United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 18-1679

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Lorenzo T. Burns

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

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Submitted: April 15, 2019

Filed: June 17, 2019

[Unpublished]

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Before SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Lorenzo Burns appeals his 62-month sentence for being a felon in possession

of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2), arguing that the
district court abused its discretion in applying an upward variance fromthe top of his

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United States Sentencing Guidelines range. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, we affirm.

On September 26, 2016, Kansas City, Missouri police officers stopped Burns

for a traffic violation, determined he had outstanding warrants and no valid driver’s

license, and arrested him. A subsequent inventory search of Burns’s vehicle revealed

a loaded handgun. The officers determined Burns had a felony conviction and

detained him. 

Burns was indicted on and pled guilty to one count of being a felon in

possession of a firearm. The district court determined, based on an offense level of

15 and a criminal history placing him in Category V, that Burns’s Guidelines range

was 37 to 46 months. The district court then considered the sentencing factors listed

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). As part of this discussion, the district court stated, “The

deterrence thing. . . . You don’t get less time for the more crime you commit. 

Otherwise, that’s not going to work. . . . One of the things we look at is like how

much time has he got in state court? That hasn’t deterred his behavior. He’s here. 

We look at that.” Sent. Tr. 14, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 29. In addition to deterrence, the district

court emphasizedBurns’s personal and criminal history, the need to protect the public

from further crimes, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparity. It

ultimately decided to vary upward based on these factors and applied a 16-month

upward variance, sentencing Burns to 62 months imprisonment.

On appeal, Burns argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable

because the district court did not begin its sentencing analysis with a properlycalculated Guidelines range but, instead, disregarded the Guidelines range and

The Honorable David Gregory Kays, United States District Judge for the

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Western District of Missouri.

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proceeded on the belief that a defendant should not be sentenced to a term of

imprisonment shorter than a previously-imposed sentence. We review the substantive

reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Feemster,

572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). “A district court abuses its [sentencing]

discretion . . . when it fails to consider a relevant and significant factor, gives

significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or considers the appropriate

factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.” United

States v. Miner, 544 F.3d 930, 932 (8th Cir. 2008). 

The district court must consider the Sentencing Guidelines in its sentencing

determination, but it is not bound by the recommended Guidelines range. See Gall

v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46-47 (2007). The district court must also consider the

§ 3553(a) factors, though it need not individually discuss each factor. United States

v. White Face, 383 F.3d 733, 740 (8th Cir. 2004). District courts have broad

discretion when applying the § 3553(a) factors and need not find “extraordinary

circumstances” to impose a sentence higher than the Guidelines range. Gall, 552 U.S.

at 47, 51.

While the district court’s remark to Burns indicating that defendants do not get

shorter sentences for committing more crime may be incorrect as an invariable

summation of sentencing law, that remark, on its own, does not constitute reversible

error. See United States v. Dace, 842 F.3d 1067, 1070 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam)

(upholding an 18-month upward variance as substantively reasonable when the

district court told the defendant that “you don’t get less time the more felonies you

commit” but based its decision on the § 3553(a) factors). The district court here

specifically stated that it considered the Guidelines range and all the § 3553(a)

factors. It explicitly discussed at least five of the § 3553(a) factors at sentencing and

explained how each factor affected its sentencing analysis. It then imposed an

upward variance based on Burns’s criminal history, the need to protect the public, and

“all those other factors [it had] just stated.” Sent. Tr. 15. 

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Based on the district court’s own words at sentencing, it did not ignore the

Guidelines range and considered all the appropriate factors in arriving at its

sentencing decision. We therefore decline to find that the district court abused its

discretion in applying an upward variance in this case. 

We affirm the district court’s judgment.

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