agreed in specific instances. Reciprocally each

country will continue to provide with its minimum of formality for the transit through

its territorial waters of military aircraft and public vessels of the other country.

5. As an underlying principle all cooperative arrangements will be without impairment of the control of either country over all activities in its territory.

While in this, as in many other matters of mutual concern, there is an identity of view

and interest between the two countries, the decision of each has been taken independently in continuation of the practice developed since the establishment of the Joint Defense Board in 1940. No treaty, executive agreement or contractual obligation has been

entered into. Each country will determine the extent of its practical collaboration in

respect of each and all of the foregoing principles. Either country may at any time discontinue collaboration on any or all of them. Neither country will take any action inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter remains the cornerstone

of the foreign policy of each.

An important element in the decision of each government to authorize continued col1

 The official text was published in Department of State Bulletin, XVI (23 Feb 47), 361,

and CTS, 1947, No. 43.
APPENDIX E 375

laboration was the conviction on the part of each that in this way their obligations under

the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of internal peace and security

could be fulfilled more effectively. Both Governments believe that this decision is a contribution to the stability of the world and to the establishment through the United Nations

of an effective system of world-wide security. With this in mind, each Government has

sent a copy of this statement to the Secretary General of the United Nations for circulation to all its members.

In August 1940, when the creation of the Board was jointly announced by the late

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King, it was stated that the Board "shall commence immediate studies relating to sea, land and air problems, including personnel and

material. It will consider in the broad sense the defense of the north half of the Western

Hemisphere." In discharging this continuing responsibility the Board's work led to

the building up of a pattern of close defense cooperation. The principles announced

today are in continuance of this cooperation. It has been the task of the governments to

assure that the close security relationship between Canada and the United States in North

America will in no way impair but on the contrary will strengthen the cooperation of

each country within the broader framework of the United Nations.

Bibliographical Note

This volume is based primarily upon available official public documents of

the United States and Canada and upon the official files of the following

U.S. Government agencies: the U.S. Section of the Permanent Joint Board

on Defense, Canada-United States, the Department of State, the War Department, the Navy Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The public

documents used in preparing the study are listed below under Published

Works.

Official Records

Permanent Joint Board on Defense Papers

These papers were the most concentrated and fruitful source of material

for this study. They include the official records of the Board itself, the extensive correspondence exchanged between the various members of the

Canadian and U.S. Sections of the Board, and the similar but even more

extensive correspondence between the members of the U.S. Section and agencies of the State, War, and Navy Departments.

In theory, the office of the U.S. secretary of the Board in the Department

of State was the office of record for the U.S. Section. In fact, the office of

the U.S. Army members of the Board was the repository of the most complete records on the subject of U.S.-Canadian wartime military co-operation.

There appear to be two reasons for this. First, virtually all matters dealt

with by the Board were also within the purview of the U.S. Army members,

whereas many matters of narrower scope were worked out between the U.S.

Army members and War Department agencies without reference to the secretary of the U.S. Section. Second, the U.S. Army members maintained a

separate office of record, whereas the U.S. secretary did not keep distinctly

separate records for Board matters. Instead, he incorporated Board papers

with the files he maintained as the Canadian-desk officer or as officer in

charge of Dominion affairs. In addition, the bulk of the World War II

papers of the U.S. secretary has been retired to, and amalgamated with, the

general Department of State records. Where the State Department records

have been used, they are identified by a Department of State file reference.

Permanent Joint Board papers are located in the files of the U.S. Army members of the Board and references thereto are identifiable by the file index PDB.
378 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Department of State Papers

In addition to the papers of the U.S. secretary of the Board, important

materials concerning politico-military co-operation in matters outside the

area of co-operation through the Permanent Joint Board on Defense are to

be found in the Department of State papers. References thereto are identifiable by the file index notation D/S. The papers, carefully classified and

indexed, are to be found in the Division of Communications and Records.

War Department Papers

The responsibilities of the War Plans Division, or Operations Division,

as it was redesignated in March 1942, were such that the politico-military

policy matters, and the major questions of command, strategy, supply, planning, and operations pertaining to U.S.-Canadian co-operation were within

its purview. It was necessary to examine the records of those two divisions,

particularly for the periods immediately preceding and following the establishment of the Board, in order to obtain materials on those joint problems

and transactions that were handled outside the Board.

References to a portion of these papers are identifiable by the file indexes

WPD and OPD. Papers relating to problems involving countries other

than Canada and requiring consideration by the Combined and/or Joint

Chiefs of Staff were maintained by the Operations Division in a separate file

identified by the symbol ABC. Most of these records have been retired to

the Departmental Records Branch, The Adjutant General's Office.

Navy Department Papers

By and large, the Permanent Joint Board on Defense papers provided

adequate material on wartime naval co-operation. In a few instances it was

necessary to refer to records of the Chief of Naval Operations on file in the

Naval Records and History Division, Navy Department.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Papers

A number of matters bearing on U.S.-Canadian co-operation were acted

upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The scope of these matters was severely

limited by virtue of the fact that, by the time of the establishment of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 1942, the basic U.S.-Canadian plans had been

drafted, and the decisions had already been taken concerning the majority of

the strategic and logistical measures in which the two countries collaborated.

Documentation from Joint Chiefs of Staff files is identifiable by indexes

beginning with the letter "J," as, for example, JCS for Joint Chiefs of Staff,

or JPS for Joint Staff Planners.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 379

Private Papers

Significant materials frequently covering matters not of record in the

official U.S. Government files were found in the diaries of Henry L. Stimson

and Henry Morgenthau, Jr., the World War II Secretaries of War and the

Treasury, and of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, the U.S. Minister in Ottawa from

4 June 1940 to 24 January 1943. Messrs. McGeorge Bundy, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and Joseph C. Grew, respectively, generously granted access to

the pertinent data.

The papers of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park were an

additional valuable source of materials that were not to be found elsewhere.

Those papers relevant to this study were examined and, where cited, are identified as from the "Roosevelt Papers."

Interviews

A number of the principal American participants in the events recorded

in this volume were interviewed by the author or were queried through correspondence. Their views or comments were sought on points obscure in

the official records. In addition, appropriate portions of the draft of the

volume were reviewed by the following officers who held positions in the

State, War, and Navy Departments during World War II:

Brigadier General Milton W. Arnold, U.S. Air Force (retired)

Brigadier General Henry A. Barber, Jr., U.S. Army (retired)

Major General Gerald C. Brant, U.S. Army (retired)

Lieutenant General Edward H. Brooks, U.S. Army (retired)

Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Burhans, U.S. Army

Colonel Albert H. Burton, U.S. Army (retired)

Mr. Lewis Clark, Department of State

Colonel C. M. Clifford, U.S. Army

Major General Robert W. Douglass, Jr., U.S. Air Force

Brigadier General Beverly C. Dunn, U.S. Army (retired)

Colonel Farmer W. Edwards, U.S. Army

Lieutenant General Stanley D. Embick, U.S. Army (retired)

Major General Robert T. Frederick, U.S. Army (retired)

Colonel Paul R. Goode, U.S. Army (retired)

Major General Guy V. Henry, U.S. Army (retired)

Vice Admiral H. W. Hill, U.S. Navy (retired)

Colonel E. W. Hockenberry, U.S. Air Force (retired)

Vice Admiral Alfred W. Johnson, U.S. Navy (retired)

Colonel Archibald King, U.S. Army (retired)

Mr. J. Graham Parsons, Department of State

Major General Thomas M. Robins, U.S. Army (retired)

Rear Admiral R. W. Ruble, U.S. Navy

Brigadier General F. S. Strong, Jr., U.S. Army (retired)
380 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Major General C. L. Sturdevant, U.S. Army (retired)

Rear Admiral Frank P. Thomas, U.S. Navy (retired)

Miss Margaret Joy Tibbetts, Department of State

Rear Admiral J. P. Whitney, U.S. Navy

Colonel Kenneth G. Wickham, U.S. Army

Brigadier General Robert J. Wood, U.S. Army

Brigadier General Ludson D. Worsham, U.S. Army (retired)

The comments of these individuals have been appropriately incorporated in

this study. The records of the interviews and the correspondence involved

are in the possession of the. author.

Published Works

The student of the history of U.S.-Canadian relations will find the best

collection of studies on the subject to be in the twenty-five volume series on

The Relations of Canada and the United States sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History. The

only volume cited below, by John B. Brebner, is in part an over-all summary and provides excellent background reading for this study. It also contains a list of all the volumes in the series.

Books

Baxter, James P., 3d. Scientists Against Time, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946.

Bemis, Samuel F. A Diplomatic History of the United States. Third edition. New York:

Henry Holt and Company, 1950.

Brebner, John B. North Atlantic Triangle. (THE RELATIONS OF CANADA AND

THE UNITED STATES.) Revised edition. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1947.

Burhans, Robert D. The First Special Service Force. Washington: Infantry Journal Press,

1947.

Bykofsky, Joseph, and Harold Larson. The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas.

(UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.) Washington: Government

Printing Office, 1957.

Byrd, Richard E. Skyward. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928.

California University, Committee on International Relations. Problems of Hemispheric Defense. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942.

Callahan, James M. American Foreign Policy in Canadian Relations. New York: The

Macmillan Company, 1937.

Canada in World War II. Montreal: Wm. S. Boad and Company, 1945.

Carr, William G. Checkmate to the North. Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1945.

Carter, H. Dyson. Sea of Destiny. New York: Greenberg Publisher, Inc., 1940.

Cave, Hugh B. Wings Across the World: The Story of the Air Transport Command. New

York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1945.

Chacko, Chirakaikaran Joseph. The International Joint Commission. New York: Columbia

University Press, 1932.

Churchill, Winston S. The Second World War. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

(All volumes published through 1951.)

Cleveland, Reginald M. Air Transport at War. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 381

Cline, Ray S. Washington Command Post: The Operations Division. (UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.) Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951.

Coale, Griffith. North Atlantic Patrol. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1943.

Coe, Douglas. Road to Alaska. New York: Julian Meissner, Inc., 1943.

Conference on Canadian-American Affairs: Proceedings at Queen's University, June 23-26, 1941.

R. G. Trotter and A. B. Corey (eds.). Toronto: Ginn and Company, 1941.

Craven, Wesley F., and James L. Cate (eds.). Plans and Early Operations. (THE ARMY

AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II, Vol. I.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1948.

———. Europe-TORCH to POINTBLANK. (THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN

WORLD WAR II, Vol. II.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949.

———. The Pacific-Guadalcanal to Saipan. (THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD

WAR II, Vol. IV.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950.

Davies, Raymond A. Arctic Eldorado. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1944.

Dawson, Carl A. (ed.). The New North-west. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,

1947.

Dawson, Robert M. Canada in World Affairs: 1939-1941. Toronto: Oxford University

Press, 1943.

Dexter, Grant. Canada and the Building of Peace. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1944.

Dmitri, Ivan. Flight to Everywhere. New York: Whittlesey House, 1944.

Eggleston, Wilfrid. Scientists at War. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1950.

843d Signal Service Battalion, U.S. Army Signal Corps. Alaska Highway Telephone System. Commercial Printers, Limited, circa fall 1945.

Elliott, W. Y., and H. D. Hall (eds.). The British Commonwealth at War. New York:

Alfred A. Knopf, 1943.

Feis, Herbert. The Road to Pearl Harbor. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950.

Finnic, Richard. Canol. San Francisco: Ryder and Ingram, 1945.

Glazebrook, G. P. de T. A History of Canadian External Relations. Toronto: Oxford

University Press, 1950.

Godsell, Philip H. The Romance of the Alaska Highway. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1944.

Griffin, D. F. First Steps to Tokyo: The Royal Canadian Air Force in the Aleutians. Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1944.

Griffin, Harold. Alaska and the Canadian Northwest. New York: W. W. Norton &

Company, 1944.

Hardy, H. Reginald. Mackenzie King of Canada: A Biography. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1949.

Harvey, Heather J. Consultation and Co-operation in the Commonwealth. New York:

Oxford University Press, 1952.

History of Force 2600. (Unidentified and undated account of Canol Project operations obviously prepared by a U.S. Army agency circa 1944.)

Hooker, Nancy H. (ed.). The Moffat Papers. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

1956.

Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. 2 vols. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948.

Humphrey, John P. The Inter-American System: A Canadian View. Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1942.

Hutchinson, Bruce. The Incredible Canadian. Toronto: Longmans, Green and Company,

1952.
382 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Ingraham, Rex. First Fleet: The Story of the U. S. Coast Guard at War. Indianapolis:

Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1944.

James, Robert W. Wartime Economic Co-operation: A Study of Relations Between Canada and

the United States. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1949.

Karig, Walter. The Atlantic War. (BATTLE REPORT, Vol. II.) New York: Farrar

& Rinehart, 1946.

Keenleyside, Hugh L. Canada and the United States. Revised edition by Keenleyside

and G. S. Brown. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952.

Kennedy, John de Navarry. History of the Department of Munitions and Supply: Canada in

the Second World War. 2 vols. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1950.

King, Ernest J., and W. M. Whitehall. Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record. New York:

W. W. Norton and Company, 1952.

King, W. L. Mackenzie. Canada at Britain's Side. Toronto: The Macmillan Company,

1941. ———. Canada and the Fight for Freedom. Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1944.

Kizer, Benjamin H. The U.S.-Canadian Northwest. Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1943.

La Farge, Oliver. The Eagle in the Egg. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949.

Langer, William L., and S. Everett Gleason. The Challenge to Isolation. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952.

———. The Undeclared War. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953.

Lanks, Herbert C. Highway to Alaska. New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1944.

Leahy, William D. I Was There. New York: Whittlesey House, 1950.

Lingard, C. C., and R. G. Trotter. September 1941 to May 1944. (CANADA IN WORLD

AFFAIRS, Vol. III.) Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1950.

Lissitzyn, Oliver J. International Air Transport and National Policy. New York: Council

on Foreign Relations, 1942.

Longstaff, F. V. The Uganda in Action. Victoria, B. C.: The Author, 1952.

Lower, Arthur R. M. Canada: Nation and Neighbor. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1952.

Lower Post or Freeze: 340th Engineer Regiment on the Alaska Military Highway. Charlotte,

N. C.: Herald Press, 1944.

McInnis, Edgar W. The Unguarded Frontier. New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1942.

MacKay, R. A. (ed.). Newfoundland: Economic, Diplomatic and Strategic Studies. Toronto:

Oxford University Press, 1946.

Mansergh, Nicholas. Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of External Policy,

1931 to 1939. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1952.

Matloff, Maurice, and Edwin M. Snell. Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-

1942. (UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.) Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls. (HISTORY OF UNITED

STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II, Vol. VII.) Boston: Little,

Brown and Company, 1951. ———. The Atlantic Battle Won, May 1943-May 1945. (HISTORY OF UNITED

STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II, Vol. X.) Boston: Little,

Brown and Company, 1956.

———. The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943. (HISTORY OF UNITED

STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II, Vol. I.) Boston: Little,

Brown and Company, 1947.

Morton, Henry V. Atlantic Meeting. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1943.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 383

Myers, C. V. Oil to Alaska, Canol Unveiled. Edmonton: Douglas Printing Company,

circa 1945.

Nelson, Donald M. Arsenal of Democracy. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company,

1946.

Plumptre, A. F. W. Mobilizing Canada's Resources for War. Toronto: The Macmillan

Company, 1941.

Polunin, Nicholas. Arctic Unfolding. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1949.

Roberts, Leslie. Canada's War in the Air. Third edition. Montreal: Alvah M. Beatty,

1943.

———. Canada, and the War at Sea. (CANADA'S WAR AT SEA, Vol. II.) Montreal:

Alvah M. Beatty, 1944.

———. The Mackenzie. New York: Rinehart & Company, 1949.

Roosevelt, Elliott. As He Saw It. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946.

Roosevelt, Elliott (ed.). F. D. R., His Personal Letters, 1928-1945. 2 vols. New York:

Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950.

Rosen, S. McKee. The Combined Boards of the Second World War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951.

Rosenman, Samuel I. (compiler). The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 13 vols. New York: Random House, 1938 (Vols. 1-5), The Macmillan Company, 1941 (Vols. 6-9), and Harper & Brothers, 1950 (Vols. 10-13).

Ross, Richard M. The History of the 1st Battalion, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (M. G).

Ottawa: n.d.

Schull, Joseph. The Far Distant Ships. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1950.

Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History. New York: Harper &

Brothers, 1948.

Shores, Louis. Highways in the Sky: The Story of the AACS. New York: Barnes & Noble,

1947.

Soward, F. H. From Normandy to Paris, 1944-1946. (CANADA IN WORLD AFFAIRS,

Vol. IV.) Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1950.

Soward, F. H., et al. The Pre-war Years. (CANADA IN WORLD AFFAIRS, Vol. I.)

Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1941.

Soward, F. H., and A. M. Maccaulay. Canada and the Pan American System, (CONTEMPORARY AFFAIRS, No. 21). Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1948.

Stacey, Charles P. The Canadian Army, 1939-1945. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer,

1948.

—————. Th . Sixe Years Military of Problems War: Th oef Army Canada. in Toronto Canada, Britain : Ryerso ann Press d the, Pacific. 1940. (OFFICIAL

HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN ARMY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. vol.

I.) Ottawa: E. Cloutier, Queen's Printer, 1955.

Stefansson, V., and H. W. Weigert (eds.). Compass of the World. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944.

Stettinius, Edward R., Jr. Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory. New York: The Macmillan

Company, 1944.

Stimson, Henry L., and McGeorge Bundy. On Active Service in Peace and War. New

York: Harper & Brothers, 1947.

The Long Trail: 341st Engineers on the Alaska Military Highway. Charlotte, N. C.: Harold

Press, 1943.

The War Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall, General of the Army H. H.

Arnold and Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King. Foreward by Walter Millis. New York:

J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947.
384 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Tucker, G. N. The Naval Service of Canada. 2 vols. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer,

1952. Watson, Mark S. Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations. (UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.) Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950.

Welles, Sumner. Co-operation Between Canada and the United States in the Search for World

Peace. Winnipeg: J. W. Dafoe Foundation, 1946.

Whitaker, Arthur P. (ed.). Inter-American Affairs. (Annual surveys 1-5 inclusive for

the years 1941-1945.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1942-46. (Contain

sections on Canada.)

Public Documents—Canada

Air Force Headquarters, Air Historical Section. Silver Jubilee of the Royal Canadian Air

Force. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1949.

Canada Law Reports. Part VIII, 1943. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1943.

Canadian Information Service. Statement, August 15, 1945. (Published as Appendix 8

of H. D. Smyth, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes, Princeton University Press, 1946

Edition.)

Canadian Mutual Aid Board. Final Report, 1946. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer,

1947.

Crown Assets Disposal Corporation (formerly War Assets Corporation). Sixth Annual

Report, April 1, 1949-March 31, 1950. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1950.

——— . Seventh Annual Report, April 1, 1950-March 31, 1951. Ottawa: E. Cloutier,

King's Printer, 1951.

Department of External Affairs. Annual Reports. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer,

1939-1952.

——— . "Canada and Latin America," External Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 5 (May 1949), 25-34.

——— . "Canadian War Data," 1946 Reference Papers Series, No. 4, May 15, 1946.

——— . "Joint War Production Committee, Canada and the U.S.A.," Press Release 2,

January 12, 1946.

Department of External Affairs, Information Division. Background of the Great Lakes-St.

Lawrence Waterway and Power Project. Reference Paper 52. Ottawa: 1950.

——— . Three Power Co-operation on Atomic Energy. Reference 52. Ottawa: 1949.

Department of Munitions and Supply. The Industrial Front. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's

Printer, 1944.

Department of National Defense. Annual Reports. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer,

1939-1952.

——— . Canada's Defense. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1947.

——— . Canada's Defense Program. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1949.

——— . Canadian Defense Planning. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1948.

Department of Reconstruction. Canada's Role in Atomic Bomb Drama. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1945.

Department of Transport, Air Services Branch. Canada Air Pilot. 2 vols. Ottawa: Department of Mines and Technical Surveys.

Dominion Bureau of Statistics. "Canada's Northern Airfields," The Canada Year Book,

1945, pp. 705-12. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1945.

———. "The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan—A Summary of the R.C.A.F.'s

Major Role in the War of 1939-45," The Canada Year Book, 1946, pp. 1090-99. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1946.

———. The Canadian Balance of International Payments, 1926 to 1948. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1949.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 385

Foreign Exchange Control Board. Report to the Minister of Finance, March 1946, Ottawa:

E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1946.

Naval Service Headquarters. Royal Canadian Navy Monthly Review, Nos. 1-43 inclusive.

Ottawa: 1942-1945.

North Pacific Planning Project. Canada's New Northwest. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's

Printer, 1947.

Ottawa Air Training Conference, May 1942. Report of the Conference. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1942.

Privy Council. Canadian War Orders and Regulations. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's

Printer, 1942-1945. ———. Proclamations and Orders in Council Relating to the War. 8 vols. Ottawa: E.

Cloutier, King's Printer, 1940-1942.

Royal Canadian Air Force, Northwest Air Command, Public Relations Office. The

Northwest Staging Route. Edmonton: 1945.

Supreme Court. "Jurisdiction of Canadian Criminal Courts over Members of the Armed

Forces of the United States," Factum of the Attorney General of Canada and Case. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1943. (See also similar factums of the Attorneys

General of Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia.)

War Assets Corporation. Annual Report, July 12, 1944 to March 31, 1945 and Second to

Fifth (inclusive) Annual Reports for the four succeeding years. Ottawa: E. Cloutier,

King's Printer, 1945-1949.

Wartime Information Board. "Canada and the Inter-American System." Reference Paper 34, February 16, 1945.

——— . Canada at War, Nos. 1-45 inclusive. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 1941-45.

——— . Defense Projects in Northwest Canada. Ottawa: 1944. (Mimeographed.)

Public Documents—Great Britain

Central Office of Information. Atlantic Bridge. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1945. ——— . The Battle of the Atlantic. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1946.

Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet. The Contribution of the British Pacific Fleet to

the Assault on Okinawa, 1945. Despatch by Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, G.C.B., K.B.E.,

published as a supplement to The London Gazette of 1 June 1948. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office.

Public Documents—United States

Army Service Forces, Control Division. Statistical Renew: World War II. Washington:

1945.

Army Service Forces, International Division. A Guide to International Supply. Washington: 1945. ——— . Lend-Lease. 2 vols. Washington: 1945.

Bureau of the Budget. The United States at War. Washington: Government Printing

Office, 1946.

Civilian Production Administration. Official Munitions Production of the United States.

Washington: 1947. Coast Guard. The Coast Guard at War: Greenland Patrol. Washington: 1945. (Processed.)

Department of Commerce. The St. Lawrence Survey. 7 vols. Washington: Government

Printing Office. 1941.
386 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. International

Transactions of the United States During the War, 1940-1945. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948.

Department of State. Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943.

Department of State, Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner. Reports to Congress

on Foreign Surplus Disposal. Nos. 1-14, inclusive. Washington: Government Printing

Office, 1946-1949.

Finance Department. Lend-Lease Shipments in World War II. 2 vols. Washington: 1946.

House Committee on Roads, 79th Congress, 2d Session. House Report 1705, on House

Resolution 255. The Alaska Highway. Washington: Government Printing Office,

1946.

Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Congress, 1st Session. Hearings on Senate Concurrent Resolution 27. Pearl Harbor Attack. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946.

National Archives. Federal Records of World War II. 2 vols. Washington: Government

Printing Office, 1951.

Navy Department, Bureau of Yards and Docks. Building the. Navy's Bases in World War

II. 2 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947.

Northwest Service Command. First Semi-Annual Progress Report. Whitehorse: 1944.

Northwest Service Command, Public Relations Branch. Canol. Whitehorse: 1944. ——— . The Alaska Highway. Whitehorse: 1944.

Office of Naval Intelligence. The Aleutians Campaign. Washington: 1945.

Office of The Quartermaster General. QMC Historical Study, 9, Fuels for Global Conflict,

by Erna Risch. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945.

Special Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, 78th Congress,

1st Session. Senate Report 10. Investigation of the National Defense Program Pursuant

to Senate Resolution 71, 77th Congress and Senate Resolution 6, 78th Congress. Part

14. Additional Report. The Canol Project. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944.

Special Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, 78th Congress, 1st

Session. Hearings on Senate Resolution 6, Investigation of the National Defense Program. Part 22. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944.

Special Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, 79th Congress,

2d Session. Hearings on Senate Resolution 46, 80th Congress, extending Senate Resolution 71, 77th Congress. Investigation of the National Defense Program. Part 39.

Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947.

War Production Board. Industrial Mobilization for War, Vol I, Program and Administration. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947.

Articles

Armstrong, Elizabeth H. "Canadian-American Co-operation in War and Peace, 1940-

1945," Department of State Bulletin, XIII (October 28, 1945), 674-78.

Balch, Thomas W. "Is Hudson Bay a Closed or an Open Sea," American Journal of International Law, VI (1912), 409-59.

——— . "The Hudsonian Sea Is a Great Open Sea," ibid., VII (1913), 546-65.

Bartlett, Robert A. "Servicing Arctic Airbases," The National Geographic, LXXXIX

(May 1946), 602-16.

Barton, G. P. "Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity From Criminal Jurisdiction," British

Year Book of International Law, XXVII (1950), 186-235.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 387

——— . "Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity From Supervisory Jurisdiction," ibid., XXVI

(1949), 380-414.

Bathurst, M. E. "Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces," British Year Book of

International Law, XXIII (1946), 338-41.

Batt, William L. "Canada-United States Co-operation," Industrial Canada, XLIV (July

1943), 115-18, 131.

Borchard, Edwin. "The Attorney General's Opinion in the Exchange of Destroyers for

Naval Bases," American Journal of International Law, XXXIV (1940), 690-97.

——— . "The St. Lawrence Waterway and Power Project," ibid., XLIII (1949), 411-34.

Brebner, J. B. "A Changing North Atlantic Triangle," International Journal, III (Autumn

1948), 309-19.

——— . "Canada in North American History," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review,

XXXIV (March 1948), 653-59.

Brebner, J. B., and R. G. Trotter. "Relations of Canada and the United States," Canadian

Historical Review, XXIV (1943), 117-35.

Briggs, Herbert W. "Neglected Aspects of the Destroyer Deal," American Journal of International Law, XXXIV (1940), 569-87.

——— . "The Validity of the Greenland Agreement," ibid., XXXV (1941), 506-13.

Brown, Wilson. "The Allies at Quebec," Queens Quarterly, LVI (Winter 1949-1950),

465-78.

Carnegie, R. K. "The Quebec Conference," Canadian Geographical Journal, XXVII (September 1943), 96-105.

Claxton, Brooke. "Anglo-American Relations and Canadian Policy," in V. Anderson

(ed.), The United Nations Today and Tomorrow (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1943).

Duggan, Stephen. "The Western Hemisphere as a Haven of Peace," Foreign Affairs,

XVIII (July 1940), 614-31.

Ellis, F. H. "New York to Nome and Back," The Beaver, Outfit 280 (September 1949),

28-32.

Ells, S. C. "Alaska Highway," Canadian Geographical Journal, XXVIII (March 1944),

104-19.

Evans-Lombe, E. M. "The Royal Navy in the Pacific," Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, XCII (August 1947), 333-47.

Fairman, Chas., and Archibald King. "Taxation of Friendly Foreign Armed Forces," '

American Journal of International Law, XXXVIII (1944), 258-77.

Falls, Cyril. "Canada, the United States and the Commonwealth," Canadian Army Journal, I (July 1947), 12-14.

——— . "Defense of the Commonwealth," ibid., I (June 1947), 14-15, 32.

Fenwick, Chas. G. "Canada and the Monroe Doctrine," American Journal of International

Law, XXXII (1938), 782-85.

Finnic, Richard. "A Route to Alaska Through the Northwest Territories," Geographical

Review, XXXII (July 1942), 403-16.

——— . "The Epic of Canol," Canadian Geographical Journal, XXXIV (March 1947),

136-40.

Glazebrook, G. P. de T. "Canadian Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century," Journal of

Modern History, XXI (March 1949), 44-55.

Harrington, Lyn. "The Alaska Highway," Canadian Geographical Journal, XLII (June

1951), 239-59.

Harrison, W. E. C. "Canadian-American Defense," International Journal, V (Summer

1950), 189-200.

——— . "Strategy and Policy in the Defense of Canada," ibid., IV (Summer 1949), 212-

43.
388 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Heslop, Barbara. "Arctic Rescue," The Beaver. Outfit 274 (March 1944), 8-14.

Hitchins, F. H. "Evolution of the Royal Canadian Air Force," Canadian Historical Association Report, 1946, pp. 92-100.

———. "The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan," The Roundel, II (December

1949), 5-13. Hopkins, Oliver B. "The 'Canol' Project," Canadian Geographical Journal, XXVII (November 1943), 238-49.

Horner, S. G. L. "Atmospheric Defense," The Beaver, Outfit 276 (December 1945), 40-

42.

Hunter, Croil. "Northwest Airlines Unfolds Epic of its March to Help Save Alaska,"

Air Transportation, IV (February 1944), 7-10.

Johnston, R. N. "Speeding-Up the Alaska Highway by Aerial-Survey Methods," Roads

and Bridges, LXXX (November 1942), 17-23, 54.

Johnston, V. K. "Canada's Title to Hudson Bay and Hudston Strait," British Year Book

of International Law, XV (1934), 1-20.

——— . "Canada's Title to the Arctic Islands," Canadian Historical Review, XIV (March

1933), 24-41.

King, Archibald. "Further Developments Concerning Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign

Armed Forces," American Journal of International Law, XL (1946), 257-79.

——— . "Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces," ibid., XXXVI (1942), 539-

67.

Knox, F. A. "Canada's Balance of International Payments, 1940-45," Canadian Journal

of Economics and Political Science, XIII (August 1947), 345-62.

Laing, Lionel H. "Does the Monroe Doctrine Cover Canada?," American Journal of International Law, XXXII (1938), 793-96.

Lane, Albert L. "The Alcan Highway," Military Engineer, XXXIV (October 1942), 492-

500.

Lloyd, Trevor. "Oil in the Mackenzie Valley," Geographical Review, XXXIV (1944),

275-307.

——— . "The Mackenzie Waterway: A Northern Supply Route," ibid., XXXIII (1943),

415-34.

Lower, A. R. M. "Newfoundland in North Atlantic Strategy," Foreign Affairs, XX (July

1942), 767-70.

McCarthy, Leighton. "Canadian-American Relations in War and Peace," International

Conciliation, No. 398 (March 1944), pp. 200-205.

MacKay, R. A. "The International Joint Commission Between the United States and

Canada," American Journal of International Law, XXII (1928), 292-318.

McKechnie, L. M., et al. "Home War: The R.C.A.F. Guards Our Shores," Canadian

Geographical Journal, XXVII (October 1943), 150-77.

MacKinnon, M. H. M. "The R.C.A.F, in Newfoundland," University of Toronto Quarterly,

XV (April 1946), 213-21.

McMillion, Shelby A. "The Strategic Route to Alaska," Military Engineer, XXXIV

(November 1942), 546-54.

MacNaught, Jack. "The Battle of the St. Lawrence," Maclean's Magazine, LXII (October

15, 1949), 7, 68-70, and (November 1, 1949), 22, 47-49.

McNaughton, A. G. L. "Defense of North America," Ottawa: Department of External

Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 48/18, 1948.

——— . "Organization and Responsibilities of the International Joint Commission,"

Engineering Journal, XXXIV (January 1951), 2-4, 12.

Mansergh, Nicholas. "Strains on the Commonwealth," Foreign Affairs, XXVII (October

1948), 129-42.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 389

Massey, Vincent. "Canada and the Inter-American System," Foreign Affairs, XXVI (July

1948), 693-700.

Miller, Eugene H. "Canada and the Pan American Union," International Journal, III

(Winter 1947-48), 24-39.

Milner, Samuel. "Establishing the Bolero Ferrying Route," Military Affairs, XI (Winter

1947), 213-22.

Mosely, Philip E. "Iceland and Greenland: An American Problem," Foreign Affairs,

XVIII (July 1940), 742-46.

Neuberger, Richard L. "Highballing at Sixty Below," Saturday Evening Post, 27 November 1943, pp. 15, 109-10.

"Oil for the Planes of Alaska," The Beaver, Outfit 274 (September 1943), 4-14.

Pearson, Lester B. "Canada and the North Atlantic Alliance," Foreign Affairs, XXVII

(April 1949), 369-78.

——— . "Canada Looks 'Down North'," ibid., XXIV (July 1946), 638-48.

——— . "Canada's Northern Horizon," ibid., XXXI (July 1953), 581-92.

Perkins, Dexter. "Bringing the Monroe Doctrine Up to Date," Foreign Affairs, XX (January 1942), 253-65.

Pierce, S. D., and A. F. W. Plumptre. "Canada's Relations with Wartime Agencies in

Washington," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XI (August 1945),

402-19.

Podea, Iris S. "Pan American Sentiment in French Canada," International Journal, III

(Autumn 1948), 334-49.

"Prince Rupert—Secret City of the War," Canadian National Magazine, XXXI (November 1945), 6-7, 10, 12.

Rainey, Froelich. "Alaska Highway as an Engineering Epic," National Geographic Magazine, LXXXIII (February 1943), 143-68.

Richardson, B. T. "Canada-U.S. Relations in the New North," Canadian Business, XVII

(May 1944), 28-29, 186, 189.

Richardson, Dougall. "Economic Cooperation with Canada 1941-1947," Department of

State Bulletin, XVI (June 22, 1947), 1185-92.

Ringold, Herbert. "Lifeline to the U.S.S.R.," Air Force, XXVII (November 1944), 24-

27.

Sage, Walter N. "The Historical Peculiarities of Canada with Regard to Hemisphere

Defense," Pacific Historical Renew, X (March 1941), 15-29.

Stacey, C. P. "The Myth of the Unguarded Frontier, 1815-1871," American Historical

Review, LVI (October 1950), 1-18.

Standley, William H. "Stalin and World Unity," Collier's, June 30, 1945, pp. 17, 75-76.

Stephenson, Wm. "Northern Salvage," The Beaver, Outfit 276 (September 1945), 36-39.

Sturdevant, C. L. "The Alaska Military Highway," Engineering Journal, XXVI (March

1943), 117-21.

——— . "The Military Road to Alaska," Military Engineer, XXXV (April 19.13), 173-81.

Trotter, Reginald G. "Canada and Pan Americanism," Queens Quarterly. XLIX (1942),

252-60.

Tucker, Gilbert N. "Some Aspects of the Battle of the Atlantic," Report of the Canadian

Historical Association, 1946, pp. 84-91.

Trully, T. J. "The Story of the Alaska Communications," Signals, II (May-June 1948),

24-29.

Waters, S. C. "Anzio," Canadian Army Journal, II (August-September 1946), 16-23.

Wattsford, G. J. H. "The Strategic Importance of Canada," Canadian Army Journal, II

(March 1949), 17-21.
390 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Wilcox, F. O. "The Monroe Doctrine and World War II," American Political Science

Review, XXXVI (June 1942), 433-53.

Wilson, J. A. "Expansion of Aviation into Arctic and Subarctic Canada," Canadian Geo-

——— graphical . "Northwes Journal, XLt Passag I (Septembe e by Air, r 1950) " ibid.,, 130-4 XXV1I (March 1943), 107-29.

Wood, E. P. "Northern Skytrails," The Roundel, I, serialized in Nos. 1 (November

1948) to 11 (September 1949), inclusive.

Wright, Kenneth. "How Goose Bay Was Discovered," The Beaver, Outfit 277 (June

1946), 42-45.

Wright, Quincy. "The Transfer of Destroyers to Great Britain," American Journal of

International Law, XXXIV (1940), 680-89.

Manuscripts and Unpublished Monographs

Carr, Edwin R. "Great Falls to Nome: The Inland Air Route to Alaska, 1940-1945."

Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1947.

Conn, Stetson, and Byron Fairchild. "The Framework of Hemisphere Defense." Manuscript in preparation for publication in the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II.

Cressy, Arthur Cheever, Jr. "Canadian-American Co-operation in World War II." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1952.

Keenleyside, Hugh L. "The Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defense, 1940-

1945." Unpublished manuscript, 1947.

Kittredge, Tracy B. "U.S.-British Naval Co-operation, 1940-1945." Unpublished monograph, Washington, 1947.

Smith, Gordon W. "The Historical and Legal Background of Canada's Arctic Claims."

Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1952.

A large number of unpublished official, secondary materials in the form

of historical reports prepared by unknown authors in the U.S. Government

agencies were available, some of which are listed below. Prepared as part

of a directed program, these reports were in some cases written by inadequately qualified people. Consequently they vary considerably in quality

and utility. The compilations of documents usually appended to the texts

of these reports were especially useful.

Alaskan Department. "Official History of the Alaskan Department." Unpublished historical report on file in the Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army.

Army Air Forces. "The Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command." Reference History 7. Unpublished historical report, 1945, on file in the Department of the Air

Force, Air University Historical Liaison Office.

——— . "The Army Airways Communication System," Vol. I, "From Activation to Victory." Unpublished manuscript on file at Headquarters, Military Air Transport

Service.

——— . "History of the Army Air Forces Weather Service." Vols. III-VI, inclusive.

Unpublished manuscript in the files of the Air Weather Service Historian, Headquarters, Military Air Transport Service.

Army Air Forces, Air Transport Command. Unpublished official histories, on file at

Headquarters, Military Air Transport Service (variously prepared in 1945 and 1946):

"Administrative History of the Air Transport Command: June 1942-July 1944."
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 391

"Administrative History of the Ferrying Command: 29 May 1941-30 June 1942."

"Alaskan Division, Historical Record Report."

"Ferrying Command Operations: 29 May 1941-30 June 1942."

"History of the Ferrying Division: 20 June 1942-30 September 1945."

"History of the North Atlantic Division: 1941-1 April 1944."

"History of the Northwest Air Route to Alaska: 1942-1945." (This history was

submitted to the University of Minnesota as a Ph.D. dissertation by its author,

Edwin R. Carr, under the title "Great Falls to Nome: The Inland Air Route to

Alaska, 1940-1945.")

"North Atlantic Wing: 1 April 1944-1 October 1945."

"The Northwest Route Under the Ferrying Division: 16 June 1942-1 November

1942."

"Organizational History of the Ferrying Division: 20 June 1942-1 August 1944."

"The Air Transport Command in World War II."

"The CRIMSON Route."

"The Origins of the Ferrying Division: May 1941 Through June 1942."

Army Air Forces, Air Transport Command, North Atlantic Division. Unpublished official historical monographs, on file at the Air University Research Studies Institute:

"Historical Data: CRYSTAL II." "History of CRYSTAL I." "History of the 1383d A.A.F. Base Unit."

"History of the 1387th A.A.F. Base Unit."

"History of the 1388th A.A.F. Base Unit."

Army Service Forces, Control Division. "The Alaska Highway." Report 175. 2 vols.

Unpublished report on file in the Office of the Chief of Military History.

——— . "The Canol Project." 7 vols. Unpublished report on file in the Office of the

Chief of Military History.

Army Service Forces, Seattle Port of Embarkation. "Historical Report: Section V. Expansion and the Subports." Unpublished manuscript on file in the Office of the Chief

of Military History.

Bureau of the Budget. "The Canol Project." Report to the Director by the Principal

Budget Examiner. Copy in file ASF 65-8 of the Departmental Records Branch, The

Adjutant General's Office.

Corps of Engineers, North Atlantic Division. Unpublished official accounts of base development and construction, 1946, on file in the Office of the Chief of Military History:

"U.S. Army Base, District of Keewatin, Canada: Southampton Island."

"U.S. Army Base, Labrador: Goose Bay."

"U.S. Army Bases: Newfoundland."

"U.S. Army Bases, Province of Manitoba, Canada: Churchill, The Pas."

"U.S. Army Base, Province of Quebec: Fort Chimo."

"U.S. Army Base, Province of Quebec: Mingan."

Eastern Defense Command, "History of the Eastern Defense Command." Unpublished

manuscript on file in the Office of the Chief of Military History.

U.S. Army Forces in Central Canada. "History of U.S. Army Forces in Central Canada."

Unpublished historical report on file in the Office of the Chief of Military History.

U.S. Navy, Atlantic Fleet. "Administrative History of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet in World

War II." Vol. II, "Commander, Task Force Twenty-Four." Unpublished official

history, 1946, on file in the Naval Records and History Division of the Navy Department.
392 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

War Production Board. "History of the Canadian Division of the War Production

Board, March 1942-June 1945." Unpublished manuscript, 1945. Copy in War Production Board Records, National Archives.

Western Defense Command. "History of the Western Defense Command." 5 vols.

Unpublished historical report on file in the Office of the Chief of Military History.

——— . "Military History of the Northwestern Sector." Unpublished manuscript on

file in the Office of the Chief of Military History.
Chronology of Statements in the

Canadian House of Commons

Although not paralleled in the United States legislature, the Canadian

procedure whereby the Prime Minister and his Cabinet Ministers present

policy statements and render progress reports on the floor of the House of

Commons offers an important source of authoritative material. A list of

statements related to the subject matter of this study follows, with the page

references to the bound House of Commons Debates:

1939

8 September Prime Minister W. L M. King, "Canada Enters the War," pp. 25-41.

1940

20 May Mr. King, "Canada's War Effort," pp. 35-50.

21 May Minister of National Defense Norman McL. Rogers, "Canada's Defense Program," pp. 90-99.

4 June Mr. King, "Naval Assistance to Britain," pp. 482-85.

18 June Mr. King, "Emergency War Measures," pp. 853-56.

29 July Mr. King, "Canada's Defense Policy," pp. 2089-92.

29 July Minister of National Defense J. L. Ralston, "Our Defense Program,"

pp. 2093-2103.

29 July Minister of National Defense for Air C. G. Power, "Air Forces and

Naval Services," pp. 2104-11.

30 July Minister of Munitions and Supply C. D. Howe, "Munitions and Supply," pp. 2113-20.

6 August Mr. King, "Canadian Participation in the Pan American Union," pp.

2540-41.

12 November Mr. King, "Canada's War Aims and Efforts and the Ogdensburg

Agreement," pp. 48-61.

15 November Col. Ralston, "Canada's Military Program," pp. 136-53.

18 November Mr. Power, "The Royal Canadian Air Force," pp. 164-76.

19 November Minister of National Defense for Naval Services A. L. Macdonald,

"The Royal Canadian Navy," pp. 202-08.

20 November Mr. Howe, "Progress on War Production," pp. 258-72.

1941

17 February Mr. King, "Progress of the War," pp. 806-17.

24-25 February Mr. King, "The Permanent Joint Board on Defense," pp. 980-81,

1015-16.

24 March Minister of Mines and Resources T. A. Crerar, "Interpretation of the

Rush-Bagot Agreement," pp. 1777-79.

25 March Mr. King, "Canada's War Effort," pp. 1852-54.

27 March Mr. King, "Defense of Newfoundland," p. 1904.
394 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

28 April Mr. King, "Co-operation in Economic Defense—The Hyde Park

Declaration," pp. 2286-89.

3 November Mr. King, "The United States and the War," pp. 4054-56.

4 November Mr. Howe, "Canada's Munitions Program," pp. 4081-91.

30 December Prime Minister Winston Churchill, "Canada and the War," pp. 4479-

82.

1942

26 January Mr. King, "Canada's War Effort," pp. 30-51.

27-28 January Mr. King, "Imperial War Cabinet," pp. 58, 105-06.

10 February Mr. King, "Pacific War Council," p. 598.

18 March Mr. King, "Unity of Command in Coastal Defense," p. 1411.

25 March Mr. King, "The Defense of Canada," pp. 1627-32.

25 March Mr. King, "Co-ordination of United Nations Strategy," pp. 1632-33.

21 April Mr. King, "Pacific War Council," pp. 1790-91.

10 June Mr. King, "Canada's War Effort," pp. 3238-44.

23 June Minister of Finance J. L. Ilsley, "Hyde Park Agreement," pp. 3573-74.

1943

1 February Mr. King, "Joint Defense Projects," pp. 20-21.

1 February Mr. King, "Canada's War Effort," pp. 40-55.

2 April Mr. King, "Civil Air Transport," pp. 1776-78.

14 May Col. Ralston, "The Canadian Army in Canada," pp. 2691-94.

21 May Mr. Power, "The R.C.A.F. Home Establishment and Antisubmarine

Operations," pp. 2884-87.

7 June Mr. Macdonald, "Battle of the Atlantic," pp. 3409-15.

9 July Mr. King, "Combined Organization and Planning," pp. 4556-58.

12 July Mr. King, "Relations With Latin American Countries," pp. 4664-68.

1944

29 February Mr. Howe, "Northwest Staging Route," pp. 979-81.

16 March Mr. King, "Canadian Mutual Aid," pp. 1539-41.

21 April Mr. Ilsley, "Hyde Park Declaration," pp. 2226-28.

5 May Mr. Crerar, "Canol Project," pp. 2648-52.

26 May Mr. Crerar, "Canol Project," pp. 3266-95.

1 August Mr. King, "Financial Settlement for Defense Installations," pp. 5706-08.

4 August Mr. King, "Canada and the Pan American Union," pp. 5912-13.

1945

4 April Mr. King, "The Pacific War," pp. 433-35.

17 December Mr. King, "Tripartite Declaration on Atomic Energy," pp. 3632-38.

1946

3 June Minister of Reconstruction and Supply C. D. Howe, "Atomic Energy,"

pp. 2105-15.

1947

12 February Mr. King, "Defense Co-operation with the United States," pp. 345-48.
List of Abbreviations

AAF Army Air Forces

ACofS Assistant Chief of Staff

AG Adjutant General

ASF Army Service Forces

ATC Air Transport Command

Brig Brigadier

CCAC Combined Civil Affairs Committee

CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff

Cdn Canadian

CG Commanding General

CINCLANT Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet

Cir Circular

CJS Canadian Joint Staff

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

CO Commanding Officer

CofS Chief of Staff

CTS Treaty Series (Canada)

DCofS Deputy Chief of Staff

Desp Despatch

D/S Department of State

EAS Executive Agreement Series (United States)

EDC Eastern Defense Command

Emb Embassy

EO Executive Order

FR Federal Register

GHQ General Headquarters, U.S. Army

GO General Order

GS General Staff

JAN-CAN Joint U.S. Army, Navy-Canadian

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JPC Joint Planning Committee

Leg Legation

Ltr Letter

Maj Major

Memo Memorandum

Memo/Conv Memorandum of conversation

Momp Mid-ocean meeting place

NBC Newfoundland Base Command

NWSC Northwest Service Command

OCE Office, Chief of Engineers

OCMH Office, Chief of Military History

OCNO Office, Chief of Naval Operations

ONI Office of Naval Intelligence

OPD Operations Division, War Department General Staff

Ott Ottawa

PDB File indicator derived from PJBD
396 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

PJBD Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States

PL Public Law

RAF Royal Air Force

RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force

Rpt Report

Secy Secretary

SO Special Order

SUSAM Senior U.S. Army Member

SW Secretary of War

TAG The Adjutant General

Telg Telegram

TIAS Treaties and Other International Acts Series (United States)

TS Treaty Series (United States)

UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

USW Under Secretary of War

VLR Very long range

WD War Department

WDC Western Defense Command

WDGS War Department General Staff

Westomp Western ocean meeting place

WPD War Plans Division, War Department General Staff
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War Department

Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945

The Army and Economic Mobilization

The Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground Forces

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops

The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service Forces

The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western Hemisphere

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense

Guarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in the Pacific

The Fall of the Philippines

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive

Victory in Papua

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls

Campaign in the Marianas

The Approach to the Philippines

Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

Triumph in the Philippines

Okinawa: The Last Battle

Strategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy

Salerno to Cassino

Cassino to the Alps

The European Theater of Operations

Cross-Channel Attack

Breakout and Pursuit

The Lorraine Campaign

The Siegfried Line Campaign

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge

The Last Offensive
The Supreme Command

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II

The Middle East Theater

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India Theater

Stilwell's Mission to China

Stilwell's Command Problems

Time Runs Out in CBI

The Technical Services

The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War

The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field

The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat

The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany

The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor

Theaters

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War

The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply

The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany

The Signal Corps: The Emergency

The Signal Corps: The Test

The Signal Corps: The Outcome

The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations

The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Special Studies

Chronology: 1941-1945

Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945

Rearming the French

Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt

The Women's Army Corps

Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors

Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces

The Employment of Negro Troops

Manhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb

Pictorial Record

The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Japan
Index

ABC-1. See Plans, defense and war, ABC-1.

ABC-2, 104n

ABC-22. See Plans, defense and war,

ABC-22.

ABC (Pacific)-22, 107

Act of Chapultepec, 148, 334

Act of Havana, 153

Adak, 254, 255-56, 258

ADB, 103n

Admiralty, British, 170n, 243, 245

Aerial photography, 284

Air bases. See Bases, air, British; Bases, air,

Canadian; Bases, air, U.S.

Air Corps Ferrying Command, U.S., 130,

182, 204, 308

Air cover. See Submarines, antisubmarine

air operations.

Air defense. See Air defense zones, western

Canada; Air warning services; Antiaircraft defense; Central Air Defense Zone,

U.S.; Central Canada Aircraft Detection

Corps; Military Area, Sault Sainte

Marie; Newfoundland; Signal Aircraft

Warning Reporting Companies, U.S.

Air defense zones, western Canada, 302

Air ferry routes. See also Bases, air, British;

Bases, air, Canadian; Bases, air, U.S.;

CRIMSON Project; North Atlantic Ferry

Route Project Committee; Staging fields.

Alaska-Siberia. See Air ferry routes, Northwest Staging Route.

Interior Staging Route, 306

Mackenzie River air route, 139, 213-15,

237-38, 322n, 323, 324

North Atlantic, 46, 53-54, 70, 95, 130,

136, 149, 151, 183, 184, 186, 189, 190,

191-93, 301-02, 314, 315-16, 318, 357-

58, 363-64

operation of, 181-82

Northwest Staging Route. 53-54. 100, 138,

139, 199-214, 215-18, 219-20, 236, 237-

38, 315-16, 317-18, 320-21, 351, 354-

55, 359-61, 363-64

agreements. 203-04, 209-11, 314

air traffic, 205, 217

aircraft deliveries, 215-16

aircraft losses, 202-03

airway traffic control, 302, 304-06,

309

airways facilities, 202-03

Air ferry routes—Continued

Northwest Staging Route— Continued

commercial airlines, use of by AAF,

307

design criteria, year-long discussion

of, 213

expenditures on, 213, 324

RCAF traffic-control delay, and equipment shortages, 305-06

and U.S. troops in Canada, 296-97

operation of, PJBD recommendations, 51

Pacific, 312

Air Force, Department of the, 35n. See also

Army Air Corps, U.S.; Army Air Forces,

U.S.; U.S. Army Air Forces in Newfoundland.

Air Force Headquarters, Canadian, 253

Air forces, Canadian. See also Royal Canadian Air Force.

Annette Island, 252

Newfoundland, 95, 165-66

Air Forces, U.S.

Fourth, 303

Eighth, 191-92, 241

Air Ministry, British, 118

Air Ministry, Canadian, 72n

Air navigation, 337

Air Observers School. Canadian. 217 n

Air patrol. See also Submarines, antisubmarine air operations.

Alaska and Aleutians, 253

North Atlantic, 14-15, 284

Air rescue, Hudson's Bay Company personnel, 284

Air Staff, Canadian, 113

Air strips. See Flight strips, Canadian;

Flight strips, U.S.

Air Traffic Regulations Subcommittee, Canadian, 304-05

Air transport. See Aviation, postwar international operations.

Air Transport Command, U.S., 136, 168,

206, 207, 211 , 217n, 237

Alaskan Wing, 133, 204, 209, 216-17,

302n, 303, 309, 318

cadres, western Canada, 308

carrying of passengers for hire, Executive

Order, 312

commercial airlines as contract carriers,

133, 307
400 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Air Transport Command, U.S.—Continued

North Atlantic Division, 131, 192

North Atlantic Wing, 133

and Northwest Airlines, 308-10

Northwest Route, Ferrying Division, 204-

05, 216

some routes not authorized, 310

Air warning services, 117, 195-96

Airborne Divisions, U.S.

82d, 267

101st, 267

Aircraft, Canadian

B-18, 99

Bolingbroke, 252, 252n, 253

flights over Maine, 307

production, 295

trainers and flying boats to U.S., 2

Aircraft, cargo, lack of for Norway operation, 260

Aircraft, commercial. See Airlines, commercial, contract carriers.

Aircraft, U.S.

A-20 Boston medium bombers, 271

B-17, 181, 241, 243n, 248

B-17B, 98, 172

B-24, 181, 248, 250

B-26, 203

B-29, 337

Canadian requests for, 7, 13-14, 90-91

carrier-based, 249

Catalina PBY, 192

deliveries to Canada, 90-91

deliveries to Soviet Union, 216

deliveries to United Kingdom, 181-82,

184, 191

flights over Canadian territory, 306-07

flying boats not reallocated to Canada, 61

Lockheed Hudson, 181

losses, North Atlantic ferry route, 192

P-40, 202-03, 253

permission to fly over Canada, 306-07

purchase of used planes by Canada, 10

routes in Canada, application for, 310-11

trainers, 282

VLR (very long range) patrol, 249, 250

Aircraft carriers

British, 272

Canadian, 251, 272

Japanese, 204

U.S., 249, 250-51

Aircraft ferrying. See Air ferry routes; Green

Project, AAF; White Project, AAF.

Aircraft production

U.S., 184

U.S.-Canadian totals, 290

Aircraft Repair, Limited, Canadian, 217n

Airfields. See also Airports; Bases, air, British; Bases, air, Canadian; Bases, air, U.S.

authorization for use of Canadian by U.S.

planes, 308

northern, cost distribution, 320-21, 322-23

northern, importance to Canada, 321

Airlift of troops and materials by commercial airlines, 204

Airlines, commercial, contract carriers, 133,

310-11, 312-13. See also Airlift of

troops and materials by commercial airlines; Northeast Airlines; Northwest

Airlines.

flights over Canada and U.S., agreement

on, 307

Goose Bay and Newfoundland, 307

militarization of, 308, 309-10, 311, 312

Northwest Airlines, and friction with

Canada, 307-10

on Northwest Staging Route, 202-03, 216-

17, 304, 307-10

Airports

Dorval, 181

Gander, 19-20, 95, 96, 97, 99, 117, 118,

165-66, 173, 181, 182-83, 190. See also

Bases air, Canadian; Bases, air, U.S.

Goose Bay, 303. See also Bases, air, Canadian; Bases, air, U.S.

Newfoundland. See Airports, Gander.

traffic control, 304-05.

Airships, nonrigid, in air patrol, 361

Airspace

Canadian, 301

Canadian, restricted zones, 195, 197, 305n,

307

Airway traffic control, 301-03, 304-13. See

also Air ferry routes, Northwest Staging

Route; JAN-CAN (Joint Army, Navy,

Canadian).

Airways

facilities, 141, 214-15. See also Air ferry

routes, Northwest Staging Route.

maintenance and control of facilities, 304-

06, 310-16, 355-56, 361-63

Aklavik, 227

Alaska, 40, 48, 50, 53-54, 87-88, 100-101,

107, 109, 110, 120, 128, 199, 201-03,

207, 215-17, 218-20, 225-26, 227-28,

230-31, 235, 238-39, 258n, 277, 283,

302-03, 306-07, 308, 312, 318, 323n,

325n. See also Aleutian campaign; and

under Bases.

defense of, 218, 252

defenses, penetration of by Japanese, 204

Alaska Defense Command, 112, 202, 215-16,

224n, 303
INDEX 401

Alaska Highway, 41, 42n, 44, 53-54, 75,

127-28, 135, 200-201, 203n, 206, 207,

213, 217-27, 229-30, 232, 236, 241,

296-97, 304, 318, 319, 323, 327, 357,

363, 370-72. See also Flight strips, Canadian; Flight strips, U.S.

agreements, 221, 226-27

civilian traffic, 223-24

gift to Canada, 329

Haines-Champagne road, 226-27, 330-31

military traffic, 223-24

postwar use by U.S. military vehicles, 221

redesignated, Northwest Highway System,

224n

Tok road, 225

transfer to Canada, 224, 227

U.S. expenditures, 223, 330

and use of highways to U.S. border, 221

waiving of duties, taxes, and fees, 278

Alaska Railroad, 225

Alaskan International Highway Commission.

217, 227

Albert and Davidson Corporation, 333

Alberta, 128, 137, 218, 299

Alcan Highway, 136. See also Alaska Highway.

Aleutian campaign, 224n, 252-59, 317, 318.

See also First Special Service Force, U.S.-

Canadian.

Aleutian Islands, 252, 253, 256

Alexander, Maj. Gen. R. O., 121, 253

Allied Powers, 289-90, 294-95

postwar positions, 337, 339, 344-45

Aluminium Company of Canada, 151, 151n

Aluminum, 149, 155n, 196

Amadjuak Lake, 191

Amchitka, 254, 255, 257

America, 96

American Nations, use of term, 153

American Red Cross, and relief problem in

Greenland, 150

American Republics, 142-43, 293

Act of Chapultepec, 148, 334

Act of Havana, 153

Canada as a member of British Commonwealth, 144, 334-35

defense, 11, 22, 26, 149, 161

defense and neutrality, discussion at Panama, 144

and Greenland bases, use of, 152-53

Inter-American Conference, 1945, 147, 148

Inter-American Conference, 1947, 48

Inter-American Defense Board, 145

liaison officers to, 11

Meeting of Foreign Ministers, First, 1939,

Panama, 144

Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Second,

1940, Havana, 11-12, 26n, 143, 144

American Republics—Continued

Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Third, 1942,

Rio, 144-46, 160

military co-operation, 334

Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 48

Ammunition, 281. See also Munitions, Canadian; Munitions, U.S; Munitions, U.S.-

Canadian.

Amphibious Training Force 9, U.S.-Canadian, 255, 258

Anchorage, 100, 202, 225, 239, 253-54

Anderson, Air Vice Marshal N. R., 37

Anglo-American Food Committee, 83

Anglo-French Purchasing Board, 60

Annapolis, 165

Annette Island, 202, 252-53, 254, 255

Antiaircraft Battery (Heavy), Canadian 40th

195, 197

Antiaircraft defense

Annette Island, 252

Buffalo, 198

Canada, 317-18

Maritime Provinces, 89

Newfoundland, 92-93, 98-99, 173

Sault Sainte Marie, 194-95, 196

Antilles, 19

Antisubmarine operations. See Convoys; Submarines.

Antisubmarine Squadrons, U.S.

6th, 250

19th, 250

20th, 248

Antisubmarine Wings, U.S. 25th, 250

Anzio, 265, 266

ARCADIA Conference, 59, 63-64, 66, 66n, 75

Argentia, 62, 96, 124-25, 168, 178, 179, 184n,

244, 245, 247, 354. See also Bases, air,

U.S.; Bases, naval, Canadian; Bases, naval, U.S.; Bases, U.S.

Argentina, 144

ARGONAUT Conference, 66n

Armaments, on vessels in Great Lakes, 279-

80

Armed forces, Canadian, at outbreak of World

War II, 4-5, 5n

Armies, Canadian First, 241, 265

Armies, U.S.

Third, 31

Fourth, 107

Fifth, 266

Seventh, 266

Arms production, Canadian, 273

Army, British, 8-9, 162-63

Army, Canadian, 4-5, 34-35, 89, 105, 118,

173, 198, 241-42, 252, 256-57, 263-64,

274n, 276, 330. See also Troops, Canadian.
402 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Army, Canadian—Continued

active units on V-J Day, 271-72

Atlantic Command, 20, 30n, 99, 111-12,

173-74

casualties, Aleutians, 259

equipment, lack of, 5-6

General Staff, 113, 260-61

Newfoundland Force, 116

Pacific Command, 101, 107, 111-12, 121,

253, 256

Pacific Force, 51, 268-70, 271-72

regimental combat team for Kiska assault,

257

Army, French, 162

Army, U.S., 11, 48-49, 105-06, 126, 128-30,

167, 178, 180, 182, 188, 218, 225-26, 231-

32, 240, 247, 259, 276, 303, 304, 306

Army Air Corps, U.S., 96, 151-52, 181

Army Air Forces, U.S., 35, 48-49, 51, 128,

131, 140, 184, 203, 205, 206, 207, 215,

217, 241, 248, 249, 276, 282, 284, 302,

305-06, 307, 308-09. See also Army Air

Corps, U.S.; U.S. Army Air Forces in

Newfoundland.

aerial photography mission, 133

antisubmarine force, Newfoundland. 173

antisubmarine units, transfer of, to United

Kingdom, 250

defense of Dutch Harbor, 253-54

offer to equip RCAF with Boston medium

bombers, 271

and RCAF offer of unit for Pacific, 270-71

standardization of RCAF on U.S. equipment, 271

weather forecasting services, 237-38

Weather Region, 16th, 133

weather reports, teletype, Canadian northwest, 238

Army-Navy Liquidation Commissioner, U.S.,

328n, 334

Army Post Office, New York City, 277

Army Service Forces, U.S., 132, 140

Army Transport Service, U.S., 239

Arnold, General of the Army Henry H., 59,

70, 103n, 248, 271, 282-83

Aruba, 142-43, 143n, 149n

Arvida, 196

Assiniboine, 123n

ATFERO, 181

Athabasca, 324

Atherton, Ray, 147

Athlone, the Earl of, Governor General of

Canada, 28

Atlantic Bridge, 181, 191

Atlantic Charter, 62, 69, 244

Atlantic Conference, 62, 123, 123n, 124-25,

184n, 244, 245

Atlantic Convoy Conference, 125-26, 248-50

Atlantic Fleet, U.S., 123, 124-25, 127, 245,

247

Support Force, 124, 244

Task Force, 111-12, 132

Atomic bomb, 273, 284, 286-87, 288-89, 339

Atomic bombing, postwar threat to U.S. and

Canadian cities, 341

Atomic energy research, U.S.-Canadian, 273,

284, 286-89

Atomic energy tripartite agreement, 289

Atomic weapons, 341

Attachés, air-military-naval. See Service attachés.

Attlee, Clement, 289

Attorney General of Canada, 299

Attu, 255-56, 257

Aurora borealis, 236

Australia, 57, 67-68, 70, 72, 82, 84, 235, 281,

295

Avalon Peninsula, 165, 178-79

Aviation, postwar international operations

airports in Canadian northwest, 304

Canadian acquisition of airfields at fraction of cost, 333-34

Canadian fear of U.S. advantages, 340

civil aviation policy, Canadian Government,

303-04, 321

U.S. and Canadian advisory committees,

303n

U.S. and Canadian plans, 303

AWOL problems, 277

Axis, and St. Pierre plebiscite, 159

Axis attack on North America, threat of 47,

87, 95

Axis Powers, 108, 109, 193, 339

Azores, 251

Baffin Island, 183, 187. See also Bases, air,

U.S., Frobisher Bay (CRYSTAL II), Northwest Territories; Bases, air, U.S., Padloping Island (CRYSTAL III).

Bagley, Vice Adm. D. W., 36

Bahamas, 149n

Baker Lake, 191

Baldwin, J., 135-36

Balkans, 266

Balloons, Japanese, 200

Base Commands. See Newfoundland Base

Command.

Bases, air, British

Azores, 251

Iceland, 182, 251

Kaldaharnes, 182

Reykjavik, 182

United Kingdom, 250
INDEX 403

Bases, air, Canadian

Adak, 254

Amchitka, 254, 255

Anchorage, 253-54

Annette Island, 252-53, 254, 255

Bellingham, 283

Botwood, 170n

Calgary, 324

Edmonton, 324

Gander Airport, 170, 170n, 303, 306

Gander Lake, 247

Gleneagles, 170n

Goose Bay, 170n, 188, 303, 306, 314, 324

99-year lease, 189, 303n

Grande Prairie, 324

Halifax, 247

Houlton, 283

Kamloops, 324

Kodiak, 253, 254

Labrador, 304

leased bases, 99-year lease, 170

Lethbridge, 205, 324

Newfoundland, 304

Nome, 253

Nova Scotia, 250

Patricia Bay, 253

postwar use, 303

Prince George, 324

Regina, 186, 324

Sea Island, 253

Smith River, 208, 210, 324

Smithers, 252

Sydney, 247

Torbay, 170n, 172, 173, 184, 247

Ucluelet Airdrome, 351-52

Umnak, 254-55

Watson Lake, 324

Whitehorse, 324

Yarmouth, 247

Bases, air, U.S. See also CRIMSON Project;

Fort Chimo (CRYSTAL I), air base; Fort

Nelson, U.S. air base; Fort St. John,

U.S. air base.

Adak, 254

Alaska, 204, 224

Amchitka, 254

Anchorage, 100, 202

Annette Island, 202, 252

Antilles, 19

Argentia, 96, 168, 178, 244, 247

Azores, 251

Baffin Island, 183, 185n, 186

Bermuda, 97n, 164

Bethel, 100, 202

Big Delta, 202

Botwood, 165, 172

British possessions, 23

Bases, air, U.S.—Continued

Calgary, 205, 208, 213, 323, 324

Canada, 49, 52, 53, 75, 89-90, 128, 130,

191, 199, 224, 304

bases to become Canadian property,

186, 189-90

Caribbean, 19, 162, 164

Churchill, Manitoba, 130-31, 186, 187, 189,

189n, 284, 304, 316, 324, 325n

Cordova 100, 202

Cumberland Sound, site survey, 184

Edmonton, 203, 204, 207-08, 209-10, 211,

217, 323, 324

Edmonton satellite base. See Bases, air,

U.S., Namao.

Fairbanks, 100, 202, 215-16

Frobisher Bay (CRYSTAL II), 130-31, 184,

187, 189, 190, 192-93, 304, 324, 325n

Galena, 202

Gander Airport, 19, 97, 171-72, 182, 183,

184, 190, 191-92, 250, 313-14

Gander Lake, 165, 192

Goose Bay, 130, 131, 184, 187-89, 192, 307,

314, 323, 324. See also Bases, air. U.S.,

North West River.

Grande Prairie, 201-02, 207, 208, 211, 212,

323, 324

Greenland, 149, 182, 183, 186-87, 192

agreement on bases, 152-54

Canadian-British proposal of site survey, 151-52

Canadian use of, 152, 153

construction by U.S., plan No. 2, 152-

53

construction with U.S. aid, plan No.

1, 152

site surveys, 151-52

South Greenland Survey Expedition,

154

Gulkana, 202

Harmon Field, 127, 166-68, 169, 173, 192

Iceland, 156-57, 182n, 186, 192, 248, 250

Juneau, 202

Ketchikan, 100

Kodiak, 253

Labrador, 128, 186, 191, 304

McGrath, 202

Maritimes, proposal of, 49-50

Mingan, 188, 189, 190, 324, 325

Naknek, 202

Namao, 208, 211, 316, 323, 324

Narsarssuak (BLUIE WEST 1), 154, 182

Newfoundland, 7, 14, 19-20, 21, 52, 62,

95-96, 97, 164, 181, 186, 187, 191, 250,

304, 307

Nome, 100, 202, 216

North West River, 41, 182-83, 353-54
404 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Bases, air, U.S.—Continued

Northway, 202

Pacific, 199

Padloping Island (CRYSTAL III), 130, 131,

184, 187

postwar use, 303

Presque Isle, 188, 191-92, 247

Prince George, 202, 213, 323, 324

Smithers, 202

Søndre Strømfjord (BLUIE WEST 8), 154n,

182

Southhampton Island, 130, 186, 187, 189,

190, 192-93, 304, 324, 325n

The Pas, 130, 186-87, 189, 189n, 284, 304.

315, 316, 324, 325n

Trinidad, 97n

Umnak, 254

Watson Lake, 201, 207, 208, 211, 212, 323,

324

West Indies, 14-15

Whitehorse, 201-02, 203, 204, 207, 208,

211, 212, 215, 225, 323, 324, 325, 327

Yakutat, 100, 202, 253

Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, proposal of, 23

Bases, Army, U.S. See also Fort McAndrew;

Fort Pepperrell.

Anchorage, 100

Canada, 52

Fairbanks, 100

St. John's, 166

Bases, naval, British

Azores, 251

Boston, 246, 283

Halifax, 246

Bases, naval, Canadian

Argentia, 118

Bay Bulls, 170n

Boston, 246, 283

Halifax, 123, 246

Kodiak, 255, 283

Maritime Provinces, 99

St. John's 95, 170, 170n, 246

Shelburne, 123

Bases, naval. U.S.

Antilles, 19

Argentia, 116, 118, 127, 132, 167, 168,

178, 244, 246, 247

Azores, 251

British Isles, 243

British possessions, 23

Canada, 52

Caribbean, 19

Dutch Harbor, 100

Greenland, 152-53

Halifax, 49, 123

Iceland, surveys for, 156

Kodiak, 100

Bases, naval. U.S —Continued

Leyte, 272

Maritime Provinces, 49-50

Newfoundland, 52, 62, 95-96

St. John's, 93, 165-66, 173

Shelburne, 49, 123

Sitka, 100

Sydney, Nova Scotia, 49

Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, proposal of, 23

Bases, U.S. See also Destroyers-for-bases;

Legislation, U.S.; Military planning, U.S.;

Prince Rupert.

Alaska, 238

Argentia, 166

Atlantic, need of, 163

Canada, 23, 26, 29, 32-33, 49-50, 69n, 88,

107. 301

Caribbean, 163

Latin America, 163

leased

agreements, 62. 96, 97-98, 164, 165,

166-67, 169-70, 188-89, 189n

Canada, 23-24

Greenslade Board, 166, 177

Newfoundland, 23, 126-27

99-year lease, 164, 165, 166

Newfoundland, 162, 165, 167-73, 177-78,

307

cost of, 168

defense of, 165-66

undeveloped sites and construction delays, 171

U.S. jurisdiction, 165, 166-67

Pacific, 238

Western Hemisphere, need of, 11

Batt, William L., 78, 79

Battle of the Atlantic, 123, 162, 174, 242-51

Battle of Britain, 8, 47-48, 50, 55-56, 94, 103-

04

Battle of Los Angeles, 121

Battle of the St. Lawrence, 174n

Bauxite, 149n

Bay Bulls, 170n

Bearn, 158

Beaverbrook, Lord, 70, 82n

Bechtel-Price-Callahan company, 232, 327,

328

Belgian Congo, 287, 288

Belgium, 293

Bell, R. P., 80

Bell Island, 95

Bell Telephone Company of Canada, 180

Bellingham, 283

Berle, Adolf A., Jr., 78

Bermuda, 97n, 149n, 164

Bethel, 100, 202

Big Delta, 222, 225
INDEX 405

Biggar, O. M., 32, 34, 37, 90, 113, 114, 115,

120, 183, 201, 335

Bilateral trade agreement, U.S.-Canadian, 4

Bishop, Air Marshal William, 7

Bismarck, 154, 243

Bissell, Lt. Col. C., 36

Black Watch, 95

Blissville, 305

BLUIE WEST 1, 154, 154n, 182

Board of Inquiry for the Great Lakes Fisheries, U.S.-Canadian, 27

Bombardment Squadrons, U.S.

77th, 203

421st, 248

Bomber Reconnaissance Squadrons, Canadian

No. 8, 254

No. 10, 98n

No. 115, 252n, 255

No. 149, 255

Bonesteel, Maj. Gen. Charles H., 157

Boston, 39, 41, 246

Boston Port of Embarkation, 130, 132, 133

Botwood, 92, 95, 99, 165, 170n, 172, 173

Bouchard, J. G., 78

Boundary, Alaska, 219

Bowman, Isaiah, 157n

Bowman Bay, 191

Brant Maj. Gen. Gerald C., 117-18, 118n,

119-20, 301-02

Brazil, 48, 87, 144

Bristol, Rear Adm. Arthur L., 124, 244

British Air Force. See Royal Air Force.

British Columbia, 71, 88, 101, 106-07, 111,

112, 120, 121, 128, 137, 217, 218, 225n,

259, 281, 298n, 299

British Commonwealth, 15, 20-21, 49, 55,

56-57, 61, 63, 64, 69, 69n, 82, 83, 85,

144, 145, 146, 147n, 160, 161, 282, 293,

294, 298, 338, 339-40. See also British

Empire; United Kingdom.

British Commonwealth Air Training Plan,

9-10, 14, 241n, 242, 274-75, 281-83

British Commonwealth Occupation Force, 270

British destroyer fleet, December 1940, 242

British Empire, 1, 3-4, 9, 25, 60, 63-64, 68,

69, 164, 293. See also British Commonwealth; United Kingdom.

British Fleet, 3, 49, 272. See also Royal Navy.

disposal of, if Britain falls, 8-9, 12-13, 14, 16,

163, 164

British Government. See United Kingdom.

British Guiana, 149n

British Isles. See United Kingdom.

British Military Mission, 58, 63, 72-73

British Navy. See British Fleet; Royal Navy.

British Overseas Airways Company, 312

British Pacific Fleet, 272

British Purchasing Commission, 15, 60, 61, 92

British Scientific Mission, 285, 286

British Supply Council in North America, 61

British West Indies, 9, 295

Brodeur, Rear Adm. V. G., 72, 75n

Buffalo, 39, 41, 102, 198

Burma, 271

Burwash, 206, 207

Bush, Vannevar, 288

Butler, Maj. Gen. William O., 255

Byrd, Lt. Richard E., 2

Cabinet, U.S., 218, 219, 228

Cabinet Defense Committee, Canadian, 336

Cabinet War Committee, Canadian, 34, 42,

70, 71, 75, 80-81, 105, 114, 119, 120,

121, 135-36, 137, 183-84, 188, 204,

209, 210-11, 215, 227, 229, 261, 268,

272, 321

Cadres, for Canadian Army Pacific Force,

269, 270

Cairo-Tehran Conference, 66n

Calgary, 205, 208, 213, 323, 324

Cameron Highlanders, 156

Camp 550, Edmonton, 327, 328

Camp Bedford, 262

Camp Breckinridge, 270

Camp Canol, 214

Camp Pine, 22

Camp Shilo, 133, 281

Campbell, 151

Canadian-American Military Board, 275, 276

Canadian claims

title to all U.S. facilities in Canadian northwest, 203-04

to U.S. bases, 186

to U.S. facilities in Canada, Newfoundland,

Labrador, 186

to U.S. radar sets, 71

Canadian Forces in Newfoundland, 118-19

Canadian Fusiliers, 257

Canadian grant to United Kingdom, 294-95

Canadian Military Headquarters in United

Kingdom, 264

Canadian military mission to Washington.

See Joint Staff Mission, Canadian; U.S.-

Canadian relations, areas of Canadian

discontent, military mission to Washington.

Canadian National Railways, 196, 238, 239,

284

Canadian Pacific Railway Company, 181

Canadian Prime Minister. See King, W. L.

Mackenzie. Canadian Special Service Battalion, 1st. See

First Special Service Force, U.S.-Canadian.
406 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Canadian-U.S. relations. See U.S.-Canadian

relations, areas of co-operation; U.S.-

Canadian relations, areas of Canadian

discontent; U.S.-Canadian relations, areas

of U.S. discontent.

Canol Project, 52, 128, 135, 136, 200, 214-

15, 217, 224, 225, 227, 228-36, 241,

304, 315, 318, 319, 328n, 361-62. See

also Air ferry routes, Mackenzie River

air route; Flight strips, Canadian; Flight

strips, U.S.

agreements, 229-31, 232-33, 234-35

contracts, revision of, 234

disposition of, 329, 331-33

expenditures, 234, 322n

expenditures and sale price, 333

and Special Committee of Senate to Investigate the National Defense Program,

233

Task Force 2600, 127, 231

and U.S. troops in Canada, 297

waiving of Canadian royalties, 278

CAP 365. See Airways, maintenance and

control of facilities.

Cape Dorset, Hudson's Bay Company, 191

Cape Low, 191

Carcross, 230, 331

Cargo transport, intercountry, 51

Caribbean, 7, 19, 48, 142-43, 162, 163, 164,

228, 249

Carmichael, J. H., 80

Carnegie Institute, 286

Casablanca conference, 67n, 248

Caucasus, 261

Central Air Defense Zone, U.S., 195, 197

Central America, 48, 142

Central Canada Aircraft Detection Corps,

195, 197-98

Century Group, 19

Ceylon, 271

Chadwick, Sir James, 288

Chalk River, Ontario, 288

Chalk River Atomic Energy Project, 288, 289

Champagne, 226-27

Chautauqua, 3

Chicago Tribune, 18

Chief of General Staff, Canadian, 265, 268

Chief of Naval Operations, U.S., 35, 92, 157,

194, 249. See also King, Admiral

Ernest J.

study of Japanese threat, 55n

Chief Signal Officer, U.S. Army, 133-34, 236

Chief of Staff, U.S., 74, 88, 92, 108, 110-11, 113, 115, 187, 219. See also Marshall,

General of the Army George C.

Chiefs of Staff. See Chiefs of Staff, British;

Chiefs of Staff, Canadian; Combined

Chiefs of Staff—Continued

Chiefs of Staff, U.S.-British; Joint Chiefs

of Staff, U.S.; Joint Staff, Canadian;

Joint Staff Mission, British; Joint Staff

Mission, Canadian. Chiefs of Staff, British, 56, 57, 59, 66

Chiefs of Staff, Canadian, 13, 42, 66, 76, 108,

119, 120, 121, 194, 268, 336

Chiefs of Staff, U.S. See Joint Chiefs of Staff,

U.S.

Chile, 144, 147

China, 3, 58-59, 67, 68, 70, 293, 295

Christie, Loring, 13, 21, 21n, 31, 149

Churchill, Manitoba, 191, 281. See also

Bases, air, U.S.

Churchill, Winston S., 8-9, 12-13, 19, 20-

21, 21n, 24n, 25, 63-65, 65n, 66, 84-85,

123, 156n, 159, 160, 162-65, 248, 260,

268, 340. See also Roosevelt and

Churchill.

CINCLANT, 124

Citizen action groups

program for Canadian action, 18, 18n

U.S. Century Group urges destroyers-forbases, 19

Civil Aeronautics Administration, U.S., 305

Civil Aeronautics Authority, U.S., 202

Civil Air Patrol, 247

Civil air transport. See Aviation, postwar international operations.

Claims, collision, settlement of, 277-78

Clark, Lewis, 291n

Claxton, Brooke, 18n

Coast Artillery Regiments

57th, 96

62d, 96

100th, 195

Coast defense, 317. See also Harbor defenses,

guns, 92, 93-94, 175

Maritime Provinces, 89

units, Canadian, 98-99

Coast Guard, U.S., 125, 152, 192, 245

Coast Guard cutters, 165

Coastal Frontier. See Naval Coastal Frontier,

North Atlantic; Naval Coastal Frontier,

Pacific; Sea Frontier.

Cold war, 337, 338

Coldwell, M. J., 19n

Colombia, 48

Colonies, European, in Western Hemisphere

U.S. policy on, 10, 142-43, 143n, 146,

149-50, 152-53, 158, 163

Columbia, 165

Combined Chiefs of Staff, U.S.-British, 27, 46,

58, 59-60, 62-63, 64, 65n, 66-68, 75,

76, 77-78, 82, 83, 248, 249, 267, 268.

See also Conferences, politico-military.
INDEX 407

Combined Chiefs of Staffs, etc.—Continued

CRIMSON Project review, 186

third powers participate, 65

U.S. personnel, 59, 59n

Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 65-66

Combined Committee on Air Training in

North America, 283

Combined Communications Board, 65

Combined Food Board, U.S.-British, 83-84,

84n

Combined versus joint agencies, 77-78

Combined Meteorological Committee, 65

Combined Policy Committee (atomic research), 288

Combined Production and Resources Board,

U.S.-British, 83, 84n

Combined Raw Materials Board, U.S.-British,

63, 79, 83, 84n

Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, U.S.-

British, 63, 83

Command, unity of, 109, 140-41, 340

in ABC-1 plan, 102-03

antisubmarine operations, under Canadian

control, 251

AAF-USN dispute, antisubmarine air

cover, 247

in Canada and Newfoundland, 110-22

Canadian antiaircraft battery under U.S.

control, 195

in Canadian Armed Forces, 121-22

Canadian insistence on mutual co-operation,

110-11, 356

convoys, eastern Atlantic, under USN and

RN, 248-49

convoys, western Atlantic

under Royal Canadian Navy, 125-

26, 245-46, 248-49

under U.S. Navy, 123-26, 244, 248-49

U.S. patrol planes, Newfoundland, under RCAF, 249

for Joint Task One, antisubmarine air patrol, 118

lack of, in ABC-22 plan, 103-04, 105-06

lack of, in British Columbia, 120-21

lack of, in Canada and Newfoundland, 74

lack of, in Newfoundland, 97, 98, 104

lack of, in 1940 Plan, 88-90

Newfoundland air patrol, under USN, 247

U.S. antisubmarine aircraft, Newfoundland,

under RCAF, 250

U.S. insistence upon, 342

vested in U.S. under 1940 Plan, 115

Commander in Chief, Western Approaches,

122, 243, 245-46

Commodity Supply and Allocation Committees, 83. See also Combined Food Board.

Communication channels, multiplicity of, 134

Communication facilities, 86, 130-31, 141, 318

Alaska Communications System, 133-34

Alaska Highway and Canol radio nets,

236, 237

Army Airways Communications Service,

133

Canada, 52, 136, 190, 190n, 349-50

Canadian northwest, 236-37

Greenland, 149

Maritimes, 349-50

Newfoundland, 118, 179, 180, 190n, 349-50

Newfoundland (Gander) Airport, 190

telephone and telegraph line, Edmonton

to Alaska, 236-37, 305-06, 323, 324,

325, 325n

White Hills, Newfoundland, 167

Communications agreement, U.S.-Canadian.

See JAN-CAN.

Communications Committee, U.S.-Canadian,

139.

Compulsory military service for aliens, 276.

See also Conscription.

Conant, James B., 288

Conception Bay, 174-75

Conferences, politico-military

ARCADIA, Washington, 59, 63-64, 67, 67n.

75

ARGONAUT, Malta-Yalta, 66n

ATLANTIC, Argentia, 62, 123, 123n, 124-

25, 184n, 244, 245

OCTAGON, Quebec, 66, 268, 272

Ottawa Air Training Conference, 282-83

QUADRANT, Quebec, 67, 82, 288

SEXTANT-EUREKA, Cairo-Tehran, 66n

SYMBOL (ANFA), Casablanca, 66n, 248

TERMINAL, Potsdam, 66n

TRIDENT, Washington, 66

Congress, U.S., 274, 289, 300-301. See also

Legislation, U.S.

Conscription. See also Compulsory military

service for aliens.

French-Canadian opposition to World

War I, 206

use of Canadian conscripts outside of Canada, 257-58, 258n

Construction and Engineering Committee,

U.S.-Canadian, 139

Construction of facilities. See also Engineer

Districts; Engineer Divisions; Engineer

Troops, U.S.; Engineers, Chief of; Roads,

Newfoundland.

Alaska Highway, 218-27

Baffin Island, 184

Canada, bases and facilities, 126-31, 133-

40, 304n
408 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Construction of facilities—Continued

Canada, review and authorization of projects, 139, 140

Canol Project, 228-32, 234-35

CRIMSON Project, 184-90

Goose Bay, separate facilities for U.S. forces,

188, 314, 323

Greenland, 182

Labrador, 182-84

Mackenzie River air route, 213-15, 318

Newfoundland bases, 162-63, 166, 167-73

Newfoundland fortifications, radar, roads,

175-80

no continuing rights for U.S. in Canada,

320, 322, 334

Northwest Staging Route, 199-213, 318

Prince Rupert, 239-40

Quebec, 184

telephone-telegraph line, Edmonton to

Alaska, 236-37, 305

water route, Waterways to Norman Wells,

231

winter roads, 231-32

Consulates. See Diplomatic missions.

Contracts, with Canada

cancellation of, 292-93

revision to allow profits, 293

Controlled areas, railroad, The Pas to

Churchill, 284

Controller of Meteorological Services, Canadian, 190

Convoys. See also Atlantic Convoy Conference; Command, unity of, convoys,

eastern Atlantic, under USN and RN;

Command, unity of, convoys, western

Atlantic; Newfoundland Escort Force;

Task Group 4.19.

Atlantic, U.S. escort, Canada to British

Isles, 243

Atlantic coast, 246

Eastern Local Area, 246, 248

with escort aircraft carriers, 249

fast and slow convoys, 245

Greenland, 249

Iceland-Momp shuttle, 246, 248

Kodiak to Dutch Harbor, 256

to Mediterranean, 248-49

Mid-ocean Area, 246, 247

North Africa, 246-47

North Atlantic, 246-47, 251

Pacific, 105-06

routing of, 245

troops for Attu and Kiska operations, 256

troops to Mediterranean, 248-49

troops to United Kingdom, 125, 246

Convoys—Continued

western Atlantic, 48, 49, 88, 105-06, 122-

23, 125-26, 242-43, 244, 245-46, 248

loss rate, 158

unified command under U.S., 123-24

Western Local Area, 246, 247

Coral Harbour, 191

Corbett, Percy, 144

Cordova, 100, 202

Corlett, Maj. Gen. Charles H., 258

Cormoran, 191

CORONET, 269

Corps, U.S. XVI, 241

Corps Areas, Ninth, 121

Corps of Engineers. See Engineers, Corps of.

Corvettes

British, 243

Canadian, 122, 243, 244, 246, 249, 251, 256

Free French, 246

COTTAGE, 257

Courts, Canadian civil, concurrent jurisdiction over U.S. troops, 297, 298-99

Courts, U.S. military

full jurisdiction over U.S. troops, 300

jurisdiction in Canada, limits to, 297

Courts-martial, in Canada, 298, 300, 301.

See also Courts, U.S. military.

Craig, Malin, 149n

Crerar, Gen. Henry D. G., 241

CRIMSON Project, 127, 130-31, 132, 190, 191,

192-93, 318. See also Air ferry routes,

North Atlantic,

basis, 181

preparatory studies, 182-87

review of American plan by JCS, 45-46

urgent construction project, 187, 188

Crops, 79

Crown Assets Allocation Committee, Canadian, 326

Cruisers

British, 244

Canadian, 251, 256, 272

Cryolite

international meeting, New York, on output, 151

mines, 149-50, 151, 154-55

synthetic, 154-55, 155n

CRYSTAL I (Fort Chimo). See Fort Chimo

(CRYSTAL I), air base.

CRYSTAL II (Frobisher Bay). See Bases, air,

U.S., Frobisher Bay (CRYSTAL II).

CRYSTAL III (Padloping Island), 130, 131,

184, 187

Cuffe, Air Commodore A. A. L., 17, 32, 37.

Cumberland Sound, Baffin Inland, 184
INDEX 409

Curaçao, 143n, 149n

Curds, Air Vice Marshal W. A., 37

Customs duties, Canadian, 278, 358

avoidance of, on U.S. equipment, 257

on surplus property, 326-27

Customs duties, Newfoundland, 169

Customs duties, U.S., 358

avoidance of. on Canadian equipment, 254

Cutters. U.S. Coast Guard, 245

Czechoslovakia, 293

Dawson, 256

Dawson Creek, 128, 202, 221-22, 225, 236,

298n. See also Flight strips, Canadian,

Beatton River.

de Gaulle, General Charles, 158-60

Declarations of war

by Canada, 5, 19-20, 69, 107-08, 162

by United Kingdom, 5, 68

by United States, 107-08

Decorations, 265-66

Deerwester, Col. C. H., 36

Defense, Pan American. See American Republics, defense.

Defense, U.S.-Canadian. See also Military

planning, U.S.-Canadian; Permanent

Joint Board on Defense; Plans, defense

and war.

belligerent Canada, neutral U.S., complications of, 93-94, 160-61, 244

change in emphasis after Pearl Harbor, 109

defense statement, 12 February 1947, 337-

39, 374-75

joint defense, demand in Canada for, 21-22

joint defense, necessity of, 1-2, 22

joint planning for, 86-108

military value of facilities in Canadian

northwest, 335

Newfoundland, two defense systems, 180

postwar security requirements, 336, 337

and U.S. troops in Canada, 296-97

Defense Commands

Alaska. 112, 202, 215-16, 224n. 303

co-ordination with many commands, 111

Eastern, 132, 173-74, 197, 198

Northeast, 101, 111-12

Western, 100-101, 107, 112, 120, 121, 197,

252, 256, 302-03, 302n

Defense Department, U.S., 50n

Denmark, 149, 153, 293. See also Iceland.

Germany, occupation of, 150, 152-53

Dental service, 277

Department of the Air Force, 35n

Department of External Affairs, Canadian,

34, 35, 41, 42, 135, 136, 151, 160, 297,

312, 336. See also Keenleyside, Hugh L.

Department of Mines and Resources, Canadian, 135, 136, 219

Department of National Defense, Canadian,

5, 34, 35, 42, 263, 264, 266, 328

Department of National Defense for Air,

Canadian, 136, 328

Department of State, U.S., 24, 28-29, 31,

32, 34, 38, 42, 43n, 57-58, 60, 68, 69,

70, 71, 73, 135, 144, 146, 147, 150-54,

155, 158, 159, 160, 169-70, 189n, 219,

221n, 229, 234, 303n, 311, 312, 328n, 336

Department of State Bulletin, 28-29

Department of Transport, Canadian, 135, 136,

184, 187, 201, 203, 205, 207-08, 209, 212-13, 236, 237, 238, 302n, 307, 308,

309, 323, 328

Deserters, 277

Destroyers. See also Destroyers-for-bases.

British 242, 243, 246, 249

Canadian, 122, 243, 244, 246, 251

Polish, 246

U.S., 246

to Canada, 92

sale of to Canada, proposal, 163, 164

Destroyers-for-bases, 19, 21, 23-24, 29, 32,

49, 62, 69n, 92, 95, 126, 162-65, 165n, 242. See also Bases, air, Canadian, leased;

Bases, U.S., leased; Legislation, U.S.

delivery of destroyers, 165

DeWitt, Lt. Gen. John L., 41n, 252, 253, 256

Dieppe raid, 257n

Dill, Field Marshal Sir John, 288

Dimond, Anthony, 221

Diplomatic missions

British, in Iceland, 157

British, in South America, 146

British, in Washington, 69, 149. See also

Lothian, Lord.

Canadian, in Greenland, 150-51.

Canadian, in Latin America, 144, 147,

148, 161

Canadian, in Washington, 31, 42n, 71n,

135, 282. See also Christie, Loring.

Danish, in Washington, 150

Icelandic, in U.S., 155

U.S., in Greenland, 150

U.S., in London, 163

U.S., in Ottawa, 135, 234, 271, 282, 291n,

310n, 312. See also Atherton, Ray;

Moffat, Jay Pierrepont.

U.S., in St. John's, 117-18, 177

U.S.-Canadian, embassy status for, 76

USSR, in Washington, 216

Doenitz, Admiral Karl, 242

Donald, J. R., 80

Douglas Harbour, 191
410 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Douglass, Lt. Col. R. W., Jr., 35

Drummond, L. E., 135

Duff, Sir Lyman, 299

Dunkerque, 7-8, 47-48, 90

Dunn, Brig. Gen. Beverly C., 139

Durand, E. Dana, 78

Dutch East Indies, 103n, 228

Dutch Harbor, 100, 253-54, 256

East Hope Lake, Hudson's Bay Company, 191

Eastern Air Command, 99, 112, 125, 249

Eastern Defense Command, 132, 173-74,

197, 198

Eastern Theater of Operations, 127

Economy. See also Pay.

Canadian, 199, 207, 210, 273

Newfoundland, 168-69

Edmonton, 127-28, 133, 135, 137, 199-200,

202, 203, 204, 224, 236-37, 238-39,

305, 306, 307-08, 323, 324

Edmund B. Alexander, 96

Egypt, 293

Eire, 16

Eisenhower, General Dwight D., 265, 266

Eldorado Mining and Refining, Limited, 228

Election, U.S. presidential, 55, 56

Embassies. See Diplomatic missions.

Embick, Lt. Gen. Stanley D., 31, 32, 36,

102, 107-08

Emergency stations, U.S., in Canada, 70

Emerson, L. E., 41n, 179

Empress of Asia, 244

Engineer Districts

Dawson Creek, 128

Edmonton, 128

Fairbanks, 128

Hudson, 127, 130

Newfoundland, 127, 166, 167

Skagway, 128, 226

Whitehorse, 128

Engineer Divisions

North Atlantic, 127, 130, 132, 139

Northwest, 128, 132, 135, 139

Engineer Regiments, 330th Engineer General Service, 130, 187

Engineer troops, U.S., 172, 214, 221, 223, 318

Alaska Highway, pioneer road, construction of, 222

Canol Project, 231

Greenland, 154

use of, in Canada, 207

use of, and withdrawal from Canada, 206

Engineers, Chief of, 127-28, 130, 140, 219, 228

Engineers, Corps of, 127, 130, 132, 136, 139,

166, 188, 195, 209, 211, 222, 226, 229,

239, 240, 328n

England. See United Kingdom.

English Channel, 8, 56

Enlistment, of Americans in Canadian Armed

Forces, 241-42, 241n, 274-75, 281-82

Enlistment, of Canadians in U.S. Armed

Forces, 242

ESKIMO, 281

Eskimo Point, 191

Esquimalt, 255, 272

Etawney Lake, 191

Ethiopia, 3, 293

European Theater of Operations, 241, 317,

318

Evans, Pvt. William, 298n

Exchange. See also Morgenthau-Ilsley agreement; Roosevelt, Franklin D., Hyde

Park Declaration.

Canadian, made available to U.K., 294

Canadian need of U.S. dollars, 291

Canadian surplus of U.S. dollars, 292-93,

292n, 322

limits on Canadian holdings of U.S. dollars, 322

Executive Agreement Series, U.S., 29

Executive Agreements

on Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway, deferral of, 274

Ogdensburg Declaration, 28-29

Executive Orders, ATC authorized to carry

passengers for hire, 312-13

Exercises. See by name.

Explosives, 286

Exports, Canadian, to United States, 291-92

Facilities. See Airways, maintenance and

control of facilities; Construction of facilities; Facilities in Canada; Transportation facilities.

Facilities in Canada

Alaska Highway, gift to Canada, 329-31

to become Canadian property: PJBD recommendation, 320, 325

to become Canadian property after reimbursement to U.S., 326

disposition of, 44, 54, 317-20, 358-59,

364-65

negotiated settlement, 333-34

sale of, to Canada, 327-34

and surplus property, 328-29

transfer to Canada, 323, 325

Fairbanks, 100, 202, 215-16, 222, 225, 227,

230, 232, 234n, 235, 237, 308, 331, 332,

333

Far East, 103n, 202

Ferguson, George, 18n

Fermi, Enrico, 287

Fighter Squadrons, Canadian

No. 14, 254, 255
INDEX 411

Fighter Squadrons, Canadian—Continued

No. 111, 253, 254-55

No. 115, 252, 252n

No. 118, 254, 255

No. 135, 255

Financing. See also projects by name.

airfields, in eastern Canada, 323

airfields, northern, expenditures on, U.S.

and Canadian, 323, 324, 333-34

Alaska Highway, 220, 221, 224

atomic energy research, 287, 288

Canol Project, 230, 232-33

Goose Bay air base, 323

Mackenzie River air route, 213

Northwest Staging Route, 202, 203, 211-

12, 213-14, 220, 320-21

Canadian payment for permanent improvements, 322-23

projects in Canada, at U.S. expense, 320

telephone-telegraph line, Alaska Highway,

323

telephone-telegraph line, for RCAF, 306

First Quebec Conference, 66, 82, 288

First Special Service Force, U.S.-Canadian,

51, 258-68

administrative agreements on, 262-63

administrative problems for Canadian personnel, 263-64

and Aleutian campaign, 258-59, 266

awards and decorations, problem of, 265-66

Canadian replacements, problem of, 265

casualties, 266

evaluation of, 267-68

and invasion of France, 266-67

and Italian campaign, 265, 266

training of, 261-62

Fleets, U.S.

Fifth, 272

Pacific, 112, 125, 255

Flight strips, Canadian

Aishihik, 208, 210, 324

Beatton River, 208, 210, 324

Snag, 208, 210, 324

Teslin, 208, 210, 324

Flight strips, U.S. See also Fort SimpsonFort Smith, Northwest Territories.

Alaska Highway, 206, 207, 304, 315, 324,

330

Burwash, 206, 207

Camp Canol, 214

Canol Project, 214, 304, 316

Dawson Creek, 206, 207

Embarras, 214

Fort Providence, 214

Fort Resolution, 214

Fort Simpson, 214

Flight strips, U.S.—Continued

Fort Smith, 214

Hay River, 214

Liard River, 206, 207

Mackenzie River air route, 214, 322n, 323

Mills Lake, 214

Norman Wells, 214

Peace River, 214

Pine Lake, 206, 207

Pon Lake, 206, 207

Prophet River, 206, 207

Sikanni Chief River, 206, 207

Squanga Lake, 206, 207

U.S. alternates for Canadian staging fields,

206, 213, 304

Waterways, 214

weather stations, 237

Wrigley, 214

Flying Control Committee, U.S.-Canadian,

139

Food, purchases in Canada, 137n. See also

Combined Food Board, U.S.-British; War

Food Administrator, U.S.

Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, U.S., 328,

333, 334

Foreign policy, Canadian, and United Nations, 337

Forrestal, James V., 24, 31n, 80

Fort Benning, 281

Fort Brady, Ottawa, 195

Fort Chimo (CRYSTAL I), air base, 130, 184,

185, 186, 187, 189, 190, 192, 284, 304,

324, 325n

Fort Fitzgerald, 231

Fort Good Hope, 215

Fort McAndrew, 127, 167-68, 173, 175, 178,

179, 180

Fort McMurray, 284

Fort McPherson, 215

Fort Nelson, 201, 202, 207, 208, 211 , 212,

215, 323, 324

Fort Pepperrell, 96, 127, 167-68, 173, 180

Fort Providence, 214, 231

Fort Richardson, 254

Fort Ross, 284

Fort St. John, 127, 201, 202, 207, 208, 211,

212, 219, 221, 227, 323, 324

Fort Simpson, 214, 215

Fort Smith, Northwest Territories, 135, 214,

231, 232

Fort Stevens, 122n

Fort William Henry Harrison, 261-62

Fort Yukon, 215

Foster, Brigadier Harry W., 257

Foster, L. B., Company, 333

Foster, Maj. Gen. W. W., 137-41, 224, 344
412 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

France, 293, 295, 339

fall of, 6, 7-8, 9-10, 18, 20, 47-48, 60, 90,

95, 131, 142, 144, 156, 158, 162, 163,

242, 290

invasion of, 266-67

invasion build-up, 251

matériel aid for, 15

member, Military Representatives of the

Associated Pacific Powers, 68

sabotage raids in, 266

Frederick, Lt. Col. Robert T., 260

Free French, 158-59, 160

naval force from Halifax takes St. Pierre,

159

occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon, 50

French Committee of National Liberation,

159

Frigates, Canadian, 251

Frobisher Bay (CRYSTAL II). See Bases, air,

U.S.

Fry, Eric, 183

Gaffney, Col. D. V., 209

Gander Lake, 165, 192, 247

Gaspé. See Harbor defenses.

Gaspé Peninsula, 89

General Headquarters, U.S. Army, 112, 127

General Staff, Canadian, 113, 260-61

George, Brig. Gen. Harold L., 130

Germany, 8, 10, 11, 102-03. 105, 339. See

also Declarations of war.

air attacks on Great Britain, 55-56

collapse of, 334

failure to attempt Channel crossing, 56

Greenland, activities in, 154n

Greenland, aerial reconnaissance of, 154

Greenland weather stations, British seizure

of, 154

invasion of USSR, 244

naval and air power, Atlantic, 197

naval operations, 154-55

occupation of Denmark, 149, 155

occupation of France, 7

St. Pierre radio-weather station, 158

submarines, increased number on patrol

duty, 248

surrender of, 270

threat to bases in Greenland, Iceland,

West Indies, 142

threat to Greenland, 150, 151

threat to Iceland, 155

Gleneagles, 170n

Glenn Highway, 225

Godthaab, 150

Goose Bay. See Bases, air, Canadian, Goose

Bay; Bases, air, U.S., Goose Bay and

North West River; Newfoundland.

Gordon, Herbert, 271n

Gordon, Walter 80

Governor General, Canada, 28, 299-300

Graham, James H., 228

Grand Prairie, 201-02, 207, 208, 211 . 212.

323, 324

Great Bear Lake mine, 287, 288

Great Britain. See United Kingdom.

Great Circle Route to Europe, 303

Great Circle Route to the Orient, 201, 303

Great Falls, 204, 205

Great Lakes, 1, 278-80

Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River defense,

198

Great Lakes-St. Lawrence seaway, 50, 274

Greece, 293, 295

Green Project, AAF, 192, 319

Greenland, 14, 48, 50, 87, 88, 105, 142, 154,

155, 161, 182, 341. See also Bases, air,

U.S.; Plans, defense and war, ABC-1.

American protectorate, suggestion by Denmark, 150

Canadian interest, basis of, 151

Canadian memo to U.S. on security of

cryolite mines, 150

cryolite output, and New York City meeting, 151

defense of, 149-55

conflicting American policies on, 150-

51

protection for mines, Canadian offers

of, 151, 154

German-controlled weather station, 154

German planes, aerial reconnaissance, 154

request for U.S. protection, 150, 151

U.S. opposition to Canadian or U.K. occupation, 149-50, 151

GREENLIGHT. See Infantry Brigades, Canadian 13th.

Greenslade, Rear Adm. John W., 166

Greenslade Board, 166, 177

Groves, Maj. Gen. L. R., 288

Guided missiles, 341

Hackworth, Green H., 164n

Hague Convention, 10

Haines, 226

Haines-Champagne road, 226-27, 330-31

Halifax, Lord, 59, 146

Halifax, Nova Scotia, 39, 41, 49, 123, 124,

125, 159, 165, 242, 244, 245, 246, 247,

305

Hamilton, 165

Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation, 266

Handy, General Thomas T., 269

Hansen, Alvin H., 78

Harbor defenses. See also Coast defense.
INDEX 413

Harbor defenses—Continued

Argentia, 354

Bell Island, 95, 173

Botwood, 92, 95, 99, 173

Canadian, 89-90

Gaspé, 92

Juan de Fuca Strait, 93, 107

Prince Rupert, British Columbia, 94, 239

Puget Sound, 93, 106

St. John's, 92, 93, 95, 96, 99, 116, 173

Shelburne, 92

Harmon Field, 127, 166-68, 169, 173, 178, 192

Harrison, W. A., 80

Havana, 11, 26, 143, 144

Hawaii, 312

Hay River, Alberta, 231, 232

Heakes, Group Capt. F. V., 37

Hebron, 183

Helena, 237, 261

Henry, Maj. Gen. Guy V., 36, 207, 334-35

Henry, R. A. C., 78

Hepburn, Rear Adm. A. J., 41n

Herchmer, 191

Heuvelton, New York, 23, 28n

Hickerson, John D., 32, 36, 136-37, 256

Highways. See Roads; and by name.

Hill, Capt. Harry W., 31, 32, 36

Hiroshima, 284

Hitler, Adolf, 8, 156, 334

Hobbs, Col. G. K., 130

Hockenberry, Lt. Col. E. W., 36

Holyrood, 179

Hong Kong, 71n, 272n

Honshu Island, 200, 272

Hopkins, Harry, 48, 82, 123, 156

Hospital facilities, for Canadian troops in

U.S. Army hospital, 277

Houlton, 283

House of Commons, British, 8, 13

House of Commons, Canadian, 15n, 18, 23,

24, 28, 92, 119, 144, 146, 162, 235, 319,

321, 338

House Joint Resolution 367, 11

House of Representatives, 274

Howe, C. D., 61, 185n, 203, 205, 209, 288,

308, 309, 316n, 321

Hudson, Albert B., 299

Hudson Bay, 194-95, 196, 281

U.S. policy on, 194n

Hudson's Bay Company, 151, 231, 284

Hull, Cordell, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 35, 55, 59,

62, 68, 71n, 75, 143n, 149-50, 151-53,

153n, 159, 160, 164n, 218, 254, 279,

291. See also Department of State, U.S.

Hyde Park, 29

Hyde Park Declaration. See Roosevelt,

Franklin D., Hyde Park Declaration.

Hydroelectric plants

Lake of St. Francis, power increase, 273

Niagara Falls, power increase, 273

Norwegian and Alpine, 259

Hydroelectric projects, 50, 274

Iceland, 9, 48, 49, 50, 123, 124, 162, 182,

243, 244-45, 250, 293, 341. See also

Bases, air, British; Bases, air, U.S.;

Bases, naval, U.S.

American troops in, 156, 157

British troops, occupation by, 155

defense of, 14, 155-57

Denmark, Act of the Union with, 155

and Denmark, King of, 155

German bases, threat of, 142

Hitler declares island in war zone, 156

President of, 157n

refusal to request U.S. troops, 157

request for Monroe Doctrine protection,

155

Ickes, Harold, 230

Ilford, 191

Ilsley, J. L., 322.

Imperial Oil Company, Limited, 228, 229,

232-33, 234-35, 331, 333

Imperial War Cabinet, London, 64

Imports, Canadian, from United States, 292

Income tax, Canadian, 278

India, 67, 82, 295

INDIGO, 157

Industry, Canadian, 14. See also Munitions,

Canadian; Munitions, U.S.; War production.

matériel production program, 5, 86

need of U.S. dollars, 291

and U.S. machine tools, 92n, 290-91

Industry, U.S.-Canadian. See also Munitions,

Canadian; Munitions, U.S.; War production,

joint production program, proposal, 341-

42, 350

production capacity, wartime expansion,

290-91, 342

Infantry Battalions, Canadian, 95, 99, 142, 257

Infantry Brigades, Canadian 13th, 257-58,

259

Infantry Divisions, Canadian

2d, 156, 156n

3d, 99

6th, 270, 317

7th, 317

8th, 317

Infantry Regiments, U.S.

3d, 96, 175

17th, 258

53d, 258
414 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Infantry Regiments, U.S.—Continued

87th Mountain, 258

131st, 195

184th, 258

474th (Separate), 267

Installations. See Communication facilities;

Construction of facilities; Facilities in

Canada; Flight strips, Canadian; Flight

strips, U.S.; Weather stations, U.S.;

under Bases; and by name.

Institute of International Affairs, Canadian,

337

Intelligence

exchange of, 347

and exchange of staff officers, 280

Intelligence Division, U.S. War Department

General Staff, 17

Inter-Allied Personnel Board, 275, 276

Inter-American Defense Board, 145

Interior Staging Route, British Columbia,

306. See also Air ferry routes.

International Conference of American States,

143

International Fisheries Commission, U.S.-

Canadian, 27

International Joint Commission, U.S.-Canadian, 27

Internationa l Joint Defense Plan for Juan de

Fuca Strait and Puget Sound, 106-07

International law, 339

and Canadian jurisdiction over its forces

in U.S., 300-301

jurisdiction over friendly foreign forces,

297n

International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission, 27

Iran, 293

Iraq, 293

Iron ore, 193, 273, 274

Isolationism, U.S., 2

Italy, 10, 241, 264, 265, 266, 293

declaration of existence of state of war,

by U.S., 108

surrender of, 251

Ivigtut, 149, 151

Jamaica, 49, 142, 149n

James Bay, 194, 196

JAN-CAN (Joint Army, Navy, Canadian),

302-03

communications and air traffic control,

302

dissolved February 1944, 305

JAN-CAN Committee, U.S.-Canadian, 141

Japan, 10, 87, 94, 100, 107-08, 143n, 162,

252, 317, 334, 335, 339. See also Aleutian campaign; Attu; Kiska.

Japan—Continued

attack on Dutch Harbor, 253

Attu, occupation of, 255

build-up on Attu and Kiska, 256

Canadian desire to participate in final assault on, 268

Canadian attitude toward occupation of,

270

carrier task force attack on Dutch Harbor,

204

diplomatic discussions with, 70

Kiska, evacuation of, 259

Kiska, occupation of, 204, 255

Kiska garrison, attacks on 254-55

surrender of, 270, 271, 319

task force off Aleutians, 253

threat to Alaska, 252, 255

threat of attack on Aleutians, 253

threat in Pacific, 55, 70

threat to west coast, 199, 318

threat to west coast shipping, 218

threat to western Canada, 255

Japanese, evacuation of, from west coast, 284

Japanese balloons, 200

Japanese population, Prince Rupert, evacuation of, 240

Jesuit College, Edmonton, 327, 328

Jeter, Capt. T. P., 36

Johnson, Vice Adm. A. W., 36

Johnson, Air Vice Marshal George, 249

Joint Agricultural Committee, U.S.-Canadian, 81, 84n

Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board

Priorities Committee, U.S., 61

Joint Basic Defense Plan, Newfoundland,

117, 119

Joint Basic Defense Plan—1940. See Plans,

defense and war, Joint Basic Defense

Plan—1940, U.S.-Canadian.

Joint Basic Defense Plans 1 and 2, 89, 101-

02, 103-04, 105, 112-15

Joint Board, U.S., 45, 46

Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S., 10, 45, 46, 56,

59n, 66, 76, 106, 120, 268, 269, 270,

280, 336

Joint Declaration by the United Nations, 69

Joint Defense Production Committee, U.S.-

Canadian, 79

Joint Economic Committees, U.S. and Canadian, 78-80, 84n

Joint Material Coordinating Committee, 79,

83, 84

Joint Service Committee, Canadian, 121

Joint Staff, Canadian, 34, 51, 52, 76, 135,

268, 269, 270, 280

Joint Staff, U.S. See Joint Chiefs of Staff,

U.S.
INDEX 415

Joint Staff Mission, British, 58, 63, 72, 73

Joint Staff Mission, Canadian, 72-76, 104,

112, 113, 248, 260, 264, 267, 268, 280,

336, 342

Joint Task One (protection of overseas shipping), 122, 125. See also Submarine,

antisubmarine operations.

Joint Task Two (defense of Newfoundland),

116

Joint Travel Control Board, U.S.-Canadian,

141, 224

Joint War Aid Committee, U.S. and Canada, 82, 84n

Joint War Production Committee, U.S.-

Canadian, 80, 84n. See also Joint Defense Production Committee, U.S.-

Canadian.

Jones, Rear Adm, G. C., 37

Juan de Fuca Strait, 106-07, 111

Julianehaab, 182

Julius Thomsen, 151

Jurisdiction, 134, 165-67, 169, 189, 296-301

U.S.-Australian and U.S.-New Zealand

agreements, 298

U.S.-British agreement, 297-98

U.S.-Canadian agreements, 299-301

Kaldaharnes, 182

Kamloops, 324

Kauffmann, Henrik de, 150, 152-53

Keenleyside, Hugh L., 2n, 12, 18n, 21n, 31,

32, 33n, 34, 35, 37, 78, 310n

Kennedy, Joseph P., 8, 163

Kenny, Air Commodore W. R., 71-72

Kerwin, Patrick, 299

Ketchikan, 100, 202

Kiel Canal, 193

King, Admiral Ernest J., 59, 59n, 249

King, W. L. Mackenzie, 3, 4, 9, 12, 13-15,

18-19, 20, 21, 21n, 22, 23, 25, 34, 42,

59, 60, 62, 64-65, 65n, 66, 68, 69n, 70-

71, 71n, 73, 76, 92, 114, 119, 120, 121,

142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150,

159, 160, 162, 218, 220-21, 260, 288,

289, 303-04, 319-20, 321, 336, 338. See

also Roosevelt and King.

Kingston, Ontario, 3, 24

Kiska, 254-56, 265, 266

assault on, 256, 257, 258-59

assault force, 255, 258

occupation of, 255

Klondike gold rush, 225

Kluane, 226

Knox, Frank, 19, 32, 164, 194. See also Secretary of the Navy, U.S.

Knudsen, William S., 79

Kodiak, 100, 253, 234, 255, 283

Kure, 272

Labor, Canadian, 134. See also Western

Labor Board, Canadian,

co-ordination of, 137

inadequacy of, 205-06, 207, 209, 210

Northwest Staging Route, 209, 210, 212

Labor, U.S.

Alaska Highway, 221, 222, 227, 318

Argentia, 168

Canadian northwest, 199

Canadian projects, 296

Canol Project, 318

Northwest Staging Route, 208, 209-10

telephone-telegraph line, 236-37

Labrador, 20, 48, 130-31, 149n, 162, 163,

182-83, 258n, 302, 303, 304, 305. See

also Bases, air, U.S., Goose Bay, Labrador, and North West River; CRIMSON

Project.

Lacey, Capt. J. K., 151

Ladd Field. See Bases, air, U.S., Fairbanks.

LaGuardia, Mayor Fiorello H., 22n, 31-32,

31n, 34, 36, 38n, 41, 42, 50, 52n, 90,

96, 113-14, 119-20, 171, 183, 185n, 218,

220n, 275, 327

Lake Harbour, Hudson's Bay Company, 191

Lake Huron, 193

Lake of St. Francis, 273

Lake Superior, 193

Landing strips. See Flight strips, Canadian;

Flight strips, U.S.

Latin America, 7, 87, 142, 144, 145, 147,

148, 149. See also American Republics,

defense of, 161, 341

U.S. policy, in connection with Canadian

and Commonwealth interest, 161

Laurier, Sir Wilfred, 2

Lawrence, Air Vice Marshal T. A., 305

Le Pensie, 191

Le Regiment de Hull, 257

Leahy, Admiral William D., 59n

Leased bases. See Destroyers-for-bases; Legislation, U.S.; and under Bases.

LeCapelain, C. D., 135

Leckie, Air Marshal R., 271

Legations. See Diplomatic missions.

Legislation, British, United States of America

(Visiting Forces) Act, 1942, 298, 299,

300

Legislation, Canadian

Defense Air Regulations, 305n

Dominion Companies' Act, 326n

Foreign Forces Order, 297, 298-99

full jurisdiction for U.S. service courts, 300

Mutual Aid Act, 295

National Resources Mobilization Act,

1940, 257-58

oil industry, partial government ownership, 233, 235
416 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Legislation, Canadian—Continued

Surplus Crown Assets Act, 326n

uranium mines, government ownership,

288

U.S. jurisdiction, removal of exceptions to,

299

War Appropriation (United Nations Mutual Aid) Act, 1943, 81-82, 294

War Measures Act of 1914, 5, 299-300

Legislation, U.S.

aircraft, equipment and munitions, 6

Alaska Highway, designation of, 221n

Atomic Energy Act, 1946, 289

claims commissions, 278

contract renegotiation, 293

critical matériel, transfer of, 92-93

jurisdiction over friendly foreign forces,

300-301

Lend-Lease Act, 82, 83, 166, 177, 181-82,

242, 293

limits on transfer of critical supplies, 15

machine tools, export licensing, 290-91

military and naval assistance to American

republics, 11

Naval Expansion Act, 1938, 6

Neutrality Act, 1937, 68

Selective Service and Training Act, 1940,

276

surplus matériel, sale of, 92

LEMMING, 281

Lend-lease. See also Bases, U.S., leased;

Destroyers-for-bases; Legislation, Canadian, War Appropriation (United Nations Mutual Aid) Act; Legislation,

U.S., Lend-Lease Act; Mutual Aid

program, Canadian.

40-billion-dollar program, 293

aircraft deliveries, 182, 318

component parts for Canadian-built equipment, 292

convoy of lend-lease cargoes, 243

matériel in Canada, 329

purchases in Canada for transfer to U.K.,

292

repairs to British naval vessels, 242

summary of, 293

total cost, 295

Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke, 99

Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, 156

Lethbridge, 205, 324

Letson, Maj. Gen. H. F. G., 72, 269, 270

Leyte, 272

Liaison, Canadian. See also Service attachés.

with Combined Chiefs of Staff, 65

with U.S. construction projects, 135, 343

Liaison, U.S.-British, 20-21, 20n, 58, 110,

122, 124, 242-43, 244. See also Combined Chiefs of Staff; Military planning,

U.S.-British; Service attachés.

Liaison, U.S.-Canadian, 32, 51, 58n, 71-73,

75-76, 110, 121, 122, 136, 244, 280. See

also Permanent Joint Board on Defense.

Liaison officers, Canadian, at U.S. air bases,

315, 316n

Liard River, 206, 207

Liberia, 293

Lincoln and Welland Regiment, 99

Liverpool, 243

Llewellin, Col., J. J., 288

Load-line regulations. See Transportation

facilities, Great Lakes, load-line regulations.

Locomotives, 178

Logistical and administrative command, U.S.-

Canadian, feasibility of, 140

Logistical headquarters, U.S.

communications zone type, feasibility of,

141

theater-type, feasibility of, 344

Logistical headquarters, U.S.-Canadian, theater-type, feasibility of, 344

Logistics. See also Construction of facilities;

North West Purchasing, Limited; Western Labor Board, Canadian.

Canol Project, 231

facilities in Canada, 107, 109, 318

North America as logistical base, 317

organization for, 126-41

London, 55n, 77

leased bases technical discussions, 166

prewar military staff meetings, 58

London Food Committee, 83, 84

Londonderry, Ireland, 246

Loran (long range radio navigation), 337

Lothian, Lord, 10, 13, 14, 19, 55

Lovett, Robert A., 283

Low Countries, 6-7, 11

Lower, R. M., 18n

Low-level Route, Canada, proposed, 215.

See Air Ferry routes.

Luftwaffe, 8

Lynn Canal, 226

MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas,

269

McCrae, John, 241n

Macdonnell, R. M., 37

Machine tools, 290-91, 345

Mackay, R. A., 18

Mackenzie, Alexander, 228
INDEX 417

Mackenzie, C. J., 285, 288

Mackenzie, Ian A., 7

Mackenzie District, 232

Mackenzie King, W. L. See King, W. L.

Mackenzie.

Mackenzie Range, 232

Mackenzie River, 218, 227, 231, 233, 237

Mackenzie River air route, 314, 316. See

also Air ferry routes.

Mackenzie River valley, 228, 331

Mackintosh. W. A., 78

MacMillan. H. R., 80

McLean, A. D., 201

McNamara Construction Company, Ltd., 188

McNarney, Lt. Gen. Joseph T., 32, 36, 107,

260

McNaughton, Gen. A. G. L., 37, 41n, 156n,

269n, 335, 336

Magee, John Gillespie, 241n

Mahoney, Merchant, 10

Mail

for American troops in Canada, 312

to Canadian forces, 277

diplomatic only, carried in Canada, 311

Maine, 307

Maintenance and control of bases. See Airways.

Maintenance of facilities. See Airways.

Malta-Yalta conference, 67n

Manila, 55n

Mapping, aerial, northern Canada, 284

Marine Companies, U.S., 3d Provisional, 96

Marine Operators, 231

Marines, U.S.

Iceland, 156-57

Marine brigades, 157

withdrawn from Iceland, 157

Maritime Provinces, 2, 14, 15, 17, 30n, 49-

50, 53, 86, 89, 92, 99-100, 101, 110-11,

112, 166, 176, 307

defense of, 173-74, 348-49

Marshall, General of the Army George C.,

10, 11, 11n, 14, 15-16, 56, 59, 59n, 92,

93, 94, 156, 163, 218, 243n, 259, 260-

61, 268, 268n. See also Chief of Staff, U.S.

Martinique, 158

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 285

Material Coordinating Committee, U.S. and

Canada, 79, 83, 84n

Materials, allotment of, 349

Matériel, allocations of, by PJBD, 86

Matériel, Canadian

to British Commonwealth nations, 294

dollar receipts under Hyde Park program,

292

Matériel, Canadian—Continued

purchases for lend-lease and for U.S., 292

to U.K. after Dunkerque, 8

to USSR, 294

Matériel, U.S. See also British Purchasing

Commission; Combined Production and

Resources Board, U.S.-British; Combined

Raw Materials Board, U.S.-British;

Combined Shipping Adjustment Board,

U.S.-British; Munitions Assignments

Board, U.S.-British.

Canadian needs, supply of, 60-61

Canadian request for, 13, 49

direct purchases by Canada, 60, 61

U.K. study of U.S. production, 285

Mayors, U.S. Conference of, 34

Medical service free for U.S. and Canadian

troops, 277

Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 317

Metals Reserve Corporation, U.S., 292

Mexico City, 148

Mid-ocean Escort Force, 247

Mid-Pacific islands, 109

Mignano, 266

Military Area, Sault Sainte Marie, 197

Military Cooperation Committee, U.S.-Canadian, 336, 338

Military District, Sault Sainte Marie, 195

Military enlistment centers, Canadian, in U.S.,

for enlistment of nondeclarant male

Canadians, 276

Military hospital, Edmonton, 327

Military planning, Canadian

base for British Fleet, July 1940, 13

defense of Newfoundland and British and

French territories, May 1940, 9, 9n

disposal of British fleet, discussion of, with

Washington, June 1940, 12

Joint Basic Defense Plan—1940, 110

studies on impending fall of France, June

1940, 9

troops to Greenland if necessary, April 1940,

150

Military planning, United Kingdom

British fleet to U.S. or Canada, June 1940, 9

Canadian Army Corps in England, July

1940, 156

Military planning, U.S. See also Plans, defense and war.

ABC-1 as basis, March 1941, 58

Alaskan defense, January 1942, 218

arms and liaison officers to Latin America,

May 1940, 11

bases in Canada, need for, June 1940, 10,

11
418 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Military planning, U.S.—Continued

Canadian air trainees, none in U.S. schools,

May 1940, 10

change from defense to support of Britain,

October 1940, 55-56

for defeat of Japan, February 1943, 208

defense of the hemisphere, April 1940, 7

estimate of U.S.-Canadian situation, July

1940, 16

estimate of world situation, June 1940, 11,

163

for Europe, North Africa, Alaska, Pacific,

December 1941, 109

Greenland not strategically important, May

1939, 149

increased planning with Britain, 1941, 58-

59

invasion of Japan, 1945, 269

lack of urgency, September 1939, 6

occupation of European colonies in South

America, proposal of, May 1940, 10

orientation toward Caribbean, June 1940,

7, 162, 163, 341

1,200 Canadian trainees in U.S., July 1940,

16

Military planning, U.S.-British. See also

Combined Chiefs of Stall: Plans, defense

and war. ABC-1 and ABC-2,

and CRIMSON Project, June 1942, 186, 187

informal talks in London, August 1940,

20, 55, 77, 242

invasion build-up, 1942-44, 186, 191-92,

251, 259

Japanese threat, British proposal of talks

on, October 1940, 55

military missions, first meeting of, June 1941,

58

staff talks, British request for, June 1940,

14

staff talks, Washington, January-March

1941, 55-57, 102, 112, 123, 153n, 155-

56, 242-43

U.S. troops for Iceland, June 1941, 156-57

Military planning, U.S.-Canadian. See also

Plans, defense and war; Permanent Joint

Board on Defense.

Aleutian campaign, May 1943, 256-57

Alaska, defense of, April 1942, 252

Alaska, and west coast defense, December

1941, 199

defense, Newfoundland and north Atlantic

coast, 1941, 162

estimate of world situation, 1946, 336

estimate of world situation, 1947, 338

Greenland, July 1940, 142

Iceland, July 1940, 142

Military planning, U.S.-Canadian—Con.

Montreal Revise, April 1941, 113-14

postwar collaboration, 1946, 337-38

Prince Rupert port, March 1941, 238

Security plan, 1947, 336, 338

staff talks, defense of North America, July

1940, 13-18

state of readiness at time of Pearl Harbor,

December 1941, 53

and U.S.-British talks, January-March 1941,

57

U.S. troops allotment to Canada, April 1942,

173-74

West Indies, July 1940, 142

Military planning, U.S.-Dutch-British, 103

Military Police Battalions, U.S. 702d, 195

Military Railway Service, U.S. Army, 225-26

Military Representatives of the Associated

Pacific Powers, 68

Millinocket, 283

Mingan, 188, 189, 190, 324, 325n

Minister of Mines and Resources, Canadian,

235

Minister of National Defense, Canadian, 108,

258, 267

Minister of Transport, Canadian, 239

Ministry of Aircraft Production, British, 181

Miquelon (off Newfoundland), 14, 50

Miyako Island, 272

Moffat, Jay Pierrepont, 13-16, 18, 22-23, 24,

24n, 28, 60, 73-74, 135, 142-43, 158, 219

Momp (mid-ocean meeting place), 244, 245,

246

Monroe, James, 48

Monroe Doctrine, 2-3, 4n, 26n, 48, 153n

applicable to 20° west longitude, 155

and Iceland, 155-56, 155n

in relation to Greenland, 152

Monte la Difensa, 266

Monte la Remetanea, 266

Montebello Conference, 337

Montreal, 39, 41, 181, 287, 288

Montreal Revise, 113-14

Montreal Subport of Embarkation, 133

Moose Factory, 186

Morgenthau, Henry, Jr., 15, 16, 60, 164, 322

Morgenthau-Ilsley agreement, 306, 322, 322n,

323

Mountbatten, Vice Admiral Lord Louis, 259,

260

Munitions, Canadian, 342

Canada third largest producer, 82, 341

expansion of industry, 6, 6n

to Newfoundland, 20, 162

shipments to U.S., World War I, 2
INDEX 419

Munitions, U.S.

to Canada, 91-92, 94

Canadian requests for, 15, 16, 31, 90-91,

92-94

heavy weapons for Canadian 13th Infantry Brigade, 257

loans to Canada, 93-94

purchase of, by Canada, 7

shipments to Canada, World War I, 1-2

to United Kingdom, 8, 90, 94

Munitions, U.S.-Canadian

complementary production programs, proposal of, 341-42

production, 289-90, 291-92

Munitions Assignments Board, U.S.-British,

63, 64, 82

Munitions Assignments Committees, 82. See

also Munitions Assignments Board, U.S.-

British.

Murray, Rear Adm. L. W., 17, 32, 37, 124,

243, 249

MUSKOX, 336-37

Mussolini Canal, 266

Mutual Aid program, Canadian, 295

Nagasaki, 284

Nagoya, 272

Namao, 208, 211, 316, 323, 324

Naples, 266

Narsarrssuak, 154, 182

Nascopie, 151, 284

Nascopie expedition, 151n

National Defense Headquarters, Ottawa, 253

National Research Council, Canadian, 260,

285, 287

Naval Air Transport Service, USN, 133, 216-

17

Naval Air Transport Squadrons, West Coast,

303

Naval Coastal Frontier, North Atlantic, 111,

112, 127, 132

Naval Coastal Frontier, Pacific Northern, 107,

111, 112

Naval support groups, Canadian, 251

Naval support groups, U.K., 251

Navy, British. See Royal Navy.

Navy, Canadian. See Royal Canadian Navy.

Navy, U.S., 3, 48, 49, 96, 98, 123, 124-26,

173, 218, 244, 247, 248, 249, 250, 302-03

British convoy training, 242-43

build-up in Alaskan waters, 255-56

convoys. See Convoys.

Eastern Sea Frontier, command of antisubmarine air operations in, 247

escort forces. See Convoys; Task Force 4;

Task Group 419.

Navy, U.S.—Continued

liaison officers to South America, 11

neutrality patrol, 243, 244

patrol duties, 163

patrol of Hudson Bay, proposal of, 196

ships withdrawn from North Atlantic escort, 125, 245

training vessels on Great Lakes, 279

troop escorts, 246, 248-49

Navy Department, U.S., 7, 10-11, 17, 29,

31, 34, 35, 38, 42, 46, 50, 56, 72, 73-

74, 76, 90, 96, 105, 122, 127, 132, 135,

148, 163, 168, 244, 245, 292, 311, 328n,

343

Netherlands, 58-59, 67, 68, 70, 142, 143n, 293

Neutrality, U.S., 2, 9, 68-69, 161

Neutrality patrol, 243, 244

New England, 247

air units in, 126

defense of, 174

New York, 39, 41

New York City, 151, 313

New Zealand, 67, 68, 72, 84, 281, 295

Newfoundland, 11, 50, 52, 53, 126-27, 133,

162-81, 243, 250, 258n, 304, 313, 317,

341, 344. See also Communication facilities; Pay; Plans, defense and war;

Radar, stations; Railways; Roads; Troops,

Canadian; U.S. Army Air Forces in

Newfoundland; and under Bases,

airway traffic control, 301-02, 305, 306

aviation, postwar, 303

Canadian defense mission, 29-30, 170, 188-

89

command problem, 30n, 74, 89, 97, 98,

101, 104, 111, 113, 116, 117, 118-19,

120, 133, 141

defense, 86, 87-88, 92-94, 95-96, 98n, 99,

105, 110, 111, 112, 114, 122, 125, 162,

164, 175-76, 180, 347-48, 350

economic rehabilitation of, 345

fuel storage, 352-53

German prisoners of war to, plan, 351

Protocol, Canadian, 98

Newfoundland a part of Canada for

defense purposes, 62, 97

strategic importance to Canada, 19-20, 99.

180

union with Canada, 170n, 180-81, 345

union with U.S., discussion of, 180-81, 345

U.S. air forces to, 98, 172, 352

Newfoundland, Governor of, 166

Newfoundland Base Command, 98-99, 112,

116, 117-18, 119, 126-27, 132, 133,

159, 176-77, 180, 248, 301-02, 314
420 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Newfoundland Base Contractors, 167

Newfoundland Escort Force, 122, 124, 125,

243, 244-46

Newfoundland Government, 21, 41n, 95,

118n, 119, 311

Air Bases Agreement with Canada, 170n

Bay Bulls, 99-year lease to Canada, 170n

Goose Bay, 99-year lease to Canada, 170,

189

and large American population, 169

and leased bases, 165, 167

and maintenance of roads, 178-79

and Newfoundland Railway, 177-78

Railway Loan Act, 178

request that Canada occupy St. Pierre, 158

Royal Commission, 19, 110

Newfoundland Railway, 53, 175, 177-80, 353

Niagara, 165

Niagara River, 273

Nisutlin River bridge, 222

Noble Drilling Corporation, 233

Nome, 100, 202, 216, 253

Norman Wells, 214, 215, 228, 229, 231-33,

284, 331, 332, 333

Normandy, 241

North Africa, 109, 249, 266

North Atlantic Ferry Route Project Committee, 187

North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier, 111,

112, 127, 132

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 148

North Atlantic triangle, 59-68, 84, 85

North Pacific Force, USN, 255, 259

North West Purchasing, Limited, 136-37, 199

North West River, Labrador, 183. See also

Bases, air, U.S., Goose Bay and North

West River.

Northeast Airlines, 307, 310

Northeast Defense Command, 101, 111-12

Northern Indian Lake, 191

Northland, 152

Northwest Air Command, 305

Northwest Airlines, 237, 307, 308

ATC insignia and Army uniform, 309, 310

and friction with Canada, 307-11

militarization, 310

Northwest Highway System, 330. See also

Alaska Highway.

Northwest Service Command, 132

Northwest Staging Route. See Air ferry routes;

CRIMSON Project; Flight strips; Canadian; Flight strips, U.S.

Northwest Territories, 128, 137

Northwest Territories Council, Canadian, 136

Norway, 259-60, 262, 293

Nova Scotia, 174, 250

Nuclear research, 286-87

Nueltin Post, 191

Nuwata, 191

O'Connor, Col. James A., 128

OCTAGON Conference, 66, 268, 272

Office, Chief of Engineers, 45n

Office of Scientific Research and Development, U.S., 260

Ogdensburg, 21n, 22, 24, 25, 26n, 27-28,

29, 31, 48, 69, 69n, 91

Ogdensburg Agreement, 27-29. See also Ogdensburg Declaration.

Ogdensburg Declaration, 22-26, 27-29, 30,

32, 47, 72, 88, 142, 160, 241, 306, 335,

343

Oil, royalties on Canol production, waiving

of, 278. See also Aruba; Canol Project.

Oil fields

Canadian reserves, 233

Dutch East Indies, 228

Mackenzie River, 228

Oil industry, Canadian, partial government

ownership, 235

Oil pipelines, 224, 229, 230-31, 232, 233,

234n, 235, 331, 332, 333

Oil refineries, 228

Rumanian, 259

Whitehorse, 228-29, 232, 233, 234, 235,

331, 332, 333

Oil well drilling, 232-33

Okinawa, assault on, 272

Old Crow, 215

Olds, Brig. Gen. Robert, 203, 308, 309

Ontario, 299, 307

Ontario, 272

Orders-in-council. See Legislation, Canadian.

Ordnance, testing center, 133

Ordnance Department, U.S. Army, 133

Oregon, 220n

Ores. See Cryolite; Iron ore; Radium ore;

Uranium.

Organizations, U.S., multitude of in Canada,

131-34, 343, 344

Ottawa, 39

Air Training Conference, 283

Churchill speech on Free French, 160

leased lands, transfer of, discussion on, 211

maintenance and control of facilities, talks

on, 304

Munitions Assignments Committee, meetings of, 82

North Atlantic route, fields needed, talks

on, 183

Northwest and Low-level routes, PJBD

talks on, 215
INDEX 421

Ottawa—Continued

Northwest Staging Route, AAF-RCAF talks

on, 203-04, 309

Northwest Staging Route, construction,

talks on, 207-08

PJBD meetings, 33, 40

U.S. organizations in Canada, delineation

of, 136, 139

Oumansky, Constantine, 216

Pacific, air defense, 252

Pacific Fleet, USN, 112, 125, 255

Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, 107,

111, 112

Pacific Theater of Operations, 318

Pacific War Council, in London, 66-67

Pacific War Council, in Washington, 67

Padloping Island (CRYSTAL III), 130, 131,

184, 187, 191

Page, Maj. Gen. L. F., 117-18, 119, 120

Pan American Airlines, 133

Pan American defense. See American Republics, defense.

Pan American Union, 153

Canadian interest, basis for, 143, 144n, 148,

149

and Canadian membership, 26n, 143-49

U.S. opposition to Canadian membership,

143-48

Panama, 144

Panama Canal, 7, 87, 94, 193

Parachute Battalions, Canadian 1st, 265, 267,

281

Parachutists, Canadian, 267. See also First

Special Service Force, Canadian replacements, problem of; Parachute Battalions,

Canadian 1st.

Parliament, British, 164, 298

Parliament, Canadian, 5, 23, 24, 28n, 44,

220-21, 274, 299-300, 303-04

Parliament, Icelandic, 157

Passengers, fare-paying. See also Air Transport Command, U.S.; Northwest Airlines,

agreement on, 312-13

Canadian opposition to, 309, 311, 312, 313

Patricia Bay, 253

Patrols. See Air patrol; Submarines, antisubmarine air operations.

Patterson, R. P., 80

Pay

overseas increment, U.S., 263

Pacific campaign bonus, Canadian, 270

U.S. and Canadian, First Special Service

Force, 263

for U.S. and Canadian laborers, 207

U.S. dollars for Canadian troops in Alaska,

277

Peace River, 231

Peace River bridge, 222

Pearkes, Maj. Gen. G. R., 256

Pearl Harbor, 58, 71n, 75, 107, 109, 120,

126, 241, 242, , 245, 259

state of U.S.-Canadian readiness, 52-53

Pearson, Lester B., 63

Pennsylvania Salt Manufacturing Company,

151

Perkins, Milo, 80

Permanent Joint Board on Defense, 21n, 22n,

25-27, 28, 29-30, 31-54, 55, 58, 61, 70,

71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76-78, 86-90, 91, 96,

98, 101-02, 103, 104, 106-07, 112, 113-

14, 115-16, 118, 119-20, 120-21, 125,

135, 136, 137, 140, 148, 172, 175, 207,

215, 218, 219, 224, 226-27, 228, 230,

239, 241, 252, 256-57, 274-75, 280,

297, 302, 307, 311 , 319, 325, 331, 334-

36, 337. See also Military Co-operation

Committee : Military planning , U.S.-

Canadian.

areas not discussed, 50, 142, 154n, 155

bases, construction and operation, 49-50,

52, 139

British as members, 146

civilian chairmen, 38, 342

command problem, 110-11

co-ordination between U.S. and Canadian

organizations, 343

and CRIMSON Project, 185-86

defense projects, not offense, 50-51

as executive agency, 34, 45, 45n, 343

geographical limits, 23, 24, 26, 46, 48-49,

50, 87, 105, 111, 142

interior air defense, 193-98

meetings of, 39

membership of, 36-37

Newfoundland air bases, construction by

Canada, 171-72

no solution to command problem, 114

offices of, 38

as operating agency, 45, 51

operational planning, 52, 103-04

procedures of, 41, 90

radar facilities, Newfoundland, 176

recommendations, 33, 34, 42-44, 42n, 43n,

45, 46, 49, 51, 52-53, 54, 86, 90, 95, 99,

100, 109, 117, 125n, 128, 130, 138, 171,

174, 178-79, 183, 186, 187, 188, 190,

193-94, 195, 196n, 201-02, 208-09, 217-

18, 219, 220-21, 240, 282, 304, 306,

310, 313-16, 320, 325-26, 327, 329, 330,

332, 333, 337-38, 347-75

Report, First, 43, 43n, 44, 48, 48n, 49, 50,

52, 88n, 90, 97, 100-101, 106, 171, 172-

73, 174, 201, 366-69
422 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Permanent Joint Board on Defense—Con.

Report, Second, 43n, 113, 115

reports unpublished, 44

responsibilities of, 46-48, 50-51

St. Pierre and Miquelon, discussion of,

158-59

standardization of U.S., British Commonwealth forces, 335

standardization of U.S., Canadian forces,

proposal, 334-35

transfer of bases to Canada, 189

war industry members, proposal, 352

Petroleum Administrator for War, U.S., 234

Petroleum Coordinator for War, U.S., 230

Philippine Commonwealth, 67, 272

Pilots

transfer of. from RCAF to AAF, 276

world-wide training requirements, 51

Pine Camp, New York, 22

Pine Lake, 206, 207

Placentia Bay, 166, 174

Plans, defense and war

ABC-1 (Joint Basic War Plan, U.S.-British),

46, 49, 57, 58, 58n, 65, 72-73, 101-04,

104n, 105, 106, 112, 114, 122, 149n

British responsibility for east Greenland defense, 153n

British responsibility for Iceland defense, 155-56

U.S. protection of shipping, western

Atlantic, 243

ABC-2 (Joint Basic War Plan, U.S.-British),

104n

ABC-22 (Joint Canadian-U.S. Basic Defense Plan 2), 46, 48, 52, 57n, 65, 72n,

73, 74, 89, 101-02, 103-08, 114, 115,

116, 117, 120, 122, 126, 178, 198, 280,

335, 336

ABC (Pacific)-22, 107

ADB (U.S.-Dutch-British plan for Far East

operations), 103

International Joint Defense Plan for Juan

de Fuca Strait and Puget Sound, 106-07

Joint Basic Defense Plan—1940, U.S.-

Canadian, 48, 86-90, 100, 101, 105, 111,

115, 116, 201, 280, 350

Joint Basic Defense Plans 1 and 2, 1941,

U.S.-Canadian, 89, 101-02, 103-04,

105, 112-15

Joint Defense Plan, Newfoundland, 117, 119

RAINBOW 1, 11-12

RAINBOW 4, 10, 13

RAINBOW 5, 106, 108

security plan, 338

WPL-50 (Navy Hemisphere Defense Plan

3), 122

Plans, defense and war—Continued

WPL-51 (Navy Hemisphere Defense Plan

4), 122-24

WPL-52 (Navy Hemisphere Defense Plan

5), 123, 124

PLOUGH, 259-60. See also First Special Service Force.

Poland, 5, 68, 293

POLAR BEAR, 281

Pon Lake, 206, 207

Pope, Maj. Gen. Maurice, 36, 74n, 75, 108,

256

Port Edward staging area, 240, 327, 332

Ports. See individual ports by name.

Ports of Embarkation. See Boston Port of

Embarkation; Hampton Roads Port of

Embarkation; Prince Rupert Subport of

Embarkation; Quebec Subport of Embarkation; San Francisco Port of Embarkation; Seattle Port of Embarkation.

Portugal, 251

Potsdam conference, 66n

Power, C. G., 14, 24n, 30

President, U.S., 336. See also Roosevelt,

Franklin D.; Roosevelt and Churchill;

Roosevelt and King.

President's emergency fund, 154, 178, 219

Presque Isle, 131, 188, 191-92, 247

Prestwick, 181

Prime Minister, Canadian, 120, 336. See

also King, W. L. Mackenzie; Roosevelt

and King.

Prince Baudouin, 267n

Prince David, 256

Prince Edward Island Highlanders, 99

Prince George, British Columbia, 202, 213,

227, 305, 323, 324

Prince George, 222n

Prince Henry, 256 267n

Prince Robert, 256, 272

Prince Rupert, 133, 202, 222n, 252-53, 328,

331-32. See also Harbor defenses;

Prince Rupert Subport of Embarkation.

Prince Rupert, 222n

Prince Rupert defenses, Canadian, 252

Prince Rupert Subport of Embarkation,

222n, 230, 234n, 238-40, 318-19, 327,

332

Prince of Wales, 123

Princess Charlotte, 222n

Princess Louise, 277

Princess Norah, 222n

Prisoners of war, Germans, 351

Privy Council, Canadian, 28, 37-38, 135-36,

137, 137n

Prizes of war, disposal of, 278
INDEX 423

Proclamations, presidential

jurisdictional law, application to Canada

and U.K., 301

limited national emergency, 6

Procurement regulations, U.S., 137

Production. See Industry; Munitions; War

Production.

Program of Immediate Canadian Action, 18,

18n

Prohibited areas. See Prohibited flying

zones.

Prohibited flying zones, 195, 307

Northwest Staging Route, 305n

within 100 miles of Sault Sainte Marie

locks, 197

Prophet River, 206, 207

"Protected places," U.S. premises in Canada,

284

Protocol, Canadian, 98

Proximity fuze, 286

Public Health Service, U.S., 169

Public opinion, Canadian, 296, 298, 299,

301, 334-35. See also U.S.-Canadian

relations, areas of co-operation,

little co-operation with U.S., no antagonism toward USSR, 337

and Pan American Union, 147

Public opinion, U.S. See also U.S.-Canadian

relations, areas of co-operation,

on defense of Canada, 25

on involvement in war, 25, 26, 55

on Permanent Joint Board on Defense, 25

Public Roads Administration, U.S., 127-28,

132, 206, 227

Puget Sound, 93, 106-07, 281.

Pursuit Squadrons, U.S. 11th, 202-03

Purvis, Arthur B., 60

QUADRANT Conference, 66, 82, 288

Quartermaster Market Center, 133

Quebec (City), 39, 305

Quebec (Province), 30n, 130, 299

Quebec conferences. See Conferences.

Quebec Subport of Embarkation, 133

Quidi Vidi. See Fort Pepperrell.

Radar

airborne, 286

ASVC (air-to-surface-vessel, Canadian),

286

British advanced developments to U.S.,

285

equipment, Canadian, 94, 177

equipment, U.S., 71, 286

microwave, 285, 286

stations, 52, 71, 94, 175-77, 179, 180,

188n, 196, 197-98

Radio

proximity fuze, 286

stations, St. Pierre, 158, 159

U.S. military broadcasting stations in

Canada, 277

Radium ore, 287

Railway guns, 91, 93, 94

Railways. See also Canadian National Railways; Canadian Pacific Railway Company; Newfoundland Railway; White

Pass and Yukon Route Railway,

northern Canada, 187, 222, 225, 231, 232,

284

sale of railheads and depots to Canada,

327, 328

U.S. to Alaska, proposed, 228

RAINBOW 1, 11-12

RAINBOW 4, 10, 13

RAINBOW 5, 106, 108

Ralston, J. L., 14, 94

Rand. I. C., 299

Rat River, 191

Raw materials, equal U.S.-Canadian allocations, 291

RDX, research on, 286

RDX Committee, 286

Real estate, 126, 134

Canada to acquire land needed by U.S.,

211, 304n

Canada to take over titles and leases, 210-

11, 304n

Reconnaissance Squadrons, Canadian No. 8,

253

Reconnaissance Squadrons, U.S.

21st, 98, 183

41st, 98

Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 43n,

178

Regina, 186, 324

Reid, Capt. H. E., 37

Replacements, 267

Canadian policy of nonreinforcement in

the theater, 265

U.S., 265, 267

Repulse Bay, 191

Research and development, U.S. See

Atomic energy research, U.S.-Canadian;

Radar; Radio, proximity fuze; RDX,

research on.

Research and development, U.S.-British, 285-

89

Restigouche, 123n

Restricted zones. See Central Air Defense

Zone, U.S.; Controlled areas, railroad,

The Pas to Churchill; Prohibited flying

zones; "Protected places."
424 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Reykjavik, 157, 182

Rhine River, 241

Richard Peck, 168

Richardson Highway, 222, 225

Richmond Gulf, 186

Rio de Janeiro, 144-46, 160

Riviera, 267

Roads. See also Alaska Highway; Alcan

Highway; Glenn Highway; Richardson

Highway; Winter roads.

Canadian, south of Alaska Highway, poor

quality, 222

Canol Project, 227

Newfoundland, 53, 175, 177 , 178, 179,

355

Robins, Maj. Gen. Thomas M., 139, 209

Rocky Mountain Range, 217

Rocky Mountain Rangers, 257

Rome, 266

Roosevelt, Capt. Elliott, 183, 184

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 7, 8, 10-13, 14, 15,

16, 21, 22, 23, 26, 29, 31n, 32-33, 34,

38, 41-42, 43n, 46-47, 50, 56, 59, 59n,

63, 64, 65, 65n, 66-67, 68, 69, 70, 71n,

82, 90, 96, 105, 108, 114, 120, 144, 150,

152, 156-57, 163, 166, 171, 178, 182,

185n, 194, 209, 216, 218, 219, 221, 222,

228, 268, 275, 283, 288n, 289, 301, 312,

336. See also Roosevelt and Churchill;

Roosevelt and King.

Americans in Canadian forces, no loss of

citizenship, 274

arms supply policy for American Republics, 12

Chautauqua pledge of defense assistance,

3

destroyers-for-bases plan, 19, 164-65

and Free French on St. Pierre, 159, 160

Hyde Park Declaration, 79-80, 291, 292,

341, 342, 345, 373

Iceland not in Western Hemisphere, 157n

Kingston pledge of defense solidarity, 3-4,

24, 26n, 28

"shoot on sight" warning to Germany and

Italy, 244

no troops to Iceland without invitation,

157

unlimited national emergency, declaration

of, 58, 243

at Victoria, British Columbia, 3

Roosevelt and Churchill, 55, 63, 75, 83, 84,

98, 123, 126, 242, 244 248, 288

ARCADIA Conference 59

Atlantic Conference, 62

OCTAGON Conference, 66

QUADRANT Conference, 66

TRIDENT Conference, 66

Roosevelt and King, 22, 22n, 24, 25-28, 30,

31, 35, 44, 46, 48, 49, 62, 78, 79, 82,

145, 158, 160, 282, 291, 343

Atlantic coastal defense talks, 4

Ogdensburg Declaration, 22-24

Ogdensburg meeting, 91

Pacific staff discussions, 3

staff talks, request for, 21-22, 21n

at Warm Springs, 4, 7

Washington talks, 4

Royal Air Force, 241, 248, 249, 301, 302

Ferry Command, 181

VLR aircraft for RCAF, 249n

Royal Canadian Air Force, 5, 6, 17, 32, 34,

35, 51, 91, 98, 105, 110, 117, 118, 166,

171-73, 176, 177, 183, 188-89, 195,

198, 201, 207, 217, 241-42, 241n, 247,

255, 275, 276, 281, 283, 284, 309. See

also Air forces, Canadian.

antisubmarine squadrons, 251

casualties, Aleutians, 259

Eastern Air Command, 99, 112, 125, 249

ground support, AAF, 254

inability to purchase aircraft, 271

Newfoundland air traffic, RCAF desire to

control, 301-02

Northwest Air Command, 305

No. 1 Group, Newfoundland, 98n, 116,

125

offer to operate with AAF in Pacific,

270-71

operation with RAF in Pacific, 271, 271n

Ottawa meetings, 203

personnel in Alaska, distinguished foreign

visitors, 254

planes and pilots to England, 10

Regulations for Control of Aircraft Movement, 305

request for Flying Fortresses for Bismarck

attack, 243n

Special Reserve for Americans and others,

274n

squadrons, withdrawal from Alaska, 255

squadrons in Alaska, 252-55

squadrons in Burma and Ceylon, V-J Day,

271

Tiger Force, proposed, 271

U.S. construction of facilities for, 306

VLR aircraft, 249, 250

Western Air Command, 107, 112, 252,

302n, 303, 307

"X" Wing Headquarters, Fort Richardson,

Alaska, 254

Royal Canadian Artillery, 24th Field Regiment, 257

Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, 238

Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 158, 198
INDEX 425

Royal Canadian Naval Air Service, 2

Royal Canadian Navy, 5, 32, 34, 35, 110,

123, 124, 126, 165, 170n, 184n, 242,

243, 245-46, 248, 250, 272, 283. See

also Newfoundland Escort Force; Western Local Escort Force.

Atlantic Coast Command, 99, 111-12, 245

Atlantic Command, 20

convoy escort, 244

engagements in Japanese war, 271-72

growth of, 251

Naval Staff Headquarters, 245

Newfoundland Command, 123-24, 244,

245

Newfoundland Force, 111, 116

Northwest Atlantic Command, 249

Pacific Coast Command, 107, 112

Pacific coast facilities at disposal of U.S.

Navy, 255

proposals for Pacific force, 272

vessels in Alaskan build-up, 255-56

Royal Flying Corps, 1

Royal Navy, 122, 150-51, 165, 242, 245, 248

Royal Navy escort group, 244

Royal Regiment of Canada, 156

Ruble, Capt. R. W., 36

Rush-Bagot Agreement, 1, 278-80

Russia. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Sabotage raids, 259, 262

St. Clair, 165

St. Croix, 165

St. Francis, 165

St. Georges Bay, 174

St. John's, 30, 39, 41, 119, 124, 127, 174-

75, 179, 243, 247, 305. See also Bases,

Army, U.S.; Bases, naval, Canadian;

Bases, naval, U.S.; Harbor defenses.

Local Joint Defense Committee, 117-18

U.S. Army Supply Dock, 167

St. Lawrence River, 23, 174n, 273

St. Lawrence Valley, 2

Saint Marys River, 193, 194

St. Pierre, 14, 50

Hull, on Free French seizure, 159

plebiscite for Free French, 159

St. Pierre and Miquelon, 146, 158-60, 161

San Francisco, 39, 41

San Francisco Port of Embarkation, 238,

258, 266

Sandy Lake, 191

Santa Barbara, California, 121

Saskatchewan, 281

Saudi Arabia, 293

Sault Sainte Marie, 352

defense of, 193-98, 357

Scientists, British. See British Scientific Mission.

Sea Frontier, Northwest, 302n, 303

Sea Island, British Columbia, 253

Seattle Port of Embarkation . 222n . 238-39.

240

Second Quebec Conference, 66, 268, 272

Secretary of the Interior, 218

Secretary of the Navy. U.S., 46, 58. 74, 105,

106, 114, 156, 218, 228. See also Knox,

Frank.

Secretary of State, 271. See also Hull, Cordell.

Secretary of War, U.S., 46, 58, 74, 92, 105,

106, 114, 154, 156, 171, 218, 228, 271.

See also Stimson, Henry L.

Security of Communications Committee,

U.S.-Canadian, 139

Security measures, U.S.-Canadian

evacuation of Japanese from Canadian

Railway line, 284

evacuation of Japanese from west coast,

284

restricted zone, railroad, The Pas to

Churchill, 284

Senate, Special Committee of, to Investigate

the National Defense Program, 52, 233-

34, 235, 322n

Senate, U.S., 29, 274

purchase of Greenland, consideration of,

149

Service attachés, 51, 71-7-3, 76, 135, 271, 336

Service Commands

Northwest, 128, 136, 212, 224, 236, 237,

240, 318

Sixth, 130, 132

Services of Supply, U.S., 127, 128, 228

Seven Islands (Sept Isles), 188

Seward, 225

SEXTANT-EUREKA Conference, 66n

Sheils, G. K., 80

Shelburne, 49, 92, 123

Sherman, Commander Forrest P., 32, 36

Sherridon, 191

Shipbuilding

on Great Lakes, 279

Canadian, 249, 295

U.S.-Canadian, 290

Shipping. See also Transportation facilities,

civilian and defense, requirements for, 79

equal U.S.-Canadian allocations, 291

Shipyards, Atlantic, Canadian, 279

Shoal Harbor, 180

Siberia, 48, 204, 216

Sicily, 241, 257n

Signal Aircraft Warning Reporting Companies, U.S. 671st, 196n
426 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Signal equipment, shortage of, 306

Signal Service Battalions, U.S. 843d, 236

Sikanni Chief River, 206, 207

Singapore, 55, 103n

Sitka, 100

Skagway, 128, 222n, 225, 226, 230, 232,

234n, 235, 237; 331, 332, 333

Skelton, Alexander, 18n

Skelton, D. A., 78

Ski troops. See First Special Service Force.

Sloops, British, 243

Smith, Maj. Gen. J. P., 36

Smith River, 208, 210, 324

Smithers, 202, 252

Somerset Island, 284

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 228

Søndre Strømfjord, 154n, 182

South America, 26, 48, 142

South Greenland Survey Expedition, 154

Southampton Island. See Bases, air, U.S.,

Southampton Island.

Southwest Pacific, 63

Sovereignty, Canadian, 140-41

and U.S. forces in Canada, 296

and U.S. planes on Canadian airways, 301

Special Commissioner for Defense Projects,

137-41, 224, 344

Squanga Lake, 206, 207

Staff organization

differences in U.S. and Canadian units,

258

U.S. Army type for Canadian Army Pacific Force, 269, 270

U.S. Army type for Canadian brigade,

257

Staging area, Port Edward, 240, 327, 332

Staging fields, 185. See also Air ferry routes,

North Atlantic; Air ferry routes, Northwest Staging Route; CRIMSON Project;

Fort Nelson; Fort St. John; Prestwick;

and under Bases.

Staging routes. See Air ferry routes; CRIMSON Project; Northwest Staging Route.

Stalin, Joseph V., 216

Standard Oil Company, Whitehorse, 327

Standard Oil Company of California, 229

Stanley, 191

Stark, Admiral Harold R., 10, 11, 14, 15-16,

56, 59, 59n, 156

Stedman, Air Commodore E. W., 285

Stefansson, Vilhjalmur, 218

Stephenville, 180. See also Bases, air, U.S.,

Harmon Field.

Stettinius, Edward R., Jr., 80

Stevenson, Air Vice Marshal L. F., 270-71

Stewart, J. S., 135

Stimson, Henry L., 23, 24, 32, 94, 164, 216,

243, 288. See also Secretary of War,

U.S.

Stinebower, L. D., 78

Strong, Brig. Gen. George V., 17

Stuart, Lt. Gen. Kenneth, 17, 30n, 32, 37,

106-07, 253, 260, 265, 285

Submarine warfare, 341

Submarines. See also Joint Task One.

antisubmarine air operations, 247-48, 249-

51, 361. See also Aircraft carriers.

Canadian command of, 251

co-ordinated plan, 247

and USN command problem, 118

antisubmarine equipment, 250

antisubmarine operations, 2, 98, 126, 173,

174, 242-47, 248-49

in 1940 plan, 87

antisubmarine trawlers, Canadian loan to

U.S., 246

French, Surcouf, to St. Pierre, 159

German

Hudson Bay, threat of entry, 194, 196

losses to, in Atlantic, 158, 174, 175,

197, 242, 243, 246, 247, 248, 280

losses to, Conception Bay, 175

losses to, in St. Lawrence River, 174n

reconnaissance of Newfoundland bays,

174

St. John's harbor, mining of approaches, 175

shelling of Caribbean oil facilities, 228

shifted from North American coastal

waters, 250

warfare in western Atlantic, 247

wolf-pack technique, 242

Japanese

in Aleutians, 254

shelling of west coast, 121, 121n

reduction of menace, 317

tanker losses to, 228

Suez Canal, 193

Superintendent of Airways, Canadian, 201

Supplies, 137

acquisition of, in Canada, 136-37

in Canada. See North West Purchasing,

Limited; War Supplies, Limited.

Supply Committee, U.S.-Canadian, 139

Supreme Court, Canadian, opinion on jurisdiction, 299-300

Supreme war council, proposal of, 59

Surcouf, 159

Surplus property

in Canada, disposition of, 44, 317, 319-20,

326-29, 326n, 333, 358-59, 364-65

in U.S., purchase of by Canada, 329
INDEX 427

Sydney, Australia, 272

Sydney, Nova Scotia, 2, 49, 245, 247

Sykes, Howard, 79

SYMBOL (Casablanca) Conference, 66n, 248

Tanana, 230

Tanks, 92, 281

production totals, U.S.-Canadian, 290

Taschereau, Robert, 299

Task Force 1, USN, 123, 124. See also Atlantic Fleet.

Task Force 4, USN-RCN-RN, 116, 124,

125

Task Force 24, 248

Task Force 57, RN, 272

Task Force 2600, 127, 231

Task Force Tare, 255-56

Task Group 4.11. See Newfoundland Escort

Force.

Task Group 4.19, USN-RCN, 125, 244, 245

Task Unit 16.1.1, AAF-RCAF, 254, 255

Tavani, 191

Taxes, Canadian

American personnel, 134

reimbursement of, 278

Taxes, Newfoundland, 169

Taxes, U.S., 278

TERMINAL Conference, 66n

Tests, cold weather, Camp Shilo, 281

The Pas. See Bases, air, U.S.

Theobald, Rear Adm. Robert, 255-56

Thicket, 191

Thomas, Capt. F. P., 36

Tizard, Sir Henry, 285

Tizard Mission, 285, 286

TNT, 286

Tok road, 225

Torbay, 170n, 172, 173, 184, 247

Toronto, joint conference on Military Area,

197

Toronto Group, 286

Trade, Canadian

with Latin America, 143, 148, 161

agreements with Argentina, Brazil, and

Chile, 144

Training. See also Air Observers School,

Canadian; British Commonwealth Air

Training Plan; Pilots, world-wide training requirements; U.S.-Canadian relations, areas of co-operation,

air, in Canada, for U.S. personnel, proposal of, 42n, 281-83, 343, 356

assistance, request for by Canada, 13

British air crews, in U.S., 282

Canadian personnel in U.S. Army schools,

281

Training—Continued

cold weather. ESKIMO, POLAR BEAR, LEMMING exercises, 281

naval, on Great Lakes, 279, 280

parachute, for Canadian personnel, Fort

Benning, 281

RCAF, at Bellingham, 283

RCAF officers at U.S. airway traffic control school, 305

specialized for First Special Service Force,

261-62

Transfers

of Americans from Canadian to U.S.

forces, 274-76, 282

of Canadians from U.S. to Canadian

forces, 276

Transportation Committee, U.S.-Canadian,

139

Transportation Corps Regulating Station,

Edmonton, 133

Transportation facilities, 86, 186, 189, 191n,

193. See also Air Transport Command;

Alaska Highway; CRIMSON Project;

Northwest Staging Route; Railways;

Roads; Water routes; White Projects.

air, to Alaska, 219

Canada, 350

Canadian, U.S. improvement of, 345

Great Lakes, load-line regulations, 273

Maritimes, 349-50

Newfoundland, 177-79, 349-50

to northern air bases, 187

northern Canada, improvements by U.S.,

333-34

ore carriers, Canadian, in U.S. domestic

shipping, 274

river routes, 202

shipping to Alaska, 239

U.S. Army truck fleet, Alaska Highway,

223-24

water, to Alaska, 219

water route, Waterways to Norman Wells,

214, 231

winter roads, 202

winter roads, Peace River-Fort Providence, 214

winter roads, Peace River-Norman Wells,

214, 231, 232

Treasury Board, Canadian, 278

Treasury Department, U.S., 292

Treaties

Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway, rejection of, 274

U.S.-Great Britain, on boundary with

Canada, 27

Treaty of Ghent, 1
428 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 48

Treaty Series, Canadian, 29

TRIDENT Conference, 66

Trinidad, 97n

Troops, Australian, 270

Troops, British, 50, 270

Aruba, 142

Iceland, 155

relieved in Iceland, 157, 157n

Troops, Canadian, 47

Aleutian campaign, 257

Bahamas, 149n

Bermuda, 149n

British Guiana, 149n

British West Indies, 9

Caribbean, 143

England, 156n

Fort Benning, 281

Goose Bay, 188

Great Britain, 162

Hong Kong, capture by Japanese, 7 In,

272n

Iceland, 9, 142, 156, 162

Iceland garrison transferred to British Isles,

157

Jamaica, 49, 142, 149n

Labrador, 149n

LEMMING exercise, 281

Maritime Provinces, 99, 162

Newfoundland, 9, 20, 20n, 95, 98-99,

149n, 166, 170, 173, 175

west coast, 101

Troops, India, 270

Troops, Netherlands, 63

Troops, New Zealand, 270

Troops, U.S. See also Air forces, U.S.

Alaska, 100-101, 199, 204, 277

Argentia, 168

Aruba, 149n

Canada, 134, 199, 296-97, 317-18

withdrawal from, after V-J Day, 306

to Canada only if attack imminent, 16-17

Curaçao, 149n

Greenland, 154, 243

Iceland, 156-57, 243

mobile reserves to repel aggression, 162

Maritimes, 16-17

Newfoundland, 16-17, 93, 170, 173, 175,

296, 317-18

Troopships

Canadian, 222n, 267n, 277

U.S., 258

Truk, 272

Truman, Harry S., 289

Truman Committee. See Senate, Special

Committee of, to Investigate the National Defense Program.

Trusteeships. See Colonies, European, in

Western Hemisphere.

Turkey, 293

Uganda, 272

Umnak, 254-55

Uniform, Army, for contract airline personnel, 309, 310

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 58-59,

205, 216, 244, 293, 294-95, 318, 337,

338-39

United Airlines, 133, 308

United Kingdom, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 15, 18-

20, 21, 23, 24-25, 27, 48, 49, 55, 56-

58, 60, 61-62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69,

70, 72, 77, 83-84, 85, 90, 94, 97, 99,

102, 103-04, 110, 112, 115, 123, 126,

130, 142, 146, 148, 149-50, 149n, 151,

153n, 155-57, 159, 162, 163, 164, 167,

171, 181, 182, 184, 186, 241, 242, 243,

244, 245, 246, 248, 250, 260, 267, 275,

281, 282, 285, 287, 288, 292, 294-95,

298-99, 300, 329, 338, 339. See also

Battle of Britain; Commander in Chief,

Western Approaches.

Free French occupation of St. Pierre and

Miquelon, suggestion of, 158

government in exile, if Britain falls, 9

occupation of Iceland to prevent German

use, 155

pressure on Canadians to occupy Greenland, 150

war leadership, 340

United Nations, 148, 337

U.S. Army Air Forces in Newfoundland, 98,

125, 126, 172, 190, 247, 313

U.S. Army Construction Forces for the Alcan

Highway, 127

U.S. Army Forces in Central Canada, 45n, 131

U.S. Army Forces in Eastern Canada, 131

U.S.-British agencies. See Anglo-American

Food Committee; Combined Chiefs of

Staff, U.S.-British; Combined Civil Affairs Committee; Combined Communications Board; Combined Food Board,

U.S.-British; Combined Meteorological

Committee; Combined Policy Committee (atomic research); Combined Production and Resources Board, U.S.-

British; Combined Raw Materials Board,

U.S.-British; Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, U.S.-British; Munitions

Assignments Board, U.S.-British.

U.S.-Canadian agencies. See Alaskan International Highway Commission; Board of

Inquiry for the Great Lakes Fisheries,
INDEX 429

U.S.-Canadian agencies—Continued

U.S.-Canadian; Canadian Air Traffic

Regulations Subcommittee; Communications Committee, U.S.-Canadian; Construction and Engineering Committee,

U.S.-Canadian; Flying Control Committee, U.S.-Canadian; International Fisheries Commission, U.S.-Canadian;

International Joint Commission, U.S.-

Canadian; International Pacific Salmon

Fisheries Commission; JAN-CAN Committee, U.S.-Canadian; Joint Agricultural Committee, U.S.-Canadian; Joint

Defense Production Committee, U.S.-

Canadian; Joint Economics Committee,

U.S. and Canadian; Joint Travel Control

Board, U.S.-Canadian; Joint War Aid

Committee, U.S. and Canadian; Joint

War Production Committee, U.S.-

Canadian; Material Coordinating Committee, U.S. and Canada; Military

Cooperation Committee, U.S.-Canadian;

Permanent Joint Board on Defense; Security of Communications Committee,

U.S.-Canadian; Special Commissioner

for Defense Projects; Supply Committee,

U.S.-Canadian; Transportation Committee, U.S.-Canadian; Weather Committee, U.S.-Canadian.

U.S.-Canadian relations. See U.S.-Canadian

relations, areas of co-operation; U.S.-

Canadian relations, areas of Canadian

discontent; U.S.-Canadian relations, areas

of U.S. discontent; Public opinion, Canadian; Public opinion, U.S.

U.S.-Canadian relations, areas of Canadian

discontent. See also U.S.-Canadian relations, areas of co-operation; U.S.-

Canadian relations, areas of U.S.

discontent

AAF offer of outmoded bombers for use

in Pacific, 271

ABC-1 report, 57

American attitude on Canada, 340

attitude on Canadian independence, 68-

70, 335, 339, 341

British-American staff liaison in London,

20-21

control over contract airlines, 308-10

construction sites, 200, 296

failure to consult, 85

inadequacy of voice in Commonwealth

strategy, 5n

leased-bases agreement on Newfoundland,

62

matériel procurement difficulties, 60-61

military mission to Washington, 72-76,

104, 120, 342

Pacific problems, 70-71, 160

U.S.-Canadian relations, etc.—Continued

reference to First Special Service Force as

a U.S. unit, 261

representation on Combined Food Board,

83, 84

representation in war councils, 57, 59-60,

62-64, 68, 73-74, 84-85, 102, 339

Rio de Janeiro meeting, 160

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting off Newfoundland, 62

Secretary Hull's reference to "so-called"

Free French, 160

unity of command, 342

U.S. postwar advantage, 340

U.S. troops and civilians on Canadian soil,

340

U.S.-Canadian relations, areas of co-operation,

24-25, 319-20. See also Military planning, U.S.-Canadian; Permanent Joint

Board on Defense; Plans, defense and

war; U.S.-Canadian relations, areas of

Canadian discontent; U.S.-Canadian relations, areas of U.S. discontent; and

projects by name.

aerial mapping of northern Canada, 284

aerial torpedo range in Puget Sound, 281

air training in Canada for U.S. personnel,

proposal, 281-83

apprehension of AWOL's and deserters, 277

on the battlefield, 241-42

cold-weather exercises ESKIMO, POLAR

BEAR, LEMMING, 281

cold-weather tests, U.S., at Camp Shilo,

281

compulsory military training for nondeclarant males, 276

construction of facilities, 344

dental and medical services, 277

enlistments and transfers in Armed Forces,

274

exchange of intelligence, 280-81

hospital facilities, 277

Lake of St. Francis, 273

Lend-Lease, 293-94

mail service, 277

MUSKOX exercise, 336-37

Niagara River, 273

parachute training at Fort Benning, 281

payment of Canadian troops in U.S. dollars, 277

prizes of war, 278

rescue of Hudson Bay Company personnel,

Fort Ross, 284

research and development, 273, 284-89

Rush-Bagot Agreement, 278-80

security measures, 283-84

settlement of claims, 277-78

shipping facilities on Great Lakes, 273

troopships, Canadian, loan of, 222n, 277
430 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

U.S.-Canadian relations, etc.—Continued

U.S. military broadcasting stations in

Canada, 277

use of air and naval facilities, 283

waiving of Canadian duties, taxes, royalties, 278

before World War II, 1-3, 296

U.S.-Canadian relations, areas of U.S. discontent. See also U.S.-Canadian relations, areas of co-operation; U.S.-

Canadian relations, areas of Canadian

discontent.

air defense, Gander Airport, 117

airway control and operation, 238

authority and interservice discord in Newfoundland, 118

changes in design specifications for staging

fields, 212

communications in Newfoundland, 118

control of U.S. air bases and traffic in

Canada, 304, 306

construction sites, 200, 296

delays on Northwest Staging Route fields,

205, 207, 209

inadequate labor force and refusal to permit use of Engineer troops, 205

limited use of proposed Canadian Army

Pacific Force 268

local defense, necessity of agreement among

commanders, 117

Newfoundland air facilities, 96-97, 171

proposed tax on surplus property used in the

war, 327

radar installation in Canada, 71

reassignments to obtain seniority, 117-18

refusal of U.S. servicing detachment at

Torbay, 173

repeated failure to meet delivery schedules,

292-93

reversal to Canadian construction on Staging Route, 212, 304

RCAF desire to control air traffic in Newfoundland, 302

RCAF use of U.S. buildings, Gander Airport, 172

unity of command, 74, 89, 90, 98, 104,

121-22

U.S. urgency versus Canadian study of

postwar effects, 71, 235, 340

U.S. Department of State. See Department of State, U.S.

U.S. Joint Board. See Joint Board, U.S.

University of Chicago, 287

Unlimited national emergency, U.S., 58

UNRRA, 295

Uranium, 287, 288

Urquhart, Mr., 135

Valdez, 222, 225

Vancouver, 39, 41, 238, 240, 305

Vancouver, 256

Vancouver Island, 122n, 257, 258

Vandenberg, Arthur, 29

Vanier, Lt. Col. George P., 35, 37

Venezuela, 48

Vessels

Canadian commercial, on Great Lakes, 274

military, on Great Lakes. See Rush-Bagot

Agreement.

Mutual Aid program ships, Canadian title

to, 294-95

U.S., passage through Canadian waters,

307, 310

U.S.-Canadian construction totals, 290

U.S., and Icelandic flag, 123

Veterans Guard, 149n

Vichy French Fleet, 158

Vichy Government, 158

Vickery, H. L., 80

Victoria, 39, 41, 201

Villeneuve-Loubet, 267

V-J Day, 317

Wager Bay, 191

Wagner, Capt. F. D., 36

Walsh, Air Vice Marshal G. V., 75n

Walwyn, Vice Adm., 166

War Assets Corporation, Limited, 326, 326n,

333

War Cabinet, British, 56

War debts, 2

War Department, U.S., 7, 10-11, 17, 29, 31,

34, 35, 38, 42, 42n, 43n, 45-46, 50, 56,

72-74, 76, 90, 92, 96, 104, 105, 107,

115-16, 118, 120, 127, 130-31, 132, 133-

35, 148, 149, 152, 163, 169-70, 171,

182, 185, 187, 189, 194, 197, 204, 205,

206, 212, 213, 215, 217, 218, 219, 224,

226-31, 232, 234-35, 239, 240, 252,

253, 260, 266, 267, 268-70, 271, 278,

280, 282, 283, 292, 306, 311-12, 322n,

328, 328n, 343

War Department General Staff, 17, 35, 89,

111, 113-14, 136, 140

War of 1812, 1

War Food Administrator, U.S., 84

War Office, British, 156n

War Office, Canadian, 72n

War Plans Division, WDGS, 17, 52, 89, 103-

04, 111, 115-16, 149n

War production. See also Industry, Canadian; Industry, U.S.-Canadian; Joint War

Production Committee, U.S.-Canadian;

Munitions, Canadian; Munitions, U.S.;
INDEX 431

War production—Continued

Munitions, U.S.-Canadian; Roosevelt,

Hyde Park Declaration,

amortization, on Canadian-owned facilities,

293

distribution of, 295

Canadian, 295

U.S., 292-94

U.S. and Canadian, 339

U.S.-Canadian joint declaration on, 80-81

U.S.-Canadian totals, 289-91

War Production Board, U.S., 260

War Shipping Administration, U.S., 292

War Supplies, Limited, 83, 292

War Supply Board, Canadian, 60

Warm Springs, 4

Wartime Industries Board, Canadian, 79

Wartime Information Board, Canadian, 26n

Washington

Atlantic Convoy Conference, 125, 248-49

Canadian air traffic regulations, talks on,

304-05

Inter-American Defense Board, seat of, 145

meeting, Permanent Joint Board on Defense,

39, 40

Military Cooperation Committee meeting,

336

Newfoundland air traffic control, talks on,

301-02

staff talks, January-March 1941. See Military planning, U.S.-British,

staff talks, prewar, announcement of, 58

tripartite agreement on atomic energy, 289

Washington State, 106, 220n

Water route, Waterways to Norman Wells,

231, 331

Waterways, Alberta, 231-32

Watson Island, 240, 327

Watson Lake, 201, 202, 207, 208, 211, 212,

230, 232, 234n, 235, 323, 324, 331, 333

Watson-Watt, Robert, 94

Weapons, advanced, and Canadian privileged

sanctuary position, 341

Weapons, atomic, 341

Weasel, 260, 262, 281

Weather, meteorological services, Canadian

northwest, 236, 237-38, 309

Weather Committee, U.S.-Canadian, 139

Weather stations, U.S., 318, 327

Brochet, 191

Calgary, 338

Canada, 52, 70, 136, 141, 189, 190-91

Canadian hindrances to U.S. weather services, 190

Cape Harrison, 191n

Churchill, 191

Weather stations, U.S.—Continued

Coral Harbour, 191

Duck Lake, 191

Edmonton, 238

Eskimo Point, 191

Fort Chimo, 184, 190, 191

Fort Nelson, 238

Fort St. John, 238

Foxe Basin, 191

Frobisher Bay, 184, 190, 191

Gander, Canadian forecasts for U.S. garrison, 190

Gillam, 191

Greenland, 149

Hebron, 191n

Hudson Bay Junction, 191

Indian House Lake, 191

Island Falls, 191

Lake Harbour, 191

Mecatina, 191

Newfoundland (Gander) Airport, 190

Padloping Island, 184, 190, 191

Prince George, 238

River Clyde, 191

Stillwater Lake, 191

The Pas, 191

Wabowden, 191

Watson Lake, 238

Whitehorse, 238

York Bay, 191

Welland Canal, 279

Welles, Sumner, 10, 11n, 14, 15, 21-22, 31,

145, 145n, 146, 163, 164

West Indies, 14-15, 142

Western Airlines, 133, 308

Western Defense Command. See Defense

Commands, Western.

Western Hemisphere, 10, 11, 19, 23, 24, 26,

40, 46, 48, 49, 50-51, 142, 143, 153,

153n, 161, 163, 164, 271, 341. See also

American Republics; Colonies, European,

in Western Hemisphere; Military planning, U.S.; Monroe Doctrine; Permanent

Joint Board on Defense, geographical

limits.

and Iceland, 155-56, 157n

U.S. convoys to 30° west, 123, 244

U.S. neutrality patrol to 26° west, 243

Western Labor Board, Canadian, 137, 199-

200

Western Local Escort Force, RCN-U.K.,

125, 245-46, 247

Western Union Telegraph Company, 180

Westomp (western ocean meeting place), 244

246

Whitbourne, 180

White, Harry D., 78
432 MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

White Hills. See Fort Pepperrell.

White Pass and Yukon Route Railway, 128,

225, 225n, 226, 230

U.S. lease of, 225-26

White Project, AAF, 192, 318

Whitehorse, 127, 128, 135, 224, 226, 228-29,

230-31, 232, 235, 236, 237, 238, 305,

323, 324, 325, 330, 332. See also Bases,

air, U.S., Whitehorse.

Whitney, Rear Adm. J. P., 36

Whittier, Alaska, 225

Wilson, J. A., 135, 205

Winant, John G., 156

Winnipeg, 45n, 131, 195

Winnipeg Grenadiers, 142, 257

Winter Outpost, Canada, 191

Winter roads, 202, 214, 231, 232

Woodbridge, 4

Woodring, Harry H., 149n

World War I, 1-2, 59

conscription, French-Canadian opposition

to, 206n

U.S.-Canadian relationships, 2

World War II

cost, military, to Canada, 295

cost, military, to U.S., 295

Worsham, Brig. Gen. Ludson B., 128, 139

WPL-50 (Navy Hemisphere Defense Plan 3),

122

WPL-51 (Navy Hemisphere Defense Plan 4),

122-24

WPL-52 (Navy Hemisphere Defense Plan 5),

123, 124

Wrangell, 202

Wrigley, 215

Wyman, Col. Theodore, Jr., 128, 214

Yachts, for conversion, purchase of by Canada, 7

Yakutat, 100, 202, 253

Yarmouth, 23, 247

York Bay, 191

Yugoslavia, 293

Yukon River, Yukon-Alaska, 218, 225n, 227

Yukon Territory, 128, 137, 225n, 232

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1990 242-456/00020