FOURTH DIVISION

	March 31, 2004

1-03-2031

In re ABNER P.; ELIZABETH P.; NATHANIEL P.;	)	    Appeal From

AARON P.; JACOB P.; STEPHANIE P.; and		)	 the Circuit Court

SARA P.; Minors,						)	 of Cook County.

								)

		Respondents-Appellees,			)

								)  No. 99 JA 1279/1280/1281/1282

(The People of the State of Illinois,				)  No. 99 JA 1283/1285/1386

								)

		Petitioner-Appellee,				)

								)

v.								)

								)

Pavel P.,							)	   Honorable

								)	Rena Van Tine,

		Respondent-Appellant.)			)	Judge Presiding.

	JUSTICE THEIS delivered the opinion of the court:

	Respondent Pavel P.'s parental rights as to seven of his children, Abner P., Elizabeth P., Nathaniel P., Aaron P., Jacob P., Stephanie P., and Sara P. (collectively, the children), were

terminated pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act)1 ( 705 ILCS 405/1-1 et. seq. (West 2002)). Respondent filed a motion to quash service by publication and vacate void judgment,

which the trial court denied after a hearing.  On appeal, respondent contends that the order

terminating his parental rights is void because the service by publication effectuated by the State

was defective and therefore the trial court did not have jurisdiction over him.  Specifically, respondent argues that: (1) the State's affidavit for service by publication did not comply with the requirements of the Act; (2) the clerk did not mail notice to respondent's last known address; (3)

the trial court erred in striking respondent's Rule 237(b) (166 Ill. 2d R. 237 (b)) notice to appear;

(4) diligent efforts were not used to serve process either personally or by certified mail; and (5) it

was error for the trial court to find that laches applied.  We affirm.

	On May 24, 1999, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship on behalf of the

children.  Respondent was personally served with summons and the adjudication petitions on June

30, 1999.  The summons contained language informing respondent that he would not be entitled

to further notice or publication of proceedings in the case, including the filing of an amended

petition or a motion to terminate parental rights.  Respondent filed his appearance on March 14,

2000, and was present personally and through counsel at the adjudication hearing, which

commenced on February 6, 2001.  On February 7, the trial court found that the children were

neglected and physically abused.  

	On April 15, 2001, the State filed a petition to appoint a guardian with right to consent to

adoption on behalf of the children.  Respondent filed an answer denying the allegations in that

petition.  On November 14, 2001, the State filed a Rule 237(b) notice for respondent to appear at

the termination of parental rights trial.  Respondent filed a motion to advance and reset the trial

date of December 10, 2001.  On February 26, 2002, the State was granted leave to withdraw its

motion to appoint a guardian with right to consent to adoption.  On April 16, 2002, respondent's

counsel filed a motion for leave to withdraw, which the trial court granted.  Respondent did not

request to be appointed another attorney.  On June 4, 2002, the trial court entered dispositional orders finding that respondent was unwilling and unfit to parent his children and adjudicating them

wards of the court and appointing the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) as

guardian. 

	On November 14, 2002, the State filed supplemental petitions for appointment of a

guardian with the right to consent to adoption on behalf of the children.  These petitions were

filed under the same case numbers listed on the summons that was personally served to

respondent on June 30, 1999.  On November 15, 2002, the State issued a summons advising

respondent of the termination proceeding.  A sheriff attempted to serve respondent at 4933 West

Cuyler on December 3, 2002, at 7:47 p.m. and December 5, 2002, at 11:25 a.m.  The summons

return forms indicated that respondent was "not listed" as a resident.

	On December 24, 2002, the State filed an affidavit for service by publication and notice by

publication was subsequently printed in the Chicago Sun-Times on January 16, 2003, advising

respondent of the January 30, 2003, hearing date, as well as the time and location.  The notice

also warned respondent that his parental rights could be terminated and that a guardian could be

appointed with power to consent to the adoption of his children.

	Respondent did not appear at the January 30, 2003, hearing, and the trial court entered an

order defaulting him for want of appearance.  Thereafter, on March 4, 2003, the trial court

entered an order involuntarily terminating respondent's parental rights with respect to the children

on the basis that he was unfit.  The order also provided for appointment of a guardian with

authority to consent to the adoption of the children.

	On April 4, 2003, respondent filed a pro se notice of appeal from the March 4, 2003 termination orders.  The children, through the public guardian, filed a motion to dismiss the

appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the notice of appeal was filed more than 30

days after the entry of the contested order.  On May 20, 2003, this court granted the children's

motion.  Prior to entry of the dismissal order, respondent filed a pro se motion seeking appointment of counsel, which the trial court granted.  On May 20, 2003, respondent's counsel

filed a "Motion to Quash Service By Publication and Vacate Void Judgment" in the trial court. 

On June 20, 2003, the State filed its response to respondent's motion and attached the affidavit of

Kimberly Seymore, chief deputy clerk of the Cook County juvenile court child protection division.

	Respondent filed a notice to appear under Supreme Court Rule 237(b) (166 Ill. 2d R.

237(b)) requiring Mesha G. Miller, who signed the affidavit in support of service by publication,

to appear at the hearing.  The State filed a motion to strike that motion.  The trial court ruled in

the State's favor, finding that a Rule 237(b) notice was not appropriate for a posttrial motion. 

Respondent then sought to strike Seymore's affidavit, arguing that it did not comport with the

requirements of Supreme Court Rule 191 (145 Ill. 2d R. 191).  The trial court denied respondent's

motion.

	A hearing on the motion to quash service by publication and vacate void judgment was

held on July 7, 2003.  On July 11, prior to ruling on the motion, the trial court stated that it was

treating respondent's motion as a section 2-1401 motion pursuant to the Illinois Code of Civil

Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2002)) because it was filed after 30 days but within 2 years

of the order terminating his parental rights.  The trial court then denied the motion, finding that

service by publication was proper.  The trial court further found that respondent's procedural attack on the order terminating his parental rights was barred by the doctrine of laches and that respondent had actual knowledge of the termination proceedings.  Respondent then filed this

timely appeal.

	On appeal, respondent first argues that the trial court's order terminating his parental

rights is void because the service by publication effectuated by the State was defective and

therefore the trial court did not have jurisdiction over him. 

	An order rendered by a court is void "'only where there is a total want of jurisdiction in the

court which entered the judgment, either as to the subject matter or as to the parties.

[citation.]'"  In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174, 692 N.E.2d 281, 284 (1998).  Proper service of summons is required to establish in personam jurisdiction.  In re D.J.S., 308 Ill. App. 3d 291, 294, 719 N.E.2d 1168, 1171 (1999).  The manner in which summons was to be

served in this case is governed by the Act, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

			"(3) *** The summons shall contain a notice that the parties will 

		not be entitled to further written notices or publication notices of proceedings

		in this case, including the filing of an amended petition or a motion to

		terminate parental rights, except as required by Supreme Court Rule 11.

							                              ***

			(5) Service of summons and petition shall be made by: (a) leaving 

		a copy thereof with the person summoned ***." 705 ILCS 405/2-15(3), (5) 

		(West 1998).

	 Respondent does not dispute that on June 30, 1999, he was personally served with summons in the underlying adjudication phase of the juvenile cases in question.  Pursuant to the

Act, the summons with which he was served stated as follows:

		"YOU WILL NOT BE ENTITLED TO FURTHER WRITTEN NOTICE 

		OR PUBLICATION NOTICES OF PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASE 

		INCLUDING THE FILING OF AN AMENDED PETITION OR A 

		MOTION TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS EXCEPT AS

		REQUIRED BY SUPREME COURT RULE 11." 

	We find that the summons that was served personally upon respondent contained the

requisite language and otherwise met the requirements of the Act, and therefore vested the trial

court with personal jurisdiction over him.  Respondent argues, however, that the jurisdiction the

trial court gained over him by way of personal summons did not extend to the termination phase

of the case.  Prior to addressing respondent's specific arguments regarding the propriety of the

subsequent service by publication, we must address the question of whether it was necessary for

the trial court to reestablish personal jurisdiction over respondent upon the inception of the

termination phase of this case.

	 Respondent concedes that he has found no cases specifically on point, but argues that due

to the complete finality and extreme gravity of an order extinguishing all parental rights, a

supplemental petition seeking such relief should be considered to be a new proceeding, although

filed under an existing case number.  Therefore, he argues, it should be necessary for a court to

reestablish jurisdiction over a parent prior to terminating parental rights.  The question of whether

the termination of parental rights phase of a juvenile case constitutes a new proceeding such that jurisdiction over the parties must be reestablished at its inception appears to be one of first

impression.

	In a recent Fourth District case, in deciding whether respondent's motion to substitute

judge was properly denied, the majority stated that "[b]y filing a motion to terminate parental

rights, the State initiated an entirely new proceeding, albeit in the same circuit court case

number," but cited no authority for the proposition.  In re D.F., 321 Ill. App. 3d 211, 224, 748 N.E.2d 271, 282-83 (2001).  In his dissent, Justice Cook noted that the majority's reasoning that

separate proceedings are involved is at odds with the Act, which provides that the parties are not

entitled to additional notice upon the filing of an amended petition or a motion to terminate

parental rights.  In re D.F., 321 Ill. App. 3d at 227, 748 N.E.2d at 285 (Cook, J., dissenting).  On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court found that it did not need to reach the issue of whether the

filing of a petition to terminate parental rights in a case that has been proceeding under the Act

"'begins a new case within that case number'" in order to resolve the substitution-of-judge issue. 

In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 507, 777 N.E.2d 930, 947 (2002), quoting In re D.F., 321 Ill. App. 3d at 224.

	Left without guidance from case law, we look to the language of the Act itself to answer

the question before us.  Section 2-15 of the Act, which concerns summons, was amended by

Public Act 90-28, effective January 1, 1998.  The amendment added the provision requiring that

the summons provide notice to the parties that they will not receive further written notices or

publication notices of proceedings in the case, including the filing of an amended petition or a

motion to terminate parental rights.  705 ILCS 405/2-15(3) (West 1998).  To hold that jurisdiction over a respondent in a juvenile case must be reestablished upon the filing of a

termination petition would render the language added to the summons section of the Act by way

of Public Act 90-28 meaningless.  See First Chicago Gary-Wheaton Bank v. Gaughan, 275 Ill. App. 3d 53, 59, 655 N.E.2d 936, 941 (1995) ("[Statutory] language should be given its plain and

ordinary meaning [citation] and no word or paragraph should be interpreted so as to be rendered

meaningless").  This we will not do.

	Based on the language in the Act added by Public Act 90-28, we agree with Justice

Cook's reasoning that the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights does not initiate an

entirely new proceeding within an existing case number.  We find that because the Act does not

require notice of the filing of a motion to terminate parental rights upon a respondent who has

been properly served with summons, then it is also not necessary to reissue a summons for that

party upon the filing of such a motion.  We further find that because a new proceeding is not

involved and because the termination phase of a juvenile case proceeds under the same case

number as the adjudication phase of the case, jurisdiction over a respondent need not be

reestablished once it has been properly established in the existing juvenile case in question.2  

	Additionally, this court has held that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over a

respondent who had not been served with summons upon the filing of a petition for adjudication

of wardship, but who nonetheless voluntarily appeared at the initial hearing, thereby subjecting himself to the jurisdiction of the court.  In re D.J.S., 308 Ill. App. 3d at 294, 719 N.E.2d at 1171.  This court further held that the orders of the trial court, including the order terminating

respondent's parental rights, were not void.  In re D.J.S., 308 Ill. App. 3d at 294, 719 N.E.2d at 1171.  The facts in the case at bar provide stronger support for our holding that the trial court's

order terminating respondent's parental rights is not void because the trial court properly

exercised jurisdiction over respondent than in In re D.J.S. because.   Nnot only did the respondent here

appear at the adjudication hearing, thereby subjecting himself to the court's jurisdiction, but he

was also served with personal summons along with the petitions for adjudication of wardship.   

	Because we find that the trial court did not need to reestablish personal jurisdiction over

respondent upon the initiation of termination proceedings, the trial court's order terminating

respondent's parental rights was not void.  Because the remainder of respondent's arguments on

appeal are predicated on the assumption that jurisdiction over him had to be reestablished, we

need not address them. 

	For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of Cook County  is affirmed.

	Affirmed.

	QUINN, P.J.,, and GREIMAN, J., concur.