1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APRIL LANKFORD, : Civil No. 3:23-CV-1106

 : 

 Plaintiff : 

 : 

 v. : 

 : (Magistrate Judge Carlson) 

MARTIN O’MALLEY, : 

Commissioner of Social Security, : 

 : 

 Defendant : 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Until 2019, April Lankford worked as a medical practice office manager 

despite suffering from depression and anxiety for at least twenty-five years prior to 

the alleged onset of her disability. (Tr. 137-40). In January of 2020, Lankford applied 

for disability insurance benefits, alleging an onset of disability in September of 2019. 

(Tr. 315). However, following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied 

Lankford’s application for benefits. (Tr. 13-39). Citing her activities of daily living, 

history of conservative treatment and normal mental examinations, and the medical 

opinions of a number of experts, including two State agency consultants and a 

consultative examiner who found that Lankford experienced only mild limitations 

in her mental functional abilities, the ALJ concluded at Step 2 that Lankford’s mental 

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impairments were nonsevere and did not account for any mental limitations in the 

residual functional capacity (RFC). Based upon this RFC determination, the ALJ 

found that Lankford could perform her past work as a medical practice office 

manager. 

Lankford now challenges this aspect of the ALJ’s residual functional capacity 

assessment, arguing that the ALJ erred in failing to account for the mild functional 

limitations defined at Step 2 in the RFC determination or otherwise explain why it 

was unnecessary. In considering this claim, we are mindful of two guiding legal 

tenets. First, as the Supreme Court has recently underscored, we employ a limited 

scope of review when considering Social Security appeals. Our task is simply to 

determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. On this score:

The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout 

administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency 

factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. ––––, ––––, 

135 S.Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015). Under the substantialevidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record 

and asks whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the 

agency’s factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 

305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis 

deleted). And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts, 

the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial 

evidence, this Court has said, is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.; see,

e.g., Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). It means—and means only—“such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S.Ct. 206. See Dickinson v. 

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Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999) 

(comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearlyerroneous standard).

Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).

Second, consistent with this deferential standard of review, when we are 

called upon to assess whether an ALJ has sufficiently articulated a rationale for the 

mental and emotional components of an RFC, we have recently been instructed that 

this aspect of an RFC is sufficient “as long as the ALJ offers a ‘valid explanation’” 

for the mental and emotional limitations imposed upon a worker. Hess v. Comm’r 

Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2019). On this score, it has been held that an 

ALJ offers a valid explanation for a mental RFC when the ALJ highlights factors 

such as “mental status examinations and reports that revealed that [the claimant] 

could function effectively; opinion evidence showing that [the claimant] could do . 

. . work; and [the claimant]’s activities of daily living, . . . . ” Hess v. Comm’r Soc. 

Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 214 (3d Cir. 2019).

Thus, Hess tells us that the legal sufficiency of an ALJ’s mental RFC 

assessment should not be addressed in the abstract, through a mechanical process 

which requires adherence to certain terms of art. Instead, this analysis should be a 

pragmatic consideration grounded in the evidence presented at the disability hearing. 

Mindful of the fact that substantial evidence “means only—‘such relevant evidence 

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as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,’” Biestek v. 

Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019), and recognizing that a mental RFC is 

sufficient “as long as the ALJ offers a ‘valid explanation,’” for the mental and 

emotional limitations imposed upon a worker, Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 

198, 211 (3d Cir. 2019), we find that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s 

findings in this case. Therefore, for the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the 

decision of the Commissioner denying this claim.

II. Statement of Facts and of the Case

On January 24, 2020, April Lankford filed an application for Disability 

Insurance Benefits (DIB), alleging that she had become totally disabled beginning

on September 6, 2019, due to blind or low vision, sixth nerve palsy, anxiety, 

depression, asthma, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, bilateral knee 

replacement, bilateral reconstructive feet surgery, and spinal stenosis. (Tr. 284-85, 

314-15). Lankford was born in 1955 and was sixty-three years old at the time of the 

alleged onset of her disability, making her a person closely approaching retirement 

age under the regulations. (Tr. 284, 315). She had prior employment as a medical 

practice office manager, where she worked from around 2004 until September 2019. 

(Tr. 33, 144, 315, 676). 

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This appeal advances a specific, and narrowly framed, question, challenging

the sufficiency of the ALJ’s analysis of Lankford’s emotional impairments and

specifically argues that this analysis was deficient and infirm because the ALJ did 

not sufficiently reconcile the RFC with his determination at Step 2 of the sequential 

analysis that governs social security cases that she had mild impairments in several 

areas of mental functioning. As we have noted, this issue cannot be addressed in the 

abstract, but should be evaluated in the context of the ALJ’s articulated factual 

findings concerning Lankford’s mental impairments and capabilities. In this case, 

the ALJ found at Step 2 of the sequential analysis which applies to Social Security 

appeals that Lankford’s mental impairments were nonsevere. (Tr. 22-25). In so 

finding, the ALJ thoroughly summarized the longitudinal medical evidence with 

regard to her mental impairments, stating:

On April 13, 2018, the claimant, who had been taking Sertraline and 

Trazodone prescribed by her primary care provider for a number of 

years for mental health symptoms, reported to her primary care provider 

feeling stable on her medications despite experiencing work stress 

(Exhibit 6F). On March 15, 2019, the claimant reported to her primary 

care provider experiencing anxiety and burn out from work after her 

department had gone from four (4) to two (2) employees with having 

to perform the same amount of work and feeling persecuted by 

management (Exhibit 7F). The claimant did not want to change her 

medications at that time (Exhibit 7F). The claimant did not undergo 

recommended therapy at that time (Exhibit 7F). On May 31, 2019, the 

claimant reported to her primary care provider that things are better at 

work than they had been at her last appointment (Exhibit 7F). The 

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claimant underwent an assessment for therapy on July 6, 2019, sharing 

the belief that her current medications are working and her current 

struggles are situational related to work (Exhibit 5F). The claimant 

indicated that she is on FMLA leave to protect her from getting fired 

and she does not want to retire until she turns sixty-five (65) so she can 

receive Medicare (Exhibit 5F). On July 16, 2019, the claimant reported 

that she is moving on September 26, 2019 with a last day of work 

scheduled on September 6, 2019 (Exhibit 5F). The claimant explained 

at that time that she is trying to get disability for trouble walking and 

getting around due to her size because she wants free insurance (Exhibit 

5F). There is no documentation of therapy after August 24, 2019, at 

which time the claimant was doing well (Exhibit 5F).

On December 19, 2019, the claimant reported to her primary care 

provider that her mental health symptoms have been much better since 

she has not been working (Exhibit 7F). On February 5, 2020, the 

claimant’s depression and anxiety were noted to be well controlled 

overall on Sertraline (Exhibit 17F). The claimant’s Trazodone dosage 

was increased at that time for worsening sleep issues after she reported 

retiring and moving (Exhibit 17F). On June 5, 2020, the claimant’s 

mental health symptoms were described as well controlled overall on 

medications despite stressors including several family members having 

died over the past few months (Exhibit 17F). At the consultative 

examination on August 12, 2020, the claimant appeared cooperative 

with adequate manner of relating, social skills and overall presentation 

and appropriate eye contact (Exhibit 14F). The claimant appeared to be 

of average intellectual functioning, and her attention, concentration and 

memory appeared intact with the ability to perform serial threes and 

sevens and to recall five (5) digits forward and four (4) digits backward 

(Exhibit 14F). The claimant’s mental health symptoms were noted to 

be overall well-controlled on medications on December 7, 2020 

(Exhibit 17F). At the consultative examination on March 23, 2021, the 

claimant again appeared cooperative with adequate overall presentation 

and appropriate eye contact (Exhibit 18F). The claimant’s attention and 

concentration appeared mildly impaired in that she was able to count 

and to perform simple calculations while struggling with serial threes 

and sevens (Exhibit 18F). Further, the claimant’s memory appeared 

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mildly impaired in that she was able to recall 3/3 objects immediately 

and with delay and four (4) digits forward and backward (Exhibit 18F). 

The clamant again appeared to be of average intellectual functioning at 

that examination (Exhibit 18F). On June 15, 2021, the claimant reported 

to her primary care provider wanting to focus on physical health issues 

before changing medication or treatment relating to her mental health 

symptoms, which she shared the belief were related to fatigue and 

physical issues (Exhibit 23F). There is no documentation of additional 

significant treatment with any provider for mental health symptoms, 

nor is there documentation of inpatient psychiatric hospitalization, 

participation in a partial hospitalization or intensive outpatient

program, emergency treatment, treatment with a psychiatric provider or 

specialized mental health treatment with any provider beyond therapy 

the claimant attended for approximately two (2) months prior to the 

alleged onset date. Rather, it appears that the claimant’s symptoms 

since that time appropriately have been managed with medications 

prescribed by the claimant’s primary care provider without the need for 

more intensive interventions. Further, the record does not document the 

claimant’s exhibition of significant dysfunctional behavior directed 

toward others or significant, consistent attentional, cognitive or 

memory deficits. This record fails to establish that mental impairments 

posed more than minimal functional limitations upon the claimant.

(Tr. 22-24). 

The ALJ then carefully assessed the severity of Lankford’s emotional 

impairments, describing the degree of her impairment in the following terms:

The first functional area is understanding, remembering or applying 

information. In this area, the claimant had no limitation. While the 

claimant indicates that she required reminders to take medication and 

to go places, she indicates that she did not require reminders to attend 

to her personal care needs (Exhibit 4E). The claimant indicates that she 

did ok with spoken instructions with repetition and she did fairly well 

with written instructions (Exhibit 4E). The claimant indicates that she 

managed her own finances (Exhibit 4E). At a consultation with a 

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neurology provider on April 25, 2019, the claimant’s functional 

cognition appeared intact and her memory appeared good (Exhibit 3F). 

At the consultative examination on August 12, 2020, the claimant’s

memory appeared intact, and she appeared to be of average intellectual 

functioning (Exhibit 14F). The claimant’s memory appeared intact at 

appointments with her primary care provider on September 15, 2020 

and December 7, 2020, respectively (Exhibit 17F). At the consultative 

examination on March 23, 2021, the claimant’s memory appeared 

mildly impaired in that the claimant exhibited 3/3 recall abilities both 

immediately and with delay and recalled four (4) digits both forward 

and backward (Exhibit 18F). The claimant appeared to be of average

intellectual functioning at that examination (Exhibit 18F). When the 

claimant met with her primary care provider on July 2, 2021, she 

appeared to have an above average fund of knowledge and intact 

memory (Exhibit 23F). On these facts, the claimant had no limitation 

in understanding, remembering or applying information.

The next functional area is interacting with others. In this area, the 

claimant had mild limitation. The claimant has her driver’s license, and 

she left the home to shop, to perform senior exercises and to go to the 

senior café (Exhibit 4E, Testimony). The claimant drove forty-six (46) 

miles to the consultative examination on March 23, 2021 (Exhibit 18F). 

While the claimant indicates that she had problems getting along with 

family, friends and neighbors if the relationships became negative or 

too stressful, she indicated that she got along great with authority 

figures (Exhibit 4E). At the physical consultative examination on that 

date, the claimant appeared friendly and well dressed, and she 

interacted appropriately throughout (Exhibit 19F). At mental health

consultative examinations on August 12, 2020 and March 23, 2021, the 

claimant appeared cooperative with adequate manner of relating, social 

skills and/or manner of relating and appropriate eye contact (Exhibit 

14F, 18F). For these reasons, the record indicates that the claimant had 

mild limitation in interacting with others.

The third functional area is concentrating, persisting or maintaining 

pace. In this area, the claimant had mild limitation. As indicated above, 

while the claimant indicates that she required reminders to take 

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medication and to go places, she indicates that she did not require 

reminders to attend to her personal care needs (Exhibit 4E). The 

claimant indicates that she did ok with spoken instructions with 

repetition and she did fairly well with written instructions (Exhibit 4E).

The claimant indicates that she finished what she started (Exhibit 4E). 

At a consultation with a neurology provider on April 25, 2019, the 

claimant’s functional cognition appeared intact, and her attention and 

concentration appeared within normal limits (Exhibit 3F). At the 

consultative examination on August 12, 2020, the claimant’s attention 

and concentration appeared intact with the ability to count and to 

perform simple calculations and serial sevens and threes, and she

appeared to be of average intellectual functioning (Exhibit 14F). At the 

consultative examination on March 23, 2021, the claimant’s attention 

and concentration appeared mildly impaired in that the claimant was 

able to count and to perform simple calculations but struggled to 

perform serial sevens and threes (Exhibit 18F). The claimant appeared 

to be of average intellectual functioning at that examination (Exhibit 

18F). When the claimant met with her primary care provider on July 2, 

2021, she appeared to have an above average fund of knowledge 

(Exhibit 23F). Accordingly, the record establishes that the claimant had 

mild limitation in concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace.

The fourth functional area is adapting or managing oneself. In this area, 

the claimant had mild limitation. The claimant relocated to 

Pennsylvania during the fall of 2019 to a senior living community, and 

she lives alone there (Testimony). The claimant had no problems 

attending to her personal care needs (Exhibit 4E). The claimant 

performed household chores including caring for her cats, preparing 

meals, laundering clothes, dusting and performing simple household

repairs (Exhibit 4E, Testimony). The claimant reported on April 16, 

2020 having fallen while gardening two (2) weeks before (Exhibit 17F). 

The claimant has her driver’s license, and she left the home to shop, to 

perform senior exercises and to go to the senior café (Exhibit 4E,

Testimony). The claimant reported on June 15, 2021 that she performs 

tai chi and senior aerobics four (4) times per week (Exhibit 23F). The 

claimant managed her own finances (Exhibit 4E). The claimant 

indicated that she does ok with changes in routine (Exhibit 4E). 

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Therefore, the record indicates that the claimant had mild limitation in 

adapting or managing herself.

Because the claimant’s medically determinable mental impairments 

caused no more than “mild” limitation in any of the functional areas 

and the evidence does not otherwise indicate that there is more than a 

minimal limitation in the claimant’s ability to do basic work activities, 

they were nonsevere (20 CFR 404.1520a(d)(1)).

(Tr. 23-25). 

The ALJ then formulated the following RFC for Lankford:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds 

that through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual 

functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 

404.1567(a) except that she was capable of lifting and/or carrying ten 

(10) pounds occasionally and less than ten (10) pounds frequently. The

claimant was capable of sitting for six (6) hours and standing and 

walking for two (2) hours’ each in an eight (8) hour day. The claimant 

was capable of occasional performing of postural movements, but never 

climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds or crawling. The claimant was 

required to avoid moderate exposure to heights and moving machinery 

parts.

(Tr. 25). 

This RFC assessment for Lankford rested upon the consideration of her 

treatment records, which the ALJ summarized at Step 2, reported activities of daily 

living, and the medical opinion evidence. As to her activities of daily living, the ALJ 

highlighted:

The claimant’s activities of daily living similarly support the claimant’s 

ability to perform work activities within the residual functional capacity 

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assigned. As indicated above, the claimant relocated to Pennsylvania 

during the fall of 2019 to a senior living community, and she lives alone 

there (Testimony). The claimant had no problems attending to her 

personal care needs (Exhibit 4E). The claimant performed household 

chores including caring for her cats, preparing meals, laundering 

clothes, dusting and performing simple household repairs (Exhibit 4E, 

Testimony). The claimant reported on April 16, 2020 having fallen 

while gardening two (2) weeks before (Exhibit 17F). The claimant has 

her driver’s license, and she left the home to shop, to perform senior 

exercises and to go to the senior café (Exhibit 4E, Testimony). The 

claimant reported on June 15, 2021 that she performs tai chi and senior 

aerobics four (4) times per week (Exhibit 23F). The claimant managed 

her own finances (Exhibit 4E). These activities of daily living are 

consistent with the claimant’s ability to perform work activities within 

the residual functional capacity assigned.

(Tr. 29). 

The ALJ also considered the medical opinion evidence with regard to 

Lankford’s mental impairments. On this score, the ALJ considered the opinions of 

State agency psychological consultants Dr. John Gavazzi and Dr. Thomas Fink, who 

opined that Lankford had no limitation in understanding, remembering or applying 

information, mild limitation in interacting with others, concentrating, persisting, or 

maintaining pace and adapting or managing herself and that she had nonsevere 

mental impairments. (Tr. 29). The ALJ also considered the opinion of consultative 

examiner Dr. John Kajic who also opined that Lankford had mild limitations in 

making judgments on complex work-related decisions, interacting appropriately 

with coworkers and supervisors and responding appropriately to usual work 

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situations, and to changes in a routine work setting, but no limitation in 

understanding, remembering or carrying out simple and complex instructions, 

making judgments on simple work related decisions or interacting appropriately with 

the public. (Id.) The ALJ found these opinions persuasive, explaining:

To the extent that these opinions are suggestive that mental 

impairments posed no more than minimal functional limitations upon 

the claimant, they are supported by the absence of documentation of 

inpatient psychiatric hospitalization, participation in a partial 

hospitalization or intensive outpatient program, emergency treatment, 

treatment with a psychiatric provider or specialized mental health 

treatment with any provider beyond therapy the claimant attended for 

approximately two (2) months prior to the alleged onset date, the record 

reflecting that the claimant’s symptoms since that time appropriately 

have been managed with medications prescribed by the claimant’s 

primary care provider without the need for more intensive interventions 

and the record that does not document the claimant’s exhibition of 

significant dysfunctional behavior directed toward others or significant, 

consistent attentional, cognitive or memory deficits. For these reasons, 

these opinions are persuasive to the extent that they are suggestive that 

mental impairments posed no more than minimal functional limitations 

upon the claimant.

(Tr. 29). Thus, in finding these opinions persuasive, and declining to adopt

limitations on Lankford’s mental functioning in the RFC, the ALJ highlighted 

Lankford’s conservative mental health treatment, the fact that her mental 

impairments were managed with medication, and the lack of any objective evidence 

of significant limitations in her mental functional abilities. 

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The ALJ also considered the opinion of consultative examiner Dr. Leah 

Bielski, who found Lankford had moderate limitations in understanding, 

remembering and carrying out complex instructions, making judgments on complex 

work related decisions, interacting appropriately with the public, coworkers and 

supervisors and responding appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in 

a routine work setting and mild limitations in understanding, remembering, and 

carrying out simple instructions and making judgments on simple work related 

decisions. (Tr. 32, 884-98). The ALJ found the opinion of Dr. Bielski partially 

persuasive to the extent it suggested only mild limitations, but concluded that the 

findings of moderate limitations were too extensive, in light of:

[T]he absence of documentation of inpatient psychiatric 

hospitalization, participation in a partial hospitalization or intensive 

outpatient program, emergency treatment, treatment with a psychiatric 

provider or specialized mental health treatment with any provider

beyond therapy the claimant attended for approximately two (2) months 

prior to the alleged onset date, the record reflecting that the claimant’s 

symptoms since that time appropriately have been managed with 

medications prescribed by the claimant’s primary care provider without 

the need for more intensive interventions and the record that does not 

document the claimant’s exhibition of significant dysfunctional 

behavior directed toward others or significant, consistent attentional,

cognitive or memory deficits.

(Tr. 32).

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Based upon this RFC determination, the ALJ concluded that Lankford could 

perform her past relevant work as a medical practice office manager as generally 

performed, skilled work with an SVP of 7 that is generally performed at a sedentary 

level and actually performed at a light level. (Tr. 33). Based upon these findings, the 

ALJ concluded that Lankford had not met the exacting disability standards 

prescribed by law and denied this claim. (Id.) 

This appeal followed. (Doc. 1). On appeal Lankford advances a single claim, 

arguing that the RFC determination made by the ALJ was flawed in that it failed to 

account for the mild limitations in three areas of mental functioning determined at 

Step 2 in the RFC determination. This case is fully briefed and is therefore ripe for 

resolution. For the reasons set forth below, under the deferential standard of review 

that applies here, we will affirm the decision of the Commissioner. 

III. Discussion

A. Substantial Evidence Review – the Role of this Court

When reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s 

application for benefits, this Court’s review is limited to the question of whether the 

findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial evidence in the 

record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 

(3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012). 

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Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but 

rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Substantial 

evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not 

substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a 

conflict created by the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 

1993). But in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be 

“something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two 

inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision] 

from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 

383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In determining if the Commissioner’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” 

Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). 

The Supreme Court has recently underscored for us the limited scope of our 

review in this field, noting that:

The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout 

administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency 

factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. ––––, ––––, 

135 S.Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015). Under the substantialevidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record 

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and asks whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the 

agency’s factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 

305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis 

deleted). And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts, 

the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial 

evidence, this Court has said, is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.; see,

e.g., Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). It means—and means only—“such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S.Ct. 206. See Dickinson v. 

Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999) 

(comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearlyerroneous standard).

Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).

The question before this Court, therefore, is not whether the claimant is 

disabled, but rather whether the Commissioner’s finding that she is not disabled is 

supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application 

of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, 

at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ’s errors of law denote 

a lack of substantial evidence.”) (alterations omitted); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F. 

Supp. 913, 914 (W.D.Pa. 1981) (“The Secretary’s determination as to the status of a 

claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v. 

Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal 

matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (“[T]he court has plenary review 

of all legal issues . . . .”). 

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Several fundamental legal propositions flow from this deferential standard of 

review. First, when conducting this review, “we are mindful that we must not 

substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 

607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 552). Thus, we are enjoined 

to refrain from trying to re-weigh the evidence. Rather, our task is to simply 

determine whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings. However, we 

must also ascertain whether the ALJ’s decision meets the burden of articulation 

demanded by the courts to enable informed judicial review. Simply put, “this Court 

requires the ALJ to set forth the reasons for his decision.” Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000). As the Court of Appeals has noted 

on this score:

In Burnett, we held that an ALJ must clearly set forth the reasons for 

his decision. 220 F.3d at 119. Conclusory statements . . . are 

insufficient. The ALJ must provide a “discussion of the evidence” and 

an “explanation of reasoning” for his conclusion sufficient to enable 

meaningful judicial review. Id. at 120; see Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 

501, 505 & n. 3 (3d Cir. 2004). The ALJ, of course, need not employ 

particular “magic” words: “Burnett does not require the ALJ to use 

particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his 

analysis.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505.

Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009).

Thus, in practice, ours is a twofold task. We must evaluate the substance of 

the ALJ’s decision under a deferential standard of review, but we must also give that 

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decision careful scrutiny to ensure that the rationale for the ALJ’s actions is 

sufficiently articulated to permit meaningful judicial review.

This principle applies with particular force to legal challenges, like the claim 

made here, based upon alleged inadequacies in the articulation of a claimant’s 

mental RFC. In Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 212 (3d Cir. 2019), the 

United States Court of Appeals recently addressed the standards of articulation that 

apply in this setting. In Hess the court of appeals considered the question of whether 

an RFC which limited a claimant to simple tasks adequately addressed moderate 

limitations on concentration, persistence, and pace. In addressing the plaintiff’s 

argument that the language used by the ALJ to describe the claimant’s mental 

limitations was legally insufficient, the court of appeals rejected a per se rule which 

would require the ALJ to adhere to a particular format in conducting this analysis. 

Instead, framing this issue as a question of adequate articulation of the ALJ’s 

rationale, the court held that: “as long as the ALJ offers a ‘valid explanation,’ a 

‘simple tasks’ limitation is permitted after a finding that a claimant has ‘moderate’ 

difficulties in ‘concentration, persistence, or pace.’ ” Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 

F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2019). On this score, the appellate court indicated that an ALJ 

offers a valid explanation a mental RFC when the ALJ highlights factors such as 

“mental status examinations and reports that revealed that [the claimant] could 

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function effectively; opinion evidence showing that [the claimant] could do simple 

work; and [the claimant]’s activities of daily living, . . . . ” Hess v. Comm’r Soc. 

Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 214 (3d Cir. 2019).

In our view, the teachings of the Hess decision are straightforward. In 

formulating a mental RFC the ALJ does not need to rely upon any particular form 

of words. Further, the adequacy of the mental RFC is not gauged in the abstract. 

Instead, the evaluation of a claimant’s ability to undertake the mental demands of 

the workplace will be viewed in the factual context of the case, and a mental RFC is 

sufficient if it is supported by a valid explanation grounded in the evidence. 

B. Initial Burdens of Proof, Persuasion, and Articulation for the ALJ

This is a disabled widow’s disability claim. Once the threshold requirements 

are met to satisfy widow status, to receive benefits by reason of disability, a claimant 

must demonstrate an inability to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason 

of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected 

to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous 

period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. 

§1382c(a)(3)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §§404.1505(a), 416.905(a). To satisfy this 

requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment that 

makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any other substantial gainful 

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activity that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. 

§1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1505(a), 416.905(a). To receive benefits under 

Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she contributed 

to the insurance program, is under retirement age, and became disabled prior to the 

date on which he or she was last insured. 42 U.S.C. §423(a); 20 C.F.R. §404.131(a).

In making this determination at the administrative level, the ALJ follows a 

five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a), 416.920(a). 

Under this process, the ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant 

is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe 

impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed 

impairment; (4) whether the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work; and 

(5) whether the claimant is able to do any other work, considering his or her age, 

education, work experience and residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. 

§§404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). 

Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ must also assess a claimant’s residual 

functional capacity (RFC). RFC is defined as “that which an individual is still able 

to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).” Burnett v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. 

§§404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1), 416.920(e), 416.945(a)(1). In making this 

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assessment, the ALJ considers all of the claimant’s medically determinable 

impairments, including any non-severe impairments identified by the ALJ at step 

two of his or her analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2). 

At Steps 1 through 4, the claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating 

the existence of a medically determinable impairment that prevents him or her from

engaging in any of his or her past relevant work. Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064. Once this 

burden has been met by the claimant, it shifts to the Commissioner at Step 5 to show 

that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could 

perform that are consistent with the claimant’s age, education, work, experience, and 

RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1512(f), 416.912(f); Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.

The ALJ’s disability determination must also meet certain basic substantive 

requisites. Most significant among these legal benchmarks is a requirement that the 

ALJ adequately explain the legal and factual basis for this disability determination. 

Thus, in order to facilitate review of the decision under the substantial evidence 

standard, the ALJ’s decision must be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory 

explication of the basis on which it rests.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d 

Cir. 1981). Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved and the ALJ must indicate 

which evidence was accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons for 

rejecting certain evidence. Id. at 706-707. In addition, “[t]he ALJ must indicate in 

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his decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis 

for his finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F. 3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 

1999).

C. The ALJ’s Decision in this Case is Supported by Substantial 

Evidence. 

In this setting, we are mindful that we are not free to substitute our 

independent assessment of the evidence for the ALJ’s determinations. Rather, we 

must simply ascertain whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence, a quantum of proof which is less than a preponderance of the evidence but 

more than a mere scintilla, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), and 

“does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence,” Pierce v. Underwood, 

487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988), but rather “means—and means only—‘such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” 

Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). We also acknowledge that an 

ALJ’s mental RFC assessment does not have to follow any particular format and 

should be upheld “as long as the ALJ offers a ‘valid explanation,’” for that 

assessment. Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2019). 

Judged against these deferential standards of review, we find that substantial 

evidence supported the ALJ’s mental RFC assessment in this case. The plaintiff 

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argues that the ALJ erred in finding she had mild limitations in three out of four 

areas of mental functioning at Step 2 of the sequential analysis but adopting no 

mental limitations in the RFC finding without adequate explanation. To support her 

argument for remand, the plaintiff cites to the Tenth Circuit case, Wells v. Colvin, 

727 F.3d 1061 (10th Cir. 2013). Indeed, this Court has recognized the requirement in 

Wells that:

As a general matter, an ALJ must consider limitations and restrictions 

associated with all of a claimant's impairments, both severe and nonsevere, when formulating the RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2). “[T]he 

Commissioner's procedures do not permit the ALJ to simple rely on his 

finding of non-severity as a substitute for a proper RFC analysis.” Wells

v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 1061, 1065 (10th Cir. 2013). “A conclusion that the

claimant's mental impairments are non-severe at step two does not

permit the ALJ to simply disregard those impairments when assessing

a claimant's RFC and making conclusions at step four and five.” Id. at

1068–69. 

Kich v. Colvin, 218 F. Supp. 3d 342, 355–56 (M.D. Pa. 2016). Thus, it is well settled 

that, despite a finding of non-severe mental impairments at Step 2, an ALJ must at 

least consider those impairments when fashioning the RFC. 

However, “the ALJ's consideration of the individual's non-severe impairments 

does not amount to a requirement that the ALJ must include limitations in the RFC 

associated with mild impairments.” Weidner v. Kijakazi, No. CV 20-1250-MN, 

2022 WL 610702, at *9 (D. Del. Feb. 1, 2022), report and recommendation adopted,

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No. CV201250MNSRF, 2022 WL 610678 (D. Del. Feb. 16, 2022) (citing Smith v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2016 WL 3912850, at *9 (D.N.J. July 19, 2016)). Instead, the 

requirement in Wells that an ALJ must explain the reasons for excluding mild mental 

functional limitations is cabined by the Third Circuit’s holding in Hess that an ALJ’s 

mental RFC assessment should be upheld “as long as the ALJ offers a ‘valid 

explanation,’” for that assessment. Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 211 (3d 

Cir. 2019). Indeed, as previously noted, an ALJ offers a valid explanation of a mental 

RFC when the ALJ highlights factors such as “mental status examinations and 

reports that revealed that [the claimant] could function effectively; opinion evidence 

showing that [the claimant] could do simple work; and [the claimant]’s activities of 

daily living, . . . . ” Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 214 (3d Cir. 2019). See 

also Shaffer v. Colvin, 2014 WL 4925067, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2014) (“It is 

clear from the record that the ALJ adequately considered all of the relevant medical 

evidence, as well as plaintiff’s reported activities, in assessing plaintiff’s residual 

functional capacity, and that he incorporated into his finding all of the limitations 

that reasonably could be supported by the medical and other relevant evidence.”); 

McCafferty v. Astrue, 2008 WL 1869282, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2008) (finding 

that the requirements of SSR 96-8p were satisfied by ALJ's narrative discussion of 

the claimant's functional limitations in the context of the objective medical evidence, 

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doctors’ notes and opinions, the claimant's activities of daily living, and the 

claimant's subjective complaints). 

The plaintiff provides a robust line of caselaw supporting this proposition that 

an ALJ errs in failing to account for even mild mental limitations in the RFC without 

valid explanation. But, where the plaintiff has provided much legal support for her 

argument, she has failed to highlight evidence which explains precisely what mental 

limitations would have precluded her from performing her past work. Indeed, the 

plaintiff has foregone a recitation of the medical evidence, instead relying on a solely 

legal argument that a remand is always required where an ALJ finds mild limitations 

at Step 2 but does not explicitly account for those limitations in the RFC. The 

plaintiff bolsters her argument by explaining that her past work is considered skilled 

work and thus any limitations at Step 2 would preclude her from performing it. 

However, in our view, the ALJ’s decision not to include mental limitations in 

the RFC was both adequately articulated and supported by substantial evidence. At 

the outset, the ALJ thoroughly considered and analyzed the longitudinal medical 

evidence with regard to Lankford’s mental impairments at Step 2. The ALJ then 

conducted a thorough “paragraph B” analysis, detailing each of the four broad 

functional areas, finding only mild limitations in interacting with others, 

concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and adapting or managing herself. 

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(Tr. 24). The ALJ noted “mental status examinations and reports that revealed that 

[the claimant] could function effectively; opinion evidence showing that [the 

claimant] could do simple work; and [the claimant]’s activities of daily living, . . . 

. ” Hess, 931 F.3d at 214. The ALJ then acknowledged that “[t]he following residual 

functional capacity assessment reflects the degree of limitation the undersigned has 

found in the ‘paragraph B’ mental function analysis.” (Tr. 25). 

The RFC assessment at Step 5 focuses on a summary of the longitudinal 

medical evidence of her severe physical impairments since the medical evidence of 

her nonsevere impairments was summarized at Step 2. But the Step 5 analysis does 

consider how her ability to perform her activities of daily living supports the mental 

RFC determination, noting that she lives alone, has no problems attending to her 

personal care needs, can perform household chores and simple repairs, leaves home 

to shop, perform senior exercises and go to the senior café, performs tai chi and 

senior aerobics four times per week, and manages her finances. The ALJ’s RFC 

analysis also considered the opinion evidence of three psychological consultants 

whose opinions he found persuasive, and one whose opinion he found partially 

persuasive, highlighting her conservative mental health treatment, the fact that her 

mental impairments were managed with medication, and the lack of any objective 

evidence of significant limitations in her mental functional abilities. In our view, this 

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is an adequate assessment of the evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision not to 

include her mild limitations in mental functioning in the RFC. See Weidner 2022 

WL 610702 at *10 (“The ALJ appropriately exercised his discretion in declining to 

include limitations addressing Weidner's mental impairments in the hypothetical 

posed to the VE or the RFC assessment based on the thin evidence of limitations 

caused by those alleged impairments”).

Moreover, we reject the plaintiff’s argument that mild limitations in 

“paragraph B” criteria per se preclude her from performing skilled work. Indeed, 

other courts have found claimants capable of skilled work despite these mild 

limitations. See O’Connor v. Commissioner Social Sec., 466 Fed. Appx. 96 (3d Cir. 

2012) (finding claimant was capable of performing skilled work as an attorney 

despite mild limitations in mental functioning); Weidner, 2022 WL 610702 (finding 

no error where the ALJ found claimant could return to past semi-skilled and skilled 

work despite mild mental impairments); Pividori v. Colvin, No. CV 15-1290, 2016 

WL 6647912, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2016) (collecting cases rejecting argument

that mild limitations in the broad functional areas is incapable of skilled work). 

Indeed, these are fact-bound determinations and, here, there is substantial evidence 

supporting the ALJ’s conclusion that Lankford could perform her past work. In fact, 

her examinations revealed average intellectual functioning and intact memory, she 

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indicated she gets along great with authority figures, interacts appropriately with 

healthcare providers, has her driver’s license, shops, performs senior exercises and 

goes to the senior café, can attend to her personal care needs, does ok with spoken 

instructions with repetition and did fairly well with written instructions, performs tai 

chi and senior aerobics four times per week, manages her own finances, and does ok 

with changes in routine. (Tr. 23-25, 115-151, 327-340).1

Finally, even if the ALJ erred in finding Lankford capable of her past skilled 

work with mild limitations in three of the four “paragraph B” criteria, any error 

would be harmless since, at the hearing, the vocational expert testified that there 

were three other sedentary occupations at an SVP 4, considered semi-skilled,2 to 

1 Moreover, as the ALJ pointed out, in a 2019 assessment Lankford stated that she 

had intended to retire from her full-time position but did not want to have to pay for 

health insurance prior to turning 65. (Tr. 677). On July 16, 2019, she reported that 

she was trying to get disability for trouble walking and getting around due to her size 

because she wants free insurance. (Tr. 22, 686).

2 Under recent policy guidance:

20 CFR 404.1568 and 416.968. We consider occupations with 

specifical vocational preparation (SVP) levels one and two to be 

unskilled. Occupations with SVPs of three and four are semi-skilled, 

and occupations with an SVP of five or greater are skilled. See POMS 

DI 25015.015 Work Experience as a Vocational Factor, available 

at: https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0425015015 and DOT 

Appendix C, available 

at: https://www.occupationalinfo.org/appendxc_1.html#II and. For 

additional information about how we consider skills from past work 

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which Lankford’s skills could transfer, including Clerk Typist, DOT 203.362-010, 

Data Entry Clerk, DOT 203.582-054, and Admitting Clerk, DOT 205.362-018. (Tr. 

145-46). Each of these occupations has a reasoning level of three. As this Court has 

noted, to show harmful error: 

Plaintiff would have to demonstrate that [s]he was incapable of 

performing reasoning level 3 jobs, which requires an individual to 

“Apply commonsense understanding to carry out instructions furnished 

in written, oral, or diagrammatic form. Deal with problems involving 

several concrete variables in or from standardized situations.” (Pl. Brief 

at 23). The only medical expert in the record opined that Plaintiff's mild

limitations in activities of daily living, social functioning, and 

concentration, persistence, or pace were non-severe. (Tr. 81). A nonsevere impairment is a “slight abnormality” causing “no more than a 

minimal effect on an individual's ability to work.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 

482 U.S. 137, 154, 107 S. Ct. 2287, 2298, 96 L.Ed. 2d 119 (1987). 

“[E]ven if an individual were of advanced age, had minimal education, 

and a limited work experience, an impairment found to be not severe 

would not prevent him or her from engaging in SGA.” SSR 85-28. If 

an impairment is non-severe, then Plaintiff retains “the ability to 

perform basic work activities, as required in most jobs. Examples of 

these are...seeing, hearing, and speaking; understanding, carrying out, 

and remembering simple instructions; use of judgment, responding 

under our rules, see SSR 82-41: Titles II and XVI: Work Skills and 

Their Transferability as Intended by the Expanded Vocational Factors 

Regulations Effective February 26, 1979.

Social Security Ruling, SSR 24-1p. Titles II and XVI: How We Apply 

Medical-Vocational Profiles, Federal Register Vo. 89, No. 110, pg 48477 

n.18. Available at: https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/02/SSR2024-

01-di-02.html. 

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appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; and 

dealing with changes in a routine work setting.” Id. 

Kuntz v. Colvin, No. 115CV00767SHRGBC, 2016 WL 6634942, at *9 (M.D. Pa. 

Sept. 30, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:15-CV-767, 2016 WL 

6599994 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2016). Thus, even if Lankford were incapable of 

performing her past work due to her mild mental impairments, substantial evidence 

reveals that other jobs existed in the national economy that she would be capable of 

performing. Moreover, as previously noted, the plaintiff has pointed to no specific 

mental limitations that would prevent her from performing basic work activities. Id.

(citing Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552-53 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Plaintiff 

cannot demonstrate that any error was harmful without identifying the additional 

limitations the ALJ should have included in the RFC”). In fact, substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s determination that she could perform these duties.

In closing, the ALJ’s assessment of the evidence in this case complied with 

the dictates of the law, was adequately articulated, and was supported by substantial 

evidence. This is all that the law requires, and all that a claimant can demand in a 

disability proceeding. Thus, notwithstanding the argument that this evidence might 

have been viewed in a way which would have also supported a different finding, we 

are obliged to affirm this ruling once we find that it is “supported by substantial 

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evidence, ‘even [where] this court acting de novo might have reached a different 

conclusion.’ ” Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190–91 (3d Cir. 

1986) (quoting Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. NLRB, 804 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1986)). 

Accordingly, under the deferential standard of review that applies to appeals of 

Social Security disability determinations, we find that substantial evidence 

supported the ALJ’s evaluation of this case. Therefore, this decision will be 

affirmed.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner in this case will 

be affirmed and the plaintiff’s appeal denied. 

An appropriate order follows.

 /S/ Martin C. Carlson 

Martin C. Carlson

 United States Magistrate Judge

DATED: December 11, 2024

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