GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR 496 

MERCURY-ITS OCCURRENCE 

AND ECONOMIC TRENDS 
MERCURY-ITS OCCURRENCE AND ECONOMIC TRENDS 

By Edgar H. Bailey and Roscoe M. Smith 

GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR 496 

Washington 1964 
United States Department of the Interior 

STEWART L. UDALL, SECRETARY 

Geological Survey 

THOMAS B. NOLAN, DIRECTOR 

Free on application to the U.S. Geological Survey, Washington, D. C. 20242 
CONTENTS 

Page Page 

Abstract---------------------------- 1 Mercury required by the U.S. Govern- Introduction ________________________ _ 

Characteristics of mercury deposits __ _ 

Characteristics of the mercuryproducing industry~----------------

Technologic factors _____________ _ 

Economic factors ____ ------- ____ _ 

Mercury -required by industrial 

consumers------------------------

1 

1 

2 

2 

3 

3 

ment----------------------------- 4 

Economic trends-------------------- 5 

Response of domestic production to 

price-------------------------- 6 

Anticipated position after price rise_ 7 

Ore reserves----------------------- 8 

Status of domestic mines in 1964______ 9 

Outlook for future supply_____________ 10 

ILLUSTRATIONS 

Page 

Figure 1. World mercury production, 1955-63; U.S. mercury production, imports, consumpt~on, price in constant dollars, and grade of ore mined 19 5 5-6 3--- _- _--- IV 

2. Industrial consumption of mercury in the United States, 1920-63, and projection 

indicating future requirements ____________ ------ ______ ----- __ ----------- 4 

3. Response of mercury production intheUnitedStatesto domestic price, 1911-63__ 6 

4. U.S. mercury price, production, and industrial consumption, 1957-63, with 

projection to 1967 __________________________________________ --- ____ -- __ - 8 

III 
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1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 

Figure 1. -World mercury production, 1955-63; U.S. mercury production, imports, consumption,price in 

constant dollars, and grade of o:e mined,1955-63. 
Mercury-Its Occurrence and Economic Trends 

By Edgar H. Bailey and Roscoe M. Smith 

ABSTRACT 

In 1963 the domestic production of primary mercury was 

less than on~-fourth of the do~~stic consumption, largely 

because a senes of years of declm1ng price led to the closing 

of most of the domestic mines. During 1963 and 1964 the 

U.S. price, which usually responds to world price, increased 

from $180 to about $500 a flask. Should the fluctuation in 

price and production conform to a previously established 

pattern, the response of the domestic industry to an increased 

price will be a predictable increase in production. If the price 

avera~es $300 a flask for 1 year or more, annual production 

may Increase to a rate of 30,000-35,000 flasks in 1966 or 

1967. If the price averages $400 a flask, production may increase to 45,000-50,000 flasks a year after a timelag of two 

or three years. New ore bodies would have to be found however, to attain these rates of production, and the min,ing of 

lower grade ores would be needed to sustain them for more 

than a few years. 

By 1966 the U.S. economy will require at least 67 000 

flas~s, and t~e domestic demand for mercury thereafter 'wi II 

contmue to Increase. The probability that domestic mines 

will continue to supply a fourth or more of the domestic consumption is dependent upon the price of mercury for the next 

few ye?rs. The outlook for the long-term supply is reassuring, 

but 1t IS dependent, not only upon price, but upon continued 

progress in new techniques of discovery. 

INTRODUCTION 

In 1963 the consumption of mercury in the 

United States reached an alltime high of 

77,936 flasks 1 while concurrently the domestic production declined to 19, 104 flasks, the 

lowest level of the past 9 years, as is shown 

on figure 1. While the U.S. pro.duction was 

declining, the world production remained 

nearly constant, and increasing demand, both 

here and abroad, reduced available stocks to 

a minimal level. As a result of increased 

labor costs, Italian producers raised their 

price in late 1963, and subsequently prices 

increased throughout the world. The U.S. 

price of mercury, which is established by the 

world market, had been gradually declining 

since 1955 and was at a low of about $180 a 

flask, but in early 1964 it had risen to $27 5 a 

1 The unit of marketing in the meri::ury industry is a steel flask 

containing 76 pounds of mercury. 

flask, and by December it had reached about 

$500 a flask. The purpose of this report is 

to•analyze the present large gap between domestic production and consumption of mercury and to discuss the probable effect on domestic production of the recent increase in 

the price in the light of the unusual characteristics of mercury. 

The statistical data in this report are compiled from records of the U.S. Bureau of 

Mines. The authors are pleased to acknowledge, also, the valuable comments of Mr. 

John E. Shelton, commodity specialist, U.S. 

Bureau of Mines, who reviewed the manuscript. 

CHARACTERISTICS OF MERCURY DEPOSITS 

All major mercury deposits are epithermal--deposited by rising warm solutions at 

comparatively shallow depths ranging from 

a few feet to a little more than 2, 000 feet beneath the surface. Half of the domestic mines 

that have yielded a hundred or more flasks 

of mercury are less than 200 feet deep, and 

only six of the larger mines are more than 

1, 000 feet deep. 

Because of their shallow character, mercury deposits, once formed, are generally 

quickly removed by erosion. The deposits 

available for mining in the United States are 

those so young that they have not yet been 

eroded; they are found in the western part of 

the United States in a region of recent volcanic and tectonic activity. For this reason, 

and other more subtle geologic considerations, it would be useless to look for epithermal mercury deposits in any of the major 

regions of the United States other than those 

in which mercury has already been found. 

1 
2 MERCURY -ITS OCCURRENCE AND ECONOMIC TRENDS 

A second geologic consequence of the shallow character of mercury deposits is the 

presence of near-surface products of hydrothermal alteration in addition to the mercury 

that has been introduced. The alteration often 

takes the form of the conversion of feldspar 

to clay with the result that many deposits 

are in "heavy ground"-that is, ground in 

which mine openings must be constantly repaired to keep them open. Although a significant number of the deposits in the California 

Coast Ranges are in a hard alteration of 

serpentine (silica- carbonate rock) in which 

stopes remain open for years, the surrounding rocks are usually mashed serpentine or 

altered sandstone, and the adits providing 

access to the stopes are quickly lost if the 

workings are not maintained. 

Mercury ore bodies are generally smaller 

and more erratic in distribution than deposits 

of other minerals. Although the largest mines 

have the most continuous ore bodies, in only 

a few of these have reserves been blocked 

out a year in advance of mining, and in many 

smaller mercury mines the ores to be exploited a year later are largely in the "hopedfor" category. A continual search for new 

ore, bodies is required for sustained production in many of the mines, and the ratio of 

exploration costs to production costs may be 

high. 

All the domestic mercury mines and all 

the larger ones in the rest of the world are 

operated solely for the value of the mercury 

in their ores, and no byproducts are recovered. There are exceptions in some of the 

smaller mines, however, and mercury has 

been recovered as a byproduct of gold mining 

in Chile, iron mining in Czechoslovakia, and 

lead mining in Tunisia, Algeria, and elsewhere. Ores from Huitzuco, Mexico, yielded 

both antimony and mercury, and ores of the 

Red Devil mine in Alaska contained much 

more antimony than mercury, although · none 

of the antimony was recovered. Nonetheless, 

because of the general isolation of mercury' 

ores from other metals, neither the domestic 

uor world production of mercury is appreciably affected by gross change in the value of 

other metals. 

Although thousands of small deposits have 

been exploited, only a few small areas yield 

the bulk of the world supply. Of the entire 

world production, one-third has come from 1 

mine, one-half from 2, and three-fourths 

from only 6 mines or districts. The source 

of domestic production is strikingly similar; 

one-third has come from 1 mine, one-half 

from 2, and ,three-fourths from 7 mines or 

districts. 

In only a few mines are deposits of less 

than ore grade sufficiently well known to estimate tonnage and grade, but low-grade deposits in other mines are suspected. 

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MERCURY -PRODUCING 

INDUSTRY 

Several features of the technology of the 

recovery process and of the economics of the 

mercury-mining industry reflect the unique 

or unusual properties of the met;:tl and the 

unusual characteristics of the deposits. The 

background factors that need to be considered 

in a realistic appraisal of the present status 

and probable future of the industry are summarized below. 

TECHNOLOGIC FACTORS 

Mercury is easily recovered from its common mercury sulfide ores by heating in 

either a retort or furnace; hence, 99.9 percent pure metal is generally recovered at 

the mine. The cost of constructing a recovery plant amounts to only about $1,000 per 

ton of daily capacity but varies from mine to 

mine as a result of differences in remoteness or inacessibility. Small retorts to treat 

a ton or so a day can be built by individual 

miners at comparable costs, or less if secondhand material and their own labor is used. 

The cost of furnacing the ore ranges from $2 

to $10 per ton, varying according to size of 

the operation and access to fuel. 

Mercury ore may be concentrated by tabling and flotation, but, because these processes require crushing or grinding, the concentrating cost generally exceeds that of 

direct furnace treatment. Leaching and recovery by chemical or electrolytic precipitation, followed by retorting, can be made an 

efficient method of recovery, but no largescale application of this recovery process 

has met with economic success. 

Generally 5G-75 percent of the cost invoived in the m~ing and treatment of normal 

ore is the cost of labor. 

Mercury niining generally presents no 

special problems other than those due to the 
MERCURY REQUIRED BY INDUSTRIAL CONSUMERS 3 

erratic distribution of the ore bodies and the 

"heavy ground" found in some of the mines. 

In a few mines explosive gas and excessive 

heat required special attention. Geologists 

are not employed at most mines, and geologic 

maps of workings are not maintained. Sampling and assaying procedures at many mines 

are crude or inadequate. 

Secondary mercury, derived from scrap, 

has been of minor but increasing importance 

owing to the trend toward industrial uses in 

which the mercury is recoverable. In 1950, 

production of secondary mercury was 2, 000 

flasks, whereas in 196 3 it was 5, 920 flasks. 

ECONOMIC FACTORS 

Nearly all the worlq production of mercury 

is by seven countries, which in order of productivity in recent years are: Italy, Spain, 

United States, Russia, China, Mexico, and 

Yugoslavia. Much of the mercury produced 

in Russia and China remains behind the Iron 

Curtain, but mercury of Yugoslavia and the 

other nations is available to the Free World. 

The largest and richest deposit is that of 

the great Almaden mine in Spain, which recently was processing ore containing 3. 2 

percent mercury as compared with 0. 6 percent for U.S. deposits. Mine operation and 

marketing are controlled by the Spanish 

Government. Some of the furnacing and mining equipment has been modernized in recent 

years, and a new shaft has been sunk, partly 

to permit the hoisting of more ore and partly 

for exploration. Recent expansion of activity 

at other Spanish mines suggests that attempts 

to find and develop new ore bodies at Almaden 

did not come up to expectations, however, and 

increases in efficiency due to modernization 

may not have resulted in any appreciable reduction in overall costs because the Government feels obligated to provide a living for 

over 2, 000 workers at Almaden. Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that mercury can 

be recovered at Almaden more cheaply than 

at any other mine, and there is no reason to 

believe this condition will not continue for 

many years to come. 

The Italian deposits, which are in part privately owned and in part held by a Government-financed organization, are operating on 

ores comparable in grade to those mined in 

the United States. Several of their plants 

were recently modernized, and the mines 

seem to be operated efficiently. The recent 

rise in mercury prices began when the Monte 

Amiata Co., which operates several of the 

large mines, increased its selling price because of "increased labor costs and decreasing ore values." Because less rewarding 

parts of the mines had been taken out of pro~ 

duction in 1961, in spite of the suspension of 

the Italian production tax in 1959, it seems 

likely that their move to raise the selling 

price was really necessary for sustained 

production. 

The selling price of the big producers of 

mercury, Italy and Spain, determines the 

world price, and hence the U.S. price. Prior 

to World War II these two countries regulated 

prices and sales through a cartel; since 1950 

they have operated independently. Both the 

U.S.S.R. and China are believed to be producing annually several tens of thousands of 

flasks of mercury, most of which is consumed behind the Iron Curtain. The U.S.S.R. 

is aggressively searching for deposits and 

developing mercury mines. With only a small 

increase in production or decrease in consumption, either the U.S.S.R. or China could 

upset the normal trade pattern by dumping a 

few tens of thousands of flasks on the world 

market. A few years ago the U.S.S.R. brought 

about a temporary break in the world price 

by dumping into Europe several thousand 

flasks obtained from Yugoslavia. Conversely, because of the small quantities involved, 

a single new major use could easily increase 

the demand enough to bring about a sustained 

increase in price. 

The mercury mining industry is small, 

both as compared to other mining industries 

and as compared to the industries requiring 

some mercury in their processes or products. The worth of the entire U.S. production in 1963 was about $3.6 million if computed at the average New York price, but 

actually somewhat less was received by the 

producers in the Far West. In 1943, when the 

productive peak of 51,929 flasks was achieved, 

the value was a little more than $10 million. 

In most years fewer than 1, 000 persons are 

directly involved in all phases of the production of primary mercury. 

MERCURY REQUIRED BY INDUSTRIAL CONSUMERS 

Mercury is utilized by the U.S. industry in 

many diverse ways, and new uses are being 

constantly discovered. The greatest single 
4 MERCURY -ITS OCCURRENCE AND ECONOMIC TRENDS 

use in recent years has been in plants manufacturing chlorine and caustic soda, where 

several thousand flasks are required initially 

for each new installation and about 8, 000 

flasks were required in 1963 just to replace 

losses. The domestic demand for chlorine 

has increased in recent years because it is 

used in the manufacture of plastics and detergents. Electrical apparatus requires a 

large amount of mercury each year, as does 

also the manufacture of toXic compounds, 

such as bactericides, fungicides, and mildewproofing paint. Significant amounts are used 

in dental preparations, medicines, mercury 

batteries, thermometers, atomic plants, and 

so on through a list of about 3,000 distinct 

uses. 

Because domestic production expands during periods of war and the price increases 

as a result of unavailability of imports, mercury is generally thought of as a war mineral. It is better regarded as an industrial 

mineral because what increase there is in 

wartime consumption is largely a result of 

an increased use in many applications brought 

about by the general acceleration of manufacturing rather than by large consumption 

of mercury in war goods, such as fulminate 

and pharmaceuticals. That it is truly an industrial mineral is shown by the fact that the 

industrial consumption in 1963 was larger 

than at any time during either World War., 

Thus, even though mercury may be regarded 

as a strategic mineral that is necessary in 

times of war, it is equally vital to the U.S. 

economy in times of peace. 

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A graph of the annual average consumption 

of mercury in the United States since 1920 

and a projection indicating f';lure requirements are shown in figure 2. The trend line 

of consumption based on 10-year averages 

shows a remarkably steady increase and indicates that by 1980 there will be an annual 

domestic demand for at least 90,000 flasks. 

The trend of domestic consumption in 1960-

6 3 shows a much higher rate of increase, but 

this increase is believed to be a short-term 

cyclic fluctuation resulting from new uses in 

electrical products and new caustic soda 

plants, both of which reflect general industrial expansion. The increase in consumption from 196(}-63 is at a rate of about 10 

percent per year, whereas the long-term 

growth is at a rate of about 2 percent per 

year. The rate of increase in consumption 

was greater than the increase of industrywide spending on new plants and equipment, 

which rose from $34 billion in 1960 to nearly 

$40 billion in 1963, but it is more nearly 

comparable to the rapid growth of the chemical and electrical industries. Figure 2 suggests that, even though the 1963 consumption 

of 78,000 flasks was abnormally high, still 

greater consumption will be normal within a 

decade. The 196(}-63 trend perhaps will not 

last many years, but the long-term consumption trend surely will continue. 

MERCURY REQUIRED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 

The U.S. Government since World War II 

has purchased, either directly or indirectly, 

large amounts of mercury for the strategic 

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(Trend line based on consumption during each of 5 years preceding 

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1 I I I 

1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 

Figure 2. -Industrial consumption of mercury in the United States, 1920-63, and projection indicating future requirements. 
ECONOMIC TRENDS 5 

or supplemental stockpile and for the AE C 

(Atomic Energy Commission). The stockpile 

objective was revised upward in mid-1963 by 

the Office of Emergency Planning to 200,000 

flasks, and in 1964 the inventory was slightly 

above this figure owing to the transfer of 

50,000 flasks from the AEC. The AEC also 

declared 6 5, 736 additional flasks to be excess 

during 1964. One may conclude that the Government does not currently need additional 

mercury nor does it anticipate any expanded 

need in the future. Stockpile objectives have 

been re-evaluated several times, however, as 

industrial needs increased. The domestic 

mercury producers are well aware of the 

large quantity of mercury in Government 

hands and are keenly concerned about its release onto the open market. The release of 

even small amounts will depress the price. 

However, when the domestic consumption far 

exceeds production and the world demand remains at a high level, the sale of mercury by 

the Government at a limited rate, and only 

when the prevailing price is high, would protect both the consumer and the producer. 

The quantity that might be released without 

upsetting normal trade will vary inversely 

with domestic supply and should remain 

small enough to avoid any appr,eciable decrease in U.S. purchases from Italy or Spain, 

which is basically what determines the domestic price. 

The domestic component of the mobilization base for mercury was set in 1956 at 

7, 500 flasks a year-a level that is adequate 

for mobilization purposes in view of the 

present stockpile inventory. Since 1956 the 

domestic mines have produced annually several times this amount, but if the 1961-6 3 

production trend were to continue, it would 

fall below this rate by 1965. The latest declining trend in production is likely to be reversed before this low level is reached, owing 

to the latest surge of price. 

ECONOMIC TRENDS 

The present production cycle of mercury 

mining in the United States clearly began just 

before the World War II period and was at its 

peak in the early 1940's when the index price, 

relative to 1957-59 dollars, was in the range 

$3 50-$400 and annual production exceeded 

50,000 flasks. During this period almost 

every mercury mine that had once been a 

substantial producer was opened, explored, 

and, if possible, brought into production; 

prospects were developed into mines; and a 

diligent search was made for undiscovered 

deposits. The intensified activity was supported by various forms of Government aid, 

both direct and indirect. With the withdrawal 

of Government aid in 1944 and worldwide 

oversupply, the price fell abruptly and continued downward until 1950. Prior to the decline in price, a few of the mines had exhausted the apparent ore and closed, but even 

when the price became so low that mining 

was unrewarding, an attempt was made at 

many of the larger mines to keep in production as long as possible in hopes of a reversal in the down:vard price trend. Nonetheless, by December 1950 the Sonoma mine 

was the -only major producer still operating, 

though several other major mines were being 

maintained so they could be promptly reactivated. 

Following the outbreak of the Korean war 

(June 1950), the price rose abruptlyto a peak 

early in 1951, and many of the deposits held 

in readiness again began production. From 

1955 until 1963 the price steadily declined, 

but production continued to rise until 1958. 

The continued high rate of production during 

the declining market from 1955-58 resulted 

from (1) operating inertia of going mines and 

(2)the establishment in July 1954 of a pricesupport program promising a stable floor 

price for a period of 3t years (later extended 

1 more year). The support program, which 

set a floor about $50 below the market price 

at that time, was of considerable stimulus to 

the industry, as for the first time domestic 

producers were relieved of the fear of an 

abrupt drastic price drop being imposed by 

foreign producers. Because the floor price 

'remained belowthe market price for most of 

the period, the U.S. Government had to purchase mercury only near the end of the support period, and then only to the extent of 

30,165 flasks costing about $6.8 million. The 

mercury so obtained was transferred to the 

AEC. 

Since 1958, with ever-declining prices, the 

mines have one by one gone out of production. 

Prospecting for new ore bodies, either in o~d 

mines or new areas, has been much reduced. 

The Government programs for assistance in 

exploration have been helpful, but, even with 

this aid, there has been little interest in 

looking for mercury in the past few years. 

Prior to mid-1958, 41 exploration contracts 
6 MERCURY ~ITS OCCURRENCE AND ECONOMIC TRENDS 

were written by the Defense Minerals Exploration Administration, but since 19 58 only 

10 have been written by the Office of Minerals 

Exploration, though the revised contract limitations are not greatly different. By the end 

of 1961 only 4 of the mines aided by these 

exploration programs were operating, and by 

the end of 1963 only 1 was obtaining some of 

its supply from ore found under OME exploration. 

RESPONSE OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTION TO PRICE 

Since 1911, the United States has not obtained from domestic mines the quantity of 

mercury required by its economy, except for 

brief periods during the World Wars and the 

1931 depression. Throughout these 50 years, 

however, always a few domestic mines were 

in operation, and other unworked deposits 

with marginal ore were available. When the 

price reached a sufficiently high level, oper80 

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ating mines increased their production by 

processing larger amounts of lower grade 

ores, closed mines were reopened, and new 

mines were started. The result has been an 

increase in production that is closely related 

to price, but lags behind the price increase 

because of the time required to get into production. This relation is shown in the following table and in graphic form in figure 3. 

The table indicates clearly the lag of production in response to price, and it is significant that this lag is becoming increasingly 

large as it becomes more difficult to find 

mercury ore, to install larger plants and 

more complicated mining equipment, and to 

bring major mines into production. Similarly, the mines today, once in operation, 

have greater momentum and are closed with 

greater reluctance than formerly, resulting 

in a longer lag in the depression of production following the lowering of price. The 

EXPLANATION 

• Peakprice and subsequent peak production 

• Minimum price and subsequent minimum production 

400 500 600 

PRICE PER FLASK,IN INDEX DOLLARS (1957-59=100) 

Figure 3. -Response of mercury production in the United States to the domestic pnce, 1911-63. 
ANTICIPATED POSITION AITER PRICE RISE 7 

Time relation between maximum and minimum price and production of mercury 1911-63 ' 

Peak Lowest 

Production 

lag in years 

From From 

Price Produc- Price Produc- peak lowtion tion price est 

price 

1911 1912 ----- -------- 1 ------ ---- -------- 1913 1914 ------ 1 

1916 1917 ----- -------- 1 ------ ---- --------- 1921 1921-22 ------ 0 

1930 1931 ----- -------- 1 ------ ---- -------- 1932 1933 ------ 1 

1940 1943 ----- r-------- 2t ------ ----- -------- 1948 1950 ------ 2 

1955 1958 ----- -------- 3 ------ ----- -------- 1963 1964-65 ______ 1 or 2 

(est) (est) 

normal lag in the response of production to a 

price increase was 2 years for the last production peak (1948-50), and the lag in response to a price decrease was 3 years 

(1955-58). The low in production related to 

the 1963 low in price may be yet to come; 

hence this low, as plotted on figure 3, is an 

estimate. 

When the price production data are plotted 

in terms of constant dollars as in figure 3, it 

becomes apparent that the response of peak 

and minimum production to price over the 

entire 1911-58 period has been fairly uniform 

and since 1921 has been nearly linear--that 

is, a particular price has yielded nearly the 

same production throughout the entire period, in spite of changing economic and technologic conditions. In detail, however, the response of production to price increase was 

progressively less in three of the four upswings that have taken place since 1914, suggesting that it has become progressively 

more difficult or costly to find new reserves. 

The exception to this trend was the 1955-58 

upswing, which·may have resulted from technologic advances in both mine and mill. 

In spite of these slight departures from a 

linear response, the general "trend of reBponse ·of production to price" can be used 

with some confidence to predict future production at various price levels. The 1963 

average price was $189, and the recorded 

production was 19,104 flasks--the response 

line of the graph would predict a production 

of 17,500 flasks if no time lag is considered 

and a production of 18,900 flasks if a lag reflecting the price 2 years earlier is introduced. 

ANTICIPATED POSITION AFTER PRICE RISE 

In 1963, when the average price was 

$189.45 a flask, the U.S. production consisted of 19, 104 flasks of primary mercury 

and 6,500 flasks of secondary mercury, while 

the consumption was 77,965 flasks. The primary production in 1963 was less than onefourth the consumption, and in the first quarter of 1964 the primary production was 

lower than in the corresponding period of 

1963. In November 1963 the price rose to 

about $210, and then about $500 a flask in 

November 1964. The trend of price-production response shown in figure 3 suggests the 

U.S. production will increase in response to 

the higher price but will not respond fully 

until after a lag of about 2 years. As the 

consumption is also increasing rapidly, it is 

instructive to anticipate the production-consumption situation in 196 6 after this lag has 

taken effect. The results of estimates based 

en two different assumptions regarding consumption are shown in figure 4. 

If we assume the price increase will average $300 for at least 1 year, which seems 

probable, the trend line in figure 3 indicates 

the domestic primary mercury production in 

1966 will be 35,000 flasks, to which we might 

add 10,000 flasks from secondary mercury 

and Government sources to obtain a total of 

4 5, 000 flasks available for consumption. The 

consumption in 1966 indicated by the 25-year 

trend shown in figure 2 would be about 

67,000 flasks, which with the indicated domestic production leaves a deficit of 22,000 

flasks that must be offset by imports. If 

consumption were to rise at the 1961-63 

rate, however, it would be 105,000 flasks in 

1966, and there would be a supply deficit of 

60,000 flasks. This extreme rate of increase 

is unlikely, as stated earlier, but it is included in figure 4 to illustrate that a net saving to the national economy will result from 

prices higher than those prevailing in 1963 

owing to increased domestic production. If 

we assume an annual average price of $400 

a flask, the expected production would be 

45,000 to 50,000 flasks, but to bring out a domestic production equal to even our minimum 
8 MERCURY -ITS OCCURRENCE AND ECONOMIC TRENDS 

150 .....----- 300 

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50 

--

1957 . 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 

Figure 4. -U.S. mercury price, production, and industrial consumption, 1957-63, with projection to 1967. 

estimate of consumption of 67,000 flasks 

would, accord~ng to figure 3, require a sustained price of at least $500 a flask. 

ORE RESERVES 

Mercury ore reserves of all classes, minable at $190 a flask, were estimated by E. H. 

Bailey in March 1962. As the average price 

until 1964 was very close to the $190 figure, 

it is instructive to compare the production 

with the estimate. as is done in the table on 

page 9. 

Reserves of ore minable at $190 a flask 

are now believed to be somewhat less than 

the original estimate for Alaska, where ore 

has become inaccessible owing to the closing 

and flooding of the major mine. but reserves 

in California and Nevada are a little larger 

than estimated. About two-thirds of these 

reserves are now depleted. Reserves of all 

classes minable at $250 a flask were computed to be 228,500 flasks in 1962. These 

reserves are minable at 1964 prices, and 

the estimate minus subsequent production 

amounts to 183,219 flasks, of which about 

half is inferred. 

Mercury reserves of the world in minable 

ores were estimated. in 1962 to be about 3 

million flasks. Only a small part of this has 

been mined, and there is no question but that 

the reserve is ample to supply the world 
STATUS OF DOMESTIC MINES IN 1964 9 

U.S. mercury reserves minable in 1962 

[In flasks] .-

Minable Recovered Minable 

State at $190 1962-63 at $250 

per flask ~er flask 

Alaska ---- 12,000 4,119 25,000 

Arizona ___ -------- (*) 3,000 

Arkansas __ -------- ---------- 1,000 

California _ 52,000 29,543 149,000 Idaho ______ -------- (*) 20,000 

Nevada---- 10,000 11,517 17,000 

Oregon---- 2,000 (*) 7,500 

Texas----- -------- (*) 5,000 

Utah and 

Washington -------- ---------- 1,000 

Total ______ 76,000 45,179 228,500 

"Not significant. 

requirements for several years. However, 

some ores of lower grade than those included 

in the estimate will soon be needed to meet 

the expected consumption if the upward trend 

is maintained, a fact which suggests that the 

average price will remain above the 1962 

level of $191 a flask. The 1962 estimate of 

all grades and subsequent production is given 

in the following table. 

At Almaden, Spain, and Monte Amiata, Italy, 

the practice is to develop each year as much 

ore reserve as is mined, whereas in the 

World mercury reserves minable under 1962 economic 

conditions 

[In thousands of flasks] 

Country Estimate Recovered 

or area March 1962 1962-63 

United States ______ 75 45 

Canada ___________ ----------- _ _______ .__ 

Mexico _____ .... _____ 12 5. 37 

South America ____ 20 8 Spain _____________ 1,000 106 

Italy ------------- 700 109 

Yugoslavia ________ 400 32 

Czechoslovakia ____ 5 1 

U.S.S.R.---------- 300 70 

Japan ------------ 60 9 

China ------------ 400 52 

Turkey ___________ 40 6 

Philippines ------- 35 5 

Total _____________ 3,160 480 

United States few mines are able to do this 

because the deposits are smaller and more 

erratic. Hence, the absolute quantity of ore 

reserves at any particular time is not in itself an indication of the potential of the industry. A better indication is the historical 

response of production to price, and the effect of depletion upon the response. 

STATUS OF DOMESTIC MINES IN 1964 

The debilitated condition of the domestic 

mercury mining industry is not fairly revealed by statements of the number of producing mines, which in 1963 was 47, or even 

the number of mines· producing more than 100 

flasks, which was 8 in 1963. The true condition is better revealed by the status of the 

few large mines that have in the past yielded 

nearly all the domestic production. In the 

following two tabulations are shown the current status of the 20 largest producers for 

Status of the 20 largest domestic mercury producers, 1850-19621 

[Production in :flasks] 

Mine Production Status 

1850-1962 1964 2 

New Almaden, Calif _ 1,083 J 773 

New Idria, Calif- ____ 520,201 + 

Oat Hill, Calif ______ 153,210 0 

Sulphur Bank, Calif __ 129,162 0 

Knoxville, Calif----- 120,894 0 

Guadalupe, Calif ____ 116,609 

Sonoma, Calif _______ 105,186 0 

Great Western, 

Calif- ____________ 105,179 0 

Chisos -Rainbow, Tex ______________ 92,097 0 

Cordero, Nev ------- 84,765 t 

Aetna-Aetna Extension, Calif ------- 65,806 0 

Abbott, calif ________ 49,253 0 

Mirabel, Calif ______ 41,801 0 

Oceanic, Calif ______ 41,168 0 

Bonanza, Oreg ______ 39,488 0 

Altoona, Calif _______ 35,657 0 

Mariposa, Tex- _____ 33,974 0 

Red Devil, Alaska ___ 31,718 0 

Reed, Calif ________ ~ 27 J 749 0 

Klau, Calif ____ _____ 25,903 0 

1 During 1964, 16 of the 20 largest producers were inactive, 

and only 2 were operated on a major scale; however, 12 of the 

20 had significant production in World War II. 

2Status symbols defined in paragraph following tables. 
10 MERCURY -ITS OCCURRENCE AND ECONOMIC TRENDS 

Status of the 13 largest domestic mercury producers, 1950-62 1 

[Production, in flasks] 

Mine Production Status 

1950-62 19642 

New Idria, Calif ____ 71,083 + 

Cordero, Nev _______ 61,359 ± 

Sonoma, Calif ______ 31,603 0 

Red Devil, Alaska ___ 28,765 0 

Abbott, Calif------- 15,525 0 

Buena Vista, Calif __ 14,625 t 

Idaho Almaden, Idaho ____________ 11,827 0 

New Almaden, Calif ____________ 7,~46 

Bonanza, Oreg ------ 7,697 0 

Hermes, Idaho ______ 4,938 0 

Guadalupe, Calif ____ 3,959 

Bertz, Nev --------- 3,699 0 

Redwood City, Calif_ 2,720 0 

1 Of these 13 mines that have been the largest source of 

domestic mercwy production in the past decade, only one has 

moderate production and developed reserves in 1964; two others 

are producing at a diminished rate and have little developed 

reserves; two are operated on a small scale by a few lessees wlio 

have almost no developed ore; and the rest are inoperative, 

th~:mgn ,a few are known to contain ore of marginal quality. 2Status symbols defined in paragraph following table. 

1850-1962, which account for all but 12 percent of the total U.S. production, and the status of the 13 largest producers for 1950-

1962, which account for all but 10 percent of 

the production in this period. In the "status" 

column a plus (+) indicates the deposit is 

producing in 1964 at a scale commensurate 

with its past record, a plus-minus (t) indicates declining production, a minus (-) indicates small-scale operation such as might be 

conducted by a few lessees, and a zero (0) 

indicates the mine is either closed down or 

is supporting an insignificant cleanup operation. 

OUTLOOK FOR FUTURE SUPPLY 

The response of mercury production pr~­

dicted by statistical methods may not be entirely valid because the statistical trend may 

in the near future be warped by factors that 

heretofore have not been so important. For 

example, exploration has been carried on at 

a reduced rate for so long that nearly all 

major mines are closed with the results that 

some known ore reserves are now (1964) inaccessible and new discoveries are increasingly difficult to make. Although reserves 

are adequate to permit the industry to reach 

a production of 3 5, 000 flasks a year with few 

additional discoveries, they are inadequate to 

sustain production at this level; moreover 

prices below about $300 a flask are inadequate to offer the stimulus necessary to sustain this level of production. There are only 

one or two major mines operating in 1964 

that might increase their production by mining a much larger amount of lower grade 

ore. 

As mentioned earlier in this report, the 

gee logic habit of mercury mineralization results in shallow ore bodies, which have two 

consequences that must inevitably influence 

· future production. First, the areas favorable 

for the formation and preservation of mercury ore bodies, both in the United States and 

in the rest of the world, are quite limited, 

and within the past 50 years they have become 

well known. The discovery of entirely new 

districts containing major ore bodies cannot 

be expected except in the most remote, densely forested, or otherwise covered areas, but 

geologic techniques recently developed and 

being tested will -facilitate their discovery in 

these more difficult terranes. Second, the 

shallow depositional environment of mercury 

results in the proportion of the total number 

of existing ore bodies exposed at the surface 

being much larger than is the case of ores of 

most other metals; and, in consequence, a 

larger proportion of those that exist have 

been found. These two factors together lead 

one to believe that the discovery of the new 

ore bodies required to maintain or increase 

production in the United States will become 

increasingly difficult and costly. Since the 

inception of World War I, 50 years ago, there 

have been three periods of intensive search 

for mercury deposits. During this time, only 

two major mercury deposits--cordero, Nev., 

and Red Devil, Alaska-have been discovered; 

and., further, these are now seriously depleted, having yielded altogether only about 3 

percent of the all time U.S. production. The 

major production during this period came 

from the mining of previously known ore 

bodies or newly discovered extensions of 

known deposits. The history of mercury discoveries elsewhere in the Free World is 

comparable; only the Palawan mercury deposit in the Philippine jungle and some of the 

low-grade deposits on Hokkaido in Japan can 

be regarded as major deposits found since 

World War I. 
OUTI.OOK FOR' :FUTURE SUPPLY 11 

The increasing cost of finding hidden ore 

bodies is partly offset by technological improvements permittinghigh-speed drilling of 

exploratory holes and the development of improved methods of geochemical prospecting. 

Other technologic advancements seem unlikely to be of great aid to the mercury mining industry, as the ore bodies are small and 

not adapted to the most modern large-bulk 

mining methods, and furnacing is such an efficient extractive method that it is not likely 

to be greatly improved. 

We may conclude that changes in the mercury industry in the United States since 1911 

are changes of degree rather than of basic 

characteristics. Price cycles may be expected to continue in response to errat.ic demand, but they may not reach the extreme 

low points of earlier cycles because of the 

trend toward increc:..singly diversified uses. 

The availability of mercury is dependent 

more upon price than upon the absolute quantity of ore reserves that are known at any 

given time. The majority of discoveries in 

the near future are almost certain to come 

from known districts, but there is a chance 

that exploration, utilizing new methods and 

knowledge, in generally favorable regions 

may uncover new districts as well. Although 

all major deposits are of the epithermal type, 

it is possible that other types of lower grade 

deposits of mercury may be found in other 

kinds of geologic environments, such as the 

occurrence of mercury with oil and gas in 

an oilfield in California. Such possibilities 

should be examined in future studies, for it 

seems to be apparent that the epithermal deposits of the world are of insufficient magnitude to support the longest term requirements. 

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