LAW AND

MILITARY

OPERATIONS

IN

KOSOVO:

1999-2001

LESSONS

LEARNED

FOR

JUDGE

ADVOCATES

Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO)

The Judge Advocate General’s School

United States Army

Charlottesville, Virginia
 

 

 


 


 


 

CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS
 

(CLAMO) 

Director 

COL David E. Graham 

Deputy Director 

LTC Stuart W. Risch 

Director, Domestic Operational Law 

(vacant) 

Director, Training & Support 

CPT Alton L. (Larry) Gwaltney, III 

Marine Representative 

Maj Cody M. Weston, USMC 

Advanced Operational Law Studies Fellows 

MAJ Keith E. Puls
 

MAJ Daniel G. Jordan
 

Automation Technician 

Mr. Ben R. Morgan 

Training Centers 

LTC Richard M. Whitaker Battle Command Training Program 

LTC James W. Herring Battle Command Training Program 

MAJ Phillip W. Jussell Battle Command Training Program 

CPT Michael L. Roberts Combat Maneuver Training Center 

MAJ Michael P. Ryan Joint Readiness Training Center 

CPT Peter R. Hayden Joint Readiness Training Center 

CPT Mark D. Matthews Joint Readiness Training Center 

SFC Michael A. Pascua Joint Readiness Training Center 

CPT Jonathan Howard National Training Center 

CPT Charles J. Kovats National Training Center 

Contact the Center 

The Center’s mission is to examine legal issues that arise during all phases of military operations 

and to devise training and resource strategies for addressing those issues. It seeks to fulfill this mission in 

five ways. First, it is the central repository within The Judge Advocate General's Corps for all-source 

data, information, memoranda, after-action materials and lessons learned pertaining to legal support to 

operations, foreign and domestic. Second, it supports judge advocates by analyzing all data and 

information, developing lessons learned across all military legal disciplines, and by disseminating these 

lessons learned and other operational information to the Army, Marine Corps, and Joint communities 

through publications, instruction, training, and databases accessible to operational forces, world-wide. 

Third, it supports judge advocates in the field by responding to requests for assistance, by engaging in a 

continuous exchange of information with the Combat Training Centers and their judge advocate observercontrollers, and by creating operational law training guides. Fourth, it integrates lessons learned from 

operations and the Combat Training Centers into emerging doctrine and into the curricula of all relevant 

courses, workshops, orientations, and seminars conducted at The Judge Advocate General’s School. Fifth, 

in conjunction with The Judge Advocate General’s School, it sponsors conferences and symposia on topics 

of interest to operational lawyers 

The contents of this report are not to be construed as official positions, policies, or decisions of the 

U.S. Army, The Judge Advocate General, the U.S. Marine Corps, or the Staff Judge Advocate to the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Center welcomes and solicits suggestions and contributions of 

relevant operational law materials from the field. 

 


 


 


 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS
 

IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 

LESSONS LEARNED FOR
 

JUDGE ADVOCATES
 

CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

15 DECEMBER 2001
 

-

LAw AND MILrrARY QPERAllONS IN Kosovo: 1999-2001 

LA W AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN Kosovo, 

1999-2001: LESSONS LEARNED FOR JUDGE 

ADVOCATES 

I. 	 INTRODUCTION ~ 	 1



II. 	 THE MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THEIR CONTEXT: A HISTORY 

OF Kosovo s 

A. Introduction 	 S 

B. 	 Kosovo in the Early Years 	 11



C. Kosovo in Recent Years 	 23



III. 	 OPERA TION ALLIED FORCE/T ASK FORCE HAWK/OPERATIONS 

AT CA~P AJJLE ~ENTRY, F~~OM ~~ 

A. 	 Operation Allied Force 	 44



1. Command and Control 	 44



2. 	 USEUCOM Lessons Learned 	 45



a. Agreement Must Be Reached on the Applicability of the Law of Armed
 


Conflict Prior to Commencement of Operations. 46



b. Targeting 	 48



1. The target review process developed during Noble Anvil should be
 


considered for future operations 48



2. Reemphasize that the infliction of collateral damage is not a per se
 


violation of intemationallaw. 50



3. Understand the ongoing debate over targeting the will of the enemy. ...51



3. 	 AFSOUTH Lessons Learned 	 53



a. 	 Many U.S. Judge Advocates Have an Inadequate Understanding of the
 


NATO Command Structure. 53



b. Staying Abreast of Rapidly Changing Diplomatic Efforts is Critical. 54



c. 	 The Inability to Negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement Prior to the
 


Arrival of Military Forces Creates Significant Problems. 55



1

CENTER FOR LAW A.ND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

d. Be Prepared to Fulfill All Legal Missions Despite Inadequate Staffing 

and Resources 	 : 56



B. Task Force Hawk 	 57



1. Overview 	 57



2. Lessons Learned 	 58



a. Targeting 	 58



1. Judge advocates must be in the Deep Operations Coordination Cell. 59



2. Develop a target review methodology and document decisions. 60



b. Rules of Engagement 	 62



1. Confusion over the chain of command has a direct impact on ROE 

development. 	 62



2. Expect disagreement over "templated" targets, counter-battery radar, 

r", '- c. 	 d " b d" Be an 0 serve Prepared for PW filIes. Isues, 	 Even if Not Engaged 	 : in Ground Combat 63
4 

d. Foreign Claims 	 66



1. Coordinate procedures for reaching outlying claimants given the 

security and logistical constraints. 	 67



2. Realize that local law may be difficult to ascertain and plan 

accordingly. 	 68



3. 	 Understand the unique role that village elders can play in claims



adjudication. 68



4. Interpreters provide essential support for claims adjudication. 	 69



5. Paying legitimate claims can be a force multiplier 	 69



e. Fiscal Law-Donation of Property Must Be Analyzed on a Case-byCase Basis. 	 69



1. 	 Consider a third-party transfer using an Acquisition and Cross-


Servicing Agreement to donate property that is not excess. 70



2. Consider classifying property as "consumed" by the operation. 71



3. Realize the difficulty of classifying staple items as excess. 	 72



f. Contract Law Support Is Required Immediately. 	 73



g. Military Justice 	 74



1. Expect a General Order Number One. 	 74



2. Documenting jurisdictional alignment requires meticulous attention. ...74



3. Retaining jurisdiction over soldiers in the rear during a deployment 

will 	 cause delays 	 75



4. On-call Trial Defense Services requires coordination. 	 75



h. 	 Preparation, Personnel, and Equipment 	 76



i. Administrative Law 	 77



ii 
r 

LAW AND MILrrARyQpERAllONS IN Kosovo: 1999-2001



1. Operational tempo and the deployed environment 	 can make
 


administrative tasks more difficult. 77



2. 	 Emphasize to the investigating officer that legal advice provided
 


during the conduct of the investigation does not constitute legal
 


review. 78



C. 	 Camp Able Sentry, FYROM 	 78



1. Operating Without 	 a Clearly Applicable Status of Forces Agreement
 


Presents Legal Challenges. 79



2. 	 Humanitarian Assistance Fiscal Law Issues Underscore the Importance
 


ofJA Integration into the Staff and the Utilization of Technical
 


Channel Support. 81



3. The Capture of the Three U.S. Soldiers Highlights 	 the Need for a Senior
 


and Impartial Investigating Officer. 83



IV. 	 OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN 	 84



A. Overview 	 84



1. Command and .Control 	 86



2. International Framework 	 89



a. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 	 89



b. United Nations in Kosovo Regulations 	 91



c. The Military Technical Agreement 	 92



d. The Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation of the UCK. ...93



e. 	Rambouillet Accords 	 93



f. 	 The Kosovo Protection Corps/Commander Kosovo Force's Statement of 

g. 	Notice ofCOMKFOR's Principles 	 Intent Regarding Entry of FRY and Republic 

of Serbia Forces in GSZ 	 95



h. Mission 	 95



B. International Law 	 97



1. Judge Advocates and Commanders Must Understand the International
 


Legal Framework for the Military Mission. : 97



2. 	 Rule of Law 	 ' 98



a. 	 Arrest, Investigation, Detention, and Trial of Non':members of the
 


Force. 99



III-,

-

CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


1. Line units must be prepared to discharge the policing function in the
 


event that a law enforcement vacuum exists. 101



2. Soldiers must have an arrest standard they can understand 103



3. Prepare to operate a detention facility 	 104



4. Review conditions of the detention facility. 	 105



5. Judge Advocates should be familiar with detention facility doctrine... 106



6. Protect detainees' rights through a review process 	 107



7. Units must be prepared to detain individuals believed to be a threat to
 


the force. 112



8. Independent evidence must be developed in addition to information
 


gathered for intelligence purposes. 115



9. The criminal justice system can be manipulated by citizens to further
 


ethnic bias. 116



b. Support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
 


Yugoslavia 116



1. Expect initial ICTY investigative teams to arrive with no support. 117



2. Provide a single point of contact to the ICTY. 	 118



3. Devise a system to track and report war crimes locations within the
 


Area of Responsibility. 118



c. Rule of Law Contains a Civil Component-"Property Repatriation" 119



3. Despite Operating Under Consent-Based Agreements, Expect No
 


SOFA 120



4. Joint Implementation Commission Operations 	 121



a. Use the JIC Proceedings to Establish Legitimacy. 	 122



b. Review Taskings from Multinational Higher Headquarters for
 


Compliance with U.S. Law. 122



c. 	 If the JIC is Responsible for Ensuring Compliance with an Agreement,
 


Use a Success Matrix to Track Compliance Issues. 123



d. The JIC Can Provide Valuable Assistance to JAs. 	 124



5. Brown & Root Operations and Status 	 124



6. 	 Interagency Relationships 	 125



a. Expect NGOs to Criticize Decisions 	 126



b. Expect to Mentor Interagency Actors on the Mission and Possibly Their
 


Roles. 126



c. Coordinate with NGOs for Joint Humanitarian Projects. 	 126



C. Rules of Engagement 	 127



1. Expect Difficulties with ROE in Coalition Operations. 	 128



a. Modifications to the ROE Will Be Difficult to Obtain 	 128



IV 
r c 

LAW ANDMn..rrARY QPERAllONS IN Kosovo: 1999-2001



b. Requests for Modification to the ROE Should Be Submitted Through
 


Both the Operational and National Chains of Command. 128



c. 	 Actions in Self-Defense by U.S. Soldiers Are a U.S. Issue and
 


Interpretations of Self-Defense Issues Should Remain in U.S. Legal
 


and Operational Channels. 129



1. Out-of-Sector Exercises and Operations 	 129



2. 	 Current Operations and Training 	 130



2. Individual and Leader ROE Training Must Be Done Before the Mission
 


Rehearsal Exercise; Individual Training Should Focus on Self-
 

Defense. 132



3. ROE Training Should Continue During the Mission and Should
 


Incorporate Current Intelligence and Tactical Situations. 133



4. Soldiers and Marines Will Have to Understand Multiple ROE. 133



5. Be Prepared to Articulate Rationale for Use of Riot Control Means and
 


Plan for Alternatives. 135



6. JAs Must Know the "Peace Operation" Variation to the Code of
 


Conduct for Training. 135



D. 	 Military Justice 	 136



1. Establishing Jurisdictional Alignment 	 136



2. On-Call Trial Defense Service Support Can Be Effective. 	 138



3. Violations of General Order Number 1 and Negligent Discharges
 


Dominate the Military Justice Workload. 140



4. JAs Must Be Aware of the Potential Problems Caused by a Lack of
 


Unity of Command and Unity of Effort 140



5. Trying Courts-Martial in a Deployed Environment Presents Numerous
 


Challenges. 142



a. Judge Advocate/Public Affairs Coordination is Vital. 	 142



b. Maintain a Media Log 	 143



c. Insulate the Trial Counsel from Distractions. 	 144



d. Carefully Consider Trial Location. 	 144



E. Administrative Law 	 145



1. Be Prepared to Provide Legal Support to Public Affairs, Psychological
 


Operations, and Other Aspects of Information Operations. 145



2. Understand the Distinction Between War Trophies and Historical
 


Artifacts and Be Prepared to Address Unit Desires to Retain Historical
 


Artifacts. 146



v

CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


3. Standardize Administrative Investigative Procedures ................................ 147 


4. Design a Method to Ensure Mandatory Investigations Are Promptly 


Completed................................................................................................. 148 


5. Be Prepared to Advise Counterintelligence Units ...................................... 148 


F. 	Civil Law ...................................................................................................... 149 


1. Contract Law ............................................................................................... 149 


a. 	JAs Must Have a Basic Understanding of the Brown & Root 


Sustainment Contract. ............................................................................ 150 


b. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement Operations Have Matured 


to a Level Where Few Issues Arise, but JAs Must Remain Prepared ... 150 


c. 	Be Prepared to Provide Logistical Support Through Agreements Other 


than ACSAs ............................................................................................ 151 


1. 	Support can be provided through a Foreign Military Sales Case, with 


specifics detailed in a memorandum of agreement. ............................ 151 


2. The U.S. cannot give free logistical support and should explain the 


anticipated costs associated with U.S. logistical support .................... 152 


d. Be Prepared to Advise the Joint Acquisition Review Board ................... 154 


2. Fiscal Law ................................................................................................... 154 


a. 	 Humanitarian Assistance Projects Should Be Centrally-Managed and 


Reviewed to Ensure Expenditures Are in Compliance with the 


Appropriation......................................................................................... 156 


b. Make Sure Contractors Understand That They Are Limited to Payment 


Only for Contracted Work. .................................................................... 156 


c. 	Understanding the Mission and the Legal Framework of the Operation 


Can Lead to Fiscal Justification for Expenditures ................................. 157 


d. Support to the UN Requires Reimbursement. ......................................... 158 


e. 	A Commander's Force Protection Obligation May Provide the Basis for 


Expenditures That Might Appear To Be Humanitarian Aid ............... ~ .. 159 


f. Gifts for Visitors Are a Recurring Issue ................................................... 160 


g. Know When to Ask for Procurement Funds ............................................. 161 


G. 	Claims .......................................................................................................... 162 


H. Legal Assistance ......................................................................................... 164 


1. Tailor Legal Assistance Support to the Client. ........................................... 164 


2. Get Authority for Responsible Legal Specialists to Perform Notary 


Services..................................................................................................... 165 


vi 
LAW ANDMILrrARY QPERAllONS IN Kosovo: 1999-2001



3. Be Prepared to Provide Advice on Imminent Death Situations 165



I. 	 Base Camp Operations 	 166



1. Give Careful Consideration to the Base Camp Assignment 	 166



2. Remain Constant! y A ware of the Potential for Conflicts of Interest .166



3. Expect Confusion if Base Camps Are Located in a Different Country 167



J. Personnel, Training, and Equipment 	 168



1. A Successful Deployment is a Team Effort ! 	 l68 

a. 	 Deploy the Minimum Staffing Necessary to Accomplish the Essential
 


Legal Mission and Retain Surge Capability 169



b. Consider Using Civilian "Over Hires" in Rear Offices, but Realize it
 


Takes Planning and Time 170



c. 	 A U.S. Judge Advocate Needs to Be in the Key Decision Centers 171



d. Expect to Have Units Attempt to Prevent Legal Specialists from
 


Working in a Consolidated Legal Center 171



e. 	 Certain Judge Advocates Will Need Top Secret Clearances 172



2. Training 	 172



a. 	 Proficiency in Basic Soldier Skills Is Critical to Success in the Early
 


Stages of a Mission 172



b. Training Should Include Basic Country Background Material and
 


Political Information 173



c. 	 Continue Training in Theater 	 173



3. 	 Equipment 	 173



a. The Rucksack Deployable Law Office Concept Is Sound 	 173



b. Access to a Secret Internet Protocol Router Network Is Required in
 


Today's Operating Environment 174



c. 	 Obtaining Military Equipment to Accomplish the Legal Mission
 


Will Require Persistence and a Strong NCOIC Relationship with
 


the HHC : 175



d. Standing Operating Procedures Are Critical for Future Mission
 


Success 175



V. 	 OPERATIONPROVIDE REFUGE 	 176



A. 	 Command and Control 	 180



1. Lead Federal .Agency 180



.2. Department of Defense 181



vii 
CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

B. Lessons Learned 	 184



1. Understand the Legal Basis for Military Support to Civil Authorities. 184



2. JAs Will Face Military and Civilian Criminal Jurisdiction Issues. 185



a. Clarify Command Relationships. 	 185



b. Domestic Military Operations Should Be Located, to the Extent
 


Possible, on Areas of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction. ~ 186



c. 	 Be Aware That Not All Military Personnel Will Have the Same Status,
 


and That Some Personnel Will Not Be Subject to the UCMJ. 187



3. Security and Criminal Jurisdiction Issues Will Be Complicated. 187



a. Facilitate Law Enforcement Coordination and Cooperation with an
 


Interagency Law Enforcement Memorandum of Agreement. 189



b. Understand the Roles of the Various Security Agencies 	 189



1. INS is responsible for refugee security and administrative processing. 190



2. Understand the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act 	 191



3. Distinguish security issues from criminal investigation issues. 191



c. 	 Remember the Responsibilities of the Various Agencies When
 


Reviewing Contracts for Security Services. 193



d. Forcibly Removing Refugees Raises Policy Issues. 	 194



e. The JA Should Facilitate Weekly Meetings Among the Law
 


Enforcement Agencies. 196



f. Access to the Refugee Camp Is Both an INS Issue As Well As a Force
 


Protection Issue. 196



4. Rules of Interaction/Rules of Engagement 	 198



5. Be Aware of the Potential Limitations on Military Support for War
 


Crimes Investigations. 200



a. Ensure That Requests for Support Meet MSCA Requirements. 200



b. The Standards for Active Duty MSCA Are the Same for Reserve
 


Component MSCA. 202



c. Ensure Proper Authority Is Granted For Access to Refugees For
 


Inter:views. 202



6. Be Prepared for Refugee Deaths, Births, and Marriages 	 203



a. Consider Both Religious and Legal Requirements when Faced with a
 


Refugee Death. , 203



1. Refugee death before arrival 	 203



2. Refugee death after arrival 	 204



b. Weddings Must Be Conducted In Accordance With State Law. 205



c. Citizenship Issues Are Conti"olled by Federal Law. 	 206



7. Expect Refugees and Soldiers to Want to Volunteer. 	 206



VIII 
LAW ANDMlLITARY0PERATIONSINKOSOVO: 1999-2001 

a. 	 Refugee Volunteer Work Cannot Violate the Antideficiency Act. ........ 206 


b. Ordering Soldiers to Work Directly for a Relief Organization Is 


Improper................................................................................................. 207 


8. 	 Providing Legal Assistance to Refugees Requires Secretary of the Army 


Approval.................................................................................................... 208 


9. Access to Military Dining Facilities by Civilians Requires an Exception 


to Policy ..................................................................................................... 208 


10. Fiscal Law ................................................................................................. 209 


a. Indirect Operating Costs May Not Be Reimbursable .............................. 209 


b. Contractual Needs Must Be Tied to Mission Support and Properly 


Documented........................................................................................... 209 


c. Competitive Contracting Procedures Are Required Absent Exception ...210 


11. The JA Will Face Donation Issues ........................................................... 211 


a. Soldiers Cannot Solicit Donations ........................................................... 211 


b. New Jersey Army National Guard Donation Effort ................................ 211 


APPENDICES 

llI-1: V CORPS SJA DOCC APPENDIX ••••.•..••.•...•••..•....••••••••.....•..••••215 


III-2: ADOCS INFORMATION PAPER •••••.••....•.••....•••••••...•••••...•..••.••••219 


111-3: SJA TARGET ANALYSIS FORM ••••..••.••.••.••..•.•••••.•...••.••••••..••••••220 


III-4: TASK FORCE HAWK ROE CARD •••••••••••••••••...•....••..•.••.•.•••..••••221 


111-V: TASK FORCE HAWK SOLDIER IN-BRIEF ••••.••.•••••...•.•.•••.....••••222 


IIl-6(A): CLAIMS PROCESSING INSTRUCTIONS ••.•••••••....•.••.••.•.....•••••226 


IIl-6(B): CLAIMS FORM ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•.....••.••....•.•...•••.••••227 


III-6(C): CLAIMS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ••••••......••.•••....•.•••.•••••••229 


III-7: TASK FORCE HAWK GENERAL ORDER #1 ••••••••••••••••••••...••.••••230 


111-8: TASK FORCE HAWK JURISDICTIONAL ALIGNMENT •••••...••••••233 


IV-1: MILITARY TECHNICAL AGREEMENT ••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•....•.••••238 


IV-2: UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1244 •.......•••••..•....•••••••244 


IV-3: MAP OF MNB(E) AREA OF Kosovo .......................................253 


IV-4: CHAINS OF COMMAND TASK FORCE FALCON ••••••••••••••••••••••••254 


IV-5: UNDERTAKING OF DEMILITARIZATION & TRANSFORMATION 


JJ'\.7 'I'~ UCK .........................................................................2~~ 

IV-6: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES •••••••••••••••....•........••.••.•.....•..••.•••••.•260 


IV-7: lST ID LEADERS LEGAL BRIEFING •••••.•.........•••.........•.•••••.•.••••272 


IV-8: DETENTION POLICY (KFOR lA) ••....••.....•.........•.••••..........•..•.•281 


ix 
CENTER FOR LAW AND MIL IT ARY OPERATIONS 

IV-9: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION INTO 


ALLEGATIONS OF EXCESS FORCE BY 3-504 PIR••••••••••••.••285 


IV-18: DETENTION PROCESSING WITH OPERATIONAL 


IV-2(): CAS ROE CARD••••••••••.•.••..•.•..•.••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••..•••.•..•••••••••34~ 

IV-3~: JARB Ol'~RATIOf'iJ~•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••38~ 

IV-10: WEAPONS CONFISCATION POLICY ••••.•••.•.....•••.....•.•.••••.....••••294 


IV-11: DD FORM 2665-R••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••..•••.••.•......•••..•...•••.•....••••296 


IV-12: DETENTION FACILITY DIAGRAM ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••...•••.•.••••297 


IV-13: MNB-E DETENTION PROCESS SOP (KFOR lB) •••••....•.•.••••298 


IV-14: MAGISTRATE REVIEW MEM0••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••...•••••313 


IV-15: MAGISTRATE REVIEW MEMO, DOCUMENTS ONLY •••••...•••••317 


IV-16: DETENTION POLICY (KFOR 2A) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••...•...••••319 


IV-17: DETENTION PROCESSING (KFOR lB)•••••••••••••••••••....••.•.•••••••322 


DETENTION ••••••••••••••••••••••••.••.•.••..•..•...•.•••.••..••••••....••••...••••••••323 


IV-19: MAGISTRATE'S REPORT ••••..•••••••••••....•......••.•.....•.•...•.•.••••••.••••324 


IV-20: PARAGRAPH 7 REPORT ••••.••.••••••••••...•••••••••.•.••••••.....••.•.....•.••••325 


IV-21: ICTY DATABASE ••••••••••••••.••.••....•..•.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••..•.•.•••••327 


IV-22: :ICTY SOP •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••.....••••.•..•••••••••••••.•...•••••333 


IV-23: DISPUTED PROPERTY FORMS •••••.••••••.••••.•..••.•••••••••••••.....•••••.•338 


IV-24: MEASURES OF SUCCESS MATRIX •••••••••••••.••.•.•••••••••••.•••.•..•••••341 


IV-25: Kosovo ROE CARD ••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••.•.••••••••....•••••..•••••••344 


IV-27: lAD ROE TEST ••••••••••••••••••••.•.•..•••••••••••••••••••••••.••.•..•••••.•••••••••347 


IV-28: ROE AZIMUTH CHECKS •••••••••••••.•.•.••.••••••••••••••.....•.•..••••.•.•••••351 


IV-29: SAMPLE JURISDICTION MEM0••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••...•••.••••••354 


IV-30: GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 1 AND AMENDMENT ••••••.•.•••••••••360 


IV-31: WEAPONS DISCHARGE INVESTIGATION ................................364 


IV-32: HISTORICAL ARTIFACTS PROCESSING INFORMATION ••••••••365 


IV-33: COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT OF USE OF LETHAL FORCE •••367 


IV-3'4.: MOU UAE AND USAREUR•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••371 


IV-36: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FuNDING MESSAGES •••••..••.•••397 


IV-37: FISCAL LAW IN MILITARY OPERATIONS •••••••••....•.....•..•...••••408 


IV-38: IMMINENT DEATH PROCESSING ••••••••••••••••••••••.•.•.....•.•.•...••..••423 


IV-39: Kosovo BACKGROUND BRIEFING CMTC •••••••••.•..•.•.••...•..••429 


V-1: COUNTRIES SUPPORTING KosovAR REFUGEES ••.••.•.•.•••....••.••436 


V-2: PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION NO. 99-23 ••••••••....•.•••.•.••...••.•437 


x 
~ 

~ 

l:

',',

LAw AND MlllTARY OPERAllONS IN Kosovo: 1999-2001
 


V -3: -DoD/DHHS MOA 438 


V -4: U. S. VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT AGENCIES 441



V -5: AGENCIES IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION PROVIDE REFUGE 442



V -6: DOD-DHHS SUPPORT/CONTRACT RESPONSIBILITIES 444



V -7: JTF PROVIDE REFUGE COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE
 


AND UNITS IN SUPPORT 445



V -8: JOINT TASK FORCE PROVIDE REFUGE GENERAL ORDER #1 .446



V -9: JOINT TASK FORCE PROVIDE REFUGE STAFF JUDGE
 


ADVOCATE STANDARD OPERATION PROCEDURE 448



V-I0: MILITARY SUPPORT To CIVIL AUTHORITIES BASIC



PRINCIPLES 455



V-II: J3 OPERATIONS STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES 457



V -12: FORT DIX INSTALLATION LAYOUT 473



V -13: REFUGEE IN- PROCESSING 477



V -14: LAW ENFORCEMENT M OA 478



V -15: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ANNEX 480



V -16: STATEMENT OF GRATUITOUS SERVICES 482



,1

;


",1


r 

!I, 

Xl 
 

 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 

1999-2001 

LESSONS LEARNED FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 

I. INTRODUCTION 

As Kosovo1 leapt onto the world stage at the close of the twentieth 

century, the U.S. military was again engaged in operations marked by legal 

complexity. Like the missions in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia that preceded 

Kosovo, the broadcast images of the mission only told part of the story. 

People around the world recall the vivid photographs of the NATO bombing 

campaign, the Kosovar refugees flooding into temporary camps set up in 

neighboring countries, and troops moving into Kosovo to keep the peace and 

begin the rebuilding process. Less visible were the judge advocates (JAs) 

providing counsel on critical legal issues underlying military action. Also 

hidden from view but seen throughout this review of the Kosovo operation 

was a common thread—that of change at a dizzying rate. 

The rapid transition in Kosovo from international armed conflict to 

peacekeeping2

 was just one example of change faced by JAs and legal 

specialists3

 from the outset. JAs addressed the change in the status of their 

mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) when, 

overnight, they were no longer part of a UN mission they had been sent to 

perform. JAs wrestled with the fiscal implications involved in rapidly 

transforming and training the former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) into a 

U.S. National Guard-like force with an ongoing emergency services mission. 

JAs sent to Albania as advisors for an attack aviation effort suddenly found 

1

 The province is known as Kosovo to the Serbians and Kosova to the Albanians. This book will utilize the 

Serbian term rather than the Albanian as the former is the more commonly used term in most Western style 

manuals. 

2

 Throughout this publication, Operation Joint Guardian will be referred to as a “peacekeeping” mission. 

“Peacekeeping” is a “military operation undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, 

designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a 

long-term political solution.” JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 322 (12 Apr. 2001). See also JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, 

JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR 371 (16 June 1995). 3

 On 1 Oct. 2001, the Military Occupational Specialty 71D, Legal Specialist, changed to 27D, Paralegal 

Specialist. The change was designed to consolidate and unify all aspects of Army Military Legal Services 

under one career management designation. Throughout this Book, the terms “71D” and “legal specialist” 

are used. 

1 
 

 

 

 

 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

themselves faced with the unexpected issue of the capture of prisoners of 

war. JAs supporting a criminal detention mission in Kosovo addressed an 

explosion in the number of noncriminal detainees posing both a threat to the 

force and to the overall mission of establishing a secure environment in 

Kosovo. Daily, JAs working in targeting cells reviewed newly discovered 

targets of opportunity for compliance with legal obligations. JAs assisting in 

the mass humanitarian immigration of thousands of refugees from Kosovo to 

the U.S. faced the unfamiliar web of issues surrounding the use of military 

forces domestically and the interaction with federal agencies outside the 

Department of Defense. 

Dizzying change and fluid operating environments often do not 

provide the opportunity for contemplative thought. Additionally, the 

operational environment may lead deployed JAs to perceive facts and 

circumstances differently than JAs reviewing the deployment years later 

with the benefits of time, comfort, and unlimited resources. As described by 

the first legal advisor to the U.S. task force in Kosovo, an underlying theme 

of the Kosovo mission was the famous Clausewitzian metaphor: “‘the light 

of reason does not move here in the same medium . . . it is not refracted in 

the same manner as in speculative contemplation.’”4

 Undoubtedly, one of 

the largest hurdles in undertaking a lessons learned publication is trying to 

understand the manner in which the light of reason was refracted by those 

participating. With the benefit of speculative contemplation, the Center for 

Law and Military Operations (CLAMO or “the Center”) has not set out to 

criticize or question decisions made by those participating in the operation. 

Rather, CLAMO’s efforts, as described below, summarize the issues and 

solutions as the JAs who were on the ground in Kosovo described them and, 

using the benefit of hindsight, attempt to augment the analysis with 

appropriate legal authority. 

The reasoned application of law during these ever-changing 

operations by military lawyers from all services contributed to the 

remarkable success of the Kosovo missions during the first two years, the 

time period reviewed by this Book. NATO’s bombing efforts stopped the 

Serbian campaign against Kosovar civilians. Millions of displaced Kosovar 

4

 LTC Mark S. Martins, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, 1ID, Task Force Falcon Interim After Action 

Review, Operational Law CLE, PowerPoint presentation, briefing slide 3 (3 Dec. 1999) (quoting GENERAL 

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR, bk. I, ch. IV (edited and translated by J.J. Graham, N. Trubner 1873) 

(1832) (presentation on file with CLAMO). LTC Martins was the former Legal Advisor and Chief of Staff 

of Task Force Falcon. 

2 
 

 

 

 

 

 


 


 


 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

civilians returned to their homes in Kosovo. The province of Kosovo enjoys 

a relative level of peace and security not experienced for a decade. Military 

lawyers played a role in all of these efforts. 

While change provides a common thread through the lessons from 

Kosovo, there is also an undercurrent of continuity. For example, the 

Kosovo operations served to validate traditional operational law analysis, 

which may have been dormant during recent years of peacekeeping. A 

resurgence of the need to understand the basics of the law of armed conflict, 

a static concept when compared with other aspects of legal practice, 

emerged when judge advocates were called on for counsel on targeting and 

prisoner of war status. 

Perhaps the best evidence of continuity, the Kosovo operations also 

served to validate Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps (JAGC) doctrine.5 

The Center can say with great confidence that current JAGC doctrine 

accurately reflects “how the JAGC provide[s] legal support to operations 

and how commanders should integrate legal support in operational planning 

and training.”6

 Validation of doctrine is most clearly seen in the roles of the 

JA in the commanders’ key decision-making processes. JAs were engaged 

in targeting analysis, deep operations planning, information operations, ROE 

cells, and the military decision-making process. Doctrinal validation is also 

captured in the support provided by JAs to command and control, 

sustainment, and personnel service support functions. 

The Center can also state that the JAGC is learning the lessons of 

previous operations. While some of the lessons of this Book are similar to 

lessons from previous operations, the issues as presented here were, almost 

without exception, addressed with the knowledge of previous JA efforts and 

often with the full benefit of the previous research and thought. The clearest 

example of this is found within the law and order mission conducted by U.S. 

forces in Kosovo. JAs preparing and executing the law and order mission 

were able to draw on the lessons of Operation Restore Hope in Haiti and put 

those experiences to use in Kosovo. 

From the outset, this project was an ambitious work. Previous 

reviews by the Center have focused on a single type of operation, typically 

5

 U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-100, LEGAL SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS (1 Mar. 2000)
 

[hereinafter FM 27-100].
 6 Id. at vii.
 

3 
 

 

 

 

 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

occurring in one theater.7

 In contrast, this Book addresses three different 

operations, with three very different missions, occurring in multiple theaters. 

Operation Allied Force was NATO’s bombing campaign in the Federal 

Republic of Yugoslavia; Operation Joint Guardian was the peacekeeping 

mission to Kosovo; and Operation Provide Refuge was the immigration 

assistance mission at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Where possible, this work also 

incorporates some of the lessons of the U.S. Marine Corps, whose 26th 

Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable (MEU(SOC)), 

participated in two of the three operations.8 

Thus, the name of this Book, “Law and Military Operations in 

Kosovo,” may be slightly misleading. The report reflects the experience of 

JAs that supported a variety of operations surrounding the Kosovo crisis. 

This Book captures lessons from JAs operating around the world and across 

the operational spectrum. JAs supported the Kosovo mission both inside 

and outside Kosovo—from Germany, FYROM, Italy, Albania, Belgium, and 

the U.S.—and they provided advice on bombing campaigns, peacekeeping, 

and humanitarian assistance. Most importantly, this Book attempts to 

capture not only knowledge helpful for future missions to Kosovo, but also 

knowledge that allows future JAs and legal specialists deploying to any 

theater to gain the benefits of historical experience. 

The mission of the JAGC is “to provide professional legal support at 

all echelons of command throughout the range of military operations.”9

 In 

assessing the JAGC performance of this mission in Kosovo, the Center, 

where possible, has organized the discussion around the six core legal 

disciplines: international law, military justice, administrative law, civil law, 

claims, and legal assistance.10 The choice of organization, by legal 

discipline rather than chronologically, is useful yet artificial; it should not 

lead the reader to believe that all lessons are equal. Two similar sets of 

facts—one arising while the mission was new and uncertain and the area of 

operations fluid, the other arising in a mature theater—may, correctly, be 

7 See THE CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.
 

ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI 1994-1995: LESSONS LEARNED FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES
 

(1995) [hereinafter HAITI]; THE CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATED
 

GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS 1995-1998: LESSONS
 

LEARNED FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES (1998); THE CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE
 

ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
 

HURRICANE MITCH RELIEF EFFORTS, 1998-1999 (2000).
 8

 Since 1998, CLAMO has included a Marine Corps JA in its ranks to assist with Marine Corps issues.
 9

 FM 27-100, supra note 5, ¶ 1.1.
 10 Id. at Ch. 3.
 

4 
 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

resolved differently. This is merely recognition of the fact that all operations 

in Kosovo, legal operations included, benefited from longevity that allowed 

improvements to infrastructure—logistical, administrative, operational, and 

legal—and basic comfort.11 The organization of this Book is also 

subdivided by operation. This organization has led to similar lessons arising 

in multiple chapters; however, the context in which the lessons arose 

provides distinctions justifying the duplication. 

CLAMO’s lessons learned methodology has not changed since the 

publication of its first lessons learned book, Law and Military Operations in 

Haiti, 1994-1995.

12 To write the Kosovo book, CLAMO gathered and 

analyzed information from a variety of resources: 

•		 transcripts from the June, 2000, After Action Review (AAR) hosted by 

USAREUR and CLAMO and the materials presented during the March, 

2001, AAR conducted via video teleconference with 1AD;13 

11 See HAITI, supra note 7, at 33 (quoting the SJA, 10th Mountain Division and Fort Drum as saying, 

“[t]here is a[n] . . . impact on legal operations when, for the first three weeks of the operation, everybody 

(lawyers included) are eating nothing but MREs, fighting for scarce water supplies, scrounging for a place 

to sleep, not having electricity, digging slit trenches, wearing full battle dress (flak vests, Kevlar, and 

locked and loaded weapons), and otherwise concerned with survival while trying to also provide legal 

services.”). 

12 Id. 13 In June 2000, CLAMO and USAREUR hosted a two-and-a-half day AAR in Heidelberg, Germany. 

During the AAR, participants in military operations during the various Kosovo missions presented 

materials for comment. The AAR participants were BG Thomas Romig, Assistant Judge Advocate General 

for Military Law and Operations; COL Warren Hall, Judge Advocate, United States Army Europe and 

Seventh Army; COL James Coyne, Deputy Judge Advocate, United States Army Europe and Seventh 

Army; COL Thomas McShane, Staff Judge Advocate, Southern European Task Force; COL John Phelps, 

Legal Advisor, Allied Forces South; LTC Richard Batty, United Kingdom; LTC Mark Cremin, Staff Judge 

Advocate, 1st Infantry Division; LTC Mark Martins, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, 1st Infantry Division; 

LtCol James Meyen (USMC), Oceans Law and Policy Branch, Naval War College; Lt Col (USAF) Tony 

Montgomery (USAF), Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, European Command; LTC Mark Oswald, Deputy 

Staff Judge Advocate, Southern European Task Force; LTC Patt Prugh, Legal Advisor, Allied Forces 

South; LTC Maggie MacDonald, Canada, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; LTC Richard 

Sprunk, Contract Law Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army; LTC Sharon Riley, 

Deputy Director, CLAMO; MAJ Tracy Barnes, 1st Infantry Division; MAJ Larrs Celtnieks, 1st Armored 

Division; MAJ Brian Goddard, United States Army Contracting Command, Europe; MAJ Michael Henry, 

1st Infantry Division; Maj Brian Palmer (USMC), European Command; MAJ Pam Stahl, Deputy Staff 

Judge Advocate, 1st Armored Division; Maj. Will Ferrell (USMC), Marine Representative, CLAMO; CPT 

Peter Amuso, V Corps; CPT Jimmy Bagwell, 1st Infantry Division; CPT Teresa Blount, 1st Infantry 

Division; CPT Mary Card, 1st Armored Division; CPT Stephen Carpenter, 1st Armored Division; CPT 

Elizabeth Duffy, 1st Armored Division; CPT Kerry Erisman, V Corps; CPT Grace Gallagher, 1st Armored 

Division; CPT Larry Gwaltney, 1st Infantry Division; CPT Brian Heslin, 1st Infantry Division; CPT Chris 

Jacobs, 1st Infantry Division; CPT Charlie Kovats, 1st Infantry Division; CPT Jay McKee, United States 

Army Europe and Seventh Army; CPT Craig McNeil, 1st Infantry Division; CPT Charlie Poche, 1st 

Armored Division; CPT Carlos Santiago, V Corps; CPT Keith Moore-Erickson, V Corps; WO1 Gregory 

Salyards, Southern European Task Force; and SSG Michelle Browning, 1st Infantry Division. In March 

5 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

•		 AARs from legal offices worldwide; 

•		 interviews of JAs that participated in operations; 

•		 materials from the Center for Army Lessons Learned; 

•		 reports, critiques, and other relevant documents produced by the United 

Nations, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Joint 

Center for Lessons Learned, U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, and other 

organizations participating in the Kosovo mission. 

As with any publication designed for a broad audience, some of what 

follows will seem oversimplified. This Book does not shy away from 

restating basic principles. This approach may provide some lessons that 

seem obvious to veterans of other U.S. deployments, but valid basic 

principles are important to emphasize and may be lessons of first impression 

for many JAs and legal specialists. In addition to basic principles, the Book 

highlights ongoing debates—providing citations to other sources for further 

study, but recognizing that final solutions may not yet exist. By not 

providing solutions to all problems addressed, this Book recognizes that 

issue spotting in itself is a lesson for future operations and hopes that the 

publishing of the issue spurs others, in a position to effect resolution, to 

consider answers prior to future U.S. operations. 

This lessons learned Book is not a history of JAs involved in the 

Kosovo mission. However, an appreciation of the historical setting of the 

region which gave rise to the operation in Kosovo is necessary for two 

reasons. First, the history of the region provides the contextual background 

to understand the lessons learned. Second, the need to understand the 

history in order to provide proper counsel is, in itself, a lesson learned from 

operations in Kosovo. Accordingly, Chapter II of this Book provides a 

history of the region. It outlines the actions of the various organizations 

(e.g., UN, NATO) during the Kosovo conflict, recounts the post-conflict 

situation, and discusses the U.S. involvement through Operation Allied 

Force, Operation Joint Guardian, and Operation Provide Refuge. The 

remainder of the Book summarizes lessons learned. Chapters III, IV, and V 

capture the lessons of Operations Allied Force, the NATO bombing 

2001, CLAMO hosted a video teleconference with 1st Armored Division. Participants in the AAR were 

LTC John Kent, Staff Judge Advocate, 1st Armored Division; LTC Sharon Riley, Deputy Director, 

CLAMO; MAJ Dan Kelly, 1st Armored Division; Maj Will Ferrell (USMC), Marine Representative, 

CLAMO; MAJ Keith Puls, Graduate Course Student, The Judge Advocate General’s School, U.S. Army; 

CPT Joe Berger, 1st Armored Division; CPT Paula Schasberger, 1st Armored Division; CPT Mike 

Forrester, 1st Armored Division; CPT Marie Anderson, 1st Armored Division; CPT Larry Gwaltney, 

CLAMO; and SSG Donnell McIntosh, 1st Armored Division. 

6 
 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

campaign, Joint Guardian, the peacekeeping mission, and Provide Refuge, 

the immigration assistance mission at Fort Dix, New Jersey, respectively. 

Publishing this Book is only one facet of the overall CLAMO mission 

to examine legal issues that arise during all phases of military operations and 

devise training and resourcing strategies to address those issues. In fulfilling 

its overall mission, the Center serves as a repository within the JAGC for allsource data and information.14 Some of that raw data is included in this 

Book in the form of appendices. Other data is referenced within the 

footnotes to the lessons. Additional information, which may not have found 

its way into this Book may, nevertheless, be important for future operations. 

To provide all of this information to the largest military legal audience 

possible, CLAMO maintains vast databases with original documents, after 

action reports, standing operating procedures, operations plans, annexes, and 

training aids. These databases allow JAs to design and tailor deployment 

packages and gives them direct access to valuable resources. Access to 

these databases is obtained through the JAGCNET at 

www.jagcnet.army.mil. Additionally, members of the military legal 

community may contact the Center directly at CLAMO@hqda.army.mil to 

request any of these materials. 

14 The Center seeks to fulfill its mission in five ways. First, it is the central repository within The Judge 

Advocate General's Corps for all-source data, information, memoranda, after-action materials, and lessons 

learned pertaining to legal support to operations, foreign and domestic. Second, it supports judge advocates 

by analyzing all data and information, developing lessons learned across all military legal disciplines, and 

by disseminating these lessons learned and other operational information to the Army, Marine Corps, and 

Joint communities through publications, instruction, training, and databases accessible to operational 

forces, worldwide. Third, it supports judge advocates in the field by responding to requests for assistance, 

by engaging in a continuous exchange of information with the Combat Training Centers and their judge 

advocate observer-controllers, and by creating operational law training guides. Fourth, it integrates lessons 

learned from operations and the Combat Training Centers into emerging doctrine and into the curricula of 

all relevant courses, workshops, orientations, and seminars conducted at The Judge Advocate General’s 

School. Fifth, in conjunction with The Judge Advocate General’s School, it sponsors conferences and 

symposia on topics of interest to operational lawyers. 

7 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 


 
 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

II. THE MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THEIR CONTEXT: A HISTORY OF 

KOSOVO 

A page of history is worth a volume of logic.
 

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.1
 

A. INTRODUCTION 

Being creatures of such a young nation, it's more than a little 

difficult for Americans to understand the conflict in Kosovo. 

Unlike American wars, Kosovo's armed conflict is not defined by 

a generation, it's an heirloom passed down from generation to 

generation. Today's conflict in Kosovo is a child of centuries of 

conflict. Kosovo is a chronicle of refugees fleeing and returning 

to the area over generations. There have been dozens of wars 

over hundreds of years. Each generation remembers the wrongs 

done to the last and passes the bitterness on to the next.2 

From time immemorial, the area that is modern-day Kosovo has been 

the home, be it temporary or for an extended period, to many different 

groups of people. For two of these groups, the Serbians and Albanians, the 

Balkan3

 province of Kosovo4 holds a unique and profound historical 

significance.5 

1

 JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 543 (16th ed. 1992) (citing New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 

U.S. 345, 349 (1921)). 2

 Chicago-Kent College of Law, A Historical View of the Conflict in Kosovo, War Crimes Evidence 

Library 1, http://pbosnia.kentlaw.edu/projects/warcrimes/history.html [hereinafter War Crimes Library] 

(last visited 24 Aug. 2001). 

3

 The term “Balkan” is derived from the Turkish word for mountain, or "chain of wooded mountains." 

WILLIAM T. JOHNSEN, DECIPHERING THE BALKAN ENIGMA: USING HISTORY TO INFORM POLICY 9 (1995) (a 

book prepared for the Strategic Studies Institute, United States (U.S.) Army War College). The Balkan 

countries include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

(FRY) (comprised of Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, and Vojvodina), Greece, the Former Yugoslav Republic 

of Macedonia (FYROM), Romania, Slovenia, and Turkey. The territory that became the Kingdom of 

Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1918 ultimately became known as Yugoslavia in 1929. Yugoslavia ceased 

to exist in 1991, but both Montenegro and Serbia remain constituent republics in the FRY. Id. at 8. 4

 Present-day Kosovo is the southern province of the FRY. The FRY is approximately the size of the state 

of Kentucky (39,517 square miles), and the province of Kosovo is roughly the size of the state of Maryland 

(4,126 square miles). The FRY is bordered to the north by Hungary, to the east by Romania and Bulgaria, 

to the south by the FYROM and Albania, and on the west by the Adriatic Sea, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

and Croatia. See Figure 4 (map of the Balkans) for greater detail on the location of each surrounding 

country. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, A MAP FOLIO 4 (1993). 5 See ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE, AUSA BACKGROUND 

BRIEF: ROOTS OF THE INSURGENCY IN KOSOVO 1 (June 1999) [hereinafter AUSA BRIEF] (on file with 

CLAMO). 

8 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

The Serbs perceive Kosovo as the birthplace of their civilization, their 

ancestral homeland. After the Serbs initially inhabited the area in the sixth 

century A.D., the province served as a European political and cultural center 

under the Serbian Nemanjic dynasty's control from the twelfth through the 

fourteenth centuries A.D.6

 It is the one true location in which Serbs can find 

the riches of their medieval religious and political heritage—that is, the 

scenes of the defining events and the places that connect them with their 

sense of nationhood.7

 Maintaining control over Kosovo as a Serbian 

province is a fundamental aspect of the Serbian national identity.8 

Conversely, the Albanians claim Kosovo based on their status as 

direct descendants of the ancient Illyrian tribes which inhabited a 

considerable amount of land in the Balkans—to include Kosovo—over 

2,000 years ago, prior to the Greeks and centuries before the Slavic people, 

including the Serbs, migrated south into the Balkans.9

 Toward this end, the 

Albanians point to their language, Shqip,

10 which linguistic experts have 

determined to be a derivative of the Illyrian tribal language and distinct from 

any other recognized language.11 Moreover, evidence clearly indicates that 

6 See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, OFFICE OF DCI INTERAGENCY BALKAN TASK FORCE, KOSOVO: 

HISTORY OF A BALKAN HOTSPOT 1 (June 1998) [hereinafter BALKAN HOTSPOT] (an intelligence report 

prepared by the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Interagency Balkan Task Force) (on 

file with CLAMO). 

7 See AUSA BRIEF, supra note 5, at 1; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 

Kosovo: The Historical and Political Background, Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As Told 1 (1999), 

http://www.osce.org/kosovo/reports/hr/part1/ch1.htm [hereinafter OSCE Brief]. Perhaps the most 

important of these events was the Turks' defeat of the Serbs on 28 June 1389 at the Battle of Kosovo Polje, 

on the plains that are west of what is now Pristina (or Prishtina). BALKAN HOTSPOT, supra note 6, at 1. 

See also infra notes 57–64 and accompanying text. Kosovo is also the site of numerous Serbian Orthodox 

monasteries and other locations that portray the rich Serbian cultural tradition. See generally War Crimes 

Library, supra note 2, at 1; ROBERT D. KAPLAN, BALKAN GHOSTS: A JOURNEY THROUGH HISTORY 35 

(1993) (referring to the Serbian Orthodox medieval monasteries as "safeboxes of art and magic, most 

powerfully symbolized by Grachanitsa [Gracanica]."). 

8 See AUSA BRIEF, supra, note 5, at 1. The Serbs, and their sympathizers, firmly believe that the 

Albanians were "imported en masse from the Caucasus, by the Ottoman Turks," long after the Serbs had 

settled the land, only then to have the Turks wrest it from their control. STEPHEN SCHWARTZ, KOSOVO: 

BACKGROUND TO A WAR 1-2 (2000). 9

 Centuries ago the Illyrians, or the primordial Albanians, conquered a much greater area than they were 

able to dominate later in time. The land that was Roman Illyricum included present-day western Slovenia, 

Croatia, Bosnia, all of Albania, and much of Serbia. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 12. 10 Literally translated as the "speech of the eagles." Id. at 1. 11 War Crimes Library, supra note 2, at 1. Illyrian lands were the most thoroughly “Latinized” areas within 

the region, although the native dialect persisted in the inaccessible southwestern valleys. The dialect also 

survived the later Slavic invasions and is spoken to this day by the Albanian people, with a heavy overlay 

of Latin, Greek, Slavic, and Turkish words. L.S. STAVRIANOS, THE BALKANS SINCE 1453, at 21 (1958). 

"The Danish scholar Kristian Sandfelt, founder of modern Balkan linguistics, traced the very name of 

9 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 


 


 


 


 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

the massive Slavic invasions of the sixth century A.D. forced these Illyrian 

settlers out of Kosovo and into Albania, western Macedonia, and 

southeastern Montenegro.12 Centuries later, after the Ottoman Turks drove 

the Serbs from Kosovo in the late fourteenth century, significant numbers of 

Albanians migrated back into Kosovo, the territory they perceived to be their 

homeland. The early twentieth century then saw numerous shifts in power 

within Kosovo, but today the Albanians represent a significant majority– 

almost 90%–of the province's population.13 Thus, Albanians also hold a 

cultural, religious, and emotional attachment to the land, and maintaining 

control of Kosovo is absolutely vital to the Albanians as well as the Serbs. 

As a result of cultural and religious differences, Kosovo, a microcosm 

of the Balkan region, has been the stage for scenes of distrust, strife, hatred, 

and violence among and between its inhabitants and neighbors throughout 

its existence. It is extremely difficult to accurately portray the magnitude 

and constancy of the violence that has engulfed the entire region over the 

past two millennia.14 Nevertheless, as alluded to by the quotes at the outset 

of the chapter, comprehending the underlying history of a conflict is not only 

essential to understanding the conflict but also to placing our nation's related 

military operations into the proper context. Armed with the following 

historical backdrop of Kosovo and the surrounding region as it relates to 

Kosovo, one begins to better understand the source of the current tension 

and discord and the international community's response and involvement. 

Thus, two themes are constant throughout this history: first, that the 

present crisis clearly finds its roots in events that occurred within the region 

centuries ago; and second, that Kosovo holds tremendous value for Serbs 

and Albanians alike. The recent bloodbath that is Kosovo only serves to 

underscore the overwhelming importance of the region to each respective 

culture. As such, neither ethnic group is likely to give up its claim to the 

province without a significant struggle. That each is so intent on 

maintaining its grasp on an area that is so inextricably intertwined with its 

Dardania, the Roman province that is now Kosovo, to the Albanian word dardhe, or pear; thus, 'the land of
 

pear-trees.'" SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 12.
 12 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 12-13.
 13 War Crimes Library, supra note 2, at 2.
 14 See JOHNSEN, supra note 3, at 9.
 

10 
 

 

 

 

 


 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 

past is demonstrative of the extraordinary effect that history has on the 

present.15 

B. KOSOVO IN THE EARLY YEARS
 

For centuries prior to the Roman conquest of the Balkans during the 

third and second centuries B.C., two non-Hellenic16 people occupied the 

region—the Illyrians and the Thracians.17 The Thracians settled the general 

area that is present-day Bulgaria and parts of Greece and Turkey.18 The 

Illyrians consisted of numerous tribes that are believed to be the most 

ancient race in southeastern Europe. Initially settling most of what is 

present-day Yugoslavia, the Illyrians are the earliest-known inhabitants of 

Bosnia and Kosovo.19 Many scholars believe that the Illyrian culture 

evolved from as far back as the Stone Age and ultimately manifested itself in 

the lands that now comprise Albania and the immediate surrounding 

region.20 At its inception, the Illyrian kingdom was vast, encompassing 

15 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. 

ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, LESSONS LEARNED FOR JUDGE 

ADVOCATES 28-42 (13 Nov. 1998) [hereinafter THE BALKANS]. 

16 The first great civilization within the Balkans was the Greek civilization, which settled on the coastlines 

of present-day Greece and its islands, as well as the Aegean coast of what is today Turkey. The first great 

center of Greek culture was establised on the island of Crete from 3400 B.C. to 1100 B.C. The Greeks 

called themselves "Hellenes," whereas the term "Greek" comes from Latin, the language of the later 

Romans. During the first millennium B.C., ancient Greek city-states led by Athens made tremendous 

advances in the areas of government, philosophy, and the arts. STAVRIANOS, supra note 11, at 15-17. 17 Id. at 17. The Thracians were a large collection of unified tribes that initially settled in southeastern 

Europe at the end of the second millennium B.C. The formation of their tribal community "appreciably 

antecedes the emergence of the other Indo-European communities,” including Roman, Celtic, German, 

Slavic, and Scandinavian. Dimiter Markovski, The Thracians, in Bulgaria: A Brief History Outline 1, at 

http://www.eunet.bg/books/history/thracians.html [hereinafter Thracian History] (last visited 25 Oct. 2001). 

The early Thracians, or "Proto-Thracians," took part in the Trojan War and the famous expedition against 

the city of Troy in approximately 1200 B.C., a battle that has been memorialized in the Iliad by Homer. 

See STAVRIANOS, supra note 11, at 16; Thracian History, supra, at 1. 18 The Thracians inhabited the area that extended from the Carpathian Mountains in the north to the Aegean 

Sea in the south, and from the Black Sea in the east to the Morava and Vardar Rivers valley in the west. 

Thracian History, supra note 17, at 1. 

19 See G. Richard Jansen, Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, An Abbreviated History 1 (June 1999), 

http://lamar.colostate.edu/~grjan/kosovohistory.html; STAVRIANOS, supra note 11, at 17; Thierry Domin, 

NATO/SFOR Informer: History of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ch. 1, at 1 (July 2001), at 

http://hq.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/117/p03a/t0103a.htm. During the first millennium B.C., the Greeks 

established a string of colonies on Illyrian lands, which allowed the Illyrians greater contact with a more 

advanced civilization, from which their tribes evolved both economically and politically. The Illyrians, A 

Brief History 2, at http://www.albanian.com/main/history/illyrians.html [hereinafter Illyrian History] (last 

visited 24 Oct. 2001). See also supra note 3 (containing a brief discussion on the history of Yugoslavia). 20 See Illyrian History, supra note 19, at 2. All indications suggest that the Illyrians are descendants of the 

earliest Aryan immigrants. Domin, supra note 19, at 1. 

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Dalmatia,21 Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and a sizeable 

portion of present-day Serbia and Kosovo.22 The demise of the Illyrian 

kingdom can be traced to the fourth century B.C., when Philip II, the 

Macedonian king from 358-336 B.C., engaged and defeated many of the 

Illyrian tribes in an effort to expand Macedonia's empire.23 

Alexander II, who subsequently became one of the few men in history 

to be referred to as "the Great," ascended the throne on his father Philip's 

death in 336 B.C. and served as king until his own death in 323 B.C. 

Alexander used the formidable Macedonian Army to consolidate his hold 

over Greece and end the age of the powerful Greek city-states in 

southeastern Europe.24 Moreover, during his relatively short reign as king, 

he conquered territories from Italy to Mesopotamia to Persia to India, 

including Illyrian lands and present-day Kosovo.25 Attempts to unify 

Macedonia's considerable empire died along with Alexander in 323 B.C. 

With his death, the region began to disintegrate into a period of continual 

21 Dalmatia is the historic region of Croatia along the Adriatic Sea, extending from Rijeka to the Gulf of 

Kotor, with its provincial capital located in Split. It has long been the subject of disputes between 

neighboring lands over its sovereignty. Originally vanquished by the Romans in the first century A.D., it 

became a Roman province. It was subsequently conquered by the Ostrogoths in the fifth century A.D., the 

Byzantine Empire in the sixth century, and finally settled by the Slavic people in the seventh century. The 

kingdoms of Croatia and Serbia divided it north and south, respectively, in the tenth century. Control of 

Dalmatia continued to change hands numerous times from the thirteenth through twentieth centuries, 

finally becoming part of Yugoslavia as part of the treaties that arose out of World War II. Following 

Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia in 1991, many of the beautiful ports and harbors on the Dalmatian 

coast were shelled by the Yugoslavians, and Serbs and Croats engaged in brutal fighting in an attempt to 

regain control of various parts of Dalmatia. See BARBARA JELAVICH, HISTORY OF THE BALKANS, 

EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES 23-25 (1983); Encyclopedia.com, Dalmatia, at 

http://www.encyclopedia.com/articles/03406.html (last visited 1 Nov. 2001). 

22 See Illyrian History, supra note 19, at 1. The Illyrians were not a homogeneous unit of people but a 

collection of tribes that inhabited the Balkans. Id. Despite limited commerce with Greek colonies that had 

sprung up on the Dalmatian coast, "Illyria remained a comparatively self-contained and conservative 

region, with its tribes living in a state of intermittent warfare with their neighbors and one another." 

STAVRIANOS, supra note 11, at 18. However, the Illyrians comprised the core of the pre-Hellenic 

population inhabiting the southern portion of the Balkan Peninsula, extending into Thrace (which territories 

are now parts of modern-day Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey, and lands east of Macedonia) and Italy. 

Domin, supra note 19, at 1. 23 See STAVRIANOS, supra note 11, at 19. Philip, and his successor, Alexander II, also engaged the 

Thracians in an effort to subjugate these unruly tribes. Id. 24 Both Philip and Alexander took advantage of Greece's weakened state, the result of outside invasions 

coupled with internal strife, in the form of the Peloponnesian Wars, which took place from 431-404 B.C. 

These wars pitted Athens and her allies against Sparta and her allies for control of the Greek states. See 

J.M. ROBERTS, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE WORLD 121 (1993).
 25 "By 324 B.C. . . . the entire world east of Rome, everything, was under the control of a single man,
 

Alexander the Great." Richard Hooker, Rome: The Conquest of the Hellenistic Empires 1, at
 

http://www.wsu.edu:8080/~dee/rome/conqhell.htm (last visited 24 Oct. 2001).
 

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LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

wars between the monarchies that developed in the wake of his passing.26 

The result of this internal strife was a thoroughly weakened set of ruling 

monarchies, ripe for the Roman legions to divide and conquer, which, for the 

Illyrians, began in 229 B.C.27 

Figure 1: Balkan Region 1000-188 B.C. 

While their intermittent wars in the Balkans lasted for over three 

centuries, the Romans eventually conquered the Illyrians and all of the 

Balkans around the first century B.C.28 Although under Roman rule from 

26 Alexander left no heir to assume his positions and, as such, his military generals soon began squabbling 

over the spoils. See ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 126. 27 See STAVRIANOS, supra note 11, at 19. 28 The Romans regarded the Illyrian territory as a unique bridgehead for Roman conquests east of the 

Adriatic. Illyrian History, supra note 19, at 2. Figure 1 depicts the Balkan region from 1000 B.C. to 188 

B.C. Balcanica.org, History in Maps, at http://www.balcanica.org/history/1000-188BC.html (last visited 

11 Dec. 2001). 

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this time through the second century A.D., Illyrians, Thracians, and Celts29 

continued to inhabit the general area now considered Kosovo,30 while Rome 

completed the incorporation of what would become Yugoslavia into its 

empire.31 Notably, while other cultures languished under the Romans' reign, 

the Illyrians thrived.32 This period of Pax Romana33 allowed different 

Balkan cultures to live together in relative harmony. Yet Rome's grip on the 

region was relatively short-lived. By the close of the third century A.D. it 

began to loosen. After a century or more of economic crises, internal 

dissent, and limited foreign invasions the Romans faced a deluge of new 

barbarian invasions at the close of the fourth century A.D.34 

The West Goths, or Visigoths, traversed the Carpathian Mountains 

and crossed the Danube to lay siege to almost all of the Balkan Peninsula. 

In 410 A.D., they drove westward into Italy and eventually captured and 

sacked Rome.35 Thereafter, Rome was overrun yet again, first by Attila the 

29 The Celts were a group of tribal people who spoke an Indo-European dialect and initially settled in 

southwestern Germany and eastern France during the second millennium B.C. Using their superior warrior 

skills, iron weapons, and sleek horses, they continued to spread throughout Europe, into France, Italy, and 

Spain, and then into Asia Minor. They fought the Macedonians and raided Greek centers of culture. In the 

fourth century B.C., the Germanic tribes forced them out of Germany and northern Europe. Their culture 

then began to intermingle with the other cultures in southeastern Europe during the first few centuries A.D. 

See Encyclopedia.com, Celt, at http://www.encyclopedia.com/articles/33033.html (last visited 1 Nov. 

2001). 

30 The area that is now considered Kosovo was the Roman province of Dardania. Jansen, supra note 19, at 

1; SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 12. 31 See BALKAN HOTSPOT, supra note 6, at 1. The Roman province of Illyricum included what is presentday western Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, all of Albania, and much of Serbia. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 12. 32 Under the Romans the Illyrian lands were able to rise from their former obscurity and backwardness and 

flourish. See STAVRIANOS, supra note 11, at 21. Latin civilization spread throughout the land, Illyricum 

served as fertile recruiting grounds for the Roman legions, and "more than one Illyrian soldier fought his 

way up from the ranks to the imperial purple.” Id. Moreover, some of the most well known Roman 

Emperors were actually the offspring of Illyrian peasants. Id. 33 The literal translation of the term means Roman power, or rule. "Roman power brought peace for longer 

periods of time to a larger area of the Mediterranean and Near East than ever before. . . . Before the 

Republic came to an end, it had created a political and military framework on a scale without parallel west 

of China and protected Hellenistic civilization. Many different cultures could live side by side within it and 

make contributions to the cosmopolitan whole." ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 132. 34 See Hooker, supra note 25, at 1. With pressure from the invaders becoming excessive, Emperor 

Constantine vacated the imperial city of Rome for the old Greek colony of Byzantium (now Istanbul, 

Turkey), making it the new administrative capital of the Roman Empire. He promptly named the capital 

"New Rome," but it was instead popularly known as Constantinople—or, the "polis," or city, of 

Constantine. With the move of the empire's capital to the east, the Balkan Peninsula, over time, assumed 

increased importance over the western Roman territories. See also JOHNSEN, supra note 3, at 12-13 

(indicating that the divisions between the eastern and western halves of the Roman Empire expanded 

quickly). 

35 See STAVRIANOS, supra note 11, at 22; Hooker, supra note 25, at 3. The Goths were a Germanic tribe 

that originated in southern Scandanavia. Population pressures forced them to move to new lands between 

the Oder and the Vistula Rivers, in what is now Poland. From there they apparently moved into the 

Ukraine, and subsequently swept south and southwest, crossing the Danube River and defeating the 

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LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

Hun from 451-453 A.D., and then by the Vandals, another Germanic tribe, 

in 455 A.D.36 The fall of the Roman Empire was inevitable when in 476 

A.D. the barbarian chief Odoacer and his tribe deposed the Roman 

emperor—the boy-ruler Romulus Augustulus—and named himself 

emperor. 37 The beginning of the end of Roman rule had arrived,38 and the 

Medieval Period, or Middle Ages, had begun. 

The influx of the Slavic people into the Balkan Peninsula began in the 

fourth century A.D. with these invasions of Roman territories. Yet the 

arrival of the Slavs was more of a gradual drift or migration as opposed to a 

sudden invasion.39 By the sixth century, these Slavic groups began to 

permanently settle in the region. Although the Huns and other ethnic groups 

marched into the region as well, they did not stay. Agriculturally minded 

Slavs, however, sunk roots in the Balkans making ownership claims that still 

exist to the present day.40 

Over time, the region's Slavic tribes developed into three distinct 

groups—Croatians, Serbians, and Slovenians.41 The Slovenians, or 

Slovenes, settled in the lands at the head of the Adriatic Sea. The Croatians 

generally landed in the area bounded by the Drava River and the Adriatic 

Sea. The Serbians became the dominant group in the lands now commonly 

recognized as the FRY—Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo—and in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina as well.42 By the end of the eighth century, these Slavic 

Romans in numerous battles, and capturing their lands, during the third and fourth centuries A.D. The tribe 

was eventually forced into northern Italy by the advancing Huns. See The Goths, at 

http://www.btinternet.com/~mark.furnival/goths.htm (last visited 1 Nov. 2001). 

36 From 410-476 A.D. Rome was subjected to repeated attacks by additional German tribes, to include the 

Franks, East Goths, Angles, and Saxons. STAVRIANOS, supra note 11, at 22-23. 37 Id. at 23. 38 Id. This was primarily true for the western half of the Roman Empire. Although the barbarians assumed 

control of the western half, they still perceived the emperor at Constantinople as their sovereign, and called 

their own leader "patrician," a Roman term. Vestiges of Roman rule clearly remained in the eastern half, as 

the Roman emperor remained as the ruler over the Byzantine empire, or "Christendom," until 1453 A.D., 

when Constantinople finally fell. See Hooker, supra note 25, at 9; ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 134-35, 150­

54. 

39 STAVRIANOS, supra note 11, at 23. 40 Id. 41 See BALKAN HOTSPOT, supra note 6, at 1. A fourth group, comprised of those Slavs not within one of 

the other three ethnic groups, moved southeast toward the Black Sea. They were soon conquered by the 

Bulgarians, a group related in some aspects to the barbarous Huns. In time, however, the Slavic culture 

overtook that of the minority Bulgarians, and that Slavic culture remains in Bulgaria today. See 

STAVRIANOS, supra note 11, at 24. 42 See BALKAN HOTSPOT, supra note 6, at 1. Those Slavs settling in the region known as "Rashka," or 

"Rascia," which included the territory that is now Kosovo, took the name of the dominant Slav tribe, or 

"Serbs." OFFICE OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN THE U.S.A., KOSOVO IN THE 

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CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

groups had become the region's permanent inhabitants, and the area became 

known as the Land of the Slavs (Slavinia), which evolved into modern-day 

Yugoslavia.43 Although differing views exist as to exactly where each of 

these ethnic groups originated—perhaps the Ukraine, Russia, or any of the 

Nordic countries—each settled in a different location and different cultures 

evolved.44 Nevertheless, it is important to note that Croats, Slovenes, and 

Serbs all share a common ancient Slavic heritage or origin.45 

The continuous migration of the Slavs southward resulted in the 

assimilation or displacement of the Illyrian people, who moved south and 

eventually settled in what is present-day Albania.46 Meanwhile, the Serbians 

established an emergent state in the lands they occupied within Yugoslavia. 

Late in the ninth century, however, the Bulgarian khan, or king, Khan 

Simeon, who ruled from 893 through 927 A.D., conquered the Serbian lands 

as part of an attempt to form a great Balkan Slavic empire. This was just 

one of a number of similar attempts aimed at conquering much sought-after 

Serbian territory. Kosovo and other Serbian lands were "repeatedly a point 

of contention among Bulgarian, Hungarian, Byzantine, and Roman leaders 

into the 12th century."47 

At this juncture, it is necessary to pause for a moment and consider 

the importance and effect of the region's different religions on Kosovo's 

history. Christianity based on the Roman Catholic Church had been the 

prevailing religion during these early years. However, Constantine's transfer 

of the administrative capital of the Roman Empire had taken the seat of 

government to Constantinople but left the seat of the Roman Catholic 

Church in Rome. A conflict ensued between the two halves of the empire 

over control of the church. Over time, doctrinal differences between the 

eastern and western halves increased, culminating in the "Great Schism" of 

HISTORY OF THE SERBIAN CHURCH 2 (2000), available at http://www.oea.serbianchurch.net/kosovo_history.html (last visited 24 Aug. 2001).
 43 See Domin, supra note 19, at 1. "Jug" in Serbo-Croatian, the Serbian language, literally translated means
 

"south." As such, the translation of "Yugoslavia" is "Kingdom of the South Slavs." See THE BALKANS,
 

supra note 15, at 30; ALESKA DJILAS, THE CONTESTED COUNTRY 2-3 (1991).
 44 See Domin, supra note 19, at 2. "[M]any of the Slav lands—notably in Russia—form part of the flat
 

expanses where Europe and Asia meet; across them nomadic peoples had wandered for thousands of years
 

and through them great folk movements had pushed time and again." ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 169-70.
 45 See Domin, supra note 19, at 2.
 46 STAVRIANOS, supra note 11, at 24, 32. The Thracians were also dispersed, many of them ending up
 

north of the Danube River, comprising, in part, what is now Romania. See id. at 24.
 47 BALKAN HOTSPOT, supra note 6, at 1. At the outset of the twelfth century, Slavic tribes had inhabited
 

most of the arable land within the region presently known as Northern Albania and Kosovo. Jansen, supra
 

note 19, at 1.
 

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1054 A.D. This schism resulted in two separate and distinct churches within 

the region—Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodoxy. As time passed, the 

Croats and Slovenes, within the western half, remained steadfast to the 

church in Rome, while the Serbs remained loyal to the Orthodox church.48 

As a direct result of its conversion to Eastern Orthodox Christianity 

and the related unity that such conversion created, the Serbians were able to 

coalesce numerous unaffiliated tribes into two nascent states within greater 

Serbia. The first state, Zeta, formed along the Adriatic coast and the second, 

Rashka (or Rascia), formed within the interior.49 Thereafter, beginning in 

the twelfth century, Serbians enjoyed a unique independence under the 

Nemanjic dynasty, which produced some of Serbia's greatest rulers. Stephen 

(or Stefan) Nemanja ruled from 1169-1189, and his son and successor, 

Stephen Nemanja II, reigned from 1196-1228. Stephen Milutin's reign 

extended from 1281-1321 and Stephen Dushan's from 1331-1355. These 

rulers were known not as kings but as the "Great Zhupans of Rashka." 

These periods of Nemanjic rule are referred to with great pride by Serbians 

as the "golden eras" of Serbian history, as there was economic prosperity 

and political power on par with that of other European monarchies.50 

Kosovo had become the administrative and cultural center of the medieval 

Serbian state.51 During his reign, Stephen Nemanja was successful in 

uniting a majority of the Serbian people and, as a result, was victorious in a 

number of wars during which he was able to expand the territory of what 

then became the Serbian kingdom.52 Stephen Nemanja II was finally able to 

obtain complete Serbian independence as the result of the fall of the 

Byzantine Empire at the hands of the Crusaders at Constantinople in 1204.53 

Serbian expansion continued into the fourteenth century with the 

defeat of the neighboring Bulgarians in 1330 under the reign of Stephen 

Milutin. In 1331, Stephen Dushan "the Mighty" began his reign as Serbia's 

ruler. Dushan sought first to strengthen Serbia's hold on Bulgaria, and then 

to assume control over Albania, Macedonia, Thessaly, and Epirus. Yet 

instead of consolidating his power after earning victories over these smaller 

48 See JOHNSEN, supra note 3, at 27-29.
 49 STAVRIANOS, supra note 11, at 27. Rashka formed the "nucleus of future Serbian greatness." Id.
 50 BALKAN HOTSPOT, supra note 6, at 1.
 51 Jansen, supra note 19, at 1. This powerful dynasty lasted 200 years and still today Kosovo is known by
 

Serbians as "Old Serbia." Id.
 52 See STAVRIANOS, supra note 11, at 27. Stephen fought both Byzantium and Bulgaria, and was able to
 

conquer all of Zeta and increase Rashka's territory. Id.
 53 See id.
 

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empires, Dushan, like many before him, tried to overrun Constantinople and 

assume control of the reestablished Byzantine Empire. Dushan died on the 

march to do battle with Constantinople's defenders in 1355.54 With Dushan's 

death came the end of the Nemanjic dynasty55 and the resultant collapse of 

the Serbian kingdom. This collapse created a political vacuum within the 

Balkan region that was to be filled not by one of the remaining Balkan 

kingdoms, but by the Turks of the Ottoman Empire in 1459.56 

Perhaps the most significant event and defining moment in Kosovo 

history, particularly from the Serbian perspective, was the Battle of Kosovo 

Polje57 on 28 June 1389.58 During this battle,59 the invading Ottoman Army 

inflicted heavy casualties on the Serbian Army, to include the ceremonial 

beheading of the Serb leader, Knez ("Prince") Lazar, who thereafter became 

a martyr to the Serbian people.60 As it has become such a central part of the 

54 See id. at 28. 55 Dushan's son, Uros, ascended the throne on his father's death, however, he was nothing close to the ruler 

that his father had been. Although he ruled until his death in 1371, Serbian feudal lords assumed greater 

power at Uros' expense during his reign and, with his death, placed Knez (Prince) Lazar in control of 

Serbia. See KAPLAN, supra note 7, at 36. 56 See STAVRIANOS, supra note 11, at 28-29. Figure 2 depicts the Balkan region from 1335 to 1451 

Balcanica.org, History in Maps, at http://www.balcanica.org/history/1335-1451.html (last visited 11 Dec. 

2001). 

57 Serbians refer to this place of battle as "The Field of Black Birds." It was on this field that the Turks, 

after delivering the final defeat to the Serbs, left their bodies for "carrion birds to devour." KAPLAN, supra 

note 7, at 35. The battlefield is still regarded as a sacred monument to the Serbs who lost their lives in 

defense of what they perceive as their homeland. 

58 "Kosovo is known as the cradle of the medieval Serbian empire—the most powerful and civilized state in 

the Balkans. . . . This state was effectively annihilated on June 28, 1389, a day as important to the Serbs as 

July 4, 1776 is to Americans." War Crimes Library, supra note 2, at 1. "Because this [battle] marked the 

end of the glory days and the beginning of centuries of struggle against neighbors bent on dominating 

Serbia, no date is more significant and no place dearer to Serbians." BALKAN HOTSPOT, supra note 6, at 1. 

"In all of European history it is impossible to find any comparison with the effect of Kosovo on the Serbian 

psyche. The battle changed the course of Serbian history . . . ." Thomas Judah, It is Better to Die in Battle 

Than to Live in Shame, in THE SERBS: HISTORY, MYTHS, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAVIA 22, 30 

(1997). 

59 For various reasons, it is difficult for historians to determine the actual facts of this battle. However, the 

commonly accepted version indicates that the Serb Army assembled on Kosovo Field (Kosovo Polje) at 

dawn to wage war against an infinitely superior Turkish Army. The weight of the Serb forces’ heavy 

armor, iron halberds, and maces created another significant disadvantage for the Serbian troops. During the 

battle, the more mobile Turkish cavalry shredded the Serbian Army and captured the Serbian leader, Prince 

Lazar, ultimately beheading him. See War Crimes Library, supra note 2, at 1. 60 "Not kings Stefan Nemanja, Milutin, and Stefan Dushan, nor even Saint Sava, elicit the intense emotions 

among the Serbs that Knez Lazar does . . . ." KAPLAN, supra note 7, at 38. The famous Serbian poem, 

"The Battle of Kosovo," portrays Prince Lazar, albeit the leader of the losing forces, as a hero and a martyr. 

War Crimes Library, supra note 2, at 1; see infra Part IV, note 5. For a more detailed discussion of the 

Serbian legends surrounding Prince Lazar, see KAPLAN, supra note 7, at 36-41. 

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Serbian story, this battle has become a historical crossroads for the Serbs.61 

The outcome of the encounter was to effectively seal the fate of the Serbian 

Figure 2: Balkan Region 1335-1451 

people and the entire Balkan Peninsula for centuries.62 After the battle, the 

Moslem, Turk-dominated Ottoman Empire eventually occupied Kosovo. 

The victory also led to the subsequent conquest of all Serbia by the Ottoman 

Empire in 1459, driving many Serbs to seek refuge to the north and west in 

Vojvodina and Krajina.63 

61 See Judah, supra note 58, at 30. 62 See KAPLAN, supra note 7, at 36. 63 For the Turks, the battle did not hold as much significance. Kosovo had merely been the next step in the 

logical progression toward assuming control of Serbia and all of the Balkans. Following the Battle of the 

Maritsa River in 1371, in which Serbia suffered a significant defeat at the hands of the Turks, Serbia 

attempted to strike back at the raiding Ottomans, but to no avail, other than to focus the Turks' attention on 

Serbia. The decisive battle then occurred at Kosovo Polje in 1389. Thereafter, a Serbian state, called a 

19 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

For the next few centuries, Ottoman rule meant harsh oppression, 

savage Serbian revolts, and brutal Turkish suppression of these revolts and 

any political dissent whatsoever.64 Such harsh treatment and the near 

incessant violence resulted in droves of Serbs abandoning Kosovo for the 

relative safety of Serbia and adjoining lands.65 Albanian Muslims sought to 

fill the void left by the fleeing Serbs and (with the encouragement of the 

Ottomans) repopulated Kosovo in considerable numbers up through the 

middle of the nineteenth century. At this point, the Serbs began the 

movement that would lead to regaining the lands lost to the Turks and 

occupied by the Albanians.66 

The year 1878 proved to be another significant year in the region's 

history for both Serbs and Albanians alike. The Russo-Turkish War ended 

favorably for the Russians, who attempted to utilize the resultant peace 

negotiations and Treaty of San Stefano to settle the "Eastern [Balkan] 

Question." Only the intervention of the Great Powers in the ensuing 

Congress of Berlin kept any one state within the region from gaining too 

despotate, survived for another seventy years, until 1459, when Serbia finally fell to the Turks. The Turks 

had other threats with which to deal before turning their complete attention to Serbia. See Judah, supra 

note 58, at 30-32; BALKAN HOTSPOT, supra note 6, at 1. 64 The violence that marked this period was particularly harsh, and set the tone for ensuing generations, 

such that the Balkans has remained the scene of continuous violence for the past six centuries. See 

JOHNSEN, supra note 3, at 13-15. Recent examples of atrocities within the region abound, from ethnic 

cleansing and genocide, to rape and robbery, to harassment in an effort to force people to flee, and all 

parties to the recent conflicts, to some degree, have been responsible for committing these atrocities. Note, 

however, that this Turkish oppression was not based on religious grounds. When they initially conquered 

the Balkans, the Turks introduced their Islamic faith, further confusing a religious landscape already in 

turmoil with the rift between Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism. Yet the Turks were tolerant of these 

other religions and did not force conversion to the Islamic faith. They did welcome voluntary conversion 

to Islam and did not hesitate to discriminate against non-Muslims both economically and socially—nonMuslims were clearly an inferior class. Id.at 27-29. See generally JELAVICH, supra note 21, at 39-126 

(discussing the Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule). The Albanians slowly migrated toward the Muslim 

faith to both avoid the Turks' discrimination and obtain the Turks' protection. The Albanian conversion 

rate to Islam was almost 70%. See CHARLES JELAVICH AND BARBARA JELAVICH, THE BALKANS (1965). 65 See JOHNSEN, supra note 3, at 13-15. As a result, the Serbian “center of gravity” shifted, at least 

temporarily, from Kosovo to Belgrade, the capital of Serbia. Jansen, supra note 19, at 1. The massive 

migration of Serbs occurred immediately following unsuccessful uprisings, in 1689-90 and again in 1738. 

See BALKAN HOTSPOT, supra note 6, at 2. In 1690 the Serbian patriarch Arsenije III Carnojevic fled with 

more than 100,000 people to Austrian-ruled southern Hungary. The Austrian emperor allowed these 

people to practice their own religion and to elect their own military governor, or "vojvoda." The province 

where these Serbs settled eventually became known as Vojvodina. Yugoslavia: The Serbs and Serbia, 

Vojvodina, and Montenegro, at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin.htm (last visited 1 Dec. 2001). 66 Toward this end, the Serbs opened up a seminary in Prizren in 1871, and began to aggressively 

encourage Serbs to migrate back into Kosovo to increase Serbian presence within the province. See Jansen, 

supra note 19, at 2. Conversely, the Ottomans encouraged Albanians to flood back into Kosovo to 

discourage Serbian expansion within the province. See BALKAN HOTSPOT, supra note 6, at 2. 

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much land or power. 67 Yet for the Serbs, the de facto independence that 

Serbia had earlier obtained with Russian support became de jure with the 

signing of these peace agreements, making Serbia an independent nation.68 

Although these agreements gave the Serbs two cities in Kosovo, Mitrovica 

and Pristina, the Ottoman leaders maintained ultimate control over Kosovo.69 

As for the Albanians, those in Kosovo formed the first organized 

Albanian nationalist movement, the League of Prizren, in an effort designed 

in part to resist invasion by foreign powers. The Albanians not only sought 

protection and assistance from Ottoman leaders, but also sought reforms that 

would eventually lead to Albanian autonomy within the province.70 

Following the grant of independence to Serbia, the Serbs began expelling 

and killing Albanians as part of their plan to "ethnically cleanse" Serbian 

territory.71 Thus began a trend that would set the stage for continued 

harassment and atrocities by both Serbians and Albanians throughout the 

twentieth century and up to the present day. 

Meanwhile, Albanians in Kosovo were chafing under the Ottoman 

yoke and continuously sought methods of ousting the foreign rulers. As a 

result, in 1908 they allied with a liberal group of dissidents within the 

Ottoman government—known as the "Young Turks"—in a rebellion against 

67 The Berlin Treaty, at http://www.unet.com.mk/nian/berlin.htm (last visited 1 Nov. 2001) [hereinafter 

Berlin Treaty]. Russia sought to pull the region within its sphere of influence with the signing of the Treaty 

of San Stefano of 1878. Pursuant to the Russian imposed terms of the treaty, Serbia, Romania, and 

Montenegro gained both territory and independence from the Ottoman Empire. Bulgaria was given 

significant amounts of territory—to include land in Serbia and Macedonia—and autonomy as well. The 

Great Powers (Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Britain, and Italy) were dissatisfied with the treaty, and 

met in Berlin to determine how to force Russia to revise the terms of peace. The resulting Congress of 

Berlin in essence ratified the expansion of Serbia and Montenegro, gave Bosnia and Herzegovina to 

Austria-Hungary, left Macedonia temporarily under Ottoman rule (with terms promising Macedonian selfgovernment in the future), and overturned the decision to grant land and autonomy to Bulgaria. Serbia had 

to remove its troops from portions of Kosovo. Neither the Macedonians, Bulgarians, Austro-Hungarians, 

nor Russians were satisfied with the eventual outcome, setting the stage for future conflict between the 

Great Powers and their satellite lands. Id.; JOHNSEN, supra note 3, at 16-18. 68 See BALKAN HOTSPOT, supra note 6, at 2; Berlin Treaty, supra note 67, at 1-4. Serbia had initially 

gained its autonomy in 1830 due in large measure to support provided by Russia. 

69 Berlin Treaty, supra note 67, at 1-2; Jansen, supra note 19, at 2. 70 See BALKAN HOTSPOT, supra note 6, at 2; AUSA BRIEF, supra note 5, at 1-2. The League of Prizren 

initially sought to work with the Ottomans. Over time, however, the focus of each changed and the League 

was ultimately shattered in 1881 by Ottoman military forces. Id. 71 See AUSA BRIEF, supra note 5, at 2. Almost 60,000 to 70,000 Albanian refugees from Serbia entered 

Kosovo during this time frame. Meanwhile, Serbs were fleeing Kosovo upon the return of Albanians to 

certain areas. The term "ethnic cleansing" refers to the brutal methods used to create a shift in civilian 

populations to create ethnically pure areas. See The War in Bosnia, History of the Balkan Conflict, USA 

Today, at http://www.usatoday.com/news/index/bosnia/nbos002.htm (last visited 6 Nov. 2001). 

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Ottoman rule.72 However, after the Ottoman Sultan was finally deposed, the 

Albanians found life under the Young Turks' rule no better and organized 

yet another rebellion in 1910.73 The revolt was immediately suppressed and 

its leaders and many other Albanians punished and imprisoned. This did not 

prevent a second uprising in 1912 that was more successful, gaining Albania 

quasi-independence from the Ottoman Empire.74 Seizing the opportunity 

created by the success of the Albanian insurgency, other Balkan states allied 

in an effort to achieve independence from the Turks, and so began the First 

Balkan War in 1912.75 

Figure 3: Balkan Region 1908-1913 

In the First Balkan War, Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria were successful 

in jointly defeating and breaking away from Ottoman rule. The victors 

72 See Jansen, supra note 19, at 2-3; AUSA BRIEF, supra note 5, at 3.
 73 "The Young Turks were strongly opposed to nationalist tendencies within the Empire and worked toward
 

centralization of power and authority and Turkification of all subjects in the Ottoman domain. As is the
 

case in present day Serbia, the Ottomans strongly opposed the autonomy desired by Kosovars in general
 

and Albanians in particular. This was one of many Albanian Kosovar disappointments through the years."
 

Jansen, supra note 19, at 2.
 74 See AUSA BRIEF, supra note 5, at 2-3.
 75 See id. Figure 3 depicts the Balkan region between 1908 and 1913. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
 

supra note 4, at 4.
 

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quickly attempted to divide the spoils of the Ottoman Empire, namely 

Macedonia and Albania.76 Serbia took distinct advantage of this opportunity 

and drove on through Kosovo, destroying Albanian villages, expelling their 

occupants, and attempting to remove all Albanian presence from the 

province.77 Inexplicably, Bulgaria then turned on its former allies, attacking 

Serbia and Greece and thereby initiating the Second Balkan War in 1913. 

With surprising Ottoman assistance, Serbia and Greece defeated Bulgaria in 

short order, and peace negotiations encompassing the entire region ensued.78 

Clearly concerned about the outcome of those negotiations, the Great 

Powers, as they had in 1878, again interceded to ensure that no one entity 

became too powerful within the region.79 With Russian support, and 

notwithstanding Austro-Hungarian intentions, Serbia was able to regain 

control of Kosovo and parts of Macedonia. Serbians promptly returned to a 

campaign of harassment and deportation of Albanian occupants of Kosovo.80 

These violent regional disputes, coupled with the general dissatisfaction 

among many of the Balkan states over the Great Powers' intervention in 

what they perceived as purely Balkan affairs, made the region a veritable 

powder keg as the 525th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje 

approached in June 1914. 

C. KOSOVO IN RECENT YEARS 

In Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, Gavrilo Princip, an ethnic Bosnian Serb 

nationalist intent on promoting a Bosnia and Herzegovina–Serbia union, 

assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the imperial throne of the 

76 See JOHNSEN, supra note 3, at 18-19. Again, the Western powers were not particularly anxious to see 

any one country assume too much power within the region, and they imposed their own peace settlement 

on the parties to the conflict. Id. at 19. At the Conference of Ambassadors in London in 1912, Serbia was 

granted sovereignty over Kosovo. It has retained that sovereignty to the present day. Jansen, supra note 

19, at 2. 

77 See War Crimes Library, supra note 2, at 2. "Serbia viewed the subjugation of Kosovo in October 1912 

as the fulfillment of a historic crusade." AUSA BRIEF, supra note 5, at 3. "Serbian atrocities committed 

against Albanians, especially those committed by paramilitary bands called 'chetniks,' suggested to some 

contemporary Western observers that Serbia was bent on a systematic extermination of Kosovo's Muslim 

population to transform the ethnic character of Kosovo." Id. 78 See JOHNSEN, supra note 3, at 19. Bulgaria apparently felt isolated and threatened by its neighbors and 

"allies" and, as such, decided to "strike while the iron was hot." 

79 For a discussion of the Great Powers and their earlier involvement within the region see supra note 67 

and accompanying text. Pursuant to the Treaty of Bucharest, the major Western powers denied Serbia the 

ability to obtain an outlet through Albania to the Adriatic, and instead nodded in approval of Albanian 

autonomy. See also AUSA BRIEF, supra note 5, at 3; JOHNSEN, supra note 3, at 19. 80 See AUSA BRIEF, supra note 5, at 3; Jansen, supra note 19, at 2. 

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Austro-Hungarian Empire.81 Princip and his fellow Serb nationalists were 

disturbed over Austria-Hungary's earlier annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

The assassination provided the spark that started the Third Balkan War or 

what eventually became known as World War I, and served to further 

increase centuries-old hatred and violence within the region. AustriaHungary immediately assumed that the murder conspiracy was 

masterminded by the "Black Hand," a Serbian ultra-nationalist organization, 

and issued an ultimatum to the Serbs to apologize and permit investigators 

into Serbia to hunt for the Black Hand.82 Serbia declined to comply with 

this ultimatum, and the stage was set for war.83 

The ensuing conflict, horrific even to the most hardened observers, 

lasted over four years during which Serbia took a brutal pounding.84 For a 

significant portion of the war, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian forces 

occupied Kosovo, which was the scene of vicious fighting. Albanians 

accompanied these "allies" into Kosovo and began establishing Albanianoccupied zones in an attempt to undermine the Serbian presence.85 By the 

end of the conflict, however, the Austro-Hungarians were defeated, and in 

the wake of the Austro-Hungarians' retreat from Kosovo, the Serbs quickly 

81 Archduke Ferdinand was the unpopular nephew of the well-respected Emperor Franz Joseph. As 

Ferdinand had taken a wife—countess Sophie Chotek, who died along with him—not considered of royal 

cloth, Ferdinand was ostracized and often traveled outside of the country with his wife to avoid close 

scrutiny and ridicule. This brought him to Sarajevo that fateful day, too close to the Serbian border. 

Princip was the member of a small group of Bosnian extremists who actually planned the Archduke's death, 

waiting along the route of the royal motorcade. Princip was the last of seven would-be assassins in line 

along the route. However, five of the first six were unable, for unknown reasons, to carry out the task. The 

sixth terrorist weakly threw a small bomb in the direction of the motorcade, but it did not detonate. As the 

sole assassin remaining, Princip waited for the vehicle to slow down, and then "stepped onto the [car's] 

running board and into history." Timothy Kutta, Serbia in World War I, COMMAND MAG., July-Aug. 1993, 

at 46-47. 

82 Id. at 47. The ultimatum demanded two items: 1) that Belgrade officially apologize for the deaths, 

thereby admitting guilt; and 2) that Belgrade allow Austro-Hungarian investigators into Serbia to track 

down the Black Hand organization. Id. Some argue that the Austro-Hungarians knew that Serbia could not 

comply with the ultimatum, and was merely looking for a pretext to declare war. In any event, Serbia 

declined and, after issuing a final ultimatum, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. 

83 Although the Serbian Army was no match for the Austro-Hungarian Army, when the additional parties to 

the conflict aligned with their respective allies, the "plot thickened." If Serbia was attacked, Russia pledged 

to come to its aid, and France and Great Britain were allied with Russia. Similarly, Germany supported 

Austria-Hungary. Importantly, Albania sided with Austria-Hungary, and thousands of Kosovar Albanians 

joined the Austro-Hungarian Army. See Jansen, supra note 19, at 3. 84 See id. at 3. What became known as Yugoslavia is reported to have endured almost two million deaths 

total, and losses of over one-half of the 700,000 men it sent into battle, or one-half of the young male 

population, which occurrence continues to have a ripple effect on today's Serbian population. JOHNSEN, 

supra note 3, at 20. 85 See Jansen, supra note 19, at 3. 

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returned and exacted a full measure of revenge on the Albanians.86 In 

response, the Albanians fled to the hills and formed armed guerilla 

organizations that continued to engage in limited and largely unsuccessful 

attacks on Serbs within Kosovo throughout the next few decades. 

At the end of the war, Kosovo was incorporated into the Kingdom of 

Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes under the Treaty of Versailles and related 

international agreements. In 1929, a constitutional monarchy was 

established, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes became known 

as Yugoslavia ("Kingdom of Southern Slavs").87 The interwar years saw no 

respite from the turmoil and violence that had plagued the region for the 

preceding four decades. The Serbs embarked on a campaign seeking to 

bolster the Serbian population within the province, creating Serb colonies in 

what were Albanian-held lands, in a well-conceived "colonization" plan to 

force the Albanians to leave.88 The Albanians attempted to 

"internationalize" their plight, taking their concerns over Serbian atrocities 

in Kosovo and Albania to the Paris Peace Conference and the League of 

Nations, but the Albanian pleas fell on deaf ears. The U.S. and others in the 

international community were relatively unsympathetic and declined to take 

any action.89 

During this interwar period, neighboring Albania formed close ties 

with Italy and its fascist government under Mussolini, who sought to 

destabilize what he perceived as a Yugoslavia that was too powerful within 

the region. At issue was ultimate control of Albania. In 1939, Italy's 

concern over Yugoslavian intentions in Albania resulted in Italy's invasion 

of Albania, after which Mussolini installed a puppet fascist government. In 

1941, Yugoslavia responded by attacking Italian forces stationed in 

86 The Serbs reportedly massacred women and children, destroyed villages and homes, and quickly brought
 

the province back under Serbian rule. Id.
 87 Id. at 3-4. Included within the new kingdom were Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
 

Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Vojvodina. The capitol of the new kingdom resided in Belgrade.
 

Id.
 88 Estimates indicate that between 1926 and 1941, more than half of all Kosovars—ethnic Albanians of
 

Kosovo—may have emigrated, primarily to Albania and Turkey. See BALKAN HOTSPOT, supra note 6, at
 

2. The shifts in the population during this time period are a matter of great dispute. After 1912 significant 

numbers of Serb families were moved into Kosovo at the expense of wealthier Albanians already living 

there who were dispossessed by land reforms. Estimates also indicate that as many as half a million 

Albanians were expelled from their homes. Conversely, the Serbs claim that hundreds of thousands of 

Albanians moved into Kosovo between 1941 and 1945. See OSCE Brief, supra note 7, at 1. 

89 See AUSA BRIEF, supra note 5, at 3. 

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Albania.90 Within one week, combined German and Italian forces had 

forced Yugoslavia into an unconditional surrender, and Kosovo was 

thereafter placed under the control of the Italian-sponsored Albanian 

government.91 Kosovo had now entered World War II. 

During the war, Kosovo was yet again occupied by several different 

armies—Germany, Bulgaria, and Italy at first, each sympathetic to the 

Albanian nationalist movement.92 As the result of continued Albanian–Serb 

tensions, many Serbs fled the area, reversing the results of the Serbs' 

colonizing policies and raising the ethnic-Albanian proportion of the 

population to almost ninety percent. In 1945, upon the conclusion of World 

War II and the Allied victory over Germany, 93 Yugoslavia became a 

communist republic under Marshal Josip Broz Tito and became known as 

the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. Marshal Tito organized a 

socialist state, comprising six federated “republics,” of which Serbia was 

one. 94 In September 1945, Kosovo was included within the Republic of 

Serbia as a semi-autonomous region.95 The new republic's policies toward 

Kosovo following the war vacillated between appeasing the Kosovar 

Albanians and attempting to assimilate them into the republic, and 

suppressing any nationalistic tendencies that were anti-Communist.96 

The imposition of Communist regimes in Albania, Yugoslavia, 

Romania, and Bulgaria following the war had a positive effect on the 

90 See id. at 4. Yugoslavia initially entered into the Tripartite Pact (Germany, Japan, and Italy), but shortly 

thereafter, as the result of an anti-Axis coup, renounced their previous agreement. Germany followed this 

renunciation with its invasion of Yugoslavia. Jansen, supra note 19, at 4. 

91 See JOHNSEN, supra note 3, at 22-23 (citing MARTIN VAN CREVELD, HITLER'S STRATEGY: THE BALKAN 

CLUE (1973)). 

92 AUSA BRIEF, supra note 5, at 4. However, resistance to the hated German occupation was relentless, 

under the direction of General Mihailovic of the Loyalist Chetniks and head of the Communist Party Josip 

Broz, a Croat, of the Partisans. The resistance movement was relatively successful in that it became a 

stubborn thorn in Hitler's side within Yugoslavia. It was successful enough that the Allies began to support 

it, eventually casting their complete support to only Broz and the Partisans. This support subsequently 

allowed the Partisans to defeat the Loyalists in the civil war that raged within Yugoslavia—while the world 

war raged on all around it—and take control of post-war Yugoslavia. See Jansen, supra note 19, at 4. 

93 The conflict's effects on Yugoslavia cannot be overstated. Estimates place total Yugoslavian casualties 

at 1.7 million out of a total population of 16 million. "Coupled with the massive losses sustained in World 

War I, two generations of Yugoslavs effectively had been wiped out." JOHNSEN, supra note 3, at 23. 

94 The six republics consisted of the "usual suspects"—Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

Montenegro, and Macedonia. Theoretically, Vojvodina and Kosovo held autonomous status within the 

Serbian Republic. Id. at 55. 

95 See AUSA BRIEF, supra note 5, at 5. "In an attempt to recruit Albanian fighters, Yugoslavia's leader, 

Josip Broz, promised that, after the war, Kosovo would be permitted to join Albania. Sadly, for the mislead 

[sic] Albanians, this was yet another lie." War Crimes Library, supra note 2, at 2. 96 See BALKAN HOTSPOT, supra note 6, at 2. 

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persistent conflict and violence that had beset the region for so long.97 

While Tito's authoritarian government quickly and brutally put down any 

serious resistance movements, the general fear also existed that any local 

conflict could again potentially involve the superpowers in another 

catastrophic war.98 As a result of these two factors, the region stayed 

relatively calm from the close of the war through Tito's death in 1980. Prior 

to his death, however, Tito had begun to make ever-expanding concessions 

to the Kosovar Albanians,99 culminating in the 1974 recognition of Kosovo 

in the Yugoslavian constitution as an autonomous province.100 Then, as 

today, Kosovo had a large Albanian population, which only continued to 

increase as the result of the resurgence in Albanian nationalism following 

Tito's recognition of Kosovo's self-rule. Influenced by the Albanian 

majority, Kosovo exercised its newly granted autonomy by establishing 

Albanian language schools and officially observing Islamic holidays. 

Kosovo also allowed ethnic Albanians to use their language—Albanian, as 

opposed to Serb—within the local government, media, and educational 

system.101 Not surprisingly, Serb resentment over Kosovo's autonomy grew 

more with each passing day. 

With Tito's death in 1980, the relative calm that had pervaded 

Yugoslavia came to an abrupt end as ethnic and nationalist differences flared 

up yet again.102 Initially, Kosovar Albanians rioted in 1981 over poor living, 

97 The hostilities did not cease completely. Kosovar Albanians continued to demand autonomy or republic 

status within the federation, and revolutionary movements, complete with guerilla bands, organized and 

took action from time to time. Conversely, the Serbians mounted crackdowns, which included the search 

and arrest of suspected Albanian dissidents. Albanians continued to flee the province during this period— 

some estimates place the number of refugees from 1954-57 at close to 200,000. See BALKAN HOTSPOT, 

supra note 6, at 2; AUSA BRIEF, supra note 5, at 5. 

98 See JOHNSEN, supra note 3, at 23-24. 99 Tito had long been concerned over Serbia's power within the federal republic. See OSCE Brief, supra 

note 7, at 2. 

100 "At least as a matter of constitutional theory, 1974 was the zenith of Kosovo's autonomous status.” 

AUSA BRIEF, supra note 5, at 6. Due in large part to Tito’s efforts, the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, which 

remained in effect until the final collapse of the Yugoslav Federation, practically gave Kosovo equal status 

with Yugoslavia's six republics and its own direct representation in the main federal Yugoslav governing 

bodies. Id. 101 War Crimes Library, supra note 2, at 2. "From 1974 until the late 1980's Albanians in Kosovo 

undoubtedly had enjoyed the most administrative and cultural autonomy in their history . . . but for the 

Kosovars that favored independence, it wasn't enough." Jansen, supra note 19, at 6. Moreover, despite 

these positive events on the political and social front, Kosovo remained an "economic backwater." 

BALKAN HOTSPOT, supra note 6, at 2. Both Serbs and Kosovars fled the province in droves from the mid1960's through the mid-1980's—estimates place the numbers at almost 100,000—due to a lack of economic 

opportunities. Id. 102 "Tito's death in 1980 set in motion the slow, painful demise of Yugoslavia." JOHNSEN, supra note 3, at 

57. 

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economic, and educational conditions. Pristina University became a "hotbed 

of Albanian nationalism,"103 and another mass exodus of Serbs and 

Montenegrins from Kosovo followed anti-Serb riots by the Albanian 

population.104 In response, Serbian anger continued to increase as Serbs 

now saw themselves as the aggrieved, disadvantaged party.105 By 1987, 

swelling Serbian resentment led to massive protest marches and rallies, 

paving the way for Slobodan Milosevic,106 who surged to power on a 

platform of radical Serb nationalism.107 

Milosevic's first guarantee was that he would protect ethnic Serbs 

from abuse in Kosovo. He then had the Serbian government outlaw school 

instruction in the Albanian language. In 1989, he succeeded in completely 

stripping Kosovo of its autonomy108 and sent in the Serbian Army and 

Serbian police units to maintain order and discipline after rioting occurred in 

response to the constitutional amendments revoking Kosovo autonomy.109 

103 Jansen, supra note 19, at 5. 104 Official statistics place the number of Serbs leaving Kosovo prior to 1987 at 100,000. BALKAN 

HOTSPOT, supra note 6, at 2. 105 As rumors of Albanian atrocities began to circulate within the Serb communities, Serbian nationalism 

increasingly expanded until March 1986 when the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences declared that the 

Serbs were the oppressed minority in Yugoslavia. JOHNSEN, supra note 3, at 57 (citing Sabrina Petra 

Ramet, War in the Balkans, 71 FOREIGN AFF. 82 (Fall 1992)). The Academy's memorandum, which among 

other things warned of the potential for Serbian genocide in Kosovo, was heavily publicized in mass 

circulation newspapers, and it served to galvanize Serbian resistance. See OSCE Brief, supra note 7, at 2. 106 Milosevic, a product of the Yugoslav Communist system, was the former manager of a state-owned gas 

company who began his meteoric ascent to power when Tito died in 1980. He was the protégé of Ivan 

Stambolic, who became Prime Minister of Serbia after Tito's death. Milosevic eventually replaced 

Stambolic, became leader of the Serbian Communist Party, and ultimately assumed the position of 

Yugoslavian President. See Jansen, supra note 19, at 6. 107 Clearly, 24 April 1987 was a significant date for Serb nationalism and Kosovo's future. Milosevic, a 

prominent figure in the republican communist party—known as the League of Communists of Serbia— 

traveled to Kosovo on that day to speak with the local Serbs about their grievances. While in Kosovo 

Polje/Fushe Kosove meeting local Serb representatives, he witnessed a large crowd that was demonstrating 

in their support being attacked and driven back by local police using riot batons. As the crowd fought back, 

Milosevic stepped outside to address them. He turned himself into an instant hero of the Kosovar Serbs, 

urging them in front of television cameras that "no one should dare beat you," and making their 

controversial nationalist agenda his own. By the end of the year, Milosevic was firmly in control of both 

the republican communist party and the Serbian government. See OSCE Brief, supra note 7, at 2-3. In 

1989, on the 600th anniversary of the Serb's battle against the Turks at Kosovo Polje, Milosevic held at 

rally at the site of the battle, Kosovo Field, which was attended by nearly one million Serbs, who hailed 

Milosevic as the reincarnation of Prince Lazar. See War Crimes Library, supra note 2, at 2. 108 "Milosevic professed a simple platform: unrestrained Serbian nationalism that sought to overturn the 

existing system and restore Serbs and Serbia to their 'rightful place.'" JOHNSEN, supra note 3, at 57-58. In 

his first two years, he had wrested control of his party, eradicated his rivals, gained the backing of his army, 

dismantled the governments of Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro, and revoked the autonomy granted to 

both Kosovo and Vojvodina. Id. 109 The constitutional amendments that revoked Kosovo's autonomy also provided Serbia with control over 

the police, courts, and civil defense systems therein. AUSA BRIEF, supra note 5, at 6. 

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From 1989 through late 1992, Milosevic effectively enforced a state of 

emergency in Kosovo, in which Serbian "security" forces suppressed 

Albanian media, language education, protests, and strikes. 

Kosovo and other Yugoslav republics evinced strong concerns over 

Milosevic's actions in short order. Albanian legislators met secretly in 1990, 

declared the Republic of Kosovo to be in existence, and created a "shadow" 

Kosovo government—the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)—led by 

Dr. Ibrahim Rugova.110 In an effort to avoid being similarly swept up in 

Milosevic's centralization and nationalistic policies,111 first Slovenia,112 in 

1990, and then Croatia,113 in 1991, declared independence from Yugoslavia. 

Milosevic responded by sending Yugoslav tanks into Slovenia. As a result, 

Yugoslavia effectively ceased to exist as of 27 June 1991.114 

By 1992 the situation within the region had deteriorated drastically. 

The Communist world in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe had collapsed 

and the call for revolution continued to drift across southern Europe and the 

Yugoslav republics. Already in dire straits as the result of a massive debt 

and triple-digit inflation and heavily dependent on Western aid, the 

Yugoslav economy bordered on collapse with the advent of an international 

economic embargo in late 1991 against Serbia and Montenegro. Slovenia 

had already achieved independence, and the bloody slugfest within Croatia 

110 See id. at 6-7. The term "League" created an association with the First and Second Leagues of Prizren, 

historically significant entities to the Kosovar Albanians. Dr. Rugova sought a nonviolent, internationally 

backed response to Serbian efforts aimed at Kosovo, to include a general boycott of the Yugoslavsponsored, Serbian-dominated local government. Id. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 130-32 

(discussing Rugova and the LDK). 

111 Already discontent over their roles as Yugoslavian "bill-payers" due to their stronger economic 

condition, the two countries fretted over Milosevic's Serbian nationalistic rhetoric and his ability to utilize 

state power to repulse any anti-Serb movement, as he did in using the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) to 

quell riots in Kosovo. Throughout 1989, Serbian nationalists argued that the internal republic boundaries 

artificially separated the Serb nation, and that Serbia reserved the right to speak for Serbs everywhere, not 

just those living within Serbian boundaries. JOHNSEN, supra note 3, at 57-58. 112 Slovenia was able to break away after a brief period of struggle, aided by the fact that over 90% of its 

population was composed of ethnic Slovenians. Serbia conducted a vastly different campaign against 

Slovenia than it did Croatia. Ultimately, after sporadic fighting on the shared borders, JNA forces 

withdrew from Slovenia pursuant to a negotiated settlement and the Slovenes were allowed to secede. See 

Steven W. Sowards, The Yugoslav Civil War, The Balkans in the Age of Nationalism 4, at 

http://www.lib.msu.edu/sowards/balkan.lect25.htm (last modified on 5 July 2000) (a series of twenty-five 

lectures on modern Balkan history, presented by Michigan State University). 

113 Croatia’s population was over 15% Serbian. Moreover, the Croat–Serb relationship had soured during 

World Wars I and II when the Croats allied with the Habsburgs and the Germans and, as a result, had killed 

numerous Serbs. The Serbian memory was not short on this issue. Consequently, Yugoslavia/Serbia 

fought hard in a brutal war against Croatia’s succession for the next four years. See ROBERTS, supra note 

24, at 510; JOHNSEN, supra note 3, at 51. 114 See JOHNSEN, supra note 3, at 58-59. 

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continued.115 Macedonia declared independence in January 1992,116 and 

Bosnia and Herzegovina followed suit in March 1992. However, this 

declaration of Bosnian independence from Yugoslavia led only to a violent 

struggle between the Bosnian Serbs, supported by Serbia, and the Bosnian 

Muslims. The Serbs sought to divide the country along ethnic lines and 

unite with a "Greater Serbia." In the midst of all of this, Serbia and 

Montenegro joined together to form the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

(FRY) in April 1992, with Milosevic at the helm. 

On one side of the Bosnian conflict were the Bosnian Serbs, led by 

Premiere Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, and the 

"Chetniks."117 They both had the support of Yugoslav National Army (JNA) 

units, and were intent on eradicating the Muslim population through terror 

tactics and a vicious ethnic cleansing program.118 Pitted against them were 

115 On 25 September 1991, the UN entered the Balkan conflict by establishing a weapons and military 

equipment embargo on the former Yugoslavia. See THE BALKANS, supra note 15, at 33 (citing S.C. Res. 

713, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/Res/713 (25 Sep. 1991). In an effort to put an end to the warfare and ethnic 

cleansing in Croatia, a United Nations-brokered cease-fire took place on 2 January 1992. Nevertheless, 

smaller battles continued to occur for the next few years, especially in the province of Krajina. Estimates 

place the number of Serb refugees that fled from Croatia at anywhere from 200,000 to 400,000. Jansen, 

supra note 19, at 7-8. 116 Concerned over the potential for spillover of the conflict into neighboring states, the UN became even 

more engaged in the region's crisis, establishing the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) on 21 February 

1992 in UNSCR 743, and authorizing the full deployment of the force in UNSCR 749 on 7 April 1992. 

The largest, most expensive and complex peace operation in UN history, the force's mandate was to "create 

conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav 

crisis." See UN Dep't of Public Information, UN Protection Force, Former Republic of Yugoslavia 1-2 

(Sept. 1996), at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_b.htm. On 11 December 1992, UNSCR 

795 authorized the establishment of the force's presence in FYROM. UNPROFOR's mandate was extended 

by subsequent resolutions through March 1995. The U.S. contribution to UNPROFOR was called Task 

Force Able Sentry (TFAS), which was established on 12 July 1993 at Camp Able Sentry (CAS), FYROM. 

On 31 March 1995, in UNSCR 983, the UNSC again extended the mandate of UNPROFOR, but 

determined that the force in FYROM would be thereafter known as the UN Preventive Deployment Force 

(UNPREDEP). This force's mandate was similar to that of its predecessor, namely, "to monitor and report 

any developments in the border areas, which could undermine confidence and stability in the FYROM and 

threaten its territory." See UN Dep't of Public Information, UN Preventive Deployment Force, Former 

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 1, 5-6 (16 Mar. 1999), at 

http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpred_p.htm. 

117 Meaning "men in armed bands," the Chetniks were Loyalist Serbs who originally fought the German 

occupiers in WWII, and who also waged a civil war against Moslems, Croats (Ustashi), and the Partisans 

under Tito. General Mihailovic, their WWII leader, was tried for treason upon Tito's assumption of control 

and executed by firing squad in 1946. See Vern Liebl, A Non-Partisan View of World War II Yugoslavia, 

COMMAND MAG., May/June, 1993, at 131. 118 Clearly, all parties to this conflict were guilty of atrocities against the opposing side. However, the 

Serbs appeared to be the primary culprits when it came to acts of terror, to include rape, mass killings, and 

the creation of concentration camps at which many of these horrific acts occurred. See Sowards, supra note 

112, at 5. It was these atrocities that forced the international community to escalate its commitment to help 

resolve the conflict, with NATO military forces if necessary. Id. The JNA, the Yugoslav People's Army, 

was part of the regular armed forces in Yugoslavia. The successors to the JNA were the Army of 

30 
 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

the Bosnian Muslims, who were merely attempting to hold on to as much 

territory as possible. To further complicate matters, however, the Bosnian 

Croats were also seeking to obtain Bosnian land for Croatia and were 

attacking Bosnian Muslims as well. 

Figure 4: Balkan Region Recent Years 

Early in 1993, peace talks in Geneva, Switzerland, ensued, but to no 

avail, and the fighting continued throughout the year.119 Thereafter, in 

March 1994, the Bosnian Muslims and Croats were finally able to agree on a 

partition of the country that would end their conflict. Their agreement 

created the joint Muslim/Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

Yugoslavia (VJ) and the Army of the Serb Republic (VRS). See Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, Yugoslav Military and Security Forces: Facts and Figures (Apr. 22, 1999), at 

http://www.csis.org/kosovo/yugoforces.pdf. 119 The most significant of these was the Anglo-American Vance-Owen proposal, which provided for a 

three-way partition of Bosnia that would separate the warring factions and hopefully end the fighting as 

well. Unfortunately, the proposal was unacceptable to all sides, especially the Muslims. See Sowards, 

supra note 112, at 5; Jansen, supra note 19, at 8. 

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Significantly, it allowed both sides to end their armed struggle against each 

other and concentrate their combined efforts against the Bosnian Serbs. 

The Serbs then embarked on a ruthless campaign that included attacks 

on the previously declared "safe" areas within Bosnia, especially Sarajevo. 

These Serb attacks forced the international community to assume a greater 

role in the conflict. The U.S. and NATO threatened air strikes if the Serbs 

continued to attack recognized safe areas. The Serbs stopped attacks on 

Sarajevo but continued to target other safe areas. In 1995, the worst such 

attacks to date took place in Srebrenica and Zepa. These attacks resulted in 

almost 8,000 Bosnian Muslim fatalities.120 Serbs then attacked the Krajina 

province yet again but were beaten back by combined Muslim and Croat 

forces that recaptured the province and immediately expelled all Serbs.121 

Upwards of 150,000 refugees fled Bosnia and flooded into Kosovo and 

neighboring locations. 

The response of the international community was unprecedented as 

the U.S., with NATO support, pounded the Bosnian Serbs with air strikes. 

Ultimately, this military action brought all sides to the negotiating table in 

Dayton, Ohio, and led to the Dayton Accords. The Accords were agreed 

upon and signed in November 1995 by the presidents of the three warring 

factions—Milosevic for the FRY (Bosnian Serbs), Franjo Tudjman for 

Croatia (Bosnian Croats), and Alije Izebegovic for Bosnia and Herzegovina 

(Bosnian Muslims). The Accords divided Bosnia in half, giving 51% to the 

Muslim/Croat Federation, and 49% to the Serb-led Republika Srpska, or 

Serbia. The agreement also called for in excess of 60,000 UN Peacekeepers 

in Bosnia to enforce the agreement and prevent any further outbreaks of 

120 Reportedly, these attacks included some of the conflict's worst ethnic cleansing and the Bosnian Serb 

Commander, General Ratko Mladic, was involved in bringing about this massacre of Bosnian Muslims. 

See Sowards, supra note 112, at 6-7. Both Mladic and Radovan Karadzic have been indicted by the 

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on charges of genocide stemming from 

the massacre in Srebrenica. See Indictment, The Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Radovan Karadzic, 

Ratko Mladic, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 

http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/kar-ii951116e.htm (indictment concerning Srebrenica); 

Indictment, The Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, International 

Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/karii950724e.htm (sixteen-count indictment concerning the taking of UN peacekeepers as hostages, the 

sniping campaign in Sarajevo, and crimes against civilians and places of worship in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina ). See also Karadzic, Mladic Accused of Horrendous New War Crimes, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 

16, 1995, at 1, available at http://www.chron.com/content/chronicle/wprld/95/11/17/yugo.html. 121 During the period following their victory in Krajina, Croat forces embarked on a rampage through the 

region, burning and looting property and engaging in the mass killing of ethnic Serbs. See Raymond 

Bonner, Conflict in the Balkans: The Overview; In Broad Attack, Croatia is Trying to Dislodge Serbs, N.Y. 

TIMES, Aug. 5, 1995, at A1. 

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war.

122 Importantly, the Albanians viewed the Accords with disdain. They 

were embittered over their belief that the Accords failed to recognize and 

address the "Kosovo Question," or their quest for independence in 

Kosovo.123 

While the Bosnian conflict and subsequent peace negotiations were 

occurring, the situation in Kosovo worsened. Rugova's policies of passive 

resistance increasingly came under verbal attack and were frequently 

replaced by violence. In May 1993, an armed ethnic Albanian group called 

the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)124 was founded, replacing its 

underground predecessor, the National Movement for the Liberation of 

Kosovo.125 In 1997, the political structure within Albania collapsed and 

civil war ensued, dimming prospects for Kosovar Albanians' ultimate 

unification in a "Greater Albania." Money and weapons began to flow out 

of Albania and into the hands of the KLA. Simultaneously, attacks in 

Kosovo against Serb police, border guards, and prominent figures increased, 

as momentum shifted away from Rugova and his nonviolent policies to the 

KLA and its radical approach. The KLA eventually admitted responsibility 

for these attacks and soon began to speak as the now radical voice for 

Albanian independence within the region.126 

122 See General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec.14, 1995, Rep. of Bosn. 

& Herz.–Rep. of Croat.–Fed. Rep. of Yugo. [commonly known as, and hereinafter, Dayton Peace Accords]. 

See also BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SUMMARY OF THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT 

(1995), available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/dayton.html. See also Sowards, supra 

note 112, at 7. 

123 "The Dayton Accord had not only recognized Republika Srpska, but more importantly had shut the door 

to the Albanian Kosovar case by decreeing that no additional changes in borders within Yugoslavia would 

be sanctioned." Jansen, supra note 19, at 9. Many Albanian leaders cited to this as proof that nonviolent 

resistance to Serbian encroachment would never work. They noted that in the Dayton Accords, the 

Bosnian Serbs were apparently rewarded with a new territory for their cruel ethnic cleansing policy within 

Bosnia. See War Crimes Library, supra note 2, at 2; BALKAN HOTSPOT, supra note 6, at 2-3. 124 The Albanian acronym for this organization is UCK, or "Ushtria Clirimtare e Kombatere." The UCK, or 

KLA, is a Kosovo Albanian paramilitary group formerly led by Hashim Thaci. The group's stated function 

is to resist Serbian rule and seek independence via armed conflict. Its targets are not limited to Serbs— 

Kosovar Albanians supporting Serbian authorities have also been subject to harsh attacks in the past. See 

OSCE Brief, supra note 7, at 4. See also Marlise Simons, UN War Crimes Tribunal Steps Up Its Inquiry 

Into Kosovo, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1998, at A4 (indicating that the ICTY was investigating war crimes 

allegedly committed by the KLA during the fighting in Kosovo) Elizabeth Olson, Crisis in the Balkans: 

Atrocities; Report Finds Shared Guilt Inside Kosovo, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1999, at A12 (indicating that a 

report to the UN Human Rights Commission accused both Serb and Albanian forces of committing 

numerous atrocities in Kosovo). 

125 Jansen, supra note 19, at 9. 126 See id. at 9; AUSA BRIEF, supra note 5, at 7. The KLA also began to create areas that were completely 

free of Serbian presence, by forcing the Serbs out via threats of violence. See BALKAN HOTSPOT, supra 

note 6, at 3. 

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During 1998, a full-fledged civil war opened up between Serbia and 

Kosovo. In the battles between Serb military and police forces and the 

KLA, thousands died and hundreds of thousands sought refuge elsewhere.127 

Kosovo quickly became the foremost concern of the international 

community, posing grave humanitarian concerns and risking spillover into 

neighboring countries, which needed little to fan the existing embers of 

ethnic hatred and violence.128 A six-country "Contact Group"129 formed and 

initially called for negotiations on autonomy in place of armed conflict. 

Buttressed by internal support for his policies, Milosevic rejected the calls 

for Serbia to cease all military action in Kosovo. Instead, Milosevic sent 

more troops into Kosovo and escalated the level of fighting during the 

summer months of 1998. In response, the North Atlantic Council (NAC)130 

asked NATO to explore and assess numerous military options to end the 

crisis in Kosovo.131 

Amid the unearthing of evidence of additional massacres and the 

continued rejection of peace overtures by Milosevic, the UN Security 

Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution (UNSCR) 1199 on 23 September 

127 An estimated 400,000 people became refugees from the warfare during 1998. Trained Serb "security" 

forces in Kosovo responded to brutal KLA violence in kind with large-scale attacks in Drenica and other 

regions using military vehicles and weapons and vicious house-to-house raids in which Albanians were 

killed, beaten, or at the very least forced to leave their homes and/or families. See OSCE Brief, supra note 

7, at 4-5; Background to the Conflict, at http://kforonline.com/resources/intro.htm (last visited 1 Dec. 

2001). 

128 From late 1997 forward the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union 

(EU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) all focused their attention on 

the developing situation in Kosovo. United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, Kosovo: An Account of the 

Crisis—The Crisis Unfolds, at http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/account/crisis.htm (last visited 23 Oct. 2001) 

[hereinafter UK Account]. 

129 The six-member group included representatives from France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United 

Kingdom, and the U.S. It was established by the 1992 London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, 

which sought to give the international community a "better foundation to defuse, contain, and bring to an 

end the conflict in the former Yugoslavia" by establishing "a new, permanent negotiating forum, cochaired 

by the United Nations and European Community." Press Release, Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater 

on the London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (Aug. 28, 1992), available at 

http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1992/92082802.html. The U.S. sought an end to the bloodshed, the use 

of international observers within Kosovo, and an "enhanced" status for Kosovo within Serbia. See UK 

Account, supra note 128, at 1; Jansen, supra note 19, at 9. The international community as a whole 

threatened limited sanctions against Serbia, viewed by most as the aggressor. These sanctions and an arms 

embargo were ultimately imposed in March and April 1998, in response to Milosevic's blatant disregard of 

all diplomatic efforts, including those of the Contact Group. 

130 The NAC is the principal decision-making authority of the North Atlantic Alliance, containing 

representatives of all member nations and chaired by the Secretary-General. See NATO OFF. INFO. & 

PRESS, NATO HANDBOOK 278 (2001). 131 See Background to the Conflict, supra note 127, at 1; UK Account, supra note 128, at 1. After 

producing the requested options, NATO began a series of military exercises focused on demonstrating to 

Milosevic the NAC's intentions if he refused to comply with international requests and demands. Id. 

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1998.132 The resolution called for an immediate cease-fire, an international 

presence, and the immediate withdrawal of Serbian troops from within 

Kosovo.133 Although the Serbs thereafter claimed to have complied, at least 

in part, the Contact Group observed no evidence of such compliance. Thus, 

while the Contact Group sent U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke and others to 

Belgrade to obtain Milosevic's assurances of future compliance with the 

terms of the resolution, on 13 October 1998 NATO authorized air strikes in 

the event that Milosevic ultimately failed to comply.134 

Under this threat of NATO air strikes, Milosevic finally agreed to 

withdraw troops from Kosovo, pursuant to the "Milosevic-Holbrooke 

Agreement."135 The Serbs then temporarily discontinued their offensive and 

withdrew from Kosovo, NATO suspended the air strike activation order, and 

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) sent in the 

Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM).136 For almost two months, the 

situation appeared to be progressing; the KLA, however, took advantage of 

132 S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998), available at 

http://www.un.org./Docs/scres/1998/98sc1199.htm [hereinafter UNSCR 1199]. The UNSC acted pursuant 

to its authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and the vote was unanimous, with China abstaining. 

See OSCE Brief, supra note 7, at 5. 133 UNSCR 1199, supra note 132. The resolution also "highlighted the impending human catastrophe" in 

Kosovo and expressed great concern over the Serbs' excessive use of force. Id.; UK Account, supra note 

128, at 2. 

134 NATO's Secretary General Javier Solana, the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, General 

Naumann, and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Clark, all visited Belgrade with U.S. 

Envoys Holbrooke and Hill to meet with Milosevic and his representatives. See Background to the 

Conflict, supra note 127, at 2. 135 This agreement was announced, but not published, on 16 October 1998, after numerous sessions 

primarily between Holbrooke and Milosevic in Belgrade. See OSCE Brief, supra note 7, at 5-6. 

136 Pursuant to the resolution and agreement, the hostilities ended, limits were thereafter placed on the total 

number of Serbian forces in Kosovo, and refugees returned to their homes. Additionally, the OSCE was to 

establish a "verification mission" on the ground—that is, a 2,000 member unarmed civilian force–and 

NATO was to create an aerial surveillance system, code-named Operation Eagle Eye, both of which would 

verify the Serbs' compliance. See id. at 6; Background to the Conflict, supra note 127, at 1. See also S.C. 

Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998), available at 

http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/98sc1203.htm [hereinafter UNSCR 1203] (endorsing the establishment 

of the two missions and demanding that the FRY comply "fully and swiftly" with UNSCR 1160 and 

UNSCR 1199 and cooperate fully with the OSCE KVM). The KVM actually replaced the Kosovo 

Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM), which was established on 6 July 1998 in response to the Moscow 

Declaration by Serbian President Milosevic and Russian President Yeltsin on 31 March 1998. The KDOM 

consisted of members from the U.S., Russia, and member states of the EU and its mission was to monitor 

and report on the security and welfare of the people in Kosovo. To facilitate communications between the 

KVM and NATO, the Kosovo Verification Coordination Centre (KVCC) was established on 26 November 

1998. Located at Kumanovo in FYROM, it conducted liaison, planning, coordination, and exchange of 

information with the OSCE KVM verifiers. It also served as the liaison with the FYROM government to 

coordinate all flights within FYROM airspace and as the link to the NATO forces identified to assist in the 

extraction of the KVM if necessary. NATO aerial surveillance and the KVM monitoring mission ceased all 

operations in March 1999. 

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the opportunity presented by the lull in Serb activity and intensified its 

military efforts with weapons smuggled from Albania. The Serbs responded 

by strengthening their forces in Kosovo and allowing the Serbian military 

and police to resume their "barbaric" tactics.137 As the new year approached, 

it was clear that the cease-fire had ended, the verification force was in 

danger, and the refugees were not returning home due to continued 

violence.138 

The Serb massacre of forty-five Albanians in the village of Racak on 

15 January 1999139 forced the international community’s hand once again. 

NATO issued a "solemn warning" to both sides that it would resort to 

military force immediately if they did not again heed the terms of the ceasefire. In an effort to settle the rising tension, the Contact Group announced a 

peace conference in Rambouillet, France, near Paris, on 6 February 1999.140 

The warring parties received Western-drafted proposals on how to resolve 

the ongoing conflict and were "provided" a deadline by which they were to 

agree to the proposals.141 Although the Serbs initially expressed a 

willingness to discuss the proposal's terms, they reneged at subsequent 

meetings held in Paris in mid-March. As a result, the negotiations ended, 

137 See Jansen, supra note 19, at 9-10. Again, the Serbs were not alone in committing these acts of 

barbarity, as the KLA could be just as heinous as the opposition. 

138 In response, a 2,300-person NATO extraction force was established in neighboring FYROM in the event 

the KVM needed to be evacuated from Kosovo on short notice. OSCE Brief, supra note 7, at 6. 

139 See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Yugoslav Government War Crimes in Racak (Jan. 29, 1999), 

available at http://www.hrw.org/press/1999/jan/yugo0129.htm. Some of those injured or killed—most of 

whom were shot in the head at close range, or in the back attempting to run away—were children. Many 

were tortured before they were killed. Id. at 3-4. Some critics have disputed the allegations that what 

occurred in Racak was a massacre. Id. at 4-5. However, their arguments appear to lack merit. Notably, 

after the leader of the OSCE's KVM accused the Serbs of responsibility for the massacre, Serbian 

authorities ordered him out of the country but he refused to leave, setting the stage for a final showdown 

between the international community and Milosevic. OSCE Brief, supra note 7, at 6. 140 Present at the 6-23 February and 15-18 March 1998 conference, co-chaired by the UK and France, were 

members of the Contact Group, Serbian leaders, and representatives from both the LDK and UCK (KLA). 

See UK Account, supra note 128, at 3. 141 Id.; See Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, unsigned, 

Fed. Rep. Yugo.–Serb.–Kosovo, U.N. Doc. S/1999/648 (1999). The Rambouillet Accords were a threeyear interim agreement designed to provide democratic self-government, peace, and security for all living 

in Kosovo. BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFF., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, UNDERSTANDING THE RAMBOUILLET 

ACCORDS (Mar. 1, 1999), available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_990301_rambouillet.html. 

The Accords set forth a framework to transform Kosovo into an autonomous province within the Yugoslav 

Federation and to achieve a final settlement for Kosovo in three years. Id. at 1-2. Pursuant to the 

Agreement, the FRY would withdraw all of its forces from Kosovo, the KLA would disarm, and NATO 

troops would enter Kosovo to keep the peace. However, some viewed certain provisions within the 

Accords as more appropriate for an occupying force after an armistice than for a peace accord, in that they 

required the FRY to surrender "many aspects of its national sovereignty" to NATO. Jansen, supra note 19, 

at 10. The Albanians eventually signed the proposed peace agreement but the Serbs would not. 

36 
 

 

 

 

 

 

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the violence in Kosovo intensified, the KVM withdrew, and NATO once 

again threatened a strong military response.142 

On 22 March, Holbrooke attempted a "last-ditch" effort to convince 

Milosevic to sign the agreement and prevent a military confrontation. The 

international community hoped to avoid air strikes but nonetheless continued 

to plan them.143 However, Holbrooke’s efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. 

On 24 March, NATO forces began a campaign of air strikes—code-named 

Operation Allied Force—against FRY military targets to force the Serbs to 

cease hostilities and allow ethnic Albanian refugees to return to their homes 

in Kosovo.144 Instead of immediately achieving the desired goals, however, 

the air strikes only led to the intensification of Serbian-led assaults on 

Albanians, with Serbian police and paramilitary units and the JNA razing 

villages and forcing residents to flee.145 Thereafter, the bombing campaign 

lasted seventy-eight days and inflicted tremendous destruction within the 

region.146 

Finally, on 3 June, Milosevic and the Serbian National Assembly 

accepted a peace plan that arose out of negotiations initiated by Russian 

Special Envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin.147 On 10 June, after having received 

142 Not only had Milosevic reneged on earlier promises to work toward a peaceful resolution but evidence 

depicted an increased intensity in Serbian-induced violence as well as a massive Serb security force buildup 

of almost 30,000 troops in and around Kosovo. On 20 March, obstructed by Serb forces and incapable of 

performing its mission, the KVM withdrew. See Background to the Conflict, supra note 127, at 2. 

Interestingly, subsequent revelations demonstrated that while Milosevic was feigning interest in a 

negotiated settlement, he was covertly developing a plan—code-named Operation Horseshoe—designed to 

drive Albanians from Kosovo in "scenes reminiscent of the 1930s and 1940s." UK Account, supra note 

128, at 5. 

143 "In response to Belgrade's continued intransigence and repression, the Secretary General of NATO, to 

whom the North Atlantic Council had delegated on 30 January the authority to decide on air operations, is 

completing his consultations with the Allies to this end." Press Release, NATO, Statement by the North 

Atlantic Council on the Situation in Kosovo, (1999)038 (22 Mar. 1999), available at 

http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-038e.htm. 

144 See UK Account, supra note 128, at 4-5. 145 Almost one million Kosovars fled, mostly due to Serbian atrocities or fear of them, but some because of 

the bombing campaign itself. Jansen, supra note 19, at 10. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR) put the number of refugees at just under one million, placing an extremely heavy burden on the 

neighboring countries of FYROM and Albania. Yugoslavia, at http://info.lycos.com/ipa/a0772953.html 

(last visited 22 Oct. 2001). 

146 During the campaign, NATO flew over 38,000 sorties, with over 10,000 of them being strike sorties. 

See NATO & Kosovo: Operation Allied Force, NATO’s Role in Kosovo, A Historical Overview 1-2, at 

http://www.nato.int/kosovo/kosovo.htm (last visited 20 Nov. 2001). 

147 The international community desperately sought a political resolution to the conflict that would end the 

air strikes as well as the bloodshed on the ground. The G-8 group of industrialized countries—the Group of 

Seven and the Russian Federation—had adopted "general principles" upon which this political resolution 

would be based. The UNSC also adopted these principles, along with a paper drafted by Finnish President 

Marti Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin. Both men presented the paper and principles to Milosevic in Belgrade 

37 
 

 

 

 

 

 

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confirmation from SACEUR that Serb forces were withdrawing from 

Kosovo pursuant to the terms of a NATO–FRY Military-Technical 

Agreement (MTA) dated 9 June,148 NATO officially halted the air strikes.149 

Also on 10 June, the UNSC passed UNSCR 1244, which welcomed the 

FRY's acceptance of the "principles on a political solution to the Kosovo 

crisis" and demanded the FRY's "full cooperation in their rapid 

implementation."150 

Although 10 June brought an end to the military campaign, significant 

events occurred during the two-plus months of NATO military action. One 

week after the start of the campaign, the crisis in the region escalated when 

on 31 March Serbs captured three U.S. soldiers patrolling the FRY-FYROM 

border.151 In April 1999 Serb troops were responsible for the massacre of at 

least forty-seven Albanian men, and the forced departure of thousands more, 

from the town of Djakovica.152 In response, NATO intensified its campaign 

on 2 June, and the Government of the FRY accepted them on 3 June (both documents comprise annexes to 

the final UN Resolution, UNSCR 1244). S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999), 

available at http://www.un.org./Docs/scres/1999/99sc1244.htm [hereinafter UNSCR 1244]; Background to 

the Conflict, supra note 127, at 2. 148 Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and The 

Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999 [hereinafter 

MTA], available at http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm. A copy of the MTA is included in 

Appendix IV-1. The MTA contemplated the deployment of the Kosovo Force, or KFOR, into Kosovo as 

soon as the UNSC adopted UNSCR 1244. The KFOR would “take all necessary action to establish and 

maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo” without hindrance from any party. Id. at art. I, ¶ 

2. To accomplish this the MTA initially established both an Air Safety Zone (ASZ), which extended 

twenty-five kilometers beyond the Kosovo border into the remainder of the FRY, and a Ground Safety 

Zone (GSZ), which extended five kilometers beyond the Kosovo border and into the FRY. Id. at art. I, ¶ 

3d-e. To “establish a durable cessation of hostilities,” the Agreement then required all FRY and Serbian air 

and ground military forces to withdraw in phases from Kosovo and the GSZ and ASZ and remain outside 

of the zones, as applicable. Id. at art. I, ¶ 4a; art. II, ¶¶ 2-3. 

149 Once SACEUR, General Clark, confirmed that the withdrawal of Serb forces had begun, Secretary 

General Solana instructed Clark to suspend the air operations. See Background to the Conflict, supra note 

127, at 2. 

150 UNSCR 1244, supra note 147, ¶ 2. Again the UNSC acted pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 

and the resolution was unanimously adopted with one abstention (China). Among other things, as detailed 

later in this chapter, the resolution called for an immediate end to the violence and the FRY's withdrawal of 

its military, paramilitary, and police forces from Kosovo and the deployment of an international civil and 

security presence in Kosovo. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5, 7-11. 151 On 31 March 1999, three U.S. soldiers, two sergeants and a specialist, were captured by Serbian forces 

just north of Algunja, FYROM. See John J. Cushman, Jr., Crisis in the Balkans: The Ambush; 3 G.I.s 

Missing in Macedonia After They Reported Attack, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 1, 1999, at A1. On 2 May 1999, the 

three soldiers were released after the Reverend Jesse Jackson negotiated their return with Milosevic. See 

Charles M. Madigan, Trip to Germany Ends Soldiers' Ordeal; Bombs Rain Amid Signs of Push for a Peace 

Settlement, CHI. TRIB., May 3, 1999, at 1. See also infra Part III, notes 8-16 and accompanying text 

(providing a detailed discussion of the soldiers’ status as a result of their capture). 

152 See Scene of Horror, ABC News.com/World News, 

http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/kosovo990625_moran.html (an on-line interview with an 

ABC news correspondent at the scene of the massacre approximately two months later) (indicating that 

38 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

of air strikes, bombing roads, bridges, oil production facilities, and other 

significant targets in the FRY. On 5 May an Apache helicopter, part of 

“Task Force Hawk,” crashed in Albania while on a training mission, causing 

two U.S. pilots to become the only NATO casualties during the air strikes.153 

Additionally, on 6 May the first group of ethnic Albanian refugees 

from Kosovo arrived in the U.S. as part of Operation Provide Refuge, the 

U.S. humanitarian effort to relieve the overflow of Kosovar refugees into the 

FYROM.154 On 7 May NATO bombs struck the Chinese embassy in 

Belgrade, killing three Chinese journalists and prompting massive protests in 

Beijing, where the American ambassador was trapped in the U.S. embassy 

for over forty-eight hours.155 NATO also committed other errant bombings 

during the air campaign. In separate incidents in both April and May, 

NATO bombs struck what were mistakenly thought to be Serb military posts 

or vehicles but were actually Albanian villages or convoys, causing 

twenty people—twelve children, seven woman, and one man—were allegedly gunned down, burned, and 

their remains left for dogs to pick over). In addition to these atrocities, the UN and Human Rights Watch 

later reported that Serbian troops killed 200-300 men in the village of Meja on 27 April 1999. See UN 

Reports Massacre Evidence, ABC News.com/World News, 

http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/kosovo_main_990430.html. Serb forces have also been 

accused of using Albanians as human shields, raping women, burning and looting homes, destroying crops 

and livestock, and destroying many ethnic Albanians’ citizenship papers, etc., in an effort to suppress their 

identity, origin, and property ownership. The KLA was also guilty of similar atrocities and violations of 

human rights. See Carlotta Gall, Belgrade Sees Grave Site as Proof NATO Fails to Protect Serbs, N.Y. 

TIMES, Aug. 27, 1999, at A3 (on file with CLAMO). 153 The helicopter, an AH-64 Apache, crashed during a training flight near Tirana, Albania, killing its twoman crew. This was the second Apache to crash during the operation, but the first did not involve any 

injuries. See U.S. Helicopter Crew Killed in Crash in Albania (May 5, 1999), at 

http://cgi.cnn.com/US/9905/05/apache.crash.htm. The helicopters were part of an overall force of 

approximately 2,000 U.S. troops sent to Albania as part of Task Force Hawk. The task force, an element of 

the larger Operation Allied Force, consisted of almost fifty helicopters (twenty-four Apache helicopters), a 

Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) battalion (eighteen MLRS systems), an Infantry battalion (300 

soldiers with M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles and M1 Abrams tanks), a Deep Operation Control Center 

(DOCC) (coordination cell), and other support elements, providing NATO with a deep strike capability out 

of Albania into Kosovo. See Press Release, Public Affairs Office, U.S. Army, Army Sending Task Force to 

Albania (Apr. 5, 1999), at http: //www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/Apr1999/a19990405hawk.html. 154 See infra Part V (detailed discussion of Operation Provide Refuge). 155 Amid Protests, U.S. Says “Faulty Information” Led to Chinese Embassy Bombing 1 (May 9, 1999), at 

http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9905/09/kosovo.01/htm. A critical mistake in properly identifying 

the target apparently led to the bombing, which killed three and injured twenty more, some critically, as 

many used knotted bed sheets draped out of the windows to escape the flames that engulfed the building. 

While many non-NATO countries condemned the attack and the U.S. and NATO apologized profusely, 

intense anti-U.S. protests took place in Beijing, China. Almost 20,000 protesters surrounded the U.S. 

Embassy, hurling rocks at the windows and scaling the walls in an attempt to gain entry to the compound. 

Most embassy workers were advised to remain in the relative safety of their homes, and the Ambassador 

did not leave the building. Id. at 3-4. 

39 
 

 

 

 

 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

numerous Albanian casualties.156 On 27 May 1999 the UN International 

Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) unsealed an indictment 

accusing Milosevic and four other senior Yugoslav officials of committing 

numerous war crimes in Kosovo.157 

In passing UNSCR 1244, the UNSC formally declared its adoption of 

the general principles upon which the political solution to the Kosovo crisis 

would be based158 and announced its decision to deploy an international civil 

presence and an international security presence under UN auspices within 

Kosovo.159 The international civil presence was entitled the United Nations 

Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK),160 and the 

156 See Michael R. Gordon, Crisis in the Balkans: A NATO Account; NATO Admits Pilot Bombed 2d 

Convoy on Kosovo Road, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1999, at A12 (on file with CLAMO); Michael R. Gordon, 

Crisis in the Balkans: The Attack; NATO Admits Village Attack and Casualties, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1999, 

at A1. See also NATO in Kosovo: A Timeline 3 (Oct. 22, 2001), http://infoplease.lycos.com/spot/kosovotimeline1.html [hereinafter NATO Timeline]. 

157 See Press Release, The Hague, President Milosevic and Four Other Senior FRY Officials Indicted for 

Murder, Persecution, and Deportation in Kosovo (27 May 1999), available at 

http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p403-e.htm. The ICTY indicted and issued arrest warrants for Milosevic, 

the Serbian President, the FRY Deputy Prime Minister, the JNA Chief of Staff, and the Serbian Minister of 

Internal Affairs. Id. The indictment alleged murder, persecution on political, racial, and/or religious 

grounds, and deportation—all crimes against humanity. The indictment further alleged that between 1 

January and late May 1999, Serb or FRY forces under the five individuals’ control murdered 340 people 

(identified by name), persecuted the Kosovo Albanian population on political, racial, or religious grounds, 

and expelled over 750,000 Albanians from Kosovo. Id. These indictments are in addition to pending 

criminal charges against Milosevic and others stemming from the murders of hundreds of civilians and the 

expulsion of almost 200,000 non-Serbs from their homes and towns during the Serbs’ war with Croatia. 

See The Charges Against Milosevic, BBC News, Europe 1-2, at 

http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1402000/1402790.stm. Finally, a new 

indictment was recently filed against Milosevic for war crimes, to include genocide, that are alleged to have 

occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995. The most recent indictment includes twenty-nine 

counts, the third count alleging genocide, under a superior authority theory. Ratko Mladic and Radovan 

Karadzic are named in the indictment as well. Prosecutors currently plan to merge all three indictments 

into one trial to eliminate overlapping testimony. See Bosnians Hail Milosevic Move, CNN.com/World 

News, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/11/23/milosevic.genocide/index.html. 158 See supra note 147 and accompanying text. The general principles included, among others: an 

immediate and verifiable end of the violence and repression in Kosovo; withdrawal of all FRY military, 

police, and paramilitary forces; deployment of effective international civil and security presences, and 

substantial NATO participation in such presences along with unified command and control; establishment 

of an interim administration as directed by the UNSC; the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced 

persons; a political process providing for both substantial self-government in accordance with the 

Rambouillet Accords and the demilitarization of the KLA; and a comprehensive approach to the economic 

development and stabilization of the region. UNSCR 1244, supra note 147, at annexes 1-2; Background to 

the Conflict, supra note 127, at 2. 

159 UNSCR 1244, supra note 147, ¶ 10. The UNSC determined that the KFOR’s responsibilities would 

include deterring renewed hostilities, demilitarizing the KLA, and establishing a secure environment for the 

safe return of the refugees and the safe operation of the international presences. Background to the 

Conflict, supra note 127, at 2. 160 "The task before the international community is to help the people of Kosovo to rebuild their lives and 

heal the wounds of conflict." United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 

40 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

international security presence was known as KFOR. On 12 June, 

synchronized with the departure of the FRY forces, the initial elements of 

KFOR rolled into Kosovo. This almost 50,000-member international force 

was to assume the critical peacekeeping mission in Kosovo—code-named 

Operation Joint Guardian.161 The U.S. contribution to this force, "Task 

Force Falcon," operated within one of the five multinational brigades within 

Kosovo that comprised KFOR—the Multinational Brigade East (MNB(E)), 

located in southeast Kosovo, bordering the FYROM and the FRY.162 By 20 

June 1999 a majority of the FRY forces had vacated Kosovo, KFOR was 

well established, and NATO had formally terminated the air campaign.163 

The NATO peacekeepers worked mightily to maintain the relative 

peace, although the violence continued within Kosovo. By January 2000, 

however, in the face of trade sanctions from the U.S. and other nations, the 

FRY economy continued to deteriorate and dissent within the region spread. 

Montenegro discussed separating from the FRY. Milosevic's popularity 

with many Serbs began to plummet over the loss of Kosovo. On 24 

September 2000, elections were held in the FRY and opposition leader 

Vojislav Kostunica164 emerged as the victor. Milosevic refused to release 

the complete results, however, and instead demanded a runoff election 

against Kostunica.165 

Bringing Peace to Kosovo: Mandate and Tasks 1, at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo12.htm 

(quoting UN Secretary General Kofi Annan) (last visited 18 Nov. 2001). UNSCR 1244 gave UNMIK the 

mandate to establish an interim civilian administration [led by the UN] under which the Kosovo population 

could enjoy substantial autonomy. Id. The head of UNMIK is the Special Representative of the Secretary 

General for Kosovo. From 1999-2001, this was Dr. Bernard Kouchner of France, and currently Mr. Hans 

Haekkerup of Denmark holds the position. Id. at 2. See also infra Part IV (discussion of UNMIK’s 

mission, responsibilities, regulations, and policies). 

161 See NATO’s Role in Relation to Kosovo, NATO Fact Sheets, NATO On-Line Library 1-2, at 

http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/kosovo.htm (last visited 20 Nov. 2001). KFOR consisted of five 

multinational brigades with personnel from all of the nineteen NATO-member nations and twenty other 

troop contributing nations (TCN). See also infra Part IV, notes 5-7 and accompanying text (detailed 

discussion of the composition and command and control of KFOR). 

162 The U.S. contribution to KFOR, TFF, was almost 8,100 soldiers, approximately 7,400 of which were 

located in Kosovo and the remainder at TFF (Rear) in FYROM. See Major General Ricardo S. Sanchez, 

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, United States Army Europe, Kosovo Scene Setting, PowerPoint 

presentation, briefing slide 5 (2001) (on file with CLAMO). 

163 Background to the Conflict, supra note 127, at 2. 164 Kostunica was a former constitutional law professor, political outsider, and reluctant candidate, having 

been urged to run against Milosevic only when it was clear that the two other candidates opposing 

Milosevic had no chance of winning. See Vojislav Kostunica: Tough Intellectual, CNN.com/World News 

(Oct. 6, 2000), at http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/10/05/etime/kostunica/. 165 See Steven Erlanger, Milosevic Seeking a Runoff Election After His Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 

2000, at A1 [hereinafter Runoff Election] (on file with CLAMO). See also Slobodan Milosevic, Former 

Yugoslav President, ABC News.com, at http://www.abcnews.go.com/reference/bios/milosevic.html (last 

41 
 

 

 

 

 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

In response to Milosevic's refusal to step down, massive public 

protests and demonstrations took place within Serbia. A general strike was 

called, and over one million people flooded Belgrade, ultimately attacking 

the Parliament building. Serb security forces either joined the demonstrators 

or retreated. On 5 October 2000, Milosevic finally conceded the election 

and stepped down. 166 His Socialist Party, still maintaining a degree of 

political power, agreed to share power with two opposition parties.167 Yet 

after thirteen cruel years and four more Balkan wars, Milosevic's reign had 

finally come to a close. 

The international community's response to Milosevic's departure was 

swift—Russia and China immediately recognized the new government and 

the U.S. and EU quickly lifted economic sanctions against the FRY. 

However, Kostunica clearly asserted that he would not be a Western puppet. 

He recognized that his primary task was to rebuild a shattered FRY after 

years of turmoil and the recent NATO bombing campaign.168 

On 1 April 2001 Milosevic was arrested by FRY authorities and 

charged with official corruption and abuse of power. In response, the U.S. 

released $50 million in economic aid to the FRY. Milosevic was thereafter 

turned over to the ICTY in The Hague in June 2001 for prosecution on the 

war crimes indictments. The UNSC then lifted the arms embargo on the 

FRY in September 2001, the last remaining sanction against the embattled 

country.169 

Currently, the international community considers Kosovo to be an 

autonomous province of the FRY, yet the Kosovar Albanians still seek 

complete independence from Serbian authority. As this Book went to press, 

under the watchful eyes of over 40,000 peacekeepers from over thirty 

different nations, residents of Kosovo went to the polls on 17 November 

2001 to elect members of a 120-seat legislature. This legislature will in turn 

visited 27 Nov. 2001) [hereinafter Milosevic]. Milosevic claimed that although Kostunica had received
 

more votes, the final count was so close that a runoff election was necessary.
 166 See Runoff Election, supra note 165, at A1; Milosevic, supra note 165, at 1-2. See also Steven
 

Erlanger, Showdown in Yugoslavia: The Overview; Milosevic Concedes His Defeat; Yugoslavs Celebrate
 

New Era, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2000, at A1 (on file with CLAMO).
 167 Milosevic Party Agrees to Power Sharing Deal, CNN.com/World News (Oct. 16, 2000), at
 

http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/10/16/yugoslavia.government.02/index.html.
 168 See Milosevic, supra note 165, at 5-6.
 169 Id. at 6.
 

42 
 

 

 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

select a Kosovo President and government to run the province, which is still 

under the overall control of the UN administration.170 The Serbs in Kosovo, 

contrary to the predictions of many election monitors, did not boycott the 

election. Nevertheless, they continued to call for the safe return of over 

170,000 Serbs driven from their homes in Kosovo during the UN air 

campaign and afterward.171 In a fairly substantial victory, Dr. Ibrahim 

Rugova's moderate ethnic Albanian party, the Democratic League of Kosovo 

(LDK), still pursuing Kosovo independence through nonviolent means, was 

returned to power after years of violence had rocked the province.172 

170 See Polling Stations Close in Kosovo, CNN.com/World News (Nov. 18, 2001), at 

http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/11/17/kosovo.elex/index.html. 171 See id. Initially, voting in Serb enclaves was light. However, the Serb turnout surged as the day wore 

on, and many polls stayed open well past the designated closing time to accommodate the large numbers of 

voters standing in line. Many Serbs who did not vote indicated that they "did not want to legalize an 

Albanian government." Id. at 2. The Serbs were guaranteed at least ten seats in the new Parliament and as 

many as twenty if Serb voter turnout was high. Id. 172 First Results Hand Rugova Victory, CNN.com/World News (Nov. 19, 2001), at 

http://europe.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/11/19/kosovo.elex/index.html. Early analysis of 92% of the 

vote indicated that Rugova's LDK had obtained 46% of the vote, while Hashim Thaci's Democratic Party of 

Kosovo (DPK) had received only 25% of the vote. The results did not give Rugova a clear majority, 

meaning that he will not be able to rule alone but will need to form a coalition government. However, this 

did not deter Rugova from immediately calling for Kosovo independence. His calls were met with anger 

and dismay by representatives of the international community, who still believe that the best resolution to 

the Kosovo conflict is substantial autonomy for Kosovo within the Yugoslav Federation. Id. See also 

Press Release, NATO, Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, (2001)153 (17 Nov. 2001), 

at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-153e.htm (discussing the success of the first free and democratic 

elections in Kosovo history). 

43 
 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

III. OPERATION ALLIED FORCE/TASK FORCE HAWK/OPERATIONS AT 

CAMP ABLE SENTRY, FYROM 

A. OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 

In 1989, Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic revoked 

Kosovo's status as an autonomous province of the Federal Republic of 

Yugoslavia (FRY), annexing Kosovo into the FRY province of Serbia. In 

response, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a militant group comprised 

of ethnic Albanians, was founded in 1993, initiating a campaign of violence 

against the FRY government. In 1998, Milosevic sent Yugoslav troops into 

KLA strongholds and the conflict escalated. The United Nations (UN) 

Security Council called for a cease fire in UN Security Council Resolution 

(UNSCR) 1199 on 23 September 1998. The North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) authorized air strikes against Serb military targets on 

13 October 1998. As a result, Milosevic agreed to withdraw troops, to 

facilitate the return of refugees, and to accept international monitors. 

Despite these assurances, the violence continued to escalate. 

In 1999, the political and military leaders from Kosovo, Serbia, and 

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) agreed to attend a peace 

conference in Rambouillet, France. The Kosovar Albanians signed the 

“Rambouillet Accords,” which specified that the province would remain a 

part of Serbia but be allowed to operate autonomously. Under the Accords, 

up to 30,000 NATO troops would have deployed to Kosovo to keep the 

peace. The Serbs refused to sign the Accords, objecting to various 

provisions, most notably elections that might potentially lead to Kosovo 

independence, and talks were suspended. Because the violence continued, 

NATO began air strikes against Serb targets in Serbia and Kosovo on 24 

March 1999. The NATO air campaign, designated Operation Allied Force, 

lasted until 10 June 1999, when Milosevic agreed to withdraw Serb forces 

from Kosovo and permit the entry of the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) to 

keep the peace.1 

1. Command and Control 

Allied Force was a NATO operation. Inserted into the NATO chain 

of command was a U.S. command component designated as Operation 

1

 For a more detailed discussion of the historical and contextual background leading up to Allied Force, see 

supra Ch. II. 

44 
 

 

 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

Noble Anvil. The command relationships derived from this basic starting 

structure must be understood before proceeding into lessons learned.2 

Without the insertion of the U.S. component, the NATO military 

chain of command for this Operation would have flowed from Supreme 

Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), to Allied Forces Southern 

Europe (AFSOUTH), to a task force headquarters created out of one or more 

of AFSOUTH's subordinate component commands: Allied Air Forces South 

(AIRSOUTH), Allied Naval Forces South (NAVSOUTH), Allied Naval 

Striking Forces South (STRIKFORSOUTH), and Allied Land Forces South 

(LANDSOUTH).3 

However, with the insertion of the U.S. command component, U.S. 

forces did not simply fall in upon the extant NATO command structure. 

Instead, a joint task force was created—Joint Task Force Noble Anvil— 

directly subordinate to U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), the U.S. 

geographic combatant command. The chain of command for U.S. forces 

thus had a distinctly American flavor within the overall NATO command 

structure.4 

2. USEUCOM Lessons Learned 

Lawyers from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force served 

on the legal staff at USEUCOM during Operation Allied Force. Two broad 

lessons learned, while not necessarily unique to USEUCOM, are best 

viewed through a USEUCOM lens: the applicability of the Law of Armed 

Conflict (LOAC) and targeting at the operational and strategic levels. 

2

 In fact, a lesson learned is derived from this concept itself: Judge advocates must understand the 

command structure. See infra text accompanying notes 42-43. 3

 Looking at NATO more broadly, Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR), located at SHAPE in 

Mons, Belgium, is one of two NATO strategic commands. The other is Supreme Allied Command Atlantic 

(SACLANT), located in Norfolk, Virginia. Through September 1999, AFSOUTH was one of three 

commands immediately subordinate to SHAPE. The other two were Allied Forces Northern Europe 

(AFNORTH) and Allied Forces Northwest (AFNORTHWEST). A major reorganization occurred in 

September 1999, aligning all NATO troops in Europe subordinate to SHAPE under two commands, 

Regional Command Allied Forces North (RCNORTH) and Regional Command Allied Forces South 

(RCSOUTH). For a more detailed description of the current NATO command structure, see North Atlantic 

Treaty Organisation, Military Command Structure, http://www.nato.int/structur/struc-mcs.htm.

4

 Adding to the confusion, many commanders held a NATO and a U.S. command title, or were "dualhatted," commanding separate U.S. and NATO staffs. For example, SACEUR and CINCEUR were the 

same person (General Wesley Clark). The Commander in Chief AFSOUTH (CINCAFSOUTH) was dualhatted as the Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) (Admiral James Ellis). 

45 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 
 

a. Agreement Must Be Reached on the Applicability of the Law of 

Armed Conflict Prior to Commencement of Operations. 

Both prior to and during the early days of the air campaign, 

disagreement existed within U.S. and NATO political and legal circles over 

whether or not LOAC applied to Operation Allied Force.5 Because LOAC 

applies to international armed conflicts,6

 the precise legal issue was whether 

5 See CLAMO, Kosovo After Action Review Conference (12-14 June 2000); Transcript at 263-64 

[hereinafter Kosovo AAR]. The issue of the applicability of LOAC to Operation Allied Force should not 

be confused with the legal basis for the NATO use of force during the Operation. The applicability of 

LOAC has a direct impact on JAs advising commanders at every level, squarely addressing the issue of 

what law governs the treatment of combatants and noncombatants in an operation. While of the utmost 

importance, the issue of the legal basis for the use of force is a separate analysis. This point, perhaps 

counterintuitive at first blush, is also made in Major Geoffrey S. Corn & Major Michael L. Smidt, "To Be 

or Not to Be, That is the Question:" Contemporary Military Operations and the Status of Captured 

Personnel, ARMY LAW., June 1999, at 1, 2. The tangible impact on JAs of the stated legal basis for the use 

of force is difficult to measure. In fact, while the topic was certainly discussed in the various AARs 

referenced by this Book, the link between any stated lesson learned for JAs and the legal basis for the use 

of force during the Operation seems tenuous at best. Lessons learned that are mentioned in the context of 

the legal basis for the use of force seem, upon closer analysis, to be products of a separate source—in this 

specific lesson of captured soldiers, LOAC. Accordingly, because this Book draws its lessons learned from 

the experiences of the JAs involved in the Operation, a detailed discussion and analysis of the legal basis 

for the use of force—perhaps the most important and intellectually stimulating legal issue to come out of 

Operation Allied Force—does not appear. 

JAs should generally understand that the U.S. basis for the intervention in Kosovo is commonly 

referred to as the "factors approach." Memorialized in various documentary sources and official public 

comments, this approach justifies the use of force as the cumulative product of a series of factors: 

1) preexisting United Nations Security Council Resolutions, taken pursuant to Chapter VII of the United 

Nations Charter, that recognized the situation in Kosovo as a threat to international peace and security and 

demanded that Serbia cease aggression; 2) the frequently expressed concern that the conflict could 

destabilize regional security by drawing in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), 

Albania, Greece, and Turkey; 3) the humanitarian concern for the Kosovar Albanian civilian population 

and refugee flow into FYROM and Albania; 4) NATO's "special responsibility" in the Former Yugoslavia 

based on NATO's active presence there since 1992; 5) the multilateral nature of the action, comprising the 

united voice of all nineteen NATO members; 6) Serbian LOAC violations, most notably the January 1999 

massacre of dozens of Kosovar Albanians at the hands of Serbian military forces in the town of Racak, 

Kosovo; and 7) the need to protect the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 

observers in Kosovo. See, e.g., James P. Rubin, U.S. Dep't of State Daily Press Briefing (Mar. 16, 1999) 

("We and other NATO allies have looked to numerous factors in concluding that such action . . . would be 

justified . . . ."); Point Paper, NJAG10, subject: Legal Basis for the Use of Force in Former Republic of 

Yugoslavia (FRY—Serbia and Montenegro) (26 Mar. 1999) (on file with CLAMO). Sophisticated 

discussions of the legal basis for the use of force in Kosovo can be found in a rich and rapidly growing 

body of literature on the subject. See, e.g., Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and Kosovo, 36 

STANFORD J. INT'L L. 1 (2000); Ruth Wedgwood, Editorial Comments: NATO's Kosovo Intervention: 

NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 828 (2000); Thomas D. Grant, Extending 

Decolonization: How the United Nations Might Have Addressed Kosovo, 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 9 

(1999).

6

 Common Article 2 of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 states that "the present Convention shall 

apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of 

the High Contracting Parties." Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 

and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2-3, T.I.A.S. 3362; Geneva Convention for the 

Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2­

46 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

Operation Allied Force constituted an international armed conflict. It also 

seems apparent that political concerns entered the calculation.7

 The debate proved more than academic when Yugoslav forces 

captured three U.S. soldiers conducting a security patrol along the border 

between the FRY and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 

(FYROM) on 31 March 1999, one week after NATO forces had dropped the 

first bombs of Allied Force.8

 At issue was the soldiers' legal status: were 

they prisoners of war entitled to full Geneva Convention9

 protections (as 

would be the case if LOAC applied); were they "detainees" entitled to some 

lesser status;10 were they common criminals under host nation law; or were 

they something else? The immediate U.S. political response was that the 

soldiers had been "illegally abducted."11 This position quickly evolved into 

a curious amalgam of prisoner of war language mixed in with demands for 

immediate return of the soldiers (although prisoner of war status affords 

protections under international law, it also allows the detaining power to 

hold the prisoner until the end of the conflict).12 

The ultimate U.S. position was that LOAC applied to Operation 

Allied Force and, accordingly, that the soldiers were prisoners of war.13 

However, by not presenting an early, united front on the status of the 

3, T.I.A.S. 3363; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2­

3, T.I.A.S. 3364; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
 

12, 1949, art. 2-3, T.I.A.S. 3365. 

7 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 257, 261. 8

 For a detailed discussion of this incident and an analysis of the status of captured personnel in modern
 

military operations, see Corn & Smidt, supra note 5, at 1.
 9

 Specifically, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 6.
 10 The initial NATO guidance was that "detainee" would be the appropriate term for a captured member of 

NATO forces. See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 265. 11 The phrase was used by both President Clinton and Secretary of Defense Cohen. See Guy Dinmore & 

Joan Biskupic, Yugoslavia Opens Case Against 3 American Soldiers, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1999, at A11.
 12 Department of State Spokesman James Rubin, at a press briefing held the day after the soldiers' capture, 

used a confusing mixture of terms, asserting that the soldiers were at once prisoners of war entitled to
 

Geneva protections and "illegal detainees" who should be immediately released. James P. Rubin, U.S. 

Dep't of State Daily Press Briefing (Apr. 1, 1999).

13 On the same day that Mr. Rubin made his confusing comments, Department of Defense Spokesman 

Kenneth Bacon articulated what soon became the official U.S. government position: "We consider them to
 

be [prisoners of war]. . . . By international law the Geneva Convention applies to all periods of hostilities 

. . . . [T]he government has decided that the Geneva Convention applies." Kenneth H. Bacon, Off. of the 

Ass't Sec'y of Defense (Public Affairs), Dep't of Defense News Briefing (Apr. 1, 1999). Interestingly, 

despite the conclusion that the soldiers were prisoners of war and thus could be kept until repatriated at the 

end of the conflict, the Reverend Jesse Jackson was widely credited with securing the soldiers' 2 May 1999
 

release as a result of the private religious delegation that he led to Serbia. See Charles M. Madigan, Trip to
 

Germany Ends Soldiers' Ordeal; Bombs Rain Amid Signs of Push for a Peace Settlement, CHI. TRIB., May 

3, 1999, at 1. 

47 
 

 

 

 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

captured soldiers, equivocation within U.S. policy channels potentially 

placed the soldiers in harm's way. For example, the Serbs might have 

agreed with early U.S. statements that made no mention of prisoner of war 

status, thereby concluded that the soldiers did not have combatant immunity, 

and then tried the soldiers for domestic crimes.14 

The early confusion during Operation Allied Force over the 

applicability of LOAC raised grave concerns not only at USEUCOM, but 

with judge advocates (JAs) advising commanders and soldiers throughout 

the operational chain. Beyond the specific case of the three captured 

soldiers, the concerns ranged from targeting issues to rules of engagement to 

treatment of civilians.15 It follows that resolution of LOAC applicability at 

the national level—an issue that JAs can vociferously raise, if not 

necessarily solve—should be a top priority before the commencement of any 

future operation.16 

b. Targeting 

The USEUCOM SJA (an Army JA) and Deputy SJA (an Air Force 

JA) both had direct involvement in targeting during the air campaign. Noble 

Anvil bombing missions concentrated on fixed targets using high-flying, 

high-speed aircraft. Several lessons emerged from the thought process that 

went into developing a target review methodology for the Operation and 

from the factors that went into the actual targeting decisions. 

1. The target review process developed during Noble Anvil 

should be considered for future operations. 

Planners expected the air campaign to force Milosevic to capitulate 

within a matter of a few days. Prior to the start of the campaign, a list of 

some forty targets had been meticulously analyzed and pre-approved using a 

14 See Corn & Smidt, supra note 5, at 14-18. 15 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 264. 16 The Department of Defense has attempted to assuage the problem of determining what law applies at the 

operational and tactical level in the absence of strategic level guidance. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 

5100.77, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM (9 Dec. 1998) (requiring as a matter of policy that, unless directed 

otherwise by national level authority, DOD personnel follow the letter of the law of war during operations 

involving hostilities, and follow the "principles and spirit" of the law of war during operations not 

involving hostilities). Clearly the problem with the case of these captured soldiers was that national level 

authority gave conflicting initial guidance over the applicability of LOAC. For a thorough treatment of 

DOD Directive 5100.77 in the context of captured soldiers in modern military operations, see Corn & 

Smidt, supra note 5, at 7-16. 

48 
 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

time-consuming and inefficient process. A proposed target would be staffed 

sequentially, via e-mail, to a lengthy list of key players throughout the chain 

of command and various supporting commands and agencies. Each staff 

member, such as the JA, provided input before sending the target to another 

e-mail destination for further review. Prior to the start of the campaign, the 

time from target proposal to target approval could last upwards of ten to 

fifteen days. Information flow was redundant and, most disturbing, 

sometimes resulted in a change to the desired target that was not rerouted to 

allow a review of the change by all members of the chain.17 

When the campaign extended beyond initial assumptions and more 

targets needed expedited review, it became clear that the process needed to 

be somehow streamlined without sacrificing sufficiency of target analysis.18 

Through trial and error, a new process resulted that is worthy of description 

and consideration for use in future operations. 

The new process called for bringing all relevant staff members 

together in a "collaborative session" via a classified "chat room."19 During 

these sessions, all major participants were “on line” at one time, reviewing 

the same information. A computer program retained a record of the 

discussion for future reference.20 

To explain in more concrete terms, the JA would access the Joint 

Analysis Center (JAC) classified web page prior to the session. The web 

page contained files for each target that included detailed pictures and 

descriptions of the target and surrounding area. The JA would use this 

information to do a preliminary legal analysis and develop questions and 

issues for discussion during the collaborative session. When the chat room 

17 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 267-69. 18 See id. at 275. 19 See id. at 275-78. The list of represented staff sections was long, including, but not limited to, the Joint 

Analysis Center (JAC); the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC); the Sixth Fleet Tomahawk Land 

Missile (TLAM) Strike Cell, Plans and Targets; the USEUCOM JA; the Defense Intelligence Agency 

(DIA)/Joint Staff (JS) J2T Washington, D.C.: Targets; the 32d Air Intelligence Squadron (AIS), Targets; 

Joint Task Force Noble Anvil; and the USEUCOM J35 (future operations). See id. For further discussion 

of the various members of the chat room and an explanation of the technology behind the process, see 

Gregory G. Chapin, Examining the Necessity and Benefits of Systems Engineering in the Trenches 

(unpublished paper), at 

http://www.mitre.org/support/papers/tech_papers99_00/chapin_examining/chapin.pdf (last visited 18 Sept. 

2001).

20 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 280. 

49 
 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

convened, all participants were available electronically to analyze and 

discuss the target.21 

Targets approved in the collaborative session would be placed on 

slides for the President of the United States ("POTUS slide"). The POTUS 

slide was forwarded through CINCUSEUCOM and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

to the President. As the campaign progressed, authority to approve certain 

categories of targets was delegated down to the CINCUSEUCOM and 

sometimes JTF levels. After U.S. approval, the targets were forwarded to 

NATO for final approval.22 

All told, the use of collaborative sessions in an electronic chat room 

paid significant dividends during Operation Allied Force. Targets could 

now be approved in a matter of two to three hours. Using parallel planning 

instead of sequential planning increased staff productivity, minimized 

redundant planning efforts, and solved the problem of changes in target 

aspect not being communicated to all staff members.23 In the words of the 

USEUCOM Deputy JA, the process worked so well "that we are going to 

see it again."24 

2. Reemphasize that the infliction of collateral damage is 

not a per se violation of international law. 

JAs during Operation Allied Force were sensitive to the fact that some 

participants in the target review process might misunderstand the legal 

implications of collateral damage. In other words, the JAs wanted to ensure 

there was no misperception that the infliction of collateral damage was a per 

se violation of international law, and that the collateral damage analysis did 

not come at the expense of forgetting the military necessity analysis.25 

The relevant concept of international law is the principle of 

proportionality. Proportionality is essentially a balancing test: the "loss of 

life and damage to property incidental to attacks [also known as collateral 

damage] must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 

21 See id. at 275-80. 22 See id. at 270, 274. 23 See Chapin, supra note 19, at 7. 24 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 276. 25 See id. at 295. 

50 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

advantage expected to be gained."26 It follows that nothing stops a 

commander from placing a high premium on minimizing collateral damage. 

However, as the USEUCOM JAs point out, a necessary step in the equation 

is articulating the military advantage to be gained.27 Disapproving targets 

based solely on collateral damage assessments without a discussion of 

military necessity raises the suspicion that an overly restrictive legal 

standard is being applied. JAs can serve a critical role by emphasizing to 

staffs and commanders that the infliction of collateral damage is only one 

side of the proportionality balancing test. 

3. Understand the ongoing debate over targeting the will of 

the enemy.28 

The primary goal of Operation Allied Force was to compel Milosevic 

to capitulate to NATO's terms. 29 Accordingly, the air campaign was dualpronged: 1) destroy Serbia's military capability, and 2) break the will of 

Milosevic and the Serb population.30 Many of the targets that had the effect 

of satisfying the latter prong highlight the current debate over the lawfulness 

of targeting the will of the enemy. 

The latest—and most pertinent to this discussion—effort to codify and 

reflect the law of targeting is Article 52(2) of Protocol I to the Geneva 

Conventions (GP I).31 The Article states: 

Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In 

so far as objectives are concerned, military objectives are 

limited to those objects which by their nature, location, 

26 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶ 41 (18 July 1956) (C1, 15 

July 1976). 

27 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 295. 28 CLAMO thanks Maj Jeanne M. Meyer, U.S. Air Force, for her assistance in developing this lesson 

learned. 

29 See Interview by PBS with Gen. Klaus Naumann, Chairman, NATO Military Committee (PBS television 

broadcast, Feb. 22, 2000), available at 

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/naumann.html (last visited 20 Sept. 

2001) (stating that the Allied Force air campaign was intended "to go after those targets which really hit the 

opponent and force him to accept our will"). 30 See John A. Tirpak, Victory in Kosovo, 82 AIR FORCE MAG. 2, 5 (July 1999) (stating the dual goals of the 

air campaign as "destruction of Serb forces and enabling installations in Kosovo and attack of strategic 

targets within Serbia itself, which attacks were intended to diminish the will to resist of both Milosevic and 

the Serb population"). See also Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 287-90. 31 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 

Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 

48. 

51 
 

 

 

 

 


 


 


 


 


 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

purpose or use make an effective contribution to military 

action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 

neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers 

 a definite military advantage.32 

The U.S. has not ratified GP I, but it does view Article 52(2) as an accurate 

statement of customary international law.33 There is some disagreement, 

however—not only between states,34 but within U.S. legal circles35—over 

what exactly Article 52(2) encompasses. The plain language meaning of the 

Article is not settled, the dispute centering on the interpretation of what 

constitutes "a contribution to military action" and what provides a "military 

advantage." 

During Operation Allied Force, it is a matter of public record that, in 

addition to strictly military targets, NATO aircraft targeted "dual-purpose" 

objects—that is, targets whose destruction had the simultaneous effect of 

damaging the enemy's military capability and dampening the morale of the 

civilian leadership and population. Such dual-purpose targets included 

bridges, highways, electrical power installations, and railroads. Few would 

question the lawfulness of striking these targets under the Article 52(2) 

standard. 36 

The selection of other targets, however, has spawned debate in the 

U.S. and international legal community. For example, NATO aircraft 

targeted television stations.37 They also dropped dispensers of specially 

treated wire over electrical power sources designed to cut off power to 

seventy percent of the Serbian population for a period of roughly twentyfour hours.38 Striking these targets undoubtedly contributed to the NATO 

goal of breaking the enemy's will to fight. However, some argue that these 

32 Id. at art. 52(2). 33 See Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to
 

the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419, 420 

(1987). 

34 See Theodore Meron, The Humanization of International Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 276-77 (2000). 35 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 291. 36 See Meron, supra note 34, at 276.
 37 See Interview by PBS with Gen. Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (PBS television
 

broadcast, Feb. 2, 2000), available at
 

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/clark.html (last visited 22 Sept. 2001) 

(stating that the television stations "had a high political symbolism," and were used by Milosevic for 

"command and control" and to "inflame the passions of ethnic cleansing"). 38 Dana Priest, The Commander's War: Bombing by Committee, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1999, at A1, A10. 

52 
 

 

 

 

 

 


 


 


 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

targets may not have been sufficiently military in nature and, accordingly, 

may have run afoul of a restrictive interpretation of Article 52(2).39 

JAs should understand that varying interpretations of Article 52(2) 

exist, and familiarize themselves with the terms of this debate.40 

3. AFSOUTH Lessons Learned 

Two U.S. Army lawyers were involved in Operation Allied Force as 

members of the Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) staff. Drawing 

from a host of legal issues across a broad spectrum—particularly in the 

weeks and months leading up to Allied Force—four overarching lessons 

41

emerge. 

a. Many U.S. Judge Advocates Have an Inadequate Understanding 

of the NATO Command Structure. 

As eloquently stated in the AFSOUTH JA Allied Force After Action 

Report, generally speaking, "lawyers of the greatest military in the world 

know[ ] less about the Alliance structure than those lawyers aspiring for 

NATO membership."42 Although learning the intricacies of the complex 

NATO command structure might be a daunting task, a firm grasp of the 

chain of command—particularly when operating in a joint or combined 

setting—is essential for any JA.43 Not unique to AFSOUTH, this lesson 

recurs at various levels of command on such issues as ROE development, 

target approval authority, and criminal jurisdiction. 

39 See, e.g., Meron, supra note 34, at 276-77. 40 Several terms have arisen in the context of describing targeting the will of the enemy, such as "regime 

targets," "influence net targets," "will of the people targets," and "patronage targets." See Kosovo AAR, 

supra note 5, at 287-89. For more detailed discussions of this debate, see, e.g., Meron, supra note 34;
 

Tania Voon, Pointing the Finger: Civilian Casualties of NATO Bombing in the Kosovo Conflict, 16 AM. 

U. INT'L L. REV. 1083 (2001); Julie Mertus, International Law Weekend Proceedings: The Impact of 

Kosovo on the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 527 (2000); Randy W.
 

Stone, Comment, Protecting Civilians During Operation Allied Force: The Enduring Importance of the 

Proportional Response and NATO's Use of Armed Force in Kosovo, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 501 (2001). 41 LTC Virginia P. ("Patt") Prugh, former AFSOUTH Deputy Legal Advisor, AFSOUTH After Action
 

Report (10 Sept. 2001) [hereinafter AFSOUTH AAR] (on file with CLAMO). The AFSOUTH AAR 

provides an excellent discussion of the background behind the lessons learned above, as well as several
 

other issues that do not neatly fit under a lessons learned category. 

42 Id. at 17. 43 For a discussion of the NATO command structure, see supra text accompanying notes 2-3. 

53 
 

 

 


 


 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

b. Staying Abreast of Rapidly Changing Diplomatic Efforts is 

Critical. 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199, adopted on 23 

September 1998, declared that the deteriorating situation in Kosovo was a 

threat to regional peace and security and welcomed any diplomatic efforts to 

solve the crisis.44 Three weeks later, on 13 October, U.S. Ambassador 

Richard Holbrooke announced that an agreement had been reached with 

Serbia allowing 2,000 observers from the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to enter Kosovo.45 NATO then stood up the 

Kosovo Verification Coordination Centre (KVCC), an organization which 

was to be comprised of 155 multinational personnel, tasked with the 

mission, among others, to monitor the OSCE observers.46 The AFSOUTH 

Deputy Legal Advisor accompanied the Commander, KVCC (COMKVCC), 

a U.S. Marine Corps brigadier general, into FYROM to conduct initial 

liaison for insertion of the KVCC force. 

Upon arrival in FYROM, COMKVCC met with the FYROM Minister 

of Defense to coordinate a location for the KVCC headquarters. The 

Minister of Defense queried if NATO had any intentions of expanding the 

KVCC force beyond the 155 personnel previously contemplated. 

COMKVCC replied that he knew of no such efforts. That same evening, 

U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright publicly announced that NATO 

intended to insert an additional 2,000 troops as a contingency extraction 

force for the KVCC. COMKVCC's coordination efforts were consequently 

undermined by the loss of credibility in the eyes of the local FYROM 

leadership.47 

This particular AFSOUTH experience highlights the broader lesson 

that rapid developments on the diplomatic front can have dramatic effects 

for commanders on the ground. JAs can serve a valuable role by not only 

recognizing the need to stay abreast of the latest diplomatic efforts, but also 

taking on the task of aggressively pulling this information from higher in the 

event that it is not being pushed down. 

44 See supra Ch. II, text accompanying notes 132-134.
 45 See AFSOUTH AAR, supra note 41, at 4. 46 For a more thorough discussion of the background behind the KVCC and its other missions, see id. at 4-5. 47 See id. at 5. 

54 
 

 

 
 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

c. The Inability to Negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement Prior to 

the Arrival of Military Forces Creates Significant Problems. 

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) did not 

authorize the KVCC Legal Advisor (KVCC-LA, the AFSOUTH DLA) to 

conduct any formal Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) negotiations with 

the Macedonians.48 The KVCC-LA was encouraged, however, to determine 

what the FYROM posture towards a SOFA and its provisions might be. 

Acting pursuant to this nebulous charter, the KVCC-LA was able to broker 

tentative agreements between relevant members of the KVCC staff and 

FYROM authorities on wide-ranging issues typically addressed in a SOFA. 

Such issues included tax exclusion, criminal and civil status of the members 

of the force and those accompanying the force, communications frequencies, 

road tolls, hiring procedures, foreign claims waivers, and airport access.49 

At this point—late October 1998—the KVCC-LA reported to the 

"NATO Legal Advisor"50 through SHAPE and AFSOUTH legal channels 

that all parties concerned were prepared to enter into a SOFA. The NATO 

Legal Advisor determined that an exchange of letters was more appropriate 

than a single-document SOFA.51 The basic Exchange of Letters was not 

signed until 23-24 December 1998.52 

The roughly two-month legal void between the first arrival of KVCC 

elements and the final signing of the Exchange of Letters led to significant 

interim problems. For one example among several,53 NATO funds could not 

be obligated, absent a formal agreement, for facilities leasing and 

construction costs of the various troop contributing nations arriving in 

theater. Faced with the untenable situation of not having a signed 

agreement, yet needing to establish suitable headquarters facilities before the 

onset of cold weather, ad hoc informal agreements sprang up between 

NATO units and local FYROM army units. The resulting hodgepodge of 

agreements lacked uniformity and failed to address many key billing and 

48 See id. 49 See id. 50 The attorney advising the private office of the NATO Secretary General. 51 See AFSOUTH AAR, supra note 41, at 5-6. 52 See id. at 7. 53 Other examples included difficulties in securing the use of Skopje (Petrovec) Airport for NATO forces 

and the unwillingness of FYROM authorities to grant tax exemptions for construction efforts absent a 

formal agreement. See id. at 7-8.
 

55 
 

 

 

 


 


 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

cost-sharing concerns, contributing to a deterioration of relations between 

NATO and several ministries within the FYROM government.54 

The lesson learned for JAs from this AFSOUTH experience can be 

separated into two parts. First, sending military forces into a host nation 

without the protections and procedures contained in a SOFA or like 

instrument is clearly problematic. The JA should voice this concern early 

and make every effort to facilitate expeditious SOFA negotiation. Second, 

the JA should actively seek the authority to negotiate SOFA provisions.55 

The fact that the KVCC-LA reports meeting prohibitive resistance when 

these steps were taken should not discourage future JAs from attempting the 

same. 

d. Be Prepared to Fulfill All Legal Missions Despite Inadequate 

Staffing and Resources. 

From the point of view of the AFSOUTH DLA, NATO as a whole did 

not have adequate legal staffing.56 The numbers seem to support this 

opinion. NATO Headquarters had one lawyer, a civilian (the NATO Legal 

Advisor mentioned above). While SHAPE had several lawyers, farther 

down the chain neither AIRSOUTH nor NAVSOUTH nor 

STRIKFORSOUTH had a lawyer. As discussed above, the KVCC-LA was 

drawn without replacement from one of the two lawyers at AFSOUTH. 

Moreover, the KVCC-LA had no 71D support, and finding adequate 

workspace and office equipment was a continual challenge.57 The KVCCLA often borrowed services and equipment, such as Internet access, fax 

capability, and a car, from the contracting office.58 

It goes without saying that JAs are expected to perform their legal 

missions despite personnel and resource shortages. JAs should always be 

prepared for less than adequate support and plan accordingly. JAs should 

not assume that the equipment and conditions they are accustomed to in a 

U.S. billet will necessarily be found in a NATO billet. Similarly, JAs should 

understand that voluntary U.S. contribution of additional lawyers may be 

54 See id. at 7-8. 55 Approval authorities and procedural requirements governing the involvement of DOD personnel in
 

negotiating international agreements are delineated in U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 5530.3,
 

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS (11 June 1987) (C1, 18 Feb. 1991). 56 See AFSOUTH AAR, supra note 41, at 11; see also Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 21-22. 57 See AFSOUTH AAR, supra note 41, at 11. 58 See id. at 12. 

56 
 

 

 


 


 


 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

easier said than done, and that significant coordination must take place 

before more NATO legal billets are created.59 

B. TASK FORCE HAWK 

JAG involvement in fires was essential . . . . 60 

1. Overview 

Task Force Hawk was a U.S. task force designed to provide support to 

Operation Allied Force, specifically, to address moving targets such as 

tanks. An Attack Helicopter Regiment of twenty-four AH-64 Apache 

helicopters and a reinforced Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) 

battalion formed the core of Task Force Hawk, which was complemented by 

a Corps Aviation Brigade Task Force with thirty-one aircraft, including UH60 Blackhawk, CH-47 Chinook, and C-12 fixed-wing aircraft.61 A Corps 

Support Group and a signal battalion supported these elements. Force 

protection was provided by a brigade headquarters and headquarters 

company, a mechanized infantry battalion, and an airborne infantry 

battalion. Lieutenant General (LTG) John W. Hendrix, the V Corps 

Commander, commanded Task Force Hawk, which was headquartered at 

Rinas Airfield in Tirana, Albania. 

Because Task Force Hawk was a U.S. task force with an on-order 

NATO mission, there was a great deal of confusion regarding the chain of 

command. During the operation, the Task Force was prepared to answer to 

three different chains of command. (Fig. 1) The operational chain of 

command remained in U.S. channels, running from the President through the 

Secretary of Defense, through CINCUSEUCOM and JTF Noble Anvil to 

Task Force Hawk. Administrative support responsibilities did not change. 

They began with the Department of the Army and ran through U.S. Army 

Europe (USAREUR) and V Corps to Task Force Hawk. Task Force Hawk 

also had an on-order NATO chain of command that was never implemented. 

This chain ran from SACEUR through AFSOUTH through NATO’s 

Albania Force (AFOR) (a NATO task force providing humanitarian relief to 

59 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 347-49.
 60 Lieutenant Colonel Peter W. Rose II & Major Keith Flowers, Task Force HAWK Command and Control, 

in JOINT CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED, BULLETIN, at 1, 8 (vol. II, iss. III, n.d.).
 61 See Center for Army Lessons Learned, Introduction, in CALL NEWSLETTER, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND
 

PROCEDURES FROM TASK FORCE HAWK DEEP OPERATIONS: VOLUME I, at iii (no. 00-8, Aug. 2000). 

57 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 


 


 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

Kosovar Albanian refugees in Albania) to Task Force Hawk. Although clear 

to delineate after the fact, the chain of command was not clear to the JAs and 

Tactical/Operational Support Tactical/Operational 

(US) (US) (On-order)(NATO) 

SECDEF

 | 

USEUCOM 

| 

 JTF Noble Anvil 

| 

 TF Hawk 

HQDA

 | 

 USAREUR 

| 

V Corps 

| 

 TF Hawk

 SHAPE 

| 

 AFSOUTH 

| 

AFOR (Albania Forces) 

| 

TF Hawk 

Figure 1: Task Force Hawk Command Relationships 

senior officers in Task Force Hawk. Confusion arose concerning when, if 

ever, Task Force Hawk fell under the NATO chain of command. 62 

The V Corps SJA deployed in support of Task Force Hawk, 

accompanied by three JAs and two legal specialists. Space limitations and 

an initial force cap hindered the flow of legal personnel into the theater. 

After the Military Technical Agreement was signed ending the bombing 

campaign, two Task Force Hawk JAs moved to Camp Able Sentry (CAS) in 

FYROM to assist 1st Infantry Division (1ID) JAs with the deployment of 

Task Force Falcon to Kosovo. 63 

2. Lessons Learned 

a. Targeting 

While Task Force Hawk did not execute deep operations, it conducted 

a series of Mission Rehearsal Exercises to prepare for combat. The Task 

Force Hawk Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC) developed daily 

lists of targets for attack by Apache helicopters with supporting artillery. 

The DOCC also developed and forwarded targets to the Air Force for attack 

62 One JA noted during the AAR, “[f]ive different times in the first 20 days we completely switched chains 

of command. . . . [I]t was emphasized at a very high level AAR by General Hendrix. And General
 

Hendrix said . . . ‘from one day to the next, I did not know who my chain of command was.'" Kosovo
 

AAR, supra note 5, at 91. 63 For a discussion of the Military Technical Agreement, see infra Ch. IV, text accompanying notes 12-14. 

For a thorough treatment of Task Force Falcon and the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, see infra Ch. IV.
 

58 
 

 

 

 


 


 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 

by fixed-wing assets. These operations allowed Task Force Hawk to 

develop new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) not found in 

existing doctrine.64 A driving force behind the new TTPs was 

Mission/Enemy/Troops/Terrain-Time Available/Civilians (METT-TC) 

factors.65 Unique factors included a dispersed enemy, the mountainous 

terrain of Kosovo, the large number of civilians on the battlefield, and the 

handling of SECRET/NOFORN intelligence in a coalition operation.66 

1. Judge advocates must be in the Deep Operations 

Coordination Cell. 

It is crucial that JAs be located inside the DOCC.67 JAs need access 

to the most up-to-date information, and must be available for “spur of the 

moment meetings,” such as when the commanding general calls a “quick 

huddle” to discuss the latest developments. Additionally, the DOCC issued 

its Air Tasking Order (ATO) ninety-six hours ahead of scheduled 

operations.68 The targets had to be reviewed by the JAs early during the 

targeting process so that legal considerations were incorporated into the 

planning process rather than at the "go/no-go" execution meeting.69 The 

legal review required “intensive, nonstop work” to review “over one 

hundred different targets at any one time.”70 Changes in the intelligence 

picture required constant refinement of the Suppression of Enemy Air 

Defenses (SEAD) plan throughout the targeting process. Analyzing the 

SEAD plan and keeping up with the constant changes presented a bigger 

challenge than reviewing the targets in the Apache engagement area.71 

The Task Force Hawk SJA placed two JAs in the Task Force DOCC 

full-time and added an SJA Appendix to the Deep Operations Annex of the 

V Corps Field Standing Operating Procedures (SOP). The SJA DOCC 

Appendix is included in Appendix III-1 of this Book. The SJA Appendix 

provided for twenty-four-hour JA coverage in the DOCC. The JA's role was 

64 See Major Mark S. Segovis & Captain Robert M. Salvatore, Deep Operations Coordination Cell
 

(DOCC), in CALL NEWSLETTER, supra note 61, at 19. 65 See id. at 23. 66 See id. 67 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 122. 68 See id. at 125. 69 See id. at 121. 70 Id. 71 See Memorandum, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, V Corps, to CLAMO, subject: Comments to Draft 

Lessons Learned Document (11 Sept. 2001) [hereinafter V Corps DSJA Memorandum] (on file with 

CLAMO). 

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CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

to perform comprehensive legal reviews of all proposed target nominations 

and to identify potential legal issues as targets were developed. JAs 

involved in targeting required a top secret clearance to gain access to 

satellite imagery and to have access to the Analysis and Control Element 

(ACE). 

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) developed Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures from Task Force Hawk Deep Operations, a 

publication that includes an appendix on DOCC organization, personnel, 

equipment, and functions. 72 This appendix states that a DOCC should 

include two JAs, each equipped with laptop computers and the Automated 

Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS). 73 The appendix further 

notes that the JA "[u]ses ADOCS to review targets for possible legal 

ramifications, develops Rules of Engagement and provides operational law 

expertise."74 CALL also observed that the use of ADOCS "allowed 

members of the TF staff, who traditionally are left out of the targeting 

process (lawyers and civil affairs), to review targeting products and approve 

targets."75 The Joint Center for Lessons Learned made the same 

observation, noting, “JAG involvement in fires was essential because 

attacking targets which violated the rules of engagement may have created 

adverse political ramifications, or caused more damage than the benefit 

derived from attacking the target.”76 

2. Develop a target review methodology and document 

decisions. 

The SJA Appendix to the Deep Operations Annex provided a list of 

twenty-six questions to be asked when evaluating targets. The list included 

questions regarding the size of the civilian population, the estimated number 

72 See CALL NEWSLETTER, supra note 61, at app. C, C-1. 73 Id. The ADOCS is a computer program that provides the user with an integrated set of tools for data 

management and analysis, along with mission planning, coordination, and execution. ADOCS uses 

Defense Mapping Agency products as well as digital terrain elevation data. Overlays of military units, 

facilities, platforms, mission plans, operational graphics, and no fire areas can be applied to a map at any 

scale. See Information Paper, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, V Corps, subject: Automated Deep 

Operations Coordination System (18 Mar. 1999) (included in Appendix III-2). Similar systems are now
 

being used in training. The XVIII Airborne Corps used a system called Falcon View® during its 2001
 

Warfighter.

74 CALL NEWSLETTER, supra note 61, at app. C, C-2. 75 Segovis & Salvatore, supra note 64, at 26. 76 Rose & Flowers, supra note 60, at 8. 

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of civilian casualties, the importance of the target to the accomplishment of 

the mission, and the ability to mitigate the impact on the civilian population. 

To accomplish the legal mission, JAs monitored the protected site list 

and the ADOCS. JAs used ADOCS, which contained the most up-to-date 

information, to screen for potential legal issues associated with deep 

operations early in the process. Specifically, they used ADOCS to view 

engagement areas and targets, track enemy movement, anticipate the 

potential for collateral damage, and monitor no-fire areas. 

It was essential for the JAs to develop an understanding of Army 

weapons systems to render effective advice. For example, the Army 

Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) comes in three types and Army 

Howitzers fire eleven types of munitions with varying burst radii and 

potential for collateral damage.77 JAs at Task Force Hawk coordinated with 

the V Corps Artillery Commander to have his staff develop a templated 

"footprint" for each weapon and munition that the JAs could apply to a map 

board to predict collateral damage when reviewing a proposed target.78 This 

innovative approach to the legal review “gave the operators a completely 

different perspective on how they fire their weapons systems.”79 

This approach also placed the responsibility squarely upon the 

operators to predict the nature and extent of the damage that would be 

caused by firing a particular munition in a particular way. This information, 

along with intelligence concerning the presence or absence of 

noncombatants in the target area, provided the basis for JAs to conduct a 

legal analysis of the proposed target.80 

The JAs also developed a "Target Analysis" form to document the 

advice provided. A sample "Target Analysis" form is included in Appendix 

III-3. 

Dedicated JA support to the DOCC at Task Force Hawk continued the 

trend toward integration of JAs into battle staffs and validated existing 

JAGC doctrine.81 JA integration ensures that legal advice is timely and 

77 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 136. 78 See id. at 138. See also V Corps DSJA Memorandum, supra note 71.
 79 Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 138. 80 See V Corps DSJA Memordandum, supra note 71. 81 See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-100, LEGAL SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS ¶ 5.5.4 (31 Mar. 

2000). 

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more effective, saving planning staff time and integrating legal 

considerations into the military decision-making process. 

b. Rules of Engagement 

In addition to the targeting issues discussed above, Task Force Hawk 

faced significant ROE development and interpretation issues. NATO had 

not addressed rotary-wing operations when preparing for Operation Allied 

Force. While Task Force Hawk was never under the operational control 

(OPCON) of NATO, the training and mission rehearsals anticipated Task 

Force Hawk becoming part of the larger NATO operation. 

1. Confusion over the chain of command has a direct 

impact on ROE development. 

Because of the confusion over command and control,82 it was not 

clear to Task Force Hawk whether U.S. or NATO ROE applied. Further 

complicating the issue was the fact that the NATO air ROE contemplated 

high-flying, fixed-wing aircraft, not low-flying helicopters.83 Requests for 

supplemental measures were submitted through both the NATO and U.S. 

chains of command.84 In the end, Task Force Hawk JAs determined that 

NATO ROE governed the Apaches and U.S. ROE governed ground forces, 

reasoning that the use of Apaches for air operations in Kosovo would have 

constituted the use of force by NATO, while U.S. ground operations in 

Albania would be solely a U.S. component of the operation.85 

Because Operation Allied Force focused on air operations, there was 

no ground ROE—despite the fact that Serb forces were massed at the border, 

with mortar positions aimed at U.S. forces. 86 Soldiers were briefed upon 

arrival that offensive operations were not authorized, that operations outside 

Albania were not authorized, and that no force had been declared hostile.87 

Soldiers received R-A-M-P training on the principles of hostile intent, 

hostile act, and minimum force.88 Soldiers also received an "ROE Card" 

82 See supra text accompanying note 62.
 83 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 89. 84 See id. at 92-93. 85 See id. at 101-02. 86 See id. at 90. 87 See JAs, Task Force Hawk, Task Force Hawk Soldier In-Brief, PowerPoint presentation (n.d.) (included 

in Appendix III-5).

88 See Major Mark S. Martins, Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not 

Lawyering, 143 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1994) for a discussion of R-A-M-P. 

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which summarized the ROE and included other "General Rules" concerning 

the treatment of detainees and EPWs and the collection and care of the 

wounded. The ROE card is included in Appendix III-4. In the absence of 

any mission-specific ground ROE, both the rules and the briefing were based 

on the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement.89 

2. Expect disagreement over "templated" targets, counterbattery radar, and "observed" fires. 

One significant challenge the DOCC faced was the use of templated 

targets.90 The Army develops templated targets to protect low-flying 

helicopters. The targets are “templated” based on terrain, other known 

enemy locations, and enemy doctrine. These targets are an “educated guess” 

at the location of enemy air defenses and include areas that provide 

concealment for shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles.91 To suppress these 

potential threats, the Army fires Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) 

missions. 

U.S. Air Force elements in the Combined Air Operations Center 

(CAOC) were unfamiliar with the term “templated target.” To minimize 

collateral damage, the Air ROE required that all fires be “observed.”92 The 

Army had a difficult time convincing the CAOC that templated targets were 

observed or, for that matter, even necessary. According to one JA who 

served in the DOCC, the Air Force “could not even fathom us just firing at a 

piece of land.”93 Air Force lawyers at USEUCOM did come to understand 

the concept and later assisted in gaining approval of the Army’s definition of 

observed fires from the DOD General Counsel.94 

The Army argued that the targets were in fact “observed” because 

they were reviewed using unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) photographs, as 

well as satellite imagery, to determine whether an area was inhabited. The 

imagery allowed Task Force Hawk to determine the location of villages and 

displaced persons to avoid collateral damage. Firing SEAD on the 

89 CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTR. 3121.01, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. 

FORCES (1 Oct. 1994) (partially classified document). The January 2000 revision to the Standing Rules of
 

Engagement did not apply to Task Force Hawk at the time (3121.01A of 15 Jan. 2000). 

90 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 4. 91 See id. at 127. 92 See id. at 89. 93 Id. at 128. 94 See id. at 306. 

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templated targets was considered essential to protect the helicopters. As the 

issue was briefed to the DOD General Counsel, agreement was reached that 

the target to be fired could be considered “observed” if the area had been 

viewed within twelve hours of the mission.95 

Another “observed” fire issue involved the use of the AN/TPQ-36 and 

Q-37 radar.96 The Air Force initially determined that identification by these 

radar systems did not constitute observed fire. After lengthy discussions, 

Task Force Hawk received clarification that Q-36 and Q-37 radar 

identification did indeed constitute “observed” fire.97 

c. Be Prepared for PW Issues, Even if Not Engaged in Ground 

Combat. 

Perhaps another ramification of the single-minded focus on air 

operations, the Task Force Hawk order did not contain a discussion of 

prisoner of war (PW) issues. This became an issue when the KLA captured 

a Serb PW and turned him over to Task Force Hawk on 16 April 1999.98 

The SJA was not made aware of this until two days later when the Task 

Force Hawk Commander queried if the PW was being handled in 

accordance with international law.99 

The SJA found a 6’3” prisoner being held in the back of a field 

ambulance. The PW had been handcuffed and blindfolded much of the time, 

but the PW was being treated by a doctor and had been allowed access to a 

chaplain. The SJA advised the Task Force Hawk Commander that the 

prisoner was not being held in compliance with the Geneva Conventions. 

The SJA assisted the staff in finding a room in which to hold the PW, and 

the PW was transferred to a small concrete room that day. Task Force Hawk 

notified the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) about the PW, 

95 See id. 96 The Q-36 and Q-37 are counter-battery radar systems, medium-range and long-range, respectively, that 

can pinpoint locations of enemy artillery, mortars, and rocket launchers once fired. While range is a 

distinction, most see the Q-36 as being employed against high-angle mortar fire, and the Q-37 against lowangle artillery fire. For more detailed discussions, see 

http://www.raytheon.com/es/esproducts/ses036/ses036.htm and 

http://www.raytheon.com/es/esproducts/ses037/ses037.htm (last visited 23 Sept. 2001). 97 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 89. 98 See Stephen Lee Myers, Serb Officer, Captured by Rebels, Held by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1999, at 

A6. 

99 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 94. The debate over PW status and whether the Law of Armed 

Conflict applied to Allied Force had already been resolved with the capture of the three U.S. soldiers two 

weeks earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 5-16. 

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forthrightly revealing the initial treatment of the PW. The ICRC conducted 

an inspection and later filed a formal objection about the way the PW was 

initially handled.100 U.S. forces eventually received another PW, with no 

problems being identified about his initial treatment.101 

Several issues arose prior to moving these PWs out of Albania. First, 

the USAREUR JA had to find a place to house them. Mannheim 

Confinement Facility (MCF) was suggested, because it was only housing 

prisoners in a portion of the facility. The USEUCOM SJA raised concerns 

about housing the PWs in the MCF based on the Geneva prohibition against 

housing PWs alongside common criminals.102 The USEUCOM 

Commander, however, believed that MCF provided the best available 

solution and directed the PWs be transferred. USAREUR gained approval 

of the German government to bring the PWs into the country. The PWs 

were transferred to the MCF. The MPs at the MCF segregated the PWs 

from the rest of the facility population and provided the PWs with separate 

recreational facilities and athletic clothing.103 The ICRC visited the PWs, 

inspected the facilities, and approved the arrangement, eliminating the 

concern over co-locating the PWs with the prison population.104 

MCF denied requests by the media to interview or photograph the 

PWs, forwarding the requests to the ICRC.105 MCF provided SerboCroatian translations of the Third Geneva Convention and religious 

materials to the PWs. The Department of State and National Security 

Council proposed allowing the International Criminal Tribunal for the 

Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to interview the prisoners. The ICRC objected, 

and the interviews did not take place.106 Upon release of the PWs, the 

prisoners were flown from Heidelberg Army Airfield to Hungary, 

transferred to a waiting convoy, and driven to the Serbian border, where they 

were given to the ICRC for repatriation.107 

100 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 93-96. 101 See id. at 44. 102 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 6, at art. 22. 103 Military Police relied on existing Army standards to address PW issues. See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 

190-8, ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND OTHER DETAINEES (1
 

Oct. 1997). 

104 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 42-43. 105 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 6, at art. 13 (prisoners
 

must be shielded from public curiosity). 

106 The ICRC was concerned that the PWs might face problems in Serbia when repatriated if they provided
 

evidence to the ICTY. See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 46. 107 See id. at 43-44. 

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d. Foreign Claims 

The Department of the Army has had Single Service Claims 

Responsibility (SSCR) for Albania since 1996.108 The legal basis for the 

adjudication and payment of foreign claims in Albania derived first from the 

claims provisions of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 109 as 

incorporated by the Partnership for Peace (PfP) SOFA.110 On 8 April 1999, 

the North Atlantic Council (NAC) issued a decision waiving Albania’s 25% 

cost-sharing contribution that had been required by the NATO SOFA.111 As 

a practical matter, U.S. Army adjudication of foreign claims in Albania then 

fell under the provisions of the Foreign Claims Act,112 as implemented by 

Army Regulation 27-20, Claims.

113 AFSOUTH published the “JFC Theatre 

Claims Policy” on 20 June 1999, containing supplemental claims processing 

guidance for Albania and FYROM.114 

Three JA CPTs served successive terms as Foreign Claims 

Commissions (FCCs) under the FCA during the Operation. Their 

appointment letters authorized payment of foreign claims for amounts not 

exceeding $15,000. Because the 1996 SSCR included all of Albania, the 

JAs were responsible for processing claims for both Task Force Hawk and 

Operation Shining Hope, the Air Force humanitarian relief mission co108 See Memorandum, MAJ Martin L. Sims, Acting Chief, U.S. Army Claims Service, Europe, to CPT 

Peter C. Amuso, subject: Appointment as a Foreign Claims Commissioner, and Claims Approval 

Authority under the Foreign Claims Act (FCA) (21 June 1999) (discussing Office of the General Counsel, 

DOD, decision of 12 March 1996 regarding SSCR assignment) (on file with CLAMO). 

109 Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, June 

15, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792. 

110 Agreement Among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Other States Participating in 

the Partnership for Peace Regarding the Status of their Forces, June 19, 1995, T.I.A.S. No. 12,666 

[hereinafter PfP SOFA].

111 FYROM had initially approached the NAC requesting a waiver of the cost-sharing contribution, citing a 

provision in the NATO SOFA that allowed a country to petition for relief if the burden of sharing claims 

costs became too great. For the first time in the fifty-year history of NATO, the NAC approved the request 

and, on its own, extended the waiver to Albania as well. See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 31. 112 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2000). 113 U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 27-20, CLAIMS (31 Dec. 1997) [hereinafter AR 27-20]. 114 At least one JA argues that the FCA was the sole legal basis for adjudication of claims in Albania 

because the International Agreement Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2734a (2000), creates the general rule that 

the FCA will not apply in a foreign country with which the U.S. has an agreement requiring claims cost 

sharing. Accordingly, since the NAC waived Albania’s cost-sharing obligation, the FCA would govern 

claims processing independent of the NATO SOFA as incorporated by the PfP SOFA. See Kosovo AAR, 

supra note 5, at 171-72. 

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located at Rinas Airfield. The JAs paid approximately 137 claims totaling 

nearly $100,000.115 

The JAs denied three claims locally, and forwarded one higher for 

adjudication and ultimate denial.116 A JA denied an Albanian Air Force 

claim for $2,500 for damage to a guard house because the NATO SOFA 

provision excluding claims by any party’s armed forces still controlled. The 

Albanian Air Force also claimed $31,000 for damage to Rinas Airfield. The 

JA forwarded the claim to U.S. Army Claims Service Europe (USACSEUR) 

because it exceeded the JA’s local settlement authority; USACSEUR 

similarly denied the claim as damage to military property excluded under the 

NATO SOFA.117 A JA denied a claim for damage to an olive grove as 

baseless, and denied a claim by a construction company for road damage 

because the company did not own the road.118 

1. Coordinate procedures for reaching outlying claimants 

given the security and logistical constraints. 

Reaching claimants throughout the area of operations required prior 

coordination and creative planning. Force protection concerns119 and 

logistical constraints limited the JAs’ ability to travel the countryside 

extensively. Security requirements prevented Albanian citizens from 

entering the camp. The JAs coordinated with civil affairs (CA) to share 

tents that had been set up adjacent to the camp, and advertised times and 

dates to locals that claims would be received. Briefed by the JAs on claims 

procedures, CA personnel also agreed to receive and investigate some 

distant claims.120 Close coordination with MPs resulted in vehicle and 

security support when the JAs traveled outside the camp.121 

115 Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 176.
 116 Memorandum, CPT Peter C. Amuso, Foreign Claims Commission, Task Force Hawk, to Chief, 

International and Operational Claims, U.S. Army Claims Services, Europe, subject: Final Claims Report (1
 

Aug. 1999) [hereinafter Amuso Memorandum] (on file with CLAMO). 

117 NATO subsequently resolved the airfield damage contractually. See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 

170-73. 

118 See Amuso Memorandum, supra note 116.
 119 One claimant actually threatened to throw a grenade into the compound if not paid. See Memorandum
 

for Record, MAJ Tyler Randolph, CLAMO, subject: Interview with Captain Elizabeth G. Eberhardt, 

Albania, 30 April – 20 June 1999 (9 Aug. 1999) [hereinafter Randolph Memorandum] (on file with
 

CLAMO).

120 See id. at 2. 121 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 173. 

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The last JA FCC faced the issue of reaching claimants who desired to 

file after Task Force Hawk stopped accepting claims on 1 August 1999. The 

JA coordinated transfer of claims intake responsibility to the U.S. Embassy 

in Tirana, and provided claims processing forms, which are included in 

Appendices III-6(a)-(c). After documenting the details of the claim, the 

Embassy then would forward the claims to CAS in FYROM for 

adjudication. This process eased the filing burden on claimants, who now 

had a local mailing address and point of contact for claims resolution. The 

Embassy also agreed to assist in disbursing payments to claimants. 122 

2. Realize that local law may be difficult to ascertain and 

plan accordingly. 

Verifying property ownership in Albania proved difficult. The JAs 

quickly found that they needed to do considerable research to determine the 

governing property laws. The property records were a confusing remnant of 

the country’s monarchical and communist past. However, a crude system of 

property law and deeds registration was in place. To establish ownership 

and minimize fraudulent claims, JAs required claimants to either produce an 

official copy of a preexisting deed or register the property under the new 

Albanian recordation system.123 

3. Understand the unique role that village elders can play 

in claims adjudication. 

The typical Albanian village had little formal governmental structure, 

instead organizing itself as a “family” with the eldest male serving in almost 

a mayoral capacity, having power under Albanian law to sign official 

documents and perform notarial acts.124 JAs had conflicting attitudes 

towards these elders. On the one hand, the elders could facilitate claims 

adjudication by signing claims paperwork when the claimant was not 

present—a common occurrence. On the other hand, one JA tried to avoid 

the elders, suspecting that they were taking portions of settlements before 

delivering the money to the rightful claimants.125 

122 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 176-77.
 123 See Randolph Memorandum, supra note 119, at 2; see also Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 168-69. 124 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 169. 125 See Randolph Memorandum, supra note 119, at 2. 

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4. Interpreters provide essential support for claims 

adjudication. 

Interpreters were a must for talking to and preparing documents for 

non-English speaking claimants. Additionally, interpreters proved valuable 

in less obvious respects. Interpreters helped filter out fraudulent claims by 

pointing out claimants who previously had asked the interpreter how to “get 

money” out of the JA.126 Interpreters also helped translate relevant Albanian 

law.127 Moreover, interpreters were a rich source of information on local 

customs and practices.128 

5. Paying legitimate claims can be a force multiplier. 

The JAs anecdotally attest that paying legitimate claims in Albania 

fostered goodwill with the local population and undoubtedly contributed to 

overall mission accomplishment. One JA recounted that by paying $800 to a 

woman weeping over her destroyed crops, “we changed her life.”129 

e. Fiscal Law—Donation of Property Must Be Analyzed on a Caseby-Case Basis. 

The most persistent fiscal law issue faced by Task Force Hawk 

involved the donation of Army property to the civilian population. The 

Purpose Statute provides that “[a]ppropriations shall be applied only to the 

objects for which the appropriations were made except as otherwise 

provided by law.”130 Thus, expenditures must be authorized by law131 or be 

reasonably related to the purpose of an appropriation in order to be lawful. 

Accordingly, a unit cannot donate to civilians property that was originally 

purchased for military use unless there is a statutory exception. One such 

exception is 10 U.S.C. § 2557 (previously 10 U.S.C. § 2547), Excess 

Nonlethal Supplies: Humanitarian Relief, under which the Secretary of 

Defense may make available for humanitarian relief purposes any DOD 

nonlethal excess supplies.132 

126 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 174. 127 See id. at 168. One interpreter happened to be a law student. Id.
 128 See id. 129 Id. at 177. Conversely, not all lawyers involved in theater, particularly advisors at higher levels of
 

command, agreed that failing to pay claims would have been a mission detractor. See id. at 203. 130 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (2000).
 131 Such authority includes permanent legislation, annual appropriations and authorization acts, or case law. 132 10 U.S.C § 2547 (2000). 

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“Nonlethal excess supplies” refers to property that is in Defense 

Reutilization and Management Office (DRMO) channels, and may include 

all property except real property, weapons, ammunition, and any other 

equipment or materiel designed to inflict bodily harm or death.133 Property 

is “excess” if it is no longer required for the needs and discharge of 

responsibilities of the relevant military service. Excess supplies furnished 

by the military under authority of 10 U.S.C. § 2557 (previously 10 U.S.C. § 

2547) are transferred to the Department of State (DOS), specifically, the 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which is responsible 

for the distribution of the supplies to nations targeted for humanitarian 

relief.134 Should the need arise, funding authority for DOD transportation of 

the supplies may be provided under 10 U.S.C. § 2561 (previously 10 

U.S.C.§ 2551).135 

As Task Force Hawk prepared to redeploy to Central Region 

(Germany) upon completion of Operation Allied Force, the fiscal law issue 

of property donation arose in several specific instances. 

1. Consider a third-party transfer using an Acquisition and 

Cross-Servicing Agreement to donate property that is not 

excess. 

Task Force Hawk had 80,000 gallons of aircraft fuel that were no 

longer needed once the mission ended. Task Force Hawk first sought 

permission to characterize the fuel as excess and donate it to the Albanian 

government rather than incurring the transaction costs of shipping it to Task 

Force Falcon, in Kosovo, or back to Germany. Because the fuel was still 

useful to the government and not truly excess, Task Force Hawk transported 

30,000 gallons to Task Force Falcon and transferred the remainder to the 

Albanians as "payment-in-kind" for services provided by Albania to U.S. 

forces. The transfer of fuel to the Albanians was accomplished using what 

133 See 10 U.S.C. § 2557 (previously 10 U.S.C. § 2547(d)). 134 For more detailed guidance on nonlethal excess supplies, see U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL 

4160.21-M, DEFENSE MATERIEL DISPOSITION (18 Aug. 1997) [hereinafter DOD MANUAL 4160.21-M]. 135 Transportation and Other Humanitarian Support, 10 U.S.C. § 2561 (2000) (previously 10 U.S.C. §
 

2551). Under the statute, DOD may transport humanitarian relief supplies using funds from the Overseas 

Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Assistance (OHDACA) appropriation. See Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-259, 114 Stat. 663 (providing $55.9 million for all programs 

conducted under the authority of, inter alia, 10 U.S.C. § 2551 (Code now renumbered as 10 U.S.C. § 2551)
 

during FY 2001 and 2002). 

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is commonly referred to as a "third-party transfer" under an Acquisition and 

Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA).136 

An ACSA is an agreement with a foreign government or international 

regional organization that allows DOD to acquire and transfer logistical 

support without resorting to oftentimes slow and inflexible contracting 

procedures. Acquisitions and transfers are effected on a replacement-in-kind 

(RIK), equal value exchange (EVE), or cash reimbursement basis.137 In this 

particular context of donating property that is not technically excess, the use 

of an ACSA can also be a mechanism to avoid violating the Purpose Statute. 

 At the time of the Operation, however, DOD did not have an ACSA 

with Albania.138 Therefore, Task Force Hawk JAs, in close consultation 

with JAs at V Corps, USEUCOM, and USAREUR, devised a solution that 

involved utilizing the authority of the preexisting SACLANT ACSA.139 Put 

simply, SACLANT and USAREUR entered into an agreement for the 

transfer of the fuel from Task Force Hawk to SACLANT, specifying the 

delivery point to be with the Albanians.140 Thus, the issue of the fiscal 

authority to deliver fuel to the Albanians was resolved using a third-party 

transfer under an ACSA. It should be noted that third-party transfers under 

an ACSA are not routine, and must be first coordinated through the 

cognizant combatant command. 

2. Consider classifying property as "consumed" by the 

operation. 

Task Force Hawk also sought to transfer wooden guard towers and 

wooden tables and chairs built on-site to the Albanian government. After 

coordinating with the USAREUR JA's office and USEUCOM, Task Force 

Hawk analogized to a similar situation confronted by the Air Force during 

136 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 178-79. 137 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 2010.9, MUTUAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT BETWEEN THE UNITED 

STATES AND GOVERNMENTS OF ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES AND NATO SUBSIDIARY BODIES (30 Sept. 1988). 138 The U.S. and Albania entered into an ACSA on 8 November 2000. 139 For a discussion of where SACLANT falls within the NATO command structure, see supra note 3. JAs 

at SHAPE were not receptive to the idea of using the authority of the preexisting SHAPE ACSA. See Email from John J. Birch, Host Nation Support, USAREUR, to CPT Peter C. Amuso, Administrative Law 

Attorney, Task Force Hawk (21 July 1999, 09:04 CET) (on file with CLAMO). 140 See E-mail from John J. Birch, Host Nation Support, USAREUR, to CPT Peter C. Amuso, 

Administrative Law Attorney, Task Force Hawk (21 July 1999, 07:58 CET) (on file with CLAMO). Of 

note, SACLANT desired that the Albanians hold SACLANT harmless from any liability regarding the 

quality of the fuel to be transferred. The Albanian Ministry of Defense drafted and signed a memorandum 

to that effect. See id. 

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Operation Shining Hope. When the U.S. military withdrew from Operation 

Shining Hope, the Air Force had sought permission to leave the tents they 

had erected as well as several small wooden structures they had constructed. 

The Air Force compared the cost of recovering and redeploying the tents and 

other materiel from Shining Hope to the cost of replacement. The materiel 

had a value of approximately $6 million. Disassembling, packing, shipping, 

and transporting the items would have cost approximately $8 million. The 

Shining Hope operations order also contemplated leaving the materiel in 

place. With these factors in mind, the Air Force, with the concurrence of the 

JCS legal office, decided to leave the materiel in place.141 

Task Force Hawk applied the same principle to the donation of 

wooden guard shacks and tables and chairs constructed on site. The 

property was of minimal value, and, once disassembled, could not be reused. 

This analysis was apparently based on "common sense" and "best business 

practices" rather than specific legal authority. The materiel was considered 

"consumed" by the operation, since the recovery cost exceeded the value.142 

3. Realize the difficulty of classifying staple items as excess. 

The donation of food proved more difficult. Task Force Hawk sought 

to donate food to a local orphanage prior to redeployment. Because the 

proposed donation (two tractor-trailer loads) exceeded a "de minimis" 

amount,143 the JA consulted USAREUR and advised the command that the 

food could be donated if declared excess through proper channels. The 

potential donation included flour, milk, and bread.144 

Prior to declaring the items excess, many legal obstacles would have 

to be negotiated. The Task Force Hawk property book officer would have to 

complete a DA Form 3161, "Return for Issue or Turn In," declaring the food 

141 See E-mail from LTC Roger Washington, Office of the Judge Advocate, USAREUR, to CPT Peter C. 

Amuso, Administrative Law Attorney, Task Force Hawk (15 July 1999, 15:17 CET) (on file with
 

CLAMO).

142 See E-mail from LTC Roger Washington, Office of the Judge Advocate, USAREUR, to CPT Peter C. 

Amuso, Administrative Law Attorney, Task Force Hawk (16 July 1999, 13:36 CET) (on file with
 

CLAMO). Although the principle of "abandonment" was not applied, it arguably could have been, and 

certainly seems to contemplate a very similar commercial analysis of the costs and benefits of simply 

leaving materiel behind. See DOD MANUAL 4160.21-M, supra note 134, at ch. 8.
 143 Small unit commanders are generally authorized to give small amounts of food to the local populace.
 144 See E-mail from CPT Peter C. Amuso, Administrative Law Attorney, Task Force Hawk, to LTC Roger 

Washington, Office of the Judge Advocate, USAREUR (15 July 1999, 18:55 CET) [hereinafter Amuso
 

Food Donation E-Mail] (on file with CLAMO). 

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excess. The veterinarian would then have to examine the excess food and 

determine whether the food was fit for human consumption. If the 

veterinarian determined that the food was fit for consumption, the form 

would have to be sent to USAREUR Food Service, which would determine 

whether other military units in USAREUR could use the food. If no other 

unit could use the food, USEUCOM would have to contact DOS, as required 

by 10 U.S.C. § 2547.145 Faced with these requirements, the Task Force 

Hawk logistics section decided to send the food to Task Force Falcon, an act 

which itself demonstrated that there was a military use for the items.146 

JAs should look closely at what is considered excess. Most staple 

items will be difficult to classify as excess unless they are very near their 

expiration date. 

f. Contract Law Support Is Required Immediately.147 

A contingency contracting team deployed with the first elements of 

Task Force Hawk. Contracting Command, Europe, (CCE) JAs provided 

contract law advice from Germany and later from FYROM, as space 

limitations prevented the deployment of an actual contract law attorney with 

Task Force Hawk. The contingency contracting team worked long hours to 

improve quality of life under harsh conditions. Deep mud and lack of 

infrastructure required immediate contracts for gravel and rock, wells, 

vehicles capable of operating in the environment, and port-a-lets. While 

logistics contractors quickly take responsibility for base camp construction, 

they require extensive government contracting support early in the 

deployment. 

Requirements for rock to build roads and foundations for structures 

exceeded local transportation capabilities. Engineers established strict 

priorities for projects, and contracting officers sometimes rode with the 

delivery trucks to ensure the loads were not diverted to competing projects. 

145 See Memorandum, CPT Peter C. Amuso, Administrative Law Attorney, Task Force Hawk, to G4, Task
 

Force Hawk, subject: Charitable Donations of Food to Albanian Orphanage (n.d.) (on file with CLAMO). 146 See Amuso Food Donation E-mail, supra note 144. 147 The material in this section is drawn from the comments of an Army contracting officer who visited 

Task Force Hawk in May 1999. His comments are contained in E-mail from COL David E. Graham, 

Chief, International and Operational Law Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army, to
 

MAJ John W. Miller, Deputy Director, Center for Law and Military Operations, et al., subject: Task Force 

Hawk Contracting Issues (2 June 1999) (on file with CLAMO).
 

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Three deep-water wells were installed under local contracts within 

thirty days to provide water for meal preparation and showers. Because the 

mud was too deep to allow toilet construction, port-a-lets were required 

immediately. Over 175 toilet units were procured in Italy, and contracts 

were formed for cleaning services. When the mud proved too deep for the 

trucks to reach the port-a-lets, contractors hired local nationals to move the 

port-a-lets to the trucks. 

Experienced contract law support is required, either on the ground or 

from home-station, early in the deployment. CCE expertly provided this 

advice from a central location during operations in Bosnia, Albania, 

FYROM, and Kosovo. Because most corps headquarters do not have inhouse contract law expertise, this support is essential. 

g. Military Justice 

1. Expect a General Order Number One. 

U.S. Commander in Chief, U.S. EUCOM (CINCUSEUCOM), 

General Wesley Clark, approved "General Order 1 in Support of Allied 

Force and Humanitarian Efforts in the Balkans" on 12 April 1999.148 The 

order is included in Appendix IV-30. The order addressed a variety of 

issues, including the possession of alcohol, weapons, war trophies or 

unexploded munitions, gambling, the exchange of currency, and the 

destruction of archaeological artifacts. The order delegated to JTF 

Commanders the authority to waive the alcohol prohibition when mission 

requirements permitted. General Order 1 required SJAs to provide written 

copies of the waivers to the USEUCOM SJA. The Commander, Task Force 

Hawk, published a separate General Order, emphasizing many of the 

provisions of the CINCUSEUCOM order, and adding provisions specific to 

the Task Force Hawk mission. The Task Force Hawk General Order is 

included in Appendix III-7. 

2. Documenting jurisdictional alignment requires 

meticulous attention. 

On 17 April 1999, USAREUR amended the V Corps Commander’s 

General Court-Martial Convening Authority (GCMCA) to include all 

148 Headquarters, USEUCOM, General Order Number 1 in Support of Allied Force and Humanitarian 

Efforts in the Balkans (12 Apr. 1999 as amended 29 June 1999). 

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LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

soldiers in Task Force Hawk. The Corps Commander also retained courtmartial authority over troops in Germany. The Task Force Hawk 

jurisdictional structure became effective when a unit or soldier deployed to a 

location at Task Force Hawk and ended when the soldier or unit redeployed. 

Provision was made for units not listed in the alignment to be attached for 

UCMJ purposes to the Commander, V Corps, Special Troops Battalion. The 

jurisdictional alignment is included in Appendix III-8. The most significant 

problem when addressing jurisdiction was ensuring the alignment included 

all slice elements. JAs sometimes found that walking around the camp to 

see which units were present was the best way to accurately identify all of 

these slice elements.149 

3. Retaining jurisdiction over soldiers in the rear during a 

deployment will cause delays. 

At least one brigade commander retained Special Court-Martial 

Convening Authority (SPCMCA) jurisdiction over the portion of his brigade 

remaining in Germany. Other convening authorities designated a 

provisional unit (with separate Unit Identification Code) and appointed a 

rear commander. Split-based operations—that is, situations where a 

commander retains jurisdiction over a unit separated into two or more 

geographic locations—created logistical challenges. While most actions 

were completed satisfactorily, the delay in processing was significant. The 

JAs that deployed recommended against employing split-based UCMJ 

operations when possible. The Corps SJA believed it would have been 

necessary to separate the forward and rear military justice actions had 

combat operations ensued. Scanners and e-mail were essential to maintain 

split-based UCMJ operations.150 

4. On-call Trial Defense Services requires coordination. 

The Trial Defense Service (TDS) did not deploy a defense counsel. 

Instead, TDS developed an on-call roster. A TDS attorney in Germany was 

designated each week to provide telephonic counseling for nonjudicial 

punishment. One TDS JA did visit Albania during an investigation. He 

agreed to counsel as many clients as possible during his visit. 

While TDS worked cooperatively with the unit, the telephone system and 

long duty day in Albania made contact more difficult. The JAs that 

149 See Randolph Memorandum, supra note 119, at 3. 150 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 148-53. 

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deployed recommended for future deployments that TDS provide attorneys 

during extended hours and that telephonic counseling times be 

preestablished. 

h. Preparation, Personnel, and Equipment 

Deployment with Task Force Hawk reinforced the need for thorough 

preparation and training in basic soldier skills. Participants deployed four 

times on exercises prior to the short-notice deployment to Albania. Once 

deployed, austere conditions required all personnel, including the Corps 

SJA, to fill sandbags, prepare fighting positions, and assist in the process of 

digging in.151 Personnel initially had to survive in the field with few 

amenities; they did not have showers, hot food, or laundry service for nearly 

a month.152 

All legal personnel must also possess battle staff skills. Members of 

Task Force Hawk were required to serve as members of, or interact with 

members of, the battle staff. Skills such as map reading, radio use, and 

proper use of other military equipment were essential when operating as part 

of the battle staff. The legal team deployed to Albania also stressed the 

necessity for sufficient weapons training. According to two deployed 

captains, “JAs need more than the JAOBC familiarization and yearly 

qualifying at their post. How to properly clear and the proper way to 

assemble and disassemble weapons is a must.”153 

The deployment team consisted of the Corps SJA accompanied by a 

lieutenant colonel, three captains, and two legal specialists. Two 

subordinate units also brought legal specialists. A fourth captain replaced 

the lieutenant colonel after one month. The Task Force Hawk legal team 

deployed with one HMMWV, at least one set of night vision goggles, and 

personal weapons.154 

The SJA was initially given space in the Commanding General’s van. 

Eventually, the SJA office was established in a tent. Communications 

consisted of only Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) telephone and email. In Germany, the V Corps OSJA set up an MSE line to allow a direct 

151 See id. at 80. 152 See id. at 100. 153 E-mail from CPT Kerry L. Erisman & CPT Peter C. Amuso, Operational Law Attorneys, Task Force 

Hawk, to CPT Tyler Randolph, CLAMO (9 June 1999) (on file with CLAMO). 

154 See Randolph Memorandum, supra note 119, at 1. 

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link. The “legal assistance office” took the form of two chairs outside the 

tent on “the porch.” Dust and dirt caused constant problems for the 

computer equipment. Cleaning supplies, such as compressed air, became 

important. Replacement equipment was shipped to the Task Force 

periodically from the rear OSJA. As in other recent deployments, the SJA 

office did get Internet and e-mail access quickly.155 

i. Administrative Law 

Two Task Force Hawk helicopters crashed within a ten-day window 

in late April and early May 1999. Two pilots suffered minor injuries in the 

first accident. The second accident resulted in two pilot fatalities.156 Both 

accidents required a series of investigations157 from which two primary legal 

lessons emerge. 

1. Operational tempo and the deployed environment can 

make administrative tasks more difficult. 

The Task Force Hawk SJA opined that the most noteworthy legal 

lesson learned regarding the helicopter investigations was the difficulty of 

performing otherwise routine administrative tasks during a contingency 

deployment.158 For one, at the time of the accidents the Task Force Hawk 

camp infrastructure was not fully developed; the primitive conditions had a 

direct impact on the ability of the legal staff to perform its missions. 

Secondly, the flurry of legal issues generated by the rapid operational tempo 

stretched the capabilities of the legal staff. Recognizing that the JA 

community advertises its ability to operate in an austere, fast-paced, 

155 See id. 156 For a discussion of both accidents, see Joseph Albright, Conflict in the Balkans; Apache Crash, THE 

ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 6, 1999, at 16A. 157 Aircraft accidents require safety accident investigation reports. See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 385-40, 

ACCIDENT REPORTING AND RECORDS ¶ 1-7 (1 Nov. 1994) [hereinafter AR 385-40]. There may be other 

"collateral" investigations required or desired depending upon the specific circumstances surrounding the 

accident. These may include a report of survey, line of duty, litigation, disciplinary action, adverse 

administrative action, high public interest, or claims investigation. See id. ¶ 1-8. Collateral investigations 

do not necessarily have to be separate and may be accomplished by conducting one 15-6 investigation. See 

U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 15-6, PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATING OFFICERS AND BOARDS OF OFFICERS 

(20 Sept. 1996) [hereinafter AR 15-6]. Any collateral investigation that might involve potential claims 

should follow the investigation procedures set forth in AR 27-20, supra note 113. See AR 385-40, ¶ 1-8(d). 

Otherwise, collateral investigations should follow the procedures set forth in AR 15-6. See id. 158 E-mail from COL Nolon Benson, former Task Force Hawk SJA, to LTC Stuart Risch, CLAMO (23 Oct.
 

2001) [hereinafter Benson E-mail] (on file with CLAMO). 

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deployed environment,159 JAs should anticipate these difficulties and plan 

accordingly. 

2. Emphasize to the investigating officer that legal advice 

provided during the conduct of the investigation does not 

constitute legal review. 

Task Force Hawk JAs provided legal advice to the investigating 

officers (IOs) for the helicopter accidents. One of the IOs conducting two 

separate investigations relating to the accidents mistook the legal advice he 

was receiving during the investigations as the legal review required upon 

completion of the investigations. For unexplained reasons, the 

investigations were subsequently lost. The Task Force Hawk legal office 

had not retained copies of the investigations because the JAs understood 

their role to be only advisory in nature. Similarly, because the IO—who had 

returned to his parent command in Germany—had not pursued a legal 

review, the parent command legal office did not have a copy of the 

investigations. The investigations had to be redone, causing embarrassment 

for the Task Force Hawk command and legal office.160 JAs in the position 

of providing legal advice to IOs should emphasize that a separate legal 

review needs to be done after the investigation is complete. Furthermore, 

particularly when the IO is geographically removed, JAs should consider 

making a copy of the investigation for their own records. 

C. CAMP ABLE SENTRY, FYROM 

In February 1992, the UN Security Council established the United 

Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) as a peacekeeping force for the 

crisis in the former Yugoslavia. UNPROFOR had been a security presence 

in FYROM since December 1992, having first deployed to Croatia and later 

extending to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In March 1995, the UN Security 

Council replaced UNPROFOR with three separate but interlinked 

peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, one of which was the 

United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in FYROM. 

The UN continuously extended the UNPREDEP mission until February 

1999, when a Chinese veto prevented further extension. 

159 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-100 ¶ 2.4.1, LEGAL SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS (1 Mar. 

2000) ("Legal organizations provide OPLAW support throughout all stages of mobilization and operations
 

in the deployment theater . . . [and] must be as capable as the units they support."). 160 See Benson E-mail, supra note 158. 

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UNPREDEP’s mission was to monitor and report activity along the 

FYROM/Serbian border. Twenty-seven countries supported UNPREDEP, 

with most of the troops coming from the U.S., Finland, Indonesia, Norway, 

Denmark, and Sweden. The U.S. Army contribution to UNPREDEP was 

called Task Force Able Sentry (TFAS) and was located at Camp Able Sentry 

(CAS), in FYROM. 

After UNPREDEP disbanded, the U.S. mission was renamed Task 

Force Sabre. Task Force Sabre remained at CAS and was tasked to preserve 

the U.S. infrastructure there as a forward staging and logistics area for the 

future U.S. contribution to the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo. 

Upon completion of the Allied Force air campaign, Task Force Sabre 

merged into Task Force Falcon, the U.S. task force initially co-located at 

CAS responsible for the follow-on NATO peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. 

Operations at CAS became Task Force Falcon (Rear).161 

Several legal lessons emerged from CAS during the period between 

the February 1999 disbanding of UNPREDEP and the completion of 

Operation Allied Force. 

1. Operating Without a Clearly Applicable Status of Forces Agreement 

Presents Legal Challenges. 

The end of the UNPREDEP mission meant the end of the UN status 

for U.S. TFAS forces which had been based on the relevant UN Status of 

Mission Agreement (SOMA).162 At this point in time, the 23-24 December 

1998 Exchange of Letters concerning the Basic Agreement between NATO 

and FYROM, previously discussed in the AFSOUTH section, only applied 

to the KVCC and its extraction force.163 It was not until 21 April 1999 that 

the Exchange of Letters was extended to apply to all NATO forces in 

FYROM.164 Thus, Task Force Sabre and Task Force Falcon operated 

without a SOFA or like instrument in place for nearly two months. 

161 For a more detailed discussion of the historical background surrounding the establishment of CAS, see
 

supra Ch. II, note 116 and accompanying text.
 162 See LTC Mark S. Martins, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, 1ID, Task Force Falcon Interim After Action
 

Review, Operational Law CLE, PowerPoint presentation, notes to briefing slide 24 (3 Dec. 1999)
 

[hereinafter Martins Presentation] (on file with CLAMO). 

163 See supra text accompanying notes 48-52. 164 See Information Paper, LTC Jeff McKitrick, International Law and Operations Division, USAREUR,
 

subject: Agreements with Macedonia (2 Feb. 2000) (on file with CLAMO). 

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The lack of a SOFA resulted in a variety of challenges. Border 

crossing issues arose, from refusal to admit U.S. soldiers to demands for fees 

to preventing the movement of contractor vehicles.165 Criminal jurisdiction 

issues were unclear.166 Efforts to expand the CAS infrastructure into a more 

robust staging base met resistance.167 Reaching agreement on runway usage 

fees and billing for utilities at CAS was a constant struggle.168 

Army JAs attempted to fill this legal void by proposing that the 

Partnership for Peace (PfP) SOFA169 applied and by negotiating a separate 

consignment agreement for CAS.170 Although FYROM has been a PfP 

member since 1996, the fact that Task Forces Sabre and Falcon were on the 

ground without any specific agreement with FYROM regarding the U.S. 

military presence as a non-UN force called into question the applicability of 

the PfP SOFA by its very terms.171 Nonetheless, Army JAs achieved a 

measure of success in arguing the PfP SOFA's applicability and hammering 

out the terms of the more detailed consignment agreement for CAS.172 

JAs then faced an additional hurdle. Even though some level of 

consensus was reached that the PfP SOFA applied, this information did not 

always filter down to lower levels, such as to FYROM border guards who 

continued to demand fees and obstruct border crossings. As an example of a 

response to this problem, the Task Force Sabre Commander tasked a JA to 

accompany a particularly sensitive reconnaissance mission to ensure that the 

terms of the SOFA were communicated to the guards at a FYROM–Albania 

border station.173 

Despite the efforts of JAs to apply the PfP SOFA and to negotiate a 

consignment agreement, and despite the later applicability of the theater165 See Martins Presentation, supra note 162, at notes to briefing slide 28. 166 See id. at notes to briefing slide 24. 167 See id. 168 See E-mail from CPT James A. Bagwell, Operational Law Attorney, Task Force Falcon (Rear), to CPT 

Alton L. Gwaltney, III, CLAMO (31 Mar. 2000) (on file with CLAMO). 169 See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text. 170 Accommodation Consignment Agreement for Army Compound "Strasho-Pindjur/Camp Able Sentry" at
 

Petrovec Airfield, Skopje, U.S.–MK [FYROM Ministry of Defense], Apr. 19, 1999. 

171 See PfP SOFA, supra note 110, at para. 3.
 172 Lieutenant Colonel Mark Martins, the Task Force Falcon Legal Advisor and, at one point, the Task
 

Force Falcon Chief of Staff, paints a vivid picture of just how these efforts transpired: "The last half of 

April for me was a series of smoke-filled rooms, Turkish coffee, and byzantine negotiations at the 

[FYROM] Ministry of Defense . . . ." Martins Presentation, supra note 162, at notes to briefing slide 24.
 173 See id. at notes to briefing slide 28. 

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specific Exchange of Letters, many key details, particularly in the realm of 

contractor support, were left unanswered. The most notable example was 

the omission of any language clarifying the status to be enjoyed by civilian 

contractors such as Brown & Root.174 JAs argued, with varying degrees of 

persuasiveness, that the contractors should be considered members of the 

force under the PfP SOFA and, later, under the technical annexes of the 

Exchange of Letters.175 As members of the force, civilian contractors would 

receive the same criminal procedural protections as U.S. soldiers and face 

less resistance—such as licensing requirements and fees—when crossing 

FYROM borders. 

Operating in the absence of a clearly applicable SOFA—or with a 

SOFA that did not adequately address key issues—gave JAs the opportunity 

to display their legal mettle through a combination of creative arguments and 

persistent negotiations. Such legal skills will surely be needed the next time 

U.S. forces are called into a country where SOFA production lags behind 

military requirements. 

2. Humanitarian Assistance Fiscal Law Issues Underscore the 

Importance of JA Integration into the Staff and the Utilization of 

Technical Channel Support. 

During the conduct of the Allied Force bombing campaign—March 

through June 1999—hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanian refugees 

streamed into FYROM.176 The flood of refugees quickly overwhelmed the 

ability of humanitarian aid organizations to provide food and shelter. To 

alleviate the problem, German forces began establishing a camp southwest 

of Skopje, with all of the NATO forces in FYROM contributing to the effort. 

NATO asked U.S. military forces in country to lend support, which in turn 

raised the U.S. domestic fiscal law question of the permissibility of 

providing humanitarian assistance.177 

This situation underscores the importance of JA integration into the 

staff on two fronts. First, the close relationship of the JA to the commander 

and his staff enables the JA to fully understand the commander's intent. One 

174 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 360-61. For a discussion of Brown & Root, see infra Chapter IV, 

note 114. 

175 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 5, at 361. 176 See Martins Presentation, supra note 162, at notes to briefing slide 22. 177 See id.
 

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of the Commander's unwritten goals in this situation was to battle the 

perception that the U.S. was not fully committed to participate in KFOR 

once the bombing campaign ended.178 The humanitarian crisis in northern 

FYROM presented an opportunity not only to provide necessary relief, but 

also to demonstrate U.S. resolve toward the KFOR planning effort. 

Second, JA integration into the staff is critical because commanders 

and staffs may act without JA consultation, not realizing that they may be 

treading on thin legal ice. Given the pressure on a commander to act (as in 

this instance with the request from NATO to provide humanitarian 

assistance) and the common sense notion that certain expenditures (such as 

providing food and water to those in need) seem to be the right thing to do 

professionally and morally, the JA must be a key member of the planning 

process. If the JA is not involved, policing up fiscal law miscues after the 

fact will be extremely difficult.179 

Incorporating the JA into staff planning affords the JA the lead time to 

translate the commander's intent into a legally defensible position. In this 

particular case, the JA leaned heavily upon technical channel support, 

obtaining counsel from JAs ranging from USAREUR to USEUCOM to 

OTJAG to CJSC. Additionally, the JA worked closely with the U.S. 

Ambassador to FYROM, the USAID representative in country, and the 

Office of the Defense Attaché.180 

The extensive coordination with and robust support provided by the 

technical channel and embassy personnel resulted in the Ambassador 

declaring the humanitarian situation a "disaster."181 The JA used this 

declaration as a springboard to argue that the "and other humanitarian 

assistance worldwide" language in 10 U.S.C. § 2551182 provided a fiscal law 

justification to provide food and water to the refugees.183 Another benefit of 

the extensive coordination was to build a priori consensus along the 

technical chain that this argument had merit.184 

178 See Martins Presentation, supra note 162, at notes to briefing slide 22. 179 See id. 180 See id. 181 See id. 182 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
 183 See Martins Presentation, supra note 162, at notes to briefing slide 22. 184 See id. 

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3. The Capture of the Three U.S. Soldiers Highlights the Need for a 

Senior and Impartial Investigating Officer. 

The 31 March 1999 capture of three U.S. soldiers by Serbian forces 

near the FRY–FYROM border185 reinforced the importance of senior and 

impartial officers conducting sensitive investigations. The Commanding 

General, 1ID, the captured soldiers' unit, appointed an outside investigator, 

the Commander, 7th Army Training Command (ATC), to formally inquire 

into the circumstances of the case. The 7th ATC Commander received 

advice from a JA selected from his own staff. The selection of an 

independent and impartial investigating team arguably helped preempt any 

accusations or perceptions that the investigation was biased. 186 

Most importantly, the investigation proved to be thorough, accurate, 

and timely. The findings of the investigation were later supported by 

debriefings held with the three soldiers upon their release.187 All told, the 

conduct of the investigation served to validate the guidance in service 

regulations of the need for a prompt, comprehensive, and independent 

investigation—particularly in the case of high-profile, sensitive matters.188 

185 See supra text accompanying note 8. 186 See Martins Presentation, supra note 162, at notes to briefing slide 21. 187 See id. 188 See, e.g., AR 15-6, supra note 157; U.S. DEP'T OF NAVY, JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN. INSTR. 5800.7C, 

MANUAL OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL (JAGMAN) ch. II (3 Oct. 1990) (C3, 27 July 1998). 

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IV. OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN 

You can fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, 

pulverize it and wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend 

it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the 

ground, the way the Roman Legions did, by putting your young 

men in the mud.1 

A. OVERVIEW2 

The nineteen member nations of NATO, along with twenty other 

troop contributing nations (TCNs), combined to conduct Operation Joint 

Guardian, the NATO peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. Operation Joint 

Guardian began immediately after operation Allied Force, the seventy-eight 

day NATO air campaign suspended on 10 June 1999 after the North Atlantic 

Council (NAC) received confirmation that Yugoslav forces in Kosovo had 

begun to withdraw. The Yugoslav withdrawal was in accordance with the 

Military Technical Agreement (MTA) between NATO and the Federal 

Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY),3

 which was designed to establish a durable 

cessation of hostilities within Kosovo and provide the authorization for the 

deployment of an international security force into Kosovo. 

On 10 June 1999, pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) 

Charter, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244 (UNSCR 1244)4 

welcoming the FRY acceptance of the framework for a political solution to 

the Kosovo crisis, including a withdrawal of military police and paramilitary 

forces. UNSCR 1244 also authorized the deployment of an international 

security force under UN auspices. Synchronized with the departure of Serb 

forces, the first elements of the Kosovo Forces (KFOR) entered Kosovo on 

12 June 1999. Thus began the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. 

1

 T.R. FEHRENBACH, THIS KIND OF WAR 427 (1963). 2

 For a complete discussion of the history of the Kosovo region see supra Chapter II. 3

 Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (“KFOR”) and The Governments 

of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999 [hereinafter MTA], 

available at www.nato.int/usa/policy/d990609a.htm. A copy of the MTA is included in Appendix IV-1. 

For a discussion of the MTA see infra the text accompanying note 12. 4

 S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999) [hereinafter UNSCR 1244], available at
 

www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1244.htm (last visited 25 Sept. 2001). A copy of UNSCR 1244 is 

included in Appendix IV-2. For a discussion of UNSCR 1244 see infra the text accompanying note 8. 

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LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

The 1st Infantry Division (1ID) had been planning various Kosovorelated deployments for about eight months. The previous deployments 

centered on the reinforcement of the U.S. element of the United Nations 

Preventive Deployment Forces (UNPREDEP) in the former Yugoslav 

Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the safe extraction of the Kosovo 

Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM). The U.S. UNPREDEP mission was 

Task Force Able Sentry (TFAS), which had its main base of operations at 

Camp Able Sentry (CAS), Petrovec Airfield, FYROM. Designed to prevent 

the spread of hostilities from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into 

FYROM, the TFAS mission began as part of the UN Protection Force 

(UNPROFOR) in 1993, when Yugoslav republics began breaking away 

from the FRY. 

While the seeds of the conflict in Kosovo may have been sewn 

thousands of years ago, Kosovo had enjoyed a high degree of autonomy and 

relative calm as a member of Yugoslavia from 1974 until 1989. In 1989, 

Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic altered the status of Kosovo, removing 

regional autonomy and bringing the region under the direct control of 

Belgrade, the Serbian capital. Kosovar Albanians within Kosovo 

strenuously opposed Serbian rule, and, after a decade of aggression and 

intermittent fighting, open conflict eventually erupted between Serbia and 

Kosovo. 

In February 1999, concerted international efforts to find a peaceful 

solution to the Kosovo problem culminated in negotiations in Rambouillet, 

France. In an effort to end the fighting between Serb troops and the “Ushtria 

Clirimtare e Kombatere” (UCK, also known as the Kosovo Liberation Army 

(KLA)), the contact group of five nations—U.S., U.K., Germany, Italy, and 

France—in conjunction with the Russians, developed a blueprint for peace 

in Kosovo. The Rambouillet framework restored some autonomy for the 

Kosovo province but kept Kosovo within the FRY. The framework also 

included the creation of a Kosovo force to implement the agreement. The 

role of a Kosovo force was prominent in the Rambouillet Accords, and from 

this beginning, the U.S. component was intended to be the bulk of only one 

multinational brigade (MNB) of a force that would have a distinctly 

European lead. 

The breakdown of the Rambouillet negotiations and withdrawal of the 

KDOM observers, who had been in Kosovo under UN mandate since the fall 

of 1998, immediately preceded the Operation Allied Force air strikes, which 

85 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

began on 24 March 1999. Increased Serbian military and police operations 

against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo led to a refugee humanitarian disaster 

marked by the expulsion of an estimated 1.5 million Kosovars from their 

homes by May 1999. 

1. Command and Control 

The NATO-led Operation Joint Guardian fell under the political 

direction and control of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Military control 

of KFOR included a command structure that began with NATO’s Supreme 

Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), General Wesley Clark, who was 

dual-hatted as U.S. Commander-in-Chief, European Command 

(CINCEUCOM). SACEUR designated NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction 

Corps (ARRC) Commander, Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson, from 

the United Kingdom, as the first Commander, Kosovo Forces (COMKFOR). 

KFOR consisted of five MNBs with troops from all nineteen NATO 

member nations as well as twenty other TCNs. The French headed MNB 

Figure 1: Multinational Brigade Areas of Responsibility 

North (MNB(N)), which operated out of Mitrovica in the northeast corner of 

Kosovo. The Italians were responsible for MNB West (MNB(W)), which 

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LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

was headquartered in Pec and included the area along the northwest Kosovo 

border with Montenegro and Albania. Germans commanded MNB South 

(MNB(S)) and operated out of Prizren in the southwest. MNB Center 

(MNB(C)), located in Pristina, was commanded by a British officer; and 

MNB East (MNB(E)), the U.S.-led “Task Force Falcon,”5

 operated in the 

southeast bordering FYROM and FRY. Figure 1 is a map of Kosovo 

depicting the multinational brigade areas of responsibility within Kosovo. A 

map of the southeastern corner of Kosovo, the Task Force Falcon area of 

operations, is included in Appendix IV-3. 

Troops from the 1st Armored Division (1AD) and 82d Airborne 

Division (82d) comprised the initial Army maneuver units of Task Force 

Falcon. These units had been part of the security force for Task Force Hawk 

in Albania. Marines from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special 

Operations Capable (MEU(SOC)) rounded out the maneuver units of Task 

Force Falcon.6

 All of these forces were under the command of a 

headquarters element of 1ID. As elements of 2d Brigade, 1ID, began 

arriving in Kosovo, the forces of the 1AD and the 26th MEU left Kosovo. 

By 10 July 1999, the core of Task Force Falcon, formed around the 1ID, was 

5

 The name “Falcon” was selected from the old Serbian poem, “The Battle of Kosovo,” about Prince Lazar, 

the Serb leader whose 77,000 soldiers perished at the hands of the Ottoman Turks, in the Battle of Kosovo 

Polje in 1389. In the poem, Lazar dreams that a “great gray bird, a taloned falcon” bearing a swallow in its 

beak confronts Lazar with a choice—do you seek an earthly kingdom or a heavenly kingdom? If Prince 

Lazar chose the earthly kingdom, his troops would defeat the Turks, but if he chose a heavenly kingdom, he 

and his men would die. The legend says that Prince Lazar chose the heavenly kingdom, and, in the ensuing 

battle, was killed. For a further discussion of the history of the Kosovo region see supra Chapter II. A 

complete translation of “The Battle of Kosovo” is at http://www.kosovo.com/history/battle_of_kosovo.html 

(last visited 24 Sept. 2001). 

6

 The 26th MEU(SOC) left the United States on 16 April 1999 to begin a six-month deployment to the 

Mediterranean as the Landing Force, Sixth Fleet (LF6F). On 28 April, the MEU arrived on station in the 

Adriatic and assumed the Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) alert posture in support of 

Operation Allied Force. The MEU’s first active participation in Operation Allied Force was on 1 May 

when its AV-8B Harriers flew sorties in the Kosovo are of operations (AO). The 26th MEU(SOC) 

consisted of the MEU Command Element (CE), Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 3/8 as the Ground Combat 

Element (GCE), HMM-365 as the Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and MEU Service Support Group 

(MSSG) 26 as the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE). The GCE consisted of the 3rd Battalion, 8th 

Marines, reinforced with a light armored vehicle (LAV) detachment (16 LAVs), an amphibious assault 

vehicle (AAV) detachment (15 AAVs), and an artillery battery (six 155mm howitzers). The ACE was 

centered around HMM-365, a composite squadron consisting of 12 CH-46 medium lift helicopters, four 

CH-53E heavy lift helicopters, three UH-1N utility helicopters, four AH-1W attack helicopters, six AV-8B 

fixed wing attack aircraft, and two land-based KC-130 aerial refueler/transport aircraft. MSSG-26 

provided the MEU combat service support with engineer, motor transport, supply, landing support, 

medical, and dental detachments. All information on Marine Corps operations was obtained from 

Memorandum, Staff Judge Advocate, 26th MEU(SOC), to Commanding Officer, 26th MEU(SOC), 

subject: Quick Look After Action Report Operation Joint Guardian (18 July 1999) [hereinafter MEU 

AAR] (on file with CLAMO), and the After Action Report, Staff Judge Advocate, 26th MEU(SOC), 

subject: MEU Lessons Learned (n.d.) (on file with CLAMO). 

87 
Multi-National Brigade East Area Of

Responsibility

G 3 Men of Plans - Good Like Chicken!

II 

I

I

I

I 

II 

MNB (E) HQ MNB (E) HQ

Multi-National Brigade East Area Of 

Responsibility 

80 km long 

30 km wide 

Approx 2300 sq km 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

in Kosovo and troops from Greece, Jordan, Poland, Russia, the Ukraine, and 

the United Arab Emirates (UAE) augmented Task Force Falcon to form 

MNB(E), a multinational task force arrayed as represented in Figure 2. 

G 3 Me n of Plans - G ood Like Ch icken! 

Figure 2: Multinational Brigade East Area of Responsibility 

Brigadier General (BG) John Bantz Craddock, the Assistant Division 

Commander (Maneuver), 1ID, became the first Task Force Falcon 

Commander. The NATO chain of command for MNB(E) passed through 

KFOR headquarters in Pristina to SACEUR. As the highest-ranking U.S. 

commander in Kosovo, BG Craddock, as Commander, USKFOR, fell under 

the Combatant Command of General Clark, CINCEUCOM. Administrative 

support for Task Force Falcon ran through U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) 

to the Department of the Army. Finally, because the majority of the brigade 

combat team composing Task Force Falcon as well as substantial staff 

elements came from the 1ID, the Task Force Falcon chain of command also 

led to the Commander, 1ID. The MNB(E) Commander also had to be aware 

of the various national interests brought to Task Force Falcon, which was a 

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LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

multinational task force. The chart included in Appendix IV-4 depicts the 

various chains of command the MNB(E) Commander had to consider.7 

The first rotation of 1ID soldiers that deployed to Kosovo was 

commonly referred to as the “KFOR 1A” rotation. In October 1999, 2-505 

Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), the light infantry battalion from the 82d, 

was replaced by 3-504 PIR, also from the 82d. 3d Brigade, 1ID, replaced 2d 

Brigade in December 1999 to start the KFOR 1B rotation. 3-504 PIR was 

replaced in March 2000 by 1-187 Infantry, which was replaced six months 

later by 2-327 Infantry. Both 1-187 and 2-327 were from the 101st Airborne 

Division (Air Assault). 1AD assumed command of Task Force Falcon in 

June 2000 for one year (KFOR rotations 2A and 2B). The 101st, as the 

headquarters for KFOR rotation 3A, assumed responsibility for Task Force 

Falcon in June 2001. The 101st Airborne Division commanded maneuver 

units from both the 101st and the 3d Infantry Division. 

2. International Framework 

While comparisons to the mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina are 

inevitable, the Kosovo mission is a different contingency operation with a 

very different framework. Unlike Bosnia, there is no recognized peace 

accord and no “zone of separation” between former warring factions in 

Kosovo. Serbs and other minorities live in small enclaves within the larger 

predominantly Kosovar-Albanian cities or within small Serb or Roma 

communities. Unlike Bosnia, Kosovo never had an integrated civil 

infrastructure, and when Task Force Falcon entered the Kosovo province, 

absolutely no government functions existed—no police, no postal system, no 

water, electric, or sewage services. Under one civil administrator, the 

Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), and pursuant to a 

host of agreements, Kosovo began to rebuild in June 1999. 

a. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 

UNSCR 1244, enacted on 10 June 1999, provided the framework for the 

mission in Kosovo. The resolution delineated the responsibilities of the 

“international security presence” (KFOR) as well as the responsibilities of 

7

 MG Ricardo S. Sanchez, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, United States Army Europe, Kosovo Scene 

Setting, PowerPoint presentation, briefing slide 6 (2001) [hereinafter Sanchez Briefing] (on file with 

CLAMO). 

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CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

the “international civil presence” (The United Nations Interim 

Administration Mission in Kosovo) (UNMIK). 

KFOR’s responsibilities included: 

• deterring renewed hostilities; 

• demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed 

Kosovo Albanian groups; 

• establishing a secure environment; 

• ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence 

could take responsibility for this task; 

• supervising de-mining until the international civil presence could, as 

appropriate, take over responsibility for this task; 

• supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the 

international civil presence; 

• conducting border monitoring duties as required; and 

• ensuring the protection and freedom of movement for itself, the 

international civil presence, and other international organizations.8 

UNMIK was responsible for: 

• promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial 

autonomy and self-government in Kosovo; 

• performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as 

required; 

• organizing development of provisional institutions for democratic and 

autonomous self-government (including elections); 

• transferring administrative responsibilities to these institutions; 

• facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future 

status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords; 

• overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional 

institutions to institutions established under a political settlement; 

• supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic 

reconstruction; 

• supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian 

organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid; 

8

 UNSCR 1244, supra note 4, ¶ 9. 

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LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

• maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces 

and deploying international police personnel; 

• protecting and promoting human rights; and 

• assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced 

persons to their homes in Kosovo.9 

UNMIK sought to accomplish these tasks through a four-pillared 

approach under the direction of the SRSG. Each pillar was headed by a 

different international organization as described below.10 

• Civil Administration—under the UN: The civil administration pillar was 

responsible for governmental structures, public services, health services, 

energy, public utilities, post and telecommunications, and education. 

• Humanitarian Assistance—led by United Nations High Commission for 

Refugees (UNHCR): The humanitarian assistance pillar oversaw the 

return of refugees, improving shelter and water conditions, and landmine 

and unexploded ordnance removal. 

• Democratization and Institution-Building—led by the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE): The democratization and 

institution-building pillar oversaw the rule of law, police education, 

media affairs, human rights, and elections. 

• Economic Reconstruction—managed by the European Union: The 

economic reconstruction pillar assisted in humanitarian relief, 

reconstruction, and rehabilitation, and prepared economic, social and 

financial policies with the goal of creating a viable market-based 

economy. 

b. United Nations Mission in Kosovo Regulations 

UNSCR 1244 gave the SRSG tremendous authority. These powers 

included the ability to change, suspend, or repeal existing laws; appoint 

persons to perform functions within the interim administration; and issue 

9 Id. ¶ 11. 10 For additional information on the UNMIK mission see United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
 

Kosovo: Report of the Secretary General (1999) at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1999/s1999779.htm
 

(last visited 1 Sept. 2001) [hereinafter UNMIK Report].
 

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legislation in the form of regulations. During the first two years of the 

mission in Kosovo, the SRSG promulgated over one hundred regulations.11 

These regulations addressed a broad spectrum of topics involved with 

running a government. Many of the regulations had legal implications and 

judge advocates (JAs) referred to them almost daily during the Kosovo 

mission. UNMIK Regulations addressed banking, the judiciary, police, 

utilities, vehicle registration, construction, property ownership, 

administrative appointments, and a variety of other issues. 

c. The Military Technical Agreement 

The Military Technical Agreement between the International Security 

Force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

and the Republic of Serbia (MTA) was signed on 9 June 1999.12 

Suspending the NATO bombing campaign, the MTA required all FRY 

military forces to leave Kosovo and pull five kilometers behind the KosovoSerbia border, beyond an area described as the “Ground Safety Zone” 

(GSZ). The agreement further required all FRY aircraft and air defense 

systems to remain at least twenty-five kilometers beyond the Kosovo border, 

creating an “Air Safety Zone” (ASZ). 

 Previously described in reviews of Bosnia operations as a “silver 

bullet clause,”13 language in the MTA provided the KFOR Commander the 

authority to take all action necessary to establish and maintain a secure 

environment for all citizens of Kosovo.14 Broad interpretation of this clause, 

originally intended for use against uncooperative FRY and Serb forces, 

provided the KFOR Commander flexibility in addressing a multitude of 

problems including Kosovar Albanian violence. 

11 The complete collection of UNMIK Regulations is at 

http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/regs.html (last visited 4 Aug. 2001). 12 MTA, supra note 3. 13 THE CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. 

ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS 1995-1998: LESSONS LEARNED FOR JUDGE
 

ADVOCATES 77 (1998) [hereinafter BALKANS]. 14 MTA, supra note 3, at app. B., ¶ 1. 

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d. The Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation of the 

UCK 

The Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation of the UCK 

(Undertaking) between the Commander, KFOR (COMKFOR), and the 

Commander, UCK, was signed on 20 June 1999.15 It called for an 

immediate cease-fire and disengagement as well as an ongoing phased 

demilitarization and integration into society of UCK personnel. The 

demilitarization of the UCK began almost immediately after the cease-fire 

and was completed ninety days later, at which time members of the KLA 

were no longer allowed to wear uniforms or carry weapons. The 

Undertaking did not directly address the armed ethnic Albanian groups that 

formed during the two years after the signing of the Undertaking; however, 

the definition of “UCK” contained within the Undertaking was extremely 

broad.16 The Undertaking required the UCK to abide by the spirit and 

promises made by the Kosovar Albanian delegation to the Rambouillet 

negotiation discussed below. The Undertaking also provided for the 

transformation of the KLA into a National Guard-like organization based on 

a future additional agreement. This agreement, called the Kosovo Protection 

Corps/Commander Kosovo Force’s Statement of Principles (Statement of 

Principles), created the Trupat e Mbrojtjes se Kosoves (TMK), or simply 

Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). 

e. Rambouillet Accords 

The Rambouillet Accords—Interim Agreement for Peace and SelfGovernment in Kosovo were the draft accords placed before representatives 

of the FRY, the Republic of Serbia, political leaders of Kosovo, and the 

KLA during talks in Rambouillet, France, in March 1999.17 While the 

Accords were never signed or enacted, their “spirit” is a guide to the Kosovo 

mission as incorporated through UNSCR 124418 and the Undertaking.19 

15 Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation by the UCK, 20 June 1999, COMKFOR-UCK, 

available at http://www.legacyrus.com/NewsReel/Kosovo/KLADisarmAgreement.htm [hereinafter 

Undertaking]. A copy of the Undertaking is included in Appendix IV-5. 

16 Id. ¶ 5a. 17 Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, unsigned, Fed.
 

Rep. Yugo.–Serb–Kosovo, U.N. Doc. S/1999/648 (1999) [hereinafter Rambouillet]. 18 UNSCR 1244, supra note 4, ¶ 11 (“[T]he main responsibilities of the international civil presence will 

include: Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and selfgovernment in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords . . . and Facilitating a 

political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords
 

. . . .” ).
 

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CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

The Rambouillet Accords laid out the basic framework for the process 

of transforming Kosovo into an autonomous, but not independent, province 

within the FRY. JAs must remain aware of the principles contained in the 

Rambouillet Accords because the overall plan adopted by UNMIK during 

the interim government period is similar to the plan contained in the 

principles of Rambouillet.20 

f. The Kosovo Protection Corps/Commander Kosovo Force’s 

Statement of Principles 

The Statement of Principles was the cornerstone document in the 

transformation of the KLA into the KPC.21 The Statement of Principles 

provided the framework for a multidisciplinary, multi-ethnic, indigenous 

emergency service agency. The KPC was designed to provide disaster 

relief, conduct search and rescue operations, and assist in rebuilding the 

infrastructure in Kosovo. The KPC had no role in law enforcement, riot 

control, counter-terrorism, or any tasks involved in the maintenance of law 

and order. The KPC organized under one central headquarters and six 

regional headquarters and task groups. KPC 6th Regional Headquarters and 

the engineer headquarters were located in the U.S. AOR. 

Former members of the KLA filled the KPC ranks. This fact, along 

with the leadership’s desire to maintain an organized rank structure and wear 

military-styled uniforms, caused most to view the KPC with suspicion 

during the early days of its existence.22 KFOR held 2,000 weapons in trust 

for the KPC should an event arise when the KPC would need them. The 

19 Undertaking, supra note 15, ¶ 1. 20 See UNMIK Report, supra note 10, for an overview of the plan to rebuild Kosovo. 21 The Kosovo Protection Corps, Commander Kosovo Forces, Statement of Principles (20 Sept. 1999), 

available at http://www.kforonline.com/resources/kpc/stmt_principles.htm [hereinafter Statement of 

Principles]. The Statement of Principles is included in Appendix IV-6. 22 There were other actions by KPC members that called into question the desire of the organization to 

demilitarize and reintegrate into normal Kosovo society. KFOR found weapons caches within KPC 

buildings and in other storage locations under KPC control. For an overview of allegations leveled against 

the KPC, see Terry Boyd & Scott Schonauer, Members of Protection Corps Run into Problems Prompting 

Reprimand from U.S., STARS AND STRIPES, July 24, 2001, at 

http://ww2.pstripes.osd.mil/01/jul01/ed072401i.html. See also Terry Boyd & Scott Schonauer, Accounts 

Vary about Kosovo Protection Corps’ Role as Disaster Relief Group, STARS AND STRIPES, July 24, 2001, at 

http://ww2.pstripes.osd.mil/01/jul01/ed072401h.html. The KPC also had considerable reservations about 

the policing restrictions placed on them by KFOR. During almost every early meeting with members of 

KFOR, KPC members raised issues about being able to serve in a police role. See, e.g., Memorandum, 

LTC Douglas E. Nash, Chief MNB(E) Joint Implementation Commission, to Commanding General, 

MNB(E), subject: Meeting with KPC Leadership 6 NOV 99 (7 Nov. 1999). 

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LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

weapons could not be issued to KPC members without COMKFOR 

approval; however, 200 of the 2,000 weapons were constantly in use for 

KPC installation security.23 Equipping and training the KPC, as discussed 

below, became a recurring issue within Task Force Falcon. 

g. Notice of COMKFOR’s Intent Regarding Entry of FRY and 

Republic of Serbia Forces in GSZ 

To address the Ethnic Armed Albanian Groups (EAAG) operating 

within the GSZ, COMKFOR allowed a certain number of Serb military 

forces to patrol areas within the GSZ. The key framework document for this 

return was the Notice of COMKFOR’s Intent Regarding Entry of FRY and 

Republic of Serbia Forces into GSZ Sector C (East) (COMKFOR Intent).24 

Under the provisions of the COMKFOR Intent, FRY forces were allowed 

into the MTA established GSZ but could not use tanks, rocket systems, antitank guns, aircraft, mines, or towed artillery within the GSZ. FRY patrols 

within one kilometer of the Kosovo-Serbia administrative boundary required 

separate COMKFOR approval. 

Based upon the COMKFOR Intent, on 13 March 2001, Serb forces 

were allowed into a small area of the GSZ beginning at the Serbia-FYROM 

border and extending approximately five kilometers north. This area was 

known as GSZ Sector C (East). By 24 May 2001, Serb forces were allowed 

into all four sectors of the GSZ bordering the U.S. Area of Responsibility 

(AOR).25 

3. Mission 

The initial Task Force Falcon mission was four-pronged: 

• to monitor, verify, and enforce as necessary the provisions of the MTA 

and the Undertaking to create a safe and secure environment; 

• to provide humanitarian assistance in support of UNHCR efforts; 

• to initially enforce basic law and order, transitioning this function to the 

to-be-formed designated agency as soon as possible; and, 

23 Statement of Principles, supra note 21, at art. 8, ¶ 1.f. 24 COMKFOR, Notice of COMKFOR’s Intent Regarding Entry of FRY and Republic of Serbia Forces into
 

GSZ Sector C (East) (12 Mar. 2001) [hereinafter COMKFOR Intent]. 

25 Additional information on the return of Serb forces to the GSZ is at 

www.kforonline.com/news/releases/nrel_24may01.htm (last visited 24 Sept. 2001).
 

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• to establish/support resumption of core civil functions.26 

Every aspect of the Task Force Falcon mission was legally intensive. 

The first prong required the interpretation and enforcement of legal 

documents. The second prong expressly made Task Force Falcon 

responsible for providing humanitarian assistance in support of the UNHCR 

efforts. This second prong was a markedly broader mandate than 

peacekeepers in Bosnia faced.27 JAs were going to be at the center of the 

effort to enforce law and order—the third prong—because of JA training and 

experience in the law. The final prong—to support resumption of core civil 

functions—would lead to numerous requests for Task Force Falcon 

assistance. 

The legal support mission, as quoted below, nested with the Task Force 

Falcon mission. 

The Task Force Falcon Legal Section integrates completely into 

Task Force operations, providing comprehensive legal support 

in Kosovo in order to: 

• Ensure accurate interpretation of the Military Technical 

Agreement (MTA) and UCK Undertaking; 

• Ensure that humanitarian assistance and civil function 

responsibilities remain within U.S. fiscal and procurement 

laws; 

• Assist the command within areas of judge advocate 

expertise relating to law and order and detention until 

UNMIK can assume the law and order responsibility; 

• Assist the command in maintaining discipline; and 

• Provide individual soldiers client services.28 

Set forth below are the lessons from this mission. 

26 See LTC Mark S. Martins, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, 1ID, Task Force Falcon Interim After Action 

Review, Operational Law CLE, PowerPoint presentation, briefing slide 5 (3 Dec. 1999) [hereinafter 

Martins Presentation] (on file with CLAMO). LTC Martins was the former Legal Advisor and Chief of 

Staff of Task Force Falcon. 

27 The initial mission in Bosnia was to provide a secure environment for other organizations to provide 

humanitarian assistance. See generally BALKANS, supra note 13, at 42. 28 Martins Presentation, supra note 26, at briefing slide 6. 

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LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 

B. INTERNATIONAL LAW 

International law is the application of international 

agreements, international customary practices, and the general 

principles of law recognized by civilized nations to military 

operations and activities.29 

Within Kosovo, international law provided an extremely broad area of 

practice. Understanding the legal underpinnings of the international 

framework of coalition military operations pursuant to the UN Charter can 

be extremely difficult. In addition to the various agreements discussed 

above, JAs had to remain cognizant of treaty law and fundamental human 

rights law. The predominant law of peace theory, that a sovereign nation 

retains the right to apply its own law, further complicated the issues JAs 

faced when advising commanders, because JAs were now required to have 

some understanding of the legal codes of both the FRY and the Province of 

Kosovo.30 

1. Judge Advocates and Commanders Must Understand the International 

Legal Framework for the Military Mission. 

Commanders expected JAs to understand the international framework 

for the mission in Kosovo and to provide counsel on legal issues rarely faced 

in previous U.S. military operations. Commanders themselves had to 

understand the international justification for the U.S. presence in Kosovo 

because it drove the mission.31 Moreover, commanders had to be prepared 

to explain the military’s task and purpose to the press, nongovernmental, and 

international organizations operating in Kosovo.32 

To assist commanders with this task, legal advisors conducted 

“Leader Teach” on the framework agreements and rules of engagement 

(ROE). The legal team also prepared legal guides that included full text 

29 U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-100, LEGAL SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS ¶ 3.4 (1 Mar. 2000) 

[hereinafter FM 27-100].

30 JAs deployed to Kosovo believed that an understanding of civil law systems was important. One 

deployed JA was well-versed in civil law and comparative legal systems. 

31 As stated in JAGC doctrine, “the legal basis of the operation guides the commander in many ways. It
 

may affect the operation’s purpose, scope, timing, and ROE; the status of personnel; the command’s
 

relationship with military and nonmilitary organizations; and the applicable funding authorities.” FM 27

100, supra note 29, ¶ 6.6.1. 32 See id. (describing how a clear understanding of the legal basis promotes legitimacy and enables
 

commanders to better structure public statements). 

­

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versions of the applicable agreements. The “Leader Teach” was designed to 

teach both commanders and senior leaders within the units (E-6 and above) 

the key points of the framework of the Kosovo mission. The legal guides 

were designed to give those in command the key documents for review prior 

to the mission. A copy of the slides from one of the “Leader Teach” 

sessions is included in Appendix IV-7.33 Field grade officers preparing for 

deployment with 1AD were required to take a command-prepared written 

test on the applicable agreements and basic ROE provisions.34 A copy of the 

unclassified component of the 1AD test with answers is included in 

Appendix IV-27. 

2. Rule of Law 

The importance of the “rule of law” in the Task Force Falcon mission 

is impossible to overstate.35 One of the missions of the Task Force was to 

“enforce basic law and order.”36 Consequently, the emphasis placed by the 

Task Force on policing and detention, a mission with significant legal 

implications, became the largest single issue to face the deployed JAs in 

Kosovo during the first year. Subsequent Task Force Falcon rotations faced 

similar detention issues posed by the need to provide a safe and secure 

environment through the use of “operational detention.” As the international 

security presence in Kosovo and the force initially given responsibility for 

law and order, KFOR, and the subordinate brigades, had considerable 

33 See MAJ Tracy Barnes, Legal Advisor Task Force Falcon & CPT Alton L. Gwaltney, III, Deputy Legal 

Advisor, Task Force Falcon, 1st Infantry Division Leaders Legal Brief, PowerPoint presentation, briefing 

slides 3-25 (Sept. 1999) [hereinafter Leaders Legal Brief] (on file with CLAMO). The legal team 

preparing for the 1st Infantry Division deployment compiled a booklet of all the framework legal 

documents entitled, “Commanders’ Legal Guide to Kosovo.” The 1AD attorneys prepared a similar book 

entitled, “Critical KFOR Legal Documents.” These books were provided to all key leaders. 34 The ROE test had a classified and an unclassified component. In addition to the unclassified issues, 

specific ROE provisions from the classified plans were tested in a separate exam. See E-mail from CPT 

Joseph B. Berger, former Deputy Legal Advisor, Task Force Falcon, to CPT Alton L. Gwaltney, III, 

CLAMO (18 June 2001) (on file with CLAMO); see also Memorandum, CPT Joseph B. Berger, former 

Deputy Legal Advisor, Task Force Falcon, to CLAMO, subject: Response to Draft Kosovo Lessons 

Learned (29 Aug. 2001) [hereinafter Berger memo] (on file with CLAMO). 

35 “Rule of law” as used in this publication parallels the definition in previous CLAMO publications. See 

THE CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. 

ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI 1994-1995: LESSONS LEARNED FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 

1 n.2 (1995) [hereinafter HAITI]. “'Rule of Law’ will connote the notion of a ‘law-governed’ state or 

community, which in addition to institutional arrangements—such as judicial review of legislative acts or 

civilian control of the military—demands ‘a disposition to take law seriously, a concern with process and 

with following forms, as much as with substantive results.” Id. (citing RUDOLPH B. SCHLESINGER, 

COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS 80 (Supp. 1994 to 5th ed.). 36 See supra text accompanying notes 8 and 26 (discussing UNSCR 1244 and the Task Force Falcon 

mission). 

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interest in creating accountability for criminal action and in creating 

perceptions among all Kosovars that a new era had dawned in Kosovo where 

criminals would face consequences. Beyond criminal accountability, KFOR 

wanted to instill confidence that disputes were better handled through civil 

processes than self-help. These themes are most clearly seen in Task Force 

Falcon’s detention mission, support to the International Criminal Tribunal 

for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the unique “property repatriation” 

program. 

a. Arrest, Investigation, Detention, and Trial of Non-Members of 

the Force. 

When Task Force Falcon entered the province of Kosovo in June 

1999 as part of the larger Kosovo Force, it was confronted with a law and 

order mission not faced by U.S. forces since the post-World War II 

occupations of Germany and Japan.37 KFOR and UNMIK, the international 

civil presence tasked with maintaining civil law and order, executed a law 

and order mission complicated by the absence of a functioning criminal 

justice system. KFOR’s public security measures, intended to be short-term, 

continue, in one form or another, through the publishing of this Book. 

The law and order mission was not a small task. The number of major 

crimes committed by the citizens of Kosovo during the first year of KFOR 

operations greatly exceeded that of the city of Los Angeles, California, an 

area with a population two times that of Kosovo.38 

The KFOR mandate under UNSCR 1244 and the broad provisions of 

the MTA combined to provide the basis for the KFOR law and order 

mission. Contained within COMKFOR’s order to all of the subordinate 

Multinational Brigades was the mission to “[i]nitially enforce basic law and 

37 U.S. forces have faced numerous peacekeeping deployments with difficult law and order missions. See, 

e.g., Colonel F. M. Lorenz, Law and Anarchy in Somalia, PARAMETERS, Winter 1993-94, at 27; HAITI, 

supra note 35, at 63; BALKANS, supra note 13, at 109. Task Force Falcon legal section drew on all of these 

experiences when addressing the broad Kosovo law and order mission. 

38 The Los Angeles Convention Bureau reports the city’s population at 3.6 million. Los Angeles 

Convention Bureau On Line at http://www.lacvb.com/modl15/release25.html (last visited 1 Aug. 2001). 

UNMIK Police report Kosovo’s population at 1.8 million. See UNMIK Police, “UNMIK Police Strength” 

at www.civpol.org/unmik/stats/2000/00ratiopopul.htm (last visited 24 Sept. 2001). In calendar year 1999, 

Los Angeles investigated 432 homicides and attempted homicides. See LAPD On Line, Crime Statistics, at 

http://www.lapdonline.org/general_information/crime_statistics/2000_crime_summary.htm (last visited 24 

Sept. 2001). From just July to December 1999, 454 murders were reported in Kosovo. UNMIK Police 

Crime Statistics, at www.civpol.org/unmik/stats/1999/99whole.htm (last visited 8 Aug. 2001). 

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order, transitioning this function to the to-be-formed designated agency as 

soon as possible.”39 The “designated agency” became a combination of 

U.N. Police (UNMIK-P) and locally recruited and trained Kosovars, 

(Kosovo Police Service (KPS)). Despite the U.N.’s urgent call for more 

than 3,100 international police to assist with the UNMIK mission, the 

international community did not meet the U.N.’s request for almost a year. 

By that time, the U.N. had increased its request to 4,700.40 

UNMIK’s41 efforts to establish a judiciary were hampered 

significantly by the scarcity of professional and lay jurists. Because of the 

exodus of Serbs from Kosovo, most of the Serbian-trained judiciary left the 

province. The few remaining Serb judges departed, ultimately, because of 

security concerns. The remaining legally trained Kosovar Albanian jurists 

were without judicial experience, because they had not been allowed to 

practice their profession since 1989.42 Because of the ethnic Serbian 

civilians’ flight following KFOR’s arrival, UNMIK also had a very small 

pool from which to select Serb lay judges, the rough equivalent of a jury 

member in U.S. criminal law. 

Delays in the deployment of adequate police to the region slowed the 

establishment of permanent prison operations. Within the U.S. AOR, the 

lack of an existing large prison facility exacerbated the detention situation. 

Only small detention centers attached to local police stations were available 

in the Task Force Falcon area. 

KFOR’s guidance to subordinate brigades to enforce basic law and 

order, combined with UNMIK’s inability to establish the criminal justice 

systems necessary to assume the law and order mission, required Task Force 

Falcon soldiers and Marines to police criminal misconduct, provide judicial 

39 Martins Presentation, supra note 26, at briefing slide 5.
 40 The build-up of international police can be traced by reviewing the archives of Kosovo News Archive, 

“UNMIK Latest Development ‘News Archive,’” at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/news/99/kosarc.htm
 

(last visited 5 Aug. 2001). 

41 The responsibility to establish the judiciary fell to UNMIK’s Judicial Affairs (UNMIK-JA) section. 

UNMIK-JA had branches in each administrative region of Kosovo. UNMIK-JA hired, paid, and
 

supervised all judges and prosecutors in Kosovo. See generally Memorandum, MAJ Daniel W. Kelly, 

former Legal Advisor, Task Force Falcon, to CLAMO, subject: Comments on CLAMO Kosovo Lessons 

Learned ¶ 6 (5 Sept. 2001) [hereinafter Kelly Memo 2] (on file with CLAMO). The OSCE monitored 

judicial operations. 

42 To address this issue, OSCE established the Kosovo Judicial Institute to “develop and facilitate the 

training of judges, public prosecutors and other relevant legal personnel.” See OSCE, Kosovo, A Review 

of the Criminal Justice System, 1 September 2000 - 28 February 2001, 40 (2001), at
 

http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/criminal_justice2.pdf [hereinafter OSCE 2001]. 

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review for those arrested, and establish and run prisons. The ability of Task 

Force Falcon to execute a stop-gap law enforcement mission, a role that 

soldiers and Marines are not trained to undertake, illustrates the military’s 

ability to adapt traditional combat roles to peacekeeping missions. 

1. Line units must be prepared to discharge the policing 

function in the event that a law enforcement vacuum exists. 

Within the U.S. KFOR AOR, UNMIK-P was not prepared to accept a 

substantial portion of the policing mission until a year after the U.S. entered 

Kosovo. Even then, UNMIK-P had to rely on U.S. troops in some outlying 

areas and there was continuing pressure for U.S. troops to continue largescale policing.43 On entry into Kosovo, Task Force Falcon Military Police 

(MP) and Criminal Investigation Command (CID) investigators were able to 

respond to only the most serious crimes; therefore, soldiers and Marines 

assigned to combat units were called on to conduct basic criminal 

investigations in conjunction with detentions and arrests.44 These soldiers 

and Marines had little or no law enforcement or investigative training 

because the basic doctrine and mission essential tasks of combat units do not 

address law enforcement and criminal investigation.45 

To assist the troops with these unfamiliar investigation missions, the 

first Task Force Falcon legal section created situational vignettes for basic 

43 See Memorandum, MAJ Larrs Celtnieks, former Legal Advisor, Task Force Falcon, to CPT Alton L. 

Gwaltney, III, CLAMO, subject: KFOR AAR Comments, ¶ 8 (3 Aug. 2001) [hereinafter Celtnieks AAR] 

(noting increased pressure by KFOR, eight months after U.S. KFOR had transferred policing authority to 

UNMIK-P, for soldiers to perfect crime scenes, canvass witnesses, and testify at trial) (on file with 

CLAMO).

44 Policy Letter 4, Commanding General, Task Force Falcon, subject: Policy Letter #TFF-04 Detention 

Processing, ¶ 5(b) (3 Aug. 1999) [hereinafter Detention Policy] instructed soldiers responding to crimes to 

establish control of the scene, notify the MPs, take statements from the victims and witnesses (sworn 

statements when possible), prepare a sketch of the scene, render personal statements, account for all 

physical evidence on a DA Form 4137, and bring the suspect(s) and all documents to the nearest MP sub

station. A copy of Detention Policy, supra, is included in Appendix IV-8. See also Executive Summary, 

COL John W. Morgan, III, Investigation Pursuant to AR 15-6 into the Unit Climate and State of Discipline 

of 3-504 Parachute Infantry Regiment, 8 (2000) [hereinafter EXSUM] (on file with CLAMO) ( “. . .in the 

Kosovo operation it is difficult to draw a distinction between Military Police (MP) duties and the infantry 

soldiers’ on the ground. . . .”). The EXSUM is included in Appendix IV-9. 45 “Mission essential tasks are collective tasks in which an organization must be proficient to accomplish 

some portion of its mission in a theater. . . . The Mission Essential Task List (METL) concept was 

conceived in recognition that units and organizations cannot achieve and sustain proficiency on every 

possible training task.” FM 27-100, supra note 29, ¶ 4.5.2. METL and METL development is fully 

discussed in U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 25-101, BATTLE FOCUSED TRAINING (30 Sept. 1990) 

[hereinafter FM 25-101]. A typical infantry METL might include tasks such as perform tactical road 

march, occupy assembly area, defend, move tactically, attack/counterattack by fire, and assault. Id. at 2-5. 

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law enforcement training. The training vignettes covered the topics of 

arrest, search, use of force, probable cause, and basic investigative 

procedures. Soldiers were instructed to take statements and document 

evidence seized at crime scenes for further prosecution efforts. The 1AD 

legal section prepared detailed fact sheets describing the procedures 

necessary to properly account for seized items.46 Even with these efforts, 

basic law enforcement was a difficult task for KFOR soldiers.47 

Mission rehearsal exercises for units deploying to Kosovo stressed the 

law enforcement role and provided training on basic law enforcement.48 

Soldiers were able to adopt existing forms and procedures from wartime 

roles to the peacekeeping mission.49 After the first year, the law 

46 A copy of the 1AD guidance for seizing property during cordons and sweeps, at checkpoints, or during 

other operations is included in Appendix IV-10. JAs in 1AD prepared this document after the Task Force 

had transferred most law enforcement roles, and the document was designed mainly to address property 

accountability.

47 As an example, U.S. soldiers conducted large-scale raids on command posts, staging areas, and arms 

caches on 15 March 2000. During the raids the soldiers seized twenty-two crates of ammunition, twentyeight hand grenades, 2 mortars, various other arms, and stockpiles of food and medical supplies. The 

troops arrested nine Kosovar Albanians during the raids. See Roberto Suro, GIs Raid Militias in Kosovo, 

WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2000, at A1. At the completion of the operation, the Task Force Battle Captain sent 

out photographs of the seized items and asked how to dispose of the seized items properly. The Task Force 

Legal Advisor immediately responded that items seized during the raid must be treated as evidence in the 

criminal cases against the detained civilians. As evidence, the seized items could not be destroyed without 

the permission of the prosecutor and judge. See E-mail from MAJ Tracy Barnes, Legal Advisor, Task 

Force Falcon, to CPT Garth Case, Battle Captain, Task Force Falcon (16 Mar. 2000) (on file with 

CLAMO). While not unique, as presented in this context, the failure to recognize the need to perform basic 

law enforcement-like tasks with the seized items is noteworthy. At the time of this operation, 1ID had been 

responsible for the Kosovo mission for nine months. The soldiers involved in the operations had been in 

Kosovo for over three months and had performed numerous detentions. Task Force policy letters discussed 

the need to document evidence, and the mission rehearsal exercises stressed the need to understand basic 

law enforcement concepts. Despite these efforts, the immediate reaction by the task force was to destroy 

the weapons and ammunition and to give away the food and medical supplies. This reinforces the lesson 

that JAs need to be involved in planning. This operation, unlike most, was planned outside the normal 

operations planning cell. The perceived need for secrecy concerning this operation led to a select group of 

members of the planning cell conducting all planning. This group did not include a JA. 

48 See, e.g., Legal Observer/Controller Report, 1-325 Airborne Infantry Regiment, Mission Rehearsal 

Exercise, 30 November – 7 December 2000, 2 (7 Dec. 2001) (on file with CLAMO) (noting “[g]enerally 

the legal tasks and subtasks were performed extremely well [during a cordon and search operation]. During 

one operation, an MP team followed the search teams to document all seized items. In addition to 

documenting serial numbers and descriptions of seized items, the team videotaped the search and was able 

to trace seized items back to detained persons.”) This training is in stark contrast to the finding of COL 

Morgan in his investigation into the activities of 3-504 PIR where he noted, “[T]he 3-504 soldiers were not 

adequately trained for the police mission that they were asked to execute.” EXSUM, supra note 44, at 8. 49 For example, the soldiers used U.S. Dep’t of Army, DA Form 2665-R, Capture Card for Prisoner of War 

(LRA) (May 1982) to account for detainees. A copy of DA Form 2665-R is included in Appendix IV-11. 

The soldiers used U.S. Dep’t of Army, DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (July 1976) 

to account for evidence seized during operations. 

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enforcement role of MNB(E) was scaled back. Instructions to the Task 

Force were simply to secure crime scenes and contact UNMIK-P.50 

2. Soldiers must have an arrest standard they can 

understand. 

While KFOR recognized that the powers of arrest and detention were 

generally to conform to the FRY standards,51 the leadership also understood 

that KFOR was incapable of replicating the FRY legal infrastructure and 

criminal procedures for law and order. Copies of the FRY and Serbian legal 

codes were not available in English, and even if they had been, the task to 

replicate the civil-law based system of FRY would have been impossible to 

complete.52 As a result, KFOR determined that internationally respected 

standards of law enforcement and detention, as found in the TCNs’ own 

relevant procedures, would provide adequate due process protections to the 

citizens of Kosovo.53 

Based on the KFOR guidance, Task Force Falcon instructed U.S. 

soldiers and Marines to detain persons who committed criminal misconduct 

under a familiar standard, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 

This was the standard to be applied during each of the 1,300 patrols that U.S. 

soldiers conducted per week in Kosovo. If soldiers or Marines witnessed an 

act that would be a crime under the UCMJ, they arrested the wrongdoer. 

50 See Kelly Memo 2, supra note 41, ¶ 7(a). 51 Because the deployment of forces into Kosovo, a province of the sovereign Federal Republic of 

Yugoslavia, was technically permissive, the body of international law applicable in wartime did not apply. 

Under prevailing peacetime international law, the law of a sovereign nation applies within its sovereign 

territory. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 206 cmt. b 

(1986). Although the KFOR mandate was not that of an occupier, had it been, the law of occupation also 

required the penal laws and tribunals of Kosovo to remain in force. See Geneva Convention Relative to the 

Protection of Civilians in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 64, 6 U.S.T. 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. 290 U.S. The 

U.N. Secretary General reinforced this by stating, “UNMIK will respect the laws of the Federal Republic of
 

Yugoslavia and of the Republic of Serbia insofar as they do not conflict with the internationally recognized
 

human rights standards or with regulations issued by the Special Representative in the fulfillment of the 

mandate given to the United Nations by the Security Council.” UNMIK Report, supra note 10, ¶ 36. The 

SRSG reinforced this standard with the promulgation of the first regulation. U.N. MISSION IN KOSOVO, 

REG. 1999/1, ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION IN KOSOVO § 3 (23 July 1999)
 

[hereinafter UNMIK Reg. 99/1] (establishing the applicable law as that in force in the territory of Kosovo
 

on 24 March 1999). This regulation was subsequently modified by U.N. MISSION IN KOSOVO, REG. 

1999/24, ON THE APPLICABLE LAW IN KOSOVO § 1 (12 Dec. 1999) [hereinafter UNMIK Reg. 99/24]
 

(mandating the applicable law in Kosovo as that which was in force on 22 March 1989). 

52 Copies of the FRY Code were not available, even in its native language, during the entire MEU 

deployment, from June to July 1999, to Kosovo. See MEU AAR, supra note 6. 53 The KFOR law and order mission is fully documented in Annex Z to KFOR OPLAN 60507, Guidance 

on Law and Order in Kosovo, 10 June 1999 (classified NATO document) (on file with CLAMO). 

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COMKFOR and the SRSG augmented crimes under the military code with 

mission-specific unauthorized acts, such as weapons, uniform, and curfew 

violations.54 Soldiers were also authorized to detain local citizens who were 

considered a threat to the military or to the overall mission.55 

3. Prepare to operate a detention facility. 

Prior to the deployment, Task Force Falcon pressed KFOR to take 

advantage of a centrally located and established Kosovo prison for use as a 

multinational KFOR detention facility. In a detailed memorandum drafted 

by JAs, the Commander, Task Force Falcon, recommended that COMKFOR 

“consider planning for and resourcing a multinational detention facility in 

the vicinity of Pristina for the first 60 to 90 days that KFOR [was] on the 

ground in Kosovo.”56 Despite the Task Force Falcon recommendation, 

KFOR did not address detention issues until after the signing of the MTA. 

After the signing of the MTA, planners in Task Force Falcon 

continued to believe that a centrally run detention operation was in the best 

interest of the KFOR mission. The planners believed that a coalition 

detention facility would provide economies of scale that would free security 

assets for other missions. Additionally, the planners believed that one 

centrally run facility would be easier for UNMIK to take over once a 

sufficient number of officers were available.57 In response, Task Force 

54 See Detention Policy, supra note 44, ¶¶ 2(c)(3) (weapons violations), 2(c)(4) (UCK uniform violation), 

2(c)(7) (establishing an unauthorized checkpoint), 2(d)(1) (curfew violations); see also Undertaking, supra 

note 15, ¶¶ 22-23 (detailing the demilitarization of the UCK); MTA, supra note 3, at art. II (explaining the 

cessation of hostilities and phased withdrawal of FRY forces), app. B, ¶ 5 (authorizing KFOR to compel 

removal, withdrawal, or relocation of weapons). 

55 Detention Policy, supra note 44, ¶ 2(a)(1); see also U.N. MISSION IN KOSOVO, REG. 1999/2, ON THE 

PREVENTION OF ACCESS BY INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR REMOVAL TO SECURE PUBLIC PEACE AND ORDER § 2 

(12 Aug. 1999) [hereinafter UNMIK Reg. 99/2] (explaining right to detain civilians posing a threat to 

public peace and order); MTA, supra note 3, at app. B, ¶ 5 (allowing use of force to prevent acts that are 

considered a threat to KFOR or the KFOR mission); U.N. MISSION IN KOSOVO, REG. 2000/62, ON THE 

EXCLUSION OF PERSONS FOR A LIMITED DURATION TO SECURE PUBLIC PEACE, SAFETY AND ORDER § 2.1 

(30 Nov. 2000) [hereinafter UNMIK REG. 00/62] (allowing authorities to issue an exclusion order requiring 

a person to leave and/or stay away from any area under their authority if there are grounds to suspect that 

such a person is or has been involved in the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of violence 

which may affect public peace and order within or beyond the territory of Kosovo).

56 Letter from BG Bantz Craddock, Commander, Task Force Falcon, to LTG Michael Jackson, United 

Kingdom, Commander, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (25 Mar. 1999), summarized in e-mail from LTC 

Mark Martins, former Legal Advisor, Task Force Falcon, to CPT Alton L. Gwaltney, III, CLAMO (11 Jan. 

2001) [hereinafter Craddock Letter] (on file with CLAMO). 

57 See E-mail from Legal Advisor, Task Force Falcon, to Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. European Command, 

¶ 3 (12 July 1999) (“Compared notes today with Lt Col Redden, 5th UK (Abn) Bde Legal Advisor and his 

PM on detention and related issues. He is keen, as are we, to turn the jailing and detention process over to 

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Falcon drafted a complete plan for a centralized detention facility for 

KFOR.58 As with policing and pretrial detention review, however, KFOR 

made detention facilities a decentralized issue, to be handled by the TCNs.59 

In addition to the detention facility lessons discussed below, operating 

a detention facility will lead to a host of issues. Some of these issues are 

listed for consideration. 

• Care for detainees with medical conditions (including pregnancy) 

• Care for detainees with mental conditions 

• Handling juvenile detention 

• Force-feeding hunger-striking detainees 

• Detainee escape, recapture, and misconduct 

• Press interviews with detainees 

• Access to detainees by family, local medical personnel, and local 

court personnel 

• Religious accommodation 

• Detainee labor 

• Use of force within the detention facility60 

4. Review conditions of the detention facility . 

JAs regularly reviewed the detention facility to ensure detainees were 

being treated properly. The condition of the detainees was also reviewed by 

the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the OSCE, the United 

Nation’s Children’s Fund, Amnesty International, and other human rights 

organizations. JAs typically accompanied the representatives from these 

UNMIK. We have to try to use one of the hardened jails in the Pristina area and set up the provisional 

judges nearby in an office.”) (on file with CLAMO). 58 Task Force Falcon, Draft Detention Facility Plan (13 June 1999) (on file with CLAMO). 59 After two years, KFOR opened a detention facility to address TCNs’ concerns about “operational 

detainees.” See UNMIK-KFOR-UNMIK Police Press-UNHCR Briefing, 21 May 2001, Temporary 

Detention Center at 

http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/ab71c0105274f97b85256a560 

048290f?OpenDocument (last visited 24 Sept. 2001). Operational detainees are discussed infra text 

accompanying notes 76-85. 

60 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-19.40, MILITARY POLICE 

INTERNMENT/RESETTLEMENT OPERATIONS, app. B (1 Aug. 2001) (containing rules for the use of force for 

Military Police in operating internment camps, including camps for EPWs). 

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organizations during the visits. Organizations generally gave the Task Force 

high marks for the care provided detainees.61 

5. Judge Advocates should be familiar with detention 

facility doctrine. 

The first detainee, taken four days into the Task Force Falcon mission, 

was housed initially in a small military tent surrounded by concertina wire. 

A HMMWV’s headlights provided security lighting. The Task Force, 

required to care for the detainee at a level no less than that accorded a 

Prisoner of War, pieced together personal use articles, such as a razor, 

shaving cream, and a toothbrush, for the detainee.62 The detainee was fed 

MREs and was dressed in a PT uniform, spray-painted with a mark on the 

back of his shirt to distinguish him from soldiers in PT uniforms. 

From this Spartan beginning, Task Force engineers constructed a 

detention facility based on existing doctrine.63 Operating on the belief that 

UNMIK would quickly take over detention operations, the initial detention 

facility was small, holding approximately fifty detainees. Upon the 

realization of the Task Force that UNMIK would not be able to assume the 

detention mission, a larger detention facility was constructed. When 

completed, this facility consisted of six, tier-three, GP medium tents, three 

GP small tents, a shower facility, visitation area, and court tent. A fence, 

concertina wire, and lights surrounded the entire compound. A diagram of 

the detention facility is included in Appendix IV-12. 

61 This does not mean that the detention operation did not have occasional critics. OSCE criticized the use 

of the “COMKFOR hold” to detain suspected criminals ordered released by the judiciary. See OSCE, 

Kosovo, A Review of the Criminal Justice System, 1 February 2000 – 31 July 2000, 25 (2000) [hereinafter 

OSCE 2000] available at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/criminal_justice.pdf (last 

visited 16 Sept. 2001). OSCE also criticized the detention of juveniles by US KFOR on suspicions that 

they were members of an EAAG. See OSCE 2001, supra note 42, at 29. The International Committee of 

the Red Cross and Amnesty International criticized aspects of the facility (such as detainee exercise and 

bathing opportunities) at various times. Task Force Falcon considered and addressed the complaints. 

Telephone Interview with COL John Phelps, Legal Advisor, Allied Forces South (2 Oct. 2001). 62 See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 

3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standardization Agreement 2044, Standard 

Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War (6 Mar. 1957). 

63 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 19-40, ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, CIVILIAN INTERNEES, AND 

DETAINED PERSONS (27 Feb. 1976) [hereinafter FM 19-40]; see also U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 

19-4, MILITARY POLICE BATTLEFIELD CIRCULATION CONTROL, AREA SECURITY AND ENEMY PRISONERS OF 

WAR OPERATIONS (7 May 1993). 

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An MP platoon operated the detention facility based on modified 

existing MP doctrine.64 As detainees were brought into the facility, the MPs 

entered information into a detainee database, to include the circumstances 

surrounding detention, basic background information, a photograph, and a 

listing of personal items confiscated from the detainee. MP and CID 

investigators, as well as counterintelligence personnel, were able to 

interview the detainees upon their arrival at the detention facility. 

The ethnic background and sex of the detainees dictated tent 

assignments. Detainees slept on cots with sleeping bags. They were dressed 

in orange uniforms and athletic shoes. In the winter, the detainees received 

winter coats and boots. All detainee support came from the Army’s logistics 

system. Detainees could smoke, write letters, and exercise, as well as 

receive visits from family members and attorneys. Doctors examined 

detainees upon entry, and the detention facility was capable of dispensing 

medication and providing any necessary medical attention. 

The detention facility at Camp Bondsteel processed approximately 

1,800 detainees during the first year of operation. During the second year, 

the detention facility processed an additional 810. The largest population in 

the detention facility, at any one time during the first two years, was 

approximately 120 detainees. 

6. Protect detainees’ rights through a review process . 

When patrols arrested local citizens for committing criminal offenses, 

the patrols delivered initial criminal packets and evidence, along with the 

detainees, to the U.S. detention facility at Camp Bondsteel. Guidance from 

COMKFOR concerning “continued pre-trial detention” enabled Task Force 

Falcon to apply standards similar to those found in the UCMJ.65 At Camp 

64 See Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. Swengros, Military Police Functions in Kosovo, MIL. POLICE BULL., 

May 2000, at 8. 

65 See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 305(h)(2)(B) (2000) [hereinafter MCM].
 

These standards were similar to those used in detention hearings in Haiti. See HAITI, supra note 35, at 68

69. The standards also had a basis in the Criminal Code of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. See XV 

Criminal Code of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia § 191(2) [hereinafter KZSRJ] (allows for continued 

pretrial detention if the following circumstances surround the grounds for custody: 

1. If [the detainee] conceals himself or if his identity cannot be established or if other 

circumstances obtain which suggest the strong possibility of flight; 

2. If there is a warranted fear that [the detainee] will destroy the clues to the crime or if 

particular circumstances indicate that he will hinder the inquiry by influencing witnesses, 

fellow defendants or accessories after the fact; 

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Bondsteel, a Task Force Falcon lawyer, called a “magistrate,” reviewed each 

detainee’s case within forty-eight hours. The magistrate would then 

recommend whether continued pretrial detention was warranted and ensure 

that the case file contained sufficient information to pass the cases to the 

civil prosecution system, once the system was established.66 

In considering whether further pretrial detention was warranted, the 

magistrate would review the case file to determine whether: 

1. An offense had been committed that would be triable by courtmartial if it had been committed by a person subject to the UCMJ or if 

a mission-specific crime had been committed; 

2. The person detained committed the offense; and, 

3. Continued detention was required by the circumstances. 

To determine whether detention was “required by the circumstances,” 

the magistrate would first have to determine whether: 

1. The individual was armed and if release would threaten civic order; 

2. The individual posed a threat to KFOR, other protected persons, 

key facilities, or property designated mission-essential by COMKFOR; 

3. The individual had committed serious criminal acts (defined as 

homicide, aggravated assault, rape, arson, robbery, burglary, or 

larceny); or 

3. If particular circumstances justify a fear that the crime will be repeated or an 

attempted crime will be completed or a threatened crime will be committed;
 

4. If the crime is one for which a prison sentence of 10 years or more severe penalty may 

be pronounced under the law and if, because of the manner of execution, consequences or 

other circumstances of the crime, there has been or might be such disturbance of the 

citizenry that the ordering of custody is [urgently] necessary on behalf of the unhindered 

conduct of criminal proceedings or human safety). 

A copy of the detention operation SOP published by the KFOR 1B rotation in May 2000 is included in 

Appendix IV-13. 

66 See MCM, supra note 65, R.C.M. 305(h)(2)(A) (1998); cf. Riverside County v. McGlaughlin, 500 U.S.
 

44 (1991) (imposing a review within forty-eight hours of pretrial confinement); XV KZSRJ 192, 197, supra
 

note 65 (requiring a review within twenty-four hours of pretrial confinement). 

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4. The individual had valuable information pertaining to individuals 

not yet detained to whom one or more of the above three stated 

grounds applied.67 

The magistrate would also consider whether the detainee posed a risk 

to flee Kosovo to escape prosecution and whether the detainee would 

attempt to intimidate witnesses or obstruct justice. 

Before and during the hearing, another JA collected information and 

articulated the detainee’s argument against further detention. This JA, the 

“Command Representative for the Detainee,” would assist the detainee in 

rebutting the command’s grounds for continued detention. The JA did not 

form an attorney-client relationship, but served to ensure that the detainees 

understood the process and articulated the best case for release. The 

detainee was also given the opportunity to address the magistrate through an 

interpreter and to explain why continued detention was not warranted. 

If the magistrate believed that continued detention was warranted, he 

would recommend that the Task Force Falcon Commander order continued 

detention.68 If the magistrate believed the standards for continued detention 

had not been met, he recommended that the Task Force Commander order 

release. The Task Force Falcon Commander personally reviewed all 

continued detention hearing recommendations during the first month of the 

mission. 

After one month, UNMIK established an Emergency Judicial System 

(EJS) to review pre-trial confinement. As the EJS became established, the 

Task Force pretrial confinement procedures experienced subtle changes. 

While continuing to protect the rights of detainees, the changes recognized 

67 The entire process was stated in an SOP. See Task Force Falcon Legal Advisor, MNB-E Detention 

Process SOP, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate 3 (n.d.). The fourth provision for determining whether 

pretrial detention was required under the circumstances is a great expansion of MCM, supra note 65, 

R.C.M. 305. The fourth provision does have some basis in U.S. federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000) 

(allowing for arrest of material witness); United States v. Guadian-Salazar, 824 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1987) 

(discussing the relationship between 18 U.S.C. § 3144, which authorizes the arrest of material witnesses 

and 18 U.S.C. § 3142, which provides conditions for release of persons detained); In re Class Application 

ex rel. Material Witnesses, 612 F. Supp. 940 (W.D. Tex. 1985) (discussing the competing constitutional 

interests of the material witnesses and the government). 

68 A copy of a magistrates’ review memo is included in Appendix IV-14. The generic nature of the 

magistrate review memo was a product of necessity; however, as pointed out by JAs reviewing files six to 

twelve months after the magistrate review, the generic nature did not provide clear guidance into the 

rationale for continued detention or the basic circumstances surrounding arrests. See Berger Memo, supra 

note 34, ¶ g. For continuity, a more detailed review that is factually specific may provide a better product. 

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that local systems were coming into place that served to protect detainees’ 

rights. The magistrate tasked with reviewing continued detention began 

conducting the initial hearings entirely on paper, because detainees would 

receive a hearing in front of a Kosovar Investigating Magistrate if the 

military magistrate considered further detention warranted.69 The 

Commander’s Representative for the Detainee was no longer necessary, as 

detainees had access to civilian defense attorneys. The Task Force 

Commander delegated his continued detention authority to the Chief of Staff 

and the Provost Marshal, depending upon the severity of the charges; 

however, the Commander maintained review authority over detainees 

suspected of war crimes and acts aimed at KFOR soldiers.70 When it 

became apparent that criminal trials were not going to be conducted until 

some time in the significant future, detainees suspected of minor crimes 

could be ordered released prior to the magistrate conducting a review of the 

detainee’s case.71 

69 A copy of a magistrates’ review conducted after the establishment of the Emergency Judicial System is 

included in Appendix IV-15. 

70 Initially, the basic criminal charges were broken into four categories. Category I crimes were hostile acts 

or threats toward KFOR and war crimes. Category II crimes were murder, rape, kidnapping, arson, 

aggravated assault, any crime involving a suspect that had been previously detained by KFOR, and any 

crime in which a weapon was used in the commission of the crime. Category III crimes were 

burglary/housebreaking, larceny/looting, weapons violations, UCK uniform violations, driving under the 

influence of alcohol or drugs, prostitution, establishing an unauthorized checkpoint, destruction of property, 

black-marketing, simple assault, harassment, use or possession of illegal drugs, possession of stolen 

property, and auto theft/carjacking. Category IV crimes were curfew violations and drunk and disorderly 

conduct. See Detention Policy, supra note 44, ¶ 2. The appropriate level for determining the release of 

detainees remains an area of debate. First identified in HAITI, supra note 35, at 71, the problems of access 

to the task force commander during operations weighs in favor of delegating all release authority to a lower 

level. The sensitivity of the decision to release or hold a detainee, understandably, has the task force 

commander’s attention. As poignantly stated in HAITI, “Discomfort of commanders to delegate release 

authority may persist until the development of a comprehensive set of guidelines for establishing and 

operating a detention facility during operations other than war.” Id. 71 On-scene commanders had the authority to order the release of Category IV detainees to prevent 

transporting the detainee to Camp Bondsteel. Detention Policy, supra note 44, ¶ 3. This standard was 

changed to the Company Commander after approximately one year of operations. See Policy Letter 4, 

Commanding General, Task Force Falcon, subject: Detention Policy (24 July 2000) [hereinafter Detention 

Policy 2] (This detention policy substantially changed the detention procedures, recognizing that UNMIK-P 

had policing authority and removing JA review, relying instead solely on the Kosovo courts, and defining 

misconduct as either “unlawful” or “unauthorized.” Unlawful conduct was criminal behavior defined by 

the laws of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Serbia, the province of Kosovo, or 

UNMIK regulation. These acts could be prosecuted in criminal court. Unauthorized conduct was defined 

by the MTA (threats to a safe and secure environment), the Undertaking (prohibited weapons), and KFOR 

directives (counter-barricades). Commanders and soldiers were authorized to enforce these rules, but 

Kosovar courts would not prosecute the misconduct unless there was an underlying criminal act. A copy of 

the Detention Policy 2, supra, is included in Appendix IV-16.). The Provost Marshal initially had the 

authority to release Category III or IV detainees prior to the case being sent to the military magistrate. See 

Detention Policy, supra note 44, ¶ 3. After the first year, the Provost Marshal no longer had the authority 

to order release. See Detention Policy 2, supra. 

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The EJS had to deliver all release orders to the U.S. magistrate for 

action. The magistrate reviewed all cases in which the EJS ordered release 

and made recommendations to the appropriate Task Force Falcon release 

authority. The U.S. military release authorities for EJS-ordered releases 

were the same authorities designated to review magistrate recommendations 

for release after initial detention hearings. In effect, once a detainee entered 

the Camp Bondsteel detention facility, Task Force approval was required for 

release.72 In order to track the status of a detainee, both the detention facility 

and the magistrate maintained reports. The magistrate’s report included the 

detainee’s name and ethnicity, alleged offenses, the date detained, the date 

of the Kosovar Investigating Magistrate review, whether the detainee was 

indicted, whether the detainee was ordered to continued detention, and the 

date of the next hearing. A copy of a magistrate’s report is included in 

Appendix IV-14. 

In February 2000, UNMIK appointed a permanent judiciary for 

Kosovo. For the first months of permanent judicial operations, the review 

process by the Task Force did not change. As the Rule of Law systems 

matured over the next seven months, the Task Force began to transfer some 

of the responsibilities to the appropriate UNMIK organizations. Soldiers 

handed detainees over to UNMIK-P, which was running detention facilities 

in Gnjilane, Prizren, and Pristina. After soldiers turned detainees over to 

UNMIK-P, the Task Force did not conduct an independent review of the 

detainee’s case and criminal detainees were processed entirely within the 

Kosovo judicial system. 

After the first year, JAs remained active in the civilian detention 

system by reviewing the cases of detainees remaining in the Camp Bondsteel 

detention facility and by attending high-profile trials in the local courts; 

however, JAs no longer conducted any pretrial detention reviews. By late 

October 2000, it looked as though the Task Force Falcon detention mission 

was nearing completion. 

72 A diagram of the initial Task Force Falcon release procedure is included in Appendix IV-17. CPT Alton 

L. Gwaltney, III, Multinational Brigade East Pre-trial Detention Process, PowerPoint presentation, briefing 

slide 2 (Jan. 2000). This procedure was applicable for the first year of Task Force operations. A diagram 

of the subsequent detention procedure is included in Appendix IV-18. Task Force Falcon Legal Section, 

Detention—General, PowerPoint presentation, briefing slide 1 (July 2000) (on file with CLAMO). 

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 As the criminal detention mission waned,73 a new detention mission 

based on operational necessity began to receive significant Task Force 

attention. As discussed further below, “operational detainees” were a subset 

of individuals who threatened the force and the safe and secure environment 

in Kosovo that KFOR was responsible for maintaining. 

7. Units must be prepared to detain individuals believed to 

be a threat to the force. 

In early planning for the Kosovo mission, members of the Task Force 

legal team recognized the need to be able to hold individuals who were 

threats to KFOR outside of whatever existing Kosovo legal system that was 

in place.74 As the EJS took root, this issue presented itself when the Task 

Force Commander did not believe a detainee should be released prior to trial 

even though the EJS had so ordered. 

To address this situation, JAs at the Task Force drafted petitions from 

the Task Force Falcon Commander to the KFOR Commander requesting 

that the KFOR Commander order the detainees held until trial. This 

procedure, developed by Task Force Falcon JAs, became known as the 

“COMKFOR hold.” KFOR determined that UNSCR 1244 and the MTA 

contained the authority to continue to hold detainees ordered released by a 

Kosovar magistrate.75 

73 Planning began in late Fall 2000 to have all criminal detainees out of the Camp Bondsteel detention 

facility and into the Kosovo detention facilities by June 2001. See Letter from Commanding General, 

Multinational Brigade (East), to Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (1 Nov. 2000) (on file 

with CLAMO). By March 2001, all criminal detainees were transferred out of the Camp Bondsteel 

Detention facility. After March 2001, the Task Force held criminal detainees only at the request of 

COMKFOR. See Celtnieks AAR, supra note 43, ¶ 1. 74 See Craddock Letter, supra note 56. 75 See Memorandum, KFOR Legal Advisor to COMKFOR, subject: COMKFOR’s Authority to Overrule 

Judicial Release Order (30 July 1999) [hereinafter KFOR LEGAD MEMO] (on file with CLAMO). The 

KFOR legal advisor explicitly recognized that the law of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as adopted by 

the SRSG in UNMIK Reg. 99/1, was the applicable law in Kosovo. However, UNMIK Reg. 99/1 “did not 

limit KFOR’s authority granted under the MTA or the UNSCR.” This authority included the ability to take 

“all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment,” MTA, supra note 3, at art. 1, ¶ 2; 

“take such actions as are required including the use of necessary force to ensure protection of [KFOR] . . . . 

Id. ¶ 4; and “do all that [the commander] judges necessary and proper, including the use of military force, 

to protect KFOR” Id. at app. B. The first case sent to COMKFOR for review involved two Serbian males 

who initiated a firefight with U.S. Marines. The Serbs continued the attack until they were seriously 

wounded (with another accomplice being killed). The investigating judge ordered the detainees released 

pending trial. See KFOR LEGAD MEMO, supra. 

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Within the request to COMKFOR was the factual background of the 

case, the procedural background, and a justification for why the detainee 

should not be released. The reasons for continued detention varied from the 

fact that a detainee had attacked a soldier to claims that the detainee was 

ordered released based on his ethnic background. 

In late summer 2000, Task Force Falcon stopped conducting 

independent reviews of detainee cases and began relying solely on the 

Kosovo judicial system for release action. At the same time, action by 

insurgent Albanian groups began to increase along the southern border of 

MNB(E). 

The need to hold persons declared a threat to the force or the mission 

presented itself again upon the emergence of various Ethnic Armed 

Albanian Groups (EAAG), the generic name given to all insurgency groups 

operating in the GSZ and Kosovo. The security situation in Kosovo grew 

tense in late 2000 with the activities in the Presevo valley of one EAAG 

known by the initials of its Albanian name UCPMB, Ushtria clirimtare e 

Presheves, Medvegjes dhe Bujanovcit, which translates into English as the 

Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedjav, and Bujanovac.76 The UCPMB 

was involved in violence, military training, and arms smuggling in the GSZ. 

Some of the violence was directed at MNB(E) soldiers. To prevent Kosovo 

being used as a staging ground or sanctuary for EAAG, MNB(E) conducted 

operations to interdict and obstruct EAAG activities in and near the GSZ. 

The Task Force operations resulted in the extrajudicial detention of persons 

suspected of being EAAG members involved in violence, training, or 

smuggling.77 

Again faced with the need to provide procedural protections, this time 

for detainees held under suspicion of EAAG involvement, the Task Force 

legal section created a system to review continued “operational detention.”78 

The problem was that evidence rarely existed of EAAG members 

committing crimes in Kosovo. The violence and crimes were occurring in 

Serbia. Mindful of international detention norms, KFOR and MNB(E) used 

76 The UCPMB wanted to join the southwesternmost tip of Serbia to Kosovo. Ethnic Albanians make up
 

the majority of the population in three municipalities known as the Presevo valley, part of Serbia proper. 

See Jane’s Intelligence Review, KFOR Contains Conflict in Presevo, Zoran Kusovac, 8 Jan. 2001 at
 

http://www.janes.com/regional_news/europe/news/jir/jir010108_1_n.shtml (last visited on 5 Aug. 2001). 77 UNMIK Report, supra note 10, at 3-4. 78 These detainees may or may not have committed a crime in Kosovo. See Celtnieks AAR, supra note 43, 

¶ 3. 

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UNSCR 1244 as authority for operational detention.79 They also drew on 

UNMIK Regulation 2000/6280 and certain Kosovo judicial standards as the 

foundation for the system. SACEUR granted COMKFOR the authority to 

order detention outside the criminal justice system.81 COMKFOR retained 

long-term detention authority. 

The procedures established for continued operational detention 

required review by an informal board—including a JA, the Provost Marshal, 

and an intelligence officer. The board reviewed the facts and circumstances 

of every operational detention and made specific findings, based on a 

preponderance of the evidence, on three specific questions: 

1. What is the degree of an individual’s association with other 

known EAAG members? 

2. Does the individual pose a real and significant threat to 

KFOR’s mission? 

3. What are the relevant tactical and operational threats the 

individual poses? 

Detainees were informed verbally that they were suspected of being 

an EAAG member involved in the violence. Although there was no formal 

hearing and the detainee had no right to counsel, detainees could present 

matters as to why continued detention was not warranted. The board used 

all available evidence in making its findings, including intelligence 

information and statements made or presented by the detainee.82 

The board was also tasked with making recommendations about the 

duration of continued detention.83 Following an initial review within 

seventy-two hours of detention, the Task Force reviewed all cases every 

thirty days to determine whether detainees should continue to be held.84 The 

79 See Task Force Falcon Legal Section, MNB-E Detention Board Process SOP, 2 (n.d.) [hereinafter
 

Detention Board] (on file with CLAMO). 

80 UNMIK REG. 00/62, supra note 55 (extending UNMIK’s authority to address acts committed beyond the 

territory of Kosovo that threatened the safe and secure environment of citizens in Kosovo). 81 See FRAGO 997, 241615 MAR 01, KFOR, subject: Operation Consistent Effort (classified NATO 

document) (on file with CLAMO). 

82 The use of intelligence information poses potential problems. Some intelligence information is 

designated “U.S. only,” and thus cannot be shared with allies within the coalition. 83 Detention Board, supra note 79, at 5. 84 Celtnieks AAR, supra note 43, ¶ 4. 

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cases of suspected EAAG members, who also were suspected of committing 

a criminal act in Kosovo, were transferred into the Kosovo criminal system 

for action. Recommendations of the board for suspected EAAG members 

who had not committed a criminal act were sent to the Task Force 

Commander for action. If the Commander believed continued detention was 

warranted, he forwarded a request for detention to COMKFOR. 

If a detainee was determined not to be a threat on initial review or if a 

detainee was determined no longer to be a threat on subsequent review, the 

Task Force released him. If necessary, the Task Force Commander would 

issue an exclusion order under UNMIK Regulation 2000/62, ordering the 

detainee away from the GSZ. The Task Force transported the detainee to a 

place of his choosing, normally either his residence in Kosovo or the 

Kosovo/Serbia boundary, if he resided in Serbia. Minors were released to 

their parents, if the parents were available. 

The welfare of detainees was monitored by various outside agencies, 

including the local courts, OSCE, ICRC, and UNICEF. The Task Force had 

an “open door policy” for monitoring agencies. Any international 

organization that wanted to tour the Bondsteel detention facility was allowed 

to do so. This policy helped clarify rumors of detainee mistreatment and 

mollify critics of the operational detention program.85 

8. Independent evidence must be developed in addition to 

information gathered for intelligence purposes. 

Intelligence operations often provided information of criminal 

activities by Kosovars. The nature of some of the intelligence required that 

the information contain a security classification. The Task Force could not 

turn classified intelligence information over to prosecutors or allow the 

information to be introduced in court. While the Task Force developed 

excellent intelligence related to several crimes, the inability to develop 

independent evidence hampered prosecution and strained the relationship 

between the International Prosecutor and the JAs.86 

85 Id. ¶ 5. 86 Memorandum, MAJ Daniel W. Kelly, former Legal Advisor, Task Force Falcon, to CLAMO, subject:
 

Comments on CLAMO Kosovo Lessons Learned ¶ 6 (12 Sept. 2001) [hereinafter Kelly Memo 3] (on file
 

with CLAMO); Celtnieks AAR, supra note 43, ¶ 8 (commenting that the international prosecutor wanted
 

carte blanche to review intelligence). 

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9. The criminal justice system can be manipulated by 

citizens to further ethnic bias. 

Competing ethnic groups may be able and willing to use the judicial 

process as a weapon for ethnic intimidation. Ethnic minorities can be 

subject to continued pretrial detention, exorbitant fines, or lengthy jail 

sentences while members of the ethnic majority can act with impunity, 

hiding behind court protection. Reviews of the OSCE quarterly reports of 

the Kosovo judicial system provide numerous examples of ethnic bias within 

the Kosovo courts.87 JAs must be prepared to monitor decisions and 

sentences made by fledgling courts. JAs who perceive judicial bias should 

confront judges and consider options to combat perceived judicial 

misconduct. Task Force Falcon JAs monitoring court actions were able to 

forcefully argue that COMKFOR should be allowed to continue to exercise 

extrajudicial detention authority in countering opinions by NATO and the 

KFOR legal advisor that court action should be final.88 

b. Support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 

Yugoslavia 

Within two weeks of entering Kosovo, Task Force Falcon discovered 

the first major war crime scene in MNB(E). Though much smaller in terms 

of body count than sites in the German and Italian areas, the level of atrocity 

and tragedy involved captured the imagination of the media,89 and the 

87 See OSCE, Development of the Kosovo Judicial System (10 June through 15 December 1999) (1999) at 

http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/report2.htm (last visited 16 Sept. 2001); OSCE 

2000, supra note 61; OSCE 2001, supra note 42. 88 Kelly Memo 2, supra note 41, ¶¶ 2, 4. 89 JAs who visited the scene and took photographs saw houses and livestock buildings burned and 

bulldozed. Visible on the ground in one of the former rooms of the house was a pair of garments, with 

bones protruding. Also on the ground, on top of a piece of stove wreckage, were several bones. The story 

of the Vlastica massacre was related to the Task Force and the International Criminal Tribunal for the 

Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) through a thirteen-year-old girl, Vlora Shabani, who survived the incident. She 

stated that on the afternoon of 30 April 1999, she and her family were in and around her house. Many 

families in the town of Vlastica had already left the town. In fact, Nehat Shabani, a cousin in the 

neighboring house, had taken his family and had moved to Slatina to evade Serbs. The family unit living in 

Vlora’s house consisted of five people: Vlora, as well as Rifat Shabani, Vlora’s grandfather, Selami 

Shabani, Vlora’s father, Zjavere Shabani, Vlora’s mother, and Fisnik Shabani, Vlora’s two-year-old 

brother. Vlora’s father was giving something to the cow in the livestock building. Two men came to the 

house. Vlora said that one man was in a uniform, which, by her description, was a Serbian military (VJ) 

uniform. The two men walked past the buildings and into the backyard. They then threatened Selami 

Shabani, Vlora’s father, and told him to go into the house. The two men then went up the street to another 

of the few Vlastica houses in which people continued to live and ordered the inhabitants of those houses 

out into the street and then into Vlora’s house. There were fourteen people moved from the village into 

Vlora’s house. The two men ordered the group into the downstairs room of Vlora’s house. They ordered 

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potential for linkage to higher level criminal wrongdoing interested the 

prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 

(ICTY).90 

Within the first six months, the number of potential war crimes sights 

grew to over 120. Investigators from around the world, including U.S. 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, supported the ICTY mission in 

Kosovo. MNB(E) was initially supported by an investigative and forensic 

team sent by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Task Force Falcon also 

received investigators from Denmark, Switzerland, Austria, and Iceland to 

support the investigative effort. 

1. Expect initial ICTY investigative teams to arrive with no 

support. 

Task Force support to the war crimes investigative teams in MNB(E) 

was modest but constant. It amounted to a dedicated squad, with a 

lieutenant or a senior NCO, several vehicles, a GP medium tent, a generator, 

and a laboratory tent with running water at Camp Bondsteel.91 Even after 

the men to go to the side of the room near the stove and the women to the side of the room near the 

window. Then the man wearing the uniform began shooting the men (mostly firing at their heads at close 

range) with an automatic weapon. After shooting and killing most of the men, he began shooting the 

women. The older man wearing the uniform shot and killed the four members of Vlora’s family as well as 

nine of the fourteen that had come from the other house. The gunman injured at least three others, 

including Vlora. Vlora had been standing behind her mother, who was holding two-year-old Fisnik, when 

her mother and Fisnik were shot. Vlora was holding her left cheek with her left hand, and both were hit by 

a bullet. Vlora and fourteen-year-old Imer Hyseni ran for help. The men had reportedly stated after the 

executions, “Look at your people—they’re all dead.” One of the motives for leaving survivors is that they 

could spread the horror of the event and perhaps keep the areas free of Albanian resettlement. Martins 

Presentation, supra note 26, at notes accompanying briefing slides 30-31. See also David Finkel, UP 

AGAINST THE WALL; For Generations, Serbs and Albanians Coexisted in Kosovo. Then Came the 

Killing. And Now Former Neighbors must Face Not Only Their Separate Scars and Memories, But Also 

Their Hatred, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1999, at Mag., p. W09. 90 The ICTY indictment against Slobodan Milosevic specifically referred to events that took place within 

the area occupied by U.S. forces prior to the start of the peacekeeping mission. See International Criminal 

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Indictment against Slobodan Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola 

Sainovic, Dragoljub Ojdanic, and Vlajko Stojiljkovic available at 

http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ii990524e.htm (last visited 2 Oct. 2001). 91 Veterans of the Bosnia peacekeeping mission may be surprised at the level of support provided to the 

ICTY as the Bosnia mission did not contain such authorization. The NATO OPLAN for Operation Joint 

Guardian required Task Force Falcon to establish liaison and support to the ICTY. As the SJA at EUCOM 

explained, “I think support is mandated—and if relief is sought it would certainly be considered—but not 

sure it would be approved.” See E-mail from MAJ Mark Martins, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, 1ID, to 

MAJ Michael Henry, Legal Advisor, Task Force Falcon (13 Aug. 1999) (quoting in part E-mail from COL 

Faggioli, Staff Judge Advocate, EUCOM, to COL Benson, Staff Judge Advocate, V Corps (23 July 1999)). 

Emphasis on investigating war crimes in Kosovo was significant. The United States provided eighty FBI 

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being provided this support, the ICTY investigative teams often wanted 

additional support beyond the means and capabilities of the Task Force. For 

example, the investigators wanted an engineer company to excavate a well.92 

The JAs assisting the ICTY were aware of an NGO capable of supporting 

the request and were able to link the NGO with the ICTY. 

2. Provide a single point of contact to the ICTY. 

As the ICTY began its work in Kosovo, the investigators would 

request support from any available JA. These ad hoc requests led to 

multiple JAs attempting to assist the ICTY without an overall coordinated 

effort. The JAs quickly realized that one point of contact to collect 

information and coordinate assistance was a better solution. This one JA 

took in the information from the ICTY, coordinated with the G-3 when U.S. 

Army support was allowable, coordinated with the G-5 to provide outside 

support, prepared FRAGOs to assist the G-3 in tasking units as needed, and 

provided information to the staff and throughout the chain of command 

about the ICTY’s progress.93 After the first year, all ICTY coordination 

occurred directly with the G-3. 

3. Devise a system to track and report war crimes locations 

within the Area of Responsibility. 

Information about potential war crimes sites often came from soldiers 

patrolling the cities and towns of Kosovo in reports to the G-3. To track war 

crimes sites as they were reported, JAs developed a database, in conjunction 

with CID, the MPs, and the ICTY. The database helped the ICTY rank 

order the crimes in an effort to prioritize efforts.94 The database also helped 

the JAs track ongoing investigations and provided information to the 

numerous people within the chain of command interested in the ICTY’s 

agents to assist the ICTY, and the U.S. and NATO relied on potential war crimes as one justification for the 

air campaign. See supra Ch. III, note 5. 92 CLAMO, Kosovo After Action Review Conference (12-14 June 2000); Transcript at 400 [hereinafter 

Kosovo AAR] (on file with CLAMO). 

93 In the early stages of the KFOR mission, the investigations by the ICTY were extremely important. The 

investigations were constantly in the news, and the Commander, Task Force Falcon, wanted information 

briefed nightly at the Battle Update Briefing. This information included where bodies were discovered, 

how the people were killed, what the investigation showed, and what type of support the U.S. was 

providing. See id. at 400. 94 The ICTY was not capable of investigating all of the potential war crimes sights. They focused mainly 

on areas supporting the existing indictment against Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosivic. 

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work.95 A copy of the database is included in Appendix IV-21. A copy of 

the ICTY SOP is included in Appendix IV-22. 

c. Rule of Law Contains a Civil Component—“Property 

Repatriation” 

Within the opening days of the operation, the Commander, Task Force 

Falcon, accompanied by 9-10 others, including the legal advisor, was 

returning from Gnjilane toward Camp Bondsteel. As they drove through the 

Serb town of Klokot, they noticed young Kosovar Albania men jumping out 

of windows on the second floor of a Serb home. The men were carrying 

valuables from the home. Kosovar Albania refugees were returning home, 

and looters were becoming a problem because many Serbs had fled 

following KFOR arrival. 

The command group stopped and instructed the Kosovar Albanians to 

drop the loot. The soldiers then noticed, coming down the main road, a 

whole convoy of primitive tractor-pulled carts loaded down with washing 

machines, furniture, satellite dishes, carpets, TV sets, and refrigerators. Old 

men and women were driving these carts, and entire families were on the 

trailers. The soldiers stopped all of these vehicles, which included about 100 

people in total and 10 large truckloads of property, and told the Kosovars, 

through the interpreters, to unload the items into a parking lot. 

A small percentage of these folks were opportunistic criminals who 

had no connection to the property. Many of these people, however, were 

crying and emotionally stating that the property they were carrying belonged 

to them and had been taken by either VJ or MUP or by Serb citizens of 

Klokot. According to the Kosovar Albanians, the Serb homes were gorged 

with stolen property. 

The command group calmed the crowd down and told the crowd that 

the Task Force needed to make sure that people were rightfully carrying 

away the property. The Commander asked them to return the next morning 

with proof of ownership but to go back to their villages for the night. Task 

95 In addition to reporting to the Task Force Commander, JAs had to meet a reporting requirement pursuant 

to Message, 082155 (CET) MAY 99, USCINCEUR, subject: War Crime Reporting in Kosovo and the 

Surrounding Region (requiring reports of “alleged violations within the jurisdiction of the ICTY committed 

by the VJ/MUP or UCK personnel in or around the territory of the former Yugoslavia.”). This report was 

called a “Paragraph 7” report. A copy of one Paragraph 7 report is included in Appendix IV-20. 

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Force Falcon surrounded the parking lot with concertina wire and guarded 

the property overnight. 

When the command group got back to Camp Bondsteel, the JAs were 

tasked to prepare the FRAGO to hold a personal property claims court the 

next day in the parking lot where the items were left by the Kosovar 

Albanians. The next day, about 100 people showed up at the parking lot. 

Initially, three JAs served as adjudicators, but they quickly trained line 

officers to do the adjudication with some simple forms the JAs drafted and 

had translated.96 The JAs were initially concerned that most of the people 

were not going to be able to prove ownership, but the majority of people 

could.97 

The model of U.S. soldiers serving as adjudicators—impartial but 

authoritative referees—was something that applied across the MNB(E) area 

many times a day. Soldiers were breaking up arguments and stopping 

violence, working out sensible arrangements for the manning of economic 

activities like bottling factories, helping concerned citizens briefly set aside 

hatreds to get the electricity running again or to harvest the wheat from the 

fields. In all of these situations, the KFOR soldier, as a symbol of the rule of 

law, had credibility and authority from the perspective of all sides, and it 

made an enormous difference.98 

3. Despite Operating Under Consent-Based Agreements, Expect No 

SOFA. 

Even though operations in Kosovo were framed under consent-based 

agreements, there was no SOFA between the U.S. and the FRY. Within 

FYROM, where all U.S. forces passed on the way to and from Kosovo, 

SOFA protections were tenuous and constantly tested.99 Commanders want 

to know the status of soldiers serving in a foreign country, especially the 

protections for both soldiers and civilians accompanying the U.S. forces 

when faced with criminal allegations. 

96 A copy of the forms in English, Serb-Croatian, and Albanian is included in Appendix IV-23. 

97 One story of proof of ownership related by the JAs at the scene bears repeating. The first lady to claim 

an item of property walked up and said that a particular stove was hers. The JAs asked her how she knew it 

was hers, and she said that in the grease drip pan area was an x-ray of her son’s tooth. The JAs looked and 

the x-ray was in the pan. See Martins Presentation, supra note 26, at notes accompanying briefing slide 39. 98 Id. at notes accompanying briefing slide 40. 99 For a discussion about SOFA issues in FYROM see supra Ch. III, text accompanying notes 48-54, 162­

175. 

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Despite the MTA’s reference to a “to be negotiated” SOFA, no SOFA 

existed through the first two years of the operation. KFOR and UNMIK, 

through guidance included in a classified declaration, set forth SOFA-like 

provisions for soldiers and civilians performing the KFOR mission in 

Kosovo.100 In August 2000, 14 months after the start of the mission, the 

SRSG promulgated regulatory guidance concerning the status of soldiers.101 

4. Joint Implementation Commission Operations 

Both the MTA and the Undertaking refer to a Joint Implementation 

Commission (JIC), an organization designed to ensure compliance with 

various security agreements, investigate actual or threatened breaches of the 

agreements, and undertake tasks in the interest of maintaining the cessation 

of hostilities.102 JICs were organized at KFOR Headquarters and at the 

various MNBs. The JIC typically included one senior officer, one company 

grade officer, and a senior NCO. As needed, other staff sections 

supplemented JIC operations. The JIC closely resembled the Joint Military 

Commission (JMC) used for similar purposes in Bosnia.103 

While important to the overall KFOR mission, JIC operations and 

experiences within Kosovo did not mirror those of the JMC in Bosnia. The 

agreements framing the mission in Kosovo were designed to remove the 

military organizations operating within Kosovo. Thus, a military 

coordination mechanism, such as the one in Bosnia, was unnecessary. The 

JIC facilitated removal of military organizations by operating as the 

commander’s liaison with the Serb Army as it withdrew from Kosovo and 

with the KLA as it demilitarized. Once the KLA demilitarized, the JIC’s 

function shifted to implementing the Statement of Principles by coordinating 

the activities of the KPC. 

The early stages of the JIC operation required significant legal 

support. One JA provided that support on an as-needed basis. Eventually, 

100 Joint Declaration, Commander, KFOR, UN SRSG, Kosovo (17 Aug. 2000) (classified NATO 

document). 

101 See U.N. MISSION IN KOSOVO, REG. 2000/47 ON THE STATUS PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF KFOR 

AND UNMIK AND THEIR PERSONNEL IN KOSOVO (18 Aug. 2000), available at
 

http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg047.html (last visited 5 Oct. 2001). 102 See MTA, supra note 3, at art. IV; Undertaking, supra note 15, ¶¶ 20-21. 103 See BALKANS, supra note 13, at 80-90. 

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one legal NCO was tasked to the JIC full time to assist in the mission. This 

tasking lasted for about the first 180 days of the operation. 

a. Use the JIC Proceedings to Establish Legitimacy. 

When Task Force Falcon conducted a JIC meeting with members of 

the KLA, it was, in the words of one JA, “impressive and awe inspiring.”104 

Prior to the meetings, a maneuver unit would secure the building selected to 

host the event. Explosive Ordnance Disposal units would sweep the 

building for bombs. Soldiers manned checkpoints controlling access to and 

from the meeting area. The meeting had an air of formality and grandeur 

that conveyed messages of Task Force Falcon power and control.105 These 

were important messages in the early days of the Task Force mission. 

b. Review Taskings from Multinational Higher Headquarters for 

Compliance with U.S. Law. 

After KFOR JIC meetings, the five MNBs would often receive 

taskings to implement issues covered during the JIC. JAs working in the JIC 

ensured that these taskings did not run afoul of U.S. law. For example, the 

KFOR JIC, in an effort to support KLA demilitarization, agreed to provide 

clothes, food, and water to members of the KLA. While ultimately Task 

Force Falcon provided limited support for these tasks, fiscal constraints 

prevented Task Force Falcon from adopting the entire mission.106 

Training the KPC provided numerous legal challenges for Task Force 

JAs. Through JIC channels, KFOR tasked subordinate brigades to develop 

training advisory teams to facilitate direct contact between KFOR and the 

KPC.107 The training advisory teams had a large list of tasks, both to ensure 

compliance and to provide assistance to the KPC. Among these tasks were 

the requirements to develop a comprehensive training system on various 

equipment, train the KPC in civil emergency response, and provide basic 

training for KPC recruits.108 

104 Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 377. 105 See id. at 379. 106 See id. at 380. 107 Memorandum, Chief of Staff, KFOR, to Subordinate Brigade Commanders, subject: KFOR Directive to
 

Establish KFOR Training Advisory Teams to the Kosovo Protection Corps (5 Oct. 1999) (on file with 

CLAMO).

108 Id. ¶¶ 10a(5), b(1)(4), (6).
 

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Although the KLA had demilitarized, significant concerns about 

training former KLA members, now new KPC members, in emergency 

response tasks arose because of the appearance of training a “foreign 

military.”109 The suspicions concerning the true KPC motives had to be 

balanced against the desire to engage the former KLA members in 

meaningful work for the good of the KFOR mission. Legal advisors during 

the first rotations encouraged the MNB(E) Commander to adopt a more 

distant approach to the KPC, focusing more on the compliance enforcement 

tasks rather than the training assistance tasks. The JAs supported this 

guidance with reference to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and security 

assistance programs under the FAA which require State Department 

coordination and approval.110 

As the mission in Kosovo matured, the Task Force began small-scale 

assistance in first aid and vehicle maintenance. This assistance was not 

considered foreign assistance training. Instead, it was justified by 

interoperability, safety, and familiarization information exceptions, which 

are not considered security assistance training, and by allowing KPC 

members to view Army training that was conducted for the primary purpose 

of training U.S. soldiers.111 

c. If the JIC is Responsible for Ensuring Compliance with an 

Agreement, Use a Success Matrix to Track Compliance Issues. 

From the start of the Kosovo mission, the Task Force Falcon JIC used 

a “measures of success matrix,” designed by JAs, to convey the Task Force 

109 The training of foreign military forces should occur through the International Military Education and 

Training Program (IMET), 22 U.S.C. §§ 2347-47a-d (2000), Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Programs, 22 

U.S.C. §§ 2761-62 (2000), or other Congressionally authorized program. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2779a 

(2000) (authorizing reciprocal training). Operations and Maintenance funds cannot be used for training 

foreign military forces.

110 Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2431 (2000). The FAA charged the State 

Department with the responsibility of providing guidance for FAA programs. While the military is heavily 

involved in FAA activities, it is always under the lead role of the State Department and using State 

Department (Title 22) funds. Through coordination with a State Department representative operating in 

Pristina, the Task Force legal office learned that the State Department provided funding for some KPC 

activities through UNMIK Headquarters and not directly to the regional level. See E-mail from Larry 

Rossin, Head of Mission, to CPT Alton L. Gwaltney, III, Deputy Legal Advisor, Task Force Falcon (Jan. 

2000) (copy lost). 

111 Minor amounts of interoperability, safety, and familiarization information do not constitute training as 

used in the context of security assistance. See The Honorable Bill Alexander, House of Representatives, B213137, Jan. 30, 1986 (unpublished GAO opinion). See also Memorandum, Command Judge Advocate, 

Task Force Falcon, to 40th Engineer Battalion, subject: Request for Legal Review—KPC Training (31 Jan. 

2001) (on file with CLAMO). 

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Falcon Commander’s guidance and track the KLA’s progress in meeting that 

guidance. During each JIC meeting, the measures of success would be 

discussed. The matrix contained a list of issues and next to each issue on the 

list was a red, yellow, or green bullet to assess the progress of the KLA in 

addressing the issue. Typically, the commander would meet with the KLA 

commanders individually at some time prior to or after the meeting to 

further discuss the issue so as not to embarrass the KLA leader at the JIC. A 

copy of the measures of success matrix is included in Appendix IV-24. 

d. The JIC Can Provide Valuable Assistance to JAs. 

KFOR JIC’s liaison with Serb authorities provided valuable assistance 

in locating witnesses for criminal trials in Kosovo. The KFOR JIC was able 

to orchestrate the return of Serb witnesses, who once resided in Kosovo, for 

trial dates. The MNB(E) JIC also assisted in spreading the task force “rule 

of law” message to the community through established relationships with the 

TMK. General and specific information about pending trials was 

disseminated into the Kosovo community and the TMK through the JIC.112 

5. Brown & Root Operations and Status 

JAs must remain aware of the issues concerning the status of 

contractors providing logistical support.113 To address significant delays and 

holdups on the route to Kosovo, NATO negotiated a transit agreement for a 

bypass around a main border crossing in Blace, between FYROM and 

Kosovo. This agreement allowed NATO vehicles to bypass the long lines at 

the border crossing point and continue into Kosovo without having to stop. 

The transit agreement failed to include Brown & Root Services,114 the 

112 See Kelly Memo 3, supra note 86, ¶ 4. 113 See BALKANS, supra note 13, at 78 (“Whether LOGCAP personnel were covered by the various SOFAs 

remained in doubt for much of the operation.”). The Army policy concerning contractors on the battlefield 

acknowledges that existing SOFAs may not appropriately address LOGCAP personnel. See Memorandum, 

Kenneth J. Oscar, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army, to Distribution List, subject: Policy 

Memorandum—Contractors on the Battlefield (12 Dec. 1997); see also U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD 

MANUAL 100-21, CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD (26 Mar. 2000) [hereinafter FM 100-21]. The 

Army is currently revising FM 100-21. See Memorandum, BG Henry W. Stratman, Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Doctrine, U.S. Army, to Distribution List, subject: Revised Program Directive, FM 3-100.21-X Tactics, 

Techniques and Procedures (TTP) for Contractors on the Battlefield (18 Jan. 2001) (on file with CLAMO). 114 GOV’T. ACCT. OFF., THE ARMY SHOULD DO MORE TO CONTROL CONTRACT COST IN THE BALKANS, 

GAO/NSIAD-00-225 (Sept. 2000). Beginning in 1995, logistical support in the Balkans was provided 

under the existing LOGCAP contract. The LOGCAP contract expired in 1997. Upon expiration, the 

Balkan support requirements were removed from the LOGCAP Statement of Work and placed under a new 

contract, the Balkans Support Contract. The outgoing LOGCAP contractor, Brown & Root Services, was 

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contractor that provided U.S. logistics support, from transiting on the 

bypass. The importance of Brown & Root operations to the U.S. mission is 

not fully understood by our coalition allies.115 JAs must be prepared to 

advise U.S. allies about treatment of contract logistics personnel and to 

argue that these personnel are a crucial extension of the military force. 

Criminal jurisdiction over logistics personnel was also a point of 

concern for the JAs.116 When the civilians providing logistics support 

committed minor criminal misconduct, the contractors were quick to fire the 

suspected employees and remove them from Kosovo. The concern of the 

Task Force was how to handle allegations of serious criminal misconduct. 

Arguably, the civilians were subject to the dysfunctional Kosovo criminal 

system—a position no one wanted to take. At the same time, the thought of 

returning a suspect of a serious crime back to the U.S. with no possibility for 

prosecution, because there was no jurisdiction for U.S. courts, was equally 

unpalatable. The Task Force never faced this difficult determination, and 

the U.S. Congress subsequently passed the Military Extraterritorial 

Jurisdiction Act to fill this jurisdictional gap.117 

6. Interagency Relationships 

The relationships developed between nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs) and the U.S. military during peacekeeping operations can be 

difficult to characterize, and the sheer numbers of NGOs involved in a 

peacekeeping mission can make generalizations impossible. When mission 

success hinges on a particular interim task or operation being handed from 

the military to an international organization (IO) or NGO, it is in the 

military’s best interest to see that those organizations succeed. Often, 

however, merely because the military has undertaken a task, even on an 

interim basis, can prove to be a disincentive for an NGO to commit its 

limited resources to that task. 

awarded a sole-source contract for two years. In May 1999, the Army competitively awarded the Balkans 

Support Contract to Brown & Root Services. Id. at 5-6. 115 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 493. 116 See Kelly Memo 3, supra note 86, ¶ 5. 117 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2000). See also Captain Glenn R. Schmitt, The Military Extraterritorial
 

Jurisdiction Act: The Continuing Problem of Criminal Jurisdiction over Civilians Accompanying the 

Armed Forces Abroad—Problem Solved?, ARMY LAW., Dec. 2000, at 1.
 

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a. Expect NGOs to Criticize Decisions. 

An NGO may bring an agenda to a peacekeeping mission that is not 

always in concert with other NGOs or the military’s stated mission. Some 

NGOs may be quick to claim as a success a program designed, implemented, 

and run by the military; other NGOs may just as quickly pass failures off to 

the military. NGOs are constantly looking for information about ongoing 

operations. Unfortunately, this information is often used to criticize the 

military’s actions.118 Because of this, JAs must ensure that the Task Force 

makes decisions that are principled and well-grounded in U.S. law and 

policy, international law, and the legal framework of the mission. Once 

these decisions are made, the U.S. military can robustly defend the decisions 

and procedures. JAs dealing with these issues in Kosovo agreed that 

criticism of NGOs was better left to private conversation and could be 

counterproductive if aired publicly.119 

b. Expect to Mentor Interagency Actors on the Mission and 

Possibly Their Roles. 

Members of NGOs tasked to serve important roles in the Kosovo 

interim government had little experience in what should have been an area 

of expertise. For example, the OSCE was responsible for monitoring the 

interim judges and pretrial court procedures. The monitors came from 

countries across Europe and around the world. Some of the monitors had no 

criminal law or trial experience, yet they were tasked with reviewing 

criminal proceedings. JAs had to explain basic trial procedures, under both 

the U.S. detention review system and Kosovo law, to the monitors. The high 

rate of turnover of the judicial monitors required JAs to repeat these 

explanations.120 

c. Coordinate with NGOs for Joint Humanitarian Projects. 

The limited ability of the military to provide humanitarian support, 

and the restrictions placed on the limited support the military can provide, 

placed the onus on the NGOs operating in Kosovo to provide humanitarian 

relief. Monetary restrictions placed on humanitarian projects conducted by 

U.S. forces required undertaking certain projects with the assistance of 

118 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 392-94. 119 See id. at 391-95. 120 See id. at 394. 

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NGOs. Understanding which NGOs are operating within a task force area 

allows JAs to provide a better range of options when reviewing humanitarian 

projects. Civil Affairs (CA) sections maintain a list of NGOs and the types 

of aid the NGOs provide. JAs should coordinate with CA to review the 

NGO list.121 

C. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 

[Rules of Engagement are] directives issued by competent 

military authority that delineate the circumstances and 

limitations under which the United States forces will initiate 

and/or continue combat engagement with other forces 

encountered.122 

The rules of engagement (ROE) for Operation Joint Guardian were 

promulgated in an ROE implementation message and published in Appendix 

1 to Annex R to Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Operations Plan 60507 

(classified) dated 10 June 1999. 1ID received the ROE on 11 June 1999 and 

requested modifications on 12 June 1999.123 The Commander disseminated 

unclassified portions of the ROE to troops on an ROE card. The ROE card 

is included in Appendix IV-25. The ROE included sections addressing both 

self-defense and mission accomplishment, which were delineated in a 

weapons release authority matrix. Soldiers assigned to Task Force Falcon 

Rear at Camp Able Sentry (CAS) did not fall under the NATO ROE in 

OPLAN 60507, instead operating under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff Standing ROE (SROE). The CAS ROE card is included in Appendix 

IV-26. ROE lessons learned stem from the nature of coalition operations, 

difficulties in training mission-specific ROE that are received immediately 

prior to executing a mission, and having to address multiple ROE. 

121 For a complete discussion about the funding provided for direct humanitarian assistance by the task
 

force see infra text accompanying notes 229-232. 122 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND 

ASSOCIATED TERMS 371 (12 Apr. 2001). 123 Memorandum, BG Bantz Craddock, Commander, Task Force Falcon, to Commander, KFOR, subject:
 

Request for Changes to Rules of Engagement (ROE) (12 June 1999) (classified document) (on file with
 

CLAMO). 

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1. Expect Difficulties with ROE in Coalition Operations. 

The ROE for the Kosovo mission required the consensus of all NATO 

member nations through the approval of the NAC.124 Nineteen independent 

governments reaching consensus on political guidance necessary to draft the 

ROE was not simple. Interpretation of ROE provisions was subject to the 

laws and experiences of the interpreting country. Army JAs must remain 

aware of NATO ROE procedures, the TCN’s interpretative foundations, and 

U.S. policy when operating in a coalition. 

a. Modifications to the ROE Will Be Difficult to Obtain. 

The nature of the ROE approval process dictates that changes will be 

difficult to obtain. Requests for modifications to the ROE that have to be 

forwarded to the NAC require all NATO members to agree on the 

modification. This process can be extremely slow and often unworkable. 

Requests for modification to the ROE that are submitted immediately on 

receipt of the ROE are more likely to be approved than requests submitted 

once the operation begins. The higher HQ will likely question the necessity 

of the request if the Task Force has been able to operate without the 

requested measure for some length of time.125 

b. Requests for Modification to the ROE Should Be Submitted 

Through Both the Operational and National Chains of Command. 

To ensure that requests for changes to the ROE received appropriate 

visibility, while understanding that approval authority rested with NATO, 

Task Force Falcon forwarded the ROE Request (ROEREQ) through both the 

U.S. chain of command126 and the NATO chain of command.127 As other 

ROE issues arose once the Operation commenced, Task Force Falcon also 

124 NATO ROE procedures are detailed in North Atlantic Military Committee, MC 362 encl. 1, NATO 

Rules of Engagement (9 Nov. 1999). The North Atlantic Council consists of representatives from all 

NATO member nations. The NAC is chaired by the NATO Secretary General. The NAC is the principal 

decision-making authority of the North Atlantic Alliance. All decisions by the NAC require consensus. 

See NATO, NATO HANDBOOK, ch. 13, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1301.htm 

(last modified 30 May 2001). 

125 See E-mail from LTC Mark Martins, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, 1ID, to CPT Charles Kovats, Task 

Force Falcon JA (2 Sept. 1999) (on file with CLAMO). An exception to this is a post-incident request for a 

permanent change to the ROE based on the facts of the incident. 

126 At that time, the U.S. chain of command was 1ID, V Corps, and USAREUR, who, as the Army forces in 

Europe, would forward the request to CINCEUCOM.

127 The NATO chain of command was KFOR(ARRC), AFSOUTH, SHAPE. See Kosovo AAR, supra note 

92, at 413. 

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sent requests for clarification through both chains of command. This 

method was effective in notifying U.S. commanders, outside the NATO 

approval chain, that the Commander, Task Force Falcon, believed certain 

ROE provisions were overly restrictive. 

c. Actions in Self-Defense by U.S. Soldiers Are a U.S. Issue and 

Interpretations of Self-Defense Issues Should Remain in U.S. Legal and 

Operational Channels. 

U.S. forces always retain the right to use necessary and 

proportional force for unit and individual self-defense in 

response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.128 

1. Out-of-Sector Exercises and Operations 

Planning for contingencies while in Kosovo led to exercises among 

the coalition partners. When planning for exercises outside the U.S. area of 

operations, operators and legal staff must remain aware that some aspects of 

self-defense remain open to interpretation by the participating countries. 

These interpretations cannot infringe on the U.S. service member’s right of 

self-defense as stated in the SROE. 

During the planning for one out-of-sector exercise involving French 

and U.S. forces in the French sector of Kosovo, a member of the French staff 

distributed a memorandum addressing the “Rules of Engagement (ROE) for 

Attack Helicopters (AH).” The memorandum discussed the basis for selfdefense under the MNB(N) ROE, and the memorandum stated that to fire in 

self-defense, “the hostile act must have already begun (not an intention but 

reality).”129 When pressed by the U.S. representatives, including a JA, a 

member of the French staff explained that if an individual deployed an SA128 CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTR. 3121.01A, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. 

FORCES, encl. A, ¶ 1.c.(1) (15 Jan. 2000) (partially classified document, enclosure A is not classified) 

[hereinafter SROE]. The previous version of the SROE, which was in force for the first seven months of 

the Kosovo peacekeeping operation stated, “U.S. forces will be assigned and remain OPCON to a 

multinational force only if the combatant commander and higher authority determine that the ROE for that 

multinational force are consistent with the policy guidance on unit self-defense and with the rules for 

individual self-defense contained in this document.” CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTR. 3121.01, 

STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. FORCES, encl. A, ¶ 1.c.(2) (1 Oct. 1994) (partially classified 

document, enclosure A is not classified). 

129 Memorandum, CPT William Schmittel, Task Force Falcon JA, to Commander, MNB(N), subject: Rules 

of Engagement for U.S. Forces Participating in OPLAN 21410, Operation Resolve (12 Jan. 2000) 

[hereinafter Schmittel Memo] (quoting translation of MNB(N) FRAGO 388) (on file with CLAMO). 

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7130 visible to U.S. Apaches, the Apaches would not be able to engage the 

individual until he fired the SA-7. The U.S. JAs explained that U.S. forces 

must be allowed to engage such a target under the U.S. understanding of 

“hostile intent” and that U.S. forces must use the U.S. definition of selfdefense. After the meeting ended, the JAs drafted a letter that was 

ultimately sent to both the Commander, MNB(N), and Commander, KFOR, 

restating the U.S. position, quoting the KFOR ROE allowing for TCNs to 

follow domestic laws when the NATO ROE was inconsistent with the 

TCNs’ domestic laws, and stating that U.S. forces would not be able to 

participate in exercises or operations that infringed on the right of selfdefense.131 Ultimately, all parties agreed that the U.S. soldiers and aviators 

would be able to defend themselves in accordance with U.S. policy. Two 

months later, KFOR tasked the U.S. to participate in operations in Mitrovica, 

located in the French sector. Because of the earlier successful efforts, which 

clarified U.S. self-defense concerns, there were no ROE issues delaying U.S. 

support to the operation. 

2. Current Operations and Training 

Not long after the start of the Kosovo mission, MNB(E) was faced 

with someone regularly firing a mortar into Serbian villages. Addressing the 

threat of the “mad mortarman,” as he came to be dubbed, was a Task Force 

priority. Task Force Falcon drafted situational training vignettes to address 

potential confrontations by U.S. forces faced with the mad mortarman. One 

particular mad mortarman training vignette caused considerable 

disagreement within various coalition legal channels, including KFOR 

HQ.132 

130 The SA-7 is a man-portable, shoulder-fired, surface-to-air missile which uses an optical sight and 

tracking device with an infrared seeking mechanism to strike flying targets. Its maximum effective range is 

approximately 6,125 meters and maximum effective altitude is approximately 4,300 meters. See United 

Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, at 

http://www.undcp.org/terrorism_weapons_conventional.html (last visited 2 Oct. 2001). 131 Schmittel Memo, supra note 129. 132 The training vignette, as finally drafted, is reprinted below. 

SITUATION: 1st Infantry Division is deployed on a peacekeeping operation to keep 

Kosovo Albanian separatists and Serb nationalists from resuming hostilities. Organized 

forces of Kosovar Albanians have signed 2 separate agreements for demilitarization 

banning all crew-served weapons (allowing only a small number of side arms). KLA 

hard-liners have resisted demilitarization. All organized Serb military has withdrawn 

from the U.S. sector. Over the last 2 months, cities that were predominantely Serbian 

have become predominantely Albanian, sometimes overnight. This has oftentimes been 

accomplished through the murder of Serbian civilians and the burning of Serbian homes. 

Over the last month, there have been 4 mortar strikes on Serbian neighborhoods within 

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The contentious issue in the original training vignette occurred at the 

point of confrontation between U.S. forces and the mad mortarman, who, 

after being told to halt, turned and fled. Foreign attorneys at KFOR HQ 

reviewing the vignette believed that deadly force was not authorized to stop 

the mad mortarman. The KFOR analysis was heavily weighted on mission 

accomplishment ROE serials and stated that the mortarman was “actively 

running away,” implying that this was somehow inconsistent with hostile 

intent. 

U.S. lawyers reviewed the mad mortarman vignette and proposed 

response and the U.S. JAs concluded that this vignette should be framed 

solely as a self-defense issue rather than a mission accomplishment issue. 

The mad mortarman had been firing into villages patrolled by U.S. forces, 

and rounds had landed within 100 yards of U.S. soldiers. Using an analysis 

that stressed looking at the totality of the circumstances and incorporating all 

known intelligence and actions by the mortarman led to the conclusion that 

the U.S. sector. On 2 occasions, Q-36 has acquired a point of origin for the mortar fire, 

but patrols were unable to locate the mortars. On one occasion, the mortar round fell 

within 100 meters of U.S. troops patrolling in the area. Crater analysis on previous 

attacks indicates that the rounds are 82 mm. 

EVENT: You are on patrol on the outskirts of Donja Budriga. You hear an explosion 

and are soon notified that a Q-36 has acquired a point of origin of mortar fire near your 

location. You are given the grid coordinate, which is located on an old logging trial on a 

wooded hillside. As you approach the location, you see 3 men loading a mortar tube into 

a truck just off the logging trial. Your squad sets up blocking positions on the road, and 

you issue a verbal warning for the 3 men to halt. They drop the tube and 2 mortar rounds 

and take off running into the woods. You are authorized to fire a warning shot, but the 

warning shot does not stop the men. 

CONSIDERATIONS: Key RAMP principles are “Anticipate Attack” and “Measure 

Force.” You do not need to receive fire before firing. You are allowed to use force, up to 

and including deadly force, when you have clear indicators of hostile intent. Here the 

soldier can conclude that the 3 men’s intentions are hostile. The Hand SALUTE factors 

support this conclusion. Note that the men’s activities are extremely serious in nature 

and are likely to recur. The men are located at the Q-36 grid point of origin of the recent 

attack just minutes from the last mortar attack, and they are operating a crew-served 

mortar. Each of the RAMP rules supports a decision to fire. A finding of hostile intent is 

further supported by the recent mortar attacks and by the fact the men have ignored your 

verbal warnings and warning shot by running away, providing them with the ability and 

opportunity to fire again. These are indications that the men intend to continue 

conducting hostile acts. Because the lives of soldiers patrolling the villages and the lives 

of villagers are at risk, you can protect human life with deadly force. You must measure 

the amount of force. Under these facts, lesser VEWPRIK measures have failed (verbal 

warning; warning shot). 

SUGGESTED RESPONSE: Fire aimed rounds at the fleeing mortar men and report the 

activity higher. 

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the man could be shot while fleeing.133 As a result of framing the problem in 

terms of self-defense, guidance from KFOR became irrelevant, as selfdefense issues are a national prerogative. 

2. Individual and Leader ROE Training Must Be Done Before the 

Mission Rehearsal Exercise; Individual Training Should Focus on SelfDefense. 

MREs conducted at the Combat Training Centers are excellent 

collective situational training in preparation for peacekeeping operations.134 

Does the individual pose a real and significant threat to KFOR’s mission? 

For the MRE to be effective, units must complete both individual and leader 

training on the ROE prior to the MRE.135 Training for the Kosovo mission 

incorporated ROE classroom briefings with training vignettes, individual 

training, collective training during a MRE, and separate leader training.136 

The ability of U.S. soldiers to defend themselves should be a battle 

task.137 Effective individual training for the first units deploying to a 

peacekeeping mission should emphasize self-defense rather than mission 

accomplishment, because the latter may not be fully understood until just 

prior to the operation. Later rotations to the same peacekeeping theater must 

incorporate current intelligence, SOPs, and Tactics, Techniques, and 

133 U.S. attorneys also noted that the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment, while not binding on U.S. 

soldiers operating in Kosovo, did not prohibit shooting a “fleeing felon.” See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 

U.S. 1 (1985) (stating that the Fourth Amendment would not prohibit the use of deadly force to prevent the 

escape of a suspected felon when the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a 

significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others); cf. SROE, supra note 128, at 

encl. A, ¶ 8(3)(b) (allowing U.S. troops to “pursue and engage hostile forces that continue to commit 

hostile acts or exhibit hostile intent”). 

134 See generally E-mail from CPT Coby Langley, Legal Advisor, Task Force 1-325 Airborne Infantry 

Regiment, to LTC Renn Gade, Staff Judge Advocate, 82d Airborne Division (16 Feb. 2001) [hereinafter 

Langley E-mail] (on file with CLAMO) (stating “the effectiveness of the MRE cannot be understated - 

simply put, our troopers were set up for success.”). 

135 Individual training would focus on self-defense principles while leader training would address additional 

mission-specific issues that commanders and small unit leaders need to understand. See THE CENTER FOR 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, RULES OF 

ENGAGEMENT HANDBOOK FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES, 2-2 to 2-11 (CLAMO 2000) for general ROE training 

principles; see also Major Mark Martins, Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not 

Lawyering, 143 MIL. L. REV. 3 (1994) [hereinafter A Matter of Training]. 136 See, e.g., Sanchez Briefing, supra note 7, at briefing slide 16 (The KFOR 1B Training Cycle). 137 A battle task is a “task which must be accomplished by a subordinate organization if the next higher 

headquarters is to accomplish a mission essential task. Battle tasks are selected by the senior commander 

from the subordinate organization’s METL.” FM 25-101, supra note 45, at glossary 2. 

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Procedures (TTPs) into the MRE.138 Self-defense training must be 

incorporated into other mission-specific or MOS-specific training.139 

Training self-defense in accordance with the principles in the SROE 

adequately prepares soldiers for peacekeeping missions and helps overcome 

inherent delays in receiving the mission-specific ROE during coalition 

operations. 

3. ROE Training Should Continue During the Mission and Should 

Incorporate Current Intelligence and Tactical Situations. 

ROE training for the Kosovo mission continued after deployment and 

sought to incorporate current key events and intelligence. For example, as 

discussed above, JAs in the first rotation to Kosovo drafted training 

vignettes to address the “mad mortarman.” JAs during the KFOR 1B 

rotation taught refresher ROE monthly to aviation units using recent 

operations as the basis for situation vignettes. JAs in the third rotation to 

Kosovo developed what they titled an “ROE Azimuth Check” to disseminate 

current ROE questions and answers. The Azimuth Check was a one-page, 

eye-catching flyer distributed with FRAGOs to update soldiers on ROE 

issues. Examples of the Azimuth Check are included in Appendix IV-28. 

One unit made ROE briefings a part of their precombat drills before 

patrolling or conducting operations.140 JAs deployed during the KFOR 2B 

rotation assisted in preparing the Task Force soldiers for the return of Serb 

forces into the GSZ—a mission that included a concurrent amnesty program 

for Albanian insurgents desiring to disarm and return to Kosovo. Task Force 

JAs developed training scenarios to assist the soldiers in assessing hostile 

intent during this tense period.141 All of these methods effectively focused 

soldiers on current ROE issues. 

4. Soldiers and Marines Will Have to Understand Multiple ROE. 

In addition to understanding the ROE applicable for the mission in 

Kosovo, all soldiers deploying to Kosovo passed through an Initial Staging 

138 See EXSUM, supra note 44, at 7. COL Morgan’s investigation into the accusation of excessive force 

by members of 3-504 PIR found, in part, that the unit’s High Intensity Conflict (HIC) focus during
 

predeployment training did not adequately prepare them for Peace Support Operations (PSO). 139 See A Matter of Training, supra note 135. 140 See Langley E-mail, supra note 134 (Stating, “LTC Owens has stressed that no matter how monotonous
 

troopers may feel it is, it [the ROE] will be briefed prior to every mission, every patrol, no matter how 

frequent.”). 

141 See Celtnieks AAR, supra note 43, ¶ 6. 

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Base (ISB) at CAS in Skopje, FYROM. The NATO ROE applicable in 

Kosovo were not applicable within FYROM, so soldiers had to understand 

that self-defense rules, as stated within the SROE, were the only applicable 

ROE until they entered Kosovo.142 

Soldiers who accompanied equipment being shipped from their home 

stations into Kosovo faced various rules for up to six different host nations 

during transit.143 Each country through which the U.S. shipped equipment 

was responsible for the protection of the U.S. soldiers and military 

equipment.144 Each country had different rules for how or whether soldiers 

could be armed and when they could respond with deadly force to particular 

threats to property. These differences posed a significant challenge for the 

JAs drafting the “Rail Security ROE.”145 These JAs had to consider SOFAs, 

supplemental agreements, transit agreements, and various other international 

agreements when drafting and training ROE for the transit guards. 

Marines were also subject to multiple ROE. In addition to having to 

travel through Greece and FYROM to enter Kosovo, thus facing issues 

similar to those faced by the Army, the Marines faced multiple ROE while at 

sea. When the 26th MEU was operating in the Adriatic Sea as a part of the 

Sixth Fleet, it operated under the U.S. SROE. When the MEU’s Harriers 

began flying bombing missions in support of Operation Allied Force, the 

aircraft fell under NATO ROE once they left the deck of the ship. This 

situation also applied if the MEU was called to perform a Tactical Recovery 

of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) mission to rescue a downed NATO pilot. 

Once the TRAP package left the ship, they were subject to NATO ROE.146 

142 See Memorandum, CPT Jimmy Bagwell, JA, Task Force Falcon (Rear), to MAJ Tracy Barnes, Legal 

Advisor, Task Force Falcon, subject: After Action Review (20 Apr. 2000) [hereinafter Bagwell AAR] (on 

file with CLAMO). 

143 The KFOR 1B/2A rotation between 1ID and 1AD shipped equipment by rail between Germany and 

FYROM. The rail route passed through Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece. 144 This is a delicate issue. Based upon Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), receiving states are often 

responsible for the protection of all members of sending states, just as they are responsible for the security 

of their own citizens. Commanders obviously consider force protection imperative when planning the 

mission. This would include protecting the force not only once in the theater of operations but also in 

transit, through countries with which we have SOFAs. The friction created by these often competing 

interests placed commanders in the difficult position of having unarmed troops traveling through foreign 

countries, many of whose citizens did not always support U.S. intentions and ideals. See generally E-mail 

from CPT Mike Roberts, Oplaw JA, USAREUR, to CPT Alton L. Gwaltney, III, Chief, International and 

Operational Law, 1ID (19 Oct. 1999) (on file with CLAMO). 

145 See E-mail from CPT Elizabeth Duffy, Chief International and Operational Law, 1AD, to LTC Mark 

Martins, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, 1ID (22 Mar. 2000) (on file with CLAMO). 

146 MEU AAR, supra note 6, ¶ 14. 

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5. Be Prepared to Articulate Rationale for Use of Riot Control Means and 

Plan for Alternatives. 

Lessons under this heading cannot be appropriately addressed in this 

unclassified forum. A discussion of these lessons is included on CLAMO’s 

secure database or can be obtained by contacting CLAMO and asking for an 

electronic copy sent to a secure e-mail account.147 

6. JAs Must Know the “Peace Operation” Variation to the Code of 

Conduct for Training. 

Training for a peacekeeping operation usually includes some 

combination of Law of Armed Conflict training, ROE training, and Code of 

Conduct training. Code of Conduct training for peacekeeping operations is a 

modified form of Code of Conduct training for wartime missions.148 For 

example, Article III of the Code of Conduct requires prisoners of war to 

make every effort to escape. In a peacekeeping operation, the provisions of 

the Geneva Conventions affording prisoner of war protections may not 

apply. As a result, U.S. soldiers detained by a force during a peacekeeping 

mission may be subject to the domestic criminal laws of the detaining 

nation. Because escape from government detention is a crime in most 

countries, a failed escape attempt may provide the detaining country with 

further justification to prolong detention by adding additional criminal 

charges. Because of the potential for additional criminal charges and 

prolonged detention, escape from detention is discouraged except under 

unique or life-threatening circumstances under the Peace Operation variation 

to the Code of Conduct.149 JAs must understand these distinctions and be 

prepared to conduct the necessary training. 

147 CLAMO’s secure database is accessed through Army Knowledge Online Secret (AKO-S) at 

https://www.us.army.smil.mil. Users must first register with AKO-S. After approval to enter AKO-S is
 

granted, users must then register with CLAMO’s secure knowledge center by following the link from
 

AKO-S. 

148 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSTR. 1300.21, CODE OF CONDUCT (COC) TRAINING AND EDUCATION ¶ 

E3.3 (8 Jan. 2001) [hereinafter DODI 1300.21]; See generally U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 1300.7, 

TRAINING AND EDUCATION TO SUPPORT THE CODE OF CONDUCT (COC) (8 Dec. 2000). 149 See DODI 1300.21, supra note 148, ¶ E3.10.5.
 

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D. MILITARY JUSTICE 

Military Justice is the administration of the Uniform Code of 

Military Justice (UCMJ), and the disposition of alleged 

violations by judicial (courts-martial) or nonjudicial (Article 

15, UCMJ) means.150 

Within the first two years of the Kosovo operation, both 1ID and 1AD 

addressed high-profile courts-martial. 1ID tried the case of United States v. 

SSG Frank J. Ronghi. SSG Ronghi pled guilty to murder, forcible sodomy, 

and indecent acts with a child, and a panel of military officers sentenced him 

to life imprisonment without the possibility for parole.151 1AD tried United 

States v. PFC Nicholas E. Young, in which PFC Young was ultimately 

acquitted of negligent homicide and dereliction of duty.152 Both 1ID and 

1AD preferred charges against other soldiers.153 Additionally, the two 

rotations prepared almost 700 nonjudicial punishment actions during the first 

two years of the Kosovo operation.154 

1. Establishing Jurisdictional Alignment 

Jurisdiction over all conventional soldiers within Kosovo and CAS 

fell to the General Courts-Martial Convening Authority (GCMCA) of the 

division responsible for the Task Force Falcon headquarters. 1ID exercised 

GCMCA for the first year; 1AD exercised jurisdiction for the second year. 

Special Court-Martial Convening Authority fell to the brigade commander 

150 FM 27-100, supra note 29, ¶ 3.3. 151 SSG Frank J. Ronghi was found guilty of premeditated murder, forcible sodomy, and indecent acts with
 

a child. On 13 January 2000, the accused left his unit and went into an apartment building in Vitina, 

Kosovo. The accused saw eleven-year-old Merita Shabiu enter the apartment, took her to the basement of
 

the apartment building, committed the sexual acts and killed her. He later returned and removed the girl’s 

body, dumping it in the countryside outside of Vitina. A fellow soldier, not knowing what the accused was 

doing, accompanied the accused outside of Vitina to dump the body. This soldier turned the accused into
 

authorities. 

152 PFC Young was acquitted of dereliction of duty and negligent homicide for the shooting death of a fiveyear-old Kosovo boy. PFC Young was on a mission to a Kosovo school that his unit regularly visited.
 

While in the turret of a HMMWV, PFC Young accidentally discharged an M-249, squad automatic 

weapon, killing Gentrit Rexhepi. 

153 1ID preferred charges against six other soldiers. 1AD preferred charges against two soldiers in addition 

to Young. 

154 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 509; see also CPT Alton L. Gwaltney, III, Deputy Legal Advisor, 

Task Force Falcon, Multinational Brigade (East) Legal Operations Overview (USKFOR 1B), PowerPoint
 

presentation, briefing slide 11 (2000) (documenting 345 Article 15s) (on file with CLAMO); 1AD Mil. 

Justice Section, Task Force Falcon Article 15 Stats, Jun 00-May 01 (n.d.) (documenting 343 Article 15s) 

(on file with CLAMO). 

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of the brigade supplying the Task Force Falcon headquarters. The brigade 

commander was also the Deputy Task Force Commander. Assistant 

Division Commanders exercised command over Task Force Falcon but did 

not exercise UCMJ convening authority. Jurisdictional alignment was 

detailed in both Memorandums and Task Force FRAGOs. Summary 

Courts-Martial jurisdiction ran generally within command lines despite the 

fact that most of the units came from Germany where area jurisdiction was 

predominant155 and that often slices of one commander’s soldiers were under 

the operational control of a different commander. Both JAs and 

commanders agreed that command line jurisdiction worked well under these 

circumstances.156 

Jurisdictional alignment in a task force can be difficult to establish. 

JAs in both of the first two rotations asked the personnel section (G-1) to 

identify all of the units within Task Force Falcon. In both circumstances, the 

G-1 was unable to account for all of the units represented in Kosovo. 

Eventually, the JAs and 71Ds had to call every battalion commander within 

the Task Force to determine which elements of the battalion were deployed 

and which elements remained behind.157 JAs discovered that the operations 

section (G-3) had much better visibility on units within Task Force Falcon 

than the G-1 and relied on the G-3 documentation and extensive 

coordination with commanders of non-organic battalions to assist in 

jurisdictional preparation.158 

The jurisdictional document must contain a “catchall” phrase that 

accounts for slice units or individual soldiers that may have been missed in 

the jurisdictional document.159 Because the entire Task Force did not rotate 

in and out of Kosovo at the same time, and because some units were on 

155 Area jurisdiction assigns UCMJ convening authority based on a unit’s physical location. Units within 

the same military community will generally fall to the same convening authority whether the units are 

within the same organization or not. See U.S. ARMY, EUROPE, REG. 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE ¶ 12 (1 Feb. 

2001), available at http://www.aeaim.hqusareur.army.mil/library/home.htm. 156 Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 502; CLAMO, Kosovo After Action Review Video Teleconference with 

1AD (19 Mar. 2001); Read Ahead Packet at § III, ¶ B (2001) [hereinafter 1AD AAR] (on file with 

CLAMO).

157 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 500. 158 See 1AD AAR, supra note 156, § III, ¶ B. 159 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 501. A sample jurisdiction memo from USKFOR 1B rotation is 

included in Appendix IV-29. The catchall phrase, as noted in the USKFOR 1B jurisdiction document, was 

“[a]ll soldiers assigned to units not specifically mentioned in this jurisdictional memorandum are attached 

for UCMJ purposes to HHC, 3d Brigade until the unit can be incorporated into a subsequent 

memorandum.” 

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shorter or longer rotations to Kosovo, the jurisdictional documents had to be 

reviewed and updated every six to eight weeks to remain current.160 

2. On-Call Trial Defense Service Support Can Be Effective. 

The Region VIII Regional Defense Counsel,161 in coordination with 

the Task Force Legal Advisors and SJAs, determined that the defense 

counsel workload at Task Force Falcon was not sufficient to support a fulltime Trial Defense Service (TDS) attorney in theater.162 TDS support for 

soldiers deployed to Kosovo was provided through a 71D liaison to an oncall TDS JA. Soldiers in need of TDS assistance would speak to a JA on the 

telephone. If needed, TDS JAs would deploy to Kosovo to represent 

clients.163 During the first rotation, a separate tent was set up for TDS 

assistance. During the later rotations, Task Force Falcon designated a 

separate office facility in a Southeast Asia (SEA) Hut164 for TDS support. 

For an on-call system to be successful, TDS attorneys must be willing 

to treat issues arising during the deployment as a priority. Soldiers 

attempting to receive Article 15 counseling over the phone must be able to 

reach the on-call attorney, and the on-call attorney must be able to assist the 

soldiers, who remain involved in an ongoing operation, as soon as possible. 

160 KFOR 1A updated the Task Force base jurisdictional alignment three times in six months. KFOR 1B 

amended the jurisdictional alignment twice in six months.

161 A Regional Defense Counsel is an Army JA responsible for the performance of the U.S. Army TDS 

mission within a geographical area designated by TJAG. See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 27-10, MILITARY 

JUSTICE ¶ 6-3 (20 Aug. 1999). 162 The legal advisor concluded that there was sufficient work only if the TDS counsel could also provide 

assistance with certain legal assistance clients. Trial Defense Service JAs are allowed to perform 

nondefense duties in accordance with Army Regulation. See id. ¶¶ 6-8(a)-(e) (20 Aug. 1999). Nondefense 

duties might include assistance with “cases involving such administrative matters as reports of survey, 

evaluation report rebuttals or appeals, traffic violations, or administrative letters of counseling or 

reprimand.” Id. ¶ 6-8(a). These types of cases are normally seen by legal assistance attorneys. See U.S. 

DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 27-3, THE ARMY LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ¶ 6(g)(4) (21 Feb. 1996). 163 One TDS attorney commented that his experiences “demonstrated the critical importance of TDS 

attorneys being prepared to deploy on short notice to investigate cases.” This counsel noted the difficulty 

of contacting witnesses by telephone when the witnesses were participating in an ongoing mission that took 

them “out in sector” for days at a time. E-mail from CPT Peter Amuso, Defense Counsel, to CPT Alton L. 

Gwaltney, III, CLAMO (7 Sept. 2001) (on file with CLAMO). 

164 The SEA Hut was originally designed and used in Southeast Asia, hence the name. Each SEA Hut is a 

prefabricated wooden structure comprised of approximately 3,000 sq. feet. In each SEA Hut are five 

sleeping rooms that accommodate six people each. All SEA Huts are equipped with heating and airconditioning, and showers and toilets. In addition to providing sleeping quarters, the SEA Hut was also 

used to provide workspace on U.S. base camps. Additional information is available at 

http://www.kforonline.com/chronicle/chronicle_1_1999/p12.htm and at 

http://www.wood.army.mil/ENGRMAG/PB5994/finney.htm (both web sites last visited 6 Sept. 2001). 

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Deployed soldiers will need access to a fax machine to send copies of 

statements and other documents to TDS counsel. 

The task force also plays a large role in the success of an on-call TDS 

mission. Command emphasis is required to ensure TDS attorneys receive 

support when they are within the AOR for military justice matters. TDS 

attorneys will need a place to work, a telephone, and the ability to conduct 

legal research through the use of the Internet. 

TDS visits in Kosovo were treated like any other military operation.165 

Units were tasked to provide vehicular support to outlying areas for the 

attorney to conduct witness interviews and crime scene visits. Units were 

further tasked to make witnesses available to meet with the attorneys during 

a particular time and at a particular location. The camp mayor was tasked to 

provide logistical support for housing. The signal officer was tasked to 

provide telephone and Internet support to the TDS counsel’s living and work 

areas. A well-coordinated visit can allow the TDS attorney to accomplish all 

that needs to be done in a quick and efficient manner. 

Attorneys providing TDS support to the Kosovo mission always 

understood that they were a part of an ongoing U.S. Army mission. The 

TDS attorneys had to attend all the necessary predeployment training, 

qualify on their assigned weapons, and arrive in Kosovo with the appropriate 

basic military personal equipment. The TDS attorneys supporting the 

mission understood that getting into and out of Kosovo was a timeconsuming challenge and that without prior coordination, the visits to 

Kosovo would not be successful. The combination of command emphasis 

placed on TDS support, soldier support to TDS, and TDS attorneys’ 

understanding of the working environment led to a largely successful on-call 

TDS mission.166 

165 See, e.g., 1AD AAR, supra note 156, § III, ¶ (b) (“All movement in Kosovo, to include TDS attorneys 

working on behalf of their clients, had to be coordinated with tactical units.”). 

166 Legal advisors to the first three rotations thought that the TDS system worked well. See Kosovo AAR, 

supra note 92, at 512-13; 1AD AAR, supra note 156, § III, B. JAs assigned to base camps were not as
 

enthusiastic about the TDS system. See Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 486; Bagwell AAR, supra note 

142, ¶ 5b.
 

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3. Violations of General Order Number 1 and Negligent Discharges 

Dominate the Military Justice Workload. 

Violations of General Order Number 1 (GO 1) for drinking and 

negligent discharges of weapons were the two most common offenses 

occurring within the task force.167 Commanders handled these offenses 

through nonjudicial punishment and administrative letters of reprimand. 

Soldiers would often attempt to use exceptions within GO 1 to justify 

drinking.168 

There is some indication that command emphasis on the alcohol 

prohibitions of GO 1 can lead to decreases in the number of alcohol 

violations of GO 1.169 For example, during the KFOR 1B rotation, the 

Commander required all exceptions to GO 1 to be in writing and approved 

prior to the event.170 Additionally, the Commander stated that he did not 

intend to grant himself the exception, and the Commander made it clear to 

local leaders that neither he nor his staff would drink during meetings or 

events. Violations of GO 1 for drinking during the KFOR 1B rotation, the 

second six-month rotation, were drastically lower than during the KFOR 1A 

and 2A rotations, the first and third six-month rotations. 

4. JAs Must Be Aware of the Potential Problems Caused by a Lack of 

Unity of Command and Unity of Effort. 

Seek unity of effort in every operation. 

Unity of effort emphasizes the need for directing all means to a 

common purpose.

171 

The command of Task Force Falcon fell to an Assistant Division 

Commander from the divisions responsible for the Task Force. The Task 

Force staffs were formed from a combination of deputy staff officers from 

the division headquarters and from officers outside the division. At various 

167 Headquarters, EUCOM, General Order Number 1 in Support of Allied Force and Humanitarian Efforts 

in the Balkans (12 Apr. 1999) (amended 29 June 1999) [hereinafter GO1]. A copy of GO1 is included in 

Appendix IV-30. Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 498, 508-09. 168 GO1 stated that individuals were authorized to consume alcoholic beverages, e.g., toasts, whenever
 

refusal to do so would offend host nation military or civilian officials. GO1, supra note 167, ¶ 5b. 169 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 506-07. 170 Headquarters, Task Force Falcon, Commanding General Policy Letter #5, subject: General Order 

Number 1—Alcohol Consumption ¶ 2 (21 Dec. 1999). 

171 U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-23, PEACE OPERATIONS 16 (30 Dec. 1994). 

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times, the Task Force itself was comprised of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 

Marines. 

Although he had elements of all services under his command, the 

Commander, Task Force Falcon, was not a JTF Commander172 and therefore 

did not have authority under the UCMJ.173 Additionally, unlike military 

operations in Haiti, where the JTF Commander retained court-martial 

jurisdiction over troops assigned to his own corps or division, the 

Commanders of Task Force Falcon, as Assistant Division Commanders, 

brought with them no UCMJ jurisdiction and none of the other powers 

associated with holding UCMJ authority. The Division Commanders of the 

Division responsible for the Task Force Headquarters retained GCMCA over 

the Division troops assigned to Task Force Falcon. The Division 

Commander also gained jurisdiction over other Army troops attached to the 

Task Force from units outside the Division. The Division Commander did 

not gain jurisdiction, however, over all U.S. troops within the Task Force— 

meaning no commander had unity of general courts-martial jurisdiction.174 

Additionally, no one had unity of effort over administrative actions. 

Officer evaluation chains branched outside the Task Force back to staff 

principals or separate brigade commanders located outside Kosovo. This 

complicated unity of effort within Task Force Falcon. 

172 “A joint task force (JTF) is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of 

Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing joint task 

force commander.” JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 0-2, UNIFIED ACTION ARMED FORCES (UNAAF) 

GL-9 (10 July 2001).

173 A commander of a unified or specified command may convene courts-martial over members of any of 

the armed forces. MCM, supra note 65, R.C.M. 201(e)(2)(A). The Secretary of Defense may empower 

any commanding officer of a joint command or joint task force to convene courts-martial. Id. R.C.M. 

201(e)(2)(B). Once empowered to convene courts-martial, a joint task force commander may convene a 

court-martial over a member of any branch of the armed service. Id. R.C.M. 201(e)(3)(A). An accused 

from of one branch of the service may also be tried by a court-martial convened by a member of another 

armed force when the accused cannot be delivered to the armed force of which the accused is a member 

without manifest injury to the armed forces. Id. R.C.M. 201(e)(3)(b). Manifest injury does not mean minor 

inconvenience or expense. Examples of manifest injury include direct and substantial effect on morale, 

discipline, or military operations, substantial expense or delay, or the loss of essential witnesses. Id. 

Discussion R.C.M. 201(e). 

174 The 1ID and 1AD Commanders, in addition to having GCMCA over all of the soldiers assigned to their 

units located in Kosovo, also had jurisdiction over soldiers in the separate battalions from the 82d and 101st 

Divisions. The 1ID and 1AD Commanders did not exercise court-martial jurisdiction over Army special 

operations and civil affairs forces, and they had no jurisdiction over service members from other branches 

of service. For a discussion about unity of command and military justice, see Major Michael J. Berrigan, 

The UCMJ and the New Jointness: A Proposal to Strengthen the Military Justice Authority of Joint Task 

Force Commanders, 44 NAVAL L. REV. 59 (1997). 

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The effect the lack of unity of command had on the mission in 

Kosovo is difficult to assess.175 However, JAs must remain aware of 

potential problems. One problem is the potential for disparate treatment of 

members of the task force accused of the same misconduct. Another 

problem is that a task force commander without UCMJ authority cannot 

punish disobedience to his own orders. Should these potential problems 

become realized, soldier discipline may decline and mission accomplishment 

may suffer. 

5. Trying Courts-Martial in a Deployed Environment Presents Numerous 

Challenges. 

Numerous issues arise during the investigation and prosecution of 

U.S. soldiers accused of committing crimes in which the victims and 

witnesses are members of the host nation. Unlike serious criminal cases 

arising in garrison, where criminal charges may gain local or statewide 

notoriety, similar cases against U.S. soldiers arising during a deployment 

gain international exposure.176 Many of the lessons provided by these types 

of cases are factually driven and are not deployment specific. The lessons of 

a more universal nature for future deployments are discussed below. 

a. Judge Advocate/Public Affairs Coordination is Vital. 

A . . . Total Army force of Public Affairs professionals . . . [will] 

conduct operations in peace, conflict and war and maintain a 

timely flow of accurate, balanced information to the American 

public, the Army and other key audiences.177 

175 The Task Force JAs coordinated with Navy and Air Force commanders when disciplinary cases arose. 

Typically, Navy and Air Force commanders took action similar to actions taken by Army commanders in 

Kosovo. Often, these commanders would report actions taken to the Task Force Falcon legal advisor. See 

Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 507. The most glaring exceptions to this involved civil affairs and special 

operations soldiers who were often merely returned to their home station with no action taken. See 

Interview with LTC Mark Martins, former Legal Advisor, Task Force Falcon, in Charlottesville, Va. (11 

June 2001).

176 See, e.g., CNN, Army Sergeant Sentenced to Life Without Parole for Murder of Girl in Kosovo (Aug. 1, 

2000) at http://europe.cnn.com/2000/LAW/08/01/kosovo.soldier.sentence.01/index.html (last visited 24 

Sept. 2001); CNN, Soldier Cleared over Kosovo Killing (Mar. 13, 2001), at 

http://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/03/13/germany.soldier (last visited 24 Sept. 2001). 177 Chief of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Army, Vision 2000/Public Affairs Into the 21st Century (April 

1994). 

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Unfavorable news will be released with the same care and 

speed as favorable news. Candor is essential in dealing with 

the public.178 

Public affairs officers (PAO) receive significant training in conveying 

Army news, both the good and the bad news. Typically, PAO training 

encourages the quick and complete release of information. While it is 

impossible to sit mute while a criminal case is breaking during a 

deployment, JAs must vigilantly ensure that the information given to news 

agencies is accurate and does not harm the accused’s right to a fair trial. JAs 

must review all press releases and answers to press queries about an ongoing 

criminal investigation or court-martial. Such reviews must consider the 

effect of the release of information on various audiences, such as 

commanders who have not acted on the case, witnesses, and future panel 

members. 

SJAs should appoint a JA to assist public affairs detachments with the 

procedural and technical aspects of the UCMJ. This JA needs to have 

experience in prosecuting courts-martial,179 and must remember to address 

the narrow issues concerning the procedural posture of the case and not the 

underlying facts. The JA spokesman must make sure the press does not 

view the answers he provides as the government’s position on the charges or 

as infringing on the commanders’ roles in the court-martial process. 

b. Maintain a Media Log. 

The legal staff should collect all news stories concerning pending 

trials. Public affairs detachments can assist in gathering the news articles, 

and the Internet provides ready access to news. If the investigation garners 

both print and video media attention, JAs must be prepared to collect the 

videotaped news segments about the case. These materials will be critical 

for a variety of purposes, including voir dire, motions practice, witness 

examination, and presentencing. 

178 U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 360-5, THE ARMY PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM ¶ 1-4b (9 Sept. 2000). 179 The three different spokesmen for United States v. Ronghi all had previous trial experience. CPT Bill 

Schmittel, the spokesman in Kosovo, had previously been a TDS attorney. CPT Lisa Gossart, the 

spokesman for the second Article 32 investigation, held in Vilseck, Germany, had been both a TDS 

attorney and a trial counsel. CPT Chris Jacobs, the spokesman during the trial in Wuerzburg, Germany, 

had also been both a TDS attorney and a trial counsel. 

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c. Insulate the Trial Counsel from Distractions. 

The intense media scrutiny can be distracting to the trial counsel 

attempting to investigate and ultimately prosecute the case. By appointing 

other JAs to handle media issues, witness travel arrangements, requests for 

information from outside the command, and other mission-specific duties, 

the trial counsel can better focus on case preparation.180 

d. Carefully Consider Trial Location. 

Of the nine cases referred to General and Special Courts-Martial 

during the first two years of the Kosovo operation, only one was tried in 

Kosovo.181 Factors to consider when determining whether to try a case in 

the deployed environment or elsewhere include: 

• the effect a trial would have on the overall mission; 

• the length of the deployment and its effect on witness availability; 

• timing of the court-martial and the effect of units rotating into and out of 

the deployed environment; 

• significant leave time allowed soldiers returning to home station and 

potential for significant delay; 

• whether victims and witnesses from the host nation are capable of 

traveling;182 

• the ability to accommodate potential media interest; 

• court reporter and judge availability; 

• host nation concerns; and 

• the base camp infrastructure, and whether it is capable of supporting a 

court-martial, including witness and panel living areas, waiting rooms, 

and MP guards and bailiffs.183 

180 See E-mail from CPT Marie Anderson, Trial Counsel, 1AD, to CPT Alton L. Gwaltney, III, CLAMO 

(31 July 2001) (on file with CLAMO). 

181 United States v. SFC Reynaldo Medina. SFC Medina pled guilty to a violation of GO1 by drinking 

alcohol, dereliction of duty by leaving patrol and drinking alcohol, drunk on duty, and assaulting a staff 

sergeant and a private. He was sentenced to a reduction to the grade of E-3, forfeiture of $670 pay per 

month for 6 months, and a reprimand. 

182 For cases arising out of Kosovo, the passport issue was time consuming. Citizens of the province of 

Kosovo needed a passport from the federal government, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. While the 

FRY maintained a passport office in Pristina, this office was not processing passport applications. 

UNMIK, the provisional government, was incapable of providing a FRY passport, but could provide 

“travel papers.” Some foreign governments, but not all, honored these papers. 

183 Much like the command emphasis necessary to ensure that on-call TDS operations function properly, 

the commander’s full support is necessary to conduct a trial in a deployed environment. Most 

administrative and support issues surrounding a court-martial are transparent to commanders in garrison. 

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E. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 

Administrative law is the body of law containing the 

statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions that govern the 

establishment, functioning, and command of military 

organizations.

184 

JAs deployed to Kosovo continued to address many of the 

administrative law issues faced by JAs in garrison. Deployment specific 

issues, like those discussed below, supplemented routine garrison issues. 

1. Be Prepared to Provide Legal Support to Public Affairs, Psychological 

Operations, and Other Aspects of Information Operations. 

One unique area within the administrative law discipline faced by JAs 

within Task Force Falcon was the support required by information 

operations (IO). In addition to participating in the IO working groups, Task 

Force Falcon JAs were regularly called on to review products intended for 

the public—both international and local—prepared by the PAO office and 

the psychological operations detachment. Extensive coordination between 

IO cells and JAs occurred during significant events, such as the highvisibility trials of Kosovars detained by U.S. forces, the Task Force plan to 

address militant groups operating in the GSZ, high-profile U.S. criminal 

cases, and the status of investigations of international interest.185 The IO 

section often needed detailed information on the legal issues surrounding 

these high-profile situations to produce an effective command message. JAs 

played a critical role in IO by tailoring the information to the appropriate 

audience, while ensuring that all products were legally and factually 

accurate. 

To provide timely advice to IO, JAs must be aware of the 

methodology applied in the IO field.186 Understanding how an IO cell 

operates allows JAs to provide advice while time exists to pursue alternate 

While deployed, the administrative and support issues of a court-martial are not merely visible but 

conspicuous. See Memorandum, CPT Paula Schasberger, former Deputy Legal Advisor, Task Force
 

Falcon, to CLAMO, subject: Comments to AAR for Kosovo , ¶ 1(g) (n.d.) [hereinafter Schasberger 

Memo] (on file with CLAMO). 

184 FM 27-100, supra note 29, ¶ 3.5. 185 See 1AD AAR, supra note 156, § 3, ¶ D. 186 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-6, INFORMATION OPERATIONS (27 Aug. 1996). 

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courses of action, if necessary. Additionally, understanding the language 

and decision-making process of the IO cell gives the JA additional 

credibility with the members of the IO cell. 

2. Understand the Distinction Between War Trophies and Historical 

Artifacts and Be Prepared to Address Unit Desires to Retain Historical 

Artifacts. 

Under international law, materiel captured from an enemy during an 

armed conflict becomes the property of the government of the capturing 

force. Title to the seized property passes by convention.187 Various Army 

regulations allow the seized property to be used for intelligence, 

reutilization, training, and historical purposes.188 Units can request to retain 

property seized during an armed conflict as an historical artifact; 

additionally, confiscated enemy property may be retained by individual 

soldiers if the property is properly designated as a war trophy in accordance 

with law and regulation.189 

In operations other than war, property recovered from a host nation 

does not become the property of the seizing government. A limited 

exception exists when the property was obtained through donation or 

purchase, was abandoned, or was originally U.S. property.190 

Two Army regulations, AR 870-29, Historical Activities: Museums 

and Artifacts, and AR 608-4, Control and Registration of War Trophies, 

address obtaining artifacts. However, these two regulations do not provide 

specific guidance for retaining property confiscated during peacekeeping 

operations as historical artifacts. After discussion with the Center for 

Military History (CMH), USAREUR decided the best approach to address 

the desire of units to retain historical artifacts was to submit requests from 

187 See Annex to Hague Convention No. IV Embodying the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs 

of War on Land, art. 23, ¶ g (1907).

188 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 870-20, ARMY MUSEUMS, HISTORICAL ARTIFACTS (11 Jan. 1999)
 

[hereinafter AR 870-20]. 

189 See National Defense Authorization Act of 1994, § 1171, 10 U.S.C. § 2579 (2000). For an item to be 

declared a war trophy, it must have first been seized in a combat zone and within a proscribed period of
 

time. See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 608-4, CONTROL AND REGISTRATION OF WAR TROPHY AND WAR 

TROPHY FIREARMS ¶ 4(b) (28 Aug. 1969). There was no designated combat zone during Operation Joint
 

Guardian.
 190 See AR 870-20, supra note 188, ¶ 2-5; see also E-mail from David C. Cole, Associate Chief Curator,
 

Center for Military History, to CPT Alton L. Gwaltney, III, Chief of Operational Law, 1ID (28 Oct. 1999) 

(on file with CLAMO). 

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the Task Force, through the chain of command, to USAREUR for review 

and recommendation. USAREUR would then forward the requests to the 

CMH for action as an exception to the current policy. Because of the 

sensitive nature of these requests, the CMH decided to forward all requests 

to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army for review.191 

Processing unit requests to retain seized items for historical purposes 

consumed JA time on each of the first four rotations to Kosovo. Marines in 

Kosovo during the first month of the operation were unable to resolve the 

issue prior to redeployment.192 At the Task Force level, JAs were 

responsible for drafting and disseminating the implementing procedures of 

the USAREUR policy for units within the Task Force. In conjunction with 

the G-4, JAs detailed the internal procedures for requests in a FRAGO to 

units in the Task Force.193 Exceptions to the policy were processed slowly. 

The Task Force did not receive a final decision on the requests until nine 

months after the request was submitted. By that time, the units were out of 

Kosovo and providing the historical items to the units became 

extraordinarily difficult. 

3. Standardize Administrative Investigative Procedures. 

The current version of AR 15-6 requires all investigating officers to 

meet with a legal representative prior to beginning an investigation.194 This 

requirement can make properly advising the numerous administrative 

investigating officers appointed during a deployment an overwhelming 

task.195 Standardizing the pre-investigative briefing allows any JA or legal 

specialist to provide the initial advice. Investigative packets designed to 

address a specific issue can also be helpful in streamlining investigations. 

JAs in the 1AD designed a special “Weapons Discharge Investigation” 

worksheet, included in Appendix IV-31. This worksheet was particularly 

helpful in addressing a recurring issue requiring investigation. 

191 See E-mail from John Alva, USAREUR, ODCSLOG, to MAJ Steve Russell, XO, 1-26 Infantry (30 May 

2000) (on file with CLAMO). 

192 See MEU AAR, supra note 6, ¶ 4. 193 A copy of the internal processing procedures as provided by the 1ID JAs is included in Appendix IV-32. 194 U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 15-6, PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATING OFFICERS AND BOARDS OF OFFICERS 

¶ 3-0 (20 Sept. 1996). 

195 JAs deployed during each of the four rotations of the first two years of the mission to Kosovo 

commented on the large number of administrative investigations conducted by the Task Force. It was 

common to have four or five investigations pending at any one time. See Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 

517-18; 1AD AAR, supra note 156, § III, ¶ D; Telephone Interview with MAJ Rob Jefferson, former Legal 

Advisor, Task Force Falcon (23 July 2001) (notes on file with CLAMO). 

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4. Design a Method to Ensure Mandatory Investigations Are Promptly 

Completed. 

JAs should consider advising commanders to mandate reporting to the 

tactical operations center (TOC) certain incidents requiring investigation. 

JAs need to further ensure that the Battle Captain knows to report the 

information to the legal staff to initiate appointment of investigating officers. 

The types of incidents requiring investigation typically include the death or 

injury of a soldier, death of a civilian through U.S. action, or accidents 

requiring safety investigations such as aircraft accidents or those causing 

damage in excess of $2,000.196 Two years into the Kosovo mission, 

USAREUR mandated Commander’s Assessments be performed any time 

U.S. troops used lethal force that resulted in injury.197 A copy of the 

implementing memorandum and Commander’s Assessment Guide are 

included in Appendix IV-33. 

JAs must track the progress of the investigations and ensure that they 

are completed in a timely manner. Stresses of the mission and the high 

tempo of deployment can cause delays in completing these investigations. 

JAs need to relay the importance of these investigations to the investigating 

officer and be prepared to update the command on the status of the 

investigations. Because of the high volume of investigations that occur 

during a deployment, JAs should maintain a database tracking the status of 

the investigation from appointment to final action. 

5. Be Prepared to Advise Counterintelligence Units. 

Because most deployed task forces will have significant outside 

intelligence assets, JAs must be prepared to provide intelligence law advice 

during operational deployments. This will include advising 

counterintelligence units about limitations on information collection and 

196 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 385-40, ACCIDENT REPORTING AND RECORDS ¶ 1-1 (1 Nov. 1994) 

(“[A]n Army accident is defined as an unplanned event, or series of events, that results in injury/illness to 

either Army or non-Army personnel, and/or damage to Army or non-Army property as a direct result of 

Army operations (caused by the Army). In addition, a recordable accident (over $2,000 damage to Army 

property, or a workday lost by Army personnel when there is no degree of fault by the Army (military or 

civilian)), will be reported . . . .”). 

197 See Memorandum, GEN Montgomery C. Meigs, Commander, USAREUR, to Distribution List (A), 

subject: Commander’s Assessment of Lethal Force Resulting in Personal Injury During Peace Operations 

(7 May 2001). 

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searches of U.S. persons.198 Applicable directives and regulations prohibit 

physical surveillance of U.S. persons abroad to collect foreign intelligence, 

except to obtain significant information that cannot be reasonably acquired 

by other means.199 The applicable directives and regulations also prohibit 

intelligence assets from conducting nonconsensual searches of U.S. persons 

without Attorney General approval.200 JAs must also be prepared to give 

advice on issues regarding the interrogation of detainees pending criminal 

trial, intelligence contingency funds, low-level source operations, and the 

role of the G-2X.201 To appropriately advise CI assets, a JA will need to 

hold a Top Secret security clearance. 

F. CIVIL LAW 

Civil law is the body of law containing the statutes, 

regulations, and judicial decisions that govern the rights and 

duties of military organizations and installations with regard to 

civil authorities.

202 

All JAs participating in the KFOR mission agreed that it was critical 

to have subject matter experts available for assistance in civil law matters.203 

JAs face contract and fiscal law issues almost daily while deployed. 

1. Contract Law 

Contract law is the application of domestic and international 

law to the acquisition of goods, services, and construction.204 

198 See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 CFR 200 (1981) [hereinafter Exec. Order No. 12,333]; U.S. DEP’T OF 

DEFENSE, DIR. 5200.27, ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS NOT 

AFFILIATED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (7 Jan. 1980); U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 381-10, U.S. 

ARMY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (1 July 1984) [hereinafter AR 381-10]. 199 See Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 198, ¶ 2.4(d); AR 381-10, supra note 198, ¶ 2(D), 9(C)(2).
 200 See Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 198, ¶¶ 2.4(b), 2.5; AR 381-10, supra note 198, ¶ 7(C)(2)(b). 201 Schasberger Memo, supra note 183, ¶ 1(i). 202 FM 27-100, supra note 29, ¶ 3.6. 203 From an early stage in the operation, Contracting Command, Europe (CCE), and the Office of the Judge 

Advocate, USAREUR, supported the mission to Kosovo with an attorney well-versed in contract and fiscal 

law. Typically serving ninety days in theater, these attorneys would travel between CAS and Camp
 

Bondsteel. This position is now filled as a one-year PCS assignment. When not in the area, the CCE 

attorneys remained available through e-mail and telephone contact to assist the deployed JAs. See Kosovo
 

AAR, supra note 92, at 534-35 (describing these attorneys as “heroes” to the deployed JAs). 204 FM 27-100, supra note 29, ¶ 3.6. 

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a. JAs Must Have a Basic Understanding of the Brown & Root 

Sustainment Contract. 

Brown & Root provided sustainment services to troops deployed to 

FYROM and Kosovo under the Balkans Support Contract,205 similar to the 

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).206 When the operation 

was in its nascent stages, there was no Administrative Contracting Officer 

(ACO) and no attorney from Contracting Command or the Corps of 

Engineers permanently in theater to monitor the contract, so JAs were 

required to fill the gap by providing contracting advice to the command.207 

Even after operations were well established, the Task Force command 

section looked to the JAs within the Task Force headquarters to assist with 

contract interpretation and enforcement. JAs faced various issues arising 

from the sustainment contract, ranging from issues about the quality of the 

TOC door locks208 and general base camp construction, to food and laundry 

services. 

b. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement Operations Have 

Matured to a Level Where Few Issues Arise, but JAs Must Remain 

Prepared. 

The multinational coalition of forces in Kosovo required an extensive 

use of Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSAs)209 for logistics 

support by and to the U.S. For example, all coalition countries drew fuel 

supplies from the French. While JAs were prepared to address ACSA issues 

based on previous lessons learned,210 the operations ran smoothly at the Task 

Force level and required little JA involvement. The G-4 section identified 

an ACSA point of contact, and the predeployment training prepared the Task 

Force to address ACSA issues. While legal sections for each rotation had an 

205 See supra note 114 for a discussion about the Brown & Root Balkan sustainment contract. 206 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 700-137, LOGISTICS CIVIL AUGMENTATION PROGRAM (LOGCAP) (16 

Dec. 1985). 

207 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 490-91. 208 After moving into the permanent Task Force Falcon TOC, many of the door locks broke. JAs took a 

particular interest in this issue—during one rotation, a lock broke while the Task Force Falcon legal advisor 

was in the latrine, forcing him to climb out the latrine window. 

209 ACSAs allow DOD to enter into agreements with other eligible countries for the reciprocal provision of 

logistics support. Acquisitions and transfers are on a cash-reimbursable, replacement-in-kind (RIK), or 

equal value exchange (EVE) basis. 10 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2350 (2000). Lists of current ACSA agreements 

within the European Community and ACSA training slides are at 

http://www.odcsrm.hqusareur.army.mil/rmbud/acsahp1.htm (last visited 2 Oct. 2001). 210 See BALKANS, supra note 13, at 152-53. 

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identified POC for ACSA issues, few issues arose.211 However, prior to 

trained logisticians arriving to provide ACSA support and accounting, JAs 

need to be prepared to advise the command on ACSA issues.212 

c. Be Prepared to Provide Logistical Support Through Agreements 

Other than ACSAs. 

There is no legal authority to provide free logistical support to foreign 

militaries. This axiom was severely tested when troops from the United 

Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Ukraine arrived to participate in KFOR. 

For political reasons, there was a great deal of interest at the National 

Command level to have the UAE and the Ukraine participate in KFOR. 

USAREUR faced the challenge of providing logistical support to troops 

from the UAE and the Ukraine, even though neither country had an ACSA 

with the U.S.213 USAREUR was tasked to review all logistical support 

requirements for the two countries’ task forces. The support included 

billeting, meals, communications, quality of life, and, for the UAE, AH-64 

aviation parts and maintenance facilities. Ultimately, the support was 

provided through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases, as discussed below. 

For the Task Force, the everyday approach to capturing the costs and 

forwarding the amounts to higher headquarters was the same as if the 

support was provided pursuant to an ACSA. 

1. Support can be provided through a Foreign Military 

Sales Case, with specifics detailed in a memorandum of 

agreement. 

In August 1999, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency prepared 

two FMS cases for the UAE. FMS cases are normally used to provide 

military hardware and equipment to foreign nations, but in this instance they 

were tailored to provide logistical support to the UAE while serving as part 

211 See 1AD AAR, supra note 156, § III, ¶ E.
 212 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 361 (noting “[t]he agreement is just the first step. What doesn’t 

happen a lot of times [early in the deployment] is you don’t have the trained, the school-trained logistics 

personnel who know how to collect and who know how to account for the stuff the other services are 

getting from you or you’re getting from the other services. In some areas it worked well . . . but there were 

a lot of other areas where I didn’t see the tough accounting occurring.”) (quoting LTC Mark Martins,
 

Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, 1ID). 

213 The U.S. and the Ukraine entered into an ACSA on 19 November 1999. 

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of Task Force Falcon.214 The UAE funded the FMS cases with $11.3 

million and received support pursuant to the FMS case.215 The UAE’s 

participation in KFOR was unique in that their troops were not only part of 

KFOR, but they also served as part of Task Force Falcon. It was therefore 

necessary to prepare a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with detailed 

command and control, training, aircraft configuration, and claims 

provisions.216 USAREUR prepared this MOA at the same time the FMS 

cases were being prepared, with the expectation that both documents would 

be signed before the UAE began putting troops on the ground. The MOA 

also specified the types of logistic support, by class, that USAREUR and 

Task Force Falcon would provide. 

The Ukrainian forces arrived for the Kosovo mission with short notice 

to DOD officials, and before any support agreements were in place.217 The 

day after the Ukraine contingent arrived in theater, U.S. Army Security 

Assistance Command initiated three FMS cases in support of the Ukrainian 

deployment. The FMS cases were funded with $700,000 from Foreign 

Military Financing (FMF) funds.218 Essentially, the U.S. funded the Ukraine 

deployment, and the $700,000 was expended prudently to provide basic life 

support for as long as possible. 

2. The U.S. cannot give free logistical support and should 

explain the anticipated costs associated with U.S. logistical 

support. 

Both the UAE and the Ukraine were offered a “menu” of logistic 

support options, ranging from basic support to the same level and quality of 

support provided to U.S. soldiers. Both countries chose the same level of 

214 The Foreign Military Sales Program is a security assistance method by which the U.S. provides defense 

articles and training to further national policy. Eligible governments purchase defense items based on 

contracts managed by DOD as an FMS “case.” 22 U.S.C. §§ 2761-62 (2000). 

215 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 556. 216 The MOA is included in Appendix IV-34. 217 When the Ukrainian advance party showed up with little notice, USAREUR instructed Task Force 

Falcon to provide the minimum level of support necessary (water, food, shelter), and track the costs. When 

the FMS cases were completed, the accumulated costs were rolled into the FMS cases. E-mail from LTC 

Richard Sprunk, Office of the Army General Counsel, to Maj Cody Weston, CLAMO (16 Oct. 2001) 

[hereinafter Sprunk E-mail] (on file with CLAMO). 

218 Foreign Military Financing is one security assistance method by which the U.S. provides defense 

articles and training to further national policy. Eligible governments receive congressional appropriations 

to assist in purchasing U.S. defense items. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2363-64. The U.S. added another $4.3 million in 

FMF funds to the Ukraine’s FMS case after the Ukrainian troops arrived in Kosovo. 

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support provided to U.S. soldiers and balked at the amount of money they 

were paying for logistical support. 

The UAE was most vocal about the price they were paying for support 

and regularly sought ways to reduce costs. One politically troubling issue 

was their request for a free helicopter maintenance clamshell, in 

consideration for the amount of money they were paying to live in SEA 

Huts. They then wanted to return some of the SEA Huts they owned and use 

the “residual value” to pay for the clamshell. The UAE also proposed 

renting the SEA Huts rather than buying them, but because the SEA Huts 

were not excess to U.S. needs, the U.S. could not lease the SEA Huts.219 

This controversy went on for several months. The experience made it clear 

that the MOA should restate U.S. law concerning the provision of goods and 

services, and that during MOA negotiations it be made clear that the U.S. 

must capture all support costs and bill them to the country provided the 

support.220 JAs should remember that the terms of the FMS case will control 

the transaction, and that the MOA is a supporting instrument. 

After several months, the Ukraine’s FMS case began to run out of 

funds, and no additional FMF funds were available to fund it. The 

Ukrainians began looking for ways to economize and extend their 

participation in KFOR. After about one year, they moved off Camp 

Bondsteel and relocated to a camp occupied by the Polish Battalion 

operating in the U.S. sector. Task Force Falcon determined it had a need for 

the Ukraine’s SEA Huts, and purchased them for their residual value; the 

funds were then put back into the Ukraine’s FMS case.221 The U.S. 

continued to provide some logistical support to the Ukraine after they left 

Camp Bondsteel, but at a significantly reduced level. For example, because 

the Ukrainians were not availing themselves of all the logistic support 

available at Camp Bondsteel,222 their costs were expected to shrink to about 

$40,000 a month, down from approximately $350,000 a month. 

219 See 22 U.S.C. § 2796 (2000). The statute requires the President to determine that the defense articles to 

be leased are “not for the time needed for public use.” If the Task Force had existing SEA Huts previously 

constructed, but no longer needed to support the Task Force, they might have been determined to be 

available for lease, but this was not the situation in Kosovo. 

220 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 557. 221 USAREUR required Task Force Falcon to pay for the SEA Huts out of the Task Force’s allotted 

CONOPS funds. See Sprunk E-mail, supra note 217. 222 For example, base camp maintenance, laundry, food and food preparation, bottled water, class III (bulk 

petroleum) storage and distribution, all MWR activities, HAZMAT removal, bulk water transportation, and 

all Brown & Root Services management overhead. 

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d. Be Prepared to Advise the Joint Acquisition Review Board. 

The Task Force ran a Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB) to 

review all requirements that cost more than $2,500. JAs working in the Task 

Force attended the twice-a-week JARB meetings as nonvoting advisors. The 

JARB was responsible for validating proposed requirements, making a 

source selection utilizing the best value to the U.S., ensuring that 

inappropriate or unauthorized purchases were not processed, and 

documenting the validation and source selection process.223 

When attorneys from Contracting Command Europe (CCE) 

participated in the JARB, Task Force JAs often served as a liaison between 

the Task Force and the CCE attorney to ensure that the CCE attorney had all 

the necessary information to advise the JARB. Because the CCE attorney 

was responsible for operations in Kosovo and FYROM, Task Force JAs 

would have to advise the JARB when the CCE attorney was absent. 

2. Fiscal Law 

Task Force Falcon attorneys faced a steady stream of fiscal law 

questions from commanders and staff. Commanders 

occasionally became unpleasant when JAs had to say “no” to a 

proposed project . . . ; our lack of fiscal law experience 

aggravated these minor confrontations.224 

[Fiscal law] is an area that most JAs do not have enough 

training in and we need more training in it.225
 

Fiscal law is the application of domestic statutes and 

regulations to the funding of military operations, and support to 

non-federal agencies and organizations.226 

Commanders and staffs deployed on peacekeeping missions face 

enormous pressure to act in support of the numerous requests for 

223 JARB Operations within USAREUR-commanded areas are now guided by “Contingency Operations
 

Financial Management Implementing Instructions,” included in Appendix IV-35. See Memorandum, 

Deputy Commanding General USAREUR, to Distribution List, subject: Contingency Operations Financial 

Management Implementation Instructions (23 Apr. 2001) (on file with CLAMO). 

224 1AD AAR, supra note 156, § III, ¶ E. 225 Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 519. 226 FM 27-100, supra note 29, ¶ 3.6. 

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humanitarian and civil support. Commanders’ training and beliefs tell them 

that providing support to those in need is the right thing to do. U.S. law, 

however, may not permit the support because it requires that funds be spent 

in a manner consistent with congressional appropriations and authorization. 

A key point to remember is that money appropriated for contingency 

operations (CONOPS),227 when transferred into other DOD accounts, takes 

on the character and restrictions placed on those accounts. CONOPS is not a 

magic funding source without restriction. CONOPS funds are primarily 

placed in Operations and Maintenance Accounts (OMA); those CONOPS 

moneys take on the purpose, duration, and amount requirements of normal 

OMA dollars.228 

In addition to CONOPS/OMA money, operations in Kosovo received 

funds from the appropriation for Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic 

Aid (OHDACA). Early in the operation, the Commander, Task Force 

Falcon, also drew on his inherent authority to protect the force to justify a 

transfer of fuel to firefighters and farmers in Kosovo. The issues and lessons 

discussed below are a small representation of the numerous fiscal law issues 

that arose in Kosovo. 

227 “CONOPS” is the vernacular term used to refer to funding from the Overseas Contingency Operations 

Transfer Fund (OCOTF) appropriation. DOD Appropriations Act for FY 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-259, 114 

Stat. 661. OCOTF funds are “no-year” funds intended to reimburse DoD and the military departments for 

unprogrammed contingency operations that occur during a given FY. OCOTF funds are now available for 

transfer into OMAs, working capital funds, the Defense Health Program account, procurement accounts, 

research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) accounts, and military personnel accounts. For FY 

2001, Congress appropriated $3.94 billion in no-year funds “for expenditures directly relating to Overseas 

Contingency Operations by U.S. Military Forces.” See also U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REG. 7000.14-R, 

DOD FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REGULATION, vol. 12 (Special Accounts and Programs), ch. 23 

(Contingency Operations) (Feb. 2001). The National Defense Authorization Act for 2001 expanded the 

utility of the OCOTF. Prior to FY 2001, OCOTF funds were available for transfer only into OMAs, 

working capital funds, and the Defense Health Program account. The National Defense Authorization Act 

for 2001 permitted DOD to transfer contingency funds into procurement accounts, but there has been a 

marked reluctance to do so. See Sprunk E-mail, supra note 217. 228 During the first FY of a new contingency, DoD and the military departments must fund the operation 

with funds currently available. Once Congress takes action, either on an annual appropriation, or 

supplemental appropriation, Congress may designate certain contingencies to receive funding from the 

OCOTF. Once Congress has designated the new contingency in an appropriation act, DoD may then 

access the OCOTF to fund the contingency. After the legislative designation, the forces executing the 

contingency will request the type and amount of funds necessary to fund the contingency. OCOTF funds 

may now be requested for transfer into the following appropriations: O&M accounts, working capital 

funds, the Defense Health Program account, procurement accounts, RDT&E accounts, and military 

personnel accounts. Once transferred, the OCOTF funds take on the character of the fund into which they 

have been transferred. At the time operations began in Kosovo, OCOTF funds were only available for 

transfer to O&M accounts, working capital funds, and the Defense Health Program account. 

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a. Humanitarian Assistance Projects Should Be CentrallyManaged and Reviewed to Ensure Expenditures Are in Compliance 

with the Appropriation. 

Task Force Falcon received $5 million in a two-year appropriation for 

urgent humanitarian assistance.229 The JCS and EUCOM placed numerous 

restrictions on the use of these funds. These restrictions included project 

cost limitations, limits on the types of projects the Task Force could 

undertake, and a requirement to use certain legal authorities for the 

expenditures. After some trial and error, the Task Force developed a system 

whereby the CA staff section prepared each potential humanitarian 

assistance project with cost estimates, photographs, and project details. The 

project was reviewed by a group of staff officers, including a JA, before 

being sent to the Commander for action. The JA’s review included 

consideration of the restraints of the OHDACA appropriation.230 Even with 

this system in place, problems with OHDACA spending still arose. 

b. Make Sure Contractors Understand That They Are Limited to 

Payment Only for Contracted Work. 

While this lesson may sound obvious, problems arose when 

contractors performed work beyond that for which the Task Force 

contracted. For example, a contractor working on roof repairs to a school— 

a project allowable under the OHDACA appropriation and approved by the 

Task Force Commander—was contacted by the school administrator and 

asked to add new ceilings or new lights to the school. The Task Force did 

not request these repairs, and, in some circumstances, the work exceeded the 

rudimentary repairs authorized by the DOD policy governing the use of 

229 See Message, 131310Z AUG 99, USCINCEUR, subject: USKFOR Program Approval and Funding for 

Urgent Humanitarian Needs. The following messages implemented the OHDACA program: Message, 

201153Z Aug 99, CDR USAREUR DCOPS, subject: USKFOR Funding for Urgent Humanitarian Needs; 

Message, 101424Z SEP 99, USCINCEUR, subject: USKFOR Program Approval for Urgent Humanitarian 

Needs; Message, 291337Z NOV 99, USCINCEUR, subject: USKFOR Urgent Humanitarian Needs 

Program; Message, 011254Z DEC 99, subject: USCINCEUR, USKFOR Urgent Humanitarian Needs 

Program. All messages are included in Appendix IV-36. 230 Understanding the operations of the numerous NGOs within Kosovo aided in the overall quality of the 

legal review. JAs knowledgeable in the available NGO resources and understanding the legal restrictions 

placed on spending were able to provide better advice on the overall handling of humanitarian assistance 

projects. For example, because funding categories for humanitarian assistance by military forces were 

limited, some projects could only be undertaken by a joint NGO/Task Force effort. See Schasberger 

Memo, supra note 183, ¶ 1(f). 

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OHDACA funds.231 The contractor would make the repairs and attempt to 

bill the Task Force for the repair work, but such requests for additional 

payments were denied.232 

c. Understanding the Mission and the Legal Framework of the 

Operation Can Lead to Fiscal Justification for Expenditures. 

Deployment into and out of Kosovo posed a logistical hurdle for U.S. 

KFOR planners.233 Many existing lines of communication were unable to 

support the movement of U.S. heavy equipment. One such logistical issue 

arose with the need to improve a railroad loading dock in Gerlick, Kosovo, 

to support a palletized loading system to offload U.S. goods shipped into 

Kosovo by rail. The U.S. could not get approval from Serbia for the 

necessary repairs because this immediately followed the Allied Force 

bombing campaign. The UNMIK government was not in a position to assist 

with property ownership issues at the early stages of the mission. JAs 

attempting to determine an appropriate authority to improve the railroad 

facility looked to the MTA. In the MTA, Kosovo forces were given the 

authority to “take all necessary action” to carry out the mission. The U.S. 

used this language as a rationale for making the necessary improvements to 

the rail station. 

The transportation of Serb schoolchildren in HMMWVs and 

nontactical vehicles to and from school also hinged on the interpretation of 

the SACEUR Operational Plan to determine whether such transportation was 

a necessary and incident expense to meet the requirements of the Purpose 

Statute.234 SACEUR, in an NCA-approved mission plan, directed Task 

Force Falcon to observe and prevent interference with the movement of 

231 One such “mission expansion” project included adding a new boiler to a school for heating. The boiler 

was not compatible with the pipes in the school and when the boiler was fired, all the pipes blew apart. 

Other examples included adding indoor bathrooms to schools that previously had no indoor plumbing; retiling floors; and purchasing and installing electrical substation transformers, thus improving the electrical 

system beyond preconflict condition.

232 See MAJ Brian Goddard & LTC Richard Sprunk, Operation Joint Guardian: Contract and Fiscal Law 

Issues, PowerPoint presentation, notes accompanying briefing slide 15 (2000) (on file with CLAMO). 233 The acting Operations Officer for Military Traffic and Management Control is quoted as saying, 

“[Kosovo] has got to be one of the hardest places to get to in the world.” John R. Randt, Landing the 

Kosovo Force, at http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/JanFeb00/MS519.htm (last visited 8 Sept. 2001). 234 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (2000). See also Memorandum, Deputy Legal Advisor, Task Force Falcon, to 

Resource Management, Task Force Falcon, subject: Serb Escort Missions (17 Mar. 2000) [hereinafter Serb 

Escort Memo] (on file with CLAMO). The fact-specific determinations frequent in fiscal law opinions 

often lend themselves to disagreements over appropriate use of funds. E-mails sent to various JAs asking 

for their technical expertise with this issue led to entirely different responses. 

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civilian populations and to respond appropriately to deliberate threats to life 

and property as part of the overall Task Force Falcon mission. Task Force 

Falcon thought it necessary to transport Serb schoolchildren because of 

recent attacks on Serb convoys, including the intentional bombing of a Serb 

shopping convoy.235 Based on these facts, the JA opined that the support 

was appropriate.236 In this particular instance, the “third-party tasking” fell 

within the scope of the NCA-directed mission. U.S. forces cannot simply 

execute third-party taskings without determining that such taskings fall 

within the scope of the NCA-directed mission, or determining an 

independent U.S. legal authority for executing the particular tasking. 

d. Support to the UN Requires Reimbursement. 

Issues of support to the UN presented themselves in a variety of ways. 

Often there were direct requests for support from UN representatives; other 

times, KFOR taskings would contain embedded support requirements. One 

tasking, which was part of a KFOR and UN Office for Project Services 

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), would have required the U.S. to 

expand the size of the Task Force ammunition holding area to accommodate 

the requirements of the MOU addressing demining activities.237 Another 

KFOR tasking would have required Task Force Falcon to transfer C4 

explosive, blasting caps, detonation cord, and time fuses on a reimbursable 

basis to a civilian demining organization working under UN guidance.238 

JAs rightly saw these as legally objectionable taskings from KFOR. 

There were also constant issues over use of dining facilities, medical 

facilities, and the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) by UN 

workers—particularly Americans working with the UN. UN representatives 

would often question the Task Force Commander directly on U.S. 

235 Because Kosovar Serbs were not able to move freely around Kosovo, U.S. forces accompanied convoys 

of Kosovar Serbs to the Kosovo-Serbia border so the Kosovar Serbs could shop for groceries and other 

items in Serbia. The convoys typically ran two times a week. 

236 Serb Escort Memo, supra note 234, ¶ 3a. The JA noted that this support could not be without end: 

“[T]he ultimate goal is to transfer these types of actions to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 

(UNMIK). Additionally, the Task Force, through the G-5, could attempt to coordinate with Nongovernmental Organizations for support for these missions until UNMIK is prepared to take 

responsibility.” Id. ¶ 4(i). 237 See Memorandum for Record, Operational Law Attorney, Task Force Falcon, subject: Legal Review of 

MOU between KFOR and UNOPS (9 Mar. 2000) (on file with CLAMO). 

238 See Memorandum, Deputy Legal Advisor, Task Force Falcon, to Assistant Task Force Engineer, Task 

Force Falcon, subject: Transfer of Explosives to Civilian Demining Companies (15 Aug. 2000) (on file 

with CLAMO). 

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support.239 Although an ACSA is authorized by statute,240 there is no ACSA 

between the U.S. and the UN, and there is no other source for 

reimbursement between the UN and the U.S. Army in Kosovo.241 With no 

mechanism for reimbursement, UN workers could not just “sign in” to the 

dining facilities as members of the forces of other countries were allowed to 

do. USAREUR required UN workers to pay for meals when eating in the 

U.S. dining facility.242 Even though some American police members of 

UNMIK-P stated they were promised medical care at the U.S. facility as part 

of their employment contract, U.S. physicians could only treat UN workers 

in cases where there was a danger of loss of life, limb, or eyesight. The 

USAREUR Commander granted UN workers access to AAFES in 

accordance with AR 60-20.243 

e. A Commander’s Force Protection Obligation May Provide the 

Basis for Expenditures That Might Appear To Be Humanitarian 

Aid. 

The early days of the mission in Kosovo led to urgent requests from 

the local population to prevent the precarious situation from slipping into an 

even greater humanitarian disaster. Almost immediately upon KFOR’s 

entry into Kosovo, the 800,000 Kosovar refugees in camps in Albania and 

FYROM flooded back into the Kosovo province.244 Clashes between 

239 See E-mail from Legal Advisor, Task Force Falcon, to Chief, International and Operational Law, 

USAREUR, (20 Sept. 1999)(on file with CLAMO). 

240 See 10 U.S.C. § 2341-42 (2000). 241 Support to the UN may be provided in a variety of ways. As mentioned in the text, support may be 

provided through an ACSA; however, the UN has chosen not to enter into an ACSA with the U.S. Support 

may be provided through the UN Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 287d (2000), which allows the President to 

authorize personnel, supplies, services, and equipment for noncombat UN activities. Support may be 

provided through the Foreign Assistance Act, section 607, 22 U.S.C. § 2357 (2000), which allows the U.S. 

to provide support on an advance of funds or on a reimbursable basis to friendly foreign countries and the 

UN. Support may also be provided through the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2761-62 (2000) and 

through the Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1535 (2000). None of these provisions were applicable to the UN 

operations in Kosovo. An outline for fiscal law in military operations is provided in Appendix IV-37. 

Teaching Outline, General Officer Legal Orientation, MAJ Kevin Walker, Contract and Fiscal Law 

Department, The Judge Advocate General’s School, U.S. Army, Fiscal Law in Military Operations (May 

2000). 

242 See E-mail from CPT Eric Young, Operational Law Attorney, USAREUR, to CPT Alton L. Gwaltney, 

III, CLAMO (20 June 2001) (on file with CLAMO). 

243 U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 60-20, ARMY AIR FORCE EXCHANGE SERVICE OPERATING POLICIES ¶ 2­

11(b)(4) (15 Dec. 1992). 

244 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that there were 445,000 refugees in 

Albania, 345,000 refugees in FYROM, and 70,000 refugees in Montenegro. ASTRI SUHRKE ET AL., THE 

KOSOVO REFUGEE CRISIS: AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF UNHCR’S EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND 

RESPONSE ¶ 31 (Jan. 26, 2000), at http://www.unhcr.ch/evaluate/kosovo/toc.htm (last visited 27 Sept. 

2001). The total number of refugees from Kosovo between March and June 1999 topped one million. See 

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Kosovar Albanians and Serbs were not uncommon, and some groups of 

Kosovar Albanians resorted to arson to force Serbs to leave Kosovo.245 

Local fire departments did not have fuel for trucks to respond to the arson 

calls. KFOR was already concerned about adequate shelter for all Kosovars 

for the winter before the rash of arson attacks made the situation critical.246 

In addition, crops planted in the spring, before the NATO bombing 

campaign, were ripe and going to spoil if not harvested. There was no fuel 

to enable the farmers to harvest their crops. The Task Force viewed the 

employment of field workers as crucial to force protection and securing the 

Kosovo community, because workers in fields would not be burning homes 

and formulating plans to remove Serbs from Kosovo. 

The Task Force Falcon Commander felt that the situation was so dire 

that failing to act would lead to a widespread disaster and continue to 

threaten the safety of U.S. troops. Because no humanitarian funding was 

available, the commander acted under his inherent authority to protect the 

force and his authority to establish a secure environment in Kosovo and 

distributed approximately 12,000 gallons of fuel over a period of two 

weeks.247 This type of factually specific decision should not be made prior 

to coordinating with higher headquarters. DOD eventually approved the use 

of OHDACA funds for this purpose based on the Task Force request.248 

f. Gifts for Visitors Are a Recurring Issue. 

The Task Force Falcon Joint Visitors Bureau (JVB) maintained a 

robust schedule of visitors to the Task Force. The hundreds of visitors 

included the President of the United States, leaders of foreign countries, 

military leaders, and entertainers. JAs were constantly facing issues 

involving gifts—from coins, posters, hats, and jackets to bronze Falcon 

statues—for these visitors. Commanders and staffs regularly desired to use 

appropriated funds, either directly or under the Brown & Root contract, to 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Kosovo, UNHCR Web page, at
 

http://www.unhcr.ch/world/euro/seo/kosovo.htm (last visited 2 Oct. 2001) [hereinafter UNHCR]. 245 See UNHCR, supra note 244. 246 Based on surveys done between June and September 1999, UNHCR estimated that 128,105 homes were
 

damaged. See UNHCR, Housing Damage June 1999 (1999), at
 

http://www.unhcr.ch/world/euro/seo/maps/koshousing99.gif (last visited 27 Sept. 2001). 247 See Martins Presentation, supra note 26, at notes to briefing slide 23. See also Memorandum, 

Commander, Task Force Falcon, to Commander, JTF-Noble Anvil, subject: Emergency Fuel Distribution
 

(15 July 1999) (on file with CLAMO). 

248 See supra text accompanying notes 229-232. 

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purchase these gifts. While JAs vigilantly explained the gift-giving rules in 

a variety of formats, including information papers, legal reviews, e-mails, 

charts, and personal counseling, the message required constant repeating. 

Unit coins and certificates may be purchased with OMA funds and 

awarded for unique contributions to a mission. These items must be given 

as an award to soldiers or DOD appropriated fund civilian employees but 

must not be given as a token to all mission participants. Coins and 

certificates purchased with O&M funds may not be given to superiors, 

foreign officers, or as gifts.249 Gifts presented to authorized guests in 

connection with official courtesies may be purchased with Official 

Representation Funds (ORF).250 An authorized guest is one whose rank, 

position, function, or stature justifies entertainment. Authorized guests 

include distinguished citizens, military personnel, and government officials 

meeting regulatory criteria.251 Generally, DOD personnel are not considered 

authorized guests, unless listed in the governing regulations.252 Finally, 

commanders may always use personal funds to purchase gifts for Task Force 

visitors. 

g. Know When to Ask for Procurement Funds. 

The expense/investment threshold requires that items costing in 

excess of $100,000 and items that are centrally managed, whether in excess 

of $100,000 or not, be purchased with procurement appropriations rather 

than OMA.253 Proposed purchases during the deployment often conflicted 

with this threshold. There were several requirements for radios and warning 

systems that were centrally linked through some type of base station. JAs 

249 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-8-22, MILITARY AWARDS (25 Feb. 1995). 250 Representational funds are a subcategory of funds called “Emergency and Extraordinary Expenses” 

(E&E). 10 U.S.C. § 127 (2000). E&E funds are an “earmarked” portion of the annual OMA appropriation 

of DOD and each of the military departments. As such, the earmarked funds represent a formal subdivision 

of funds. E&E funds are tightly controlled by the Secretary concerned. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF 

DEFENSE, DIR. 7250.13, OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION FUNDS (23 Feb. 1989); U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 37­

47, REPRESENTATION FUNDS OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ¶ 2-3 (31 May 96) [hereinafter AR 37-47]; 

U.S. DEP’T OF AIR FORCE, INSTR. 65-603, OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION FUNDS: GUIDANCE AND 

PROCEDURES (1 Nov. 1997); U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, SEC’Y OF THE NAVY INSTR. 7042.7, GUIDELINES FOR 

USE OF OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION FUNDS (5 Nov. 1998). 251 AR 37-47, supra note 250, ¶ 2-3. 252 Id. ¶ 2-4.
 253 This limitation is established by annual legislation. See The Department of Defense Appropriations Act,
 

2001, Pub. L. No. 106-259, § 8043, 114 Stat. 656, 682 (2000). See also U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REG. 

7000.14-R, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REGULATION, vol. 2A, ch. 1, ¶ 010201 

(June 2000); and U.S. DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING, MANUAL 37-100-FY, app. A (2000). 

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reviewing these types of purchases considered many possible alternatives to 

assist the Task Force in fulfilling the requirements. JAs recommended 

leasing some of the equipment because leases do not fall under the same 

investment threshold requirements and they can be funded with OMA. JAs 

also encouraged the Task Force to review the requirements, in an effort to 

bring the purchase price below the $100,000 threshold.254 Additionally, JAs 

were involved in finding alternate sources of equipment that cost less than 

the threshold and did not have to be centrally operated.255 

JAs should be aware that it is extremely difficult for task forces and 

higher commands to get procurement funds for contingency operations. On 

rare occasions, DOD or DA provided small amounts of procurement funds 

(typically for force protection measures) to Task Force Falcon when 

USAREUR made a request through resource management channels, but the 

vast majority of the requests for procurement funds were denied.256 

Therefore, JAs need to be vigilant and ensure that requirements are properly 

described to keep them under the expense/investment threshold, and if that is 

not possible, counsel their commanders to lease what they need. 

G. CLAIMS 

The Army Claims Program investigates, processes, adjudicates, 

and settles claims on behalf of and against the United States 

world-wide “under the authority conferred by statutes, 

regulations, international and interagency agreements, and 

DOD Directives.”257 

Task Force Falcon, through the first two years of the mission, did not 

pay foreign claims in Kosovo.258 The MTA specifically provided that 

neither the “International Security Force (‘KFOR’) nor any of its personnel 

254 This was the method used to approve the purchase of fifty radios and a repeater system to connect all the 

radios to the same secure system. The JA advised separating the radios, which would operate 

independently from each other, and the base from the remaining items forming the system, and purchasing 

those without the repeater station. See Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 548. 255 This occurred when a JA reviewed the Task Force proposal to purchase an early warning system that
 

outfitted all of the living quarters and the guard towers with sirens, lights, and video cameras, and which
 

were all connected to a central computer monitoring system. The total cost of the system was $1.5 million. 

Because no procurement funds were available, the Task Force purchased tornado warning horns mounted 

on poles as a warning system until procurement funds became available. Id. 256 Sprunk E-mail, supra note 217. 257 FM 27-100, supra note 29, ¶ 3.7. 258 The U.S. and NATO paid claims in FYROM. 

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or staff shall be liable for any damages to public or private property that they 

may cause in the course of duties related to the implementation” of the 

MTA.259 The largest practical impediment to the payment of claims was the 

almost total absence of legitimate proof of ownership documents for 

automobiles and real property. Without such proof, there was no way to 

determine if the claimant was actually entitled to payment.260 

Potential claimants were informed of the claims policy, asked to fill 

out a basic claims information form, and told that if the policy were to 

change, they would be able to file a claim at that time. Soldiers distributed 

the basic claims information forms when they were involved in an accident 

but told potential claimants about the current policy.261 The JAs briefly 

reviewed the claims and filed information that had been provided by the 

potential claimant. They also prepared SOPs for adjudicating and paying 

foreign claims. U.S. Army Claims Service, Europe, prepared to augment the 

Task Force to catch up on what was anticipated to be a large backlog of 

claims should the policy change. 

Problems occasionally arose when commanders promised claims 

repayment for damages the Task Force was incapable of reimbursing. 

Making clear the claims posture in predeployment briefings may be the only 

way of ensuring the correct information is disseminated to locals. 

To engender goodwill without the claims program, soldiers were 

authorized, in some circumstances, to perform minor repairs to items the 

military damaged.262 For example, if a tracked vehicle backed into a wall 

and knocked it down, engineers might return to rebuild the wall. However, 

many circumstances that otherwise would have given rise to compensable 

claims went unpaid because of this policy. 

259 MTA, supra note 3, at app. 3, ¶ B. 260 E-mail from MAJ Martin L. Sims, former U.S. Army Claims Service Europe Deputy, to CLAMO (6
 

Sept. 2001) (on file with CLAMO). 

261 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 528. 262 See E-mail from Legal Advisor, Task Force Falcon, to Judge Advocates, Task Force Falcon (4 Mar. 

2000) (on file with CLAMO). 

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H. LEGAL ASSISTANCE 

Legal assistance is the provision of personal civil legal services 

to soldiers, their family members, and other eligible personnel. 

The mission of the Army Legal Assistance Program is “to assist 

those eligible for legal assistance in a timely and professional 

manner . . . .”263 

1. Tailor Legal Assistance Support to the Client. 

Tailoring legal assistance to support the client begins with appropriate 

home station briefings. Legal offices supporting a unit preparing for 

deployment can practice extensive preventive legal assistance. JAs and legal 

specialists need to ensure that soldiers take the few minutes available during 

the predeployment processing to think about personal finances, leases, court 

appearances, and any other potential issues that may arise during the length 

of the deployment. If soldiers will be deploying during tax season, JAs 

should inform the soldiers of the various ways to file income taxes, either in 

the deployed theater or in the rear through a power of attorney.264 

Soldiers distracted by legal problems can be a mission detractor and 

become a command discipline problem. This legal assistance problem can 

be exacerbated when the program designed to assist soldiers is not “user 

friendly.” JAs realized this and addressed it in many ways. 

Task Force Falcon JAs set legal assistance hours to conform with 

normal business hours in the U.S. During each rotation, one battalion was 

CONUS-based. Additionally, many of the issues that arose from Germanybased soldiers could only be resolved by making contact with individuals 

and businesses in the U.S. Convenient legal assistance hours prevented 

clients from having to return twice for no reason other than timing. 

As operations within Kosovo became stable, the legal assistance 

attorney ran “Legal Assistance Road Shows” to remote locations throughout 

the sector. The NCOIC of the tax program during the first year used the 

263 FM 27-100, supra note 29, ¶ 3.8. 264 See E-mail from SGT Stephanie Suski, former NCOIC Income Tax Program, Task Force Falcon, to
 

CPT Alton L. Gwaltney, III, CLAMO (8 June 2001) [hereinafter Suski E-mail] (on file with CLAMO). 

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road show in early 2000 with great success.265 The road show was adopted 

for all legal assistance issues by the fall. Each road show brought services to 

a relatively small number of clients, but it brought services to soldiers who 

would otherwise have had to use free time during recovery periods at the 

main base camp to address legal assistance matters.266 

2. Get Authority for Responsible Legal Specialists to Perform Notary 

Services. 

Absence of the JAs in the Task Force Legal Section from Camp 

Bondsteel often left legal specialists not permitted automatically by Army 

regulation to perform notary services as the sole soldier support to the legal 

assistance mission.267 SJAs may grant authority to legal specialists in the 

grades of E-3 and E-4 to perform notary services if the legal specialists 

possess appropriate judgment and maturity, serve under the supervision of a 

JA, and complete notary training.268 An extra notary can be a valuable legal 

assistance asset. 

3. Be Prepared to Provide Advice on Imminent Death Situations. 

A tragic consequence of any military action is the death of soldiers. 

Commanders rely on JAs to provide advice on survivor benefits in situations 

where a soldier is wounded seriously and may soon die. The core legal issue 

is whether the soldier should die on active duty or be medically retired. In 

most circumstances when death is imminent, retirement for physical 

disability provides greater benefits; however, due to variables that affect 

benefits, an exact monetary comparison of benefits between death on active 

duty and death in a retired status is impossible to discuss in this Book. To 

assist JAs on future deployments, an information paper is included in 

Appendix IV-38. 

265 See id. Starting in January 2000, the Task Force Falcon legal section offered income tax assistance, to 

include electronic filing of tax returns from Kosovo. This represents a vast advance in the JAGC’s ability 

to provide legal services to deployed soldiers. See, e.g., HAITI, supra note 35, at 123 n.405 (discussing that 

soldiers deployed to Haiti had to mail tax returns because electronic filing capability was hindered due to 

the inadequacy of telephone lines.). 

266 See 1AD AAR, supra note 156, § III, ¶ G. 267 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 27-55, NOTARIAL SERVICES ¶ 2-2a(2) (10 Apr. 1997) (gives notary 

power to noncommissioned officers performing in the 71D MOS). 

268 Id. ¶ 1-6. 

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I. BASE CAMP OPERATIONS 

Task Force Falcon occupied Camp Bondsteel as its headquarters. 

This is where the majority of legal assets were located. JAs were also 

located at Camp Monteith, about twenty miles from Camp Bondsteel, in the 

city of Gnjilane, Kosovo, and CAS in FYROM.269 Three CONUS infantry 

battalions also brought JA support during three separate rotations to 

Kosovo.270 These JAs were located outside both Camps Bondsteel and 

Monteith. JAs faced many issues unique to base camp operations. 

1. Give Careful Consideration to the Base Camp Assignment. 

The nature of operations at a base camp requires both the JA and legal 

specialist to handle issues arising across the core legal disciplines. Being 

separated from the legal support of the headquarters requires the JA to be 

proficient in all areas of military law. The legal specialist assigned to the 

base camp must be able to run an office when operations require the JA to 

leave the base camp.271 To be successful in providing legal support to a 

remote base camp, the JA and legal specialist will have to exercise sound, 

mature judgment, often beyond that expected of those holding similar rank 

or time in service. 

2. Remain Constantly Aware of the Potential for Conflicts of Interest. 

JAs at a base camp often perform legal assistance272 and provide 

advice to the command. The JA and legal specialist constantly have to 

screen clients and issues for potential conflicts of interest. These conflicts 

will most often arise in the context of reports of survey, where the JA could 

be called on to advise a survey officer or a respondent, but the conflicts 

could also arise in any circumstance where a soldier and the soldier’s 

269 After the first year, the U.S. regularly supplied a JA to KFOR headquarters in Pristina. Additionally, 

JAs from AFSOUTH and Contracting Command Europe regularly visited Kosovo to address specific 

concerns. After the first year of operations, a full time contracting attorney operated out of CAS to address 

contracting and fiscal issues in both FYROM and Kosovo. 

270 1-187, Infantry Battalion, 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division; 2-327 Infantry Battalion, 101st 

Airborne (Air Assault) Division; and 1-325 Airborne Infantry Battalion, 82d Infantry Division. 

271 “Competent, trustworthy 71D’s are an indispensable asset in a deployed environment. In addition to 

relieving the JAs of many administrative burdens, such as weekly reporting and ministerial office 

functions, a knowledgeable 71D may also prove valuable in providing . . . procedural advice to soldiers in 

the attorney’s absence.” Bagwell AAR, supra note 142, ¶ 3. 272 The JAs operating out of base camps performed considerable legal assistance. See Kosovo AAR, supra 

note 92, at 489 (estimating 75% of time performing legal assistance). 

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command are in conflict.273 The JA operating at a base camp legal office 

must ensure that there is a plan to address conflicts so that all parties 

requiring legal advice are able to get advice in a timely manner.274 

3. Expect Confusion if Base Camps Are Located in a Different Country. 

CAS, located in FYROM, served as the intermediate staging base 

(ISB) for operations in Kosovo. A battalion of infantry soldiers along with a 

Rear Area Operations Command (RAOC), medical, aviation, and other 

support organizations occupied CAS. All soldiers heading into or out of 

Kosovo passed through CAS. Despite being considered Task Force Falcon 

(Rear), CAS’s mission, ROE, and relationship with the host nation were 

distinctly different than those of Task Force Falcon. 

Soldiers operating out of CAS fell under the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement rather than the mission 

specific ROE of soldiers in Kosovo. This distinction required different ROE 

cards and training for the soldiers of CAS, and it required soldiers transiting 

between Kosovo and CAS to remain aware of the change in ROE when in 

FYROM. 

The distinction between the ROE also affected one significant 

operation at CAS. Approximately one week before the one-year anniversary 

of the initiation of the air campaign in Kosovo, the head of security for the 

U.S. Embassy in Skopje requested that CAS provide a security detail in the 

event that planned demonstrations turned violent. The battalion commander 

at CAS requested from the Task Force Falcon Commander in Kosovo the 

release of certain weapons, the use of which the ROE for the Kosovo 

mission restricted. The Task Force Falcon Commander granted this release. 

JAs learned about the mission five days before the mission was to occur. 

After asking a few background questions, the JAs realized that no one in the 

appropriate chain of command was aware of this tasking, which had come 

directly from the head of security at the Embassy to the battalion 

commander. The JA also realized that the battalion was operating under the 

belief that the ROE for the Kosovo mission was applicable for the Embassy 

mission. Recognizing these problems, the legal advisors were able to 

273 This could include debt counseling, spousal or child support, administrative investigations 

recommending nonpunitive actions, and early criminal investigations. 

274 Within Task Force Falcon operations, conflict cases were referred to the Camp Bondsteel main legal 

office. See, e.g., Bagwell AAR, supra note 142, ¶ 3.
 

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coordinate within legal channels for the battalion to receive authorization 

from the proper approval authorities before mission initiation.275 

The JAs assigned to CAS, which was located in a NATO Partnership 

for Peace Country,276 had to address claims and SOFA issues.277 The JAs 

involved in operations at CAS also had to address concerns of a functioning 

host nation government and understand additional bilateral and multilateral 

agreements affecting military operations.278 

J. PERSONNEL, TRAINING, AND EQUIPMENT 

Kosovo operations confirmed the validity of past lessons learned 

under this heading.279 Determining appropriate personnel for a deployment 

is driven by the mission and nature of the operation. Operations in Kosovo 

again saw the need to assign JAs to base camps where less than a brigade of 

soldiers operated. To successfully accomplish the mission, certain JAs 

needed Top Secret security clearances and the ability to communicate by 

secure means. Focused training, in both soldier and legal skills, remains a 

key to success. 

Other lessons, not highlighted in previous Lessons Learned, arose 

during operations in Kosovo with implications for future legal operations. 

Legal offices in the rear supplemented operations with the use of temporary 

civilian employees. While deployed, JAs realized the value of having U.S. 

JAs occupy billets in higher headquarters. Training for the Kosovo mission 

highlighted the need to understand the complex political and social 

environment in which the deployed personnel would be operating. 

1. A Successful Deployment is a Team Effort. 

It is difficult for a legal office in a deployed environment to 

accomplish its mission without assistance from every level of the JA chain 

275 Id. ¶ 2. 276 Partnership for Peace (PFP) is the basis for practical security cooperation between NATO and individual 

partner countries. Activities include defense planning and budgeting, military exercises, and civil 

emergency operations. There are now twenty-six members of the PFP program. Additional information on
 

the PfP is available at http://www.nato.int/pfp/pfp.htm (last visited 24 Sept. 2001).
 277 Agreement Among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Other States Participating in
 

the Partnership for Peace Regarding the Status of their Forces, June 19, 1995, T.I.A.S. No. 12,666 

[hereinafter PfP SOFA].

278 For a discussion about these issues see supra Ch. III, text accompanying notes 48-54, 162-175. 279 See HAITI, supra note 35, at 158-66; BALKANS, supra note 13, at 187-98. 

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of command and from subject matter experts at The Judge Advocate 

General’s School, U.S. Army (TJAGSA). For a deployed JA, understanding 

when to seek assistance is important. Taking issues outside the task force 

can be viewed as “disloyal” or “chain of command jumping” if not done 

judiciously. Informing the Chief of Staff or the Commander prior to taking 

an issue to an outside headquarters may be prudent depending on the 

sensitivity of the issue. 

Making the deployment the priority of effort for offices in the rear 

takes clear guidance from the SJA.280 JAs deployed to Task Force Falcon 

cited examples of JAs, NCOs, and DA civilians, at the Division, Corps, 

USAREUR, and EUCOM levels who were willing to stop what they were 

doing to support the deployment. Throughout Germany, the Judge Advocate 

General’s Corps assisted with training, planning, and resourcing for the 

mission to Kosovo.281 

a. Deploy the Minimum Staffing Necessary to Accomplish the 

Essential Legal Mission and Retain Surge Capability. 

There were times when I would walk in the office and say [to a 

judge advocate], “What are you doing tomorrow? . . . Nope. 

You’re going to Kosovo.”282 

Commanders and staff often covet the skills that JAs bring to a 

deployment. The ability to sort through a myriad of factual details while 

understanding the overarching political considerations and the international 

legal framework for a mission is a valuable staff skill that someone with 

legal training is capable of performing. When performing a troop-to-task 

analysis to determine the appropriate mix of legal talents necessary to 

support a task force, an SJA should strive to provide the minimum staffing 

to accomplish the legal mission. This level of staffing might not equal all of 

the requests from commanders who believe they can gainfully employ a JA, 

280 As described by the SJA,1ID, “In the Central Region, everybody in my office knows that the priority 

mission is to take care of [our deployed JAs]. If they call on any question, you don’t go to sleep until 

you’ve either given them the answer or you’ve told them when you can give them the answer and it’s 

within a suspense date they can live with.” Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 337. 281 V Corps provided JA support to each rotation in Kosovo. 1AD JAs commented that training provided 

by 1ID JAs on Kosovo situational and legal awareness was a positive influence on the 1AD preparation for 

the Kosovo mission. 1AD AAR, supra note 156, § 5, ¶ A. 1ID JAs cited 1AD’s willingness to provide 

Observer/Controller augmentees as a positive influence on 1ID’s predeployment training. Kosovo AAR, 

supra note 92, at 330. 282 Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 332 (quoting LTC Mark Cremin, Staff Judge Advocate, 1ID). 

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but could require assigning a JA down to battalion level to provide 

appropriate support.283 

When providing staffing at a level to support only the essential legal 

mission, SJAs must be able to furnish additional support when necessary. 

When 1ID was faced with the preliminary murder investigation in United 

States v. Ronghi, while concurrently investigating allegations of abuse by 

members of 3-504 PIR, the 1ID SJA quickly deployed two additional JAs 

and a court reporter to assist. V Corps also deployed an additional JA to 

assist. When faced with a two-month National Guard lapse in legal 

coverage at CAS, another JA from 1ID was quickly deployed. When JAs 

recognized the need for U.S. JA support at KFOR headquarters in Pristina, 

1ID deployed a captain for six weeks. To provide officers and soldiers when 

needed, everyone must remain aware of the ongoing situation and be 

prepared to deploy.284 

b. Consider Using Civilian “Over Hires” in Rear Offices, but 

Realize it Takes Planning and Time. 

Unlike recent USAREUR experiences with peacekeeping in Bosnia, 

the mission to Kosovo did not include authorization for reserve 

augmentation for legal offices in Germany.285 It is now axiomatic that a 

deployment does not necessarily lead to a decrease in legal issues in the 

rear.286 To fill the gap left by the deployment, 1ID OSJA was able to 

temporarily hire four extra attorneys, have them certified by the TJAG,287 

and employ them in legal assistance and claims positions. Processing a 

civilian hiring action takes time, so for this hiring to be successful, it 

requires forethought and planning.288 

283 Three battalion-sized units deployed to Kosovo had a dedicated JA. Another JA operated at Camp
 

Monteith, the location of two battalion headquarters. There was also a JA at CAS, the location of less than 

a battalion of troops. 

284 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 331-32. 285 See BALKANS, supra note 13, at 188. 286 See FM 27-100, supra note 29, ¶ 3.3 (“The SJA should expect an increase in the home station military 

justice workload, and must ensure that resources are properly allocated between the deployment theater and 

home station.”). 

287 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 690-200, GENERAL PERSONNEL PROVISIONS, ch. 213, subch. 4, ¶ 4-3
 

(C7, 3 Sept. 1993); U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES 2-1(x) (30 Sept. 

1996). 

288 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 342, 344.
 

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c. A U.S. Judge Advocate Needs to Be in the Key Decision Centers. 

For large segments of time during the first year of the mission, there 

was not a U.S. JA at KFOR Headquarters.289 JAs from Task Force Falcon 

would visit KFOR Headquarters in Pristina once a month for the legal 

advisors meeting, but there was no one in the legal department at KFOR 

pushing issues the U.S. Task Force raised. Because of the nature of the 

decisions made at the KFOR level, and because of the liaison between 

KFOR and the UNMIK, a U.S. JA would have been invaluable. This was 

particularly important during the first year of the operation while the mission 

was starting.290 U.S. JAs from various branches of the armed services 

deployed for short rotations to KFOR Headquarters after the first year of the 

mission and remedied this problem. 

Within Task Force Falcon, attorneys were involved in all of the key 

decision-making processes. Attorneys attended all planning meetings, IO 

working groups, force protection working groups, daily battle updates, 

command and staff meetings, JIC meetings, and the daily Analysis and 

Control Element (ACE) intelligence updates. To provide assistance in these 

areas, JAs must “speak the language” of the operators. The JAs must 

understand the military decision-making process;291 they must understand 

the “decide, detect, deliver, and assess” methodology involved with 

targeting;292 and they must understand staff functions.293 

d. Expect to Have Units Attempt to Prevent Legal Specialists from 

Working in a Consolidated Legal Center. 

Within Germany, most legal specialists assigned to battalions work 

within a consolidated community legal center. This practice leverages 

economies of scale that allow units without assigned legal assets to receive 

the same timely legal services as units that do have assigned legal 

specialists. Even with this arrangement at the 71D’s home station, many 

units wanted to retain the legal specialists at the unit during the deployment. 

289 See The notable exception being EUCOM’s deployment of Maj. Brian Palmer, USMC to KFOR during
 

the early stages of the mission and 1ID’s deployment of CPT May Nicholson from May to June 2000. 

290 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 347-48. 291 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 101-5, STAFF ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS ch. 5 (31 May 

1997); for a brief synopsis of the Military Decision Making Process, see FM 27-100, supra note 29, ¶ 4.2.3. 292 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 6-20-10, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR THE 

TARGETING PROCESS (8 May 1996). 293 Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 353, 401; 1AD AAR, supra note 156, § 2, ¶ B.
 

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More often than not, the units looked at the legal specialist as another guard, 

driver, radio operator, or personnel asset.294 Prior coordination between the 

Chief Legal NCO, SJA, task force legal advisor, and battalion command 

group to define the roles and responsibilities of 71Ds once deployed can 

prevent these issues from arising once in theater. 

e. Certain Judge Advocates Will Need Top Secret Clearances. 

Daily operations of Task Force Falcon required members of the legal 

section to possess Top Secret security clearances. Every day, the 

Commanding General received an ACE intelligence briefing. Numerous 

topics, including significant detention facility issues, requiring JA input 

arose during these briefings. Access to the ACE briefing required a Top 

Secret clearance. Any JA directly involved with advising the Task Force 

Commander should possess a Top Secret clearance to ensure access to all 

necessary information. Additionally, the JA tasked to assist operational 

planners should also possess a Top Secret clearance. In Task Force Falcon, 

this included the legal advisor, deputy legal advisor, and operational law JA. 

2. Training 

a. Proficiency in Basic Soldier Skills Is Critical to Success in the 

Early Stages of a Mission. 

Deployment to an austere environment requires all members of a legal 

team to understand basic soldier skills. Reading a map, raising a tent, 

operating a stove, using a radio, firing a weapon, and driving a HMMWV 

must be trained well in advance of deployment notification so that upon 

notification, training can focus on mission-specific responsibilities.295 In 

addition to basic soldier skills, legal section soldiers involved in the initial 

deployment need to deploy someone with automation expertise to assist in 

set up.296 

294 This is not to say that legal NCOs and specialists should not pull guard duty or be exempt from their
 

unit’s duty roster. Every rotation worked out agreements with the 71D’s units to facilitate accomplishing 

both the legal mission and the unit’s missions. 

295 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 354; 1AD AAR, supra note 156, § V, ¶ A.
 296 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 432. 

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b. Training Should Include Basic Country Background Material 

and Political Information. 

Predeployment training should include country overviews and 

political assessments.297 All deployed JAs worked closely with the Task 

Force political advisor when advising the commander and staff. To advise 

the Task Force, JAs need to understand both U.S. and local political issues 

involved with the mission.298 

c. Continue Training in Theater. 

Once deployed, training for members of the legal task force should 

continue as the mission allows. Being in a location with all members of a 

combat team provides fertile ground for training opportunities. The 

members of Task Force Falcon were eager to explain to the members of the 

legal section how their weapons systems worked, what their mission in 

Kosovo entailed, and what their mission in wartime would be. 

3. Equipment 

a. The Rucksack Deployable Law Office Concept Is Sound. 

The first legal assets in Kosovo deployed with the doctrinally 

prescribed Rucksack Deployable Law Office and Library (RDL).299 With 

the RDL, the legal advisor was capable of sustained legal operations for 

weeks into the deployment. The legal team used all capabilities within the 

RDL, and occasionally, the legal section was the only staff section with the 

ability to perform certain functions like printing or copying. Laterdeploying assets augmented the RDL with desktop computers and laser 

297 1AD AAR, supra note 156, § II, ¶ D. JAs received training on Kosovo history and political background 

of the region from a civil affairs officer during preparation for the MRE at Hohenfels, Germany. See 

Combat Maneuver Training Center, Country Overview, PowerPoint presentation (1999). A copy of the 

slides is included in Appendix IV-39.

298 This lesson is not restricted to the legal community. Understanding the political situation in which the 

Task Force operated was important to all members of the Task Force. The investigation into 3-504 PIR 

suggests that a lack of understanding of the operating environment contributed to the problems faced by A 

Company, 3-504 PIR, in Vitina, Kosovo. In his conclusion to the 15-6 investigation, COL Morgan wrote, 

“Although the allegations of misconduct and excessive use of force appear isolated to A/3-504 located in 

Vitina, I found this was due to the ethnic mix in Vitina (approximately 30% Serbian; 70% Albanians). 

Given the battalion and company commander’s propensity towards Serb favoritism . . . , Vitina was the 

natural focal point for abuses and excessive use of force against the Albanians.” See EXSUM, supra note 

44, at 9. 

299 FM 27-100, supra note 29, ¶ 4.4.1. 

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printers. When combined with Internet access, the RDL is a powerful legal 

resource. Once the Task Force became established, a large purchase of 

computer equipment allowed the equipment initially brought to Kosovo to 

be returned to Germany. 

Training on the use of the RDL before the deployment to ensure 

compatibility with other equipment used by the Task Force is crucial. 

Additionally, preventive maintenance, such as the use of compressed air 

dusters and keyboard covers, expand the lifespan of the RDL system in 

harsh, dusty environments. Even with attempts to prevent deterioration 

caused by the environment, initial RDLs deployed and remaining in Kosovo 

past the initial six-month rotation were inoperable by the end of the eighth 

month. 

Property accountability during deployments can be an overwhelming 

task. The rapid development of a deployment can lead hand receipt holders 

to lose accountability of assigned property. Proper accountability, through 

sub-hand receipts, is essential, and deployed property should be hand 

receipted to a deploying soldier and not left on the hand receipt of someone 

remaining in the rear. 

b. Access to a Secret Internet Protocol Router Network Is Required 

in Today’s Operating Environment 

Secure e-mail and telephone capabilities are essential for both 

deployed JAs and JAs in the rear. The nature of military operations requires 

JAs to be able to communicate over secure means. Initially, the JAs in 1ID 

in Germany could receive secure e-mail only through the Division 

Headquarters about a mile away. This proved to be unworkable, and a secret 

Internet protocol router network (SIPRNET) was installed within the OSJA. 

In addition, there were levels of command within the operation that 

conducted all military business, classified or not, on secure systems. To 

communicate with those conducting business solely on secure networks, JAs 

must have access to the same.300 

300 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 353. 

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c. Obtaining Military Equipment to Accomplish the Legal 

Mission Will Require Persistence and a Strong NCOIC Relationship 

with the HHC. 

Current Army Military Tables of Organization and Equipment 

(MTOE) do not provide adequate vehicles and radios for a legal section to 

accomplish its mission.301 Attending court hearings, investigating criminal 

cases, providing legal assistance, and accomplishing the various additional 

tasks required to complete the legal mission requires mobility and 

communication. Without appropriate allowance for material on the MTOE, 

obtaining HMMWVs and radios can be a factor of personality. A strong 

relationship between the NCOIC and the headquarters company commander 

and first sergeant is often crucial in the attempt to obtain equipment 

necessary to accomplish the legal mission.302 

d. Standing Operating Procedures Are Critical for Future Mission 

Success. 

To successfully capture how a legal team is accomplishing its 

mission, the JAs involved must take time to update the Standing Operating 

Procedures (SOPs) under which they are working. Preparing work product 

not directly related to the mission at hand can be distracting, but, if the 

procedures are not captured contemporaneously, they are frequently 

incapable of being reproduced. SOPs provide a product invaluable to 

replacement JAs.303 

301 See 1AD AAR, supra note 156, § II, ¶ B; Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 445-46. The typical Staff 

Judge Advocate section of an infantry division has three HMMWVs and no radios. See U.S. DEP’T OF 

ARMY, MILITARY TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT, HHC INF DIV (MECH) line 36 (Apr. 2001), 

available at https://www.usafmsardd.army.mil/toe.cfm?toenumber=87004A200 (last visited 27 Sept. 

2001); see also FM 27-100, supra note 29, ¶ 4.4.2 (stating a commander should dedicate four HMMWVs, 

one five ton truck, and four cargo trailers to a division SJA section). 

302 See Kosovo AAR, supra note 92, at 435. 303 See Schasberger Memo, supra note 183, ¶ 1(d) (it is easy to lose continuity from one rotation to the next
 

if appropriate emphasis is not placed on preparing SOPs). 

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V. OPERATION PROVIDE REFUGE 

“Operation Provide Refuge"1

 was the U.S. humanitarian effort to 

relieve the overflow of Kosovar refugees into the former Yugoslav Republic 

of Macedonia (FYROM) and to provide for their resettlement in the U.S. 

from temporary FYROM facilities.2 Task Force Provide Refuge (TFPR), an 

interagency team headed by the U.S. Department of Health and Human 

Services (DHHS), contained a military component of U.S. Army Reserve 

(USAR), Active Duty (AD), and New Jersey Army National Guard (NJ 

ARNG) soldiers. Several government agencies and nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs) and the Fort Dix, New Jersey (Fort Dix), team of 

civilians, contractors, and military personnel came together to complete 

TFPR and execute Operation Provide Refuge. 

U.S. participation was part of a multinational effort to assist Kosovo 

and neighboring countries that received refugees forced out of Kosovo.3 

Appendix V-1 lists the countries that supported the Kosovar refugees. The 

resettlement operation at Fort Dix was a response to the burden that the 

Kosovar mass exodus placed on the FYROM government and international 

relief operations.4 On 21 April 1999, Vice President Gore announced the 

U.S. commitment to relocate up to 20,000 Kosovar refugees to the U.S.5 

President Clinton's authorization, Presidential Determination No. 99-23, is 

included in Appendix V-2.6

 The Department of State (DOS) expected that 

1

 Operation Provide Refuge was called "Operation Open Arms" until 10 May 1999. See E-mail from 

William S. Spraitzar, Army War College, to COL John E. Baker, Fort Knox, Ky. (11 May 1999) (on file 

with CLAMO). 

2 See generally Fact Sheet, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. 

Support for Balkan Refugees (May 17, 1999), 

http://www.state.gov/www/global/prm/fs_990517_balkan_aid.html [hereinafter Balkan Refugees Fact 

Sheet]; see also Joint Task Force Provide Refuge, Standard Operating Procedures, Joint Information 

Bureau, annex C (Prepare Briefings, Briefers and Interviewees), app. 2 (Briefing/Interview Preparation 

Guide), Tab A (Sample Questions and Answers) (16 May 1999) [hereinafter JIB SOP] (on file with 

CLAMO). Macedonia was not the only country to receive a flood of Kosovar Albanians. A significant 

number of Kosovar Albanians also fled to Albania. As of May 1999, 282,000 Kosovar refugees were 

living with 47,700 Albanian families (7% of all Albanian families); 45,000 additional refugees were housed 

in various Albanian collection centers; and another 76,600 refugees were spread across thirty Albanian 

refugee camps. Balkan Refugees Fact Sheet, supra. 3 See Fact Sheet, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Dep't of State, Admission Program 

for Kosovar Albanians (April 29, 1999), http://www.fema.gov/nwz99/ks429.htm. 

4 See Headquarters, U.S. Army, Fort Dix, Force Projection Directorate, Operations Order 99-005 ¶ 1 (25 

May 1999) [hereinafter OPORDER 99-005] (on file with CLAMO). 5 See Balkan Refugees Fact Sheet, supra note 2. 6

 Presidential Determination No. 99-23, The White House, Memorandum for the Secretary of State, 

Subject: Determination Pursuant to Section 2(c)(1) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, 

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most refugees would want to return to Kosovo after the air campaign and 

that the U.S. would assist refugees in returning when it was safe to do so.7 

Refugees choosing to stay in the U.S. would remain at Fort Dix temporarily, 

completing the admissions process and receiving services until placement 

with sponsoring families. DOS anticipated the temporary stay to be about 

two weeks. 

The primary plan for moving refugees into the U.S. was to complete 

refugee processing and documentation in FYROM, with the refugees then 

traveling directly to their sponsorship site. Because of delays in establishing 

a processing system in FYROM, the U.S. used the secondary plan of 

establishing a center in the U.S. to process and temporarily house refugees.8 

The Department of Defense (DOD) supported DHHS, the lead federal 

agency (LFA), in the resettlement of 4,049 Kosovar refugees. The primary 

DOD operational force for the mission was Joint Task Force 350, commonly 

referred to as “Joint Task Force Provide Refuge” (JTF PR).9 The JTF PR 

mission was to establish a welcome center supporting DHHS in the 

reception of the Kosovar refugees to facilitate their link-up with relatives or 

sponsors in the U.S.10 A Memorandum of Agreement between DOD and 

DHHS (hereinafter referred to as DOD/DHHS MOA), effective 4 May 1999, 

was valid through 30 September 1999.11 The DOD/DHHS MOA is included 

in Appendix V-3. 

Fort Dix was the temporary processing center until refugee service 

agencies identified sponsor families. U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) 

alerted U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) in early April 1999 to 

review and update mass immigration plans.12 The initial planning focus was 

as Amended (May 18, 1999), http://clinton6.nara.gov/1999/05/1999-05-18-presidential-determination-on

kosovar-refugees.html [hereinafter PD 99-23]. 

7 See Balkan Refugees Fact Sheet, supra note 2. 8 See U.S. Army Forces Command, After Action Review, Operation Provide Refuge, 

http://freddie.forscom.army.mil/maca/Word/jtfpraar.doc [hereinafter FORSCOM AAR] (last visited 2 July 

2001). 

9 See Directorate of Information Management, Fort Dix, N.J., After Action Review, Operation Provide 

Refuge, Phase I (June 3, 1999) [hereinafter DOIM AAR] (on file with CLAMO). 

10 See 1079th U.S. Army Garrison Support Unit, After-Action Report on Utilization and Involvement of the 

1079th USA Garrison Support Unit in Support of Joint Task Force Operation Provide Refuge (22 July 99) 

[hereinafter 1079th AAR] (on file with CLAMO).
 11 See Message, 121700 (EDT) May 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 10
 

[hereinafter SITREP 10] (on file with CLAMO). 

12 See FORSCOM AAR, supra note 8, at 4. Pursuant to CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, UNIFIED 

COMMAND PLAN 1999 (7 Oct. 1999) (classified document) [hereinafter UCP 99], the Chairman, Joint 

­

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on identifying suitable sites for resettlement operations. FORSCOM 

evaluated potential sites based upon two criteria: 

• the resettlement operation would not be a tent operation; and 

• the site should be east of Chicago, Illinois.13 

The criteria narrowed the viable installations to two U.S. Army 

Reserve Command (USARC) installations: Fort Dix and Fort McCoy, 

Wisconsin (Fort McCoy).14 General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commanding 

General, FORSCOM, selected Fort Dix because of the following: 

• proximity to ethnic Albanian populations; 

• availability of adjacent McGuire Air Force Base (AFB); 

• barracks facilities that could be readily modified for refugee housing; and 

• availability of contractor support.15 

The initial Fort Dix housing area was called the “Village,” and held 

3,000 refugees. An expansion, called the “Hamlet,” increased capability to 

4,200. The refugees were housed in “dormitories,” which were former 

Army barracks. To make it look like a “village,” Fort Dix put up a wooden 

garden fence around the dormitories and planted new shrubs and flowers. 

The first refugees, a total of 453, arrived at McGuire AFB on 4 May 

1999.16 The 453 refugees quickly became 454 with the birth of a child. The 

refugees were medically triaged at the airfield. Three refugees were 

evacuated to the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) for more extensive 

medical treatment, and the remaining refugees were transported to the 

Village for in-processing. The longest in-processing period was about eight 

hours for Flight #2, and eventually in-processing time was reduced to less 

than three hours.17 

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), reassigned geographical responsibilities for the commanders of the various
 

combatant commands. In UCP 99, the CJCS also renamed Atlantic Command as Joint Forces Command. 13 See FORSCOM AAR, supra note 8, at 4.
 14 Because Fort McCoy is west of Chicago, the requirement that the installation be east of Chicago 

apparently was not mandatory. 

15 See FORSCOM AAR, supra note 8, at 4.
 16 Message, 061700 (EDT) May 99, JTF Open Arms, subject: JTF Open Arms SITREP 4 [hereinafter
 

SITREP 4] (on file with CLAMO). 

17 Id. See also E-mail from LTC Willis C. Hunter, Staff Judge Advocate, JTF Provide Refuge, to MAJ 

Patrick E. Koepp, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces Command (17 May 1999) (on file 

with CLAMO). 

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PHS worked processing issues with the refugee service agencies that 

had agreements with DOS. These agencies, through their networks of more 

than 400 local affiliates, ensured that the refugees were properly resettled. 

To accomplish this, the agencies offered a wide variety of assistance, such as 

enrolling children in school, obtaining medical attention, applying for work, 

and receiving language training.18 Appendix V-4 lists the refugee service 

agencies involved in Operation Provide Refuge. Immigration & Refugee 

Services of America (IRSA) was designated the Joint Volunteer Agency 

(JVA), serving as the designated spokesman for the other service agencies. 

The DOS goal was to bring only refugees who had sponsoring family 

members in the U.S. However, many refugees brought to the U.S. as part of 

Operation Provide Refuge did not have sponsor families. In a concerted 

effort with DHHS and DOS, refugee service agencies identified U.S. 

families with relatives in FYROM and recruited additional sponsoring 

families. 

Once refugees arrived at the Village and had an opportunity to rest, 

they underwent additional medical screening and sponsorship processing. 

Medical personnel observed conditions including diarrhea, uncontrolled 

hypertension, tuberculosis, lice, and pulmonary emboli.19 PHS placed two 

families in a separate area because of possible pulmonary tuberculosis.20 To 

satisfactorily address concerns about tuberculosis, PHS met with over 300 

private contractors, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization (INS) staff, and the 

local refugee council.21 Once in-processing was complete, DOD transported 

families to communities where official sponsorship had been arranged. 

By 6 July 1999, JTF PR combined with subordinate operations centers 

to reduce manpower requirements.22 The Director of Military Support 

(DOMS), the executive agent charged with processing all Military 

Assistance to Civil Authorities requests, directed that the support capacity 

for refugees be reduced from 4,200 to 3,000, enabling closure of the 

18 See Balkan Refugees Fact Sheet, supra note 2.
 19 See SITREP 10, supra note 11. 20 See Message, 271700 (EDT [Eastern Daylight Time]) May 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF 

Provide Refuge SITREP 25 [hereinafter SITREP 25] (on file with CLAMO). 21 See Message, 281700 (EDT) May 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 26
 

[hereinafter SITREP 26] (on file with CLAMO). 

22 See Message, 061700 (EDT) July 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 65
 

[hereinafter SITREP 65] (on file with CLAMO).
 

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Hamlet.23 Twenty-four-hour operations ceased on 15 July 1999.24 On 15 

July 1999, Brigadier General (BG) James R. Helmly, Commander, JTF PR, 

conducted a news conference and reported to the media: 

As of this moment, there is one Kosovar refugee guest left at Fort Dix. 

I would like to report through you to the people of the U.S., "mission 

accomplished." Your Army, in conjunction and cooperation with a 

truly professional team of 5 other Federal agencies, 18 volunteer 

agencies, and the great State of New Jersey, have provided refuge, 

security, care, compassion, and hope to a group of brutalized people 

who were formerly in despair and desperation. A total of 4049 

refugees arrived here and not one has left without hope and words of 

praise and thanks for America.25 

By 16 July 1999, all refugees had been placed with sponsoring 

families. JTF PR ceased operations on 30 July 1999. 

A. COMMAND AND CONTROL 

1. Lead Federal Agency 

It is important to emphasize from the outset that DOD performed a 

support role during Operation Provide Refuge. Overall control and 

operational oversight was the responsibility of DHHS as the "lead federal 

agency" (LFA). DHHS had a senior representative at JTF PR directing the 

mission.26 DOD was only one of a multitude of other support agencies, such 

as INS, DOS, American Red Cross (ARC), NJ ARNG, and IRSA (the 

JVA).27 Appendix V-5 provides an exhaustive listing of the support 

agencies who comprised TFPR. 

DOD had responsibility for management of the physical 

infrastructure. Appendix V-6 lists DOD and DHHS responsibilities for 

23 See Message, 151700 (EDT) June 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 44
 

[hereinafter SITREP 44] (on file with CLAMO). 

24 See Message, 151700 (EDT) July 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 74
 

[hereinafter SITREP 74] (on file with CLAMO). 

25 Id. (quoting BG Helmly). 26 See Message, 051700 (EDT) May 99, JTF Open Arms, subject: JTF Open Arms SITREP 3 [hereinafter 

SITREP 3] (on file with CLAMO). 

27 See Balkan Refugees Fact Sheet, supra note 2. 

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LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

support services. Fort Dix performed all budgeting and cost capturing for 

JTF PR.28 

2. Department of Defense 

"[B]ear in mind the philosophy . . . encapsulated in the 

acronym ‘TIPS.’ TALK to the refugees; reassure them at every 

opportunity. Keep them INFORMED. Work to provide a 

steady stream of information about what is happening in their 

homeland, about what will occur in the welcome center at Fort 

Dix, and about what to expect in America. Help make their 

lives more PREDICTABLE by explaining the requirements for 

processing and the steps and time required to obtain sponsors. 

In all things, be SENSITIVE to their needs and anxieties. In 

essence, we treat the refugees with dignity and respect."29 

The Army was in direct support of DHHS and provided limited 

support to the other agencies participating in the operation.30 Organizational 

relationships, however, continued to be redefined and refined during the 

early days of the Operation.31 

Planning for “Operation Open Arms,” the initial name for the 

Operation, commenced on 22 April 1999.32 The Commander, USARC, 

nominated BG Mitchell M. Zais, the USARC Chief of Staff, to be the 

Commander, JTF PR.33 General Schwartz approved the nomination. The 

300th Military Police Command (MPC), a USAR unit with an internment 

and resettlement mission, was the primary choice to conduct the operation. 

28 See Joint Task Force Provide Refuge, Standard Operating Procedures, Resource Management ¶ 1-4 (12 

May 1999) (on file with CLAMO). 

29 1079th AAR, supra note 10, at 1 (quoting the JTF Commander's intent).
 30 See Message, 01063Z May 99, Director of Military Support, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, 

subject: Execute Order for Kosovo Refugee Processing Operation, available at
 

http://freddie.forscom.army.mil/maca/Word/doms%20openarms%20order.doc; Message, 010933Z May 99, 

Commander, U.S. Atlantic Command (J3), subject: Execute Order, available at
 

http://freddie.forscom.army.mil/maca/Word/ACOMORDER.doc; Message, 011333Z May 99, Commander, 

U.S. Army Forces Command, subject: Execute Order, available at
 

http://freddie.forscom.army.mil/maca/Word/forscomexord.doc. 31 See 1079th AAR, supra note 10, at 3.
 32 See DOIM AAR, supra note 9, at 1. 33 See FORSCOM AAR, supra note 8, at 5.
 

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On 3 June 1999, BG Helmly, the Deputy Chief of the Army Reserve 

(DCAR), assumed command of JTF PR from BG Zais.34 

Coordination efforts for the Operation commenced upon the 

designation of BG Zais as Commander, JTF PR. A concept plan developed 

by the Fort Dix Force Projection Directorate became the main planning 

document. During a 27-28 April 1999 visit of MG Magruder and BG Zais to 

Fort Dix, the C2 structure was clarified, with FORSCOM assigned as the 

JTF PR higher headquarters. DOMS gave FORSCOM a warning order on 

Friday, 30 April 1999, to be prepared to receive refugees on Tuesday, 4 May 

1999, at Fort Dix. The Fort Dix staff began executing contracts upon 

receiving FORSCOM funding approval on 30 April 1999. The 300th MPC 

could not respond in such a short time period. Because the 300th MPC 

could not mobilize quickly enough, FORSCOM tasked XVIII Airborne 

Corps to augment full-time USARC personnel with units and additional C2 

elements for the JTF PR headquarters. XVIII Airborne Corps designated the 

507th Corps Support Group (CSG) to provide units and augmentation of the 

JTF PR headquarters. The 507th CSG was the JTF PR headquarters 

nucleus. The 507th CSG selected elements of the 530th Supply and Services 

Battalion to provide the necessary personnel. XVIII Airborne Corps also 

sent medic support and a military police (MP) platoon. USARC and 

FORSCOM augmented the 507th CSG with the 1079th U.S. Army Garrison 

Support Unit (USA GSU). The State of New Jersey coordinated all 

volunteer support efforts, including receipt and donation of material goods, 

and the New Jersey Governor volunteered the NJ ARNG to manage donated 

goods. 35 Appendix V-7 outlines the C2 structure and units in support of JTF 

PR. 

Operational responsibilities included the following: 

• command and control—interagency and military; 

• reception—the reception of refugees at McGuire AFB; 

• in-processing—those initial actions in the Welcome Center; 

• processing—those key actions by PHS (medical screening), JVA 

(interviews and assurances), and INS (interviews and documentation); 

• housing—physical care of the refugees; 

34 See Message, 021700 (EDT) June 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 31
 

[hereinafter SITREP 31] (on file with CLAMO). 

35 See FORSCOM AAR, supra note 8, at 5.
 

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• support for the Village—care and feeding of refugees; 

• camp life—social life and camp government; and, 

• out-processing—orientation and onward movement of refugees. 36 

Advance elements from FORSCOM, USARC, and XVIII Airborne 

Corps arrived on 1 May 1999. Interagency representatives and the XVIII 

Airborne Corps main body arrived on 2 May 1999. The number of DOD 

personnel supporting JTF PR rapidly expanded from 239 (2 May 1999) to 

355 (4 May 1999). DOD personnel included 262 active duty soldiers, 92 

reservists, and 1 NJ ARNG soldier. There were four additional military 

liaison officers, one each from FORSCOM, USACOM, DOMS, and the NJ 

ARNG.37 

JTF PR reached a peak of 387 soldiers.38 The 1079th USA GSU 

completed its administrative support mission with JTF PR on 23 July 1999.39 

The NJ ARNG, which peaked at 91 soldiers,40 completed its mission on 26 

July 1999. 

The National Command Authority (NCA) was clear in identifying the 

JTF PR objectives: DOD was to provide a suitable facility to receive, house, 

feed, and care for displaced Kosovar refugees and support their rapid 

transfer to sponsors in CONUS. USACOM passed the support mission to 

FORSCOM and the USARC. The Commander, FORSCOM, provided 

mission guidance to the Commander, JTF PR. The civilian in charge of 

DHHS operations, and thus in charge of Operation Provide Refuge, arrived 

late in the planning process and never provided clear guidance to the 

military. Perhaps because DHHS is a civilian organization, it never wrote an 

operations order.41 

36 1079th AAR, supra note 10, at 2.
 37 SITREP 3, supra note 26. 38 Message, 071700 (EDT) June 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 36
 

[hereinafter SITREP 36] (on file with CLAMO). 

39 Message, 221700 (EDT) July 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 81
 

[hereinafter SITREP 81] (on file with CLAMO). 

40 SITREP 26, supra note 21. 41 See DOIM AAR, supra note 9, at 3. 

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B. LESSONS LEARNED 

The mission of the JTF PR Staff Judge Advocate (JTF SJA) was 

broad: 

• provide legal advice to the JTF PR Command Group on military and 

domestic law; 

• coordinate with the Fort Dix SJA to provide legal services in 

administrative law, claims, contract law, criminal law, legal assistance, 

and environmental law to JTF PR personnel; 

• coordinate with the Fort Dix SJA to provide General Courts-Martial 

Convening Authority (GCMCA) support involving the administration of 

military justice; and 

• provide legal review for all contracts. 42 

The JTF SJA provided advice on court-martial jurisdiction, MP 

security and investigative jurisdiction, memoranda of agreement, military 

and refugee status, international law, claims, fiscal law, rules of 

interaction/rules of engagement (ROI/ROE), alcoholic beverages, 

pornography, weapons, refugee issues (fraternization, marriages, births, 

deaths, remains disposal, volunteer work, religious support), and interagency 

relationships. The JTF SJA drafted a punitive order, General Order Number 

1 (GO 1), containing detailed rules on interacting with refugees.43 GO 1 was 

signed by the JTF Commander and is included in Appendix V-8. The JTF 

SJA Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) is included in Appendix V-9. 

A variety of lessons learned emerged from the wide range of legal 

issues addressed by the JTF SJA. 

1. Understand the Legal Basis for Military Support to Civil Authorities. 

The JA must understand that the DOD role in Military Support to 

Civil Authorities (MSCA) is unlike typical DOD operational missions. The 

LFA has responsibility for executing the mission, whatever that may be, and 

42 See Headquarters, Joint Task Force Provide Refuge, Operation Plan 99-01, annex AC (Legal) (30 June 

99) [hereinafter OPLAN 99-01] (on file with CLAMO); Joint Task Force Provide Refuge, Standard 

Operating Procedure, Staff Judge Advocate (4 June 1999) [hereinafter SJA SOP] (on file with CLAMO). 43 See Memorandum, LTC Willis C. Hunter, Staff Judge Advocate, JTF Provide Refuge, to MAJ Donna L. 

Barlett, Chief, Operational Law, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Reserve Command, 

subject: Legal Issues Arising at Fort Dix (14 May 1999) [hereinafter Hunter Memorandum] (on file with 

CLAMO). 

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LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

DOD operates in a supporting role only.44 DOD acts only in response to 

LFA requests to provide specific support. MSCA directives establish 

parameters concerning types and amount of support DOD may provide to 

the LFA. DOD cannot “volunteer” to do more than what the LFA requests. 

DOD will determine, among its available resources, how to best suited fulfill 

the request. Included in Appendix V-10 is an “MSCA Basic Principles" 

Information Paper.45 

Accordingly, JTF PR had to receive an LFA written request setting 

forth, at a minimum: 

• organization or agency and the requesting official’s name, title, address, 

and telephone number; 

• acknowledgment and statutory basis to reimburse DOD costs; 

• brief statement of situation, to include location, identification of specific 

support requirements, and an estimate of the time needed; and 

• assistance requested/provided by the National Guard, other military 

departments, or the Federal Emergency Management Agency.46 

2. JAs Will Face Military and Civilian Criminal Jurisdiction Issues. 

a. Clarify Command Relationships. 

The JTF SJA addressed the issue of whether the JTF Commander had 

assumed command of the installation.47 Some installation staff were unclear 

if BG Zais had assumed command of Fort Dix.48 Both the JTF SJA and the 

Fort Dix SJA initially agreed the JTF PR was a tenant organization, because 

the JTF PR Commander had not published any assumption of command 

orders for the installation. 

In reviewing the execute orders issued by DOMS, USACOM, and 

FORSCOM, FORSCOM determined that the Fort Dix Commander 

44 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 3025.15, MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (18 Feb. 1997)
 

[hereinafter DOD DIR 3025.15]. 45 See E-mail from LTC Marsha A. Sajer, Office of the Army General Counsel, to MAJ Neoma J. White, 

International/Operational Law Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army (28 May 1999)
 

(on file with CLAMO). 

46 See Joint Task Force Provide Refuge, Standard Operating Procedures, J3 Operations, ¶ 2-15 (10 May
 

1999) [hereinafter JTF J3 Ops SOP] (included in Appendix 11); SJA SOP, supra note 42. 47 See Hunter Memorandum, supra note 43.
 48 See Message, 131700 (EDT) May 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 11
 

[hereinafter SITREP 11] (on file with CLAMO). 

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remained the installation commander but the installation was under 

operational control of the Commander, JTF PR.49 Therefore, the JTF PR 

Commander had the power to exercise authority over the installation 

commander for purposes of mission execution, which provided him more 

authority than being a tenant activity on the installation. The command 

relationships between the various commanders did not affect existing courtmartial jurisdiction. 

b. Domestic Military Operations Should Be Located, to the Extent 

Possible, on Areas of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction. 

Mass immigration operations, such as Operation Provide Refuge, 

should be located on areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction. If such a 

location is not available, an area of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction 

can be an adequate substitute. Locations offering only state exclusive 

jurisdiction, such as state military reservations, should not be considered.50 

Federal jurisdiction on CONUS installations may be exclusive, concurrent, 

or none (state jurisdiction only). During a previous refugee operation at Fort 

Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, problems arose because refugee camps were 

located on an installation where only state jurisdiction applied.51 Because 

only state jurisdiction applied, the command lacked direct law enforcement 

authority over the refugee population. As crimes went unpunished, 

discipline and order declined. 

Fort Dix was a military installation under exclusive federal 

jurisdiction. All legal authority remained in federal hands. JTF PR, 

installation, and federal law enforcement officials were free to plan and 

make decisions knowing such decisions would be final without the 

additional requirement of obtaining approval from state, county, or local 

governments. Coordination was maintained with nonfederal agencies, but 

confusion and decision-making delay were eliminated. While sharing of 

authority adds flexibility, it requires increased coordination with state 

officials. 

49 See E-mail from MAJ Patrick E. Koepp, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces 

Command, to LTC Willis C. Hunter, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, JTF Provide Refuge (14 May 

1999); Message, 141700 (EDT) May 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 12 

[hereinafter SITREP 12] (on file with CLAMO); OPORDER 99-005, supra note 4, ¶ 1. 50 See JTF Staff Judge Advocate, After Action Review Input (n.d.) [hereinafter SJA AAR] (on file with 

CLAMO).

51 See MILITARY HISTORY OFFICE, U.S. ARMY FORCES COMMAND, THE ROLE OF FORSCOM IN THE 

RECEPTION AND CARE OF REFUGEES FROM CUBA IN THE CONTINTENTAL U.S. (1984). 

186 
 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

c. Be Aware That Not All Military Personnel Will Have the Same 

Status, and That Some Personnel Will Not Be Subject to the UCMJ. 

Although military personnel, AD, Reserve Component (RC), and 

National Guard, will wear the same uniform, the command and control and 

UCMJ jurisdiction for each may vary. In JTF PR, AD soldiers remained 

under the court-martial jurisdiction of their home unit. The SJA SOP 

indicated USAR and ARNG soldiers were attached to the GCMCA of the 

Fort Dix Commander on an as-needed basis and in accordance with orders 

placing them on AD. 52 As was the case with NJ ARNG personnel, National 

Guard personnel will normally not be in a federal AD status. National 

Guard personnel will generally remain in a Title 32 or state active duty 

status, under a governor’s command and control.53 USAR personnel will be 

subject to UCMJ jurisdiction when in an AD, ADT, AT, or IDT status. For 

example, the Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM) 

identified USAR personnel to replace JTF PR staff.54 Most of the personnel 

received Contingency Operation Temporary Tour of Active Duty orders, but 

they were a combination of Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA), 

Individual Ready Reservists (IRR), and Troop Program Unit (TPU) soldiers. 

3. Security and Criminal Jurisdiction Issues Will Be Complicated. 

JTF PR struggled with security and criminal jurisdiction issues.55 JTF 

PR security and criminal investigation authorities included FBI agents, INS 

agents, border patrol agents, contracted security guards, DOD Police,56 CID 

agents, and MPs. All had different roles and responsibilities. To understand 

the interaction between the various security agencies, it is important to 

understand the Fort Dix refugee camp design and the INS administrative 

procedures. 

52 See SJA SOP, supra note 42, ¶ 6-2. 53 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 12301–12321 (2000). 54 See SITREP 26, supra note 21. 55 See E-mail from Brian H. Gerber, Chief, Civil Law Division, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. 

Army Forces Command, to Beverly Thomas, DCSLOG (20 May 1999) (on file with CLAMO). 

56 DOD Police are U.S. government employees in the grade of GS-4 through GS-6. Potential DOD police 

officers must possess a bachelors degree or have at least one year of law enforcement experience. Upon 

being accepted into the DOD Police program, police officers attend an eight-week Police Training Course 

in Glynco, Georgia. See Cop Career.com, Department of Defense, Police Officer, at 

http://www.copcareer.com/federal/defense/dodpolice.htm (last visited 4 Aug. 2001). At Fort Dix, DOD 

police had replaced MPs and were responsible for law enforcement in the Fort Dix community. See Talk 

City.com, Department of Defense Police, Major John Dove, at 

http://home.talkcity.com/BoomerSt/majordove/ (last visited 4 Aug. 2001). 

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Fort Dix set aside one area of the installation to accommodate the 

refugee mission. This area was called the “Welcome Center.” MP and 

DOD Police controlled access to this area by setting up traffic control points 

along the "outer perimeter."57 Between the outer perimeter and a temporary 

interior fence was an area known as the “buffer zone.” JTF PR headquarters 

was located within the buffer zone. At the heart of the refugee camp was the 

inner perimeter, bounded by the temporary fence. The inner perimeter was 

known as the “Village.” Within the Village were dormitories, a medical 

center, dining facility, and village store—all provided for the refugees. 

Detailed schematics of the installation layout are included in Appendix 12. 

The INS considered the Village to be a port of entry (POE) for 

immigration purposes. The situation is analogous to a plane being diverted 

from a known POE to an alternate airfield due to weather. Regardless of 

where the plane lands, that airfield becomes a POE, and passengers are 

subject to Customs and INS requirements before leaving the POE.58 

The INS policy required the refugees to remain in the Village until all 

immigration processing could be completed. Before arriving at the Village, 

INS gave the refugees Form I-590, “Registration for Classification as a 

Refugee.”59 Form I-590 allowed refugees to meet with INS to obtain a Form 

I-94 “Arrival-Departure Record.” As refugees inprocessed, INS obtained a 

family history and examined all refugee identification. The refugees moved 

into the dormitories to wait for other phases of in-processing, including a 

complete medical exam, an interview to check for criminal record 

information, and assignment of a sponsor by JVA.60 

The refugees would not obtain Form I-94 until all in-processing steps 

were complete. With a Form I-94, the refugees could leave the camp and 

legally enter the U.S.61 After one year, the refugees would be eligible to 

57 See SJA SOP, supra note 42, ¶ 6-5; JTF J3 Ops SOP, supra note 46, ¶ 2-16(o). 58 See generally E-mail from MAJ Neoma J. White, International/Operational Law Division, Office of the 

Judge Advocate General, Army, to LTC Willis C. Hunter, Staff Judge Advocate, JTF Provide Refuge (28
 

May 1999) (on file with CLAMO). 

59 See E-mail from LTC Willis C. Hunter, Staff Judge Advocate, JTF Provide Refuge, to CPT Natalie A. 

Kolb, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces Command (12 May 1999) (on file with
 

CLAMO).

60 See Headquarters, Joint Task Force Provide Refuge, Command Brief, PowerPoint presentation, briefing
 

slide 19 (n.d.) (entire presentation on file with CLAMO). Briefing slide 19 is included in Appendix V-13. 61 See Balkan Refugees Fact Sheet, supra note 2.
 

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LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

apply for a Green Card (resident alien). After five years with a Green Card, 

the refugees would be able to apply for citizenship. 

a. Facilitate Law Enforcement Coordination and Cooperation with 

an Interagency Law Enforcement Memorandum of Agreement. 

The JTF PR SJA prepared an Interagency Law Enforcement 

Memorandum of Agreement (LE MOA).62 The LE MOA was designed to 

clarify the roles of the various security and law enforcement agencies 

involved in the JTF PR operation.63 The LE MOA had to be reviewed by 

the Department of Army (HQDA) and could not be finalized at the JTF PR 

level until HQDA completed its review.64 Because the LE MOA needed to 

be staffed with the elements ultimately responsible for providing security 

assets and resources, HQDA determined the appropriate agencies to execute 

the MOA (DHHS, JTF, INS, and DOD Police).65 The LE MOA is included 

in Appendix V-14. 

b. Understand the Roles of the Various Security Agencies. 

The FBI was responsible for overall mission security.66 As the LFA, 

DHHS was responsible within the entire Welcome Center for refugee 

security. DHHS assigned this responsibility to the INS, which executed the 

security responsibility through border patrol and contract security 

personnel.67 The military policing agencies (DOD Police, CID, MPs) were 

primarily responsible for military security and military criminal 

investigation issues. The military investigative agencies also had criminal 

62 The agreement concerning law enforcement and peacekeeping responsibilities for Cuban refugees 

provided the precedent and guidance for the LE MOA. See MILITARY HISTORY OFFICE, supra note 51. See 

also E-mail from LTC Marsha A. Sajer, Office of the Army General Counsel, to MAJ Neoma J. White, 

International/Operational Law Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army (27 May 1999)
 

(on file with CLAMO). 

63 See Message, 211700 (EDT) May 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 19
 

[hereinafter SITREP 19] (on file with CLAMO). 

64 See E-mail from MAJ Patrick E. Koepp, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces 

Command, to LTC Willis C. Hunter, Staff Judge Advocate, JTF Provide Refuge (27 May 1999, 16:20
 

EDT) (on file with CLAMO). 

65 See E-mail from MAJ Neoma J. White, International/Operational Law Division, Office of The Judge 

Advocate General, U.S. Army, to CPT Natalie A. Kolb, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army
 

Forces Command (26 May 1999) (on file with CLAMO). 

66 See SITREP 4, supra note 16. 67 See E-mail from Beverly Thomas, DCSLOG, to Brian H. Gerber, Chief, Civil Law Division, Office of 

the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces Command (20 May 1999) [hereinafter Thomas E-mail to
 

Gerber] (on file with CLAMO). See also Message, 101700 (EDT) May 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: 

JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 8 [hereinafter SITREP 8] (on file with CLAMO). 

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investigative responsibility for certain refugee crimes.68 All security 

agencies agreed to work through the FBI for security issues and to address 

threats made to anyone involved in the mission. The Fort Dix Installation 

Security Office and the JTF PR J2 (Intelligence and Security) tracked and 

communicated threat information to the FBI.69 To control access to the 

operation, the Director, Force Projection Directorate (FPD), only granted 

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) access to individuals supporting JTF 

PR who possessed INS-issued badges.70 Based on mission or threat 

condition level changes, the Director, FPD, could impose access 

restrictions.71 

1. INS is responsible for refugee security and 

administrative processing. 

Because the Village was considered a POE, INS was responsible for 

entry and exit to and from the Village as well as security within the Village. 

To control entry, the INS used a badge system. To ensure refugees did not 

leave the Village without proper authority, INS border patrol and contracted 

security personnel patrolled the fence surrounding the Village and the buffer 

zone between the inner and outer perimeters.72 The function of the INS 

guards was to enforce INS requirements. To further provide immigration 

control and refugee security, INS inspected every car that left the inner 

perimeter.73 These searches were conducted by the contracted security 

guards. Initially, the JTF SJA opined that as Fort Dix was an Army 

installation, only three people could order inspections of vehicles—the 

Installation Commander, the JTF PR Commander, or a federal judge. 

FORSCOM, however, later advised that because parts of Fort Dix were 

considered a POE, the INS and the contract security guards could conduct 

68 See infra text accompanying notes 77-83 for a more detailed discussion of criminal investigation 

responsibilities. 

69 See Joint Task Force Provide Refuge, Standard Operating Procedures, J2 Operations ¶ 2-1 (May 10, 

1999) [hereinafter JTF J2 Ops SOP] (on file with CLAMO). 70 See Headquarters, U.S. Army Fort Dix, Standard Operating Procedures, Emergency Operations Center, ¶ 

7-8 (n.d.) (on file with CLAMO). 

71 See JTF J2 Ops SOP, supra note 69, ¶ 2-1. 72 See E-mail from LTC Robert C. Todd, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS), to FORSCOM
 

Operations Center, Watch Team (3 May 1999) (containing the first situation report of Operation Open 

Arms) (on file with CLAMO). 

73 See E-mail from LTC Willis C. Hunter, Staff Judge Advocate, JTF Provide Refuge, to MAJ Patrick E. 

Koepp, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces Command (27 May 1999, 13:08 EDT) (on
 

file with CLAMO). 

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administrative inspections in the limited area for which DHHS and INS had 

security responsibility.74 

2. Understand the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act. 

The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) prohibits the military, including MPs 

and DOD Police, from directly enforcing immigration law and other civil 

laws.75 The PCA does not, however, prevent MPs and DOD Police from 

investigating crime occurring on an installation. While enforcing 

immigration procedures and responding to refugee crimes were 

responsibilities of DHHS/INS,76 this did not prevent MPs or DOD Police 

from maintaining order and security on Fort Dix or from conducting 

investigations of crimes committed by civilians on the installation. The MPs 

had the authority to stop crimes being committed on the installation pursuant 

to the inherent authority and responsibility of the Fort Dix and JTF PR 

Commanders to maintain order and security on the installation. The JTF PR 

Provost Marshall (JTF PM) provided security for the Welcome Center on 

Fort Dix, twenty four hours a day, seven days a week.77 In addition to 

walking patrols, MPs used golf carts to patrol the perimeter of the refugee 

area. The Military Personnel Directorate (MPD) provided vehicle 

registration passes for operational personnel (military and DOD civilian), 

agency personnel, and other visitors that needed access to Fort Dix. 

3. Distinguish security issues from criminal investigation 

issues. 

While the INS was responsible for all refugee security, criminal 

investigation fell to multiple investigative agencies. The INS reported any 

crime committed within the Village to the DOD Police. Upon receiving a 

report, DOD Police would make an initial evaluation as to whether the 

74 See E-mail from MAJ Patrick E. Koepp, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces 

Command, to LTC Willis C. Hunter, Staff Judge Advocate, JTF Provide Refuge (27 May 1999, 17:35
 

EDT) [hereinafter Koepp E-mail to Hunter (27 May 1999)] (on file with CLAMO). 75 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000). The PCA applies to the DOD Police as well as to MPs. See U.S. DEPT OF
 

ARMY, REG. 190-56, THE ARMY CIVILIAN POLICE AND SECURITY GUARD PROGRAM ¶ 5-2 (21 June 1985)
 

(“Civilian police and security guard personnel, while on duty at an installation, are considered part of the 

Army, and are therefore subject to the restrictions on aid to civilian law enforcement imposed by section
 

1385, title 18, U.S. Code, commonly known as the Posse Comitatus Act.”). 

76 See E-mail from CPT Natalie A. Kolb, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces Command, 

to LTC Willis C. Hunter, Staff Judge Advocate, JTF Provide Refuge (26 May 1999) (on file with 

CLAMO).

77 See OPORDER 99-005, supra note 4, at annex K, ¶ 2. 

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offense was a misdemeanor or felony. If the case was a misdemeanor, the 

DOD Police reported the case to the DOD Criminal Investigations Unit 

(CIU). If the case was a felony, DOD Police reported the case to Fort 

Monmouth CID. CID was responsible for coordinating the case with the 

FBI. If the crime was refugee against refugee or involved a refugee and 

civilian employee, the FBI was to investigate. If the crime involved a 

military perpetrator, an unknown perpetrator, or if the FBI chose not to 

investigate, then CID would investigate. Coordination with DHHS and INS 

was required, no matter which investigative unit responded. If a crime 

occurred, DOD Police had authority to detain, just as for any criminal 

offense on post. 

While INS was responsible for enforcing INS immigration 

requirements within the buffer zone, MPs and DOD Police were responsible 

for policing criminal activity within the buffer zone. The relationship 

between these two agencies’ responsibilities had to be clarified when 

determining procedures for handling refugees attempting to leave the Village 

and Fort Dix without the INS-mandated Form I-94. 78 If refugees attempting 

to leave the Village were considered to be committing a “criminal act,” the 

DOD Police and MPs were authorized to prevent the refugee from leaving.79 

If the refugees were not considered to be committing a criminal act by 

attempting to leave Fort Dix without proper authorization, it was important 

to ensure that INS, DHHS, and other agencies clearly understood that the 

DOD Police and MPs would not assist in preventing refugees from leaving. 

JTF PR took the position, with which FORSCOM agreed,80 that DOD 

personnel would not detain any refugees for attempting to leave without 

proper authorization.81 If DOD personnel observed a refugee leaving the 

Village, they would take no other action other than to make a report to INS 

officials. JTF PR SJA advised MP and DOD Police that preventing refugees 

from leaving Fort Dix was an INS responsibility. The JTF SJA opined that, 

78 See E-mail from MAJ Patrick E. Koepp, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces 

Command, to LTC Willis C. Hunter, Staff Judge Advocate, JTF Provide Refuge (14 May 1999, 13:45
 

EDT) (on file with CLAMO). 

79 See SJA SOP, supra note 42, ¶ 6-8.
 80 See E-mail from MAJ Patrick E. Koepp, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces 

Command, to LTC Willis C. Hunter, Staff Judge Advocate, JTF Provide Refuge (14 May 1999, 15:23
 

EDT) (on file with CLAMO). 

81 See E-mail from LTC Willis C. Hunter, Staff Judge Advocate, JTF Provide Refuge, to MAJ Patrick E. 

Koepp, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces Command (14 May 1999, 14:14 EDT) (on
 

file with CLAMO). 

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in reality, there was no confusion over responsibilities.82 All three execute 

orders from DOMS, USACOM, and FORSCOM clearly stated that 

“[s]ecurity of Kosovar refugees off the installation is a function of local law 

enforcement. Security of refugees on the installation is the responsibility of 

the LFA and INS.”83 

c. Remember the Responsibilities of the Various Agencies When 

Reviewing Contracts for Security Services. 

DHHS entered into a security contract with a private security agency 

to augment border police providing refugee security. The security contract 

indicated that the contractor would provide security for the outer perimeter, 

a phrase that could have been interpreted to mean an area beyond the 

Welcome Center.84 Thus, although structured to meet the refugee protection 

and processing needs of DHHS, the contract also appeared to contemplate 

security services for purposes of JTF PR force protection and overall 

installation security. In other words, it appeared that DOD might have been 

a party to the DHHS contract in order to meet the DOD security 

requirements. This was an issue that required clarification. 

Upon review, the contract provision had to be interpreted narrowly. 

DOD could not have been a party to a contract for installation security, 

refugee security, or force protection for a number of reasons. First, except in 

certain narrow circumstances, DOD is statutorily prohibited from 

contracting for security guards in the U.S. Second, DOD was not authorized 

to provide refugee security and therefore could not contract for refugee 

security services. Finally, the installation and the JTF PR commanders had 

the ultimate authority and responsibility for maintaining order on the 

installation and protecting persons and property thereon. 

DOD is statutorily prohibited from contracting for security guard 

functions. 10 U.S.C. § 2465 prohibits DOD from obligating or expending 

appropriated funds for security guard functions at any CONUS military 

installation or facility.85 A broad interpretation of the contract provision to 

82 See id.
 83 E.g., Message, 010933Z May 99, USCINCACOM, subject: Execute Order (on file with CLAMO). 84 See E-mail from MAJ Patrick E. Koepp, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces 

Command, to Brian H. Gerber, Chief, Civil Law Division, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army 

Forces Command (19 May 1999) (on file with CLAMO). 

85 This statutory prohibition does not apply to (1) a contract to be carried out on a government-owned but
 

privately operated installation, or (2) a function that was under contract on September 24, 1983. 10 U.S.C.
 

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provide installation security would have violated 10 U.S.C. § 2465 because 

DOD appeared to be entering into a contract for security guard services. 

This statutory restriction is not applicable to DHHS, which could contract 

directly for security services. Because DHHS was paying for the contract 

services and was the actual entity entering into the contract, the contract 

provision had to be limited to areas of the installation for which DHHS was 

responsible. 

DOD had a limited military support role and was only authorized to 

provide support requested by DHHS and authorized by DOMS. Any 

expenses incurred for support, which were not approved by DOMS, would 

result in DOD not being reimbursed by DHHS, as they would be deemed to 

be unauthorized assistance to civil authorities. The DOD/DHHS MOA 

established the scope of services for which DHHS would reimburse DOD. 

Security inside the Village and the Hamlet was specifically an INS 

responsibility.86 DOMS consistently made clear the position that the 

provision of “security” services, which were a DHHS responsibility, was not 

one of the services covered by the MOA. Thus, it was not an activity in 

which DOD should engage. If the Army contracted for security inside the 

Village perimeter, DHHS could refuse to reimburse the Army, as this service 

was not requested in the DOD/DHHS MOA. Understanding this, it became 

clear that DOD was not a party to the contract. 

Force protection and installation security are the responsibility of the 

JTF and installation commanders. Because the JTF PR commander and the 

installation commander had the ultimate authority and responsibility for 

maintaining order on the installation and protecting persons and property, a 

contract between DHHS/INS with a private security firm could not have 

contracted away force protection authority. 

d. Forcibly Removing Refugees Raises Policy Issues. 

The JTF PR began experiencing more aggressive behavior on the part 

of refugees towards each other and U.S. contract laborers.87 Refugees were 

verbally abusing dining facility workers and refugee interpreters. Refugee 

§ 2465(b) (2000). After the events of 11 Sept. 2001, Congress suspended 10 U.S.C. § 2465 during
 

Operation Enduring Freedom and for 180 days thereafter. U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001, H.R. 3162, 107th 

Cong. § 1010 (2001) (enacted).

86 See Thomas E-mail to Gerber, supra note 67. 87 See SITREP 19, supra note 63. 

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LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

interpreters were effective as intermediaries, if they spoke English and had 

some authority figure physically present. It was important that uniformed 

INS agents be present in all dining facilities to maintain order. 

In addition to disciplinary problems, potential overcrowding created 

the need to address the possibility of removing refugees. Any plan to move 

refugees raised two issues: 

• the INS authority to force refugees to board transportation, and 

• the policy problems if the Army had to resort to force to move 

refugees.88 

Refugee disposition was an issue for resolution by the LFA, DHHS.89 

Even if INS had a legal basis to force refugees to leave the installation, DOD 

personnel would not be involved in forcing refugees to leave, as this would 

go beyond the military’s supporting role. DOMS directed JTF PR not to 

take a position on removing refugees by force.90 The JTF PR was to support 

the DHHS position—which was that all agencies (PHS, DHHS, INS, and 

JVA) do all that they could to encourage refugees to resettle in the U.S. The 

DOMS position was that a refugee not wanting to depart was a DHHS issue. 

The issue was ultimately a policy decision rather than a legal 

decision.91 Before any action to expel a refugee, DHHS must have had the 

opportunity to resolve the issue. If DHHS was unable to resolve the issue 

and asked the Commander, JTF PR, to expel a refugee, the Commander was 

not to take any action to force refugees to leave without first consulting with 

his assigned legal counsel who, in turn, would coordinate with FORSCOM. 

FORSCOM would coordinate with HQDA, if necessary. 

On 9 June 1999, a refugee family refused to leave. INS officials 

assisted and raised the issue to DHHS, Washington, D.C., as a major policy 

88 See E-mail from CPT Natalie A. Kolb, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces Command, 

to LTC Willis C. Hunter, Staff Judge Advocate, JTF Provide Refuge (12 May 1999) (on file with 

CLAMO).

89 See E-mail from COL James N. Hatten, Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces Command, to CPT 

Mark E. Austin, DCSOPS (14 June 1999) [hereinafter Hatten E-mail to Austin]; E-mail from MAJ Patrick 

E. Koepp, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces Command, to CPT Mark E. Austin, 

DCSOPS (15 June 1999) [hereinafter Koepp E-mail to Austin] (on file with CLAMO). 

90 See E-mail from COL Robert Fitton, Deputy, Director of Military Support, to MAJ Neoma J. White, 

International/Operational Law Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General, Army (15 June 1999) (on 

file with CLAMO). 

91 See Hatten E-mail to Austin, supra note 89.
 

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concern. Fortunately, there was no confrontation, and the family left the 

same day to join a sponsoring family.92 

e. The JA Should Facilitate Weekly Meetings Among the Law 

Enforcement Agencies. 

Operation Provide Refuge required teamwork from all law 

enforcement agencies. Weekly meetings between the many law 

enforcement agencies provided the foundation for the close coordination of 

the law enforcement agencies in Operation Provide Refuge. The meetings 

were essential to identify issues, consider future responses, and clarify areas 

of responsibility initially established by the Rules of Interaction/Rules of 

Engagement (ROI/ROE). 

Early in this type of operation, a “Law Enforcement Working Group” 

should meet on a weekly basis.93 Each law enforcement agency should 

designate a representative to meet and work through security, law 

enforcement, and related legal issues with all affected law enforcement 

agencies. The LFA law enforcement official should chair the meetings with 

close JTF SJA coordination. Participating in the JTF PR meetings were 

representatives from DHHS, INS, DOD Police, CID, FBI, JTF PR, XVIII 

Airborne Corps, New Jersey State Police, the Burlington County District 

Attorney's Office, U.S. Border Patrol, and the Fort Dix Directorate of 

Information Management (DOIM).94 

f. Access to the Refugee Camp Is Both an INS Issue As Well As a 

Force Protection Issue. 

Even though access to the Village was an INS responsibility, JTF PR 

faced several force protection issues regarding access. A concern arose 

regarding Serbia sending “moles” among the refugees.95 This became 

increasingly significant as the number of improperly documented refugees 

increased. 

92 See Message, 081700 (EDT) June 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 

[hereinafter SITREP 38] (on file with CLAMO). 

93 See SJA AAR, supra note 50; SJA SOP, supra note 42, ¶ 3.1(d). 94 See Message, 261700 (EDT) May 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 24
 

[hereinafter SITREP 24] (on file with CLAMO). 

95 See Message, 091700 (EDT) May 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 7
 

[hereinafter SITREP 7] (on file with CLAMO). 

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LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

Initially, improperly documented refugees were administratively 

segregated.96 INS removed these individuals from refugee status and placed 

them into an “expedited removal” process to be treated as illegal 

immigrants. 97 Because they were no longer eligible for refugee status, they 

had the right to apply for political asylum.98 If they applied for political 

asylum, they were afforded a hearing before the nearest immigration judge, 

who was in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.99 

The INS advised that if a refugee had a “credible fear” that he would 

be killed or harmed if returned to his native country, the refugee would 

usually be granted asylum. In the context of Kosovar refugees, INS believed 

it was a virtual certainty that asylum would be granted. The irony was that 

persons sent through the political asylum process were actually released 

much sooner than refugees in the Welcome Center, because the political 

asylum process was completed in a week or less while the INS processing 

took longer than a week. 

When FORSCOM questioned why refugees had been placed in 

administrative segregation, INS advised the JTF SJA that the improperly 

documented refugees were not authorized entry into the U.S. because they 

had committed fraud in attempting to gain entry. Refugees in FYROM were 

assigned to one of the nineteen participating countries where they were to be 

taken as part of the overall refugee mission. Refugees were not offered the 

opportunity to select a country.100 Some refugees in FYROM did not wish 

to come to the U.S., so they traded or sold their credentials to gain 

transportation to another country. When INS reviewed a refugee’s 

documents and found that the documents did not match the refugee 

presenting them, the refugee was then deemed to have lied on the application 

for refugee status. Other refugees stated that there was a rumor in the 

refugee camp in FYROM that the U.S. was only allowing families to come 

96 Three Kosovars provided false information when boarding the 7 May 1999 flight from FYROM. Six 

other refugees were segregated from the 10 May 1999 flight. See Message, 111700 (EDT) May 99, JTF 

Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 9 [hereinafter SITREP 9] (on file with CLAMO). 

On 12 May 1999 (Flight #4), twenty-one refugees were segregated for false representations to the INS. See 

SITREP 10, supra note 11; SITREP 11, supra note 48. Six improperly documented refugees were
 

segregated from the 14 May 1999 flight. See SITREP 12, supra note 49. Flight #7 (19 May 1999) had five
 

improperly documented refugees aboard. See Message, 201700 (EDT) May 99, JTF Provide Refuge, 

subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 18 [hereinafter SITREP 18] (on file with CLAMO). 97 See SITREP 10, supra note 11. 98 See Hunter Memorandum, supra note 43.
 99 See SITREP 11, supra note 48. 100 See SITREP 10, supra note 11. 

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to the U.S. Groups of individuals were getting together, assuming one 

family name, and posing as a complete family. Thus, all of these refugees 

were no longer eligible for refugee status and had to be placed in 

administrative segregation. 

On 15 May 1999, INS changed procedures for the handling of 

improperly documented refugees.101 The INS began admitting such refugees 

into the Village population rather than segregating them. Only individuals 

who continued to be deceptive about their identity and administrative 

information would be segregated. 

Another force protection issue arose because of the large number of 

packages addressed to “any refugee.” Fort Dix DOIM purchased mailscanning equipment to address any force protection issues posed by the large 

volume of mail.102 

As the result of an incident on 13 May 1999, JTF PR J3 coordinated 

with DHHS and the DOD Police to implement additional security measures 

within the Welcome Center.103 Ten individuals, who were Jehovah's 

Witnesses posing as chaplains, managed to gain access into the Welcome 

Center and obtain identification badges. The individuals attempted to 

distribute literature and religious books to the refugees. Three of these 

individuals returned on 14 May 1999 and were taken aside for questioning 

by DHHS and the JTF PM, who confiscated their identification badges. 

4. Rules of Interaction/Rules of Engagement 

On 5 May 1999, the Commander, JTF PR, approved the ROI/ROE. 

The ROI/ROE were included as part of the SJA SOP and handed out to JTF 

PR personnel on wallet-sized cards.104 Appendix V-15 contains an 

operations order annex spelling out the ROE/ROI. 

The ROI provided guidance to DOD and military security personnel 

in dealing with refugees and other persons. Developed from guidance 

101 See Message, 151700 (EDT) May 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 13
 

[hereinafter SITREP 13] (on file with CLAMO). 

102 See DOIM AAR, supra note 9, at 2. 103 See SITREP 12, supra note 49. 104 See SJA SOP, supra note 42, ¶ 6-8; see also SITREP 3, supra note 26. 

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LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

provided by DOMS, USACOM, and FORSCOM, the ROI were coordinated 

with the SJAs at Fort Dix, USARC, USACOM, FORSCOM, and OTJAG. 

The ROI were primarily designed to ensure that the refugees were 

treated with dignity and respect and that there was no improper 

fraternization or misconduct between the military personnel and refugees. 

The ROI restricted chaplains from providing direct religious support 

to civilians, including refugees.105 Direct support was defined as preaching 

or leading a religious service. The ROI allowed chaplains to provide 

"indirect support," which included providing a place for religious services, 

procuring a civilian minister to lead services, providing necessary equipment 

and seating, and meeting with and counseling refugees.106 

The ROI prohibited the introduction, possession, use, sale, transfer, or 

consumption of any alcoholic beverage within the limits of the Welcome 

Center, the Village, the Hamlet, or any other refugee housing areas. JTF PR 

personnel could engage in moderate consumption of alcoholic beverages 

when off-duty and in areas away from the Village or refugee housing 

107 areas. 

The ROE allowed JTF PR soldiers to use necessary force to defend 

themselves and others when threatened with death or serious bodily injury. 

The ROE instructed soldiers to avoid using force to accomplish the TF 

mission as long as they could accomplish the mission without using force. 

While allowed to use force, the ROE directed soldiers to use the minimum 

force necessary and to consider the risk of death or serious bodily harm to 

innocent bystanders prior to using force.108 The ROE also contained 

guidance on security and investigative jurisdiction, discussed above.109 

105 See SJA SOP, supra note 42, ¶ 6-7. The Army has also has a regulation on point. See U.S. DEP'T OF 

ARMY, REG. 165-1, CHAPLAIN ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY ch. 4 (26 May 2000) (The
 

regulation was originally printed 28 February 1998; this printing incorporates Change 1.). 106 See SJA SOP, supra note 42, ¶ 6-7.
 107 See id. ¶ 6-1. 108 See OPLAN 99-01, supra note 42, at annex E; SJA SOP, supra note 42, ¶ 6-8. 109 See supra text accompanying notes 55-83. 

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5. Be Aware of the Potential Limitations on Military Support for War 

Crimes Investigations. 

A dispute arose between DHHS, DOS, and the FBI over war crimes 

investigations. The Ambassador of War Crimes, DOS, was responsible for 

coordinating interviews of the refugees to gather war crimes evidence.110 

The U.S. Attorney General also directed a war crimes investigation,111 and 

tasked the FBI to interview the refugees to obtain facts concerning war 

crimes that the refugees witnessed or experienced.112 FBI agents wanted 

access to the refugees to pursue the tasking from the U.S. Attorney 

General.113 Because the DHHS, DOS, and the Department of Justice had not 

agreed on the procedures for interrogation, DHHS and DOS did not grant the 

FBI agents access to the refugees. 

OTJAG and FORSCOM advised JTF PR to make clear to DHHS that 

DOD had not been asked to assist in war crimes fact-gathering at the refugee 

camp.

114 DOD personnel were not to participate in such missions, and it was 

not appropriate to advise DHHS of any specific civil affairs or other military 

capabilities. Although some DOD personnel had been used as interpreters, 

DOD personnel were not specifically trained on how to conduct war crimes 

interviews.115 

a. Ensure That Requests for Support Meet MSCA Requirements. 

A DOS representative asked the Commander, JTF PR, for assistance 

in debriefing Kosovar refugees.116 Specifically, the request was for 

members of the 325th Military Intelligence Battalion, 94th USAR Command, 

to assist the DOS in collecting information about war crimes to provide to 

the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. FORSCOM 

advised JTF PR to provide no support until DOMS approved the level and 

110 See E-mail from MAJ Patrick E. Koepp, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces 

Command, to MAJ Neoma J. White, International/Operational Law Division, Office of The Judge
 

Advocate General, Army (1 June 1999) (on file with CLAMO). 

111 See SITREP 3, supra note 26. 112 See E-mail from MAJ Patrick E. Koepp, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces 

Command, to MAJ Neoma J. White, International/Operational Law Division, Office of The Judge
 

Advocate General, Army (20 May 1999) (on file with CLAMO). 

113 See SITREP 4, supra note 16. 114 See E-mail from MAJ Neoma J. White, International/Operational Law Division, Office of The Judge 

Advocate General, U.S. Army, to MAJ Patrick E. Koepp, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army 

Forces Command (24 May 1999) (on file with CLAMO). 

115 See id.
 116 See SITREP 38, supra note 92. 

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kind of support to be provided, if any.117 The positions adopted by the 

Office of the Army General Counsel, HQDA, and OTJAG were that DOS 

should submit an official request to the Executive Secretary, Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD), for support to its war crimes investigation.118 

DOMS would only approve military support specifically requested by 

DHHS in its role as the LFA. DOS would need to make a formal request 

through DHHS for this type of military assistance prior to such support 

being provided by AD or Reserve Component (RC) personnel.119 In other 

words, such support was treated under typical military support to civil 

authority procedures.120 

The request raised a number of legal issues, including the effect of the 

PCA. Under Executive Order (EO) 12333,121 the military is generally 

precluded from performing interrogations in support of law enforcement 

agencies and from using intelligence assets to perform a law enforcement 

mission.122 Further, the request did not comply with the procedures 

established in DOD Directives 3025.15123 and 5525.5.124 The Secretary of 

Defense had not delegated authority to approve requests for support to law 

enforcement operations. Accordingly, if DOS required DOD support for 

war crimes investigation, DOS would have to submit a request, signed by an 

authorized DOS official, to the OSD Executive Secretary. The request 

needed to outline the mission to be performed by DOD, and also indicate 

that the DOS would reimburse DOD, request a waiver, or cite statutory 

authority that would permit DOD to provide this support to DOS on a 

nonreimbursable basis. 

117 See Hatten E-mail to Austin, supra note 89.
 118 See E-mail from LTC Marsha A. Sajer, Office of the Army General Counsel, to BG Bruce Lawlor,
 

DOMS (14 June 1999); E-mail from LTC Marsha A. Sajer, Office of the Army General Counsel, to MAJ 

Neoma J. White, Operational Law Attorney, Office of the Judge Advocate General (14 June 1999) 

[hereinafter Sajer E-mail to White] (on file with CLAMO). 

119 See E-mail from MAJ Neoma J. White, International/Operational Law Division, Office of The Judge 

Advocate General, U.S. Army, to MAJ Patrick E. Koepp, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army 

Forces Command (4 June 1999); E-mail from MAJ Patrick E. Koepp, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 

U.S. Army Forces Command, to MAJ Michael A. Newton, USALSA, Office of The Judge Advocate 

General, U.S. Army (4 June 1999) (on file with CLAMO). 

120 See supra text accompanying notes 44-46. 121 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (2001). 122 See Sajer E-mail to White, supra note 118. 123 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 124 U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 5525.5, DOD COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT
 

OFFICIALS (15 Jan. 1986) (C1, 20 Dec. 1989). 

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b. The Standards for Active Duty MSCA Are the Same for Reserve 

Component MSCA. 

Several RC officers were interested in assisting with war crimes 

interviews of the Kosovar refugees.125 DOMS would only approve military 

support specifically requested by DHHS as the LFA. DOS had to make a 

formal request through DHHS for this type of military assistance prior to 

such support being provided by AD or RC personnel.126 

A related issue concerned RC officers who were interested in 

responding to a DOS request to the American Bar Association (ABA) for 

assistance with war crimes interviews.127 The concern was whether approval 

would appear contrary to the HQDA position regarding RC support. If the 

RC officer went to Fort Dix in a RC capacity, this would be contrary to the 

HQDA/DOMS guidance. However, the RC officer could respond in a 

civilian capacity to the ABA. 

c. Ensure Proper Authority Is Granted For Access to Refugees For 

Interviews. 

The Commander, JTF PR, received a phone call from a Senate staff 

member from the Senate Intelligence Committee, inquiring why the 

Commander had denied Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) personnel 

access to the refugees.128 In response, the Commander explained that 1) the 

DIA had not requested access to the refugees, and 2) if DIA had asked for 

access, the Commander would not be able to grant the request because there 

was no interagency agreement allowing such interrogation. The 

Commander further advised that the only people conducting interviews were 

the DOS and Amnesty International, both organizations focusing on war 

crimes, not exploitable military intelligence. 

125 See E-mail from MAJ Patrick E. Koepp, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces 

Command, to MAJ Neoma J. White, International/Operational Law Division, Office of The Judge 

Advocate General, Army (1 June 1999); E-mail from MAJ Patrick E. Koepp, Office of the Staff Judge 

Advocate, U.S. Army Forces Command, to MAJ Neoma J. White, International/Operational Law Division, 

Office of The Judge Advocate General, Army (9 June 1999) [hereinafter Koepp E-mail to White (9 June 

1999)] (on file with CLAMO). 

126 See E-mail from MAJ Neoma J. White, International/Operational Law Division, Office of The Judge 

Advocate General, U.S. Army, to MAJ Patrick E. Koepp, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army 

Forces Command (4 June 1999) (on file with CLAMO).

127 See Koepp E-mail to White (9 June 1999), supra note 125. 128 See SITREP 22, supra note 148. 

202 
 

 

 


 


 


 

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During an interagency conference call on 25 May 1999, a National 

Security Council representative indicated that the same Senate staff member 

called to discuss the DIA interrogation of refugees for the purpose of 

gathering exploitable military intelligence.129 On 2 June 1999, JTF PR J2 

received FORSCOM guidance directing JTF PR to provide only logistical 

support to the Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Service of the DIA, 

as HUMINT had received DHHS and INS approval to participate in refugee 

interviews.130 

6. Be Prepared for Refugee Deaths, Births, and Marriages. 

a. Consider Both Religious and Legal Requirements when Faced 

with a Refugee Death. 

Before JTF PR began, U.S. Army Claims Service (USARCS) 

considered the issue of potential claims, including claims arising out of 

refugee deaths. USARCS considered the LFA responsible for establishing a 

procedure for the investigation and payment of claims.131 FORSCOM 

recommended that the JTF PR conduct claims investigations, which they 

believed should fall within the purview of the installation SJA, who already 

had claims authority.132 

1. Refugee death before arrival 

After yesterday’s funeral, Ali Maxhuni, son of the deceased, 

stated, "I only wish my mother had lived for three more days to 

see the kindness of America."133 

JTF PR received 463 refugees on 19 May 1999.134 The JTF SJA 

worked the issue of handling the remains of a seventy-eight-year-old woman 

who died during the flight to Fort Dix.135 There were no legal concerns 

129 See SITREP 23, supra note 145. 130 See SITREP 31, supra note 34. 131 See E-mail from CPT Natalie A. Kolb, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces
 

Command, to LTC Willis C. Hunter, Staff Judge Advocate, JTF Provide Refuge (7 May 1999, 16:52 EDT) 

(on file with CLAMO). 

132 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 27-20, CLAIMS ¶ 2-2(c)(1)(b) (31 Dec. 1997) (requiring claims
 

investigations when a civilian is killed by an act or omission of a government employee). 

133 SITREP 19, supra note 63 (quoting Ali Maxhuni). 134 See Message, 191700 (EDT) May 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 17
 

[hereinafter SITREP 17] (on file with CLAMO). 

135 See id. 

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regarding the transfer of the body to local Muslim religious officials for 

handling in accordance with the deceased’s religious beliefs.136 INS did not 

classify persons pronounced dead upon arrival at McGuire AFB as 

refugees.137 U.S. Customs had no issues. DHHS’ statutory responsibility 

for the resettlement of refugees within the U.S. and its designation as the 

LFA dictated that it should be primarily responsible for responding to 

refugee deaths, which occurred in transit or in the Welcome Center, and for 

funding necessary costs. If DHHS requested DOD assistance in responding 

to refugee deaths, the JTF PR had authority to provide appropriate assistance 

in accordance with its limited military support mission, e.g., transportation 

to burial site, but DOD involvement was a last resort. 

Accordingly, the remains were immediately released and transported 

to the local hospital for preparation of a death certificate. There was no 

autopsy because of the deceased’s age and no indications of foul play. The 

Fort Dix Casualty Affairs Officer advised that there was no requirement to 

use the installation mortuary contract because the contract was only for AD 

soldiers and indigents that died on post. The family and a JTF PR Chaplain 

arranged for the remains to be taken to a Muslim mortuary to be prepared in 

accordance with Muslim religious requirements. Muslim law requires that 

the body be bathed in accordance with religious beliefs and be buried before 

the next sunrise. The JTF SJA met with a JTF PR Chaplain to confirm that 

the funeral was completed in accordance with the Muslim religion without 

any problems.138 

2. Refugee death after arrival 

Law enforcement authorities planned to treat a death occurring in a 

refugee housing area as an unexplained death. The DOD Police were to 

respond and secure the scene for evaluation by CID. CID would conduct a 

crime scene analysis and coordinate with the FBI. The body would then be 

handled in accordance with normal police procedures, in consultation with 

DHHS, INS, and Muslim advisors. 

136 See Koepp E-mail to Hunter (27 May 1999), supra note 74. 137 See SJA SOP, supra note 42, ¶ 6-3.
 138 See SITREP 18, supra note 96. 

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The second refugee death occurred on 13 June 1999, at Burlington 

Memorial Hospital.139 DHHS made all burial arrangements. A 

Commander’s Critical Information Requirement (CCIR) report was provided 

through FORSCOM to USACOM. The JTF PR Chaplain contacted a 

volunteer Albanian-speaking imam140 to assist in notifying the immediate 

family. The Chaplain also coordinated the essential religious elements for a 

traditional Muslim burial within twenty-four hours. 

b. Weddings Must Be Conducted In Accordance With State Law. 

The need arose for the JTF SJA to determine the legal requirements 

for refugee marriages in New Jersey.141 The SJA coordinated with the 

Garrison SJA and determined that: 

• the bride and groom must be 18 or older; 

• there must be at least one witness; 

• the license fee was $28; and 

• there was a three-day waiting period after applying for the 

license. 142 

If refugees wanted to be married while at Fort Dix, an application for 

a marriage license was obtained from the New Hanover Township Registrar 

in Cookstown, New Jersey. The JTF SJA assisted in obtaining and 

completing the marriage license application for two refugees.143 The JTF 

SJA visited the New Hanover Township Registrar and picked up the 

completed marriage license.144 He then provided the license to DHHS for 

completion by the imam and the witnesses. Lastly, he returned the 

completed marriage license to the Registrar for filing and obtained certified 

copies of the documents for the newly married couple.145 On 22 May 1999, 

the wedding of the refugees occurred.146 The wedding was supported 

through donations: wedding dress and tuxedo, a wedding cake prepared by 

139 See Message, 131700 (EDT) June 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 42
 

[hereinafter SITREP 42] (on file with CLAMO). 

140 An imam is a recognized leader or religious teacher of Islam.
 141 See SITREP 17, supra note 134. 142 See SJA SOP, supra note 42, ¶ 6-10. 143 See SITREP 18, supra note 96. 144 See SITREP 19, supra note 63. 145 See Message, 251700 (EDT) May 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 23
 

[hereinafter SITREP 23] (on file with CLAMO). 

146 See Message, 231700 (EDT) May 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 21
 

[hereinafter SITREP 21] (on file with CLAMO). 

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volunteers in the federal prison, rings, scarves for the women to cover their 

heads in the Muslim church, flowers, a string of pearls for the bride, and an 

Albanian band from the Bronx. LIFE magazine provided wedding pictures 

in exchange for exclusive coverage inside the chapel and at the reception. 

The bride and groom had been separated for a year and were reunited at a 

refugee camp in FYROM. To accompany her and her family to the U.S., the 

groom posed as a cousin to the bride. 

c. Citizenship Issues Are Controlled by Federal Law. 

Children born at Fort Dix were U.S. citizens upon birth. U.S. law 

provides that persons born in the U.S., and subject to U.S. jurisdiction, are 

considered citizens of the U.S.147 The first child born after arrival at Fort 

Dix was named “Amerika.”148 

7. Expect Refugees and Soldiers to Want to Volunteer. 

a. Refugee Volunteer Work Cannot Violate the Antideficiency Act. 

Refugees wanted to help with odd jobs around the Village.149 

Working in coordination with FORSCOM, the JTF SJA prepared a waiver 

for Kosovar refugees to work in the Village.150 The Judge Advocate 

General’s School, U.S. Army (TJAGSA), provided FORSCOM with an 

example waiver that was prepared for Kurdish refugees during Operation 

Provide Comfort in 1991.151 The JTF SJA then prepared a Statement of 

Gratuitous Services Agreement for refugees to sign.152 The Agreement is 

included in Appendix V-16. 

Violation of the Antideficiency Act prohibition against accepting 

volunteer services153 was a major issue. FORSCOM advised that according 

147 See 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2000).
 148 See Message, 241700 (EDT) May 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 22
 

[hereinafter SITREP 22] (on file with CLAMO). 

149 See SITREP 10, supra note 11. 150 See E-mail from CPT Natalie A. Kolb, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces
 

Command, to LTC Willis C. Hunter, Staff Judge Advocate, JTF Provide Refuge, (7 May 1999, 13:11 EDT) 

[hereinafter Kolb E-mail to Hunter (7 May 1999)] (on file with CLAMO). 151 See E-mail from LTC Willis C. Hunter, Staff Judge Advocate, JTF Provide Refuge, to CPT Natalie A. 

Kolb, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces Command (7 May 1999, 13:18 EDT) (on file 

with CLAMO). 

152 See Hunter Memorandum, supra note 43.
 153 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
 

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to Comptroller General decisions it was not a violation of the Antideficiency 

Act to accept free services from a person who agreed, in writing, to waive 

entitlement to compensation. It could, however, be an improper 

augmentation of an appropriation if a refugee was performing a job that 

would otherwise require someone to be paid.154 If the refugee was only 

performing tasks within the Village, or was performing tasks directly related 

to processing of refugees, FORSCOM determined that these tasks were not 

tasks that would otherwise require payment. FORSCOM recommended that 

the issue be coordinated with the unions on Fort Dix and the Inter-Agency 

Working Group, to ensure that no one objected to refugee volunteer labor 

and that everyone agreed with the language of the Statement of Gratuitous 

Services.155 

After consulting with the JTF SJA, the Fort Dix Commander 

coordinated with the Fort Dix union representatives and the Fort Dix 

Civilian Personnel Officer. There were no objections so long as the refugees 

worked within the Village and did not displace government employees. 

Because no one had any objection to the proposal, the JTF SJA drafted the 

Gratuitous Service Agreement and provided it to the JTF J2 for translation 

into Albanian.156 The SJA used a second translator to verify the translation. 

The document was then provided to the J3 and the Civil-Military Officer. 

b. Ordering Soldiers to Work Directly for a Relief Organization Is 

Improper. 

A separate issue arose concerning soldiers' desires to assist the JVA, 

the organization representing the charitable organizations placing the 

refugees with family or sponsors.157 The JTF SJA advised that ordering 

soldiers to work directly for the JVA was improper.158 Soldiers could 

154 See Kolb E-mail to Hunter (7 May 1999), supra note 150. 155 See E-mail from CPT Natalie A. Kolb, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces 

Command, to LTC Willis C. Hunter, Staff Judge Advocate, JTF Provide Refuge (12 May 1999, 13:11 

EDT) (on file with CLAMO). 

156 See SITREP 8, supra note 67. 157 See SITREP 10, supra note 11. Refer to Appendix V-4 for the list of refugee service agencies. 158 Ordering soldiers to work directly for the JVA runs afoul of fiscal controls and government standards of 

conduct. First, a commander cannot obligate and expend funds without affirmative congressional 

authority. See, e.g., United States v. MacCollum, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976) ("The established rule is that 

the expenditure of public funds is proper only when authorized by Congress . . . ."). Second, a commander 

cannot ethically force a subordinate to perform a nonofficial duty. See Standards of Ethical Conduct for 

Employees of the Executive Branch, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.705(b) (2001) ("An employee shall not encourage, 

direct, coerce, or request a subordinate to use official time to perform activities other than those required in 

the performance of official duties or authorized in accordance with law or regulation."). 

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volunteer, however, to work during their off-duty time. The JTF SJA further 

advised that volunteers must be true volunteers and that it would be wise to 

require them to perform their duties in civilian clothes to avoid the 

perception that they had been directed to work. 

8. Providing Legal Assistance to Refugees Requires Secretary of the Army 

Approval. 

Pursuant to Army Regulation (AR) 27-3, The Army Legal Assistance 

Program,

159 Kosovar refugees were not entitled to legal assistance, but could 

become eligible legal assistance clients upon approval of the Secretary of the 

Army (SECARMY). If FORSCOM desired to expand legal assistance to 

Kosovar refugees, FORSCOM was advised to send a request to The Judge 

Advocate General for review. Legal Assistance, OTJAG, recommended that 

local bar committees be contacted to see if they could mobilize pro bono 

assistance.160 

Subject to the availability of legal staff, 10 U.S.C. § 1044 authorizes 

SECARMY to provide legal assistance services for only AD members, their 

dependents, and retirees and their dependents. SECARMY could direct that 

certain otherwise ineligible clients, such as refugees, receive certain legal 

assistance services in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 3013. JTF PR did not 

pursue this exception and, accordingly, did not provide legal assistance to 

refugees. 

9. Access to Military Dining Facilities by Civilians Requires an Exception 

to Policy. 

Civilian personnel, including contractors, volunteers, and federal 

civilian employees, wanted to eat in military dining facilities.161 In 

consultation with the Fort Dix SJA and the Director of Logistics, the JTF 

SJA determined that according to AR 30-22, The Army Food Service 

Program (draft AR),162 the Fort Dix Commander could authorize civilian 

159 U.S. DEP’T. OF ARMY, REG. 27-3, THE ARMY LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (21 Feb. 1996). 160 See E-mail from Colonel George L. Hancock, Jr., Office of The Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army, to
 

Major Curtis A. Parker, Deputy Chief, Legal Assistance Policy Division, Office of The Judge Advocate 

General, U.S. Army (6 May 1999) (on file with CLAMO). 

161 See SITREP 10, supra note 11. 162 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 30-22, THE ARMY FOOD SERVICE PROGRAM (draft). As of the publishing of
 

this Book, the AR 30-22 draft has not yet replaced the current AR, U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG 30-1, THE 

ARMY FOOD SERVICE PROGRAM (15 Aug. 1989). 

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personnel to eat in a military dining facility if a legitimate government 

interest was served by doing so.163 Applying this analysis, the Fort Dix 

Commander felt that a legitimate government interest was the morale and 

productivity of the civilian force. Accordingly, he authorized all civilians 

employed in support of Operation Provide Refuge to eat in government 

dining facilities.164 

10. Fiscal Law. 

a. Indirect Operating Costs May Not Be Reimbursable. 

The USARC Comptroller notified Fort Dix that $20 million had been 

released directly to Fort Dix through the Defense Finance and Accounting 

Service (DFAS) on 14 May 1999 to provide reimbursement for Operations 

and Maintenance (O&M) costs incurred by Fort Dix, USARC, XVIII 

Airborne Corps, and FORSCOM.165 The funding was available through 30 

September 1999. 

As of 14 June 1999, the JTF PR had not received guidance regarding 

any agreements between DA, DOD, and DHHS on what was or was not 

reimbursable.166 DOD incurred many costs at the beginning of the operation 

that it was committed to pay, and the local DHHS office was questioning 

some of these costs. These primarily involved “indirect” costs associated 

with support of installation activities and responsibilities that were affected 

by the operation. Examples included: contracted support for units and 

soldiers training at Fort Dix; additional costs for training that could not be 

performed as originally budgeted because the barracks were used for refugee 

housing; and additional DOD Police patrols. 

b. Contractual Needs Must Be Tied to Mission Support and 

Properly Documented. 

JTF PR had not received final written approval from the Fort Dix 

contracting office prior to forming contracts in support of the mission. 

Instead, JTFPR relied upon verbal approval with an understanding that the 

163 See Hunter Memorandum, supra note 43. 164 See SITREP 11, supra note 48. Civilians were required to pay the basic food charge plus a surcharge. 

The meal rates were fixed. Even if civilian workers were authorized full per diem, the rates did not change. 

165 See SITREP 12, supra note 49. 166 See Message, 141700 (EDT) June 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 43
 

[hereinafter SITREP 43] (on file with CLAMO). 

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details would be worked out later. In other words, JTF PR had contractually 

obligated its O&M funds without first establishing whether the contracts 

would be reimbursable by DHHS. This approach caused confusion once the 

contracts were submitted for official review. 167 

While all of the contracts broadly purported to be in support of the 

mission, closer inspection revealed that some of the construction contracts 

actually contained elements of infrastructure improvement—roof repair, for 

example—that arguably went beyond the bounds of mission support. 

Further complicating the analysis, the DOD/DHHS MOA was silent on 

whether construction costs were reimbursable expenses. In an effort to solve 

the problem after the fact, FORSCOM recommended that JTF PR draft a 

memorandum for record that would clarify how the disputed expenditure 

was tied to mission support.168 Understanding that many contracts are 

formed in response to urgent needs and that the paperwork then follows, 

units should nonetheless strive to obtain formal written authorizations from 

the desired fund source before executing contracts whenever practicable. 

c. Competitive Contracting Procedures Are Required Absent 

Exception. 

Under the Competition in Contracting Act,169 the government must 

seek competition for its contractual requirements. When circumstances do 

not allow for competitive contracting procedures, the contracting officer 

must prepare a Justification and Approval (J&A) and forward the J&A to 

higher headquarters for approval.170 JTF PR never prepared a J&A, instead 

relying successfully upon Operation Order 99-005 to justify invoking the 

“unusual and compelling urgency” exception to competitive contracting 

procedures provided in 10 USC § 2304(c)(2).171 

167 See E-mail from Brenda Quinn, Fort Dix, to Brian H. Gerber, Chief, Civil Law Division, Office of the
 

Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces Command (8 June 1999) (on file with CLAMO). 168 See E-mail from Brian H. Gerber, Chief, Civil Law Division, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. 

Army Forces Command, to Brenda Quinn, Fort Dix (8 June 1999) (on file with CLAMO). 

169 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (2000).
 170 See GENERAL SERVS. ADMIN. ET AL., FEDERAL ACQUISITION REG. 6.303 (June 1997).
 171 See E-mail from MAJ Patrick E. Koepp, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Forces 

Command, to Brian H. Gerber, Chief, Civil Law Division, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army 

Forces Command (1 June 1999) (on file with CLAMO).
 

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11. The JA Will Face Donation Issues. 

a. Soldiers Cannot Solicit Donations. 

The JTF SJA reviewed issues surrounding JTF PR staff soliciting 

donations for items for refugees from local businesses.172 The JTF SJA met 

with the JTF PR J3 to clarify the issue and point out that soldiers cannot 

solicit items on behalf of the Army.173 

b. New Jersey Army National Guard Donation Effort 

The NJ ARNG picked up, transported, sorted, warehoused, and 

distributed supplies and materiel donated by individuals, groups, and 

corporate sponsors.174 DHHS anticipated that clothing requirements would 

be met by commercial and/or private donation. The NJ ARNG coordinated 

all donated clothing and supply efforts.175 The NJ ARNG received over 120 

calls from public and outside agencies offering relief and support.176 Due to 

the overwhelming response for donations, JTF PR temporarily placed a 

moratorium on individual donations of clothing and other articles. The NJ 

ARNG continued to accept corporate-sponsored donations of certain items 

in short supply. 

The American Red Cross (ARC) maintained all records of donations 

and lists of potential donors. The NJ ARNG operated two warehouses177 

where ARC shipments were received, off-loaded, sorted, and stored.178 To 

support distribution to the refugees, the NJ ARNG opened “Village Stores” 

in eight of the nine Village dormitories and stocked the stores with goods 

from the two warehouses. The Village Store stocking priorities were 

updated daily based on items requested from the Village. The changes were 

172 See Hunter Memorandum, supra note 43.
 173 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REG. 5500.7-R, JOINT ETHICS REGULATION ¶ 2-100 (30 Aug. 1993); Email from LTC Willis C. Hunter, Staff Judge Advocate, JTF Provide Refuge, to LTC Herbert Flora, 

DCSOPS, U.S. Army Reserve Command (13 May 1999) (on file with CLAMO). 

174 See Message, 161700 (EDT) May 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 14
 

[hereinafter SITREP 14] (on file with CLAMO). 

175 See OPORDER 99-005, supra note 4, at annex I (Service Support), ¶ 3(b)(1). See also Joint Task Force 

Provide Refuge, Standard Operating Procedures, J4 Logistics, annex B (Supply and Service Operations),
 

tab 1 (Points of Contact/Services) (19 May 99) [hereinafter JTF J4 Logistics SOP] (on file with CLAMO). 

176 See SITREP 19, supra note 63. 177 See JTF J4 Logistics SOP, supra note 175, ¶ 1(b). 178 See Message, 171700 (EDT) May 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 15
 

[hereinafter SITREP 15] (on file with CLAMO). 

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then posted to the New Jersey Governor’s home page, “Kosovo Refugee 

Relief Effort,” to maximize visibility. 

The ARC logistics officer worked to clear the donation warehouse, 

which contained about three million dollars worth of new children’s 

clothing.179 The ARC requested DOD validation of the requirement to 

obtain military airlift and authorization to execute the airlift to the Kosovar 

camps in FYROM and Albania for distribution.180 On 6 July 1999, the ARC 

logistics officer confirmed through the International Red Cross that the 

children’s clothing in the JTF PR warehouse was not needed for Kosovar 

camps and that military airlift would not be pursued. The ARC then 

distributed the clothing through local charitable organizations such as the 

Salvation Army.181 

179 See Message, 021700 (EDT) July 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 61
 

[hereinafter SITREP 61] (on file with CLAMO). 

180 The Denton Amendment, 10 U.S.C. § 402 (2000), allows for the transportation of nongovernmental
 

privately donated humanitarian goods on a space-available basis using DOD assets. The program is jointly 

administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and DOD. 181 See SITREP 65, supra note 22. 

212 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

APPENDICES 

213 
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214 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

APPENDIX III-1: V CORPS SJA DOCC APPENDIX 

1. REFERENCES. 

a. CJCSI 3121.01, JCS SROE for US Forces. 

b. Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare. 

c. Department of Defense Directive 5100.77, Department of Defense Law of War 

Program. 

d. MJCS 0124-88, Joint Chiefs of Staff Implementation of the Department of Defense 

Law of War Program. 

e. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms. 

f. Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-1, Treaties Governing Land Warfare. 

g. Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-24, Selected International Agreements, Volume 

II. 

h. AFP 110-31, International Law - Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations. 

i. MJCS 59-83, Implementation of DOD Law of Armed Conflict. 

2. PURPOSE. To prescribe the manner in which the V Corps Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) 

will provide legal services in support of deep operations during wartime, transition to war, 

and other contingency operations. 

3. SCOPE. The information contained herein is applicable to V Corps and its supporting 

organizations during planning and execution of Corps deep operations missions. 

4. GENERAL. The V Corps SJA will provide legal support and services to the Corps Deep 

Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC). Support will include advice on all legal issues 

(foreign, domestic, and international) associated with combat operations. The V Corps SJA 

exercises technical supervision over all judge advocates in V Corps. 

5. ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES. 

a. Personnel. The V Corps SJA provides two Operational Law judge advocates to the 

DOCC for the planning, coordination, and execution of twenty-four hour deep operations. 

Appendix III-1 215 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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b. Organization. The Operational Law judge advocates work out of the DOCC LNO 

section. 

c. Responsibilities. 

(1) Advises the CG, CofS, G3, FSCOORD, Aviation Regiment Commander, and 

DOCC personnel on all targeting legal issues, to include international law, rules of 

engagement, law of war, proportionality, collateral damage, protected sites, and displaced 

civilians (DCs). 

(2) Monitors the protected site list and locations of DCs. 

(3) Monitors the Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS). 

(4) Serves as the liaison between the DOCC and the V Corps SJA. 

6. PROCEDURES. 

a. The Operational Law judge advocates participate in all stages of the mission planning 

and analysis, which includes attending targeting meetings, targeting boards, Go-No Go for 

planning meetings, Go-No Go for execution meetings, and targeting scrub meetings to 

provide legal advice and determine the focus for future operations. The judge advocates 

serve as combat multipliers, not inhibitors. As such, it is vital to work closely with the other 

planning sections from the inception of planning in order to identify possible legal 

objections/problems early on. This ensures maximum productivity from all sections. 

b. The Operational Law judge advocates perform comprehensive legal reviews on all 

proposed target nominations and identify potential legal issues. 

(1) A valid military target is any combatant and objects that by their nature, location, 

purpose, or use make an effective contribution to enemy military action. The basic principle 

of “proportionality” applies to all targeting decisions. The rule as it is often stated is that the 

loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in relation to 

the concrete and direct military advantage to be gained. 

(2) Certain people, places, and property are protected and may not be directly targeted. 

Examples of protected persons are civilians who are not engaged in hostilities, and enemy 

soldiers who are out of combat due to surrender or injury or who are exclusively engaged in 

medical duties. An undefended city that is open for unopposed occupation is an example of a 

place that is protected and that may not be targeted. Also, forces must take all necessary 

measures to spare the following specific types of sites: 

(A) Hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected. 

(B) Buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes. 

(C) Historic monuments. 

216 Appendix III-1 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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(3) Many, but probably not all, of the protected sites listed above are designated as no 

fire areas in OPORDs. Whether or not designated in an OPORD, protected persons, places, 

and property may not be targeted. Protected sites lose their legal protection, however, if the 

enemy misuses them for hostile purposes. 

(4) Collateral Damage. Unavoidable and unplanned damage to persons and property 

incurred while attacking a military objective is not a violation of the Law of War. The rule 

of proportionality, however, still applies. Planners and commanders must take all 

reasonable steps to ensure not only that the targets they identify and approve are military 

objectives or defended places, but also that these objectives may be attacked without 

probable losses in lives and damage to property out of proportion to the military advantage 

gained. 

(5) The following questions should be addressed and considered by judge advocates in 

those situations where there is a substantial probability of collateral damage to a protected 

site or where the potential target is located near a built-up or populated area. 

(A) What is the make-up of the population? Is it civilian, military, or a 

combination of both? What proportion of the population is military as opposed to civilian? 

(B) How large is the population? 

(C) Is there a time during the day in which the population density is less? 

(D) What is the estimated collateral damage? 

(E) What is the estimated civilian loss of life? 

(F) What are the estimated civilian casualties? 

(G) What is the estimated destruction of civilian property? 

(H) What is the nature of the target? 

(I) How critical is the target to the enemy war effort? 

(J) How important is the destruction of the target to accomplishment of 

our mission? What is the military objective? 

(K) Is it a target that may be needed by U.S. Forces at end state to 

reestablish order (e.g., power plants, rail lines, commercial communication lines, etc.)? 

(L) Is the target susceptible to alternate means of destruction 

(Information warfare, PSYOPS)? 

Appendix III-1 217 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 
 

(M) What can be done to mitigate the impact on the civilian population? 

(N) Is the target time sensitive or can the decision be delayed and what is the 

impact of delay? 

(O) What will be the political/military impact of the collateral damage if the 

decision is made to destroy the target? 

(P) What will be the U.S. media reaction (CNN factor)? 

(Q) What will be the world reaction (media, international organizations such 

as the UN, or the ICRC)? 

(R) What will be the reaction of our allies and the Coalition (will it affect their 

support for our war effort)? 

(S) Will it impact on our domestic support for the war effort? 

(T) Is the target recognized as a protected site under international law (Geneva 

Conventions/Hague Treaty). If so, answer the following questions: 

(1) Is the target dedicated to religion, art, science, charitable purposes, 

historical monuments, a hospital, or have some cultural significance? 

(2) Has the target lost its protected status by enemy misuse? 

(3) What was the nature of the misuse (balancing test between 

misuse and military necessity)? 

(4) If so, are there any civilians or other non-combatants present? 

(5) If so, is there a requirement to warn of a potential attack prior to such 

attack. 

(6) Is surprise a key element to attacking the target that would nullify 

the duty to warn? 

7. SUMMARY. This appendix offers a brief overview of the functions and responsibilities 

of the V Corps SJA in the DOCC. The Operational Law judge advocates are a vital part of 

the deep operations team. 

8. PROPONENT. The Proponent for this appendix is the V Corps SJA. 

218 Appendix III-1 
 

 

 

 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

APPENDIX III-2: ADOCS INFORMATION PAPER 

AETV-JA 18 March 1999 

INFORMATION PAPER 

SUBJECT: Automated Deep Operations Coordination System 

1. Purpose: To familiarize with the uses and technical requirements of the Automated 

Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS) for the Office of the Staff Judge 

Advocate, V Corps. 

2. Overview: The ADOCS is a computer program that provides the user with an 

integrated set of tools for data management and analysis, along with mission planning, 

coordination, and execution. It was originally developed for deployment at the Corps 

level, but has since migrated to both higher and lower echelons. ADOCS map displays 

utilize standard Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) products. It also employs DMA’s 

Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) for terrain analysis and DMA Gazetteers for 

locating place names. ADOCS uses overlays to depict military units, facilities, platforms, 

events, sensors, mission plans, operational graphics, and no fire areas. Any of these 

items may be displayed over any map background at any scale. 

3. Application: The ADOCS system is fully operational in the SJA Main Command 

Post. It provides the most accurate and up-to-date information available which allows us 

to thoroughly analyze potential legal issues associated with deep operations early in the 

process, ensuring we are combat multipliers, not inhibitors. The OSJA, V Corps uses 

ADOCS for the following purposes: 

a. To analyze engagement areas and their surroundings; 

b. To analyze targets and potential targets; 

c. To anticipate the potential for collateral damage; 

d. To track no fire areas (permanent and temporary); and 

e. To track enemy force movement (by unit). 

4. System Requirements: ADOCS operates on a standard Windows-NT workstation. 

A color display and network interface card are required. The minimum amount of RAM 

is 12 MB, although 32 is recommended. Generally, at least 2 GB of storage space for 

map and DTED data will be required. Map data can easily be shared by multiple users on 

a classified network. 

Prepared by CPT Kerry L. Erisman, Operations Law, OSJA, V Corps 

Reviewed by LTC Gaylen G. Whatcott, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, OSJA, V Corps 

Appendix III-2 219 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 
 

APPENDIX III-3: SJA TARGET ANALYSIS FORM 

TARGET ANALYSIS – SJA 

1. Name of Engagement Area: 

2. Location of Engagement Area: 

3. Major Units In Engagement Area: 

4. Protected Sites In/Near Engagement Area: 

5. Legal Issues/Concerns With Engagement Area: 

6. Recommendation: GO / NO GO 

Appendix III-1 220 
 

 

 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

APPENDIX III-4: TASK FORCE HAWK ROE CARD 

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 

TASK FORCE HAWK 

MISSION STATEMENT 

Your mission - provide security for U.S. and Allied Forces engaged in 

Operation ALLIED FORCE. 

SELF DEFENSE 

• You have the right to use force, including deadly force, in self defense. 

• Use only the minimum force necessary to defend yourself. 

GENERAL RULES 

• Use the minimum force necessary to accomplish your mission. 

• Hostile forces/belligerents who want to surrender will not be harmed. 

Disarm them and turn them over to your superiors. 

• Treat everyone, including civilians and detained hostile 

forces/belligerents, humanely. 

• Collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe. 

• Respect private property. Do not steal. Do not take “war trophies”. 

• Prevent and report all suspected violations of the Law of Armed 

Conflict to superiors. 

CHALLENGING AND WARNING SHOTS 

• If the situation permits, issue a challenge: 

In English: “STOP OR I WILL FIRE!” 

In Serbo-Croat: “Shta-nee ee-lee poot-sam!” 

In Albanian: “N-dahl per n-droo-shay joo-eye!” 

• If the person fails to halt, you may be authorized by the on-scene 

commander or by standing orders to fire a warning shot. 

OPENING FIRE - You may fire only if you, friendly forces, persons or 

property under your protection are threatened with deadly force. This 

means you may fire against an individual who: 

• Fires or aims his weapon at you, friendly forces, or persons with 

designated special status or property with designated special status 

under your protection. 

• Plants, throws, or prepares to throw an explosive or incendiary device 

at you, friendly forces, or persons with designated special status or 

property with designated special status under your protection. 

• Deliberately drives a vehicle at you, friendly forces, persons with 

designated special status or property with designated special status 

• Attempts to take possession of friendly force weapons, ammunition, or 

property with designated special status, and there is no other way of 

avoiding this. 

MINIMUM FORCE - If you have to fire: fire only aimed shots; fire no more 

rounds than necessary; take reasonable efforts not to destroy property; and 

stop firing as soon as the situation permits. 

Appendix III-4 221 

 


 


 


 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

APPENDIX III-V: TASK FORCE HAWK SOLDIER IN-BRIEF 

Slide 1
 

TASK FORCE HAWK 

SOLDIER IN-BRIEF 

Slide 2 TASK FORCE HAWK

 SOLDIER IN-BRIEF 

Rules of Engagement 

Slide 3 TASK FORCE HAWK

 SOLDIER IN-BRIEF 

NOTHING IN THESE ROE LIMIT A 

SOLDIER’S OBLIGATION TO TAKE 

ALL NECESSARY ACTION TO 

DEFEND HIMSELF AND HIS UNIT 

222 Appendix III-5
 
 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

Slide 4 TASK FORCE HAWK

 SOLDIER IN-BRIEF 

• NO FORCE HAS BEEN DECLARED HOSTILE 

• OPERATIONS OUTSIDE HN NOT AUTHORIZED 

• OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS NOT AUTHORIZED 

KEY POINTS 

Slide 5 TASK FORCE HAWK

 SOLDIER IN-BRIEF 

• DURING A GROUND DEFENSE ALERT,

 REMAIN IN DESIGNATED STATION 

• CHALLENGE, DETAIN, AND TURN OVER TO

 HOST NATION SECURITY SUSPICIOUS

 PERSONS FOUND INSIDE THE WIRE 

HOST NATION HAS PRIMARY 

RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY 

Slide 6 TASK FORCE HAWK

 SOLDIER IN-BRIEF 

HOSTILE ACT -- HOSTILE INTENT 

• THREAT OR ATTACK BY FOREIGN FORCE

 OR TERRORIST UNIT AGAINST US FORCES,

 NATO TROOPS, PROTECTED PERSONS, OR

 DESIGNATED PROPERTY 

• RESPONSE: PROPORTIONAL FORCE TO

 DETER, NEUTRALIZE, OR DESTROY THREAT 

Appendix III-5 223
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 


 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

Slide 7 TASK FORCE HAWK

 SOLDIER IN-BRIEF 

• USE MINIMUM FORCE NECESSARY

 TO COUNTER THREAT 

• FORCE MUST BE REASONABLE IN

 INTENSITY, DURATION, MAGNITUDE 

PROPORTIONALITY 

Slide 8 TASK FORCE HAWK

 SOLDIER IN-BRIEF 

• VERBAL WARNINGS 

• SHOW OF FORCE 

• WARNING SHOTS (IF AUTHORIZED) 

• DEADLY FORCE (SHOOT TO KILL) 

USE MINIMUM FORCE 

Slide 9 TASK FORCE HAWK

 SOLDIER IN-BRIEF 

IF YOU HAVE TO OPEN FIRE: 

• FIRE ONLY AIMED SHOTS 

• FIRE NO MORE ROUNDS THAN 

NECESSARY 

• DO NOT UNNECESSARILY

 DESTROY PROPERTY 

• STOP FIRING ASAP 

224 Appendix III-5
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

Slide 10 TASK FORCE HAWK

 SOLDIER IN-BRIEF 

OPENING FIRE EXAMPLES 

• INDIVIDUAL AIMS WEAPON AT YOU 

• INDIVIDUAL FIRES WEAPON AT YOU 

• VEHICLE DELIBERATELY DRIVEN AT 

YOU 

Slide 11 TASK FORCE HAWK

 SOLDIER IN-BRIEF

 MORE OPENING FIRE EXAMPLES 

• INDIVIDUAL PLANTS, THROWS, OR

 PREPARES TO THROW AN EXPLOSIVE

 OR INCENDIARY DEVICE AT YOU 

• INDIVIDUAL TAKES POSSESSION OF 

FRIENDLY FORCE WEAPONS, 

AMMUNITION, OR PROTECTED 

PROPERTY 

Slide 12 TASK FORCE HAWK

 SOLDIER IN-BRIEF 

RAMP – APPLICATION OF ROE 

RETURN FIRE WITH AIMED FIRE 

ANTICIPATE ATTACK 

MEASURE THE AMOUNT OF FORCE 

PROTECT WITH DEADLY FORCE ONLY 

HUMAN LIFE AND DESIGNATED 

PROPERTY 

Appendix III-5 225
 
 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

APPENDIX III-6(a): CLAIMS PROCESSING INSTRUCTIONS 

U.S. Army

ANKESA PER PASURI TE HUMBUR 

CLAIMS FOR DAMAGE TO PROPERTY 

Ne do te kerkojme dokumentat vijues per nje proces te rregullt me ju : 

We will require the following documents in order to process your claim : 

Leter ose formular ankimi qe tregon mendimin tuaj dhe shumen qe deshironi. 

Letter or claim form telling your intenton to claim including the amount you wish to claim. 

Nje kopje te leternjoftimit ose te pasaportes. 

A copy of your ID card. 

Nje kopje te dokumentit te pronesise ose te nje dokumenti tjeter qe verteton pronesine. Ne 

qofte se ankesa juaj eshte per deme ndaj tokes atehere duhet te bini : a) Certifikaten e 

regjistrimit te tokes b) kartelen c) harten treguese.

A copy of your deed or other document proving ownership. If you are claiming damage to the land 

you must include a photocopy of the : a)The certificate of land registration b) The cartela c) The 

indicatory map. 

Nje kopje te dokumentave te sigurimit te pasurise. 

A copy of your property insurance documents. 

Fature origjinale per riparim te pasurise.Ne qofte se po ankoheni per demtime te tokes ju 

duhet te perfshini nje fature origjinale te agronomit per demet perkatese.

Original invoices for property repair or estimate of repair. If you are claiming damage to the land, 

you must include an official estimate of the damage from an agronomist. 

Nje kopje te raportit te policise lokale ose te forcave ushtarake te NATOs ( nese eshte e 

mundur)

A copy of the local police report or U.S. or NATO military police report ( if available) 

Emrin e njesise te ushtrise te SH.B.A. qe beri demtimin dhe emrin e komandantit te asaj 

njesie. 

The name of the U.S. army unit that caused that damage and the name of the units commander. 

Disa fotografi te pasurise te demtuar.

Any photographs that you may have of the damaged property. 

Ne qofte se po ankoheni ne interes te personave te trete ,duhet te bini edhe nje prokure te 

posacme.

If you are claiming on behalf of someone else you must include an original power of attorney. 

Ju lutem ti coni keto dokumenta ne : 

Please send this documents to : 

U.S. EMBASSY 

RRUGA E ELBASANIT 103 

TIRANE, ALBANIA 

ATTN : CLAIMS 

226 Appendix III-6(a) 
 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

APPENDIX III-6(b): CLAIMS FORM 

APLIKUESI Applicant 

Emri i plote Name in full Numri i telefonit Telephone number 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________ ______________________________ 

Adresa perkatese Mailing Address 

SHUMA E KERKUAR Amount claimed 

Demi i pasurise Property damage___________ Demi personal Personal injury____________ 

Tjeter, pershkruaje Other, describe______________________Shuma Amount_____________ 

Totali i shumes se kerkuar Total amount claimed 

INCIDENTI Incident 

Data date__________________ Ora Hour________________ 

Vendi Place___________________________________ 

Jepni nje pershkrim te detajuar te incidentit. Identifikoni te gjithe personat dhe pasurine qe 

u perfshine ne incident. Bashkangjisni te gjitha provat. Give a detailed description of the 

incident. Identify all persons and property involved. Attach all supporting evidence. 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

DEMI I PASURISE Property damage. Deklaroni emrin dhe adresen e pronarit ne rast se 

eshte e ndryshme me te ate te personit qe ben ankesen. Deklaroni vitin e prodhimit dhe 

gjendjen fizike te pasurise se demtuar. Pershkruani riparimet e nevojshme dhe jepni 

koston e perafert. State name and address of owner, if other than claimant. Describe and 

substantiate the age and the conditions of the damaged property. Describe necessary repair and 

substantiate all costs. 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

DEMI PERSONAL Personal injury. Jepni emrin dhe adresen e personit te demtuar. 

Pershkruani dhe vertetoni natyren , madhesine e demtimit dhe trajtimin mjekesor perkates. 

State name and address of injured person. Describe and substantiate the nature and extent of 

injury and required medical treatment. 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

Appendix III-6(b) 227 
 

 

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Deshmitaret. Witnesses. Jepni emrin ,adresen dhe numrin e telefonit te te gjithe 

deshmitareve te njohur. State name ,address ,and phone number of all known witnesses. 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

___________________________ 

Shenoni siguracionet qe ka pasur pasuria e demtuar. Specifikoni cdo lloj menyre tjeter qe 

te merrni demshperblim ( p.sh. sigurim shendeti ,sigurim social ,kompensimi i punonjesit 

dhe atij te dhene prej punedhenesit ). Jepni informata mbi natyren dhe madhesine e 

kompensimit. List all insurance applicable to damaged property. Specify any other source of 

recovery, i.e.health insurance, social insurance, worker`s compensation fund and employer. State 

the nature and amount of compensation. 

Siguruesi Insurer______________ Numri i siguracionit Policy number_______________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________ 

Certifikate . Une vertetoj se kjo deklarate eshte e plote dhe korrekte dhe se cdo artikull i 

pyetur eshte plotesisht dhe ekskluzivisht i lidhur me incidentin e permendur. Une vertetoj 

se nuk kam marre dhe nuk jam i gatshem te marr kurrfare kompensimimi as pagese nga 

ndonje person tjeter. Une kuptoj se cdo paraqitje pa zbulim ose pa faktemund te rezultoje 

ne perfundim ose zbritje te kompensimit. Nese propozohet ndonje kompensim dhe une bie 

dakord me ate kompensim, une pranoj se kerkesat e mia jane plotesuar dhe perfundon 

zgjidhja e ketij ankimi te arritur prej incidentit, dhe une nuk do te kerkoj kompensim me tej 

nga ju apo nga ndonje pale tjeter. 

Certification. I certify that my statements above are complete and correct and that each requested 

item is entirely and exclusively related to the aforementioned incident. I also certify that I have not 

received nor I am eligible to receive any compensation or payment for these damages from any 

third party. I understand that any nondisclosure or fraudulent statement may result in denial of my 

request or a reduction in my award. If any award is offered and I accept that award, I agree that 

such acceptance will be in full satisfaction and final settlement of my claims arising from this 

incident and that I shall have no further claim against the tortfeasor or any third party. 

Nenshkrimi__________________________________ 

Signature 

Vendi_____________________________________ Data_________________________ 

Place Date 

228 Appendix III-6(b) 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

APPENDIX III-6(c): CLAIMS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 

U.S. Armed Forces 

MARRVESHJE PER ZGJIDHJE TE ANKESES 

CLAIMS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 

Numri i ankeses_____________ 

Claim number 

I NJOHUR NGA TE GJITHE TE PRANISHMIT Known by all men present : 

Nepermjet kesaj une vertetoj se e pranoj shumen ____________ ne kenaqesi te plote dhe 

te drejte si dhe perfundimin e te gjitha ankesave qe kam ose kam pasur kundra Shteteve 

te Bashkuara , oficereve te saj , agjentave dhe punetoreve, per te gjitha demtimet dhe 

humbjet, nese ka ndodhur ndonje si rezultat i forcave te SH.B.A. ne kete date. Une garantoj 

se jam pronari i ligjshem i pasurise se demtuar. Une garantoj se do te mbroj qeverine e 

SH.B.A. kunder cdo gjeje ne rast te kundert. Ne rast se eshte vendosur se dikush tjeter ose 

nje tjeter entitet eshte pronari i drejte i pasurise, se paku ,une do te ja kthej te gjithe 

pagesat qeverise se SH.B.A. Ne qofte se ka ndryshime mes tekstit shqip dhe atij anglisht 

,teksti anglisht do te kete precedence. 

I hereby agree to accept the sum of _____________ in full and fair satisfaction and final 

settlement of all claims, which i have or may have against the United States, its officers, agents 

and employess, for all damages and injuries, if any, incurred by me as a result of U.S. Forces as 

of this date. I warrant that I am the rightful owner of the damaged property. I warrant that I will 

defend the United States government against all claims to the contratry. In the event that is 

determined that another person or entity is the rightful owner of the damaged property, at a 

minimum I will refund all payments to the U.S. Government. In the event of different 

interpretations between the English and Albanian text, the English test will be controlling. 

Emri i ankuesit i shtypur_____________________________ 

Typed or printed name of claimant 

Nenshkrimi i ankuesit_______________________________ 

Signature of claimant 

Adresa e ankuesit___________________________________ 

Address of claimant 

Appendix III-6(c) 229 
 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

APPENDIX III-7: TASK FORCE HAWK GENERAL ORDER #1 

HEADQUARTERS 

TASK FORCE HAWK 

TIRANA AIR BASE, ALBANIA 

General Order #1 6 April 1999 

Operation Noble Anvil 

Title: Duties and Prohibited Activities of Personnel Serving in Task Force Hawk 

Applicability: All U.S. military and civilian personnel assigned or attached to, serving 

with, or accompanying U.S. Armed Forces deployed with or in support of Task Force 

Hawk while in the area of operations. For purposes of this order, the area of operations 

consists of the land territory, territorial water, international waters nearby, and airspace of 

the Balkans (including but not limited to Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of 

Macedonia (FYROM), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). 

1. Statement of Military Purpose and Necessity. High standards convey the serious 

commitment of the U.S. and facilitate mission accomplishment. This order establishes 

individual standards and duties and sets essential restrictions upon certain activities in 

order to maintain the security, health, and welfare of U.S. Forces, prevent conduct 

prejudicial to good order and discipline or of a nature to bring discredit upon U.S. Forces, 

and maintain good relations within the region. 

2. Individual Duties. 

a. Everyone subject to this General Order must observe a "no-alone" policy, that is, they 

must be in parties of at least two U.S. military or accompanying civilian persons when 

outside assigned accommodations or secure field sites. 

b. Everyone subject to this General Order must become familiar with and respect the 

laws, regulations, and customs of the Host Nation (HN) insofar as they do not interfere 

with the execution of their official duties. All personnel are charged to respect and 

cooperate to the maximum extent possible with the personnel of the armed forces of other 

nations participating and acting in concert with U.S. Forces in the execution of the 

missions of Operation Noble Anvil. 

c. All persons subject to this General Order are directly responsible for mission, 

technology, and force protection, and must ensure the security of sensitive information, 

230 Appendix III-7 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

equipment, plans, and procedures. 

3. Individual standards of training/certification: Deploying personnel must be at 

peak military proficiency in their duties, operation of their equipment, and the following: 

a. Individual weapon qualification; 

b. Mask and personal NBC defense; 

c. Counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism; 

d. Cultural awareness, applicable requirements of HN law, and their rights and 

responsibilities under applicable Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA). 

4. Prohibited Activities. 

a. Failure to be in a party of at least two U.S. military or accompanying civilian 

persons outside the assigned commercial accommodations or secure field sites. 

b. Travel across international boundaries, except as specifically authorized in the 

performance of official duty. 

c. Taking or retaining public or private property as souvenirs of the operation. 

(Legitimately purchased souvenirs, other than weapons, munitions, or items prohibited by 

customs regulations are authorized). 

d. Consuming alcoholic beverages, except for designated personnel at designated 

ceremonies, as approved by the Task Force Commander, Deputy Commander, or Chief 

of Staff. 

e. Gambling of any kind, including sports pools, lotteries, or raffles and the entry 

of any establishment where gambling is permitted or occurring. 

f. Selling, bartering, or exchanging any currency other than at the officially 

approved HN exchange facilities. 

g. Possessing, touching, using, or knowingly approaching without legal authority 

any mine, unexploded munition or ordnance of any kind or description whatsoever. 

Without legal authority means an act or activity undertaken by U.S. personnel which is 

not done at the direction of a commander or as the result of military necessity while 

performing military duties. 

h. Purchase, possession, use, sale, shipment or introduction of privately-owned 

firearms, ammunition, and explosives. 

i. Removing, possessing, selling, transferring, defacing, or destroying 

Appendix III-7 231 
 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

archaeological artifacts or national treasures. 

j. Any sexual conduct or contact with any person other than one's spouse. 

k. Participating in any form in HN political activities outside the scope of official 

duties. 

l. Entry of any HN religious shrine or mosque without approval of the Task Force 

Commander, Deputy Commander, or Chief of Staff. 

5. Punitive Order. This order is punitive. Persons subject to the Uniform Code of 

Military Justice (UCMJ) who violate this order may be punished under Article 92, 

UCMJ, for violating a lawful general order. Civilians accompanying U.S. Forces may 

face adverse administrative action. 

6. Unit Commander Responsibility. Unit commanders and supervisors are charged to 

ensure all personnel are briefed about the individual duties and prohibited activities 

contained herein. 

7. Contraband. Prohibited items may be considered contraband and be immediately 

confiscated. Commanders or law enforcement personnel should coordinate with the Task 

Force legal advisor before destroying confiscated contraband. 

8. Effective Date and Expiration. This General Order is effective immediately. It will 

expire upon stand down of Task Force Hawk, unless sooner rescinded, waived, or 

modified. 

 JOHN W. HENDRIX 

 Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

 Commanding General 

232 Appendix III-7 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

Appendix III-8: TASK FORCE HAWK JURISDICTIONAL 

ALIGNMENT 

Appendix III-8 233 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 
 

234 Appendix III-8 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

Appendix III-8 235
 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 
 

236 Appendix III-8 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

Appendix III-8 237
 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

APPENDIX IV-1: MILITARY TECHNICAL AGREEMENT 

Military Technical Agreement 

between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the Federal 

Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia 

9 June 1999 

Article I: General Obligations 

1.The Parties to this Agreement reaffirm the document presented by President Ahtisaari 

to President Milosevic and approved by the Serb Parliament and the Federal Government 

on June 3, 1999, to include deployment in Kosovo under UN auspices of effective 

international civil and security presences. The Parties further note that the UN Security 

Council is prepared to adopt a resolution, which has been introduced, regarding these 

presences. 

2.The State Governmental authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 

Republic of Serbia understand and agree that the international security force ("KFOR") 

will deploy following the adoption of the UNSCR referred to in paragraph 1 and operate 

without hindrance within Kosovo and with the authority to take all necessary action to 

establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise 

carry out its mission. They further agree to comply with all of the obligations of this 

Agreement and to facilitate the deployment and operation of this force. 

3.For purposes of the agreement, the following expressions shall have the meanings as 

described below: 

a."The Parties" are those signatories to the Agreement. 

b."Authorities" means the appropriate responsible individual, agency, or 

organisation of the Parties. 

c."FRY Forces" includes all of the FRY and Republic of Serbia personnel and 

organisations with a military capability. This includes regular army and naval forces, 

armed civilian groups, associated paramilitary groups, air forces, national guards, border 

police, army reserves, military police, intelligence services, federal and Serbian Ministry 

of Internal Affairs local, special, riot and anti-terrorist police, and any other groups or 

individuals so designated by the international security force ("KFOR") commander. 

d.The Air Safety Zone (ASZ) is defined as a 25-kilometre zone that extends 

beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of FRY territory. It includes the airspace 

above that 25-kilometre zone. 

238 Appendix IV-1 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

e.The Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) is defined as a 5-kilometre zone that extends 

beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of FRY territory. It includes the terrain 

within that 5-kilometre zone. 

f.Entry into Force Day (EIF Day) is defined as the day this Agreement is signed. 

4.The purposes of these obligations are as follows: 

a.To establish a durable cessation of hostilities, under no circumstances shall any 

Forces of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia enter into, reenter, or remain within the 

territory of Kosovo or the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) and the Air Safety Zone (ASZ) 

described in paragraph 3. Article I without the prior express consent of the international 

security force ("KFOR") commander. Local police will be allowed to remain in the GSZ. 

The above paragraph is without prejudice to the agreed return of FRY and Serbian 

personnel which will be the subject of a subsequent separate agreement as provided for in 

paragraph 6 of the document mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article. 

b.To provide for the support and authorization of the international security force 

("KFOR") and in particular to authorize the international security force ("KFOR") to take 

such actions as are required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance 

with this Agreement and protection of the international security force ("KFOR"), and to 

contribute to a secure environment for the international civil implementation presence, 

and other international organisations, agencies, and non-governmental organisations 

(details in Appendix B). 

Article II: Cessation of Hostilities 

1.The FRY Forces shall immediately, upon entry into force (EIF) of this Agreement, 

refrain from committing any hostile or provocative acts of any type against any person in 

Kosovo and will order armed forces to cease all such activities. They shall not encourage, 

organise or support hostile or provocative demonstrations. 

2.Phased Withdrawal of FRY Forces (ground): The FRY agrees to a phased withdrawal 

of all FRY Forces from Kosovo to locations in Serbia outside Kosovo. FRY Forces will 

mark and clear minefields, booby traps and obstacles. As they withdraw, FRY Forces 

will clear all lines of communication by removing all mines, demolitions, booby traps, 

obstacles and charges. They will also mark all sides of all minefields. International 

security forces' ("KFOR") entry and deployment into Kosovo will be synchronized. The 

phased withdrawal of FRY Forces from Kosovo will be in accordance with the sequence 

outlined below: 

a.By EIF + 1 day, FRY Forces located in Zone 3 will have vacated, via designated 

routes, that Zone to demonstrate compliance (depicted on the map at Appendix A to the 

Agreement). Once it is verified that FRY forces have complied with this subparagraph 

and with paragraph 1 of this Article, NATO air strikes will be suspended. The suspension 

Appendix IV-1 239 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

will continue provided that the obligations of this agreement are fully complied with, and 

provided that the UNSC adopts a resolution concerning the deployment of the 

international security force ("KFOR") so rapidly that a security gap can be avoided. 

b.By EIF + 6 days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have vacated Zone 1 (depicted 

on the map at Appendix A to the Agreement). Establish liaison teams with the KFOR 

commander in Pristina. 

c.By EIF + 9 days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have vacated Zone 2 (depicted 

on the map at Appendix A to the Agreement). 

d.By EIF + 11 days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have vacated Zone 3 

(depicted on the map at Appendix A to the Agreement). 

e.By EIF +11 days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have completed their 

withdrawal from Kosovo (depicted on map at Appendix A to the Agreement) to locations 

in Serbia outside Kosovo, and not within the 5 km GSZ. At the end of the sequence (EIF 

+ 11), the senior FRY Forces commanders responsible for the withdrawing forces shall 

confirm in writing to the international security force ("KFOR") commander that the FRY 

Forces have complied and completed the phased withdrawal. The international security 

force ("KFOR") commander may approve specific requests for exceptions to the phased 

withdrawal. The bombing campaign will terminate on complete withdrawal of FRY 

Forces as provided under Article II. The international security force ("KFOR") shall 

retain, as necessary, authority to enforce compliance with this Agreement. 

f.The authorities of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia will co-operate fully with 

international security force ("KFOR") in its verification of the withdrawal of forces from 

Kosovo and beyond the ASZ/GSZ. 

g.FRY armed forces withdrawing in accordance with Appendix A, i.e. in 

designated assembly areas or withdrawing on designated routes, will not be subject to air 

attack. 

h.The international security force ("KFOR") will provide appropriate control of 

the borders of FRY in Kosovo with Albania and FYROM (1) until the arrival of the 

civilian mission of the UN. 

3.Phased Withdrawal of Yugoslavia Air and Air Defence Forces (YAADF) 

a.At EIF + 1 day, no FRY aircraft, fixed wing and rotary, will fly in Kosovo 

airspace or over the ASZ without prior approval by the international security force 

("KFOR") commander. All air defence systems, radar, surface-to-air missile and aircraft 

of the Parties will refrain from acquisition, target tracking or otherwise illuminating 

international security ("KFOR") air platforms operating in the Kosovo airspace or over 

the ASZ. 

240 Appendix IV-1 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

b.By EIF + 3 days, all aircraft, radars, surface-to-air missiles (including manportable air defence systems (MANPADS)) and anti-aircraft artillery in Kosovo will 

withdraw to other locations in Serbia outside the 25 kilometre ASZ. 

c.The international security force ("KFOR") commander will control and 

coordinate use of airspace over Kosovo and the ASZ commencing at EIF. Violation of 

any of the provisions above, including the international security force ("KFOR") 

commander's rules and procedures governing the airspace over Kosovo, as well as 

unauthorised flight or activation of FRY Integrated Air Defence (IADS) within the ASZ, 

are subject to military action by the international security force ("KFOR"), including the 

use of necessary force. The international security force ("KFOR") commander may 

delegate control of normal civilian air activities to appropriate FRY institutions to 

monitor operations, deconflict international security force ("KFOR") air traffic 

movements, and ensure smooth and safe operations of the air traffic system. It is 

envisioned that control of civil air traffic will be returned to civilian authorities as soon as 

practicable. 

Article III: Notifications 

1. This agreement and written orders requiring compliance will be immediately 

communicated to all FRY forces. 

2. By EIF +2 days, the State governmental authorities of the FRY and the Republic of 

Serbia shall furnish the following specific information regarding the status of all FRY 

Forces: 

a.Detailed records, positions and descriptions of all mines, unexploded ordnance, 

explosive devices, demolitions, obstacles, booby traps, wire entanglement, physical or 

military hazards to the safe movement of any personnel in Kosovo laid by FRY Forces. 

b.Any further information of a military or security nature about FRY Forces in the 

territory of Kosovo and the GSZ and ASZ requested by the international security force 

("KFOR") commander. 

Article IV: Establishment of a Joint Implementation Commission (JIC) 

A JIC shall be established with the deployment of the international security force 

("KFOR") to Kosovo as directed by the international security force ("KFOR") 

commander. 

Article V: Final Authority to Interpret 

The international security force ("KFOR") commander is the final authority regarding 

interpretation of this Agreement and the security aspects of the peace settlement it 

supports. His determinations are binding on all Parties and persons. 

Article VI: Entry Into Force 

Appendix IV-1 241 
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CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

This agreement shall enter into force upon signature. 

Appendices: 

A. Phased withdrawal of FRY Forces from Kosovo 

B. International security force ("KFOR") operations 

1.Consistent with the general obligations of the Military Technical Agreement, the State 

Governmental authorities of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia understand and agree 

that the international security force ("KFOR") will deploy and operate without hindrance 

within Kosovo and with the authority to take all necessary action to establish and 

maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo. 

2.The international security force ("KFOR") commander shall have the authority, without 

interference or permission, to do all that he judges necessary and proper, including the 

use of military force, to protect the international security force ("KFOR"), the 

international civil implementation presence, and to carry out the responsibilities inherent 

in this Military Technical Agreement and the Peace Settlement which it supports. 

242 Appendix IV-1 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

3.The international security force ("KFOR") nor any of its personnel or staff shall be 

liable for any damages to public or private property that they may cause in the course of 

duties related to the implementation of this Agreement. The parties will agree a Status of 

Forces Agreement (SOFA) as soon as possible. 

4.The international security force ("KFOR") shall have the right: 

a.To monitor and ensure compliance with this Agreement and to respond 

promptly to any violations and restore compliance, using military force if required. 

This includes necessary actions to: 

1.Enforce withdrawals of FRY forces. 

2.Enforce compliance following the return of selected FRY personnel to Kosovo 

3.Provide assistance to other international entities involved in the implementation or 

otherwise authorised by the UNSC. 

b.To establish liaison arrangements with local Kosovo authorities, and with 

FRY/Serbian civil and military authorities. 

c.To observe, monitor and inspect any and all facilities or activities in Kosovo 

that the international security force ("KFOR") commander believes has or may have 

military or police capability, or may be associated with the employment of military or 

police capabilities, or are otherwise relevant to compliance with this Agreement. 

5.Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, the Parties understand and 

agree that the international security force ("KFOR") commander has the right and is 

authorised to compel the removal, withdrawal, or relocation of specific Forces and 

weapons, and to order the cessation of any activities whenever the international security 

force ("KFOR") commander determines a potential threat to either the international 

security force ("KFOR") or its mission, or to another Party. Forces failing to redeploy, 

withdraw, relocate, or to cease threatening or potentially threatening activities following 

such a demand by the international security force ("KFOR") shall be subject to military 

action by the international security force ("KFOR"), including the use of necessary force, 

to ensure compliance. 

Footnote: 

1.Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name. 

Appendix IV-1 243 
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APPENDIX IV-2: UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1244 

United 

Nations 

S/RES/1244 (1999) 

10 June 1999 

RESOLUTION 1244 (1999) 

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, 

on 10 June 1999 

The Security Council, 

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the 

primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace 

and security, 

Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 

1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999, 

Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these 

resolutions, 

Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of 

Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons 

to their homes, 

Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts 

by any party, 

Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing 

concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo, 

Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in 

safety, 

Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former 

Yugoslavia, 

Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 

May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by 

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper 

244 Appendix IV-2 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to that paper, 

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial 

integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out 

in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2, 

Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful selfadministration for Kosovo, 

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international 

peace and security, 

Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the 

implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and 

acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 

1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general 

principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements 

in annex 2; 

2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and 

other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation 

of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation; 

3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and 

verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable 

phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to 

a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in 

Kosovo will be synchronized; 

4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and 

police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in 

accordance with annex 2; 

5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international 

civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and 

welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences; 

6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a 

Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, 

Appendix IV-2 245 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

and further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to 

coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences 

operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner; 

7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the 

international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary 

means to fulfil its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below; 

8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and 

security presences to Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in their 

deployment; 

9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and 

acting in Kosovo will include: 

(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, 

and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic 

military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2; 

(b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian 

groups as required in paragraph 15 below; 

(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return 

home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration 

can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered; 

(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take 

responsibility for this task; 

(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take 

over responsibility for this task; 

(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international 

civil presence; 

(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required; 

(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil 

presence, and other international organizations; 

10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international 

organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an 

interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial 

246 Appendix IV-2 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional 

administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional 

democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life 

for all inhabitants of Kosovo; 

11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include: 

(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and 

self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords 

(S/1999/648); 

(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required; 

(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic 

and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of 

elections; 

(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities 

while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional 

institutions and other peace-building activities; 

(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into 

account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648); 

(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional 

institutions to institutions established under a political settlement; 

(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction; 

(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian 

and disaster relief aid; 

(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and 

meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo; 

(j) Protecting and promoting human rights; 

(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their 

homes in Kosovo; 

12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the Federal 

Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid 

organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective 

delivery of international aid; 

Appendix IV-2 247 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to 

economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced 

persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international 

donors' conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the 

earliest possible date; 

14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security 

presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; 

15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all 

offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the 

head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative 

of the Secretary-General; 

16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall 

not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil and security 

presences; 

17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international 

organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and 

stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a 

Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to 

further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional 

cooperation; 

18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all 

aspects of this resolution; 

19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial 

period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise; 

20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the 

implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the 

international civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of 

the adoption of this resolution; 

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 

248 Appendix IV-2 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

Annex 1 

Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting 

of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre 

on 6 May 1999 

The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political 

solution to the Kosovo crisis: 

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo; 

- Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces; 

- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, 

endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the 

achievement of the common objectives; 

- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the 

Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and 

normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo; 

- The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded 

access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations; 

- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political 

framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, 

taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty 

and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other 

countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA; 

- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the 

crisis region. 

Appendix IV-2 249 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 
 

Annex 2 

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of 

the Kosovo crisis: 

1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo. 

2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces 

according to a rapid timetable. 

3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and 

security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of 

guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives. 

4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to 

establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to 

their homes of all displaced persons and refugees. 

5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil 

presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United 

Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while 

establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing 

institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in 

Kosovo. 

6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be 

permitted to return to perform the following functions: 

- Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security 

presence; 

- Marking/clearing minefields; 

- Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites; 

- Maintaining a presence at key border crossings. 

7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the 

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to 

Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations. 

250 Appendix IV-2 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework 

agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the 

Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the 

demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay 

or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions. 

9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis 

region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe 

with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, 

economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation. 

10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above 

in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are 

specified in the footnote below.1 A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly 

concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the 

roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo: 

Withdrawal 

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and 

delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn; 

Returning personnel 

- Equipment associated with returning personnel; 

- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities; 

- Timetable for their return; 

- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation; 

- Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence and 

the international civil mission. 

Appendix IV-2 251 

 

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Notes
 

1

 Other required elements: 

- A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven 

days to complete withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn 

outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 48 hours; 

- Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be 

under the supervision of the international security presence and will be 

limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands); 

- Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of 

verifiable withdrawals; 

- The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall 

not extend the previously determined time for completion of 

withdrawals. 

252 Appendix IV-2 

 


 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 

APPENDIX IV-3: MAP OF MNB(E) AREA OF KOSOVO 

Appendix IV-3 253
 
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APPENDIX IV-4: CHAINS OF COMMAND TASK FORCE FALCON 

ADC-M 1ID 

UAE 

CG, TFF 

RUS BAT 

POL BAT 

CG, 

MNB(E) 

GREEK 

BAT 

1ID(M) 

Battalions 

Non- ID(M) 

US 

Battalions 

CG, 1ID(M) 

CG, V 

Corps 

CG, USAREUR 

CINC, 

USEUCOM SHAPE 

NAC SECDEF 

NCA NATO Governments 

Other Governments 

US Cdrs 

National Command 

US OPCON 

NATO OPCON 

Other US 

CINCs 

US COCOM 

US Attached 

COM 

USKFOR 

Ukrainian 

Company 

(By Agreement) 

(By Agreement) 

The Chain of Command The Chain of Command

CINC, 

AFSOUTH 

COMKFOR 

254 Appendix IV-4 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

APPENDIX IV-5: UNDERTAKING OF DEMILITARIZATION & 

TRANSFORMATION BY THE UCK 

1. This Undertaking provides for a ceasefire by the UCK, their disengagement from the zones of conflict, 

subsequent demilitarisation and reintegration into civil society, in accordance with the terms of UNSCR 1244 and 

taking account of the obligations agreed to at Rambouillet and the public commitments made by the Kosovar 

Albanian Rambouillet delegation. 

2. The UCK undertake to renounce the use of force, to comply with the directions of the Commander of the 

international security force in Kosovo (COMKFOR), and where applicable the head of the interim civil 

administration for Kosovo, and to resolve peacefully any questions relating to the implementation of this 

undertaking. 

3. The UCK agree that the International Security Presence (KFOR) and the international civil presence will continue 

to deploy and operate without hindrance within Kosovo and that KFOR has the authority to take all necessary action 

to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission. 

4. The UCK agrees to comply with all of the obligations of this Undertaking and to ensure that with immediate 

effect all UCK forces in Kosovo and in neighbouring countries will observe the provisions of this Undertaking, will 

refrain from all hostile or provocative acts, hostile intent and freeze military movement in either direction across 

international borders or the boundary between Kosovo and other parts of the FRY, or any other actions inconsistent 

with the spirit of UNSCR 1244. The UCK in Kosovo agree to commit themselves publicly to demilitarise in 

accordance with paragraphs 22 and 23, refrain from activities which jeopardise the safety of international 

governmental and non-governmental personnel including KFOR, and to facilitate the deployment and operation of 

KFOR. 

5. For purposes of this Undertaking, the following expressions shall have the meanings as described below: 

a) The UCK includes all personnel and organisations within Kosovo, currently under UCK control, with a 

military or paramilitary capability and any other groups or individuals so designated by Commander KFOR 

(COMKFOR). 

b) "FRY Forces" includes all of the FRY and Republic of Serbia personnel and organisations with a military 

capability. This includes regular army and naval forces, armed civilian groups, associated paramilitary groups, 

air forces, national guards, border police, army reserves, military police, intelligence services, Ministry of 

Internal Affairs, local, special, riot and anti-terrorist police, and any other groups or individuals so designated 

by Commander KFOR (COMKFOR). 

c) The Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) is defined as a 5-kilometre zone that extends beyond the Kosovo province 

border into the rest of FRY territory. It includes the terrain within that 5-kilometre zone. 

d) Prohibited weapons are any weapon 12.7mm or larger, any anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons, grenades, 

mines or explosives, automatic and long barrelled weapons. 

6. The purposes of this Undertaking are as follows: 

a) To establish a durable cessation of hostilities. 

b) To provide for the support and authorisation of the KFOR and in particular to authorise the KFOR to take 

such actions as are required, including the use of necessary force in accordance with KFORs rules of 

engagement, to ensure compliance with this Undertaking and protection of the KFOR, and to contribute to a 

secure environment for the international civil implementation presence, and other international organisations, 

agencies, and non-governmental organisations and the civil populace. 

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7. The actions of the UCK shall be in accordance with this Undertaking. "The KFOR" commander in consultation, 

where appropriate, with the interim civil administrator will be the final authority regarding the interpretation of this 

Undertaking and the security aspects of the peace settlement it supports. His determinations will be binding on all 

parties and persons. 

Cessation of Hostilities 

8. With immediate effect on signature the UCK agrees to comply with this Undertaking and with the directions of 

COMKFOR. Any forces which fail to comply with this Undertaking or with the directions of COMKFOR will be 

liable to military action as deemed appropriate by COMKFOR. 

9. With immediate effect on signature of this Undertaking all hostile acts by the UCK will cease. The UCK Chief of 

General Staff undertakes to issue clear and precise instructions to all units and personnel under his command, to 

ensure contact with the FRY forces is avoided and to comply fully with the arrangements for bringing this 

Undertaking into effect. He will make announcements immediately following final signature of this Undertaking, 

which will be broadcast regularly through all appropriate channels to assist in ensuring that instructions to maintain 

this Undertaking reach all the forces under his command and are understood by the public in general. 

10. The UCK undertakes and agrees in particular: 

a) To cease the firing of all weapons and use of explosive devices. 

b) Not to place any mines, barriers or checkpoints, nor maintain any observation posts or protective obstacles. 

c) The destruction of buildings, facilities or structures is not permitted. It shall not engage in any military, 

security, or training related activities, including ground, or air defence operations, in or over Kosovo or GSZ, 

without the prior express approval of COMKFOR. 

d) Not to attack, detain or intimidate any civilians in Kosovo, nor shall they attack, confiscate or violate the 

property of civilians in Kosovo. 

11. The UCK agrees not to conduct any reprisals, counter-attacks, or any unilateral actions in response to violations 

of the UNSCR 1244 and other extant agreements relating to Kosovo. 

This in no way denies the right of self-defence. 

12. The UCK agrees not to interfere with those FRY personnel that return to Kosovo to conduct specific tasks as 

authorised and directed by COMKFOR. 

13. Except as approved by COMKFOR, the UCK agrees that its personnel in Kosovo will not carry weapons of any 

type: 

a) Within 2 kilometres of VJ and MUP assembly areas; 

b) Within 2 kilometres of the main roads and the towns upon them listed at Appendix A; 

c) Within 2 kilometres of external borders of Kosovo; 

d) In any other areas designated by COMKFOR.
 

14. Within 4 days of signature of this Undertaking: 

a) The UCK will close all fighting positions, entrenchments, and checkpoints on roads, and mark their 

minefields and booby traps. 

256 Appendix IV-5 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

b) The UCK Chief of General Staff shall report in writing completion of the above requirement to COMKFOR 

and continue to provide weekly detailed written status reports until demilitarisation, as detailed in the following 

paragraphs, is complete. 

Cross-Border Activity 

15. With immediate effect the UCK will cease the movement of armed bodies into neighbouring countries. All 

movement of armed bodies into Kosovo will be subject to the prior approval of COMKFOR. 

Monitoring the Cessation of Hostilities 

16. The authority for dealing with breaches of this Undertaking rests with COMKFOR. He will monitor and 

maintain and if necessary enforce the cessation of hostilities. 

17. The UCK agrees to co-operate fully with KFOR and the interim civil administration for Kosovo. The Chief of 

the General Staff of the UCK will ensure that prompt and appropriate action is taken to deal with any breaches of 

this Undertaking by his forces as directed by COMKFOR. 

18. Elements of KFOR will be assigned to maintain contact with the UCK and will be deployed to its command 

structure and bases. 

19. KFOR will establish appropriate control at designated crossing points into Albania and the FYROM. 

Joint Implementation Commission (JIC) 

20. A JIC will be established in Pristina within 4 days of the signature of this Undertaking. The JIC will be chaired 

by COMKFOR, and will comprise the senior commanders of KFOR and the UCK, and a representative from the 

interim civil administration for Kosovo. 

21. The JIC will meet as often as required by COMKFOR throughout the implementation of this Undertaking. It 

may be called without prior notice and representation by the UCK is expected at a level appropriate with the rank of 

the KFOR chairman. Its functions will include: 

a) Ensuring compliance with agreed arrangements for the security and activities of all forces; 

b) The investigation of actual or threatened breaches of this Undertaking; 

c) Such other tasks as may be assigned to it by COMKFOR in the interests of maintaining the cessation of 

hostilities. 

Demilitarisation and Transformation 

22. The UCK will follow the procedures established by COMKFOR for the phased demilitarisation, transformation 

and monitoring of UCK forces in Kosovo and for the further regulation of their activities. They will not train or 

organise parades without the authority of COMKFOR. 

23. The UCK agrees to the following timetable which will commence from the signature of this Undertaking: 

a) Within 7 days, the UCK shall establish secure weapons storage sites, which shall be registered with and 

verified by the KFOR; 

b) Within 7 days the UCK will clear their minefields and booby traps, vacate their fighting positions and 

transfer to assembly areas as agreed with COMKFOR at the JIC. Thereafter only personnel authorised by 

COMKFOR and senior Officers of the UCK with their close protection personnel not exceeding 3, carrying side 

arms only, will be allowed outside these assembly areas. 

c) After 7 days automatic small arms weapons not stored in the registered weapons storage sites can only be 

held inside the authorised assembly areas. 

Appendix IV-5 257 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 


 


 


 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

d) After 29 days, the retention of any non automatic long barrelled weapons shall be subject to authorisation by
 

COMKFOR. 

e) Within 30 days, subject to arrangements by COMKFOR if necessary, all UCK personnel who are not of local 

origin, whether or not they are legally within Kosovo, including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers,
 

volunteers, and personnel from neighbouring and other States, shall be withdrawn from Kosovo. 

f) Arrangements for control of weapons are as follows: 

(1) Within 30 days the UCK shall store in the registered weapons storage sites all prohibited weapons 

with the exception of automatic small arms. 30 per cent of their total holdings of automatic small arms 

weapons will also be stored in these sites at this stage. Ammunition for the remaining weapons should 

be withdrawn and stored at an approved site authorised by COMKFOR separate from the assembly 

areas at the same time. 

(2) At 30 days it shall be illegal for UCK personnel to possess prohibited weapons, with the exception 

of automatic small arms within assembly areas, and unauthorised long barrelled weapons. 

Such weapons shall be subject to confiscation by the KFOR. 

(3) Within 60 days a further 30 per cent of automatic small arms, giving a total of 60 per cent of the 

UCK holdings, will be stored in the registered weapons storage sites. 

(4) Within 90 days all automatic small arms weapons will be stored in the registered weapons storage 

sites. Thereafter their possession by UCK personnel will be prohibited and such weapons will be 

subject to confiscation by KFOR. 

 g) From 30 days until 90 days the weapons storage sites will be under joint control of the UCK and KFOR 

under procedures approved by COMKFOR at the JIC. After 90 days KFOR will assume full control of these sites. 

 h) Within 90 days all UCK forces will have completed the processes for their demilitarisation and are to cease 

wearing either military uniforms or insignia of the UCK. 

 i) Within 90 days the Chief of General Staff UCK shall confirm compliance with the above restrictions in 

writing to COMKFOR. 

24. The provisions of this Undertaking enter into force with immediate effect of its signature by the Kosovar 

Albanian representative(s). 

25. The UCK intends to comply with the terms of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, and in this 

context that the international community should take due and full account of the contribution of the UCK during the 

Kosovo crisis and accordingly give due consideration to: 

a) Recognition that, while the UCK and its structures are in the process of transformation, it is committed to 

propose individual current members to participate in the administration and police forces of Kosovo, enjoying 

special consideration in view of the expertise they have developed. 

b) The formation of an Army in Kosovo on the lines of the US National Guard in due course as part of a 

political process designed to determine Kosovos future status, taking into account the Rambouillet Accord. 

26. This Undertaking is provided in English and Albanian and if there is any doubt as to the meaning of the text the 

English version has precedence. 

OFFERED BY HASHIM THAQI, COMMANDER IN CHIEF UCK 

RECEIVED BY LT GEN MIKE JACKSON, COMMANDER KFOR
 

21 June 1999 

258 Appendix IV-5 
 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

Appendix A 

ROADS 

1) Pec - Lapusnik - Pristina 

2) Border - Djakovica - Klina 

3) Border - Prizren - Suva Reka - Pristina 

4) Djakovica - Orahovac - Lapusnik - Pristina 

5) Pec-Djakovica - Prizren - Urosevac - Border 

6) Border - Urosevac - Pristina - Podujevo - Border 

7) Pristina - Kosovska Mitrovica - Border 

8) Kosovka Mitrovica - (Rakos) - Pec 

9) Pec - Border with Montenegro (through Rozaj) 

10) Pristina - Lisica - Border with Serbia 

11) Pristina - Gnjilane - Urosevac 

12) Gnjilane - Veliki Trnovac - Border with Serbia; 

13) Prizren - Doganovic 

Appendix IV-5 259 
 

 

 

 


 

	 

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APPENDIX IV-6: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 

THE KOSOVO PROTECTION CORPS 

COMMANDER KOSOVO FORCE'S STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 

The members of the Kosovo Protection Corps will act in accordance with the United Nations 

Security Council Resolution 1244(1999) of 10 June 1999. 

The members of the Kosovo Protection Corps will act in accordance with the Undertaking of 

Demilitarisation and Transformation by the UCK offered on 21 June 1999. 

The Members of the Kosovo Protection Corps are resolved to provide a disciplined and 

effective emergency service. 

They therefore agree to this Statement of Principles. 

Article 1 Purpose 

1. The Kosovo Protection Corps is to provide assistance to the United Nations Mission 

In Kosovo in the event of natural disaster or similar emergency, in the reconstruction 

of the Kosovo civilian infrastructure and other assistance as may from time to time be 

requested by the United Nations Mission In Kosovo. 

2. The Kosovo Protection Corps is consistent with the process outlined in the 

Undertaking on Demilitarisation and Transformation signed on 21 June 1999. 

3. Mission. The Kosovo Protection Corps shall be the only multidisciplinary, multiethnic, indigenous emergency service agency that will undertake to: 

a. Respond to any disaster affecting the population and territory of Kosovo. 

b. Conduct search and rescue operations. 

c. Assist in rebuilding the infrastructure and community of Kosovo. 

d. Provide assistance to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo and Kosovo 

Force when required. 

e. Perform ceremonial duties. 

in order to serve all the people of Kosovo in keeping with the transition to a 

democratic and free society. 

4. The Mission of the Kosovo Protection Corps may only be changed by the Special 

Representative of the Secretary General. 

260	 Appendix IV-6 
 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

Article 2 Principles 

1. The Kosovo Protection Corps in pursuit of the purpose stated in Article 1 of this 

Statement of Principles, shall act in accordance with the following principles: 

a. The Kosovo Protection Corps will exist to serve all of the people of Kosovo. 

It will be politically neutral, and its members will neither serve in public office 

nor hold any office or positions in political parties whether voluntary or paid. 

b. The Kosovo Protection Corps shall comply with internationally recognised 

human rights agreements in all aspects including recruitment, retention, career 

progression and in the activities of the Kosovo Protection Corps. There shall 

be no discrimination against any person on grounds of race, sex, colour, 

language, religion, political or other opinion, national or ethnic or social origin 

or association with a national community, property, birth or other status. 

c. Nothing contained in this Statement of Principles shall authorise or permit the 

Kosovo Protection Corps to intervene or concern itself with, as an organisation 

or through its membership, any matter other than those specified in this 

Statement of Principles. 

d. Any member of the Kosovo Protection Corps who breaches the principles and 

regulations contained in this Statement of Principles or the United Nations 

Mission In Kosovo Regulation 1999/8 may be dismissed from the Corps and 

may be subject to criminal prosecution. 

e. Members of the Kosovo Protection Corps may only operate outside the 

boundaries of the Province of Kosovo with the authority of the Special 

Representative of the Secretary General. 

Article 3 Composition 

1. The strength of the Kosovo Protection Corps will be about 5000 members, of which 

3000 will be permanent members and the remainder reserve members. Up to 100 

locally employed personnel may also be employed. 

2. Recruiting to the Kosovo Protection Corps will be on an individual basis and will be 

carried out by the Kosovo Force and the Kosovo Protection Corps transitional 

leadership under the authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary General. 

A significant portion of the Kosovo Protection Corps will initially come from the 

leadership and ranks of the demilitarised UCK and the remainder from the civilian 

population at large. 

3. The Kosovo Protection Corps is to be recruited and based on multi-ethnic, nonsectarian principles. No specific religious, ethnic or gender quotas will be applied; 

however, continued international support will depend upon continued evidence of an 

organisation that mirrors the Province's ethnic balance. 

Appendix IV-6 261 
 


 

	 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

4. Every member of the Kosovo Protection Corps will wear a uniform; the pattern of the 

uniform and its badges and emblems will be in accordance with that which has been 

approved by the Commander Kosovo Force. The official badge of the Kosovo 

Protection Corps is at Annex D. Members of the Kosovo Protection Corps may not 

wear any other form of uniform. They may wear their uniforms whilst off duty and at 

home if they so wish; however, any evidence of misuse of this privilege will result in 

the uniform only being worn on duty. 

5. The Kosovo Protection Corps will issue an identification card of an approved design 

to every member of the Kosovo Protection Corps under the supervision of the 

Commander Kosovo Force. This identification card must be carried at all times. 

Article 4 Command Status 

1. Commander Kosovo Force will exercise day to day supervision of the Kosovo 

Protection Corps within the framework of the Mission. 

2. No formed body of the Kosovo Protection Corps may be used outside its regional 

boundaries without the express permission of the Commander Kosovo Force. 

3. Commander Kosovo Protection Corps will employ the Corps in accordance with 

Commander Kosovo Force’s direction. 

4. Commanders of the Kosovo Force multinational brigades will exercise supervision 

over and, consistent with the requirements of a secure environment, provide security 

for any tasking of the Kosovo Protection Corps within their areas. Multinational 

brigades will provide assistance to operational deployments of the Kosovo Protection 

Corps within means and capabilities. 

Article 5 Organisation 

1. The Kosovo Protection Corps is to consist of one Central Headquarters, six regional 

headquarters and task groups, one Guard and Rapid Reaction Group, seven central 

support or service support groups including Communications, Engineer, 

Environmental and Chemical Protection, Air Search and Rescue, Medical, Transport 

and Supply, and Maintenance, and two training colleges. The structure of the Kosovo 

Protection Corps is shown at Annex A to this Statement of Principles. Changes to 

this structure can only be authorised by the Special Representative of the Secretary 

General. 

2. The Kosovo Force will, within means and capabilities, provide Training and Advisory 

Teams to the Kosovo Protection Corps, at its Central Headquarters and six regional 

headquarters. 

3. The administrative locations for the key components of the Kosovo Protection Corps 

may not be changed without the authority of Commander Kosovo Force. 

 Article 6 Training and Assistance 

262	 Appendix IV-6 
 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

1. All training for the Kosovo Protection Corps will be planned by Commander Kosovo 

Protection Corps and will be approved by Commander Kosovo Force. 

2. All aid, equipment and assistance provided to the Kosovo Protection Corps by the 

International Community must be authorised by the Special Representative of the 

Secretary General and Commander Kosovo Force. 

3. The Kosovo Protection Corps will maintain liaison links with other public service 

organisations such as the civil fire, police, electricity, water and forestry departments 

as well as key international humanitarian organisations that could require specialised 

emergency assistance. 

Article 7 Equipment 

1. The equipment of the UCK is to be made available for use by the Kosovo Protection 

Corps. Specific arrangements for weapons are covered in Article 8.1.f. 

2. All equipment issued to the Kosovo Protection Corps for the purpose of fulfilling its 

Mission is to be accounted for at the Kosovo Protection Corps Central Headquarters. 

Where such equipment is issued down to regional task groups, similar accounting 

procedures are to be in place. 

3. A rolling annual stock take of equipment is to be completed. Quarterly returns are to 

be submitted to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General for Civil 

Administration, via the Kosovo Protection Corps chain of command. 

Article 8 Self Defence 

1. Every member of the Kosovo Protection Corps has the inherent right of self defence. 

To clarify this, the following guidelines apply: 

a. Every member of the Kosovo Protection Corps who is attacked, or reasonably 

believes he is about to be attacked, may use reasonable minimum force as is 

necessary in the circumstances to defend himself. 

b. No member of the Kosovo Protection Corps has the right to use force to 

defend another person, unless the member has been specifically authorised by 

the Special Representative of the Secretary General to protect that person. 

c. Force can never be used unless necessary and then only minimum force can be 

used. 

d. Minimum force can include lethal force but only if life is in imminent danger 

and no alternative action can be taken. 

e. No member of the Kosovo Protection Corps will be permitted to carry arms of 

any kind unless authorised to do so by the Special Representative of the 

Secretary General. 

Appendix IV-6 263 
 

 


 

	 

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f. 2000 weapons in total are held in trust for the Kosovo Protection Corps. 200 

will be in use at any one time for: 

(1) Guarding of installations. 

(2) Security when units are deployed. 

Issuance of these weapons will be specifically authorised by Commander 

Kosovo Force and their use by the Kosovo Protection Corps will be in 

accordance with Kosovo Force guidelines. 

g. The remaining 1800 weapons held for the Kosovo Protection Corps will be 

stored within Kosovo Force secure weapons facilities to which authorised 

Kosovo Protection Corps members will have privileged access in order to 

exercise joint control. 

h. Additionally: 

(1) Weapons (sidearms) may be carried by authorised officers for personal 

protection, as authorised by the Commander Kosovo Force, using his 

delegated authority from the UNMIK Police Commissioner. Such 

authorisations will be limited to a period of one year and will be 

subject to review at the Special Representative of the Secretary 

General's discretion. 

(2) Ceremonial units will carry de-commissioned bolt action weapons. 

(3) Close protection units will carry sidearms or automatic short barrelled 

weapons for close protection of key members of the Kosovo Protection 

Corps. 

i. Weapons will be made available to the Kosovo Protection Corps for training. 

Article 9 Supplemental Arrangements 

1. The Special Representative of the Secretary General shall make such supplemental 

arrangements to this Statement of Principles which may from time to time be 

required. When concluded, such arrangements will be annexed to and shall form part 

of this Statement of Principles and shall have the same force and effect as this 

Statement of Principles. 

Article 10 Amendments 

1. Any part of this Statement of Principles may be amended or modified by the Special 

Representative to the Secretary General. 

264	 Appendix IV-6 
 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

M D JACKSON 

Lieutenant General 

Commander Kosovo Force 

Accepted By: 

Agim Çeku 

Lieutenant General 

Annexes: 

A. Authorised Structure of the Kosovo Protection Corps. 

B. Kosovo Protection Corps Key Tasks. 

C. Kosovo Protection Corps Locations. 

D. Kosovo Protection Corps Official Badge. 

Appendix IV-6 265 
 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

ANNEX A TO THE KOSOVO PROTECTION CORPS 

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 

Day to Day 

Supervision

 SRSG UNMIK 

LEADER 

ACADEMY 

TRAINING 

& DOCTRINE 

CENTER 

KOSOVO PROTECTION CORPS HQ 

CENTRAL STAFF 

•CHIEF 

•DEPUTY 

• PERSONAL STAFF 

•PERSONNEL 

• INFORMATION ANALYSIS 

• OPERATIONS AND TRAINING 

• LOGISTICS 

• COMMUNICATIONS 

•CIVILIAN AFFAIRS 

•RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 

•SPECIALIST STAFF 

119 

60 56 

REGIONAL 

TASK GROUP 

608 614 

COMMUNICATIONS 

AND SIGNAL 

GROUP 

EMERGENCY 

MEDICAL 

GROUP 

MAINTENANCE 

TPT & SUPPLY 

GROUP 

ENGINEER 

GROUP 

ENVIRONMENTAL 

AND CHEMICAL 

GROUP 

50 75 161 139 50 AIR 

GROUP 

50 

COMKFOR 

Directive 

Funding 

Administration 

AUTHORISED STRUCTURE OF THE KOSOVO PROTECTION CORPS 

GUARD AND 

RAPID REACTION 

GROUP 

CLOSE 

PROTECTION 

DETACHMENT 

CEREMONIAL 

FORMATION 

AND BAND 

RAPID 

RESPONSE 

UNIT 

62 74 188

KEY 

636(1) 

LEADER 

ACADEMY(2) 

(1) UNIT NUMBERS 

(2) UNIT TITLE 

(3) SHADING DENOTES 

UNIT CONTAINING 

RESERVISTS 

(3) 

266 Appendix IV-6 
 


 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 

Appendix IV-6 267
 
 

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268 Appendix IV-6 
 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

ANNEX B TO THE KOSOVO PROTECTION CORPS STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 

KOSOVO PROTECTION CORPS KEY TASKS 

1. To provide an emergency response capability to meet natural disasters and other 

situations defined by UNMIK, in order to protect the life and property of the people of 

Kosovo. 

2. To assist the Kosovo population in case of natural and technological disasters. 

3. To re-establish and control the normal flow of traffic in emergencies when requested 

by UNMIK. 

4. To support and actively participate in the rebuilding of the living accommodation and 

infrastructure of Kosovo. 

5. To conduct de-mining and EOD clearance of mine and munitions affected areas in 

support of UNMIK and NGOs. 

6. To provide training for all new members of the Corps and lay down the foundations 

of a youth training organisation. 

7. Continuously to enhance the professional skills of the staff with scientific 

programmes adapted to the conditions and structures of Kosovo. 

8. To maintain the capabilities of active and reserve elements and sufficient information 

on the terrain, vegetation, weather, climate, structure, railways and roads to react rapidly to 

all disasters. 

9. To conduct all planning necessary to fulfil the mission. 

10. To organise and implement the training of reserve personnel of the Corps. 

11. To undertake search and rescue operations for people and property in case of 

accidents. 

12. To provide support to KFOR when requested. 

13. To perform ceremonial duties upon the arrival or departure of high state personalities 

and similar cases. 

14. To be responsible for guarding the Corps installations and senior officers of the 

organisation. 

15. To guard and maintain the equipment of the Corps. 

16. To write doctrine and Standing Operating Procedures for the organisation. 

Appendix IV-6 269 
 


 


 

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ANNEX C TO THE KOSOVO PROTECTION CORPS STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 

KOSOVO PROTECTION CORPS HEADQUARTERS LOCATIONS. 

1. Locations. The following locations have been provisionally identified: 

a. Central Level 

(1) General Headquarters PRISTINA GR 126217 (Auto-Moto Liaison) 

(2) Guard and Rapid Reaction Group PRISTINA GR 115224 (former VJ 

barracks) and BLINAJA (company buildings) 

(3) Leadership Academy PRISTINA GR EN 135217 (technical faculty 

PRISTINA university). Proposed accommodation at GR DM 116222. 

(4) Training Centre (To Be Confirmed) 

(a) JUNIK (former textile factory) Option 1. 

(b) NASHEC (PRIZREN) Option 2. 

(5) Communication Group PRISTINA. 

(6) Medical Group PRISTINA (PRISTINA Hospital). 

(7) Logistics Group PRISTINA (Togbashqe Barracks). 

(8) Engineer Group FERIZAJ. 

(9) Chemical Group SUHAREKË. 

(10) Helicopter Group PRISTINA (Slatina) Airport 

b. Regional Level 

(1) Regional Headquarters PRISTINA GR 128229 (former VJ barracks). 

(2) Regional Headquarters MITROVICA GR DN 892489 (former VJ 

mobilisation centre). 

(4) Regional Headquarters GJILAN. 

(5) Regional Headquarters SKENDERAJ GR DN 826322 . 

(6) Regional Headquarters PEC GR DN 432227 (former state motel) and 

GR DN 443226 (old HGV test centre). 

(7) Regional Headquarters PRIZREN GR DM 786737 (former VJ senior 

officer's house).(TBC). 

270 Appendix IV-6 
 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

ANNEX D TO 

THE KOSOVO PROTECTION CORPS 

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 

T M K 

TRUPAT 

E 

M BRO J T J E S

SË KOSOVËS 

T K 

BRO JTJE S

M

SË KOS

O

V ËS

TR UPA

E

T

M 

Appendix IV-6 271 

 


 

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APPENDIX IV-7: 1ST ID LEADERS LEGAL BRIEFING 

272 Appendix IV-7 

 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 

Appendix IV-7 273
 
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274 Appendix IV-7 

 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 

Appendix IV-7 275
 
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276 Appendix IV-7 

 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 

Appendix IV-7 277
 
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278 Appendix IV-7 

 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 

Appendix IV-7 279
 
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280 Appendix IV-7 
 

 


 


 

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APPENDIX IV-8: DETENTION POLICY (KFOR 1A) 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

HEADQUARTERS, TASK FORCE FALCON 

CAMP BONDSTEEL, KOSOVO 

APO AE 09340 

TASK FORCE FALCON 

POLICY LETTER #TFF-04 

DETENTION PROCESSING
 

AETV-BGA-FWD 3 Aug. 1999 

1. Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, KFOR has the responsibility 

to ensure public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for 

this task. Sergio Vieira de Mello reiterated that, “In performing this task, KFOR has the right to 

apprehend and detain persons who are suspected of having committed offenses against public 

safety and order, including the commission of such serious offenses as murder, rape, kidnapping 

or arson, or war crimes (enclosure).” This memorandum outlines the procedures to be employed 

in the Multi-National Brigade-East Area of Responsibility (MNB-E AOR) for the detention and 

release of civilians. 

2. The most common types of crimes in the MNB-E AOR are divided into the following four 

categories: 

a. Category I: 

(1) Hostile acts or threats toward KFOR 

(2) War Crimes 

b. Category II: Serious Crimes 

(1) Murder 

(2) Rape 

(3) Kidnapping 

(4) Arson 

(5) Aggravated Assault 

(6) Any crime involving a suspect that has been previously detained by KFOR 

(7) Any crime in which a weapon was used in the commission of the crime 

c. Category III: Standard Crimes 

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(1) Burglary/Housebreaking 

(2) Larceny/Looting 

(3) Weapons Violations 

(4) UCK Uniform Violations 

(5) Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs 

(6) Prostitution 

(7) Establishing an unauthorized checkpoint 

(8) Destruction of Property 

(9) Blackmarketing 

(10) Simple Assault 

(11) Harassment 

(12) Use or possession of illegal drugs 

(13) Possession of stolen property 

(14) Auto Theft/Carjacking 

d. Category IV: Misdemeanors 

1) Curfew Violations 

2) Drunk and Disorderly 

3. In accordance with Yugoslav law, within 48 hours of the time an individual is brought to the 

Camp Bondsteel Detention Facility, KFOR must either make a determination to release the 

individual or conduct a hearing to determine if there is probable cause for continued detention. 

Only the Task Force Falcon Commander has the authority to order the release of individuals 

detained for Category I crimes. The Task Force Falcon Chief of Staff has the authority to order 

the release of individuals detained for Category II crimes. The Provost Marshal has the authority 

to order the release of individuals detained for Category III crimes. The on-scene commander 

has the authority to order the release of individuals detained for Category IV crimes. 

4. The Task Force Falcon Commander personally reviews all cases in which continued detention 

beyond 48 hours is recommended. The authority to order continued detention of suspects 

beyond 48 hours rests solely with the Task Force Falcon Commander. 

5. The initial investigation and documentation of alleged crimes must be as thorough and 

complete as possible. The operational constraints of conducting law enforcement activities in 

the present environment severely inhibits KFOR’s ability to conduct follow-up investigations. It 

is imperative that the investigation be done correctly, the first time. Therefore, the first soldiers 

to respond to the scene of an alleged crime will take the following actions. 

a. When responding to the scene of a Category I, II or III crime, the first responders will: 

(1) Establish control of the scene. 

(2) Notify the Military Police (MP) as soon as possible. MPs will notify CID as 

appropriate (Rape, Murder, Arson, Kidnapping) 

282 Appendix IV-8 
 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

(3) Continue to provide perimeter security until the MPs have completed their 

investigation. 

b. When responding to the scene of a Category IV crime, or when the Military Police have 

specifically deferred the investigation of the alleged Category III crime to the on-scene 

commander, the first responders will: 

(1) Establish control of the scene. 

(2) Notify the MPs. 

(3) Take statements from the victims and witnesses (sworn statements when possible). 

(4) Prepare a sketch of the scene. 

(5) Render personal statements. 

(6) Account for all physical evidence on a DA Form 4137. 

(7) Bring the suspect(s) and all documents from sub-paragraphs 3 through 6 to the 

nearest MP sub-station. 

6. The MP sub-station plays a critical role in preparing the evidence for the detention facility. 

The MP sub-station will do the following: 

(1) Review the statements and ask follow-up questions. 

(2) Ensure the evidence is properly tagged and the DA Form 4137 is completed. 

(3) Coordinate with the Camp Bondsteel Detention Facility for transportation of suspects 

to the detention facility. 

7. The Camp Bondsteel Detention Facility will accept all individuals for detention. If the 

statements and documents are not detailed or complete, the capturing unit must submit 

supporting statements and physical evidence (if obtained) to the Camp Bondsteel Detention 

Facility within twelve hours. 

8. When individuals brought to the detention facility are known to be members of the UCK, the 

detention facility will notify the JIC or the G-5 so that the individual’s Chain of Command can 

be contacted. This coordination should occur as soon as possible, but may occur after the 

individual has been interrogated by Military Police Investigators (MPI), Criminal Investigation 

Division (CID) Special Agents or Counter Intelligence (CI) Agents. Members of the UCK that 

are detained solely for violations of the Undertaking for Demilitarization and Transformation of 

the UCK will be released to UCK Chain of Command. However, members of the UCK deemed 

to be a threat to KFOR or that are suspected of committing criminal acts will be processed 

through the detention process like any other detainee. 

9. It is the responsibility of the NCOIC of the Camp Bondsteel Detention Facility to prepare a 

memorandum THRU the Provost Marshal FOR the appropriate release authority recommending 

the release or continued detention of each detainee. The memorandum will be supported, as 

applicable, by the following enclosures: 

a. Statements of the first responders, investigators, victim(s), witnesses, and suspect(s) 

b. Evidence/Chain of Custody Document 

Appendix IV-8 283 
 

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c. Sketch of the crime scene 

d. Digital photograph of the detainee with corresponding biographical information 

Release will occur in accordance with Paragraph 2. 

10. In the event that the Kosovar Investigating Magistrate directs the release of an individual 

detained in the Camp Bondsteel Detention Facility, coordination will be made with the Task 

Force Falcon Chief of Staff. All such releases must be approved by the Task Force Falcon Chief 

of Staff. 

11. POC for this memorandum is CPT Jacobs at MSE 563-3568. 

Encl (as) BANTZ J. CRADDOCK 

Brigadier General, USA 

Commanding, Task Force Falcon 

DISTRIBUTION: 

101 MI B 2/10 SFG 

121 SIG ENG BDE 

510 PSB E TRP 1-4 CAV 

299 FSB 2-1 AVN 

DIVARTY 106 FIN 

67 CSH CTAC 

2-505 IN POLISH BN 

1-26 IN RUSSIAN BN 

1-77 AR GREEK BN 

793 MP 

284 Appendix IV-8 
 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

APPENDIX IV-9: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, AR 15-6 

INVESTIGATION INTO ALLEGATIONS OF EXCESS FORCE BY 3-

504 PIR 

I. Introduction

 The charter appointed to me, COL John W. Morgan, III, SUBJECT: Appointment 

of AR 15-6 Investigating Officer, dated 23 January 2000. The purpose was to 

conduct an informal investigation into the unit climate and state of discipline within 

3rd Battalion, 504 Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), presently attached to Task 

Force Falcon, Kosovo. The appointment order (paragraphs 2b. - 2j.) charged me to 

address 9 separate allegations of which 7 were substantiated and 2 were 

unsubstantiated. Facts, Findings, and Recommendations of each of the allegations are 

addressed in Section VIII of the Report of Investigation (ROI). 

II. Objective of the Investigation

 To determine the overall unit climate and state of discipline within the 3-504 PIR, 

attached to Task Force Falcon, Kosovo 

III. Overview of the Investigation

 On 23 January 2000, during my office call with the Appointing Authority, 

Brigadier General (BG) Ricardo Sanchez, the scope of the investigation was orally 

expanded. The expansion included interviewing soldiers from direct/general support 

units (e.g., Civil Affairs, Military Police, Counter-Intelligence, Intelligence Collection 

Assets) that operated in and around the Vitina area. Additionally, BG Sanchez orally 

tasked me to interview members of the local population in Vitina to include 

community leaders from both ethnic groups (i.e., Serbians and Albanians). The scope 

of the investigation was also expanded to cover the entire period from 3-504 PIR’s 

deployment in early September to present and determine if there were additional 

incidents of misconduct. In addition, I was orally tasked to contact NonGovernmental Organizations (e.g. UNHCR, OSCE, ICRC) and TFF medical assets 

including the TFF Surgeon and Psychiatrist. To ensure the thoroughness of the 

investigation, I also interviewed former and present TFF commanders and soldiers 

across the Multi-National Brigade (East) sector to include individuals that had already 

redeployed to home station. 

IV. Methodology of the Investigation

 Initially, I gathered all available CID statements involving the murder of the 11-

year-old Albanian girl, Merita Shabiju. I also collected all available CID statements 

involving unit members’ alleged use of excessive force against local nationals. I 

coordinated daily with CID ensuring that my investigation did not impede or hamper 

the criminal investigation. 

Appendix IV-9 285 
 

 

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 I conducted 65 interviews of officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted 

soldiers assigned to the 3-504 PIR and across Task Force Falcon (TFF). The 

investigation consisted of two phases. The first phase of the investigation occurred in 

the MNB (E) sector, Kosovo, and spanned thirteen days. The second phase occurred 

within the 1st Infantry Division footprint in Central Region, Germany. I gathered 

sworn statements from TFF leadership and soldiers involved in both 1st ID rotations 

to Kosovo. Additionally, I gathered 155 exhibits that I incorporated into the ROI and 

gathered an additional 25 reference documents. 

 My investigation explored the following: pre-deployment training, 

usefulness/realism of home-station training; communication and effectiveness of the 

Transfer of Authority (TOA) between KFOR 1 Alpha and KFOR 1 Bravo units; 

communication flow from unit leadership to troops on the ground; relationships 

between the 3-504 and its direct/general support assets; quality of training and 

leadership of officers and noncommissioned officers specifically focused on A/3-504. 

My investigation also reviewed statistical information and trends in the areas of 

military justice and mental/physical health. 

V. Summarized Findings and Recommendations 

A. Whether members of Alpha Company, 3-504 Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) 

have violated the limits and terms of their military assignments in and around 

Vitina. 

• Findings

 Yes. Unit members violated the limits and terms of their military assignments by 

intimidating, interrogating, abusing and beating Albanians and by traveling outside of 

their physically assigned sector to conduct some of these activities. These actions 

violated KFOR/TFF Rules of Engagement (ROE) and TFF standing policies. These 

actions also constituted criminal violations of the UCMJ and violated basic standards 

of conduct, human decency and the Army Values of treating others with dignity and 

respect. 

• Recommendations 

 That the command considers imposing the range of nonjudicial to judicial 

punishment on unit members depending upon the severity of the circumstances of 

each case. The command should also conduct refresher training on ROE and on the 

basic tenets of Army Values. Commanders, at all levels, should ensure that soldiers 

understand the mission statement and associated specified and implied tasks and 

require periodic brief-backs on the methods used to execute the mission. 

B. Provide the facts surrounding a demonstration(s) by Kosovar civilians in or 

around Vitina on or about the period 9 to 10 January 2000, to include the location, 

timing, size, stated reasons for, and duration of the demonstrations(s), the Task 

Force Falcon elements and individual soldiers in the vicinity of the 

demonstrations(s), and the conduct of those elements and soldiers. 

286 Appendix IV-9 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

• Findings

 Although the demonstrators were not overly hostile or aggressive and appeared 

organized, the evidence revealed systemic deficiencies pertaining to the soldiers’ 

crowd control methods and techniques. The unit invited a Combat Camera team to 

videotape the staged demonstrations. Overall, I did not see any excessive use of force 

on the part of A/3-504, but evidence reveals that unit members treated local nationals 

roughly, yelled vulgar obscenities and conducted personnel searches not in 

accordance with proper procedures. Although the command dismisses the 

demonstrations as an information operations campaign to rid Vitina of the unit, the 

reasons for the demonstrations stemmed from the unit’s pro-Serb mentality and 

reflected growing anti-KFOR sentiment in the Vitina Opstina. Specifically, the 

crowd was protesting the unit’s recent arrests of Albanian MRP members, suspected 

of criminal misconduct. 

• Recommendations

 That the command strive to develop an environment that reflects impartiality 

towards both ethnic groups by employing methods that strike a balance, reflecting fair 

and impartial treatment of all local nationals. The unit should also be equipped with 

proper training on crowd control, search techniques and use of force. Additionally, 

the command should provide interpreters at the squad leader level to prevent a 

communication barrier that leads to frustration and ultimately violence. 

C. Whether Members of Alpha Company, 3-504, used Excessive Force in 

Responding to the Demonstrations. 

• Findings

 See B. supra 

• Recommendations

 See B. supra 

D. Whether Members of Alpha Company, 3-504, have used Excessive Force during 

questioning of Kosovar Civilians suspected to be Perpetrators of or Witnesses to 

Crimes or Have Otherwise Used Excessive Force. 

• Findings 

Yes. Unit members intimidated, interrogated, and beat Albanians suspected of 

crimes. Additionally, during Vitina’s weekly “Market Days” the soldiers committed 

acts of misconduct and used excessive force against Albanians. These actions 

Appendix IV-9 287 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

violated KFOR/TFF ROE and TFF standing policies. These actions also constituted 

criminal violations of the UCMJ and violated basic standards of conduct, human 

decency and the Army Values of treating others with dignity and respect. 

• Recommendations

 That the command considers imposing the range of nonjudicial to judicial 

punishment on unit members depending upon the severity of the circumstances of 

each case. The command should also conduct refresher training on ROE and on the 

basic tenets of Army Values. Commanders, at all levels, should ensure that soldiers 

understand the mission statement and associated specified and implied tasks and 

require periodic brief-backs primarily on the methods used to execute the mission. 

E. Whether members of Alpha Company, 3-504, either in Connection with the 

Demonstrations or Otherwise, have Inappropriately touched Kosovar Civilian 

Females While Purporting to Conduct Searches for Weapons or Contraband or 

have Otherwise inappropriately touched Kosovar Civilian Females. 

• Findings 

Yes. Although the evidence indicates that much of this misconduct centered 

around SSG Ronghi, the facts reveal several incidents of soldier misconduct towards 

females including inappropriate touching, grabbing of breasts and buttocks, and the 

perception by Kosovar females of improper searches conducted by soldiers. This 

misconduct reflects the overall negative command climate and violated basic 

standards of conduct, human decency and the Army values of treating others with 

dignity and respect. 

• Recommendations

 That the command ensures individual soldiers are trained on proper search 

procedures during pre-deployment training, emphasizing dignity and respect of 

others. Additionally, due to force protection measures, searching females is 

mandatory; however, the command should equip soldiers with “wands” or “scanners” 

to avoid the perception, based upon cultural standards, that the soldiers are 

mistreating female local nationals. 

F. Whether and under what circumstances members of Alpha Company, 3-504 

were authorized to be away form Traffic Control Points (TCPs) or other military 

posts, alone, in the streets and/or buildings of Vitina. Include copies of any written 

standing operating procedures (SOPs), orders, or standards pertaining to the 

conduct of patrols, the manning of TCPs, protection of the force, and any activity in 

which the minimum number of soldiers or vehicles is addressed; if not in writing, 

record any such procedures, orders, or standards in the sworn statements of the 

soldiers and leaders relating them. 

• Findings 

288 Appendix IV-9 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 

 Although in many instances the procedures were not formalized in a unit SOP, 

unit members understood there were no circumstances when they were authorized to 

be away from TCPs or other military posts unaccompanied. Although soldiers clearly 

understood that convoys required a minimum of two vehicles, I found a discrepancy 

in the minimum amount of soldiers required for each vehicle. Despite SSG Ronghi’s 

ability to travel through the sector unaccompanied on numerous occasions, there was 

limited evidence of soldiers violating the “buddy concept.” Note, however, I 

personally observed a lone soldier on foot traveling the streets of Vitina. 

• Recommendations

 That the command formalize a SOP on this subject, emphasizing the basic “buddy 

concept” and ensure units are provided with the proper resources to meet the twovehicle rule. Additionally, the command must provide the squad leader with a 

mechanism for force protection while moving from one four-man team to emplace 

another four-man team. 

G. Whether members of Alpha Company, 3-504 have drunk vodka or consumed 

any other alcoholic beverage in the company of a Kosovar woman referred to by 

soldiers as “Yugoslavia,” at or near an old warehouse on a street in Vitina referred 

to by soldiers as “Ireland Street.” 

• Findings 

 Despite SSG Ronghi’s consumption of alcohol with “Yugoslavia”, no other 

evidence exists to substantiate that any other soldier consumed alcohol in the 

company of “Yugoslavia.” 

• Recommendations 

None. 

H. Whether members of Alpha Company, 3-504 have consumed alcohol on other 

occasions in Kosovo in violation of General Order Number 1. 

• Findings 

 Despite numerous allegations of the Alpha Company Commander’s and his First 

Sergeant’s consumption of alcohol, there is no evidence to substantiate these 

allegations. Other than SSG Ronghi’s violation of General Order Number 1 and legal 

statistics documenting the command’s imposition of nonjudicial punishment for 17 

violations of General Order Number 1, no other evidence exists to substantiate that 

any other unit members consumed alcohol in violation of General Order Number 1. 

• Recommendations

 None. 

Appendix IV-9 289 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

I. Whether members of Alpha Company, 3-504 have had sexual intercourse with a 

woman referred to by soldiers as “Yugoslavia,” at or near an old warehouse on a 

street in Vitina referred to by soldiers as “Ireland Street.” 

• Findings 

 Although SSG Ronghi had an intimate relationship with “Yugoslavia” and had 

sexual intercourse with her on numerous occasions, no other evidence exists to 

substantiate that any other soldiers had sexual intercourse with “Yugoslavia” or any 

other local national females. 

• Recommendations

 None. 

J. Whether members of Alpha Company, 3-504, have had sexual intercourse with 

Kosovar women on other occasions. 

• Findings 

See I. supra 

• Recommendations

 See I. supra 

K. Whether leaders within Alpha Company and the Battalion knew of allegations 

of misconduct such as those described above, and whether they took appropriate 

actions upon hearing any reports of misconduct by 3-504 soldiers and subordinate 

leaders. 

• Findings 

 The Battalion Commander and Alpha Company commander deny any prior 

knowledge of the most serious incidents of interrogations, abuse and beatings of 

Kosovar Albanians. Nonetheless, there are numerous instances of misconduct, 

including the excessive use of force, that either the commanders or their respective 

staffs knew or should have known based upon reports from intelligence/operational 

assets, OSCE, Civil Affairs, Military Police and directly from local national reports. 

• Recommendations

 That the command consider issuing both the Battalion and Company commander a 

General Officer Memoranda of Reprimand (GOMOR) and the Alpha Company First 

Sergeant a Brigade Commander Memorandum of Reprimand and/or other adverse 

administrative personnel actions for failing to properly investigate or cause to be 

investigated allegations of criminal misconduct and/or excessive use of force within 

290 Appendix IV-9 
 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

the unit, thereby perpetuating a volatile situation leading to an unhealthy command 

environment. 

L. To what extent, if any, the Inadequacy of the Unit’s Pre-Deployment Training, 

the Chain of Command’s Pressure to Accomplish the Mission, or the Complexity of 

the Peacekeeping Law Enforcement Mission in this Environment Contributed to the 

Misconduct by 3-504 soldiers. 

1. Inadequacy of the Unit’s Pre-Deployment Training. 

• Findings

 Due to the unit’s High Intensity Conflict (HIC) focus during predeployment, the 

unit was not adequately trained for a Peace Support Operation (PSO). Additionally, 

the unit conducted little PSO oriented training during pre-deployment nor did they 

undergo an externally evaluated Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE). I interviewed a 

cross-section of officers, noncommissioned officers and junior enlisted personnel who 

deployed to Kosovo prepared for a combat operation with little PSO oriented training. 

• Recommendations

 That as the command deploys highly trained combat soldiers into a PSO theater of 

operations relevant measures are taken to assist the unit adapt from HIC focused 

combat operations to PSO. That the command also ensures units undergo a Mission 

Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) prior to deploying to a PSO theater of operation. 

2. Chain of Command’s Pressure to Accomplish the Mission. 

• Findings

 The Battalion Commander’s command emphasis and determination to accomplish 

Specified Task #7 (see Task 7a, Classified ROI) set the tone for the battalion's focus. 

This task was outside of TFF’s command intent and the Battalion Commander’s 

emphasis on this task permeated the unit’s climate and created a set of conditions that 

provided his subordinates the opportunity to step over the line of acceptable conduct 

(e.g., criminal misconduct, excessive use of force and lack of dignity and respect for 

others). 

• Recommendations

 That the command consider issuing the battalion commander a General Officer 

Memorandum of Reprimand (GOMOR) and/or consider other adverse administrative 

personnel actions for exceeding the limits and scope of his military duties and 

assignments which created an unhealthy command climate, ultimately resulting in 

alleged criminal violations by members of his unit. Commanders, at all levels, should 

require periodic and detailed brief-backs on the task, purpose, and primarily methods 

for executing the mission and articulating the end state. 

Appendix IV-9 291 
 

	 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

3. Complexity of the Peacekeeping Law Enforcement Mission in this Environment. 

• Findings

 The totality of the evidence within the ROI substantiates and highlights several 

systemic deficiencies pertaining to 3-504 soldiers exceeding the scope of their duties 

by conducting policing operations. Although in the Kosovo operation it is difficult to 

draw a distinction between Military Police (MP) duties and the infantry soldiers' on 

the ground, KFOR/TFF had polices in effect for defining the role between the MP 

and the soldier on the ground. In the policing duties the soldier on the ground is 

required to perform in Kosovo, the 3-504 soldiers were not adequately trained for the 

police mission that they were asked to execute. This problem is exacerbated by the 

United Nation’s failure to adequately and, in a timely manner, provide a viable 

civilian police force. 

• Recommendations

 That the Kosovo operation be reinforced with a greater presence of Military Police 

and Counter-Intelligence Agents inherently trained on the proper aspects of crowd 

control, search procedures and interrogation. Commanders should ensure that the 

general support (GS) assets develop a relationship of trust with the commands they 

support either at home station during Individual Readiness Training (IRT) and/or 

during Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MREs), or if not possible at home station, 

immediately begin to cultivate this relationship upon entering the PSO theater of 

operations. 

VI. Overall Investigative Conclusions/Impressions 

• Although the murder of the 11-year-old Albanian girl, Merita Shabiju, was an 

isolated incident, the accompanying statements of the CID murder 

investigation and companion CID investigation involving alleged abuses of 

Kosovars by members of the 3-504 revealed systemic command climate 

deficiencies 

• Because Kosovar abuses and other misconduct centered on the alleged 

misconduct of SSG Ronghi and his squad, excluding his alleged murder of the 

Albanian girl, I believe unit members felt free to speak candidly about this 

misconduct. Whereas, I believe unit members were less candid in their 

discussions and/or knowledge concerning additional misconduct due to the 

fear of possible chain of command reprisals/repercussions. 

• Although the 3-504 appears to be a highly trained unit focused on HIC 

operations, it is my impression that the unit was not adequately trained for the 

full range of PSO. As a result, the 3-504 experienced difficulties tempering 

their combat mentality for adapting and transitioning to the Kosovo PSO. In 

the PSO environment, the unit’s overly aggressive tendencies were manifested 

in practices such as the unit slogan, “shoot ‘em in the face” and their standard 

292	 Appendix IV-9 
 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

operating procedure of pointing the M-4 carbine weapon system with attached 

maglight in the face of local nationals in order to illuminate their faces. 

• The 3-504 Battalion Commander’s Task #7 (see Task 7a, Classified ROI), a 

task outside of TFF's command guidance and intent, set the tone for the 

battalion's focus. This focus permeated, and, to a certain extent, infected the 

command climate. Although the Battalion Commander and his Alpha 

Company commander both claim lack of knowledge about unit members' 

interrogations, abuses, and beatings of Kosovars, there are indicators that both 

commanders and their respective staffs knew or should have known of other 

allegations of misconduct and/or excessive use of force. 

• Although the allegations of misconduct and excessive use of force appear 

isolated to A/3-504 located in Vitina, I found this was due to the ethnic mix in 

Vitina (approximately 30% Serbians; 70% Albanians). Given the battalion 

and company commanders’ propensity towards Serb favoritism, coupled with 

the battalion’s emphasis on Task 7a, Vitina was the natural focal point for 

abuses and excessive use of force against the Albanians. 

• The 3-504 is a highly trained unit focused on High Intensity Conflict (HIC) 

operations. My overall impression of 3-504 is that of a professional 

organization comprised of highly disciplined, mission focused and motivated 

soldiers. During the extended period of their deployment, however, some 

elements of the battalion suffered disciplinary and leadership breakdowns as 

they transitioned from High Intensity Conflict (HIC) to complex Peace 

Support Operations (PSO) in Kosovo. Some of the leadership and 

disciplinary breakdowns occurred at the small unit level (e.g., squad and 

platoon level). These breakdowns, coupled with the command emphasis to 

accomplish their perceived mission, Task 7a, contributed to the patterns of 

alleged misconduct. It is my opinion that battalion and company level 

leadership failed to take appropriate action based upon reported allegations of 

soldier misconduct, to include the excessive use of force. 

Original Signed 

JOHN W. MORGAN, III 

COL, FA 

 Commanding 

Appendix IV-9 293 
 


 


 

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APPENDIX IV-10: WEAPONS CONFISCATION POLICY
 

AETV-TFF-CJA 22 June 00 

INFORMATION PAPER 

SUBJECT: Rules Governing Possession, Registration, and Confiscation of Civilian Weapons 

1. REFERENCES: 

a. KFOR Directive 012, Weapons Policy Instruction (7 Dec 99) 

b. Kosovo Criminal Code, Article 199 (1977) 

c. Undertaking of Demilitarization (20 June 1999) 

2. BLUF. Disabled and ceremonial weapons of the KPC are legal without special authorization. 

Certain members of the KPS and TMK are authorized to carry firearms. Civilians may possess 

certain caliber hunting and sporting rifles and shotguns that are properly registered with 

UNMIK-P. KFOR personnel have the discretion to confiscate legal weapons that pose a threat to 

KFOR or to the establishment of a safe and secure environment. All other weapons are 

unauthorized and may be confiscated. KFOR may not return confiscated weapons until UNMIK 

publishes guidance on the return of those weapons. 

3. AUTHORIZED WEAPONS 

a. Disabled and Ceremonial Weapons. Weapons must be disabled by: (1) a vertical cut of 

no less than 5 mm in width through middle portion of the barrel extending from outer casing to 

bore so that the bore is clearly visible to the naked eye; (2) filling the barrel with a immovable, 

impassable, solid plug of molten lead; or (3) welding working parts into the breech so that 

movement is impossible. 

b. KPC/TMK and KPS. Individual members of these organizations possessing a valid 

weapons authorization card (WAC) or weapons card (WC) may lawfully carry the weapon 

identified on the card. 

c. Civilian Possession. Civilians may posses any of the following: (1) unmodified, singleshot, breach-loaded or manually-cocked shotguns of no greater than 12 bore gauge; (2) 

unmodified, single-shot, bolt-action, hunting rifles (not military sniper rifles) with a maximum 

caliber of 8 mm; or (3) air powered rifles and pistols with a maximum caliber of 6 mm. Civilians 

must obtain a license from UNMIK-P for their hunting and recreational use weapons. 

d. Weapons can only be stored, transported and used by the registered owner. 

e. All other weapons not mentioned above are unauthorized. 

4. CONFISCATION OF WEAPONS 

294 Appendix IV-10 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

a. All unauthorized weapons will be confiscated and stored in the SWSS. 

b. KFOR may seize authorized weapons when they are used illegally or when the owner 

fails to produce the appropriate WAC, WC or UNMIK-P-granted license. 

c. KFOR may seize authorized weapons found in excessive quantities or found with 

unauthorized weapons when there are indications of suspicious activity. 

5. RETURN OR DESTRUCTION OF WEAPONS 

a. Confiscated weapons belonging to the KPC/TMK or KPS will be stored in the SWSS 

until ordered returned to their owner following an investigation. 

b. Weapons confiscated pursuant to a criminal investigation will be stored in the SWSS until 

the investigation and trial is complete. They will then be destroyed by MNB-E on the order of 

KFOR MAIN. 

c. MNB-E will not return confiscated civilian weapons to their owners until UNMIK makes 

a decision to destroy or return the weapon. No decision has currently been made. 

d. MNB-E has the authority to destroy all other confiscated weapons. 

6. POCs are CPT Joe Berger or CPT Rebecca Connally, TFF TOC, DSN 781-6016. 

Appendix IV-10 295 

 


 

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APPENDIX IV-11: DD FORM 2665-R 

296 Appendix IV-11 

 


 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 

APPENDIX IV-12: DETENTION FACILITY DIAGRAM 

Appendix IV-12 297
 
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APPENDIX IV-13: MNB-E DETENTION PROCESS SOP (KFOR 1B) 

GENERAL 

Purpose 

The purpose of this SOP is to provide future TFF Judge Advocates an understanding of 

TFF Legal’s role in the detention process. 

References 

1. The Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security Force 

(“KFOR”) and the Governments of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of 

Serbia (MTA). 

2. United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1160, 1199, and 1203 (1998), 

1239, and 1244 (1999). 

3. Compilation of Primary Criminal Laws Applicable in Kosovo on 22 March 1989, 

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Rule of Law Division, Pristina, 

February 2000. 

a. UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24. 

b. The Criminal Code of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo (1977). 

c. The Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1977). 

d. The Criminal Procedure Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

(1977). 

e. The Criminal Law of the Republic of Serbia (1994). 

f. The Law of the Execution of Penal Sanctions of the Republic of Serbia (1977). 

4. Uniform Code of Military Justice and Manual for Courts-Martial, 1998. 

5. Task Force Falcon Policy Letter #TFF-04, Detention Processing, signed by Brigadier 

General Sanchez (1B). 

6. CONPLAN 07 (MNB-E Witness Summons) to TF Falcon 99-01 (Operation Joint 

Guardian). 

298 Appendix IV-13 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

7. UNMIK Regulations: 1999/1, 1999/2, 1999/5, 1999/6, 1999/7, 1999/24, 1999/26, 

2000/17: accessible at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/regs.html. 

Overview 

The current judicial process is a work in progress. In the past few months many 

changes have occurred in the MNB-E sector to include: 

1. 14 January 2000: UNMIK appoints judges, prosecutors, and lay judges for the 

district and municipal courts in Kosovo. Gnjilane district court and Ferizaj municipal 

courts are re-opened. 

2. February 2000: USKFOR transfers several detainees under Pristina district 

court jurisdiction to Prizren. 

3. February-March 2000: MP platoon assigned to the substation in Gnjilane 

refurbishes and improves the holding facility in the UNMIK police substation. KFOR 

begins to transport detainees awaiting initial investigation for Gnjilane district and 

surrounding municipal courts to Gnjilane. Detainees remain at the Gnjilane holding 

facility awaiting hearings for short periods of time (2-7 days). 

4. March-April 2000. UNMIK-P begin to support the MPs at the Gnjilane holding 

facility with personnel. 

5. April 2000. USKFOR transfers primary responsibility of the Gnjilane holding 

facility to UNMIK-P and Kosovo Corrections. Result: All detainees arrested by UNMIKP go directly to Gnjilane detention facility for processing. Only Serbians, murder 

suspects, ethnic-related assault suspects, and high-profile detainees are transferred to 

Bondsteel IDF. 

6. 1 May 2000. Vitina municipal courthouse opens for court. Interim plan is to 

continue to process detainees through Gnjilane. Also in May, Kamenica municipal 

courthouse opens for court. 

7. 8 May 2000. Lipjan prison opens. Lipjan will primarily hold females and 

minors. USKFOR transfers 5 detainees from Bondsteel IDF to Lipjan prison. 

8. June 2000. Ishtak prison opens. Kosovo’s largest prison opens – effect on 

Bondsteel IDF?? 

COURT ORGANIZATION 

Appendix IV-13 299 
 

 

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The Kosovo courts are currently separated into two criminal jurisdictions – district 

courts and municipal courts. These courts mirror felony and misdemeanor courts in the 

United States. Serious crimes are withheld to the district courts while lesser crimes are 

handled by the smaller municipal courts. In addition, the district court’s geographical 

jurisdiction encompasses the smaller municipal court jurisdictions. For example, 

Gnjilane district court covers the opstinas (counties) of Gnjilane, Vitina, and Kamenica. 

Those opstinas are also covered by lower municipal courts. The opstina of Ferizaj 

(Ferizaj, Strpce, Kacanik) is covered by a municipal court; Pristina district court 

encompasses the Ferizaj opstina for serious crimes. (see below) 

MNB-E court jurisdictions: 

Gnjilane District Court 

- Gnjilane municipal court 

- Kamenica municipal court 

- Vitina municipal court 

Pristina District Court 

 -Ferizaj municipal court 

CURRENT SITUATION 

Given the detention facilities/holding facilities operating in MNB-E (Bondsteel 

IDF/Gnjilane holding facility), the current process is as follows: 

1. All municipal level offenders arrested by UNMIK police in the Gnjilane district go 

directly to the Gnjilane holding facility. They are processed by UNMIK-P, their cases 

are presented to the court, and decisions are handed back to UNMIK-P. KFOR is not 

involved with these suspects unless they have been somehow identified as intelligence 

opportunities. In that case, MI interrogators will interview the suspects at the Gnjilane 

holding facility. 

2. Most serious crime offenders arrested by UNMIK police in the Gnjilane district go 

directly to the Gnjilane holding facility and are processed as in para. 1. Crimes involving 

murder, ethnic-related assaults, Serbians and other Kosovar minorities, and high-profile 

detainees are sent to Bondsteel IDF for processing. (see below for procedures) 

3. All levels of offenders arrested by UNMIK police in the Ferizaj district (Ferizaj, 

Strpce, Kacanik) are brought directly to Bonsteel IDF for processing. (see below for 

procedures) 

4. All offenders detained by KFOR in the MNB-E sector are brought directly to 

Bondsteel IDF for processing. 

300 Appendix IV-13 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

Transition Tasks 

1. Orientation to Bondsteel Installation Detention Facility (IDF) at Camp Bondsteel. 

Tour of detention facility to include the courtroom, military police detention operations 

center, interview/detainee visitation tent, and detainee living area. 

2. Orientation of local courts, including Gnjilane District Court and Ferizaj Municipal 

Court. Tour of courts and introduction to key court personnel, including: presidents of 

court, prosecutors, judges, linguists and court security personnel. 

3. Orientation of UNMIK-P operations in Gnjilane and Ferizaj. Tour of UNMIK police 

stations in Gnjilane and Ferizaj; introduction to regional commanders, regional 

investigators and court liaisons. 

4. Brief on detention operations. Review MNB-E SJA TACSOP, and pertinent 

CONPLANS, OPLANS, and OPORDS. Review the detention process SOP. Provide 

overview of the complete criminal justice process from apprehension to trial. Discussion 

of applicable procedural law and KFOR’s role in the process. 

5. Introductions of key personnel to include the interpreters assigned to TFF Legal. 

Personnel Requirements 

1. One Judge Advocate (JA) to 1) perform duties as the Military Magistrate when 

reviewing case files; 2) act as legal advisor to the Installation Detention Facility; 3) 

perform duties as the legal liaison for all the courts and court personnel in the MNB-E 

sector; and 4) oversee court hearings held at the IDF. 

2. One enlisted soldier (MOS 71D) to provide administrative and logistical support. The 

legal specialists helps the attorney to maintain administrative accountability of all 

detainees processed through the IDF, maintain case files, and provide 

escort/transportation to court. 

3. Two KFOR interpreters, one of whom must speak and read both Serbian and 

Albanian. Because of the sensitive nature of the proceedings, both interpreters should 

be Category II (US citizen-secret clearance) interpreters. 

Required Equipment 

1. Computer with printer to maintain current and released detainees matrixes. Office 

supplies for creation and maintenance of individual detainee files. Filing cabinet to hold 

detainee case files. 

Appendix IV-13 301 
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2. The courtroom at the IDF requires seating for 16 individuals and desk/table top space 

for 12 individuals. Presently, four fest benches, four folding chairs, two fest tables, two 

field desks, and two folding tables occupy the courtroom. This represents the minimum 

acceptable amount of furniture. Class I support is necessary for the judicial team. 

Class I support includes bottled water and MREs supplied by the IDF. 

3. One HMMWV for escort of court personnel to the IDF, as well as transportation of 

legal personnel to off-basecamp courts. 

Battle Rhythm 

The battle rhythm varies given the weekly trial schedule and the flow of detainees in and 

out of the detention facility. Trials are not set on certain days of the week. Below is a 

typical example of a given week: 

1. Sunday: Prepare new cases of detainees for initial investigation by Investigating 

Magistrate; update current detainee matrix – synchronize with on-hand report. 

2. Monday: Travel to Gnjilane District court to provide new cases (KFOR detentions) to 

prosecutor, review weekly trial schedule, receive court documents for current detainees, 

and coordinate witnesses. 

3. Tuesday: Administrative day. Review case files, ensure that UNMIK-P has provided 

Ferizaj municipal court with new cases. Travel to Ferizaj (if necessary) to coordinate 

Thursday court hearings. 

4. Wednesday: Travel to Gnjilane District court for trial. Escort detainee to trial, 

observe trial, receive court documents, coordinate with court. 

5. Thursday: Detention hearings at the Camp Bondsteel Detention Facility for Ferizaj 

municipal court. Deliver court documents from Ferizaj to detainees. 

6. Friday: Travel to Gnjilane District for trial. Escort detainee to trial, observe trial, 

receive court documents, coordinate with court. 

7. Saturday: File court documents, deliver all court documents to detainees, answer 

detainee questions. 

DETENTION PROCESS 

The processing procedures for all detainees sent to the Bondsteel IDF is as follows: 

Pre-Hearing Procedure 

302 Appendix IV-13 
 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

1. Individual suspected of criminal conduct is detained (Arrest + 0 hour). IAW TFF 

Policy Letter #4 and Annex Z of OPLAN 60507, evidence is collected and presented to 

the Deputy Provost Marshal (PM) NLT A+24. (PM has delegated authority to the DPM) 

The DPM, after counsel from the legal advisor, may elect to release individuals detained 

for Category III or IV crimes. The DPM does not have the authority to release Category 

I and II offenders. For definition of criminal “categories,” see Task Force Falcon Policy 

Letter #4 included in this SOP at Enclosure A. If the DPM orders detention, MPs deliver 

case file to the TFF Military Magistrate NLT A+48. UNMIK police will deliver their case 

files to the IDF IAW their procedures in compliance with the above time limits. 

2. In cases where the DPM has ordered immediate release, the Bondsteel IDF will 

ensure that the detainee is entered into the IDF database (with detainee #), maintain a 

case file of the detainee, and file the detainee’s case file by detainee number. 

3. In all other cases, the military magistrate prepares case file for court. The legal 

specialist creates an individual case file for military magistrate files and copy for court. 

The military magistrate reviews case and prepares a memorandum that 1) details the 

essential facts surrounding detention, 2) lists what crimes have been substantiated by 

the evidence, 3) recommends continued detention for action by the appropriate court. 

(see example at ENCLOSURE ) If necessary, the military magistrate tasks 

interpreters to translate substantive documents. The original file is returned to the 

Bondsteel IDF with a copy of the military magistrate’s memorandum. The legal 

specialist creates a detainee file with chronology sheet, copy of the case, and 

magistrate’s memorandum. In addition, a copy of the case and the magistrate 

memorandum is made for the court. (see below) 

a. Case files where detainee is held for court: 

i) File with original case file and magistrate memorandum – to IDF 

ii File with chronology sheet, case file, and magistrate memorandum – for 

magistrate’s records 

iii) Copy of case and magistrate memorandum – for court 

4. The military magistrate adds the detainee to the current detainees matrix under “new 

cases” and delivers case to court at the soonest opportunity. Note: in cases where 

arrest was made by UNMIK police in the opstina of Ferizaj, the UNMIK-P court liaison 

should deliver a copy of the case to the Ferizaj prosecutor immediately following deliver 

of detainee to Bondsteel IDF. The military magistrate should doublecheck with the 

UNMIK-P court liaison to ensure compliance. 

Detention Hearing: Kosovar Prosecutor’s Role 

Appendix IV-13 303 
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1. The TFF JA (or UNMIK-P court liaison) will present the complete case file, to include 

the Military Magistrate’s review, to the appropriate prosecutor. The Military Magistrate’s 

review and any other pertinent statements shall be translated for the prosecutor unless 

the court is staffed with adequate linguists, e.g. Gnjilane. 

2. The prosecutor will review the packet and decide whether or not to prosecute the 

detainee. The TFF JA must play an active role in this decision, ensuring the prosecutor 

considers all the evidence before rendering a decision. This is especially important 

when cases involve detainees in which TFF has a significant interest. 

3. If the prosecutor elects to prosecute, he will type a charge sheet and present the 

charge sheet and case file to the Kosovar Investigating Magistrate who is also a judge

of the court. The IM is then responsible for conducting an investigation into the case. 

This process is roughly equivalent to the grand jury process in the US. 

4. Significantly, a case that has been presented to the IM by the prosecutor is required 

to be investigated whether or not the individual charged for the crime remains in 

detention. Only the prosecutor has the power to drop the charges. 

5. If the prosecutor elects not to prosecute, he will prepare two documents for the JA. 

One will be a statement describing his legal opinion of the case; one will be an order for 

release (see example and form document at ENCLOSURE ). It is important to have 

an interpreter provide a summary of the case in English on these documents to ease 

any future reference. These documents should be retained for TFF records in the 

detainee’s case file. In addition, the military magistrate should log entry into the case 

chronology. 

Detention Hearing: Investigating Magistrate’s Role 

1. Upon receipt of the case from the prosecutor, the IM will begin his investigation by 

reviewing the case file and then interviewing the detainee. This interview is conducted 

in “open court,” in the presence of the prosecutor and defense counsel. In cases of 

significant TFF interest, a KFOR interpreter should monitor the testimony of the 

detainee to keep the JA apprised of the case. After completing the interview, the IM will 

provide the TFF JA with a description of the case and a notice whether to release or 

continue the detention. 

2. The IM has the authority to order a detainee to be held for 1 month. This is the 

statutory maximum granted to the IM. During this period, the IM must conduct his 

investigation of the alleged crime. If he should be unable to complete the investigation 

during this period, the IM must petition the three-judge panel in Pristina for an extended 

detention. The three-judge panel will conduct an ex-parte review of the case (a “paper 

review,” no appearances are made) and may order up to two months of additional 

detention. In special circumstances, the IM may petition the Kosovar Supreme Court for 

304 Appendix IV-13 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

an additional three months of detention. However, six months of detention is the 

maximum permitted under the applicable procedural law. After six months, the IM must 

turn his findings over to the prosecutor who must then indict the individual and go to trial 

or drop the charges and release the individual. UNMIK has implemented UNMIK 

regulation 1999/26 which allows an appeal to the Supreme court to extend pre-trial 

detention without an indictment beyond 6 months (rarely used). 

3. It is the responsibility of the IM to ensure that the present term of detention does not 

expire. Under FRY law, the detaining authority is required to release any detainee 

should the court ordered term of detention expire. Any detention beyond that which has 

been ordered by the court is unlawful. However, MNB-E has taken the position that 

those individuals who represent a threat to KFOR shall remain in detention despite lack 

of “local legal authority.” They will remain in detention pending the outcome of a “1244” 

appeal discussed below. 

Detention Hearing: KFOR Interpreters Role 

1. The KFOR interpreters are required to provide translation/interpretation services for 

the JA. Translation of documents from English to Albanian or Serbian for the 

prosecutor and magistrate is required. Translation of documents from Albanian or 

Serbian into English for the JA is also required. 

2. The KFOR interpreters are also required to provide interpretation support whenever 

the JA needs to address any of the court officers. They also are required to assist 

KFOR witnesses when KFOR witnesses appear to testify. 

3. Finally, the KFOR interpreters are often tasked to “eavesdrop” on the testimony of 

both detainees and witnesses for the JA. This critical function permits the JA to stay 

informed about cases of special interest to KFOR. This information can often be used 

to appeal a release order from the IM. 

Witnesses 

1. The IM will require the testimony of witnesses to aid in his investigation. UNMIK 

police has assumed police primacy within MNB-E, therefore, they also assume full 

responsibility for delivering witnesses. TFF is only responsible for producing KFOR 

witnesses and individuals who require substantial security, e.g. serbs. 

2. During the course of the detention hearings, the IM will often deliver a witness 

subpoena to the JA. This subpoena will list the name of the desired witness, the 

address where he/she can be located, and the case name and file number. The 

subpoena is written in Albanian and will require translation to be understood. 

3. Using this subpoena, the JA will produce the witness portion of the FRAGO. This 

FRAGO will task the unit, to deliver the witness to the IDF or court to allow the IM to 

Appendix IV-13 305 
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conduct his interview. Once the witness portion of the FRAGO is drafted, it must be 

delivered to the G-3 to be incorporated in the TFF FRAGO and disseminated to the 

units. A copy of a TFF FRAGO is included at Enclosure E. 

4. The unit tasked to deliver the witness(es) will be required to provide a statement to 

the JA if they are unable to produce the witness(es). A sample of this statement, along 

with other coordinating instructions for the maneuver units, is outlined in CONPLAN 7, 

included at Enclosure F. One copy of this statement will be provided to the IM for his 

records. The TFF JA will retain one copy in the “Witnesses Not Found” file. 

5. Depending on the reason for the failure to secure the witness, it may be worthwhile 

to attempt to retrieve the witness at a later date (fled to Serbia vs. temporarily out of 

town). This determination should be made on a case by case basis in consultation with 

the IM. 

6. Be prepared to brief KFOR witnesses on the facts of the case about which they are 

summoned to appear. KFOR soldiers have often been involved in numerous arrests 

and will not necessarily know which case is at issue. 

Detention Hearing: Defense Counsel’s Role 

1. FRY law requires that all “accused” have the opportunity to be represented by 

counsel. UNMIK has further stipulated that any “accused” unable to afford counsel will 

have counsel appointed and paid for by UNMIK. 

2. Although the “accused” is entitled to access to an attorney, under FRY law this 

access is controlled by the IM. Consequently, the defense attorneys routinely ask the 

IM for permission to visit with their client. Permission is normally granted. When 

granted, the court reporter will give the detaining authority a note signed by the judge 

permitting an attorney to visit a client(s). An example of this “permission slip” is 

included at Enclosure G. An attorney should not be allowed access to a detainee 

unless the attorney has written permission from an IM. 

Release Procedures 

1. Category III and Category IV: As stated above, IAW TFF Policy Letter # 4, the 

Provost Marshal is the release authority for Cat III and Cat IV detainees. The 1B 

Provost Marshall has delegated all release authority to the Deputy Provost Marshall 

(DPM). Therefore, if a court orders the release of a Cat III or Cat IV detainee, the 

process is as follows: 

a. The military magistrate provides the DPM with a copy of the signed release 

order form. 

306 Appendix IV-13 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

b. The DPM makes a decision to release or appeal (see release order appeals 

below). 

c. If the DPM orders release, he/she will clear the detainee through the Military 

Intelligence team attached to the IDF to ensure that the detainee has been 

questioned. 

d. Once cleared through MI, the DPM sends out an e-mail to various 

commanders and staff announcing the anticipated release date (usually the next 

day). 

e. At the next morning’s ACE, the intelligence officer for the MP battalion briefs 

the day’s releases. 

f. If no reasonable objections to release are made, the DPM orders the IDF to 

execute release (usually at 1300 of that day). 

2. Category II: IAW TFF Policy Letter #4, the Chief of Staff is the release authority for 

Cat II detainees. If a court orders the release of a Cat II detainee, the process is as 

follows: 

a. The military magistrate creates a release file in the proper file configuration: 

i) Case evidence with magistrate memorandum on top on the right side of 

file. 

ii) Translated court documents organized chronologically and chronology 

sheet on left side. 

iii) Detainee’s info sheet/picture and copy of signed release order form 

attached to the front of file. 

b. The military magistrate or TFF legal advisor briefs the case to the Chief of 

Staff with recommendations regarding release. 

c. The Chief of Staff makes a decision to release or appeal (see release order 

appeals below). 

d. If the Chief of Staff orders release, the military magistrate notifies the DPM of 

the decision and the release procedures for Cat III and Cat IV detainees are 

followed. 

3. Category I: IAW TFF Policy Letter #4, the Commanding General of TFF is the 

release authority for Cat I detainees. If a court orders the release of a Cat I detainee, 

Appendix IV-13 307 
 

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the process is the same as the release procedures for Cat II detainees, except the 

decision authority is the CG. 

Release Order Appeals 

1. On occasion, the IM will order the release of individuals who, in the judgment of the 

TFF JA, should remain in detention. These cases involve individuals who represent a 

threat to KFOR or satisfy one of the criteria in Article 191 of the FRY Code of 

Procedure. Namely, that they (1) are a threat to commit future crimes, (2) may 

intimidate or kill witnesses, (3) may destroy physical evidence, or (4) represent a flight 

risk. See Enclosure I. In such cases, the TFF JA should appeal the release order. 

2. The first level of “appeal” is to the IM who ordered the release. The TFF JA should 

not hesitate to ask “Why?” whenever an objectionable release is ordered. The JA 

should discuss the evidence in the case file, the existence of prior offenses, and which 

prong(s) of Article 191 apply. Occasionally, the IM has neglected to consider a key 

statement from an eyewitness, evidence of prior misconduct, evidence from a related 

case, or other relevant evidence. These release orders can sometimes be rescinded 

after a frank discussion with the IM. 

3. If unsuccessful with the IM, the release order should be appealed to the Kosovar 

prosecutor. By law, any release order must be “blessed” by the prosecutor. However, 

neither the IM’s decision to release nor the prosecutor’s desire to detain is superior. 

Consequently, if the JA can convince the prosecutor to “non-concur” with the release, 

the detainee must remain in custody pending a review by the three-judge panel. This 

appeal is presented to the three-judge panel who reviews the case and renders a 

decision in a matter of days. The JA has no official role in this appeal. 

4. There is no mechanism under applicable FRY law for appealing the decision of the 

three-judge panel to release a detainee. Should the three-judge panel order the release 

of a detainee, all “local” means of appeal will have been exhausted. However, in certain 

cases, it is possible to seek redress from Commander, KFOR (COMKFOR). This form 

of redress should be sought sparingly, in only the most egregious of cases. It is 

KFOR’s position that UNSCR 1244 grants COMKFOR the authority to detain 

individuals, even contrary to a judge’s order, in order to preserve the “peace and 

security” of Kosovo and to ensure the protection of the force. 

5. Because UNSCR 1244 vests this power in COMKFOR, these appeals must be made 

to COMKFOR. MNB-E legal will brief Commander, TFF, to obtain his approval to 

appeal. When approval is granted, MNB-E Legal will call KFOR Legal and inform them 

that MNB-E is holding a detainee contrary to a court’s order for release. MNB-E legal 

should prepare a brief to COMKFOR stating the objections to the release and providing 

all necessary documentation to support continued detention. This brief should be 

written through Commander, Task Force Falcon for COMKFOR. The brief should be 

delivered to KFOR Legal in Pristina who will present the case to COMKFOR. A copy of 

308 Appendix IV-13 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

one such appeal is included at Enclosure J. During this process, the detainee will 

remain in the custody of KFOR. 

Post Hearing Tasks 

1. The JA notifies the DPM of any releases that were ordered by the Prosecutor, 

Investigating Magistrate, or the three-judge panel. 

2. Additionally, the JA must update the “Detention Hearing Matrix.” This Excel 

document tracks the cases delivered to the Kosovar Prosecutor and disposition of the 

case. Relevant information includes the name of the detainee, type of offense, date of 

detention, date of first hearing, whether the case will be prosecuted, whether the 

individual was ordered to remain detained, and when the next detention hearing will be. 

A copy of the Detention Hearing Matrix is at Enclosure M. 

3. Finally, the JA must deliver to the detainees the documents that arise out of the 

judicial proceedings. These documents can be (1) detention extensions, (2) procedural 

notices, or (3) release notices. The detention extensions and other procedural notices 

will be delivered to the detainees. The detainee will sign for the document(s) on a 

receipt furnished by the court. This receipt will be returned to the IM at the next 

available opportunity. Significantly, release notices should not be given to any detainee 

until the detainee is outprocessing the IDF. Instead, these notices should be given to 

the MP’s who will place the paperwork in the detainee’s property box. The detainee will 

then receive notice of his release at that time. 

Pending Changes in the Applicable Law 

1. Presently, the UN/international community is drafting a new criminal code and 

procedural code for Kosovo province. Until this is approved; however, the pertinent 

legal authority remains the applicable law prior to 22 March 1989: reference the OSCE 

Compilation of Applicable Law in Kosovo. 

Appendix IV-13 309 
 

	 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

POINTS OF CONTACT 

KFOR Personnel 

1. The Deputy Provost Marshal: DSN 781-6334 

2. IDF: DSN 781-3137. 

3. OIC of IDF: DSN 781-3137. 

4. Senior KFOR Legal Advisor. LTC Tresguerres, (from DSN) 9-606-681-2085 or KPN 

5507. Chief legal advisor for Commander, KFOR. 

5. KFOR Deputy Legal Advisor. LTC Buellesbach, same as above. 

International Organizations 

1. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). UNMIK agency 

chiefly responsible for standing up and monitoring the Kosovar judicial process. The 

chief legal advisor for OSCE is David Marshall (American). Judicial monitors include 

Michael Lackner (Austrian) and other interpreters. 

a. David Marshall’s e-mail: dmarshall@mindspring.com 

b. Michael Lackner’s e-mail: mlackner@hotmail.com

 Satellite phone: +871-762-138-685 

2. United Nations High Commission for Human Rights. The UNMIK agency chiefly 

responsible for safeguarding human rights in Kosovo. As such, their representatives 

find it necessary to monitor the Kosovar judicial process. 

3. OSCE and the various other international groups (ECMM-European Committee 

Monitoring Mission, ICRC-International Confederation of the Red Cross/Crescent, 

UNICEF, Amnesty International) often desire to monitor the court proceedings and 

sometimes visit the detainees. The position of MNB-E has been to permit open access 

to the court and to the detainees except as limited by the Kosovar court. Of course, the 

detainees may always refuse visitors themselves. 

a. Shelly Inglis, Esq., UNICEF: singlis@amnesty.org 

4. The UNMIK regional district of Gnjilane is serviced by a legal advisor, Oriano 

Miccaletti (Italian). His office is in the UNMIK building across the street from the courthouse. 

310 Appendix IV-13 
 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

a. Oriano Miccaletti’s e-mail: mcintalan@hotmail.com 

Kosovar Judicial Officials 

The phone system in Kosovo is still a work in progress. The judges do not have e-mail 

access. The only way to contact them is through go-betweens who can give messages 

in person. Below are the names of the important court personnel that the military 

magistrate deals with on a consistent basis. 

1. Gnjilane District Court 

a. Ymer Huruglica, President of the Gnjilane District Court 

b. Mustafe Musa, Vice President of the Gnjilane District Court 

c. Sabit Avdulla, Prosecutor 

d. Refik Alili, Judge 

e. Hasan Sadiki, Judge 

2. Ferizaj Municipal Court 

a. Rifat Abdullahu, President of the Ferizaj Municipal Court 

b. Ekrem Shabani, Prosecutor 

c. Vesel Jashari, Judge 

d. Zenullahu Heta, Judge 

e. Isak Neziri, Judge 

f. Muhamed Beqiri, Judge 

g. Nasmir Ibrahimi (f), Judge 

3. Pristina District Court 

a. Ramadan Berisha, President of the Pristina District Court 

b. Pjeter Rrapi, Prosecutor 

Appendix IV-13 311 
 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

c. Osman Kryeziu, Prosecutor 

d. Selman Bogiqi, Judge assigned to Ferizaj, Strpce, Kacanik opstina 

4. Three-judge panel. Members include Ramadan Berisha (president of the Pristina 

Judiciary). Role in the detention process includes extending detention beyond one 

month and up to three months. Possesses the authority to resolve disputes between 

the IM and the prosecutor. 

5. Supreme Court. Seven members. Role in the detention process includes extending 

detention beyond three months. 

312 Appendix IV-13 
 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

APPENDIX IV-14: MAGISTRATE REVIEW MEMO 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

HEADQUARTERS, TASK FORCE FALCON 

OFFICE OF THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE 

APO AE 09340 

AETV-BGJA 23 June 1999 

MEMORANDUM OF MILITARY MAGISTRATE’S FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

SUBJECT: Detention Hearing, Blagoje Petkovic 

1. A Detention Hearing was held on 22 June 1999, at the 793d MP Battalion Detention Center, 

US Area, Kosovo, to determine if the actions of Blagoje Petkovic warrant continued detention. 

2. The following individuals were present: 

a. Blagoje Petkovic, Detainee; 

b. CPT Alex Bustamante, Command Representative for the Detaineec; 

c. A Serbian language interpreter; 

d. An MP guard for the detainee; 

e. CW2 Robert Sirmons, SAC, attached to 793d MP Battalion; 

f. CPT Christopher Jacobs, Military Magistrate. 

3. Prior to the detention hearing, CPT Bustamante, the Command Representative for Detainees, 

and Mr. Petkovic had a thirty (30) minute discussion. With the aid of an interpreter, CPT 

Bustamante informed Mr. Petkovic that he had the right to remain silent. He was also informed 

that anything he said could be used against him in a later trial. CPT Bustamante also discussed 

the procedural and substantive aspects of a detention hearing. Mr. Petkovic agreed to talk with 

CPT Bustamante. They discussed the circumstances for detainment. Mr. Petkovic also indicated 

that he wanted CPT Bustamante to speak on his behalf. CPT Bustamante presented a detailed 

argument on behalf of Mr. Petkovic during the hearing. He pointed to the lack of forensic 

evidence (i.e., matching bullets of the victims to the weapon) and to the lack of witness 

statements by victims involved. Mr. Petkovic also made several statements during the hearing. 

4. CW2 Sirmons presented the following documents for my review: 1) 8 sworn statements by 

US Marines assigned to the 26th MEU; 2) two diagrams, one of Mr. Petkovic’s apartment and 

one of the area surrounding Mr. Petkovic’s apartment building; 3) a medical statement by MAJ 

Appendix IV-14 313 
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Kungys, Forward Surgical Team Orthopedic Surgeon; 4) six digital pictures of areas relevant to 

the criminal investigation; 5) a portion of a map of Gnjilane showing the area at issue; 6) a DA 

Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document; and 7) a digital photograph of Mr. Petkovic 

with biographical information. These documents are attached to this memorandum as an 

enclosure. 

5. CW2 Sirmons stated that on or about 191100Jun99, US Marines patrolling in Gnjilane 

heard gunfire. At the intersection adjacent to Mr. Petkovic’s apartment building, the driver of a 

white Mercedes was shot and killed. The driver wore a black, UCK uniform. A passenger in the 

white Mercedes was wounded by a gunshot to his arm. A white van was abandoned in an alley 

along the side of Mr. Petkovic’s apartment building. The van had several bullet holes through 

the roof, and blood on the driver’s seat. The driver of the van could not be located. 

6. As the Marines closed on the location of the shots, civilians in the area pointed to a 

window at the end of the second floor of an apartment building. An elderly man with gray hair 

stuck his head out of the window. The marines told him to raise his hands and hold them out of 

the window. The man complied. Another team of marines entered the building and kicked in 

the door to an apartment from where they believed the shots originated. No one was found in the 

apartment. The marines then kicked in the door to Mr. Petkovic's apartment. Inside they found 

Mr. Petkovic, an AK-47 with a hot barrel, 4 AK-47 magazines, fifty-two 7.62 rounds, a 12-guage 

shotgun, a 7mm pistol, an ammunition belt with nineteen 12-guage shotgun shells, a pistol 

magazine with five rounds, and a knife. Next to one of the windows in the apartment they found 

several 7.62 shell casings. Several of the same type shell casings were found on the ground 

outside of the window. According to CW2 Sirmons, both the white Mercedes and the white van 

could be fired upon from the window. 

7. During the hearing, Mr. Petkovic and CPT Bustamante related the following series of 

events: The day before the shooting incident, Mr. Petkovic’s son was told by a person who 

identified himself as a member of the UCK that Mr. Petkovic and his family must leave in a 

couple of days. The next morning, 19 June 1999, Mr. Petkovic received a phone call from a 

person who identified himself as a member of the UCK. Mr. Petkovic was told to leave. At 

approximately 1030 that same morning, he heard a knock on his door. Mr. Petkovic grabbed his 

AK-47. As he approached the door, the door was forced open. Mr. Petkovic stated that he saw a 

man in a black uniform holding an automatic weapon standing in his doorway. Mr. Petkovic 

shot at the door several times. He then used a wooden chair leg to jam his front door closed to 

prevent the man from entering his apartment. He stated that he tried calling NATO for help. Mr. 

Petkovic stated that he does not think that he hit the man in the black uniform when he fired. 

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Petkovic said that he heard people talking outside of his door about 

throwing a bomb into his apartment. He stated that he was terrified. He backed up to his 

window to defend himself. He looked out of his window and saw a car containing people in 

black uniforms. He stated that he shot into the ground in self defense. He does not think that he 

shot anyone. Mr. Petkovic stated that he “lives good” with his Albanian neighbors. He said that 

he is not going to kill anyone. He also said that if he killed any man it was not because he 

wanted to, but out of self-defense. 

314 Appendix IV-14 
 

 

 

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8. Based on my review of the documents presented by CW2 Sirmons, by the comments of 

CW2 Sirmons and by the statements of Mr. Petkovic and CPT Bustamante, I have determined by 

a preponderance of the evidence that there is probable cause to believe: 

a. That Blagoje Petkovic has committed a serious criminal act (serious criminal act 

defined as: homicide, aggravated assault, rape, arson, robbery, burglary, or larceny); and 

b. Continued detention is warranted based on the seriousness of the crimes at issue and 

the necessity to secure Mr. Petkovic's presence for trial. Because of the threats he has received 

from the UCK, it is foreseeable that Mr. Petkovic and his family will flee Kosovo. 

9. Recommendation and the factual findings on which it is based: 

a. Recommendation. Blagoje Petkovic remain in detention. 

b. Findings. US Marines heard gunshots. As they responded to the location of the 

shots, local civilians pointed to a second-story apartment window. A gray-haired man stuck his 

head out of the window and was directed by the marines to hold his hands above his head and 

out of the window. He complied. A team of marines entered the apartment building and 

eventually located the apartment from which the witnesses indicated the shots were fired. When 

they entered the apartment, they found Mr. Blagoje Petrovic and took him into their custody. 

Mr. Petrovic is an elderly man with brownish-gray hair. From the apartment the marines also 

siezed an AK-47 with a hot barrel, 4 AK-47 magazines, fifty-two 7.62 rounds, a 12-guage 

shotgun, a 7mm pistol, an ammunition belt with nineteen 12-guage shotgun shells, a pistol 

magazine with five rounds, and a knife. The marines also found 7.62 shell casings near one of 

the apartment’s windows and on the ground outside of the window. 

Outside of the apartment building, a man in a black uniform was shot and killed while sitting in 

the driver’s seat of a white Mercedes. The passenger in the white Mercedes was wounded by a 

gunshot. An abandoned white van in an alley next to Mr. Petrovic’s apartment building had 

bullet holes in the roof and a pool of blood in the driver’s seat. It is possible to fire at both the 

white Mercedes and the white van from the window of Mr. Petrovic’s apartment at which the 

shell casings were found. In addition, Mr. Petkovic stated that he fired the AK-47 out of his 

window in self-defense. These facts, taken together, indicate that it is more likely than not that 

Mr. Petkovic fired an AK-47 out of his apartment window, killing one man and injuring at least 

one other. 

10. Blagoje Petrovic and CPT Bustamante were notified of my recommendation on 222230 

June 1999. 

Appendix IV-14 315 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 
 

Encl (as) CHRISTOPHER W. JACOBS 

 CPT, JA 

 Military Magistrate 

Coordination: 

TF Falcon Legal Advisor Concur_________Nonconcur__________ 

Task Force Falcon Commander Action; Approved__________Disapproved__________ 

316 Appendix IV-14 
 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

APPENDIX IV-15: MAGISTRATE REVIEW MEMO, DOCUMENTS ONLY 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

HEADQUARTERS, TASK FORCE FALCON 

OFFICE OF THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE 

APO AE 09340 

AETV-BGJA 9 October 1999 

MEMORANDUM OF MILITARY MAGISTRATE’S FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

SUBJECT: Detention Hearing; Bashkim Gagica (843) 

1. A detention hearing was held on 9 October 1999, at the Task Force Falcon Staff Judge 

Advocate Cell, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, to determine if the actions of Bashkim Gagica warrant 

continued detention. 

2. The following documents were presented for my review: 1) a memorandum signed by the 

Provost Marshal regarding the results of the preliminary investigation; 2) a detainee information 

sheet; 3) a military police report (DA From 3975); 4) two information worksheets; and 5) two 

statements. These documents are attached as an enclosure. 

3. Findings: On 30 September 1999, Bashkim Gagica demanded money from Mr. Sami Hasami 

and Mr. Bajram Hasami in exchange for not burning their house down. Bashkim Gagica 

demanded 10 DM and stated that he would return at 2300 to collect his money. Bashkim Gagica 

was detained by KFOR at 2355 hours in the vicinity of the Hasami’s home. He was detained 

after he was identified by several individuals as the man responsible for burning several homes 

in the area. 

4. Based on my review of the documents and available information, I have determined by a 

preponderance of the evidence that there IS probable cause to believe that: 

a. The individual is currently a member of the UCK, or is armed, and threatens essential 

civic order; 

b. The individual poses a threat to KFOR, other protected persons, key facilities, or 

property designated mission-essential by COMKFOR; 

c. The individual has committed serious criminal acts (defined as: homicide, aggravated 

assault, rape, arson, robbery, burglary, or larceny); OR 

Appendix IV-15 317 
 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 
 

d. The individual has valuable information pertaining to individuals not yet detained to 

whom one or more of grounds a. through c. apply. 

5. Recommend that Bashkim Gagica remain in detention. 

Encls (as) CHRISTOPHER W. JACOBS 

 CPT, JA 

 Military Magistrate 

Coordination: 

Commander, 793d MP Battalion Concur ______ Nonconcur______ 

TF Falcon Legal Advisor Concur ______ Nonconcur______ 

Task Force Falcon Commander Action: Approved______Disapproved_____ 

318 Appendix IV-15 
 

 

 


 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 

APPENDIX IV-16: DETENTION POLICY (KFOR 2A)
 

AETV-TFF-CG 24 July 2000 

COMMANDING GENERAL POLICY LETTER #4 

SUBJECT: Detention Policy 

1. This policy letter outlines Multi-National Brigade-East (MNB-E) procedures for the detention 

and release of civilians in the brigade’s Area of Responsibility (AOR). It applies to all MNB-E

units and personnel operating in the AOR. Supplementation of this policy requires the approval 

of the Commander, MNB-E. 

2. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 gives KFOR the responsibility to ensure 

public safety and order until the international civil presence can take complete responsibility for 

this task. This policy letter provides specific guidance for handling civilians detained by KFOR 

and UNMIK-P to ensure that human rights are observed and properly balanced against KFOR’s 

mandate to provide a safe and secure environment. The failure of any individual to adhere to the 

provisions of this policy letter will not confer any benefit on any person accused of an offense. 

3. Task Force Falcon commanders and soldiers may apprehend individuals for either unlawful or 

unauthorized conduct. 

a. “Unlawful conduct” is criminal behavior defined by the laws of the Federal Republic of 

Yugoslavia, the Republic of Serbia, and the province of Kosovo. It includes common offenses 

such as murder and assault. UNMIK Regulations can also define unlawful conduct (e.g., publicly inciting intolerance). Kosovar courts can prosecute unlawful conduct. 

b. “Unauthorized conduct” is defined by the Military Technical Agreement (threats to a safe 

and secure environment), the Undertaking of Demilitarization (prohibited weapons), and KFOR 

directives (counter barricades). Commanders and soldiers are authorized to enforce these rules 

but Kosovar courts will not prosecute the misconduct unless there is an underlying criminal act. 

4. Detainees will be released upon the order of an international judge or a local magistrate. An 

international judge or local magistrate has unlimited authority to order the release of a detainee. 

5. Military authorities may order the release of a detainee at any point before an international 

judge or local magistrate has taken action. The proper military release authority is determined by 

the type of alleged misconduct. The commander, MNB-E, may withhold military release author- ity on a case-by-case basis. Delegation of military release authority is not permitted without the 

prior approval of the Commander, MNB-E. There are three categories of crimes and unauthorized conduct. 

a. Category I - The MNB-E Commander is the military release authority for Category I 

crimes. The proposed release of an individual detained for a Category I crimes will be reviewed 

in accordance with paragraph X, below. Category I crimes include: 

(1) War crimes 

(2) Any ethnically motivated crime 

(3) Hostile acts or threats toward KFOR 

Appendix IV-16 319 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

(4) Murder and attempted murder 

(5) Kidnapping

(6) Aggravated Assault with a Dangerous Weapon 

(7) Armed Robbery 

b. Category II - The MNB-E Deputy Provost-Marshal is the military release authority for 

Category II crimes. The proposed release of an individual detained for a Category II crime will 

be reviewed in accordance with paragraph X, below. Category II crimes include: 

(1) Rape

(2) Arson 

(3) Larceny or looting equal to or greater than DM 1000.00 

(4) Burglary and housebreaking

(5) Possession of illegal drugs in a quantity that implies an intent to sell or distribute 

(6) Any crime committed by a suspect previously detained by KFOR (repeat offenders) 

(7) Any crime, other than a Category I crime, in which a weapon was used in the commission of the crime 

(8) Weapons violations 

(9) UCK uniform violations 

(10) Establishing an unauthorized checkpoint

(11) Intimidation, harassment, communicating a threat, and provoking speech 

c. Category III - The company commander is the military release authority for Category III 

crimes. The Deputy Provost-Marshal may order the release of individuals detained for Category 

III crimes at any time after they have been transported to the Camp Bondsteel IDF. Category III

crimes include: 

(1) Larceny or looting less than DM 1000.00

(2) Curfew violations 

(3) Simple assault (no weapons involved) 

(4) Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs 

(5) Possession of illegal drugs in a quantity that implies personal use, rather than intent to 

sell or distribute 

(6) Possession of stolen property

(7) Black marketing 

(8) Auto theft 

(9) Drunk and disorderly

(10) Traffic violations 

(11) Unlawful destruction of property 

6. Units will deliver detainees to the supporting MP sub-station, Gnjilane Information Center, or 

the Camp Bondsteel Installation Detention Facility (IDF). All individuals are detained in Gnjilane except: 

a. Individuals detained as a threat to KFOR are detained at the Camp Bondsteel IDF. 

b. Serbian detainees are detained at the Camp Bondsteel IDF. 

c. Individuals apprehended in the Urosovec, Kacanik, and Strpce opstinas are detained at the 

Camp Bondsteel IDF. 

7. In order to comply with local law and international standards of due process and human 

rights, units will comply with the following. 

320 Appendix IV-16 
 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

a. Detainees may not be used to perform any type of labor outside of the detention/holding 

facility itself. Any work details must directly support the maintenance of cleanliness, security, 

and or safety of the detention/holding facility where they held. 

b. Detaining units will complete all required paperwork (to include witness statements, evi- dence vouchers, crime scene sketches, or other required documentation, as determined by the 

supporting MP or UNMIK-P office) before departing the the supporting MP sub-station or deten- tion facility. The Camp Bondsteel IDF will provide a copy of this file for each new detainee at 

the IDF to the IDF Judge Advocate. 

8. The Deputy Provost-Marshal will release a detainee upon the order of an international judge, 

local magistrate, or the appropriate Military Release Authority. 

a. International judges and local magistrates have the primary responsibility for reviewing an 

individual’s detention. This review must occur within 72 hours of initial detention. The Camp

Bondsteel IDF may hold detainees for a reasonable period beyond 72 hours if an international 

judge or local magistrate has scheduled an initial detention review. MNB-E is not required to 

conduct initial detention reviews in the absence of an international judge or local magistrate. 

b. The IDF Judge Advocate will review each detainee’s file and determine whether there is 

probable cause to believe that continued detention is warranted. If the IDF Judge Advocate finds

insufficient evidence to warrant continued detention, she will coordinate with UNMIK-P or the 

Deputy Provost-Marshal, as appropriate. If insufficient evidence still exists, the appropriate 

Military Release Authority may release the detainee without waiting for an international judge or

local magistrate to conduct an initial detention review. 

c. Upon receipt of a release order from an appropriate authority, the Deputy Provost-Marshal 

will notify, via e-mail, the TFF G2, G3, Command Judge Advocate, IDF Judge Advocate, 

UNMIK-P, 503rd MP Battalion commander and S-3, and appropriate battalion commander. Ab- sent an objection from one of the above, the Deputy Provost-Marshal will release the detainee 

when transportation assets are available (at the latest, within 48 hours). 

9. COM KFOR may direct that a detainee be held in the interest of maintaining a safe and secure

environment. Such a “COM KFOR hold” is subject to close scrutiny, granted sparingly, and au- thorized only when there is concrete and clear evidence that the detainee is a threat to a safe and 

secure environment. Units that desire a COM KFOR hold must: 

a. Notify the TFF G3, G2, and Command Judge Advocate immediately upon apprehending an 

individual that a COM KFOR hold is appropriate and requested. 

b. Provide a copy of all evidence in their possession that supports a COM KFOR hold di- rectly to either the Command Judge Advocate or the IDF Judge Advocate. 

c. Identify a point of contact that will be available to provide additional information. 

10. The POC for this memorandum is LTC Nelson, Deputy Provost-Marshal, DSN 781-6334. 

RANDAL M. TIESZEN 

Brigadier General, USA 

Commanding 

Appendix IV-16 321 
 

l

ns

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

322 Appendix IV-17

APPENDIX IV-17: DETENTION PROCESSING (KFOR 1B) 

DPMO 

Military

Magistrate

Hearing 

Kosovar 

Prosecutor 

Kosovar 

Magistrate 3-Judge Panel Appeals Court 

72 Hours 

Probable Cause 

Need to Detain 

Recommendation > 1 month > 3 months 

Legal Advisor 

DPMO

N

o Pr

o

b

a

ble Ca

use

> 6 months 

< 1 year 

Cat 1 

Cat 2 

Cat 3 

Task Force 

Commander 

Chief of Staff 

DPMO 

Ad Hoc Court 

of 

Final Appeal 

CBS Detention 

Facility 

Military 

Magistrate 

No Need to Detain 

Cat 4 

Sub Station 

R E L E A S E 

No Need to Detain 

COMKFOR 

Recommendation 

RELEASE 

DETAIN Recommendation 

Hold Request 

Police Patro 

or 

Unit Detai 
 

UCPMB with

Criminal

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

APPENDIX IV–18: DETENTION PROCESSING WITH OPERATIONAL 

DETENTION 

1 10/11/2001 

G 3 Men of Plans - Good Like Chicken! G 3 Men of Plans - Goo d Li ke Chicken! 

Operation Joint Guardian Operation Joint Guardian Operation Joint Guardian

UNCLASSIFIED 

UNCLASSIFIED 

DETENTION Flow Chart DETENTION Flow Chart

Apprehension 

Unit Processing 

Screening Officer 

EAAG Leader EAAG with 

Criminal Act

 UNMIK/CIV POL 

Investigating Judge 

Yes 

Hold 

Suspected EAAG 

No Criminal Act 

Transport to BDF 

BOARD 

EAAG 

No Criminal Act 

MI Interrogation 

Release 

72 hours/COMKFOR Hold 

72 Hours 

COMFALCON 

Hold Release 

COMKFOR or SRSG 

Hold 

Rule 62 

Release 

Court Ordered Detention 

Release 

No 

72 hours/COMKFOR Hold 

No 

72 Hours 

SRSG Hold 

Criminal Act Only 

Appendix IV-18 323 
5 

10 15 20 25 30 

 

# Name Ethnicity Offense Date Detained Jud Hrng Indicted Cont'd Det Next Hrng Comments 

1 Blagoje Petkovic Serbian Murder 18-Jun-99 03-Jul-99 Yes Yes 03-Oct-99 2 Ismail Ramini Albanian Kidnapping 04-Jul-99 10-Jul-99 Yes No N/A 

3 Negjat Sopi Albanian Attempted Murder 01-Jul-99 10-Jul-99 Yes Yes 02-Sep-99 

4 Fadil Beqiri Albanian Attempted Murder 01-Jul-99 10-Jul-99 Yes Yes 02-Sep-99 

Abdylkadir Rexhepi Albanian Aggravated Assault 05-Jul-99 13-Jul-99 Yes No N/A 

6 Hajdar Kllokoqi Albanian Aggravated Assault 05-Jul-99 13-Jul-99 Yes No N/A 

7 Agron Kllokoqi Albanian Aggravated Assault 05-Jul-99 13-Jul-99 Yes No N/A 

8 Sabit Tahiri Albanian Kidnapping 07-Jul-99 13-Jul-99 Yes No N/A 

9 Lulzim Neziri Albanian Kidnapping 07-Jul-99 13-Jul-99 Yes No N/A 

Naser Shaqri Albanian Kidnapping 07-Jul-99 13-Jul-99 Yes No N/A 

11 Srecko Arsich Serbian Communicating Threats 07-Jul-99 13-Jul-99 Yes No N/A 

12 Ivica Gjvrich Serbian Communicating Threats 07-Jul-99 13-Jul-99 Yes No N/A 

13 Zoran Milkich Serbian Communicating Threats 07-Jul-99 13-Jul-99 Yes No N/A 

14 Boban Momcilovic Serbian Murder 11-Jul-99 15-Jul-99 N/A N/A N/A No Decision 

Mirolub Momcilovic Serbian Murder 11-Jul-99 15-Jul-99 N/A N/A N/A No Decision 

16 Jugoslav Momcilovic Serbian Murder 11-Jul-99 15-Jul-99 N/A N/A N/A No Decision 17 Zhivoje Jovanovic Serbian Attempted Murder 12-Jul-99 15-Jul-99 N/A N/A N/A No Decision 

18 Zhivoje Jovanovic Serbian Attempted Murder 12-Jul-99 17-Jul-99 Yes No N/A 19 Raif Kosumi Albanian Attempted Murder 11-Jul-99 17-Jul-99 Yes No N/A 

Bekim Shabani Albanian Attempted Murder 11-Jul-99 17-Jul-99 Yes No N/A 

21 Ismail Jahiu Albanian Kidnapping 13-Jul-99 17-Jul-99 No N/A N/A 

22 Boban Momcilovic Serbian Murder 11-Jul-99 17-Jul-99 Yes* Yes 10-Aug-99 

23 Mirolub Momcilovic Serbian Murder 11-Jul-99 17-Jul-99 Yes* Yes 10-Aug-99 24 Jugoslav Momcilovic Serbian Murder 11-Jul-99 17-Jul-99 Yes* Yes 10-Aug-99 

Selim Bajrami Albanian Aggravated Assault 12-Jul-99 19-Jul-99 Yes Yes 11-Aug-99 

26 Beqe Uka Albanian Aggravated Assault 12-Jul-99 19-Jul-99 Yes Yes 11-Aug-99 27 Mikaiaovic Yugoslave Serbian Attempted Murder 23-Jun-99 19-Jul-99 Yes Yes ? ***, ### 

28 Sasha Stojanovic Serbian Attempted Murder 23-Jun-99 19-Jul-99 Yes Yes ? ***, ### 

29 Alija Emini Albanian Murder 17-Jul-99 22-Jul-99 Yes Yes 16-Aug-99 

Nobosha Zarcovic Serbian Obstructing Justice 15-Jul-99 22-Jul-99 No N/A N/A 

31 Musli Basraliu Albanian Rape 17-Jul-99 22-Jul-99 Yes Yes 16-Aug-99 

32 Ekrem Jakupi Albanian Murder 17-Jul-99 26-Jul-99 Yes Yes 16-Aug-99 02-Aug-99 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

APPENDIX IV-19: MAGISTRATE’S REPORT 

(***) = Threat to KFOR (###) = Release Denied 

Appendix IV-19 32
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 

APPENDIX IV-20: PARAGRAPH 7 REPORT 

USCINCEUR MSG 082155 MAY 99, SUBJ: WAR CRIME REPORTING IN KOSOVO AND THE
 

SURROUNDING REGION (relating to “alleged violations within the jurisdiction of the ICTY committed by the 

VJ/MUP or UCK personnel in or around the territory of the former Yugoslavia” 

Describe the scene or evidence, to include the factors supporting the conclusion that U.S. Forces were not involved: 

House, yard, and livestock building in the village of Vlastica, EM 41779283, Opstina of Gnjilane, Province of 

Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. House and livestock building had been burned and bulldozed. Visible on 

the ground in one of the former rooms of the house was a pair of garments, with bones protruding. Also on the 

ground, on top of a piece of stove wreckage, were several bones. In the neighboring house, was Nehat Shabani (see 

witness information below) a 35-year old man who provided a detailed account of what his 13-year old female 

cousin, Vlora Shabani (see witness information below) told him on and after 4 May 1999 about the events in the 

burned/bulldozed house on the afternoon of 30 April 1999. Evidence thus far collected consists of photographs 

taken by Task Force Falcon team from 1330 to 1430 on Friday, 25 June 1999 along with interview notes of the 

account related by Nehat Shabani during the 1330-1430 Task Force Falcon team visit, and a powerpoint sketch of 

the alleged crime scene. Nehat Shabani related that on and after 4 May, Vlora Shabani told him the following: 

In the afternoon of 30 April 1999, Vlora and her family were in and around the house. Many families in the town of 

Vlastica had already left the town. In fact, Nehat Shabani had taken his family from the house neighboring Vlora’s 

and had moved to Slatina in order to evade Serbs. The family unit living in Vlora’s house consisted of five people: 

Vlora as well as Rifat Shabani (male—Vlora’s Grandfather), Selami Shabani (male—Vlora’s father), Zjavere 

Shabani (female—Vlora’s mother), and Fisnik Shabani (male—Vlora’s 2 year old brother). Vlora’s father was 

giving something to the cow in the livestock building. Two men came to the house (not clear whether on foot or by 

vehicle). Nehat Shabani was unable to describe the men secondhand. He recalls Vlora saying that one man was 

older than the other and that he was in a uniform. The uniform Nehat says Vlora described was a VJ uniform and a 

uniform of the type she had seen in the town earlier. The two men walked passed the buildings and into the 

backyard. They then threatened Selami Shabani, Vlora’s father and told him to go into the house. The two men 

then went up the street to another of the few Vlastica houses in which people continued to live and ordered the 

inhabitants of that house out into the street and then into Vlora’s house. The individuals in the other house consisted 

of fiftteen people: Deli Hyseni (30-year old male survivor), Imer Hyseni (14-year old male survivor), Drita Hyseni 

(female survivor), Leonard Hyseni (female survivor), Blerina Hyseni (female survivor), Hysen Hyseni (male), Ajshe 

Hyseni (female), Fazli Hyseni (male), Hrife Hyseni (female), Driton Hyseni (male), Xxxxxx Hyseni (wife of Deli 

Hyseni), Blerin (male, last name unknown), Xhavit Berisha (male), and Sylejman Ibishi (male). The two men then 

ordered the nineteen people (five from Vlora’s family and five from the Hyseni house) into the main downstairs 

room of Vlora’s house, ordered the men to go to the side of the room near the stove, and the women to the side of 

the room near the window. Then the older man wearing the uniform began shooting the men (mostly firing at their 

heads at close range) with an automatic weapon. After shooting and killing most of the men, he began shooting the 

women. Nehat says that Vlora was familiar enough with weapons to know that it was an automatic weapon. The 

older man wearing the uniform shot and killed the four other individuals in Vlora’s family as well as nine of the 

fourteen that had come from the Hyseni house: Hysen, Ajshe, Fazli, Hrife, Driton, Blerin, Xhavit, Sylejman, and 

the unnamed woman who was Deli’s wife. He injured Deli Hyseni (shot in shoulder), Leonora Hyseni (injury 

unknown), and Vlora (shot in pinky finger of left hand and received a grazing wound to the left cheek). The 

condition of Drita and Blerin was not known by Nehat. Imer was not injured. Vlora had been standing behind her 

mother, who was holding the 2-year old Fisnik, when her mother and Fisnik were shot. She was holding her left 

cheek with her left hand, and both were hit by a bullet, she told Nehat. 

Factors supporting conclusion that U.S. Forces were not involved: alleged murders occurred more than five weeks 

before KFOR entered the country. Witness accuses Serb individuals. No connection to U.S. Forces is supported in 

any way. 

Specific location where found or observed (e.g., street address, grid coordinates, maps, drawing) EM 41779283, 

Opstina of Gnjilane, Province of Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Photos taken from the air and ground. 

Full name, unit addresses, SSN and DOB of U.S. military witnesses: there were no U.S. Military witnesses. 

Appendix IV-20 325 
 

 

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 

 


 


 


 


 


 


 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

Full name, addresses, ssn, and dob and best means of contacting other witnesses:
 

Nehat Shabani, Village of Vlastica, House next door to crime scene, Driver’s Licence Number 0312964970043, 

Issued by SUP Station Gnjilane, Date of Issue 27 June 1995, Date of Birth 12 December 1964--Cousin to Vlora 

Shabani, survivor of alleged murders; knows where Vlora is living in Gnjilane and can get in contact with the 

members of the Hyseni family now staying in Gnjilane.
 

Vlora Shabani, survivor of alleged murders, From Village of Vlastica, Now staying in Gnjilane, 13 years old,
 

reachable through Nehat Shabani. 

Deli Hyseni (30-year old male survivor), Now staying in Gnilane, reachable through Nehat Shabani and Xhevat 

Hyseni, member of family who remains in contact with Vlastica. 

Imer Hyseni (14-year old male survivor), Now staying in Gnilane, reachable through Nehat Shabani and Xhevat
 

Hyseni, member of family who remains in contact with Vlastica. 

Drita Hyseni (female survivor), Now staying in Gnilane, reachable through Nehat Shabani and Xhevat Hyseni, 

member of family who remains in contact with Vlastica. 

Leonard Hyseni (female survivor), Now staying in Gnilane, reachable through Nehat Shabani and Xhevat Hyseni,
 

member of family who remains in contact with Vlastica. 

Blerina Hyseni (female survivor), Now staying in Gnilane, reachable through Nehat Shabani and Xhevat Hyseni, 

member of family who remains in contact with Vlastica. 

Photographs or undeveloped film, if any, of the incident location or evidence (appended to report). Name, address,
 

ssn/identification number, dob and best means of contacting the photographer must be included. 

Seized evidence, if the evidence, in the opinion of the on-scene commander, is susceptible to destruction or loss if 

left unsecured. No physical evidence was seized on 25 June 1999. 

To the extent possible, each piece of evidence seized should be marked with the initials of the seizing individual and 

placed in a sealed container. 

A written chain of custody form (da form 4137—evidence and property custody document) must be affixed to the 

evidence and properly completed until its expeditious turnover to the icty, icty investigators, or to allied 

governments pursuant to para 5. 

Evidence related to para 6 violations that is found at locations in which icty investigators are present, shall be turned 

over directly to the investigators with a copy of the para 7 report. The name and best means of contacting the icty 

investigator should be included in the report. 

326 Appendix IV-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

APPENDIX IV-21: ICTY DATABASE 

LOCATION GRID STATISTIC 

S 

DESCRIPTION DISPOSITION 

Aca Bogocevic EM 130927 1 body bound 

and shot in back 

of hed 

Body of Lukim Murati – found skeleton at grid. 

Remains turned over to Hysni Murati for burial 

Banjica EM13572-

82442 

2 bodies One body was already exhumed by the family 

and re-buried in Brod. The second body was 

identified as Qamil Rexhepi killed on 3 MAR 99 

Danish Team completed 

11OCT99 

Beljan EM216759 4 males/ shot Exhumed from site- identified as locals Danish Team completed 

5OCT99 

Binac EM3006082226 2 bodies Ijuf Hysen and Jakup Hysen found in gravesite at 

local cemetery- No autopsies were performed 

OSCE – Completed by 

villagers on 25SEP99 

Binacka 

Morava (Route 

Chrome) 

EM457977 Several bodies Several bodies- UXO’s and mines present though 

Crnilo EM164005 1 Body of Baki Grajinca was found killed after the 

war in the village- buried in the village. 

Reburied by locals 

Delekare EM342895 Unconfirmed 6 dead (including two children) and 16 wounded 

by MUP 

Reported to ICTY on 20 

JAN 00 

Doganaj 

(Kacanik area) 

1 body Sami Tusha exhumed- Cause of death not 

determined 

Danish Team completed 

6 OCT 99 

Donja Groa EM176814 Multiple 

reported 

Multiple graves reported, also gravesite of small 

child near artillery 

Donja 

Nerodinjce 

EM07959007 1 body Xhemail Nuha shot by Serbs and thrown into 

local well. Team didn’t have necessary 

equipment to recover body- turned over to Civil 

Affairs 

Canadian team recorded 

on 7JUL99 

Donji Zegovac Vrbica area 4 bodies- 2 were 

UCK 

4 local Albanians killed as car approached Serb 

roadblock on 15APR99 

Canadian team recorded 

on 8JUL99 

Driamjak 

(South of) 

EM0470792742 1 Young possibly female 8-12 years old skeletal 

remains. Body is burned and missing head and 

foot. Found in the same area as an Albanian 

camp. 

Dubrava EM16167857 9 bodies- 8m/1f Killed in a Serb offensive 25May99. All local 

Albanians. Eyewitness to 3 of the killings. One 

family refused to have body exhumed. 

Swiss team completed 

23SEP99 

Dubrava (Lama 

Mahala) 

EM1491078613 11 bodies- 1 was 

UCK 

Local Albanians killed during Serb offensive 

13APR99 Eyewitness to some of the killings 

Canadian team 

completed 26JUL99 

Dunav EM460786 2 Bodies of Imer Kadriut & Nebi Zyberi found 

killed close to their house. Killed on 31MAR99. 

Reburied by locals. 

Firaja 

(Kacanik) 

4 bodies Exhumed from remote site. All were identified. Danish team completed 

8OCT99 

Gatnjanska 

Livada 

EM146845 1 Serb Orthodox priest was missing. Found dead 

behind the church. 

Gerlica Eperme EM1786 1 body Body of Skender Gashi found by Ramadush 

Prushi. Gashi was abducted by Serbs during the 

conflict. He is buried in Begrace, Old Kacanik 

Inspected by ICTY 

31AUG99, completed by 

locals 

General 

Jankovic 

EM2273969132 2 bodies- UCK UCK said watched Serbs bury bodies from OP in 

mountains. However, 2 numbered stakes (115 & 

116) similar to those found at Kacanik site were 

observed.. 2 KLA soldiers buried there. The 

UCK moved the bodies to the UCK cemetery. 

Canadian team 

inspected- revisited by 

ICTY 8OCT99 

Completed by UCK 

Appendix IV-21 327 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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20NOV99 

Glavica (East 

of) 

EM17698144 Gravesite found near another gravesite that was 

excavated 

Gnjilane (near 

Montieth) 

EN37879952 1 Human bones lying in a ditch found 03JUL99 Investigated by MP 

Gnjilane 

(behind 

Montieth) 

Site with several bodies CID Inspecteddetermined probably just 

a graveyard. 

Gnjilane EN38200023 40-50 reported Possible mass grave site identified by aerial 

recon. Site is in Muslim cemetery, but no 

evidence to suggest the graves relate to a war 

crime – 6-10 newly buried. 

Site inspected by ICTY 

16AUG99 

Gornje 

Nerodimlje 

EM07059130 Ali Nuhaj reported that the men were separated 

from the women and children. W&C heard 

gunfire and the men were not heard from again. 

Blood was found in the house. 

Gornje Zegovce 

(NE of) 

EN288070 4 bodies 

Grlica EM1381680728 1- shot in chest Ibrahim Voglici exhumed from local cemetery. Danish team completed 

10OCT99 

Izance EM0804581147 3 Reportedly contains bodies of 3 local villagersOsman, Handije and Solman Halili buried at grid 

at 75m N of grid- last seen 23APR99- probably 

same site as below- different info though. 

Izance EM0804581147 3 Bodies of husband/wife and of Ismajil Vladi – 

killed in Izance. H/W reburied in Firaja, Vladi 

reburied in Urosevac. Naser Suroja still missing 

from village. Probably same site as above. 

Reburied by families. 

Kacanik (SW 

right off Route 

Hawk) 

EM211749 1 female Blue dress, shot execution style in head and 

dumped 

MPs removed 

Kacanik EM209750 1 male Partially decayed body of 71 year old male found 

in river buried at grid brought in by 13 UCK. 

Kacanik EM209740 Woman’s body- appeared to have been mugged 

or hit by a car 

Kacanik EM20957552 25 25 bodies recovered from the local cemetery. All 

identified. 

Swiss team completed 

20SEP99 

Kacanik EM20957552 8 Also located in Muslim cemetery (see above) . 

All civilians identified. 

Swiss team completed 

20SEP99 

Kacanik EM2165469333 4- 3m/1f Site discovered 13JUL99- one body identified as 

Bairam Bega. All bodies reburied in Kcanik 

cemetery 

Inspected by ICTY on 

8OCT99. Completed by 

local UCK 22NOV99. 

Kacanik EM20437397 1 male Body badly burnt and decayed 

Kacanik EM20957552 1 Ramadan Elezi exhumed from local cemetery. 

Cause of death not established. 

Danish team completed 

7OCT99 

Kacanik 

Cemetery 

EM20957552 8 unconfirmed Reported to ICTY investigators that 7 

unidentified civilians and 1 unidentified person in 

UCK uniform are still in the local cemetery and 

have not been exhumed yet. 

Kacanik 1 male Found shot to death in the river in the city. 

Buried at night on a hill by locals. 

Swiss completed 

27SEP99 

Kacanik I 

Vjeter 

1 male Victim exhumed has been identified. Danish team completed 

8OCT99 

Kacanik I 

Vjeter 

EM177815 0 3 graves on Ymeri farm-contained canine remains Canadian team 

completed 15JUL99 

328 Appendix IV-21 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

Kacanik I 

Vjeter

 18 bodies16m/2f Number of victims were members of the UCK. 

Women were nurses. Majority of victims were 

identified. Graves were marked with numbered 

stakes (82-97) 

Canadian team 

completed 17JUL99 

Kacanik (West 

of) 

EM20987423 1 One body reported by aviation 

Kamena Glava EM1786 Possible human bones in well. Reported by 

Fatmir Haliti- strip map in file. 

Kamenica EM48721567 1-2 Site exhumed but only remains of burned bones 

recovered. Not possible to identify remains. 

Body of Ramadan Kastrati expected to be found 

here. 

OSCE completed 

19SEP99 

Kmetovc EM4314503569 2 females Killed on 28MAR99 while taking shelter in a 

basemant in Malesevo- Buried in local cemetery. 

Reburied by locals. 

Kodra e Made 

(near) 

EM238751 4 3m/1f In open grave discovered 26JUL99- dead for 

about 4 weeks 

Kodra Mar EN263084 6 bodies 

Kotlina EM192697 22- 10 were 

UCK 

22 villagers were executed by Serb forces 

24MAR99. Bodies dumped in 2 wells on a 

hillside above the village. Wells were then 

collapsed by explosives. 

Locals and NGO began 

to exhume site on 

3SEP99. Austrian SOC 

team completed on 

16SEP99 

Kotlina EM192697 3 Elderly villagers (Idria Kuqi, Zymer Loku and 

Vesel Vlashi) killed by Serb forces on 24 

MAR99- are buried in local Muslim cemetery. 

Austrian SOC team 

completed 16SEP99 

Lagja E Re 1- gunshot 

wound to chest 

Maliq Zharku exhumed from site. Danish team completed 

7OCT99 

Lagja E Re 5 bodies Exhumed from area Completed by Swiss 

team 26SEP99 

Lipovac EM274820 5 (unconfirmed) 5 grave mounds surrounded by a minefield 

Llapushnica 

(near Uglare) 

EM456971 

EM455969 

11 11 bodies in very shallow grave- body parts 

visible- some are Serbs. 6 bodies have been 

identified and returned to families, & other 5 

bodies were buried. 

Austrian/Icelandic team 

completed 11AUG99 

Llapushnica 

(near Uglare) 

N42 25.621 

E21 33.124 

2 2 unidentified corpses reported floating 

downstram. Looked comparatively fresh- ICTY 

felt case was in KFOR/CIVPOL jurisdiction. 

Icelandic team inspected 

6AUG99 

Llapushnica 

(near Uglare) 

EM453976 1-Contact injury 

to skull 

Partial skeleton remains found 24JUL99. 

Recovered by US Army CID 

Inspected 23AUG99 by 

ICTY 

Lovce EM46529541 7 bodies- 5m/2f 9 killed by Serb paramilitary- 7 graves- victims 

identified as local Albanians killed on 5APR99-2 

eyewitness accounts 

Canadian team 

completed 10JUL99 

Malesevo EN415002 4/5 bodies Albanians 

Manastirce EM08018906 1 Young boy executed- shot in head- witness 

Rraman Begisholli. Videotape of body and 

others killed in our file. 

Mrosavjte (NW 

of) 

EM19909445 1 Gravesite, body exposed 

Nerodimjle EM1914794272 1 Body was submerged in a well and was recovered 

by family- we had report of three graves at this 

same site and three bodies in the well at this same 

site- ICTY reports only one body. 

Swiss team recorded 

4JUL99 

Novo Selo EM2665293977 2 bodies Bone fragments and 2 skulls found in a burned 

out house 22SEP99 

CID investigated? 

Papaz EM155964 4-6 bodies 

unconfirmed 

Reported by villagers of Softovic 

Appendix IV-21 329 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Patronivici 

(NW of) 

EM35548238 1 Peter Tunia found shot in head behind barn 

Pojatiste EM180940 4 males On 4APR99, 5 elderly men were killed in a field 

near the village- 5th male still missing 

Swiss team recorded on 

4JUL99- bodies reburied 

by the locals. 

Radanova Mala DM987756 1 61 year old Serb farmer shot several times and 

head missing 

Radivojce EM3292 1 54 year old male tortured and shot in neck. 

Buried between Radivojce and Donje Budriga. 

POC is wife Ismete Ph#029020226 and sister 

Sojite in Radivojce EM3449130. 

Ramjane EM 254909 Unconfirmed Well 20m deep containing bodies. 25JUN99 nothing was 

found with a grappling 

hook. 

Ravsii Vrelos EM177558160 Suspected murder site (unknown if current or old) 2 Helo flights over to 

confirm location 

Rojatiste EM180938 4 Executed- graves and witnesses present 

Sasare EM3781 1 Pesic Iranica found shot in head 

Slatina EM1379 5 Victims identified as local Albanians. 4 were 

killed during Serb offensive 13APR99, 2 were 

UCK. Very remote site. May be the same site as 

the site below. 

Canadian team recorded 

19JUL99 

Slatina EM1379 3 Killed by Serbs on 28MAR99- Identified as 

Qemalij Deda, Nazmi Elezi, and Vesel Elezi from 

the villages of Dedaj and Slatina- may be the 

same site as above. 

Danish team completed 

6OCT99 

Smira (SW of) EM 23688204 1 Human remains found near old Serb fighting 

positions. UXO reported in area. 

Smira EM274820 5 Bodies of Mirali Sejdiu, Hebib Sejdiu, Skender 

Salihu and Elvi Demiri found- reburied in Vitina. 

Body ofRamadan Berati also found- reburied in 

Smira-Zylfi Agushi still missing from village. 

All 5 reburied by locals. 

Sojevo EM1817191696 3 Victims were elderly local Albanians. The bodies 

were exhumed and filmed by OSCE but no 

autopsies done. Victims were Shaqir, Shukri & 

Haki Kciku- videotape given to ICTY (R. 

Manas)- suspect Shinisha (first name) 

OSCE completed on 

24JUL99 

Sojevo EM185898 4 Victims Haxhere and Nazmije Nebihu, Hamet 

Halimi and Qerim Ajvazi – All were shot. 

Danish team completed 

12OCT99 

Sojevo EM1890 2- 1 shot by 

sniper 

Xhevaire Tahiri was exhumed from a local 

cemetery, only burnt bones remained. Bulic 

Mehmet found buried in the wood, shot by sniper 

Danish team completed 

12OCT99 

Sopotnica EM1679 5-7? 

(unconfirmed) 

Serbs allegedly killed 5-7 local Albanians 

Stagova EM2094379886 10 bodies4m/5f/ & 1 child Serb paramilitaries from Vrban fired on villagers 

fleeing Stagova on 21MAY99. 13 killed, 7 

wounded. 10 buried in mass grave near the 

village. All victims identified- 3 eyewitnesses to 

the incident. 

Swiss team completed 

25SEP99 

Stagovo EM2080 2 Fahri Mani and Ramush Jaha killed 21MAY99 

by VJ- remote site 

Danish team completed 

7OCT99 

Staro Selo EM165890 5-7 

(unconfirmed) 

Local villagers report 7 people missing. Villagers 

found suspected brain tissue at one site (turned 

out to be animal brains) and saw Serbs digging at 

another site. ICTY examined, but found no 

human remains at either site. 

ICTY inspected 

19JUL99 

330 Appendix IV-21 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

Staro Selo EM1597289361 4- 2m/2f 4 local Albanians killed and were found in a 

septic tank. Zeka family. 

Austrian/Icelandic team 

completed 5AUG99 

Staro Selo EM1649689082 0 Local villagers suspected bodies in a local well. 

ICTY dragged well with a grappling hook but 

found nothing. 

ICTY inspected 

5AUG99 and 27 OCTstill nothing fouund. 

Staro Selo EM156903 Mass grave near warehouse without roof. May 

be related to sites above. 

Stojglavica EM3715887230 6- 2m/2f/2 

children 

Victims were local Albanians killed in the town 

of Djelekare on 15APR99 by Armed serbs in VJ 

type uniforms 

Austrian/Icelandic team 

completed 14AUG99 

Strelica EM491174 1 Decomposed body found 

Surlane EM440835 3 males Villagers killed on 31MAR99. All identified and 

reburied in the local cemetery. 

Reburied by locals. 

Tankosic EM239921 1 male Albanian gunshot wound to head 

Tarajela EM143895 unconfirmed Albanian man has new gravesite in his back yard 

Uji I Tharte 

(Etezhan) 

EM231679 unknown Potential gravesite to be exhumed reported to 

ICTY 

Inspected by ICTY on 

25NOV99 

Unknown Unknown 1 male Decomposed body found in civilian clothes. Taken to Gnjilane 

hospital 

Unknown Unknown 1 Body recovered from well- Zufi Kastrati, shot in 

head 

CIMIC had victim’s 

identification pending 

investigation. 

Unknown Unknown 1 Vehvi Sojeva found by son Murahem Sojeva 

burned and shot. Victim last seen alive 9APR99. 

Urosevac EM145907 Lulzim Aliv (Besnif) reported bunker smells 

decayed. 

Urosevac EM1391 1 73 year old man found shot in chest 

Urosevac EM117915 8 5 bodies buried in mass grave and 3 separately in 

local Muslim cemetery. Two graves marked with 

numbered stakes (122/99 and 123/99). All 8 

bodies identified as local Albanians, and 6 have 

been reburied elsewhere. We have reports stating 

the cemetery here is actually Serbian and there 

are Albanians buried there. ICTY has details. 

Bodies reburied by 

locals 

Urosevac EM11909165 5- 4m/1f Site discovered on 31JUL99 in a local Orthodox 

cemetery.. Local Albanians could not identify 

bodies, ICTY suspects they may be Serbs.- - Also 

we have report of 5 graves in cemetery across 

from soccer field at N4225.621/E2133.124 (not 

sure if same sight)- and of shallow graves 

covered with plywood in a Serbian cemetery in 

Urosevac- not sure if this report is the same site 

either. 

OSCE documented site 

and submitted a file to 

ICTY 

Urosevac 

(near Sajkoe) 

EM03498945 Multiple 

(unconfirmed) 

Reported 400m UCK trench which had been 

filled in by the Serbs reported to be a mass grave 

site. Soldiers found clothing at the site. POC in 

area is Skender Bega. 

ICTY has inquired with 

locals and UCK- no one 

knows about it so far. 

Urosevac (SE 

of on Route 

Hawk) 

EM1590918 1 Decomposed body lying in a well. 

Velekince EM48271421 7 7 Killed from village, 2 in the village and 5 taken 

from convoy in Malasevo. 

Completed by locals. 

Vitina (SE of) EM300848 Suspected mine field and evidence of bombing. 

Strong death odor present in area. 

Vladove EM392927 5- 4m/1f Killed when local Serbs attacked the village on 

2APR99. All 5 victims are identified, but a 6th 

man is still missing. 

Inspected by ICTY on 

16AUG99 

Appendix IV-21 331 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Vladovo EM3892 

(vicinity) 

5-6 bodies Buried in different spots- POC Avdush Ajeti. 

EM3849892546, EM3844392496, 

EM391829273, EM3909992818 and EM 

3898192905. Killed by Serb paramilitary. 

Vladovo (NW 

of) 

EM380936 Albanian from Donji Livoc reported graves at 

grid resulted from wr crimes at a concentration 

camp (factory at EM375947) 

Vlastica EM4192 4 Local Albanians killed when the Serbs raided a 

makeshift camp in the hills above the village. At 

least 3 of the bodies were elderly. 

Canadian team 

completed on 14JUL99 

Vlastica EM416926 1 13 year old boy decapitated and disemboweledReportedly there are other decapitated victims in 

the town. 

Vlastica EM4171692637 13 13 people shot and burned in home by Serb 

paramilitaries 

Canadian team 

completed 5JUL99 

Vrban EM225840 Albanian men reported that Serbian Jokic Milos 

murdered someone in MAY99 

MP investigated 

Vrbica EN4303 7 Site is in local Muslim cemetery and contains 

bodies of 7 identified local Albanians killed in 

isolated incidents during a Serb offensive on 

16APR99. No witnesses to the killings. 

Canadian team recorded 

on 8JUL99 

332 Appendix IV-21 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

APPENDIX IV-22: ICTY SOP 

OFFICE OF THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE 

GENERAL 

Purpose 

The purpose of this SOP is to provide future Judge Advocates an understanding 

of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), its 

mission in Kosovo, and the Judge Advocate’s role with ICTY. 

References 

1. The Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security Force 

(“KFOR”) and the Governments of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 

Republic of Serbia (MTA). 

2. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 (1999). 

3. SACEUR OPLAN 10413 Operation Joint Guardian, dtd. 11JUN99. 

4. Task Force Falcon OPORD 99-01. 

General Overview 

1. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is the 

section of the UN that is investigating war crimes in order to prosecute the war 

criminals the UN has indicted. ICTY’s mission is to gather evidence on individual 

war crimes committed and to link those war crimes to the indictees by showing a 

causal link between their orders and decisions made as military and political 

leaders and the war crimes that were actually committed down the chain of 

command by Serbian police (MUP), the Serbian Army (VJ) and paramilitary 

forces. 

ICTY General Procedures 

1. During the warmer months, (March through October), the forensics teams 

come in to Kosovo from different UN countries (prior teams in MNB(E) have been 

from Canada, Austria, Iceland, Switzerland, and Denmark). These forensics 

teams document crime scenes, exhume bodies, perform autopsies, attempt to 

have the victims identified, and return the bodies to the families who normally 

have their own funerals for the victims. ICTY does cursory interviews during this 

process, and aids the forensics teams in performing their jobs. The exhumation 

of sites begin again in March or April after the spring thaw. 

Appendix IV-22 333 
 

 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

2. During the winter months, ICTY does in-depth interviews with witnesses and 

the victims’ families to gather evidence against the indictees. They locate 

witnesses and take statements to support the physical evidence found at the 

crime scenes. 

ICTY Liaison 

1. The ICTY liaison with the US military is an investigator sent down from the 

Hague to coordinate the crime scene investigations, exhumations, and interviews 

in the MNB(E) AO. This person is the POC for the US Army. 

2. The ICTY Kosovo office is in Pristina. The MNB(E) ICTY liaison lives in 

Pristina. The PTT number (Kosovo civilian number) is 00871-762-083-095. The 

liaison, however, spends most of his/her time in MNB(E) sector and is rarely in 

the ICTY office. A message can be left for the liaison to come to Camp 

Bondsteel if it is important that he/she be reached. Otherwise, the liaison reports 

periodically to the SJA office in the TOC at Camp Bondsteel to give an update on 

his movement and actions in MNB(E) and to request any logistical support 

necessary. 

Task Force Falcon (TFF) Legal Advisor Liaison 

1. A TFF Legal Advisor will be the liaison officer for ICTY. Responsibilities of the 

liaison include: 

a. Coordination with ICTY on at least a biweekly basis as to their activities in 

MNB(E). 

b. Obtaining information and statistics for briefing the Task Force Commander 

and staff (see ‘Briefing’ section below). 

c. Updating ICTY on possible new war crimes sites found in the area. 

d. Coordination between the tasked support unit and ICTY liaison (screening 

support requests for those TFF cannot support, etc.). 

e. Obtaining information on possible new war crimes sites discovered by or 

reported to ICTY. 

f. Updating the War Crimes in MNB(E) database. 

Logistical Support 

1. TFF Legal is the liaison office for the ICTY operating in MNB(E). In SACEUR 

OPORD 10413, Task Force Falcon is tasked with aiding ICTY within our means 

334 Appendix IV-22 
 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

and capabilities. This phrase has different meanings to different Task Force 

Commanders. MNB(E) has provided the following support to ICTY. 

a. Housed the Forensics teams on Camp Bondsteel and provided them 

logistical support (food, laundry). 

b. Provided 24 hour point security at the crime sites while the sites were 

being exhumed. 

c. Provided EOD support to clear the sites of UXOs, mines, ordnance, booby 

traps and other explosives. 

d. Various other logistical support such as 5 tons, water buffaloes, high 

pressure sprayers, body bags, stretchers, cranes (lifting equipment), casualty 

affairs support, and even coffins. 

2. Procedure. TFF Legal coordinates with G-3 who tasks a unit to provide the 

logistical support listed above to the forensics teams and to ICTY. TFF Legal 

prepares the FRAGO tasking the unit to continually provide logistical support and 

security to the forensics teams, the ICTY, and its mission. The tasked unit’s S-3 

should then be introduced to the ICTY liaison. The TFF Legal office should 

encourage the ICTY liaison to go directly to the unit assigned to support them 

when ICTY has logistical support needs. Many times the ICTY liaison will come 

back to TFF Legal when they need support, or ask for it during the course of 

reporting their in-sector activities. The liaison should be referred to the tasked 

unit or the TFF Legal should call the unit and ask for the support. The liaison 

should also be prepared to deny requests that are not feasible. See Enclosure A 

for example of tasking FRAGO. 

War Crimes Sites in MNB(E) 

1. Reporting Procedures. A war crime by definition can only happen during 

war. Therefore, only those killed before the MTA was signed and the Serbian 

forces pulled out of Kosovo are possible war crime victims. TFF Legal has 

created a database of possible war crimes sites in our area that have been 

discovered thus far. These reports come from various sources. ICTY (they have 

their own database which they provide to us), Civil Affairs, G-3, and SOCCE 

report a majority of the sites. This database must be updated as new sites come 

in. The database is in alphabetical order according to what village the site is in or 

near. The number of sites found monthly dramatically decreased after the first 

month Task Force Falcon was present in Kosovo. The reports come in all forms, 

such as SPOT reports, on half sheets of paper, etc. All information on a site is 

located in a manila file folder labeled with the name of the village (as on the 

database). There is a file for each village or city that has one or more reported 

war crimes. These files are a good reference when questions come up about the 

site. There is no information other than an oral report on many of the sites. 

Appendix IV-22 335 
 

 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 
 

2. Database. Most of the sites that have been reported so far have already 

been completed by the forensics teams. The database is annotated as to which 

sites have been finished. Some of the sites in the database are just reports of 

dead decomposed bodies lying out. In those cases, according to the PMO, the 

unit finding the body is responsible for policing it up and taking it to the morgue. 

If it is possible the death is a result of a war crime (could have been killed before 

the MTA was signed), then the information regarding the site will be recorded on 

the database. Historically, ICTY has not been interested in this type of site, but 

they should be briefed on its existence nonetheless. Obviously, a body that 

could not be from the pre-MTA time period is a regular murder and should be 

reported to the PMO. See Enclosure B for a copy of the database. 

3. Briefings. The Task Force Commander and staff will be briefed during the 

BUB by the Task Force Legal Advisor on ICTY activities in sector. These briefs 

will include ICTY’s movements in the AO and new statistics from the war crimes 

sites. Therefore, there should be a constant flow of information from ICTY to the 

TFF Legal liaison to ICTY on the following: 

a. What site the ICTY/forensic team is currently investigating or exhuming. 

b. At the site, how many bodies have been recovered, autopsies done, cause 

of death, sex of bodies, age of bodies, whether civilians or UCK. 

c. Logistical support provided or requested. 

d. Any other information of particular importance or interest. 

4. Evidence Collection. Any physical evidence (shell casings, videotapes, etc) 

from a possible war crimes site collected by or brought to the US military should 

be recorded by filling out a chain of custody form and turned over to the ICTY 

liaison. See Enclosure C for the form. 

Reports 

1. Paragraph 7 Reports. A report to USCINCEUR should be done on each site 

investigated by ICTY. See Enclosure D for a copy of the report. The report 

provides USCINCEUR with the following information if applicable and available: 

a. Description of the scene. 

b. Names of local witnesses. 

c. Names of military witnesses. 

d. Photographs. 

e. Description of seized evidence 

336 Appendix IV-22 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

2. Bi-Monthly Report to KFOR. A bi-monthly report to KFOR Main J-3 

compiles information on the ICTY investigations in each MNB. This information 

is reported to SHAPE. The report should be sent by CRONUS to KFOR Main. 

See Enclosure E for a copy of the report. The information reported is as follows: 

a. Time period covered. 

b. Summary of Recent Operations. 

c. Meetings between MNB Reps and ICTY Representation. 

d. Forecast. 

e. Way Ahead. 

d. Conclusion 

Appendix IV-22 337 
_______________________________________________________ 

_______________________________________________________ 

_______________________________________________________ 

_______________________________________________________ 


 


 


 


 


 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

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APPENDIX IV-23: DISPUTED PROPERTY FORMS 

ENGLISH 

Disputed Property Form
 NAME:____________________________ DATE:____________
 

FORM OF IDENTIFICATION:________________________________.
 

ADDRESS:________________________________________________
 

______________________________________________________. 

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS
 

•	 Please fully describe your missing property or item:_____________ 

______________________________________________________. 

•	 Please describe how you acquired it:_________________________ 

______________________________________________________. 

______________________________________________________. 

•	 Where did you get the item (please include name of store or 

individual):____________________________________________. 

•	 How much did it cost:____________________________________. 

•	 Do you have any receipts, pictures or witnesses that can show that 

this item belongs to you:__________________________________. 

•	 Do you have anything else that would show ownership of these 

items:_________________________________________________. 

338	 Appendix IV-23 
 

_______________________________________________________ 

_______________________________________________________ 

_______________________________________________________ 


 


 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

ALBANIAN 

Formular Per Pasuri Kontestuese
 

EMRI:____________________________ DATA:____________ 

NR. I LETERNJOFTIMIT, PASAPORTES OSE PATENT 

SHOFERIT:____________________________________________. 

ADRESA:________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________. 

JU LUTEM TE PERGJIGJENI NE PYETJET VIJUESE
 

•	 Pershkrimi i pasurise:____________________________________ 

______________________________________________________. 

•	 Pershkruani si e keni marre (fituar):__________________________ 

______________________________________________________. 

•	 Ku e keni marre:_________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________. 

•	 A keni fakture, fotografi ose deshmitare i cili mund te deshmoj ge 

ajo ju takon (perket):______________________________________ 

______________________________________________________. 

•	 Sa ka kushtuar (cmimi):___________________________________. 

•	 A keni deshmi tjeter se jeni pronar I ketyre gjerave (sendeve, 

pasurive):_______________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________. 

Appendix IV-23 339 
 

_______________________________________________________ 

_______________________________________________________ 

_______________________________________________________ 

_______________________________________________________ 

 


 


 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

SERBO-CROATIAN 

Formular Za Sporno Imanje
 

IME:____________________________ DATUM:____________ 

BROJ LICNE KARTE, PASOSA ILI VOZACKE 

DOZVOLE:____________________________________________. 

ADRES:________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________. 

MOLIM VAS DA ODGOVORITE NA SLEDECA PITANJA
 

•	 Opis imanja:____________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________. 

•	 Opisajte kako ste ga nabavili:_______________________________ 

______________________________________________________. 

______________________________________________________. 

•	 Gdje ste ga nabavili:_____________________________________. 

•	 Koliko je kostovao:______________________________________. 

•	 Da li imate racun, sliku, ili svjedok koji moze pokazati da to vam 

pripada:_______________________________________________. 

•	 Da li imate drugi dokaz da ste vlasnik ove stvari:______________ 

_____________________________________________________. 

340	 Appendix IV-23 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

APPENDIX IV-24: MEASURES OF SUCCESS MATRIX 

Immediately-- 243d MIB 52d Corps Arty Bde MUP UCK 

All parties cease 

committing hostile or 

provocative acts 

All aircraft, radars, 

SAMS (including 

MANPADS) and AAA 

begin withdrawing to 

outside the MSZ 

The appropriate NATO 

commander shall 

control and coordinate 

use of airspace 

Other Forces observe 

Art I, para 2, Art II, para 

1, and Art III and refrain 

from all hostile intent, 

military training, etc. 

Other Forces publicly 

commit themselves to 

demilitarization, 

renounce violence, 

guarantee security of 

international personnel, 

and undertake to respect 

the international borders 

of the FRY and all terms 

of this Annex. 

Other Forces must not 

carry weapons within 1 

km of VJ and MUP 

cantonments or of main 

roads or within 6 km of 

international borders. 

5 Days-- 243d MIB 52d Corps Arty Bde MUP UCK 

VJ Army units complete 

redeployment to 

approved cantonment 

sites 

senior VJ commander in 

Kosovo confirms in 

writing to that the VJ is 

in compliance and 

provides the information 

required in Article VII 

(and then weekly) 

Other Forces abandon 

and close all fighting 

positions, 

entrenchments, and 

checkpoints. Senior 

commander reports 

completion 

Other Forces establish 

secure weapons storage 

sites, which are 

registered with and 

verified with the KFOR; 

MUP units complete 

redeployment to the 

approved cantonment 

sites or to garrisons 

outside Kosovo. Senior 

MUP commander 

confirms in writing 

Appendix IV-24 341 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 
 

MUP units not assigned 

to Kosovo prior to 1 Feb 

1998 withdraw 

Parties furnish specific 

information per Art VII 

and update COMKFOR 

weekly 

10 Days-- 243d MIB 52d Corps Arty Bde MUP UCK 

Withdrawal of all 

aircraft, radars, SAMS 

(including 

(MANPADS)) and 

AAA completed and 

reported by senior VJ 

commander in Kosovo 

commander 

14 Days-- 243d MIB 52d Corps Arty Bde MUP UCK 

VJ Border Guard forces 

down to 1500 members 

and in Djakovica, 

Prizren, and Urosevac 

and subordinate 

facilities within the 5 

kilometer Border Zone 

Routes and procedures 

for VJ travel determined 

Parties provide info on 

prisoners to ICRC 

20 Days-- 243d MIB 52d Corps Arty Bde MUP UCK 

all Special Police, 

including PJP, SAJ, and 

JSO forces, and their 

equipment out of 

Kosovo 

21 Days-- 243d MIB 52d Corps Arty Bde MUP UCK 

Parties release and 

transfer all persons held 

in connection with the 

conflict 

30 Days-- 243d MIB 52d Corps Arty Bde MUP UCK 

Chief of VJ General 

Staff provides detailed 

plan for withdrawal to 

COMKFOR 

Other Forces store all 

prohibited weapons in 

registered weapons 

storage sites 

Other Forces 

commanders confirm 

completion of weapons 

storage to COMKFOR 

Other Forces in Kosovo 

cease wearing military 

uniforms and insignia 

Other Forces personnel 

who are not of local 

origin withdrawn 

Senior MUP 

commander provides 

detailed plan for 

withdrawal to 

COMKFOR 

60 Days-- 243d MIB 52d Corps Arty Bde MUP UCK 

50% drawdown of the 

342 Appendix IV-24 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

remaining MUP units 

90 Days-- 243d MIB 52d Corps Arty Bde MUP UCK 

VJ withdraw 50% of 

men and materiel and all 

designated offensive 

assets 

COMKFOR reviews 

deployments of VJ and 

adjusts 

authority for storage 

sites passes to the 

KFOR. Weapons 

subject to confiscation 

120 Days--

demilitarization of all 

Other Forces completed. 

drawdown to 2500 MUP 

180 Days--

all VJ Army personnel 

and equipment 

withdrawn 

1 Year--

all MUP withdrawn 

Appendix IV-24 343 
 

 

 

 

 

 


 


 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

APPENDIX IV-25: KOSOVO ROE CARD 

FRONT 

KFOR RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR USE 

IN KOSOVO 

SOLDIER'S CARD 

To be carried at all times. 

MISSION. Your mission is to assist in the implementation of and to help 

ensure compliance with a Military Technical Agreement (MTA) in Kosovo. 

SELF-DEFENSE. 

a. You have the right to use necessary and proportional force in selfdefense. 

b. Use only the minimum force necessary to defend yourself. 

GENERAL RULES. 

a. Use the minimum force necessary to accomplish your mission. 

b. Hostile forces/belligerents who want to surrender will not be harmed. 

Disarm them and turn them over to your superiors. 

c. Treat everyone, including civilians and detained hostile 

forces/belligerents, humanely. 

d. Collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe. 

e. Respect private property. Do not steal. Do not take "war trophies". 

f. Prevent and report all suspected violations of the Law of Armed Conflict 

to superiors. 

CHALLENGING AND WARNING SHOTS. 

a. If the situation permits, issue a challenge: 

- In English: "NATO! STOP OR I WILL FIRE!"

 - Or in Serbo-Croat: "NATO! STANI ILI PUCAM!"

 - (Pronounced as: "NATO! STANI ILI PUTSAM!) 

- Or in Albanian: "NATO! NDAL OSE UNE DO TE QELLOJ!

 - (Pronounced as: "NATO! N'DAL OSE UNE DO TE CHILLOY!) 

b. If the person fails to halt, you may be authorized by the on-scene 

commander or by standing orders to fire a warning shot. 

BACK 

OPENING FIRE. 

a. You may open fire only if you, friendly forces or persons or property 

under your protection are threatened with deadly force. This means: 

(1) You may open fire against an individual who fires or aims his weapon 

at, or otherwise demonstrates an intent to imminently attack, you ,friendly 

forces, or Persons with Designated Special Status (PDSS) or property with 

designated special status under your protection. 

(2) You may open fire against an individual who plants, throws, or prepares 

to throw, an explosive or incendiary device at, or otherwise demonstrates an 

intent to imminently attack you, friendly forces, PDSS or property with 

designated special status under your protection. 

(3) You may open fire against an individual deliberately driving a vehicle at 

you, friendly forces, or PDSS or property with designated special status. 

b. You may also fire against an individual who attempts to take possession 

of friendly force weapons, ammunition, or property with designated special 

status, and there is no way of avoiding this. 

c. You may use minimum force, including opening fire, against an 

individual who unlawfully commits or is about to commit an act which 

endangers life, in circumstances where there is no other way to prevent the 

act. 

MINIMUM FORCE. 

a. If you have to open fire, you must: 

- Fire only aimed shots; and

 - Fire no more rounds than necessary; and

 - Take all reasonable efforts not to unnecessarily destroy property; and 

- Stop firing as soon as the situation permits. 

b. You may not intentionally attack civilians, or property that is exclusively 

civilian or religious in character, except if the property is being used for 

military purposes or engagement is authorized by the commander. 

344 Appendix IV-25 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

APPENDIX IV-26: CAS ROE CARD 

FYROM RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 

1. GENERAL RULES 

A. The CJCS Standing Rules of Engagement (“SROE”) are in effect in FYROM for 

US forces (CJCSI 3121.01A) 

B. The FYROM ROE are different than the ROE currently used in Kosovo by TFF 

2. SELF-DEFENSE 

A. You have the inherent right and obligation to use force, including lethal force, 

to defend yourself and/or members of your unit and other US forces in the 

vicinity against attack or imminent attack. 

B. Use only the minimum force necessary to defend yourself and/or your unit. 

3. GENERAL RULES 

A. Necessary and Proportional: Use of force must be proportional in nature, 

duration, and scope to the threat you face. When time and circumstances permit, 

attempt to de-escalate the situation. 

1. Shout a warning. 

2. Show your weapon. 

3. Demonstrate that you are prepared to use your weapon. 

4. Warning shots are not prohibited. 

5. The minimum force necessary for self and unit defense may be lethal force. 

B. Remember that FYROM is a sovereign country – if you see a crime being 

committed or about to be committed, notify FYROM authorities immediately. 

C. Protect property with minimum force -- but remember: You are not permitted to 

protect property with deadly force unless the loss of that property poses an 

immediate threat to yourself or other US forces (such as theft of a loaded weapon 

that is immediately pointed in your direction)! 

4. OPENING FIRE 

A. You may open fire only if you, your unit, or other US forces are attacked or 

threatened with imminent attack with deadly force. 

B. You my open fire against: 

1. A person who aims his weapon at you, your unit, or other US forces. 

2. A person who plants, throws, or prepares to throw an explosive or 

incendiary device at you, your unit, or other US forces. 

Appendix IV-26 345 
 


 

	 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

3. A person about to use any other force against you, your unit, or other US 

forces and you reasonably believe that force to be deadly. 

4. MINIMUM FORCE 

A. If you have to open fire, remember: 

1. Fire only aimed shots. 

2. Fire no more rounds than necessary. 

3. Make all reasonable efforts not to unnecessarily destroy civilian 

property. 

4. Stop firing as soon as the situation permits. 

5. Immediately report the situation. 

6. Treat any casualties resulting from the use of lethal force. 

B. You may not intentionally attack civilians, their property, or property that is 

religious in character unless that property is being used against you for a military 

purpose and engagement is authorized by the your commander. 

346	 Appendix IV-26 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

APPENDIX IV-27: 1AD ROE TEST 

Section I: True or False 

1. U.S. soldiers may use deadly force to defend themselves only when authorized by the senior 

tactical leader present. 

True or False 

2. The Military Technical Agreement (MTA) allows FRY forces (defined in the MTA to 

include, among others, regular Yugoslav Army Forces) to operate in the Air and Ground Safety 

Zones (ASZ and GSZ). 

True or False 

3. When operating out of the MNB-E sector, a U.S. soldier’s right to self-defense is governed by 

the ROE of the nation “owning” that sector (e.g., when operating in MNB-N, U.S. Forces are 

governed by French ROE if that ROE differs from US or KFOR ROE). 

True or False 

4. Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, FRY Forces have the right to reenter Kosovo at any time for any or all of the following specific reasons: (1) to guard

Patrimonial sites; (2) to maintain a presence at key border crossings; (3) to mark and clear 

minefields; and (4) to liaison with UNMIK and/or KFOR. 

True or False 

5. The Military Technical Agreement allows “local police” to remain within the five kilometerwide Ground Safety Zone (GSZ). 

True or False 

6. You are always required to issue a challenge in the local language before using deadly force. 

True or False 

7. Although the air campaign has ended, VJ Forces are still categorized as a declared hostile 

force. 

True or False 

Section II: Multiple Choice

Select the single correct answer from each of the four options. 

8. Company commanders are authorized to: 

(a) Retain seized weapons for unit “trophy” cases back at home station; 

(b) Attack property (like a hospital) that is exclusively civilian in nature when that 

property is being used for military purposes;

(c) Call for indirect fires into a crowd in order to separate fighting Serbian and Albanian 

factions; or, 

(d) Direct U.S. soldiers to conduct out of sector operations (e.g., out of MNB-E) in order to 

provide routine support to fellow KFOR Troop Contributing Nations. 

Appendix IV-27 347 
 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

9. The abbreviation R-A-M-P stands for: 

(a) Return fire with aimed fire; Allow the situation to fully develop; Measure your response;

Protect with deadly force that property which is designated by the commander; 

(b) Return to home station immediately upon receiving hostile fire; Anticipate the attack; 

Measure the number of rounds you fire; Protect sensitive items with deadly force; 

(c) Return fire with aimed fire; Anticipate the attack; Measure your response; Protect 

with deadly force that property which is designated by the commander; or,

(d) Return fire with aimed fire; Annihilate the attacker; Measure the number of rounds you fire; 

Protect sensitive items with deadly force. 

10. “Hand SALUTE” is an abbreviation that allows you to:

(a) Ensure soldiers are in compliance with the military tradition of saluting senior officers; 

(b) Determine whether or not an individual is demonstrating hostile intent; 

(c) Determine whether or not an individual is committing a hostile act; or, 

(d) Comply with TFF-specific Peace Support Operations SOPs. 

11. In the absence of further guidance, you may open fire at: 

(a) Kosovar Albanians who hurl insults at you and your soldiers; 

(b) Serbs who hurl insults at you and your soldiers; 

(c) An escaping detainee;

(d) An individual deliberately driving a vehicle at your position at a high rate of speed who 

shows no intent of slowing down. 

12. When acting in self-defense, the directive to “use the minimum force:” 

(a) May include deadly force; 

(b) Never includes the use of deadly force;

(c) Includes the use of deadly force only when authorized by COMKFOR; 

(d) Includes the use of deadly force only when authorized by the senior tactical leader on the 

scene. 

13. The ____________ is responsible for the Rules of Engagement. 

(a) Operations Officer; 

(b) Staff Judge Advocate;

(c) The Commander; or, 

(d) The National Command Authority (NCA). 

Section III: Fill in the Blank 

14. The written source of a U.S. soldier’s inherent right to self-defense is________________ 

__Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)____ 

15. The possible range of graduated responses for individual soldier self defense includes: A 

verbal warning, ____exhibit weapon / show of force___________, warning shots (when

authorized by the appropriate commander), use of pepper spray or CS gas (when authorized by 

the appropriate commander), use of a riot baton or the butt of your rifle, and deadly force. 

16. When opening fire, every reasonable effort should be made to__minimize / avoid_____ collateral damage. 

17. Who can release individuals stopped for Category IV crimes (the lowest order of crimes)? __the on-the-scene commander_______. 

348 Appendix IV-27 
______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

18. The Ushtria Clirimtare Kosoves (UCK), is known in English as the ___________________ 

__Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)_________. 

19. The Air Safety Zone (ASZ) is _______25_______ kilometers wide. 

20. You may __detain and search_______ an individual attempting to enter a restricted area 

(an area under U.S. control) with a false ID card. 

Section IV: Short Answer 

21. A U.S. helicopter pilot flying an AH-64 in support of French forces in MNB-N positively 

identifies an individual in a small courtyard below him pulling out of a large box what clearly 

appears to be a SA-7 missile and place it on his shoulder, pointing it skyward. French standing

ROE on self- defense require French soldiers to wait until fired upon to fire back. The U.S. pilot

should 

22. A U.S. soldier, acting as a courier, is carrying SECRET documents between Camps 

Bondsteel and Montieth. While passing through Partes, his two-vehicle convoy is forced to stop 

due to a traffic accident ahead being handled by UNMIK Police. The soldier gets out of the 

vehicle. A teenager runs up to the vehicle and grabs the soldier’s helmet bag containing the 

SECRET documents. What actions should the soldier take? What is the highest level response 

appropriate? 

23. A soldier is pulling gate guard duty at Camp Monteith, situated just outside of Gnjilane. 

Suddenly, a yellow truck that has circled the block in front of the main gate three times gathers 

speed and barrels towards the main gate you are tasked with guarding. Within a matter of 

seconds it could be at the main building. The soldier should 

Appendix IV-27 349 
______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 
 

24. You are on a dismounted patrol on the outskirts of Donja Budriga. You hear an explosion.

A nearby patrol reports that the round exploded harmlessly in an open field. TF Falcon’s Q-36 

has acquired a point of origin near your location and sends you the grid coordinates via FM. The 

location is an old logging trail on a wooded hillside about 2 kms from your current location. 

You are within sight of the origin grid coordinates eight minutes after receiving the grid 

coordinates from your higher headquarters, and ten minutes after hearing the explosion. As you

approach the location, you see two men standing near a mortar tube and talking excitedly. Your 

squad sets up blocking positions on the road, and you yell “HALT! NATO! STANI ILI 

PUTSAM!” (a verbal warning for the two men to halt). They give you a startled look and one

takes off running into the woods. The other man momentarily freezes in place and then reaches 

into the vehicle that is parked next to the mortar tube. You can’t see what he’s reaching for. 

You fire a warning shot at the one who is fleeing, but he doesn’t even hesitate. What now, squad 

leader? 

350 Appendix IV-27 
 

 


 


 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 

APPENDIX IV-28: ROE AZIMUTH CHECKS
 

UCK Flags

and Other Paraphernalia 

Situation: You are out on patrol in a mostly KAlbanian part of your sector. You see a large 

UCK flag flying from a flagpole attached to the 

roof rafters of a local house. What do you do 

now? 

Response: You continue your patrol. There are 

no restrictions for flying flags from private 

residences. Since it’s a mostly K-Albanian area, 

it’s not a provocative or inflammatory act. THE ALBANIAN FLAG 

Situation: What if it’s an Albanian flag? 

Response: You continue your patrol. There are 

no restrictions for flying flags from private 

residences. 

THE UCK CREST 

Situation: What if the flag is flying from out the 

windows of a K-Albanian car being driven 

through the middle of a K-Serb area? 

Response: Stop the car. You can seize the flags, 

with the appropriate hand-receipt. This is 

provocative act and compromises our mission of 

establishing a safe and secure environment. 

Situation: You are manning a checkpoint and 

see a small UCK flag hanging from the rear 

view mirror of a vehicle you have stopped. You 

recognize the driver as a member of the TMK, 

but he is not in TMK uniform. What do you do 

now? 

Response: Do NOT seize the flag. It is private 

property. TMK members wearing civilian 

clothes are permitted to possess small quantities 

of UCK paraphernalia. If he were in uniform, 

you could direct him to remove the flag. If he 

refused, you could seize it (making sure you 

issue a proper hand-receipt for it). 

BACKGROUND 

• COMKFOR has specifically allowed 

KPC/TMK members to have small quantities of 

non-obtrusive UCK insignia or any kind of UCK 

memorabilia in their possession or in their POVs 

when they are NOT in their KPC/TMK 

uniforms. UCK insignia or memorabilia is not 

prohibited. 

• NEVER seize private property without (1) a 

lawful basis, (2) issuing a hand-receipt for the 

property, and (3) safeguarding the property 

afterwards. Remember, GO#1 prohibits taking 

or keeping private property as souvenirs 

Appendix IV-28 351 

 


 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

TEMPORARY 

DETENTION 

and Work Details 

Situation: It is after the posted curfew time. 

You are on patrol in your sector. You see 

someone violating the curfew. What do you 

do? 

Response: You are authorized to detain 

them for up to 12 hours IAW UNMIK 

Regulation 1999/2. 

Situation: You’re still out on patrol and 

you’ve now rounded up 6 curfew violators. 

You think you can keep them busy and out 

of trouble by making the curfew violators 

pick up trash along the MSR. Can you do 

it? 

Response: NO. Forcing detainees to work 

violates Department of Defense guidelines. 

Situation: You are on patrol and come upon another squad from your company. They have a 

bunch of curfew violators lined up on the side of the road and are making them do push-ups and 

other exercises. What do you do? 

Response: Find the NCO in charge and direct him to stop. Making detainees do push-ups or 

other physical exercises also violates DoD guidelines. 

BACKGROUND 

• Remember FAR #4: Apply the Golden Rule-Treat everyone with dignity and respect. 

• UNMIK Regulation 1999/2 only allows detention by the unit for up to 12 hours. 

• U.S. Forces must comply with the principles of the law of war, even in a peacekeeping 

operation. In Kosovo, this means that you can’t make detainees work and you can’t punish them 

by making them do pushups or other exercises. 

352 Appendix IV-28 
 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

“ROE” UPDATE 

Questions 2A soldiers have 

Asked 

Q: Can we mark all vehicles on a MEDCAP 

mission with the Red Cross? 

A. No. The only vehicles that can be marked 

with the internationally recognized, Geneva 

convention approved red cross or red crescent 

are actual medical vehicles (i.e., ambulances). 

Support and security vehicles may not be 

marked, even though they are being used to 

support medical missions (i.e., MEDCAPs). 

Other markings (e.g., “MEDCAP Vehicle”) on 

support and security should be avoided as they 

present the appearance of attempting to use 

protected status symbols for an unauthorized 

purpose. 

Q: What are the prohibitions against wearing 

complete, partial, or “clothing significantly 

similar to” FRY uniforms (as FRY is defined in 

the MTA to include, among others, the MUP)? 

A: FRY personnel are not permitted in Kosovo 

without the express consent of COMKFOR. 

Individuals wearing actual FRY uniforms (even 

partial uniforms, with such indicators as 

insignia) should be stopped and questioned. If 

necessary, detain the individual. 

Q: What are the prohibitions against wearing 

UCPMB uniforms? 

A: UCPMB uniforms are not prohibited by any 

treaty or agreement, however, individuals 

wearing them clearly present a threat to a “safe 

and secure” environment. Individuals wearing 

these can be detained for operational reasons and 

questioned. If necessary, detain the individual. 

Q: What is our authority to arrest/detain 

individuals for illegal policing? 

A: KFOR’s mandate is to establish a safe and secure environment. Vigilante police groups undermine the rule of law and threaten safety and security. KFOR soldiers and UNMIK-P may stop 

individuals who are engaged in “illegal policing” 

(e.g., an illegal checkpoint), question them, and 

detain them for up to 72 hours. “Illegal policing”, 

however, is not a crime under the Kosovo Criminal Code. Local courts will release individuals 

charged only with “illegal policing”. Usually, 

individuals conducting “illegal policing” have 

communicated a threat, assaulted someone, or 

committed a number of other crimes under the 

Kosovo Criminal Code. In order to have local 

courts detain these individuals longer than 72 

hours, soldiers must charge them with an actual 

crime and not merely with “illegal policing.” 

Detention of individuals for illegal policing should 

be coordinated with your supporting Judge 

Advocate. 

Appendix IV-28 353 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 


 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

APPENDIX IV-29: SAMPLE JURISDICTION MEMO
 

AETV-BGJA (27-10) 2 January 2000 

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION 

SUBJECT: UCMJ Jurisdiction over U.S. Army personnel located in Kosovo and the Former 

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 

1. References. 

a. UR 27-10, Military Justice, 15 August 1994 (Change 1, 2 May 1997). 

b. 1ID Circular 27-98-1, 15 September 1998. 

c. Memorandum, AEAJA-MC, Subject: Assignment of General Court-Martial Jurisdiction – 

Operation Joint Guardian, dated : 23 June 99. 

d. Memorandum, AETV-BGCG, Subject: Temporary Assignment of Units from the 3d 

Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, to the Special Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 100th Area Support 

Group (ASG). 

2. Pursuant to reference c, the Commander 1st Infantry Division is the designated General CourtMartial Convening (GCMCA) authority for all U.S. Army personnel located in Kosovo and the 

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia pursuant to Operation Joint Guardian. Pursuant to 

reference d, the 3d Brigade Commander (Deputy Commander, Task Force Falcon) is the 

designated Special Court-Martial Convening Authority (SPCMCA) for all U.S. Army personnel 

located in Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia pursuant to Operation Joint 

Guardian. 

3. U.S. Army personnel assigned to the following units located in Kosovo and the Former 

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are further aligned under Summary Court-Martial Convening 

Authorities (SCMCA) and Company Commands as follows: 

a. The soldiers assigned to the following Commands fall under the SCMCA of Commander, 

1-63 Armor Battalion. 

1) HHC, 1-63 AR 

2) A Co, 1-63 AR 

3) B Co, 1-63 AR 

4) C Co, 1-63 AR 

354 Appendix IV-29 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

5) D Co, 1-63 AR 

b. The soldiers assigned to the following Commands fall under the SCMCA of Commander, 

55th Personnel Service Battalion. 

1) HHC/55th PSB 

c. The soldiers assigned to the following Commands fall under the SCMCA of Commander, 

39th Finance Battalion. 

 1) B/39th FN 

d. The soldiers assigned to the following Commands fall under the SCMCA of Commander, 

2-2 Infantry Regiment. 

 1) HHC, 2-2 IN

 2) A Co, 2-2 IN 

3) B Co, 2-2 IN 

4) C Co, 2-2 IN 

5) D Co, 2-2 IN 

e. The soldiers assigned to the following Commands fall under the SCMCA of Commander, 

1-1 Aviation Battalion. 

(1) HHC/1-1 AVN 

(2) F/159 

(3) B/1-1 AVN 

(4) B/2-1 AVN 

(5) D/1-1 AVN 

(6) D/1-4 CAV (This includes all soldiers assigned to any CAV Troop) 

(7) A/3-58 AVN 

(8) 236th Medical Company (AA) 

Appendix IV-29 355 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

(9) 236th Medical Commander (This includes all soldiers assigned to 557th Medical 

Company (AMB) 

f. The soldiers assigned to the following Commands fall under the SCMCA of Commander, 

3-504 Parachute Infantry Regiment. 

1) HHC/3-504 IN (This includes all soldiers assigned to 307th EN Company, 3-4 ADA 

Company; 3-319 FA Company;, and 307th FSB) 

2) A/3-504 IN 

3) B/3-504 IN 

4) C/3-504 IN 

5) D/3-504 IN 

g. The soldiers assigned to the following Commands fall under the SCMCA of Commander, 

1-6 Field Artillery Battalion 

1) HHB/1-6 FA 

2) A/1-6 FA 

3) B/1-6 FA 

4) SVC/1-6 

 5) E/151 

6) HHC, 3d BDE (This includes all soldiers assigned to HHC, 1st ID; HST, V Corps; 55th SG 

CO; USACCE; DCMSC; LIWA) 

7) F/4 BRT 

h. The soldiers assigned to the following Commands fall under the SCMCA of Commander, 

101 Military Intelligence Battalion. 

1) C/101 MI (This includes all soldiers assigned to the NIST without a local Company 

level Commander) 

2) D/101 MI 

i. The soldiers assigned to the following Commands fall under the SCMCA of Commander, 

709th Military Police Battalion. 

356 Appendix IV-29 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 

 1) HHD/709th MP (This includes soldiers assigned to the 515th MP Detachment (CID) 

 2) 212th MP 

 3) 65th MP 

4) 92d MP 

j. The soldiers assigned to the following Commands fall under the SCMCA of Commander, 

201st Forward Support Battalion. 

1) HHC, 201st FSB 

2) A Co., 201st FSB 

3) B Co., 201st FSB 

3) C Co, 201st FSB 

4) HHC, DISCOM 

5) 701st MSB?? 

6) A Co. 701st MSB 

7) B Co. 701st MSB 

8) D Co., 701st MSB 

6) 19th MMC?? 

7) 792d QM Co. 

8) 95th Maintenance Co. 

9) DLA 

10) LSE 

11) 54th QM Co. 

12) 41st Transportation Co. 

13) A Co., 601st ASB 

Appendix IV-29 357 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

k. The soldiers assigned to the following Commands fall under the SCMCA of Commander, 

82d Engineer Battalion. 

(1) HHC/82d (This includes all soldiers assigned to HHC, Engineer Brigade; MAC; 

BCCA; ATFE; 467th EN (Firefighter); HQ/142 EN CO) 

(2) A/82d 

(3) B/82d 

(4) C/82d 

(5) A/864th EN 

(6) 568th CSE 

l. The soldiers assigned to the following Commands fall under the SCMCA of Commander, 

2-63 Armor Battalion. 

(1) HHC 2-63 AR 

(2) A/2-63 AR 

m. The soldiers assigned to the following Commands fall under the SCMCA of Commander, 

67 Combat Surgical Hospital. 

(1) HQ/67 CSH (This includes soldiers assigned to 226 MEDLOG; 93d Dental 

Detachment; 64th MED; 64th VET; 133 Preventive MED; and any other soldiers assigned to the 

TF Falcon hospital) 

n. The soldiers assigned to the following Commands fall under the SCMCA of Commander, 

852 RAOC. 

o. The soldiers assigned to the following Commands fall under the SCMCA of the 

Commander, 121 Signal Battalion. 

(1) B/121 (This includes soldiers assigned to B/440 SIG; D/440 SIG and HHC/121) 

(2) 324th SIG (This includes soldiers assigned to HHD, 72d SIG; 58th SIG; and HHC, 7th 

SIG BGD) 

(3) 268th SIG 

n. The soldiers assigned to the following Commands fall under the SCMCA of the 

Commander, 15th PSYOP Battalion. 

(1) 350th PSYOP Company 

358 Appendix IV-29 
 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

(2) 321 PSYOP Company 

o. All soldiers assigned to 415th Civil Affairs Battalion (SCMCA) fall under the Commander, 

415th CA Battalion for both Company and Summary Court-Martial Authority. The soldiers 

assigned to the following Commands also fall under the SCMCA of the Commander, 415th CA 

Battalion. 

(1) 22d Public Affairs Detachment 

p. All soldiers assigned to the 852d RAOC fall under the Commander, 852d RAOC for both 

Company and Summary Court-Martial Authority. 

q. All soldiers assigned to SOCCE fall directly under the Commander 3d Brigade. 

4. All soldiers assigned to units not specifically mentioned in this jurisdictional memorandum 

are attached for UCMJ purposes to HHC, 3d Brigade until the unit can be incorporated into a 

subsequent memorandum. 

DISTRIBUTION: A CLINTON T. ANDERSON 

COL, AR 

 Deputy Commander 

Appendix IV-29 359 

 


 


 


 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

APPENDIX IV-30: GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 1 AND 

AMENDMENT
 

DTG is 290903Z JUN 99. 

CINC approved attached message for release as amended. 

AMENDMENT FOLLOWS: 

AMENDMENT OF GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 1 - EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY 

"General Order Number 1, HQ, EUCOM, issued 12 April 1999, is hereby 

amended and expanded as of the date of promulgation of this amendment, to 

apply, in addition to the operations cited, to all U.S. Forces in the named 

countries supporting NATO Operation Joint Guardian or related operations, or 

other units and elements who fall under the operational authority of 

USCINCEUR. General Order Number 1 does not apply to individuals serving in 

NATO positions." 

Wesley K. Clark 

General, U.S. Army 

Original General Order Number 1 is attached. 

01 01 122213Z APR 99 RR RR UUUU AT ZYUW ETCC 

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECCC// 

COMJTF NOBLE ANVIL//COM/DIR/J1/J2/J3/J4/J6/SJA// 

COMJTF SHINING HOPE//J1/J2/J3/J4/J6/SJA// 

CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGB/SJA// 

CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGC-O// 

COMUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE 

HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC/CE/DO/IN/XP/LG/JA// 

CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//OO/DOO/O1/N1/N3/N4/N5/N7/N9/JA// 

COMMARFOREUR HQ MARFOREUR BOEBLINGEN GE//G1// 

COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//J1/JA//
 

INFO JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J1/J2/J3/LC// 

SECDEF WASHINGTON DC 

CSA WASHINGTON DC 

DA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-ZC/ZCJ/JA// 

CNO WASHINGTON DC//N3/N5C/JA// 

CSAF WASHINGTON DC 

HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XO/XOO/XOJP/XOPX/XOOO/JA// 

CMC WASHINGTON DC//JA// 

CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J1/JA// 

USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//JA// 

HQ AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL//CC/DO// 

CDRUSASOC FT BRAGG NC 

USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL 

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI 

USAFE AOS RAMSTEIN AB GE//AOR/AOX/CAT-DIR//
 

COMSIXTHFLT//N3/JA// 

360 Appendix IV-30 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

COMNAVFOR JTF NOBLE ANVIL 

424 ABS RAF FAIRFORD UK 

16 AF AVIANO AB IT//CC/CV/DO// 

USAFE AMOCC RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC// 

CDR V CORPS HEIDELBERG GE//AETC-GC/AETV-GC-P// 

COMMARFORLANT//G1// 

JSOTF2 SAN VITO DEI NORMANNI AS IT//CC/DO// 

JSOTF2 BRINDISI AB IT 

CDR 1 10THSFGA BOEBLINGEN GE 

NAVSPECWARUNIT TWO 

352 SOG RAF MILDENHALL UK 

DISA EUR VAIHINGEN GE 

USNMR SHAPE BE 

HQ USEUCOM LO WASHINGTON DC 

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECCS/ECJ1/ECJ2/ECJ3// 

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4/ECJ5/ECJ6/ECJ35// 

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD/ECCH/ECMD/ECCM// 

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJA/ECPA/ECSM/ECRA// 

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ETCC/ECJ31/ECJ33// 

USCINCEUR ALT SHAPE BE//SPASAC// 

BT 

 UNCLAS 

OPER/NOBLE ANVIL/SHINING HOPE// 

MSGID/ORDER/USCINCEUR// 

ORDTYP/GENERAL ORDER/USCINCEUR// 

SUBJ:GENERAL ORDER 1 IN SUPPORT OF ALLIED FORCE AND HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS 

IN THE BALKANS (U)// 

TIMEZONE/Z// 

NARR/THIS IS A LAWFUL GENERAL ORDER APPROVED, ISSUED, PUBLISHED AND BY 

USCINCEUR.// 

GENTEXT// 

1. TITLE: PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES FOR U.S. PERSONNEL DEPLOYED IN THE 

REGION OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA IN SUPPORT OF ALLIED FORCE AND 

HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS IN THE BALKANS. 

2. AUTHORITY: TITLE 10 UNITED STATES CODE SECTION 164(C)(1)(F) AND 

THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE (UCMJ)(TITLE 10 UNITED STATES 

CODE SECTIONS 801-940). 

3. APPLICABILITY: THIS GENERAL ORDER IS APPLICABLE TO ALL U.S. 

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SERVING WITH OR ACCOMPANYING THE 

ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF NATO 

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE OR NATO HUMANITARIAN OPERATION ALLIED HARBOR, 

DEPLOYED TO THE LAND, TERRITORIAL SEAS AND AIRSPACE OF ALBANIA AND 

THE NATIONS WHICH FORMERLY COMPRISED THE NATION OF YUGOSLAVIA, TO 

INCLUDE CROATIA, BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, MACEDONIA, SERBIA AND 

MONTENEGRO. THIS GENERAL ORDER DOES NOT COVER INDIVIDUALS ASSIGNED 

OR ATTACHED TO SFOR. WITH REGARD TO MILITARY MEMBERS THIS GENERAL 

ORDER IS PUNITIVE. WITH REGARD TO CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IT MAY SERVE 

AS THE BASIS FOR ADVERSE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IN CASE OF VIOLATION 

OF ITS PROVISIONS. 

4. STATEMENT OF MILITARY PURPOSE AND NECESSITY: RESTRICTIONS UPON 

CERTAIN ACTIVITIES ARE ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN THE SECURITY, HEALTH 

AND WELFARE OF U.S. FORCES; TO PREVENT CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD 

ORDER AND DISCIPLINE OR OF A NATURE TO BRING DISCREDIT UPON THE U.S. 

FORCES; AND TO IMPROVE U.S. RELATIONS WITHIN THE REGION. THESE 

RESTRICTIONS ARE ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVE U.S. RELATIONS WITH HOST 

NATIONS AND OTHER FRIENDLY FORCES. FURTHERMORE, CURRENT OPERATIONS 

Appendix IV-30 361 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

PLACE U.S. ARMED FORCES IN COUNTRIES WHERE LOCAL LAW AND CUSTOMS 

PROHIBIT OR RESTRICT CERTAIN ACTIVITIES. THIS GENERAL ORDER TO 

ENSURE GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE ARE MAINTAINED AND HOST NATION LAWS 

ARE RESPECTED TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT CONSISTENT WITH MISSION 

ACCOMPLISHMENT. 

5. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES: 

5A. TAKING, POSSESSING, OR SHIPPING CAPTURED, FOUND OR PURCHASED 

WEAPONS WITHOUT LEGAL AUTHORITY OR FOR PERSONAL USE. "WITHOUT LEGAL 

AUTHORITY" MEANS AN ACT OR ACTIVITY UNDERTAKEN BY U.S. PERSONNEL 

THAT IS NOT DONE AT THE DIRECTION OF A COMMANDER OR AS A RESULT OF 

MILITARY NECESSITY DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF MILITARY DUTIES. 

5B. INTRODUCTION, POSSESSION, USE, SALE, TRANSFER, MANUFACTURE, OR 

CONSUMPTION OF ANY ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE OR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 

INDIVIDUALS ARE AUTHORIZED TO CONSUME ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES, E.G., 

TOASTS, WHENEVER REFUSAL TO DO SO WOULD OFFEND HOST NATION MILITARY 

OR CIVILIAN OFFICIALS. 

5C. POSSESSING, TOUCHING, USING, OR KNOWINGLY APPROACHING WITHOUT 

LEGAL AUTHORITY ANY UNEXPLODED MUNITIONS OR ORDNANCE, OF ANY KIND OR 

DESCRIPTION WHATSOEVER. 

5D. PURCHASE, POSSESSION, USE, SALE, OR INTRODUCTION OF PRIVATELY 

OWNED FIREARMS, AMMUNITION, AND EXPLOSIVES. 

5E. GAMBLING OF ANY KIND, INCLUDING BETTING ON SPORTS, LOTTERIES 

AND RAFFLES. 

5F. SELLING, BARTERING, OR EXCHANGING ANY CURRENCY OTHER THAN AT 

THE OFFICIAL HOST NATION EXCHANGE RATE. 

5G. ENTRANCE INTO A RELIGIOUS SHRINE OR MOSQUE UNLESS APPROVED BY 

OR DIRECTED BY MILITARY AUTHORITIES OR COMPELLED BY MILITARY 

NECESSITY. 

5H. REMOVING, POSSESSING, SELLING, TRANSFERRING, DEFACING, OR 

DESTROYING ARCHEOLOGICAL ARTIFACTS OR NATIONAL TREASURES. 

5I. PARTICIPATING IN ANY FORM OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF THE HOST 

NATION, UNLESS DIRECTED TO DO SO AS PART OF THE MISSION. 

5J. TAKING OR RETAINING PUBLIC OR PRIVATE PROPERTY AS SOUVENIRS OF 

THE OPERATION. LEGITIMATELY PURCHASED SOUVENIRS, OTHER THAN 

WEAPONS, MUNITIONS, OR ITEMS PROHIBITED BY CUSTOMS REGULATIONS ARE 

AUTHORIZED. 

6. PUNITIVE ORDER: TO REITERATE, THIS ORDER IS PUNITIVE. PERSONS 

SUBJECT TO THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE WHO VIOLATE THIS 

ORDER MAY BE PUNISHED UNDER ARTICLE 92, UCMJ, FOR VIOLATING A LAWFUL 

GENERAL ORDER. CIVILIANS ACCOMPANYING THE U.S. ARMED FORCES MAY 

FACE ADVERSE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS. 

7. INDIVIDUAL DUTY: PERSONS SUBJECT TO THIS GENERAL ORDER ARE 

CHARGED WITH THE INDIVIDUAL DUTY TO BECOME FAMILIAR WITH AND TO 

RESPECT, THE LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND CUSTOMS OF THE HOST NATION 

INSOFAR AS THEY DO NOT INTERFERE WITH THE EXECUTION OF THEIR 

OFFICIAL DUTIES. INDIVIDUAL ACTS OF DISRESPECT OR FLAGRANT 

VIOLATIONS OF HOST NATION LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND CUSTOMS MAY BE 

PUNISHED AS A VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ FOR MILITARY MEMBERS AND MAY 

LEAD TO ADVERSE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION AGAINST CIVILIANS WHO VIOLATE 

ITS PROVISIONS. COMMANDERS SHOULD REMIND SERVICEMEMBERS OF THEIR 

RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE 

INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT. 

8. UNIT COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITY: UNIT COMMANDERS AND SUPERVISORS 

ARE TO ENSURE THAT ALL PERSONNEL ARE BRIEFED ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS 

GENERAL ORDER. 

9. CONTRABAND: ITEMS DETERMINED TO VIOLATE THIS GENERAL ORDER MAY 

362 Appendix IV-30 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

BE CONSIDERED CONTRABAND AND MAY BE CONFISCATED. BEFORE DESTRUCTION 

OF CONTRABAND, COMMANDERS, OR LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL SHOULD 

COORDINATE WITH THEIR SERVICING STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE. 

10. EFFECTIVE DATE: THIS GENERAL ORDER IS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY. 

AN AMNESTY PERIOD OF 72 HOURS IS GRANTED, FROM THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF 

THIS GENERAL ORDER, FOR PERSONNEL TO SURRENDER OR DISPOSE OF ITEMS 

THAT VIOLATE THIS GENERAL ORDER. INDIVIDUALS OR COMMANDERS MAY 

ARRANGE FOR SAFEKEEPING OF PERSONAL FIREARMS WITH THEIR UNIT 

MILITARY LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY. THERE IS NO AMNESTY PERIOD FOR 

ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES. 

11. EXPIRATION: THIS GENERAL ORDER WILL EXPIRE UPON THE COMPLETION 

OF OPERATIONS UNLESS IT IS RESCINDED, WAIVED OR MODIFIED. 

12. WAIVER AUTHORITY: MISSION REQUIREMENTS MAY PERMIT AND HOST 

NATION TOLERANCE MAY ALLOW FOR THE CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL IN CERTAIN 

PORTIONS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. THEREFORE, AUTHORITY TO WAIVE 

OR MODIFY THE PROHIBITIONS OF THIS ORDER RELATIVE ONLY TO ALCOHOLIC 

BEVERAGES IS DELEGATED TO JOINT TASK FORCE COMMANDERS. WHEN WAIVER 

OR MODIFICATION IS GRANTED COMMANDERS WHO GRANT SUCH WAIVERS WILL 

NOTIFY DCINC USEUCOM IMMEDIATELY. REQUESTS FOR WAIVER OF OTHER 

PROVISIONS BEYOND THEIR AUTHORITY WILL BE DIRECTED TO DCINC USEUCOM. 

13. STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATES FOR THE WAIVER AUTHORITIES WILL PROVIDE 

THE USEUCOM JUDGE ADVOCATE WITH COPIES OF ALL WAIVERS GRANTED TO 

THIS ORDER. 

14. WHEN COMMANDERS INFORM SUBORDINATES OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS 

GENERAL ORDER, THEY WILL ALSO INFORM THEM THAT I AM PERSONALLY VERY 

PROUD OF THEIR COURAGE, PROFESSIONALISM AND DEDICATION TO DUTY UNDER 

VERY DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. MAKE NO MISTAKE ABOUT IT, THE TASKS 

WE ARE UNDERTAKING ARE DIFFICULT AND WILL CALL FOR PERSONAL 

SACRIFICE. NEVERTHELESS, I KNOW THAT WHEN OUR SERVICEMEMBERS ARE 

CALLED UPON TO MAKE PERSONAL SACRIFICES AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THEIR 

COUNTRY THEY ALWAYS PERFORM SELFLESSLY AND BRILLIANTLY. I CANNOT 

OVER-EMPHASIZE THE TRUST, FAITH AND CONFIDENCE I HAVE IN THEM. THEY 

WILL GET THE MISSION DONE WITH SKILL AND EXPERTISE OUT OF A SENSE OF 

DUTY AND PATRIOTISM. WHAT THEY ARE DOING THEY ARE DOING FOR 

AMERICA. I KNOW THAT WHEN PARTICIPANTS LOOK BACK ON THEIR ROLE IN 

THIS WORTHY ENDEAVOR, WHETHER IT BE FIGHTING FOR THEIR COUNTRY OR 

HELPING TO FEED AND CARE FOR THE DISPOSSESSED IN THIS STRIFE-TORN 

PART OF THE WORLD, THAT IT WILL BE WITH PRIDE. THEY WILL KNOW THAT 

THEIR SACRIFICE MADE A DIFFERENCE IN THE LIVES OF THOSE IN NEED. 

SIGNED, WESLEY K. CLARK, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, 

GENERAL, U.S. ARMY. 

BT 

Appendix IV-30 363 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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______________________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________________ 


 

	 

	 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

APPENDIX IV-31: WEAPONS DISCHARGE INVESTIGATION 

1. OFFICER CONDUCTING INVESTIGATION: _____________________________________ 

2. UNIT:__________________________ 3. DTG OF DISCHARGE: ____________________ 

4. TIME TOC NOTIFIED:_____________ 5. LOCATION OF DISCHARGE:______________ 

6. TYPE OF WEAPON: __________________ 7. # OF ROUNDS DISCHARGED:_________ 

8. RANK / NAME OF SOLDIER: ________________________________________________ 

9. RANK / NAME OF SENIOR LEADER PRESENT: _________________________________ 

Y N 

10.   Was discharge into a clearing barrel?

(If NO, describe circumstances surrounding discharge on reverse side of form.) 

11.   Was any property damaged? 

 US property (describe property) _______________________________________________ 

 Other KFOR property(describe property) ________________________________________ 

 Private property(describe property) ____________________________________________ 

Description of damage:__________________________________________________________ 

Y N 

12.   Was anyone injured? 

 U.S. soldier  Other KFOR soldier  Civilian (If known, nationality: ___________) 

Name: _____________________________________________________________ 

Unit (if military): _____________________________________________________________ 

Location of injured individual: _____________________________________________________ 

 Nature of injuries: _____________________________________________________________ 

13. WITNESS INFORMATION: 

a) Name: _____________________________________________________________ 

Unit (if military): _____________________________________________________________ 

b)	 Name: _____________________________________________________________ 

Unit (if military): _____________________________________________________________ 

c)	 Name: _____________________________________________________________ 

Unit (if military): _____________________________________________________________ 

14. ATTACHMENTS: 

 Statement of soldier discharging round (or DA 3881 Rights Warning Cerificate) 

 Statement of senior leader present 

 Statement(s) of any witness(es) 

15. ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENTS (witness statements, photographs, sketch of AO, etc.): 

a)_________________________________ c)________________________________________ 

b)_________________________________ d)________________________________________ 

16. UNIT ACTIONS TAKEN: 

CONTINUE INFORMATION FOR ANY SECTION ON THE BACK OF THIS PAGE. CLEARLY 

INDICATE THE SECTION THE INFORMATION APPLIES TO. PRINT NEATLY. 

364 Appendix IV-31 
 


 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

APPENDIX IV-32: HISTORICAL ARTIFACTS PROCESSING 

INFORMATION
 

REFERENCES: 

a. AR 608-4, Control and Registration of War Trophies, 28 August 1969. 

b. AR 870-20, Historical Activities: Museums and Artifacts, 11 January 1999. 

c. MESSAGE, Vice Chief of Staff, Army, Subject: Resource Stewardship—Control and 

Registration of War Trophy Firearms, DTG 281049Z APR 98. 

d. MESSAGE, DCSLOG, USAREUR, Subject: USAREUR Policy on Authorization of War 

Trophies and Historical Artifacts, DTG 131316Z JUL 99. 

f. Information Paper, AETV-BGJA-TFF, SUBJECT: War Trophies and Historical Artifacts, 

dated, 29 January 2000. (available on Outlook in public folders; subfolder “legal;” subfolder 

“info papers”) 

1. Units wishing to obtain permission to retain historical artifacts must submit their requests 

NLT____ to Task Force Falcon G-4, Attention__________. The Task Force G-4 will be the 

single source collector for all Task Force requests and will submit a consolidated Task Force 

Request through the appropriate channels IAW reference “d” above. 

2. A unit application for the retention of historical artifacts should include the following: 

a. Memorandum Requesting Retention of Historical Artifacts (see below) 

b. DA Form 2609 (for each item)

 c. Photograph of Each Item

 d. Signed Affidavit Listing all Weapons that were rendered inoperable (by whom, how, when 

and where) 

3. The memorandum requesting retention of historical artifacts should include the following: 

a. Nomenclature/ Description of each Item

 b. Serial Numbers/ Markings 

c. Acquired Locations/ Dates 

d. Sources/ how each item was obtained (Gift, Captured, Seized, Abandoned, etc.) 

e. Current Locations 

f. Proposed holding Site in Garrison (reference AR 870-20) 

g. Disposition Requested (unit wants to retain items and wants Chief, Military History 

approval) 

h. Name of Artifact Responsible Officer (ARO) who will be the hand-receipt holder of the 

items

 i. Proposed hold site 

j. Brief description of the items' historical significance 

Appendix IV-32 365 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

k. If the requesting unit’s home station is in Germany the memorandum should be signed by 

the Commander and addressed as follows: 

THRU: 

Commander, Task Force Falcon, APO AE 09340 

 Commander, First Infantry Division, APO AE 09036 

USAREUR ODCSLOG Supply Division, Unit 29351, Attn: AEAGD-SD-GSB, 

APO AE 09014 

FOR Commander, U. S. Army Center of Military History, Attn: DAMH-MD, 103rd 

Avenue, Fort McNair, Washington, D. C. 20319-5058 

l. If the unit’s home station is NOT located in Germany, the Memorandum should be 

addressed as follows: 

THRU: 

 Commander, Task Force Falcon, APO AE 09340 

 USAREUR ODCSLOG Supply Division, Unit 29351, Attn: AEGD-SD-GSB, 

APO AE 09014 

FOR Commander, U. S. Army Center of Military History, Attn: DAMH-MD, 103rd 

 Avenue, Fort McNair, Washington, D. C. 203190-5058 

3. Units are reminded that the USAREUR Commander has restricted unit requests to 3 items per 

Battalion. Separate companies should not request more than 2 items. No vehicles may be 

included in the requests. 

4. Units are further reminded that until approved by the Center for Military History, items may 

not be removed from Kosovo. Units that remove items without the proper approval will be 

considered in violation of General Order Number 1, and punitive action may be taken against 

individuals determined to be in violation of this General Order. 

366 Appendix IV-32 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

APPENDIX IV-33: COMMANDER’S ASSESSMENT OF USE OF LETHAL 

FORCE
 

Appendix IV-33 367 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 
 

368 Appendix IV-33 

 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 

Appendix IV-33 369
 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 
 

370 Appendix IV-33 

 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

Appendix IV-34: MOU UAE and USAREUR
 

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 

BETWEEN 

THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE 

OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 

AND 

THE COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE AND SEVENTH 

ARMY (USAREUR/7A) 

CONCERNING 

THE ATTACHMENT OF UNITED ARAB EMIRATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS 

FORCES, AH64 (C) APACHES AND CREWS, AND JORDANIAN SPECIAL 

OPERATIONS FORCES, TO A UNITED STATES ARMY FORCE FOR 

PARTICIPATION IN OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................................................................371 

SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS ..........................................................................................................................374 

SECTION 2. PURPOSE..................................................................................................................................375 

SECTION 3. SCOPE .......................................................................................................................................375 

SECTION 4. SELECTION AND TRAINING OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. ..........................375 

SECTION 5. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS......................................................376 

SECTION 6. USE OF FACILITIES ..............................................................................................................377 

SECTION 7. JURISDICTION AND OPERATIONS ..................................................................................377 

SECTION 8. SECURITY / INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT ..........................................................................378 

SECTION 9. UNIFORM.................................................................................................................................378 

SECTION 10. SIGNS AND MARKINGS .......................................................................................................378 

SECTION 11. FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS.................................................................................................379 

Appendix IV-34 371 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

SECTION 12. AIRCRAFT AND VEHICLE MISHAPS ...............................................................................379 

SECTION 13. LIABILITY AND CLAIMS.....................................................................................................379 

SECTION 14. DISPUTES.................................................................................................................................380 

SECTION 15. EFFECTIVE DATE, AMENDMENT, AND TERMINATION............................................380 

ANNEX A TO THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT (MOA) BETWEEN UNITED STATES ARMY
 

EUROPE AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES MINISTER OF DEFENSE CONCERNING THE 

ATTACHMENT OF UNITED ARAB EMIRATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, AH-64(C ) APACHES 

AND CREWS, AND JORDANIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, TO A UNITED STATES ARMY TASK 

FORCE FOR PARTICIPATION IN OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN .............................................................380 

A. GENERAL. ..................................................................................................................................................381 

B. CONCEPT OF SUPPORT. ..............................................................................................................................381 

C. LOGISTICS AUTOMATION. ..........................................................................................................................381 

D. CLASSES OF SUPPLY...................................................................................................................................381 

E. SERVICES. ..................................................................................................................................................383 

F. MAINTENANCE...........................................................................................................................................383 

G. COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT......................................................................................................................383 

H. ADDITIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT.............................................................................................................384 

APPENDIX 1: SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS TO US LIAISON COORDINATION ELEMENT (LCE) .384 

APPENDIX 2: CONFIGURATION OF UAE AIRCRAFT AND RESPONSIBILITIES .............................384 

APPENDIX 3: TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR UAE AVIATORS CONDUCTING AVIATION 

OPERATIONS WITH US ARMY AVIATORS ..................................................................................................385 

I. TAB 1, APPENDIX 3: UAE TRAINING ASSISTANCE PLAN .................................................................386 

372 Appendix IV-34 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 

BETWEEN 

THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE 

OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 

AND 

THE COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE AND SEVENTH 

ARMY (USAREUR/7A) 

CONCERNING 

THE ATTACHMENT OF UNITED ARAB EMIRATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS 

FORCES, AH64 (C) APACHES AND CREWS, AND JORDANIAN SPECIAL 

OPERATIONS FORCES, TO A UNITED STATES ARMY FORCE FOR 

PARTICIPATION IN OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN 

PREAMBLE: The Minister of Defense of the United Arab Emirates, represented by the 

Commander, United Arab Emirate Task Force (UAE TF) and the Commanding General, United 

States Army, Europe & Seventh Army, represented by the ODCSRM, Agreements Division, 

United States Army, Europe and Seventh Army (USAREUR/7A), hereinafter referred to as “the 

Parties,” 

Considering the attachment of Special Operations Forces and AH–64 (C) helicopters 

from the UAE and Jordan to a US Army unit participating in Operation Joint Guardian; 

Taking into account United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, 

which authorizes the establishment of an international security presence in Kosovo; 

Further recognizing the applicability of the Military Technical Agreement between the 

International Security force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

and the Republic of Serbia of 9 June 1999 which establishes the authority, privileges, and 

obligations of the international security force in Kosovo; 

Taking note of separate foreign military sales arrangements between the Parties, in 

existence or under negotiation, which will govern the provision of reimbursable logistic support 

to UAE forces; 

Taking further note of negotiations between the Parties to establish an Acquisition and 

Cross–Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which, in certain circumstances, might be used as a further 

means of providing logistic support, 

Have agreed as follows: 

Appendix IV-34 373 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS 

For purposes of this MOA the following definitions apply: 

a. Designated personnel: All special operations forces, aircrews, technicians, and other 

personnel deploying as part of the UAE TF. 

b. Designated equipment: The aircraft and all other equipment deployed in support of 

the designated personnel. 

c. Host Unit: USAREUR. 

d. National authorities: The United States of America or the United Arab Emirates. 

e. MOA: Memorandum of Agreement. 

f. UAE TF: United Arab Emirates Task Force. 

g. Combined mission: OPCON of designated personnel and equipment to TF Falcon. 

h. UAE TF SOF Company: Combined United Arab Emirates and Jordanian Special 

Operations Forces task organized into one company under UAE command. 

i. MNB(E): Multi-National Brigade (East). 

j. OPCON: Operational control - Transferable command authority that may be 

exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. 

Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control 

may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate 

forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating 

objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational 

control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training 

necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be 

exercised through the commanders of subordinated organizations. Normally this authority is 

exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component 

commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and 

forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary 

to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include 

authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, 

or unit training. 

k. TACON: Tactical Control - Command authority over assigned or attached forces or 

commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the 

detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to 

accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. 

Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of 

combatant command. Tactical control allows commanders below combatant command level to 

374 Appendix IV-34 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

apply force and direct the tactical use of logistical assets but does not provide authority to 

change organizational structure or direct administrative and logistical support. 

l. ADCON: Administrative Control. Direction or authority exercised over subordinate 

or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service 

forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and 

unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included 

in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. 

m. Task Force Battalion Commander: Designated US Maneuver Battalion 

Commander in support of TF Falcon. 

n. KFOR: Kosovo Forces. 

o. TF Falcon: Task Force Falcon. 

SECTION 2. PURPOSE 

This MOA sets forth a program for the assignment of designated personnel and equipment to the 

Host Unit, and from the Host Unit onward. This MOA enables the participation of designated 

personnel and equipment in a US Army combined mission within the framework of Operation 

Joint Guardian in Kosovo. 

SECTION 3. SCOPE 

3.1 This MOA sets forth the general terms and conditions which will govern the participation of 

designated personnel and equipment in Operation Joint Guardian. Specific logistics support 

terms and conditions will be provided by separate Foreign Military Sales (FMS) arrangements, 

or by an Acquisition and Cross–Servicing Agreement (ACSA) (under negotiation), between the 

Parties. 

3.2 No provision of this MOA will supersede the terms of any existing lease arrangements 

between the National Authorities or the Parties. The terms contained in such lease arrangements 

will remain in effect and control in the event of conflict with any provision contained in this 

MOA. 

SECTION 4. SELECTION AND TRAINING OF PERSONNEL AND 

EQUIPMENT. 

4.1 The UAE SOF Commander is solely responsible for the selection of designated personnel 

and equipment for deployment. 

4.2 Aviation training requirements will be in accordance with UAE Aviation Training 

Assistance Plan. See Appendix 3. 

4.3 The UAE TF will assign a total of up to 125 SOF personnel, 12 pilots, 25 technicians and 

6xAH-64 aircraft for the mission. USAREUR will provide a Training Assistance Team to assist 

Appendix IV-34 375 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

UAE authorities with: 

a. Pre-deployment training in UAE prior to deployment or immediately upon arrival at 

TF Falcon in the subjects of mine awareness training, Kosovo area orientation, in-country brief, 

weapons clearing/safety, heat/cold injury training, and NATO KFOR Rules of Engagement 

(ROE) briefings. 

b. Aviation Phase One - 16 hours of aviation orientation, instruction, and "round table 

discussion" in UAE. 

c. Aviation Phase Two - 5 day detailed familiarization training with the Army Airspace 

Command and Control (A2C2), route review, sector boundaries, Aircrew Procedures Guide 

(APG), Search and Rescue (SAR) briefing, and mission overview in AOR prior to conducting 

operational flying missions. 

4.4 The TF Falcon Commander will ensure that the designated personnel are trained and ready 

for deployment and operations as part of TF Falcon, and the selected crews meet entry level 

aviation training standards and qualifications. 

SECTION 5. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS 

5.1 Transfer of Authority (TOA) over UAE personnel will occur upon debarkation in NATO 

KFOR Area of Responsibility (AOR). The AOR includes Albania, Greece, Former Yugoslav 

Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and Kosovo. OPCON over designated personnel will be 

exercised by the TF Falcon Commander (Commander MNB(E)). 

5.2 The command relationship between the TF Falcon Commander and designated personnel 

will be in accordance with SACEUR OPLAN 10413. It is agreed that this command relationship 

must provide the TF Falcon Commander the proper latitude to integrate and employ the 

designated personnel and equipment into TF Falcon as fully as possible. 

5.3 It is understood by all participants to this MOA that the Rules of Engagement (ROE) to be 

employed during this operation are the NATO KFOR ROE (currently described and detailed in 

Annex E (ROE) to SHAPE OPLAN 10413). 

5.4 The UAE TF Commander will deploy with at least one (preferably two) member(s) of the 

TAFT to serve as a facilitator between the UAE element and the Aviation Task Force 

Commander. 

5.5 The UAE TF Commander will provide an LNO to the Aviation Task Force Commander for 

the duration of the operation. This LNO shall be a pilot fluent in English and capable of 

performing flight duties. 

5.6 In accordance with Serial 27-xx of the NATO KOSOVO SOR, SOCEUR will provide a 

regionally–focused Liaison and Coordination Element (LCE) consisting of up to 15 Army 

Special Forces personnel. SOCEUR has agreed that the mission of the LCE will be to advise 

and assist the UAE SOF Company Commander and improve the overall integration of the UAE 

376 Appendix IV-34 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

SOF Company into the MNB(E) structure. The LCE will operate under OPCON of Commander 

Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) TF Falcon, and TACON to Task 

Force Ground Maneuver, Commander. SOCCE TF Falcon will have no command and control 

authority over the UAE SOF Company. 

5.7 The UAE TF SOF Company will be employed primarily to support one or more of the 

following missions: 

a. Mounted Reconnaissance Patrolling. 

b. Dismounted Reconnaissance Patrolling. 

c. Convoy Security. 

d. Direct Action. 

e. Special Reconnaissance. 

5.8 The TF Falcon Commander and the UAE TF Commander will mutually agree on how 

religious holidays and customs will be accommodated within the needs of TF Falcon's mission 

and operational tempo. 

SECTION 6. USE OF FACILITIES 

6.1 All quality of life facilities normally available to US members of TF Falcon will ultimately 

be available to the assigned designated personnel. This includes, but is not limited to, MWR and 

AAFES facilities. 

6.2. The UAE TF Commander will coordinate the use of all other facilities (e.g. maintenance 

clamshells) with the TF Falcon Commander. In the event UAE requirements for such facilities 

exceed TF Falcon capabilities, the UAE may request support be provided via the sustainment 

contractor in accordance with Annex A, Section H, Additional Contract Support. 

SECTION 7. JURISDICTION AND OPERATIONS 

7.1 The UAE TF Commander will at all times retain jurisdiction and authority over designated 

personnel for military justice and other disciplinary or administrative measures. The TF Falcon 

Commander may request that designated personnel be removed from their duties. Such a request 

will specify the reasons for the request, and will be directed to the UAE TF Commander. 

7.2 Designated personnel will respect the regulations, orders, instructions, and customs of the 

US Army and Host Unit insofar as they are applicable and consistent with laws or regulations of 

the United Arab Emirates government and service. 

7.3 Designated personnel will be tasked to perform duties equal to those performed by US Army 

personnel of the same rank, and/or who perform the same duties. 

Appendix IV-34 377 
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7.4 UAE TF personnel are authorized to fly on US Military aircraft for missions in support of 

TF Falcon in the TF Falcon AOR. 

SECTION 8. SECURITY / INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT 

8.1 All communications, aircraft survivability equipment (ASE) loads, and other 

secure/cryptological material will be loaned by the US to the extent possible and permissible 

under applicable US law and FMS cases. The designated personnel will deploy with their 

organic hardware, in accordance with the guidance given in NSA message 091955Z Jul 99 

(NOTAL). 

8.2 All mission essential information, normally required for mission accomplishment by nonNATO KFOR personnel conducting operations in MNB(E), will be releasable to the designated 

personnel on the same basis as to KFOR personnel. 

8.3 The provisioning US encryption equipment will be from CECOM. The temporary transfer 

of the said encryption equipment will be done in the AOR in the form of a hand receipt to the 

designated UAE COMSEC Responsible Officer(s). The equipment will be installed, maintained 

and removed only by US contract personnel. UAE COMSEC equipment will be keyed only on a 

mission by mission basis, to include IFF MODE 4 codes. All keying of COMSEC equipment 

will be done by properly cleared US personnel. Upon mission completion, the COMSEC 

equipment will be cleared (zeroized) of COMSEC codes by US personnel. Upon completion of 

the overall mission, COMSEC equipment and ASE equipment will be returned to US standard 

logistic channels prior to UAE aircraft departing for home station (HS). 

8.4. UAE will pass clearances through USDAO from the American Embassy in UAE. 

Clearance Certificate will be filed with USAREUR, ODCSINT, AEAGB-CI-S, Unit 29351, 

APO AE 09063. UAE individuals will have the equivalent of a SECRET clearance. Designated 

personnel will have access to all TF Falcon intelligence products up to SECRET RELEASABLE 

KFOR. 

SECTION 9. UNIFORM 

9.1 Designated personnel will wear their own distinctive UAE duty uniform. 

9.2 The order of dress for any occasion is to be that which most nearly conforms to the order for 

TF Falcon. TF Falcon guidelines will be observed concerning the wearing of civilian clothes. 

9.3 Designated personnel will adhere to the same force protection uniform standards as US 

Army personnel. 

SECTION 10. SIGNS AND MARKINGS 

UAE vehicles will be painted woodland green camouflage pattern and display UAE and KFOR 

markings. Aircraft will display their own distinctive markings and the KFOR markings. 

378 Appendix IV-34 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

SECTION 11. FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS 

11.1 Pricing, invoicing, and payment for all reimbursable logistic support shall be in accordance 

with the terms and conditions set forth in separate FMS cases, or an ACSA, should one be 

concluded between the Parties. Orders for, and deliveries of, supplies and services under FMS 

cases or an ACSA shall be documented, recorded, and reported on the required forms and in 

accordance with applicable laws and regulations. 

11.2 Pay and allowances for designated personnel are the responsibility of the UAE. Pay and 

allowances will not be paid or reimbursed by TF Falcon or the US government. 

11.3 The UAE assumes all responsibility for costs incurred by the Jordanian element. 

11.4 Currency to be used in the TF Falcon AOR will be US Dollars or Deutsche Marks. 

11.5 The UAE will reimburse the Host Unit for one contract accounting technician hired to 

track and account for expenses incurred in support of UAE TF. 

SECTION 12. AIRCRAFT AND VEHICLE MISHAPS 

12.1 Any aircraft and vehicle accident, incident or mishap occurring under this MOA involving 

designated personnel and/or equipment will be investigated in accordance with US procedures 

and the applicable laws and regulations of the appropriate national authority. 

12.2 In the event of an aircraft or vehicle accident, incident or mishap, only US personnel will 

recover and secure all aircraft COMSEC material. 

12.3 Safety investigations identified in any situation above will be conducted jointly by the 

Parties’ designated representatives. 

12.4 The appropriate national authority will conduct collateral investigations. 

12.5 The Parties agree that a Commander or other competent authority may lawfully direct 

members of their government to conduct investigations relating to third party claims brought 

against their government as a result of aircraft or vehicle mishaps. The Parties further agree that 

they will, to the extent practicable, cooperate with the persons directed to conduct such an 

investigation. 

SECTION 13. LIABILITY AND CLAIMS 

13.1 The Parties agree to waive all claims against one another, other than contractual claims, for 

any property damage, loss, or destruction of property belonging to the other Party’s armed 

forces, or for death or injury to a Party’s military and civilian personnel, if such damage, death, 

or injury was caused or experienced in the course of official duties performed under or related to 

this MOA.. 

13.2 Each Party is solely responsible for third party claims asserted against it for any property 

Appendix IV-34 379 
 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

damage, death, personal injury, or medical care caused by that Party. In cases in which 

responsibility for property damage, death, personal injury, or medical care cannot be clearly 

affixed to one Party exclusively, the Parties shall consult to determine an appropriate cost– 

sharing apportionment. 

13.3 For purposes of resolving claims, the specific terms of the applicable FMS arrangement, or 

ACSA if one is concluded between the Parties, will govern in the case of any inconsistency or 

contradiction between this MOA and the applicable FMS arrangement or ACSA. 

SECTION 14. DISPUTES 

Disputes arising under or relating to this MOA will be resolved only by consultation between the 

Participants and will not be referred to an individual, a national or international tribunal, or any 

other forum for settlement. 

SECTION 15. EFFECTIVE DATE, AMENDMENT, AND TERMINATION 

15.1 This MOA will become effective upon the date of the last signature affixed. 

15.2 This MOA may be amended by the mutual consent of the Parties. All amendments will be 

in writing, and will become effective upon the date of the last written approval. 

15.3 This MOA may be terminated by mutual consent of both Parties, or unilaterally by 

providing 60-day advance notice, in writing, to the other Party indicating the intention to 

terminate the MOA. Neither the notice to terminate, nor an actual termination, will absolve a 

Party of financial obligations owed to the other Party, when such obligations were: 

a. Incurred pursuant to this MOA for logistic support; or, 

b. Otherwise incurred in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in separate 

FMS cases, or an ACSA, should one be concluded between the Parties. 

15.4 The above represents the understandings reached between the representatives of the 

Minister of Defense of the United Arab Emirates and USAREUR/7A. 

COMPLETED ON_____________ , IN DUPLICATE, IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. 

FOR USAREUR/7A FOR THE UNITED ARAB ERIRATES 

ANNEX A TO THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT (MOA) BETWEEN 

UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 

380 Appendix IV-34 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

MINISTER OF DEFENSE CONCERNING THE ATTACHMENT OF UNITED 

ARAB EMIRATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, AH-64(C ) APACHES 

AND CREWS, AND JORDANIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, TO A 

UNITED STATES ARMY TASK FORCE FOR PARTICIPATION IN 

OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN 

A. GENERAL. 

All requests for logistical support, supplies and services described in this Annex 

(Sections B through F, below) will be requested and provided only in accordance with 

separate Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases or an Acquisition & Cross Servicing 

Agreement (ACSA) should one be concluded between the Parties. The Parties shall 

accomplish pricing, invoicing and payment for all reimbursable logistics support in 

accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the appropriate FMS case or, if 

applicable, ACSA. 

B. CONCEPT OF SUPPORT. 

USAREUR will delegate the administrative authority for the logistics support, supplies 

and services described in this Annex to UAE TF on a reimbursable basis in accordance 

with the terms and conditions set forth in the appropriate FMS case or, if applicable, 

ACSA. 

C. LOGISTICS AUTOMATION. 

1. UAE TF will be integrated into the Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS), which 

will allow it to process automated requests for required materiel and equipment. 

2. HQDA will provide UAE TF with a Unit Identification Code (UIC). 

3. USAREUR will obtain Department of Defense Activity Address Codes 

(DODAACs) for UAE TF after it has been assigned a UIC. 

4. USAREUR will initiate a contract to provide UAE TF with ULLS-A, ULLS-G 

and ULLS-S4 capabilities. Automation hardware and an operator trained in all three 

systems will be provided via contract. USAREUR will provide ULLS software. 

D. CLASSES OF SUPPLY. 

1. Class I (Food/Water). USAREUR will provide UAE TF with Class I in the 

form of bottled water and MREs, T-pack or Class A rations. 

2. Class II (Clothing, Office/Administrative/Housekeeping Supplies, Tools, maps 

and Geospatial Information). UAE TF will requisition any required Class II items. 

a. Organizational Clothing & Individual Equipment (OCIE). UAE TF 

Appendix IV-34 381 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

personnel will deploy with some of their OCIE requirements. UAE TF may requisition 

additional OCIE requirements (e.g. cold weather clothing) via its ULLS-S4 account. TF 

Falcon will not provide OCIE. 

b. Chemical Defense Equipment (CDE). UAE TF personnel will deploy 

with individual CDE (to include protective masks and filters). UAE TF may requisition 

additional CDE items, except protective masks, via its ULLS-S4 account. 

c. Aviation Life Support Equipment (ALSE). UAE TF will deploy with 

ALSE, but may requisition additional ALSE items via its ULLS-S4 account. 

3. Class III(P) (Packaged Petroleum Products). UAE TF will deploy with Class 

III(P). UAE TF will requisition replenishment stocks via its ULLS-G account. 

4. Class III(B) (Bulk Petroleum Products). USAREUR will provide UAE TF with 

bulk petroleum. 

5. Class IV (Barrier/Construction Materiel). UAE TF will requisition Class IV 

items via its ULLS-S4 account. 

6. Class V (Ammunition). 

a. UAE TF will be responsible for providing all required ammunition less 

DODICs specifically made available for its use via FMS or, if applicable, an ACSA. 

b. Requests for Class V not available to UN forces, but required to support 

missions approved and directed by the Commander, TF Falcon, will be provided if 

available following HQs USAREUR approval. 

7. Class VI (Personal Demand Items). UAE TF personnel may purchase Class VI 

items from AAFES facilities collocated with TF Falcon. 

8. Class VII (Major Items of Equipment). USAREUR will loan UAE TF the Class 

VII items identified below. USAREUR will attempt to satisfy additional UAE TF 

equipment requirements via loan if the equipment it requests is available. 

a. SINCGARS “B” Kits. USAREUR will loan UAE TF (7) RT-1476/ARC201(V) or RT 1476A/ARC-201A(V) radios. 

b. PRC-112 Radios. USAREUR in accordance with the terms of FMS case 

will lease or sell UAE TF these survival radios. 

c. GARMIN GPS XLS. UAE TF will purchase its GPS requirements 

directly from the vendor. 

9. Class VIII (Medical Supplies). UAE TF may submit requests for Class VIII(A) 

382 Appendix IV-34 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

and VIII(B) items required to support its forces. 

10. Class IX (Repair Parts). UAE TF may requisition repair parts for its aircraft or 

ground equipment using its ULLS-A and ULLS-G accounts, respectively. 

E. SERVICES. 

1. Base Operations (BASOP) Support. USAREUR will ultimately provide the 

UAE TF with billeting, bath/shower and laundry support at a quality consistent with that 

provided US forces. 

2. Mortuary Affairs. The UAE TF will be responsible for all providing all aspects 

of mortuary affairs support in case of UAE TF fatalities. 

3. Army/Air Force Exchange System (AAFES) and Morale, Welfare and 

Recreation (MWR) Support. Designated personnel will be authorized access to all 

AAFES and MWR facilities in the TF Falcon AOR. 

4. Medical Services. USAREUR will provide UAE TF with medical support 

consistent with that provided US forces. The UAE TF will, however, be responsible for 

strategic aeromedical evacuation. 

F. MAINTENANCE. 

1. Aircraft. 

a. The UAE TF is responsible for all scheduled and unscheduled 

AVUM/AVIM-level maintenance. 

b. The UAE TF is responsible for configuration control of its aircraft. 

USAREUR ICW UAE TF will install COMSEC/ASE “A” Kits in UAE TF AH-64s. “A” 

Kits will be installed prior to UAE TF’s deployment if possible. 

2. Ground Equipment. 

a. UAE TF is responsible for all organizational through depot level 

scheduled and unscheduled maintenance. 

b. USAREUR will provide UAE TF with emergency vehicle recovery upon 

request. 

G. COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT. 

1. The UAE TF will be responsible for bringing its aircraft to US communications 

standards. 

2. The UAE TF will comply with US regulations regarding the use of US 

Appendix IV-34 383 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

provided communications equipment. 

3. USAREUR will provide appropriate communications connectivity to the UAE 

TF SOF element. 

H. ADDITIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT. 

1. The UAE TF may elect to establish contracts to provide, maintain and/or 

operate its facilities and equipment (e.g. to provide facilities for its headquarters, 

administrative support, storage, maintenance activities or other operational needs such as 

helipads and parking areas; or to augment its air/ground maintenance capabilities). UAE 

TF will process requests for contractor support through the TF Falcon Joint Acquisition 

Review Board (JARB). 

2. Any interpreters and accounting personnel needed to support UAE TF will be 

provided by USAREUR under separate contract and reimbursed by the UAE TF. 

APPENDIX 1: Support Requirements to US Liaison Coordination Element 

(LCE) 

General: this appendix is intended to capture support requirements for the US LCE 

assigned to support UAE TF SOF Company. It is understood that the LCE is required for 

effective integration of the UAE TF SOF Company, and that the LCE would not be 

required but for the presence of the UAE elements. Accordingly, the UAE agrees to: 

1. Reimburse the USSOCOM for transportation from USA to Kosovo Aerial Port of 

Embarkation and return of 15 USSOF personnel, plus their individual and organizational 

equipment. 

2. Reimburse the USSOCOM for transportation to and from Kosovo Aerial Port of 

Embarkation of three M1114 HUMMVs. 

3. Include the USSOF LCE as part of the UAE TF SOF DODDAC to capture cost for 

spare parts, consumables and maintenance. 

APPENDIX 2: Configuration of UAE Aircraft and Responsibilities 

Configuration of UAE Aircraft Responsible Party 

UAE Aircraft plumbed for ESSS 

Operations 

UAE 

Aux tank – One (1) per aircraft UAE 

Hellfire launchers – Two (2) per aircraft UAE 

Rocket pods – One per aircraft UAE 

384 Appendix IV-34 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

SINCGARS – installation of 3 A Kits USAREUR/CECOM/OLR 

SINCGARS Radios – loan of two 

RT1476/ARC–201(V) or RT– 

1476A/ARC–201A(V) radios 

USAREUR/CECOM/OLR 

GPS – installation of antenna per aircraft UAE 

GPS – installation of LRU (B–kit) per 

aircraft 

UAE 

ASE– and COMSEC–equipment – 

installation B–kits 

UAE 

ASE– and COMSEC–equipment – 

loading/unloading data–keys 

USAREUR 

Fire Control Computer (FCC) – installation 

of higher standard equipment (–9 or 

higher) per aircraft 

N/R EGI Equipped 

Modification Work Orders for Turret 

Control Boxes 

N/R EGI Equipped 

Roundel marking UAE 

KFOR marking USG 

TEAC 8MM Video Recorders UAE/CECOM (expedited delivery) 

AMPS Map Data Base CDs USAREUR 

APPENDIX 3: Training Requirements for UAE Aviators Conducting 

Aviation Operations with US Army Aviators 

1. References. 

a. AR 95–1. 

b. TC 1–210. 

c. Applicable Aircrew Training Manual. 

2. Commanders Evaluation. 

a. Records review. The purpose is to assess previous aircrew qualification and 

training and to establish Individual Aircrew Training Folders (IATF) and Individual 

Flight Records Folders (IFRF). 

b. If the folders already exist then they are to be inspected by the gaining unit to 

insure records standardization and to make the appropriate assignment entries. 

Appendix IV-34 385 

 

	 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

c. Commanders will verify that previous relevant qualifications and training are 

properly documented on the appropriate forms prior to any flights with UAE aviators. 

3. Gunnery Training. The UAE aviators will meet the same requirements per TC 1– 

210 and FM 1–140 as the US Army aviators, including a live–fire Table VIII. 

4. Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT). The UAE aviators will be ACT trained 

using the US Army ACT program of instruction (POI). Documentation of having 

completed the US Army ACT training within the previous year is sufficient. If it was has 

been more than one year since completing the US Army ACT training a refresher 

academics class is required. 

5. Continuation Training. UAE aviators will meet the same Readiness Level (RL) 1 

continuation training requirements as the US Army aviators while assigned to the US 

unit. 

6. Authorization for Flight. Only the Aviation Task Force Commander (LTC or 

above) will approve the mixing of US and UAE aircrews for orientation flights, missions 

and maintenance test flight purposes. 

a. Only US Instructor Pilots (IPs or SIPs) or Maintenance Test Pilots (MTPs) will 

be authorized to fly in an UAE aircraft. 

b. UAE aviators may only fly US aircraft with a US Instructor Pilot (IPs or SIPs) or 

a US Maintenance Test Pilot (MTP). 

I. TAB 1, APPENDIX 3: UAE TRAINING ASSISTANCE PLAN 

1. The UAE training assistance will take place in two phases. The first phase (time 

permitting) will be given to the entire UAE Aviation TF in their home station in 

UAE. The second phase will consist of a 5-10 day period in Camp Able Sentry 

(CAS), Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) dedicated to formal 

“right seat” rides to familiarize the UAE pilots and leadership with the mission, 

routes and procedures for supporting the Aviation Task Force. 

2. Phase One is envisioned to be based around 16 hours of orientation, instruction and 

“round table discussion” in UAE. The briefing team would consist of the USAREUR 

Aviation Assistance Team - Corps Aviation Safety & Standards Division (CASSD). 

The broad topic areas included in Phase One are as follows: 

a. General Area Data Video and/or photos of: 

(1) Camp Able Sentry (CAS) 

386	 Appendix IV-34 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

(2) Camps Bondsteele/Monteith 

(3) Skopje Airfield 

(4) Living conditions in general 

(5) Video/Photo Tour of US AOR 

(6) Weather extremes (winter and summer) 

b. Theater Specific Aviation Topics 

(1) Mountain Flying Techniques 

(2) Aircrew Procedural Guide (APG) – Copies provided 

(3) KFOR Landing Sites 

(4) Map Preparation 

(a) Map Issue (6-8 sets) if available, 1:50,000, 1:100,000, & 1:250,000 

(b) Hazard Overlay 

(c) Route/Check Point Overlay 

(5) SPINS/ACO/ATO/NOTAMS (Declassified Copies for instructional purposes) 

(6) Rules of Engagement (unclassified overview only) 

(7) Communications Plan 

c. Individual Aviator Topics 

(1) Records Review 

(2) ISOPREP Instruction (to be filled out in CAS) 

(3) SAR Procedures 

(4) PRC-90 and PRC-112 Operations 

(5) Handheld (Garmin) GPS overview 

(6) Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT) – Given by TAFT if possible 

(7) Unique aspects of Performance Planning (PPC) for Kosovo 

Appendix IV-34 387 
	 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

d. AH-64 Specific topics 

(1) Intro to KFOR mission 

(2) Mission Video Tapes 

(3) Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) use (dependant on configuration) 

(4) Mission Profiles: 

(a) Performance 

(b) Blackout Operations 

(c) 2-1/1-1 Avn TACTICAL SOPS 

(d) Terrain and Weather Issues 

(e) Lessons Learned 

(f) Ammunition Configuration 

(g) FARP operations 

(h) ERFS Qualification and Flight 

3. Phase Two – Will consist of detailed mission overview, route review culminating in 

formal “right seat rides” given by US AH-64 instructor pilots to the UAE pilots in 

UAE aircraft. Additional subjects will include: inter alia, Condensed Individual 

Readiness Training (IRT), weapons clearing/safety, Heat/Cold injury training, SAR 

Review, and Classified ROE briefings. 

4. The above POI is not all-inclusive and is subject to mutually agreed upon 

modifications. 

388	 Appendix IV-34 
 


 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

APPENDIX IV-35: JARB OPERATIONS 

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS 

1. Purpose. Proper stewardship is vital in preserving resources for future use. In order to ensure that 

requirements for contingency operations are reviewed at the appropriate level, a Joint Acquisition Review 

Board (JARB) process will be utilized. The JARB ensures that all expenditures are for bona-fide needs 

and reflect the Best Value to the United States to accomplish the mission and achieve required 

standards. 

2. The Process. The JARB performs several functions and will review all requirements that may cost 

$2,500.00 or more, as defined by this guidance, in the area of responsibility (AOR). The JARB is 

responsible for: 

• Validating the requirement 

• Making a source selection utilizing the Best Value to the United States Government. 

Available methods are, but not limited to: 

o Host Nation Support 

o Troop Labor 

o Local Purchase through the Joint Contracting Center (JCC) 

o Balkan Support Contract 

o USAREUR Engineering Logistics Center 

• Ensuring that inappropriate or unauthorized purchases are not processed 

• Documenting the validation and source selection process 

3. Establishment of JARBs. JARBs will be established in Taszar, Hungary; Tuzla, Bosnia; Skopje, 

FYROM; Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, 21st TSC, and other locations as required. Meetings will be held as 

required, usually on a weekly basis but at least once per month. 

4. Process Standardization to Validate Requirements. Items required to be submitted to the JARB. 

All requirements projected to cost $2,500.00 or more must be reviewed and approved by the JARB prior 

to commitment of funds. Examples of such requirements that must be boarded are as follows: 

o All commercial acquisitions (e.g., PR&Cs) $2,500.00 or more (decision is that all 

items on CTA, TDA, etc., that need to be purchased outside normal supply channels 

need to be “JARB’ed.” The reason for this is that even though the purchase is 

authorized, it may not be necessary or may be available within an Army system 

rather than via a PR&C). 

o All procurements using bulk-funded PR&Cs. Unless specifically addressed by the 

JARB in their approval, approval of a bulk-funded PR&C for future requirements is 

not a blanket approval of all future requirements that are $2,500 or more using bulk 

funds. 

o All Balkan Support Contract work orders. 

o All construction, repair and maintenance requirements. 

o All new leases and lease renewals or execution of options. 

o All new service contracts and service contract renewals or execution of options. 

o All changes to previously approved projects with a net cost growth of 25% or more to 

the initially approved project. 

A. Sample JARB Packet. An instructional packet entitled “Requirement Nomination Packet” will be 

developed by the JARB Secretary [the JARB Secretary may be the G4, Base Camp Coordinating 

Agency (BCCA), or the ENGR as determined by the TF Commander] and made available to all 

Requiring Activities (RAs) and Camp Mayors by the local JARB's secretary (see Enclosure 1). The 

JARB Secretary is the point of contact responsible for assembling packets and coordinating meetings. 

Appendix IV-35 389 
 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

B. Identification of Costs. The total value of all resources used in meeting a requirement, even 

those costs provided within the current O&M budget, must be included in the estimated cost of a 

requirement. The total life cycle costs of the requirement must also be included. The government 

estimated cost should be a reasonable estimate of the projected contracted cost. Other factors to be 

considered in life cycle costing are the incremental cost to: award, administer, and control the 

contract and contractor along with the incremental cost to order, receive, stock, and account for 

additional inventory. These incremental costs do not necessarily need to be actually computed but 

considered in the total life cycle evaluation. The time spent in identification of the life cycle costs 

should be proportional to the value or criticality of the project being considered. 

(1) Life Cycle Costing. When establishing the total cost of a requirement, requesting activities 

and board members will consider all life cycle costs. Life Cycle costing includes start-up 

(including the cost of all resources consumed), sustainment, and termination costs for a project. 

Some commonly neglected costs requiring consideration are: repairs to bring a facility up to 

standards, shipment into and out of theater, and contract initiation and termination costs. 

Interoperability with existing systems must be considered. 

(2) Cost Benefit Analysis. In order to ensure prudent use of procurement options, requesting 

activities and board members will evaluate several courses of action to accomplish a mission 

goal. The advantages and disadvantages of each option will be carefully quantified and 

compared. Historical data should be used to estimate costs when available. The most effective, 

and not necessarily the cheapest, course of action should be selected. The final analysis will be 

which alternative or source provides the best value to the United States Government. 

C. Units / Staff Sections. Each unit commander/ staff section OIC has the authority to approve the 

commitment of funds under $2,500.00. The RM will provide oversight of these activities’ PR&Cs to 

ensure the appropriate commitment of funds. 

5. Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB). 

A. JARB. The local body responsible for reviewing and validating requirements is the JARB. There 

are two steps in the JARB process: Step One is the requirement’s validation. Step Two is source 

selection. The appropriate G4 or BCCA chairs the JARB. 

(1) Step 1- Requirements Validation. The JARB validates the requirement and funds 

availability (some requirements are approved as an Unfinanced Requirement (UFR) if they 

are essential and funding is not available). The requestor, or a designated representative, 

may be required to answer questions from the board. Ad Hoc advisors will be invited as nonvoting members at the discretion of the Chair. These advisors will not include prospective 

contractors. A prospective contractor may be invited to the JARB to answer specific 

questions posed by the committee, but he or she will be excused after all questions have 

been answered. The JARB shall not release or disclose to a contractor any information, 

particularly cost and price data, provided by another contractor in response to the JARB’s 

questions. This is to protect the confidentiality of information and cost and pricing data 

obtained from different contractors, which is not releasable to other parties who are not 

directly connected with the contracting process or the JARB. If questions concerning the 

requirement remain after the JARB review, all efforts will be made to contact the Requiring 

Activity (RA) for clarification. 

(2) Step Two – Method of Satisfying the Requirement. The JARB must recommend a 

method of satisfying the requirement. The board must document the validation and 

document the basis for selecting either Host Nation Support, Troop Labor, Local Purchase, or 

the Balkan Support Contract (for example) as the means to acquire the service/supply. For 

projects estimated under $10.000.00, the documentation may be a summarized statement 

390 Appendix IV-35 
 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

that the board considered all life cycle costs, validated the compelling requirement of the 

project, and determined the recommended source as the best value to the United States 

Government. For projects with an estimated life cycle cost of $10,000.00 or over, the board 

must maintain a written summary of the justification used to validate and to select the method 

of satisfying the requirement. The JARB is not required to select the lowest cost method, but 

shall consider all factors including price/cost, and make the best business decisions 

considering all factors. For example, some of the factors to be considered (in addition to 

price) could be, does the Task Force have sufficient trained resources to do the following: 

o Properly write a statement of work or specifications 

o Provide contractor escort 

o Perform COR or COTR duties 

o Administer the contract 

o Interoperability with existing systems – consider such things as additional spare 

parts stockage, connectivity, operational and maintenance requirements, etc. 

o Validated required operational / delivery date 

B. Independent Government Estimate (IGE) versus a Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) 

o An Independent Government Estimate (IGE) will be prepared by the requestor using 

available historical data such as final cost data for previous like project (available from 

the BCCA / DCSENG or the ACO). Additionally the BCCA / DCSENG can assist the 

requestor with unique construction projects. 

o A Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) will not be used as an IGE. If the ACO suspects a 

ROM is going to be used as an IGE the ROM will NOT be requested. 

C. JARB Recommendation. The JARB has the authority to recommend approval / disapproval 

and source selection on every project it reviews, regardless of the dollar amount. Each member 

will have a single vote, and the final decision will be by a simple majority. 

(1) Voting members will be as follows: 

G4/J4 

Base Camp Coordinating Agency (BCCA) / Director of Public Works (DPW) 

Engineer 

Camp Mayor(s) 

RM 

JCC Representative (must be present at all JARB meetings) 

G3/J3 

(2) Advisors without vote: 

G1/J1 

G6/J6 

IRACO 

Safety 

JCC Contract Lawyer or SJA 

DCMA Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) (must be present at all JARB meetings) 

Property Book Officer 

Contractor (called in only to answer specific questions and then be dismissed for 

remainder of meeting) 

* JARB Members should be the primary staff or deputy. 

D. Board Members. During the JARB, board members should be actively involved in pursuing the 

validity of a requirement; ensuring its purchase benefits the operation in the long run. Board 

Appendix IV-35 391 
 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

members should research the issues to be voted prior to the JARB. For instance, if an issue involves 

the purchase of a computer, it’s important to ask the DCSIM/IMO/G6/J6 if there are excess 

computers or if IMAR numbers have been requested. The following are some examples of questions 

that should be asked by board members during the JARB: 

What is the funding source for the requirement? 

Was this item in your budget? 

How have you gotten along without it for so long? 

Why is this a valid requirement? 

Is there any similar excess property available in the TF, or in another command or agency that 

could fill the need? 

When considering construction and facility renovation projects, are temporary construction/Red 

Book Standards and a 3-5 year planning horizon being used? 

Why is the requested quantity needed, and why can’t you get by with fewer? 

Why won’t a cheaper version suit the need? (Remember that cheaper sometimes means more 

expensive in the long run, if lower quality products must be replaced more quickly) 

Is the vendor or contractor you recommend the best source/only source you looked at? 

Is this part of a larger project? Will any other purchases need to be made to produce a complete 

and useable facility, or to produce a complete and functional system? 

Can the item/materials be harvested if we move? 

Do you realize that when you leave here that the property will not go with you and that it stays 

here with the TF? 

E. Walk-Through or Emergency JARB. Should a requirement be of such a nature that calling an 

emergency JARB meeting or waiting for the next JARB will damage the mission of the Task Force, 

that requirement will go directly to the OJA to validate legal sufficiency and then to the Chief of Staff 

for his approval or disapproval. These should be extremely rare. Requirements are not to be partially 

JARB’d (e.g., getting four yes votes and bypassing the other three members). The JARB secretary 

will include all requirements that are not presented before the full and open JARB, in the minutes of 

the next JARB. These requirements will be accompanied by written rationale as to the reason the 

requirement was so urgent and compelling that the JARB procedures had to be bypassed (see Para. 

14 for distribution of these minutes). 

F. Chief Of Staff. Requirements recommended for approval will be submitted to the Chief of Staff or 

General Officer (depending on dollar value) for approval. Records of the meetings, recommendations 

and acquisition sourcing of each meeting will be recorded and maintained by the JARB Secretary. 

The Secretary will schedule meetings, provide advance packets to board members, provide 

assistance for requestors in the development of their packets, and routinely assess the efficiency and 

effectiveness of the JARB process. 

G. Legal Review. All requirements that are recommended for approval by the JARB will be 

reviewed for legal sufficiency by either the JCC Contract Lawyer or a Staff Judge Advocate with fiscal 

law expertise. The JARB will not approve a requirement that is determined to be legally objectionable. 

Legal issues concerning the Balkan Support Contract should be staffed concurrently through the 

JCC, the Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO), and the USAREUR Office of the Judge Advocate, 

ATTN: AEAJA-KL, for coordination with the US Army Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Programs 

legal advisor. 

H. Building Initial JARB Program. USAREUR Staff Program Managers (PM), upon receipt of an 

initial or modified OPLAN, will begin building their JARB Program for contingency operations. 

I. Modifying the Implementing Instructions. Recommended changes to the JARB procedures will 

be submitted to the Program and Budget Division, USAREUR DCSRM. 

J. ROLE OF THE JCC and ACO Representatives: The JCC and the ACO are the acquisition 

expert 

392 Appendix IV-35 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

advisors to the JARB and must be present at all JARB meetings. The JARB must consider the 

advice rendered. The JCC representative is the only Independent Government Source of information 

on local contractors, local business climate, and local business conditions. Additionally he can draw 

upon the resources of US Army Contracting Command - Europe. The ACO is the JARB's expert 

advisor in the capabilities of the Balkans Support Contractor and the scope of the contract. A 

summary of the JCC Representative and ACO's comments must be attached to the JARB minutes 

should the JARB's recommendation run contrary to the expert advice provided. 

Appendix IV-35 393 
 

 

 

 

 

 


 


 
 


 

	 

	 


 


 


 


 


 	 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

K. Flow Chart. The following flow chart shows how the JARB process works: 

JOINT ACQUISITION REVIEW 

BOARD (JARB) PROCEDURES
 

STEP ONE: 

REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT 

VALIDATION Unit has a need
 Voting Members Non-VotingMembers
 

- G4 / J4 - G1/J1
 

STEP TWO: 

ACQUISITION 

METHOD 

Considerations Considerations - BCCA/ DPW - G6 / J6 

- Availability of funds	 - Engr - IRACO - Criticality - Cost 

- Red book standards	 - Camp Mayor (s) - Safety - Timeliness - Quality - RM - JCC Contract Lawyer or - - Admin effort - Legal sufficiency - JCC Rep SJA 

- Priority for Mission - G3/J3 - DCMC ACO
 

- Property Book Officer
 

- Contractor (on call)
 

TROOP SUSTAINMENT KTR/ HOST NATION SPT -

JCC LABOR LOGCAP 

USAREUR Engineering 

Logistics Center Requirement 

Approved 

GENERAL OFFICER
 

CHIEF OF STAFF
 military.ppt 1/26/2001	 32 

6. BALKAN SUPPORT CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS. 

A. Funding Approval Levels. The local Chief of Staff has authority to approve Balkan Sustainment 

Contract requirements recommended by the JARB costing under $50K. All Balkan Support Contract 

requirements costing $50K or more must be forwarded to USAREUR ODCSLOG for 

approval/disapproval. (See Enclosure 2). 

B. New Work. New work is defined as either construction projects or contractual services that the 

task force requires. The following are the types of projects funded under the category of new work: 

construction; services (Custodial, administrative, etc.); movement of facilities, structures special 

equipment; replacement of a military function with a commercial contract; consultation or special 

expertise not resident in the task force. At the beginning of each FY, ODCSRM provides TF 

commanders with annual new work funding targets for projects to be completed during the FY. The 

TF will decide whether to use the Balkan Sustainment Contract or an independent contractor to 

execute new work projects. If the Balkan Sustainment Contract is used, the Task Force will submit 

funding to ODCSLOG; and if an independent contractor is chosen, a contract will be awarded though 

the JCC or other contracting agency. Once approved by the JARB, new work projects will be 

processed IAW ODCSRM Memorandum, SUBJECT: Funding Policy and Procedures for FY01 New 

Work in Deployed AOR’s (Change 1), dated 1 February 2001. 

7. ALL OTHER REQUIREMENTS. All other requirements (Non – Balkan Support Contract) will be 

processed IAW USAREUR Memorandum, SUBJECT: Approval of OMA USAREUR-Funded Purchase 

Requests and Commitments and Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request Requirements, dated 26 

January 2000 (see Enclosure 4; Note: this memorandum, which provides internal controls on approval 

levels, is currently under review to determine whether it will be updated or discontinued). Regardless of 

the status of USAREUR guidance on PR&Cs, all requirements in excess of $2,500, generated by the TF 

and those generated by HQ, USAREUR in support of the deployed AOR that use USAREUR CONOPS 

394	 Appendix IV-35 
 

 

 

 

 

 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

funds, will be submitted to the JARB for review. These requirements must be JARB’d at the appropriate 

AOR and forwarded to the appropriate USAREUR Staff office for coordination and approval as required. 

The following USAREUR Agencies are the proponents for requirements as specified: 

REQUIREMENT PROPONENT (USAREUR Agency)
 

Personnel / MWR ODCSPER DSN: 370-9623/9626 

Intelligence ODCSINT DSN: 370-7846/6773 

Operational / Training ODCSOPS DSN: 370-8944/8104 

Logistical ODCSLOG DSN: 370-1962/9004 

Communications ODCSIM DSN: 370-9126/7070 

Medical OSURG DSN: 370-2010/2190 

Construction, building renovation, repair ODCSENGR DSN: 370-1915/8935 

Each proponent will first review the requirement to verify whether other USAREUR agencies, or 

Balkan Sustainment Contract (ODCSLOG), are involved. If this is the case, the proponent receiving 

the JARB packet from the Task Force will coordinate with other agencies involved to ensure total 

USAREUR-level visibility in the approval process. For example, all construction, building renovation 

and repair projects costing $50,000 or more must be forwarded to ODCSENGR who will coordinate 

with other agencies as required. Also, if the Task Force JARB’s a requirement to construct a new 

training facility, it will submit the requirement to ODCSOPS (since it is training focused) for 

coordination with ODCSENGR. Attempts to bypass the JARB process (i.e., obtaining Approving 

Officer signature from Central Region and the processing the requirement through the Contracting 

Office without JARB review) violate the intent of the JARB Implementing Instructions and are subject 

to USAREUR level inquiry. 

8. REQUIRE PROPER IDENTIFICATION OF INVOICES / FREIGHT WARRANTS BEFORE PAYMENT. 

Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) must direct that invoices / freight warrants be certified by the 

MCT before being submitted to finance for payment. The commander must designate certifying officials. 

As an additional check and balance, verification of this procedure should be incorporated into the 

Command Inspection Process Checklist. 

9. DISBURSING FINANCE OFFICE PROVIDE COPIES OF PAYMENT VOUCHERS TO LOCAL 

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT OFFICE. In addition to providing a copy of all payment vouchers to the 

responsible contracting office at the time of disbursement, the disbursing finance office will also provide a 

copy of all payment vouchers to the responsible RMO. 

10. INVOICES ITEMIZED AND TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH PRIOR TO ACCEPTANCE. Qualified 

interpreters will provide translations of all current financial documents (written in the Host Nation 

language) to accompany original documents when submitted to finance for payment. This translation will 

eliminate any potential controversy concerning the legitimacy of transactions and reduce the processing 

time. 

11. JCC CONTRACTING OFFICER’S REPRESENTATIVES (CORs) CONDUCT A MONTHLY 

RECONCILLIATION, IAW USAREUR Reg. 715-3. 

A. JCC Responsibilities. The JCC will ensure that the designated Contracting Officer's 

Representative (COR) performs all duties IAW USAREUR Reg. 715-3 and the COR appointment 

Letter. 

B. COR. The COR will verify that the contractor is performing in accordance with the requirements 

of the contract term, conditions and specifications, to include delivery expectations. 

Commanders/supervisors must allow appointed CORs to devote sufficient time to perform their COR 

duties. In some instances, this may require 25% of the individuals’ duty time. 

12. LEADERS RECEIVE TRAINING ON BASIC CONTRACTING PROCEDURES. The JCC will 

prepare and provide informational instructions to all newly arriving LTCs (and above) and PR&C 

Appendix IV-35 395 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

Approving Officers. This information must clarify the “do’s and don’ts” of dealing with contractors and 

contracts; specific rules on ethics and Standards of Conduct; and Contracting Office Points of Contact. 

13. REQUIRING ACTIVITY REPRESENTATIVES “RIGHT SEAT” THE JARB. Actively identify new 

personnel rotating into the Area of Responsibility who may be assigned to positions requiring them to 

submit Requirement Nomination Packets to the JARB. Ensure these individuals are exposed to the 

JARB as a part of their Right Seat In-processing. 

14. REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES. A Copy of all JARB minutes with appropriate signatures affixed 

must be provided electronically to Balkans Support Contract Program Manager’s Office, the S-3, USACCE, and USAREUR DCSRM Budget Execution Branch within 24 hours of signature. 

396 Appendix IV-35 
 

 

	 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

APPENDIX IV-36: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FUNDING MESSAGES 

Originator: USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4// 9 of 15 

DTG: 131310Z Aug 99 Precedence: P DAC: General 

Subject:	 USKFOR PROGRAM APPROVAL AND FUNDING FOR URGENT Format for Printing 

HUMANITARIAN 

PATUZYUW RUFGNOA0830 2251332-UUUU--RUFGNOA. 

ZNR UUUUU 

P R 131310Z AUG 99 FM USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4// 

TO RUFDAAA/CDR USAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGC-O// 

INFO RUFDAVC/CDR V CORPS HEIDELBERG GE//AETV-GCO// 

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP// 

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//DJS/J5/J4/ILED// 

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//SOLIC:PK/HA/DSCA:HA// 

RUFDTFA/CDR TASK FORCE FALCON 

RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4-ID/EN/ECMD/ECJA/ECCM/ECJ5-E/ 

ECJ6// 

RUETIED/HQ USAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGF// 

BT 

UNCLAS 

SECTION 1 OF 2 

SUBJ:USKFOR PROGRAM APPROVAL AND FUNDING FOR URGENT 

HUMANITARIAN 

NEEDS 

REFS: A. (S) CDR V CORPS MSG 031831Z AUG 99 SUBJ: REQUEST FOR $5 

MILLION IN DOD QUICK DISBURSEMENT FUNDS FOR TASK FORCE FALCON 

HUMANITARIAN PROJECTS IN KOSOVO 

B. THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LTR DATED 6 AUG 99, SUBJ: USKFOR 

PAGE 2 RUFGNOA0830 UNCLAS 

FUNDING FOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS 

1. IN RESPONSE TO REF A, OSD APPROVED THE REQUEST FOR $5M TO BE 

USED FOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROJECTS ONLY IN THE U.S. 

CONTROLLED SECTOR OF KOSOVO. THE COST FOR ANY INDIVIDUAL PROJECT 

SHOULD NOT EXCEED $300K. FUNDS WILL BE PROVIDED BY DSCA 

THROUGH DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY TO CG USAREUR. THESE FUNDS 

WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR OBLIGATION UNTIL 30 SEP 00. USEUCOM IS 

DESIGNATED THE EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR DOD HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES IN 

KOSOVO. HQ USAREUR IS DESIGNATED THE EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE 

EXECUTION OF THE $5M PROGRAM AUTHORITY FOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN 

PROJECTS WITHIN THE USKFOR SECTOR. THIS $5M INCLUDES ALL FUNDS 

AVAILABLE FROM THE LEGAL AUTHORITIES CONTAINED IN PARA 2. 

Appendix IV-36 397 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 
 

2. DOD HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROJECTS ARE SANCTIONED UNDER THREE 

DIFFERENT LEGAL AUTHORITIES AS SUMMARIZED BELOW. 

NO ASSISTANCE TO MILITARY OR PARAMILITARY 

ORGANIZATIONS IS PERMITTED. PROJECTS TO BE EXECUTED MUST USE ONE OF 

THE LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND FIT UNDER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING APPROVED 

CATEGORIES: ESSENTIAL REPAIRS OF SCHOOLS, REPAIR OF ELECTRICAL 

GRIDS, MEDICAL SUPPORT AND SUPPLIES, URGENT HUMANITARIAN HOUSING 

NEEDS, REPAIR OF WATER TREATMENT PLANTS, REPLACEMENT/REPAIR OF FIRE 

PAGE 3 RUFGNOA0830 UNCLAS 

AND SANITATION TRUCKS AND PROVIDING DIESEL FUEL TO FARMERS. 

A. SECTION 401, TITLE 10, U.S. CODE ESTABLISHES THE HUMANITARIAN AND 

CIVIC ASSISTANCE (HCA) PROGRAM. THIS ALLOWS U.S. FORCES, IN 

CONJUNCTION WITH ONGOING MILITARY OPERATIONS, TO PERFORM SMALLSCALE RUDIMENTARY HUMANITARIAN PROJECTS. SUCH ACTIVITIES 

MUST PROMOTE THE SECURITY INTEREST OF THE U.S. AND THE COUNTRY IN 

WHICH ACTIVITIES ARE CARRIED OUT, AS WELL AS THE OPERATIONAL 

READINESS SKILLS OF PARTICIPATING U.S. FORCES. MILITARY UNITS 

ATTACHED TO CDR TF FALCON COULD CARRY OUT PROJECTS, SUCH AS 

RUDIMENTARY REPAIR OF SCHOOLS, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, OR MEDICAL 

CLINICS AND/OR THE PROVISION OF BASIC MEDICAL CARE IN RURAL AREAS, 

UNDER THIS AUTHORITY. IF A GIVEN PROJECT IS EXECUTED THROUGH 

THE HCA PROGRAM, U.S. MILITARY FORCES MUST PROVIDE THE ACTUAL LABOR. 

BUILDING MATERIALS AND OTHER INCREMENTAL COSTS INCURRED FOR 

PROJECTS 

PERFORMED UNDER SECTION 401 AUTHORITY ARE TO BE FUNDED FROM 

ARMY OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE (O&M) ACCOUNTS. CDR TF FALCON 

CAN EXECUTE IMMEDIATELY THOSE PROJECTS APPROVED 

IN THIS MESSAGE, WHICH COMPLY WITH HCA REQUIREMENTS 

AND FALL WITHIN APPLICABLE FUNDING LIMITS WITHOUT WAITING FOR 

SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING, SINCE AVAILABLE O&M CAN BE USED IN THE 

PAGE 4 RUFGNOA0830 UNCLAS 

SHORT TERM. IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 401 TITLE 10 USC, CDR TF 

FALCON MUST COORDINATE PROJECTS WITH USAID AND STATE 

DEPARTMENT TO ENSURE THE ACTIVITIES COMPLEMENT, AND DO NOT 

DUPLICATE, ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY OTHER USG AGENCIES. 

SUCH O&M EXPENDITURES MAY BE REIMBURSED FROM THE SUPPLEMENTAL 

FUNDS AVAILABLE TO DOD FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN THE REGION. 

B. SECTION 2547, TITLE 10, USC PROVIDES THE AUTHORITY TO 

MAKE AVAILABLE FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF PURPOSES, THROUGH THE STATE 

DEPARTMENT, ANY NON-LETHAL EXCESS SUPPLIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

398 Appendix IV-36 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

DEFENSE. THIS INCLUDES SHIPMENTS OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO 

DESIGNATED ORGANIZATIONS. 

C. SECTION 2551, TITLE 10, USC PROVIDES AUTHORITY FOR DOD TO 

CARRY OUT BROADER, MORE EXTENSIVE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 

PROJECTS. 

PROJECTS WHICH USE CONTRACTORS, INCLUDE THE PURCHASE OF END ITEMS 

OTHER THAN THOSE USED IN CONNECTION WITH SECTION 401 HCA ACTIVITIES, 

OR INVOLVE THE PROVISION OF TRAINING OR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR 

HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES, WOULD BE CARRIED OUT UNDER THIS AUTHORITY. 

THE AUTHORITY CAN ALSO BE USED TO PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION OF 

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF SUPPLIES USING DOD ASSETS OR RESOURCES. 

INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS APPROVED BY THIS MESSAGE 

PAGE 5 RUFGNOA0830 UNCLAS 

SHALL BE LIMITED TO RUDIMENTARY CONSTRUCTION AND BASIC 

REPAIRS. SALARIES AND OTHER SUPPORT COSTS FOR LOCAL ADMINISTRATION 

(INCLUDING POLICE, FIRE, AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL) ARE NOT AUTHORIZED. 

3. THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FOR PROJECTS WITHIN THE 

SEVEN APPROVED CATEGORIES LISTED IN PARA 2 ABOVE AND ARE EXPANDED 

BELOW: 

A. ESSENTIAL REPAIRS FOR SCHOOLS: THIS IS ONE OF THE MOST 

STRAIGHTFORWARD AND COMMON USES OF DOD HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. 

THESE PROJECTS CAN BE JUSTIFIED UNDER EITHER SECTION 401 

(IF REPAIRS ARE ACCOMPLISHED BY U.S. FORCES) OR SECTION 2551 (IF 

CONTRACTS ARE USED). 

B. REPAIR OF ELECTRICAL GRIDS (CATEGORY FUNDING LIMIT - $600K) DOD 

ASSISTANCE MAY BE PROVIDED TO CARRY OUT RUDIMENTARY REPAIRS TO 

ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS, RATHER THAN TO MAKE IMPROVEMENTS WHICH WOULD 

ENHANCE SERVICE TO A LEVEL HIGHER THAN IN PRE-WAR KOSOVO. 

PROCEDURES 

MUST BE IN PLACE TO ENSURE REPAIRS TO GRIDS IN UROSEVAC, GNJILANE, 

AND STRPCE COMPLY WITH THESE GUIDELINES. 

C. MEDICAL SUPPORT AND SUPPLIES: USE OF DOD FUNDS FOR THESE 

FUNCTIONS IS WELL ESTABLISHED. PROVISION OF DIRECT MEDICAL CARE BY 

U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN RURAL AREAS WOULD NORMALLY BE DONE 

USING 

PAGE 6 RUFGNOA0830 UNCLAS 

SECTION 401 AUTHORITY TO FUND THE INCREMENTAL COSTS OF SUPPLIES AND 

MATERIALS. PURCHASE OF EQUIPMENT UNCONNECTED TO DEPLOYMENT OF 

MILITARY PERSONNEL, OR MEDICAL CARE PROVIDED IN NON-RURAL AREAS 

WOULD NORMALLY BE CARRIED OUT UNDER SECTION 2551 AUTHORITY. 

PURCHASE OF MEDICAL EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE CAREFULLY EVALUATED IN 

ADVANCE TO ENSURE THAT EQUIPMENT IS PROVIDED TO PUBLIC FACILITIES, 

Appendix IV-36 399 
___________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 
 

IS AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGY FOR KOSOVO FACILITIES, 

AND CAN BE PROPERLY MAINTAINED AND OPERATED BY LOCAL PERSONNEL 

IN THE FUTURE. IT IS ALSO CRITICAL TO NOTE THAT THERE IS A 

STATUTORY LIMIT OF $100,000 FOR ANY ONE END ITEM/PIECE OF EQUIPMENT 

PURCHASED WITH DOD HUMANITARIAN FUNDS. CDR TF FALCON SHOULD ALSO 

EXPLORE OPPORTUNITIES TO BUILD OR REPAIR PUBLIC HEALTH CLINICS 

USING THIS FUNDING. 

D. URGENT HUMANITARIAN HOUSING NEEDS: PROJECTS WITHIN THIS CATEGORY 

MUST BE FOR IMMEDIATE, TEMPORARY REPAIR AND WINTERIZATION OF 

DAMAGED STRUCTURES. NEW CONSTRUCTION, IMPROVEMENTS, OR 

PERMANENT 

REPAIRS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED UNDER THIS CATEGORY. 

E. REPAIR OF WATER TREATMENT PLANTS (CATEGORY FUNDING LIMIT - 

$150K): DOD ASSISTANCE MAY BE PROVIDED ONLY TO CARRY OUT 

RUDIMENTARY REPAIR, RATHER THAN TO IMPROVE WATER SYSTEMS BEYOND 

BT 

#0830 

Originator: CDR USAREUR DCSOPS HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGC-O// 2 of 13 

DTG: 201153Z Aug 99 Precedence: P DAC: General 

Subject: USKFOR FUNDING FOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS Format for Printing 

PATUZYUW RUFDAAA3151 2321632-UUUU--RUFGNOA. 

ZNR UUUUU ZUI RUFDMHS2701 2321633 

P 201153Z AUG 99 FM CDR USAREUR DCSOPS HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGC-O// 

TO RUFDTFA/CDR TASK FORCE FALCON//CDR/G3/G5/POLAD// 

RUFDAVU/CDRVCORPS HEIDELBERG GE//AETV-CS/AETV-GC/AETV-GCP/AETVGCO/AETV-GD// 

INFO RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ETCC/ECJ3/ECJ33/ECJ35/ECJ4/ECJ5 

/ECJ8// 

RUFDNOU/CDRUSAREUR DCSOPS HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGC-O// 

RUFDAAU/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAEN/AEAGF/AEAIG/AEAJA/AEAMD 

/AEAPA/AEAGA// 

BT 

UNCLAS 

SUBJ:USKFOR FUNDING FOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS 

USAREUR MESSAGE #9908109 

REF/A/ (S) CDR V CORPS MSG 031831Z AUG 99, SUBJ: REQUEST FOR $5M IN 

DOD QUICK DISBURSEMENT FUNDS FOR TASK FORCE FALCON HUMANITARIAN 

PROJECTS IN KOSOVO 

400 Appendix IV-36 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

REF/B/ THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LTR DATED 6 AUG 99, SUBJ 

USKFOR 

FUNDING FOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS 

REF/C/ USCINCEUR MSG 131310Z AUG 99, SUBJ: USKFOR PROGRAM APPROVAL 

AND FUNDING FOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS 

1. DCSA HAS PROVIDED, THROUGH DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, TO USAREUR 

$5M 

TO BE USED FOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROJECTS. FUNDS ARE 

TO 

USED FOR PROJECTS IN THE U.S. CONTROLLED SECTOR OF KOSOVO ONLY. 

PAGE 02 RUFDAAA3151 UNCLAS 

THIS 

IS A ONE-TIME ALLOCATION FOR TASK FORCE FALCON PROJECTS IN KOSOVO. 

2. USAREUR ODCSRM WILL PROVIDE THESE FUNDS TO V CORPS BY FUND 

ALLOCATION DOCUMENT. THE $5M IS A TWO-YEAR APPROPRIATION. SPECIAL 

CONTROL MEASURES ARE REQUIRED FOR THE USE AND CONTROL OF THE FUNDS 

PROVIDED. TO CONTROL FUNDS, ENSURE PROPER USE AND FACILITATE 

REPORTING V CORPS ACSRM WILL INITIATE THE FOLLOWING MEASURES: 

A. ESTABLISH ACCOUNT PROCESSING CODES (APCS) TO CAPTURE COSTS. 

RECOMMEND SEPARATE APCS FOR EACH AUTHORIZED PROJECT/CATEGORY 

OUTLINED 

IN REFERENCE C. 

B. IAW REFERENCE C, PARAGRAPH 4, V CORPS WILL CONSTRUCT A MONTHLY 

TIME PHASED OBLIGATION SPENDING PLAN FROM AUG 99 TO SEPT 00, NLT 1 

SEP 99. 

C. FUNDS PROVIDED MAY ONLY BE USED TO LIMITS STIPULATED IN REFERENCE 

C AND REITERATED ON THE FAD. 

3. USAREUR EXPECTS TO RECEIVE AN ADDITIONAL ALLOCATION OF 

HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE (HCA) PROGRAM FUNDS, TO 

ACCOMMODATE 

COSTS INCURRED WHICH ARE ALLOWABLE UNDER SECTION 401, TITLE 10, U.S. 

PAGE 03 RUFDAAA3151 UNCLAS 

CODE. THESE FUNDS ARE O&M AND ARE A ONE-YEAR APPROPRIATION. FUNDS 

WILL BE USED TO COVER COSTS INCURRED FOR SUPPLIES CONSUMED AND 

EQUIPMENT REPAIRS AS OCCUR IN THE EXECUTION OF AUTHORIZED PROJECTS. 

AUTHORIZED PROJECTS ARE OUTLINED IN REFERENCE C, PARAGRAPHS 3, A 

THRU 

G. 

A. CDR TASK FORCE FALCON CAN EXECUTE IMMEDIATELY THOSE PROJECTS 

AUTHORIZED UNDER SECTION 401 AUTHORITY. 

B. V CORPS WILL ESTABLISH A SEPARATE APC TO CAPTURE AND RECORD COSTS 

EXPENDED UNDER SECTION 401 AUTHORITY. 

Appendix IV-36 401 
 

	 

	 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

C. V CORPS WILL ESTABLSIH AN ADDITIONAL APC TO CAPTURE MISSION FUNDS 

EXPENDED TO SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS AND REPORT THESE 

EXPENDITURES TO USAREUR ODCSRM FOR REIMBURSEMENT. 

4. THE TASK FORCE FALCON POLAD AND G5 ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR EXECUTION 

OF THE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND ENSURING COMPLIANCE 

WITH 

THE RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING USE OF THE FUNDS. THE POLAD AND 

G5 WILL ALSO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 

OUTLINED IN REFERENCE C. 

5. REFERENCE C OUTLINES REPORTING FREQUENCY, FORMATS AND AGENCIES 

TO 

PAGE 04 RUFDAAA3151 UNCLAS 

RECEIVE REPORTS. REFERENCE C PROVIDES SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FOR 

EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS AND 

ALSO 

PROVIDES THE LEGAL AUTHORITY AND FUNDING LIMITS FOR SPECIFIC 

PROJECTS. 

6. USAREUR ODCSRM POC FOR THIS MESSAGE IS MAJ KINARD, PHONE NUMBER 

IS DSN 370-8176, UNCLAS E-MAIL (ALL LOWER CASE) IS: 

KINARD@HQ.HQUSAREUR.ARMY.MIL. 

BT 

#3151 

Originator: USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4// 4 of 15 

DTG: 101424Z Sep 99 Precedence: R DAC: General 

Subject:	 USKFOR PROGRAM APPROVAL FOR URGENT Format for Printing 

HUMANITARIAN NEEDS 

RATUZYUW RUFGNOA0105 2531453-UUUU--RUFGNOA. 

ZNR UUUUU 

R 101424Z SEP 99 

FM USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4// 

TO RUFDAAA/CDR USAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGC-O// 

INFO RUFDAVC/CDR V CORPS HEIDELBERG GE//AETV-GCO// 

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP// 

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//DJS/J5/J4/ILED// 

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//SOLIC:PK/HA/DSCA:HA// 

RUFDTFA/CDR TASK FORCE FALCON 

RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4-ID/ECJA/ECCM/ECJ5-E// 

RUFDNTC/HQ USAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGF// 

402	 Appendix IV-36 
 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

BT 

UNCLAS 

SUBJ:USKFOR PROGRAM APPROVAL FOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS 

REFS: A. TELEPHONIC INQUIRIES/REQUESTS FROM V CORPS AND TASK 

FORCE FALCON REGARDING USE OF $5M AUTHORIZATION FOR DISPERSMENT 

OF FUEL FOR MUNICIPAL VEHICLES. 

B. USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE MESSAGE 131310Z AUG 99 PROVIDED 

CDR USAREUR AUTHORITY AND GUIDANCE FOR THE EXECUTION OF $5M 

TO BE USED FOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN PROJECTS IN KOSOVO 

C. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LTR DATED 6 AUG 99, SUBJ: USKFOR 

PAGE 2 RUFGNOA0105 UNCLAS 

PROGRAM APPROVAL AND FUNDING FOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS 

D. CORRESPONDENCE WITH OSD (HA/SOLIC/OUSDP), DSCA (HA-D), AND HQ 

USAREUR (AEAGC-O) 

1. IN CONSULTATION WITH OSD,DSCA, AND USAREUR, AND IN RESPONSE TO 

REF (A), APPROVAL IS GIVEN TO UTILIZE EXISTING $5M FOR THE ISSUANCE 

OF FUEL NEEDED FOR MUNICIPAL VEHICLES (I.E., FIREFIGHTING VEHICLES, 

AMBULANCES, AND TRASH DISPOSAL VEHICLES) WITHIN THE U.S. SECTOR, 

REF(D)REFERS. 

2. ALTHOUGH FUEL FOR MUNICIPAL VEHICLES WERE NOT SPECIFICALLY 

ADDRESSED WITHIN REFS (B) AND (C), PRECAUTIONS MUST BE TAKEN 

BY CDR TF FALCON TO PREVENT DIVERSION OF FUEL BY RECIPIENTS 

FOR BLACK MARKET SALES. 

3. RECOMMEND CDR TF FALCON WORK CLOSELY WITH KFOR AND UNMIK TO 

ADDRESS A LONG TERM SOLUTION TO PROVIDING FUEL TO MUNICIPAL 

VEHICLES 

WITHIN SECTOR. 

4. COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH PROVIDING FUEL TO MUNICIPAL VEHICLES 

SHOULD BE REPORTED AS A SUB-PARAGRAPH TO THE "FUEL TO FARMERS" 

CATEGORY. COSTS SHOULD BE REPORTED AS A SEPARATE LINE ITEM AND NOT 

- REPEAT NOT - ROLLED IN TO THE "FUEL TO FARMERS" FIGURE. FUEL 

PROVIDED TO MUNICIPAL VEHICLES WILL NOT COUNT AGAINST THE CEILING 

PAGE 3 RUFGNOA0105 UNCLAS 

ESTABLISHED FOR "FUEL TO FARMERS". 

5. ECJ4 POCS FOR THIS MESSAGE ARE LTCOL THOMPSON, LTCOL NICHOLSON 

AND MR.ZIMMERMAN. PHONE NUMBERS ARE COMMERCIAL 49 711 680 

4052/5303/8836, FAX IS 49 711 680-5360. 

Originator: USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4// 2 of 15 

DTG: 291447Z Nov 99 Precedence: R DAC: General 

Appendix IV-36 403 
 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

Subject: USKFOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS PROGRAM Format for Printing 

RATUZYUW RUFGNOA0151 3331523-UUUU--RUFGNOA. 

ZNR UUUUU 

R 291447Z NOV 99 

FM USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4// 

TO RUFDAAA/CDR USAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGC-O// 

INFO RUFDAVC/CDR V CORPS HEIDELBERG GE//AETV-GCO// 

RUEKJCS/SEC DEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP// 

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//DJS/J5/J4/ILED// 

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//SOLIC:PK/HA/DSCA:HA/COMPT// 

RUFDTFA/CDR TASK FORCE FALCON 

RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4-ID/EN/ECMD/ECJA/ECCM/ECJ5-E/ 

ECJ6// 

RUFDNTC/HQ USAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGF// 

BT 

UNCLAS 

SUBJ:USKFOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS PROGRAM 

REFS: A. CDR TF FALCON MSG, 101904Z NOV 99 SUBJ: HUMANITARIAN AID 

SPENDING 

B. USCINCEUR MSG, 101424Z SEP 99, SUBJ: USKFOR PROGRAM APPROVAL FOR 

URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS 

C. USCINCEUR MSG, 131310Z AUG 99, SUBJ: USKFOR PROGRAM APPROVAL AND 

FUNDING FOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS 

PAGE 2 RUFGNOA0151 UNCLAS 

D. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SLOCOMBE MEMO DATED 6 AUG 99, SUBJ: 

USKFOR FUNDING FOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS 

E. CDR V CORP MSG, 031831Z AUG 99, SUBJ: USKFOR FUNDING FOR URGENT 

HUMANITARIAN NEEDS AMPN REFS B AND C: PROVIDED GUIDANCE FOR 

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROJECTS IN RESPONSE TO REF E. 

1. THIS MESSAGE IS A USCINCEUR, DSCA AND OSD/SOLIC/PKHA COORDINATED 

RESPONSE ISSUING POLICY GUIDANCE TO REF A. IN CONFORMITY WITH THE 

PREVIOUS GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REFS B THRU D, THE FOLLOWING 

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED: 

A. REPAIR WATER TREATMENT PLANTS. BASED UPON TFF REQUEST, THE 

CATEGORY FUNDING LIMIT IS INCREASED FROM $150K TO $650K. BECAUSE OF 

THE EMERGENCY NATURE OF DOD HUMANITARIAN FUNDING, REPAIRS MUST BE 

RELATED TO WAR DAMAGE AND SHOULD NOT RESULT IN IMPROVING 

INFRASTRUCTURE BEYOND THAT EXISTING IN PRE-WAR YUGOSLAVIA. 

B. DIESEL FUEL TO FARMERS. THE REQUEST TO INCREASE THE CEILING FROM 

$50K TO $100K TO PROVIDE FUEL TO FARMERS IS DISAPPROVED AT THIS 

TIME, PENDING FURTHER INFORMATION FROM USKFOR INDICATING THAT THIS 

INCREASE IS NECESSARY TO ADDRESS SHORT-TERM EMERGENCY NEEDS, 

404 Appendix IV-36 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

RATHER 

THAN LONG-TERM RECURRING REQUIREMENTS. RECOMMEND USKFOR 

CONTINUE TO 

WORK WITH INTERNATIONAL AND NGO ORGANIZATIONS TO INCREASE THEIR 

PAGE 3 RUFGNOA0151 UNCLAS 

SUPPORT WITHIN SECTOR TO MEET THE BULK OF THIS REQUIREMENT. 

C. WELL DRILLING. AUTHORIZATION IS GRANTED TO DRILL WELLS IN RURAL 

AREAS WHERE WATER SOURCES/CAPABILITIES WERE DAMAGED AS A RESULT 

OF 

DESTRUCTION STEMMING FROM THE CONFLICT. ALTHOUGH THE USE OF 

OVERSEAS HUMANITARIAN DISASTER ASSISTANCE AND CIVIC AID (OHDACA)/ 

SECTION 2551 AUTHORITY/FUNDING IS APPROVED TO CONTRACT THIS SUPPORT, 

CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO EXECUTING/FUNDING THIS EFFORT 

THROUGH HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE (HCA), SECTION 401. WHILE 

IT IS EXPECTED THAT ACTUAL LABOR WILL BE PERFORMED BY LOCAL 

CIVILIANS, USKFOR SHOULD ENSURE THAT SOME U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL 

PARTICIPATE IN THESE PROJECTS, IN AN OVERSIGHT/MANAGEMENT ROLE, SO 

THAT DOD IS NOT IN THE ROLE OF SIMPLY PROVIDING A FUND SOURCE. 

NOTE: COSTS DO NOT COUNT AGAINST $650K FUNDING LIMIT APPROVED IN (1 

A) ABOVE. 

D. HEATING FUEL FOR SCHOOLS. PROVISION OF EMERGENCY HEATING FOR 

SCHOOLS USING DOD FUNDS IS DISAPPROVED. SUPPLYING FUEL TO SCHOOLS, 

AS WELL AS HOSPITALS, POLICE STATIONS, GOVERNMENT OFFICES, AND OTHER 

SITES, SEEMS TO BE A LONG TERM REQUIREMENT WHICH SHOULD BE 

ADDRESSED 

BY OTHER USG AGENCIES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. 

E. PURCHASE OF SCHOOL DESKS. AUTHORITY TO PURCHASE SCHOOL DESKS IS 

PAGE 4 RUFGNOA0151 UNCLAS 

DISAPPROVED. RECOMMEND USKFOR PURSUE SOURCING OF DESKS THROUGH 

HQ 

USEUCOM HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE EXCESS PROPERTY PROGRAM, TITLE 10, 

SECTION 2547. IF DESKS ARE AVAILABLE WITHIN THE EUCOM THEATER, 

USKFOR MAY USE THE $5M AUTHORITY TO TRANSPORT DOD EXCESS PROPERTY. 

F. ADDITIONAL $500K FOR TRANSPORT OF DOD EXCESS PROPERTY. 

USCINCEUR WILL SUBMIT OUT-OF CYCLE REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDS TO 

SUPPORT TRANSPORTATION OF EXCESS DOD PROPERTY TO USKFOR AS THESE 

REQUIREMENTS ARISE. UNTIL ADDITIONAL FUNDING BECOMES AVAILABLE, 

USKFOR COULD FUND TRANSPORTATION FOR CRITICAL DOD EXCESS PROPERTY 

BY 

PROVIDING FUNDS FROM ITS EXISTING $5M AUTHORIZATION, UTILIZING 

SECTION 2551 AUTHORITY. 

2. THE AFOREMENTIONED SUPPLEMENTAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 

Appendix IV-36 405 
 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

AUTHORITIES WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE REMARKS SECTION OF A "NO DOLLAR" 

FUND AUTHORIZATION DOCUMENT (FAD) ISSUED BY DSCA/COMPT TO USAREUR 

DCSRM. 

3. POCS FOR THIS MESSAGE ARE LTCOL THOMPSON, LT COL NICHOLSON, 

MR ZIMMERMAN AND MS BARTCH. PHONE NUMBERS ARE DSN 

430-4052/5303/8836/5084. COMMERCIAL 49 711 680-4052/5303/8836/5084, 

FAX IS 49 711 680-5360. UNCLAS EMAIL ADDRESSES (ALL LOWER CASE) ARE: 

THOMPSSJ@EUCOM.MIL,NICHOLSD@EUCOM.MIL, ZIMMERMA@EUCOM.MIL, AND 

PAGE 5 RUFGNOA0151 UNCLAS 

BARTCHC@EUCOM.MIL. 

BT 

#0151 

Originator: USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4-ID// 1 of 15 

DTG: 011254Z Dec 99 Precedence: R DAC: General 

Subject: USKFOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS PROGRAM Format for Printing 

RATUZYUW RUFGNOA0286 3351408-UUUU--RUFGNOA. 

ZNR UUUUU 

R 011254Z DEC 99 

FM USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4-ID// 

TO RUFDAAA/CDR USAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGC-O// 

INFO RUFDAVC/CDR V CORPS HEIDELBERG GE//AETV-GCO// 

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP// 

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//DJS/J5/J4/ILED// 

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//SOLIC:PK/HA/DSCA:HA/COMPT// 

RUFDTFA/CDR TASK FORCE FALCON 

RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4-ID/EN/ECMD/ECJA/ECCM/ECJ5-E/ 

ECJ6// 

RUFDNTC/HQ USAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGF// 

BT 

UNCLAS 

SUBJ:USKFOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS PROGRAM 

REFS: A. CDR TF FALCON MEMO, DTD 25 NOV 99 SUBJ: HUMANITARIAN 

ASSISTANCE INCREASE REQUEST 

B. USCINCEUR MSG, 101424Z SEP 99, SUBJ: USKFOR PROGRAM APPROVAL FOR 

URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS 

C. USCINCEUR MSG, 131310Z AUG 99, SUBJ: USKFOR PROGRAM APPROVAL AND 

FUNDING FOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS 

PAGE 2 RUFGNOA0286 UNCLAS 

406 Appendix IV-36 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

D. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SLOCOMBE MEMO DATED 6 AUG 99, SUBJ: 

USKFOR FUNDING FOR URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS 

E. CDR V CORP MSG, 031831Z AUG 99, SUBJ: USKFOR FUNDING FOR URGENT 

HUMANITARIAN NEEDS 

AMPN REFS B AND C: PROVIDED GUIDANCE FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 

PROJECTS IN RESPONSE TO REF E. 

1. THIS MESSAGE IS A USCINCEUR, DSCA AND OSD/SOLIC/PKHA COORDINATED 

RESPONSE ISSUING POLICY GUIDANCE TO REF A. IN CONFORMITY WITH THE 

PREVIOUS GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REFS B THRU E, THE FOLLOWING 

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED: 

A. REPAIR ELECTRICAL GRIDS. BASED UPON REF A, REQUEST TO INCREASE 

CEILING UNDER THIS CATEGORY FROM $600K TO $800K IS APPROVED. 

ASSISTANCE WITHIN THIS CATEGORY MUST CONTINUE TO BE LIMITED TO 

RUDIMENTARY REPAIRS TO ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS, RATHER THAN TO MAKE 

IMPROVEMENTS THAT WOULD ENHANCE SERVICE TO A HIGHER LEVEL THAN IN 

PRE-WAR KOSOVO. 

2. THE AFOREMENTIONED SUPPLEMENTAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 

AUTHORITY 

WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE REMARKS SECTION OF A "NO DOLLAR" FUND 

AUTHORIZATION DOCUMENT (FAD) ISSUED BY DSCA/COMPT TO USAREUR 

DCSRM. 

3. POCS FOR THIS MESSAGE ARE LTCOL THOMPSON AND MR ZIMMERMAN. 

PAGE 3 RUFGNOA0286 UNCLAS 

PHONE NUMBERS ARE DSN 430-4052/5303/8836/5084. 

COMMERCIAL 49 711 680-4052/5303/8836/5084, FAX IS 49 711 680-5360. 

UNCLAS EMAIL ADDRESSES (ALL LOWER CASE) ARE: 

THOMPSSJ@EUCOM.MIL, AND ZIMMERMA@EUCOM.MIL. 

BT 

#0286 

Appendix IV-36 407 

 

	 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

APPENDIX IV-37: FISCAL LAW IN MILITARY OPERATIONS 

I. SUPPORTING MULTILATERAL PEACE & HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS 

A. UN Participation Act (UNPA) § 7, 22 U.S.C. § 287d-1. 

1. Scope. Upon UN’s request, President may authorize the following support 

specifically directed to the peaceful settlement of disputes and not 

involving employment of armed forces under Chapter VII of the UN 

Charter— 

a. Details of Personnel. Up to 1,000 military personnel as observers, 

guards, or any non-combatant capacity. 

b. Supplies, Services, & Equipment. Furnishings of facilities, 

services or other assistance, and the loan of the U.S.’s fair share of 

supplies and equipment. 

2. Reimbursement. Section 723 of the FY 00-01 Foreign Relations 

Authorization Act (as enacted in Pub. L. No. 106-113) amended the 

UNPA to add a new Section 10. Section 10 requires the United States to 

obtain reimbursement from the UN for DoD assistance that is provided to 

or for an assessed UN peacekeeping operation, or to facilitate or assist the 

participation of another country in such an operation. The statute provides 

for several exemptions and grounds for waiver. This requirement to 

receive reimbursement is not limited to assistance provided under the 

UNPA, but applies to any authority under which assistance may be 

provided to as assessed peacekeeping operation. 

3. Delegation of authority. The President has delegated authority to direct 

support to the Secretary of State (SecState). Executive Order 10206 ¶ 1, 

16 Fed. Reg. 529 (1951). He has delegated the authority to waive (in 

national interest) reimbursement to SecState, in consultation with the 

Secretary of Defense (SecDef). Id. ¶ 2. 

408	 Appendix IV-37 
 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001
 
 

B. Drawdowns. 

1. Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) § 506(a)(1), 22 U.S.C. § 2318(a)(1). 

Authorizes the President to direct the drawdown of defense articles and 

services having an aggregate value of up to $100,000,000 in any fiscal 

year for unforeseen emergencies requiring immediate military assistance 

to a foreign country or international organization. See Defense and 

Security Assistance Improvements Act, Pub. L. 104-164 (1996) (increase 

from $75M to $100M). 

2. FAA § 506(a)(2), 22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(2). Authorizes the President to 

direct the drawdown of articles and services having an aggregate value of 

up to $200M from any agency of the U.S. in any fiscal year for (among 

other things) counterdrug activities, disaster relief, migrant and refugee 

assistance, antiterrorism, and non-proliferation assistance. (The Security 

Assistance Act of 2000 increased the amount from $150M to $200M and 

added antiterrorism and non-proliferation to the permissible uses of this 

authority.) Of that amount, not more than $75M may come from DOD 

resources; not more than $75M may be provided for counternarcotics; and 

not more than $15M to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos for POW 

accounting. Drawdowns supporting counternarcotics and refugee or 

migration assistance require 15 days notice to Congress. See Defense and 

Security Assistance Improvements Act, Pub. L. 105-164 (1996). 

3. FAA § 552(c)(2), 22 U.S.C. § 2348a(c)(2). Authorizes the President to 

direct the drawdown of up to $25M in any fiscal year of commodities and 

services from any federal agency for unforeseen emergencies when 

deemed important to U.S. national interests. 

C. Reimbursable Support. 

1. FAA § 607, 22 U.S.C. § 2357 – Authorizes any federal agency to furnish 

commodities and services to friendly countries and international 

organizations on an advance-of-funds or reimbursable basis. 

2. FAA § 632, 22 U.S.C. § 2392 – Authorizes the State Department to use its 

funds to obtain DoD’s support under the FAA or Title 10 authorities. 

Appendix IV-37 409 

 

	 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

3. Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1535 – Authorizes the provision of defense 

articles and services indirectly to third countries, the UN, and international 

organizations on a reimbursable basis for another federal agency (e.g., 

Department of State). 

4. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) – Arms Export Control Act (AECA) §§ 21-

22, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2761-62 – Third countries and the UN may enter 

standard FMS contracts with DoD for the sale of defense articles and 

services. 

5. Leases – AECA §§ 61-62, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2796-2796a – Authorizes leases of 

Defense articles to foreign countries or international organizations, 

generally on a reimbursable basis. 

6. Acquisition & Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) – 10 U.S.C. §§ 2341-

2350 – DoD authority to acquire logistic support without resort to 

commercial contracting procedures and to transfer support outside of the 

AECA. Under the statutes, after consulting with the State Department, 

DoD may enter into agreements with NATO countries, NATO subsidiary 

bodies, other eligible countries, the UN, and international regional 

organizations of which the U.S. is a member for the reciprocal provision 

of logistic support, supplies, and services. Acquisitions and transfers are 

on a cash reimbursement or replacement-in-kind or exchange of equal 

value basis. 

II. DOD HUMANITARIAN & DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS 

A. Appropriations. $55.9M in FY2001 for Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and 

Civic Aid (OHDACA) programs of the Department of Defense under 10 U.S.C. 

§§ 401 (only for humanitarian demining), 402, 404, 2547, and 2551. 

B. Humanitarian & Civic Assistance (HCA). 10 U.S.C. § 401. See also, DOD Dir. 

2205.2, 6 Oct 1994; DOD Inst. 2205.3, 27 Jan 1995. 

410	 Appendix IV-37 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

1. Need for Express Authority. 

a. 41 U.S.C. § 12: “No contract shall be entered into for the erection, 

repair, or furnishing of any public building, or for any public 

improvement which shall bind the Government to pay a larger sum 

of money than the amount in the Treasury appropriated for the 

specific purpose. 

b. 63 Comp. Gen. 422 (1984): “[I]t is our conclusion that DoD’s use 

of O&M funds to finance civic/humanitarian activities during 

combined exercises in Honduras, in the absence of an interagency 

order or agreement under the Economy Act, was an improper use 

of funds, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a).” 

2. Scope of Authority. Secretary concerned may carry out HCA in 

conjunction with authorized military operations of the armed forces in a 

country if the Secretary determines the activities will promote 

a. The security interests of the U.S. and the country where the 

activities will be carried out; and 

b. The specific operational readiness skills of the servicemembers 

who will participate in the activities. 

3. Limits. 

a. May not duplicate other forms of U.S. economic assistance. 

b. May not be provided (directly or indirectly) to any individual, 

group, or organization engaged in military or paramilitary 

activities. 

c. SecState must specifically approve assistance. 

d. Must be paid out of funds approved and budgeted for HCA. 

Appendix IV-37 411 

 

	 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

e. U.S. personnel may not engage in the physical detection, lifting, or 

destroying of landmines (except concurrent with U.S. military 

operations), or provide such assistance as part of a military 

operation not involving U.S. forces. 

4. Definition. HCA means— 

a. Medical, dental, veterinary care in rural areas; 

b. Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; 

c. Well drilling and construction of rudimentary sanitation facilities; 

d. Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities; and 

e. Detection and clearance of landmines, including education, 

training, and technical assistance. 

5. De minimis HCA. 10 U.S.C. § 401(c)(4) and DOD Dir. 2205.2, E1.1.1. 

a. Provides authority for commanders to react to HCA “targets of 

opportunity”during the course of a military operation. Such 

activities must be modest in scope and involve only “minimal 

expenditures for incidental costs.” 

b. All costs incurred in executing a De minimis HCA action are 

funded from the unit’s O&M account. 

c. Rule of Thumb: A few soldiers, a few dollars, for a few hours. 

CINC’s may have promulgated specific guidance regarding the 

level of effort/funding that falls under the definition of De Minimus 

HCA in their AORs. 

d. Examples: 

412	 Appendix IV-37 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

(1) A unit’s doctor’s examination of villagers for a few hours, 

with the administration of several shot and the issuance of 

some medicine, but not the deployment of a medical team 

for the purposes of providing mass inoculations to the local 

populace. 

(2) The opening of an access road through the trees and 

underbrush for several hundred yards, but not the 

asphalting of a roadway. 

6. Exercise-Related Construction (ERC) distinguished. 

10 U.S.C. § 2805(a)(2). 

a. “Funds from this account may only support construction activities 

necessary for the conduct of U.S. military exercises. The account 

is not a foreign assistance program.” --S. Rep. 355, 102d Cong., 

2d Sess. 10 (1992)(emphasis added). 

7. Appropriations. Specifically fenced O&M for HCA. Demining, however, 

uses OHDACA. De minimis HCA is funded from the unit’s O&M 

account. 

C. Transportation of Humanitarian Relief Supplies for NGOs. 10 U.S.C. § 402. 

1. Scope of Authority. SecDef may transport to any country, without charge, 

supplies furnished by NGOs intended for humanitarian assistance. 

Transport permitted only on a space-available basis. Supplies may be 

distributed by U.S. agencies, foreign governments, international 

organizations, or non-profit relief organizations. 

2. Preconditions. Before transporting supplies, SecDef must determine— 

a. The transportation of the supplies is consistent with U.S. foreign 

policy; 

b. The supplies to be transported are suitable for humanitarian 

purposes and are in usable condition; 

Appendix IV-37 413 

 

	 

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c. A legitimate humanitarian need exists for the supplies by the 

people for whom the supplies are intended; 

d. The supplies will, in fact, be used for humanitarian purposes; and 

e. Adequate arrangements have been made for the distribution of the 

supplies in the destination country. 

3. Limits. Supplies transported may not be distributed (directly or indirectly) 

to any individual, group, or organization engaged in military or 

paramilitary activities. 

D. Foreign Disaster Assistance – 10 U.S.C. § 404. 

1. Scope of Authority. 

a. General. President may direct SecDef to provide disaster 

assistance outside the U.S. to respond to manmade or natural 

disasters when necessary to prevent the loss of life. Amounts 

appropriated to DoD for Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and 

Civic Aid (OHDACA) are available for organizing general policies 

and programs for disaster relief programs. 

b. Delegation of Authority. President delegated to SecDef authority 

to provide disaster relief with SecState’s concurrence and in 

emergencies when insufficient time to seek SecState concurrence 

(provided SecDef seeks SecState concurrence as soon as 

practicable thereafter). Executive Order 12966, 60 Fed. Reg. 

36949 (July 14, 1995). 

2. Types of Assistance. Transportation, supplies, services, and equipment. 

3. Notice to Congress. Within 48 hours of commencing relief activities, 

President must transmit a report to Congress. 

4. Appropriations. Funded from the OHDACA appropriation. 

E. Excess Nonlethal Supplies for Humanitarian Relief – 10 U.S.C. § 2547. 

414	 Appendix IV-37 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

1. Scope of Authority. SecDef may make available for humanitarian relief 

purposes any DoD nonlethal excess supplies. Excess supplies furnished 

under statute transferred to DoS, which is responsible for the distribution 

of the supplies. 

2. Limits. Statute does not constitute authority to conduct any activity that, if 

carried out as a DoD intelligence activity, would require notice to the 

intelligence committees under 50 U.S.C. §§ 413 et seq. 

3. Definition. “Nonlethal excess supplies” means property that is excess 

under DoD regulations and is not a weapon, ammunition, or other 

equipment or material designed to inflict serious bodily harm or death. 

F. Humanitarian Assistance. 10 U.S.C. § 2551. 

1. Scope. 

a. General. To the extent provided in authorization acts, funds 

appropriated to DOD for humanitarian assistance shall be used for 

providing transportation of humanitarian relief and other 

humanitarian purposes worldwide. 

b. Availability of Funds. To the extent provided in the appropriations 

acts, funds appropriated for humanitarian assistance remain 

available until expended . 

2. Reports. Statute contains detailed annual reporting requirements. 

3. Appropriations. Funded from the OHDACA appropriation. 

4. § 2551/§ 401 Distinguished. If it fits § 401 in each and every particular, 

it’s § 401 HCA. If not (but for humanitarian purpose) it’s § 2551 HA. 

III. SPECIAL AUTHORITIES. 

A. CinC Initiative Funds (CIF). 10 U.S.C. § 166a. See DoD Appropriations Act for 

FY 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-259 (2000) ($25M for CIF in FY 2001 in Defense-wide 

O&M); DoD Dir. 7280.4, 26 Oct 1993; CJCSI 7401.01A, 30 Jan 1999. 

Appendix IV-37 415 

 

	 

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1. Scope. CJCS may provide to CinCs (including NORAD) sums 

appropriated for the following activities: 

a. Force training. 

b. Contingencies. 

c. Selected operations. 

d. Command and Control. 

e. Joint Exercises (including participating expenses of foreign 

countries). 

f. Humanitarian and civil assistance. 

g. Military education and training to military and related civilian 

personnel of foreign countries (including transportation, 

translation, and administrative expenses). 

h. Personnel expenses of defense personnel for bilateral or regional 

cooperation programs. 

i. Force protection. 

2. Priorities. CJCS should give priority consideration to requests for funds 

that would (1) enhance warfighting capability, readiness, and 

sustainability of forces assigned to the commander requesting the funds; 

(2) be used for activities in a CinC’s AOR that would reduce threats to, or 

enhance, U.S. national security. 

3. Relationship to Other Funding. Any amount provided as CinC initiative 

funds for an authorized activity are “in addition to amounts otherwise 

available for that activity during the fiscal year.” 

4. Limits. 10 U.S.C. § 166a(e). Of funds made available— 

416	 Appendix IV-37 
 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

a. No more than $7M may be used to buy end items with a cost 

greater than $15,000; 

b. No more than $1M may be used to pay the expenses of foreign 

countries participating in joint exercises; 

c. No more than $2M may be used for education and training to 

military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries; and 

d. No funds may be used for any activity for which Congress has 

denied authorization. 

B. Emergency & Extraordinary (E&E) Expenses. 10 U.S.C. § 127. 

1. General. Within appropriations made for this purpose, SecDef may pay 

for any emergency or extraordinary expenses that cannot be anticipated or 

classified. SecDef may spend the funds appropriated for such purposes as 

deemed proper; and such determination is final and conclusive upon the 

accounting officers of the U.S. This authority may be delegated (and 

redelegated). 10 U.S.C. § 127(b). 

2. Congressional Notification. DoD Authorization Act for FY 1996 revised 

§ 127 to require that SecDef give congressional defense and 

appropriations committees 15 days advance notice before expending or 

obligating funds in excess of $1 million and five days advance notice for 

expenditures or obligations between $500K and $1M. Pub. L. No. 104­

106, § 915 (1996). 

3. Appropriations. $10.616M for Army; $5.146M for Navy and Marine 

Corps; $7.878M for Air Force; and $30M for SecDef. DoD 

Appropriations Act for FY 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-259 (2000). 

C. Contingency Operations Funding Authority. 10 U.S.C. § 127a (amended by DoD 

Authorization Act for FY 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 1003 (1996). 

Appendix IV-37 417 
 


 

	 

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1. Applicability. Deployments (other than for training) and humanitarian 

assistance, disaster relief, or support to law enforcement operations 

(including immigration control) for which funds have not been provided, 

which are expected to exceed $50M, or the incremental costs of which, 

when added to other operations currently ongoing, are expected to result in 

a cumulative incremental cost in excess of $100M. Does not apply to 

operations with incremental costs not expected to exceed $10M. 

2. Consequences. 

a. Waiver of Working Capital Fund (WCF) Reimbursement. Units 

participating in applicable operations receiving services from WCF 

activities may not be required to reimburse for the incremental 

costs incurred in providing such services. Statute restricts SecDef 

authority to reimburse WCF activities from O&M accounts. (In 

addition, if any activity director determines that absorbing these 

costs could cause an Anti-Deficiency Act violation, reimbursement 

is required.) 

b. Transfer Authority. Authorizes SecDef to transfer up to $200M in 

any fiscal year to reimburse accounts used to fund operation for 

incremental expenses incurred. 

3. Congressional Notification & GAO Compliance Reviews. Statute 

contains provisions for both. 

418	 Appendix IV-37 
 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

4. Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF). DoD 

Appropriations Act for FY 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-259, Title II (2000). 

Appropriates $3.94B of “no-year” funds “for expenditures directly relating 

to Overseas Contingency Operations by U.S. Military Forces.” These 

funds may be transferred to O&M accounts, military personnel accounts, 

Defense Health Program appropriation, procurement accounts, RDT&E 

accounts, and working capital funds. 1 H.Rep. 106-754, the Conference 

Report accompanying the Appropriations Act, states this amount covers 

the estimated costs of continuing operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and 

Southwest Asia. See, DoD Reg. 7000.14-R, DOD Financial Management 

Regulation, vol. 2B, Budget Formulation and Presentation, ch. 17, 

Contingency Operations (June 2000) and DoD Reg. 7000.14-R, DOD 

Financial Management Regulation, vol. 12, Special Accounts Funds and 

Programs, ch. 23, Contingency Operations (Sep 1996). 

IV. SECTION 8070 NOTIFICATION. DOD APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR FY 2001, 

PUB. L. NO. 106-259, § 8070 (2000). 

A. General. Requires DoD to notify the congressional appropriations, defense, and 

international relations committees 15 days before transferring to another nation or 

international organization any defense articles or services (other than intelligence 

services) in conjunction with (a) peace operations under chapters VI or VII of the 

UN charter or (b) any other international peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, or 

humanitarian assistance operation. See also DoD Appropriations Act for FY 96, 

Pub. L. 104-61 § 8117 (1995). 

B. Notice Requirement. The notice required includes: 

1. A description of the articles or services to be transferred; 

2. The value of the articles or services; and 

1 1 DOD Appropriations Act for FY 2001 § 8131, Pub. L. No. 106-259, 114 Stat. 661. 

None of the funds appropriated in this Act under the heading “[OCOTF]” may be transferred or obligated 

for [DOD] expenses not directly related to the conduct of overseas contingencies: Provided, That the 

[SECDEF] shall submit a report no later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal quarter to the Committees 

on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives that details any transfer of funds from the 

“[OCOTF]”: Provided further, That the report shall explain any transfer for the maintenance of real 

property, pay of civilian personnel, base operations support, and weapon, vehicle or equipment 

maintenance. 

Appendix IV-37 419 

 

	 

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3. With respect to a proposed transfer of supplies and equipment, a statement 

of 

a. Whether the inventory requirements of all elements of the armed 

forces (including the Reserve Components) for the types of articles 

and supplies to be transferred have been met; and 

b. Whether the items to be provided will have to be replaced and how 

the President proposes to pay for such replacement. 

C. Congress’ Intent. Section 8117 of the DoD Appropriations Act for FY 1996 was 

originally part of the House DoD Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2126) which was 

adopted in the first Conference without comment. The House Appropriations 

Committee expressed concern about the diversion of DoD resources to nontraditional operations, such as Haiti, Guantanamo, Rwanda, and the former 

Yugoslavia. The Committee stated that Congress must be kept fully aware of the 

use and involvement of defense assets in “essentially non-defense activities in 

support of foreign policy.” H.R. Rep. No. 208, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1995). 

D. President’s Interpretation. In “acquiescing” in the Appropriations Act, the 

President expressed concern about section 8117 and pledged to interpret it 

consistent with constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations and as 

Commander in Chief. Statement by the President (Nov. 30, 1995). 

E. Scope. 

1. Included Activities. Section 8070 affects DoD’s use of any statutory 

authority to furnish articles and services to other countries and 

international organizations during peace, humanitarian, and disaster relief 

operations. Examples include— 

a. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements during peace and 

humanitarian assistance operations. 10 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2350. 

b. Drawdowns for peace and humanitarian assistance operations 

(Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) §§ 506, 552). 

c. Humanitarian & Civic Assistance (HCA). 10 U.S.C. §§ 166a(b)(6), 

401. 

420	 Appendix IV-37 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

d. Transportation of humanitarian assistance to the extent the service 

is provided to another nation or an international organization. 10 

U.S.C. § 2551. 

e. Excess non-lethal supplies for humanitarian relief. 10 U.S.C. § 

2547. 

f. Reimbursable support to other nations and international 

organizations in connection with peace and humanitarian 

assistance operations (FAA § 607; UNPA § 7), and reimbursable 

support to other federal agencies for peace and humanitarian 

assistance operations to the extent the DoD transfers articles or 

services to another nation or international organization. 31 U.S.C. 

§ 1535; FAA § 632. 

g. Landmine clearance activities. FY 1995 DoD Authorization Act, 

Pub. L. No. 103-337, § 1413 (1994). 

2. Excluded Activities. Section 8070 does not affect all DoD activities with 

other countries and international organizations. Examples of excluded 

activities include— 

a. Exercises in which the DoD pays the incremental expenses of 

participating developing countries—including Partnership for 

Peace (PFP) exercises. 10 U.S.C. § 2010. 

b. SOF training. 10 U.S.C. § 2011. 

c. Bilateral/regional conferences and seminars unconnected with 

peace and humanitarian assistance operations. 10 U.S.C. § 1051. 

d. LATAM Coop unconnected with peace and humanitarian 

assistance operations. 10 U.S.C. § 1050. 

e. Military to military contacts. 10 U.S.C. § 168. 

f. EDA authorities (FAA § 516) which already have congressional 

notice requirements equal to or in excess of 15 days. 

Appendix IV-37 421 

 

	 

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g. Support for other nations and international organizations in 

operations unrelated to peacekeeping, peace enforcement and 

humanitarian assistance (e.g. coalition operations in time of war). 

F. Compliance. DoD complies with section 8070 by— 

1. Notifying Congress before DoD transfers supplies or services in 

connection with peace or humanitarian assistance operations; or 

2. Transferring supplies and services in such operations without 

congressional notification when— 

a. Providing disaster relief; 

b. Providing support without using funds appropriated to DoD (e.g. 

“advance of funds” basis); or 

c. Providing support under an FMS case. 

V. CONCLUSION. 

MAJ Kevin Walker 

TJAGSA 

422	 Appendix IV-37 

 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

APPENDIX IV-38: IMMINENT DEATH PROCESSING 

TAPD-OEA 10 Feb 2000 

SUBJECT: Imminent Death Processing 

1. Purpose. To provide an overview of expeditious processing of imminent death cases 

and 

the benefits that result when a soldier pending death is expeditiously retired for physical 

disability. 

2. Facts. 

a. Expeditious processing of imminent death cases consists of procedures for 

completing 

 physical disability evaluation and retirement on a 24-hour basis. 

b. Imminent death procedures are applied to the cases of Active and Reserve 

Component soldiers when the Medical Treatment Facility (MTF) determines that the 

soldier is expected to die within 72 hours from a medical condition incurred or 

aggravated in the line of duty. 

c. No regulatory and statutory requirements are omitted or accomplished after the 

fact 

of death. For example, if a line of duty determination is required, retirement is not 

executed until the required level of determination (informal or formal) per AR 600-8-1, 

chapter 39 (1986), is approved and confirms an in-line-of-duty finding. Retirement must 

be executed before death as defined by the laws of the state where the soldier is assigned, 

or if soldier is outside of the Continental United States, as defined under military medical 

standards. 

d. To protect the interests of the soldier and the government should the soldier 

recover 

or improve, the soldier is placed on the Temporary Disability Retired List. 

e. The MTF Physical Evaluation Board Liaison officer (PEBLO) and the 

Installation 

Retirement Services Officer (RSO) have joint responsibility to counsel the soldier and the 

soldier’s next of kin. 

(1) The PEBLO is responsible for counseling the soldier and the soldier’s next of 

kin 

on the disability evaluation process, the soldier’s rights in the process, the Physical 

Evaluation Board findings, estimated disability compensation, and potential Department 

of Veterans Affairs (DVA) benefits and programs. 

Appendix IV-38 423 
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(2) The RSO is responsible for counseling the soldier and the soldier’s next of 

kin on 

retirement and survivor benefits, to include the Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP), and DVA 

and Social Security entitlements. The RSO must: 

(a) Complete the DD Form 2656 (Data for Payment of Retired Personnel), 

which 

indicates the family’s desired SBP election; and 

(b) Coordinate with HQDA, Army Retirement Services--the Secretary of the 

Army designee to make SBP elections on behalf of death imminent soldiers. 

(3) The Army and Air Force Mutual Aid Association is available to assist the 

PEBLO or RSO by producing a benefits comparison tailored to the soldier’s 

circumstances. The Association will telefax or email the comparison to the PEBLO and 

RSO without regard to whether the soldier is a member of the Association. The 

questionnaire at enclosure 1 must be provided to the Association. The printout is 

generally available only during the Association’s office hours: 0830 to 1630, Eastern 

Standard Time. The objective of the Association is to be of service to the soldier and his 

family by providing the maximum information available on benefits. However, as a 

private institution not under contract to Department of Defense, the Association cannot 

assume liability for the choices made. 

f. Due to the variables that affect benefits, primarily under SBP, this information 

paper 

cannot provide an exact monetary comparison of benefits between death on active duty 

and death in retired status. These variables include: The age of the spouse; whether there 

are children; the ages of the children and whether any are handicapped; whether a wife is 

pregnant at time of the soldier’s death; specifics of any divorce settlement regarding 

former spouse entitlement to SBP; effect of remarriage on benefit entitlement; and, 

whether a single soldier has a relative that would qualify as an insurable interest 

beneficiary. 

g. In most cases when death is imminent, retirement for physical disability provides 

greater 

benefits than if death occurs on active duty due to the benefits described below. A 

summary matrix is attached. 

(1) Entitlement to the same active duty death benefits. 

(a) Soldiers retired under imminent death procedures are totally disabled 

soldiers. 

Totally disabled soldiers retain coverage under Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance 

(SGLI) up to one year or until the disability ceases to be total in degree, whichever occurs 

first, with no premium cost during this period. 

424 Appendix IV-38 
 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

(b) The death gratuity is payable to certain survivors if the death occurs 

within 120 days following retirement and is related to service connected causes as 

determined by the DVA. 

(2) Eligibility for DIC and SBP. 

(a) Eligible survivors of soldiers who die on active duty are entitled to DVA 

Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC). They are not entitled to SBP unless 

the soldier had at least 20 years of federal service. In that case the law directs a “spouse 

only” election for a married soldier or a “child(ren) only” election for an unmarried 

soldier with child(ren). No other options are available. 

(b) Survivors of retired soldiers who die of a service-connected disability may 

be 

entitled to DIC. The DVA should be consulted to ensure eligibility based on the DVA’s 

marriage requirements and in-line-of-duty considerations. 

(c) Soldiers pending disability retirement are eligible to elect SBP and have 

several election options: Spouse only, children only, spouse and children, former spouse 

only, former spouse and children; insurable interest; and, no election. 

(d) There is a dollar for dollar offset between DIC and SBP for SBP elections 

of 

spouse only or spouse and child. However, depending on the retired pay entitlement, 

SBP may exceed the DIC amount, in which case monies would be payable from both VA 

and DoD. DIC has no offsetting impact on a child’s SBP receipt. Thus, the flexibility of 

options available to the soldier pending retirement allows for weighing long term versus 

short term benefits in light of the number of dependents and their ages. 

(e) A single soldier with no children or one dependent child has the election 

option 

of “natural person with an insurable interest.” An annuity can be provided to any relative 

more closely related to the soldier than a cousin or a close business associate with proof 

of being financially affected by the soldier’s death. This option is not available to single 

soldiers who die on active duty eligible for retirement. 

(f) When a soldier pending retirement is mentally incompetent to make an 

SBP 

election, the Secretary of the Army makes the appropriate election on behalf of the 

soldier. This authority has been delegated to Chief, Army Retirement Services, Office of 

the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. The RSO coordinates the action. 

(3) Eligibility for Supplemental SBP (SSBP). SSBP is the supplemental plan 

which 

Appendix IV-38 425 
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increases basic SBP’s after-age-62 annuity amount. SSBP is not part of the active-duty 

death survivor package, even when the member has more than 20 years active federal 

service. It can only be elected at retirement. It is not connected to DIC; it is payable at 

age 62 to a qualified surviving spouse in addition to any DIC amounts received. 

(4) Possibility of Greater retired pay and greater SBP/SSBP annuity. Retired pay 

is computed using a multiplier equating to years of service or the disability rating—both 

limited to 75%. The disability rating for imminent death retirement is 100%. Thus, even 

a soldier who was eligible to retire for length of service would benefit from death 

imminent retirement processing because of the higher multiplier used to calculate retired 

pay as well as the SBP election flexibility afforded by retirement. 

(5) Eligibility for Service Disabled Veterans Life Insurance (RH) (SDVI). This is 

a 

$10,000 policy for disabled veterans. A soldier must be retired in order to apply for it. 

(a) Totally disabled veterans, may apply for waiver of premiums for the basic 

policy. 

After six months, totally disabled veterans may apply for an additional policy of up to 

$20,000. 

(b) If the veteran is mentally competent, but physically incapable of signing 

the 

application, a statement to that effect can be submitted by his doctor or nurse. The 

statement must confirm that the veteran was totally aware of what was happening and 

why he couldn’t sign. If he is mentally incompetent, only a court appointed guardian can 

sign the application. 

(c) If the mentally incompetent soldier dies before a guardian is appointed, the 

soldier’s beneficiary may apply for gratuitous SDVI (“ARH”). This is a lump sum 

payment, the approval of which rests with the DVA. 

h. There are two considerations which may result in retirement posing a hardship. 

(1) Civilian life insurance: Does the soldier have a civilian policy that provides 

greater 

benefits if death occurs on active duty? Usually these are policies offered by military 

oriented associations. The amount of such a policy should be carefully weighed against 

the overall entitlement package afforded by retirement. 

(2) Hospitalization in a civilian facility: If the soldier is in a civilian facility 

when 

retired, the spouse becomes responsible for those medical costs not covered under the 

soldier’s TRICARE plan. While this is a factor to consider, a death imminent soldier 

who survives but needs additional hospital level care may be transferred to a VA hospital, 

426 Appendix IV-38 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

where TRICARE is not an issue. The installation Health Benefits Advisor (HBA) should 

be consulted on this matter. 

Frances A. Dennis(202) 782-3064 

USPDA Policy Officer 

Dennis E. Brower(202)782-3002 

USPDA Legal Advisor 

(DSN 662) 

Appendix IV-38 427 
 

 

 

 

 

 

_____ 

_____ 

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AAFMAA PEBLO/CAO QUESTIONNAIRE 

(No Cover Sheet Required – Page 1 of 1) 

AAFMAA CAO/PEBLO Requesting: __________________ 

Ft. Myer, VA 22211 Address: __________________ 

FAX # (703) 875-0070 __________________ 

Phone: ________________

 FAX: _________________ 

I. SERVICE MEMBER DATA 

1. NAME: _______________________ 2. DATE OF BIRTH: MO _____ DAY _____ YR 

3. PRESENT RANK/GRADE: _______ 4. DATE OF DEATH: MO _____ DAY_____ YR 

5. SSAN: _______ - _______ - _______ 

6. PAY ENTRY BASE DATE (PEBD): MO_____ DAY _____ YEAR _____ 

7. BASIC ACTIVE SERVICE DATE (BASD): MO _____ DAY _____ YEAR _____ 

8. PRESENT MARITAL STATUS: SINGLE _____ MARRIED _____ 

9. DATE OF PRESENT MARRIAGE: MO _____ DAY _____ YEAR _____ 

II. FAMILY DATA 

10. CURRENT SPOUSE NAME: ________________________________ 

11. SPOUSE DOB: MO _____ DAY _____ YEAR _____ 

12. CHILDREN: 

#1___________________________________ DOB: MO _____DAY _____YR _____ 

#2___________________________________ DOB: MO _____DAY _____YR _____ 

#3___________________________________ DOB: MO _____ DAY _____ YR _____ 

#4___________________________________ DOB: MO _____ DAY _____ YR _____ 

#5___________________________________ DOB: MO _____ DAY _____ YR _____ 

#6___________________________________ DOB: MO _____ DAY _____ YR _____ 

Please complete ALL date fields. Dates are more important than names if names are not readily 

available. 

FOR AAFMA USE: PROCESS DATE: __________ INITIALS: _____________ 

428 Appendix IV-38 

 


 


 

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APPENDIX IV-39: KOSOVO BACKGROUND BRIEFING CMTC 

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APPENDIX V-1: COUNTRIES SUPPORTING KOSOVAR REFUGEES1 

• Over 600,000 Kosovar Refugees worldwide to date (May 14, 1999). 

• The location and number of refugees: 

3⁄4 Albania 359,000 3⁄4 Macedonia 132,500 

3⁄4 Bosnia- 3⁄4 Montenegro 68,200 

Herzegovina 32,300 

• Refugees evacuated from Macedonia and Albania as of April 25, 1999: 

3⁄4 Austria 324 3⁄4 Israel 106 

3⁄4 Belgium 676 3⁄4 Norway 1,104 

3⁄4 Croatia 88 3⁄4 Poland 635 

3⁄4 France 348 3⁄4 Sweden 5,000 

3⁄4 Germany 9,974 3⁄4 Switzerland 33 

3⁄4 Iceland 23 3⁄4 Turkey 4,002 

• Nations accepting refugees on a temporary basis: 

3⁄4 Australia 4,000 3⁄4 Malta 100 

3⁄4 Austria 5,000 3⁄4 Norway 6,000 

3⁄4 Canada 5,000 3⁄4 Poland 1,000 

3⁄4 Denmark 1,500 3⁄4 Romania 1,500 

3⁄4 Germany 10,000 3⁄4 Sweden 5,000 

3⁄4 Finland 10,000 3⁄4 Turkey 20,000 

3⁄4 Iceland 100 3⁄4 United States 20,000 

1 E-mail from MAJ Donna L. Barlett, Chief, Operational Law, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army 

Reserve Command, to LTC Willis C. Hunter, Staff Judge Advocate, JTF Provide Refuge (May 14, 1999) (on file 

with CLAMO). 

436 Appendix V-1 
 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

APPENDIX V-2: PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION NO. 99-23 

THE WHITE HOUSE 

Office of the Press Secretary 

For Immediate Release May 18, 1999 

May 18, 1999 

Presidential Determination 

No. 99-23 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE 

SUBJECT: Determination Pursuant to Section 2(c)(1) of the

Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as Amended 

Pursuant to section 2(c)(1) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended, 22 

U.S.C. 2601(c)(1), I hereby determine that it is important to the national interest that up to $15 

million be made available from the U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund to 

meet urgent and unexpected humanitarian requirements associated with the Kosovo crisis. 

These funds will be used to meet the urgent and unexpected needs of refugees, displaced 

persons, victims of conflict, and other persons at risk due to the Kosovo crisis. These funds may 

be used, as appropriate, to provide contributions to governmental, international, and 

nongovernmental organizations. As necessary, funds will also support requirements associated 

with the U.S. program to provide refuge in the United States for up to 20,000 Kosovar refugees, 

and for administrative expenses of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. 

You are authorized and directed to inform the appropriate committees of the Congress of this 

determination and the use of funds under this authority, and to arrange for the publication of this 

determination in the Federal Register. 

WILLIAM J. CLINTON 

Appendix V-2 437 
CENTER F OR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

APPENDIX V-3: DOD/DHHS MOA 

Interagency Agreement Between 

The Department of Health and Human Services 

and 

The Department of Defense 

In Support of Kosovar Refugees 

I. Purpose 

This interagency agreement establishes the basis for certain services to be provided to the 

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) by the Department of Defense (DOD). 

Under the provisions of this Agreement, HHS, Administration for Children and Families 

(ACF), Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) will reimburse DOD for support to 

Kosovar refugee processing at DOD facilities. 

II. Authority 

This agreement is entered into in accordance with sections 411(b) and 412(b)(3) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (8 U.S.C. 1521(b) and 1522(b)(3)). This 

Agreement governs activities described herein and authorized pursuant to section 412 (b) 

(3) of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1522(b)(3)). 

III. Scope of Work 

Section 412(b)(3) of the INA authorizes the Secretary of HHS to make arrangements, 

including cooperative agreements with other Federal agencies, for the temporary care of 

refugees in the U.S. in emergency circumstances, including the establishment of 

processing centers. Specifically, funds provided under this Agreement will be used to 

support the processing of Kosovar refugees at DOD facilities. HHS agrees to pay for 

only the incremental costs incurred by DOD to provide the support. Incremental costs 

are those costs that DOD would not incur except to provide the support under this 

agreement. HHS reserves the right to reclaim any goods, equipment, or facilities 

purchased or constructed with HHS funds. Processing costs may include, but are not 

limited to, preparation and establishment of appropriate billeting, administrative, medical, 

and laundry facilities, ground transportation, food services, and communications support. 

HHS will provide $20.0 million for the incremental costs DOD expects to incur to 

provide support under this agreement. DOD will notify HHS if funds expenditure 

approaches 90 percent of the allocated amount. 

438 Appendix V-3 
 

 

 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

IV. Period of Agreement 

This agreement is effective from April 30, 1999 through September 30, 1999. This 

agreement may be amended or canceled upon mutual written agreement of the parties. 

Signatories will review this agreement 60 days prior to the end of the fiscal year if DOD 

support is projected to extend beyond the effective date set forth in this agreement. 

V. Project Officers

 DOD 

Lt. Col. Dave Hough 

OSD, PK/HA (703-695-7164) 

HHS 

Loren Bussert (202) 401-4732 

Office of Refugee Resettlement 

VI. Funds Transfer Instructions 

ORR will transfer $20.0 million to DOD through the Online Payment and Collection 

(OPAC) system. These funds may only be drawn down as costs are incurred. The 

accounting data are as follows: 

HHS/ACF/ORR DOD/Army O & M 

Agency Code: 75-03-0030 Agency 21 

Appropriation Number: 7591503 Appropriation 2192020 (O & M) 

Common Accounting Number: 9G991131 

Object Class Code: 25.39 

Amount: $20.0 million 

VII. Approval 

This agreement is entered into on behalf of the Department of Health and Human 

Services and the Department of Defense by the undersigned duly authorized individuals. 

Original Signed Date 5/4/99 Original Signed Date 5/4/99 

John T. Monahan James A. Schear 

Principal Deputy Assistant Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

For Children and Families Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs 

Appendix V-3 439 
CENTER F OR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

Temporary Care of Kosovar Refugees at DOD Facilities in the U.S. 

Necessary costs include, but are not limited, to the following: 

Food Costs 

Food Services and Contract Personnel 

Equipment and Basic Supplies 

Miscellaneous Consumables, as necessary 

(Sheets/towels, Cleaning supplies, etc.) 

Miscellaneous contracts (custodial, phone hookups, grounds, etc.) 

Supplies and Fuel 

Quality of Life Material

 (Recreational equipment, etc.) 

Utilities 

Interpretation and translation as necessary and not available from the JVA 

Ground Transportation for Refugees 

440 Appendix V-3 
 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

APPENDIX V-4: U. S. VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT AGENCIES 

Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration 

Participants In Department Of State (PRM) Reception 

And Placement Program for Kosovar Albanians 

United States Voluntary Settlement Agencies 

Bureau of Refugee Services (IOWA) Church World Service (CWS) 

Iowa Department of Human Services Immigration and Refugee Program 

1200 University Avenue, Suite D 475 Riverside Drive 

Des Moines, Iowa 50314 New York, New York 10115-0050 

(515) 283-7999 churchworldservice.org 

(212) 870-3304 

Episcopal Migration Ministries (EMM) Ethiopian Community Development Council, 

The Episcopal Church Center Inc. (ECDC) 

815 Second Avenue 1038 South Highland 

New York, New York 10017 Arlington, Virginia 22204 

http://www.dhfms.org/emm/ (703) 685-0510 

(212) 867-8400 

Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) Immigration & Refugee Services of America 

333 Seventh Avenue (IRSA) 

New York, New York 10001- 1717 Mass. Ave., NW, Suite 200 

5004 Washington, DC 20036 

(212) 967-4100 (202) 797-2105 

International Rescue Committee (IRC) Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service 

122 East 42nd Street-12th Floor (LIRS) 

New York, New York 10168- 390 Park Avenue South 

1289 New York, New York 10016-8803 

http://noprofits.cor/gallery/alpha/irc (212) 532-6350 

(212) 551-3000 

United States Catholic Conference World Relief Refugee Services (WRRS) 

(USCC) PO Box WRC 

Migration and Refugee Services 3211 Nyack, New York 10960 

Fourth Street, NE (914) 268-4135 

Washington, DC 20017 

http://nccbuscc.org 

(202) 541-3169 

Appendix V-4 441 
 

 


 


 


 


 

	 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

APPENDIX V-5: AGENCIES IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION 

PROVIDE REFUGE1
 

• Governmental Organizations 

3⁄4 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 

 Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) (part of DHHS' 

Administration for Children and Families) 

ORR coordinated all the governmental and nongovernmental 

organizations in ensuring the health and safety of the refugees 

and resettlement into communities across the country. 

 U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) 

Conducted the medical screenings for all the refugees as part of 

their processing into the U.S and operated a fully staffed 

medical clinic. The screening included a physical examination, 

X-rays and blood tests. The clinic provided emergency acute 

care services, general physicians, pediatricians, OB/GYN, 

nurses, physician assistants, and emergency medical 

technicians. 

 PHS Commissioned Corps2 

 Office of Emergency Preparedness 

 Food and Drug Administration 

 Indian Health Service 

 Health Care Finance Administration 

 Health Resources Services Administration 

 Substance Abuse Mental Health Services Administration. 

 Center for Disease Control and Prevention 

Handled the medical records on each of the refugees, compiling 

medical histories and tracking past or potentially current 

communicable conditions. Any refugee who was diagnosed 

with a communicable condition, such as tuberculosis, was fully 

treated at Fort Dix before resettlement. 

3⁄4 Department of State (DOS) 

3⁄4 Department of Transportation (DOT) 

1 See Headquarters, U.S. Army, Fort Dix, Force Projection Directorate, Operations Order 99-005 ¶ 1(b)(1) 

(25 May 1999) (on file with CLAMO); see also E-mail from William S. Spraitzar, Army War College, to
 

COL John E. Baker, Ft. Know, KY (May 11, 1999) (on file with CLAMO).

2 See Message, 221700 (EDT) May 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 20 (22 

May 1999) [hereinafter SITREP 20] (on file with CLAMO).
 

442	 Appendix V-5 
 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

3⁄4 Department of Veteran’s Affairs 

3⁄4 Department of Justice (DOJ) 

 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

 Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 

Responsible for processing refugees into the U.S. and 

establishing their INS files through refugee interviews. 

3⁄4 Department of Treasury (DOJ) 

 Customs Service 

3⁄4 National Security Council (NSA) 

3⁄4 Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 

3⁄4 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 

3⁄4 Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) 

Represented 13 different teams from 12 different states.3 

3⁄4 State of New Jersey (state and local police, state government) 

• Nongovernment Organizations: 

3⁄4 American Red Cross (ARC) 

3⁄4 Immigration and Refugee Services of America (IRSA) (Joint 

Volunteer Agency (JVA)) [NOTE: see also Appendix V-4] 

 Voluntary agency providing refugee resettlement services in 

support of Department of State (DOS) and DHHS programs. 

 Managed the sponsorship process as the JVA at Fort Dix. 

 Provided interpreters and prepared the paperwork necessary to 

ensure that each family was provided appropriate sponsorship by one 

of the ten national resettlement agencies that can officially sponsor 

these families. 

3 See id. 

Appendix V-5 443 
 


 

	 

C ENTER FOR L AW AND MILITARY O PERATIONS 

APPENDIX V-6: DOD-DHHS SUPPORT/CONTRACT 

RESPONSIBILITIES 

• DHHS support/contract for:1 

3⁄4 Transportation to CONUS (Charter Aircraft) 

3⁄4 Transportation from point of arrival to the Joint Task Force Village 

3⁄4 Medical Care (incl. U.S. Public Health Service) 

3⁄4 Food Services 

3⁄4 Housekeeping 

3⁄4 Security 

3⁄4 Immigration processing (performed by U.S. Immigration and 

Naturalization Service (INS) 

• DoD support of the Department of Health and Human Services:2 

3⁄4 Arrival Departure Airfield Control Group operations. 

3⁄4 Transportation of refugees from McGuire Air Force Base to Ft. Dix, N.J. 

3⁄4 All physical facilities for the operation. 

3⁄4 Dining facility operations for the refugees. 

3⁄4 Exchange operations for the refugees. 

3⁄4 Chaplain coordination for religious support. 

3⁄4 Joint Information Bureau and media support operations. 

3⁄4 Infrastructure and support items for in-processing and interview facilities. 

3⁄4 External perimeter security. 

3⁄4 Communications and information management support. 

3⁄4 All housing management operations for the refugees. 

3⁄4 Utilities, building maintenance, grounds maintenance, and refuse 

removal. 

3⁄4 Support for refugee quality of life, i.e., soccer, entertainment support. 

1 E-mail from MAJ Donna L. Barlett, Chief, Operational Law, U.S. Army Reserve Command, to LTC Willis C. 

Hunter, Staff Judge Advocate, JTF Provide Refuge (May 14, 1999) (on file with CLAMO). 

2 See U.S. Army Forces Command, After Action Review, Operation Provide Refuge, 

http://freddie.forscom.army.mil/maca/Word/jtfpraar.doc (last visited July 2, 2001) (on file with CLAMO). 

444 Appendix V-6 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

APPENDIX V-7: JTF PROVIDE REFUGE COMMAND AND CONTROL 

STRUCTURE1 AND UNITS IN SUPPORT2

U.S. Army Reserve 

Command 

Team Dix 

1079th GSU 

Ft. Dix Installation 

Commander 

Installation Staff

Secretary of Defense 

Secretary of Army 

(DOMS Action Agent) 

U.S. Atlantic Command 

(CINCUSACOM

U.S. Army Forces Command 

(CINCFORSCOM)

(LOA) 

Commander 

JTF Provide Refuge 

Commander 

TF Refugee Support 

Support Staff 

OPCON Units 

UNITED STATES UNITED STATES ATLANTIC COMMAND ATLANTIC COMMAND 

McGuire 

U U SS

A CA C

OO

MM Air Force Base

New Jersey 

Natioal Guard 

HQ Commandant 

(TPU) 

XVIII Airborne Corps 

1st Corps Support Command 

507th CSG 

530th S&S Bn 

7th Trans Bn 

403d Trans Co 

330th MCC 

21st MP Co 

Co C, 261st Medical 

 1 See E-mail from MAJ Donna L. Barlett, Chief, Operational Law, U.S. Army Reserve Command, to LTC Willis C. 

Hunter, Staff Judge Advocate, JTF Provide Refuge (May 14, 1999) (on file with CLAMO). 

2 See Message, 131700 (EDT) May 99, JTF Provide Refuge, subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 11 (13 May 

1999) [hereinafter SITREP 11] (on file with CLAMO); Message, 151700 (EDT) June 99, JTF Provide Refuge, 

subject: JTF Provide Refuge SITREP 44 (15 June 1999) [hereinafter SITREP 44] (on file with CLAMO); U.S. 

Army Forces Command, After Action Review, Operation Provide Refuge, 

http://freddie.forscom.army.mil/maca/Word/jtfpraar.doc (last visited July 2, 2001) (on file with CLAMO). 

Appendix V-7 445 
 


 


 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

APPENDIX V-8: JOINT TASK FORCE PROVIDE REFUGE 

GENERAL ORDER #1
 

Joint Task Force _____________ 

General Order #1 

1. This order is applicable to all U.S. military and DoD civilian personnel attached, 

assigned, or under the operational control of Joint Task Force ___________. 

2. PURPOSE: This order establishes command policy concerning the conduct of JTF 

________ personnel within areas designated for Kosovar refugees and while interacting 

with the refugees. This includes the policy on alcoholic beverages, use of privately 

owned automobiles, and fraternization with the refugees. 

3. The following activities are prohibited: 

a. JTF _____ personnel will not enter areas designated for Kosovar refugees unless 

on official duty or official business or otherwise approved by competent authority; 

b. JTF _____ personnel will not purchase goods from or sell goods on behalf of 

refugees. "Goods" is hereby defined to include property, services and currency. This list 

is not exhaustive and could be expanded. 

c. JTF ______ personnel will not fraternize with migrant personnel. Fraternization 

is defined as associating in an informal, personal or intimate manner which reflects a 

familiarity that is inappropriate for the workplace. 

d. JTF _________ personnel will not engage in any conduct that creates an actual or 

perceived conflict of interest between their military duties and their personal activities. 

e. JTF_______ personnel will not engage in any physically intimate or sexually 

oriented activities with migrant personnel. 

f. JTF ______ personnel will not knowingly take or use supplies that are meant for 

the use of refugees, unless instructed otherwise by competent authority. 

4. This order is punitive. Persons subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice may 

be punished under Article 92, UCMJ for violating a lawful general order. DoD civilians 

may face adverse administrative action. 

5. Unit commanders and supervisors are charged to ensure all appropriate personnel are 

briefed on the content of this order. 

446 Appendix V-8 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

6. This general order will expire upon the completion of Operation _______ unless 

earlier rescinded, waived or modified. 

7. Direct all inquiries, comments and suggested amendments to JTF _______, ATTN: 

Legal Advisor. 

XXXXXXXXXX 

XXXXXXXXX 

 Commander, Joint Task Force________ 

Appendix V-8 447
 
 

 


 


 


 

	 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

APPENDIX V-9: JOINT TASK FORCE PROVIDE REFUGE STAFF
 

JUDGE ADVOCATE STANDARD OPERATION PROCEDURE
 

Joint Task Force 

Provide Refuge 

Fort Dix, NJ 

4 June 1999 

Staff Judge Advocate 

Standard Operating Procedure 

Applicability: This SOP applies to all personnel in the Staff Judge Advocate section. 

Chapter 1. 

General Information. 

1.1. Purpose. The SOP prescribes operating procedures and administrative policies for 

the Joint Task Force Provide Refuge Staff Judge Advocate. 

1.2. References. Related publications are: DOMS Execute order OlO636Z May 99, 

USACOM Execute Order OlO933Z May 99, and FORSCOM Execute Order O11333Z 

May 99. 

1.3. Responsibilities. All members of the Staff Judge Advocate section will adhere to the 

policies and procedures prescribed in this SOP. 

Chapter 2. 

General Duties and Responsibilities of SJA Personnel. 

2.1. General. The mission of the legal staff will be executed under the guidance of the 

Staff Judge Advocate. 

2.2. Responsibilities of the Staff Judge Advocate. 

a. Provide legal advice to the Task Force Commander and Staff. 

b. Attend daily staff meetings to provide input and obtain information. 

c. Provide relevant input to the daily SITREP. 

d. Review the daily SITREP to identify legal issues and obtain information. 

e. Attend Law Enforcement staff meetings each Wednesday. 

f. Tour the refugee housing areas at least once daily to observe conditions and 

identify potential legal problems. 

g. Observe refugee in-processing to identify potential legal problems. 

h. Check the SJA in-box on the second floor at least twice daily. 

i. Coordinate legal issues with the Fort Dix SJA. 

j. Coordinate legal issues with the USARC SJA. 

k. Coordinate legal issues with the FORSCOM SJA, Operational Law Division. 

448	 Appendix V-9 
 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

l. Respond to all JTF Taskings. 

m. Coordinate law enforcement issues through the JTF Provost Marshal. 

n. Maintain copies of all legal documents in file folders. 

o. Provide copies of all legal documents to the JTF Historian. 

p. Save all non-personal e-mail traffic for historical review. 

Chapter 3. 

SJA Operating Procedures.
 

3.1. SJA operations. 

a. Staffing. The SJA section is staffed with a single officer who must be 

available 24-hours per day. The normal duty day is O83O-173O, Monday - 

Saturday. 

b. Physical Training. The SJA section conducts PT each duty day at O63O or 

alternatively, during the lunch hour. 

c. Daily Meetings. The SJA meets daily with the JTF staff in the Command 

Conference Room (Basement of Bldg. 5957). This meeting is usually held 

from 16OO to 17OO each duty day. The SJA should also attend the Joint 

Agency Meeting held at O9OO each morning in the same location. 

d. Weekly Meetings. Each Wednesday there is a Law Enforcement personnel 

meeting in the JTF conference room. Meetings are normally held at 13OO. 

3.2. SJA Support . 

a. Administrative Support. The SJA section may obtain some administrative 

support from the Fort Dix SJA office in Building 5418 (phone 562-3O43). Support may 

consist of research assistance, supplies, or personnel support. 

b. Transportation. 

1. On-Post. The SJA section has been provided a GSA vehicle for on post 

transportation. The vehicle must be re-dispatched each Monday at the Installation motor 

pool located on Delaware Avenue across the street from the Fort Dix Fire Station. 

2. Off-Post. There is a New Jersey Transit bus available for transportation 

to the Moorestown and Cherry Hill Malls. The bus stop is located at the corner of 

Pemberton-Wrightstown Road and Pennsylvania Avenue (in front of the installation 

transportation office). A published bus schedule is available in the SJA office. 

c. Communications. The SJA section has traditional telephone, cellular phone, 

fax, e-mail, and internet communications facilities. The SJA's phone number is 

(6O9)562-

Appendix V-9 449 
 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

5299; cell phone number is (6O9)413-4O63. Incoming fax number is (6O9) 562-4144 

(the fax is located in the J-3 section). NOTE: cell phone usage inside the headquarters 

building is virtually impossible. 

d. Quarters. SJA personnel have quarters in the Fort Dix BOQ (Bldg. 5254). 

e. Meals. SJA personnel will be issued a government meal card. Meals are 

available in the dining facility located in Bldg. 5432, located on 6th Street between 

Pennsylvania and Delaware Avenues. 

f. Shopping. Fort Dix has a large PX/Commissary complex. All items normally 

found on a large base are available as well as several specialty shops offering flowers, 

rental cars, optical shop, computer repairs, and laundry facilities. An ATM machine is 

also located in the PX area. The PX/Commissary complex is located near the intersection 

of Texas Avenue and Pemberton-Wrightstown Road at the McGuire Air Force Base 

entrance gate. Fort Dix also has a Burger King, Shoppette, and gas station located near 

the PX/Commissary complex. 

g. Laundry. Fort Dix has a full support laundry at very inexpensive prices. The 

laundry is located at the intersection of Pemberton-Wrightstown Road and Pennsylvania 

Avenue. Laundry is normally returned within 48-72 hours. The JTF also has established a 

laundry pick-up point in the building with the dining facility. This service operates from 

O6OO-O8OO Monday thru Friday. Additionally, the BOQ has washing machines and 

dryers available free of charge to residents. 

h. Medical. SJA personnel utilize the troop medical clinic in building 566O for 

medical support. This clinic is located at the south end of the cantonment area (near the 

correctional facility) just off of Doughboy Loop on 1 6th Street. Phone number is 562- 

268O. 

i. Haircuts. A barbershop and a hairdresser are available at the PX. 

Chapter 4. 

Routine Points of Contact for SJA Personnel . 

4-1. USARC SJA Office. COL Gary Casida or LTC Willis Hunter may be reached at 

(4O4) 464-8O58/8O48. The fax number for the USARC SJA office is (4O4) 464-8O6O. 

The DSN access number for Fort McPherson is 367. 

4-2. FORSCOM SJA Office. MAJ Pat Koepp can be reached at (4O4) 464-3836; fax is 

(4O4) 464-2792. The DSN access number is 367. 

4-3. Fort Dix SJA Office. LTC Paul Grimstad can be reached at (6O9) 562-5258. His 

home number is 7O2-8O87. To dial from an on-post phone simply dial the last five digits 

of the phone number (2-5258). 

450 Appendix V-9 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

4-4. Office of the Judge Advocate General, International and Operational Law. MAJ 

Neoma White is the OTJAG POC. She can be reached at (7O3) 588-O143. There is 

also an Emergency Operations Center in Washington that can reach her 24-hours a day 

(7O3) 695-2971/1898. 

Chapter 5. 

Military Support to Civilian Authorities. 

5-1. Introduction. Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) is unlike any other 

DoD operational mission. The DoD plays a supporting role only to another Lead Federal 

Agency (LFA). It is the empowering statutes of the LFA that allow the DoD to participate 

at all, and which require the DoD to provide support to individuals or communities only 

through and at the request of the LFA. 

5-2. The Role of the Judge Advocate. Judge Advocates deploying to a Task Force 

established in CONUS to support civil authorities must be aware of applicable statutes 

and DoD regulations. often, JAs and the Commanders they advise, have little or no 

experience operating in such support missions. While the following general principles 

provide a start point for evaluating mission parameters and a Commander's legal 

authority to act, JAs must have ready access to governing statutes and directives in order 

to properly advise their clients. 

5-3. MSCA Rules. 

a. MSCA directives establish parameters concerning types and amount of support DoD 

may provide to the LFA; which Federal, state and local authorities may receive support; 

and specify under which statute reimbursement shall be made. See, DoDD 3O25.15, 

Military Support to Civil Authorities, and DoDD 3O25.l5, Military Assistance to Civil 

Authorities. 

b. DoD must receive a written request from the LFA, which sets forth at a minimum: 

acknowledgement and statutory basis to reimburse DoD costs, and identification of 

specific requirements, not capabilities. For example, a request for transportation should 

indicate whether for personnel or supplies (requirement), but should not ask for a truck 

company (capability). The DoD will determine, among its available resources, what type 

of transportation unit is best suited to fulfill the request. 

c. SECDEF or SECARMY must approve the initial LFA request for assistance prior to 

any DoD component providing support. Acting prior to such approval may relieve the 

LFA from providing reimbursement for any DoD funds expended. Once the initial 

support mission is approved, a defense coordinating officer (DCO) or task force 

commander may thereafter be authorized to act on behalf of the SECARMY and accept 

additional requests for support. Such a delegation to a DCO or task force commander will 

be delineated in the Execute Order, or a subsequent Fragmentary Order. 

Appendix V-9 451 
 

	 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

d. The LFA has responsibility for executing the mission, whatever that may be; DoD 

operates in a supporting role only. DoD can act only in consonance with the legal 

authority of the LFA and only in response to specific support requests. DoD cannot 

“volunteer” to do more than what the LFA requests. In operational terms, this is 

“mission creep.” In MSCA terms, it is improper use of DoD personnel, resources and 

funds. 

e. The DCO, task force commander, or other DoD representative to the LFA, 

should assist the LFA to identify and leverage the interagency assets available. Where 

appropriate, the DCO or task force commander should assist the LFA to consider 

practical, cost-effective alternatives to DoD support. For example, use of commercial 

transportation methods may be quicker and cheaper than use of DoD transport. DoD 

resources are used to supplement the LFA and support provided by other Federal 

agencies, and must not exceed that which is properly requested and authorized. 

Chapter 6. 

Recurring Legal Issues 

6-1. Alcoholic Beverages. JTF Order Number 1, dated 11 May 1999, prohibits the 

introduction, possession, use, sale, transfer, or consumption of any alcoholic 

beverage within the limits of the Welcome Center Village or refugee housing 

areas. Task Force personnel may engage in moderate consumption of alcoholic 

beverages when off-duty and in areas away from the Welcome Center Village or 

refugee housing areas. 

6-2. Court-Martial Jurisdiction. Active duty soldiers remain under the UCMJ 

jurisdiction in their home unit. Reserve and National Guard soldiers will be 

attached to GCM jurisdiction of the Fort Dix Commander on an as needed basis, 

or in accordance with their orders placing them on active duty. 

6-3. Deaths. 

a. Dead on Arrival. The INS does not consider persons who are dead upon 

arrival at McGuire Air Force Base as refugees. Accordingly, their bodies will 

immediately be released for transport to the Burlington County Hospital for 

creation of a death certificate. Muslim law requires that the body be bathed in 

accordance with religious beliefs and be buried before the next sunrise. As a 

result, if there is no sign of foul play, the body will quickly be released to a 

nearby Muslim funeral home for burial. Funeral costs are the responsibility of 

DHHS. 

b. Death After Arrival. Any death occurring in the refugee housing areas will be 

treated by law enforcement authorities as an unexplained death. The DoD 

Police will respond when called and secure the scene for evaluation by CID. 

CID will respond and conduct a crime scene analysis and coordinate with FBI. 

The body will be handled in accordance with normal police procedures, in 

452	 Appendix V-9 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

consultation with DHHS, INS, and Muslim advisors. 

6-4. Fraternization. JFT Order Number 1, dated 11 May 1999, prohibits task force 

personnel from engaging in fraternization with refugee personnel. Fraternization 

is any association in an informal, personal, or intimate manner, which reflects a 

familiarity or favoritism that is inappropriate for the workplace. 

6-5. Military Police Security and Investigative Jurisdiction 

a. Military police and DoD police will provide security at traffic control 

checkpoints at the outer perimeter of the Task Force area. 

b. Upon receiving a report of crime in the housing areas, DoD police will 

respond and make the initial evaluation as to whether the possible offense is 

misdemeanor or felony offense. For misdemeanor offenses, the case will be 

reported to the DoD Criminal Investigations Unit (CIU). For felony offense, 

the case will be reported to the Fort Monmouth CID. Whichever investigative 

unit responds will handle the case in accordance with normal investigative 

procedures, ensuring coordination with DHHS and INS. 

6-6. Pornography JTF Order Number 1, dated 11 May 1999, prohibits the 

introduction, possession, transfer, sale, creation, or display of any pornographic or 

sexually explicit materials. The Order is drafted very broadly with the intent to 

preclude display of nudity or semi-clothed persons. Refer to the Order for 

additional details. 

6-7. Religious Support. 

a. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States precludes the 

Federal Government from the establishment of any religion or religious 

practice. One exception to this provision is that the Government may provide 

military chaplains to minister to the needs of soldiers and their families. 

b. In recognition of this legal exception, Army regulations restrict chaplains 

from providing direct religious support to civilians, including refugees. 

Accordingly, a distinction must be made between direct and indirect religious 

support. Direct support would be preaching or leading a religious service. 

Indirect support would be providing a place for religious services, procuring a 

civilian minister to lead the services, providing necessary equipment and 

seating, and meeting with and counseling refugees. 

6-8. Rules of Engagement. The JTF Commander approved Rules of Engagement on 

5 May 1999. Essentially, the rules can be summarized as follows: 

a. Task Force personnel retain their inherent right of self-defense as well as the 

right to defend any other person who needs help; 

Appendix V-9 453 

 

	 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

b. Outside of the Welcome Center Village and refugee housing areas, the DoD 

Police and MPs retain the right to maintain good order and discipline. Inside 

the Village and refugee housing areas, the DHHS and INS have that 

responsibility. DoD Police and MPs may be called to assist if they become 

unable to carry out their responsibility. 

c. MPs will maintain traffic checkpoints at the outer perimeter of the Welcome 

Center Village. These checkpoints are intended to prevent unauthorized 

personnel from getting access to the Welcome Center Village and refugee 

housing areas. 

d. If a criminal act occurs at the refugee housing areas, the INS and DHHS 

representatives will immediately contact the DoD Police Department to come 

to the scene and secure the crime scene, as well as restore order if necessary. 

The DoD Police Department will then determine whether the DoD Criminal 

Investigative Unit (CIU) should investigate the offense or whether the Army 

Criminal Investigative Division (CID) should investigate it. All criminal acts 

by civilians will be referred to the Fort Dix Special Assistant United States 

Attorney in the Fort Dix Staff Judge Advocate Office. 

6-9. Weapons. JTF Order Number 1, dated 11 May 1999, prohibits the purchase, 

possession, use, or sale of privately owned firearms, ammunition, explosives, or 

any introduction of these items into the Provide Refuge Welcome Center Village 

and refugee housing areas. 

6-10. Weddings. Refugees may wish to be married while residing at Fort Dix. If this 

happens, an application for a marriage license must be obtained from the New 

Hanover Township Registrar in Cookstown, NJ. The Registrar’s name is Mr. 

Martin Poinsett and his phone number is (609) 758-7149. 

The legal requirements for marriages are as follows: 

a. If the bride and groom are over 18, parental permission is not required. If 

either is over 16, but younger than 18, a parent must give written approval. 

If either is under 16, they must have the approval of the Municipal Judge; 

b. A fee of $28 is required for the application for a marriage license, plus 

there is a $5 fee to get the license certified and filed after the wedding; 

c. One witness must sign the marriage license application; 

d. The parties must physically go to the New Hanover Municipal Building, 

or alternatively, someone can go to the building and be appointed as an 

Assistant Registrar. Once appointed as Assistant Registrar, they come 

back and collect the paperwork to take to the Registrar; 

e. There is a 72-hour waiting period after the application is filed; 

f. The license is good for 30 days, in the State of New Jersey, only; 

g. At the wedding, it will be necessary to have two (2) witnesses; 

h. After the wedding, the license must be returned to the Registrar so he can 

apply the official seal and file it with the State of New Jersey. 

454	 Appendix V-9 
 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

APPENDIX V-10: MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES 

BASIC PRINCIPLES 

MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES 

BASIC PRINCIPLES 

"DON'T GET OUT AHEAD OF YOUR AUTHORITY" 

 Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) is unlike any other DoD operational 

mission. The DoD plays a supporting role only to another Lead Federal Agency (LFA). 

It is the empowering statutes of the LFA that allow the DoD to participate at all, and 

which require the DoD to provide support to individuals or communities only through 

and at the request of the LFA. 

 Judge Advocates deploying to a Task Force established in CONUS to support civil 

authorities must be aware of applicable statutes and DoD regulations. Often, JAs and the 

Commanders they advise, have little or no experience operating in such support missions. 

While the following general principles provide a start point for evaluating mission 

parameters and a Commander's legal authority to act, JAs must have ready access to 

governing statutes and directives in order to properly advise their clients. 

1. MSCA directives establish parameters concerning types and amount of support DoD 

may provide to the LFA; which Federal, state and local authorities may receive support; 

and specify under which statute reimbursement shall be made. See, DoDD 3025.1, 

Military Support to Civil Authorities, and DoDD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil 

Authorities. 

2. DoD must receive a written request from the LFA, which sets forth at a minimum: 

acknowledgement and statutory basis to reimburse DoD costs, and identification of 

specific requirements, not capabilities. For example, a request for transportation should 

indicate whether for personnel or supplies (requirement), but should not ask for a truck 

company (capability). The DoD will determine, among its available resources, what type 

of transportation unit is best suited to fulfill the request. 

3. SECDEF or SECARMY must approve the initial LFA request for assistance prior to 

any DoD component providing support. Acting prior to such approval may relieve the 

LFA from providing reimbursement for any DoD funds expended. Once the initial 

support mission is approved, a defense coordinating officer (DCO) or task force 

commander may thereafter be authorized to act on behalf of the SECARMY and accept 

additional requests for support. Such a delegation to a DCO or task force commander 

will be delineated in the Execute Order, or a subsequent Fragmentary Order. 

Appendix V-10 455 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

4. The LFA has responsibility for executing the mission, whatever that may be; DoD 

operates in a supporting role only. DoD can act only in consonance with the legal 

authority of the LFA and only in response to specific support requests. DoD cannot 

"volunteer" to do more than what the LFA requests. In operational terms, this is "mission 

creep." In MSCA terms, it is improper use of DoD personnel, resources, and funds. 

5. The DCO, task force commander, or other DoD representative to the LFA, should 

assist the LFA to identify and leverage the interagency assets available. Where 

appropriate, the DCO or task force commander should assist the LFA to consider 

practical, cost effective alternatives to DoD support. For example, use of commercial 

transportation methods may be quicker and cheaper than use of DoD transport. DoD 

resources are used to supplement the LFA and support provided by other Federal 

agencies, and must not exceed that which is properly requested and authorized. 

456 Appendix V-10 
 

________________________________________________________________________ 


 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

APPENDIX V-11: J3 OPERATIONS STANDARD
 

OPERATING PROCEDURES
 

Joint Task Force J3 Operations 

Provide Refuge 

Fort Dix, NJ 

10 May 1999 

Standard Operating Procedures 

Applicability. This SOP applies to all personnel in the Office of the J3 Operations. 

1-1. Purpose. The SOP prescribes operations procedures and administrative policies for 

the J3, Joint Task Force, Operation Provide Refuge. 

1-2. References. The related publications are: DOMS Execute Order 

010636Z May 99, USACOM Execute Order 010933Z May 99, and FORSCOM 

Execute Order 011333Z May 99. 

1-3. Responsibilities. All members of the J3 staff will adhere to the policies and 

procedures prescribed in this SOP. 

1-4. Explanation of acronyms and abbreviations. 

The glossary explains acronyms and abbreviations used in this publication. 

Chapter 2 

General Duties and Responsibilities of J3 Members. 

2-1. General. The mission of the Operations Section will be executed under the 

guidance of the Joint Operations Officer (J3). 

2-2. Responsibilities of the J3 Section. 

a. Provide current operations update and tracking. 

b. Prepare daily SITREP. 

c. Develop estimates and future plans based on mission and refugee flow. 

d. Track incoming and outgoing refugee flow. 

e. Provide Civil-Military coordination and planning. 

f. Prepare and conduct Command briefings. 

g. Prepare and update Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). 

h. Prepare and track JTF taskings. 

i. Conduct Provost Marshal coordination. 

j. Conduct flight tracking and manifesting. 

Appendix V-11 457 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

k. Prepare JTF training plan and track conduct of training. 

l. Provide safety management and integrate risk management to the JTF. 

2-4. The Assistant J3 responsibilities. 

a. Report directly to the J3. 

b. Interface with the JTF Command Group and staff primaries on J3 matters. 

c. Designate the J3 Battle Captain and provide operational supervision of the Joint 

Operations Center (JOC). 

d. Review and recommend content of the daily command briefing. 

2-6. The Battle Captain responsibilities. 

a. Is directly responsible to the Assistant J3. 

b. Recommend JOC staffing and shift arrangement. 

c. Enforce JOC policies and procedures. 

d. Supervise and coordinate the operation of his/her JOC shift. As appropriate, has 

the authority to act for the Assistant J3 or the J3. Provide overall coordination and direct 

supervision of the J3 JOC staff. 

f. Conduct the shift change brief as required. 

g. Review applicable incoming and outgoing messages and correspondence. 

h. Establish priority of actions within the JOC. Task appropriate action officers to 

accomplish incoming actions and establish suspense dates/times for completion. 

i. Advise the J3 and Assistant J3 of situations requiring command attention. 

j. Coordinate all briefings; serve as primary JOC briefing officer. Ensure that all 

decisions, orders, and taskers are documented, disseminated, and executed. 

k. Ensure that classified material is treated in accordance with AR 380-5. 

l. Act as the primary action officer for coordination of staff input for the production 

of the After Action Report (AAR) upon termination of the JTF. 

2-7. Operations officer responsibilities. 

a. Act as chief during J3 Chief's absence and be familiar with the duties and 

responsibilities of the J3 Chief. 

b. Coordinate all JTF actions among the task force action officers and task force 

members, as appropriate. 

c. Ensure required reports and responses are prepared and dispatched to meet 

established suspenses. 

d. Prepare, coordinate, and present the J3 portion of daily command briefings. 

e. Conduct interface of J3 representatives on JTF issues. 

f. Receive subordinate command SITREPs and take appropriate action. 

g. Control status of taskings. 

h. Review and submit the JTF daily SITREP. 

i. Maintain status charts and situation maps required by the J3 Chief. 

j. Supervise and coordinate the operation of a J3 shift in a 24-hour operation. 

l. Ensure classified material is processed and controlled in accordance with 

AR 380-5. 

l. Coordinate all briefings. Serve as the primary J3 briefing officer. Ensure that all 

decisions, orders, and taskings are documented, disseminated, and executed. 

458 Appendix V-11 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

2-8. Operations Non-commissioned Officer (NCO) responsibilities. 

a. Supervise the physical layout, security, and police of the JOC. 

b. Be responsible for security and accountability of classified documents within the 

JOC. Maintain the safe and ensure the proper destruction of classified documents. 

c. Assist the OPSEC officer with OPSEC overwatch for the JOC. 

d. Supervise the assistant operations NCOs. 

e. Control distribution. 

f. Read all incoming messages and correspondence. Effect and track appropriate 

routing. Assist the JOC Battle Captain in monitoring taskers and determining appropriate 

action on all incoming correspondence. 

h. Maintain incoming and outgoing message reading files in marked 3-ring binders. 

i. Receive, edit, and secure release of final copy messages. 

j. Coordinate establishment and control of suspense dates. 

k. Maintain JOC historical files in concert with the Admin NCO. 

l. Establish and maintain map files and applicable charts. 

m. Maintain status charts and situation maps required by the shift leader. 

n. Assist in preparation of Operations Plans (OPLANs) and orders. 

o. Assist in preparation of SITREPs, situation briefings, briefing books, and visitors’ 

reading file. 

p. Assist in presentation of the daily situation briefing. Ensure that the briefing area 

and resources are ready. Be prepared to brief visitors to the JOC. 

q. Coordinate Training and Audiovisual Support Center (TASC) audiovisual and 

computer requirements. 

r. Provide periodic training of all JOC personnel to maintain proficiency. 

s. Identify and coordinate the training requirements for JTF personnel. 

t. Responsible for JOC property. Control assigned JOC vehicles when provided. 

u. Establish and maintain duty rosters of all shifts and capture workload data for 

each JOC member for the duration of the operation. Coordinate meals, breaks, and work 

schedules for J3 members. 

2-9. Assistant Operations Non-commissioned Officer responsibilities. 

a. Control access to the JOC to only required personnel. 

b. Maintain the JOC Access Roster. 

c. Control the visitors' log. 

d. Coordinate escort of visitors. 

e. Inform the Operations NCO of any attempt to remove classified or unauthorized 

items from the JOC. 

f. Act as a message courier and perform other administrative and clerical functions 

as determined by the Operations NCO. 

k. Assist the Operations NCO in maintaining reports, charts, maps, etc. 

l. Assist the Operations NCO in orderly closeing of the JOC upon termination of the 

operation. 

m. Assist the Operations NCO with physical security of the JOC. 

k. Be familiar with the duties of the Operations NCO. 

p. Maintain key control for workstations, and secure telephone unit IIIs (STU IIIs). 

Appendix V-11 459 
 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

l. Monitor Cable News Network (CNN), and prepare videotapes of significant news 

segments for use during briefings, or as appropriate. 

2-10. Liaison Officer (LNO) responsibilities. 

a. Be directly responsible to the JTF J3. 

b. Attend all staff briefings and shift change meetings in the JTF. 

c. Advise supporting commands on any matters involving the operation. Investigate 

status of all actions (actual, potential) which affect JTF units or personnel. 

d. Read all JTF distribution. Highlight applicable text. 

e. Maintain a staff journal at their LNO desk. 

2-11. Administrative Non-commissioned officer responsibilities 

a. Manage staffing of administrative cell. 

b. Maintain JOC computer local area network (LAN) system. 

c. Establish administrative support priorities. 

d. Consolidate staff journal input. Maintain staff journal binder. 

e. Coordinate administrative support from attached support personnel. 

f. Maintain the JOC historical files. 

g. Supervise the J3 administrative personnel in their functions. 

h. Establish and maintain a consolidated list of points of contact (POC), telephone 

directories/organization directories of supporting headquarters and agencies. 

i. Maintain a message/correspondence/telephone or verbal conversation record file. 

j. Maintain the action officer suspense file. 

k. Determine and coordinate means of transmission for outgoing messages. 

l. Maintain the JOC reference library. 

m. Requisition supplies and the maintenance of equipment, including STU IIIs, 

telephones, safe combinations, copiers, shredders, computers, and typewriters. 

n. Maintain an adequate supply of blank forms. 

o. Monitor housekeeping of the JOC. 

p. Act as Operations NCO during reduced manning or in the absence of the 

Operations NCO. 

q. Control/issue expendable supplies. 

r. Coordinate with staff for JOC duty personnel, and maintain the J3 duty roster. 

2-12. Deployment representative responsibilities. 

a. Provide deployment flow information to JTF staff. 

b. Monitor the refugee processing status. 

c. Develop/coordinate initiatives which enhance the visibility of refugee status. 

2-13. Future plans representative responsibilities. 

a. Develop plans specifically focused to potential contingencies, including 

Contingency plans (CONPLANS), OPLANS. 

b. Serve as the primary interface with FORSCOM G-3 Plans staff in coordination 

with the FOC liaison officer. 

c. Provide Staff recommendations and updated information. 

d. Provide information relating to all components (COMPO 1, 2, 3). 

460 Appendix V-11 
 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

2-14. Training responsibilities. 

a. Recommend and validate individual training requirements. 

b. Maintain current status of Task Force training. 

c. Oversee pre-employment training requirements. 

2-15. Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) representative responsibilities 

2-15-1. General 

Requests for military assistance normally are passed up from local officials, through the 

state (governor), and then to the President. Upon the President making a declaration of a 

national emergency, federal agencies are employed through the Federal USARC 

Management Agency (FEMA) to render assistance. Downward coordination is from 

FEMA to the Department of Defense (DOD), to Director of Military Support (DOMS), to 

FORSCOM, through USARC and then to the RSC/DRC/EAD/EAC. This process may 

take several hours to several days, depending upon the magnitude of the emergency and 

the forces requested/required. 

2-15-2. Procedures 

Requests for military assistance may not always pass through formal channels, as 

described above. If requests are received at the JTF level, they should be passed as 

applicable through the J3, to the CofS, and then to the CJTF. The CJTF may authorize 

the loan of military equipment up to 90 days, and may authorize volunteer personnel to 

be placed on active duty status for a limited time. Requests must be submitted in writing. 

The following information should be obtained from any requester: 

a. Name, address, telephone number of requester, organization or agency, and title 

of the requester. 

b. Brief statement of situation, to include location, specific support required, and an 

estimate of the time needed. 

c. What assistance has been requested/provided by the National Guard, other 

military departments, or FEMA. 

2-15-3. Immediate Response 

Any commander may determine the situation to be an imminent serious condition beyond 

the capabilities of local or state government to respond. If an imminent serious 

condition, the commander may authorize support to local or state officials in the 

emergency to reduce loss of life and human suffering. If the commander determines that 

the situation is not as described above and declines to provide assistance, or if the 

situation is beyond the JTF capability, a message will be sent to FORSCOM, forwarding 

the request and outlining the reasons it was not acted upon. 

2-15-4. Functions. 

a. Coordinate funding requirements for liaison personnel with appropriate agencies. 

b. Serve as functional expert liaison with all non-governmental agencies. 

Coordinate JTF issues through the FORSCOM and USACOM liaison officers. 

c. Provide augmentation to JOC for 24-hour coverage. 

Appendix V-11 461 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 
 

2-16. Provost Marshal representative. 

a. Review force protection correspondence and evaluate the terrorism 

counteraction programs and provide guidance and assistance as required. 

b. Integrate intelligence, counterintelligence, criminal intelligence, operations 

security (OPSEC) information, physical security, and security activities into terrorism 

counteraction planning and exercises. 

c. Maintain interface with the FORSCOM PM offices to ensure a smooth flow of 

military police (MP) information. 

d. Maintain liaison with U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command USACIC). 

e. Coordinate personal protective services for general officers/high risk 

personnel. 

f. Coordinate criminal investigative support to prevent/respond to a terrorist 

incident or threat. 

g. Maintain liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other 

civilian law enforcement agencies. 

h. Oversee the security of JTF facilities and sensitive material from criminal 

threats and terrorists activities. 

i. Coordinate PM representative support. Advise the J3 on unresolved issues. 

j. Review message traffic and take action, within the PM functional area or as 

directed by the J3. 

k. Attend twice daily JTF staff meetings, as required. 

l. Provide input to the daily Situation Report. (SITREP) 

m. Prepare reports and staff estimates. 

m. Prepare and submit the section After Action Report upon termination of 

operation. 

n. Apply Operational Security (OPSEC) measures as outlined in AR 530-11. 

o. Coordinate and monitor traffic control points. 

p. Coordinate with outside agencies for threat analysis. 

q. Provide liaison to the lead federal agency, the International Red Cross, the 

Installation Provost Marshal, and other local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. 

q. Coordinate with DoD police to support the installation reaction force. 

2-17. Safety representative will: 

(1) Provide guidance and assist in developing and integrating safety in all 

operations to include-

(a) Ensure statutory compliance/Liability Limitation. 

(b) Safety guidance to the CJTF and subordinate commanders and staff. 

(c) Coordinate with higher headquarters, MACOMs, U.S. Army Safety Center, 

and civilian agencies to ensure current safety procedures are understood and followed 

(d) Conduct special safety briefings and seminars as needed. 

(e) All personnel operating vehicles will observe the posted speed limits. When 

 speed limits are not posted the maximum speed limit is 55. 

(f) Transportation of troops and civilians in military vehicles will be conducted 

in accordance with Fort Dix regulations. 

462 Appendix V-11 
 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

(g) Initial report. Any accident classified as a class A or B must be reported as 

soon as possible to the Task Force Headquarters. 

1. All accidents classified as class C or D will be reported within 24 hours 

of mishap occurrence. A submit a follow-up report when complete information is 

available. 

2. Provide rescue and medical assistance within capabilities. 

3. Take appropriate fire protection in case of fire, flammables or a 

possibility of fire. 

4. If injuries are involved, call for medical aid and transportation on 

published MEDEVAC frequency. 

5. Contact Military Police for all accidents. 

6. Notify the Task Force Headquarters of accident and any known details. 

C. Upon accident notification the Task Force Operations center will: 

(1) Complete report form with details of accident. 

(2) Contact closest DOD facility or local community emergency response 

team for fire and rescue services. Advise responders of any HAZMAT 

concerns, if required. 

(3) Alert appropriate service/command safety representative. 

(a) FAX form to appropriate service representative. 

(b) Follow up with courtesy phone call. 

TELEPHONIC ACCIDENT REPORT FORM 

NAME / RANK OF CALLER: 

PHONE NUMBER OF CALLER: DATE/TIME: 

UNIT INVOLVED IN ACCIDENT: 

TYPE OF ACCIDENT: (circle one) GROUND AIRCRAFT 

LOCATION OF ACCIDENT: ON POST OFF POST 

VEHICLE INVOLVED (circle one): YES NO 

AIRCRAFT INVOLVED (circle one): YES NO 

TYPE VEHICLE/AIRCRAFT: (If unknown, describe color, markings, etc.) 

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED: MILITARY CIVILIAN 

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL: INJURED DECEASED 

NAME / RANK OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED: 

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT: 

FOR AIRCRAFT MISHAPS PARACHUTES? YES NO HOW MANY? 

Chapter 3 

Security 

3-1 General. The JOC is a restricted area located on the third floor of building 5957. 

The JOC Operations Sergeant performs as Security Manager for the JOC. The J3 Provost 

Marshal has overall staff responsibility for physical security and force protection. 

3-2 Physical Security. 

Appendix V-11 463 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 
 

a. Threat. Report fire, bomb threats, unauthorized attempts to access the JOC. 

b. All JTF personnel are authorized unescorted access within the JTF area. 

c. Visitors not assigned to the JTF will be escorted in the JTF and TF Village. 

3-3. Classified material 

a. AR 380-5 applies to all document handling, processing, storage, and 

transmissions. 

b. The assistant operations NCO will control classified documents. Classified 

documents will not be taken from the JOC without permission of the J3. JOC members 

will check daily to ensure that security directives and control procedures are followed.

 (1) SECRET documents may be removed from the JOC with J3 approval. 

(2) All other documents may be removed from the JOC area without permission. 

(3) Classified containers will be emptied and waste stored until there is an 

adequate amount for destruction. Place classified waste only in appropriately marked 

containers. 

(4) The Assistant Operations NCO will conduct daily security checks. 

3-4. JTF safeguarding of classified material evacuation plan 

a. When circumstances permit, secure classified material as follows: 

(1) Place all classified material into the nearest General Service Administration 

(GSA) approved container, lock the container, and vacate the building. 

(2) The Operations NCO will ensure all safes within the agency are locked prior 

to vacating the building. 

b. When circumstances do not permit, secure classified material as follows: 

(1) Gather all classified material in your work area and hand-carry it with you as 

you vacate the building. 

(2) Upon reaching the assembly point, all personnel hand carrying classified 

material will notify the operations NCO or Watch Officer. The operations NCO or 

Watch Officer will take custody of the classified material. 

(3) In the event of an urgent evacuation of the building, it may be necessary to 

leave classified material unsecured in the building. The individual leaving the unsecured 

classified material will advise the Operations NCO as soon as possible after exiting the 

building and reaching safety. The Operations NCO will then advise the J2 representative 

of all classified material which was not secured. 

c. Based on the circumstances requiring evacuation, the Watch Officer or 

Operations NCO will determine the assembly point. 

3-5. Routine destruction of classified information 

a. The JOC will account for and destroy classified materials on a daily basis. 

b. The Operations NCO will collect, process, and destroy classified materials. 

3-6. Counter-Terrorism 

During a Terrorist Threat Condition (THREATCON) BRAVO, consideration will be 

made to augment the Assistant Operations/Security NCO with Military Police at the JTF 

Headquarters entrance. 

464 Appendix V-11 
 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

3-7. Automatic data processing equipment 

a Privacy Act, For Official Use Only (FOUO), and sensitive information will be 

processed ONLY on systems accredited as Unclassified Sensitive 2 (US2) or higher. 

b. All software, hard disks, and floppy data disks brought into the JOC will be 

checked with the approved anti-virus program before release for use in the JOC. 

c. No personally owned equipment or software, to include laptop computers, will be 

introduced into the JOC without advance coordination. 

d. Under no circumstances will Automated Information System equipment, 

software, or floppy disks be moved from their location. 

Chapter 4 

Operations Procedures 

4-1. JOC Operations 

a. Staffing. The JOC is normally operated on two 12-hour shifts for short duration 

and three 8-hours shifts for extended operations. Duty hours for each shift are as follows: 

Extended Short Duration 

Shift 1 0700-1530 Shift 1 0730-2000 

Shift 2 1500-2330 Shift 2 1930-0800 

Shift 3 2300-0730 

b. Shift Changeover Procedures. The JTF staff sections will conduct informal 

continuity briefings with their replacements the end of their shifts. 

c. Daily meetings. The JTF staff will meet with the JTF Command Group twice 

daily at 0800 and 1800 in the CCR, building 5957 unless otherwise directed by the CJTF. 

The CJTF may also require on-call meetings. The J3 will notify staff sections of 

unscheduled meetings are announced. Staff sections are responsible to answer staff and 

Command Group questions and prepare an informal command update for each meeting. 

d. The J3 will prepare a summary of taskers and comments from the Command 

Group and principal staff. The J3 or Chief of Staff will provide guidance and taskers to 

appropriate staff agencies. 

g. Shift Changeover Procedures. 

(1) The CAT Chief will conduct a formal shift changeover briefing with the 

incoming shift personnel and the outgoing shift personnel. 

(2) The general format of the changeover briefing follows. 

SHIFT CHANGEOVER TOPICS 

Current refugee status 

Significant actions completed last shift (by directorate) 

Significant actions to be completed next shift 

Appendix V-11 465 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 
 

Ongoing actions

Taskers w/suspense time/date 

Closing comments 

Shift changeover should include, as a minimum J1, J2, J3, J4, staffs as needed. 

Chapter 5 

Administration 

5-1. General. 

a. The Operations Officer will provide general supervision of the JOC. 

b. Immediate or flash messages will be picked up as soon as possible after 

notification. The Operations Officer/NCO will coordinate for pickup times for routine 

and priority messages 

c. Record all telephone messages and requirements on the Optional Form (OF) 271, 

Telephonic or Verbal Conversation Record. 

e. Keep a copy of all correspondence (OF 271) in a historical record file. 

f. Each JOC member will maintain a staff journal containing an operations summary 

with a brief account of actions taken within their area of responsibility. 

5-2. Incoming messages 

a. All incoming message traffic will be routed through the Operations Sergeant for 

action/distribution. 

b. The Operations Sergeant will scan all messages, highlight key information, 

annotate or recommended distribution, batch (action and no action) and pass to the J3. 

c. The Battle Captain will review and assign an action agency using the JTF tasking 

system. 

d. The Operations Sergeant will: 

(1) Stamp and enter the date in the lower right hand corner of the first page. 

(2) Assign the document a sequential alpha-numeric number using "I" for 

 incoming and "O" for outgoing correspondence. An example would be “I7 or O13”. 

This number should be placed near the "received" date in the lower right hand corner. 

(3) Complete the LOG (see figure 5-1) for all messages received. 

(4) Copy and distribute the action and information messages received from the 

Operations Officer. 

(5) Place one copy of all messages in the applicable 3-ring binder for reference. 

(6) Place another copy in the daily reading file for circulation to key personnel 

identified on the routing slip attached. 

(7) Maintain a historic message file in binders marked for the operation/exercise. 

5-3. Outgoing correspondence preparation and processing 

a. Correspondence preparation procedures: 

(1) Staff Action Officer will: 

(a) Prepare initial draft correspondence of action. 

(b) Keep a copy of incoming correspondence and or outgoing action. 

(c) Forward draft correspondence electronically to Admin NCO. 

(2) Admin NCO will: 

466 Appendix V-11 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

(a) Log action in log. 

(b) Type final outgoing action. 

(c) Pass completed action back to the action officer. 

(3) Staff Action Officer will: 

(a) Append supporting documents (and disk, if GCCS) to outgoing action. 

(b) Obtain approval/release of action from J3 /Battle Captain. 

(c) Pass action to Admin and suspense it for return from admin cell. 

(d) Ensure Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) messages are taken to the 

communications center for transmission, receipt, stamping, and returned to Admin NCO. 

(e) Ensure GCCS messages along with disk of text are taken to the Ft Dix GCCS 

operator to add headings and ensure transmittal to addressees. Ensure completed action 

is returned to the admin NCO. 

(f) Reassemble outgoing original message with supporting documentation. 

(g) Make distribution. Ensure copy goes to originating staff to clear action 

officer's suspense and information copies provided to pertinent staff offices. 

(h) File completed action with supporting documentation in outgoing files. 

(i) The admin section will maintain a control log which tracks processing from 

initial receipt by clerk typists to dispatch of the finished action. 

(j) The Admin NCO is responsible for prioritization of work by the admin team. 

He/she will ensure that work is completed timely or by the designated suspense. The 

Admin NCO coordinates with the J3/Battle Captain in all cases of conflict in priorities 

and inability to meet designated suspenses. 

5-4. Reading Files. The Admin NCO will prepare reading files for the J3 and CJTF. 

a. CJTF Reading Files 

(1) Prepare the CJTF reading file in two sections. (classified and unclassified) 

Arrange the messages in date-time-group (DTG) sequence (newest on top). Highlight the 

DTG, FROM ADDRESS, and SUBJECT lines. Divide the sections into increments 

corresponding to the CJTF update meeting schedule. 

(2) Retire each message when its tasks are complete, its guidance is superseded, 

or its information is more than 48 hours old. 

(3) Prepare bullet summaries as cover sheets for each section. The summaries 

highlight message changes, SITREP updates, and other items of interest to the CJTF. 

(4) Prepare two CJTF reading files for each day. Keep the files current and 

available for review by the CJTF or JTF CofS. 

b. JOC Reading File. 

(1) Prepare the JOC reading file in a three ring binder for all messages. Arrange 

the messages in DTG sequence (newest on top). 

(2) Mark “CG” in the upper right corner of messages also placed in the 

Command Group Reading File. Place a tape flag on the edge of the top right corner of 

messages in the current CJTF Reading File. Keep the tape flag on the message as long as 

the message remains in the CJTF Reading File. 

(3) Retire messages from the JOC reading file when they are five days old. File 

retired messages by originating headquarters in DTG sequence (newest on top). 

5-5. Message log (see figure 5-1) 

Appendix V-11 467 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 
 

a. Document Files. 

(1) Document folders are numbered consecutively. 

(2) The first folder contains the most recent document, which is filed on top in 

front of the folder. 

(3) The first folder does not have an ending document number until the folder is 

full (approximately two inches thick). When the folder is full, write the last document 

number on the folder and start a new document folder with the beginning message 

number to be placed in the new folder, leaving the ending document number blank. 

b. Identify Document for Filing. 

(1) Pick up all logged/reproduced messages from the Admin NCO. 

(2) Separate incoming (I) documents from outgoing (O) documents. 

(3) Place documents in numerical order and file them beginning with an (I) for 

incoming or (O) for outgoing messages/correspondence. 

c. Suspense File. 

(1) Photocopy the incoming document, coordinate assignment of a suspense date, 

and send a copy to the action office. 

(2) Place incoming document with the suspense copy in suspense file. 

(3) After the action officer responds to the suspense: 

(a) Pull the incoming document out of the suspense file. 

(b) Photocopy the outgoing document and attach copy to the incoming document 

pulled from suspense file. Place them in the completed file. 

(c) Place the original incoming document with the outgoing response and submit 

for appropriate distribution. 

5-6. SITREP Development Procedures 

a. Review SITREPs, orders, and messages from DOMS, DA, USACOM, 

FORSCOM, USARC, TF Village, supporting installations, and others agencies for items 

to include in the JTF SITREP. 

b. Coordinate with JTF staff sections to confirm/reconcile SITREP information. 

c. Staff sections will electronically provide daily SITREP input to the J3, NLT 1700. 

d. Continue to follow changes or new information throughout the day and make 

entries on the work copy of the SITREP as necessary. 

d. Follow-up unresolved issues that would impact SITREP preparation. 

e. SITREP officer will make distribution to the entire JTF staff, assigned LNOs and 

other agencies as directed. Post copies of the SITREP in the SITREP binder. 

f. Ensure addressee listing includes: JCS, DOMS, USACOM, FORSCOM, USARC, 

XVIII ABN Corps, other affected commands, all primary JTF staff members and 

CONUSAs, as appropriate. 

g. Start new SITREP file. Save on hard drive, floppy diskette, and a shared drive. 

5-7. Training 

a. General. The mission of the JTF demands that the JTF staff be capable of 

reacting promptly, accurately, and decisively during the operation. 

b. Responsibilities 

(1) The J3, has primary staff responsibility for JTF training. 

468 Appendix V-11 
 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

(2) Each coordinating/special/ personal staff agency will ensure that all JTF staff 

personnel attend required training sessions. 

(3) Staff sections will conduct training, as required, in order to ensure that JTF 

members are prepared to assume the responsibilities to which they are assigned. 

Chapter 6 

STANDING DOWN/FACILITY MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS 

6-1. General 

Termination of JTF Provide Refuge may be directed only by DOMS, USACOM and the 

FORSCOM Commander. 

6-2. Inactivation 

Standing down of the JOC will be accomplished in phases commencing prior to the 

termination of the operation based upon the operational level of activity. Initially, 

personnel requirements will be reviewed. Personnel will be released as they are no 

longer needed to sustain operational levels. 

6-3. Stand down checklist 

____ JTF Inactivation message published and disseminated. 

____ JOC Staff Journal completed and closed out. 

____ Staff worksheets, notes, files organized and secured. 

____ In/out boxes emptied of working materials; actions completed. 

____ Classified documents returned to Administrative NCO and secured. 

____ Classified trash shredded and/or destroyed in accordance with AR 380-5. 

____ Unclassified trash removed from the JOC. 

____ Supplies properly stored or returned. 

____ Equipment borrowed returned to staff sections or appropriate post agency. 

____ Situation maps and charts taken down and destroyed, or stored. 

____ JOC vacuumed and returned to orderly and neat condition. 

____ Draft AAR provided to J3. 

CHARLES A. TODD 

LTC, GS 

JTF J3 

Appendix V-11 469 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

GLOSSARY 

AAR After-Action Report 

ADP	 Automated Data Processing 

ADSW Active Duty for Special Work 

AFRC Armed Forces Reserve Centers 

AGR	 Active Guard Reserve 

AIG Address Indicator Group 

AIS Automated Information Systems 

ALO Authorized Level of Organization 

AMDF	 Army Master Data File 

AMOPES	 Army Mobilization/Operations Planning and Execution System 

AR	 Armor/Army Regulation 

ARPERSCOM U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center 

AT Annual Training 

BDU Battle Dress Uniform 

BI Background Investigation 

CCIR Commander’s Critical Information Requirements 

C-Day Unnamed Day Deployment 

CIO USAR Chief Information Office (formerly DCSIM) 

CJTF	 Commander, Joint Task Force 

CLRP	 Command Logistics Review Program 

CLRT	 Command Logistics Review Team 

CofS	 Chief of Staff 

COMPO Component Code 

CONPLAN Contingency Plan 

CONUS Continental United States 

CONUSA Continental United States Army 

CRC CONUS Replacement Center 

CSS Combat Service Support 

D-DAY Beginning of a contingency operation or of hostilities 

DA Department of the Army 

DAMPL Department of the Army Master Priority List 

DCG Deputy Commanding General 

DCO Defense Coordinating Officer/Disaster 

Control/Deputy Commanding Officer 

DCSIM Deputy Chief of Staff, Information Management 

(now known as IO) 

DCSINT Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence 

DCSLOG Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics 

DCSOPS Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations 

DCSPER Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel 

DCSRM	 Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management 

DMOS Duty Military Occupational Specialty 

DMOSQ Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualified 

DOD Department of Defense 

470	 Appendix V-11 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

DOMS Director of Military Support 

DTG Date Time Group 

DUIC Derivative Identification Code 

E-DATE Date of Status Change of a Unit (Effective Date) 

FAO Finance And Accounting Office 

FAX Facsimile 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FMC Fully Mission Capable 

FOC FORSCOM Operation Center 

FONECON Telephone Conversation 

FORMDEPS FORSCOM Mobilization Deployment Planning System 

FORSCOM U.S. Army Forces Command 

GCCS Global Command and Control System 

HS Home Station 

IDT Inactive Duty For Training 

IPR Inprocess Review 

IRR Individual Ready Reserve 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 

JTF Joint Task Force 

JOC Joint Operations Center 

JULLS Joint Universal Lessons Learned 

M-Day Mobilization Day 

MSC Major Subordinate Command 

MTOE Modification Table Of Organization And Equipment 

MUTA Multiple Unit Training Assembly 

NLT Not Later Than (Date) 

OCAR Office of the Chief, Army Reserve 

OMA Operation and Maintenance, Army 

OMAR Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve 

OPCON Operational Control 

OPORD Operation Order 

OPSEC Operations Security 

PA Public Affairs 

PM Provost Marshal 

POD Point Of Debarkation 

POE Point Of Embarkation 

POM Preparation for Overseas Movement 

RSC Regional Support Command 

PSRC Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up 

RCUCH Reserve Component Unit Commanders Handbook 

RPA Reserve Personnel, Army 

SIDPERS Standard Installation Division Personnel System 

SIR Serious Incident Report 

SITREP Situation Report 

SJA Staff Judge Advocate 

SOP Standing Operating Procedure 

Appendix V-11 471 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 
 

SRC 

STU III 

TBD 

TDA 

TDY 

THREATCON 

TOE 

TPFDD 

TPFDL 

TPU 

TF 

TTAD 

UIC 

JOC 

USACOM 

USAR 

USARC 

USR 

ZULU 

Standard Requirement Code 

Secure Telephone Unit (Third Generation) 

To Be Determined 

Tables Of Distribution And Allowances 

Temporary Duty 

Threat Condition 

Tables Of Organization And Equipment 

Time-Phased Force Deployment Data 

Time-Phased Force Deployment List 

Troop Program Unit 

Task Force 

Temporary Tour of Active Duty 

Unit Identification Code 

USARC Operations Center 

United States Atlantic Command 

U.S. Army Reserve 

U.S. Army Reserve Command 

Unit Status Report 

Time Zone Designator of Greenwich Mean 

472 Appendix V-11 
 

 Paz

 AG

 

 

Ar s &

Cra s

 

 

 

T

 

 

 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

APPENDIX V-12: FORT DIX INSTALLATION LAYOUT1 

12 

The Location of the Village 

FORT DIX CS/CSS LSA 

GYM

 CID 

Indoor Pool 

Fire 

Station Theater 

Red Cross

 US

 Post

 Office

 Bank

 Denny 

l a 

FCI 

Doughboy Field 

Chapel 

Police 

GROVE PARK 

0100 

AAFES 

Service Station 

Burger 

King 

Laundry 

Doughboy

 Inn 

Club Dix 

Dogwood 

Lake Delaware Avenue 

Pennsylvania Avenue 

Texas Avenue 

8th Street 

DOL 

Laurel

 Pond 

t 

ft 

Pointville Road 

Budniak Outdoor 

AMWC 

Sever Street

S. Scott Street 

1st Street

New Jersey Ave 

Pemberton - Wrightstown Road 

Fire Station 

TMP Maryland Ave 

School 

Juliustown Road 

McGuire Air Force Base 

airplane 

Pemberton - Wrightstown Road 

AER 

Gym 

Baltimore Ave 

Augusta Ave 

10th Street New Jersey Avenue

Doughboy Loop 

HOLLY CRES 

0000 

COLONIAL PLAZA

 0200 

1200 

1100 

GARDEN 

TERRACE 1400 

1600 

1500 

5600 

5500 

6500 

5700, 5800, 6500, 6600, 6800 

2200 

6000 

S. SCOTT 

PLAZA 

LAUREL HILL 

0800 

KENNEDY CTS 

0900 

EOC 

RCC 

S

R

P 

MAG 1 

Mag 1 road STAGING AREA 

Family Support 

Visitors 

HQ 

A 

Burger 

King 

Kelly Reserve Center

3100 

3200 

3500 3400 

3300 

To Wrightstown 

1

 Headquarters, Joint Task Force Provide Refuge, Command Briefing, PowerPoint presentation, briefing slides 12-

15 (n.d.) (entire presentation on file with CLAMO). 

Appendix V-12 473
 
 

 

 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 

474 Appendix V-12 

13 

The Village 

.. 

The heart of the“Village” is an area of brick 

barracks that have been converted into dormitories to 

house up to 3000 refugees. Each dormitory has 

colored doors matching the map on the left. 

Each dormitory floor has separate male and female 

restroom and shower facilities. The shower areas 

have curtains for privacy. 

On the first floor of each dormitory are a prayer 

room, a television room, a children’s play room, a 

classroom, and a “store” where free goods are 

distributed. 

Within the village are two dining facilities, a 

shopette, the in-processing center, the Public Health 

Service medical clinic, the out-processing center, an 

interagency interview and office area, and large, open 

grassy areas. 

Dormitories 

Exchange 

Dining 

Chapel 

Inprocessing Center 

Medical Clinic 

Dining 

Dormitories 

Snow Fence 

Outprocessing 

Interviews 

JTF Hqs 

TF Village Hqs 

TF Village Facility 

Snow Fence 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

14 

The Location of the Hamlet 

FORT DIX CS/CSS LSA 

GYM

 CID 

Indoor Pool 

Fire 

Station Theater 

Red Cross

 US

 Post

 Office

 Bank

 Denny

 Plaza 

AG 

FCI 

Doughboy Field 

Chapel 

Police 

GROVE PARK 

0100 

AAFES 

Service Station 

Burger 

King 

Laundry 

Doughboy

 Inn 

Club Dix 

Dogwood 

Lake Delaware Avenue 

Pennsylvania Avenue 

Texas Avenue 

8thStreet 

DOL 

Laurel

 Pond 

Arts & 

Crafts 

Pointville Road 

Budniak Outdoor 

AMWC 

Sever Street

S. Scott Street 

1st Street

New Jersey Ave 

Pemberton - WrightstownRoad 

Fire Station 

TMP Maryland Ave 

School 

Juliustown Road 

McGuire Air Force Base 

airplane 

Pemberton - WrightstownRoad 

AER 

Gym 

Baltimore Ave 

Augusta Ave 

10th Street New Jersey Avenue

Doughboy Loop 

HOLLY CREST 

0000 

COLONIAL PLAZA

 0200 

1200 

1100 

GARDEN 

TERRACE 1400 

1600 

1500 

5600 

5500 

6500 

5700, 5800, 6500, 6600, 6800 

2200 

6000 

S. SCOTT 

PLAZA 

LAUREL HILL 

0800 

KENNEDY CTS 

0900 

EOC 

RCC 

S

R

P 

MAG 1 

Mag 1 road STAGING AREA 

Family Support 

Visitors 

HQ 

A 

Burger 

King 

Kelly Reserve Center

3100 

3200 

3500 3400 

3300 

To Wrightstown 

Appendix V-12 475
 
CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 
 

15 

The Hamlet 

 The Hamlet has four 

dormitories that can house up 

to 1200 people. 

 The dormitories have the 

same features as those in the 

“Village.” 

 One dining facility supports 

the “Hamlet.” 

 A first aid station provides 

medical support. 

 Refugees shuttle by bus 

between the “Hamlet” and 

the “Village” for interviews 

and medical screening. 

Dormitories 

Immigration and 

Naturalization Service Dining Facility 

Medical 

Aid Station 

Snow Fence 

476 Appendix V-12 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 


 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

APPENDIX V-13: REFUGEE IN-PROCESSING 

19 

Initial Processing Through 

Assignment of a Sponsor

(graphics by Goldberg) 

JVA prepares 

completed file 

JVA establishes 

refugee file 

PHS screens 

medical 

JVA Interview 

JVA gives bio to 

INS-Asylum 

INS Asylum Interview 

INS 

approves to process 

INS give file 

to JVA 

JVA faxes bio to 

RDC 

JVA prepares 

biography 

JVA faxes bio to 

WPC 

RDC Allocates Cases 

Agencies Assure WPC faxes security 

clearance to JVA 

PHS gives 

samples to lab 

CDC 

approves medical 

PHS prepares packet 

OF 157 & X-ray 

PHS gives original 

OF 157 and X-ray 

packet to JVA 

JVA faxes assurances 

to PHS 

JVA 

quality check 

1-3 

days TFV assigns 

housing 

Customs clears 

refugee

INS takes photo & 

finger prints 

TFV & JVA 

interpreter escort 

to dorm 

Lab gives results 

to PHS 

PHS gives results 

to CDC 

1-3 

days 

CDC gives OF 157 

to PHS 

WPC 

approves security 

clearance 

1-3 

days 

1-7 

days 

1-7 

days 

0-1 

days 

PHS gives packet 

to JVA 

PHS copies medical 

treatment record for 

PHS records 

JVA notifies case 

for interview 

PHS notifies case 

for medical 

Refugee arrives 

at in-processing 

INS establishes 

refugee A-file 

RDC faxes assurance 

to JVA 

INS copies A-files for 

flight to floppy disk 

INS gives flight 

A-files to PHS 

End of 

mission 

Legend 

CDC........Center for Disease Control 

FD..........Fort Dix 

HHS........Health &Human Services 

HHS-CL...Camp Life 

HHS-Out..Out-processing 

INS.........Immigration &

 Naturalization Service 

INS-Insp....Inspections 

IOM........International Organization

 for Migration 

JVA........Joint Voluntary Agency 

NY.........New York 

PHS........Public Health Services 

RDC.......Refugee Data Center 

TFV.......Task Force Village 

WPC......Washington Processing 

Center 

Expect a minimum of 11 days for this process 

Appendix V-13 477
 
 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

APPENDIX V-14: LAW ENFORCEMENT MOA 

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 

BETWEEN 

THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 

THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 

JOINT TASK FORCE PROVIDE REFUGE, 

AND 

THE DoD POLICE DEPARTMENT AT FORT DIX, 

This agreement is made by and between The Department of Health and Human Services, 

represented by Lieutenant Jerry Gates, hereinafter referred to as DHHS, The Immigration and 

Naturalization Service, represented by Henry Bakely, hereinafter referred to as INS, Joint Task 

Force Provide Refuge, represented by LTC Willis Hunter, hereinafter referred to as JTF, and 

The DoD Police Department at Fort Dix, represented by Chief Steve Melly, hereinafter referred 

to as DoD Police 

1. Purpose. 

This interagency agreement establishes responsibilities and procedures for providing security 

for Kosovo refugees and JTF personnel, as well as responsibilities and procedures for handling 

and processing crimes committed within refugee housing areas, hereinafter known as The 

Village and The Hamlet. 

2. Scope of Agreement. 

Security within The Joint Task Force Welcome Center is divided between the JTF/DoD Police 

and the DHHS/INS. The JTF and DoD Police provide security at traffic control checkpoints 

located at the outer perimeter of the Refugee Welcome Center. This security is intended to 

deter uninvited visitors and provide the first level of Force Protection security. DHHS and INS 

provide security at The Village and The Hamlet. This security is intended to prevent refugee 

personnel from departing from the United States Port of Entry without proper authority. 

JTF and DoD Police personnel cannot lawfully provide assistance to INS personnel in 

preventing the unauthorized departure of refugee personnel. Accordingly, JTF and DoD Police 

personnel have been instructed not stop any person or vehicle leaving the refugee complex, 

unless there is evidence of a criminal act committed by the departing person or persons. If they 

478 Appendix V-14 
 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 

become aware that refugee personnel are departing The Village or The Hamlet, they are 

authorized to notify INS personnel, however, they may not detain fleeing refugee personnel. 

DHHS and INS personnel are responsible for preventing the unauthorized departure of refugee 

personnel from the housing areas, however, these agencies are not equipped or trained to 

provide law enforcement services with The Village and The Hamlet. Accordingly, whenever 

criminal activity is reported to DHHS or INS security personnel, they will immediately notify 

the DoD Police for assistance. The DoD Police will respond to the crime scene in the same 

manner as they would for any other crime on the Fort Dix military installation. 

Misdemeanor offenses will be investigated by the Fort Dix Criminal Investigations Unit (CIU). 

Initially felony offenses will be investigated by the Fort Dix CIU and then referred to the Fort 

Monmouth Resident Agency CID. CID will coordinate with the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) to determine FBI interest, however, CID will have primary jurisdiction. 

3. Implementation: 

a. This MOA becomes effective upon signature of the parties and will remain in effect 

until amended, revised, superseded or terminated. 

b. This MOA will be reviewed as required and may be amended or revised at any time by 

consent of the parties. 

FOR Joint Task Force: ______________________ FOR DHHS: _______________________ 

DATE: ________________________ DATE:_________________________ 

FOR DoD Police: ______________________ FOR INS:__________________________ 

DATE: ________________________ DATE:_________________________ 

Appendix V-14 479 
 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

APPENDIX V-15: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ANNEX 

ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO OPERATION PLAN 99-01 

1. SITUATION. The JTF developed "Rules for the Use of Force" and "Rules for Interaction" 

for JTF personnel. 

2. MISSION. To ensure the proper use of force and interaction of personnel with the refugee 

population is understood by all JTF personnel. 

3. EXECUTION. 

a. Concept of Operations. Print this information on wallet size cards and ensure all 

personnel, government, non-government, and voluntary agency personnel read, understand, and 

carry on their person. 

b. Tasks to units. Ensure all personnel within units and agencies comply with the concept of 

operations. 

c. Coordinating Instructions. 

(1) Rules for the use of force. 

(a) You are always authorized to use reasonably necessary force to defend yourself and 

others. 

(b) Avoid using force if you can accomplish your duties without it. 

(c) Use the minimum force necessary when the use of force is authorized. 

(d) You many use force to apprehend civilians whose actions threaten serious bodily 

injury or death. Apprehended persons will be detained for delivery to the custody of U.S. 

Marshals as soon as practicable. 

(e) Rules for the use of deadly force. Deadly force is authorized only as a last resort 

when all three of the following circumstances are present: 

[1] Lesser means have been exhausted or are unavailable. 

[2] The risk of death or serious bodily harm to innocent bystanders is not significantly 

increased by the use of deadly force; and 

[3] The purpose of using deadly force is one or more of the following: 

{a} Self-defense to avoid death or serious bodily injury, including defense of another, 

{b} Prevention of a crime which could result in the death or serious bodily injury of any 

person, 

{c} Prevention of the destruction of public utilities or similar critical infrastructure vital 

to public health or safety, damage to which would imperil life, or 

{d} Detention of persons who have attempted to commit one of the serious offenses 

above, but only if escape of the person would pose an imminent danger of death or serious bodily 

injury to military or law enforcement personnel or to any other person. 

480 Appendix V-15 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 
 

ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO OPERATION PLAN 99-01 

(2) Rules of interaction.

 (a) The Joint Task Force 350 commander and installation commander retain the inherent 

authority to maintain order and security on the installation, and to take reasonable steps to 

provide for the safety of both persons and facilities on the installation. 

(b) U.S. forces retain the right to defend both themselves and others. 

(c) Except when necessary to quell a disturbance or come to the defense of another, only 

individuals authorized by the lead federal agency are permitted to enter the Welcome Center. 

(d) Joint Task Force 350 personnel are always authorized to come to the defense of 

others, and to quell disturbances caused by persons anywhere on the installation, to include 

within the Welcome Center when the responsible civilian security authorities are unable to carry 

out their responsibilities. 

(e) Security of refugees on the installation is the primary responsibility of the 

Department of Health and Human Services (the lead federal agency) and Immigration and 

Naturalization Service Security. 

(f) Security of refugees off the installation is a function of local law enforcement. 

(g) Fraternization with the refugees is prohibited. Avoid even the appearance of playing 

favorites. 

(h) Ensure all actions maintain and preserve the dignity and respect of the refugees. 

(i) Smile, be friendly, be courteous, but avoid unnecessary familiarity. 

(j) Be a good listener and be responsive to refugee complaints. 

(k) Do not negotiate with or make promises to refugees. 

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Omitted. 

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL. Omitted. 

Appendix V-15 481 
 

 

 

 

 

 

_______________________________ ___________________________ 

 

______________________________ ___________________________ 

 

____________________ 

CENTER FOR L AW AND M ILITARY O PERATIONS 
 

APPENDIX V-16: STATEMENT OF GRATUITOUS SERVICES 

STATEMENT OF GRATUITOUS SERVICES 

As a Kosovar refugee in the United States, I am currently living at the Task Force Open Arms Village, Fort 

Dix, New Jersey, where the U.S. Government and other agencies are providing me food, shelter, medical 

care and all the necessities of life. I appreciate this assistance and welcome the opportunity to contribute 

my services on a gratuitous and voluntary basis. These services may include improving and maintaining 

our living area in the Task Force Open Arms village, preparation of food and administrative services for 

refugees, distribution of goods and materials for refugees, preparation for emergencies involving refugees, 

translating, assisting the Task Force Commander and his staff in performing their duties, and any other task 

I am capable of and willing to perform, and that is not prohibited by statute. I understand that I cannot 

replace a government employee, and cannot perform work that would otherwise be performed by a 

government employee. I offer to provide these services effective this date without any expectation of 

compensation. I expressly agree that my services will be performed without pay, and that I will not, solely 

because of these services, be considered an employee of the United States government or any 

instrumentality thereof. I waive any future claim of compensation against the United States for services 

provided from the date of this statement until I am no longer a guest of the United States government and 

residing at the Task Force Open Arms Village, Fort Dix, New Jersey, regardless of any past or current 

employment agreements with the United States. 

Printed Name of Refugee Signature of Refugee 

Printed Name of Witness Signature of Witness 

Date 

482 Appendix V-16