IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JAMES A. WALKER, : Civil No. 4:10-CV-0467

:

 Plaintiff, :

: (Chief Judge Kane)

 v. :

: (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

BERNIE J. ZOOK, et al., :

:

Defendants :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Statement of Facts and of the Case

This is a pro se civil rights complaint brought by JamesWalker, who complains

that state police, state court officials, prison officials, prothonotary staff and clerk’s

office personnel, have all violated his civil rights in the course of state criminal

proceedings brought against Walker in the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin

County. Walker’s complaint involves alleged denials of accessto court records, false

testimony in court proceeding, erroneous rulings in the course of his criminal case,

and other alleged misconduct. (Doc. 11.)

One of the Defendants named in this complaint is Magisterial District Judge

Barbara Clare. As to Judge Clare, all of the allegations in the amended complaint

lodged against the judge stem from the performance of her judicial duties;

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specifically, from her presiding over Walker’s state court preliminary hearing. In

his complaint, Walker alleges that Judge Clare “refused to acknowledge facts

leading to arrest such as no probable cause and illegal searches . . ..” (Doc. 11, ¶

8.) Furthermore, Plaintiff allegesthatJudge Clare “raised Mr. Walker’s bail for not

waiving preliminary hearing.” (Id., ¶ 29.) Finally, in the complaint, Walker

questions the court’s rulings from the bench, alleging that Judge Clare did not

make a “fair and unbiased ruling.” (Id., ¶ 28.) On the basis of these complaints

concerning the performance of her judicial duties, Walker sues Judge Clare in her

individual capacity, (Id., ¶ 8), seeking an unspecified amount of punitive and

compensatory damages. (Id., ¶ 63.)

Judge Clare has moved to dismiss this complaint, citing the immunity from

lawsuits generally conferred upon judicial officers. (Doc. 18.) This motion has been

fully briefed by the parties, and is now ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth

below, it is recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted. 

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)–Standard of Review

The Defendant having filed a motion to dismiss, this Court must assess

whether the pro se complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

since Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure providesthat a complaint

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should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency

of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recently

aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court,

stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in

recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (12007) continuing with our

opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.

2008)]and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal –U.S.–, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading standards

have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more

heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the

possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).

In considering whether a complaint failsto state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, the Court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,

20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s

bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.

Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally a court

need not “assume that a ... plaintiff can prove facts that the ... plaintiff has not

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alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a

plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

actions will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Id. In keeping with the principles of Twombly,

the Supreme Court recently underscored that a trial court must assess whether a

complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to

dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), the Supreme Court

held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying

pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the

assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 1949. Rather, in conducting a review of the

adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:

[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than

conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual 

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allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id. at 1950. 

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal a well-pleaded complaintmust contain more than

mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a complaint must recite factual allegations 

sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere

speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated: 

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, district courtsshould conduct a two-part analysis. First, the

factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District

Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but

may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must

then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient

to show that the plaintiff has a‘plausible claim for relief.’ In other

words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement

to relief. A complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts. 

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

In our view, these heightened pleading standards apply to all aspects of the

Court’s threshold analysis of a complaint’s legal sufficiency. Thus, we will apply this

analysis both when assessing the adequacy of the factual assertions set forth in the

complaint, and when examining whether a complaint names proper parties to the

lawsuit.

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B. Magisterial District Judge Clare Is Entitled to Immunity from

Lawsuit.

To the extent that Walker seeks in his complaint to hold a state judge

personally liable for civil rights violations, it is well-settled that such an official is

individually cloaked with immunity from liability. The United States Supreme Court

has long recognized that those officials performing judicial, quasi-judicial, and

prosecutorial functions in our adversarial system must be entitled to some measure

of protection from personal liability for acts taken in their official capacities. In order

to provide this degree of protection fromliability for judicial officials, the courts have

held that judges, Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991); prosecutors, Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976); and those who perform adjudicative functions,

Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n. 20 (grand jurors); Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284

(3d Cir. 1986)(parole board adjudicators); are entitled to immunity from personal

liability for actions they take in our adversarial system of justice.

These longstanding common law immunities for judicial, quasi-judicial, and

prosecutorial officials are applicable here and prevent Walker from maintaining this

civil action against the individual Defendant he has named in his complaint,

Magisterial District Judge Clare. Indeed, it is well-established that a judge, like

Magisterial District Judge Clare, who presides over a case is entitled to absolute

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judicial immunity for her actions taken in the course of that case. Kwasnik v. Leblon,

228 F.App’x 238, 243 (3d Cir. 2007). As the Third Circuit explained when it rejected

a similar effort to impose personal civil rights liability on a judge in a state case, this

immunity is both broad and absolute:

A judicial officer in the performance of his or her duties has absolute

immunity from suit. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116

L.Ed.2d 9 (1991). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because

the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess

of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has

acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’ ” Stump v. Sparkman, 435

U.S. 349, 356-57,98S.Ct. 1099, 55L.Ed.2d 331 (1978)(citation omitted).

Kwasnik, 228 F.App’x at 243.

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This judicial immunity applies to Section 1983 actions like the lawsuit

brought here by Walker, see Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980), and

embraces both requests for damages, as well as costs and attorney’s fees. See

Corliss v. O’Brien, No. 3:05-CV-0347, 2005 WL 2334792 (M.D. Pa. 2005), aff’d,

200 F.App’x. 80 (3d Cir. 2006). This judicial immunity also expressly extends to

Pennsylvania magisterial district court judges. Indeed, as the United States of

Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly observed, there is no distinction “between

While this decision is not precedential, it is highly persuasive as a 1

“paradigm of the legal analysis [this Court] should . . . follow.” Drinker v.

Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864 n.12 (3d Cir. 1996). 

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judges of courts of limited and general jurisdiction” when applying the judicial

immunity doctrine, Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 441 (3d Cir. 2000), and

“[t]he doctrine ofjudicial immunity applies equally to courts oflimited jurisdiction,

such as district justices, as to courts of general jurisdiction.” Martin v Bicking, 30

F.Supp.2d 511, 512 (E.D. Pa. 1998);see also Schuler v. City of Chambersburg, 641

F.Supp. 657, 659 (M.D. Pa. 1986); Horne v. Farrell, 560 F.Supp. 219, 222-23 (M.D.

Pa. 1983). Moreover, this judicial immunity specifically applies to judicial actions

ruling on bail requests, making probable cause determinations, and presiding over

preliminary hearings in state criminal cases. See, e.g., Pokrandt v. Shields, 773

F.Supp. 758 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Fox v. Castle, 771 F.Supp. 411 (M.D. Pa. 1977). Thus,

the very judicial acts complained of here by Walker are actions which are clearly

encompassed by this absolute judicial immunity from lawsuit. Nor can Walker vitiate

thisimmunity by claiming thatJudge Clare erred in her rulings. Even if Judge Clare’s

decisions were in error, those rulings still may not give rise to civil liability since

judicial immunity applies to all of a judge’s rulings, even those that are later

determined to be mistaken. See Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania., 211 F.3d

760, 769 (3d Cir. 2005).

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In our view, these issues of judicial immunity are insurmountable obstacles to

the Plaintiff maintaining this lawsuit. Therefore, the complaint must be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In reaching this conclusion,

we recognize that in civil rights cases pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an

opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, see

Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir.

2007), unless it is clear that granting further leave to amend would be futile, or result

in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case, we

provided the Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend these pleadings, but to no avail.

The current complaintstill failsto state a viable civil rights cause of action asto Judge

Clare. Since the Plaintiff has been afforded the opportunity to correct the deficiencies

identified in the original complaint, has failed to state a viable civil rights cause of

action, and the factual and legal grounds proffered in support of the complaint make

it clear that he has no right to relief, granting further leave to amend would be futile

or result in undue delay. Id. Therefore, it is recommended that the complaint be

dismissed without further leave to amend.

. 

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III. Recommendation

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the

motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s complaint as to Judge Clare for the failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted (Doc. 18) be GRANTED. 

The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, 

recommendations orreport addressing a motion or matter described in 28

U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition

of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days

after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk

of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written

objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed

findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the

basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local

Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of

those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole orin part, the findings orrecommendations made by the

magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only

in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the

record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own

determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive

further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the

magistrate judge with instructions.

Submitted this 2d day of August, 2010.

S/MartinC. Carlson

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge

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