IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 172A19

Filed 24 January 2020

IN THE MATTER OF: J.H., Z.R., A.R., D.R.

Consolidated appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1) and on writ of 

certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) from orders entered on 26 February 2018 

and 6 February 2019 by Judge Denise S. Hartsfield, in District Court, Forsyth

County. This matter was calendared in the Supreme Court on 17 January 2020 but 

was determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 

30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Theresa A. Boucher, Assistant County Attorney, for petitioner-appellee Forsyth 

County Department of Social Services.

Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Brandon Duckworth, for appellee 

Guardian ad Litem.

Sydney Batch for respondent-appellant mother.

EARLS, Justice.

Respondent appeals from the trial court’s 26 February 2018 permanency 

planning order and from its 6 February 2019 order terminating her parental rights 

to Jared, Zendaya, Aaron, and Devon.1 We affirm. 

Background

 

1 Pseudonyms are used to protect the identity of the juveniles and for ease of reading. 
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Respondent is the mother of nine children. Four of her older children were 

adjudicated abused or neglected and she relinquished her parental rights with regard 

to those children in 2008. Over the last twenty years, respondent and her children 

have been the subjects of over forty Child Protective Services reports. 

More recently, the Forsyth County Department of Social Services (DSS) 

received a report on or about 21 October 2016 that respondent was using 

inappropriate discipline by punching her sons Jared (age 9 at the time) and Devon 

(age 8 at the time). Two reports were made to DSS on or about 10 November 2016. 

The first concerned an injury to Devon’s top lip that required medical attention. The 

second report indicated that respondent’s daughter Zendaya (age 4 at the time) had 

been sexually abused by Zendaya’s adult brother, I.H., one of respondent’s older sons. 

The sexual abuse occurred after respondent was evicted from her home and had 

moved into I.H.’s home. Prior to moving in with I.H., respondent was aware of the 

dangers I.H. posed to her children. Specifically, DSS advised respondent multiple 

times that I.H. posed a risk of harm to the younger children and, earlier in 2016, I.H.

had been named as a sexual offender in a report involving the sexual abuse of 

respondent’s son, Jared. Jared, Zendaya, Aaron, and Devon were removed from the 

care, custody, and control of respondent on 11 November 2016. 

On 3 April 2017, the trial court adjudicated Jared, Zendaya, Aaron, and Devon

to be abused and neglected. In its order, the trial court required respondent to take a 

number of steps in order to reunify with her children, including:
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a) Complete a mental health assessment and follow all 

the recommendations of her assessment.

b) Maintain employment to demonstrate her ability to 

provide for herself and her children for a minimum 

of six months.

c) Maintain appropriate and safe housing for herself 

and her children for a minimum of six months.

d) Participate in parent coaching to change and 

develop appropriate ways to parent her children and 

implement those skills during visits. [Respondent] is 

to follow the recommendations of the parent coach.

e) That [respondent] signs the necessary release forms 

to allow FCDSS and the Courts to monitor her 

progress.

The trial court held a review hearing on 31 May 2017, followed by a 

permanency planning hearing on 1 September 2017. Following the latter hearing, 

the court entered an order on 8 December 2017 finding that respondent was thus far 

“in compliance with her court plan and has made progress,” but that “[respondent] 

can not safely parent her children. The Court continues to have concerns about the 

safety of [respondent’s] new baby in her home.” 

The court held another permanency planning hearing on 24 January 2018. In 

its subsequent written order filed 26 February 2018, the court found that respondent 

had complied with some of the terms of her case plan while failing to comply with 

others. The court found that “[respondent] has made some progress but still 

demonstrates that she cannot safely parent her children” and that “the issues that 

brought the children into care are still present.” After noting that DSS had filed 

petitions to terminate respondent’s rights on 5 January 2018, the court ordered the 
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cessation of reunification efforts and visitation between respondent and her children, 

ordered that the permanent plan for Zendaya, Aaron, and Devon be reunification with 

the father with a secondary plan of adoption, and ordered that the permanent plan 

for Jared be reunification with the father with a secondary plan of adoption. On 23 

March 2018, respondent filed a “NOTICE TO PRESERVE RIGHT OF APPEAL” of 

the 26 February 2018 order ceasing reunification efforts.

The trial court held a termination of parental rights hearing on 12 September 

2018. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court terminated respondent’s 

parental rights as to these four children. The termination of parental rights order 

was filed on 6 February 2019. In its order, the court found that respondent did not 

successfully complete compliance with the prior orders of the courts, including, inter 

alia, by failing to demonstrate safe parenting skills during the 22 months her children 

were in the custody of DSS and failing to successfully complete parenting classes. The 

court concluded that respondent had abused and neglected Jared, Zendaya, Aaron, 

and Devon and that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights under 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). Furthermore, the court concluded that respondent “failed 

to demonstrate . . . that she can safely maintain her children in a safe home,” that 

return of the children to respondent “would result in a strong likelihood of repeated 

abuse or neglect of the children,” and that it is in the best interests of the children to 

terminate respondent’s parental rights. On 28 February 2019, respondent filed a

notice of appeal. 
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Cessation of Reunification

Respondent first contends that the trial court erred in its 26 February 2018 

permanency planning order ceasing reunification efforts and excluding reunification 

with respondent as a permanent plan (the cessation order).

2 We hold that the trial 

court’s findings are supported by competent evidence and that its permanency 

planning order was not an abuse of discretion.

“Our review of [a] cease reunification order . . . ‘is limited to whether there is 

competent evidence in the record to support the findings [of fact] and whether the 

findings support the conclusions of law.’ ” In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. 165, 168, 752 S.E.2d 

453, 455 (2013) (second alteration in original) (quoting In re P.O., 207 N.C. App. 35, 

41, 698 S.E.2d 525, 530 (2010)). “The trial court’s findings of fact are conclusive on 

appeal if supported by any competent evidence.” Id. (citing In re P.O., 207 N.C. App. 

at 41, 698 S.E.2d at 530). Further, we agree with the Court of Appeals that we review 

an order ceasing reunification “to determine . . . whether the trial court abused its 

discretion with respect to disposition.” See In re N.G., 186 N.C. App. 1, 10, 650 S.E.2d 

 

2 Respondent filed her appeal of the termination of her parental rights in this Court 

but simultaneously filed her appeal of the cessation order in the Court of Appeals. On 17 

June 2019, DSS filed a motion at the Court of Appeals to dismiss respondent’s appeal of the 

cessation order based upon potential procedural issues with respondent’s appeal. 

Respondent filed a response, arguing that DSS’s contentions were without merit. On 14 

November 2019, this Court “acting on its own motion, in order to resolve expeditiously all of 

the issues relating to these children, . . . issue[d] a writ of certiorari, . . . to consolidate both 

matters for review in this Court, as contemplated by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(2).” We decline 

to address those procedural issues here given our determination that, in any event, the trial 

court did not err in its cessation order. 
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45, 51 (2007) (quoting In re C.M., 183 N.C. App. 207, 213, 644 S.E.2d 588, 594 (2007)), 

aff’d per curiam, 362 N.C. 229, 657 S.E.2d 355 (2008). “At the disposition stage, the 

trial court solely considers the best interests of the child. Nonetheless, facts found by 

the trial court are binding absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 10, 650 

S.E.2d at 51 (quoting In re Pittman, 149 N.C. App. 756, 766, 561 S.E.2d 560, 567 

(2002). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is so arbitrary 

that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” Id. at 10–11, 650 S.E.2d 

at 51 (quoting In re Robinson, 151 N.C. App. 733, 737, 567 S.E.2d 227, 229 (2002)).

At a permanency planning hearing, “[r]eunification shall be a primary or 

secondary plan unless,” inter alia, “the court makes written findings that 

reunification efforts clearly would be unsuccessful or would be inconsistent with the 

juvenile’s health or safety.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(b) (2019). Additionally, the court 

must make findings “which shall demonstrate the degree of success or failure toward 

reunification,” including:

(1) Whether the parent is making adequate progress 

within a reasonable period of time under the plan.

(2) Whether the parent is actively participating in or 

cooperating with the plan, the department, and the 

guardian ad litem for the juvenile.

(3) Whether the parent remains available to the court, the 

department, and the guardian ad litem for the juvenile.

(4) Whether the parent is acting in a manner inconsistent 

with the health or safety of the juvenile.
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Id. § 7B-906.2(d). This Court has stated in the context of orders ceasing reunification 

efforts that “[t]he trial court’s written findings must address the statute’s concerns, 

but need not quote its exact language.” In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. 165, 168, 752 S.E.2d 

453, 455 (2013). 

Here the trial court found that respondent completed a mental health 

assessment, signed the requisite release forms, and maintained, at the time of the 

hearing, an appropriate home. On the other hand, the trial court found that 

respondent was unemployed and was not in compliance with the requirement that 

she maintain employment and demonstrate her ability to provide for herself and her 

children for a period of six months. Additionally, the trial court found that while 

respondent participated in parent coaching, the parenting coach “reported that 

parenting coaching should be discontinued” due to respondent’s slow progress and 

struggles with parenting her children. The court further found that “[respondent] 

has made some progress but still demonstrates that she cannot safely parent her 

children” and that “the issues that brought the children into care are still present.” 

The Court determined that return of the children “to the home of their parents would 

be contrary to the welfare of the juveniles at this time.” 

Respondent contends that, with respect to her parenting skills, the trial court’s 

finding that she only made “some progress” was unsupported by evidence. Yet, the 

weekly reports from the parent coaching sessions catalogue how respondent, rather 

than listening to the coach and implementing suggested strategies, became 
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argumentative, failed to follow simple instructions, and would threaten to leave the 

sessions. On one occasion, respondent “pin[ned] [Aaron] to the ground using her 

weight to restrain him,” and when asked by the parenting coach not to lie on the child 

because doing so could cause injury, began yelling at the coach and then left the 

session. Respondent brought food for the children to which they were allergic, stating 

that she was “aware of the allergies but ‘they only cause diarrhea.’ ” Additionally,

the parenting coach reported that she “asked [respondent] weekly for the last two 

months to bring diapers for [Devon] and every week she has a different reason for not 

bringing the diapers. I ask her again if she remembered to bring a diaper. She did 

not.” The parenting coach ultimately reported:

I’m recommending coaching services be discontinued for 

[respondent]. She has been consistent with visits and 

appears to enjoy spending time with her children when 

they are compliant. However, she is not making the effort 

or showing improvement when parenting is difficult. She 

has four children with severe trauma and/or developmental 

disabilities. Parenting will be difficult, challenging and 

stressful. . . . Both [Aaron] and [Devon] can be defiant, 

difficult to communicate with and require consistent and 

constant monitoring. [Respondent] avoids engaging the 

children when they [ ] need the additional attention. When 

I try to redirect her, she is argumentative o[r] simply 

ignores my suggestions. This behavior/conflict is not 

productive and sets a poor example for the children. 

Similarly, the parenting coach reported that she explained to respondent:

I also wanted her to know it is my recommendation that 

coaching services be terminated because she is not making 

progress and some of the reasons I believe this is so, 

specifically she feels there is no need for services or room 
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for growth. In addition, I believe she sees coaching as 

punitive and is therefore defensive when I offer suggestions 

or recommendations. I have seen the children, specifically 

[Jared], negatively impacted by her response to me and this 

does not benefit her, them or the process.

We conclude that there was ample evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

finding that respondent only made “some progress” with respect to her parenting 

skills. Moreover, we conclude that, given the trial court’s extensive findings about 

respondent’s degree of progress and the underlying evidence, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in determining that ceasing reunification was in the best 

interests of the children. 

Termination of Parental Rights

A termination of parental rights proceeding involves two stages: an 

adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage. See In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 

110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984). During the adjudicatory stage, the party petitioning 

for the termination of parental rights must show the existence of one or more of the 

statutory grounds for termination of parental rights by clear, cogent, and convincing 

evidence. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 (2017). In this appeal, respondent does not challenge 

the trial court’s findings that these four children are abused or neglected and that 

statutory grounds exist to terminate her parental rights. 

Having found grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights, the trial 

court then moved to the dispositional stage, where it examined whether the 

termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children. See N.C.G.S. § 
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7B-1110. We review the trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights at the 

disposition stage for abuse of discretion. In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 842, 788 S.E.2d 

162, 167 (2016) (citations omitted). “[A]buse of discretion results where the court’s 

ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have 

been the result of a reasoned decision.” In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 107, 772 S.E.2d 

451, 455 (2015) (quoting State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 

(1988)). We find no such abuse of discretion in this case.

In determining the best interests of a child during the dispositional phase of 

the termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must make relevant 

findings concerning: (1) the age of the juvenile, (2) the likelihood of adoption, (3) 

whether termination will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan, (4) the 

bond between juvenile and the parent, (5) the quality of the relationship between the 

juvenile and the proposed permanent placement, and (6) any relevant consideration. 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). The trial court made findings related to each issue 

enumerated by statute, and individually determined that Jared, Zendaya, Aaron, and 

Devon each had a “high probability” of adoption. Respondent argues that the trial 

court erred in terminating her parental rights solely because she believes it is 

unlikely the children would be adopted due to their numerous serious developmental 

challenges. However, the record shows that the trial court thoroughly considered the 

children’s developmental challenges and their likelihood of adoption based on their 

current placement and potential future adoptive parents.
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Jared

The trial court found that Jared has “special mental health and educational 

needs,” has a learning disability, and has been diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress 

Disorder (PTSD) and ADHD for which he is prescribed medication. In determining 

Jared’s probability of adoption the trial court found:

[Jared] is 11 years old. He is placed in the home of his 

father and stepmother. He is receiving good and safe care 

in this home. There is a high likelihood that a stepparent 

adoption can occur for Jared so that he will have an intact 

two-parent home. 

At the time of the termination hearing Jared was in the care of his biological father, 

his step-mother, and his sixteen year old sister. The evidence presented at the 

hearing showed that Jared is bonded with his biological father and that if he remains 

with his father, there is a strong likelihood of stepparent adoption. Thus, there is 

evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding that Jared was likely to be 

adopted even though he has a learning disability and other challenges. 

Devon

The trial court found that Devon has “very special needs.” At ten years old, he 

has severe intellectual disabilities, is not toilet trained, and is non-verbal. Devon is 

learning sign language in order to communicate his needs. Further, the trial court 

found that Devon has received an Innovations Waiver, which will provide him with 

necessary services for the rest of his life. In considering the probability that Devon 

would be adopted, the trial court found: 
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There is a high likelihood of [a]doption and there is an 

identified prospective adoptive home for [Devon] but he is 

not living in that home at this time. The maternal 

grandmother has expressed interest in adopting [Devon] 

and all of his siblings. The Court is unable to determine the 

quality of that relationship. 

. . . .

[Devon] is currently placed in a specialized facility . . . .. 

[Devon] is doing well in this facility and he has learned to 

swim. He is also learning to ride a bike. [Devon] is learning 

to have positive peer relationships and is making 

improvements in this area. 

The trial court heard testimony that Devon was thriving in his current placement. 

There was evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that despite Devon’s 

developmental challenges his probability of adoption was high because there is a 

prospective adoptive home for him in addition to the desire of his maternal 

grandmother to adopt him. 

Aaron

The trial court found that Aaron has “special needs” and that he has been 

diagnosed with mild intellectual disabilities. Aaron has an Individual Education Plan 

and is diagnosed with ADHD for which he receives medication. In determining 

Aaron’s probability of adoption the trial court found:

[Aaron] is 6 years old. The likelihood for Adoption is very 

likely. 

. . . .

[Aaron] is placed in a prospective adoptive home and he has 
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a very good relationship with his prospective adoptive 

parent. [Aaron] looks to her for comfort and guidance. He 

is thriving in this home. His communication skills have 

improved greatly. In this home he has a same-age sibling 

and the two children have a close relationship. 

At the termination hearing, Ms. Tonya Britton, a foster care social worker with DSS,

summarized Aaron’s progress with his prospective adoptive parent:

Q. What is the quality of relationship between 

[Aaron] and his prospective adoptive parent?

A. He’s very bonded to her. He’s called her Mom. He 

also has a foster brother in the home as well that he’s very, 

very close to. They are the same age.

Q. Does he look to her for comfort and guidance?

A. Yes, he does.

Q. When you have visited him in that home, does he 

appear to be at home there?

A. Yes. . . . He has thrived in that home to the point 

that he has been caught up, as far as some of the 

educational things that he was behind in. He’s 

communicating a whole lot better now. He could have a 

conversation with you, compared to when he didn’t used to 

talk at all, or you couldn’t understand what he was saying.

The testimony presented at trial supported the court’s finding that even in light of 

his special needs, Aaron was likely to be adopted. 

Zendaya

The trial court found that Zendaya has “special needs.” Further, the trial court 

found that Zendaya was sexually molested by her brother I.H. and needs ongoing 
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support and therapy. Zendaya has been diagnosed with PTSD but is making 

significant progress since her removal from her mother’s home. With regard to the 

probability of Zendaya’s adoption the trial court found: 

[Zendaya] is 5 years old. The likelihood of Adoption for 

[Zendaya] is very high. There are multiple families 

interested in adopting her. 

. . . .

[Zendaya] is in kindergarten and is making educational 

progress. 

[Zendaya] has a safe and nurturing relationship with her 

current caregivers, who are prospective adoptive parents. 

[Zendaya] looks to them for comfort and guidance. She is 

involved in community and church activities with her 

prospective adoptive [parents]. She is thriving in this 

home. 

The evidence at trial established that Zendaya was thriving in her current placement, 

even calling her prospective adoptive parents “Daddy, and Mom.” Zendaya has 

multiple potential adoptive families and there was testimony that the prospect of her 

being adopted was “[v]ery, very, very, very likely.” The trial court’s finding that 

Zendaya was likely to be adopted despite her developmental challenges was 

supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence in the record. 

Respondent argues that children with behavioral challenges and/or 

developmental delays, as well as children in foster care, are difficult to place with 

adoptive families. Such general truths cannot overcome the particularized evidence 

in this case supporting the trial court’s factual findings that each of these children 
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had a high probability of being adopted. Notably, as relevant to the ultimate 

conclusion that termination of respondent’s parental rights is in the children’s best 

interests, there was also testimony that Jared, Devon, Aaron and Zendaya are 

thriving and showing great improvement developmentally in their current 

placements. This evidence suggests they are benefitting from not being in the custody 

and control of respondent. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding 

that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. 

AFFIRMED.