IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AMIR ISBELL, et al., : CIVIL NO. 4:12-CV-00043

:

Plaintiffs, : 

:

v. : (Magistrate Judge Schwab)

:

PAUL BELLINO, et al., : 

: 

Defendants. :

OPINION

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND OF THE CASE.

A. Procedural History.

Presently before the Court for judgment is the claim for compensatory 

damages arising from the plaintiffs’ complaint (Doc. 1) against defendants,

employees of Montour County Children and Youth Services (the “Agency”)—

Craig Patterson (“Patterson”), Rachel Wade (“Wade”), Julie Spencer 

(“Spencer”)—and Montour County. The Court conducted a bench trial on 

October 7-9, 2014. The record is now closed, and the Court is prepared to render 

its judgment. This Opinion constitutes the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions 

of law made pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Husband and wife plaintiffs, Amir A. Isbell (“Mr. Isbell”), Bergina 

Brickhouse-Isbell, M.D. (“Mrs. Isbell”) (collectively the “Isbells”), and minor 

plaintiffs, A.I. and J.B., commenced the above-captioned action pursuant to 42 

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U.S.C. § 1983 on January 6, 2012, alleging various claims, including procedural 

due process claims arising out of a child-abuse investigation and voluntary safety 

plan implemented by Patterson, Wade and Spencer (collectively referred to as the 

“Individual Defendants”) and a similar claim against Montour County pursuant to 

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (“Monell”). 

(Doc. 1.). On September 25, 2012, the Court denied the Individual Defendants’ 

and Montour County’s motion to dismiss regarding plaintiffs’ procedural due 

process and Monell claims. Thereafter, on August 27, 2013, the Court granted 

plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to liability but found that punitive 

damages were unavailable against the Individual Defendants. Isbell v. Bellino, 962 

F. Supp. 2d 738 (M.D. Pa. 2013). Finding that the parties had not produced in the 

summary-judgment record sufficient evidence or argument on the issue of actual 

damages from which the Court could make a determination, the matter was set for 

trial on the issue of compensatory damages only. Isbell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 757-

58. 

By order dated June 17, 2014, the case was reassigned to the undersigned, 

upon consent of the parties, for the purpose of conducting a bench trial on the issue 

of compensatory damages, (Doc. 118), which such trial was conducted on October 

7-9, 2014. After the trial, the parties submitted proposed findings of fact and 

conclusions of law on December 15, 2014. (Doc. Nos. 149, 150).

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B. Factual Findings.

With respect to the remaining issue of compensatory damages in this 

litigation, we make the following findings of fact.1

The Isbells are the natural parents of A.I., and Mrs. Isbell is the natural 

mother of J.B. During all relevant times to matters addressed at trial, Mrs. Isbell 

worked as a psychologist at a local prison and Mr. Isbell, having taken a hiatus 

from medical school, stayed at home to care for the children, particularly A.I. since 

he was an infant. The Isbells are deeply religious. Their family life and social 

activities are deeply rooted in their church and church activities.

On January 7, 2010, A.I. was admitted to Geisinger Medical Center

(“Geisinger”) due to increasing lethargy and dehydration. Suspecting that A.I. had 

been abused, Geisinger doctors reported their suspicion to the appropriate 

authorities. The next day, January 8th, the Agency received a suspected physical 

child abuse report concerning A.I. which was documented in a Childline Report,

 

1

In making these findings of fact, we rely on the testimony elicited at the trial 

and the exhibits submitted by the parties. We have examined the evidence that has 

been made part of the record and reflected upon the credibility and reliability of the 

witnesses’ testimony. Where testimony or a document is quoted directly, the

findings of fact include a citation to the record. These citations are intended merely 

as a guide for the reader. Further, while some findings of fact are based solely upon 

the record, many are based at least in part upon the reasonable inferences drawn 

from the record. To the extent that any of the proposed findings of fact submitted 

by the parties are inconsistent with findings set forth herein, those proposed 

findings are rejected.

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triggering an investigation of suspected child abuse that ultimately involved 

Patterson, Wade and Spencer. Wade met with the Isbells at 3 a.m. on January 8th

to discuss the incident, and, later in the day, asked them to sign a safety plan.2 

The January 8th safety plan was handwritten and signed by the Isbells, Wade 

and Ruth Brickhouse, Mrs. Isbell’s mother, who agreed to supervise any contact 

with J.B. The plan prohibited both parents from any unsupervised contact with 

J.B. and “inappropriate discipline on [sic] both children” by any other adult. 

(Defendants’ Ex. 2)3. The plan further provided that the door to A.I.’s hospital 

room “will remain open,” and contained the following typed provision:

By signing this safety plan, I/We are assuring the safety of all children 

in our home and that we will follow the safety plan as listed above to 

ensure that the children in our care remain safe and free from harm.

Id.

By letters dated January 8, 2010, the Isbells, individually, were further 

formally notified by the Agency of the report of suspected child abuse and of the 

Agency’s mandate to conduct an investigation to determine if the report was 

“unfounded,” “indicated,” or “founded.” (Exhibits 8, 9). The letters also informed 

the Isbells that neither of them were named as the alleged perpetrator at that time. 

 

2 Due to the number of safety plans, both typed and handwritten, involved in 

this matter, we will refer to each plan by the date on which it was signed.

3 Unless otherwise cited, since plaintiffs and defendants submitted many of 

the same documents as exhibits, for ease of citation and reference, we cite only to 

defendants’ exhibit numbers.

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Thereafter, however, on January 20, 2010, Mr. Isbell received a letter from the 

Agency informing him that he was now named as the alleged perpetrator of the 

suspected abuse of A.I. Two days later, on January 22, 2010, felony and 

misdemeanor criminal charges arising from this incident were filed against Mr. 

Isbell, who was arraigned on January 27, 2010, and released on bail conditions that 

he comply with all of the Agency’s guidelines and directives. 

Also, on January 22, 2010, Patterson drafted a new safety plan in 

anticipation of A.I. returning home from the hospital. The Isbells signed the 

January 22nd safety plan, which prohibited Mr. Isbell from residing in the home 

until further notice from the Agency. The plan mandated no unsupervised contact 

with both children by the parents, required that contact between Mr. Isbell and A.I. 

be held at the Agency and supervised by Agency staff, and prohibited physical 

discipline from being used on either child. The plan further stated that Ruth 

Brickhouse would provide the assurance of safety for the children, monitor that the 

safety plan was being followed, and supervise, at her discretion, any contact 

between Mr. Isbell and J.B. A handwritten note initialed by “CP” appears on the 

plan between paragraphs 2 and 3 and states that “Phone calls are acceptable.” The 

plan provided that if its provisions were not followed, “the agency will petition the 

Juvenile Court for emergency protective custody.” (Ex. 12). 

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A.I. was discharged from the hospital on January 30, 2010. Thereafter, on 

February 12, 2014, an indicated finding of child abuse was made with respect to 

Mr. Isbell. (Ex. 15). As a result, the Agency proposed a new safety plan, dated

February 16, 2010, which the Isbells signed. The language and format of the 

February 16th safety plan differed from the previous plans.4 In connection with the 

signing of the February 16th safety plan, Patterson advised that he informed Mrs. 

Isbell that she had the option not to sign the plan; however, if she did not sign, the 

Agency would consider petitioning the juvenile court for intervention. The plan 

was divided into sections marked “For: Amir Isbell Sr.” and “For Berginia 

Brickhouse-Isbell.” (Ex. 16). Mrs. Isbell was now permitted unsupervised contact 

with both children and allowed to supervise contact between Mr. Isbell and J.B. 

Mr. Isbell was restricted to unsupervised contact with any minor child and 

forbidden from being in the home when A.I. was present in the home. The plan 

continued restricting Mr. Isbell from residing in the home, did not allow 

unsupervised contact with A.I., and only permitted contact between Mr. Isbell and 

A.I. to take place at the Agency with Agency staff supervising. Physical discipline 

of either child was forbidden; although that mandate fell only under Mrs. Isbell’s 

section of the plan. And, the plan contained the warning that if its provisions were 

 

4 On February 3, 2010, Leola Isbell, as paternal grandmother, and Spencer 

also signed a form titled “Safety Plan” dated February 3, 2010, containing 

handwritten provisions. Leola Isbell signed as the person assuring the safety of the 

children and compliance with the plan. (Ex. 14).

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not followed, the Agency would petition the Juvenile Court for emergency 

protective custody.

From approximately the end of January until February 16th, the Isbells asked 

many questions of the Individual Defendants regarding navigating their various 

social and religious activities within the confines of the safety plans. Such 

questioning while aimed at clarifying the terms of the safety plans, resulted in a 

series of amendments and supplements to the plans. On or about March 11, 2010,

for example, Mr. Isbell was alone at the family residence when Spencer arrived 

there for a pre-arranged visit and observed Mr. Isbell picking up the house and 

preparing to grill for the family and guests who were in town for a medical 

procedure. Mr. Isbell was outside grilling when Mrs. Isbell arrived home with 

A.I., J.B. and the guests. Although Spencer talked with Mrs. Isbell, she did not 

mention her belief that Mr. Isbell’s grilling outside of the home while A.I. was 

inside the home was a safety plan violation. Upon leaving the home, Spencer 

telephoned Patterson who informed her to call the family back and tell them to 

have Mr. Isbell leave the home. Upon receiving that call, Mr. Isbell left the 

property. 

The next day, March 12, 2010, at 9:00 a.m. Supervisor Riley noted that he 

called Mr. Isbell “to clarify that where the safety plan states NF [Amir] may not be 

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present in the home when the VC child is present or reside [sic] in the home it 

includes the property not just the house.” (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1a, at 20). Riley 

further noted that he informed Mr. Isbell that “by violating the safety plan he is 

putting his child at risk of being placed [in foster care].” Riley’s note does not 

mention that he discussed with Mr. Isbell a 100-yard requirement, and Mr. Isbell 

does not remember any discussion of that distance limitation. On March 12, 2010,

however, the safety plan was amended:

#1a. Amir can not physically be present on the property of the 

home when the victim child is on the property of the home.

#4a. The father will not be in the same room, building or within 

one hundred yards of the victim child.

(Ex. 20). On April 30, 2010, Patterson and Spencer met with the Isbells and 

their counsel to discuss a family service plan and a revised safety plan. This 

revised safety plan, dated April 30, 2010, mirrored the February 16th safety 

plan and incorporated the March 12th amendment.

On May 15, 2010, A.I. had surgery at Hershey Medical Center. Between 

May 14-19, 2010, the Isbell’s left telephone messages on the Agency’s answering 

machine cancelling several of the scheduled visits. The Isbells, however, did not 

inform the Agency or the Individual Defendants that the cancellations were, in 

part, due to A.I.’s surgery until May 19th, nor did they inform the Agency or the 

Individual Defendants to which hospital they admitted A.I. for his surgery. As a 

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result, although Mr. Isbell had not visited A.I. at the hospital, trust between the 

parties was shattered. Patterson admitted that the April 30th safety plan, in effect at 

the time, did not require the Isbells to notify the Agency of A.I.’s medical 

procedures and the facilities at which they were performed. Patterson further 

admitted that he didn’t know why such a provision was not in the safety plan, 

stating that he “just didn’t think about it and I don’t think any of my team or any of 

us thought that we needed to include, if you were going to go to another children’s 

hospital with this child, please notify us.” (Trial Transcript, October 8, 2014, at

384). 

Nevertheless, the incident provided the catalyst for the Agency to file a 

Petition for Dependency with the Court of Common Pleas of Montour County 

against the Isbells on May 27, 2010. On June 30, 2010, the Montour County Court 

of Common Pleas convened a hearing on the dependency petition. The Court did 

not conduct a hearing on the merits; rather, the Isbells stipulated to a temporary inhome dependency for A.I. for three to five months, after which the dependency 

could be withdrawn by the Agency or litigated at the request of the Agency or the 

Isbells. The Court further permitted Mr. Isbell to meet Mrs. Isbell and the children 

at church for the purpose of attending church together.5 The parties also signed a 

 

5 The Court’s granting of permission for the family to attend church together 

was not incorporated into the June 30, 2010 safety plan.

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new safety plan dated June 30, 2012, which contained the April 30th safety plan 

language, incorporated the March 12th amendment into the body of the main plan, 

and contained new language requiring all persons who care for A.I. to be fully 

aware of the safety plan and agree to its provisions. The June 30th safety plan also 

included new language pertaining specifically to Mrs. Isbell, as follows:

1. Birginia Isbell will notify the agency in advance, within 48hrs, of 

ANY medical care appointment including any visits to any other 

hospital. 

2. Berginia Isbell will give 72 hrs advance notice of any change of 

location or residence and will provide the agency with the address 

in order for the agency to notify and coordinate ongoing services 

with that county’s child welfare agency or any child welfare agency 

that has the jurisdiction for that address.

(Ex. 24).

While the interactions between the parties may have initially been 

cooperative, the Isbell’s justified need for clarification of the various safety plans’ 

sometimes vague and confusing provisions, and the Agency’s modifications and 

amendments of the plans ultimately created an unworkable situation. Throughout, 

the Isbells were reminded, both in the written language of the plans, and in the 

verbal exchanges with the Agency, that non-compliance ran the risk of putting both 

children in placement. According to Mrs. Isbell:

That’s what they told us since January the 8th [e]very chance - - I don’t 

want to say every chance they got because I don’t think that’s fair. But I 

think whenever they perceived we were in violation, it was mentioned, 

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you’re putting your kids at risk of placement, they’re in danger of 

placement. 

Mr. Patterson, I remember, on April 30th, he’s like, I will not hesitate to 

ask for a hearing to put them in placement. And, you know, that constant 

threat, that’s scary. . . . Again, the safety plans kept changing. 

(Trial Transcript, October 7, 2014, at 71).

The Isbells perceived the various modifications to the safety plans as a 

constantly moving target. Mrs. Isbell, in particular, felt that the Individual 

Defendants were “trying to catch [her] doing something wrong and ... set 

something up to take [her] kids away from [her].” (Trial Transcript, October 7, 

2014 at 89). Conversely, the Individual Defendants perceived the Isbells

questions and actions as stretching the “boundaries of the safety plan,” (Trial 

Transcript, October 8, 2014, at 336), and that the parties were on a “very, very 

slippery slope and [they] were sliding down it.” (Trial Transcript, October 8, 2014, 

at 387, 403). Further, the Individual Defendants viewed Mr. Isbell as the 

perpetrator of child abuse, and would not consider allowing him to return to the 

family home until the criminal charges against him were resolved. 

During the relevant time period, Mrs. Isbell experienced nightmares, 

depression, suicidal thoughts and fear, particularly related to the constant threat of

her children being taken away from her and the restrictions placed on her in her 

role as a mother. Such emotional distress was unrelated to the Childline Report, 

the pending criminal charges against her husband or any other issues occurring at 

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the time. Mr. Isbell corroborated Mrs. Isbell’s symptoms, stating that he “slowly 

watched [his] wife get broken.” (Trial Transcript, October 8, 2014, at 225). He 

also stated she became depressed, despondent and suicidal. Mr. Isbell experienced 

depression, nightmares and suicidal thoughts and lost his ability to trust in others 

all in relation to the possibility that the children would be placed in foster care.

II. DISCUSSION.

This case comes to us for the limited determination of “whether and what 

amount of compensatory damages should be awarded” to the plaintiffs as a result 

of the defendants’ procedural due process violation. Isbell v. Bellino, 962 F. Supp. 

2d 738, 758 (M.D. Pa. 2013). Here, the plaintiffs are claiming emotional distress 

damages stemming from the absence of due process in connection with the

alteration of the Isbell’s parental rights as a result of the safety plans entered into 

during the time period January 8, 2010 through June 30, 2010. The law is settled 

that a court may award compensatory damages in a § 1983 civil rights action for 

the denial of procedural due process. See Carey v. Piphus, 443 U.S. 247 (1978)

(“[A] purpose of procedural due process is to convey to the individual a feeling 

that the government has dealt with him fairly, as well as to minimize the risk of 

mistaken deprivations of protected interests). Such an award, however, may not be 

based on the “‘abstract value of a constitutional right.’” Young v. Pleasant Valley 

Sch. Dist., No. 3:07-CV-00854, 2012 WL 1827194, at *19 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 

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2012) aff'd, No. 13-3605, 2015 WL 452362 (3d Cir. Feb. 4, 2015) (quoting 

Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986)). Where 

procedural due process rights have been violated, absent proof of causation and 

actual injury, a plaintiff is entitled only to nominal damages. Carey, 435 U.S. at 

264; see also Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992) (“[N]o compensatory 

damages may be awarded in a § 1983 suit absent proof of actual injury.”). 

Compensatory damages linked to an actual injury, however, are not limited 

to out-of-pocket loss and monetary harm. Pryer v. C.O. 3 Slavic, 251 F.3d 448, 454 

(3d Cir. 2001). Emotional distress injuries, such as mental anguish and suffering,

are compensable under § 1983 provided they are supported by competent evidence. 

Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 216 (3d Cir. 2008). Expert medical or 

psychological testimony, or any “specific type of evidence,” is not required to 

establish that a plaintiff has suffered mental or emotional harm. Bolden v. SEPTA,

21 F.3d 29, 34-36 (3d Cir.1994); see also Carey, 435 U.S. at 264 n. 20

(explaining that “[a]lthough essentially subjective, genuine injury . . . may be 

evidenced by one's conduct and observed by others”).

That a plaintiff suffered emotional injuries, however, does not end the 

inquiry into whether he or she is entitled to an award of compensatory damages 

from the defendants. Rather, where procedures are deficient, a plaintiff is required 

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to establish that the distress suffered is attributable to the denial of procedural due 

process and not the underlying deprivation. Carey, 435 U.S. at 259 (“Procedural 

due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from 

the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.”); see Gomes v. 

Wood, 451 F.3d 1122, 1132 (10th Cir. 2006) (acknowledging the fine line drawn by 

Carey between damages arising from the liberty or property deprivation and those 

arising from the denial of procedural due process). 

“Once the plaintiff clears [these] hurdles, the burden shifts to the defendant, 

who then has an opportunity to prove that the same actions would have occurred 

even if due process had been provided.” Burns v. PA Dep't of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 

181 (3d Cir. 2011) (referring to the burden shifting scheme in Carey); see also 

Alexander v. Polk, 750 F.2d 250, 264 (3d Cir. 1984) (upholding burden-shifting in 

a procedural due process case with references to Carey and Mount Healthy City 

School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)); McClure v. 

Independent School District No. 16, 228 F. 3d 1205, 1213 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Mt. 

Healthy and Village of Arlington Heights make clear that once a plaintiff 

establishes a constitutional violation, the burden shifts to the defendant to show by 

a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same result absent 

the violation.”). Critical to this defense, though, is the court’s ability to determine 

what the outcome would have been had plaintiffs been afforded their due process 

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rights. Carey, 435 U.S. at 261 n. 16 (“We presume that this determination will 

include consideration of the likelihood that any mitigating circumstances to which 

respondents can point would have swayed the initial decisionmakers.”); see also,

Wallace v. Powell, No. 3:09-CV-286, 2012 WL 5379153, at *11-12 (M.D. Pa. 

Oct. 31, 2012). Notwithstanding a defendant’s success in this regard, “[b]ecause 

the right to procedural due process is ‘absolute’ in the sense that it does not depend 

upon the merits of a claimant’s substantive assertions, and because of the 

importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed, . . . the 

denial of procedural due process [is] actionable for nominal damages without proof 

of actual injury.” Carey, 435 U.S. at 267 (citations omitted).

Judged against these principles, we find that the plaintiffs have not met their 

burden of proving a nexus between J.B.’s emotional distress and the lack of 

procedural due process in connection with the safety plans. While we do not doubt 

that J.B. experienced stress throughout the relevant time period, we find that such 

stress was attributable to disruption in the family’s life as a result of Mr. Isbell not 

being in the home and not to any procedural due process violations, of which there 

is no record evidence that she was aware. With respect to A.I., we find the 

evidence insufficient to support a finding that he experienced any emotional 

distress as a result of defendants’ procedural due process violation. 

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With respect to Mr. Isbell’s claim for damages, while we credit Mr. Isbell’s 

testimony regarding his emotional distress, we find that the defendants have met 

their burden of establishing that he would not have prevailed, and would have been 

removed from the family home, even if he had been afforded due process in 

connection with the safety plans. Mr. Isbell was considered by the agency as the 

perpetrator of child abuse and was criminally charged as a result. No mitigating 

evidence was provided at trial that would compel a result other than Mr. Isbell 

being removed from the home. 

Mrs. Isbell, however, has presented sufficient evidence that she suffered 

actual injuries in the nature of emotional distress as a result of being denied 

procedural due process safeguards in connection with the alteration of her parental 

rights as a result of the safety plans. We reject the defendants’ contention that Mrs. 

Isbell’s agreement to the June 30th safety plan negates her claim for damages in 

that such plan was the same as the initial plan entered into in January, and thus the 

result with respect to her also would have been the same even if she had been 

provided procedural protections. Between January 8, 2010, and June 30, 2010, 

there were at least six iterations of the safety plans between the parties. And, 

although Mrs. Isbell never had to leave the family home, the arbitrary manner in 

which safety plans were revised and amended resulted in significant interference 

with her parental rights. No doubt Mrs. Isbell suffered emotional distress due to 

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the health problems her child was experiencing and the charges against her 

husband. Based on her testimony, we conclude that she also suffered emotional 

distress stemming directly from her feeling like the defendants did not deal with 

her fairly. Moreover, as a consequence of the deteriorating relationship between 

the parties, the final safety plan dated June 30th contained more restrictions on Mrs. 

Isbell’s parental rights that may not have been included in the plan had due process 

been afforded from the outset. Thus, it is entirely conceivable that had Mrs. Isbell 

been provided meaningful and timely due process the interference and alteration of 

her parental rights would have been less severe and arbitrary and the emotional 

distress she suffered ameliorated.

III. Conclusion.

Accordingly, consistent with the findings of fact and conclusions of law set 

forth in this opinion, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Nominal damages in the amount of ONE DOLLAR ($1.00) shall be paid by 

defendants to J.B.

2. Nominal damages in the amount of ONE DOLLAR ($1.00) shall be paid by 

defendants to A.I.

3. Nominal damages in the amount of ONE DOLLAR ($1.00) shall be paid by 

defendants to Mr. Isbell.

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4. Compensatory damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND 

DOLLARS ($100,000) shall be paid by defendants to Mrs. Isbell.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Susan E Schwab

Susan E. Schwab

United States Magistrate Judge

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