1 See Order dated Mar. 1, 2006 (Doc. 5) at 1 (granting IFP status).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DOMINGO COLON-MONTANEZ, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 06-161

)

v. ) Judge Hardiman

) Magistrate Judge Caiazza

MICHAEL OPPMAN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

It is respectfully recommended that the Plaintiff’s action

be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and that

all pending motions be denied as moot.

In this Section 1983 action, state inmate Domingo ColonMontanez (“the Plaintiff”) claims his due process rights were

violated in connection with deductions made from his inmate

account. As an in forma pauperis (“IFP”) litigant,1

the Plaintiff is subject to Section 1915(e)(2), which mandates

the dismissal of an IFP complaint that is “frivolous.” See

generally Stevens v. Chex Sys. of Dallas, 2000 WL 1522856, *1

(E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2000) (citing and quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)).

As seen below, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the

Plaintiff’s claims. His Complaint therefore is frivolous under

Section 1915(e)(2), and it should be dismissed. See, e.g.,

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Newton v. Nixon, 2004 WL 2282878, *1 (8th Cir. Oct. 12, 2004)

(affirming district court’s dismissal of pleading as frivolous

based on collateral estoppel); Lewis v. Green, 2004 WL 1399202,

*1 (5th Cir. Jun. 22, 2004) (same), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155

(2005).

A. Collateral Estoppel

The doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral

estoppel, “ensures that once an issue is actually and necessarily

determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that

determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a

different cause of action involving a party to the prior

litigation.” See Burlington North R. Co. v. Hyundai Merchant

Marine Co., Ltd., 63 F.3d 1227, 1232 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation and

internal quotations omitted). “The prerequisites for the

application of issue preclusion are satisfied when: (1) the

issue sought to be precluded is the same as that involved in the

prior action; (2) that issue was actually litigated; (3) it was

determined by a final and valid judgment; and (4) the

determination [was] essential to the prior judgment." See id.

(citations, internal quotations, and alterations omitted).

In Montanez v. Beard, Civ. Action No. 04-2569 (M.D. Pa.),

the Plaintiff stated claims identical to the ones alleged here,

i.e., that the Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment

rights by making deductions from his inmate account to satisfy

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2 The rulings in the Middle District are not part of the record here. 

The District and Circuit Courts may access them by contacting their

local Third Circuit librarians and obtaining a “login” and “password”

for the Middle District’s Electronic Document Filing System (found at 

https://ecf.pamd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/login.pl), where copies of the

referenced filings can be accessed.

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fines, costs and restitution ordered as part of his criminal

sentence. See generally Compl. (Doc. 1) in M.D. Action.2 

The Middle District Court analyzed the Plaintiff’s claims, on the

merits and pursuant to applicable legal standards, and concluded

he had not stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. 

See id. at Doc. 54 (R&R), Doc. 66 (2d R&R), & Doc. 70 (final

Order of Jul. 12, 2006, dismissing case under Rule 12(b)(6)). 

The Plaintiff has taken the case to the Third Circuit Court,

where his appeal remains pending.

The Plaintiff is an obvious candidate for the application of

collateral estoppel. In the Middle District, identical issues

were actually litigated to a final, valid ruling, and the

determinations made there were essential to the prior judgment. 

See discussions supra; cf. also Cameron v. Church, 253 F. Supp.2d

611, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (ruling on 12(b)(6) motion may

“operate[] as a decision on the merits” that satisfies the “final

judgment” requirement) (citations omitted). There is no reason

to revisit the Plaintiff’s claims here, especially given the

pendency of his appeal before the Third Circuit. Cf. Rutter v.

Rivera, 2003 WL 22047996, *4 (3d Cir. Aug. 29, 2003) 

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(“a judgment is deemed final” for purposes collateral estoppel

“unless or until it is reversed on appeal”) (citation omitted)

and In re Wilson, 116 F.3d 87, 90 (3d Cir. 1997) (same)

(citations omitted).

The Plaintiff’s complaint is barred by collateral estoppel,

and it should be dismissed as frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2).

In accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.1.4 (B) of the Local Rules

for Magistrates, objections to this report and recommendation are

due by November 24, 2006. Responses to objections are due by 

December 4, 2006.

November 8, 2006

cc:

DOMINGO COLON-MONTANEZ, ED-3826

SCI Fayette

50 Overlook Drive

Box 9999

LaBelle, PA 15450-0999 

Francis R. Filipi, Esq. (via email)

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