* After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has

determined unanimously that oral argument would notmaterially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without ora l argument. This Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, (continued...) 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUN 12 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

JACK LANE, RODROCK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NOLA T. FOULSTON, District Attorney, Eighteenth Judicial District, State of Kansas; ROBERT C. BELL, Judge; PAUL BUCHANAN, Judge; MICHAEL CORRIGAN, Judge; DAVID W. DEWEY, Judge; CLARK V. OWENS, Judge; DOUGLAS R. ROTH, First Deputy District Attorney; MARK A. JORDAN, Assistant District Attorney; CHRISTINE M.T. LADNER, Assistant District Attorney; MICHAEL D. HILL, Sheriff; DONALD E. LAMBDIN; LUCY L. HERLOCKER; SUSAN MUELLER; RON RUGG, Judge; JAMES MATHUES GUY; MICHAEL MEULLER; SAM HOUSTON, Sargent; DOUG WITSON, Sheriff, Defendants-Appellees. No. 97-3350 (D.C. No. 97-1257 - JTM) (District of Kansas)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT ** (...continued)

res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court g enerally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and ju dgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

1 In all of his filings both in the district court be low and in this court, Mr. Rodrock has used a comma after his middle name. We will conform this Order & Judgment to his appellation. - 2 - Before BALDOCK , EBEL and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

In this civil rights suit against a plethora of jud ges, lawyers and sheriffs, we are left with utterly no idea from reading Jack Lan e, Rodrock’s 1 verified complaint what particular events or conduct alleged ly deprived him of the laundry list of constitutional and common law rights he ass erts in this case. As a result, we must affirm the district court’s dismissal of hi s complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because Rodrock’s suit fails to meet th e “plain statement” requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Background Rodrock filed his verified complaint pro se againstsix judges, four prosecutors, two sheriffs, one sheriff’s departmentsergeant, three private practice attorneys, and a married couple living in Wichita, Kansas. (See R., Doc. #1, Compl. at 2.) The most that can be gathered from R odrock’s allegations is the following: On March 8, 1996, Judge David W. Dewey i ssued an order to2 Additional materials submitted with Rodrock’s summary judgment motion

indicate that Rodrock was held in contempt of courtfor his failure to make substantial payments toward an accumulated child support debt of more than $14,000. (See R., Doc. # 32, “Dewey Ex. # 2” (Tr. of Proceeding in Case No. 89- D-3144, March 8, 1996), at 7.) Although these additional summary judgment material s provide some context to help us decipher Rodrock’s pleadings in this case, we have found nothing in them that alters our conclusion below th at Rodrock can allege no set of facts upon which relief may be based.

3 Our interpretation of Rodrock’s complaint on this p oint stems from his repetitive citations to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(2), a j urisdictional statute that merely provides the federal courts with subject-matter jur isdiction to hear a civil rights conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. - 3 - incarcerate Rodrock because of a dispute in a child support case emanating from the dissolution of Rodrock’s marriage to the now-re married Susan Mueller. 2 (See id. at 4, ¶ 7.) On October 28, 1996, Judge Clark V. O wens issued a bench warrant for Rodrock, and on March 21, 1997, Judge Paul Buch anan remanded Rodrock to jail. (See id. at 3-4, ¶¶ 5-6.) Out of these three bare facts, Rodrock has alleged a vast superstructure of constitutional claims, citing the First, Fourth, Fi fth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. (See id. at 4, ¶¶ 6-7, 9-10.) Furthermore, reading Rodrock ’s complaint as generously as possible, he appears also to be asserting a conspiracy by the defendants to deny him the equal protection, privil eges and immunities of the laws under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 3 (See id. at 5, ¶¶ 12-15.) Finally, Rodrock’s complaint includes an itemized list of “counts” aga inst the various groups of4 Rodrock’s complaint lists the following “counts”:

Against the defendant judges - “Perjury of Oath,” “Deprivation of Rights,” “Duress ,” “Chilling Effect Doctrine,” “Conspiracy,” “Constitutional Tort,” “De famation of Character,” and “Collusion.” Against defendant prosecutors - “Perjury of Oath,” “Deprivation of Rights,” “Duress ,” “Chilling Effect Doctrine,” “Conspiracy,” “Extortrio (Legal),” “Fidu ciary Misconduct,” “Malpractice,” “Defamation of Character,” and “Coll usion.” Against the defendant private attorneys - “Perjury of Oath,” “Deprivation of Rights,” “Duress ,” “Chilling Effect Doctrine,” “Conspiracy,” “Extortrio (Legal),” “Fidu ciary Misconduct,” “Malpractice,” and “Collusion.” Against Sheriff Hill and Sergeant Houston - “Perjury of Oath,” “Deprivation of Rights,” “Duress ,” “Chilling Effect,” “Conspiracy,” “Slander,” and “Defamation of Charact er.” Against Sheriff Witson - “Perjury of Oath,” “Deprivation of Rights,” “Duress ,” “Chilling Effect Doctrine,” and “Conspiracy.” Against Mr. and Mrs. Mueller - “Defamation of Character,” “Deprivation of Rights,” “Duress,” “Tort,” “Conspiracy,” “Collusion,” and “Mallice” [sic]. - 4 - defendants, and on the basis of these “counts” Rodr ock has demanded a total of $35.6 million from the defendants, that is, $200,00 0 for each count against each defendant plus an additional $2 million from Sherif f Hill and Sergeant Houston. 4 All of the defendants responded to Rodrock’s compla int by arguing that it violated Rule 8(a)’s requirement of a “short and pl ain statement” of the claims, and they filed motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)( 6) or in the alternative for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). (See R., Doc. # 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18, 19, 22.) Finding that Rodrock’s complaint was “a r ambling, incoherent series of- 5 -

generalizations,” the district court dismissed the complaint for violating Rule 8(a). (See R., Doc. # 36, Mem. & Order, at 2.) The court als o found that the complaint was barred by the absolute or qualified i mmunity of all the defendants. (See id. at 3.) Rodrock filed a timely notice of appeal, (see R., Doc. # 47), and his brief on appeal appears to assert a single issue, i.e., w hether the district court violated the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial i n all suits at common law for damages of more than $20, (see Aplt. Br. at 6). In light of our obligation to construe pro se pleadings generously, see Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), we believe that Rodrock’s appeal should be interpreted as raising the question of whether the district court erred in dis missing his complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).
Discussion We review de novo a district court’s decision to di smiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), taking all the plaintiff’s “well-ple aded” allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Yoder v. Honeywell , 104 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 55 (1997). Although we must construe a pro se plaintiff’s comp laint with forbearance, we may not accept as true those allegations that are c onclusory in nature, i.e., which state legal conclusions rather than factual asserti ons. See Hall v. Bellmon , 935- 6 -

F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[C]onclusory all egations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based.”). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may dismiss acomplaint that fails to comply with Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirement of a “short and plain statement of the claim” if there appears to be no set of facts on wh ich the plaintiff may state a claim for relief. See Monument Builders of Greater Kansas City, Inc. v. American Cemetery Ass’n , 891 F.2d 1473, 1480 (10th Cir. 1989). If it appe ars that no amendment of a plaintiff’s complaint will s atisfy the requirement for stating a claim upon which relief may be granted, t hen a district court may dismiss the case even without resort to the procedu re for amending a complaint under Rule 15(a). See Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Labs. , 630 F.2d 1383, 1389 (10th Cir. 1980) (noting that permission to am end a complaint need not be given when the “futility of amendment” is “apparent ”) (quoting Foman v. Davis , 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). The Federal Rules have established a liberal standard of “notice pleading” in which “technical forms of pleading” are not requ ired, but instead, a plaintiff’s factual pleading must merely contain “a short and p lain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” F ed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) & (e)(1). The Supreme Court has explained that the Federal Ru les “do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the- 7 -

contrary, all the rules require is ‘a short and pla in statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintif f’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). We have interpreted this require ment to mean that “factual pleading is required only insofar as it is necessary to place a defendant on notice as to the type of claim alleged and the grounds upo n which it rests, thereby enabling a defendant to prepare a responsive pleadi ng.” Mountain View Pharmacy , 630 F.2d at 1388. In Rodrock’s case, although his recitation of const itutional and common law claims may well be “short,” it is not at all “p lain.” Rodrock’s complaint provides no notice to the defendants of the factual grounds upon which his claims rest, nor is his complaint sufficiently specific to allow the defendants to respond with anything other than a general denial. Furthermore, the complaint fails to meet its additional obligation to “apprise the court of sufficient allegations to allow it to conclude, if the allegations are proved , that the claimant has a legal right to relief.” See Perrington Wholesale, Inc. v. Burger King Corp. , 631 F.2d 1369, 1371 (10th Cir. 1979), quoted inMonument Builders , 891 F.2d at 1480. As a result, the district court did not err in dism issing Rodrock’s complaint5 In light of this conclusion, we need not, and do no t, address the district

court’s alternative rationale involving the doctrin es of absolute and qualified immunity. - 8 - for violating Rule 8(a)(2). 5 Thus, we AFFIRM. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT

David M. Ebel Circuit Judge