Opinion issued December 22, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-15-00583-CV

———————————

THE HONORABLE MARK HENRY, COUNTY JUDGE 

OF GALVESTON COUNTY, Appellant

V.

THE HONORABLE LONNIE COX, JUDGE OF THE 56TH DISTRICT 

COURT OF GALVESTON COUNTY, Appellee

On Appeal from the 56th District Court

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 15-CV-0583
2

O P I N I O N

In this interlocutory appeal,1appellant, the Honorable Mark Henry, County 

Judge of Galveston County, challenges the district court’s2 order granting appellee, 

the Honorable Lonnie Cox, Judge of the 56th District Court and Local 

Administrative Judge of Galveston County, a temporary injunction suspending the 

termination of the employment of Bonita Quiroga, the Galveston County Director 

of Judicial Administration, directing the reinstatement of her employment, and 

enjoining Henry and “his agents, servants, and representatives, and those acting in 

concert with him,” from taking action against Quiroga, her department, and her staff. 

In four issues, Henry contends that the “temporary injunction order has become moot 

on appeal,” the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to grant the 

temporary injunction, the district court “did not validly exercise its supervisory 

jurisdiction” in granting the temporary injunction, and the temporary injunction is

otherwise invalid. 

We affirm.

Background

In his amended petition, Judge Cox alleges that in 2000, the judges of the 

Galveston County District Courts and County Courts at Law “selected” Quiroga as 

 

1 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2015).

2 The Honorable Sharolyn Wood, sitting by assignment. 
3

Director of Judicial Administration (“DJA”) and the Galveston County 

Commissioners Court approved their selection. Although her DJA duties were 

“overwhelmingly judicial in nature,” Quiroga also performed certain duties for the 

county judge and commissioners. 

Fourteen years later, on July 24, 2014, Judge Henry, who had taken office in 

2011, purported to unilaterally terminate Quiroga’s employment as DJA. In the 

months that followed, certain Galveston County District Court Judges, County Court 

at Law Judges, and a Probate Court Judge (collectively, “the judges”),3speaking 

through Judge Cox, the Local Administrative Judge, endeavored to reinstate Quiroga 

to her position. At Cox’s request, the Office of Court Administration of the State of 

Texas (“OCA”) sought an opinion in the matter from the Office of the Attorney 

General of the State of Texas (“OAG”). 

In August 2014, Peri Bluemer, Chief Human Resources Officer for Galveston 

County, acting at Judge Henry’s direction, publicly posted Quiroga’s position to 

 

3 The Honorable Lonnie Cox, Judge of the 56th District Court and Local 

Administrative Judge; the Honorable Kelly Neves, Judge of the 10th District Court; 

the Honorable John Ellisor, Judge of the 122nd District Court; the Honorable Anne 

B. Darring, Judge of the 306th District Court; the Honorable Michelle Slaughter, 

Judge of the 405th District Court; the Honorable Jack D. Ewing, Jr., Judge of the 

County Court at Law No. 3; the Honorable Barbara Roberts, Judge of the County 

Court at Law No. 2; and the Honorable Kimberly Sullivan, Judge of the Galveston 

County Probate Court.
4

solicit applications, conducted telephone interviews with candidates, and began 

scheduling interviews with the three “finalists.”

On September 24, 2014, the day that Bluemer had scheduled final interviews 

to begin, Judge Cox issued an order directing that Judge Henry and the 

commissioners cease searching for a replacement for Quiroga. Cox concluded that 

Henry’s termination of Quiroga’s employment as DJA was “void” because the 

judges, not Henry and the commissioners, had the authority to appoint and terminate 

the employment of court personnel; Henry’s termination of Quiroga’s employment 

and his proposed selection of a replacement violated the Separation of Powers 

Provision of the Texas Constitution4and infringed on the inherent powers of the 

Galveston County Judiciary; and Henry’s actions constituted an illegal attempt to 

influence the appointment of a person to a position authorized by the commissioners 

court for the department of another district, county or precinct officer in the county.5 

Days later, Judge Henry filed in this Court a petition for a writ of mandamus, 

requesting that this Court vacate Judge Cox’s order. After Henry notified the OAG

of the filing of his mandamus petition, it declined to issue an opinion on the issue of 

Henry’s purported termination of the employment of Quiroga. And after this Court 

 

4 See TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1.

5 See TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE ANN. § 151.004 (Vernon 2008).
5

denied Henry mandamus relief, he filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the

Texas Supreme Court, which also denied him relief.

Subsequently, OCA crafted a proposed compromise for the judges to submit 

to Judge Henry and the commissioners. Under the proposed compromise, two 

separate positions would be created: (1) “Director of Court Administration” 

(“DCA”) and (2) a “public safety position.” Judge Henry and the commissioners 

requested that the judges submit a supplemental proposal regarding the salary for the 

newly proposed DCA position. On May 12, 2015, the judges attended a 

“compromise meeting workshop,” at which they submitted their recommendation 

that the newly proposed DCA position encompass certain duties and have an annual 

salary of no less than $85,000 and no more than $120,000. 

On May 29, 2015, after Judge Henry and the commissioners had not acted, 

the judges issued an order, concluding that it was “in the best interest of the Court 

system and the citizens of Galveston County to reinstate the position of Justice 

Administrator,” which was to be filled by Quiroga, effective June 8, 2015. And 

Judge Cox issued an order to “carry out the reinstatement of Quiroga,” directing 

Henry to provide her with a key to her office, a personal computer with employee 

email access, and an office telephone. Cox further ordered that Henry direct “Human 

Resources to allow [Quiroga] to complete all paperwork necessary for her to be 
6

reinstated as a full time employee” and the “Treasurer to reinstate and pay 

[Quiroga].”

However, when Quiroga, accompanied by some of the judges and Galveston 

County Sheriff H. Trochessett, arrived at the Galveston County Justice Center on the 

morning of June 8, 2015, they found that the lock on Quiroga’s office door had been 

changed. After the Sheriff used his own key to admit Quiroga to her office, she 

discovered that her personal computer and telephone had been removed. 

The next day, Quiroga arrived at the Justice Center to find that, once again, 

the lock on her office door had been changed and she had been locked out. After 

Judge Cox arranged for her to work on her personal computer in an empty office 

space, Judge Henry scheduled a meeting with the commissioners court to discuss the 

“[a]uthority of county and [d]istrict [c]ourt judges to appoint administrative 

employees” and the filing of litigation against the judges and a judicial-conduct 

complaint against Cox. 

Also on June 9, 2015, Judge Cox filed in the 405th District Court of Galveston 

County his original petition in the instant case, seeking injunctive relief. The district 

court subsequently granted a temporary restraining order, prohibiting Judge Henry 

and “all acting in concert with [him]” from taking any official action on the agenda 

posted for the special meeting of June 9, 2015. In response, Henry tabled matters in 

the commissioners court until June 13, 2015. And, at a June 13, 2015 “special 
7

meeting,” Henry and the commissioners “authorized” a reduction in the salary for 

Quiroga’s position from $113,000 to $63,695. Even though, as noted by Cox, Henry 

and the commissioners, by comparison, had previously authorized a salary of 

$65,000 for a candidate who had been appointed to perform just “one” of Quiroga’s 

former duties. 

In his amended petition, Cox sought temporary and permanent injunctive 

relief and a declaration that the “purported firing of [Quiroga] on July 24, 2014 was 

void and is void at the present time”; “subsequent purported changes to the salary 

scale and administrative organization of the Galveston County Department of Justice 

Administration” are “void”; and Quiroga’s salary is “as of the date of final judgment 

the same rate . . . as was applicable on July 23, 2014.”

In making his request for a temporary injunction, Judge Cox asked the district 

court to preserve the “last, actual, peaceable noncontested status that preceded the 

controversy.” He asserted that Judge Henry’s actions were causing harm to the 

Galveston County district and county courts, and he argued that the harm is 

“imminent and ongoing” because Henry was continuing to “reassign” department 

employees. Cox further sought “to invoke statutory rights of non-interference”6; 

“enforcement of constitutional rights and powers under the inherent power of courts 

 

6 See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 151.004.
8

to demand and receive adequate funding, personnel, and facilities”7; and to “enforce 

the separation of powers” and “supervisory control” of district courts over Henry 

and the commissioners court.

8

 And he requested an order enjoining “Henry and all 

those acting in concert with him” from:

1. Taking any action on the agenda items Nos. [enumerated], posted 

for the special meeting of June 9, 2015 and June 13, 2015, or any 

future action concerning those items[.]

2. Barring entrance by [Quiroga] to that portion of the Galveston 

County Justice Center previously occupied by her as [DJA.]

3. Preventing or impeding in any way the provision of computer 

services to [Quiroga] . . . [.]

4. Instructing any employee of Galveston County to disregard any 

directive, instruction, or request of [Quiroga] relating to the 

administration . . . [.]

5. Appointing or employing any person other than [Quiroga] to 

perform the duties of specified above as the job description of 

the [DJA.]

. . . .

7. Employing or authorizing any person to fill the duties of the posts 

purportedly created and pertaining to justice administration in 

the meeting of June 13, 2015.

8. Reassigning or relocating any employee who occupies a position 

or duties which, as of July 23, 2014, reported to [Quiroga] as 

[DJA], including but not limited to . . . Gracia, and Deputy Clint 

Purcell.

 

7 See Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 755 S.W.2d 78, 79 (Tex. 1988); Vondy v. 

Comm’r’s Court of Uvalde Cty., 620 S.W.2d 104, 109–10 (Tex. 1981).

8 See TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1, art. V, § 8.
9

In his brief, filed in opposition to Judge Cox’s request for a temporary 

injunction, Judge Henry contended that Cox was seeking, “by way of temporary 

injunction,” the “very remedy (on many of the same grounds)” that Quiroga seeks

“in her earlier filed lawsuit.”9 He asserted that if the district court granted Cox the

temporary injunction, it would be awarding Quiroga the ultimate relief that she 

seeks, i.e., reinstatement of her employment. Henry further argued that Cox’s

lawsuit is moot because the commissioners court had already “abolished” Quiroga’s 

DJA position and, by order issued June 13, 2015, approved the judges’ application 

to appoint Quiroga to a new “court administrator position.” And he argued that Cox 

could not invoke the judges’ statutory right of non-interference because “Quiroga 

was never appointed to her position as Director” pursuant to statute.10

At the temporary-injunction hearing, the district court admitted into evidence 

copies of a 1995 commissioners court meeting agenda and minutes, which included 

“authorizing the employment of a Professional Services Director and Justice 

Administration Director submitted by the County Judge”; a May 1, 2000 letter from

the Honorable David E. Garner, Judge of the 10th District Court of Galveston 

County, to then Galveston County Judge Jim Yarborough; and a May 8, 2000 

commissioner’s court agenda. 

 

9 Bonnie Quiroga v. Galveston Cty., Tex., No. 14-CV-1289 (212th Dist. Ct., 

Galveston Cty., Tex., filed Dec. 9, 2014). 

10 See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 151.004.
10

The minutes of the April 13, 1995 “Special Called Session” of the 

commissioners court reflects that the then commissioners court voted to appoint Ed 

Wells, who was then “employed as Court Administrator for the District Courts of 

Galveston County,” to “the Director of Justice Administration.” The commissioners 

agreed that “[t]he duties of the position will include continuing helping the District 

Courts Administration, but also broadening that responsibility to the County Courts 

at Law and also the current Justices of the Peace throughout the county.” The 

minutes do not reflect that Wells was to perform any duties for the commissioners 

court.

After Wells had subsequently resigned his position, Judge Garner, the Local 

Administrative Judge, acting on behalf of three district court judges, two county 

court at law judges, and a probate judge, submitted to then County Judge

Yarborough a May 1, 2000 letter, stating that “after careful consideration of the 

applications for the position of Director of Justice Administration for Galveston 

County,” the Galveston County judges collectively recommended that Bonnie 

Quiroga be appointed to fill the vacancy. They further requested that the “matter be 

placed on the [commissioners court’s] agenda for action.” And the May 8, 2000 

commissioners court agenda includes “Consideration of appointment of Director of 

Justice Administration submitted by the Administrative Law Judge.” The 

commissioners court subsequently ratified Quiroga’s appointment. 
11

The district court also admitted into evidence a 2005 “Job Description 

Certification,” signed by Quiroga, and various excerpts of “Program Budget[s]” 

from fiscal years 2004 and 2009 through 2012. The excerpts contain, for each year, 

an organizational chart, which shows the “commissioners court” in a position over 

the department of “Justice Administration,” but includes in a position below the 

department only the duties of “Court Collections,” “Justice of Peace Task Force,” 

“Law Library,” and “Pre-Trial Release.” The 2005 “Job Description Certification” 

reflects that Quiroga reported to the “County Judge.” However, the “Position 

Summary,” contained in the description, states that she “manages, coordinates, 

directs, and plans the operations and activities of all courts.” And it lists her 

“Essential Functions” as follows:

 Oversees the Texas Fair Defense Act-Galveston County Plan to 

ensure compliance with all procedures.

 Prepares and presents monthly activity and status reports, as 

requested or required.

 Provides on-call assistance to judiciary, county jail, and related 

county departments.

 Develops, implements, and oversees collection procedures for 

the county courts.

 Coordinates and schedules courtroom security.

 Plans, schedules, and implements requests by visiting judges, 

including courtroom space, lodging, and travel.

 Audits and processes claims for payment of indigent 

representation.

 Manages caseloads; develops and implements more efficient 

procedures for processing dockets and caseflow.
12

 Determines eligibility of attorneys to serve under the Texas Fair 

Defense Act-Galveston County Plan.

 Maintains statistical data and records on caseflow and case 

management.

 Develops and implements automated documents for use by the 

court.

 Provides for the comfort, convenience, and security of jurors.

 Develops and maintains court calendar.

 Plans and assigns space for court hearings and court-related 

services.

 Assists in the preparation, review, and implementation of 

legislation affecting the courts and related county departments.

 Assesses and analyzes the court’s current and future technology 

needs.

 Plans and coordinates training for court employees.

 Inspects property in court, arranging for maintenance, repairs, 

and replacement as necessary.

 Directs the administrative operations of the Justice 

Administration Department, including development of all 

department and court budgets, audit and approval of department 

expenditures and payroll, supervision and discipline of 

employees, and related duties.

 Performs other related duties as assigned.

Judge Henry testified that he took office as Galveston County Judge on 

January 1, 2011 and is a member of the commissioners court.11 From 2000 to July 

24, 2014, Quiroga was the DJA and reported to the county judge and the 

commissioners court. He explained that “because it became convenient over time,” 

 

11 The County Judge is the “presiding officer” of the County Commissioners Court. 

TEX. CONST. art. V, § 18(b).
13

the DJA position had both judicial and non-judicial responsibilities. Henry admitted 

that on July 24, 2014, he terminated Quiroga’s employment solely on his own

initiative as county judge, and not on behalf of the commissioners court. Although 

he had discussed terminating Quiroga’s employment with one of the other 

commissioners, he did not raise the matter at a commissioners court meeting, nor did 

he confer with the judges before terminating her employment. Henry also conceded 

that neither he nor the commissioners court had given Quiroga any prior jobperformance reviews, nor had there been any documented dissatisfaction with her 

job performance. However, he opined that it was “in the public’s best interest” to 

amend the 2015 fiscal-year budget and restructure and reorganize certain County 

departments. He noted that after he had terminated Quiroga’s employment, “it was 

important to have that role filled,” and he assigned Bluemer to “spearhead[]” the 

effort. 

Judge Henry further testified that for “months” after he had terminated 

Quiroga’s employment, he and the judges had discussed the “possible mechanism 

by which [they] could appoint personnel.” And the judges “agreed” that the county 

law library, building facilities, personal bonds, and collections were “exclusively in 

the domain” of the commissioners court. In May 2015, after the judges submitted 

an application to the commissioners court seeking a “pay grade” for the new position 

of DCA in the range of $85,000 to $120,000, Henry assigned his chief of staff, Tyler 
14

Drummond, to “find internal and external comparable[]” positions. Based on

Drummond’s research, Henry and the commissioners court set an annual salary for 

the new DCA position at $63,695. And the district court admitted into evidence a 

June 9, 2015 commissioners court order, which shows that they set the salary range 

for the new DCA position at $57,705 to $63,695. 

Although the commissioners court had, prior to Judge Henry’s purported 

termination of Quiroga’s employment, approved her DJA salary of $113,000, it cut 

the salary for the new DCA position by $49,305 because, as per Henry, “all” the 

commissioners court “functions” were removed. He claimed that the new DCA 

position would have “approximately 25 percent of the responsibility that the old

[DJA] position had,” based on the number of people reporting to the new DCA, 

although the number of judges to whom the DCA would report was not considered, 

nor was the gravity and time commitment of one duty over another. Henry noted 

that the “Pre-Trial Release Department” had been renamed the “Personal Bond 

Office.” And he had hired one of the September 2014 candidates at an annual salary 

of $65,000 to perform pre-trial bond requests. 

Drummond testified that Judge Henry, in May 2015, asked him to assist in 

determining the salary range for the new DCA position. He explained that he based 

his research on the job description that the judges had submitted in their May 12, 

2015 application. And he noted that the commissioners court duties removed from 
15

the new DCA position included the law library, personal bond office, building 

facilities, and collections, which together had constituted a “significant portion” of 

the duties of the DJA. In arriving at his salary recommendation for the new DCA 

position, Drummond utilized various online resources and census data from 

Galveston and Cameron counties, and he contacted three of the counties listed in the 

judges’ salary survey, as well as others. He presented his findings to the 

commissioners court, and he drafted portions of their June 9, 2015 order setting the 

salary range for the new DCA position. 

Drummond explained that he graduated from Vermont Law School in 2012

and does not hold a Texas law license, has prior experience working for the Vermont 

Legislature, and took a statistics class and several economics classes in college. 

Drummond admitted that, in determining salary ranges for Galveston County 

positions, he does not apply any methodology that is generally accepted by counties 

in setting such salary ranges.12 

 

12 During cross-examination, the following discussion took place: 

THE COURT: I’m sitting here listening to this gentleman’s expert 

testimony with absolutely no Daubert foundation at 

all. I have no idea if this man—I know he has a law 

degree, but he’s never passed a Bar exam. He’s never 

practiced in a court. He’s never worked in a court. I 

haven’t heard anything yet that has told me that this 

gentleman has any concept of how a court works, how 

court administration works, or how the laws of Texas 

impact on Judges requiring to do their job. . . . If he 

has knowledge, if he studied, if he knows the laws, 
16

Bluemer testified that in early August 2014, Judge Henry “asked” her “to find 

candidates for [Quiroga’s] position as it stood, Director of Justice Administration.” 

After she publicly posted the position, “probably a hundred, maybe 150” people 

applied for the job. Bluemer selected the “10 to 15” candidates who “fit the role.” 

She then conducted telephone interviews, narrowed the field to “four,” and set up 

interviews with Henry and Ryan Dennard, Galveston County Commissioner, 

 

and he has by training, experience, or background any 

expertise to provide testimony on this, let me hear it. 

If not, let’s move on.

. . . .

And if he’s saying that he has done a study that 

complies with any methodology that makes this a 

valid study, other than picking out the information he 

wanted in his presentation, I’d be glad to hear his 

qualifications on being able to do that. I’ve heard he 

had statistics. I heard he had economics, but I’m an 

economics major. Okay? So let’s prove him up, or 

let’s move on. . . .

[Defense Counsel]: Mr. Drummond, what experience do you have with 

regard to reviewing salaries, in general, doing salary 

analysis?

[Drummond]: I assisted the County—actually, took the lead on 

hiring our Chief Information Officer, Chief Human 

Resources Officer, our Chief Financial Officer, all of 

which were country searches, nationwide searches.

[Defense Counsel]: In each of those job searches, in determining the 

salaries, did you use [a] methodology that is generally 

accepted by Counties in trying to determine salary 

ranges for those individuals?

. . . .

[Drummond]: No.
17

Precinct One. Ultimately, Henry and Dennard chose three “final” candidates, none 

of whom had experience in court administration. One candidate “had formerly been 

an attorney” and “had a very passionate story to tell about his [previous] drug 

addiction.” Bluemer noted, however, that he “had a very strong passion for the 

judicial system” and “knew some of our players.” She also noted that “two members 

of the [district attorney’s] office” had applied for the position, but were eliminated 

as “way underqualified.” And a former Galveston County judge had applied, but 

did not “make the cut” for “the final three.” On cross-examination, Bluemer 

admitted that she was not familiar with the court system and had no previous 

experience working in a courthouse or with any court administrators.

Judge Cox testified that up until July 2014, his and Quiroga’s offices were 

located one floor apart at the Justice Center, he “saw her almost every day,” and they 

“talk[ed] all the time.” And he testified at length about her many essential duties to 

the judges in Galveston County. For instance, Quiroga “did the budget for all of the 

Courts, except the Probate Court; and she did the budget for the Department of 

Justice Administration.” And she was “instrumental” in developing, and 

“responsible” for administering, the judiciary’s “Fair Defense Plan,” which provides 

counsel to indigent parties. A significant portion of her duties also involved the 

provision of interpreters. Noting that he was not warned prior to the termination of 

her employment, Cox chronicled the events, as outlined in his amended petition,
18

surrounding Judge Henry’s lock-out of Quiroga from her office, removal of her

personal computer and telephone, “filing [of] criminal trespass warnings or notices” 

against her, and attempts to conduct interviews for her replacement. 

Judge Cox explained that after he went to OCA for assistance with a 

compromise, the judges submitted a proposal to the commissioners court. And the 

district court admitted into evidence the May 12, 2015 application submitted by the 

“Administrative Judges of the Galveston County District Courts, County Courts at 

Law, and Probate Court” to the commissioners, requesting approval to hire a 

“Director of Court Administration” with an annual salary range of $85,000 to 

$120,000. The judges’ application includes a job description and a “Salary Survey,”

which provides the salary ranges, varying from a low of $45,894 to a high of 

$149,488, for court administrators in Bexar, Collin, Dallas, Denton, Tarrant, and 

Williamson counties. The survey also indicates the number of courts to which each 

administrator reports. Judge Cox noted that the court administrators in Lubbock and 

Montgomery counties have annual salaries of $110,000 and $100,000, respectively. 

Judge Cox further testified that at the May 12, 2015 workshop, Judge Henry 

expressly stated that “he would never pay” the new DCA in the judges’ requested 

salary range of $85,000 to $120,000. The judges, who had not had a court 

administrator since the purported termination of Quiroga’s employment ten months 

earlier, then began their attempt to reinstate her. Cox explained that although the 
19

revised job description for the new DCA position does have fewer job duties with 

fewer employees reporting to the director, the proposed salary range of $57,705 to 

$63,695, based on his experience, is “ridiculously low.” 

Commissioner Dennard testified that although “[t]he judges were the primary 

customer of the Department of Justice Administration,” statutory amendments in 

2005 and 2011 require that “Personal Bond, Building Security, Collections, and the 

Law Library” be supervised by the commissioners court.

After the hearing, the district court issued its temporary injunction order, 

finding, in pertinent part, as follows:

[Judge Henry] intentionally interfered with the independence of 

the Galveston County judiciary and the ability of the Galveston County 

judiciary to perform its judicial functions. . . .

. . . .

Galveston County created an administrative department to serve 

the administrative needs of its courts and to assist county government 

in court related projects. Fourteen years ago, the judges selected Bonnie 

Quiroga as the second director of Judicial Administration, and such 

selection was approved by the Commissioner’s Court. The testimony 

was that Ms. Quiroga had been employed by Galveston County for 

thirty years at the time [her employment] was terminated by [Henry] on 

July 24, 2014, so [she] was well known by the other employees and 

elected officials.

The director of th[e] hybrid judicial-governmental administrative 

department, called Justice Administration, reported to the County Judge 

for the county government related duties and to the local Administrative 

Judge for the judicial administrative duties. The principal duties of 

Justice Administration are judicial administration. This department 

had a Director and other employees supervised by the Director. Offices 

for Judicial Administration are located in proximity to the Galveston 

County courts in the Galveston Justice Center. The other employees’ 
20

duties are judicial in nature. The Director reported daily to the local 

Administrative Judge. The Director also reported to the County Judge 

for the government related projects.

On July 24, 2014, [Henry] terminated the employment of the 

Director of Judicial Administration from both her governmental related 

responsibilities as well as her duties to the Galveston County judiciary. 

[Henry] did not consult with the judiciary, nor did he advise the 

judiciary that he intended to terminate the Director of Judicial 

Administration’s duties performed for the Galveston County Courts. 

[Cox] disputes that grounds existed to terminate [Quiroga’s 

employment].

. . . .

. . . . [Henry] placed his HR employee Peri Bluemer in charge of 

choosing the replacement [DCA]. In her testimony, Ms. Bluemer 

demonstrated a lack of knowledge about courts, administrative duties 

of the court, and the nature of trust and confidence necessary in any 

person holding this sensitive court position.

. . . [Bluemer] used standards she designed to limit the 

consideration to only three applicants, eliminating applicants familiar 

with the Galveston County courts and attorneys in good standing with 

the State Bar, while including a wholly unacceptable applicant who 

could not meet the standards of integrity necessary in such a sensitive 

position due to addiction to drugs and whose law license had been 

suspended by the State Bar.

. . . .

The Court finds this qualification and interview process was 

designed to orchestrate the selection of the replacement administrator 

for the courts without . . . the advice or consent of the judiciary. . . .

The Court finds that . . . [Henry] abandoned his plan to force a 

hand-picked candidate as the judiciary’s chief administrative officer, 

yet, used the ability to set the salary for the new position at a sufficiently 

low salary to continue to control the hiring process.

. . . .

[Henry’s] staff member Tyler Drummond was assigned to 

determine the salary for the new judicial administrator. Mr. Drummond 

graduated from a Vermont law school two years ago and did not 
21

demonstrate knowledge about courts, administrative duties of the 

courts, and court administrators. He had prior experience working for 

the Vermont legislature.

. . . [Drummond] performed his salary search without including 

the salaries from other area counties and without input from the 

Galveston judiciary, or the judiciary in any of his comparative counties.

. . . .

. . . [And he] used standards he designed without sufficient 

expertise to establish an appropriate salary range for such a position.

. . . [Drummond’s] salary survey process was arbitrary and 

designed to orchestrate the salary of the replacement administrator for 

the courts at the lowest possible level, improperly undermining the 

independence of the judiciary.

. . . .

[And] Henry’s attempts to force his will as to employment of the 

judicial administrator included the attempt to intimidate the Galveston 

judges by including filing complaints with the Judicial Conduct 

Commission as part of the Agenda for June 9 and June 13 

Commissioner’s Court meetings.

The Court finds that [Cox] has demonstrated irreparable injury if 

a temporary injunction is not issued as shown by the conduct of 

[Henry,] who attempted to stymie the effort of the judges to restore a 

judicial administrator by holding an emergency Commissioner’s Court 

meeting on June 13, 2015, to create a new judicial administrator 

position at the salary level [Henry] knew was at a salary level the 

judiciary considered arbitrarily low to attract a suitable candidate.

(Emphasis added.)

The district court concluded, in pertinent part, as follows:

• [Cox] has the probable right to recover relief in his suit that 

[Henry] may not eliminate and attempt to control the 

replacement of the administrator for the courts in Galveston 

County and, then, manipulate employment terms and applicants 

to replace the administrator position to eliminate suitable 

applicants;
22

• [Cox] and the courts of Galveston County are irreparably injured 

by the acts committed by [Henry], and will be irreparably 

injured by further acts, to interfere with the administrative ability 

of the courts to perform their judicial functions;

• the last peaceable status quo should be restored pending final trial 

in the case; and,

• if not enjoined, [Henry] will continue to deny administrative 

support for the Galveston County courts, further interfering with 

the independence of the Galveston County judiciary and the 

ability of the Galveston County judiciary to perform its judicial 

functions.

(Emphasis added.)

Based on its findings and conclusions, the district court ordered Judge Henry,

and “his agents, servants, and representatives, and all those acting in concert with 

him”:

[to] restore the employment of the Justice Administration Director 

[Quiroga] as an employee of Galveston County, under the same terms, 

judicial administrative organization, and salary scale of employment, 

as employed on July 23, 2014, to perform all administrative duties 

serving the courts of Galveston County as performed on July 23, 2014, 

which employment shall be supervised by the Galveston County local 

Administrative Judge. . . .

. . . [And] perform all necessary actions to carry out the reinstatement 

of [Quiroga] to her position as Galveston County Justice Administrator, 

including, but not limited to:

a. issuing to [her] a key to her office in the Justice Center;

b. directing IT to provide a computer and access to Galveston 

County Employee e-mail and other systems necessary for the 

performance of her job duties;

c. providing [her] with a phone for her office; 
23

d. directing Human Resources to allow [her] to complete all 

paperwork for her to be reinstated, effective June 8, 2015, as a 

full time employee; and

e. directing the Treasurer to reinstate [her], effective June 8, 2015, 

and pay . . . [her] her same salary as was paid prior to July 24, 

2014.

The district court further enjoined Henry, “his agents, servants, and representatives, 

and all those acting in concert with him,” from:

1. Taking any action on the matters:

(a) relating to [the] application by county and district court 

judges for authority to appoint administrative employees 

for the courts other than in compliance with this temporary 

injunction;

(b) relating to justice administration other than in compliance 

with this temporary injunction;

(c) relating to Galveston County staff and agents regarding 

[Quiroga] other than in compliance with this temporary 

injunction;

(d) relating to Galveston County facilities used by Galveston 

County courts, court staff, and administrative staff other 

than in compliance with this temporary injunction; and

(e) relating to applications to appoint court administrative 

employees other than in compliance with this temporary 

injunction.

. . . .

2. Barring entrance to the Galveston County Justice Center by 

Justice Administration personnel, including [Quiroga].

3. Preventing or impeding in any way the provision of, and the use 

of, county equipment and furnishings necessary to Justice

Administration personnel, including [Quiroga], to perform their 

administrative duties.

4. Instructing any Galveston County employees to disregard 

directives, instructions, or requests of Justice Administration, 
24

including [Quiroga], to perform the duties of Justice 

Administration.

5. Appointing or employing any person other than [Quiroga] to 

perform the duties of [DJA] as directed by [Cox].

6. Reassigning or relocating any employee who was an employee 

of Justice Administration on July 23, 2014, including but not 

limited to [Quiroga], Monica Gracia, and Deputy Clint Purcell.

7. Taking any action to prevent or impede access by Justice 

Administration personnel, including [Quiroga], Monica Gracia, 

and Deputy Clint Purcell, to the offices occupied by Justice 

Administration on July 23, 2014.

The district court also ordered that Henry “his agents, servants, and representatives, 

and all those acting in concert with him,” 

restore Justice Administration under the same terms, judicial 

administrative organization, and salary scale of employment as existed 

on July 23, 2014, so that Justice Administration may perform all 

administrative duties serving the courts of Galveston County as 

performed on July 23, 2014, which duties shall be supervised by the 

Galveston County Administrative Judge.

(Emphasis added.) And it ordered that Henry “immediately provide written notice” 

of the court’s order to each of the commissioners and all County “Department 

Heads” and employees under the supervision of the commissioner’s court. The 

district court further noted that its temporary injunction did not include Quiroga 

“performing any duties relating to the law library, pretrial, or recovering costs.” And 

it set the case for trial and set a bond.

 Standard of Review
25

The sole issue in a temporary injunction proceeding is whether the applicant 

may preserve the status quo of the litigation’s subject matter pending trial on the 

merits. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). The “status 

quo” is defined as “the last, actual, peaceable, noncontested status which preceded 

the pending controversy.” In re Newton, 146 S.W.3d 648, 651 (Tex. 2004). 

To obtain a temporary injunction, an applicant is not required to establish that 

he will prevail upon a final trial on the merits, but must plead and prove (1) a cause 

of action against the defendant, (2) a probable right to the relief sought, and (3) a 

probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 

204; Occidental Chem. Corp. v. ETC NGL Transp., LLC, 425 S.W.3d 354, 363 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. dism’d). An irreparable injury is shown if 

there is no adequate remedy at law, i.e., the applicant cannot be adequately 

compensated in damages or damages cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary 

standard. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204.

We review the district court’s order granting the temporary injunction for a 

clear abuse of discretion. Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993); 

Occidental Chem. Corp., 425 S.W.3d at 363. Accordingly, we will not reverse the 

district court’s order unless it is “so arbitrary as to exceed the bounds of reasonable 

discretion.” Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211; Occidental Chem. Corp., 425 S.W.3d at 

363. The scope of our review is limited to the validity of the temporary injunction 
26

order; we do not review the merits of the underlying case. Walling, 863 S.W.2d at 

58; INEOS Grp. Ltd. v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 312 S.W.3d 843, 848 (Tex. 

App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). 

We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s

ruling, drawing all legitimate inferences from the evidence, and deferring to the 

district court’s resolution of conflicting evidence. INEOS Grp. Ltd., 312 S.W.3d at 

848. A court abuses its discretion if it misapplies the law to established facts. Id. 

An abuse of discretion does not occur as long as there is some evidence that 

reasonably supports the court’s decision. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211.

The Inherent Powers of the Texas Judiciary

At the outset, it must be noted that at the core of Judge Cox and the judges’

complaints against Judge Henry, and, thus, the resolution of most of the issues 

presented by Henry in his appeal of the district court’s temporary injunction, is the 

fundamental constitutional principle that the Texas Judiciary, as a separate, equal, 

and independent branch of government, has certain well-established inherent 

powers. 

Texas courts “derive” their existence and “judicial power directly” from the 

Texas Constitution. Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 755 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Tex. 1988) 

(Spears, J., concurring) (citing TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1); see also Vondy v. Comm’r’s 

Court of Uvalde Cty., 620 S.W.2d 104, 109–10 (Tex. 1981); Eichelberger v. 
27

Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398–99 (Tex. 1979). Indeed, the “judicial power”

of Texas is “vested” in our constitutionally established courts, which constitute and 

operate as a separate and equal branch of government. TEX. CONST. art. II, §1; id.

art. V, § 1. 

Moreover, the Texas Constitution, unlike the United States Constitution, 

contains a specific, strongly-worded provision, entitled “The Powers of 

Government,” which mandates a strict separation of powers among the state’s 

Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Departments. See TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1. And 

the drafters of the Texas Constitution thought the provision so important that they 

placed it in article II, ahead of the separate articles establishing the Legislative, 

Executive, and Judicial Departments of the state’s government. See id. arts. III, IV, 

V. Only the Texas Bill of Rights, contained in article I of the Constitution, precedes 

the Separation of Powers Provision in prominence of place. See id. art. I, §§ 1–34. 

The provision expressly states: 

The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided 

into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a 

separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are Legislative to 

one; those which are Executive to another[;] and those which are 

Judicial to another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of 

one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached 

to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly 

permitted.

Id. art. II, § 1 (emphasis added).
28

The judicial power of the state is divided among the various constitutionally 

established courts “by means of express grants of jurisdiction contained in the 

constitution and statutes.” Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398. In addition to these 

express grants of judicial power, courts have “inherent” and “implied” powers “not 

expressly authorized or described by the constitution or statute.” Id. (emphasis 

added). These powers are “woven into the fabric of the constitution by virtue of 

their origin in the common law” and “the mandate of . . . the separation of powers 

between three co-equal branches.” Id. (citing TEX.CONST. art. II, § 1). As explained 

by the Texas Supreme Court:

The inherent judicial power of a court is not derived from legislative 

grant or specific constitutional provision, but from the very fact that the 

court has been created and charged by the constitution with certain 

duties and responsibilities. The inherent powers of a court are those 

which it may call upon to aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in the 

administration of justice, and in the preservation of its independence 

and integrity. Inherent power of the courts has existed since the days 

of the Inns of Court in common law English jurisprudence. . . . It also 

springs from the doctrine of separation of powers between the three 

governmental branches. . . . This power exists to enable our courts to 

effectively perform their judicial functions and to protect their dignity, 

independence and integrity.

Id. at 388–89 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 

In Vondy, the Texas Supreme Court further explained that Texas courts have 

the inherent power to compel payment of sums of money if they are reasonable and 

necessary in order to carry out the court’s mandated responsibilities. 620 S.W.2d at 

109. This inherent power is “necessary for the judiciary to carry out its functions, 
29

independently of the other branches of government,” and “protect and preserve the 

judicial powers from impairment or destruction.” Id. The court noted that courts 

across the nation have employed their inherent powers to hire staff and require that 

salaries be paid for secretaries, probation officers, and assistants. Id. at 110 (citations 

omitted). It also noted that in 1857, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania required a

county to compensate a constable for his services because of the benefit derived by 

the county for such services in the preservation of order and administration of justice. 

Id. (citing Lancaster Cty. v. Brinthall, 29 Pa. 38, 40 (1857)). 

Accordingly, the Texas Supreme Court held that “the county commissioners 

of Uvalde County must compensate the county’s constables” because “[t]he judicial 

system of this state cannot function properly if those officials who are responsible 

for carrying out certain duties in that process are not properly compensated” and “[i]t

is the duty of the commissioners court to provide process servers as a necessary part 

of the proper administration of justice in this state, and to compensate them 

adequately.” Id. (citations omitted). The court noted the fact that the 

commissioner’s court “is also part of the judicial branch of this state.” Id. (citing 

TEX. CONST. art V, § 1). But it concluded “this fact does not alter our powers to 

protect and preserve the judiciary by compelling payment for process servers.” Id.

In fact, when making fiscal and budgetary decisions, a commissioner’s court 
30

exercises its legislative function. See Comm’rs Court of Titus Cty. v. Agan, 940 

S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex. 1997). And, as emphasized by the court,

The legislative branch of this state has the duty to provide the judiciary 

with the funds necessary for the judicial branch to function adequately. 

If this were not so, a legislative body could destroy the judiciary by 

refusing to adequately fund the courts. The judiciary must have the 

authority to prevent any interference with or impairment of the 

administration of justice in this state.

Vondy, 620 S.W.2d at 110 (emphasis added).

Again emphasizing that Texas courts derive their judicial power directly from 

the constitution and it “expressly mandates a separation of governmental powers,” 

the Texas Supreme Court, in Mays, expressly stated that “even in the absence of a 

statutory provision, a court has the inherent power to compel the expenditure of those 

public funds which are reasonably necessary for the court to efficiently fulfill its 

constitutional function.” 755 S.W.2d at 80 (citing Vondy, 620 S.W.2d at 109–10;

Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398–99). Thus, “[o]n this basis alone, a district judge 

may set a reasonable salary” for court staff. Mays, 755 S.W.2d at 80. 

Writing for the majority of the court in Mays,

13 Justice Franklin Spears further 

elaborated: 

Like the power to punish for contempt, a court’s inherent power to 

compel funding flows from the law of self-preservation. No legislative 

 

13 We note that although Justice Spears’ opinion in Mays is labeled a concurring 

opinion, four other justices joined the opinion and, in it, the majority of the court

simply elaborated on its previous discussions of the inherent powers of Texas courts. 

See 755 S.W.2d at 80.
31

authority, state or local, can so tighten the purse strings of the 

judiciary’s budget that it fails to provide the funds reasonably necessary 

for the court’s efficient and effective operation. To adhere to any 

contrary view would effectively concede to the legislature the power to 

render inoperative the judicial branch of government. It could force 

the judiciary into the role of a subordinate and supplicant governmental 

service—in effect, a mere agency. The judiciary is not an agency, but 

is a constitutionally established separate, equal and independent 

branch of government. 

Id. (citing LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Tex. 1986)) (emphasis added). 

Thus, the “inherent power of the courts is necessary not only to preserve the judicial 

branch of government, but also to preserve for the people their security and 

freedom.” Id. Indeed, 

The judicial power provides a check on the abuse of authority by other 

governmental branches. If the courts are to provide that check, they 

cannot be subservient to the other branches of government but must 

ferociously shield their ability to judge independently and fairly. This 

is the essence of our very existence; we owe the people of Texas no less 

than our unflinching insistence on a true tripartite government. It is the 

responsibility of this court to preserve this constitutional framework. 

The inherent power of the courts to compel funding thus arises out of 

principles and doctrines that are so thoroughly embedded as to form 

the very foundation of our governmental structure. The judiciary may 

often be denominated as the “third” branch of government, but that does 

not mean it is third in importance; it is in reality one of three equal 

branches. As such, the judiciary is an integral part of our government 

and cannot be impeded in its function by legislative intransigence in 

funding.

Id. at 80–81(emphasis added).

Again, the court in Mays noted that courts across the nation have used their 

inherent powers to compel funding for a wide variety of essentials, including 
32

janitorial services, chairs and carpeting, tape recording equipment, telephone 

services, and air conditioning equipment. Id. at 80–82 (citations omitted). And 

“[n]umerous courts have held that the hiring of court personnel and the designation 

of staff salaries are matters over which courts may properly exercise their inherent 

powers.” Id. at 82 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 

With this in mind, the court noted that the Supreme Court of Indiana had 

expressly recognized that the “power of the courts to employ necessary personnel 

and fix their salaries” is “grounded on the most fundamental of constitutional 

principles.” Id. (citing Noble Cty. Council v. State ex. Rel. Fifer, 125 N.E.2d 709, 

714 (Ind. 1955)). And it quoted the Indiana court’s reasoning:

These [constitutional] mandates necessarily carry with them the right 

to quarters appropriate to the office and personnel adequate to perform 

the functions thereof. The right to appoint a necessary staff of 

personnel necessarily carries with it the right to have such appointees 

paid a salary commensurate with their responsibilities. The right 

cannot be made amenable to and/or denied by a county council or the 

legislature itself. Our courts are the bulwark, the final authority which 

guarantees to every individual his right to breathe free, to prosper and 

be secure within the framework of a constitutional government. The 

arm which holds the scales of justice cannot be shackled or made 

impotent by either restraint, circumvention or denial by another branch 

of that government.

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Noble Cty. Council, 125 N.E.2d at 714). The court in 

Mays also noted that many courts have “expressly concluded that, as a matter of 

constitutional law, the judiciary must directly control court personnel.” Id. (citations 

omitted). 
33

Moreover, the court further explained that “courts may even compel payment 

of those expenses which are reasonably necessary for the court to exercise its 

inherent powers. Thus, if it becomes necessary for a court to retain counsel in order 

to litigate an exercise of inherent powers, then payment of attorney fees may also be 

compelled.” Id. (citation omitted).

With these important constitutional principles in mind, we turn to the issues 

presented in this appeal.14

Mootness

In his first issue, Judge Henry argues that the district court’s temporary 

injunction has become moot on appeal because the Texas Legislature recently 

 

14 Our dissenting colleague asserts that the district court, in its temporary injunction 

order did not expressly “rely on the judiciary’s inherent authority.” And we note 

that the district court did not make reference to the Separation of Powers Provision 

of the Texas Constitution. However, the district court, in issuing its temporary 

injunction, specifically found that Judge Henry had “intentionally interfered with 

the independence of the Galveston County judiciary” and its “ability” to perform its 

judicial functions, and he would “continue” to do so. As noted above, Texas courts 

have the inherent power to “protect and preserve” their “judicial powers from 

impairment or destruction,” and this power is “necessary for the judiciary to carry 

out its functions, independently of the other branches of government.” Vondy, 620 

S.W.2d at 109. Although the district court did not expressly refer to its inherent 

power in issuing the temporary injunction order, this power necessarily formed the 

basis of the order, especially given the fact that Judge Cox invoked it and the 

Separation of Powers Provision in his request for the temporary injunction. 

We note that Judge Henry, in his briefing to this Court, does not present an issue in 

which he challenges the inherent powers of the Texas Judiciary to protect and 

preserve the proper administration of the judicial system, nor does he contend that 

the district, in entering the temporary injunction, acted outside of the scope of its 

inherent power.
34

amended the Texas Government Code to, “[f]or the first time,” provide “specific 

authority for the creation of a county-funded court administrative system for the 

district courts collectively in counties like Galveston County” and the amendment 

became effective on September 1, 2015. (Emphasis added.) See Act of May 27, 

2015, 84th Leg., R.S., S.B. 1913, ch. 966, §1–2 (codified as an amendment to TEX.

GOV’T CODE ANN. § 75.401) (referred to hereafter as TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.

§ 75.401 (Vernon Supp. 2015)). He further argues that because the “new 

amendments to section 75.401” “now give authority to the judges in Galveston 

County” “to appoint Ms. Quiroga to the new Court Administrator position,” “where 

she would be supervised by those judges and serve at their pleasure,” and “now

clearly gives” the commissioners court “the authority to set the salary for that 

position,” the temporary injunction “does not have any practical effect on an existing 

controversy.” (Emphasis added.) 

“[C]ourts have an obligation to take into account intervening events that may 

render a lawsuit moot.” Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 166–67 

(Tex. 2012). Appellate courts lack jurisdiction to decide moot controversies and 

render advisory opinions. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 

86 (Tex. 1999). A justiciable controversy between the parties must exist at every 

stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal, or the case is moot. Williams v. 

Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001). “If a controversy ceases to exist—the issues 
35

presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the 

outcome—the case becomes moot.” Id. The same is true if an appellate court’s 

judgment cannot have any practical legal effect upon a then existing controversy. 

Zipp v. Wuemling, 218 S.W.3d 71, 73 (Tex. 2007). A case may become moot by 

reason of new legislation or acts that supersede existing legislation. In re Gruebel, 

153 S.W.3d 686, 689 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, orig. proceeding). However, a case 

is not moot if some issue is still in controversy. Id.

Section 75.401, as amended, provides:

(a) In a county that has more than one district court or statutory 

county court, those courts may establish and maintain, on 

approval of the commissioners court, a court administrator 

system.

(b) The judges of the district courts or the statutory county courts 

may by local rule designate local court divisions and the duties 

of the court administrator for each division, if applicable. The 

court administrator shall cooperate with regional, presiding, and 

local administrative judges and state agencies having duties 

relating to the operation of the courts to promote uniform and 

efficient administration of justice.

(c) The court administrator is appointed by the judges of the district 

courts or the statutory county courts served by the court 

administrator. The court administrator serves at the pleasure of 

those judges.

(d) A court administrator is entitled to reasonable compensation, as 

determined by the judges served and in the salary range for the 

position, as set by the commissioners court.

(e) The judges of the courts served by the court administrator, with 

the approval of the commissioners court, shall appoint 

appropriate staff and support personnel according to the needs of 

the local jurisdiction.
36

(f) On order and directive of the judges, the commissioners court 

shall fund the court administrator system from fines collected by 

the courts served by the court administrator. If the fines collected 

are insufficient to provide the total funding for the program, the 

county shall provide the additional funds needed.

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 75.401 (emphasis added). 

The legislature explained that it amended section 75.401 because “interested 

parties” had “contend[ed] that there [was] a need to clarify the statutory authority of 

judges to hire a county court administrator in a county served by multiple district 

courts and statutory county courts.” House Comm. on Judiciary & Civ. 

Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 1913, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015) (emphasis 

added). The previous version of section 75.401 discussed the authority of courts in 

counties with “more than one” “county criminal court or more than one county court 

at law” “to establish a court administrator system.” Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., 

R.S., ch. 480, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1720, 2015 (amended 2009). The amended 

version discusses the establishment and maintenance of a court administrator system 

by courts in counties that have “more than one district court or statutory county 

court.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 75.401(a). The current version of section 75.401,

as did the previous version, recognizes that the court administrator “is appointed by 

the judges” of the courts served by the administrator and “serves at” their “pleasure.” 

Compare TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 75.401(b), (c), with Act of May 17, 1985, 69th 

Leg., R.S., ch. 480, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1720, 2015 (amended 2009). 
37

Moreover, the current version of section 75.401, as did the previous version, 

recognizes that a court administrator “is entitled to reasonable compensation.” 

Compare TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 75.401(d), with Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., 

R.S., ch. 480, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1720, 2015 (amended 2009). 

Judge Cox argues that the district court’s temporary injunction is not moot 

because, regardless of the recent changes made to section 75.401, this case “directly 

involves the constitutional prerogative of the trial judges, who have a wellestablished right to select judicial personnel and to have them reasonably 

compensated by the commissioners.” See Mays, 755 S.W.2d at 80–82; Vondy, 620 

S.W.2d at 109–10. He asserts that these rights are “recognized” in section 75.401 

and Judge Henry and the commissioners court, relying on the fact that the legislature 

has recently amended the statute, are merely attempting “to rig” the compensation 

of the court administrator “so as to” illegally “control [the] selection process.” Cox

further asserts that Henry illegally “fire[d] Ms. Quiroga,” “arrogate[d] to himself and 

his staff the selection of a successor,” and “compounded the harm by attempting to 

cut the judges out of the selection process,” “flimflam[ing] the system by a stacked

salary review.” 

Judge Cox notes that at the time Judge Henry purportedly terminated 

Quiroga’s employment in July 2014, her compensation was set and approved by the 

commissioners court at $113,000. Henry then, based on Drummond’s unfounded 
38

“research,” recommended, and the commissioners court approved, a salary range of 

$57,705 to $63,695 for the “new” court administrator position. And Cox asserts that 

the judges cannot hire a qualified court administrator at a salary within that range, 

nor can they set any level of compensation within that range that would be 

“reasonable.” See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 75.401(d).

We first note that Judge Henry’s argument that the district court’s temporary 

injunction is moot is based entirely on the false premise that the “new amendments 

to section 75.401,” “[f]or the first time,” gave the Galveston County Judiciary the 

authority “to appoint Ms. Quiroga to the new position of Court Administrator.” 

Henry, in making this assertion, ignores the fact, as found by the district court, that 

the judges had “[f]ourteen years ago” “selected” Quiroga as the second DJA. And 

he ignores the well-established constitutional principle that Texas judges have the 

“inherent power to act to protect and preserve the proper administration of the 

judicial system.” Vondy, 620 S.W.2d at 109. As noted above, this includes the 

inherent power to hire staff and “compel the payment of sums of money if they are 

reasonable and necessary in order to carry out the court’s responsibilities.” Id. at 

109–10. The legislature, in amending section 75.401, did not, as Henry asserts, 

“[f]or the first time” give the Galveston County Judiciary the authority to appoint 

Quiroga to her position. It merely, in its own words, at the request of “interested 

parties,” “clarified” the judges’ “statutory authority to do so.” House Comm. on 
39

Judiciary & Civ. Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 1913, 84th Leg., R.S. 

(2015) (emphasis added).

More important, the fact that the legislature amended section 75.401 does not 

in any way “moot” the district court’s findings that

• [Judge Cox] has the probable right to recover relief in his suit 

that [Judge Henry] may not eliminate and attempt to control the 

replacement of the administrator for the courts in Galveston 

County and, then, manipulate employment terms and applicants 

to replace the administrator position to eliminate suitable 

applicants;

• [Cox] and the courts of Galveston County are irreparably injured 

by the acts committed by [Henry], and will be irreparably 

injured by further acts, to interfere with the administrative ability 

of the courts to perform their judicial functions;

• the last peaceable status quo should be restored pending final trial 

in the case; and,

• if not enjoined, [Henry] will continue to deny administrative 

support for the Galveston County courts, further interfering with 

the independence of the Galveston County judiciary and the 

ability of the Galveston County judiciary to perform its judicial 

functions.

(Emphasis added.)

Specifically, in regard to Quiroga’s position and salary as Galveston County 

DJA, the district court found: 

• [Judge Henry] intentionally interfered with the independence of 

the Galveston County judiciary and the ability of the Galveston 

County judiciary to perform its judicial functions. . . .

 Fourteen years ago, the judges selected Bonnie Quiroga as the 

second director of Judicial Administration, and such selection 

was approved by the Commissioner’s Court. . . .
40

 The director of th[e] hybrid judicial-governmental administrative 

department, called Justice Administration, reported to the 

County Judge for the county government related duties and to 

the local Administrative Judge for the judicial administrative 

duties. The principal duties of Justice Administration are 

judicial administration. . . . The Director reported daily to the 

local Administrative Judge. The Director also reported to the 

County Judge for the government related projects.

 On July 24, 2014, [Henry] terminated the employment of the 

Director of Judicial Administration from both her governmental 

related responsibilities as well as her duties to the Galveston 

County judiciary. [Henry] did not consult with the judiciary, nor 

did he advise the judiciary that he intended to terminate the 

Director of Judicial Administration’s duties performed for the 

Galveston County Courts. . . .

 [Henry’s] qualification and interview process was designed to 

orchestrate the selection of the replacement administrator for the 

courts without . . . the advice or consent of the judiciary. . . .

 [Henry] abandoned his plan to force a hand-picked candidate as 

the judiciary’s chief administrative officer, yet, used the ability 

to set the salary for the new position at a sufficiently low salary 

to continue to control the hiring process.

 [Henry’s] staff member Tyler Drummond was assigned to 

determine the salary for the new judicial administrator. . . .

 [Drummond’s] salary survey process was arbitrary and designed 

to orchestrate the salary of the replacement administrator for the 

courts at the lowest possible level, improperly undermining the 

independence of the judiciary.

 [And Henry] attempted to stymie the effort of the judges to 

restore a judicial administrator by holding an emergency 

Commissioner’s Court meeting on June 13, 2015, to create a new 

judicial administrator position at the salary level [Henry] knew 

was at a salary level the judiciary considered arbitrarily low to 

attract a suitable candidate.

(Emphasis added.)
41

The evidence presented at the injunction hearing supports the district court’s 

findings, which Henry does not challenge. Commissioner Dennard admitted that

“[t]he judges were the primary customer of the Department of Justice 

Administration.” Regardless, Henry, himself, testified that on July 24, 2014, he 

terminated Quiroga’s employment solely on his own initiative as county judge. 

Although he had discussed terminating Quiroga’s employment with one of the 

county commissioners, he did not raise the matter at a commissioners court meeting,

nor did he confer with the judges before terminating her employment. Henry also 

conceded that neither he nor the commissioners court had given Quiroga any prior 

job-performance reviews, nor had there been any documented dissatisfaction with 

her job performance. He simply opined that it was “in the public’s best interest” to 

amend the 2015 fiscal-year budget and restructure and reorganize certain County 

departments. Henry noted that after he had terminated Quiroga’s employment, “it 

was important to have that role filled,” and he then assigned, again without 

consulting Judge Cox and the judges, his own staff to “spearhead[]” the effort and 

set a salary range for the new position. And although the commissioners, in the June 

9, 2015 order, set the salary range for the new DCA position at $57,705 to $63,695, 

Drummond admitted that, in determining salary ranges for County positions, he does 

not apply any methodology that is generally accepted by counties in setting such 

salary ranges.
42

As noted above, Judge Cox testified at length about Quiroga’s many duties to 

the Galveston County Judiciary. And the district court admitted into evidence 

Quiroga’s 2005 “Job Description Certification,” the “Position Summary” of which 

states that she “manages, coordinates, directs, and plans the operations and activities 

of all courts” and lists her numerous “Essential Functions.” Cox explained that he 

was not warned prior to the termination of Quiroga’s employment, and he chronicled 

the subsequent events, including Judge Henry’s lock-out of Quiroga from her office, 

removal of her personal computer and telephone, “filing [of] criminal trespass 

warnings or notices” against her, and attempts to conduct interviews for her

replacement. 

Cox further testified that, based on his experience, Drummond’s proposed 

salary range is “not an adequate salary for this position.” And the judges, in their 

May 12, 2015 application to the commissioners court to approve the hiring of a DCA

at an annual salary of $85,000 to $120,000, included a job description and a “Salary 

Survey.” The Salary Survey includes the salary ranges, which vary from a low of 

$45,894 to a high of $149,488, for court administrators in Bexar, Collin, Dallas, 

Denton, Tarrant, and Williamson counties and indicates the number of courts to 

which each administrator reports. Cox also testified that Lubbock and Montgomery 

counties reported court administrator annual salaries of $110,000 and $100,000, 

respectively. 
43

Judge Cox further explained that despite this evidence, Judge Henry, at the 

end of one of the May 2015 “workshops,” stated that “he would never pay” the 

director in the judges’ requested salary range of $85,000 to $120,000. And Cox

noted that although the revised job description for the position of court administrator 

eliminates duties in regard to the law library, building facilities, pre-trial release, and 

collections and has fewer reporting employees, Henry’s proposed salary range is, 

based on Cox’s experience, “ridiculously low.” Moreover, the judges have not had 

a court administrator since Henry purportedly terminated Quiroga’s employment on

July 24, 2014.

Judge Henry did testify that he and the commissioners court reduced the salary 

range for the “new” DCA because “all” of the commissioners court “functions” had 

been removed from the duties of the position. And he asserted that the “new” DCA 

position has “approximately 25 percent of the responsibility that the old DJA 

position had,” based on the number of people reporting to the director. However, he 

conceded that he, in proposing the new salary range, did not consider the number of 

elected officials to whom the director reports, nor did he consider the importance of 

one duty over another. Although Henry asserts that Judge Cox has not attempted to 

hire a court administrator in the proposed salary range, this assertion wrongly 

presumes that Henry had the legal authority to terminate Quiroga’s employment, in 

regard to her duties to Cox and the judges, in the first place. This issue is yet to be 
44

decided by the district court. Moreover, the evidence reveals that Henry himself was 

unable to fill the position with a qualified candidate. Bluemer testified that after she

had publicly posted the position, she selected the “10 to 15” candidates who “fit the 

role,” conducted telephone interviews, narrowed the field to “four,” and set up 

interviews with Henry and Dennard. Ultimately, Henry and Dennard chose three 

“final” candidates, none of whom, according to Bluemer, had any experience in 

court administration. 

We defer to the district court’s resolution of conflicting evidence. See INEOS 

Grp. Ltd., 312 S.W.3d at 848. The district court was free to believe Judge Cox, and 

credit evidence in his favor, and to disbelieve Judge Henry, and discredit evidence 

in his favor. Based on the evidence, the district court could have reasonably 

concluded, as it did, that Henry, by purporting to unilaterally terminate Quiroga’s 

employment, had intentionally denied administrative support for Cox and the judges

and interfered with the independence of the Galveston County Judiciary and its 

ability to perform its judicial functions. And, based on the evidence, the district 

court could have reasonably concluded, as it did, that Henry would continue to do 

so. Thus, the district court’s issuance of the temporary injunction was in accord with 

the valid exercise of its inherent power to act to protect and preserve the proper 
45

administration of justice.15 And the recent amendments to section 75.401, which 

became effective on September 1, 2015, do not vitiate the district court’s findings

and conclusions. 

Although section 75.401 recognizes that the commissioners court has the

discretion to set a salary range for Quiroga’s position, this power cannot be used

arbitrarily or unreasonably or in a manner that interferes with Judge Cox and the 

judges’ inherent powers and abilities to perform their judicial functions effectively. 

See Mays, 755 S.W.2d at 83; Vondy, 620 S.W.2d at 109–10; Eichelberger, 582 

S.W.2d at 398–99. The ultimate resolution of the salary dispute is yet to be decided 

by the district court and is outside the scope of our review, which is limited to the 

validity of the temporary injunction.

16

 See INEOS Grp. Ltd., 312 S.W.3d at 848.

We conclude that there remains a justiciable controversy regarding Judge 

Henry’s purported termination of Quiroga’s employment and his attempts, as found 

by the district court, to influence the judges’ decision to keep Quiroga as their 

administrator and interfere with the independence and ability of the judges to 

 

15 Of course, Judge Cox and the judges also have the same inherent power. See Mays, 

755 S.W.2d at 80–83; Vondy, 620 S.W.2d at 109.

16 Our dissenting colleague asserts that the district court “erred in setting a specific 

salary; instead, it should have instructed the commissioners court to set a new—and 

reasonable—salary for Quiroga’s new position.” However, the court has not set a 

permanent salary for Quiroga, nor has it permanently reinstated her to the DJA 

position. It merely entered the temporary injunction to preserve the status quo 

pending trial on these ultimate issues.
46

perform their duties by setting an “arbitrarily low” salary range for her position. See

Vondy, 620 S.W.2d at 109–10; Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 399; Griffin v. Birkman, 

266 S.W.3d 189, 195 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied); Hooten v. Enriquez, 

863 S.W.2d 522, 528–29 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1993, no pet.). Accordingly, we hold 

that the district court’s temporary injunction order is not moot.

We overrule Judge Henry’s first issue.

Jurisdiction

In his second issue, Judge Henry argues that the district court lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction to issue the temporary injunction because Judge Cox “lack[s]

standing to seek an injunction reinstating [Quiroga] to her old job at her old salary”; 

“[l]egislative immunity bars this suit . . . as a matter of law”; and “the other county 

commissioners are indispensable parties and their absence is jurisdictional.” 

Whether a district court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law 

that we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 

217, 228 (Tex. 2004). 

Standing

Judge Henry first argues that Judge Cox “lacked standing to seek an 

injunction” because “[t]he injury alleged in this case was suffered only by Bonita 

Quiroga—being terminated from her job” as DJA. He asserts that Cox “did not 

demonstrate that he had standing ‘in his official capacity as Judge of the 56th District 
47

Court of Galveston County’ to seek an injunction reinstating Ms. Quiroga to her old 

job.” 

In response, Judge Cox asserts that “Quiroga was not the only party injured”; 

rather, “[a]nother distinct casualty was the constitutionally grounded ability of 

judges to select competent personnel and to have them adequately compensated.” 

Standing is implicit in the concept of subject-matter jurisdiction, and subjectmatter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case. Tex. Ass’n 

of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). Thus, standing is 

never presumed, cannot be waived, and may be raised for the first time on appeal. 

Id. at 443–44. The test for standing requires that there be a real controversy between 

the parties that will actually be determined by the judicial declaration sought. 

Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cty. Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. 1996). 

Without a breach of a legal right belonging to the plaintiff, no cause of action can 

accrue to his benefit. Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Tex. 1976). 

A plaintiff has standing when he is personally aggrieved, regardless of 

whether he is acting with legal authority. Nootsie, Ltd., 925 S.W.2d at 661. He has 

standing if: (1) he has sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, some 

direct injury as a result of the wrongful act of which he complains; (2) he has a direct 

relationship between the alleged injury and claim sought to be adjudicated; (3) he 

has an individual stake in the controversy; (4) the challenged action has caused him 
48

some injury in fact; or (5) he is an appropriate party to assert the public’s interest in 

the matter as well as his own interest. Lake Medina Conservation Soc., Inc./BexarMedina Atascosa Counties WCID No. 1 v. Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n, 

980 S.W.2d 511, 515–16 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied); Billy B., Inc. v. Bd. 

of Trustees, 717 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ). 

A plaintiff has the burden of alleging facts that affirmatively demonstrate a 

court’s jurisdiction to hear a cause. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. And we 

construe the allegations in the pleadings in favor of the pleader. Id. A court deciding 

an issue of standing is not required to look solely to the pleadings, but may consider 

evidence, and must do so when necessary, to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. 

Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000); In re Shifflet, 462 

S.W.3d 528, 537 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, orig. proceeding). A 

challenge to standing cannot be used to require the party to prove his entire case but 

should be limited to facts that might be characterized as primarily jurisdictional. See 

Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 554; In re Shifflet, 462 S.W.3d at 537.

Judge Henry’s argument that Judge Cox lacks standing to seek injunctive 

relief from the district court is based on the false premise that “[t]he injury alleged 

in this case was suffered only by Bonita Quiroga—being terminated from her job” 

as DJA. (Emphasis added.) In fact, Cox alleges that he suffers “imminent, 

“ongoing,” and “irreparable” harm because Henry has interfered with the ability of 
49

Cox’s court to properly perform its judicial functions. And Cox seeks “enforcement 

of constitutional rights and powers under the inherent power of the courts to demand 

and receive adequate funding, personnel and facilities.” 

As noted above, the district court expressly found that Judge Henry 

“intentionally interfered with the independence of the Galveston County [J]udiciary” 

and its ability to “perform its judicial functions.” It further found that Henry “will 

continue to deny administrative support for the Galveston County courts, further 

interfering with the independence of the Galveston County [J]udiciary” and its 

ability to “perform its judicial functions.” 

In support of that finding, Judge Cox testified that Judge Henry, without notice 

to Cox and the judges, had dismantled the Department of Justice Administration, 

unilaterally terminated the employment of Quiroga, and begun reassigning court 

staff. And since September 24, 2014, Cox and his colleagues have been without a 

DJA, and, thus, without an executive to perform numerous “essential functions,”

including assisting with and managing caseloads and implementing efficient docket 

control; training court staff; arranging for personal bonds (pretrial); arranging for 

interpreters; determining the eligibility for and appointing indigent defense counsel; 

and providing for the comfort, convenience, and security of jurors. Cox further 

testified that the new salary range proposed by Drummond and Henry is so 

unreasonably low that the judges cannot fill it with a qualified candidate. 
50

Accordingly, we hold that Judge Cox has sufficiently alleged facts and 

presented evidence affirmatively demonstrating his standing to bring the instant suit 

against Judge Henry.

17

 See Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443–44; see generally

Cty. Comm’rs Court of Dall. Cty. v. Williams, 638 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. App.—

Eastland 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (practicing attorney, “due to the special interest 

attorneys have in their profession,” had standing to enjoin commissioners court from 

enforcing order allocating courtroom and library space). 

Legislative Immunity

Judge Henry next argues that “legislative immunity bars Judge Cox’s suit 

against” him “as a matter of law” because Cox’s claims involve Henry’s 

 

17 We further note, as discussed more fully above, that the district court itself possesses 

inherent powers upon which it may call “to aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in 

the administration of justice, and in the preservation of its independence and 

integrity.” Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. 1979). In 

Vondy, the Texas Supreme Court further explained that Texas courts have the 

inherent power to compel payment of sums of money if they are reasonable and 

necessary in order to carry out the court’s mandated responsibilities. 620 S.W.2d at 

109. This inherent power is “necessary for the judiciary to carry out its functions, 

independently of the other branches of government,” and “protect and preserve the 

judicial powers from impairment or destruction.” Id. “On this basis alone,” the 

district court has jurisdiction to decide the instant case and provide injunctive relief, 

including the reinstatement of Quiroga’s employment and the setting of a 

“reasonable salary” for her, pending the outcome of the trial on the merits. See 

Mays, 755 S.W.2d at 80.

Moreover, although Judge Cox did not rely upon his own inherent powers as the 

judge of the 56th District Court to order Judge Henry to show cause why he should 

not be held in contempt of Cox’s September 24, 2014 and June 8, 2015 orders, Cox 

did invoke, as discussed below, the district court’s jurisdiction and general 

supervisory control over the commissioners court by filing the instant lawsuit. See

TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 24.020 (Vernon 2004).
51

“performance,” as a member of the commissioners court, of “legislative functions 

and duties” in “passing and effectuating [commissioners court] orders” terminating 

Quiroga’s employment as DJA, creating the “new administrator position,” and 

setting the salary range for the new position.” 

Legislative immunity protects individuals from “personal liability” for actions 

performed in their legislative capacity. In re Perry, 60 S.W.3d 857, 859 (Tex. 2001). 

“‘When officials are threatened with personal liability for acts taken pursuant to their 

official duties, they may well be induced to act with an excess of caution or otherwise 

to skew their decisions in ways that result in less than full fidelity to the objective 

and independent criteria that ought to guide their conduct.’” Id. (quoting Forrester 

v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223, 108 S. Ct. 538, 542 (1988)); see also Hays Cty. v. Hays 

Cty. Water Planning P’ship, 106 S.W.3d 349, 359 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no 

pet.). 

Here, Judge Cox does not sue Judge Henry in his personal capacity; rather, 

Cox sues Henry in his official capacity as county judge. Moreover, although Henry 

filed, in the district court, a plea to the jurisdiction, he did not raise an immunity 

defense, but instead advanced other grounds. Immunity from liability does not affect 

a court’s jurisdiction to hear a case. See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 

636, 638 (Tex. 1999). Like other affirmative defenses to liability, it must be pleaded 

or it is waived. Id.; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 94. 
52

Accordingly, we hold that Judge Cox’s suit is not barred by legislative 

immunity. 

Indispensable Parties

Judge Henry next argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue a 

temporary injunction against him because Judge Cox did not join the county

commissioners, or the commissioners court as a whole, as parties to the suit. Henry 

asserts that the commissioners are “indispensable parties and their absence is a fatal 

jurisdictional defect.” 

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 

(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to 

service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his 

absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already 

parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action 

and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may 

(i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that 

interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a 

substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent

obligations by reason of his claimed interest. . . .

(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a 

person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a 

party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience 

the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be 

dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The 

factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a 

judgment rendered in the person’s absence might be prejudicial to him 

or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective 
53

provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, 

the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment 

rendered in the person’s absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the 

plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for 

non-joinder.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 39(a)–(b). “Although [rule 39] provides for joinder in mandatory 

terms, ‘there is no arbitrary standard or precise formula for determining whether a 

particular person falls within its provision.’” Longoria v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 255 

S.W.3d 174, 180 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. denied) ( quoting Cooper v. 

Tex. Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.3d 200, 204 (Tex. 1974)); see also Kodiak Res., Inc. 

v. Smith, 361 S.W.3d 246, 251 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2012, no pet.). If a district 

court determines that an absent person falls within the provisions of the rule, it has 

a duty to effect that person’s joinder. Longoria, 255 S.W.3d at 184; see TEX. R. CIV.

P. 39(a). If a person required to be joined under subsection (a) cannot be joined, the 

district court must decide “whether in equity and in good conscience the action 

should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed” by considering 

the factors listed in subsection (b). Id.; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 39(b); State Office of Risk 

Mgmt. v. Herrera, 288 S.W.3d 543, 549 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, no pet.). 

“At one time, it was at least theoretically possible that the joinder of a person 

could be so essential to a case that proceeding in the person’s absence would 

constitute fundamental error, which could be raised for the first time on appeal.”

Onwudiegwu v. Dominguez, No. 14-14-00249-CV, 2015 WL 4366213, at *4 (Tex. 
54

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Vondy, 620 

S.W.2d at 106). However, the Texas Supreme Court has held that since rule 39 was 

amended, a party complaining of a nonjoined person’s absence waives that 

complaint by failing to raise it in the district court, explaining that

[h]enceforth, it will be rare indeed when an appellate court properly 

determines that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute 

when the nonjoining person’s absence is raised for the first time on 

appeal by one of the parties in the trial court, at least insofar as the 

judgment affects parties who participated in the trial, directly or 

indirectly, or who purposely bypassed the proceedings. The doctrine 

of fundamental error should no longer protect persons from the binding 

force of judgments when they have had an opportunity to raise the 

absence of the nonjoined person and waived it.

Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 162–63 (Tex. 2004) (issue of suit 

dismissal because zoning board not joined as defendant constituted “prudential 

rather than jurisdictional question”); see also Trust Fund for Haynes v. Walden on 

Lake Conroe Cmty. Imp. Ass’n, Inc., No. 09-04-374 CV, 2006 WL 137434, at *3 

(Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 19, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (issue of whether party 

indispensable waived by failure to raise it in trial court); Wilchester W. Concerned 

Homeowners LDEF, Inc. v. Wilchester W. Fund, Inc., 177 S.W.3d 552, 558–60 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (non-joinder not jurisdictional and 

waived because not raised in trial court). 

Courts have held that there are “rare cases in which failure to name an 

indispensable party will deprive a court of jurisdiction,” i.e., “where a party 
55

responsible for enforcing a statute is not named in an action to declare that statute 

unconstitutional.” Motor Vehicle Bd. v. El Paso Indep. Auto. Dealers Ass’n, Inc., 

37 S.W.3d 538, 540–41 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, pet. denied) (trial court lacked 

jurisdiction because party enforcing blue law not named in action to declare statute 

unconstitutional); see also Herrera, 288 S.W.3d at 549 (affirming dismissal, where 

plaintiff failed to join one of two insurance carriers allegedly liable for payment of 

death claim and issue raised in petition could not be joined); Gilmer Indep. Sch. Dist. 

v. Dorfman, 156 S.W.3d 586, 588–89 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, no pet.) (holding 

commissioner of education indispensable and dismissing property owner’s suit to

declare unconstitutional two chapters of Education Code).

Again, we note that Judge Henry did not raise his joinder issue in his plea to 

the jurisdiction. Judge Cox’s pleadings establish that he seeks to temporarily enjoin 

only “the acts of Mark A. Henry” and those whom he directs or controls, or those 

“acting in concert” with him. “[C]ourts have held that a party with rights to be 

preserved pending final trial need not join all necessary parties before obtaining 

interim orders, such as a temporary injunction.” Hyde v. Ray, No. 2-03-339-CV, 

2004 WL 1277869, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 10, 2004, no pet.) (mem. 

op.); see also Speedman Oil Co. v. Duval Cty. Ranch Co., 504 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tex. 

Civ. App.—San Antonio 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“Persons against whom no 

complaint of wrongdoing is lodged and against whom no injunctive relief is sought 
56

are not indispensable parties (to a proceeding for temporary injunction). . . . [I]t may 

well be that other parties will have to be brought into the suit. . . . This, however is 

not fatal to the temporary equitable relief granted.” (internal citations omitted)). 

“Before a case is called for trial, additional parties necessary or proper parties to the 

suit, may be brought in, either by the plaintiff or the defendant, upon such terms as 

the court may prescribe.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 37. “Thus, on appeal of a preliminary 

matter, such as the issuance of [the] temporary injunction, the question of necessary 

and indispensable parties [to the suit] is not reached.” Hyde, 2004 WL 1277869, at 

*2–3. Accordingly, we hold that neither the Galveston County commissioners, nor 

the commissioners court as a whole, are indispensable parties to the district court’s 

temporary injunction. 

We overrule Judge Henry’s second issue.

Supervisory Jurisdiction

In his third issue, Judge Henry argues that the temporary injunction is “void” 

because the district court “exceeded its supervisory jurisdiction” over the 

commissioners court. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8. He further argues that the 

“district court’s exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction is invalid” because (1) the 

commissioners court “did not act beyond its jurisdiction or abuse its discretion by 

failing to perform a clear statutory duty when it (i) terminated [Quiroga’s] 

employment, (ii) created the new administrator position, and (iii) set the salary for 
57

the new position” and (2) the district court “had no authority to tell [him] who to 

appoint or what salary to pay.” (Emphasis added.) Henry asserts that although a 

district court “may order a commissioners court to set a reasonable salary for a 

county employee,” it “cannot itself determine what that salary is or tell the 

commissioners court what salary to adopt.” 

The Texas Constitution provides that a county commissioners court “shall 

exercise such powers and jurisdiction over all county business, as is conferred by 

this Constitution and the laws of the State, or as may be hereafter prescribed.” TEX.

CONST. art. V, § 18(b). The powers and duties of a commissioners court include 

legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial functions. Id. In exercising its 

powers and jurisdiction over county business, a commissioners court has implied 

authority to exercise broad discretion to accomplish the purposes intended. Griffin, 

266 S.W.3d at 194. Along with its constitutionally derived jurisdiction over “county 

business,” a commissioners court has specific statutory authority to oversee the fiscal 

operation of the county by approving and authorizing a budget. Id. (citing TEX. LOC.

GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 111.001–.095 (Vernon 2008)).

When making fiscal and budgetary decisions, a commissioners court exercises 

its legislative function. See Agan, 940 S.W.2d at 81; see also Vondy, 620 S.W.2d at 

110; Hooten, 863 S.W.2d at 528. This legislative function, “when properly 

performed, is protected from the scrutiny of the judicial branch by the 
58

constitutionally-mandated separation of powers doctrine.” Griffin, 266 S.W.3d at 

195 (emphasis added); see TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“[N]o person, or collection of 

persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly 

attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.” 

(emphasis added)). 

We note that the district court, in its order, did not expressly state the grounds 

upon which it relied in entering the temporary injunction against Judge Henry. 

Again, however, Judge Cox alleges, and the district court expressly found, that 

Henry had “intentionally interfered with the independence of the Galveston County 

[J]udiciary and [its] ability to perform its judicial functions,” and, if “not enjoined,” 

he would “continue to deny administrative support for the Galveston County courts, 

further interfering” with their independence and ability to function. Thus, in 

addressing Henry’s first issue, in which he contends that the temporary injunction 

became moot on appeal, we noted that the district court’s issuance of the injunction 

was in accord with the valid exercise of its inherent power to act to protect and 

preserve the proper administration of justice. On this ground alone, the district court 

has jurisdiction to address Cox’s complaints against Henry. See In re El Paso Cty. 

Comm’r’s Court, 281 S.W.3d at 27–28. And on this ground alone, the district court 

had the legal authority to issue the temporary injunction. 
59

As noted above, the Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that Texas 

courts have certain inherent powers, including the inherent power to compel 

payment of sums of money from the other branches of government if they are 

reasonable and necessary in order to carry out the court’s mandated responsibilities. 

Mays, 755 S.W.2d at 80; Vondy, 620 S.W.2d at 109. Again, as emphasized by the 

supreme court in Mays:

Like the power to punish for contempt, a court’s inherent power to 

compel funding flows from the law of self-preservation. No legislative 

authority, state or local, can so tighten the purse strings of the 

judiciary’s budget that it fails to provide the funds reasonably necessary 

for the court’s efficient and effective operation. To adhere to any 

contrary view would effectively concede to the legislature the power to 

render inoperative the judicial branch of government. It could force 

the judiciary into the role of a subordinate and supplicant governmental 

service—in effect, a mere agency. The judiciary is not an agency, but 

is a constitutionally established separate, equal and independent branch 

of government. 

755 S.W.2d at 80 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

In Vondy, the Texas Supreme Court specifically held that where the law 

requires that compensation be provided, commissioners courts must set “reasonable” 

salaries. 620 S.W.2d at 108–09. There, the applicable constitutional provision 

required that “all justices of the peace, constables, deputy constables and precinct 

law enforcement officers” be compensated on a salary basis. Id. at 108 (quoting 

TEX.CONST. art. XVI, § 61). The commissioners voted not to set a salary for a newly 

elected constable, asserting that by setting “no salary,” it had set “a salary.” Id. at 
60

105, 108. The commissioners argued that because the constitutional provision at 

issue did not mandate that they set a “reasonable” salary, and no statute mandated a 

minimum salary, it had the discretion to set no salary at all. Id. at 108. The supreme 

court held that the commissioners were required to compensate the county’s 

constables. Id. at 110. Noting that “[t]he judicial system of this state cannot function 

properly if those officials who are responsible for carrying out certain duties in that 

process are not properly compensated.” Id. The court explained:

The legislative branch of this state has the duty to provide the judiciary 

with the funds necessary for the judicial branch to function adequately. 

If this were not so, a legislative body could destroy the judiciary by 

refusing to adequately fund the courts. The judiciary must have the 

authority to prevent any interference with or impairment of the 

administration of justice in this state.

Id. It further explained that “[e]ven in matters involving some degree of discretion, 

the commissioners court may not act arbitrarily.” Id. at 109; see also Neeley v. W. 

Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 804 (Tex. 2005) (Vondy

demonstrates that “governmental discretion is circumscribed by the Constitution”).

In addition to the general inherent powers that a court may exercise sua sponte, 

Texas district courts specifically have “appellate jurisdiction and general 

supervisory control over the County Commissioners Court, with such exceptions and 

under such regulations as may be prescribed by law.” TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8; TEX.

GOV’T CODE ANN. § 24.020 (Vernon 2004). If a commissioners court “acts beyond 

its authority in attempting to perform its legislative function, the supervisory 
61

jurisdiction of the district court comes into play.” Griffin, 266 S.W.3d at 195; 

Hooten, 863 S.W.2d at 528. And a district court may reverse a commissioners court 

order if the latter has acted “arbitrarily, capriciously, collusively, fraudulently, or 

otherwise in abuse of its discretion.” Griffin, 266 S.W.3d at 195; Hooten, 863 

S.W.2d at 528. Thus, “a district court may enjoin a commissioners court from 

enacting a budget that fails to provide essential funding.” Randall Cty. Comm’rs 

Court v. Sherrod, 854 S.W.2d 914, 921 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1993, no pet.) (Poff, 

J., concurring) (“[I]t could be said that a budget that fails to provide such essential 

funding is not a reasonable budget.”); see also Vondy, 620 S.W.2d at 109–10 (where 

law requires compensation be provided, commissioners courts must set “reasonable” 

salaries). However, a district court, in reviewing a commissioners court’s order

under article V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution, may not substitute its judgment 

and discretion for the judgment and discretion of the commissioners court. Ector 

Cty. v. Stringer, 843 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex. 1992). If a commissioners court acts 

illegally, unreasonably, or arbitrarily, a “court of competent jurisdiction may so 

adjudge, but there the power of the court ends.” Id.

Here, the district court’s issuance of the injunction was not only in accord with 

the valid exercise of its inherent authority to protect and preserve the proper 

administration of the legal system, but it was also in accord with its supervisory 
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jurisdiction under article V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution. Again, the district 

court ruled that

• [Judge Cox] has the probable right to recover relief in his suit 

that [Judge Henry] may not eliminate and attempt to control the 

replacement of the administrator for the courts in Galveston 

County and, then, manipulate employment terms and applicants 

to replace the administrator position to eliminate suitable 

applicants;

• [Cox] and the courts of Galveston County are irreparably injured 

by the acts committed by [Henry], and will be irreparably injured 

by further acts, to interfere with the administrative ability of the 

courts to perform their judicial functions;

• the last peaceable status quo should be restored pending final trial 

in the case; and,

• if not enjoined, [Henry] will continue to deny administrative 

support for the Galveston County courts, further interfering with 

the independence of the Galveston County judiciary and the 

ability of the Galveston County judiciary to perform its judicial 

functions.

(Emphasis added.) 

And, again, in regard to Quiroga’s position as Galveston County DJA, the 

district court specifically found that Judge Henry had “intentionally interfered with 

the independence of the Galveston County [J]udiciary” and its ability “to perform 

its judicial functions.” It further found that the judges, “[f]ourteen years ago,” had 

“selected” Quiroga as “the second director of Judicial Administration,” and the 

commissioners court had approved their selection. Although the “principal duties 

of Justice Administration are judicial administration,” Henry unilaterally terminated 

Quiroga’s employment without regard to her duties to the Galveston County 
63

Judiciary and without consulting with Judge Cox and the judges or advising them

that he intended to terminate her employment. Henry then placed Bluemer in charge 

of choosing Quiroga’s replacement, even though, as found by the district court, she

“demonstrated a lack of knowledge about courts, administrative duties of the court, 

and the nature of trust and confidence necessary in any person holding this sensitive 

court position.” And she “used standards she designed to limit the consideration to 

only three applicants, eliminating applicants familiar with the Galveston County 

courts and attorneys in good standing with the State Bar.” Henry also assigned 

Drummond “to determine the salary for the new” DJA. And, as found by the district 

court, Drummond utilized a salary survey process that was “arbitrary and designed 

to orchestrate the salary of the replacement administrator for the courts at the lowest 

possible level, improperly undermining the independence of the judiciary.”

The district court further found that Judge Henry’s “qualification and 

interview process was designed to orchestrate the selection of the replacement 

administrator for the courts without . . . the advice or consent of the judiciary.” 

Although he “abandoned his plan to force a hand-picked candidate as the judiciary’s 

chief administrative officer,” Henry “used the ability to set the salary for the new 

position at a sufficiently low salary to continue to control the hiring process.” And 

he “attempted to stymie the effort of the judges to restore a judicial administrator by 

holding an emergency Commissioner’s Court meeting on June 13, 2015, to create a 
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new judicial administrator position at the salary level [Henry] knew . . . the judiciary 

considered arbitrarily low to attract a suitable candidate.”

The district court’s general and specific findings support the ultimate 

conclusion that Judge Henry, in first purporting to terminate Quiroga’s employment, 

and then working to reduce her salary to “a sufficiently low” level “to continue to 

control the hiring process,” acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and beyond his authority.

See Griffin, 266 S.W.3d at 195; Hooten, 863 S.W.2d at 528. And, as we noted in 

addressing Henry’s first issue, the evidence presented at the temporary injunction 

hearing supports the district court’s findings, which Henry does not challenge in his 

appeal. Deferring to the district court’s resolution of conflicting evidence, we 

conclude that the evidence supports the district court’s issuance of the temporary 

injunction. See INEOS Grp. Ltd., 312 S.W.3d at 848; Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211 

(abuse of discretion does not occur where some evidence reasonably supports district 

court’s decision). 

We note that the district court has not entered a ruling on a permanent 

injunction, but only on the temporary injunction. And the scope of our review is 

limited to the validity of the temporary injunction. See INEOS Grp. Ltd., 312 S.W.3d 

at 848. We further note that the district court, in its temporary injunction, did not 

purport to resolve the ultimate issues in this case. Rather, it simply ordered that the 
65

status quo, that is, the “last, actual, peaceable noncontested status that preceded the 

controversy,” be maintained pending trial. See In re Newton, 146 S.W.3d at 651. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the district court relied upon its supervisory 

jurisdiction under article V, section 8, of the Texas Constitution in issuing its 

temporary injunction, we hold that it did not exceed that authority. 

We overrule Judge Henry’s third issue.

Prior Orders

In a portion of his fourth issue, Judge Henry argues that the temporary 

injunction is “void” because the underlying temporary restraining order and Judge 

Cox’s own prior orders are void. 

“‘A temporary restraining order is one entered as part of a motion for a 

temporary injunction, by which a party is restrained pending the hearing of the 

motion. A temporary injunction is one which operates until dissolved by an 

interlocutory order or until the final hearing.’” Del Valle Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lopez, 

845 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Tex. 1992) (quoting Brines v. McIlhaney, 596 S.W.2d 519, 

523 (Tex. 1980)). Thus, a temporary restraining order restrains a party from acting 

only during the pendency of a motion for temporary injunction, i.e., until a full 

evidentiary hearing on the motion occurs. Id.; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 680. The 

expiration of a temporary restraining order renders a challenge to it moot. See 

Hermann Hosp. v. Tran, 730 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, 
66

no writ). We do not review temporary orders that are moot because such a review 

would constitute an impermissible advisory opinion. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 

Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999).

Here, as Judge Henry himself points out in his brief, the subject of Judge 

Cox’s prior orders and the temporary restraining order are subsumed in the 

temporary injunction. Thus, even were we to conclude that Cox’s prior orders and 

the temporary restraining order were void, this would not void the temporary 

injunction because the district court’s issuance of the temporary injunction was

based on the evidence adduced at the temporary injunction hearing. 

In support of his argument, Judge Henry relies on Ex parte Lesher, 651 

S.W.2d 734, 735 (Tex. 1983) (granting habeas relief after trial court held party in 

contempt for violating temporary restraining order, where trial court waived filing 

of bond), and Lodispoto v. Ruvolo, No. 05-12-01580-CV, 2013 WL 3155000, at *1 

(Tex. App.—Dallas June 19, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding trial court could not 

enforce void temporary injunction, where trial court did not set bond or trial date). 

Here, however, the district court did not issue the temporary injunction to enforce 

the temporary restraining order or Judge Cox’s prior orders; rather, the district court 

issued its temporary injunction after conducting its own evidentiary hearing. 
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Accordingly, we hold that Judge Henry’s challenges to the temporary 

restraining order and Judge Cox’s prior orders are moot. See Tran, 730 S.W.2d at 

57.

Procedural Complaints

In the remaining portion of his fourth issue, Judge Henry argues that the 

temporary injunction is void because it does not set forth the “irreparable harm that 

Judge Cox will suffer absent its issuance” and the district clerk did not approve the 

bond set by the district court. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 683, 684. 

The procedural requirements of rules 683 and 684 are mandatory. Qwest 

Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. 2000). An order 

granting a temporary injunction that does not meet these requirements is “subject to 

being declared void and dissolved.” Id. 

Rule 683 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Every order granting an injunction . . . shall set forth the reasons for its 

issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail 

and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts 

sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the 

action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and 

upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who 

receive actual notice of the order . . . .

TEX. R. CIV. P. 683. The purpose of the rule is to “‘adequately inform a party of 

what he is enjoined from doing and the reason why he is so enjoined.’” In re 

Chaumette, 456 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, orig. 
68

proceeding) (emphasis omitted) (quoting El Tacaso, Inc. v. Jireh Star, Inc., 356 

S.W.3d 740, 744 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.). A trial court must, in its order 

granting injunctive relief, set forth specific reasons why the court deems it proper to 

issue the writ to prevent injury to the applicant in the interim; that is, “the reasons 

why the court believes the applicant’s probable right will be endangered if the writ 

does not issue.” Id. Mere conclusory statements or recitals of harm are insufficient. 

Id. at 305–06 (holding void temporary-injunction order merely reciting: “The Court 

finds . . . Plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury for which he has no legal remedy if 

this injunction is not granted”); see e.g., El Tacaso, Inc. v. Jireh Star, Inc., 356 

S.W.3d 740, 747 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (conclusory statement plaintiff 

“will suffer an irreparable injury for which it has no other adequate legal remedy” 

failed to explain probable, imminent, and irreparable harm absent injunction).

Here, as discussed above, the district court’s order, which is nine pages in 

length, sets out in specific detail the reasons for its issuance. The order explains that 

Judge Henry has “interfered with” the “ability of the Galveston County judiciary to 

perform its judicial functions” by “attempting to control the replacement of the 

administrator for the courts in Galveston County.” And Judge Cox has 

“demonstrated irreparable injury if a temporary injunction is not issued,” in that 

Henry “after keeping the [court administrator] position vacant for over eleven 

months,” continues to “stymie the efforts of the judges to restore a judicial 
69

administrator.” And “if not enjoined, [Henry] will continue to deny administrative 

support for the Galveston County courts.” Because the order adequately sets out the

reasons why the district court believed that Cox’s “probable rights [would] be 

endangered if the writ [did] not issue,” we hold that the district court’s order 

complies with rule 683. See Chaumette, 456 S.W.3d at 305.

Judge Henry next argues that the temporary injunction is void because the 

bond set by the district court was not approved by the district clerk. Rule 684 

provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

In the order granting any temporary restraining order or temporary 

injunction, the court shall fix the amount of security to be given by the 

applicant. Before the issuance of the temporary restraining order or 

temporary injunction the applicant shall execute and file with the clerk 

a bond to the adverse party, with two or more good and sufficient 

sureties, to be approved by the clerk, in the sum fixed by the judge, 

conditioned that the applicant will abide the decision which may be 

made in the cause, and that he will pay all sums of money and costs that 

may be adjudged against him if the restraining order or temporary 

injunction shall be dissolved in whole or in part.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 684 (emphasis added). The failure of an applicant to file such a bond 

renders an injunction void. Benavides Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Guerra, 681 S.W.2d 246, 

250 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1984, writ refused n.r.e.).

The record shows that the district clerk approved Judge Cox’s $100 deposit in 

lieu of a bond that he filed in conjunction with the temporary restraining order. The 

district court, in issuing the temporary injunction, stated: 
70

Bond for this temporary injunction is set at $100. Finding that [Cox] 

has previously posted bond in the amount of $100, such amount shall 

be posted as bond for this injunction. . . . On the approval of the bond, 

all writs are to issue. 

At the hearing, the district court explained:

The bond—there was previously a hundred-dollar bond posted. The 

bond for the temporary injunction will be set at $100, and the prior 

bond posted will be accepted as that bond by the district clerk. The 

district clerk will have to approve that bond, make sure that’s all done.

(Emphasis added.) 

Judge Henry complains that the clerk’s record does not show that the “district 

clerk approve[d] the bond for the temporary injunction.” In support of his argument, 

he relies on Ex parte Lesher, 651 S.W.2d at 736; MW Petroleum Corp. v. Exxon 

Corp., No. 14-96-00040-CV, 1997 WL 634159, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] Oct. 16, 1997, no pet.); and Diversified, Inc. v. Turner, 650 S.W.2d 175, 177 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th] 1983, no writ). 

In Lesher, the court held that the district court erred in waiving the requirement 

of a bond prior to issuing a temporary restraining order. 651 S.W.2d at 736. Here, 

the district court did not waive the posting of a bond. In Diversified, there was no 

bond on file whatsoever. 650 S.W.2d at 177. In Exxon, which seems to tangentially 

support Judge Cox’s opposing position, the court held that the district court did not 

err in ordering that only a single bond be filed to support an injunction in a case in 

which multiple parties had joined seeking the injunction. 1997 WL 634159, at *7. 

It explained that, “as a practical matter,” there was no need to secure separate bonds. 
71

Id. The court noted that the purpose of a bond is to protect the party against whom 

relief is granted for damages incurred as the result of the injunction. Id. And it 

“[could] not see how allowing a single party to provide this protection lessens its 

effect.” Id. As “a legal matter,” the court found no authority for the contention that 

a bond by a single plaintiff to secure an injunction for the benefit of several plaintiffs 

did not satisfy the requirements of rule 684. Id.

As stated, the purpose of a temporary restraining order is to restrain a party 

from acting only during the pendency of a request for a temporary injunction, i.e., 

until a full evidentiary hearing on the temporary injunction occurs. Lopez, 845 

S.W.2d at 809; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 680. Here, at the temporary injunction hearing, 

the purpose of the temporary restraining order having expired, the district court 

ordered that Judge Cox’s prior cash deposit made in lieu of a bond supporting the 

temporary restraining order be retained as the bond securing the temporary 

injunction. See Ex parte Coffee, 328 S.W.2d 283, 285, 291–92 (Tex. 1959) (trial 

court may authorize bond filed for temporary restraining order continued as bond 

supporting temporary injunction). And this is not a case in which a party sought 

recovery on the bond given to support a temporary restraining order. We hold that 

the requisites of rule 684 have been satisfied. 

Accordingly, we hold that the district court’s injunction order is not void on 

the grounds that it fails to comply with rules 683 and 684. 
72

We overrule Judge Henry’s fourth issue.

Conclusion

In sum, the district court, in entering the temporary injunction, found that 

Judge Henry had “intentionally interfered with the independence of the Galveston 

County judiciary” and its ability “to perform its judicial functions,” and he would 

continue to do so. And the evidence presented at the temporary injunction hearing 

supports the district court’s findings. Thus, the district court had the inherent power 

to enjoin Henry from further interfering with the independence of the Galveston 

County Judiciary and to order him to perform the actions necessary to reinstate 

Quiroga to her position as Galveston County DJA with her annual salary of 

$113,000, pending trial. 

The district court, in so enjoining Henry, also acted within it supervisory 

jurisdiction under article V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution. Further, the district 

court’s temporary injunction has not become moot on appeal, the district court has 

subject matter jurisdiction over Judge Cox’s claims, and the temporary injunction is 

not void.

We recognize that it may seem somewhat counterintuitive to some members 

of the legislative and executive branches of our government that Texas courts have 

the inherent power to compel funding from them for essential court staff and 

facilities. And it may come as a surprise to some that the Texas Constitution 
73

specifically grants to Texas district courts supervisory jurisdiction over county 

commissioners courts. However, as one of our sister court’s long ago noted, “[t]hat 

the judicial branch of government possesses inherent power to require the legislative 

and executive branches to provide essential staffing and facilities for it to properly 

perform its judicial functions is no longer open to serious question.” Dist. Judges 

of 188th Judicial Dist. v. Cty. Judge and Comm’rs’ Court for Gregg Cty., 657 

S.W.2d 908, 909 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (emphasis added). 

Indeed, as explained by the Texas Supreme Court, without such powers, “a 

legislative body could destroy the judiciary by refusing to adequately fund the 

courts.” Vondy, 620 S.W.2d at 110. 

Texas courts should of course exercise their inherent powers and their 

supervisory jurisdiction over commissioners courts sparingly and carefully. They 

should always be mindful that “the process of allocating public resources is 

complex” and “[b]oth state and local legislative bodies make difficult decisions 

when faced with competing priorities.” Mays, 755 S.W.2d at 82. And the legislative 

and the executive branches should be mindful that “unlike state agencies, courts 

cannot reduce services”; “[t]he judiciary can only delay or postpone the disposition 

of justice.” Id. Thus, the judiciary simply cannot “permit its efficiency and progress 

to be stymied” by those who might “misunderstand the constitutional role and 

function of the judiciary as a separate, independent and equal branch of 
74

government.” Id. at 83. Although “the ‘power of the purse’ is a legislative power,” 

“it is not an absolute power” and “may not be used to divest the court of its ability 

to function independently and effectively.” Id.

Ultimately, as explained by the Texas Supreme Court:

Although the judiciary retains the inherent power to compel necessary 

funding, a spirit of mutual cooperation is unquestionably the people’s 

best guarantee of a constitutional government. Rather than being a 

source of contention, the judiciary’s insistence on its own inherent 

powers can open an avenue for greater cooperation among the branches 

of government. Only by recognizing each other as equals can we 

effectively communicate.

Id. (emphasis added). 

We affirm the order of the district court. We dismiss all pending motions as 

moot. 

Terry Jennings

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Brown.

Brown, J., concurring and dissenting.