i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 9- 00 37 4- CR Ric ha rd Er ne st GU ERRA , Appellant
v . T h e STA TE of

Te xas, Appellee Fr om the 379th J udicial District Court, Be x ar County , Texas

Trial Court No. 2008CR6529 Honora ble Pat Priest, J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Catherine Stone, Chief Justice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Kar en Ang elini, J ustice Rebec ca Simmons, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: J une 2, 2010 AFF I RMED Richard Er

nest Guer ra a ppeals his conviction for

assault of a

member of

his household. On
a pp e a l, Gue rr a

c on te nd s th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly and fa c tua lly ins uf

fi c ie nt to e sta

bli shthat he wa s a
me mbe r o f t

he c omp la ina

nt’ s h ou se ho ld. Gu e rr a als o com pla ins that th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in admitting into evidenc e: (1) hi s s t at ements m ade dur ing c ustodial interrog ation; and (2) his prior
c on vic tio ns . We a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.04

- 09

- 00 37 4- CR

- 2- S U FF I C I ENC Y OF THE E VI DE NCE I n order for the jur

y to have f ound Guer

ra gu i l t y , t h e jury

was re quired to find: (1) Guerr a intentionally , knowing ly , or re cklessly cause d bodily

injury to the comp l ainant, Virginia N aveja r; and (2) Gu erra and N aveja r we re living toge ther in the same dwelling . T EX . P EN . C ODE ANN . § 2 2. 01 (b )( 2) (V e rn on

Sup p. 20 09 ); T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 71.005 (Ve rnon 2008). Gue rra contends the e vidence is leg ally and factually insufficient to establish t hat Guer ra a nd Nave jar we re living tog ether

in the same dwe lling whe n the offe nse occ urre d. I n consideringthe leg al suffic iency of the e vidence , we revie w all of the e vidence in the light most favora

ble to t h e v er d i ct to determine w hether any rational trier

of fa ct could have found the essential elements of the offe nse beyond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1 97 9) ; Vo do c ho ds k

yv . S tate , 158 S.W .3d 502, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). I n conductinga fa ctual sufficie ncy

revie w, we vie w all of the e vidence in a neutra l lig ht a nd set aside the ver dict only if: (1) the e vid e nc e is s o we a k that the ve rd ic t is c le arl y wr on g and

manif e stl y un jus t; o r ( 2) the ve rd ic t is ag ainst the gre at weight and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. J oh ns on v . S

tate , 2 3 S. W. 3 d 1 , 1 1 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ). “ [D]ue de fe re nc e mus t be a c c or de d th e fa c t f ind e r’ s d e te rm inatio ns , p art ic ula rl y those deter

minations concer

ning the weig ht and cr edibility of the evidenc e,” and a revie wing court’s dis a g re e me nt “ wi th t

he fa c t f ind e r’ s d e te rm inatio n is a pp ro pr iate on ly whe n the r e c or d c le arl y indicates such a

step is nece ssary

to arre st the occur

renc e of a manifest injustice.” Id. at 9. On direc t examination, Navejar te stified that Guer ra star ted living wi th her at a house she inherited fr om her mother a pproxi mately

six months before he wa s arr ested for the assault. Navejar testified Guer

ra was a roommate, but the y slept toge ther a fe w times. On cross- examination, Navejar testified that Guer

ra w as living in the house with her, but she did not want him living there . Guer ra04

- 09

- 00 37 4- CR

- 3- left clothes at Naveja

r’s house but wa s g one about thre e nig hts out of the we ek. Navejar testified that she did not want to be at t h e h o u s e b ec ause of Guer ra so she did not sleep at her house eve ry nig ht. Pr ior to the da

y of the a ssa

ult , Na ve jar te sti fi e d that sh e ha d n ot b e e n h ome in e le ve n d ay s. On the da y of the a ssa ult , N a ve jar t e sti fi e d th a t sh e wa s ho me in th e a ft e rn oo n p a c kin g a ba g to leave
. Guer

ra’ s father

had visited Nave

j ar’s house about four

or five times be fore the day of the assault. Guer

ra’ s father

stated that Gue rra

lived at Nave

jar’s h o u s e for awhile, and Gue rra kept clothes in his bedroom at Na vejar ’s house. Guer ra’ s mother visited Guerr a and Nave jar at Nave

jar’s house a fe w wee ks befor e Gue rra
was a rre sted. Be fore that day , Guer ra’ s mother had spoke n with Navejar o n t h e phone about five times. Naveja

r told Guerr a’s mother

that she wa

nted to meet h er b ec au s e Nave jar loved G uerr a. Nave jar told Gue rr a’ s mother that Nave jar a nd Guer ra ha d a g ood relationship. Guerra ’s mother stated that Gue rra

was living with Naveja

r at Na vejar ’s house. Guer ra admitted that he tol d police his addre ss was the addre ss to Nave jar’s house the nig ht of the a ssault; however , Guer ra state d that he wa s not livi ng at t h e h o u s e. Gue rra stated that he would stay

at Nave jar’s house a fe w nig hts a wee k. The jury was in t h e b es t p o s i tion to assess the cre dibilit y of the witnesse s. Johnson , 23 S.W .3d at 9. The jury

could have chosen to be lieve Na vejar ’s testimony

on direc t examination t hat Guer ra ha d been living with her at her house f or appr ox imately

six months before the assault. The jury also could have chosen to believe the testimony of Gue rra ’s father a

nd mother that Gue rra

was living with Nave

jar at her house f

or some per iod of time befor e the a ssault. Even if the jury believed Na ve jar a nd Gu e rr a ’s c oh a

bit a tio n w a s in te rm itt e nt d ue to t he ir dis a g re e me nts , th e e vid e nc e wo uld04

- 09

- 00 37 4- CR

1 ... M i r anda v

. Ar i z ona , 38 4 U
. S. 43 6 (19 6 6 ).

- 4- still be suff

icient to suppor

t a finding that they

wer e living tog ether

in the same dwe lling. See G omez
v . S tat e , 183 S.W .3d 86, 90 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, no pet.). Guer ra’ s first and sec ond issues are
overr uled. M OT I ON T O S U PPRE SS I n his third issue, Guerra complains that the trial court e rre d in admitting statements he ma de to police in response to custodial interrog ation without being pr ov ided the re quisite Miranda 1

warnings. W e r e v ie w a

tr ia l c o u rt’ s r

u li n g o na

mo ti o nto s u

p p r e s s u n d e r

ana b u s e o f d is c r e tion standard. State v. Dixon , 206 S.W .3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We will sustain the trial court’s r uling if it is rea sonably

supported by

the re cord and is corre ct on any theory of law applicable to the case
. Id . We give almost total defer en ce to a trial court’ s express or implied deter mination of historical fac ts and revie w de novo the c ourt ’s a pp lic a tio n o f the law t o th os e fa c ts. Id
. Gu e rr a

sp e c if ic a lly c omp la ins a

bo ut thr e e state me nts he ma de to p oli c e . F ir st, in r e sp on se to a n office r asking Guer

ra what was happening , Guer ra responde d, “We fig ht all the time.” Guer ra contends that t h e officer

asked the question after

Guer ra w as plac ed under

arr est. The tria l court found that Gue rra

had not bee n place d under a rre st; ther efor e, the statement was not the product of custodial interrog ation. After Offic er T i m Ga rc i a and his field training office r, Off icer Xavier Cordero, a

rrived at Nave jar’s house , they

hear d a fe male y elling, “ Help me. He is be ating me. He is hitting me.” When Offic er G arc ia shined his flashlig ht into the window, he sa w a woma

n, later ide ntified as Navejar , with a bloody

fac e and a s ilhouette of someone r unning. N aveja

r told the offic ers she would let them04

- 09

- 00 37 4- CR

- 5- in the side door. Offic er Garc ia t estified that he was conc erne d for the sa fety of both Nave

jar a nd the offic ers since the assailant could have a weapon. The officer s asked Naveja r to step outside, and th e y w e n t in s id e to s e ar c h th e h o u s e . O f f ic e r Co r d e r o f

o u n d G u e r

r a h id in g in a c lo s e t an d place d him in handcuffs. B oth office rs t estified that Guer ra w as only

being detained when he w as plac ed in handcuf

fs. Off icer Cordero state d t h at he plac ed Gue rra in handcuf

fs base d on Nave

jar’s state me nt that sh e wa s b e ingbe a te n a nd “ no t kn ow inghim

e ith e r, no t kn ow ingwh a t he wa s c a pa ble of , f or my ow n s a fe ty , y ou

kn ow , I a m g oin g to h and c uf

f him imm e diate ly .” Of

fi c e r G arc ia

a lso testified that Guer

ra w as plac ed in handc uffs for office r safe ty , stating, “You have someone that y ou walk into a situation, someone is full of blood. You don’t even know what is g oing on. You don’t know if there is [ sic] any wea pons involved. You don’t know, y ou k n o w, the individual’s capa biliti es.” When Of

fice r Ga rcia asked G uerr a what happened , Gu err a said, “ We fig ht all the time.” A p e rs on

wh o is be ing te mpo ra

ri ly de ta ine d is no t fr e e to l e a ve , b ut i s b e ingde ta ine d w hil e
an office r investigates whether a crime ha s been c ommitt ed. Sta te v . S he pp ar d , 271 S.W .3d 281, 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). A temporar y detention is not, howeve r, a custodial arr est. Id . at 289. The T e x a s C o u rto f

C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s h a s o u t l i n e d f o u r g e n e r a l s i tu a t i o n s w h i c h m ay c o n s t i tu t e c u s t o dy: (1) when the suspect is phy sically deprive d of his f ree dom of action in a

ny signific ant way ; (2) whe n a law e nforc ement officer tells the s uspect that he cannot leave ; (3) when law e nforc ement off icer s
cre ate a situation that would lead a re asonable person to believe that his free dom of movement has been sig nificantly

restric ted; and (4) when ther e is probable cause to arre st and law e nforc ement office rs do not te ll the suspect that he is f ree to leave. Do wth itt

v . S tate , 9 3 1 S. W. 2 d

2 4 4 , 2 5 5 ( T e x. C ri m. App. 1996). In the fourth situation, the off icer ’s knowledg e of pr obable c ause must be04

- 09

- 00 37 4- CR

- 6- manifested to the suspect. Id
. I n the first three situations, the restriction on movement must amount to the deg ree associate d with a n arr est as opposed to a

n investigative detention. Id . Severa l fac tors may be conside red in de termining whether an enc ounter is an a

rre st or a dete ntion, including: (1) the amount of for ce display ed; (2) the duration of the detention; (3) the eff iciency of t he investig ative proce ss and whether it is conduc ted at the or igina l location or the pe rson is transported to a nother location; (4) the of

fice r’s e x presse d intent – that is, w hether he told the detained person that he was under a rre st or was be ing de tained only for a temporar y investiga t i o n ; and (5) any other re levant fac tors. Sta te v . S

he pp ar d , 271 S.W .3d at 291. I n th is c a se , G ue rr a wa s ph y sic a lly re str a ine d by ha nd c uf fs
. Th e us e of ha

nd c uf fs do e s n ot, howeve r, conver

t a temporar

y detention into a

n arr est. Id
. at 289. Both officer s testified that Guer ra was pl a c e d

in h an d c u f f s f o r o f f ic e r s a f e ty
. I na d d it io n , th e d e te n ti o n , w h ic h w a s a t t h e o r ig in al loc a ti o n , la s te d

o n ly u n ti l t h e o f f ic e r s w e r e a

b le to g a th e r

s u f f ic ie n t i n f o r mati o nto p la c e G u e rra
un de r a rr e st. B oth of

fi c e rs te sti fi e d that Gu e rr a wa s be ing de ta ine d on ly un til an inve sti g a tio n c ou ld be completed. The trial court concluded that the of fice rs wer e entitled to ask a fewquestions before they wer e oblig ed to ar

rest somebody
. Given the totality of the c ircumstance s, the trial cour t did not abuse its discre tion in concludin g t h at Guerra wa s not under ar rest whe n he made the initial state me nt. Guer ra ne x t complains about the admissibilit y of his statement, “I

know the g ame.” Guer

ra
m a d e t h i s s t a t e m e n ta f

t e r b e i n g ar r e s t e d an d p l a c e d i nt h e p o l i c e c a r

f o r t r an s p o rt a t i o n . F i n a l l y, Guer ra co n t ends t he trial c ourt err ed in admitting his statement, “ I f y ou char g e me with a misdemeanor, I

won’t complain.”04

- 09

- 00 37 4- CR

- 7- Spontane o u s , v o lu

n te e r e d s tate me n ts th a t a

r e n o t m a d e in

r e s p o n s e to in te r

r o g a ti o nare
a dmi s s ib le a s e v id e n c e . Dos set t v . S tate , 2 16 S.W. 3d

7, 24 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa

n A nto nio 20 06 , p e t. ref ’d). Of fi ce r Ga rc i a testified that Gue rra asked w hat was g oing to ha ppen af ter he was plac ed under a rre st. I n response to Officer Ga rcia ’s statement that Gue rra was g oing to be arr ested for assault, Guer

ra r esponded, “ Yea

h, I know t he game .” Simi larly , Offic er G arc ia testified that Gue rra
ma de the state me nt, “ I f y ou c ha rg e me wi th a

mis de me ano r, Iwo n’ t c omp la in, ” wh ile Of fi c e r G arc ia was tra nsporting Guerr a for medical tre atment. Off icer Gar cia testified that the statement wa s
s p o n t an e o u s l y m a d e an d

w a s n o ti nr e s p o n s e t o a

n y qu e s t i o n s . In l i g h t o f

O f f i c e r G ar c i a ’ s t e s t i m o n y, the trial cour

t did not abuse its discr etion in c oncluding that the sec ond and third statements a bout which Guer

ra complains wer e not ma de in response to interr og ation and we re a dmissibl e. Gue rra ’s third issue is overruled. P RI OR C ONVI CT I ONS I n h is f ourt h is su e , G ue rr a c on te nd s the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in a dmi tti nge vid e nc e of six of his prior convic tions. Guerra asser ts the evidence wa s inadmissibl e under Texas Rule of Evidence 609 be c a us e the pr ob a tiv e va lue of the e vid e nc e wa s o utw e ig he d b y its pr e jud ic ia l e ff

e c t. We review a trial court’s ruling on the admis sibili ty of a pr ior conviction under an abuse of discretion standa

rd. The us v . S

tate , 845 S.W .2d 874, 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) . Be fore admitting evidenc e of a prior conviction for purposes of attacking the credibility of a witness, the trial cour t
mus t de te rm ine that the pr ob a tiv e va lue of a dmi tti ng the e vid e nc e ou tw e ig hs its pr e jud ic ia l e ff

e c t. T EX . R. E V ID . 609. A diffe rent rule applies, howe ver, if the more than te n y ear s has ela psed since the date of

the prior conviction. T EX . R. E V ID . 60 9( b) ; LaH oo d v . S tate , 1 7 1 S. W. 3 d

6 1 3 , 6 2 0 ( T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 20 05 , p e t. r e f’ d) . I f th e con vi ction is ov e r t e n y e ars old , th e te st i s04

- 09

- 00 37 4- CR

- 8- wh ether the probative va lue su bs tan tia lly outweig hs the prejudicia l effe ct. T EX . R. E V ID . 609(b); LaHood , 171 S.W .3d at 620. The su bs tan tia lly outweig hed re quirement doe s not apply , howeve r, if the witness’s lac k of re formation is shown by evidenc e of a

n intervening conviction for a fe lony
or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. LaHood , 171 S.W .3d at 620. In that circ umstance, the admissibili ty

of the prior

conviction is analy

zed under the g ener al “outwe ighs” test. Id
. I n this case, the State e licited evidenc e fr om Guerr a that he had previously been c onvicted of fe lo n y b u r g la r y o f a v e h ic le in

1 9 9 4 , tw o mi s d e me an o r

a s s a u lt s o f h is e x- w if

e in 1 9 9 9 , f e lony burg lary of a ha bitation in 2001, m i s d em eanor assault of his ex-wife in 2004, and f elony unauthorized use of a

vehicle in 2005. Be cause evidenc e of the 2004 misdemeanor a ssault was admitted without objection to prove the enhanc ement of the charg ed offense, the trial court was not require d to analy

ze t h e ad m i s sibili ty

of that off

ense unde r Rule 609. Acc ording ly , we turn our
a tte nti on to t he oth e r f ive pr ior c on vic tio ns . I n consideringwhether

the probative value of

a prior c onvictio n o u t weighs its prejudicial eff ect, tria l courts ar e instructed to c onsider the following fac tors: (1) the impeachme nt value of the prior cr ime; (2 ) the tempora l prox imity of the pa st crime re lative to the cha rg ed off ense a nd the witness’s subsequent history ; (3) the similarity betwee n the past cr ime an d t h e off ense be ing pr os e c ute d; (4 ) the imp or

tanc e of the de fe nd ant’ s te sti mony ; and (5 ) t he imp or tanc e of the c re dib ili ty issue. Theus , 845 S.W .3d at 880. I n this case, we separ ately analy ze the felony

convictions and the 19 99 mis de me ano r c on vic tio ns . A. Fe lony

Convictions Apply ing the T

h eus f a c to r s , the impeac hment value of crimes that involve de ception is hig her than cr imes that involve violence. Theus , 84 5 S.W. 2d a t 88 1. B oth

burg lary and un a uth or ize d u se04

- 09

- 00 37 4- CR

- 9- of a motor ve hicle hav e b een held to be offe nses involving de ception. Ba c a v . S tate , 223 S.W .3d 478, 484 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, no pet.). Althoug h the 1994 conviction appe ars r emote, the 2001 and 2005 convictions are intervening convictions that obviate the nece ssity for the tr ial court to d e te rm ine if

the pr ob a tiv e val ue of the 19 94 c on vic tio n is su bs tan tia lly ou tw e ig he d b y

its prejudicia l effe ct. See LaHood , 171 S.W .3d at 620. Mo re o v er , the re peate d felony convictions demonstrate a propensity for Guerra “runningafoul of the law.” Theus , 845 S.W .2d at 881. None of the fe lony

convictions are simil ar to the char g ed assault offe nse. Finally , the ca se involved the te sti mony of on ly Gu e rr a and the State ’s wi tne sse s; the re fo re , th e imp or tanc e of Gu e rr a ’s c re dib ili ty and testimony

esca lates as doe s the nee d to allow the State an o p p o rt unity to impeach Gue rra ’s
cre dibilit y . Se e id . H a vin g re vie we d th e a pp lic a ble fa c tor s, we c on c lud e the tr ia l cou rt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

a dmi tti ngthe e vid e nc e of the pr ior fe lony c on vic tio ns . B. Misdemeanor

Assault Convictions Misdemeanor

assault on a f

emale is a crime of

moral turpitude, se e Lud wig v . S tate , 969 S.W. 2d 22 , 3 0 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or

t Wor th 1 99 8, pe t. r e f’ d) ; Ha rd e ma n v . S tate , 868 S.W .2d 404, 407 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993), pet. dism’d , 89 1 S.W. 2d 96 0 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ); ho we ve r, it a lso is a crime of violence which has a hig her pote ntial for pre judice. Se e De lk

v . S tate , 855 S.W .2d 700, 70 8 (Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ); Theus , 8 4 5 S. W. 2 d a t 8 8 1
. A lt h o u g h th e 1 9 9 9 c o n v ic ti o n s are not
rec ent, Guer

ra ha d sever al interve ning c onvictions. The offenses are simi lar to the cha rg ed off ense, which militates ag ainst their admission beca u s e o f t he dang er that the jury might convic t on the perc eption of a past pattern of conduct, instead of on the fac ts of the char g ed off ense. See Theus , 845 S.W .2d at 881. As previously discussed, howeve r, the nature of the case esca lated the importanc e of Gue rra ’s testimony

and cr edibility
. Se e id
.04

- 09

- 00 37 4- CR

- 10- Given the diff

iculty of analy zing whethe r the trial c ourt abused its discre tion in admitt ing the 1999 convictions, we w ill assume for purpose s of t his opinion that the t rial court erre d and turn our attention to whether

the admissio n of the e vidence would be har mless. Be cause the er

ror is not consti t u t i o n al er ro r, it must be disreg arde d if it does not affe ct substantial rig hts. T EX . R. A PP . P. 44 .2 (b ); Mo til la v . S

tate , 7 8 S.W. 3d

35 2, 35 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); Arro y o v . S tate , 123 S.W .3d 517, 520 (Tex. App.—Sa n An t o nio 2003, pet. ref ’d). Er ror a ffe cts a substantial rig ht when it has a substantial and injurious ef fec t or influence in deter

mining the jury ’s verdict. Arroyo , 123 S.W .3d at 520. In assessing the likelihood that the jury ’s dec ision was adver sely aff ecte d by the er ror, the appellate court should consider ever y thing in the r ecor d, including a ny testimony

or phy sical evidenc e admitted for the jury ’s consider ation, the nature of the e vidence supporting the verdic t, the char acte r of the a lleg ed er ror, a nd how the er

ror mig ht be con s i d er ed i n connec tion with other evidenc e in the ca se. Mo til la , 7 8 S. W.3 d at 35 5; Arroyo , 123 S.W .3d at 520. I n this case, Na

vejar testified re g ardingGuer ra a ssaulting he r. The r esponding office rs observe d Nave

jar’s injuries a

nd located Guerr a hiding in the closet. Gue rra ’s father ha d observe d his son and Navejar fig hting that afte rnoon, and Guer ra told the officers that he and Navejar foug ht all the time. Evidence of Guer ra’ s three prior felony convictions and his 2004 conviction for a prior misdemeanor a ssault of his ex-wife wer e prope rly admitted into evidence . Havingconsidere d the
re c or d a s a wh ole , we c on c lud e that the a dmi ssi on of the 19 99 c on vic tio ns , if

e rr or , w a s h arm le ss. C ONCL US I ON The trial c ourt’s judg ment is affirme d. Catherine Stone, Chief Justice DO NO T PU B L I SH