UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

The War Department 

GLOBAL LOGISTICS 

AND STRATEGY 

1940-1943 

by 

Richard M. Leighton 

and 

Robert W Coakley 

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STA 1'£S ARMY 

WASHiNGTON, D. c., J 995 





Foreword

The present volume, and its successor, depict a massive achievement: the

performance by the Army of the task of effecting the orderly assembly, movement, and delivery of great masses of men and matériel throughout the world

to meet not only American requirements but also those of the other nations

fighting the Axis. The authors show how the demands of this task affected

American strategy and how it reacted on the shape and mission of the Army.

These volumes present the outlook of the War Department as a whole on

this task, rather than that of any one agency or command of the Army. Two

other volumes in the same subseries will deal with the Army's procurement of

munitions and supplies from that standpoint. The rest of the logistical story will

be told in volumes on the Army Service Forces, the seven technical services, and

the theaters of operations.

Logistical tasks account in large measure for the enormous administrative

machinery that the Army developed in the course of the war. Its development,

though not a complete surprise, exceeded all anticipations. The demand for

service troops seemed insatiable and required repeated revisions of the troop

basis. With this went a "proliferation of overhead" in the form of complex

controls and higher headquarters that ate up officers needed for the training

and leading of fighting troops, drew into the service a multitude of specialists,

and confused the chain of command. The trend ran counter to the traditional

American belief that the overriding mission of the Army is to fight, a conviction

so deep that some commanders, like General McNair, fought to keep the Army

lean and simple. In World War II they lost this fight.

Those who fear that administration is supplanting combat as the primary

mission of the Army will find much to ponder in this book and its companion

volumes.

A. C. SMITH

Major General, USA

Chief, Military History

Washington, D. C. 12 March 1954

vii
The Authors

Richard M. Leighton, who received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in

History from Cornell University, has taught in Brooklyn College, the University

of Cincinnati, and George Washington University. During World War II, commissioned in the Quartermaster Corps, he was assigned to the Control Division,

Headquarters, Army Service Forces, as a historical officer, and wrote various

studies on the organization and administration of that command.

Robert W. Coakley, who has a Ph. D. in History from the University of

Virginia, has taught in that university, Tulane University, the University of

Arkansas, and the Fairmont State College, West Virginia. After serving as a

noncommissioned officer in Headquarters Battery, 927th Field Artillery Battalion, 102d Infantry Division, he became a member of the Historical Division

of ETOUSA and USFET and wrote for that office the studies, "Organization

and Command in ETO" and "Supply of the Army of Occupation."

Since 1948 the authors have been members of the Logistics Section of this

Office. Dr. Leighton is chief of the section.

viii
Preface

The great conflict of 1939-45 was not the first world war (nor even the

second), nor was it the first war that drove some of its participants close to the

limits of their material resources. But in the combination of these characteristics

it brought forth problems, in the technical and administrative spheres, of a

degree if not of a kind that was new in the history of warfare. World War II produced, in effect, a new logistics—new in that it was at once interconnected and

global. Every local logistical problem was part of a larger whole; none could be

settled without consideration of the impact its settlement would have on other

local problems, often in a widening circle of repercussions rippling clear

around to the other face of the world. As the war itself was global, the logistics

of each battle or campaign often had world-wide ramifications, even though the

outcome of the operation itself might be purely local in its effects. A handful of

landing craft, two or three freighters, a few precious tanks used at one spot

might mean a desperate lack somewhere else.

In this volume we have viewed the logistical problems of the U.S. Army in

World War II from the point of view that most accentuated their interconnected

and global character—the point of view of the high command and staffs in

Washington. We have confined ourselves to those large problems that more or

less constantly engaged the attention of the high command: transportation

across oceans and continents—division of effort and resources in a coalition of

sovereign, unequally endowed nations, different in their interests and outlook—

co-ordination of logistical support of "joint" operations employing land, sea,

and air power in varying admixtures—development of effective planning techniques for anticipating needs in men and matériel long before they emerged—

organizational and administrative difficulties attendant upon mobilization and

an unprecedented expansion of the nation's military power—the delicate relationships between strategy and logistics, especially in the formulation of strategic

plans—the frictions of interagency co-ordination, both within the Military

Establishment and between it and the civilian authorities. The most persistent

theme is the chronic, pervasive competition for resources—a competition that

was scarcely diminished even when the war machine began to pour out those

resources with a prodigality the world had never before seen.

This approach has its disadvantages. In looking out from the center at a

distant horizon, so to speak, we may have missed some of the hard and humdrum reality of logistics, as many of our readers no doubt experienced it—

ix
perhaps while driving a truck in New Guinea or, on another war front, while

inventorying underwear and blankets in a North Carolina warehouse. Of such

realities a Yankee friend of ours, learning one day in 1944 that he was about to

be transferred from this latter war front to a more active one overseas, scribbled

a few exultant verses:

Shake, shake, oh dust of Charlotte, from my feet!

Leave off, oh rebel twangings, from my ears;

Unpackage me, oh package factory, That from your ancient war that never ends

I may go on to this one that today

Is real ... .

This reaction was understandable. The "package factory" in North Carolina

was unexciting enough, Heaven knows, yet it was indispensable to the "real"

war that our friend yearned to see. It was, in fact, one of the realities of the

Army's logistical experience that, regrettably, does not figure largely in this

book.

In so broad an approach, moreover, certain topical omissions have been

unavoidable in the effort to achieve, within the space at our disposal, a reasonable depth of treatment. We have made no attempt to cover the entire potpourri

of activities that official usage in recent years has labeled as "logistics." Most of

the subject areas here treated only lightly or not at ail have been assigned to

other volumes in the series—such areas as training, military procurement and

manpower, the administration of the Army's establishment in the United

States, the internal logistics of overseas theaters, and the detailed aspects of the

various specialized commodity and service activities for which the Army's technical services were responsible. We have left to the historians of the Army Air

Forces, moreover, the task of treating the logistics of air power. What remains,

in general, is a central view of the logistics of ground warfare, heavily accenting

supply and transportation, and bounded in space on one side by the factory and

depot in the United States, on the other by the overseas port or beachhead.

Chronologically, the book covers the prewar mobilization period and the first

year and a half of American participation in the war, stopping on the eve of the

Washington conference of May 1943. A second volume, now in preparation,

will carry the story through to the end of the war.

This is a work of collaboration. Very few chapters are solely the product of

one author's labors. With little visible strain upon good nature or friendship,

we have freely exchanged criticism and suggestions, editing, substantive data,

and even draft segments of chapters, though one or the other of us has undertaken the final writing of each chapter. The general scheme of the book is a

joint product. Over all, the division of labor has shaped up approximately as

follows: Chapters and sections dealing with Anglo-American strategic planning,

ship construction and munitions production, allocation of merchant shipping,

landing craft, the Army's supply programs and its machinery for supply and

transportation, the Pearl Harbor crisis, the logistical build-up in the British

Isles and the North African operation are by Leighton—Introduction, and

x
Chapters I (in part), II, V, VI (in part), VIII, IX, XII-XIV, XVI, XVII,

XXII, XXIII, and XXV-XXVII. Those dealing with foreign aid, the logistical

machinery of the joint and combined committee systems and the combined

boards, Army-Navy logistical co-ordination, and the war against Japan are by

Coakley—Chapters I (in part), III, IV, VI (in part), VII, X, XI, XV,

XVIII-XXI, and XXIV.

Our large debt to others can only be sketchily described here. First and

most grateful mention goes to Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian of

the Army and conscientious literary godfather, who has patiently read and

meticulously criticized the manuscript at each of its many stages, and through

it all has never allowed us to forget—however little our endeavors seemed to

justify the hope—that a specialized subject can be made interesting to others

besides specialists. Mrs. Susan Frost Parrish not only did much of the basic

research for the chapters on the Pacific war, but also made important monographic contributions to those chapters. Similarly, parts of the chapters on the

North African operation are based on material prepared in draft by Dr. Mae

Link. Mr. Charles Owens, coming late into this project, was yet able to do most

of the work of compiling and drafting the charts and tables and to shepherd the

manuscript through innumerable proofreadings. To our editor, Miss Mary Ann

Bacon, and copy editor, Miss Nancy L. Easterling, for their indefatigable labor

in what might be called the logistics of publishing this book, we are eternally

grateful. Our statistical data have undergone the vigilant scrutiny of Messrs.

Theodore E. Whiting, George R. Powell, and Joseph A. Logan of the Army

Comptroller's Office; our photographs, were assembled by Miss Margaret E.

Tackley; our maps were prepared by Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff and his staff,

with the exception of the three map-sketches on pages 47, 51, and 720,

which were drawn by Miss Muriel Chamberlain of the Government Printing

Office. Our massive index is the work of Dr. Rose C. Engelman, who we hope

will never again have to undertake such a chore. The task of digging through

mountains of administrative records would have been immeasurably more

difficult without the cheerful assistance given by Mrs. Hazel E. Ward and other

members of the staff of the Departmental Records Branch, AGO, in Alexandria; Mrs. Mary Margaret Gansz Greathouse and Miss Wava Phillips of the

General Research Unit, G-3; and the personnel of the Federal Records Depot

on Lawrence Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. The specific contributions of our

colleagues in the Office of Military History, who have all had a direct or indirect influence on the book, have been shown in the footnotes and Bibliographical Note. In particular, we owe much to Mr. Maurice Matloff's special

competence in the field of strategic planning. Many others have given generously of their time in reading and criticizing large sections of the manuscript;

we would like especially to thank Col. Vincent J. Esposito, Dr. Benjamin H.

Williams, Col. George G. O'Connor, Capt. Tracy B. Kittredge, USNR (Ret),

Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward (Ret), Dr. John D. Millett, Dr. John Bowditch, Dr.

Stetson Conn, Dr. Louis Morton, Lt. Gen. LeRoy Lutes (Ret), Lt. Col. Leo J.

xi
Meyer, Maj. Gen. William M. Goodman (Ret), Brig. Gen. Frank A. Bogart,

Maj. Gen. Walter A. Wood, Jr. (Ret), Maj. Gen. Richard C. Moore (Ret), Maj.

Gen. Robert W. Grow (Ret), Maj. Gen. Carter B. Magruder, Brig. Gen. William E. Carraway, Col. George A. Lincoln, and Maj. Gen. George H. Olmstead. Members of the Historical Section of the British Cabinet Office have also

contributed helpful comments on portions of the manuscript.

31 March 1954

Washington, D. C. RICHARD M. LEIGHTONROBERT W. COAKLEY

xii
Contents

Chapter Page

INTRODUCTORY: LOGISTICS—THE WORD AND THE THING . 3

The Revolution in Warfare .................... . 3

Changing Conceptions of Logistics .................. . 8

The Vagaries of Usage ..................... . 11

The Army's Logistical Effort, 1940-43 . ............... . 13

Part One: The Neutrality Period

I. REARMAMENT AND FOREIGN AID BEFORE LENDLEASE ........................ . 2 1

The Peacetime Logistical Establishment ........... . 21

The Impulse Toward Rearmament and Foreign Aid ....... . 27

Early Organization and Policy for Control of Foreign Purchases ... . 30

Use of Army Stocks To Aid Anti-Axis Motions ........ . 32

Anglo-American Co-ordination of Production Planning ...... . 36

Aid to Other Nations .................. . 39

The Drift Toward Collaboration With Britain ........ . 41

II. WAR PLANS AND EMERGENCY PREPARATIONS ... . 46

Britain's Wa r ..................... . 4 7

The Logistics of Hemisphere Defense ............ . 50

ABC-1 and Rainbow 5 ................. . 52

Ships fo r Britain .................... . 5 7

The Logistics of Emergency Expeditionary Forces ........ . 60

The Abortive Azores Expedition .............. . 68

State of Readiness: Mid-1941 ............... . 71

III. THE ARMY AND EARLY LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS . . 76

The Administrative Problem ................ . 77

Early Operations Under Lend-Lease ............. . 82

The Injection of Chinese Demands. ............. . 85

Inclusion of the Netherlands Indies ............. . 88

The Latin American Program ............... . 88

Search for an Allocation Policy: February-August 1941 ..... . 89

IV. THE BROADENING PATTERN OF LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS ........................ . 9 7

The Beginnings of Aid to the USSR ............ . 97

Adjustments in Programs and Allocations: September-December 1941 . . 102

Extension of Lend-Lease Activities Overseas .......... . 107

The Halting Flow of Lend-Lease .............. . 112

xiii
Chapter Page

V. WIDENING COMMITMENTS. ............. . 11 7

Britain's Bid for American Intervention ........... . 118

Skipping: Ferrying Versus Amphibious Transport ........ . 121

Build-up in the Philippines ................ . 123

Logistics fo r Victory ................... . 12 6

The Army's Victory Program ............... . 129

Global Logistics and Mass Invasion ............. . 132

America's Contribution: Weapons or Armies? ......... . 137

Part Two: Crisis

VI. PEARL HARBOR AND EARLY DEPLOYMENT ..... . 143

The Impact of Pearl Harbor ............... . 144

The Far East and the Pacific Line of Communications ...... . 149

Plans and Deployment in the Atlantic ............ . 151

The Search for Shipping for the Far East .......... . 154

Change of Pace in the Atlantic ............... . 158

Pressure of Scarcity in Hawaii ............... . 161

VII. IMPROVISATION IN THE PACIFIC .......... . 166

T h e Australian Base .................. . 16 6

Probing the Japanese Blockade ............... . 170

Emergence of the Southwest Pacific Area Command ....... . 172

Manning the Island Line ................. . 177

Bobcat: Case History in Joint Task Force Logistics ...... . 179

The Army's Administrative Problem in the Pacific Islands .... . 186

Joint Versus Parallel Supply ............... . 187

Part Three: The Emergence of Policy and Method

VIII. STRATEGY, PRODUCTION GOALS, AND SHIPPING . . 195

The Victory Program—Morning After ............ . 195

Production Goals and the Problems of Balance ......... . 197

Shipping: Capacity To Deploy Versus Capacity To Support ... . 202

The Drain of Ship Losses ................ . 206

Army Allocations and New Construction ........... . 208

IX. THE MACHINERY OF LOGISTICAL CO-ORDINATION

A N D ADMINISTRATION ............... . 21 3

Logistics in the Military Committee System .......... . 214

Allocation and Employment of U.S. Merchant Shipping ..... . 215

The Army's Logistical Organization During the Emergency Period . . 219

Logistics in the War Department Reorganization of March 1942 . . . 223

Supply and Transportation in the SOS ............ . 227

The Contest for Control of the Ports ............ . 233

The Limits of Port Autonomy ............... . 238

The Theater Segment of the Pipeline ............ . 241

Secession of the Air Forces ................ . 244

xiv
Chapter Page

X. LEND-LEASE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF COALITION WARFARE ........................ . 24 7

The Munitions Assignments Board and the Common Pool .... . 247

Organization of the MAB and Its Committees ......... . 253

Other Combined Boards: A Summary View .... . ..... . 25 5

The Principle of Reciprocal Aid .............. . 257

Adjustment of Lend-Lease Procedure to Combined Arrangements ... 259

Readjustments in War Department Organization and Procedure . . . 261

Storage and Shipment of Lend-Lease Materials ......... . 267

XI. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MUNITIONS POOL ..... . 270

Determination of a Basis of Assignments ........... . 270

The Basis of Aircraft Allocations ............. . 275

The Relation of Requirements to Assignments ......... . 277

The Weeks-Somervell Agreement .............. . 282

Application of Assignments Theories: The Work of the MAC(G) . . 285

The Adjustment of Assignments and Shipping ......... . 291

XII. THE ARMY'S SYSTEM OF REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLLED DISTRIBUTION ............. . 29 5

The Army Supply Program ................ . 295

The Method of Calculating Requirements ........... . 298

Development of the Army Supply Program in 1942 ....... . 301

The Distribution of Scarce Material ............ . 303

The Equipment Crisis and the Emergency Pool ........ . 309

XIII. THE SUPPORT OF OVERSEAS OPERATIONS ..... . 317

The System of Overseas Supply .............. . 317

Procedural Problems in Overseas Supply ........... . 322

Supply Versus Transportation ............... . 328

Filling th e Pipeline ................... . 33 3

Equipping Outbound Troops ............... . 336

Service Troops and the Troop Basis ............ . 346

Part Four: Build-up and Early Offensives

XIV. BUILD-UP IN THE BRITISH ISLES—FIRST PHASE ... 353

Middle-of-the-Road Strategy ............... . 35 3

The Changing Outlook in Shipping ............. . 356

The London Staff Conversations .............. . 360

The Flow of Troops .................. . 362

The Flow of Cargo ................... . 368

Landing Craft: The Elusive Bottleneck ........... . 376

The Demise of Sledgehammer ............... . 383

xv
Chapter Page

XV. TURNING POINT IN THE PACIFIC ......... . 388

Strategy and Logistics in the Pacific War ........... . 388

Deployment and the Shipping Shortage ............ . 392

The Crisis at Noumea .................. . 398

Problems of Cargo Shipment ............... . 404

The General Depot at Nouméa .............. . 406

Landing Craft and Intratheater Transport .......... . 407

Equipment for Jungle Warfare .............. . 410

Service Troops ..................... . 41 2

The Pacific Outlook at the End of 1942 ........... . 414

XVI. THE DESCENT ON NORTH AFRICA ......... . 417

T h e Essay Contest ................... . 41 7

Birth of a Task Force .................. . 424

Inside Versus Outside .................. . 42 7

Cutting the Foot To Fit the Shoe .............. . 435

Launching the Western Task Force ............. . 439

The Pay-Off and Its Lessons ............... . 445

XVII. FOLLOW-UP IN NORTH AFRICA ........... . 456

Torch and the Atlantic Pool of Shipping ........... . 457

Administrative Arrangements for Support of Torch ....... . 462

T h e Convoy Bottleneck .................. . 46 8

Widening th e Bottleneck ................. . 47 2

The Beginning of Routine Support ............. . 478

The Dwindling of Bolero ................ . 480

Part Five: Theaters of Foreign Aid

XVIII. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ORBIT ........... . 491

Lend-Lease and Reciprocal Aid in the United Kingdom ..... . 492

The South and Southwest Pacific .............. . 496

T h e Middle East ................... . 50 3

French Rearmament: The Initial Phase ........... . 511

Military Supply to Turkey ................ . 520

Control of Lend-Lease by Theater Commanders ........ . 522

XIX. CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA ............. . 525

The Failure of the Prewar Chinese Lend-Lease Program ..... . 526

Stilwell's Plans and Policies for Supply to China ........ . 532

Strategic Plans and Logistical Support: May-December 1942 ... . 535

Chennault's Air Plan .................. . 541

Casablanca and After .................. . 542

Reciprocal Aid in India and China ............. . 547

xvi
Chapter Page

XX. THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—I .......... . 551

Pearl Harbor and the First Protocol ............. . 552

The First Protocol and the Shipping Problem ......... . 555

Formulation of the Second Protocol ............. . 560

The Search for Alternate Routes .............. . 564

Development of the Persian Gulf: January-July 1942 ...... . 566

XXI. THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—II .......... . 574

The Persian Gulf: Decision on U. S. Responsibility ...... . 574

The Persian Gulf: Plans Versus Accomplishments ....... . 577

Second Protocol Deliveries Fall Behind ............ . 583

T h e Casablanca Decisions ..... . .......... . 58 7

N ew Disappointments .................. . 58 9

War Department Supply Agencies and the Second Protocol .... . 592

Part Six: The Casablanca Period—Strategic Plans and Logistical

Method

XXII. WAR PRODUCTION AND SHIPPING: YEAR'S END OUTLOOK ........................ . 60 1

The Cutback in Military Supply .............. . 602

Shipping and the New Drift of Deployment .......... . 611

The Pressure for Economy in Ship Operations ......... . 616

Enlarging and Balancing the Merchant Fleet ......... . 624

The Fever Chart of Deployment Forecasting .......... . 629

XXIII. ECONOMY AND STABILIZATION ........... . 632

The Reduced Army Supply Program ............. . 632

The Attack on Waste .................. . 635

Administrative Improvements in Overseas Supply and Deployment . . . 642

XXIV. JOINT LOGISTICAL PLANNING AND CO-ORDINATION . 649

Logistics in Joint Strategic Planning ............ . 649

The Army-Navy Basic Logistical Plan ........... . 655

XXV. CASABLANCA AND THE STRATEGIC-LOGISTICAL DEBATE ........................ . 66 1

T he Two Wars ................... . 662

The Mediterranean Life Line ............... . 668

Bolero Renewed .................... . 67 3

British Imports: The Six-Million-Ton Misunderstanding .... . 677

Limitations on Amphibious Assault ............. . 682

xvii
Chapter Page

XXVI. AFTER CASABLANCA ................. . 687

Deployment Planning Adrift ................ . 68 7

British Imports: The "Bombshell" ............. . 690

Military Operations Versus War Economy .......... . 694

T h e President Disposes ................. . 69 8

"For Planning Purposes Only" .............. . 702

Part Seven: Conclusion

XXVII. LOGISTICAL PLANNING AND ITS END PRODUCTS . . 709

Appendixes

A. SHIPPING TERMINOLOGY AND PLANNING DATA: 1942-43. . 722

1. Weight and Space ..................... . 722

2. Maintenance Requirements for Overseas Forces: 1942-43. ...... . 723

3. Tonnage Requirement Factors for Overseas Shipments: July 1941-June

1943 .......................... . 72 3

4. Initial Cargo Shipping Requirements for Selected Units: Late 1942 ... . 724

5. Initial Cargo Shipping Requirements for Selected Units: Late 1943 . ... 724

6. Cargo Vessel Turnaround Time in Days: 1943 ......... . . 725

7. Selected Types of Landing Craft Available in 1941-42 ....... . 726

8. Principal U. S. and British Convoys: Autumn 1939-Spring 1943 ... . 727

B. PROCUREMENT: 1940-43. ................. . 72 8

1. Deliveries of Selected Items of Munitions to the Army: 1940-43 .... . 728

2. Estimated Value of War Department Procurement Deliveries: January 1942-

3 0 June 1943 ..................... . 72 9

C. LEND-LEASE TRANSFERS ................. . 73 0

1. War Department Procurement Deliveries and Lend-Lease Shipments: January

1942-June 1943 ..................... . 73 0

2. Lend-Lease Shipments Compared With War Department Procurement Deliveries: 1 January 1941-30 June 1943 ............. . 730

D. NUMBER OF VESSELS AND CARGO TONNAGE SHIPPED

FROM UNITED STATES TO USSR: 22 JUNE 1941-30 JUNE

1943 ........................... . 73 1

E. OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT ................. . 73 2

1. Personnel Movement Overseas in Army-Controlled Shipping by Theater:

December 1941-June 1943 ................. . 73 2

2. Cargo Movement Overseas in Army-Controlled Shipping by Theater:

December 1941-June 1943 ................. . 73 3

xviii
Chapter Page

F. OVERSEAS SUPPLY .................... . 73 4

1. Authorized Levels of Overseas Supplies: July 1942 and July 1943 ... . 734

2. Ammunition: The Unit of Fire and The Month of Supply, October 1942. . 736

3. Ammunition: The Unit of Fire and The Day of Supply, October 1943. . . 738

G. SUPPLY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PORTS OF EMBARKATION .......................... . 74 0

H. SHIPPING LOSSES AND GAINS .............. . 741

1. Construction and Losses of Dry Cargo Ships, United States, Allied, and Neutral: September 1939-June 1943 ............... . 741

2. Construction and Losses of Tankers, United States, Allied, and Neutral:

Fourth Quarter 1939-June 1943 .............. . 741

I. GROWTH OF THE SERVICE ESTABLISHMENT: 1942 .... . 742

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE AND GUIDE TO FOOTNOTES ... . 743

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................. . 751

GLOSSARY OF CODE NAMES ................. . 756

INDEX ............................ . 75 9

Tables

No.

1. Shipping for RAINBOW 5: Estimated Availability and Requirements . . 74

2. Army Calculations of Shipping Requirements for Victory Program ... 136

3. Estimated Capacity of Cargo Shipping To Support Offensive Deployment:

December 1941 ....................... . 20 6

4. Capacity To Deploy Versus Capacity To Support: January 1942 . . 207

5. Proposed Tank Programs: 1942-43 ............... . 289

6. Estimates of U. S. Landing Craft To Be Available for SLEDGEHAMMER:

April-June 1942. ...................... . 38 2

7. Tentative Convoy Schedule for Western Task Force: 17 September 1942 . 431

8. Anticipated Port and Convoy Limitations for Slow Convoys to North

Africa: September 1942 ................... . 43 6

9. Eisenhower's Proposed Convoy Schedule: 27 September 1942 .... . 437

10. Timetable for Preparing a Task Force: Ideal Schedule Compared With

TORCH Preparations ..................... . 45 4

11. Proposed Division of Troop and Troop-Carrying Contribution in TORCH . 459

12. Estimated Capacity To Support Forces in North Africa Through Morocco:

September-October 1942. .................. . 46 9

13. U.S. Convoys to North Africa: November 1942-May 1943 ..... . 485

xix
No. Page

14. Types of Cargo in U.S. Convoys to North Africa: November 1942-May

1943. ........................... . 48 6

15. War Department Performance Under the First Soviet Protocol . . . 559

16. Soviet Aid Shipments to Persian Gulf Versus Casablanca Program: January-June 1943 ....................... . 59 1

17. Soviet Aid Shipments Via Pacific Versus Casablanca Program: JanuaryJune 1943 ......................... . 59 2

18. Revised 1943 Military Program ................. . 607

19. Measurement Tons of Cargo Moved Per Dead-Weight Ton of Shipping:

June-December 1942 .................... . 61 3

20. Reduction of 1943 Army Supply Program: November 1942 .... . 636

21. Shipping Space Required for Moving a Division Overseas: Late 1942 . . 637

22. Estimated Capacity To Support Forces in North Africa Through Morocco:

January-February 1943 ................... . 67 0

23. Proposed U.S. Army Deployment for 1943: January 1943. ..... . 677

24. Tentative Allocations of American Landing Craft at Casablanca Conference. ........................... . 68 5

25. Proposed Versus Scheduled U.S. Shipping Assistance to British Imports . 701

Charts

1. The Peacetime Army: September 1939 .............. . 24

2. Organization for Handling Military Lend-Lease: November 1941 ... 81

3. The Army on the Eve of Pearl Harbor .............. . 220

4. The Reorganized Army: September 1942 . ............ . 225

5. Combined Assignments Machinery: 1942 ............. . 256

6. Organization and Procedures for Handling Lend-Lease (Ground Matériel): October 1942 .................... . 265

7. The Port of Embarkation in the Overseas Supply System: 1942 ... . 324

8. Procedure for Equipping a Typical Unit for Overseas Movement: Decembe r 1941 .......................... . 338

9. Procedure for Equipping a Typical AGF Unit for Overseas Movement:

Mid-1942. ......................... . 34 1

10. Procedure for Equipping a Typical AGF Unit for Overseas Movement

(POM): February 1943. ................... . 647

11. The Joint Committee System: December 1942 . .......... . 653

12. Dissolution of the Casablanca Deployment Program: First Quarter

1943 ........................... . 68 8

13. The Effort To Formulate a Deployment Program, February-March 1943:

OPD Versus SOS Estimates. ................. . 689

14. Comparison of "Agreed Deployment" Program With Actual Army

Deployment: April-December 1943 .............. . 703

15. The Two Wars: The Division of Effort, January 1942-March 1943 ... 716

xx
No. Page

16. The Two Wars: The Flow of Army Troops Overseas, December 1941-

April 1943 ......................... . 71 7

17. The Two Wars: The Flow of Army Cargo Overseas, December 1941-

April 1943 ......................... . 71 7

18. The Two Wars: Build-up of Army Strength Overseas, 31 December 1941-

30 April 1943 ........................ . 718

19. The Two Wars: Build-up of Army Assigned Shipping, March 1942-March

1943. ........................... . 71 8

Maps

1. Logistics of British Imperial Defense, 1940-41 ............ . 47

2. Logistics of Hemisphere Defense, 1941 ............... . 51

3. The Pacific Areas, 1 August 1942 ................. . 175

4. American Transoceanic Supply, 1942-43 .............. . 349

5. Lines of Communication in French North Africa . .......... . 418

6. Lines of Communication in China-Burma-India Theater, December

1942 ............................ . 52 9

7. Persian Corridor Supply Routes .................. . 572

8. Logistics of Coalition War, 1942-43 ................ . 720

Illustrations

Army and Navy Munitions Board, June 1941 ............. . 31

Army-Navy Amphibious Maneuvers, August 1941 ........... . 66

Beachhead Supply Dump ..................... . 67

Aboard H. M. S. Prince of Wales During the Atlantic Conference, August

1941. ............................. . 9 8

Meeting of the Joint Board, November 1941 ............. . 120

Army War Plans Division, November 1941 .............. . 130

The Troop Transport SS Monterey .................. . 148

En Route to Northern Ireland, February 1942 ............ . 160

Quonset Huts in Northern Ireland and Newly Arrived Troops ...... . 161

The Liner Normandie Burning. ................... . 204

Rear Adm. Emory S. Land, Maritime Commission Chairman and War

Shipping Administrator ..................... . 21 8

Lewis W. Douglas, Deputy Administrator, War Shipping Administration... 219

Key Figures of the Services of Supply, March 1942 .......... . 229

Preparing To Board a Troopship ................. . 234

Loading Ships, New York Port, 1943 ................ . 235

American and British Air Chiefs, Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold and Air Chief

Marshal Sir Charles Portal ................... . 275

xxi
Page

The Queen Elizabeth, One of the "Monsters".............. . 365

Crated 21⁄2-ton Trucks. Twin-Unit Packs, England, 1943 ....... . 370

Amphibious Training in Mock LCV. ................ . 379

Three Types of Landing Craft, Summer 1942 ............ . 381

The Beached Transport SS President Coolidge, October 1942 ....... . 394

Survivors Coming Ashore at Espiritu Santo.............. . 395

Dock at Nouméa, December 1942 .................. . 400

Aerial View of Nouméa, January 1943 ................ . 401

Sorting Damaged Rations, New Caledonia, April 1942 ......... . 405

The "Maracaibo" H. M. S. Misoa, October 1942 ........... . 446

Seatrain USS Lakehurst in North Africa, November 1942 ........ . 447

Aerial Views of Casablanca .................... . 450

Burdened Soldiers Debarking at Phosphate Pier, Casablanca ...... . 453

Convoy of LCI's Crossing the Atlantic ................ . 474

Draft of "Pentagon" Cable, Styer to Somervell ............ . 476

Allied Convoy Passing Gibraltar .................. . 478

U. S. Tanks at Heliopolis, Egypt, January 1943 ............ . 508

Workshop at Heliopolis ...................... . 509

A Lend-Lease 105-mm. Howitzer (Self-Propelled) in Egypt ....... . 510

Lend-Lease Material for the French, North Africa .......... . 519

Chinese Soldiers and an American Instructor ............. . 534

The Bengal-Assam Railroad .................... . 536

Arriving for a Conference in New Delhi, India, 1943. ......... . 545

Trucking Supplies to Tehran Through the Persian Corridor ...... . 570

Train Loaded With Tanks for the USSR .............. . 571

Liberty Ships Unloading at the Port of Khorramshahr ......... . 581

Soviet and American Officials at Qaleh Morgeh Airport, Iran, 1943 ... . 585

Soviet Freighter Docked at Portland, Oregon, 1943 .......... . 596

The War Against the U-Boat ................... . 614

Army, Navy, and Civilian Chiefs at Lunch, 8 December 1942 . ..... . 628

At Casablanca, January 1943 ................... . 666

Churchill on Shipping Losses ................... . 674

Lord Leathers on British Port Capacity ............... . 678

General Gross on British Imports .................. . 691

The illustrations on pages 218 and 219 are from the U.S. Maritime Commission.

All others are from the Department of Defense files.

xxii
GLOBAL LOGISTICS

AND STRATEGY

1940-1943

INTRODUCTORY

Logistics—The Word

and the Thing

Logistics is an ancient word and a still

more ancient thing.1 Like many ancient

words, it has meant different things at different times, and the thing itself has been,

and still is, often called by other names.

Yet the several current usages of the word,

in military vocabulary, seem to be of

rather recent vintage, probably no earlier

than 1838 when Antoine Henri Jomini

erected a theory of the art of war upon the

trinity—strategy, grand tactics, and logistics.2

 While the word had been used occasionally in military parlance before that

time, it apparently had had no single or

very specific meaning. Since then its uses

have been varied, and for long periods it

has fallen into almost complete disuse.

Meanwhile, the thing itself (whether we

define the word narrowly or broadly) has

grown from the comparatively humdrum,

routine activity it once was into a very

complex "Big Business," embracing a

considerable part, some would say the

greater part, of all the business of modern

war.

The Revolution in Warfare

Jomini's attempt to incorporate into a

rational theory of war the miscellaneous

noncombatant activities on which armies

and navies had always depended in order

to live and fight occurred at a time when

warfare itself was about to undergo a fundamental transformation. Signs of the impending change had already appeared

during the long period of almost continuous warfare in Europe from 1792 to

1815—most conspicuously, a tremendous

increase in mobility and the range of

movement of armies, made possible by improved roads and the growing productivity of agriculture. Jomini himself, though

most impressed by the tactical symptoms

1

 The original derivation of the word "logistics" was

Greek, from logistikos meaning "skilled in calculating." In Roman and Byzantine times there appears to

have been a military administrative official with the

title logista, whose duties, it is easy to imagine, must

have required an intimate familiarity with logistics,

the science of mathematical computation—a meaning still carried in most general dictionaries along

with the more modern military meaning. For many

centuries European warfare lacked an organized administrative science in anything like the modern

sense, and most noncombatant services (as well as

certain combatant ones such as siegecraft and the use

of artillery) were performed for a long time by civilians. The word "logistics," as applied to military administration, did not appear until the eighteenth

century. See articles on logistics in the Enciclopedia

universal ilustrada (Barcelona, 1907-30), Vol. XXX;

the Enciclopedia italiana (Rome, 1934), Vol. XXI; and

the Encyclopedia Americana (New York, 1953), Vol.

XVII. 2

 See Antoine Henri, Baron de Jomini, Précis de

l'art de la guerre, 2 vols. (Paris, 1838), Vol. II, Ch. VI.

Jomini mentioned, but without discussing them, two

additional branches of warfare—engineering and

minor tactics.
4 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

of these underlying changes, dimly perceived other more disturbing phenomena—the growing size of armies, the

mounting ferocity of warfare, and the

emergence of a new, more murderous

technology. Jomini's attention was mainly

captured by the latest improvements in

artillery, particularly by a new "steam"

gun that seemed to hold horrendous

promise. A far more portentous phenomenon, steam-propelled rail transport, he

dismissed as an instrument of peace only,

although five years earlier a French general had declared in the Chamber of

Deputies that the strategic use of railways

would cause a revolution in military

science, and across the Rhine Friedrich

List was trying hard to impress the same

point on his countrymen.3

 All of these

developments were in fact harbingers of a

revolution that was not to reach full tide

until the great wars of the twentieth century, though governments and high commands began to grapple with the problems it presented from the midnineteenth

century on.4

Like all revolutions, this one grew out of

the double challenge of new demands and

new opportunities. Nationalism and conscription produced huge armies; new

weapons multiplied fire power. To feed the

armies and unleash their fire power, military staffs had no choice but to come to

terms with the new technologies of supply

and movement—mass production of munitions and foodstuffs, the railroad, the

steamship, the long-distance pipeline, the

internal combustion engine, eventually

the transport airplane. Wars came to be

fought along wide fronts of continental

extent; lines of communications became

deep zones containing an elaborate establishment of military administration and

services.

Stupendous magnitudes were involved.

World War I saw an expenditure of artillery ammunition by British and French

forces, during one average month, more

than twice as great as that by the Union

forces during the entire four years of the

3

 (1) Jomini, Précis de l'art de la guerre, II, 284-85.

(2) Edwin A. Pratt, The Rise of Rail Power in War and

Conquest, 1833-1914 (London, 1915), Ch. I. (3) Edward

Mead Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy: Military

Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton University

Press, Princeton, N. J., 1948), pp. 148-52. 4

 Only a sampling of the literature on this subject

can be given here. (1) Most of the works of Maj. Gen.

John F. C. Fuller deal with the subject, primarily with

reference to mechanization and armor; see especially

his The Reformation of War (New York, E. P. Dutton

& Co., Inc., 1923), and Armament and History: A Study

of the Influence of Armament on History (New York, C.

Scribner's Sons, 1945). See also: (2) Baron Colmar

von der Goltz, The Nation in Arms, translated by Philip

A. Ashworth (London, 1913), and The Conduct of War,

translated by Joseph T. Dickman (Kansas City, Mo.,

1896), Chs. I-II, VIII; (3) Jan Gottlieb Bloch, The

Future of War in Its Technical, Economic and Political Relations, translated by R. C. Long (Boston, Ginn &

Company, 1902); (4) Jean Colin, The Transformations

of War (London, 1913), Chs. IV-V; (5) Edwin A.

Pratt, The Rise of Rail Power in War and Conquest, 1833-

1914 (London, 1915); (6) Victor W. Germains, Mechanization of War (London, 1927), Chs. IX, XII; (7)

Lowell M. Limpus, Twentieth Century Warfare: How

Modern Battles Are Won and Lost (New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1910); (8) Quincy Wright, A Study of

War, 2 vols. (Chicago, The University of Chicago

Press, 1942), Ch. XII; (9) Benedict Crowell, America's Munitions, 1917-1918 (Washington, 1919); (10)

Brooks Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials (New

York, The Macmillan Company, 1944); (11) Bernard

Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age (Princeton, N. J.,

Princeton University Press, 1941); (12) James P. Baxter, III, Scientists Against Time (Boston, Little, Brown

and Company, 1946); (13) Vannevar Bush, Modern

Arms and Free Men (New York, Simon & Schuster,

Inc., 1949); (14) John U. Nef, War and Human Progress:

An Essay on the Rise of Industrial Civilization (Harvard

University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1950); (15) Lewis

Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1934); (16) Irving B.

Holley, Ideas and Weapons (New Haven, Conn., Yale

University Press, 1953); (17) George E. Turner, Victory Rode the Rails: The Strategic Place of the Railroads

in the Civil War (Indianapolis, Ind., Bobbs-Merrill,

1953); and (18) Lt. Col. John D. Millett, "Logistics

and Modern War," Military Affairs, Vol. IX, No. 3

(Fall 1945), pp. 193-207.
LOGISTICS—THE WORD AND THE THING 5

War Between the States, a conflict that

itself revealed many characteristics of the

new warfare. In the seven days of the Battle of the Somme in 1916, British artillery

fired about 4 million rounds, roughly

1,200 times as many as the Union Army

fired in the three-day Battle of Gettysburg

in 1863.5 World War II piled Pelion upon

Ossa. During the first nineteen months of

its participation in World War II, the U.S.

Army purchased almost 950,000 trucks,

nineteen times the number it had procured during the corresponding period of

World War I. From Pearl Harbor to V-J

Day it procured for its own and Allied

forces some 84,000 tanks, 2.2 million

trucks, 6.2 million rifles, 350,000 artillery

pieces, .5 billion rounds of ground artillery

ammunition, 41 billion rounds of small

arms ammunition. It shipped overseas 127

million measurement tons of cargo, and

7.3 million troops and other passengers.

The U.S. Army Air Forces dropped over

two million tons of bombs on the enemy.6

The new juggernaut armies' voracious

appetite for food, fuel, and munitions dictated a basic change in the method of supply. From the earliest times the swiftly

moving, hard-hitting, self-contained force,

living off the country and a lean baggage

train, had been the dream of every commander. In the hands of Hannibal, Xenophon, Subotai, Gustavus, Marlborough,

Napoleon, Jackson, and Sherman, such

forces had performed spectacular exploits.

When armies became chained to depots

and their trains grew heavy and sluggish,

as happened in some of the wars of the

eighteenth century, warfare itself became

a mere appendage of logistics in which,

as Frederick the Great is said to have observed, "the masterpiece of a skillful general is to starve his enemy." In the new

warfare, the possibility of self-containment

almost disappeared. Under the logistical

system that emerged in the late nineteenth century, first formalized by Prussia

in 1866, armies were supplied not by a

train, but by a "tail"—vehicles shuttling

in relays over segments of the total distance between the army and its sources of

supply, thus pushing freight continuously

forward as though by a series of endless

conveyor belts. As an army advanced, its

"tail," in order not to lose contact with the

base, naturally stretched out, requiring

more and more transport to keep supplies

moving forward.7

The basic elements of this system were

adopted by all large modern armies in the

first half of the twentieth century. Given

the necessity for continuous resupply, some

system of staging was dictated in any case

when freight was transshipped from one

form of transportation to another—normally, at port, at railhead, and at truckhead. The principle of continuous movement of supply from rear to front was

supplemented, on a large scale, by the

older method of stocking supplies at convenient distribution points. Since the rate

of movement over all stages of the line of

supply could never be uniform because of

differences in the capabilities of the means

of transport and handling, backlogs of

freight piled up at bottlenecks along the

5

 Benedict Crowell and Robert F. Wilson, The

Armies of Industry, 2 vols. (New Haven, Conn., Yale

University Press, 1921), I, 27, 29, 31. 6

 (1) Annual Report of the Army Service Forces, 1943

(Washington, 1944), p. 271. (2) Theodore E. Whiting,

Statistics, a volume in preparation for the series

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II,

Procurement Sec, 9 Apr 52 draft. (3) Third Report of

the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces to the

Secretary of War, 12 November 1945, p. 64. 7

 (1) Brevet Lt. Col. G. C. Shaw, Supply in Modern

War (London, 1938). (2) Goltz, The Nation in Arms,

Pt. IV, Ch. 6, and Pt. V. (3) Henry G. Sharpe, The

Art of Subsisting Armies in War (New York, John Wiley

& Sons, 1893), Ch. III.
6 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

line, usually at transshipping points. Additional reserves had to be stocked forward

of such critical bottlenecks as insecure

transoceanic communication lines and

ports of entry of meager capacity. Against

the threat of enemy penetration and in

order to utilize alternate communication

lines, reserves in war theaters had to be

dispersed among many magazines, both

laterally and in depth. Large-scale offensive operations, in addition, demanded

immense accumulations of munitions, fuel,

and subsistence close behind the point of

impact—requiring months and sometimes

years to build up—in order to provide

crushing initial force and sustained

impetus.

World War I, in the western theater,

with its creeping, sealed front and enormous concentration of forces in small

areas, offered a natural habitat for the

modified system of staged, continuous resupply. The abrupt return to mobility in

1939-45 strained the system to the limit.

To supply staffs, a break-through by their

own forces presented problems almost as

formidable as one by the enemy, for the

methodical disposition forward of depots,

dumps, fuel pipelines, and transport systems could not possibly keep pace with

racing armored columns, even if the capacity of supply lines to the rear could be

expanded rapidly enough. Roads, rail

lines, and bridges in territory abandoned

by the enemy could be expected to be seriously damaged; in the absence of prepared

relay and transshipping facilities, transport would have to operate in abnormally

long shuttles. The mobility necessary to

sustain a break-through, in consequence,

could only be gained by lavish use of all

forms of transportation, far beyond the

amounts normally available.

Yet, short of curtailing drastically the

scale of military operations, World War II

brought forth no real alternative to continuous resupply. Guerrilla forces, ill

armed and without regular supply lines,

won amazing successes against regular

troops in the Soviet Union and the Balkans, and on occasion were able to carry

out large-scale operations, but only for

limited periods at a time. What was likely

to happen to an army cut off from its

sources of resupply, even when it had substantial stocks on hand, seemed to be

demonstrated by the fate of MacArthur's

forces in the Philippines in 1942, an experience that made a lasting impression

on the American high command. Mountains, jungles, and vast ocean distances in

the theaters of the war against Japan dictated many compromises in the lavish

logistical support to which American

forces were accustomed, but the solution

was not found in a return to self-containment. In the end, these obstacles were

overcome simply by moving up the apparatus of land, sea, and air power on so

massive a scale that it was possible not

merely to crush the enemy at selected

points of impact but also to contain him

elsewhere, to protect communication lines

and bases of operations, and even to neutralize and bypass major enemy strongholds.8

 This kind of logistical support demands virtually unlimited resources in

munitions, supplies, and transport. With

them, and employing the staging method

of resupply in combination with accumulated reserves near the front, armies can 8

 (1) For the logistical problems created by the Allied break-through in France in July 1944, see Roland

G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies (Washington, 1953). (2) See also, Louis Morton's forthcoming volume on strategy, command, and logistics in

the Pacific war, and, for the first Philippine campaign

in particular, his The Fall of the Philippines (Washington, 1953). All are in the series UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
LOGISTICS—THE WORD AND THE THING 7

strike hard, move swiftly, and sustain their

driving force, even though with diminishing returns in mobility and flexibility, and

increasing risk that road, rail, or port

bottlenecks may clog and result in paralysis. Without abundant resources, armies

can only strive by austere living and improvisation to stretch their limited transport, using it mainly to sustain fire power,

and to make mobility offset weakness in

offensive strength. Austerity, improvisation, and even mobility are military virtues, not because they are ends in themselves but because they serve to extract the

maximum of effective power from available resources, thus to some degree

compensating for lack of abundance.

Supply and transportation were only

one aspect, though unquestionably the

most important one, of the new logistics.

This logistics was deeply embedded in the

economy of the nation. Armies drew from

science and the civil professions many

things besides weapons and means of

transport—medicine and surgery, electric

power, the telegraph, the telephone, radio

and radar, the bulldozer, psychiatry, business management, propaganda, planned

recreation, techniques of indoctrination.

Armies became, in fact, complex communities in themselves, miniature and specialized replicas of the societies that sustained them. The traditional cleavages

between the noncombatant and combatant skills, and those between military and

civilian spheres of activity, became

blurred. Engineers in many armies became shock troops; signal corpsmen were

expected to work and fight with the most

advanced units, truck drivers to man antiaircraft machine guns. In coming to terms

with the new technologies of war, the military profession had to broaden and dilute

its training to include dozens of skills remote from combat and command. The

technicians and administrators within its

ranks multiplied and in many fields drew

closer to the civilian community in outlook

and professional qualifications than to

their colleagues in the combat arms.

Even so, the military profession could

not hope to master all the skills it had to

exploit. In time of war the needs of sudden

expansion could only be met by a wholesale influx of civilians into the military administrative establishment, and whether

they donned uniform or not scarcely

affected the character of their employment. Nor could the military extend very

far, in relation to the immensity of the

field, its administrative control and supervision over the noncombatant activities it

was unable to master. In the United States

the military services controlled the procurement of most of the finished munitions

and a limited part of the transportation

they used, but even this control was vigorously attacked during World War II and

after.9 In many other countries the power

rested in civilian government agencies. In

fact, from the late nineteenth century on,

the pressure to expand military control

over various segments of national economies usually encountered, and yielded to,

the more powerful drive of the state,

through its central civil agencies, to mobilize under its own aegis the nation's

war-making resources.10

9

 For the attack on the military procurement power

in the United States, see: (1) John D. Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954), Ch. XIX; (2) Bureau of the Budget, The

United States at War: Development and Administration of

the War Program of the Federal Government (Washington,

1946), pp. 129-31. 10

 For a survey of the systems in various countries

during World War II, see Foreign Logistical Organizations and Methods, 15 October 1947, Report of the

Secretary of the Army, OCMH.
8 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

The revolution in warfare thus brought

an immense growth in the range and

complexity of activities supporting armies

and navies. The range of professional

military skills also broadened, but not

nearly to the limits of the whole field that

war now exploited, while military control

tended to shade off into various forms of

partnership with government agencies and

private enterprise as it reached back into

the vast expanse of services that supported

a nation's military effort. What theorists

had once called logistics had spread to

embrace a considerable part of the economic life of the nation.

Since the end of World War II the

rapid development of the air arm, the

promise of transcontinental guided missiles, and above all the emergence of a

whole family of weapons employing the

principles of nuclear fission and fusion

have enormously accelerated two very old

trends in weapons—increasing destructiveness and increasing range. Whether

these developments presage a new revolution in logistics it is still too early to determine. Certainly they seem likely to accentuate and continue trends already

manifest. By bringing rear administrative

areas, lines of communications, and even

sources of supply progressively under fire,

the new weapons will further enhance the

necessity for dispersion of installations and

channels of movement, disrupt orderly

administration, interrupt the continuity,

and reduce the net volume of supply—

phenomena familiar to every Allied theater commander in World War II and conspicuous ones in the final collapse of

Germany and Japan. On the other hand,

the growing range of fire power involves a

corresponding diminution of the distances

over which the ingredients of fire power

must be transported, to that extent simplifying the logistical problem; conceivably the necessity for massive overseas

establishments may eventually disappear

altogether. There are signs, moreover,

that growing reliance on long-range

weapons of tremendous per-unit destructiveness may in time actually reduce the

aggregate amounts of supply requirements

for all forces in the field, thus reversing

one of the oldest trends of logistics. In the

end, by raising the possibility that a conflict may be won or lost within the first few

days or even hours, the new technology

may virtually eliminate the whole problem of military supply and reduce to irrelevance most of the complex apparatus

of industrial potential that for almost a

century has been an indispensable requirement for sustaining, as well as for

launching, a major war. Neither World

War II nor the Korean conflict, however,

put the newest weapons to the test. As

these words are being written, armies appear to be still dependent upon an elaborate rear area administrative establishment and a massive, uninterrupted flow

of food, fuel, and munitions from secure

sources of supply.

Changing Conceptions of Logistics

This transformation of the environment

in which logistics operated inevitably

brought about an adjustment in attitudes

and conceptions concerning it. The character of the adjustment was strongly

colored by the doctrines of Karl von

Clausewitz, whose teachings dominated

European military thought during the last

quarter of the nineteenth century.11 A

11

 (1) Dallas D. Irvine, "The French Discovery of

Clausewitz and Napoleon," Journal of the American

Military Institute, Vol. IV, No. 3 (Fall, 1940), pp. 144-

45. (2) Herbert Rosinski, The German Army (New

York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940), pp. 121-

29.
LOGISTICS—THE WORD AND THE THING 9

contemporary of Jomini, Clausewitz did

not even use the term "logistics." In his

celebrated work On War, he defined the

"conduct of war"—which he identified

with strategy and tactics—as "the art of

making use of given means in combat,"

and from this he sharply differentiated, as

purely preparatory and contributory processes, both the creation of armed forces

(mobilization, training, and so forth) and

their maintenance in time of war—"subservient" services which, although they

stood "in a constant reciprocal relation to

the use of troops," were not yet part of

"the conduct of war properly so called."

Clausewitz was well aware that certain

activities, notably "marches, camps and

quarters" and subsistence, sometimes exerted a decisive influence on the outcome

of battles and campaigns, but he dismissed

them as irrelevant to his discussion.

We are at present occupied not with the

concrete facts of any individual case, but

with abstract theory ... . the theory of

war itself is occupied not with perfecting

these means but with their use for the object

of the war. It needs only the results of them, that is to say the knowledge of the principal

properties of the means it has taken over.

Convinced as he was of the superiority of

moral to material forces in war, Clausewitz had little interest in the "subservient"

services, even though he conceded their

importance. Out of the 125 chapters of

On War, his discussion of these services

occupies only half a chapter.12

The generation that burned incense at

Clausewitz' altar did not, of course, keep

this doctrine pure. A very few exaggerated

and oversimplified it into a crass disparagement of all noncombatant services,

which they relegated to technicians and

menials as something apart from the profession of arms. Veneration of Clausewitz,

however, did not prevent his most brilliant

disciples—the elder Moltke and Schlieffen, for example—from readily grasping

and vigorously exploiting the potentialities of "given means" that Clausewitz

could not have foreseen. The Prussian victories of 1866 and 1870-71 owed much to

the railroad and the telegraph, perhaps

even more to a well-greased machinery of

military administration, which functioned

as it did because professional soldiers did

not scorn to give it their personal attention.13

 The importance of the major logistical innovation of nineteenth-century

warfare, moreover, was recognized by the

formation of a Railway Section in the

Prussian Great General Staff, specially

trained military railway troops, and a

centralized military-civilian organization

for co-ordinating railway operations in

Prussia in time of war.14

More fundamentally, military organization and practice rejected the doctrine,

strongly implied though not explicitly

asserted by Clausewitz, that the "subservient" services could be relegated to a separate compartment from the conduct of

combat operations. European armies after

1870, and ultimately the U.S. Army,

placed the specific function of co-ordinating important logistical activities (as well

12

 Karl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by O.

J. Matthijs Jolles (New York, Random House, Inc.,

1943), pp. 61-66. 13

 (1) General Fieldmarshal Count Alfred von

Schlieffen, Cannae (Fort Leavenworth, Kans., The

Command and General Staff School Press, 1931),

Chs. III-IV. (2) Pratt, The Rise of Rail Power, Chs. XXII.

14

 (1) Dallas D. Irvine, "The French and Prussian

Staff Systems Before 1870," Journal of the American

Military History Foundation, Vol. II, No. 4 (Winter,

1938), pp. 193-94. (2) James D. Hittle, The Military

Staff: Its History and Development (Harrisburg, Pa.,

Military Service Pub. Co., 1949), p. 66. (3) Pratt, The

Rise of Rail Power, Chs. X-XI.
10 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

as the responsibility for general co-ordination) at the general staff level cheek by

jowl with the staff sections charged with

strategy and tactics.15 "Logistics," declared

a U.S. Army staff text in 1926, "cannot be

separated from tactics and strategy. It is a

major factor in the execution of strategic

and tactical conceptions, so inextricably

interwoven that it is an integral part of

each"—a doctrine that harked back

almost a hundred years to Jomini's observation that logistics was the province

"not merely of staffs, but also of generalsin-chief."16

Yet the basic ingredients of the Clausewitzian view remained. In the analytical

and interpretive literature on war. by professional military writers since the middle

of the nineteenth century, the expanding

role of the noncombatant services has received only perfunctory recognition, while

scarcely any of the writers have chosen to

describe the actual mechanics of administration. Among professional officers of the

U.S. Army, at least until recently, indifference to logistics was widespread and

traditional—a striking paradox in an

army that can claim some of the most

spectacular advances in that field. This

attitude, in the opinion of many who once

shared it, can be traced back to a general

military education in which, down to

World War II, logistics was held in low

esteem.17 Since the end of World War II

logistical subjects have been given a more

prominent place in courses at the U.S.

Military Academy and the Command and

General Staff School as well as at the more

specialized schools, and, with the broadening of opportunities for advancement in

the logistical field, there has been some

quickening of interest in it. But staff organization and practice, in the American as

in most other armies, continue to elevate

the operations function over the administrative, and officers schooled in the mysteries of logistics are employed more as

expert consultants than as active participants in the processes of strategic and

tactical planning.18

Military thought, in short, has clung to

two characteristically Clausewitzian ideas:

that the primary function of the soldier is

to use the tools of war in combat, not to

fashion or provide them, and that material forces have not yet diminished the

classic and decisive role of courage, leadership, and the arts of command. The

development of warfare has subjected

both these principles to considerable

strain. The once clear distinction between

the use and the providing of weapons has

been virtually obliterated, and modern

war engages more soldiers in the latter

task than in the former. Courage and

leadership are steadily losing the power to

override heavy material odds. The Clausewitzian conception of logistics, in its pure

form, is clearly unsuited to the conditions

of modern warfare. It remains to be seen

whether it can continue to adapt itself to

a revolution in warfare still under way, or

whether it will be replaced by a radically

new approach.

15

 (1) See Hittle, The Military Staff, Chs. 3-6, passim.

(2) See also, Otto L. Nelson, Jr., National Security and

the General Staff (Washington, Infantry Journal Press,

1946). (3) FM 100-10, Field Service Regulations: Administration, any edition. (4) FM 100-5, Field Service

Regulations: Operations, any edition. 16

 (1) Command, Staff and Logistics: A Tentative

Text, issued by The General Service Schools, Fort

Leavenworth, Kans., 1926, Sec 11, par. 12. (2)

Jomini, Précis de l'art de la guerre, II, 150. 17

 See the testimony of Lt. Gen. LeRoy Lutes and

other observers as noted below, Ch. XVI. 18

 For a statement of this doctrine, see Ray S. Cline,

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1951), pp. 1-7, 258-61. See also below,

Chs. IX, XXIV.
LOGISTICS—THE WORD AND THE THING 11

The Vagaries of Usage

The revolution in warfare raised a

semantic problem in connection with the

term "logistics" that remains unresolved

to this day. What precisely is the scope of

activity embraced by logistics? The question was and is of more than academic

interest, for, as one writer pointed out in

1917, when the word was only beginning

to come into American military usage,

The purpose of the definition is to establish

a division of labor, and if two divisions [strat- egy and tactics] are properly drawn while the

third is not, there will be either duplication

of effort, or some functions will be overlooked entirely, with the result that certain preparations for war will not be made.19

In Jomini's own day logistics was

thought of vaguely as military staff business in general, a "science of detail."

Jomini ascribed the derivation of the word

to the title of the major généraux (or maréchaux) des logis in French armies of the

eighteenth century who, originally

charged with miscellaneous administrative functions such as the arrangements

for marches and quarters, had come to

serve in effect as chiefs of staff to higher

commanders—as did their counterparts,

the Quartiermeister, in Prussian armies.

While Jomini clearly intended to use

"logistics" in a broader sense, his discussion, in contrast to the logical clarity of

most of his writing, is inconclusive and

vague.20 Tradition, nevertheless, drew

from Jomini's brief disquisition the implication that he supposed logistics to cover

all or almost all of the field of military

activities supporting combat.

As a practical matter such a conception

had little meaning for military men who

had to organize and administer these activities. Such matters as transportation,

supply, engineering, and medical care

were continuing problems, which no commander or staff could afford to ignore, particularly under the new conditions of

warfare, while others, such as legal and

religious affairs, pay and allowances, and

many of the details of personnel administration, were under ordinary circumstances peripheral or routine. To lump

them all under a single name implied a

unity that did not in fact exist. It is significant that the word "logistics," despite the

enormous influence of Jomini's writings

during the long middle span of the nineteenth century, remained an academic,

almost archaic term throughout that century, rarely used by theorists, hardly at all

by soldiers.21 Shortly before World War I

it began to creep into military service parlance in the United States, but down to

World War II it seldom appeared in the

working vocabulary of the average Army

or Navy officer. It was used, moreover, in

a rather narrow sense, meaning simply

transportation and supply in the field; the

noncombatant services as a whole were

known, instead, by the term "administration," a usage similar to that in British

service terminology.22

With World War II the word "logistics"

in American usage came into sudden,

19

 George Cyrus Thorpe, Pure Logistics: The Science

of War Preparation (Kansas City, Mo., Franklin Hudson Publishing Co., 1917), p. 16. 20

 Jomini, Précis de l'art de la guerre, II, 146-50. 21

 For example, see: (1) Marmont, Esprit des institutions militaires (Paris, 1845); (2) Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle, translated by

Col. John N. Greely and Maj. Robert C. Cotton (New

York, The Macmillan Company, 1921); (3) V. Derrécagaix, Modern War, 3 vols., translated by C. W.

Foster (Washington, 1888); and (4) M. Alfred Rambaud, Termes militaires français-anglais (Paris, 1903).

None of these mention the word "logistics." 22

 (1) Command, Staff and Logistics, Sec 11, par.

12. (2) FM 100-10, Field Service Regulations: Administration, 9 Dec 40.
12 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

luxuriant vogue. Every writer on military

subjects began to employ it with joyous

abandon, and its meaning lost what little

stability it had possessed when restricted

to the vocabularies of military theorists

and a few bookish staff officers. Wide

usage brought immediately into conflict

the urge to adopt "logistics" as a convenient term covering all primarily noncombatant military activities and the inertia

of habit wedded to a more limited meaning. Official Army usage of the word received a powerful impulse toward a

broader definition as a result of the consolidation, during World War II, of most

of the Army's supply and service activities

in the United States under a single command, the Army Service Forces (Services

of Supply in the period covered by this

volume). That organization's final report

defined "logistics," largely in terms of its

own functions, to include an impressive

list of activities: procurement, storage, and

distribution of equipment and supplies;

transport of troops and cargo; construction

and maintenance of facilities; communications; care of the sick and wounded;

induction, classification, assignment, welfare, and separation of personnel.23

 Many

military agencies during and after the war

began to adopt the label "logistics" or

"logistical," though none performed so

wide a range of functions as had the Army

Service Forces, and soon after the end of

the war the Army developed a group of

type headquarters called "logistical commands," each designed to co-ordinate

all the supporting services for a territorial

area of specified size within a theater of

operations.24 In the Navy the word "logistics," with a somewhat longer tradition

behind it, enjoyed a comparable renaissance.25

 In 1950, the Year IV of Unification, the whole process culminated when

the three military services agreed on an

official definition, assigning to "logistics"

all activities in the military establishment

involved in the handling of personnel,

matériel, facilities, and services—in effect,

the entire field of military administration.26

But official definitions, as Burke observed of the English constitution, go but

a little way. Usage remains stubbornly

inconsistent, conservative, and opportunist. Army field service regulations, a bible

for operating personnel, did not even recognize the term "logistics" until 1949, and

then in a sense more narrow than that of

the official joint definitions of 1948 and

1950.27 Among the Army's technical services, especially the Engineer, Signal, and

Chemical Corps, which have a strong

combat tradition, there is an ingrained

resistance to any label such as "logistics"

that seems to imply nonexposure to battle.

None of the agencies so labeled, in any

case, has functional responsibilities covering more than a portion of the field of

logistics as officially defined.

To the average Army officer, at least,

"logistics" is something both narrower

and vaguer than the official definition of

1950, though perhaps not so narrow or

vague as it was to one highly placed officer in 1943 who held that a certain committee handled "not only logistics matters

but also . . . personnel, organization,

23

 Logistics in World War II, Final Report of the

Army Service Forces (Washington, 1947), p. vii. 24

 James A. Huston, Time and Space, MS, 1953,

Pt. 1, Ch. II, pp. 180-88, and Pt. 2, Ch. V, pp. 12-19,

OCMH. 25

 Duncan S. Ballantine, U.S. Naval Logistics in the

Second World War (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1947), Ch. I, especially pp. 1-8, 30-31. 26

 Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms for Joint Usage

(Washington, June 1950). 27

 FM 100-10, Field Service Regulations: Administration, Sep 49.
LOGISTICS—THE WORD AND THE THING 13

troop basis, requirements, production,

supplies and matériel."28 Repeated use of

such locutions as "logistics and administration," "logistics and construction," and

even, inexplicably, "logistics and supply"

betrays a widespread uncertainty in the

military profession itself as to precisely

where logistics stops and something else

begins. Evidently the term is still in process of rapid and healthy growth.29

 Until it

matures and settles down, we must accept

it, perforce, in whatever guise it appears—

that is to say, with the specific shape, content, and emphases it derives from its concrete environment.

The Army's Logistical Effort, 1940-43

Such an environment was the spreading conflict that opened in September

1939, bringing to a spectacular climax the

revolution in warfare whose dim beginnings Jomini had observed a century

earlier. During the three years from spring

1940 to spring 1943 the U.S. Army, facing

first the possibility then the actuality of

participation in the war, developed a logistical system that its leaders believed

best adapted to this new environment.

The system was conceived and fashioned

pragmatically, with little deference to traditional logistical doctrine, and it differed

not only from the systems to which it was

opposed but also in important respects

from those of Allied forces. It can best be

described by reference to the underlying

factors of geography, economics, and history from which it took its "distinctive form.

American Industrial Power

Inferior to the Axis powers at the outset

in developed capacity to produce munitions, though outweighing them in manpower, the other nations opposing the

Axis inevitably depended upon the United

States to give their side industrial superiority. In any case, it was almost inevitable that this country, possessing a vast

industrial potential disproportionate even

to its large population, would make its

greatest contribution to the Allied effort

in weight of matériel rather than in weight

of manpower.30 The degree of this emphasis has been obscured by the fact that

the United States at the peak of its mobilization was able to put some twelve million of its able-bodied citizens into uniform. However, almost half of these went

into the "armament heavy" naval and air

arms; the ground army, biggest single user

of manpower, was held down to a modest

size, both in relation to the entire Military

Establishment and as compared to the

armies that European belligerents with

smaller populations were able to put in

the field, in order that industry and agriculture, producing for Allied as well as the

domestic economy, might have the workers they needed.31

 The high command

28

 Memo, Brig Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer for CofS,

5 Mar 43, sub: Orgn of Plng Agencies Subsidiary to

JCS, WDCSA 334 JCS. 29

 For a recent, far from definitive, effort to fix the

meaning of the word, see Rear Adm. Henry E. Eccles,

USN (Ret.), "Logistics—What Is It?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 79, No. 6 (June 1953), pp.

645-53. 30

 From the beginning of the war through 1944 the

United States produced nearly 40 percent of the combat munitions produced by the United Nations for

use against the European Axis. See: (1) World Production of Munitions at the End of the War in Europe, WPB

Doc 25 (Washington, June 15, 1945), pp. 1, 4, 13-14;

(2) Raymond W. Goldsmith, "The Power of Victory,

Munitions Output in World War II," Military Affairs,

Vol. X, No. 1 (Spring, 1946), pp. 69-80; and (3)

Bureau of the Budget, The United States at War, pp.

505-06. 31

 Approximate peak strengths of the U.S. Army

and Navy at the end of World War II were 8,291,300
14 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

sought, therefore, to make weight of matériel compensate for limited numbers,

stressing air and naval power, equipping

all its forces on a lavish scale, and developing massive fire power. American industry not merely met these demands, but

was able in addition to equip and support

large Allied forces. The emphasis upon

weight and quantity of matériel, sometimes at the expense of qualitative superiority over the enemy, radiated through

every aspect of the Army's logistics. It was

reflected above all, perhaps, in a supply

system that accepted and greatly extended

the modern mass army's dependence on

continuous resupply. By employing myriads of ships, trucks, and other transport,

performing miracles in port rehabilitation, stocking supplies in depth on a huge

scale, and copying the managerial techniques of American big business, the U.S.

Army was able to achieve a continuity

and volume of supply—and therefore sustained offensive power—that even the

Germans, who had pioneered in this field,

could not equal.

Eighteen Months of Unmolested

Rearmament

In December 1941, thanks to the prolonged threat of enemy aggression since

spring of 1940, the U.S. Army was better

prepared than ever before on the eve of a

great war. It had swelled to a strength of

1,600,000 men, partially trained, partially

equipped, backed by an industrial mobilization that had, by and large, completed

the critical "tooling up" phase and that

was ready to swing into production of

munitions on an unprecedented scale. In

a deeper sense, the Army had bridged the

gulf between smallness and bigness, more

a matter of thinking, doctrine, and method than even of physical growth. By the

time the Japanese struck, the U.S. high

command was thinking in terms of an

army of 10 million men and 250 divisions.32

 There had been concrete experience in bigness, too. The Army's commanders had learned how to maneuver

divisions, corps, and armies. Perhaps even

more important, its logistical staffs had

gained some notion of what was involved

in moving a division with its ancillary

units, guns, tanks, trucks, and other impedimenta across half a continent, and

loading the whole apparatus into transports and freighters for a transoceanic

voyage. The ports of embarkation and the

depots behind them had had months of

experience in building up overseas establishments on something like a wartime

scale and in providing the continuous sustenance needed to keep them alive. The

central staffs in Washington had had to

keep in balance all the divergent and

competitive purposes of a vast expansion

program—training and equipping a moand 3,408,300, respectively. The Army Air Forces

reached a strength of 2,354,210 on 30 April 1945; the

Navy's air arm numbered 437,998 on V-J Day. See:

(1) Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and

Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat

Troops, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1947), pp. 235-36; (2) Office

of Naval Operations, The U.S. Navy at War, 1941-1945

(Washington, 1946), pp. 152-317; (3) Strength of the

Army Report, STM-30, 1 May 45; and (4) Archibald

D. Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord, History of U.S.

Naval Aviation (New Haven, Conn., Yale University

Press, 1949), p. 322. (6) In the World Almanac and

Book of Facts for 1952 (New York, New York WorldTelegram and The Sun, 1952), p. 512, peak World

War II strength of all armed forces of Germany is

given as 10,200,000, of Japan as 6,905,000, of Italy

as 3,750,000, of the United Kingdom as 5,120,000. In

the first two of these countries, at least, the ratio of

ground army forces to other armed forces was considerably higher than in the United States. 32

 See below, Ch. V.
LOGISTICS—THE WORD AND THE THING 15

bilizing conscript army, providing garrisons and mobile striking forces to meet

any sudden emergency, and diverting

munitions to embattled anti-Axis forces in

Europe and Asia. In terms of practical experience, plans, and even blueprints, the

Army was ready to shoulder, with surprising ease and swiftness, the logistical burdens of a great global war.

The Ocean Gap

Under the conditions of warfare in

1940-43 the United States still could derive a large measure of security from the

wide, encircling oceans. American hemisphere defense plans in 1940 and 1941

counted on exploiting to the utmost the

logistical advantages conferred by a single

economic-geographic center of gravity,

interior lines, mutually supporting, accessible outposts, and the vast stretches of

water over which an attacking enemy

would have to advance. But in the event,

the United States had to sacrifice these

advantages in order to carry the war to

the enemy. At the outset, moreover, the

United States suffered a catastrophic defeat in the Philippines, largely because the

Navy and Air Forces were unable to keep

open the lines of communications supporting that distant outpost. During 1942

German submarines very nearly succeeded in sealing off the eastward passage

of munitions and supplies across the Atlantic. The impact upon American strategic and logistical thinking was profound.

The Army's planners, with Bataan and

Corregidor fresh in their memories, were

prone to insist upon secure and, if possible,

short sea communications as a condition

of any strategy. The Army became the

largest user of the nation's merchant shipping. Army staffs had to become expert in

operating ships and ports, in scheduling

transoceanic troop and cargo movements,

in adjusting the rhythm of demand and

supply to the exigencies of traffic control,

convoy schedules, and the availability of

bottoms. Because of the time required to

move supplies from factory to overseas

consumer, the Army had to order huge

quantities, not actually to be used or consumed, but merely to "fill the pipeline,"

besides further quantities to replace the

cargoes lost or to be lost at sea, and still

other quantities to be stocked overseas

against possible cutting of the ocean supply line. Army logistics, in short, became

predominantly a logistics of overseas deployment and supply, simply because the

ocean gap was the longest, most vulnerable stage on the long road from factory

and training camp to battle front. After

mid-1943 secure Allied command of the

sea lanes, together with the mammoth

output of American shipyards, was to enable the Army to take full advantage of

the mobility of sea communications, making them a source of strength rather than

of weakness.

Involvements of a Coalition War

That the United States fought in World

War II as a member of a coalition, against

a coalition, was of decisive importance in

shaping the Army's logistical effort. The

geographical location of the belligerents

in itself dictated the world-wide extension

of the conflict; the differences in their military capabilities and the disposition of

their power, on both sides, went far to determine the character of American participation—the use of land, sea, and air

forces, the apportionment of munitions,

and the areas in which American forces

operated. During 1939, 1940, and 1941,
16 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

while the European war was spreading

and the alignment of powers was taking

shape, American strategic and logistical

plans, veering to meet each shift in the fortunes of the war, ran the gamut from a

last-ditch defense of the Western Hemisphere, as envisaged in the RAINBOW 4

plan of mid-1940, to the actual multifront

global war into which the United States

plunged in December 1941. Long before

then, Army staffs had acquired through

lend-lease a working familiarity with

many of the practical logistical problems

of a coalition war—the amounts and

manifold types of military matériel required for operations in remote corners of

the globe and the immense difficulties of

delivering them there, the complex administrative machinery needed to apportion munitions and the use of shipping

among several claimants, the baffling

question of standardization of equipment

design, the delicate political and psychological problems that arise even on the administrative level in such an enterprise.

In December 1941 the final major shift

in the power alignment brought both

Japan and the United States into the war.

Japan's unexpected attack and the

prompt American decision to fight back

from bases in the southwest as well as the

central Pacific forced the United States to

establish and defend a supply line across

the world's broadest ocean, and in that

distant theater to carry on a "triphibious"

warfare under conditions that imposed

tremendous logistical difficulties. It was

the struggle in this theater, above all, that

forced Army and Navy staffs to work out

methods of co-ordinating the logistics of

land, air, and sea forces operating together. To the eastward, where approved

strategy dictated the major effort, the

Army before the end of 1942 also became

involved in a vast program of logistical

undertakings reaching half-way around

the globe. Army ships and cargoes plied

around the Cape of Good Hope to the

Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and beyond;

Army service troops were scattered along

supply routes across Africa and operating

supply bases in the Near and Middle East,

India, and China. Two foci of this network—the growing service establishments

in the Persian Corridor and in the ChinaBurma-India theater—had the primary

mission of forwarding munitions by rail,

truck, and transport aircraft to the Soviet

Union and China. All these activities extended the Army's logistical effort, in

range and volume, far beyond what would

have been required for the support only

of its own relatively modest forces deployed overseas by spring of 1943. They

were concomitants, in fact, of the Army's

role in a coalition war.

In the three years of preparing for and

entering World War II, the Army's logistical staffs had both to learn and to apply

their craft, unlearning in the process much

that they had inherited from their predecessors. It was in these three years that the

Army built the logistical machine, assembled the resources, and completed the initial deployment that enabled it to carry

out the great offensives of 1943-45. Its

contacts with the enemy during 1942 and

1943 were essentially holding actions,

limited offensives, and incidents of its

overseas deployment. While the Army

was gathering strength and striving to

avoid premature commitments, the brunt

of the enemy attack was necessarily borne

by the other nations opposing the Axis

and by the U.S. Navy, which began to

convoy ocean shipping and had its first

encounters with enemy submarines
LOGISTICS—THE WORD AND THE THING 17

months before Pearl Harbor. This division

of labor was a logical product of circumstances. British and Soviet forces were already in the field, their mobilization well

advanced, and the U.S. Navy, with a

strong striking force in being, was the nation's first line of defense. The Army's

mobilization and deployment and, even

more, the industrial mobilization needed

to wage full-scale war, started from a low

ebb in 1940 and would have been disrupted by an early trial of strength with

Axis land and air forces. This danger, indeed, threatened more than once during

1942, while the enemy held the strategic

initiative and the American public clamored for victories. When the day came for

the Army finally to throw its full weight

into the scale, it was prepared to exert

decisive power.

PART ONE

THE NEUTRALITY PERIOD

CHAPTER I

Rearmament and Foreign Aid

Before Lend-Lease

In logistics, as in other fields of military

activity, the two years of neutrality preceding December 1941 were for the U.S.

Army a period of learning—hard, costly,

but supremely valuable. The logistical

experience of this period went far beyond

the routine supply problems of a tiny

peacetime establishment. In three fields of

activity, above all, the Army gained forward-looking experience in dealing with

logistical problems, without which it could

scarcely have met the challenge of fullscale war in the years following: in rearming for hemisphere defense, in providing

material aid to the nations opposing the

Axis, and, from late 1940 on, in planning

for possible military collaboration with

those nations. The conflict between rearmament and foreign aid, which emerged

during the last half of 1940, foreshadowed

what was to be perhaps the most fundamental problem of military policy facing

the United States as a member of a coalition—how to apportion resources between

its own armed forces and those of its allies.

The Peacetime Logistical Establishment

In the late summer of 1939, on the eve

of the European war, the U.S. Army had

a total active strength of 190,690 men

(almost 20,000 under its authorized

strength), of whom less than 50,000 were

stationed outside the continental United

States. These Regular forces could be augmented in an emergency by the partially

trained National Guard (about 200,000)

and an Officers' Reserve Corps of about

110,000. The Army was largely an infantry-artillery army, the Air Corps numbering only 25,722 and the organized

armored units only about 1,400. Forces

overseas were mainly in five garrisons—

Hawaii (21,500), Panama Canal (13,500),

Philippines (10,900), Puerto Rico (900),

and Alaska (400). In the United States

there were, on paper, four field armies,

which were responsible for training the

field forces and serving as a framework for

mobilization. Actually these armies had

no staffs and contained only four organized and seven partially organized divisions, all, of course, far below war

strength.1

The level of equipment was even lower.

At the end of 1939 the Air Corps had only

1,800 planes on hand, of which a handful

were of modern types. Many of the ground

1

 (1) Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1940,

Tables C, D. (2) Annual Report of the Secretary of War,

1939, Table C. (3) Annual Report of the Secretary of

War, 1941, Chart 1. (4) Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951),

pp. 8-9.
22 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

army's weapons were of ancient vintage,

some—such as the Springfield rifle, the

75-mm. gun, and the 3-inch antiaircraft

gun—inherited from World War I. Most

of these were to be replaced by modern

weapons—notably the Garand semiautomatic rifle (Ml) and the high-speed 105-

mm. howitzer—when production permitted. Comparatively large stocks of the

older weapons were on hand, more than

enough to outfit the one-million-man army

(augmented Protective Mobilization Plan

(PMP) force) that full mobilization was

expected to put in the field—for example,

over 2,500,000 bolt-action rifles, 113,000

machine guns, and almost 9,000 field artillery pieces. But there were no modern

tanks capable of meeting on equal terms

those unleashed by the German Wehrmacht in Poland in September. Of the 329

tanks available, most were light. There

were only 438 antiaircraft guns, 93 mortars, and no aircraft cannon or rocket

launchers. There were only limited quantities of ammunition, even for the obsolescent weapons. Scarcely more than token

numbers of the new weapons were being

produced—for example, only 4,000 Garand rifles and 30 light tanks per month.

In short, the state of equipment was such

that in late 1939 not even a single division

could have been put in the field on short

notice.2

The logistical support of this establishment, shaped to the routine needs of

peace, was meager by later standards.

Service troops of all categories numbered

about 38,400, or 21 percent of the whole

active Army. Of this number, the four supply services accounted for 69 percent

(Quartermaster Corps 31 percent, Medical Department 28 percent, Ordnance

Department 8 percent, and Chemical

Warfare Service 2 percent); the two supply arms 28 percent (Corps of Engineers

17 percent and Signal Corps 11 percent);

and the five administrative services 3 percent (Adjutant General's Department,

Inspector General's Department, Judge

Advocate General's Department, Finance

Department, and Corps of Chaplains).

Only a little more than a quarter of this

personnel belonged to the two supply

arms, which trained troops to take part in

combat, and only 10 percent to services

(Ordnance and Chemical Warfare) that

procured and serviced weapons and ammunition.3

In the ground army, supply and transportation operations, the major logistical

functions, centered in the four supply services and the two service arms; they provided the Army's supplies and equipment,

the personnel to service them, and the

means to transport both troops and matériel. The Quartermaster Corps was the

principal transportation agency; it designed, procured, and serviced the Army's

wheeled motor vehicles, trained troops to

operate them, controlled Army traffic on

inland commercial carriers, and supervised Army water transportation, including the operation of the New York and

San Francisco Ports of Embarkation and

the Army's fleet of transports and cargo

vessels. The only other service having a

considerable role in transportation was

2

 (1) Troyer S. Anderson, Munitions for the Army:

A Five Year Report on the Procurement of Munitions by the War Department, 1946, p. 5, OCMH.

(2) Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Defense

of the Western Hemisphere: I, The Framework of

Hemisphere Defense, a volume in preparation for

the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II, Ch. I, pp. 19-34. 3

 Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1940, Table

D.

Chemical Warfare Service, though not an "arm,"

trained certain units—for example, chemical mortar units, which had a combat mission.
REARMAMENT AND FOREIGN AID BEFORE LEND-LEASE 23

the Corps of Engineers, which was responsible for the construction, operation, and

maintenance of military railways. Apart

from the Quartermaster Corps, which

procured a miscellaneous assortment of

supplies and equipment, each supply arm

and service had responsibility for procurement, storage, and issue of a well-defined

group of related commodities—for example, the Signal Corps for communications equipment, the Corps of Engineers

for construction material, and the Medical

Department for medical supplies and

equipment.4 In the United States the distribution of supply was decentralized

regionally to the nine corps areas. Since

1932 when the four armies were created,

the corps areas—originally the basic territorial organization for administration,

training, and mobilization—had served

primarily as "housekeeping" agencies for

supply and other services for the Army in

the United States.5 (Chart 1)

The Army's logistical operations, in the

years of peace, were almost wholly separate from those of the Navy, and only

rudimentary machinery for interservice

co-ordination existed. There was no executive mechanism. The Joint Army and

Navy Board, a committee composed of the

Army Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of

Staff, and Chief of the War Plans Division

(WPD), and their Navy opposite numbers,

served as a meeting ground for discussion

of whatever problems the heads of the two

services were willing to bring before it. It

reported to the two service secretaries and,

after July 1939, to the President as well.6

The board was assisted by the Joint Planning Committee, consisting of six or more

members equally representing the two

War Plans Divisions. There were three interservice boards in 1939 concerned with

promoting logistical co-ordination between the two services—the Joint Army

and Navy Munitions Board (ANMB) in

the fields of supply procurement and planning for industrial mobilization, the Joint

Economy Board in administration and

organization, and the Joint Aeronautical

Board in the development of aviation.7

On the top level of staff supervision and

planning in the War Department, there

was no single agency or official responsible

for the field of logistics as a whole, and

only two—the Supply Division (G-4) of

the War Department General Staff

(WDGS), and the Office of the Assistant

Secretary of War—whose responsibilities

might, by a liberal interpretation of the

term, be considered as exclusively logistical. G-4 was the principal logistical agency

on the General Staff. It was charged with

planning, policy making, and staff supervision in the fields of supply requirements,

distribution, storage and issue, equipment

4

 (1) Chester Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: I,

Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951) (hereafter cited as Wardlow, Trans I),

35-37. (2) John D. Millett, The Organization and Role

of the Army Service Forces, UNITED STATES ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954) (hereafter

cited as Millett, ASF), Ch. I. 5

 (1) Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 8-9. (2)

Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and

Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat

Troops, Vol. I of the subseries The Army Ground

Forces in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1947) (hereafter cited as

Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, AGF I), 3-4. 6

 One of the conspicuous achievements of the Joint

Board in recent years had been the issuance in 1927

of Joint Action, a compendium of procedures and

policies for wartime interservice co-ordination in logistical and other areas. 7

 (1) Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 45-46.

(2) Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and

Preparations, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1950), pp. 79-81.

(3) Civilian Production Administration, Industrial Mobilization for War: I, Program and Administration (Washington, 1947) (hereafter cited as CPA, Industrial

Mobilization for War), 3-5.

REARMAMENT AND FOREIGN AID BEFORE LEND-LEASE 25

and supply allowances tables, transportation and traffic control, procurement of

real estate, construction and maintenance

of buildings, hospitalization, and distribution of noncombat troops.8

 Each of the

other four WDGS divisions was also concerned with some aspect of logistics—G-1

(personnel) with administration, G-2 (intelligence) with logistical capabilities of

foreign countries, G-3 (operations and

training) with equipment allowances of

tactical units and some of the training of

service troops, War Plans Division with

logistical capabilities in general since war

planning could not safely ignore any aspect of them. Logistics similarly was a

part, though not all, of the purview of the

single Deputy Chief of Staff, who relieved

the Chief of Staff of decisions on routine

matters, generally of a budgetary, legislative, or administrative nature, and of that

of the secretary of the General Staff, who

co-ordinated and often initiated staff action on all kinds of matters.

The organization of the General Staff,

in fact, did not recognize logistics as a welldefined field of activity requiring separate, specialized attention; lines of specialization in the General Staff cut across that

field and were not too sharply drawn in

any case. (Chart 1) General Staff officers,

in American doctrine and tradition, were

expected to possess a general competence

and perspective enabling them to advise

the Chief of Staff on broad problems of

policy, not merely on the substantive and

technical matters with which each, in the

interests of orderly division of staff work,

gained a special familiarity. For technical

counsel the Chief of Staff looked rather to

the chiefs of arms and services, sometimes

called collectively the War Department

Special Staff. And as the General Staff was

not supposed to specialize, similarly it was

prohibited from "operating"—from engaging in "administrative duties for the

performance of which an agency exists"—

in contrast to the chiefs of arms and services, who operated as well as advised.

From supervision, explicitly a WDGS

function, it was, to be sure, only a short

step to participation in the operations

supervised, and thence to specialization.

Until 1940 the General Staff did not move

far in this direction, partly because of the

entrenched prerogatives of the arms and

services, partly because the General Staff

was too small (only 232 officers in 1939,

many of whom were serving in the field

with troops) to descend far below its assigned sphere of plans, policy, and broad

supervision.9

In the largest area of logistics—supply—

staff supervision did not center in the

General Staff but was divided between the

Supply Division and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. This situation

grew out of the National Defense Act of

1920 and the reorganization of the War

Department resulting from the Harbord

Board (Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord,

Chairman) recommendations in 1921.

The former had charged the Assistant

Secretary of War with "supervision of the

procurement of all military supplies" and

"assurance of adequate provision," that is,

advance planning, for industrial mobilization in time of war. These functions embraced the "business or industrial" aspects

of supply, which the Harbord Board had

sharply distinguished from the purely military aspects. In the long process of supply,

the board argued, the concern of the professional Army was primarily with the de8

 AR 10-15, 18 Aug 36. 9

 (1) Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 24-28.

(2) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch. III. (3)

Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1939, Table C.
26 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

termination of requirements and specifications at the beginning, and the acceptance of finished munitions at the end;

supervision of these activities belonged

properly to G-4. The vast middle portion,

comprising the War Department's dealings with private industry and the government agencies concerned with production

of munitions, could be most effectively

controlled by a civilian official, preferably

a "captain of industry," though it seemed

unlikely, as Secretary of War Newton D.

Baker had pointed out, that the services of

such a tycoon could be secured in time of

peace. During the two interwar decades,

at any rate, the supply arms and services—the procuring and issuing agencies—

had two masters, the Assistant Secretary

of War in matters of procurement, the

"business" side of supply, and G-4 in matters of requirements and distribution, the

"military" side.10

The leisurely pace and modest volume

of the Army's logistical business in the

years of peace did not unduly strain this

structure. Yet there were ample portents

of future trouble. The division between

the business and military aspects of supply

proved difficult to observe in practice.

Both transportation and storage, occupying borderline positions, were causes of occasional contention between G-4 and the

Assistant Secretary's office. It was obviously unrealistic to determine equipment

specifications and requirements without

reference to production capabilities; yet

co-ordination between G-4, charged with

the former, and the Assistant Secretary's

office, charged with the latter, would

surely impede the swift action demanded

in an emergency. Moreover, the planning

of industrial mobilization, assigned to the

Assistant Secretary, was clearly part of the

broader task, charged to the General Staff

in the National Defense Act, of planning

for "the mobilization of the manhood of

the nation and its material resources."

Clear evidence that mobilization was an

indivisible process was afforded in 1938,

when Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring found it necessary to order the size of

the planned initial force under PMP

scaled down to the indicated capacity of

industry.11

Finally, the very existence of divided

authority caused uneasiness in the General Staff, which was mindful of its long

struggle to control the supply and administrative bureaus. The Office of the Assistant Secretary in the late 1930's was a

growing organization; by mid-1940 it

numbered 181 persons at a time when the

whole General Staff, including many officers in the field, comprised less than 350.

As early as 1930 General Charles P. Summerall, the Chief of Staff, complained of

encroachment by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War into the domain of

General Staff jurisdiction and warned,

"the unity of control necessary to the efficient development of our military system

no longer exists." He continued:

We, therefore, find ourselves dangerously

near the status of divided authority in the

War Department which prevailed in 1898

and again in 1917 . . . . There is no doubt as to what general

course affairs would take on the occurrence

of a national emergency if the present situa- tion should continue. As in 1917-18, the

necessity for integrating the services of sup10

 (1) John D. Millett, "The Direction of Supply

Activities in the War Department," American Political

Science Review, XXXVIII (June 1944), 475-84. (2)

Otto L. Nelson, Jr., National Security and the General

Staff (Washington, Infantry Journal Press, 1946), Ch.

VI and pp. 320-22. 11

 (1) Millett, "The Direction of Supply Activities

. . . ," pp. 488-92, cited n. 10(1). (2) Annual Report

of the Secretary of War, 1938, p. 1.
REARMAMENT AND FOREIGN AID BEFORE LEND-LEASE 27

ply would early become apparent, and action

analogous to that found essential during that

period would be taken. In the meantime, im- portant preparatory measures would have

been neglected, and a delay and confusion

that might prove fatal to the success of our

arms would be inevitable.12

The Impulse Toward Rearmament

and Foreign Aid

In the nine months following the outbreak of the war in Europe in September

1939. the United States did little either to

augment her own forces or to arm those of

the Western Allies with which her official

and popular sympathies lay. These powers

and Germany seemed to have reached a

deadlock, while in the Far East Japan

cautiously awaited the outcome, held in

check for the present by fear of an attack

by the USSR and by the threat of the

U.S. Pacific Fleet. Uneasy rather than

alarmed, and seeking above all to insulate

the Western Hemisphere against war, the

United States added less than 55,000 men

to the Regular Army, bringing it to a

strength of 245,413 by the end of May

1940. With this increase it was possible to

organize five triangular divisions, create

sufficient corps and army units to make

up a full army corps and a field army, and

hold large-scale maneuvers. At the same

time the National Guard, its authorized

level raised to 235,000, began more intensive training, and a number of Reserve

officers were recalled for short tours of

active duty. The Navy, meanwhile, kept

its main fleet in the Pacific, and in the Atlantic instituted a "neutrality patrol" extending a few hundred miles out to sea.13

As for aid to the Western Allies, the

Neutrality Act of November 1939 restricted the United States to the role of a

disinterested purveyor of munitions to all

who could buy them and carry them

away. Great Britain and France purchased, accordingly, with an eye to conserving their limited fund of dollars. In

the main they sought aircraft and machine tools, looking to the United States as

a source of emergency and reserve supply

in other respects while building up their

own munitions industries. Several neutral

nations also placed small orders with

American manufacturers, and Finland

made some purchases during her brief war

with the Soviet Union during the winter

of 1939-40. The total volume of orders

was not large, but it did give an impetus,

particularly in the field of aircraft, to the

development of an American munitions

industry—an impetus that the Army's

own orders, filled largely by government

arsenals, were wholly unable to provide.14

In the spring of 1940 the German mili12

 (1) Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1930, pp.

108, 116. (2) Millett, "The Direction of Supply Activities . . . ," pp. 489, 493, cited n. 10(1). (3) For

growing difficulties in supply organization during

1940 and 1941, see below, Ch. IX. 13

 (1) Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1940,

Table C. (2) Conn and Fairchild, Framework of

Hemisphere Defense, Ch. I, pp. 27-41. (3) Annual

Report of the Secretary of War, 1941, pp. 48-50. 14

 (1) W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing, British

War Economy (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949), p. 106. (2) International Division, ASF,

Lend-Lease as of September 30, 1945, I, MS (hereafter cited as ID, Lend-Lease), 66-72, OCMH. (3)

Rpt, President's Ln Com, sub: Foreign Purch Other

Than Br, 1 Jul-1 Oct 40, President's Ln Com file CC

ANMB, Job A46-299. Clearance Committee files are

with those of the Defense Aid Division, Office of the

Under Secretary of War, and are generally catalogued with records of the International Division,

ASF. (4) CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War, p. 4.

(5) For a detailed account of Anglo-French purchasing activities during this period, see H. Duncan Hall,

North American Supply, a volume in preparation for

the British series HISTORY OF THE SECOND

WORLD WAR, galley proof, Chs. III-IV, Hist Br,

Cabinet Off, London.
28 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

tary machine burst through the defenses

of the Allies, and almost overnight the

threat to the countries of the Western

Hemisphere took on terrifying proportions. Late in May, while the debacle in

western Europe was at full tide, the military staffs prepared an emergency plan for

a large-scale descent on the coast of Brazil

to counter any major Axis move in that

direction; the plan's name, "Pot of Gold,"

aptly suggests the total unreadiness of the

Army and Navy to carry out any such

undertaking. In the same month the planning staffs hurriedly set to work to revise

plans for hemisphere defense under what

seemed to be all too probable assumptions—that both France and Great Britain would be defeated (rather than merely

neutral, as under earlier assumptions),

that remnants of their fleets would be

taken over by the victors, and that the

United States and Canada would have to

face the combined power of Germany,

Italy, and Japan. Against such overwhelming odds, the planners concluded,

the United States would be forced to fall

back upon Hawaii and Alaska in the Pacific, concentrate most of her fleet in the

Caribbean, and for the time being try to

defend the Western Hemisphere only as

far south as the bulge of South America.

The completed plan, RAINBOW 4, was approved by the Joint Board on 7 June 1940

and by the President on 14 August.15

On 10 June, a week before France capitulated, President Franklin D. Roosevelt hopefully proclaimed at Charlottesville that the United States intended not

only to rearm but also to help the nations

opposing the Axis:

We will extend to the opponents of force

the material resources of this nation and, at

the same time, . . . harness and speed up

the use of those resources in order that we

ourselves in the Americas may have equip- ment and training equal to the task of any

emergency and every defense.16

Two weeks later Britain was the only important "opponent offeree" remaining in

the field against Germany, and few

doubted that she would either sue for

peace or be overrun by the Wehrmacht.

Army planners feared also that a Japanese invasion of Indochina was brewing,

possibly to be preceded by an attack on

Hawaii or the Panama Canal, and a Japanese-Soviet alliance against the United

States in the Pacific seemed to the Chief

of Staff, General George C. Marshall, a

strong possibility. In this situation the military leaders saw no hope of carrying out

both courses of action laid down by the

President. They urged him to subordinate

foreign aid wholly to rearmament in order

to build up sufficient forces to defend the

hemisphere within the limits indicated in

the current RAINBOW 4 plan. They

warned:

The naval and military operations necessary to assure successful Hemisphere defense

call for a major effort which we are not now

ready to accomplish. ... To overcome our disadvantage in time, the concerted effort of

our whole national life is required. The out- standing demands on this national effort

are—first a radical speed-up of production,

and second, the assembly and training of organized manpower.17

Into these two tasks the administration,

Congress, and the armed services plunged

with spectacular energy in the summer of

15

 (1) Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Ch. II, pp. 2-10. (2) Watson, Prewar

Plans and Preparations, pp. 95-96, 104-07. 16

 U.S. Dept of State, Peace and War: United States

Foreign Policy, 1931-1941, Pub 1853 (Washington,

1943), p. 76. 17

 (1) Memo, CNO and CofS for President, 27

Jun 40, WPD 4250-3. (2) Watson, Prewar Plans and

Preparations, pp. 107-11.
REARMAMENT AND FOREIGN AID BEFORE LEND-LEASE 29

1940. On 28 May the President had revived the Advisory Commission to the

Council of National Defense of World

War I, and under it, in the following

months, the machinery of economic mobilization began to take form. Congress

immediately raised the authorized strength

of the Regular Army to 375,000 and voted

funds to purchase badly needed seacoast

defense equipment, aircraft, and other

critical items, to expand the pilot training

program, to establish ordnance munitions

plants, and to conduct field maneuvers.

The President's call for a 50,000-plane air

force in May set the mood, if not the actual objectives, for mobilization. By the

middle of September Congressional appropriations for the armed forces totaled

over $8 billion, of which about three

fourths was allotted to the Army. The

Army also established a separate Armored

Force, provided commanders and staffs

for the four continental field armies, and

set up in skeleton form the new General

Headquarters (GHQ) which, under plans

prepared soon after World War I, was intended eventually to become the command post for directing military operations in the next conflict—for the present,

it merely took charge of an accelerated

training program.

By the end of the summer, legislation

was also enacted to authorize the manpower for a vast program of mobilization,

through the induction of the National

Guard, by calling up the Organized Reserve, and through Selective Service. This

program contemplated the expansion of

the Army to 1,400,000 men by the following July. Meanwhile, the Army laid down

and the President approved a program of

matériel mobilization to match the provision of military manpower—the great

Munitions Program of 30 June 1940. This

aimed at producing by autumn of 1941

equipment and reserves for an initial Protective Mobilization Plan force of 1,200,-

000 men, and by the end of 1941 equipment and reserves for 2,000,000. Within

the same period the aircraft industry was

to be built to a capacity of 18,000 planes a

year, with a view to creating by spring of

1942 an air force of 12,000 planes and 54

combat groups. Beyond these goals, productive capacity was to be created sufficient eventually to equip and support an

army of 4,000,000. Balancing this expansion of land and air power, Congress on 19

July also approved a "two-ocean Navy,"

of approximately double the Navy's existing strength.18

But the surge of American rearmament

in the summer of 1940, while impressive,

was not the all-out effort that the military

leaders had urged. The President at the

end of June rejected their more extreme

proposals—longer hours and three-shift

operations in munitions factories, an immediate draft, and complete mobilization—and, as a corollary, stipulated that

aid to Britain must continue, though on a

small scale. As General Marshall reported

his decision:

. . . if . . . the British displayed an ability

to withstand the German assault, and it ap- peared that a little help might carry them

through to the first of the year, then we

might find it desirable from the point of view

18

 (1) Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1941, pp.

50-53, 60-61, Chart 3. (2) Wesley Frank Craven and

James Lea Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations—January 1939 to August 1942, Vol. I in THE ARMY AIR

FORCES IN WORLD WAR II (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1948) (hereafter cited as

Craven and Cate, AAF I), 105. (3) Watson, Prewar

Plans and Preparations, pp. 168-82. (4) Samuel Eliot

Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic: September 1939-May

1943 (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1947), pp.

27-28. (5) CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War, Pt. I,

Chs. 2-3 and chart on p. 37.
30 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

of our defense to turn over other material

that apparently would exercise an important

effect on the action.19

The President directed further that British munitions orders were to be accepted

in the United States, even though at some

cost to American rearmament. This policy

reflected the President's determined faith,

not fully shared by the Army staff nor

even by General Marshall, that American

industry could produce munitions for nations fighting the Axis in ever-increasing

volume without "seriously retarding" the

huge rearmament program launched in

June.

Events abroad soon lent some support

to the President's policy. From the moment when, on 3-4 July, the British neutralized or destroyed the bulk of the

French Navy, most of the danger of an

early expansion of German naval power

evaporated. By mid-September the repulse

of the Luftwaffe's assaults upon England

ended, for the time being, the menace

of a German invasion and immeasurably improved the outlook for Britain's

survival. American staff planners, cautiously surveying the scene toward the end

of that month, estimated that Britain

could probably hold out for at least

another six months, thus giving the

United States a year's respite, possibly

longer, since the Germans would require

six months to refit and man whatever

remnants of the British Fleet they might

capture. Aid to Britain began to appear

less a course of desperation than a longterm investment in American security.20

Early Organization and Policy for Control

of Foreign Purchases

The machinery of foreign aid had begun to take form in 1939, before the outbreak of the European war. Anticipating

a flood of orders from Great Britain and

France, the Assistant Secretaries of War

and the Navy proposed in July 1939 that

the Army and Navy Munitions Board, of

which they were chairmen, should be

made responsible for co-ordinating foreign

purchases. The President approved, and a

Clearance Committee was set up in the

ANMB before the end of the year. This

committee was to obtain information on

all foreign orders and facilitate the placing of such orders by "friendly foreign

governments" where they would promote

the growth of an American arms industry,

at the same time striving to prevent competition with Army or Navy procurement.

U.S. designs and specifications were to be

released to friendly governments if they

placed firm, substantial orders and as long

as release would not prejudice national

defense. From the beginning, in short, an

effort was made to draw from foreign aid

the maximum benefit for American

security.

The War and Navy Departments originally envisaged the Clearance Committee as the central organization for controlling foreign purchases, but the President

in December 1939 superimposed upon it

an interdepartmental liaison committee,21

in which Treasury influence was dominant, to handle all contracts with foreign

19

 Informal memo, G. C. M. [Marshall] for Brig

Gen George V. Strong, 24 Jun 40, WPD 4250-3. 20

 (1) Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 25 Sep 40, sub:

Prob of Pdn of Mun in Relation to the Ability of the

U.S. To Cope With Its Def Probs in the Present

World Sit, WPD 4321-9. (2) Watson, Prewar Plans

and Preparations, pp. 110-17. (3) Conn and Fairchild,

Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Ch. II, pp. 17-

19, 63. 21

 The liaison committee in June 1940 was given

the name Interdepartmental Committee for Coordination of Foreign and Domestic Purchases. Before and

after that date, however, it was known as the President's Liaison Committee.
REARMAMENT AND FOREIGN AID BEFORE LEND-LEASE 31

ARMY AND NAVY MUNITIONS BOARD JUNE 1941. Seated left to right: Brig.

Gen. Charles Hines, Brig. Gen. Harry K. Rutherford, Robert P. Patterson, James V. Forrestal,

Capt. Edmund D. Almy, Capt. Anton B. Anderson; standing left to right: Maj. Gerson K. Heiss,

Col. Henry S. Aurand, Comdr. Vernon H. Wheeler, Comdr. Leon B. Scott.

governments relating to purchases of war

materials in the United States. The President answered protests from the military

by pointing out that over half of the

foreign procurement would be of nonmilitary items. It seems more likely that the

President's real reason was his desire to

keep the negotiations in the hands of

Henry L. Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of

the Treasury, who earlier had established

a close and sympathetic relationship with

Arthur B. Purvis, the Scottish-Canadian

industrialist who headed the AngloFrench Purchasing Board. Morgenthau

was an enthusiastic supporter of aid to the

Allies while Harry Woodring, Secretary of

War, was an outspoken isolationist. At all

events, the Clearance Committee was reduced to a subordinate role, and the principle of civilian control over foreign aid

was established. Army members of the

Clearance Committee continued to carry

out their earlier prescribed duties where

purchases of military material were involved, acting for the Secretary of War

through the President's Liaison Committee rather than for the ANMB. This action, during the period of the "phony

war," consisted largely of collecting information and rendering assistance. Nearly

all orders were for foreign types of munitions rather than for those standard to the
32 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

U.S. Army, and only in the case of aircraft

was there any serious question of release of

U.S. designs.22

In April and May 1940 the British and

French Governments appealed frantically

to the United States for all kinds of military material. The British cabinet

scrapped its cautious financial approach,

deciding to rely on American production

to the extent of British need, rather than

of British ability to pay, hoping naturally

for an eventual relaxation of the American "cash and carry" restriction. In May

the new Prime Minister, Winston S.

Churchill, appealed directly to the President for supplies, and the Anglo-French

Purchasing Board in the United States

began to comb the country for facilities to

produce small arms and artillery. When

France fell, the British Purchasing Commission supplanted the board and took

over all French contracts. The mushrooming of British orders dictated a tightening

of the whole machinery of control.23

Congress on 28 June 1940 passed an act

enabling the President to give priority to

all Army and Navy orders over deliveries

for private account or for export. By October 1940 a Priorities Board had been

formed within the Advisory Commission

to the Council of National Defense, and to

it the President delegated his own powers.

The ANMB assumed control of determining priorities for production of all munitions. Beginning in July 1940 foreign governments were required to file Purchase

Negotiation Reports, which had to be approved by the Advisory Commission, on

all proposed contracts over $150,000.

When military materials were involved,

the Clearance Committee screened the

contracts, working through the Advisory

Commission and the President's Liaison

Committee.24 The machinery provided a

means of eliminating British competition

with the American defense program, and

the spirit of the Congressional legislation

and the inclination of the military leaders

was to use it to this end. The President,

however, insisted that the British program

be accommodated as far as possible.

The issue of British aid during and

after the crisis of May and June centered

in the two questions of what could be given

immediately from surplus Army stocks

and what could be planned on a longrange basis from future production. These

two aspects, together with their implications for the U.S. Army's rearmament

program, will be treated in turn.

Use of Army Stocks To Aid Anti-Axis Nations

The Army's largest stocks of weapons,

as already noted, were of obsolescent types

upon which, until industry could produce

22

 (1) Memo, ASW and ASN for President, 30 Jul

39. (2) Memo, ANMB for Col Charles Hines, Chm

CC ANMB, et al., 1 Dec 39, sub: ANMB Com for

Clearance on Mun, with incl on rules and policies.

(3) Ltr, President to SW, 6 Dec 39. (4) Memo, ASW

and ASN for President, 9 Dec 39. (5) Memo, President for Chairmen ANMB, 14 Dec 39. (6) Memo,

Hines for ASW, 22 Mar 40, sub: Present Status of

CC ANMB. All in ID, Lend-Lease, Doc Suppl, I.

(7) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, p. 300. (8)

For information on the work of the Clearance Committee, see its weekly reports to the Secretary of War

in Rpts to ASW file, CC ANMB. (9) For an informative account of the Morgenthau-Purvis channel, see

Hall, North American Supply, Ch. IV, galleys 1-4,

Hist Br, Cabinet Off, London. 23

 (1) Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy, p.

119. (2) Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease: Weapon

for Victory (New York, The Macmillan Company,

1944), pp. 31-35. (3) Rpt 40, CC ANMB to SW et al.,

Rpts to ASW file, CC ANMB. (4) Winston S.

Churchill, The Second World War: Their Finest Hour

(Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), pp. 23-

25.

24

 (1) CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War, pp. 17-

28, 50-51. (2) PL 671, 76th Cong. (3) ID, Lend-Lease,

I, 72-73. (4) Ltr, Morgenthau to President, 19 Dec

40, President's Ln Com file, CC ANMB.
REARMAMENT AND FOREIGN AID BEFORE LEND-LEASE 33

modern ones, the Army would have to depend for any sudden mobilization in the

near future. Only in a limited sense could

they be considered as "surplus." Requests

from Latin American and European neutral countries in 1939 first raised the question of releases from these stocks. On 1

March 1940, in response to a request from

the Swedish Government, G-4 drew up a

fairly definitive list of items that the staff

believed could be turned over without undue risk. The list included 100,000 Enfield

rifles and 300 British-type 75-mm. guns

and some obsolescent machine guns, heavy

artillery, and mortars. On 12 March the

Secretaries of State and War agreed that

such surplus should be sold directly to

neutral governments, but not to private

individuals, corporations, or other potential intermediaries who might transfer the

matériel to belligerent governments and

thus lay the administration open to the

charge of violating the neutrality laws.

Under this policy sales were made to Finland, Sweden, Greenland, and several

Latin American republics.25

It was the President himself who reversed this neutral policy in May and

June 1940 over the strenuous objections of

Secretary of War Woodring. At his direction, the War Department searched existing statutes for authority to turn over surplus arms to the British and came to the

conclusion that it would be entirely legal

to sell them to a private corporation,

which could in turn sell to the British. A

new surplus list was hastily prepared, obviously based more on what the British

and French wanted than on what Army

officials really conceived to be surplus.

The President lengthened the list. The

U.S. Steel Corporation assumed the role

of intermediary, and on 11 June 1940 the

material was transferred from the government to the steel corporation and from the

corporation to the British on the same day

and for the same price—500,000 Enfield

rifles with 129,140,708 rounds of ammunition, 80,583 machine guns of various

types, 316 3-inch mortars, 20,000 revolvers, 25,000 Browning automatic rifles,

895 75-mm. guns with a million rounds of

ammunition, and other miscellaneous

items. In a few weeks this matériel was on

its way to England, there to be used to

arm the Home Guard and the troops who

had returned from Dunkerque against the

apparently inevitable German invasion.

The Army also agreed, as a separate transaction, to trade ninety-three Northrop

light bombers back to the manufacturer

who could then deliver them as part of a

British contract; the Navy took similar

action on fifty Curtiss-Wright dive bombers.26

Both General Marshall and Admiral

Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, were convinced that no more surplus

stocks could be released without endangering defense preparations. But the

President's decisions on military policy at

the end of June kept the door open for further releases. Also, Congress passed a law

legalizing an exchange contract technique 25

 (1) Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, 1 Mar 40, sub:

Surplus Ord Mat Available for Sale to Foreign Govts,

G-4/26057-2. (2) Related papers in same file and in

AG 400.703 (2-20-40). (3) Memo, Cordell Hull and

Harry Woodring, no addressee, 12 Mar 40, ID, LendLease, Doc Suppl, I. (4) A summary of the laws covering sales of surplus is in G-4/33184. (5) Records of

surplus sales are in the AG 400.3295 series and in the

Clearance Committee, ANMB files, classified by

countries. The most convenient summary is a list compiled by the Clearance Committee as of 17 February

1941 (hereafter cited as CC surplus list, 17 Feb 41),

in Corresp re Surplus Mat file, CC ANMB. 26

 (1) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp.

309-12. (2) Stettinius, Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory,

pp. 26-31. (3) CC surplus list, 17 Feb 41. (4) Hall,

North American Supply, Ch. V, Galley 4, Hist Br,

Cabinet Off, London.
34 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

by which the Secretary of War could exchange surplus or obsolescent military

equipment for newer types under production on foreign contracts. One important

brake was provided, however. On 28 June

1940 Congress ruled that any military

material sold or exchanged to foreign governments must be certified by the Chief of

Staff as surplus to the defense needs of the

United States.27 In the months that followed General Marshall used this power

judiciously, though he showed himself

willing to take certain calculated risks.

After June 1940 the releases of surplus

equipment to Britain were grounded, at

least nominally, on the principle that the

equipping of the initial PMP force should

not thereby be seriously retarded.

The course of this policy and the calculated risk it involved, both in June 1940

and later, may best be illustrated by the

cases of rifles and light artillery. There

were in government arsenals in June 1940

approximately 1,800,000 Enfield and

900,000 Springfield rifles; 240,000 Garands were in prospect by June 1942. Since

two million rifles would serve four million

men, there was an ample margin of safety

if the possible needs of State Guards were

disregarded. Some 500,000 Enfields were

declared surplus and transferred to the

British in June 1940, and more were released in the following months until the

total reached 1,135,000 in February

1941.28 Though these releases were made

without serious deprivation to the U.S.

Army during 1940 and 1941, they resulted

in a serious shortage of rifles for training

the vastly larger forces mobilized after

Pearl Harbor.

The transfer of ammunition, without

which the rifles were of no use to the British, was a more serious problem. There

were only 588,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition on hand in the United States in

June 1940, and the rate of current production was pitifully small—four million

rounds monthly in June and July, with a

scheduled expansion to ten million

monthly from August through December.

Requirements for the initial PMP force

were estimated by G-4 in early June at

458,000,000 rounds, an estimate that evidently ignored training needs entirely. But

this figure, together with the premise that

the ammunition was deteriorating in

storage, provided the basis in June for releasing the 129,000,000 rounds to accompany the rifles.29

This amount was far from an adequate

supply for the rifles released. The British

were dependent on the United States for

.30-caliber ammunition since their own

production was entirely of .303-caliber.

They requested 250,000,000 rounds from

U.S. stocks in May 1940, and placed a

contract with Remington Arms, but deliveries on this contract would not begin

until April 1941. Army authorities at first

agreed that old ammunition from stocks

should be released in exact ratio as the

new came off the production line—four

million rounds a month in June and July,

ten million per month from August

through December. In August General

Marshall repudiated this agreement. A

review of the situation revealed that training requirements for the National Guard

and Selective Service troops over the next

year would be 1.6 billion rounds, and

there were further needs for stocking island garrisons. Indeed, .30-caliber ammu27

 (1) PL 671, 76th Cong. (2) PL 703, 76th Cong. 28

 (1) Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, 5 Jun 40, sub:

Surplus Ord Mat Available for Sale to Foreign Govts,

G-4/26057-2. (2) CC surplus list, 17 Feb 41. 29

 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofOrd, 6 Jun 40, sub:

Exch of Deteriorated Am, with note for rcd only,

G-4/16110-6.
REARMAMENT AND FOREIGN AID BEFORE LEND-LEASE 35

nition promised to be the most gaping of

all the deficits in meeting the PMP schedule. After the release of the first eight million rounds in June and July, Marshall refused to certify further releases in August;

not until February 1941 did he agree to

let the British have fifty million additional

rounds, and then with the proviso that

they should replace it from the May-July

production on their Remington contract.30

This release of 188,000,000 rounds of

rifle ammunition, though large in terms of

current stocks and production, was a relatively small factor in the serious shortage,

which continued well into 1942. The entire amount represented only eight days'

combat supply for the rifles and machine

guns released. The basic cause of the

shortage was the delay in reaching full

production. For this various factors were

responsible—serious miscalculations in

the development of new production facilities, labor difficulties, an untimely explosion at an important ordnance plant,

to mention only a few. As a result, it was

impossible to meet British, U.S. Army,

Navy, and other needs.31

Of light artillery, the U.S. Army had

on hand in the spring of 1940 4,470 75-

mm. guns, including 3,450 of the French

type, 700 of the British, and 320 of the

American. Of these, only the French-type

weapons were considered suitable for combat, and were being modernized for the

purpose. In an emergency they would

have to serve not only in their normal role

of infantry support, but also as the only

available substitute for the 37-mm. antitank gun. Brig. Gen. Richard C. Moore,

the Deputy Chief of Staff, estimated on

the basis of PMP requirements and normal wastage that there would be a shortage of 3,220 of these guns within a year

after war broke out. Nevertheless, he was

willing to dispose of the British-type guns.

Two hundred were sold to the Finns in

March, and on 4 June General Moore approved release to the British of the 395 remaining serviceable British-type guns.32

The President, dissatisfied with this contribution, ordered the release of five hundred of the French type over the protests

of the General Staff. One staff officer commented at the time that if sudden mobilization were necessary "everyone who

was a party to the deal might hope to be

found hanging from a lamp-post."33 After

June 1940 General Marshall approved no

further transfers of artillery until the following February, when prospects for production of the new 105-mm. howitzer

seemed much brighter. He also resisted

pressure from both the British and the

President to release Army bombers, and

in agreeing early in 1941 to release of a

30

 (1) Ltr, Charles T. Ballantyne, Secy Gen AngloFrench Purch Bd, to Donald M. Nelson, Chm President's Ln Com, 17 Jun 40, sub: Small Arms Am, AG

400.3295 (6-17-40) (1). (2) Watson, Prewar Plans and

Preparations, pp. 312-14. (3) Memo, unsigned, no

addressee, 16 Aug 40 [sub: Br Arms and Am], Binder

4, Foreign Sale or Exch of Mun file, OCofS. (4) CC

surplus list, 17 Feb 41. An additional six million

rounds of .30-caliber ammunition for machine guns

were transferred from naval stocks on 22 July 1940.

(5) See material in AG 400.3295 (6-22-40). (6) Memo,

President for SW, 4 Feb 41, and accompanying

papers, in AG 400.3295 (2-4-41) (1). 31

 (1) Memo, Brig Gen Richard C. Moore, DCofS,

for CofOrd, 23 Sep 40, sub: Pdn of Small Arms Am,

G-4/31773. (2) For a discussion of production problems in this period, see R. Elberton Smith, Army Procurement and Economic Mobilization. (3) Harry C.

Thomson and Lida Mayo, The Ordnance Department: II, Procurement and Supply. Last two are

volumes in preparation for the series UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 32

 (1) Memo cited n. 28(1). (2) Memo, unsigned, no

addressee, 11 Jun 40. (3) Memo, Gen Moore for CofS,

11 Jun 40, sub: Sale of 75-mm. Guns. Last two in

Binder 4, Foreign Sale or Exch of Mun file, OCofS. 33

 (1) Memo for info, W. B. S. [Maj Walter Bedell

Smith], no addressee, 11 Jun 40, Binder 4, Foreign

Sale or Exch of Mun file, OCofS. (2) Watson, Prewar

Plans and Preparations, p. 312.
36 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

few light tanks, he insisted that the British

replace them, with interest, at a later date

from output under their own contracts.34

Army surplus stocks released to the British nevertheless put them in a much better position to resist invasion. Similarly,

the fifty over-age destroyers transferred to

the British in September in exchange for

Atlantic bases immeasurably strengthened

the sea communications on which Britain's survival depended. To British morale

the contribution was of inestimable value.

Nevertheless, transfers of surplus matériel

were only stopgap measures. Without assurance of continuing support from the

United States in the form of modern

weapons, which could only come from

new production, the British could hardly

hope to carry on indefinitely, much less

win the war.

Anglo-American Co-ordination of

Production Planning

The President's decisions at the end of

June 1940 had erected a barrier against

complete subordination of British arms

orders to American defense needs.35 In almost continuous discussions between

American and British representatives in

Washington throughout the last half of

1940, a solution was worked out on the assumption that the British aid program

must be accommodated along with American rearmament. In these negotiations

the War Department insisted that the

British must present a broad program of

requirements instead of placing individual

contracts at random, that these requirements must be confined as far as possible

to standard U.S. Army equipment, and

that no British orders should be allowed to

interfere with achievement of the goal of

equipping the initial PMP force by the

end of 1941.36

Co-ordination of aircraft production

and deliveries was the most pressing problem and the one on which agreement was

first reached. By the end of June 1940,

after absorbing French orders, the British

had contracts with American manufacturers for 10,800 airplanes, against a U.S.

Army-Navy program for only 4,500. Expansion of aircraft production was going

ahead far more rapidly than that of

ground equipment, but was still very small

in relation to the need. In conferences in

mid-July 1940 it was agreed that the British should be allowed to continue to get

deliveries on their existing contracts, and

that the solution should be vastly increased production. Under the expanded

program, contracts for 33,467 planes were

to be placed for delivery by 1 April 1942.

Of these, 14,375 were to be for the British

and the rest for the U.S. Army and Navy.

Arthur Purvis, taking what then seemed

an almost unbelievably optimistic view of

American production capabilities, secured

an additional promise that after 1 January

1941 the British should be permitted to

order an additional 3,000 planes a month

if they could be produced. The British

agreed to adjust their requirements, as far

as possible, to planes and accessory equipment standard to the U.S. Army and

Navy. In September 1940 the ArmyNavy-British Purchasing Commission

Joint Committee (later called the Joint

34

 (1) On planes, see Watson, Prewar Plans and

Preparations, pp. 306-09. (2) On the tank question,

see voluminous correspondence in G-4/31691-1 and

AG 400.3295 (8-7-40) (1), and Staff Study 29A, Br

Purch Comm file, CC ANMB. 35

 See above, pp. 29-30. 36

 (1) Memo cited n. 20(1). (2) Draft memo, G-2

for CofS, Oct 40, sub: Br Mun Reqmts for Calendar

Year 1941, WPD 4340-3. (3) Watson, Prewar Plans

and Preparations, pp. 316-18. (4) Rudolph A. Winnacker, The Office of the Secretary of War Under

Henry L. Stimson, MS, Pt. I, p. 52, OCMH.
REARMAMENT AND FOREIGN AID BEFORE LEND-LEASE 37

Aircraft Committee), consisting of American and British Air officers, was established to carry on a continuing consultation on aircraft standardization and adjustment of production schedules. The

Joint Aircraft Committee became, in

actual practice, also the body that arranged for allocation of finished planes

when delivered. Under these arrangements no priority was in fact assured for

the expanding U.S. Army Air Corps, and

production inevitably fell behind the

highly optimistic estimates. The President

in November expressed a desire that

planes coming off the production line be

divided 50-50 with the British, but in

reality no set formula was adopted.37

In September a similar arrangement

was made for tanks, an article for which

the British had placed no earlier orders.

The British agreed to order Americantype tanks of the medium M3 series, recently developed, if these were modified

in accordance with British battle experience. By November the British had been

allowed to place orders for 2,048 medium

tanks with firms not then producing tanks

for the U.S. Army. They also placed an

experimental order for 200 light tanks,

but later canceled it. Henceforth, the

countries co-operated closely in developing tank-type weapons, Great Britain depending increasingly on the United States

to fill its needs.38

For the general run of ground equipment standard to infantry divisions, however, the problem of types proved more

difficult. The British used .303-caliber

rifles, 25-pounders, 4.5-inch and 5.5-inch

field artillery, and 40-mm. and 6-pounder

(57-mm.) tank and antitank guns, while

the Americans used .30-caliber rifles, 105-

mm. and 155-mm. field artillery, 37-mm.

and 75-mm. tank and antitank guns, and

37-mm. and 90-mm. antiaircraft artillery.

Each country regarded its own types as

superior and its own production program

as too far advanced to permit a change. A

separate program for production of British types in the United States would absorb scarce machine tools and plants and

violate the principle that facilities for

British aid must be capable of rapid conversion to meet American needs. In late

September 1940 Sir Walter Layton of the

British Ministry of Supply arrived in the

United States to negotiate the whole issue.

Layton presented a preliminary comprehensive statement of British requirements,

the basis of which was a recently developed plan to arm fifty-five divisions by the

end of 1941. The United States was asked

to provide marginal quantities that British industry could not produce in time

and quantities necessary to insure against

loss of British capacity because of German

air bombardment. This British "A" Program, as it was entitled, included one million .303-caliber rifles; 1,000 2-pounder

antitank guns and 2,000 37-mm. guns;

2,250 2-pounder tank guns for tanks

manufactured in Britain; 1,500 37-mm.

and 1,500 75-mm. tank guns to match the

British tank program in the United States;

1,600 37-mm. and 1,800 90-mm. antiaircraft guns; and 1,800 25-pounder artillery pieces and 300 4.5-inch or 5.5-inch

pieces. Negotiations hung fire for several

weeks because the War Department re37

 (1) Hall, North American Supply, Ch. VI, Galleys 7-8, 18-19, Hist Br, Cabinet Off, London. (2)

Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 305-09.

(3) Winnacker MS, Pt. I, pp. 52-53, cited n. 36(4).

(4) Ltr, SW to Gen Moore, 13 Sep 40, ID, LendLease, Doc Suppl, I. 38

 (1) AG ltr to WD Rep President's Ln Com, 6 Sep

40, sub: Release of Designs for Medium Tanks . . . ,

and accompanying papers, AG 400.3295 (8-7-40) (1).

(2) Hall, North American Supply, Ch. VI, Galley 12,

Ch. VII, Galley 27, Hist Br, Cabinet Off, London.
38 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

fused to consider the British types involved. To break the deadlock, Layton

finally proposed in late October a solution

on an entirely different basis—the British

would place orders for American standard

equipment for ten British divisions. This

plan, subsequently known as the "B" Program, was accepted by the War Cabinet

reluctantly since the British did not have

any definite plans for completely equipping and maintaining ten British divisions

with American equipment. Yet it offered

the British a measure of participation in

the developing American munitions program and promised an increase in American capacity for production of arms, a

step that the British regarded as desirable

as did the U.S. General Staff. They also

hoped that acceptance of the Ten Division

Program would open the gates for the

placing of orders for their "A" Program,

which they continued to regard as far

more important.39

In November the Army's War Plans

Division undertook a study to determine

to what extent the British programs could

be met without interfering with the delivery of equipment to an American force

capable of protecting the Western Hemisphere in case of British collapse. It was

assumed that full training requirements

must be on hand by 30 June 1941 and full

operational requirements as soon thereafter as possible. Though WPD found a

wide variation in the expected degree of

interference with respect to different items

of equipment, the staff concluded that the

British "B" program should be accepted

with an adjustment of time schedules since

in the end it would serve to expand production of munitions.40

 On 29 November

1940, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson

informed Sir Walter Layton that the Ten

Division Program was acceptable, subject

to the proviso that no final commitments

could be made as to time or delivery and

to certain other conditions. British orders

must be placed immediately and with the

approval of the appropriate supply

branches of the War Department. Complicated legal and financial questions

would have to be resolved, and a provision

must be placed in each contract permitting its assumption by the United States if

necessary for national defense.41

Meanwhile, the Advisory Commission

and the Treasury agreed on 29 October

1940 on the principle that "henceforth the

general rule would prevail . . . that orders would be entertained in this country

only for items of equipment which were

standard for this country."

 42

 In keeping

with this principle, Stimson also informed

Layton that while existing British orders

for nonstandard equipment—.303-caliber

rifles, 2-pounder guns, 4.5-inch and 5.5-

inch artillery—would be allowed to stand,

no additional contracts could be placed

for them. No orders for ammunition for

these types beyond existing contracts for

.303-caliber would be permitted. For the

rest of their "A" Program, the British

were required to place orders for American types. In no case could any of these

"A" Program orders be given priority over

fulfillment of the complete American

program.43

39

 (1) Winnacker MS, Pt. I, pp. 54-55, cited n.

36(4). (2) Memo, Arthur E. Palmer, Sp Asst to SW,

for SGS, 6 Nov 40, AG 400.3295 (11-6-40). (3) CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War, p. 52. (4) Hall, North

American Supply, Galleys 12-16, Hist Br, Cabinet

Off, London. 40

 Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 20 Nov 40, sub:

Mat Assistance for Gt Brit, WPD 4323-7. 41

 Ltr, Stimson to Layton, 29 Nov 40, Br A&B Progs

file, DAD, Job A46-299. 42

 Memo cited n. 39(2). 43

 (1) Ltr cited n. 41. (2) Ltr, A. E. Palmer to William S. Knudsen, NDAC, 19 Nov 40, Br A&B Progs

file, DAD.
REARMAMENT AND FOREIGN AID BEFORE LEND-LEASE 39

Concurrently with the negotiations over

the ground force program, the British presented an additional proposal for letting

contracts for 12,000 airplanes, over and

above those set up under the July agreement, and for a speed-up in delivery

schedules. By the end of November this

proposal had also been accepted, though

with the same reservations as to time of

delivery. Aircraft production schedules

were projected further into the future, and

automobile manufacturers were brought

into the aircraft production picture.44

General Marshall on 10 December 1940

expressed satisfaction with both the air

and the ground force programs, pointing

out that the former would provide planes

for 60 additional air groups in case of

British collapse and the latter, equipment

for 300,000 additional men for the ground

forces. In the meantime, he had prescribed

priorities for delivery of equipment for the

Ten Division Program with the aim of

safeguarding the equipping of the initial

PMP force. The general policy was to be:

a. No deliveries . . . will be made prior

to July 1, 1941, and no deliveries of any items . . . until the minimum training requirements of the Army of the United States

(PMP and replacement centers) are filled. b. During the period July 1-September 15, 1941, minimum training requirements of the

British 10-Division program will be filled as

far as practicable. c. Following the fulfillment of the initial

training requirements for the British no additional items will be furnished them until

the full American requirements of the PMP

and replacement centers are filled.45

These decisions on the Ten Division

Program met all the conditions of the War

Department and at the same time promised a larger measure of aid to Britain

than had at first been thought possible.

The principle on which they were based—

British use of U.S. standard equipment—

recommended itself to Army planners

since it promised to expand production.

The specific arrangements, to be sure,

proved to be ephemeral, but they were an

important step toward systematizing planning with a view to dividing the munitions

output of American industry among the

forces of both nations in a manner best

calculated to defeat the Axis—that is to

say, toward uniting U.S. defense and foreign aid munitions requirements in a

single consolidated supply program.

While the British were undoubtedly disappointed both in their failure to secure

acceptance of their own types for production and in the priority accorded to deliveries of ground equipment under their

contracts, they had gained their major

objective—a share in the vast output

of munitions of which the American industrial machine would eventually be

capable.

Aid to Other Nations

Virtually every independent nation in

the world outside the Axis orbits made inquiries or tried to place munitions contracts in the United States in 1940. The

requests of nations within the British

Commonwealth of Nations and of refugee

governments residing in London were

largely absorbed within the British programs, but others lay outside the British

sphere—notably those of Latin American

nations, China, and the Netherlands In44

 (1) Winnacker MS, Pt. I, pp. 58-60, cited n.

36(4). (2) CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War, pp. 49-

50.

45

 (1) Memo, SGS for ACofS WPD, 2 Dec 40, sub:

Mat Assistance to Gt Brit Under Br "B" Prog, Br

A&B Progs file, DAD. (2) Memo, CofS for SW, 10

Dec 40, sub: New Airplane Prog and U.S.-Type Ord

Prog of Br Purch Comm. Br A&B Progs file, DAD.
40 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

dies. Under prevailing policy and strategy,

aid to Britain came first. British needs,

when added to those for American rearmament, so absorbed existing stocks and

production facilities that scant consideration could be given these other demands.

Military aid to Latin American nations

might, indeed, have been regarded as a

logical part of the scheme of hemisphere

defense. But while the principle was accepted in 1940, very little was done to implement it. The Pittman Resolution,

passed by Congress on 15 June 1940, permitted the War Department to sell coast

defense and antiaircraft material from

surplus stocks to Latin American countries and to manufacture these arms for

them in government arsenals and factories. Releases of surplus stocks to Latin

American nations in 1940, however, were

limited to a few thousand rifles to Haiti

and Nicaragua, and some obsolete coast

artillery to Brazil. In his decisions on military supply policy at the end of June 1940,

the President stipulated that, in view of

the requirements for U.S. rearmament

and aid to nations fighting the Axis, only

token aid to countries south of the border

would be possible.46 Some plans were

made for future aid from new production.

Latin American governments were invited to make their needs known, and arrangements were made to extend credit

through the Export-Import Bank of

Washington. The Joint Army-Navy Advisory Board on American Republics was

set up to handle all Latin American munitions requests and to draft a detailed program. To equip the forces of these republics, WPD in December 1940 established

a priority that would permit them to receive small quantities of U.S. standardtype weapons once the needs of the initial

PMP force were met, but this program

could not be expected to get under way

before early 1942. In effect, U.S. policy

indicated an intention to rely largely on

U.S. forces for defense of the Western

Hemisphere.47

China and the Netherlands Indies occupied positions of vital importance in the

Far East but the American policy after

mid-1940 was to avoid war with Japan

or, if this were not possible, to commit no

more forces west of Hawaii. Aid to China

received little consideration until the very

end of the year. The Chinese Government, with scanty financial resources,

could purchase in the United States only

by borrowing. The Export-Import Bank

granted China a loan of $100 million late

in 1940, and the Universal Trading Corporation, the Chinese agent in this country, presented requests for an air program

and for considerable quantities of ordnance either from stocks or from future

production contracts. These requests

coincided with the visit of Col. Claire L.

Chennault,48 American air adviser to the

Chinese Government, and Maj. Gen. Mao

Pang-tzo49 to the United States to press

the issue of Chinese aid. The Chinese were

allowed to place some contracts with Curtiss-Wright for aircraft, and the British

agreed to divert one hundred old-type

P-40's from their own contract with this

firm to be replaced from the Chinese contract later. The hundred P-40's became

the initial equipment of the American

Volunteer Group, the Flying Tigers,

under Chennault, but the War Depart46

 (1) Pub Resolution 83, 76th Gong. (2) CC surplus list, 17 Feb 41. (3) Informal memo cited n. 19. 47

 Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere

Defense, Ch. IX. 48

 This was a Chinese Air Force rank. He held also

the rank of captain, USA-Ret., until 9 April 1942,

when he was ordered to active duty as a colonel. 49

 Often anglicized to Peter T. Mow.
REARMAMENT AND FOREIGN AID BEFORE LEND-LEASE 41

ment was unable to do anything further

to satisfy the Mao-Chennault requests.50

The position of the Netherlands Indies

was the most difficult of all. Its government commanded ample financial resources and presented a well-defined program of ground, naval, and air requirements. By February 1941 it had placed

contracts valued at $83 million, ranking it

as the second largest foreign purchaser in

this country. But its low priority gave little

hope of receiving deliveries of critical

items for a long time to come. The Dutch

were unable even to place contracts for

many of their most vital needs such as

rifles and ammunition, and the Army

refused to release material to them from

its stocks. As Lt. Col. Edward E. MacMorland, Secretary of the Clearance

Committee, ANMB, confessed in February 1941:

. . . the possibilities of early deliveries for

the Netherlands East Indies are hopeless

under present laws and priority conditions

. . . they are competing with the United

States and British in a market with limited

immediate supplies and must wait a long

time for sizeable deliveries.51

The Drift Toward Collaboration

With Britain

By the end of 1940 the mobilization and

rearmament programs were in full swing.

The Army had grown mightily in numbers—from 264,118 at midyear to 619,403

at the end of the year—and its service

establishment now included 149,400

troops. Since August, troops had been

moving to the overseas garrisons in considerable numbers, raising the total overseas strength from 64,500 the preceding

May to almost 92,000 in December; the

acquisition of a fringe of new bases from

Britain in the Atlantic in September foreshadowed an even greater overseas deployment. Some $270 million in military

construction had been initiated, largely

to accommodate the flood of selectees sent

to the camps for training beginning in the

autumn. Federalization of the National

Guard had begun. The activation of

GHQ, the designation of Army commanders and staffs, and the further separation of the territorial organization for

administration, supply, and "housekeeping" (the corps areas) from the tactical

and training organization (GHQ and the

field armies) were all important steps in

launching mobilization on a large scale.

The enormous increase in the business

of staff control incident to this mobilization was reflected in the addition of two

new deputies to the Chief of Staff's office

late in 1940, one for Air Corps matters

and one (General Moore) for a miscellany

of largely logistical business—construction, maintenance, supply, transportation,

land acquisition, and hospitalization—

and problems concerning the Armored

Force. The number of officers on the General Staff, including those in the field, rose

from less than 350 in mid-1940 to over

550 at the end of the year.52

50

 (1) Ltr, Archie Lockhead, Universal Trading

Corp., to Philip Young, Chm President's Ln Corn, 8

Jan 41. (2) Memo, Maj Gen James H. Burns, U.S.

Army member President's Ln Com, for Young, 28

Jan 41. Both in China (2) file, DAD. (3) For details,

see Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, UNITED STATES ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), pp. 7-13. 51

 (1) Memo, MacMorland for G-2, 14 Feb 41, sub:

Netherlands Mun Reqmts, Netherlands file, DAD.

(2) Rpt cited n. 14(3). (3) Ltr, SW to Secy of State,

no date, with accompanying papers. AG 400.3295

(9-4-40) (1). 52

 (1) Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1940,

Tables C, D. (2) Annual Report of the Secretary of War,

1941, Tables C, D. (3) Watson, Prewar Plans and

Preparations, pp. 69-71. (4) Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 8-11, 24. (5) Greenfield, Palmer, and

Wiley, AGF I, pp. 6-8. (6) Anderson, Munitions for

the Army, p. 15, cited n. 2(1).
42 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

But the very substantial progress achieved in this six-month period was

largely in the necessary preparatory work

of defining policy, working out procedures

and organization, placing contracts, and

"tooling up." The output of organized,

trained, and equipped troops was not impressive. The influx of selectees into the

Army had a disrupting and retarding

effect on training; "blind leading the

blind, and officers generally elsewhere,"

was Maj. Gen. Lesley J. McNair's dry

comment after visiting one division in

September.53 Organization tables for the

triangular division, the basic unit of the

new army, were not completed until late

in 1940. Six months of munitions production, moreover, had added relatively little

to the Army's stock of weapons.54 (See Appendix B.) The output included no medium tanks, no heavy-caliber antiaircraft

guns, no new standard 105-mm. howitzers

(the bulk of light artillery pieces produced

were 37-mm. and 75-mm. antitank guns),

and almost no new heavy artillery (all except three pieces were modified older

models). The production of .50-caliber

ammunition had been meager. In this

record can be seen at a glance the reason

why foreign aid during 1940 consisted

largely of releases from stocks of obsolescent matériel.

Both rearmament and foreign aid were

falling short of meeting the needs of the

situation developing abroad in the late

summer and autumn of 1940. The repulse

of the Luftwaffe's attack on Britain in September, heartening though it was, scarcely

diminished German power, but rather diverted it into other channels. In the latter

part of 1940 the signs pointed to an impending German drive to the southwest,

in conjunction with Italy's effort to overrun Greece and to crush British power in

the eastern Mediterranean. During October Vichy France seemed about to collaborate, at least passively, with Germany

in this design. While an invasion of the

Western Hemisphere did not yet seem imminent, Germany probably had the

strength to capture Gibraltar and push

down the west coast of Africa. If she

should gain the whole eastern shore of the

Atlantic from the English Channel to

Dakar, her aircraft and naval raiders

could make a shambles of the Atlantic sea

lanes, and it would be difficult to prevent

Latin American countries from being

drawn into her political orbit. In September, too, Japan formally joined the Axis

and made her first move into northern

Indochina.55

Against the full-scale aggression on

which Japan seemed about to embark, the

U.S. Fleet, then concentrated mainly in the

eastern Pacific, was the only real deterrent.

It could remain there, however, only as

long as the British Navy guarded the

Atlantic, and because the U.S. Navy

would be for some time to come the

country's only real mobile defense, it

could not be committed to action anywhere until the nation's very existence

was at stake. Under RAINBOW 4 it would

attempt to hold the Alaska-HawaiiPanama triangle. For a major effort in

the Far East, the planners warned, "we

are not now prepared and will not be prepared for several years to come."56

 To

counter the threat from the east, they

53

 Personal ltr, Gen McNair to Maj Gen Walter

C. Short, 23 Oct 40, GHQ 320.2/21. 54

 (1) War Production Board and Civilian Production Administration, Official Munitions Production

of the United States by Months, July 1, 1940-August

31, 1945. (2) Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, AGF I,

p. 36. 55

 Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere

Defense, Ch. II, pp. 58-66, and Ch. III. 56

 Memo cited n. 20(1).
REARMAMENT AND FOREIGN AID BEFORE LEND-LEASE 43

thought the United States would have to

move rapidly—occupying the Azores at

the first indication of a German advance

into Spain and Portugal, occupying ports

and airfield sites in northeastern Brazil if

the Germans took Gibraltar and moved

into North Africa. And if the worst should

befall, if the British Fleet were destroyed

or surrendered, "from that very day the

United States must within 3 months securely occupy all Atlantic outpost positions from Bahia [Baia] in Brazil northward to include Greenland."57

If this RAINBOW 4 situation should in

fact develop, Army planners estimated

that a minimum force of 1,400,000 troops

completely trained and equipped would

be needed to defend the hemisphere north

of Brazil. The objectives of the munitions

program were revised upward late in 1940

to provide for equipping an initial PMP

force of this size, with a first augmentation

of 2,800,000; the 4,000,000-man force remained a long-term goal. But there was

no expectation that even the initial PMP

force would be ready before April 1942.

By April 1941, the staff estimated, not

more than six full-strength divisions with

supporting units (150,000 men) could be

put in the field. Currently (September

1940) it would be possible to muster perhaps five skeleton divisions (about 55,000

men), virtually without support, only by

dint of scalping other units of personnel

and equipment and reducing training

allowances across the board by half. The

Army, in fact, could not at this time have

maintained in combat any balanced force

without slashing training allowances of

ammunition all along the line.58

At the end of 1940, therefore, the survival of Britain and her fleet appeared

more than ever a prerequisite to the security of the Western Hemisphere. In

November both General Marshall and

Admiral Stark concluded that the United

States could not afford to allow Britain to

lose the war. To this end, they agreed, the

United States would probably have to engage eventually in large-scale land operations against Germany in Europe in conjunction with British forces. This might

well mean temporarily sacrificing American interests in the Far East. General

Marshall thought it imperative to "resist

proposals that do not have for their immediate goal the survival of the British

Empire and the defeat of Germany."59

"The issues in the Orient," asserted the

Joint Planning Committee, "will largely

be decided in Europe."60 Army and Navy

leaders disagreed only as to the degree to

which the armed forces (in effect, the

Navy) could afford at this time to be committed to resisting Japanese aggression.

Admiral Stark assumed that a vigorous

defense, at least, must be undertaken, but

General Marshall warned, "a serious commitment in the Pacific is just what Germany would like to see us undertake."61

To avoid such a commitment was the

aim of the cautious course of action that

57

 (1) Ibid. (2) Memo, Gen Strong for CofS, 1 Oct

40, WPD 4175-15. 58

 (1) Memo cited n. 20(1). (2) WD ltr, 18 Feb 41,

sub: Def Objectives, AG 381 (2-17-41). (3) Watson,

Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 318-19. Army

records for the closing months of 1940 contain numerous allusions to the revised PMP objectives,

which probably were formulated in connection with

RAINBOW 4. (4) For the difficulties of mounting expeditionary forces late in 1940, see below, Ch. II. 59

 Memo, CofS for CNO, 29 Nov 40, sub: Tentative Draft, Navy Bsc War Plan-RAINBOW 3, WPD

4175-15. 60

 Memo, JPC for JB, 21 Dec 40, sub: Natl Def

Policy for the U.S. in Response to a 14 Dec 40 Dir

From JB, JB 325, Ser 670. 61

 (1) Memo cited n. 59. (2) Memo, Adm Stark for

SN, 12 Nov 40 (familiarly known as the Plan Dog

Memo), WPD 4175-15. This is a revised version of

Admiral Stark's memo of 4 November 1940 to the

Secretary of the Navy, no copy of which exists in
44 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

the President in January 1941 laid down

for the armed services to follow in the immediate future. The Navy was to remain

on the defensive in the Pacific, based on

Hawaii, without reinforcing its squadrons

in far Pacific waters. In the Atlantic the

Navy was to prepare to convoy shipments

of munitions to Britain, a course that the

President was not yet ready to risk but one

that some of his advisers, notably Stimson

and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox,

were already urging as the only further

contribution the United States could now

make to Britain's defense. The Army was

to undertake no aggressive action at all

for some time; "our military course," the

President warned, "must be very conservative until our strength [has] developed."

 62

 Late in the month British and

American military staff representatives

began conversations in Washington looking to the more distant and hypothetical

contingency of full participation by the

United States in the war against the

European Axis.63

Britain's most pressing need, in any

case, was material aid, and Prime Minister

Churchill in a long, eloquent message to

the President on 8 December 1940, drove

home this point. Even though deliveries

on existing contracts would continue for

some time, the dwindling of Britain's

dollar resources had reached a point

where the supply programs then under

discussion—by now an important part of

the plans for continuing the war—could

not be financed. The cost of supplies actually on order for the British at the end of

1940 totaled $2.7 billion; the larger programs would cost $6.5 billion more. By the

most strenuous efforts, the British could

not muster more than half this sum in

dollar exchange. On the American side, it

appeared virtually impossible to continue

aid to Britain, as heretofore, without

enabling legislation. Involved legal arrangements would be necessary to finance

plant expansion with mixed American

and British funds, and to place contracts

with the same firms under different conditions of payment. Part of the matériel for

the Ten Division Program would have to

be produced in government-owned or

government-leased plants, and there was

no legal method of transferring this matériel to the British except as surplus certified by the Chief of Staff to be nonessential

to American defense. The placing of

British contracts came to a virtual standstill while these issues were being threshed

out, and the Ten Division Program remained, along with its allied arrangements, largely a paper proposition.64

The President, after mulling over these

problems early in December during a

cruise in the Caribbean (where Churchill's

appeal reached him), returned to the

United States in mid-December with the

idea of lend-lease. The famous metaphor

with which Roosevelt illustrated this idea

in a press conference on the 17th—of the

loan of a garden hose to put out a fire in a

neighbor's house—actually was not parWar Department files. (3) See discussion in Watson,

Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 119-23. (4) Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning

for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953),

pp. 25-28.

62

 Memo, CofS for ACofS WPD, 17 Jan 41, sub:

White House Conf Thursday, January 16, 1941,

WPD 4175-18. 63

 For American-British Conversations, see below,

Ch. II. 64

 (1) Ltr, Churchill to President, 8 Dec 40, as

quoted in Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 558-67. (2)

Memo, Maj Gen Charles M. Wesson, CofOrd, for

SW, 4 Dec 40, sub: Procurement of Br "B" Prog, Br

A&B Progs file, DAD. (3) CPA, Industrial Mobilization

for War, p. 53. (4) Hall, North American Supply, Ch.

VI, Galleys 26-27, Hist Br, Cabinet Off, London.
REARMAMENT AND FOREIGN AID BEFORE LEND-LEASE 45

ticularly apt, since relatively little of the

material "lent" to Britain and other nations under lend-lease was to be returned

or made good after the world conflagration was finally extinguished. If lend-lease

embodied the idea of a loan at all, it was

in the notion of free and continuous exchange of assistance of all kinds—goods,

services, and information—that over the

long haul would be of roughly equal benefit to both sides. The central idea, as the

President put it in the same press conference, was to "get rid of the silly, foolish,

old dollar sign"—in short, to remove all

financial obstacles to the flow of American

aid to nations fighting against a common

enemy. A few days later, in his Fireside

Chat of 29 December, Roosevelt tossed

out another catchy phrase—arsenal of

democracy—which, by emphasizing the

primary role of the United States as a supplier of munitions, unquestionably bolstered the deep-seated hope that it would

not be necessary to "send the boys overseas" as well. Nevertheless, the debate

over lend-lease, in Congress and throughout the country, raged for more than two

months before the lend-lease bill (HR

1776) finally became law on 11 March.65

At one stroke the Lend-Lease Act

cleared away the legal and financial barriers that stood in the way of aid to Britain

and other nations claiming American aid.

It held out the promise of a single consolidated military production program financed entirely with American funds to

meet both foreign and domestic military

needs, something the War Department

had frequently urged during 1940. It put

the stamp of Congressional approval on

the President's policy of dividing American resources between U.S. rearmament

and anti-Axis nations abroad, and promised that aid to these nations would continue so long as they showed any ability to

resist. And since Britain's claims overshadowed all others at the moment, it was

a long step toward partnership with

Britain in military supply, just as the staff

conversations going on in Washington,

while the lend-lease bill was being debated, were a step toward full military collaboration. Hemisphere defense remained

the bedrock on which both lend-lease and

plans for collaboration rested, but lendlease was to be an important factor in

enabling the United States to wage war

as a member of a powerful and victorious

coalition rather than as the sole defender

of her own shores.

65

 (1) Winnacker MS, Pt. I, pp. 56-57, 61, cited n.

36(4). (2) Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins:

An Intimate History (rev. ed., New York, Harper &

Brothers, 1950), pp. 221-29.
CHAPTER II

War Plans and Emergency

Preparations

By the end of 1940 American military

leaders were convinced that American

security was bound up with Britain's survival, and that for practical reasons this

would require the defeat of the European

Axis. American military policy, they

agreed, must be decisively oriented to this

end, if necessary at the expense of American interests in the Far East and at the risk

of eventual direct involvement in the war.

They began, therefore, to give thought to

the probable terms and form of direct involvement. In the Army staff, at least,

habituated to the logistics of hemisphere

defense, the far-ranging expanse of Britain's imperial commitments and her long,

exposed lines of communications inspired

misgivings. Discussions with British military staff representatives in Washington

late in the winter of 1940-41 brought the

maturing ideas of the Americans on this

subject squarely into conflict with British

views. While agreeing that defeat of Hitler

must be the primary goal of an AngloAmerican partnership, the staffs tended,

on each side, to approach military collaboration in terms of their own experience

and plans, especially with reference to

oceanic lines of communications. The British were influenced, too, by the fact that

theirs was a "going" war, and their mobilization and deployment well advanced,

while American military power was still

largely potential. Out of these differences

in outlook grew a sharp disagreement as

to the best methods for pursuing the common end and, more particularly, as to the

role that American armed forces should

play.

During the winter and spring of 1941,

meanwhile, as Britain's military fortunes

steadily deteriorated, the United States

prepared to expand its principal contribution to Britain's war—material aid—and

also moved rapidly closer to direct participation through "measures short of war" in

the Atlantic. Until the end of May, moreover, the threat of a German move to the

southwest into northwest and west Africa

remained acute, provoking the United

States in that month to actively prepare

for an occupation of the Azores, a project

that fell just short of being carried out. The

Army thus labored under a double logistical burden during this period—equipping

the rapidly expanding mass of the Army

in training, and deploying garrison forces

to outlying bases and territories, while

concurrently preparing small, mobile,

striking forces for emergency action. In

both these tasks, by late spring 1941, preparations had fallen far short of what the
WAR PLANS AND EMERGENCY PREPARATIONS 47

rapidly developing situation seemed to demand, accentuating an unreadiness that

appeared almost as acute as that of June

1940.

Britain's War

By the beginning of 1941 the logistical

scope of Britain's war was more vast and

involved than the actual localization of

the fighting would indicate. The conspicuous battles were being fought in Libya and

in the air over the home islands. But the

effort to sustain armies in Egypt, Libya,

east Africa, and elsewhere in the Near and

Middle East, and to maintain naval and

air power in the Mediterranean was absorbing, or was soon to absorb, half of

Britain's war production, transported at

enormous cost over the long route around

the Cape of Good Hope or in occasional

convoys forced through the Mediterranean. In all the imperial outposts from

Hong Kong and Singapore to the West

Indies, Britain and her Commonwealth

associates had to maintain forces, meager

in numbers but costly in shipping and material. On the seaways binding together

the scattered parts of the Empire and

Commonwealth, the deadly war against

the submarine, long-range bomber, and

raider went on—a war that Britain in

spring of 1941 was losing.

Geography forced Britain to operate on

exterior lines, around the periphery of her

opponents' compact land-based power.

Prime Minister Churchill wrote to the

President in December 1940:

The form which this war has taken, and

seems likely to hold, does not enable us to

match the immense armies of Germany in

any theatre where their main power can be

brought to bear. We can, however, by the use

of sea-power and air-power, meet the German armies in regions where only compara- tively small forces can be brought into action. We must do our best to prevent the German

domination of Europe from spreading into

Africa and into Southern Asia. We have also

to maintain in constant readiness in this

island armies strong enough to make the

problem of an oversea invasion insoluble. . . . Shipping, not men, is the limiting factor, and the power to transport munitions

and supplies claims priority over the movement by sea of large numbers of soldiers.1

Even with the mobility conferred by sea

power, Britain's strength in men and munitions, as well as in shipping, was inadequate to overcome the disadvantage of

long and exposed lines of communications.

Germany could move larger forces into

the Mediterranean with far less effort than

could Britain. Germany could concentrate

her armies on the English Channel more

rapidly than the British could ship divisions back from Egypt or from the Far

East and, therefore, Britain had to keep

large forces idle at home.

Britain's logistical disadvantage was not

merely a matter of distance; the geographical disposition of the various parts of the

Empire and Commonwealth also contributed to it. The British imperial axis

stretched halfway around the globe joining two centers of gravity, the British Isles

and the far eastern dominions (Australia

and New Zealand). (Map 1) In between

stood the Middle East and east Africa,

draining military strength from both, their

nearest support the Union of South Africa.

A military liability, the whole area was

essentially a link in the imperial lifeline, a

valuable source of oil, and the dwelling

place of peoples whose good will was vital

to the Empire. In the summer of 1940,

with the German invasion expected at any

1

 Ltr, Churchill to President, 8 Dec 40, as quoted

in Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 559-60.

48 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

time, Churchill had dared to weaken the

home defenses in order to send to Egypt a

full armored brigade along with almost

half the few tanks available in England.

To abandon the eastern Mediterranean,

even if a line somewhat farther south and

east could be held, would enable the

enemy to move Romanian and Soviet oil

through the Dardanelles, tap the oil fields

of Iraq, capture immense stocks of matériel in Egypt, and swallow up Turkey. Farreaching political repercussions would be

felt in Iran, Afghanistan, and India. But

expulsion from the Far East, British

leaders thought, would be incomparably

more disastrous. Australia and New Zealand contributed to the Commonwealth

war effort important military forces, food

for the United Kingdom and the Middle

East, training facilities for British air pilots

and crews, merchant shipping, and a substantial production of aircraft, munitions,

and warships. Britain also drew upon the

manpower and wealth of India, the tin

and rubber of Malaya, and the oil of the

Netherlands Indies. Churchill wrote to the

prime ministers of Australia and New

Zealand in August 1940 that, in the event

of a Japanese invasion of those countries,

. . . we should then cut our losses in the

Mediterranean and sacrifice every interest, except only the defence and feeding of this

island, on which all depends, and would pro- ceed in good time to your aid with a fleet able

to give battle to any Japanese force which

could be placed in Australian waters, and

able to parry any invading force, or certainly

cut its communications with Japan.2

Six months later British staff representatives in Washington asserted that loss of

the Far East would mean "disintegration

of the British Commonwealth and a crippling reduction in our war effort."

 3

"This island" was indeed a first charge,

but there was a limit beyond which Britain could not afford, except in the ultimate

extremity, to reduce her overseas commitments. Even though costly to defend, the

overseas territories and dominions made

important contributions to British power,

and the home islands, vulnerable to starvation as well as attack, could not survive

for long if cut off from their outlying

sources of nourishment. The British staff

representatives declared:

We are a maritime Commonwealth; the

various dominions and colonies are held to- gether by communications and trade routes

across the oceans of the world. Our popula- tion in the United Kingdom depend for exist- ence on imported food and on the fruits of

trade with the overseas dominions and colo- nies, with India and with foreign countries,

including the vast area of China. Finally, we

are trustees for the sub-continent of India,

with a population more than twice that of the

United States, many of them turbulent, temperamental and excitable people, who de- pend on us entirely for defense against exter- nal aggression and security against internal

disorders.4

Britain was forced to compromise between

her imperial obligations and the obvious

desirability of drawing upon near sources

of supply in the interests of shipping economy. During the first nine months of the

war, only 36 percent of Britain's imports

came from the accessible North Atlantic

region, and even at the end of 1940, when

every possible economy was being sought,

almost half her imports were still coming

from the more remote areas, which depended on British power to sustain their

2

 Msg, 11 Aug 40, as quoted in Churchill, Their

Finest Hour, p. 436. 3

 (1) Note by U.K. Deleg, U.S.-Br Stf Convs, 31

Jan 41. (2) Statement by U.K. Deleg, U.S.-Br Stf

Convs, 29 Jan 41. (3) Appreciation by U.K. Deleg,

U.S.-Br Stf Convs, 11 Feb 41. All in Item 11, Exec

4. (4) Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 428, 436, 446. 4

 Appreciation cited n. 3(3).
WAR PLANS AND EMERGENCY PREPARATIONS 49

defense and on British shipping and commodities to maintain their economies.5

Britain's logistical position thus offered

no pattern for a defensive strategy of relinquishing outposts in order to fall back

upon contracting and progressively stronger defense lines toward a common center—

no pattern for defense in depth. The

enemy was massed at her doorstep and

ranged along the flank of her major lifelines in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and a formidable potential enemy

threatened her in the Far East. Britain's

own external sources of strength were remote, and she had to accept the exorbitant

logistical costs of defending them. But

under the pressures the European Axis and

Japan (or even the former alone) were

capable of bringing to bear, the brittle and

attenuated imperial structure seemed

likely to break, and its defenders likely to

be forced back upon its two centers of

gravity, which would then no longer be

able to support one another. (See Map 1.)

In the winter and spring of 1941 this

catastrophe seemed neither unlikely nor

too far distant. Before the end of 1940 the

diminishing threat of invasion had been

replaced by the equally deadly and more

persistent menace of economic strangulation, which in turn presently revived the

danger of invasion. Shipping losses, while

declining somewhat from a peak of almost

450,000 gross tons a month during September and October, remained high

through the fall and winter and in the following spring climbed even higher. In

April 1941 the sinkings for the month—

British, Allied, and neutral—came to

654,000 gross tons. During the last half of

1940 shipping losses had aggregated

almost 2.5 million tons; during the six

months following they rose to more than

2.8 million. This attrition was not alone

the work of German U-boats but also that

of long-range aircraft, magnetic mines,

and merchant and heavy warship raiders.

(See Appendix H-1.)

Apart from sinkings, the effective capacity of shipping declined. "The convoy

system, the detours, the zigzags, the great

distances from which we now have to

bring our imports, and the congestion of

our western harbours," Churchill wrote,

"have reduced by about one-third the

fruitfulness of our existing tonnage."

 6 In

March, April, and May 1941 the Luftwaffe pounded with devastating effect at

British ports, almost paralyzing the movement of goods. As a result, imports into the

British Isles fell to a volume less than that

needed to feed the population and to keep

war industries running. From a rate of

over 45 million tons per year during the

first nine months of the war, they fell to an

annual rate of only 30 million tons during

the last few weeks of 1940. During the first

quarter of 1941 the rate declined further

to 28 million tons, and rose only slightly

thereafter. In the year to come, Churchill

warned the President at the end of 1940,

the capacity to transport across the ocean

would be "the crunch of the whole war."

 7

While Britain's home economy was

weakening under this attrition, her armies

met disaster in the Middle East. Early in

5

 (1) Ibid. (2) Hancock and Gowing, British War

Economy, p. 241. 6

 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 564. 7

 (1) The above figures do not include tanker imports. Loss figures vary somewhat; those given here

are from Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War:

The Grand Alliance (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 782, and Churchill, Their Finest Hour,

p. 714. (2) Ltr, Churchill to President, 8 Dec 40, as

quoted in Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 560. (3)

Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy, pp. 205,

242, 249-56, 263-68. (4) Frederick C. Lane, Ships for

Victory: A History of Shipbuilding Under the U.S. Maritime Commission in World War II (Baltimore, Md., The

Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), p. 62.
50 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

the year the forces of General Sir Archibald Wavell had virtually destroyed the

Italian armies invading Egypt and had

rapidly swept over Cyrenaica, and by the

middle of May Italian power in east Africa

was crushed. But in April the Germans

overran Yugoslavia and Greece, almost

destroying a sizable British expeditionary

force in the process, while in Libya the recently arrived Afrika Korps of Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel drove the British back to the Egyptian border, leaving a

large imperial garrison beleaguered in

Tobruk. In May came the devastating

German airborne conquest of Crete, which

threatened to drive the British eastern

Mediterranean fleet through the Suez

Canal. Against these reverses, Britain's

success during May and June in overcoming local revolts and Nazi infiltration in

Syria and Iraq seemed small indeed.

The Logistics of Hemisphere Defense

Britain's war was not the war for which

the U.S. Army had been preparing. The

logistics of hemisphere defense presented

formidable problems, but they were incomparably simpler than the global logistics with which Britain had to struggle.

American military power had a single

center of gravity in continental North

America. This central base was rich in

manpower and material resources; it possessed the capacity to create and sustain

powerful armed forces and also to feed its

population. To the east, southeast, and

west, outlying islands provided footholds

for outpost defense; far to the north inhospitable land masses barred the approach

of an invader. Against an aggressor operating anywhere north of Brazil the United

States would have the supreme advantage,

which Britain lacked, of fighting on interior lines. Against superior power, defending forces could withdraw along radial

lines toward the central base, shortening

their communications in the process. Only

after an invader had secured substantial

lodgments on the North American continent would this advantage give way to the

serious problems of integrated defense created by the distribution of population and

industry and by mountain barriers, among

other factors. But to gain lodgments in

North America, an aggressor would first

require a tremendous margin of superiority.

To defend the whole Western Hemisphere was another matter. South and

Central America were generally lacking in

the political, economic, and military capabilities for effective resistance to a powerful aggressor. U.S. forces in South America

would have to operate at the end of lines

of communication longer than those of a

European enemy attacking from the east,

where the bulge of northeastern Brazil

faces Dakar across the South Atlantic narrows. The American planning staffs were

therefore anxious to establish advance

bases in northeastern Brazil at the first

sign of an Axis move toward west Africa.

To eject a powerful aggressor from the distant southern portion of South America

below the Brazilian bulge, Army planners

thought, would be a task far beyond the

capabilities of the initial PMP force of

1,400,000; that force, indeed, was considered "barely sufficient" to defend U.S.

territory (not including the Philippines)

and to provide "limited task forces" to

support Latin American governments

against fifth-column activities. Hemisphere defense plans (RAINBOW 1 and 4)

contemplated that the region below the

Brazilian bulge could be secured only in

later stages of a war, after the area to the
WAR PLANS AND EMERGENCY PREPARATIONS 51

north had been firmly consolidated.8

In most areas, however, the logistical

difficulties confronting an invader of the

Western Hemisphere were more formidable than those of the defense. In the far

north, terrain, climate, and economic development were unfavorable to military

operations; both there and far to the south,

immense distances from possible bases of

operations were an added obstacle and

tended on the whole to give the logistical

advantage to the defense. To the west,

Hawaii provided a strong naval and air

base, readily accessible to logistical support

from the west coast, and in turn supported

Midway, which otherwise would have

been dangerously exposed to attack from

Japan's main base at Truk and advanced

positions in the Marshall Islands.

In the last resort the United States did

not have to defend the entire hemisphere

in order to survive. (Map 2) A citadel defense of the area north of the Brazilian

bulge could be so formidable, many military observers believed, as to deter any

possible aggressor. The Joint Planning

Committee even ventured the opinion

(which many challenged) that the United

States could "safeguard the North American continent, and probably the Western

Hemisphere, whether allied with Britain

or not."

 9 It was not so much the logistical

difficulties of hemisphere defense that

made the danger of invasion real; it was

rather the possibility that potential aggressors might be able to muster the necessary

margin of superior power to override the

meager forces defending the hemisphere

despite the logistical advantages the latter

would enjoy.

American policy makers had accepted

the possibility of military collaboration

with Britain on the premise that American

security could be assured in no other way,

but hemisphere defense remained the

point of departure in any consideration of

participation in Britain's war. American

planners naturally tended to visualize that

participation as a projection of their plans

for hemisphere defense and, as a corollary,

to project the logistical principles on which

hemisphere defense was based. Military

power pushed far outward from a central

base was a diminishing power, long lines

of communications were costly to protect,

and an enemy became progressively

stronger as he was pressed back on his

bases of operations. The British could not

deny the validity of these principles, which

their enemies had so long and so often exploited against them; they had grown

accustomed, however, to making the most

of such compensating advantages as the

mobility inherent in sea power and a network of established overseas bases. U.S.

Army planners were understandably reluctant to abandon completely the comparative security of the Western Hemisphere in order to share fully the risks and

costs of Britain's global war. If American

power must be projected overseas beyond

hemisphere boundaries, they reasoned, let

it be projected mainly into the North Atlantic area. On the Atlantic seaboard were

centered most of America's heavy industry, her densest transportation net, her

best ports; in the Atlantic was the bulk of

her merchant shipping. A partnership of

the United States, Britain, and Canada,

moreover, could generate immense military power, sufficient to control the narrow span of the North Atlantic and, in

8

 (1) WPD study, Jan 41, title: Possible Necessity for

an Army of 1,400,000 Men and One of 4,000,000

Men, Item 5, Exec 4. (2) Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Chs. I-II. 9

 Ltr, JPC to JB, 21 Jan 41, sub: Jt Instns for A&N

Reps for Holding Stf Convs With the Br, JB 325, Ser

674.

52 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

effect, to create a single center of military

and economic gravity in that area. Such a

power could dominate the entire Atlantic

region and perhaps eventually crush the

power of Germany entrenched in Europe,

despite her advantage of interior lines. (See

Map 8.)

ABC-1 and Rainbow 5

Late in January 1941, as Britain's fortunes declined, British and American staff

representatives in Washington began a

series of secret meetings that became

known as the ABC (American British Conversations) meetings. The discussions were

concerned with "the best methods by

which the armed forces of the United

States and the British Commonwealth can

defeat Germany and the powers allied

with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war."

 10

How the United States intended to contribute to this endeavor, if compelled to

enter the war, had in general terms

already been spelled out with Presidential

sanction before the conference began—

first and basically, secure the Western

Hemisphere; then exert the principal

American military effort in the Atlantic

area and only "navally" in the Mediterranean; if Japan should enter the war despite

all efforts to keep her out, limit American

operations in the Pacific and Far East to

such a scope as not to interfere with concentration in the Atlantic; hold to the defeat of the European Axis as the major

goal of coalition strategy.11

These stipulations, particularly the first

three, reflected the misgivings with which

the Army representatives viewed the logistical problems of full involvement in Britain's war, and their determination that

American land and air forces should be

employed primarily within a short radius

of North America. In principle the stipulations did not conflict with British notions

as to the bases for collaboration; the fourth

one, of course, was the concept to which

the British had hoped above all to bind

their prospective allies. But sharp differences of opinion emerged as soon as the

discussion got down to the specific questions of employment of forces and division

of responsibilities. Symptomatic of these

differences was the discussion of assignment of naval forces to protect the communications in the Atlantic on which

overseas deployment of ground forces in

that area would depend. The Americans

questioned the British representatives

closely regarding the trend of ship sinkings

and "the probable situations that might

result from the loss of the British Isles."

 12

U.S. naval forces, and British too, they

thought, should be concentrated to cover

the northwestern approaches to the British

Isles in order to eliminate the most dangerous threat to communications with

North America. The British refused even

to discuss the contingency that the British

Isles might be conquered; the question

was academic, they said, since if the islands

10

 (1) Statement by CNO and CofS, 27 Jan 41,

WPD 4402-94. (2) The agreements reached at the

ABC meetings were embodied in two reports: United

States-British Staff Conversations: Report, March 27,

1941, known by the short title, ABC-1 Report, covering strategy and employment of forces; and United

States-British Staff Conversations: Air Collaboration,

March 29, 1941, known by the short title, ABC-2 Report, covering air policy and allocation of air matériel.

Both reports are reproduced in Pearl Harbor Attack:

Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of

the Pearl Harbor Attack (hereafter cited as Pearl Harbor

Hearings), Pt. 15, pp. 1485-1550. (3) Watson, Prewar

Plans and Preparations, pp. 367-82. 11

 (1) Statement cited n. 10. (2) See above, Ch. I. 12

 Min. 2d mtg U.S.-Br Stf Convs, 31 Jan 41, Item

11, Exec 4.
WAR PLANS AND EMERGENCY PREPARATIONS 53

fell "the British Army and Air Force would

have ceased to exist."

 13

 As for naval dispositions, the British insisted on spreading

their forces, however thinly, throughout

the Atlantic and in other oceans as well.

The current rampaging in the Atlantic of

the German warship raiders Scharnhorst,

Gneisenau, and Hipper, lent point to their

argument. The Americans were not convinced, however, and the final agreement

recorded their insistence that the center of

gravity for U.S. naval operations in the

Atlantic would be in the northwestern approaches to the United Kingdom, and

that U.S. land forces outside the Western

Hemisphere would be used mainly to support U.S. naval and air forces in areas

bordering on the Atlantic.14

The sharpest of the disagreements growing out of the Americans' desire to limit

their logistical commitments centered

upon Singapore and the Far East. The

British hoped to secure an American commitment to help defend Singapore. "The

security of the Far Eastern position," they

argued, "including Australia and New

Zealand, is essential to the cohesion of the

British Commonwealth and to the maintenance of its war effort. Singapore is the

key to defense of these interests, and its

retention must be assured."

 15

 If the Japanese captured the great base, they might

be able to cut communications to the west;

India and Burma would immediately become military liabilities; Australia and

New Zealand might be isolated or even

overrun. Loss of Singapore, the British

concluded, "would be a disaster of the first

magnitude, second only to loss of the British Isles."

 16

 They proposed that the U.S.

Asiatic Fleet, then based in the Philippines, be heavily reinforced to the point

where, in conjunction with British and

Dutch naval forces, it could deter or at

least delay a Japanese onslaught on

Malaya.17

These arguments met with an unsympathetic response. Singapore was indeed

a symbol and a bastion and its loss would

be felt. But loss of the Philippines would

also be a severe blow to the United States.

Both partners must be willing to take risks

and accept losses. In a private session

Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles complained

that British preoccupation with the Far

East was diverting attention from their

central problem, the security of the

United Kingdom. As the British themselves conceded, the Japanese did not need

Singapore to harass shipping in the Indian

Ocean while, even with Singapore, they

probably would not risk large naval forces

far to the west as long as the U.S. Pacific

Fleet menaced their eastern flank. Moreover, the Americans felt confident that the

Pacific Fleet could protect communications between Australia and New. Zealand

and the Western Hemisphere through the

South Pacific, and even deter Japan from

attempting to overrun the dominions.

Even if the Asiatic Fleet were reinforced,

the Americans feared it might eventually

be engulfed by superior enemy forces,

while the Pacific Fleet would be seriously

weakened and unable to send essential

reinforcements to the Atlantic. The American plan was to defend the Malay Barrier

as long as possible with existing forces (including the Asiatic Fleet, which would

probably retire from the Philippines at

13

 Ibid. 14

 (1) Min, 2d, 4th, 6th, 8th, and 9th mtgs U.S.-Br

Stf Convs, 31 Jan, 5 Feb, 10 Feb, 15 Feb, and 17 Feb

41, Item 11, Exec 4. (2) ABC-1 Report, pars. 13(b),

(f), (g), Pearl Harbor Hearings, Pt. 15, pp. 1491-92. 15

 Statement cited n. 3(2). 16

 Appreciation cited n. 3(3). 17

 (1) Ibid. (2) Statement cited n. 3(2). (3) Note

cited n. 3(1).
54 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

the outbreak of hostilities); the Pacific

Fleet, meanwhile, would operate against

Japan's eastern flank; the Chinese, fortified by American munitions, would strike

at Japan's mainland forces; and the

weapon of economic blockade would be

exploited to the full. In general, the Americans felt that the Far East, except Japan

itself and areas to its north and east, was

a British and Dutch sphere of responsibility, and that if the British were bent on

holding Singapore, they should themselves

send the necessary naval forces via their

own secure line of communications around

the Cape of Good Hope. In the end, the

representatives could only agree to disagree. The British recorded their conviction that the security of Singapore was essential to the joint war effort, and their

intention to strengthen their naval power

in the Indian Ocean. The Americans

undertook to augment their own naval

power in the Atlantic and Mediterranean,

thus releasing British units from those

areas, but indicated that no strengthening

of American forces in the Far East was

contemplated.18

To resist further entanglements in the

Far East seemed to the Army staff not

only sound logistics but a logical corollary

of the principle on which they and the

British had agreed—that defeat of Germany must be the primary objective. An

American commitment to help defend

Singapore might imply an undertaking

"to seek the early defeat of Japan" and acceptance of "responsibility for the safety

of a large portion of the British Empire."

It might lead to "employment of the final

reserve of the Associated Powers in a nondecisive theater."

 19

 As to how Germany

was finally to be defeated, the American

staff had as yet no definite ideas. Admiral

Stark's hints, the preceding November, of

massive land operations in Europe had

aroused little enthusiasm among the Army

planners, particularly his suggestion of repeating Wellington's exploits in Spain. A

WPD paper prepared late in January

reached the conclusion, among others

similarly pessimistic, that an invasion by

the historic route through the Low Countries would be dangerous folly. Army

thinking, in general, was oriented toward

the initial, not the later, stages of an

Anglo-American partnership.20 The British had somewhat more definite and farreaching ideas on the subject. Germany

would be defeated in the end, they

thought, by small, highly mechanized

armies wielding tremendous fire power.

These forces would enter the Continent at

various points, to the accompaniment of

internal uprisings, only after the enemy

had been battered to the breaking point

by preliminary attacks around the perimeter of Europe, air bombardment, blockade, and subversive activity.21

British notions as to the form American 18

 (1) Min, Jt mtg of A&N sees, U.S. Stf Com, 13

Feb 41. (2) Statement by U.S. Stf Com, "The U.S.

Military Position in the Far East," 19 Feb 41. Both in

Item 11, Exec 4. (3) Memo, Maj Gen Stanley D.

Embick, Brig Gens Leonard T. Gerow and S. Miles,

and Col Joseph T. McNarney for CofS, 12 Feb 41,

sub: Dispatch of U.S. Forces to Singapore, WPD

4402-3. (4) ABC-1 Report, pars. 11 (b), 13 (d), and

Annex III, par. 35, Pearl Harbor Hearings, Pt. 15, pp.

1490, 1492, 1518. 19

 Statement cited n. 18(2). 20

 (1) Min, 11th mtg U.S.-Br Stf Convs, 26 Feb 41,

Item 1 1, Exec 4. (2) Statement cited n. 18(2). (3)

Memo, unsigned, for ACofS WPD, no date sub: Stf

Convs With Br, Item 11b, Exec 4. (4) See above, Ch.

I. (5) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 118-

20.

21

 (1) See Churchill's allusion to "superior air-power" and "the rising anger" of "Nazi-gripped populations" in his letter to Roosevelt, 8 December 1940, as

quoted in Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 560. (2) See

also the fully developed plan described a year later

in Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 646-51. (3) For

the various British views, see the minutes of the U.S.

British Staff Conversations, Item 11, Exec 4.
WAR PLANS AND EMERGENCY PREPARATIONS 55

participation in the war might take were

closely related to this strategy of attrition

and peripheral attack. The "party line"

laid down by Churchill was expressed

in his famous exhortation, "give us the

tools and we'll finish the job." "We do

not need the gallant armies which are

forming throughout the American Union," Churchill declared. "We do not need

them this year, nor next year; nor any

year that I can foresee."

 22

 While this assertion, made during the debate over the

Lend-Lease Act, was perhaps not wholly

candid, the British staff representatives in

Washington admitted that they dreaded a

vast American mobilization and training

program that would swallow up the output of American munitions in an effort to

put huge armies in the field at an early

date, thus cutting off the vital flow of

American weapons to British forces already fighting the enemy. In the event the

United States should enter the war, the

British anticipated that the still embryonic

American ground forces would for some

time play a minor, largely defensive role,

protecting their own air and naval bases

and relieving the British in quiet sectors.

British forces, far more advanced in their

mobilization and already disposed around

the periphery of enemy power, would

gradually be strengthened by troops thus

released and by American air units. Only

for the U.S. Navy, a powerful force in

being, did the British envisage an independent role. American land and air

power, in short, was to be introduced

piecemeal and on a small scale (except for

long-range bombing forces) into the existing pattern of the war, thereby helping to

perpetuate that pattern and eventually to

consummate the strategy of "closing the

ring" around Germany.23 The principal

American contribution would not be

armies but the weapons to equip armies.

The final ABC-1 report on the whole

reflected British long-range strategic

thinking—emphasizing strategic air power, support of resistance movements and

neutrals, "raids and minor offensives,"

checking of Axis advances in North Africa, knocking Italy out of the war, capture of launching positions for an "eventual" offensive. Nowhere was there any

mention of a cross-Channel invasion based

on the British Isles. The implication was

that the process of nibbling at the fringes

of Axis power would continue for a long

time, and that the enemy would be defeated in the end less by shock than by

exhaustion. ABC-1 also gave assurance

that the flow of material aid to Britain

would continue, even if this meant reducing the size of the armed forces the United

States could throw into the scale. Already,

important concessions were being made to

the British in the allocation of aircraft and

other critical matériel.24

Yet the Army staff reacted strongly to

the British tendency to assign American

forces a complementary and subordinate

role. By virtue of its immense potential

power, one staff paper pointed out, the

United States was destined to become the

dominant partner if it should enter the

anti-Axis coalition, and would "constitute

the final reserve of the democracies both

in manpower and munitions." That reserve should be conserved "for timely employment in a decisive theater, and not

22

 Churchill's speech of 9 Feb 41, quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 261-62. 23

 (1) Statement cited n. 3(2). (2) Note cited n. 3(1).

(3) Min, 4th and 5th mtgs U.S.-Br Stf Convs, 5 and

6 Feb 41, Item 11, Exec 4.

The British also wanted to assign some U.S. naval

units piecemeal to British naval commands in the Atlantic. 24

 (1) ABC-1 Report, pars. 12-13, Pearl Harbor

Hearings, Pt. 15, pp. 1490-91. (2) See below, Ch. III.
56 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

dissipated by dispersion in secondary theaters."

 25

 "We must not make the mistake,"

warned another staff paper, "of merely reinforcing the British in all areas, but

should throw our weight in a single direction."

 26

 ABC-1 laid down the rule, in fact,

that the forces of each partner should operate, in the main, under their own commanders "in the areas of responsibility of

their own Power"—partial insurance

against the absorption of American forces

anonymously into the pattern of Britain's

war.27

This reservation was reflected in the

actual dispositions of American forces contemplated under the ABC-1 agreement

and the RAINBOW 5 war plan drawn up

during the weeks following. The RAINBOW

5 schedules provided for a maximum

overseas deployment, during the first six

months following American entry into the

war (M Day), of 413,900 Army troops,

but of these about 236,000 were definitely

assigned to tasks within the Western Hemisphere and another 109,500 to cover its

approaches and to forestall threats against

it. The remainder were to be sent to the

British Isles, within the orbit of AngloAmerican power and on the direct approaches to northwestern Europe.28

 The

scheduled deployment was as follows:

Hawaii.............................. . 44,000

Alaska .............................. . 23,000

Panama ............................. . 13,400

Caribbean bases...................... . 45,800

West coast of South America (task force) . . . 24,000

Brazil (task force) ..................... . 86,000

British Isles .......................... . 68,200

Iceland (relief of British) ............... . 26,500

Transatlantic operations to forestall German

move toward Dakar.................. . 83,000

413,900

Even U.S. naval power in the Atlantic,

a more mobile instrument, was to be concentrated mainly to protect the northwestern approaches to the United Kingdom,

although the Navy had the further mission of assisting the British occupation of

the Azores and Cape Verdes if the Axis

should move in that direction. In the Pacific the main fleet was to remain based on

Hawaii and, in the event of war with

Japan, would raid its communications and

subsequently operate against the Marshall and Caroline Islands. The Philippines, in that event, would be a beleaguered citadel far beyond the limits to

which American power, for many months

after the outbreak of a war in the Far

East, could hope to expand. Under ABC-1

the United States was assigned primary

responsibility for most of the Pacific, its

sphere extending westward to include

Japan but not the Philippines, Formosa,

or the areas to the south; on the Atlantic

side, American responsibility extended

only to the mid-Atlantic, short of Iceland

and the Azores.29 (See Map 2.)

Thus, except for the build-up of U.S.

strategic bomber forces in the British Isles

(which was to begin as soon as the United

States entered the war), the bulk of Amer25

 Draft memo, no date, atchd to memo, Gen

Gerow for Col McNarney, 6 Feb 41, Item 11, Exec 4. 26

 WPD paper, no date, sub: Stf Convs With Br,

Item 11b, Exec 4. 27

 (1) ABC-1 Report, pars. 9, 14(b), Pearl Harbor

Hearings, Pt. 15, pp. 1489, 1493. (2) Draft memo cited

n. 25. (3) WPD paper cited n. 26. 28

 Incl A to rpt, JPC to JB, 30 Apr 41, sub: Jt Bsc

War Plan—RAINBOW 5 and Rpt of U.S.-Br Stf Convs,

March 27, 1941, JB 325, Ser 642-5. 29

 (1) Ibid. (2) Memos, WPD for CofS, 20 and 31

May 41, sub: Analysis of Plans for Overseas Expeds,

RAINBOW 5, WPD 4175-22. (3) Charts atchd to memo,

WPD for CofS, 15 May 41, WPD 3493-11. (4) Papers

in Item 7, Exec 4. (5) Annex III to ABC-1 Report,

Pearl Harbor Hearings, Pt: 15, pp. 1504-35.

The schedule was revised from time to time

throughout 1941 and included additional small forces

to be sent to Greenland and Newfoundland.
WAR PLANS AND EMERGENCY PREPARATIONS 57

ican land and air power during the early

period of participation was to be held back

either inside the United States or within a

safe radius of North America, with short,

easily protected overseas communications.

This applied not merely to the great mass

of the Army still in training, but even to

most of the mobile striking forces, unless

these should be called into action by an

enemy threat to the hemisphere. Two considerations lay behind this whole plan.

The paramount reason, of course, was

that the Army would not be ready for

large-scale action of any kind for many

months—by 1 September, the earliest

date on which its commitments under

ABC-1 could become effective, it could

expect to put in the field, at the most, only

about six divisions and six air combat

groups. Secondly, the staff was determined

that American land and air power should

not be introduced piecemeal, as it grew,

into a global war in which for a long time

it could play only a subordinate role. "The

building up of large land and air forces for

major offensive operations against the

Axis powers," stated the Army's RAINBOW

5 plan, "will be the primary immediate effort of the United States Army. The initial

tasks of United States land and air forces

will be limited to such operations as will

not materially delay this effort."

 30

Ships for Britain

In the spring of 1941 Britain needed

more tangible and immediate assistance

from the United States than agreements

for military collaboration that were contingent upon the United States' being

forced into the war and that, as far as the

Army was concerned, could not become

effective before September. In December

the Prime Minister had warned Roosevelt:

Unless we can establish our ability to feed

this island, to import the munitions of all

kinds which we need, unless we can move our

armies to the various theaters where Hitler

and his confederate Mussolini must be met, and maintain them there, ... we may fall

by the way, and the time needed by the

United States to complete her defensive

preparations may not be forthcoming.31

American officials from December on

watched Britain's blood-letting with growing concern. Stimson recorded in his diary

on the 19th, ". . . it is now very clear

that England will not be able to hold out

very much longer unless some defense is

found."

 32

 The President's decisions on

military policy in January were based on

the assumption that Britain might hold

out for six more months. Harry Hopkins,

visiting in England a little later, found a

general expectation that the all-out invasion would certainly come in the spring,

and thought that the outcome would depend on how much material could be sent

from the United States "within the next

few weeks."33 Early in April Admiral

Stark concluded that the situation was

"hopeless except as we take strong measures to save it."

 34

The most dramatic and far-reaching response by the United States to Britain's

peril was the passage of the Lend-Lease

Act in March, but apart from some badly

needed shipments of food made under its

authority, the benefits of lend-lease lay in

the future; most of the munitions sent to

the British during 1941 were bought for 30

 Incl A to rpt cited n. 28. 31

 Ltr, Churchill to President, 8 Dec 40, as quoted

in Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 560. 32

 Stimson Diary, December 19, 1940 entry, quoted

in Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active

Service in Peace and War (New York, Harper &

Brothers, 1948), p. 367. 33

 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 257. 34

 Ltr, Adm Stark to Adm Husband E. Kimmel, 4

Apr 41, Pearl Harbor Hearings, Pt. 16, p. 2161.
58 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

cash.35 Except for munitions, Britain's

most pressing need was ships. Hopkins

forwarded urgent pleas on this score from

England in February, and Sir Arthur Salter, who came over in March to head the

British Merchant Shipping Mission, carried a new warning from the Prime Minister:

The Battle of the Atlantic has begun. The

issue may well depend on the speed with

which our resources to combat the menace to

our communications with the western hemi- sphere are supplemented by those of the

U.S.A. I look to you to bring this fact home

to the U.S. Administration . . . .36

The United States could do little to

meet this need. Building capacity was still

in the early stages of expansion—in 1939

American yards had produced only twenty-eight ocean-going ships, in 1940 only

fifty-three. Late in 1940 the British had let

contracts with the Todd-Kaiser Company

for sixty emergency-type freighters (precursors of the Liberty ships), but none of

these could be expected off the ways until

late in 1941; only five were completed before the end of the year. Of U.S. shipping

already in existence, substantial transfers

had been made before 1941 to British and

other foreign registry, thus releasing the

ships from the prohibitions of the neutrality laws in order to carry British cargoes.

Early in 1941 the entire U.S. merchant

fleet aggregated less than ten million gross

tons, of which more than half were working in the coastal trades. Only about 3.7

million tons, on the Atlantic side, were

suitable for transoceanic operation. Four

fifths of the entire fleet were vessels of

World War I vintage, too slow for travel in

danger zones except at great risk. Finally,

the domestic demands upon U.S. shipping

were mounting, especially for importing

strategic materials. Between mid-1940

and the end of 1941 Britain acquired

about a hundred secondhand ships from

the United States, most of them before the

Lend-Lease Act was passed; many of these

ships had to be laid up for repairs and refitting for months afterward. Of this small

tonnage, only the tankers appreciably

changed the situation in 1941 by building

up British oil stocks, which during the

summer had fallen to the danger level.

The United States also turned over to the

British in 1941 considerable Axis and

Danish tonnage interned in U.S. harbors

and persuaded other American republics

to do likewise—perhaps a million deadweight tons of shipping all told. U.S. pressure helped to secure other foreign tonnage for the British under charter.37

This was a small beginning. In December 1940 Churchill voiced to the President

his hope that American building capacity

would be expanded on the scale of the

Hog Island yards of World War I. From

Empire resources, producing well under 2

35

 (1) See below, Ch. III. (2) Stettinius, Lend-Lease:

Weapon for Victory, pp. 104-05 and Chs. VIII-IX. 36

 (1) Quoted in Hancock and Gowing, British War

Economy, p. 257. (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins,

pp. 257-58. 37

 Estimates of total tonnage vary widely; the figure

given in the text is from Charles H. Coleman, Shipbuilding Activities of the National Defense Advisory

Commission and the Office of Production Management, July 1940 to December 1941, WPB Special

Study 18. (1) On U.S. merchant fleet, see Coleman,

pp. 26-28, 30ff; Lane, Ships for Victory, pp. 42-43;

Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy, pp. 257-

58; and memo, G-4 for WPD, 28 May 41, sub: Strategic Est of Sit, with atchd tables, G-4/33052. (2) For

the British shipbuilding contracts in 1940 and transfers of U.S. shipping to Britain, see Hancock and

Gowing; Coleman; and Hall, North American Supply, Ch. VI, Galley 11, Hist Br, Cabinet Off, London.

Shipping transferred under lend-lease to the British

Commonwealth in 1941 amounted to only 1.1 percent

of all lend-lease transfers in that period. (3) For relationship of gross, net, and dead-weight tonnages, see

below, App. A-1.
WAR PLANS AND EMERGENCY PREPARATIONS 59

million dead-weight tons (1,250,000 gross

tons) per year, Britain could not hope to

replace her losses, which in April 1941

reached an annual rate of almost 12 million dead-weight tons (actual losses in 1941

were about 5 million tons). During the

spring, in fact, both merchant and naval

construction in the United Kingdom had

to be cut back in order to provide labor

and facilities to reduce the mountainous

backlog of damaged shipping clogging the

ports. The British frankly rested their

hopes on receiving a flood of American

tonnage in 1942—at an annual rate of 4.5

million dead-weight tons, according to

early 1941 calculations. Before the end of

1941 the British had raised their estimated

requirements to 8.2 million dead-weight

tons per year.38

Expansion of American shipbuilding

capacity spurted forward during 1941 in

three successive waves. The first, benefiting from the British contracts with ToddKaiser, began early in January with the

President's order for 200 emergency-type

freighters to be completed in two years;

under the current Maritime Commission

program, a like number of standard-type

vessels was to be completed by mid-1941.

The second wave of expansion followed

soon after the Lend-Lease Act was passed

and added more than 300 vessels, including 112 emergency-type freighters and 72

tankers, to the program. The third wave,

spread over the second half of the year, involved a variety of types. By the end of the

year, over 1,200 vessels (about 13 million

dead-weight tons) were scheduled for delivery before the end of 1943, aiming at a

peak annual production capacity of more

than 7 million tons. In 1941 the results of

the expansion were meager. Actual construction during the last half of the year

lagged behind schedule. About 100 merchant vessels of all types (1,161,000 deadweight tons) were completed in that year,

of which only 7 were Liberty ships and 53

standard freighters.39

This expansion was aimed largely at

British needs and owed much to lendlease funds. How much tonnage actually

would be turned over to the British remained, as the President remarked, an

"iffy" question. Shipping lent itself more

aptly than munitions to the President's

homely metaphor of the garden hose to be

returned to its owner after the fire was put

out. The expansion program, however,

gave the British the insurance they needed.

The Prime Minister told the House of

Commons on 25 June:

If we can resist or deter actual invasion this

autumn, we ought to be able, on the present

undertaking of the United States, to come

through the year 1941. . . . there is no rea- son why the year 1942, in which the enor- mous American new building comes to hand, should not present us with less anxious or- deals than those we must now endure and

come through.40

"Ships for Britain" included not merely

those the United States made available in

1941 and was prepared to build in the

future but also the British tonnage that,

without action by the United States,

might otherwise have been lost, immobilized, or uneconomically employed. Until

the Neutrality Act was repealed in No38

 (1) Ltr, Churchill to President, 8 Dec 40, as

quoted in Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 564. (2) Note

cited n. 3(1). (3) Memo, John J. McCloy for Gen

Marshall, 11 Feb 41, Item 11c, Exec 4. (4) Churchill,

The Grand Alliance, pp. 127, 150-55; dirs by Minister

of Defence, 6 and 27 Mar 41, as quoted on pp. 123-

26, 865-66. (5) For the figure 8.2 million dead-weight

tons (5.5 million gross tons), see below, Ch. V. 39

 (1) Lane, Ships for Victory, Ch. II. (2) WPB Sp

Study 18, Table on p. 5 and pp. 25-51, cited n. 37.

(3) See also below, App. H-1. 40

 Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 154.
60 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

vember 1941, U.S. shipping could not

enter the war zones, but in April, as the

east African campaign was drawing to a

close, the President declared the Red Sea

open to U.S. shipping, and by midyear

forty-eight American freighters were plying this route, relieving British tonnage for

more dangerous service. In March the

Army took the first steps toward developing facilities for ferrying aircraft across the

North and South Atlantic, a project that

promised eventually to release substantial

amounts of shipping for other uses. The

government also urged private shipyards

to make their repair facilities available to

British merchant ships and, in March, extended the services of private and naval

yards to British warships. During the last

nine months of 1941 British tonnage repairing in American ports averaged 430,-

000 dead-weight tons a month.41

Finally, in April 1941, the President

took the first decisive, though limited, step

toward what would certainly be the major

role of the United States in the Atlantic

during the initial stages of participation in

the war—the convoying of merchant shipping. Although the Navy had prepared,

and the President had tentatively approved, plans for full convoying by the

U.S. Navy in the eastern as well as the

western Atlantic, the action he actually

took late in April, after long hesitation,

was cautious. He ordered the Navy to

patrol the sea lanes west of a mid-Atlantic

line (longitude 26° west, but including

Greenland and the Azores) and to broadcast the movements of potentially hostile

ships and aircraft. To implement this decision naval forces in the Atlantic were augmented, late in May, by three battleships

and other units representing approximately a fourth of the strength of the

Pacific Fleet. The reporting patrol, as the

President warned in a speech on 27 May,

was earnest of the determination of the

United States to ensure Britain's survival,

above all to "deliver the goods" across the

Atlantic. Extended by successive steps, it

was to draw the United States by the following September into a "shooting war"

with German submarines.42

The Logistics of Emergency Expeditionary Forces

Measures to aid Britain and plans for

eventual military collaboration were not

the Army's most pressing concern. For the

Army, during the first half of 1941, hemisphere defense was still the first order of

business. The threat of imminent aggression against the Western Hemisphere remained real until the German invasion of

the Soviet Union late in June canceled it

for the time being.

Since June 1940 the 1st and 3d Infantry

Divisions, on the east and west coasts, respectively, had been earmarked to form

the nuclei of small, mobile, striking forces

that might anticipate or counter a sudden

enemy move. Some effort was made during the summer and fall of 1940 to provide

these forces and a few supporting units

with special equipment and to give them

amphibious training, with a view eventually to operating in conjunction with the

Marines. Little was actually done during

1940 to give effect to these plans. Equipment could not be spared from the general

41

 (1) Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy, p.

258. (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 228-29.

(3) Stettinius, Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory, p. 149

and Chs. XII-XIII. (4) Craven and Cate, AAF I, Ch.

IX.

42

 (1) Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Ch. V, pp. 5-15. (2) Morison, Battle

of the Atlantic, pp. 44-57. (3) Stimson and Bundy, On

Active Service in Peace and War, pp. 386-87.
WAR PLANS AND EMERGENCY PREPARATIONS 61

training program. Every Regular Army

unit had to provide instructors for the

flood of selectees coming into the Army.

Amphibious training scarcely had reached

the point where joint exercises with the

better-equipped and better-trained marines (who enjoyed higher priorities)

would have been profitable. Even the 1st

Division, the best-trained Army unit, did

not engage in amphibious maneuvers until February 1941, and then with only 10

percent of its personnel.43

In October 1940 American relations

with Vichy France were growing tense

over the question of the disposition of

Vichy naval forces at Martinique and

Dakar. The Army took steps to form three

task forces, each of division strength, to

meet any emergency in the Atlantic. Besides the 1st Infantry Division, the 30th

and 44th National Guard (square) Divisions and several supporting artillery, antiaircraft, and service units, were earmarked. But only the 1st Division and a

single antiaircraft regiment could be given

the high priority for equipment and for

exemption from contributing training

cadre that alone would permit rapid progress toward readiness. Only Task Force 1,

built around the 1st Division, had a mission involving landings on a hostile shore

in the Caribbean area or northeastern

Brazil; Task Force 2 was to support and

perhaps relieve it, following a successful

landing; Task Force 3 was to help in the

defense of Newfoundland.44

Late in October 1940 the President ordered the Navy to plan an emergency descent upon Martinique, to be carried out

on three days' notice; the Navy in turn

asked the Army to prepare to follow up

the initial Marine landing. Feeling that at

least 25,000 troops would be needed for

such an undertaking, the Army planners

urged that it not be attempted until a

strong expeditionary force, organized

around the 1st Division, could be formed

and amphibiously trained. Nothing came

of this proposal, and the Army's contribution to the projected Martinique operation

consisted of three small regimental-size

task forces ("A," "B," and "C"), formed

in November from the 1st Division. Only

the first of these was considered fit to join

the attack on Martinique; B Force was

slated to land on nearby Guadeloupe,

which was weakly defended; C Force soon

lost even its identity.45

The Martinique crisis swiftly faded, but

the effort to prepare the Army task forces

was a chastening experience in the logistics of emergency action. Forces A and B

were to have jumped off five days and ten

days, respectively, after M Day (the date

of the initial Navy and Marine assault),

but it soon became necessary to double

these intervals. Preparations involved endless "time-consuming details—packing,

crating, shipping, uncrating, and reissuing

equipment, innumerable inspections and

checkings of shortages, locating and tracing the movement of units, transfering

equipment from units in training to those

in the task forces, and scheduling the

movement of troops and equipment to

port. The staffs at all levels, from G-4

down, were unfamiliar with the mechanics

of mounting a task force; even the trade

jargon was strange, causing misunder43

 (1) Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, AGF I, pp.

85-86. (2) Memo, WPD for G-3, 11 Jun 40, WPD

4232-3. (3) AG ltr to CG First Army, 26 Jun 40,

WPD 4161-3. 44

 (1) Papers in WPD 4161-2 and WPD 4161-3.

(2) Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, AGF I, p. 85. 45

 (1) Memo, CofS for CG First Army, 20 Nov 40,

sub: Exped Forces, G-4/31832. (2) Papers in AG 381

(11-12-40) and WPD 433 7-1. (3) Conn and Fairchild,

Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Ch. IV, pp. 2-12.
62 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

standings of such terms as combat team

and M Day.46

Had the expedition been launched, difficulties would also have been encountered

in transporting the Army forces to the

scene of action. The Army was operating

about this time some fifteen ocean-going

vessels—eight combination troop transports, which carried some cargo, and

seven freighters, some of the latter under

long-term charter. Two of its transports

were over thirty years old, former German

internees from World War I; all were more

or less makeshift converts to military use;

some were so nearly unseaworthy that the

Department of Commerce had raised objections to their continued operation. The

small and shoddy fleet was fully occupied

in late 1940 in supporting the existing

overseas garrisons. To this traffic was soon

to be added the new deployment of garrisons, with their burden of initial equipment, reserves, and construction material,

to the fringe of bases in the Atlantic recently acquired from Great Britain in the

destroyers-for-bases transaction.47 For the

Martinique operation it would therefore

have been necessary to acquire shipping

by short-term charter or by renting space

at going commercial rates—expensive

methods at a time when cost was still a

dominant consideration. Even these expedients might not have sufficed. A rough

survey late in the summer of 1940 revealed

that in any ten-day period there were likely to be in the New York area only five to

ten vessels suitable for conversion to military duty and available for charter. The

movement of a single triangular division,

it was then estimated, would require from

ten to fourteen transports. Even minimum

hasty conversion of commercial vessels for

military use was a complicated and

lengthy process, involving installation of

messing and sanitary facilities, additional

companionways, lifesaving gear, and

ventilating equipment, to mention only a

few. About twelve days, on the average,

were required merely to negotiate the

transaction, another seventeen to complete conversion.48

 Such preparations

scarcely fitted into any pattern of emergency action.

Although the Army did not have to

cope with the logistical problems of actually moving an expeditionary force late

in 1940, Forces A and B remained earmarked, and the preliminary arrangements for supply and movement remained

in suspense. The general tension, meanwhile, continued to mount. On 16 January

1941 the President, laying down military

policy for the next few months, warned

the services, "we must be ready to act with

what [is] available."

 49

 Later that month

WPD tried again to broaden the base of

the Army's striking power by placing two

more divisions and some supporting units

in top priority for equipment and ammunition, with immunity from "cadre scalping." Again the attempt had to be abandoned because of the impact it would

have had upon the training and equipping of the rest of the Army. For example,

in order to give the four antiaircraft regiments involved in WPD's plan full allowances of .50-caliber antiaircraft machine

46

 (1) Rcd of G-4 conf, 1 Nov 40. (2) Memo, Lt Col

George W. Griner, Jr., for Lt Col Henry S. Aurand,

4 Nov 40, sub: Exped Forces. Both in G-4/31832. (3)

Other papers in same file. 47

 William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The

Challenge to Isolation: 1937-1940 (New York, Harper &

Brothers, 1952), Ch. XXII. 48

 (1) Corresp in G-4/29717-41, G-4/29717-44, and

G-4/29717-46. (2) See also, Wardlow, Trans I, pp.

136-39. 49

 Memo, CofS for ACofS WPD, 17 Jan 41, sub:

White House Conf Thursday, January 16, 1941,

WPD 4175-18.
WAR PLANS AND EMERGENCY PREPARATIONS 63

guns, it would have been necessary to strip

weapons from thirty-seven other regiments

already struggling to train with 20 percent

allowances; if full complements of 105-

mm. howitzers had been issued to the field

artillery units in WPD's list, issues to the

rest of the Army would have been held up

five months.50

Under the plan approved in February,

Task Force 1, built around the favored 1st

Division, was the only one of the three

emergency forces with an equipment and

training priority adequate to advance its

state of readiness appreciably beyond that

of the mass of the mobilizing Army—essentially the situation that had existed the

preceding October. If emergency action

were called for at any time in the near future, the three task forces would have to

be issued the remainder of their equipment after M Day, under a hectic schedule

in which Forces 1 and 3 were to jump off

in ten days, Force 2 in thirty days. G-4,

mindful of its recent difficulties in preparing the small Martinique-Guadeloupe

forces, warned that this could not be done;

Force 1 probably could be equipped on

schedule, Force 2 possibly; but to outfit

Force 3, now handicapped by a low priority, within ten days, would be quite impossible. G-4 asserted in February:

If a situation exists which warrants a plan

calling for the 100 percent equipping of a

force within 30 days, action should be taken

to equip that force at once. . . . It is opti- mistic to believe that men and transferred

equipment can be assembled and dispatched

as a well-trained force within 10 or 30 days.51

Meanwhile, the growth of the Army's

transport fleet progressed at a pace comparable to the slow expansion of its striking forces. In mid-December 1940 the

War Department finally received authorization to acquire, under various forms of

control, some seventeen additional vessels.

Further funds were allotted to modernize,

overhaul, and refit the existing fleet, but

the actual acquisition of these vessels was

strewn with setbacks. Shipowners raised

their charter rates steeply in the tightening market. Vessels ran aground, failed to

pass inspection, and developed mechanical defects. The owners of one chartered

vessel requested, and were granted, its return for Alaskan cannery operations.

Technical difficulties dragged out the

process of conversion for months.52

The U.S. Maritime Commission, moreover, showed a growing reluctance to assign shipping permanently or for long

periods to the military services, not only

because the tonnage assigned would not

be available for more urgent needs but

also because the services were to some degree guilty of uneconomical operating

practices. The Maritime Commission

early in 1941 took the Army to task for its

waste of cargo space on inbound voyages;

inbound cargo capacity was then at a premium because of the demands of the government's large program of importing

strategic raw materials. On 4 February

the President issued a manifesto on utilization of merchant shipping, ordering the

military services to take over only a minimum number of vessels and to operate

these at full capacity and only for essential

50

 Memo, G-4 for WPD, 10 Feb 41, sub: Readiness of Combat Divs, G-4/32509. 51

 (1) Memo, G-4 for CofS, 28 Feb 41, sub: Orgn

of Emergency Exped Forces, G-4/32550. (2) Memo,

WPD for G-4, 31 Jan 41, sub: Readiness of Combat

Divs, G-4/32509. (3) Memo cited n. 50. (4) WD ltr to

CG First Army, 11 Feb 41, sub: Orgn of Exped

Forces, WPD 4161-3. (5) Memo, G-4 for Chiefs of Svs,

27 Feb 41, same sub, G-4/32550. (6) Papers in WPD

4161-4. 52

 (1) Ltr, SW to President, 4 Dec 40, G-4/29717-

41. (2) Other corresp in same file. (3) Corresp in

G-4/29717-56.
64 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

military needs. "This is no time," the pronouncement severely stated, "to set up a

reserve of Army or Navy transports or

other ships, which, since we are at peace,

could be put to civilian use."

 53

The statement seemed to imply that

shipping should be pooled, an idea then

widely shared among officials and ship

operators, but the President gave the

Maritime Commission no powers and provided no mechanism for genuine pooling.

The operating practices of the military

transport services remained, for practical

purposes, their own business, and the military fleets continued to grow, though

slowly. While the commission in May recei-ved broad powers of requisition over

privately owned merchant shipping, real

pooling of the nation's shipping, with effective curbs on the expansion of the military transport fleets, had to await the

pressure of war.54

From the late winter of 1940-41 on, relations between the War Department and

the Maritime Commission began to improve. In an effort to win the commission's

co-operation in meeting the Army's growing need for tonnage, Army transportation officials trimmed their sails to the prevailing winds. As a general practice, purchases of new tonnage were limited to

those needed for "regular and permanent

servicing of Army establishments"; shortterm needs were met by chartering or borrowing vessels from the Maritime Commission; cargo shipments were assigned to

commercial lines wherever possible. Arrangements were even made for strategic

materials to be moved in Army bottoms on

return voyages to the United States—

mainly crude rubber from the Netherlands Indies—arrangements that, Secretary Stimson pointedly reminded Rear

Adm. Emory S. Land (Ret.), chairman of

the Maritime Commission, were "in accordance with the President's policy" of 4

February.55

Behind these concessions there were

reservations. The arrangements for transporting strategic materials actually were

financially advantageous to the Army,

and were carefully hedged to preclude

long-term commitments and to assure

that transports could be recalled without

notice under military necessity. Present

policies, as an official remarked, "would

be subject to revision if a major emergency

should develop."

 56

 Meanwhile the concessions bore fruit. G-4 observed in July

that the Maritime Commission was "on

the whole, well satisfied with Army operation of its ships and . . . on the other

hand, critical of the Navy's failure to give

full employment to ships turned over to

it."

 57

53

 (1) Memo, President for SW, SN, and Rear Adm

Emory S. Land (Ret.), 4 Feb 41, G-4/29717-48. (2)

Memo, TQMG for DCofS, 27 Jan 41, sub: Acquisition

of Additional Vessels. (3) Ltr, SW to Adm Land, 8

Jan 41. (4) Memo, G-4 for CofS, 8 Jan 41, sub: Augmentation of Army Trans Sv. (5) Memo, G-4 for CofS,

3 Feb 41, sub: Additional Army Trans. Last four in

G-4/29717-26. 54

 (1) Ltr, John M. Franklin to Chester C. Wardlow, Chm, Trans Advisory Group, OQMG, 24 Jan

41. Franklin was president of the U.S. Lines and a

member of the Transportation Advisory Group. (2)

Ltr, President to Adm Land, 10 Feb 41. Both in

G-4/29717-48. (3) Wardlow, Trans I, pp. 136-41. 55

 (1) Ltr, SW to Adm Land, 12 Mar 41, G4/29717-54. (2) Other corresp in same file. (3)

Memos, Wardlow for Col Douglas C. Cordiner,

OQMG, 6 and 19 Feb 41, G-4/29717-48. (4) Memo,

G-4 for CofS, 7 Mar 41, sub: Negotiations With

Maritime Comm . . ., G-4/29717-26. (5) Other corresp in same file and in G-4/297 17-55. 56

 (1) Memo, 6 Feb 41, cited n. 55(3). (2) Memo for

rcd atchd to G-4 disposition form to TAG for TQMG,

28 Jul 41, sub: Army Trans Sv to S America,

G-4/29717-26. 57

 (1) Memo, G-4 for CofS, 9 Jul 41, sub: Utilization of Army Vessels, G-4/29717-26. (2) Other corresp in same file. (3) Memo, G-4 for CofS GHQ, 16

Oct 41, sub: Delay in Shipt of Replacements, G-4/

33098. (4) Wardlow, Trans I, p. 141.
WAR PLANS AND EMERGENCY PREPARATIONS 65

While during the winter and spring of

1941 the Army was thus trying to build

up its capacity to transport forces overseas, its education in the logistics of joint

task operations continued to lag. So uncertain were the Army staffs at all levels of

the mathematics of computing shipping

requirements that reserve supplies shipped

to depots for certain of the task forces had

piled up by late winter to about four times

the total requirements as estimated by

G-4. It developed further that the basic

factors used by the Army for computing

its shipping space requirements differed

radically from the Navy's, a discrepancy

that could cause untold confusion when

the time came to set up shipping. Since

the Army's factors were of hoary vintage

(dating, some suspected, back to World

War I), WPD advised G-4 in some embarrassment to come to an agreement

with the Navy on the matter. Tentative

shipping factors, accordingly, were worked

out jointly in March.58 Efforts to co-ordinate shipping arrangements with the

Navy also promised trouble for future expeditions. G-4 found flagrant evidence of

"confusion and lack of control over matters relating to overseas transportation."59

These experiences reflected the embryonic state of Army-Navy organization and

training for joint amphibious operations.

The Navy itself, responsible for all amphibious operations, was behindhand in

providing transports and landing craft for

its own amphibious maneuvers; in the

fleet landing exercise held at Culebra Island, Puerto Rico, during the winter of

1941, the Navy had to borrow two Army

transports, although no Army troops participated. The Army's role in amphibious

training through 1941 was that of a poor

relation. Only with the greatest difficulty

was the Army able to obtain, by direct

purchase, sufficient landing equipment to

carry out, during the winter of 1940-41,

limited exercises by the 1st Division on the

east coast and by the 3d Division on the

west coast. In May Admiral Stark, reviewing the Army's RAINBOW 5 plan, proposed that the two services co-ordinate

their preparations for emergency expeditions, and ventured the opinion that the

Army was pouring too much of its strength

into static defense outpost positions; more

effort should be given, he thought, to preparing mobile striking forces. This criticism touched a sensitive spot, not because

of any dedication to the principle of static

defense among the Army staff, but because the latter scented in the Navy proposal to reduce Army garrisons an attempt

to secure for the Marine Corps an even

larger share of scarce ammunition and

equipment. General Marshall himself remarked, about this time, "My main battle

is equipping the Marines. Whether we

will have anything left after the British

and Marines get theirs, I do not know."

 60

His staff pointed out that the Navy, not

the Army, had been laggard in promoting

joint amphibious training. It was in June,

in fact, that the first concrete step toward

joint training was taken with the organization of the 1st Joint Training Force, consisting of the Marine 1st Division and the

Army 1st Division; this subsequently developed into the Amphibious Force,

Atlantic Fleet, which in 1942 organized

the amphibious phases of the U.S. landings in Morocco. On the west coast, simi58

 (1) Corresp in G-4/31832, G-4/32550, and G4/32598. (2) For the agreed factors, see below, Apps.

A-2, A-3. 59

 (1) Memo, G-4 for CofS, 10 Apr 41, sub: Readiness of Vessels, G-4/31832. (2) Other corresp in same

file. (3) See below, Ch. IX. 60

 Min, Gen War Council mtg, 3 Jun 41, Binder 1,

SW Confs File.
66 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ARMY-NAVY AMPHIBIOUS MANEUVERS at New River area, North Carolina,

August 1941. Light tank coming off landing craft.

larly, the 2d Joint Training Force was

created in September, consisting of the

Army 3d Division and the Marine 2d

Division; this later became the Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet. Both forces were

under Marine command.61

The first large-scale joint exercises on a

divisional scale were held early in August

1941 by the Army's 1st Division and the

1st Marine Division in the New River

area of the North Carolina coast, under

the CARIB Plan of 21 June. Virtually every

feature of the exercises was severely criticized by both Army and Navy observers.

Embarkation of Army and Marine troops

alike was badly snarled: because of inexperience and ignorance of officers in

charge of the loading, the Army transports had to be completely reloaded before

proceeding to New River, and, for lack of

transports, some 1,700 marines were left

behind—the climax of a process of embarkation extending over a five-week

period. Troop transports proved to be inadequate in gear and facilities of all kinds.

The landing was executed in daylight,

with a calm sea, but an Army observer

found the spectacle discouraging: men

burdened with heavy packs being sub61

 (1) Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S.

Marines and Amphibious War (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 58-63. (2) Wardlow,

Trans I, pp. 144-46. (3) Greenfield, Palmer, and

Wiley, AGF I, pp. 85-86. (4) Ltr, Adm Stark to CofS,

22 May 41, sub: Analysis of Plans for Overseas Expeds, RAINBOW 5 Development file, G-3 Registered

Docs.
WAR PLANS AND EMERGENCY PREPARATIONS 67

BEACHHEAD SUPPLY DUMP. Piles of unidentifiable rations at New River Army-Navy

amphibious maneuvers, August 1941.

merged as they scrambled out of the

boats; a Marine captain "so mad that he

was almost weeping" because the Navy

had sent his ammunition boats ashore in

the first wave without protection; tanks

plunging off ramps into deepening holes

in the surf-covered sand. "One tank . . .

disappeared into a hole and was completely submerged. The driver climbed

out and stood disconsolately on the turret,

looking for all the world like pictures you

see of Jesus walking on the water." Shore

organization was chaotic, responsibilities

for unloading and other beach operations

had not been fixed, and as a result both

Army and Marine combat troops had to

serve as stevedores although, according to

one report, the Marines had assigned men

for this purpose because "from past experience they had learned that the Navy

never did it." Boxes of ammunition and

rations, handed from the boats to men

standing in the surf, were usually saturated. Cardboard cartons of C rations,

stacked on the beach, disintegrated, "and

the cans of vegetable hash mingled with

the cans of meat stew in a tall silver pyramid which glistened in the sunlight, but

which was difficult to distribute to kitchens." Equipment rusted ashore because

lubricants had been stowed deep in ships'

holds.62

62

 (1) Rpt, unsigned, no date, sub: Fleet Landing

Exercise, G-4/33088. (2) Isely and Crowl, The U.S.

Marines and Amphibious War, pp. 63-65.
68 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

It was a depressing experience. "The

whole procedure convinced me," commented the Army observer mentioned

above, "that an effective landing is impossible unless all resistance is previously

neutralized."

 63

 The commander in chief

of the Atlantic Fleet declared a few weeks

later that he considered the Atlantic Fleet

Amphibious Force to be unfit for combat.

Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony, Deputy

Chief of Staff, found four major failings in

the exercise: lack of time for preparation,

lack of experience, faulty planning, and

complicated channels of command. These

had undermined all aspects of the operation, but especially its logistics. The staffs

planning real task force landings a few

months later might have read these lessons with profit.64

The Abortive Azores Expedition

The Army and the Navy were in no

posture, therefore, to act jointly to meet

an emergency that in the spring of 1941

was drawing rapidly closer. Germany's

spectacular successes in the Balkans and

in Libya during April, combined with reports from Marshal Henri Petain that the

Germans were hinting at moving troops

through unoccupied France and French

North Africa for an attack on Gibraltar,

seemed to herald a major German drive

to the southwest. The crisis was precipitated when on 15 May Marshal Petain

announced his government's intention to

collaborate with Germany. The United

States immediately issued a sharp warning to Vichy and seized eleven French

ships in American ports (including the

liner Normandie), and on the 22d the President ordered the Army and Navy to make

plans to occupy the Azores, possibly

against opposition, within a month's

time.65

For the Army staff this assignment was

both unexpected and unwelcome. Plans

had been prepared for action against the

Azores, as for many other possible operations, but the staff had consistently advised against such an operation, arguing

that the islands, if occupied, would be

hard to defend against enemy air power

based in France or on the Iberian Peninsula and that they were too far north to

provide a useful base for countering a German move toward Dakar. Under ABC-1

all the Atlantic islands lay within the British sphere of responsibility, and the British had assigned forces to occupy the

Azores and the Cape Verdes if the Germans entered Spain; the U.S. Navy undertook to give assistance in this eventuality, if needed, but the Army had not

anticipated that it would be involved. The

Army, in May, had perhaps forty thousand troops available for an overseas expedition, but it would have been difficult

to put together a balanced expeditionary

force of any size. Legislative restrictions

upon the employment of certain categories

of personnel outside the Western Hemisphere constituted a serious obstacle to

planning for emergency action. As for

shipping, the Army Transport Service had

under its control about twenty-six vessels,

all fully engaged in routine service.66

As the Army staff viewed the situation,

an occupation of the Azores at that time

was the least desirable of possible moves

63

 Rpt cited n. 62(1). 64

 (1) Wardlow, Trans I, p. 147. (2) Greenfield,

Palmer, and Wiley, AGF I, pp. 87-88. 65

 (1) Ltr, Stark to Marshall, 23 May 41, G4/31832. (2) Conn and Fairchild, Framework of

Hemisphere Defense, Ch. V, pp. 16-26. 66

 (1) Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Ch. V, pp. 27-29. (2) Notes on Gen

War Council mtg, 19 May 41, Binder 1, SW Confs

File. (3) Notes on conf in OCofS, 16 Apr 41, Binder

10, CofS Confs File. (4) Wardlow, Trans I, p. 140.
WAR PLANS AND EMERGENCY PREPARATIONS 69

in the Atlantic-Caribbean area. It would

rule out the fulfillment of the Army's commitments under ABC-1 (scheduled for as

early as September in the event of war)

for the remainder of the year, and probably could not be mounted adequately, in

any case, before mid-August. Nevertheless, it was the Azores expedition that now

had to be mounted—and by the President's deadline of 22 June.67

 By the end of

May it was decided to use the 1st Army

and 1st Marine Divisions to form the nucleus of a new task force of about 28,000

under over-all Navy command, the Marine division commander to be in charge

of the landing operation. Three of the

twelve battalion landing teams were to be

contributed by the Army, which also set

up additional reserve forces of about

11,000—approximately 25,000 Army

troops in all.68

Ammunition was the tightest chokepoint. Minimum allowances for the assault elements and partial allowances for

the follow-up forces would have exhausted

all stocks of certain critical types—for example, 3-inch antiaircraft and 37-mm.

antitank—and exceeded both stocks and

anticipated production to 1 October in

others such as .50-caliber antiaircraft. A

few types, notably 60-mm. mortar, would

not be available at all for several months.

The ammunition allowances requested by

the Army commander had to be slashed,

on the average, by half.69

Shipping also presented a major problem, even though it was not the principal

limiting factor. This shortage, at the outset, ruled out the possibility of holding

joint landing rehearsals on the coast of

Puerto Rico (too far away to permit more

than one round trip and final assembling

of the force before the target date, 22

June); the commanders had to be content

with separate, small Army and Marine

rehearsals along the U.S. east coast. For

the initial movement, forty-one transports

and cargo vessels were needed. The services could provide twenty-nine of these;

the remaining twelve, with fourteen more

to take over normal duties of the diverted

military shipping, would have to be found

by the Maritime Commission. Practically

all the vessels used in the initial movement, moreover, would have to be retained indefinitely to bring in normal

maintenance supplies and construction

material for building airfields and other

installations. In the time available only a

few transports and cargo vessels could be

rigged and armed to carry assault troops

and their equipment, a circumstance that

severely restricted both the number of

troops and the amount of gasoline, ammunition, and reserve supplies that could

be carried in the initial assault.70

The Navy found it necessary, against

strong protests by the Army, to take over

six of the Army's newest and largest troop

transports. Two were peculiarly suited for

use on the long transpacific run, and a

third was needed in the Bermuda and

Newfoundland service. Army officials argued that to use vessels such as these in a

67

 See below, n. 82. 68

 (1) Papers in WPD 4422-3; WPD 4422-4; WPD

4232-5; WPD 4232-10; WPD 4232-11; AG 353 (5-

23-41), Sec 1; AG 370.5 (5-26-41); Exec 13; and G4/33088. (2) See also, notes on Gen War Council

mtg, 26 May 41, Binder 1, SW Confs File. (3) Gen

Gerow's Diary, 29 May and 2 Jun 41 entries, Item

1, Exec 10. 69

 Memo, Maj Louis E. Cotulla for Col Francis B.

Mallon, 3 Jun 41, sub: Am for Exped Force (GRAY),

G-4/33088. 70

 (1) Draft ltr, SN to President, in Tab A to memo

for rcd, unsigned, 26 May 41, sub: Trf of Army Trans

to Navy, Tab M, Item 7, Exec 4. (2) Notes cited n.

68(2). (3) Memo, G-4 for Chiefs of Svs and CG

NYPOE, 31 May 41, sub: Tng Exercise. (4) Memo,

Lt Col Albert W. Waldron for Col Mallon, 4 Jun 41,

sub: Lack of Co-ord . . . . Last two in G-4/33088.
70 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

combat-loaded convoy would sacrifice the

advantages of their speed and capacity on

normal runs. While the loss to the Army

would be made up by equivalent tonnage,

this involved inevitable delays and disruption of service, and there was always the

danger that Hawaii and Alaska might

have to be suddenly reinforced during the

change-over.71

As it happened, the Azores expedition

did not have to be launched. On 4 June

the President approved the joint plan, but

at the same time ordered the services to

prepare another plan—one for the relief

of British forces in Iceland. On the 7th,

probably as a result of information pointing to the impending German invasion of

the USSR, he suspended the Azores project, and the first American ground forces

(marines) landed in Iceland a month

later.72 The Army's portion of the Azores

force remained earmarked, as Task Force

GRAY, for its original mission, and the

transfer of Army transports to the Navy

was carried out. The effort to mount the

Azores expedition had emphasized, among

other things, the strategic importance of

the small military transport fleets, for on

the disposition of these few specialized vessels, a tiny fraction of the total merchant

marine, depended the ability of the armed

forces to react promptly and effectively to

an emergency. It had emphasized also the

fact that, a year after the launching of the

defense mobilization program, an expedition involving some twenty-five thousand

miscellaneous Army troops, with only

three battalion landing teams, represented

a maximum effort.

To the man in the ranks, far from Washington staff offices, the logistics of task

force movements seemed to be largely a

matter of being moved about and waiting

to be moved about. The saga of one unit

added a plaintive postscript to the history

of the Azores expedition.

"In May," began the chronicle, "a secret letter was received . . . ." The unit

was to be part of a task force, then forming, and was to draw its cold-weather

clothing. But soon a new order came. The

unit was now assigned to Task Force GRAY

and was to prepare for tropical service.

For the next two weeks the troops were

busy packing equipment, turning in coldweather clothing, drawing tropical clothing, and requisitioning personnel. "With

all equipment packed and crated and, for

the most part, loaded on trucks, the regiment waited for movement orders which

never came." About 1 July the unit

learned that the task force had been disbanded—three days later that it had been

reconstituted.

Consequently the regiment still waited

and no equipment was unpacked; only such

training as could be conducted with individ- ual equipment, or convoys, was given. Bat- teries disposed of day room and kitchen

property, and officers and enlisted men owning automobiles generally disposed of them

at a financial loss.

Presently Battery E was ordered to join

another task force. This necessitated transfers of personnel from three other batteries, which meanwhile uncrated part of

their equipment and began to train. But it

was Battery E that waited; F and G, ordered to join a new training force, hastily

repacked equipment and departed on 11

July.

71

 (1) Ltr, Marshall to Stark, 25 May 41, in Tab B

to memo for rcd cited n. 70(1). (2) Draft ltr cited n.

70(1). (3) Memo, Col Theodore H. Dillon for Col

Mallon, 23 May 41, G-4/29717-26. (4) Memo, G-4

for WPD, 24 May 41, sub: Utilization of Army Trans,

G-4/29717-71. (5) Ltr cited n. 61(4). 72

 Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere

Defense, Ch. V, pp. 35-49.
WAR PLANS AND EMERGENCY PREPARATIONS 71

Their average strength was 63 men when

ordered away, and I [the station commandant] was directed by General Ord [Brig.

Gen. Garesché J.] to bring them to war

strength, which required the transfer of 226

men including several non-commissioned of- ficers. As the other automatic weapons had

been depleted to fill Battery E and the latter

was still a part of a task force prepared for

movement, the 226 filler replacements for

Batteries F and G had to be taken from the

1st Battalion. . . . The above so depleted

the 1st Battalion as to prevent manning

much of its equipment until about 356 re- placements were received on July 23d and

relieved the situation somewhat. However, as it was originally understood that Batteries

F and G were to return about September 1st, the above replacements were assigned according to the eventual needs of all units of

the regiment. Subsequent information indicates that Batteries F and G will not rejoin until about October 15th. Finally, on Sep- tember 6th a letter was received from II

Army Corps to the effect that all instructions

with reference to Task Force 3 [the one to

which the regiment was first assigned] were

rescinded.

The chronicle ended with a bleak survey

of the damage:

. . . waiting for orders . . . financial loss

. . . disruption of family life . . . cancellation of furloughs and leaves . . . camp improvements were given away . . . . For a

period of 11⁄2 months there was little artillery

training . . . thereafter equipment sufficient

for training was unpacked as required and

training resumed, but always with half an

idea on the possibility of having to pack up

quickly in the same boxes and crates . . . .

All of which "had an adverse effect on

morale, training and housekeeping."

 73

State of Readiness: Mid-1941

At midyear the Army's emergency

forces were hardly formidable. In April

Task Forces 2 and 3 had finally been given

the equipment priorities thought necessary

to bring them rapidly to a condition of

readiness, but the process of actually

equipping the units was still going on.

Three more infantry divisions—the 2d,

3d, and 5th—were added to the emergency list early in June and assigned

higher priorities for equipment. By the

end of July the proliferation of task forces

had brought the total to nine—two small

Martinique-Guadeloupe Forces, A and B;

Forces 1 through 5, GRAY (Azores), and

Carib (Army component of the 1st Joint

Training Force). The versatile 1st Division

was the nucleus of most of these task forces,

and many smaller units also had multiple

assignments. For each force supplies had

been stocked, transportation tentatively

arranged, and movement procedures set

up. But experience indicated that any

specific emergency was likely to demand

a force tailored for the occasion; in effect,

the Army was attempting to build a pool

of units from which such forces might be

formed. Accordingly, the War Department

in August abolished the first five of the

forces listed above and created the War

Department Pool of Task Force Units,

comprising seven divisions and various

supporting units.74

But. as Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow

reported to General Marshall early in

73

 Memo, Gen Malony for WPD, 5 Nov 41, sub:

Rpt of CO Camp Stewart, Ga., . . . , WPD 4161-21. 74

 The seven divisions in the pool were the 1st, 2d,

3d, 5th, 41st, and 45th Infantry and the 6th Cavalry.

Task Forces 4 and 5 were earmarked tentatively for

Iceland and Brazil, respectively. (1) Memo, Gen

Gerow for CofS, 9 Jun 41, sub: Readiness of Combat

Divs. (2) Memo, Gerow for CofS, 28 Jun 41, sub:

Emergency Exped Forces. (3) WD ltr to GHQ AAF,

CG's of Armies, Corps Areas, NYPOE, Seattle POE,

and Chiefs of SAS and WDGS Divs, 20 Aug 41, sub:

Units for Exped Forces. All in WPD 4161-16. (4)

Other papers in same file. (5) Memo, G-4 for WPD, 9

Jun 41, sub: Readiness of Combat Divs, G-4/32509.

(6) Corresp in same file and in G-4/32550.
72 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

June, "the 1st Division reinforced is the

only triangular division we have which

even approximates readiness for combat

service involving a landing on a hostile

shore."

 75

 This was the net result of a year

of effort to create mobile striking forces for

emergency action. Larger forces might

have been equipped for such service by

pillaging units in training, but until spring

of 1941 General Marshall steadily resisted

the pressure to do so and yielded only

partially to it even then.

As it was, equipment was spread thin.

Manpower had flowed into the expanding

Army more or less as planned, bringing it

by the end of June to a strength of 1,455,-

565—substantially the goal set in 1940—

but the flow of weapons to equip it had

fallen short of expectations. Production of

aircraft, mortars, certain types of antiaircraft artillery and machine guns, rifles,

field artillery ammunition, light tanks,

and trucks showed encouraging increases,

but in most other categories progress was

scant. Much of this matériel, moreover,

had been diverted into foreign aid. According to a G-4 estimate in midsummer,

the equipping of the ground army was

about "a year behind the expectations of a

year ago,"

 76

 which meant presumably

that another year's production would be

needed to meet the objectives laid down in

summer of 1940 for mid-1941. In certain

categories the troops were relatively well

equipped—for example, in clothing, personal equipage, standard engineer equipment (but not special construction items

for combat theaters), and motor transport

(except the versatile 1⁄4-ton jeep and 21⁄2-

ton truck). Some medical items were

plentiful, but there were acute shortages of

certain drugs and laboratory and dental

equipment. Signal Corps material was

generally scarce. Radios had to be built

into aircraft; therefore combat vehicles, to

which radios could be added as accessories, had a lower priority for this equipment. Development changes in electronics

presented a perennial problem, impeding

standardization and mass production.

Army forces in training had received their

first 20 percent "go around" in most major

items but not, as yet, in the newer types;

by July 1942 it might be possible to outfit

the initial PMP force fully with most signal items except electronics, for which the

outlook was uncertain.77

Shortages in ordnance equipment were

a serious obstacle to readiness for combat.

Light, automatic antiaircraft weapons

(37-mm., 40-mm., and .50-caliber) were

scarcer than heavy ones (3-inch and 90-

mm.), but in neither category would full

allowances for the initial PMP force be

completed by the end of 1942. Ground

forces suffered from the preference given

the Air Corps in allocation of ordinary

automatic weapons which, like radios, had

to be built into aircraft; substitution of

.30-caliber for .50-caliber machine guns in

ground units offered only partial relief.

Similarly, infantry units came off second

best in distribution of 37-mm. guns, since

tanks had to be equipped on the production line; the antitank gun was therefore

still in the 20 percent "go around" stage

for the initial PMP force, and complete

allowances were not expected until mid1942. Although 60-mm. mortars were

fairly plentiful, 81-mm.'s were scarce. The

new M1 Garand rifle was promised, optimistically, as it proved, for all infantry,

cavalry, and engineer units by the end of

75

 Memo cited n. 74(1). 76

 Memo, G-4 for CofS, 28 Aug 41, sub: Status of

Equip, G-4/33484. 77

 (1) Ibid. (2) Army strength figure is from the

Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1941, Table A.

(3) See below, App. B.
WAR PLANS AND EMERGENCY PREPARATIONS 73

October. Distribution of field artillery was

held up by modernization of the standard

75-mm. gun, which in turn was to be replaced by the newer 105-mm. howitzer

when available. All the existing forces

could be equipped with one or the other

weapon in a few months, but to little avail

since fire control instruments would not be

fully available until mid-1942. Tanks were

coming along well, enough to equip six

armored divisions and all the PMP tank

battalions by January 1942, but only if

lend-lease diversions were not taken into

consideration.78

Finally, ammunition. In the small arms

category, allocations to the Navy, Air

Corps, and lend-lease had stripped the

ground army bare. G-4 doubted whether,

for two years to come, production would

be sufficient to maintain the initial PMP

force in the field. Antiaircraft (other than

small calibers) and field artillery ammunition was currently in shorter supply than

the weapons using it, but this situation was

due to be reversed the following spring.

Bombs of most types could probably be

supplied for any number of aircraft likely

to be put into operation, but armorpiercing ammunition of all types fell far

short of requirements, and there was little

prospect of production catching up with

the output of weapons.79

The British had been promised, in

ABC-1, that the U.S. Army could put into

the field on 1 September about six divisions (two armored) and six air combat

groups. By midyear this fair vision had

vanished. The favored 1st Division, with

five supporting antiaircraft regiments and

two brigades of field artillery, was not expected to be fully prepared for combat in

all respects until October. The GHQ Air

Force did not have a single unit equipped

with modern combat planes; by September it might be possible to assemble a group

of light bombers, two squadrons of dive

bombers, and one and a half groups of

pursuits, all with inadequate reserves and

ground support. Either these air forces or

the ground forces would have to operate

virtually without small-caliber ammunition. Not until the following March could

anything like the forces promised in ABC-1

be put into the field.80

A 1 September M Day evidently would

find the Army something less than ready to

meet its commitments under ABC-1 and

RAINBOW 5. Shipping, if fully mobilized,

was not expected to present a major problem. The Navy, upon which the responsibility would fall, estimated that it could

muster for military use before the end of

1941 about 384 vessels—71 transports and

313 cargo ships. Definitely scheduled

moves under RAINBOW 5 would impose a

peak demand, a month after M Day, of

fifty-nine transports and cargo vessels. If

all contingent operations were carried out,

including the movement of a ten-division

force beginning six months after M Day,

requirements for initial movement and

maintenance would climb to more than

200 vessels almost a year after M Day;

maintenance thereafter would keep about

177 cargo ships steadily employed. These

calculations were highly theoretical and

did not actually look more than a year

ahead, when both new deployment and

new ship construction would enter the picture; foreign aid requirements to replace

Allied shipping losses and to transport

lend-lease material were not considered.

Perhaps the weakest feature of the calculation, as the experience of 1942 was to

show, was the assumption that large ton78

 (1) Memo cited n. 76. (2) See below, Chs. III-IV. 79

 Memo cited n. 76. 80

 Memo cited n. 37 (1).
74 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

TABLE 1—SHIPPING FOR RAINBOW 5: ESTIMATED AVAILABILITY AND REQUIREMENTS

a

 Combination transports, carrying some cargo as well as troops. b

 The total U.S. merchant fleet at this time, according to one estimate, comprised 1,179 vessels of 7,353,000 gross tons (about 11,000,000

ship tons). c

 Total of 384 vessels available. d

 For regular servicing of established garrisons and movements to be launched on M Day. Initial moves to reinforce Panama, Puerto

Rico, Alaska, and Hawaii, however, were not specifically included, on the assumption that they could be absorbed into the schedule. All

requirements were calculated on the basis of 1,500 troops per transport and 8,750 ship tons per cargo vessel. e

 For maintenance factors, see below, App. A-3.

Source: Memo, Gen Malony for CofS, 20 May 41, sub: Overseas Garrisons, RAINBOW 5, WPD 4175-22.

nages of commercial shipping could be

mobilized for military use within a few

weeks or months. Taking a longer view,

G-4 estimated, about this time, that nine

million gross tons of new ship construction

would be needed each year to carry on a

RAINBOW 5 war; only two million were

then scheduled for 1942. From the vantage

point of mid-1941, however, a RAINBOW 5

war centering in the Atlantic area did not

seem likely to strain unduly the shipping

capabilities of the United States.81 (Table 1)

It was primarily the meagerness of ready

forces rather than of shipping that caused

the Army staff, in late May and June, to

regard with uneasiness the President's apparently adventurous intentions in the

Atlantic area. During the preparations for

the Azores operation the Army staff

warned that, because of the unbalanced

character of available forces and the lack

of combat aviation, no expedition could be

sent within a thousand miles of Europe or

Africa (thus ruling out the Cape Verdes

but not the Azores). Moreover, any such

undertaking, unless liquidated early,

would probably interfere with any September operations under ABC-1; an occupation of the Azores certainly would do so,

a limited expedition to Brazil only moderately. On 27 May the Army planners

suggested to General Marshall two alter- 81

 (1) Memo, Gen Malony for CofS, 20 May 41,

sub: Overseas Garrisons, RAINBOW 5. (2) Memo, Gen

Gerow for CofS, 26 May 41, sub: Analysis of Plans for

Overseas Expeds. Both in WPD 4175-22. (3) Memo

cited n. 37(1).
WAR PLANS AND EMERGENCY PREPARATIONS 75

natives, of which they favored the second:

either carry out the moves to Iceland and

the British Isles in September as contingently scheduled, or postpone these moves

for a few weeks and send a balanced force

immediately to northeastern Brazil.82

Even though suspended early in June an

Azores expedition remained very much a

live alternative, other eastern Atlantic

projects were being discussed, and the Iceland movement was about to begin; with

about 130,000 troops already overseas, the

Army had some 75,000 more scheduled

for deployment; the remaining ABC-1

commitments might soon have to be

faced.83 The Army planners felt that for

the present all projects looking beyond the

Western Hemisphere should be abandoned. To strike at Dakar, the most effective riposte to a German move into northwest Africa, would be far beyond the

Army's power for a long time; without

Dakar the Canary and Cape Verde Islands

could not be held, even if taken. Neither

they nor Iceland nor the Azores were

essential to a static defense of the Western

Hemisphere. WPD thought that an immediate occupation of northeastern Brazil,

which was "within present and future

means," would be the most effective and

feasible move to checkmate Axis designs

on the hemisphere.84

When the President late in June, therefore, blandly suggested that the Army

raise a force of "about 75,000" looking to

possible action in several quarters—Iceland, the Azores, the Cape Verdes, "or

elsewhere"—the reaction of the Army staff

amounted almost to an outburst. Such a

force would be three times the size of the

late unlamented Azores task force. The

President was asking the Army, in effect,

to commit its best troops, virtually all its

small arms ammunition, and much of its

equipment to a remote area where they

might be isolated by an unlucky naval reverse, leaving the country denuded of land

defense. General Marshall explained to

the President that there were two main

obstacles to carrying out his proposal—

legislative restrictions upon sending certain categories of troops outside the Western Hemisphere, and the complex of logistical and other limitations that had stood,

and would long continue to stand, in the

way of creating fully trained, equipped,

and balanced striking forces and moving

them overseas. He bluntly told the President that "he would not give his consent

to the dispatch of any troops outside the

United States that were not completely

trained and equipped to meet a first-class

enemy."

 85

82

 (1) Memo, Lt Col Lee S. Gerow for Gen Gerow,

27 May 41, WPD 4422-5. (2) Memo, G-2 GHQ for

CofS GHQ, 28 May 41, GHQ 381, Sec 1. (3) Conn

and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense,

Ch. V, pp. 26-35. 83

 (1) Memo, 31 May 41, cited n. 29(2). (2) Memo,

Lt Col Jay W. MacKelvie for Exec Off WPD, no

date, sub: Availability of Key Units, RAINBOW 5

. . . , Item 7, Exec 4. (3) Annual Report of the Secretary

of War, 1941, Table C. 84

 Memo, Gen Gerow for CofS, 14 Jun 41, sub:

Strategic Opns, Brief Analysis . . . , Tab L, Item 7,

Exec 4. 85

 Gerow Diary, 19 Jun 41 entry, Item 1, Exec 10.
CHAPTER III

The Army and Early LendLease Operations

After passage of the Lend-Lease Act in

March 1941, supply of military materials

to foreign governments became a direct

responsibility of the Army and one of its

principal supply activities. Lend-lease was

in its conception largely a means of overcoming financial and legal barriers to the

continuance of aid to the British, and this

concept was clearly reflected in the manner in which needs of the British at first

absorbed both the immediate and the

prospective supply of munitions to be distributed under it. But gradually other nations secured recognition of their claims,

and by December 1941 China, the Soviet

Union, the Netherlands Indies, and the

Latin American nations had taken their

places beside Britain as lend-lease beneficiaries.

While funds appropriated by Congress

to finance lend-lease would contribute to

the ultimate expansion of munitions production, there was no magic formula that

could make these funds immediately produce weapons. Industrial mobilization

continued at a slow pace, and the production estimates upon which hopes of fulfilling Army and British programs rested

proved too optimistic. Competition grew

keener, both for the limited stocks of munitions on hand and for the ample flow

expected from future production. The situation demanded a policy to govern

current and projected allocations.

There was a growing conviction within

the War Department that lend-lease operations should be tied to definite national

objectives, but the President, with an eye

on isolationist opposition in Congress, was

reluctant to spell out these objectives. He

had to justify lend-lease before Congress

in the first instance as a measure of defense,

and the first lend-lease programs were

formulated only on the general assumption that aid to Britain and China would

contribute to that end. The ABC-1 meetings produced a strategic concept for

American participation in the war against

the Axis in alliance with Britain, but the

President would never specifically sanction tying lend-lease operations to this

conditional agreement. Indeed ABC-1

gave no final answer to the question of

whether the American contribution should

be in weapons or armies. The British

pressed for delay in American rearmament

in favor of foreign aid, but the Army found

it difficult to accept the full implications of

such a policy. The President's decisions,

generally favoring foreign aid, found expression in a series of specific actions rather

than in any pronouncement of a general

policy for the Army to follow.

The War Department sought to center
THE ARMY AND EARLY LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS 77

control of procurement and distribution of

military lend-lease within its own organization, combining them in one consolidated supply program with similar functions performed for the U.S. Army. In its

view, such a program offered the best

means of rapidly expanding production of

munitions and of making allocations based

on strategic principles. The President preferred to keep lend-lease powers in his own

hands or to rely on civilian advisers and

administrators. This gave rise to a system

of administration that, when combined

with the immaturity of both the civilian

and the military organizations involved,

compounded the confusion resulting from

lack of clarity in national aims.

The Administrative Problem

The Lend-Lease Act empowered the

President to transfer "defense articles" and

"defense information" to any foreign government whose defense he deemed vital to

that of the United States. Two types of

transfers were authorized—materials produced on funds especially appropriated for

lend-lease purposes, and materials from

government stocks.1 The only limitations

on the President's power to transfer materials procured on lend-lease funds were

those inherent in the appropriations. These

were made in some ten categories with a

proviso that the President could make

transfers between categories up to 20 percent as long as no single category was increased by more than 30 percent. There

were two lend-lease appropriations in

1941, one on 27 March for $7 billion and

another on 28 October for $5.985 billion.2

Recognizing that it would take time to

procure materials with lend-lease funds,

Congress also authorized transfers from

stocks, but carefully circumscribed the

President's powers in this regard. He could

not transfer materials produced on appropriations made subsequent to the LendLease Act to regular government agencies.

Transfers from material produced on previous regular appropriations were limited

to a valuation of $1.3 billion, and would

require the approval of the Chief of Staff

or Chief of Naval Operations in the case

of military or naval materials.3 Beyond

these restrictions, the procedures for carrying out lend-lease were left almost entirely

to the discretion of the President.

Roosevelt decided even before the act

was passed that it should be administered

by existing government agencies within

their various spheres of responsibility.

Thus, the War Department would carry

the largest share of the burden, for almost

all materials to be released under the "Billion Three" clause would come from Army

stocks, and approximately $4 billion of the

first appropriation (of $7 billion) and $2.4

billion of the second (of $5.985 billion) fell

into categories for which it had primary

responsibility—viz., I, ordnance and ordnance stores; II, aircraft and aeronautical

equipment; III, tanks and other vehicles;

and V, miscellaneous military equipment.

Initially, the War Department proposed

direct appropriations by Congress to the

Army within these categories, but this proposal was rejected and an arrangement

was finally made whereby the appropriations were made to the President and allocated by him to the proper procurement

agency.4 This system, as the President ap1

 PL 11, 77th Cong (Lend-Lease Act). 2

 (1) PL 23, 77th Cong. (2) PL 282, 77th Cong. 3

 The so-called Billion Three clause, Sec 3a (2) of

Lend-Lease Act. 4

 (1) Memo, Col Aurand for Maj Gen Richard C.

Moore, 15 Feb 41, sub: Conf on Method of Appropriation for Lend-lease Bill, G-4/32697-1. (2) PL cited

n. 1.
78 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

plied it, led to a separation of lend-lease

and Army contracts for the same articles

and produced a welter of complicated

administrative practices.

The President did not delegate to the

War Department as much authority to

administer lend-lease as Secretary Stimson had evidently expected, nor did he

give to his military advisers the dominant

voice in determining lend-lease policy that

they thought the situation demanded. Tabling a suggestion from Stimson that overall control be vested in a cabinet board on

which the service departments would predominate, Roosevelt appointed Harry

Hopkins, his close personal adviser, as

Lend-Lease Administrator. Hopkins did

not become the head of any organization

or office for the purpose, and remained a

sort of lend-lease minister without portfolio, wielding vast influence, but little

concerned with the details of practical administration. To fill the administrative

void, the President on 2 May 1941 created

the Division of Defense Aid Reports

(DDAR), with Maj. Gen. James H. Burns,

Executive Assistant to the Under Secretary of War, as executive officer. DDAR

became the President's agency for receiving foreign requests, for co-ordinating the

activities of the various government agencies involved in lend-lease, and for accounting, but it was never vested with

more than limited authority to approve

allocation of funds or transfers of materials. Until October 1941 nearly every

specific action under lend-lease required

the personal approval of the President.

 5

If the President's mode of operating was

the underlying cause of the administrative

confusion that followed, the War Department organization compounded it. The

first organization for handling lend-lease

within the War Department was established in early April 1941. As on the

higher level, existing agencies were used as

far as possible. The supply arms and services—Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal,

Medical, Chemical Warfare, and Engineers—together with the Air Corps, were

to be the principal operating agencies for

procurement and distribution of supplies,

with planning, supervision, and direction

of their activities divided between the

Office of the Under Secretary of War in

matters of procurement, and the General

Staff in requirements and distribution. A

Defense Aid Division was established in

the Under Secretary's office as a coordinating agency, with Colonel MacMorland, former Secretary of the ANMB

Clearance Committee, as its head. To

perform the detailed work necessary in

reviewing foreign requirements and formulating aid programs, defense aid requirements committees were also established, one for each of the supply services.

The nucleus of each committee was to be

a chairman and a secretariat from G-4, a

representative of the Office of the Under

Secretary of War (OUSW), and a representative of the foreign country concerned.

The existing Joint Aircraft Committee was

continued as the requirements committee

for aircraft.6

With so many different agencies involved, the early procedures were inevi5

 (1) Ltr, Stimson to President, 13 Feb 41, with

incl, sub: Lend-lease Orgn, AG 400.3295 (2-13-41)

(3). (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 278. (3)

EO 8751, 2 May 41. (4) The limited delegations of

authority made by the President may be found in

ltrs, President to SW, 18 Mar and 4 Jun 41; ltr, President to Exec Off DDAR, 26 Jul 41; and ltr, President

to Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 18 Sep 41. All in Auth

File of President's Ltrs, DAD. 6

 (1) AG ltr to Chiefs of SAS and WDGS Divs, 10

Apr 41, sub: Proced Under Lend-Lease Act, AG

020.1 (3-29-41). (2) Ltr, SW to Maj Gen Henry H.

Arnold, Actg DCofS, 22 Apr 41, sub: Jt Aircraft Com,

ID, Lend-Lease, Doc Suppl, I.
THE ARMY AND EARLY LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS 79

tably cumbersome. The requirements

committees worked out programs for each

category of equipment on the basis of the

funds appropriated, and the President

made tentative allocations of funds based

on these programs. Each item in the program then had to be separately requisitioned, and each requisition had to go

through a tortuous chain of offices. A foreign requisition was first received by

DDAR and, if for a military article, referred to the Secretary of War. The Secretary referred it to the Defense Aid Division,

which then secured action by the appropriate requirements committee and approval of G-4 (and WPD if matters of

strategy were involved). The results were

incorporated in a staff study for the Chief

of Staff, who then prepared necessary

action for the Secretary of War. The Secretary sent the ultimate decision back to

DDAR, which in case of approval prepared the necessary allocation or transfer

letter for the signature of the President.

The President's authorization had to make

the return trip through channels before a

directive could be issued by the Secretary

of War to the appropriate supply service to

take action. The same process had to be

repeated when materials became available

for transfer.7 Where requisitions or transfers merely confirmed items on approved

programs, the tortuous journey was largely

perfunctory, but spot requisitions, program

changes, and emergency demands had to

go through the whole time-consuming

process. The War Department was not

only hamstrung by the necessity of continually referring all sorts of minutiae to the

President, but muscle-bound by its own

procedures.

Between April and October the War

Department gradually improved the situation within its own house. The Secretary's office was eliminated from routine

administration and the Defense Aid Division made responsible for initial receipt of

requisitions. The numerous requirements

committees were reduced to a status of informal subcommittees under one Defense

Aid Supply Committee.8 The big stumbling block remained the division of

authority between G-4 and the Under

Secretary's office. The Requirements and

Distribution Branch, G-4, headed by Lt.

Col. Henry S. Aurand (promoted to colonel on 26 June 1941), set up its own Defense Aid Section, which provided the

permanent nucleus for the Defense Aid

Supply Committee and did much of the

work on which the Defense Aid Division

had to depend for its staff studies. There

were inevitable duplications of function,

and inevitable delays in processing papers

between the two offices. Colonel Aurand

proposed as early as May that the two sections be consolidated, but Robert P. Patterson, the Under Secretary of War,

refused to surrender the procurement

function, and the General Staff refused to

surrender the requirements function. The

final solution, approved by Secretary

Stimson on 1 October 1941, was ingenious.

All offices engaged in lend-lease activities,

including the Defense Aid Division,

OUSW, the Defense Aid Section, G-4, and

the home offices of lend-lease missions

then being dispatched to overseas theaters,

were placed together, adjacent to the office

7

 (1) Ltr cited n. 6(1). (2) AG ltr to Chiefs of SAS

and WDGS Divs, 17 Jun 41, sub: Proced Under

Lend-Lease Act, AG 020.1 (6-12-41). (3) Agenda for

Def Aid Sup Com, 8 Aug 41, ID, Lend-Lease, Doc

Suppl, I. 8

 (1) Ltr cited n. 7(2). (2) AG ltr to Chiefs of SAS

and WDGS Divs, 10 Jul 41, sub: Change in Proced

Under Lend-Lease Act, AG 020.1 (7-9-41). (3) ID,

Lend-Lease, I, 113.
80 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

of the Assistant Secretary, John J. McCloy,

to whom Stimson had delegated his own

functions in regard to lend-lease. The lines

of responsibility remained the same but

Colonel Aurand was named Defense Aid

Director of the War Department and

hence the head of all the separate offices.

The chairmanship and secretariat of the

Defense Aid Supply Committee were

transferred to his jurisdiction, supply arms

and services were required to appoint

lend-lease officers, and foreign governments were requested to name liaison

officers with Aurand's office.9

By the end of October Aurand had converted this physical consolidation into a

genuine organizational consolidation. The

separate offices were made branches of the

Office of the Defense Aid Director. Aurand

soon made of this organization something

closely resembling a general staff section

charged with supply to foreign armies,

though its exact relation to G-4 remained

undefined. Aurand could, at least in

theory, exercise authority only in the name

of one of his four superiors—the Deputy

Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Richard C.

Moore, on requirements and distribution;

the Under Secretary, Mr. Patterson, on

procurement; the Assistant Secretary, Mr.

McCloy, on policy matters relating to the

Secretary's office; and the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Robert A. Lovett, on

matters pertaining to Air Forces matériel.

Nevertheless, a real measure of centralization of War Department lend-lease activities had been achieved.10

 (Chart 2)

While the War Department organization was evolving, the President finally

began to delegate his lend-lease powers. In

August he called in Edward R. Stettinius,

Jr., as special assistant on lend-lease and,

on 28 October 1941, appointed him LendLease Administrator, vested with all the

presidential powers under the act, save

those of designating countries to be aided

and those of negotiating master agreements with them.11

 The Office of LendLease Administration (OLLA) absorbed

the organization and functions of the Division of Defense Aid Reports. The creation

of OLLA offered the prospect of simplified

administrative procedures, but raised the

spectre of domination of military lendlease by a civilian agency that military

officials considered to be little suited for

the task. Colonel Aurand and Mr. McCloy

immediately began to press Stettinius for

more freedom of action. They asked that

OLLA allocate funds in a lump to cover

programs worked out for each country

within the Defense Aid Supply Committee, grant blanket authority to the Secretary of War to transfer the articles contained therein, and set up a revolving fund

of sufficient size to take care of other demands that came up outside the programs.

Processing individual requisitions through

OLLA should no longer be required, and

the War Department should have full

freedom within the limits of existing legislation to make adjustments in programs,

transfer funds from one category to an9

 (1) Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, 22 May 41, sub:

Change in Proced Under Lend-Lease Act, G-4/

32697, Sec 1. (2) Memo, USW for ACofS G-4, 31

May 41, same sub. (3) G-4 consideration ofnonconcurrence. Last two in Proced Lend-lease file, DAD.

(4) Memo, Col Aurand for Lt Col Stanley R. Mickelsen, 5 Sep 41, sub: Trf of DAD, AG 020.1 (2-29-41).

(5) Memo, Patterson for SW, 19 Sep 41, sub: Lendlease Proced, ID, Lend-Lease, Doc Suppl, I. (6) AG

ltr to Chiefs of SAS and WDGS Divs, 1 Oct 41, sub:

Change in Proced Under Lend-Lease Act, AG 020.1

(9-19-41)OD-F. 10

 (1) Memo, Aurand for all offs in ODAD, 29 Oct

41, USSR Mis 334 file, DAD, Job 11. (2) Memo,

Aurand, no addressee, 1 Nov 41, sub: Def Aid Policies and Orgn, Misc Stf Studies, Proced Lend-lease

file, DAD. 11

 EO 8926, 28 Oct 41.

82 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

other, make transfers under the "Billion

Three" clause, and retransfer material

earmarked for one country to another as

the situation demanded.

Stettinius was generally co-operative

and War Department fears of encroachment proved groundless, but he moved

slowly and still insisted on retaining a degree of financial control within OLLA. He

accepted the principle of programing and

granted the Secretary of War blanket

transfer authority under approved programs, but maintained most of the other

restrictions on the use of funds and transfer of material. Aurand complained on the

eve of Pearl Harbor that continuing control by OLLA would prevent the War

Department from running a program

based on military considerations.12

The lesson to be drawn from these administrative difficulties, War Department

officials generally concluded, was that

lend-lease appropriations for military articles should be consolidated with Army

appropriations with a limitation only on

the dollar value of lend-lease transfers.

Only in this way, they thought, could the

goal of a consolidated military production

program with distribution on a strategic

basis be achieved. A limited plan of this

sort was offered to Congress as part of the

Army's request for supplemental appropriations in November 1941 but was rejected in the House of Representatives.

Nevertheless, this proved only a temporary

setback. The temper of Congress changed

rapidly after Pearl Harbor.13

Early Operations Under Lend-Lease

Passage of the Lend-Lease Act was

closely followed by a new series of surplus

releases and by the formulation of production programs for aid to Britain. In February General Marshall approved a new list

made up primarily of various obsolescent

types of artillery that might legitimately

be considered surplus now that prospects

of new production were brighter. Originally, the list was drawn up on the supposition that all materials would be turned

over to the British, but since the President

also wished to make some gesture of aid to

Greece, and since the British themselves

wanted to strengthen their influence in

Turkey, the surplus was divided among

the three countries by agreement with the

British representatives. On 11 March

1941 the President declared defense of

Great Britain and Greece vital to that of

the United States; releases to Turkey were

handled through the British, obviating the

need for such a declaration for that country.

Shortly thereafter the German invasion of Yugoslavia added another urgent

claimant. General Marshall agreed to

make additional releases from U.S.

stocks—some of which, 75-mm. ammunition and P-40 pursuit planes, for example,

were not clearly "surplus"—and the British consented to a further division of their

allotment. The lightning conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece prevented the delivery of any supplies to either country, and

only Turkey got its share. The British were

allowed to retain most of the remainder

12

 (1) Ltr, McCloy to Stettinius, 29 Oct 41, Misc Stf

Studies, Proced Lend-lease file, DAD. (2) Memo,

Aurand for Stettinius, 4 Dec 41, Proced Lend-lease

file, DAD. (3) Min of mtgs in Aurand's off on def aid,

Oct-Nov 41, Conf Memos file, DAD. (4) Ltr, Stettinius to SVV, 22 Nov 41, Misc Corresp Lend-lease 3

file, DAD. (5) Third Report to Congress on Lend-Lease

Operations, pp. 27-31. (6) ID, Lend-Lease, I, 679-80. 13

 Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on

Appropriations, HR, 77th Cong, 1st Sess, on Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriations Bill for

1942, 17-26 Nov 41, Pt. 2, pp. 1-256.
THE ARMY AND EARLY LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS 83

for their own hard-pressed forces in the

Middle East.14

Meanwhile in February, while the lendlease bill was being considered in Congress, the British presented a statement of

their over-all requirements through 30

June 1942. Calculated on a very generous

scale, they were regarded by the British

themselves as more a hope than a reality,

a measure of the expansion of American

production that would eventually be

needed rather than a precise program or a

basis for contract action. The British used

the "balance sheet" technique developed

by Jean Monnet, the French industrialist

associated with the British Supply Council in North America, balancing against

the stated requirements their estimates of

British production and presenting the

deficit as the amount that must be met

from American production.15

These requirements, when adjusted to

what preliminary studies indicated would

be the maximum capacity of American

production, and undoubtedly to what the

President thought would be politically

expedient, served as the basis for the first

$7 billion lend-lease appropriation.16 They

also had to serve, during March and April

1941, as a blueprint for working out expenditure programs for submission to the

President. The aircraft program was formulated by the Joint Aircraft Committee

largely in terms of agreements reached in

1940 and at the ABC staff meetings, adjusted of course to the actual current prospects of production. The ground force programs were at first handled by informal

committees of supply services and British

representatives, later giving way, as the

War Department lend-lease organization

became defined, to formal defense aid requirements committees. In presenting

their ground force requirements, the British quietly dropped the Ten Division Program as a separate entity, though for some

time they retained in their programs the

individual articles involved. The battle of

types was, to some degree, renewed,

though to little avail for the British since

the U.S. representatives on the requirements committees refused to budge from

the basic decision of 1940 that American

production for foreign aid must be of

equipment capable of filling U.S. Army

needs. Some British types—the Bofors 40-

mm. antiaircraft gun, the 4.5-inch gun (on

an American carriage), and the British 6-

pounder (57-mm.)—had been accepted

for full or limited use by the U.S. Army as

a result of tests made early in 1941. Beyond this, the British were able to get only

a small program devoted to nonstandard

articles of their own types despite the emphasis they placed upon it. Of the nonstandard requirements in the British "A"

Program of 1940, only those for .303-caliber rifles and ammunition were ever

14

 (1) Memo, Moore for CofS, 24 Feb 41, WPD

4323-21. (2) Memo, CofS for President, 11 Mar 41,

AG 400.3295 (1-6-41) (1). (3) Ltr, President to SW,

11 Mar 41, AG 400.3295 (1-6-41). (4) Ltr, President

to SW, 23 Mar 41, AG 400.3295 (3-11-41). (5) Related papers in last two files. (6) Memo, Marshall for

Hopkins, 5 Apr 41, sub: Mun Which Can Be Delivered ... to Yugoslavia. (7) Memo for rcd in OCofS,

7 Apr 41, sub: Mun for Yugoslavia. Last two in AG

400.3295 (4-5-41) (1). (8) For detailed material on all

aspects of redistribution of this surplus, see English

Lend-lease Stocks file, Case B-l, DAD; English Corresp Lend-Lease 1 and 2 files, DAD; and AG

400.3295 (3-11-41) (2). 15

 (1) Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy,

p. 232. (2) M. M. Postan, British War Production (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office and Longmans,

Green and Co., 1952), p. 237. (3) Memo, Henry Morgenthau for Maj Gen Edwin M. Watson, 13 Feb 41,

AG 400.3295 (2-13-41) (2). (4) Memo, Aurand for

Moore, 25 Feb 41, sub: Discussion With Regard to

Br Reqmts, G-4/33247. 16

 Min, informal com mtg with Br reps, 18 Mar 41,

Reqmts Com Mtgs file, DAS G-4. The DAS G-4 files

are with those of the DAD.
84 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

accepted in the United States either on

British contracts or as a part of lend-lease.

Under lend-lease they also received a sizable new commitment for Universal carriers, a British-type armored vehicle that

the U.S. Army did not use. The rest of the

program devoted to noncommon articles

consisted of components for tanks, planes,

and other finished equipment to be produced in Great Britain. Also, in accordance with the Hyde Park Declaration of

20 April 1941 establishing a common program for the United States and Canada,

contracts for other British-type weapons

were placed in Canada with lend-lease

funds. As the lend-lease programs took

shape, it appeared that the British would

adapt their entire program to permit use

of specific American types as substitutes

or as supplementary equipment and rely

on American production for supplying

items that British industry was ill prepared

to produce in volume. For example, they

would depend very heavily on the United

States for medium tanks and other combat vehicles, revolvers, and small arms

ammunition of all types, and entirely for

Thompson submachine guns, but would

meet their own needs in their entirety for

most standard items of equipment for infantry divisions, such as the Bren gun

(.303-caliber) and the 25-pounder.17

By mid-June, the basic expenditure programs had been accepted and allocation

of funds and submission of detailed requisitions were well under way. While no

contracts already placed by the British

could legally be absorbed under lendlease, pending contracts were, and many

others conveniently deferred in favor of

lend-lease contracts for the same articles.

The most important British contracts that

remained were those for aircraft and medium tanks. The President exerted continual pressure to see that contracts with

lend-lease funds were let as rapidly as possible. The primary consideration in the

early months was to put the money to

work.18 But haste, combined with involved

procedures, inevitably caused a great deal

of confusion. Little consideration could be

given to establishing the justification for

individual British requests. Spelling out

the British program in detail was a complicated matter and required adjustments

at every step of the way. The British presented requisitions not only for items on

the agreed programs but also for new demands and items to be financed under

future appropriations. There was insufficient co-ordination among the British

agencies involved in presenting these requirements. The British Supply Council

in North America, embracing all British

civilian agencies in Washington, presented

all formal requisitions, but the British

Army Staff (British Army representatives

in Washington) furnished the members for

the requirements committees and was responsible for justifying military requests.

The British Joint Staff Mission, established

17

 (1) Minutes of the early defense aid committee

meetings are in DAS G-4 and DAD files. The development of the committee system and the formulation

of early programs are traced in these minutes and in

memorandum, Aurand for ACofS G-4, 25 March

1941, sub: Recent Lend-lease Activities, G-4/

32697, Sec 1. (2) AG ltr to CofOrd, 11 Mar 41, sub:

Pdn for Br Reqmts, WPD 4323-23. (3) Papers in

G-4/32575, G-4/31691-10, and AG 400.3295

(12-12-40) (3). (4) Hyde Park Declaration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King,

20 Apr 41, ID, Lend-Lease, Doc Suppl, I. (5) Memo,

ACofS WPD for ACofS G-4, 16 Jul 41, sub: Proposed

New Lend-lease Appropriations Bill, WPD 4323-38.

(6) Postan, British War Production, p. 245. 18

 (1) Memo, SW for Exec Off DDAR, 20 Jul 41, in

separate folder of DAD files. (2) Ltr, President to SW,

29 May 41. (3) Memo, Aurand for Finance Br G-4,

11 Jun 41, sub: Obligation of Funds Available to WD.

Last two in G-4/32697, Sec 1. (4) Memo, USW for

Marshall, 6 Jun 41, OCofS 21210-38.
THE ARMY AND EARLY LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS 85

after the ABC meetings, sometimes presented particularly urgent demands that

might or might not duplicate requests submitted through regular channels.

In spite of confusion, all the funds in the

first appropriation were rapidly earmarked or allocated and consideration of

a second lend-lease appropriation began

in July, largely on the basis of British requirements in the February presentation

not yet financed, and requests made during the interim.19

 Again there was little

time for a review of the basis of British requests. WPD admitted, when asked for a

strategic justification, that it could not relate British requirements to British war

strategy and concluded with a general justification sufficient at least for the moment:

So long as the maintenance of Great Britain's war effort is considered as furthering

the interests of the United States, we should . . . supplement British production of equip- ment to the extent that such equipment can

be provided without jeopardizing our own

security. . . . The time lag between the

placing of orders and the delivery of the

equipment makes it impracticable to predict

whether the equipment will actually be allo- cated to the British or used by our own

forces . . . . Any surplus over actual LendLease needs at the time the equipment is

delivered can be allocated to our own

use . . . .20

The Injection of Chinese Demands

While the initial lend-lease programs

were framed entirely for aid to Britain, demands for lend-lease soon came from the

Far East also. Though there is no indication that aid to China was considered in

the passage of the Lend-Lease Act, President Roosevelt had dispatched Dr. Lauchlin Currie, one of his administrative assistants, to China early in the year. Currie returned on the very day lend-lease became

law. Shortly thereafter Dr. T. V. Soong,

Chiang Kai-shek's brother-in-law, presented to General Burns a complete statement of Chinese requirements. A corporation chartered in Delaware, China Defense Supplies, Inc. (CDS), with Soong as

president but staffed largely by American

businessmen, was formed as a counterpart

of the British Supply Council to represent

the Chinese Government in lend-lease

transactions. On the American side, on 4

April Harry Hopkins assigned Lauchlin

Currie "primary responsibility in developing our contacts with the Chinese Government in the administration of the LendLease Bill."

 21

 Currie's efforts were to be

largely responsible for the formulation of

a sizable Chinese aid program along the

lines indicated by Soong. On the basis of a

preliminary War Department review of

the availability of commercial materials,

Currie on 6 May 1941 secured from the

President an allocation of $45.1 million

for transportation and construction materials, and an immediate transfer of 300

trucks originally intended for Yugoslavia.

Transfer of the trucks was accompanied

by the all-important declaration that the

defense of China was vital to that of the

United States.22

19

 (1) Memo, Exec Off DDAR for SW, 7 Jul 41,

Misc Corresp Lend-lease 1 file, DAD. (2) Memo,

ACofS G-4 for CofS, 18 Jul 41, sub: Lists of Def Articles . . . To Be Included in New Def Aid Appropriations, G-4/32697, Sec 1. (3) Related papers in same

file. (4) See Lend-lease 2 file, DAS G-4. 20

 Memo cited n. 17(5). 21

 (1) Ltr, Chinese reps to Gen Burns, 31 Mar 41.

(2) Ltr, HU Shih, Chinese Ambassador, to Secy of

State, 24 May 41. (3) Related papers. (4) Ltr, Hopkins to Gen Burns et al., 4 Apr 41. All in China Lendlease file, Stf Study C-1-A, DAD. 22

 (1) Memo, Stimson for Currie, 22 Apr 41, sub:

Aid Prog for China. (2) Memo, Currie for President,

23 Apr 41, sub: Preliminary Aid Prog for China. (3)

Ltr, President to SW, 6 May 41. All in AG 400.3295

(4-14-41) Sec 1.
86 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Meanwhile, the requirements committees had concluded a detailed analysis of

the Soong program, and on 3 May 1941

Patterson presented the results to Currie.

He urged a cautious approach in the face

of Currie's pressure for speedy action. The

program would cost $1,064,000,000 as opposed to the Chinese estimate of $567 million. Allocation of lend-lease funds had

been based entirely on aid to the British,

who would naturally expect to get the

material thus financed. Even if money

could be found, it would be a long time

before materials could be produced under

lend-lease contracts. Surplus Army stocks

had been depleted by releases to Great

Britain, and plans for future releases were

based on continuation of this policy. Patterson also felt that shipping would act as

a further limitation on the amount of aid

that could be furnished China.23

Currie was undaunted by these difficulties, and a few days later secured reluctant

approval from the War Department for

an additional allocation of $50 million for

selected ordnance items. By adjustments

here and there, funds in other categories

to an eventual total of over $200 million

were similarly earmarked for China. By

July 1941 aid to China had become an

established policy. In plans for the second

lend-lease appropriation, Chinese requirements were given a definite place beside those of Britain.24

Soong's March program had provided

the over-all blueprint on which the Chinese aid program was based. It included

(1) a thousand planes for the Chinese Air

Force; (2) ground munitions for an army

capable of offensive operations; (3) material for improving the transportation system from Burma; (4) material for operating arsenals manufacturing small arms

and ammunition within China. The major

portion of these requirements, except those

for the arsenals, fell within the War Department categories. The Chinese began

to present specific requisitions on a wholesale basis, but because of their lack of

knowledge of American types, the requisitions were often wholly inadequate, and

bore little relation to actual need. Indeed,

it soon became apparent that the Chinese

were mainly interested in getting any and

all material that they could secure from

American sources without more than a

vague idea of how it was to be moved to

China or how used once there. It became

the task of the War Department to work

out an orderly program from the deluge

of Chinese requests and to find a place for

it within the existing Anglo-American

structure.

Any appraisal had to take into consideration the means of access to Free China.

The only route remaining open was

through the port of Rangoon in Burma,

over the Burmese railroad to Lashio, and

thence into China over the Burma Road.

This whole system in early 1941 was in

condition to carry but few supplies, and

any aid program for China would obviously depend upon overhauling it.

Soong originally proposed not only improving the Burma Road, but constructing a Burma-Yunnan railroad to parallel

it, and a new highway from British India

23

 Ltr, Patterson, Actg SW, to Currie, 3 May 41,

with incl DAD rpt on def aid prog for China, AG

400.3295 (4-14-41) Sec 1. 24

 (1) Memo, Currie for MacMorland, DAD, 10

May 41. (2) Memo, Stimson for Currie, 16 May 41.

Both in China Lend-lease file, Stf Study C-l-C, DAD.

(3) Memo, Patterson for CofS, 19 Jul 41, sub: Co-ord

of Chinese Def Aid, in separate folder of DAD files.

(4) On policy, see Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's

Mission to China, pp. 13-25.
THE ARMY AND EARLY LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS 87

to China. The new highway was ruled out

as impractical, and efforts were concentrated on providing necessary materials

for improving the Burma Road and building the subsidiary railway. Requirements

for both were elaborately calculated by

U.S. Army engineers, and procurement of

materials began. While construction and

transportation materials did not offer such

procurement difficulties as guns and ammunition, it was clear that heavy material

for the railroad could not be ready until

late 1942 and when available would be

difficult to transport.

The ultimate aim would be to equip a

Chinese army and air force capable of

effectively resisting the Japanese. An air

force seemed to offer the best prospects of

immediate results. Plans for Chennault's

volunteer group were already well advanced. A training program for Chinese

pilots in the United States was inaugurated. Because furnishing more planes to

China would affect either the British or

American program, the Joint Aircraft

Committee referred Soong's aircraft requirements to the Joint Army-Navy Board

for decision. Currie, in the meantime, proposed a short-term program of approximately 350 pursuits and 150 bombers and

transports. The Joint Board approved in

principle in July, with a statement of

broad policy:

Without jeopardizing our own preparedness, to furnish material aid to China by pro- viding aircraft ... in quantities sufficient

for effective action against Japanese military

and naval forces operating in China and in

neighboring countries and waters.25

By September a schedule had been

worked out providing for delivery of 269

pursuits, 66 light bombers, 10 transports,

and 70 trainers before the end of March

1942. Even these allocations, though

mainly of obsolescent-type planes, brought

serious objections from the British of interference with their aircraft procurement

program under lend-lease.26

The ground force requirements presented by Soong evidently were based on

a project to arm thirty Chinese divisions

on a scale considered adequate for warfare in China. Though these requirements

could be reasonably well defined and

were not comparable to those for thirty

U.S. divisions, they brought in their wake

problems of type and availability that

seemed virtually insoluble. Little could be

done to furnish small arms or ammunition. The standard Chinese caliber was

7.92-mm., which the United States refused to produce because it would interfere with the existing .30-caliber program,

and it seemed a futile gesture to offer the

few thousand .30-caliber rifles still available from old stocks, since no ammunition

for them could be sent.27 For other ordnance equipment — machine guns, field

artillery, and antitank and antiaircraft

guns—either outlets must be found for

lend-lease contracts or equipment must be

released from stock. The prospects in

April and May 1941 were that only driblets could be furnished to meet the Chinese

thirty division program for at least a year,

but the program was accepted, and by

dint of scraping here and there it was

found that some matériel at least could be

provided to meet it. Lauchlin Currie

25

 JB 355, Ser 691. 26

 Ltr, Currie to SW and SN, 18 Sep 41, sub: China

Def Aid Aircraft Reqmts in 1942, JB 355, Ser 727. 27

 (1) Min, mtg of Def Aid Ord Reqmts Com for

consideration of items submitted by CDS, 25 Apr 41,

Rpts on Confs on Lend-lease file, AMMISCA 337,

Job 11. (2) Memo, Col Victor V. Taylor, DAD, for

CofOrd, 10 Jul 41, sub: China Reqmts for Ord Mat,

G-4/32192, Sec 1. (3) See China Rifles file, DAD.
88 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

found facilities in Canada for many substitute items of British types.28

 Thus, despite all obstacles, a sizable program of aid

to China took shape on the planning

boards, intensifying the competition for

the limited supply of munitions available.

Inclusion of the Netherlands Indies

Other pleas for aid against the Japanese

came from the Netherlands Indies.

Though not yet actively in the war, these

islands occupied a position of critical

strategic importance in the Far East. In

response to continuing Dutch complaints

over their inability to get priorities for

their contracts, Assistant Secretary of War

Patterson agreed in March 1941 that it

was generally in the interests of the United

States to furnish them with adequate materials for defense, but ruled that Dutch

requirements must be placed in lower

priority than those of Britain, Greece, and

China, "nations . . . actually engaged

in warfare for the defense of democracy."

 29

 This priority helped very little,

and Dutch wealth only made Dutch representatives prey to financial adventurers

seeking to sell nonexistent rifles from government stocks.

Seeking a way out the Dutch foreign

minister, on a visit to the United States in

June 1941, asked for inclusion under lendlease, with the understanding that the

Dutch would continue to pay for their

goods. Their most pressing needs were for

small arms, antiaircraft guns, and ammunition to repel a Japanese invasion, which

the Dutch believed to be imminent. The

War Department undertook to review the

Dutch requirements, and concluded that

forty thousand Enfield rifles could be released, but that no ammunition would be

available to go with them. The dilemma

was finally resolved in August by sending

only twenty thousand rifles and taking

seven million rounds of ammunition from

stocks originally set up as a reserve for the

Iceland expedition. On 21 August 1941

the President formally declared the Netherlands Indies eligible for lend-lease aid

and transferred the rifles and ammunition

on a cash reimbursement basis. This step

insured more careful consideration of

Dutch requirements and their inclusion

in the framework of lend-lease priorities,

but still left their specific priority low in

relation to other demands.30

The Latin American Program

The republics of Latin America had

already been established as claimants for

aid in 1940, but as long as the chances for

British survival seemed good their priority

remained even lower than that of the

Netherlands Indies. On 3 March 1941,

28

 (1) Memo cited n. 24(1). (2) Memo, Marshall for

Hopkins, 26 Mar 41, sub: Army Equip From Pdn in

Near Future Available for Trf to China, AG 400.3295

(4-14-41) Sec 1. (3) See China Tanks file, DAD. (4)

Ltr, Currie to Col Taylor, DAD, 27 Aug 41. (5) Ltr,

Currie to Patterson, 24 Nov 41. (6) Related papers.

Last three in China Corresp Lend-lease file, DAD. 29

 (1) Ltr, Patterson to Young, Chm President's Ln

Com, 25 Mar 41. (2) Ltr, Young to Marshall, 3 May

41. (3) Ltr, Marshall to Young, 7 May 41. (4) Related

papers. All in AG 400.3295 (3-17-41) (1). 30

 (1) Ltr, Sumner Welles, Under Secy of State, to

Marshall, 4 Jun 41. (2) Ltr, Marshall to Welles, 14

Jun 41. (3) Related papers. All in AG 400.3295

(3-17-41) (1). (4) Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 10

Jun 41. (5) Memo, unsigned, for ACofS G-4, 19 Aug

41. (6) Related papers. Last three in WPD 4363-6.

(7) Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States

Army, July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1943 to the Secretary of War,

p. 94. (8) Ltr, President to SW, 21 Aug 41, AG

400.3295 (3-17-41).

Cash reimbursement lend-lease meant that the

beneficiary nation would pay the U.S. Government

for goods received, but the U.S. Government, not the

foreign purchasing commission, would place contracts

with private firms as part of the lend-lease production

program.
THE ARMY AND EARLY LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS 89

shortly before the passage of lend-lease,

the Joint Army-Navy Advisory Board on

American Republics completed the draft

of a Latin American arms program. By

July this program had been placed in relatively permanent form. The board set up

a gross allocation of $400 million for both

Army and Navy materials, $300 million

of which was for Army equipment, the

materials to be supplied over a three-year

period or longer. Each individual nation

was given a specific allocation in proportion to its anticipated contribution to

hemisphere defense. In view of Brazil's

strategic importance and general tendency to co-operate, her needs were given

first consideration and she received $100

million of the total allocation. In late

April the President agreed that the Latin

American republics should be declared

eligible for lend-lease. No allocation was

made for Latin American countries under

the first lend-lease appropriation, but

$150 million was earmarked in the second, $100 million of which fell into War

Department categories. Master agreements were subsequently negotiated with

each nation (except Argentina), obligating

each to pay in cash for a certain proportion of the equipment provided, in accordance with the country's presumed ability

to pay. But most of these master agreements (in effect supply protocols for the

nations concerned) were not negotiated

until after Pearl Harbor.

The Advisory Board on American Republics recommended that all armaments

furnished the republics be in accordance

with their needs for hemisphere defense as

evaluated in the United States, that procurement be entirely of U.S. standard

equipment and through U.S. military

channels, and that it be handled in such a

manner as not to interfere with procurement plans and deliveries for U.S. armed

forces and for the lend-lease programs for

Britain and China. Not more than $70 million in Army supplies was to be delivered

before 30 June 1942. Adoption of these

recommendations meant continuation of

the policy of 1940 under which deliveries

could be postponed indefinitely as long as

other needs were deemed more pressing.31

Search for an Allocation Policy

February-August 1941

Programs based on foreign requirements

added to the net total of munitions production. The Vinson Priorities Act of 31

May 1941 gave the President authority to

accord lend-lease contracts priority equal

to that for Army and Navy production.32

The War Department, however, refused

to accept the premise that the allocation

of funds constituted a definite promise

that munitions produced with them would

always be delivered to the country designated. Rather, as indicated earlier, it desired a consolidated military production

program with distribution to be based on

strategic policy.

During the ABC meetings, the American and British staffs agreed that immediate steps should be taken to provide "a

method of procedure which will ensure

the allocation of Military Material . . .

in the manner best suited to meet the demands of the Military situation."

 33

 But

only in the case of aircraft allocations did

the conference take any steps to carry out

this recommendation. It was agreed that

aircraft production should be accelerated,

31

 (1) Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Ch. IX. (2) ID, Lend-Lease, II,

1226-33. 32

 PL 89, 77th Cong. 33

 ABC-2 Report, Pearl Harbor Hearings, Pt. 15, p.

1543.
90 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

and that the British should receive all

planes from their own production, the output of their approved 14,375-airplane and

12,000-airplane programs in the United

States,34 and all additional U.S. production resulting from new capacity until

such time as the United States should

enter the war. The existing 54-group U.S.

Air Corps goal was accepted, as well as

one of 15,000 planes for the U.S. Navy,

and a 100-group force for the Army projected in case of British collapse, but it was

stipulated that actual deliveries would be

conditioned by the ability of the respective

organization, British or American, "to

absorb material usefully." This meant a

practical priority for the British programs,

though no definite schedule of allocations

was set up.35 As the principle was applied,

allocation of planes was largely arranged

by the Joint Aircraft Committee in planning production schedules. The British

received all planes produced on their own

and lend-lease contracts, while the U.S.

Army and Navy received those on funds

from military appropriations. The major

source for the British continued to be

planes produced on their own contracts.

Only a few diversions from U.S. Army

contracts were made before the introduction of the Soviet demands for aircraft.

This arrangement of production priorities

gave the British a definite advantage and

substantially met their request that development of a U.S. air force be delayed in

their favor.

No similar agreement for the allocation

of ground equipment was reached during

the ABC meetings. Ground munitions lent

themselves far less readily to allocation on

the basis of production priorities, except

of course in case of noncommon articles

produced specifically for a foreign country. For the great bulk of common articles

that made up both the Army and lendlease programs, contracts were let with the

same firms and administered by the same

people in the supply arms and services,

though they were financed with separate

funds. Much of the final assembly work

was done in Army arsenals, where it was

impractical to separate components produced under two types of contracts.36

 Even

where separation of the two types of contracts was possible, it was undesirable in

the interests of both maximum production

and intelligent distribution. In this situation the source of financing gradually became an administrative and accounting

matter. As such it caused all sorts of procedural headaches, and while necessarily

serving as the basis of long-range planning

for both requirements and allocations, it

could not be used to determine a time

schedule of deliveries. Interpreted strictly

according to source of financing, lendlease production of munitions in 1941 was

largely a matter of future promise. Immediate aid could come only from production already planned, principally production on Army contracts financed before

the passage of lend-lease. The "Billion

Three" clause of the Lend-Lease Act provided one means by which release of some

of these materials to foreign powers could

be accomplished, the juggling of contracts

another. It soon became clear that any

allocation policy would have to be based

upon considering lend-lease and Army

production of common articles as a single

program, and using these devices to provide delivery to the country desired regardless of the source of financing. The

34

 See above, Ch. I. 35

 ABC-2 Report, Pearl Harbor Hearings, Pt. 15, pp.

1545-50. 36

 See remarks of Col Alfred B. Quinton, Jr., Ord

rep at Def Aid Ord Reqmts Com mtg, 21 May 41,

Mtgs May file, DAD.
THE ARMY AND EARLY LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS 91

"Billion Three" was the principal reliance

in the beginning. And, it will be remembered, under this clause the Chief of Staff

had final say on all transfers.

Under lend-lease, as earlier, General

Marshall adopted the principle that foreign aid should not be allowed to interfere

with the initial development plans of the

Army. The formula adopted in connection

with the Ten Division Program—that

nothing beyond minimum training requirements for the British should be furnished before the fulfillment of American

requirements for the PMP program—

remained the official basis of transfers long

after the Ten Division Program had been

abandoned. This formula was revised in

February 1941 to provide that no additional items would be furnished the British

until

. . . full American requirements for certain

task forces are completed. Following completion of such deliveries to Task Forces, further

deliveries will be apportioned according to the situation existing at that time.37

The immediate calculation of task force

requirements on a satisfactory basis did

not prove feasible, however, and the policy

as put into practice made the initial PMP

force plus three months of maintenance

the minimum American requirement.

During the spring of 1941 the size of this

initial force was again expanded, this time

to 1,820,000 men, with a first augmentation to 3,200,000. The target date for completely equipping the first force was

changed from 1 April to 30 June 1942, and

the policy adopted held this goal to be

sacrosanct, not to be compromised by

lend-lease releases.

The requirements committees, in planning the British lend-lease programs in

March, applied this yardstick to determine what proportion of British requirements could be met by releases from production on Army orders. A tentative list of

such releases was prepared but no attempt

was made to state when they would take

place. Actual releases, meanwhile, were

made on the basis of specific decisions by

the Chief of Staff on a flood of requests

from the British and later from the

Chinese. The emergency nature of most of

these requests put the utmost pressure on

General Marshall to make exceptions to

the above policy, and in some cases he

did.38

The most important single instance of

an exception came in response to urgent

demands of the British for supplies for

their forces in the Middle East. The visit

of Brigadier J. F. M. Whiteley to the

United States in May 1941, as representative of General Wavell, bearing tidings of

the critical needs of the British in that area

and a specific list of equipment desired,

moved General Marshall and Secretary

Stimson to decide that maximum possible

support should be given to the Middle

East during the next few months "even if

some sacrifice of our own plans for expanding our own military strength is

necessary."

 39

 In keeping with this decision, two hundred light tanks, twenty-four

antiaircraft guns, four 155-mm. guns, a

considerable amount of 155-mm. ammunition, and sizable quantities of engi37

 (1) Memo, Gen Moore, DCofS, for CofS, 25 Feb

41, AG 008 Lend-lease (4-15-41). Italics are the

authors'. (2) On the earlier policy, see above, Ch. I. 38

 (1) Min cited n. 16. (2) Ag ltr to Chiefs of SAS,

18 Apr 41, sub: WD Lend-lease Policies and Action

To Be Taken Thereunder in Immediate Future, AG

008 Lend-lease (4-15-41). (3) Action on most of these

individual requests was taken in G-4, and the record

is preserved in G-4 inds to DAD in G-4/31691-1 and

G-4/32192. 39

 Note for rcd only accompanying disposition form,

DAD for AG, 23 May 41, sub: Army Equip Available

for Trf to U.K. for Middle East, AG 400.3295

(5-12-41) (2).
92 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

neer equipment were released. The rest of

the requirements on the " Whiteley List"

were placed on a high priority basis for

production.40

Nevertheless, actions by the Chief of

Staff on this and other special requests

failed to produce any new policy on diversions from stocks or production for defense

aid. As early as 7 April ,1941 a G-4 memorandum, the work of Colonel Aurand,

called attention to the lack. With characteristic boldness and breadth of conception, Aurand proposed not only a formula

on which releases of ground force equipment might be based but also that an

Anglo-American organization be formed

to allocate on a strategic basis available

lend-lease supplies and to prepare a plan

for a "sufficient supply effort to insure

victory." Confining consideration at present to Aurand's concrete proposals for a

distribution formula, his suggestion was

that minimum Army requirements should

be based on having on hand at all times

complete equipment plus three months of

maintenance for base and task forces and

minimum training requirements for PMP.

On this basis, Aurand thought, a time

schedule of defense aid releases might be

prepared. General Moore, Deputy Chief

of Staff, agreed to the preparation of such

a schedule but insisted that proposed releases in contravention of the February

policy must still be submitted item by item

to the Chief of Staff.41

Hardly had G-4 entered on these computations when WPD requested that the

task force requirements be based on placing RAINBOW 5 in effect on 1 September

1941. Despite Aurand's protest that maintenance requirements for the RAINBOW 5

force would preclude any sizable transfers

to the British before 30 June 1942, releases

were suspended while the complicated

calculations on the basis of RAINBOW 5

were made. These calculations, too, were

soon interrupted by a request from the

President for an estimate of total quantities to be transferred under the "Billion

Three" clause to 30 June 1942, broken

down into monthly schedules by item,

quantity, and country. The President's

request made immediate determination of

a distribution policy mandatory and carried the implication that such a policy

must be reasonably generous.42

Again it was Aurand who proposed the

solution.43 He began by demonstrating

that a distribution policy must include all

common articles, whether financed under

Army appropriations, lend-lease, or certain types of foreign contracts. He dismissed as too complicated the calculation

of surplus above either Army requirements for PMP plus three months maintenance or those for RAINBOW 5. He also

pointed out that such calculations had to

be based on unreliable production sched40

 (1) Ltr, Arthur B. Purvis to SW and SN, 12 May

41, sub: Urgent Br Reqmts in Middle East Campaign.

(2) Memo, ACofS WPD for ACofS G-4, 1 May 41,

sub: Additional Br Reqmts in Middle East Campaign.

(3) Note cited n. 39. (4) Ltr, Marshall to Hopkins, 26

May 41, sub: Army Equip Available for Trf to U.K.

for Middle East. All in AG 400.3295 (5-12-41) (2).

(5) Related papers in G-4/31691, Sec 1. 41

 (1) Memo, ACofS G-4 for DCofS, 7 Apr 41, sub:

WD Lend-lease Policies and Action To Be Taken

Thereunder in Immediate Future, G-4/32697. (2)

Memo [signed Gen Moore], no addressee, no date,

atchd to memo cited above, AG 008 Lend-lease

(4-15-41). 42

 (1) Memo, ACofS G-4 for ACofS WPD, 16 May

41, sub: Release of Mil Equip, G-4/31691-1, Sec 1.

(2) Min, Def Aid Ord Reqmts Com mtg, 21 May 41,

Mtgs May file, DAD. (3) Memo, Gen Burns for SW,

18 Jun 41. (4) Ltr, President to SW, 24 Jun 41. Last

two in G-4/32697, Sec 1. 43

 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, 26 Jun 41, sub: Trf

Prog of WD Under Def Aid, G-4/32697, Sec 1.

Though officially proposed by Brig. Gen. Eugene

Reybold, ACofS G-4, to General Marshall, it was

clearly the work of Colonel Aurand.
THE ARMY AND EARLY LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS 93

ules and would result in transferring unbalanced quantities of equipment. He suggested instead that 20 percent of the

monthly production of each type of equipment be transferred to defense aid, arguing

that such a fixed ratio would provide for

concurrently meeting U.S. and foreign requirements, permit lend-lease nations to

obtain sufficient U.S. equipment to familiarize themselves with its use, and provide

balanced quantities instead of widely

varying ones of mutually essential items.

Aurand chose 20 percent as the most equitable figure since he felt it would cause

little delay in RAINBOW 5 schedules,

though he recognized the grave danger

that the figure was "subject to arbitrary

revision upwards by agencies higher than

the War Department."

 44

 Transfers of 30

percent he thought would require postponements up to three or four months in

delivering certain critical items to U.S.

forces. In view of the acute shortage of

ammunition he suggested that transfer of

20 percent of production should not begin

until October.

Aurand's proposal, presented officially

to General Marshall by G-4, was concurred in for the most part by the rest of

the General Staff divisions. War Plans Division, looking into the future, added the

provision that after PMP requirements

plus three months maintenance were met,

80 percent of monthly production should

go to defense aid. General Moore recommended the solution to General Marshall

as the "only practicable method by which

we can comply with the directive of the

President."45 General Marshall approved

on 1 July, amending the WPD addition in

ink to permit 80 percent of monthly production to go to defense aid once the PMP

and one month's combat maintenance were

in the hands of U.S. troops.46

Applying the 80-20 formula to monthly

production for the next year, G-4 drew up

an "Availability List" that projected transfers through 30 June 1942. This became

the basis for the report to the President

(made on 18 July 1941) and for furnishing

the British and Chinese with tentative

schedules of what they might expect to

receive during the next twelve months.

Division between the two countries was

based generally on the proportion of contracts financed for each under lend-lease.

A monthly revision was planned to keep

the Availability List in line with changing

production forecasts.47 The G-4 Availability List at least provided some basis on

which both the U.S. Army and foreign

governments could anticipate transfers,

and the 80-20 formula firmly established

the principle that American and foreign

needs for munitions would be met concurrently. But the formula provided no complete solution to the problem of allocation,

and did not eliminate the .necessity for

individual decisions by the Chief of Staff

and the President. It proved impossible

for G-4, with limited personnel, to keep

the transfer schedules adjusted to the latest

production information. Also the formula

was rigid and divorced from strategic considerations. The source of financing was as

poor a guide to distribution between

44

 Ibid. 45

 Memo, Gen Moore for CofS, 30 Jun 41, sub:

Schedule of Items Which Can Be Trfd to Other

Countries, Trfs-Policy file, DAS G-4. 46

 (1) Memo, ACofS WPD for ACofS G-4, 28 Jun

41, sub: Comments on Trf Prog of WD Under Def

Aid. (2) Memo cited n. 45. (3) Memo, Col Mickelsen,

Asst SGS, for ACofS G-4, 1 Jul 41, sub: Trf Prog of

WD Under Def Aid. All in Trfs-Policy file, DAS G-4. 47

 (1) Memo, McCloy for Exec Off DDAR, 12 Jul

41. (2) Related papers. Both in G-4/32697, Sec 1. (3)

Memos, ACofS G-4 for DAD, 26 and 28 Jul 41, subs:

Items Available for Trf to Foreign Countries, G-4/

31691-1, Sec 3.
94 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

claimant countries as it was to distribution

between the U.S. Army and foreign aid. If

any transfers were to be made to the

Netherlands Indies, to Latin America, or

to the USSR, they would have to come out

of the allotted 20 percent, lessening the

share of Britain and China. Emergency

demands from all claimants were bound

to arise that could not be satisfied within

the formula.

Exceptions had to be made from the

very start, the most important single one

being tanks. The British relied heavily on

American production for tanks as a result

of the decisions of 1940. By the end of June

1941 General Marshall had agreed to release to them, largely for the Middle East,

20 medium tanks out of a total U.S. production of 26, and 480 light tanks out of a

total production of 1,133 (based on actual

production figures through the end of July

1941). Under the proposed 20 percent

policy, the British would receive a far

smaller proportion for the rest of the year.

Quite in contrast, the British presented requests that would have virtually absorbed

American tank production, and urged

acceleration of the tank production program. The President on 14 July 1941 asked

the War Department to review the entire

tank situation and to make a special effort

to expedite production, indicating at the

same time that any increase "should in the

main go to the British, because of their

very great necessity."

 48

 General Marshall

finally agreed that 760 light tanks out of a

prospective production of 1,420 before the

end of the year should go to the British

under lend-lease, and that out of a total

production of 1,350 mediums they should

receive 537 on their own contracts and

163 under lend-lease. It appeared in July

that these allocations would not seriously

delay the U.S. program for six armored

divisions and fifteen separate tank battalions as part of the initial PMP force, if production schedules could be met. But the

allocations proposed by Marshall were

based on a production schedule that was

highly optimistic in view of the fact tank

priorities (A-1-d) were far lower than those

of ships and planes (A-1-a), and in fact

actual production soon fell in arrears.49

The proposal to delay ammunition

transfers also created problems. Any transfers of rifles, machine guns, tanks, or planes

inevitably brought in their train a demand for ammunition to make them

usable in combat. For example, a delicate

situation arose when a hundred P-40's, released by the British, were shipped to

Chennault's American Volunteer Group.

Although the British had assumed the obligation of supplying the planes with

ammunition and spare parts, they were

unable to do so, and the responsibility fell

on the United States. General Marshall

was reluctant to accept this responsibility

in view of the ammunition shortage, but

Lauchlin Currie appealed to Hopkins and

the President, "If we don't get the ammunition over there there will be an international scandal and we might as well forget

the rest of the lend-lease program for

48

 Ltr, President to SW, 14 Jul 41, Auth File of

President's Ltrs, DAD. 49

 (1) Memo, ACofS G-4 for DAD, 12 Jun 41, sub:

Release of Tanks to Britain, G-4/31691-1, Sec 2. (2)

WPD and CPA, Official Munitions Production of the

United States by Months, July 1, 1940-August 31,

1945, pp. 225-26. (3) Memo, G. C. M. [Gen Marshall], no addressee, 11 Jul 41. (4) Memo, McCloy

for SW, 28 Jul 41. Last two in Misc Corresp Lendlease 1 file, DAD. (5) Memo, unsigned, for CofS, 19

Jul 41, sub: Trf of Tanks to Britain, Misc Corresp

Lend-lease 2 file, DAD. (6) Memo, SW for President,

26 Jul 41, sub: Tank Pdn, G-4/31691-1, Sec 3. (7) See

also material in English Corresp Lend-lease 1 file,

DAD; England Tanks, England Lend-lease Cases 3

file, DAD; and WPD 4323-34.
THE ARMY AND EARLY LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS 95

China."

 50

 The President suggested a

"token amount to show them we mean

business," and General Marshall finally

agreed to release a million rounds of .30-

caliber and five hundred thousand rounds

of .50-caliber on the recommendation of

WPD that these amounts could be spared

with a reasonable margin of safety if prospective U.S. task forces did not exceed

two divisions.51

While action from February to August

1941 was being based almost entirely on

expediency, a movement was under way

to link lend-lease allocations to over-all

strategic and supply planning for ultimate

victory over the Axis Powers. The need for

such a link was recognized not only by

Colonel Aurand (in the memorandum of

7 April 1941) but also by Under Secretary

Patterson and General Malony, acting

head of WPD. "This organization for defense aid," Malony warned Marshall on

12 May 1941, "is seriously deficient in that

it includes no agency directly charged

with . . . assuring coordination between

plans for production and distribution of

means and our strategic plans and policy . . . ." But while Aurand proposed an

organization specifically set up for this purpose composed of representatives of the

Army, Navy, Maritime Commission, and

the Office of Production Management,

with their British opposite numbers, and

one representative from the Chinese

Army, Malony thought "recommendations for the distribution of military equipment between U.S. armed services and the

armed services of other countries should

never be formulated by a group containing foreign representatives as an integral

part." He suggested, instead, that the Joint

Board would be the "most logical and

qualified agency to accomplish the task."52

General Marshall approved Malony's

suggestion and referred it to the Joint

Board in May, though not until August,

and then at the behest of Harry Hopkins,

was the proposal presented to the President. On 26 August Marshall sent to General Burns as a joint Army-Navy proposal

a draft executive order for the President's

signature designating the Joint Board as

the agency "for recommending to the

President general policies and priorities

which shall control the distribution among

the United States and friendly powers, of

munitions of war produced or controlled

by the United States."

 53

 The proposed

guides to such allocation policies were to

be national policy and military strategy of

the United States, production possibilities

both in the United States and nations to

be aided, extent to which aid could be

effectively utilized, and limitations imposed by transportation.54

 The President

refused to sign the order, insisting that

recommendations should come to him

from his Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff

50

 (1) Ltr, Currie to Hopkins, 3 Jul 41, AG 400.3295

(4-14-41), Sec 1. (2) See detailed correspondence in

same file for the complete story. 51

 (1) Memo, Hopkins for Gen Burns, 12 Jul 41. (2)

Ltr, Philip Young to SW, 8 Aug 41. Both in AG

400.3295 (4-14-41), Sec 1. (3) Memo, ACofS WPD for

DCofS, 1 Aug 41, sub: Sup of Small Arms Am for

Chinese Govt, WPD 4389-5. 52

 (1) Memo, Malony for CofS, 12 May 41, sub:

Co-ord of Plng and Sup. (2) For Patterson's suggestions, see memo, Patterson for SW, 18 Apr 41, sub:

Ult Mun Pdn Essential to Safety of America. Both in

WPD 4321-12. (3) Memo cited n. 41(1). (4) Memo,

ACofS G-4 for DCofS, 28 Apr 41, sub: Draft Ltr for

SW's Signature in Connection With Ult Sup Plan,

JB 325, Ser 692. (5) On the Victory Program planning, which was a companion piece to the effort to

establish an agency for allocations, see below, Ch. V. 53

 Memo, Marshall for JB, 14 May 41, sub: Co-ord

of Plng and Sup, WPD 4321-12. 54

 (1) Ibid. (2) Memo, Gen Burns for Hopkins, 26

Aug 41, sub: Proposed EO, Policies and Priorities for

Distrib of Mun, WPD 4576-1. (3) Admiral Stark had

not finally agreed to the draft that General Marshall

sent as a joint proposal. In general, their views were

similar but Stark wanted to make a more pointed cor-
96 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

individually rather than through the Joint

Board. The President's refusal was a reaffirmation of his determination to maintain the reins of control in his own hands

and not to delegate too wide powers to the

military agencies.55 The emergence of a

new claimant for aid—the Soviet Union—

and the President's desire to exercise close

personal supervision over the development

of a Soviet aid program may well have

influenced this decision.

The principal achievement of the first

few months of operations under lend-lease

was the development of production programs for foreign aid which, together with

the Army's own program, promised a

swelling flow of munitions from American

factories. This flow was still only a future

promise, and the immediate effect of lendlease was to heighten the competition for

the existing limited supply. Though the

principle was accepted that foreign aid

should not be allowed to interfere with the

achievement of the minimum essential

program for development of the U.S.

Army, in practice the Army found itself

forced to make repeated concessions to nations whose very survival was at stake. The

British were favored in the establishment

of priorities for production of aircraft, in

the special arrangements for division of

tank production, and in specific diversions

of material to the Middle East; minor concessions had been made to China and the

Netherlands Indies at the expense of Army

projects; and the 80-20 formula represented some sacrifice of the principle that

the PMP force should have a clear priority

on American munitions production. With

the addition of the Soviet Union to the

ranks of those receiving aid, the prospect

was that further concessions must follow.

relation of national objectives to ABC-1 than Marshall was willing to accept. Marshall forwarded his

own draft because General Burns was pressing for

immediate presentation of the matter to the President.

See material in AG 400.3295 (8-19-41) and WPD

4576-1.

55

 Memo, President for CofS and CNO, 8 Sep 41,

JB 355, Ser 726.
CHAPTER IV

The Broadening Pattern of

Lend-Lease Operations

The Beginnings of Aid to the USSR

The German invasion of the USSR on

22 June 1941 placed the Soviet Union in

the ranks, if not of the democracies, at least

of those nations opposing a common

fascist enemy. On 23 June Prime Minister

Churchill pledged the British Government

to extend the utmost possible aid to the

USSR, and on the same day President

Roosevelt in a press conference made a

more guarded statement pledging U.S.

aid. Nevertheless, in the United States the

approach to a Soviet aid program had to

be cautious because of widespread suspicion of the USSR. For the time being no

attempt was made to include the Soviet

Union under lend-lease; aid was extended

through U.S. Government agencies in return for cash payments from the Amtorg

Trading Corporation, the Soviet Union's

commercial representatives in New York.

The first action taken toward aiding the

USSR consisted of review and release of

certain materials that Amtorg had purchased earlier but that had been impounded in New York because the State

Department would not issue export licenses. This was followed by presidential

approval in July and August 1941 of two

programs for Amtorg's purchases of raw

materials, industrial materials, and explosives to a total value of $167 million. The

programs contained semifinished military

materials, the export of which might well

interfere with existing lend-lease and

Army production programs.1 The Soviet

requests for finished munitions in July and

August threatened to interfere even more,

including as they did vast quantities of aircraft, tanks, artillery, and small arms.2

War Department officials were extremely reluctant to make the radical readjustment that meeting even a small proportion

of these demands would necessitate. With

little knowledge of the Soviet Union's real

capabilities of resistance, the General Staff

felt the best method of aiding the USSR

would be to continue aid to Britain. In

early August General Marshall agreed to

token releases to the Soviet Union of

bombs, submachine guns, and ammunition from Army stocks, but beyond these

he insisted that shipments of finished mu1

 Stettinius, Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory, pp.

129-36. (2) Ltr, Gen Burns to President, 23 Jul 41.

(3) Memo, President for "Pa" Watson [Gen E. M.],

25 Jul 41. (4) Memo, Burns for President, 18 Aug 41.

All in Papers Taken to London Conf (Col V. V.

Taylor) file, DAD. 2

 See General Burns' summary of Soviet requirements as known at the end of August 1941, attached

to his memorandum for the Chief of Staff, 31 August

1941, in Papers Taken to London Conf (Col Taylor)

file, DAD.
98 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ABOARD H. M. S. PRINCE OF WALES during the Atlantic Conference, August 1941.

Seated left to right: Sir Alexander G. M. Cadogan, Air Chief Marshal Wilfred R. Freeman,

Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (note Fala at the President's feet), Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, General Sir John Dill; standing left to right:

W. Averell Harriman, Harry Hopkins, Admiral Ernest J. King, Admiral Ross T. McIntire,

Sumner Welles, Maj. Gen. Edwin M. Watson, John A. Roosevelt, Admiral Harold R. Stark,

General George C. Marshall.

nitions to the Soviet Union would have to

come out of the British allotment.3

Meantime, Harry Hopkins had returned from a special mission to Moscow

with a firm conviction of Soviet ability to

resist, and the President decided that the

USSR must be given the utmost aid possible. During his interview with Marshal

Joseph V. Stalin, Hopkins had suggested

that a conference be held in Moscow between representatives of the USSR, Great

Britain, and the United States. At the Atlantic Conference held in August off the

coast of Argentia, Newfoundland, Churchill seconded the suggestion, the Soviet

Government agreed later, and the date

was set for 1 October 1941.4 On 31 August

the President informed the Secretary of

3

 (1) Memo, ACofS G-4 for DAD, 4 Aug 41. (2)

Memo, G-4 for CofS, 8 Aug 41. Both in G-4/33388.

(3) Memo, Gen Moore for CofS, 18 Aug 41. (4)

Memo, McCloy for USW, 26 Aug 41, sub: Exch of

Ord Mat for Russian Account. Last two in AG

400.3295 (8-14-41) Sec 1. (5) Memo, Moore for CofS,

31 Jul 41, with pencil note by Gen Marshall thereon,

Russia-Gen file, DAS G-4. (6) Min of confs in OASW

on sub of Soviet requests, 9 and 11 Aug 41, AG

400.3295 (8-14-41) Sec 1. 4

 (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 321-22,

327-43, 359. (2) Papers in WPD 4557-4.
THE BROADENING PATTERN OF LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS 99

War of these developments, directing

action in the following terms:

I deem it of paramount importance for the

safety and security of America that all rea- sonable munitions help be provided for

Russia, not only immediately but as long as

she continues to fight the Axis powers effectively. I am convinced that substantial, and

comprehensive commitments of such character must be made to Russia by Great Britain

and the United States at the proposed conferences.

It is obvious that early help must be given

primarily from production already provided

for. I desire your department working with

the Navy Department to submit to me by

September 10 your recommendations of distribution of expected United States produc- tion of munitions of war, as between the

United States, Great Britain, Russia and

other countries to be aided—by important

items, quantity time schedules and approximate values, for the period from the present

time until June 30, 1942 . . . .5

The President then outlined plans for a

preliminary conference between British

and American military officials in which

the Soviet allocation should be decided.

The War Department now had to find

additional ground force matériel from

scheduled production, over and above the

previously agreed 20 percent, to provide

for aid to the USSR, and to reopen the

whole question of air allocations. A new

basis for calculating minimum U.S. Army

requirements was adopted, providing that

base and task forces should be 100 percent

equipped before 30 June 1942, but forces

in training only 50 percent. By this postponement of Army objectives, and by certain curtailments in deliveries to the

British, it was calculated that 152 90-mm.

guns, 991 37-mm. antitank guns, 1,135

mortars, 20,000 submachine guns, 729

light and 795 medium tanks, 155,341

miles of field telegraph wire, and a few

other items could be furnished the USSR.

The Air Forces proposed to send 1,200

planes of all types, to be diverted from

lend-lease contracts for the British. This

list became the basis of the American offer

of equipment to the Soviet Union.6

At the conference with the British in

London, which began on 15 September

1941, the Americans first had to counter a

British effort to control the entire program

of aid to the USSR. Lord Beaverbrook,

British Minister of Supply, wanted the

Americans to make an over-all allocation

to the British, out of which the latter

would, with American advice, make suballocations to the Russians at the conference in Moscow. The British clearly feared

the effect of American aid to the Soviet

Union on their own lend-lease program.

They had already made commitments of

200 pursuit planes and 250 medium tanks

a month to the USSR, and counted

heavily on American allocations to enable

them to maintain this flow. The Americans

firmly rejected this approach, and finally

Lord Beaverbrook agreed that the United

States should make separate allocations to

the Soviet Union, in addition to the British

program, and that the definite offers to be

made by both countries should be agreed

in London before departure for Moscow.7

The British continued to fight for their

own lend-lease allocations in subsequent

conferences and subcommittee meetings.

While they eventually agreed to the U.S.

offers of ground munitions except in the

5

 Memo, President for SW, 31 Aug 41, Auth File of

President's Ltrs, DAD. 6

 (1) Memo, Moore for ASW, 6 Sep 41, sub: Availability of Items on Russian List, G-4/33388. (2)

Memo, SW for President, 12 Sep 41, sub: Proposed

Distrib of War Mun, Russia-Gen file, DAS G-4. (3)

For task forces contemplated at this time, see above,

Ch. II. 7

 Min, mtg in Cabinet Bldg, London, 15 Sep 41,

Min of London Conf (Col Taylor) file, DAD. Copies

of these minutes are also in WPD 4557-4.
100 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

case of tanks, they appended to this agreement a statement of the additional quantities they desired from American production.8

 On tanks the conference was unable

to agree without reference back to the

United States. Tank production had fallen

behind the optimistic schedules furnished

the President in July and showed dangerous signs of bogging down at the very

moment when Soviet demands, eventually

stated at 1,100 monthly, injected an additional complication. In the schedules the

U.S. Army representatives brought to

London, the delivery of 729 light and 795

medium tanks to the Russians was predicated on cutting British allotments drastically after the first of the new year. U.S.

Army plans were also curtailed to the

extent that three of the six armored divisions planned and the fifteen separate tank

battalions would receive only 50 percent

of their tanks by the beginning of 1942,

and the 6th Armored Division would not

be activated until March 1942.9 The British were stunned by the American proposal under which the USSR would get

795 medium tanks before 30 June 1942

and Britain only 611. W. Averell Harriman, the head of the American delegation,

cabled Hopkins that the British had been

led to expect larger numbers of tanks at

the Atlantic Conference in August and

that the discussion of tanks was becoming

"acrimonious." Immediately after receipt

of this cable, the President peremptorily

directed that tank production in the

United States be doubled by 30 June 1942,

and that the delivery dates on the existing

program be stepped up 25 percent. Hopkins cabled back to Harriman that tanks

available for export would be considerably

greater than the Army figures indicated,

and the conference went on to agree that

500 tanks a month should comprise the

combined offer to the USSR, 250 from the

United Kingdom and 250 from the United

States. The British would make up the

deficit that would necessarily exist in the

American quota until U.S. tank production reached higher rates, in return for a

substantial increase in their own allotment

later.

Hurried conferences in Washington

produced figures that substantially met

the British request for 1,500 light and

2,000 medium tanks before 30 June 1942.

Ordnance prepared schedules, based on

raising preference ratings from A-l-d to

A-1-a, showing a total production of 5,200

medium and 3,190 light tanks by that

time. Of these totals 3,994 mediums and

1,953 lights would be surplus to the revised

requirements of the U.S. Armored Force.

With 2,250 promised the Russians, there

was still a sufficient surplus to meet British

expectations. The President also informed

Harriman that the commitments to the

USSR could be vastly increased during

the second half of 1942.10

The Army viewed these promises with

misgivings, fearing that if production

lagged British and Soviet allocations

8

 Rpt, Subcom on Alloc of Mil Mat to Russia, 16

Sep 41, Min of London Conf (Col Taylor) file, DAD.

Lord Beaverbrook remarked that the British did not

agree to these allocations but had to accept them. 9

 (1) Memo cited n. 6(1). (2) Memo, Col Aurand

for ASW, 12 Sep 41, sub: Tank Reqmts. (3) Memo,

Gen Moore, no addressee, 18 Sep 41, sub: Conf Est of

Condition of U.S. Forces on Approval of Proposed

Distrib of Tanks. Last two in England Tanks file,

DAD. 10

 (1) Msg 4321, Harriman to Hopkins, 17 Sep 41.

(2) Msg, Hopkins to American Embassy, London, for

Harriman, 17 Sep 41. (3) Msg, Harriman to President, 18 Sep 41. (4) Msg, Hopkins to Harriman via

Navy radio, 20 Sep 41. (5) Msg, President to Harriman, 30 Sep 41. All in Russian Cables Supersecret

file, ID. (6) Memo, Robert Patterson for Lt Col William P. Scobey,JB, 19 Sep 41, sub: A-1-a Rating on

Tanks. (7) Memo, Gen Moore for Adm Stark, 23 Sep

41. Last two in Misc Corresp Lend-lease 2 file, DAD.

(8) Memo, Maj Gen Charles T. Harris, Jr., OCofOrd,

for USW, 13 Sep 41, sub: Pdn Schedules for . . .

Tanks, G-4/31691, Sec 5.
THE BROADENING PATTERN OF LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS 101

would have to be met at the expense of the

U.S. armored program. The President on

25 September followed his oral orders

with a modified written directive ordering

that every effort be made to increase the

monthly rate of tank production over the

next nine months by 15 percent and that

the proposed maximum rate under this

schedule of fourteen hundred monthly in

June 1942 be doubled during the ensuing

year. Any attainment of these objectives,

Ordnance reported, would be contingent

upon A-1-a preference ratings for tanks,

and the Navy objected violently to this

advance, fearing its effects on the pace of

shipbuilding. In the end it was granted on

only part of the program, and the actual

pace of production of tanks during October and November proved that the Army's

fears were well grounded.11

Aircraft allocations caused a similar

crisis. The Americans proposed to send

the Soviet Union twelve hundred planes,

largely from production the British had

expected to receive. The aircraft would

be of all types, including a small number

of heavy bombers. The total quantity

would still be insufficient to make up half

of the four hundred a month the Russians

requested. The British objected to giving

heavy bombers to the USSR and felt the

United States should compensate for

Great Britain's loss of other types by increasing their allotment of heavy bombers.

This struck at a very sensitive point in

American military plans since General

Marshall was even then trying to get

heavy bombers for Hawaii and the Philippines. The only agreement reached at the

conference was that the United States and

Great Britain should together furnish the

Soviet Union 300 fighters and 100 bombers a month, with the question of type

held in abeyance. The ultimate decision

came from Washington, after the departure of the mission for Moscow, and represented a considerable concession to the

British. Hopkins cabled that the United

States would furnish 1,800 instead of 1,200

planes over the nine-month period, made

up roughly of 900 fighters (P-40 pursuits),

698 light and 72 medium bombers, and

the rest of miscellaneous types. The President had decided that no heavy bombers

should be sent to the USSR and increased

the number of medium bombers to compensate. The increase of six hundred

planes was to be taken out of the U.S.

Army allocations rather than from British

lend-lease. The adjustment of British allocations necessitated by this step would

have to take place later.12

In Moscow negotiations began on 28

September 1941 and culminated on 1 October when the First (Moscow) Protocol

was signed. The protocol consisted of commitments by the United States and Great

Britain of materials to be made available

at their "centres of production" over the

nine-month period from 1 October 1941

through 30 June 1942. The two countries

also promised to "give aid to the transportation of these materials to the Soviet

Union."

 13

 The Anglo-American commitments on major items were those agreed

on at London, but on other semifinished

11

 (1) Ltr, President to SW, 25 Sep 41, G-4/

31691-1, Sec 6. (2) Memo cited n. 10(7). (3) Memo,

CofS and CNO for ANMB, 29 Nov 41, sub: Priority

of A-1-a for Medium Tank Pdn, England Tanks file,

DAD. 12

 (1) Rpt, Subcom on Aircraft Mats, 17 Sep 41.

(2) Min of full conf mtg, 17 Sep 41. Both in Min of

London Conf (Col Taylor) file, DAD. (3) Msg, Hopkins to American Embassy, Moscow, 26 Sep 41, Russian Cables Supersecret file, ID. (4) Craven and Cate,

AAF I, p. 134. 13

 (1) For the official text of the protocol, see U.S.

Dept of State, WARTIME INTERNATIONAL

AGREEMENTS, Soviet Supply Protocols, Pub 2759,

European Ser. 22 (Washington, no date), pp. 1-12.

(2) For a description of the entire conference, see

Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 387-93.
102 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

materials and miscellaneous military

equipment, decision was withheld pending further study in Washington. Most

final decisions on matters left open were

communicated to Stalin by the President

on 31 October 1941, and on the same day

Soviet representatives in Washington were

furnished detailed monthly delivery

schedules for the entire American commitment. In view of Stalin's remark at the

conference that the war would be won by

the side with the best motor transport, the

most significant additional commitment

was one for 5,600 trucks immediately and

10,000 monthly thereafter to the end of

the protocol period.14

In summary, the commitments under

the protocol for which the War Department would be responsible included 1,800

planes, 2,250 tanks, 152 90-mm. antiaircraft guns, 756 37-mm. antitank guns,

5,000 jeeps, 85,000 cargo trucks, 108,000

field telephones, 562,000 miles of telephone wire, and large quantities of toluol,

TNT, assorted chemicals, and army cloth.

As long as the USSR was not eligible for

lend-lease, there were many obstacles to

the transfer of any of this material. The

President decided that the time had come

to declare the USSR eligible for lend-lease

and on 30 October cabled Stalin that he

approved the commitments made in the

protocol and that the Soviet Union would

be granted $1 billion under lend-lease to

fulfill them. On 7 November, Roosevelt

formally declared the defense of the USSR

vital to that of the United States.15

In this manner a Soviet aid program

came into being, second only in size to the

British program. For the War Department

it posed serious problems: reconciling new

demands on American production with

the equipping of task forces and of troops

in training, fulfilling promises already

made to Britain and China, and dealing

with a new and somewhat un-co-operative ally. Above all, and this was by no

means a matter solely of War Department

concern, it posed the problem of how to

move materials made available at such

sacrifice over the inadequate supply routes

to the USSR.

Adjustments in Programs and Allocations

September-December 1941

The introduction of the Soviet aid program produced the major complication in

the developing pattern of lend-lease operations in the three months immediately

preceding Pearl Harbor. The effort to fit

the Soviet program into the existing structure was accompanied, however, by a general trend toward systematizing and extending lend-lease operations. Following

the passage of the second lend-lease appropriation on 28 October 1941, the Office of Lend-Lease Administration placed

in effect the system of programing instead

of random requisitioning, and Colonel

Aurand as Defense Aid Director labored

indefatigably to get all foreign military requirements, except the inevitable emergency demands, placed into programs. As

a result of representations by General

Marshall at the Atlantic Conference, the

British agreed to collate the presentation

of requirements by their civilian officials in

14

 (1) U.S. Dept of State, Soviet Supply Protocols. (2)

Msg, President to Stalin, through American Embassy,

Moscow, via Navy radio, 31 Oct 41, Russian Info Cables file, ID. (3) Ltr, Brig Gen Sidney P. Spalding to

Andrei A. Gromyko, 31 Oct 41, Russia (1) file, DAD. 15

 (1) Memo, Aurand for DCofS, 4 Oct 41, sub:

Conf on Trf of Oct Quota of Articles for Russia, Russia file, DAD. (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp.

396-98. (3) Stettinius, Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory,

pp. 142-43. (4) Ltr, President to SW, 7 Nov 41, AG

400.3295 (4-14-41) Sec 1.
THE BROADENING PATTERN OF LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS 103

Washington with military plans of their

chiefs of staff. They presented in early

November a comprehensive statement of

their detailed requirements from American production through the end of 1942,

including those intended for future financing as well as those covered by plans for

the use of the second lend-lease appropriation. An attempt was made to work

out a similar program for the Chinese.

A portion of Latin American demands

was set up for production under the October appropriation, and Dutch requirements were programed on a cash reimbursement basis. Because plans for the

British, Chinese, and Latin American programs absorbed nearly all funds available,

military items on the Soviet protocol had

to be set up for delivery under the "Billion

Three" clause, from production originally

planned for the U.S. Army. Though it

took time to reduce the existing welter of

requisitions to some order and to put the

new system in effect, the programs represented a considerable advance over the

helter-skelter manner in which lend-lease

production planning had been handled

earlier.16

The requirements programs, nevertheless, tied up as they were with the intricacies of lend-lease financing, could not

meet the mushrooming demands for immediate deliveries under lend-lease. The

British continued to insist that U.S. rearmament be subordinated to increased assistance. Chinese and Dutch demands

greatly added to the pressures. With the

addition of the Soviet protocol, demands

for lend-lease threatened anew to eclipse

the Army's preparedness program. The

President himself seemed inclined to the

view that America's contribution to the

defeat of the Axis should be weapons, not

armies.

Since 1940 the 54-group program of the

U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF) had been

subordinated to British demands. But until the Soviet program was introduced,

production on AAF contracts had normally been reserved for the United States,

the British receiving all planes on their

own and lend-lease contracts. As has been

indicated, the large Soviet requests for

planes forced re-examination of the whole

question. On 9 September Maj. Gen.

Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the AAF, proposed that during the period to end 30

June 1942, the anti-Axis pool should receive 15 percent of the planes produced

on AAF contracts. These planes plus the

aircraft from lend-lease and foreign orders

would account for 66 percent of American

aircraft production (excluding naval aircraft). Final tentative allocations, as

agreed in British-American conferences

after the Soviet protocol had been formulated, went slightly further. Out of the

scheduled production to the end of June

1942, the AAF was to receive 4,189 tactical planes, Great Britain 6,634, the

Soviet Union 1,835, China 407, and other

nations 109. This meant that approximately 68 percent of American production of tactical planes would go to the

anti-Axis pool and that Britain would receive around 75 percent of this allocation.

The smallness of these production figures

in proportion to those set up in the ambitious plans of 1940 illustrates the extent

16

 (1) ID, Lend-Lease, II, 943. (2) Memo, Aurand

for Stettinius, 31 Oct 41, sub: WD Expenditure Prog,

2d Lend-lease, Col Joseph W. Boone's file, DAD. (3)

Ltr, Lt Col Jonathan L. Holman, OLLA, to Col

Aurand, 5 Nov 41, Russia (2) file, DAD. (4) Memo,

Aurand for E. P. Taylor, Chm Br Sup Council, 1 Dec

41, English Corresp Lend-lease 4 file, DAD. (5) Ltr,

Gen Sir John Dill to Gen Marshall, 3 Sep 41, G-4/

31691-1, Sec 5.
104 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

to which the problem of allocation remained one of dividing a deficiency.17

In the apportionment of ground equipment, the trend was in a similar direction.

In calculating what could be given the

USSR, it will be recalled that the Army's

minimum requirements were set at 100

percent equipment for task forces and 50

percent for forces in training before 30

June 1942. On this basis a new G-4

Availability List was drawn up on 11 September supplanting that of July, this time

including the Soviet Union, the Netherlands Indies, and Latin America as well as

Britain and China. General Marshall indicated that this was the limit to which

the Army could go, but he was forced to

make further concessions, evidently as a

result of pressure from the White House.

On 22 September 1941, the day Marshall

attended a White House conference on

the general subject of delaying Army expansion,18

 he approved a new formula for

allocations that clearly envisaged further

retarding the pace of rearmament in favor

of diverting the lion's share of American

production to lend-lease at the earliest

possible moment. The July formula had

provided that 80 percent of U.S. munitions production should go to defense aid

after 1 June 1942, when 100 percent of the

equipment for the 1942 PMP (1,820,000

men) was expected to be on hand; the

new formula provided that 75 percent of

total production should go to defense aid

after 1 March 1942, when 70 percent of

the PMP equipment was expected to be

on hand. Also, the percentage division of

ammunition was completely abandoned

and the provision substituted that ammunition should be furnished with weapons

on U.S. expenditure rates, as long as no

more than 50 percent of monthly production of any given type was released. Colonel Aurand's office began in October to

prepare a new schedule of defense aid

releases based on this formula with deliveries projected through the end of the

calendar year 1942.19

While these calculations were being

made, crises in the Middle and Far East

produced new pleas for acceleration of

lend-lease aid. By making heavy tank

shipments to the USSR, the British left

their own position in the Middle East precarious. On 6 November 1941, General

Sir John Dill (promoted to field marshal

on 18 November) appealed directly and

personally to General Marshall for tanks

to bolster British defenses in the face of a

possible German attack through the Caucasus and Anatolia. General Marshall

agreed that a total of 350 medium tanks

should be shipped to the Middle East from

November, December, and January production, the British to make repayment

out of their allotments for the first quarter of 1942. The diversion represented

virtually the entire remaining medium

tank production earmarked for the U.S.

Armored Force. While it was partially

17

 (1) Memo, Arnold for CofS, 9 Sep 41, sub: Release of Airplanes and Related Equip for Def Aid,

AWPD/2, in English Corresp Lend-lease 1 file, DAD.

(2) Agreement between Gen Arnold and Capt H. H.

Balfour, Br Under Secy of State for Air, 22 Oct 41,

WPD 4557-20. (3) Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp.

134-35. 18

 See below, Ch. V. 19 Documentary evidence of this change in the basis

for releases is strangely absent from the records covering the time it was agreed to by General Marshall.

The account here is based on the memorandum, Col.

Albert W. Waldron, Requirements and Distribution

Branch, G-4, for Col. Stephen J. Chamberlin, Acting

G-4, 17 November 1941, subject: Transfer Bases for

Defense Aid, in Colonel Boone's file, DAD. Colonel

Waldron says the Chief of Staff did agree to the

change in September and refers to a memorandum

from Colonel Aurand for Col. Raymond A. Wheeler,

Acting G-4, 22 September 1941, as the basis of the

policy. Aurand's memorandum could not be located.
THE BROADENING PATTERN OF LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS 105

counterbalanced by an upsurge in production of light tanks, these could only be

used as substitutes in training.20

The second pressure for immediate deliveries came from China. Never satisfied

with promises of arms in the distant future, the Chinese feared their needs would

be shoved even further into the background by the growing emphasis on aid

to the USSR. None of the finished munitions promised had actually been shipped

by mid-October 1941, and Lauchlin Currie, pressing for acceptance of a long-term

aircraft program for China, found it impossible to get any commitments from the

War Department.21 To the Chinese, their

fears of neglect seemed well grounded despite rosy promises. They seized the occasion of a threatened Japanese attack on

Kunming in late October to place the

utmost pressure on the U.S. Government

for acceleration of deliveries. Both Chiang

Kai-shek and Dr. Soong appealed directly

to the President. While Roosevelt indicated that he regarded the Chinese requests as urgent, General Marshall was

willing to make few concessions. A strategic and intelligence survey by WPD and

G-2 indicated the situation in China was

not so serious as Chiang indicated. Marshall felt that strengthening the Philippines was of far greater importance in

safeguarding American interests in the Far

East than aid to China. He emphatically

vetoed a proposal to take twenty-four 3-

inch antiaircraft guns from U.S. troops

and send them to the Chinese. "It would

be an outrage," he told Col. Victor V.

Taylor, Aurand's deputy, "for me to deny

to MacArthur something that we send on

a round-about uncertain voyage up into

China, and I can't give any to MacArthur

because I've got these regiments with only

one battery, that . . . have been in now

for a year . ..."

 22

 On 12 November 1941

Stimson finally informed Soong that none

of his demands could be met, though all

steps would be taken to "accelerate and

where possible to amplify the material

now scheduled for China." Roosevelt replied to Chiang in the same vein.23

Another pressure point in the Far East

was the Netherlands Indies, feverishly

preparing as fears of a Japanese invasion

mounted. At the instigation of Harry

Hopkins, the War Department instructed

Lt. Gen. Douglas MacArthur to send a

mission to Batavia to survey the needs of

the Dutch Army with a view to fitting the

Dutch into the lend-lease program. The

mission's report, submitted to MacArthur

on 23 August 1941, corroborated the previous requirements presented by the

Dutch in the United States. The mission

found the shortage of small arms so acute

that MacArthur cabled recommending

delivery of 50,000 rifles and 30 million

rounds of ammunition immediately, a re20

 (1) Msg 50326, Dill to Marshall, 6 Nov 41. (2)

Msg, Marshall to Dill, 7 Nov 41. Both in Misc Stf

Studies, Lend-lease file, Case Lend-lease 41, DAD.

(3) Ltr, President to SW, 7 Nov 41. (4) Ltr, SW to

President, 12 Nov 41. (5) Related papers. Last three

in AG 400.3295 (3-11-41) (1). 21

 (1) Memo, ACofS G-2 for CofS, 20 Aug 41, sub:

Chinese Resistance, WPD 4389-15. (2) Ltr, SW to

Currie, 29 Oct 41, and accompanying papers, WPD

4389-20. 22

 (1) Telephone Convs Col Taylor file, Bk. 1,

DAD. (2) Memo, Soong for President, 31 Oct 41. (3)

Memo, Hopkins for Gen Burns, 31 Oct 41. (4) Memo,

Burns for Aurand, 3 Nov 41. (5) Memo, Gen Moore

for CofS, 4 Nov 41, with Marshall's marginal notes.

Last four in China (2) file, DAD. (6) Ltr, Soong to

Stimson, 6 Nov 41, AG 400.3295 (4-14-41) Sec 1. (7)

Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 1 Nov 41, sub: Immediate Aid to China. (8) Memo for rcd, Col Charles W.

Bundy, WPD, 1 Nov 41, same sub. (9) Notes by

Bundy on conf with Currie, 1 Nov 41. Last three in

WPD 4389-27. 23

 (1) Ltr, Stimson to Soong, 12 Nov 41, sub: Def of

Yunnan and Burma Road, AG 400.3295 (4-14-41)

Sec 1. (2) Msg, President to Chiang Kai-shek, 14 Nov

41, WPD 4389-8.
106 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

quest that could not be met because of

the critical shortage of ammunition. War

Plans Division, while agreeing that some

efforts must be made to meet Dutch needs, felt that "no significant diversions" should

be made from materials allocated to Brit- ain, the USSR, and China.24

The Dutch were given a small share of

the pool of common articles scheduled for

distribution under lend-lease in the Sep- tember G-4 Availability List, and an effort

was made to see that the requirements re- ported by the mission were scheduled for

eventual delivery under either lend-lease

or private contracts. But in view of the

priority established, precious little could

actually be furnished as the critical hour

for the Netherlands Indies approached. In November 1941 the Dutch pressed for

acceleration of deliveries of antiaircraft

guns, light artillery, small arms, and am- munition, much as the Chinese did, but

they got only minor concessions.25

By 25 November 1941 Colonel Aurand

and his staff had completed the new defense aid allocation table with schedules

projected through the end of the calendar

year 1942. In the meantime, the Joint

Board had concluded that the President's

rejection of the proposal to make it responsible for determining policy on lendlease allocations still left it free to take

such action in the name of the Chief of

Staff and of the Chief of Naval Operations

separately, and on 3 November approved

a recommendation by General Marshall

that the board should act on "all matters

of policy concerning Lend Lease distribu- tion and diversions incident thereto."26

This meant that WPD, in its role as the

Army representative of the Joint Planning

Committee, would have most of the re- sponsibility. But WPD had long been out

of touch with the situation, and it was not

until 25 November that it was even in- formed of the distribution policy approved

by General Marshall in September.27

Nevertheless, in conferences with DAD

and G-4 officers, WPD representatives

made a belated effort to relate defense aid

allocations to strategic policy and to cur- tail interference of defense aid deliveries

with U.S. Army plans. Because of the

necessity for haste, they limited them- selves to considerations of transfer sched- ules for the month of December 1941, but

stipulated that future schedules should be

reviewed monthly in a similar manner. While necessarily accepting the existing

basis of division between U.S. Army and

defense aid, WPD objected that many al- lotments were inconsistent with it and

would not permit meeting 70 percent of

PMP requirements by 1 March 1942, and

suggested that no defense aid allotments

of ammunition be made until U.S. re- quirements for task force reserves were

filled. As a basis for strategic distribution 24

 (1) Memo, Gen Burns for CofS, 3 1 Jul 41. (2)

Msg 202, Manila to TAG, 27 Aug 41. Both in AG

400.3295 (3-17-41) (1). (3) Rpt, Mis To Inquire Into

and Verify Reqmts of Netherlands Indies Govt . . . ,

23 Aug 41. (4) Memo, ACofS WPD for DAD, 6 Nov

41, sub: Rpt of U.S. Army Mis on Mun Reqmts of

Netherlands Indies. Last two in U.S. Army Mis to

Netherlands Indies Lend-lease file, DAD. (5) Memo,

Actg ACofS G-4 for CofS, 20 Sep 41, sub: Availability

of Def Aid Items for Netherlands Indies, G-4/31979. 25

 (1) Three ltrs, Lt Col A. van Oosten, Netherlands

Purch Comm, to Gordon Williams, OLLA, 4 Nov 41,

and accompanying papers. (2) Ltr, Aurand to van

Oosten, 29 Nov 41. Both in Netherlands Nov and Dec

file, DAD. (3) Memo, Col Donald Wilson for Gen

Gerow, 4 Nov 41. (4) Note, Bundy for Gerow, 6 Nov

41. Last two in WPD 4363-9. (5) Msg, Netherlands

Purch Comm, N.Y., to Gen Marshall, 1 Dec 41. (6)

Msg, Marshall to Netherlands Purch Comm, 2 Dec

41. Last two in AG 400.3295 (3-17-41) (1). 26

 Rpt, JPC to JB, 13 Oct 41, JB 355, Ser. 726. 27

 (1) Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 10 Nov 41,

sub: Trfs, Lend-lease Prog. (2) Memo, ACofS WPD

for DAD, 18 Nov 41, sub: Distrib Progs and Diversions Therefrom. (3) Memo, Aurand for WPD, 25

Nov 41, same sub. All in WPD 4418-16.
THE BROADENING PATTERN OF LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS 107

of munitions, WPD suggested adherence

to the Soviet protocol and increased aid to

the Soviet Union wherever possible as first

priority. As a second, in the absence of

other factors, there should be a distribution of 40 percent to the United Kingdom,

40 percent to the USSR, 10 percent to

China, and 10 percent to others, or an

even division between Great Britain and

the USSR where there were no requirements from other countries. Since actual

production seldom lived up to the estimated schedules, transfers should be made

on a basis proportionate to monthly allotments rather than in terms of specific

quantities. As an example, the tables proposed to give 265 medium tanks to Great

Britain and 184 to the Soviet Union, a

total of 449. Scheduled production of 75-

mm. tank guns for December was only

317, and no tanks could be shipped without their guns. WPD opposed taking any

tank guns from stocks or from troops and

accordingly would reduce the number of

tanks allocated to 317, dividing them

equally between Britain and the USSR.28

General Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff,

who with Aurand had since September

done virtually all the work on defense aid

allocations and transfers, rejected most of

the WPD suggestions as impractical.

These suggestions ignored the financial

ramifications of lend-lease and the commitments made to Britain at the London

Conference and later by General Marshall. These, both Moore and Aurand

realized, could not be abandoned in favor

of any arbitrary percentage division between countries. Moore recognized the

right of the Joint Board to make any

changes in the allocation tables it thought

desirable, but warned that the Soviet protocol was a "three-sided agreement" that

could only be changed at the political

level. The building up of task force reserves could not be accepted as an absolute first priority if it interfered with meeting the protocol. Certain sacrifices in the

70 percent PMP requirement would have

to be accepted in order to honor commitments already made; all these had been

personally approved by himself or General Marshall. While the principle of proportionate monthly assignments was theoretically sound, there were too many practical difficulties in carrying it out. As far

as medium tanks were concerned, General Marshall himself insisted his promises

to Dill must be met and vetoed the WPD

scheme for a 50-50 division. Minor adjustments were made to meet WPD objections, however, including reduction of defense aid allotments of ammunition.29

In this way the issue was settled, but the

defense aid allocation table was never issued. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor a few days later rendered the whole

discussion academic. Nevertheless, the episode serves to illustrate the extent to which

plans existing on 7 December 1941 called

for sacrificing the requirements of the U.S.

Army to lend-lease.

Extension of Lend-Lease Activities Overseas

The formulation of lend-lease programs

and the allocation of available supplies

went on at first almost entirely in response

to requests made in Washington by foreign representatives, and little effort was

made to inquire into the basis of these requests at their source. The theory was that

28

 Memo, ACofS WPD for DCofS, 3 Dec 41, sub:

Def Aid Alloc Table, WPD 4418-17. 29

 (1) Rcd of conf, 2 Dec 41, WPD 4418-17. (2)

Memo, Gen Moore for ACofS WPD, 4 Dec 41, sub:

Def Aid Alloc Table, G-4/32697. This memo was

drafted by Aurand.
108 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

lend-lease supplies, in keeping with the

neutral position of the United States,

should be transported abroad in the ships

of the beneficiary governments and then

used without further aid or assistance.

This theory gave way as the need was

demonstrated for American supervision

in the proper use and maintenance of the

equipment furnished, American participation in the development of transportation and communications facilities abroad,

and some evaluation of foreign munitions

requirements at their source. Plans soon

took shape for military lend-lease missions

to perform these functions.

The most definite and pressing need for

a mission was in China. Chiang Kai-shek's

army lacked not only supplies but also the

organization and technical competence

necessary to put them to effective use.

There was little knowledge of modern

equipment or experience in the handling

of it, either among officers of the Chinese

Army or among the civilian representatives in the United States. The operation

of the last remaining line of supply through

Burma was characterized by maladministration, corruption, and general confusion,

and hardly half of the supplies that started

over the route from Rangoon ever arrived

at Chungking. Both Chiang and Dr. T V.

Soong, his spokesman in the United States,

sang the continual refrain that China only

needed more tanks, guns, and planes to

enable her to drive Japanese forces out.

But among those officers in the War Department who had had experience in

China there was from the beginning a fear

that Chinese lend-lease would only be

wasted unless carefully controlled by

Americans. This fear found expression in

a staff study prepared by Maj. Haydon L.

Boatner of G-4, an old "China Hand,"

and presented by Brig. Gen. Eugene Reybold to the Chief of Staff on 16 June 1941.

Boatner pointed out that aid to China was

being treated exactly as aid to the British,

despite "critical factors entirely different."

Drawing on the previous experience of the

Germans and Russians in China, Boatner

asserted that "any foreign loan or gift to

China, to be effective, must be carefully

restricted and supervised. Our Government must supervise the shipment, receipt,

storage, distribution and use of all equipment sent to China."30

Boatner's suggestion that a military

mission be sent to China to do this "supervising" was approved by General Marshall, the Joint Board, and the President,

in turn, and Brig. Gen. John Magruder, a

former military attache in China, was

selected by the War Department to head

it. According to the letter of instructions

issued Magruder on 27 August 1941, he

was to "advise and assist the Chinese Government" in all phases of procurement,

transport, and maintenance of materials

furnished by the United States under defense aid, and in training of Chinese personnel in their use and maintenance.31

General Magruder divided his mission

into two parts, a home office in Washing30

 (1) Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, 16 Jun 41, sub:

Co-ord of China Def Aid Activities, G-4/32192, Sec

1. (2) Memo, Brig Gen John Magruder for CofS, 11

Aug 41, sub: Mil Mis to China, ID, Lend-Lease, Doc

Suppl, I. (3) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. I. The mission, headed by David G.

Arnstein who went to China at the request of Harry

Hopkins, revealed to American authorities, as well as

to Chiang Kai-shek, the almost hopelessly disorganized conditions on the Burma Road. Arnstein's mission was not under American auspices, but reported

directly to Chiang. 31

 Memo, Patterson, Actg SW, for Magruder, 27

Aug 41, sub: Instns for Mil Mis to China, Mis to

China file, DAD. For a fuller consideration of the

events leading to the formation of this mission, see

Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China,

Ch. I.
THE BROADENING PATTERN OF LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS 109

ton and an operating group in the field.

The home office was to work toward correcting the flaws in the Chinese program

in the United States, co-operating with

China Defense Supplies, Inc., on the presentation of requirements and the movement of supplies to China. The operating

mission would review Chinese requirements at the source, advise the home office

of priorities for shipment, instruct the Chinese in the use of American weapons, and

take an active part in improving the supply line through Burma.32

In late September 1941 General Magruder departed for China, arriving in

Chungking on 1 October. Improving the

supply line between Rangoon and Chungking proved the most pressing problem.

Magruder organized "task forces," one of

which was assigned to Burma Road operations and another to the construction of

the Yunnan-Burma Railway. Before the

departure of the mission, plans had been

made to send U.S. civilian personnel to

aid in the operation of the Burma Road.

Soon afterward, other plans were hastily

drawn for an extensive system of repair

shops, depots, and assembly plants, to

be operated under American direction,

mostly under contracts with the General

Motors (Overseas Operations) Corporation. Working with the home office, Magruder also began in late October a series

of recommendations on a practical program for regulating this flow to the capacities of both the transport system from

Rangoon and the ability of the Chinese

Army to absorb supplies and equipment.33

As the mission to China took its place

in the War Department organization, consideration of overseas lend-lease representation at other points increased. The War

Department already had special observers

in England and the Middle East, and

Averell Harriman held a special position

as the President's civilian lend-lease representative in England. The British exerted a continual pressure for direct aid in

operating the line of communications in

the Middle East. All these developments

came to a head in September 1941. In a

memorandum on the 8th, General Burns

informed the Secretary of War that there

should be a general plan for lend-lease

representation overseas in order to assure

"assistance and supervision sufficiently

close to the point of use of defense aid

materials to insure maximum effectiveness."34

Even before sending the memorandum,

Burns had on 4 September told the War

Department that it would be expected to

set up depots and maintenance facilities

in the Middle East to support the British,

and preliminary plans had begun on this

basis. On 13 September, the President formally directed the step:

In order to comply with the expressed

needs of the British Government, it is re- quested that arrangements be made at the

earliest practicable time for the establishment

and operation of depots in the Middle East

for the maintenance and supply of American aircraft and all types of ordnance furnished

the British in that area. Arrangements should

also be made for the necessary port, railroad

and truck facilities necessary to make the

supply of American material effective. . . .

32

 (1) Memo cited n. 29(2). (2) Memo, Magruder

for CofS, 22 Aug 41, sub: Plan of Mil Mis to China,

AG 400.3295 (4-14-41) Sec 1. 33

 (1) A virtually complete record of cables exchanged between the mission in Chungking and the

home office in Washington is in AMMISCA IN and

OUT Cables files, Bks. 1 and 2, ID. (2) For correspondence and other material on early mission activities, see AG 400.3295 (4-14-41) Sec 1; China file,

DAD; and the files of the mission itself in DRB AGO,

Job 11. 34

 Memo, Burns for SW, 8 Sep 41, AG 400.3295

(8-9-41) Sec 1.
110 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

The depots and transportation facilities

should be established and operated under

contracts executed and administered by the

appropriate branch of the War Department

with American companies, preferably al- ready existing, but if not practicable, organized especially for this purpose. . . . The

necessary funds will be furnished from Defense Aid appropriations. . . . The British

authorities should be consulted on all details

as to location, size and character of depots

and transport facilities. Their needs should

govern.35

A survey of the situation led to the decision that instead of one mission for the

whole Middle East, there should be two,

one for the Red Sea region with headquarters at Cairo, and one for the Persian

Gulf area with headquarters somewhere

in Iraq. British forces in the two areas

were under separate commands with different missions—in Africa, the defeat of

Italo-German forces in the desert; in IranIraq, the security of the area against possible Axis attack from the north or German-inspired insurrection. Most important of all, as events proved, Iran offered

possibilities as a supply route to the USSR

if its port, rail, and road facilities were

properly developed. Such a mission would

be entirely separate from that of support

of the British forces in the eastern Mediterranean area.36

Two missions having been decided

upon, Brig. Gen. Russell L. Maxwell was

chosen to head the North African mission,

and Brig. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler the

Iranian. Identical letters of instructions

(except for the definition of territory) were

issued to them on 21 October, charging

them with two interrelated functions:

(1) establishment of essential port, transportation, storage, assembly, maintenance

and training facilities ... . (2) advice and assistance to the British and

other friendly governments in obtaining appropriate military defense aid . . . and to assure that the most effective and economic

use is made thereof.37

The task assigned to Maxwell and

Wheeler of organizing supply and maintenance facilities for handling lend-lease

material to another nation, to operate

within the supply organization of that

nation, was a highly complicated one. The

supply line would have to be operated by

civilian personnel through contracts

financed with lend-lease funds, and all

materials for mission projects would have

to be channeled through the complicated

lend-lease machinery. Operation by military personnel was impossible, both because of the lack of an adequate number

of service troops in 1941 and because the

use of troops might be construed by Congress as dispatch of an expeditionary force.

The selection of projects to be undertaken

had to be governed by British desires,

which sometimes reached the United

States through several different channels

and were apt to be conflicting. Even the

primary purpose of the mission to Iran—

support to the British or development of a

supply line to the USSR—remained undetermined.

In late November the vanguards of the

missions arrived in their respective areas.

General Maxwell established his headquarters at Cairo on 22 November, and

General Wheeler, after a visit to Wavell

in New Delhi, commenced operations at

Baghdad on 30 November. The operation

of the two missions on a peacetime basis

was therefore short lived, and little be35

 Memo, President for SW, 13 Sep 41, AG

400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 1. 36

 Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 24 Sep 41, sub:

Mil Mis in Iran, WPD 4596. 37

 Ltr, SW to Maxwell, 21 Oct 41, sub: Ltr of

Instns, AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 6.
THE BROADENING PATTERN OF LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS 111

yond planning had emerged before Pearl

Harbor.38

Though the Iranian mission was to be

at least partially concerned with supply to

the USSR, the War Department decided

to send yet another mission directly into

Soviet territory to render technical assistance to Soviet armies in the use of lendlease material. On 5 November a letter of

instructions was issued to Maj. Gen. John

N. Greely as head of this military mission,

with functions generally the same as those

assigned Maxwell and Wheeler. This step,

however, was taken without any assurance of an invitation from the USSR itself. The Lend-Lease Administration was

already represented in the Soviet Union

by Col. Philip R. Faymonville and Douglas Brown. While Faymonville had urged

that by being tactful American representatives could effectively render much

needed technical assistance, Brown

warned on 4 November 1941 that all the

material America could send would be

welcomed but that the Soviet Government intended to use its own technicians,

experts, and personnel to employ the material in its own way, and desired no additional U.S. personnel. Brown's warning

proved a very accurate estimate of the

situation, for the Greely mission was never

to enter the USSR.39

The final point at which the War Department made an effort to establish military lend-lease representation was in the

United Kingdom itself. On 25 September,

Maj. Gen. James E. Chaney, head of the

Special Army Observer Group in London, was instructed to represent the War

Department on military matters pertaining to lend-lease. But Chaney was always

overshadowed by Averell Harriman, the

civilian lend-lease representative in England, and the lend-lease functions of the

Special Army Observer Group never

amounted to very much. The channel for

presentation of British requirements was

always in Washington, through the British

agencies there, and not in London.

Chaney's function in regard to supply and

maintenance of American equipment in

England was limited to technical advice.40

The other four military missions—to

China, North Africa, Iran, and the

USSR—had become an established part

of the lend-lease machinery by December

1941. Following the precedent of General

Magruder, all established home offices in

Washington, responsible to General

Moore, but placed within the Office of the

Defense Aid Director for co-ordination.

The functions of the missions were roughly

threefold—to determine the need for lendlease materials requested by foreign countries for use in their area, to aid in forwarding material from the United States

to the theater or country concerned, and

to see that once the material had arrived

it was properly used.41 While the performance of all three functions was but

imperfectly realized in any case, and only

the second function in the case of the mis38

 (1) For a full account of the Iranian mission, see

T. H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid

to Russia, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1952), Chs. I-VII. (2) For an

account of the prewar activities of the North African

mission, see T. H. Vail Motter, The Story of United

States Forces in the Middle East, draft MS in OCMH. 39

 (1) Ltr, Stimson to Greely, 5 Nov 41, sub: Ltr of

Instns, ID, Lend-Lease, Doc Suppl, II. (2) Msg 1875,

Brown to Maj Gen George H. Brett and Averell Harriman, 4 Nov 41. (3) Cf. Msg 1876, Faymonville to

Hopkins, 4 Nov 41. Last two in Russian Cables Supersecret file, ID. 40

 (1) Msg 57, AGWAR to Sp Army Observer

Group, 25 Sep 41. (2) Memo, Marshall for Moore, 14

Nov 41. (3) Ltr, Gen Moore to Gen Chaney, 19 Nov

41. All in AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 2. 41

 See remarks of Colonel Aurand at meeting with

members of all home offices, 2 December 1941, Conf

Memos file, DAD.
112 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

sion to the Soviet Union, the concept of

American supervision and assistance at

the receiving end of the lend-lease line

was a lasting one that filled a real need.

The Halting Flow of Lend-Lease

Despite the increased generosity of allocations and the general broadening of the

scope of lend-lease activities in the last

part of 1941, actual deliveries lagged.

Most allocations were still in terms of futures. There were many unforeseen shortfalls in production, particularly of accessory equipment necessary to make

armored vehicles, planes, and other major

items useful in combat. In some cases

these shortfalls resulted in cancellation of

allocations, but more frequently they

merely produced delays in delivery. Within the supply arms and services lend-lease

work was an additional burden that at

times received inadequate attention. The

supply services were geared to serve the

U.S. Army, not foreign armies, and when

questions arose they were prone to meet

Army needs first. The G-4 Availability

Lists did not constitute an actual directive

for transfer but only a basis for planning,

with the result that the struggle for material sometimes degenerated into a game of

"catch-as-catch-can" between U.S. Army

and defense aid requirements, a game in

which the latter would "generally come

out a poor second."42 The delays were not

always the fault of the services. They in

turn could complain bitterly of the inadequacy of instructions they received.

The British, Russians, and Chinese often

did not furnish adequate information on

their desires as to shipment; neither G-4

nor the Office of the Defense Aid Director

kept the allocation schedules geared to the

most recent production information; orders were frequently issued changing the

destination of shipments already moving

to port.43

Further delays arose from the flaws in

the machinery of distribution. Packing,

crating, co-ordination of spare parts, accessories, and ammunition with major

items, and movement to port all created

serious problems. The establishment of

special defense aid depots where final assemblies and co-ordination of shipments

could take place, and of a procedure for

calling material forward to port, marked

a first step in solving these problems, but

it took time to perfect the system. In August a co-ordinating committee of all interested agencies, set up under the auspices

of the Division of Defense Aid Reports,

began to work on the difficult task of coordinating availability of supplies with

shipping, but this co-ordination, too, was

inevitably imperfect in the beginning. As

long as only the British were concerned,

the existence of a well-developed British

transport organization in New York—a

branch of the British Ministry of War

Transport (BMWT)—considerably eased

the Army's load, but for the USSR and

China, transport, storage, and shipping

42

 Memo, Maj Robert E. Burns, OCSigO, for Maj

C. H. Thompson, OUSW, 31 Oct 41, sub: Comments

on Pdn Rpts and G-4 Charts, Misc Corresp Lendlease 3 file, DAD. 43

 (1) Appraisals by the various supply services of

difficulties in lend-lease operations are included in

memo, Maj Thompson for Col Taylor, 5 Nov 41, sub:

Memos From Various SAS on Def Aid Pdn Rpts and

G-4 Proced, Misc Corresp Lend-lease 3 file, DAD.

(2) Memo, Maj Paul M. Seleen, OCofOrd, for Col

Aurand, 17 Oct 41, sub: Shipg Instns to Def Aid

Countries, Misc Corresp Lend-lease 2 file, DAD. (3)

Memo, Col Hugh C. Minton, Exec Off OCofOrd, for

DAD, 8 Nov 41, sub: 37-mm. and 75-mm. Tank Gun

Deliveries, England Tanks file, DAD. (4) Related

papers in same file. (5) Material in English Corresp

Lend-lease 3 file, DAD.
THE BROADENING PATTERN OF LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS 113

arrangements had to be accomplished almost entirely by American agencies or by

the BMWT. In sum, both in the process of

production and in that of distribution the

confusion normally attendant on the early

stages of development of any supply program delayed the flow of lend-lease aid.

Even the deliveries to Britain, where the

situation was best, fell behind allocation

schedules. Of the total war supplies of the

British Commonwealth during 1941, only

11.5 percent came from the United States,

and only 2.4 percent represented lendlease transfers.44

Delays in shipments to Britain were less

serious than to other countries. It was only

after the Chinese appeal for acceleration

in late October that the first munitions

were shipped to China. While seven ships

with cargoes of lend-lease munitions were

en route to Rangoon by 8 December, an

accumulation of supplies at the CBS shipping point at Newport News, Virginia, had

also begun. The most serious delays of all,

however, occurred in meeting the Soviet

protocol.

In the protocol, the United States and

Great Britain promised to aid the Soviet

Union in the delivery of the material to

which they were committed. Since the

Soviet merchant marine was a negligible

quantity, most of the shipping had to be

arranged by Britain and the United States

through diversion from other routes.

Roosevelt instructed Admiral Land that

every effort must be made to provide the

necessary ships for the Soviet aid program

and that only "insurmountable difficulties" should be allowed to interfere with

it.45 The number required was large in

proportion to the material to be carried

because of the long, roundabout routes

involved. There were three alternatives:

(1) across the Atlantic and North Sea and

around the coast of Norway to the Arctic

and White Sea ports; (2) across the Pacific

to Vladivostok and over the Siberian Railway; and (3) around the coast of Africa to

the Persian Gulf and thence across Iran to

the Soviet border. The shortest but most

dangerous route was that around Norway,

involving as it did the threat of German

submarines and land-based aircraft. It

was doubtful, too, if Soviet ports could be

kept free from ice for year-round operations. The rail connections between Murmansk and the Soviet centers to the south

were already threatened by German

forces, leaving only Archangel and smaller

ports on the White Sea available. Supplies

delivered at Vladivostok had to be carried

on limited rail facilities, and the capacity

of the port itself was hardly greater than

that of the rails. Supplies delivered

through the Persian Gulf after a long

ocean voyage had to be carried across Iran

for delivery at the Soviet border. Neither

port facilities nor transport facilities northward were sufficiently developed to carry

any appreciable load. Yet in contrast to

the northern route, the southern route was

relatively free from the threat of interference by German submarines and was

available for year-round operation.

At the London Conference the British

44

 (1) Capt W. H. Schmidt, Jr., The Commercial

Traffic Branch in the Office of The Quartermaster

General, July 1940-March 1942, Monograph 6, pp.

270-343, OCT HB. (2) AG ltr to SAS and AAF, 20

Aug 41, sub: Def Aid Storage and Trans, AG 681

(8-14-41). (3) Background papers in G-4/32697-2.

(4) Memo, Aurand for ACofS G-4, 16 Oct 41, sub:

Def Aid Storage and Trans, Misc Corresp Lend-lease

2 file, DAD. (5) Memo, Gen Burns for SW, 15 Aug

41, sub: Forecast, Delivery, Storage, and Mvmt of Def

Aid Mats, and accompanying papers, AG 400.3295

(8-15-41) (1). (6) Hancock and Growing, British War

Economy, p. 373. 45

 Ltr, President to Adm Land, 19 Nov 41, Misc

Corresp Lend-lease 3 file, DAD.
114 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

and Americans agreed that the northern

ports offered the greatest capacity and

possibilities, but could only be used for a

few immediate deliveries since they would

be closed by ice from mid-November until

June. About 75,000 to 90,000 tons

monthly could be sent to Vladivostok

pending further development of port facilities and the capacity of the Siberian Railway. While the Persian Gulf could accommodate only 6,000 tons monthly for the

present, American assistance in port and

railway development should increase that

to 60,000 tons by the spring of 1942. The

conferees felt that the Persian Gulf route

would eventually offer the best avenue for

the flow of supplies to the USSR.46

The Soviet attitude at first was one of

insistence on the utmost use of the northern ports. They promised to keep Archangel free from ice the year round by use

of icebreakers, and asked that all war material be shipped to that point. As their

desires finally crystallized, they proposed

that out of 500,000 tons monthly, 270,000

should move through Archangel and the

other smaller northern ports, 224,000

through Vladivostok, and the remaining

6,000 through Iran. The British and

Americans soon found this program unrealistic because the Russians had vastly

overestimated the capacity of Archangel

as well as their ability to keep it open. The

eventual estimate of American port experts in the USSR was 90,000 tons

monthly, while the British placed it as low

as 60,000. A group of British shipping experts was sent to Archangel to work with

the Russians in improving this capacity,

but the task promised to take some time.47

Given these port conditions and the

possibility of heavy losses on the northern

route, the British and Americans turned to

explore the possibilities of the Pacific and

Persian Gulf routes. Only civilian-type

supplies could move over the Pacific route

because of the complications of RussoJapanese relations, leaving the Persian

Gulf as the only alternative for shipping

war materials. Planning began for the

development of this route under British

auspices with the aid of the American

mission under General Wheeler. It seemed

possible to deliver trucks and planes via

Iran even before the Iranian State Railway could be improved, and a considerable number of shipments was projected

for December. But little had actually been

accomplished before Pearl Harbor that

would make possible the use of the Persian

Gulf for movement of sizable quantities

of war supplies to the Soviet Union. Of

the twenty-eight ships that departed the

United States carrying Soviet lend-lease

supplies in October and November 1941,

nineteen sailed for the northern Soviet

ports, eight for Vladivostok, and only one

for the Persian Gulf.48

Obviously these limited sailings were

insufficient to keep the flow of materials

up to American commitments under the

protocol. The sole cause did not lie in the

lack of shipping or of an adequate route of

entry. While the Army bent every effort to

the task in response to pressure from

higher authority, it found it impossible to

46

 Rpt, Trans Subcom, 16 Sep 41, sub: Sup Routes

to Russia, B.H. (41) 5, in Min of London Conf (Col

Taylor) file, DAD. 47

 (1) Msg, Kuibyshev to Dept of State [Faymonville for Hopkins], 1 Nov 41, Russian Cables Supersecret file, ID. (2) Msg, Kuibyshev to Dept of State

[Faymonville for Hopkins], 20 Nov 41, Russian Info

Cables file, ID. 48

 (1) Report on War Aid Furnished by the United

States to the USSR, prepared by the Protocol and

Area Info Stf, USSR Br, and the Div of Research and

Rpts, Dept of State, November 28, 1945 (hereafter

cited as Report on War Aid to USSR, 28 Nov 45).

(2) See below, App. D.
THE BROADENING PATTERN OF LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS 115

furnish material in keeping with the schedules during October and November. Difficulties arose in satisfying Soviet specifications on many articles, and material had

to be prepared for shipment in the greatest

haste by an Army organization not yet

prepared to handle large overseas movements. No sooner had the first carloads of

equipment arrived at port than the air

was thick with complaints from the Soviet

representatives. Many items were delivered incomplete, they said, 90-mm.

guns without complementary directors,

locators, or height finders; tanks, mortars,

and other items in defective condition or

without necessary spares or ammunition.

There was the utmost confusion in shipping-documents and packing-lists that

identified crates, and many materials

were inadequately packed for the long

voyage. They refused to have the materials shipped until these defects were

remedied and as a result shipments were

delayed in some cases as much as a month

and a half.49 While these difficulties could

be charged off to the haste with which the

first shipments had to be prepared, they

made a very bad impression on the Russians and accentuated their impatience

with American performance. While the

War Department was ready to make a

valiant effort to catch up with its schedules

in December, Pearl Harbor interfered

with the performance. Thus the legacy of

the prewar period was a gaping deficit in

meeting protocol commitments, one that

was to constitute one of the most formidable logistical problems of the early months

of the war. Harriman stated in a conference on 24 December 1941 that Britain

was 100 percent on schedule in meeting its

commitments while the United States had

shipped only 25 percent of scheduled

quantities.50

It has often been said of American aid

to the nations opposing the Axis in the

pre-Pearl Harbor period that it was "too

little and too late." Munitions actually delivered during that period in no case exercised a decisive influence on the course

of the war, nor did they prevent the long

series of disasters that befell the Allied

Powers in early 1942. Indeed, the drain on

American resources that lend-lease created

contributed to the weakness of our own

defenses in the Pacific in the face of the

Japanese attack. While American aid undoubtedly made an important emergency

contribution to the defense of the British

Isles and to the British campaign in the

Middle East, it would be presumptuous to

say that it enabled the British to survive.

Most of the American supplies that went

to Britain in 1941 were produced under

British contracts rather than under lendlease. The impact of U.S. aid to the Soviet

Union was as yet insignificant and played

no role in the repulse of the German attack before Moscow in the fall of 1941.

The Chinese had little more than promises

and Chennault's 100-plane air force, and

that unable to operate at full efficiency for

lack of supplies. No better example of "too

little and too late" could be chosen than

the case of the Netherlands Indies.

In truth, the prewar period of lend-lease

operations proved to be only one phase of

preparation for participation in World

War II, a phase to be linked with others

49

 (1) Ltr, K. I. Lukashev, President Amtorg, to

Gen Spalding, DDAR, 28 Oct 41. (2) Ltrs, Col Holman to Col Aurand, 30 Oct and 11 Nov 41. Both in

Russia file, DAD. (3) Ltr, Maj Gen Alexander C.

Repin, Soviet Mil Mis, to SW, 5 Feb 42, AG

400.3295 (8-14-41) Sec 1. 50

 Memo, Lt Col Joseph W. Boone for Col Aurand,

24 Dec 41, sub: Mtg in Mr. Stettinius' Off, Col

Boone's file, DAD.
116 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

such as the expansion of the U.S. Army

and its planning for future eventualities.

The United States could not become the

"Arsenal of Democracy" until its industry

had been fully mobilized for the task. In

1941 the fruits of that developing mobilization were still meager and had to be

divided among too many claimants. Lendlease planning had to deal in terms of

futures, of deliveries to be made after

American industry was producing munitions in a volume that would permit their

distribution on a more lavish scale. But

lend-lease played an important role in

demonstrating the necessity for expansion

of production and established the principle that U.S. production would be distributed in such a manner as to best

promote victory over the Axis regardless

of the nationality of the forces employed.
CHAPTER V

Widening Commitments

During the summer and autumn before

Pearl Harbor, the war spread into new

areas and threatened to spread into still

others. In June, when Germany invaded

the Soviet Union, it seemed as though the

storm was moving away from the Americas. Most of the experts expected the

Soviet armies to dissolve within three

months, but even so this meant a welcome

respite from the threat of a German invasion of the British Isles and of a German

move through Spain into France's African

possessions. Signs of the impending German shift to the East had led the President

early in June to suspend the scheduled

occupation of the Azores and to turn to the

relief of British forces in Iceland—a task

that did not have to be executed in one

stroke against opposition, seemed more

feasible logistically, and offered justification for extending U.S. naval protection

over parts of the vital North Atlantic

convoy routes.1

But the German invasion of the USSR

brought the Army no relief from the growing logistical burdens of strengthening and

expanding its overseas establishment, and

the prospect of having to undertake risky

new overseas ventures remained. In the

Far East, Japan, her hands freed by the

war in the Soviet Union, moved promptly

into southern Indochina, gaining positions

for her eventual attack on Malaya and

Singapore, now definitely decided upon.

U.S. policy toward Japan immediately

stiffened, and the Army presently found

itself committed to an ambitious program,

reversing previous war plans, of transforming the Philippines into a great bastion of American air power. On the other

side of the world, the Iceland undertaking

proved unexpectedly difficult,2 and July

and August brought a sudden revival of

the menace of a German incursion into

northwestern and western Africa via the

Iberian Peninsula. President Roosevelt,

meeting Prime Minister Churchill on shipboard off Argentia, Newfoundland, in

August, gave an unqualified promise that

American forces would occupy the Azores,

by invitation from Portugal, while the

British simultaneously would seize the

Canary and Cape Verde Islands, the last

named to be turned over subsequently to

American forces. As it happened, the German drive to the southwest failed to materialize, Portugal's attitude cooled, and the

planned Anglo-American moves were not

carried out. Nevertheless, the American

1

 (1) Msg, Stimson to President, 23 Jun 41, quoted

in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 303-04. (2)

G-2 study, 11 Jul 41, title: Data for WD Strategic

Est . . . , WPD 4510. (3) Conn and Fairchild,

Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Ch. II, p. 82. 2

 For details of the Iceland operation, see: (1) Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Defense of the

Western Hemisphere: II; and (2) Joseph Bykofsky

and Harold Larson, The Transportation Corps: III,

Activities in the Oversea Commands (hereafter cited

as Bykofsky and Larson, Trans III). Both are volumes

in preparation for the series UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
118 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

planners continued to discuss expeditions

to the Azores, the Cape Verdes, and French

North and West Africa, and late in the

year a major operation against Dakar was

seriously considered as a prelude to a

combined Anglo-American occupation of

French North Africa. Meanwhile, the

U.S. Navy, reinforced from the Pacific

during the spring, by September was covering in effect the whole western half of

the North Atlantic convoy routes, and was

actually engaged in a "shooting war"

against German submarines.3

For the U.S. Army, the spreading conflagration thus meant an increase in present burdens and a prospect of new ones in

the near future. American participation in

the war, while still indirect, was growing

correspondingly larger through the medium of lend-lease, and moving closer to

outright belligerency through measures

"short of war." These trends naturally

called for a more searching scrutiny than

had hitherto been attempted of the problems and costs, both immediate and ultimate, involved in open participation in the

war. Army planners became even more

sensitive to the prospect of having soon to

shoulder the tasks of a coalition war in distant theaters, tasks for which the Army

was still far from prepared. Increasingly,

too, they gave much thought to the role

that the United States should play as a

participant. Should it be one of full military collaboration, with balanced American ground, air, and naval forces employed

on a grand scale, or should it be primarily

one of arming the manpower of other nations, with American forces limited mainly

to the air and naval arms? This was a

question of high policy, which the military

could not decide, but it naturally evoked

emphatic professional views. The President himself more or less accidentally

opened the door to a thoroughgoing discussion and presentation of these views by

the staffs when he called for an estimate of

the ultimate costs in munitions of defeating the Axis. The resulting "Victory Program," completed a few weeks before Pearl

Harbor, rested upon assumptions that the

actual course of the war was presently to

demolish, but the program afforded a revealing glimpse, nevertheless, of the logistical magnitudes involved in a global

coalition war.

Britain's Bid for American Intervention

During the early summer of 1941 Army

planners watched with growing uneasiness

as Britain, hard-pressed at sea and in

Egypt and threatened by Japanese moves

toward Singapore, tried strenuously to

bolster its defenses everywhere. Even more

strongly than in February, the staff felt

"that the Battle of the Atlantic is the final,

decisive battle of the war and everything

has got to be concentrated on winning it."4

There were, indeed, encouraging developments in that very quarter; British shipping losses during June, July, and August

declined spectacularly, leading the British

to add two million tons to their goal for

1941 imports (lowered the preceding

March to thirty-one million tons). But

3

 (1) Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Ch. VI, pp. 1-24. (2) William S.

Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War:

1940-1941 (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1953), Chs.

XVIII, XXI. (3) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning:

1941-1942, Ch. III. (4) Louis Morton, The Fall of the

Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1953), Ch. III. (5) Morison,

Battle of the Atlantic, Ch. V. 4

 Staff views on the Battle of the Atlantic as

reported by Hopkins, visiting England in July, quoted

in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 314.
WIDENING COMMITMENTS 119

American military observers seemed little

impressed by this trend. "Unless the losses

of British merchant ships are greatly reduced," gloomily asserted the Joint Board

in September, ". . . the resistance of the

United Kingdom cannot continue indefinitely, no matter what industrial effort is

put forth by the United States."

 5 Britain's

determination to hold on every front had

already necessitated diversions of American tanks and other matériel to the Middle

East in May and June; it threatened further to extend American logistical commitments in the impending joint effort

against the Axis. In July, moreover, the

first lists of requirements from the Soviet

Union were giving some indication of the

immense drain this new battle front was to

place upon American munitions production. The Army's immediate resources,

meanwhile, were strained by its present

relatively small undertakings—relief of

British forces in Iceland and the garrisoning of its other bases—to which soon was

to be added the build-up in the Philippines. None of these programs was to be

completed by the end of the year. The one

major overseas venture that the Army

staff regarded as an effective countermeasure to the German threat in the South

Atlantic and within its capabilities was an

occupation of northeastern Brazil. To this

project the President gave little encouragement, while his aggressive support of Britain in the North Atlantic seemed likely to

bring on open hostilities with Germany.

At the Atlantic Conference in August,

the British staff unfolded a far-reaching

program of military action—last-ditch defense in Egypt and a renewed offensive in

the fall; heavy reinforcements for Singapore; preventive occupation of the Atlantic

islands even at the almost certain risk of a

German invasion of Spain and Portugal,

and subsequently an Anglo-American

occupation of North Africa. As a climax,

the staff now made a strong plea for early

American intervention in the war.6

There was little discussion of this program at the conference, but the reaction of

the U.S. Army staff, analyzing the program in Washington during the weeks following, was explosive. Criticisms employed

such terms as "propaganda" and "groping

for panaceas." Britain's strategy seemed

no more than a confession of bankruptcy.

It seemed to explore no new avenues of

action, no new sources of power, but

merely to appeal for more American munitions, shipping, and now direct military

participation. Some felt the British were

laggard in exploiting their own resources;

one officer (Maj. Albert C. Wedemeyer)

wondered why Britain did not import

some of India's 390,000,000 people to

England to fill the labor shortage. These

and similar tail-twisting comments reflected a sense of frustration arising from

present impotence. Not for two years, by

current calculations, would U.S. forces be

strong enough to influence the course of

the war by military action. The overseas

adventures on which the British expected

the U.S. to embark in northwestern Africa

and elsewhere would absorb shipping that

could not be spared from Britain's own

import program. British requirements in

munitions exceeded, in some categories,

the entire present and planned production

of the United States. For the present, staff 5

 (1) JB 355, Ser 707, 11 Sep 41, title: JB Est of U.S.

Over-All Pdn Reqmts. (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and

Hopkins, pp. 314-17. (3) Churchill, The Grand Alliance,

App. E, Bk. I, and pp. 128-29, 828-35. (4) Hancock

and Gowing, British War Economy, pp. 263-68, and

Table 3(d), p. 205. (5) See below, App. H-l. 6

 (1) General Strategy Review by the British Chiefs

of Staff, 31 Jul 41, WPD 4402-64. This paper was presented at the conference. (2) Papers on discussions of

conf in Item 11b, Exec 4.
120 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

MEETING OF THE JOINT BOARD, November 1941. Seated around the table left to

right: Brig. Gen. Harold F. Loomis, Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Maj. Gen. William Bryden,

General Marshall, Admiral Stark, Rear Adm. Royal E. Ingersoll, Rear Adm. John H. Towers,

Rear Adm. Richmond K. Turner.

officers argued, "we should engage Germany with the weapon in which we claim

superiority . . . i.e. economic force . . .

not land operations in Europe against the

German army."

 7 The Joint Board's official reply to the British proposals emphatically declared, "the weakness of our potential allies, the present inadequacy of

production, the unreadiness of our forces,

the lack of shipping at this time, and the

two-ocean threat to our ultimate security,

present a situation we are not prepared to

meet as a belligerent." Early intervention

would draw the United States into "a

piecemeal and indecisive commitment of

our forces against a superior enemy under

unfavorable logistic conditions."8

In September, events and the President's purposes, nevertheless, seemed to be

marching irresistibly toward the early participation the staff feared. It was in this

month that the first attacks on American

destroyers by German U-boats occurred,

and the President issued his "shoot on

sight" order. In response to a personal request from Churchill, moreover, the President consented to lend a sizable block of

shipping, including three of the Navy's

finest transports, to move two British divisions around the Cape of Good Hope. The

transports sailed in November.9

7

 Staff papers on General Strategy Review by the

British Chiefs of Staff, WPD 4402-64, Sec 4. 8

 Memo, JB to Sp A&N Observers, London, 25 Sep

41, JB 325, Ser 729. 9

 (1) Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 491-95,

817-19. (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp.

375-76.
WIDENING COMMITMENTS 121

Shipping: Ferrying Versus Amphibious

Transport

Shipping, as the Joint Board's statement

in September indicated, was one of several

bottlenecks. It was probably not the crucial one, since there seemed to be enough

tonnage that could be mobilized in an

emergency to deploy overseas the relatively meager forces scheduled for early

movement under RAINBOW 5.10 But in the

existing situation, which did not permit

full mobilization of merchant shipping,

the problem of overseas deployment was

acute. The effort to mount the Azores expedition late in May had thrown a glaring

light on the unpreparedness of the military

services, even with pooled resources, to

undertake any considerable overseas

movement on short notice. It would evidently be necessary, as the President conceded a few weeks later, to earmark a

certain amount of privately controlled

tonnage for military service and keep it

within a reasonable distance of the east

coast ports if any of the several emergency

expeditions then in view were to be carried

out. No specific action was taken to do

this, and as late as October G-4 complained that the rule against holding

vessels for future sailings was mainly responsible for the current bog-down of

movements to Iceland.11

Under established Army-Navy agreements for joint action, responsibility for all

military ocean transport was to pass to the

Navy at the outbreak of war. In December

1940 G-4 had urged that the transfer be

made immediately, since an emergency

situation existed, but most Army transportation officials then frankly doubted if

the Navy, with more exacting standards

for training crews and rigging military

transports, could meet Army schedules.

The G-4 proposal was overruled. By April

1941 this feeling had changed somewhat,

partly because of current labor and conversion difficulties and partly because of

the greater imminence of war. Arrangements were made accordingly to progressively transfer Army-controlled transports

to the Navy, the Army retaining its responsibility for loading its own cargo and

the right to obtain additional shipping, if

need be, from the Maritime Commission

to meet its current needs.12

From the outset, the transfer program

lagged, the Navy encountering difficulties

in manning and converting the transports.

The crisis of late May brought a temporary acceleration, with the transfer of six

large Army transports to the Navy to

mount the Azores expedition. But these

ships had to be replaced almost immediately by the Maritime Commission to meet

the Army's deployment needs, and during

the summer and fall the transfer of Army

transports and their conversion and manning by the Navy fell farther behind

schedule. By 7 December only seven were

actually in operation with Navy crews.

During this same period the Army's own

fleet, perforce, continued to grow. When

war broke it numbered, all told, 140 vessels under various forms of military control, including 33 directly owned and 29

chartered ocean-going transports.13

10

 See above, Ch. II. 11

 (1) Memo, President for Adm Land, 1 Aug 41,

quoted in Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F. D. R.: His Personal

Letters, 1928-1945, II (New York, Duell, Sloan and

Pearce, 1950), 1193. (2) Memo, G-4 for CofS GHQ,

16 Oct 41, sub: Delay in Shipt of Replacements,

G-4/33098. 12

 Corresp in G-4/29717-51. 13

 (1) Corresp in G-4/29717-26. (2) Memo, G-4 for

CofS, 23 Jun 41, sub: Relief of Navy Crews . . . ,

G-4/29717-51. (3) Memo, G-4 for CofS, 11 Dec 41,

sub: Shipg Sit, 10a Shipg file, Plng Div ASF.
122 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

This growth reflected the steady expansion of Army deployment to established

overseas bases, a ferrying operation that

employed conventional shipping to discharge passengers and cargo through developed ports. The Navy was not primarily

interested in this ferrying function, which

it was in the process of taking over from

the Army. In naval operations the characteristic transport task was the moving of

complete military formations in fighting

trim to a hostile shore, there to be landed

against opposition in small boats and tank

lighters carried on the transports. The

amphibious transport, or combat loader,

was a specially designed and rigged vessel.14

 Conventional vessels could be converted for the purpose, but only by an

expensive and lengthy process involving

heavier ballasting, provision for heavier

deck-loading, extensive armament, and

elaborate installations, all of which reduced cargo and passenger capacity by 15

percent or more. Amphibious transportation was essentially a branch of naval

tactics; ferrying to overseas bases was a

purely logistical function. Some Army

officials believed that the Navy consciously

subordinated the latter "to other matters

considered more vital."15

During the summer of 1941 the Navy

expanded and accelerated its conversion

program. Three of the six Army transports

taken over at the end of May were to be

converted to combat loaders, and two

others, large passenger liners, along with

a third turned over by the Maritime Commission, were to be made into aircraft

carriers. Ten more Army transports were

earmarked for the combat-loader program

during the summer. In all, twenty-seven

vessels, in addition to the three carriers-tobe, were scheduled for conversion.16

From the Army's point of view this

program involved a dangerous and unjustifiable diversion of badly needed snipping. For ferrying purposes, the tonnage

would be forever lost, while the work of

conversion would immobilize ships altogether for months to come. Transfer of the

ten Army transports would swallow at a

gulp more than half the Army's fleet, including the newest, fastest, and largest

vessels. The three liners destined to become carriers were the mainstay of the

Army's troop deployment plans. In August

G-4 wrote:

No large movement, approaching 12,000

or more, has been contemplated without re- lying on at least two of these ships . . . these

three vessels are essential as transportation to

fulfill the missions of the RAINBOW No. 5

plan, and to accomplish other overseas move- ments already initiated and suspended ... . Their conversion will deny their use for a

year for any purpose. That year, because of

lack of ships, may well be a critical one.17

Nevertheless, the Navy for the time being,

after the matter had gone to the Joint

Board, had its way. The Navy undertook

to adjust its combat-loader schedule in

part to Army plans, but. offered no replacement for the three large liners. These

departed in November, in fact, to ferry 14

 There were two types: the attack personnel

transport (APA) carrying both troops and equipment,

and the attack cargo transport (AKA) carrying only

cargo. See below, App. A-7. 15

 (1) Memo, G-4 for WPD, 19 Nov 41, sub: Trf of

Army Trans ... . (2) Memo, G-4, no addressee, no

date, sub: Conversion of Army Trans ... . Both in

G-4/29717-51. (3) Memo, G-4 for WPD, 30 Aug 41,

same sub, G-4/29717-81. (4) Memo, CNO for JB, 5

Aug 41, sub: Conversion of Army Trans for Combat

Loading, JB 320, Ser 715. 16

 (1) Memo cited n. 15(4). (2) Memo, G-4 for

CofS, 26 Aug 41, sub: Indefinite Postponement by

Navy of Conversion . . . , G-4/29717-65. 17

 (1) Memo cited n. 15(3). (2) Memo, TQMG for

G-4, 13 Aug 41, sub: Army Trans Conversion, G-4/

29717-81. (3) Memo, Gen Marshall for Adm Stark,

25 Sep 41, sub: Conversion . . . , OCofS 17396-56B.

(4) Other corresp in G-4/29717-65 and G-4/

29717-26.
WIDENING COMMITMENTS 123

British troops to the Middle East, where

they remained for many months.18

The Army's case in this dispute was, at

bottom, a plea for balance in the instruments of overseas warfare—balance between troop-carrying and cargo-carrying

capacity (the latter being, at this time,

more plentiful than the former), between

ferrying tonnage and amphibious tonnage,

between logistics and tactics. Navy spokesmen conceded that the program would

"greatly restrict the ability of the Navy to

transport large Army forces to overseas

destinations on short notice," as movements to the Philippines were soon amply

to demonstrate. But they took their stand

quite simply on service prerogative: "The

Navy must be left free to use and dispose

of individual ships of the Navy as it deems

necessary to meet its responsibilities."

 19

The whole episode contributed to a

growing reluctance on the part of Army

transportation officials, during the closing

months of 1941, to hasten the Navy's

assumption of responsibility for all overseas transportation. When WPD at the

end of the year attempted to spur the

transfer program, G-4 protested sharply.

The Army, that official asserted, was handling the job of ocean transportation to its

own satisfaction, its relations with the

Maritime Commission were excellent, and

"its efficiency . . . is at present far superior to that of the Navy." The competence

of the latter to undertake the growing tasks

of overseas transportation, G-4 pithily

concluded, should be more clearly demonstrated "before the Army gives up the

power to do for the need to petition."

 20

Build-up in the Philippines

The largest single additional burden

placed upon military shipping during this

period grew out of the decision to reinforce

the Philippines and to broaden the islands'

role as a bastion against Axis aggression.

Late in July the President created a new

Army command in the Philippines under

General Douglas MacArthur—U.S. Army

Forces, Far East—and plans were put in

train not merely to strengthen the island

defenses but also to develop there a formidable base for offensive air power. The

task thus undertaken swelled before the

end of the year into a major logistical

operation, involving a heavy diversion of

effort from the Atlantic theater.21

In this plan there was curiously little

consideration of the enormous logistical

problems involved in building up and

supporting large forces in the far Pacific.

The decision rested to a large degree on

the confidence of the Army Air Forces,

evidently infectious, that its heavy bomber,

the B-17, if based in the Philippines

athwart Japan's major sea communications and within range of her home islands,

would be a sufficient threat to deter Japan

from further aggression. This meant that

both the defenses and the striking power

of the base would have to be built up rapidly and, in effect, under the noses of the

Japanese, before the latter were ready to

take counteraction. That failing, all depended on the ability of the Army and

18

 (1) Memo, JPC for JB, 8 Oct 41, sub: Conversion

of Tr Trans . . . , JB 320, Ser 723. (2) Memo cited

n. 15(4). (3) Memo, Gen Gerow for G-4, 2 Oct 41,

sub: Conversion of Tr Trans . . . , G-4/297 17-65.

(4) Memo, Gerow for G-4, 18 Sep 41, sub: Conversion

of Army Trans . . . , G-4/29717-81. 19

 Ibid. 20

 Memo cited n. 15(1). 21

 (1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, Chs. II-III.

(2) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 434-38.

(3) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942,

pp. 63-75. (4) Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 178-93.

(5) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to

China, pp. 23-24. (6) See above, Ch. IV.
124 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Navy to build up reserves in the islands,

before Japan struck, sufficient for a prolonged citadel defense — at least six

months, according to the plan. With the

enemy controlling the whole intervening

region west of Midway except for the

isolated outposts of Wake and Guam, and

probably possessing the means to cut the

approaches from the south, General MacArthur could expect little help from the

outside until the Pacific Fleet, with powerful ground and air forces, could fight its

way through from the Central Pacific.

Even if communications with the

Netherlands Indies and Australia could

be kept open, the only secure approach

from the United States was along the island chain of the South Pacific, stretching

in a vast arc more than five thousand

miles from Honolulu. Naval officers had

long advocated construction of bases in

the middle and western Pacific to extend

the fleet's operating range, but up to the

very eve of war Congress refused to grant

appropriations for this purpose. It was a

commercial airline, Pan American Airways, that pioneered the first air route

across the Pacific in 1935, building waystation facilities on Guam, Wake, and

Midway. Thereafter its big flying boats

maintained a regular service between San

Francisco and Manila. Not for four years,

however, could the Navy obtain sufficient

funds to capitalize on Pan American's

experience. The appropriation, finally

granted in 1939, enabled the Navy to start

a modest program of base construction,

but it was prohibited even then from

dredging the harbor at Guam. By April

1940 the Navy had started to improve its

west coast and Hawaiian facilities and

had begun construction of patrol-plane

facilities at Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra. Nine months later work was under

way on the projected air base at Wake.

Using this route—Midway-Wake-Port

Moresby-Darwin—nine B-17's early in

September 1941 successfully completed

the flight from Hawaii to Luzon. This was

an historic achievement, giving some

promise of quick, direct delivery of the

Army's principal strategic weapon to the

Far East. But the Midway-Wake approach was dangerously exposed, and in

early October 1941 the War Department

approved an Air Forces proposal to construct a permanent air ferry route farther

east and south. Small teams of Army

engineers, supplemented by civilian workmen, hastily set about building airstrips

on the first two bases, Christmas and Canton, while a commercial engineering firm

took over construction of the runways at

the remaining two stations, Fiji and New

Caledonia. The Australians, meanwhile,

in co-operation with General MacArthur

who was responsible for the bases lying between Australia and the Philippines, were

striving to complete the western lap of the

route. On 6 December, the day before the

Japanese attack, Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short,

commander of the Hawaiian Department,

notified Washington that he expected to

have the chain of new bases open to ferry

traffic in January.22

22

 (1) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, Chs.

XIII-XIV. (2) Samuel Eliot Morison, The Rising Sun

in the Pacific: 1931-April 1942 (Boston, Little, Brown

and Company, 1948), pp. 27-40. (3) Duncan S. Ballantine, U.S. Naval Logistics in the Second World War

(Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1947),

pp. 26-29, 60-62. (4) Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp.

172, 177-93. (5) Matthew Josephson, Empire of the

Air: Juan Trippe and the Struggle for World Airways (New

York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1944), Chs.

VII-VIII. (6) Building the Navy's Bases in World War

II: History of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the Civil

Engineer Corps, 1940-1946, I (Washington, 1947), 121.

(7) Hepburn Board [Adm Arthur J. Hepburn, Chairman] Report, 1 Dec 38, with atchmts, WPD 4156.

The report was printed as House Document 65, 76th
WIDENING COMMITMENTS 125

These preparations looked to the future.

For the immediate task of building up the

defenses of the Philippines in the summer

of 1941, it was possible, though risky, to

ship directly across the Pacific through

Japanese-controlled waters. This was a

formidable job calling for a large-scale

troop-ferrying and cargo-ferrying operation, massive in terms of anything undertaken since the last war. The troop movement program was smaller than that for

cargo since, with the Philippine Army

being mobilized, General MacArthur's

primary need was not manpower but material. By mid-November, nevertheless,

the War Department was planning to ship

more than 20,000 troops during the following month, in addition to about 5,000

already arrived or on the way. The demand came at an unfortunate time. The

Navy's conversion program was immobilizing passenger tonnage, and six large

liners were about to be sent to the Indian

Ocean on British service. The arrangements for shipping the 20,000 troops required the use of five privately owned

liners in addition to six Army transports.

When the Japanese attack halted the program on 7 December, only 8,563 troops

had actually reached the Philippines since

July. Over 11,000 more were en route, but

only 4,400 of these got through to Australia; the remainder were turned back.23

Cargo movements were of larger volume. Requests from General MacArthur

during August and September totaled

.9 million measurement tons, and tentative schedules to transport the bulk of this

material from November through March

involved some 70 separate shipments.

Even more than the troop movements,

these demands were beyond the capacity

of the Army's transport fleet. Out of more

than a million measurement tons of shipping tentatively lined up for shipments to

the Philippines during the period November to March, the Army expected to provide only 150,000; the Maritime Commission would have to assemble the remainder. Scheduling shipments and assembling

shipping took time; not until November

did the cargo requested in August and

September begin to flow across the Pacific,

and the bulk of the shipments was scheduled for December and later. By November there was a backlog of more than a

million tons of material in ports and

depots available for MacArthur's forces.

Facilities at San Francisco and Manila

were heavily taxed, especially at the latter

port. In September the Navy instituted

convoying between Honolulu and Manila,

and later schedules spaced convoys at

twelve-day intervals, creating new difficulties in traffic control and scheduling.24

All these problems provided the first

taste of build-up operations on something

like a wartime scale. But the Japanese

stopped the program before it got into full

stride. Only seven freighters and five passenger vessels carrying small amounts of

cargo reached Manila during September

Congress, 1st Session, January 3, 1939. (8) Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1,

1939 to June 30, 1941 to the Secretary of War; and . . .

July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1943. (9) Lewis H. Brereton,

The Brereton Diaries (New York, William Morrow and

Company, 1946), pp. 19-20.

23

 (1) Msg 277, MacArthur to Marshall, 7 Sep 41,

AG 320.2 (7-28-41) Orgn and Reinf for USAFFE.

(2) Memo, Lt Col Frank S. Ross for G-4, 24 Sep 41,

sub: Conversion . . . , G-4/29717-65. (3) Memo,

G-4 for CofS, 13 Nov 41, sub: Philippine Mvmt, G-4/

29717-26. (4) Rpt, no date, sub: Shipg Sit at SFPOE

Following Pearl Harbor. (5) Alfred J. Bingham, Reinforcement of the Philippines, pp. 8-11. Last two in

OCT HB. 24

 (1) Corresp in G-4/27573, G-4/33451, G-4/

29367-120, and SWPA folder, OCT HB. (2) Bingham, Reinforcement of the Philippines, pp. 3-7, OCT

HB. (3) See below, Chs. VII, XI. (4) For various

weight and space measurements, see below, App. A-1.
126 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

and October. In November only five

freighters and three passenger vessels arrived. Most of the schedule lay ahead,

with eighteen arrivals slated for December

and thirty for January. Two days before

Pearl Harbor General Marshall noted

that about one hundred thousand ship

tons of material were on the way, with

twice as much ready to move to port, and

fifty-five vessels had been assigned. The

Pensacola convoy (containing three freighters and two troopships) and four other vessels already at sea on 7 December brought

their cargo through to Australia; two

other cargo vessels were lost.25

General MacArthur faced the Japanese

onslaught with his Regular Army troops

and Philippine Scouts fairly well equipped,

but with the Philippine Army low on most

types of equipment and supplies; defense

reserves, which had been set at a sixmonths' level for fifty thousand troops,

were only about half filled. The uncompleted build-up in the Philippines left the

United States with a large military investment and an equally large legacy of frustrated hopes in the Far East, both of which

would be difficult to write off.26

Logistics for Victory

The two policies laid down by President

Roosevelt in June 1940, rearmament at

home and aid to the "opponents of force"

abroad, by mid-1941 were exerting a

growing pressure upon the still meager

output of American munitions. The objectives of the former program remained

within the framework of the needs of hemisphere defense. Foreign aid, even with

large lend-lease appropriations in 1941

and some expansion of plant capacity

under the direct impulse of foreign orders,

had been kept alive on the whole by

siphoning off a part of the production

intended for American forces. It lacked

long-range objectives, except those that

presumably lay behind the requests of the

claimant nations. There was a pressing

need for a policy and a program to guide

both American rearmament and foreign

aid and to establish a firm ratio of emphasis between them.

On 9 July the President, perhaps unwittingly, opened the door to the formulation of such a policy and program. In the

opening sentence of a letter to the two

service secretaries on that date he set forth

what appeared to be a sweeping proposal:

to explore "at once the overall production

requirements required to defeat our potential enemies." In reality, as the rest of

the letter conclusively showed, he merely

wanted to know the amount of munitions

the United States would have to produce

(in addition to the production of its present and potential friends) in order "to

exceed by an appropriate amount that

available to our potential enemies." He

was not concerned with "requirements"

as the military staffs customarily used the

term—that is, as a shopping list of items

needed for specific operations. The letter

stated:

I am not suggesting a detailed report, but

one which, while general in scope, would

cover the most critical items in our defense

and which could then be related by the OPM

into practical realities of production facilities. It seems to me we need to know our

program in its entirety, even though at a later

date it may be amended.27

25

 (1) Bingham, Reinforcement of the Philippines,

pp. 7-11, OCT HB. (2) Brig Gen Charles C. Drake,

Report of Operations, Quartermaster General, U.S.

Army, in the Philippine Campaign, 1941-1942, Pt. I,

p. 3, Hist Sec OQMG. 26

 Morton, Fall of the Philippines, Ch. III. 27

 (1) Ltr, President to SW and SN, 9 Jul 41, WPD

4494-1. (2) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch.

XI.
WIDENING COMMITMENTS 127

The President was not concerned with the

strategic concept or plans that might govern eventual American participation in

the war, nor with the American forces that

might be required. The whole tenor of the

request implied, in fact, that whether or

not the United States became a belligerent, it would continue to serve primarily

as an arsenal for the nations actively fighting the Axis. His basic assumption, made

explicit in a supplementary message a few

weeks later, was that "the reservoir of munitions power available to the United

States and her friends is sufficiently superior to that available to the Axis to insure defeat of the latter."

 28

To the Army staff this approach seemed

unsound. "It would be unwise to assume,"

General Gerow wrote to Assistant Secretary McCloy, "that we can defeat Germany simply by outproducing her."

Weapons must not only be produced but

also brought effectively to bear against the

enemy; this required trained soldiers,

transport, services, expert leadership,

sound plans—the whole panoply of organized military power. Wars were won,

General Gerow reminded the Assistant

Secretary, by "sound strategy implemented by well-trained forces which are

adequately and effectively equipped."

 29

The order of priority was important. Factories produced weapons; weapons helped

to produce armies, navies, and air forces;

these forces provided the means of implementing strategy. The requirements for

victory therefore must be approached in

reverse order: first, a basic strategy, from

which would be derived concrete plans;

second, forces essential for carrying out

strategic plans; last, productive capacity

sufficient to arm these forces.30

The Army staff, in fact, welcomed the

President's instructions as a logical extension of a task it had had in hand for several

weeks. This was an effort to draw up a

comprehensive strategic estimate of the

current situation and its probable future

development, an estimate from which concrete strategic objectives and an appropriate program of action might be derived—in brief, a strategy. Leaders of industry and officials concerned with defense production had long been pressing

for such objectives to provide the basis for

a master plan of economic mobilization.

Some officials, notably Stacy May of the

Bureau of Research and Statistics, Office

of Production Management, Jean Monnet

of the British Supply Council, Under

Secretary of War Patterson, and Colonel

Aurand thought in terms of "ultimate"

requirements, the total production effort

that would have to be made in order to

defeat the Axis. But production officials

for the most part did not yet look beyond

the current defense production effort,

finding it difficult enough to preserve some

order in the multitude of competing shortrange programs. Lack of co-ordination

was perhaps the more immediate problem, and an important step toward meeting it was taken in August with the creation of the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board with powers to "determine

the total requirements of materials and

commodities needed respectively for defense, civilian and other purposes and to

establish policies for the fulfillment of such

requirements . . . ."

 31

 Still the lack of

long-range objectives stood in the way of

the expansion of capacity that the growing

needs of rearmament and of foreign aid

28

 Ltr, President to SW, 30 Aug 41, WPD 4494-1. 29

 Memo, Gerow for McCloy, 5 Aug 41, Item 7,

Exec 4. 30

 Ltr, SW to President, no date [drafted by

McCloy], Item 7, Exec 4. 31

 EO 8875, 28 Aug 41.
128 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

demanded; by spring of 1941 there were

already threatening shortages in critical

materials and machine tools.32

Until the President gave the word, the

military staffs could hardly set their sights

above the established concepts of hemisphere defense and material aid to opponents of the Axis. Indeed, until national

policy and Congressional sentiment moved

definitely beyond these concepts, it was

doubtful whether speculations as to "ultimate" needs would provide guidance sufficiently firm to permit much expansion of

production capacity. General Marshall in

May had expressed doubt whether the

Army could justifiably set up requirements for more than the 2,800,000-man

force of the first PMP augmentation; "we

will not need a 4,000,000-man army unless England collapses," he stated.33

 He

feared, moreover, that a sudden increase

in orders might interfere with current production and eventually produce "a pile of

stuff which is not only obsolescent but

blocks other things more essential."

 34

 In

any case, if the Army was to place demands on industry beyond the present

short-range goals, such increases must be

rooted firmly in strategic needs. Late in

May Marshall directed his staff to draw

up "a more clearcut strategic estimate of

our situation" that might provide a "base

of departure" for an orderly expansion of

production capacity.35

Into this endeavor the President's letter

of 9 July interjected the hypothesis of

"ultimate" needs, which the Army staff

gladly embraced, and the concept (or at

least the implication) that industrial superiority alone was a sufficient guarantee

of victory, which the staff rejected. As the

staff read the President's instructions, the

task was to determine the total requirements for victory—strategy, forces, and

munitions. This was a monumental job

and the President set impossible deadlines.

As a result, the mountain of material that

Mr. Stimson and Mr. Knox finally delivered to the White House on 25 September, fifteen days late, was both amorphous

and incomplete. It included three "ultimate" requirements compilations with

their supporting strategic estimates, one

each for ground forces, air forces, and the

Navy; a brief report by the Joint Board,

which did not succeed in smoothing over

basic interservice differences on strategy;

and the existing foreign aid programs,

which were variously incomplete and

largely uncorrelated. Information on production capacity, which the President had

requested, was not a part of this "Victory

Program," as it came to be called. That

information had been prepared by Mr.

Stimson's staff, with the help of the Office

of Production Management and British

experts, and submitted two days earlier in

the form of a consolidated balance sheet

showing stocks of war materials on hand

and expected quarterly production in the

United States, United Kingdom, and

Canada to the end of 1942; estimates, admittedly unreliable, of Axis stocks and

production capacity were prepared separately.36

32

 (1) Committee on Public Administration Cases,

The Feasibility Dispute: Determination of War Production Objectives for 1942 and 1943, 1950 (hereafter

cited as Com on Pub Admin Cases, Feasibility Dispute), pp. 17-23. (2) CPA, Industrial Mobilization for

War, Pt. II, Chs. 1-3. (3) Watson, Prewar Plans and

Preparations, pp. 331-35. 33

 Notes on conf, 17 May 41, Binder 15, OCofS. 34

 Notes on conf, 31 May 41, Binder 15, OCofS. 35

 (1) Notes on conf, 21 May 41, Binder 15, OCofS.

(2) Memo, CofS for WPD, 21 May 41, WPD 4510

Strategic Est. 36

 (1) Ltr, SW to President, 23 Sep 41, AG 400

(9-17-41) Sec 1. (2) Ltr, SW to President, 23 Sep 41,

SW Secret File 1848-a. (3) Draft ltr, SW to President,

no date, Item 7, Exec 4. (4) Ltr, SW and SN to Presi-
WIDENING COMMITMENTS 129

In the nature of the situation, any solid

prediction of ultimate foreign aid requirements at this time was quite impossible.

The President was evidently prepared to

give generously to the Soviet Union, but

the planners were pessimistic as to Soviet

capacity to hold out for long; aid to China

would depend largely on whether the

United States would have to fight a war in

the Far East, a question that probably

would be decided by Japanese not American action. And at bottom the long-term

ratio between foreign aid and American

rearmament was itself at issue in any calculation of "victory requirements."

Only in the case of the British program

was a serious attempt made to draw up a

"victory program" dovetailed with the

American. In response to a request in August, the British presented with some misgivings a tentative list of ultimate requirements for critical items, but proposed that

a staff conference be held to draw up a

comprehensive Anglo-American victory

program, embracing the total needs of

both countries and their allies in a coalition war fought under the strategic concept of ABC-1. This project and that of

aid to the USSR were the principal topics

discussed by the American and British

staff representatives at the London Conference of mid-September. There, the

British presented their own "Victory Programme," based on estimates offerees to

be employed in their areas of strategic responsibility as marked out in ABC-1.

Against total requirements of critical items

thus determined, they matched the expected output of Empire production; the

deficit, they proposed, should be met by

the United States. The Americans accepted the British statement and agreed

to integrate it into an over-all Victory

Program along with Soviet and American

military requirements; the whole would

then be examined by American production authorities to determine how far it

could be met. Adjustments, if necessary,

would be discussed at a subsequent Victory Program conference of the two staffs

in the light of the strategic situation.37

These steps were never completed. When

Japan struck on 7 December, the Office of

Production Management experts were

still analyzing the feasibility of the whole

assemblage of hypothetical victory requirements. No Victory Program conference was ever held, but the British program submitted in September at London

became, to a large extent, the basis on

which the American staffs after Pearl

Harbor unilaterally merged British requirements into their own wartime supply

programs.38

The Army's Victory Program

In drawing up its own victory requirements, the Army staff had ostensibly proceeded methodically along the lines suggested by General Gerow's formula—

strategy determines forces determines

munitions determines productive capacity. Gerow wrote Marshall in turning over

the Army study:

WPD approached this problem by first de- termining in a general way the strategic oper- ations necessary to achieve victory ... . dent, 25 Sep 41, with reqmts studies and JB rpt, AG

400 (7-9-41) Ult Pdn. (5) The assembling and coordinating of the data is described in Watson, Prewar

Plans and Preparations, pp. 342-52. (6) Hancock and

Gowing, British War Economy, p. 385.

37

 (1) Rpt, Plng Com, 19 Sep 41, sub: Vic Reqmts,

B.H. (41) 14, Vic Prog (Col V. V. Taylor) file, DAD.

(2) For the Soviet program, see above, Ch. IV. 38

 See below, Ch. XI.
130 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ARMY WAR PLANS DIVISION, November 1941. Around the table left to right: Col.

Lee S. Gerow, Col. Charles W. Bundy, Lt. Col. Matthew B. Ridgway, Brig. Gen. H. F. Loomis,

Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow (Chief), Col. Robert W. Crawford, Lt. Col. Stephen H. Sherrill,

Col. Thomas T. Handy, Lt. Col. Carl A. Russell.

These possible operations were then translated into terms of major units ... . Having

the major units we were then able to compute

the critical items required ... . In order to

obtain the total productive capacity required

by an all-out effort, the requirements in critical items of associated powers were added to

our own.39

The authors of the program did not in fact

follow the formula very closely. The program's troop basis, purportedly designed

to implement a predetermined strategy,

actually had only a loose relation to it. Lt.

Col. Albert C. Wedemeyer, the program's

principal author, insisted at the time that

the total figure—8,795,658 men—had

been arrived at after careful study of such

factors as probable enemy and Allied

forces, recent developments in tactics, organization and matériel, and probable

theaters of operation with their terrain,

climate, communications, population, and

general economy. Such considerations undoubtedly were present in his mind in

connection with the strategic estimates on

which the staff had been working for

many weeks past. But the figure 8,795,658,

according to Wedemeyer's own testimony

years later and as suggested in WPD's 39

 Memo, Gerow for CofS, 10 Sep 41, sub: Ult

Reqmts, WPD 4494-9.
WIDENING COMMITMENTS 131

covering missive accompanying the report

when it was transmitted to the Chief of

Staff on 24 September, seems to have been

the product of a simpler computation. The

8,800,000 men, more or less, represented

the marginal manpower that supposedly

would remain for the Army to draw upon

through mid-1943, after the estimated

needs of the sister service, industry, and

agriculture had been met. Around this

total, despite General Gerow's formula,

Army strategists had to wrap their

strategy.40

Whether this approach was more realistic than the one that took strategic requirements as its starting point is highly

problematical. As a professional staff officer, Wedemeyer could have had no illusions as to the value of any two-year forecast of military manpower needs, above

all one made at this particular time. Being

less familiar with the mysteries of labor

supply and demand and of population

statistics, perhaps he felt more confidence

in the data gathered for him by the civilian manpower experts in the other government departments. Yet the question marks

and variables surrounding any estimate of

the manpower resources and needs of a

fully mobilized war economy two years in

the future were at least as large and numerous as those that clouded similar projections of military requirements—indeed,

since the magnitudes were larger the room

for error was far greater. Wedemeyer, himself, showed some awareness of this by

allowing a cushion of 3.5 million men in

his estimates to absorb unforeseen needs in

the war economy. Considering all the variables, it is remarkable that the Victory

Program figure for the Army's ultimate

strength exceeded by only about .5 million

men the peak strength of 8.2 million actually reached in 1945. In its composition, of

course, the Army in 1945 bore little resemblance to the force envisaged in 1941.41

The composition of the 8.8 million-man

Army envisaged in the Victory Program

clearly showed the influence of the assumption that it would ultimately be

necessary to grapple with heavily armed

German land forces on the European continent. The total of 215 divisions was

amply weighted with armored (61 divisions), motorized, antitank, and antiaircraft elements, and had substantial service support. The Air Corps program, separately prepared, reflected the doctrine

that strategic bombing would play an important, if not decisive, role in defeating

Germany. To this extent the troop basis

served a strategic concept, though there

was no attempt to determine forces needed

for particular theaters of operation, except through the inclusion of garrison

strengths for specific overseas bases and

the two task forces destined under current

war plans for operations in South Amer40

 (1) Memo, Wedemeyer for CofS, 24 Sep 41, sub:

Ult Reqmts of Army Ground and Air Forces. (2)

Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 24 Sep 41, same

sub. Both in WPD 4494-13. (3) Statement by Wedemeyer to Mark S. Watson in 1948, summarized in

Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 343-44.

The Army total included an estimated 2,000,000

for the Air Corps; Navy requirements were set at

1,250,000. 41

 (1) For a more detailed description of the Victory

Program estimates, see Watson's draft chapter, "The

Victory Program," marked "6 July Revision"; and a

study by Guy A. Lee, Ultimate Requirements,

Ground Forces, Estimate of September 1941 (Method

Used). Both in Supporting Docs to Watson, Prewar

Plans and Preparations file, OCMH. (2) The recollections of another active participant in this episode,

General J. H. Burns, do not altogether bear out

Wedemeyer's account. According to Burns, the WPD

planners simply applied an arbitrary 8 percent factor

to the total national population in order to arrive at

the number of able-bodied males that would be

available for military service. See interview, Burns

with Mark Watson, no date, same file.
132 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ica. The remainder of the proposed forces

consisted of five armies and a number of

separate corps, divisions, and other units

(three of the armies were loosely designated "potential task forces"), a force of

1.2 million to defend and administer the

continental United States, and a strategic

reserve of about 3 million.42

This absence of any specific connection

between estimated troop requirements

and anticipated strategic employment

struck the British, at the London Conference in September, as rather odd. They

were accustomed to calculate their requirements theater by theater, taking into

account as far as possible such factors as

climate and terrain, port capacity, rail

and road nets, power facilities, expected

enemy strength, and expected intensity of

combat—precisely the factors Wedemeyer

alleged had been considered in drawing

up the Army troop basis. The American

representatives at the conference dissented

sharply. Their estimates, Lt. Col. Charles

W. Bundy stated, were "based on the necessary troops to accomplish victory, and a

general estimate was founded on enemy

forces without consideration of individual

theaters."43 In the words of Assistant Secretary McCloy, interpreting the view of

the military staff, "the only safe assumptions concerning theaters of operations are

that they may develop in any part of the

globe, and that the Atlantic and European

area will be the decisive theater."44

Theoretically, munitions requirements

were derived by straight computation

from the troop basis, but in a period of expanding production, fixed ultimate objectives were of dubious value except as

incentives. Maximum production, practically speaking, was the goal of economic

mobilization. "The plan for material,"

Colonel Aurand noted toward the end of

1941, "need await neither a strategic concept nor a determination of troops to accomplish this objective. It is sufficient to

know that maximum production of military equipment must be obtained in this

country at the earliest possible date." The

real problem was to determine the proper

division of emphasis among categories of

munitions. It was up to the strategists,

Aurand thought, to fix the desired ultimate monthly production of each item.

The production authorities could then determine how many of each item could

actually be produced each month, "so that

the maximum use is made of the country's

resources."

 45

 Whether maximum production would meet the need only time would

reveal. War Department supply officers

were inclined to believe that "the load to

be placed on both industry and raw materials in the United States will tax its maximum capacity."46

Global Logistics and Mass Invasion

In the Victory Program the Army staff

set forth, more fully than hitherto, its case

for full participation in the war, as against

the President's "arsenal" policy. The Pres42

 (1) "Ultimate Requirements Study: Estimate of

Army Ground Forces," accompanying "War Department Strategic Estimate . . . 11 September 1941,"

WPD 4494-21. (2) For the Air Corps program, set

forth in a paper known as AWPD/1, see Craven and

Cate, AAF I, pp. 131-32, 146-47, 149-50, 594, 599-

600.

43

 Min of conf on U.S.-Br pdn, 17 Sep 41, WPD

4494 Br Vic Prog. 44

 Draft ltr cited n. 36(3). 45

 Memo, Col Aurand for Gen Moore, 10 Nov 41,

sub: Method of Properly Financing Vic Prog, WPD

4494 Vic Prog, U.S. Data. 46

 Memo, Col Mallon for Col Bundy, 17 Nov 41,

sub: Method of Properly Financing Vic Prog, WPD

4494 Vic Prog, U.S. Data.
WIDENING COMMITMENTS 133

ident's letter of 9 July did not invite such

a statement, and the letter's exclusive concern with productive capacity implied

that victory against the Axis would be decided in the long run by industrial power,

the element, by general agreement, in

which the United States excelled. The

staff's insistence on the "strategy-forcesmunitions" formula, however, opened the

door to a comprehensive exposition of the

strategic method that Army leaders believed essential to victory. This method,

as Secretary Stimson summarized it, involved early, if not immediate, participation "in an avowed all-out military effort"

against Germany, as opposed to a strategy

that would go little beyond the present

policy of contributing "munitions, transport and naval help." Army and Navy

leaders were united, Stimson wrote the

President, in the conviction that "in default of such participation, the British and

their allies cannot defeat Germany, and

that the resistance of the United Kingdom

cannot continue indefinitely, no matter

what industrial effort is put forth by us."

 47

In this conclusion there were traces, no

doubt, of both nationalism and professionalism, but the Army's view rested also on

a persuasive estimate of the probable future course of the war. There was no optimism as to Soviet ability to repel the

German invaders. By July 1942, the planners predicted, the Soviet Union would be

"substantially impotent," with German

air power pulverizing at leisure the territories not yet conquered. Germany might

then dispose of British power in the Middle East, either by negotiation or by force,

opening the way for a drive to the southeast or, alternatively, southwest through

Spain toward Dakar. But the planners did

not despair of the ultimate outcome. Germany would require a full year to restore

order in her European conquests. She

would be weakened by the long struggle,

suffering from blockade, bombardment,

and internal unrest. In the Far East, Japan

would remain opportunistic and cautious.

When and if she decided to strike, Army

planners hoped, air power in the Philippines, armed and revived Chinese armies,

and the Soviet Siberian divisions, together

with modest Allied forces along the Malay

Barrier, might hold her at bay until

American naval power could be brought

fully to bear.48

In this perspective, mid-1943 was a

critical point. Up to that time Germany

would be spending her substance in winning military victories. Thereafter, she

would begin to renew her powers and, unless prevented, would eventually become

invincible. The Allied Powers could not

afford to wait later than mid-1943, therefore, to take the offensive. Long before

then they must weaken Germany by air

bombardment, blockade, and subversive

activities, and engage her land forces in

peripheral areas. The outcome would depend largely on the extent and rapidity of

American mobilization. The industrial

potential of the United States was more

than ample for the task, but productive

capacity took time to build—eighteen

months to two years by current estimates—

and time was running out.

It is mandatory that we reach an early

appreciation of our stupendous task, and

gain the whole-hearted support of the entire

country in the production of trained men,

ships, munitions and ample reserves. Other- wise, we will be confronted in the not distant

47

 Ltr cited n. 36(2). 48

 (1) "War Department Strategic Estimate . . .

October 1941," WPD 4494-21. (2) JB 355, Ser 707,

11 Sep 41, title: JB Est of U.S. Over-All Pdn Reqmts.

(3) "Ultimate Requirements Study . . . ," cited n.

42(1).
134 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

future by a Germany strongly entrenched

economically, supported by newly acquired

sources of vital supplies and industries, with

her military forces operating on internal lines,

and in a position of hegemony in Europe

which will be comparatively easy to defend

and maintain. . . . The urgency of speed

and the desirability of employment of our

present great economic and industrial advan- tage over our potential enemies cannot be

over-emphasized.49

The Victory Program strategic estimate

was the first really searching look at the

implications of full involvement in the

war. It was a bold look, accepting with

fewer qualms than earlier, apparently, all

the logistical costs and risks that American

forces would incur in a coalition strategy

modeled on the British theory of encirclement and attrition. The planners envisaged U.S. ground and air operations in

several "subsidiary" theaters—Africa, the

Near East, the Iberian Peninsula, Scandinavia—to establish bases "which encircle

and close in on the Nazi citadel."

 50

 From

these bases Allied air power would shatter

the enemy economy, paving the way for

ground and air attacks against the central

land defenses. Germany would be forced

to overextend and disperse her strength

and use up scarce commodities such as oil.

At the same time, presumably, large

American forces might also be fighting in

the Philippines, which the Army Staff now

hoped could be successfully defended.

This venturesomeness did not necessarily indicate that Army planners had

abandoned their earlier aversion to risky

and expensive logistical commitments.

Their aversion was amply demonstrated,

even as the Victory Program estimates

were reaching completion, in the staffs

sharp rejoinders to the estimates of the

situation that the British had recently presented at the Atlantic Conference. The

willingness of the staff to contemplate elaborate logistical commitments far from the

North American continent was no more

than a logical corollary of its conviction

that Germany could be defeated only if

the full industrial and military power of

the United States were hurled against her.

How to project that power with maximum force and minimum cost—with the

greatest economy of force—was to a large

degree a problem of logistics with which

the American staff had not yet come to

grips. Speculation on the impending conflict now embraced two distinct though

complementary and sequential types of

land operations. One, derived from the

British strategy of encirclement, involved

a large number of relatively small-scale

operations, co-ordinated but separate,

many of them amphibious assaults on defended shores, exploiting the mobility conferred by sea power in order to keep the

enemy stretched thin and off balance.

The Army staff during the summer and

fall of 1941 drew up outline plans of several

such operations, reflecting the strong impression made by German successes in

Norway, Crete, Greece, and elsewhere.

The characteristic instrument of these

operations was the tailor-made task force,

organized, trained, and equipped to take

a specific objective. Task force operations

on the German model called for meticulous, detailed planning and thorough

preparations; the "hot-house" training

undergone by Rommel's Afrika Korps was

a frequently cited example.51

The other type of operation, in many

ways the antithesis of the above, was a

49

 "Ultimate Requirements Study . . . ," cited n.

42(1). 50

 Ibid. 51

 (1) Studies in the series WPD 4510. (2) Comments on German operations in "Ultimate Requirements Study . . . ," cited n. 42(1).
WIDENING COMMITMENTS 135

frontal assault with maximum force, upon

the enemy's main positions in Europe.

Such an operation would be attempted

only after a long build-up and would be

aimed at winning a final decision. Most of

the Army staff now felt that the British

underestimated the size and weight of

forces that would be needed to break into

and capture the German citadel. Against

the extreme champions of air and naval

power, moreover, ground force members

of the staff stressed the "almost invariable

rule that wars cannot be finally won without the use of land armies."

We must prepare to fight Germany by

actually corning to grips with and defeating

her ground forces and definitely breaking her

will to combat ... . Air and sea forces will

make important contributions, but effective

and adequate ground forces must be avail- able to close with and destroy the enemy

within his citadel.52

It was clear, of course, that the Allied

Powers probably could not attain numerical superiority over the Axis, much less the

2-to-1 ratio that traditional doctrine demanded for an attacker. Such a ratio

would have required, by current estimates,

eight hundred Allied divisions in the

European area alone. Army planners were

thinking of superiority in weight and fire

power, not numbers. Nevertheless, they

envisaged massive invading forces—five

million American troops to be transported

"to European ports"—far larger than

those contemplated in current British

plans. The Army's Victory Program Troop

Basis was shaped to fit this concept.53

Shipping costs of the Army's contemplated victory effort were calculated, in

the interests of simplicity, in terms of the

tonnage that would be required when the

effort reached its peak, that is, for the final

struggle on the European continent. It was

assumed that preliminary operations

would be on whatever scale shipping permitted during the period that ship construction was being expanded. In August

General Reybold warned that availability

of cargo shipping would determine how

rapidly American munitions could be

moved overseas, and thus probably fix the

timing of the offensive phase of Allied

strategy; current discussion of forces to be

mobilized, he noted, was already running

ahead of the probable capacity of shipping

two.years hence.54 In September G-4 made

a rough calculation of the tonnages involved in overseas deployment on the scale

contemplated in the Victory Program.

(See Table 2.) To move 5 million troops and

their equipment across the Atlantic within

a period of one year, G-4 estimated, would

require about 6.7 million gross tons of

shipping; if two years were allowed, only

3.4 million would be needed. Ten and

a half million tons would be required to

sustain these forces overseas. The total

tonnage for a two-year build-up program

would thus rise from 3.4 million at the

beginning to about 10.5 million tons at

the end of the period. Additional tonnages

would be absorbed by maintenance of

overseas garrisons, essential commercial

trades, replacement of both British and

American shipping losses, maintenance of

the British domestic economy, and shipments of munitions to other Allied forces.

The grand total, "ships for victory," came

to more than 30 million tons, to carry on

52

 (1) Memo cited n. 8. (2) "Ultimate Requirements

Study . . . ," cited n. 42(1). 53

 (1) "Ultimate Requirements Study . . . ," cited

n. 42(1). (2) Churchill, in December, spoke of a combined Anglo-American invading force of only 1.5

million. See paper, Churchill for President, "Part I:

The Atlantic Front," 16 Dec 41, as quoted in Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 646-51. 54

 Memo, unsigned, for WPD, 5 Aug 41, sub: OverAll Pdn Reqmts, WPD 4494 Ult Mun Reqmts, Sec 1.
136 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

TABLE 2—ARMY CALCULATIONS OF SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS FOR VICTORY PROGRAM

a

 Excludes garrisons in outlying possessions and bases, to be maintained by the regular transport fleets. Assumed turnaround, two

months. b

 Estimated necessary augmentation of Navy's transport fleet which, under current plans, was to absorb the Army fleet also. c

 For an estimated 15 million weight tons of annual imports. d

 At the London Conference in September the British asked for 5.5 million gross tons of U.S. shipping by January 1943, largely to replace

anticipated losses; this included .5 million tons already under contract to them in American yards. The Army planners rounded this off

to 6 million. e

 One of a number of current estimates.

Source: Table adapted from memo, Stokes for Scoll, 27 Nov 41, sub: Shipg Reqmts of Vic Prog, Plng Div Studies folder, OCT HB.

the kind of war the Army planners had in

mind.55 (Table 2)

Between encirclement and frontal assault, between task force operations and

massive power drives, the Army staff as

yet saw no clear conflict. The American

planners, like the British, envisaged preparatory medium-scale operations in peripheral theaters, followed by a large-scale

invasion of the Continent. The difference

was in emphasis, but it promised sharper

disagreement in the future. The Americans still underestimated the logistical

problems of the build-up that must precede a successful invasion of Europe, and

they did not foresee the extent to which

the build-up would be retarded by necessary preliminary offensives around the

perimeter of the European fortress and

necessary holding operations in the Pacific.

Task force operations were individually

costly in training, equipment, shipping,

and amphibious paraphernalia. For each

operation the entire process of planning,

organization, special training, and mounting must be repeated. In a series of such

operations there was inevitably a high

incidence of haste, waste, and last-minute

upsets. The details of preparations were

not readily reduced to routine, standardized procedures; each operation, to a large

degree, was sui generis.

The logistics of a large-scale invasion of

55

 (1) Memo, Col Charles P. Gross for WPD, 9 Sep

41. (2) Memo, Maj Marcus B. Stokes, Jr., for Mr.

David E. Scoll, Maritime Comm, 27 Nov 41, sub:

Shipg Reqmts of Vic Prog. Both in Plng Div Studies

folder, OCT HB. (3) Papers in WPD 4494 Br Vic

Prog, especially Annex IV to rpt cited n. 37(1). (4)

JB 355, Ser 707, 11 Sep 41, title: JB Est of U.S. OverAll Pdn Reqmts, App. I, in WPD 4494 JB Ests.
WIDENING COMMITMENTS 137

Europe promised, on the whole, to be simpler, perhaps cheaper. Even if an amphibious assault should be necessary to gain

entry, it would be only a small part of the

whole undertaking. Once a beachhead

was gained, the whole invading force

could pour in with little opposition. Transportation of the invading armies would

thus become a massive ferrying operation

using conventional rather than amphibious shipping. Large forces organized on a

large scale meant low "unit" cost, with

economies gained through standardization

of organization, equipment, training,

and administrative procedures. Logistical

plans could be stabilized far in advance.

In essence, the logistics of task force operations was retail, that of large-scale invasion

wholesale. The argument of economy, all

things considered, favored the latter.

Yet economy gave no guarantee of success. A given situation usually dictated

short-term solutions within a narrow range

of choice, in defiance of long-range plans,

and costly in terms of logistics. The war

was to provide no clear-cut or fair test of

either of the two general methods described above, and even victory was always

to leave unanswered the question of

whether it might have been bought at a

lower cost.

America's Contribution: Weapons or Armies?

The military leaders were all ostensibly

in agreement that full participation by the

United States was the only means of defeating Hitler; they were not certain, even

under this assumption, that the job could

be done.56 There were wide differences,

however, in the meanings the staffs attached to the concept of "full participation," the lines of cleavage conforming

generally to those that divided the champions of ground, air, and naval power.

Between the first two groups the differences were not deep enough to preclude

general agreement on the ultimate requirements for victory, and both Air Forces

and Navy leaders endorsed the principle

that Germany could be finally defeated

only by land armies on the European continent. But the measures and means by

which the Navy proposed to put this principle into effect seemed to the Army staff

wholly inadequate.

The Navy's position was that,

. . . since the principal strength of the Asso- ciated Powers is at present in naval and air

categories, the strategy which they should

adopt should be based on the effective em- ployment of these forces, and the employ- ment of land forces in regions where Germany

cannot exert the full power of her land

armies.57

This view reflected the Navy's concern

over the anticipated shortage of shipping.

The Navy Victory Program envisaged

that only a million and a half U.S. troops

would be deployed overseas (excluding

garrisons of outlying possessions and

bases), a third of them in Latin America.

Massive U.S. naval and air power, supplementing the forces of other nations,

would provide the rest of the punch needed

to defeat the Axis. In the opinion of the

Army staff, this program took an unduly

optimistic view of the capabilities of naval

and air power, even on the scale the Navy

proposed to muster it, and also seemed to 56

 (1) Ltr, SW to President, 3 Sep 41, SW Secret

File 1848-a. (2) JB 355, Ser 707, 11 Sep 41, title: JB

Est of U.S. Over-All Pdn Reqmts. 57

 (1) JB 355, Ser 707, 11 Sep 41, title: JB Est of

U.S. Over-All Pdn Reqmts. (2) For a discussion of

the Air Forces program, AWPD/1, see Craven and

Cate, AAF I, pp. 131-32, 146-47; and Maj Margaret

A, Bacchus, "Manpower Planning—the Victory Program," Sec II-C, Pt. I, Ch. IV of Mobilization, Procurement and Allocation of Manpower and Material

Means, hist monograph, Hist Sec, JCS.
138 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

assume that British and American land

armies would be able to invade and conquer Axis Europe in the face of German

forces enjoying a 5-to-1 superiority.58 Naval shipping estimates, moreover, contemplated a more generous provision for

continuing normal commerce than did the

Army's estimates.59 Navy planners, in

short, evidently contemplated a war calling for something less than a maximum

national effort, giving full play to U.S. sea

and air power, but relying heavily on foreign manpower and mobilizing only

modest U.S. land armies. This program

stood in sharp contrast to the Army's conception of an all-out, balanced effort culminating in a major test of strength in

central Europe with U.S. land armies

playing a leading role.

The inherent conflict between these two

conceptions was moving toward a showdown in the autumn of 1941, for the

Army's mobilization was approaching a

stage where decisions would soon have to

be made as to future expansion. At the

end of June 1941 the Army's strength had

reached 1,455,565, culminating a year of

unprecedented peacetime growth, and attaining the manpower goal for the initial

PMP force set forth the preceding summer.

Five months later, on 7 December, the

total strength had risen only to 1,643,477.

The Army's primary aim during the last

half of 1941 was to complete the training

and equipping of this force and to develop

it into an efficient fighting machine. In

this respect much remained to be done. At

the beginning of October only one division, five antiaircraft regiments, and two

artillery brigades were considered to be

ready for combat; the Air Forces were in

even a worse case, with only two bombardment squadrons and three pursuit

groups ready. These small, mobile, striking forces, the staff hoped, might possibly

be doubled in size by the end of 1941.60

To have in readiness forces adequate for

hemisphere defense remained the immediate goal, and one still far from realization. The forces available to the Army in

October, its spokesmen admitted, were

"barely sufficient to defend our military

bases and outlying possessions," many of

which were still well below their authorized, peacetime, garrison strengths. To

oppose any serious invasion of the Western

Hemisphere the Army in its present state

would be "wholly inadequate." Operations in distant theaters on the scale contemplated in the Victory Program lay far

beyond the immediate horizon and might

be ruled out altogether by an Axis victory

in Europe before the United States was

ready.61

The United States seemed unlikely to

move rapidly toward readiness for a coalition war against the Axis as long as the

58

 (1) JB 355, Ser 707, 11 Sep 41, title: JB Est of

U.S. Over-All Pdn Reqmts. (2) Memo, CofS for

CNO, 10 Sep 41, sub: U.S. Over-All Pdn Reqmts.

(3) Memo, Gerow for CofS, 10 Sep 41, same sub. (4)

Memo, A.C.W. [Wedemeyer] for Gerow, 9 Sep 41.

Last three in WPD 4494-10. 59

 Major differences between Army and Navy

shipping estimates in gross tons were:

Army Navy

Essential trades............ . 3,500,000 6,000,000

U.S. forces overseas. ........ . 10,500,000 2,400,000

Other Allied forces overseas. . . 3,000,000 5,000,000

Additional shipping needed . . . 13,100,000 9,500,000

See memo, Stokes for Scoll, 27 Nov 41, sub: Shipg

Reqmts of Vic Prog, Plng Div Studies folder, OCT HB. 60

 (1) Strength figures are from annual Report of the

Secretary of War, 1941, Table A; and table, Returns

Sec, Misc Div, AGO, in Binder 1, Secret Papers file,

GHQ. (2) For training and maneuvers in late 1941,

see Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, AGF I, pp. 40-55.

(3)"War Department Strategic Estimate . . . October 1941," WPD 4494-21. 61

 (1) "War Department Strategic Estimate . . .

October 1941," WPD 4494-21. (2) For the status of

outlying bases and possessions, see Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Ch. VI,

p. 32.
WIDENING COMMITMENTS 139

country remained technically at peace.

Public and Congressional sentiment, in the

late summer and fall of 1941, was still far

from willing to abandon this status, as was

evidenced by the slim one-vote margin in

Congress in favor of extending Selective

Service, the continuation of the prohibition against sending selectees outside the

Western Hemisphere, and the apathetic

public response to submarine attacks on

American destroyers in September and

October. General Marshall himself, perhaps in deference to this sentiment, did not

put forward definite plans for immediate

substantial expansion of the Army. Plans

were afoot, in fact, eventually to retire all

the National Guard units, and to replace

all selectees and National Guard enlisted

men by recruitment, measures that would

certainly delay the training program and

temporarily disrupt organization somewhat, even though in the long run the

Army's strength would not be reduced.

Current plans late in 1941 anticipated

that ground forces would be expanded by

about 10 percent, and General Marshall

expected to prepare no more than sixteen

divisions for overseas service. When Lt.

Gen. Lesley J. McNair, Chief of Staff,

GHQ, proposed in October a program for

"mass production of trained divisions" on

the assumption that the Army, as he said,

had as its mission something "more than

passive hemispherical defense," the General Staff rejected the plan.62

Thus, despite the Army staff's conviction that full participation in the war at an

early date was the only effective means of

meeting the long-range threat to American security, the building of American

armies late in 1941 was slowing down

markedly. This trend was accompanied by

a definite movement to shape plans for

eventual American participation along the

lines suggested by the Navy's rather than

the Army's Victory Program estimates—

with a view to making the United States'

contribution to the war, as Walter Lippmann put it in a widely discussed article,

one "basically of Navy, Air and manufacturing."63

 There was strong pressure to

actually reduce the size of the ground

forces in order to make more matériel

available for lend-lease, especially to the

Soviet Union. And on 22 September, two

days after Lippmann's article had appeared, General Marshall was called to

the White House to defend the present and

planned strength of the Army.64

General Marshall's defense was vigorous. He reviewed the strategic concept

embodied in the Victory Program estimates (which were to be submitted three

days later) and the forces there listed as

necessary for defeating Germany. He declared that if the United States remained

committed to that policy,

. . . then we must build toward these forces

as rapidly as possible. To seize and hold the

initiative we must have forces available for

employment at the time and place of our own

choosing, not Hitler's. Any reduction of our

present forces may result in fatal delay. . . .

We are already late. We must not abandon present gains and we should push on with

unremitting effort. Furthermore, sudden basic changes in policy . . . are devastating

to organized effort. The "long view" is essential to our interests. In other words, to shift

our national objectives by the reduction of

our army at the present time might well be

disastrous.65

62

 (1) Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Ch. VI, pp. 29-32. (2) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 358-66. 63

 New York Herald Tribune, September 20, 1941,

byline Walter Lippmann. 64

 (1) Papers in Tab K, Item 7, Exec 4. (2) Memo,

CofS for President, 22 Sep 41, sub: Ground Forces.

(3) Related papers. Last two in WPD 4594. (4)

Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 360-66. 65

 Memo cited n. 64(2).
140 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Reviewing the Army's current plans for

overseas garrisons, task forces, and forces

in the United States (within the framework

of the initial PMP), Marshall reached two

conclusions. Any reductions in numerical

strength or equipment justified in the light

of the immediate situation would not yield

significant amounts of matériel of the types

most needed by Great Britain and the

Soviet Union. Whatever "momentary encouragement" such diversions might give

the USSR and Britain "would be far outweighed by the positive indications it

would give to the German government

that they need not fear an eventual

onslaught of ground forces."

 66

Marshall's general impression, on leaving the White House, was that the President at least did not intend to reduce the

Army.67 No further action to that end, in

fact, was taken before Pearl Harbor, but

until then the Victory Program remained

a hypothesis without real influence on

either American mobilization or foreign

aid. Since midyear, moreover, plans for

dividing munitions production between

the U.S. Army and foreign claimants had

moved steadily toward an early effectuation of the "arsenal" theory of American

participation. Under the policy laid down

on 22 September, the bulk of the output of

American munitions was to have been

allotted, beginning in March 1942, to foreign "opponents offeree." Even though its

minimum training allowances of equipment were expected to be only 70 percent

complete by March 1942, the Army's mobilization, in effect, would then have come

abruptly to a halt. Thenceforth, the Army

would have shifted over to something like

a stand-by status, slowly filling its equipment shortages and perfecting its preparations to protect the hemisphere against an

invader. How much of this policy might

have survived if the United States had

been drawn into a purely European war,

instead of a two-front global one, can only

be conjectured. Even though aloof, Japan

would doubtless have remained a threat,

pinning down a large segment of both

American and British strength; one and a

half million American soldiers, it is safe to

say, would hardly have sufficed to secure

U.S. positions in the Pacific and also to

play an effective role in Europe. On the

other hand, the menace of the European

Axis alone might not have aroused the

United States to mobilize its manpower

and resources, particularly the former, on

the scale that, in the event, marked this

country's participation in the war. On the

eve of Pearl Harbor the prospects were

that America's contribution to the war

would be in weapons, not armies.68

66

 Ibid. 67

 Memo, CofS for Col Robert W. Crawford, 22

Sep 41, WPD 4594. 68

 (1) See above, Ch. IV. (2) In his account of the

developments summarized in the foregoing four paragraphs, Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp.

358-66, erroneously infers that steps were actually

taken to reduce the ground establishment. See also,

Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War: 1940-1941,

p. 735.
PART TWO

CRISIS

CHAPTER VI

Pearl Harbor and Early

Deployment

The disadvantage imposed upon the

United States by Japan's sudden attack in

December 1941 went far beyond the

actual losses then inflicted. To replace

these, from the immense fund of military

power ultimately generated by the United

States, was a comparatively simple matter. But the attack, in its immediate impact, was temporarily crippling and

helped the enemy to gain positions from

which he could be dislodged only at massive cost over nearly four years of war. The

most fundamental gain for Japan and her

European partners was the loss of equilibrium suffered by the United States. U.S.

national policy had accepted in advance

the disadvantage of conceding to the

enemy the first blow, and had counted on

the compensatory effect of extensive mobilization beforehand while potential allies held potential enemies at bay. To the

achievements of prewar mobilization the

United States in the long run owed her

salvation, but they did little to mitigate

the shock of the enemy's first blow. Germany, not Japan, had been expected until

very late in 1941 to strike that blow, and

the daring attack on Pearl Harbor, the

main U.S. base in the Pacific, in conjunction with the anticipated offensive of the

Japanese to the south, had scarcely been

foreseen at all. The United States thus

found its lines of communications in the

Pacific jeopardized beyond its worst expectations, while those in the Atlantic and

the Caribbean soon proved dangerously

vulnerable. The logistics of initial military

action, as anticipated in prewar plans, was

thus thrown off balance; virtually every

previously planned movement offerees

had to be modified or abandoned. Beyond

this initial impact, the Japanese attack

disrupted the timetable of American strategy and, for upwards of seven months,

threw the weight of the Army's effort in a

direction markedly different from that

planned. The basic eastward orientation

of strategy remained a long-range goal,

but the actual development of the military situation held out little assurance

that it could be put into effect. As a consequence, the whole program of logistical

preparations supporting that strategy was

in some measure disrupted. National

policy, in short, by yielding the initiative

to the enemy, laid a heavy burden upon

the logistical staffs in December 1941.

Throughout the U.S. military structure

the shock of war was violent. There was a

vast surge of activity, both confused and

purposeful, a fever of organization and

reorganization, and, most visibly of course,

an unprecedented expansion. In the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS) system, created dur-
144 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ing the early months of 1942, the Army

and Navy fashioned the nucleus of a committee machinery for co-ordinating the

planning and direction of American mili tary- operations, and also established the

principle of unified command for all military operations employing both Army and

Navy forces. The service departments

themselves found it necessary to make internal structural adjustments. On the

Army side the reorganization, accomplished in March 1942, was far reaching,

creating among other things new machinery for logistical planning and direction,

and centering control of the Army's vast

logistical operations in the United States in

a new command, the Services of Supply

(SOS).1

Pearl Harbor plunged the United

States into a coalition war. Toward the

end of December 1941 Prime Minister

Churchill arrived in Washington accompanied by his principal civilian and military planners. At the ARCADIA Conference, which followed, the Anglo-American alliance was cemented and an effort

was made to formulate a broad strategy

and to create an organization to guide the

common endeavor. The organization that

emerged was the Combined Chiefs of Staff

(CCS) system, generally paralleling the

JCS committee system and designed to coordinate Allied strategy and the allocation of munitions, shipping, and other

resources.2 In the realm of strategy, the

ARCADIA Conference confirmed the tentative agreements reached at the ABC meetings of February-March 1941 that the

principal effort of the Anglo-American

coalition should be concentrated on defeating Germany. In the Pacific the Allies

agreed to remain on the defensive and try

to hold Japan to limited gains. But as

Japan, during the winter and spring of

1942, relentlessly continued to exploit the

advantages of surprise and of her opponents' unreadiness, the Allied high command found itself driven to using its

meager resources piecemeal in a desperate

effort to avert catastrophic losses in the

Pacific. Until the situation could be stabilized somewhat in this quarter, no longrange strategic plan could remain firm,

and the effort to mobilize and deploy

forces against the European Axis came almost to a standstill.

The Impact of Pearl Harbor

The Japanese attack caught the U.S.

Army about three months short of completing what had been planned as the

most intensive phase of its rearmament—

roughly definable as the three-quarters

arming of the initial Protective Mobilization Plan force (increased to 1.8 million

men the preceding summer). Production of munitions had made great strides

during the second half of 1941, but generally had fallen short of expectations.

Only moderate increases over the output

of the preceding six months had been

made, for example, in heavy field artillery

pieces and ammunition, small arms ammunition, and trucks; antiaircraft artillery production had actually declined.3

 A

hasty survey soon after Pearl Harbor indicated that by the end of March 1942 a

more or less balanced force of sixteen divisions—about half the initial PMP force—

could be put in the field by various

expedients and, in addition, overseas garrisons could be outfitted at war strength,

with most of their basic equipment but

with very slim allowances of certain key

1

 See below, Chs. VIII-IX. 2

 See below, Chs. IX-X. 3

 See below, App. B.
PEARL HARBOR AND EARLY DEPLOYMENT 145

items, above all, ammunition. By spreading matériel even more thinly, the entire

initial PMP force might be equipped in

some fashion within the same time. Yet

these deficiencies, for forces that might

soon have to face a powerful enemy overseas, could scarcely be regarded as other

than crippling.

One bottleneck created another. The 3-

inch self-propelled antitank gun, which

would be in critical supply for months,

could be replaced in an emergency by the

75-mm. gun; but ammunition for the latter was short, and in all types of artillery,

fire control equipment was even shorter.

This last shortage was expected to prevent

arming the initial PMP force with heavy

antiaircraft weapons until some time in

1943. Enough medium tanks were in prospect for the armored forces, but 75-mm.

tank guns remained a choke point.

Ammunition was the immediate and

pervasive shortage—especially .50-caliber

and 37-mm. armor-piercing ammunition,

without which tanks could not operate,

and without which there could be no defense against tanks. Production of .50-

caliber was not expected to improve until

midyear, 37-mm. and 75-mm. somewhat

earlier. Ammunition stocks for 60-mm.

and 81-mm. mortars were practically

nonexistent in the United States, and the

production outlook was not hopeful.

Any precise estimate of preparedness in

terms of divisions ready for combat was

difficult to make. For lack of ammunition

in major categories, only a single division

and a single antiaircraft regiment could

be made available on a full war footing

.for overseas service, although three divisions were reasonably well equipped and

five were more or less well trained. Supply,

in general, would catch up with the progress of training by February 1942, permitting eight divisions, trained and

equipped with bare essentials, to take the

field, but still only two of these divisions

would have enough ammunition to risk

combat. Two months later, supply and

training would again be out of balance,

with sixteen divisions trained but only

thirteen adequately equipped and supplied with ammunition for full-scale operations. Even these estimates of availability

offerees in the near future, Brig. Gen.

Brehon B. Somervell, the new G-4,

warned, were "on the optimistic side."4

They presupposed an immediate acceleration of production and an overriding

priority for U.S. forces over other claimants—in other words, an immediate cessation of lend-lease deliveries.

Even if more divisions had been ready

for combat, most of them would have had

to remain in the United States. As of 10

December, troop transports available in

port were sufficient to move about 14,000

on the west coast and 5,700 on the east

coast. By April, monthly embarkations of

perhaps 46,000 across the Atlantic, 31,000

or less across the Pacific, might be undertaken.5

 The shortage of shipping, together

with the shortage of ready divisions, predetermined the form that overseas deployment was to take during the next few

weeks—a piecemeal movement of miscellaneous small units, mainly of supporting

combat and service types.

It was not easy, immediately after 7

December 1941, to decide how the available small forces could be most effectively

4

 Memo, G-4 for DCofS, 21 Dec 41, sub: Equip for

Combat Units, with atchd papers, Item 14, Exec 4. 5

 (1) Memo, Gross for Somervell, 10 Dec 41, sub:

Shipg Sit As It Affects the Army, Plng Div Studies

folder, OCT HB. (2) For an analysis of the shipping

shortage in all its aspects, see below, Ch. VIII. (3)

See also the markedly different estimate made later

in December, p. 153.
146 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

disposed to meet the immediate threat.

RAINBOW 5, the only war plan now applicable, was still in effect, but each scheduled movement had to be considered on

its merits, and the worsening situation in

the Pacific was soon to invalidate the

whole schedule. On the west coast aircraft

factories were almost defenseless against

air raids, and during the jittery mid-December period there were numerous reports of actual enemy task forces hovering

off the coast from Alaska to the Panama

Canal. In Hawaii, those naval installations that were somehow passed over by

the Japanese attack lay open to a second

onslaught which, if it came, would have

to be met by ground forces with very little

air and naval support. General Short, the

commander in Hawaii, was clamoring for

troops, planes, bombs, and ammunition.

The Panama Canal, hardly more strongly

fortified than Hawaii had been, seemed a

logical next objective for Japan, since the

Pacific Fleet was crippled. Alaska, while

less inviting, was even more vulnerable.

And to the distant Philippines, soon to be

cut off from help, General Marshall on 7

December sent assurance of "every possible assistance within our power," thus

adding another large commitment to the

Army's already overwhelming burdens.6

At the emergency meetings of the Joint

Board on 8 and 9 December, Army and

Navy leaders agreed, however, that immediate reinforcement of the Philippines

was probably out of the question. The

Navy placed the primary emphasis on reinforcing Hawaii. Admiral Stark urged

immediate shipment of all available antiaircraft artillery there, even at the cost of

denuding continental installations, and

spoke of reinforcements on the scale of

100,000 troops and 500,000 gross tons of

shipping. But the Navy admitted at the

same time that, with the Pacific Fleet immobilized, it could guarantee neither adequate naval protection for Hawaii nor

coverage for the movement of troops and

material across the Pacific. General Marshall questioned the wisdom of risking

everything on defending Hawaii, which

might be isolated in any case, while available equipment and ammunition were inadequate even for the defense of west coast

installations and the Canal.7

During December, therefore, though

placing major emphasis on deployment to

Hawaii, the Army also moved substantial

reinforcements and material to Panama,

the west coast, Alaska, and the North Atlantic bases, including Iceland. Troop

movements to Hawaii and Panama accounted for the great bulk of overseas deployment during December, while the

cargo movements to these points were well

over half the total shipped from the

United States. Reinforcement of the

Canal was virtually completed by the end

of January, by which time some sixteen

thousand troops together with bombers,

pursuit planes, and air-warning equipment had been sent there. Other bases in

the Caribbean and Alaska received a

steady flow of troops and material through

the winter and early spring.8

The shipments to Hawaii were made in

an atmosphere of extreme urgency. Responding promptly to General Short's

pleas, the War Department by the morn6

 (1) Msg 736, Marshall to MacArthur, 7 Dec 41,

WPD 4544-20. (2) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, pp. 78-96. (3) For the state of

Hawaii's defenses before and after 7 December, see

Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 474-75. 7

 (1) Memo, CNO for CofS, 11 Dec 41, sub: Dangerous Strategic Sit in Pac Ocean, Item 4, Exec 10.

(2) Memo, CofS for CNO, 12 Dec 41, sub: Def of

Oahu, WPD 4544-29. 8

 (1) See below, App. E. (2) For deployment of air

forces, see Craven and Cate, AAF I, Ch. VII.
PEARL HARBOR AND EARLY DEPLOYMENT 147

ing of 12 December had set up seven

thousand troops and most of the material

requested on highest priority for shipment

by the earliest transport available, and arrangements were made to fly out twentyseven heavy bombers. On that day there

were five freighters and eleven troop transports in San Francisco Harbor, including

five transports that had returned safely

since the 7th. Two, possibly three, of the

transports were earmarked to carry the

troops, due to sail in convoy about the

16th or 17th. About half the bulk cargo, it

appeared, could also be dispatched at an

early date.9

At San Francisco the Army port authorities estimated that, by strenuous efforts, the two fastest transports—Matsonia

and Monterey—could be loaded with

troops, pursuit aircraft, and some small

arms ammunition in time to sail on the

night of the 13th. To Somervell and Marshall it seemed worth the risk to waive

convoy and let the transports make a dash

to Honolulu without escort. Orders were

given to push the loading and the matter

was put to the Navy, which proved unalterably opposed to unescorted convoys

and, at least in the eyes of General Somervell and General Gerow, seemed remarkably unconcerned about the Army's desire

for speed. Tempers were frayed, and sharp

words were exchanged, but the Navy refused to yield. Three fast transports—Matsonia, Monterey and Lurline—sailed on the

16th, under convoy as the Navy had insisted. Not until the end of January were

troopships allowed to sail the Central Pacific without escort.10

On 17 December two more troop transports—Bliss and Garfield—left San Francisco for Hawaii with troops, planes, and

other supplies. On the 27th, after the

Chief of Staff had approved further reinforcements of one division, two antiaircraft regiments, and about ten thousand

service troops, another large troop and

cargo convoy sailed for Hawaii, the last of

the year. By the end of December total

shipments of material to Hawaii amounted

to 77,756 measurement tons; troop reinforcements totaled about 15,000.11

Meanwhile, second thoughts were being given to Hawaii's position and to the

possibilities of a Japanese landing on the

US. west coast. The danger, on the whole,

seemed to be waning. Even on the 15th,

General Short had acknowledged that few

of the reports of enemy parachutists, air

reconnaissance, mysterious flares, suddenly surfacing submarines, and the like

could be verified. Short thought there was

little indication of an enemy intent to attempt a landing. On the 24th the AngloAmerican Chiefs of Staff in Washington,

discussing the possibility of an enemy attack on the U.S. west coast, concluded

that while sporadic naval and air attacks,

9

 (1) Msg, CG HD to TAG, 14 Dec 41, G-4/33822.

(2) Msg, CG HD to CofS, 8 Dec 41, AG 381

(1 1-27-41) Far Eastern Sit, Sec 1. (3) Memo, Exec

Off G-4 for Br Chiefs, 10 Dec 41, sub: Proposed Reinf

for Hawaii, Convoys folder, OCT HB. (4) Rpt, no

date, sub: Shipg Sit. at SFPOE Following Pearl Harbor, OCT HB. 10

 (1) Disposition form, WPD to G-4, 11 Dec 41,

sub: Reinf for Hawaii. (2) Msg, G-4 to CG SFPOE,

11 Dec 41. (3) Disposition form, G-4 to CG HD, 18

Dec 41, sub: Units and Cargo To Be Shipped on

Matsonia, Monterey, and Lurline. All in G-4/33822.

(4) Memo, G-4 for CofS, 12 Dec 41, sub: Lack of

Effort of Navy To Speed Up Dispatch of 21-Knot

Convoy to COPPER [Territory of Hawaii], Convoys

folder, OCT HB. (5) Corresp in WPD 4622-12; WPD

4622-39; and WPD 3444-14. 11

 (1) Memo, G-4 for DCofS, 16 Dec 41, sub: Water

Mvmts to COPPER and "X," G-4/33817. (2) See Ship

Charts and Logs, Atlantic and Pac folders, G-4/33700.

(3) Rpt cited n. 9(4). (4) Memo, G-4 for CofS, 24 Dec

41, sub: Shipts to COPPER and "X," G-4/33822. (5)

Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition

Warfare: 1941-1942, original draft chapter, "Reaction to Pearl Harbor," pp. 28-3C, OCMH. (6) See

below, App. E.
148 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

THE TROOP TRANSPORT SS MONTEREY at San Francisco, January 1942.

or even a hit-and-run raid involving landings, were within Japan's capabilities, any

large amphibious operations in the eastern

Pacific were unlikely. The most telling

argument was the obvious southward

focus of Japanese operations toward the

Malay Archipelago; it seemed less and less

probable, during the last days of 1941,

that the admittedly weak defenses of Hawaii would soon be tested. The decisions

on grand strategy reached by the Allied

leaders at the end of the year, while stressing the vital role of the Alaska-HawaiiPanama triangle to hemisphere defense,

pointed out also that a major Japanese invasion of the United States was unlikely in

any event.12

Independently of these discussions, the

War Department had first lengthened the

schedule of shipments to Hawaii and then,

on the 24th, assigned to movements later

than the 27 December convoy a priority

lower than that for Australia and the Philippines. By the end of December the crisis

atmosphere surrounding shipments to

Hawaii had disappeared, and the focus of

strategy had shifted away from the Central Pacific to the main theater far to the

12

 (1) Msgs, CG HD to TAG, 15, 18, and 19 Dec

41, AG 381 (11-27-41) Far Eastern Sit, Sec 1. (2) Annex 2, Probable Maximum Scale of Enemy Attack on

West Coast of North America, to min, ABC-4

JCCSs-1, 24 Dec 41. (3) ABC-4/CS-1, Memo, U.S.

and Br CsofS, 31 Dec 41, title: American-Br Grand

Strategy.
PEARL HARBOR AND EARLY DEPLOYMENT 149

west and to the intervening lines of communications.13

The Far East and the Pacific Line of

Communications

The determination of the President and

General Marshall that everything possible

must be done to help General MacArthur's forces, however forlorn the hope,

set in train a series of steps that rapidly reversed the Joint Board's initial decision

(largely Navy-inspired) to write off the

Philippines and concentrate all available

strength for the defense of the Central

Pacific. On 15 December General Marshall renewed his assurances of support to

MacArthur and two days later approved

a plan submitted by his new staff adviser

on Far Eastern matters, Brig. Gen. Dwight

D. Eisenhower, for establishing a base in

Australia to support the Philippines.14

Meanwhile, a convoy of seven ships,

carrying troops, ammunition, crated aircraft, and other material and escorted by

the cruiser Pensacola, had been at sea

Manila-bound since early in December.

On the 8th the Joint Board, at the Navy's

urging, ordered the convoy to return to

Honolulu. But on the next day, the President having intervened, the Joint Board

reversed itself and directed the convoy to

proceed to Brisbane, Australia. Brig. Gen.

Julian F. Barnes, senior officer aboard the

convoy, was ordered to place himself and

his forty-five hundred troops at General

MacArthur's disposal and to make every

effort to get the convoy's cargo, especially

the aircraft, to the Philippines. Four other

cargo vessels, also at sea on the 7th, were

diverted to Australia.15

"Task Force, South Pacific," as Barnes

entitled his command, made its uneasy

way to Brisbane where it arrived safely on

the 22d. Before its arrival the base, of

which the task force was to be the nucleus,

was placed under the command of Maj.

Gen. George H. Brett, senior American

Air officer in the Far East. By the 22d, the

earlier emphasis upon forwarding fighter

aircraft and supplies at once to the Philippines was yielding under the pressure of

Japanese conquests to a broader plan for

a substantial base capable of supporting

extended air operations. On the 24th the

War Department informed General Douglas MacArthur that, in view of the probable impossibility of staging fighter aircraft

to Luzon and the impending loss of airfields there, its aim was to develop "a

strong United States air power in the Far

East based on Australia."

 16

An almost necessary corollary to this

program was that American air power

would be fitted into the scheme of Allied

resistance to Japan then being hastily organized. Of the nine air combat groups

allocated to the southwestern Pacific during the last week of December, three were

assigned to help in the defense of the

Netherlands Indies. At the end of December the Australian-British-Dutch-American (ABDA) Command, under General

Wavell, was created, and in it were placed 13

 (1) Memos, Exec Off G-4 for Br Chiefs, 25 and

26 Dec 41, subs: Reinf for COPPER, G-4/33822. (2)

Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, pp.

78-87. 14

 (1) Msg 787, Marshall to MacArthur, 15 Dec 41,

WPD 4544-31. (2) Memo, WPD for CofS, 17 Dec 41,

sub: Plan for Australian Base, WPD 4628-1. 15

 (1) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-

1942, pp. 78-96. (2) Elizabeth Bingham and Richard

M. Leighton, Development of the United States Supply Base in Australia, ASF hist monograph, OCMH. 16

 (1) Msg, Marshall to MacArthur, 24 Dec 41,

WPD 3633-27. (2) For movement of the Pensacola convoy, see draft of Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua, a

volume in preparation for the series UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, Ch. I; Morton, Fall of the Philippines, Ch. V; and Bingham and

Leighton monograph cited n. 15(2).
150 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

all Allied forces operating in the Netherlands Indies, Malaya, Burma, and, at

least formally, the Philippines. The U.S.

supply base in Australia, now U.S. Army

Forces in Australia (USAFIA), was not

included in the ABDA Command, but its

supply mission was broadened to include

support of operations in the ABDA area as

well as in the Philippines.17

The program of building "overwhelming air power," as the purpose was described to General MacArthur at the beginning of January, faced terrific obstacles

from the beginning.18 The Air Forces

hoped to deliver heavy bombers to the Far

East via Cairo at the rate of three a day

beginning about 5 January, but fighter

aircraft, ground crews, and material

needed to operate an air force had to move

by ship in driblets across the Pacific. The

flow began with the diversion to Australia

of one of the three transports (Polk) scheduled to sail in the second convoy to Hawaii. This ship, two freighters, and a

tanker departed before the end of the

year, carrying aircraft, ammunition, gasoline, subsistence, vehicles, and other cargo. In all some 230 pursuit planes, besides

the 17 in the Pensacola convoy, were

shipped to Australia between 7 December

and the end of the year. Innumerable obstacles stood in the way of getting these

airplanes into action and forwarding supplies to either the Philippines or Netherlands Indies. A basic step had been taken

with the decision to establish an Australian

base, and from late December on its development began to profit by the shift

from the initial emphasis upon reinforcing

Hawaii and Panama.19

It was an inescapable corollary of this

decision that the long island chain of communications through the South Pacific to

the subcontinent must also be secured.

The Japanese attack caught the United

States in the early stages of developing air

ferry routes between Hawaii and the Philippines. In the critical area between Hawaii and Australia the total American

assets consisted of embryonic air stations

at Midway and Wake; engineer detachments constructing airfields on Christmas

and Canton Islands; incomplete naval air

facilities at Palmyra and Johnston Islands;

a minor fueling and communications center, then in process of expansion, at Pago

Pago Harbor in Samoa; and Guam, the

"Gibraltar of the Pacific," devoid of facilities. With the possible exception of Midway, none of these American bases had

anything remotely resembling an adequate defense force. Outside the American

orbit, a single company of Australians garrisoned New Caledonia. The entire Fijis

group, 250 islands, was defended by less

than eight thousand New Zealand troops

with only twenty-two planes.20

17

 (1) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-

1942, Ch. VI and pp. 170-71. (2) Memo, WPD for

TAG, 12 Jan 42, sub: Instns to Maj Gen Lewis H.

Brereton . . . , WPD 4628-20. (3) See below, Ch.

VII.

General MacArthur, under special arrangements,

continued to report directly to Washington. 18

 Msg, Marshall to MacArthur, 2 Jan 42, Msg 5

file, Case 17, WPD. 19

 (1) For air operations in the Far East during December and January, see Craven and Cate, AAF I,

Chs. VI, X-XII. (2) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, pp. 78-96. (3) Memo, unsigned, for

CofS, 17 Dec 41, CofS WDGS Mar-Jun 42 folder, Hq

ASF. (4) Memo, A-4 for G-4, 27 Dec 41, sub: Summary of Aircraft, G-4/33861. (5) Other corresp in

same file. (6) Memo, Gross for Somervell, 25 Dec 41,

sub: Sailing of Trans . . . , G-4/33817. (7) Establishing a Supply Base in Australia, draft MS, OCT

HB.

20

 (1) Morison, Rising Sun, pp. 184, 228, 250, 258.

(2) ABC-4/8, Rpt, JPC to CsofS, 10 Jan 42, title: Def

of Island Bases Between Hawaii and Australia. (3)

Msg, Short to Arnold, 12 Dec 41, AG 381 (11-27-41)

Far Eastern Sit, Gen. (4) Memo, Asst Exec Off G-4

for Br Chiefs, 1 Jan 42, G-4/33822.
PEARL HARBOR AND EARLY DEPLOYMENT 151

Guam fell on 11 December, Wake on

the 23d; Midway was attacked by a Japanese task force; the enemy came within

striking distance of Canton and Palmyra;

Johnston and Samoa were shelled by submarines. In the few days immediately following the outbreak of hostilities, the War

Department had grave doubts as to the

feasibility of attempting to hold the Central Pacific at all, and until the end of December only passing attention was given

to reinforcing and developing the island

chain. General Short did what little he

could to bolster the defenses of Canton

and Christmas from the slender resources

of the Hawaiian Department. With the

shift of emphasis to the far Pacific at the

end of December, the line of communications gained a new strategic and logistical

importance. In the grand strategy laid

down at the ARCADIA Conference on 31

December, the security of the main air

and sea routes in the Pacific was listed as

an essential part of the 1942 program.

Shortly thereafter the Anglo-American

planners, in a report approved near the

end of the conference, assigned to the

United States responsibility for defense of

Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American

Samoa, and Bora Bora—the last a small

island in the Society group, which lay to

the southeast of the principal chain and

which was under Free French control.

New Zealand was to provide most of the

garrison for the Fijis, supplemented by air

units and supplies from the United States

and Britain. New Caledonia was held to

be within the Australian sphere of responsibility, but since Australia could not for

many months spare troops to reinforce the

single ill-equipped company occupying

the island, the United States was also to

undertake to strengthen this garrison

immediately.21

These requirements placed new demands upon the slender pool of available

troop units, supplies, and shipping. Even

before the planners reported, the War Department had set up shipments to reinforce the garrisons on Christmas and Canton, and a task force of about four thousand troops was being prepared to establish a naval fueling station on Bora Bora.

An AAF pursuit squadron was dispatched

to the Fijis, and a much larger task force

was under preparation for New Caledonia.

Meanwhile, the Navy went ahead with

plans to reinforce Palmyra, Johnston, and

American Samoa.22

Plans and Deployment in the Atlantic

Despite the dangerous situation in the

Pacific, the President and General Marshall still considered the aims of RAINBOW

5 in the Atlantic valid. The first post-MDay movements overseas, under RAINBOW

5, were to have taken place mainly in the

North Atlantic, with the aim of securing

sea communications with the United

Kingdom and relieving British forces for

service in more active theaters. Before the

Prime Minister and the British military

chiefs arrived in Washington on the 22d

for the ARCADIA meetings, the Army was

already setting up forces to relieve the

British in Northern Ireland and others to

relieve the U.S. Marine brigade in Iceland. These decisions were confirmed during the first meeting between the President

and the Prime Minister on the 23d. Movement offerees to England and Scotland,

it was understood, would have to be de21

 (1) Min, ABC-4 JCGSs-7, 31 Dec 41. (2) ABC-4/

CS-1 cited n. 12(3). (3) ABC-4/8 cited n. 20(2). (4)

Morison, Rising Sun, p. 259. (5) Msg, CG HD to TAG,

12 Dec 41, AG 381 (11-27-41) Far Eastern Sit, Sec 1.

(6) Related corresp in same file. 22

 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942,

pp. 114-19.
152 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

layed. As for the various South Atlantic

moves contemplated during 1941, the

American planners were now more dubious. The British raised the question, on

the 24th at the first meeting of the military

leaders, of occupying the Azores and the

Canaries (for which latter project they

already had a small force and shipping

ready), and neutralizing the Cape Verdes.

Admiral Ernest J. King's comment was,

"we cannot do all these things,"23 and the

matter was left for further study. The

Americans were also fearful of the possible

consequences of sending forces to Brazil,

where the political situation was touchy.

Definite steps were already in progress,

however, to occupy Curasao and Aruba,

as provided under RAINBOW 5.24

The British had a more daring undertaking in view—the Allied occupation of

northwest Africa (GYMNAST)—which

Churchill had put forward the summer

preceding. The Prime Minister renewed

his proposal at the White House conference on 23 December. For the entry into

Algeria the British had a force of fifty-five

thousand troops, with shipping, ready to

move in the event the Eighth Army succeeded in pushing Rommel back to the

Tunisian border. If that happened, the

French authorities in North Africa might

be persuaded to invite an Allied occupation. Churchill wanted the Americans to

undertake the occupation of French Morocco, landing in the Casablanca area,

while the British moved into Algeria and

Tunisia. The whole plan, it was emphasized, hinged on a friendly reception by

the French.25

Most of the American planners were

cool to this scheme, despite the interest it

obviously awakened in the President. One

WPD officer, Col. Matthew B. Ridgway,

pointed to the "difficulties of troop movement and logistical support by sea," in

view of the shipping shortage and the

nearness of German forces to the target

area.26 Available U.S. forces were absolutely unprepared, from the standpoint of

training and equipment, to undertake an

amphibious operation against a hostile

shore. Some of the American planners,

moreover, challenged the British estimate

of the strategic value of North Africa to

the Allies, regarding it rather as a "subsidiary" area peripheral to the main theater, which even if captured would contribute only indirectly to the defeat of

Germany. The Army did have plans and

preparations afoot for an expedition

against Dakar to occupy French West

Africa, and Maj. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell

was ordered to Washington immediately

after Pearl Harbor to take charge of the

planning. This operation, conceived with

a view to securing the Atlantic sea lanes,

was eventually abandoned.27

Most of the argument over GYMNAST

seemed academic, before the end of December 1941, in the face of the shipping

shortage. A subcommittee set up by the

British-American planners, with General

23

 Min, ABC-4 JCCSs-1, 24 Dec 41. 24

 (1) Notes, SW, sub: Memo of Decisions at White

House, Sunday December 21, 1941, WDCSA 381

(12-21-41). (2) Notes, G. C. M. [Marshall], 23 Dec

41, sub: Notes on Mtg at White House With President and Br Prime Minister Presiding, WPD 4402-

136. (3) Min cited n. 23. (4) Matloff and Snell,

Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, Ch. V. (5) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 491-92. 25

 (1) Paper, Churchill for President, "Part I: The

Atlantic Front," 16 Dec 41, as quoted in Churchill,

The Grand Alliance, pp. 646-51. (2) Notes cited n.

24(2). 26

 Memo, Ridgway for Marshall, 23 Dec 41, Tab

Misc, Bk. 1, Exec 8. 27

 (1) Memo, Gen Embick, no addressee, no date,

sub: Notes on Est of Br CsofS, separate folder, Item

13, Exec 4. (2) Notes cited n. 24(2). (3) Draft study,

no date, title: Decline of the SUPER-GYMNAST Concept, OPD Hist Unit File.
PEARL HARBOR AND EARLY DEPLOYMENT 153

Somervell and Col. Charles P. Gross representing the Army, presented an array of

figures on the 26th that pointed inescapably to the conclusion that if GYMNAST

were attempted, no other major movements could be carried out in the Atlantic

until spring, at least. The limitation was

in troop-carrying shipping. Somervell's

staff had to reckon on a number of movements already ordered or in progress—to

Hawaii and Panama, Australia, Alaska,

Curasao and Aruba, and Iceland. Beyond

these undertakings and the maintenance

of other existing garrisons, there was

enough American troop shipping in the

Atlantic to lift a total of about 25,000

troops by mid-January, 43,000 by 1 February, 58,000 by 1 March, and 83,000 by

1 April. A smaller capacity was available

in the Pacific, but could not be transferred

to the Atlantic in so short a period. These

figures stood for something like a maximum effort. Losses were estimated at a

low level; transfers to Britain and assignment of more ships to lend-lease during

the three months in question were ruled

out. A number of the regular services, currently operating, would be interrupted.

No help could be expected from the British, who would be hard pressed to mount

their own part of the undertaking.28

The planners, meanwhile, had gone

ahead and studied some of the other logistical problems involved. A mass of more

or less fragmentary information, dating

back to the 1941 plans, offered little encouragement. The Atlantic coast line of

North Africa for most of its length, the

prevailing weather, the ground swell, and

the tide were all unfavorable for amphibious landings. Limited port facilities and

road and rail communications indicated

that the main landing on the Atlantic

coast would have to be made at Casablanca, with smaller ones at Fedala, Safi,

Rabat, and Port-Lyautey. Casablanca

was a large modern port, but hardly sufficient alone to permit a rapid build-up of

forces ashore. The target area was hemmed

in by the Atlas Mountains on the east and

El Rif mountains to the north. From

Casablanca the railroad, with a highway

closely parallelling it, stretched with very

few branch lines for over fourteen hundred

miles to Tunis, exposed most of the way to

attack from the north. At the end of December the American planners decided

that much larger forces than the British

had contemplated would be required, and

on 4 January the Joint Planning Committee conceded that "it will be impracticable in the near future to capture French

North Africa if important resistance is encountered."

 29

 On New Year's Day, meanwhile, the President and the Prime Minister had approved the measures already in

train to carry out the relief of British forces

in Northern Ireland and, eventually, both

the U.S. Marines and the British in Iceland. On the 4th, following the planners'

report on GYMNAST, they confirmed this

decision. The first North Atlantic movements were set up for the 15th—about

14,000 troops for Northern Ireland (MAGNET) and 6,000 for Iceland (Indigo).30

28

 Memo, Subcom for Allied JPC, 26 Dec 41, sub:

U.S. Shipg Capacity To Carry Trs Overseas, G-4/

29717-116. 29

 Memo, Rear Adm Richmond K. Turner for

Adms Stark and King, 4 Jan 42, sub: Status of Work

Before CsofS and JPC, with JCCSs-7 in ABC 337

ARCADIA (12-24-41), 2. 30

 (1) ABC-4/2, Rpt, JPC to CsofS, 25 Dec 41, title:

NW Africa Project, Item 13, Exec 4. (2) WPD study,

no date, title: Occupation of NW Africa, WPD 4510.

(3) Conf at White House, 1630, 26 Dec 41. (4) Rcd,

mtg at White House, 1830, 1 Jan 42. Last two in

WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Confs (1-28-42). (5) Memo,

CofS, no addressee, 1 Jan 42, sub: Initial Atlantic Tr

Mvmt, WDCSA 381, 1. (6) Jt A&N Dir for MAGNETINDIGO Mvmt, 4 Jan 42, G-4/33180. (7) Matloff and

Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, Ch. V.
154 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

GYMNAST remained on the books. It was

understood that the loading of the MAGNET-INDIGO convoy could be halted at any

time up to 13 January, if circumstances

called for immediate execution of the

North African expedition. Churchill was

anxiously waiting for news of victories in

Libya that never came; during the last

few days of December, in fact, Rommel

had struck back with disconcerting force.

Meanwhile, the Prime Minister was as

eager as the Americans to get on with the

North Atlantic movements, which were

tied in intricately with others extending

around the world to the Far East. These

were more pressing for the moment than

GYMNAST, and Churchill had no desire to

hold back "real ships from real jobs." He

and the President "could talk about the

matter again in a few days."

 31

The Search for Shipping for the Far East

Atlantic deployment and the orderly

strengthening of Pacific defenses were

both disrupted in the middle of January

by the march of events in the Far East.

During the first week of the new year the

Japanese drove swiftly down the last hundred miles of the Malay Peninsula toward

Singapore and on 7 January crushed

British imperial forces along the Sungei

Slim River, the last defensible barrier before the naval base. Since Japanese aircraft had sunk the British capital ships

Prince of Wales and Repulse on 10 December, Allied naval forces could only harass

without seriously impeding the flow of

enemy troops and material by sea. These

events menaced the entire Allied strategy

of a prolonged holding action against

Japan. On 11 January Admiral Stark

urged upon his colleagues the need for

"subordinating everything in the immediate future to the necessity for getting reinforcements quickly" to the Far East, even

if the movements to Northern Ireland and

Iceland had to be curtailed.32

General Marshall immediately pointed

out that it was not a question of diverting

troops, but one of finding ships. Two convoys had been set up to sail to Australia in

January, and despite serious altercations

with the Navy over escorts and allotment

of troopships, the first convoy sailed as

scheduled on the 12th—three troop transports carrying about seventy-five hundred

Air Corps and supporting service troops,

fifty pursuit planes, and a quantity of assorted ammunition, bombs, and maintenance supplies. Other material was to

follow on freighters sailing individually

without escort. A smaller convoy was

scheduled for the end of the month. But

hopes of shipping additional pursuit planes

and medium bombers with the mid-January convoy on the Navy's two converted

seatrains had been dashed when one was

held up for repairs and the Navy claimed

the other for its own use. As for troop

space, the large luxury liners that the British had already offered would not be

available during January.33 The program

31

 (1) Notes on conf at White House, 4 Jan 42,

WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Confs (1-28-42). (2) Churchill,

The Grand Alliance, pp. 684-85. 32

 (1) Min, ABC-4 JCCSs-9, 11 Jan 42. (2) Matloff

and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, Ch. IV. 33

 (1) Memo, Gross for Somervell, 26 Dec 41, sub:

Conf With Navy re Vessels to "X." (2) Memo, Gross

for CG SFPOE, 31 Dec 41, sub: Vessels To Accompany Convoy to "X." Both in G-4/33861. (3) Memo,

Gross for Somervell, 2 Jan 42, Pac folder, OCT HB.

(4) Rpt cited n. 9(4). (5) Memo, WPD (Navy) for

Ship Mvmts Div (Navy), 23 Dec 41, sub: Employment of Kitty Hawk and Hammondsport, G-4/33822.

There were five seatrains (large vessels able to

transport whole trains of railroad cars and locomotives); three were still in commercial service. The

Army made arrangements late in January to use the

latter, and in February the Maritime Commission

launched a program to construct fifty of this type of
PEARL HARBOR AND EARLY DEPLOYMENT 155

for building "overwhelming air power" in

the Southwest Pacific, as it stood, would

require three months. The immediate necessity, as General Marshall pointed out,

was to speed up the program—"to accelerate three months' movement into one

month, several weeks into two weeks."34

There was also the necessity for immediately strengthening the island approaches

to Australia. On 10 January the BritishAmerican planners, in their report on the

South Pacific island bases, pointed out

that the Japanese were then in a position

to strike at New Caledonia and the Fijis at

almost any time. From these positions the

enemy would be able to cut the flow of

troops and material to Australia.35

The Army moved rapidly, during early

January, to accelerate troop movements

as a countermeasure to this threat. Ten

thousand men—antiaircraft and service

units—were added to the 6,000 Air Corps

troops already scheduled for dispatch to

Australia. A task force (POPPY Force), consisting of a heavily augmented infantry

brigade of 16,000 combat and supporting

service troops, was formed to occupy New

Caledonia. Five thousand Air Corps and

engineer troops for Australia were to form

part of the same movement, and 10,000

additional Air Corps troops were set up

for later shipment. To explore the possibilities of finding shipping for these movements, the Allied Chiefs of Staff once

again called in the shipping experts—

General Somervell and his British opposite number, Brigadier Vernon M. C.

Napier.36

Their report, of which Somervell and

his staff were the principal authors, was

ready by the 12th. The situation with regard to troop shipping was clear enough

and offered little room for choice. Some

British troopers, including two or perhaps

three of the largest liners, were expected to

be available in February, as were several

other liners then operating commercially

in South American waters. The U.S.

Navy's block of combat loaders was then

engaged in amphibious training on the

Atlantic coast, and hitherto had been considered sacrosanct as far as troop ferrying

was concerned. The only sizable pool of

shipping otherwise available for the January movement was the MAGNET-INDIGO

flotilla, then loading at New York. Somervell offered three plans. One, which could

be put into effect by 1 February, contemplated using the Navy's combat loaders

and two liners from the South American

run. The second would use the liner Queen

Mary and four of the South American vessels about the middle of February. Since

neither of these would meet the time

schedule desired, Somervell proposed, as

the third alternative, to use most of the

MAGNET-INDIGO fleet, along with one other

transport, to move 21,800 troops about 20

January. With the remnant of that fleet,

along with the British liner Straithaird,

about 6,500 troops could still be shipped

to Northern Ireland and Iceland in the

same month. The one serious objection,

apart from the reduction in North Atlantic deployment, was that unloading and

reloading the shipping would involve

much confusion at New York.37

Cargo shipping presented a more difficult problem. Distance and the primitive

vessel; these were later converted into passenger vessels. See correspondence in G-4/33822, G-4/29717-

26, and G-4/29717-133 files; and Lane, Ships for Victory, pp. 145, 618.

34

 Min cited n. 32(1). 35

 (1) Ibid. (2) ABC-4/8 cited n. 20(2). 36

 (1) Min cited n. 32(1). (2) Matloff and Snell,

Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, pp. 114-19. 37

 Memo, G-4 for CofS, 12 Jan 42, sub: Shipg

Capabilities To Reinf ABDA Area, G-4/29717-115.
156 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

nature of local facilities at most of the Pacific bases made it necessary for troops to

take with them abnormally large reserves

of supplies and equipment—a heavy

drain on cargo space. The shortage of

cargo shipping was for the moment more

acute than that of troop transport. For

movements already scheduled, the Army

faced a shortage of twenty-six cargo vessels. Lend-lease shipments, particularly to

the USSR and the Middle East, promised

to cause a heavy drain on the pool of cargo

shipping, as did also imports of raw materials into the United States. Sinkings, as

yet unmatched by new construction, had

leaped upward with the entrance of the

United States into war. (See Appendix H.)

A few days before Somervell submitted

his report, the Maritime Commission announced that the limit had been reached,

for the present, in allocations of cargo

shipping for military undertakings. This

announcement, Somervell warned, meant

a probable shortage of one hundred thousand tons of cargo shipping for the original

MAGNET-INDIGO convoy, which therefore

would not be available for use in the

Pacific.38

Somervell thought the estimated twenty

cargo vessels, one tanker, and special carriers for medium bombers needed to support the POPPY Force movement should

be taken from other programs—British

lend-lease, strategic materials imports,

Soviet aid, the South American services.

"The ships are in being. It is assumed that

their use to support this endeavor will

transcend all other calls and that the President will so direct."

 39

 Somervell urged

further that all other overseas movements

be suspended, for the present, except for

about 9,000 troops a month to Northern

Ireland and the same number to Hawaii.

This would make it possible to maintain a

steady stream of about 12,000 a month to

the Far East.

On the 12th the Allied Chiefs of Staff,

with scant discussion, approved the plan

to divert most of the MAGNET-INDIGO convoy to the Far East, and reduced the cargo shipping problem to two alternatives

(or a combination of the two) —either

lend-lease shipments of tanks, vehicles,

and aircraft to the Middle East, or Soviet

aid would have to be cut. Their own recommendation was that shipments to the

Middle East should not be interrupted.

The problem was taken up to the White

House that same afternoon.40

Besides the President and Mr. Churchill, the military chiefs, Lord Beaverbrook,

and Harry Hopkins were present. As General Marshall posed the problem, the proposed movement would mean reducing

shipments to the USSR over the next four

months by 30 percent. The President's

first reaction was that "the plan sounded

good," but Churchill interjected that the

Russians "would undoubtedly be disappointed," and there was some discussion

of eliminating the New Caledonia portion

of the convoy. At this point Hopkins

broke in with the blunt observation that

the 30 percent reduction amounted to only

seven freighters which, he thought, surely

could be found somewhere; it should not

be necessary to "hold up General Marshall's plan on this account." This idea

took hold and in the end the President ap38

 (1) Memo, G-4 for CofS, 12 Jan 42, sub: Capacity of Shipg for War Effort Overseas in Early 1942,

G-4/29717-116. (2) Related papers in same file and

in Shipg 1941-43 folder, Hq ASF. 39

 Memo cited n. 37. 40

 (1) Min, ABC-4 JCCSs-10, 12 Jan 42. (2) Secretary Stimson also wrote the President urging that both

Soviet aid and Middle East lend-lease be cut in order

to support movements to the Far East. See memo, SW

for President, 12 Jan 42, sub: Alloc of Shipg To Reinf

Far East, G-4/29717-115.
PEARL HARBOR AND EARLY DEPLOYMENT 157

proved the plan with the remark that, for

Soviet requirements, "we will make

Beaverbrook and Hopkins find ships."41

The MAGNET-INDIGO shipping accordingly was unloaded, and the great POPPY

Force convoy sailed from New York late

on 22 January—seven vessels carrying

about 20,500 troops (including 4,000 service troops bound for Australia) and two

months' assorted supplies. A long voyage

and an uncertain destination lay ahead.

Marshall commented almost three weeks

later, "we have constantly in mind the

possibility of the New Caledonia force

being so badly needed in ABDA or Australia that it might never reach its projected destination."42

POPPY Force was the largest movement

yet attempted, and its arrangements were

complicated. The two-day postponement

of the original sailing date resulted from

the decision to combine the movement, in

order to save escorts, with that of the small

Bora Bora force sailing from Charleston a

few days later. The heavy organizational

impedimenta and much other material

were shipped later in unescorted freighters

sailing at intervals from the west coast. All

ships were routed first to Australia, where

they were to await their equipment, unload

material (especially aircraft) for forces in

Australia, and reload with a view to rapid

debarkation and possibly early action in

New Caledonia.43

These arrangements were sharply criticized. The Navy and even some Army

officers were outraged by a distribution of

cargo which, even if only one vessel were

sunk, would leave some units without any

equipment. The President, in Admiral

King's presence, demanded from General

Marshall an explanation of why the convoy had not been combat loaded directly

to New Caledonia, and Brigadier Napier,

the British shipping expert, was unhappy

about sending troops into a combat area

without their heavy equipment. But under

the circumstances, the Army had had little

choice. Shortage of cargo shipping and

lack of time dictated maximum economy

in stowage and use of all available vessels,

fast or slow, thus ruling out a single

combat-loaded, troop-and-cargo convoy;

the New York convoy was out loaded, in

fact, between 17 and 23 January, at the

same time that the Navy's Atlantic amphibious force, back from maneuvers, was

disembarking—a scrambled operation. In

any case, the Army did not possess sufficient combat loaders, and there was no

time for conversion. A further consideration was the immediate need for aircraft in

Australia. In short, the arrangements

aimed, as General Marshall explained, at

utilizing "to the utmost the available

capacity of shipping . . . at the sacrifice

of speed"; they seemed "the best way out

of a difficult situation."44

Though Soviet lend-lease shipments fell

41

 (1) Min of conf at White House, 12 Jan 42,

quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 460-

66. (2) Memo, CofS for WPD, G-3, and G-4, 13 Jan

42, G-4/33983. 42

 (1) Memo, Marshall for Dill, 11 Feb 42, WPD

37 18-25. (2) The largest vessel in the convoy was the

Kungsholm, a recently purchased Swedish liner. See

report, NYPOE Statistical Summary, in OCT HB. 43

 (1) Memo, G-4 for CofS, 18 Feb 42, sub: Moving

of Trs Directly to New Caledonia, G-4/33888. (2) Related papers in same file. (3) Memo, Gross for CG's

NYPOE and SFPOE, 15 Jan 42, sub: Shipt of Equip

and Sups Accompanying Mvmt to "X," G-4/33861.

(4) See also, Pac folder, OCT HB. (5) Harold Larson,

Water Transportation for the U.S. Army 1939-1942,

Monograph 5, p. 184, OCT HB. (6) For the Bora

Bora movement, see below, Ch. VII. 44

 (1) Memo, Marshall for King, 20 Jan 42, sub:

Loading of Trans, OCofS 21359-32. (2) Memo, Marshall for President, 23 Feb 42, OCofS 21381-7. (3)

Memo, Lt Col Carter B. Magruder for Br Chiefs G-4,

14 Jan 42, sub: Shipt 6814, Pac folder, OCT HB. (4)

Min cited n. 40(1). (5) Study, no date, title: Early

Orgn and Activities of Hq USAFIA, OCT HB.
158 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

behind schedule in January and February,

this could not be laid directly at the door

of the POPPY convoy. The burden of providing its cargo shipping seems to have

been distributed so widely over time and

other programs that it became imperceptible. Indeed, as Admiral Land and Maj.

Gen. Brehon B. Somervell admitted, the

estimated 30 percent reduction in Soviet

lend-lease was suspect to begin with; no

man could weigh with precision all the

variables that went into that elusive

abstraction, "available shipping."

 45

In the plans for February movements to

Australia, the large British liners played a

prominent part. In the second week of

January London tentatively promised the

"monsters" Queen Elizabeth and Aquitania

for February sailings from the west coast

and the Queen Mary for a run early in the

month to the Far East from the Atlantic

coast via the Cape of Good Hope and the

Indian Ocean. The "lesser monsters"—

Mauretania, Île de France, and Nieuw Amsterdam—which the British had been using to

ferry troops between South Africa and the

Middle East, were to be retained to move

Australian and New Zealand divisions

back to the Far East. The whole transaction was part of an intricate arrangement

by which several British troopers were to

be diverted to the U.S. east coast, on their

return trip from the Indian Ocean, to

transport American troops across the

North Atlantic to Northern Ireland and

Iceland.46

These plans went awry. Delayed for repairs, the Queen Mary finally sailed from

Boston on 18 February with a full complement of troops on the long eastward voyage to Australia. The Aquitania and Queen

Elizabeth were also held up for repairs and

neither sailed in February. The Aquitania

was later assigned to the Honolulu run because her unusually deep draft made the

anchorages at Australian and intermediate ports hazardous. She left San Francisco

on her first trip on 10 March. Queen Elizabeth did not reach San Francisco until the

middle of March, whence she sailed on

the 19th for Sydney. The loss of the two

"monsters" for South Pacific movements

during February was partially made up

by other vessels, temporarily diverted from

the Hawaii run. The giant Normandie, in

New York since late in 1941 being fitted

for troop duty, caught fire there on 9 February and was irreparably damaged—a

serious loss to Allied overseas deployment

during World War II. Troop movements to

Australia declined from 25,000 in January

to 20,000 in February, but cargo shipments rose from 115,000 to 212,000 measurement tons during the same period,

reflecting delayed shipments of equipment

and supplies supporting the January troop

movements.47

Change of Pace in the Atlantic

After a wild scramble of unloading and

reloading and shuffling of troop units, the

rump MAGNET-INDIGO convoy sailed from

45

 (1) See above, n. 41. (2) See also below, Ch. XIX. 46

 (1) See British file, Mvmts Div, OCT HB. (2)

See also, Wardlow, Trans I, Ch. VI.

The term "monsters" was used loosely, usually with

reference to the Queens, the Normandie, and the Aquitania; "lesser monsters" appears less frequently in the

records. Gradually both terms lost currency, possibly

because British officials in London requested they not

be used. 47

 (1) See British file, and Queen Mary and Normandie folders, OCT HB. (2) Rpt cited n. 9(4). (3) Memo,

G-4 for WPD, 5 Feb 42, sub: Shipg Capabilities in

Pac, G-4/33992. (4) Roland W. Charles, Troopships of

World War II (Washington, Army Transportation

Assn, 1947). (5) Rpt cited n. 42(2). (6) See below,

App. E.
PEARL HARBOR AND EARLY DEPLOYMENT 159

New York on 15 January—four ships

crammed with some seven thousand

troops. The Northern Ireland contingent

amounted to only a quarter of that originally planned, while the Iceland contingent, a little less than three thousand, left

the Marine brigade still unrelieved.48 For

a time it looked as though the flow of deployment across the North Atlantic might

be resumed in February with full force,

using the Queen Mary, the old coal-burner

George Washington (recently in British service but returned as unfit), and other British

transports returning from the Indian

Ocean. The principal movement was

scheduled for about 10 February. But

London decided that the Queen Mary could

not be risked at this time in the dangerous

North Atlantic waters, and the old George

Washington could not be coaxed out of dry

dock. Considerable troop capacity remained, but cargo shipping became the

main bottleneck. On 25 January the Joint

Planning Committee concluded, on the

basis of the decision that lend-lease and

the nonmilitary programs could not be

touched, that the 10 February convoy

would have to be abandoned. The newly

organized Combined Chiefs of Staff faced

the question of whether North Atlantic

deployment should be allowed to lapse

until the cargo shipping sent to the Far

East returned late in May. Once again the

heads of state had to render a decision.

The President and Mr. Churchill decided

on 27 January that the Navy's fleet of

combat loaders and specially rigged

cargo vessels, hitherto reserved for amphibious training for a possible North

African operation, should be used for a

single voyage across the North Atlantic.

Delayed by difficulties in finding British

escort vessels, the convoy of Navy ships

and three Army transports left New York

on the night of 18-19 February carrying

about fourteen thousand troops.49

Throughout the late winter and the

spring the cargo shipping shortage remained the most acute problem in North

Atlantic deployment. Movement of cargo

was further impeded, during January and

February, by port congestion at Reykjavik, Iceland. Routing the contingents

bound for Iceland raised problems of

escorting and added a sizable lap to each

transatlantic voyage. Beginning in March

cargo shipments to Iceland began to rise

as harbor congestion was broken, but the

movement of troops to both Iceland and

Northern Ireland in March and most of

April virtually lapsed. Except for a small

shipment of about 4,000 troops to Iceland

early in April, no large movement across

the North Atlantic occurred until the last

day of that month when 19,000 troops

embarked.50

GYMNAST, meanwhile, remained on the

shelf. In mid-January the British Eighth

Army's offensive was losing momentum

and Rommel receiving reinforcements.

On the 14th the Allied chiefs definitely

placed the North African operation in a

priority below MAGNET and INDIGO and

approved a revised version of GYMNAST to

be executed whenever the means and opportunity presented. D Day was tentatively set for 25 May, the earliest date that

48

 (1) See NYPOE folder, and British file, OCT

HB. (2) Papers in Shipg 1941-43, ACofS G-4, and

ACofS OPD folders, Hq ASF. (3) Papers in G-4/

33940 and G-4/33180. (4) Rpt cited n. 42(2). 49

 (1) Paper, U.S. JPS to CPS, 25 Jan 42, sub:

Mvmt of U.S. Trs to N Ireland, with CPS 4 in ABC

370.5 N Ireland (1-22-42). (2) Min, 2d mtg CCS, 27

Jan 42. (3) Rpt cited n. 42(2). (4) See also above, n.

48.

50

 (1) Rpt cited n. 42(2). (2) Corresp in G-4/33180.

(3) See also below, Ch. XII.

The last marines left Iceland on 9 March.
160 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

EN ROUTE TO NORTHERN IRELAND, February 1942.

some 230,000 measurement tons of cargo

shipping could return from the far Pacific.

An earlier launching date might be managed, if a favorable opportunity should

suddenly offer itself, by using the Navy's

amphibious shipping. This would be risky

since only about 12,000 troops could be

moved in these vessels and seven months

would be consumed in shuttling less than

100,000 troops to North Africa. Nor would

this remedy the shortage of cargo shipping,

which could only be found by robbing

other undertakings. The decision to use

the amphibious shipping for North Atlantic movements in February eliminated all

possibility of launching GYMNAST until

April, in any case. Late in February,

finally, a new study by Somervell indicated that by June the Army's current

deployment schedule would completely

absorb the cargo shipping available for

military use. For the Army to mount

GYMNAST with its own resources would

mean suspending North Atlantic movements altogether and reducing the reinforcement of the southwestern Pacific and

Hawaii to a trickle. There was more shipping to be had, of course; the British and

the U.S. Navy held some, and large tonnages were still tied up in commercial

services. Fundamental preliminary decisions were required—on strategy, longrange deployment, and allocation of shipping—and in the end the President would

probably have to make them. Until then,

"planning for a movement such as Super-
PEARL HARBOR AND EARLY DEPLOYMENT 161

QUONSET HUTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND and newly arrived troops.

Gymnast must necessarily be nebulous."51

Somervell's study provided the clinching arguments that led the chiefs to conclude that GYMNAST would not be "a

practical possibility during 1942." On

3 March plans for the operation were formally relegated to an "academic" basis;

training and planning continued, but

actual resources would now be available

for other ventures.52

Pressure of Scarcity in Hawaii

Troop deployment to the Central

Pacific in January and February 1942 was

confined to movement of the garrisons for

Christmas and Canton and small reinforcements for Hawaii, a total of about

forty-five hundred troops. Though the flow

of material was substantially greater than

in December, it fell far below the expectations of Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, who

51

 (1) Memo, G-4 for WPD, 14 Feb 42, sub: Shipg

for SUPER-GYMNAST, G-4/34025. This was circulated

as CPS 2/3, 21 Feb 42. (2) SUPER-GYMNAST—code

name given the plan for an Anglo-American invasion

of French North Africa, combining U.S. and British

plans and often used interchangeably with GYMNAST.

(3) Min cited n. 41(1). (4) Memo, Gross for Somervell, 13 Jan 42, sub: Ability To Execute SUPERGYMNAST, Plng Div Studies folder, OCT HB. (5)

ABC-4/2 A, Rpt, JPC to CsofS, 13 Jan 42, title: Opn

SUPER-GYMNAST. (6) Memo, Somervell for CofS, 13

Jan 42, sub: Shipg Criticism of Jt Rpt to CsofS on

SUPER-GYMNAST, G-4/32697-19. (7) Matloff and

Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, Ch. V. 52

 (1) CCS 5/2, 3 Mar 42, title: SUPER-GYMNAST.

(2) Min, 9th mtg CCS, 3 Mar 42. (3) See also, Craven

and Cate, AAF I, p. 614.
162 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

had relieved General Short as commander

of the Hawaiian Department on 17 December.53

 Emmons had seen his department superseded on the priority list first

by Australia and then by the ferry islands.

On 15 January he sent a bitter message to

the War Department in which he complained that shipping was standing idle on

the Pacific west coast, awaiting assignment

of naval escorts, while thousands of tons of

critically needed materials were piled on

docks and in warehouses at San Francisco

and Los Angeles. His convoys, he declared,

were being retarded by slow ships, and

valuable cargo space was being wasted by

loading low-priority supplies (including a

shipment of beer) at the expense of badly

needed items.

General Marshall in reply pointed out

that there were not enough fast ships to go

around, and that slow ones would have to

be employed whenever and wherever possible, especially on the short Honolulu

run. He denied that there were empty

freighters on the west coast. Frequency of

shipments, he pointed out, depended in

the last analysis upon intertheater priorities and on the Navy's escort policy, both

matters over which the War Department

could not exercise exclusive control. The

order in which items had been shipped

had been determined by Emmons' own

priorities. Marshall reminded Emmons

pointedly of the over-all shortage of shipping and told him his supply agencies

must "confine their requests to bare necessities exploiting local resources and facilities to the utmost."

 54

General Emmons' discontent was not

allayed. His requests in January included

a quantity of sulfanilamide greater than

the total capacity of U.S. industry, over

thirty-seven thousand of the new Garand

rifles to arm the civilian population, and

enough rocket guns (a weapon still under

development) to defend fifteen airfields.

He approached the Matson Navigation

Co. directly in an effort to obtain more

ships. Finally, near the end of February,

he poured out his troubles to a Mr. William H. Husted, a representative of the

War Production Board (WPB) then in

Honolulu investigating scrap iron shipments. Husted was so impressed that he

sent a long report, sharply critical of the

War Department, to his own superiors,

which Emmons supplemented by a personal letter to Donald M. Nelson, chairman of the WPB. Emmons gave a copy of

Husted's report to Assistant Secretary of

War McCloy, who visited the islands in

March. Mr. Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of

the Interior, meanwhile learned of the

report's contents, and passed on to James

V. Forrestal, Under Secretary of the Navy,

some of Husted's allegations of ArmyNavy friction in Hawaii. Thus, before the

War Department could act, the matter

had become more or less public property

within government circles.55

The gist of Husted's charges was that

the Army supply system had "broken

down completely" in Hawaii. Gasoline

stocks had fallen to eighteen days' supply;

the cement shortage was so acute that

53

 (1) Control Division, ASF, Statistical Review,

World War II (Washington, 1946). (2) See also above,

Ch. V. 54

 (1) Msg, CofS to CG HD, 16 Jan 42, AG 381 (11-

27-41) Far Eastern Sit, Sec 1. General Somervell's

draft was more blunt; see Central Pac 1942-44 folder,

Hq ASF. (2) Msg, Emmons to TAG, 15 Jan 42, AG

381 (11 -27-41) Far Eastern Sit, Sec 1. 55

 (1) Corresp in G-4/33822. (2) Memo, G-4 for

CofEngrs, 2 Mar 42. (3) Memo, G-4 for CG HD, 24

Feb 42, sub: Contl of Shipts From W Coast to Hawaii.

Last two in G-4/33817. (4) Rpt, Husted to Mr. E. A.

Locke, Jr., 4 Mar 42, sub: Honolulu and Critical

Shortages, filed with most of the related corresp in

Hawaiian Sup Sit envelope, Plng Div ASF.
PEARL HARBOR AND EARLY DEPLOYMENT 163

seventy-three freighters, plying continuously for three months, would be needed

to remedy it; aircraft spare parts were

almost exhausted; ammunition stocks were

too small "for even a half-hearted defense

of the islands"; there were no gas masks

for children under five years of age.

Husted repeated the complaint about slow

ships, pointed to the tanker shortage, and

mentioned such chronic problems as inefficient loading, shipment of low-priority

material, and lack of discharge facilities

and labor in Honolulu. "Additional shipping," the report declared, "should and

must be assigned to the Honolulu route,"

if necessary by diverting it from the Atlantic. Husted also charged that the Army

and Navy, below the top levels, were at

loggerheads, refusing to co-ordinate such

matters as the supply of oil and aviation

gasoline. There seemed to be, he thought,

"a woeful lack of understanding that this

is a real war."56

A special feature of Hawaii's supply

problem was the prominence of civilian

interests, both organized and unorganized.

General Emmons, as military governor,

controlled the civilian as well as the military economy. Beneath the tight clamp of

Hawaii's low strategic priorities, the more

powerful of these interests—notably the

large construction, power, and shipping

firms known as the "Big Five"—had

already sought to bring pressure to bear

through unofficial channels. With these

interests, the military administration of

the islands had close ties.57 Both Emmons

and Husted emphasized the interdependence of military and civilian needs in

Hawaii. Husted urged that the local electrical, acetylene gas, and railroad facilities

be secured against attack at all costs, and

pointed out the detrimental effects that

gasoline rationing and breakdowns in airmail service would have upon civilian

morale.

The climax of Husted's report was his

accusation that the War Department had

shown no understanding of the problem

and that "there has been no attempt to

rectify an obviously bad situation." Husted

based his charge presumably on information received from Emmons and his staff,

and Emmons himself remarked shortly

afterward in a letter to Lt. Gen. Brehon B.

Somervell, "I think the report speaks for

itself."

 58

 He hastened to assure General

Marshall, on the other hand, that "we

need lots of things, but understand the situation."

 59

 Subsequently he complained

that Husted had misrepresented him, and

he explicitly disavowed the charges of

non-co-operation with the Navy.60 At all

events, even before Husted's report burst

over the War Department, supply shipments to Hawaii had begun to mount in

volume. During March three large convoys to Honolulu moved over 200,000

measurement tons, consisting entirely of

material Emmons had requisitioned earlier. In March and early April, moreover,

as the Aquitania was put on the Hawaii

run, the 27th Division was sent out to bolster the defenses there. On the other hand,

for lack of new priorities, the bulk of some

56

 Rpt cited n. 55(4). 57

 Husted was a friend of Alexander Budge, president of the firm of Castle and Cooke, of Honolulu,

who is mentioned as representing General Emmons

at San Francisco in efforts to secure priorities for essential materials. See letter, Emmons to D. M. Nelson,

24 Feb 42, in Hawaiian Sup Sit envelope, Plng Div

ASF; and other papers in same file. 58

 Ltr, Emmons to Somervell, 21 Mar 42, Hawaiian

Sup Sit envelope, Plng Div ASF. 59

 Memo, Emmons for CofS, 9 Mar 42, WDCSA

520 (3-5-42). 60

 U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific and Predecessor Commands, WD hist monograph, Vol. IV, Pt. 2,

pp. 1023-24, OCMH.
164 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

115,000 measurement tons of engineer

materials that had been piled on the docks

at San Francisco since early January remained unshipped. A few additional

tankers were assigned to the Central Pacific area, but no important changes were

made in the existing distribution of dry

cargo shipping.61

Emmons' "out of the ordinary" procedure (as Judge Patterson dryly called it),

in taking his case directly to the War Production Board, went largely unreprimanded.62

 The Chief of Staff admonished

him mildly for his "direct action" and

requested him to "please have your people

keep within channels"

 63—language that

represented considerable toning-down of

a stronger message drafted for him by

Somervell. What caused more concern

was the evident failure of the Hawaiian

commander to appreciate or accept the

larger exigencies that had relegated His

theater to a secondary strategic role. On

the matter of shipping, for example, Somervell pointed out to Emmons that neither

the Husted report nor his own communications showed any awareness of the "priorities between overseas theaters and

departments prescribed by the President,

and limitations of shipping to meet overall requirements throughout the world."64

Judge Patterson commented bluntly that

the report "ignores completely these conflicting demands for shipping."

 65

By this time, however, "localitis" had

become a recognized and well-nigh universal malady among theater commanders. From Australia, Lt. Gen. George

H. Brett had already added his voice to

MacArthur's in calling for a reversal of

the whole ARCADIA strategy in order to

pour enough troops and war matériel into

the Australia-New Zealand area to permit

a sustained offensive. Theater commanders

themselves sometimes had to cope with a

similar attitude among their own subordinates. The Army commander on Canton

Island somewhat later appealed to Under

Secretary of the Navy Forrestal to rectify

"the cramped thinking of our supply and

operations, both in the War Department

and in the Hawaiian Department" with a

view to building up Canton to "an installation and armament comparable to Midway." Like Emmons before him, this officer

was convinced that the needed material

was actually available in abundance,

"right in Oahu, if they would only see the

right people and look around a bit." Above

all, he felt that his post was a pivot of the

war effort, "the most important link in the

chain of air communication and ferry

routes on the entire supply line from Oahu

to Australia. . . ."66

A myopic view of the broader needs of

global strategy was only to be expected,

perhaps, in a local commander at any level

from theater down. Recognizing in the

abstract that other war areas also had

pressing needs, each commander naturally

felt that his own were more real and

61

 (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, Somervell to Emmons, 4 Apr 42,

with tabs. (3) Memo, Brig Gen LeRoy Lutes for Gen

Somervell, 10 Mar 42, sub: Gasoline Sup, Hawaii.

Last two in Hawaiian Sup Sit envelope, Plng Div

ASF. 62

 Memo, USW for WPD, 5 Mar 42, with Husted

rpt incl, Hawaiian Sup Sit envelope, Plng Div ASF. 63

 Memo, CofS for CG HD, 5 Mar 42, OCofS 520

(3-5-42). A draft copy, corrected in Marshall's hand,

is in Hawaiian Sup Sit envelope, Plng Div ASF. 64

 Ltr, Somervell to Emmons, 12 Mar 42, Hawaiian

Sup Sit envelope, Plng Div ASF. 65

 Memo cited n. 62. 66

 (1) Ltr, Lt Col Robert A. Ellsworth to USN, 28

Aug 42, OPD 381 Canton Island, 3. This officer requested his addressee to "please treat this as a very

personal and confidential letter." In an earlier visit

to Canton, Forrestal had talked to the commander

and asked him to write a letter. Ellsworth was eventually transferred to another command. (2) Corresp

in OPD 472.91 (9-16-42); and OPD 210.31 PTO, 18.

(3) Msg, CG USAFIA to WD, 11 Mar 42, OPD 381

Australia, 19.
PEARL HARBOR AND EARLY DEPLOYMENT 165

urgent, and found it difficult to appreciate

a strategy that did not accord them the

highest priority. Nor was the phenomenon

altogether to be deplored, since men

usually achieve more when they believe

firmly in the transcendant importance of

what they do. But while recognizing this,

the War Department expected overseas

commanders, even if they were not convinced of the wisdom of approved strategy,

to exercise judgment and moderation in

pressing their requirements. In the middle

of March the War Department laid down

for all theaters a general policy of economy in materials and shipping. "Shortage

of shipping requires that you reduce drastically the amount of construction required

in your command. Resurvey your needs,

reduce them to the minimum, and report

changes in your requirements."

 67

Three months after Pearl Harbor the

Army's deployment was flowing mainly

into the theaters of the Japanese war, concentrating particularly on the effort to

build a base in Australia and to secure the

line of communications leading to it. The

establishment of American land and air

power in the Atlantic region, assigned

highest priority in RAINBOW 5, was running a poor second. This shift in emphasis

had not been an immediate result of the

Japanese onslaught in early December.

For three weeks following Pearl Harbor

the U.S. high command had sought to

compromise between the measures immediately necessary to bolster American

defenses on the west coast and along the

Alaska-Hawaii-Panama triangle, and the

North Atlantic deployment scheduled in

RAINBOW 5. And with the arrival of

Churchill and his entourage in Washington toward the end of December, planning

began to look hopefully toward an early

stabilization of the situation in the Far

East that would permit heavier American

deployment in the North Atlantic and

perhaps an Anglo-American descent upon

North Africa.

It was the rapid march of Japanese arms

toward Singapore and the Netherlands

Indies and the growing isolation of the

Philippines that, beginning in January,

brought a sharp shift in emphasis to Australia and the intervening island chain. In

contrast to December when almost no

troops and only 13 percent of cargo shipments went to this area, during the three

months January through March it absorbed over 50 percent of total troop

deployment and 33 percent of cargo shipments. Because of the tremendous distances and other logistical difficulties

involved, this shift had an impact on

movements to other areas that was out of

all proportion to the number of troops and

the cargo tonnages actually sent to the

South and Southwest Pacific. Movements

to the Caribbean and to Alaska, employing small coastal vessels to a large extent,

were little affected, and cargo shipments

to Hawaii, for all General Emmons' complaints, continued in an expanding volume

through March. However, the flow of

troops to Hawaii, until the sailing of the

27th Division late in March, shriveled to

almost nothing. And in the North Atlantic, where large movements had been

looked for, deployment of both troops and

cargo was an insignificant part of the total

outflow during this period—only 12 percent of all troop and 9 percent of all cargo

shipments. What had been discussed as

the opening move in the Anglo-American

counteroffensive against the European

Axis, the occupation of North Africa, now

had to be shelved indefinitely.

67

 (1) Msg, WD to Theater Comdrs, 17 Mar 42,

WDCSA 520. (2) See also below, Ch. XXIII.
CHAPTER VII

Improvisation in the Pacific

The United States had plunged into a

war in what was, for the Army, a new,

strange, and distant theater. Since mid1941 planning for this theater had been

curiously back-handed, resting on the

premise that defenses in the Far East could

be built to such impressive strength before

Japan was ready to strike that she would

not attempt to overcome them. Supply

planning and operations, geared to this

hope, had all been directed toward a

rapid build-up of equipment and supplies

in the Philippines, and little thought had

been given to the problem of continuous

logistical support from the United States

to forces in the Far East. The Japanese attack in December 1941 entirely upset

these calculations. As long as the Japanese

retained the initiative, both American

strategy in the Pacific and its logistical

support were necessarily shaped by shortterm considerations. Supply plans and operations had to dispense with methodical

calculations—the logisticians' stock-intrade—and it proved impossible to develop a stable pattern of supply organization until after the initial force of the Japanese drive had waned.

The most pressing need in the Pacific

was for bases that could be held against

the initial Japanese onslaught and eventually used to mount counteroffensives.

The first effort to develop such bases

stemmed from the immediate need to forward supplies to the Philippines and the

Netherlands Indies. This effort failed but

it did determine the direction of logistical

effort in the Pacific. With the collapse of

Allied defenses, first in the Indies and then

in the Philippines, the embryonic American bases in Australia and the chain of islands in the South Pacific leading to them

became the natural line of defense and

communications, one that had to be

strengthened and held if the far Pacific

were not to be abandoned altogether.

The Australian Base

The decision in Washington in mid-December 1941 to establish a supply base in

Australia grew out of the determination

not to abandon the Philippines. In General Eisenhower's plan of 17 December,

Australia was to serve as the rear base for

logistical support of the Philippine battle

front.1 In the days following, the General

Staff hastily worked out the details of the

Australian project. Plan "X," completed

by G-4 on 20 December, set forth in general terms the intended method of building up supplies in Australia and the Philippines. The plan established sixty days of

supply as the tentative objective for accumulation of stocks of all items, including

ammunition, in both areas. Material and

equipment required to build up these reserves were to be shipped to Australia,

without requisition, as rapidly as available

shipping and supplies permitted. To relieve pressure on scarce shipping, General

1

 See above, Ch. VI.
IMPROVISATION IN THE PACIFIC 167

Brett was ordered to exploit Australian

resources to the fullest extent. Tentative

arrangements were made with the Navy

for forwarding critical items to MacArthur

from Australia, under the assumption that

Darwin, Australia's northernmost port,

could be converted in short order into a

major air and sea transshipment point.

Reinforcements and supplies were to be

landed at Brisbane, sent overland to Darwin, and thence forwarded to the Philippines via air and blockade runners. Other

shipments would be sent directly from San

Francisco and Panama into Darwin.2

Plan "X" was carried to the theater by

Col. Stephen J. Chamberlin, slated to become chief of staff to General Brett, and

the first of a series of War Department

emissaries. Chamberlin did not get to

Australia until 9 January 1942, by which

time Plan "X" had been completely outdated by the march of events in the Philippines. Late in December MacArthur

withdrew his forces to the Bataan Peninsula and sent his few remaining B-17

bombers to Australia under his air commander, Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton. At

this point the War Department determined to attempt to build up overwhelming air power in the Far East, based no

longer on the Philippines but on Australia,

with advance operating bases in the

Netherlands Indies. Instructions to Brett

in late December and early January

stressed the immediate need to prepare a

base establishment in Australia—airfields,

air depots, and maintenance facilities.

The Far East Air Force under Brereton

was specifically exempted from Brett's

command, but Brett was given the major

responsibility for supporting it. The War

Department was thus placing upon Brett's

command a double logistical burden—the

continuing effort to supply the Philippines, as stressed in Plan "X," and the

task of building up a base establishment to

support air power disposed in depth.3

For either mission, let alone both, the

logistical difficulties were staggering.

When Brett arrived in Australia on 29

December 1941 his command, designated

U.S. Army Forces in Australia, consisted

of about four thousand U.S. troops, mostly

artillerymen unversed in supply operations, who had arrived on the Pensacola

convoy. Sizable reinforcements from the

United States would not begin to reach

Australia until late in January. With this

handful of troops Brett had to begin the

immense task of developing a supply line

across a sparsely populated and generally

undeveloped continent of nearly three

million square miles. Australia's ports, industry, agriculture, and population were

concentrated in a narrow strip of land extending southward along the coast from

Brisbane (midway up the eastern seaboard) around to Perth and Fremantle in

the southwestern corner of the continent.

Five million of its seven million people

were settled in the coastal fringe between

Brisbane and Adelaide (midway to Perth),

the majority of them crowded into the

southeastern tip of the country. The thin

rim of seaboard settlement enclosed a vast

wasteland sprawled over the central portion of Australia. Communications were

2

 (1) Ltr, TAG to CG U.S. Forces in Australia, 20

Dec 41, sub: G-4 Admin Order—Plan "X," AG 381

(12-20-41) MSC-D-M. (2) Rpt, JPC to JB, 21 Dec

41, sub: Agreement on Orgn and Consolidation of

A&N Support . . . in Pac, Netherlands E Indies,

and Australia, JB 325, Ser 738. 3

 (1) See above, Ch. VI. (2) Msg, TAG to Mil Attache Australia for Brett, 2 Jan 42, AG 381 (11-27-

41). (3) Col Julian F. Barnes, Report of Organization

and Activities of U.S. Forces in Australia, December

7, 1941 to June 30, 1942, photostat, Pt. II, p. 34,

OCMH. (4) Msgs exchanged between Marshall and

MacArthur, Msg 3-5 files, WPD. (5) Matloff and

Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, Ch. IV.
168 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

poor and generally concentrated along the

coasts, an inviting target for attack. Rail

lines were few, mostly single track, and of

five different gauges, requiring frequent

transshipment. For lack of modern equipment, manual labor had to be used to

transfer freight, with an average delay of

about twenty-four hours at each transshipment point. A single railroad wound

around the coastline from Perth to Cairns,

on the east coast north of Townsville;

north-south communication consisted of

two lines, one stretching three hundred

miles into the interior south from Darwin

and the other one thousand miles north

from Adelaide, the two being connected

by a six-hundred-mile stretch of gravel

road. More than half of Australia's motor

roads could not be used for military transport and the best of them were concentrated, with the bulk of the nation's other

economic facilities, in the southeast.4

Air operations in the Netherlands Indies

and Philippines would have to be based

upon the undeveloped areas in the north.

Townsville, on the east coast about eight

hundred miles north of Brisbane, and

Darwin, in the north, had been chosen as

termini of the air ferry route on which

work had begun late in 1941, but little

had been done to develop these areas.

Darwin was an isolated outpost in Australia's desolate back country, its facilities

primitive. Water there was very scarce

and would have to be impounded to meet

the needs of a military base; there was

shelter for only seven hundred men and

little labor for construction work. Darwin's air base was in an embryonic stage,

and the good natural harbor had few

docking facilities. Practically all the supplies, equipment, and construction material, together with the troops required to

set up and defend the base, would have to

be brought in by water. Water routes were

long, and coastwise movements were subject to the continuous threat of enemy attack. At Darwin there would inevitably

be delays in unloading material.5

With the best will in the world, Australia simply did not have resources for

the tremendous effort required. Australian

manpower, scant to begin with, had already been drained for her military forces

and war industries. Her continental defenses were at rock bottom, the best of her

troops and the bulk of her military equipment having been sent overseas. Her

economy was already stretched tight by

the demands of two years of war and was

scarcely sufficient to meet her own requirements. While a large part of the basic

U.S. Army ration, items of clothing, and

the like could be obtained locally, only a

brief survey was needed to convince

Americans in Australia that the great bulk

of military supplies—including construction equipment and construction labor—

would have to come from the United

States.6

During the last days of December 1941

Brett, accompanied by Brereton, made a

rapid survey of Australia's resources.

Mindful of War Department orders to

establish bases in Australia adequate to

support air power in depth, Brett decided

4

 (1) James R. Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1941-1947, monograph, pp. 656-59, 687-97, OCMH. (2) Sumner

Welles, ed., An Intelligent American's Guide to the Peace

(New York, Dryden Press, 1945), pp. 146-50. (3) Msg

9, Brett to TAG, 5 Jan 42, Msg 5 file, Case 303, WPD.

(4) Msg 36, Brett to TAG, 2 Jan 42, Msg 5 file, Case

148, WPD. (5) Msg 143, Maj Gen Julian F. Barnes to

AGWAR, 31 Jan 42, Pac folder, OCT HB. 5

 (1) Msgs cited n. 4(3) and n. 4(4). (2) Msg, Brett

to TAG, 3 Jan 42, Msg 5 file, Case 386, WPD. 6

 (1) Ltr, Brig Gen Stephen J. Chamberlin to Gen

Somervell, 26 Feb 42, Logis File, OCMH. (2) Barnes

rpt, Incl 19, cited n. 3(3). (3) Milner, Victory in

Papua, Chs. I-II.
IMPROVISATION IN THE PACIFIC 169

that the country must be transformed into

a "second England." "I am firmly convinced," he reported to Marshall on 2

January, "that it is essential to have a

stable establishment in Australia prior to

large-scale tactical operations."

 7 At conferences with the Australian authorities

and with General Wavell at Melbourne

in early January, he outlined a plan for a

series of bases along the Brisbane-Townsville-Darwin line in support of air operations in the Netherlands Indies. The

Americans, he asserted, were prepared to

build from the ground up, if necessary,

and in defiance of logistical obstacles.8

In a steady stream of cables to the War

Department early in January, Brett listed

his needs: for his staff, a group of experienced air supply officers; for defense of his

northern bases, four regiments and four

battalions of antiaircraft troops, two airwarning service organizations, and 180

barrage balloons with operating personnel;

for aircraft maintenance, two completely

equipped mobile air depots; for base construction, three separate engineer battalions, one general service regiment, three

engineer aviation companies, and a long

list of supplies including one hundred

thousand tons of asphalt, thirty asphaltproducing plants, crushing plants, compressors, jack hammers, screening plants

for gravel, explosives, landing mat; for

transportation, rail and rolling stock,

trucks, gasoline storage tanks, and operating personnel.9

Brett's plans to build a "second England" were not unreasonable in view of

the instructions he had received, but

when his lists began to roll in, War Department officials were dismayed. No

shipping was in sight to move such quantities of men and material, even if all

planned moves in the Atlantic were abandoned. In separate messages originating in

G-4 and WPD, Brett was ordered to apply the brakes. WPD told him he must restrict his requirements to those "absolutely

necessary for effective air and anti-air operations of the immediate future;"

 10

 G-4

warned that construction must be limited

to "pioneer," "theater of operations"

types, employing the "more primitive facilities and methods" available in the theater.11

Clearly, there was an enormous disparity between the War Department's

announced aims and actual logistical

capabilities in the southwestern Pacific.

The General Staff had no choice but to

insist on improvisation and short-term

supply plans, but almost coincident with

its veto of Brett's plan, the War Department, responding to new and urgent appeals from MacArthur, renewed pressure

on USAFIA to bend every effort to break

through the blockade of the Philippines.

Taken aback by the obvious disparity between what he was asked to do and the

means with which he was expected to do

it, Brett could only quote his earlier instructions and reiterate his requests.12

7

 Msg cited n. 4(4). 8

 Barnes rpt, Incls 11a, 13a, and 13b, cited n. 3(3). 9

 (1) Msgs cited n. 4(3) and n. 5(2). (2) Msg, Brett

to TAG, 3 Jan 42, Msg 5 file, Case 151, WPD. (3)

Msg, Brett to TAG, 6 Jan 42, Msg 5 file, Case 351,

WPD. (4) Msg 5, Brett to TAG, 7 Jan 42, Msg 5 file,

Case 359, WPD. (5) Msg 6, Brett to TAG, 7 Jan 42,

Msg 5 file, Case 258, WPD. (6) Msg 17, Brett to

TAG, 9 Jan 42, Msg 5 file, Case 498, WPD. (7) See

summaries of msg cited n. 4(4); Msg 8, Brett to TAG,

4 Jan 42; and msg, Brett to TAG, 8 Jan 42, in G-4/

33861. 10

 Memo, ACofS WPD for TAG, 8 Jan 42, sub:

Personnel and Sup Policy in Australia, Msg 5 file,

Case 418, WPD. 11

 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, 8 Jan 42, sub: Gen

Brett's Requests for Construction Equip and Mats,

G-4/33861-2. 12

 (1) Msgs in AG 381 (11-27-41) Far Eastern Sit,

Sec 1, and in G-4/33861. (2) Msg, Brett to AGWAR,

14 Jan 42, Msg 6 file, Case 771, WPD.
170 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Meanwhile, the Australian base had assumed a new importance in relation to

General Wavell's ABDA Command. Only

northern Australia was included in the

territorial boundaries of the ABDA Command, but Australia was visualized as the

base through which men and materials

from the United States would be fed into

the fighting zone, in the same manner that

India would serve as the base for men and

materials coming from Britain and the

Middle East. General Brett relinquished

his Australian command to become deputy to Wavell and Intendant-General of

ABDA Command, which post gave him

general supervision over all rear area administration and supply. Brereton was assigned command of all U.S. air operations

in the ABDA area. Command of USAFIA

fell temporarily to Maj. Gen. Julian F.

Barnes, commanding officer of the troops

that had arrived in the Pensacola convoy.

Because of the growing isolation of the

Philippines, USAFIA was withdrawn from

MacArthur's command and made an appendage of the ABDA Command, though

its supply responsibilities for MacArthur's

forces remained the same. Thus USAFIA,

despite its slender resources, had to assume

responsibilities for supply support of

American forces stretching from the Philippines to Java and Australia.

The War Department wanted to place

the whole command under Brereton,

whose air operations it was charged with

supporting; there were not enough senior

U.S. officers in the area to permit separate

tactical and logistical commands under an

over-all American commander. For a few

hectic days in January, Brereton held the

USAFIA command and, on another flying visit to Australia, shook up the organization there. Brereton was dissatisfied both

with the conglomeration of responsibilities

now thrust upon him, and with Barnes'

efforts to push supply shipments through

to the Philippines and Java. At Brereton's

behest, Wavell made representations to

Washington that he (Brereton) could not

properly handle air operations in the Indies and also direct a logistical establishment three thousand miles to the rear.

General Marshall accordingly relieved

the latter of the unwelcome burden of

USAFIA. The luckless Barnes was restored to that command and lectured on

his mission to "provide timely and effective logistical support" to Brereton, now

once again commanding American air

forces in the ABDA area; "his calls upon

you," Marshall told him, "must be answered promptly and effectively."

 13

Probing the Japanese Blockade

The Japanese, meanwhile, were rapidly

closing the avenues to the Philippines and

overrunning the weak defenses in the

Netherlands Indies. The first American

surface shipments from Australia to the

Netherlands Indies were those aboard the

Bloemfontein (one of the Pensacola convoy

ships), which sailed to Surabaja at the end

of December with a few hundred artillerymen and some old British 75's. Through

January and February desperate efforts

were made to ship material, including airplanes, to Java, as well as to fly planes to

that area. In the great enemy air raid on

Darwin on 19 February, most of the available cargo shipping was wiped out, and

13

 (1) Msg, Marshall to CG USAFIA, 27 Jan 42,

WPD 4628-5. (2) Msg, Marshall to CG USAFIA, 30

Jan 42, WPD 4628-25. (3) Msg, Wavell to Marshall,

16 Jan 42, WPD 4369-19. (4) Delaying and Containing Action, monograph, pp. 1-8, OPD Hist Unit File.

(5) Incl 18, msg, Marshall to CG USAFIA, 18 Jan 42,

to Barnes rpt cited n. 3(3). (6) Brereton, The Brereton

Diaries, pp. 76-83. (7) See also corresp in WPD 4628-

20 and WPD 4628-25.
IMPROVISATION IN THE PACIFIC 171

Java was sealed off from further surface

shipments from Australia; on 27 February

thirty-two P-40's went down when the old

seaplane tender Langley was sunk; many

other aircraft were lost, before they could

get into action, while being flown north

from Australia; still others were purposely

destroyed during the evacuation of Java to

prevent their capture. On the last day of

February General Brett radioed the War

Department that he considered further

shipments to Java "unwarranted wastage." Ten days later, with the capture of

Bandung, resistance in the Netherlands

Indies came to an end.14

In the Philippines the debacle was more

prolonged. Following his withdrawal to

Bataan, General MacArthur declared

himself "professionally certain" that the

enemy blockade could be easily pierced.

He recommended using numerous small

vessels and submarines, arguing that his

requirements, though urgent, were modest. The War Department, which wanted

to retain the large ships for transoceanic

runs, was agreeable to the use of small

vessels; in any case, the Americans no

longer possessed discharge facilities for

large ships on Luzon. On 18 January Col.

Patrick J. Hurley was sent to the southwestern Pacific as General Marshall's personal representative to infuse more energy

into the search for small craft in Australia

and the Netherlands Indies. Meanwhile,

USAFIA headquarters dispatched Col.

John N. Robinson, who had commanded

the troops on the Holbrook, with six assistants to comb Java, Sumatra, and Celebes

for food and coastal vessels. Other officers,

armed with War Department authority to

expend practically unlimited funds, were

directed to "organize blockade running

on a broad front."

 15

Small craft, fast and with sufficient fuel

capacity, were hard to obtain. Masters

and crews usually refused to risk death or

capture, despite the offer of large bonuses.

Precious time was lost in negotiations between Washington and London over alleged duplication in assignment of shipping. Only three vessels succeeded in

breaking through the blockade, reaching

Mindanao and Cebu during February and

March, respectively, with about 10,000

tons of rations, 4,000,000 rounds of small

arms ammunition, 8,000 rounds of 81-mm.

mortar shell, and a quantity of medical,

signal, and engineer supplies. Only a

small fraction of these supplies reached

the beleaguered forces on Luzon. An attempt was made, despite misgivings on

the part of Admiral Thomas C. Hart and

General Wavell, to run supplies through

by submarine; about ten of these craft

sailed from various points between early

January and the surrender of Corregidor

in May, and at least five actually reached

"The Rock." Only three, however, were

able to discharge cargo.

By the beginning of March the blockade of the southern approaches to the

Philippines had become so tight that both

Hurley and Brett thought the effort to

pierce it should be abandoned. General

MacArthur had already concluded, and

urged upon the War Department, that the

whole approach up to now had been

wrong. Direction of the effort, he declared

on 22 February, should be centralized in

Washington and "re-energized," rather

14

 (1) Bingham and Leighton, Development of the

United States Supply Base in Australia, ASF hist

monograph, pp. 94-98, OCMH. (2) Blockade Running to the Philippines, MS, pp. 28-29, OCT HB. (3)

Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, pp.

131-36. (4) Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 391-98. 15

 (1) Bingham and Leighton monograph, pp. 100-

101, cited n. 14(1). (2) MS cited n. 14(2). (3) Corresp

in G-4/33861 and AG 381 (11-27-41) Far Eastern Sit,

Sec 1. (4) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, Ch. XXII.
172 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

than being relegated to USAFIA where it

was being handled, he charged, "as a subsidiary effort."

 16

 The resources in Australia and the Netherlands Indies, in any

case, were insufficient for the task. Many

shipments, MacArthur thought, should be

routed along the westward passage from

Honolulu. Asserting that the enemy's

coverage of the approaches was still thin,

MacArthur evidently envisaged an uninterrupted stream of vessels probing the approaches to the Philippines along several

routes. Many ships might be lost, but

many, he felt, would get through.

There had been no lack of energy in the

War Department's attack upon the problem. Since mid-January it had been working on a project to fit seven old destroyers,

converted into banana carriers, for the

westward voyage. In response to MacArthur's message of 22 February the War

Department notified him that three of the

converted destroyers, each of about fifteen

hundred tons cargo capacity, were being

loaded identically with food, medical supplies, ammunition, and other items and

would be sent to Mindanao within three

weeks; the first was leaving almost immediately. But time and circumstances

whittled down this plan. There were delays in arming the vessels, in providing

Army gun crews (the Navy had none

available), in assembling cargoes, in working out routings. The first vessel sailed

from New Orleans on 2 March, and two

more at approximately one-week intervals. Only one got as far as Honolulu before the surrender of Corregidor. In midApril General MacArthur, then in Australia, acknowledged that with the enemy

in possession of both the Cavite and Bataan shores of Manila Bay it was useless to

send more blockade runners to Corregidor.

The dreary game thus dragged to an end.

In mid-March General Eisenhower, now

head of the Operations Division (OPD),

had jotted a notation, "For many weeks—

it seems years—I've been searching everywhere to find any feasible way of giving

real help to the P. I. . . . . I'll go on trying, but daily the situation grows more

desperate."

 17

Emergence of the Southwest Pacific Area

Command

By the end of February both the Philippines and the ABDA Command were effectively beyond the reach of logistical

support. With the fall of Java imminent,

Wavell closed his headquarters there on

23 February and Brett returned to Australia to assume command of USAFIA.

Allied forces in the Far East were split,

driven westward into India and southeastward into Australia and the tip of New

Guinea. With the collapse of ABDA Command and the War Department's futile intervention to "re-energize" blockade running to the Philippines, the supply task of

the Australian base shrank to more manageable proportions. Beginning in midJanuary 1942, the War Department had

begun to adjust its supply plans to place

major emphasis on building a permanent

base in Australia. This, in reality, had

been the predominant concern of the staff

of USAFIA almost from the beginning.

On 10 January G-4 directed the release

and redistribution of depot stocks that had

been accumulating since the preceding

summer for shipment to the Philippines.

Shipments were to be limited, for a time,

to such essential items as ammunition,

food, and critical medical supplies that

16

 Msg 344, MacArthur to Marshall, 22 Feb 42,

G-4/33817. 17

 (1) Notations by Eisenhower, 13 Mar 42 entry,

Item 3, OPD Hist Unit File. (2) See above, n. 15.
IMPROVISATION IN THE PACIFIC 173

could be transported by air as well as by

sea, and to additional critical supplies (up

to a hypothetical thirty-day level) that

would be useful in Australia if transshipment to MacArthur should prove impossible. This move to place supply of the

Philippines in a special category was confirmed in a new supply plan for Australia

that had taken shape by early February.

Reserves to be held in Australia for the

Philippines were definitely restricted to

thirty days' supply, with the qualification

that the Commanding General, USAFIA,

was authorized to request from the War

Department such additional supplies as

he was able to push through to them. For

Australia, on the other hand, supply levels

were set at ninety days for ground force

materials and five months for air force

supply. Procedures were made more detailed and restrictive than in the December directive (Plan "X"), and a trend toward orderly supply methods was evident.

In addition to its other responsibilities,

USAFIA was assigned the obligation of

supplying POPPY Force until its commander, Brig. Gen. Alexander M. Patch,

could organize a base port in New Caledonia.18

In order to systematize local procurement, USAFIA was ordered on 3 February to establish a General Purchasing

Board that would consolidate all procurement in Australia for the U.S. Army and

Navy, on the pattern of the board created

in France during World War I. Brig. Gen.

James C. Roop, who had been executive

officer of the older board, was sent to the

theater as General Purchasing Agent and

chairman of the General Purchasing

Board. The board was to consist of the

senior officer of each supply arm and service of USAFIA, a representative of the

Navy supply corps, and such other members as the Commanding General,

USAFIA, wished to appoint. General

Roop and the board were charged with

supervision of all local procurement in the

Australian area by both the Army and

Navy, and with making all necessary arrangements with the local governments.19

Simultaneously, another War Department emissary, Brig. Gen. Arthur R. Wilson, was sent out to serve as Barnes' chief

quartermaster and to infuse vigor into all

supply activities in Australia, including

local procurement. General Marshall's

letter to USAFIA on 6 February outlining

Wilson's mission still placed heavy emphasis on forwarding supplies to the Philippines and Netherlands Indies.20

 But

Wilson, bringing with him the February

supply plan, did not arrive until March,

by which time events had made this aspect of his mission almost obsolete. With

the collapse of ABDA Command, the

British and United States Governments

had turned to a reconsideration of Pacific

organization and strategy, and the overriding concern now was for the safety of

Australia itself.

On 23 January the Japanese had taken

Rabaul on New Britain Island, thus uncovering Port Moresby, the weakly held

Australian base in southern Papua across

the Torres Strait, which in turn controlled

the approaches to the continent across the

Coral Sea. Invasion seemed imminent,

and Australian defenses were weak. Two

divisions of the Australian Imperial Forces

had already been hastily withdrawn from 18

 (1) Memo, Exec Off G-4 for Br Chiefs, 10 Jan 42,

sub: Shipts for Forces in Philippines, G-4/33861. (2)

AG ltr to CG USAFIA and Chiefs of SAS, 2 Feb 42,

sub: Sup of USAFIA Area, AG 400 (1-31-42). 19

 TAG ltr to CG USAFIA, 3 Feb 42, sub: Estab of

a Gen Purch Bd in Australia, AG 334.8 Australia,

Gen Purch Bd (1-30-42) MSC-D-M. 20

 (1) Ltr, CofS to CG USAFIA, 6 Feb 42, G-4/

33861. (2) Related papers in same file.
174 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

the Middle East and were en route to

Australia; the Australian Government demanded the return of a third. The United

States, on the other hand, was in the best

position geographically and otherwise to

provide reinforcements, and on 14 February General Marshall decided to send the

41st Division to Australia along with supporting service troops. The quest for shipping again had to be taken to the White

House, via the versatile Mr. Hopkins, who

contrived to have the request for additional vessels, beyond the pooled resources

of the Army and Navy, put to Admiral

Land at the White House level. The first

phase of the movement got under way on

3 March with the sailing from New York

of a large convoy of five troopships, carrying about 13,500 men; the rest of the 41st

Division and support troops sailed from

San Francisco in March and April. Meantime, in a message to Prime Minister John

Curtin on 20 February, the President, in

an effort to persuade the Australian Government to permit the diversion to Burma

of the two Australian divisions en route

from the Middle East, assured Curtin that

the United States would reinforce the

Australian position with all possible speed.

In effect, Roosevelt accepted the defense

of Australia as an American responsibility.21

In early March Churchill appealed to

the President to send an additional American division to Australia and one to New

Zealand in order to permit retention of

one Australian and one New Zealand division in the Middle East. The President

agreed, and on 25 March the 32d Division, which had been awaiting shipment

to Northern Ireland, was hastily withdrawn from the MAGNET Force and put

under orders for movement to Australia in

April. The 37th Division was scheduled

for shipment to New Zealand in May.

With the allocation of these ground forces

to the theater, War Department deployment policy entered a new phase. Instead

of only air units and essential service

troops, the aim was now to build a balanced air and ground force for the defense

of Australia. The Australian base had become the anchor of the American line of

defense in the Pacific.22

The shift in deployment was accompanied by a dramatic change in command

arrangements. General MacArthur, on

orders from the President, left the Philippines and made his way to Australia, arriving at Darwin on 17 March 1942. The

announcement was made on that day that

he would become supreme commander of

all Allied forces in Australia and the Philippines. A few days later the United States

and Great Britain agreed on a general division of strategic responsibility and exercise of command for Allied forces throughout the world. The plan established three

broad strategic areas—the Pacific, the

Middle East-Indian Ocean, and the European-Atlantic. The conduct of the war

in the Pacific would become the primary

responsibility of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of

Staff, the British Chiefs of Staff were to be

similarly responsible for the Middle EastIndian Ocean region, and the European21

 (1) Memo, Marshall for Eisenhower, 14 Feb 42.

(2) Memo for rcd, Brig Gen Robert W. Crawford, 14

Feb 42. Both in WPD 4360-65. (3) Memo, G-4 for

CofS, 14 Feb 42, sub: Trans for Reinf to "X," G-4/

29717-116. (4) Matloffand Snell, Strategic Planning:

1941-1942, Chs. VI-VII. (5) Rpt, NYPOE Statistical

Summary, OCT HB. 22

 (1) Milner, Victory in Papua, Chs. I-II. (2) Matloffand Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, Ch. VII.

(3) Memo, ACofS OPD for TAG, 10 Mar 42, sub: Est

of Sit, Anzac Area, OPD 381 Australia, Case 9. (4)

As a part of the general effort to strengthen the British

position in the Middle East, the President also promised shipping to transport two British divisions to that

area. See below, Chs. XIV, XVIII.
IMPROVISATION IN THE PACIFIC 175

MAP 3

Atlantic would be a combined responsibility. The Combined Chiefs would continue

to determine grand strategy for all areas.

In the Pacific, the U.S. Joint Chiefs established two main theaters, the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) and the Pacific

Ocean Area, the former to be under General MacArthur's command, the latter

under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. Australia, the Philippines, New Guinea, the

Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomon

Islands, and all of the Netherlands Indies,

except Sumatra, were included within

SWPA. The rest of the Pacific, with the

exception of a relatively small area in the

southeastern part for which no command

was established, fell within the Pacific

Ocean Area. This area was further divided

into North, Central, and South Pacific

subareas, the first two to be directly controlled by Admiral Nimitz and the third

by a deputy of his own choosing.23 (Map 3)

23

 (1) Milner, Victory in Papua, Ch. II. (2) Matloff

and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, Ch. VII. (3)

CCS 57/2, 24 Mar 42, title: Strategic Responsibility

of U.S. and U.K.
176 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

After the approval of the Australian

Government had been obtained, General

MacArthur on 18 April announced the

structure of his new command. All forces

under his control were organized into five

subordinate commands: Allied air forces

under General Brett; Allied land forces

under the Australian General Sir Thomas

Blarney; Allied naval forces under Rear

Adm. Herbert F. Leary; USAFIA, once

again, under General Barnes; and U.S.

Forces in the Philippines under Lt. Gen.

Jonathan M. Wainwright. While supply

and administration remained divided

along national lines, operational control

of all ground, air, and naval units whether

American, Australian, or Dutch came under the Allied commander. For all American forces, USAFIA served as a supply

and service agency as well as an administrative headquarters for the transmission

of policy directives; in supply matters it

was the channel of communication to the

War Department.24

Soon after his arrival, General MacArthur won the Australian Chiefs of Staff to

his view that the best hope of saving the

dominion lay in concentrating such resources as were available on the defense of

Port Moresby and undertaking limited offensive action in New Guinea at the

earliest practicable date. This policy made

it clear that development of the base establishment would have to be focused on

northeastern Australia and carried north

into Papua. This shortened the line of

communications from the well-developed

ports of southeastern Australia, and made

Townsville rather than Darwin the focal

point in the undeveloped north. USAFIA

at last had a supply mission of manageable

proportions and reasonable clarity.25

By this time, too, the base in Australia

was acquiring some flesh and sinew. There

were 34,000 American troops in Australia

by the middle of March and 23,000 more

en route. Supply operations were becoming more systematic. With more staff personnel available, seven base sections were

organized under USAFIA and began to

operate with some smoothness. General

Wilson had taken over the functions of

chief quartermaster, the General Purchasing Board under General Roop was in operation, and an Allied Supply Council had

been set up. A survey of local resources indicated that most of the subsistence for

American troops could be procured in

Australia, as could a considerable quantity of clothing, construction materials,

and other supplies. Shipments of supplies

from the United States were also now arriving in quantity, and the build-up of reserve stocks was well under way. Brig.

Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin reported to

General Somervell at the end of February

that materials were coming so fast "we are

having trouble taking care of them."

 26

The build-up in Australia represented

in fact the major logistical effort of the

U.S. Army during the first quarter of

1942, absorbing approximately half of the

troops and a third of the cargo shipped

overseas by the Army during that period.

After March 1942 the proportion fell rap24

 (1) Delaying and Containing Action, pp. 32-34,

cited n. 13(4). (2) Ltr, GINCSWPA to TAG, 26 May

42, sub: Sup Orgn and Proced, SWPA Sup folder,

Plng Div ASF, Job A44-140. (3) Msg, USAFFE to

AGWAR, 20 Apr 42, ABC 323.31 POA (1-29-42), 2. 25 Milner, Victory in Papua, Ch. II.

26

 (1) Ltr cited n. 6(1). (2) Barnes rpt, Pt. I, pp. 38-

44, and Pt. VI, cited n. 3(3). (3) Matloff and Snell,

Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, Ch. VII. (4) Contl Div,

ASF, Statistical Review, World War II. (5) Msg 758,

Brett to TAG, 19 Mar 42. (6) Memo, Gen Wilson for

CG USAFIA, 12 Jun 42, sub: Suggested Rpt to WD.

Last two in SWPA Sup folder, Plng Div ASF, Job

A44-140. (7) For lend-lease and reciprocal aid arrangements, see below, Ch. XVIII.
IMPROVISATION IN THE PACIFIC 177

idly, as the United States and Britain held

to their initial decision to concentrate first

on the war against Germany. Within the

Pacific itself, much of the emphasis shifted

to the island chain and once again to Hawaii. MacArthur had to accept a lower

priority in troops, materials, and shipping.

Troop shipments to Australia dropped

abruptly in May, cargo shipments in

June.27 The early build-up made possible

the development of a base in Australia

adequate for the defense of the continent,

but hardly equal to the demands even the

most limited Allied counteroffensive would

impose. The fundamental logistical problems of vast distances, scanty transportation and communication facilities, and

scarce and inefficient labor remained.

There was no real solution to these problems in sight as long as the strategic emphasis on other areas precluded further

heavy concentration of American military

resources in Australia.

Manning the Island Line

Like the base in Australia, the American

defense and communications line along

the Pacific islands west of Hawaii was an

outgrowth of circumstances rather than of

plan. In the command structure set up in

March 1942, the entire Pacific Ocean

Area was made a naval responsibility, but

the Army had to garrison most of the island

bases and provide the long-range bomber

support that the Navy considered essential

to fleet operations. Interservice co-operation in logistics was therefore a central

problem from the start.

The first phase of deployment to the

island chain got under way in January

with the movement of POPPY Force to New

Caledonia, the establishment of the refueling station at Bora Bora, and the reinforcement of existing naval and air-ferryroute bases.28

 In February the Navy

launched a second phase with the recommendation that joint task forces should be

sent to occupy two new bases, Tongatabu,

one of the Tonga (Friendly) Islands, and

Efate in the New Hebrides archipelago.

The two islands sat astride the undefended

approaches to Samoa, Fiji, and New Caledonia. In conjunction with its current plans

to dispatch a Marine force to establish

supplementary air bases in the Samoan

Islands, the Navy conceived of this as a

three-way move to strengthen the southwestern portion of the route where a

strong Japanese attack was considered

most likely. The Army staff viewed the

plan with some misgivings as it was concerned over growing evidence that the

Navy wished to establish bases on many

small islands, a program they thought

would be entirely too costly in manpower,

shipping, and above all in long-range

bombers. Nevertheless, General Marshall

finally agreed on 2 March to send Army

garrisons to Tongatabu and Efate, and the

movements were set up later in the month.

Efate was occupied during March by a

holding force of Marine and Army troops

drawn, respectively, from Hawaii and

Maj. Gen. Alexander M. Patch's force on

New Caledonia. The Tongatabu force, the

main Efate force, and the Marine force for

Samoa were sent during April from the

States. About the same time, at Admiral

Nimitz' request, the Hawaiian Department dispatched a small garrison to relieve

New Zealand troops guarding the cable

station on Fanning Island, an atoll between Palmyra and Christmas. Further

down the chain and later in the spring a

27

 (1) Contl Div, ASF, Statistical Review, World War

II. (2) See below, App. E. 28

 See above, Ch. VI.
178 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

small force, detached from the New Caledonia garrison, occupied Espiritu Santo

on the recommendation of the commanding general on Efate who felt that the

northern flank of his base was dangerously

exposed.29

The third and final stage of the initial

effort to secure the island chain was carried out in May 1942 when the 37th Division was sent to the Fijis, where weakness

in ground troops had left a vulnerable link

in the line of communications. This, along

with the move of the 32d Division to

Australia, was part of the effort to enable

the British to retain dominion troops in

the Middle East. The Navy undertook to

establish important naval facilities on Viti

Levu, the principal island of the Fiji

group, and about the same time began to

develop a major supply and fleet base at

Auckland, New Zealand.30

Deployment of the Army contingents to

the island bases followed two main patterns—movements the War Department

and its field agencies handled alone, and

those they shared with the Navy. Broadly

speaking, the former applied to the reinforcement of the original Army ferry bases:

Christmas, Canton, Fiji, and New Caledonia. Conversely, the Navy took full

responsibility for reinforcing the "line"

islands in which it had a prior interest:

Samoa, Palmyra, and Johnston. In the

category of joint deployment were the

balanced task forces sent to occupy the

flanking bases—Bora Bora, Tongatabu,

and Efate. In the case of the joint task

forces, the Army still furnished the bulk of

the manpower, approximately 7,200 of

the 8,200 men for Tongatabu and 4,900 of

the 6,500 for Efate. On each of the three

islands, the joint command of the garrison

was entrusted to an Army officer. Unlike

POPPY Force, where the troops sailed with

only their personal equipment, the other

expeditions were all combat-loaded task

forces and provided the Army with its first

experience in this type of movement.

These movements to the South Pacific

were characterized by an inordinate

amount of confusion and waste motion

arising out of the haste with which each

was conceived and executed, the inexperience of both Army and Navy supply personnel, and the lack of established channels

of co-ordination between the two services.

There was haste and waste at both ends of

each movement—in the process of mounting the expedition in the United States

and in the debarkation and setting up at

the destination. Had the Japanese been in

a position to attack, they might well have

disrupted any one of these task forces before it was in a posture for defense. The

assembling and loading of troops and supplies were badly managed; delays occurred

in finding suitable vessels and outfitting

them; scrambled loading of supplies produced confusion and delay in unloading

at the destination. In no case was it possible to provide a genuinely balanced task

force; each expedition was composed of

miscellaneous combat units hastily assembled from different points and without

much service support. On arrival the combat troops had to perform unfamiliar

service functions for themselves, a burden

especially onerous at Bora Bora, Tongatabu, and Efate, where neither port facilities nor civilian labor of any sort was

29

 (1) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-

1942, Ch. VII. (2) Ballantine, Naval Logistics, pp. 71-

72. (3) Building the Navy's Bases, II, 193-94. (4) OPD

Diary, 10 and 13 Apr 42 entries, OPD Hist Unit File.

(5) Ltr, CG HD to CofS, 18 Apr 42, Pac folder, Logis

File, OCMH. 30

 (1) Delaying and Containing Action, pp. 46-47,

cited n. 13(4). (2) Jt A&N Plan for Relief of New

Zealand and the Fiji Islands, 13 May 42, OPD 381

Fiji, Sec 1, Case 3.
IMPROVISATION IN THE PACIFIC 179

available. There was scant knowledge of

the geography, climate, terrain, or economic development of the islands to be

occupied, with the result that many obstacles encountered in unloading and

establishing base forces were not anticipated in the planning. In truth, there was

no real logistical plan for any of the moves;

each was largely a process of trial and

error. The Bora Bora expedition, a capsule containing most of the ingredients of

this experience, may profitably be examined in some detail.

Bobcat: Case History in Joint Task Force

Logistics

The joint task force sent out to Bora

Bora had the mission of establishing and

defending a fueling station to serve shipping from the west coast and the Panama

Canal to Australia. The expedition was

given the code name BOBCAT. Following

the decision on 30 December 1941 to undertake the project, and after securing the

President's approval, the Navy requested

the Army to provide a garrison of some

four thousand troops. After two days of

deliberation the War Department agreed

to "make available . . . whatever troops

and material Admiral King decided would

be necessary."

 31

 Immediately, the Army

and Navy war plans divisions began to

work out the details.

By 5 January General Gerow, acting

head of WPD, was able to submit to General Marshall a list of services and equipment the Navy was prepared to supply,

together with his specific recommendations for the composition of the Army

garrison. Three days later a joint plan was

completed. Under it the Army's contribution was to be chiefly manpower and the

Navy's base facilities. Specifically, the

Army became responsible for supplying

all subsistence ashore as well as for defense

of the island, the Navy for moving the task

force overseas and providing shore construction at its destination. The strength of

the force was set at 4,400. Troops numbering 3,900 made up the defense garrison,

whose main components were an antiaircraft regiment, and a reinforced infantry

regiment less two battalions; the remaining 500 were naval personnel, many of

whom were to be withdrawn from the

island when the base was completed. The

plan assigned local unity of command to

the Army commander, Col. Charles D. Y.

Ostrom, under General Emmons, commanding general of the Hawaiian Department. Charleston was assigned as the port

of embarkation and the expedition was

scheduled to leave in about two weeks'

time.32

The core of the planned base was a tank

farm for storage of fuel. In addition, there

were to be a small seaplane base, harbor

installations, unloading facilities, coastal

defenses, a water distillation system, storage, refrigeration, and other accessory

facilities. Most of the material for these

installations was provided by the Navy,

largely from reserve stocks at the Quonset

naval depot in Rhode Island.33 The Army,

for its part, was concerned mainly with

outfitting the defense garrison and assembling its maintenance supplies. Insofar as

possible, shortages in organizational equip31

 (1) Memo, SW for CofS, 1 Jan 42. (2) Memo,

COMINCH for CNO, 1 Jan 42. Both in WPD 4571-

21. (3) Memo for rcd, Col Lee S. Gerow, 3 Jan 42,

WPD 4571-22. (4) Ballantine, Naval Logistics, p. 67. 32

 (1) Memo, WPD for CofS, 5 Jan 42, sub: Bora

Bora Def Force. (2) Memo, WPD for TAG, 17 Jan

42, sub: Ltr of Instr to Col Ostrom. Both in WPD

4571-24. (3) Building the Navy's Bases, II, 191. 33

 (1) Building the Navy's Bases, II, 191. (2) Ballantine, Naval Logistics, pp. 63-67. (3) Memo, cited n.

32(1).
180 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ment were filled locally by transferring

needed items to troops earmarked for

BOBCAT from other units in the same corps

areas; the supply arms and services were

held responsible for making up the remaining deficits and were charged also

with moving maintenance supplies for the

garrison into the port area. For the initial

movement to Bora Bora, the War Department set two months (sixty days) as the

general level of maintenance, doubling it,

however, in the case of rations (Class I)

and gasoline (Class III). Ammunition

maintenance to accompany the force was

determined in terms of units of fire, seven

for antiaircraft weapons and five for all

others.34

Army troops and cargo all were scheduled to be loaded at Charleston. Naval

personnel and equipment were to be

picked up and redistributed in stages starting at Quonset, where specialists and most

of the base materials were to be taken on.

At Norfolk additional Navy cargo was to

be loaded, a step that involved partial unloading and reloading. Final redistribution

and loading would take place at Charleston.35

 But the original plans were soon

submerged in a series of complications.

The first setback came when the Navy,

charged with all transportation arrangements, ran into difficulties in obtaining

adequate shipping for the force. Six vessels

were required for the movement. The

Navy could provide only three and on

short notice had to turn to the Maritime

Commission for the remaining ships. These

had to be armed. It was discovered, besides, that one of the ships was damaged

and could not make the journey. The

Arthur Middleton was hastily substituted

and promptly turned out to be a major

problem in herself. Before she left New

York her master reported to the Third Naval District that she was unstable and

required fifteen hundred tons of ballast to

compensate for the weight of her newly

installed armament. Navy officials insisted

that "the ship was all right," and the Middleton set out for Charleston with a 12-

degree list.36 At Charleston the Navy yard

already had its hands full with unanticipated repairs on the President Tyler, one of

the troopships assigned to the expedition.

In the blunt words of the BOBCAT naval

commander, Comdr. Carl H. Sanders,

"The Tyler was a mess and still is. I understand that she was condemned as a passenger vessel and for the past seven years

has been used as a freighter. At the time

the Navy took her over nothing had been

done to outfit her properly and the Yard

worked on her continuously up to the time

of sailing to correct deficiencies."

 37

The scheduled departure date, at first

set by the Navy for 15 January, was postponed to the 25th (in the plan of 8 January), although the Army logistical staff,

until the middle of the month, was under

the impression it would be the 27th. Then,

on the 15th, Admiral King suggested that

the POPPY and BOBCAT movements be

combined in order to economize on escort

vessels. POPPY Force was due to leave New 34

 (1) Memo, G-4 for CSigO, CofEngrs, and SG, 8

Jan 42, G-4/33793. (2) Control Division, ASF, Movement of U.S. Army Troops and Supplies to South

Pacific Theater of Operations, MS, p. 64, OCMH.

(3) Ltr, CofTrans Br G-4 to CG SFPOE, 7 Mar 42,

CPOE folder, OCT HB. 35

 (1) Memo, G-4 for TAG, 10 Jan 42, Logis File,

OCMH. (2) Memo to those concerned, 10 Jan 42,

sub: Info for Those Concerned With Loading of Vessels for BOBCAT, and atchd memo for rcd, WPD 4571-

24. (3) Building the Navy's Bases, II, 197. (4) Ltr,

Comdr SE Pac Force to COMINCH, 21 Mar 42, sub:

Advance Bases—Loading of Store Ships and Trans,

for, Bora Bora folder, Logis File, OCMH. 36

 Ltr, Comdr Carl H. Sanders to Capt Bertram J.

Rodgers, OCNO, 3 Feb 42, CPOE folder, OCT HB. 37

 (1) Ibid. (2) Ballantine, Naval Logistics, p. 68. (3)

Building the Navy's Bases, II, 197.
IMPROVISATION IN THE PACIFIC 181

York for Australia on 20 January. General

Marshall was willing to compromise. If

the Navy would sail BOBCAT two days

ahead of schedule, on the 23rd, he would

direct the POPPY convoy to meet BOBCAT

off the South Carolina coast on that date.

This arrangement; the Army calculated,

would cost the Australian movement four

days of delay—one lost in waiting off

Charleston (the trip from New York required two days) and the other three because of reduction of speed to match that

of the slower Bora Bora convoy.38

Admiral King accepted this proposal

and the POPPY flotilla duly cleared New

York Harbor late on the 22d. On the night

of the 24th, just as POPPY Force was due

off Charleston, the War Department received word from the port commander

there, Lt. Col. James E. Slack, that the

Navy could not make ready two of the

BOBCAT vessels, Middleton and Hamul, until

afternoon of the following day. Charleston

Navy yard was working around the clock

to complete the two-day job of reballasting

the Middleton, which should have been

done at New York. Since an additional

thirty-six hours had to be allowed for loading the two ships, there was no prospect of

getting them out of Charleston until early

morning of the 27th.39

This was news of the utmost gravity.

Each day's delay in moving POPPY Force

to the Far East added to the possibility of

disaster. By acceding to the Navy's wish to

combine POPPY with the slower BOBCAT

convoy, the War Department had accepted

a loss of several days in sailing time. The

whole movement now had to be postponed

until the 27th. This development, General

Somervell declared indignantly to General Marshall, should be viewed " in the

light of Admiral King's longhand memorandum to you to the effect that there

would be no further delays in this movement. All ships are being furnished by the

Navy and all delays are attributable to the

Navy."40

But the War Department could scarcely

claim to be wholly blameless in the muddle at Charleston, where confusion prevailed at the Army port of embarkation no

less than at the Navy base. Inefficient and

inadequate dock labor at the Army base

seriously hampered joint loading operations. Commander Sanders found that the

bosses of the Army's stevedoring crews

were "the only ones who knew anything

about loading" and that naval personnel

who were finally pressed into helping with

the loading "did it twice as fast as the

stevedores."41 At a critical moment, moreover, the antiaircraft regiment, fourteen

hundred strong, arrived at the port with

its equipment uncrated despite specific instructions to the contrary. The I Corps

headquarters, in sending the movement

orders, had left out the clause pertaining

to this aspect of the movement. The consequence was a scramble at the port to find

labor and packing materials, and loading

was held up for two days. There were

other problems. Army and Navy shipments alike arrived so poorly marked as to

defy identification. Loading plans turned

out to be unsuited to the ships actually

used. Small detachments of troops coming

from distant posts required additional

38

 (1) Memo, Adm King for CofS, 15 Jan 42, sub:

Convoys to BOBCAT and Australia, with atchd notes,

Col Gross for Gen Somervell and Gross for Col Ross,

G-4/29717-115. (2) Memo, WPD for G-4, 13 Jan 42,

no sub, CPOE folder, OCT HB. (3) Memo, G-4 for

CSigO, CofEngrs, and SG, 14 Jan 42, G-4/33793. 39

 (1) Memo, G-4 for CofS, 24 Jan 42, G-4/29717-

114. (2) Ltr cited n. 36. (3) Ballantine, Naval Logistics,

pp. 68-69. (4) Memo, CofS for President, 23 Feb 42,

Pac folder, OCT HB. 40

 (1) Memo cited n.39(1). 41

 Ltr cited n. 36.
182 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

clothing and individual equipment that

port stocks were inadequate to supply. Advance detachments sent to the port to assist

the port quartermaster in handling the

supplies for their units proved to be more

of a hindrance than a help, being generally ignorant of precise needs and of supply

procedures. Conditions at Charleston

seem, in general, to have been the product

of many failures, large and small, on the

part of both services. Each was handicapped by haste, inexperience, and many

shortages. At the port, the first point where

their earlier separate arrangements were

merged into a single effort, it became clear

that because BOBCAT was a joint operation, neither service could escape the consequences of the other's failures.42

On the 25th the Hamul and the luckless

Middleton tied up at the Army base for

loading. The following day, on the eve of

sailing, the crowning blow fell when, without warning, some eight hundred tons of

Navy cargo, which Colonel Slack was totally unprepared to handle, began to

arrive at the Army wharf for loading on

the two vessels. The commandant of the

Navy yard, for his part, had had no advance notice of the total Navy cargo

scheduled for Bora Bora, and when the

unexpected shipment appeared, he could

only send it on to Colonel Slack since by

that time the other BOBCAT vessels at the

Navy yard had been fully loaded. To make

matters worse, the eight hundred tons included pontoons, heavy tractors with bulldozer attachments, vehicles, and other

matériel—the very type that should have

been distributed carefully among the vessels with a view to being immediately

available when the convoy arrived at

Bora Bora. Furthermore, the new shipment contained many heavy lifts, which

added greatly to the difficulty of getting

the cargo aboard in a hurry. Colonel

Slack estimated that "three heavy tractors

alone required eighteen gang-hours of

loading time."

 43

 The inevitable happened.

Although the Hamul cleared the Army pier

on schedule in the early morning of the

27th, the Middleton was delayed nine hours

past sailing time. All hands, Army and

Navy, had worked without break to get

her away on schedule but the deadline

could not be met. Finally, in mid-afternoon

of the 27th, the BOBCAT vessels sailed.44

Commander Sanders foresaw that there

would be a price to pay for haphazard

loading when the convoy discharged at

Bora Bora, and his apprehensions were

more than justified. Trouble began the

moment the convoy arrived at Bora Bora

on 17 February. The first problem, according to Rear Adm. John F. Shafroth who

escorted the convoy, arose from the fact

that "the ships could not be unloaded

without the floating equipment and the

floating equipment could not be assembled without unloading."

The pontoon barges which were the prin- cipal means by which the cargo could be

moved from ship to shore were stored in various holds and often deep in these holds. . . .

Not only were pontoons not stored near the

top of the holds but in some cases were dis- covered in holds of ships on which pontoons

were not known to be loaded.45

42

 (1) Memo, TQMG for G-4, 26 Jan 42, CPOE

folder, OCT HB. (2) Ballantine, Naval Logistics, p. 68.

(3) Charleston had been a subport of New York until

8 January when it became a port of embarkation. See

CPOE folder, OCT HB. (4) Memo, Asst Exec Off

G-4 for ACofS G-4, 29 Jan 42, sub: Tr Mvmt Ordered to Overseas Garrisons, G-4/33098. 43

 Ltr, Col Slack to G-4, 28 Jan 42, G-4/33793. 44

 (1) Loose paper headed "Diary," 28 Jan 42, in

CPOE folder, OCT HB. By 24 January the number of

vessels had been reduced from six to five—three

freighters and two transports—the number that actually sailed. (2) See also, memo cited n. 35(2). 45

 Ltr cited n. 35(4).
IMPROVISATION IN THE PACIFIC 183

Four thirty-ton tank lighters stowed on

deck saved the day. Within twenty-four

hours of the arrival these were in the

water and operating, most of them at reduced speed because of engine trouble. In

the next eight days the four fifty-ton barges

gradually were put into service, but at the

end of three weeks the two one-hundredton barges still had not been uncovered.46

This was merely the prelude. Tie rods

and accessories for assembling the pontoon

barges had been buried beneath other

cargo in loading; the first few craft had

to be assembled by welding. Weighthandling equipment (slings and cargo nets

on the supply ships) had not been provided. Three weeks went by before the

first crane could be located and unloaded.

Top-loaded materials that were not needed

immediately had to be strung out for two

miles along the beach. Poorly marked supplies proved even more of a problem at

Bora Bora than at Charleston; identification was possible only by breaking into

packing boxes and crates. Tractors and

trucks needed for unloading the lighters

and barges at the beach were fairly accessible, but this advantage was offset by the

fact that neither of the two small coral

landings was wide enough to admit more

than one truck at a time or substantial

enough to support a heavy load. Under

these conditions the thirty-ton lighters

proved doubly useful, for they could come

close in on sloping sections of the beach.

Even after both equipment for lightering

cargo ashore and vehicles for moving it inland became available, the work still

dragged because the small boats and

lighters were too few to maintain a steady

flow of material from ship to shore.

Admiral Shafroth pointed out:

In unloading a number of ships, four 50-

ton lighters are far more valuable than two

100-ton lighters . . . at BOBCAT it was often

necessary to stop work on board ship due to

the necessity of waiting for a lighter to be unloaded at the beach and similarly to stop

work at beach heads to await the loading of

a lighter at some cargo ship.47

All told, fifty-two days were required to

discharge the convoy and an additional

supply ship. Hasty loading, together with

inadequate attention to landing facilities

in the plans for the expedition, had made

the BOBCAT Force a sitting duck for any

Japanese attack during the critical first

seven weeks of the occupation. Fortunately, none came.

To the military planners, Bora Bora was

an unknown speck of land—one of many,

in fact, for which the Army and Navy in

early 1942 had suddenly to prepare detailed operational plans. The Occidental

world in general had little exact knowledge of most of the Pacific areas beyond

Hawaii; more than one of the operational

plans rested upon data gathered in the

eighteenth or nineteenth century and

never since revised, nor was there time to

explore thoroughly the knowledge that

did exist. The Bora Bora expedition had

been preceded by a naval survey ship,

which provided the force with some hydrographic data. But the plans for the

land installations were based on a map

drawn up by French navigators a hundred years earlier. The only topographical

information available to the Washington

planning staffs came from a naval air pilot

who had been on the island in 1936. After

the convoy had sailed the Army staff,

searching for an interpreter, more or less

46

 (1) Ltr, Comdr SE Pac Force to SN, 18 Feb 42,

OPD 045.44 (3-5-42). (2) Ltr cited n. 35(4). 47

 (1) Ltr cited n. 35(4). (2) Ltr, Brig Gen Charles

D. Y. Ostrom to CofS, 26 Apr 42, OPD 381 Bora

Bora, Case 1. (3) Building the Navy's Bases, II, 199. (4)

Ballantine, Naval Logistics, pp. 68-69.
184 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

accidentally ran across a young Army Reserve officer who as a graduate student

had been in the Orient and on Bora Bora

during the preceding summer engaged in

research for a thesis on Japanese colonization. 2d Lt. Walter H. Pleiss was immediately flown to Balboa where he joined

the task force as it passed through the

Canal. Even he, however, was scarcely

qualified to warn Colonel Ostrom in detail of the technical difficulties that lay

ahead.48

Once ashore, the expedition encountered conditions for which it was quite unprepared. The planners had assumed the

existence of a water supply; there was

none. Since the dry season was close at

hand, Brig. Gen. Charles D. Y. Ostrom

had to assign part of his force for six weeks

to building dams and laying thirteen miles

of pipeline. To avoid a repetition of the

earlier chaos in unloading, landing facilities had to be developed to handle future

shipments from the mainland. Bora Bora's

one road, encircling the island along the

coast, was vital to defense; immense labor

was required to put it into shape to support

military traffic, for it was a single-lane

road built of coral and sand on a spongy

base. For this task there were no graders

and only one rock crusher. The seven-ton

prime movers, provided to tow assembled

heavy radar equipment, were too heavy

for the flimsy road; bridges and culverts

were broken down and the bed damaged,

and the heavy trucks finally had to be

barred from use in order to keep lighter

traffic moving. Meanwhile, the few troops

that could be spared had begun to construct defense installations. Heavy guns

for the seacoast batteries had to be hauled

one to two thousand feet up 45-degree

slopes to get them into position. Many

items of needed construction equipment

had either been omitted from the allowance tables prepared for the force, or simply left on the Charleston docks. Before

it could be moved inland, much of the

construction material had to be sorted out

from disordered heaps along two miles of

beach. It was early April before work

could be started on the tank farm. The

planners had assumed that tanks for the

naval fuel depot would be installed on "a

coastal flat" bordering the harbor. At no

point, it developed, did the flats extend

more than 50 to 150 yards in from the

coast before rising abruptly toward lofty

peaks in the center of the island. Level

stretches inland were rare. To install the

tanks so that fuel lines would reach harbor

moorings, the naval construction detachment was forced to blast shelves from solid

rock on the steep hillsides. Even with

seven hundred Army troops helping the

Seabees to build tanks for the farm, it was

early June before the first eight tanks were

complete.49

The time and labor poured into the

various unanticipated preliminary tasks,

and into overcoming other obstacles to

planned construction, seriously delayed

putting the base into operation and con48

 (1) Morison, Rising Sun, pp. 262, 266. (2) Ballantine, Naval Logistics, p. 69. (3) Building the Navy's Bases,

II, 192. (4) Nelson L. Drummond, History of the U.S.

Army Forces in the South Pacific Area During World

War II from 30 March 1942 to 1 August 1944, MS,

Pt. IV, p. 757, unnumbered note, OCMH. (5) WDGS

Info Memo 2, 8 Jan 42, in G-4 Rpts, Bora Bora,

SOPA folder, Plng Div ASF. (6) Memo, Capt Rodgers for Adm Turner, 30 Jan 42. (7) Memo, WPD for

Turner, 2 Feb 42. Last two in WPD 4571-34. (8) For

an account of the Pleiss episode, see Cline, Washington

Command Post, pp. 81-82. 49

 (1) Ballantine, Naval Logistics, pp. 69-70. (2)

Building the Navy's Bases, II, 192, 199-201. (3) Ltr

cited n. 47(2). (4) Ltr, Comdr SE Pac Force to

COMINCH, 21 Mar 42, sub: Advance Bases—Motorized Equip for, Bora Bora folder, Logis File,

OCMH. (5) Memo, Adm Turner for Gen Gerow, 4

Jan 42, G-4/33943.
IMPROVISATION IN THE PACIFIC 185

structing its defense installations. These

delays were heaped upon those already

incurred at the outset in unloading.

Equally serious, from the point of view of

the force's commander, was the necessity

for diverting combat troops from their

normal functions to labor alongside the

service personnel on virtually every project. The characteristic dilemma of force

commanders in overseas operations, especially those in the Pacific, had made its

appearance: commanders understandably desired maximum fighting power,

but the shipping shortage limited the numerical strength of the expeditions and

therefore a large number of the troops,

whether combat or service, had to be used

for construction and administration in

primitive regions. As a result, it was a

common phenomenon in 1942 that commanders, who in setting up their task

forces had insisted upon a high proportion

of combat to service troops, clamored for

more service troops as soon as they encountered the practical problems of getting a base into operation.

No single remedy was available to prevent recurrences of BOBCAT'S logistical

ailments. The expedition was the first

venture in small-scale task force logistics

under wartime pressures—as General

Ostrom said, "a step into the unknown."50

The slow accumulation of experience in

time would help to smooth the process of

mounting and loading these small task

forces, but the difficulties presented by

each were in large measure unique. After

BOBCAT the Chief of Transportation did,

however, direct his Washington organization to see to it that vessels sailing on such

expeditions were of suitable type and

possessed adequate cargo-handling gear,

together with winchmen and other personnel; that each force was provided with

sufficient small boats and lighters for the

unloading operation; that a competent officer was on hand to assist task force commanders in assembling material and arranging loading priorities. But the remedy

for hasty planning, the basic source of the

difficulties, lay in early basic decisions,

and this was beyond the jurisdiction of

the logistical agencies. Army port commanders were told that the Office of the

Chief of Transportation would "make

every effort to insure that sufficient time

elapses between issuing orders and sailing

dates to permit assembly of cargo and

troops in an orderly manner."

 51

 The effort

was to be made, but in 1942 usually in

vain.

Many of the mistakes of the Bora Bora

task force were repeated in the occupation

of Efate and Tongatabu. The forces sent

to the Fijis and Australia about the same

time did not encounter the same kind of

difficulties as those going to the less developed islands, but even in Australia port

facilities and labor were far from ample,

and the handling of troop and supply

movements to that area was often attended by waste and confusion. Logistical

methods in general were in a state of upheaval, and as long as the military situation precluded an orderly sequence of

planning and action, overseas deployment

inevitably moved by jerks and jolts. The

experience of BOBCAT and the other small

task forces sent to the South Pacific in the

early part of 1942 was to be repeated later

in the year on a larger scale in the descent

on North Africa.

50

 Ltr cited n. 47(2). 51

 Memo, Col Frank S. Ross for CG's POE's and

CofWater Br OCT, 12 Apr 42, sub: Orgn and Trans

of Task Forces, Bora Bora folder, Logis File, OCMH.
186 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

The Army's Administrative Problem

in the Pacific Islands

The piecemeal progress of occupation

and the division of responsibilities between

the Army and Navy for the Pacific islands

from Hawaii to New Zealand did not

favor the rapid establishment of a satisfactory system of command, administration,

and flow of supplies. The islands were in

the Central and South Pacific subareas of

the Pacific Ocean Area, which was under

naval command, but it was some time before the subarea commands began to

function. In any case, the Navy exercised

only operational control; administration

and supply remained divided between the

two services. At the bases garrisoned by

the Marine Corps—Samoa, Palmyra and

Johnston—the Navy controlled all activities, but at the others—Christmas, Canton, Bora Bora, New Caledonia, the Fijis,

Tongatabu, Efate, Espiritu Santo, and

Fanning—Army forces were predominant

and the Army therefore had the greater

administrative burden.

Theoretically at least, command and

logistical arrangements for the islands

under Navy control were centralized

under Admiral Nimitz' headquarters at

Pearl Harbor. Administration of the Army

bases was shared by the War Department,

the San Francisco port, the Hawaiian

Department, and, to a limited extent,

USAFIA. Since General Emmons' Hawaiian command was the only mature

Army establishment in the entire Pacific,

the War Department originally assigned

to him a large part of the responsibility for

the island bases. But Emmons' responsibilities for the bases were assigned piecemeal and as the specific need arose, and

they varied both in nature and extent.

New Caledonia, where the largest garrison was stationed, was beyond effective

administrative range of the Hawaiian Department. The War Department retained

direct control of POPPY Force, dividing

supply responsibility between USAFIA

and the San Francisco port. It was typical

of the general muddle that Emmons retained responsibility for construction of

airfields at Plaines des Gaiacs outside

Noumea in New Caledonia. By the terms

of the War Department's overseas supply

directive of 22 January 1942, Christmas,

Canton, Bora Bora, and Fiji were assigned

to the Hawaiian Department for supply,

though Emmons was empowered to authorize base commanders to requisition

directly on the San Francisco port. The

commanders of the joint task forces sent to

Tongatabu and Efate were ordered to report directly to the War Department, and

the San Francisco port was made responsible for supply of the Army forces involved.52

There was logic in the assignment to

Emmons of supply responsibility for

Christmas and Canton, for these two islands lay on the shipping routes from

Hawaii. But Bora Bora and the Fijis, as

Emmons soon recognized, could be supplied far more easily by direct shipments

from San Francisco. After the activation

of the Pacific Ocean Area and its subareas,

moreover, Emmons' responsibilities in the

South Pacific became anomalous, since

his relation to Nimitz in that area remained undefined. In April the Navy

announced the formation of the South

52

 (1) TAG ltr to Gen Patch, no date, sub: Def of

New Caledonia, G-4/33888. (2) TAG ltr, 22 Jan 42,

sub: Sup of Overseas Depts, Theaters, and Separate

Bases, AG 400 (1-17-42). (3) See below, Ch. XIII. (4)

Jt Bsc Plan for the Occupation and Def of Tongatabu,

12 Mar 42, OPD 381 Tongatabu, Case 1. (5) Jt Bsc

Plan for the Occupation and Def of Efate, New Hebrides, 20 Mar 42, OPD 381 Efate, Case 8.
IMPROVISATION IN THE PACIFIC 187

Pacific Area Command under Vice Adm.

Robert L. Ghormley. It was clearly time

for the Army to take some similar step to

provide an administrative structure for its

own scattered bases lying within Ghormley's jurisdiction.

Emmons became increasingly disturbed

and late in May recommended that an

Army command be set up for the South

Pacific island bases "to coordinate their

operations, supply and maintenance."

 53

Emmons thought this command should

bear the same relationship to his Hawaiian Department that Ghormley's command bore to that of Admiral Nimitz, but

the War Department waited until after

Admiral Ghormley had formally assumed

command of the South Pacific Area on 19

June before moving to clarify Army command and supply responsibilities in the

area—and then it only partially followed

Emmons' suggestions. The first step was a

new supply plan for the South Pacific on

25 June, freeing Emmons of most of his logistical responsibilities there. Only Christmas, Canton, and Fanning remained

wholly dependent upon Hawaii for supply

(Canton alone was in the South Pacific

Area); Hawaii was also made responsible

for certain administrative services at Bora

Bora and Fiji, and for airfield construction along the alternate ferry route. For

the rest, all Army forces in the South Pacific were placed directly under the War

Department for administration, and were

to be supplied either by local procurement

in New Zealand and Australia or by San

Francisco.54

This measure was followed on 7 July by

the establishment of a separate Army

command, the U.S. Army Forces in the

South Pacific Area (USAFISPA). Maj.

Gen. Millard F. Harmon, Chief of the Air

Staff, was appointed commanding general

under a directive that made him directly

responsible to the War Department for

administration, supply, and training of all

Army forces in that area. Harmon was to

serve under Ghormley and exercise no operational control over Army troops in the

theater, but he was to assist the naval

commander in planning and executing

such operations as involved Army forces.

With Harmon's appointment, the separation of the Army commands in the South

Pacific from those in the Central Pacific

and Australia was complete.55

Joint Versus Parallel Supply

The clarification of supply and administrative responsibilities within the Army's

own organization was but one facet of the

problem of logistical organization in the

Pacific. In this area of joint operations,

supply of Army forces was intertwined

with the supply of Navy forces. Both services had to recognize the necessity for

some measure of logistical co-ordination.

The first rudimentary steps toward such

co-ordination were taken in the separate

agreements incorporated in the basic

plans for establishment of forces at Bora

Bora, Tangatabu, Efate, Fiji, and Samoa.

Generally speaking, these agreements

made the Navy responsible at each base

for providing fuel, and the Army for rations (except in the Samoan group where

53

 Ltr, CG HD to CofS, 20 May 42, sub: Army

Comd in S Pac Area, OPD 334 PTO, Sec 1, Case 18. 54

 (1) TAG ltr to CG's U.S. Army Forces in Efate,

Fiji, New Caledonia, Tongatabu, and Espiritu Santo,

25 Jun 42, sub: Sup of USAFISPA, AG 400 (6-22-42).

(2) Msg, Marshall to Emmons, 4 Jul 42, CM-OUT

1179. (CM-IN and CM-OUT numbers used in the

footnotes of this volume refer to numbers appearing

on copies of those messages in General Marshall's In

and Out Logs, filed in the Staff Communications Office, Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.) 55

 Ltr, CofS to Gen Harmon, 7 Jul 42, sub: Ltr of

Instn to CG USAFISPA, OPD 384 PTO, Case 18.
188 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

the Navy had sole responsibility); each

service supplied its own distinctive individual and organization equipment. These

agreements were tentative and loose, however, and there were no basic plans at all

for New Caledonia and Espiritu Santo.56

Progress toward a more integrated system of joint logistics was slow, halting, and

the subject of acrimonious dispute between the two services. At the meeting of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 6 April 1942,

Admiral King and Admiral Turner, Chief

of the Navy War Plans Division, opened

the question by pointing out that supply

to New Zealand, where the Navy was

planning to establish its major base in the

South Pacific, was linked with that of

American troops in Australia. They suggested somewhat vaguely a South Pacific

service force for sending supplies to both

areas. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs, in directing the Joint Staff Planners (JPS) to

study the matter, excluded SWPA from

their purview as far as joint supply from

the mainland was concerned. The planners were instructed merely to investigate

and make recommendations on the composition of a joint Army and Navy service

force for the South Pacific Area and the

possibilities of local procurement in both

Australia and New Zealand as a means of

reducing shipping requirements from the

United States, and to recommend whether

General MacArthur should be responsible

for supplying any troops outside his area.57

The Joint Planners appointed a subcommittee composed of Brig. Gen. LeRoy

Lutes, Director of Operations in the new

Services of Supply, with three other SOS

staff officers and three Navy supply experts, to study the problem. Specifically,

it seemed necessary to (1) organize local

procurement in New Zealand with machinery for co-ordination with SWPA, (2)

make shipping available in Australia,

Hawaii, and on the west coast for distributing supplies to the island bases, and (3)

determine whether a joint supply system

was desirable (outside the area of local

procurement), and, if so, how it was to be

set up.58

On the first point, it was readily agreed

that a joint purchasing board should be

established in New Zealand, that competition between it and the similar agency

(General Purchasing Board) in Australia

must be prevented, and that to extract the

most benefit from local resources, the two

purchasing boards should co-operate in

obtaining supplies from Australia for U.S.

forces stationed in New Zealand and the

island bases. The question of shipping, it

was agreed, turned upon information that

would have to be obtained from theater

commanders. The committee decided to

ask General MacArthur for an estimate

of the shipping available to him that could

be used for servicing Army and Navy garrisons in the South Pacific, and to question both Emmons and Nimitz as to procurement of subsistence stores in Australia

and New Zealand for the South Pacific

Area, availability of spare ship tonnage in

Hawaii and San Francisco, and the possible advantage of "joint Army-Navy use

of shipping from Hawaii to the island

bases."

 59

56

 (1) Jt A&N Plan cited n. 30(2). (2) Jt Bsc Plan

cited n. 52(4). (3) Jt Bsc Plan cited n. 52(5). 57

 (1) Min, 9th mtg JCS, 6 Apr 42. (2) JPS 21/4/D,

7 Apr 42, title: JPS Dir, Jt A&N Sv Force for the S

Pac Area. 58

 (1) Memo, Secy JPS for Lutes et al., 10 Apr 42,

sub: Subcom, Appointment of, with incl, Unified Sup:

Army-Navy 1942-43 folder, Lutes File. (2) Min, 11th

mtg JPS, 8 Apr 42. (3) JPS 21/9, 25 Apr 42, title: JPS

Subcom Rpt, Jt A&N Sv Force for Pac Theater. (4)

Min, 2d and 3d mtgs JPS Subcom on Sup Sv for Pac

Theater, 15 and 20 Apr 42. 59

 (1) Min, 2d mtg, cited n. 58(4). (2) Memo, Lutes

for Somervell, 15 Apr 42, Lutes File.
IMPROVISATION IN THE PACIFIC 189

Nimitz' reply to these queries brought

the question of a joint supply system to a

head. He suggested that supply of the

South Pacific should be handled entirely

as a joint enterprise. He proposed the

establishment of a "joint supply service at

Auckland staffed with Navy, Marine and

Army personnel,"60 to be under the naval

commander of that area, and to form part

of the Service Squadron, South Pacific,

the Navy's supply agency in the new theater. The proposed joint staff would have

responsibility for supplying to outlying

islands such stores as could be obtained

locally. Shipping and storage facilities

would be used jointly and purchases made

under joint arrangements. Interservice

co-ordination was also necessary, Nimitz

thought, in supply from the mainland. He

recommended the establishment of a "like

office with joint personnel in the Service

Force Subordinate Command at San

Francisco . . . but with existing storage

and procurement agencies to be used."61

All shipping and supply arrangements for

the South Pacific would be handled by

this office on a joint basis.62

General Emmons, writing independently from Hawaii on 19 April, expressed

generally similar views. He felt that transportation in the Pacific Ocean Area

should be pooled, with priorities on shipments determined by Admiral Nimitz as

senior tactical commander. "In my judgment," he wrote, "it is just as necessary

to have logistical unity of command as

tactical unity of command."

 63

 Emmons

wanted to know the War Department's

attitude before making any recommendations to Admiral Nimitz. In replying to

Emmons, General Somervell adroitly used

certain of Emmons' earlier references to

an improved supply situation in Hawaii

as arguments against joint supply:

You will admit, I am sure, that you owe

that [the improved supply situation] to the

direct logistical support of the Army and that

we were better able to serve you because we

controlled both the supply facilities and the

transportation necessary. . . . when you consider our greater strength in the Pacific,

in Hawaii, in Australia, in Alaska, in many

of the smaller islands, and our incomparably

larger supply set-up, it is inevitable that the

operations so undertaken would necessarily

become joint in character with all the fric- tions, inefficiencies and divided responsibil- ities that flow therefrom. We have so dominant an interest; we have so clear a responsibility in the supply of our large forces; we

must definitely control the means.64

From this position, the Army members

of the subcommittee refused to budge,

and in the end they carried their point.

The first report of the subcommittee on 25

April recommended that "shipping out

of West Coast ports continue to be coordinated under the principle of mutual

cooperation as at present."

 65

 The Joint

Planners returned the report for restudy,

but the impasse could not be broken. The

champions of joint supply had to be content with an agreement to set up joint machinery for local procurement in the South

Pacific. The Joint Chiefs agreed on 11

May that the Navy's announcement that

a joint purchasing staff would be formed

in New Zealand satisfied their original di60

 See below, n. 61. 61

 Msg 3528, CG HD to CG SOS, 21 Apr 42, ABC

400 POA (4-4-42). This is Emmons' paraphrase of

Nimitz' message. No copy of Nimitz' original message

could be found in War Department files. 62

 (1) Ibid. (2) Min, 3d mtg, cited n. 58(4). (3) Ballahtine, Naval Logistics, pp. 96-98. 63

 Min, 3d mtg, cited n. 58(4). 64

 Ltr, Somervell to Emmons, 28 Apr 42, Gross Day

File, Apr-Jun 42, Case 39, OCT HB. The letter was

drafted by Brig. Gen. Charles P. Gross, Chief of

Transportation. 65

 JPS 21/9 cited n. 58(3).
190 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

rective to the Joint Planners.66

Later in the year Somervell and Lutes

were to give vigorous support to an even

more comprehensive scheme of joint logistics than that under consideration in

April 1942. The reasons for their earlier

stand are not difficult to discern. In Nimitz' April plan the Navy would hold the

reins of control. Somervell and his advisers were dubious of the ability of

the Navy's logistical organization, which

seemed to them laggard in adjusting itself

to wartime tasks, to cope with operations

on the scale demanded in the Pacific, and

they feared Army interests would suffer.

The SOS, moreover, especially its Transportation Service (not yet risen to the

eminence of a corps), was itself troubled

by growing pains and feeling its way toward an orderly system of overseas supply; participation at this time in a new interservice mechanism would raise new

and unwelcome problems.67

The subcommittee made several more

positive suggestions for economies in shipping, emphasizing cross-procurement and

co-ordinated exploitation of local resources between the Southwest and South

Pacific Areas. The committee was convinced that these methods would produce

savings of at least 10 to 15 percent in

mainland supply to the South Pacific.

Since most of the logistical support must

still come from the United States, the

committee also turned its attention to

economies in utilization of ships. It urged

that all vessels assigned to the long Pacific

run should carry full cargoes for the greatest possible proportion of the round trip,

and that large vessels should be released,

as far as possible, from time-consuming

"milk-runs" involved in distribution to

line bases. Full shiploads should be delivered directly to the bases from the west

coast and Australia whenever possible.

Admiral Ghormley was to report on the

possibility of shipment to centrally located

distribution points from which further

distribution could be carried out in small

vessels. To expedite supply to the island

chain, the South Pacific Area and SWPA

commanders were to make full use of

space in ships returning to the United

States.68

With the delineation of both the Army

and Navy command and administrative

systems in the South Pacific, steps were

taken to put the recommendations into

effect. On the day he formally assumed

command, 19 June 1942, Admiral Ghormley activated the Joint Purchasing Board

for the South Pacific, composed of three

officers representing the Army, Navy,

and Marine Corps, respectively, with the

Army member, Col. Lawrence Westbrook,

serving as president. The board soon assumed control of all procurement from

sources other than the United States. In

the Army's supply plan for the South Pacific of 25 June, Army commanders at

Pacific bases were instructed to inform the

board of any supplies available on their

islands and in turn to requisition on the

board for whatever supplies it could furnish. The board in turn would inform the

San Francisco port of all supplies obtainable through local procurement, and San

Francisco would ship the balance of supplies to whatever port the South Pacific

66

 (1) Min, 15th mtg JPS, 29 Apr 42, Item 4. (2)

JCS 50, 6 May 42, title: Jt A&N Sv Force for the S

Pac Area. (3) OPD notes on 14th mtg JCS, 11 May

42, ABC 400 (4-4-42). (4) Memo, Secy JCS for Gen

Lutes et al., 13 May 42, Unified Sup: Army-Navy

1942-43 folder, Case 14a, Lutes File. 67

 (1) For the decentralized system of logistical organization in the Navy at this time, see Ballantine,

Naval Logistics, pp. 38-93. (2) See also below, Chs.

XV, XXIV. 68

 JPS 21/9 cited n. 58(3).
IMPROVISATION IN THE PACIFIC 191

Area commander designated. Ghormley's

headquarters was to be responsible for

all transshipment and for distribution of

locally procured supplies.69As a final step the Army and Navy in

July, spurred by the imminent prospects

of a campaign in the South Pacific, turned

to codify in a single plan the various

arrangements that had been generally

agreed upon for logistical support of the

South Pacific. On 15 July an agreement

was reached between General Somervell

and Vice Adm. Frederick J. Horne, Admiral King's deputy and senior naval

supply officer, entitled "Joint Logistical

Plan for the Support of United States

Bases in the South Pacific Area." The existing division of responsibility for items in

common use was confirmed and extended

to New Caledonia and Espiritu Santo.

The Army was to assume responsibility

for supplying to shore-based personnel in

South Pacific bases (except the Samoan

group) such rations as could not be

procured through the Joint Purchasing

Board. In turn, the Navy undertook to

provide all gasoline and oil including that

for aircraft, and to supply all items available from local resources through the

Joint Purchasing Board—clothing, equipment, and construction and miscellaneous

materials as well as rations. Each service,

after determining which items could be

satisfied from local sources by the Joint

Purchasing Board, was to process requisitions for the remainder of its needs directly

to its own mainland sources—for the

Army the San Francisco port, for the Navy

the Commander, Service Force Subordinate Command, Pacific Fleet, and the

Commandant, Twelfth Naval District. As

far as practicable shipment of supplies

from the United States was to be made in

shipload lots by each service directly to

the bases. Where redistribution was necessary, control was vested in Admiral

Ghormley, who was to control all ships

assigned to the theater, designate the port

or ports to which supplies for redistribution were to be delivered, and distribute

within the theater supplies shipped for redistribution and those procured locally.70

The plan thus left the logistical systems

of the two services intact and separate insofar as supply from the United States was

concerned. On the other hand, it clarified

respective responsibilities and provided for

a measure of joint action within the theater. The failure to achieve greater integration reflected the lack of appreciation

by either service of the impelling necessity

for it.

"Logistics is still, and for a long time

will be, in a muddle," General Harmon

wrote in August from the South Pacific.71

The same might have been said of the

Southwest Pacific, though in less measure,

for the logistical system there, owing to the

early clarification of command responsibilities and stabilization of the military

situation, had had longer to become settled. In the South Pacific the initial phase

of manning the island chain was largely

completed in May, but when the first offensive in the Pacific, the Guadalcanal

Campaign, was launched the following

69

 (1) TAG ltr cited n. 54(1). (2) Ltr, Comdr S Pac

Area to atchd distrib list, 19 Jun 42, sub: Jt Purch Bd

of the S Pac Area. (3) Ltr, President Jt Purch Bd to

CG SOS, 19 Jul 42, sub: Rpt on Orgn and Opn of Jt

Purch Bd, S Pac Area, with App. B. Last two in U.S.

Jt Purch Bd, S Pac Area, Wellington, New Zealand:

Rpt on Orgn and Opn of Jt Purch Bd, S Pac Area

folder, Plng Div ASF, Job A44-140. 70

 Jt Logis Plan for the Support of U.S. Bases in the

S Pac Area, 15 Jul 42, 370.2 Jt A&N Opns and Rpt

folder, Plng Div ASF, Job A44-140. 71

 Ltr, Gen Harmon to Brig Gen St. Clair Streett,

27 Aug 42, quoted in Drummond MS, Pt. I, Ch. 3, n.

25, cited n. 48(4).
192 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

August, the whole South Pacific Area administrative structure was still in the formative stage. Admiral Ghormley set up

his command in June. General Harmon

arrived in New Caledonia late in July to

establish the Army headquarters, but it

was not adequately staffed and scarcely

functioned at all until September; no

services of supply was created until late in

October. July saw the emergence of the

Army's supply plan and the Joint Logistical Plan for the SouthPacific. Neither was

definitive, and the scarcity of supply

personnel, both Army and Navy, was a

failing no paper arrangement could overcome. The Joint Logistical Plan, moreover,

ratified the existing duality of separate

Army and Navy supply systems, postponing a settlement of this issue until later

in the year when, as the Guadalcanal

Campaign reached an acute stage, it

could no longer be evaded. Nevertheless,

the logistical arrangements of July created

a framework within which an effective

supply and administrative system could

take shape, and the Joint Logistical Plan,

as a naval historian has remarked, "provided at least a cornerstone in the development of joint maintenance and supply

procedure in the Pacific."

 72

72

 Ballantine, Naval Logistics, p. 100.
PART THREE

THE EMERGENCE OF POLICY

AND METHOD

CHAPTER VIII

Strategy, Production Goals,

and Shipping

In the midst of a more or less continuous emergency in the Pacific and a

mounting shipping crisis in the Atlantic

and Caribbean, the military leaders and

staffs had also to attempt to make plans

for the more distant future—specifically to

formulate a strategy for taking the offensive and defeating the enemy, and to develop programs for mobilizing the forces,

munitions, and shipping needed to carry

out that strategy.

The Victory Program—Morning After

Allied political and military leaders

meeting in Washington soon after Pearl

Harbor to formulate a coalition strategy

took as their point of departure the principle already enunciated in ABC-1, that

the defeat of Germany should be the first

and major goal of Allied strategy, and

that operations in other theaters must not

be allowed to retard its attainment. Beyond this, agreement was more difficult.

The British brought to the conference the

plan of action they had set forth the preceding summer. This strategy looked to an

eventual return to the European continent

in force, possibly in the summer of 1943,

with numerous landings around its perimeter. Churchill envisaged the invading

armies, strong in armor but relatively

modest in numbers, serving as spearheads

behind which the peoples of Europe would

rise and smite their German conquerors.

U.S. Army planners still took a dim view

of this program, foreseeing that it would

involve a long series of costly preliminary

operations merely in order to gain positions

for penetrating the Continent simultaneously from several directions. The main

effort, they felt, should be concentrated

upon one point of the enemy's defenses,

and delivered with maximum force in

conjunction with a Soviet offensive from

the East.1

The American planners as yet had no

positive counterplan to offer, and the

whole question of how to defeat Germany seemed to lie in the dim future. For

months to come, the staff pointed out,

Britain would be hard pressed merely to

hold her own at home and in the Middle

and Far East. The United States, a staff

paper stated late in December,

. . . can only inadequately defend its coasts

against air raids, hold Hawaii, the Panama

1

 (1) Paper, Churchill for President, "Part III: The

Campaign of 1943," 18 Dec 41, as quoted in Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 655-58. (2) Memo, Br

CsofS, 22 Dec 41, sub: Br-American Strategy, ABC

337 ARCADIA (12-24-41), 2. (3) WPD paper, 21 Dec

41, sub: Notes on Agenda Proposed by Gt Brit,

Folder-Bk. 2, Exec 4. (4) Matloff and Snell, Strategic

Planning: 1941-1942, Ch. V. (5) See above, Chs. II, V.
196 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Canal and other existing bases, gradually

complete the relief of the British in Iceland, reinforce the Philippines or Dutch East In- dies, occupy Natal, and possibly occupy some

other base not seriously defended by Axis

forces or sympathisers (Cape Verdes or

Azores). It will be practicable and may be

necessary to send some armored or infantry

divisions to the British Isles in the winter or

spring. . . . The shortage of U.S. flagship- ping . . . precludes the possibility of execut- ing more than one, or at most two, of these

operations concurrently.2

In short, it looked to the planners as

though Allied military action for some

time to come would have to be shaped

from day to day, more or less as the enemy

called the tune.

The "grand strategy" upon which the

Allied leaders agreed, therefore, after

about a week's discussion at the end of

December, was not very explicit, and it reflected British ideas more than American.

Action in 1942, under the circumstances,

could only be tentatively projected, and

was mainly of a defensive character or

preparatory to later offensives; the descent on North Africa, the major operation in the Atlantic envisaged for 1942,

was already fading from view as a practical possibility. The year 1943, it was

hoped, might see the way clear for "a return to the Continent, across the Mediterranean, from Turkey into the Balkans, or

by landings in Western Europe." Meanwhile, it would be well to "be ready to

take advantage of any opening ... to

conduct limited land offensives" in 1942,

or in other ways to further the aim of

"closing and tightening the ring around

Germany."

 3

To the mobilization of forces and munitions for ultimate victory, therefore, the

strategic planners could offer little guidance. General Gerow, who had laid down

the "strategy-forces-munitions" formula

for the Victory Program in July 1941, admitted late in December, "the forces that

the Associated Powers now estimate as

necessary to achieve victory and for which

productive capacity must be provided,

may not be adequate or appropriate. No

one can predict the situation that will develop while the enemy retains the strategic initiative."

 4

Current notions of the size of forces that

would be needed to win the war therefore

tended to reflect little more specific than

a sense of urgency. A new Victory Program Troop Basis, circulated late in December, set new goals, for long-range supply planning, of more than four million

men by the end of 1942 and more than

ten million by mid-1944. These figures

were higher than the objectives for actual

expansion of the Army, which in late December 1941 contemplated 3.6 million

troops (ground and air) under arms by the

end of 1942, with seventy-one divisions

organized, though many of these would be

understrength and in the early stages of

training. Mobilization plans did not at

this juncture look ahead to 1943, though

it was widely assumed that the Army

would then double its 1942 strength.5

Meanwhile, the civilian production experts, who had been examining the feasibility of the original Victory Program objectives, submitted their findings to the

2

 WPD paper, sub: Immediate Mil Measures, part

of WPD paper cited n. 1(3). 3

 (1) ABC-4/CS-1, memo, U.S. and Br CsofS, 31

Dec 41, title: American-Br Grand Strategy. (2) For

the decline of the GYMNAST plan, see above, Ch. VI. 4

 Memo, Gerow for Marshall, no date, sub: Vic

Prog, WPD 4494 Vic Prog, U.S. Data. 5

 (1) Corresp in WPD 4494 series, especially WPD

4494-23, WPD 4494-26, and WPD 4494 Vic Prog,

U.S. Data; and G-4/33473. (2) Memo, Ray S. Cline

for Col William A. Walker, 24 Jan 47, sub: Info Concerning Tr Basis, Stf Action Corresp folder, OPD Hist

Unit File. (3) See also, Greenfield, Palmer, and

Wiley, AGF I, pp. 198ff.
STRATEGY, PRODUCTION GOALS, AND SHIPPING 197

military authorities a few days after Pearl

Harbor. Statisticians of the Office of Production Management estimated that the

entire bill, at current prices and including

the program financed to date, would come

to $150 billion. About $20 billion had

already been spent, and the experts calculated that industry could absorb $45 billion in 1942 and $60 to $65 billion in

1943. At this rate the program would be

only three-quarters completed by the end

of September 1943, the remainder some

time the following spring. Other estimates

were more conservative. Mr. William S.

Knudsen thought that no more than

$38 billion could be disbursed in 1942,

$57 billion in 1943. Within these limits,

moreover, the civilian production experts

believed that the goals for certain items,

such as small arms ammunition, Garand

rifles, 155-mm. guns, and several types of

trucks, were "out of line" and would have

to be lowered. No one believed that all

seventy-one divisions could be fully or

even half equipped in 1942; a great deal

would depend on how much matériel

went to lend-lease. But the experts seemed

reasonably confident that the 3.6 millionman Army could be equipped in some

fashion by the end of 1942.6

Army supply officers were inclined to be

skeptical of these predictions. "If this is all

that can be done," remarked Colonel

Aurand at one point with reference to the

more cautious estimates of Mr. Knudsen

and the Supply Priorities and Allocations

Board, "we might as well give up."

 7 But

there was, in general, little impulse from

within the military organization at this

time to raise the sights of industrial mobilization. The staffs were immersed, during

December, in a vast amount of pick-andshovel work. New financial estimates were

being rushed through for Congressional

action so that production might be accelerated. New requirements were being

drawn up to close the gap between the $27

billion in production that current schedules, when projected, indicated for 1942,

and the $40 to $45 billion in capacity that

the civilian experts said would be available. The Victory Program itself had to be

revised in greater detail to include the vast

amounts of clothing, equipage, and other

easy-to-produce items omitted from the

original estimates. Beyond this, military

supply men, from long experience, feared

to tamper with production schedules

already established and in operation—the

machine might then have to be slowed

down before it could be speeded up.8

Production Goals and the Problem of Balance

The impulse that lifted industrial mobilization out of the prison of peacetime

conceptions of national productive capacity came from outside the Military Establishment. For more than a year Purvis,

Monnet, and their associates in the British

missions in the United States had labored

to jar American officials into awareness of

the huge quantities of munitions needed to

win the war, as well as of the vast potentialities of American industry for producing

them. In the last days of December Lord

Beaverbrook, the British Minister of Sup6

 (1) Memo, Donald Nelson for SW, 11 Dec 41, G4/33473. (2) Other corresp in same file. (3) Notes to

accompany tabulation, "Major Combat Units That

Can Be Equipped by Specific Dates," 21 Dec 41, Item

14, Exec 4. (4) CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War,

pp. 273-74. 7

 Memo, Col Aurand for Gen Moore, 11 Dec 41,

sub: All-Out Mun Prog, U.K. Vic Prog folder, DAD. 8

 (1) Memo, SW for Donald Nelson, 16 Dec 41,

sub: Vic Prog, G-4/33473. (2) WD paper, 21 Dec 41,

sub: Estd Pdn, WPD 4494-22 to WPD 4494-36 Vic Prog, Sec. 2. (3) Corresp in WPD 4494 Vic Prog, U.S.

Data. (4) Memo, unsigned, no addressee, 25 Dec 41,

sub: Sup for 1942, Misc Corresp Lend-lease 4 file,

DAD.
198 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ply, who was in Washington as part of the

Prime Minister's entourage, pressed these

arguments directly upon the President.9

His efforts evidently were successful. The

President wrote Stimson on 3 January

that victory depended in the last analysis

upon "our overwhelming mastery in the

munitions of war," to achieve which "the

concept of our industrial capacity must be

completely overhauled." America's allies,

already "extended to the utmost," could

not arm their own large armies. "We

must not only provide munitions for our

own fighting forces but vast quantities to

be used against the enemy in every appropriate theater of war, wherever that may

be."

 10

 He directed forthwith that the war

effort be geared to a new set of production

goals, expressed significantly not in dollars

but in quantities of a few major items—

60,000 airplanes in 1942 and 125,000 in

1943; 45,000 tanks in 1942 and 75,000 in

1943; 20,000 antiaircraft guns in 1942 and

35,000 in 1943; half a million machine

guns in 1942 and as many in 1943;

8,000,000 dead-weight tons of merchant

shipping in 1942 and 10,000,000 in 1943.

These goals were blazoned forth three

days later in the President's state-of-theunion message to Congress. "This production of ours . . . must be raised far above

present levels ... . We must raise our

sights all along the production line. Let no

man say it cannot be done. It must be

done—and we have undertaken to do

it."11

The response to the President's January

production objectives, both among the

production authorities and in the Military

Establishment, was less than enthusiastic.

The goals had no anchor either in feasibility or in need; they flew in the face of both

the production authorities' notions of what

could be produced and the military chiefs'

claim to the right to determine what

should be produced. Estimates of probable

cost varied, but they ranged upward from

a figure of $52 billion for 1942 production

alone. Mr. Nelson's advisers did indeed

revise their estimates of production capacity upward to close the gap, but the President's program, when translated into

detailed programs of military supply,

showed a tendency to climb even higher.

The Army's War Munitions Program of

11 February, precursor of the Army Supply Programs, piled up requirements estimated at $62 to $63 billion through 1943,

bringing the estimated total of all war

needs to $62.6 billion for 1942 and $110

for 1943. During the spring and summer

individual portions of the program rose

and fell in estimated valuations, but the

total war production program, until

autumn, climbed steadily, particularly in

such categories as naval-vessel and merchant-vessel construction. The production

authorities resisted this trend, but on the

whole without marked success, despite a

ruling from the President early in April

setting a ceiling of $45 billion for 1942 and

$75 billion for 1943. The revisions resulting from this rule failed to bring production goals down to the limits established,

and the President himself, on 1 May, called

for new quantitative goals, some of which

were in excess of those announced in

January.12

9

 (1) Note, Beaverbrook to President, as quoted in

Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 689. (2) See also

above, Chs. I, III. 10

 Memo, President for SW, 3 Jan 42, WPD 4494

Vic Prog, U.S. Data. 11

 (1) Address, President to Cong, 6 Jan 42, 77th

Cong, 2d Sess, HR Doc 501, pp. 3-4. (2) CPA Industrial Mobilization for War, pp. 277-78. (3) Churchill,

The Grand Alliance, pp. 688-91. (4) Hancock and

Gowing, British War Economy, pp. 387-88, 398. 12

 (1) CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War, pp. 273-

85. (2) For the development of the Army Supply Program, see below, Ch. XII.
STRATEGY, PRODUCTION GOALS, AND SHIPPING 199

At the outset the military services were

determined to translate the President's

major-item goals into a balanced program

for all items of munitions. General Somervell, comparing the President's January

goals with the amounts of the corresponding items already incorporated in the

Army's supplemental estimates for 1942,

concluded optimistically, "the items in the

President's directive are indices of balanced production contemplated by time

objectives established before its receipt. In

other words, the accomplishment of the

President's directive for 1942 can be accomplished by the production of a balanced equipment program." Even with

respect to the still unformulated program

for 1943, Somervell was confident that a

balanced program "on the scale indicated

in the President's directive" could be

achieved.13 What this meant in terms of

total objectives the mammoth War Munitions Program of 11 February soon demonstrated. Its size, indeed, caused some

uneasiness even in the services. Admiral

King feared the impact of a huge expansion program upon production during the

next few months. "What we need most and

need urgently," he warned, "is the maximum output of plants that are now producing ... . It is literally a case of first

things first.' " But he, too, insisted upon

balance. "It is of little use to go all out on

tanks unless there are ships to ferry them,

trained and equipped troops to man them,

aircraft to cooperate with them, antiaircraft guns and field artillery to protect

them."

 14

The civilian production officials threw

up their hands in horror at the Army's

11 February program, and took their case

to the President. His goals for airplanes,

tanks, antiaircraft and antitank guns, and

merchant shipping could be achieved, they

said, but not in conjunction with the multitude of ancillary items that the services

wanted to procure on a like scale. A choice

must be made: either the announced objectives in major items, or a balanced program pitched at a lower level. The services

accordingly were directed to revise their

requirements downward, but in balance.15

Thereafter the trend of Army requirements, in the supply programs of 1942,

was downward.

On the dangers of imbalance, as on

those of sin, almost everyone could agree.

But "balance" meant something different

to each of the claimants. The result was

bitter contention within the Military Establishment, and between the military and

civilian authorities, over the priorities

structure that would govern the division of

the national product. Long before Pearl

Harbor, the lack of a firm policy and of

effective machinery to decide among the

competing claimants had resulted in overloading the top-priority ratings and depreciating the lower ones. In the flood of

orders and new programs of early 1942 the

situation quickly got out of hand. The

Army and Navy Munitions Board reported late in February that, out of total

war expenditures scheduled or in prospect

for 1942 (about $56 billion at this juncture), over $31 billion, or almost 56 percent, was in the top-priority band. The

Combined Chiefs of Staff considered the

problem, but their jurisdiction over what

seemed to be a distinctly American prob13

 (1) Memo, Somervell for CofS, 7 Jan 42, sub: Effect of President's Dir of 3 Jan, WPD 4494 Vic Prog,

U.S. Data. (2) CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War,

pp. 273-74. 14

 Memo, Adm King for SN, 19 Feb 42, sub: Priority of Pdn of Mat, WPD 4494-22 to WPD 4494-36

Vic Prog, Sec 2. 15

 (1) CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War, pp. 275-

76, 283. (2) See below, Ch. XII.
200 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

lem was a matter of dispute. Not until a

combined board for production and resources was established in June was the

priorities question to receive any serious

consideration at the combined level. In the

interim, what and how much to produce

became a problem for the U.S. military

agencies to work out with the civilian production authorities.16

Within the military staffs there was general agreement that production programs

should be shaped to serve strategic objectives. A "balanced" program would be one

that provided adequate amounts of the

various categories of munitions in time to

execute an approved strategy. The basis of

an Army supply program, General Somervell asserted late in January,

. . . should consist of the strategical concept

for the prosecution of the war, the general

policy and detailed plans for the supply of

Army-type munitions to the United Nations,

and the plans for the mobilization, training

and utilization of the Army, to consist not

only of the long-range plan but also of de- tailed plans for the immediate future.

It is realized that the basis . . . cannot be

stated with exactitude, that broad assump- tions . . . must be made, and that the statement is subject to constant change. Neverthe- less . . . these factors are the impulse behind

the entire Army Supply Program from the

formulation of the program through alloca- tion of facilities and raw materials, the plac- ing of orders, production and delivery.

It might be argued that such a statement

would be so full of uncertainties that it would

not be worth attempting. This is not, however, the case. Under any conditions, plans

must be made and actions taken ... . Without such a statement, those responsible

for various phases of supply are forced to

make their own uncoordinated assumptions

and guesses.17

The fundamental difficulty, as Somervell hinted, was that there was no approved

strategy sufficiently explicit to provide a

basis for concrete programs of requirements, production schedules, and priorities. ARCADIA had produced only a

concept, a "grand strategy"; the specific

course of action best calculated to give

effect to this strategic concept, assuming

that the development of events so permitted, was a subject of lively debate on

the upper staff levels and between the

military and political leaders, and the advocates of each major arm of warfare naturally tended to bestow the label "balanced," like an accolade, only on programs

and priorities that supported their own

favored strategy. One brief, for example,

evidently prepared by an Air officer, stated

first the general proposition, "The national

industry must be so coordinated that production meets the requirements of grand

strategy, rather than the reverse," and

from this proceeded to the conclusion,

"Allocation of production must be predicated on the creation of the air forces set

forth in the Victory Program in the shortest practicable time, and balancing of all other

requirements in relation thereto" 18

Late in February the Joint Planners

were directed to "review the strategical

situation, to include probable . . . operations in order of priority, and determine

the critical items of material such as merchant and combat vessels, tanks, aircraft,

antiaircraft equipment, guns, etc., which

16

 (1) Papers in CGS 400.3 (2-17-42) Pt. 1. (2) Min,

sp mtg JB, 20 Feb 42. (3) JPS 2/3/D, 22 Feb 42, title:

JPS Dir, Priorities in Pdn of Mun Based on Strategical Considerations. (4) Memo, ANMB for CCS

[American Sec], 26 Feb 42, sub: Resume of Priorities

Sit ... , JB 355, Ser 745. Last three in CCS 400.17

(2-20-42) Sec 1. (5) For efforts to set up a combined

requirements program, see below, Ch. XI. 17

 Memo, Gen Somervell for Gen Moore, 22 Jan

42, sub: Army Supply Program, CofS WDGS 1941-

42 folder, Hq ASF. 18

 Paper, unsigned, 6 Jan 42, sub: Vic Prog, WPD

4494 Vic Prog, U.S. Data. Italics are the authors'.
STRATEGY, PRODUCTION GOALS, AND SHIPPING 201

must be produced to implement these

operations."

 19

 However, the Joint U.S.

Strategic Committee (JUSSC), to which

the task was assigned, found that it could

only go in circles without the basic strategic decisions, which "control the projected

development and deployment of fighting

forces, which in turn control the needs of

the fighting forces for war materials."20

The committee was beset by representations from competing interests—Lt. Gen.

Henry H. Arnold, for example, wanted a

new priority list topped by "aircraft complete, with munitions,"21

 and Admiral

King complained that naval shipbuilding

was being subordinated. The JUSSC

finally recommended nine separate categories of war material for assignment to

highest priority. These, representing a

composite of all the competing claims, in

effect sought to ensure material support

for all the divergent strategies clamoring

for favor.

On 1 May the President, worried by

lagging production, announced a new set

of objectives for 1942. Those for aircraft,

antiaircraft guns, tanks, and artillery remained generally at the levels set in January. Machine guns were reduced from

500,000 to 400,000, certain adjustments

were made in antiaircraft and antitank

weapons, and "tanks" now included selfpropelled artillery and other "tank-type"

weapons. For merchant shipping the objectives, already raised in February, were

confirmed at nine million dead-weight

tons. The formidable naval program,

omitted in January, was now included.

Perhaps the most significant addition was

"complementary equipment required for

a decisive land and air offensive involving

amphibious landing operations"—an important concession to balance. The President even mentioned "complementary

weapons for the supporting troops required," and noted that "every effort must

be made" to produce equipment for training additional forces, for lend-lease, and

for "other needed items." Nevertheless, at

the end he warned, "a balance in these

latter items must not be attained at the

expense of the specific items which I have

enumerated herein."

 22

The President also declined to tie production objectives to any specific strategy.

April had seen a sudden lifting of the mists

that had obscured future coalition action,

when General Marshall and Harry Hopkins succeeded at London in winning British acceptance to the plan for invading

Europe the following spring. The decision

seemed to presage a long-range course of

action that could be charted in detail to

provide a firm guide for mobilization and

production planning alike, and it was reflected in the President's reference to

"complementary weapons" for "decisive"

amphibious operations. But he also appended a prophetic note to the Joint

Chiefs: "We cannot foretell the critical

period in our war effort, and maximum

production of major items of military

equipment must be obtained without

delay."

 23

In the same vein the President approved,

on 1 May, the recommendations of the

Joint Chiefs on production priorities,

which followed in the main those sub19

 Min cited n. 16(2). 20

 JPS 20, 23 Mar 42, title: Priorities in Pdn of Mun

Based on Strategical Considerations, CGS 400.17 (2-

20-42) Sec 1. 21

 Memo, CG AAF for USW, 17 Mar 42, sub: Priorities for Pdn of Mun Based on Strategical Considerations, CCS 400.17 (2-20-42) Sec 1. 22

 Ltr, President to Donald Nelson, 1 May 42, incl

with memo, President for JCS, 1 May 42, sub: Recommendations to JCS for Priority of Pdn of War Mun,

CCS 400.17 (2-20-42) Sec 1. 23

 (1) Ibid. (2) See below, Chs. XIV, XVI.
202 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

mitted by the JUSSC.24 On 20 May these

recommendations were translated into a

new draft directive on priorities by the

Army and Navy Munitions Board. The

directive superimposed upon the existing

structure of priorities an emergency rating

band, AAA, and four other bands, AA-1

through AA-4. To the latter were assigned

the existing military programs with necessary plant expansion and raw materials.

Bands AA-1 and AA-2 were intended to

comprise a balanced program of the most

urgently needed munitions; the lower two

covered less urgent military production

and construction. Into AA-1 went roughly

half the military programs, including half

of the President's "must" items. All the

nonmilitary programs, including lendlease and the whole field of civilian requirements, were relegated by implication

to the existing and now downgraded priority categories. Inexplicably, part of the

vital merchant shipping program was

placed in a rating that would virtually

preclude its accomplishment. The directive immediately became the focus of a

prolonged dispute between the services

and WPB, which continued even after the

directive, in revised form, was approved

by Mr. Nelson and the President early in

June. In the revision the Maritime Commission program was given a more favored

status, and later two new rating bands,

AA-2X and AA-5, were added for urgent

nonmilitary items.25

By midyear the output of munitions, at

any rate, was prodigious by all previous

standards. During the first six months of

1942 more than twice the amount of munitions was produced for the Army as

during the six months preceding—almost

a million hand and shoulder weapons,

235,000 machine guns, 16,100 pieces of

artillery, 7,329 tanks, 285,600 trucks,

3,222,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 32,925,000 rounds of artillery

ammunition, 212,000 tons of aircraft

bombs, and 18,060 aircraft, to mention a

few major categories. Monthly production

rate had at least doubled in practically all

categories since the end of 1941, in small

arms and artillery ammunition it had

tripled, and in aircraft bombs and artillery

pieces it had quadrupled. Production of

self-propelled weapons, at 650 a month,

represented a surge in output from almost

zero at the end of 1941. With this achievement, American industry was already well

on the way to making 1942 the year of

greatest expansion of production in American history.26

Shipping: Capacity To Deploy Versus

Capacity To Support

Capacity to deploy and support forces

overseas during the first half of 1942

lagged far behind the production of munitions and of trained and equipped forces

ready for deployment. In the crisis immediately following Pearl Harbor, the greatest limitation upon the outward movement

of troops was the shortage of troop-carrying tonnage. There were in December 1941

upwards of 130 ocean-going passenger

vessels flying the American flag and suitable for military use, including the military transport fleets. Another dozen new

transports were expected during 1942. On

the other hand, the Navy was holding

some twenty potential troopers for conversion into light cruisers, aircraft carriers,

and other auxiliaries, and six of its largest

transports, engaged in trooping for the 24

 (1) Memo cited n. 22. (2) JCS 30, 5 Apr 42, title:

Priorities in Pdn of Mun Based on Strategical Considerations. (3) Memo, JCS for President, 10 Apr 42,

CCS 400.17 (2-20-42) Sec 1. 25

 CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War, pp. 295-302. 26

 See below, App. B.
STRATEGY, PRODUCTION GOALS, AND SHIPPING 203

British in the Indian Ocean, could not return for many weeks. An indeterminate

number of vessels probably would have to

be kept in normal commercial services, at

least for some time. Most of the conventional transports in the military fleets

would be needed to reinforce existing overseas garrisons, and a block of about

twenty-five combat loaders had to be reserved for possible amphibious expeditions. There would be losses. Estimates of

the net total of tonnage that could be

counted on for ferrying troops in any new

overseas ventures in 1942 ranged between

40 and 50 transports, with a capacity of

60,000 to 70,000 troops on a single trip.

In terms of deployment to the nearest possible theater of action, the European, this

meant average monthly embarkations of

about 30,000, or about 350,000 by the end

of the year. This could hardly be called a

maximum effort, however. As Army planners were at pains to point out, the Navy

might give up its earmarked auxiliaries,

and amphibious shipping might be used

for ferrying. Various economies were possible—air transport, slashing equipment

allowances, double bunking and shift

sleeping on transports, curtailing commercial services. If all means were employed,

perhaps as many as 850,000 to 900,000

troops could be shipped across the Atlantic

in 1942.27

Before the end of December the Army

forced the issue of the Navy's conversion

program, a subject of dispute since the

preceding summer. Three large transports,

to be converted into aircraft carriers, were

the heart of this program—Mount Vernon,

Wakefield, and West Point, all three currently

in the Indian Ocean in British service.

There was also a new liner recently purchased from Sweden, the Kungsholm. In

the aggregate these vessels represented a

carrying capacity of twenty-two thousand

troops. These and other conversions in

progress and planned would hold up construction of about twenty-five new troop

transports. When the Maritime Commission suggested substituting tankers for the

vessels to be converted, the Navy decided

to convert both tankers and transports. On

22 December General Marshall, in a

"Dear Betty" letter, conveyed the protests

of his staff to Admiral Stark, while Admiral Land approached the President. On

the 27th, at the President's order, conversion of the four big transports was canceled

and the other projects were modified.

Early in January the British were granted

another voyage of the Wakefield and West

Point, but four other transports in Eastern

waters were ordered to return.28

Somervell was thus able to report on

10 January that available passenger tonnage, excluding Navy combat loaders but

including the giant Normandie, then being

refitted, had a total capacity of 159,000

troops. (Soon thereafter the Normandie was

put out of action by a fire.) Meanwhile the

British had agreed to turn over for American use, beginning in February, the "monsters"— Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth, and

Aquitania—the first two with a capacity

then conservatively rated at 6,000 each,

the last at 4,500. Several smaller British

27

 (1) G-4 study, 10 Dec 41, title: Analysis of Passenger Shipg. (2) Memo, Gross for Somervell, 2 Dec

41, sub: Maximum Overseas Mvmt. (3) Memo, Gross

for Somervell, 10 Dec 41, sub: Shipg Sit As It Affects

the Army. All in Plng Div Studies folder, OCT HB.

(4) Memo, Gross for Somervell, 21 Dec 41, sub: Est

of Shipg Available for U.S. Overseas Effort 1942-43,

G-4/29717-116.

28

of (1 Conversio ) Memon, Gros. . . , sfo G-4/33473 r CofS, 22 De. (2c 41 ) Memo , sub:, Effec Martshall for Stark, 22 Dec 41, G-429717-81. Admiral

Stark had carried the nickname "Betty" ever since his

first year at the Naval Academy. (3) Memo, Somervell for CofS, 7 Jan 42, sub: Br Request To Retain Six

U.S. Trans, G-4/29717-111.
204 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

THE LINER NORMANDIE BURNING at dockside, North River, New York, 9 February

1942.

transports were also to be made available

to the Army.29

Britain had far more shipping than the

United States, both troop-carrying and

cargo, though her capacity to build was

limited. Early in March the Prime Minister appealed to the President to "double

or treble the American man-lift by the

summer of 1943."30 British troop-carrying

capacity then stood at about 280,000, and

there seemed little prospect of augmenting

it. Moreover, since the bulk of it was servicing the Indian Ocean area, the long

return voyage of empty transports around

the Cape kept a large proportion of this

capacity out of use for extended periods.

The President, on the advice of Army

shipping officials, turned a deaf ear to

Churchill's request. American troop-carrying capacity in being was now estimated

at about 130,000. To this it was expected

another 75,000 in conversions and new

construction would be added by June

1943, an additional 100,000 by the end of

1943, and 95,000 more by mid-1944—

bringing the total, by that time, to 400,000.

This program, Colonel Gross insisted,

"cannot be advanced; it may only be ex29

 (1) Memo, Somervell for CofS, 19 Jan 42, sub:

Maximum Tr Mvmt and Forces Overseas . . . , G4/29717-116. (2) See also above, Ch. VI. 30

 Msg, Former Naval Person [Churchill] to President Roosevelt, 5 Mar 42, as quoted in Winston S.

Churchill, The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate

(Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 193.
STRATEGY, PRODUCTION GOALS, AND SHIPPING 205

tended."31 In April, however, the Army

reversed its stand to the extent of agreeing to the construction of fifty new C-4

transports, in place of the same number

of seatrains, contracted for in February,

which the Navy feared would be too vulnerable to attack. By May the estimated

combined capacity of the British and

American transport fleets had risen to

about half a million.32

Cargo shipping from the outset presented the greater problem. Army calculations soon after Pearl Harbor showed

about 1.6 million gross tons potentially

available to support new deployment, beyond routine and already scheduled uses.

Even with 4 million gross tons of new construction scheduled for 1942, and under

optimistic assumptions as to the requirements for lend-lease shipments and for

replacement of British and U.S. shipping

losses, the 1.6 million tons was expected

to dwindle to 1.4 million by the end of

1942. Moreover, as the troop population

overseas grew, maintenance requirements

would mount. Progressively larger tonnages of cargo shipping would have to be

assigned, first to build up and then to

maintain existing garrisons and bases yet

to be established. This shipping would not

be available for supporting the deployment of forces for offensive operations.

Capacity to deploy offensively, as Colonel

Gross epigrammatically put it, was "a diminishing function."33

 Not until 1943,

after the overseas defensive and logistical

establishment was complete, could new

shipbuilding under the building programs

current in December 1941 be expected to

increase the capacity for offensive deployment. On 3 January 1942 the President

raised the 1942 shipbuilding program

from 6 million to 8 million dead-weight

tons, and the 1943 program from 8 million

to 10 million. The Maritime Commission,

with some misgivings, thought there was

a fair chance of meeting these goals, but

there were also new demands for cargo

shipping in prospect. The President's new

production goals for munitions meant increased imports of raw materials, and

much of the expanded munitions output

was evidently intended by the President to

be transported to the Allies in American

cargo ships, at the expense of supplying

U.S. forces overseas.34

Tremendous tonnages of cargo shipping,

moreover, were needed to complement a

relatively small amount of troop-carrying

tonnage in the deployment and support of

forces overseas. The troop transports becoming available for Army deployment

early in 1942 were mostly new, large, and

fast. One speedy liner, for example one of

the Queens, could, by conservative reckoning, move eighteen thousand troops in

three trips across the Atlantic in seventytwo days—the time required for a slow

convoy of freighters, carrying these same

troops' equipment and supplies, to make

a single round trip. Even with larger programs of cargo shipbuilding, the expansion

of troop-carrying capacity, both accom31

 Memo, Gross for Somervell, 6 Mar 42, sub: Reply to Mr. Churchill's Cablegram . . . , Army Trans

Sv folder, OCT HB. 32

 (1) Msg, Former Naval Person to President

Roosevelt, 5 Mar 42, as quoted in Churchill, Hinge of

Fate, pp. 191-94. Part of the President's reply, dated

8 March, is quoted on p. 196. (2) Min, 5th and 10th

mtgs CCS, 17 Feb and 7 Mar 42. (3) Lane, Ships for

Victory, p. 618. (4) CMT 5/3, 8 May 42, title: Availability of United Nations Shipg for Mil Trans, Chart

D and appended notes, ABC 570 (2-14-42) Sec 1. 33

 Memo cited n. 27(4). 34

 Lane, Ships for Victory, pp. 138-39.

On the eve of Pearl Harbor about 5 million deadweight tons (3.3 million gross tons) of new merchant

shipping were scheduled for construction in 1942, and

7 million dead-weight tons (4.7 million gross tons) in

1943. By the end of December 1941 these figures had

risen to 6 and 8 million tons, respectively.
206 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

TABLE 3—ESTIMATED CAPACITY OF CARGO SHIPPING TO SUPPORT OFFENSIVE

DEPLOYMENT: DECEMBER 1941 a

a

 These figures are broad and rather hasty estimates of the number of troops that might be supported overseas by the cargo shipping

expected to be available on each of the dates given. The estimates are unrealistic and theoretical in several respects. They assume, for

example, that the task of holding the enemy on the front not chosen for offensive deployment could be performed by whatever base and

garrison forces were assigned to that area, and in the case of the January 1942 figures they make no allowance for the time that would be

required to deploy these forces overseas.

The primary significance of the estimates, in the present context, is to illustrate the "diminishing function" of shipping capacity to

deploy during a period when overseas bases and lines of communications were also being developed and shipbuilding had not yet reached its

peak—that is, according to the expectations of the estimate, during most of 1942. Thus it appeared that it would be possible to deploy

forces overseas for offensive operations, either against Germany or against Japan, in larger numbers immediately—while the defensive establishment overseas was still undermanned—than could be deployed six or nine months later. By the end of 1942, the maintenance costs of the

overseas establishment could be expected to level off, and the full effect of new ship construction (by then expanded to maximum capacity)

would be felt thereafter in a steadily expanding capacity to deploy and maintain forces overseas. As can be seen, the estimate contemplated

a defensive and logistical establishment overseas of some 455,000 troops, to be completed before the end of 1942. Note the effect of greater

distance in limiting the volume of deployment to the Far East, as compared with that to the European area.

Maintenance requirements were estimated at .9 gross tons (about 2.25 measurement tons) per man per month; turnaround to the

European area was taken as two months, to the Far East as three months. Compare these assumptions with others shown below in Appendixes A-2, A-3, and A-6. b

 Not stated in source.

Source: Based on memo, Gross for Somervell, 21 Dec 41, sub: Est of Shipg Available for U.S. Overseas Effort 1942-43, G-4/29717-116.

plished and in prospect in mid-January,

indicated that for a long time to come

cargo shipping would probably be the

chief limitation upon overseas deployment.35

 (Tables 3 and 4)

The Drain of Ship Losses

Sinkings during the winter and spring

increased the imbalance between troop

and cargo shipping. During the first ten

weeks of the year, a period of intensified

activity by German submarines, Allied

losses of dry cargo shipping reached an

annual rate of over 10 million dead-weight

tons. In March alone the toll was some

788,000 tons. In June it was 936,000 tons.

Tanker losses were even more alarming,

reaching an all-time peak of 375,000 tons

in March and leading the U.S. Government to withdraw all its tankers from the

Atlantic coastal traffic. The Navy, responsible for antisubmarine defense, faced this

peril with totally inadequate resources.

Late in December 1941 it had only twenty

assorted surface vessels and about a hundred aircraft in the critical area covered

35

 (1) Memo, Somervell for CofS, 12 Jan 42, sub:

Capacity of Shipg for War Effort Overseas Early 1942,

G-4/29717-116. (2) During the summer following, the

Queens actually carried as many as fifteen thousand

troops on a single trip. See below, Ch. XIV.
STRATEGY, PRODUCTION GOALS, AND SHIPPING 207

TABLE 4—CAPACITY TO DEPLOY VERSUS CAPACITY TO SUPPORT: JANUARY 1942

These estimates reflected the current crisis in the Far East (see above, Ch. VI). Under both assumptions deployment was oriented

mainly to the Pacific.

All figures represent troops. First two columns represent troop-carrying capacity; last two columns represent number of troops that

could be sustained overseas by cargo shipping.

Under "Capacity To Transport," "maximum" figures are based on assumption that Navy combat loaders, Navy chartered transports,

and the six Navy transports in the Indian Ocean would be available; "minimum" figures exclude these vessels.

Under "Capacity To Support," "maximum" figures are based on assumption that some additional British tonnage in the North Atlantic, and additional Navy cargo vessels in both oceans, would be available; "minimum" figures exclude this shipping.

Source: Based on memo, Somervell for CofS, 12 Jan 42, sub: Capacity of Shipg for War Effort Overseas Early 1942, G-4/29717-116.

by the North Atlantic Naval Coastal

Frontier (later the Eastern Sea Frontier)

available for independent action against

submarines; most of the vessels were unable to meet a submarine on equal terms,

and none of the planes could maintain

long-range patrol. The Army Air Forces

was able to put perhaps a hundred aircraft

of somewhat longer range into the battle.

During the winter and spring these meager

forces, only gradually augmented, attempted unsuccessfully to combat the

growing number and widening range of

enemy attacks on shipping throughout the

western Atlantic, Gulf, and Caribbean

areas. Apart from the inadequacy of forces,

antisubmarine measures were hampered

by divided responsibility between the

Army and Navy, a problem that remained

the subject of prolonged interservice controversy throughout 1942 and was never

wholly resolved.36

The Navy held firmly to the belief that

convoying was the only real answer to the

submarine menace. Hampered by a severe

shortage of escort vessels, it put heavy pressure on the Army to reduce the number

of special convoys and to rely on regular,

widely spaced movements. Army officials,

on the contrary, wanted flexible arrangements, permitting emergency movements

(like those to Hawaii immediately after

Pearl Harbor), without escort when the

situation demanded, and they argued that

the Navy's rigid standards regarding size

and speed of convoyed vessels would drastically curtail the amount of usable shipping. In the late winter the dispute became

bitter. "This sort of thing cannot go on,"

Admiral King protested in March; "we

simply have not the means to escort multifarious expeditions."

 37

 Late in January

the Navy agreed to permit freighters in

36

 For these and subsequent figures on ship losses,

see: (1) Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 17 Jun 42,

sub: Submarine Sinkings of Combined Merchant

Fleet, Gross Day File, OCT HB; (2) Churchill, Hinge

of Fate, p. 199 and table on p. 879; (3) Hancock and

Gowing, British War Economy, p. 416; (4) Memo, Lt

Col A. S. Palmerlee for Chester Wardlow, 14 Dec 43,

sub: Shipg Losses, Shipg 1941-43 folder, Hq ASF; (5)

Min, 12th mtg CCS, 17 Mar 42; and (6) CCS 39/1,

14 Mar 42, title: Relation of Merchant Shipg Losses

to Prosecution of War. (7) See below, App. H.

For Army-Navy antisubmarine operations and controversy, see Craven and Cate, AAF I, Ch. 15, and

Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, passim. 37

 (1) Memo, Adm King for CofS, 23 Mar 42, Convoys folder, OCT HB. (2) Other corresp in same file.
208 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

the Pacific to shift for themselves if too

slow to accompany troop convoys, and on

9 February a comprehensive convoy

schedule and policy was issued. Troop

convoys were to run every forty days from

New York to Iceland and the United

Kingdom and from Boston to Newfoundland and Greenland; sailings to Bermuda,

the Caribbean bases, South America, Australia, and the Pacific ferry islands were to

be spaced at intervals of thirty days; sailings to Hawaii, six days. Cargo sailings

were to be unescorted unless fast enough

to accompany troop convoys. Troop transports, even if escorted, must have a speed

of at least fifteen knots (slightly less later).

Fast vessels could go without protection,

except from the air, in coastal waters. The

Navy required one month's advance notice on each convoy. Late in April American cargo shipments to the United

Kingdom were merged with British convoys out of Halifax, and in May the Navy,

with the help of borrowed British trawlers,

instituted coastal convoys in the Atlantic.38

Despite these measures the toll of sinkings rose steadily through the spring and

into the summer. In terms of percentages

of the total Allied dry cargo fleet, losses

rose from 1.7 percent in January to 2.5

percent in May. Tanker losses averaged

3.5 percent of the monthly tanker tonnage

in use, and totaled more than two million

dead-weight tons for the six-month period,

about four fifths of the amount lost during

the entire twenty-seven months of war before Pearl Harbor. During the first six

months of 1942 losses of United Nations

shipping were almost as heavy as during

the whole of 1941 and exceeded new construction and other gains by almost 2.8

million dead-weight tons. While the

United States was able by May to balance

its own current losses by new ships, Allied

replacements continued to lag behind

losses until the following August. Another

year passed before building could overcome cumulative losses. "This problem,"

General Marshall wrote the President

gloomily in June 1942, "is with us daily

and hourly."

 39

 If sinkings continued at

current rates, American forces would eventually be immobilized in the Western

Hemisphere. In June the Navy urged that

the whole ship construction program be

revised to produce more escorts, at the expense of merchant tonnage, arguing that

there was little use in building ships that

the enemy would promptly sink; such

action, in modified form, was to be taken

later in the year. But despite the bleak outlook, General Marshall felt that strategy

and industrial mobilization must be based

on the assumption "that present losses by

submarine will be overcome, . . . . Under

no circumstances should the government

be placed in the position where its military effort overseas will be curtailed by

lack of equipment and supplies."

 40

Army Allocations and New Construction

After mid-January General Somervell

pressed for a definite allocation of shipping to the Army sufficient to support a

substantial deployment. Specifically, he

urged either an immediate allocation of

two hundred freighters with a monthly al38

 (1) Memo, CofS for G-4, 27 Jan 42, sub: Notification of Army Convoys, OCofS 21345-15. (2) Memo,

G-4 for CofS, 29 Jan 42, same sub, G-4/29717-89. (3)

Memo, Adm King for CofS, 30 Jan 42, Overseas Tr

Mvmts 1940-42 folder, OCT HB. (4) See also, Wardlow, Trans I, Ch. VI. (5) Draft study, May 1945, title:

Hist of Convoy and Routing, signed by Rear Adm

M. K. Metcalf, U.S. Navy (Ret.), prepared in the Off

of Naval Hist. (6) Hancock and Gowing, British War

Economy, pp. 413-16. (7) See below, App. A-8. 39

 Memo, CofS for President, 10 Jun 42, CofS

WDGS 1941-42 folder, Hq ASF. 40

 (1) Ibid. (2) Memo, Navy members MAC(G) for

MAB, 4 Jun 42, sub: Balanced Building Prog of Cargo and Combat Shipg, incl to CPS 33/D, 9 Jun 42, in

ABC 570 (2-14-42) Sec 2.
STRATEGY, PRODUCTION GOALS, AND SHIPPING 209

lotment thereafter often new vessels, or a

monthly allotment of eighteen new ships

without a large block allocation. If this

were done, Somervell's staff calculated,

about .8 million troops could be supported

overseas by the end of 1942, mainly in the

Atlantic area. This would permit an offensive deployment, over and above garrison forces, of about .6 million. If the

main effort were made in the Far East, as

now seemed likely, only about 480,000

troops could be deployed offensively. With

its present small available tonnage of

about 110 freighters, the Army could not

support more than 90,000 additional

troops overseas during 1942. "Such an effort," Somervell wrote to Admiral Land,

"on its face fails to meet the military

situation."

 41

Foreign aid was a heavy drain upon

American cargo shipping, and promised

to become even more demanding. Four

days after Pearl Harbor Somervell warned

the Chief of Staff that the Victory Program plans for American participation in

the war were incompatible with the "arsenal of democracy" theory; shipping

"might in time permit fulfillment of one

program, or parts of both, but not both."

 42

Lend-lease was then employing about 180

U.S. cargo vessels, including 100 in the

Red Sea service, and Army officials eyed

them covetously. Somervell was at pains

to point out, in connection with his January and February ship allocation proposals, that if the foreign aid services, especially Soviet lend-lease, were "thoroughly emasculated" by the end of 1942,

U.S. forces overseas might be built up to

850,000 with a main effort in the Far East,

or to 1,100,000 if concentrated chiefly in

the Atlantic area.43

Actually, Somervell's proposals did not

aim at "emasculating" lend-lease services.

He proposed to allow about eight new

freighters for lend-lease movements each

month over and above the 180 already in

service. Britain's shipping problem, moreover, was reaching a stage where it could

not be ignored. Her cargo fleet was bearing the brunt of the intensified German

submarine campaign in the Atlantic,

some of the American vessels assigned to

carry British imports had been withdrawn, and shipments to the Soviet Union

and British forces overseas created a

mounting drain. By March imports to the

British Isles were running at an annual

rate of less than 22 million tons, in contrast to more than 30 million the preceding year and estimated minimum requirements of 26 million for 1942. Such a

volume could not be achieved, Churchill

warned Roosevelt early in March, "without very substantial additions to our shipping resources."

 44

It was already evident in January and

February that the President was determined to expand rather than contract the

foreign aid programs. "Under demands

far more tempered than these," remarked

Colonel Gross pessimistically in mid-January with reference to the new programs 41

 (1) Memo, cited n. 29(1). (2) Paper, 29 Jan 42,

sub: Capabilities of Shipg Now Under Army Contl.

(3) Memo, Lt Col Marcus B. Stokes for Rear Adm

Sherwoode A. Taffinder, 5 Mar 42, sub: Est of Army

Shipg Reqmts. Last two in Plng Div Studies folder,

OCT HB. (4) Ltr, Somervell to Adm Land, 31 Jan 42,

G-4/29717-116. 42

 Memo, Somervell for CofS, 11 Dec 41, sub:

Shipg Sit, l0a Shipg file, Plng Div ASF. 43

 (1) Memo, Somervell for Gross, 13 Jan 42, Plng

Div Studies folder, OCT HB. (2) Memo cited n.

29(1). 44

 (1) Msg, Former Naval Person to President

Roosevelt, 4 Mar 42, as quoted in Churchill, Hinge of

Fate, pp. 189-91. (2) Br Merchant Shipg Mis paper,

5 Feb 42, sub: Merchant Shipg in 1942, WPD 4494

Vic Prog, U.S. Data. (3) Note, Churchill to Hopkins,

10 Jan 42, MS Index to the Hopkins Papers, Bk. V,

Orgn of the WSA, p. 2, Item 11. (4) Hancock and

Gowing, British War Economy, pp. 353-57, 416-26.

By strenuous efforts, British imports were brought

up to 12.2 million tons by midyear.
210 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

then under discussion, "no further U.S.

military overseas expeditions may be considered or undertaken."

 45

 Some three

million tons of U.S. shipping already in

British service in that month remained

there, and a considerable tonnage completed under earlier contracts in the

United States was transferred. Through

pooling arrangements made early in the

year, American freighters sailing to the

British Isles often carried mixed cargoes

of lend-lease and U.S. military matériel.

Soviet lend-lease shipments in 1942 employed American and British bottoms in

approximately equal proportions.46

Only two avenues remained open,

therefore, to provide more cargo tonnage

for Army troop deployment—ruthless

economy in "nonessential" uses, and further augmentation of construction programs. Somervell advocated both. His

proposals of January and February involved elimination of several commercial

services and reduction of others in the

Western Hemisphere and to Africa. But

new construction offered the only real solution. The six hundred thousand troops

that it seemed likely might be deployed

overseas in 1942 were only a third of the

number that were expected to be trained

and equipped by the end of that year. By

the end of 1943 there would be at least 3.6

million troops ready for overseas service,

by current indications, but under present

building programs less than a million

troops could be sent and maintained overseas during 1943. Evidently the Army

faced a huge unemployment problem at

home unless more tonnage were provided.

Somervell shared the doubts of Maritime

Commission officials as to the feasibility

of further increases in construction in

1942, but he along with many others believed that the 1943 program could be

augmented by 50 percent. With 15 million tons of new construction in 1943,

forces overseas could be raised to 2,260,-

000. It would be fatal to accept a deployment of only 1,500,000 or 1,800,000 as

"the measure of the whole productive

capacity of the country and its military

might, ... . An all-out effort in this

field [ship construction]," he urged Marshall to tell the President, "must precede

an all-out military effort. The maximum

possibilities in this regard should be determined, attained, and the Army advised of

what it can expect."

 47

The Army's hopes for a definite allocation of tonnage, preferably in a large

block, did not materialize. With the

creation of the War Shipping Administration (WSA) in February and the modus

operandi worked out between it and the

military services in May and June, U.S.

merchant shipping was pooled under the

tight control of WSA, and shipping other

than what the services already controlled

was assigned for use generally on a single

voyage basis.48 In the field of ship construction, action came suddenly and dramatically. On 18 February General Marshall sent to the President, with little

change, Somervell's strongly worded plan

45

 Memo, Gross for Somervell, 19 Jan 42, sub: Def

Aid Trfs and Trf Schedules, Plng Div Studies folder,

OCT HB. 46

 (1) Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy,

pp. 353-57, 426-27. This mentions $195 million in

shipping transferred under lend-lease. (2) Churchill,

Hinge of Fate, p. 199. (3) For Soviet aid, see below,

Chs. XX-XXI. (4) For British imports, see below, Ch.

XXVI. 47

 (1) Draft memo, Marshall for President, no date,

Shipg 1941-43 folder, Hq ASF. This draft is evidently

a paraphrase of memo, Somervell for Rear Adm

Howard L. Vickery and Stacy May, 13 Feb 42, sub:

Increase in 1943 Ship Construction Prog, G-4/29717-

152. (2) Memo, Gens Somervell and Burns for Hopkins, 22 Feb 42, sub: Alloc of U.S. Shipg for 1942, G4/29717-116. (3) Memo, Col Stokes for Col Gross, 3

Feb 42, sub: Overseas Effort in 1942, Plng Div Studies

folder, OCT HB. 48

 See below, Ch. IX.
STRATEGY, PRODUCTION GOALS, AND SHIPPING 211

for an augmented program. The next day

the President summoned Admiral Land

to his bedroom and told him to build 9

million dead-weight tons of shipping in

1942 and 15 million in 1943, 24 million

tons in all. Exactly a week before this,

Land had warned, "the shipbuilding cup

is full to overflowing."

 49

 His belief was not

now changed, but orders were orders.

Telephoning the news to his colleague,

Rear Adm. Howard L. Vickery, who

agreed that 9 million tons was more than

could be produced in 1942, Land reported, ". . . all I said was we would

try."

 50

Three months later the picture had

changed. In terms of expansion of yard

capacity and the acquisition of the know

how, which could come only from actual

experience in mass production, the shipbuilding industry had farther to go in

1942 than the munitions industry, since

economic mobilization before 1942 had

concentrated more on producing weapons

than on producing ships. However, cargo

ship construction, even more than that of

many items of munitions, lent itself to

standardization and mass production, and

the basic task of designing had largely

been completed during the prewar emergency period. By spring 1942 shipyards

that had begun to build in 1941 had

learned their craft so well that they were

smashing records every week, finishing

ships in 60 to 70 days, against a schedule

based on 105 days. Deliveries rose from

26 in March and 36 in April to 57 in

May and 67 in June. On Maritime Day,

22 May, Admiral Vickery publicly announced that American shipyards by the

end of 1943 might be able to turn out, as

their two-year total, not 24 million but 28

million dead-weight tons. Late in May

and early in June some of the new capacity was already being absorbed by new

orders for tank landing ships (LST's) and

"baby flattop" escort carriers. Even with

the addition of these types, Admiral Vickery estimated in the middle of June that

the commission could produce 27.4 million tons of merchant shipping by the end

of 1943, 3.4 million more than the President's goal.51

If the expanding shipbuilding capacity

was to be used, more steel would have to

be fed into the yards, probably at the expense of other users. At a conference on 23

June, the President made remarks about

"scraping the bottom of the barrel." Admiral Land, one of those present, interpreted this to mean that the goal of 24

million tons was again to be raised, but

during the next two weeks the Navy and

other users of steel pressed their claims

upon the production authorities, and on

9 July Admiral Land learned from Donald Nelson that the President had once

more set the limit for shipbuilding by the

end of 1943 at 24 million tons, of which

slightly more than 8 million was to be

completed in 1942. Here, for the moment,

the matter rested.52

The spectacular logistical achievements

of these first six months of war were on the

level of operations and performance—in 49

 Lane, Ships for Victory, p. 143. 50

 Ibid., p. 144.

Admiral Land, who in 1938 had succeeded Joseph

P. Kennedy as chairman of the Maritime Commission, had been retired from active service since 1937.

Another naval officer, Comdr. Howard L. Vickery,

became a commissioner in 1940 on Land's recommendation, and by special act of Congress was permitted to remain on the active list. The five-man

commission contained a third retired naval officer,

Capt. Edward Macauley, who became a commissioner in 1941. By another special act of Congress,

Land was promoted in July 1944 to vice admiral;

Vickery became rear admiral in January 1942 and

vice admiral in October 1944. See Lane, Ships for Victory, pp. 12-15, 459. 51

 Ibid., pp. 173-81. 52

 Ibid., pp. 183ff.
212 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

the immense outpouring of war materials,

and, in the spring, the attainment of mass

production of cargo shipping. Expansion,

training, and equipping of the Army were

also advancing on an impressive scale. But

in the most basic realm of logistical planning—the determination of long-range

needs and the formulation of programs,

schedules, and priorities for meeting

them—the absence of a settled and concrete strategy, unavoidable as long as

the momentum of the enemy's initial attacks continued, created a virtually insoluble problem. Approved military requirements, at least in the upper half of the

priorities scale, were now in some sort of

"balance," and the now standardized

military supply programs purported to list

item by item the long-range needs of a

specific troop basis which, in theory, was

designed to implement an agreed strategy.

After mid-1942, however, the only concrete strategy for a long time was a series

of limited operations planned at shortrange or extemporized. The troop basis

provided a pool of armed manpower from

which forces were drawn to execute these

operations, the scope and character of

which were inevitably shaped by its limitations. Production programs were aimed,

indeed, at the listed ultimate requirements

of the troop basis, but month-to-month

schedules were shaped by a multitude of

factors totally unrelated to ultimate

goals—shortages of materials, facilities,

and labor, and the immense inertia of administration.

At the beginning of the year Colonel

Aurand had observed:

It should not be necessary . . . to have to

first set up a troop basis to establish the rela- tive numbers to be produced each month of

the various items . . . . This can be based

upon the general view of the war, the thea- ters in which the war will be fought, and the

necessities for U.S. production to supply the

equipment in these theaters . . . . After all, the immediate requirements, regardless of

what they are, can be met only from the pro- duction which is now under way . . . . Month by month requirements at the mo- ment are entirely dependent upon produc- tion schedules.53

In June month-by-month requirements

apparently were still dependent on current production, and the ultimate goal, to

all practical intents, was still what it had

been when the Victory Program was formulated—maximum production. Particularly was this true in the field of merchant

shipping, where capacity (as limited by

shortages of materials) fell far short of indicated demand. The striving for an unspecified and largely unknown maximum

was, in fact, the dominant motif in the

whole field of logistics. Colonel Aurand,

with some ironical exaggeration, noted

its many ramifications—in Congressional

authorizations, "more than could possibly

be produced"; in planned facilities expansion, "beyond shipping possibilities and

availability of raw materials"; in foreign

aid programs, "more than they could possibly transport"; in planned overseas reserves, "more than would ever be used."

 54

All of which, he thought, was probably

necessary. Unspent funds could be returned to Treasury, what could not be produced in nine months could be produced

in twelve, a "bank" of cargo was essential

to efficient utilization of shipping, and excess reserves, after all, were better than

"too little and too late."

 55

53

 Memo, Aurand for Somervell, 24 Jan 42, sub:

Army Supply Program, MAB Orgn file, DAD. 54

 Memo, Brig Gen Henry S. Aurand for Brig Gen

Lucius D. Clay, 18 Jun 42, sub: Basis for Present

Progs, ID 334 MAB, I. 55

 Ibid.

For a judgment similar to Aurand's, made after

the war, see Logistics in World War II, Final Report of

the Army Service Forces (Washington, 1948), p. 57.
CHAPTER IX

The Machinery of

Logistical Co-ordination and

Administration

During the immediate post-Pearl Harbor period a great heaving and shifting in

the structure of co-ordination and administration was under way. From it emerged,

by mid-1942, a basic organizational pattern that was to endure with little important change throughout the remainder of

the war.

On the international level, the ARCADIA

Conference in December 1941 and January 1942 created the fundamental AngloAmerican structure for the direction of

strategy and control of the resources

needed to execute it. The Combined Chiefs

of Staff, composed of the chief military

advisers (or their representatives) of the

two heads of state, Roosevelt and Churchill, stood at the top of the military pyramid; the combined Munitions Assignments

Boards in Washington and London, operating under the CCS, controlled the assignment of military equipment. Other

combined boards for shipping, raw materials, production, and food were set up

during the first six months of 1942. These

stood outside the military committee system and reported directly to the President

and the Prime Minister.1

At the same time, the national machinery for control of the American war economy, which had come into being during

the emergency period, was undergoing

reorganization and expansion. In January

the new War Production Board took over

the general direction of industrial mobilization, with full authority under the President's war powers to lay down "policies,

plans, procedures, and methods" for all

government agencies engaged in "war procurement and production."

 2 On 12 March

its chairman, Donald Nelson, reached an

agreement with General Somervell that

confirmed to the Army its traditional function of determining its own requirements,

translating these into terms of raw materials, facilities, labor, and components, and

procuring end-items directly from private

industry. This agreement, hailed by Nelson as "the Magna Carta of our operation,"

 3 actually left many jurisdictional

1

 For a discussion of the combined boards, see below, Ch. X. The British Chiefs of Staff were represented in the CCS in Washington by a permanent

committee, the British Joint Staff Mission. Periodically, special conferences were held that the British

Chiefs, and sometimes the heads of state, attended

in person. 2

 CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War, p. 208. 3

 Ibid., p. 215.
214 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

boundaries unsettled, and above all failed

to provide a formula for dividing the national product between military and civilian needs. The conflict over this basic issue

and a multitude of related disputes was

to continue throughout the war.

Logistics in the Military Committee System

The CGS, which began to function in

January 1942, had as its central task the

"formulation of policies and plans" for

"the strategic conduct of the war,"

 5

 and

the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (consisting of

the military chiefs of the Army, Army Air

Forces, and Navy) by February were serving similarly as the top-level co-ordinating

committee for all U.S. forces. The Joint

Board, made up of the Army and Navy

chiefs, remained nominally in existence

throughout the war. There was no central

executive machinery, either combined or

joint, however, to put into effect the decisions of the high command. The CCS ordinarily named either the British or the U.S.

Joint Chiefs of Staff to act as its executive

agent, and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in

turn employed the established machinery

of its service departments.

On the American side, the Army planners soon after Pearl Harbor proposed the

creation of a supreme U.S. military commander, responsible to the President as

Commander in Chief, and a joint general

staff. Essentially the same plan had been

advanced the summer before by the

Navy's General Board, but by February

1942 Navy opinion had hardened against

it and the scheme was dropped. When

Admiral William D. Leahy was appointed

a few months later as the President's personal chief of staff and assumed the chairmanship of the JCS, many believed he was

destined to become supreme commander,

supplying the pinnacle that the structure

still lacked. This step was never taken.

When the Joint Chiefs disagreed, they

could only appeal to the President.6

The joint committee system, as it rather

haphazardly developed in 1942, was essentially a loose collection of planning and

information-gathering committees and

boards. Increasingly, but by no means

uniformly, the JCS dealt with them

through the Joint Staff Planners and the

principal working committee of the JPS,

the Joint U.S. Strategic Committee. The

CCS similarly dealt through the Combined

Staff Planners (CPS). The JPS served generally as a clearinghouse for the bulk of

JCS business and, more specifically, as the

central planning committee for the JCS.

Planning at this level was not specialized;

"strategic" plans were the end product of

a process of weighing all sorts of pertinent

information, logistical and other, that funneled into the JPS and JCS. Both the JCS

and the CCS themselves dealt directly and

continuously with logistical matters, formulating programs of requirements and

assignments and, not infrequently, making

final decisions on allocations of shipping

for specific troop and cargo movements

and of critical equipment for specific operations. The JPS and JUSSC drew the information they needed for strategic planning from the more specialized joint

committees and from the technical staffs

4

 (1) Ibid., Pt. III. (2) Millett, ASF. (3) R. Elberton

Smith, Army Procurement and Economic Mobilization.

5

 ABC-4/CS-4, 14 Jan 42, title: Post-ARCADIA Collaboration. 6

 (1) Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 46, 98-

104. (2) Min, JB mtgs, 28 Jan and 16 Mar 42. (3) Papers in WPD 4532-2; JB 325, Ser 742; ABC 370.26

Unity of Comd (3-16-42), 1-A. (4) Ray S. Cline and

Maurice Matloff, "Development of War Department

Views on Unification," Military Affairs, Vol. XIII,

No. 2 (Summer 1949), pp. 65-74.
LOGISTICAL CO-ORDINATION AND ADMINISTRATION 215

of the Army and Navy. There was no separate joint agency assigned the task of

making logistical plans or of appraising

the logistical feasibility of proposed operations. In a limited sense the Joint Military

Transportation Committee (JMTC) did

perform this function in the critical field of

shipping; the JMTC consisted of two

Army and two Navy members, making up

the American half of the corresponding

Combined Military Transportation Committee (CMTC). But the conclusions of

the JMTC, like those of the other committees, usually went into the hopper of the

JPS to be weighed along with other pertinent considerations in strategic planning.

Neither the JPS nor the JUSSC contained,

on the Army side, experts in the general,

or in any particular, field of logistics.7

The theory underlying these arrangements was that strategic planning and

direction, if it were to be aggressive and

imaginative, must not become shackled to

the judgments of experts or technicians as

to what could or could not be done. This

was the danger, the Joint Planners feared,

in any attempt to create a separate logistical planning committee to advise the JCS

directly. In any given situation, they held,

the range of alternatives was broader and

more flexible than any statistical computation of available troops, matériel, and shipping would indicate. Strategic planners

had to consult the logistical experts, much

as they consulted the intelligence experts,

in order to obtain factual data bearing on

the situation. From these data they should

draw their own conclusions, weighing in

the balance not merely logistical limitations but also the state of organization and

training, the enemy's capabilities, the pressure of strategic necessity, and other pertinent factors.

Such was the theory. By the logistical

experts themselves it was accepted only

with reservations, if at all. Until the invasion of North Africa, however, plans and

preparations for assembling an invasion

force in the British Isles constituted the

only major military undertaking involving

forces of all services, both British and

American, and for this operation special

committees were set up in Washington and

London to handle detailed day-to-day

preparations and much of the joint and

service staff long-range logistical planning.

On many matters during 1942 and later,

the military chiefs reached agreement

through informal discussion, the information and counsel by which they formed

their views flowing up to them through

their own service staffs, bypassing the committees altogether. The system of logistical

co-ordination under the joint and combined committees did not face the acid test

until the North Africa undertaking, and

then it very nearly broke down.8

Allocation and Employment of U.S.

Merchant Shipping

Merchant shipping was perhaps the

principal ready resource, other than the

Navy, that the United States at the beginning of 1942 could contribute to the Allied

cause, but the co-ordinating machinery

developed before Pearl Harbor was palpably inadequate for the task of making

shipping immediately available for war

7

 (1) Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 101-04,

124. (2) Wardlow, Trans I, Ch. V. The two Army

members of the JMTC were Generals Somervell and

Gross; Admiral Land, chairman of the Maritime

Commission and War Shipping Administrator, often

attended. (3) For the role of the CPS and the unsuccessful efforts to make the Munitions Assignments

Board and the Combined Production and Resources

Board interallied agencies for determining requirements for production, see below, Ch. XI. 8

 See below, Chs. XIV-XVI.
216 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

uses and husbanding its employment. On

the day following Pearl Harbor the President set up under his immediate supervision a Strategic Shipping Board "to establish policies for and plan the allocation

of"—but not to operate—merchant shipping.9

 The board, composed of the Maritime Commission chairman, the two military chiefs, and Harry Hopkins, was not

markedly successful. Its members had

other heavy responsibilities, disagreement

could be resolved only by appeal to the

President, and administration had to be

delegated to existing agencies. A meeting

of minds—the board's presumed objective—could be achieved as readily through

the normal process of direct communication between the members. It was symptomatic of the board's impotence that the

sharp dispute between the Army and

Navy during December 1941 over use of

shipyards for Navy conversion did not

even come before it and was settled by

presidential decision.10

The first move to remedy the situation,

a Navy proposal to create a cabinet-level

"Office of Shipping Coordination" to take

over both allocation and operation of all

merchant shipping, was not to the Army's

liking. Somervell and Gross, while agreeing in principle that "there must be some

agency endowed with absolute powers over

the allocation of shipping and the establishment of priorities,"

 11

 objected immediately to giving up the Army's transport

fleet and ports of embarkation; they also

sensed danger in the creation of a new

cabinet officer who, in shipping matters,

might challenge the influence of the Secretary of War.12

 Army shipping officials also

had no desire to diminish the powers of

the Maritime Commission, with which

they enjoyed smooth working relations.

Through the commission, they could reasonably hope to fill the Army's rapidly

growing shipping needs, while still retaining the Army's existing fleet. A cabinetlevel superagency, possibly dominated by

the Navy, would endanger both expectations. The Navy had proposed, in fact,

that it should clear all Army requests for

shipping. This scheme the Army rejected

out of hand, and at the first meeting of the

Strategic Shipping Board General Marshall advanced the principle that the

Maritime Commission should be recognized as the agency "most capable in sea

transportation, as is the Navy in sea combat."

 13

 This was followed shortly by an

Army proposal that, "with the direct and

full assistance of the Maritime Commission," the Army should be given control of

all shipping needed to meet its deployment

requirements.14

In response to the Navy's scheme, the

Army offered a counterplan for a "Central

Shipping Administration" that in effect

would give the Shipping Board a chairman

(Admiral Land) and replace its exalted

9

 Ltr, President to SW, 8 Dec 41, Shipg 1941-43

folder, Hq ASF. 10

 (1) Ltr, Hopkins to President, 8 Dec 41, MS Index to the Hopkins Papers, Bk. V, Orgn of the WSA,

p. 1, Item 2. (2) Memo, Gross for CofS, 26 Dec 41,

sub: Strategic Shipg Bd, Independent Action by the

Navy, G-4/29717-26. (3) Duncan S. Ballantine, Shipping in Naval Logistics: The History of the Naval

Transportation Service, Monograph 5 in U.S.

NAVAL ADMINISTRATION IN WORLD WAR

II, pp. 42-47, Naval Hist Div OCNO. 11

 Memo, CofS for Adm Stark, 31 Dec 41, sub: EO

Estab Central Shipg Admin, G-4/33920. 12

 Memo, Somervell for CofS, 28 Dec 41, sub: Adm

Turner's Proposed JB Action . . . , G-4/33920. 13

 Memo, Somervell for CofS, 14 Dec 41, with incl,

Agenda for 1st Mtg Strategic Shipg Bd, G-4/33813-1. 14

 (1) Memo, Gross for Gerow, 23 Dec 41, sub:

Overseas Trans for Army . . . . (2) Memo, CofS for

Adm Stark, 24 Dec 41, sub: Sea Trans. Both in G-4/

29717-26. (3) JB paper, 27 Dec 41, sub: Proposed Solution of Prob of Alloc and Contl of U.S. Merchant

Shipg, G-4/33920. (4) Ballantine, Shipping in Naval

Logistics, p. 46, cited n. 10(3).
LOGISTICAL CO-ORDINATION AND ADMINISTRATION 217

membership by a board of directors consisting of the War Department G-4, his

Navy opposite number, and a representative of the Office of Production Management. The two services would continue to

operate their fleets, the Maritime Commission the remaining pool of merchant shipping. The administrator would allocate

shipping under the supervision of a board

of directors and, most significantly, in all

military movements he was "to comply

with the joint decisions of the Secretary of

War and the Secretary of the Navy as regards their requirements."

 15

 This scheme,

modified to meet Navy objections, had to

run the gantlet of critics in the Maritime

Commission, the Bureau of the Budget,

the White House, and even Mr. Churchill,

who feared British needs would not get a

proper hearing.16

What emerged from all this discussion

was the President's executive order of 7

February creating the War Shipping Administration as the ship operating agency

of the Maritime Commission, headed by

Admiral Land in the dual capacity of

Chairman, Maritime Commission, and

War Shipping Administrator. The new

agency's powers were clearly shaped by

the feeling, as Hopkins put it, that "there

are so many interests involved other than

Stimson and Knox, that Jerry [Admiral

Land] should be made responsible for the

whole business."

 17

 Admiral Land was to

be responsible directly to the President,

with authority covering not only allocation

but also "operation, purchase, charter,

requisition and use" of noncombatant

ocean shipping other than that in the military transport fleets, which was exempted

at General Somervell's insistence.18 The

restrictions, written in the Army-Navy

plan, upon the administrator's powers to

allocate shipping for military purposes had

been greatly watered down in the executive order; he was now held merely to

"comply with strategic military requirements."

 19

 This vague proviso, which ran

counter to the strong representations of

General Somervell during preliminary discussions, was inserted at the last moment

at the insistence of Hopkins and Admiral

Land, with the acquiescence of the Navy,

but without Somervell's knowledge. As

Maritime Commission chairman, Admiral

Land of course remained responsible for

ship construction. He thus became, in

truth, a "shipping czar" as well as a "ship

construction czar," as his colleague Admiral Vickery put it, with authority that

fell only a little short of the "absolute

powers" to which Somervell and Gross,

perhaps disingenuously, had earlier agreed

in principle.20

The executive order of 7 February, stating explicitly that the Army should control

its own transports and be allocated shipping directly by WSA, at least seemed to

settle the question of whether there was to

be one military shipping agency or two.

The Navy evidently had assumed that this

provision was only temporary, an assump15

 Memo, with draft charter atchd, cited n. 11. 16

 (1) Ltr, SW and SN to Hopkins, 13 Jan 42, MS

Index to the Hopkins Papers, Bk. V, Orgn of the

WSA, p. 3, Item 13. (2) Ltr, SN to White House for

Hopkins, 13 Jan 42, sub: EO Estab Central Shipg

Admin, WSA folder, OCT HB. (3) Memo, Somervell for SW, 28 Jan 42, G-4/33813-1. (4) Memo, Adm

Vickery for Hopkins, 12 Jan 42, MS Index to the

Hopkins Papers, Bk. V, Orgn of the WSA, p. 3, Item

12. (5) Note, Churchill to Hopkins, 10 Jan 42, MS

Index to the Hopkins Papers, Bk. V, Orgn of the

WSA, p. 2, Item 11. 17

 Msg, Hopkins to President, 22 Jan 42, paraphrased in MS Index to the Hopkins Papers, Bk. V,

Orgn of the WSA, p. 3, Item 13. 18

 EO 9054, 7 Feb 42. 19

 Ibid. 20

 (1) Memo cited n. 16(4). (2) Papers in Shipg

1941-43 folder, Hq ASF. (3) Ballantine, Shipping in

Naval Logistics, pp. 47-51, cited n. 10(3).
218 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

REAR ADM. EMORY S. LAND,

Maritime Commission chairman and War

Shipping Administrator.

tion that goes far to explain its acquiescence in the vast powers conferred upon

the administrator. In the last week of February Admiral Stark abruptly raised the

issue, proposing not only to take over the

Army's transports during the next two

months but also to serve as the sole agency

for consolidating military shipping requirements and presenting them to WSA.

General Marshall promptly and brusquely

rejected the suggestion. Present arrangements, he asserted, were "most satisfactory

to the Army" and promised a "much better use of our shipping . . . than has ever

obtained in the past." As far as the Army

was concerned, the issue had been "disposed of."

 21

Two questions remained outstanding.

One concerned control of loading and unloading cargo vessels allocated to the Army

by WSA. Among Army transportation

officials it was basic doctrine that these

operations, along with the flow of military

cargo into and through the port, must be

under military control in the interests of

efficient traffic management as well as of

timely and adequate supply. WSA, for its

part, felt it was essential to co-ordinate the

movement of military with that of nonmilitary supplies and was especially insistent upon reducing the waste of shipping

space that inevitably resulted from separate handling and loading of military and

nonmilitary cargo. The other question had

to do with the method of allocation. The

Army, like the Navy, expected to obtain

block allocations permanently or for extended periods, an expectation apparently

formed during the discussions by the Strategic Shipping Board in December. In

January and February Somervell sought

from the Maritime Commission such longterm allocations, but it quickly became

apparent that the WSA would not countenance this method of allocation, which

violated the pooling principle.22

Both issues—control of loading and

method of allocation—came to a head in

June. On the 13th an agreement was

signed by General Somervell, for the War

Department, and Lewis W. Douglas, for

WSA, that represented a concession by

21

 (1) Memo, CofS for CNO, 27 Feb 42. (2) Memo,

CNO for CofS, 26 Feb 42. (3) Related papers. All in

Army Trans Sv folder, OCT HB. (4) Ballantine, Shipping in Naval Logistics, pp. 55-57, cited n. 10(3). 22

 (1) Ltr, Traffic Dir WSA to Navy Trans Sv, 25

Feb 42. (2) Disposition form, G-4 to CG USAFIA, 28

Feb 42. This refers to an agreement that cargo vessels

returning from overseas should be made available to

WSA if not needed for military use. Both in G-4/

33861. (3) See also Ballantine, Naval Logistics, pp. 88-

90; and (4) Ballantine, Shipping in Naval Logistics,

pp. 46, 57, cited n. 10(3). (5) See above, Ch. VIII.
LOGISTICAL CO-ORDINATION AND ADMINISTRATION 219

LEWIS W. DOUGLAS, Deputy Administrator, War Shipping Administration.

WSA on the first issue and by the Army on

the second. Under the agreement all cargo

vessels assigned to the Army were to be

loaded by the Army, but they were to be

assigned only for the outward lap of a single voyage, reverting to WSA control after

their Army cargo was discharged. On each

side, however, the concession was qualified. The Army was to rely upon WSA for

additional terminal facilities and labor

under WSA terms of use. Idle facilities

were not to be reserved for future use.

Cargo was to be interchanged between

vessels, whenever possible, to secure tight

stowage. WSA recognized that troop transports were usually needed on an assignment longer than cargo vessels; later,

transports came to be assigned normally

for the round trip. Freighters, too, could

be retained in a theater "as the military

necessity demands."

 23

This "treaty" at least cleared the air and

defined the issues. It concluded, significantly, with mutual assurances that neither signatory had designs upon the rightful jurisdiction of the other. But before the

end of the year its basic provisions were

again to be a subject of dispute.24

The Army's Logistical Organization During

the Emergency Period

The prewar logistical structure of the

Army had managed to carry its share of

the growing burden of mobilization during

the emergency period, but there was a

mounting conviction on the higher levels

that fundamental alterations would be required to meet the impact of war.25

 Logistical business, in the broad sense, made up

the bulk of the enormous and growing volume of administration with which the

General Staff daily had to deal, and which

by the end of 1941 had transformed each

of its divisions into a large operating organization, immersed in details of supervision 23

 (1) Memo Covering the Interdepartmental Relationship Between the Army and WSA To Form a

Basis for Full and Complete Cooperation in Connection With the Purchase, Charter, Use, and Opn of

Vessels and Terminal Facilities, 13 Jun 42, Shipg

1941-43 folder, Hq ASF. (2) A similar agreement was

reached between the Navy and WSA in letters dated

7 April and 7 May. See Ballantine, Naval Logistics, p.

89, and Wardlow, Trans I, Ch. VI.

Lewis W. Douglas had become a deputy administrator (there were two other deputies) of WSA, and

in effect the head of that organization, under Admiral

Land, in May 1942. Douglas was president of the

Mutual Life Insurance Company and a former Director of the Bureau of the Budget; he was also a good

friend of the President, who approved his appointment and promised to back him in what promised

to be an exposed position in the "Battle of Washington." See Lane, Ships for Victory, p. 755. 24

 See below, Ch. XXII. 25

 For the prewar logistical organization of the

Army, see above, Ch. I and Chart 1.

LOGISTICAL CO-ORDINATION AND ADMINISTRATION 221

to the detriment of its policy-making and

planning functions. G-4 became, next to

G-2 and its affiliated intelligence services,

the largest of the General Staff divisions,

with an officer personnel at the beginning

of March 1942 numbering upwards of two

hundred.26 (Chart 3) The Chief of Staff

himself, despite the interposition of three

deputies, a secretariat, and the five assistant chiefs, was similarly swamped as a

consequence of the large number of subordinate headquarters permitted direct

access to him.

Logistics was involved also in the fundamental conflicts of authority that emerged

in 1941 between the General Staff and

GHQ. By late winter of 1941-42 GHQ

had been assigned, over and above its basic

training task, command of all the Atlantic

and Caribbean bases and the two theaters

of operations (Western and Northeastern)

activated in the United States immediately

after Pearl Harbor, as well as a variety of

new planning responsibilities. The War

Plans Division, even more definitely, was

moving toward the command post role

that the Harbord Board had intended for

GHQ having been given command of the

important outposts of Hawaii and the

Philippines and having become the staff

division upon which General Marshall relied most in directing current operations.

These converging lines of development

brought GHQ to a point where it needed a

measure of authority in the field of logistics that the General Staff was unwilling

to surrender to it. Under the first enlargement of its responsibilities in July 1941,

GHQ was promised direct control of "such

credits in supplies, ammunition and equipment as may, from time to time, be specifically allotted to it by the War Department."

 27

 As GHQ officers interpreted it,

this meant block allotments of means with

full control over their use and administration, but GHQ never succeeded in securing such an arrangement. The corps areas,

under G-4 supervision since their separation from army commands in mid-1940,

controlled the flow of routine supply to

bases and departments overseas, while G-4

exercised staff supervision directly over the

movement of troops and overseas supply

generally. The Chief of Engineers, under

G-4's supervision, was responsible for

overseas construction and the supply of

construction materials. The Air Service

Command provided technical items of Air

Corps supplies. Thus, in the case of the

Newfoundland Base Command, cited by

General McNair as "an interesting example of superior command,"

 28

 real control

of the means necessary to effective command was exercised through at least five

separate channels (of which three were for

logistical matters) bypassing GHQ the

headquarters theoretically in command of

the base; the final word in allocation of

personnel and material actually lay with

WPD. GHQ's real function amounted to

no more, as General McNair described it,

than "such inspection and coordination as

is practicable under the circumstances."

 29

WPD readily conceded, in principle,

that "control of supply is an essential ele26

 (1) At the end of 1941 G-4 was reported to have

about 150 officers and 130 civilians. See Nelson, National Security and the General Staff, p. 322. (2) The figure of two hundred officers is from Supply Division

G-4, War Department General Staff, MS history,

OCMH. (3) See also min, WD Gen Council mtg, 19

May 42. (4) Cline, Washington Command Post, p. 54. 27

 WD ltr, 3 Jul 41, sub: Enlargement of the Functions of GHQ, AG 320.2 (6-19-41) MC-E-M. 28

 Memo, CofS for ACofS WPD, 2 Sep 41, sub:

Functions, Responsibility, and Auth of GHQ Orgn,

GHQ 320.2/1. 29

 (1) Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, AGF I, pp.

6-9, 17-20, 22-23, 132, 136-37, 147; quote is from p.

133. (2) Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 63-65.

(3) WD ltr cited n. 27.
222 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ment of command," but insisted that the

shortage of munitions and shipping dictated "rigid control" over supply by the

War Department.30 G-4's stand in the matter was not wholly unequivocal, but generally followed this line. When the question

of GHQ's authority over the "Carib"

training force was raised in July 1941, G-4

insisted that existing channels of supply

through Second Corps Area, and of transportation through The Quartermaster

General and ports of embarkation, be

maintained. The following January General Somervell, who had become G-4 at

the end of November 1941, took the uncompromising stand that GHQ should

exercise "no direct control over supplies or

troop movements in the Zone of Interior,"

including those destined for overseas.

GHQ, he asserted, "does not have an

organization empowered or prepared to

implement a supply plan for military operations. The War Department is set up for

this purpose."

 31

It was under this principle that the

logistical phases of Army deployment were

directed during the first three months following Pearl Harbor. GHQ submitted

theater plans to G-4 for analysis as to logistical feasibility; G-4, after obtaining a tentative order of priority for the various

plans, proceeded to initiate procurement

and "other advanced logistical arrangements."

 32

 In supply GHQ assumed control only from the time that troops and

material left the port of embarkation,

merely observing the process up to that

point. Otherwise, GHQ's supply functions

were limited to recommending priorities

for supply among and within theaters, inspecting supply conditions and recommending to G-4 levels of reserves to be

maintained overseas. Implementation of

plans and recommendations was the task

of the established machinery supervised

by G-4.33

Somervell's memorandum outlining

these functions bore a significant penciled

comment by his recently appointed executive officer, General Lutes: ". . . the attached will definitely limit GHQ powers

and enable you to have the final word on

supply." The Defense Aid Director, Colonel Aurand, had remarked two months

earlier on "the crying need for reorganization of the War Department to put all

supply in the hands of one man."

 34

 Toward this end Somervell's efforts, in January 1942, were unmistakably directed. The

division of supply responsibilities between

G-4 and the Office of the Under Secretary

of War—with G-4 controlling requirements and distribution and the OUSW

controlling procurement—was one that

many observers still believed to be feasible,

notably the management firm of Booz,

Frey, Allen and Hamilton, which surveyed the OUSW late in 1941. But jurisdictional lines, during the expansion of

1940 and 1941, became badly blurred, as

the staffs in G-4 and the OUSW grappled

more and more with similar or identical

problems of requirements and availability.

Moreover, as the pressure on production

mounted, G-4's task of expediting supply 30

 Memo, WPD for CofS, Aug 41, sub: Functions

and Auth of GHQ, incl with memo, McNair for

DCofS, 11 Aug 41, same sub, GHQ 320.2/4. 31

 (1) Memo, G-4 for WPD, 24 Jan 42, sub: Co-ord

Between WPD, G-4, GHQ, and Theater Comdrs. (2)

Memo, G-4 for CofS, 18 Jan 42, same sub. Both in

G-4/34015. (3) Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, AGF

I, pp. 142, 147. (4) Memo, G-4 for WPD, 5 Aug 41,

sub: Activation of Alaskan and Caribbean Def

Comds, G-4/33366. 32

 Memo cited n. 31(2). 33

 Ibid. Somervell here notes the Chief of Staffs

approval of these definitions of responsibility on 21

January. 34

 Memo, Aurand for Moore, 24 Nov 41, sub: Necessity for Immediate Action . . . , Misc Corresp

Lend-lease 3 file, DAD.
LOGISTICAL CO-ORDINATION AND ADMINISTRATION 223

depended more and more upon the meeting of current production schedules, over

which G-4 had no jurisdiction. Finally, the

expansion of the OUSW, unfettered by

any traditional inhibition against "operating," had far outpaced that of G-4; at the

end of 1941 that organization numbered

some twelve hundred persons.35

One of Somervell's first steps, after becoming G-4, was to call in his and Mr.

Stimson's friend, Goldthwaite H. Dorr, a

prominent New York attorney and Assistant Director of Munitions in World War I,

to examine the whole problem of supply

organization in the War Department. Dorr

and a small committee began to work

quietly in January, at the same time that,

probably unknown to Somervell, plans for

a wholesale decentralization of the War

Department's operating and supervisory

functions were maturing. The coincidence

was ironical, for Dorr's and Somervell's

explorations at the outset were aimed at

consolidating in the General Staff the

direction of all supply, including the procurement functions of the OUSW, somewhat as it had been concentrated during

World War I under Maj. Gen. George W.

Goethals in the Purchase, Storage, and

Traffic Division. It was not difficult to

merge the two lines of planning, when the

drift of the broader reorganization project

was revealed early in February, for the

latter envisaged the creation of a single

supply and service command for the continental United States.36

 To its commander,

as readily as to an assistant chief of staff in

the General Staff, could be assigned the

"final word in supply."

 37

Logistics in the War Department Reorganization

of March 1942

On 28 February the President signed

the executive order creating "a ground

force . . . an air force . . . and a service

of supply command," under the Chief of

Staff.

 38

 In the reorganized War Department, which officially came into existence

on 9 March, a streamlined General Staff

was restricted to the provision of "such

broad basic plans" as would enable the

various commands, including the three

mentioned above, "to prepare and execute

detailed programs."

 39

 The Army Ground

Forces (AGF) was created and, under

General McNair's command, took over

the training tasks of GHQ, which was now

abolished. The Army Air Forces, which

had been created in July 1941, continued

with little change in status. Under the

Services of Supply, General Somervell's

new command, was centralized control of

supply and administration for the entire

Army in the United States, with certain

specific exceptions, principally relating to

the Air Forces. Somervell's headquarters

took over a number of important functions

formerly assigned to the General Staff,

as well as the anomalous organization

charged with the administration of military lend-lease. To the Services of Supply

were now subordinated most of the logistical agencies that had formerly reported

directly to the General Staff: the supply

and administrative services, with their regional establishments; various separate

installations formerly "exempted" from

higher control lower than the General

35

 Nelson, National Security and the General Staff, p.

321.

36

 (1) For details, see Millett, ASF, Chs. I-II. (2)

See also, Millett, "The Direction of Supply Activities

in the War Department," American Political Science Review, XXXVIII (June 1944), 492-94. 37

 Penciled comment by Lutes on memo cited n.

31(2). 38

 EO 9082, 28 Feb 42. 39

 (1) WD Circular 59, 2 Mar 42. (2) Ltr, CG SOS

to Chiefs of SAS, et al., 9 Mar 42, sub: Initial Dir for

the Orgn of SOS, Hq ASF.
224 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Staff, such as the ports of embarkation,

holding and reconsignment points, regulating stations, proving grounds, procurement offices, and general depots; and the

regional administrative machinery of the

nine corps areas (renamed service commands in July), which now included most

of the training installations of the supply

and administrative services, induction and

reception centers, alien and prisoner of

war camps, dispensaries and general hospitals, repair shops, and the station complements and housekeeping facilities at

ground force installations.

 40

 (Chart 4)

General Somervell, commander of the

SOS, reported now to two masters—the

Chief of Staff with respect to supply requirements and distribution, and the

Under Secretary with respect to procurement. But inasmuch as most of the existing

personnel of both the OUSW and the G-4

were transferred bodily to Somervell's

staff, the two former co-ordinating offices

were left with only a vague and, as experience speedily proved, nominal policymaking and planning role. G-4 found it

impossible, with the eight to a dozen officers assigned to it, to exercise even policy

supervision over logistical activities. The

SOS rapidly moved into the vacuum to

become a policy-making and planning as

well as a supervisory and operating organization, and its forceful commander retained the responsibility, which he had

held as G-4, of advising General Marshall

directly in matters of supply. "We occupy

a middle position," a G-4 officer wrote bitterly about a year after the reorganization,

"between General Somervell as the Army

representative in joint and international

supply deals and General Somervell as the

Commanding General of the Army Service Forces, a theoretical subordinate."

 41

General McNair, a disapproving observer

of the trend, later told Somervell bluntly,

"G-4 is the proper adviser of the Chief of

Staff in logistics policies, even though such

is not the case today due to the force of

your personality."

 42

But the "final word on supply," which

the reorganization of March 1942 snatched

away from G-4 and the OUSW, was not

bestowed upon the Services of Supply,

powerful though Somervell's voice remained in high councils. War Plans Division (shortly renamed Operations Division

and known as OPD) became, under the

reorganization, the central command post

that GHQ had never been allowed to be.

Its functions included not only war planning but also "strategic direction of military forces in the theater of war,"

 43

 and it

was organized as a separate general staff

within the General Staff, equipped to command and operate as well as to plan. In

general, the three great zone of interior

commands were supposed to provide

trained forces, equipment, and supplies in

the United States, and the means to transport them overseas; G-1, G-3, and G-4 to

formulate Army-wide policies primarily

in the United States (that is, those affecting all three major commands) in the fields

of personnel, unit organization, and sup40

 (1) Ibid. (2) Annual Report of the Army Service Forces,

1943 (Washington, 1944), Ch. XIX. (3) Millett, ASF,

Ch. III. (4) See other accounts in Greenfield, Palmer,

and Wiley, AGF I, pp. 143-56; Watson, Prewar Plans

and Preparations, Ch. IX; Cline, Washington Command

Post, Ch. VI; and Nelson, National Security and the General Staff, Ch. VIII. 41

 Memo, Lt Col James McGormack, Jr., for Brig

Gen Raymond G. Moses, 16 Apr 43, sub: Reorgn of

the WD, G-4/020.

The SOS was renamed Army Service Forces in

March 1943. 42

 (1) Memo, McNair for Somervell, 24 Jun 43, sub:

Your Proposed Reorgn of Sv Activities, AGF 1943-44

folder, Hq ASF. (2) See Cline, Washington Command

Post, pp. 114-15. 43

 WD Circular 59, 2 Mar 42.

226 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ply; OPD to direct operations overseas.44

In practice, there were few matters, in

logistics or any other field, in which OPD

did not claim an interest and assert final

jurisdiction, since all military activities in

the zone of interior were oriented directly

or indirectly to the support of overseas

operations. And since OPD was not restricted, as were G-1, G-3, and G-4, to

planning and policy making, it quickly

built up a sizable staff of specialists in various fields to interpret the stream of technical information that daily poured into the

division both from overseas theaters and

from other zone of interior agencies. By

mid-1942 two branches of OPD's organization, Theater Group and Logistics

Group, were dealing directly and continuously with logistical matters. The former,

through its theater sections, each organized as a miniature general staff, monitored the flow of messages between the

War Department and overseas commanders and served as an operational control

center for directing overseas operations.

The Theater Group also included a Troop

Movements Section, which supervised the

preparation of movement orders by the

three major commands and co-ordinated

the flow of troops overseas. The Logistics

Group, at first called Resources and Requirements, concerned itself with logistical

problems in the large, rather than theater

by theater, and placed special emphasis

upon the balancing of requirements

against assets. It was this group that,

among other tasks, prepared and maintained the Victory Program Troop Basis.

Necessarily, officers in the Logistics Group

depended on the SOS and other sources

for detailed logistical data, but they had

access to the latest strategic plans, a source

denied the planning staff of SOS. Through

the Logistics Group, OPD became the

Army's highest logistical planning and coordinating agency in the sense that it

brought detailed knowledge and informed

judgment of logistical limitations to bear

in the final stages of strategic planning and

decision.45

The Services of Supply, by contrast, was

the Army's central operating and coordinating agency for supply in the United

States and to the overseas theaters (except

for material peculiar to the Air Forces).

In the procurement field and in those

phases of distribution that did not impinge

immediately upon overseas operations,

such as the management of the depot system and the supply of posts and installations in the United States, the co-ordinating function of the SOS reached upward

to the policy-making level. In another

dimension, wherever logistical operations

could be reduced to routine procedures

and automatic controls, the authority of

the SOS was comparatively little subject

to review or co-ordination from above. It

was in logistical planning, the movement

of troops to overseas theaters, and certain

phases of overseas supply, activities that

had a crucial bearing on military operations and, throughout 1942 at least, continued to demand a high degree of supervision, that the SOS found its information,

judgments, and operations more or less

constantly under scrutiny by OPD. Sometimes the scrutiny descended to routine,

even humdrum questions. "Too many

matters," wrote General Lutes, Somervell's Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, in September 1942, "that are of

primary interest to the SOS are being

handled in the Operations Division. . . .

44

 Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 93-95. 45

 Ibid., pp. 123-31. See also Cline's draft MS, Ch.

XVII, p. 632, in Supporting Docs to Cline, Washington Command Post file, OCMH.
LOGISTICAL CO-ORDINATION AND ADMINISTRATION 227

Unless we are careful . . . we may find a

great many supply matters bottlenecked

in the Operations Division. Overseas commanders may not understand this and not

realize that the delays are due to the General Staff."

 46

 Several months later the

same officer complained of the "gradual

tendency by the General Staff to tighten

the rein of supervision over all the planning and operational procedures of Headquarters, ASF."

 47

From the point of view of the SOS, this

supervision was senseless and wasteful in a

structure created expressly for the purpose

of lessening the administrative burdens of

the General Staff. The patience of the SOS

commander, never Job-like, occasionally

broke under OPD interference in routine

logistical business. On one occasion he

wrote acidly to General Handy, the chief

of OPD:

The officers who handled the matter in

your office knew nothing of the situation. . . .

The exchange of wires has now dragged on for over a month. In my opinion this is an inexcusable waste of time and I am sure that

inefficiency will result in the event that junior

officers in OPD continue to interfere in mat- ters of supply.48

Understandably, this kind of irascibility

caused annoyance in OPD, particularly

when it was accompanied by strictures

against the alleged incompetence of OPD

in logistical planning. In this area the two

staffs jostled repeatedly, and no really

satisfactory modus operandi was ever found.

Supply and Transportation in the SOS

The initial organization of SOS headquarters reflected the dependence of distribution upon current production. These

two functions were combined under a single Director of Procurement and Distribution; a Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements and Resources was responsible for

"requirements, programs, resources and

procurement planning,"

 49

 including the

administration of defense aid, which was

a function of distribution as well as of requirements. Both these officials were part

of the commanding general's immediate

office staff. The supply arms and services,

with a new Transportation Division (later

Service, and still later Corps) and a General Depot Service, were initially designated the "operating divisions" of the

SOS.50

But the key agency of the SOS in

co-ordinating its support of overseas operations was its Operations Division, a staff

section not under the Director of Procurement and Distribution. This division was

charged somewhat ambiguously with coordinating plans and instructions on "projected and current operations" involving

two or more agencies of the SOS, with respect to troop and supply movements and

"supply matters in connection with specific tactical or strategic operations, or

other War Department activities."

 51

 Its

role at first was rather narrowly defined.

According to Col. Clinton F. Robinson,

one of the "founding fathers" of the SOS:

The primary functions of the Operations

Division are those concerned with purely

military operations. Its chief duty should be

the working out of the necessary supply ar- rangements with the War Plans Division and

the Ground and Air Forces for specific mili46

 Memo, Lutes for Dir Plng Div SOS, 12 Sep 42,

Misc Notes, Lutes File. 47

 Memo, Maj Gen LeRoy Lutes for Maj Gen Wilhelm D. Styer, 30 Mar 43, Misc Notes, Lutes File. 48

 Memo, Gen Somervell for Maj Gen Thomas T.

Handy, 24 Feb 43, ACofS OPD 1942-44 folder, Hq

ASF. 49

 Ltr cited n. 39(2). 50

 (1) Ibid. (2) Report of the Chief of Transportation,

ASF, World War II (Washington, 30 Nov 45), pp.

17-18. 51

 Ltr cited n. 39(2).
228 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

tary operations. . . . The Operations Divi- sion is concerned with current and shortrange military operations both within the

zone of the interior and movements overseas.52

But from the outset the chief of the SOS

Operations Division, General Lutes, whom

Somervell had brought into G-4 only in

January as his executive officer, interpreted

his responsibilities broadly and forcefully.

One of the primary areas was distribution,

which Somervell on the eve of the reorganization had offered to place under Lutes'

immediate supervision. Lutes had demurred, arguing that without transportation, already assigned a separate staff

status, his direct control of distribution

would be ineffective. But he had made it

clear that he intended to co-ordinate both

functions, even though the Distribution

Branch was placed under the Director of

Procurement and Distribution, who, unlike Lutes, was part of Somervell's immediate office. The weeks following the reorganization witnessed the anomaly of

papers issuing from Distribution Branch

over Lutes' signature instead of Col.

Charles D. Young's, the Director of Procurement and Distribution. Finally, in

July, Lutes was raised to the status of Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, on a

par with the Assistant Chiefs for Personnel

and Materiel, created at the same time.

Lutes' organization now included a Distribution Division and a Plans Division, with

the "operations" function centered in his

own office (the Operations Division had

been eliminated). This was an important

change, recognizing for the first time the

cleavage between the requirements-procurement function, now consolidated

under Brig. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, Assistant

Chief of Staff for Materiel, and the distribution-logistical planning function.53

One of the "operations" that it seemed

might logically be performed for the Army

as a whole by the Operations Division of

the SOS was that of co-ordinating troop

and accompanying supply movements. For

this purpose Lutes' initial organization

contained a Troop and Supply Movements

Subsection, predecessor of the later Movements Branch. In prereorganization conferences SOS representatives had gained

the impression that agreement had been

reached on a procedure whereby the SOS.

which was involved in all troop movements through its supply and transportation functions, would issue general directives for all movements, while AGF and

AAF might issue supplementary orders as

they saw fit, "if they do not conflict with

SOS directives."

 54

 Theoretically, this procedure would combine in SOS the functions formerly performed in G-3, which

had prepared the command portions of the

basic order (including designation of units

tables of organization, and strength breakdown), and in G-4, which had prepared

the paragraph relating to supplies, equipment, and transportation.55

The first movement carried out under

the new procedure, that of the Tongatabu

task force ordered by the Joint Chiefs on

12 March, showed what the procedure

meant in practice. Army Ground Forces,

given full responsibility for setting up the

Army portion of the joint force, and pos52

 Memo, Robinson for Styer, 19 Mar 42, Misc

Notes, Lutes File. 53

 (1) Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 6 Mar 42, Misc

Notes, Lutes File. (2) Memo cited n. 52. (3) SOS GO

24, 20 Jul 42. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff

for Requirements and Resources was abolished. (4)

See also, History of the Planning Division, Army

Service Forces, MS, I, 8, OCMH. 54

 Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 7 Mar 42, sub: Summary of Opns, Misc Notes, Lutes File. 55

 (1) History of the Planning Division, ASF, MS,

I, 34, 36, 136, OCMH. (2) Troop Movements in

World War II, 31 Oct 45, MS, p. 6, OCMH.
KEY FIGURES OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY, March 1942. Top left, Lt. Gen.

LeRoy Lutes (then Brig. Gen.); top right, General Brehon B. Somervell (then Lt. Gen.); bottom

left, Maj. Gen. Charles P. Gross (then Brig. Gen.); bottom right, Maj. Gen. Lucius D. Clay

(then Brig. Gen.).
230 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

sessing all the former G-3 officers who

knew the technique of writing movement

orders, issued the basic order for virtually

all the Army ground elements, both combat and service; SOS issued an order for a

single finance detachment, together with

implementing instructions to corps areas,

supply services, and ports to carry out supply and transportation arrangements for

the entire force; the AAF staff, floundering

in an unfamiliar task with inexperienced

personnel, got out an order for the movement of air units and for the supply of

items of peculiar interest to the Air Forces.

Obviously, decentralization under the reorganization had complicated an already

involved procedure.

On the day that the SOS movement

order was published, 16 March, General

Lutes took the problem to Col. William K.

Harrison, Jr., one of the OPD officers who

had fathered the War Department reorganization. AGF was now insistent that it

must write movement orders for its own

units, excepting only those portions relating to marking, transportation, and bulk

supplies. Besides writing complete orders

for its own units, SOS claimed the right to

prepare all instructions concerning transportation and supply, including the provisions for supplies and equipment accompanying the troops, since the process of

actually providing this material was the

responsibility of SOS agencies. AAF was

uncertain, but on the whole inclined to go

along with the SOS view. The three commands agreed that the command portions

of the orders should properly be prepared

by each command for its own units. Maj.

Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, the Deputy

Chief of Staff, was prevailed upon to accept

OPD's proposed solution—to centralize

the co-ordinating and supervisory function

once again in the General Staff, this time

in OPD, where at the beginning of April

a small troop movements section was set

up within the Theater Group.

On 20 March, while the staffs were still

struggling with the Tongatabu movement,

OPD issued a directive assigning to itself

the "initiation, supervision and co-ordination" of movement orders.56

 For each

movement OPD issued a single basic

order; the three major commands then

co-ordinated their efforts in preparing a

single implementing order, each writing

so much of it "as pertains to their respective activities."

 57

 The final draft was submitted to OPD for approval and publication. The procedure was further centralized by the requirement that all movement

orders must be cleared with the Deputy

Chief of Staff. Insofar as this procedure

provided for the drafting of separate supply arrangements by each major command, however, it became almost immediately a fiction. AAF accepted the supply

and transportation provisions for its units

as drafted by the SOS staff. AGF continued to prepare for its units the provisions

applying to material accompanying the

movement, but it became a routine procedure for OPD to use the provisions for

supply as well as transportation drafted by

the SOS. In this respect, as in many others,

the SOS Operations staff performed the

Army-wide services given up by G-4 in the

reorganization.58

General Lutes also exploited vigorously

56

 Memo, TAG for WPD, 20 Mar 42, sub: Responsibility and Proced for Preparation of Overseas Mvmt

Order, OPD 370.5 Changes of Station, 12. 57

 Ibid. 58

 (1) Memo, Exec Off for ACofS WPD, 22 Mar 42,

sub: Mvmt Orders, OPD 370.5 Changes of Station,

193. (2) Min, WD Gen Council mtg, 31 Mar 42. (3)

Troop Movements in World War II, 3 1 Oct 45, MS,

pp. 3-7, OCMH. (4) History of the Planning Division,

ASF, MS, I, 136-37, OCMH. (5) Cline, Washington

Command Post, pp. 125-27.
LOGISTICAL CO-ORDINATION AND ADMINISTRATION 231

what he called "the general follow-up of

the functioning of the supply system,"

 59

and under a "maintain-close-liaison"

clause in the initial SOS directive, he

established virtually complete control over

the "foreign relations" of SOS and the

supply services with the other two major

commands and the General Staff in the

field of supply. In particular, he successfully asserted the prerogative of co-ordinating "all supply matters and supply information" between SOS and OPD.60

Lutes at first visualized his office as a

G-4 for the SOS, having the function of

"co-ordinating and supervising the operations . . . affecting principally the field

forces and the War Department General

Staff."

 61

 Presently, however, he perceived

a happier analogy—with OPD. This was

suggested by the rapid extension of the

function of logistical planning by the SOS

staff. Under the original concept of the

SOS, long-range planning was dispersed

among several agencies—Requirements,

Resources, and the operating divisions

(supply services).62 These continued, of

course, to plan, but Lutes' planning staff

soon became the dominant planning

agency of the SOS. The Distribution Division, after it was added to Lutes' organization, became by contrast essentially an

operating or executive staff. His Plans

Division, despite its name, consisted in

July 1942 of branches not only for general

plans, but also for mobilization, movements, storage and shipping, and hospitalization and evacuation, all of which, except the first, were concerned far more

with supervision than with planning. The

General Plans Branch, nucleus of the later

Planning Division, was organized on the

OPD pattern, with a theater section broken down by geographical areas and a

"supply strategy" section, which evolved

later in the year into the Strategic Logistics Division, a small staff specializing in

long-range logistical studies. Lutes wrote

somewhat later:

Experience has shown . . . that a co- ordinating agency is needed in the staff of

Hqs ASF to correlate supply planning in its

relation to strategic plans and current opera- tions. . . . The agency best organized to

accomplish this co-ordination is believed to

be the Planning Division, ASF. Further, it is

believed that the Director of Operations,

ASF, should have the same staff relationship

to the entire staff of the Commanding General, ASF, in regard to overseas matters as the

Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations,

WDGS, has in relation to the other staff officers of the General Staff. The Director of

Operations, ASF, should be charged with the

strategic employment of the supplies, in con- sonance with the approved strategic plans,

and charged with all ASF matters affecting

overseas operations.63

"Operations" in the SOS, in short, just as

on the General Staff, were closely linked

with the planning function, and both were

oriented heavily toward overseas operations. In some respects at least, General

Lutes' organization became the OPD of

SOS.64

59

 Memo, Lutes for CofS SOS, 21 Apr 42, Misc

Notes, Lutes File. 60

 (1) Memo, Dir of Opns SOS for OPD, 20 Apr 42,

Misc Notes, Lutes File. (2) Ltr cited n. 39(2). (3) Plng

Div SOS Diary, 11 May and 10 Jun 42 entries, Plng

Div ASF. This diary was a day-to-day account of the

Planning Division's work and appeared under various

of the designations of the division's antecedents, such

as the Planning Branch, Operations Division, and the

General Plans Branch, Plans Division. For simplification, it will be cited hereafter as Plng Div SOS Diary.

(4) Memo, Dir of Opns SOS for TQMG and CofOrd,

20 May 42, 400 Sup Gen folder, Plng Div ASF. 61

 Memo cited n. 53(1). 62

 (1) Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 17 May 42, Misc

Notes, Lutes File. (2) Memo cited n. 52. 63

 Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 27 Jul 43, Misc

Notes, Lutes File. 64

 History of the Planning Division, ASF, MS, I,

8-13, 32-40, OCMH.
232 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

The most powerful challenge to that

role came from the autonomous organization of transportation. In March 1942 the

Chief of Transportation, General Gross,

took over the functions of the former Transportation Branch in G-4 and the Transportation Division of the Office of The

Quartermaster General, including procurement of floating equipment, command

of ports of embarkation and holding and

reconsignment points, and training of port

headquarters and port battalions. The

following September General Gross assumed responsibility for operation and

maintenance of military railways from the

Chief of Engineers, and similar functions

pertaining to utility railroads from the

Quartermaster Corps. In November the

Transportation Corps took over from the

Engineer Corps the design, procurement,

storage, and issue of all railway equipment, the training of railway troops, and

the entire Military Railway Service.65

Control of transportation, in short, was

centralized under the Chief of Transportation much as control of supply centered in

the Assistant Chief of Operations, SOS.

General Gross, while a line officer as chief

of a supply service, also served in a staff

capacity as Somervell's transportation

adviser.

General Lutes' earlier confidence that

he could effectively co-ordinate supply and

transportation without directly controlling

both functions was soon shaken. They

were "intimately connected operations,"

as he had noted, but their organizational

compartmentation made it difficult to

bring them together at the numerous

points where co-ordination was needed in

the complicated process of arranging troop

and supply movements.66 Lutes' counterpart in the transportation organization was

Gross' Director of Operations, Brig. Gen.

Robert H. Wylie, who, like Lutes, coordinated the activities of operating divisions and field installations and handled

most of his chief's external relations with

other SOS staff agencies, the Navy, civilian

transportation agencies, private carriers,

and the General Staff, including OPD.

Most of these channels paralleled those by

which Lutes' organization co-ordinated

supply operations.67 Exchange of information between the central transportation

and supply organizations in SOS was not

always free or continuous. One SOS staff

officer once recorded, "It appears, although it cannot be proved, that subordinate agencies in Transportation have either

been directed to withhold information

from this office or have taken this attitude

from their superiors."

 68

 In March 1943

Lutes registered a complaint with the

Chief of Transportation.

It frequently happens that the Plans Divi- sion of this office becomes involved in de- tailed planning with . . . [OPD, Assistant

Chief of Staff for Materiel in SOS, service

commanders, AGF, and AAF]; troops are

designated for overseas operations; equip- ment is started to the home stations . . . only

to find that a change in the shipping plans

has been made directly between OPD and

the Office of the Chief of Transportation.

65

 Report of the Chief of Transportation, ASF, World

War II, p. 18.

Procurement of motor vehicles, however, remained

with the Ordnance Department, and training of truck

companies was performed mainly by the Ground and

Air Forces.

Gross was promoted to brigadier general on 11

March 1942 and to major general on 9 August 1942. 66

 Memo cited n. 53(1). 67

 (1) Wardlow, Trans I, Ch. III. (2) Memo, Lutes

for Dir of Plng Div, 3 Sep 42, Misc Notes, Lutes File.

Lutes was promoted to the rank of major general on

25 October 1942. 68

 "For record" to memo, Col Frank A. Heileman

for CofTrans, 4 Feb 43, sub: Sup Sit . . . , 18 Shipg

file, II, Case 53, Plng Div ASF.
LOGISTICAL CO-ORDINATION AND ADMINISTRATION 233

He requested testily that his office be informed immediately of "each and every

change" in shipping arrangements.69

The fundamental difficulty, however,

was functional, arising from the fact that

supply and transportation to some degree

had conflicting purposes. Success in supply

was measured in terms of timely delivery

of desired amounts and items of material;

success in transportation, in terms of efficient traffic management and economy in

use of transport. Normally, the two purposes worked to a common end, but during 1942 the converging pressures for

effective supply and for economy in the use

of shipping brought them often into conflict. The conflict came to a head in the

question of control over the ports of embarkation.

The Contest for Control of the Ports

The prewar primary port, or port of

embarkation, was almost purely a transportation agency, a funnel and transshipping point for troops and material moving

overseas. While each of the three primary

ports being used by the Army on the eve of

Pearl Harbor (New York, San Francisco,

and New Orleans) was the site of a general

depot that served both overseas bases and

neighboring installations, the port itself

had no co-ordinating responsibility in

overseas supply and no operating supply

functions except in serving its own personnel and troops moving through it. The

administrative and functional core of the

prewar port was the Army Transport

Service, headed by a Quartermaster officer

with the title of superintendent, who was

charged with supervision and control of all

water transportation. The War Department's supervision of port operations in the

years of peace was not close, but The

Quartermaster General, to whom the superintendent of the Transport Service at

each port was in practice answerable, successfully resisted efforts by port commanders themselves, by the corps areas, and by

other supply services to encroach upon this

jurisdiction. On 17 December 1941 all

ports of embarkation and general depots

located at them were placed under the

Chief of the Transportation Branch, G-4,

and the following March they passed to the

Chief of Transportation in SOS. Wartime

transportation operations at the ports were

thus brought under central control from

the beginning. Under the immense burden of traffic moving overseas after December 1941, the importance of the ports

as transshipping agencies was enhanced,

and central control was tightened. Movements of Army troops and freight, including military lend-lease to and through the

ports, were carefully regulated by the Chief

of Transportation's office in Washington,

and in March 1942 a Transportation Control Committee was established, which

eventually represented the military services, the British Ministry of War Transport,

the Office of Defense Transportation, and

the War Shipping Administration, for

co-ordinating all portbound freight movements.70

69

 Memo, Lutes for Gross, 26 Mar 43, Misc Notes,

Lutes File. 70

 (1) A primary port was headquarters of a line of

Army transports, and when located at a general depot

both were under the same commandant. The three

primary ports were also ports of embarkation. A subport was administratively subordinate to a primary

port. See AR 270-5, 30 Nov 40, and AR 30-1110,

1 Apr 40. (2) WD ltr, 17 Dec 41, sub: Orders Affecting Mvmt of Trs . . . , AG 612 (12-16-41). (3) Larson, Water Transportation for the U.S. Army 1939-

1942, Monograph 5, OCT HB. (4) Schmidt, The

Commercial Traffic Branch in the Office of The

Quartermaster General, July 1940-March 1942, OCT

HB Monograph 6, OCMH. (5) Wardlow, Trans I, pp.

39-41, 95-110, 373. (6) Chester Wardlow, The Trans-
234 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

PREPARING TO BOARD A TROOPSHIP, San Francisco Port of Embarkation,

September 1942.

In March 1942, when the new overseas

supply plan issued in January went into

effect, the Army ports also became regional centers for the routine administration of overseas supply. Each port became,

in effect, the agent to which one or more

overseas bases sent their supply requisitions, on which they relied to maintain a

regular flow of automatic supply shipments, and to which they looked, in general, to handle their routine supply needs.

The theaters and bases that a port served

in this capacity were not always those for

which troop movements and many emergency cargo shipments originating at the

port were destined. (See Appendix G.) Upon

the old role of the port as transshipping

agency, in short, an altogether new one

was superimposed, and the administrative

autonomy conferred upon the port in performing its new functions contrasted

sharply with its subordination to central

authority in transportation matters.71

portation Corps: II, Movements, Training, and Supply, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (hereafter

cited as Wardlow, Trans II), Ch. IV. (7) Rpt, Jun 42,

sub: Study of Governmental Contl of Trans Facilities,

Contl Div ASF. 71

 See below, Ch. XIII.
LOGISTICAL GO-ORDINATION AND ADMINISTRATION 235

LOADING SHIPS, NEW YORK PORT, 1943

The ports were slow in developing an

organization to handle their new duties.

Only a broad injunction to do so was contained in the overseas supply plan itself,

and the Chief of Transportation left the

matter generally to the discretion of the

port commanders. Before the war the limited supply functions of the ports had

usually devolved upon the port quartermaster, who had miscellaneous duties including the control of rail and highway

movements into the port. An overseas supply division was established at San Francisco early in 1942, but apparently did not

begin to function effectively until midyear.

Not until July was a separate overseas supply division established at New York,

largely under the prompting of General

Lutes and headed by Brig. Gen. William

M. Goodman, Lutes' nominee and a

former assistant executive in G-4 under

Somervell. The New York Overseas Supply Division became the prototype for

overseas supply organizations at the other

ports. While the overseas supply divisions

were of course subordinate to the port

commanders, they looked to Lutes' office

in Washington for their policy direction in

overseas supply and gradually assumed a

role commensurate with the port's autonomous supply function, enforcing War Department policy and co-ordinating the
236 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

port's relations with interior depots, supply

services, SOS headquarters, and overseas

commanders. General Goodman, himself,

later became the New York port commander's deputy.72

Following a visit to the New York port

in July 1942, General Lutes wrote to Somervell, "The trip has convinced me that

similar visits must be made to check supply matters at other ports. To date more

stress has been placed at ports on purely

transportation matters."

 73

 Ports tended to

be dilatory in following up requisitions

sent to depots and not filled; port transportation agencies failed to properly

"marry up" parts of assemblies, for example sending artillery shells and propelling

charges overseas in separate shipments.

The chief complaint was against unbalanced loading. After mid-1942 the ports

and the Transportation Corps came under

increasingly heavy pressure from the War

Shipping Administration to economize on

shipping by more efficient scheduling and

loading. This pressure had its effect. Much

filler cargo, especially subsistence and ammunition, was shipped overseas with little

regard for need, and sometimes at the expense of more critical matériel, in order

that ships might sail loaded "full and

down." Ammunition and ration stocks in

North Africa early in 1943 rose to embarrassingly high levels, and perishables

began to deteriorate.

Supply and transportation, in short,

were working at cross-purposes. The issue

came to a head late in February 1943

when Lutes learned that the New York

port had failed to carry out earlier instructions from his office to discontinue automatic supply of ammunition to North

Africa as soon as theater reports showed

sufficient stocks on hand. "The time has

come," Lutes wrote Somervell on the 24th,

". . . when shipments must be loaded

according to military necessity. The principal shortages overseas at present are

organizational equipment and items that

do not and cannot completely fill the

ships." Two days later he proposed a solution. "It has been difficult," he bluntly

told Somervell, "for this office to regulate

overseas supply with complete control

resting in the ports of embarkation."

 74

His own organization, he added pointedly,

contained a new Stock Control Branch

responsible for regulating supply stockages. Lutes recommended that either the

port overseas supply organization be

turned over outright to his control, leaving the Transportation Corps to operate

solely as a shipping agency, or "the Chief

of Transportation look to this office for instructions relative to overseas supply, and

. . . conform strictly to such instructions.

The Chief of Transportation," he concluded, "has fought rightly to retain control of military shipping, but there is no

advantage in such control from a military

standpoint unless ships are loaded accordingly. Commercial loading and shipping

72

 (1) Wardlow, Trans II, Ch. V. (2) Transcript of

Port Comdrs' Conf, Boston, Aug-Sep 43. (3) Harold

Larson, Role of the Transportation Corps in Oversea

Supply, Monograph 27, pp. 18-19, 148-51. (4) San

Francisco Port of Embarkation 1941-1942, hist rcd,

pp. 169-71. Last three in OCT HB. (5) Richard M.

Leighton, Overseas Supply Policies and Procedures,

ASF hist monograph, pp. 76-82, OCMH. (6) Interview, author with Gen Lutes, 28 Feb 48, Logis File,

OCMH. 73

 Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 17 Jul 42, Misc

Notes, Lutes File.

The following account of the controversy over the

ports is largely based on correspondence in the possession of General Lutes (referred to elsewhere in this

volume as Lutes File) and is related in detail in Leighton, Overseas Supply Policies and Procedures, pp.

83-111, OCMH. 74

 (1) Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 24 Feb 43. (2)

Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 26 Feb 43.
LOGISTICAL CO-ORDINATION AND ADMINISTRATION 237

procedures do not effect balanced supply

stocks in overseas military bases."

 75

Gross agreed in principle to the second

alternative. "As Chief of a Corps having

line as well as staff functions," he wrote

Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer, Somervell's

Chief of Staff,

. . . I stand ready and willing to obey, and

to see that all elements under my command

obey, all directives of the Assistant Chief of

Staff for Operations on overseas supply and

other matters under his jurisdiction. . . . but

strongly urge that no action be taken which

would completely sever the present direct

lines of command.76

Under existing arrangements, in fact, the

supply staffs of the SOS were already permitted to deal directly with the overseas

supply divisions at the ports. But Lutes

had hoped that the overseas supply divisions "would dominate the shipping or

Army Transport Service personnel in the

ports in order to effect intelligent overseas

supply."

 77

 Instead, transportation had

dominated supply and was likely to continue to dominate it as long as the shipping

shortage remained acute.

General Gross made a counterproposal—to establish within his own organization an overseas division to co-ordinate

all matters concerning overseas supply

and transportation operations. Lutes objected on the ground that

. . . overseas supply is not listed as one of the

major functions of the Transportation Corps.

. . . at no place . . . is the Chief of Trans- portation charged with such functions as

would require him to establish an overseas

supply staff in Washington to perform other

than administrative duties pertaining to the

transportation of supplies.78

Also, Lutes feared that the proposed new

agency would prevent the direct contacts

between his own office and the port overseas supply organizations, which he considered indispensable. On the other hand,

it was difficult to deny the right of the

Chief of Transportation to set up an office

to co-ordinate the supply activities of the

ports, as long as they remained under his

jurisdiction. A possible escape from the

dilemma, suggested by a member of Lutes'

staff, would be to place the ports under a

new "neutral" staff agency responsible for

overseas supply and transportation and

reporting directly to the Commanding

General, Army Service Forces (ASF).

General Lutes, understandably, was not

taken by this suggestion and it went no

further. The ideal solution, from his point

of view, would be to place the port overseas supply organizations directly under

his control, thus keeping the Transportation Corps "out of the supply business."

 79

General Styer, whom Somervell assigned

to mediate the quarrel, was inclined to

agree. By April, however, most of the conditions about which Lutes had complained

seemed to be already on the wane. "Marrying up" of assemblies, for example, was

being transferred from ports to depots and

holding and reconsignment points where

it could be performed by specialists. Routine procedures in transportation and supply were tightened up, and General Gross

bore down on his own staff to keep the

supply agencies informed. Lutes admitted

in April that matters were improving.

General Styer recommended, therefore, that "no radical change in organization for handling overseas supply" be

75

 Memo cited n. 74(2). 76

 Memo, Gross for Styer, 1 Apr 43, quoted in Larson, Role of the Transportation Corps in Oversea

Supply, p. 163, OCT HB. 77

 Memo, Gen Lutes for Lt Gen John L. De Witt,

18 Apr 43. 78

 Memo, Lutes for Gross, 10 Apr 43. 79

 Memo cited n. 77.
238 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

made.80 An exchange of memoranda between Lutes and Gross late in April provided that Lutes' office would deal with

the Chief of Transportation on general

matters of overseas supply policy, while on

routine matters the supply staff would

communicate directly with the port overseas supply divisions; on questions falling

into intermediate categories, communications would be sent directly to the headquarters concerned, with notification copies to other interested agencies. General

Gross' proposed overseas division never

materialized as such. Thus, the dispute

was settled within the existing organizational framework, and the duality of supply and transportation was reaffirmed. "As

a staff officer for transportation," General

Styer explained, "General Gross has the

same duties and responsibilities and the

same relationship with the Commanding

General, ASF, in transportation matters

that the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations has in regard to supply matters."

They would have to work together, he

observed, "like a pair of Siamese twins."

 81

The Limits of Port Autonomy

The development of the ports during

1942 as autonomous administrative units

in the system of overseas supply was carefully guided by the War Department and

the SOS to avoid an extreme of decentralization that might have made each port

the simple advocate and agent of its assigned theaters in the fierce competition

for supply support. This middle path was

not easy to follow. There were pressures,

dating back to the interwar years, for a

larger measure of autonomy, particularly

on the distant west coast. In January 1941

Brig. Gen. John C. H. Lee, then commander of the San Francisco port, had

proposed that all the shipping and storage

facilities in the San Francisco, Seattle, and

Los Angeles areas be consolidated under

his command, as "Commander, Pacific

Ports of Embarkation"; this regional command would serve all troops on the west

coast and all garrisons in the Pacific.

Lee's successor, Col. Frederick Gilbreath,

proposed a similar consolidation "in case

of a major national effort involving a large

expeditionary force"

 82

 to the Pacific, and

Colonel Aurand, while still in G-4, recommended a grouping of all ports under two

regional coastal commands, one for the

west coast, the other combining the Atlantic and Gulf coasts.83

In the crisis following Pearl Harbor the

whole future role of the ports came under

review. Transfer of the Army's shipping

responsibilities to the Navy seemed now to

be postponed indefinitely. Army ports

were being swamped by an unprecedented

volume of troop and cargo movements.

The overseas supply system was being revamped. On the west coast, the Navy's

field organization was giving an impressive demonstration of aggressive and efficient local initiative. In chartering shipping and expediting supply movements,

Army officials found themselves hampered

by their subordination to a distant headquarters while the Navy could operate

with relative freedom.84 To the men on the

spot, and even more to the commanders

overseas whose fate hung on their efforts,

the situation seemed to demand a great 80

 Memo, Styer for Somervell, 16 Apr 43. 81

 Ibid.

82

 Memo, CG SFPOE for G-4, 15 Jan 41, G-4/

32464. 83

 (1) San Francisco Port of Embarkation 1941-

1942, p. 23, OCT HB. (2) Memo, Chief of Reqmts

and Distrib Br for G-4, 7 Mar 41, sub: Things That

Won't Wait, Plng folder, OCT HB. 84

 For the impact of this situation upon the Hawaiian Department, see above, Ch. VI.
LOGISTICAL CO-ORDINATION AND ADMINISTRATION 239

national effort to make available to the

west coast the reinforcements and supplies

that were needed, together with greater

freedom for the Army organization there

to exploit local resources and facilities.

Some of this feeling emerged in a proposal made in mid-January 1942 by General Emmons, commander of the Hawaiian Department, for the creation of a

Pacific coast communications zone, bringing together all the Army's west coast

supply and transportation activities. The

Pacific theaters would look to this communications zone for all their material

requirements, including supplies for the

civilian population, and would present

their requirements through representatives

on the zone commander's staff. The latter,

in turn, would have "complete authority

to act" for the War Department under a

general directive, and in addition would

be given access to the "alphabetical agencies" of the government for production,

resources, and shipping through representatives on his staff, who would be "clothed

with the necessary authority."

 85

General Marshall's reply, which was

sent at once, concentrated on the immediate issue from which Emmons' proposal

had sprung—the shipping shortage—and

rejected the plan with little further comment. Nevertheless, the point Marshall

made with reference to allocation of shipping could be applied equally to the other

critical resources that Emmons' plan

vaguely implied should be placed at the

disposal of the proposed new command.

"Our own and allied shipping is fully considered," Marshall wrote, "in every operation undertaken, and allocations are

made on the basis of urgency, which can

only be determined in joint [interallied]

conferences. Many movements to the Pacific have and will continue to be made

from the Atlantic coast."

 86

 The zone commander, in Emmons' plan, would probably have been allowed to charter local

shipping, as the Navy was doing, and

would have enjoyed administrative contacts and channels for tapping regional

resources on behalf of the Pacific theaters

that were denied to other theaters and

field agencies. The west coast region embraced a considerable part of the national

economy, and it was far from Washington.

A single autonomous logistical command

dominating so important an area might

well have become a powerful sectional influence in economic mobilization; in any

case, the scheme pointed toward a geographical compartmentation inimical to

flexible administration on a nationwide

basis. Almost certainly such a command

would have exerted its influence to promote a westward, as against the already

approved eastward, orientation of strategy. With relation to the theaters it was

to serve, the proposed command would

not, of course, be a communications zone

at all in the usual sense, but a full-fledged

intermediate logistical "theater"; Emmons

nominated Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt to

command it, evidently having in mind

that it would be merged with the Western

Defense Command. In a limited sense, the

plan foreshadowed the intermediate role

Emmons' own command in the Hawaiian

Islands was later to play in the Pacific

war.

The kind of autonomy envisaged in

Emmons' plan stood out in sharp contrast

to that in the War Department's overseas

85

 Msg 1709, CG HD to TAG, 15 Jan 42, AG 381

(11-27-41) Sec 1. 86

 Msg 1013, CofS to CG HD, 16 Jan 42, AG 381

(11-27-41) Sec 1.

Emmons was rebuked by the War Department

somewhat later for chartering shipping directly from

the Matson Navigation Company. See above, Ch. VI.
240 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

supply plan published a week later. In the

War Department's plan, the autonomy of

the port of embarkation was circumscribed—though unfettered within its assigned sphere. The port was not an allocating agency; in servicing requisitions it

acted merely as the administrative agent

of the War Department. It employed the

means assigned to it—shipping and depot

credits; it could not exploit the resources

in its environs. After the rejection of General Emmons' proposal, the transportation

activities of the ports continued to be subordinated to central control from Washington, and when Maj. Gen. Frederick Gilbreath in spring of 1943 renewed his

recommendation for consolidation of west

coast ports under one command, General

Gross again rejected the idea.87

In the sphere of overseas supply, however, the autonomy already gained created

pressure for further extension. In September 1942, in connection with an attempted

revamping of supply reporting, General

Somervell put forward a proposal that in

all matters of supply the port commander

should be considered the agent for his assigned theaters and bases. To the port

would go all supply communications from

overseas, those on which the port was not

empowered to act being forwarded immediately to higher headquarters with recommendations. The port would be authorized to require from overseas bases all

reports and information needed to execute

its supply responsibility. But both OPD

and G-4 turned their faces against the proposal, being unwilling to abandon the

direct channels by which overseas commanders communicated with the General

Staff on all nonroutine matters.

Late the following winter the regional

principle once more reared its head, again

in the sphere of supply, when Brig. Gen.

Clinton F. Robinson, Somervell's chief

adviser on organization and management

and probably the author of the "agent"

idea, suggested the formation of an Atlantic coast service command, possibly to be

followed later by similar organizations on

the other coasts. General Lutes enthusiastically endorsed the idea, seeing in it a

solution to his troubles in maintaining the

ascendancy of supply over transportation

in port operations, but General Gross' resolute hostility settled the matter. In 1943

certain ports on the east coast were sometimes brought under the control of another

port, usually New York, for specific supply

movements to areas in the latter's sphere

of responsibility, and the actual burden of

outflowing traffic on both east and west

coasts was concentrated less heavily than

in 1942 on the two major ports, New York

and San Francisco.

Actually, there was no really strong

tendency toward regionalism. The Army's

sources of supply in the United States

(unlike the Navy's) were spread too widely

and too far back from the coasts to make

feasible a regional scheme of administrative decentralization to coastal areas.

Army transportation, dependent upon the

nation's highly interdependent rail system,

lent itself even less readily to area compartmentation, while the fierce competition for transportation facilities made real

decentralization on any basis impracticable. As transshipping agencies, therefore,

the ports continued to function as cogs in

a nationwide transportation system that

was tightly and centrally co-ordinated. As

administrative centers for overseas supply,

the ports enjoyed a real if limited autonomy, but their jurisdiction had no regional

87

 Memo, CofTrans for CG SFPOE, 19 Apr 43,

SPTT 323.94 SF file, OCT.
LOGISTICAL CO-ORDINATION AND ADMINISTRATION 241

character except in the sense that the theaters they served constituted geographical

areas.88

The 7heater Segment of the Pipeline

The administrative sphere of the port of

embarkation did not extend beyond the

harbor's mouth. Getting troops and material safely across the ocean gap was the

Navy's job, and at the port of destination

the theater's rear area organization took

charge. The organization of the segment

of the supply pipeline lying beyond the

theater port of entry, like all matters of

theater administration, was regarded as

the theater commander's business under

the prevailing American military doctrine,

which gave a field commander free rein in

the choice of methods for carrying out his

assigned mission.89

This autonomy had certain disadvantages in overseas supply. As master of his

own house, the theater commander could

be urged, but only with difficulty required,

to institute an effective system of stock control, to keep accurate records of the movement and status of supply, to determine

his requirements on a realistic basis, or, in

general, to maintain minimum standards

of supply control. The overseas theater,

moreover, was not a homogeneous segment

of the pipeline, and its administration was

not easily divorced from that of the lines

of communications lying to the rear. In a

large theater the ports of entry might be

only the first of several transshipment and

storage points, and the staging of supply

forward might lead only gradually into the

retail, dispersed system of distribution that

in general characterized the theater segment of the pipeline.90

Under field service regulations the rear

areas of a theater were ordinarily organized as a communications zone—an autonomous theater-within-a-theater that might

comprise the greater part of the theater's

geographical area. The communications

zone commander, responsible directly to

the theater commander for forwarding

troops and supplies to the combat zone,

also relieved the latter of the administrative burden involved in the vast complex

of rear area activities necessary to the functioning of large armies.91

 This geographical division of responsibilities opened the

door to a wide duplication of functions

between the theater and the communications zone staffs, on the theory that most

logistical functions had "theater-wide" as

well as purely rear area aspects. In an

effort to reduce this duplication and free

his staff of administrative responsibilities,

General John J. Pershing in 1918 had replaced his Line of Communication, as the

rear area organization of the American

Expeditionary Forces was called, by a

"Services of Supply"—or, as its author,

Brig. Gen. Johnson Hagood, called it, a

"Services of the Rear." To this SOS were

assigned, despite this latter title, most of

the administrative and technical activities,

not merely rear area services, supporting

the U.S. armies in France. In supply, the

theater staff continued to supervise only

the determination of destinations and re88

 (1) Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 24 Mar 43, Misc

Notes, Lutes File. (2) Wardlow, Trans I, Ch. IV. (3)

See above, pp. 233-38, and below, pp. 327-28. (4) For

a discussion of wartime rail operations and the traffic

control system, see Joseph R. Rose, American Wartime

Transportation (New York, The Thomas Y. Crowell

Company, 1953), Chs. I, IV. 89

 (1) FM 101-5, Staff Officers' Field Manual, Aug

40, par. 1. (2) For the effect of Pearl Harbor in bringing about a closer direction of overseas operations by

the high command in Washington, see Cline, Washington Command Post, Chs. V-VI. 90

 See below, Ch. XIII. 91

 FM 100-10, Field Service Regulations: Administration, 1940, Ch. 2, Sec V.
242 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

quirements, and the SOS commander was

authorized to deal directly with Washington on supply matters. War Department

officials, indeed, felt that the tie should be

closer, and Secretary Baker proposed in

July 1918 that the SOS be placed directly

under War Department control. General

Pershing emphatically rejected the proposal, appealing to the doctrine of "unity

of command and responsibility."

 92

The precedent of 1918 lent support to

two important principles: first, that a theater's rear area organization, even though

most of its business was carried on far behind the combat zone, was the proper

agency to handle most theater-wide administration as well, and second, that it

must be permitted free and direct access to

War Department logistical agencies on

most matters. Both principles tended to

enhance its administrative autonomy visa-vis the theater. The influence of the experience of 1918 was clearly evident, not

only in the creation of a central Services of

Supply in the War Department in March

1942, but also in the establishment during

that year of several rear area organizations

overseas bearing the SOS label and more

or less closely resembling the original 1918

SOS—in the Central, Southwest, and

South Pacific, North Africa, the Middle

East, India, and the British Isles. In none

of these experiments did the jurisdictional

issue raised by Secretary Baker in 1918 reappear in precisely its original form since

the War Department had no inclination to

assume direct command over widely scattered and remote areas overseas. But in

each theater the SOS or the communications zone usually was permitted to deal

directly with the War Department Services

of Supply on a variety of more or less routine administrative matters that comprised

the bulk of the theater's logistical business

with the zone of interior.93 In general,

however, the jurisdiction of rear area

organizations over theater-wide activities

remained limited, and most theaters maintained large administrative staffs at theater

headquarters.

In only one theater, the European, did

the War Department clearly attempt to

dictate the form of the rear area organization.94

 General Somervell believed, and

persuaded General Marshall, that the theater SOS should parallel in its structure

that of the War Department SOS, in order

to permit direct dealings between "opposite numbers" of the two staffs. Marshall

also accepted Somervell's recommendation of Maj. Gen. John C. H. Lee as commanding general of the theater SOS, and

before his departure for England late in

May 1942, Lee was thoroughly briefed by

Somervell's staff and by General Harbord,

former commander of the SOS in France

in 1918. The plan of organization was

drafted in April and May by Somervell's

staff.

This scheme grouped the heads of the

supply and administrative services in the

theater's SOS headquarters, leaving the

92

 (1) Ltr, Pershing to Secy Baker, 6 Jul 18, quoted

in John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War

(New York, Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1931, 2

vols.), I, 190. (2) For details on the Services of Supply

of 1918, see ibid., I, 109, 180-91, 321, 348, II, 55, 108,

140, 204; and General Johnson Hagood, The Services

of Supply: A Memoir of the Great War (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1927). (3) Millett, "The Direction of Supply Activities in the War Department,"

American Political Science Review, XXXVIII (April

1944), 260-65. 93

 For a general discussion of theater supply organization, see Logistics in World War II, Ch. 7. 94

 For details, see Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical

Support of the Armies, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), Ch. I; and

Robert W. Coakley, Organization and Command in

the European Theater of Operations, Vol. II, Pt. II of

Administrative and Logistical History of the European Theater of Operations, MS, OCMH.
LOGISTICAL CO-ORDINATION AND ADMINISTRATION 243

theater commander's own headquarters to

be organized "along the general pattern of

a command post."

 95

 It was bitterly attacked in the theater. The burden of the

criticism was that the services, being

theater-wide in function, could not be

supervised by a headquarters that was

merely co-ordinate with the major tactical

commands reporting directly to the theater commander. Lee was forced to accept

a compromise, which endured with only

minor changes for the next year and a half.

The SOS remained in control of supply

services, but administrative services for the

most part were assigned to theater headquarters. Lee's authority was so defined as

not to interfere with "inherent command

responsibilities of other force commanders."

 96

 Policy-making authority in general

remained at the theater level. On the other

hand, Maj. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower,

the new theater commander, assigned the

SOS broad responsibilities in supply planning and authorized direct communication

with the War Department in supply and

administrative matters. No serious effort

was made by the War Department to restore the organization it had originally

sponsored. The new one had the sanction

of the theater commander, and few were

inclined to challenge his right to work out

his own administrative arrangements, particularly since these still conformed to

the general pattern laid down by the War

Department.97

Somervell's plan for a logistical organization in the European theater closely paralleling his own in the United States was

thus defeated. Lee's own headquarters

eventually assumed the traditional "G"

structure, deviating markedly from the

scheme of functional staff divisions that

Somervell had adopted. But Somervell

undoubtedly looked beyond mere organizational parallelism. From April to July

1942 there was every reason to expect that

the European theater would soon overshadow all the other war zones, and that

the British Isles, like France in 1918, would

become the great entrepot of American

military power overseas—in effect an extension of the base of supply in the United

States. In 1942, to be sure, the whole

European theater, as far as the land war

was concerned, was essentially a "services

of the rear," engaged in the primarily

logistical business of developing a base and

assembling an invasion force. In these circumstances it was natural for the theater

commander to maintain close control

over his logistical organization, but as

early as June 1942 officers in OPD foresaw

that the theater commander, after the invasion began, might find himself relegated

to the role of maintaining base areas and

forwarding troops and supplies—to the

role, in fact, of an SOS commander.98 Evidently, if he were to direct the invasion, he

would have to shift the burden of rear area

administration to others. This would probably involve an organizational arrangement similar to the one Pershing had

adopted in 1918. Perhaps it might lead

eventually to the union proposed by Secretary Baker between the logistical agencies on both sides of the Atlantic.

95

 (1) Ltr, Marshall to CG USAFBI, 14 May 42,

sub: Orgn of SOS, BOLERO 1942 folder, Lutes File.

Several drafts of this letter are in same file; these and

other papers indicate that the organization was

drafted in Lutes' Plans Branch. (2) See also, min of

SOS stf confs, 7 and 14 May 42, Contl Div ASF. 96

 Ltr cited n. 95(1). 97

 (1) See above, n. 95. (2) Ltr, Gen Lutes to Brig

Gen Thomas B. Larkin, 24 Feb 42, BOLERO 1942

folder, Lutes File. (3) Corresp in OPD 320.2 Gt

Brit, 52. 98

 Memo, Col John E. Hull for ACofS OPD, 6 Jun

42, sub: System of Comd for ROUNDUP, OPD 381

BOLERO, 12.
244 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

In the multitheater war that developed

after mid-1942, such a solution was hardly

practicable. But while rear area administration, in the European and other theaters, continued to be subject to theater

control, that control was tempered in every

theater by a large degree of decentralization leaning far toward regional autonomy.

A theater's rear area organization was tied

by the character of its functions to the central base of operations and line of communications behind it as well as to the combat

zone in front. Efficient performance of

those functions depended in large measure

upon the smoothness, continuity, and

directness of its administrative contacts

with the logistical agencies farther to the

rear.

Secession of the Air Forces

Long before March 1942 the movement

of the Army Air Forces toward separate

status had resulted in the development of

a separate logistical establishment that

duplicated at many points the facilities for

supplying and servicing the ground forces.

This duality was perpetuated by the War

Department reorganization on the general

principle that supplies and services peculiar to the Air Forces should be provided

within the AAF establishment. After

March 1942, indeed, the AAF steadily

broadened its jurisdiction in such fields as

storage, communications, and housekeeping and utilities functions at AAF installations.99

In overseas supply it was intended in the

reorganization of March 1942 that the

ports would serve as channels for supply of

air as well as ground forces. Port commanders forwarded requests for "technical" (that is, peculiar) items of AAF

supply, without action, to the Air Service

Command at Wright and Patterson Fields,

or to designated Air depots. The AAF determined how much and what kinds of

material should be stocked at SOS depots

for its troops, and AAF items were not

stocked at the ports at all. Technical Air

Forces supplies were stored at Air depots.

Items of common use were supplied by the

ports under uniform procedures for air and

ground forces alike. AAF freight and troop

movements through the ports were subject

to port control, and air traffic to and from

overseas theaters was co-ordinated by the

Chief of Transportation until July 1942,

when it was taken over by the AAF. AAF

liaison officers were stationed at each port,

and the Air Staff determined supply policies for its own forces overseas.100

These arrangements recognized supply

of air and ground forces as distinct in many

respects, but still capable of being handled

under a single administrative system. The

aspirations of the AAF to separate status

were well understood in G-4 and the SOS,

and a determined effort was made to

accommodate the overseas supply system

to its needs. But it became evident in prereorganization conferences that the ground

and air commands had diametrically opposite notions as to the kind of services

desired from the SOS. The former intended to utilize these to the utmost, while

the Air Staff was determined to develop a

supply system paralleling that of the

ground forces.101 Almost immediately, Air

99

 See Millett, ASF, Chs. I-II, IX, XI. 100

 (1) WD ltrs, 22 Jan and 28 Apr 42, sub: Sup of

Overseas Depts, Theaters, and Separate Bases, AG

400 (1-17-42). (2) Report of the Chief of Transportation,

ASF, World War II, p. 18. (3) Min, WD Gen Council

mtg, 30 Jun 42. 101

 (1) Memo cited n. 54. (2) 1st Ind, Hq SOS to

Hq AAF, 25 Jul 42, in Notes, Air Force Sup, Logis

File, OCMH.
LOGISTICAL CO-ORDINATION AND ADMINISTRATION 245

commanders overseas began to send requisitions for technical items directly to

Wright Field, and late in June the AAF

proposed that this practice be legalized.

SOS representatives objected, urging the

advantages of funneling all supply requests

through the ports. They pointed out that

the AAF enjoyed virtually complete control over the supply of its forces and

argued that "as long as they are part of the

Army and the Army transports their supplies, . . . the focal point for requests and

water shipment must be the port commander."

 102

 But with the Air Forces evidently bent on developing a separate supply system, these arguments availed little.

An SOS officer remarked, "I don't believe

there is anything we can do about it."

 103

The desired changes were incorporated,

accordingly, in the October revision of the

overseas supply plan. Commanders overseas were directed to send straight to

Wright Field at Dayton their requisitions

not only for technical supplies but also for

all regularly issued equipment procured

by the AAF. Later amendments broadened

the exempted categories still further. Reports on status of AAF supply overseas

similarly were routed directly to the Air

Service Command.104 The autonomy thus

gained was steadily extended in late 1942

and 1943. Air commanders overseas, General Lutes observed in March 1943, "have

become accustomed to requisition on Dayton for everything," including clothing

and other items of common use.105 The

SOS also found it increasingly difficult to

co-ordinate the movement of AAF troops

overseas with that of ground units. Lutes

wrote Somervell in March 1943:

We are not permitted to check Air Force

units under orders for overseas. We call on

the Air Forces for lists of shortages in order to

assist them in equipping their troops, but we

have great difficulty in obtaining such lists

within the time limits. It has been the usual

custom for Air Force units to arrive at staging

areas with considerable shortages in individ- ual equipment. Time frequently does not

permit us to complete their equipment.106

Ground troops moving overseas received

showdown inspections at their home stations, with SOS field agents initiating

immediate action to fill shortages. "We

have offered this service to the Air Forces,"

Lutes stated, "but have been turned

down."

 107

 On occasion, AAF supplies

were even moved into port without notification to the port commander, in violation

of a cardinal principle of traffic control

established immediately after Pearl Harbor.108

From time to time the SOS made proposals for merging the two systems at

various points in order to check the growing duplication of facilities. In November

1942, for example, the Chief of Transportation suggested that the AAF use his system of intransit depots behind the ports;

requisitions for Air Forces supplies would

be edited at the ports and AAF supply

records maintained there by a special staff

of Air officers; the AAF was offered "necessary safeguards to insure that the Commanding General, AAF is at all times in

102

 1st Ind cited n. 101(2). 103

 (1) Pencil note on 1st Ind cited n. 101. (2) For

the background of Air Corps aspirations, see Watson,

Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch. IX, and Craven and

Cate, AAF I, pp. 152-55. 104

 WD Memo W700-8-42, 10 Oct 42, sub: Sup of

Overseas Depts, Theaters, and Separate Bases, and

Change 1, 12 May 43. 105

 Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 4 Mar 43, Misc

Notes, Lutes File. 106

 Ibid. 107

 Memo, Lutes for DCofS, 9 Mar 43, Misc Notes,

Lutes File. 108

 (1) Memo, Lutes for ACofS Opns AAF, 31 Dec

42, Misc Notes, Lutes File. (2) See also ltr. Gross to

WSA, 17 Oct 42, WSA folder, OCT HB.
246 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

control of the movement of these supplies . . . ."

 109

 In a similar vein General

Lutes wrote to AAF headquarters:

We have a very simple overseas supply system which to date has operated with reason- able success—not perfectly, but in step with

the shipping facilities available. If you could

see your way clear to have your requirements

for overseas shipments which are not to be

forwarded by air screened through the Over- seas Supply Divisions of our ports, it would

greatly simplify coordination, and I believe

would be of better assistance to you in the

long run.110

But these and similar proposals faced into

the prevailing winds, which were carrying

Army organization toward separation, not

unification, of air and ground logistics.111

The organizational upheaval that followed the entrance of the United States

into the war had three main features: centralization of co-ordinating responsibilities

at the pinnacle and upper levels of the

structure, decentralization of supervisory

and operating functions, and consolidation

of these functions at intermediate rather

than lower levels. The same pattern has

often been followed by complex modern

societies under the impact of war. In the

system of logistical management that

emerged after Pearl Harbor, the largest,

most powerful concentration of authority

at the intermediate level was General

Somervell's Services of Supply, a large new

constellation in the organizational firmament. Into it were gathered in March 1942

almost all the War Department's executive

functions in the logistical sphere, and, in

addition, a miscellaneous assortment of

administrative functions that have only

rarely borne the label "logistical." The

union of all these disparate activities under

one command was not altogether happy,

and centrifugal forces soon came into

play; before the end of 1942 the flight of

jurisdiction to the Army Air Forces, a

more homogeneous organizational entity,

was well under way. Within the SOS, internal stresses appeared, such as the conflicts of purpose and method between the

representatives of supply and transportation. But, despite its heterogeneous composition, General Somervell's command

was from the first an aggressive and expansive organization. It clashed with the War

Shipping Administration in the effort to

gain more control over merchant shipping,

and waged bitter jurisdictional disputes—

outside the province of this study—with

the War Production Board and other

civilian agencies. The SOS also had a natural tendency to attempt to project the

interests and functions that it represented

into the upper levels of planning and coordination, demanding for them a form of

organizational representation at those

levels that would ensure their consideration as a distinct and independent factor

in strategy and policy. Hence the sharp

conflicts between Somervell's planning

staff and OPD, and the virtual elimination

(which proved temporary) of G-4 as a

potent influence in logistical planning.

Toward the end of 1942 the pressure of the

logistical "interest" in the upper realms of

planning was to pose a challenge to the

organization of the Joint and Combined

Committee systems and to the concept of

the subordinate role of logistics in strategic

planning upon which that organization

was based.112

109

 Paper, 20 Nov 42, sub: Proced for Shipt of Air

Force Sups Overseas, POE Gen Overseas Sup folder,

OCT HB. 110

 Memo cited n. 108(1). 111

 For efforts to unify naval and ground logistics,

see below, Ch. XXIV. 112

 See below, Ch. XXIV.
CHAPTER X

Lend-Lease as an Instrument

of Coalition Warfare

Momentarily, the reaction to Pearl Harbor left the future of lend-lease in doubt.

In an emergency action to assure that its

own needs would be met, the Army on the

night of 7 December 1941 stopped the

movement of all supplies to foreign governments. Axis propagandists trumpeted the

claim that American entrance into the

war meant the end of American supply

aid, and even the British showed alarm at

the course events were taking. But the

doubt was soon dispelled by an announcement by the President that U.S. entry into

the war would mean an increase, not a

stoppage or decrease, in lend-lease supplies. The Army continued during December to give first priority to its own

needs, but the existing schedules of lendlease releases were reviewed and many

shipments resumed. By the end of the year

it was clearly established that lend-lease

would continue; what remained to be determined was the extent to which the supply of Allied nations would be affected by

that of the U.S. Army, now that the latter

was engaged in active hostilities.1

Lend-lease in 1941 had been an instrument of economic warfare, based on the

theory that the United States could, solely

by furnishing supplies, enable other

powers to defeat the Axis. Pearl Harbor

put an end to this illusion. There was no

longer any question about the need for

large American armed forces to defeat the

Axis, but the United States also remained

the principal reservoir of industrial production for the entire coalition to which it

now belonged, and the need for American

munitions by the other Allied armed forces

continued as acute as before. Lend-lease

had now to be transformed into an instrument of coalition warfare, and some means

had to be found for allocating the growing output of American munitions to the

forces, including our own, that could use

them most effectively to win the war,

regardless of nationality.

The Munitions Assignments Board and

the Common Pool

During 1941 the prevailing military

thought had been that American resources

should be allocated entirely by Ameri1

 (1) Memo, Col V. V. Taylor for CofEngrs, 8 Dec

41, sub: Suspension of Def Aid Shipts, Misc Corresp

Lend-lease 4 file, DAD. (2) Telephone Convs Col

Taylor file, Bk. 1, DAD. (3) Memo, Col Aurand for

Gen Moore, 18 Dec 41, sub: Review of Trf Schedules,

Col Boone's file, Item 79, DAD. (4) Memo, Stettinius

for Hopkins, 8 Dec 41, MS Index to the Hopkins

Papers, Bk. VII, Lend-lease in Opn (1941), p. 4, Item

48. (5) Ltr, Stettinius to Hopkins, 9 Dec 41, MS Index

to the Hopkins Papers, Bk. V, FDR and HLH Actions

Post-Dec 7, p. 2, Item 6. (6) Cable, Harriman to Hopkins, 11 Dec 41, MS Index to the Hopkins Papers, Bk.

V, FDR and HLH Actions Post-Dec 7, p. 2, Item 7.

(7) Memo, DAD for Chiefs of SAS, 3 Jan 42, Misc

Corresp Lend-lease 1 file, DAD.
248 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

cans.2 After the rejection of the MarshallStark proposal of August 1941 to place

allocation of military materials under the

Joint Board, the question of a suitable organization remained in abeyance until

November when Harry Hopkins proposed

formation of a Strategic Munitions Board

to be composed of himself, the Chief of

Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations.

The President acted on this suggestion

immediately after Pearl Harbor, assigning

to the new board the functions of establishing programs for the allocation of munitions to the United States and defense

aid countries and of preparing a production program "to achieve sure and final

victory."

 3 The composition of the board

was to be entirely American, conforming

to the prevailing conception. It was also to

be directly responsible to the President,

indicating continuance of Roosevelt's close

personal supervision over distribution of

munitions.

The Strategic Munitions Board never

became more than a paper organization.

It never held a formal meeting, and, so far

as is known, played no part either in the

preparation of munitions allocation programs or in that of the Victory Program.

General Marshall delegated his functions

as a member to his deputy for supply,

General Moore. General Moore, acting

either in his capacity as a member of the

board or as a representative of the Chief

of Staff, and with the advice of G-4 and

WPD, made item-by-item decisions on release schedules prepared by the Defense

Aid Director, Colonel Aurand—continuing the practice in effect since October

1941.4

The Strategic Munitions Board had

been conceived while the United States

was still at peace and was not suited to the

needs of a coalition war to be fought in

close collaboration with Great Britain.

Discussions at the ARCADIA Conference

indicated that this collaboration would

include supply as well as strategic planning, and, in view of Britain's dependence

on American production, continuance of

munitions allocations on a unilateral basis

was soon ruled out. This was undoubtedly

the most important reason why the Strategic Munitions Board never functioned.

The partnership with the British was

already well advanced. There had been

staff conversations and an exchange of

staff missions before the United States entered the war. On the supply side the

British participated in the work of the Defense Aid Supply Committee and the Joint

Aircraft Committee, the bodies charged

with determination of the ground and air

force lend-lease programs, respectively. A

combined Victory Program was on the

planning boards, and the Consolidated

Balance Sheet provided for mutual exchange of production information. On the

supposition that America would meet a

considerable proportion of British military

supply requirements, Britain had gone

ahead to place a far higher proportion of

its available manpower in the armed services than would otherwise have been possible. American strategy, as far as it had

been developed, was predicated on the

existence of these British forces to be armed

with American matériel. In daily contacts

and mutual experience in dealing through

2

 See above, Ch. III. 3

 (1) Memo, President for SW, 8 Dec 41, Auth File

of President's Ltrs, DAD. (2) Memo, Gen Burns for

Hopkins, 24 Nov 41, MS Index to the Hopkins Papers,

Bk. V, Orgn of WSA, p. 1, Item 2. (3) On the Strategic Shipping Board created at the same time, see

above, Ch. IX. 4

 (1) Memo, Aurand for CofS, 13 Jan 42, sub: Def

Aid Trfs and Trf Schedules, Misc Stf Studies, Lendlease 2A file, DAD. (2) 1st Ind, Aurand to ACofS

G-4, 19 Dec 41, G-4/32697.
LEND-LEASE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF COALITION WARFARE 249

a committee system, a practical partnership was already being welded. It remained for the ARCADIA Conference to

formalize this partnership with permanent

arrangements for the combined direction

of a combined war effort.

The British were in a far better position

to take the lead in the development of

combined machinery, since their own national organizations for direction of the

war effort had already crystallized during

two years of war, while the Americans

were only beginning to fashion theirs. The

British came to ARCADIA with a plan

already drawn up for a system of combined organizations—a combined strategic planning organization for all the services (the CCS committee system); a

combined supply board to deal with production, the allocation of raw materials,

and so forth; a combined committee to

deal with the allocation of military matériel; a combined shipping committee; and

other combined bodies as the situation

might dictate.5 The Americans, with no

definite plan of their own, perforce accepted British leadership. But while they

recognized the soundness of the British

proposals, they feared that the British,

with superior experience and more mature

institutions of war direction, might gain

an undue predominance in combined

bodies. Consequently, they received the

British plan with a certain wariness.

This wariness was evident in the American approach to the problem of allocating

munitions. The first discussions of allocations took place between members of the

British and American staffs particularly

concerned with supply. Very early in the

conference a combined military supply

committee was informally set up, first designated as the Joint Planning Committee,

later as the Joint Supply Committee. The

committee soon assumed many of the

functions of the Strategic Munitions

Board. While it had no specific powers to

take action, it provided a forum for discussion and for agreements that could be carried out by the respective British and

American members acting within the

framework of their own national organizations.6

 Since its own existence was limited to the period of the ARCADIA Conference, it was almost inevitable that the

committee should give some attention to

the question of a permanent combined organization to carry on its work. The immediate issue that brought the problem to the

committee's attention was the submission

of parallel demands by the Dutch East

Indies to London and Washington. At the

meeting of 7 January, Lt. Gen. George N.

Macready of the British Joint Staff Mission reported that "pursuant to a high

level decision," all allocations to the

Netherlands Government would be determined in London. This, he said, would be

part of a larger scheme for the division of

the United Nations into proteges of either

the United States or Great Britain. The

British group would include all European

refugee governments, all parts of the British Empire, Egypt, and Turkey; the American group, the Latin American nations,

China, and Iceland. Allocations in Washington to the United Kingdom would include, in addition to her own needs,

requirements of the nations for which she

5

 (1) Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy,

pp. 389-93. (2) On the organizational development

on the American side, see above, Ch. IX. 6

 Min, Jt Plng Com mtg, 24 Dec 41, and Jt Sup

Com mtgs, 2, 7, and 12 Jan 42, ID, Lend-Lease, Doc

Suppl, II. Regular attendants for the U.S. were General Moore, Colonel Aurand, and Capt. Paul Hendren, USN; for the British, Lt. Gen. George N.

Macready and Brigadier Donald Campion. This committee functioned only for the duration of the

ARCADIA Conference.
250 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

assumed supply responsibility. Soviet allocations would continue to be based on the

joint protocol.

This proposal of the British took the

Americans by surprise, for they had heard

of no such high-level decision. In reality

there had been none. After a long discussion in which the Americans indicated

only a general agreement on the principle

of combined allocations, the matter was

tabled, but after the meeting General

Macready drew up a memorandum stating his conception of bulk allocations.7

 The

basic principle Macready put forward was

that equipment must be allocated according to the military situation and not "according to the origin of the order which

produces it." A careful reading of his

memorandum revealed, however, that he

proposed a combined allocation committee in Washington to make bulk allocations

to the British and their proteges out of

American production, but a War Office,

purely British, allocation committee in

London to divide up these bulk allocations, as well as British production, among

the Empire countries and the British

proteges.

Macready's memorandum received a

thorough review by War Department and

lend-lease officials. Nearly everyone

agreed that equipment must be allocated

in accordance with military need, but all

showed some suspicion of the British protege arrangement, and the War Department spokesmen in particular thought that

the pooling arrangement must extend to

British stocks as well as American. In his

formal reply to Macready General Moore

followed this line, expressing agreement on

the proposition that there should be combined committees to make allocations on

strategic principles but insisting that there

must be U.S. representation on the London committee as well as British representation on the one in Washington. Nevertheless, Moore raised no explicit objection

to the division of the world into protege

nations, and though this acceptance of the

British theory carried no official weight,

the British later acted on the supposition

that it did.8

A final decision could only be made at

a higher level, in the conferences of the

British and American Chiefs of Staff with

the Prime Minister and the President. Toward the very end of the ARCADIA Conference, in the meeting on 13 January 1942,

the British Chiefs proposed their scheme

for continuing collaboration. On the supply side, they suggested that the newly

formed CCS should "settle the broad programme of requirements based on strategic policy," and "from time to time issue

general directives laying down policy to

govern the distribution of available weapons of war." To give effect to these directives, combined allocation committees

should be formed to make allocations

between the United States and the British

Commonwealth, "each caring for the

needs of Allies for whom it has accepted

responsibility."

 9 The U.S. Chiefs were

cautious in committing themselves, insisting that they were not yet prepared to

enter into details, but they accepted the

general principle of CCS authority over

broad requirements programs and policy

7

 Memo, Gen Macready for Brig L. C. Hollis, 7 Jan

42, sub: Alloc of Finished Mil Equip to Allies, English Corresp Lend-lease 1 file, DAD. 8

 (1) For a digest of various views, see MS Index to

the Hopkins Papers, Bk. V, Estab of Jt Bds Dec-Feb

42, pp. 3-7, Item 13. (2) Ltr, Moore to Macready, 12

Jan 42, English Corresp Lend-lease 1 file, DAD.

Moore's letter was evidently drafted by Colonel

Aurand. 9

 Annex 1, memo, Br CsofS, 8 Jan 42, title: PostARCADIA Collaboration, to min, ABC-4 JCCSs-11, 13

Jan 42.
LEND-LEASE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF COALITION WARFARE 251

for strategic allocation, and a minute was

drafted for submission to the President and

Prime Minister, reading:

We, the combined US-British Chiefs of

Staff are agreed in principle that finished war

equipment shall be allocated in accordance

with strategic needs. We accordingly submit

that an appropriate body should be set up

under the authority of the CCS, in Washing- ton, and a corresponding body in London, for the purpose of giving effect to this prin- ciple.10

In the meeting of the military chiefs it

was clearly recognized that the allocation

agencies, of whatever composition, should

be responsible to and under the authority

of the CCS. Meanwhile Lord Beaverbrook, head of the British Ministry of Supply, had been urging a different scheme,

presumably with the support of Churchill.

The British Ministry of Supply was generally responsible for all procurement in

England and for allocation of raw materials and facilities. The British military did

not enter into the picture. Lord Beaverbrook proposed that an American counterpart of the British ministry be set up

under Harry Hopkins, directly responsible

to the President. A combined agency representing the two, with Hopkins as chairman, would then constitute a high command for supply independent of and on a

level with the CCS. Such an agency would

include within its purview long-range

plans for allocation of military equipment.11

Though President Roosevelt evidently

was not ready to accept Beaverbrook's

scheme in toto, his ideas about organization

for allocation of munitions were clearly

influenced by it. On the evening of 14 January 1942 the matter came up for final

decision in the last formal session of

ARCADIA at the White House. Before the

arrival of the rest of the conferees, General

Marshall had a brief meeting with the

President and Hopkins. Roosevelt read

Marshall a proposal for a munitions assignments board that would be responsible

directly to the President and the Prime

Minister and would have broad powers.

The board was to be divided into two

parts, one in Washington with Hopkins as

chairman, the other in London with

Beaverbrook as chairman. This confirmed

Marshall's worst fears, and when asked for

an opinion he informed the President that

unless the proposed munitions assignments

board were made responsible to the CCS

"he could not continue to assume the responsibilities of Chief of Staff."

 12

 No military organization, he thought, could

assume responsibility for operations if supplies essential to their conduct were not

placed under its control. The issue of civilian versus military control of munitions

allocations, the overtones of which had

been heard all through 1941, thus came to

a sudden and dramatic crisis. The President turned to ask Hopkins his opinion,

and Hopkins, evidently much to the surprise of both the President and his Chief of

Staff, gave his wholehearted support to

Marshall. Hopkins' attitude evidently decided the President, for when the rest of

the British and American representatives

arrived he presented the matter to them

much as Marshall had outlined it. It was

evidently a disappointment to Churchill

and Beaverbrook, who raised numerous

objections. Hopkins pointed out to them

that the way was open for an appeal to the

President and Prime Minister if political

matters were involved, and Churchill

finally agreed to try the system "for a

10

 Min, ABC-4 JCCSs-11, 13 Jan 42. 11

 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 470. 12

 Ibid., p. 471-72; quote is from p. 472.
252 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

month." The President closed the discussion by saying, "We will call it a preliminary agreement and try it out that way."

 13

So the issue was decided, and the preliminary agreement never came up for reconsideration. The Munitions Assignments

Boards, Washington and London, responsible to the CCS in Washington, became

the agencies that were to control allocation

of finished munitions throughout the war.

A joint public announcement of their formation was made by the President and

Prime Minister on 26 January 1942, prefaced by a statement of the theory behind

their operations: "The entire munitions

resources of the United States and Great

Britain will be deemed to be in a common

pool, about which the fullest information

will be interchanged."

 14

The establishment of the Munitions

Assignments Boards was a logical corollary, on the supply side, of the principle of

combined strategic direction of the war

effort by the CCS. Some machinery was

necessary to assure a continuing relationship between allocation of supplies and

agreed strategy, and the assignments

boards were to serve that purpose admirably. What the abstract principle of the

common pool of munitions would mean in

practice remained yet to be determined.

Since the United States would ultimately

put far more into the pool than Britain, it

was inevitable that the British should become the proponents of the pooling theory

and that the Americans should view it

with misgivings. The actual principles

under which allocations would be made

had necessarily to be worked out after

manifold differences in the British and

American approaches were resolved. For

this reason the decision to limit the scope

of the Munitions Assignments Boards

solely to military materials proved a wise

one. Within these limits Anglo-American

co-operation was to prove possible, but it

turned out to be not so feasible when extended to the broader area of over-all production planning, along the lines that

Beaverbrook had evidently intended.

As to the relationship of other nations

to the London and Washington boards, the

Roosevelt-Churchill announcement said:

"Members of the Board will confer with

representatives of the USSR, China and

such others of the United Nations as are

necessary to attain common purposes and

provide for the most effective utilization of

the joint resources of the United Nations."

 15

 In truth the boards were, like the

CCS, instruments of Anglo-American policy, and the other United Nations were

left on the periphery. Of the various Allies,

only China ever raised the issue of membership on the Washington board, and it

was refused on the basis that only nations

with a disposable surplus should be represented.16

 Undoubtedly this was only a half

truth. The real reason was that neither the

British nor the Americans wanted to create an unwieldy body where conflicts of

many varying interests would make action

impossible. Of all the other United Nations only the USSR really had the greatpower status that entitled her to consideration, and by virtue of the protocol, which

made allocations to her subject to arrange13

 (1) Ibid., p. 472. (2) Notes on informal confs held

during visit of Br CsofS in Washington, conf at White

House, 14 Jan 42, WDCSA 334. 14

 Jt Declaration, President and Churchill, 26 Jan

42, ID, Lend-Lease, Doc Suppl, II. 15

 Ibid. 16

 (1) OPD Diary, 24 Apr 42 entry, OPD Hist Unit

File. (2) Memo, Aurand for McCloy, 27 Apr 42, sub:

Mtg of 28 Apr re China Proced, China Lend-lease 2

file, DAD.
LEND-LEASE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF COALITION WARFARE 253

ments transcending the powers of the

boards, the USSR occupied a unique position. The Russians preferred to keep their

relations on this plane.

As for the other nations, the British

clung to their scheme of bulk allocations

and protégés. The United States never formally accepted this procedure. Hopkins

informed General Burns shortly after the

formation of the Washington board: "I

think it should be clearly understood that

the memorandum prepared by MacCready . . . and gone over by General

Moore does not necessarily have to be our

bible."

 17

 Yet during the first year of the

Washington board's operations, it followed

this system in practice to a considerable

degree, for it conformed generally to the

manner in which allocations had been

handled during 1941 and to the division

of strategic responsibility between the two

countries as agreed afterward.

Organization of the MAB and Its Committees

The announcement by the President

and Prime Minister laid down only the

very broad outlines for the munitions assignments machinery. The details were

left to the CCS and the two governments

concerned. The CCS issued a charter for

the Munitions Assignments Board in

Washington (MAB) on 4 February 1942,

assigning it functions as follows:

2. Working in close collaboration with the

corresponding London organization the

Board will maintain full information of the

entire munitions resources of Great Britain

and the United States and translate such re- sources into terms of combat forces and their

material reserves. It will . . . keep the esti- mate up-to-date in the light of war develop- ments and also of variations in production

achievements and prospects . . . in order

that the CCS may be fully informed and recommend the measures necessary to keep

planned requirements programs in line with:

a. strategic policy;

b. changing operational conditions in

their effect on war material; and

c. the realities of production.

3. Under such strategic policies, directives

and priorities as have been approved, and in

accordance with agreements with the corre- sponding London organization, the Board

will be responsible for making assignments of

the stocks and production of finished war

material to the United States and Great

Britain and to others of the United Nations.18

The membership of the MAB, with

Harry Hopkins as chairman, consisted of

representatives of the U.S. Ground Forces,

Air Forces, and Navy, with their British

opposite numbers. The U.S. representatives at first were General Moore, Admiral

William H. Standley, and General Harmon; the British, Lt. Gen. H. C. B.

Wemyss, Admiral Sir Charles J. C. Little,

and Air Marshal Douglas C. S. Evill.19 A

permanent staff and a secretariat were

formed on a combined basis with General

Burns as executive officer. The staff was at

first divided into four parts, Army, Navy,

Air, and Statistical, but other sections were

added later as necessary for efficient operations. This staff, under the direction of

General Burns, was responsible for preparation for meetings, examination of proposed assignments, execution of the decisions of the board, liaison with appropriate

civilian agencies, and maintenance of nec17

 Memo, Hopkins for Burns, 12 Feb 42, MS Index

to the Hopkins Papers, Bk. V, Estab of Jt Bds DecFeb42, p. 11, Item 18 (b). 18

 CCS 19/1, 4 Feb 42, title: Order Estab MAB.

Hereafter MAB will refer only to the Munitions

Assignments Board in Washington. The London

Munitions Assignments Board will be abbreviated

LMAB. 19

 CCS 19/1 cited n. 18. Admiral Joseph M. Reeves

replaced Admiral Standley as the U.S. naval member

on 11 February 1942.
254 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

essary statistics on combined requirements

and resources.20

In order to utilize the detailed information at the command of the individual

services, the board directed the formation

of three committees, a Munitions Assignments Committee (Navy) for naval materials, a Munitions Assignments Committee (Air) for air materials, and a Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground)

for ground materials (MAC(N), MAC(A),

and MAC(G)). The board stipulated that

these three main committees should have

British membership, but left their detailed

composition to the service departments

concerned. Accordingly, the War Department organized the Air and Ground Committees. As originally organized, Brig.

Gen. Henry S. Aurand, Defense Aid

Director, was chairman of the MAC(G),

with membership from WPD and the

British Army Staff; General Harmon,

Chief of the Air Staff, was chairman of the

MAC(A), with membership from the AAF

and RAF.21 In practice the three committees did all the detailed work of preparing

assignment schedules, working frequently

through subcommittees of their own. The

MAB acted largely as a court of appeals

when agreements could not be reached in

the committees, and as a policy-determining body, subject always to further appeal

to the CCS in case of dissent. Nevertheless,

all assignments had to be formally approved by the board before they became

effective.

The London Munitions Assignments

Board (LMAB) was organized in the same

general manner.22 Its allocations included,

in addition to British production, material

assigned to the British by the Washington

board and critical items of Empire production. In contrast to the policy in Washington where the MAB assigned all military items right down to single rifles for

test purposes, the British classified equipment as assignable and nonassignable,

subjecting only critical items to the assignments procedure. Items not in short

supply were merely allocated by War

Office agencies. The committees of the

London board were also allowed to make

final assignments where there was no dissent, and the LMAB met only on occasions where a dissent required its decision

rather than regularly as did the board in

Washington. Since American bids against

British production were never of large

proportions, the combined aspects of the

LMAB's operations were never so important as those of the Washington board. It

concerned itself primarily with allocations

to the nations of the British Empire, those

assumed to be within the British sphere of

responsibility, various agencies of the British Government, and theaters of operations in British areas of responsibility—all

matters that, during 1942, the Americans

were satisfied to leave under British control. The LMAB also acted as the parent

board for certain Empire assignments

committees set up in Australia and India

during the progress of the war.23

A special word needs to be added about

Canada. It was tentatively agreed that

20

 Tab D, Orgn of Stf of MAB, to memo, Aurand

for CofS, 11 Feb 42, sub: Dir for MAB, ID 020, ID

Orgn and Functions. 21

 (1) Ltr, Hopkins to SW, 9 Feb 42. (2) Ltr, SW to

Hopkins, 19 Feb 42. Both in Orgn MAB file, DAD.

Brig. Gen. R. W. Crawford of WPD and Brig. Donald Campion of the British Army Staff were the

original members of MAC(G). 22

 The charter of LMAB is War Cabinet Paper

LMAB (42) 1, 25 Mar 42, sub: LMAB, ID, LendLease, Doc Suppl, II.

Col. Erle M. Wilson was the first U.S. executive of

the LMAB but was succeeded later by Maj. Gen.

James K. Crain. 23

 See ID, Lend-Lease, I, 166-76.
LEND-LEASE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF COALITION WARFARE 255

Canadian production should fall under

the jurisdiction of the Washington board.

But in practice only the part of it that had

been contracted for by the U.S. Government through the agency of War Supplies

Limited, a subsidiary corporation of the

Canadian Department of Munitions and

Supply, was ever so assigned. The Canadians soon established a Munitions Assignments Committee of their own in

Ottawa, with representation from both the

United Kingdom and the United States.

The Canadian committee was more useful

as a link between the civilian Department

of Munitions and Supply and the Canadian armed forces than as an agency for

making allocations on a strategic basis. An

American observer noted in October 1942

that needs of the Canadian armed forces

got top priority and that for the rest the

committee made assignments in keeping

with contractual obligations rather than

strategic considerations. The Canadian

committee was not, except perhaps in

theory, under the authority of either of the

other boards or of the CCS.24 (Chart 5)

Other Combined Boards: A Summary View

The machinery for munitions assignments was but one part of the combined

Anglo-American organization for supply

Collaboration. The President and Prime

Minister on 26 January 1942 also announced the formation of a Combined

Raw Materials Board and a Combined

Shipping Adjustment Board (CSAB). The

raw materials board was to make plans

for development, expansion, and use of

raw materials of the two nations, and to

make recommendations to the various

agencies of the British and American Governments for execution of such plans. The

shipping board would "adjust and concert

in one harmonious policy the work of the

British Ministry of War Transport and the

shipping authorities of the United States

Government."

 25

 In principle, American

and British shipping would be pooled, but

in practice the pool would be divided into

two parts in keeping with the geographical situation, one part to be administered

in London, the other in Washington, each

under the control of the national authorities concerned. The CSAB would recommend the interchanges necessary for the

most effective utilization of shipping from

both pools.26

The British had envisaged a combined

organization for production planning as

the real hub of the whole system of combined boards, but no such organization

was set up at ARCADIA, evidently because

the Americans had not yet developed their

own national organization. But since this

gap in the combined machinery was recognized on both sides, the President and

Prime Minister on 9 June 1942 announced

the establishment of a Combined Production and Resources Board (CPRB) composed of Donald Nelson, chairman of

WPB, and Sir Oliver Lyttelton, British

Minister of Production. The CPRB was

assigned the broad function of combining

the production programs of the United

States and United Kingdom into a single

integrated program, adjusted to strategic

requirements of the war as indicated by

the CCS and to all relevant production

factors. On the same day a Combined

Food Board was added to "obtain a

24

 (1) Ibid., I, 185-92. (2) Memo, Maj William S.

Gaud for Actg Dir ID, 18 Oct 42, sub: Asgmt of

Canadian Pdn Allocated in Ottawa to War Sups Limited, ID, Lend-Lease, Doc Suppl, III. 25

 Jt Declaration cited n. 14. 26

 Ibid.

LEND-LEASE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF COALITION WARFARE 257

planned and expeditious utilization of the

food resources of the United Nations."

 27

These two boards completed the setup

of combined agencies, and with their addition the structure came to resemble closely

the blueprint the British had brought to

Washington in December 1941. Boards for

raw materials, resources and production,

food, munitions assignments, and shipping covered virtually the entire war

effort. Nevertheless, the civilian combined

boards were never to play the role in

directing the war effort that the British

had hoped they would. The Americans,

with far greater resources at their disposal,

proved reluctant to place too many powers

in their hands. The British, for their part,

too frequently looked on the boards as

mechanisms for increasing the flow of

American aid. Only the Munitions Assignments Boards, responsible to the CCS,

had express powers to make allocations of

the materials under their jurisdiction. The

other combined boards had no express

powers of their own; they were responsible

to the President and Prime Minister

directly, and could only make recommendations to be acted on by the agencies

of the governments concerned. Their

powers derived in the end largely from the

fact that membership of each board normally consisted of only two persons, the

heads of the respective British and American agencies concerned, or their deputies.

The boards thus served mainly to give a

formal institutional status to the consultation and collaboration between British

and American officials on the economic

front that was continuous throughout the

war. The Combined Raw Materials Board

was the only one that had any measure of

success in fulfilling the functions assigned

it as a board. The others, after an ambitious start in 1942, gradually declined in

power and prestige. Yet, despite their

failure as genuine international bodies,

they gave at least a semblance of reality to

the common pool as applied to the total

resources of the United States and the

British Commonwealth of Nations.28

The Principle of Reciprocal Aid

As far as the common pool was a reality, lend-lease served as the mechanism

whereby allied nations could draw on

American resources without money payments; its obverse, reverse lend-lease or

reciprocal aid, served as an equally convenient instrument by which the United

States could draw on the resources of

Great Britain and other allies. While supplies and services received by the United

States under reciprocal aid were never

comparable in volume to lend-lease aid

given, they frequently involved greater

sacrifices from nations far less rich. They

were of vital importance in effecting economies in shipping for the support of American forces overseas.

The provision in the Lend-Lease Act

that benefits to accrue to the United States

might be "payment or repayment in kind

or property, or any other direct or indirect

benefit the President deems satisfactory,"

27

 Report to the 78th Congress on Lend-Lease Operations

From the Passage of the Act, March 11, 1941, to December

31, 1942, submitted by Edward R. Stettinius, App.

VIII. 28

 (1) For an analysis of the work of the civilian

combined boards from the American point of view,

see S. McKee Rosen, The Combined Boards of World

War II (New York, Columbia University Press, 1951).

(2) For a British view of the boards, see H. Duncan

Hall and C. C. Wrigley, Studies of Overseas Supply,

a volume in preparation for the British series HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, first

draft, Chs. V-VI. This draft is located in the Historical Branch, Cabinet Office, London.
258 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

furnished the legal basis for reciprocal

aid.29 The President authorized receipt of

supplies under this clause in May 1941,

but application before Pearl Harbor was

limited. The British furnished special

equipment for defense of the Panama

Canal, and installations and supplies were

taken over from them when American

forces occupied bases in Iceland and the

Caribbean. The principle also served as a

convenient means by which components

produced on British contracts in the

United States could be used interchangeably with American components in production of tanks, planes, and other munitions.30

After Pearl Harbor, as American troops

moved overseas to Australia, New Zealand, the Pacific islands, and England,

reciprocal aid soon became a matter of

much greater importance. In England it

was at first largely a matter of taking over

British installations and using British

transportation and other services. Meanwhile, in Australia and New Zealand, a

much broader application of reciprocal

aid was taking shape with American

troops drawing on local resources for most

of their food and much of their clothing

and other expendable supplies. This Australian pattern was soon extended to the

British Isles as the number of American

troops there was increased. As early as

31 January 1942, the War Department issued instructions to overseas commanders

to receive "supplies, equipment or facilities" under reverse lend-lease,31

 but this

directive was limited in scope and framed

to apply largely to the taking over of facilities in England that were evacuated by

British troops. Basing its action on the developing pattern in the Pacific, the WarDepartment issued more positive instructions in June and July 1942, authorizing

theater commanders to make arrangements under reciprocal aid for "any services, facilities, supplies or equipment" that

in their discretion could reasonably be

made available by the local government

concerned.32

To systematize these overseas procurement activities, the War Department

authorized the establishment of a General

Purchasing Board in Australia in February 1942, and one in England in May.33

These organizations, particularly the Australian, became the models for those to be

organized in other theaters. As far as possible, local procurement in overseas areas

was centralized in the hands of the general purchasing organizations and con- ducted by agencies of the government

concerned. Reciprocal aid became largely

a theater matter, the War Department's

role being confined to general co-ordination, over-all record keeping, and establishment of general policies and procedures. But since overseas procurement

had to be fitted into general requirements

planning, procedures were established in

late 1942 for quarterly forecasts from each

29

 Sec 3b. 30

 (1) International Division, ASF, History of Reciprocal Aid, 9 May 1941-31 December 1945, MS,

p. 4, OCMH. (2) Ltr, President to SW, 9 May 41, ID,

History of Reciprocal Aid, Doc Suppl, OCMH. (3)

Ltr, C. E. I. Jones, Br Purch Comm, to Capt C. H.

Dyson, DAD, 14 Nov 41, English Corresp Lend-lease

2 file, DAD. (4) Related papers in same file and in

English Corresp Lend-lease 4 file, DAD. 31

 TAG ltr to all comds, 31 Jan 42, sub: Trf of Property From Foreign Govts to U.S. Army Forces in

Overseas Theaters and Separate Bases, AG 400.3295

(1-21-42). 32

 (1) TAG ltr to maj comds and mil mis's, 22 Jun

42, sub: Trf of Property From Foreign Govts to U.S.

Army Forces in Overseas Theaters and Separate

Bases, AG 400.3295 (1-21-42). (2) Backing papers in

same file and in G-4/33940 and G-4/32697-21. (3)

Msg, AGWAR to all overseas comds, 14 Jul 42, Reciprocal Aid Dirs file, ID. (4) See below, Ch. XVIII. 33

 See above, Ch. VII.
LEND-LEASE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF COALITION WARFARE 259

theater of prospective reciprocal aid transfers.34

While reciprocal aid was at first based

largely on informal arrangements, these

were soon ratified by formal diplomatic

agreements. The Master Lend-Lease

Agreements signed with each of the lendlease beneficiaries contained the pledge

that each would "contribute to the defense

of the United States . . . and . . . provide such articles, services, facilities or

information as it may be in a position to

supply."

 35

 More specific reciprocal aid

agreements were signed with the United

Kingdom (to include her colonial empire),

Australia, New Zealand, and the Free

French on 3 September 1942.36 While the

United States could never complain about

the implementation of these reciprocal aid

agreements in the United Kingdom itself,

or in Australia and New Zealand, there

were difficulties in various parts of the

British colonial empire where officials did

not understand them as well. There were

also difficulties about valuation since the

United States insisted on a strict accounting and the British maintained it would

require too much time and manpower.

These, however, were matters of detail. In

general, by September 1942 when the

final agreements were signed, reciprocal

aid had already become the corollary of

lend-lease as an instrument of supply collaboration among the various United

Nations.

Adjustment of Lend-Lease Procedure to

Combined Arrangements

The decision on the common pool of

munitions represented the attainment of

the goal the War Department had set up

in 1941—a consolidated production program for the United States and foreign aid

with distribution on the basis of strategic

necessity. The old lend-lease procedure

had to be adapted to this new arrangement. It involved a new system of appropriations, a redefinition of relations between the War Department and the Office

of Lend-Lease Administration, and a consolidation of control of lend-lease requirements for Army materials within the War

Department and of allocations under the

new combined agencies. It marked a separation of military lend-lease from its

civilian counterpart, the former now coming under direct control of the War Department and the CCS, the latter remaining under OLLA.

Before 7 December 1941 the War

Department had suggested a solution to

the appropriations problem—consolidation of Army and lend-lease funds with

only a dollar value limitation on transfers

under lend-lease. This solution, rejected

by the House of Representatives in November 1941, was accepted with little dissent after Pearl Harbor. The Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1942, was passed on

26 December 1941 and provided that

materials to the value of $2 billion could

be furnished out of Army stocks for lend34

 ID, History of Reciprocal Aid, pp. 7-10, 19-22,

OCMH. 35

 In all, thirty-five nations entered into formal

Master Lend-Lease Agreements with the United

States. The agreement with the United Kingdom

(which included her colonial empire) was signed 23

February 1942, that with China, 2 June 1942, and

with the USSR, 11 June 1942. For the text of the

agreement with the United Kingdom (substantially

the same as that for all the others with the exception

of certain special clauses in those with the Latin

American republics), see ID, Lend-Lease, Doc Suppl,

II. For discussion, see ID, Lend-Lease, I, 49-55. 3 6 ID, History of Reciprocal Aid, Doc Suppl,

OCMH. No separate lend-lease agreements were

made with Australia and New Zealand, but they accepted the principles of the U.K. Master Agreement.
260 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

lease. It established a precedent, and,

until the end of the war, funds for both

U.S. Army and lend-lease items to be procured by the War Department were

packaged together with dollar value limitations on lend-lease transfers. A similar

system of appropriations was adopted for

the Navy Department and the Maritime

Commission. The over-all limitation on

dollar values for War Department articles

reached a total of $32,170,000,000 by the

end of the war, far in excess of the value

of goods actually transferred.37 Little more

need be said of these financial arrangements beyond the fact that appropriations

for civilian lend-lease continued to be

made as before and administered by

OLLA. The appropriations made to the

War Department were entirely adequate

and served the desired purpose, making

possible a consolidated production program from which allocations were made

by the Munitions Assignments Board.

Beyond the announcement of the formation of the Munitions Assignments

Board by the President, and the financial

arrangements set up by Congress, there

was no further action by either to place

the new system in operation. Exact adjustments between the War Department and

OLLA had to be worked out on an administrative basis. OLLA retained the

only powers the President had delegated

to authorize transfer and export, and

proved somewhat reluctant to restrict its

activities solely to civilian materials. For

some time OLLA officials continued to

negotiate with foreign representatives on

military requirements and to needle the

War Department in various ways. But,

after protracted negotiations, the LendLease Administration on 9 April 1942

finally delegated to the Secretary of War

authority to authorize transfer and export

of military lend-lease material, "subject to

the policies and directives of the President

or the Combined Munitions Assignments

Board."

 38

This delegation of powers formally put

the new arrangements into effect. In addition to production under lend-lease and

War Department appropriations, materials under foreign contracts were also

brought into the consolidated production

pool as far as possible by changing financing to a lend-lease basis. While this took

time and involved difficult financial and

legal complications, it meant that the

single munitions production program

under unified direction had at last become

a reality.39

The Office of Lend-Lease Administration remained the central agency for lendlease accounting, for laying down broad

policy outside the strategic sphere, and for

planning lend-lease programs in support

of the civilian economy of beneficiary nations. For military lend-lease, OLLA's

functions were reduced to those of a legal

or accounting nature.40 There naturally

remained many areas in which the military and civilian agencies had mutual interests, and jurisdiction was difficult to

define. It was not always possible to completely separate military and civilian supply. Many items, such as trucks and railroad equipment, were of a dual nature. 37

 ID, Lend-Lease, I, 538-41. 38

 (1) Memo, Aurand for McCloy, 30 Jan 42, sub:

Clarification of Status of WD With Respect to OLLA,

Orgn MAB file, DAD. (2) Ltr, McCloy to Stettinius,

31 Jan 42, Proced 1 file, DAD. (3) Ltr, Thomas B.

McCabe, Deputy Lend-Lease Admin, to SW, 9 Apr

42, ID 400.318, I. 39

 (1) Ltr, Morgenthau to Stimson, 20 Mar 42. (2)

Ltr, Stimson to Morgenthau, 3 Apr 42. Both in

MAC(G) Misc Corresp file, ID. 40

 The problems of lend-lease accounting are

treated at some length in ID, Lend-Lease, I, 667-759.

Pertinent documents are mainly in the Misc Corresp

Lend-lease DAD and ID 008 series.
LEND-LEASE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF COALITION WARFARE 261

Machine tools, while not strictly speaking

a military item, had always been procured

by the Ordnance Department. Agreements had to be reached as to who should

make budget estimates and procure these

doubtful items. After considerable controversy, these matters were generally settled

through the Procurement Policy Board of

WPB. Sometimes, as in the case of medical supplies, the War Department continued to act as a procurement agency for

OLLA under the old requisition system.41

In overseas areas, OLLA maintained

representatives concerned with lend-lease

and reciprocal aid matters and, except in

Australia, the theater commanders' control over them was never so complete as

the War Department desired. Despite

these overlapping areas, the broad principle of division of lend-lease into military

and civilian segments under different lines

of control was established. Henceforth,

foreign requirements for military articles

would be presented directly to the War

Department and consolidated with the

Army's requirements program; assignments of military material would be made

exclusively by the authority of the MAB.

Readjustments in War Department Organization and Procedure

New procedures for military lend-lease

aimed at making contact between the War

Department and foreign representatives

"as direct and simple as possible" were

announced on 2 March 1942.42 Requirements for common articles—those standard to the U.S. Army—were to be submitted to the Defense Aid Director for

inclusion in the Army Supply Program

(ASP), but acceptance would carry no

guarantee of delivery to the nation for

which the requirement was established.

Assignments of finished articles, when

produced, would be made by the Munitions Assignments Committee (Air or

Ground) subject to approval by the MAB.

Requirements for noncommon articles—

those produced to foreign specifications—

were to be submitted to the Defense Aid

Supply Committee in the case of ground

munitions and to the Joint Aircraft Committee in that of air materials, for determination as to feasibility of procurement.

If procurement were ruled feasible, transfer to the requesting nation would normally be automatic as the materials came

off the production line.43

The Office of the Defense Aid Director

under General Aurand continued to be

the administrative center for War Department lend-lease activities and the point of

contact for foreign representatives. It furnished the chairman and secretariat for

both the MAC(G) and the Defense Aid

Supply Committee, collected and consolidated international aid requirements,

issued the necessary directives for procurement, transfer, and shipment, and exercised co-ordination over the lend-lease

activities of the various supply services

and the home offices of the lend-lease missions overseas.44

 Yet the independent

status of the Office of the Defense Aid Director and its diffuse lines of responsibility

were better adapted to the method of operations of 1941 than to the new conception of a consolidated supply program.

41

 See long, involved correspondence in the Misc

Corresp Lend-lease (1942) DAD and ID 008 Requisitions series. 42

 Ltr, ASW to Morris Wilson, Chm Br Sup Council in N America, 2 Mar 42, ID, Lend-Lease, Doc

Suppl, II. 43

 Ibid. 44

 (1) On the evolution of this lend-lease machinery

during 1941, see above, Ch. III. (2) Memo, Aurand

for McCloy, 5 Feb 42, sub: Orgn and Functions of

ODAD, ID 020 (321) ID Orgn.
262 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

General Somervell from the time he became G-4 in early December 1941 felt

that co-ordination of military lend-lease

operations by a separate War Department

agency posed a constant threat to U.S.

Army interests. "The whole trouble with

Defense Aid in the beginning," he wrote

some time later, was that "it was an entirely separate and uncoordinated outfit

without any knowledge of, or interest in,

the supply problem as a whole."

 45

 When

the War Department reorganization was

finally accomplished in March 1942, General Aurand's office was one of the many

scattered supply agencies brought into

Somervell's sprawling SOS empire. While

Aurand had long been a proponent of

consolidation of supply responsibility

within the War Department along the

very lines the reorganization took, he

played little part in the direct chain of

events leading to it, and the net effect was

to reduce the prestige and importance of

the office of which he was the head.46 The

realignment of lend-lease organization

and procedure that followed was a matter

of fitting them into what Somervell conceived to be their proper place within the

new machinery for military supply.

The Office of the Defense Aid Director

was incorporated into the SOS on 9

March 1942 with no change in its organization or functions except that matters

pertaining to lend-lease of air materials

were turned over to the Army Air Forces.

It was redesignated the International

Division on 9 April 1942 and continued

under that name for the rest of the war.

Two studies were made of the division's

activities during the summer of 1942 by

the Control Division of Headquarters,

SOS, and by October it had been generally integrated into the SOS organization.47

 It was the contention of General

Aurand, who remained head of the International Division until mid-July 1942,

and of his principal subordinates, that the

division must be kept intact and on a high

level within the War Department in order

to preserve the principle of centralization

of lend-lease activities and to avoid giving

any impression to our allies that lend-lease

had ceased to be important. On leaving

the division, Aurand went so far as to suggest that it should be returned to the general supervision of the Assistant Secretary

of War. Somervell dismissed this as a case

of special pleading. He placed the International Division under General Clay,

Assistant Chief of Staff for Materiel, some

two steps lower in the echelons of the War

Department than it had been as an independent agency. The functions of the division as defined in early September 1942,

however, differed little from those set forth

in the initial directive establishing the organization of the SOS.48

Nevertheless, integration into the SOS

inevitably brought closer control over

both lend-lease requirements and assignments by those responsible for supply of

the U.S. Army. Long-range requirements

for both the Army and lend-lease were

consolidated in the Army Supply Program, formulated and administered by

the Requirements Division, SOS. From 45

 Memo, Somervell for Clay, 27 Jul 42, Hq ASF

folder, ID. 46

 See memo, Aurand for Somervell, 24 Jan 42, sub:

Army Supply Program, MAB Orgn file, DAD. 47

 (1) SOS GO 4, 9 Apr 42. (2) Cont Div rpts in ID

020 (321) ID Orgn. 48

 (1) Memo, Aurand for Clay, 18 Jun 42, sub:

Place of ID in Orgn. (2) Memo, unsigned, for Lt Col

John B. Franks, Actg Dir ID, no date. (3) Related

papers. All in ID 020 (321) ID Orgn. (4) Memo,

Aurand for Somervell, 18 Jul 42, sub: Rpt at Time of

Leaving ID, Hq ASF folder, ID. (5) Memo cited n.

45. (6) Services of Supply Organization Manual, 30

Sep 42, ASF files. (7) Cf. par. 9i of ltr, CG SOS to

Chiefs of SAS et al., 9 Mar 42, sub: Initial Dir for the

Orgn of SOS, Hq ASF, with memo, Dir ID for all br

and sec chiefs, 12 Sep 42, ID 020, ID Orgn and Functions.
LEND-LEASE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF COALITION WARFARE 263

the start, Somervell and Clay sought to

limit lend-lease procurement to articles

approved in the ASP and to reduce nonprogram demands to a minimum. In the

small but troublesome area of noncommon items, which at first were not included in the ASP, the Defense Aid Supply Committee had formal authority. But

by early 1942 this committee had stopped

holding regular meetings, and its work

was largely performed by Aurand's office

in consultation with subcommittees in

supply services, each normally composed

of one British and one American representative. Somervell found these subcommittees too free in their use of raw materials and moved to place them under

Stricter control. The Defense Aid Supply

Committee was reconstituted as the International Supply Committee (ISC), and its

formal approval was required before procurement of any item not listed in the

ASP could be undertaken. The British retained membership on the new committee

and General Aurand continued as chairman, but the voting members on the

American side came from Clay's office,

from the Production Division, SOS, and

from OPD. Foreign requests for special

procurement encountered a very "tough"

attitude in the new ISC, against which

Aurand's protests were in vain.49

The powers of the International Supply

Committee were broadened to include

cognizance of nonprogram requirements

for common items and revisions of the

lend-lease part of the ASP. At least in

theory, it became responsible for all international aid requirements. In September

1942 the clear distinction between common and noncommon item procedures

was considerably modified. All requisitions for noncommon items previously approved by the ISC were incorporated in a

separate section of the September revision

of the ASP (Section VI). Since bids for

these items were frequently received from

several different lend-lease nations, they

were subjected to assignment by MAC(G)

and automatic transfer was stopped except in cases where the ISC specifically

stipulated it in approving procurement.50

On the assignments side, the SOS took

the position that, except in exceptional circumstances, allocations of finished equipment should never exceed accepted requirements. A Requirements Division,

SOS, member was added to MAC(G) in

April, and General Somervell himself

became a member of the MAB in August.

The chairman and secretariat for MAC(G)

came from the International Division and,

working with subcommittees in the supply services, collected the basic data on

which the recommendations of MAC(G)

to the board were made. The chairman of

MAC(G) acted as sponsor for the bids of

all nations, except those of the British,

before the committee. Since the MAB in

95 percent of the cases followed these

recommendations, the extent to which the

SOS was therefore able to determine assignments on an administrative basis is

apparent, once the International Division

was made a truly integrated part of its organization.51

 Nevertheless, it must be kept

in mind that the basic principle on which

assignments were made was that of strate49

 (1) Memo, Aurand for Somervell, 8 Mar 42, sub:

Mtg With Def Aid Sup Com and Subcom Members,

10 Mar 42, MAB Orgn file, DAD. (2) Memo, Aurand

for Somervell, 23 Apr 42, sub: International Supply

Committee, ID, Lend-Lease, Doc Suppl, II. (3)

Memo, Aurand for Chiefs of Sup Svs, 19 May 42, sub:

Procurement of Lend-lease Spot Items, Misc Corresp

Lend-lease 5 file, DAD. (4) Memo cited n. 48 (4). (5)

Memo cited n. 45. 50

 (1) Rpt, Contl Div SOS, 20 Aug 42, sub: Proced

Rpt on ID, ID 020 (321) ID Orgn. (2) Memo, Col

John B. Franks for br chiefs ID, 10 Sep 42, sub: Proced

ISC MAC(G), ID 008 Lend-lease, I. (3) Min 933, 52d

mtg MAC(G), 1 Oct 42. 51

 Rpt cited n. 50(1).
264 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

gic necessity and that the governing policies emanated from the MAB, the CCS,

and the political heads of state in Great

Britain and the United States. Even on

the American side of MAC(G), the OPD

member exerted a powerful influence

whenever critical items or strategic policies were concerned. Also, the British were

represented at every step in the assignments process and retained the right of

appeal to the MAB and CCS.

The supply services remained the actual

operating agencies, responsible for the

procurement and distribution of lendlease materials. Neither General Aurand

nor the Control Division was happy about

the supply services' general organization

for and handling of lend-lease. Most of

their inadequacy, Aurand thought, could

be traced to the fact that the international

supply officers in the services were on too

low an echelon and frequently could not

give their full time to lend-lease. Combined with what Aurand characterized as

"a human desire to equip our own forces

in preference to those of foreigners," this

circumstance resulted in the "failure of the

supply services to take proper interest and

assign sufficient personnel to their LendLease activities."

 52

 To remedy this situation, General Clay had the International

Division prepare instructions clearly defining the services' responsibilities for procurement, transfer, and movement. In

addition, each supply service was ordered

to set up an international aid branch or

division to devote its full time to lend-lease

activities. Thereafter improvement in the

handling of lend-lease at the operating

level was rapid.53

By mid-October 1942 the SOS procedures for handling procurement, transfer,

and export of War Department lend-lease

materials had taken a sufficiently final

form to permit codification. Long-range

requirements, whether for common or

noncommon items, would be presented to

the International Division sixty days

before the semiannual revision of the ASP.

The International Aid Branch of the service concerned would screen each request

for need, suitability of the item, availability of materials, availability of production

facilities, and possibility of substitution of

a standard item if the request was for a

noncommon one. On the basis of the review in the supply service, the ISC would

then make a final recommendation to the

Requirements Division, SOS. If approved.,

it would be placed in the ASP; if disapproved, the foreign representative would

have the right of appeal to the Munitions

Assignments Board or the Combined

Production and Resources Board. In the

case of interim requirements the procedure would be the same, except that the

ISC would also include a recommendation for priority. Procedure for assignment

would be as before, by bids on MAC(G),

with final transfer dependent upon apt

proval by the MAB. If approved by the

MAB, the International Division would

issue a transfer directive to be executed by

the supply service concerned. When the

material actually became available from

production, the supply service would issue

a notice of availability to the beneficiary

government.54 (Chart 6)

52

 Memo cited n. 48 (4). 53

 (1) Rpt cited n. 50 (1). (2) Note, Clay to Franks,

20 Aug 42, ID 020 (321) ID Orgn. (3) Memo, Franks

for Chiefs of Sup Svs, 8 Sep 42, sub: Responsibilities

of Chiefs of Sup Svs for Accomplishing Aid to United

Nations, ID, Lend-Lease, Doc Suppl, III. (4) For Numerous other detailed directives, see ID 020 (321) ID

Orgn. 54

 Memo, TAG for Chiefs of Sup Svs, 14 Oct 42,

sub: Authorization To Procure; Trf, and Export WD

Lend-lease Mats Other Than AAF Mats, ID 020, ID

Orgn and Functions.

266 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

On the surface, these new operating

procedures only represented refinements

of those announced in March, but there

were certain intangible changes resulting

from the fact that lend-lease was placed

under new management and integrated

into an organization for the supply of the

Army. General Aurand left the International Division in July to become part of

the executive staff of the newly formed

Combined Production and Resources

Board, and with his departure the initiative in War Department lend-lease affairs

passed to Generals Somervell and Clay.

Aurand had been the ablest defender of

the lend-lease principle within the War

Department and was a far more convinced advocate of the common pool

theory than either Somervell or Clay. They

recognized the importance of lend-lease

as an instrument of coalition warfare as

well as Aurand, but their experience and

orientation was toward supplying the U.S.

Army first, and they tended to subordinate

lend-lease to this end. They preferred direct action within the confines of the SOS

staff to the involved deliberations of combined committees. In sum, the new management adopted a more national outlook,

aimed at preventing foreign raids on the

U.S. supply pool. Possession of the administrative machinery for War Department

lend-lease operations enabled the SOS

staff to make that outlook felt in decisions

rendered at a high level on the distribution of American-made munitions.55

The area in which the British felt the

impact of the new arrangements most

severely was in the procurement of noncommon items. The British noncommon

program, as it had taken shape by mid1942, included essential components for

manufacture of finished munitions in Britain, ammunition for British-type weapons,

tank transporters and other heavy vehicles, and miscellaneous signal, engineer,

transportation, and quartermaster materials peculiar to the British Army. While

of vital importance to the British in maintaining their own war production and supplying marginal requirements of the Commonwealth's armies, the noncommon program was inevitably a nuisance to an organization concerned with planning an

orderly military procurement program

that would take full advantage of American mass production methods. Production

of bits and pieces on spot requisitions and

small orders for noncommon stores threatened to absorb vital raw materials or facilities out of all proportion to their actual

volume. From March 1942 onward the

British were forced to fight continually in

the International Supply Committee to

keep their noncommon program from

being completely submerged. From the

British point of view, the scope of the International Supply Committee was far too

narrow, for, unlike the Joint Aircraft

Committee, it confined itself to consideration of specific lend-lease requests and did

not have any authority over the competing

demands of the U.S. Army for raw materials and industrial facilities. This was in

keeping with Somervell's outspoken philosophy that the British should have no

part in shaping the American production

program. The main premise on which the

International Supply Committee acted

was that requirements for procurement of

noncommon articles should not be allowed

55

 The differences in points of view are clearly reflected in the long memorandum written by Aurand

on the occasion of his departure from the International Division and in Somervell's and Clay's comments thereon. Memo cited n. 48 (4).
LEND-LEASE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF COALITION WARFARE 267

to interfere with the program for American standard equipment.56

Storage and Shipment of Lend-Lease Materials

In the distributive phase, the simple

separation of lend-lease into its military

and civilian components was no longer

possible. When tanks, guns, and ammunition arrived at port they had to be shipped

in the same vessels, as a part of the same

shipping program, as foodstuffs, raw materials, and other supplies destined to bolster

civilian economies abroad. While military

lend-lease had a higher dollar value, and

was made up of more highly specialized

items, it represented only 20 percent of the

bulk of lend-lease shipments. Shipping

was either furnished by the foreign government concerned, or arranged for through

the War Shipping Administration out of

the Allied pool. WSA exercised over-all

supervision over the whole lend-lease shipping program, working closely with the

British Ministry of War Transport. The

Army's direct responsibility was confined

to making supplies available and delivering them to port in condition for immediate overseas shipment.

In exercising this responsibility, the

Army used generally the same facilities

and procedures for storage and internal

movement of lend-lease materials as it did

for its own supplies. It was only necessary

to physically segregate lend-lease and give

it special marking and packing. The Transportation Corps controlled rail movement

of both types of material into the port

area. When immediate movement to port

was impossible, lend-lease was stored in

general and branch depots under the supply services. It was moved into intransit

storage in holding and reconsignment

points under Transportation Corps control

when necessary to prevent clogging of port

areas. The main difference between movements of lend-lease and of Army material

lay in that the former was called forward

to port by and consigned to representatives of a foreign government instead of

the Army port organization. However,

Transportation Corps port agencies, initially established in 1941 under the Quartermaster Commercial Traffic Branch,

were charged with doing whatever was

necessary to expedite the loading and dispatching of military lend-lease shipments.57

 There were innumerable snarls

in the handling of military lend-lease

movements in the period following Pearl

Harbor. The Army's supply organization

was undergoing radical changes, and the

simultaneous increase in both Army and

lend-lease shipments was more than the

Army could handle efficiently. Record

keeping and documentation of lend-lease

shipments were extremely confused and

usually no one could tell the exact whereabouts of material in the pipeline. Though

technical inspections were supposedly performed all along the line, material arrived

in port improperly packed, with related

items unassembled, or defective in one

way or another. Lacking clear-cut jurisdiction over materials once they arrived in

56

 For an admirable statement of the British point

of view, see Hall and Wrigley, Studies in Overseas

Supply, first draft, Ch. III, pp. 237-77, Hist Br, Cabinet Off, London. 57

 (1) TAG ltr to Chiefs of Sup Svs, 11 May 42, sub:

Trans and Storage of Lend-lease Sups, AG 486.1

(5-6-42). (2) Sec on trans in rpt, 19 May 42, sub: ID

Orgn and Functions, ID 020, ID Orgn and Functions.

(3) Schmidt, The Commercial Traffic Branch in the

Office of The Quartermaster General, July 1940-

March 1942; OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 343ff,

OCMH. (4) On the general functioning of the system

of movements to port, see Wardlow, Trans II, Ch. IV.
268 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

port, the Transportation Corps port agencies were hampered in remedying these

defects. There were so many agencies and

individuals within and without the SOS

involved in lend-lease shipments that a

constant procession of co-ordinating committees, liaison arrangements, informal

agreements, and an excessive use of the

long distance telephone were required to

keep them moving.58

As a part of the whole SOS effort to

streamline international aid procedures

during the summer of 1942, the supply

services were charged with a close followup of each shipment from the time a transfer directive was issued until the material

was loaded aboard ship. Reporting procedures were simplified and co-ordinated

with those of the Lend-Lease Administration. A directive was also issued whereby

all War Department-procured lend-lease

except air materials would be consigned to

Army port agencies and retained under

their control until turned over at shipside

to the foreign government. Only in this

way, the SOS believed, could the control

over movements in the port area be complete, proper technical inspections and assembly operations be performed, and accurate records be insured.59

 But the directive had to be revoked almost immediately

on protest from the British and WSA. Under the Bland Act of March 1942 WSA

had been granted control over all foreign

water-borne commerce, and in November

1942 it asserted that authority by prescribing that all lend-lease freight for export

should be consigned to its forwarding corporations set up at each port. A final

settlement on procedure along these lines

was agreed upon between the SOS and

WSA in December. WSA forwarding corporations were made entirely responsible

for calling lend-lease material forward to

port and handling it once it arrived there.

Nevertheless, the Transportation Corps retained its responsibility for controlling all

rail movements into port, and the port

agencies were charged with maintaining

proper liaison with forwarding corporations for follow-up of shipments, return of

documents, and performance of lastminute inspections and assemblies. Procedures for reporting inventories at various stages of movement were immensely

complicated by divided responsibilities.

SOS would have infinitely preferred the

simpler system of Army control in the port

area, but there was no evading the authority of WSA in this instance. The cumbersome "water-borne export procedure"

remained basically the same throughout

the rest of the war.60

While the great bulk of lend-lease shipments was made under this system,

another was devised for those cases where

it was necessary or desirable for the Army

to retain control even after the material

arrived in the theater. This was the socalled Commanding General Shipment.

Materials shipped under this arrangement were consigned to the U.S. com58

 (1) Min, SOS stf conf, 26 Jun 42, Contl Div ASF.

(2) Papers in ID 008 Shipts, I. 59

 (1) Memo, CG SOS for Chiefs of Sup Svs, 9 Sep

42, sub: Doc of Lend-lease Shipts of Mat to Foreign

Govts. (2) Draft ltr, evidently prepared in ID for dispatch by ASW to Lewis Douglas, WSA, no date. Both

in ID 008 Shipts, I. (3) Dirs, Hq SOS to Sup Svs, 9-11

Sep 42, ID, Lend-Lease, Doc Suppl, III. 60

 (1) PL 498, 77th Cong (Bland Act). (2) WSA Dir

4, 5 Nov 42. (3) WSA Opns Regulation 23. (4) WSA

Forwarding Regulation 1. Last three in ID, LendLease, Doc Suppl, IV. (5) Memo, CG SOS for Chiefs

of Sup Svs, 4 Dec 42, sub: Proced for Shipt of WD

Lend-lease Mat for Water-Borne Export, ID 008

Shipts, II. (6) For a detailed treatment of operations

under this and later modified water-borne export procedures, see ID, Lend-Lease, I, 574-97.
LEND-LEASE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF COALITION WARFARE 269

manding general in the area involved for

delivery to the intended foreign beneficiary. This method was used principally in

deliveries to China, the French in North

Africa, and the Brazilian Expeditionary

Force in Italy. Commanding General

Shipments were consigned to and called

forward by the regular Army port organization, in virtually the same manner as

those for U.S. troops overseas.61

Thus emerged in the months following

Pearl Harbor an elaborate system for the

allocation and distribution of American

munitions to other nations engaged in the

common struggle—a system that made

military lend-lease supply an effective part

of the logistics of coalition warfare. The

capstone of the structure was the Munitions Assignments Board, an AngloAmerican body that provided a link between the allocation of munitions and the

strategic policies of the CCS. The consolidation of the U.S. Army and lend-lease

production programs under military control eliminated most of the administrative

confusion of 1941 and created a single

production pool out of which MAB could

make allocations on a strategic basis. At

the operational level, the old lend-lease

machinery of the War Department was

revamped and fitted into the new Army

supply organization, the Services of Supply, establishing a close correlation between Army and lend-lease distribution.

And even as the organization was taking

shape, the principles under which it was

to operate were also emerging.

61

 (1) See detailed discussion in ID, Lend-Lease, I,

605-16. (2) See also below, Chs. XVIII-XIX.
CHAPTER XI

The Anglo-American

Munitions Pool

Determination of a Basis of Assignments

Winston Churchill came to Washington

in December 1941 fearing that American

insistence on training and equipping a

large ground and air army would upset

British plans, which since 1940 had been

based on the expectation of a continuing

flow of American munitions.1 The agreements reached at ARCADIA went far to dissipate these fears, but the issue remained a

fundamental source of conflict in the combined effort to establish a basis for allocation of material. The British, with most of

their troops already trained and deployed

in areas immediately threatened (the British Isles, Australia, New Zealand, Malaya,

Burma, India, the Middle East, and

Africa), insisted that the principle of

assignments in consonance with strategy

could be properly applied only by giving

first priority to existing theaters of operations. In view of the critical situation in

which the British found themselves, actual

delivery of material in 1942 seemed to

them of more vital importance than promises of an American army to fight beside

them in 1943 or 1944. The American staff,

though willing to make some concessions

to the British, felt that its own program of

preparing a vast army for future operations should constitute a first charge

against American production. The lack of

any specific combined plan of action for

1942 made resolution of these conflicting

points of view doubly difficult.

Immediately following Pearl Harbor,

while allocations were still largely a matter for unilateral determination by the

General Staff, priorities were generally

given to U.S. forces to the "extent necessary to meet their immediate probable

consumption of munitions and build up

and maintain reserves."

 2 Numerous transfers of critical items scheduled for Great

Britain, the USSR, and other countries

were canceled, and the distribution schedules prepared before Pearl Harbor were

abandoned in favor of short-term, almost

day-by-day, allocations. The need to bolster continental U.S. defenses, to prepare

emergency task forces, and to speed up the

tempo of training made such a policy

almost mandatory, but the overriding priority for U.S. forces could not continue

indefinitely if the common pool was to

have any semblance of reality. The President gave every indication that he would

insist on generous allocations of munitions 1

 Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 642. 2

 Agenda for 1st mtg of Strategic Mun Bd, 10 Dec

41, Col Boone's file, DAD. Though the board never

met, this agenda in fact contained the principles on

which allocations were made during the first two

months after Pearl Harbor.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MUNITIONS POOL 271

for lend-lease. Recognizing this, the General Staff during January wrestled with

the problem of determining some new

basis for allocations. General Aurand, as

Defense Aid Director, suggested a return

to the percentage division formula in force

before Pearl Harbor; General Somervell,

as G-4, that allocations be governed by the

availability of shipping to transport them.

In truth, as General Moore pointed out in

rejecting Aurand's solution, policy could

hardly be fixed as long as neither the

scope of the American effort overseas nor

a combined plan of action for 1942 had

been determined.3

At the end of January the problem

passed from the surveillance of the General

Staff alone to that of the combined agencies—the CCS and the Munitions Assignments Board. The MAB at its first meeting,

31 January 1942, adopted an approach

that was completely in harmony with the

common pool concept. Assignments, the

board decided, should be based on combined Anglo-American plans for combat

forces in the various theaters and for forces

in training, balanced against combined

munitions resources and planned production. The board, however, was in no position to establish priorities among theaters

and national forces or between theaters

and forces in training, since it had received no strategic guidance on these matters from the CCS. The board's program

therefore remained only a long-range goal.

For the present, it ruled, assignments

would continue to be based on "existing

transfer schedules of United States stocks

and production."

 4

Following this line, the Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground) in its

early actions continued to give priority to

U.S. troop needs. A British protest was inevitable and was not long in coming. At

the MAC(G) meeting of 21 February 1942

the War Plans Division member, Brig.

Gen. Robert W. Crawford, insisted that

minimum U.S. requirements for arming

seventy-one divisions before the end of

1942 must be met before any critical items

could be assigned to other countries. The

British member, Brigadier Donald Campion, dissented emphatically, arguing that

to fix such prior charges cut across the

whole principle of assignment in accordance with need. MAC(G) was unable to

proceed with March assignments, and

General Aurand, its chairman, requested

guidance from the MAB. The MAB, in

turn, asked for a strategic directive from

the CCS.5

The British representatives on the CCS

came up almost immediately with a fullblown proposal centering around the principle that "the provision of full equipment

for existing units available in or about to

proceed to an active theater of war, or to

one immediately threatened, is ... the

first charge on available assets, in such

order or priority as may be assigned the

various theaters."

 6 They suggested equal 3

 (1) Memo, Aurand for CofS, 13 Jan 42, sub: Def

Aid Trfs and Trf Schedules, Misc Stf Studies, Lendlease 2A file, DAD. (2) Memo, Moore for CofS, 13

Jan 42, same sub. (3) Memo, Gross for Somervell, 19

Jan 42, same sub. (4) Memo, Somervell for Gross, 13

Jan 42. Last three in Plng Div Studies folder, OCT

HB.

4

 Tab E, Preliminary Asgmts Dir by MAB, to

memo, Aurand for CofS, 11 Feb 42, sub: Dir for

MAB, ID 020, ID Orgn and Functions. 5

 (1) Min 32, 4th mtg MAC(G), 21 Feb 42. (2) Tab

A to min cited above (1), memo, Aurand for Exec Off

MAB through Moore, 21 Feb 42, sub: Basis for

Asgmts. (3) Tab E to min cited above (1), 1st Ind,

Moore to Exec Off MAB, and 2d Ind, Exec Off MAB

to CCS, to Aurand memo. (4) Min 33, 5th mtg

MAC(G), 23 Feb 42. At this meeting the British

agreed to accept an interim requirement for equipping thirty-five U.S. divisions by 30 June 1942 in

order that March assignments might proceed. 6

 CCS 50, memo by Br reps on CCS, 26 Feb 42,

title: Asgmt of Mun.
272 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

scales of equipment, ammunition, and reserves for forces of all the United Nations

in the same theater, and proportional

scales of equipment and ammunition for

training. They thought the CCS should

indicate the relative priority of theaters,

and draw up an order of battle outlining

combat forces under its operational direction in all theaters as they were and as it

was intended they should be on 30 June

and 31 December 1942.

General Aurand thought the British

approach sound, but there were strong

objections within WPD. These objections,

as noted privately, were, first, that the

United States could not accept British

standards of training, and, second, that

fulfillment of requirements for forces in

active theaters or about to proceed there

would "consume all production for some

time to come and there will be nothing

left for the needs of large forces that must

be developed if we are going to win the

war."

 7 General Marshall took something

of a middle ground and ended by charging

Aurand with the preparation of a statement as to the form in which allocations

should be made by MAC(G). Aurand's

draft followed generally along the lines of

the British proposal as to the form of directive required, but was sufficiently indefinite on the question of specific priorities

between theaters and training to permit

General Eisenhower, the new head of

WPD, to accept it.8

The CCS, on considering the British

paper and the suggestions made by

Aurand and after further consultation

with the MAB on the precise nature and

scope of the guidance required, entrusted

the drafting of an assignments directive to

the Combined Staff Planners. The CPS

was unable to provide the precise and detailed sort of directive the MAB desired

but did reach agreement on a broad set of

principles, and a draft assignments directive was presented to the CCS on 24

March 1942 (CCS 50/2).9 The staff planners proposed that allocations by the

assignments boards in Washington and

London should be made from combined

production to ground and air forces in

theaters, about to proceed to theaters, and

in training, according to the following

principles:

14. Amounts of munitions assigned to the- aters should be based on the size of forces

actively engaged and the existing state of

their equipment; the probable period of

active operations; and the probable charac- ter of the operations. 15. Although it is impossible to give abso- lute priorities to the extent of entirely denying

equipment and supplies to units in lower pri- orities, it is believed that the following gen- eral objectives should serve as a guide in the

allocation of munitions:

(a) 100% equipment, reserves and main- tenance, including ammunition for training:

(1) for fully trained units in active theaters of

war, (2) for those units which can be dis- patched thereto in three months' time, and

(3) for those units allocated for defense of

vital installations against hostile raids in in- active theaters. Original supply, reserves, and maintenance levels will differ for differ7

 OPD notes on agenda for 9th mtg CCS, 3 Mar 42,

ABC 400 (2-17-42) Sec 1. 8

 (1) Memo, Aurand for Moore, 2 Mar 42, sub:

Conf With CofS re Basis for Asgmt to United Nations.

(2) Memo, Aurand for CofS, 2 Mar 42, sub: Method

of Making Asgmts to United Nations. (3) Memo,

Eisenhower for CofS, 3 Mar 42, sub: Method of Allocating Mun to United Nations. All in MAB Orgn file,

DAD. 9

 Steps leading to the directive may be traced in

the following: (1) Min, 9th mtg CCS, 3 Mar 42. (2)

MBW 3/1, memo by MAB for CCS, 10 Mar 42, title:

Nature and Form of Strategic Dir To Govern Asgmts

Proced. (3) Min, 12th mtg CCS, 17 Mar 42, Item 1.

(4) Min, 9th mtg CPS, 19 Mar 42, Item 1; 10th mtg,

20 Mar 42; 11th mtg, 23 Mar 42, Item 1. (5) CCS

50/2, 24 Mar 42, title: Dir for Asgmt of Mun.

MBW (Munitions Assignments Board in Washington) is an alternate abbreviation for MAB.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MUNITIONS POOL 273

ent categories and locations of forces. These

figures will be established by appropriate

authority.

(b) 100% of equipment and training

ammunition for units in training except for

those items of which there is a shortage. Of

these latter a minimum of 50% will be pro- vided. If the available supply of munitions is

insufficient, proportionate cuts in (a) and (b)

should be made. 16. In order to eliminate inequalities be- tween different arms and different theaters of

war,

(a) Approximately equal scales of equip- ment, ammunition and reserves should be

established for United States and British

forces in the same theater. (b) Approximately equal scales of equip- ment and ammunition for training should be

established.

Priorities for the various theaters were

established. The Middle East, IndiaBurma-Ceylon, Australia, and, for air

operations, the United Kingdom were

classified as priority "A" for continuous

major operations; New Zealand and the

Pacific islands on the lines of communications from the United States, priority "A"

for major operations for two months;

Hawaii and the United Kingdom for land

operations, priority "B" for major operations for two months; Africa, Alaska, Iceland and Greenland, the United States

and Canada, South America, and the

Caribbean, "C" priority, as subject only to

airborne or sea-borne raids. Appendixes

were to be prepared showing the proposed

disposition of American and British forces

in each theater as of 30 June and 31

December 1942.

CCS 50/2 also recognized certain assignments problems not clearly related to

theaters under control of the CCS. These

were Latin America, China, the USSR,

Turkey, and the Free French. Allocations

to Latin America were to be limited to

items that would not hamper operations

or training of the United States and British Commonwealth. The Moscow Protocol would remain the basis of assignments

to the Soviet Union but should be reexamined, revised, and extended as soon

as possible, "based upon giving maximum

aid to Russia within the transportation

capabilities to the ultimate destination,

provided essential United States and British operations will not be unduly handicapped." Allocations to China should be

limited to those that could be delivered to

Chinese troops and effectively used by

them. Limited amounts of munitions

would be allocated to Turkey "as a means

of influencing her to oppose Germany."

Munitions for the Free French forces in

Africa and the Middle East would be provided from British allocations; for French

forces in the Pacific, from U.S. allocations.10

The Combined Chiefs gave final approval to these proposals on the day they

were presented, rejecting at the same time

General Marshall's request for a special

directive to cover April assignments, giving priority to the equipping of certain

U.S. divisions. Shortly afterward the

Combined Staff Planners began work on

the appendixes showing prospective deployment. These were completed and approved by the CCS on 28 April.11

Though the British got in CCS 50/2 the

form of directive they initially had asked

for, the principles of assignment there

established only partially reflected their

views. The spirit of compromise was evident throughout. The WPD staff had to

abandon its claim for first priority on

10

 CCS 50/2, 24 Mar 42, title: Dir for Asgmt of

Mun. 11

 (1) Min, 13th mtg CCS, 24 Mar 42, Item 17;

17th mtg, 28 Apr 42, Item 5. (2) Ltr, Gen Marshall

to Field Marshal Dill, 24 Mar 42, ABC 400 (2-17-42)

Sec 1.
274 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

minimum requirements for building an

American army, but in turn the British

had to accept the 50 percent requirement

for troops in training on an equal priority

with theater needs. A British proposal to

set minimum training requirements at

33-1/3 percent was firmly rejected.12 On the

other hand, troops were to be entitled

to full equipment only three months before departure for a theater, instead of six

months as WPD had asked. Also, the

British gained their point in the stipulation of approximately equal scales of

equipment for training and for various

national forces in the same theater.

The concessions made to the British in

the assignments directive itself were more

than balanced by the amount of latitude

left in interpretation. CCS 50/2 was from

the first only a general guide, not a

"bible." There were no exclusive priorities, and the actual scales of supply to be

used for both theaters and training were

left for determination by national authorities. The provision for "equal scales" was

therefore virtually a dead letter from the

start. The appendixes showing deployment were not drawn up on the basis of

any specific combined plan of action and,

at least on the American side, were regarded as only educated guesses. The approach to allocation was pragmatic rather

than doctrinaire, and the assignment of

critical items each month often brought

forth the same conflict of views that was

evident in the shaping of the initial directive. The importance of the assignments

directive lay not in the specific theater

priorities laid down, for these were bound

to vary in the fluctuating strategic situation of 1942, but in the definite confirmation by CCS action that the principle of

strategic need and not national interest

would be the guide for assignments by the

MAB. National interest, of course, could

not be completely ruled out, and certainly

the American members of MAC(G) and

the MAB managed in one way or another

under the directive to assure a certain continuing priority for U.S. Army needs.

Nevertheless, they always had to base

their actions on strategic grounds.

It was originally expected that the theater priorities set forth in CCS 50/2 would

be revised periodically in the light of shifts

in combined strategy. Only one such revision ever took place. On 10 June 1942

the CCS gave an "A" priority to forces assigned to operations on the continent of

Europe (BOLERO) in consonance with the

plan developed in April for a cross-Channel invasion in 1942 or 1943. In practice

the Americans generally gave to BOLERO

preparations a status above that of the

British priority "A" theaters in India and

the Middle East. Although the BOLERO

strategy was short-lived, the United States

meantime had been augmenting its forces

in the Pacific beyond original plans. The

first counteroffensives against the Japanese were launched on Guadalcanal and

New Guinea in August. Simultaneously,

preparations were begun for the invasion

of North Africa and by November the

U.S. Army was heavily engaged on two

fronts. While the British were able during

the first half of 1942 to get what they considered a fair share of American equipment in the general famine, during the

latter part of the year they found it increasingly harder to make their claims

stand up against American requirements

for forces actively engaged. The fact remains, nevertheless, that the most urgent

British requests were met and neither of

the most vital fronts, the Middle East

12

 Memo, Col Thomas T. Handy for Jt Sec CCS, 21

Mar 42, ABC 400 (2-17-42) Sec 1.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MUNITIONS POOL 275

AMERICAN AND BRITISH AIR

CHIEFS, Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold and

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal.

and the United Kingdom, suffered inordinately for lack of American equipment.

At the same time, the Americans were

able to proceed with equipping their own

Army and to give adequate support for its

first campaigns. The relative flexibility of

CCS 50/2 thus proved a definite advantage, enabling the assignments machinery to meet the pragmatic tests of the first

year of American participation in the

war.13

The Basis of Aircraft Allocations

The provisions of CCS 50/2 were never

related in more than a general sense to the

allocation of aircraft. At the ARCADIA

Conference General Arnold negotiated

with Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal

an agreement on air allocations for 1942

that remained the basis of assignments by

MAC(A) until mid-July. Though the

AAF could now count on a vastly expanded production of aircraft, Arnold insisted that the United States had so

stripped itself of air materials for the defense of Great Britain during 1941 that

the schedules agreed on before Pearl Harbor for delivery to the British must be

curtailed. The Arnold-Portal Agreement

effected a reduction, but not to the extent

that Arnold desired, and he continued to

insist that if allocations to Britain and the

USSR were not further reduced it would

be impossible to provide enough planes

for the planned expansion of the AAF to

115 groups.14

The Arnold-Portal Agreement preceded the creation of the MAB, but was

accepted by that body in early March for

production planning purposes and became the tentative guide to aircraft assignments. The appendixes of CCS 50/2

contained deployment schedules for air as

well as ground units, but it was a measure

of the dubious validity of these schedules

that the CCS ruled that the Arnold-Portal

Agreement should continue to govern as13

 (1) CCS 50/3, 10 Jun 42, title: Amendment to

Dir for Asgmt of Mun. (2) Min, 24th mtg CCS, 10

Jun 42, Item 7. (3) Memo, Aurand for Somervell, 18

Jul 42, sub: Rpt at Time of Leaving ID, Hq ASF

folder, ID. (4) Hall and Wrigley, Studies in Overseas

Supply, first draft, Ch. IV, pp. 282-92, Hist Br, Cabinet Off, London. (5) On BOLERO planning, see below,

Ch. XIV. (6) On Pacific operations, see below, Ch.

XV. (7) On the invasion of North Africa, see below,

Chs. XVI-XVII. 14

 (1) Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 248-49. Under

the Arnold-Portal Agreement the British, during

1942, were to receive from American production 589

heavy bombers, 1,744 medium bombers, 2,745 light

bombers, 4,050 pursuits, 402 observation planes, and

852 transports. (2) Memo, AAF for OPD, 23 Mar 42,

sub: Reduction in Commitment of All Types of

Planes to the Br, OPD 452.1, Case 36. (3) For prePearl Harbor schedules, see above, Ch. IV.
276 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

signments until a new agreement could be

negotiated. Negotiations to this end were

already in progress. In early April Arnold

presented to the President his case for a

reduction in the commitments of planes to

the British. The decision at approximately

the same time to concentrate resources on

an early invasion of the Continent heightened the need for a ruling, for the Americans would need a large air force to carry

out their part of such an operation, and

the composition of that air force would

also be an issue. The CCS appointed a

special committee to study the problem

but it could make no final determination

of the matter until the President's disposition was known.15

The President's decision came in a message to Churchill on 19 May 1942:

Today it is evident that under current ar- rangements the U. S. is going to have in- creasing trained air personnel in excess of air

combat planes in sight for them to use. We

are therefore anxious that every appropriate

American-made aircraft be manned and

fought by our own crews. Existing schedules

of aircraft allocations do not permit us to do

this. . . . My thought is that the CCS, with

your approval and mine, would determine

the strength of aircraft to be maintained in

the respective theaters of war. I think the

maximum number of planes possible should

be maintained in combat and the minimum number consistent with security be held in

reserve and in operational training units, and that American pilots and crews be as- signed to man American-made planes far

more greatly than at present on the combat

fronts.16

This decision meant that the main

American air contribution in the future

would take the form of air units manned

by Americans rather than planes for British pilots to fly. A new schedule of allocations was worked out after the horse trading so typical of Anglo-American negotiations of this sort and was approved by

the CCS on 2 July 1942. The schedule,

signed by General Arnold, Air Vice Marshal J. C. Slessor (representing Portal),

and Rear Adm. John H. Towers, USN,

and known as the Arnold-Slessor-Towers

Agreement,17 stipulated not only the numbers and types of aircraft to be turned over

to the British during the rest of the year but

also the size and composition of U.S. combat air forces to be established in the Middle East, India, and the United Kingdom.

The agreement gave the AAF the prospect of far more planes for its own expansion. At the same time, the establishment

of an American air force in the Middle

East, coming as it did at a critical juncture

in British affairs there, at least partially

compensated the British for the reduction

in aircraft deliveries.18

The Arnold-Slessor-Towers Agreement

was to be followed by a series of similar

pacts negotiated periodically throughout

the rest of the war. These, rather than

CCS 50/2, were to serve as the basis for

assignment of aircraft by MAC(A) and

MAB. Nevertheless, the principle on

which these agreements were based was a

similar one to that of CCS 50/2, since

theater deployment of British and U.S.

air forces was the criterion for determining the respective needs of each nation.

However, the superior mobility of air units

made it possible to determine this deploy15

 (1) Distribution of Air Materiel to the Allies

1939-1944: Control, Procedures and Policies, AAF

Reference Hist 6, MS, p. 56, Air University Hist Ln

Off, Washington, D.C. (2) Ltr, SW to President, 12

Apr 42, WDCSA 452.1. (3) Min, 15th mtg CCS, 7

Apr 42; 17th mtg, 28 Apr 42, Item 5. (4) Matloff and

Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, Ch. IX. (5)

Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 250, 554-56. 16

 Msg 147, President to Former Naval Person

[Churchill], 19 May 42, ABC 400 (2-17-42) Sec 1. 17

 Also sometimes known as the Arnold-PortalTowers Agreement. 18

 (1) Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 566-70. (2) On

the Middle East crisis, see below, Ch. XVIII.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MUNITIONS POOL 277

ment without the same regard for national

composition as was the case with ground

components. The air agreements provided

a stable base of calculation on which both

the AAF and the RAF could plan their

future development. The President's decision of May 1942 assured the AAF of the

larger role its commander thought it

should play, and made it possible for the

American air staff to accept the principle

of theater deployment as a basis for aircraft allocations without fear that it would

result in emphasizing expansion of British air forces at the expense of its own.

The Relation of Requirements

to Assignments

The air agreements established for the

rest of 1942 a close relationship between

production planning and allocations, a

relationship that both the British and

Americans had to recognize as vitally

necessary for other types of equipment as

well. Even though lend-lease had been

consolidated with U.S. military requirements into one grand munitions program

for American industry, that program had

to be framed in terms of the requirements

of the individual forces and nations to be

supplied. Allocations had to be closely related to these requirements, for unless assignments in the end closely approximated

the total requirements of each claimant,

no stable plans for development or deployment of either American or British

forces were possible. The division of manpower between the military services and

industry in Britain and America alike depended upon prior calculations of the

equipment to be available. To a large degree the execution of any agreed strategy

also depended upon it. On this fundamental principle the British and Americans could easily agree. But it was not so

easy to resolve divergent views on the

means of applying it.

By the logic of circumstances, it was the

British who took the lead in urging a combined requirements program based on

combined strategy as determined by the

CCS. They had long calculated military

requirements in terms of specific numbers

and types of troops in specific theaters of

war. Their position in 1942 was that the

Americans should do likewise and that the

combined order of battle for the entire

war should determine combined production requirements. These combined strategic requirements would form the basis

not only for adjustments in production

programs in both countries but also for allocations by the Munitions Assignments

Boards. This approach offered certain

obvious advantages for the British, for it

would assure them CCS approval for their

requirements against American production. While the British thought that in the

immediate crisis in early 1942 assignments

should be made in keeping with shortterm operational needs, for the long pull

they wanted more definite assurances of

the kind and quantity of American aid

they could expect.

Meantime, the U.S. supply planners

found it necessary to calculate their requirements solely in terms of the over-all

size and type of military forces to be

armed. British requirements against

American production were included initially in terms of the deficits the British

had presented in their Victory Program of

1941, deficits they could not meet from

sources available to them—a generous

enough basis to start with, since these requirements were generally inflated ones.

However, the initial Army Supply Pro-
278 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

gram, in which these requirements found

expression, proved well beyond the capacity of American industry and had to be

scaled downward in successive revisions

during 1942.19 The British soon learned

that acceptance of a requirement, even

when scaled down, did not necessarily

mean that an assignment would be made

to fulfill it when there were competing

American demands. The British plan for

combined strategic requirements as a

guide to adjustments of both production

plans and allocation of matériel was one

phase of their general endeavor to secure

recognition for their needs and a stable

basis for calculating the amount of American aid they might expect in the light of

ever-shifting production plans.

The method of procedure the MAB

proposed to adopt was generally along the

lines of the British plan. It will be recalled

that in addition to its allocation function,

the MAB was also charged by the CCS

with maintaining information on combined munitions resources and translating

them into terms of combat forces as a

guide for the CCS in keeping requirements programs in line with both strategy

and the realities of production. The MAB

first started to follow this directive literally, converting production forecasts into

terms of troop units, but soon found it impractical and adopted the opposite (and

older) method of determining first the

troop requirements and then matching

them with production schedules. The

MAB proposed to determine these troop

requirements in terms of deployment and

training schedules, but was handicapped

at first by inadequate information on

prospective deployments. The first studies

undertaken were therefore of a series of

critical items, limited to requirements

against U.S. production as determined

from the Army Supply Program. After the

preparation of the appendixes of CCS

50/2, the Combined Staff Planners directed the MAB to broaden its scope to

include combined requirements and resources of both the United States and

United Kingdom during 1942, and to

base its studies on these deployment

schedules. Its conclusions would then

serve as a basis both for production planning and for allocations.20

 The MAB

under this plan would extend its studies to

include 1943 and 1944, once a combined

strategy could be determined upon which

an order of battle for these years could be

based. The board regarded CCS 50/2 as

only a temporary guide and expected that

a new directive for allocations would be

prepared in terms of this combined strategic planning for ultimate victory.

For a brief period during the spring and

summer of 1942 it appeared that the British and MAB plan would come to fruition.

The British agreed, in conferences in London in April 1942, to the American plan

for concentration of forces for early invasion of Europe as the major Allied effort.

In the latter stages of the conference, the

British proposed to General Marshall that

19

 (1) On 1941 Victory Program planning, see

above, Ch. V. (2) On development of the Army Supply Program, see below, Ch. XII. (3) On inclusion of

British requirements in ASP, see ID, Lend-Lease, II,

947-50, and Doc Suppl, II. (4) Memo, Gen Aurand

for Brig Campion, 6 Jun 42, Col Boone's file, Item

380, DAD. (5) Memo, Gen Moore for ACofS WPD,

7 Jan 42, sub: Former Vic Prog, Vic Prog 1 file, DAD.

(6) Ltr, Col Handy to Brig G. K. Bourne, Br Army

Stf, 7 Mar 42, ABC 400 (2-17-42) Sec 1. 20

 (1) CCS 19/1, 4 Feb 42, title: Order Estab MAB.

(2) MBW 34, 5 Nov 42, title: Rpt on Par. 2 of Order

of 4 Feb 42 Estab MAB. (3) Min, 15th mtg CPS, 23

Apr 42, Item 4. (4) Memo, MAB, no addressee, no

date, sub: Check of Critical Items To Gauge Relation

Between Resources and Reqmts, Incl 4 to agenda for

14th mtg MAB, 6 May 42.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MUNITIONS POOL 279

in the light of this strategy each country

should prepare an order of battle for all

areas around which a combined production program could be set up. Early in June

the British formally presented their order

of battle for 1 April 1943 to the Combined

Staff Planners, urging action on the proposal. Citing the fact that there could be

for any given date "only one order of battle whether it be for planning, for production or for munitions assignment," they

urged replacement of the appendixes of

CCS 50/2 by the deployments now presented and an early decision on comparable deployments for 1 April 1944.21

 The

American staff planners agreed generally

but declined to accept the British deployments until they had been reviewed by

the Combined Staff Planners.22

A more potent pressure for action was

not long in coming. The presentation of

the British plan coincided with a visit to

Washington by Sir Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of Production, to confer with

Donald Nelson, chairman of WPB, on

combined production problems. Out of

these conversations emerged the Combined Production and Resources Board.

Formed on 9 June 1942, the CPRB was

charged with combining the production

programs of the United States and United

Kingdom into a single integrated whole,

adjusted to the strategic requirements of

the war as indicated by the CCS on the

one side and production realities on the

other. Nelson and Lyttelton, who formed

the board, were soon pointing out that existing production plans were based on requirements drawn up independently in

the two countries and that they would not

necessarily assure the provision of essential

equipment to carry out operations scheduled by the CCS. In a resolution adopted

at its first meeting, the CPRB asked that

the CCS direct the appropriate service

authorities to furnish a statement of combined requirements of arms and munitions necessary by the terminal dates 31

December 1942 and 31 December 1943

in order to execute strategic plans for the

years 1943 and 1944, respectively. The

CPRB would then put these strategic requirements to the test of feasibility.23

The CCS accepted the suggestion without much objection, indeed with a certain

enthusiasm. It adopted the CPRB report

on 2 July 1942 with only minor amendments and instructed the MAB to secure

the combined requirements from the services concerned. A special committee,

headed by Brigadier J. M. Younger of the

British Joint Staff Mission, was appointed

to investigate differences in maintenance

and reserve scales of ammunition used by

the American and British Armies. At this

stage there was no indication that the

American staff seriously questioned the

idea of combined requirements planning

on the basis of theater deployment.24

The preparation of strategic requirements as the CPRB requested depended

upon agreement on combined deployments for 1943 and 1944. As long as the

plan for early invasion of Europe remained the prevailing conception of strategy, this seemed feasible. The Combined

21

 (1) Br paper, 1 Jun 42, sub: Pdn Reqmts of

United Nations, ABC 400 (2-17-42) Sec 2. (2) For a

discussion of the April 1942 London conference, see

below, Ch. XIV. 22

 (1) Min, 18th mtg CPS, 5 Jun 42, Item 1. (2) For

strategic developments, see Matloff and Snell, Strategic

Planning: 1941-1942, Ch. VIII. 23

 (1) On the founding of the CPRB, see above, Ch.

X. (2) CCS 82, rpt by CPRB, 18 Jun 42, title: Pdn

Policy. 24

 (1) Min, 26th mtg CCS, 18 Jun 42; 30th mtg, 2

Jul 42, Item 1. (2) Min, 21st mtg JCS, 23 Jun 42, Item

11. (3) CCS 82/1, rpt by Sp Com Appointed To Consider CCS 82, 27 Jun 42, title: Pdn Policy.
280 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Staff Planners in mid-July were able to

present a combined order of battle for 1

April 1943 (CCS 91), which the CCS

agreed to accept for purposes of production planning. But almost simultaneously,

the whole concept of strategy was changed,

much to the chagrin of the American staff,

by a decision to undertake the invasion of

North Africa in the fall of 1942 (Operation TORCH), thus leaving strategic planning for 1943 and 1944 in an uncertain

state. The CCS proved unable to arrive at

any final decision that could serve as a

guide for drawing up an order of battle for

1944. That for 1943 (CCS 91) proved

hardly more reliable than had been the

appendixes of CCS 50/2, since the Americans found it necessary to commit larger

forces to the Pacific than originally

planned. With this change in the situation, the American planners began to cool

perceptibly toward the British proposal

for a program of strategic requirements.25

Meanwhile the CPRB, under increasing British influence, pressed the CCS for

their 1943 program. The CPRB prescribed a deadline of 1 September 1942,

and in a report to the President in early

August emphasized the fact that unless it

received such a statement by that date, it

would be impossible for the CPRB to

frame production programs for 1943 intelligently. The President wrote Donald

Nelson that he would "make sure these

strategic requirements are in your hands

at an early date," and Nelson forwarded

this comment to the CCS.26

This pressure served only to crystallize

the opposition of American staff officers.

With no agreed strategy in prospect, they

viewed the September deadline as impossible of attainment. Quite apart from

this fact, they had also come to regard the

whole proposal as one that would favor

the British at the expense of equipping an

American army. When the MAB on 24

July finally presented its balance sheet for

combined requirements and resources of

critical items for 1942 (based on CCS 91),

it revealed to the American planners the

vastly higher maintenance and reserve

factors used by the British in calculating

their theater requirements. For example,

the British added to their initial requirements for tanks 76.5 percent for reserve

and 68.3 percent for maintenance in contrast to a 21 percent reserve factor used for

U.S. armored forces. There was an obvious

implication that if these British theater requirements were accepted for production

planning, they must also be accepted for

assignments, thus allowing the British to

accumulate vast reserves while the U.S.

Army struggled to get enough equipment

to make its expansion possible. "The comparison of US and UK requirements and

resources," wrote a perturbed OPD officer, "infers [sic] that US production be

turned over to the British and the US

Army take the remainder."

 27

 When the

balance sheet was considered by the Combined Staff Planners, the OPD member

saw to it that it was returned to the MAB

for reconciliation of the British and American scales. MAB referred the matter to the

ground committee which, after well over

three months of debate, was unable to produce more than a complete statement of

the differences. Meanwhile, the deliberations of the Younger committee on scales of

25

 (1) CCS 91, 14 Jul 42, title: Strategic Policy and

Deployment of U.S. and Br Forces. (2) Min, 31st mtg

CCS, 16 Jul 42; 37th mtg, 27 Aug 42. (3) For strategic

developments, see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, Chs. XII-XIII. 26

 CCS 102, 24 Aug 42, title: Pdn Policy for 1943. 27

 OPD notes on 28th mtg CPS, 7 Aug 42, ABC 400

(2-17-42) Sec 2.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MUNITIONS POOL 281

ammunition resulted in the same sort of

deadlock.28

These difficulties over the scale on

which requirements should be calculated

combined with the lack of an agreed strategy to lead OPD, SOS, and the executive

staff of the MAB to the same conclusions—

that the existing Army Supply Program

was the only practical basis for American

production planning and that the only

British requirements to be accepted

should be those included therein. General

Somervell by mid-August was even questioning the role the CPRB was assuming,

arguing that its consideration should not

extend to "the types and quantities of

munitions to be utilized in any theater"—

decisions "military in character" that

"must rest with the military authority."

 29

With the CPRB deadline already past, the

JCS on 4 September officially proposed

that each country furnish its existing requirements program, the British program

based on theater deployment, the American on total forces that could be transported to and maintained in transoceanic

theaters and total forces required for hemisphere defense, training, or use as strategic reserves. There was little the British

members of the CCS could do but accept.

The MAB had in fact on 3 September

already furnished the CPRB with existing

requirements programs in pursuance of an

informal agreement reached between the

two boards.30

Though the British won the concession

that a continuing effort should be made to

develop a program of combined requirements, the U.S. staff was ready to abandon the project entirely. The CPRB, in its

second report to the President on 22 September 1942, implied that the requirements furnished earlier were not based on

strategy and again called on the CCS to

remedy the situation. On 4 October

Churchill himself cabled Roosevelt suggesting that the adjustment of the President's January production goals to production realities—a necessity now that

these goals had served their initial purpose

of raising the sights—was a task to be accomplished by the CPRB on the basis of

the strategic plans of the CCS. This time

the President turned to the JCS for advice,

and his reply to Churchill, drafted in the

main by General Somervell, was a polite

rebuff. It recited coldly the steps being

taken in the United States to bring the

production program in line with realities

and ended with the statement that the

CPRB "rather than questioning specific

requirements items," should restrict itself

to an analysis of the total United States

and British requirements already presented, in order to determine the feasibility

of procurement.31

28

 (1) Ibid. (2) Min, 28th mtg CPS, 7 Aug 42. (3)

MBW 19/1, 29 Jul 42, title: Comparison of Combined

Reqmts and Resources. (4) MBW 19/2, 10 Aug 42,

title: Combined Resources and Reqmts as of 31 Dec

42. (5) MBW 19/3, 28 Nov 42, title: Combined Resources and Reqmts. (6) MBW 19/4, 11 Dec 42, same

title. (7) CCS 117, Interim Rpt of Sp Com, 6 Oct 42,

title: Study of Am. 29

 (1) Memo, Gen Somervell for Gen Burns, Exec

Off MAB, 15 Aug 42, sub: Relationship of WD to

MAB and CPRB, MAB folder, Hq ASF. (2) OPD

notes cited n. 27. (3) Memo, Brig Gen William F.

Tompkins for Exec Off MAB, 25 Aug 42, sub: Combined Reqmts, CCS 400.17 (7-6-42). 30

 (1) Min, 31st mtg JCS, 1 Sep 42. (2) Min, 39th

mtg CCS, 4 Sep 42, Item 3. (3) CCS 82/2, 4 Sep 42,

title: Combined Pdn Reqmts. (4) MBW 25/2, 3 Sep

42, title: Pdn Policy for 1943. (5) MBW 26, 25 Aug

42, title: Form of 1943 Reqmts. 31

 (1) Draft msg, President to Churchill, sent on 12

Oct 42. (2) Msg 156, Churchill to President, 4 Oct 42.

Both in CCS 400.17 (7-6-42) Sec 2. (3) CCS 102/1,

25 Sep 42, title: Pdn Policy for 1943, with incl, memo,

CPRB for CCS, transmitting 2d rpt of CPRB to President, 22 Sep 42. (4) Memo, Exec Off MAB for Secy

CCS, 28 Sep 42, sub: 2d Progress Rpt to President by

CPRB, Annex I to MBW 25/4, 28 Sep 42, title: Pdn

Policy for 1943.
282 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

This message ended for all practical

purposes the effort to arrive at a combined

requirements program based on strategic

deployments. On 16 October 1942 the

CCS, with considerable reluctance on the

part of the British members, agreed to

inform the CPRB that the requirements

submitted in September should be accepted as a basis of planning, and that

these requirements would be adjusted

from time to time to changing strategy.32

The net result was to firmly establish the

principle that production requirements on

U.S. industry and priorities thereon would

be handled as American problems by

American agencies, and requirements on

British production on a similar national

basis in Britain. The effort of the CPRB to

draw up a combined production program

was completely thwarted, and the board

itself gradually declined in importance. It

is apparent that one of the major reasons

for this was the distrust with which the

U.S. military authorities, particularly

General Somervell, had come to regard it.

They were well aware that the British

civilians on the CPRB had much broader

authority in their own country than

Donald Nelson had in the United States,

and they feared that the British would

dominate the board's actions. "It has been

difficult," Somervell informed the Chief of

Staff on one occasion, "to prevent the

combined committees having to do with

production and transportation from becoming dominated by the British viewpoint."

 33

Similarly, fear of over-allocations to the

British dictated much of the American opposition to the combined strategic requirements program. Both OPD and SOS regarded the British demands against American production as likely to be too great if

their theater requirements program were

accepted as a basis of assignments. They

thought it would be easier to deal with the

British in direct negotiations and in the

MAB on individual issues than to accept

the blanket commitments involved in any

combined strategic requirements program

prepared in advance. "Had we gone on a

theater basis," wrote Brig. Gen. Patrick

H. Tansey, head of OPD's Logistics Group,

in 1945, "we would have found an undue

portion of our supplies being transferred to

the British to be piled up in such logistical

vacuums as India."

 34

 These American

fears combined with the inherent difficulty

of arriving at valid estimates of future deployment to spell the demise of combined

requirements planning and allocations

based on them. As a corollary, the effort to

arrive at equal scales of equipment for

training and for British and American

forces in the same theater also lapsed and

these scales were left for determination by

the respective national authorities.

The Weeks-Somervell Agreement

The failure of combined requirements

planning left the British without any firm

basis on which to anticipate allocations for

the following year. Their experience with

the munitions assignments machinery,

meantime, had been generally disappointing. MAC(G) was never able to make firm

assignments for more than a month in advance. The acceptance of British requirements in the Army Supply Program gave

no assurance of ultimate assignment as

32

 Min, 44th mtg CCS, 16 Oct 42, Item 4. 33

 Memo, Somervell for CofS, no date, sub: Orgn

of Combined Bds, WDCSA 334 (1942-43). 34

 (1) Memo, prepared by Tansey, no addressee, no

date, sub: Alloc of Mun for Logis Support of Global

Strategy, ABC 400 (2-17-42) Sec 6. (2) For a brief

statement of the British position, see Hancock and

Gowing, British War Economy, pp. 397, 399.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MUNITIONS POOL 283

long as production schedules were uncertain and as long as elaborate strategic

justification was required where there

were competing bids. In fact, during the

whole of 1942 the British were allocated

only about 50 percent of their requirements for that year as accepted in the September 1942 version of the Army Supply

Program. Even considering that many of

their requirements were inflated, this performance was disappointing. Moreover,

allocations, in terms of proportion of

American production, declined during the

last half of the year. Deliveries of components and other items on the noncommon list were even further behind schedule. Then, as Roosevelt informed Churchill in his October message, the adjustment

of requirements to the realities of production was already under way in the United

States, and it promised to result in further

curtailment of British lend-lease expectancies. The War Production Board in September 1942 found the military requirements program for 1943 (including lendlease), as determined by the War and

Navy Departments, too great for the productive capacity of the country. The brunt

of the consequent reduction fell on ground

force equipment and was reflected in the

12 November 1942 revision of the Army

Supply Program. In this adjustment,

British requirements had to be sacrificed

on at least a similar scale to American (by

approximately 25 percent). By October

1942 the British had reached a crisis of

their own in allocating the last reserves of

manpower available, and felt they could

proceed no further without more specific

assurances as to the scope of future American aid. For this reason, the War Cabinet

sent to the United States a mission headed

by Sir Oliver Lyttelton to reach definite

agreements on the whole range of matters

affecting the common war effort—production, allocation of munitions, and shipping.35

During the visit of the Lyttelton mission General Somervell, as anxious as the

British to place their lend-lease program

on some definitely predictable basis, negotiated with Lt. Gen. Sir Ronald M. Weeks

an agreement on ground equipment that

scaled down British requirements by approximately 25 percent, but in turn gave a

definite promise that the reduced requirements would be met by actual assignments. It was agreed:

(a) that the British requirements on the

United States shall be the minimum necessary to cover the deficit which cannot be supplied from production under British control,

and it is understood that these requirements

as now stated do not exceed the British capacity to man or operate as far as their own

troops and allies for whom they are responsible are concerned.

(b) that the acceptance of British requirements in the 1943 American Programme of

Supply and Procurement shall carry an equal

obligation to produce and make available to

both forces the quantities involved in accordance with an agreed schedule for the twelve

calendar months of 1943, and in the event of

failure to meet the schedules, the quantities

will be scaled down in proportion to the

requirement accepted. (c) that no departure will be made from

this understanding, unless in the event of a

major unforeseen change in the strategical

situation, and then by agreement between

the two parties.36

The agreement itself listed allocations of

most major items, constituting about 60 35

 (1) Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy,

p. 400. (2) Hall and Wrigley, Studies in Overseas

Supply, first draft, Ch. IV, pp. 286-321, Hist Br, Cabinet Off, London. (3) For a discussion of the "feasibility" crisis in U.S. production planning, see below,

Ch. XXII. 36

 Weeks-Somervell Agreement, incl in ltr, J. Eaton

Griffith, Jt Secy London Mis, to Somervell, 19 Nov

42, ID, Lend-Lease, Doc Suppl, III.
284 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

percent of the British ground army requirements on the United States for 1943.

The Americans were to make every effort

to accept the other British requirements

not agreed upon in detail. The minimum

flow of components and complementary

items necessary to maintain the British

production program was also to be continued, and an earlier agreement on a

special pool of raw materials to meet spot

item requests was confirmed.37

The Weeks-Somervell Agreement was

part of a whole pattern of Anglo-American

accords reached during the visit of the

Lyttelton mission, including a new agreement for the allocation of aircraft and one

on shipping for the British Import Program.38

 The whole principle of the WeeksSomervell Agreement was that the Army

Supply Program, now geared to a realistic

appraisal of U.S. productive capacity,

should form the basis for both requirements and assignments of ground munitions from American production. Under

this principle, allocations would be related

to strategic or operational needs only

insofar as the respective national requirements programs reflected them. This

was in contravention of the theory on

which the MAB had been proceeding.

When the agreement was presented to

that body, the U.S. Navy member, Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, leveled a sharp

attack upon it, charging that the War Department was assuming the functions of

the MAB when it made firm commitments

in advance for assignment to the British.

"The War Department," Reeves said,

"undertakes to do this without consideration of the directives, strategic needs and

strategic policies as may be issued by the

Combined Chiefs of Staff, and without

reference to the Combined Munitions

Assignments Board."

 39

Reeves struck at a vulnerable point. If

the Weeks-Somervell Agreement were accepted without qualification, the freedom

of action of the MAB would be measurably reduced. Yet there had to be some

foundation for long-term calculations. The

allocation of aircraft had been determined from the beginning by very similar

agreements, and despite Admiral Reeves'

denial, naval allocations were in large

measure determined by prearranged production plans. The President had already

indicated to Churchill his general agreement. The MAB finally decided to approve, subject to the reservation that

"assignments can be made only by the

Munitions Assignments Board and that

such assignments must be in conformity

with the directives of the Combined Chiefs

of Staff."

 40

What then remained of the principles

of the common pool and of CCS 50/2? An

OPD officer suggested at one point that

CCS 50/2 be explicitly repealed in favor

of a definite theory of assignments on the

basis of requirements in the ASP.41 The

objections raised by Admiral Reeves seem

to have ended consideration of this move,

and CCS 50/2 remained on the books. Its

37

 On the special pool of raw materials and the procedure for noncommon items, see: (1) MBW 21, 3

Aug 42, title: Proced for Non-Programed Items; and

(2) Ltr, Gen Clay to James S. Knowlson, Deputy

Chm CPRB, 2 Dec 42, ID 092.2, Treaties and Agreements, I. 38

 (1) See ltr, President to Churchill, 30 Nov 42,

ABC 400 (11-19-42). (2) On the shipping question,

see below, Ch. XXVI. 39 Memo, Reeves for MAB, 10 Jan 43, sub: Agreement . . . Regarding Procurement of Br Reqrnts in

U.S. and Subsequent Asgmt to U.K., Annex I to

min, 48th mtg MAB, 10 Jan 43. 40

 (1) Min, 48th mtg MAB, 10 Jan 43, and atchd

addendum. (2) See also, memo, Col Franks for CG

SOS, 12 Jan 43, sub: . . . Items for Consideration at

49th Mtg of MAB, ID 334 MAC(G), I. 41

 OPD notes on 46th mtg JCS, 15 Dec 42, ABC

400 (2-17-42) Sec 4.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MUNITIONS POOL 285

general principles were sometimes to be

invoked, even though its specific theater

priorities had long been outdated. It was

never to be revised, a fact that in itself indicated its principles continued to have

only a very general application. Nevertheless, the MAB reservation prevented the

Weeks-Somervell Agreement from assuming the status of a definite protocol. And

OPD was able during 1943 to secure tacit

acceptance within the munitions assignment machinery of a new theory that

employments—active combat use of troops—

and not deployments should govern allocations. In accordance with this theory the

British still were required during 1943 and

afterward to give complete operational

justification for their assignments even

where the requirement had been accepted.

The decisions rendered at the international conferences at Casablanca and

afterward served as amendments to CCS

50/2 in providing guidance on employments and strategic priorities.42

The Weeks-Somervell Agreement definitely sealed the fate of combined longrange requirements planning on a strategic basis and, taken in conjunction with

the air agreements, substituted the principle of periodic bilateral negotiations. After

the Casablanca Conference in January

1943, the CCS instructed the Combined

Staff Planners to draw up tentative deployment schedules for planning purposes, but these were never used as a basis

for calculating combined requirements. As

far as the MAB was concerned, the net

effect was to reduce its requirements function to the nominal one of preparing statistical studies on individual items and

maintaining a general balance sheet on

combined production. Useful as these

studies were in pointing out necessary adjustments in production that might be

made by national authorities, they were

only advisory in nature and but a weak

substitute for the genuine combined requirements planning the MAB had set as

its initial goal.43

As for the common pool, its fate may

well be summarized in the words of an

International Division study in mid-1943:

It is commonly said that . . . the resources

of the two nations have been placed in a com- mon pool. While unobjectionable as a meta- phor, it is a mistake to construe this statement

as being literally correct. For, whereas the

two countries are engaged in a common en- terprise and the resources of each are pooled

in the sense that requests for munitions may

be filed against each on behalf of any lend- lease country, the resources of the United

States are applied primarily to equipping

United States Forces, and the resources of

the United Kingdom are applied primarily

to equipping British Forces. Furthermore, the control of production facilities within

each country remains in the hands of that

country, as does the power to determine what

and how much those facilities shall produce.44

Application of Assignments Theories:

The Work of the MAC(G)

The broad theories of assignment found

application in the detailed work of the assignments committees. Of these, the Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground) is

of greatest interest in this volume, and a

brief summary of its policies and practices

is necessary to an understanding of the assignments process. The MAC(G) handled 42

 (1) ID, Study on International Aid for Joint Staff

Planners, (mimeographed) Jun 43, pp. 2-13, ID. (2)

Memo, Col Albert C. Wedemeyer for Gen Handy,

ACofS OPD, 27 Nov 42, OPD 400 U.K., Case 40. 43

 (1) Min, 70th mtg CCS, 5 Feb 43, Item 9. (2)

MBW 43, 19 Jan 43, title: Proposed 1943 Prog Under

Par. 2 of CCS 19/1. (3) Min 4, 50th mtg MAB, 21 Jan

43. (4) Min 4, 52d mtg MAB, 3 Feb 43. (5) Hancock

and Gowing, British War Economy, p. 397. 44

 ID, Study on International Aid for Joint Staff

Planners, p. 3, cited n. 42.
286 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

a vast range of equipment from medium

tanks and tractors to picks and shovels.

While MAC(A) assigned all equipment

peculiar to the air forces, MAC(G) handled those materials that were in common

use by ground and air forces. A special

Radar and Communications Coordinating Committee, with Army, Navy, Air

Forces, and British representatives, was

set up to assign radar and related equipment. The radar committee, though in a

sense independent, reported its recommended assignments to the MAB through

the ground committee.45 The main ground

committee soon found that with only the

assistance of its secretariat it could not

render informed decisions on transfer

schedules for the thousands of items under

its control. Subcommittees soon began to

mushroom. The first was an assignments

subcommittee charged with preparing the

monthly assignments schedules. This was

followed by subcommittees for explosives,

tanks, tractors, trucks, signal equipment,

amphibious vehicles, chemical warfare

equipment, medical equipment, engineer

equipment, diesel engines, and quartermaster and transportation stores. In addition, special stockpile arrangements were

made for handling the manifold small

items procured by the Medical and Engineer services. All these subcommittees

contained British representation and reported through the Assignments Subcommittee to MAC(G). Normally, only

matters upon which the subcommittees

could not agree received detailed consideration in the main ground committee. In

turn, only when the MAC(G) could not

agree were assignments referred to the

MAB. Thus, a neat and logical hierarchy

of assignments committees evolved, providing for Anglo-American consultation

from the lowest to the highest level, with a

system of appeals similar to that of a

judicial system.46

During 1941 the various schedules for

defense aid deliveries had been projected

for a year in advance but during 1942 this

proved impossible. MAC(G) at first tried

to make firm assignments for one month

in advance and tentative assignments for

the next two, but when the first American

requirements for BOLERO were presented

in May, the tentative assignments were

dropped. At the insistence of the British,

who contended they needed this much advance notice in order to plan the utilization of shipping and equipment, the

tentative assignments were resumed in

August. A plan for making assignments

firm by quarterly periods was thoroughly

studied by the committee at this time, but

finally rejected. Nevertheless, efforts were

made to assign certain large and bulky

materials such as tractors and tanks by

quarters.47

Assignments were made on the basis of

estimates of the next month's production.

If production either fell short of or exceeded estimates, adjustment had to be

made. In order to provide for these adjustments on an equitable basis, MAC(G)

adopted the method, already in use by the

air committee, known as the block system.

A "block" for a given item was normally

set at an estimated week's production. As

a convenient example, say that a week's

estimated production of .30-caliber am45

 Min 606, 39th mtg MAC(G), 15 Jul 42; Min 660,

41st mtg, 30 Jul 42; Min 81 1, 45th mtg, 27 Aug 42;

Min 849, 47th mtg, 2 Sep 42; Min 885, 48th mtg, 10

Sep 42; and Min 909, 49th mtg, 17 Sep 42. 46

 (1) Min 582, 37th mtg MAG(G), 9 Jul 42; and

Min 1858, 89th mtg, 15 Apr 43. (2) For Engineer and

Medical common stockpiles, see ID, Lend-Lease, I,

484-94, 524-25. 47

 (1) Min 749, 43d mtg MAC(G), 13 Aug 42; and

Min 806, 45th mtg, 27 Aug 42, with Tab K. (2) See

also, ID, Lend-Lease, I, 231-33.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MUNITIONS POOL 287

munition was 100 million rounds. Each

country interested was then assigned a

certain quantity from each block in a certain order of priority. The first 20 million

rounds might go to the United States,

then 30 million to the United Kingdom,

next 20 million to the USSR, and finally

30 million to the United States. If the first

block, instead of being produced in a

week, took ten days, everyone would

share alike in the effects of the delay. If it

were produced in five days, everyone

would share in the accelerated production.

When some emergency demand had to be

met, wedges could be inserted between

blocks. Suppose after the first block had

been delivered, China had an urgent demand for .30-caliber ammunition and

MAC(G) made the assignment. It would

be inserted as a wedge before deliveries on

the second block were begun.48

The block system could not be applied

to all types of equipment, nor did it serve

as a complete solution where it was. There

was an inevitable tendency for operating

divisions to give priority to special needs of

U.S. forces, regardless of the transfer

directives issued by the International Division. The division's efforts to put an end

to this practice were never completely successful so long as demand exceeded

supply.49

In connection with his agreement with

General Weeks in November 1942, General Somervell worked out with British

General Macready an adaptation of the

block system to long-range assignments

scheduling. Estimated yearly production

of each article would be divided into a

number of blocks, normally between 75

and 125. Each block would then be divided into subblocks for the United Kingdom, United States, the USSR, and

China. The smaller countries for whom

the United States was responsible would

be included in the U.S. block, the dominions, colonies, and other countries in the

British sphere in the United Kingdom

block. In general, the size of each subblock

would be determined by the proportion of

the requirement of that nation to the total

1943 Army Supply Program. To provide a

means whereby paramount operational

needs of one country might be met, provision was made for exchange of subblocks

or insertion of wedges. Under the new system of assignments, these adjustments

would be the principal means by which

MAC(G) would maintain a continuing

relationship between assignments and operational plans.50

 The ground committee

worked out the details, and this ingenious

system was put into effect in February

1943. In practice it soon proved too rigid

since strategic need continued to be the

criterion for action, and MAC(G) reverted

to its older practice of making firm assignments for one month and tentative assignments for two, within the over-all limitations of requirements accepted for each

country in the Army Supply Program.

Whatever the theories of allocation,

assignment by MAC(G), both before and

after the Weeks-Somervell Agreement,

48

 (1) Min 82, 9th mtg MAC(G), 12 Mar 42. (2)

Min 1(e)(iix), 8th mtg MAB, 25 Mar 42. (3) Ltr, Lt

Col Willet J. Baird to P. I. Molchanov, Soviet Purch

Comm, 28 May 42, ID 400.318 USSR Mis File. 49

 (1) Memo, ID for CofOrd, 24 Aug 42, ID

400.318, I. (2) Memo, Col Franks for ACofS for Materiel, 4 Sep 42, sub: Compliance of OCofOrd With

Trf Dirs of MAC(G), ID 400.318 U.K., I. (3) Memo,

Secy for Chm MAC(G), 2 Nov 42, tab to agenda for

57th mtg MAC(G), 5 Nov 42. (4) Min 1156, 57th mtg

MAC(G), 5 Nov 42. 50

 (1) Ltr, Macready to Somervell, 27 Nov 42. (2)

Ltr, Somervell to Macready, 28 Nov 42. Both in ID,

Lend-Lease, Doc Suppl, III. (3) Memo, CG SOS for

Chiefs of Sup Svs, 3 Mar 43, sub: Institution of a

Block System of Asgmts, ID, Lend-Lease, Doc

Suppl, V.
288 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

was an item-by-item problem. The factors

influencing each decision were many and

varied, and normally there were compromises at any and all of the various levels.

Early in 1942 a relatively arbitrary decision was rendered that for the rest of the

year all .30-caliber rifles should be allotted

to the U.S. Army, while the British would

receive all rifle production from a special

.303-caliber line. The allocation of tractors, a type of equipment in critically short

supply for both military and civilian purposes, had to be arranged by a permanent

tractor committee, which planned production schedules and recommended allocations on a quarterly basis. A British request in midsummer 1942 for an increased

allotment of 40-mm. antiaircraft Bofors

guns to protect their cities against lowflying German aircraft ran the whole

gantlet of committees and subcommittees

before a typical compromise decision was

rendered by the MAB.51 Space does not

permit consideration in detail of these and

the manifold other individual assignments

problems. A brief sketch of the allocations

of tanks, the most important single item of

ground equipment, will have to serve as

an illustration of the problems and the

way the assignments machinery met them.

A long lead time was required for tank

production planning, making it necessary

to tie allocations closely to production

plans. The British were most dependent

upon American production for tanks,

their requirements making up almost half

the entire American tank program. In

March 1942, at the invitation of the War

Department, the British sent a group of

tank experts to Washington to meet with

a U.S. tank committee in an effort to

formulate a tank program for the next two

years. The combined conference was

charged with reduction of tank designs to

the fewest compatible with tactical requirements, determination of combat vehicle requirements for all theaters of operations, and adjustments in production

necessary to meet these requirements. The

Americans had already agreed among

themselves that the principal item of tank

production in the United States should be

the M4 medium tank series (popularly

designated the General Sherman), with a

subsidiary production of light tanks. The

British accepted this decision since the

Sherman met their requirement for a

"cruiser" tank to fulfill the mobile role in

armored divisions. However, they also had

large requirements for an "assault" tank—

heavier and less mobile than the cruiser

though armed with the same guns—which

they thought necessary for use in support

of infantry or in attack on fortified positions. The Americans agreed to develop

experimental models of an assault tank,

though their own doctrine recognized no

need for the type. Since all parties agreed

that strategy had not yet developed far

enough to permit formulation of tank requirements on a theater basis, they were

computed solely in bulk for the years 1942

and 1943. Lip service was paid to the

President's tank production goals, but

only by including therein all the various

sorts of armored combat vehicles that used

either the light or medium tank chassis.52

51

 (1) Min 211, 18th mtg MAC(G), 9 Apr 42. (2)

Background papers in English Corresp Lend-lease 2

file; Misc Corresp Lend-lease 3 file; and Col Boone's

file, DAD. (3) For a summary of the tractor problem,

see ID, Lend-Lease, I, 458-67. (4) MBW 22, 11 Aug

42, title: Bofors Guns, Equip, and Am. (5) Memo,

Gen Clay for Subcom MAB, 26 Aug 42, sub: Ground

Com Case 29, AG 400.3295 (4-5-41) (1). (6) Min 2b,

30th mtg MAB, 26 Aug 42; Min 9b, 31st mtg, 2

Sep 42. 52

 (1) Findings and Final Minutes of the Joint British Tank Mission and U.S. Tank Committee, 30 Mar

42, Mis's Sec, Ord Hist files. (2) Memo, unsigned, no

addressee, 13 Jan 42, sub: Decisions Taken and Ob-
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MUNITIONS POOL 289

TABLE 5—PROPOSED TANK PROGRAMS: 1942–43

There were also U.S. requirements for 115 heavy tanks in 1942 and combined requirements for 770 aero tanks in each year. The presidential objective included 500 heavy tanks in 1942 and 5,000 in 1943. For simplicity's sake the table omits other sorts of combat vehicles,

which made total figures match those of the presidential objective.

Source: Findings and Final Minutes of the Joint British Tank Mission and U.S. Tank Committee, 30 Mar 42, Mis's Sec, Ord Hist files.

These production planning estimates

never became a satisfactory basis for allocations. The tank schedules agreed upon

after the London and Moscow Conferences in 1941 were revamped by MAC(G)

in February and extended to the end of

June 1942. But the actual process of assignments became a month-by-month

struggle over the newest and best types,

the British basing their claims on their

needs for the Middle East, and the Americans insisting on training their forces with

the types they were expected to use in

combat. It was not until July, and then at

the behest of the British, that MAC(G)

made any attempt to convert the tank

conference plans into allocation schedules.

The newly formed tank subcommittee

then worked out schedules for the rest of

the year in terms of the conference's production plans, and they were approved by

MAB as "firm to the end of 1942."

 53

As early as October the "firm" plans

began to crumble. For lack of priorities,

servations Made in Conf With . . . . (3) Memo,

Aurand for Moore, 15 Jan 42, sub: Unsigned Memo

Dated 13 Jan 42 . . . . Last two in G-4/31691-1. (4)

Memo, ASW for Gen Moore, 16 Jan 42. (5) Memo,

Somervell for Moore, 16 Jan 42. Last two in Gen Stf

(1) 1941-42 folder, Hq ASF. (6) TAG ltr to Aurand,

6 Mar 42, sub: U.S. Tank Com, AG 334 U.S. Tank

Com (3-6-42). (7) For light, medium, and assault

tanks as approved at the conference, see Table 5.

53

 (1) Min 668, 41st mtg MAC(G), 30 Jul 42. (2)

Min 163, 13th mtg MAC(G), 26 Mar 42; Min 183,

14th mtg, 30 Mar 42; Min 186, 15th mtg, 2 Apr 42;

Min 264, 22d mtg, 24 Apr 42; Min 518, 35th mtg, 22

Jun 42; Min 533, 36th mtg, 2 Jul 42; Min 570, 37th

mtg, 9 Jul 42. (3) Min 37, 7th mtg MAC(G), 26 Feb

42, with Tabs A and B; Min 40, 8th mtg, 9 Mar 42.

(4) Agenda for 10th mtg MAC(G), 16 Mar 42. (5)

Memo, Lt Col George H. Olmstead for CofOrd,

14 Aug 42, sub: Distrib of Light and Medium

Tanks . . . , ID 470.8, I.
290 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

tank production had to be cut back considerably from agreed schedules for the

last quarter of the year. The British accepted a cut in their light tank deliveries

without protest and the principle of a proportionate reduction in medium tanks as

well, but bitterly protested a decision of

the MAC(G) to cut their assignments of

the M4A2 type, which they considered the

most suitable for desert warfare. The issue

was finally settled by a compromise by

which a number of M4A2 tanks destined

for the USSR were diverted to the British,

there being no means of immediately shipping them to Russia. The net result of all

these shifting schedules, however, was that

the British during 1942 got considerably

fewer tanks than they had expected after

the March conference, both in numbers

and in terms of proportion of American

production. Out of a total medium production of 12,936 (March forecast, 14,000)

they received 4,526 (March forecast,

5,777), and out of a total light production

of 10,947 (March forecast, 10,588) they

received 2,331 (March forecast, 3,500).54

The downward revision of tank production schedules for 1943 had graver implications and created the only serious crisis

of the Weeks-Somervell negotiations. At a

second tank conference, held in London in

August 1942, the British agreed to drop

their requirements for 8,500 assault tanks,

but asked that this figure be added to their

1943 requirements for mediums to make a

total of 22,993. When General Weeks got

to Washington in November he found that

General Somervell was not ready to accept even half that figure. The President's

goal of 50,000, Somervell calculated,

would have to be reduced to 35,500. U.S.

requirements were lowered to 9,000, the

Soviet figure set at 4,500, other lend-lease

at 2,000, self-propelled vehicles using the

medium tank chassis at 10,000, leaving

10,000 as the maximum figure for the

British. General Weeks protested violently

that 12,000 was the absolute rock bottom

the British could consider, and asked that

the production goal be set at 40,000. He

hinted broadly in a letter to Somervell

that he would ask Lyttelton to take the

matter up with higher authorities. Incensed, Somervell, who insisted Weeks was

asking the impossible, pointed out that the

British, from their own and American

production, were asking for double the

number of tanks required by American

forces. Through Harry Hopkins he appealed to the President to support the

position taken by the War Department.

There is no record of any decision by the

President, except that in a letter to

Churchill he suggested that both countries

were underrating the need for medium

tanks. The Weeks-Somervell Agreement

stated both the British and the American

positions, and stipulated that a review of

the raw material situation should take

place on 1 April 1943 with a view to determining if the goal of 40,000 could be

met. In the interim, actual production

would be assigned at a ratio often medium

tanks for the British to nine for the Americans. Before April, a reduction in Soviet

requirements made it possible to accept

the British figure of 12,000 medium tanks

54

 (1) Min 1022, 53d mtg MAC(G), 8 Oct 42. (2)

Memo, Chm MAC(G) for Exec Off MAB, 3 Nov 42,

sub: Readjustment of 4th Quarter 1942 Asgmt Medium Tanks, MAB folder, Hq ASF. (3) Min 3a, 40th

mtg MAB, 4 Nov 42; Min 5a, 41st mtg, 11 Nov 42.

(4) Min 1184, 58th mtg MAC(G), 12 Nov 42; Min

1244, 63d mtg, 26 Nov 42; Min 1273, 64th mtg, 7 Dec

42. (5) See tables in Hist of Lend-lease Tanks 11 Mar

41-31 Dec 44 file, ID. (6) For production figures, see

below, App. B. (7) See also below, Ch. XXI, for the

tank problem re the Soviet Union.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MUNITIONS POOL 291

for 1943 without any change in production

plans.55

The Adjustment of Assignments

and Shipping

In framing CCS 50/2, the planners

deliberately chose to recognize strategic

need as the basis for assignments rather

than the availability of shipping as General Somervell had suggested in January

1942. This decision reflected a general

agreement that shipping should not be

allowed to dictate strategic requirements,

but must rather be treated as one of the

several governing factors determining

their feasibility. The adjustment of assignments to shipping was left as a matter for

the MAB and its committees to work out

without any specific directive from the

CCS. Since shipping allocations and arrangements were made by other agencies,

neither the Army nor the MAB could

control the volume of shipping available,

nor, on occasions, even accurately estimate

what it would be. They had therefore to

proceed from the other end to adjust the

rate of assignments to the availability of

shipping on a short-term basis and to devise means to prevent accumulations of

unshipped assignments.

The Army took the position that either

goods should be shipped by the nation to

whom they were assigned in a reasonable

length of time or they should be repossessed for American use or assignment to

some other lend-lease claimant. This policy was aimed not so much at increasing

the Army's stocks as at keeping the ports

clear, insuring an effort by foreign governments to expedite shipment, and providing a guide for future assignments in terms

of ability to float.56 The first policy promulgated by the War Department in January 1942 provided for optional repossession by the U.S. Army of goods awaiting

transport for more than thirty days. This

system produced little more than confusion since the supply services did not at

first understand it and were in no position

to make the reports required; the time

limit of thirty days proved too short in

view of a shipping cycle that averaged

forty-five to fifty days. Experience with

the 30-Day Rule led General Aurand and

General Somervell to recommend to MAB

a 45-day time limit, with mandatory

rather than optional repossession at the

end of that period.57

In June a special committee of MAB

decided on a more flexible policy and one

more favorable to lend-lease recipients.

Material held for forty-five days was to be

reported for possible repossession, but the

MAB would render an individual decision

after reviewing the circumstances in each

case. Under the procedure finally set up,

the various supply services made biweekly

55

 (1) United States Technical Mission, Joint Report and Findings, 26 Aug 42, Mis's Sec, Ord Hist

files. (2) Memo, Somervell for Hopkins, 11 Nov 42,

Harry L. Hopkins folder, Hq ASF. (3) Ltr, Weeks to

Somervell, 11 Nov 42. (4) Ltr, Somervell to Weeks,

12 Nov 42. (5) Ltr, Somervell to Gen Sir Walter Venning, Dir-Gen Br Ministry of Sup Mis, 26 Feb 43.

Last three in Br folder, Hq ASF. (6) Min 1439, 69th

mtg MAC(G), 7 Jan 43. (7) Ltr, Venning to Somervell, 18 Mar 43, ID 470.8 U.K., I. (8) On reduction

in Soviet requirements, see below, Ch. XXI. 56

 Memo, Gen Clay for CG SOS, 19 Oct 42, sub:

Opn of 45-Day Rule, ID 319.1 Rpts Storage, I. 57

 (1) Memo, USW for Chiefs of SAS, 3 Jan 42,

sub: Trf of Def Articles to Foreign Govts, ID, LendLease, Doc Suppl, II. (2) TAG ltr to Chiefs of SAS,

27 Feb 42, same sub, AG 681 (2-19-42). (3) Backing

papers in Misc Stf Studies, Case Lend-lease 10A,

DAD. (4) Memo, Aurand for all DAD offs, 24 Feb 42,

sub: One Month's Accumulation of Sups. (5) Memo,

Maj William W. Goodman, Chief of Progress Sec

DAD, for Aurand, 5 Jun 42, sub: Unshipped Items

Held Thirty Days or Longer. Last two in ID 319.1

Rpts Storage, I. (6) Min 372, 29th mtg MAC(G), 18

May 42; Min 378, 30th mtg, 21 May 42. (7) Min 5,

18th mtg MAB, 3 Jun 42.
292 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

reports to MAC(G) of material made

available to foreign governments and not

shipped within forty-five days of the notice

of availability. MAC(G) then made recommendations to MAB for repossession,

reassignment, or extension of the time for

shipping, and the MAB, as in the case of

the original assignments, rendered the

final decision.58 The 45-Day Rule was put

into effect just at a time when congestion

at the ports was becoming dangerous, and

there can be no doubt that it played an

important part in clearing up the situation. Yet it was the general application of

pressure under the rule and not its literal

interpretation or efficient operation that

accomplished this result. The first reports

rendered by the supply services were so

flagrantly inaccurate that MAC(G) refused to make any positive recommendations on them. It was not until after the

procedures had been streamlined within

the SOS and special subcommittees set up

within MAC(G) that reporting became

sufficiently accurate to permit intelligent

action.59

Even with improved reporting, there

were other aspects of administration of the

45-Day Rule that made it a cumbersome

method of accomplishing the purpose for

which it was intended. Repossession of

noncommon items seldom served any useful purpose, for they were usually designed

and manufactured for one specific nation

and could not serve another. Even on

common items, material for lend-lease

had to be physically segregated and given

special markings and packing. Repossession then necessitated repacking, remarking, and sometimes transshipment all the

way across the country to a new port of

exit. Since, in accordance with MAB

policy, assignments were usually made to

replace any material repossessed, the

whole process took on a certain air of futility.60

 This situation led inevitably to

leniency in the enforcement of the rule.

The supply services usually gave a very

liberal interpretation to the date of availability, from which the forty-five days

were to be calculated, and excluded from

the reports material about to be shipped

even though it had been held too long.

Processing through the munitions assignments machinery delayed the actual act

of repossession to an average of from sixtysix to seventy-three days rather than the

prescribed forty-five. The ground committee and the board granted frequent extensions of time where the circumstances

seemed to justify it. Actual repossessions in

the end were limited. On the other hand,

the effect of the pressure exerted by the

rule is exemplified by the gradual decrease in the number of items reported. At

the end of October 1942 the SOS informed the MAB that the 45-Day Rule

was fulfilling its fundamental purposes of

effectively clearing ports and storage

areas, diverting needed materials from

storage to use, and assisting in establishing levels for assignment.61

The British did not share this satisfaction and looked on the rule with some misgivings. It was not always possible to provide shipping within the time limit prescribed, even when the requirement for a

58

 (1) Min 5, 19th mtg MAB, 10 Jun 42. (2) Min

462, 34th mtg MAC(G), 15 Jun 42; ltr, Aurand to

Chiefs of Sup Svs, 10 Jun 42, sub: Reporting of Lendlease Mat Not Floated for 45 Days, Tab B to min; and

see also Tabs C and E to min. (3) Min 556, 36th mtg

MAC(G), 2 Jul 42. (4) ID, Lend-Lease, I, 645-57. 59

 (1) See above, Ch. X. (2) ID, Lend-Lease, I,

647-48. (3) Min 514, 35th mtg MAC(G), 22 Jun 42.

(4) Min, Hq ASF stf conf mtg, 26 Jun 42. 60

 (1) ID, Lend-Lease, I, 647-49, 659-61. (2) 1st

Ind, MAB to MAC(G), 11 Jun 42, Tab E to min, 34th

mtg MAC(G), 15 Jun 42. 61

 MBW 9/2, 31 Oct 42, title: Repossession of

Equip Awaiting Shipt for More Than 45 Days.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MUNITIONS POOL 293

British theater was a most urgent one.

There were particular difficulties in floating very heavy equipment—large trucks,

tank transporters, locomotives, tractors,

tanks, and heavy engineer equipment—

and it was in these very categories that the

British were most dependent upon American production. They were engaged in

supplying theaters in widely scattered

parts of the globe—India, Africa, Australia, and the Middle East as well as the

United Kingdom itself—and they preferred to ship directly from the United

States to these outlying theaters rather

than to transship via the British Isles.

Sailings to some of these points were infrequent and it was exceedingly difficult

to operate within the limits of the 45-Day

Rule. Even though the Americans were

lenient in its interpretation, there would

always be cases where they might use the

rule to repossess particularly critical items

that both countries needed badly. Brigadier Campion in August proposed that the

purposes behind the rule could be better

achieved by regulation of assignments

than by repossession. He suggested establishment of allowable cushions for each

item, consisting of an estimated thirty

days' to forty-five days' assignment. When

unshipped material exceeded this cushion,

then the next month's assignments should

be curbed in proportion. These adjustments would be made on a short-term

basis, with the long-term assignments to

balance long-term requirements. There

Was a good deal of logic in the British proposal, but the Americans rejected it,

evidently because the 45-Day Rule was

just becoming effective and to institute a

new system would produce administrative

confusion. In connection with the WeeksSomervell Agreement and the block system of assignments, General Macready

again proposed that the 45-Day Rule be

abolished and shipping adjustments made

by the exchange of subblocks, but again

the Americans would not agree.62

Nevertheless, the Americans did apply

the cushion policy to motor vehicles, always the most serious backlog because of

the large amount of space required for

their shipment. Despite intensive efforts to

promote economy in the shipment of motor vehicles, the unshipped backlog

mounted constantly during the spring and

summer of 1942. Consequently, when it

became necessary in August to reduce

lend-lease vehicular requirements in the

Army Supply Program, General Clay

moved to do so by using as a criterion the

proven ability of the countries concerned

to ship them. It was to implement this

principle in making assignments that

MAC(G) in September established allowable "cushions" or unshipped backlogs for

each type of motor vehicle consisting of a

normal one and a half months' assignment. By regulating the rate of assignment,

this unshipped backlog was subsequently

kept fairly constant. The British asked for

a ninety-day cushion for all vehicles of five

tons and over, but the MAB allowed it

only for the very heaviest types—20-ton

and 40-ton tank transporters.63

62

 (1) Memo, Br rep MAC(G) for Chm, 31 Jul 42,

sub: 45 Day Rule, Tab 19 to agenda for 42d mtg

MAC(G), 6 Aug 42. (2) Min 717, 42d mtg MAG(G),

6 Aug 42; Min 776, 44th mtg, 20 Aug 42. (3) Ltr

cited n. 50(1). 63

 (1) Min 787, 44th mtg MAC(G), 20 Aug 42;

Min 803, 45th mtg, 27 Aug 42; Min 1022, 53d mtg,

8 Oct 42; Min 1057, 54th mtg, 15 Oct 42. (2) Min 2b,

39th mtg MAB, 28 Oct 42. (3) Memo, Col Franks for

Gen Clay, 29 Aug 42, sub: Wheeled Vehicle Pdn

Reqmts for International Aid, ID 451.01, I. (4)

Memo, Secy for Chm MAC(G), 29 Sep 42, sub: Repossession of Motor Vehicle Backlog, Tab B to min,

52d mtg MAC(G), 1 Oct 42. (5) Rpt of Subcom on

Vehicles to 54th mtg MAC(G), 15 Oct 42.
294 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

British troubles in shipping heavy

equipment led to other special exceptions.

Locomotives and related rail transportation stores were exempted entirely from

operation of the rule. In December 1942

the Americans moved aggressively to repossess quantities of road construction machinery assigned to the British for west

Africa in order to meet needs for the

Alcan Highway and the Persian Gulf. The

resulting controversy was finally settled

by an MAB compromise establishing a rule

that the repossession date for heavy engineering equipment should be ninety

days rather than forty-five where there

was no other demand for the item, where

it was manufactured to meet exceptional

needs, or where, as in the case of west

Africa, sailings were infrequent.64

A further exception to the 45-Day Rule

was made on 1 May 1943 for ammunition.

A "credit balance system" was established

for ammunition under which it was not

physically segregated on assignment but

only when called forward to port for shipment. Issues were made by Ordnance

depots against credits established by assignment. This system eliminated the

necessity for repossession since ammunition remained under U.S. Army control

until shipping was available, and it also

eliminated a great deal of crosshauling

and transshipment.65 It was the most

practical method of all for handling lendlease transfers and adjusting them to shipping, but unfortunately it could only be

applied to such bulk items as ammunition.

In no aspect of its operations did the

Anglo-American machinery for allocations find that its decisions could be cut

too closely to a pattern. Allocations had to

be made on a short-term basis and guided

by many varied factors, of which strategic

need and shipping availability were usually the most important. Long-range requirements planning based on strategic

plans never became the guide to assignments, both because of difficulties in resolving American and British views and

because of the inherent difficulty in determining such requirements. Even bilateral

agreements had to be adjusted to changing strategic conditions and production

realities. Yet by the end of 1942, if the

ideal theories of the early part of the year

looking toward allocation of Anglo-American resources as a genuine common pool

had proven inapplicable, still the assignments process as it evolved represented as

practicable a version of pooling as could

be devised as long as divergent national

interests existed and each nation wished

to maintain a certain measure of control

over the disposition of its own resources.

Granted that the British did not get as

great a proportion of American production during 1942 as they had hoped, still

most of their urgent strategic requirements

were satisfied and munitions withheld

played their part in preparing the U.S.

Army for the great campaigns of the next

two years.

64

 (1) Min 1290, 64th mtg MAC(G), 7 Dec 42; Min

1536, 75th mtg, 5 Feb 43. (2) Min 2a, 45th mtg MAB,

9 Dec 42; Min 4, 48th mtg, 10 Jan 43. (3) Memo, Col

Franks for CG SOS, 8 Dec 42, sub: . . . Items for

Consideration at 45th Mtg MAB, ID 334 MAC(G), I. 65

 ID, Lend-Lease, I, 438-43, 650-51.
CHAPTER XII

The Army's System of

Requirements and Controlled

Distribution

Two of the main ingredients that logistics contributes to the support of an army's

operations are the weapons, equipment,

and supplies used by forces at home and

abroad, and the technical and administrative services that keep equipment operating and armies functioning. To the mechanisms by which the U.S. Army attempted

to meet its requirements in matériel and

service personnel in 1942, this chapter and

the one that follows are devoted. The

present chapter deals with the development of the system of formulating matériel requirements and the policies for

controlling distribution of the scarcer categories of matériel within the Army. In the

next, the focus shifts more explicitly to the

methods and means of supporting military

operations overseas.

The Army Supply Program

The emergence of a standardized, comprehensive Army Supply Program coincided roughly with that of the Army's new

logistical organization.1 General Somervell who, first as G-4 and then as chief of

the Services of Supply, was in a position to

influence the development of the program,

set forth his ideas on the subject late in

January 1942 while Goldthwaite Dorr's

informal committee was making its study

of War Department supply organization.

The existing "expenditure programs,"

since August 1940 the basic periodic statement of the Army's supply requirements,

were limited mainly to equipment, omitting such important categories of supply as

construction materials, subsistence, fuel,

and spare parts. Army-type matériel procured for the Navy and lend-lease was

also omitted. The expenditure programs,

finally, were short-range projections, tied

to specific appropriations, and they indicated only terminal not intermediate objectives—that is, they did not schedule

requirements. Somervell wanted to bring

together in one program, drawn up in

G-4, all the requirements for which the

Army was responsible, and to make that

program serve as a directive to the procuring agencies, as a basis for planning,

and as a vehicle for defending appropriations before Congress.2

1

 See above, Ch. IX. 2

 (1) Memo, G-4 for DCofS, 22 Jan 42, sub: Army

Supply Program, CofS WDGS 1941-42 folder, Hq

ASF. (2) Goldthwaite H. Dorr, Memorandum Notes

on the Activities of an Informal Group in Connection

With Supply Reorganization in the War Department,

January-May 1942, circa 1 Mar 46, pp. 7-8, OCMH.

(3) S. M. Frank, The Determination of Army Supply

Requirements, MS (hereafter cited as Frank, Army

Supply Requirements), pp. 1-15 and Doc 8, OCMH.

(4) Hq ASF, Background of the Army Supply Program (1944), pp. 11-14 and Chart 6B, Sp Reference

Collection 102, DRB AGO.
296 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

The huge War Munitions Program of

11 February was not what Somervell had

in mind; produced in haste, it set forth

only ultimate objectives and omitted

Army-produced Navy requirements and

stocks on hand. But the immense labor of

formulating the detailed long-range compilation described in Somervell's memorandum to General Moore was already in

train. After the War Department reorganization of 9 March, the Requirements Division of the new Services of Supply took

over the task of formulating the Army

Supply Program. Its first emission, Section

III covering miscellaneous and expendable supplies, appeared on 17 March;

Section I, the most important, covering

ground equipment, on 6 April, and Section II, air equipment, on 9 April, both

exclusive of aircraft; Section V, construction materials, on 11 April; Section IV,

air force supplies, on 4 July; and Section

VI, miscellaneous noncommon items for

lend-lease, on 1 September.3

At the outset, an important decision

had to be made as to the proper basis for

computing requirements for U.S. Army

forces. War material would be used mainly

and would be most needed in the theaters

of war. To many, it seemed logical that requirements should be calculated primarily

on the basis of the estimated needs of

forces expected to be employed in the various theaters, with additional allowances

for forces to be retained in line of communication areas and in the zone of interior, for replacement of losses, and for

continuous resupply of expendable items.

Since the preceding September, however,

the American planners had consistently

rejected this method, which the British

favored, as a basis for determining interallied requirements, primarily because it

would have favored British forces, already

extensively deployed overseas, at the expense of the training needs of American

forces at home.4

To determine requirements by theater

would also raise the obvious question of

whether deployment and operations could

in fact be planned one or two years in advance in sufficient detail for the purpose—

or whether, indeed, they could be planned

at all so far ahead. American planners

doubted this. Under British pressure in

March and April 1942 the American

planners drew up projected deployment

tables for U.S. troops to accompany the

directive issued by the CCS late in March

to govern munitions assignments.5 OPD's

comment somewhat later on these tables

was that "these data do not represent in

any sense U.S. Army requirements, nor

do they represent firm requirements for

any particular theater except as of this

date and hour."

 6 From the beginning of

1942 OPD issued a Weekly Status Map

showing current and projected numerical

strengths in each theater, and during the

spring began to put out in addition an

overseas troop basis showing Army units

overseas by location and destination, and

lists of units earmarked for movement

overseas. All these projections were highly

unstable, although for line of communication bases and inactive areas OPD could

sometimes provide the supply staffs with

3

 (1) Frank, Army Supply Requirements, pp. 22-

32 and Docs 20, 33. (2) The six sections were later

reduced to four by combining the ground force sections (I and III) and the air force sections (II and IV)

into one section each; Section VI then became III,

and V became IV. See Annual Report of the Army Service Forces, 1943, p. 16. (3) For the War Munitions Program of 11 February, see above, Ch. VIII. 4

 See above, Chs. V, XI. 5

 CCS 50/2, 24 Mar 42, title: Dir for Asgmt of

Mun, with apps. For discussion, see above, Ch. XI. 6

 Memo, OPD for Chm MAB, 12 Jun 42, sub:

Reqmts for U.S. Theaters . . . , ID 334 MAB, I.
REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLLED DISTRIBUTION 297

fairly stable figures on projected garrison

strengths five or six months ahead. Predictions of forces to be in major theaters

more than a few weeks ahead were only

guesswork.7 Referring to the overseas

troop basis, an OPD officer irritably told

an SOS representative "only a gullible

person would take this publication seriously."

 8 Supply planners were left in an

unhappy dilemma for, as an SOS diary

plaintively noted, "no further basis for

supply planning for overseas theaters has

been furnished by OPD."

 9

Instructions issued to the supply services

in September 1942 for the computation of

supply requirements included a provision

to cover the needs of "task forces and

special operational plans . . . wherever

advanced planning permits."

 10

 But advanced planning, until late in 1943, did

not so permit. A large part of these special

requirements was for equipment and supplies of irregular issue (Class IV), primarily construction material, which could

not be based on numbers of troops or types

of units. Late in 1942 the first steps were

taken toward formulating "operational

projects" for certain theaters—plans for

specific logistical undertakings, usually involving construction, with lists of equipment and material that would be needed

if and when they were carried out. The

operational project system did not embrace a significant proportion of total supply requirements until late in 1943; during 1942 the supply services either made

"general estimates" of this type of requirements or no provision at all.11

 Some of the

supply programs of 1942 did, however, include special provisions for specific items,

such as cold weather clothing that would

be needed only in particular areas, requirements being based on rough estimates of the number of troops to be so outfitted. Late in 1942 a substantial shift of

emphasis in artillery procurement resulted

from the General Staff's conclusion that

lighter types would be more effective in

jungle warfare.12

From spring of 1942 on General Somervell's planning staff also began, largely

without guidance from the strategists, to

explore the requirements of hypothetical

future overseas operations in order to

have ready-made bills of particulars to

present if and when these operations

should be undertaken. In August 1942

Somervell set up an office in his headquarters to handle this more or less speculative logistical planning—or "strategic

logistics," as it was labeled—which, according to a later report, was "believed to

be logical and in consonance with plans

under consideration by the Joint and

Combined Chiefs of Staff."

 13

 But these

excursions in long-range planning by an

agency the General Staff regarded as

"operating" not "staff" were viewed with

scant favor on levels higher than the SOS.

7

 (1) Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 87, 129.

(2) 1st Ind, Hq SOS for TQMG, 7 Apr 42, to memo,

TQMG for CG SOS, 18 Mar 42, sub: Strength, Overseas Bases, QM 400 PC-WP. 8

 Plng Br SOS Diary, 25 Apr 42 entry, Plng Div

ASF. 9

 Ibid.

10

 SOS Admin Memo 38, 16 Sep 42, sub: Proced

for Determination and Admin of ASP, in Frank,

Army Supply Requirements, Doc 26. 11

 (1) Memo, USW. for Chiefs of SAS, 5 Feb 42,

sub: Equip Sec of ASP, WPD 4321-12. (2) G-4 off

memo, Exec Off for named offs, 7 Apr 42, G-4/400.

(3) History of the Planning Division, ASF, MS, Vol.

I, Ch. XIII, OCMH. 12

 (1) Frank, Army Supply Requirements, Doc 39.

(2) Annual Report of the Army Service Forces, 1943, pp.

20-21. 13

 (1) Logistics in World War II, p. 59. (2) History of

the Planning Division, ASF, Vol. I, p. 11; Vol. II, Ch.

XVI, OCMH. (3) Memo, Somervell for Lutes, 15

May 42, Misc Notes, Lutes File. (4) See above, Ch.

IX.
298 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

In general, supply programs in 1942

and 1943 excluded theater requirements

as such. They were submerged in total

estimated needs of forces set forth without

indication of their destined employment

in the Victory Program Troop Basis.

There were those who continued to regard

this method as unrealistic, among them

General Lutes who declared in September

1942, when shortages of equipment were

creating a crisis in training and the equipping of task forces:

A requirements program based purely on an over-all troop basis will not meet war requirements. All the probable theater plans

should have been used to build up a list of

both ordinary and special requirements for

each theater in order of priority, and a program of production and procurement initiated for that purpose, even if it appeared

beyond the capacity of industry.14

Others, including Colonel Aurand, rejected both troop basis and theater plans

as an avenue for determining total requirements. Aurand urged, instead, the establishing of desired proportions among the

various types of munitions based on "the

general view of the war [and] the theaters

in which the war will be fought," and concentration, within these proportions, upon

achieving a maximum monthly output.15

But the weight of opinion among SOS

staff officers, including Brig. Gen. Walter

A. Wood, Jr., the director of Requirements Division, was that the over-all troop

basis offered the most durable foundation

on which to build a system of requirements. This was also Somervell's view.

"Requirements cannot be measured or

determined," he asserted, "by theaters of

operation. It is the availability of trained

and equipped troops, with ample over-all

reserves, which will enable us to take the

initiative."

 16

The Method of Calculating Requirements

Calculations based on a single troop

basis were simpler than those based on a

complex of overlapping and unstable

theater plans, theater troop bases, special

projects, and deployment schedules, but

the process was intricate enough to absorb

the full attention of a large staff in SOS

headquarters and in each supply service.

To calculate initial allowances of equipment was relatively simple, involving

merely the multiplication of prescribed

allowances of each item to each soldier or

troop unit type by the total number of

soldiers or of units of each type in the troop

basis. Far more complex, uncertain, and

arbitrary was the calculation of quantities

of equipment needed for replacing losses

and for filling the supply pipeline, and

quantities of expendable material needed

for continuous resupply.17

The calculation of maintenance requirements involved the use of a "maintenance factor," a percentage figure representing, for each item of equipment, the

average rate per month at which it would

have to be replaced after it had been put

in the hands of its users, under all the

hazards of deterioration, loss, destruction,

14

 Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 30 Sep 42, Misc

Notes, Lutes File. 15

 Memo, Aurand for Somervell, 24 Jan 42, sub:

Army Supply Program, MAB Orgn file, DAD. 16

 (1) Memo, Somervell for Burns, 15 Aug 42, sub:

Relationship of WD to MAB and CPRB, MAB folder, Hq ASF. (2) Ltr, Gen Wood to Maj Gen Orlando

Ward, 9 Sep 52, OCMH. 17

 During 1942 and most of 1943 the term "maintenance" was used to mean replacement of losses. It

also was used throughout the war to refer to the care

and repair of equipment. In a more general sense it

referred to the continuous supply of expendable articles such as ammunition and fuel, as well as replacement of equipment; but "maintenance factor" was

used only in connection with the latter. Late in 1943

the term "replacement" was officially adopted to

designate the resupply of complete items in this sense.
REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLLED DISTRIBUTION 299

and damage beyond repair. Most items

had two maintenance factors, one (usually

quite low) for use in the zone of interior,

and one for use overseas. The theater

maintenance factor, if applied to the total

quantity of an item actually in a theater,

would give the additional quantity that

would have to be provided to replace

losses there during an average month

of use—for example, if an artillery piece

had a maintenance factor of 3 percent

and there were a hundred in the theater,

three new pieces would have to be supplied each month. Actually in Army

Supply Program calculations the theater

maintenance factor was applied rather to

the total initial issue of each item for the

whole troop basis, and the resulting figure

was multiplied by a given number of

months, estimated as necessary to provide

sufficient maintenance quantities to support all the forces expected to be overseas

during the period of a year. Thus, in the

above example (assuming a total initial

issue of ten thousand and a prescribed

three months of maintenance), nine hundred pieces would be provided in the

Army Supply Program to make good expected losses in overseas theaters over a

period of a year. A similar procedure was

followed in computing zone of interior

maintenance. The prescribed number of

months in each case, it can be seen, was

only an arithmetical expedient; the same

results could have been produced by computing twelve months of maintenance for

the forces expected actually to be in overseas theaters or in the zone of interior.

Closely related to the maintenance factor was the "day of supply," representing

the average daily consumption of various

expendable items of supply. For ammunition it was expressed in terms of rounds

fired per weapon per day, as a general

average for all theaters of operations; ammunition allowances for training in the

United States were computed as a fixed

number of rounds per year for a given

number of troops, representing, of course,

a far lower rate of expenditure than the

theater day of supply. Food requirements

were computed as multiples of the ration,

the average quantity consumed by a single

soldier in a single day. Fuel requirements

were based on the estimated average daily

consumption of each vehicle.18 In the

Army Supply Program the day of supply

thus represented multiples of rounds, rations, and other units of measure.

Beyond the amounts of equipment and

supplies that the Army needed to keep operating, additional amounts had to be

produced to fill the pipeline. In order that

there might be a pair of boots at hand to

issue to a soldier overseas as soon as his old

pair wore out, there must be boots at all

times in theater depots, boots in transit,

and boots in depots in the United States.

These additional pipeline allowances were

provided for in requirements computations during 1942 and part of 1943 by a

"distribution factor," expressed as a percentage of total initial requirements.19

18

 The term, "day of supply," in the present context, was used for purposes of procurement requirements and referred to supplies only. The same term

and the term "month of supply" were also used in a

broader sense in distribution calculations referring

to both supplies and equipment. Thus, thirty days of

supply stocked in a depot might include quantities of

all types of material sufficient to replace equipment

losses and to maintain continuous resupply of the

forces dependent upon the depot for that period of

time. See below, App. F. 19

 (1) Contl Div, SOS, Instruction Manual for

Computation of Section 1 of the Army Supply Program, January 1943, Reqmts folder, Logis File,

OCMH. (2) Report of the War Department Procurement Review Board, 31 Aug 43 (hereafter cited as

Report of WD Procurement Review Board), pp. 18-

21, in WD, Levels of Supply and Supply Procedures,

1 Jan 44, Vol. I, Plng Div ASF, Job A47-192.
300 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Thus, the entire "life span" of a rifle or

a bullet or a K ration, from the time it

emerged from a factory to its "death"

through expenditure, loss, or wear, was

anticipated in the calculation of requirements by two sets of factors—"pipeline"

(distribution) factors, covering movement

through the channels of supply, and "use"

(maintenance and day of supply) factors,

covering the periods of actual service.

Pipeline factors, during 1942 and part of

1943, were a kind of insurance designed to

set production at sufficiently high levels to

pour munitions into the empty distribution system in greater volume than they

were being spewed forth and expended at

the other end. In time the pipeline would

become full, and each bullet or replacement rifle needed in the combat zone

could be drawn from stocks close at hand,

which in turn could be replenished from

stocks farther to the rear. When this stage

was reached, the rate of flow through the

pipeline would approximately match the

rate of expenditure, and procurement for

the pipeline could safely be stopped. With

a full and flowing pipeline, sudden losses or

increased expenditure could be absorbed

for a time by accumulated reserves; if the

trend persisted, production could again be

expanded. In 1942, however, large segments of the pipeline were void, most theater stocks were at low levels, and the

"leakage" of ship sinkings along the ocean

gap, where supplies could not be stocked

at all, threatened to dry up the flow altogether. For many a needed item, troops

overseas had to reach back all the way to

a factory in the United States.

Both pipeline and use factors, in most

instances, were established separately for

individual items or groups of items. Ammunition for each weapon had its own

day of supply, with a percentage breakdown by types (armor-piercing, tracer,

and so forth); the day of supply for fuel

and food, on the other hand, was less differentiated. Maintenance factors were

established for many individual items of

equipment, though they tended to be

identical for broad classes. Distribution

factors, generally for classes rather than

individual items, ranged from 5 to 90 percent in the supply programs of 1942 and

early 1943.20

The factors were not differentiated

horizontally, as they were vertically. Separate factors were employed for use in the

zone of interior and the theaters, but

otherwise each pipeline and use factor

represented a weighted average of the

probabilities covering all the demands

that might have to be met throughout the

entire process of distribution or use.

Ideally, each weighted average should

have been arrived at through scientific

study of a wide range of experience data

together with careful analysis of probable

future conditions, but the uncertainty of

strategic plans in 1942 ruled out systematic study of the specific conditions of

climate, terrain, and intensity of action to

which material might be subjected in future campaigns. As for the lessons of past

experience, technical analysis in 1941 and

1942 of the performance of material in the

field only nibbled at the edge of the problem. Theater commanders were lax or

sporadic in reporting on the performance

of matériel under combat conditions and

were inclined generally to overemphasize

20

 Report of the War Department Special Committee for Restudy of Reserves, 13 Nov 43, p. 56, in WD,

Levels of Supply and Supply Procedures, I, cited n.

19(2).

For authorized levels of supply and content of the

unit of fire and day of supply of ammunition, see below, App. F.
REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLLED DISTRIBUTION 301

data based on short periods of combat,

when attrition was heavy, in recommending weighted average use factors. Until

late in 1943 ammunition expenditure

tables used in the field (except those for

antiaircraft ammunition) were based on

"such statistics as are available from

World War [I] sources."

 21

 In the day of

supply tables used for procurement planning, certain changes had been made before 1942—for example, increases for

small arms ammunition to reflect wider

use of automatic weapons—but for the

most part the tables continued to reflect

the experience of World War I.

Pipeline factors were similarly uncertain. The time normally required to move

war material through certain portions of

the pipeline could be measured and averaged with fair precision—for example,

fifteen days in transit time in the United

States, forty-five days for movement to the

theater. But the rate of movement through

the theater distribution system was less

predictable, and only arbitrary allowances

could be made for abnormal losses and

delays and disruption of communications

by enemy action. For ship sinkings, in fact,

a separate allowance of about 2.5 percent

was made during 1942, over and above

the separate distribution factors. And in

the last analysis pipeline factors necessarily reflected the inaccuracy of use factors,

since these had to be employed in computing the actual quantities to be stocked in

theater and zone of interior depots and to

be kept moving between storage points,

even though the total requirements set up

in the supply program for distribution

purposes were computed as flat percentages of initial allowances.22

As official instructions early in 1943 admitted, pipeline and use factors were no

more than "reasonable assumptions."

Experience data are not yet available in

quantities sufficient to permit the actuarial

determination of these factors . . . Both

maintenance and distribution factors repre- sent the resultant of a number of variable

factors which can neither be determined nor

predicted in advance. The relative effect of

each variable upon the overall factors is con- tinually shifting.23

It was the task of the supply services,

under the supervision of SOS Requirements Division, both to determine pipeline and use factors for the items of supply

each procured and to keep these factors

under continuous study. The results were

not encouraging. A special board reviewing the methods of determining requirements in the summer of 1943 pointed out

that, after a year and a half of war, distribution factors were still set arbitrarily,

and maintenance and day of supply factors, which "were originally assumptions

and still are," were no more than "knowledgeful estimates and educated guesses."

 24

Development of the Army Supply Program

in 1942

During 1942 the Army Supply Program, as expected, proved to be highly

unstable. The troop basis, to which it was

tied, was in a state of flux. In May the

President authorized an increase of 750,-

000 men for the current year, primarily

to meet the demands of the European invasion plan; by November another 650,-

000 had been added, largely recognizing 21

 FM 101-10, Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organizational, Technical and Logistical Data, Jun 41, par.

93. This manual was revised for instructional purposes in November 1942, and was revised and republished in October 1943. 22

 (1) Report of WD Procurement Review Board,

pp. 17-21, 33-44. (2) Rpt, pp. 45-63, cited n. 20. 23

 Instruction Manual cited n. 19. 24

 Report of WD Procurement Review Board, pp.

46-49; first quote from p. 48, second from p. 46.
302 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

overdrafts already made, and bringing the

ceiling for 1942 to about 5 million. Some

of these increases were advance drafts on

the 1943 troop basis. In November 1942

the 1943 ceiling was fixed at about 8.2

million, including officer strength, or 7.5

million enlisted men, far below the 8.9

million contemplated by the Victory Program early in the year. Within these numerical fluctuations the internal composition of the troop basis changed frequently

and radically, abandoning the earlier emphasis on armor and building up combat

and service support, while reducing the

planned total of divisions and expanding

air power generally at the expense of

ground combat forces. At the end of 1942

the troop basis envisaged a ground army

of only one hundred divisions, instead of

the two hundred or more in earlier plans;

the original goal of sixty-seven armored

divisions had dwindled to twenty. In mid1942 the chief of OPD confessed:

We cannot figure now what troops we will

need six months from now, or where we will

have to use them. . . . no one should get

the impression that we could set up a theoretical troop basis and stick to it for any

length of time. . . . the desire of everyone

to have some fixed goal to operate toward

[is natural] but in this war it [is] impossible

to establish any fixed troop basis.25

It had been intended that the whole

Army Supply Program would be recomputed annually, but during the first four

months of 1942 four sections had to be revised completely to keep pace with

changes in the troop basis and allowance

tables and to reflect limitations in raw materials (such as rubber) and plant facilities.

In September quarterly revisions were directed. In ground army requirements, the

most important interim changes were the

revisions of the ground equipment program on 29 May and 1 September.26

The generally downward trend of the

ground Army's requirements in supply

programs during 1942 owed something to

successive eliminations of "cushions" that

had padded the program against unforeseen contingencies. Requirements for

some initial-issue equipment were reduced

across the board, though not below what

was considered a safe level for the number

of troops expected actually to be under

arms. Thus, in the 6 April revision of the

equipment program, essential items (readily procurable or replaceable by substitutes) to be issued in 1943 only were computed on the basis of the 6 million troops

expected to be under arms, rather than

the more theoretical Victory Program

goal of 8.9 million. In the 1 September

program a similar basis was used, but the

number of expected activations by then

had risen. Some potential fat was removed

in the form of allowances for maintenance

and for resupply of expendable items.

The cuts in initial issues mentioned above

automatically brought about proportionate reductions in total allowances for

maintenance. Beyond this, allowances for

combat (theater) maintenance, based

originally on highly inflated deployment

estimates, were successively reduced, first

by using more realistic estimates of terminal overseas strength, and later by using

estimated average overseas strengths for

each year. In the case of miscellaneous

and expendable supplies, an effort was

made to estimate the forces to be deployed

to various climatic areas in order to eliminate such obvious anomalies as procure25

 (1) Min, WD Gen Council mtg, 31 Jul 42. (2)

Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, AGF I, pp. 198-217,

and table "Ground Forces in the Army, December

1941-April 1945." (3) Report of WD Procurement

Review Board, p. 8. 26

 (1) Frank, Army Supply Requirements, Doc 49.

(2) CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War, p. 274.
REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLLED DISTRIBUTION 303

ment of skis and mittens for troops serving

in tropical climes.27

This method of reducing over-all requirements was employed, on the whole,

with caution during 1942. Maintenance

requirements in the 1 September program,

while using average overseas strengths,

based these in turn on a projected terminal overseas strength for 1943 of 3 million

at a time when no more than 2.6 million,

at the outside, seemed likely to be deployed. Somervell, defending these estimates, argued that a radical shift in the

military situation, such as an Allied collapse in the Middle East or USSR, would

have the effect of concentrating American

overseas operations in less distant theaters,

thus permitting a larger deployment. "We

would be remiss in our planning," he advised the Chief of Staff, "if we did not

have available adequate and appropriate

forces, and the required munitions to take

advantage of every reasonable contingency."

 28

 The Army Supply Program, by

early autumn, had shrunk considerably

from the massive proportions of the February War Munitions Program. Substantial cuts had been made in capital allowances. In the 1 September program initial

issues of critical items other than rifles had

been slashed by 50 percent for units in

training in 1942, thus conforming to current distribution policy. A similar reduction was later applied to units to be activated in 1943. Unit tables of equipment

allowances had been streamlined to a certain extent, especially in motor transport,

reducing supply requirements. Perhaps

the largest single reduction resulted from

the radical curtailment of armored components in the troop basis; an armored

division was estimated to require roughly

five times as much matériel as an infantry

division. Despite these economies, the effort to provide for "every reasonable contingency" had produced a supply program

which in September was still far from

austere. For the ground army this was

fortunate, for it was to bear the brunt of

the major cuts in war supply programs

ordered in November.29

The Distribution of Scarce Material

Competition for scarce items of material began long before they issued from

production and continued throughout the

process of distribution. The first assignment of a scarce item was often not the

last. In emergencies, such as that in Egypt

in summer of 1942, equipment might be

snatched from American units and

shipped overseas to arm other Allied

forces, and lend-lease equipment already

transferred to one country might be diverted to other recipients. Within the

Army in the States, equipment often

passed through many hands. Indeed, the

basic problem of distribution within the

Army for a year and a half after Pearl

Harbor was one of redistribution. Under

pressing shortages the mounting of a task

force or even the sending of a unit overseas often was possible only by taking

equipment from other units, regardless of

the impact upon their training.

The scarcer items of equipment and

supplies, before and after Pearl Harbor,

were distributed under an elaborate

mechanism of central controls and prior27

 Frank, Army Supply Requirements, Docs 22, 23,

31, 32, 38-42, 44, 49. 28

 Memo, Somervell for CofS, 22 Sep 42, sub: JPS

Dir, JPS 57/1/D, CofS WDGS 1942 folder, Hq ASF. 29

 (1) Frank, Army Supply Requirements, Docs

cited n. 27. (2) Annual Report of the Army Service Forces,

1943, p. 19. (3) For the supply cutbacks of November

1942, see below, Ch. XXII. (4) For tank programs in

1942, see above, Ch. XI. (5) For reductions in equipment allowances, see below, Ch. XXIII.
304 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ities. The most critical items were classified as "controlled," a term circularly

defined as "important items which are

distributed direct to organizations by the

War Department according to approved

priorities." Controlled-item lists were

drawn up by each supply service and consolidated first by the War Department

and, after March 1942, by the SOS. Growing abundance tended to shorten the lists,

technological advance to lengthen them,

and shifts of procurement responsibility

from one service to another involved much

reshuffling of items. During 1942 some of

the lists dwindled, notably those for Quartermaster and Chemical Warfare items,

but the general trend until spring of 1943

was to add more controlled items. The

total list rose from about 400 early in

1942 to almost 800 in spring of 1943;

thereafter it shrank, until in mid-1943 it

numbered 130.30

"Credit" items, a less critical category,

were distributed in fixed amounts to corps

area depots, where quotas were established to the credit of units and installations in the corps areas and drawn upon

by requisition, usually for a fixed period of

time. This system was essentially a quota

system, designed to ensure equitable distribution; the controlled-item system

aimed rather at distribution according to

urgency, under priorities that usually

were highly inequitable from the standpoint of those who did not benefit by

them. The credit system lingered on during the war period, and the credit method,

in a broader sense, was used in a variety

of ways—for example, in allotments

placed at the disposal of the Army Air

Forces by the Chief of Ordnance for certain weapons of common use. On occasion

credit items were even placed under priorities, but the main trend, especially from

1943 on, was to transfer controlled items

to the credit list, thus decentralizing distribution controls.31

On the eve of Pearl Harbor distribution

policy for controlled items recognized two

broad categories of recipients in the

Army—units entitled to full authorized

allowances (Group A), and units that were

to be issued controlled items in order of

priority in three successive installments,

bringing them in turn up to 20, 50, and

finally 100 percent of authorized allowances (Group B). Interpreted literally, this

policy would have left little or no scarce

equipment for units below the upper

brackets of Group A; actual distribution

during 1941 was governed by ad hoc considerations. As a general rule, initial issues

of controlled equipment were made automatically; replacement was by requisition.32

Immediately after Pearl Harbor priorities were rearranged to give preference

(a) to troops about to go overseas, together

with forces in the Philippines; (b) to those

air combat forces, with accompanying

services, for which aircraft were immediately available; (c) to Hawaii and Panama; (d) to antiaircraft defenses in the

United States; (e) to Atlantic and Caribbean garrisons; and (f) to west coast

forces, including those in Alaska. Units

going overseas and the air combat and 30

 (1) WD ltr, 30 Dec 40, sub: Current Sup Policy

and Proced, AG 475 (12-27-40). (2) Distrib Div, ASF,

History of Supply in the Zone of Interior, MS, 1946,

pp. 2-8, OCMH. (3) Contl Div, ASF, Rpt 97, Distribution of Controlled Items of Equipment, Mar 43. 31

 (1) WD ltr, 25 Apr 42, sub: Credit Items of

Equip, AG 381 (4-23-42). (2) WD ltr cited n. 30(1).

Another category, "supervised" items, included

certain equipment numbered serially, overlapping

the other two categories; subordinate commanders

were responsible for certain procedures in their distribution and use. 32

 WD ltr, 24 Sep 41, sub: Distrib of Controlled

Items, AG 400 (9-13-41).
REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLLED DISTRIBUTION 305

antiaircraft forces were to be equipped

with controlled items from current production and, if necessary, by transferring

equipment from units in Group B. Early

in February Group B was broken into two

categories, B and C, the latter providing

a pool from which most equipment transfers were to be made. The general policy

in making transfers was to draw on units

in a widening circle from the unit being

equipped, exploiting first the lower priority units in the corps area where the beneficiary unit was stationed, as recommended by the army commander, and then low

priority units in other corps area. On the

west coast the commanding general of the

Western Defense Command (which included the Ninth Corps Area) was authorized to make transfers at discretion among

all units under his command, but even his

units were subject to the overriding priority of troops shipping out from San Francisco. Remaining forces in Group A were

to be equipped as far as possible from

stock or current production.33

During December and January the effort to arm troop transports on the Pacific

coast and to equip troops sailing from

Pacific coast ports seriously depleted the

defenses in that area. General De Witt,

the army commander there, warned the

War Department at the end of December

that he was being obliged to strip his own

troops of ammunition, rifles, machine

guns, and artillery pieces.

I am obeying my orders literally and I will

not let the troops [sailing for overseas] go

without this equipment, if it takes every gun

I have, but you must remember that I have

both an internal and an external threat here. . . . this situation has gotten to the point

now where I must have my replacement ma- teriel . . . in order that I may have some- thing effective with which to carry out my

mission.34

Early in January he wrote that his antiaircraft units had only enough small-caliber ammunition for about six to eight

minutes' firing. When he telephoned the

War Department a few days later, General Moore told him that "it's just a

desperate situation."

 35

As late as mid-March the forces on the

west coast had received little replacement

matériel, but by then the area seemed in

no immediate danger. Early in February

the Western Defense Command had been

dropped to a C-8 priority for distribution

of controlled items. Henceforth the sharpest competition for scarce matériel was

between forces going or already overseas

and those in training in the United States.

Throughout 1942 the War Department

was torn between two conflicting urges: to

concentrate upon equipping forces for

early shipment overseas, or to spread

equipment more thinly in an effort to

build up as rapidly as possible reserves for

future offensives.

The priority structure necessarily favored troops being sent overseas, as the

more urgent demand, although the shortage of shipping and the slow pace of training, in addition to lack of equipment,

placed limitations upon the number of

troops that could be deployed. On the

presumption (not always warranted) that

any unit already overseas was reasonably

well outfitted, overseas theaters and bases

33

 (1) WD ltr, 22 Dec 41, sub: Distrib of Controlled

Items of Equip. (2) WD ltr to CG Western Def Comd,

22 Dec 41, same sub. (3) WD ltr, 12 Dec 41, same

sub. All in AG 400 (12-17-41). (4) WD ltr, 4 Feb 42,

same sub, AG 400 (2-1-42). 34

 Telephone msg, Gen De Witt to Gen Malony,

30 Dec 41, G-4/33819. 35

 (1) Telephone msg, Gen De Witt to Gen Moore,

7 Jan 42, Telephone Convs 1942 folder, G-4. (2) Corresp in G-4/33819 and G-4/31793. (3) Memo,

Somervell for CofS, 4 Feb 42, sub: Shortages of Rifles,

CofS WDGS 1941-42 folder, Hq ASF.
306 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

were placed in a lower priority for shipments of controlled material than troops

being sent or about to be sent there. Early

in 1942 the troops in the Philippines were

the only forces overseas in an A-2 priority,

the one assigned to units sent overseas. In

June all overseas forces were placed in an

A-6 priority, arranged generally to give

active areas precedence over inactive

ones; in November, following the landings

in North Africa, the former category was

elevated to an A-2-b category, immediately below that for troops moving overseas. The precedence given troops moving

to a theater over troops already there

caused difficulties. Except when special

arrangements were made to the contrary,

units that sailed without all their authorized equipment—and there were many

such in 1942—might wait for it for weeks

or months after arriving overseas while

troops following them arrived fully

equipped. "It appears to me," noted an

SOS staff officer in May 1942, "that it is

silly to equip units going overseas with 100

per cent of controlled items when there

are other units actually in the area ready

to fight, with less . . . ."

 36

 But not until

early in 1943 were overseas theaters and

bases given a higher priority than outbound units.37

Troops in training and newly activated

were spread over the remainder of the

priority structure in 1942, below the relatively small number of units about to go

overseas and those already overseas. In

the competition for ammunition, training

received short shrift. Peacetime allowances of ammunition for training were

larger in the U.S. Army than in any other

army in the world, but in the crisis following Pearl Harbor they were cut to the

bone. No .50-caliber ammunition at all

was allotted to ground forces in training;

"absolutely essential" Air Corps training

claimed all that could be spared from the

forces overseas. Caliber .30 ammunition

was reduced to 40 percent of prescribed

allowances. Artillery officers, their normal

allowances reduced by a third, were directed in the spring to "fire a simulated

problem each day . . . using a matchbox, sandtable, some sort of terrain board,

or any other expedient . . . .38 Many

further cuts were made during 1942. Ammunition was also doled out to departing

task forces and overseas theaters and bases

in quantities smaller than their commanders thought safe, but sometimes in excess

of actual needs. In spring of 1943, while

General McNair was pleading for sufficient ammunition to allow ground troops

to qualify in firing their individual weapons, almost a billion and a half rounds of

small arms ammunition were piled in

depots and dumps in North Africa.39

Motor vehicles, being particularly essential to training, were authorized for all

units, in the initial issue, up to 50 percent

of allowances, and ground combat troops

were supposed to receive full allowances

in the sixth month of training (normally

36

 Note for rcd only, with memo, Dir of Opns SOS

for Chiefs of Svs, 11 May 42, sub: Controlled Items of

Equip in Overseas Bases, 400.3 Distrib of Sups and

Equip folder, Plng Div ASF, Job A44-140. 37

 (1) WD ltrs, 4 Feb, 8 Mar, 23 Apr, 27 Jun, and

9 Nov 42, sub: Distrib of Controlled Items of Equip,

with priority lists, AG 400 series. (2) WD ltr, 14 Feb

43, same sub, AG 400 (2-9-43). (3) For supply of

forces overseas and forces moving overseas, see below, Ch. XIII. 38

 Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R.

Keast, The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat

Troops, Vol. II of the subseries The Army Ground

Forces in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1948) (hereafter cited as

Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, AGF II), p. 555. 39

 (1) Ltr, Gen Marshall to Sir John Dill, no date,

OPD 400 Sups and Equip, 1. (2) Palmer, Wiley, and

Keast, AGF II, pp. 464-65. (3) For overseas supply of

ammunition, see below, Ch. XIII.
REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLLED DISTRIBUTION 307

the beginning of advanced unit training).

Even more favorable provisions were

made, in the second half of 1942, for air

force and antiaircraft units. It was further

hoped that pools of new vehicles of standard, general-purpose types could be built

up in overseas theaters; departing units

would take with them only their administrative and special vehicles. Equipment

that the units turned in could be used

again for training, and old-model vehicles

could eventually be relegated exclusively

to administrative uses in the United

States. Throughout 1942, however, training continued to depend on used, oldmodel, and substitute types. Much of the

supply of new vehicles went to outfit task

forces (which took their vehicles with

them), and into foreign aid. Substantial

numbers were shipped crated to the British Isles for U.S. forces there.40

To newly activated units most controlled equipment was initially issued up

to 20 percent of authorized allowances,

and a second issue was intended to bring

the level up to 50 percent; both issues were

made in the established priorities. But

prevailing shortages postponed the second

issue to many units for months, and units

far down on the priority list often received

only part of their initial training issue. In

February 1942, in order to give the most

important combat units a start in life and

to protect them from being stripped bare

by transfers to departing troops, newly

activated infantry divisions were designated as "training" divisions and given an

A-9 priority to receive half their authorized allowances of controlled equipment.

A-9 stood near the bottom of the A

Group, below units going overseas, garrisons overseas, and most of the combat

forces in the States, but training divisions

took precedence, for their 50 percent allowances, over a long list of service units

and a few combat units in the A Group,

not to mention the large number of older

units in B and C Groups. For their remaining allowances of controlled equipment the new training divisions took only

a very low C priority, below the nine other

divisions in C Group. They were, however, expressly shielded from transfers for

the benefit of all other categories of units

except those scheduled for immediate departure overseas, and they were less exposed even to this risk than a mass of less

favored B and C units.41

These arrangements were modified from

time to time in subsequent months, but

training divisions continued to enjoy a

favored status. Even with favored treatment, however, none of the divisions activated during the spring and summer received full training allowances on schedule or for many weeks afterward. As General Lutes observed in August, "The original conception of training divisions no

longer exists. It might be said there are no

training divisions or that all divisions are

training divisions."

 42

40

 (1) WD ltr, 6 Jun 42, sub: Sup and Distrib of

Automotive Vehicles, AG 400 (6-5-42). (2) WD ltr,

9 Aug 42, same sub, AG 400 (8-7-42). (3) WD Memo

W850-19-42, 27 Nov 42, same sub. (4) WD ltr, 27

Jun 42, sub: Distrib of Controlled Items of Equip, AG

400 (6-16-42). (5) WD ltr, 9 Nov 42, same sub, AG

400 (11-5-42). 41

 (1) WD ltr cited n. 33(4). (2) WD ltr, 19 Feb 42,

sub: Distrib of Controlled Items of Equip to Tng Divs,

and amendment of 1 Mar 42, AG 400 (2-16-42). (3)

Memo, G-4 for G-3, 13 Feb 42, sub: Minimum Tng

Allowances of Critical Items. (4) Note for rcd only,

with memo, G-4 for TAG, 1 Feb 42, sub: Distrib of

Controlled Items of Equip. Last two in G-4/31793. 42

 (1) Memo, Lutes for G-3, 18 Aug 42, sub: Policy

Governing Distrib of Controlled Items. (2) See also,

memo, Lutes for G-3, 24 Aug 42, same sub. Both in

AG 400 (8-10-42) Sec 1. (3) WD ltr, 23 Apr 42, sub:

Distrib of Controlled Items of Equip, AG 400 (4-8-

42). (4) WD ltr cited n. 40(4).
308 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Moreover, the favoring of new divisions

with respect to scarce equipment merely

shifted the burden elsewhere—to the older

divisions in training and to the growing

number of nondivisional units. Stripping

units in training, General Marshall wrote

near the end of March, "will wreck the

morale of the troops involved and undermine public confidence."

 43

 AGF staff officers, making field inspections during the

summer, sent in gloomy reports of the

losing struggle to carry out realistic training with meager equipment. Units in the

26th Division, supposedly well advanced

in training, had twenty-nine of their fortyfive authorized antitank (37-mm.) guns at

the end of March; seven more were taken

away to equip a division moving overseas.

The 101st Cavalry Regiment, with only 3

of an authorized 28 antitank guns on

hand, had to give up even these 3, in addition to 39 of its 73 .30-caliber machine

guns (138 authorized), and 7 of its 41 .50-

caliber machine guns (124 authorized).44

Nondivisional units, especially service

units, were hit much harder. Even more

dependent than infantry divisions upon

equipment for training in their special

functions, nondivisional units stood below

them in every priority subgroup. Signal

communications troops could learn little

of their technical functions without radio

sets and telephone switchboards, and

maintenance units could scarcely gain

practical experience without equipment to

service. One Signal Corps unit reported in

the summer of 1942 that "equipment received consists largely of many items

which cannot be used for training purposes without the receipt of key items such

as telephones, switchboards, etc."

 45

 Service units generally were far worse off than

combat units with respect to basic weapons; a Quartermaster battalion late in

1942 had only 284 rifles for 1,113 men.

General Lutes warned G-3 in August:

All units require some equipment for

training. The insistence that "training" divisions receive 50 per cent of controlled items

of equipment . . . often precludes non- divisional units from receiving any of the

common items. The training of these non- divisional units is of equal importance but is

jeopardized in order that divisions may be

given the presently prescribed 50 per cent.46

In effect, the policy for distributing

scarce equipment was to treat the mass of

units of all types in training as a large pool

from which to equip units and task forces

going overseas, with mitigating provisions

designed to shield air force units and certain ground combat units, particularly

newly activated divisions, from being

stripped. It was not an easy policy to enforce. Effective control depended on centralization of responsibility, which was

inimical to speed of operation and to administrative efficiency. Authority to order

transfers of controlled equipment among

units in the United States rested with the

three major commands and the defense

commands; the SOS administered the

process and it alone could delegate transfer responsibility within its own establishment. All transfers were supposed to be

reported immediately to the appropriate

supply services, which kept the records of 43

 Ltr cited n. 39(1). 44

 (1) Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, AGF II, p. 456.

(2) Memo, Dir of Opns SOS for CofOrd, 13 Apr 42,

sub: Replacement of Controlled Items, 400.3 Distrib

of Sups and Equip folder, Plng Div ASF, Job A44-

140.

45

 Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, AGF II, pp. 555-57;

quote is from p. 556. 46

 (1) Memo cited n. 42(1). (2) Memo cited n.

42(2). (3) Memo, G-3 for G-4, 13 Mar 42, sub: Distrib of Controlled Items, WDGCT 400 (3-13-42).

This directed SOS to issue controlled items to units

in each group and subgroup in the order of AAF,

AGF, SOS. (4) See also, WD ltrs cited n. 40(4), n.

42(3), and WD ltr, 8 Mar 42, cited n. 37(1).
REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLLED DISTRIBUTION 309

controlled items (transfers of air matériel

were reported to the Air Service Command). General Staff approval, besides,

was required for any transfers from units

in Groups A or B. Various additional restrictions were also placed on transfers of

certain categories, such as tanks, antiaircraft weapons, Garand rifles, carbines, and

motor vehicles.

But, in preparing troop units for movement overseas, the three major commands

and the defense commands from the end

of June onward were permitted, in the

interests of speed, to delegate transfer

authority along with other preparatory

processes to their field commands. In practice, moreover, most transfers of controlled

equipment in the latter half of 1942 were

made to units going overseas, and therefore by field agencies exercising delegated

authority, usually under the heavy pressure of imminent departure dates.47

 In

these circumstances it was difficult for SOS

to supervise effectively the distribution of

controlled items. Both Air and Ground

Forces repeatedly sought to have transfer

authority delegated more broadly for purposes other than overseas movement, and

there were numerous deviations from

prescribed procedures. Commanders of

ground units, senior in rank to the post

commander, sometimes used their seniority to force the latter to transfer to them

equipment already earmarked for another

unit. AGF staff officers sometimes negotiated directly with a supply service, bypassing SOS headquarters, in an effort to

obtain arsenal or depot stocks instead of

robbing their own units.48

In November 1942 the prohibiting of

delegation of authority was relaxed. Almost immediately the chiefs of the supply

services began to complain that field

agencies of AGF and AAF were either not

reporting transfers, or reporting them so

late that issues of controlled items were

duplicated and control was lost. Early in

January 1943, accordingly, the three major commands and the defense commands

were again enjoined from delegating transfer authority, except as prescribed in current procedures for equipping units going

overseas. The old difficulties immediately

reappeared. An SOS staff report in March

stated". . . authority to transfer . . . is

being usurped or delegated and the transfers are not reported."

 49

The Equipment Crisis and the

Emergency Pool

During the summer and fall of 1942 the

equipment problem became critical. First

the flow of troops to the British Isles and

then the mounting of the North African

task forces, coincident with heavier deployment to the Pacific, stripped the Army

of available trained units and in the process brought a hurly-burly of equipment

47

 (1) WD ltr, 2 Apr 42, sub: Current Sup Policy

and Proced, AG 475 (4-1-42). (2) WD ltr, 10 Jun 42,

same sub, AG 475 (6-7-42). (3) WD ltr, 8 Mar 42,

cited n. 37(1). (4) WD ltrs cited n. 40(4), n. 40(5),

and n. 42(3). (5) For troop movement procedures, see

below, Ch. XIII. 48

 (1) Memo, Dir of Opns SOS for Chiefs of Svs,

1 May 42, sub: Trf of Controlled Items. (2) Memo,

Dir of Opns SOS for Distrib Sec, 22 Jun 42, sub: Ord

Sup. Both in 400.3 Distrib of Sups and Equip folder,

Plng Div ASF, Job A44-140. (3) 1st Ind, Hq SOS

to CG AAF, 20 Oct 42, 400 Sup Gen folder, Plng

Div ASF, Job A44-140. (4) Memo, Hq SOS for Chiefs

of Svs, Corps Area Comdrs, CofTrans Sv, 20 Jul 42,

sub: Sup Deficits and Responsibilities, Notes on Tr

Mvmts, Logis File, OCMH. (5) 1st Ind, Hq SOS to

CG AGF, 7 Oct 42, Misc Notes, Lutes File. 49

 (1) Rpt cited n. 30(3). (2) WD ltrs cited n. 37(2)

and n. 40(5). (3) WD ltr, 8 Jan 43, sub: Distrib of

Controlled Items of Equip, AG 400 (1-6-43). (4)

Memo, ACofS Opns SOS for G-3, 30 Dec 42, same

sub. (5) Memo, ACofS Opns ASF for G-4, 12 Apr

43, sub: Trf of Controlled Items. Last two in 400.3

Distrib of Sups and Equip folder, Plng Div ASF, Job

A44-140.
310 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

and personnel transfers that crippled

many of the units remaining. During the

last three months of 1942 activations of

ground combat units, partly in consequence of the depletion of equipment

available for training, had to be slowed

almost to a halt. "For the first time," General Lutes wrote to Somervell in September, "we are unable to equip newly activated units with several items of training

equipment."

 50

The crisis had been building up for

some time. Back in January The Inspector

General, disturbed by the confusion attending outbound troop movements, had

advanced an obviously desirable solution—formation of a pool of units ready

for emergency deployment. He recommended, in addition, procedures to ensure

activation of a unit at least two months

before sending it overseas, and issuance of

movement orders at least forty-five days

before sailing. This was easier said than

done. Somervell "heartily endorsed" his

recommendations as an ideal, but saw no

way to avoid last-minute transfers as long

as equipment was short and plans were

changed from day to day. General Gerow

reminded the Chief of Staff that the pool

of equipped units formed the preceding

August was still in existence, though depleted; it had not been kept up to strength,

since otherwise "too many units would be

in the 100 percent equipment group and

some units in lower priority would be

denied their training equipment."

 51

 In

subsequent months it proved difficult to

maintain a pool of any size. At the end of

May General McNair was complaining of

being called on "almost daily" to prepare

units for task forces. The effort to keep the

pool of equipped units (Group A) even to

the absolutely minimum requirements

brought the results Gerow had feared in

February. The 4 February priority list

contained forty-four ground units to be

fully equipped within a month; that of

8 March listed eighty. By the end of April

the list approached three hundred, not

counting several subcategories labeled

simply "to be announced." Even larger

numbers were being assigned for full

equipment within two months, and from

June onward a three-months category was

added, which covered, in effect, units that

might be sent overseas four months or

more in the future.52

The earmarking of units for early overseas shipment had outdistanced even the

rising flood of actual deployment. An OPD

officer asserted in June:

The existing system is not unsound but has

gone overboard because the supply of equipment, personnel and shipping cannot keep

pace with the earmarking of units for service

in theaters . . . . OPD does not expect AGF

and SOS to earmark units long in advance of

shipping available for movement. If the present system ties up equipment at the expense

of training, the high priority groups should

be diminished either by purging the list of all

not expected to move in less than 90 days, or

by eliminating the practice of earmarking

entirely.53

In part the proliferation of earmarked

50

 (1) Memo cited n. 14. (2) Greenfield, Palmer,

and Wiley, AGF I, pp. 208-09. (3) See also below,

Ch. XVI. 51

 (1) Memo, Gerow for CofS, 13 Feb 42, sub:

Overseas Mvmt. (2) Memo, TIG for CofS, 28 Jan 42,

same sub. (3) Memo, Somervell for CofS, 4 Feb 42.

All in WPD 4161-27. (4) Memo, Somervell for CofS,

2 Feb 42, G-4/33889. 52

 (1) Memo, Maj Harvey H. Fischer for ACofS

OPD, 25 May 42, sub: Priority for Dirs . . . , OPD

370.5, 160. (2) Memo cited n. 46(3). (3) Memo, OPD

for G-3, 25 Jun 42, sub: Policy Governing Distrib

of Controlled Items, OPD 400 Sups and Equip, 35. 53

 Memo, Resources and Reqmts Sec Opns Group

for ACofS OPD, 1 Jun 42, sub: Priority for Asgmt

of Personnel and Distrib of Controlled Items . . . ,

OPD 370.5, 160.
REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLLED DISTRIBUTION 311

units could be laid at the door of OPD itself, whose seven theater sections requisitioned units separately and with little

co-ordination. In part, it was a consequence of the understandable desire of the

major commands, responsible for providing troops at a moment's notice, to take

out insurance in the form of a substantial

backlog of at least partially ready units.

But there was no insurance against the

abrupt nomination for imminent departure of units far down on the priority list,

a practice that became increasingly common during the hectic summer and early

fall of 1942. In a similar category was the

repeated demand to activate on short notice, especially during the mounting of

TORCH, special units not provided in the

troop basis. The repeated plundering of

the equipment of low-priority units for

these and more orthodox purposes had the

effect of freezing them in a low-equipment

status. A case study made by SOS during

the summer revealed that a representative

group of units had made only insignificant

progress over a thirty-day period in receiving certain important items of equipment,

and that units in the higher priority subgroups often were in worse state than those

standing below them.54

Actual deployment was governed largely by availability of shipping. General

Lutes argued that the pool of ready units

should be limited to the number for which

shipping would be available for three

months to come, instead of including all

the units for which a requirement was indicated during that period. Below this

group, distribution of available equipment

should be co-ordinated closely with the

process of training in order to ensure continuous replenishment of the top priorities

as they were depleted by shipment overseas.

The equipping of units must be governed

by availability of equipment. Certain units

for which a definite mission exists should be

fully equipped as soon as possible (Group A).

Other units should be given priorities based

on anticipated time needs for task forces and

availability of equipment. Units should nor- mally be activated in the lowest position in

the lowest group, and progress to the higher

group priority as training increases and

makes them suitable for field operations. By

proper anticipation . . . there should always

be a well-balanced group of units in Group A

to meet requirements . . . .

The occasional selection of low-priority

units for early shipment, Lutes thought,

"must be recognized as an indication of

faulty planning, and as such must be employed only in the face of an unforeseen

emergency."

 55

 He recommended three

priority groups, the first two to comprise

units for which shipping was available

within three and within six months, respectively. Controlled equipment would

be issued to the three groups, respectively,

up to 100 percent, 50 percent, and 25 percent of authorized allowances, and no new

activations would be permitted unless the

initial 25 percent issue could be made.

Lutes thought that this initial issue should

go to newly activated divisional and nondivisional units alike, and that the policy

of favoring new divisions should cease. In

effect the first priority group would constitute a balanced striking force of ground

divisions, with adequate combat, service,

and air support, kept up to strength by the

orderly admission of units from lower

groups.56

54

 (1) Memo, ACofS Materiel for ACofS Opns

SOS, 14 Oct 4'2, AG 400 (8-10-42) Sec 1. (2) See also,

Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 183-86. (3) See

below, Ch. XVI. 55

 Memo cited n. 42(2). 56

 (1) Ibid. (2) Memo cited n. 42(1). (3) Memo,

Somervell for OPD, 23 Aug 42, Misc Notes, Lutes

File. Lutes made a similar proposal in June.
312 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

A balanced pool of fully trained, fully

equipped troops was, as OPD wrote Somervell, "the ultimate aim of every army."

But with the enemy holding the initiative,

OPD argued, it had been impossible up to

now to create such a pool:

The basic strategy of a nation forced into

hostilities while unprepared must be to con- tain the enemy with the means at hand until

a striking force of sufficient size and capabilities has been assembled to seize the initiative

and launch a decisive offensive. Attainment

of this objective is best served by rapid mobi- lization to the extent of manpower resources

and training facilities, and equipping of such

mobilized units in an orderly progressive

manner.

The whole mass of units in Groups A and

B constituted a pool of sorts, which OPD

hoped some day would develop into the

desired striking force, "to be employed in

a major effort in one theater." But OPD

saw no need at the moment for the kind of

pool from which could be produced on

short notice several "completely integrated

task forces," and was unwilling to build

up the equipment of B units for this purpose at the expense of minimum training

needs of newer units.57

OPD evidently was awaiting the outcome of current discussions of the 1943

troop basis. By October it was apparent

that the strategy for 1943, in default of a

massive land invasion of Europe, would

seek partial compensation through an air

offensive against Germany at the expense

of ground operations. About the same time

the Joint Chiefs bowed to the judgment of

the production experts that military supply programs would have to be cut. The

necessary reductions were made principally in the weapons of large-scale ground

warfare. It was clear, moreover, that the

shipping expected to be available would

not permit the deployment overseas of

forces on the scale earlier planned. "Since

. . . it appears," G-3 wrote late in October, "that early employment of a mass

Army, which must be transported by

water, is not practicable, it follows that the

trend must be toward light, easily transportable units."

 58

 The signs pointed, in

short, to a strategy of task force operations

in 1943—"scatterization," as Army planners labeled it—involving a piecemeal

deployment that the existing amorphous,

heterogeneous pool of semiprepared troop

units was ill suited to support.

The development of a settled distribution policy based upon the pooling principle, to support the new strategy, consumed

the last three months of 1942. In October

the War Department officially sanctioned

the concept of a "reserve of fully equipped

units to meet task force requirements,"

and OPD informally laid down for G-3 a

policy of limiting the number of earmarked units to the capacity of shipping

for three months in advance.59 But the

major commands continued to seek insurance against badly co-ordinated deployment by building up large reserves of

equipped and nearly equipped units, necessarily at the expense of troops in early

stages of training and of new activations.

It was necessary, in fact, to defer activations of many ground combat units during

the last three months of 1942. In November, contrary to General Lutes' proposal

for equal equipment allowances to new

57

 (1) Memo, OPD for CG SOS, 1 Sep 42, sub:

Equip of Units, OPD 320.2 (6-26-42). (2) For the

OPD scheme similar to Lutes' proposal, see draft

memo, OPD for CG AGF, 7 Jun 42, OPD 370.5, 160. 58

 (1) Memo, WD for AGF and SOS, 25 Oct 42,

sub: Tr Basis 1943, WDGCT 320.2 Gen (10-25-42).

(2) Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, AGF I, pp. 288-

89. (3) See below, Ch. XXII. 59

 Memo, G-3 for CG AGF, 30 Oct 42, sub: Priority List for Distrib of Controlled Items . . . , with

atchd note for rcd only, AG 400 (8-10-42) Sec 1.
REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLLED DISTRIBUTION 313

divisional and nondivisional units, the

War Department confirmed the established initial 50 percent allowance of controlled items for new divisions (of all

types), and also ordered initial full allowances of credit items (which now included

rifles); new nondivisional units still had to

get along with an initial 20 percent allowance, though this was now prescribed as

an irreducible minimum.60

By November there was, of course, more

equipment available, but its actual distribution through the Army, because of the

disorderly course of deployment, had deviated more and more from the established

priority groupings. An increasing number

of units, elevated suddenly from the depths

to top priority for movement and as suddenly degraded, found themselves with

assortments of new and old equipment

that added up to aggregate allowances in

excess of what their existing priorities entitled them to. The transfers of equipment

attendant upon this process often had not

been reported, and the disparity between

central supply service records of controlled

equipment and actual distribution in the

field widened. The major commands were

ordered in November to straighten out

this situation by ransacking their cupboards and redistributing all excess equipment in accordance with the authorized

allowances in each priority group. For this

purpose, as mentioned earlier, delegation

of the transfer authority was authorized.

By the end of the year there seemed a reasonable likelihood that troops in training

would soon have their authorized training

allowances and that new units would receive full allowances of controlled items

within six months of activation.61

It was decided, finally, to form a small

pool of equipped units to meet emergency

demands only. In the priority scale, it was

placed at first immediately below units

under a three-month alert for overseas

movement; later it was shifted to a position below the group earmarked for shipment within four to six months. The pool

was also limited in size by availability of

equipment, in consideration of minimum

training needs. It comprised, in effect, a

balanced group of units in an advanced

stage of training and with almost full

allowances of equipment. When ordered

overseas, earmarked units moved immediately into the priority for early movement

(A-2) without passing through the pool,

and any unit placed in the A-2 priority,

whether taken from the pool or from the

earmarked groups, was immediately issued

the remainder of its equipment. All Group

A units, by definition, were moving toward, or had already reached, a 100 percent equipment status. Group B units,

authorized to receive 50 percent of full

allowances, were those at least six months

old or sufficiently well trained to move

into the pool or one of the earmarked

categories. Group C, with 20 percent allowances (except for new divisions, authorized 50 percent), included all other units.62

These arrangements, in some sort, provided the pool General Lutes seemed to

have had in mind the preceding summer

and fall, but there was still no provision for

60

 (1) Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, AGF I, pp.

208-09. (2) WD ltr cited n. 40(5), and subsequent

ltrs, 14 Feb and 1 Jun 43, same sub, AG 400 series. 61

 (1) WD ltr cited n. 40(5). (2) Disposition form,

OPD to G-3, 21 Dec 42, sub: Proper Priority List of

Type Units . . . , OPD 400 Sups and Equip, 47. (3)

Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 28 Dec 42, Misc Notes,

Lutes File. (4) Rpt cited n. 30(3). 62

 (1) Memo, G-3 for maj comds, 18 Jan 43,

WDGCT 475 (1-18-43). (2) WD ltr, 5 Jan 43, sub:

Orgn, Tng, and Equipg of Units for Overseas Sv, AG

320.2 (1-2-43). (3) WD ltrs cited n. 37(2), and WD

ltr, 1 Jun 43, cited n. 60(2). (4) Palmer, Wiley, and

Keast, AGF II, pp. 582-87. (5) Annual Report of the

Army Service Forces, 1943, p. 101.
314 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

relating the earmarking of units to visible

capacity to move them overseas. OPD retained the option of being realistic or unrealistic, as it saw fit, in setting up the "six

months' list" of troops it expected to deploy overseas. During the late winter and

spring of 1943, in fact, deployment planning virtually lost touch with the estimated

limitations of shipping, and deployment

schedules, caught between the two, began

to fluctuate in a manner reminiscent of the

preceding September. Before the end of

February General Lutes was complaining

that OPD's changes in the list of earmarked units had "already reached such

proportions as to practically nullify its

value."

 63

Before the winter was out, moreover, a

new crisis was looming in the training program. Ground forces were still not receiving authorized equipment and ammunition for training. On 1 March 1943 General McNair wrote Marshall that current

and proposed restrictions upon equipping

troops in training and providing them

with ammunition threatened disaster.

Training cannot progress beyond a certain

fixed point if it is based on too many assumptions, improvisations, and part-time use of

equipment. . . . It is unsound to permit allocations of equipment which may operate

to place our troops in combat in the same

theater of operations with other allied forces

who have more and better U.S. equipment

than do our own forces.64

He recommended that all units should

receive 50 percent of their authorized controlled items on activation, to be brought

up to full allowances within six months for

divisions and within four months for nondivisional units.65

Except for OPD, the Assistant Chiefs of

Staff concerned in the matter—G-1, G-3,

and G-4—lined up solidly behind General

McNair. "There can be no sounder judgment," G-4 declared, "than that of General McNair, whose long-considered recommendation herewith is taken at face

value."

 66

 Army Service Forces (formerly

SOS) was also sensitive to the needs of

training, especially for its own nondivisional units, which were among the most

starved for equipment; on the other hand,

larger training allowances would interfere

with its plans, then hatching, to ship large

amounts of material in bulk to the British

Isles. OPD took its stand on the rather

theoretical argument that the Army Supply Program had set up requirements sufficient to provide every unit with full

allowances within six months of its activation, and that the Munitions Assignments

Board assigned munitions "on the basis of

operational needs, giving full weight to all

U.S. requirements, including those in the

Army Supply Program."

 67

 Staff supporters of General McNair's proposal, an

OPD officer noted irritably, "are not

familiar with the operation of the JCS and

CCS and Munitions Assignments Board.

They likewise appear to be unfamiliar

with the Army Supply Program."

 68

 All of

which, as General Moses (G-4) retorted

with some acerbity, was hardly to the

point.

Regardless of the provisions of the Army

Supply Program, and of pertinent CCS and

63

 (1) Memo, Lutes for Dir of Tng SOS, 30 Feb 43,

Misc Notes, Lutes File. (2) For troop movement procedure, see below, Ch. XIII. (3) For early 1943 deployment, see below, Ch. XXVI. 64

 Memo, CG AGF for CofS, 1 Mar 43, sub: Vic

Prog Tr Basis, OPD 400 (3-1-43) Case 2. 65

 Memo, CG AGF for CofS, 6 Apr 43, sub: Equip

for AGF, OPD 475 Equipg of Trs, 25. 66

 Memo, G-4 for CofS, 7 Apr 43, sub: Equip for

AGF, OPD 475 Equipg of Trs, 25. 67

 Memo, OPD for G-4, 14 Apr 43, sub: Equip for

AGF, OPD 475 Equipg of Trs, 25. 68

 Note for rcd, with memo cited n. 67.
REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLLED DISTRIBUTION 315

JCS papers, the AGF are not receiving sufficient equipment to meet minimum training

requirements as determined by General McNair. . . . The basic question of the present

discussion is whether the War Department

will actively encourage the assignment of a

greater percentage of manufactured material

to AGF.69

This OPD was not prepared to do beyond a certain point, "consistent with

other needs." The shortage in critical

items for training was caused partly by

lagging production, partly by unanticipated operational demands overseas.

Output was expected to reach its peak in

mid-1943. If production schedules were

not met, OPD stated, all claimants would

have to share the deficit proportionately.

Ammunition allowances for training had,

in fact, been increased somewhat since 1

March. "It is believed," OPD wrote reassuringly, while rejecting General McNair's

proposal, ". . . that as the rate of production increases and requirements in overseas theaters become more stabilized,

AGF will receive a greater share of current production . . . the situation, while

at present somewhat somber, is continually improving."

 70

 The strategic planners,

their eyes fixed on the impending offensives in the Mediterranean and the Pacific, were more concerned at this time

with equipping units for combat and with

finding shipping to move them overseas;

the training problem received only secondary consideration. Two weeks before

McNair's proposal was rejected, in fact,

OPD had obtained from ASF a rough

estimate that eighteen divisions with supporting troops could be equipped for overseas service in 1943 provided, among

other things, that equipment could be

withdrawn from units in training. In May

ASF launched its program of stockpiling

material in the British Isles for a 1944 invasion—a program that seriously threatened to cut into training allowances in the

United States. Despite rising production,

the War Department finally decided in

June to reduce the 1943 Troop Basis,

mainly by cuts in ground combat units

from 7.5 million to 7 million enlisted men,

thus curtailing somewhat the long-range

demand for equipment for new units.71

In its requirements and distribution

policies during 1942 the Army faced the

basic problems, which conditioned its

strategy and its logistics generally, of attempting to meet the demands of the immediate military situation while at the

same time mobilizing large forces for later

offensives. The Army's system of determining and programing requirements was

an attempt primarily to meet the needs of

the mobilizing reserves in the United

States, in preparation for the big battles

expected in 1943 and 1944, and only secondarily to provide for the relatively small

forces that had to be deployed against the

enemy in 1942. There was logic in this

since other Allied forces were sustaining

the principal weight of enemy power in all

theaters except the Pacific, where the

American Navy was performing a similar

service. The Army's great role was to

come later, and a large part of the burden

69

 (1) Memo, G-4 for OPD, 17 Apr 43, sub: Equip

for AGF, OPD 475 Equipg of Trs, 25. (2) Greenfield,

Palmer, and Wiley, AGF I, pp. 220-21. 70

 Memo, OPD for G-4, 22 Apr 43, sub: Equip for

AGF, OPD 475 Equipg of Trs, 25. 71

 (1) Memo, ACofS Opns ASF for OPD, 6 Apr 43,

sub: Equipg of Units 1943, OPD 475 Equipg of Trs,

23. (2) Memo, ACofS Opns ASF for OPD, 17 Apr 43,

sub: Estd Dates of Completion of Equip for Divs, OPD

475 Equipg of Trs, 27. (3) Greenfield, Palmer, and

Wiley, AGF I, pp. 220-27. (4) Richard M. Leighton,

The Problem of Troop and Cargo Flow in Preparing

the European Invasion, ASF hist monograph, Ch. III,

OCMH.
316 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

of equipping forces for early deployment

fell, in any case, upon current production,

existing stocks, and material already in

the hands of units in training. But there

were those who thought, by late 1942, that

the requirements system was partly to

blame for the shortage of troop units ready

for overseas service, in that it had failed to

anticipate the specific types of equipment

needed and also to spur industry to an

adequate over-all volume of output. The

emphasis in the requirements system upon

the distant and the general need, as opposed to the immediate and the specific

one, involved a method of calculation that

led unavoidably to overestimates in some

categories and underestimates in others.

As a corollary, it virtually dictated a

policy of liberality in the realm of allowances for unforeseeable contingencies.

This tendency to padding by late 1942 ran

head on into the production authorities'

estimates of the future limits of national

productivity, and the failure to make allowances in the supply programs for specific conditions of operation was to cause

trouble in 1943 and 1944.

Distribution policy in 1942, by an equal

logic, focused upon the immediate rather

than the long-range need. Priorities and

transfer policy heavily favored troops

going or soon to go overseas and troops in

overseas theaters and bases, rather than

those in training. Under this system, the

drain of equipment and ammunition to

forces that had to be sent overseas threatened constantly to cripple the advancing

training of the mass of troops in the United

States. Equipping support-type units,

especially service units, was seriously retarded by a policy, which many considered shortsighted, of favoring divisional

units. In the late summer and autumn of

1942 the whole system of priorities, aimed

at keeping the equipment program and

the training program abreast of one another, almost broke down under the impact of sudden changes in strategic plans

and the disruption of deployment schedules. Generally speaking, the erratic

course of strategy and operations in 1942

created difficulties in the equipping of

troops that were far beyond the power of

any distribution policy to overcome. In

the face of those difficulties, the system of

controlled distribution did succeed, not

always but during most of 1942, in producing equipped troop units up to the

capacity of shipping to transport them

overseas. This result was accomplished by

decelerating new activations during the

last few months of 1942 and by a consistent skimping on allowances of equipment

and ammunition for troops in training. As

late as spring of 1943, when production

was approaching peak levels, General

McNair considered this skimping an invitation to disaster.
CHAPTER XIII

The Support of Overseas

Operations

The Army's requirements and distribution policies were both oriented to the support of overseas operations, the former in

a long-term, the latter in a short-term

sense. To supply the overseas theaters and

the troops about to be sent to them was

perhaps the largest single task of the

Army's logistical organization. The procedural mechanisms developed in 1942 to

perform this task are the primary subject

of the present chapter. A closely related

and scarcely less formidable task—training service troops to support overseas operations—was a matter of unending concern to logisticians even though it has not

always been considered to belong to the

sphere of logistics. While the problem of

service troops cannot be treated in full in

this volume, brief attention is here given

to the difficulties encountered in developing an adequate service troop basis within

the framework of the Army's allotted manpower.

The System of Overseas Supply

Along with other important features of

the Army's wartime logistical system, the

general pattern of wartime overseas supply policies, procedures, and organization

was worked out by the G-4 staff before the

end of January 1942. General instructions

were published on the 22d, effective 1

March. The salient feature of the system

there outlined was the decentralization of

the administration of most overseas supply on a geographical basis to the ports of

embarkation, each of which was to serve

certain specified theaters and bases. To the

War Department were left, in general,

control of the distribution of scarce matériel, allocation of shipping, co-ordination

of supply with strategic needs (for example, determining intertheater priorities), and matters of general policy. After

the reorganization of March 1942, SOS

and AAF took over practically all the

work of central administration and supervision, and the War Department's role was

largely confined to setting levels of supply,

determining intertheater priorities, and

allocating shipping to overseas commands.

SOS now dealt directly with WSA for

single-voyage allocations of shipping, designated ports of embarkation to serve particular theaters and bases, prescribed port

reserves and credits in depots behind the

ports, assigned shipping to the ports as

needed, regulated policy for handling supply requisitions, directed replacement of

shipments lost at sea, and, outside the

special jurisdiction of the AAF, shared
318 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

with the General Staff the co-ordination

and supervision of the distribution of most

types of scarce matériel to overseas forces.1

The principal category of controlled

supply to overseas commands was a selected list of scarce items (similar to but

not identical with the controlled items list,

and including ammunition), of which

overseas commanders each month reported the quantities on hand. This, the

Materiel Status Report, was submitted

directly to the War Department, there to

be consolidated by the Statistical Branch

into a single compilation. The individual

reports were also extracted to the supply

services for audit and action, subject to review and co-ordination by SOS headquarters. Air force matériel was handled

under separate procedures and AAF control. In the supply services, the extracted

reports were collated with records of supply shipments and authorized allowances

to provide a basis for supplying the listed

items; actual shipments were made, in the

case of replacement items on the controlled list, on receipt of the overseas commanders' requisitions, which the ports

forwarded without action to the supply

services. Most items of scarce equipment

shipped to forces overseas fell into this

category; the relatively few items of initial

issue that had to be sent to troops already

overseas were shipped automatically.2

Ammunition (Class V supply), the

scarcest of the scarce categories and a substantial part of all overseas requirements,

was not supplied by requisition (although

requisitions were often submitted), but

under a system of allocations based on

priorities, shipments being made automatically within limits of immediate availability. Allowances of ammunition to

overseas commands during most of 1942

were stated in terms of "units of fire," a

primarily tactical unit of measure reflecting average expenditures in combat

among all the overseas theaters. Allowances were computed, therefore, on the

basis of "active" weapons in each overseas command—that is, weapons in the

hands of troops, not in storage or in the

pipeline.3

As late as June 1942 the official hope

was that ammunition soon could be supplied automatically as a credit item, within the administrative sphere of the ports.

1

 (1) WD ltr, 22 Jan 42, sub: Sup of Overseas Depts,

Theaters, and Separate Bases, AG 400 (1-17-42), and

revision, 28 Apr 42. (2) WD ltr, 2 Apr 42, sub: Current Sup Policy and Proced, AG 475 (4-1-42). (3)

WD ltr, 10 Jun 42, same sub, AG 475 (6-7-42). (4)

The general plan of overseas supply seems to have

been mainly the work of General Lutes and officers

in the Supply Branch of G-4, while reflecting some of

the ideas of The Quartermaster General, Maj. Gen.

Edmund B. Gregory. See memo, G-4 for CofS, 17

Jan 42, sub: Sup of Overseas Depts, Theaters, and

Separate Bases, G-4/33889; memo, Lutes for ACofS

G-4, 15 Jan 42, sub: Overseas Sup Opns, G-4/33889;

memo, G-4 for TQMG, 16 Jan 42, sub: Sup of Trs in

Australia and Pac Islands, G-4/33861; memo,

CofTrans Br for CofSup Br G-4, 8 Jan 42, Overseas

Sup folder, OCT HB; and Lt Gen LeRoy Lutes,

"Supply Reorganization for World War II," Antiaircraft Journal (March-April 1952), pp. 5-6. (5)

For overseas territorial responsibilities of each port of

embarkation, see below, App. G. 2

 (1) WD ltr, 6 Mar 42, sub: Monthly Materiel

Status Rpt, Overseas Comds, AG 400 (2-28-42).

(2) Related corresp in G-4/34224, G-4/33825, and

G-4/31796. 3

 (1) WD ltrs cited n. 1(1). (2) WD Memo W700-

8-42, 10 Oct 42, sub: Sup of Overseas Depts, Theaters, and Separate Bases. (3) WD ltr, 6 Aug 42, sub:

Authorized Allowance of Weapons and Ord Vehicles

and ... Am, AG 400 (8-2-42). (4) WD ltr to

CG USAFIA, 13 Feb 42, sub: Sup of USAFIA,

G-4/33861. (5) Related corresp in same file. (6) FM

101-10, Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organizational,

Technical and Logistical Data, pars. 90, 92. (7) In the

case of armored vehicles, the individual vehicle rather

than the weapons mounted on it was the basis of calculation. The unit of fire was broken down into percentages for each type of ammunition (for example,

armor-piercing, high-explosive). See FM 100-10,

Field Service Regulations: Administration, Ch. I. (8)

See also below, App. F-2.
THE SUPPORT OF OVERSEAS OPERATIONS 319

But this hope was not realized. The authorized levels of ammunition reserves assigned to each overseas command in July

1942 were theoretically minimum levels,

but for most areas they remained distant

goals. North Africa, by early 1943, had

become a conspicuous exception; there a

policy of largely unregulated automatic

shipments resulted in a huge accumulation of ammunition before the flow was

finally reduced—almost a billion and a

half rounds of small arms types alone—

an extravagance that was partly responsible, of course, for the prevailing shortages

elsewhere. Because of this shortage, it was

difficult if not impossible during 1942 to

relate the supply of ammunition to estimated or projected needs. An SOS official

wrote in June:

There will never be enough to meet the

demand of all theaters, if theater commanders are authorized to submit requests based

upon projected expenditures. . . . If ammunition is supplied on actual reports of expenditures, the time lag between the actual

expenditure and the delivery of replacement

ammunition will be so great that the supply . . . might be reduced to dangerously

low levels.4

Except for the important item of ammunition, relatively little of the supply of

overseas forces was placed under central

controls. In the 22 January general instructions, administration of the bulk of

overseas supply was decentralized to the

ports. Two large classes of this supply,

moreover—food (Class I) and fuel (Class

III)—were exempted even from the requisitioning procedure and were shipped

automatically by the ports on the basis of

predetermined allowances. Spare parts,

for a time, were also shipped automatically to certain theaters. For these categories of supply the demand was fairly

constant and could be anticipated with

reasonable accuracy if the number of consuming units (soldiers, trucks, and so

forth) were known and the conditions of

use were not too abnormal. Clothing,

weapons, vehicles, and other items for

which allowances to individuals or troop

units were fixed in standard tables (Class

II), and items for which there were no

fixed allowances (Class IV) such as machinery and construction materials and

equipment were shipped in response to

requisitions from overseas commanders.5

Petroleum fuels and lubricants (Class

III supply) were not notably scarce items,

despite the loss of the wells and refineries

of the Netherlands Indies; the pinch was

felt rather in the means of transporting

and, occasionally, of storing and packaging the products. Certain controls were

placed upon their use and distribution,

therefore, aimed primarily at making the

most effective use of transportation, especially ocean shipping. Upwards of half of

the Army's tonnage shipped to forces overseas consisted of petroleum products.6

Other factors helped to place the supply of

petroleum products in a special category.

Sources of supply were widely dispersed

4

 (1) Memo, Dir of Procurement and Distrib Div

SOS for G-4, 12 Jun 42, sub: Sup of Overseas Depts,

Theaters, and Separate Bases. (2) Memo, G-4 for

CG's SOS and AAF, 27 May 42, same sub. Both in

G-4/400. (3) Ltr, SOS, 24 May 42, sub: Handling of

Requisitions at POE's, SPX 400 (5-21-42). (4) WD

ltrs cited n. 1(2) and n. 1(3). (5) Report of WD Procurement Review Board, p. 36. (6) History of the

Planning Division, ASF, II, 191, OCMH. (7) Col.

Creswell G. Blakeney, ed., Logistical History of

NATOUSA-MTOUSA, 11 August 1942 to 30 November

1945 (Naples, Italy, 1946), pp. 89-91. 5

 (1) WD ltr cited n. 1(1). (2) WD memo cited n.

3(2). 6

 (1) Erna Risen, Fuels for Global Conflict, QMC Hist

Study 9 (rev. ed., Washington, 1952), pp. 1, 43. The

following account is based largely on this study. (2)

For an account of the problem of distributing petroleum products within the United States, see Rose,

American Wartime Transportation, Ch. VIII.
320 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

geographically and under several national

jurisdictions, with a consequent need for

international pooling and co-ordination of

distribution, particularly among overseas

theaters. The petroleum industry was

perhaps the most highly integrated in the

world, controlling its products directly or

indirectly from source to consumer. The

Army (except for the Air Forces, which

contracted independently) bought most of

its oil and related products under consolidated contracts made by the Treasury

and the Navy; posts, depots, and supply

services all purchased directly under these

arrangements. Few of the Army's procuring agencies understood clearly where

their responsibilities began and ended. An

officer in Somervell's headquarters, trying

to survey the system in March 1943, questioned ten different individuals in one

service without finding out "how or where

petroleum products are purchased."

 7

During 1942 and early 1943 responsibility for co-ordinating the Army's purchases of petroleum products was gradually centered in the Office of The Quartermaster General.8

 On the interservice

level, the Army-Navy Petroleum Board

(ANPB), established in July 1942 with

limited authority to co-ordinate requirements and information, became by mid1943 the central U.S. agency under the

JCS for co-ordinating the distribution and

use of petroleum products. Automatic supply by the ports of embarkation operated

within the framework of allocations to

each theater as determined by the ANPB.

By early 1943 several theaters had area

petroleum officers who served on the theater staffs but also reported to the ANPB.

In other theaters supply of petroleum

products was administered under earlier

Army-Navy agreements; the Navy had

full responsibility, for example, in the

South Pacific. In still other areas, such as

the British Isles and the Middle East,

American forces were served by the British

through reciprocal aid. Local procurement, finally, was employed by Army

forces in a few areas including Hawaii and

Alaska.9

Very little control was exercised over

spare parts supply in the early months of

the war. Some spare parts were shipped

overseas with every cargo of vehicles, and

additional parts later, on the basis of

scanty records of the number of vehicles

overseas. On 24 May 1942 the resupply of

automotive spare parts to all theaters became automatic. This effort to be generous in supplying the forces overseas seems

to have produced adverse effects at home;

The Inspector General reported in July

that lack of spare parts was accounting for

from two thirds to three fourths of the disabilities among vehicles in the United

States.10 By August, procurement had been

planned to provide two years' supply of

replacement parts for each noncombatant

type of vehicle within six months after its

delivery, though combat vehicles were

given a lower life expectancy. Units in the

United States obtained replacement parts

in exchange for worn ones by requisitioning on the next highest echelon or level of

maintenance if the needed parts were not

available at its own installation. Spare

7

 Contl Div, ASF, Rpt 94, Purchasing Responsibility for Petroleum Products, Mar 43. 8

 (1) WD Circular 317, 17 Sep 42. (2) WD Procurement Regulation, Revision 12, 3 Mar 43. 9

 (1) Ltr, Vice CNO and CG SOS, 20 Jul 42, sub:

ANPB, Orgn of, and atchd dir, 14 Jul 42, sub: Creation of the ANPB . . . , ANPB Dirs, Job A51-60,

DRB AGO. (2) See also, Risch, Fuels for Global Conflict, Chs. III-IV. 10

 (1) Min, WD Gen Council mtg, 21 Jul 42. (2)

Disposition form, G-4 to CG USAFIA, 5 Mar

42, sub: Automatic Shipt of Spare Parts . . . ,

G-4/33861. (3) SOS ltr cited n. 4(3).
THE SUPPORT OF OVERSEAS OPERATIONS 321

parts maintenance and repair operations

overseas similarly were organized in echelons representing successively more elaborate operations, but with greater dependence upon mobile maintenance units,

which operated close to the combat areas.

Spare parts were assembled in standard

but divisible lots (usually for a hundred

vehicles) sufficient for a year's maintenance. Parts having an average mortality

of less than one per hundred vehicles were

boxed and shipped separately. For most of

the standard types of vehicles of recent

model (procured by the Ordnance Department after August 1942) spare parts were

supplied automatically only to overseas

areas specifically designated—notably the

Southwest Pacific and, somewhat later,

the Persian Gulf Service Command. Forces

in North Africa were supplied spare parts,

and virtually everything else, automatically during the first few months of the

campaign. The main burden of control

was placed upon the port, which was expected to maintain a running record of

vehicles in each theater and with each task

force. Theater commanders, in turn, were

expected to indicate to the port when automatic supply (if in force) proved either

inadequate or superabundant to their

needs.11

The overseas supply system was designed

for economy and fluidity, in operations involving huge magnitudes—thousands of

ocean miles, hundreds of thousands of

troops, millions of separate items, and millions of tons of freight. Automatic supply

was fluid, but patently uneconomical; it

used precious shipping space for cargo not

urgently needed and led to the accumulation of unbalanced stocks overseas. But

during the first year it was the only way to

maintain a regular flow of supplies to new

bases, which lacked time or personnel for

paper work. Automatic supply kept these

bases alive and enabled them to build up

reserves. In the system as a whole, however, it was an incidental and temporary

feature. Fundamentally, economy and

fluidity were pursued by the same methods

that had long been employed in largescale private business: organization was

decentralized, administrative procedures

were standardized and made routine, operations were wholesale. Each of the ports

of embarkation was the administrative

center for supplying one or more overseas

theaters or bases. Channels of administration ran from the theater to the port and

thence directly to sources of supply, the

depots backing up the port, bypassing

Washington altogether; the flow of supply

followed the same channel in reverse. Procedures were generalized and standardized for broad classes of material, thus

reducing improvisation and waste motion.

What the system lost in control, it gained

in administrative economy.

Even more fundamentally, the system

rested upon the principle of wholesale operations. In its broadest sense, this was an

effort to free the flow of supply from the

erratic pace of day-to-day demand, in

order to gain flexibility in the use of transport, storage, and handling facilities. As

far as possible, requirements were consolidated and material was shipped and

stored in bulk, primarily to fill the longrange cumulative demand rather than the

interim specific need. Such a system could

justify itself in wartime, of course, only to

the extent that it succeeded, in fact, in

meeting this interim specific need as it

11

 (1) WD Memo W850-5-42, 24 Aug 42, sub:

Automotive Parts Policy, and changes of 8 Sep 42.

(2) WD ltr, 11 Jun 42, same sub, AG 451.9 (6-4-42).

(3) Blakeney, Logistical History of NATOUSAMTOUSA, pp. 265-66.
322 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

arose. To do so required careful long-range

planning, based on close study of trends in

past and current demand and painstaking

analysis of the factors that might influence

future demand. And since long-range

planning, at best, could produce only educated estimates, the system depended also

upon the amassing of reserves to cushion

the impact of unforeseen demands. In

theory, these reserves were stocked at intervals along the lines of communications as

well as in the United States so that forces

overseas might be supplied from sources

near at hand, and these, in turn, might be

replenished from sources farther to the

rear. This was the modern version of the

system of staged supply perfected by the

Prussian Army in the 1860's, but adapted

to global lines of communications over

both oceanic and overland routes.

Wholesale supply could not, however,

adequately serve the fluctuating and

urgent needs of the battle front, which

demanded retail and often emergency

methods. In the overseas theaters, which

lay beyond the jurisdiction of the system

administered by the ports of embarkation,

wholesale methods merged into retail,

armies in the field provisioning themselves

at need from the reservoir of depots behind

them, while the reservoir in turn was replenished and kept at a safe level by an

even flow of supply, through wholesale

methods, across the oceans. Reserves thus

tended to be massed in rear areas of overseas theaters rather than being distributed

evenly through the pipeline. Economy demanded, in any case, that the number of

transshipment stages be kept at a minimum. Stocks scattered along the oceanic

lines of communications therefore were

relatively few and small, serving to sustain

garrisons at these points and to reprovision

and refuel passing ships and aircraft. With

the shifting of routes and of the foci of

military operations, the growing security

of the sea lanes, and the forward movement of fighting fronts, many stockage

points along the way, or in what had once

been forward areas, were bypassed and

allowed to stagnate. The "full and flowing

pipeline" was never, in strict fact, altogether full—above all during 1942—and

only in the intervals between stockage

points could it be said to flow. The phrase

did, however, suggest an important underlying purpose during 1942 and early

1943—to amass sufficient reserves at key

points along the pipeline, particularly in

overseas theaters, so that during the period

of expanding deployment the process of

supplying forces overseas from theater

stocks, and of replenishing those stocks,

would become part of a generally continuous forward movement. It was a system of

calculated oversupply, which laid claim to

long-term economy through administrative efficiency, elimination of improvisation, and the forestalling of war's greatest

waste, that resulting from defeat on the

field of battle.

Procedural Problems in Overseas Supply

The two basic functions of the port in

routine overseas supply were to initiate

and co-ordinate the filling of requisitions

received from overseas, and to take the

necessary action incident to forwarding

automatic shipments. Action on a requisition at the port normally fell into three

stages: (1) editing, an examination to detect obvious errors or omissions, and to

check for conformity with authorized allowances as stated in the requisition or as

indicated by port records; (2) extraction,

forwarding the individual requests listed

in the requisition to their appropriate
THE SUPPORT OF OVERSEAS OPERATIONS 323

sources of supply, usually either the port's

own reserves or filler depots backing up

the port; and (3) follow-up, checking the

progress of filling the requisition at the

depots. The port acted only on requisitions

of a routine character; those involving

controlled or status report items or otherwise out of the ordinary were referred to

the headquarters of the supply services

concerned or to SOS headquarters.12

(Chart 7)

Effective supply action by the ports,

both on requisitions and on automatic

supply, called above all for up-to-date,

pertinent information. Requests could not

be accepted at face value since overseas

commanders had a tendency to ask for

whatever they thought the traffic would

bear (in one widely publicized instance, a

four years' supply of laundry soap). Overseas commanders were supposed to keep

the port informed of shortages and surpluses in subsistence and fuel, quantities of

supplies procured locally, storage space

available in the theater, priorities desired

in shipping supplies, and ports of entry to

be used. Authorized levels of reserves for

each overseas command were published

periodically by the War Department, and

the bases of issue could be found in standard allowance tables, expenditure tables,

and established use factors. The chief difficulty was encountered in determining the

strength and composition of the forces

supplied. From the General Staff (OPD

and G-3) the ports were supposed to receive for each overseas command a troop

basis, revised quarterly, and a monthly

troop list showing troops present at and en

route to the base. Actually, both strength

figures and troop bases appeared at irregular intervals in 1942, were usually many

weeks out of date, and were late in reaching the ports. Further, they included no

projection of strength to cover the weeks or

months that would elapse before shipments

actually reached the base. Fluctuating

troop movement schedules in 1942 gave

little help.13

The ports thus had to depend mainly on

their own records of troop movements and

such information as they could glean from

the overseas bases. Both sources were uncertain. There were no procedures in 1942

for notifying a port of troops moved to its

assigned bases through other ports, still

less of the later peregrinations of troop

units within and among overseas theaters.

Discrepancies between actual strength at

a base and the official or estimated figures

at the port often mounted to thousands of

men. Requisitions were often computed

on projected rather than actual strength,

inviting duplication by later requisitions.

In July 1942 the War Department ordered

that each requisition indicate actual troop

strength, together with quantities of requested items on hand, the period covered,

and "any other information necessary to

indicate clearly the need and basis thereof."

 14

 But in August it was still necessary

explicitly to prohibit the practice of requi12

 (1) OCT Circular 82, 19 Nov 42. (2) Leighton,

Overseas Supply Policies and Procedures, pp. 51-54,

OCMH. (3) Larson, Role of the Transportation Corps

in Oversea Supply, pp. 105-07, OCT HB. 13

 (1) AG ltr, 2 Oct 43, sub: Editing of Overseas

Requisitions for Laundry and Dry Cleaning Sups,

SPX 438 (9-28-43). (2) Memo, OCT for Port Comdrs,

14 Aug 42, sub: Proper Editing of Requisitions . . . ,

SPTSP 400.212-BF, OCT. (3) WD ltrs cited n. 1(1).

(4) Transcript of Overseas Sup Conf, Washington, 22

Jul 42, 10:45 A.M. to 12:00 noon, pp. 13-14, 1:15 to

2:00 P.M., p. 1 and passim, Logis File, OCMH. (5)

Memo, G-4 for G-3, 4 Feb 42, sub: Overseas Tr

Bases, G-4/33889. (6) Related corresp in same-file

and in AG 400 (1-17-42) Sec 1. (7) History of the

Planning Division, ASF, II, 210-11. OCMH. (8) For

use factors, see above, Ch. XII. (9) For levels of supply, see below, this chapter. 14

 WD ltr, 19 Jul 42, sub: Level of Sup for Overseas Depts . . . , AG 400 (7-11-42).

THE SUPPORT OF OVERSEAS OPERATIONS 325

sitioning on projected strength.15 Overseas

commanders were also laggard or forgetful in notifying the ports of desired shipping priorities, with the result that they

sometimes received less urgent items ahead

of more urgent ones.

In both the centralized and the decentralized systems, the determination of

supply status was the very heart of the

process. Effective supply control, in any

continuous sense, depended upon the

ability of the supplying agencies to ascertain with reasonable accuracy not merely

what the overseas base was entitled to receive, but what it already had on hand.

Part of the difficulty of doing so was inherent in the dynamism of the supply

process, which made it virtually impossible to capture, in time to be useful, a "still"

picture of status based on information collected over a period of time from various

points along the pipeline. This difficulty

was aggravated by the inevitable sluggishness of a complicated administrative

process.

Few reporting requirements were placed

upon overseas commanders in the overseas

supply plan of January 1942. The new

Materiel Status Report, instituted in

March 1942, was the most detailed and

useful report, but it covered only a fraction

of the items supplied. An older monthly

report, submitted by the base directly to

G-4, was too general in content to be useful and by the time it reached the port it

was usually obsolete. Late in January 1942

the War Department turned down a request by The Quartermaster General to

require a monthly report on the status of

subsistence from each base. After July

requisitions were supposed to contain

status information as part of the justification for the items requested, but this

information, when given, was difficult to

interpret because of the absence of clear

definitions of the several stages of the pipeline through which supplies passed (when

was an item en route?), and duplication of

reporting often occurred when supplies

moved from one stage to another. Quantities in the hands of troops were so difficult

to determine that many bases omitted this

information altogether.16 In any case, the

prolonged labor involved in piecing together the fragmentary data in many

requisitions over an extended period of

time in order to assemble a complete status

picture, and the absence of rhythm in the

flow of this information, vitiated the usefulness of any such status analysis as an

instrument of supply control.

The Materiel Status Report had been

originally designed by the G-4 staff to

show quantities authorized (by the overseas commander's reckoning) as well as

quantities on hand, and would thus have

served as a requisition. This feature was

abandoned on the assumption that successive reports would overlap in coverage,

because of the lag in shipments, and that

changes in troop strength at the base

would make it impossible to correlate successive reports of shortages. There was

also some concern over the security risk

involved in a single consolidated status

report. But the decision in March 1942 to

make the report merely a control device

rather than a requisitioning instrument

15

 (1) WD Memo, W-35-1-42, 21 Aug 42. (2)

Transcript of Overseas Sup Conf, Washington, 22

Jul 42, 2 to 3 P.M., pp. 8-10, Logis File, OCMH. (3)

WD memo cited n. 3(2). (4) History of the Planning

Division, ASF, Vol. II, Ch. XII. 16

 (1) Disposition form, G-4 to TQMG, 29 Jan 42,

sub: Rpt on Subsistence From Overseas Stations,

G-4/33889. (2) WD ltr cited n. 14. (3) WD ltr, 28

Apr 42, cited n. 1(1). (4) Transcript of Overseas Sup

Conf, Washington, 22 Jul 42, 2 to 3 P.M., pp. 8-9,

Logis File, OCMH.
326 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

only caused confusion. Some overseas

commanders evidently assumed that replacements as well as initial issues of controlled items would be supplied automatically. The New Orleans port commander

wrote in June of a "long discussion" among

officers of the Panama Canal Department

on this vexing question, "each citing various War Department letters for authority."

 17

 One disillusioned critic declared

that the Materiel Status Report was not

satisfactory

. . . either to the overseas base, the General

Staff or the various chiefs of the arms and

services. There is a definite lack of pertinent

information in each case. There is too much

work involved. There is too much loss of

time. There is no common denominator or

starting point from which all parties can base

their values and decisions. The result is the

already experienced confusion, long-winded

explanations and wasted but precious time.18

The salient defect seemed to be the failure to bring the port, which alone had an

up-to-date picture of shipments actually

cleared for overseas, into the process of

compiling the status report. Moreover, the

overseas commander, required to justify

his requisitions, lacked most of the basic

information needed to tabulate his authorized requirements. Only a quarter of this

information, according to one estimate,

was contained in literature and data that

might be available in a field headquarters.

In general, the status report system lacked

provisions for a co-ordinated stream of

pertinent data from various sources, flowing under a rigorous schedule into the central agencies, and showing the complete

status of supply at a given base at a given

time. "This masterpiece supply picture,"

the above-noted critic observed, "must be

painted by the specialists of each part."

 19

In the realm of decentralized supply,

the SOS steadily enlarged the status reporting responsibilities of the ports. By

July each port was submitting to the Office of the Chief of Transportation a

monthly automatic supply report, and was

expected to maintain a "running record"

of supply status for all classes at the bases

that it served.20 In effect, the ports were

asked to obtain from the bases by request

or hearsay information the War Department was unwilling to require in formal

reports. One port supply officer, asked

how overseas commanders reported their

levels of supply, replied tersely, "They

don't report"—and then unburdened

himself at some length:

I'll tell you what I've been doing down in

Charleston on that. I try to get hold of every

supply officer who comes through the port

and sit down with him and tell him some of

the things that will be beneficial to us back in

Charleston in keeping that supply level up.

I have even gone so far as to dictate a memorandum on some of the things. . . . I give

him a copy . . . and if he will let us know

some of the things we ask for in that memo- randum then we will be better guided. . . .

In other words, when these fellows get over

there [overseas] they shouldn't go to sleep.

They should realize that somebody back here

has to serve them, and they have to know

something in order to really, honest and

17

 (1) 1st Ind, CG New Orleans POE for CG SOS,

9 Jun 42, to SPX 400 (5-23-42). (2) Memo, Lutes for

Gross, 11 May 42. Both in Notes on Controlled Items,

Logis File, OCMH. (3) Corresp in G-4/34224. (4) Ltr

cited n. 4(3). 18

 Memo, CofCWS for Statistics Br WDGS, 7 Aug

42, sub: Monthly Materiel Status Rpt Outline, CWS

320.2/53 (8-7-42). 19

 Ibid.

20

 (1) Memo, CofTrans for Port Comdrs, 1 Apr 42,

sub: Level of Automatic Sup at Overseas Bases,

SPRVC 400.212, Overseas Bases-B. (2) Mimeographed digest of Overseas Sup Conf, Washington,

22 Jul 42, p. 12, Logis File, OCMH. (3) Memo, Lutes

for Somervell, 17 Jul 42, Misc Notes, Lutes File. (4)

2d Ind, ACofS Opns SOS for CofTrans, 30 Jul 42,

SPOPP 400, Sup-Overseas. (5) WD Memo cited n.

3(2).
THE SUPPORT OF OVERSEAS OPERATIONS 327

truly, serve them. Now they just don't give

us enough information.21

The complaint was unanimous. In July

there was extended discussion of a proposed periodic status report, to be submitted by bases to ports, covering all

classes of supply. The Boston port had already devised a fairly simple standard

form, showing days of supply on hand for

each class and subclass of supplies, which

could be transmitted by radio. But itemized reports could not be sent by radio,

and, in any case, required so long to prepare and transmit that they became obsolete before they could be received and

used. Ports often had to make their own

calculations of subsistence stocks overseas

based on an earlier strength report, dropping off the appropriate quantities from

day to day, a method which progressively

multiplied error. Experience showed in

general that whatever reports were obtained from overseas, under conditions

prevailing in 1942, were irregular, stereotyped, and inaccurate. "You end up," one

SOS staff officer dryly remarked, "with a

bunch of piffy statements that mean

nothing."

 22

The SOS supply staff had hoped from

the beginning to integrate the controls for

scarce items with the decentralized system

of overseas supply centering in the ports.

To this end SOS proposed, in September

1942, a comprehensive system of status

reporting for all types of supply, including

scarce items, centering in the ports but

depending necessarily on regular reports

from overseas bases and co-ordinated by

SOS headquarters. It was the aim of the

scheme to synchronize and schedule the

flow of information from all segments of

the pipeline into the ports, with definite

assignments of status reporting responsibilities at each stage of movement through

the pipeline. All this data would be consolidated in SOS headquarters, providing

each month a complete picture of supply

status for the entire pipeline.23

Opposition to the plan focused on the

enlarged role proposed for the port of embarkation in overseas supply. It was inadvisable, G-4 thought, "to order overseas

commanders to comply with all requests

of commanders of ports for . . . reports."

Port commanders could request the information; overseas commanders would "undoubtedly furnish it unless not practicable

to do so"—which, as experience had

shown, was a very large "unless."

 24

 General Staff officers felt, too, that subordinate

headquarters (SOS and the ports) should

not be interposed in the direct channel of

communication between overseas commanders and the General Staff on nonroutine matters. General MacArthur's

request for large amounts of special jungle

equipment, which was submitted about

this time directly to OPD and mainly

handled there, was a case in point. Under

the proposed procedure this matter would

have come first to SOS through the port

and, if interpreted in SOS as routine or

technical, might have been processed on

that level. G-4 thought that the existing

Materiel Status Report, with a few

changes, would serve its purpose.25

21

 Transcript of Overseas Sup Conf, Washington,

22 Jul 42, 2 to 3 P.M., pp. 8-10; quote is from p. 9,

Logis File, OCMH. 22

 (1) Ibid., pp. 10, 13-14. (2) Port and Field AG

Div OCT Diary, 13 Jul 42 entry, OCT HB; see also,

2 Oct 42 entry. 23

 (1) Draft dir, no date, sub: Materiel Status Rpts

arid Level of Sup Rpts from POE's, OPD 400 Sups

and Equip, 97. (2) Related corresp in same file and

in G-4/100. 24

 Memo, G-4 for Col C. F. Robinson, 8 Oct 42,

G-4/400. 25

 Corresp in G-4/400.
328 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

In the end only the report on controlled

items was put into effect, and only on a

trial basis. Port commanders were made

responsible for preparing it as best they

could, without being permitted to "require" reports from overseas. The picture

of pipeline status was completed by the

supply services, which added to the report

the quantities of material ready for shipment at depots; they also were given responsibility for computing authorized allowances for troops at each base. Shipments of controlled items (if for replacement) continued to be made in response

to requisitions. The older Materiel Status

Report, submitted to the War Department

not the ports, remained the official basis

for determining allotments of scarce material within which shipments should be

made—an imperfect instrument, which

some commands neglected to submit at all

and which, at best, reached the War Department late and the supply agencies

even later.26 The ports continued to prepare monthly reports on the automatic

noncontrolled classes of supply and to

maintain running status records on all

classes, based on whatever information

they could cajole from overseas commanders. The latter continued often to

find it "not practicable" to provide the information.27

If overseas commanders seemed to

harassed port officials to be the villains of

the piece, the fault was in circumstances

beyond the control of either. None of the

overseas bases in 1942 was in a position to

organize an effective system of supply control. Except in the United Kingdom, the

physical facilities for efficient storage and

distribution hardly existed, and even there

lack of service personnel and the enormous disruption caused by the North

African operation threw base development months behind schedule. One

squadron commander in England complained, for example, that he had only

two spare machine gun barrels on hand;

it later developed, after more had been

requisitioned from the States, that there

were four hundred spare barrels in a warehouse twenty-five miles away. Duplication

of supply occurred on a huge scale when

the North African expedition was mounted because hundreds of thousands of tons

of matériel had been "lost" in depots in

the United Kingdom. This kind of extravagance could be supported, though not

without strain, in the limited operations

of late 1942; projected on a larger scale,

it might well become prohibitive.28

Supply Versus Transportation

With its functions split between supply

and transportation, the port lived a

double life involving some conflict in purpose.29

 The overseas supply function was

a novelty superimposed upon an organization struggling with the unprecedented

volume of wartime traffic; the transportation function, though logically subsidiary

to and part of the supply function, was

already a vested interest and a going op26

 (1) Ltr, SOS, 15 Oct 42, sub: Materiel Status

Rpts . . . , SPX 400 (10-15-42). (2) WD memo

cited n. 3(2). (3) Ltr, SOS to Chiefs of SAS and

CofTrans, 5 Nov 42, sub: Materiel Status Rpts, SPX

400 (11-3-42). (4) Memo, Stock Contl Div ASF for

Gen Lutes, 11 Apr 43, sub: Comments for Conf With

Gen Lee, Conf With Gen Lee April 1943 folder, Lutes

File. (5) Memo, Capt Cross for Exec Off G-4, 11 Dec

42, G-4/400. This memo notes the lack of status reports from CBI theater. (6) See below, Ch. XXIII. 27

 Memo, CofTrans for Port Comdrs, 28 Jan 43,

sub: Prompt Submission of Rpts . . . , POE Gen Overseas Sup folder, OCT HB. 28

 (1) Memo, Gen Lutes for Maj Gen Richard J.

Marshall, 24 Nov 42, Misc Notes, Lutes File. (2) See

also below, Ch. XVI. 29

 See above, Ch. IX.
THE SUPPORT OF OVERSEAS OPERATIONS 329

eration. To a port transportation officer,

the most pressing problem was traffic

management—control of the mass of

freight and people pouring through the

narrow funnel of the port. The greatest

danger was that rail, road, and water

transport, handling equipment, and storage capacity might be glutted or overburdened and movement thus paralyzed.

When the emergency struck the ports after

Pearl Harbor, heroic efforts were required

to avert the kind of congestion that in the

winter of 1917-18 had backed up over

44,000 freight cars behind the Atlantic

ports as far west as Pittsburgh and Buffalo.

The volume of outgoing freight handled

by all the ports in December 1941 was

more than 284,000 measurement tons; in

January it rose to almost 480,000 tons; in

February to more than 630,000 tons. Out

of this experience grew the effective system of rail traffic control that successfully

carried the vast burden of troop and supply movements throughout the war.30

 To

avert congestion, transportation officials

insisted that freight cars, trucks, and ships

must be loaded with maximum economy

of space, material stored in or near the

port must not be allowed to clog movement, shipments must not be called forward to the port, or to any other transshipment point, until the way was clear

for them to move smoothly through. In

short, the full, co-ordinated capacity of the

entire pipeline to move traffic must be

utilized.

But whereas efficient transportation,

under wartime conditions, thus emphasized the movement of freight and personnel in the mass, efficient supply demanded

the delivery of specific items to specific

destinations at specific times. A shipload

of war material delivered safely overseas

was half wasted if half the cargo consisted

of filler items not needed immediately,

while urgently needed tanks and signal

equipment (bulky in relation to weight)

had been loaded, in the interests of saving

cargo space, on a later vessel. As General

Lutes wrathfully protested in February

1943, "this business of just pushing on subsistence and ammunition and stuff that

[is] not needed overseas as filler cargo, as

has been done in the last eight months,

[has got] to stop . . . ."

 31

 From the point

of view of supply, efficiency in transportation was not an end in itself, but had to

be measured in terms of effective supply.

The conflict of purpose between the

supply and transportation functions of the

port under wartime stresses became evident even before the ports had assumed

their new role in overseas supply. In the

traffic crisis following Pearl Harbor, the

great depots at San Francisco and New

Orleans (the one at New York had been

discontinued the preceding spring) immediately became an obstacle to the free

flow of supply overseas because of the cross

traffic they generated in supplying units

and installations in the United States.

Both general depots were discontinued

early in 1942. Under the new overseas

supply system the ports were intended to

serve only to a limited degree as sources

of supply, by keeping on hand "minimum" reserves for emergency needs of

overseas bases, and to fill last-minute

shortages of troops moving overseas. It

proved difficult in 1942 to keep these reserves down to manageable size, port com30

 (1) Benedict Crowell and Robert Forrest Wilson,

The Road to France, I (New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1921), 115. (2) Wardlow, Trans I, Ch.

IV, and Trans II, Ch. IV. (3) Rose, American Wartime Transportation, Ch. IV. 31

 (1) Telephone conv, Gen Lutes and Gen Goodman, 24 Feb 43, Stock Contl 1943 folder, Lutes File.

(2) See also above, Ch. IX.
330 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

manders showing a disposition to build up

reservoirs for any and all purposes. By

midyear SOS officials were concerned

over the growth of port reserves and the

increasing tendency to use them simply as

depots. Port representatives were lectured

on the subject at a conference in Washington in July 1942. Port reserves were there

defined as "the minimum amount of supplies essential to give elasticity to the overseas supply plan, and only incidentally to

fill shortages of units going overseas."

 32

The reserves should have no particular

relation to the size of an overseas garrison,

since no port had space or facilities to

serve as a filler depot, but should be confined to selected items in quantities sufficient for emergency shipments. After

midyear the emergency function of port

reserves began to fade. Procedures developed during the summer and autumn for

replacement of shipments lost at sea, for

example, speeded up the process of initiating replacement action from normal

sources of supply. Concurrently, reserves

were being amassed at overseas bases to

provide cushions against interruptions to

supply. By October 1942, in policy if not

invariably in practice, the function of port

reserves was to fill minor last-minute

shortages and to provide filler cargo in

order to permit vessels to sail fully loaded

on schedule.33

Co-ordination of supply action with the

physical movement of shipments from

depots to overseas bases during 1942 was

rather loose. Since scheduling hinged

mainly on the uncertain availability of

shipping, it was usually expedient to set

up shipments in depots in advance, as

requisitions arrived, and to draw upon

these shipments to provide cargo when

convoys or individual vessels were ready.

It was not until late in the year that the

New York port, facing the problem of

scheduling the flow of maintenance supplies to North Africa over a period of several months to come, began to work out

procedures to co-ordinate the processing

of requisitions (including those prepared

by the port for automatic shipments) with

the expected flow of shipments into and

through the ports. Only gradually was

this system extended to the other ports.34

Effective co-ordination of movement

depended upon a system of notification by

which each agency along the route

learned in advance that a shipment was

ready or en route, and thus could prepare

to handle it. For movements from depots

to ports, notification procedures were

crystallized early in 1942 as part of the

Transportation Corps' general traffic control system, and except for a few spectacular breakdowns in the movement of the

North African and some of the smaller

task forces, the system worked smoothly

throughout 1942. Far less systematized

were the procedures for notifying an overseas base of action taken on its requisitions, particularly after a shipment had

started on its journey from the depot.

Availability notices, originating at the

depot when it received an extract requisition, were supposed to be forwarded to

the port, and then by the port to the base;

32

 Transcript of Overseas Sup Conf, Washington,

22 Jul 42, 9:30 to 10:30 A.M., p. 9. See also, mimeographed digest of the conference, p. 4. Both in Logis

File, OCMH. 33

 (1) Alvin P. Stauffer, Quartermaster Depot Storage

and Distribution Operations, QMG Hist Study 18

(Washington, 1948), pp. 47-54. (2) Wardlow, Trans I,

p. 107. (3) WD ltr, 22 Jan 42, cited n. 1(1). (4) Larson, Role of the Transportation Corps in Oversea

Supply, pp. 43-46, 55-66, OCT HB. (5) Corresp in

Misc File folder, Plng Div ASF, Job A44-140. 34

 (1) Larson study cited n. 33(4). (2) Wardlow,

Trans II, Ch. V, contains a more detailed discussion

of the problems of moving cargo overseas summarized

in this section.
THE SUPPORT OF OVERSEAS OPERATIONS 331

shipping lists similarly were supposed to

be sent ahead of the shipment itself.

Omission of these notifications was a common complaint. The principal notification instrument was the cargo manifest,

which was prepared at the port while

loading was in progress and was supposed

to be dispatched by air mail immediately

after the ship's departure. Distances in the

Pacific, bad weather in the Atlantic, and

human frailty everywhere undermined

the procedure. A message from the Southwest Pacific in mid-1942 commented that

if the manifest ever should reach the theater ahead of the ship, it would be "one of

the outstanding improvements" in overseas supply procedures.35

 The loading

cable, transmitted immediately after the

ship's departure, was too brief to give

much specific information on the contents

or stowage of the cargo; even it, moreover,

was often held up for days by administrative delays in transmission and might be

garbled in decoding. All these delays

meant trouble for the people at the overseas base who had to make preparations

to handle, store, and move incoming cargo. Finally, in the endless stream of transmitted data the incidence of error and

misunderstanding was high. The SOS

staff in Great Britain reported the following harrowing experience early in 1943:

The British had vague information that

the Standard had 8 P-38s on board. We

cabled New York on 23 February enquiring

. . . . At the time . . . the vessel was due

in 8 days. New York's reply, received on 26

February, stated that 8 P-38s were on board

. . . . We checked the Bill of Lading number and found that the P-38s New York was

talking about had to do with the previous

voyage of this vessel. We cabled again on 27

February . . . . On 3 March, the day the

vessel arrived, we received New York's

reply—no P-38s on board . . . . In other

words, it took us 8 days to settle the question

while in the meantime [we] . . . had to

make the necessary arrangements just in case

the vessel did have planes onboard.

The frequent result of delays, errors, and

the inertia of a large administrative machine was that, as a typical complaint

from the ETO noted, "the first indication

this headquarters had that cargo was

aboard for our account was when the vessel arrived at Liverpool."

 36

Supply and traffic control merged in

the problem of identifying shipments. For

purposes of supply and movement, a shipment was identified by its address, its

priority, its contents, and the requisition

or other request to which it responded.

With knowledge of only the first two

points, transportation agencies along the

route could speed the shipment forward,

and the port authorities ordinarily did not

even have to know the ultimate destination, but merely the theater port of entry.

Knowledge of contents was not essential to

the physical handling of freight, except to

the extent that certain types required special treatment (for example, ammunition,

perishable foods, gasoline). At the overseas port, the problem became more complex. Theoretically, it was possible to

handle incoming cargo there as it was

handled at the port of embarkation—in

bulk—segregating matériel only by broad

classes (indicated in outside markings) for

shipment to theater depots, from which it

35

 Memo, CG SWPA for CG SOS, 25 Jul 42, AG

400 (7-25-42). 36

 (1) Memo, OCT ETOUSA for OCT WD, 9 Mar

43, sub: Late Arrival of Cargo Loading Cables . . . ,

OCT 565.2 ETO. (2) Corresp in Misc File folder,

Plng Div ASF, Job A44-140. (3) Leighton, Overseas

Supply Policies and Procedures, pp. 57-61, OCMH.

(4) Wardlow, Trans I, pp. 85-86.

From late 1942 on, cargo security officers accompanied vessels carrying Army cargo to insure delivery

of loading lists and to convey other information bearing on unloading.
332 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

would ultimately be distributed retail to

its users. SOS consistently favored this

method, since wholesale distribution of

matériel outward from the United States

was one of the pillars of the overseas supply system.

Unfortunately, wholesale supply from

the United States presupposed a mature

and well-equipped machinery of wholesale-retail distribution overseas, which in

1942 no theater possessed. The theater's

principal concern was to deliver incoming

cargo to its users as rapidly as possible.

Usually this meant that shipments had to

be identified at or near the port of entry

so that they could immediately be shipped

to a depot or supply point accessible to the

troops for whom they were destined. Delay

at the port of entry not only postponed

delivery but also threatened congestion

and invited enemy attack. To the theater

supply organization anonymous cargo was

of little more use than no cargo at all.

Lacking a claimant and clogging movement, it was likely to be shunted out of the

main stream of traffic to wait for weeks or

months until its full identity, including its

contents and destined users, could be determined.

During 1942 the whole emphasis in

identification mechanisms was upon the

needs of traffic control and movement.

The marking procedures that were developed during the first half of the year prescribed symbols to indicate merely the

geographical area of destination (for example, POPPY for New Caledonia) or the

troop movement that the shipment accompanied, the supply service and class to

which the material belonged, and in some

cases priority markings. Distinctive geometrical patterns on organizational impedimenta sometimes were used to designate units, colors to identify supply services. In addition to outer markings, packing lists attached to each box or crate, bills

of lading, shipping tickets, and manifests

all included more or less specific information as to contents. These various papers

accompanied shipments for all or part of

the journey, and copies of some, as already

noted, were sent ahead to facilitate preparations for handling. Documentation, in

general, was not standardized in form and

was haphazard in execution—packing

lists, for example, were often prepared in

pencil by the packers themselves. During

1942 the Transportation Corps concentrated its efforts mainly on improving the

manifest, making it more detailed, standardizing nomenclature and format, and

expediting transmission.37

The problem of identification specifically for purposes of supply was little

recognized in 1942. Under the instructions

issued in July, requisitions were supposed

to show markings desired by the theater,

with special symbols for "each unit, installation, area or project," to permit routing to final destination. Apart from the

enormous burden that this procedure

placed upon depots in the United States

in marking thousands of packages to a

dozen different overseas areas, each employing separate marking codes, it took no

account of changes in destination that

might occur during the long interval between preparation of a requisition and arrival of the shipment overseas. In the

United Kingdom, indeed, the port of

37

 (1) WD ltrs, 3 Jan and 24 Feb 42, subs: Uniform

Marking of Sup and Equip. (2) WD ltrs, 6 Jun and

26 Jul 42, subs: Requisitioning and Marking of Sups

for Overseas Shipt. Both in AG 400.161 series. (3)

Related corresp in same file. (4) Harold Larson, Handling Army Cargo in the Second World War, Monograph 19, Sec 14, OCT HB. (5) Leighton, The Problem of Troop and Cargo Flow in Preparing the European Invasion, pp. 56-57, OCMH.
THE SUPPORT OF OVERSEAS OPERATIONS 333

entry was not selected until a vessel approached British waters. It was in this

theater, where in the summer of 1942 the

tide of inflowing cargo was largest and

most concentrated, that the problem of

identifying cargo shipments reached crisis

proportions. Col. Frank S. Ross, the theater transportation chief, noted one arriving ship in which 30 percent of the cargo

had no marking whatever, and 25 percent

of the remainder lacked an address and

had only a general marking to show the

class of supplies. The whole identification

system, he wrote to Washington, needed "a

revision of ideas" from the embarkation

end.

If we seem impatient at times because this

baggage and equipment is not marked and

sailing cables do not arrive, please remember

that the few days that are being saved in

New York in priming a ship are more than

lost here in unscrambling the mess. . . . all

the warehouses and some of the piers here

are completely destroyed, [so] that we must

load from shipside to train and thence to

depot destinations. . . . Either the method

must be found to spend time on it, or our

efforts here will collapse.38

Marking and documentation, the two

facets of the identification problem, remained distinct and un-co-ordinated systems during 1942, designed primarily for

control of the movement of shipments as

traffic, not for supplying the item wanted

when and where it was wanted. Not until

the following year was the basic principle

of marking—use of short symbols—to be

applied also to documents, both those accompanying shipments and those making

up the paper work of supply (requisitions,

notices of availability, and so forth). Only

when the symbol in a marking or a shipping paper could be identified with the

same symbol in a requisition would it be

possible, at any stage along the route

traveled by a shipment, to identify the

items in the shipment as those listed in a

particular requisition many weeks or

months earlier (and not similar items in

another requisition which perhaps had already been supplied). With such identification the transaction initiated by the

requisition in question could be closed,

and the cycle from demand to delivery

made complete.

Filling the Pipeline

In overseas supply, as in war production, the real objectives in 1942 were

rather vaguely or arbitrarily defined

maxima, not calculated requirements.

The gap between the existing, though rising, scale of effort and the point at which

it would be safe to allow that effort to level

off was so wide that its precise dimensions,

for the moment, did not much matter.

The aim was to fill the pipeline—to amass

sufficient stocks in the distribution system,

especially in its overseas segments, to provide reasonable insurance for outposts and

line-of-communication bases against temporary interruptions of supply, and further to support operations of a limited

offensive character. Any quantitative definition of these objectives was bound to be

somewhat arbitrary in view of the unstable military situation and the shortrange character of strategic plans. The

necessity of scattering reserves along thousands of miles of communications and in

static zones far from the areas in which

they could ever be used in offensive operations was an unavoidable feature of the

defensive logistics of 1942, the cost of security against an enemy who held the initiative and could strike at many points.

38

 (1) Ltr, Col Ross to Col Wylie, 28 Jul 42, ETO

Admin 341A Trans-Gen, DRB AGO. (2) For subsequent developments, see below, Ch. XXIII.
334 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Authorized levels of supply for each

theater or base represented more or less

arbitrary estimates of the amounts, expressed in terms of days of supply (except

ammunition, which was set in terms of

units of fire), that would be required to

sustain each base during an interruption

to the regular flow of supply.39 According

to General Marshall, consideration of

"shipping turnaround, security of lines of

communications, and the character and

extent of operations anticipated" all entered into the calculation.40

 The 180-day

level authorized for Greenland, for example, had an obvious relation to the fact

that the stations there were inaccessible for

part of the year and so far off the beaten

track that frequent calls by supply ships

would be uneconomical. In the case of the

distant outposts in China and India, the

inordinate length of the supply route and

the small size of forces there were the determining factors in the high levels authorized. By contrast the Pacific bases,

while also distant and even more liable to

be cut off by enemy action, were strongly

manned and were serviced by a large

block of shipping, and their strategic importance obviously demanded a regular

flow of supply while their aggregate

strength made a high reserve level impracticable. Most of the garrisons in the

Western Hemisphere were sufficiently accessible to warrant low levels.41

In many ways it was the small, not necessarily the most distant, bases that suffered most in the competition for supplies

and shipping. At Canton, for example,

subsistence stocks early in May 1942 fell to

two weeks' supply. The Japanese drive

into the South and Central Pacific in the

spring threatened a supply crisis, leading

the War Department to raise the reserve

levels of the South Pacific bases to 120

days of supply. Local procurement in

Australia and New Zealand eventually

became a mainstay for bases near the

southern end of the island chain.42

In the North Atlantic communication

lines were shorter but less shipping was

available for the small bases. The Newfoundland garrison could obtain solid fuel

locally, but depended upon the Navy and

a small commercial line for shipments of

perishable subsistence, and upon the Navy

for gasoline and oil. Although authorized

reserve levels were raised in April from

sixty to ninety days, shipments barely met

current needs. Nonperishable food stocks

dwindled to about forty days' supply by

the end of March and rose only slightly

during the next three months. There were

hardly any fresh vegetables or fruit; motor

parts requisitioned in April 1941 did not

arrive until June 1942; the garrison received quantities of snow shoes and skis,

39

 For theater and base levels of supply, see below,

App. F-1.

Before 1942 overseas reserves of ammunition, like

other matériel, had been prescribed in days of supply;

the change was made early in 1942 in the interests

of convenience since task forces, which went overseas

with ammunition allowances prescribed as units of

fire, often became the nuclei of theaters of operations,

and the authorized reserves of a theater then became

the aggregate of the reserves prescribed for the task

forces sent to it. The day of supply, unlike the unit

of fire, was intended to reflect average expenditures of

expendable items of supply (other than ammunition)

and average mortality of replaceable equipment over

any long period of operations in an overseas theater,

not merely in combat. See above, n. 3. 40

 Ltr, Marshall to Dill, no date, OPD 400 Sups

and Equip, 1. 41

 Memo, OPD for CG SOS, 11 Jun 42, sub: Sup

Levels in Overseas Bases, OPD 400 Sups and Equip,

1, 14. 42

 (1) Memo, CG SOS for CofTrans, 28 May 42,

SPOPS 400 Overseas, Lutes File. (2) Memo, Somervell for Gross, 19 Jan 42, ACofS G-4 1941-44 folder,

Hq ASF. (3) Memo cited n. 41. (4) Memo, OPD for

CG SOS, 19 Jun 42, sub: Sp Reserves in Overseas

Theaters . . . , Opd 381.4. (5) See above, Ch. VII,

and below, Ch. XV.
THE SUPPORT OF OVERSEAS OPERATIONS 335

for which they had no use, but could not

obtain subcaliber artillery bores for training. Considerable administrative confusion

resulted from the division of supply responsibility between the Army and Navy

and between the Boston and New York

ports.43

The small base that lacked local resources was often in a sad plight. "Nothing

is available locally," wrote the Greenland

base commander, "except drinking water,

and sand and rocks for construction."

 44

On Ascension Island there were "no local

resources of any kind" and "even water

must be distilled from sea water."

 45

 The

food shortage at this base became serious

in July 1942, and was only relieved by

timely shipments. The Greenland troops

fared somewhat better, mainly because

large stocks had been accumulated before

December 1941. But on the tiny island of

Antigua, in the West Indies, there was an

almost complete lack of natural resources

or man-made facilities surplus to the needs

of a poverty-stricken population. A little

fresh fruit was all the island afforded in

the way of food, and shipments from the

mainland or from nearby Puerto Rico

were extremely irregular. Stocks of canned

goods, in February 1942, fell to fifteen

days' supply, perishable to five days'.46 For

small bases such as this, in the backwash

of overseas deployment, the authorized

level of reserves meant little as long as

shipments, fell so far short of reaching it.

While enemy submarines were terrorizing

the Caribbean in the spring of 1942, the

bases there were in real danger of starvation.

Iceland was better served. As in Newfoundland, the Navy was responsible for

supplying liquid fuels and perishable subsistence, and did so to the apparent satisfaction of the local Army commander.

Local procurement was of modest proportions, but mutton, fish, fresh milk, and

cheese purchased from the inhabitants

supplemented Army diet. While the authorized level of 120 days of supply was not

reached during the first half of the year,

the only shortages that caused concern

were in rations, small arms ammunition,

and automotive spare parts, and these

occurred only occasionally. Army dissatisfaction, in fact, focused primarily on the

beer ration, a chronic source of interservice

and interallied friction. In July the Army

base commander commented, "supply of

this base has been entirely satisfactory."

 47

There was some modification in 1942 in

the stated purpose of reserves. Many garrisons during 1942 were forced to eat into

their reserves continually, using them as

operating supplies rather than holding

them for emergencies, and for practical

purposes the authorized level served as an

ultimate or maximum objective. In May

1942 SOS informed port and overseas

commanders that these levels were to be

regarded as minimum reserves, to be

drawn upon only in emergencies. The

43

 See corresp in AG 400 (l-17-42)(2) Sec 2. 44

 1st Ind, Hq APO 858 N.Y. [Greenland] to TAG,

18 Jul 42, AG 400 (l-17-42)(2) Sec 2. 45

 (1) 1st Ind, Hq COMPOS Force 8012, APO 877

N.Y. [Ascension] to TAG, 7 Sep 42, AG 400 (1-17-

42)(2) Sec 2. (2) Memo, QM Hq APO 877 N.Y. for

TQMG, 25 Jun 42, sub: Rpt on QM Activities and

Opns at AGATE [Ascension], Logis File, OCMH. 46

 (1) See document dated 17 February 1942, which

is evidently a reply to a GHQ questionnaire and refers to the supply of Antigua, in AG 400 (l-17-42)(2)

Sec 1. (2) Min, WD Gen Council mtg, 2 Jun 42. (3)

Corresp in Overseas Sup folder and Convoys folder,

OCT HB. 47

 (1) Memo, U.S. Army Forces Iceland to AG, 30

Jul 42, sub: Sup of Overseas Bases . . . , AG 400

(1-17-42)(2) Sec 2. (2) Harold H. Dunham, Transportation of the U.S. Forces in the Occupation of Iceland, 1941-1944, Monograph 14, pp. 64ff, OCT HB.

(3) Memo, G-4 for CG Field Forces, 19 Feb 42,

G-4/33889.
336 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

logical corollary was to establish a maximum level as well, lest a high-priority theater amass large stocks at the expense of

others. General Gross, the Chief of Transportation, resisted this move on the ground

that a ceiling might prevent port commanders from taking advantage of cargo

space as and when it became available,

but both minimum and maximum levels

were embodied in the revised instructions

issued in July.48

Under the new policy the quantity of

supplies authorized over and above the

minimum level — called the operating

level—was to serve as a cushion, sustaining the base during intervals between

regular shipments. For regularly issued

equipment (Class II), this extra quantity

was not to exceed three months' normal

maintenance needs. The level to which

subsistence and fuel (Classes I and III)

reserves might be allowed to rise above

minimum levels was to be settled by agreement between port and base; operating

levels were not authorized for Class IV

material and ammunition. In practice,

maximum levels were seldom reached.

Quantities above the minimum level, in

fact, were not reserves at all, in the sense of

stocks set aside and not used. A base with

a minimum authorized level of 90 days

and a maximum of 180 would normally

have on hand its 90 days' minimum reserves, while additional quantities, up to

90 more days of supply, would be moving

through the pipeline as far back as the

port of embarkation.49

The minimum level remained, and was

often called, an emergency reserve, although there were wide differences in the

kind of emergency each base might have

to face. The most serious interruption to

supply likely to occur would come about

as a result of the sinking of a ship. Nevertheless, the danger of blockade and isolation, after the experience of Bataan and

Corregidor, was much in the minds of supply planners. A six-months' reserve of

concentrated emergency rations was accordingly authorized in the spring for all

the Pacific island bases except Hawaii and

Australia, for which a somewhat similar

provision had been made earlier, and also

for the garrison recently sent to Ascension

Island. In June a similar plan provided a

three-months' emergency reserve of essential medical items.50

Equipping Outbound Troops

The Army's experience in moving troops

overseas before December 1941 proved

more useful in many respects than its

experience in overseas supply. Prewar

overseas supply had never produced a

procedural system adapted to large-scale

operations. By contrast prewar troop

movements, while small in scope, had

made Army transportation and supply

people familiar with the problems of haste

and emergency, and had produced a procedural pattern for equipping and trans48

 (1) Memo, Dir of Opns SOS for overseas comdrs

et al., 5 May 42, sub: Level of Sup for Overseas Depts

. . . , Levels of Sup folder, Logis File, OCMH. (2)

Related corresp in same file. (3) WD ltr, 11 May 42,

same sub, AG 400 (5-5-42). (4) WD ltr cited n. 14.

(5) Memo cited n. 41. (6) Memo, CofTrans for Dir of

Opns SOS, 9 Jun 42, SPTSP 400.212 file, OCT. (7)

History of the Planning Division, ASF, Vol. II, Ch.

XI, and Apps. 11-A, 11-B, OCMH. 49

 (1) See WD ltr cited n. 14. (2) For authorized

levels of overseas theaters, see below, App. F-1. 50

 (1) Memo, Dir of Opns SOS for TQMG, 30 Mar

42, sub: Reserve of Emergency Rations, Opns SOS

1942-43 folder, Hq ASF. (2) Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 8 May 42, Misc Notes, Lutes File. (3) Ltr, CG

SOS to CINCSWPA, no date, sub: Comments on

Rpt . . . by Gen A. R. Wilson . . . , Pt. 2, Incl 1,

Study for Gen Lutes on Pac Area folder, Plng Div

ASF.
THE SUPPORT OF OVERSEAS OPERATIONS 337

porting the individual troop unit, the

common denominator of overseas deployment.51

The movement of three small forces to

Bermuda and Caribbean bases in September 1941 foreshadowed many later difficulties. "Failure by planning agencies to

allow sufficient time between announcement of the decision . . . and the effective date of embarkation" was, according

to G-4, the basic source of confusion.

At least two weeks are necessary in the case

of troops completely equipped, while one

month is the absolute minimum for those organizations in which shortages exist. Suffi- cient time must be allowed to issue supply

orders, to gain control of equipment, to over- haul or check the equipment, to properly

crate the items for overseas shipment and to

move the articles to the port of embarka- tion.52

The stocks at Charleston, the port from

which the Bermuda and Caribbean forces

sailed, were insufficient to fill shortages

that should have been filled earlier, and

efforts to draw equipment from neighboring stations met evasions or outright refusals from commandants who, unwilling

to deplete their own troops, demanded

orders from Washington. Though destined

for tropical stations, troops arrived at port

with full allowances of winter clothing.

Unit commanders failed to send ahead

representatives to oversee final processing,

and "many officers with the forces were

totally ignorant of many details prescribed

for accomplishment before leaving home

stations."

 53

 Equipment shipped to port

was improperly marked and flimsily

crated; administrative records were in

chaos.

In October and November 1941 The

Inspector General conducted extended investigations of movement operations on

both east and west coasts. Curiously

enough, virtually all the reforms he recommended turned out to be already

standard procedure. Evidently the deficiencies were not in the system but in its

operation. New instructions published on

6 December 1941 accordingly made no

important changes, but all the operating

rules were presently consolidated into a

set of standard procedures to be appended

as "Inclosure No. 1" to each troop movement order.54

Under these procedures units moving

overseas were equipped in two stages—at

the home station and at the staging area

and port. During the first stage the corps

area (for air force units, the Chief of the

AAF) had the primary responsibility for

supply (except for controlled items) and

also assumed command of the alerted unit.

In the second stage, the unit passed to the

port commander's control, and supply responsibility rested with the supply services

and the port. When first alerted, the unit

drew equipment as far as possible from

stocks at the station and nearby depots,

then from other depots or units in the

corps area. Remaining shortages were reported by corps area inspectors to the

appropriate supply services. The services

were then responsible for filling the shortages from their depots, or drawing equip51

 See above, Chs. II, V. 52

 Memo, Col Aurand for Col R. A. Wheeler,

23 Sep 41, sub: Sup of Units Departing . . . ,

G-4/33098. 53

 Ltr, Col J. E. Slack to G-4, 19 Sep 41, sub:

MAROON [Trinidad], CERISE [Antigua], VERMILION

[Bermuda] Forces, G-4/33098-2. 54

 (1) Memo, TIG for CofS, 2 Dec 41, sub: Sup and

Mvmt of Units . . . , G-4/33098. (2) WD ltr, 6 Dec

41, same sub, AG 370.5 (12-3-41). (3) Memo, G-4 for

G-3, 6 Dec 41, sub: Revision of Policy Concerning Tr

Mvmts, G-4/33378. (4) The first "Inclosure No. 1"

appeared on 9 January, for a shipment through New

Orleans. See AG 370.5 (1-9-42).

THE SUPPORT OF OVERSEAS OPERATIONS 339

ment from units under their control or

from units designated by the using arms

and services. Shipments were made to the

home station, if time permitted, or to the

port of embarkation. Items that failed to

arrive at port in time were supplied from

port stocks if available. (Chart 8)

The basic weakness of this procedure,

which had been apparent in the movements of late 1941, was that the corps area

commander, responsible for the first stage

of outfitting alerted units, lacked the

authority necessary to transfer equipment

from other units in the area, most of which

were under the control of the field army

commander. The latter naturally lacked

driving incentives to take precious equipment from his own units for the benefit of

units no longer under his control, and his

subordinates, in turn, "failed to respond

fully," as an inspecting officer cautiously

observed.55 Corps area commanders themselves appeared reluctant to press the

matter. In January and February 1942,

accordingly, the army commander was

brought back into the supply process and

made responsible for inspections to determine shortages, supervising the submission of requisitions to post supply officers

and the reporting of shortages to corps

area headquarters, designating units under

his command that were to be required to

give up equipment, and reporting remaining shortages to the supply services.

In February, as a logical corollary, the

corps area commander also lost his command authority over units being prepared

for overseas movement; these now remained under the army or other field

commander until they moved to port. As

far as the home-station phase of preparation was concerned, supply and command

responsibility were unified. The corps area

supply system remained at the disposal of

alerted units, but post supply officers,

under procedures instituted in the spring,

sent requisitions directly to depots instead

of through corps area headquarters; the

corps area was to "progressively withdraw

from the channel of supply insofar as direct

supply to troops [was] concerned."

 56

After the general reorganization of 9

March 1942, over-all command of troops

in the United States was lodged in the

Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces,

the Services of Supply, and defense commands. To fill their equipment shortages

before departure from the home station,

units looked first, as before, to the normal

supply machinery of the station and the

depots that fed it, which, for ground combat and service troops, was administered

by SOS agencies; for AAF troops, supply

was centralized in that command (except

for certain common categories of supply),

with its own regional organization. After

local sources had been exploited, if time

permitted, the major command drew upon

other depots and transferred equipment

from other units under its command. Ordinarily, however, there was not even time

for neighboring depots to make all shipments to the station before the troops departed for port, at which time the major

command relinquished control of the unit

to transportation agencies of the SOS.

Supply responsibility then passed to the

supply services, which undertook to fill

55

 (1) Memo, Inspector Gen for G-4, 17 Nov 41,

sub: Recommendations in Connection With Sup and

Mvmt . . . , G-4/33098. (2) Related corresp in

same file. (3) WD ltr, 23 Dec 41, sub: Current Sup

Policy and Proced, AG 475 (12-20-41). 56

 (1) WD ltr, 20 Jan 42, sub: Direct System of Sup

. . . , AG 475 (1-16-42). Direct supply became effective on 30 April 1942. (2) Incl No. 1 cited n. 54(4).

(3) WD ltr, 12 Feb 42, sub: Sup and Mvmt of Units

Ordered Overseas, AG 370.5 (2-11-42). (4) WD ltr,

25 Feb 42, same sub, AG 370.5 (2-24-42).
340 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

remaining shortages by direct shipment to

the port.57 (Chart 9)

Equipping units that were hurrying to

catch a boat involved more than a delivery service administered by a distant headquarters. The success of the operation

depended at bottom upon prompt and

intelligent determination of needs and

execution of the prescribed administrative

action by the supply officers of the moving

units. Station supply officers and the corps

area organization were permitted to offer

only advice and service. War Department

and SOS instructions emphasized repeatedly the need for closer supervision by

tactical commanders of the process of

equipping their troops. Unit supply officers were often ignorant of the rudiments

of supply procedure. General Somervell,

during an inspection, ran across an Air

Corps officer who had never heard of a

table of basic allowances and an AAF unit

that did not even have a supply officer.

One group of departing Air Corps officers,

"not as well instructed in supply matters

as they might be," arrived at New York,

spent the night at the Waldorf-Astoria,

and sent the bill the next morning to the

port commander.58

The "professional" supply personnel,

with less excuse for ignorance, were not

always better informed, especially at the

station level. Those who knew their procedures did not always temper their knowledge with judgment and a desire to help.

At the first conference of service commanders in July 1942, Somervell thundered in pungent language against ritual

and red tape:

. . . if anyone in any of these depots sends a

requisition back because the fifth copy is a

little faint or because some clerk forgot to put

in a comma on the second copy, I want you

to light on that bird like a ton of bricks. . . .

I do not mean that you should permit people

to do sloppy work in preparing requisitions,

but we must not stop the movement of sup- plies because someone in any of the depots

does not get things in in quintuplicate Thurs- day morning at 7:42. . . . When somebody

is supposed to have supplies, I want them to

get the supplies, and we will worry about the

red tape afterwards. Nobody will ever get

into trouble by doing this.59

The SOS looked to its regional administrative organization in the service commands, now free of direct supply responsibilities, to police the process of equipping

troops moving overseas. This was purely a

service function, not implemented by command authority nor even by supervisory

responsibility in the usual sense, and the

helpful advice that service command officers thus offered in the line of duty was not

always welcomed by troop commanders

who shared the combat soldier's ancient

suspicion of interference by an "administrative" headquarters. Nevertheless, service commanders were instructed, as Somervell put it, "to be as nosey as can be all

the time, and to step in at any time, any

place, to help anybody. Even the Air

Forces, go in and help them."

 60

Almost invariably troops arrived in the

port area without their full complement of

equipment. Unit commanders themselves

57

 (1) Incl No. 1, 22 Mar 42, and revisions, 7 May

and 18 Jun 42, AG 370.5. (2) WD ltr cited n. 1(2).

(3) Wardlow, Trans II, Ch. II. 58

 (1) Memo, Somervell for Lutes, 17 May 42, Opns

SOS 1942-43 folder, Hq ASF. (2) Min, conf of CG's

Sv Comds, Chicago, 30 Jul 42, 2d Sess, p. 72, Contl

Div ASF. (3) Memo for rcd atchd to memo, unsigned,

no addressee, 19 Jan 42, AG 400 (1-17-42) Sec 1. (4)

Ltr, AAF, 25 May 42, sub: Equip for Units Destined

for Overseas, AG 400 (1-17-42) Sec 2. (5) Mimeographed digest of Overseas Sup Conf, Washington, 22

Jul 42, passim, Logis File, OCMH. 59

 Min, p. 72, cited n. 58(2). 60

 Ibid., pp. 51, 61, 63-64, 72-73; quote is from p.

72.

342 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

were inclined to regard the port as a cornucopia from which they could obtain

whatever they needed. "Don't worry about

that, you will get it at the port," was the

reassuring comment often heard during

show-down inspections at home stations.61

The administrative burden thus placed

upon the port was aggravated by the frequent failure of unit supply officers to

bring along their reports of earlier equipment inspections and of supply services to

notify the port of action already taken and

shipments en route to the port. There

seemed to be a widespread feeling, too,

that "you can repair it at the port." Late

in spring of 1942 troops were still arriving

at New York with 13 percent of their

vehicles needing repair.62 Similar difficulties occurred in the staging areas, which

were widely used in troop movements in

1942 to avoid the confusion that had resulted the preceding autumn when troops

were moved without a pause directly to

the ports. When movement schedules permitted, some of the final inspections and

other processing were performed in these

staging areas, and stocks of selected items

were established for the purpose at some

of the principal ones. Sometimes troops

were held in the areas for weeks or months

as a result of changes in movement plans,

while equipment, training, and morale

deteriorated. The necessity to continue

training in these instances led to jurisdictional wrangles between SOS, whose port

commanders controlled the staging areas

and the troops in them, and the other two

major commands, especially AGF, which

desired more effective control over the

training of their own units. SOS successfully defended its jurisdiction, but AGF

and AAF were given authority to supervise the training of their units while in

staging areas.63

In troop movements as in overseas supply, therefore, it was difficult to curb the

growth of the ports' burdens as sources of

supply, and in 1942 the supply stocks that

they had to maintain to handle the burden

tended to increase. In July and from time

to time later, as already noted, SOS tried

to draw the line against further increases,

but as long as deployment itself remained

disorderly and ill planned, as it did

throughout that year, troops continued to

arrive in ports and staging areas with large

gaps in their equipment that had to be

filled from stocks immediately available.

The primary function of the port in troop

movements was to move, not to supply,

outbound troops, and the Transportation

Corps' procedures were directed mainly to

that end by ensuring that supply shipments from the depots moved promptly

but smoothly, that none were shipped to a

home station after troops had started for

port, and that the port received adequate

advance notification of troop and freight

shipments. Through the release system,

from early 1942 on, the ports were able to

protect themselves against being deluged

by port-bound traffic.64

All other considerations were subordi61

 Memo, Port QM [of unnamed port] for CG [of

unnamed port], 6 Aug 42, Misc Notes, Lutes File. 62

 (1) Note, unsigned, no addressee, circa May 1942,

in 400 Sup Gen folder, Plng Div ASF, Job A-44-140.

(2) Memo for rcd, 18 Jan 42, sub: Equipg of Trs, AG

400 (1-17-42) Sec 1. (3) WD ltr, 23 Jan 42, sub: Preparation of Automotive Equip . . . , AG 370.5 (1-22-

42).(4) Memo, unsigned, for br chiefs of Opns Div

SOS, 21 May 42, Misc Notes, Lutes File. 63

 (1) Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, AGF II, pp. 573-

77. (2) Wardlow, Trans II, Ch. II. (3) Chester Wardlow, Expansion of Army Transportation Facilities in

the Zone of the Interior, 1941-1944, Monograph 8,

Oct HB. (4) Larson, Water Transportation for the

U.S. Army, 1939-1942, OCT HB. (5) Corresp in

OPD 370.5 Changes of Station, 39. 64

 Corresp in Overseas Shipts folder and Overseas Tr Mvmts 1940-42 folder, OCT HB, and in

G-4/33889.
THE SUPPORT OF OVERSEAS OPERATIONS 343

nated, in troop movements, to the necessity

of meeting the scheduled sailing date. One

of the very few movements during 1942 in

which sufficient time was allowed to complete preparations before this date was that

of the 1st Infantry Division to the United

Kingdom early in August—the SOS was

informally alerted to expect this move

almost three months earlier, and another

month elapsed before movement orders

were actually issued on 19 June. Most

movements were carried out in frantic

haste. The wild scramble caused at the

New York port during the first week of

January 1942 by the last-minute diversion

of the North Atlantic convoy to the Far

East was the most spectacular of many

outloading crises. On one occasion in May

OPD first notified SOS headquarters at

5 P.M. of a movement that was to begin

three hours later. In the case of the 32d

Division, alerted in December 1941 for

movement to Iceland, there was indeed a

lapse of many weeks before it finally sailed

in April. But in the interim the division's

destination was changed twice; on both

occasions it was hurriedly made ready for

departure and then kept in a state of suspense while its equipment and morale deteriorated and its strength was depleted by

transfers to other units. Finally, after its

sailing to England had been postponed to

July and its equipment priority reduced to

C-2, the division, then at its home station

in Massachusetts, was notified by telephone that it was to sail in three weeks

from San Francisco for Australia. Within

that time SOS had to re-equip the force

and move it across the country. The task

was accomplished by attaching to the

division a special group of SOS officers

who supervised equipment inspections and

telephoned shortage lists directly to the

supply services in Washington.65

In an effort to allow time for advance

preparation, OPD began in the spring of

1942 to issue through G-3 a list of units

tentatively expected to be deployed within

the next three months. Some units were

named specifically; others were listed by

type only, leaving the major commands to

designate specific units. To the limited degree permitted by equipment shortages

and the prevailing policy of spreading

equipment thin over many units in training, this three-month projection enabled

the major commands to set up a pool of

earmarked units ready to move. During

1942, however, the erratic shifting of units

from low priorities to high and back again

left little room for procedures aiming at an

orderly and progressive equipping of units

in co-ordination with their training schedules. As early as September 1941 a G-4

observer had urged, after watching the

movements through Charleston, that the

embarkation date in the future should "be

fixed on the basis of readiness of troops,"

and the Chief of Staff had actually enunciated a policy that troops going overseas

should be completely equipped before departure.66

 But after Pearl Harbor, the time

of departure necessarily was fixed by considerations of strategic need and availability of shipping, not readiness. Beginning in

March, the General Staff began to call for

informal status reports from the major

commands showing readiness of units

alerted for movement, but these were con65

 (1) John D. Millett, Overseas Movement of the

1st Infantry Division and the 1st Armored Division,

MS, 1943, OCMH. (2) Min, WD Gen Council mtg,

27 May 42. (3) Min, p. 54, cited n. 58(2). (4) Palmer,

Wiley, and Keast, AGF II, pp. 572-73. (5) Corresp in

OPD 370.5 Changes of Station, 93; OPD 400 Sups

and Equip, 9; and G-4/33889. (6) See above, Chs.

VI-VII, and below, Chs. XVI-XVII. 66

 (1) Memo cited n. 52. (2) Memo, G-3 for CG's

maj comds, 19 Apr 42, sub: Units Scheduled for

Mvmt . . . , OPD 370.5 Changes of Station, 24.
344 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

cerned with training and general efficiency

rather than equipment. Even after status

reporting was formalized in July, the required information scarcely indicated in

any specific way how much of the unit's

equipment would be lacking when it

sailed. As a general policy, troops were not

kept from sailing for lack of equipment. To

that lack, however, sometimes could be

traced deficiencies in training that caused

many units to be judged unfit for overseas

service.67

Rare, indeed, was the unit that sailed

with all its authorized equipment, and delayed shipments from depots commonly

straggled into port for months after the

troops had departed. The equipment of

one antiaircraft regiment that went overseas in summer of 1942 was loaded haphazardly on fifty-five separate vessels calling at several different ports. Overseas

commanders naturally clamored for shipment of troops and equipment of each unit

in such a manner that they would arrive

together, or nearly so. They also pleaded

for loading and routing that would ensure

that cargo could be readily unloaded without rearrangement at several successive

ports of discharge, in order to reduce the

delay in "marrying up" troops and equipment.68

What overseas commanders desired

was largely beyond the reach of procedural improvements. Except in combatloaded convoys, rarely used in movements

from the United States, it was usually not

feasible for all of a unit's equipment to be

loaded in the same vessels with the troops,

and often not even in accompanying vessels. Availability of escorts and shipping

and general considerations of scheduling

all bore upon the problem. Minimum

essential housekeeping items ordinarily

were stowed on the transports or on vessels

in attendance; of the two barracks bags

allotted to each soldier in 1942, one went

with him, but the other all too frequently

was buried in the hold of a later ship and

never caught up with him. Most cargo

had to be loaded in freighters too slow to

keep up with troop transports; some of the

latter, such as the Queens, could not even

accommodate all the troops' personal

baggage. In many cases troopers and

freighters sailed independently from different ports — for example, the POPPY

Force convoy of January 1942. In shipments to the United Kingdom the port of

entry was not assigned until the vessel was

approaching the British Isles. Even when

departures were synchronous, cargo vessels could not keep up with troop transports except when both sailed in the same

convoy; on the long overseas runs, freighters might fall weeks behind the troop

transports. Crossing the North Atlantic,

the speedy Queens could make two round

trips in little more time than a cargo convoy required to make a single one-way

trip. Movement orders were rarely issued

early enough to permit the shipment of

cargo in advance of troops. Indeed, even

for simultaneous departure it was often

necessary to take equipment from troops

up to a month before sailing. Once a unit

sailed without some of its equipment, the

shipping shortage usually forced the the67

 (1) Memo, Exec Off for ACofS WPD, 22 Mar

42, sub: Mvmt Orders, OPD 370.5 Changes of Station, 171. (2) Memo, OPD for maj comds, 1 Jul 42,

sub: Status Rpts, OPD 370.5 Changes of Station, 184.

(3) Memo, TIG for DCofS, 10 Apr 43, sub: Readiness of Units for Mvmt Overseas, Sv Trs 1942-43,

62a folder, Lutes File. 68

 (1) Memo, Deputy Chief of Mvmts Div OCT for

Col Noble M. Coe, 5 Jun 42, sub: Shortages of Equip,

Overseas Tr Mvmts 1940-42 folder, OCT HB. (2)

Memo, Lutes for CofTrans, 26 Sep 42, sub: Difficulties in Shipg Sups Overseas, Overseas Shipts folder,

OCT HB.
THE SUPPORT OF OVERSEAS OPERATIONS 345

ater staff to make an unhappy choice of

receiving equipment left behind or equipment of units sailing later. Exigencies of

traffic control in the flow of shipments

from depots to ports and the compelling

need to economize on cargo space were

additional factors standing in the way of a

synchronized movement of troops and

equipment overseas. The Chief of Transportation found it necessary late in 1942 to

emphasize as "a fundamental of movements" that organizational equipment

should be shipped with troops or as soon

thereafter as possible, but the backlogs of

equipment at east coast ports were still so

large early in 1943 that SOS ordered this

matériel moved back to the depots.69

Fundamentally, synchronization of the

flow of troops and cargo was not feasible

because, considered as transportable commodities, people and freight presented different problems of handling and movement. On the whole, it was easier and

required less time to transport the former

than the latter. Movement of freight was

further retarded by the effort to bring together troops and their equipment at three

points—the home station, the port of embarkation, and the overseas port of entry—

an effort that many believed unnecessary.

The essential object of troop deployment

was to bring military manpower as an

effective force into striking range of the

enemy. Fully equipped and trained forces

had to be assembled in a theater for deployment in the combat zone, but this did

not necessarily require an earlier union of

troops and equipment. One field commander admitted:

Organizational commanders will always

recommend that supplies should accompany

the troop units in the same transports. . . . My personal opinion is that the main object

is to use to the maximum shipping space, and

it is not mandatory that equipment and sup- plies go on the same transport as the troops

unless it is known that these troops will be

engaged immediately upon debarkation. . . .

The getting together of troops with their

equipment after their arrival is not an insurmountable task.

The logical drift of this line of reasoning

was toward shipping equipment and supplies in advance of troops, to be stored in

bulk in the theater and reissued to the

troops after their arrival.70

Several practical difficulties stood in the

way of such a policy in 1942. Until a unit

was alerted it needed what equipment it

had for training. The process of inspections, analysis of shortages, and submission of requisitions had to be completed.

Shortages of matériel in 1942 ruled out

any general program of shipping new

equipment in advance and leaving the old

behind, when units sailed, to be used by

other units still in training. Theater commanders in general preferred to have initial equipment shipped "force marked"—

for specific units—rather than in bulk

since they objected to the additional burden of storage and distribution in the theater. Unit commanders counted equipment in the hand or on the way better

than equipment buried in a theater depot.

The War Department, for its part, was

wary of investing war matériel in theater

reserves for future offensives that might

never be undertaken. Advance shipment

69

 (1) 3d Ind, OCT to NYPOE, 11 Dec 42, OCT

370.5 England. (2) Memo, CG SOS for CG

USAFIME, 30 Dec 42, Misc Notes, Lutes File. (3)

Corresp in Overseas Shipts folder and Overseas Tr

Mvmts 1940-42 folder, OCT HB. (4) SOS Memo

S270-1-42, 8 Dec 42. (5) SOS Memo S700-1-43, 2

Jan 43. Last two refer to the cancellation of back orders and clearance of backlogs. 70

 Memo, Dir of Opns SOS for Chief of Sup Br, 17

Jul 42, Policy File SWPA folder, Plng Div ASF, Job

A46-371. Quotation by Gen. A. R. Wilson.
346 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

in bulk, therefore, was seldom attempted

in 1942 and then only on a modest scale.

Throughout that year, as a result, equipping troops for overseas movement remained largely a hand-to-mouth process.71

Service Troops and the Troop Basis

The authors of the Victory Program in

the summer of 1941 provided generously

in their estimates of service support for the

armies they expected some day to defeat

Germany on the European continent.

Going beyond even the 33 percent that

service troops had comprised in the U.S.

armies in France in 1918, the planners set

up percentages up to 46 percent in those

parts of the Victory Program Troop Basis

where service components were specified.

Ground service elements not organic to

combat units averaged about 36 percent

in the task force pool; services were 46

percent of the planned air forces. Even

higher percentages, presumably, were to

be expected in the one-million-odd troops

envisaged for administrative overhead and

garrison duties in the United States. However, plans for actual mobilization, in late

1941 and early 1942, followed a different

course. By mid-April 1942 planned services not organic to ground combat units

stood at only 18 percent of the total

ground strength in the 1942 War Department Troop Basis. In part this figure reflected a deliberate intent to push the

activation of ground divisions ahead of

that of nondivisional units, since the former required approximately twice as long

to train. It reflected also an understandable desire to produce fighting strength as

rapidly as possible, and to dispense with

"luxuries."

 72

But meanwhile, the immediate emergency was demolishing plans and programs for orderly mobilization of the

Army at home in anticipation of eventual

mass employment overseas. Base garrisons

had to be filled, new bases established,

and task forces rushed to threatened areas.

The crisis demanded immediate deployment to remote, undeveloped areas in the

Pacific on a scale far beyond that anticipated. Every commander discovered

when he arrived at his destination that he

needed more service troops than he had

brought along. Even in the highly developed economic environment of the British

Isles, American commanders were disappointed in their expectations that most of

the facilities and services needed to maintain a military establishment would be

available on the spot. During the late winter and spring of 1942, as a consequence,

service units had to be activated well in

excess of mobilization schedules and before long exceeded the total service troop

provisions of the 1942 Troop Basis. By

May overdrafts upon the troop basis,

mainly for service units, had reached

250,000.73

In January and again in March General Somervell unsuccessfully sought a

larger authorization for services in the

troop basis. In April the approval of the

cross-Channel invasion plan, looking to

an immediate build-up of base facilities in

the British Isles, focused General Staff at71

 (1) Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, AGF II, pp. 457,

572. (2) For advance shipment to the United Kingdom in 1942, see below, Ch. XIV. 72

 (1) "Ultimate Requirements Study: Estimate of

Army Ground Forces," accompanying "War Department Strategic Estimate . . . , 11 September 1941,"

WPD 4494-21. (2) Memo, Lutes for OPD, 17 Apr 42,

sub: Reqmts of Sv Units . . . , Sv Units 1942-43,

2a folder, Lutes File. (3) Greenfield, Palmer, and

Wiley, AGF I, p. 199. 73

 (1) Min cited n. 65(2). (2) Greenfield, Palmer,

and Wiley, AGF I, p. 203. (3) See above, Ch. VII,

and below, Chs. XIV-XV, XVII.
THE SUPPORT OF OVERSEAS OPERATIONS 347

tention upon the problem. SOS presented

estimates in April calling for an addition

of nearly 335,000 service troops to the

1942 Troop Basis. Early in May the General Staff approved a reduced estimate of

236,000, and the President in the same

month permitted an augmentation of

750,000 men for the entire 1942 Troop

Basis, to cover these and other troop

needs.74

Priceless time had been lost. The units

authorized in May still had to be activated

and trained. During the summer, moreover, the flow of fillers to newly activated

units was retarded when the President instituted furloughs for new inductees. The

Air Forces had first call on available manpower, both as to quality and as to

quantity; ground units of all types, combat and service alike, were pinched, and

the General Staff for the time being resisted proposals to decelerate activations

in any one branch to provide manpower

for others.75 Service troops, even more

than combat troops, suffered from the

shortage of equipment. During the summer the General Staff, on the whole, adhered to a policy of spreading critical

equipment thinly over a large number of

units in various stages of training, refusing

alike to pool equipment in a small, balanced force of units ready for early movement overseas, or to raise the 20 percent

initial allowance of critical equipment to

which new nondivisional service units

were restricted.76

After midyear, demands for service

units multiplied. Two big projects for lineof-communication development—in the

Persian Corridor and in western Canada

and Alaska—had not been anticipated

when the 1942 Troop Basis was drawn up.

These and the expanding logistical activities in certain other areas, such as the

Middle East and along the African ferry

route, called for service troops on a scale

and of a character quite different from

normal rear area support in most overseas

theaters—engineer, railway, port, and

truck units, many of regimental size or

larger. In midsummer came the sudden

decision to invade North Africa, which

meant opening up a new overland line of

communications of continental dimensions; it quickly became apparent that the

pool of service units originally intended

for the United Kingdom was inadequate

in size and composition for this task. At

the same time, the base development program in England continued, though at a

diminished pace. At the end of the year

the European theater commander was accepting partially trained units in order to

keep that program alive, an expedient to

which other bases, notably the Persian

Gulf Service Command, were also driven.

In the near and far Pacific the clamor for

more service troops, particularly for port

battalions, grew louder as the tempo of

build-up mounted. Lt. Gen. Joseph W.

Stilwell's needs in India, still largely unmet because of lack of shipping and the

low priority of his theater, became steadily

more insistent.

The zone of interior commands were

quite unprepared to meet the flooding demands for service units, which included

both standard and "odd ball" types. 74

 (1) Min, WD Gen Council mtgs, 21 Apr, 19

May, and 27 May 42. (2) Memo, SGS for CG SOS,

19 May 42, OPD 320.2 BOLERO, 8. (3) Memo, Somervell for CofS, 14 Sep 42, sub: Sv Units, Sv Units 1942-

43, 3a folder, Lutes File. 75

 (1) Memo cited n. 74(3). (2) Memo, OPD for

CG SOS, 2 Jul 42, sub: Tr Basis, OPD 320.2 (6-26-

42). (3) Min, WD Gen Council mtg, 30 Jun 42. (4)

Paper, no date, sub: Chronology of Steps To Correct

Deficiency in Sv Units, Sv Units 1942-43, 3a folder,

Lutes File. (5) Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, AGF I,

pp. 206-08. 76

 See above, Ch. XII.
348 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

"Trained non-divisional service units,"

Brig. Gen. John E. Hull wrote Lt. Gen.

Dwight D. Eisenhower in mid-July, "are

not available . . . . The state of training

and discipline of many of the service units

now going and set up for departure in the

near future is entirely unsatisfactory.

. . . I don't see any relief in the immediate future . . . ."

 77

 The service troop

program authorized in May, Somervell

commented bitterly in September in the

midst of the confusion of mounting the

North African operation, had been "completely hamstrung."

 78

SOS became the principal advocate before the General Staff for overseas commanders requesting service troops, partly

because it had the responsibility for activating and training most types of service

units, partly because of the close personal

and official relations that Somervell and

Lutes maintained with SOS commanders

overseas. For its own operations the AAF,

of course, was an equally ardent and generally successful advocate of more generous service support; the ratio of service

troops to total AAF strength ran consistently higher than the corresponding ratio

in the ground forces. General McNair, the

AGF commander, felt the existing proportion in the Army as a whole was too high

rather than too low. "It appears," he

wrote in September, "that overall production of services to combat forces is grossly

excessive; and some definite measures to

control the dissipation of manpower to

these non-combatant functions must be

instituted at once."

 79

 General McNair's

views had many champions on the General Staff, but it was difficult to resist the

pressures growing out of the peculiar conditions of warfare in 1942 and out of the

American way of life in general. As G-3

admitted, "unless we will be satisfied with

an Army like the Japanese, wherein every

soldier can carry a week's supply of rice, it

will not be possible to greatly reduce the

size of the services."

 80

Late in the summer it became evident

that a deceleration of scheduled activations was the only practicable means of relieving the manpower shortage, and

during the last four months of the year the

activation of ground combat units was

slowed almost to a stop while existing

AGF units were being brought up to

strength. In the AAF and SOS activations

continued at a rapid rate.81

At the end of the year the service troop

situation overseas showed marked improvement, and in the States SOS staff officers felt that the General Staff was

finally, if belatedly, awake to the problem.

Service troop strength in the Army had

grown rapidly in recent months, benefitting by the speed-up in inductions approved by the President in September.

The relative weight of service elements in

the Army had grown even more. Service

troops of all categories—numbering more

than 1,800,000—now comprised 34.4 per77

 Ltr, Hull to Eisenhower, 17 Jul 42, OPD 320.2

ETO, 6. 78

 (1) Memo cited n. 74(3). (2) Memo for file, unsigned, 19 Sep 42, sub: Activation and Tng of Sv

Units, Sv Units 1942-43 folder, Case 4, Lutes File.

(3) Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 1 Sep 42, Misc Notes,

Lutes File. (4) Cline, Washington Command Post, pp.

184-86. (5) Memo, Chief of Mobilization Br for Gen

Lutes, 30 Nov 42, sub: Sv Units, Sv Trs 1942-43

folder, Case 17, Lutes File. 79

 (1) Ltr, CG AGF to TAG, 30 Sep 42, sub: Tr

Basis, AGF 320.2/4, Tr Basis 1943, DRB AGO. (2)

Ltr, Lutes to CG SOS S Pac Area, 5 Jan 43, SPAC

1942-43-mid-1944 folder, Case 25, Lutes File. (3)

Ltr, Lutes to CG SOS S Pac Area, 11 Jan 43, SPAC

1942-43-mid-1944 folder, Case 33, Lutes File. 80

 Min cited n. 65(2) and n. 75(3). 81

 (1) Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 24 Sep 42, Misc

Notes, Lutes File. (2) Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley,

AGF I, pp. 208-09. (3) Min, WD Gen Council mtg,

3 1 Jul 42. (4) Gen Plans Br SOS Diary, 28 Jul 42

entry, Plng Div ASF.
THE SUPPORT OF OVERSEAS OPERATIONS 349

cent of the Army's total strength, in contrast to only 26.3 a year earlier. Prospects

were that these gains would be kept during the coming year, even though the total

strength of the Army was now not expected to rise above 7,500,000 enlisted

men. SOS had been assured that additional service units, if needed, could be

formed from the pool of unallotted

strength (500,000) in the new troop basis,

and had been given authority to alter the

distribution of service-type units. Ground

service personnel in the planned Army,

including 150,000 in the Women's Army

Auxiliary Corps and some 172,000 in

combat-zone service units, comprised 35

percent of the then allotted manpower; in

the entire Troop Basis of 7.5 million,

ground service personnel of rear area types

only comprised 27.6 percent.82

There was some quiet crowing in SOS

headquarters over this achievement. General Styer reminded his chief that it was a

result of "much hard work on the part of

General Lutes during the last two

months,"

 83

 and Lutes himself reported

that, in view of the promising outlook,

"further recommendations to the Chief of

Staff are unnecessary at this time."

 84

 To

which Somervell penciled the comment,

"Excellent."

 85

 But the battle went on.

Overseas commanders, during the winter

and spring of 1943, continued to ask for

more service units than the three zone of

interior commands could produce under

the General Staffs cautious activation

policy and with the meager allowances of

equipment given to service units for training. And by mid-1943 ASF once more

was urging the addition of more service

units to the troop basis.86

The course of events in 1942 that forced

the War Department to provide a far more

elaborate service establishment than initially planned also subjected the developing machinery of overseas supply and

deployment to unanticipated strains.

American ground forces were not massed

in a single theater, either against the

European or the Asiatic enemy, but were

dispersed along lines of communications,

in distant outposts, and in quiet areas; the

points of actual contact with the enemy

were relatively few. Most of the areas

where troops were stationed were anchors

and fueling points along supply routes,

not reservoirs. Supplies flowed outward,

perforce, along the many paths marked

out by a wide deployment.

It was difficult to support this pattern

of deployment by a system designed to

compress the flow of supply into few rather

than many channels, to extend the radius

of wholesale operations, and to pour war

material into overseas reservoirs for retail

distribution forward. The haste with

which most of the important deployments

of 1942 were ordered and carried out virtually defied any orderly procedures for

equipping outbound troops. The system

was best adapted, in the last analysis, to a

strategy of concentrated effort in one theater, a long build-up followed by massive

land campaigns. For a few weeks during

the spring of 1942 strategic plans moved

82

 (1) Corresp in Tr Basis 1943 folder and Sv Trs

1942-43 folder, Lutes File. (2) Memo, G-3 for SOS,

21 Nov 42, sub: Sv Trs' Tr Basis 1944 and Beyond,

WDGCT 320.2 Gen (11-14-42). (3) Greenfield,

Palmer, and Wiley, AGF I, pp. 208-10, 214-17, and

tables on pp. 203, 210. (4) See below, App. I. 83

 Memo, Styer for Somervell, 4 Dec 42, Sv Trs

1942-43 folder, Case 23, Lutes File. 84

 Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 4 Dec 42, sub: Sv

Units, Tr Basis 1943, Plan for folder, Lutes File. 85

 Memo cited n. 83. 86

 Corresp in Tr Basis 1943 folder and Sv Trs 1942-

43 folder, Lutes File.

350 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

in this direction and the build-up of troops

and material in the British Isles for a crossChannel invasion actually got under way.

With the suspension of invasion plans in

the summer and the mounting of limited

offensives in the Pacific and North Africa,

the logistical system faced tasks for which

it had not been designed. The forces in

North Africa were supplied for several

months by abnormal procedures and

largely uncontrolled automatic shipments.

In the mounting volume of supply to the

Pacific, the essentially retail shipments to

the small ferry bases remained through

1942 a considerable proportion of the

whole, and supply to Alaska was an almost

purely retail system of direct shipments to

individual garrisons. It seemed likely that

strategy for some time to come might consist of small-scale and medium-scale task

force operations in several theaters,

launched on short notice, variable in their

requirements, and sustained in part directly from the United States rather than

from overseas reserves. Such a trend would

shift the whole emphasis in logistical support to retail operations and to a degree of

improvisation and short-range planning

that would virtually preclude systematic

scheduling of supply on a large scale.

Nonetheless, the experience of 1942 and

early 1943 was not wholly foreign to the

system's design. The supply of any small

base in a quiet area, to the extent that current demand was stable and ultimate

objectives fixed, permitted a regular flow

of supply under routine administration,

thus foreshadowing in miniature the system for supplying a great invasion base.

At a few points—Australia, New Caledonia, Espiritu Santo, Hawaii, the British

Isles, North Africa—the building of supply reservoirs to support later offensives

got under way, and even the limited operations of late 1942 in the Pacific and in

North Africa gave a foretaste of the huge

demands later campaigns would place

upon the supply system. The flow of supply to the reservoir areas, after a period of

initial confusion, was beginning by spring

of 1943 to assume something of the routine, wholesale character, as well as the

volume, to which the system was adapted,

and the channels of supply to these areas

tended increasingly to dominate the general pattern. (Map 4)
PART FOUR

BUILD-UP AND EARLY OFFENSIVES

CHAPTER XIV

Build-up in the British Isles

First Phase

At the end of February 1942 the lately

proclaimed Allied strategy of concentrating all efforts first on defeating Germany

had an air of unreality. The ramshackle

Allied front along the Malay Barrier had

collapsed, and the drain of U.S. troops,

aircraft, and shipping to the far Pacific

left very little for action in the Atlantic.

Early in March Operation GYMNAST, the

proposed Anglo-American occupation of

French North Africa, was relegated to the

"academic" category by the Combined

Chiefs of Staff. Britain's hold on the Bay of

Bengal seemed almost lost and India open

to invasion; in the Middle East she faced

the necessity of replacing the Australian

and New Zealand divisions that those

dominions were preparing to recall to face

the threat of Japanese invasion. By the end

of January General Sir Claude J. E. Auchinleck's promising offensive in Libya had

ended in retreat and the loss of most of

Cyrenaica. In an effort to avert collapse in

the Middle and Far East, Churchill

planned to send out almost three hundred

thousand troops from the home islands

from February through May. For necessary American help in transporting these

troops, he was willing to accept a long

postponement of the planned build-up of

U.S. forces in Northern Ireland. Meanwhile, before the end of February, the

American military leaders were preparing

to send further substantial reinforcements

to the Central and Southwest Pacific and

to the island chain connecting them. There

seemed little prospect of an early "closing

and tightening the ring" about Germany.1

Middle-of-the-Road Strategy

To General Marshall and some of his

staff, this drift of strategic emphasis away

from the western theater of war seemed

dangerous. Unless Germany were soon attacked in force, the Soviet armies might

succumb and Germany might make herself invulnerable on the European continent. Whatever might be lost in the

Southwest Pacific in 1942, some members

of the staff argued, the war itself was not

likely to be lost there, while it could well

be lost in Europe. The danger seemed the

greater in January and February as the 1

 (1) CCS 5/2, 3 Mar 42, title: SUPER-GYMNAST.

(2) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942,

Chs. VI-VII. (3) See above, Ch. VI. (4) Msg, Former Naval Person [Churchill] to President Roosevelt,

4 Mar 42, as quoted in Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp.

189-91.
354 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Soviet winter offensive came to an inconclusive halt and Soviet armies in the

Crimea met serious reverses. Late in January Eisenhower noted:

We've got to go to Europe and fight—and

we've got to quit wasting resources all over

the world—and still worse—wasting time. If

we're to keep Russia in, save the Middle

East, India and Burma; we've got to begin

slugging with air at West Europe; to be followed by a land attack as soon as possible.2

The basic issue of American strategy, as

it finally emerged from discussions in the

joint planning committees by early March,

was presented in the form of three alternatives: (a) hold in the Pacific at whatever

cost to offensive operations in Europe; (b)

accept risks, possibly even collapse, in the

Southwest Pacific in order to concentrate

forces for an attack on Europe from bases

in England; or (c) provide a reasonable

minimum of forces for defense in the South

and Southwest Pacific while beginning to

concentrate in the British Isles for an early

offensive against Germany. What differentiated the third, or "middle-of-the-road,"

alternative, the position of General Eisenhower and most of the WPD staff, from

the second—supported by the Air Staff—

was evidently its moderately optimistic

view that the far Pacific could be held

without interfering with a substantial concentration in the European theater. Eisenhower himself considered that retention of

the Southwest Pacific was only a "desirable" not a "necessary" objective.3

 Only a

few of the Army planners held that "the

effective defense of the Western Pacific

. . . would jeopardize the success of the

offensive against Germany" — the view

expressed by one (probably the AAF)

member of the Joint U.S. Strategic Committee.4

 The majority view was supported

by estimates that the forces yet to be transported to the Pacific would be essentially

the same whether the intention were to

hold the existing line or to withdraw to the

Central Pacific.5

On 16 March the Joint Chiefs agreed to

recommend the third course to the President. Events demonstrated that this choice

represented only a qualified endorsement

of the principle of immediate concentration in the western European theater. The

decision was qualified by the assumption

that in the last resort the Middle East and

India, and possibly even China, must be

held at all costs, and it was weakened by

the allotment to the Central, South, and

Southwest Pacific of approximately half

the Army forces slated to be sent outside

the Western Hemisphere during 1942. In

deciding, therefore, to propose to the British a combined effort to re-enter the European continent in 1942, the Joint Chiefs

were registering their hope, but not their

determination, that the other two principal theaters of war—Middle East and

Pacific—would not absorb more strength

than had already been allotted to them.6

Since the preceding autumn the conception of a large-scale invasion of the

northwestern part of the Continent from

bases in the British Isles had been taking

form. The arguments favoring both the

general strategy of concentration against 2

 (1) Notations by Eisenhower, 22 Jan 42 entry,

Item 3, OPD Hist Unit File. (2) Memo, WPD for

CofS, 28 Feb 42, sub: Strategic Conceptions and

Their Application to the SWPA, Envelope 35, Exec 4. 3

 Memo cited n. 2(2). 4

 JPS 2/2/A (formerly JPS 12/1/A), 18 Feb 42,

title: Review of the Strategic Sit in the Japanese Theater of War. 5

 (1) JPS 2/6, rpt by JUSSC, 6 Mar 42, title: Strategic Deployment of Land, Sea, and Air Forces of U.S.

After revision, this paper was approved as JCS 23, 14

Mar 42, same title. (2) Matloff and Snell, Strategic

Planning: 1941-1942, pp. 159ff. 6

 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942,

pp. 161ff.
BUILD-UP IN THE BRITISH ISLES—FIRST PHASE 355

Germany and the specific strategy of an

invasion across the English Channel leaned

heavily on logistical considerations, above

all on the factor of shipping. Because of

the vast distances in the Pacific, only a

fraction—a half or a third—of the forces

that could be deployed against western

Europe could be supported, with the same

amount of shipping, in operations against

Japan. As Eisenhower argued, to concentrate first against Germany would actually

conform to the strategic maxim that the

weaker of two enemies should be attacked

first, since Japan was relatively stronger

than the European Axis in terms of the

power that the Allies could bring to bear

against her. The only alternatives to attacking Germany over water approaches—

from the northwest or from the south—

were to rely exclusively on air bombardment or to send large forces to the Eastern

Front; the logistical difficulties of this latter course were even greater than those of

operations in the far Pacific.

Man and nature, finally, had given the

British Isles resources and facilities needed

to build an adequate base for a land invasion of the Continent and for the strategic

air bombardment that would precede it—

raw materials, manpower, industry, transportation—and these were located adjacent to the direct approaches to the heart

of German power. The British Isles and

the eastern portions of the North American

continent, together constituting the military-economic center of gravity of the

western anti-Axis coalition, were closer to

northwestern Europe than to any other

worthwhile strategic objective—a fact

American planners had dimly perceived

back in spring of 1941. (See Map 8.) Nowhere else was it possible within a given

time to assemble so large an invasion force

in so advantageous a position for an amphibious assault as in the British Isles. An

invasion based on the British Isles would

not have to be weakened, as would one in

any other quarter, by diversion of large

forces to garrison the British Isles against

a possible German attack across the Channel. The most powerful blow that could be

struck at Germany, in short, was one based

on the British Isles.7

The crucial questions were, would such

a blow be strong enough? and could it be

struck soon enough? Germany could muster great power in northwestern Europe.

If the Allies could not strike before the

Soviet armies had been crippled, the

chances of a successful invasion would

fade to almost nothing. Eisenhower

thought it essential "to engage from the

middle of May onward, an increasing portion of the German Air Force, and by late

summer an increasing amount of his

ground forces."8 The JUSSC estimated

that in order to create a "material diversion" of German strength from the Eastern

Front the Allies would have to hurl a

ground army of 600,000 troops, with 6,500

planes, against northwestern Europe by

September at the latest. Nor could the flow

of material aid to the Soviet Union be

allowed to dwindle. The planners recommended that "maximum quantities" be

delivered in 1942, and before the end of

March, while the invasion plan was still

unsettled, the President brusquely ordered

that lagging deliveries be speeded up to

meet earlier commitments.9 The need for

7

 (1) These arguments are summed up in memo

cited n. 2(2);.and memo, Eisenhower for CofS, 25

Mar 42, sub: Critical Points in the Development of a

Co-ord Viewpoint as to Maj Tasks of the War, OPD

381 BOLERO, 6. (2) See also above, Ch. II. 8

 Memo cited n. 2(2). 9

 (1) JPS 2/6 cited n. 5(1). (2) For aid to the USSR,

see below, Ch. XX.
356 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

haste and the need for strength pulled in

opposite directions.

The Changing Outlook in Shipping

The planners had come far from the

optimism of midsummer 1941 when, assuming that the Soviet Union would

probably be crushed, they had nevertheless believed that the United States, with

modest help from Britain, would be able

to beat Germany on her own ground in

1943 and 1944. One reason for the somber

outlook in 1942 was the grim shipping

situation. Concluded the JUSSC early in

March:

Availability of shipping controls all deci- sions concerning overseas movement in 1942. . . . Shipping must be used in a manner

which will contribute most to effective results

against the Axis in 1942, as during this year

the United Nations will constantly be on the

verge of ultimate defeat.10

The committee expected losses in 1942 to

offset additions from new construction and

from diversions of merchant shipping to

military use; it urged that an effective

pooling system be instituted, that nonmilitary uses be reduced to a minimum, and

even that noncombatants be evacuated

from the United Kingdom.

In studying the alternative courses of

action in the Pacific—to hold or to abandon the far Pacific—the committee had

decided that the effect on the scale of effort

in the European theater would not be

markedly different in either case. If the

present line in the Pacific were held, it

seemed possible to send to the European

theater about 100,000 troops by July,

300,000 by October, and 435,000 by the

end of the year. If the far Pacific were

given up—presumably a difficult and

gradual process—each of these figures

might be increased by about 60,000. Evidently the British would have to assume

the main burden of any attack across the

Channel in late summer or fall of 1942.

Nevertheless, the committee thought that

U.S. forces would be sufficient to "assist

effectively" in such a venture, since the

first increments would be strongly reinforced in the weeks following the assault.11

Almost immediately these estimates had

to be re-examined. On 4 and 5 March the

British Prime Minister sent urgent messages to President Roosevelt describing the

deterioration of Britain's position in troopcarrying and cargo shipping, and the

necessity of rebuilding the forces on the

Levant-Caspian front. He requested specifically a loan of shipping to move about

forty thousand troops with their equipment around the Cape (leaving the United

Kingdom in April and May), and an allotment of two more American divisions to

the Anzac area in the hope of persuading

Australia and New Zealand not to recall

the two divisions then in the Near East.

Churchill was willing to defer for some

time further American reinforcements for

Northern Ireland, beyond those that could

be transported across the Atlantic by the

shipping to be sent over for the Cape voyage. The President's immediate decision to

grant this request meant that, just as in

January and the preceding autumn, a

large block of shipping would be sent to

distant waters from which it could not return for many months. Only about 40,000

troops, instead of 100,000, could be sent

across the North Atlantic in American

shipping before July, and direct move10

 JPS 2/5, 6 Mar 42, title: Strategic Deployment

of Land, Sea, and Air Forces of U.S. 11

 JPS 2/6 cited n. 5(1).

The 11,700 troops already in Northern Ireland

were not included in these totals.
BUILD-UP IN THE BRITISH ISLES—FIRST PHASE 357

ments to Iceland would have to be eliminated. The pre-October build-up in England, according to preliminary estimates,

would be reduced to 180,000 instead of

300,000. In addition, about thirty-six

freighters would have to be withdrawn

from the lend-lease service to the Red Sea

area.12

The long-range effects were less easily

evaluated. Since shipping in lend-lease

services was to provide the freight transport needed for the Pacific and Middle

East reinforcements, cargo shipping would

not become the limiting factor in overseas

deployment until the latter part of the

year. On the other hand, the appalling

upsurge in ship losses during March undermined all estimates of future transport

capabilities, and withdrawals from commercial services were difficult to predict.

The planners found that, in general, it was

"very difficult to arrive at precise answers"

as to cargo shipping availability during

the latter half of 1942.13 As for troop shipping, certain "potentialities" had been

omitted from the earlier estimates. Aquitania and Queen Mary, which were to be

sent around the Cape, might be used on

their return voyage, perhaps with other

British transports as well, to move U.S.

troops to the British Isles. Less promising

possibilities were the use of Navy combat

loaders for Pacific runs (releasing other

shipping for the Atlantic), acquisition of

Axis vessels interned in South America,

and piecemeal movements of small detachments of troops on freighters. From all

these facts, the JUSSC concluded that the

earlier estimates of possible build-up in the

British Isles—300,000 by October, 435,000

by the end of the year—might be "equalled

or possibly improved."

 14

 The Joint Chiefs

accordingly recommended on 16 March

that, if the British concurred, the assembling of troops and material in the British

Isles for a continental invasion should begin at once.15

Late in March, as planning for the invasion build-up went into high gear, the

transportation staff of the SOS came up

with new and disturbing predictions. In

view of the high rate of losses and the presumed necessity of completing scheduled

deployment to other theaters, it now appeared that cargo shipping would support

only about 255,000 troops in the British

Isles by the end of 1942; none would be

available for this purpose until August,

and very little until September. The Combined Staff Planners, studying the data,

reached the pessimistic conclusion that for

a mid-September assault only one infantry

and half an armored division from the

United States could be ready in the British Isles, even if air force deployment were

held down to a level that the committee

judged insufficient to give decisive superiority. There were other limitations. To

mount the assault itself would require a

"virtual cessation" of imports into England during the assembly and mounting

period, and its subsequent support would

make severe inroads upon Britain's ecoh12

 (1) Msgs, Former Naval Person to President

Roosevelt, 4 and 5 Mar 42, as quoted in Churchill,

Hinge of Fate, pp. 189-94, and summary of President's reply, pp. 195-96. (2) Matloffand Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, pp. 162-64. (3) App. II to

JCS 23 cited n. 5(1). (4) See shipping study, 27 Mar

42, title: Plan "A," Plng Div Studies folder, OCT

HB. (5) See also below, Ch. XX. 13

 App. II cited n. 12(3). 14

 Ibid.

15

 (1) Min, 5th mtg JCS, 16 Mar 42. (2) For discussion of shipping losses, see min, 12th mtg CCS, 17

Mar 42. (3) CCS 39/1, 14 Mar 42, title: Relation of

Merchant Shipg Losses to Prosecution of War. (4)

JPS 16/1, 25 Mar 42, title: Appreciation of U.S. Mil

Shipg Sit. (5) See above, Ch. VIII, and below, App.

H-1.
358 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

omy.16 Available landing craft would support a landing only about a fifth as strong

as the committee believed necessary. Projecting the estimates into 1943, the committee judged an operation in the spring

of 1943 to be barely feasible, provided the

Soviet Union were still containing the

bulk of the German Army and the use of

cargo shipping in other theaters and for

civilian needs were ruthlessly curtailed.

Even so, the American contribution would

be small, primarily air forces, with only

about five ground divisions. The CPS unequivocally ruled out a 1942 assault,

asserting it would not be possible to land

ground forces on the Continent "with sufficient support to give reasonable assurance

that they could be maintained."17

The new assessment of shipping capabilities came at a critical juncture in planning. On 25 March General Marshall had

secured the President's approval to put

the plan in shape for discussion with the

British, and during the next few days arrangements were made for Marshall and

Hopkins to take it to London instead of

working through the combined machinery

in Washington. On the 25th, also, General Eisenhower had presented a study

elaborating on the thesis developed in his

memorandum of 28 February. Up to this

point the drift of thinking among the

American planners was on the whole in

the direction of a 1942 invasion, although

there had been some discussion of a more

cautious plan presented by the British for

an operation in 1943, to be undertaken

only in the event of a serious deterioration

of German power in the West. Estimates of

forces that might be available were reassuring. By mid-August 1942 a force of six

infantry, three armored, and two motorized divisions, trained and equipped, could

be mustered; by the following April, at

least eighteen and probably twenty-one

infantry divisions, two of them trained and

equipped for amphibious operations, besides six armored divisions, five motorized

divisions, and one airborne division. The

Air Forces estimated that over 700 combat

aircraft could be made available by midSeptember and 3,300 by the following

April. But on 27 March Col. John E. Hull

of WPD received from Lt. Col. Marcus B.

Stokes of General Gross' staff a succinct

statement of the limitations imposed by

shipping. Only about 105,000 troops—

equivalent perhaps to three and one-half

infantry or two armored divisions with

supporting ground elements, but without

air forces—could be moved to England by

mid-September, and only 400,000 could

be moved and supported by April 1943,

including the troops already in or on the

way to Northern Ireland. For the program

as a whole, cargo shipping was the limiting factor. If the movement of the million

or more American troops that WPD had

estimated as necessary for an invasion were

to depend on American shipping alone,

Stokes estimated it could not be completed

until September 1943.18

16

 (1) CPS 26/1, 3 Apr 42, title: Offensive Opns in

Europe. (2) Shipping data are from the chart "Shipping Capabilities in 1942," 1 April 1942, which was

prepared by the Transportation Division, SOS, and

appended as Annex D to CPS 26/1. The troop carrying estimates corresponded roughly with the earlier

ones of the JUSSC. Cargo shipping estimates assumed

that fourteen cargo vessels a month, over and above

the eighteen already requested by the War Department, would be made available for Army use. See

above, Ch. VIII. 17

 CPS 26/1 cited n. 16(1). 18

 (1) Memo, Col Thomas D. Davis for Col Hull,

27 Mar 42, sub: Availability of Certain Maj Units. (2)

Memo, G-4 for WPD, 27 Mar 42, sub: Estd Dates by

Which Certain Divs Will Be Equipped. (3) Memo,

Stokes for Hull, 27 Mar 42, sub: Shipg Ests. All in

ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec 4, Folder 2. For comparison, Stokes showed the far greater limitations

upon deployment to the Near and Middle East. (4)

Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War,

pp. 416-19. (5) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p.

521.
BUILD-UP IN THE BRITISH ISLES—FIRST PHASE 359

Colonel Stokes did not rest his estimate

for a September 1942 operation, as he did

that for a 1943 operation, upon the recently calculated limitations of cargo shipping, which indicated that not even

105,000 troops could be supported by midSeptember. Cargo shipping limitations,

by their nature, could be expected to come

into play gradually. In the early stages of

a build-up program, cargo shipping would

be required mainly to move the equipment of deploying forces; any given body

of troops could live for a month or two, if

necessary, on the maintenance supplies

they brought with them. The wide discrepancy between Stokes' estimate and

the earlier ones relating to a 1942 operation seems to have resulted from two new

assumptions: first, that the build-up in the

British Isles could begin only after the garrisoning of other theaters and bases had

been largely completed, that is, in July

and August; and second, that any British

assistance in troop transport could not be

provided before September. The earlier

estimates had not considered the problem

of timing at all, but merely matched estimated aggregate capacity against aggregate demands.

The new shipping estimates, at any rate,

gave a decisive turn to planning. As late as

28 March WPD was inclined to accept the

earlier figures, based primarily on aggregate troop carrying capacity, which envisaged placing almost 450,000 troops in the

British Isles by the end of 1942. However,

the outline plan drawn up by the WPD

staff and approved by the President on

1 April focused, in the main, upon a 1943

invasion. It envisaged combined forces of

48 divisions and 5,800 combat planes, of

which the United States would provide

about 30 divisions and 3,250 combat

planes. This would involve a build-up, by

1 April 1943, of about a million American

troops in the British Isles. In the course of

these preparations it might become necessary in the autumn of 1942 to launch an

emergency attack across the Channel in

an effort to avert a collapse on the Eastern

Front or to take advantage of an unexpected weakening of German strength in

the West. Such an attack would have to be

launched with whatever forces were available, and on the basis of the Stokes estimates, it was candidly described in the

outline plan as a "sacrifice in the common

good."

 19

 Except in this contingency, aid to

the Soviet Union in 1942 would depend

on a continuing flow of munitions and

limited military assistance, for example by

sending air forces to the Middle East. As

for the main operation, the outline plan,

pointing again to the Stokes estimates that

only about four hundred thousand troops

could be moved and supported by April

1943 with American shipping, suggested

that British troop transports might be

made available after the situation was stabilized in the eastern theaters, and that

more cargo shipping would have to be

diverted from other uses early in 1943. For

either a 1942 or a 1943 operation, construction of landing craft would have to be

greatly accelerated. In order to meet an

April 1943 jump-off date, an immediate 19

 (1) One copy of the outline plan, or the Marshall

Memorandum as it was called, is filed as memo, CofS

for President, no date, sub: Basis for Preparation of

the Atchd Outline Plan . . . , BOLERO folder, Lutes

File. For others, see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, pp. 184-86. That the outline plan

used the estimates in the Stokes memorandum seems

fairly evident. Stokes, in turn, evidently had used the

same data as the 1 April 1942 chart, "Shipping Capabilities in 1942," though its conclusions were not the

same, particularly on the matter of cargo shipping

limitations in 1942. The estimates of divisions to be

shipped to the United Kingdom by autumn of 1942

are roughly reconcilable in Stokes' memorandum,

CPS 26/1, and in the Marshall Memorandum, except

that the latter includes some air forces as well as three

and one-half ground divisions. (2) Notes on 9th mtg

JPS, 28 Mar 42, ABC 570 (2-14-42) Sec 1.
360 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

decision was imperative so that the complex logistical preparations—base construction in the United Kingdom, procurement programs, troop and matériel

deployment—might get under way. Shipping and landing craft loomed as the

bottlenecks.20

The London Staff Conversations

In the second week of April 1942 General Marshall and Harry Hopkins went to

London to sell this project to the British.

To Churchill, the plan offered insurance

against the danger that the Americans

might turn their backs upon Europe to

prosecute the Pacific war. British agreement upon the main cross-Channel operation in 1943 (ROUNDUP) with its preparatory build-up (BOLERO) therefore was

quick and even enthusiastic. The British

did express misgivings, however, and asked

pointed questions regarding the 1942

emergency operation (SLEDGEHAMMER).

They also registered an emphatic reservation indicating that Britain's precarious

position in the Middle East must be held

whatever the cost.21

Qualified agreement, with underlying

doubts and reservations, was all that could

be accomplished at this time. The situation was such that decision had to precede,

not follow, the study, maneuvers, testing

of equipment, and actual experience in

amphibious warfare that would indicate

whether the plan were feasible. On the

crucial question of landing craft, for example, planning and production were in

such a state of confusion during April that

Marshall could give no concrete answers

to British questions, and no one on the

small staff he took to London was technically competent to discuss the problem.

On shipping, the other bottleneck, there

was more discussion but little was settled.

The Americans wanted to know, above all,

whether the British could handle the 60

percent of the total build-up program for

which American shipping appeared to be

lacking. The British indicated that the

Queens could be made available for trooping across the Atlantic after the peak of

deployment to the Middle East had been

passed, possibly as early as the coming

July. By April 1943 these giant vessels

might be able to carry some 250,000

American troops to the British Isles, and

another 100,000 might be added from

January 1943 on by additional transports

taken from the Middle East convoys. But

beyond this the British were unwilling to

commit themselves. Apart from the claim

of the Middle East upon their shipping,

they also had their eyes upon the lagging

relief of Iceland by American forces and

the movement of Canadian troops and

RAF trainees across the North Atlantic.22

The British also undertook tentatively

to provide half the cargo tonnage needed

for the program by cutting into their convoys to the Indian Ocean and into their

domestic imports. They intimated, however, that the Americans had set their tonnage requirements rather high. They

thought the equipment allowances of U.S.

troops, especially of vehicles, and American standards of subsistence and maintenance were "fat," and suggested possible

shipping economies by disassembling and

crating vehicles and by using British

20

 Ibid.

21

 (1) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-

1942, pp. 187-90. (2) Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1951), pp. 16-19. (3) Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 317-20. 22

 (1) Min, 3d mtg U.S.-Br Planners, London, 12

Apr 42. (2) Notes prepared by Home Force Logis Stf,

13 Apr 42. Both in ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec 5.
BUILD-UP IN THE BRITISH ISLES—FIRST PHASE 361

equipment. The American response to

these suggestions was cool.23

The British were willing, in short, to

provide substantial assistance in shipping

to supplement American resources, but

they were not prepared at this time to

underwrite the whole BOLERO program.

The program could now get under way,

but its completion, as far as the British

were concerned, would depend on the

course of events in the Middle East.

Unfortunately, the shipping tentatively

promised by the British would become

available, for the most part, too late to

help SLEDGEHAMMER. The British response

to this feature of the American plan was

noticeably lukewarm; far from being an

emergency operation to save the Soviet

Union from collapse, SLEDGEHAMMER appeared to the British as one that must inevitably result in catastrophe unless the

USSR were so far from collapse as to prevent the Germans from reacting vigorously to it. General Marshall was in the

uncomfortable position of attempting to

justify a venture to which the Americans

could contribute very little; his only defense of the mid-September launching

date, which the British and some of the

Americans thought would probably be too

late, was that few if any American ground

forces would be in the British Isles before

that date. The reason there would be so

few was the determination that the BOLERO

program should not be allowed to interfere with the planned build-up offerees in

other theaters and along lines of communications. It was scarcely surprising that

the British made similar reservations regarding the areas in which they had a

primary interest.24

But SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP

could not be kept in separate compartments. Delay in inaugurating the buildup of American forces would certainly

wreck a prologue operation in September

1942, but almost as thoroughly it would

ruin the "main show" seven months later.

The central logistical problem of BOLEROSLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP was one of timing and scheduling. The British administrative staffs were already pointing out

that if the build-up were concentrated in

the last two or three months before the attack, the ports in Britain might not be

able to handle the incoming traffic, let

alone the additional problem—hardly

mentioned at the conference—of outloading for the assault. The inflow of material,

if not of troops, must begin at the earliest

possible moment.25 But the problem of

scheduling seems to have attracted little

attention in the conference discussions.

The plan that Marshall brought to London itself alluded to the need for more

cargo shipping only as a problem to be

met in 1943. Colonel Hull observed that

American units sent over during 1942

might have to leave behind much of their

equipment, and both he and Marshall

evidently accepted as unavoidable the

postponement of the movement of the

bulk of the cargo until the first few months

of 1943, although they also admitted the

necessity of completing the construction

of airfields, depots, and cantonments, all

requiring materials and equipment from

the United States, before the end of 1942.26

23

 (1) Br stf paper, no date, sub: Note on Cargo

Shipg Involved in Projected American Move. (2)

Min, Br CofS mtg, attended by Gen Marshall, 14

Apr 42. Both in ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec 4,

Folder 2. (3) Min cited n. 22(1). 24

 Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 17-18. 25

 Paper cited n. 23(1). 26

 For the statement of Colonel Hull, see min cited

n. 22(1). The Stokes estimate, possibly because of lack

of information, had explicitly left British port capacity

out of consideration.
362 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

There was no assurance, when Marshall and his staff left London, that the

problem of timing and scheduling could

be solved. The simultaneous build-up for

two operations, moreover, created some

conflict in emphasis. SLEDGEHAMMER'S

overriding need was for a heavy flow of

combat troops during the coming spring

and summer, while for ROUNDUP an even

flow of cargo over the whole period was

essential in order to avoid congestion at

the end of the program. But for either operation, it was obviously desirable and

probably essential that the build-up begin

immediately.

The Flow of Troops

Fortunately the movement of troops

and material across the North Atlantic,

begun before Pearl Harbor, had not been

halted but only slowed by the crisis in the

Middle and Far East. By early March

about 11,000 of a projected force of 105,-

000 had reached Northern Ireland, and

Army forces in Iceland, after the arrival

of the late February shipment, amounted

to almost 15,000; the last U.S. marines

left Iceland on 9 March, though a sizable

British garrison remained.27

The diversion of more American shipping into the Pacific and around the Cape,

as a result of Churchill's request early in

March, cut into planned movements both

to Northern Ireland and to Iceland. Although direct shipments to Iceland had

been ruled out at first, the remainder of

the 5th Division was shipped in two small

contingents during April under a complicated shuttle arrangement by which

some of the British garrison was also transshipped to Ireland. These movements

were a by-product of the larger movement

to Northern Ireland, planned in two installments for late April and early May in

the flotilla that was subsequently to carry

two British divisions around the Cape.

The first convoy, a large one including the

British liner Aquitania, temporarily diverted from the Pacific, sailed from New

York on 30 April with some nineteen

thousand troops, including the second Iceland contingent and part of the 34th Infantry Division.28

Moving the 1st Armored Division to

Northern Ireland proved more difficult.

This was the Army's first experience in

moving a unit of this type overseas. The

division's impedimenta, including its reserve and replacement vehicles and maintenance supplies, came to more than 200,-

000 ship tons, most of it bulky cargo. The

first Iceland contingent early in April had

taken some of the immediately available

freighters, and space requirements turned

out to have been underestimated. In an

effort to avoid separating troops from their

equipment, the move was scheduled in

two installments; the first echelon, nine

thousand troops on the Queen Mary, sailed

on 11 May, the remainder in two smaller

transports on the 31st—the latter sailing

being noteworthy as the first experiment

with double loading on troop transports

(rotation of passengers between sleeping

and recreation quarters). Splitting the

troop movement did not prevent some dis27

 (1) Administrative and Logistical History of the

European Theater of Operations: The Predecessor

Commands, Vol. I, MS, OCMH. (2) WPD Weekly

Status Map, 12 Mar 42, OPD Hist Unit File. (3) See

above, Ch. VI. 28

 (1) Rpt, NYPOE Statistical Summary, OCT HB.

(2) Corresp in 370.5 England folder Br file, and in

Iceland Misc folder, OCT HB. (3) Min, 12th, 13th,

and 14th mtgs CCS, 17, 24, and 31 Mar 42. (4) CCS

58/2, rpt by CMTC, 24 Mar 42, title: Relief of Br

Trs in Iceland. (5) Msg, WPD to CG USAFBI, 28

Mar 42, OPD 320.2 Gt Brit, 3. (6) Shipping study

cited n. 12(4). (7) Msg, CG SOS to USFOR, 12 Apr

42, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec 1.
BUILD-UP IN THE BRITISH ISLES—FIRST PHASE 363

persal of the cargo movement. All the

division's tanks were carried across in two

trips, on 30 April and 13 June, by the seatrain Texas. The remainder of the tonnage

was spread over several shipments, some

in the 30 April convoy, others during

May. As late as 24 March, OPD had laid

down the law to the transportation staffs

that "troops would go overseas only when

their full equipment could go with or before them."

 29

 Six weeks later, under pressure to accelerate troop movements to

Northern Ireland, OPD informed the

SOS that the remainder of the 1st Armored Division must be shipped as soon

as transports were available, "even though

its equipment must go later."30 The whole

experience was a foretaste of the difficulty

of synchronizing the flow of troops and

cargo in a long-range deployment program.31

Following approval of BOLERO-ROUNDUP in April, planning of the deployment

program began immediately. Two combined committees were set up at the end

of the month to co-ordinate the process,

one in London to arrange for reception

and maintenance of incoming American

forces, one in Washington to schedule

movements and set shipping requirements. The BOLERO Combined Committees found themselves face to face with the

threat of later congestion, which only immediate measures could avert. SOS officials had already pointed out to OPD that

if, as shipping estimates seemed to indicate, only 250,000 troops could be supported in the British Isles by the end of the

year, then it would presumably be necessary somehow to ship the remaining

750,000, with equipment and supplies,

during the first three months of 1943.

British port capacity for handling incoming American forces had been given as

about 100,000 troops per month. Obviously it would be necessary to speed up

the movement during the summer and

fall, placing the center of gravity of the

whole program "somewhere in the middle

of the summer."

 32

Until the middle of May there seemed

little prospect of doing so. Movements already scheduled to Northern Ireland and

England, which the Combined Chiefs directed to be hastened, would bring the

total force in the British Isles by July to

about 51,000. Shipping in sight for July

could carry only 5,000 to 5,500; British

transports would not be available until

August, when some 50,000 troops were

tentatively scheduled to move. On both

sides of the Atlantic the planning staffs

29

 Plng Div SOS Diary, 25 Mar 42 entry, Plng Div

ASF. 30

 Ibid., 6 May 42 entry. 31

 (1) Ibid., 19, 26, 28 Mar; 13, 27 Apr; 1 and 2

May 42 entries. (2) Millett, Overseas Movement of

the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Armored Division, OCMH. (3) Corresp in Iceland Misc folder,

OCT HB. (4) Rpt cited n. 28(1). (5) WSA Allocation Chart atchd to CMT 5/3, 8 May 42, title: Availability of United Nations Shipg for Mil Trans, ABC

570 (2-14-42) Sec 1. (6) Memo, Eisenhower for CofS,

24 Apr 42, Misc: Memos for CofS folder, Misc Exec

Off file, OPD Hist Unit File. (7) For ship tonnage requirements of an armored division in late 1942 and

summer 1943, see below, Apps. A-4, A-5. 32

 (1) Min, 1st mtg BCC(W), 29 Apr 42, ABC 381

BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec 1. (2) Diary, 15 Apr 42 entry,

cited n. 29. (3) Msg Blue 31, BCC(W) to BCC(L), 30

Apr 42, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec 4, Folder 2.

(4) The BOLERO Combined Committee in Washington

(BCC(W)) was headed by Col Hull of OPD, and consisted in addition of one AAF officer, two Navy officers, and one representative of each of the three British

services. Eight U.S. Army assistants were also named,

including one from G-4 (Col. Shiras A. Blair) and one

from SOS (Lt. Col. C. B. Magruder). Both the

BCC(W) and the BCC(L) (BOLERO Combined Committee in London) reported to the CPS. See memo,

JCS for OPD and ACofS Plans, Navy Dept, 6 May 42,

ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec 1. See also, min, 13th

mtg JPS, 22 Apr 42; min, 17th mtg CCS, 28 Apr 42;

and memo, OPD for U.S. Secy CCS, 27 Apr 42, sub:

U.S. Army Membership . . . , OPD 381 BOLERO, 8.
364 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

began to talk of over-all reductions in the

program. The Washington BOLERO Combined Committee anticipated other difficulties—competition between service

troops and combat troops for transport

during the summer, shortages of escorts,

delays in "marrying up" troops and

equipment. And congestion in the fall and

winter would offer splendid targets to the

Luftwaffe, freed from the Eastern Front

by bad weather. The committee could only

suggest economies in shipping through rerouting and consolidation of movements,

and postponement of the relief of the British in Iceland until after August. These

measures, which the CCS forthwith approved, were only palliatives; the simple

need was for more shipping.33

In the third week of May the British

authorities, apparently deciding that no

more shipping would be forthcoming from

the Americans and that administrative

economies would not close the gap, came

to the rescue with offers to divert troop

shipping from the Middle East convoys

during the two lean months of June and

July. For June, they offered about 13,000

more spaces (in addition to the Queen Elizabeth, already scheduled); for July, 15,000.

These transports were to be available

thereafter on a six-week cycle, supplemented after November by capacity for

10,000 more. The Queens would operate

on a four-week turnaround from August

on. Aquitania, then en route to the Indian

Ocean, would be available for a BOLERO

voyage in September, and for each trip on

the triangular United States-United Kingdom-Indian Ocean run she would be replaced in the North Atlantic by equivalent

capacity in smaller British transports. On

paper, the 105,000 U.S. troops earlier set

as the maximum possibility for 1 September had now risen above 150,000, and it

looked as though 850,000 to 900,000

might be in position by the following

April. So hopeful was the outlook that Sir

John Dill asked the Combined Chiefs to

resume the Iceland program, and General

Marshall began to talk of sending another

armored division to the United Kingdom

in time for an autumn operation.34

June, the month in which the BOLERO

program was expected to really get under

way, brought instead a series of crises that

left the program virtually in suspense. The

first large BOLERO contingent, some 11,-

000 troops, primarily Air Forces, sailed on

the Queen Elizabeth on the 4th, and on the

11th about 900 parachutists and service

troops departed on a British transport,

Rampura. These movements occurred during the Midway crisis, which at the insistence of General Marshall was not allowed

to interfere seriously with BOLERO move33

 (1) Min, 1st and 2d mtgs BCC(W), 29 and 30

Apr 42, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec 1; 4th and

5th mtgs, 9 and 11 May 42, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-

42) Sec 4, Folder 2. (2) Rpt by BCC(W), 9 May 42,

sub: Shipg for BOLERO, same file. (3) Rpt by BCC(W),

13 May 42, same sub, same file. This was CPS 26/3

and was approved as CCS 72, 16 May 42. (4) Other

corresp in same files. (5) Extracts from two memos,

DQMG(L) [Deputy Quartermaster General, London], no addressee, 1 May 42, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-

16-42) Sec 4, Folder 3. (6) CMT 5/3 cited n. 31(5).

(7) Min, 19th mtg CCS, 12 May 42. (8) Memo,

Magruder for Hull, 14 May 42, sub: Priority of Shipt,

BOLERO, BOLERO 1942 Shipg folder, Lutes File. (9)

Diary, 1 May 42 entry, cited n. 29. 34

 (1) Min, 6th and 8th mtgs BCC(W), 20 May and

1 Jun 42. (2) Ltr, Col Hull to Brig Gen Charles L.

Bolte, 19 May 42. (3) Msg Pink 6, BCC(L) to

BCC(W), 19 May 42. All in ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-

42) Sec 4, Folder 2. (4) Memo, Hull for ACofS OPD,

21 May 42, sub: Tr Mvmt Schedules for BOLERO and

NABOB [N Ireland]. (5) Memo, Col Hull for Brig Gen

Thomas T. Handy, 18 May 42, no sub. Last two in

ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec 1. (6) Note, unsigned,

for Br Army Stf, Washington, circa 19 May 42, sub:

Personnel Shipg, BOLERO folder, OCT HB. (7) See

also, Relief folder, OCT HB. (8) Memo, OPD for CG

USAFBI, 17 May 42, sub: Overseas Tr Mvmts for Br

Isles, OPD 370.5 Gt Brit.
BUILD-UP IN THE BRITISH ISLES—FIRST PHASE 365

THE QUEEN ELIZABETH, ONE OF THE "MONSTERS"

ments. In the last half of June Lt. Gen. Sir

Bernard L. Montgomery's Eighth Army

was driven back to El Alamein, leaving a

large garrison to surrender to the Germans

at Tobruk. German armies meanwhile

were driving into the Caucasus. It seemed

likely that the British troopers on which

BOLERO deployment largely depended

would be diverted to rush British reinforcements to Egypt. For a time, indeed, it

looked as though American ground forces

also would be sent to the threatened area.

Prime Minister Churchill, in Washington

at the height of the crisis, asked for American help, and General Marshall offered

to send the 2d Armored Division. To do so

would at least be more economical in shipping than to ship British troops to Egypt

and replace them by additional American

troop shipments to the United Kingdom.

Cross-Channel invasion preparations

seemed likely to suffer in either case.35

By this time the British were challenging the whole BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan, objecting particularly to its SLEDGEHAMMER

feature, which they regarded more than

ever as a forlorn hope. While the debate

over this issue went on during June and

July, the projected movement of the 2d

Armored Division to Egypt was held in

abeyance, and American aid for the time

35

 (1) Rpt cited n. 28(1). (2) Craven and Cate,

AAF I, pp. 639-42. (3) Matloff and Snell, Strategic

Planning: 1941-1942, Ch. XI. (4) CPS 26/4, 7 Jun 42,

title: BOLERO Embarkation Schedule, approved as

CCS 72/1, 10 Jun 42, same title. (5) CCS 84, 25 Jun

42, title: U.S. Reinfs for Middle East. (6) Min, 27th29th mtgs CCS, 19, 20, and 25 Jun 42.
366 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

being was limited to shipments of tanks

and self-propelled artillery and to substantial air reinforcement. About four

thousand AAF personnel, the ground

echelon of three air groups, sailed for Suez

on 16 July on the Pasteur, a British transport. During July General Marshall, in an

effort to convince the British that SLEDGEHAMMER was at least as feasible as any alternative operation, used the considerable

troop tonnage that then became available

to hurry the movement of ground combat

troops to the British Isles. The impetus of

this movement carried over into August

and September, even after the SLEDGEHAMMER plan had been scrapped. The Air

Forces build-up, meanwhile, was not neglected. By the end of August almost thirty

thousand troops of the Eighth Air Force,

comprising four heavy bomber groups,

four pursuit groups, two troop carrier

groups, and various other elements, were

moved to the British Isles.36

This emphasis in BOLERO deployment

upon ground combat and air units reduced

the flow of service troops during July and

August, stunting the growth of the base

establishment on which invasion plans

depended, and reversing the intention of

the planners who in April had placed

service troops in a priority above ground

combat troops. SOS officials had at that

time foreseen the inevitable conflict between base development and preparations

for an emergency assault in 1942—similar

to the conflict that had appeared in Australia early in the year—but the planners

had argued that SLEDGEHAMMER, if

mounted, would be mainly a British enterprise. The first detailed plan, at the end

of May, for the American establishment

in the United Kingdom provided for a

Services of Supply complement of 277,000,

approximately 27 percent of the total

projected strength. This figure excluded

service elements that were to operate in

combat zones and the service troops of the

Eighth Air Force, which together would

have brought the entire service establishment up to about 48 percent of the whole.

Though placed in a high priority, service

troop movements were scheduled opportunistically and without fixed objectives

for the summer months. Competition

among the various claims was fierce—

construction of airdromes, depots, and

cantonments, operation of depots and

ports, maintenance of communications,

repair and salvage of equipment, operation of utilities, assembling of motor vehicles, and performance of sundry administrative tasks. Some of the claims dropped

out under pressure of time and shipping

space; many units requested were not provided in the Troop Basis or were activated

too late to be adequately trained. The

chief conflict during the summer was between engineer aviation battalions and

engineer general service regiments, the

two basic types of construction units.

Shipments of these two types of units remained in fair balance during the summer

and made up the majority of service troops

deployed, outrunning earlier expectations.

Port battalions, depot and maintenance

units, and most other types except Ordnance units, which were sent over in considerable numbers on the eve of the North

Africa operation, were largely crowded

out by the movement of engineer troops.

36

 (1) For AAF build-up, see Hq ETOUSA Statistical Summary 7, 7 Sep 42, OCMH; and Eighth Air

Force Station Lists and Strength Rpts, 31 Aug 42,

U.S. Air Force Hist Div Archives, Air University,

Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. (2) Msg, Marshall to

Eisenhower, 16 Jul 42, Item 9, Exec 5. (3) Msg 549,

London to AGWAR, 22 Jul 42, NATOUSA TORCH

Plng folder, OCT HB.
BUILD-UP IN THE BRITISH ISLES—FIRST PHASE 367

By the end of July the SOS establishment

in the United Kingdom amounted to 27

percent of the total American strength

there, a considerably higher proportion

than that contemplated by tentative

movement schedules in May. By the end

of September, however, the slump in service troop movements had reduced the

ratio to about 21 percent.37

By the end of July the American forces

in the British Isles had reached a total of

82,000. August schedules called for 108,-

000 more, but actual shipments fell somewhat short of this figure. By the end of

August something over 170,000 troops

were in or on their way to the British Isles.

This was a spectacular achievement by

contrast with the 105,000 predicted four

months earlier, but it left unsolved the

long-range traffic problem that had then

been foreseen. The British estimated their

capacity to handle incoming American

troops at an absolute maximum of 120,000

a month, probably less during the winter

months and certainly less while outloading

movements were under way during the

weeks immediately preceding the invasion. Incoming American troop shipments

had to be synchronized with numerous

other movements, inbound and outbound,

particularly the large outbound monthly

Middle East (WS) convoys, averaging

50,000 troops, and the biweekly inbound

Canadian (NA) convoys. The monthly

BOLERO (AT) convoys, out of New York,

normally joined the NA convoys, which

sailed from Halifax. The Queens, scheduled

to sail on a four-week cycle a few days

apart beginning in August, were "tied to

the moon," being obliged to choose the

dark week of each month for navigating in

British waters.38 Late in May U.S. naval

authorities had sought British acquiescence to a scheme to sail the AT convoys

at three-week intervals. The British objected on the grounds that such a schedule

would conflict with the movement of the

Queens and the NA convoys, swamping

their ports with American, Canadian, and

RAF troops. They suggested, instead,

combining the AT and NA convoys on a

fortnightly cycle, handling the Queens and

the WS convoys during the intervals between these arrivals. This plan had to be

given up for lack of escorts. As an alternative, the Washington BOLERO Committee

proposed alternate fortnightly and fourweek intervals for the.combined convoys,

but this would produce an uneven distribution of the port workload, and still pose

a stiff escort requirement. Since the Navy

insisted that there was absolutely "no expectation of being able to furnish an additional escort group by November," it was

finally decided to follow a staggered twoweek and four-week cycle for a time, eliminating alternate NA convoys; in November the problem would be re-examined.39

"We must face the fact," the committee

concluded, "that after November, either

the rate of acceptance through the ports

and railroads must be raised, or a solution

to the escort problem must be found to

permit a fortnightly convoy cycle, or the

37

 (1) For details, see Ruppenthal, Logistical Support

of the Armies, Ch. II. See also above, Ch. XIII. (2)

Tentative mvmt schedules for May 1942, BOLERO

1942 folder, Lutes File. (3) Related corresp in same

file. (4) Other corresp in ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42);

OPD 320.2 Gt Brit; OPD 320.2 ETO; OPD 370.5

Changes of Station; OPD 370.5 BOLERO; and min,

WD Gen Council mtgs; and Diary cited n. 29. 38

 (1) Msg Black 20, BCC(W) to BCC(L), 24 Jul 42,

ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec 4, Folder 3. (2) Hq

ETOUSA Statistical Summary 2, 7 Aug 42, DRB

AGO. (3) Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 10 May 42,

sub: BOLERO, BOLERO 1942 folder, Lutes File. (4) See

below, Apps. A-8, E-1. 39

 Min, 12th mtg BCC(W), 17 Jun 42, ABC 381

BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec 4, Folder 3.
368 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

flow of U.S. troops will fall short of the

present program."

 40

The Flow of Cargo

More complex than the problem of

moving troops to the British Isles was that

of moving their matériel. For the remainder of 1942, at least, cargo shipping

seemed likely to be scarcer than troop

transport. Not until the following year, the

British were told at London in April, was

the building of cargo ships expected to

"come level" with capacity to move

troops. With the depredations of German

submarines in the Atlantic becoming more

deadly, the Combined Military Transportation Committee reported during the first

week of May a current deficit of three million dead-weight tons of Allied cargo shipping and predicted four million by the end

of the year. The Combined Chiefs, the

committee concluded, would have to

choose between reducing projected military requirements or imposing further deprivation upon the civilian populations of

the Allied countries and reducing the flow

of aid to the Soviet Union. At the April

London conference the Americans talked

of holding back troop movements during

1942 in order to reduce the need for maintenance shipments, and G-4 later echoed

this suggestion.41

At the first meeting of the Washington

BOLERO Combined Committee, Col. Llewelyn Wansbrough-Jones, the British shipping representative, expressed different

views. The program, he insisted, must be

launched immediately with whatever

means were at hand, "regardless of the

order of arrival of troops and equipment."

 42

 About this time, OPD was bowing to the necessity, in connection with the

movement of the 1st Armored Division to

Northern Ireland, of abandoning the ancient doctrine that troops and equipment

must move together. In the SOS the staffs

working up tentative schedules of BOLERO

movements found confirmation of their

fears that the flow of cargo, if synchronized

with the then expected flow of troops

which swelled to a peak toward the end of

the year, threatened to create serious congestion in the receiving ports from August

on.43

War Shipping Administration, meanwhile, was searching its cupboards for

additional cargo lift. By the beginning of

May its officials had hopes that, by reshuffling various commercial trades (the

process of sweating them down to meet

war needs was still far from complete) and

with the aid of new construction, only now

beginning to boom, enough cargo shipping

might be found to meet stated BOLERO

requirements during the coming few

months—and perhaps even some additional in July—to "take the curse off" the

heavy August-September-October schedule, as General Gross put it.44

 Almost at

the same time, BOLERO received a windfall

40

 (1) Msg Black 13, BCC( W) to BCC(L), 17 Jun

42. (2) Memo, Col Llewelyn Wansbrough-Jones for

BCC(W), 7 Aug 42. Both in ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-

42) Sec 4, Folder 3. (3) Msg Black 8, BCC(W) to

BCC(L), 29 May 42. (4) Msg, Br War Off to Br Army

Stf, Washington, 27 May 42. Last two in ABC 381

BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec 4, Folder 2.

The Queens were to follow the old four-week cycle,

carrying U.S. troops and Canadian personnel who

would have gone on the eliminated Halifax convoy;

some of the U.S. troops were to be accommodated on

the Halifax convoys. See corresp in BOLERO folder

and Relief folder, OCT HB. 41

 (1) CMT 5/3 cited n. 31(5). (2) Memo, G-4 for

Lutes, 30 Apr 42, sub: Force BOLERO, BOLERO 1942

folder, Lutes File. 42

 Min cited n. 32(1). 43

 (1) Memo cited n. 38(3). (2) Penned note, Gross

to Lewis Douglas, 1 May 42, with atchd tables and

chart, Army Reqmts folder, WSA Douglas File. 44

 Note cited n. 43(2).
BUILD-UP IN THE BRITISH ISLES—FIRST PHASE 369

in the form of a substantial block of tonnage released from the northern convoys

to the USSR, which the British found

themselves obliged to curtail at the end of

April because of attendant losses in escorting ships. On 22 May Lewis Douglas of

WSA conferred with Somervell and SOS

staff officers in Somervell's quarters at Fort

Myer on the eve of the latter's departure

for England to survey preparations for the

impending flow of invasion troops and

matériel. The Army's stated requirements

for BOLERO during June, July, and August

then stood, respectively, at 14, 25, and

67 sailings (of the average Liberty-type

11,000-ton freighter). Seventy-six of these

106 vessels, Douglas assured Somervell,

could surely be provided and another 100

(a more miscellaneous lot, on the average

somewhat smaller than the standard Liberty) probably would be available between

15 July and 15 August. Could not some of

them, Somervell asked, be ready by the

beginning of July? Douglas thought they

might. Much depended, he warned, on

whether the ships could be armed and degaussed in time, substitutes found for certain withdrawals from commercial trades,

sufficient convoy escorts provided, and,

above all, the rising trend of ship losses

curbed. Moreover, the Army would have

to guarantee cargo to fill ships when they

were made available. Gross and Lutes

promised that no ship would lack for

cargo.45

On paper, there was thus a surplus of

cargo shipping for June-July-August—

ranging (as troop movement schedules

fluctuated) from seventy to one hundred

sailings, with a capacity that might exceed

a million ship tons. How real this surplus

would prove to be no one could yet tell.

The ships could not be put on the shelf

until the Army was ready to use them.

WSA could only hope to schedule worldwide movements of the shipping under its

control in such a way that sufficient vessels

would "present" at east coast ports to

meet the accelerated BOLERO program.

Ship sinkings were a growing incubus.

Somervell himself had enough doubts on

the matter to lead him, as soon as he

reached England, to ask Lord Leathers,

head of the British Ministry of War Transport, for a loan of fifty cargo vessels for

BOLERO shipments in July and August,

with the understanding that equivalent

tonnage was to be turned back to British

service in October and November. He

stressed that the additional shipping was

needed for advance cargo movements during the long daylight hours of the summer.

Leathers, who had hoped the Americans

would be able to get along without help

until September, cautiously promised to

do his best, stipulating, as Douglas had

done, that there must be assurance of ample cargo to fill the ships. The paper surplus of cargo shipping now began to take

on mountainous proportions.46

45

 (1) CMT 18, rpt by CMTC to BCC(W), 9 May

42, title: Shipg for BOLERO. (2) Min, 4th mtg

BCC(W), 9 May 42. Both in ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-

42) Sec 4, Folder 2. (3) Memo, Douglas for Land, 13

May 42. (4) Notes on conf in Somervell's quarters, 22

May 42. Last two in Army Reqmts folder, WSA

Douglas File. (5) WSA chart cited n. 31(5). (6) See

below, Ch. XX. 46

 (1) Paper, unsigned, no date, sub: BOLERO Plan,

BOLERO 1942 folder, Lutes File, (2) Memo, Magruder

for Lutes, 20 Jun 42, sub: Cargo for Jun-Aug, Shipg

folder, Lutes File. (3) Min, 10th and 11th mtgs

BCC(W), 6 and 10 Jun 42, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-

42) Sec 4, Folder 3. (4) Diary, 10 Jun 42 entry, cited

n. 29. (5) Msg, Sir Arthur Salter to BMWT, 25 May

42, Br Merchant Shipg Mis folder, WSA Douglas File.

(6) Memo, Somervell for Douglas, 19 Jun 42, Army

Reqmts folder, WSA Douglas File. (7) Memo cited n.

45(3).

Lord Leathers later insisted he never "promised"

to provide the ships. See msg, Harriman to Land, 1

Jul 42, Army Reqmts folder, WSA Douglas File.
370 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

CRATED 21⁄2-TON TRUCKS. Twin-unit packs, England, 1943.

To find cargo for this expected surplus

of shipping posed a formidable problem

for the SOS staff. If the Army was to make

good on the assurance given Douglas on

22 May, it would be necessary to assemble

near the ports a large bank of freight, over

and above the equipment and supplies

that would accompany scheduled troop

movements, and to replenish it as rapidly

as it was depleted. For a time it seemed

likely that almost two thirds of the expected surplus could be filled by construction materials, mainly lumber. By midJune, however, General Lee's initial requests for this material had been drastically scaled down, partly on the basis of

meeting his requirements by imports from

the Soviet Union. Vehicles offered a more

promising source of advance shipments

during the summer. Estimates of the total

number required varied widely, from as

low as 160,000 to as high as 250,000. The

British hoped at first that at least two

thirds of the vehicles for American forces

could be shipped over completely disassembled and crated (CKD). This did not

prove practicable, however, since assembly

plants and mechanics would have had to

be sent over in advance, and the shortage

of British labor was an obstacle. In the

summer of 1942 the SOS concentrated its

efforts on variant methods, notably the

single-unit and twin-unit packs (SUP and

TUP), the latter of which proved eventu-
BUILD-UP IN THE BRITISH ISLES—FIRST PHASE 371

ally to be the most satisfactory. TUP shipments, by late summer, were saving about

two thirds of the space needed for fully

erected vehicles. Under the program

worked out in May, about 48,000 vehicles

were to be shipped during the next four

months, 80 percent of them boxed. The

plan was to pool vehicles in the theater,

the troops leaving their old ones behind in

the States. It was hoped that some 400,000

ship tons of cargo could be provided from

this source alone.47

This program lagged in its early stages.

During June the SOS staff worked desperately to line up the mountains of cargo

that would be needed to fill the great tonnages of American and British shipping

expected soon to appear in east coast ports.

All sorts of oddments were scraped together and earmarked for shipment—

ammunition, subsistence, gasoline containers, lumber and other construction

materials, clothing and equipage, even a

chemical impregnating plant and prefabricated barracks—some of which the theater did not want. By the end of the month

WSA was complaining that the Army was

loading ships with "any kind of cargo,

merely to satisfy the ambition . . . that

no ship had been held up because of lack

of cargo."48 Even when there was freight

available in the depots, it was sometimes

difficult to get enough, of types suitable for

balanced loads, to the port in time to meet

scheduled sailings. WSA officials wanted

the Army to keep freight of assorted types

banked in the ports themselves; Army

officials insisted that freight must be kept

out of the ports until it was ready for loading in order to avoid congestion.49

The only large source of cargo still untapped was equipment in the hands of

troops. In the second week of June SOS

requested authority to ship the organization equipment of the 1st Division (then

earmarked for late July sailing) one month

in advance, and a week later proposed to

the Army Ground Forces that advance

shipment be adopted as a regular procedure during the next three months. The

plan was to withdraw enough equipment

from BOLERO divisions to fill available

cargo space during June, July, and August; several alternatives, involving from

four to eight divisions, were suggested.

Depending on the number of divisions

affected, the troops would be without their

equipment from six weeks to four months.50

General McNair did not like the plan,

but his opposition was not uncompromising. He raised the orthodox objections—

undermining of training and morale, deterioration of material in storage, difficulties of reissue, the danger of sending troops

overseas unequipped. On the other hand, 47

 (1) Diary, 13, 22, 26 May, 5-9, and 11 Jun 42

entries, cited n. 29. (2) Msg Pink 5, BCC(L) to

BCC(W), 15 May 42, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec

4, Folder 2. (3) Msg Pink 11, BCC(L) to BCC(W), 22

Jul 42, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec 4, Folder 3.

(4) Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 22 May 42, BOLERO

1942 folder, Lutes File. (5) Memo, Somervell for

Marshall, 24 Sep 42, CofS WDGS 1942 (2) folder, Hq

ASF. (6) Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 20 Oct 42,

CofS WDGS 1942 (3A) folder, Hq ASF. (7) Other

corresp in same files and in Shipg 1941-43 folder and

Opns SOS 1942-43 folder, Hq ASF. (8) Larson, Handling Army Cargo in the Second World War, Ch.

VIII, OCT HB. (9) See above, Ch. XIII, and below,

Ch. XXIII. 48

 Douglas' notes on conf, 1 Jul 42, Army Reqmts

folder, WSA Douglas File. 49

 (1) Diary entries cited n. 47(1). (2) Memo,

Mvmts Div for Water Div OCT, 11 Jun 42, sub:

Cargo for BOLERO, OCT 563.5 Mvmt BOLERO. (3)

Related corresp in same file. (4) Memo, Somervell

for CG SOS ETOUSA, 11 Jun 42, BOLERO 1942

folder, Lutes File. 50

 (1) Diary, 26 May, 2, 6, and 8 Jun 42 entries,

cited n. 29. (2) Corresp in OPD 370.5 BOLERO, 13.

Only the AGF reply of 15 June 1942 is filed here; the

original plan itself has not been found. The first use

of the ambiguous term "preshipment," widely used in

1943, appears to be in the 15 June AGF memorandum.
372 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

if cargo space must be filled, there were

good arguments for shipping over the

equipment of troops who would soon be in

the theater anyway. After some hesitation,

General McNair chose the alternative that

involved eight divisions, in order to spread

the withdrawals as thinly as possible. On

22 June OPD notified him that equipment

could be taken from BOLERO units no

earlier than a month before embarkation,

thus ensuring that, if the troops sailed on

schedule, they would probably arrive in

the theater about the same time as their

equipment. The 1st and 45th Infantry

Divisions were nominated forthwith to

inaugurate the program.51

But by mid-June the prospective surplus

of cargo shipping, which these measures

were designed to put to use, was already

evaporating. Rival claimants made some

inroads. One of these was the ferry route

the Air Forces had been developing since

1941 to stage short-range aircraft across

the North Atlantic from Labrador via

Greenland and Iceland. Plans to expand

this route during the spring and summer

of 1942 to a capacity of one thousand

planes a month involved estimated cargo

shipments up to half a million ship tons,

not to mention the immobilization of some

of the shipping while unloading at primitively equipped ferry bases. The Combined Military Transportation Committee

warned that to carry out the project as

planned would "necessitate a material

contraction of the BOLERO program at a

time when all circumstances indicate it

should be intensified."

 52

 In consequence,

the ferry route project was drastically curtailed late in June. Nevertheless, it cost

BOLERO fourteen small freighters during

the summer months.53

In July and August, in addition, shipments to Iceland took a small amount of

cargo shipping, although most of the

heavy equipment for the relieving forces

was deferred. On 13 July six vessels sailed

for Egypt with some three hundred tanks

and one hundred self-propelled guns,

hastily snatched from the 2d Armored Division to help the Eighth Army in its final

stand before Alexandria. One vessel was

sunk a few days out, but was replaced in

record time by a second shipment of tanks

on the seatrain Texas, which sailed on the

29th and actually overtook the convoy.

Several other ships were required for the

equipment and supplies of the three air

groups dispatched to the Middle East in

July. All these shipments, on the long Cape

route, were equivalent to several times the

same amount of tonnage that might otherwise have been available to BOLERO.54

51

 (1) Corresp in OPD 370.5 BOLERO, 13. (2) Notes

on BOLERO Plan, 16 Jun 42. (3) Memo, Plng Br SOS

for Lutes, 24 Jun 42, sub: Sup and Equip for BOLERO.

(4) Memo, Somervell for Lutes, 14 Jun 42. Last three

in BOLERO 1942 folder, Lutes File. (5) Memo, Plng

Div OCT for Lutes, 14 Jun 42, sub: Shipg for BOLERO

Cargo Jun-Aug, OCT 563.5 Mvmt BOLERO. (6) Min,

WD Gen Council mtg, 16 Jun 42. (7) Msg, WD to

CG USAFBI, 17 Jun 42, sub: Sup and Equip for Engr

Regts, OPD 520. 52

 (1) CMT 21/1, 6 Jun 42, title: Shipg Implications

of Proposed N Atlantic Ferry Route Project, ABC 381

BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec 4, Folder 3. (2) Related corresp

in same file and in ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec 4,

Folder 2. 53

 (1) Corresp in N Air Ferry Route folder, OCT

HB. (2) Memo, Eisenhower for Somervell, 11 May 42,

Item 4, Exec 1. (3) Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 12

Jul 42, ABC 381 (6-24-42). This states that 100,000

tons of shipping were diverted from BOLERO. (4)

Diary, Mar, Apr, and 10 Jun 42 entries, cited n. 29.

(5) Min, 17th and 20th mtgsJCS, 1 and 15 Jun 42.

(6) Samuel Milner, "Establishing the BOLERO Ferry

Route," Military Affairs, Vol. XI, No. 4 (Winter

1947), pp. 213-22. (7) Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp.

313ff, 640-45. 54

 (1) Min, 10th mtg BCC(W), 6 Jun 42, ABC 381

BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec 4, Folder 3. (2) Rpt cited n.

28(1). (3) Memo, Gross for Somervell, 11 Jul 42, sub:

Loading and Sailing of Convoy to Egypt, Gross Day

File, OCT HB. (4) See Vessel Name file, Fairport
BUILD-UP IN THE BRITISH ISLES—FIRST PHASE 373

Aside from specific diversions, the crisis

in the Middle East virtually suspended

British participation in the BOLERO program. In July only about a dozen of the

promised fifty freighters came forward,

and in August this source dried up altogether. Meanwhile, the deadly drain of

sinkings continued. By mid-June thirteen

out of seventy-five vessels tentatively earmarked for BOLERO for the following

month had been lost. Administrative attrition eliminated others: schedules went

awry, vessels were delayed, loadings failed

to meet expectations. Even when there was

ample cargo behind the ports, the Army

sometimes failed to bring forward enough

of the right kind at the right time, and

early in July even had to reject five or six

presenters. Sailings, as a result of all these

causes, fell far behind schedule. In June

there were only twenty-four departures

under the program, though twice that

number had been lined up as late as the

6th. July sailings came to forty-nine, but

ten of these, though charged to BOLERO,

were diverted to the North Atlantic ferry

route and other destinations. By the end of

July the backlog of BOLERO cargo of all

kinds was six times the quantity that visible shipping could move, and SOS had to

call back some shipments that had been

sent to port.55

As the surplus of shipping evaporated,

recriminations filled the air. Performance,

Somervell wrote bitterly to Admiral Land

early in August, had fallen "woefully"

short of the original goal; WSA, he

charged, had failed "to make available

cargo ships for the Army at the rate it indicated as possible and in accordance with

a schedule to which it gave its assent."

 56

Douglas drafted for Land's signature two

replies, one stiffly polite, the other heavily

sarcastic ("Oh shucks! Why did you write

that nice appreciative letter . . ."), pointing out that WSA presenters for BOLERO

had actually far exceeded the Army's

original stated requirements of 22 May

and, despite heavy losses at sea, had fallen

only moderately behind the schedules that

the Army, at WSA's urging, had later set

up.57 He reviewed the Army's past sins of

incomplete and unbalanced loadings of

BOLERO ships. At this very time, moreover,

the volume of cargo shipments to the

United Kingdom was surging upward,

and by the end of the month the total

number of sailings reached ninety. But

even this performance fell far short of expectations, and at the end of July the

whole outlook was changed by the decision to undertake the North African expedition. In preparation for the new venture a few small vessels from the BOLERO

pool were immediately taken up for conversion to combat loaders, but the most

folder, OCT HB. (5) Ltr, Sir John Dill to Somervell,

18 Jul 42. (6) Ltr, Somervell to Dill, 18 Jul 42. Last

two in Shipg 1941-43 folder, Hq ASF. (7) Memo,

Somervell for Marshall, 25 Jun 42, CofS WDGS

1941-42 folder, Hq ASF. (8) CCS 87, 28 Jun 42, title:

Interim Rpt by CMTC on Proposed AAF Deployment to Middle East. (9) Related papers in ABC 570

(2-14-42) Sec 2. (10) Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp.

566-70.

55

 (1) Memo, Ralph Keating for Douglas, 11 Jun

42. (2) Msg, John S. Maclay for Douglas, 13 Jul 42.

Both in Army Reqmts folder, WSA Douglas File. (3)

Douglas' notes cited n. 48. (4) Memo, Douglas for

Hopkins, 19 Jun 42, Hopkins folder, WSA Douglas

File. (5) Memo, Capt Conklin for Col Walter A.

Wood, Jr., 1 Jul 42, BOLERO Reqmts folder, Plng Div

ASF, Job A47-147. (6) Msg, WD to USFOR, 24 Jun

42, CM-OUT 6099. (7) Msg Black 21, BCC(W) to

BCC(L), 31 Jul 42, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec

4, Folder 3. (8) Diary, 19 Jun and 27 Jul 42 entries,

cited n. 29. (9) Memo, Marshall for King, 19 Jun

42, OPD 560, 34. 56

 (1) Ltr, Somervell to Land, 5 Aug 42, Shipg

1941-43 folder, Hq ASF. (2) Related corresp in Wylie

WSA file and Gross WSA file, OCT HB. 57

 Douglas' draft replies are in Army Reqmts folder,

WSA Douglas File.
374 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

serious impact upon BOLERO movements

resulted from the temporary immobilization of much of the cargo awaiting shipment. Two weeks after Somervell's stinging complaint to Admiral Land over

WSA's failure to provide ships, Douglas

received an embarrassed telephone call

from Gross: "Well, we're finally in a position where we have to reject ships." For

lack of ready cargo, Gross confessed,

berthing for BOLERO loading would have

to be suspended until military plans were

clarified. Douglas replied graciously that

he "understood thoroughly" and that

"there could be no cloud of criticism cast

over the Army."

 58

The BOLERO program in 1942 thus fell

short of the original conception of a massive stockpiling operation designed to take

full advantage of the summer months and

of an expected surplus of cargo shipping,

largely in advance of the deployment of

the invasion force itself. During June,

July, and August some 1,300,000 ship

tons of Army cargo were moved to the

British Isles, the bulk of it (773,000 tons)

during the final month. Very little of this

material was actually shipped ahead of

the troops who were to use it. Almost all

the units sailing after the "preshipment"

directive of 22 June—the 1st Division, for

example—were accompanied by, or preceded their equipment. Some of the cargo

shipped in August was backlog belonging

to Eighth Air Force units which had sailed

early in June. Vehicles were the only item

of organizational equipment advanceshipped in sizable numbers. Even this program languished in June and July, and a

determined effort to get back on schedule

in August was only partially successful.

During the seven weeks from mid-July

to mid-September, about 32,000 vehicles

were shipped to England—over 11,000

during the last week of the period, and all

but about 2,300 boxed. Shipments of ammunition, general supplies, subsistence,

spare parts, and medical and post exchange supplies—mostly filler cargo—

went somewhat beyond the needs offerees

in the theater, but for lack of the hopedfor surplus of cargo shipping, advance

shipment of organizational equipment,

though sanctioned as a policy, remained

in 1942 largely an abortive experiment

that was not to bear fruit until 1943.59

The extent of the shortfall in these three

months could not then, and cannot now,

be measured with any precision. Estimates

of the total amount of BOLERO cargo to be

moved by April 1943 varied widely, from

less than ten to more than fifteen million

ship tons. But it was clear, at all events,

that the summer's effort had sliced off

only a thin piece of the total requirement.

Had the program been continued with its

original objectives, a disproportionately

large amount of material would have remained to be shipped during the final

seven months before April 1943, requiring

a volume of flow that the ports and inland

transportation facilities of the United

Kingdom in all probability could not have

handled—certainly far in excess of the

1,200,000 ship tons the British in June had

set as the ceiling for average monthly in58

 (1) Telephone conv, Gross with Douglas, Army

Reqmts folder, WSA Douglas File. (2) For the impact

of TORCH preparations, see below, Ch. XVII. 59 (1) For cargo shipment figures, see below, App.

E-2. (2) Diary, 27 Jul 42 entry, cited n. 29. (3) Corresp

in OCT 563.5 Mvmt BOLERO. (4) Vehicle figures are

from chart, "Shipment of Advance Cargo to the

United Kingdom," 10 Sep 42, BOLERO folder, Logis

File, OCMH. (5) See Hq ETOUSA Statistical Summary 4, 17 Aug 42, and 7, 7 Sep 42, DRB AGO.

These sources show incoming shipments of vehicles

as follows: May, 2,286; June, 2,765; July, 3,486;

August, 13,905; total, 22,442. (6) See also, rpt, p. 35,

cited n. 28(1). (7) For shipment of 1st Division equipment, see below, Ch. XVI.
BUILD-UP IN THE BRITISH ISLES—FIRST PHASE 375

take of BOLERO cargo during the autumn

and winter months.60

To carry through the program might

also have called for more cargo shipping

than the two countries could have mustered for the purpose. The amount needed

could not be estimated with even approximate accuracy. BOLERO cargo, being

predominantly of bulky (measurement)

types, would have to be mixed in with the

predominantly dense (weight) cargo Britain imported to maintain her war economy, in order to avoid the huge cumulative waste of shipping space that would

result from unbalanced loading in a program of this size. During the summer of

1942 most vessels carrying Army shipments to the United Kingdom were

"floored" with lend-lease steel. WSA

hoped to carry this kind of pooling much

further in the months to come, when

American shipping would have to shoulder an increasingly heavy share of the

British import program, but the rough

estimates of BOLERO cargo requirements,

based on rule-of-thumb per capita tonnage formulas, gave no inkling of the proportions of weight and measurement cargo

involved. When the shipping authorities

of the two countries examined the problem late in July, therefore, they would not

even venture a guess as to the probable

shipping requirements for BOLERO. They

did agree, however, that even on an optimistically low reckoning of BOLERO

cargo requirements, the prospects of finding enough Allied shipping to move the

cargo, along with Britain's minimum import needs, were exceedingly dim.61

By late summer of 1942 the BOLERO

program thus seemed about to run into

two major pipeline bottlenecks—the capacity of the United Kingdom to absorb

the flow of material, and the capacity of

Allied shipping to transport material

across the Atlantic. The former limitation

had not yet been felt, since even the heavy

volume of August shipments was far below

the intake capacity of British ports, but it

was causing anxiety on both sides of the

Atlantic. In September the effort to mount

the North African task forces was to reveal the dangerous inadequacy of the

American depot system in the ETO. As for

shipping, the reports of the Combined

Shipping Adjustment Boards to the President and Prime Minister at the beginning

of August, resulting from their study of the

BOLERO shipping problem, led directly to

the decision in October to expand the

American shipbuilding program. From

the gloomy outlook for BOLERO the American civilian shipping authorities drew the

conclusion—one the British, out of their

long and unhappy experience in supporting the costly administrative "tails" of

their own armies in distant theaters, had

reached much earlier—that drastic economies must be sought in two directions:

(1) by contriving a leaner, less elaborately

accoutered invasion force and supporting

establishment that would not require so

much transatlantic shipping, and (2) by

improving the techniques of packing,

60

 (1) For early estimates of cargo requirements, see

memo, Magruder for Lutes, 10 Jun 42, sub: Cargo for

BOLERO, OCT 563.5 BOLERO; memo cited n. 38(3);

papers, no dates, subs: Total BOLERO Cargo, Opns

SOS 1942-43 folder, Hq ASF; and tables and charts,

28 Apr 42, prepared by Plng Div OCT, Army

Reqmts folder, WSA Douglas File. (2) For British estimates, see papers in ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec

4, Folders 2 and 3. (3) For ETOUSA estimate late in

July, see papers in LWD [Lewis W. Douglas] Misc

London Papers Jul-Aug 42 folder, WSA Douglas File. 61

 (1) Msg, Harriman and Douglas to President, 2

Aug 42, with atchd rpt by CSAB. (2) Min, mtgs of Br

War Cabinet and U.S. reps, 25 and 31 Jul 42. Both in

LWD Misc London Papers Jul-Aug 42 folder, WSA

Douglas File.
376 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

loading, and stowing cargo and the programing and scheduling of ship movements, in order to squeeze the maximum

performance from available cargo tonnage. The Prime Minister, late in that

month, aghast at American equipment

scales that provided one vehicle for every

six soldiers in the planned invasion force,

suggested to General Marshall that his

planners start from an arbitrary figure of

one hundred thousand vehicles, weed out

all nonessential types, and "see what is the

best army that can be built up on them"

in nine months.62 The idea found little

favor among the SOS staff, but in mounting the North African task forces two

months later it proved necessary to do, in

effect, what Churchill had suggested.63

One promising method of circumventing the shipping shortage was already

being pursued with some success—the use

of local resources in the United Kingdom

to support the American forces there. A

rough estimate made in November rated

the savings in shipping space brought

about through British construction of

housing and depots for U.S. forces at over

1.5 million ship tons, not counting the existing structures turned over for American

use. English coal consumed by American

troops amounted to about 15,000 long

tons a month. British-produced foodstuffs

were an important supplement to American rations. By the end of 1942 it was

estimated that locally procured supplies

other than construction materials, between May and November, were the

equivalent of 1.2 million ship tons. In these

figures can be seen some of the immense

advantages the British Isles offered as an

invasion base.64

By the end of August, the question of

the success or failure of the three-monthold BOLERO program already seemed

academic, for SLEDGEHAMMER had been

abandoned and a spring 1943 ROUNDUP

was, to the American planners at least, a

possibility hardly worth reckoning on.

Viewed as a hypothesis, it already seemed

likely that a cross-Channel invasion in

1943 would have to be postponed at least

until summer of 1943.

Landing Craft: The Elusive Bottleneck

Shipping limited the build-up of invasion forces, landing craft the strength of

the assault. Both limitations were difficult

to assess at long-range, especially landing

craft. The methods and tools of amphibious warfare were new—the experts could

not even agree on what was needed and

persistently went astray in their prediction

of what could be produced.

At the beginning of 1942 the available

amphibious forces of the United States

consisted of the 3d Infantry and 2d Marine Divisions on the West coast and the

1st Infantry and 1st Marine Divisions on

the east coast. One regiment of the 2d

Marine Division was in Iceland and another was sent to Samoa in January. The

west coast forces were almost completely

62

 Msg, Churchill to Marshall, 1 Aug 42, LWD Misc

London Papers Jul-Aug 42 folder, WSA Douglas File. 63

 (1) See n. 61. (2) Note by Minister of War Trans,

no date, sub: U.K. Imports and BOLERO Mvmts,

LWD Misc London Papers Jul-Aug 42 folder, WSA

Douglas File. (3) For the expanded shipbuilding program and ship economies, see below, Ch. XXII. (4)

For other economy programs, see below, Ch. XXIII.

(5) For the North African operation, see below, Ch.

XVI. 64

 For reciprocal aid in the United Kingdom, see:

(1) Report to the 78th Congress on Lend-Lease Operations . . . March 11, 1941 to December 31, 1942, pp. 50-

51; and (2) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies,

Ch. VI.
BUILD-UP IN THE BRITISH ISLES—FIRST PHASE 377

lacking in amphibious transport; those on

the east coast were somewhat better off.

Neither force was adequately equipped

with landing craft. There were in the

United States, on 1 January, 875 landing

craft and 53 amphibian tractors. Another

1,243 craft and 907 amphibian tractors

were scheduled for production. All the

craft were under fifty feet in length, many

of the tank lighters were unseaworthy,

and none could carry a medium tank. As

yet the United States had no large landing

ships, though a few had been ordered by

the British. During January the President

authorized construction of 300 tank landing ships and 300 tank landing craft

(predecessors of the LST and the LCT(5),

respectively), to be completed in 1944.

Some 1,150 small craft also were ordered

by the Navy in January and February,

most of them for the British, but they, too,

were to be delivered in 1944. In general,

until the end of March, landing craft production was not regarded as urgent, although Churchill had stressed the need

back in August 1941 at the Atlantic Conference.65

As discussion of future cross-Channel

operations became more pointed during

March, attention centered rather suddenly upon the landing craft question. The

Joint Planners on the 23d rated equipment for amphibious landing operations

among the three decisively limiting categories of war material, and recommended

a specific program of production for 1942.

Acting independently, the President on 4

April directed certain increases in production with scheduled deliveries by the following September. Priorities were raised

and production schedules accelerated.66

On the 8th General Marshall arrived in

London to win British approval for the

cross-Channel invasion project. In the

outline plan, landing craft requirements

for the major operation were estimated

roundly at 7,000. Most estimates ran

higher. Later in the month General

McNarney remarked that 20,000 would

be a more realistic goal. The OPD staff

had already settled on a conservative estimate of 8,100. The British did not examine the figures closely at this time,

however, and during the London conference Marshall received an optimistic message from Washington to the effect that

all requirements could be met by April

1943 and perhaps a third of them by September 1942. The War Department had

already ordered about 2,300 craft from

the Navy, mostly small personnel and vehicle carriers, for the autumn operation,

and the Navy had let contracts in midApril to cover this order; delivery was

promised in time to allow two months for

shipment across the Atlantic. All the

Army estimates in April, as Eisenhower

admitted, were hasty and impressionistic;

no allowances were made for reserves or

training, and there was no knowledge on

65

 (1) Col A. T. Mason, Special Monograph on

Amphibious Warfare, Ch. II "Domestic Affairs—

1942," Sec HD, Pt. III of Hist of JCS (mimeographed), JCS Hist Sec. (2) See below, App. A-7. 66

 (1) JPS 20, 23 Mar 42, title: Priorities in Pdn of

Mun Based on Strategical Considerations. (2) JCS 30,

5 Apr 42, same title. (3) Related corresp in CCS

400.17 (2-20-42) Sec 1. (4) Accounts of the precise directive given by the President at the White House

meeting on 4 April differ. See George E. Mowry,

Landing Craft and the War Production Board, WPD

Sp Study 11, p. 6; Donald M. Nelson, Arsenal of

Democracy (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company,

1946), p. 253; Third Annual Report of the Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Senate,

78th Cong, 2d Sess, 3 Mar 44, Senate Rpt 10, Pt. 16,

p. 157; and min, 15th mtg CCS, 7 Apr 42. (5) Mason,

Special Monograph on Amphibious Warfare, p. 55,

cited n. 65(1).
378 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

the American side of what the British

could produce. As far as SLEDGEHAMMER

was concerned, it would be executed, if at

all, as Eisenhower remarked, "with whatever personnel and equipment is actually

available at the time."

 67

During the latter part of April the Navy

was re-examining its own needs for landing craft in amphibious operations in the

Pacific and elsewhere. These approached

the four-thousand mark which, according to a CPS subcommittee estimate on

2 May, would squeeze out the Army's

SLEDGEHAMMER order altogether and most

of the requirements for ROUNDUP. By

leaving out all allowances for Army training, losses, or spare engines, the subcommittee estimated that about half the requirements for SLEDGEHAMMER could be

met. The British might be able to make

up this deficit, the subcommittee concluded, but for ROUNDUP, even with British resources, there would be about two

thousand craft lacking. One bottleneck

was in the manufacture of engines. The

subcommittee also foresaw difficulties in

providing crews. A few days later, in fact,

the Corps of Engineers was assigned responsibility for training Army crews, primarily for shore-to-shore operations, leaving the Navy to specialize in its traditional

function of ship-to-shore operations. Apart

from heaping a new burden upon Navy

procurement, the Army's cross-Channel

needs were also disruptive because of their

heavy proportion of vehicle and tank carriers; in the Navy's program the emphasis

was upon personnel carriers.68

Meanwhile, the British experts had

been growing uneasy over the American

landing craft program. At the London

conversations in mid-April one of them,

Captain Hughes-Hallett, had remarked

on the difficulties of transporting small

craft across the Atlantic and on their unsuitability for an assault across the English

Channel. It was not until early in May,

however, that British forebodings became

emphatic—which was unfortunate, since

by that time the American procurement

program was well under way and large

numbers of the small craft were scheduled

for early delivery. The matter was brought

before the President on 5 May. After some

preliminary explanation of the various

types of craft for his benefit, the British

representatives set forth in detail the objections to the three principal small types

(50-foot WM boats, 36-foot personnel

carriers, and 36-foot vehicle carriers). In

a Channel crossing, they pointed out,

many of these craft would break down or

swamp, and the troops that got across

would be in no physical condition to fight.

The British did not believe, moreover,

that the operation could be executed with

small boats landing from combat loaders.

Evidently these views were new to some of

the professionals present as well as to the

67

 (1) Memo, Eisenhower for Somervell, 10 Apr 42,

sub: Landing Craft To Be Available 15 Sep 42. . . .

(2) Memo, Eisenhower for CG SOS, 2 Apr 42, sub:

Landing Graft for Cross-Channel Opns. Both in OPD

560, Case 5. (3) CPS 26/1, App. C, cited n. 16(1). (4)

Min, Wd Gen Council mtg, 29 Apr 42. (5) Msg,

McNarney to Marshall, 13 Apr 42, CM-OUT 2240.

(6) CPS 29/1, 2 May 42, title: Study for Landing

Craft Progs. (7) Memo, Somervell for Gross, 5 Apr 42,

OCT 560. 68

 (1) CPS 29/1 cited n. 67(6). (2) Blanche D. Coll

and Herbert H. Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers:

Troops and Equipment, a volume in preparation for

the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (hereafter cited as Coll and Rosenthal, Engr

I), draft chapter "One New Mission: The Engineer

Amphibian Command." (3) Memo, Handy for Eisenhower, 2 Apr 42, sub: Landing Craft for Cross-Channel Mvmt, OPD 560, 3. (4) Memo, 25 Mar 42, cited

n. 7(1). (5) Paper, circa late Mar 42, sub: Small Boat

Sup, ABC 370 (1-28-42).
BUILD-UP IN THE BRITISH ISLES—FIRST PHASE 379

AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING IN MOCK LCV

President; General Somervell remarked

that the Navy had assured him the small

boats were suitable.69

The President, at any rate, seemed to

be convinced. At his direction and under

close British guidance a new program of

requirements was drawn up that shifted

the emphasis to the larger types of craft,

including a substantial number of oceangoing vessels. The first list, based on recommendations from the combined planners in London, set ROUNDUP requirements at about 1,950 craft, including 200

ocean-going tank landing ships (ATL's)

and 570 tank landing craft (YTL's and

similar types of large lighters). Before the

end of the month the list had been more

than doubled by additions to the smaller

types and allowances for losses and training. Early in June ROUNDUP requirements

of both British and U.S. types stood at

69

 (1) Min cited n. 22(1). (2) Paper by Capt

Hughes-Hallett, 16 Apr 42, sub: Landing Craft Required To Carry Out Marshall's Plan, ABC 381

BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec 4, Folder 2. (3) Memo, Chief of

Water Div OCT for Gross, 29 Apr 42, sub: Landing

Craft, OCT 560. (4) Memo, Gen Gross for Brig Gen

Walter Bedell Smith, 5 May 42, sub: Min of Conf at

White House . . . , Gross Day File, OCT HB. (5)

Mason, Special Monograph on Amphibious Warfare,

p. 61, cited n. 65(1).
380 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

about 4,100 craft, of which almost 2,900

were to be produced in the United States.

A few weeks later General Eisenhower

added another 100 tank landing ships and

200 large lighters to the list of initial requirements, and another 30 of each as reserves to be available each month following the assault.70

As requirements mounted, prospects of

meeting them dwindled. The landing

craft program, particularly when the new

requirements for ocean-going vessels were

added, competed directly with naval and

merchant ship construction and indirectly

with many other programs for materials,

components (such as propulsion units),

facilities, and labor. Antisubmarine and

escort vessels were the most threatened,

and Admiral King told the Combined

Chiefs in June that the building of two

heavy carriers and some cruisers was also

being delayed. For the first six months of

1942 landing craft production did not

stand high on the Navy's priority list; not

until July was it placed in the top group.

From late spring onward the Army's

training program began to compete for

craft, and the Navy's requirements for its

own amphibious forces kept pace with the

lengthening list of craft needed for ROUNDUP. Training of crews threatened at times

to be even more of a bottleneck than production of craft. The British had undertaken to provide crews for any 1942 operation, while those for 1943 were to be

divided between the two countries. But in

June, as the British construction program

was augmented, doubts were raised

whether British crews could meet the 1942

commitment. There was some discussion

of possible substitutes for landing craft in

the immediate post-assault phases, and a

number of American coastal excursion

vessels actually attempted the Atlantic

crossing during the summer—several were

lost.71

It was still possible to predict, in June,

that ROUNDUP requirements would be

met; the Navy was so predicting, but

Army officials were skeptical. Production

was lagging seriously, and schedules had

to be cut back in July. For SLEDGEHAMMER the prospects were dim indeed. Little

could be done to accelerate delivery

schedules up to early or mid-July, the

deadline for meeting a September target

date. Actual deliveries, in fact, lagged far

behind them. On 12 May General Somervell and Admiral Horne had reported to

the President that some 1,850 landing

70

 (1) See CCS 78, 7 Jun 42, title: Landing Craft,

and related papers in CGS 561 (4-10-42) Sec 1. (Principal items were 200 LST's, 300 LCT(L)'s, 340

LCT(5)'s, 750 LCM(3)'s, 707 LCP(L)'s, 400 LCV's,

400 small (28-foot) boats, 286 LCT(1-4)'s, and 425

LCA's. For description of types, see below, App. A-7.)

(2) Memo, Adms King and Land, Vice Adm J. W. S.

Dorling, Royal Navy, and Gen Somervell for President, 12 May 42, sub: Landing Craft for BOLERO

Opn, Gross Day File, OCT HB. (3) Memo, Maj

Howard W. Quinn for CG SOS, 4 Jun 42, sub: Status

of Landing Craft, OCT 560 England. (4) Memo,

Somervell for CofS, 16 Jul 42, sub: Landing Craft,

OCT 560 Mvmt BOLERO. (5) Msg 553, London to

AGWAR, 22 Jul 42. CCS 561 (4-10-42) Sec 1. 71

 (1) For priority and production problems, see

WPB Sp Study 11, Ch. II and table on p. 74, cited n.

66(4). This study, however, altogether misses the purpose of the higher priorities assigned in July by assuming that they were aimed at the requirements of the

North African operation instead of SLEDGEHAMMER.

The decision to invade North Africa was not made,

of course, until the very end of July, and landing craft

requirements for this operation were much smaller

than those for the cross-Channel attack. See below,

Ch. XVI. (2) For Army amphibious training, see Coll

and Rosenthal, Engr I. (3) Memo cited n. 70(2). (4)

Memo, Marshall for Somervell and Eisenhower, 16

May 42, OPD 381 BOLERO, 10. (5) Corresp in BOLERO

1942 Amphibious folder and BOLERO 1942 folder,

Lutes File. (6) Min, mtg of Sp Com on Landing Craft,

6 May 42, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec 4, Folder

2. (7) Corresp related to the CPS 29 series in CCS 561

(4-10-42) Sec 1. (8) For the excursion-boat experiment, see Mason, Special Monograph on Amphibious Warfare, p. 70, cited n. 65(1).
THREE TYPES OF LANDING CRAFT, summer 1942. LCM(3) (top); LCP(L)

(center); LCV (bottom).
382 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

TABLE 6—ESTIMATES OF U.S. LANDING CRAFT TO BE AVAILABLE FOR SLEDGEHAMMER:

APRIL-JUNE 1942

Source: Mason, Special Monograph on Amphibious Warfare, Ch. II "Domestic Affairs—1942," Sec IID, Pt.III of Hist of the JCS

(mimeographed), p. 72, JCS Hist Sec.

craft would definitely be ready in the

United Kingdom for an autumn operation; 1,200 of these were to come from

the United States, and the British contribution was to include four big landing

ships (LST's) and 150 large lighters

(LCT's). This program immediately began to limp. By the end of May only 110

of the two smallest types had been shipped

to the theater, against 271 scheduled; most

of the 110 had been taken from used and

obsolete stocks. Some new craft, moreover,

had to be allotted to the Engineer Amphibian Command for training. A disheartening setback was the discovery late

in May that the Navy's 50-foot tank

lighter (Bureau of Ships model)was unseaworthy; 415 of these craft scheduled for

June and July delivery thus evaporated.72

Up to 29 June, 238 craft—all of them the

three small types listed in Table 6— had

been shipped or were on the way to the

United Kingdom; a month later this figure had been not quite doubled. Actually,

few of the craft shipped in July could have

been in position for a September operation. In August shipments shot belatedly

upward: 627 craft had been loaded out by

the 15th, and 267 more were in the pipeline.73

 But in mid-July General Hull wrote

to Eisenhower, then in London, that all

the craft available and en route (including

many too far back in the pipeline to be

available in September) could land less

than 16,000 troops and 1,100 tanks and

vehicles; two months earlier the estimate

had been 21,000 troops and 3,300 tanks

and vehicles. Army logistical officials felt

the Navy had let them down and chafed

in the unaccustomed role of purchaser

from another military agency. Somervell

wrote Eisenhower in July:

The Navy's efforts . . . have been disap- pointing. This is just another indication of

how difficult it is to force an issue when you

have no control over the means of carrying it

out. There is no lack of good will on their

part, apparently, though there was much indecision in the beginning. They say that they

have the best people they have on the job,

and no doubt are doing all they can, according to their own lights, to get the job completed.74

72

 Memo cited n. 70(2).

The fading of hope for meeting the U.S. quota for

SLEDGEHAMMER is shown in Table 6. 73

 (1) Corresp in OCT 560 England, especially rpts

by Maj Quinn and Capt F. M. Warren. (2) WPB Sp

Study, pp. 8-9, cited n. 66(4). 74

 (1) Ltr, Somervell to Eisenhower, 19 Jul 42, ETO

(6) 1942-43 folder, Hq ASF. (2) Ltr, Hull to Eisenhower, 15 Jul 42, with tab, OPD 320.2 ETO, 6. (3)

Memo cited n. 71 (4).
BUILD-UP IN THE BRITISH ISLES—FIRST PHASE 383

The Demise of Sledgehammer

For more than four months after the

Joint Chiefs endorsed it in the middle of

March, the strategy of concentration in

the British Isles and "holding" elsewhere

traveled a rocky road. As General Marshall remarked following the London conference, "everyone agrees ... in principle, but many if not most hold reservations

regarding this or that."

 75

 The reservations

fell into three major categories. The first

included prior claims to which BOLERO

was necessarily subordinated. Of these,

the security of the Middle East was the

most important. Most of the shipping for

lack of which the BOLERO program lagged

so disastrously during the summer was in

the Middle East—ships that the British

had hoped to divert from that theater and

others that had to be sent there. In the

same category was the commitment, insisted upon by the President, that the flow

of aid to the Soviet Union must not

dwindle; only the prohibitive costs of forcing the convoys through to the northern

Soviet ports kept the scale of this effort low

from May onward and prevented it from

interfering with the BOLERO program

more than it did. Shipping employed in

the British import program also constituted a pool that was practically untouchable for military purposes.

A second category of reservations related to the war against Japan. From each

of the many fronts, all undermanned,

along which this war was being fought,

came a steady stream of demands for

stronger support. Each posed a threat to

the concentration of effort and resources

upon which BOLERO depended for success. The issue was brought to a climax

early in May by the threat of new Japanese drives into the South, Central, and

North Pacific. Unlike General MacArthur, who had persistently urged a complete reversal of strategy, Admiral King

even now did not contest the long-range

priority of the war against Germany over

that against Japan. He was unwilling,

however, to take "calculated" risks in the

Pacific, now above all, to the extent that

General Marshall felt was necessary. He

declared:

The mounting of BOLERO must not be per- mitted to interfere with our vital needs in the

Pacific. I am convinced that the Japanese are

not going to allow us to "hold" but are going

to drive and drive hard. . . . Important as

the mounting of BOLERO may be, the Pacific

problem is no less so, and is certainly the

more urgent—it must be faced now. . . . We

must not permit diversion of our forces . . .

to the extent that we find ourselves unable to

fulfill our obligation to implement our basic

strategic plan in the Pacific theatre, which is

to hold what we have against any attack that

the Japanese are capable of launching

against us.

This last sentence threatened what General Marshall feared most, that BOLERO

would be starved to death as a "residuary

legatee" of the war against Japan.76 The

question was settled, for the time being, by

the President's assurance on 6 May that

"I do not want BOLERO slowed down."

 77

The Japanese drives during the next few

weeks were met and countered by a redistribution of forces within the limits that

General Marshall considered safe.

In May the President also made clear

his determination that American forces,

including ground troops, must engage in

75

 Msg, Marshall to McNarney, 13 Apr 42, CM-IN

3457. 76

 Memo, King for JCS, 4 May 42, sub: JCS 48 —

Def of Island Bases in Pac, OPD 381 Gen, 62. 77

 (1) Memo, FDR [Franklin D. Roosevelt] for

Marshall, 6 May 42, filed with JCS 48 in ABC 381

Pac Bases (1-22-42), 2. (2) See also below, Ch. XV.
384 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

active operations in the European area

during 1942. In June Mr. Churchill

brought into the open his and his military

advisers' conviction that to attempt a

cross-Channel attack in 1942 would result

in disaster without commensurate profit.

The effect of these twin pressures was to

force Marshall and his staff to defend

SLEDGEHAMMER, not as a forlorn hope to

be undertaken with the means available

because no other operation was possible,

but as the most feasible and profitable of

several alternative medium-scale operations that would meet the need for "action

in 1942."

On that basis SLEDGEHAMMER was very

hard to defend. The weakness of the

American contribution to the operation

was not so much in the size of the forces

that could be ready to help the British—

General Marshall was able in June to

promise with reasonable assurance a total

of four divisions—as in the amount and

types of technical apparatus. For a crossChannel attack in September the United

States could provide only a handful of

small personnel and vehicle carriers, unmanned, unarmored, many of obsolete

design—hardly suited to ferrying troops

and armor across many miles of the most

treacherous body of water in Europe. The

British had made these points in detail

early in May and by the end of that

month their experts were convinced that

with the equipment at hand the operation

was not feasible. Vice Adm. Lord Louis

Mountbatten, who headed the British

amphibious warfare organization, visited

Washington at the beginning of June to

tell the President that "no landing that we

could carry out" would draw off any German forces from the USSR to reinforce the

twenty-five divisions Germany already had

in the West.78 If the attack were postponed

until later in the year, the larger types of

landing craft would still not be available,

and the attacking forces might find themselves at the beginning of the stormy season pinned on a narrow beach without a

port to supply them. The American defense rested mainly on the expectation of

overwhelming air power; landing forces

were to serve as bait to lure the Luftwaffe

into battles of attrition. Whether the Germans would in fact so react and whether

the results would justify hopes were, of

course, matters of opinion. In any case the

implied prospect that the landing forces,

even if the air effort were successful, might

have to be evacuated was one before which

the British understandably quailed. On

8 June the Prime Minister, and shortly

thereafter the War Cabinet, ruled out a

"tip-and-run" attack in any form; no

lodgment on the Continent must be attempted in 1942 unless German demoralization in the East and other conditions

offered a good chance that it would be

permanent. Soviet victories, rather than

imminent Soviet collapse, had thus become the chief prerequisite for SLEDGEHAMMER.79

In July the prospects both of troop

build-up and of landing craft deliveries in

the United Kingdom were even gloomier.

The British administrative staffs, moreover, had produced estimates indicating

that the autumn operation could not be

mounted without seriously disrupting

preparations for ROUNDUP. Landing forces

would have to be sustained and reinforced,

78

 (1) Conv, Mountbatten with President and

Hopkins, quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p.

582. (2) Memo, CofS for President, 23 Jun 42, OPD

381 Gen, 62. 79

 (1) OPD draft memo, CofS for President, no date,

Item 53, Exec 10. (2) Memo, Prime Minister to Gen

[Maj Gen Sir Hastings L.] Ismay, 8 Jun 42, as quoted

in Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 346-48.
BUILD-UP IN THE BRITISH ISLES—FIRST PHASE 385

at an estimated cost of 950,000 tons of

shipping a year; even a "tip-and-run"

would tie up 250,000 tons for some time.

Diversion of coastal shipping for the operation would throw an additional load on

internal transportation and require the

use of ocean-going shipping at an eventual cost to the import program of almost

half a million tons. Predicted shipping

losses in the assault came to 50 percent. If

a major operation developed, "indefinite

and much greater liabilities upon shipping

resources will be entailed."

 80

 While the

operation was in progress, amphibious

training of other forces would have to be

suspended. In an effort to secure and hold

a bridgehead, as Churchill wrote the President, "the possibility of mounting a largescale operation in 1943 would be marred,

if not ruined."81 These new limitations, as

far as the British were concerned, finished

off SLEDGEHAMMER, and on 8 July Churchill so informed the President.82

When General Marshall and Hopkins

went to London later in the month to try

to persuade the British to change their

minds, they thus had to defend a patently

unsound operation without appealing to

the two arguments by which it had originally been justified—that it might be the

only way, with meager available resources,

to help the Russians in an emergency, and

that it could be mounted in stride, at the

last moment, without hindering the larger

effort in 1943. The President's instructions

explicitly ruled that the main issue was to

decide upon some positive action for 1942,

to be undertaken regardless of the course

of events on the Soviet front; what had

once been regarded as the best argument

for SLEDGEHAMMER, that it would strike

near the heart of German power, was now

turned against it as involving great risks

not balanced by possible gains. As for the

second argument, the Americans evidently

accepted British estimates that a crossChannel attack in 1942 would delay the

invasion the following spring, since they

now suggested a July instead of an April

launching date. They also tried to meet

another British objection by transforming

SLEDGEHAMMER from a possible "tip-andrun" into a "toehold" operation, aimed at

seizing and holding the point of the Cotentin peninsula with the port of Cherbourg;

the British found this almost as unattractive as the earlier schemes. After a brief

debate, the Americans yielded and notified

the President on 23 July of their failure.

The President was not surprised.83

The British rejection of SLEDGEHAMMER

pointed up the question of alternatives.

Marshall and King now feared that the

British, when the time came, might also

back down on crossing the Channel in

1943, particularly if by that time other

operations were under way in the Mediterranean and/or Norway. Whatever alternative was chosen for 1942, the American military chiefs were convinced, would

seriously weaken and postpone any crossChannel invasion in 1943. On 10 July

General Marshall had proposed, as an alternative to further dilution of effort in

the European theater, that the United

States should shift its main effort immediately to the Pacific where the effort would

at least be a concentrated one against a

weaker enemy. How much weaker the

effort would be, however, was roughly in- 80

 Memo, Br CsofS for War Cabinet, 2 Jul 42, sub:

Future Opns, ABC 381 (7-25-42) 4-B, 19. 81

 Telegram, Former Naval Person to President

Roosevelt, 8 Jul 42, as quoted in Churchill, Hinge of

Fate, pp. 434-35. 82

 Msg, War Cabinet to Jt Stf Mis, 8 Jul 42, Item 9,

Exec 5. 83

 (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 606-10.

(2) Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 28-31. (3) Matloffand Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, Ch. XII.
386 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

dicated during the next few days as the

logistical staffs hastily assembled the pertinent data. Time would be lost in transferring shipping to the Pacific. Some forces

would have to be sent to Iceland and the

British Isles in any event. Allowing for

these, perhaps 40,000 troops a month

could be sent to the Pacific, as against currently planned shipments of 100,000 and

more to the British Isles. But because of

the long turnaround, cargo shipping would

be inadequate to support even a deployment of 40,000 a month. Behind the shipping-turnaround bottleneck, troops would

pile up in the United States where, the

staffs estimated, additional accommodations might have to be built for 400,000

troops. This information was instructive

and depressing, but the whole question

immediately became academic for on the

14th the President, with a hint of displeasure, rejected the Japan-first alternative.84

The choice for action in 1942 was thus

limited to the orbit of the war against the

European Axis. Churchill was nursing a

plan for invading northern or western

Norway, and the Combined Chiefs briefly

considered landing at various points from

the North Sea coast to and including the

Iberian Peninsula. None of these projects

aroused much enthusiasm among the military staffs, since they were considered to

involve either less profit or greater risks

than a cross-Channel attack. For American forces, with the latter alternative ruled

out, the practical options narrowed down

to operations in support of the British in

the eastern Mediterranean area, either

frontally from the east or against Rommel's back door in the west. The former

seemed to the staffs to be the most feasible

course. The shipping route around the

Cape, while long, was organized and wellworn, and at the far terminus troops and

material could be disembarked at ports

served by adequate facilities and in friendly hands. Rear area services and other

features of a "going" theater were already

in existence. On the other hand, military

collaboration by multinational forces in a

single theater raised complex administrative problems, and there was some doubt

as to whether a large number of additional troops could be supported in the

area. The military chiefs and their staffs,

however, almost unanimously favored this

course over opening a new front in northwest Africa "with all the increase of overheads and escort and transportation problems" that it involved, as Admiral King

said, and particularly with the possibility

of landings over hostile beaches.85

Political expediency overrode logistical

considerations. There were many ways of

meeting the President's insistence upon

action in 1942, but it was no secret that he

wanted above all to send an American

army into French North Africa. Such a

venture would satisfy Churchill's purposes

and Britain's interests generally better

than assigning American forces a large

role in the Middle East. "It would be much

to our advantage," the British Chiefs of

Staff reported, "to get a footing in North

Africa cheaply in the same way as the

84

 (1) Memo, Marshall, King, and Arnold for President, 12 Jul 42, sub: Pac Opns, OPD 381 Gen, 73.

(2) Memo, Somervell for CofS, 14 Jul 42, sub: Opns

in the Pac, Case 11, Item 1, Exec 5. (3) Matloffand

Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, Ch. XII. 85

 (1) Min, 28th mtg CCS, 20 Jun 42. (2) OPD

study, no date, title: Effect on BOLERO and ROUNDUP

of Diverting Forces To Execute GYMNAST or To Reinf

the Middle East, Data Prepared by OPD folder, Item

6, Exec 1. (3) OPD study, no date, title: Reinf of the

Middle East, same file. (4) Memo, President for Hopkins, Marshall, and King, 16 Jul 42, sub: Instns for

London Conf, WDCSA 381, 1.

The distance from the U.S. to Suez via the Cape

was roughly three times the distance to Casablanca.

(See Map 8.)
BUILD-UP IN THE BRITISH ISLES—FIRST PHASE 387

Germans got Norway cheaply by getting

there first."86 Churchill therefore brought

all his persuasive arts to bear on the President, who indeed needed no convincing

but who alone could overrule his military

advisers' objections. Landings in French

North Africa, Churchill insisted, would

be a better "second front" in 1942 than

SLEDGEHAMMER ever could have been.

"This second front consists of a main body

holding the enemy pinned opposite

'Sledgehammer' [that is, the English

Channel] and a wide flanking movement

called 'Torch' [as GYMNAST was rechristened on the 24th]."

 87

 Churchill's own pet

Norway project would have added a left

flank attack to this pattern. TORCH,

Churchill argued, would be cheap, it was

the only way to strike at Hitler in 1942, it

was the best way to help the Russians, and

it would not interrupt preparations for the

main invasion in 1943, to which a flanking

movement in the south would be an effective prelude. "Here," he exclaimed, "is the

true second front of 1942 ... . the safest

and most fruitful stroke that can be delivered this autumn."

 88

Churchill's exuberant rhetoric masked

a riddle. If TORCH were to relieve German

pressure on the USSR, it must be a big

operation; if it were to avoid doing "mortal

injury" to ROUNDUP, it must be a small

one. In one breath Churchill called TORCH

a "true second front"; in the next he spoke

of taking from BOLERO only six American

divisions (which might "surely" be soon

replaced), although his own military staffs

had already decided that a U.S. attack on

Casablanca would be no second front and

that there must be additional landings farther east, even beyond Algiers.89

 Field

Marshal Dill warned Churchill before

the President's representatives reached

London that, in American opinion, a

North African operation would take naval

forces from the Pacific, create a new and

expensive line of communications, and

"build up into such a large commitment

as to destroy any possibility of 'Round-up'

in 1943."90 And when, after two days of

fruitless debate at London, it was evident

that SLEDGEHAMMER was dead, Marshall

and King insisted on writing into the CCS

agreement the consensus that ". . .a

commitment to this operation [TORCH]

renders ROUND-UP in all probability impracticable of successful execution in

1943. . . ."91

86

 Digest of min, Br CsofS mtg at Chequers, 18 Jul

42, as quoted in Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 444. 87

 Msg, Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt, 27 Jul 42, as quoted in Churchill, Hinge of Fate,

p. 448. 88

 Telegram, Former Naval Person to President

Roosevelt, 8 Jul 42, as quoted in Churchill, Hinge of

Fate, p. 434; msg, Prime Minister to Dill, 12 Jul 42,

p. 438; msg, Dill to Prime Minister, 15 Jul 42, pp.

439-40; Prime Minister's Notes for Mtg on 20 Jul 42,

pp. 445-46. 89

 Telegram, 8 Jul 42, and msg, 12 Jul 42, cited

n. 88. 90

 Msg, 15 Jul 42, cited n. 88. 91

 (1) Memo, U.S. CsofS for Br CsofS, 24 Jul 42,

filed with CCS 94, 24 Jul 42, title: Opns in 1942-43,

in ABC 381 (7-25-42) Sec 1. (2) Digest of min cited

n. 86.
CHAPTER XV

Turning Point in the Pacific

Strategy and Logistics in the Pacific War

With the decision, made in April 1942,

to concentrate resources in the British Isles

for an early invasion of northwestern Europe, Army planners sought to limit commitments to the Pacific to those absolutely

necessary for a defensive strategy, but the

dangers of allowing the Japanese to extend

and consolidate their conquests could not

be ignored. Even after his rebuff in May,

General MacArthur continued to ask for

a greater concentration of resources in the

Southwest Pacific, stressing the disastrous

consequences that would result from a

Japanese lodgment on the continent of

Australia. Admiral King, for all his agreement with the Atlantic-first strategy, did

not think it should be permitted to interfere with building defenses in the Pacific

capable of withstanding any Japanese assault, or with undertaking limited counteroffensives to keep the Japanese off balance. King continually pressed Marshall

for larger numbers of long-range bombers

and additional Army air bases along the

island chain between Hawaii and Australia, steps that both General Marshall

and General Arnold opposed as involving

unnecessary diversions of planes, troops,

and shipping from the war against Germany. Their solution was to anchor a

strong mobile force of bombers at each end

of the chain—in Hawaii and Australia—

to cover the intervening area. The July

decision to abandon SLEDGEHAMMER and

undertake the invasion of North Africa as

the major effort in the Atlantic in 1942

gave added strength to the pressures from

MacArthur and the Navy, and the opportunity that presented itself for a limited

counteroffensive in the Pacific soon gave

them almost irresistible force.

During the spring of 1942 the Japanese,

after establishing a major base at Rabaul

on New Britain island, moved south into

the Solomons and New Guinea. From Lae

and Salamaua on the northern coast of

New Guinea they threatened the main

Australian base at Port Moresby, the key

to MacArthur's defense of Australia. In

June they began to build airfields on

Tulagi and Guadalcanal at the southeastern tip of the Solomons, posing an even

more serious threat to the Allied positions

in New Caledonia and the Fijis. Meantime, early in June, U.S. military forces

gained their first decisive victory in the

Pacific war at the Battle of Midway, repulsing the Japanese move to gain control

of the Central Pacific. Japanese losses,

particularly of aircraft carriers, went far

toward restoring the balance of naval

power in the Pacific. The Midway victory

opened the way for a limited offensive to

counter the Japanese threat to Australia

and the line of communications. After

some controversy over command arrange-
TURNING POINT IN THE PACIFIC 389

ments, General Marshall and Admiral

King issued a joint directive on 2 July

1942 calling for such an offensive to be

mounted at once with the ultimate object

of seizing the New Britain-New IrelandNew Guinea area. The directive laid

down three major phases or tasks. Task

One was the seizure of the Santa Cruz

Islands, Tulagi, and "adjacent positions";

Task Two, the conquest of the remainder of

the Solomons and of the northwest coast of

New Guinea; Task Three, the final assault

on Rabaul and the surrounding area.

Execution of Task One was to be under

the command of a naval officer designated

by Admiral Nimitz as commander in the

South Pacific, with MacArthur providing

naval and air support from forces under

his command in Australia. As Task One

neared completion, command was to pass

to MacArthur, who would carry out Tasks

Two and Three with South Pacific forces

playing a supporting role.

This decision laid down the basic course

of Pacific strategy for 1942. It was made,

at least on the Army side, without any calculation of what the ultimate cost would

be in terms of additional commitments of

men and material to the Pacific war front.

Indeed, both MacArthur and Admiral

Ghormley, Nimitz' choice for the South

Pacific command, were put off without

any assurances of further support when

they asked that initiation of Task One be

delayed until sufficient resources were on

hand to execute Tasks Two and Three. By

its very nature, the plan for a Pacific offensive was bound to generate demands

for additional commitments of manpower

and materials, demands of an emergency

nature that the Army staff in Washington

could hardly resist, however much they

might wish to follow the principle of concentration on the Atlantic front.

The Navy chose Guadalcanal and

Tulagi as the objectives for this first American offensive in the Pacific, and the attack was launched on 7 August 1942. The

forces that landed on Guadalcanal soon

met with determined opposition and their

hold on a small perimeter on the island

was to remain tenuous for three months.

In the Southwest Pacific, meanwhile, the

Japanese forced MacArthur's hand by

seizing Buna on the Papuan coast opposite Port Moresby and by sending expeditions over the Owen Stanley Range

toward Port Moresby. To counter this

threat, MacArthur dispatched additional

Australian forces to New Guinea and soon

committed the U.S. 32d Division there.

Thus began, also in August, the Papua

Campaign, a defensive-offensive operation

aimed at breaking the Japanese hold on

Buna as a prelude to further advances

along the north coast of New Guinea. In

this first limited step toward the execution

of Task Two, the going proved as difficult

as on Guadalcanal.1

The Guadalcanal and Papua operations were necessarily mounted and supported from bases within the theaters, and

largely with the limited resources already

there. As the difficulties of climate and

terrain became evident and the stubborn

character of Japanese resistance manifested itself, it became apparent that the

operations could not be pushed through to

victory without additional support from

the United States. Urgent appeals from

the commanders of the South and Southwest Pacific Areas for such support were

soon arriving in Washington. At the same

1

 (1) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942,

canal: Chs. VII-XIII The First Offensive, , passim UNITE . (2) John Miller D STATE, jr.,S Guadal- ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1949), pp. 1-21,

59-71. (3) Milner, Victory in Papua, Chs. V-VIII.
390 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

time, there were demands for more forces

for Alaska and Hawaii, where the possibility of Japanese attacks remained strong.

Even skeptical visitors from Washington,

when they saw the difficulties under

which all the Pacific commands were operating, usually supported these demands.

As a consequence, concessions to the war

in the Pacific were continuous, and they

completed the jettisoning of the principle

of concentration that the diversions to the

Middle East and the TORCH decision had

begun. The concessions resulted from spot

decisions to meet pressing needs; there was

little time for careful calculation of strategic goals in relation to logistical capabilities.

The Pacific war presented logistical

problems differing in many respects from

those of the war in Europe and the Mediterranean. The distance from San Francisco to Brisbane was 7,200 nautical miles,

and to Noumea in New Caledonia 6,400,

as against only 3,500 from New York to

either Liverpool or Casablanca. Distance

was a heavy liability, only partially offset

by the relative absence of the submarine

menace in the Pacific. In July, when a

shift of the major effort to the Pacific was

being considered, Marshall and King

estimated that shipping that could transport 100,000 troops to the British Isles

would move only 40,000 to Australia,

while a larger amount of cargo shipping

would be needed to support the latter deployment than the former.2

Distances between points within the

South and Southwest Pacific theaters were

almost as formidable, and at the end of

the long voyage to the far Pacific there

were no well-developed ports or bases

within striking distance of the areas where

operations had to be conducted. The large

ports of Melbourne, Sydney, and Brisbane

on the east coast of Australia, and Auckland and Wellington in New Zealand

could handle a considerable traffic in

large ocean-going ships, but Brisbane was

1,100 miles from New Guinea, and Auckland 1,500 from Guadalcanal. Townsville,

a port 900 miles north of Brisbane but

with far less ample facilities, had to be developed as the principal transshipment

point from Australia to New Guinea.

Similarly Noumea, a port with an excellent harbor but very limited docking

facilities, had to serve as the main forward

base in the South Pacific Area—and Noumea was still 900 miles from Guadalcanal.3

Movement over these distances within

the Pacific theaters depended almost entirely on water transport, not on overland

facilities as in Europe and Africa. Even in

Australia, coastwise shipping played a

more important role in local distribution

than rail or truck transport. The South

Pacific Area consisted entirely of island

bases that could be supplied only by

water. In both the South and the Southwest Pacific all supply to forward points

had to be by vessels, save for the small proportion carried by air transport. Long

water distances and paucity of internal

transport facilities made it difficult to distribute supplies from any central point

within either theater; direct shipments

from the United States to each base or

port often represented the most efficient

method of supply.

The development of water supply lines

in the South-Southwest Pacific area imposed an enormous demand for vessels of

all sorts; the need for storage, base, port,

and transportation facilities imposed an

2

 See above, Ch. XIV. 3

 Bykofsky and Larson, Trans III, Chs. VII-VIII.
TURNING POINT IN THE PACIFIC 391

equally heavy demand for construction

materials and labor. Both were far beyond

the limited availability of local resources.

In Australia and New Zealand, materials

and manpower were available but they

were inadequate; on most of the South

Pacific islands local labor was either totally lacking or hopelessly unskilled, and

the only material readily available was

coral for paving roads and airfield runways.

To distance and lack of facilities were

added the difficulties arising from climate

and terrain. Even on bases where climate

was relatively pleasant, troops had few

recreational facilities and were isolated

for long periods. In the Solomons, New

Guinea, and the islands of the Bismarck

Archipelago, areas of active operations,

the tropical heat was all but unbearable,

the rainfall torrential. Coral beaches gave

way in the interior to dense jungle foliage,

high mountains, and swollen rivers. Malaria and other tropical diseases flourished.

The toll in men and materials was terrific.

Losses from disease and exhaustion, often

exceeding battle casualties, imposed a

heavy demand for replacements. Supplies

and equipment designed for use in temperate areas deteriorated rapidly; metal

corroded, wood and fabric rotted, radios

would not work, trucks broke down, tanks

and heavy artillery bogged down in mud,

sand, or jungle undergrowth. Operations

in the Pacific required less heavy equipment than those in Europe and Africa,

but they also demanded special types designed for jungle warfare, special kinds of

packing, more frequent replacement,

more abundant maintenance facilities,

larger numbers of service troops.4

Finally, there was the man-made problem of divided administrative responsibilities. With two commands conducting

what were undeniably separate parts of

the same campaign, it was more difficult

than it would otherwise have been to

avoid duplication of facilities and supply.

In the South Pacific theater, where Army

and Navy forces were inextricably intermingled, the two services operated parallel

supply lines; there were joint arrangements only for exploitation of local resources, and a rule-of-thumb division of

responsibility for the provision of certain

types of supplies. Even these arrangements, agreed on in Washington, were

slow to take shape in the theater because

of delay in the arrival of headquarters and

service personnel.5 Separate supply lines

for two theaters and two services inevitably caused waste and duplication of

effort in an area where facilities and

resources were scarce.

The first offensives in the Pacific were

launched with but an imperfect realization even in the theaters themselves, and

much less in Washington, of the limitations imposed by logistics. Both in New

Guinea and on Guadalcanal, logistical

support was inadequate at the outset;

disaster was only averted by a narrow

margin. The experience gained in these

two campaigns made it clear that forward

movement in the Pacific could not be

sustained on a shoestring. A build-up for

future operations was well under way before the campaigns were over, but it was

limited by a general shortage of troop

and cargo shipping under a strategy that

subordinated the needs of the war in the

Pacific to those of the war in Europe.

4

 On the factors of climate and geography and

their influence on Guadalcanal and New Guinea, see

Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, pp. 24-25,

306-18, and Milner, Victory in Papua, Chs. VI,

VIII, XI. 5

 See above, Ch. VI.
392 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Deployment and the Shipping Shortage

The first four months of 1942 saw the

heaviest deployment of the year to Australia, New Caledonia, and the Fijis. During the next two months emphasis shifted

to strengthening defensive positions in

Hawaii and Alaska. By early June 1942,

when the Battle of Midway was fought,

OPD considered that forces essential for a

strategic defensive in the Pacific, under

the BOLERO strategy, were in position.

Despite the American victory at Midway,

however, the Japanese moved unopposed

into Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians. Maj.

Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., dispatched by General Marshall on a tour of

inspection, reported a need for additional

forces at all bases, particularly in Hawaii.

Garrisons in the island chain were still

weak, service troops were needed in Australia, air power throughout the Pacific

was inadequate. Admiral King continued

to press for a stronger air force in the

South Pacific, General MacArthur for a

general increase in forces in SWPA.

General Marshall made some concessions. Alaskan defenses were moderately

strengthened; the 40th Division was dispatched to Hawaii with antiaircraft and

other elements, bringing the total number

of forces in that area to four divisions; the

37th Division in the Fijis was brought up

to full strength; miscellaneous forces were

allotted to the South Pacific; and service

troops were promised for Australia. But

the War Department refused to commit

additional air groups, consenting only to

bring those already in the Pacific to full

strength. In July the total forces there

were already stronger, by a considerable

margin, than those envisaged three

months earlier, and OPD sought again to

hold the line against further deployment.6

The shift in Allied strategy in the European war late in July opened the door to a

more aggressive course in the Pacific, and

early in August the limited offensive in the

Solomons began. Tentative deployment

plans now envisaged about a one-third increase in the strength contemplated in

April—specifically, the addition of fifteen

air groups and one ground division. General Marshall's planners still wanted to

hold back, asserting at first that there had

been no final decision on TORCH, and later

arguing that the movement of these forces

to the Pacific must await the outcome of

the North Africa venture. Marshall resisted Admiral King's urgent pleas through

the first week in August. Then, having received General MacArthur's plan for Task

Two on 8 August, he proposed to King

that plans be made to carry it out immediately following Task One. A few days

after the landings on Guadalcanal the

Japanese almost wiped out the covering

naval forces. King told Marshall on the

20th that Admiral Ghormley could not

possibly spare any forces for Task Two, and

he forwarded an urgent request from both

Admiral Ghormley and General Harmon

for reinforcements for the South Pacific

Area.7

6

 (1) Approved deployment for 1942, set forth on

14 March 1942 in JCS 23, was subsequently modified

to allow for the deployment of the 32d and 37th Divisions to the Pacific. There were 237,000 men allotted

to the South and Southwest Pacific during 1942 in the

14 March tables; 252,000 were in those theaters or en

route by the end of July. See Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, Chs. VII, XI, XIII. (2) Contl

Div, ASF, Statistical Review, World War II. (3) Pacific:

June 1942-January 1943, monograph, pp. 54-57,

118-32, OPD Hist Unit File. (4) On General Richardson's trip, his recommendations, and action thereon, see OPD 333 (Gen Richardson's Trip). 7

 (1) CCS 94, 24 Jul 42, title: Opns in 1942-43. (2)

Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, Chs.

XII-XIII.
TURNING POINT IN THE PACIFIC 393

At Marshall's order, General Somervell

investigated the possibilities of meeting

this request. His study revealed that

20,000 troops might be shipped to the

South Pacific theater only if the Navy furnished troop lift for 13,000 and some of

the cargo shipping; even then, certain

scheduled movements to Australia would

have to be sacrificed. Accordingly the proposed balanced force, set by AGF at

26,000, was cut to 20,000, and the Navy

promised its share of the shipping. The reinforcements—43d Division with supporting elements—sailed in September and

October. An additional bomber group,

meanwhile, had been allotted to Hawaii,

and Admiral Nimitz was given more freedom in moving planes from Hawaii to the

South Pacific.8

These decisions represented a calculated risk: the more threatened of the two

main areas was strengthened at the expense of the less threatened. MacArthur

was told that he must expect a sharp cutback in troop movements scheduled for

his theater, at the very time that he was

predicting a major Japanese move against

New Guinea and warning that disaster

would follow if he were not reinforced.9

It was clear in any case that Tasks Two and

Three would have to wait. In October the

War Department began to allocate forces

to SWPA that would give MacArthur an

amphibious force of his own but few of

these troops could be shipped until the

Guadalcanal crisis had abated. During

September, October, and November

36,000 troops and 310,000 measurement

tons of cargo were shipped from the

United States to the South Pacific, while

only 8,300 troops and 157,000 tons of

cargo went to the Southwest Pacific. In

the same period 25,000 troops and 330,000

tons of cargo were shipped to Hawaii, and

16,000 troops and 547,000 tons of cargo to

Alaska. While movements over these

shorter runs were proportionately less

costly in shipping than those to the more

remote areas, the need to continue building up Pacific defenses closer to home

nonetheless cut deeply into the support of

even limited offensives in the far Pacific

areas. Marshall and Arnold were determined, moreover, not to throw in all their

uncommitted air power; the fifteen groups

earmarked for the Pacific late in July were

held back in strategic reserve.10

In October the effort to tip the precarious balance in the South Pacific

reached a climax. Ghormley and Harmon

decided to shift the Americal Division

from New Caledonia to Guadalcanal,

where the marines were being depleted by

climate, disease, battle weariness, and

battle casualties. The 43d Division, originally destined for New Zealand, had to

be sent to New Caledonia to replace the

Americal, and the War Department decided to send the 25th Division from

Hawaii to either the South or the Southwest Pacific. Most of the 43d Division was

transshipped from New Zealand, but the

8

 (1) Memo, CG SOS for CofS, no date, sub: Shipg

Capacity for Reinf of S Central Pac, OPD 370.5 PTO,

Case 9. (2) Related corresp in same file. (3) Memo,

AGF for CofS, 22 Aug 42, sub: Additional Forces S

Pac Theater, OPD 370.5, Case 14. (4) Memo, CNO

for CofS, 27 Aug 42, sub: Trans of Thirteen Thousand

Army Trs, OPD 381 PTO, Case 84. (5) Matloff and

Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, pp. 298-306. 9

 (1) Msg, MacArthur to CofS, 30 Aug 42, CM-IN

11408. (2) Msg, Marshall to MacArthur, 28 Aug 42,

CM-OUT 8981. 10

 (1) Contl Div, ASF, Statistical Review, World

War II. (2) Bykofsky and Larson, Trans III, Ch. X.

(3) For disposition of the fifteen air groups, see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, Ch. XIII.

(4) See below, App. E.

The tonnages shipped to Alaska were mostly construction materials for the Alcan Highway and for

garrison facilities at the scattered bases in the Alaska

area.
394 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

THE BEACHED TRANSPORT SS PRESIDENT COOLIDGE, October 1942.

first regimental combat team and a harbor defense unit were shipped on the President Coolidge late in September directly to

Noumea and thence to Espiritu Santo,

primarily to protect the new airfield from

which the forces on Guadalcanal received

their bomber support. Off Espiritu Santo

the Coolidge ran into an American mine

field and sank. Personnel losses were slight,

but all equipment was lost. Six 155-mm.

howitzers were hastily removed from a

vessel at Noumea en route to Australia;

remaining losses were made up from

reserves of the 43d and Americal Divisions,

which in turn had to be replenished from

the United States, at additional cost in

cargo shipping. The untimely sinking of

the Coolidge also delayed the movement of

the 25th Division from Hawaii.11

11

 (1) Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, pp.

103-42, 212-17. (2) Wesley Frank Craven and James

Lea Cate, eds.. The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan—

August 1942 to July 1944, Vol. IV in THE ARMY AIR

FORCES IN WORLD WAR II (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1950) (hereafter cited as

Craven and Cate, AAF IV}, pp. 28-29, 37-56. (3) Pacific: June 1942-January 1943, pp. 195-201, OPD

Hist Unit File. (4) Memo, Col Carl D. Silverthorne

for Gens Handy and Streett, 5 Oct 42, sub: Mvmt of

43d Div, OPD 370.5 New Zealand (3-5-42). (5)

Memo, OPD for CofS, 29 Oct 42, sub: Delay in

Mvmt of 25th Div, 7a Tr Unit File SWPA Prior to

1 Jan 43 folder, Plng Div ASF. (6) Rpt by Lt Gen

Millard F. Harmon, circa Jun 44, sub: The Army in

the S Pacific, p. 4, OCMH.
TURNING POINT IN THE PACIFIC 395

SURVIVORS COMING ASHORE at Espiritu Santo. Note SS President Coolidge

at upper left.

Late in October, when the Japanese

made their final great effort to crush the

American forces on Guadalcanal, the

President asked the Joint Chiefs to commit

all available weapons and resources to the

fight. General Marshall in reply pointed

out that there were already sufficient

forces in the area and that the main problem was "to distribute and maintain them

by transport in critical combat areas."

 12

The shortage of cargo shipping in the

Pacific, for both services, was estimated at

twenty-five ships a month during the next

three months; this shortage was strangling

the flow of maintenance supplies and

backlogged equipment to forces already in

or on their way to the scene of action.

About the same time War Shipping Administration officials were warning of the

general shrinkage of merchant shipping

and the drying up of the commercial

trades as sources for further accretions to

the military pool. In their opinion it would

not be possible to sustain the current operations in the Pacific along with the larger

undertakings in the Atlantic, except by diversions from lend-lease services or from

support of the Middle East and India. The

12

 Memo, CofS for President, 26 Oct 42, sub: Memo

for President, OPD 381 PTO, Sec 3, Case 107.
396 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Army and Navy, WSA noted, were asking

for forty-nine more ships in the Pacific in

November than in October, creating a

prospective deficit of forty-six. While

many of these requirements were for small

ships on the Alaska run, the deficit for the

remaining three principal areas, as calculated on 5 November, was twenty-nine

standard cargo vessels.13

On 26 October the President, in a characteristic move, ordered WSA to find

twenty additional ships for the South and

Southwest Pacific without taking them

from either the Soviet aid program or

TORCH. Since there was not time to shift

vessels from the Atlantic, WSA asked the

Joint Chiefs to indicate the military services in the Pacific to be cut. At the suggestion of Somervell and Gross, the Joint

Planners presented a plan to divert three

large ships from the Alaskan service, three

from Panama, and six from those scheduled to carry lend-lease supplies from the

west coast to India and the Middle East.

WSA then pointed out that these last diversions would require action by the CCS,

particularly in view of British allotments

of shipping for TORCH, and the JCS had to

agree. But suddenly in mid-November

WSA announced that of the total requirement of eighty-seven ships for the Army

and Navy, it would be able to make

eighty-four available.14

Just how this magic was accomplished

is not clear from the records. There seemed

little prospect that it could be repeated. In

December Somervell foresaw a deficit of

over two million tons of cargo shipping to

meet Army and Navy needs in the Pacific

through June 1943.15

This impending shortage was measured

in the light of mushrooming troop movement schedules. The pressure of the need

for service troops could no longer be withstood. Combat and disease, and the formation of skeleton units in the theaters had

created a heavy and unforeseen demand

for filler replacements. After the great air

and naval victory off Guadalcanal in early

November, the American position there

was secure, but the tedious and expensive

business of reducing Japanese forces on

the island still lay ahead. Vice Adm.

William F. Halsey, Jr., decided to turn

these operations over to the Army as soon

as a second Army division could be

brought in, and the 25th Division, which

sailed from Hawaii in December, was diverted directly to Guadalcanal. This diversion permitted withdrawal of the 1st

Marine Division to Australia where, after

rehabilitation, it was to provide MacArthur with the nucleus for an amphibious force for Tasks Two and Three. By the

end of December MacArthur had also

been promised three engineer amphibian

brigades, a parachute regiment, and a

jungle combat team. While there was no

expectation of sending more divisions to

either the South or Southwest Pacific in

the immediate future, the growing backlog of replacements, service troops, specialized combat units, and miscellaneous

other troops was sufficient to occupy all

troop shipping for a long time to come.

13

 Memo, Land and Douglas for President, 27 Oct

42, sub: Reqmts for Additional Tonnage, Shipg 1941-

43 folder, Hq ASF. The deficit for Hawaii, the South

Pacific, and SWPA is shown here as nineteen, but

JPS calculated it on 5 November as twenty-nine. See

JCS 143/1, 5 Nov 42, title: Alloc of Twenty Additional Ships for Use in SWPA. 14

 (1) JCS 143, 29 Oct 42, title: Alloc of Twenty

Additional Ships for Use in SWPA. (2) JCS 143/1

cited n. 13. (3) JCS 143/2, 16 Nov 42, same title. (4)

JCS 143/3, 17 Nov 42, same title. (5) Memo, Gross

for Somervell, no date, sub: Additional Ships . . . ,

ABC 570 (2-14-42) Sec 3. (6) Min, 42d mtgJCS, 17

Nov 42. 15

 Memo, Somervell for CofS, 7 Dec 42, sub: Trans

Reqmts Pac Theater, OPD 570, Case 17.
TURNING POINT IN THE PACIFIC 397

When Navy requirements were added to

those of the Army, a definite shortage

loomed ahead. As calculated on 3 December by the Joint Staff Planners, the deficit

would be 28,300 troop spaces in December, 900 in January, and 10,900 in

February.16

To meet this deficit, Admiral King

ordered several Navy combat loaders

(with a total carrying capacity of six

thousand) to the South Pacific run and

proposed to remove three Navy transports— West Point, Monticello, and Hermitage, each with troop capacity in excess of

six thousand—from the Atlantic to the

Pacific. The West Point was then on the

way to the Persian Gulf, but the other two

transports had been in the first TORCH

convoy and the Army counted on them for

future ones. General Somervell vigorously

protested that if all these vessels were diverted to the Pacific, it would be impossible to maintain the build-up in North

Africa as planned. It seemed unlikely,

moreover, that cargo shipping would be

available to support the additional troop

movements.17

The matter was threshed out in the

councils of the JCS. It was decided to send

the Hermitage to the Pacific, but to keep

the West Point in the Middle East service.

The question narrowed to the employment of the Monticello, and on 9 December

the Joint Planners decided that the North

African convoy was the more urgent requirement. The Joint Chiefs meanwhile

had given their approval to the launching

of a limited offensive in Burma in March

1943, for which General Stilwell had presented requests for service troops to be in

the theater before that date. To meet these

requirements, to which the JCS accorded

a priority second only to TORCH, the

Monticello was the only suitable transport

available and consequently had to be held

during December to sail for India in January.18

This process of robbing Peter to pay

Paul left the shipping shortage still weighing heavily on the build-up of forces in the

Pacific. The pressure of unsatisfied needs

for supplies and labor grew stronger. As

exemplified by the Monticello affair, the

Navy on its side was becoming more determined to speed its own deployment to

the Pacific, deployment on a scale that

led both the Army and the WSA to question the validity of naval shipping requirements. On all sides economy in the use of

and the demands upon shipping became

a major concern and an issue in interservice rivalry. At Somervell's insistence, the

Navy's combat loaders, previously assigned to voyages by the Navy without

specific reference to the JCS, were definitely placed in the pool of troop shipping

under joint control. An effort was begun

to determine joint shipping requirements

on an over-all basis, so as to permit the

JCS to make allocations strictly in the

light of strategic priorities. In the matter

of economy the Navy, having made certain reductions in recreation facilities,

pointedly called them to the attention of

the Army. Somervell outspokenly criti16

 (1) Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, pp.

177-89. (2) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-

1942, Ch. XVI. (3) JPS 92/D, 3 Dec 42, title, Trans

Reqmts to the End of Feb 43. 17

 (1) Memo cited n. 15. (2) Memo, CG SOS for

CofS, 26 Nov 42, sub: Asgmt of Navy Trans, ABC 570

(2-14-42) Sec 4. 18

 (1) Ltr, King to Marshall, 3 Dec 42, sub: Employment of Monticello. (2) Memo, CG SOS for JCS,

14 Dec 42, sub: Trans Reqmts to the End of Feb 43.

Both in ABC 570 (2-14-42) Sec 4. (3) JPS 92/D cited

n. 16(3). (4) JPS 92/1, 9 Dec 42, title: Trans Reqmts

to the End of Feb 43. (5) Min, 49th mtg JPS, 9 Dec

42, Item 13. (6) JCS 158/1, 14 Dec 42, title: Trans

Reqmts to the End of Feb 43. (7) Min, 46th mtg JCS,

15 Dec 42, Item 2. (8) See below, Ch. XIX.
398 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

cized the Navy's construction program in

the Pacific as excessive and its standards as

extravagant, and specifically attacked the

project to build a naval base at Noumea

instead of using existing facilities at Brisbane. The Joint Chiefs ordered both Halsey and MacArthur to exploit local procurement to the limit. In the meantime, as

a result of acute shipping congestion at

Noumea in New Caledonia, both the

Army and the Navy were forced to review

their logistical systems for support of Pacific operations with a view to better coordination. Even in the aggregate, all

these measures promised only to alleviate

a shortage predetermined by the subordination of the Pacific war in the general

strategy and by distances that precluded

short-term adjustments between the Atlantic and Pacific pools of shipping.19

The Crisis at Noumea

The meagerness of facilities for discharging cargo in the far Pacific aggravated the shipping shortage. At a time

when the movement of cargo was being

pushed to the limit, it was difficult to

avoid congestion and immobilization at

the end of the line. During 1942 congestion did not reach serious proportions in

the Southwest Pacific since the well-developed ports of Brisbane and Sydney continued to be the principal receiving points

for supplies. But in the South Pacific it

became the central logistical problem,

mounting to a crisis in the fall of 1942 that

dramatized, as nothing else probably

could have done so effectively, the need

for advance planning and interservice coordination in the handling of Pacific

logistics.

North of New Zealand there were few

port facilities in the South Pacific capable

of handling ocean-going ships. Suva and

Lautoka in the Fijis, and Noumea, New

Caledonia's principal port, had piers and

docks capable of handling their leisurely

peacetime commerce, but hardly equal to

the burdens imposed on them by the military emergency. Espiritu Santo and Efate,

the bases closest to Guadalcanal, offered

nothing more than protected anchorages

from which cargo had to be lightered

ashore. Storage and inland communication facilities were almost entirely lacking

on all the South Pacific islands. While a

limited amount of native labor was available in the Fijis, there was virtually none

on most of the other islands, including

New Caledonia. The assault on Guadalcanal was undertaken with little advance

planning by either the Army or the Navy

for development of bases for logistical support of the campaign that followed. The

theater command itself was organized in

such impromptu fashion just before the assault that there was no time for the development of a proper SOS organization.

Each force in the area had been sent out

with defense of an island base as its fundamental mission. The Army's supply plans

as well as the joint logistical plan of July

1942 were drawn largely in terms of maintaining island garrisons. In each task force

there was a heavy preponderance of combat troops with insufficient service troops

to support them. Faced with a combination of lack of facilities and lack of labor,

each island command was hard put to it

to carry the supply load even for these garrison forces. When it became necessary for

the commands to handle the vastly greater

19

 (1) Min, 32d mtg JPS, 30 Dec 42, Item 4. (2)

JCS 194 series, title: Trans Reqmts Pac Theater. (3)

Msg 4409, AGWAR to CINCSWPA, 7 Dec 42, AG

400.3295 (9-1-42) (3) Sec 1. (4) Ltr, SN to SW, 5 Dec

42, ABC 570 (2-14-42) Sec 4. (5) For efforts to adjust

long-range deployment plans to shipping, see below,

Chs. XXII, XXVI. (6) For efforts at economy and

co-ordination, see below, Chs. XXIII-XXIV.
TURNING POINT IN THE PACIFIC 399

burden of supplies for the Guadalcanal

Campaign, they were swamped.

The heaviest load fell on New Caledonia. Noumea rapidly became the principal point for receipt and transshipment

of supplies to Guadalcanal, Espiritu

Santo, and Efate. There were only a few

berths in the harbor, and these had to be

shared with the commercial exports of the

French Nickel Company, necessary for

the maintenance of the island's economy.

Neither the Army nor the Navy had appreciably expanded these facilities before

the avalanche of shipping incident to the

Guadalcanal operation descended on

Noumea in August and September. General Patch's warnings, as early as April,

about the lack of port troops, inadequate

discharge and storage facilities, and poor

roads had gone largely unheeded in Washington. The only port troops sent to the

South Pacific in early 1942 went to New

Zealand. Patch was authorized to activate

a port company from his own personnel,

but by mid-September it numbered only

seventy-three men.20

Given these conditions, a tie-up of ships

awaiting discharge at Noumea was almost

inevitable. On 23 September 1942 Patch

radioed that there were eighty-six ships at

anchor in Noumea Harbor; congestion

continued during the next few months,

reaching its highest point during November and December when the Americal

Division had to be outloaded to Guadalcanal, the 43d Division and New Zealand troops disembarked with their equipment, and various supplies handled for

the 25th Division, which moved directly

from Hawaii to Guadalcanal. At the end

of November, ninety-one ships were reported in the harbor, though these, as in

September, evidently included naval vessels that did not have to be discharged.21

Though the lack of facilities and personnel lay at the root of the congestion at

Noumea, the relative immaturity of both

Army and Navy logistical agencies in the

South Pacific Area and lack of co-ordination between them made it far more difficult to manage. Army and Navy organizations on the west coast, acting independently, forwarded supplies to the South

Pacific in answer to separate requests

from their respective area commanders, to

the extent that shipping was available for

the purpose and without much consideration for discharge capacity. On arrival at

Noumea the ships were unloaded by the

services separately, with no effective coordination of discharge activities or control of harbor traffic. There was an

inevitable tendency on the part of both

the Army and the Navy to unload supplies only as needed and to use the vessels

in the harbor as floating warehouses, leaving partially unloaded vessels to lie idle.

Lack of any over-all plan for construction

of facilities led to duplication both in shipments of material from the United States

and in the use of resources available in the

theater. The situation at Noumea was

paralleled at Espiritu Santo and Efate,

20

 (1) See above, Ch. VII. (2) Bykofsky and Larson,

Trans III, Ch. VIII. (3) Ltr, CG POPPY Force to CofS,

17 Apr 42, OPD 381 New Caledonia, Case 5. (4) Ltr,

CG Task Force 6814 to CofS, 17 Apr 42, sub: POPPY

Task Force Stf, OPD 320.2 New Caledonia, Case 12.

(5) Memo, ACofS Opns SOS for OPD WDGS, 5 Jun

42, sub: Rpt on New Caledonia From Gen Patch to

Gen Marshall, OPD 381 New Caledonia, Case 30. (6)

Msg, New Caledonia to AGWAR, 23 Sep 42, CM-IN

10038. (7) Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 9 Oct 42, sub:

Noumea Harbor, SPAC 1942-43-mid-1944 folder,

Lutes File. 21

 (1) Bykofsky and Larson, Trans III, Ch. VIII.

(2) Msg cited n. 20(6). (3) On the actual number of

ships requiring discharge, see Brig. Gen. Raymond

E. S. Williamson's figure of thirty-seven in midNovember discussed below, p. 402. The actual amount

of congestion at Noumea seems to have been exaggerated at times, and figures are not always reconcilable.

See Ballantine, Naval Logistics, p. 123, in which he

states that at one time a hundred vessels were at

Noumea awaiting discharge.
400 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

DOCK AT NOUMEA, December 1942.

where congestion on a smaller scale began

to appear as these bases increased in importance. At Guadalcanal there was no

joint system for calling forward cargo from

rear bases.22

The War Department became alarmed

at the indications from General Patch in

late September that congestion was becoming serious at Noumea, and this concern mounted as the situation developed.

Beyond the consideration that such a concentration of shipping presented an ideal

target for the Japanese, the waste of shipping involved in such long turnarounds to

the Pacific could hardly be tolerated. As

an immediate palliative, Patch was authorized to bring his provisional port company to full strength and use combat

troops to the utmost extent possible to unload ships. The Navy proposed to send six

hundred longshoremen by air to arrive at

Noumea early in November.

In October SOS turned to attack the

problem on a broader basis. General

Somervell dispatched General Lutes on a

tour of Pacific bases with instructions to

investigate the congestion at Noumea and

to recommend suitable bases and a suitable supply system for Army and Navy

operations. Lutes was quick to recognize

the need for an adequate Army SOS with

vastly increased numbers of service personnel and was instrumental in getting 22

 (1) See Bykofsky and Larson, Trans III, Ch.

VIII. (2) Memo cited n. 20(7). (3) Memo, Lutes for

CG SOS, 12 Nov 42, sub: Recommendations for a Jt

SOS in the Pac Theater. (4) Memo, Lutes for Somervell, no date. Last two in Unified Sup: Army-Navy

1942-43 folder, Lutes File.
TURNING POINT IN THE PACIFIC 401

AERIAL VIEW OF NOUMEA, January 1943. Note limited berthing space.

such a command organized under Brig.

Gen. Robert G. Breene. Beyond this he

was appalled by the waste and confusion

attendant on the operation of separate

Army and Navy supply lines, and was

soon convinced that any real cure for the

logistical ailments of the South Pacific

theater could only be found in closer interservice co-ordination. In a series of conferences with Army and Navy theater officials, he urged the formation of a joint

logistical staff that would prepare joint

theater requirements, determine priorities

for movement to and within the theater,

schedule unloading of ships, and institute

close co-ordination in all logistical activity. On his return to San Francisco he

similarly urged on Army and Navy port

officials the need for joint scheduling of

shipments in accordance with priorities

established by theater authorities. Back in

Washington he presented a plan for complete unification of the Army-Navy supply

lines to and within the Pacific Ocean

Area.23

In the meantime Lewis Douglas of

WSA, concerned about the long turn23

 (1) Msg, AGWAR to CG New Caledonia, 26 Sep

42, CM-OUT 8879. (2) Msg, CG New Caledonia to

AGWAR, 28 Sep 42, CM-IN 12406. (3) Memo,

ACofS OPD for CG SOS, 7 Oct 42, sub: QM Co New

Caledonia, with accompanying memo for rcd, OPD

320.2 New Caledonia, Case 39. (4) Memo, Somervell

for Lutes, 11 Oct 42, Misc Notes, Lutes File. (5) For

Lutes' recommendations on a unified supply service,

see memo cited n. 22(3) and below, Ch. XXIV. (6)

For Lutes' personal description of his trip, see Lt. Gen.

LeRoy Lutes, "Supply: World War II," Antiaircraft

Journal, Vol. LXXXXV No. 4 (July-August 1952),

pp. 2-7, and No. 5 (September-October 1952), 2-8.
402 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

arounds, had secured the services of

Frazer A. Bailey, an executive of the Matson Navigation Company in San Francisco, to work with the Army and Navy

toward more efficient use of cargo shipping in the Pacific. After surveying the

situation, Bailey came to conclusions not

significantly different from those that

Lutes had formed. He urged advance

scheduling of shipments by the Army and

Navy port authorities working together,

carefully calculated in accordance with

discharge facilities at the end of the line.

Bailey's proposals came at a time when

Lewis Douglas was essaying, on a broader

front, to bring ship loading and scheduling by the Army and Navy under closer

control by WSA. As far as the Pacific was

concerned, the upshot was the formation

in San Francisco of an Army-Navy-WSA

committee, later known as the Joint ArmyNavy-WSA Ship Operations Committee,

to work out a combined loading schedule

for Army, Navy, and lend-lease shipments

to Pacific destinations. The committee began to function in January 1943 and was

at least partially successful in introducing

a larger measure of cargo pooling and

more closely integrated schedules better

geared to the ability of Noumea and other

Pacific ports to unload supplies.24

Meantime Admiral William F. Halsey,

Jr., who had assumed command of the

South Pacific Area in October, was moving energetically, in co-operation with

General Harmon, to bring about unified

operations at the working level in the

South Pacific and to clear up the congestion at Noumea. While he partially followed the lines Lutes had suggested, he

did not go the full distance and set up a

joint logistical staff. He chose rather to

place definite responsibilities in the hands

of each service and to rely on interservice

boards or informal working arrangements

to provide for joint priorities. The growing

efficiency of the Army SOS under General Breene made Halsey's task easier. On

16 November he requested this Army SOS

to take over responsibility for all discharge

and loading activities at Noumea. On 31

December he placed in its hands responsibility for co-ordinating the forward movement of supplies to Guadalcanal, working

with the advice of a priorities board composed of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps

representatives. A newly created service

command in New Caledonia under Brig.

Gen. Raymond E. S. Williamson assumed

control at Noumea on 20 November. At

that time, Williamson reported, there

were 37 ships with 88,000 tons of cargo in

the harbor requiring discharge. During

the month following, some 52 additional

ships arrived for total or partial discharge.

By using the port company (now at full

strength), combat troops, Navy longshoremen, and native labor, by bringing

in experienced civilian and military port

personnel from New Zealand and the

Fijis, and by gaining authority for exclusive use of the French Nickel Company's

dock for three months, Williamson was

able to accomplish the discharge of sixty

ships during his first month of command,

leaving a continuing backlog of twentynine. Wharves, docks, yards, fields, and

hillsides were used for open storage of

cargoes brought ashore. In January an

additional dock was completed, construction of another begun. While a considerable backlog continued until April, cargo

discharged increased from 47,808 short

24

 (1) Ltrs, Bailey to Douglas, 14 Jan, 6 Feb, and 8

Mar 43, SWPA folder, WSA Douglas File. (2) Memo,

Land and Douglas for President, 18 Jan 43, WSA Dir

12-18-42 folder, WSA Douglas File. (3) On the

broader issues involved, see below, Ch. XXII.
TURNING POINT IN THE PACIFIC 403

tons in November to 138,085 in December

and 213,982 in January. By the end of

April 1943 the crisis at Noumea had been

"definitely solved," and the development

of the port had reached a point where it

was capable of supporting a major campaign.25

While it lasted, the Noumea crisis highlighted the central problem of logistical

operations in both the South and the

Southwest Pacific—the lack of adequate

ports and bases in advance areas for handling and transshipping supplies. The

measures taken to solve it—improvement

in theater SOS organization, provision of

larger numbers of service troops, better

interservice co-ordination in scheduling

discharge of cargo and in development

and use of supply facilities, closer scheduling of cargo sailings from mainland

ports adjusted to discharge capacity in the

South Pacific—promised to prevent any

repetition of the worst features of the

Noumea confusion in the future. But the

lessons of Noumea still provided no easy

answer to the problem of preventing ship

congestion as new advances were made up

the Solomons ladder or farther away from

the Australian base in the Southwest

Pacific. Granted the best system of coordination, commanders would inevitably

continue, in the early stages of a campaign, to call forward more supplies than

could be unloaded over inadequate facilities. Even as congestion at Noumea was

clearing up, it was reappearing farther up

the line—by January 1943 at Espiritu

Santo, by April at Guadalcanal.

In view of this situation many naval

officers frankly defended the use of ships

as floating depots, arguing that it would

prove less expensive in both materials and

shipping than building port facilities at

each successive base. Army spokesmen, in

Washington at least, insisted on the use of

shore facilities, and WSA was unalterably

opposed to lengthy retention of ships in

any theater. The provision of some sort of

mobile port facilities would obviously go

far to solve the problem, and the Noumea

crisis gave impetus to the search for suitable equipment of this sort. The most

practical suggestion was that large barges

should be used as floating warehouses and

towed from place to place by tugs as the

tactical situation demanded. There was

some experimentation during late 1942

with concrete barges but unfortunately

they proved impractical for the purpose.

Shortly after his assignment by Douglas to

the Pacific problem, Frazer Bailey began

to push enthusiastically a project for using

covered steel or wooden barges of two or

three thousand tons capacity. This promising idea was tentatively endorsed by

both Army and Navy commanders. It

turned out, however, that there were insufficient barges of a type suitable for towing to the South Pacific that could be diverted from essential trades along the

rivers and coasts of the United States. The

shortage of steel prevented approval of

any extensive program of additional construction of large, covered barges, and in

any case the tugs needed to tow them were

also in short supply. While the barges sent

proved useful, for other purposes as well as

for floating storage, the adoption of the

mobile port scheme on the scale Bailey

suggested never proved possible. The problem of ship congestion resulting from lack

2 5

 (1) Bykofsky and Larson, Trans III, Ch. VIII.

(2) Memo, Gen Williamson for CG SOS S Pac Area,

19 Dec 42, sub: Congestion of Shipg in Port of

Noumea. (3) Memo, Williamson for CofTrans, 15 Feb

43, sub: Trans Sv Hist Rcd. Last two in S Pac Area

New Caledonia folder, OCT HB. (4) Ltrs, Breene to

Lutes, 3 and 9 Jan, 4 Feb, and 19 Apr 43, SPAC

1942-43-mid-1944 folder, Lutes File.
404 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

of port and base facilities was to last as

long as the Pacific theaters themselves.26

Problems of Cargo Shipment

Difficulties in the several stages of handling supplies—packing and marking,

loading and discharge—further lessened

efficiency in the use of Pacific shipping.

While most of the difficulties were by no

means peculiar to the Pacific, distance,

climate, and lack of facilities there combined with the need for retail distribution

from the United States to make them

doubly troublesome. Composite loading

for the various different bases offered

tempting economies in the use of shipping

space. Yet in the theater these economies

often seemed false because they produced

so much confusion in unloading and distribution. In early 1942, particularly, too

little attention was given in loading to the

order of discharge. Supplies for New

Caledonia were frequently stowed below

those intended for Australia; supplies for

Sydney, Brisbane, and Townsville were

jumbled together. Because of distance and

poor roads, equipment unloaded at Sydney for a unit stationed near Townsville

could not be delivered for weeks. The

theaters insisted on unit loading and the

SOS complied whenever practicable, but

the tight shipping situation precluded its

use as normal practice during 1942. Some

improvement resulted from better exchange of information between the theaters and the San Francisco port, and from

development of theater facilities for storage and distribution. Block stowage,

whereby supplies for a single port were

stowed in a single hatch, proved the best

solution whenever composite loading still

had to be practiced, but it was not until

1943 that it came into general use.

The theaters complained of marking

and packing practices ill suited to the long

Pacific voyage and humid climate, and of

discharge and handling facilities at the end

of the line. Markings on packages did not

show contents and destination; many

packages were too large and heavy to be

handled by the limited equipment available at small island bases such as Bora

Bora or by native carriers in New Guinea;

light and flimsy packages loaded beneath

heavy ones were crushed; paper bags containing cereals, flour, and sugar tore and

their contents spilled; cardboard cartons

containing rations disintegrated when exposed to heavy moisture; paper labels on

cans disappeared leaving their contents a

mystery to the recipients; exposed parts of

equipment and machinery corroded and

rusted when not heavily sprayed with

cosmoline.27 Shipment of unassembled ve26

 (1) Bykofsky and Larson, Trans III, Ch. VIII.

(2) Ltr, Lutes to Harmon, 24 Nov 42. (3) Memo, Styer

for Lutes, 25 Nov 42. (4) Memo, Lutes for Styer, 25

Nov 42. (5) Ltr, Harmon to Lutes, 15 Dec 42. (6) Ltr,

Lutes to Breene, 5 Jan 43. (7) Ltrs, Breene to Lutes,

4 and 16 Feb, 7 and 19 Apr 43. Last six in SPAC

1942-43-mid-1944 folder, Lutes File. (8) Ltrs, Bailey

to Douglas, 6 and 11 Feb, 8 Mar, and 13 Apr 43. (9)

Ltr, Adm Horne to Douglas, 27 Feb 43. (10) Memos,

Capt Edmond J. Moran, Manager Barge and Towboat Svs WSA, for Douglas, 7 May and 29 Jun 43.

(11 ) Ltr, Adm Land to Hugh Fulton, Chief Counsel

of Senate Sp Com Investigating Natl Def Prog, 30 Jul

43. Last four in SWPA and Barge Probs folder, WSA

Douglas File. (12 ) Memo, Lt Cols A. W. Parry and

R. G. Lehnau for Gen Robinson, 12 May 43, sub: Rpt

on Inspection Trip, SWPA and S Pac Area, 16 Mar

to 4 May 43, in 12a Gen SWPA folder, Plng Div

ASF, Job A45-124. (13) For justification of the

Navy's use of ships as depots, see remarks of Comdr.

Selden B. Spangler at Conf of Base Maintenance Div

and War Plans Offs of Bureaus and Offs Concerned,

30 Apr 43, ABC 045.93 (3-12-42). 27

 (1) Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in the

Southwest Pacific Area (hereafter cited as Masterson,

Transportation in SWPA), pp. 267-89, OCMH. (2)

Bykofsky and Larson, Trans III, Ch. VIII. (3) TAG

ltr to all overseas comds, 15 Jun 42, sub: Sup of Overseas Bases [a G-4 questionnaire on supply] and replies
TURNING POINT IN THE PACIFIC 405

SORTING DAMAGED RATIONS, New Caledonia, April 1942.

hides to the South Pacific bases also

caused trouble. Only in New Caledonia

was it possible to perform even the simple

assemblies involved in the single and twin

unit packs, and only limited numbers of

vehicles for the other islands could be

handled in New Caledonia. Many of the

vehicles shipped directly from the United

States for the 25th Division had to be sent

all the way to Wellington, New Zealand,

for assembly and then transshipment to

Guadalcanal. Delays in assembly and

faulty assembly by untrained personnel

combined with an acute shortage of spare

parts and of maintenance personnel to

keep large numbers of vehicles constantly

deadlined.28

These defects in the handling of cargo

shipments were the subject of endless communications between the Pacific theaters

and the SOS in Washington. By early

1943 there was a marked improvement.

thereto from Pac, AG 400 (8-10-42) Sec 13. (4) Ltr,

Lt Col Joseph H. Burgheim to Col Cordiner, 29 Apr

42, Sup S Pac Theater folder, Plng Div ASF. (5) Rpt

by Col Frank A. Henning, 1 Aug 42, sub: Sup Opns

in Australia . . . , 1-A-1 Jt Sup Prog (SWPA and S

Pac Area) IV folder, Plng Div ASF.

28

 (1) Ltr, Maj Gen Robert G. Breene to Gen Lutes,

11 May 43, SPAC 1942-43-mid-1944 folder, Lutes

File. (2) Memo, Gen Plans Br Plng Div SOS for Chief

of Mvmts Br, 12 Dec 42, sub: Shipt of Vehicles on

Wheels to S Pac Theater, 451 Vehicles Misc 1942-43

folder, Plng Div ASF.
406 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Wooden containers replaced paper and

fiber, marking and packing improved,

cargo manifests were forwarded early by

air mail, block stowage and unit loading

were more generally practiced. As supply

levels within the theaters were built up

and theater distribution facilities improved, the need for retail distribution

from the United States diminished.

The General Depot at Noumea

Australia, for all its limited facilities,

still provided a central base for supply

operations that was totally lacking in the

South Pacific. It was possible by the fall of

1942 to establish in Australia a system of

depots for stocking theater reserves and a

system of central supply accounting that

Somervell and Lutes held up as a model

for other theaters to emulate. Requisitions

could thus be based on knowledge of the

total resources at the theater's disposal. In

the South Pacific, even after the establishment of a theater command, there were no

central depots, and requisitioning on the

United States by, and shipment to, each

separate base continued. It was well into

1943 before Maj. Gen. Robert G. Breene,

SOS commander for the South Pacific,

could establish even a semblance of central supply accounting. Since consumption

rates varied from base to base and troop

bases were not always stable, reserve stocks

at each base frequently became unbalanced. Inflexible adherence in the United

States to tables of equipment often precluded furnishing vital items to small

organizations on isolated islands lacking

access to base facilities.29

Although a reasonable level of stockage

had been achieved by autumn in individual island depots, there was no central reserve of supplies and no provision for

prompt replacement of sudden heavy

losses or meeting of emergency demands.

The invasion of Guadalcanal imposed an

almost immediate strain on reserve stocks

in New Caledonia. General Patch in

August furnished on short notice over

twenty thousand tons of supplies for Marine forces moving against Guadalcanal.

He also had to provide supplies for the

new bases at Efate and Espiritu Santo.

"Everyone robs Poppy," General Harmon

wrote OPD on 20 August 1942, and he

recommended that a small general depot

be established at Noumea as a "reservoir

from which emergency and unanticipated

demands could be filled."

 30

 Harmon's

recommendation received sympathetic

consideration in Washington, but it was

evident that such an establishment would

require additional personnel and materials to build and man the depots, and little shipping was in sight to transport them.

OPD also raised the question of co-ordination with the Navy in setting up strategic

reserves in the South Pacific. While these

matters were under discussion in Washington, stocks in New Caledonia were

again depleted to re-equip the combat

team that lost its equipment in the sinking

of the President Coolidge.31

29

 (1) Ltr, Lutes to Breene, 2 Apr 43. (2) Ltrs,

Breene to Lutes, 11 May and 29 Jun 43. Both in

SPAC 1942-43-mid-1944 folder, Lutes File. (3)

Drummond, History of the U.S. Army Forces in the

South Pacific Area During World War II From 30

March 1942 to 1 August 1944, p. 507, OCMH. (4)

Memo, Col Leonard H. Rodieck and Lt Col Edward

H. McDaniel for ACofS OPD, 24 Nov 42, sub: Visit

. . . to S and SW Pac Theater Bases, OPD 333.1

PTO, Sec 1. 30

 (1) Ltr, Harmon to Handy, 20 Aug 42, OPD 381

PTO, Case 91. (2) Rpt, p. 20, cited n. 11(6). 31

 (1) Disposition form, Actg ACofS OPD for CG

SOS, 22 Aug 42, sub: Estab of WHITE POPPY

[Noumea] Gen Depot, OPD 400 PTO, Case 9. (2)

Draft msg, Hq SOS to New Caledonia, 23 Aug 42,

with accompanying memo for rcd, New Caledonia

Gen folder, Plng Div ASF, Job A45-124. (3) Ltr,

ACofS OPD to CG USAFISPA, 12 Sep 42, with

atchd OPD memo for rcd, OPD 381 PTO, Case 100.

(4) Ltr, CG USAFISPA to ACofS OPD, 22 Oct 42,

OPD 381 PTO, Case 109.
TURNING POINT IN THE PACIFIC 407

During his visit to the South Pacific,

General Lutes recommended the establishment of supply reserves in both New

Caledonia and the Fijis since the Japanese

fleet was then at large and Lutes felt that

an alternate base should be ready in case

of an attack on New Caledonia. The defeat of the Japanese Fleet by Halsey's

forces in early November removed this

danger, but the need for a system for stocking reserves in the South Pacific remained.

In November Harmon forwarded to Washington a plan for a supply system embracing a base depot in New Zealand, intermediate depots in New Caledonia and the

Fijis, and an advance depot on Espiritu

Santo. Both Harmon and Lutes thought

the 30 days' supply proposed for the intermediate depots should be a strategic reserve over and above the 120-day level

authorized for the theater. OPD refused to

accept the plan. The establishment of a

general depot on New Caledonia was

finally authorized in March 1943, but

with the provision that it must be stocked

within existing theater supply levels. The

rest of the plan for a depot system was

dropped since it appeared that direct shipments from the United States to each base

would offer greater economy in shipping.32

Landing Craft and Intratheater Transport

As the shape of warfare in the Pacific

unfolded, it revealed an imperative need

for all forms of water transport—landing

craft for assault on hostile shores, oceangoing vessels for movement of supplies

from rear to forward bases, and small

craft of various sorts for short hauls along

the coast and between islands. Lacking

developed ports, each island base also required, in addition to barges, its complement of other types of small vessels and

floating equipment. In the South Pacific,

except for coastwise traffic and port operations, these matters were a Navy responsibility, and the Navy was in a better position to meet needs for landing craft and

small vessels as they arose. In SWPA the

shortage was so acute that it posed a limitation on all operations.

The Papua Campaign was not, nor

could it have been, an amphibious operation. The first American troops of the 32d

Division were sent by ship and air to Port

Moresby, and from there one battalion

made the tortuous trek across the Owen

Stanley Range to the north coast of Papua.

This trek, which took about five weeks,

proved that it would be impractical to

move a large force over the mountain trail

and the Americans thereafter resorted to

air transport. In the attack on Buna, supplies to the forces in combat moved mainly

by jeep, native carrier, and airdrop. MacArthur cabled the War Department on

17 October 1942:

I am greatly hampered by the total lack of

light shipping, landing boats and barges

which I have previously requested. In their

absence I am moving overland by air. Supply

is the controlling factor and must be accomplished by native carrier and by air. Improvised landing fields have been and are being

prepared. . . . Supply difficulties are incredible and limit speed of movement and

size of forces and are of course multiplied by

32

 (1) Msg, New Caledonia to AGWAR, 27 Oct 42,

CM-IN 11427. (2) Msg 14794, COMGENSOPAC

[CG S Pac] to AGWAR, 3 Nov 42. (3) Memo, Lutes

for Dir Plans Div SOS, 15 Jan 43, sub: Reserve

Sups—S Pac. (4) Memo, Gen Lutes for Col Charles E.

Dissinger, Plans Div, 20 Mar 43. Last three in SPAC

1942-43-mid-1944 folder, Lutes File. (5) Lutes, "Supply: World War II," Antiaircraft Journal, Vol.

LXXXXV, No. 4 (July-August 1952), p. 5. (6)

Memo, Lutes for OPD, 20 Apr 43, sub: Advance Depots—S Pac Theater, 13b Day File-S Pac Area-Prior

to 1 Oct 43 folder, Plng Div ASF. (7) Drummond,

History of the U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific

Area . . . , pp. 513-14, 686-92, OCMH.
408 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

lack of shipping and shortage of transport

planes.33

An observer noted in December 1942 that

there was "every reason to believe that

Buna could have been taken during November if one of our units could have put

a minimum of one combat team afloat."

 34

MacArthur had asked in July for sufficient landing craft to train and equip two

American divisions and one Australian

division, but was told he must rely on craft

locally available and those the South Pacific Amphibious Force could loan him.

The planners in Washington, engrossed in

the shortage of landing craft for SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP, were unable to

divert any even for MacArthur's training

needs. The Navy did promise to make

some available from the South Pacific

Area for training purposes, but few serviceable craft from this source had arrived in

Australia by mid-December.35

The dwindling of BOLERO and the increase in production of landing craft

altered this outlook. In setting up tentative

long-range allocations of landing craft in

September and October 1942, the JCS

agreed to provide SWPA with a substantial number of all types, the first increment,

consisting of 284 36-foot craft and 172

50-foot LCM(3)'s, in a priority just under

that of the TORCH operation and the South

Pacific Amphibious Force. At the same

time the War Department decided to send

MacArthur one Engineer amphibian brigade, an organization designed to move

one infantry division in shore-to-shore

landing operations, using primarily the

36-foot and 50-foot boats. Originally five

of these brigades had been planned for use

in Europe, and three were hastily organized in mid-1942. Only one (the 1st) had

been sent to England before the North

African venture placed the emphasis, for

the moment, upon ship-to-shore operations

under naval control. As the Navy proposed

to take over all amphibious training and

operations, OPD first ruled that no more

brigades should be committed to SWPA

until the first one had been tested. MacArthur insisted that the shore-to-shore

techniques of these brigades were better

suited to SWPA than the ship-to-shore

methods of the Navy, and Colonel Arthur

G. Trudeau of the Engineer Amphibian

Command, after a visit to Australia and

New Guinea, corroborated this view. The

necessity for flanking movements along the

coast, the shallow and constricted waters

in which operations would have to be conducted, and the usefulness of small craft in

lightering supplies and equipment all argued for the use of the brigades. OPD

accordingly decided, late in December

1942, that the 3d Engineer Amphibian

Brigade should be earmarked for SWPA

and a fourth brigade activated to be

shipped there when trained. When in February 1943 General Marshall and Admiral

King arrived at a general agreement that

the Navy should take over amphibious

training and operations, the three amphibian brigades for SWPA were excepted

from the arrangement.36

33

 (1) See msg, CINGSWPA to AGWAR, 17 Oct

42, CM-IN 07247. The undecipherable part of this

message was repeated in msg, CINCSWPA to

AGWAR, 18 Oct 42, CM-IN 07523. (2) See also,

Milner, Victory in Papua, Chs. VIII, XI. 34

 Memo, Col Arthur G. Trudeau, Engr Amphibian Comd, for ACofS OPD, 14 Dec 42, OPD 333.1

PTO, Case 3. 35

 (1) Msg, CINCSWPA to AGWAR, 6 Jul 42,

CM-IN 2049. (2) Msg, AGWAR to CINCSWPA, 7

Jul 42, CM-OUT 1772. (3) Msg, CINCSWPA to

AGWAR, 11 Jul 42, CM-IN 3720. (4) Msg, AGWAR

to CINCSWPA, 15 Jul 42, CM-OUT 4145. (5) Memo

cited n. 34. 36

 (1) Memo, OPD for CG SOS, 12 Sep 42, sub:

Landing Craft, 5d C1 IV Amphibious-SWPA folder,

Plng Div ASF, Job A45-124. (2) Memo cited n. 34.
TURNING POINT IN THE PACIFIC 409

The first elements of the 2d Engineer

Amphibian Brigade departed the United

States for Australia in December 1942, the

rest early in 1943. The 3d and 4th Brigades were scheduled for shipment during

the spring and summer of 1943. As of

4 January 1943, 1,380 LCVP's and 172

LCM(3)'s had been allocated for their use

and, in addition, 30 105-foot LCT(5)'s

were scheduled to go to MacArthur's

command.37 To ease the shipping problem,

a base shop battalion was dispatched to

Australia in late November 1942 to assemble the 36-foot craft in the theater. All

these measures promised eventual relief of

the shortage of landing craft and amphibious personnel in MacArthur's command,

but there was an inevitable time lag in fulfillment of plans. Again as of 4 January

1943, only 66 LCVP's, 10 LCM(3)'s and

3 LCT(5)'s had actually been shipped,

and the base shop battalion had yet to

establish itself in Australia and to perfect

the techniques of assembly.38

At an early date MacArthur had also

requested large vessels to move troops and

supplies from one port to another in Australia and from Australia to New Guinea.

Again he was told that he must rely on

local resources. These were meager

enough, for all available Australian vessels

were being used for domestic needs. MacArthur's main resources during the New

Guinea Campaign consisted of twenty-one

Dutch vessels that had escaped capture

after the fall of the Netherlands Indies,

three vessels of Chinese registry, and one

of Siamese. These he supplemented, despite vigorous protests from WSA, by retaining Liberty ships arriving in the theater from the States. Meanwhile, he

continued to press Washington for a larger

allotment of shipping.

In addition to large vessels, there was a

pressing need in SWPA for a wide variety

of small ships and craft, ranging from native canoes to vessels of nearly one thousand gross tons. In 1942 ocean-going

vessels could not proceed along the north

coast of New Guinea beyond Milne Bay.

Cargo and personnel had to be transshipped at Port Moresby or Milne Bay to

a miscellaneous collection of trawlers,

schooners, luggers, and ketches, largely

procured from Australian sources. To supplement these, a program of construction

under reverse lend-lease was begun in

Australia in September 1942. These measures, too, fell short of the need, and MacArthur had to place requirements on the

United States for additional small vessels.

Procurement of both large and small

vessels in the United States was slow. They

were not a normal item of Army supply.

A procurement program for small vessels

was inaugurated early in 1943, but the

(3) Pacific: June 1942-January 1943, pp. 292-310,

OPD Hist Unit File. (4) Coll and Rosenthal, Engr I,

draft ch. "The Engineer Amphibian Command,"

OCMH. (5) Masterson, Transportation in SWPA, pp.

416-17. (6) Msg, CINCSWPA to AGWAR, 20 Nov

42, CM-IN 8583. (7) Msg, AGWAR to CINCSWPA,

24 Nov 42, CM-OUT 7727. (8) Msg, CINCSWPA to

AGWAR, 2 Mar 43, CM-IN 747. (9) Memo, CofS for

CNO, 16 Feb 43, sub: A&N Amphibious Boat Crews.

(10) Memo of agreement, CofS, COMINCH, and

CNO, 8 Mar 43. Last two in OPD 353 Amphibious

Force, Case 123.

37

 The requirements for each of the three brigades

were set at 540 LCVP's, 503 LCM(3)'s, and 40 LCC's

or LCS(S)'s, a total of 1620 LCVP's, 1509 LCM(3)'s

and 120 LCC's or LCS(S)'s. The allocations were

therefore only a partial fulfillment of these requirements. The LCT(5)'s were in addition to the table of

organization requirements for the brigades. See below,

App. A-7. 38

 (1) Memo, Chief of SW Pac Theater Sec OPD

for ACofS OPD, 4 Jan 43, sub: Rpt of Inspection of

Pac Areas by Col Trudeau, OPD 333.1 PTO, Case 3.

(2) Coll and Rosenthal, Engr I, draft ch. "The Engineer Amphibian Command," OCMH. (3) Corresp in

5d C1 IV Amphibious-SWPA folder, Plng Div ASF,

Job A45-124.
410 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

placing of orders was late and there were

few deliveries before midyear. Meanwhile,

the only large vessels available were

steamers diverted from commercial trades

on the Great Lakes. Though old and constantly in need of repair, they were made

to serve. Gradually, from January 1943

onward, the local fleet at MacArthur's disposal grew, but never to the point where it

was not necessary to retain transpacific

shipping in the theater.39

The Army also had under development

amphibious vehicles that promised at least

a partial solution to the small boat problem. In July 1942 SOS announced that an

amphibian jeep, an amphibian trailer,

and an amphibian 21⁄2-ton truck (the

DUKW) were under production, each

capable of a "small amount of rough water

operation."

 40

 None of these vehicles arrived in the theaters, however, until early

1943. After trials the performance of the

DUKW was generally acclaimed, and it

promised to be of great assistance in facilitating discharge at ports having inadequate facilities, or over coral beaches. Unfortunately, the Pacific theaters had to

compete with other theaters and Allied

forces for output, which continued in 1943

to be limited.41

Air transport was a main prop of the

Papuan operations, but transport planes

were one of the scarcest commodities in

the whole catalogue of supply, demanded

by every theater commander, by the British, and by the Russians. Early in 1942,

seventy-eight transport planes were allocated to MacArthur's command but in

mid-September, when the air transport of

troops to the northern coast of New Guinea

began, there were only forty-one in the

theater and fifteen of these were being

cannibalized to provide spare parts for the

others. OPD agreed to provide two additional troop carrier squadrons. One (thirteen C-47's) reached Australia in October,

but the other was detained by General

Harmon for a month in the South Pacific

to provide air transport between New

Caledonia and Guadalcanal. The situation improved somewhat with the arrival

of the second squadron in November, and

OPD promised that two more squadrons

would be sent to SWPA in early 1943.

There were continuing limitations on air

transport, however, in terms both of transports available and of landing fields from

which to fly them. Any solution to the

transportation problem in the Southwest

Pacific would require larger quantities of

all the various forms of equipment.42 The

shortage of intratheater transport combined with that of transpacific shipping

and of theater base and port facilities to

place definite limitations on the pace of

Pacific operations.

Equipment for Jungle Warfare

Jungle warfare had been only vaguely

foreseen in the Army's prewar plans and

very little special equipment was designed

for it. American troops fought the campaigns of most of 1942 with standard

equipment and weapons. But by mid1942, the staff in Washington was turning

its attention to the development of jungle

39

 (1) Masterson, Transportation in SWPA, pp.

317-80, contains a full treatment of the vessel problem

in MacArthur's command. (2) Bykofsky and Larson,

Trans III, Ch. VIII. (3) Memo cited n. 34. 40

 Ltr, ACofS Opns to CG S Pac Area, 10 Jul 42,

sub: Sp Reqmts for Amphibious Vehicles, 451.94

Amphibian Vehicles folder, Plng Div ASF. 41

 (1) Masterson, Transportation in SWPA, pp.

412-16. (2) Ltr, 19 Apr 43, cited n. 25(4). (3) Msg,

AGWAR to CINCSWPA, 5 Jun 43, CM-OUT 2283.

(4) Memo cited n. 26(12). 42

 (1) Craven and Cate, AAF IV, p. 114. (2) Msg,

CINCSWPA to AGWAR, 17 Sep 42, CM-IN 7298.

(3) Memo cited n. 26(12).
TURNING POINT IN THE PACIFIC 411

equipment, jungle training, and special

types of units. By July 1942 a jungle kit

had been developed that, with certain

later modifications, satisfactorily met the

needs of the individual jungle soldier. This

kit consisted of one pair of jungle boots,

two pairs of cushion-sole socks, a one-piece

jungle uniform, camouflaged helmet liner

and helmet band, a flotation bladder,

machete and sheath, knit shirt, mosquito

repellent gloves, light jungle pack, eight

waterproof bags, jungle hammock, waterproof clothing bag, single-cell flashlight,

jungle medical kit, and waterproof matchbox with compass. On 24 July 1942 OPD

directed the SOS to procure 150,000 of

these kits, the first 30,000 to go to the AGF

for training in the United States, the second 30,000 to the Caribbean Defense

Command for training jungle units in

Panama and the West Indies, then 60,000

to SWPA and 30,000 to the South Pacific.43

In mid-August, General MacArthur

submitted a long and detailed requisition

for equipment needed to prepare three

divisions for warfare in New Guinea. The

list was based on the theory that organizational as well as individual equipment

should be light, most of the items requested being patterned on equipment

then being used by the Japanese. MacArthur wanted to convert his infantry

cannon companies to the use of 60-mm.

mortars, his 105-mm. howitzer battalions

to 81-mm. mortars and 75-mm. pack howitzers. He also asked for folding bicycles,

saddles, bridles, pack harnesses, light machine guns, light tractors, and other miscellaneous articles; throughout the emphasis was on light construction and

manual mobility. In keeping with his

stated troop basis, he increased the requirement for the jungle kits from the

60,000 allotted him to 116,000.44 This

special requisition was given a high priority by MacArthur, and SOS agencies

made strenuous efforts to meet it by immediate shipments. Some of the materials

reached SWPA in time to be used in the

later stages of the Buna operations. In the

Army Ground Forces, meanwhile, there

was considerable discussion about and

planning for the development of specialized light divisions for both jungle and

mountain warfare.

Experience both on New Guinea and

Guadalcanal soon revealed, however, that

standard heavy equipment was more effective than believed earlier, and it proved

to be far superior to Japanese matériel. In

the end, virtually no changes were made

in tables of organization and equipment

for troops in the Pacific. Some of the

lighter types of equipment proved useful,

but the theory of specially equipped light

divisions for jungle warfare was discarded.

The jungle kits, on the other hand, proved

their worth. General Harmon in November 1942 raised his requirement for them

from the 30,000 originally allotted to

80,000. Some time passed before either his

or MacArthur's increased requirements

could be met, the rate of availability varying with individual items. Shipments were

still incomplete in March 1943.45

43

 (1) Min, WD Gen Council mtgs, Jun 42, especially 21 Jun. (2) Memo, ACofS OPD for CG SOS,

24 Jul 42, sub: Procurement of Jungle Clothing and

Equip, 420 Clothing and Equip (Jungle and Arctic)

folder, Plng Div ASF. 44

 (1) Msg C-275, CINCSWPA to AGWAR, 16

Aug 42, paraphrase copy in 3c Cl II Sups-Jungle

Equip-SWPA Only folder, Plng Div ASF. (2) History

of the Planning Division, ASF, III, 134, OCMH. 45

 (1) See material in 3c Cl II Sups-Jungle EquipSWPA Only folder, Plng Div ASF. (2) History of the

Planning Division, ASF, III, 138, OCMH. (3) Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, AGF I, pp. 339-50. (4) Msg,

New Caledonia to AGWAR, 28 Nov 42, CM-IN

12106.
412 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Apart from individual jungle kits, the

special needs of the Pacific war narrowed

to the question of finding standard types

that would stand up under tropical conditions, and to providing larger quantities

of other types of supplies for which the

need in the Pacific was abnormally high.

In the latter classification fell antimalarial

supplies and other medical and hospital

supplies and facilities. There was also a

heavy demand for construction materials,

which, if not greater than that of other

theaters, at least imposed a heavier demand on shipping over the long distances

involved. All these special needs and problems combined to add to the lag between

demand and supply that characterized

the war in the Pacific in 1942 and 1943.

Service Troops

Of all the overseas theaters, those in the

Pacific needed service troops most, and in

none was the scarcity more severe. Ignorance of the primitive conditions to be

encountered, the natural desire of theater

and task force commanders to squeeze the

maximum of fighting strength into the

shipping space allotted them, and the

shortage of trained service units all conspired to keep the deployment of service

troops far below requirements.

In Australia the situation was far better

than on the South Pacific islands. General

Brett was not behindhand in asking for

service troops, and in answer to his requests a fair proportion of such units were

included in the early troop build-up in

Australia. But the War Department took

the view that Australian labor should be

used as far as possible, and Marshall gave

General Wilson instructions to this effect

when the latter left in February on his

mission to organize supply activities in

Australia. Wilson's experience in the theater did not shake his adherence to this

view, and it was one of the issues on which

he clashed with General Barnes, commander of USAFIA. For Barnes, as well

as most other American supply officers

and observers in Australia, was dissatisfied with Australian labor and found it

particularly irksome to rely on it for port

operations. The majority of Australian

longshoremen were over forty-five years of

age, jealous of the privileges won through

union organization, and evidently not

ardently enthusiastic in their support of

the war effort. The Australian Government, at least in the eyes of many U.S.

Army observers, gave in to every demand

of the longshoremen because of its dependence upon organized labor for political

support. American forces had also to rely

heavily on services provided by the Australian Army, and General Richardson,

when he visited Australia in July, voiced

sharp dissatisfaction with the situation,

pointing to the heavy losses of supplies

handled by Australian Army agencies.46

In mid-July Richardson's reports and

strong requests from General MacArthur

for additional service units brought the

problem to a head. There were then approximately 43,000 ground tactical troops

in Australia, with 28,000 ground service

troops to support them; in the air forces

the balance was about the same. Though

this was a high ratio of service support

compared to that currently contemplated

for the European theater, OPD conceded

46

 (1) Memo, Richardson for CofS, 17 Jul 42, sub:

Mis to Pac Bases and Australia, OPD 333 (Gen Richardson's Trip) Case 21. (2) Memo, unsigned, no addressee, 9 Jul 42, sub: Australia, Vol. V, Item 1, Exec

2. (3) Masterson, Transportation in SWPA, pp. 481-

85, 497-514. (4) Rpt, Gen Wilson to CG USAFIA, 30

May 42, sub: Plans and Projects . . . , SWPA Sup

folder, Plng Div ASF, Job A44-140.
TURNING POINT IN THE PACIFIC 413

that MacArthur's additional stated requirements from July through November—about 16,750 ground and 12,900 air

service troops over and above scheduled

shipments of 9,000—were defensible. But

the limited pool of service units in the

United States was otherwise committed,

mostly for BOLERO.47

With the dwindling of BOLERO, some of

MacArthur's requests were approved, but

unfortunately the shipping requirements

for moving the 43d Division to the South

Pacific Area, arising in September, led to

curtailment of troop movements to Australia. Forced to choose, MacArthur gave

priority to filler replacements, and the

service troops were presently pushed even

lower on the scale by amphibious and

other special combat units. The vexing

dependence on Australian civilian labor

and military services continued; port work

in Australia was handled almost entirely

by Australians. Even so, American forces

in Australia were better served than those

who pushed into New Guinea where, as in

the South Pacific, native labor could perform only the simplest and most routine

tasks. "At nearly every place visited," reported two Transportation Corps observers

in May 1943, "the general complaint of

officers was the lack of service personnel."

 48

In the South Pacific, an area where

service troops were probably more essential and needed in larger numbers than in

any other theater, the ratio of service support at the end of 1942 was shockingly

low—only 14,500 service troops to about

92,000 air and ground combat troops.49

During his October survey of the South

Pacific bases, one of General Lutes' principal recommendations was the shipment

of additional service units to each base.

With certain modifications OPD approved, but though this action promised

some relief, many of the units were not

immediately available, and some could

not be shipped until April 1943.

The South Pacific, like the Southwest

Pacific, faced steadily increasing needs in

the face of a shortage of shipping. The forward movement into the Russell Islands

and the prospect of further advances in

the Solomons meant that a base would

have to be established on Guadalcanal.

Anticipating this development, General

Harmon late in November 1942 requested

additional service units for Guadalcanal.

He was granted only one port battalion;

for the rest, OPD insisted that he must

move units forward from the rear.50 General Breene could only protest:

I respectfully submit the opinion that the

Operations Division fails completely to understand our problem if they refuse to send

Service Units to Cactus [Guadalcanal]. It is, of course, true that the rear areas can be

stripped of the meagre service units now

available in order to take care of the Cactus

problem, but the work in the rear areas must

continue. If service troops are not available

the work must necessarily be done by combat

troops. . . . local labor is almost non-exist47

 Memo, Handy for CofS, 27 Jul 42, sub: Comments and Recommendations on Gen Richardson's

Rpt on Australia, OPD 333 (Gen Richardson's Trip)

Case 19. 48

 (1) Memo cited n. 26(12). (2) Memo, OPD for

CINCSWPA, 10 Aug 42, sub: Additional Units

Authorized for U.S. Forces in Australia, OPD 320.2

Australia, Case 53. (3) Pacific, June 1942-January

1943, pp. 192-94, 319-21, OPD Hist Unit File. (4)

Masterson, Transportation in SWPA, pp. 478-513. 49

 Army Forces in S and Central Pac, 29 Dec 42,

Tab, SYMBOL: Casablanca Bks., Vol. II, Exec 6. 50

 (1) Memo, OPD for CG SOS, 21 Nov 42, sub:

Additional Sv Trs for S Pac Area, and subsequent

memos, 4, 9, 10, 17, 27 Dec, same sub, OPD 320.2

PTO, Cases 83 and 91. (2) Ltr cited n. 26(2). (3)

Msgs, New Caledonia to AGWAR, 30 Nov 42, CMIN 12737; 13 Dec 42, CM-IN 5661; 22 Dec 42, CMIN 9453; 15 Jan 43, CM-IN 6934; and 5 Feb 43,

CM-IN 3611.
414 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ent. . . . even though we are furnished

combat troops to carry out service functions,

combat troops will not take a real interest in

their service job.51

The Pacific Outlook at the End of 1942

By early December 1942 it appeared

that, despite all difficulties, the Guadalcanal and Papua Campaigns would soon

be brought to a successful conclusion. On

1 December General Marshall suggested

to Admiral King that the time had come

to proceed with Tasks Two and Three in

accordance with the July directive and

proposed that command of further operations pass to General MacArthur. Again

the Navy demurred, this time citing Admiral Nimitz' view that first the Solomons

area must be better secured and air power,

troop strength, and supporting bases built

up there. Nimitz proposed that the next

campaign be up the Solomons ladder,

probably against New Georgia where the

Japanese were beginning to build an airfield, and that the operations should remain under the direction of Admiral Halsey. General Marshall countered by

pointing out that the total Allied forces in

the South and Southwest Pacific possessed

a comfortable superiority over the Japanese. He contended that if all these forces

were brought under the unified strategic

command of General MacArthur, they

would be able to accomplish the objectives set up in July. The Navy planners

argued that the Pacific Fleet must retain

its strategic flexibility to counter any

threat arising in the whole area between

the west coast and Australia. They would

accept MacArthur's command over operations of their South Pacific forces only if

Admiral Nimitz were given over-all strategic direction of the entire Pacific. In the

end the only agreement reached was on

the necessity of initiating further operations toward Rabaul; the details of strategy and command remained in abeyance.52

Nevertheless, at the suggestion of Admiral King, General MacArthur furnished

his outline plan for the advance against

Rabaul, and OPD, in preparation for the

Casablanca Conference, prepared its own

plan on the assumption that Allied operations in the South and Southwest Pacific

would be under a single command. Both

plans envisaged an advance up the two

legs of the inverted V, of which Rabaul

was the apex.53

There was no real attempt to work out

the logistical implications of these outline

plans. While MacArthur stressed the fact

that additional resources would be necessary, OPD planners were blandly optimistic, indicating that troops, aircraft, supplies, and shipping would be available for

the operations. They did take brief notice

of the shortage of shipping, indicating that

there would not be enough assault vessels

if "separate commanders [were] . . . to

conduct simultaneous operations in the

South and Southwest Pacific areas," and

that priorities would have to be adjusted,

at the expense of other operations, if merchant shipping were to be made available.54

 They also pointed to the still unsatisfied demand for small vessels as a

possible cause of delay. For the most part,

however, OPD planners glossed over the

welter of logistical difficulties standing in

51

 Ltr, 4 Feb 43, cited n. 25(4). 52

 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942,

pp. 367-70. 53

 (1) Msg, CINCSWPA to AGWAR, 10 Jan 43,

CM-IN 4574. (2) Outline Strategic Plan, title: Allied

Offensive To Seize and Occupy the Rabaul Area,

Tab F-9, SYMBOL: Casablanca Bks., Vol. I, Exec 6. 54

 Outline cited n. 53(2).
TURNING POINT IN THE PACIFIC 415

the way of an early resumption of the offensive, and paid little heed to the clear

warnings of Nimitz and MacArthur that

the reduction of Rabaul would require

large additional air and ground forces.

Logistical difficulties and insufficient air

power had been primarily responsible for

the failure to complete Task One and

launch Tasks Two and Three in 1942, and

the remedy for the logistical shortcomings

revealed at each stage of operations had

been late in coming and usually inadequate. The complications resulting from

separate Army and Navy channels had

yet to be ironed out. Everything pointed

to the necessity for a pause in early 1943

before any further large-scale offensive

in the Solomons-New Guinea-Bismarck

Archipelago area could be resumed.

In addition to the proposed advance on

Rabaul, Army planners at the end of 1942

were also giving more serious attention to

the northern Pacific. While the northern

route had generally been ruled out as a

major line of advance toward Japan, there

was a strong disposition to eliminate the

Japanese threat to Alaska arising from

their possession of Kiska and Attu. General De Witt, commander of the Western

Defense Command, continually urged

such an operation. In August 1942 Adak

was occupied and subsequently built up

as an advanced base from which Attu and

Kiska could be brought under heavy attack. But both OPD and General Marshall regarded the troops committed to

Alaska (eighty-five thousand) as excessive

and were reluctant to divert the amphibious forces needed for the assault. Nonetheless, the discovery that the Japanese

had made a reconnaissance of Amchitka

led to American occupation of that island

in January 1943, and in preparation for

me Casablanca Conference an outline

plan was drawn up for the occupation of

Kiska. Calculations indicated that a task

force of twenty-five thousand men, built

around one amphibiously trained division, would be required. No extraordinary

logistical difficulties were anticipated beyond the additional strain on shipping,

but OPD had no enthusiasm for this project, which would mean additional dispersion of effort.55

Down to the end of 1942 the Army had

given little consideration to reviving the

prewar plan for an advance from Hawaii

through the Gilberts and Marshalls and

toward the Philippines; its plans were

generally drawn in terms of an advance

upward from the Southwest Pacific, with

Truk as the next objective after the capture of Rabaul. In Navy planning, however, the Central Pacific occupied an

important place, and at Casablanca Admiral King was to offer the Central Pacific

route as an alternative or supplement to

the Southwest Pacific line. From the logistical point of view, this approach had certain attractions since it involved shorter

lines of communication and the use of the

well-developed bases on Hawaii for

launching the initial drive.

The outlook at the end of 1942 was thus

for a continuation of the limited offensives

in the Pacific with a view to wearing down

and dispersing Japanese forces and to

gaining bases for a final assault against

Japan once the war against Germany had

been won. It appeared likely that these

advances would be from several directions, with all the problems incident to

divided theater commands. On the logis55

 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942,

Ch. XVI.
416 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

tical side, the campaigns of 1942 had

provided valuable lessons—the problems

involved in warfare in the Pacific had

been brought into proper focus and the

way pointed toward their solution. Despite

the optimism of Army planners, there was

every prospect that the scarcity of resources would continue to delay advances

during 1943 unless Pacific operations were

given a higher priority. Nevertheless, the

hard-won victories on Guadalcanal and

New Guinea without question represented

a genuine turning point. By early 1943

plans for the Pacific were being framed

entirely in terms of offensive and not defensive strategy, a marked change from

the situation that had characterized most

of the first year of the war. This change in

the strategic picture foretold a period in

which logistics could in turn be based on

solid advance planning rather than improvisation.
CHAPTER XVI

The Descent on North Africa

With the grudging American acceptance of the North Africa invasion project

at the end of July 1942, British strategic

views won a notable victory. As Churchill

later put it in one of his cadenced passages,

" 'Sledgehammer' fell by the wayside, and

'Gymnast' came into its own."

 1 AngloAmerican strategy turned again upon the

path that had been optimistically charted

and then abandoned the preceding December and January during the first wartime meetings of the leaders and staffs

after Pearl Harbor. There now remained

the task of reaching agreement on the

scope and timing of the new GYMNAST—

now called TORCH—a task that was to

consume six tedious weeks while preparations to mount the operation floundered

in uncertainty.2

The Essay Contest

The point at issue in this "transatlantic

essay contest," as one contemporary called

it, was whether the operation's center of

gravity should be in the west, with the

principal landings on the Atlantic coast, or

inside the Mediterranean.3 The former

conception was held by the American

staffs in Washington, the latter by the British and to some degree also by Eisenhower's staff in London. American plans

for GYMNAST, as late as July, had ruled out

inside landings altogether, aiming at occupying French Morocco, funneling all the

forces through Casablanca and a few satellite ports, and allowing about three months

to consolidate holdings in the west before

driving eastward. The impelling consideration was the belief that because of the

dangers of a hostile Spanish reaction, a

German move through Spain, or, at the

very least, passive opposition by the North

African French, it was imperative first to

secure the approaches to the Strait of

Gibraltar and overland communications

to the east against the possibility that the

Strait passage might be closed. There was

also an underlying reluctance on the part

of Marshall and his advisers to commit a

large part of Allied strength to operations

deep in the Mediterranean.4

The British conception was much

bolder. They saw the whole operation as

1

 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 447. 2

 (1) Discussion of strategic planning for TORCH in

this chapter, unless otherwise indicated, is based on

Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, Chs.

XII-XIV. (2) See above, Chs. VI, XIV. (3) See also

George F. Howe, Operations in Northwest Africa:

1942-1943, a volume in preparation for the series

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.

(4) Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds.,

Europe: TORCH to POINT BLANK–August 1942 to December 1943, Vol. II in THE ARMY AIR FORCES

IN WORLD WAR II (Chicago, The University of

Chicago Press, 1949) (hereafter cited as Craven and

Cate, AAF II). 3

 Capt. Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years With

Eisenhower (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1946),

p. 83. 4

 (1) OPD plng studies in Item 53, Exec 10, and

Item 6, Exec 1. (2) Memo, Chief of Plng Div OCT for

G-4, 1 Jul 42, sub: Shipg Available for Sp Project,

NATOUSA Convoy Info folder, OCT HB.
418 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

MAP 5

a major effort, in conjunction with the

Eighth Army offensive from the east, to

crush the enemy in a pincers and destroy

his power in North Africa. To accomplish

this, they held it imperative to strike early

with at least the appearance of overwhelming force before the plan leaked out and

while German forces, especially air forces,

were pinned down in the Soviet Union,

and then to gain Tunisia before German

reinforcements could be rushed across the

Sicilian narrows. If the Germans got to

Tunisia first, they could build up strength

more rapidly over their short lines of communications than could the Allies over

longer lines. "The whole conception of

TORCH," the British Chiefs of Staff declared on 11 August, "may stand or fall on

this question of early Allied occupation of

Tunisia."

 5

The more conservative views of the

Washington planners aroused bewilder- 5

 Memo, Br CsofS for Eisenhower, 11 Aug 42.

WDCSA TORCH. 1.
THE DESCENT ON NORTH AFRICA 419

ment and impatience among the British.

Casablanca, they argued, was a secondrate objective that would fall automatically if the inside landings were successful,

and that, if gained at the expense of lodgments in Algeria and Tunisia, would

impress neither friends nor neutrals, still

less enemies. Of all possible nuts, moreover, the British felt that Casablanca

would be the hardest to crack because of

surf conditions, which made landings impracticable four days out of every five, and

because of the hostile attitude of the

French authorities there. Weather and tide

offered more opportunities inside the

Mediterranean, giving commanders more

leeway in other respects—in choosing a

dark moon, for example—and as far as

local attitudes were concerned, Algiers

seemed the "softest and most paying

spot."

 6

. (Map 5) While recognizing the

value of secure communications, the Brit6

 Ltr. Prime Minister to Harry Hopkins, 4 Sep 42,

as quoted in Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 539.
420 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ish argued that the best way to cow the

Spaniards, who held the key to the Strait,

was to make a strong show of force in the

Mediterranean and to "get on shore and

get some ports."

 7 The Spaniards, the British were confident, would resist a German

incursion under those circumstances, but

an Allied reverse at Casablanca would almost certainly tempt them to attack

Gibraltar and let the Germans in. As

Churchill summed up, a strong effort

against Casablanca would

. . . be made at the expense of the landings

inside, and if there is resistance inside a fortiori

there will be resistance on the Atlantic shore,

with this difference—that you can overcome

the resistance inside and cannot overcome it

outside unless the surf is favourable, which is

four to one against. In short, the place to de- termine French action is inside, and if it is

determined there in a favourable sense there

will be no difficulty in occupying Casablanca

by agreement later.8

"The first victory we have to win is to

avoid a battle; the second if we cannot

avoid it, to win it."

 9

Throughout August Eisenhower and his

staff in London tried vainly to reconcile

the conflicting views of the British leaders

and of his superiors in Washington. The

primary obstacles to combining the two

conceptions in a single plan were the inadequacy of naval protection (surface and

air) for ocean communications and the

landings, and of assault shipping. Followup convoys must be at sea while the assaults were in progress; land-based air

support could only be based on the single

airfield at Gibraltar, directly under Spanish guns. Suspension of the northern convoys to the USSR in July released British

naval units for service in the Mediterranean, but an attempt to reinforce and

provision Malta during the second week

of August purchased meager success at

heavy cost—one carrier sunk and another

damaged. In the Pacific, American naval

power was pinned down by the Guadalcanal operation launched on 7 August. In

the desperate naval battles of that month

a carrier and several cruisers were sunk,

and in September and October a second

carrier and other warships went down.

Admiral King could make no definite

commitments during August and September to shift naval units to the Atlantic to

support TORCH.

 10

 Eisenhower thus could

not count on sufficient naval power to support three strong and widely separated

landings. His first outline plan, submitted

on 9 August, provided for both inside and

outside landings "approximately simultaneous" but with the latter postponed if

necessary a few days after the former, and

the easternmost landings very weak. His

second outline plan (21 August) abandoned the Casablanca landings altogether

and centered on securing a lodgment at

Oran, from which twin drives would be

launched into Tunisia (supporting landings farther east) and southwest across the

mountains into French Morocco. But the

complicated convoy arrangements necessary to bring in, within a few days, assault

forces, armored striking forces, service and

air forces, and material for all finally defied solution. In Washington the plan was

regarded as too risky, particularly in view

of the fate of the recent British Malta

convoy.11

7

 Ibid., p. 541. 8

 Ibid.

9

 Telegram, Former Naval Person to President

Roosevelt, 26 Aug 42, as quoted in Churchill, Hinge

of Fate, p. 528. 10

 (1) Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 505-06, 533. (2)

Craven and Cate, AAF II, p. 31. (3) See above, Ch.

XV.

11

 (1) Draft Outline Plan (Partial) Opn TORCH, Hq

ETOUSA, 9 Aug 42, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-A. (2)

Outline Plan Opn TORCH, Hq ETOUSA, Norfolk
THE DESCENT ON NORTH AFRICA 421

Assault shipping governed the timing

of the attack and the size of the attacking

forces. Most of the Navy's assault transports were in the Pacific, and there were

not enough, in any case, to meet requirements for twelve regimental combat teams

in three landings, estimated at from thirty

to thirty-six attack troop transports

(APA's) and nine to twelve attack cargo

transports (AKA's). The British contribution was uncertain, possibly enough for

four combat teams in the easternmost

landings. To convert conventional vessels

for the purpose, the Navy estimated that

almost fourteen weeks would be needed—

to make structural alterations, install

equipment, train crews, rehearse the

troops, load, and arrive at destination. On

2 August the Navy gave its opinion that

7 November was the earliest possible assault date. Some ten small vessels had

already been taken off the BOLERO run

and conversion work had started.12

On 4 August the British planners

abruptly reversed their own previous calculations and set a provisional target date

of 7 October (when the moon was favorable), which they admitted could be met

only by "superhuman efforts."

 13

 To do

this they were willing to skimp on training

and rehearsals. The American staffs were

not, but the President sided with the British and on 12 August directed Marshall to

try again for a 7 October landing, even if

this meant reducing the assault forces by

two thirds. About the same time Eisenhower also bowed to the pressure for an

early attack, and the first drafts of his second outline plan of 21 August reduced the

whole scale of the assault and placed all

landings inside the Mediterranean. This

would require the contingent from the

United States to depart late in September,

rendezvous near Gibraltar with the British

and American forces from the United

Kingdom, and make the principal attack

at Oran. As already noted, this plan involved convoy arrangements that could

not be contrived. It also seemed impossible to have the Oran contingent's assault

shipping ready in time. Admiral King did

not believe that even a 15 October assault

date could be met. The 24th, he thought,

was much more likely.14

It was further doubtful whether Eisenhower's American units in the United

Kingdom could be equipped and rehearsed in time. The 1st Division, his only

amphibiously trained American division

there, still lacked most of its heavy equipment, which depots in the States had been

unable to forward when the division sailed

early in August. A little later a freighter

carrying most of the artillery ran aground

in Halifax Harbor, and only part of the

cargo could be reloaded and shipped in a

British convoy on the 19th, reaching England at the end of the month. The staffs

Group, 21 Aug 42. Original copy issued in London

is Tab 35, Item 1, Exec 5, also circulated as Incl B to

CCS 103, 25 Aug 42, title: Opn TORCH. (3) Memo,

Marshall for President, 20 Aug 42, sub: TORCH Opn,

OPD 381 TORCH, 2. (4) Memo, Marshall for President, 24 Aug 42, same sub, Item 1, Exec 5. (5) Msg

3318, AGWAR to USFOR, 14 Aug 42, Item 9, Exec

5. (6) Corresp in ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B.

12

 (1) Memo, Handy for CofS, 2 Aug 42, sub:

TORCH, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B. (2) Papers in GYMNAST folder, Item 6, Exec 1. (3) Min, 34th mtg CCS,

30 Jul 42. (4) Msg 2818, Marshall to Eisenhower, 31

Jul 42, Item 9, Exec 5. (5) Papers in BOLERO folder,

OCT HB. (6) Plng Div SOS Diary, 3 1 Jul 42 entry,

Plng Div ASF. This source indicates fourteen BOLERO

vessels actually made available for conversion. Estimates of assault transport requirements varied. 13

 Msg 236, Br CsofS to Jt Stf Mis, 4 Aug 42, Item

2a, Exec 5. 14

 (1) Msg 237, Br CsofS to Jt Stf Mis, 4 Aug 42,

Item 2a, Exec 5. (2) Msg, King to Marshall, 22 Aug

42, sub: Sp Opns, Item 1, Exec 5. (3) Memo, Gen

Streett for CofS, 18 Aug 42, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B,

69.
422 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

allowed ten days to get equipment to the

troops after its arrival, a week or so for rehearsal, and then another ten days for outloading troops and equipment. Eisenhower's staff considered equipping the 1st

Division with the old-style howitzers of the

34th Division (part of which was also earmarked for TORCH), or with British 25-

pounders; otherwise, it would be necessary

to train two regimental combat teams of

the 34th to spearhead the Algiers attack.

It developed that there was not time to rehearse two combat teams with landing

craft and to recondition the craft for use in

the assault, nor were there enough craft in

England for both purposes. Still hoping

for a 15 October assault, Eisenhower put

one combat team of the 34th into training

and alerted one team of the 1st—just in

case. Meanwhile, the 1st Division's tardy

equipment slowly trickled in. As late as

19 September, by which time the entire

division was slated for the assault, none of

the field artillery had yet reached the

troops, though some was on the way, and

only fractional allowances of machine

guns, mortars, special vehicles, and signal

equipment were on hand.15 Back in the

States, it seemed unlikely that the 2d Armored Division, stripped of its tanks in

July to supply the British Eighth Army,

and the tank battalions attached to the 3d

and 9th Infantry Divisions could receive

their new Sherman (M4) tanks before

17 September, in time for training. The

3d Armored, if used, would have to go

with old-model Grants (M3); the 1st Armored, already in Northern Ireland, was

in the same situation. For ammunition,

forces in the United States would have to

draw on BOLERO stocks and borrow from

the Navy and the British. And in August

the transporting of tanks in an amphibious

assault was a problem still not solved; the

first LST's were not expected until October

or November.16

The 21 August outline plan pleased no

one, not even its authors. Brig. Gen. James

H. Doolittle was reported to have said, in

a mood of exhilarated pessimism, that "the

man who can put it over is a miracle

man."

 17

 Even the British Chiefs, on the

24th, finally conceded that a November

landing date might be acceptable if

stronger assaults might thereby be

mounted. But now the U.S. Chiefs wanted

to reorient the whole operation to the

westward, and so proposed on the 25th.18

Churchill, who had returned to London

from Cairo and Moscow only the day before, immediately exploded into action.

"The whole pith of the operation will be

lost," he cabled to Roosevelt, "if we do not

take Algiers as well as Oran on the first

day."

 19

 Upon Eisenhower he urged ad15

 (1) Msg 1160, USFOR to AGWAR, 14 Aug 42.

(2) Msg 1229, USFOR to AGWAR, 17 Aug 42. (3)

Msg 1291, USFOR to AGWAR, 19 Aug 42. All in

Item 9, Exec 5. (4) Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 17

Aug 42, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B, 54. (5) Memo, CofS

for President, 20 Aug 42, sub: TORCH Opn, OPD 381

TORCH, 2. (6) Msg, Gross to CG ETOUSA, 19 Aug

42, OCT 370.5 England. (7) Atchmts to memo, Magruder for Lutes, 3 Oct 42, sub: Status of Equip for

1st Div, U.K. Plans folder, Logis File, OCMH. (8)

Diary, 22 and 26 Sep 42 entries, cited n. 12(6). (9)

Memo, Adcock for Gen Larkin, 22 Sep 42, 18 Shipg

file, I, Case 29, Plng Div ASF, Job A46-371. 16

 (1) Memo, unsigned, no addressee, no date, sub:

Memo on Projected Opns, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 71. (2)

Memo, unsigned, no addressee, no date, sub: Date of

TORCH Landings Opns, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 72. (3)

Memo, Chief of Distrib Div for ACofS Opns SOS, 2

Aug 42, sub: Equip for Task Force. (4) Notes on conf,

10 Aug 42. Last two in TORCH folder, Task Force tab,

Lutes File. 17

 Msg 1417, Handy to WD, 22 Aug 42, ABC 381

(7-25-42) 4-B, 52. 18

 (1) Ltr, Eisenhower to CCS, 23 Aug 42, Incl C

to CCS 103 cited n. 11(2). (2) Msg 1465, USFOR to

AGWAR, 24 Aug 42, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B. 19

 Msg, Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt, 27 Aug 42. as quoted in Churchill, Hinge of Fate,

p. 530.
THE DESCENT ON NORTH AFRICA 423

ditional assaults at Bone and Philippeville,

along with a feint at Casablanca. The operation, he declared, must be launched

"along the broadest possible front" by

mid-October at the very latest; outloading must be accelerated somehow, naval

forces and combat loaders found somewhere—"nothing matters but success."

 20

This is an absolutely different kind of operation from the Dieppe business or any variants of "Sledgehammer." There we were up

against German efficiency and the steel- bound, fortified coasts of France. In "Torch"

we have to face at the worst weak, divided

opposition and an enormous choice of striking-points at which to land. Risks and difficulties will be doubled by delay and will far

outstrip any increase of our forces. Careful

planning in every detail, safety first in every

calculation, far-seeing provisions for a longterm campaign, to meet every conceivable

adverse contingency, however admirable in

theory, will ruin the enterprise in fact.21

Eisenhower thought Churchill was about

to jump in a plane and fly to Washington.22

The President, too, was ready to intervene, but for different reasons. In the last

week of August he received intelligence

from North Africa that convinced him

British participation in the initial landings would be a fatal provocation to local

sentiment. He approved main landings,

therefore, at Casablanca and Oran by

purely American forces, with the British

to follow through at Algiers a week later,

after the Americans had made political

arrangements. Like Churchill, the President was impatient of technical and administrative obstacles. His plan would

leave no assault shipping for the British

descent on Algiers, which might encounter

resistance, nor naval protection for the

British convoys that must be at sea in the

interim. And he, too, wanted an early

assault—"in no event later than October

30." His solution was characteristically

bland: "I think we should re-examine our

resources and strip everything to the bone

to make the third landing possible."

 23

This implied commitment evidently

broke the bottleneck. When the American

naval contribution was listed a few days

later it was clear, as Churchill wrote the

President, that "you too have skinned

yourselves to the bone." With naval protection assured, Churchill was all the

more insistent on simultaneous landings.

The British had managed to scrape together assault shipping for about thirty

thousand troops. After a few days of bargaining on the top level, the Americans

agreed to reduce the Oran and the Casablanca forces, releasing assault shipping

for ten thousand troops for Algiers. About

half of this was to be sent from the United

States in advance, carrying a full regimental combat team (the 39th) from the

9th Division, in time to join the Algiers

contingent. It was thus possible to plan

for simultaneous initial attacks:

(1) Casablanca (Western Task Force), 29,-

000 U.S. troops from the United States;

(2) Oran (Center Task Force), 25,000 U.S.

troops from the United Kingdom;

(3) Algiers (Eastern Task Force), 10,000

U.S. troops from the United Kingdom as a

spearhead, to be closely followed by larger

British forces.

The British were to provide the assault

shipping for the Oran force and half the

20

 Msg 1511, London to AGWAR, 26 Aug 42, ABC

318 (7-25-42), 4-B. 21

 Telegram cited n. 9. 22

 Msg 1559, London to AGWAR, 27 Aug 42, in

untitled folder, Misc TORCH File, DRB AGO. 23

 (1) Msg, President to Churchill, 30 Aug 42, Item

1, Exec 5. (2) Memo, Marshall for Eisenhower, 28

Aug 42. (3) Msg, 1624, Eisenhower to Marshall, 29

Aug 42. Last two in Item 9, Exec 5. (4) William L.

Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (New York, Alfred A.

Knopf, 1947), p. 309.
424 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Algiers force, or almost half the entire

attack.24

With this agreement on 5 September,

the long debate over the scope and orientation of TORCH came to an end. Timing

still remained to be settled, though by this

time an early assault was no longer possible. Since late August Eisenhower's

American staff had been wrestling with

the task of training and equipping about

half the entire initial echelon of the TORCH

force, instead of only one or two combat

teams. Readiness of these forces became

the limiting factor in setting the date of

the attack. Equipment for the 1st Division

was still arriving in driblets, and the

troops began to train with British 25-

pounders; on 4 September Eisenhower

cabled that one combat team of the division might get no final amphibious training whatever. The promise of a combat

team from the United States relieved this

situation somewhat. Yet the assault date

continued to recede. On the 8th Eisenhower gave the Prime Minister his latest

estimate—8 November—a miraculously

accurate prediction, in the light of the

problems yet to be surmounted.25

Birth of a Task Force

During the six weeks of the "essay contest" the Army administrative staffs clung

grimly to the tail of the whipsawing outline plan in an effort to keep preparations

and detailed planning moving in the right

direction. Preparations got under way, in

fact, while the status of SLEDGEHAMMER

was still in doubt. On 22 July the SOS was

busy rearranging shipping schedules and

movement orders to send more combat

troops to the United Kingdom for that operation. On the 27th came the news that

SLEDGEHAMMER was dead and orders to

dust off the GYMNAST plans and draw up

a service troop basis. But more than a

week later SOS planners still could not

get a definite commitment that TORCH

was "on." "We are busy, as are you, no

doubt," Somervell wrote wryly to Eisenhower about this time, "in changing

horses in mid-stream. We have changed

the old nags so often that we are getting

a little bit used to it even if their tramping

around does muddy up the water a good

deal."

 26

The principal task of the War Department and the SOS was to prepare the

Western Task Force, which was to be

commanded by Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. The force was to sail from the

United States and make the Casablanca

attack. For a week and a half after 27 July

the administrative staffs, lacking definite

information, made their own guesses and

did what they could. Studies of the harbor

facilities, internal transport, and resources

in North Africa were initiated, the old

GYMNAST plans were reviewed with reference to requirements for special equipment, and procurement on some of it was

ordered. Ten small vessels were taken up

for conversion. On 5 August Lt. Col. Car24

 (1) Msg 144, Prime Minister to President, 5 Sep

42, Item 1, Exec 5. (2) Other corresp, 31 Aug-5 Sep

42, in same file; in Misc TORCH File, DRB AGO; and

in ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B. (3) Churchill, Hinge of

Fate, Bk. II, Ch. 7. (4) For reference to conversion of

British shipping, see paper, 27 Aug 42, sub: Implications of TORCH on Other Shipg Commitments, TORCH

Jul-Sep 42 folder, OCT HB. (5) AFHQ (G-3) Outline Plan C (Provisional) for Operation TORCH, 5 Sep

42, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-A. (6) For conventional

shipping arrangements, see below, Ch. XVII. 25

 (1) Corresp cited n. 24(2). (2) For setting of final

date, see Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 543, 545. (3)

Corresp on 1st Div equip in OCT 565.2 England. 26

 (1) Ltr, Somervell to Eisenhower, 6 Aug 42. (2)

Ltr, Eisenhower to Somervell, 27 Jul 42. Both in ETO

(6) 1942-43 folder, Hq ASF. (3) Msg, Gross to Somervell, 22 Jul 42, Item 9, Exec 5. (4) Diary, 27 Jul 42

entry, cited n. 12(6).
THE DESCENT ON NORTH AFRICA 425

ter B. Magruder, one of General Lutes'

principal staff officers, told OPD that two

points must be determined immediately

if work was to go forward: the troop basis

for the whole operation, especially for the

Western Task Force, and the troop basis

for U.S. forces to be kept in the British

Isles. The SOS also wanted to be informed

of requirements for special equipment, the

sailing date and detailed composition of

the first contingent of the Western Task

Force, and priorities as between units to

be sent to the British Isles and to North

Africa. OPD was sympathetic but had

little information to offer. Forces in the

British Isles would probably be held to the

size of the old MAGNET Force; anywhere

from six to twelve American divisions

might be used in TORCH—assuredly the

1st Infantry and 1st Armored then in the

United Kingdom, probably the three divisions now receiving amphibious training

in the United States (3d and 9th Infantry

and 2d Armored), perhaps also the 45th

and 36th and the 3d Armored. 2d Armored could be equipped immediately.

For the present the three amphibious divisions would be considered the nucleus of

the Western Task Force, though General

Patton wanted "fast moving, hard hitting"

units with plenty of armor.27 SOS could

also go ahead and earmark a list of about

sixty thousand service troops, drawn up

by the supply services. OPD also turned

over a list of ground combat and supporting units representing its own guess as to

the form the task force might take. But all

planning was in suspense; TORCH had not

even been formally approved.28

On this basis SOS went ahead. On 6

and 7 August orders went out to supply

services to start equipping a balanced

ground force of about 250,000. The order

listed twenty specific units, including

seven divisions and several antiaircraft

units. The three amphibious divisions and

the antiaircraft units were to be equipped

by 5 September, the remainder by 5 October. A long list of special equipment was

appended. This equipment directive was

not formally sanctioned by the General

Staff, but it alerted the services to the

magnitude of the task and set preparations

in train. As units were earmarked and

equipped, they formed a pool from which

the task force could be formed. The original list of twenty grew rapidly. By the

20th it numbered 233 units, mainly service types, of which the supply services by

that date had specifically designated 198.

By then a sizable pool was in being and

well on its way to being equipped and

brought up to strength.29

But planning, meanwhile, had gone off

on another tangent. The Casablanca

landings seemed likely to be scrapped and

the Western Task Force to be sent instead

to Oran in two widely spaced echelons

with different missions. Until 22 August

Washington had only fragmentary knowl27

 Ltr, Patton to OPD, 3 Aug 42, sub: Notes on

W Task Force, Item 1, Exec 5. 28

 (1) Diary of a Certain Plan, 25 Jul-5 Aug 42 entries. (2) Chronology of a Certain Plan, 25 Jul-5 Aug

42 entries. Both are extracts and amplifications of the

diaries maintained in the Planning Branch, SOS,

during the TORCH period, and are in Plng Div ASF

files. (3) Trans studies in TORCH Jul-Sep 42 folder,

OCT HB. (4) Memo for rcd, Col Magruder, 5 Aug

42, sub: TORCH, Policy file, I, 9, Plng Div ASF, Job

A46-183. (5) Msg 995, Eisenhower to Marshall, 8

Aug 42, Item 9, Exec 5. 29

 (1) Memo, Gen Lutes for Chiefs of Sup Svs, 7

Aug 42, sub: Distrib of Equip, Task Force A, Sup,

Gen folder, Plng Div ASF, Job A46-371. (2) Diary,

6 and 7 Aug 42 entries, cited n. 28(1). (3) Memo,

OPD for SOS and AGF, 8 Aug 42, sub: Priority on

Equipg. . . , OPD 320.2 BOLERO, 19. (4) Chronology, 6-20 Aug 42 entries, cited n. 28(2). (5) Papers in

OPD 370.5 Task Force. (6) History of the Planning

Division, ASF, I, 85-86, OCMH. (7) William C.

Frierson, Preparations for "Torch," MS, p. 43,

OCMH.
426 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

edge of this plan, on which the London

staff had begun to work as early as the

13th. General Patton flew over from London with a version that had already

changed before he landed. Maj. Gen.

Thomas T. Handy flew the reverse course

in order to send back a firsthand report to

OPD. SOS planners received a brief of

the new tactical plan on the 17th, but it

was too tentative to be disseminated. Protested General Styer (Somervell's chief of

staff) on the 21st:

Confusion still obtains as to requirements

for supply and shipping for our Atlantic operations in the new major theater and in the

U.K. No dates and no strengths have yet

been made firm. . . . The supply and shipping implications of these plans . . . are so

involved that it is imperative that the Com- manding General SOS be given definite instructions regarding the support expected

from the SOS for each of these plans. These

decisions must be clearcut and remain firm

to enable the Commander of the SOS to proceed with plans and arrangements for supply

and shipping, and to take action in response

to requests for the release of shipping to our

allies.30

No reply came, and the uncertainty deepened. On the 25th SOS headquarters

learned that the date of the attack seemed

likely to be postponed until November.

Next day, the current tactical plan once

more had to be scrapped. On the 31st a

diary recorded, "no decisions reference assembly of units can be made pending

final decision as to mission of the force."

 31

During the last few days of the month

the mists began to clear. On the 29th the

SOS received a new troop basis for the

Western Task Force, minus the air components. On 2-3 September the ground

force came officially into being when OPD

finally issued a list of units in the first

echelon to be prepared for overseas service. This echelon—the initial assault forces

and the increments immediately following—was built around the three amphibious divisions (3d and 9th Infantry, 2d

Armored), with reinforcing tank destroyer

and tank units, additional artillery, strong

combat engineer elements (including some

amphibian engineers), and a long list of

supporting ground combat and service

units. The second echelon was built

around the 3d Armored Division, the

third around the 45th and 36th Infantry

and 4th Motorized Divisions. Readiness

dates for the three echelons were 10 September, 20 September, and 10 October,

respectively. Detailed instructions for special equipment followed.32

 On 9 September the AAF issued its own troop basis.

The attack was now a little more than

two months distant. The Western Task

Force was taking shape. The planners

were on the point of settling the central

questions of scope and timing. But the administrative staffs awaited decisions on a

multitude of smaller questions, or pressed

forward blindly without them. On 4 September the score of "known versus unknown" was tallied somewhat as follows:

1. Units of first echelon of Western Task

Force tentatively designated. But mission of

force not yet settled definitely. 30

 Memo, Styer for CofS, 21 Aug 42, sub: Need for

Early Definition of Forces . . . , CofS WDGS (2)

1942 folder, Hq ASF. 31

 (1) Diary, 17, 20-26, and 31 Aug 42 entries, cited

n. 28(1). (2) Chronology, 14 Aug 42 entry, cited n.

28(2). 32

 (1) Diary, 30 Aug and 2 Sep 42 entries, cited n.

28(1). (2) Memo, unsigned, for CG's AGF, SOS, and

Task Force "A," 3 Sep 42, sub: Creation of a Task

Force, OPD 320.2 ETO. (3) Memo, unsigned, for

CG's AGF, SOS, and Task Force "A," 2 Sep 42, sub:

Preparation of Units for Overseas Sv, OPD 370.5

Task Force. Similar memo for AAF units, 9 September 1942. The designation "Task Force A" created

some confusion, since Eisenhower at first labeled the

other two forces "A" and "B" (Eastern and Center,

respectively).
THE DESCENT ON NORTH AFRICA 427

2. Total strength of each echelon not determined. 3. Number of echelons not decided.

4. Interval between echelons tentatively

decided: forty days (turnaround).

5. Ultimate strength of Western Task Force

not decided. The pool of 250,000 "was never

expected to be more than a pool from which

units would be taken when a definite troop

basis was set up."

6.-9. Designation, strength, and movement schedules of units to compose U.S. forces in the United Kingdom and to remain

there not yet known.33

Inside Versus Outside

In September the organization, assembling, and equipping of the task forces on

both sides of the Atlantic went forward

along parallel lines. Preparation of the

American forces in the British Isles, however, depended to an increasing and unforeseen extent upon assistance from the

United States. Eisenhower now had to

organize and equip the Oran force and

half the spearhead of the Algiers force

from American troops and material in the

British Isles, and the effort to do so speedily revealed the full degree to which the

build-up during the summer had fallen

short of expectations. Like the British,

Eisenhower had always favored throwing

the weight of the attack to the east; the

compromise of 5 September, by contrast,

provided a strong force in the west at the

expense of those in the center and east.

Eisenhower was naturally unwilling,

therefore, to allow his inside forces to be

further weakened for lack of adequate resources on hand in the United Kingdom.

Many of the additional supporting troops

and much of the material and shipping he

needed had to be sent from the United

States in desperate haste during September and early October in order to arrive

in time for the departure of the early convoys from England. Inevitably, the Western Task Force had to foot most of the bill.

General Somervell warned on 17 September that the demands of the forces in the

United Kingdom threatened to "destroy

Patton's force by attrition."

 34

During most of August it was assumed

that Patton's force would include some of

the service troops already in England, and

that the unbalanced American forces in

the United Kingdom would have to be

supported to some extent by British service troops. It was expected, too, that some

Air Forces units from the United Kingdom would be added to the Western Task

Force. All told, the planned air and service contingent from the United Kingdom

for Patton's force numbered from 6,000 to

7,000 troops. In the United States, by

mid-August, the SOS was already scraping the bottom of the barrel for trained

service units to fill the Western Task Force

pool. A sizable number crowded into staging areas near New York, a backwash from

General Marshall's efforts in July to speed

the movement of combat troops to the

United Kingdom. The equipment of many

of these service units had already been

sent over. Was their importance to TORCH

sufficient to offset the cost of re-equipping

them? After a long delay OPD on 18 August decided that it was, except for those

units, immediately needed in England,

that would pick up their equipment there.

About half of the units whose equipment

had gone ahead were assigned to the

TORCH pool, along with practically all

those in staging areas whose equipment

33

 Memo, Gen Plans Br SOS for Lutes, 4 Sep 42,

sub: Need for Early Def of Forces . . . , TORCH folder, Def of Forces tab, Lutes File. 34

 Memo, Somervell for CofS, 17 Sep 42, CofS

WDGS (2) 1942 folder, Hq ASF.
428 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

had not. By the 20th the staging areas

were cleared for later reception of the task

force.35

The reorientation of the outline plan

late in August upset the arrangements for

augmenting Patton's force from U.S.

troops in the United Kingdom. The shoe

was now on the other foot. Eisenhower

reported that in order to mount the Oran

and Algiers assaults he would have to improvise many supporting units, use all

those earmarked for Patton's force, and

even draw upon the TORCH pool forming

in the United States. On 1 September his

specific requirements began to come in—a

few hospital and other miscellaneous

units, numerically small but with elaborate equipment, which were needed immediately, and a long list of additional

units and maintenance supplies, to be

sent later. The first group of units was to

sail combat loaded to the British Isles, arriving three and a half weeks before D

Day (D minus 24), with a cargo vessel

loaded with maintenance supplies. The

second group was to go in conventional

shipping directly to the Mediterranean

about D plus 17. During the next two

weeks numerous additions to both lists

came in.36

Transportation officials in Washington

were thunderstruck by this request for

two additional convoys, and declared

flatly that the shipping was not available.

Many of the units requested for the later

convoy had been earmarked for Patton's

force and could not soon be duplicated;

there were actually more units of several

of these types already in England than in

the States. Moreover, the combat-loaded

transport requested for the first contingent could ill be spared since Patton's assault shipping was already to be depleted

in order to send the 39th Regimental

Combat Team to join the U.S. forces in

England later in the month. Even with

the vessel requested, it appeared that only

27,000 of the Western Task Force could be

sent in assault shipping; without it, an additional battalion combat team would be

crowded out. Patton's staff had already

relegated to follow-up shipping all service

troops except Engineer shore units and

some communications personnel.37

The decision as to distribution of service

and supporting troops between the western and inside forces was, of course, Eisenhower's to make, as General Marshall

hastened to assure him. But the request

for service troops, under analysis, looked

suspiciously like a lever to obtain more

shipping. The theater had directed that

the combat loader with the small first increment of service troops be left unfilled

for "topping off" with cargo in England.

Embarrassed, OPD told transportation

officials on the one hand that "a firm

negative reply is being made,"

 38

 while on

the other it asked Eisenhower apologet35

 (1) Memo cited n. 12(1). (2) Memo, Marshall

and King for President, 4 Aug 42, sub: TORCH. (3)

Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 13 Aug 42. Last two in ABC

381 (7-25-42), 4-B. (4) Memo, unsigned, for Gen

Patton, no date, sub: Tentative Plng Data, with list

of sv units atchd, ABC 381 (7-25-42). 4-A. (5) Diary,

7, 15, 17, 18, and 20 Aug 42 entries, cited n. 28(1).

(6) Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 9 Aug 42, Item 1,

Exec 5. (7) Draft msg, OPD to London, 31 Aug 42,

Opd 370.5 Gt Brit. (8) Chronology, 14 Aug 42 entry,

cited n. 28(2). (9) Frierson, Preparations for "Torch,"

p. 17, OCMH. 36

 (1) Msg 1487, Eisenhower to WD, 25 Aug 42,

Item 9, Exec 5. (2) Msg cited n. 23(3). (3) Diary, 29,

30 Aug, and 2 Sep 42 entries, cited n. 28(1). (4) Msg

1705, Eisenhower to WD, 1 Sep 42, OCT 320.2-

565.14 England. Subsequent amendments in Msgs

1727, 1789, 1815, and 1953. 37

 (1) Msg R-452, WD to CG ETOUSA, 5 Sep 42,

Item 1, Exec 5. (2) Memo, Col Carter B. Magruder

for Gen Lutes, 25 Sep 42, sub: Action on Cables

. . . , TORCH folder, Radiograms tab, Lutes File. 38

 Pencil notation on msg cited n. 36(4).
THE DESCENT ON NORTH AFRICA 429

ically ("have no doubts as to our appreciation of your difficulties") to allow the

service troops to be sent in a conventional

vessel.39 To this plea the theater assented,

provided the first contingent of service

troops reached England in time to accompany one of the initial convoys sailing for

North Africa on 18 and 22 October. New

urgent requests came in during the days

following. By mid-September the list of

special troops desired from the United

States for the inside forces on D Day or

shortly after included over three thousand

Air Forces personnel and a growing assortment of service units in addition to the

combat-loaded 39th Regimental Combat

Team sailing late in September. If the

troops could not be shipped to England

combat loaded, the theater stipulated,

they and their equipment must be sent

early enough for equipment to be unloaded and reloaded in the early TORCH

convoys, or loaded in fast ships that, with

only partial reloading, could accompany

the early convoys.40

Even more unsettling were the theater's

demands for additional supplies and

equipment. On 8 September came Message 1949, a massive document whose

itemized portion ran to fourteen doublespaced legal-length pages. Only fifteen to

twenty days of maintenance supplies at

combat rates, the message stated, were

immediately available in the United

Kingdom for the 102,000-odd American

troops of the Eastern and Center Forces;

forty-five days of maintenance (at least

two items of each type of equipment) and

ten units of fire for these forces must be

shipped from the States. In addition, initial allowances and sixty days of maintenance were requested for a long list of

miscellaneous items, ranging from goggles

to barber chairs. The grand total—344,-

000 ship tons—for Message 1949 broke

down into the following groups:

To reach United Kingdom by 26 September

90,000 ship tons—controlled items of

equipment and supplies

To reach United Kingdom by 20 October

90,000 ship tons—motor vehicle gasoline

and oil

40,000 ship tons—maintenance equipment

40,000 ship tons—construction and mis- cellaneous materials

To reach Mediterranean by D plus 26

84,000 ship tons—aviation materials, motor vehicle gasoline and oil

All the early requirements (for September

and October) were to be set up in balanced loads, in the proportion of 10 percent for the Eastern Force and 90 for the

Center Force, with high priority items on

top. The vessels must be of types suitable

for inclusion in the United Kingdom

(KM) convoys to North Africa, since there

would be no time to unload and reload

into other ships.41

In effect, the theater wanted a mobile

and readily divisible floating depot, comprising huge quantities of material and

large tonnages of shipping. The message

was a clear confession, moreover, that

hundreds of thousands of tons of material

already shipped to the United Kingdom

for American forces were buried too deeply in British warehouses to be retrieved in

time for the impending operations. SOS

officials in Washington found the situation

difficult to understand or to extenuate.

"We have sunk a large quantity of sup39

 Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 9 Sep 42, Item

9, Exec 5. 40

 (1) Msg 2044, Eisenhower to WD, 10 Sep 42. (2)

Msg 2288, Eisenhower to WD, 16 Sep 42. (3) Msg

R-571, WD to Eisenhower, 9 Sep 42. All in Item 9,

Exec 5. 41

 Msg 1949, London to AGWAR, 8 Sep 42,

TORCH folder, Radiograms tab, Lutes File.
430 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

plies in the U.K.," wrote General Lutes to

General Lee,

. . . and these supplies, together with those

furnished for Lend Lease purposes, and those

lost by submarine sinkings, are putting the

staff on this side in an embarrassing position.

. . . It is regrettable that we do not have a

tremendous stockpile of all types of supplies

and equipment—that would be ideal. But

we do not.

He urged that Lee's staff "swarm on the

British ports and depots and find out

where these people have put our supplies

and equipment."

 42

Even if General Lee's staff had been

large enough to "swarm" on the British,

the problem could not have been solved

by such measures. During the summer the

theater SOS there had been unable to

cope with the flood of material that began

to pour across the Atlantic. British warehouses were makeshift and space inadequate; both British and American depot

personnel were untrained; differences in

supply procedure, techniques, and nomenclature made co-operation difficult.

Cargo had to be discharged and cleared

rapidly from the docks to avoid congestion

and was usually moved directly to a depot

where, owing to traffic conditions in the

United Kingdom, it had to remain; temporary sorting sheds near the ports began

to be used only late in the summer. Proper

routing thus depended mainly on accurate

identification of contents and destination

at the ports, which was virtually impossible under the system of marking and

documentation in use during 1942. Many

of the misroutings that caused shipments

to stray from their intended paths and become anonymous collections of unidentifiable boxes in warehouses somewhere in

England could be traced back to unintelligible or incomplete marking on crates

and boxes, tardy transmission of manifests

and other shipping papers, and the inadequacy of data given in those papers. The

"marrying up" of troops and their initial

equipment was especially difficult because

of the long interval that usually elapsed

between the arrival of the one and the

other.43

Compliance with Message 1949 was no

easy matter. The list was admittedly "indicative rather than definite," and a long

exchange of messages was required to

clarify numerous details.44 Many units in

the accompanying troop list were inexactly designated; substitute equipment

was requested without specifying for

which units. The theater pleaded that

"time is now so critically important that

we cannot always be accurate with respect

to these details."

 45

 Little or no effort had

been made to eliminate items already ordered; many of the controlled items, in

fact, were already moving through the

pipeline. In the absence of specific data

for computing maintenance allowances,

the theater requested that these merely be

estimated broadly and shipped in bulk.

Lack of time made the requirement of

balanced loads virtually impossible to

meet, especially for the ninety thousand

tons of controlled items needed by late

September. The effective shipping deadline was 12 September, only four days

after Message 1949 was dispatched. But

the ambiguities of the message with respect to controlled items were not cleared

up until the 13th, and General Lutes

42

 Memo, Lutes for Lee, 12 Sep 42, Misc Notes,

Lutes File. 43

 (1) For details, see Ruppenthal, Logistical Support

of the Armies, Ch. II. (2) Irving Cheslaw, Quartermaster Operations in the War Against Germany, a

volume in preparation for the series UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, draft ch.,

"The Quartermaster Establishment in the United

Kingdom." (3) See also above, Chs. XIII-XIV. 44

 Msg cited n. 41. 45

 Ibid.
THE DESCENT ON NORTH AFRICA 431

TABLE 7—TENTATIVE CONVOY SCHEDULE FOR WESTERN TASK FORCE: 17 SEPTEMBER 1942

a

 Represents a telescoping of the first slow cargo convoy and the first post-D-Day troop convoy in an earlier tentative schedule; hence

the omission of UGS-1.

Source: Schedule atchd to memo, Magruder for Lutes, 17 Sep 42, sub: Mtg Concerning Trans for Certain Opn, 18 Shipg file, I, Case 12,

Plng Div ASF. A similar schedule, dated 9 September, is in TORCH folder, Shipg tab, Lutes File.

feared that even if some of the material

reached the theater by the 26th, it would

be necessary to sort it out by service categories in England before distributing to

troops. Primarily for this reason, it was

decided not to use any of Patton's fast

cargo vessels for these shipments.46

In mid-September these proliferating

demands for early troop and cargo shipments ran head on into belatedly hardening convoy arrangements, which reflected

not the limitations of available shipping,

matériel, and trained units, but the even

tighter one of the Navy's capacity to

escort. The discarded 21 August outline

plan, hinging on swift capture and exploitation of a bridgehead at Oran, had

foundered on the dual problem of port

and escort capacity. All the versions of the

planned Oran operation had involved

more convoys in a short time, or larger

single convoys, than the Navy could

escort, and a heavier influx of cargo than

the port of Oran could probably accommodate. The staffs estimated that a month

or more would be needed to discharge the

initial troop convoys, put the harbor into

operation, and empty the first cargo

convoy.47

With the collapse of the eastwardoriented plan at the end of August, convoy planning came to a halt as the staffs

awaited final decisions on the scope and

timing of the operation. Not until the 17th

of September did Patton's staff complete a

tentative schedule, in co-ordination with

the Navy, for the movement of the Western

Task Force, under the new conception of

the operation.48 (Table 7) The schedule

46

 (1) Memo cited n. 42. (2) Memo, Brig Gen

Everett S. Hughes for Brig Gen Mark W. Clark, 14

Sep 42, sub: Est of Sup and Admin Aspects of Proposed Opn, USFET AG 400 Sups and Equip, Vol. V,

DRB AGO. (3) Memo, Lutes for OPD, 15 Sep 42,

sub: Sups for ETO Contingent for Sp Opn, TORCH

folder, Sups for ETO tab, Lutes File. (4) Related corresp in same file. (5) Other corresp in 18 Shipg file, I,

Cases 11 and 16, Plng Div ASF; and S.O. folder,

OCT HB. 47

 (1) Notes, 20 Aug 42, sub: Opn of One Port,

TORCH Jul-Sep 42 folder, OCT HB. (2) Related papers in same file and in NATOUSA TORCH Plng

folder, OCT HB. (3) Annex IV to Outline Plan cited

n. 11(2). (4) Diary, 23 Aug 42 entry, cited n. 28(1).

(5) Memo cited n. 11(3). (6) Msg cited n. 36(1). (7)

Msg 1535, Eisenhower to WD, 27 Aug 42, Item 9,

Exec 5. 48

 For convoys, see below, App. A-8.
432 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

had been drawn to Navy specifications: a

limit of 20 vessels in fast convoys following

the first, 35 to 40 vessels in slow convoys;

a normal twenty-five-day interval between

convoys of each type, starting with the

UG-3 convoys, which had to await the return of the escorts of the assault convoys.

The timing of the D plus 20 convoy reflected a hopeful estimate of the interval

needed to clear the harbor and discharge

the cargo vessels of the D plus 5 convoy.49

On the same day that Patton's convoy

schedule was transmitted to the theater,

Eisenhower's latest outline plan was

brought over from London; with it came

a convoy annex for the United KingdomNorth Africa movements, which Somervell

immediately branded as "completely irreconcilable" both with Patton's schedule

and with the capabilities for meeting the

theater's recent demands for early shipments.50

 It would clearly be impossible to

send Eisenhower's second contingent of

service troops directly to Oran on D plus

17, as requested, or in any other convoy

before D plus 40. Only a few of his service

units would be ready to sail late in September with the 39th Regimental Combat

Team and no additional convoy could be

provided. The remaining units, therefore,

must wait for the D plus 40 convoy unless

the theater wanted them to be sent to England late in October in British transports.

Their equipment could be shipped to England, or directly to Casablanca in the D

plus 20 convoy and then shuttled over to

Oran. No cargo could be shipped to the

inside forces in the D plus 5 fast convoy,

except by further excisions from Patton's

already depleted cargo shipping.51

As for the Message 1949 requirements,

it appeared that about 175,000 tons of the

first two categories could be transported in

thirteen or fourteen slow and three fast

freighters diverted from regular North Atlantic convoys scheduled to run between

17 September and early October; to ship

the remainder would cut into Patton's

convoys. But the convoy schedule that

arrived from London on the 17th indicated

that Oran harbor could accommodate

only twenty-five cargo vessels at one time,

and twenty of these spaces were already

assigned to early convoys from the United

Kingdom. Evidently only five of the sixteen or seventeen vessels from the States

could be discharged soon after the assault;

the remainder might have to be held back

for weeks. It was extremely doubtful, in

any case, whether the shipments could be

set up and loaded in time for the theater's

deadlines. To SOS officials it seemed the

obvious course to postpone the sailing of

most of the first sixteen vessels and, rather

than route them first to England, to send

them with Patton's later convoys to North

Africa, starting with the D plus 45

convoy.52

However, OPD decided on the 20th to

try to comply with the theater's wishes, the

49

 (1) Msg R-892, AGWAR to USFOR, 17 Sep 42,

Item 9, Exec 5. (2) Memo, Plng Div OCT for Gen

Wilson, 12 Sep 42, sub: Size of the Force Capable of

Being Supplied Through Atlantic Ports . . . , TORCH

Jul-Sep 42 folder, OCT HB. 50

 Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 17 Mar 42, CofS

WDGS (2) 1942 folder, Hq ASF. 51

 (1) Memo cited n. 34. (2) Msg cited n. 49(1). (3)

Memo for file, unsigned, 23 Sep 42, sub: Shipg Plan

. . . , TORCH folder, Shipg tab, Lutes File. (4) Msg

2447, Eisenhower to WD, 19 Sep 42, 18 Shipg file, I,

Case 21, Plng Div ASF. (5) Memo, Lutes for Gross,

21 Sep 42, sub: Sups for ETO . . . , 18 Shipg file, I,

Case 23, Plng Div ASF. 52

 (1) Memo cited n. 46(3). (2) Memo, Lutes for

Dir of Distrib Div, 16 Sep 42, sub: Sups for ETO Contingent for Sp Opn, TORCH folder, Sups for ETO tab,

Lutes File. (3) Memo, Magruder for Hull, 18 Sep

42, sub: Shipts From U.S. to "E" Force, TORCH folder,

Shipg tab, Lutes File. (4) Memo, Lutes for CofTrans,

18 Sep 42, sub: Sups for ETO Contingent for Sp Opn,

18 Shipg file, I, Case 14, Plng Div ASF. (5) Diary, 19

Sep 42 entry, cited n. 28(1).
THE DESCENT ON NORTH AFRICA 433

real aim of which was to have a large number of ready-loaded vessels of various sizes,

speeds, and cargoes from which to make

up the first few convoys from the British

Isles. Loading was pushed at full speed—

thirteen slow freighters to sail about 25

September, three fast ones about 5 October—although the theater was warned

that "anything approaching complete accomplishment" of the schedule was very

unlikely.53 Anticipating that many highpriority items (in the first 175,000 tons)

would not reach port in time, SOS ordered

the next 84,000 tons to port to fill holes.54

Scarcely had the message notifying the

theater of these arrangements been put on

the wires than another request arrived

from London. Since no more space was

available in Patton's D plus 5 fast convoy,

the theater now wanted five shiploads of

material to be sent in fast vessels to arrive

in the United Kingdom no later than

21 October, for inclusion in the first separate cargo convoy (KMS-2), which was to

sail for Oran on the 24th. "Every day's delay after 21 October will cause a corresponding delay in D Day."

 55

 Would it not

be possible, in fact, to persuade the Navy

to send a special convoy directly to Oran,

regardless of the risk?

 56

The Navy was not to be persuaded, and

SOS set about revising its loadings. The

five shiploads requested evidently overlapped the "1949" requirements, but to

an indeterminate degree. How much and

where they overlapped, the theater itself

could not say until it received, in turn, full

information on shipments already on the

way. A new schedule was drawn up: three

slow freighters to sail as soon as possible

after 25 September; two groups of four

vessels, each carrying an identical assortment of gasoline, oil, bombs, ammunition,

air technical items, and maintenance

equipment, to sail in me regular 1 October

convoy; six balanced loads of maintenance

items to sail separately soon after 1 October. The five shiploads for KMS-2 could

be chosen from the two groups of four sailing about the 1st; the Navy had promised

they would arrive by the 20th.57

The message sent on 22 September so

informing the theater crossed one from

London requesting that all sixteen freighters be sent as earlier scheduled, that is, all

but three to sail by 25 September, now

only three days away. It was also directed

that an additional 4,000 tons of ammunition be loaded in one of the three fast

freighters, along with some new signal and

engineer equipment and a squad of railroad mechanics equipped with hand tools.

This meant reloading some 4,000 tons of

ammunition requested earlier. From the

message SOS officials also gleaned confirmation of their earlier prediction that all

but five shiploads were to be discharged in

the British Isles for warehousing or reloading; in any case they could not be shipped

to Africa for weeks or months.58

All this shifting of gears and of direction

53

 Msg R-1002, WD to USFOR, 20 Sep 42, 18

Shipg file, I, Case 19, Plng Div ASF. 54

 (1) Ibid. (2) Memo, Magruder for Lutes, 18 Sep

42, sub: Shipts From U.S. to "E" Force, 18 Shipg file,

I, Case 15, Plng Div ASF. 55

 Msg cited n. 51 (4). This message crossed the War

Department's R-1002 of the 20th. 56

 Diary, 21 and 22 Sep 42 entries, cited n. 28(1). 57

 (1) Memo, Hull for Handy, 20 Sep 42, sub:

Mvmt of Sups for Sp Opn, 18 Shipg file, I, Case 22,

Plng Div ASF. (2) Memo cited n. 51(5). (3) Msg 2489,

London to AGWAR, 21 Sep 42. (4) Msg R-1023,

WD to USFOR, 21 Sep 42. (5) Msg R-1050, WD to

USFOR, 21 Sep 42. (6) Msg R-1080, WD to USFOR,

22 Sep 42. Last four in TORCH Radiograms, Logis File,

OCMH. 58

 (1) Msg 2592, London to AGWAR, 22 Sep 42,

18 Shipg file, I, Case 28, Plng Div ASF. (2) Diary, 24-

26 Sep 42 entries, cited n. 28(1). (3) Memo, Col

Magruder for Gen Larkin, 25 Sep 42, Policy file, I,

16, Plng Div ASF, Job A46-183.
434 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

produced the inevitable results. The first

shipments of controlled items were held up

two days because port and technical service officials waited for each other to call

shipments to port; many items could not

be assembled in time, especially air force

material. On 25 September the 39th Regimental Combat Team with a few service

troops sailed from New York as scheduled.

But the three slow freighters carrying the

first installment of "1949" requirements

did not sail until 1 October, missing their

deadline by almost a week. They alone, of

all the seventeen, were fully loaded. On

the same day the first group of four

freighters with balanced loads also departed, but the ships were only about

three-quarters full. Two days later the second group of four ships sailed, only twothirds loaded. Two fast freighters departed

on the 8th without escort, one carrying a

balanced load, the other an additional

four thousand tons of ammunition along

with gasoline, oil, and several radio towers.

During the next week four more vessels

got off with balanced cargoes, and two

additional ships were reserved to sail with

UGS-2 to Casablanca and be shuttled

over to Oran.59

In UGS-2, due to reach North Africa

about D plus 20, a large block of space

had been assigned, by the end of September, to the inside forces. Meanwhile the

stream of new requests and changes in

loading requirements from London continued, making the loading of UGS-2

largely a repetition of the strenuous experience of the "1949" shipments. Less than

a month before the convoy's scheduled

departure date (8 November), SOS in desperation registered a protest. No more

changes in UGS-2, the theater was notified, could be made, "except for urgent

strategic reasons," and all requirements for

UGS-3 should be in, if possible, by 20 October—positively by 1 November.60

 Would

the theater in future set a deadline for requirements forty-five days, and for unavoidable changes thirty days, before sailing date? The theater agreed to call a halt

to changes in UGS-2, but made no promises for future convoys. UGS-2 sailed on

13 November, five days later than scheduled—thirty-three vessels, of which eight

freighters and two tankers were destined

for Oran.61

The results of all this turmoil were disappointing. Frantic eleventh-hour efforts,

sparked by Message 1949, to re-equip the

initial echelons of the inside forces were

only partly successful. Four vessels, besides

the five squeezed into KMS-2, were assigned to early KM convoys that reached

the theater within two and a half weeks

after D Day. The remaining eight had to

be discharged in the United Kingdom,

and their cargoes added to an already

mountainous backlog awaiting later convoys. That backlog, even before the first

59

 (1) Msg cited n. 57(6). (2) Msg 2924, USFOR to

AGWAR. 30 Sep 42. (3) Msg R-1610, WD to

USFOR, 6 Oct 42. Last two in TORCH Radiograms,

Logis File. OCMH. (4) Corresp in S.O. folder, OCT

HB. (5) Memo. Gross for Somervell, 2 Oct 42, sub:

Cargo Ships for Sp Opn, 18 Shipg file, I, Case 41, Plng

Div ASF. (6) Msg 3400, USFOR to WD, 11 Oct 42,

18 Shipg file, I, Case 52, Plng Div ASF. (7) Draft msg,

Somervell to CG ETO, 2 Oct 42. (8) Msg 2994, London to AGWAR, 1 Oct 42. Last two in OCT 565.2

England. (9) Memo, Gross for Somervell, 3 Oct 42,

sub: Cargo for Sp Shipt, NATOUSA TORCH Plng

folder, OCT HB. (10) Papers in TORCH Jul-Sep 42

folder, OCT HB. (11) Msg 3587, London to

AGWAR, 14 Oct 42, OCT 565.3-900 England. 60

 Msg R-1898, WD to USFOR, 13 Oct 42, TORCH

Radiograms, Logis File, OCMH. 61

 (1) Msg 3715, London to AGWAR, 17 Oct 42,

TORCH Radiograms, Logis File, OCMH. (2) Memo,

Contl Div OCT for Somervell, 14 Nov 42, sub: Ship

Activity in NW Africa, OCT 563.51-565.3 Africa

1941-42. (3) Memo, Wylie for Gross, 14 Nov 42, sub:

Convoys for N and NW African Ports, TORCH SepNov 42 folder, OCT HB.
THE DESCENT ON NORTH AFRICA 435

convoys departed, represented material

reordered several times over, replacing not

only what had been buried in British warehouses, but also items actually on the way

from the United States that the theater

staff feared to count upon because specific

notification had not reached them. "We

have shipped all items at least twice and

most items three times," protested the SOS

in mid-October. "These items are all extremely critical, and we cannot continue

to duplicate and triplicate shipments."

 62

By that time the effort had been shown to

be largely wasted, for the navies were unable to escort, or the North African ports

to receive, more than a fraction of the

material awaiting shipment.63

"We should have paid more attention,"

General Eisenhower later admitted, "to

red tape and paper work."

 64

Cutting the Foot To Fit the Shoe

Between the 17th and 24th of September Eisenhower's staff in England had been

working to straighten out the convoy tangle. On the 25th Maj. Gen. Mark W.

Clark, Eisenhower's deputy, arrived in

Washington accompanied by Brig. Gen.

Thomas B. Larkin, G-4 of the Center

Force. On their heels came a long explanatory message from Eisenhower with a new

convoy schedule. This schedule was shaped

by two sets of limitations: the estimated

capacity of the North African ports to accommodate vessels in protected anchorages, and the size of the convoys the two

navies were prepared to escort. (Table 8)

These two limitations virtually coincided. Two cargo convoys (UGS and

KMS) arriving in North Africa waters at

about the same time would bring one

hundred vessels for which an estimated

ninety-three anchorages would be available. Moreover, two naval tankers would

accompany each KMS convoy, and six

each UGS convoy (including four to service British naval forces); for these, alongside berths would not be needed.65

 (Table

9) The build-up of forces in North Africa

thus seemed likely to be retarded by escort

and port limitations in combination, and

the limited accommodations of the ports

left very little margin for redistributing

shipping among the three task forces. The

theater proposed that, beginning with

UGS-2, fifteen vessels be allotted from

each slow convoy from the States to support the inside forces, besides the four

tankers for the Royal Navy. The residue—

twenty-six vessels—coincided neatly with

the estimated capacity of the Atlantic

ports, all of which might be used for supplying the forces ashore if the two U.S.

Navy tankers (usually considered as fleet

auxiliaries) were not included in the fortyfive vessels allotted to UGS convoys. Similarly, with the fifteen to be shuttled over

from each UGS convoy, the fifty-three vessels of the concurrent KMS convoy (deducting two naval tankers) would also fill

inside ports to capacity. Eisenhower asked

for a command decision on these arrangements.

62

 Msg R-1971, WD to USFOR, 15 Oct 42, TORCH

Radiograms, Logis File, OCMH. 63

 (1) Msg cited n. 61(1). (2) Msg R-2220, WD to

USFOR, 21 Oct 42, NATOUSA TORCH Plng folder,

OCT HB. (3) Diary, 21 Oct 42 entry, cited n. 28(1). 64

 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New

York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1948), p. 85. 65

 In addition, each KMS convoy would have three

Navy supply vessels and two "white" (gasoline)

tankers for Army forces; each UGS convoy would

have a single "white" tanker; the UGF convoys would

have four "black" (oil) tankers for the two navies. Supplies for U.S. Navy forces ashore were carried with

Army cargo. See: (1) Msg 2809, London to AGWAR,

27 Sep 42, and (2) Msg 2816, London to AGWAR,

27 Sep 42, both in TORCH Radiograms, Logis File,

OCMH; (3) memo, Lutes for OPD, 3 Oct 42, sub:

Convoy Schedule for Sp Opn, 18 Shipg file, I, Case

44, Plng Div ASF.
436 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

TABLE 8—ANTICIPATED PORT AND CONVOY LIMITATIONS FOR SLOW CONVOYS TO NORTH

AFRICA: SEPTEMBER 1942

a

 Allowances made in port estimates for berthing of naval escorts, harbor craft, coastal or French shipping, and ships not completely

discharged. At Casablanca shallow anchorages were available but were required for escort destroyers. See also tables 12 and 22. b

 Includes all ships in convoy except escorts and other combat vessels. c

 Not yet determined exactly, but some degree of synchronization with the corresponding slow cargo convoys was assumed. See table 9.

Source: (1) Msg 2809, London to AGWAR, 27 Sep 42, and (2) Msg 2816, London to AGWAR, 27 Sep 42, both in TORCH Radiograms,

Logis File, OCMH.

With little hesitation the War Department approved. Among the SOS staff,

however, there was some hope that the

accommodation capacity of the Atlantic

ports might be increased after the first

month or two, and that the Navy might be

persuaded to relax the restriction on the

size of convoys. In informal conversations

late in September, Navy staff officers indicated that if the Army were willing to

accept the risk, the Navy would go along.

On 2 October General Clark cabled from

London the theater's agreement to raising

the UGS convoy limit to fifty-five vessels

as soon as port capacity permitted.66 But

on the next day came the Navy's official

verdict: forty-five ships was the limit. Even

convoys of this size were considered dangerous, and the Navy doubted whether

port capacity could be expanded in any

case. Later in October the Navy also refused to escort fast troop and cargo convoys 66

 (1) Memo, Capt Warren, OCT, for Capt

Thomas, USN, 28 Sep 42, sub: Sp Opn, 18 Shipg file,

I, Case 34, Plng Div ASF. (2) Diary, 26 and 28 Sep

42 entries, cited n. 28(1). (3) Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 28 Sep 42, sub: Conf With Gen Clark, TORCH

folder, Conf tab, Lutes File. (4) Memo, Lutes for Hull,

29 Sep 42, sub: Sp Opn, Policy file, Plng Div ASF. (5)

Msg 3022, London to AGWAR, 2 Oct 42, TORCH

Radiograms, Logis File, OCMH. (6) Memo cited n.

65(3).
THE DESCENT ON NORTH AFRICA 437

TABLE 9—EISENHOWER'S PROPOSED CONVOY SCHEDULE: 27 SEPTEMBER 1942a

a

 This table should be studied in conjunction with table 8. The KM-1 and KM-2 convoys and the UGF-1 and UGF-2 convoys were planned and scheduled to meet immediate needs of the assault forces. Beginning with KMF-3, the convoys were to move on the regular build-up and maintenance schedule shown in table 8. It will be noted that the numbers of ships in regular slow convoys shown here do not tally with the combined limitations imposed by escort and port accommodation capacity shown in table 8. This is primarily because the number assigned to each task force does not include oil tankers, colliers, and other vessels assigned for naval

service and supply, for which no destination is shown. From 5 to 7 such vessels were to be assigned to each KMS and 6 to each UGS convoy. b

 Each regular KMS convoy was to include two gasoline tankers assigned, respectively, to the Eastern and Center Task Forces, and each regular UGS convoy was to include a gasoline tanker assigned to the Western Task Force (included in the figures shown). c

 Included in KMF-1. d

 Combat-loaded vessels; number not determined. e

 Five additional spaces in UGS-2 and two in UGS-3 to be held in command reserve. f

 As stated in source. Probably the number of vessels for Center ports had not yet been determined. g

 Not determined.

Source: Msg 2816, London to AGWAR, 27 Sep 42, TORCH Radiograms, Logis File, OCMH.

of twenty-five vessels (by including up to a

total of nine freighters and tankers). The

ceilings remained at twenty, including no

more than sixteen troop transports.67

The process of paring down tonnages to

fit these limitations had already begun.

The theater had decided to aim at building up only forty-five days of reserve supplies and ten units of fire. Even before

sending his message of 27 September,

Eisenhower's commanders had also slashed

initial allowances in the inside assault

forces. No 21⁄2-ton trucks were to be taken

at all, and only about 25 percent of allowances in many other types; the theater reported on 14 October that all types of

organizational vehicles accompanying the

67

 (1) Msg R-1546, WD to USFOR, 3 Oct 42. (2)

Msg 3333, London to AGWAR, 9 Oct 42. Both in

TORCH Radiograms, Logis File, OCMH. (3) Diary, 4

and 19 Oct 42 entries, cited n. 28(1). (4) Memo, OPD

for CG SOS, 5 Oct 42, sub: Convoy Schedule for Sp

Opns, 18 Shipg file, I, Case 46, Plng Div ASF. (5)

Memo, Col Heileman for Gen Hull, 13 Oct 42, sub:

Convoys for W and Center Task Forces, 18 Shipg file,

I, Case 54, Plng Div ASF. (6) Memo, Rear Adm

Charles M. Cooke, Jr., for OPD, 20 Oct 42, same sub.

(7) Memo, Heileman for Overseas Sup Div NYPOE,

20 Oct 42, sub: Convoy Schedules and Markings.

Last two in 18 Shipg file, I, Case 59, Plng Div ASF.
438 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

inside forces had been reduced by half.

These reductions left a backlog of vehicles

that the follow-up convoys could not hope

to absorb for many months.68

Meanwhile, the Western Task Force was

being equipped on a lavish scale. The

planned maintenance reserves for the

Western Task Force were ninety days of

supply and twenty units of fire—twice

those of the inside forces. No effort was

made by the task force staff to measure

these mounting tonnages. As early as

4 September Col. Carter B. Magruder

warned OPD: "It appears that the force,

as now set up, is too large for cargo clearance capacity."

 69

 This warning went unheeded. The only curb placed on the

amassing of material was the stipulation

that the task force commander must vouch

for the essentiality of new items.70

On 17 September representatives of

SOS headquarters, the task force, Transportation Corps, the Navy, and other

agencies compared notes on the mounting

tonnages. It was all too clear that the force

had far outgrown its transport; tonnages

would have to be slashed. A few days later

it was learned that the burden of supporting all three task forces after convoy UGS-2

would fall upon the United States. The

staffs began to tabulate cargo requirements

and to determine where cuts could be

made. "If the foot must be carved to fit the

shoe," commented an Air Forces officer,

"total tonnage can be reduced approximately fifty per cent. Such reduction will

eliminate reserves and all allowances for

losses en route. If a ship is lost the airplanes

sit on the ground. This must be a command

decision."

 71

By the 28th the gap between space

available and space desired could be estimated with fair accuracy. Lutes presented

the problem to General Clark, who was

still in Washington. Lutes started with the

assumption that a three-month level of

reserves for Patton's force was "out of the

question," particularly since the inside

forces, which would have to fight the Germans, were to get only half that allowance.72

 With the twenty-five cargo vessels

allotted in each slow convoy to the Western

Task Force and what little cargo space was

available in fast convoys, something less

than 1.5 million ship tons could be moved

to the theater in three months (through D

plus 95). Estimated requirements were

about 2.4 million tons. The deficit, 927,000

tons, was equivalent to 84 shiploads. To

absorb it, cargo convoys would have to be

expanded to 66 vessels each, and port accommodation capacity in Morocco to 46

vessels. Otherwise, tonnages must be cut.

The alternatives were to send the whole

Western Task Force with its matériel reduced by about half, or to send a smaller

force (reduced from 167,000 to about

100,000) fully equipped and mobile. Lutes

recommended the latter.73

General Clark elected instead to have a

large force, sacrificing mobility and fire

power, on the ground that the mission of

the Western Task Force would be primar68

 (1) Diary, 26 Sep 42 entry, cited n. 28(1). (2)

Msg cited n. 59(11). (3) Memo cited n. 58(3). (4)

Memo, Lutes for Clark, 28 Sep 42, sub: Maintenance

of U.S. Trs in Center and E Task Forces, 18 Shipg file,

I, Case 35, Plng Div ASF. 69

 Diary, 4 Sep 42 entry, cited n. 28(1). 70

 (1) Diary, 2 and 3 Oct 42 entries, cited n. 28(1).

(2) Frierson, Preparations for "Torch," p. 45, OCMH. 71

 (1) Memo, Hq AAF for Magruder, 17 Sep 42, 18

Shipg file, I, Case 13, Plng Div ASF. (2) Corresp in 18

Shipg file, I, Cases 7 and 17, Plng Div ASF. (3) Diary,

17 and 21 Sep 42 entries, cited n. 28(1). (4) See memo,

Magruder for Lutes, 17 Sep 42, sub: Mtg Concerning

Trans for Certain Opn, 18 Shipg file, I, Case 12, Plng

Div ASF. (5) See also, App. B of Frierson, Preparations for "Torch," OCMH. 72

 Memo cited n. 68(4). 73 Ibid.
THE DESCENT ON NORTH AFRICA 439

ily to establish and defend communications. General Patton, who apparently had

not been consulted, accepted this portentous decision without protest.74

Launching the Western Task Force

The crowded eight weeks of wrestling

with last-minute needs of the inside task

forces saw the assembling, equipping, and

outloading of the Western Task Force. It

had early been decided, at the suggestion

of SOS, to concentrate the force before

sailing, but for lack of suitable staging

areas near Hampton Roads (the port that

was to handle the outloading of the combat-loaded elements) it proved impossible

to assemble the whole force in one place.

More distant military reservations had to

be used—Fort Bragg in North Carolina,

and Camps A. P. Hill and Pickett in Virginia, for most of the ground troops of the

combat-loaded echelon; Langley Field,

Virginia, for the air forces; Fort Meade,

Maryland, for miscellaneous special units.

Fort Dix and Camp Kilmer in New Jersey, Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, Fort

Devens, Massachusetts, and other staging

areas and reservations behind New York

were used for the post-D-Day contingents,

as well as for the 39th Regimental Combat

Team, which sailed late in September. Instructions on 2 September ordered the first

echelon, comprising the 3d and 9th Infantry and the 2d Armored Divisions with

their supporting units, to be ready to move

to concentration areas by the 10th; the 3d

Armored with more units was to be ready

by the 20th; the 45th Infantry and the 4th

Motorized by 10 October. Air Forces units

received their readiness orders on 9 September, with deadline dates of 5 and 10

October and 10 November. By 25 September the concentration of the first echelon

was substantially complete.75

Equipping the force took longer, much

longer. Special equipment was authorized

piecemeal and more or less at the whim of

troop commanders, and the task force staff

fell far behind in notifying units of what

had been authorized. Redesignation of

special units and constitution of new ones

immensely complicated the task. In equipping Air Forces units, SOS encountered

particular difficulty. The instructions of

9 September had merely specified units;

on the 13th SOS still was without information as to their locations or equipment

tables. Officers on the task force air staff

reported they were "still organizing." Two

days later the information was requested

again. The air staff was in a frenzy of activity; eighteen officers were laboring to

turn out the data, which was promised

within a few days. SOS suggested it be

furnished piecemeal if necessary, and at

three-day intervals thereafter repeated the

request. On the 23d a list was received,

but proved to be incomplete. Another

promise—but at eight o'clock that evening

no further word had been received. OPD

was asked to apply pressure. Two days

later, the air staff assured SOS that the

AAF base service organizations had practically finished filling unit shortages, and

SOS need concern itself only with mainte- 74

 (1) Memo cited n. 66(3). (2) Diary, 28 Sep 42

entry, cited n. 28(1). (3) Memo, Magruder for Lutes,

6 Oct 42, sub: Maintenance Reserve Task Force "A,"

Policy file, I, 20, Plng Div ASF. The decision included

reduction of reserves to forty-five days and ten units

of fire. 75

 (1) Diary, 25, 27 Aug, and 12 Sep 42 entries, cited

n. 28(1). (2) See Concentration Task Force "A" folder,

Logis File, OCMH. (3) History of the North African

Task Force, Vol. IV, Sec 1, of History of the Mobilization Division, ASF, in Plng Div ASF. (4) Memo, OPD

for AGF and SOS, 2 Sep 42, sub: Preparation of Units

for Overseas Sv, and subsequent dirs in OPD 370.5,

Sec 1.
440 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

nance supplies. At the same time the tardy

station list was finally received, but by this

time it was obsolete since many units were

moving to concentration areas; shipments

would have to be sent there and to the

port. It developed, moreover, that the

units were far from complete; AAF base

services began to call on SOS for help.

Equipment tables still had not come in.

Fortunately, most units of the air contingent of the task force were scheduled to

move in D plus 5 and later convoys.76

Field commanders were determined

that American ground troops, in their first

encounter with the enemy in Europe,

should have the best equipment that the

country could give them, and plenty of it.

The 2d Armored Division was to be

equipped with the new streamlined Sherman (M4) medium tank, which had a

lower silhouette and greater gun elevation

than the Grant M3, as well as a 360-degree

traverse. The new light tanks had heavier

front armor and greater speed than the

older models, and an additional engine.

Some of the tank destroyer units were

equipped with a new 3-inch gun motor

carriage (M10), which outclassed the old

75-mm. self-propelled gun generally. Some

of the antiaircraft units were issued the

new multiple gun mounts, combining a

Bofors 40-mm. gun and two .50-caliber

water-cooled machine guns on one mount.

High-speed tractors were assigned as additional equipment for the 155-mm. howitzer regiments. The wheeled 105-mm.

howitzer was to be replaced in armored

divisions, as far as possible, by the M7 motor carriage, a full-tracked vehicle with a

medium tank chassis armed with a .50-

caliber machine gun as well. Some antiaircraft regiments were to receive additional 6-ton trucks as prime movers. Caliber .50 machine guns were to be installed,

as rapidly as possible, on 21⁄2-ton and larger

trucks. Certain quartermaster units were

authorized additional weapons carriers.

Officers and most noncoms were issued

submachine guns instead of pistols. A special list of additional equipment for the

two infantry divisions in the first echelon

ran to eighty items, including rubber

boats, waders, loud-speaker sets, outboard

motors, mine detectors, hand cars, magnifying glasses, lighting plants, tractors with

detachable angle dozers, "traction devices" for truck units, portable air compressors, flag kits, cotton sash cord rope

(16,000 feet per division), hardware cloth,

vehicle slings, black basketball shoes, and

amphibious tractors. The most spectacular

new item was the rocket launcher, nicknamed the "bazooka," which so impressed

General Patton in perfunctory tests shortly

before the force sailed that he insisted it be

issued to his troops, even though there was

no time for training.77

An impressive array of impedimenta

was marshalled to minister to the comfort

and health of the individual soldier. Over

and above standard allowances, there

were extra issues of wool blankets, wool

gloves, cotton shirts, shoes, socks, and cotton drawers; troops were provided with

sun and dust goggles, dust respirators,

neck cloths, hip boots, bed sacks, mosquito

bars, head nets, mosquito gloves, cook

stoves, pioneer tool sets, water-saving and

water-purifying devices, watch compasses,

bicycles, refrigerators, alarm clocks, and 76

 (1) Diary, 7-8, 13-15, 23, 25-26 Sep, 2 and 3 Oct

42 entries, cited n. 28(1). (2) History of the North

African Task Force, p. 4, cited n. 75(3). (3) Corresp

in OPD 370.5 Task Force, Sec 1; and OPD 320.2 Task

Force, Case 11. 77

 (1) See various equipment directives in OPD

370.5 Task Force. (2) Frierson, Preparations for

"Torch," pp. 43-45 and App. D, OCMH. (3) Corresp

in Task Force A Sup Gen folder, Plng Div ASF, Job

A46-371.
THE DESCENT ON NORTH AFRICA 441

stepladders. For insect control and sanitation in an underdeveloped country

and in a hot climate, there were provided insect repellent (750,000 bottles),

fumigation vaults, methyl bromide, and

chloroform. Every soldier packed his personal belongings in two water-repellent

barracks bags, one of which was to be accessible throughout the voyage. Officers

were allowed 175 pounds of equipment,

including musette bag, hand baggage, bedroll, and trunk locker; general officers had

an additional trunk locker or wardrobe

trunk. Each individual received two sets of

antigas impregnated clothing, with impregnite and protective ointment, besides

his gas mask. The task force also carried

huge tonnages of construction and fortification equipment and materials, equipment to repair and operate docks and railroads, well-digging machinery, rolling

stock, locomotives, bulldozers, tractors,

cement, asphalt, gasoline and oil pipeline,

storage tanks, beach and airfield landing

mats, elaborate radio, radar, and telephonic equipment, and thousands of miles

of wire. Troops carried with them packages

of tea, rice, lump sugar, cotton cloth, and

other articles for gifts or barter.78

This proliferation of material for a

lengthening and changing list of units

made it impossible to outfit the force in an

orderly manner. Colonel Magruder pleaded with OPD on 19 September to halt the

stream of changes and additions. At least

fifty changes had been made since the 2d

of the month, and six more had come in

between eight and nine o'clock that morning. Could not special requests be made at

one time, and should not requests for

equipment still being developed be discouraged? But the task force had the bit in

its teeth, and no one on the General Staff

seemed inclined to rein it in. 7 9

Loading was an end product. It suffered

from every mistake and breakdown that

occurred before troops and material

reached the port, and it inherited the penalties of every prior delay, which pushed

loading closer to a usually immutable sailing date. Depending more than any earlier

operation on careful planning and scheduling, it was more likely than any to be a

product of haste and improvisation. Loading plans were supposed to be worked out

by the task force staff in close conjunction

with the port officials who would have to

execute them. They involved consideration of sailing schedules, troop and freight

movement schedules, troop commanders'

desires as to distribution of units and material among transports, tonnage and

cubage computations of cargo to be loaded, detailed specifications of the cargo

capacity (weight and volume) of the transports, the peculiar layout and structure of

each vessel, details of the storage and loading facilities of the port, requirements for

special handling. On 6 September SOS

officials were pressing OPD for this basic

information. OPD, for obvious reasons,

was unable to give it. Convoy schedules

had not yet crystallized. Units had yet to

be assigned to specific convoys, to subtask

forces, and to specific transports. Commanders had not yet specified which items

should accompany each unit, subtask

force, and echelon.80

During most of September, as already

described, the accumulation of tonnages

for which no shipping space was in prospect went steadily on. On the 18th the

task force produced a detailed list of units

78

 (1) Equip dirs cited n. 77(1). (2) Annual Report of

the Army Service Forces, 1943, Ch. I. 79

 Diary, 19 Sep 42 entry, cited n. 28(1). 80

 Memo, Somervell for Handy, 6 Sep 42, sub: Sp

Opn, 18 Shipg file, I, Case 7, Plng Div ASF.
442 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

and material for the first two fast convoys

and some of the material for the first slow

convoy (scheduled to leave respectively

on 25 October and 1 and 6 November).

Then, on 28 September, General Clark

made his decision to slash tonnages by 50

percent.

This decision undid much of the work

already done. Supplies were waiting at the

depots, but the task force staff and commanders now had to decide anew how

much each unit could take. Lutes warned

that every day's delay in loading arrangements after 30 September would cause a

corresponding delay in the sailing date.

Movement orders issued on the 29th did

indicate the breakdown of the assault

force into twenty-eight contingents, one

for each transport, permitting the forwarding of some shipments. But unit assignments to the subtask forces ("X," "Y,"

and "Z," one for each area to be assaulted)

were not released until 2 October, and

unit commanders arriving at the port did

not know them. Shipments of ammunition

were also held up until publication of

weapon lists on the same day. Even thereafter, movement orders, vessel assignments, and weapons lists proved no more

stable than the troop and equipment lists

that had preceded them. Combat team

commanders were prone to shift vessel assignments after reaching port; this required reassignment of equipment, which

in turn unsettled the distribution of ammunition. Every elimination or addition

of a weapon also dictated modification in

ammunition shipments to port. As late as

10 October the Navy was clamoring for

final vessel assignments.81

A fundamental anomaly in the whole

situation was the circumstance that the

process of issuing equipment and shipping

it to port was going on at the same time

that necessary reductions in bulk and

weight were being made. "It is a great

waste of effort and equipment," Lutes

pointed out to OPD, "to issue to units full

T/BA [Tables of Basic Allowances] equipment, plus many increases, and then to

have those units sail overseas leaving behind half their T/BA and most of the increases . . . ," especially since there was

no likelihood of shipping any of the backlog during the next three months.82

 Lutes

suggested that no equipment changes be

permitted after 12 October for units whose

matériel was to be shipped in the first

three convoys, and that for later convoys

changes should be cut off one month before sailing date. He also suggested that

reductions at home stations and staging

areas be based on a rough formula aimed

at a net 50 percent cut while retaining essential items—for example, a flat 75 percent cut in vehicles that could be crated.

Also, why should not every requested

change in allowances involving an increase in weight and volume be accompanied by a recommendation for withdrawing an equivalent tonnage?

 83

These suggestions, for the present, went

unheeded. Meanwhile, OPD continued to

approve requests for new and additional

equipment, shipments continued to pour

into port from the depots, swelling the

very piles of material that had to be reduced, change succeeded change in hundreds of equipment tables, and commanders made the necessary eliminations helterskelter up to the moment of departure. On

81

 (1) Memo, Lutes for CG Task Force A, 28 Sep

42, sub: Loading of Task Force A, 18 Shipg file, I,

Case 36, Plng Div ASF. (2) Memo cited n. 66(3). (3)

Frierson, Preparations for "Torch," p. 92, OCMH. 82

 Memo, Lutes for OPD, 9 Oct 42, Policy file, I,

25, Plng Div ASF. 83

 (1) Ibid. (2) Memo, Lutes for OPD, 6 Oct 42,

Policy file, I, 22, Plng Div ASF.
THE DESCENT ON NORTH AFRICA 443

9 October, only two weeks before sailing

date, Lutes wrote grimly to OPD, "No indication of a slackening in the stream of

changes and additions in troops and

equipment for Task Force A appears as

the date of sailing of the first convoy approaches. Requests approved by your office in the past week number twentyfour."

 84

Despite all the confusion, matériel for

the D-Day convoy was at least coming in.

On 8 October General Lutes, perusing

reports on freight movements into Hampton Roads, felt reasonably confident.

"Although the Task Force staff delayed us

seriously by failing to submit loading plans

on time," he noted, ". . . we will get

everything into port marked okay."

 85

 On

29 September Brig. Gen. John R. Kilpatrick, port commander at Hampton

Roads, had called forward cargo for vessels of "Y" Force, comprising more than

half (fifteen vessels) of the whole assault

force. Loading plans still were not available and four of the transports were not

even present. The port commander decided, nevertheless, to go ahead, flooring

each ship with rations, gasoline, and other

bottom cargo; the combat load could be

built on this foundation. Most matériel,

other than ammunition, rations, and gasoline, was delivered on arrival at the port

to central warehouses in Newport News,

forming a pool from which cargo could be

drawn for each transport. Field rations

and ammunition (other than the reserves

loaded as bottom cargo) had to be routed

directly to the piers for issue to troops and

loading into vehicles. Most vehicle fuel

tanks were filled (up to the prescribed 90

percent) at staging areas. Facilities in the

area were divided between Army and

Navy; loading at the Newport News pier

was handled by the Army, loading at the

Navy pier and the Air Forces pier (both

near Norfolk) by the Navy; at the Army

Base pier near Norfolk the services operated jointly under the general direction of

the Navy. These arrangements were all

completed by 30 September. This deadline at least had been met.86

Loading was a scrambled operation.

Freight called forward on 29 September

deluged the port, much of it unidentifiable. Shipping papers arrived a day or

more late and many freight cars were

marked for the wrong destination within

the port area or lacked a specific marking

altogether. Since different railroads served

different piers some errant freight cars

had either to be lightered across the bay

or sent many miles around by rail. At one

point, crews of searchers had to comb

through 690 cars standing on sidings at

Richmond looking for certain items, while

loading was suspended. Lack of a holding

84

 (1) Memo cited n. 82. (2) Memo cited n. 83(2).

(3) Memo cited n. 74(3). (4) Memo, Magruder for

Heileman, 12 Oct 42, Policy file, I, 20, Plng Div ASF.

(5) History of the North African Task Force, Incls 29-

31, cited n. 75(3). (6) Lt. Col. Frank A. Bogart (one of

Lutes' staff officers) interrogated a year after the event,

had no recollection of any action taken on. the SOS

proposals. See Frierson, Preparations for "Torch," p.

49, OCMH. 85

 (1) Handwritten note on memo, unsigned, for Dir

of Distrib Div, 8 Oct 42, sub: Status of Equip Arriving

at HRPOE, TORCH folder, Shipg tab, Lutes File. (2)

For general treatments of the loading of Convoy

UGF-1, see Frierson, Preparations for "Torch,"

OCMH; Harold H. Dunham, U.S. Army Transportation and the Conquest of North Africa, 1942-1943,

Monograph 9. OCT HB; History of the North African

Task Force, cited n. 75(3); Hist Rpt 1, HRPOE, OCT

HB; Maj. William Reginald Wheeler, ed., The Road

to Victory (New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press,

1946); and Comdr. Walter Karig, USNR, Lt. Earl

Burton, and Lt. Stephen L. Freeland. Battle Report:

The Atlantic War (New York, Rinehart and "Company, Inc., 1946). 86

 (1) Hist Rpt 1. cited n. 85(2). (2) Frierson, Preparations for "Torch," pp. 92-96, 102. OCMH. (3)

Ltr, Gen Kilpatrick to Rear Adm Trevor W. Leutze.

30 Sep 42, TORCH folder, Shipg tab, Lutes File.
444 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

and reconsignment point near the port

was a serious handicap. An elaborate

scheme of marking, devised to route ammunition to specific piers and ships, broke

down. Wrote the port commander:

The ammunition that should have gone

into bottom stowage did not arrive first. Then when units were changed from one

ship to another, or from one group of ships

to another, we had to rejuggle our ammunition. . . . A car would be marked 4948 J-1.

That indicated the unit and the ship of the

group, but if that particular unit or a portion

of the unit had been transferred to a different

ship, it left us hanging in the air.

All matériel, he thought, should have

been shipped to port in bulk, "Thereby,

complete cargo would be unloaded at the

port, and be kept in open stock . . . and

we could call upon it to load specific ships

at specific times. That would mean that

the task force might make last-minute

changes without upsetting us in the

least."

 87

Perhaps the most difficult requirement

to meet in the loading period was that for

final rehearsal in unloading and landing.

General Lutes had warned the task force

staff that the practice loading must begin

no later than 1 October, in order to meet

the scheduled departure date of the 20th.

On 28 September he gave up hope. "A

practice loading," he noted, "has ceased

to be a possibility."

 88

 But he was wrong.

Navy, port, and task force officers, meeting at Norfolk on the 30th, decided to

make the attempt. Since berth capacity

was insufficient to load the entire force

simultaneously, Force "Y" could be partially loaded and moved down to Solomons Island for rehearsal while Force

"X" and Force "Z" were loading. Then

Force "Y" could return to complete its

loading. Wires crossed at the outset when

port loading agencies, ignorant of the

change in plan, stowed the wrong cargo

in deep holds. Many corners had to be

cut, at the expense of realism—ammunition was not unloaded, owing to risk of

damage, and dummy cases could not be

provided in time; unloading five-gallon

gasoline cans was also omitted as too risky.

The rehearsal amounted to an exercise in

loading and unloading vehicles and other

bulky items. As such, it was an efficient

performance, and went off according to

schedule.

Last-minute emergencies were numerous. Six transports floored with B rations

by the Navy at New York had to be unloaded and reloaded at Hampton Roads.

The transport Lee, completely loaded, developed engine trouble on the eve of departure; she was discharged, and her replacement, Calvert, loaded, all in the space

of thirty-five hours. Calvert had not even

had a shakedown cruise, and lacked amphibious equipment. This meant that the

crew of the Lee had to take over, and the

new transport had to be rigged with the

Lee's equipment. Cargo had to be completely discharged from the Lee before it

could be loaded into the Calvert, in order

to preserve its arrangements. Another

problem child of the flotilla was the ancient Contessa, a shallow-draft Hondurasregistered fruit ship of 5,500 tons, drafted

after intensive search to haul aviation

gasoline and ammunition up the shallow

Oued Sebou to Port-Lyautey, whose adjoining airfield was one of the initial objectives. At Hampton Roads, the Contessa's ailing engines broke down and her

nondescript crew scattered to the winds.

87

 Hist Rpt 1, cited n. 85(2). 88

 (1) Memo cited n. 81(1). (2) Diary, 21-23 Sep

42 entries, cited n. 28(1). (3) Memo, Lutes for CG

Task Force A, 22 Sep 42, sub: Loading of Task Force

A, TORCH folder, Shipg tab, Lutes File.
THE DESCENT ON NORTH AFRICA 445

But the engine was repaired, and a local

naval brig raided to fill the ship's complement. On the 26th, three days late, Contessa left port without escort in pursuit of

the convoy.89

On the morning of the 23d the assault

forces bound-for Mehdia and Safi left

port. At dawn the following day the

Fedala force sailed, and the covering

naval contingent set out from the Maine

coast. Air force elements started from Bermuda on the 25th, and the entire force

rendezvoused next day. All told, there

were 33,700 officers and men besides Navy

crews and some miscellaneous personnel.

The convoy was joined at sea by the seatrain New Jersey (rechristened Lakehurst by

the Navy), loaded at New York with 169

guns, vehicles, and tanks. With this addition, and including the tardy Contessa

(containing only 738 tons of gasoline and

bombs), the whole force carried 96,670

ship tons of cargo; this included 728 tanks

and other tracked vehicles, 2,266 wheeled

vehicles, and 254 guns.90

A few days before the convoy sailed,

Somervell sent Eisenhower a short note:

This is just to let you know that we have

been giving everything we have to outfitting

your organization, both here and in England. I know that Patton feels pretty well

satisfied with what we have been able to do

for him here and hope your boys over there

feel the same way. We have not only been

making every effort to meet your demands,

but also to do everything on our own hook

that we could to further the gigantic undertaking that you have ahead of you.

God knows, Ike, we wish you the best of

luck and outstanding success. The country

needs one badly, and if anyone can give it to

them I am sure you can.91

The Pay-Off and Its Lessons

The North African landings were attended by almost miraculous good fortune. The assault convoys successfully

evaded enemy submarines, and those carrying the inside forces steamed unmolested through the Strait; deception measures had persuaded the enemy that the

great movements of shipping, concentration of aircraft at Gibraltar, and other

preparations were aimed at reinforcing

Malta or attacking Dakar. The attack on

Algiers met little resistance; at Oran the

troops found the going harder, but by the

10th both areas had been secured. The

only disasters in the Mediterranean were

minor, resulting from attempts at both

Oran and Algiers to force a way directly

into the harbors against point-blank fire.92

In the west, the plan involved three

landings—at Safi, Port-Lyautey, and

Fedala (near Casablanca). Here, too, the

attackers were lucky. The sea, following

bad weather for two days, was calm on the

morning of the 8th, the calmest, according

to an elderly local Frenchman, in sixtyeight years. No enemy subs appeared.

Caught by surprise, the French were slow

and halfhearted in defense. Vice Adm.

François Michelier, in command at Casablanca, used his naval forces skilfully, but

they were overwhelmed. Little resistance

was encountered on the beaches at Fedala

and Safi, except from a few recalcitrant

89

 (1) Hist Rpt 1, cited n. 85(2). (2) Karig, Burton,

and Freeland, Battle Report: The Atlantic War, p. 179.

(3) Frierson, Preparations for "Torch," p. 94, OCMH.

(4) Craven and Cate, AAF II, pp. 58, 75. (5) Wheeler,

Road to Victory, p. 78. 90

 (1) Karig, Burton, and Freeland, Battle Report:

The Atlantic War, pp. 178ff. (2) Tonnage figures from

Plng Div OCT chart, 17 Feb 43, Convoy Info

NATOUSA folder, OCT HB. (3) NYPOE rpt, no

date, sub: Embarkation of Task Force A, OCT HB. 91

 Ltr, Somervell to Eisenhower, 20 Oct 42, ETO

(6) 1942-43 folder, Hq ASF. 92

 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, Ch. VI.

Submarines, concentrated south of the Azores to

cover Dakar, mauled a homeward-bound British

convoy.
446 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

THE "MARACAIBO" H.M.S. MISOA, October 1942. This was one of the three

converted shallow-draft oilers used as tank landing ships at Oran. Note bridge sections from ship

to shore.

coastal batteries; a company of Senegalese

east of Fedala surrendered after firing a

few rounds. At Port-Lyautey, to the north,

three or four thousand Moroccan Tirailleurs, French Legionnaires, and naval

troops fought resolutely, but by the 11th

resistance had ended and an armistice was

concluded. The invaders suffered their

heaviest loss on the 11th and 12th when

four transports—Hewes, Scott, Bliss, and

Rutledge— were torpedoed outside Casablanca Harbor. Another transport, Electra,

was attacked on the 15th while en route

from Port-Lyautey to Casablanca; she

was beached and eventually repaired.

Nine tenths of the cargo of the Hewes went

down with her, but most of the other cargoes had already been discharged or were

salvaged.93

As a ship-to-shore operation, TORCH relied mainly on small 36-foot carriers of

personnel and vehicles (LCP's and LCV's)

and 50-foot tank lighters (LCM(3)'s) carried on the transports. No difficulty was

anticipated or encountered in finding

adequate numbers since production was

in full tide by summer; substantial numbers had been delivered in the British Isles

by the end of August. But many of the

small craft used in TORCH were obsolescent, unstandardized, and plagued by

"bugs." Exercises indicated that bow

ramps were well-nigh indispensable; the

93

 (1) Rpt, Gen A. R. Wilson, 12 Dec 42, sub: Rpt

on Opns in N Africa, 20 Gen file, I, 47, Plng Div ASF,

Job A46-371. (2) Samuel Eliot Morison, Operations in

North African Waters: October 1942-June 1943 (Boston,

Little, Brown and Company, 1950), Chs. III-VII.
THE DESCENT ON NORTH AFRICA 447

SEATRAIN USS LAKEHURST in North Africa, November 1942. This vessel, originally

designed to carry whole trains on tracks, was used in the Torch operation to transport tanks and

assault guns.

later Higgins carriers had them, but the

older Eureka model did not. Ramp-lowering mechanisms were sluggish and awkward, and despite British warnings none

of the boats was armored against either

frontal or cross fire. The LCV was too

narrow, by an inch or two, to accommodate some of the Army's new 3⁄4-ton

trucks.94

The larger tank lighters (YTL's and

LCT's) of one hundred feet and over did

not figure prominently in plans for the assault, and only a few were actually used

(none at Casablanca).95 The new oceangoing landing vessels were not yet available. September saw the first large personnel carriers (LCI(L)'s) emerge from

production; the first tank landing ships

(LST's) came in October. For lack of

LST's Patton's assault plan required the

early capture of Safi, a small port far

south of Casablanca with a quay long

enough and with sufficient draft alongside

to berth the seatrain Lakehurst with its

94

 (1) Corresp in OCT 370.5 Mvmt BOLERO, especially rpts by Capt Warren. (2) Ltr cited n. 26(2).

(3) Memo, Lutes for CofEngrs, 18 Jun 42, BOLERO

1942 folder, Lutes File. (4) Msg 2559, London to

AGWAR, 22 Sep 42, TORCH Radiograms, Logis File,

OCMH. (5) Msg 1491, London to AGWAR, 25 Aug

42, OCT 370.5 Mvmt BOLERO. (6) Msg, WD to

USFOR, 23 Nov 42, 18 Shipg file, I, Case 85, Plng

Div ASF. 95

 (1) Mowry, Landing Craft and the War Production Board, WPB Sp Study 11, p. 10. Only 2 LCT's

were produced in the U.S. in June and July, 45 in

August, 156 in September. (2) In July the British had

about 90 of their own types in the United Kingdom.

See Landing Craft tab to ltr, Hull to Eisenhower, 15

July 42, OPD 320.2 ETO, 6. (3) Corresp in OCT

370.5 Mvmt BOLERO, and OCT 560 Mvmt BOLERO.
448 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

fifty-nine tanks and assault guns. For the

Oran attack, the British converted three

shallow-draft oilers, designed for use on

Lake Maracaibo, Venezuela; these, after

being beached, discharged light tanks

through doors in the bow over long bridge

sections pushed out to shore. The "Maracaibos" were not quite large enough to

take the old medium tanks (Grants) of the

1st Armored Division (Combat Command

B) and new Shermans did not arrive in

time for training; the Grants were shipped

to Africa later.96

Amphibian vehicles and tractors, including the 21⁄2-ton amphibian truck

(DUKW) of later fame, were going into

large-scale production on the eve of

TORCH. In June Brig. Gen. Theodore H.

Dillon, Deputy Chief of Transportation,

wrote glowingly to the European theater

of new trucks, ranging from 1⁄4-ton "jeeps"

up to 6-ton monsters, which could move

from land to water and back to land

without pause and allegedly possessed the

same overland capabilities as ordinary

trucks. With them, he averred, "we could

take your stuff direct from shipside at Irish

Sea ports overland and cross water to

ROUNDUP with one operation."

 97

 The vehicles actually never quite measured up

to this description, and in any event, largescale production was too late for TORCH.

The tracked Roebling "Alligator" (LVT,

unarmored), available in larger numbers,

had performed well in the Guadalcanal

landings in August, but not enough were

ready for the North Africa operation.98

The French in North Africa obligingly

failed to exploit the attackers' weakness

in amphibious equipment. In the west,

Safi was captured at the outset, and Lakehurst discharged her tanks and guns in

three days; by then the commodious facilities at Casablanca were available. In

the Mediterranean the "Maracaibos"

were a complete success, both in the assault and later in ferrying tanks from

Oran to Philippeville. Some of the large

LCT's, after sailing without cargo to

Gibraltar, were also used effectively in

ferrying along the North African coast.

Unfortunately, the mortality in small craft

was startlingly high. Six hundred and

twenty-nine small craft were used in the

western landings; 216, or more than 34

percent, were reported lost or disabled,

most of them at Fedala. Center Force lost

only 45 craft out of 223, but at Algiers virtually the entire flotilla of 100 craft was

wiped out. This slaughter was primarily

a result of inept handling by inexperienced personnel, though darkness, a falling tide, and defective construction and

equipment played their part. Compasses

were universally condemned as worthless;

ramp fastenings broke loose; craft broke

up in moderate seas; engines were

drowned by spray for lack of canopies;

trucks would not load into narrow craft.

Hostile machine gun fire, had it materialized, would have caused terrific casualties

96

 (1) Morison, Operations in North African Waters,

pp. 137, 234, 269, and 269 n. 38. The LCI(L), or landing craft, infantry, large (as distinguished from the

British 105-foot LCI(S)) was really an ocean-going

vessel, 158 feet long. (2) WPB Sp Study 11, App. C,

Table I, cited n. 95(1). October and November production of LCI's was 25 and 59, respectively; November production of LST's was 18. (3) Memo, unsigned,

for Col Magruder, 2 Feb 43, sub: Notes on Talk by

Maj Gen Lunsford E. Oliver, 20 Gen file, I, 72, Plng

Div ASF, Job A46-371. (4) Msg 2678, London to

AGWAR, 24 Sep 42, TORCH Radiograms, Logis File,

OCMH. 97

 Ltr, Dillon to Ross, 17 Jun 42, OCT 370.5 Mvmt

BOLERO. 98

 (1) Corresp in 451.94 Amphibious Vehicles

folder, Plng Div ASF. (2) Memo, Gen Plans Br SOS

for Lutes, 20 Aug 42, sub: Roebling Alligators, same

file. (3) Plng Div SOS Diary, 31 Jul and 2 Sep 42 entries, Plng Div ASF. (4) Miller, Guadalcanal: The First

Offensive, pp. 57, 75. (5) Production figures are from

WPB and CPA, Official Munitions Production of the

United States by Months, July 1, 1940-August 31,

1945.
THE DESCENT ON NORTH AFRICA 449

among personnel in the unarmored

craft.99 The lack of amphibious vehicles

was keenly felt, especially in clearing the

beach. Despite light opposition at the

shoreline, the advance on Casablanca was

held up for hours until the clogged

beaches could be partially cleared. Amphibian trucks and tractors could have

moved supplies without a halt to dumps

farther inland; they would have been useful, too, in pulling stranded boats back

into the water.100

The beach phase in the western landings fortunately was brief, and the Moroccan ports were in better condition when

captured than the invaders had a right to

expect. Eight berths at Casablanca were

turned over immediately to the Americans, three more at Safi, and one at

Fedala. A week later, however, the twelve

berths were still the only ones usable, out

of the twenty-six counted upon, since efforts were concentrated on repairing the

more extensive damage in the Center

Force ports. By strenuous efforts, in little

more than a week twenty-two out of the

thirty berths hoped for at Oran and adjacent ports had been put to work. In the

eastern area the situation was even better,

with thirty-four out of thirty-seven berths

usable.101

Unloading was a chaotic experience,

particularly at Casablanca. At the Phosphate Pier on the 18th (when the second

convoy arrived),

. . . it was as though some gigantic overhead scoop full of supplies had suddenly

emptied its contents. Apparently nothing had

been hauled away and nothing had been

stacked. One box was simply dumped on top

of another. On the other dock we could see

boxes, crates, ammunition, and gasoline

drums piled and scattered from one end to

another . . . .102

In part, this situation was a result of the

pell-mell loading of the vessels. The ships

of the first two convoys had been loaded

reasonably full, but haste had caused near

chaos. Thousands of barracks bags were

strewn helter-skelter about the transports.

Grenades were found lying about loose.

Much of the ammunition stowed between

decks for immediate use was not of the

types needed, while there was plenty of

small arms ammunition deep in the hold

out of reach. Organizations and individuals alike had smuggled aboard "all

manner of unauthorized and excess equipment," while many important items, such

as fire control instruments, had been left

behind.103 Vehicles had been used as

catchalls for miscellaneous baggage.

Even more, the chaos on the docks resulted from inadequate planning for dis99

 (1) Hq SOS, Lessons Learned From Recent Amphibious Operations in North Africa, 12 Feb 43, App.

G-1, copy in App. K of Frierson, Preparations for

"Torch," OCMH. (2) Memo, Gross for Somervell,

12 Dec 42, sub: U.S. Landing Craft Losses in N

Africa, OCT 370.5 Mvmt BOLERO. (3) Morison, Operations in North African Waters, pp. 59-61, 79-81,

201-02, 234, 268-69. (4) Rpt, pp. 8-9, cited n. 93(1).

(5) Ltr, Kilpatrick to Gross, 28 Nov 42, copy in Frierson, Preparations for "Torch," App. H, OCMH. (6)

Changes were made late in 1942 in 36-foot craft to

accommodate trucks; the new Borg-Warner amphibious vehicle in 1943 was wide enough to hold a 3⁄4-ton

truck. See memo, Reqmts Div for ACofS Opns SOS,

1 Jan 43, sub: Gen Wilson's "Rpt of Opns in N

Africa," 20 Gen file, I, 47, Plng Div ASF. 100

 (1) Rpt, pp. 8-9, cited n. 93(1). (2) Memo cited

n. 99(6). 101

 (1) Morison, Operations in North African Waters,

pp. 131, 157-59, 174. (2) Msg 5028, Eisenhower to

WD, 18 Nov 42, OCT 565.3-900 England. (3) Memo

cited n. 61(3). (4) Msg R-3041, Marshall to Eisenhower, 11 Nov 42, Item 9, Exec 5. (5) Diary, 14, 16,

and 19 Nov 42 entries, cited n. 28(1). (6) Chronology,

11, 14, and 19 Nov 42 entries, cited n. 28(2). (7)

Memo, Lt Col Charles F. Tank for CofS W Task

Force, 27 Nov 42, NATOUSA Misc Info folder,

OCT HB. 102

 History, 6th Port, Transportation Corps, 18 Apr

43, Vol. I, OCT HB. 103

 (1) Extracts from interview by HRPOE officer

with transport captains, December 1942, copy in

Frierson, Preparations for "Torch," App. H, OCMH.

(2) Rpt, p. 35, cited n. 93(1). (3) Lessons Learned

. . . in North Africa, cited n. 99(1).
AERIAL VIEWS OF CASABLANCA
THE DESCENT ON NORTH AFRICA 451

charge operations. These normally would

have been taken over soon after the landings by the task force services of supply,

leaving the G-4 staff to attend to direct

support of combat forces. But the assault

convoy brought in neither G-4 nor SOS.

Col. Walter J. Muller, the G-4, arrived

with some of his staff on the second convoy; General Wilson, the SOS commander designate, with two assistants, "hitched"

a ride in the assault convoy, courtesy of

the Navy, and during the first few days

ashore acted as observer only. In his perhaps prejudiced view, the dock congestion

at Fedala and Casablanca was largely a

result of the absence of "a few experts to

take hold of the situation . . . no plan or

provision was made for the orderly handling of anything, with resulting delay in

the unloading of the ships."

 104

 It was not

until early January that the Atlantic Base

Section, under General Wilson, took over

port operations. Moreover, until the arrival of the 6th Port with the second convoy there were no trained service troops to

attack the congestion. Though Navy crews

and some of the Army combat troops

worked to the point of exhaustion, there

was a general lack of drive and organization. The problem was not entirely one

of lack of manpower. Transport captains

later complained that Army details "wandered away and would not stick to their

jobs . . . ."

 105

 Natives and soldiers loitered together among heaped-up crates on

the pier. Groups wandered about in

search of their assigned places. Truck

drivers waiting in line to load up refused

to pitch in and help. Natives looted happily among unguarded supplies. "Combat

troops," General Wilson later admitted,

"cannot be used for loading supplies unless they are properly supervised and

unless they have previously done so in

maneuvers."

 106

 In an infantry regiment,

he pointed out, there were some four hundred cooks, mechanics, clerks, and other

noncombatant personnel who should normally be available to work on beaches and

docks. "Fancy special service units" and

administrative overhead, he thought, were

not needed.107 SOS headquarters later

urged task force commanders to resist the

pressure of "hobbyists" for specialized

units, and to work their regular administrative personnel to the utmost, but emphasized that certain types of service

troops were indispensable in an amphibious operation—especially port units and

amphibian engineers.108

With more equipment, cargo might

have been moved more rapidly and

smoothly. Landing boats and towed life

rafts were hardly adequate to discharge

tens of thousands of tons of cargo. Amphibian vehicles would have been a godsend in the initial stage before transports

could be moved up to the piers and lighters became available. Transports lacked

sufficient heavy lifting gear, slings for

wheeled vehicles, special bomb-lifting

gear, roller-conveyors in the hold, and

other items. Lack of salvage equipment

delayed the removal of sunken hulks. No

planking was available to pave the interlaced rail tracks on the Phosphate Pier

so that trucks could drive to shipside.109

The tonnage slash of late September 104

 Rpt, pp. 26-27, cited n. 93(1). 105

 Hist Rpt 1, cited n. 85(2). 106

 Rpt, p. 27, cited n. 93(1). 107

 Ibid., p. 26. 108

 (1) Ibid., pp. 24-27. (2) Ltr cited n. 99(5). (3)

Lessons Learned . . . in North Africa, Annex B,

cited n. 99(1). (4) OCT memo, 18 Feb 43, sub: Opns

in N Africa, copy in Frierson, Preparations for

"Torch," App. L, OCMH. (5) See also, Bykofsky and

Larson, Trans III, Ch. III. 109

 (1) Memo cited n. 108(4). (2) Msg 282, Eisenhower to WD, 11 Nov 42, Item 9, Exec 5. (3) Memo

cited n. 101(7).
452 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

accounted for some of the deficiencies, especially the most serious one—trucks to

clear away the piled-up cargo. Most of the

cargo vehicles brought with the force were

commandeered for troops operating forward, and local charcoal burners and

horse-drawn wagons had to be used. Jeeps

and 1⁄2-ton trucks, which had replaced

heavier vehicles to save tonnage, proved

poor substitutes. Not enough trucks, moreover, were equipped with winches—evidently because the task force staff had not

requested them. The second fast convoy,

arriving on the 18th, brought more trucks

and other equipment and more port

troops, but it also brought more cargo to

be discharged while that from the first

convoy still cluttered the docks. After the

arrival of the all-cargo convoy on 1 December things went better; the convoy's

twenty-five vessels were discharged in less

than three weeks and the daily rate of discharge rose from less than 1,700 ship tons

in November to 3,700 tons during December.110

The western landings, finally, drove

home some hard lessons in packing, crating, and marking cargo. Cardboard cartons disintegrated here, as they had in

maneuvers in 1941, and metal-strapped

wooden crates, inexpertly and hastily

packed at the depots, broke under rough

handling. Neither cardboard nor wood

offered much protection against theft.

Hasty packing of organizational equipment by troops at home stations proved to

be "uniformly bad."

 111

 Some material

had been packed in cases too heavy to be

manhandled or even lifted by available

gear—artillery ammunition in 360-pound

boxes, landing mat in bundles as heavy as

5,000 pounds. Color markings of the supply services were hard to discern in dark

or half-light.112

The commanders and staffs of the U.S.

forces invading North Africa found no

solution to the oldest problem of logistics—how to give the soldier the weapons,

food, and protection he needed without

immobilizing him. Despite slashes in tonnage, each soldier brought into the theater

a small mountain of impedimenta. Into

two barracks bags, bedroll, and pack, he

crammed three pairs of shoes, woolen and

cotton uniforms, antigas impregnated

clothing, two bed sacks, blankets, underclothing, toilet articles, a raincoat, a mosquito bar, a mess kit, an entrenching

tool, and whatever other articles he

thought he might find useful and was

willing to carry. Even though he carried

only one barracks bag, little effort had

been made to control its weight; some

were reported to weigh as much as 180

pounds, and contained, as one observer

later put it, "everything from a dozen

pianos to several field safes."

 113

 The barracks bag, besides, was awkward, flimsy,

and something less than water repellent.

This forthright official wrote:

I am convinced that drastic action is now

in order to rid the American Soldier of this

contraption and provide him with a container which is more compact and built with

a material that will take it. ... I realize

that the great American Public may not like

110

 (1) Bykofsky and Larson, Trans III, Ch. III. (2)

Rpt, p. 30, cited n. 93(1). (3) Lessons Learned . . .

in North Africa, cited n. 99(1). (4) Memo, Lutes for

Somervell, 30 Jan 43, sub: Rpt of Gen Wilson . . . ,

20 Gen file, I, 66, Plng Div ASF. (5) Memo cited

n. 99(6). (6) Discharge rates based on rpt, sub: Opn

of the 6th Port, Casablanca, in ASF Monthly Progress

Report, Transportation, 30 Sep 43, Sec 3. 111

 Lessons Learned . . . in North Africa, Annex

E-1, cited n. 99(1). 112

 (1) Memo cited n. 108(4). (2) Rpt, p. 33, cited

n. 93(1).

By early 1943 the metal strap industry had

launched an educational campaign in plants and

depots to improve strapping operations. 113

 Memo, Col Ross for Col Thomas H. Ramsey,

QMC, 4 Jan 43, sub: Barracks Bags, Hist Rcds OCT

AFHQ NATOUSA, Vol. I, Tab AK, OCT HB.
THE DESCENT ON NORTH AFRICA 453

BURDENED SOLDIERS DEBARKING at Phosphate Pier, Casablanca.

the idea of their sons going to war without a

complete wardrobe akin to the one which

Gary Cooper might have in Hollywood, but

I also know he can't wrestle it around in

North Africa and ever have it with him.114

On one occasion twenty-five railway cars

were requested solely to move forward the

barracks bags of a single regimental combat team.

In addition to his pack and barracks

bag, the soldier carried ashore helmet,

weapons, loaded cartridge belt, canteen,

emergency rations, life belt, grenades, and

the inevitable gas mask, perhaps the most

detested single piece of equipment since

the days of the Roman Legion. Obviously

the soldier could not carry more than a

fraction of all this into action; most of the

residue was relegated to the trucks, but a

substantial portion invariably was abandoned—on the beach, by the roadside, in

the fields. As the war went on, more and

more items, particularly clothing, were

distributed in bulk up to comparatively

near the front, and there issued as needed.

But in the North Africa landings, as the

SOS admitted, "the individual officer and

soldier was woefully overloaded."

 115

Most of the logistical difficulties of the

North African landings could be traced to

the confusion of indecision, late decisions,

and later changes in decisions that had

turned the whole process of preparation

into a feat of improvisation. The consequences of hasty planning and inadequate

preparation were cumulative. Behind the

difficulties of unloading and supply ashore

114 Ibid. 115

 (1) Lessons Learned . . . in North Africa, Annex C-2, cited n. 99(1). (2) Rpt, pp. 28, 39, cited n.

93(1). (3) Morison, Operations in North African Waters,

p. 83. (4) Memo cited n. 108(4). (5) Memo cited n.

96(3). (6) Memo cited n. 110(4). (7) Col. S. L. A.

Marshall, The Soldier's Load and the Mobility of the Nation (Washington, The Combat Forces Press, 1950)
454 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

TABLE 10—TIMETABLE FOR PREPARING A TASK FORCE: IDEAL SCHEDULE COMPARED

WITH TORCH PREPARATIONS

a

 On 8 September General Eisenhower estimated the launching date as 8 November. b

 No equivalent date.

Source: Table in Hist Mat, Mediterranean Campaigns folder, Plng Div ASF.

lay the defects of loading; behind these,

the defects of assembling and equipping

the force; behind these, the indecision and

delays in completing outline and tactical

plans. At the root of all was the sudden reversal of the SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP

preparations and the late decision to undertake a venture of altogether different

scope. At every stage the staffs lacked that

most precious commodity in war, time—

time to design, produce, and deliver equipment, time to assemble and outfit shipping, time to train and equip troops, time

to concentrate and load the assault convoys. They lacked time, above all, to plan

and arrange in advance the innumerable

interlocking details of what was to be done

and when, under this or that assumption.

Some idea of the gap between the TORCH

timetable and what the logistical staffs regarded as a reasonable schedule—"the

time actually required to do an adequate

job"

 116

—can be gained by comparing the

TORCH experience with a theoretical timetable drawn up in 1943 by the SOS planning staff as a guide to the higher staffs in

plans for future task forces. (Table 10)

116

 Paper by Col Patterson, no date, sub: The N

African Opn, Hist Mat, Mediterranean Campaigns

folder, Plng Div ASF.
THE DESCENT ON NORTH AFRICA 455

"There was," General Lutes noted years

later, "a sad reason for this"—neglect of

logistics in the Army's schools.117 His opinion was shared by virtually every logistical

staff officer who took part in TORCH. A

member of Lutes' staff observed:

Nothing taught in any of our schools prior

to the war gave a true conception of the need

for time in launching a major operation. A

few days were generally considered sufficient

to move an Army in position, to bring up the

ammunition and to launch the Army into attack, but all the logistics that precede such

an operation were unknown or at least not

taught.118

Future staff officers, according to Lutes,

"preferred to study strategy and tactics.

. . . The hard factual studies in logistics

were boresome and did not hold out the

glamor comparable to playing the tactical

games."

 119

 SOS staff officers during the

preparations for TORCH found the task

force staff to be "tactics-conscious almost

to the exclusion of other considerations."

 120

 The strategic and tactical planners, ignoring logistical limitations, made

decisions that had to be unmade as soon

as the limitations became evident, but

often too late for preparations to be unmade. General Marshall admitted that in

the London discussions of July 1942, "the

logistic situation had been given only cursory examination."

 121

 Preparations for

TORCH, as a result, offered an object lesson

in disorderly planning and brilliant improvisation.

Early in December, when hopes of

early victory were beginning to fade,

Eisenhower still believed that the risks

taken had been justified. But the operations up to that time, he confessed, "have

violated every recognized principle of war,

are in conflict with all operational and

logistical methods laid down in textbooks,

and will be condemned in their entirety

by all Leavenworth and War College

classes for the next twenty-five years."

 122

Logisticians were not inclined to quarrel

with either the judgment or the confession;

they merely argued that with firm decisions at the outset they could have mounted

a stronger and more economical operation. On all sides, the overriding sensation

was one of relief and amazement over successes which, General Patton told his

troops, seemed to be a result of "the intervention of Divine Providence manifested

in many ways."

 123

117

 Lt. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, "Supply: World War

II—The Flight to Europe in 1942," Antiaircraft Journal (May-June 1952), p. 11. 118

 Paper cited n. 116. 119

 Article cited n. 117. 120

 Lessons Learned . . . in North Africa, cited

n. 99(1). 121

 Min, 38th mtg CCS, 28 Aug 42. 122

 Ltr, Eisenhower to Handy, 7 Dec 42, Item 1,

Exec 5. 123

 Rpt, p. 28, cited n. 93(1).
CHAPTER XVII

Follow-up in North Africa

The President had declared at the beginning of August that the North African

undertaking was now "our principal objective, and the assembling of means to

carry it out should take precedence over

other operations."

 l To the U.S. military

chiefs, who had accepted TORCH only with

misgivings, the degree of precedence was

important. Feeling strongly that the new

undertaking was a diversion from the

main effort against Germany, they were

unwilling to allow it and the complementary British offensive westward from Egypt

to inherit the entire legacy of the waning

BOLERO program. At the end of July they

had stipulated that fifteen air groups and

enough shipping to move a division be

earmarked for the Pacific. Throughout

the autumn, too, the Americans resisted

British pressure to continue shipments to

the British Isles on a large scale without

regard to balance in the forces there. They

insisted, as indeed the British did also,

that a cross-Channel invasion was still the

final and overriding goal. For the present

and through the remaining months of

1942, the American chiefs felt that their

current and growing commitments in

North Africa, and even more the precarious situation in the South and Southwest

Pacific, made it impossible to continue to

amass forces and material in the United

Kingdom on the scale desired by the British. They suspected that British pressure

to do so was designed to forestall diversions of U.S. forces to the Pacific. Striving

to maintain a balance in commitments,

Marshall and Arnold were able to hold

back as a strategic reserve the fifteen air

groups earmarked for the Pacific, but the

additional division (the 43d) went out to

the South Pacific, and various other

limited measures were taken to strengthen

positions all along the line from Hawaii to

Australia.2

American reluctance to go all out in

prosecuting the new Mediterranean strategy did not extend to the point of denying North African operations the shipping

and other resources that were needed. It

showed itself rather in a steady resistance

to long-range commitments that might

predetermine the specific character of the

Europe-first strategy, and jeopardize

American positions in the war against

Japan. It was not lack of shipping but of

naval power, together with administrative

confusion and inefficient utilization of

shipping and other resources, that primarily limited the logistical support of TORCH

during the three months following the

landings. From February 1943 onward, as

the climax of the North African campaign

1

 Memo, Gen Smith for JCS, 1 Aug 42, sub: Notes

for White House Conf, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 3-B, 79. 2

 (1) Msg 835, Eisenhower to Marshall, 2 Aug 42.

(2) Msg 2913, Marshall to Eisenhower, 3 Aug 42.

(3) Msg 873, Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 Aug 42. All

in Item 9, Exec 5. (4) Matloff and Snell, Strategic

Planning: 1941-1942, Chs. XII-XIV. (5) See above,

Ch. XV.
FOLLOW-UP IN NORTH AFRICA 457

approached, the limitations were slowly

overcome. Concurrently, from September

1942 through April 1943, the flow of

American troops and matériel to the British Isles languished and dwindled almost

to nothing, a victim not of TORCH alone

but of a strategy that spread resources

more thinly than before to support both

the Pacific and the European war.

Torch and the Atlantic Pool of Shipping

The divergence of British and American

views emerged most concretely, perhaps,

in the discussion of strategic shipping priorities early in August 1942, the Americans rejecting British-proposed priorities

that placed TORCH at the top and omitted

the Pacific altogether. In the final compromise, it was necessary to group in a

single top priority not merely TORCH but

also the Middle East, the Pacific, and

shipments to the Soviet Union via the

southern route—practically all the major

competing claimants on shipping. TORCH

was to have prior claim on shipping in the

Atlantic only during the period when it

was being mounted; thereafter, a separate

decision would have to be made whenever

the question arose.3

The actual assignment of shipping to

the North African operations was governed less by these priorities than by the

practical necessity of using the shipping

readily available in the Atlantic. TORCH

replaced BOLERO as the principal competitor of the Middle East for tonnage

from the Anglo-American pool; the tonnage assembled or earmarked for BOLERO

became, in fact, a pool from which the

converging operations in North Africa

and the new program of Soviet aid

through the Persian Corridor drew sustenance.

Even before the advent of TORCH, plans

for sending nine air combat groups (under

the Arnold-Slessor-Towers Agreement of

June) to help the British in the Middle

East promised to take a substantial slice

of shipping out of the BOLERO pool. In addition, some technicians were to be sent

to U.S. missions in the Middle East. The

total deployment was not large—about

30,000 men and 380,000 ship tons of

cargo, spread over a period of seven

months—but the length of the voyage

magnified manyfold the cost in shipping

removed from North Atlantic services.

The shipping staffs calculated that BOLERO

movements would lose almost a million

ship tons. The British proposed, at the beginning of August, to assign for the purpose three fast transports—Aquitania, Mauretania, and Pasteur (the last named had

carried the first increment in July)—in

order to release escorts and smaller transports for TORCH. While these arrangements were being discussed, the President,

worried by pessimistic reports on the

Middle East situation from Col. Bonner F.

Fellers, U.S. military attache at Cairo,

ordered the Joint Chiefs to examine the

possibilities of further increasing U.S. air

strength there. Almost simultaneously

General Brereton, commanding U.S. air

forces in the area, also asked for reinforcements and acceleration of the movements

already planned.4

Reinforcements, in view of the impending needs of TORCH, seemed to be out of 3

 (1) Min, 36th mtg CCS, 13 Aug 42. (2) CCS

100/1, title: Gen Order for Priority of Shipg Mvmts.

Air forces for Britain and China were placed in

second priority; relief of Iceland third; BOLERO

ground forces fourth; India and China fifth; aid to

Soviet Union via Murmansk (if decided upon) sixth. 4

 (1) See CCS 87 series and related papers in ABC

570 (2-14-42) Sec 2. (2) Craven and Cate, AAF II,

pp. 22-24. (3) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning:

1941-1942, Ch. XIII.
458 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

the question. Acceleration was a problem

of logistics, the choke-points being naval

escorts and troop transports. If deployment to the Middle East were to be

speeded up, the fast, roomy Queens were

the only available transports that could

sail unescorted, but to use the Queens

would cripple the already weakened

BOLERO program, which would also have

to depend largely on unescorted troop

movements while the North Africa operation was in progress. For each trip that

the two Queens made around the Cape,

BOLERO would lose 70,000 to 80,000

troops, enough to halt the program altogether. The Combined Chiefs of Staff decided, on 13 August, not to accelerate the

Middle East movements. BOLERO had a

short reprieve.5

Almost simultaneously with this decision, the British raised the question of a

comprehensive allocation of shipping in

the Atlantic area to support TORCH, the

impending offensive by the Eighth Army

in Egypt, and their existing services within the operating radius of Atlantic tonnage. They proposed to divide equally the

troop-carrying burden of the initial TORCH

movements—including the first two fast

convoys from the United States and the

first three from the United Kingdom—

each country to contribute space for 25,-

000 troops in assault shipping and for

66,000 troops in convoy-loaded shipping.

In the build-up phase, approximately four

months, the American contribution would

average about 55,000 spaces a month, as

against about 30,000 for the British. This

arrangement actually placed a heavier

burden upon Britain than her planned

contribution of troops to the operation

would warrant. (Table 11) The British

hoped to restore 35,000 spaces to their

Middle East convoys after the initial

TORCH convoys returned, and to soften

the impact upon Middle East movements

still further by assigning one of the Queens

in October to make a triangular run from

the States to England and thence around

the Cape, carrying 10,000 British troops

on the latter lap. This would keep the vessel away from the North Atlantic during

November and December at least, with a

further cost to BOLERO of perhaps 30,000

troops. The British proposed another triangular run for one of the Queens in January. All these arrangements, it was estimated, would reduce the flow of American

troops to Britain from September through

the following March to 100,000 or 120,-

000, while permitting completion of the

relief of the Iceland garrison by early September 1942.6

In cargo shipping the British placed

their total requirements for TORCH and

other military services within the range of

Atlantic shipping at 230 vessels per

month, which figure they hoped, through

various economies, to compress to 185.

About a hundred bottoms were available

to meet this requirement. Ten more might

be released if the northern convoys to the

USSR, as expected, were suspended; perhaps another fifty might be squeezed out

of the domestic import program and the

Middle East military services. Elaborate

schedules had been worked out to cushion

the impact on these programs. Much of

the shipping currently working around

5

 (1) CCS 87/4, rpt by CMTC, 9 Aug 42, title:

Shipg Implications of Proposed Air Forces Deployment. (2) Min cited n. 3(1).

Later the U.S. Navy transport West Point was

assigned to the Middle East. 6

 (1) Memo 359, Br Jt Stf Mis for Br CsofS, 19 Aug

42, Item 2a, Exec 5. (2) Memo, Styer for CofS, 21 Aug

42, sub: Need for Early Definition of Forces . . . ,

CofS WDGS. (2) 1942 folder, Hq ASF. (3) Pencil

notes, 27 Aug 42, sub: Data From Col WansbroughJones. (4) Paper, 27 Aug 42, sub: Implications of

TORCH on Other Shipg Commitments. Last two in

TORCH Jul-Sep 42 folder, OCT HB.
FOLLOW-UP IN NORTH AFRICA 459

TABLE 11—PROPOSED DIVISION OF TROOP AND TROOP-CARRYING

CONTRIBUTION IN TORCH

a

 To be provided in part by converting troopers, with resulting loss of 10,000 capacity from Middle East run. b

 To be taken from BOLERO. c

 Capacity for 10,000 from BOLERO; 56,000 from Middle East run.

Source: (1) Memo 359, Br Jt Stf Mis for Br CsofS, 19 Aug 42, Item 2a, Exec 5. (2) Memo, Styer for CofS, 21 Aug 42, sub: Need for

Early Definition of Forces . . . , CofS WDGS (2) 1942 folder, Hq ASF.

the Cape, carrying military cargoes outbound and civilian imports inbound, was

to be placed instead on a triangular routing to feed the forces in North Africa and

bring imports from North America to the

United Kingdom. Even this arrangement

would mean a loss of about 325,000 tons

of imports during the remainder of 1942,

over and above another 300,000 tons to be

lost by suspending, for lack of escorts, the

trade convoys to and from Gibraltar and

Freetown, and still more from anticipated

sinkings in unescorted sailings elsewhere.

The curtailment of the outward flow of

military cargo around the Cape, moreover, could be accepted only as a temporary measure. The remaining twenty-five

vessels needed would be taken, under the

British proposal, from American tonnage

on the BOLERO run, but the loss might be

made good if the northern convoys to the

Soviet Union were suspended. The Americans would also provide their own shipping for the convoys sailing directly from

the States to North Africa, and to this end

the British suggested that BOLERO cargo

shipments be reduced to about twentyfive sailings per month, a level roughly

commensurate with the anticipated flow

of troops.7

General Eisenhower strongly endorsed

the whole plan. All the personnel shipping requested, he pointed out, and much

of the cargo shipping would actually be

used to transport American troops and

their equipment and supplies from the

United Kingdom. It would be illogical, he

thought, to ask the British to cut more

deeply into their Middle East operations,

which complemented TORCH, in order to

7

 Ibid.
460 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

spare BOLERO, which was in a low priority

and would have to suffer anyway for lack

of escorts. Nevertheless, Eisenhower's recommendation that the British proposal be

met "as far as it does not conflict with our

own needs" struck sparks from SOS officials in Washington, already irritable over

the uncertainty of TORCH plans.8 "Our

needs," General Gross acidly observed,

"have not been and are not now defined."

To him it seemed that the British wanted

"all available shipping in the Atlantic,

mainly in the interest of the Middle East,"

except for the "small amount" allotted to

the North Africa operation.9

For the present, long-term arrangements for dividing the shipping burden of

TORCH were postponed. Three small troop

transports and nine freighters were retained from BOLERO arrivals in British

ports as a first installment on the American contribution to the early TORCH convoys. In September, cancellation of the

next northern convoy (PQ-19) eased the

situation somewhat (though the ships with

high-priority cargo were held for weeks

without being unloaded), and piecemeal

cargo shipments from the United States

in response to Eisenhower's emergency requests began to swell the shipping pool

immediately available in Britain for

TORCH. By mid-October some thirty-one

American vessels in all were on hand for

the first three KMS convoys. With the

first sailing dates now imminent, the British again sought a definite division of shipping responsibility. Of the 140 vessels

forming the first three KMS convoys, 60

were required solely for the needs of

American forces sailing from Great Britain; the British requested, "on the basis of

each country carrying its own cargo," that

the 29 vessels they had already contributed of these 60 be made good by American allocations to British import services.10

 For each subsequent KMS convoy

(about fifty cargo vessels) running at fortnightly intervals, they asked the Americans to contribute thirteen vessels. The

latter contribution would be roughly

equivalent to twenty-eight ships per

month, as opposed to the twenty-five requested in August. Eisenhower again

supported the British proposal since, as he

said, "U.S. requirements from the U.K.

will approximate that number of ships

until the backlog is cleared up."

 11

 As before, Army transportation officials expressed misgivings, but the War Shipping

Administration, with certain reservations

regarding replacement of the first twentynine vessels, acquiesced in the scheme.12

The agreement envisaged national contributions of dry cargo shipping along the

following lines:13

8

 Msg 1355, Eisenhower to WD, 20 Aug 42, Item 9,

Exec 5. 9

 (1) Memo cited n. 6(2). (2) Memo, Maclay for

Douglas, 14 Aug 42, Br Merchant Shipg Mis Misc

folder, WSA Douglas File. 10

 Memo, Salter for Douglas, 21 Oct 42, Army

Reqmts folder, WSA Douglas File. 11

 Msg 3587, London to AGWAR, 14 Oct 42, OCT

565.3-900 England. 12

 (1) Msg, Salter to Sir G. Hurcomb, 20 Aug 42.

(2) Memo, Douglas for Gross, 26 Aug 42. Both in Br

Merchant Shipg Mis Misc folder, WSA Douglas File.

(3) Msg, Lee to Somervell, 29 Aug 42, OCT 370.5

England. (4) Msg cited n. 11. (5) Msg R-2000, WD to

USFOR, 16 Oct 42, TORCH Radiograms, Logis File,

OCMH. (6) Memo cited n. 10. (7) Memo, Douglas

for Salter, 29 Oct 42, Reading File folder, WSA

Douglas File. (8) See above, Ch. XVI, and below,

Ch. XXI. 13

 Table compiled from: (1) memo cited n. 10;

(2) memo cited n. 12(7); (3) msg cited n. 11; and

(4) msg cited n. 12(5).

In the ships in initial convoys entry, U.S. figure excludes 29 ships, provided by the British, to be made

up by U.S. allocations to British imports. The 109

British ships included the above 29.

Average sailings per month figures are based on

14-day intervals between KM convoys; 25-day intervals between UG convoys.

The figures on ships continuously engaged are

based on a two-month turnaround for KM convoys,

three-month turnaround for UG convoys, applied to

average monthly sailings.
FOLLOW-UP IN NORTH AFRICA 461

The actual division of effort, as the

North African campaign developed,

deviated somewhat from this pattern. Additional American vessels had to be added

to the British convoys, additional UG convoys were squeezed into the schedule, and

the growing volume of shipping retained

in the theater for various reasons in effect

greatly lengthened the average turnaround. On the other hand, the intervals

between sailings of UG convoys proved to

be longer than the planned twenty-five

days, and no UG convoy sailed with its

full complement of vessels. One dreaded

contingency happily did not have to be

met—the mounting of an emergency

landing in the Tangier-Ceuta area to

counter an enemy attempt to close the

Strait; this would have diverted some

twelve transports and twenty-two freighters. British troop carriers bore the main

burden of deployment from Britain to

North Africa, but a few American troopers were used for single voyages on this

run. At the end of 1942, however, much

of the American troop-carrying tonnage

available for movements to North Africa

was diverted elsewhere. The Monticello was

sent to the Indian Ocean, the Hermitage to

the Southwest Pacific. Another transport,

the West Point, originally assigned to

TORCH, was put into the Middle East service even before the initial convoys sailed.

The Navy also shifted back to the Pacific

its combat loaders used in the TORCH

assault.14

In all this shuffling of tonnage can be

discerned an effective pooling of British

and American controlled shipping. British troop transports carried most of the

American forces to North Africa, and

without the Queens BOLERO would have

dwindled to nothing before the end of

1942. American transports moved some

British troops to North Africa, and even

more around the Cape. British cargo tonnage carried the main burden in the initial TORCH convoys and shared equally in

the build-up. American cargo tonnage

during the latter part of 1942 was plying

regularly in various British services—the

Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the eastern

Mediterranean, and the North Atlantic.

Lend-lease steel bulked large in the cargo

of freighters carrying U.S. Army matériel

to Britain. Both BOLERO and the Murmansk convoys were closely co-ordinated

joint undertakings. In the assignment of

vessels, despite administration divided

along national lines, national registry was

a far less important consideration than

size, capacity, speed, and availability, related to the task in hand. The enormous

14

 (1) For the planned Tangier-Ceuta operation, see

CMT 30 series on provision of cargo space for special

operation, in TORCH Sep-Nov 42 folder, OCT HB.

(2) Corresp in same file. (3) Memo, Gross for Somervell, 5 Nov 42, sub: Cargo Ships for N Reserve Force,

NATOUSA TORCH Plng folder, OCT HB. (4) Corresp in Army Reqmts folder, WSA Douglas File.

(5) For assignment of Navy transports, see JCS 158

and JPS 92 series in ABC 570 (21-1-42) Sec 4, and

other correspondence in same file and in OPD 570,

Case 17. (6) See above, Ch. XV, and below, Chs.

XIX-XXI.
462 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

advantages both partners derived from

these arrangements are self-evident. Without them, to cite only one example, it

would have been necessary to set aside

and hold idle the large block of shipping

that might have been needed, but in fact

never was, for an emergency landing at

Tangier. Instead, the planners could rely

on being able to assemble the necessary

tonnage on short notice from vessels of

various national registry arriving regularly

in British ports.

But because shipping and to some degree even cargo were pooled, it is virtually

impossible to calculate the exact contribution of shipping each country made

to the North African undertaking. It

seems clear, however, that Britain's share

of the burden was heavier, in relation to

her capacity to shoulder it, than was that

of the United States. The American outlay, to be sure, was larger, but Britain's

contribution was taken from a shrinking

merchant marine and from services that

kept alive her forces already overseas and

her war economy at home. These services

had already been sweated down and their

efficiency tightened to a point that left

relatively little margin for further economies. American merchant shipping, by

contrast, was an expanding asset, with

construction marching well ahead of

losses, and small amounts of fatty tissue

were still left in some of the commercial

trades. In the belief of American shipping

officials, there was even more fat in some

of the military maintenance services—the

Caribbean, Hawaii, and Alaska, for example—and vast potential economies to

be gained by pooling military and lendlease cargo. Only one American military

program—BOLERO—was seriously curtailed by the diversion of shipping and

escorts to the North African convoys. The

Murmansk convoys also were temporarily

suspended, primarily because of the demands of TORCH for naval escorts. The

support of operations in the Pacific and

the Far East and the flow of shipments to

the Persian Gulf actually profited in the

redistribution of shipping attendant upon

postponement of the great offensive against

Germany.

In the last analysis, it was Britain's

absolute dependence upon shipping to

maintain her very existence that spelled

the fundamental difference between her

contribution and that of the United States

to the North African undertaking. By late

1942 the inroads upon Britain's domestic

economy caused by the dwindling of her

imports had become so serious, in the view

of high American as well as British officials, as to dictate a comprehensive longterm redistribution of combined shipping

resources in order to keep the flow of imports from falling below the danger level.

This settlement was being negotiated in

Washington even as the first convoys were

standing off the North African coast,

although its effects did not begin to be felt

for another four months.15

Administrative Arrangements for

Support of Torch

The forces in North Africa could be

supplied only as rapidly and abundantly

as convoy restrictions permitted. Those restrictions set fixed limits to the amounts

that could be shipped directly to the

theater from each of the two sources of

supply, the United States and Great

Britain. The division of transport capacity

between the two sources, moreover, was

distinctly uneven, since 45-ship convoys

15

 See below, Chs. XXV-XXVI.
FOLLOW-UP IN NORTH AFRICA 463

sailing every two weeks from the United

Kingdom could move considerably more

cargo than 45-ship convoys at 25-day

intervals from the United States.

In the War Department it was generally

assumed until the second week in September that maintenance responsibility for the

forces in North Africa would be divided

roughly along these lines for some time to

come—Patton's force to be supported

from the United States, the American

components of the inside task forces from

the stocks accumulated in Britain. Then

came Message 1949, indicating that the

theater supply organization could lay

hands on only about two to three weeks of

supply for the forces there. Startled, SOS

cabled an inquiry: Was the "floating

depot" only a first installment? On the

23d the theater replied. The inside forces

would have to be sustained from the States

beginning with the second cargo convoy

(UGS-3) arriving at Oran about D plus

46. "1949" shipments would cover the

bulk of maintenance requirements for the

first month and a half, and some of these,

as already noted, were to be shipped in

UGS-2. In effect, maintenance from the

United States had already started.16

The. mathematics of this arrangement

were baffling. No one knew at this point

precisely how many troops would have to

be sustained one and a half months after

the landings, when the United States was

to assume formal responsibility. According

to the schedule for U.S. convoys, about

97,000 troops of the Western Task Force

would be in the theater by D plus 40, and

about 160,000 by the end of the third

month. Schedules for the inside forces

trailed off into question marks at the end

of the first six weeks; General Larkin estimated that American troops in those

forces would then total about 114,000,

with no further augmentation definitely

anticipated for the following six weeks at

least. The total strength, British and

American, of the Center and Eastern

Forces was expected to be 267,000. It appeared therefore that the small, widely

spaced American convoys were to be

called on to support a growing troop

population, starting at 200,000 or more on

D plus 40, while the larger, more frequent

U.K. convoys were to support only a fixed

strength of 150,000—that is, only three

quarters as many troops with twice as

many ships.17

Vehicles presented a special problem.

The cut in tonnage for the inside forces,

like that for Patton's force, was mainly in

vehicles, of which a large backlog was to

be left in Britain. These vehicles, being on

wheels, made bulky cargo; there was an

additional backlog of some three months'

supply of cased replacement vehicles.

Under convoy restrictions the flow of vehicles from the United Kingdom to North

Africa after the assault would be slow in

relation to the troop build-up; the backlog

was expected to mount at the rate of ten

thousand vehicles a month for the Center

Force alone. The situation was not without irony. In Britain there was a plethora

of vehicles, but very little other cargo at

16

 (1) See above, Ch. XVI. (2) Msg R-829, WD to

USFOR, 16 Sep 42, with atchd memo for rcd, Policy

file, I, 15, Plng Div ASF, Job A46-183. (3) Msg 2605,

London to AGWAR, 23 Sep 42. (4) Msg 2816, London to AGWAR, 27 Sep 42. Last two in TORCH Radiograms, Logis File, OCMH. (5) British forces would

be supplied from their own sources; the SOS settled

this point when Clark and Larkin were in Washington a few days later. See memo, Magruder for Larkin,

25 Sep 42, Policy file, I, 16, Plng Div ASF, Job

A46-183. 17

 (1) See above, Ch. XVI. (2) Msg R-1702, WD to

USFOR, 8 Oct 42, TORCH Radiograms, Logis File,

OCMH. (3) Memo, Lutes for Clark, 28 Sep 42, sub:

Maintenance of U.S. Trs in Center and E Task

Forces, 18 Shipg file, I, Case 35, Plng Div ASF.
464 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

hand; the vehicles, being "balloon" cargo,

had to be shipped largely as topping to

other cargo, even though the latter was

hard to find. Hence the difficulty, for example, of working the "1949" shipments

into the convoys sailing from the United

Kingdom—"each time a U.S.-loaded ship

replaces a U.K.-loaded ship in a KMS

convoy, the number of motor vehicles in

the convoy is reduced."

 18

 Hence also, the

necessity of partially discharging some of

the vessels from the States in order to fill

out the loads of other vessels carrying vehicles. Even though swamped with vehicles, Eisenhower was forced, because of

restrictions on the KMS convoys, to look

to convoys from the States to sustain the

flow of replacement vehicles to the inside

forces. Replacement vehicles would arrive

in North Africa, in fact, before some of the

vehicles they were intended to replace.

The staff in the United Kingdom, unable

to determine in advance how many of

which types of vehicles would be shipped

in each KMS convoy, made the arbitrary

assumption, as a basis for replacement

shipments from the States, that all troop

units in North Africa were to have received full initial equipment within a

month and a half after D Day—even

though at least three months would elapse

before all of it could arrive on the scheduled convoys. This was one of the minor

paradoxes of the logistics of TORCH.19

General Patton's staff was slow to recognize the implications of its own backlog

problems. Shortly before the departure of

UGF-1, the staff was still busily requesting

increases in initial allowances, and wanted

in addition to earmark a large reserve of

fourteen thousand tanks, half-tracks, and

wheeled vehicles to be shipped later as replacements. But space limitations bore

equally upon equipment shipped as replacements and equipment shipped as delayed initial allowances; even at the standard rate of replacement, it would take

seven months to ship the initial equipment

left behind by the assault forces. The staff

was persuaded to give up its earmarked

reserve. It was necessary also to explain to

the staff, which wanted a full ninety days

of maintenance supplies with troops in

each fast convoy, that there would be

room for little more than fifteen days of

supply if half the limited space in the fast

convoys were given to organizational

equipment; more supplies would mean

less equipment. On cargo convoys, arriving about five days after each troop convoy, would be loaded 50 percent or more

of the organizational equipment of the

troops in the preceding fast convoy, and a

month's supply of material of all kinds for

the entire American troop population in

the theater. A month's supply every

twenty-five days would build up reserve

stocks, but very slowly, toward the prescribed forty-five day level.20

Coal presented a special problem. The

War Department had some hopes that all

American forces might be supplied from

the ample resources in the British Isles,

but late in September Eisenhower reported

that the British would be unable to export

any coal to North Africa and expected the

United States to assume the burden. The

18

 Msg 2924, USFOR to AGWAR, 30 Sep 42,

TORCH Radiograms, Logis File, OCMH. 19

 (1) Msg R-1252, WD to USFOR, 26 Sep 42,

Item 9, Exec 5. (2) Msg 2897, USFOR to AGWAR,

29 Sep 42, TORCH Radiograms, Logis File, OCMH.

(3) Msg cited n. 11. (4) Memo, Gross for Somervell,

3 Oct 42, sub: Cargo for Sp Shipt, NATOUSA TORCH

Plng folder, OCT HB. 20

 (1) Corresp in OPD 400 Task Force, 44. (2) Min

of conf, Magruder and task force reps, 20 Oct 42, Policy file, I, 31, Plng Div ASF. (3) Memo, DCofS Opns

SOS for Chiefs of Svs, 29 Oct 42, sub: Maintenance of

U.S. Army Forces Engaged in Sp Opn, Hist Mat,

Mediterranean Campaigns folder, Plng Div ASF.
FOLLOW-UP IN NORTH AFRICA 465

pinch, as usual, was primarily in convoyed

shipping, though in Britain shortages of

labor and machinery also curtailed supply.

Every collier added to a convoy meant one

less freighter; if shipped in freighters, coal

squeezed out other cargo and had to be

packed in bags, which were also in short

supply. General Clark's visit to Washington resulted in an agreement that only

enough coal would be shipped at the outset to operate railroads and a few other

facilities near the ports; shipments from the

United States would be for the Western

Force only, amounting to about 7,000 tons

(in bags) in each slow convoy. Under this

formula (despite further requests from the

theater on behalf of the inside forces) coal

shipments began in UGS-2, with about

five thousand long tons for the Western

Force. Convoys from Great Britain moved

considerably larger tonnages for the inside

forces. Civilian needs posed a much greater

problem, which was postponed for later

consideration.21

As far as possible, the Western Task

Force staff was relieved of administrative

responsibility in maintaining the flow of

supply. Over the passenger composition of

troop convoys, of course, the SOS exercised

no control. The troop commander in each

convoy could requisition on the port for

whatever he desired, within space limits;

the port overseas supply officer tried merely to see to it that space limitations were

fully understood. But the thirty days of

maintenance that each cargo convoy normally carried was set up by the supply

services near the ports, to be called forward and loaded automatically by the

port without requisitions from the task

force; "that thirty days," Colonel Magruder told the staff before their departure,

"is not your business."

 22

 Equipment left

behind by the troops reverted to the supply services, to be worked into later convoys whenever space became available.

The task force staff was asked to leave a

general priority list to govern shipments,

and was warned that "hurry up" requisitions for this or that item would only cause

confusion without creating additional

space. For urgent special needs, radiograms could be sent directly to SOS headquarters; other correspondence went to

the responsible port, New York. G-4 status

reports were to be sent back to the War

Department on each returning slow convoy, instead of at the usual three-month

intervals. Until the prescribed reserve level

of forty-five days was reached, supply of

the Western Force was thus to be largely

automatic. The SOS hoped thereby to ride

out the period of emergency supply when

routine procedures inevitably went by the

board. One of the final requests to the task

force staff was to "have an officer of some

ability review all supply radios so as to

avoid duplication and confusion."

 23

 The

SOS wanted no repetition of the nightmare of Message 1949.

During October the general administrative pattern for supporting all the forces in

North Africa began to emerge. Eisenhower evidently hoped that after the initial phase of operations supply could be

pooled at the source, enabling him to draw

at will upon either British or American

21

 (1) Msg 2870, London to AGWAR, 26 Sep 42.

(2) Msg 3240, London to AGWAR, 7 Oct 42. (3) Msg

3333, London to AGWAR, 9 Oct 42. All in TORCH

Radiograms, Logis File, OCMH. (4) Msg 2735, London to AGWAR, 26 Sep 42, Item 9, Exec 5. (5) Msg

cited n. 17(2). (6) Other msgs in same files. (7) Diary

of a Certain Plan, 28 Sep, 8 Oct 42 entries, and passim;

Plng Div ASF. (8) Risch, Fuels for Global Conflict, Ch.

VIII. (9) For civilian supply arrangements, see below,

Ch. XVIII. (10) For coal shipments, see Table 14. 22

 Min cited n. 20(2). 23

 Memo cited n. 20(3).
466 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

sources, and to use British or American

shipping, regardless of the nationality of

the forces to be supplied. "Only by some

such system of co-ordination can full economy be secured in long and short range

production, in shipping and in the provision of the immediate needs of the operations."

 24

 But a committee assigned by the

Combined Chiefs of Staff to study the

problem carefully steered clear of any

pooling arrangement beyond those already

in effect for shipping and assignment of

finished munitions. Eisenhower was assured that Washington and London would

keep alternative sources of supply "under

constant review" and co-ordinate the employment of shipping. In the theater the

Allied commander could build up common stockpiles and distribute matériel

among his forces "as the urgency of the situation demands." But supply and requisitioning channels were to be kept distinct,

and any interchange between sources of

supply would be confined to "special

cases" "as determined by both countries."

 25

 As one draft of the official communication to Eisenhower put it, "you

need not concern yourself with the actual

source of supply."

 26

The theater's proposed supply plan,

completed late in October, accordingly

drew clear lines separating the administration and supply of national forces, with

the exception that the small American

contingent with the Eastern Force was to

draw its supply for the present through the

British First Army. Two features of the

plan immediately became a subject of

controversy. Requisitions for the U.S.

Western and Center Forces were to be

routed to London, there screened by the

theater SOS, and then forwarded to Washington. Reserves in North Africa were to

be built up as rapidly as possible to ninety

days of supply and twelve units of fire, and

an additional sixty days of supply and

three units of fire were to be established in

the United Kingdom for American forces

in North Africa.27

These provisions were aimed at the difficulties arising from distance, double lines

and sources of supply, and the unbalanced

distribution of shipping resulting from

convoy restrictions. It seemed likely that

the forces in North Africa could be served

for some time more directly and continuously from the United Kingdom than from

the States. Communications (by radio, air,

and sea) to the north would be shorter and

simpler than those to the west; emergency

needs could be met more promptly in

London than in Washington. Barring a

change in the U.S. Navy's escort policy,

the convoys from Britain would continue

to provide the largest supply pipeline into

the new theater. The proposed stockpile in

Great Britain would provide balanced

cargo to utilize this capacity fully, and

flexibility in meeting unexpected needs.

Admittedly, these arrangements would involve wasteful double handling and double hauling, and would commit large

stocks of American supplies to the British

Isles, a theater that at the moment had an

uncertain future in Allied strategy. When

24

 Msg NAF 6, Eisenhower to CCS, 9 Oct 42, ABC

381 (7-25-42) Sec 2. 25

 CCS 103/10, 19 Oct 42, title: Method of Sup—

Sp Opn, Incl B. 26

 (1) CPS 48, 15 Oct 42, title: Sup Dir to Comdr

ETO. (2) See related corresp in ABC 381 (7-25-42)

Sec 2. (3) See also, memo, OPD for SOS and AAF,

22 Oct 42, sub: Sup of Trs of Sp Opn, OPD 400 Task

Force. (4) See above, Ch. XI. 27

 (1) Msg 4132, London to AGWAR, 27 Oct 42,

Policy file, I, 29, Plng Div ASF. (2) Msg R-2095, WD

to USFOR, 18 Oct 42, Policy file, I, 34, Plng Div

ASF.
FOLLOW-UP IN NORTH AFRICA 467

conditions became more stable, it was expected that American forces would be

supplied entirely and directly from the

States. As for the high level of reserves

proposed for North Africa, the theater

submitted it as a goal without a time

limit.28

The plan, in short, was interim not

final. Precisely for this reason, it was disliked in Washington, where Somervell and

his staff wanted to place supply to the new

theater on a routine basis as soon as possible. To send requisitions to be screened in

London, they thought, was merely a device "to keep the SOS ETO busy."

 29

 Efficient supply demanded direct and simple

channels of communication and a direct

flow of shipments. Why could not Eisenhower give his task force commanders appropriate instructions as to priorities, and

allow them to requisition directly on the

New York port? The separate TORCH reserve, finally, was anathema. General

Lutes declared it would result in

. . . a confused and confounded supply system. We would find TORCH supplied with

subsistence sold to the British through Lend

Lease. Also, procurement of other supplies

for TORCH would be made in the U.K. when

such supplies were readily obtainable from

the U.S. Moreover, it would be uneconomical to unload, distribute to warehouses, store

and then reship to Africa.30

Somervell tried to persuade the theater

to draw upon the British for part of the

needs of the Center Force, and to accept a

very limited reserve stock for TORCH in the

United Kingdom, sufficient to utilize space

in the KMS convoys. But Eisenhower decided in mid-November that his TORCH

reserve in the United Kingdom must be

sufficiently large and balanced to meet

emergency needs of all his American

forces. He demanded with some asperity

that his desires be met.31

In substance they were met. After further acrimonious correspondence, a provisional arrangement was made early in

December to govern the flow of supply

until the full burden could be shifted to

the United States. This provided in the

British Isles a month's reserve for American forces in North Africa (based on

actual, not future strength) consisting of

subsistence, clothing, and other expendable supplies, packaged lubricants, organizational equipment, and two units of fire.

Patton's force was to send its requisitions

to and be supported directly by the New

York port. The American contingent in

the Eastern Force would be fed by convoys

from the United Kingdom, drawing upon

American supplies there. Center Force

would be supplied from the United States

up to the capacity of the UGS convoys,

which would have to be supplemented by

an estimated five shiploads a month from

the TORCH reserve in Great Britain. Any

TORCH shipments sent from the States to

the United Kingdom were to join KMS

convoys without unloading. Center Force

requisitions would be sent through Allied

headquarters to the European theater

headquarters in London, which in turn

would requisition on New York for what

could not be provided in the United Kingdom. The simpler and more direct procedures desired by SOS had to await the

general stabilization of logistical arrange28

 (1) Msg 4404, London to AGWAR, 2 Nov 42.

(2) Msg 5020, London to AGWAR, 18 Nov 42. Both

in TORCH Radiograms, Logis File, OCMH. 29

 Pencil notation on msg cited n. 27(1). 30

 Ltr, Lutes to Goodman, 20 Mar 42, Misc Notes,

Lutes File. 31

 (1) Corresp, 30 Oct-4 Nov 42, in Policy file, I, 34,

38, 41, and 42. (2) Msg cited n. 28(2).
468 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ments, which began the following February.32

The Convoy Bottleneck

It was abundantly clear, long before the

assault convoys sailed, that the Navy's current convoy restrictions, rather than port

or overland transport capacity in the theater, would govern the rate of build-up

and maintenance in North Africa. Even

the limitations upon accommodations in

North African ports, as revealed in September, did not alter this fact since only

more frequent convoys were needed to fill

berths and anchorages as rapidly as vessels

could be discharged. Studies made by the

SOS staff in September and October

(Table 12) indicated that the theater would

be able to absorb through its western ports

and to move across the Atlas Mountains

enough cargo to sustain about 440,000

troops—far more than the 250,000 that

might be supported by UGS convoys running at twenty-five-day intervals to Moroccan harbors, which could accommodate

only twenty-seven to twenty-eight vessels

at a time. If the Strait were kept open and

the Oran-area ports should thus be available to receive the residue of the forty-fiveship UGS convoys that could not be

accommodated in the west, enough cargo

could be brought into the two groups of

ports to support about 400,000 U.S. troops.

But this number was far less than the intake capacity of those ports; those in the

Oran area alone were estimated to have

facilities to discharge seventy-five cargo

ships a month, enough to support almost

600.000 troops. These calculations lay behind the strenuous efforts made by the

SOS in September and October to persuade the Navy to escort larger or more

frequent convoys.33

The experience of the first few weeks

following the assault bore out these expectations. Despite the chaos on the docks

of Casablanca, all but two ships with partial loads of less than two thousand tons

were discharged by the time the first slow

convoy arrived on 1 December. Thereafter, as order was restored and more men

and trucks arrived, efficiency improved,

and cargo moved more rapidly. In most

cases, docks were cleared two days or more

before the arrival of incoming convoys.34

It was not inadequate port capacity, either

in the west or inside the Mediterranean,

but lack of rolling stock, locomotives, and

motor transport, and the mire of Algerian

and Tunisian roads near the front that

were primarily responsible for the bogdown in Tunisia in December. True, the

capacity of the ports to handle continuously the tonnages needed for large-scale

operations had not yet been tested, and

the deficiencies of eastern Algerian and

Tunisian roads and railroads revealed in

December were an ill omen for the future.

(See Map 4.) In the back of all the planners' minds, moreover, lurked a grim picture of the logistical feats that would be

demanded if the enemy should cut the

passage of the Strait; the studies in September and October, addressed to this unpleasant possibility, had arrived at the

indicated capacities for overland movement only on the assumption of heroic

efforts, myriad transport equipment andp

ersonnel. and no enemy interference with 32

 (1) Memo, Maj Gen Walter Bedell Smith for

TAG, 4 Dec 42, sub: Sup Plan for U.S. Forces in

TORCH, copy in Frierson, Preparations for "Torch,"

App. F, OCMH. (2) Diary, 4 Dec 42 entry, cited

n.21(7). 33

 (1) Ibid. (2) See above, Ch. XVI. 34

 (1) Msg, Patton to WD, 3 Dec 42, OCT 563.51-

565.3 Africa 1941-42. (2) Msg R-4249, WD to Algiers, 12 Dec 42, OCT 565.3-900 England. (3) Other

corresp in same files. (4) See Table 13.
FOLLOW-UP IN NORTH AFRICA 469

TABLE 12—ESTIMATED CAPACITY To SUPPORT FORCES IN NORTH AFRICA THROUGH

MOROCCO: SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1942

 a

a

 For different approaches to the same problem, and divergent estimates, see tables 8 and 22. b

 Estimated at 1.4 ship tons per man per month. c

 Estimated at 11,000 ship tons per vessel. d

 The smaller ports—Rabat-Salé, Mazagan, Port-Lyautey, Agadir, and Mogador—had only shallow anchorages and no berths. e

 Estimated sufficient to meet requirements of entire force in petroleum products. f

 Small tankers. g

 Since these studies were concerned primarily with the hypothesis that the Strait might be closed by the enemy, the question of overland

capacity beyond Oran was not examined, but note that it is here assumed that all troops would be east of the Atlas Mountains. For studies

based on the contrary assumption, see table 22. h

 At .65 short tons per man per month (1.4 ship tons). i

 This would require approximately 14 reinforced truck regiments. j

 This would require running about 7 additional trains daily, for which additional railroad equipment would have to be imported.

Source: (1) Memo, Plng Div OCT for Gen Wilson, 12 Sep 42, sub: Size of Force Capable of Being Supplied Through Atlantic Ports . . . ,

and (2) Memo, Plng Div OCT for Strategic Logis Div SOS, 25 Sep 42, sub: Port Personnel Reqmts for Sp Opns, both in Torch Jul-Sep 42

folder, OCT HB; (3) Rpt by Strategic Logis Div SOS, 16 Oct 42, sub: Logis Implications of Opns of Sp Task Force, and (4) Rpt by Strategic

Logis Div SOS, 5 Oct 42, sub: Ability for Sustained Supply of Special Operation and Operations in the Southwest Pacific, both in Plng Div

ASF files.

movements over the long rail-and-road

defile from Casablanca to Oran. But in

November, immediately after the landings, hopes ran high, and planners bandied about target strength figures (for

American forces in North Africa) of

500,000, 600,000, and higher. The implied assumption, in short, was that convoy
470 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

restrictions sooner or later would have to

be lifted.35

The convoys from the United States to

Casablanca (most of them sailing from

New York) were scheduled in pairs—one

fast and one slow—departing about the

same time. (See Table 13.) With few exceptions, the launching of each provided its

own variation on the themes of haste and

waste, though not on the epic scale of the

assault convoys, and the process did not

become reasonably orderly until the following spring. One basic cause of this persistent administrative confusion was the

circumstance that the loading of each

cargo convoy was whipsawed by every

change in the troop composition of its

parent troop convoy. Particularly in the

UG-3 and UG-4 convoys, which sailed

early in December and January, respectively, the theater's late requests for reassignment to Center Force of troop spaces

earlier assigned to Patton's forces met

fierce resistance from the latter's headquarters, resulting in a chain of piecemeal

changes in the convoy's troop lists that

threw the whole outloading process into a

turmoil. At least nine major changes were

made in the UGF-4 troop list during December, creating chaos in equipment

shortage lists and in the routing of shipments. A multitude of minor items that

ordinarily would have been supplied at

home stations had to be sent from depots

directly to port.

Changes which deleted units at a late date

resulted in maintenance supplies being

shipped which were not required. Changes

which added units resulted in a complete recheck of maintenance being furnished to

insure that sufficient equipment was en route.

Many last-minute shipments were required.36

One late substitution replaced three tank

destroyer battalions, conveniently located

near the east coast and ready to move, by

three others only half equipped, which

had to be called up from a camp in Texas.37

The loading of the cargo convoys was

further disrupted by late urgent requests

for changes in their cargoes. Special shipments of salvage equipment were called

for to clear the cluttered harbors, signal

equipment to meet a crisis in communications. One request at the end of December

for twenty thousand ship tons of Ordnance

matériel to replace losses in the 1st Armored Division made it necessary to displace all but about 30 percent of the

organizational equipment of Center Force

troops sailing in UGF-4. A few days later

came further requests for a total of 241

medium tanks to replace old-model tanks

in the British 6th Armored Division; these

squeezed out most of the remaining organizational equipment, and two fast freighters had to be taken from the Western Task

Force allotment in the convoy to move the

matériel over to Center ports. Field commanders needed 75-mm. self-propelled

guns immediately to replace the 37-mm.

antitank weapons, which had failed to stop

new German tanks, and almost a hundred

were set up for UGS-4. The Air Forces

reversed a decision of weeks earlier not to

35

 (1) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 124. (2)

Memo, Gen Handy for SW, 10 Nov 42, sub: Trs in

NW Africa, Item 2a, Exec 5. (3) Rpt by Strategic

Logis Div SOS, 16 Oct 42, sub: Logis Implications of

Opns of Sp Task Force, p. 1. (4) Rpt by Strategic

Logis Div SOS, 10 Nov 42, sub: Jt Pool of Mil Sups

(Sp Opn), p. 10. Last two in Plng Div ASF. 36

 Memo, Lutes for Styer, 9 Jan 43, Misc Notes,

Lutes File. 37

 (1) Corresp in TORCH Radiograms, Logis File,

OCMH; Item 9, Exec 5; and 18 Shipg file, I, Plng

Div ASF. (2) Diary, Nov-Dec 42 entries, cited

n. 21(7). (3) Chronology of a Certain Plan, Nov-Dec

42 entries, Plng Div ASF. (4) Summary Convoy UG-3

and UG-4 in History, 6th Port, Transportation Corps,

18 Apr 43, Vol. I, OCT HB. (5) See Table 13.
FOLLOW-UP IN NORTH AFRICA 471

send aviation gasoline; at least there was

no difficulty in accommodating the additional tanker, since by this time it was

fairly certain that neither UG-4 convoy

would have its full complement of vessels,

because of late changes. On 1 January an

eleventh-hour message unexpectedly canceled the huge tank order; the next day

the order was restored.38

This train of confusion took its toll, and

bad luck exacted an additional price. The

two UG-3 convoys were delayed five days

by successive changes in vessel assignments, engine trouble, and the late arrival

of three transports, and this delay retarded

the whole subsequent convoy schedule.

The Navy expelled two vessels from UGS-3

because they could not muster the prescribed ten-knot speed; another vessel was

damaged in collision, another fouled her

anchor, another developed engine trouble.

In all five ships had to turn back. A few

days after sailing came news that storms

had scattered part of the convoy. Two

more vessels, finally, were lost within sight

of their goal—one aground a few hundred

yards from Casablanca Harbor, the other

blown up nine miles from Oran. UGF-3

had better luck, but one transport, the

George Goethals, with 2,000 troops aboard,

broke down only 150 miles out of New

York. "They say," later wrote an OPD

officer, "the Captain never saw the vessel

until 24 hours before it sailed and he took

it out under written protest that it was not

seaworthy."

 39

In the UG-4 convoys, the backing and

filling over tanks and other changes forced

port officials to request successive postponements, and resulted in a sloppy job of

stowage that later drew complaints from

the theater. Before the convoy sailed, General Lutes protested that SOS could not be

held responsible "if this piecemeal system

of orders and changes of orders continues.

It is realized that General Eisenhower is

engaged with the enemy . . . , but there

is a limit beyond which this headquarters

cannot be helpful."

 40

 Early in January

bad weather held up lightering in New

York Harbor, and the convoys, with many

ships only partially loaded, did not get

away until 13-14 January—eight days

late. Three vessels had to be left behind,

two of them stuck in the mud. Four of the

ships that sailed were lost, three of them

victims of enemy submarines.41

The confusion of November, December,

and January in connection with the outloading of the follow-up convoys represented to some degree a breakdown of the

administrative mechanism OPD had set

up to control this logistical operation. Following the departure of most of Patton's

staff late in October, a rear echelon was

installed in the Munitions Building near

the OPD offices to look after Western Task

Force interests. OPD itself kept one or two

officers in New York to supervise the loading of troops and equipment, and from

November on one of these officers was designated to represent Center Force. OPD

also imposed direct and close surveillance

upon the whole movement of troops and

matériel to the theater, seeking to coordinate the competing demands of the

task forces according to the policies of the

theater commander, as OPD understood

38

 Diary, Nov-Dec 42 and Jan 43 entries, cited

n. 21(7). 39

 Memo, Brig Gen Carl A. Russell for Gen Handy,

6 Jan 43, sub: Delay of Sailing Date for UGF-4 and

UGS-4, Item 2, Exec 5. 40

 Memo cited n. 36. 41

 (1) Diary, Dec 42, Jan, and 2 Feb 43 entries, cited

n. 21(7). (2) Chronology, Dec 42, Jan, and 2 Feb 43

entries, cited n. 37(3). (3) Corresp in OPD 045.43

Convoys Naval. (4) Memo, Hull for Styer, 30 Jan 43,

18 Shipg file, II, Plng Div ASF. (5) Corresp re UG-3

and UG-4 in 18 Shipg file, I and II, Plng Div ASF.
472 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

them, and within the limits of available

means.42

This direct supervision raised jurisdictional problems. Some of the orders of the

OPD representatives at the port changing

priorities and vessel assignments conflicted

with port officials' understanding of the

theater's desires. SOS challenged one

order to set aside three shiploads of food

for the civilian population, since "the only

known authority for [them] is a statement

in a speech by the President," and in the

end OPD reversed the order.43 OPD also

clashed with the Transportation Corps

when the latter argued that certain orders

contravened CCS shipping assignments;

SOS took the position, on behalf of Transportation, that in such cases the latter

could accept only "minor" not "major"

revisions of troop movements—unless, of

course, OPD could establish its right "to

modify CCS directives."

 44

 So large an issue

was not really involved, although the practical problems of implementing JCS and

CCS directives had to be worked out later

in a different context. The episode was

merely a by-product of more or less improvised administrative arrangements and the

friction usually produced in times of stress

by the appearance, in the flesh, of supervisors from a higher echelon with whom

the people on the operating level normally

deal only by correspondence. Port officials

became nervous—as one observer noted,

"they spend more time looking over their

shoulder than in looking ahead."

 45

 Late

in December, after Patton's rear echelon

had departed, supervision of the UG-4

outloading was assigned to a small staff

from the 4th Motorized Division (then

scheduled for early sailing). The senior

officer, Brig. Gen. Fay B. Prickett, arrived

late, when the confusion at the port was at

its height, but after living through that experience he felt his presence had been

beneficial. He also echoed the complaints

of SOS officials regarding "the present hit

or miss loading system with its consequent

loss of time and cargo space," which had

its roots, he pointed out, in unsettled loading plans and repeated changes.46

Widening the Bottleneck

With the arrival of UGS-4 in North

African ports early in February 1943, the

convoys from the United States had transported some 1,254,000 ship tons of dry

cargo to the theater. This was roughly

363,000 less than earlier estimates of the

amounts that should have been moved by

slow convoys alone in that time. Successive delays in sailings had lengthened the

planned twenty-five-day convoy cycle to

one nearer thirty days. Ships had dropped

out of convoy and a few had been lost;

many ships had sailed not fully loaded.

Unanticipated demands, moreover—signal and salvage equipment, tanks for British forces, supplies for the civilian population, arms for French troops—had crowded out organizational equipment and

maintenance for U.S. forces.47

42

 Corresp in OPD 370.5 Task Force, 65, 100, 108;

OPD 320.2 Task Force, 14, 73, 81; and OPD 400

Task Force, 83, 128, 144, 158, 165. 43

 Chronology, 20 Nov 42 entry, cited n. 37(3). 44

 Chronology, 26 Nov 42 entry, cited n. 37(3). 45

 Memo, Col Claude B. Ferenbaugh for Gen

Handy, 15 Jan 43, sub: Informal Comments of Gen

Prickett . . . , 18 Shipg file, II, Case 28, Plng Div

ASF. 46

 (1) Ibid. (2) Chronology, 11, 20, 26 Nov, and 21

Dec 42 entries, cited n. 37(3). 47

 (1) See Table 13. (2) Rpt cited n. 35(3). (3)

Diary, 25 and 30 Dec 42 entries, cited n. 21(7).

The expectation figure is based on an average of

thirty dry cargo vessels handled each month in western ports, nineteen in center ports; 539,000 ship tons

per month, 1,617,000 for three months.
FOLLOW UP IN NORTH AFRICA 473

In December SOS had proposed a

solution—to drop every other troop convoy. This would restore balance to the

flow of troops and cargo, making it possible to ship full allowances of equipment

about the same time that the troops sailed,

and also to clear up the backlog. Even

with fewer troop convoys, SOS calculated,

the use of large transports exclusively

(feasible with a longer convoy interval)

would permit about forty thousand troops

to be sent with each convoy, enough to

move all high-priority units to the theater

by June; escorts would be employed more

economically and some smaller transports

could be diverted to other theaters. The

theater staff proposed to go even further

by replacing alternate troop convoys by

fast cargo convoys. But SOS pointed out

that fast freighters were needed on longer

runs and that a full convoy of them, loaded with mixed cargo, could probably not

be discharged in the five-day interval between arrival of slow and fast convoys.

Both schemes went by the board, along

with others, because of difficulties of timing and escorting.48

In December the question of larger convoys was also raised. General Eisenhower

requested that the UGS convoys be enlarged to accommodate a few French

ships loaded with equipment for French

troops and supplies for the civilian population of North Africa, with a view to ensuring the continued co-operation of the

French authorities in North Africa. The

Navy was persuaded to add three vessels

to each slow convoy, and later waived the

requirement that they must be French

vessels. Under continuing political pressure, Eisenhower in January allotted

25,000 tons per convoy for French rearmament matériel and 30,000 tons for

civilian supplies. While the lend-lease tonnage actually carried in UGS-4 and succeeding convoys did not always come up

to these levels and some of the civilian

supplies were sandwiched in as filler cargo,

the three-ship enlargement authorized for

the slow convoys provided little or no

space for Army cargo. It was, however,

the prelude to further enlargements in the

spring.49

Additional convoys could serve the

same purpose. Early in December the

British, to whom the first new tank landing ships (LST's) were assigned, agreed to

turn over from eight to twelve of them to

move cargo from the United States to

North Africa, and the U.S. Navy undertook to escort a separate convoy inserted

between UG-3 and UG-4. A month

passed, however, before arrangements

were completed, and the convoy was

scheduled for 15 January, to follow UG-4.

Loading the LST's presented unusual difficulties, owing to the novelty of their use

as cargo carriers and to difficulties of assembling suitable cargo in time for sailing.

Some of the engines, too, were defective.

Escort vessels were ready on 15 January,

but the LST's were not. Late in the month

the Navy issued an ultimatum, and on 27

January the ten LST's limped out only

partly loaded. Five promptly turned back

because of engine trouble, and the others

put in at Bermuda. Not until late in

March did the first LST's from the States

finally reach the theater. Other LST's and

48

 (1) Diary, 30 Dec 42 and 10 Jan 43 entries, cited

n. 21(7). (2) Min of conf at Hotel St. George . . . ,

25 Jan 43, 20 Gen file, Plng Div ASF, Job A46-371.

(3) Msg for Br Admiralty, 31 Jan 43, 18 Shipg file, II,

Case 72, Plng Div ASF. 49

 (1) Corresp in Exec 8, Vol. II, and in OPD 370.5

Africa, 86. (2) 1700 Report, 27 Dec 42, OPD Current

Group files, DRB AGO. (3) Diary, 12 Nov 42, 5, 27,

and 28 Feb 43 entries, cited n. 21(7). (4) See OPD

045.43 (4-8-42) Convoys Naval, Sec 1. (5) For French

rearmament, see below, Ch. XVIII.
474 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

CONVOY OF LCI'S CROSSING THE ATLANTIC

some LCI's, destined for use in the impending attack on Sicily, began to move

across the Atlantic in larger numbers

about this time, some independently,

some accompanying the slow convoys.50

The most dramatic move to open the

convoy bottleneck came in February.

Since early December the shortage of vehicles in the theater had increasingly

hampered Allied operations. The railroad

from Oran eastward was a poor thing, but

supplies moved over it in greater volume

than could be hauled from railhead to the

front. When the Allied chiefs met at Casablanca in January, Eisenhower painted

for them a cheerless picture, with little

hope for a break-through in Tunisia; on

the 16th it was decided to abandon plans

for an American attack to the southeast.

On the 25th Eisenhower told Marshall,

Somervell, and British staff officers in a

meeting at the Hotel St. George in Algiers

that his need for vehicles was desperate,

and that he was considering replacing the

troop transports in the next fast convoy by

fast freighters in order to bring in additional trucks.51

50

 (1) Memo, Wansbrough-Jones for Wylie, 22 Oct

42, OCT 320.2-563.14 England. (2) Memo, Capt

Warren for Opns OCT, 31 Oct 42, sub: Use of LST

as Cargo Carrier, OCT 370.5 Mvmt BOLERO. (3)

Diary, 8 Dec 42 and 2 Jan 43 entries, cited n. 21(7).

(4) Memo, Lutes for Gross, 7 Jan 43, sub: Cargo for

LST, 18 Shipg file, II, Case 19, Plng Div ASF. (5)

Other corresp in 18 Shipg file, I, Plng Div. ASF. (6)

Memo, Gross for Styer, 30 Jan 43, sub: Rpt on Convoy LST, OPD 045.43 Sec 1. (7) Related corresp in

same file. (8) Memo, Ferenbaugh for CG SOS, 25

Jan 43, sub: LST Convoy . . . . (9) Memo, Handy

for COMINCH, 25 Jan 43, sub: Landing Craft to N

Africa. Last two in 18 Shipg file, V, Plng Div ASF. 51

 (1) Ltr. Eisenhower to Handy, 7 Dec 42, Item 1,

Exec 5. (2) Min, 57th-58th mtgs CCS, 15-16 Jan 43.

(3) Min cited n. 48(2).
FOLLOW-UP IN NORTH AFRICA 475

By this time, actually, vehicles were arriving in considerable numbers. More

than 4,500 had come in UGS-3 at the end

of December, and 5,300 were on the way

in UGS-4. In UGF-4, moreover, were

technicians and equipment for assembling

crated (TUP) vehicles, capable of putting

on the road 3,000 trucks per month. But

to Somervell the situation presented a

challenge. Eisenhower needed trucks, on

wheels, in a hurry, and SOS could prove

its ability to deliver in an emergency.

Somervell declared that if the Navy could

find escorts, he would have a special convoy ready to sail in three weeks. Admiral

King promised to produce the escorts, and

Somervell immediately cabled his instructions to Washington—5,000 21⁄2-ton

trucks (1,500 on wheels), 400 11⁄2-ton

trucks (200 on wheels), 72 big tank transporters, 2,000 trailers for the trucks, and

some rolling stock, all to be loaded and

ready by 15 February, along with certain

service units. Nothing must be allowed to

stand in the way.52

In Washington the huge SOS organization swung into action. Here was something fixed and tangible to grapple with—

a specific order, unencumbered by fluctuating troop lists or uncertain priorities,

with a deadline too imminent, probably,

for last-minute changes. Two days after

Somervell's message arrived, General

Styer cabled back that the job could be

done—"if you want the Pentagon Building shipped, we would like to allow more

time."

 53

 Twenty ships were lined up, to

sail from New York, Baltimore, and

Hampton Roads. The service troops, it

was decided, would be divided between

UGF-5 and UGF-6, rather than risking

passage via the slow special convoy, which

would reach the theater less than two

weeks ahead of UGF-6 anyway. There

were a few additions to Somervell's original order. General Arnold asked for

eighty P-38's, some special vehicles and

ammunition; the Navy added a tankerload of diesel fuel; 20,000 tons of lendlease filler cargo were also added; at a late

hour passage was arranged for three small

V-mail detachments. The operation went

off like a charm. Some of the usual procedural bottlenecks were bypassed altogether: depots shipped to the port without

clearance, and cargo was loaded as it arrived without priorities, any residue being

held for UGS-6. By the 9th it was clear

that all ships would be fully loaded; by

the 11th all cargo was in port at Hampton

Roads and Baltimore, practically all at

New York. When the convoy sailed, as

scheduled, on the 15th, it carried 6,800

vehicles. Two vessels, added to the original

twenty, immediately became casualties,

one because of engine trouble, the other

fouled in her own antitorpedo net just

outside Hampton Roads, but they joined

UGS-6 the following month. There were

no other mishaps.54

It was a brilliant performance. Its success resulted in part, obviously, from the

circumstance that the convoy was not tied

to a corresponding troop convoy with a

fluctuating troop list and loading priorities. But UGS-51⁄2 was no walkover. It was

set up, loaded, and dispatched, from start

52

 (1) Min cited n. 48(2). (2) Diary, 4 Dec 42, 27

Jan 43 entries, and passim, cited n. 21(7). (3) Msg

7428, AGWAR to Styer [from Somervell, signed

Eisenhower], 26 Jan 43, Hist Mat, Mediterranean

Campaigns folder, Plng Div ASF. (4) See Table 14. 53

 Msg, CofS SOS to Somervell, 29 Jan 43, copy in

History of the Planning Division, ASF, App. 4A,

OCMH. 5 4

 (1) Diary, 27 Jan-11 Feb 43 entries, cited n.

21(7). (2) Memo, Dissinger for Lutes, 28 Jan 43, sub:

Additional Convoy, 18 Shipg file, V, Plng Div ASF.

(3) Memo, Col Normal H. Vissering for CG NYPOE,

28 Jan 43, sub: Sp Convoy . . . , 18 Shipg file, II,

Plng Div ASF.
DRAFT OF "PENTAGON" CABLE, Styer to Somervell, concerning the special North

African convoy, UGS-51⁄2.
FOLLOW-UP IN NORTH AFRICA 477

to finish, in three weeks, with operations

spread over three ports and while other

convoys, including the UG-5's which

sailed the week before, were also being

prepared. General Eisenhower was impressed.

This shipment [he wrote later] immeasurably improved our transport and supply

situation and had a profound effect in all

later operations. It was accomplished under

circumstances that should give pause to those

people who picture the War and Navy De- partments as a mass of entangling red tape.

. . . The trucks began arriving in Africa in

less than three weeks after I made my initial

request [an exaggeration, as shown above].

. . . The tremendous value of this shipment

appeared in our increased ability to ...

transfer troops rapidly from one portion of

the front to another.55

By various expedients, during the second three months of the build-up in North

Africa, the convoy bottleneck was thus

widened though not broken. Following

the successful experiment of UGS-51⁄2,

another special convoy, UGS-61⁄2, was dispatched in March carrying more French

rearmament cargo, and a third, UGS-71⁄2,

sailed in April. Others followed. The Navy

in December had reduced the minimum

speed limit for slow convoys, thus permitting more flexibility in selection of vessels,

and sundry cargo vessels and LST's were

added to the regular convoys. Late in the

winter, fast tankers began to carry bulk

gasoline and oil on unescorted runs to

North Africa directly from the Caribbean.

These "Oil Torch" (OT) runs made room

in regular convoys for more cargo vessels.

Finally, starting in April, the Navy raised

the ceiling for slow convoys from forty-five

to sixty vessels.56

From early February through early

May (UGS-4 through UGS-71⁄2), the convoys brought in some 1,958,000 ship tons

of dry cargo from the United States,

almost three fifths again as much as in the

preceding three-month period. With the

arrival of UGS-71⁄2, about 410,000 American troops were being supported in the

theater, a month later the number had

risen to slightly over 500,000. By that

time, too, most of the troops were being

equipped at full allowances, the backlog

had been substantially cleared up, and an

elaborately accoutered army was being

prepared in North Africa for the descent

on Sicily.57

On the whole, performance had borne

out the September and October estimates

of the logistical staffs. Six months after the

landings convoys from the United States

were sustaining forces of approximately

the size anticipated. Advance estimates

had been based on the assumption that

convoy restrictions would continue in

force. Instead, they had been relaxed, but

only late in the period, and the flow of

cargo over the whole period had been retarded by partial loadings, delays, losses,

and withdrawals. Very few convoys sailed

with a full complement of vessels. Moreover, even at the end of six months the inflow of cargo remained well within port

capacity. In the west this was largely because the Strait, contrary to the planners'

55

 (1) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 148-49.

In the third sentence quoted, Eisenhower may have

had in mind the trucks on UGS-4, which arrived in

the theater on 4 February. (2) Diary, 13 Feb 43 entry,

cited n. 21(7). 56

 (1) Diary, 11 Feb 43 entry, cited n. 21(7). (2)

Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 353-54. (3) Corresp

in OPD 045.43 (4-8-42) Convoys Naval, Sec 1; OPD

370.5 Africa, 86; and Exec 8, Vol. II. (4) For UGS61⁄2, see below, Chs. XVIII, XXVI. (5) See below,

App. A-8. 57

 (1) See Tables 13, 14. (2) Diary, 5 and 6 Mar 43

entries, cited n. 21(7).
478 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ALLIED CONVOY PASSING GIBRALTAR

fears, had remained open; the bulk of incoming tonnages was therefore moved

around to the inside ports, especially after

March, and the capacity of Algiers and

the small ports to the east was greatly expanded. In the west, the second three

months saw an actual diminution of cargo

intake—from about 455,000 to 327,000

ship tons.58

The Beginning of Routine Support

From early 1943 on logistical support of

the forces in North Africa became more

stable, its methods more routine. One of

the most positive signs of this trend was

the discontinuance of automatic supply.

The original intention had been to close

off automatic shipments after convoy

UGS-5. In January General Lutes raised

the issue with the General Staff, pointing

out that the steady flow of stereotyped

maintenance shipments and overship

ments of filler cargo had piled up large

surpluses of ammunition, fuel, and food in

North Africa, especially in Morocco, while

the troops still lacked organizational

equipment. The shift to requisition supply

was made in April, with UGS-7. Unregulated shipments of all the categories except subsistence ceased, and later in the

spring the North African and other theaters came under new status report and

requisition procedures.59

Efforts were also made in late winter

and spring to introduce order and system

into the loading of UG convoys. Two

58

 See apps. of History, 6th Port, cited n. 37(4). 59

 (1) Diary. 3, 5, 9, 15, 17, 19, and 27 Feb 43 entries, cited n. 21(7). (2) Memo, Lutes for OPD, 20 Jan

43, sub: Visit to N Africa . . . , 20 Gen file, I, 61,

Plng Div ASF. (3) Corresp in 18 Shipg file, II, Case

61, Plng Div ASF; and 20 Gen file, I, 84, Plng Div

ASF. (4) See below, Ch. XXIII.
FOLLOW-UP IN NORTH AFRICA 479

things were needed above all else—an

early troop list and an embargo on changes

for at least the final month before sailing.

OPD had enshrined these rules in official

policy the summer before, during the early

BOLERO movements, and had protested repeatedly to the theater against their violation, but to no avail. General Lutes and

Colonel Magruder, author of the unenforced policy, thought that the most effective solution would be

. . . to convince the theater commander that

the reduction in cargo transported, because

of inefficiency in loading resulting from lastminute changes, is more damaging than

would be the postponement of urgently desired troop units or cargo.60

In mid-December OPD had tried, with

no success, to persuade Eisenhower to

send a small staff back to the States to coordinate the follow-up movements on the

spot, where it could scarcely have failed to

see the difficulties the War Department

faced. Later in the winter OPD sent one

of its officers, Col. Voris H. Connor, to the

theater to make another effort. Connor

tried earnestly to persuade the theater

staff to send back each month a revised

priority list of troop units desired during

the coming six months, so that convoys

could be made up without last-minute exchanges of messages. In the theater the

problem was regarded in a different light.

In effect the theater staff wanted to be

able to select what it needed, at the latest

possible moment before a convoy sailed,

from a pool of ready units, matériel and

shipping set up in advance in the States.

It saw no possibility of freezing its requirements and priorities six months, or even

one month, in advance.61

In essence, the staffs on each side

wanted the same thing: for themselves a

wide range of alternatives and no fixed

decisions up to the last moment, for the

other side fixed plans and decisions well

in advance. Under the circumstances

neither side could have what it wanted.

Procedures worked out in late winter and

spring provided that the theater would

submit each month a list or catalogue of

troops that probably would be needed

during the following six months, along

with a priority list projected two months

ahead—but both subject to change. This

was an improvement, but it remained at

the mercy of the military situation overseas as long as the theater itself did not

possess a reservoir of troops and matériel

upon which it could draw to meet the fluctuating demands of that situation.62

As the restrictions on size and frequency

of convoys from the United States began

to be relaxed in January and February,

the temporary logic of the circuitous routing of part of the flow of supply through

the United Kingdom also became weaker.

In February use of the KMS convoys from

Britain to supply American forces was discontinued as a normal procedure, though

authorized as an exceptional one, and the

small TORCH reserve in Britain was liquidated.63

60

 Memo cited n. 59(2). 61

 (1) Corresp in OPD 370.5 Africa, 85; and OPD

370.5 Task Force, 146, 148, 151. (2) Diary, 30 Dec 42

entry, cited n. 21 (7). (3) Memo cited n. 59(2). 62

 (1) Msg 2345, FREEDOM [Algiers] to WD, 22 Feb

43. (2) Msg, NYPOE to FREEDOM, 25 Feb 43. Both in

18 Shipg file. II, Case 75, Plng Div ASF. (3) Diary,

30 Dec 42 and 2 Feb 43 entries, cited n. 21(7). (4)

Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 9 Feb 43, CM-OUT

3050. (5) Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 18 Apr 43,

CM-OUT 7888. (6) Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower,

26 Apr 43, CM-OUT 10758. (7) Msg, Eisenhower to

Marshall, 16 Apr 43, CM-IN 9818. (8) Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 25 Apr 43, CM-IN 15147. 63

 (1) Msg 2122, WD to CG NATOUSA, 11 Feb

43, Policy file, I, 64, Plng Div ASF. (2) Msg, WD to

CG ETOUSA, 13 Feb 43, Policy file, I, 65, Plng Div

ASF. (3) Diary. 15 and 26 Feb 43 entries, cited n.

21(7).
480 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

An adequate service establishment, one

of the essentials of stable logistics in a theater, developed slowly in North Africa. At

the time of the landings no SOS for the

entire theater-to-be had yet been created,

and that of the Western Task Force existed

only in skeleton form. General Wilson,

commander designate of the Western

Force's SOS, thought that the planned

service force—about sixty thousand troops,

some 22 percent of Patton's whole force—

was inadequate, and that current movement schedules would not build it up rapidly enough. Yet in October and succeeding months the calls of the inside forces for

troop space in the convoys took precedence generally over the needs of the

Western Task Force. At the end of October General Marshall wrote Eisenhower

that TORCH had exhausted the pool of

available service units and was cutting

into permanent zone of interior overhead;

he urged the theater commander to build

his service establishment as far as possible

on native labor. Of this expedient most

commanders, including General Wilson,

took a dim view, and their experience following the landings strengthened their

distaste. Eisenhower wrote in December

that the native laborers deserted at the

first bomb, and General Wilson's pungent

report that same month dilated on their

laziness and thievery. In January he again

complained at length of the lack of service

troops in the western sector (where he now

commanded the Atlantic Base Section).

The other sectors were little better off. In

the entire area, American forces of almost

180,000 were supported by only 2,500

service troops along the line of communications. Not until March did substantial

numbers begin to arrive. Late that month

there were some 63,000 service troops in

the theater, along with about the same

number of air forces and 171,000 ground

forces.64

There were other indications that the

period of emergency supply was coming to

an end. Theater supply requirements began to include items typical of settled occupancy—oil and gasoline pipeline, construction materials, timber, and a growing

volume of civilian supplies. Air Forces

planning staffs began to produce grandiose projects for developing North Africa

into a great base for air power; there was

talk of constructing 80 base airfields and

240 satellite fields—all of which, SOS as

usual had to point out, involved far more

matériel than there would be shipping to

transport. And as the great battle for

Tunisia drew near, SOS already was looking beyond: In February, General Lutes'

staff began to draw up the first detailed

supply plans for the invasion of Sicily.65

The Dwindling of Bolero

Far down on the priority list, the

BOLERO program languished during the

last four months of 1942 since the resources

earlier assembled to, support it were

drained off into other undertakings. In the

first four months of 1943 it almost expired.66

64

 (1) Corresp in OPD 320.2 Task Force, Sec 2. (2)

Msg R-2593, Marshall to Eisenhower, 30 Oct 42,

Item 9, Exec 5. (3) Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 31

Oct 42, CM-IN 4301. (4) Ltr cited n. 51(1). (5) Rpt

Gen Wilson, 12 Dec 42, sub: Rpt on Opns in N

Africa, 20 Gen file, I, 47, Plng Div ASF. (6) Memo,

Wilson for Somervell, 20 Jan 43, copy in Frierson,

Preparations for "Torch," pp. 149-56, OCMH. (7)

SYMBOL: Casablanca Bk., Dec 42-Jan 43, Vol. II,

ETO Tab A, and N African Theater of Opns, Tab

A, TRIDENT Revision [7 Apr 43], in Exec 6. (8) For

the general problem of service troops, see above, Ch.

XIII. 65

 Diary, 17 Dec 42 and 26 Feb 43 entries, and

passim, cited n. 21(7). 66

 For detailed discussion, see Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Chs. II-III.
FOLLOW-UP IN NORTH AFRICA 481

In August 1942 the immediate impact

of preparations for TORCH upon BOLERO

was slight. Scheduled troop movements to

the British Isles during August were reduced by about 20,000 by the withdrawal

of a few small transports for conversion to

combat loaders. Even so, more than 102,-

000 troops sailed to the United Kingdom

in that month. August cargo shipments,

more than double those of the month before, were somewhat less than scheduled

but still very large, and the reduction reflected a shortage of immediately available cargo, not shipping. With most of the

ready or near-ready divisions earmarked

for TORCH, advance shipments of equipment to the British Isles were halted before they had well begun. WSA complained in mid-August that vessels were

lying idle on Army berth in New York for

lack of BOLERO cargo to load.67

No one believed that movements could

continue at this rate. If they could not, the

still accredited BOLERO build-up objectives were pure fiction and could cause

serious imbalance in whatever limited

flow of supply might be maintained. The

Second BOLERO Key Plan, issued by the

theater at the end of July, had set up an

ultimate troop basis of 1,147,000. "We

have received some enormous requests

from the U.K.," noted General Lutes

early in August, "which in the light of our

present information appear to be unreasonable and will probably be considerably

reduced."

 68

 In the effort to fill space, all

kinds of cargo were being shipped to the

United Kingdom more or less haphazardly, and certain types seemed to be

piling up to excessive heights. There was

reportedly enough frozen beef in England

to feed American forces there for almost a

year and a half. Throughout August the

SOS tried vainly to obtain a decision as to

what size and kind of force should govern

supply planning and shipments. "OPD

will do nothing," Colonel Magruder

gloomily noted in the staff diary on the

17th, "except radio General Eisenhower

for his recommendations."

 69

 Late in the

month a single division, the 29th, was

placed under orders for September or

October shipment; movement of the 45th

was suspended. General Eisenhower, immersed in the planning of TORCH, could

give little attention to the problem. OPD,

in consequence, could offer importunate

SOS officials nothing more than guesses,

scarcely educated, as to what strength

BOLERO forces might attain.70

SOS thus had to be content with the

cloudy image in its own crystal ball. Some

of its early forecasts were made simply by

subtracting from the original troop basis

of one million the strength of American

forces expected to be sent to North Africa—which latter in early August was a

low figure. More realistic calculations produced totals ranging from two hundred

67

 (1) Diary, 3 1 Jul, 5-7, and 11 Aug 42 entries,

cited n. 21(7). (2) Memo, Lutes for Styer, 27 Aug 42,

sub: Items To Take Up With Lee, ETO folder, Hq

ASF. (3) Rpt by WSA and BMWT, 17 Aug 42, OCT

565.2 England. (4) Memo, Mvmts Div for Opns

OCT, 14 Aug 42, sub: BOLERO Cargo, OCT 370.5

Mvmt BOLERO. (5) Memo, Marshall and King for

President, 4 Aug 42, sub: TORCH, ABC 381 (7-25-42),

4-B. (6) Memo, unsigned, no addressee, 21 Aug 42,

sub: Conv, Douglas With Franklin, WSA folder, OCT

HB. (7) For troop and cargo movement figures, see

below, App. E. (8) See also above, Ch. XIV. 68

 Ltr, Lutes to Larkin, 5 Aug 42, Misc Notes, Lutes

File.

69

 Diary, 17 Aug 42 entry, cited n. 21 (7). 70

 (1) Memo, Lutes for Overseas Sup Off NYPOE,

8 Aug 42. (2) Memo, Lutes for Styer, 18 Aug 42. Both

in Misc Notes, Lutes File. (3) Diary, 25 Aug 42 entry,

cited n. 21(7). (4) Plng Div SOS Diary, 20 Aug 42

entry, Plng Div ASF. (5) Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 13

Aug 42, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B. (6) Msg 1127, Eisenhower to WD, 1 3 Aug 42, Item 5, Exec 5. (7) Msg

1380, Eisenhower to WD, 21 Aug 42, TORCH folder,

Radiograms tab, Lutes File.
482 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

thousand to five hundred thousand, to be

reached by April 1943—based on such

considerations as the capacity of the two

Queens, which seemed likely to be the sole

remaining BOLERO carriers. On 18 August

General Lutes asked for a command decision to govern supply action, and on the

21st SOS formally protested to the Chief

of Staff concerning the unsettled state of

logistical requirements for all Atlantic undertakings. On the 22d, no action being

forthcoming, Lutes made his own decision.

Supply services and the New York port

were directed to ship to the European theater on the basis of a minimum level of

ninety days of supply, and up to double

that amount, for three hundred thousand

troops. All previous requisitions based on

larger strength were canceled. This arrangement the War Department and General Eisenhower accepted for the present.71

This was only a stopgap. Early in September General Marshall accepted OPD's

recommendation that the flow of troops to

the United Kingdom be adjusted to an

interim target of 150,000 ground troops,

forming a balanced force, with an additional air component of 95,000 and about

60,000 service troops. This total of 305,000,

the OPD staff estimated, could be reached

the following April by using the two Queens

on the North Atlantic run, assuming that

there were 160,000 troops not needed for

TORCH remaining in the British Isles. But

the theater, when asked for recommendations on the basis of a balanced ground

force of 150,000, argued that larger numbers of air and service forces would be

needed to prepare for future operations

and to compensate, through air bombardment, for the postponement of action

against Germany on the ground in western

Europe. In October the War Department

accepted the theater's proposed interim

troop basis of 427,000—150,000 ground,

172,000 air, 105,000 service.72

SOS planners felt little confidence that

these objectives would remain fixed, even

though OPD assured them they would,

"unless the present strategic concept materially changes."

 73

 That "unless" was, of

course, the root of the whole question.

Procurement was continued, therefore, on

the basis of the original BOLERO requirements, though under a low priority, and

Somervell in October urged, though without success, an expanded cross-Channel

operation in 1943. He foresaw that, without such a decision, the requirements of

TORCH and other current undertakings

were likely to snowball far beyond present

proportions.74

The British tried hard to keep the

BOLERO program alive. Early in September they submitted schedules involving

regular unescorted sailings of the Queens

and occasional runs by smaller fast transports; the Queen Elizabeth would be di71

 (1) Memo, Maj Richard L. Jewett, OCT, for

Gen Hull, 1 Aug 42, sub: Effect of TORCH Opn on

BOLERO, TORCH Jul-Sep 42 folder, OCT HB. (2)

Diary, 17 and 24 Aug 42 entries, cited n. 21(7). (3)

Memo for rcd, Col Magruder, 5 Aug 42, sub: TORCH,

Policy file, I, 9. Plng Div ASF, Job A46-183. (4)

Memo cited n.70(2). (5) Memo cited n. 6(2). (6)

Memo, Opns SOS for Chiefs of Svs, 22 Aug 42, sub:

Shpts to U.K., Misc file, Plng Div ASF, Job A46-

183.

72

 (1) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-

1942, Ch. XIV. (2) Memo, OPD for CofS, 27 Aug 42,

sub: 5440 Shipts of Tr Units, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B.

(3) Memo, Lt Col E. H. Quails, OPD, for Gen Hull,

7 Sep 42. sub: BOLERO Com Mtg, ABC 381 BOLERO

(3-16-42), 4. (4) Memo, Handy for CG SOS, 13 Oct

42, sub: Forces for Br Isles, OPD 320.2 Gt Brit. (5)

Msg, Marshall to USFOR, 8 Nov 42, CM-OUT 2704. 73

 Memo cited n. 72(4). 74

 (1) Memo, Somervell for CofS, 5 Oct 42, ACofS

OPD 1942-44 folder. Hq ASF. (2) Memo, Lutes for

Clay, 20 Sep 42, Opns SOS folder, Hq ASF. (3)

Memo, Lutes for Chiefs of Svs, 26 Sep 42, sub: Shipts

to American Forces in U.K., BOLERO 1942 folder,

Lutes File.
FOLLOW-UP IN NORTH AFRICA 483

verted for one, perhaps two triangular

voyages to the Indian Ocean. The British

were also willing to step up the cycle of

the Queens on the Atlantic run from four

weeks to three, allowing them to dock in

the Clyde River at any time except within

four days before and after the full moon.

This schedule would move about 105,000

American troops across the Atlantic by the

following April, as well as 75,000 Canadians, bringing U.S. forces in the British

Isles, after the TORCH contingent was withdrawn, to about 265,000. Even for this

modest program there were not enough

uncommitted troops ready in the United

States to fill the available spaces. The

Army, as Marshall put it, had had to

"scalp" eight or nine other divisions and

to gather up practically all the remaining

service and auxiliary units fit for action in

order to form the North Africa task forces.

The drain on equipment in the hands of

troops and on ammunition stocks had also

been severe. The 29th Division, which

sailed for the United Kingdom early in the

autumn, was almost literally the only

major ground unit available.75

When Colonel Wansbrough-Jones asked

General Hull early in September, in a

meeting of the BOLERO Combined Committee, whether the fifteen thousand or so

troops needed each month to meet the

proposed shipping schedule could be

found, Hull was obliged to reply that it

was doubtful. Later that month, moreover,

General Eisenhower endorsed a British request to raise the ultimate American force

in North Africa from seven to nine divisions in order to release two British divisions, thus saving shipping by increasing

the direct flow of troops from the United

States to Africa while reducing the circuitous flow through the British Isles. General Marshall tentatively approved this

arrangement, but pointed out that it

would further hold up the movement of

American troops to Britain. "At the present rate of increase," noted General Lutes,

"it will be two years before the U.K. is

built up to the authorized 427,000. Of

course, much can happen in that time."

 76

In the combined committees, meanwhile, the British had been fighting another losing battle for BOLERO—in this

instance over the amphibious phase of the

program. Their contention was that these

preparations, at least, should be pushed

with full vigor in order to be ready to exploit any German weakening in 1943. U.S.

Navy planners (to whom the Army members, on this matter, generally deferred)

took their stand on the CCS statement in

July that TORCH had made a 1943 ROUNDUP "in all probability" impracticable, and

demanded that the original program of

American landing craft deliveries to the

United Kingdom be cut in order to make

more available for operations in the Pacific.77

 Between a fourth and a third of

that program, by mid-August 1942, had

been completed—about 800 small craft

delivered, out of 2,750 of all types scheduled. In the course of the discussions, the

Joint Chiefs unilaterally canceled production for 100 LST's, 48 LCI's and 30

75

 (1) Msg 62886, Br War Off to Br Army Stf,

Washington, 4 Sep 42, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42)

Sec 4, Folder 3. (2) Memo cited n. 72(3). (3) Memo,

Col Davis for Strategy and Policy Group OPD, 13

Sep 42, sub: Availability of Units for Sp Opn, ABC

381 (7-25-42) Sec 1. (4) Memo, Marshall for Eisenhower, 30 Oct 42, CM-OUT 10217. 76

 (1) Min, 19th mtg BCC(W), 7 Sep 42, ABC 381

BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec 4, Folder 3. (2) Msg, Wansbrough-Jones to Br War Off, 7 Sep 42, BOLERO folder, OCT HB. (3) Related corresp in same file. (4)

Msg 325, Eisenhower to WD, 18 Sep 42, Item 9, Exec

5. (5) Msg R-1016, Marshall to Eisenhower, 21 Sep

42, TORCH Radiograms, Logis File, OCMH. (6) Ltr,

Lutes to Goodman, 20 Nov 42, Misc Notes, Lutes File. 77

 CCS 94, 24 Jul 42, title: Opns in 1942-43.
484 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

LGT's in the interests of more naval warship construction. The debate, which went

on with growing acrimony during September and October, produced little result

except for an agreement to go ahead with

1942 deliveries, and left a legacy of bitterness caused primarily by the highhanded

tactics of the U.S. Navy planners. What to

do about 1943 landing craft allocations

became part of the bundle of unsettled

business passed on to the Casablanca

Conference.78

In September Prime Minister Churchill

personally intervened in the British effort

to prevent the BOLERO program from

lapsing into suspended animation. The

question whether or not to send convoy

PQ-19 to the USSR, following the costly

experience of its predecessor, raised the

problem of what to offer Stalin if it were

canceled. Churchill (as Eisenhower wrote

Marshall) evidently became aware for the

first time of "the inescapable costs of

TORCH," and expressed astonishment

when told "that TORCH practically eliminates an opportunity for a 1943 ROUNDUP." Eisenhower tried to explain to the

Prime Minister "all the additional costs

involved in opening a new theater, in establishing a second line of communication,

in building new port and base facilities,

and in longer turnaround."

 79

 He spoke of

his plans for reducing divisional equipment and using certain British types. But

all these details evidently made little impression. Writing immediately to the President, Churchill recited the familiar arithmetic of TORCH'S thirteen divisions as

against the forty-eight originally planned

for ROUNDUP, and made a strong plea for

an eight-division build-up of American

forces in the British Isles during the next

six months. To the President, the Army

staff explained again why this could not

be done. TORCH was more than a thirteendivision diversion—it was part of a new

and expensive strategy that, "envisaging

an extensive operation in North Africa

and concurrently strengthening our positions in the Pacific and the Middle East,

definitely precludes concentrating in the

U.K. on the scale previously planned."

 80

The President, like Churchill, was an able

and frequent exponent of the view that

logistical obstacles could usually be overridden by determination and hard work,

but he could offer Churchill little encouragement.81

In November the Prime Minister,

flushed with enthusiasm over the successful North Africa landings, returned to the

charge. He protested to the President

against what he called a "most grievous

decision to abandon ROUNDUP"—which

interpretation he had placed upon an

order by Eisenhower's deputy in the

United Kingdom, Maj. Gen. Russell P.

Hartle, to limit base construction there to

the needs of an ultimate force of 427,000.

Churchill admitted that the original plan

for a forty-eight-division ROUNDUP in

spring 1943 might have reflected an overoptimistic view of shipping capabilities; it

was even possible that, "try as we will, our

strength will not reach the necessary levels

in 1943."

 82

 But, he insisted, if an oppor78

 See CCS 105 series and related papers in ABC

561 (2-19-42) Sec 2. 79

 Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 21 Sep 42, ABC

381 (7-25-42), 4-B, 59. 80

 Draft ltr [by OPD], President to Prime Minister.

circa 25 Sep 42, marked "not sent," Item 42, Exec 10. 81

 (1) Ltr cited n. 79. (2) Msg 151, Prime Minister

to President, 22 Sep 42, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B, 57.

(3) Msg 2112, Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 Sep 42,

Item 9, Exec 5. (4) Ltr cited n. 80. (5) Msgs, President Roosevelt to Prime Minister, 27 Sep and 5 Oct

42, as quoted in Churchill. Hinge of Fate, pp. 573, 576-

77. (6) For cancellation of PQ-19, see below, Ch.

XXII. 82

 Msg 211, Prime Minister to President, 25 Nov

42, WDCSA 381, 1. Copy, dated 24 Nov 42, is quoted

in Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 652-53.
FOLLOW-UP IN NORTH AFRICA 485

TABLE 13—U.S. CONVOYS TO NORTH AFRICA: NOVEMBER 1942-MAY 1943

a

 Cargo in measurement tons; bulk gasoline and fuel oil are excluded. b

 Five ships torpedoed after arrival; most of cargo saved. c

 One transport in collision dropped from convoy at Bermuda. Troops and cargo picked up by UGF-6. Figures included in UGF-6 totals. d

 One ship, dropped from UGS-5 due to collision, arrived with

UGS-51⁄2; cargo included in UGS-51⁄2 totals.

e

 Includes one ship from UGF-5. f

 Rendezvoused at sea. g

 Three transports sailed separately (included in figures). Last section of convoy arrived 30 April.

Source: Based on: (1) charts by Statistical Section, OSD, NYPOE. 10 June 1943; (2) ASF Monthly Progress Rpt, Sec 3, Transportation, 31 May 1943; (3) History of 6th Port, OCT HB.
486 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

TABLE 14—TYPES OF CARGO IN U.S. CONVOYS TO NORTH AFRICA:

NOVEMBER 1942-MAY 1943

 a

a

 All figures are in ship tons except gasoline, vehicles, coal, and rations. b

 Estimated.

Source: Based on charts by Statistical Sec, OSD, NYPOE, 10 Jun 43.

tunity should present itself to strike in

1943, the Allies must be ready to grasp it.

Churchill's recognition of the possible necessity of deferring the main attack on

Germany until 1944 marked a significant

change from his position in September.

The President now willingly agreed that

any opportunity for a cross-Channel attack

in 1943 must be exploited, and he reassured Churchill "we shall continue with

BOLERO as rapidly as our shipping and

other resources permit." How large a force

should or could be assembled in 1943

would have to be worked out on the staff

level, but for the present North Africa and

the Pacific must take precedence over

BOLERO.83

BOLERO continued to fade. After the

sailing of the 29th Division in October, no

more divisions were moved to the British

Isles for almost a year. Miscellaneous

elements, amounting to approximately

37,000 troops, were found to make up

shipments during the last three months of

1942, but the sailing schedule set up by the

British in September could not be followed. Queen Mary was damaged in colli83

 Ltr, President to Prime Minister, 26 Nov 42, as

quoted in Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 653. Preliminary

drafts are in Item 63a, Exec 10.
FOLLOW-UP IN NORTH AFRICA 487

sion in October, following her late September voyage, and did not return to the

Atlantic run until December. Her absence

was partly made good by Mariposa late in

October, and Queen Elizabeth, which gave

up a scheduled trip to the Middle East for

a North Atlantic crossing on 24 November. During the first four months of 1943

troop movements to the British Isles declined even more more markedly. Cargo

shipments at the end of 1942 tumbled from

a peak of almost 800,000 ship tons in

August to less than 100,000 tons in December; no sizable increase in the flow

occurred thereafter until spring.84

Meanwhile, American forces in the

United Kingdom were being rapidly depleted by the outflow to North Africa.

From a peak of 228,000 in October, their

strength declined to 135,000 at the end of

the year and to 105,000 two months later,

by which time 156,000 troops had been

withdrawn. In the theater there was a

strong disposition to continue construction and administrative preparations on a

large scale, looking to an early resumption

of heavy troop and supply movements

from the States, but these expectations

were quashed by the War Department in

November. Similarly, the theater's requests for additional service troops merely

to operate the existing establishment were

generally refused. In November the War

Department also ordered the European

theater not to stockpile beyond the maintenance needs of the reduced troop basis;

authorized supply levels were lowered

from ninety to an average of sixty to

seventy-five days. At the end of February

1943, when its American establishment

had dwindled to 104,510 troops, the European Theater of Operations had become a

stand-by theater manned by a skeleton

crew.85

84

 (1) Msg 64942, Br War Off to Br Army Stf,

Washington, 12 Sep 42. (2) Msg 70291, Br War Off to

Br Army Stf, 6 Oct 42. (3) Msg, Wansbrough-Jones

to Br War Off, 9 Oct 42. All in BOLERO folder, OCT

HB. (4) Summary, Historical Events and Statistics,

New York Port of Embarkation, 1942, in OCT HB.

(5) See below, App. E. 85

 See Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies,

Chs. II-III.

PART FIVE

THEATERS OF FOREIGN AID

CHAPTER XVIII

The Anglo-American Orbit

Of U.S. munitions production during

1942, approximately 19 percent was exported to Allied nations, either under

lend-lease or as a result of foreign contracts negotiated earlier. If computed in

terms of assignments rather than actual

shipments, this proportion rises to 23 percent. In the general category of automotive vehicles—combat and noncombat—

the proportion was higher yet. For example, approximately 42 percent of American production of 23,883 light and medium tanks in 1942 was allocated to other

nations. Of the munitions exported, approximately 70 percent went to Great

Britain, members of the British Commonwealth, and associated nations; 25 percent

to the USSR; and the remainder to China,

France, Latin America, and other countries.1

 The United States served as the

main reservoir for meeting supply deficiencies the other nations could not meet

from their own production. In turn, where

U.S. forces operated within the territories

of associated powers, they drew as far as

possible on local supplies in order to conserve shipping. This was what the common pool meant in the various theaters of

war.

Of these theaters, all except the USSR

fell within the jurisdiction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and hence in the

Anglo-American orbit, though China represents a sufficiently distinct case to merit

separate treatment. By the division of

strategic responsibility in March 1942, the

Pacific Ocean and China fell to the U.S.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Middle East and

India to the British Chiefs. The Atlantic

and Europe formed an area of combined

responsibility.2 Yet this determination of

strategic responsibility did not necessarily

solve the question of responsibility for supply. Within each broad area, forces of

both nations and of their associates operated. While there was usually a supreme

Allied commander at the top, channels of

supply and administration were distinct.

Requests to the Munitions Assignments

Boards for material had to be justified by

operational need in a theater, but assignments were made on a national basis, and

material flowed through national supply

channels. The British tenaciously clung to

their prerogative to act as agents for those

nations they conceived to be within their

sphere of influence. In this category they

classified all the members of the British

Commonwealth, the refugee governments

in London, and the various independent

nations of the Middle East. Opposition to

this British conception grew as American

1

 (1) Report to the 78th Congress on Lend-Lease Operations From the Passage of the Act, March 11, 1941, to

December 31, 1942, pp. 28-37. (2) Hist of Lend-lease

Tanks, 11 Mar 41-31 Dec 44, File, ID. (3) Paper, prepared by WPB, no date, sub: Comparison of International Aid Asgmts and Trfs With Pdn of Maj ASP

Items, in ID. (4) See below, App. C. 2

 CCS 57/2, 24 Mar 42, title: Strategic Responsibility of U.S. and U.K.
492 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

forces, and hence American influence and

interest, increased in overseas areas. Each

theater came to present certain distinct

problems concerning supply channels, as

well as the nature and extent of U.S. logistical support to Allied forces. It is with

these specific theater problems within the

Anglo-American orbit that this chapter

will be concerned.3

Lend-Lease and Reciprocal Aid

in the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom was the nerve

center of the war effort of the British

Commonwealth. In London, the bulk requirements for Commonwealth forces and

for those of other nations the British sponsored were consolidated and deficits that

could not be met from production under

British control were presented to the MAB

in Washington. The assignment of material in Washington was at first made in

one bulk allocation to the British and

turned over to them at shipside in the

United States. The Munitions Assignments Board in London reassigned this

bulk allocation along with British munitions production to the various forces and

theaters involved. As far as possible, shipment from the United States Was made

direct to the theater of use, though normally through British channels. American

aid flowed directly to all the danger spots

around the globe—to the United Kingdom itself, to the Middle East, to Australia and New Zealand, to India, and in

smaller quantities to such inactive areas as

south and west Africa and the West Indies.

Nevertheless, though the proportion was

smaller than in 1941, a larger volume of

American military material continued to

flow to the United Kingdom than to any

other single theater or country. An even

greater proportion of the food and industrial and raw materials exported under

lend-lease went there.4 The strengthening

of Britain as the most dependable partner

in the Allied war effort, and as the principal base for military operations in Europe, continued to be the foundation of

American lend-lease policy. England was

an industrial center, long accustomed to

import food stuffs and raw materials and

to export the products of her industry in

exchange. With prospects of a continuing

flow of American aid, the British, in mid1940, began to reorganize their whole

economy for the long pull ahead. After

the passage of the Lend-Lease Act, they

were able to virtually abandon their production for the export trade and concentrate their entire industry on production

for war. U.S. lend-lease provided the food

and raw materials formerly obtained in

exchange for British exports and, in addition, machine tools and components

necessary to keep British industry operating at full speed. Military materials from

the United States provided the marginal

quantities British industry was still unable

to produce for the Empire and associated

forces deployed in various theaters around

the globe. This flow of American aid enabled the British to mobilize a far larger

proportion of their manpower than they

would have been able to had they been

totally dependent on their own resources.

During 1942 the British Commonwealth of Nations received 17 percent of

its total war supplies from the United

States as opposed to only 11.5 percent the

previous year. As American war production reached full capacity in early 1943,

3

 Supply to British forces in India will be treated

separately in Chapter XIX as part of the general

story of the CBI theater. 4

 Report to the 78th Congress . . . cited n. 1(1).
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ORBIT 493

this proportion increased considerably.

The extent of British reliance on lendlease for military equipment varied from

item to item, American supplies serving

both to supplement British production

and to fill gaps where little or no British

capacity existed. For transport aircraft,

amphibious vehicles, tank transporters,

10-ton trucks, jeeps, and self-propelled

artillery, the reliance was almost complete

since the British did little more than develop experimental models of their own

(though in the case of self-propelled artillery, for instance, they got considerable

quantities from Canada). Until they began production of the Sten 9-mm. gun in

mid-1942 they also depended entirely on

the United States for submachine guns

(Thompson .45-caliber). In other cases,

such as heavy bombers, tractors, and

tanks, there was some British production

but 40 percent or more of the Commonwealth requirements were met from the

United States. For articles such as pursuit

aircraft, light and medium bombers, small

arms ammunition, and rifles, British dependence on American production was

proportionately less, but substantial quantities were still needed to meet vital marginal requirements.5

Despite the fact that the United Kingdom was operating with a net deficit that

had to be filled by lend-lease, she was still

able to make vital contributions to the logistical support of American troops operating in and from the British Isles. It was

a matter of using supplies available locally

in the most economical manner, of using

British installations and services and a

supply system that was already operating.

This was of particular importance during

1942 when the U.S. Services of Supply in

England was still in the development

stage. There were, nonetheless, limits beyond which reciprocal aid in the United

Kingdom could not be pushed without entailing a corresponding increase in American lend-lease that would, in the end,

render the saving in shipping illusory and

give the British an undue measure of control over the American supply line. Of

these limitations and the dangers inherent

in passing beyond them, General Somervell was ever aware.

The largest British contribution was in

facilities, installations, and services. American troops in the United Kingdom were

housed almost entirely in British installations, many of which had to be specially

constructed. During 1942 available British construction labor was almost exclusively absorbed in building for the U.S.

Army. The British also furnished the bulk

of construction materials and equipment

for this effort, though lend-lease contributed to their ability to do so. In the

same manner, the British furnished transportation, communication, and housekeeping services essential to the existence

of the European Theater of Operations,

U.S. Army (ETOUSA) command.

The early build-up of the Eighth Air

Force in Britain was achieved only by extensive reliance on British sources of supply. The Eighth used British airdromes,

airfields, repair installations, and storage

depots. Beyond this it received from the

British a large proportion of its supplies.

Indeed, its first bombing strikes in July

and August 1942 were primarily Britishmounted operations though the planes

and crews were American. For almost a

year afterward the British continued to

furnish nearly half the supplies used by

the Eighth.

5

 See Hall and Wrigley, Studies of Overseas Supply,

first draft, Ch. I, pp. 1-29, Hist Br, Cabinet Off, London.
494 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

The dependence of the air force on British sources of supply was greater than that

of the ground forces only because of its

more rapid build-up. During early 1942

all American forces drew heavily on the

British for food, housekeeping and office

supplies, and some clothing. When ground

units arrived short of equipment, the British frequently made up the deficit out of

lend-lease stocks received from the United

States or, on rarer occasions, through furnishing British-type substitutes. These

emergency issues from British stocks were

of particular importance in fitting out the

task forces for invasion of North Africa.6

Virtually all this British support was

furnished as reciprocal aid without money

payment and arranged directly by the

ETOUSA General Purchasing Board

with the proper agencies of the British

Government. As far as possible, American

demands against British production were

presented for advance programming just

as British requirements in the United

States were presented for inclusion in the

Army Supply Program. For assignable

items such as guns, ammunition, and vehicles, the Americans had to present bids

to the London Munitions Assignments

Board, but the bulk of the aid received

was in services and nonassignable items

such as subsistence, clothing, and construction materials, which were arranged

administratively through the British War

Office.7

This developing pattern of supply to

American forces in the United Kingdom

through British channels soon aroused

General Somervell's fears of British control of the supply line. The British usually

asked replacement under lend-lease of articles of equipment furnished American

forces, or increased supplies of raw materials and components to enable them to

manufacture these replacements. In the

case of food, the British were receiving

large quantities under lend-lease at the

same time that they were furnishing it to

American forces as reciprocal aid. The

British espoused the view that their productive facilities could be devoted primarily to supplying all forces in the European

theater, while the United States in turn

would supply United Nations forces in the

so-called Eastern Group of theaters, that

is the Middle East, Africa, India, Australia, and New Zealand. But General

Somervell was unalterably opposed to

this, and relentlessly pushed for a separate

American supply system that would rely

on the British only for those things they

could furnish with no strings attached.

The food issue came to a head first. In

June 1942 the British reached an agreement with ETOUSA officers and with

Averell Harriman, the lend-lease representative in London, whereby the U.S.

Army would import directly only those

items not available locally. Staple items

such as flour and sugar would be imported

by the British in bulk and drawn by the

Army from British depots. In addition,

the Army would draw some meat and

vegetables from British sources, and items

such as tea, spices, and coffee, which could

thus be imported directly into England

without transshipment via the United

States. In net effect, the agreement provided for a pool of food largely under

British control, though for a separate

6

 (1) For a summary of reciprocal aid in the United

Kingdom in more detail, see Ruppenthal, Logistical

Support of the Armies, Ch. VI. (2) See also, Cheslaw,

Quartermaster Operations in the War Against Germany, draft ch., "The Quartermaster Establishment

in the United Kingdom." (3) Craven and Cate, AAF I,

pp. 631-36. 7

 (1) See above, Ch. X. (2) Ruppenthal, Logistical

Support of the Armies, Ch. VI.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ORBIT 495

American supply organization that would

present its bulk requirements and carry

out its distribution through its own channels.8

General Somervell registered an immediate and violent dissent. "The whole

scheme," he wrote Eisenhower, "in my

opinion is one on the part of the British to

divert food stuffs to their control and impose their standard of living on our

troops."

 9 But the problem was far more

complex than Somervell presented it, as

he himself later acknowledged. It was

sound economy to divert local surpluses,

which occurred from time to time despite

the prevailing food shortage in the United

Kingdom, for consumption by American

troops, and to use British storage facilities.

The SOS ETOUSA showed considerably

less fear of British control of the supply

line than did Somervell. The War Department in September finally gave ETOUSA

instructions that the department thought

would be suitable for securing the maximum advantage from local procurement

and at the same time would preserve the

integrity of the American supply line. The

theater was to exploit local resources to

the maximum extent possible consistent

with furnishing standard equipment and

supplies to the U.S. Army in simple direct

fashion and under the complete control

of the theater commander. Needed items

of food were to be procured locally if

available and if replacement from the

United States were not required. When

replacement from the United States was

required, procurement from British

sources was authorized: (1) where the replacement was to be made in raw materials less bulky than the finished product,

(2) when needed in an emergency, (3)

where it was desirable to reduce spoilage

or loss of British reserves, (4) where special

agreement had been reached between

ETOUSA and the War Department.

Needed items of clothing, equipment, and

other supplies should be procured from

British sources if no replacement were required, or if a previous agreement had

been reached between ETOUSA and the

War Department on each separate case.10

The intent of these instructions obviously was to reduce British requests for replacement to a minimum. But meantime

the British, at considerable sacrifice, had

made large issues from their own stocks to

the American forces in TORCH, and clamored for replacement. Maj. Gen. James K.

Crain, the U.S. executive on the LMAB,

supported them and urged that either

ETOUSA or the U.S. staff of LMAB

should be empowered to promise replacement for material diverted under such

emergency conditions. The Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground) in Washington finally accepted this principle but

only subject to many restrictions. As far as

possible ETOUSA should make replacement later out of its own stocks, or, if this

were impracticable, the War Department

should be consulted before any replacement deals were arranged. Where emergency conditions ruled out either possibility, ETOUSA could promise replacements

of nonassignable items (foodstuffs, housekeeping supplies, and so forth) and the

8

 (1) Msg 3457, John G. Winant to State Dept, 20

Jun 42, Br folder, Hq ASF. (2) Memo, Gen Aurand

for USW, 16 Jul 42, sub: Telephone No. 3786 From

Harriman to Nelson, Capt Gilmour's Copies Aurand

Corresp folder, DAD. (3) Cheslaw chapter cited

n. 6(2). (4) Ltr, Maj Gen Sir Harold R. Kerr, Deputy

QMG Br Army Stf, to Gen Clay, 22 Oct 42, sub: Procurement of Gen Stores in U.S. for Sup to Br Trs in

E Group Theaters of War, AG 400.3295 (10-22-42)

(2).

9

 Ltr, Somervell to Eisenhower, 19 Jul 42, ETO (6)

1942-43 folder, Hq ASF. 10

 Cheslaw chapter cited n. 6(2).
496 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

U.S. staff of LMAB replacements of assignable items (military equipment) under

the priority and at the time requested by

the British but subject to final approval

by MAC(G) in the light of strategic considerations.

This opposition on the American side

soon put an end to British hopes for an extensive system of switch deals whereby the

Americans would furnish equipment and

supplies to British forces in the Eastern

Group of theaters in return for similar

British support to the U.S. Army in the

United Kingdom. The British finally

agreed in December 1942 that the two

areas must be treated separately, replacements to the British for supplies furnished

ETOUSA as one issue and the supply of

British Eastern Group deficiencies as

another. Under these dispensations, the

pooling of resources in the United Kingdom proceeded. If it did not go to the

lengths the British desired, it at least

achieved an incalculable saving in shipping space while preserving at the same

time the principle of separate national

supply lines upon which General Somervell insisted.11

The South and Southwest Pacific

In the days of the ABDA Command,

the most pressing lend-lease problem in

the Pacific was supply to the Netherlands Indies. Dutch requests during 1941

had had to pass virtually unheeded. Their

pleas became frantic after the Japanese

attack southward began, but little more

than a gesture could be made, for the

American supply effort had to be concentrated on strengthening American outposts and lines of communication. The

Dutch had more cargo space available

than the Americans could furnish material

to fill, but with the naval situation out of

control around the Indies, there was a

serious question as to whether any ships

could get through. Neither the British nor

the Americans were in a position to spare

the highly critical materials such as rifles,

ammunition, light tanks, and antiaircraft

guns that the Dutch requested. Nevertheless, some of these supplies were dispatched

at the eleventh hour, but the effort proved

as futile as had that to aid Greece and

Yugoslavia. The Netherlands Indies fell to

the Japanese while most of the material

was en route or still in the United States.

That en route was diverted to Australia

and redistributed by General MacArthur

to forces under his command, while supplies still in the United States were purchased back from the Dutch and reassigned by the MAB. Remaining Dutch

contracts were either taken over by the

United States or canceled. The only

Dutch lend-lease program left was for

their West Indian forces and those small

contingents that made their way from the

Netherlands Indies to Australia.12

11

 (1) Ltr, Gen Crain to Col George A. Rehm,

MAB, 29 Oct 42. (2) Memo, Col Franks for ACofS

Materiel, Nov 42, sub: Reverse Lend-lease and Loans

of Sups to U.S. Forces in U.K. Both in ID 008 Reverse

Lend-lease, I. (3) Min 1366, 66th mtg MAC(G), 17

Dec 42. (4) Ltr cited n. 8(4). (5) Ltr, Clay to Kerr, 30

Oct 42. (6) Memo, Gen Clay for Gen Tompkins,

MAB, 31 Oct 42. Last two in AG 400.3295 (10-22-42)

(2). (7) Ltr, Clay to Yenning, 23 Dec 42, AG 400.3295

(9-1-42) (3) Sec 5. (8) Cheslaw chapter cited n. 6(2). 12

 (1) See papers in AG 400.3295 (12-16-41) (1);

AG 400.3295 (3-17-41); WPD 4363-21; WPD 4295-4;

Netherlands Nov and Dec File, DAD; and Netherlands Corresp Lend-lease 1 and 2 Files, DAD. (2) Ltr,

President to J. van den Broek, Netherlands Purch

Comm, 19 Dec 41, Auth File of President's Ltrs, DAD.

(3) Min 1b, 7th mtg MAB, 18 Mar 42. (4) Ltr, SW to

OLLA, 3 Apr 42, G-4/400.3295. (5) Msg 217,

AGWAR to CINCSWPA, 12 Jun 42, AG 400.3295

(1-1-42).
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ORBIT 497

As Singapore, the Netherlands Indies,

and the Philippines fell in cataclysmic succession, the British Dominions of Australia

and New Zealand assumed the pre-eminent place in the pattern of strategic defense in the far Pacific. Australia and New

Zealand were primarily agricultural, producing an exportable surplus of foodstuffs

and raw materials, which in peacetime

they normally exchanged with England

for manufactured goods. Though their industry was increasing, and the pace of its

development was vastly speeded by the

war, it was far from sufficient in 1942 to

maintain an essential civilian economy

and provide equipment for the armed

forces Australia and New Zealand could

put into the field. The large American

forces sent to the area promised an additional drain on the native economy. These

American forces would be operating at

the end of one of the longest supply lines

in the history of warfare. If they could

draw the bulk of their subsistence supplies

from local sources, the saving in shipping

would be immense. A fairly simple and

direct exchange therefore suggested itself

whereby Australia and New Zealand

would furnish American forces with housing, subsistence, clothing, and miscellaneous supplies and services in return for

which the United States would supply the

marginal needs of both their military

forces and civilian economy.

Such a simple and direct exchange

could not be arranged, however, without

regard to Australia's and New Zealand's

historic ties to the United Kingdom.

Dominion forces were armed as part of

the empire program. The Americans had

previously given no independent consideration to aid to Australia and New Zealand, as their defense was conceived to be

a British responsibility and their needs

were incorporated in British programs.

Their armies were equipped predominantly with British types of matériel not

manufactured in the United States. The

British considered assignments to Commonwealth nations to be primarily a function of the LMAB. Britain was still counting on receiving foodstuffs and raw materials from Australasia, and if these were

entirely diverted to U.S. forces, then the

United States would have to make up the

deficit in British imports. Even though

Australia and New Zealand fell within an

area of American strategic responsibility,

this established pattern of relationships

within the British Commonwealth could

not be lightly pushed aside.

The Australians in early 1942 were

quite ready to wean themselves from the

British connection and establish closer relations with the United States since they

felt Britain would offer little support in the

Pacific war.13 They sent a military mission

to Washington and established their own

procurement agency there. Though less

aggressive than the Australians, the New

Zealanders generally followed their footsteps. Representatives of both countries

presented in Washington requirements

separate from those in the British over-all

programs, and not necessarily in conformity with them. Among these were

urgent requests for construction equipment to build airfields, strategic defense

roads, railheads, and other facilities,

which they contended were necessary for

incoming American troops. By early April

1942 they were also pressing for military

equipment for the forces planned by their

own Chiefs of Staff, forces somewhat larger

than those contemplated by the British in

13

 See the account of the British Prime Minister's

difficulties with the Australian Government in

Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 3-20.
498 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

the deployment tables they had presented

to CCS.14

It was obvious that Australian and New

Zealand needs for planes, heavy construction equipment, motor vehicles, tanks,

and other equipment must be met by the

United States, but the War Department

itself was unwilling to assume the burden

of supplying their military needs in their

entirety, and regarded their stated requirements as excessive. The situation demanded some separate procedure that

would permit evaluation of the supply

needs and over-all control of the flow of

supplies to the area by the Americans, and

still allow Australian forces to be supplied

partially through British channels. The

War Department's solution was to place

both determination of requirements and

final allocation of supplies in the hands of

General MacArthur, and let him split his

requisitions between Washington and

London in accordance with the normal

source of supply of the articles concerned.

In May 1942 the Australian Government

agreed in principle to this system, and by

July procedures had been worked out in

detail by the MAB and CCS for putting

it into effect. It was easily agreed that

naval requirements should be submitted

in London and air force requirements in

Washington since these were the normal

sources of supply in each case. The difficulty arose in determining where requests

for ground equipment should be tabled,

since part would come from Britain and

part from the United States. Both OPD

and SOS insisted all ground force requirements should be presented in Washington,

on the theory that otherwise the JCS

could not exercise proper control over

supply to a theater for which they exercised strategic responsibility. They were

overruled by MacArthur himself, who

thought such a practice would serve no

useful purpose. The CCS finally agreed

that all ground force requirements save

those for motor vehicles should be tabled

in London, with a proviso that the tabling

of any item might be changed by mutual

agreement.15

Under this system, the major portion of

ground equipment furnished under lendlease to Australia was allocated as part of

the bulk assignment to the British, and

then reallocated by the London board.

General Somervell opposed this arrangement from the first and repeatedly sought

to change it. He stated the case to General

Burns, executive of the MAB, in August

1942:

While the requirements placed before the

latter board by the United Kingdom are justified on a theater basis, the bids and allocations are made in a lump sum to the United

Kingdom. Frequently these allocations are

reassigned by the London Board as it deems

desirable. This reassignment may or may not

be in accord with the reasons which govern

the action of the Washington Board, and

may or may not be in harmony with the di14

 (1) Memo, Col Ralph C. Banner, Chief of Distrib

Br DAD, for CofEngrs, 19 Mar 42, sub: Constructional Engineering Equip for Australia and New Zealand, Br Colonies Corresp Lend-lease 1 file, DAD.

(2) Min 132, 12th mtg MAC(G), 23 Mar 42; min 150,

13th mtg, 26 Mar 42. (3) Memo, Herbert V. Evatt,

Australian Minister for External Affairs, for President, 8 Apr 42, CCS M-I-3, ABC 400 (2-17-42) Sec 1.

(4) Min 5, 10th mtg MAB, 8 Apr 42. (5) On British

deployment tables, see above, Ch. XI. 15

 (1) Msg 985, AGWAR to Supreme Comdr Australia and Philippines, 30 Mar 42, AG 400.3295

(3-30-42) (1). (2) Curtin-Wasserman-MacArthur

Agreement on Proposed Lend-lease Procurement

Procedure, 22 May 42. (3) Memo, Gen Burns for

Secys CCS, 27 Jun 42, sub: Requests for Mat for

SWPA. Last two in OPD 400.3295 Australia, Case 19.

(4) Min, 19th mtg CCS, 12 May 42. (5) Memo, OPD

for MAB, 20 May 42, sub: Asgmt of Priorities to Requests for Sups for Australia, OPD 400.3295 Australia,

Case 7. (6) Min, WD Gen Council mtg, 2 Jun 42. (7)

CCS 68/1, MBW 15, 20 Jul 42, title: Alloc of Mun to

Australia.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ORBIT 499

rective from the CCS. Certainly, the United

States and the Washington Board have a di- rect interest in the operational requirements

of those theaters where our forces are engaged

in joint operations, the success of which must

depend on the fulfillment not only of our operational requirements but those of other

forces. To insure this, I am of the view that

the requirements for the Australian theater

should be filed by MacArthur at London or

at Washington depending on which place

represents the usual source of supply. Moreover, the assignments of the Washington

Board should be earmarked and not subject

to reallocation in London without the prior

approval of the Washington Board.16

Somervell's efforts had some effect. The

tabling of bids for tractors was transferred

to Washington in September 1942. The

MAB agreed that assignments made in

Washington for Australia and New Zealand should be definitely earmarked and

not subject to variation in London without concurrence of the Washington board.

Arrangements were made for a fuller interchange of information between the two

boards. Nevertheless, the fundamentals of

the procedure remained unchanged.17

If the procedure was somewhat cumbersome, it worked with a reasonable degree of success. Over-all control quite

clearly rested in American hands since

General MacArthur's headquarters determined the requirements of the Australian

forces and assigned priorities for shipment,

whether the material was to come from

Britain or from America. The CCS directive in July also gave MacArthur final

power to allocate all supplies in his area,

and at first lend-lease shipments were consigned to him as commanding general

shipments with the provision that he

might divert them to whatever purpose he

thought best. The Australian Government objected that this conflicted with the

existing civilian control of ports, and MacArthur agreed that he could exercise the

necessary control through the Australian

machinery. Consequently, after October

1942, shipments of lend-lease to Australia

were made entirely through Australian

channels. MacArthur exercised his powers

of allocation largely through review of

requisitions and assignment of shipping

priorities rather than by reallocating supplies earmarked for specific forces under

his command.18

Procedures following the Australian

pattern were established in New Zealand,

though they did not take final shape until

September 1942, when the control of New

Zealand land forces finally passed to the

American naval commander of the South

Pacific Area. The South Pacific commander was also charged with a review of

all requirements for his area, with assignments of shipping priorities, and with final

allocation of supplies. New Zealand naval

requirements, except those for certain

bases under development for the U.S.

Navy, and all ground force requirements

were to be tabled in London, all air force

requirements in Washington.19

16

 Memo, Somervell for Burns, 15 Aug 42, sub: Relationship of WD to MAB and CPRB, MAB folder,

Hq ASF. 17

 (1) MBW 15/1, 25 Sep 42, title: Tabling in U.S.

of Track-Laying Tractors for Australia. (2) Min 821,

45th mtg MAC(G), 27 Aug 42, with Tab E, Min 880,

48th mtg, 10 Sep 42; Min 936, 51st mtg, 24 Sep 42.

(3) Min 6c, 32d mtg MAB, 9 Sep 42. (4) ID Rpt 10,

Lend-lease Information, 31 May 43, sec on Australia. 18

 (1) For details of shipment priorities, see Msg AG

88, GHQ SWPA to AGWAR, 27 Jun 42, Australia

IN Cables file, Bk. I, ID. (2) Min 272, 23d mtg

MAC(G), 27 Apr 42; min 974, 51st mtg, 24 Sep 42.

(3) Min, OLLA mtg, 12 Aug 42, ID 337 Confs, I. (4)

Ltr, J. Paterson, Australian War Sup Procurement, to

ID, 14 Aug 42, ID 008 Shipts, I. (5) Msg C-390,

CINCSWPA to AGWAR, 31 Aug 42. (6) Msg C-520,

CINCSWPA to AGWAR, 18 Sep 42. Last two in

Australia Lend-lease Procurement Cables file, ID. 19

 CCS 115, 25 Sep 42, title: Equip for New Zealand.
500 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

While the commanders of the respective

theaters could determine the requirements of their areas, the decision on how

far they should be met rested with the

central machinery in Washington and

London. In the directive for assignment of

munitions (CCS 50/2), the CCS gave

Australia "A" priority for continuous

major operations, and New Zealand "A"

priority for operations for two months.

While of some value to the MAB, these

priorities hardly established the meet important point, the relative importance of

arming Australian and New Zealand

forces as opposed to preparations for the

invasion of Europe, also assigned an "A"

priority in June 1942. In response to the

request of the War Department in April,

MacArthur drew up a detailed statement

of minimum Australian requirements that

must be met from either Britain or the

United States. But even though these requirements were lower than those presented by the Australians, OPD was reluctant to approve them. "From the point

of view of both equipment and shipping,"

noted one planner, "it is obvious that in

the near future we cannot meet the requirements of Bolero and do anything in

Australia."

 20

After a detailed study by MAC(G) of

the availability of the supplies requested

from both British and American sources,

the MAB decided in June 1942 that it

should accept MacArthur's requirements,

but ruled it would be impossible to determine when they could be filled. Assignments would be made "as soon as practicable in accordance with the policies set

up in the strategic directive, CCS 50/2."

Assignments to New Zealand were placed

on the same plane after the troop basis

presented by her Chiefs of Staff had been

reviewed by the U.S. Joint Staff Planners.21

In practice, the flow of supplies to Australia and New Zealand was handled by

the Washington and London boards on an

individual item basis, geared generally to

a situation in which exact theater priorities were indeterminate. Action in Washington to meet MacArthur's and Ghormley's requests for supplies for Australian

and New Zealand forces was limited, as

was the case with supplies for U.S. forces

in their areas, by the shortage of shipping

and by the higher priority accorded Operation TORCH. The flow of military lendlease to Australia and New Zealand during 1942 was large, but second in importance to that to the United Kingdom, the

USSR, and the Middle East. The most

significant American contributions were

planes, trucks, tractors, locomotives, tanks,

antiaircraft guns, construction supplies,

and specialized jungle equipment.22

The supply of military equipment to

Australia and New Zealand was but one

aspect of coalition supply in the Pacific.

American troops had to be supplied in

turn from local sources. To furnish these

supplies on an adequate scale and to serve

as military bases, Australia and New Zealand had to have civilian supplies from

the outside. The United States necessarily

became the source of these supplies since

20

 (1) Memo, Gen Streett for Gen Handy, 3 May 42.

(2) Msg 1282, AGWAR to CG USAFIA, 14 Apr 42.

(3) Memo, Gen Handy for Theater Group OPD, 26

Apr 42, sub: Australian and Dutch Forces in SWPA.

All in ABC 400 (2-17-42) Sec 1. (4) For discussion of

CGS 50/2, see above, Ch. XI. (5) Min cited n. 14(4). 21

 (1) Memo, Gen Burns for OPD, 22 Jun 42, sub:

Mun for Australia, SW Pac Sup folder, Plng Div ASF.

(2) Memo, OPD for Chm MAC(G), 13 May 42, Tab

3 to min, 29th mtg MAC(G), 18 May 42. (3) Min 442,

32d mtg MAC(G), 1 Jun 42; Min 446, 34th mtg, 15

Jun 42; Min 501, 35th mtg, 22 Jun 42. (4) OPD notes

on 16th mtg JCS, 25 May 42, ABC 400 (2-17-42) Sec

2. (5) Min, 16th mtg JCS, 25 May 42, Item 3. 22

 (1) See rpt cited n. 17(4). (2) See also above,

Ch. XV.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ORBIT 501

the British were in no position to furnish

them. It was of vital importance to the

American military command in the area

that these imports be of a nature to best

serve the war effort and enhance the ability of Australia and New Zealand to support Allied forces in the Pacific and still

not absorb too much of the available shipping space. For the Army and the local

governments alike, it was essential that

American local procurement be carefully

planned and co-ordinated with other demands on the Australian and New Zealand economies.

Arrangements along these lines began

to take shape after an early period of confusion. In March 1942 an Allied Supply

Council was formed in Australia, with

Australian, British, American, and Dutch

representation, to determine broad supply

policy on import requirements and the extent to which all Allied forces in the area

could be supported from Australian resources. In response to an Australian request for some single agency with which it

could deal on both lend-lease and reciprocal aid matters, the Secretary of State

authorized General Roop, whom the War

Department had sent out as General Purchasing Agent and chairman of the General Purchasing Board, to act as the

American representative on the Allied

Supply Council and to speak for the

United States on both these questions.

Roop was able to make arrangements

whereby local procurement for American

forces in Australia would be centralized

under the supervision of the General Purchasing Board working with Australian

Government agencies under broad policies determined by the Allied Supply

Council. The Army would as far as possible present its requirements on Australia

for advance programming. Except for

small emergency purchases by local field

commanders, all Australian supplies transferred to the U.S. military forces would be

treated as reverse lend-lease.

The other matter, civilian lend-lease

shipments to Australia, was regulated by

an agreement signed by MacArthur and

William Wasserman, the civilian lendlease representative in Australia, with the

Australian Government in May 1942.

Australian civilian requirements would

initially be determined in accordance with

the plans of the Allied Supply Council, but

all lend-lease requisitions would require

the final approval of MacArthur's headquarters before being forwarded to Washington. MacArthur would also assign shipping priorities for all materials on approved requisitions. By concurrent arrangements, Wasserman's lend-lease mission was made a part of MacArthur's

staff, to work in collaboration with the

General Purchasing Agent in reviewing

these lend-lease requisitions.23

Under this system, MacArthur became

the comptroller of all lend-lease to Australia, for civilian as well as military supplies. Every Australian request had to be

subjected to the final test of military necessity. A similar system took shape in

New Zealand, with the formation of the

Joint Purchasing Board there under Colonel Westbrook. The South Pacific commander was entrusted with powers of final

review of all lend-lease requisitions, but in

practice that power was exercised by the

Joint Purchasing Board in co-operation

with a civilian lend-lease mission. A supply council was formed in New Zealand to

23

 (1) Cable, Secy of State to U.S. Minister, Canberra, for Gen Roop, 14 Mar 42. (2) Memo, Roop for

CG SOS, 1 Jul 42, sub: Gen Purch Agent and Gen

Purch Bd in Australia: Allied Sup Council. Both in

1-a-1 Jt Sup Prog (SWPA and S Pac Area) IV folder,

Plng Div ASF. (3) Curtin-Wasserman-MacArthur

Agreement cited n. 15(2).
502 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

determine broad supply policy, and American procurement was centralized through

New Zealand agencies. Activities of the

Joint Purchasing Board extended also to

the other scattered islands of the South

Pacific Area command.24

Within the framework of this system, the

pooling of resources was achieved in such

manner as to conserve shipping to the utmost degree possible. In no other theater

did lend-lease and reciprocal aid serve

these ends so well. American troops were

fed, housed, and partially clothed from

local sources. Some of their petroleum

came from British Middle East refineries.

Australia and New Zealand provided barracks, airfields, hospitals, repair shops,

and numerous other installations for U.S.

Army forces, and furnished the construction materials with which to build others.

The Australians undertook to supply tires

for American vehicles and even to manufacture some American-type ordnance

equipment. Another very important contribution was in the manufacture of small

boats suited to MacArthur's needs. In

turn, critical items of industrial, transportation, and construction equipment

furnished from the United States under

the careful eye of MacArthur's headquarters and the Joint Purchasing Board made

a signal contribution in enabling the

native economies to keep moving and furnish the goods and services required. Canning and dehydration equipment enabled

the Australians to preserve and distribute

food in a more economical manner. Machine tools promoted the expansion of

Australian industry in those areas the

Americans conceived as best for the war

effort. American trucks helped to give the

necessary mobility to the economy, and

heavy construction equipment enabled

the building of the facilities required for

Allied military forces. For many of the

boats manufactured in Australia, engines

came from the United States.

By the end of 1942 there were sufficient

surpluses of certain articles of Australian

manufacture to dictate some procedure

for allocating supplies outside the country,

and an Australian Munitions Assignments

Committee was formed. This committee

was composed of Australian and British

representatives only, for General MacArthur felt that his powers as Commander in

Chief gave him the right to divert to the

use of forces under his command any

munitions produced in Australia, and he

limited American representation to a

liaison officer.25

In an effort to push the pooling principle

to the limit and save even more shipping,

the combined boards and the Office of

Lend-Lease Administration in the fall of

1942 made an intensive effort to eliminate

the run from the United Kingdom to Australia and New Zealand entirely. Under

their proposal, the United States would

meet all Australasian needs for military

and industrial equipment, and the Australasian surplus of foodstuffs and raw materials would be used entirely to support

Allied forces in the Pacific. The United

States would then furnish food to Britain

to compensate for her loss from Australian

and New Zealand sources. But the necessity of furnishing Australian and New

Zealand forces with British-type equipment prevented this goal from ever being

fully realized. The United Kingdom24

 (1) See above, Ch. VII. (2) Memo, Westbrook

for CG SOS, 19 Jul 42, sub: Rpt on Orgn and Opn of

Jt Purch Bd, S Pac, 2363-1 folder, Asiatic Sec, Theater Br, Plng Div ASF. (3) Rpt, sec on New Zealand,

cited n. 17(4). 25

 Msg G-1267, Brisbane to AGWAR, 16 Dec 42,

Australia Lend-lease Proced Cables file, ID.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ORBIT 503

Australasian run was considerably reduced but never entirely eliminated.26

The Middle East

The Indian Ocean and Middle East

theater, which fell to the British, comprised

a vast expanse of territory extending from

Libya to Singapore. British forces faced

the Germans and Italians on the west, the

Japanese on the east. To these outside

threats could be added the growing restlessness of native peoples under any form

of foreign domination. The constituent

countries, almost all under British rule or

influence, were ill prepared to furnish

many of the sinews of war, or even to serve

as adequate bases for support of British

armies. The sea lines of communication

were long and tenuous, interior supply

lines poor and undeveloped. Axis control

of both shores of the Mediterranean forced

shipping to go around the coast of Africa

to ports of entry on the Red Sea, the Nile

Delta, the Persian Gulf, and India.

Geography and paucity of transportation and communication facilities divided

the area naturally in three separate regions—the eastern basin of the Mediterranean, Iran and Iraq, and India. The

bulk of the forces of the British Commonwealth, apart from those in the United

Kingdom itself, were deployed throughout

these regions, spread thin to cover all the

danger points. In the first, one British

army was waging an active campaign

against Rommel in the Libyan desert, and

another was deployed in Syria against a

possible German thrust through Turkey.

In Iran and Iraq other British forces were

preparing to meet a possible German attack southward through Russian Turkestan and were trying to develop a supply

line to the USSR. The largest British army

of all, though hardly the most effective,

was stationed in India. During 1941 India's role had largely been that of a rear

base for the war in the Middle East, but

the rapid advance of Japanese armies to

the Indian border in early 1942 forced on

it a new role as the principal Allied base

for the war in Asia.

In 1942 the British were more concerned

about protecting their hold on the Middle

East and with extending that hold to regain control of the Mediterranean than

about pursuing the war against the Japanese from India. In British concern about

the Middle East and the Mediterranean

lay part of the reason for British reluctance

to go ahead with the American plan for an

early invasion of Europe. Though the

American staff recognized that the Allies

could ill afford a setback in this area,

bringing as it inevitably would the loss of

vital oil fields and communication lines

and the threat of a junction of German

and Japanese forces, they sought to restrict

commitments to the Middle East in the

interest of concentrating resources on

BOLERO. American opposition to the British plan to base allocation of material on

theater deployments was principally motivated by fear that, with British forces deployed throughout the area from Libya to

the eastern borders of India, many of them

inactive, it would result in commitments

of matériel for purposes U.S. Army planners did not conceive to be vital to ultimate

26

 (1) Rpts, Com on New Zealand Exports and Imports to Stettinius, 15 Sep and 29 Dec 42, 334.8 S Pac

Subcom folder, Plng Div ASF. (2) Memo, Westbrook

for CG SOS, 18 Sep 42, Lend-lease folder, Hq ASF.

(3) MBW 24, 17 Aug 42, title: Economy of Shipg

Through Local Sup Arrangements; MBW 24/1, 20

Aug 42, same title; MBW 24/2, 21 Aug 42, same title;

MBW 24/3, 15 Sep 42, title: Economy of Shipg;

MBW 24/4, 17 Oct 42, same title. (4) Memo, Franks

for Clay, 5 Nov 42, sub: Ltr of E. R. Stettinius . . . ,

AG 400.3295 (9-1-42) (3) Sec 2.
504 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

victory.27 OPD planners at first took the

position that no American troops should

be sent to the Middle East, and while they

were ready to furnish supplies prerequisite

to the success of the British campaign in

the desert, they would cut allocations for

the inactive areas of Syria, Iran, Iraq, and

India to a minimum. While the whole

India and Middle East theater got an "A"

priority under CCS 50/2, the strategic directive for assignment of munitions, the

Americans recognized that priority clearly

only in the case of the active operations in

Egypt and Libya.

Even this policy promised substantial

American support to the British campaign

in the Middle East during 1942 and each

recurrent crisis forced the Americans to

increase their commitment. The flow of

American supplies and the commitment of

American shipping to the area had begun

in 1941. At the ARCADIA Conference it was

agreed that shipments to the Middle East

(and to the Soviet Union) should have a

priority second only to "continuous maintenance of existing overseas Army and

Navy garrisons and US fleets."

 28

 In the

crisis of February and March 1942, when

General Auchinleck's forces were forced to

retreat before Rommel, the President

agreed to provide additional troop shipping from the American pool to transport

two British divisions to Egypt to replace

forces diverted to Australia after the Japanese attack. General Marshall also proposed dispatch of an American air force,

but the project was temporarily dropped

when Auchinleck stabilized his position.29

The dominant note continued to be, as

it had been in 1941, supply of matériel for

British use. In Washington, assignments to

the Middle East were made as part of the

bulk allocation to the United Kingdom,

though equipment was normally shipped

directly from the United States. The main

British needs were for planes, tanks, artillery, motor transport, locomotives, communications equipment, and heavy construction material. In general, while the

assignments committees could not meet

British expectancies in their entirety, they

did everything to meet urgent operational

needs in the Middle East as far as possible

without completely crippling the U.S.

Army's training program. By furnishing

combat matériel for British use, the Americans sought to avoid commitment of their

own troops.

This policy showed very clearly in connection with the military missions under

Generals Maxwell and Wheeler, dispatched to Egypt and Iran shortly before

Pearl Harbor to aid the British in the development of their lines of communications

and in the use and maintenance of American equipment. The services these missions

were to perform were essential to the British effort. American observers were generally agreed that the British had inadequate numbers of maintenance troops and

installations. The percentage of tanks and

vehicles continually laid up for repair, and

often lost when they could not be repaired

in time, was tremendous, and the wastage

contributed to heavy British demands on

the United States for new tanks and other

vehicles. This was certainly one factor in

the reverse suffered by Auchinleck in

February and March.30

The early blueprints drawn up by the

Maxwell and Wheeler missions envisaged

27

 (1) See above, Ch. XI. (2) Matloff and Snell,

Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, pp. 198-202. 28

 Min, ABC-4 JCCSs-10, 12 Jan 42. 29

 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942,

pp. 198-202. 30

 (1) See above, Ch. IV. (2) Memo, Maj Joseph M.

Colby for Chief of U.S. Mil N African Mis, 24 Jan 42,

sub: Unserviceable but Repairable Equip, Mis to

Middle East (N Africa) file, DAD. (3) Note, DE

[Eisenhower] to Gee [Maj Gen Leonard T. Gerow],

no date, WPD 4511-28.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ORBIT 505

a system of depots and construction and

maintenance projects serving the entire

Middle East, India, the Persian Gulf supply line to the USSR, and possibly China.

The larger establishments would be in

India or South Africa, with smaller ones

located in the base areas serving British

armies in Egypt, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, respectively. In Eritrea Maxwell planned

facilities for aircraft repair and assembly

at Gura, port and naval repair facilities at

Massaua, and reconditioning and repair

shops for tanks and motor vehicles at Asmara. At Heliopolis, near Cairo, Egypt,

and at Tel Litwinsky, near Tel Aviv, Palestine, he would set up generally similar

establishments for repair, maintenance,

and reconditioning of all types of American equipment. At Umm Qasr or Baghdad

in Iraq Wheeler proposed ordnance repair

facilities to support the British army in

Iraq. In Iran the Americans would undertake to construct and repair roads, rail

lines, and port facilities, and to operate

truck and aircraft assembly plants to serve

both the British and the Russians. The

supply and personnel requirements for

these projects tended to expand as the mission chiefs became familiar with the difficulties confronting them, and as the British extended their conception of the tasks

the missions should perform.31

The tasks outlined according to the

original conception during the neutral

period were to be performed by civilian

contractors. Designation of firms, recruiting by them of skilled personnel, and procurement of equipment through War Department lend-lease channels were well

under way at the time of Pearl Harbor.

American entrance into the war transformed the missions into services of supply

for the areas in which they were located

and inevitably raised the question of militarization. Even before Pearl Harbor,

General Maxwell had urged that service

troops be furnished to perform the work on

strictly military installations, and shortly

afterward, on 21 December 1941, transmitted a British request for service troops

to operate directly in support of the British

Army.32

There were numerous objections in

Washington to both of these proposals.

From the practical standpoint, neither an

adequate number of service troops nor

sufficient troop shipping was available. On

the policy side, as General Aurand noted,

"The War Plans and G-3 . . . put it very

bluntly . . . they will not organize US

troops to dog-rob for the foreign countries."

 33

 Maxwell was informed on 2 January 1942 that no service units would be

available for the Middle East at that time,

and that he must continue efforts to operate in accordance with the prewar plan.34

While the proposal to extend American

activities to direct support of the British

Army was not to be raised again, in Feb31

 (1) Original plans submitted by the supply services in November 1941 are in AG 400.3295 (8-9-41)

Sec 6. (2) Min of conf in Gen Aurand's off, 1 Feb 42,

Item 142, Col Boone's file, DAD; min, 3 Feb 42, Item

150, Col Boone's file, DAD. (3) Memo, Lt Col Noble

M. Coe for Col Gross, 4 Feb 42, sub: Proposal To

Estab a Depot in the Middle East for Def Aid and

Other Mun, Item 151, Col Boone's file, DAD. (4)

Memo, Maj Stuart Bullivant, Chief of Home Off U.S.

Mil N African Mis, no addressee, 14 Feb 42, sub:

Breakdown of Proposed Projects in N Africa Area, N

African Mis 330, ID. (5) Memo, Maj Colby for Gen

Maxwell, 18 Jan 42, sub: Survey of Proposed Ord

Estabs in Iraq, Iran, and India, N African Mis 600.12,

ID. (5) Ltr, Gen Wheeler to Gen Moore, 19 Jan 42,

Iranian Mis 600.12, ID. 32

 (1) Min, mtg in Aurand's off, 19 Jan 42, Conf

Memos file, DAD. (2) Msg 287, Cairo to AGWAR,

2 Dec 41. (3) Msg 384, Cairo to AGWAR, 16 Dec 41.

(4) Msg 414, Cairo to AGWAR, 21 Dec 41. Last

three in AMSEG IN Cables file, Bk. 1, ID. 33

 Telephone conv, Gen Aurand with Lt Col Holland, OUSW, 12 Jan 42, Misc Corresp Lend-lease 1

file, DAD. 34

 (1) Msg 310, AGWAR to AMSEG, Cairo, 2 Jan

42, AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 6. (2) Matloff and Snell

Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, pp. 198-202.
506 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ruary 1942 Robert Patterson, the Under

Secretary of War, over the objections of

Generals Somervell, Aurand, and Moore

that service troops were just not available,

decided the missions should be militarized.

The War Department on 18 February directed that contract activities overseas,

except in the Atlantic bases, should be terminated within six months and taken over

by "military organizations and units to be

organized in the United States and sent

overseas."

 35

In pursuance of the directive for militarization, Generals Maxwell and Wheeler

presented their detailed troop requirements for the contemplated projects,

mounting to a total of 48,000. While this

was reduced in Washington to 40,000, it

still represented a commitment that could

hardly be fulfilled if service troops were to

be readied for BOLERO. Apart from the

general shortage of service troops, there

were practical difficulties in the organization of troop units to perform fundamentally industrial tasks. No suitable tables of

organization existed in many cases; some

projects were completely unsuited to military operation; tasks for which the contractors had already laid plans and procured personnel had to be replanned and

rescheduled; the construction of the required facilities, the necessary first step,

could hardly be completed in the near future if it had to await the arrival of troop

units. The War Department soon agreed

with Maxwell that construction activities

would have to proceed under the contractors and operating activities be initiated

under them, and that militarization would

have to be gradual.36

The truth was that while these elaborate

militarization plans for the missions were

taking shape, the actual movement of

civilian and military personnel and of supplies to the mission areas was alarmingly

slow. The absorption of shipping in the

initial deployment of U.S. troops overseas

in January and February 1942 left mission

personnel and cargo stranded at dockside.

Given the need for concentration on

BOLERO, it was hard to see how more than

a trifling amount of shipping could be

made available for them in the ensuing

months. OPD did not approve the service

troop basis of forty thousand for militarization, and the whole matter was left

hanging in the air. In these circumstances,

SOS decided in early April to curtail temporarily the scope of the mission projects.

The original plans were retained as ultimate goals but divided into two objectives.

First objective projects in Maxwell's area

included the major portion of the work

planned for Heliopolis and Eritrea but

postponed that in Palestine. All base projects in India and Iraq were similarly postponed and, as the first objective for that

area, it was decided to concentrate on development of the ports, roads, and assembly facilities in Iran. Troop requirements

for the first objective in North Africa were

calculated by SOS at 4,213, for Iran only

654. These were to depart the United

States by 1 September 1942 and the first

objective projects were to be completed or

in operation by the end of the year. The

35

 TAG ltr, 18 Feb 42, sub: Closing Out of Overseas

Contracts and Militarization of Contract Activities,

Mis to Middle East (N Africa) file, DAD. 36

 (1) Ltr, Col William E. Chickering to Chief of

Home Off, U.S. Mil N African Mis, 26 Feb 42, sub:

Militarization of Base Projects, N African Mis 330,

ID. (2) Memo, Lt Col Maxwell W. Tracy, Chief of

Home Off Iranian Mis, for Col John E. Upston,

WPD, 24 Feb 42, sub: Militarization of Iranian Mis,

with Tabs A-Q, Iranian Mis 370.5, ID. (3) Msg

AMSEG 451, Cairo to AGWAR, 20 Feb 42. (4) Msg

673, AGWAR to AMSEG, 25 Feb 42. Last two in AG

400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 6A. (5) Memo, Melvin Sims for

Lt Col Laurence K. Ladue, 31 Mar 42, ID folder,

Contl Div ASF.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ORBIT 507

second objective was to include the rest of

the projects set up in the original plans.

The new troop requirements were computed at 12,528 men for North Africa and

6,950 for Iran. The reduction of the original troop basis for the projects by almost

half was made on the assumption that

construction work would be done by the

contractors and that native labor would be

used to the maximum extent possible.37

First priority was thus given to the installations designed to serve the British

army in Egypt and Libya, and second to

the development of a supply line through

Iran to the Soviet Union. Projects to support the inactive British armies in Syria

and Iraq were placed in the second objective. The major bases proposed for India

were also postponed. While the selection

of these objectives came in the guise of a

decision merely to postpone certain of the

projects originally planned, the postponement in most cases became permanent.

The grand scheme of early 1942 for a single system of supply establishments to

serve the entire Middle East and India

subsequently gave way to regional planning along different lines for three separate

areas with separate missions. In North

Africa and Palestine, American activities

were to be centered on supporting the

British armies there, in Iran on developing

a supply route to the USSR, and in India

on the war with the Japanese. The SOS

decision that produced these results was

dictated both by the practical difficulties

involved in carrying out the earlier plan

and by the strategic planners' reluctance

to commit resources to the British area of

responsibility.

Even the reduced plan for the Middle

East missions was so dwarfed by the massive requirements for shipping, troops, and

supplies for BOLERO that it was almost lost

in the shuffle. OPD remained reluctant to

permit diversion of even the most negligible quantities of shipping from BOLERO for

the missions. By the end of July most of the

civilian contractor personnel had arrived

by air ferry, freighter, or troopship, but

few military units. Plans were made in late

May to dispatch all the first objective

troops and part of the second in one large

movement in August, but they were soon

disrupted by the march of events in the

Middle East.38

During May, General Auchinleck delayed in launching the attack on Rommel,

which Churchill had urged. Then, Rommel struck. By the end of June he had

driven the British back into Egypt, and the

threat of a German drive to Suez and the

Middle East oil fields was ominous. In this

crisis, the American staff had to modify its

position on commitments to the Middle

East. Churchill, in Washington for conferences, received assurances of support from

the President. At first General Marshall

proposed that an armored task force composed of the 2d Armored Division and

supporting units be sent to the Middle

East, and plans were hastily drawn up for

its shipment to Suez. But they were just as

37

 (1) Msg 516, AGWAR to AMSEG, 10 Apr 42,

AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 6B. (2) Msg 100,

AGWAR to AMSIR, Basra, 10 Apr 42, AG

400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 4. (3) Memo, Home Off U.S.

N African Mis for Provost Marshal Gen, SG, CSigO,

CofEngrs, and CofOrd, 11 Apr 42, sub: Sv Units for

N African Mis. (4) Memo, Maj David Wainhouse,

ID, for ACofS OPD, 3 May 42, sub: Activation of

Trs for N African and Iranian Mis's. Last two in Mis

to Middle East (N Africa) file, DAD. 38

 (1) Memo, Wainhouse for ACofS G-3, 28 Apr 42,

sub: Activation of Trs for N Africa and Iran Areas.

(2) Memo, Aurand for Somervell, 7 May 42, sub:

Trans for N Africa and Iran. Both in Mis to Middle

East (N Africa) file, DAD. (3) Msg, AGWAR to

AMSEG, 4 Jun 42, CM-OUT 0804. (4) Msg 1031,

Cairo to MILID, 10 May 42, AMSEG IN Cables file,

Bk. 9, ID.
508 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

U.S. TANKS AT HELIOPOLIS, EGYPT, January 1943, waiting to be repaired.

hastily abandoned when it was learned

that Churchill would not in exchange

abandon his plan for an invasion of North

Africa. Marshall then proposed shipment

of three hundred new-model Sherman

tanks and a hundred 105-mm. self-propelled howitzers, and this plan was accepted. Air shipment of tank and antitank

ammunition was arranged to counter an

imminent shortage in Egypt. To armored

force supplies was added emergency action

to provide air power in the Middle East,

and as part of the Arnold-Slessor-Towers

Agreement, six U.S. air groups were slated

for that area. In the immediate emergency, bombers en route to India and China

were held in Africa and General Brereton

was ordered from India to the Middle East

with the bulk of the heavy bombers of the

Tenth Air Force. An additional forty light

bombers were diverted with Stalin's permission from those at Basra in Iraq designated for delivery to the Russians. The first

three of the six air groups for the Ninth Air

Force were shipped during July.39

Though the basic American role of

auxiliary to the British in the Middle East

remained unchanged, the decision to send

air combat troops did alter the functions

and status of the North African mission.

The principal emphasis in the Middle

East after the midsummer crisis was on the

39

 (1) This story is told in greater detail in Matloff

and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, Ch. XI, on

which this briefer account is based. (2) See also,

Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 413-31.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ORBIT 509

WORKSHOP AT HELIOPOLIS. British soldiers learn to handle American matériel.

build-up of the Ninth Air Force rather

than a services of supply for the British.

On 16 June 1942 an overseas command

was created called U.S. Army Forces in

the Middle East (USAFIME) under General Maxwell at Cairo. Despite the growing differentiation of purpose between the

Cairo area and Iran, the Iranian mission

was included under the new command.

The former mission projects were, in

August, assumed by the new SOS USAFIME, which was divided into four service

commands, Eritrea, Delta Area, Palestine,

and Persian Gulf. The functions of the first

three of these commands included support

of the Ninth Air Force and the regional

activities of the Air Force Ferrying Command, as well as of the British. These

activities extended into Arabia and the

Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The "center of

gravity" for air force installations being in

Palestine, the projects postponed there had

to be revived in August. The old first and

second objective priorities ceased to have

much meaning, and Maxwell had to redirect the energies of his command toward

the new situation facing it.40

Despite its new responsibilities, the

40

 (1) Memo, Col Franks for CG SOS, 20 Jun 42,

sub: Estab of N African and Iran-Iraq Sv Comds, N

African Mis 334.8, ID. (2) Msg, AGWAR to AMSEG,

17 Jun 42, CM-OUT 4135. (3) Msg, AGWAR to

AMSME, 8 Aug 42, CM-OUT 2451. (4) Msg,

AMSME to AGWAR, 19 Jul 42, CM-IN 6872. (5)

Msg, AMSME to AGWAR, 29 Jul 42, CM-IN 10115.

(6) Msg, AMSME to AGWAR, 4 Aug 42, CM-IN

1123.
510 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

A LEND-LEASE 105-MM. HOWITZER (self-propelled) in Egypt.

build-up of Maxwell's SOS was slow. The

large movement of service troops scheduled for August 1942 had to be canceled

to provide shipping for air force personnel

and supplies, and was rescheduled as a

gradual movement over the following

months. The military personnel in the

SOS USAFIME totaled only 1,000 in

mid-August 1942 and this number had

risen to only 2,779 by 2 November. By

then approximately 6,000 additional men

were en route or scheduled to depart, but

most did not arrive until early in 1943.

The flow of supplies was similarly delayed,

and Maxwell had to improvise as best he

could by using native labor and materials.

While construction activities in Eritrea

were nearing completion by the end of the

year, those in Egypt were only half finished and those in Palestine had just begun. Actual maintenance operations were

in many cases just beginning in November. Full militarization was not accomplished until 1 January 1943, and even

afterward former contractor employees

continued to work directly for the Army.

The full scale of projects originally contemplated was never realized, as the need

for them disappeared with the British victory in the desert campaign in the autumn.

Only miscellaneous additional troop commitments were necessary for special projects during 1943. Similarly, the supply of

line-of-communications equipment to the

British did not measure up to their expectations, and was subordinated to the supply of combat material for the autumn

offensive. For instance, of eleven can and

drum plants ordered by the British for

manufacture of gasoline containers in

North Africa, not one was shipped from

the United States before March 1943. The
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ORBIT 511

importance of these plants was immense

for in the asbestos containers in use in the

Middle East, loss of gasoline ran as high as

30 percent.41

There is no evidence, however, that this

failure to provide the maintenance and

supply facilities originally contemplated

seriously handicapped the British autumn

campaign of 1942. The amount of American air and supply support actually furnished proved sufficient and was probably

decisive. When the attack on El Alamein

was launched, American tanks and American motor transport played a major role

in the break-through and its exploitation.

The replacements shipped from the

United States for one boatload of Sherman

tanks that had been lost en route arrived

in time to be used in the battle.42 American automotive equipment and the support of the U.S. Air Forces helped to give

the British the superior mobility and superior logistical support to their field army

that enabled it to move rapidly across the

desert to the borders of Tunisia. If the

American supply and maintenance bases

were far from complete, they nevertheless

played an important role in supplementing the British line of communications.

The complete victory scored in Africa by

the British Eighth Army and the AngloAmerican forces involved in TORCH removed the German menace from North

Africa by May 1943, and the Soviet victory at Stalingrad simultaneously removed

the threat of a German drive southward

from the USSR. The center of gravity for

future campaigns moved westward from

Egypt and Libya to Tripoli, Tunis, and Algeria. The Middle East remained a rear

area base in the Sicilian and Italian campaigns, a way station for troops and supplies en route to the Persian Gulf and Far

East, and a center of ferrying command

and air force activities. The critical phase

of the logistical problem in the Middle

East passed with the victory of General

Montgomery at El Alamein, and thereafter the Americans regarded it as a declining theater to which further resources

should not be committed

French Rearmament: The Initial Phase

From the fall of France in June 1940

until the Allied invasion of North Africa in

November 1942, only the scattered French

possessions in Africa, the Middle East, and

the Pacific that threw in their lot with

General Charles de Gaulle remained

within the Anglo-American orbit.43 By the

arrangements of March 1942, the British

assumed responsibility for supplying Free

French forces in Africa and the Middle

East, the Americans for those in the Pacific

islands. Under this dispensation, the British armed a sizable body of French com41

 (1) Msg, AMSME to AGWAR, 18 Aug 42, CMIN 6536. (2) Msg, AMSME to AGWAR, 28 Nov 42,

CM-IN 12122. (3) Msg, AMSME to AGWAR, 17

Dec 42, CM-IN 7233. (4) Msg, AMSME to AGWAR,

18 Dec 42, CM-IN 3305. (5) Msg, AMSME to

AGWAR, 19 Dec 42, CM-IN 8463. (6) Msg,

AGWAR to AMSME, 12 Aug 42, CM-OUT 3463.

(7) Msg, AGWAR to CG USAFIME, 18 Nov 42,

CM-OUT 5676. (8) TAG ltr, 17 Jul 42, sub: Closing

Out of Overseas Contracts and Militarization of Contract Activities, AG 160 (2-15-42). (9) See paper, 2

November 1942, listing SOS troops in the Middle East

in 370 Mvmt of Trs USAFIME folder, Plng Div ASF.

(10) For the long, involved history of the can and

drum plants, see Can and Drum Plants Middle East

folder, Plng Div ASF. 42

 Ltr, Gen Macready to Gen Somervell, 11 Sep 42,

Br folder, Hq ASF. 43

 Except where otherwise indicated, this section is

based on a manuscript by Marcel Vigneras, The Rearmament of the French Forces in World War II, Introduction and Chs. I-IV, OCMH.
512 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

bat troops and used them as an integral

part of their own armies, while the Americans furnished supplies for miscellaneous

defense forces on New Caledonia. The

American attitude toward de Gaulle was

continuously lukewarm, and proposals received from Free French representatives

in early 1942 for future large-scale French

rearmament under direct American auspices received scant consideration.

The invasion of North Africa in November again brought into the Allied orbit an

organized French Army of considerable

size. On 13 November the President declared "any French province, colony, protectorate, or mandated territory not under

the control of the Axis" eligible for lendlease, thus clearing the legal path for direct

American aid.44 Before the invasion, in

secret conferences with sympathetic

French leaders in North Africa, Lt. Gen.

Mark W. Clark received from French

General de Brigade Charles Mast a plan

for arming eight infantry and two armored

divisions, the force Mast said the French

could put into the field within a few

weeks after the North African landings.

The American staff immediately showed

an appreciation of the advantages to be

gained by rearming such a force. Even if

there was a shortage of equipment for

training, the greater and more compelling

shortage was that of shipping to transport

trained troops overseas. In the long run,

employment of French troops armed with

American equipment in North Africa or

Europe would be more economical of shipping than dispatch of both troops and

equipment from this country. The Americans thought the British should share the

burden by furnishing small arms, the

category in which training shortages were

most acute, and by accepting proportionate sacrifices in their own allocations under

the Weeks-Somervell Agreement. The

British, in view of their own strained supply position, objected, suggesting that the

French should be rearmed with captured

or obsolescent equipment. They argued

that taking rifles from their Home Guard

(the Enfields sold to them by the United

States after Dunkerque) would endanger

the security of the British Isles. They insisted that, if the Americans wanted to

undertake the program, it should be without interfering with their allocations from

American production or with logistical

support of agreed combined operations.

Undoubtedly there were also political factors in the background. The British did

not wish to see American support for a

rival political faction to the de Gaulle

group, which they themselves were supporting, nor a shift in responsibility for

arming the French from London to Washington.

An early clash within the CCS over the

issue was soon settled by reference to General Eisenhower, who urged a cautious

approach in view of the exigencies of the

shipping situation and his doubts about

the battleworthiness of French troops. The

CCS then agreed that the issue should be

postponed, and any assignments and shipments should be governed by Eisenhower's

wishes. Thus granted a large measure of

control over supplies for the French, the

Commander in Chief, Allied Force, in

North Africa was soon confronted with a

dilemma. He found that he needed French

co-operation badly. French troops, armed

with obsolescent weapons, soon formed a

44

 (1) Ltr, President to Stettinius, 13 Nov 42, ID 008

Lend-lease, II. (2) CCS 50/2, 24 Mar 42, title: Dir for

Asgmt of Mun.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ORBIT 513

vital part of his battle line and quickly dispelled any doubts about their battleworthiness. There was a considerable body of

French merchant shipping in northern

and western African ports, the major portion of which the French agreed, with

some misgivings, to place in the Allied

shipping pool. They naturally expected

some compensation for their support, and

their early co-operation was at least tacitly

premised on the expectation of receiving

from the United States modern equipment

for their North African army and essential

supplies for the civilian economy. However much he might wish to meet these

expectations, Eisenhower was faced with

the limitations on the size of North African

convoys and port and overland transport

capacity, which left the logistical build-up

of his own British-American forces in a

tenuous state. The use of the French merchant shipping made available provided

no ready solution, for most of the ships

were in need of extensive repairs and

would not be available for voyages until

some months later; even if available, the

limitation on the size of convoys would

effectively preclude their use.45

In these circumstances, Eisenhower's

policy was opportunistic. He accepted responsibility for providing the minimum

essential supplies for the civilian economy

and the principle that the French North

African army should be rehabilitated.

Meanwhile, he sought to maintain French

troops in the line with issues from BritishAmerican theater stocks, and asked for

token shipments for rearmament. In midDecember 1942 he established a Joint

Rearmament Committee as a part of the

staff of Allied Force Headquarters, composed of four French and four American

officers, to receive and review French requests for military equipment and to develop a long-range program for rehabilitation of French armed forces. In late December, at Eisenhower's recommendation,

three ships were added to each UGS convoy to meet his limited commitments for

rearmament and civilian supply. Yet by

necessity, he had to place rearmament

materials in fourth priority for shipment,

below materials for the British-American

build-up, essential civilian supplies, and

supplies for French forces in the field.

Rearmament materials, he reasoned,

could not be brought to bear on the enemy

in the immediate future since French

troops to be rearmed would require a

period of orientation and training in their

use. In short, Eisenhower considered rearming the French to be a long-range

problem related to future campaigns in

the Mediterranean or Europe and not to

the immediate fighting in North Africa.

In his cables to Washington in December

and January he continually insisted that

he could not, in the immediate future,

spare any additional shipping space for

the purpose; when his build-up was sufficiently advanced, he said, it would be for

the CCS to say whether they could, in the

light of the world shipping situation, "cope

with this new commitment."

 46

Of necessity, War Department policy

followed generally along the same line. In

late December 1942 Général de Division

Marie Emile Béthouart arrived in Washington as head of a military mission dispatched by Général Henri Giraud, new

commander in chief of the French North

45

 For material on French North African shipping,

see French Shipg folder, WSA Douglas File. 46

 Msg 3664, Eisenhower to Marshall, 31 Dec 42,

Jt Rearmament Com Cable File, OCMH.
514 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

African forces. Béthouart presented a

broad program of requirements divided

into three priorities. In first priority he

placed materials to meet emergency requirements of the French North African

army and North Africa's economy and

certain materials for the French Air Force;

in second, modern equipment for eight infantry and three armored divisions; in

third, materials for a services of supply.

After reviewing the Béthouart program,

the War Department decided the emergency requirements presented, except for

air force materials, should be accepted as a

charge against American production, but

that Eisenhower must continue to control

the rate of assignment and shipment. OPD

thought that the eleven-division program

might well be accepted as a long-range

goal, subject to adjustments in the composition of proposed forces, but no one in

the War Department was willing to make

any rigid commitments in the light of uncertainties as to the availability of shipping and matériel.

A commitment was made, nevertheless,

of debatable rigidity, at the Casablanca

Conference. Giraud, in conversations with

the American political and military leaders, again presented the eleven-division

program and added a request for a 1,000-

plane air force. Marshall and Somervell

gave him assurances that the United

States would proceed to equip French

troops with the greatest possible speed but,

at least in their own minds, made no

specific commitments as to the timing or

eventual scope of the program. Giraud

interpreted the assurances as considerably

more. After later conversations with the

President, he drew up a memorandum

embracing his understanding of the agreements reached. First he stated generally:

". . . it has been agreed between the

President and General Giraud that the

French Forces are to receive under priority the armament which is absolutely necessary for them to have, and that -this

material shall be made up of the most

modern kind." To this statement the President wrote "Oui" in the margin. Second

Giraud stated that in the "ulterior conversations with General Marshall and General Somervell," the total amount of this

equipment was specified as sufficient for

three armored and eight motorized divisions, and an air force of one thousand

planes. Delivery of all this material would

be accomplished by summer, enough for

three motorized divisions plus armored

supporting units and such aviation material as could be delivered by air "in the

course of the next few weeks." Shipping

would be provided for this purpose and

for transport of 65,000 tons of civilian supplies monthly in return for transfer of

165,000 tons of French merchant shipping

to the Allied pool. To these specific commitments the President noted "Oui en

principe."

 47

General Giraud left the conference jubilant, assuming that the President's "Oui

en principe" meant complete acceptance

of his views. Undoubtedly the phrase in

French meant a great deal more than its

literal English translation "Yes in principle," since nobody on the American side

interpreted it as an absolute commitment

47

 (1) There is no official record of the conversations. The above is based largely on memo, Marshall

for McCloy, 4 Feb 43, in ID 475 Equip of Trs France,

I. The English text of Giraud's memo and the President's marginal notes are included in Tabs A and B.

(2) On the President's use of French, see Vigneras,

The Rearmament of the French Forces in World War

II, OCMH.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ORBIT 515

to make materials available on any time

schedule. Action immediately following

Casablanca, both in North Africa and in

Washington, was only aimed at a limited

acceleration of the movement of rearmament supplies. On 26 January Eisenhower ruled that 25,000 tons per UGS

convoy should be allocated for French

rearmament, the priorities on this tonnage

to be determined by the Joint Rearmament Committee. At its first meeting in

February, MAC(G) began to assign equipment for two French infantry divisions

and auxiliary troops in accordance with

Eisenhower's requests, but there remained

little prospect, under the tonnage limitation, that much of the equipment Giraud

had assumed he was promised during the

"next few weeks" would actually be delivered for several months.48

The French interpretation of the Casablanca agreement could not be so lightly

dismissed. In Washington Béthouart

pressed for an increase in the shipping allocation from 25,000 to 100,000 tons, insisting that a promise had been made to

ship the equipment for three infantry divisions immediately. In North Africa, Eisenhower found his embarrassment growing

as the pace of American performance fell

so far behind what Giraud publicized as

the American promise at Casablanca.

There were strong hints that the French

might withdraw their co-operation, and

Eisenhower became increasingly concerned. While he still felt that he could

not spare any more shipping from that

regularly allotted him to carry materials

for the three French infantry divisions, he

asked Marshall in mid-February if 100,-

000 tons of additional cargo shipping

might not be provided for the purpose

either from French ships or other sources.

Marshall asked the SOS to explore the

possibilities of getting the ships and at the

same time referred Eisenhower's message

to the President for some definite policy

decision. Roosevelt immediately informed

Eisenhower firmly and finally that neither

he nor General Marshall had promised

equipment for French divisions on any

time schedule. Though this placed Marshall and Eisenhower on firmer ground in

dealing with Giraud, the situation still

seemed to call for some spectacular action

to reassure the French of American sincerity. The Navy agreed to furnish escort for

a special convoy to sail in March, and on

19 February Somervell asked Lewis Douglas of WSA for an allocation of twenty-five

ships. This request came in the midst of a

growing squeeze on Atlantic shipping—

for the Soviet aid program, for the regular

convoys to North Africa, and for the British import program. Douglas characterized it as a "terrifically stiff demand on a

very, very tight situation," and at first insisted that it could only be met by diversions from other services.49

 In the end he

was able to find nineteen ships without

any apparent dislocation elsewhere, and

the special convoy (UGS-61⁄2) was arranged to sail in mid-March with 132,000

tons of supplies for the French.50

48

 (1) Msg 7433, FREEDOM, Algiers, to AGWAR, 26

Jan 43, ID 475 Equip of Trs France, I. (2) Min 1533,

74th mtg MAC(G), 1 Feb 43; Min 1535, 75th mtg, 5

Feb 43; Min 1560, 76th mtg, 9 Feb 43; Min 1590-93,

78th mtg, 16 Feb 43. 49

 Memo, Douglas for Somervell, 19 Mar 43, Shipg

folder, Hq ASF. 50

 (1) Memo, Somervell for Douglas, 19 Mar 43,

Shipg folder, Hq ASF. (2) Douglas' notes on conf with

Somervell, 19 Feb 43, Army Reqmts folder, WSA

Douglas File. (3) Memo, Land and Douglas for President, 23 Feb 43, Allocs Gen folder, WSA Douglas File.

(4) For British import program, see below, Ch. XXVI.
516 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

When the American members of MAC-

(G) presented the large requests for assignment of equipment to the French for

three infantry divisions, the British objected and the issue was once again

brought before the CCS for a policy decision on the ultimate scope of the French

program and the priority to be accorded

it. The Americans asked that materials be

assigned the French up to a limit of eleven

divisions and a 450-plane air force at a

rate to be determined by their ability to

organize units "around a nucleus of

trained officers and non-commissioned

officers," and to the extent that shipping

could be made available for transport of

this material.51 The British countered with

objections that rearming the French would

interfere with operations agreed on at

Casablanca, particularly the build-up in

the British Isles and the proposed reconquest of Burma. They thought French rearmament should simply be placed in a

strategic priority lower than that of British or American operational needs, and

accorded such assignments as this strategic

priority merited. When the American staff

cited the President's agreement at Casablanca, the British said the Prime Minister had not participated in the decision.

In the end the CCS again agreed to disagree on the major questions involved,

though they did confirm the assignments

for the special convoy, and the British accepted the obligation to furnish rifles for

three French divisions. But the British

staff still balked at accepting the principle

that allocations to the French should come

proportionately from their share of American production under the Weeks-Somervell Agreement. In concluding the discussion, they pointed out that the CCS could

hardly pursue the matter any further in

the face of the President's undertaking

with General Giraud, and suggested that

the only recourse was for the Prime Minister to take it up with the President.52

Neither the CCS nor the President actually came to grips with the problem

again until two months later at the TRIDENT Conference in Washington. There

the CCS finally, and with much less friction than before, agreed on a policy. They

stipulated that the "rearming and reequipping of the French Forces in North

Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of equipment will

allow, but as a secondary commitment to

the requirements of the British and U.S.

Forces in the various theaters." At the

suggestion of Churchill, the stipulation

was added, "The use of captured German

equipment for this purpose will be explored."

 53

 Shortly thereafter, on 10 June

1943, MAC(G) decided, with the British

member concurring, that the action of the

CCS "made it clear that arming the

French Forces in North Africa was now

a joint undertaking" and that assignments

should be charged to the common pool,

that is, partly out of the material earmarked for the British in the Army Supply

Program.54

The decision at TRIDENT was not a clear

confirmation of the ANFA agreement.

There was no mention of the eleven-divi51

 CCS 181, 23 Feb 43, title: Equip of French Forces

in N Africa. 52

 (1) Ibid. (2) CCS 181/1, 25 Feb 43, title: Equip of

French Forces in N Africa. (3) CCS 181/2, 26 Feb 43,

same title. (4) CCS 181/3, 2 Mar 43, same title. (5)

CCS 181/5, 11 Mar 43, same title. (6) Min, 73d mtg

CCS, 26 Feb 43, Item 6; min, 74th mtg, 5 Mar 43,

Item 7; suppl to min, 75th mtg, 12 Mar 43. 53

 (1) CCS 242/6, 25 May 43, title: Final Rpt to

President and Prime Minister (TRIDENT). (2) Min,

87th mtg CCS, 18 May 43, Item 6. (3) Min, 3d mtg at

White House, TRIDENT, 19 May 43, Item 6. 54

 Min 2065, 97th mtg MAC(G), 10 Jun 43.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ORBIT 517

sion program or the 1,000-plane air force

that Giraud had requested. To this extent

it represented a compromise with the British. From a practical standpoint, however, it was a ratification of the manner in

which the Americans were already carrying out the program and marked the end

of British objections to it. As early as

March the War Department and JCS had

tentatively accepted the eleven-division

program and a 450-plane air force as the

ultimate goals for rearming the French in

North Africa, subject to change in the

light of strategic considerations or other

material conditions. The priority accorded

that program at TRIDENT was approximately the one the Americans were already giving it.55

In April both OPD and SOS, accepting

the eleven-division commitment, undertook to calculate the impact it would have

on equipping U.S. forces. Both concluded

that no deferments would be necessary in

troop activations, though it would aggravate shortages for troops in training (by 5

percent, the SOS said, on the assumption

that shipping would be provided for twothirds of the program during 1943). The

main impact would be absorbed by the reserve pool or cushion in the Army Supply

Program for which equipment was being

produced, but no specific units had yet

been designated in the troop basis. These

calculations confirmed what was already

apparent, that the more serious impact of

the French program was in its competition

for shipping, not for material.56

Thus the actual rate of fulfillment of

the program continued to be governed by

the shipping situation. After the special

March convoy, shipments reverted to the

rate of 25,000 tons a convoy established

earlier by General Eisenhower. Despite

protests from Béthouart that this rate

should be increased in the light of the

French contribution to the Allied shipping

pool, Marshall and Somervell refused to

raise the allocation. According to War Department figures in mid-April 1943, cargo

vessels of 163,000 dead-weight tons had

been turned over to the pool by the

French. None of these ships had made an

outward voyage from the United States at

the time, and not all would be available

until July. When they became available,

allowing for the two-month turnaround

involved, there would be a net of 81,500

tons a month. But since 162,000 deadweight tons of shipping had already been

used to transport materials to the French,

Marshall told Béthouart that they already

had a full quid pro quo, though he added

the hopeful note that tonnage might be

increased in the future if the strategic

situation permitted. The 25,000-ton limitation actually meant more in principle

than in practice. In April 55,263 tons were

shipped and in May 38,359. The average

monthly tonnage for the first seven months

of 1943 was 21,745, exclusive of the special

convoy, UGS-61⁄2. After the heavy shipments of March, the rate slowed perceptibly each month through July, reflecting

the absorption of Allied merchant shipping in the build-up and execution of the

Sicilian operation (HUSKY). But the shipments made provided the material for

completing the first phase of French rearmament—the equipping of three infantry divisions and a small air force along

with numerous supporting armored, anti55

 See JCS 206/1, Rpt by JPS, 20 Mar 43, title:

Equip for French Forces in N Africa. 56

 Memo, Gen Clay for OPD, 27 May 43, sub:

Equip for French Forces in N Africa, OPD 400

France, Case 32. (2) Memo, Gen Hull for CofS, 10

Apr 43, sub: French Rearmament Prog, OPD 400

France, Case 35.
518 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

aircraft, artillery, and maintenance

units.57

The system for handling military lendlease to the French, as it evolved during

this period, presented many distinctive

features. The United States was undertaking to completely equip a foreign army

of considerable size with everything from

tanks to shoe laces. The enterprise was to

be carried out under the close supervision

of an American theater organization. The

Army so formed would operate under the

strategic direction of the Anglo-American

high command. Though the ultimate

limits of the program had to be determined by the CCS or at a political level,

its composition within those limits was

largely a matter for decision by the Joint

Rearmament Committee in North Africa.

Requirements were not only screened by

the Joint Rearmament Committee, they

were also formulated by it. In theory, the

French were granted full participation,

but in practice the U.S. executive staff

performed the major portion of the work,

leaving control firmly in American hands.

In no other theater was this American

control over a lend-lease program so extensive or effective.

The system worked generally as follows:

The Joint Rearmament Committee drew

up, as far in advance of shipping schedules

as possible, lists of units to be equipped in

order of priority. These lists were cabled

to Washington, where SOS agencies under

the staff supervision of the International

Division spelled out the detailed items

necessary according to U.S. Army tables

of organization. Bids before MAC(G) for

this equipment were sponsored by the International Division, and assignments

were made to the commanding general of

the Allied forces in North Africa, for delivery to the French, normally at a pace

necessary to insure the maximum utilization of available shipping space and to

maintain a small backlog. The assigned

material was shipped through U.S. Army

channels, consigned to General Eisenhower under the Commanding General

shipment system. Eisenhower retained, at

least theoretically, the power to divert the

material to other uses if he deemed the

situation justified it. He retained also sufficient supervision over the subsequent use

of material when turned over to the

French to insure that it was used for the

purposes envisaged by the Joint Rearmament Committee. Materials for French

troops in combat in North Africa were

requisitioned and handled entirely

through American channels, with confirmation of the assignment by the MAB

after the transfers were reported. All materials turned over to the French were

charged to their lend-lease account in

Washington after Eisenhower reported

the transfer.

There was a distinction between the rearmament program and supply to other

French forces. To enable the whole French

North African army to continue to exist,

and particularly to supply those units in

battle, miscellaneous equipment of various

types was supplied largely from theater

stocks or from captured equipment. The

rearmament equipment was furnished for

57

 (1) Ltr, Béthouart to Marshall, 7 Apr 43, ID 475

Equip of Trs France, II. (2) Ltr, Marshall to Béthouart, 18 Apr 43, OPD 400 France, Case 32. (3) Related

papers in same file. (4) Memo, Col Boykin C. Wright,

Dir ID, for OCT, 26 Apr 43, sub: Limitation on Mil

Tonnage to French Forces in N Africa, ID 400.318

Free French, I. (5) Figures on tonnages shipped taken

from Vigneras, The Rearmament of the French

Forces in World War II, table at end of Ch. IV,

OCMH. (6) French ships placed in the Allied pool

were divided 50-50 between the control of WSA and

the BMWT. See material in French Shipg folder,

WSA Douglas File.
LEND-LEASE MATERIAL FOR THE FRENCH, North Africa.
520 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

specific troops withdrawn from battle, and

the Americans promised at Casablanca

that this equipment would be of the most

modern kind. This was interpreted by the

War Department to mean equipment of

the same type available for issue to U.S.

troops but not necessarily the latest

models. The most significant substitution

was of the Enfield (M1917) rifle for the

Garand automatic (M1) and the carbine

with which U.S. troops were equipped.

This substitution brought bitter complaints from General Béthouart, but the

shortage of rifles for American troops in

training was so great that the War Department refused to change its decision. For

the first three divisions, Enfields were furnished by the British out of stocks sold to

them by the United States in 1940. There

were other substitutions and deletions,

particularly of "luxury" items, but in general, equipment for French units was computed by the supply services in accordance with U.S. tables of organization for

corresponding units.58

Military Supply to Turkey

A competitor, in a sense, with the American program to rearm the French was a

British plan to furnish arms to Turkey, the

most important of the independent countries lying within the British area of strategic responsibility in the Middle East.

Turkey occupied a strategic position

athwart the approaches to the Middle

East and Winston Churchill assigned her

an important place in British plans. As

long as the British were hard pressed in

North Africa, Churchill hoped only to

maintain Turkey as a friendly neutral prepared to defend herself should the Germans attack her. Once the Axis was defeated in North Africa, he envisaged a

more ambitious campaign to secure the

islands of the eastern Mediterranean and

develop air bases in Turkey for raids on

southeastern Europe. He regarded Turkish participation in the war on the side of

the Allies as a necessary prelude to these

later operations. The British Prime Minister proposed to regulate the flow of supplies to Turkey with these purposes in

mind. In the defensive phase, Turkey

would be given just enough supplies to

bolster her defenses and maintain a favorable disposition toward the Allies. When

the British were ready to pass to the offensive, he would vastly extend the scope of

aid to Turkey as a part of a pressure campaign to induce the Turks to enter the war.

In their strategic directive for the assignment of munitions in early 1942 the CCS

generally approved Churchill's program

for Turkey in the defensive phase, stipulating that "limited amounts of munitions

should be allocated to her as a means of

influencing her to oppose Germany."

 59

This limited program of aid to Turkey

soon became tangled in procedural problems. Like so many other features of the

British effort, it was partially dependent

upon the flow of supplies from the United

States. The Turks showed a definite preference for dealing directly with the

United States, rather than receiving

American lend-lease aid through British

channels. The MAB in June 1942 decided

that, in deference to these wishes, assignments should be made directly rather

than as a part of the British bulk allocation. The British made no strenuous ob58

 (1) See ID, Lend-Lease, II, 1181-1225. (2)

Memo, OPD for CG SOS, 15 Mar 43, sub: Equip of

French Forces, OPD 400, Case 6. (3) Lengthy correspondence between Béthouart and Col. Wright on

the rifle question in ID 475, Equip of Trs France, II. 59

 (1) CCS 50/2 cited n. 44(2). (2) Churchill, Hinge

of Fate, pp. 860, 892.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ORBIT 521

jection at this point, and a procedure was

worked out whereby an Anglo-American

Coordinating Committee in Ankara would

screen all Turkish requirements at their

source, the British would decide what portion they should furnish, and the Turks

would bid directly in Washington for the

remainder. No decision was rendered on

the method of shipment and control en

route, however, and this was the subject of

long and inconclusive negotiations during

the latter part of 1942. Just as the British

in Washington appeared ready in December to concede that supplies should be

shipped from the United States to Turkey

consigned to General Maxwell to be

turned over by him or the civilian lendlease authorities in the Middle East, the

British Government in London reverted

to its original position that Turkey should

be entirely a British responsibility.60

The British Government evidently

feared that the Turkish case would become a precedent for general U.S. control

of assignments and shipments to countries

within British areas of responsibility. Also,

by the end of 1942, Churchill felt the time

had come to make a definite bid for Turkish entrance into the war and for planning

the operation to secure the eastern Mediterranean, and he thought the entire matter should rest in British hands since it

would be primarily a British affair.

Churchill and the British staff came to the

Casablanca Conference in January 1943

with a complete plan for arming Turkey

and for using her armies and territory.

They secured the agreement of Roosevelt

and General Marshall that Turkey should

be treated as a British problem. The CCS

ruled:

(a) that Turkey lies within a theater of

British responsibility, and that all matters

connected with Turkey should be handled by

the British in the same way that all matters

connected with China are handled by the

United States . . . . (b) that, in particular, under the general

direction of the C.C.S., the British should be

responsible for framing and presenting to

both Assignments Boards all bids for equip- ment for Turkey. Onward despatch to Turkey from the Middle East of such equipment

will be a function of command of the British

Commanders in Chief in the Middle East. . . .

61

After Casablanca Churchill met at

Adana with Turkish President Ismet

Inönü with a view to preparing the way

for Turkish entry into the war in the autumn of 1943. He promised extensive supplies and the development of Turkish airfields. While the results of the conferences

were inconclusive, Churchill left with high

hopes that the Turks might be persuaded.

The British staff, in co-operation with

Turkish officials, prepared during the following months an estimate of material to

be furnished. The decisions at Casablanca,

however, included no indication of the

priority Turkish requirements would be

given, and British bids for Turkey were

often treated in Washington on a level

with those for Latin America. At the TRIDENT Conference in Washington in May

1943, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke presented the detailed Turkish requirements

and asked for a higher priority for them.

On studying the plan, General Somervell

reported that out of 700,000 ship tons proposed for 1943 and 1944, about 260,000

60

 (1) Min 13, 2d mtg MAC(G), 18 Feb 42; Min

498, 35th mtg, 22 Jun 42; Min 535, 36th mtg, 2 Jul

42. (2) MBW 13/1, 1 Jul 42, title: Proced for Direct

Lend-lease Relations Between the U.S. and Turkey,

approved by MAB in Min 6, 25th mtg, 22 Jul 42. (3)

See voluminous material in ID 008 Lend-lease, I-III;

and AG 400.3295 (9-1-42). 61

 (1) Min, 63d mtg CCS, 20 Jan 43, Item 2. (2)

CCS 157, memo by Br JPS, 18 Jan 43, title: Allied

Plans Relating to Turkey.
522 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

must come from the United States with an

inevitably serious impact on French rearmament, on training of U.S. troops, and

on shipping materials for the build-up in

the British Isles. The CCS finally decided

that "with due regard to other important

commitments" assignments of equipment

to Turkey as agreed by them "should be

made with the least practicable delay."

 62

But General Marshall clearly stipulated

that training American troops and French

rearmament were "important commitments."

 63

This priority in itself thus gave no assurance of accomplishment of the British

program for the Turks. And the whole

plan was soon jettisoned because of other

developments. The American strategic

planners were lukewarm toward Churchill's plans for operations in the eastern

Mediterranean and refused to divert materials from the west for that purpose. The

failure of the British effort to seize the

Dodecanese soon diminished the chances

of enlisting Turkey's aid in the war. At the

same time, American observers reported

the Turks completely unable to make effective use of the material being furnished

them. The capacity of Turkish ports also

proved too limited to absorb the flow of

equipment sent, and in August the British

themselves requested a cutback in assignments. As it became apparent that Turkey

would probably remain a neutral, the

British plan receded into the background.64

Control of Lend-Lease by Theater Commanders

Within each of the areas treated in this

chapter, the War Department sought to

place in the hands of the American military commander a measure of control

over the flow of lend-lease. The final decisions as to allocations had necessarily to

rest with the central machinery in Washington, but the War Department wished

its theater commanders to establish the

need for lend-lease, military and civilian,

in their areas in much the same manner

that they established the need for military

supplies for forces under their command,

and in some cases to handle the distribution. The elements of this control, if fully

exercised, would include initial screening

of all lend-lease requirements, dictation of

shipping priorities, and supervision of distribution once the material arrived in the

theater. This is easily recognizable as the

pattern applied in General MacArthur's

command in Australia, and somewhat less

completely in the South Pacific Area. The

War Department accepted the Australian

pattern as a model and sought to apply as

much of it as possible in other theaters,

though it recognized that the system was

not readily adaptable to areas where the

control of the American theater commander was not so complete. The LendLease Administration, with primary responsibility for civilian lend-lease supply,

sent its own representatives abroad, but at

first was usually willing to agree that they

should either be part of the military

commander's staff or else work in close

collaboration with it.65

62

 CCS 242/6 cited n. 53(1). 63

 (1) Min, 91st mtg CCS, 20 May 43, Item 3. (2)

Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 703-16. (3) CCS 206,

memo by Br CsofS, 30 Apr 43, title: Mil Sups for Turkey. (4) Memo, Somervell for Hopkins, 12 May 43,

Hopkins folder, Hq ASF. 64

 (1) Min 6, 68th mtg MAB, 26 May 43. (2)

Memo, Somervell for Hopkins, 28 Jul 43, Hopkins

folder, Hq ASF. (3) Min 2253, 106th mtg MAC(G),

12 Aug 43; Min 2260, 107th mtg, 23 Aug 43. (4) Min,

113th mtg CCS, 20 Aug 43, Item 8. 65

 (1) Ltr, Stettinius to McCloy, 10 Jul 42. (2)

Memo, Patterson for OLLA, 18 Jul 42. (3) Memo,

Stettinius for McCloy, 2 Sep 42, sub: Relations of

Lend-lease Mis's Abroad to U.S. Army. All in ID 008

Lend-lease, I. (4) Cf. memo, Somervell for Lutes, 20

Jul 42, Opns SOS folder, Hq ASF, in which Somervell expressed his more extreme views that the lendlease representatives should be removed entirely.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ORBIT 523

Because procedures for lend-lease to the

United Kingdom had been long established and because Averell Harriman, the

lend-lease representative in England, was

in effect a personal representative of the

President and Hopkins, very little could

ever be done to apply the Australian pattern there. At the instigation of Somervell

a Lend-Lease Board of Review was set up

in late 1942 composed of representatives

of the SOS ETOUSA, the U.S. executive

staff of LMAB, and the Harriman mission

to screen British requirements in certain

fields, but it seems to have accomplished

very little. The determination of the lendlease needs of Britain itself, civilian and

military, continued to be made by the

combined boards or by negotiations between high officials of the two governments.66

It was rather in the outlying areas that

the definite attempt was made to establish

the Australian pattern, but the British

considered it their prerogative to control

the flow of supplies to their own areas of

responsibility and attempted to prevent

the establishment of separate American

channels. As early as March 1942, the

U.S. members of MAC(G) proposed that

shipments of lend-lease to all areas other

than the United Kingdom and the USSR

be consigned to theater commanders for

distribution, but the British would never

agree to this practice in India or the Middle East.67

 A War Department proposal in

August 1942 that General Maxwell screen

civilian lend-lease requirements in the

Middle East never came to fruition largely

because the British insisted that screening

should be accomplished through the established channels of the Middle East

Supply Center, an organization they had

set up in 1941 to regulate imports to all

nations east of Malta. Both Maxwell and

Frederick Winant, the lend-lease representative in the Middle East, had membership on this body, and there was a certain logic in the British position, but the

result was that the screening procedure established did not follow the Australian

pattern of military control. Distribution of

lend-lease to independent countries in the

Middle East remained in British hands.

No serious attempt was made during 1942

to screen British military requirements in

the Middle East.68

An attempt was also made in August

1942 to have General Wheeler, commander of the American SOS in India,

exercise control over lend-lease supply to

India, but it met with a similar fate.

Wheeler commented on British lend-lease

requirements for India on request, but no

definite system of screening was established. Wheeler was never even given representation on the Indian Lend-Lease Requirements Committee. On the civilian

side, in early 1943 OLLA dispatched to

India a mission, headed by Frederick W.

Ecker, to screen Indian civilian requirements, study the resources of India, and

66

 (1) See above, Chs. X-XI. (2) Ltr, Gen Somervell to Gen Lee, 5 Oct 42, sub: Screening of Lendlease Reqmts in U.K. (3) Ltr, Lee to Somervell, 16

Dec 42. (4) Ltr, Styer to Lee, 20 Jan 43. Last three

in AG 400.3295 (9-1-42) (3) Sec 5. 67

 Min 112, 11th mtg MAC(G), 19 Mar 42; Min

614, 40th mtg, 23 Jul 42. 68

 (1) Msg, AGWAR to AMSME, 18 Aug 42, CMOUT 5535; paraphrase of Maxwell's reply, 24 Aug

42, is in AG 400.3295 (9-1-42) (3) Sec 1. (2) Memo,

Frederick Winant for Dean Acheson, 17 Apr 42, sub:

Civilian Sup Reqmts of Near East Countries and

Middle East Sup Center, Middle East Corresp Lendlease 1 file, DAD. (3) Ltr, Somervell to Stettinius, 31

Aug 42, ID 008 Lend-lease, I. (4) Msg, AGWAR to

AMSME, 3 Sep 42, CM-OUT 1099. (5) Msg,

AGWAR to AMSME, 5 Sep 42, CM-OUT 1948.

(6) Msg, AGWAR to AMSME, 10 Oct 42,

CM-OUT 13336. (7) Msg, AGWAR to AMSME,

29 Nov 42, CM-OUT 9304. (8) Msg, AMSME to

AGWAR, 25 Sep 42, CM-IN 10768. (9) Msg,

AMSME to AGWAR, 22 Oct 42, CM-IN 91316.

(10) Msg, AMSME to AGWAR, 18 Nov 42, CM-IN

7876.
524 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

assist in the development of reverse lendlease procedures. An effort was made to

place Ecker on Wheeler's staff following

the Australian pattern, but this did not

succeed either. In mid-1943 the SOS was

still pressing for a much closer supervision

over military and civilian lend-lease requirements for India.69

In North Africa and in China,70 where

the British had little reason to object, the

Americans were able to institute effective

control by their theater commanders over

lend-lease shipments. As indicated earlier,

Eisenhower's control over military supply

to the French was virtually complete.

Civilian supply in North Africa was a

somewhat different problem from that in

Australia inasmuch as it was a matter of

relief and rehabilitation of an area liberated from German control. Though General Somervell urged application of the

Australian pattern of military control

there, the President chose to place the

planning of civilian supply for liberated

areas in the hands of the State Department and of other civilian organizations.

In the theater the North African Economic Board, representing most interested

American and British civilian and military organizations, was charged with

screening civilian requirements and making recommendations to Washington and

London on a program of civilian supply.

Yet the board operated in effect as a part

of Eisenhower's headquarters and the supreme commander controlled the amount

of shipping space that could be allocated

to civilian supply. Furthermore, the experience in North Africa with divided responsibilities brought a demand for closer

military control of the whole matter, and

this was the pattern that emerged in the

campaigns in Italy and Sicily.71

Thus, as American industrial production rapidly overshadowed British and

American military forces spread out over

the world, American military leaders

came increasingly to assert their control

over lend-lease supply lines and to use

them as instruments to advance American

plans and interests. In Australia and New

Zealand, dominions of the British Commonwealth, American commanders exercised almost complete control. After the

North African invasion, the French ceased

to be proteges of London and became proteges of Washington. In the Middle East

and India the British maintained their

control over the distribution of American

supplies, but the disposition of the Americans to challenge that control was evident

by early 1943 despite the concession made

regarding Turkey at Casablanca. An attack on the whole British conception of

protege nations and on the powers of reallocation exercised by the London board

was soon to follow.

69

 (1) Control Division, ASF, Army Service Forces

Activities in the Supply of China, Burma, and India,

1942-1943, MS (hereafter cited as ASF in China,

Burma, and India), p. 233, OCMH. (2) ID Rpt 10,

Lend-lease Information, 31 Oct 43, sec on India. (3)

Memo, Franks for Clay, 7 Jan 43, sub: Lend-lease

Mis to India, ID 008 Lend-lease, I. (4) Related papers

in same file and in ID 008 Lend-lease, III. 70

 On China, see below, Ch. XIX. 71

 (1) See International Division, ASF, Civilian Supply: A History of the Civilian Supply Branch, International Division, ASF, MS, pp. 1-38, OCMH. (2)

Memo, Somervell for CofS, 11 Nov 42, sub: Civilian

Sup in N Africa, CofS file, Hq ASF.

Treatment of the logistical problems raised by

civilian supply in North Africa, Europe, and other

areas is reserved for the second volume on global logistics and strategy.
CHAPTER XIX

China, Burma, and India

As far as American plans for the war

against Japan had taken shape in early

1942, China occupied an important place

in them. The containment of Japanese divisions in China was viewed as of vital importance during the defensive phase of the

Pacific war, and it seemed likely that in

any ultimate offensive to achieve the final

victory over Japan, the Japanese Army

would have to be defeated on the Asiatic

mainland rather than in the Pacific islands.

China also seemed to offer the best possibilities for development of air bases from

which massive air attacks against the Japanese homeland could be mounted. Yet

most U.S. military and political leaders

felt that, at least during the period of concentration on the Atlantic front, the American contribution to the war in Asia should

be limited to an air effort and supply support of the Chinese and Anglo-Indian

armies. The vast pool of Chinese, Indian,

and British manpower, they felt, should be

able to carry the burden of the ground war

if furnished American supplies; they

thought it unreasonable to divert sizable

American forces from other theaters, or to

commit the large amounts of shipping that

would be needed to move them to so distant an area. Supply to China was the

principal American problem in this area,

since American support for the British in

India was handled through normal British

lend-lease channels as in the Middle East.

Arming the Nationalist Army of Chiang

Kai-shek seemed the cheapest and most

logical method not only of driving the Japanese from the Asiatic mainland but also

of assuring a measure of stability there in

the postwar period.

India and Burma fell within the British

area of strategic responsibility and both

were placed, after the dissolution of

Wavell's ABDA Command, under General Headquarters, India. China, on the

other hand, occupied a unique place in the

Anglo-American command structure. An

Allied "China Theater" was created at

ARCADIA, simultaneously with Wavell's

ABDA Command, and Chiang Kai-shek

was named its supreme Allied commander.

Chiang was head of a national state and

as such did not fit into the chain of command as did other commanders of theaters

in the Anglo-American structure. It was

much as if the British and Americans had

created a Russian Theater and named

Marshal Stalin its supreme Allied commander. Chiang could not be held responsible to the CCS, nor expected to concur

in a strategy that placed the defeat of

Germany foremost.

"China Theater" was really a device by

which the President sought to accord

Chiang a position due the head of a major

Allied state, and still limit his participation in decisions on Allied strategy to those

matters involving the war in the Far East.

Despite this recognition, China, unlike the

USSR, could never make her weight felt
526 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

because of her own weakness. Chiang's illorganized, ill-equipped, and weary armies

were in no position to wage effective war

against the Japanese without extensive

outside support. The scope and nature of

this support had to be fitted into the

Anglo-American plan for global distribution of resources and hence had to be determined by the CCS and MAB. Chiang's

effort to secure a place in this machinery

failed, and he had to rely on such pressure

as he could exert through direct appeals

to the President. Within the combined

machinery, the British readily conceded

strategic and supply responsibility for

China to the United States.

Consequently, the real American influence in the determination of military

policy in the China Theater derived from

control of the all-important supply line.

The link between Chinese forces and the

CCS lay in the arrangement for exercise of

American military responsibility. For

some two months after Pearl Harbor, the

head of the lend-lease mission, General

Magruder, remained the senior American

commander in the Orient. To provide for

fuller Sino-American collaboration, a new

mission was dispatched to China in February 1942 headed by General Stilwell.

By agreement between Secretary of War

Stimson and Dr. T. V. Soong, Chiang's

brother-in-law and Chinese Foreign Minister, Stilwell was to be commander of all

U.S. troops in China, Burma, and India,

representative of the United States on all

international military councils there, and

to "supervise and control" all lend-lease

affairs relating to China. He was also to be

Allied chief of staff to the Supreme Commander, China Theater, Chiang Kaishek, and to command all Chinese troops

Chiang might entrust to him. By agreement with the British, he was charged

with maintaining liaison with the commanders in Burma and India and was

granted the right to operate a supply line

to China through these countries. The

War Department directive to Stilwell

specifically assigned him the mission of increasing the effectiveness of American aid

to China and assisting in improving the

combat effectiveness of the Chinese

Army.1 Around Stilwell's mission the

major questions of American policy in

China, Burma, and India (CBI) were to

revolve for over two and a half years.

However, simultaneously with Stilwell's

appointment, Claire Chennault, head of

the American Volunteer Group in China

and air adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, was

made an American colonel (in April a

brigadier general) and by July his "Flying

Tigers" had been transformed into a small

American air task force in China. As the

principal exponent of the use of American

air power in China rather than a laborious

effort to spur the Chinese Army to lift itself by its bootstraps, Chennault was also

to exercise a powerful influence on both

strategy and logistics in CBI.

The Failure of the Prewar

Chinese Lend-Lease Program

The objectives of the prewar lend-lease

program for China, it will be recalled, included improvement of the Burma Road,

construction of a Yunnan-Burma railroad,

creation of a Chinese air force, equipping

of a ground army of thirty divisions (on a

scale considered adequate for war in

China), and development of the capacity

of the Chinese arsenals. Though only

about 70,000 tons of Chinese lend-lease

actually left the United States for Ran1

 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to

China, pp. 70-80.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 527

goon in 1941, the prewar production program and assignments schedules for the

Chinese promised to make some 50,000

tons of supplies available monthly in early

1942. American entrance into the war in

itself necessitated no change in the program, and it continued as a blueprint for

aid to China until the Japanese conquest of

Burma rendered its fulfillment impossible.2

The Chinese regarded the 1941 program as a definite commitment on the

part of the U.S. Government, though they

had never received any assurance to this

effect, and though the whole new theory

of munitions assignment belied it. Competent observers with the Magruder mission

had already come to regard the program

as unrealistic, even before the Japanese

conquest of Burma. Transportation experts pointed to the growing stockpiles of

Chinese material at Rangoon and Lashio,

stockpiles greater than the Burma Road

could carry in six months of peak operation, if judged by previous performance.

They also found the selection of items for

shipment bad. For example, mountains of

blankets lay at Rangoon being slowly consumed by white ants while blankets continued to arrive under lend-lease. General

Magruder's cables to Washington on priorities clearly reflected the necessity for a

program of shipments carefully controlled

by the U.S. mission and not by the Chinese

in the United States. In a classic message

on 13 February 1942, he warned the War

Department that the extent of the Chinese

war effort was being highly exaggerated

by Sinophile propaganda in the United

States, and expressed doubts that the Chinese would ever put American supplies to

effective use if left to their own devices.3

Meantime, the munitions in the cargoes

dispatched just before Pearl Harbor became a bone of contention between the

British and Chinese. The British impounded some of this material on arrival

in Rangoon, and Chiang interpreted this

as a seizure. In high dudgeon, he threatened to withdraw all co-operation with

the British and to return American lendlease to its owners. While the matter was

satisfactorily adjusted by assurances to

Chiang that the War Department would

not permit retransfer of Chinese lend-lease

to the British without his approval, the

crisis had lasting effects. The Chinese were

ever after suspicious of British designs on

their supplies. To both Magruder and the

War Department, on the other hand, the

episode proved the need for American

control over lend-lease material after its

arrival in the theater.4

The fall of Rangoon in late February

1942 shut off the supply line through Burma to China and made necessary the development of a new and far more difficult

line from Indian ports of entry. There was

a convenient hiatus in shipments from the

United States from 8 December until midJanuary, which made the transition easier.

The three ships that departed in January

carrying Chinese supplies were diverted

to ports on the west coast of India. Some

of the supplies at Rangoon were also

2

 (1) See above, Ch. III. (2) Memo, Lt W. S. Brewster for Lt Col L. C. Strong, 20 May 42, AMMISCA

319.1, ID. (3) Note, prepared by WPD for Lt Gen

Hugh A. Drum, unsigned, Jan 42, Tab B, in App.,

Stilwell Washington Plng File, to History of China,

Burma, India Theater, MS, OPD 314.7 China Theater of Opns. (4) Memo for rcd, unsigned, May 42,

ASW 400.336 China. 3

 (1) See Rpt 3, Maj John E. Russell to Gen Magruder, 12 Nov 41, sub: Lend-lease Sup and Trans

in Burma, Port of Rangoon folder, CBI Theater Reds,

KCRC. (2) Most of Magruder's messages are conveniently collected in AMMISCA IN Cables file, ID. (3)

Msg 256, AMMISCA to AGWAR, 13 Feb 42, AG

400.3295 (4-14-41) Sec 1A. 4

 For a full description of the so-called Tulsa crisis,

see Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to

China, pp. 57-60.
528 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

evacuated to India. The British had already agreed that General Stilwell might

operate a supply line to China through

India, and Chiang Kai-shek negotiated

an agreement with the Indian Government permitting the use of port, rail, and

storage facilities for Chinese supplies. At

first an ambitious scheme was considered

whereby Bombay would serve as a distributing center for lend-lease for the

whole Middle and Far East with materials

remaining under U.S. control after their

arrival, but the idea was eventually abandoned as impractical, and Karachi, with

more limited facilities was chosen as the

principal American base. It was not until

early 1943 that the situation in the Bay of

Bengal permitted a gradual shift to Calcutta, on the eastern coast of India, much

closer to China. General Wheeler was already active in Karachi planning projects

connected with the Iranian mission, and

in February 1942 he was transferred to

General Stilwell's new command as head

of his Services of Supply. This SOS was to

have the dual function of supporting the

few U.S. troops in India, largely Army Air

Forces, and operating the line of supply

through India for China.5

The new supply line envisaged for

China was formidable to contemplate. It

would run from Karachi, already twelve

thousand miles by sea from the United

States, across the breadth of India to

upper Assam on the border of Burma, and

thence through or over the north Burma

jungle to road and river routes that connected with the Burma Road. In the immediate future only an airlift would be

possible, to run from Dinjan, near Sadiya,

to Myitkyina in north Burma. It was

planned that roads would follow, one to

run from Imphal to Mandalay, and another from Ledo, near Sadiya, to Myitkyina. Optimists claimed that the Imphal

Road could be in operation by the summer of 1942 and the Ledo Road by that

November if construction were rushed as

a matter of first priority. But even these

thin hopes for a supply line via Myitkyina

and Mandalay were soon dashed by the

crushing defeat of the British and Chinese

forces in north Burma. By mid-May, the

only remaining access to China was a

much longer and more difficult airlift

from Dinjan in Assam all the way to Kunming. To avoid the airfield at Myitkyina,

now under Japanese control, this airlift

had to swing northward over a spur in the

Himalayas whose lowest point was fourteen thousand feet, the famous Hump. No

road, it proved, could possibly be built

over the high and rugged Himalayas to

supplement it. (Map 6)

While the shorter airlift still seemed

possible, arrangements had been made to

divert twenty-five commercial transports

from airlines in the United States and ten

from Pan-American's trans-African line

to India, and tentative plans were laid for

placing a hundred planes on the airlift by

the end of the year, seventy-five to be operated as U.S. Army transports and

twenty-five by China National Aviation

Corporation. But performance did not

5

 (1) Msg 223, Chungking to AGWAR, 27 Jan 42.

(2) Msg 233, Chungking to AGWAR, 31 Jan 42. (3)

Msg 299, Chungking to AGWAR, 19 Feb 42. (4) Msg

315, Chungking to AGWAR, 27 Feb 42. (5) Msg 333,

Chungking to AGWAR, 6 Mar 42. (6) Msg 309,

Chungking to AGWAR, 25 Feb 42. (7) Msg 164,

AGWAR to AMMISCA, 30 Jan 42. All in AG 400.-

3295 (4-14-41) Sec 1A. (8) Min of conf in Gen Aurand's off, 1 Feb 42, Item 142, Col Boone's file, DAD;

min, 3 Feb 42, Item 150, Col Boone's file, DAD. (9)

Memo, Coe for Gross, 4 Feb 42, sub: Proposal to Estab a Depot in the Middle East for Def Aid and Other

Mun, Item 151, Col Boone's file, DAD. (10) Msg 391,

AGWAR to AMMISCA, 3 Apr 42, AG 400.3295

(4-3-42). (11) Msg 239, AGWAR to AMMISCA, 4

Mar 42, Stilwell Personal Cable File, DRB AGO.

530 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

measure up to plans. Transport planes

were one of the most critical shortages of

1942. The British had already been promised a sizable number, the Soviet Union

was clamoring for an allocation, and the

U.S. Army was hard pressed to meet its

requirements for other theaters. Even the

dispatch of the commercial transports was

delayed, none arriving in Karachi until

5 April 1942. The need for air transport

across India itself made it impossible to

place many of the arriving Army transports on the Hump air line. By July there

were still only nine in operation there, and

twelve China National Aviation Corporation planes. In addition to the shortage of

transports, there were other difficulties.

Air supply was a relatively new thing in

the logistics of war, and it would take time

and experience to develop it under the

conditions prevailing in India and China.

Lack of spare parts and inadequate maintenance facilities kept many transports on

the ground. The construction of additional

airfields in Assam, at first a British responsibility, went ahead very slowly because

of lack of vital machinery, the unreliability of local labor, and difficult climatic

conditions. For all practical purposes,

the flow of lend-lease to China stopped

with the fall of Burma and was not resumed for some time to come. The small

capacity that the airlift did develop during

1942, reaching a peak of 1,600 tons in

December, had to be devoted almost entirely to carrying supplies for Chennault's

small American air force in China.6

The readjustment in Washington to

these changed conditions was hesitant and

confused. American officials were reluctant to radically reduce a supply program

already quite small in relation to those for

Britain and the USSR, fearing Chiang

Kai-shek might abandon the fight entirely

if his hopes for supplies were suddenly

dashed. Military and civilian policy

makers alike agreed that, as an irreducible minimum, China must be kept in the

war. Soong made exaggerated claims as

to the capacity of the proposed supply line

through India, continued to press for large

allocations, and opposed repossession of

any of the materials in the United States

earmarked for China. There was an inevitable tendency to accept his views and

to delay curtailment of the Chinese program, despite continued advice from Magruder and Stilwell that shipment of any

sizable quantities of supplies into China

would be impossible for many months,

and that many of Soong's requests were

for equipment the Chinese Army could

not possibly use.7

The Achilles' heel of Soong's effort lay

in his inability to secure shipping to transport to India the supplies made available.

The average monthly allocation of shipping for Chinese lend-lease continued at

around 10,000 tons while supplies earmarked for China normally totaled

around 50,000 tons a month. Soong's

6

 (1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to

China, pp. 118-48, 163-67, 204-07. (2) Msg 437,

AMMISCA to AGWAR, 1 Apr 42, AMMISCA IN

Cables file, Bk. 4, ID. (3) Msg 201, AMMISCA to

AGWAR, 19 Jan 42. (4) Msg 252, AMMISCA to

AGWAR, 5 Feb 42. (5) Ltr, William S. Youngman,

CDS, to Stettinius, 1 Jan 42. Last three in AG 400.-

3295 (4-14-41) Sec 1A. (6) Related papers in same

file. (7) Rpt, 24 Aug 42, sub: Visit to China by Lauchlin Currie, OPD 336 China (8-24-42). (8) Craven and

Cate, AAF IV, pp. 411-15. 7

 (1) See Msg 520, AMMISCA to AGWAR, 15

Apr 42, AMMISCA IN Cables file, Bk. 5, ID. (2)

Msg 629, AMMISCA to AGWAR, 2 May 42, same

file. In this cable, Magruder, while Stilwell was still

absent in the Burma jungles, recommended that

Chiang should be asked to designate certain limited

organizations of ground and air forces that might

practically be equipped for the war against Japan,

and that lend-lease should be extended only for this

purpose, not for the build-up of national stocks.

Magruder thought Chinese supplies accumulating in

the United States over and above those necessary for

these objectives should be repossessed.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 531

earnest entreaties for an increase failed to

move either General Somervell or Admiral Land since the prospects of ultimate

delivery of the material to the Chinese

were so uncertain. A logjam of Chinese

supplies awaiting shipment soon developed. By the end of April there were 1,790

carloads of material at Newport News,

where China Defense Supplies, Inc.,

maintained a special pier, with no shipping

in prospect to move them. A rough calculation of material available at factories,

depots, and ports and on rail cars revealed

a total of 150,000 tons—500,000 if the

bulky materials for the Yunnan-Burma

Railway were included.8

The continuing growth of this log jam

in the United States, with no supplies at

all moving from India to China, finally

forced the Munitions Assignments Board

at the end of May 1942 to begin curtailment of the Chinese program. Soong saw

he must give ground and presented a new

program calling for shipment of 7,500 tons

of supplies monthly, basing this on a generous estimate of the Hump airlift when

the promised hundred transport planes

should be operating on it. He indicated

that the Chinese stockpiles in the United

States could not be released unless this

program were accepted. The Air Forces

was simultaneously estimating that only

1,200 tons a month could possibly be

transported over the Hump, the availability of a hundred transport planes for

many months to come was a doubtful

matter, and other estimates of Hump

capacity varied in direct ratio to the number of persons making them. The MAB

finally decided on a compromise figure of

3,500 tons per month, exclusive of airplane fuel, but directed that this tonnage

be shipped to General Stilwell for transfer to China at the time and place he

should decide. Based on this figure, a Chinese emergency air transport program was

worked out in conferences between China

Defense Supplies, Inc. and MAC(G) for

the six-month period May through October 1942. The assignments were made

firm for May and June, but only tentative

for the following four months. With some

difficulty, Soong was persuaded to release

most of the Chinese stockpile in the

United States for this small compensation,

and the materials were repossessed and

reassigned. Most of the special procurement under way for China was canceled

(except 7.92-mm. ammunition), and the

remainder of the Chinese military lendlease production program merely absorbed into the Army Supply Program.

Thus by the end of June 1942 only a

trickle of 3,500 tons monthly remained

earmarked for China out of the ambitious

program of 1941.9

8

 (1) Ltr, Soong to McCloy, 6 Mar 42, ASW 400.-

336 China. (2) Memo cited n. 2(4). (3) Ltr, Soong to

McCloy, 12 Feb 42. (4) Ltr, McCloy to Soong, 28 Feb

42. Last two in AG 400.3295 (4-14-41) Sec 1A. (5)

Memo, Somervell for CofS, 25 Feb 42, sub: Shipg To

Move CDS Sups, G-4/32192, Sec 2. (6) Memo for

file, Lt Col John E. McCammon, 21 Apr 42,

AMMISCA 337, ID. (7) Memo, Col Baird for Gen

Aurand, 2 May 42, Tab D, Iranian Mis 563.5, ID.

(8) Rpt of MAC(G) subcom, app to min, 29th mtg

MAC(G), 18 May 42. 9

 (1) Min 285, 24th mtg MAC(G); 30 Apr 42; Min

327, 342, and 347, 27th mtg, 11 May 42; Min 371 and

373, 29th mtg, 18 May 42; Min 394, 3 1st mtg, 25

May 42; Min 398, 32d mtg, 1 Jun 42; Min 430, 33d

mtg, 8 Jun 42. (2) Min 6, 15th mtg MAB, 13 May 42.

(3) 1st Ind, MAB to MAC(G), to min, 27th mtg

MAC(G), 11 May 42. (4) Exchange of ltrs, Soong to

McCloy, 19-21 May 42. (5) Memo, McCloy for Hopkins, 4 May 42. Last two in ASW 400.336 China. (6)

Memo, McCloy for CG SOS, 15 May 42, sub: Relation of Chinese Mats Now Frozen in U.S. (7) Memo,

Aurand for Young, 15 May 42, sub: Present Sit With

Respect to China. Last two in China Corresp Lendlease 3 file, DAD. (8) Ltr, Soong to Aurand, 1 Jun 42.

(9) Ltr, Aurand to Soong, 5 Jun 42. Last two in Item

376, Col Boone's file, DAD. (10) Ltr, Aurand to

Soong, 6 Jun 42. (11 ) Ltr, Aurand to Soong, 18 Jun

42. (12) Memo, Maj George H. Olmstead, Secy

MAC(G), for Chm, 3 Jun 42, sub: Status of Chinese

Mun. Last three in ID 400.318 China, I.
532 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Even the 3,500-ton program was threatened in July. There was already in India

a stockpile of Chinese supplies estimated

at 52,000 tons. The airlift carried only 80

tons in May and 106 in June, almost all

for Chennault's air force. Heeding reports

that heavy monsoon rains would reduce

operations even further in July, General

Aurand proposed to MAC(G) that no assignments at all should be made to China

for that month. While possibly a realistic

proposal in the light of logistical difficulties, it ignored Chinese sensibilities and

produced a violent reaction from Soong.

General Marshall recognized that the

3,500-ton program was the minimum

gesture required to placate the Chinese

and, when the case was finally referred by

the MAB to CCS, secured a decision to

continue the program.10

The July crisis marked the last challenge to the 3,500-ton program, though

the airlift was not to reach that figure for

more than a year afterward. Its adoption

marked a definite break in the story of

American lend-lease to China. The dominating circumstance conditioning all

plans from May 1942 onward was the

sheer physical difficulty of getting supplies

to the Chinese armies.

Stilwell's Plans and Policies

for Supply to China

General Stilwell, from the time of his

emergence from the Burma jungle in May

1942 until he left the theater some two and

a half years later, saw in the reconquest of

Burma the only possible means by which

the American policy of support to China

could be carried out. He immediately

asked for a U.S. corps to participate in

such a campaign, but General Marshall

could give but scanty consideration to this

demand in the light of extensive commitments for the build-up in the British Isles,

the Pacific, and the Middle East. American policy envisaged the use of British

and Chinese ground forces on the Asiatic

mainland with American participation

limited to air and supply support. Stilwell

had no choice but to frame his plans in

terms of this policy. In his role as Allied

chief of staff to Chiang, he soon came forward with a plan for retaking Burma in

which British and Chinese forces would

collaborate, with the possible aid of one

U.S. division. While the British would

bear the brunt of the campaign—an amphibious attack against Rangoon and an

advance from Imphal across central

Burma—the Chinese would also play an

important part. Chinese forces operating

from India, designated the X-RAY Force,

would form a junction with another Chinese force operating from Yunnan Province in China, designated the YOKE Force,

to drive the Japanese from northern

Burma. Marshall had suggested that the

stockpile of Chinese lend-lease in India

should be turned over to the British, to be

used by them in an effort to retake Burma,

but Stilwell instead chose to use it to equip

a Chinese army in India. Chinese troops

who had made their way into India from

Burma formed the nucleus of this force

but Stilwell got Chiang to agree to supplement them with other troops to be flown

in on return trips over the Hump. The

British agreed to the establishment of a

Chinese training center at Ramgarh in

Bihar Province, and by the end of 1942

10

 (1) Agenda and Min 4a, 21st mtg MAB, 24 Jun

42; Min 4, 22d mtg, 1 Jul 42; Min 2a, 24th mtg, 15

Jul 42. (2) Min 515, 35th mtg MAC(G), 22 Jun 42;

Min 559, 37th mtg, 9 Jul 42. (3) Ltr, Soong to McCloy, 18 Jun 42, ASW 400.336 China. (4) Min, 31st

mtg CCS, 16 Jul 42, Item 4. (5) Min, 25th mtg JCS,

14 Jul 42, Item 4.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 533

Stilwell had two full Chinese divisions

there.

Any decision on such a major campaign

naturally had to rest with the CCS, but

pending their approval Stilwell went

ahead during the summer and fall of 1942

to shape his plans for Chinese lend-lease

around the concept of Chinese participation in an effort to retake Burma. In these

plans he incorporated one part of Soong's

original blueprint, the thirty-division program, and discarded the rest. American

lend-lease to China would be concentrated entirely on the X-RAY and YOKE

Forces, the two to make up between them

the specified thirty divisions. YOKE Force,

by far the larger, would be created by the

concentration of understrength Chinese

divisions in Yunnan Province and their

consolidation into full strength divisions.

The airlift would be used to the maximum

extent possible to transport YOKE Force

supplies, though the major portion of the

equipment for YOKE would have to come

initially from Chinese sources. Once the

supply line through Burma was restored,

lend-lease could be used to equip a much

larger Chinese force. Even before the first

thirty divisions were fully equipped, Stilwell hoped to start a similar program for

a second thirty, these to be used in the defense of eastern China and eventually for

a drive to open a port on the China coast.

The equipment for sixty Chinese divisions

was not comparable to that for a similar

force of Americans since the Chinese division was smaller and was to receive far less

artillery, motor transport, and mechanized equipment.11

By the Stimson-Soong agreement of

January 1942, Stilwell was given "supervision and control" over lend-lease to

China. Though he met with considerable

opposition from Chiang Kai-shek (Soong

had in fact never informed the Generalissimo of the terms of the agreement), with

the support of the War Department and

the MAB he was able to make this control

reasonably effective by the end of 1942

and to mold the Chinese lend-lease program to his plans. In accepting the 3,500-

ton program, the MAB stipulated that

shipments should be consigned to General

Stilwell and that supplies could be diverted

by him to other uses with the approval of

the board. Since the Chinese in India had

no adequate organization for handling

supplies, in August 1942 they agreed that

General Wheeler's Services of Supply

should take care of the receipt, storage,

and transportation of lend-lease material

through India. By chartering space on

China National Aviation Corporation

planes and by insisting that transports be

sent for Army operation rather than Chinese, Stilwell was also able, for the most

part, to control what moved over the

Hump air lines.12

In Washington, Stilwell's influence also

soon replaced that of CDS in determining

Chinese requirements and assignments.

While MAC(G) worked out the 3,500-ton

program largely on the advice of CDS, its

composition conformed to the requirements for the thirty-division program as

far as they had been spelled out in June

1942. It was primarily an ordnance program with a sprinkling of signal equipment, medical supplies, and motor transport, part to come from U.S. production

11

 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to

China, pp. 135-38, 179-83, 214-21. 12

 (1) Ibid., pp. 211-12. (2) ID, Lend-Lease, II,

1166, 1173. (3) Aide-Memoire, 23 Aug 42, on

Chiang's understanding of agreements made with

Lauchlin Currie, OPD 400.3295 China, I, Case 29.

(4) Msg 1469, Roosevelt to Stilwell for Chiang, 10

Oct 42, Stilwell Personal Cable File, Bk. 1, Item 71,

DRB AGO. (5) Craven and Cate, AAF IV, p. 413.
534 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

CHINESE SOLDIERS AND AN AMERICAN INSTRUCTOR

and part from British or Canadian. When

the six-months emergency transport program expired in October, Stilwell took

steps to bring assignments in line with the

requirements his staff were working out

with the Chinese in the theater. Though

he recognized that materials were not

moving into China, he asked for specific

quantities in the following months that

would complete equipment for the first

thirty divisions, and would provide artillery and other materials for the second

thirty and special needs for the Chinese in

India. Accordingly, MAC(G) set up a new

program of approximately 5,000 tons

monthly for the next three months—November through January. As special requests from Stilwell increased, MAC(G)

soon shifted to a policy of meeting these

requests instead of setting aside any specified monthly tonnage.13

When in late 1942 CDS presented an

elaborate program of Chinese requirements for inclusion in the Army Supply

Program, it was ruled to be "materially

beyond available resources and other requirements" and forwarded to Stilwell for

comment.14 In conferences with Chinese

13

 (1) Tab B to min, 29th mtg MAC(G), 18 May

42. (2) Msg 75, AMMISCA, New Delhi, to

AGWAR, 29 Aug 42, AMMISCA IN Cables file,

Bk. 1, ID. (3) Msg 1260, AMMISCA to AGWAR,

12 Oct 42, AMMISCA IN Cables file, Bk. 6, ID. (4)

Min 1101, 55th mtg MAC(G), 22 Oct 42, and tab to

atchd rpt by Asgmts Subcom. (5) ID Rpt 10, Lendlease Information, 31 Oct 43, Pt. 2, sec on China. 14

 Msg, AGWAR to AMMISCA, 30 Dec 42, CMOUT 9999.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 535

officials in Chungking, Stilwell pared

down these requirements to the essentials

for the two thirty-division programs, and

further secured an agreement that in the

future he should be responsible for presenting Chinese military requirements in

Washington. Though CDS was to continue

to present civilian requirements, Stilwell

was also granted a voice in their determination to the extent his judgment dictated.15

In this manner the two thirty-division

programs became the basis of the remaining small lend-lease program for China,

and the flow of materials came under Stilwell's control subject to decisions on availability by the War Department and the

MAB. At Stilwell's recommendation, assignments of planes to China, except for a

few transports for the China National

Aviation Corporation, were stopped in

June 1942 and not resumed until mid1943. The War Department also tried, in

negotiations with the Office of Lend-Lease

Administration, to stop shipments of arsenal and other materials procured on CDS

requisitions since they only went to increase the stockpile in India. Though the

War Department was never entirely successful in this endeavor, these shipments

were cut to the bone. And as far as military supplies were concerned, the philosophy of the SOS and of MAC(G) was simply to assign and ship what Stilwell requested if equipment were available for

the purpose, in much the same manner

that requests were handled for U.S. troops

overseas.16

Strategic Plans and Logistical Support

May-December 1942

Though the Chinese lend-lease program

might thus be framed in terms of a prospective reconquest of Burma, there were

many barriers in the way of such an operation. None of the three major powers

involved—the United States, Great Britain, and China—was ready to commit itself unreservedly to it. The logistical

problems were formidable. Active campaigning was considered possible only

during the dry season from November

through April; from May through October the monsoons made the Burma jungle

virtually impassable. For all its vast area

and population, India was a poor base. Its

disposable resources were few, its climate

and hygienic conditions bad, and at least

part of its population apathetic or hostile

toward the Allied war effort. The supply

line from either the United States or

United Kingdom was long, running all

the way around the coast of Africa. Support of troops in India promised to exact

higher shipping costs than in any other

Anglo-American theater. While India

possessed fine ports of entry in Bombay,

Karachi, and Calcutta, interior supply

lines were poor and undeveloped. Calcutta, the port nearest the prospective

area of operations, could hardly be used

at all during 1942 because of the vulnerability of its shipping lanes to Japanese attack. Supplies landed at Bombay or

Karachi had to be transported over an inadequate rail net across the vast subcontinent of India. The existing rail net converged on the northwest frontier, the

traditional avenue of foreign invasion.

15

 (1) Rpt, Pt. 2, cited n. 13(5). (2) Msg,

AMMISCA to AGWAR, 16 Jan 43, CM-IN 7220. (3)

Msg, AMMISCA to AGWAR, 31 Jan 43, CM-IN

14594. 16

 (1) Msg 904, AMMISCA to AGWAR, 3 Jul 42,

Stilwell Personal Cable File, Bk. 1, Item 18, DRB

AGO. (2) See voluminous correspondence between

WD and OLLA in ID 400.318 Chinese Stockpile in

India, I. (3) Rpt, Pt. 2, cited n. 13(5).
536 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

THE BENGAL–ASSAM RAILROAD. American troops operating the single-track metergauge line.

Neither the British nor the Indian Government had ever given much attention to

the possibility of military action on the

eastern frontier. The line of communications to the eastern frontier was particularly poor and undeveloped and subject to

frequent interruptions by floods on the

Brahmaputra River. A single-track metergauge railway was the only line running

east and north into Manipur State and

Assam, the jumping off points for an overland invasion of Burma. (See Map 6.)

During 1940 and 1941 India's development as a base had been almost exclusively

in terms of support of the British effort in

the Middle East. The best-trained and

equipped Indian divisions had been committed there. The defeat in Burma in the

spring of 1942 left India practically denuded of properly trained and equipped

defense forces. Though the Indian Army

continued to appear formidable on

paper—generally estimated at one and a

half million men—its real expansion had

only begun with the crisis in early 1942

and Indian troops were neither trained,

equipped, nor deployed to undertake a

major effort against the Japanese on the

eastern frontier. A formidable military

force had to be continuously maintained

along the northwest frontier to keep order

among the turbulent tribes there, and

other troops of the Indian Army had to

be stationed at strategic points to maintain internal security. The British continued during 1942 to use India as a base for
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 537

the Middle East campaign and a reservoir

of reserve forces. In the summer of 1942,

hard pressed to maintain even an effective

defense of India, they considered a major

offensive well beyond their capabilities

since it would mean equipping a striking

force and maintaining it over an extremely

inadequate line of communications.

Under these circumstances, the British

showed little enthusiasm for any aggressive

policy in Burma. Their own traditional

interests inclined them to look toward

liberating Singapore and the Netherlands

Indies rather than toward opening a supply route to China, the operation on

which the Americans placed such emphasis. They made it clear from the beginning

that their war effort in India would be

heavily dependent upon American support and presented in Washington marginal requirements they could not themselves meet for the whole Indian Army

and the Indian civilian economy, requirements well beyond what the Americans

wished to accept. As noted earlier, the

British at one point asked that the United

States assume responsibility for supplying

their "Eastern Group of Theaters" in return for British acceptance of similar responsibility for supplying U.S. troops in

the European theater. But the Americans

shunned this arrangement. To them, India often seemed a huge maw into which

vast quantities of supplies might be poured

with little appreciable result. American

staff opposition to the British theory of

equipment allocations in accordance with

troop deployments was dictated in no

small part by the realization that it would

lead to large commitments for a British

and Indian Army, only a fragment of

which would be engaged in active operations against the Japanese in the foreseeable future. The SOS was also inclined to

look askance at the large civilian requirements for India, though it had no direct

jurisdiction over them. British opposition

to the screening of lend-lease requirements

for India by General Wheeler's headquarters was ever a sore point. There was a

strong feeling among the Americans that

the British wished to use lend-lease to bolster their own position in India rather

than to pursue the war against the Japanese, and American policy called for neutrality in the struggle between the British

Government of India and the Indian Nationalists. Though the policy was never

clearly put in these terms, the American

staff really wanted to use lend-lease in India as Stilwell used it for Chinese forces, to

equip an army and prepare bases for an

assault on Burma; the British felt their responsibilities in India were broader and

would never agree that they could concentrate entirely on this end.

These issues, however, were of less significance during 1942 than the fact that

the shortage of both supplies and shipping

and the higher strategic priorities given by

the CCS to the BOLERO build-up, TORCH,

the Pacific campaigns, and aid to the

USSR prevented any concerted effort to

prepare for a major offensive in India. The

British placed their principal emphasis on

the Middle East and directed the flow of

American lend-lease largely in that direction. The defenses of India were bolstered,

but little was done in the way of preparations to overcome the logistical obstacles

standing in the way of an offensive campaign in Burma.

Similarly, the American planners themselves supported the Burma operation

only on the condition that no considerable

commitment of American resources would
538 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

be required. The competition of theaters

with higher strategic priority severely limited the build-up even of U.S. air and

service forces in India and China, and, as

we have seen, of the Hump airlift, the

highest priority in CBI. After the fall of

the Netherlands Indies, General Brereton

moved north to India with the small remnant of his air force to form, with Chennault's command in China, the U.S.

Tenth Air Force. But reinforcements came

slowly, and with the crisis in the Middle

East in June, Brereton was rushed to

Egypt with most of the Tenth's bombers

and a number of transport planes. In midJuly, Chennault's air task force in China

consisted of only fifty-six P-40's and eight

B-25's. Wheeler's SOS at the same time

contained only slightly more than fifteen

hundred men, and until the very end of

the year its build-up was not conceived in

terms of support of any active ground

campaign, although Stilwell had been

building his plans around the hope of an

offensive in the spring of 1943.17

This neglect of CBI combined with the

natural caution and defensive psychology

of the Chinese to make it very difficult for

Stilwell to persuade Chiang Kai-shek that

he, Chiang, should prepare his own forces

for a Burma campaign. Though Chiang

accepted Stilwell's plan and forwarded it

to the President as his own, he had no intention of undertaking the Chinese part of

the operation without extensive American

and British support. There were powerful

forces in China working for a policy of inertia. Active campaigning by the Japanese

had come to a halt, interrupted only by

occasional raids. The Chinese Army, scattered over a broad front, was composed of

over three hundred paper divisions, but all

were understrength and equipped only

with a miscellaneous assortment of arms

of various national origins. Lacking modern transport, it had little mobility and no

central system of supply. The war lord

commanders of armies and divisions had

a vested interest in their organizations

from which they derived both prestige and

profit. Many were for all practical purposes independent of the control of the

Nationalist Government, and they preferred to hoard their men and equipment

rather than to use them in the war against

the Japanese. Some were engaged in a

smuggling trade with Japanese-occupied

territory. The individual Chinese soldier

in these armies was ill fed, ill clothed, and

subject to all sorts of petty graft by his

commanders. In the face of Stilwell's urging that he reform and consolidate his

armies, Chiang was dilatory. He feared

the effects of failure in any effort against

the Japanese in Burma, and apparently

even those of disturbing the status quo. He

insisted on greater American air and supply support and thought Stilwell as his Allied chief of staff should support these demands in Washington. Stilwell placed his

role as American representative in the

theater first and would support only those

demands he viewed as realistic in the light

of his plans. A thinly veiled hostility between the two was soon evident. Both

General Marshall and Secretary Stimson

gave their wholehearted support to Stilwell, but Chiang's direct line to the President and the sympathy for Chiang felt by

such important presidential advisers as

Lauchlin Currie and Harry Hopkins frequently left Stilwell without the crucial

17

 (1) ASF in China, Burma, and India, pp. 116,

234-36. (2) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, pp. 198-207. (3) ID Rpt 10, Lend-lease

Information, 31 May 43, Pt. 2, sec on India. (4) India

at War, 1939-1945, MS, prepared by Hist Sec GHQ

(India), OCMH. (5) See above, Chs. XI, XVIII.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 539

support he needed at the highest American level.18

Disturbed by the curtailment of the

Chinese lend-lease program, and particularly incensed by the movement of Brereton's air force without his consent, Chiang

in June 1942 presented to the President

three demands, which he stated were the

minimum requirements for maintenance

of the China theater of war. These demands were: (1) three American divisions

in India to co-operate with Chinese forces

in restoring the line of communications

through Burma; (2) an Allied air force in

China of 500 planes continuously fighting

at the front; (3) monthly transport over

the Hump of 5,000 tons of Chinese supplies. He originally set August and September 1942 as the time limits for meeting

these demands. In Washington, continuance of China in the war was considered

of paramount importance, but no one

seriously considered that the Generalissimo's ultimatum could be met if the agreed

policy of concentration on the Atlantic

front was to survive. The President delayed giving a formal answer to Chiang

until October. In the meantime, Lauchlin

Currie, as the President's representative,

went to China on a special mission in

July and in conversations with him Chiang

substantially modified his demands by removing the time limit and cutting his requirements for U.S. divisions from three

to one. The final answer of the President,

generally in accord with the recommendations of General Marshall, rejected entirely the demand for U.S. combat troops

because of lack of shipping, but promised

to build the air force in China and India

as rapidly as possible, and to make transports available for the airline in regular

monthly increments until the goal of one

hundred in regular operation was reached.

Chiang accepted this response and made

no further veiled threats to take China out

of the war.19

Despite the promises, the build-up of

the U.S. air force and of the airlift continued slow and far below the Generalissimo's

demands. Roosevelt's answer to the three

demands was tacitly premised on acceptance of the Stilwell-Chiang plan for a

Burma campaign as a substitute for compliance with them, but when the plan was

considered in the councils of the CCS in

October, the Combined Staff Planners reported that sufficient trained amphibious

troops and landing craft could not be assembled for an operation to recapture all

Burma in the dry season of 1942-43. The

JCS then fell back on a concept of a limited land offensive, to include Stilwell's

plan for an operation to overrun north

Burma, and proposed British operations

to retake the airfield at Akyab and advance from Imphal to the Chindwin River

in central Burma. On 7 December 1942

they accepted this as the basic American

strategy for CBI in early 1943.20

In the theater Stilwell simultaneously

learned in conferences with General

Wavell at New Delhi that a limited offensive was the most the British would agree

to. On his return to Chungking in November he was able to get Chiang's consent

18

 (1) See Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, pp. 32-41, 152-57, 173-77, 234-41. (2)

See also Joseph W. Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers, Theodore H. White, ed. (New York, William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948), pp. 121, 127, 315-22. (3) See also,

rpt cited n. 6(7). (4) For a typical statement of Stilwell's personal view of the Chinese Army, see Msg

204, AMMISCA to AGWAR, 7 Mar 43, Stilwell Personal Cable File, Bk. 1, Item 238, DRB AGO. 19

 See Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission

to China, pp. 169-73, 180-87, 222-25. 20

 (1) CCS 104/3, 30 Oct 42, title: Plan for Retaking Burma. (2) Min, 47th mtg CCS, 6 Nov 42. (3) JCS

162, 7 Dec 42, title: Opn in Burma—March 1943. (4)

Min, 45th mtg JCS, 8 Dec 42.
540 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

for participation in this limited offensive

on condition that the British maintain

naval supremacy in the Bay of Bengal and

air supremacy over Burma. The target

date for the operation was set as 1 March

1943. Wavell assigned Stilwell's Chinese

forces to the Hukawng Valley sector

north of the British, who would operate

along the Imphal-Kalewa line. Wheeler's

SOS was assigned responsibility for support of the Chinese from a base at Ledo in

Assam. To provide a line of supply for the

advancing Chinese forces, the project for

a road to run from Ledo to Myitkyina and

Lung-ling along the route the Chinese

had proposed in the spring was revived,

and construction assigned as an American

responsibility. If the operation were successful, this road would provide an overland route to China without the restoration of the old line of communications

through Burma. In presenting the limited

offensive plan to the President, the JCS

stressed this road as one of the most important advantages to be derived from the

operation.21

Acceptance of this plan soon posed a

new and unforeseen drain on shipping. On

8 November 1942 Stilwell sent to the War

Department a sizable request for men and

materials to enable him to operate an SOS

in the rear of the Chinese in India and to

begin construction of the Ledo Road. He

requested that they be in the theater in

time for the offensive to begin on 1 March

1943. These requirements were modest by

comparison with those of any other major

theater of war, including a few engineer,

quartermaster, and medical units with

their organizational equipment, certain

specialized engineering equipment for the

Ledo Road, and six months of combat

maintenance for the two Chinese divisions

at Ramgarh. Stilwell abandoned his earlier request for an infantry division but did

ask for one infantry battalion, three antiaircraft batteries, and one military police

battalion. The total troops involved were

10,896 and the cargo came to 109,116

measurement tons.

The War Department was not at all

prepared for these requests, having assumed that the Burma offensive would be

carried out with resources already in the

theater or earmarked for it. The North

African campaign, reinforcement of the

Pacific theaters, and movement of troops

and supplies to the Persian Gulf were currently absorbing all available military

troop and cargo shipping. Stilwell was

told on 23 November 1942 that "in view

of the magnitude of requirements for support of current offensives in other vital

theaters," neither troops, materials, nor

shipping would be available to meet more

than a small part of his requests.22

The CBI commander's protest was immediate, strong, and profane. Swayed by

this and by the action of the JCS in assigning a priority to the Burma operation

second only to that in North Africa, General Marshall asked the SOS to make a

diligent effort to meet Stilwell's demands.

While troops and materials in most cases

had to be diverted from other projects, the

really critical issue was shipping. By

eliminating all personnel for whom Indian

native labor could be substituted, shipping

requirements were reduced to 63,000 tons

of cargo and 6,375 troop spaces. The Navy

transport Monticello, currently under consideration for diversion from the North

African run to the Pacific, was diverted

instead to carry troops to India. Ships to

21

 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to

China, pp. 225-29, 247. 22

 Msg 1724, AGWAR to AMMISCA, 23 Nov 42,

AG 400.3295 (9-1-42) (3) Sec 4.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 541

float the cargo were obtained by diversion

from the Pacific and from lend-lease. This

first sizable movement of troops and matériel to CBI was carried out in January

and February 1943. Efforts were also devoted, following Stilwell's irate protests at

delays, to speed the dispatch of twelve

transport planes necessary to move essential artillery, ammunition, and gasoline to

YOKE Force in Yunnan.23

So far as any March 1943 offensive was

concerned, these efforts proved to be in

vain. Wavell, in India, showed marked reluctance to go ahead with even the limited advance to the Chindwin, and expressed strong doubts to his superiors as

to the feasibility of Stilwell's operation.

The British attack on Akyab, already

launched, ran into serious difficulties. The

British could promise neither naval supremacy in the Bay of Bengal nor air supremacy over Burma, the conditions

Chiang had made a sine qua non to his acceptance of the Chinese role in the limited

offensive. In early January 1943, Chiang

cabled the President that he could not

undertake the operation in March.24

This abortive planning for the early

1943 offensive was not entirely without

results. It clearly focused attention on the

possibilities of a land supply line through

north Burma to China as an alternative to

restoration of the old line from Rangoon.

Construction of the road was begun in

December and Chinese troops moved forward to protect it. (See Map 6.) The plan

for the Ledo Road was soon supplemented

by an accessory project for an oil pipeline

to run from the Digboi oilfields in India to

Kunming. The road and pipeline projects

were soon established alongside the airlift

as major American logistical responsibilities in CBI.25

 The normal SOS apparatus

for planning, procurement, and shipment

of materials was set to work to implement

them. Yet, as events were to prove, there

were certain dangers in this logistical

planning, divorced as it was from any

definite strategic commitment for conquest of the territory over which the proposed supply line was to run.

Chennault's Air Plan

While Stilwell had been laboriously

developing his plan for building Chinese

ground forces, General Chennault, commanding the small American air force in

China, was espousing other ideas. Operating on a shoestring and utilizing local supplies and services in China to the utmost,

Chennault had accomplished remarkable

results in the air war against Japan. Yet

since gasoline, ammunition, and spare

parts had to be flown over the Hump, his

operations were necessarily limited by the

supply line and during 1942 remained exceedingly small. Impatient with the long

delays necessary in opening an overland

supply route, and doubtful of Stilwell's

appreciation of the potentialities of an air

effort from China, Chennault developed

and brought to the attention of the President an alternate plan. He wanted the

airlift enlarged and devoted solely to sup23

 (1) ASF in China, Burma, and India, pp. 46-50.

(2) Msg 181, AMMDEL to AGWAR, 8 Nov 42. (3)

Memo, unsigned, no addressee, 1 Dec 42, sub: Sv Trs

and Engr Equip for Asiatic Theater. Last two in CBI31 May 43 folder, Lutes File. (4) Msg 1463,

AMMISCA to AGWAR, 28 Nov 42, Stilwell Personal

Cable File, Bk. 1, Item 125, DRB AGO. (5) Msg 1500,

AMMISCA to AGWAR, 8 Dec 42, Stilwell Personal

Cable File, Bk. 1, Item 140, DRB AGO. (6) On the

Monticello affair, see above, Ch. XV. 24

 (1) Msg COS W 388, Br CsofS to Br Jt Stf Mis,

Washington, 9 Dec 42, Item 22, Exec 10. (2) Ltr, Dill

to Marshall, 10 Dec 42, WDCSA China. (3) Msg 31,

Chiang to Roosevelt, 8 Jan 43, Stilwell Personal Cable

File, Bk. 1, Item 140, DRB AGO. 25

 ASF in China, Burma, and India, pp. 50-54.
542 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

porting his air force in China. With the

small air force that could be supported in

this manner, Chennault promised remarkable results. His bombers would conduct

devastating raids against Japanese shipping lanes and the Japanese-held coastal

cities of China; as a result the Japanese air

force would have to fight over China,

where Chennault's fighters would destroy

it by using proven combat techniques;

once the Japanese air force was destroyed,

the road would be open for his bombers to

attack the vital industrial cities of Japan

and destroy them. To accomplish these

astounding objectives, Chennault originally said he would need only 105 fighters,

30 medium bombers, 12 heavy bombers,

and regular replacements for losses. While

these requirements were expanded considerably by mid-1943, the fundamentals of

the plan remained unchanged.26

Chennault's ambitious proposals cut

across the entire fabric of Stilwell's plans.

Though both would enlarge the airlift,

Chennault would use it almost entirely to

support an American air force, while Stilwell would use it predominantly to transport YOKE Force supplies. While Stilwell

visualized an eventual air campaign

against Japan from China, he thought it

would have to await development of an

overland supply line to support it and of a

Chinese army adequate to protect its bases

and airfields. A premature effort, he contended, could not be given sufficient logistical support to succeed, and would only

sting the Japanese into a land campaign to

overrun the airfields from which it was

launched.27 The logistical implications of

these conflicting views are obvious. If

Chennault's plan were accepted, resources

would be concentrated on furnishing

transports, building airfields, and providing the other essentials for operating an air

force in China. Efforts to build the Ledo

Road and its accompanying pipeline and

to equip sixty Chinese divisions would be

slackened or abandoned.

While the War Department continued

to support Stilwell, the President was intrigued by this rather brilliant conception

of victory at small cost. At the other end of

the line, Chiang eagerly grasped at the

Chennault thesis as a substitute for Stilwell's plans. In his January message to the

President he pointedly suggested expansion of Chennault's force; in the months

following he became increasingly dilatory

in carrying out Stilwell's plan for a concentration of forces in Yunnan. The British

also soon began to show favor for the air

alternative and to deprecate the chances

of success in a land campaign against

Burma. While probably no one accepted

Chennault's most extravagant claims, he

offered the tempting prospect of more immediate results at small cost.

Casablanca and After

At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, the CCS provisionally scheduled

for November 1943 an operation for the

reconquest of all Burma (ANAKIM) generally along the lines of the earlier StilwellChiang plan. The Americans promised to

make landing craft available from the Pacific for the British amphibious assault on

Rangoon. In the meantime, the British

were to continue their thrust at Akyab

and initiate the advance toward the

Chindwin. If Chinese co-operation could

be obtained, advances should also be

26

 Claire L. Chennault, Way of a Fighter (New York,

G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1949), pp. 212-16, 221-22. 27

 For a succinct statement of the opposing views,

see records of the TRIDENT Conference in Washington, May 1943.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 543

made in the north along the lines of Stilwell's plan for a junction of X-RAY and

YOKE Forces. Then, at the special request

of the President, the CCS added a clause

on air operations in China, promising additional aircraft for the Hump, build-up of

the U.S. air force in China "to the maximum extent that logistical limitations and

other important claims will permit," and

more sustained air operations beginning

in the spring of 1943.28

This favorable gesture toward Chennault indicated the President's intense

interest in his plan for air operations in

China. Immediately following Casablanca, General Arnold went to China (in

company with General Somervell and

Field Marshal Dill) with a promise from

Roosevelt that transports on the Hump

run would be rapidly increased from the

existing 62 to 137, and that monthly tonnage would be expanded from 1,500 to

4,000 by mid-March. The President stipulated that Chennault should receive a

minimum of 1,500 tons out of the proposed 4,000-ton capacity. This time the

transports were rushed to India as promised. By 27 March 1943, 133 were either

on hand or en route, and a considerable

number of older types were replaced by

more modern ones. But it took a longer

time to build airfields, make other arrangements for support of the increased lift, and

develop a smoothly operating air transport

organization. The desired goal of 4,000

tons monthly was not to be achieved until

July, and in the meantime the struggle between Stilwell and Chennault for the

actual capacity was accentuated. The

President showed his unmistakable inclination toward Chennault's plan when in

March he summarily rejected Stilwell's

and Marshall's suggestion that Chiang be

required to commit himself definitely to

concentrating forces in Yunnan and undertaking the Burma operation as a price for

further American support.29

The major decision at Casablanca, however, had been on ANAKIM and neither the

War Department nor the JCS were so intrigued by Chennault's plan for victory at

small cost as was the President. Attention

of the Army's logistical agencies in Washington was therefore primarily turned toward meeting the requirements of American, Chinese, and British forces for

ANAKIM and toward planning for postANAKIM operations. ANAKIM was conceived

mainly as a British operation supported by

Chinese action. The build-up of Wheeler's

SOS in the rear of the Chinese was already

being provided for as a follow-up to Stilwell's requests in December and involved

relatively small tonnages. Shipments of

lend-lease to India for the Chinese were

stepped up only slightly, from around

5,000 tons monthly in late 1942 to between

8,000 and 10,000 in early 1943, and most

of this material merely went to enlarge the

stockpile in India. The major logistical

requirements for ANAKIM were British.

The British indicated that their participation would depend heavily on American

supplies and shipping, particularly since 28

 (1) CCS 170/2, 23 Jan 43, title: Final Rpt to

President and Prime Minister Summarizing Decisions

by CCS. (2) CCS 170, 22 Jan 43, same title. (3) Min,

3d mtg ANFA Conf, 23 Jan 43. (4) For a general discussion of the Casablanca Conference, see below,

Ch. XXV. 29

 (1) Henry Harley Arnold, Global Mission (New

York, Harper & Brothers, 1949), pp. 413-22. (2) Msg

SVC 395, Roosevelt to Chiang, 8 Mar 43, Stilwell

Personal Cable File, Bk. 2, Item 239, DRB AGO. (3)

Craven and Cate, AAF IV, p. 441. (4) Romanus and

Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, pp. 274-292.

The authors represent this presidential action as the

real turning point of Stilwell's mission in China.

Roosevelt wrote of Chiang: ". . . one cannot speak

sternly to a man like that or exact commitments from

him the way we might do from the Sultan of Morocco." See p. 279.
544 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

they had had to reduce their own shipping

to India in order to bolster their faltering

import program for the United Kingdom

itself. They presented requests for material that amounted to 263,000 tons of military cargo and 267,000 tons of civilian

supplies, and for American shipping to

make 113 trips from either the United

States or the United Kingdom to India

from April through August, and on a

somewhat reduced scale for the rest of the

year. Meeting this British shipping request

threatened to put a severe drain on cargo

shipping available to carry out other military operations, coming as it did in the

midst of a crisis created by a far larger

British demand for American shipping to

support their import program. WSA insisted that if granted it would have to come

out of military allocations, and pointed to

to the dangers involved in relinquishing

control of American shipping for the long

period involved in voyages to India. The

military authorities agreed that the British

requirement for April-August sailings

should be reduced from 113 to 90, but in

view of the CCS commitment to ANAKIM,

General Somervell insisted this reduced

scale should be met. As a start twenty additional ships were allocated to sail to

India during April, squeezed out of those

originally assigned for Panama, Hawaii,

the South and Southwest Pacific, and military lend-lease services to Australia and

the Middle East. Turnaround time was

computed as two and a half times that to

the original destinations for these ships,

thus meaning a drain equivalent to fifty

cargo ships from the pool of shipping available to support other military operations.

Allocations for future months were left in

abeyance pending, among other things,

the opening of the Mediterranean to Allied

shipping.30

Material was generally made available

to fill the twenty ships despite the fact that

some of the British requirements had not

been previously registered in the Army

Supply Program and represented commitments over and above those contemplated

in the Weeks-Somervell Agreement. There

was, nevertheless, a continuing inclination

on the American side to question the scale

of British requirements for India, and an

open suspicion that much of the material

requested was for troops that would not be

engaged in ANAKIM. The Operations Division member of MAC(G) tried unsuccessfully to have certain assignments of military matériel earmarked specifically for

ANAKIM, to revert to MAB control if the

operation were not definitely scheduled in

July.31

30

 (1) On British import program, see below, Ch.

XXVI. (2) ASF in China, Burma, and India, pp.

50-57, 236. (3) Rpt cited n. 13(5). (4) Memo, Col Magruder for ACofS Opns ASF, 12 Apr 43, sub: Cargo

for ANAKIM. (5) Memo, Gross for Somervell, 29 Apr

43, sub: Shipg for CBI. Last two in CBI-31 May 43

folder, Lutes File. (6) Memo, Somervell for Wedemeyer, 2 Apr 43, sub: ANAKIM Versus BOLERO, Shipg

1942-43 folder, Hq ASF. (7) Ltr, Macready to Somervell, 22 Apr 43, Logis File, OCMH. (8) Douglas' notes

on conf at White House, 29 Mar 43, Allocs Gen folder,

WSA Douglas File. (9) Memo, Gross for Somervell,

7 Apr 43, sub: Nomination of Twenty Ships for Apr

Loading for ANAKIM. (10) Msg, Harriman to Douglas, 20 Apr 43. Last two in Army Reqmts 1 Jan 43

folder, WSA Douglas File. 31

 (1) This move provoked a long series of discussions on the propriety of such earmarking but no final

decision was reached by the MAB. The board did

rule, however, that the specific assignments in question should proceed. See memo, Gen Tansey for Chm

MAC(G), 14 Apr 43, sub: Sp Issue of Equip to U.K.

in Support of Sp Opn, Tab G to min, 89th mtg

MAC(G), 15 Apr 43; Min 1866, 89th mtg MAC(G),

15 Apr 43; Min 2030-31, 95th mtg, 27 May 43; Min

2042, 96th mtg, 3 Jun 43; Min 2092-97, 98th mtg, 17

Jun 43; Min 3, 63d mtg MAB, 21 Apr 43; Min 4, 65th

mtg, 4 May 43; Min 5, 66th mtg, 12 May 43; Min 2a,

70th mtg, 9 Jun 43. (2) For Somervell's views on Indian requirements, see remarks at TRIDENT Conference in min, 90th mtg CCS, 20 May 43, Item 4.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 545

ARRIVING FOR A CONFERENCE IN NEW DELHI, India, 1943. Left to right:

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, Lt. Gen. Allen Hartley, Field Marshal Dill, Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold,

Maj. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler, Brig. Gen. Clayton L. Bissell, Brig. Gen. William H.

Holcombe, Air Commodore J. E. A. Baldwin, Brig. Gen. Benjamin G. Ferris.

Some of the American staff, General

Somervell in particular, favored meeting

Stilwell's earlier requests for U.S. troops to

take part in the campaigns in Burma and

China. On his visit to India in February

1943, Somervell asked General Wheeler

for an estimate of requirements for supporting U.S. ground forces of 100,000 and

500,000 men respectively over the supply

line into China once it was restored.

Wheeler's preliminary plan, submitted on

16 February 1943, was premised less on

any such specific manpower goals than on

the general requirements for restoring the

line of communications through Burma.

Wheeler postulated the recapture of

Burma by the end of April 1944, development of the supply line during the following monsoon season, May through November, and initiation of further operations in the dry season 1944-45. The Ledo

Road would be built in the rear of advancing troops, and continued in use as a

secondary supply line after that from Rangoon was restored. He presented material

requirements for the pipeline to parallel
546 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

the Ledo Road, for restoration of the port

of Rangoon and the rail and waterways

north to Bhamo and Lashio, for petroleum

storage and distribution facilities in

Burma, and for truck lines on both the

Ledo Road and the Burma Road. He

asked that 7,500 trucks of seven to ten-ton

capacity, 1,500 wooden barges, and 500

towboats arrive in the theater by 1 November 1943, the rest of the required material

and necessary service troops by 1 January

1944. On 8 May 1943, at the further request of Somervell, Wheeler presented a

more comprehensive plan specifically premised on the support of 100,000 American

troops in China. Truck, barge, and pipeline requirements were expanded, but

those for the development of Rangoon

and of the Burma Railways were omitted

on the understanding that the British were

requisitioning the necessary material,

much of it under lend-lease. As for supplying 500,000 American troops over the

route, Wheeler pointed out that it would

require an enormous expenditure of manpower and material and could not be

achieved at best before June 1946.32

Wheeler's plans were studied extensively

in the Strategic Logistics Division, SOS,

and his stated requirements became the

basis for procurement of specialized equipment for CBI. Indeed, the studies were

expanded to embrace the whole question

of the logistical feasibility of a campaign

to defeat Japan through China. While

none of the studies was conclusive, they

served to point up many of the logistical

difficulties involved. It would be difficult

to procure the necessary rail cars, locomotives, and cargo trucks. It would require

500,000 tons of cargo shipping for the

movement of materials for the line of communications alone. Once the supply line

was developed, the bottleneck would be

just where it was before, on the Burma

Road. The capacity of the river and rail

lines north from Rangoon and the feeder

road from Ledo could be increased far

more rapidly than could that of the road

running northward to Kunming.

Despite these indicated difficulties,

Somervell was optimistic about the possibilities of carrying out a major offensive in

CBI. In May he had plans drawn up for

moving 100,000 American troops to India

to permit the opening of an American sector in Assam and north Burma by the end

of 1943, accepting all the additional logistical burdens that this would involve.33

This logistical planning in the SOS

proved premature. At the higher level,

everyone from the start had reservations

about ANAKIM. Chiang showed as little

enthusiasm as before, the British increasing reluctance to go ahead despite the

amount of American support they had

been promised. The President also was

lukewarm and at one point specifically

queried the JCS if the shipping needed to

support the British effort in India might

not be better used to bolster the declining

BOLERO program. Since the British were

also apparently ready to sacrifice American shipping for ANAKIM if necessary in

order to secure a sufficient allotment for

their import program, the U.S. military

authorities were placed in the peculiar position of defending a British military shipping requirement that the British them32

 (1) Memo, Wheeler for Somervell, 18 Feb 43,

sub: Restoration of Communication Facilities in

Burma, CBI-31 May 43 folder, Lutes File. (2) Memo,

Wheeler for Somervell, 8 May 43, same sub, in History of the Planning Div, ASF, Vol. III, App. 7-F,

OCMH. 33

 (1) ASF in China, Burma, and India, pp. 61-82.

(2) History of the Planning Division, ASF, I, 126,

OCMH.
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 547

selves were unwilling to insist on. Marshall

and King told the President that any

diminution of preparations in India would

be a dangerous invitation to Japanese

attack, but they themselves had to recognize that something less than a full-scale

assault on Burma might have to suffice.

OPD by no means shared Somervell's enthusiasm for sending an American ground

army to India.

In the theater itself, meantime, British

preparations for ANAKIM fell behind. The

thrust at Akyab failed, and Wavell decided

against launching the drive on the Chindwin. While the American SOS was optimistically planning for restoration of the

supply line through Burma, Wavell was

still complaining of insufficient tonnages

arriving in India and struggling to develop

the line from Calcutta to the bases for the

proposed Sino-British drive in Manipur

and Assam. In April 1943 the British asked

that the review of ANAKIM scheduled for

July be held at the TRIDENT Conference in

Washington in May. Chiang, now wholly

devoted to the air plan, asked Roosevelt to

summon Chennault to present it in full.

The War Department asked that Stilwell

also come, the British sent for Wavell, and

when the TRIDENT Conference met, revision of the Casablanca objectives for CBI

was to be one of the first orders of business.

The decision was almost a foregone conclusion. With the British demurring, ANAKIM for November 1943 was definitely out,

and with it went the whole timetable on

which the SOS plans were based. Though

Stilwell's campaign and a limited British

offensive were to remain on the books,

Chiang, the President, and Churchill all

showed a preference for Chennault's plan,

and as a result air operations in China received the highest priority in CBI in the

months following TRIDENT.34

Reciprocal Aid in India and China

In view of the long supply line from the

United States, the growing (though still

small) American forces in India and China

found it mandatory to rely on local resources to the maximum extent possible.

Since most American troops were in India,

local procurement there was of greatest

importance. By an agreement between

General Wheeler and the Government of

India in June 1942 it was established that

U.S. procurement in India was to be centralized through General Wheeler's headquarters as far as possible and treated as

reciprocal aid. Under this agreement, and

even earlier by direct purchase, American

forces obtained the bulk of their subsistence, clothing, buildings, depot installations, roads, airfields, and labor services

from Indian sources. Gasoline until the

middle of 1943 came either from Indian

refineries or from British-controlled fields

in Iran and Iraq. Native labor was utilized

to the utmost to replace U.S. service troops

in depot installations, at ports, and in the

construction of roads and airfields. The

installations at Ramgarh, subsistence, and

other services for Chinese troops in India

were treated as reciprocal aid to the

United States and in turn by the United

States as lend-lease to China.

The Government of India, reluctant to

press for sacrifices from a people whose

standard of living was already far too low,

found it difficult to meet American expectations. Under the June agreement, the

34

 (1) Memo, CofS for President, Apr 43, Item 55,

Exec 10. (2) Memo, Wedemeyer for Hull, 25 May 43,

ABC 370.5 (2-2-43). (3) Min, 2d mtg at White House,

TRIDENT, 14 May 43. (4) CCS 242/6, 25 May 43,

title: Final Rpt to President and Prime Minister (TRIDENT). (5) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, pp. 302-06, 313-33. (6) See below,

Ch. XXVI.
548 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Government of India insisted that supply

under reciprocal aid should be limited to

the same scales of accommodation as were

accorded British troops, and Wheeler

found it very difficult to operate under this

restriction. Wheeler's lack of representation on the Indian Lend-Lease Requirements Committee, which passed also on

reciprocal aid requisitions, handicapped

him further. Americans were often forced

to purchase in the open market where

they were in competition with higher priority orders of the Government of India

and therefore had to pay higher prices or

go without.35

Wheeler was soon airing these grievances in Washington, and his remonstrances produced a pattern that was to

become increasingly familiar in connection with American demands on India.

British officials in Washington and London, more aware of the necessity for cooperation on a world-wide scale, put pressure on Indian officials. The restriction to

British scales was rescinded. The SOS in

Washington also took steps to send Wheeler experienced personnel to set up a special

section in his headquarters to be concerned with local procurement (though

no general purchasing agent or board was

created in India). Even more important,

the British established in March 1943 an

India Munitions Assignments Committee

to tie in the disposal of Indian production

to that of the rest of the British Empire

and the United States in accordance with

the accepted principles of distribution on

the basis of strategic need. The India

Munitions Assignments Committee included representation of the British Commander-in-Chief, India, the British War

Office, and the U.S. War Department

(General Wheeler). It was a branch of the

London Munitions Assignments Board, as

was the committee in Australia. After some

controversy, the right of appeal from the

Indian committee to the LMAB in all

cases was granted, though the British postulated that there were limitations to action the LMAB could take in regard to

assignments within the India Command.

The British Commander-in-Chief, India,

would have to approve assignments made

to British and Indian forces in his theater

and would have a "close connection" with

those made to American and Chinese

forces there. But his powers would not extend to assignments made to theaters outside his command, that is, to China, Australia, and the Middle East. After some

controversy over assignments of Indian

material for Chinese forces in China, it

was agreed that long-range requirements

on India for outside theaters should be

presented in London and planned as part

of the empire program while the India

Munitions Assignments Committee would

consider spot bids on their merits.36

These arrangements and continued

British pressure for greater co-operation in

India smoothed the path of reciprocal aid

considerably. By October 1943 the International Division could report:

35

 (1) Memo, R. M. Saner, Under Secy of Govt of

India, for other govt agencies, 4 Jun 42. (2) Ltr, Gen

Wheeler to Lt Gen Vickers, Br QMG, 29 Aug 42, sub:

Interpretation of Reverse Lend-lease Proced. (3) Ltr,

Wheeler to Clay, 6 Jan 43. All in ID 008 Reverse

Lend-lease, I. (4) ASF in China, Burma, and India,

pp. 159-60. (5) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's

Mission to China, Ch. VI. (6) Memo, Wing Comdr

T. E. H. Birley for ID ASF, 7 May 43, ID, LendLease, Doc Suppl, V. 36

 (1) Rpt, Pt. 2, sec on India, cited n. 13(5). (2)

LMAB (42) 63, Note by War Off Member, 20 Dec 42,

title: India Mun Asgmts Com, in ID, Lend-Lease, Doc

Suppl, IV. (3) Memo cited n. 35(6). (4) See India

Mun Asgmts Com Cables file, ID. (5) ASF in China,

Burma, and India, pp. 149-52. (6) Memo, Secy for

Chm MAC(G), 13 Jul 43, sub: India Mun Asgmts

Com, filed with min. 102d mtg MAC(G).
CHINA, BURMA, AND INDIA 549

Although reciprocal aid procurement in

India may continue to suffer from lack of

public support of the war in India and from Indian concern over the cost of such aid,

present indications are that substantial improvement has already been effected and

that both the scope and facility of procurement may continue to show improvement.37

No formal reverse lend-lease agreement

was ever made with China, but U.S. air

forces and the small detachments of headquarters, supply, and instructional personnel in China procured most of their subsistence and housekeeping supplies locally

by direct purchase. Stilwell continually

recommended against use of the reverse

lend-lease principle in China, basing his

opposition on a realistic appraisal of the

Chinese Government's ability to procure

supplies with the rapidly depreciating currency at its disposal. Also he did not wish

to incur the obligation to the Chinese that

would be implied in acceptance of reciprocal aid while China was receiving so little

from the United States. In deference to

State Department wishes such goods and

services as the Chinese offered were accepted in accordance with the terms of

Article II of the Master Lend-Lease

Agreement Between the United States and

China, but the bulk of American procurement continued, as Stilwell wished, by

direct purchase.

The amount of this procurement was

not large since there were few American

troops in China. The greater contribution

of the Chinese was really in the construction of airfields, revetments, roads, and

other projects of an operational nature

that were neither purchased nor treated as

reverse lend-lease, but financed by the

Chinese Government as Chinese projects.

There can be no question that the support

given to Chennault's air force in this manner was the only factor that enabled it to

operate on a shoestring as it did, and this

factor was taken into consideration in determining its very low requirements for

logistical support.38

Nevertheless, there were definite limits

to the local support available in either

India or China. As the American air force

in China expanded, its proportionate requirements from the outside increased.

The paucity of Indian resources and the

necessity for heavy importations from the

United States for development of the Indian base acted as a continual barrier to

the mounting of any major offensive in

CBI.

The story of the CBI theater during

1942 and early 1943 was one of constant

frustrations and failures. In an area where

logistical problems were more formidable

than in any other theater of the global

war, divergent national interests, conflicting strategic plans, and divided command

responsibilities stood in the way of any

concerted effort to solve them. The early

fall of Burma prevented fulfillment of the

initial American plan for supplying a Chinese force that would carry the main burden of the war against the Japanese on the

Asiatic mainland. An airlift of exceedingly

small capacity became the only remaining

line of supply to China, and the basic U.S.

strategy one of merely keeping China in

the war. General Stilwell insisted with

single-minded purpose that the only logi37

 Rpt cited n. 13(5). 38

 (1) Msg 988, AMMISCA to AGWAR, 26 Jul 42,

AMMISCA IN Cables file, Bk. 6, ID. (2) Msg 1720,

AGWAR to AMMISCA, 20 Nov 42, AG 400.3295

(9-1-42) (4). (3) Msg 1461, AMMISCA to AGWAR,

27 Nov 42, Lend-lease (1) folder, Dir of Materiel. (4)

Memo, Gen Handy for ASW, 23 Jan 43. (5) Memo,

ASW for Handy, 30 Jan 43. Last two in OPD

400.3295, Sec 1, Case 45. (6) A Guide to International

Supply, prepared by ID ASF, 31 Dec 45, p. 65. (7)

Chennault, Way of a Fighter, passim.
550 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

cal course of action was to go back and

retake Burma, but none of the major governments involved was ever willing to give

its full support to the effort. Chiang was

reluctant to risk the meager resources at

his disposal despite the immense advantages success would bring him. The British

in India, with far greater resources and

American support, seemed unable or unwilling to use them in an effort to regain

Burma, insisting that logistical obstacles

would make such an operation unfeasible

without more extensive preparations. The

American staff in Washington, while continually insisting on the importance of an

overland supply route to China, felt that

other strategic commitments of higher priority precluded furnishing American

ground forces and supporting them over

the long supply line involved. The President himself always sought a course of

action which would require the least drain

of resources from the Atlantic front. Chennault's plan for air operations appealed to

Roosevelt as it did to the British and Chinese. With divergent American plans complicating an already difficult situation,

both strategic and logistical planning were

cast adrift. The postponement of ANAKIM

meant that there would be no major land

campaign on the Asiatic mainland during

1943 and that, at least temporarily, logistical action would be concentrated on the

build-up of the airlift. Supply plans drawn

up by the SOS in the light of the ANAKIM

plan were left without concrete foundation. The prospects after TRIDENT were

that CBI would remain a theater secondary to the Pacific in the war against

Japan.
CHAPTER XX

The Long Road to Russia—I

In the sphere of strategy there was little

co-ordination of the war effort of the

Soviet Union with that of the Western

Allies. The Russians fought a separate

war on their own front, for different purposes, it later proved, from those that motivated Great Britain and the United

States. But while the war was on, there

was common agreement on the necessity

of defeating Germany in the most expeditious manner possible, and there was little

inclination on the part of American leaders to explore the question of differences

in postwar aims. Both sides had the same

wolf by the ears and neither could afford

to let go. American and British leaders

had to accept the hard fact that without

involvement of the major portion of the

German Army on the Eastern Front any

realization of the agreed ARCADIA strategy

of defeating Germany first would be

rendered difficult if not impossible. Since

Soviet forces during 1942 and 1943 were

carrying the brunt of the land fighting

against Germany, and since there seemed

to be throughout the period a grave danger that the USSR might be eliminated

from the war entirely, the question of how

best to aid the Russians was one of the

most serious the Allied planners faced.

There were two possible means, one by

early establishment of a second front in

Europe, the other by shipment of supplies.

Pursuit of both courses simultaneously was

of course desirable, but the Americans

and British found it impossible during

1942 and 1943 to establish a second front

on the scale the Russians asked. Consequently, the shipment of supplies to the

Soviet Union had to be pushed as a matter of utmost urgency by both the President and the Prime Minister. The President was willing to interrupt or curtail

supply to the Soviet Union only when

sheer physical difficulty made delivery impossible or when it interfered directly with

a major Allied project such as the invasion

of North Africa. Since policy on aid to the

USSR had to be determined at the highest

level, the military leaders sometimes regarded it as primarily a political program.

The War Department, the JCS, and even

the CCS objected on occasion to its interference with Anglo-American operational

plans. However, they had little choice but

to accept the sacrifices involved, and indeed to recognize the great importance of

aid to the USSR in any strategic program

aimed at the ultimate defeat of Germany.

These circumstances explain why the

program of aid continued to be based on

rigid diplomatic commitments and subject to the surveillance of the Munitions

Assignments Board only in matters of detail, and why little effort was made to go

behind Soviet requests to determine the

strategic justification of specific allocations

or to secure Soviet co-operation in return

for supply aid. Assignments to the USSR

were not weighed in the balance of thea-
552 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ter priorities, operational necessities, or

troop deployments as were those of theaters that fell within the purview of the

CCS. Since the Russians were producing

results and showed no inclination to permit Americans either to survey their needs

or to supervise the use of supplies shipped,

there was no alternative during the first

part of the war but to accept Soviet requests at their face value, or at least the

U.S. Government did not think it wise to

pursue any other course. The whole effort

to supply the Soviet Union was concentrated simply on meeting a series of annual supply protocols negotiated at the

highest governmental level.

Pearl Harbor and the First Protocol

When the bombs fell on Pearl Harbor,

shipments to the USSR to meet the First

Protocol, signed at Moscow on 2 October

1941, had already fallen far behind

monthly schedules of deliveries furnished

the Russians at the end of October. An intensive effort was under way to make up

the deficit in December. Instead, the suspension of lend-lease shipments following

Pearl Harbor and the diversions of material and shipping to meet U.S. needs

placed protocol shipments even further in

arrears. While General Marshall favored

continuation of aid to the USSR to "the

maximum extent possible," both he and

Secretary Stimson felt the protocol must

be revised in the light of the vastly expanded requirements of the U.S. Military

Establishment.1 On 28 December 1941,

however, the President directed flatly that

"the Soviet Aid Program as provided in

the Protocol Agreement be reestablished

beginning January 1," with existing deficits to be made up not later than 1 April.

He stipulated "specific amendments"

might be made with his approval, but

added, "The whole Russian program is so

vital to our interest I know that only the

gravest consideration will lead you to

recommend our withholding longer the

munitions our Government has promised

to the U.S.S.R."

 2

Stimson replied on 30 December, forwarding a new schedule of deliveries.

"While this schedule is not in all cases in

accordance with the protocol," he wrote,

"there are certain difficulties, including

shipping and production difficulties as

well as our entry into the war, which have

made some departures from the protocol

inevitable." None of the 152 90-mm. antiaircraft guns nor the 756 37-mm. antitank

guns promised could be shipped before

the end of March. Schedules for tanks,

trucks, and planes could not be brought

up to date by 1 April, though they probably could be by the end of June. The

USSR would have to accept limited quantities of ammunition. Schedules for a few

chemicals and explosives could not be

met before the end of August. Stimson

asked that the President approve these

departures as specific amendments. He

closed with the further warning:

It is also necessary to point out now that

we are at war that any substantial failure to

produce supplies as scheduled must serve as

a basis for readjustment of the amounts to be

forwarded . . . . I feel that I must, as a

matter of caution, point out that exigencies

may arise as a result of our entry into the war

which preclude us from making any absolute

commitments.3

1

 (1) Draft memo, Marshall for President, circa 13

Dec 41, sub: Aid to Russia, WPD 4557-30. (2) Related

papers in same file. (3) See above, Ch. IV. 2

 Ltr, President to SW, 28 Dec 41, AG 400.3295

(8-14-41) Sec 1. 3

 Ltr, SW to President, 30 Dec 41, AG 400.3295

(8-14-41) Sec 1.
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—I 553

The President accepted Stimson's recommendations as "minimum schedules,"

but reiterated that the objective must remain as before—to re-establish monthly

protocol schedules at the earliest practicable time and make up all deficits by 1

April.4 Restricting the discussion for the

moment entirely to the question of availability of materials, even the minimum

schedules represented a difficult goal to

meet. With production of many critical

items still meager, meeting the protocol

involved many sacrifices for an Army just

entering a major war itself. Whereas British allocations could be adjusted within

the assignments machinery on the basis of

production rates, actual need, and other

factors, the protocol commitments were

rigid.

There were additional problems of

meeting Soviet specifications on some

items, modifications of American standard

equipment necessary for use in the USSR

on others, and the provision of adequate

spare parts and accessories. For some time

after the Soviet Government had been

formally placed under lend-lease, it continued to regard supplies procured in the

United States as purchases and to impose

the most critical standards before accepting materials. The military needs of the

Red Army were made known in the

United States largely through civilian

technicians. These Soviet representatives

were slow to take any action without the

approval of their superiors in Moscow,

and at the same time extremely critical of

American efforts. They were at first quite

reluctant to accept U.S. standards of inspection, packing, and shipping equipment. They changed specifications for

items frequently, and were rigorous in

their insistence that every change be effected before they would accept the equipment. Since the First Protocol was negotiated before all their needs could crystallize,

new demands were constantly presented

in keeping with the developing pattern of

the war in the USSR and Soviet discovery

of desirable items of American production. New requests were submitted in

early 1942 for such articles as tractors,

rubber floats, transport planes, tarpaulins,

webbing, radio equipment, radar, Sten

submachine guns, and pyroxylin smokeless

powder. The Soviet representatives pressed

continually for larger scales of ammunition and spare parts, insisting that even

the scales promised were not being met.

Though frequently dilatory themselves in

submitting detailed specifications, they

were implacable in insisting on special efforts to meet their needs, and threw the

blame for any delays on the War Department in nearly every instance. Since shipments were far behind schedule, War Department representatives had to be constantly on the defensive.

Despite the difficulty of doing business

with Soviet representatives, by utmost exertions the War Department was soon

making progress toward reducing or wiping out deficits in nearly every category of

equipment for which it was responsible.

Allocations for the Soviet Union set up by

MAC(G) and MAC(A) in February and

March promised that with few exceptions

Stimson's revised schedules would be met

by the end of June 1942, and these schedules were generally adhered to. Tanks,

trucks, and planes were made available

in only slightly less than scheduled quantities. This required taking all gas-powered light tanks from U.S. forces in March

and canceling the British assignment for

4

 Ltr, President to SW, 4 Jan 42, Auth File of President's Ltrs, DAD.
554 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

April. The entire U.S. production of field

wire in January went to the USSR, 90

percent of it in February and March. The

only serious failure to meet protocol commitments, it appeared in mid-April,

would be in antiaircraft and antitank

guns, where it was decided U.S. Army

needs would not permit deliveries.5

Of new Soviet requests, some were met

immediately, while others, for various

reasons, remained the subject of negotiations for a second protocol. Requests for

Sten submachine guns were met by offering standard .45-caliber Thompsons, a

start was made on deliveries of tractors,

rubber boats, tarpaulins, and webbing,

and the Russians were granted 10 percent

of the powder production of the country

to provide for their need for pyroxylin

smokeless powder. Initiation of a program

for radio equipment was stalled by Soviet

failure to present proper specifications,

and requests for radar were turned down

in the first instance.6 General Marshall

steadfastly refused to allow transport

planes to be diverted to the USSR despite

pressure from Hopkins, the President, and

even the Navy. The MAB went so far as

to assign twenty-nine transports in April

for delivery in May and June, but its decision was reversed by the CCS on Marshall's insistence. "I can no more agree to

the diversion of additional transport plane

equipment to Russia," he wrote Admiral

King, "while charged with a primary responsibility for the preparation of a major

offensive, . . . than you could approve

the diversion of ships from naval task

forces forming for operations in the immediate future."

 7

Judging from Soviet complaints, the

most serious defect in the War Department program lay in the lack of sufficient

ammunition, spare parts, and accessories

to accompany major items, lack of co-ordination of complementary equipment,

and the defective condition of some of the

material shipped. Complaints on these

matters began with the first shipments

and continued long after. The lack of sufficient ammunition could be remedied

only by increased production, and so it

gradually was. The Soviet allotment in

rounds per gun was twice increased between January and June 1942, though it

still remained under the stated Soviet requirement. The spare parts situation was

less excusable, as was that of shipment of

defective equipment. Many of the first

tanks and planes shipped via the northern

route, the Soviets reported, could not be

put into action. The most flagrant case

was that of fighter planes shipped from

the United States to the USSR on British

account. For some time the British and

Americans bandied back and forth the responsibility for furnishing spares and accessories for these planes. The spare parts

problem in general was gradually ironed

out by more aggressive action by the War

Department, under Soviet pressure, to see

that standard U.S. scales were shipped.

But even as these steps were taken, the

Russians turned to insist that the U.S.

standard scale was inadequate for the in5

 (1) Correspondence between Soviet representatives and War Department agencies, principally the

Defense Aid Division, is in Russia Corresp Lend-lease

1-5 files, and USSR Mis file, ID. (2) Rpts, SW to

President, 17 Feb, 17 Mar, and 17 Apr 42, sub: Progress on Soviet Protocol, AG 400.3295 (8-14-41) Sec 1.

(3) Min 37, 7th mtg MAC(G), 26 Feb 42. 6

 See lengthy correspondence in Russia Corresp

Lend-lease 2-5 files, DAD. 7

 (1) Ltr, Marshall to King, 27 Apr 42, AG

400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 2. (2) On this incident, see

Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, pp.

206-10.
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—I 555

tensive combat use required in the RussoGerman war.8

To prevent shipment of defective equipment, the Soviet Military Mission in

Washington insisted that the only remedy

was to allow inspection by their agents before the material left factories. Secretary

Stimson granted this privilege, very carefully circumscribed, in February 1942.

Soviet complaints decreased thereafter,

though this probably resulted more from

increased War Department care in inspections and shipment than from Soviet inspection at the factories.

Most of the early difficulties, as Stimson informed the Soviet representatives,

were due to the hasty manner in which

the Soviet aid program had been inaugurated. As production increased, Soviet

needs were fitted into existing long-range

requirements plans, and difficulties in

making equipment available gradually

diminished, though meeting the protocols

continued to entail certain sacrifices of

U.S. Army needs. As procedures were

ironed out, difficulties over spares, ammunition, and defective equipment were

relegated to the status of administrative

problems to be solved by consultation between Soviet representatives and those of

the SOS. Though it cannot be said that

anything like the co-operation that characterized British-American relations on

this level came into being, definite channels were established, and the Soviet

representatives agreed to limit their activities to these channels. On the American

side, there was an increased understanding of the peculiar needs of the Russians

and of the Soviet manner of negotiating.

There remained matters of fundamental

understanding, of unity of purpose and

harmony of ideals that never were and

never could be settled, but given the raison

d'être of the program, an adequate apparatus for handling mechanical details had

evolved before the end of the First Protocol period. In the meantime, the big problem to emerge was that of shipping the

supplies made available at such sacrifice.9

The First Protocol

and the Shipping Problem

The requirement of cargo tonnage for

Soviet aid was in constant competition

with shipping requirements to execute

strategic plans for Anglo-American operations. Even when ships were provided,

the routes to the USSR were long, limited

in capacity, and subject to enemy interference. To keep them open or to develop

them required commitment of other vital

military and naval resources.

As recounted earlier, the President and

the Prime Minister at ARCADIA refused to

accept a 30 percent cut in shipments to

the Soviet Union as a condition to sending

the POPPY convoy to the Southwest Pacific

and ordered Hopkins and Beaverbrook to

8

 (1) See above, Ch. IV. (2) Corresp in Russia Coresp Lend-lease 1-5 files, DAD; Russia (2) file, DAD;

and USSR Mis 470.8 and 471, ID. (3) Rpt, 17 Mar

42, cited n. 5(2). (4) Msg 115 [Moscow to State Dept],

Brig Gen Philip R. Faymonville to McCabe, 18 Apr

42, Col Boone's file, Item 302, DAD. (5) Memo,

ACofS G-2 for CofS, 16 Feb 42, sub: Stf Conf With

Soviet Mil Auths, USSR Mis 336, ID. (6) Msg 131,

Kuibyshev to MILID, 23 Dec 41, Russian Info Cables

file, ID. (7) For details on spare parts question, see ID,

Lend-Lease, II, 1078-87. 9

 (1) Memo, Gen Repin, Soviet Mil Mis, to SW,

5 Feb 42. (2) Ltr, Stimson to Repin, 10 Feb 42. Both

in AG 400.3295 (8-14-41) Sec 1. (3) Memo, Somervell for Aurand, 23 Apr 42, with atchd copy of memo

handed Soviet Ambassador Maxim M. Litvinov, in

Russia Corresp Lend-lease 4 file, DAD. (4) Memo,

Soviet Purch Comm, 8 May 42, in response to memo,

Hq SOS WD, 22 Apr 42, Russia Corresp Lend-lease

5 file, DAD.
556 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

"find ships."

 10

 At ARCADIA consideration

was almost solely centered on the northern route, for the Russians insisted that

the bulk of material come that way, the

Persian Gulf ports were not yet prepared

to handle large tonnages, and the RussoJapanese situation was too uncertain to

allow any extensive use of the Pacific.

Shipping over the northern route had,

during 1941, been virtually unmolested

by the Germans, and though ships had to

be armed and convoyed by the British

Navy from Iceland onward, the problem

at ARCADIA and immediately afterward

was still primarily one of merchant shipping and not of naval convoy.

To float the cargo scheduled during

January 1942, OLLA reported that some

fifty ships would be necessary. Despite the

presidential fiat, Hopkins found it impossible to find this many. Effective control

over the allocation of shipping had yet to

be established, and the process of diversion of ships from civilian trades had only

begun. There were too few ships degaussed and equipped with antiaircraft

guns. Needs for emergency deployment of

U.S. troops to hold the line against the

Japanese got first priority in practice if not

in theory. Only twenty ships sailed from

the United States on the northern route to

the USSR during January, and four for

the Soviet Far East. By mid-January,

Roosevelt was "terribly disturbed" about

the situation, and wrote Admiral Land:

"You simply must find some ships that can

be diverted at once . . . ."

 11

 Despite this

admonition, there were even fewer sailings

in February. Though the rate was stepped

up in March, the progress of shipments

continued far behind schedule. On 17

March the President issued a far stronger

directive to Land telling him that shipping must be furnished to meet the protocol and could be taken from the South

American and Caribbean routes "regardless of other considerations."

 12

 This

meant, as Hopkins put it, "the Russian

protocol must be completed in preference

to any other phase of our war program."

 13

An intensive effort to make up the

backlog followed the President's directive.

In April some sixty-three ships with material for the Soviet Union departed for the

convoy rendezvous off Iceland, six for the

Persian Gulf, and ten for the Soviet Far

East. The President proposed to place

fifty ships monthly in regular service on

the northern route between March and

November, twenty-five from November

through February. WSA began to shape

its shipping plans around this schedule,

calculating incidentally that it would require a total commitment of 260 ships.14

While this massive shipping program

was thus taking shape, the Army was

struggling with the task of co-ordinating

availability of military equipment for

Russia with shipping. The necessity of carrying out initial troop and supply movements to overseas bases enormously com10

 (1) Min, conf at White House, 12 Jan 42, quoted

in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 465. (2) See

above, Ch. VI. 11

 (1) Note, President to Adm Land, 16 Jan 42, MS

Index to the Hopkins Papers, Bk. V, Aid to Russia,

p. 2, Item 10. (2) Ltr, Gen Spalding, OLLA, to Adm

Land, 31 Dec 41, Col Boone's file, Item 98, DAD.

(3) Report on War Aid to USSR, 28 Nov 45. (4) See

above, Ch. VII. 12

 Ltr, President to Adm Land, 17 Mar 42, Def Aid

Rpts on Russia to President folder, USSR Mis 319.1,

ID. See also, Roosevelt's letters to Stettinius and to

Donald Nelson at this time in same file. 13

 (1) Msg, Hopkins to Harriman and Faymonville,

18 Mar 42, MS Index to the Hopkins Papers, Bk. VII,

Second Soviet Protocol Agreement, p. 2, Item 10.

(2) See below, App. D. 14

 (1) See below, App. D. (2) Memo re mtg in Gen

Burns' off, 31 Mar 42, re Russia, Russian Shipg Matters 17 Mar-31 May 42 folder, WSA Douglas File.

(3) Related papers in same file.
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—I 557

plicated the task. Extensive use of the port

of New York for the latter purpose forced

a shift of cargo for the USSR to Boston,

and when it was decided to load troops at

Boston also, hasty arrangements had to be

made to divert Soviet shipments to Philadelphia, with the overflow to be taken

care of at Baltimore. These various shifts

created confusion in rail movements to

port. In addition, with no central co-ordinating agency to plan Soviet shipments,

the multifarious organizations involved

found themselves working at cross-purposes. The Soviet representatives continually complained that material they desired

to ship was not on hand in time to insure

prompt sailing of vessels under their control. They charged that even the low

scales of ammunition promised were not

being furnished in balance with the guns

in which it was to be used. Nevertheless,

as the volume of shipments mounted in

April, there was considerable improvement in all these matters. A Russian shipping board was formed, composed of

members of the Maritime Commission,

the Office of the Defense Aid Director and

the Lend-Lease Administration, which

met weekly with Soviet shipping representatives in the Commercial Traffic

Branch of the Office of The Quartermaster General. The airing given problems in

these conferences brought beneficial results. The general improvement in handling overseas shipments that followed the

confused experiences of early 1942 also

was soon reflected in the movement of

cargo to the USSR. By the end of April

1942, OLLA could report to the President

that "real effectiveness in getting supplies

to seaboard had been attained . . . ."

 15

Troubles on the northern route soon

eclipsed the successes gained in providing

ships and loading them efficiently. In February Hitler began to shift the weight of

his naval strength—submarines, surface

craft, and planes—to Norway. Ice conditions during the winter were the worst for

twenty-five years, forcing many ships to

turn back and the rest to follow closely

along the Norwegian coast. During the

long daylight hours the convoys of slow

freighters had to run the gantlet of German attacks. Losses, previously inconsequential, began to mount in March, and

each convoy became a serious fleet operation. As the rate of movement of convoys

slowed, the growing volume of ships coming from the United States resulted in a

logjam of shipping off Iceland. Fearing

that if British naval strength were concentrated too heavily in protecting the Murmansk convoys, the Germans would once

again shift their strength to the mid-Atlantic, Churchill and the British Admiralty decided in late April that only three

convoys of twenty-five to thirty-five ships

each could be sent through every two

months. Planned loadings in the United

States had meantime been going forward

on the supposition that 107 ships would

move in these convoys during May alone,

and the proposed curtailment came as a

great disappointment. Roosevelt at first

deplored the British decision, but finally

acquiesced on 3 May, expressing hope

that convoys could be kept at the maximum of thirty-five ships each.16

This curtailment of the northern convoys produced a hurried rearrangement

15

 (1) Status of the Soviet Aid Program as of April

30, 1942, rpt by OLLA to President. (2) See corresp

in Russia Corresp Lend-lease 1-4 files, DAD; and

G-4/33388. (3) Min of shipg confs, 27 Feb-2 Apr 42,

USSR Mis 337, ID. (4) WSA memo, unsigned, 6 Apr

42, sub: Orgn for Handling Shipts for Russia, Br Contl

of Shipg folder, WSA Douglas File. 16

 (1) Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 256-66. (2) Min,

16th mtg CCS, 21 Apr 42, Item 4.
558 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

of shipping plans in the United States.

There was great confusion, to say the

least, since so much depended on the actual size of the convoys the British could

maintain. After a series of hurried conferences, Harry Hopkins and Lewis Douglas

decided in late April that the berthing of

additional ships for northern Soviet ports

should be halted for the time being, that

as many ships as facilities would permit

should be diverted to the Persian Gulf,

and that all other ships scheduled for the

northern route in May should be diverted

to Army use except about ten to load

high-priority items that might be dispatched in advance of ships involved in

the log jam. As a result, only twenty-one

ships left the United States for northern

ports during May and June. Even these, it

proved, were far more than the number

for which the British could provide escort.

In May they sent through two convoys,

PQ-15 and PQ-16, totaling fifty-seven

ships, of which nine were lost. In June the

ill-fated convoy PQ-17 lost twenty-two out

of its thirty-three ships, and the British

were forced to suspend convoys entirely

during July and August. Twenty-two ships

with 129,000 tons of cargo for the Russians were unloaded in the United Kingdom and some of the material diverted to

the use of American and British forces

there. Others, loaded with cargo of higher

priority, remained in Scottish ports awaiting convoy, many not to sail until December, representing perhaps the most flagrant waste of cargo shipping during

1942.17

The net effect was to make it impossible

for the United States to meet its commitments under the First Protocol, since

neither the Persian Gulf nor the Pacific

route was yet ready to handle tonnages

that would substantially compensate.

Since all the material made available

could not be shipped, mounting backlogs

appeared in the United States. The increasing delicacy of relations with Stalin

prevented any move to modify the protocol commitments, and the War Department had to continue to make most articles available on schedule as before. The

45-day Rule18 was not generally applied to

protocol materials, and the adjustment of

backlogs became a matter of negotiation

with the Russians in each individual instance. The most serious problem was

that of military trucks. The protocol stipulated 10,000 trucks monthly, and by

April the War Department was finally

ready to meet this schedule and make up

most previous deficits. But for some time

the Russians placed a lower shipping priority on trucks than on munitions, and by

1 April 1942 there was a backlog of 28,-

000 assigned and unshipped, with an additional 20,000 scheduled for assignment

in April. Since the Russians shipped

standard U.S. Army trucks in preference

to nonstandard ones ordered especially

for them, the backlog was a particularly

serious one, for the Army could not use

nonstandard trucks. It was only with

great difficulty that the Soviet representatives were finally persuaded to agree to

17

 (1) Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 262-71. (2)

Memo, Aurand for Somervell, 30 Apr 42, sub: Conf

re Shipts to Russia. (3) Memo, Burns for Hopkins, 1

May 42, sub: Steps for Relieving Log jam of Ships for

Russia. (4) Memo, Burns for Hopkins, 4 May 42, sub:

Conf re Log Jam of Ships to Russia. Last three in

USSR Mis 337, ID. (5) Douglas' notes on conf with

Gen Burns, 27 Apr 42, Russian Shipg Matters 17

Mar-31 May 42 folder, WSA Douglas File. (6) Related papers in same file. (7) Memo, Douglas for

Hugh Fulton, 9 Apr 43, Russian Shipg 1 Jan 43

folder, WSA Douglas File. (8) Morison, Battle of the

Atlantic, pp. 169-92. (9) See below, App. D. (10) For

effects of this release of shipping to the Army on the

BOLERO program, see above, Ch. XIV. 18

 See above, Ch. X.
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—I 559

TABLE 15—WAR DEPARTMENT PERFORMANCE UNDER THE FIRST SOVIET PROTOCOL

*Information not supplied in source.

Source: Ltr, SW to President, 18 Aug 42, transmitting final rpt on mil items included in First (Moscow) Protocol, AG 400.3295 (8-14-41)

Sec 1.

ship trucks in an over-all ratio corresponding to the ratio of types in production for them. Despite the urgent recommendations of General Aurand, there was

little curtailment in truck assignments.19

While trucks were the outstanding

backlog problem, there were many others.

By the end of the First Protocol period

shipping rather than availability of supplies had become the principal bottleneck

and was to remain so. Table 15 shows

clearly both the extent to which the War

Department was successful in meeting

availability schedules and the extent to

which lack of shipping prevented the delivery of materials made available. Only

in the cases of antiaircraft and antitank

guns were there any signal failures to

furnish materials promised; while there

were other instances where availability did

not meet protocol commitments, the

amount furnished in each case was always

19

 (1) Memo, Capt H. W. Coon for Chief of Opns

Br Trans Div SOS, no date. (2) Telephone convs,

Aurand with Schley and McCabe of OLLA, 7 Apr

42. Both in ID 451 Russia, I. (3) Ltr, McCabe to

Lukashev, 11 Apr 42. (4) Ltr, Lukashev to McCabe,

17 Apr 42. (5) Ltr, I. I. Karzov, Soviet Purch Comm,

to Col Taylor, DAD, 14 Apr 42. Last three in Russia

Corresp Lend-lease 4 file, DAD. (6) Memo cited

n. 17(2).
560 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

greater than the Russians could ship. For

other items, the War Department went

beyond official promises, supplying, for

instance, more shoes, cloth, jeeps, and explosives than the Russians had originally

asked. It must be kept in mind, nevertheless, that much of the material shipped did

not reach the USSR, but was unloaded or

immobilized in England, or sent to the

bottom.

Formulation of the Second Protocol

The difficulties encountered in meeting

the First Protocol posed a serious question

as to the future course of the Soviet aid

program. As the cost of continuing shipments over the northern route mounted

there was an unmistakable competition

with the shipping requirements for BOLERO, and the opening of a second front after

all promised far greater relief to the Russians than the shipment of supplies. War

Department supply agencies, in negotiations with the Soviet Purchasing Commission on a multiplicity of new items,

were reluctant to make any promises as to

future schedules of delivery. Army strategic planners viewed aid to the USSR as

essential but subordinate to the main objective of invasion of Europe. The CCS in

their strategic directive for assignment of

munitions asked that the First Protocol be

re-examined as soon as possible, revised,

and extended to the end of 1942, the revised protocol to be "based upon giving

maximum aid to Russia within the transportation capabilities to the ultimate destination, provided essential United States

and British operations will not be unduly

handicapped."

 20

 However, the President

settled the whole issue when he wrote the

Secretaries of War and the Navy on

24 March 1942:

I understand that, from a strategical point

of view, the Army and Navy feel that aid to

Russia should be continued and expanded

to the maximum extent possible, consistent

with shipping possibilities and the vital needs

of the United States, the British Common- wealth of Nations and other of the United

Nations. I share such a view. In the near future, I expect to discuss this

question with the U.S.S.R. I desire that you

submit to me by April 6th next the monthly

assignment schedules of major items pertain- ing to your department which you recommend be offered the U.S.S.R. during the

period July 1, 1942-June 30, 1943. It is

appreciated that Soviet needs may not be

known, but, when necessary, assumptions

should be made which are based on your

estimate of the Soviet situation.21

Roosevelt designated Hopkins as his

agent to consolidate and co-ordinate recommendations of the various departments

and agencies, and each was asked to name

someone to represent its view in the formulation of the new protocol. Stimson

designated General Somervell to represent

the War Department. An informal interdepartmental committee came into being

that was to be formally constituted in

October 1942 as the President's Soviet

Protocol Committee, responsible for formulation and administration of the Soviet

aid program including co-ordination of

shipping therefor.22 Though it had, at least

on its military side, virtually an interlocking directorate with the MAB (Hopkins

was chairman and General Burns was

executive officer of both organizations), it

was not under the CCS.

20

 (1) CCS 50/2, 24 Mar 42, title: Dir for Asgmt of

Mun. (2) Memo, Aurand for Stettinius, 11 Mar 42,

sub: Negotiations With Respect to Continuance of

Russian Protocol, Russia Corresp Lend-lease 3 file,

DAD. (3) Related papers in same file. (4) Matloff and

Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-1942, pp. 174-83. 21

 Ltr, President to SW, 24 Mar 42, AG 400.3295

(8-14-41) Sec 1. 22

 Ltr, President to SW, 30 Oct 42, ID 031.1, IV.
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—I 561

War Department recommendations

were ready by 11 April 1942, and they

generally met the President's directive

that "aid to Russia should be continued

and expanded to the maximum extent

possible." For instance, proposed tank deliveries from the United States were increased from 2,250 over the nine-month

period of the First Protocol to 7,500 over

the twelve-month period of the second.

Truck schedules continued at ten thousand

monthly despite the shipping experiences

of the preceding months. Radio equipment and other new material, which had

been a subject of interim negotiations,

were added. Only in the case of planes

were the new schedules definitely disappointing to the Russians. Stimson accepted

AAF contentions and told the President

that only the existing rate—100 pursuits,

100 light bombers, and 12 heavy bombers

monthly—would be possible without seriously disrupting the development of an

AAF equal to its responsibilities. Stimson

also proposed that, to clear up backlogs

and to permit sufficient flexibility to meet

variations in production and shipping

availability, unfloated material offered

under the First Protocol should apply on

the second, and that only accumulated

totals for the first and second six months,

not monthly schedules, should be met.23

The War Department's offerings were

consolidated with those of other agencies

by the informal protocol committee, and

the total came to some 7.2 million short

tons of supplies—1.1 million tons of military and naval equipment, 1.8 million

tons of raw materials, machinery, and industrial equipment, and 4.3 million tons

of food products. With a British offering of

one million short tons, this made a grand

total of eight million tons on the joint

account of the two countries—several

times the amount offered on the First Protocol and, as events were proving, much

more than could possibly be shipped. The

Combined Shipping Adjustment Board

reported that three million tons could be

carried over the northern route, one million via the Persian Gulf, and estimated

that shipping could be found to float this

four million short tons on the assumption

that losses would not exceed 10 percent.

The current British estimate for the northern route was three convoys every two

months, an average of forty-five ships per

month. Figuring 6,000 tons to a ship, the

CSAB calculated convoy limitations

would still permit 3,240,000 short tons to

be carried over the northern route during

the twelve-month period, substantially in

accord with the port clearance capacities

in the USSR and with the shipping to be

available. No estimate was made for the

Vladivostok route because of the continuing uncertainty of Russo-Japanese relations. The informal protocol committee

therefore decided to offer the Russians

8 million short tons of material, from

which they would select the 4.4 million

tons they desired most.24

This seemingly careful estimate was

highly optimistic and concealed a competition for shipping with BOLERO and other

operations contemplated by the CCS. The

rate of loss on the convoy route during

March, April, and May had been 18 per23

 (1) Ltr, SW to President, 11 Apr 42, Def Aid

Rpts on Russia to President folder, USSR Mis 319.1,

ID. (2) Ltr, SW to President, 23 Apr 42, AG 400.3295

(8-14-41) Sec 2. (3) For British offerings under the

Second Protocol, see Russia Corresp Lend-lease 5 file,

DAD. These offers were a continuation of rates under

the First Protocol. Much of the material promised by

the British, planes in particular, was to come from the

United States under lend-lease to Britain. 24

 Memo, Gen Burns for JCS, 12 May 42, sub:

Status of Proposed 2d Russian Protocol, ABC 400.-

3295 Russia (4-19-42) Sec 1.
562 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

cent instead of 10 percent and prospects

were that losses would increase. The CSAB

had actually made its estimates on the

northern route before the convoy crisis,

and there is every indication that they

were based more on the estimated capacity of northern Soviet ports than on shipping or convoy limitations. The estimate

of one million tons via the Persian Gulf, as

will be shown later, was not based on any

realistic appraisal of the situation there. In

justice to Lewis Douglas, the American

representative on the CSAB, it should be

noted that he first placed Persian Gulf

capacity at 600,000 short tons and accepted the one million figure, apparently

under pressure, with some skepticism. He

wrote General Burns that it was "in excess of anything that has so far been lifted

and handled with reasonable dispatch

through Persian Gulf ports for Russian

account."

 25

 The figures on availability of

shipping were the most questionable of all

since the military planners continually

foresaw a deficit. On 4 May 1942 Admiral

King called some of these matters to the

attention of the JCS, pointing out the general shortage of shipping, the great difficulties encountered in getting convoys into

northern Soviet ports, and the requirements incident to manning a second front

in Europe, and suggested the protocol be

revised. He thought the BOLERO preparations ought to be a convincing argument

toward agreement on a reduction by the

Russians themselves.

As a result of King's representations, the

Joint Staff Planners undertook a study

and on 21 May came up with quite different conclusions from those of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. They

noted the loss rate on the northern route

and the fact that additional escort could

only be furnished by robbing convoys in

other areas. They also noted that the

Combined Military Transportation Committee was currently reporting an over-all

shortage of three million tons of shipping

to support Anglo-American operations

planned for 1942 and 1943 and that there

seemed no way of reconciling the CSAB

figures with these estimates. "In view of

the general shortage of shipping," they

concluded, ". . . the allocation of this

shipping to transport 4.4 millions tons of

munitions to Russia will, of necessity, curtail some other war effort."

 26

Admiral King and General Marshall

brought the matter to the personal attention of the President on 31 May, shortly

after the arrival of Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, on a mission to the United States and, in fact, after

Roosevelt had presented Molotov with the

draft protocol. The next day the President

did propose to Molotov that shipment of

general supplies during the next year be

curtailed from 2,300,000 tons to 700,000

in the interests of getting more shipping

for the second front, though he assured

Molotov that shipment of military supplies

would continue as planned. As Hopkins

reported part of the interview:

The President repeated that we expected

to set up a second front in 1942, but that

every ship we could shift to the English run

25

 (1) Memo, Douglas for Burns, 18 Apr 42, Russian

Shipg Matters 17 Mar-31 May 42 folder, WSA

Douglas File. (2) Related papers in same file. 26

 (1) JPS 28/1, 21 May 42, title: Russian Mun

Protocol. (2) Memo cited n. 25(1). General Burns at

the request of the JCS presented the informal protocol committee's estimates to them at the meeting on

12 May 1942 and informed them that the proposed

protocol was already at the White House for final approval by the President. (3) OPD notes on 17th mtg

JPS, 20 May 42. (4) Memo, Adm King for JCS, 1

May 42. Last two in ABC 400.3295 Russia (4-19-42)

Sec 1. (5) Min, 13th mtg JCS, 4 May 42; 14th mtg, 11

May 42, Item 11; 15th mtg, 18 May 42, Item 5. (6)

Min, 17th mtg JPS, 20 May 42, Item 6.
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—I 563

meant that the second front was so much

closer to being realized. After all, ships could

not be in two places at once, and hence, every

ton we could save out of the total of 4,100,000

tons would be so much to the good. The

Soviets could not have their cake and eat

it too.27

Molotov's replies were very guarded,

and he showed both a reluctance to give

up essential industrial supplies and some

doubt of American sincerity on the question of the second front. He even submitted a counterproposal for an American

naval convoy to Archangel. Since in fact

the prospects of the second front began to

fade shortly afterward, the President never

pushed his proposal for reduction any

further. As a consequence, there was little

the Joint Staff Planners could do but ignore the results of their own study. On

10 June 1942 they noted that the proposed

protocol was already in the hands of the

Russians and that "further study of this

subject with a view to revision would serve

no useful purpose at this time."

 28

Though the Second Protocol was not

formally signed until October, it was accepted by Soviet Ambassador Maxim M.

Litvinov on 7 July 1942 and really went

into effect on 1 July with the expiration of

the first agreement. As Stimson asked, materials resting available and unshipped

against the First Protocol were applied

against the second, lessening the burden of

assignment on items such as military

trucks, and taking care, at least momentarily, of the most serious backlog problems. The Second Protocol also contained

a safeguarding clause, somewhat stronger

than that in the first but still not as strong

as General Marshall had recommended.

The clause read, "It is understood that

any program of this sort must be tentative in character and must be subject to

unforeseen changes which the progress of

the war may require from the standpoint

of stores as well as from the standpoint of

shipping."

 29

General Marshall also tried to get a

clause inserted in the Second Protocol

providing for a possible reduction in aircraft deliveries. He proposed that:

Airplanes . . . be delivered up to August

15th to complete the Protocol Agreement for

30 June 1942. Thereafter the monthly rate of

100 pursuit, 100 light bombardment, and 12

medium bombardment planes will be supplied provided the rate of attrition suffered in

the British-American air offensive over the

European continent permits; but in any

event a monthly minimum of 50 pursuits, 50

light bombardment, and 12 medium bombardment planes will be guaranteed by the

United States.30

The President would not accept this condition and insisted that the minimum

commitment be set at 212 monthly until

October and afterward adjusted "on the

basis of developments incident to the progress of the war."

 31

 In accepting the protocol in July, Litvinov expressed the hope

that the aircraft schedules might be increased in October, and in the intervening

period the Russians exerted heavy pressure for such an increase.32

27

 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 570-75. Cf.

official figure of 4,400,000 tons. 28

 (1) Min, 19th mtg JPS, 10 Jun 42, Item 3. (2)

Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 574-76. 29

 (1) Ltr, Litvinov to Cordell Hull, 7 Jul 42. (2)

Memo, Burns for Hopkins, 20 Jun 42. (3) Ltr, Burns

to Maj Gen Alexander I. Belyaev, 23 Jun 42. (4) Ltr,

Belyaev to Burns, 23 Jun 42. All in ID 031.1, I. (5)

For official text of Second Protocol as adopted, see

U.S. Dept of State, Soviet Supply Protocols, Pub 2759.

For earlier drafts, see OPD 400.3295 Russia. (6) For

Marshall's suggestions on a safeguarding clause, see

min, 15th mtg JCS, 18 May 42, Item 5. 30

 Min cited n. 29(6). 31

 U.S. Dept of State, Soviet Supply Protocols, Pub,

2759. 32

 (1) Notes on War Council mtg, 18 May 42, SW

Confs file, Vol. II, WDCSA. (2) Ltr cited n. 29(1).
564 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

The Search for Alternate Routes

No sooner had the Second Protocol

been formulated and accepted than the

heavy losses on PQ-17 and the consequent

British decision to suspend the northern

convoys during July and August revealed

the tenuous character of the shipping estimates on which it was based. Shortly afterward came the President's and Prime

Minister's decision on the invasion of

North Africa, a step that meant there

would certainly be no second front in

Europe in 1942 and probably not in 1943.

A period of acute embarrassment for both

Churchill and Roosevelt vis-à-vis Stalin

ensued. There were serious doubts that the

convoys, even if resumed in September,

could be continued during the execution

of TORCH. In this situation, the U.S. Government turned to an intensive effort to

develop alternate routes for forwarding

supplies to the USSR.

The Pacific offered one obvious avenue

of approach. Ships flying the Soviet flag

had been carrying supplies to Vladivostok

from U.S. west coast ports since the inauguration of the Soviet aid program in

1941. During the summer months of 1942

these were supplemented by a limited program of shipments to Siberian arctic ports.

But Soviet flag shipping in the Pacific was

very limited, and American flag ships

could not use the route to Vladivostok because it ran directly through waters close

to the Japanese homeland. Even the Soviet

ships carried only civilian-type supplies.

In early July 1942 the Office of LendLease Administration suggested opening a

route through the Bering Strait and Arctic

Ocean around the northern fringe of

Siberia to Murmansk and Archangel,

pointing out that the Russians claimed

they were using this route during the summer months. Pursuing this idea, WSA

found some cargo vessels it considered

suited to arctic service, and in August

turned over seven of them and one tanker

to the Russians. But even the Russians apparently found this arctic route too formidable and instead placed the ships on the

regular run to Vladivostok. Since these

ships were able to proceed under the

Soviet flag unmolested by the Japanese,

further transfers were soon under consideration.33

In July and August 1942, however, as

the Germans pushed relentlessly forward

in the Caucasus, the Russians were insisting on shipment of finished munitions and

minimizing the need for civilian supplies.

In selecting material from the Second Protocol list, they specified that all items except foodstuffs would be taken at the full

rates offered.34 It was doubtful that the

Pacific route could ever serve for shipment

of planes, tanks, guns, and ammunition

since it was so vulnerable to interruption

by the Japanese. Vladivostok also was a

long way from the critical Soviet front in

the southern Caucasus. Americans had

but meager knowledge of Siberian port

facilities or of the ability of the TransSiberian Railway to transport supplies to

the European front. Operations in the Pacific were already placing a strain on shipping available there and transfers to the

33

 (1) Status of the Soviet Aid Program as of July

31, 1942, and Status of the Soviet . . . as of August

31, 1942, rpts by OLLA to President. (2) Ltr, John N.

Hazard, OLLA, to Maj Goodman, ID, 20 Jun 42,

USSR Mis 400.3295, ID. (3) Ltr, McCabe to Adm

Land, 2 Jul 42. (4) Memo, David Scoll for Lewis

Douglas, 15 Jul 42, sub: Resume of Russian Negotiations . . . . Last two in Russian Shipg 1 Jun-31 Dec

42 folder, WSA Douglas File. (5) Memo, Land and

Douglas for President, 12 Oct 42, Russia-Rpts to

President folder, WSA Douglas File. 34

 Status of the Soviet Aid Program as of November 30, 1942, rpt by OLLA to President.
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—I 565

Soviet flag could only be made at considerable sacrifice.

There was always the possibility of flight

delivery of planes. There were two possible ferry routes—one via Brazil, the South

Atlantic, central Africa, and the Persian

Gulf; the other via Alaska to Siberia. The

former route was the longer, involving

single flights possible only for bombers,

and dependent on availability of American pilots and development of airfields in

Iran. The latter route could accommodate

all types of planes, but presented problems of winterization, navigation under

difficult climatic conditions, and proper

facilities in Siberia for receipt of planes.

The United States first suggested the Alaskan ferry route in December 1941, but

found the Russians singularly unreceptive

and suspicious since they did not want to

give information on their airfields in

Siberia. The AAF thought a survey of

these facilities was necessary to proper

operation of the route.35 After Pearl Harbor, American military interest was dual,

for the Siberian air bases might eventually

be used for an air assault against Japan.

American insistence on linking this consideration with that of operation of the

ferry routes made Soviet officials even

more uncommunicative.

Finally, in May 1942, the USSR did

agree to consider taking plane deliveries

in Alaska if Soviet pilots flew them to

Siberia and if there were no question of

American operations in Soviet territory.

Taking advantage of this small opening,

the President proposed conversations in

Moscow, and a special air mission under

Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley was constituted

and sent to the USSR in July. Bradley

encountered the usual frustrations to

which American missions in Moscow were

subject, but was finally permitted by

Stalin to send a small survey party by

Soviet bomber over the ferry route. The

survey party agreed that the route was a

feasible one. Negotiations both in Washington and in Moscow then began to take

some curious turns. First the Russians,

evidently on the assumption that the full

protocol commitment of 212 planes

monthly would be flown over the route,

demanded 43 transport planes to ferry

Soviet crews back and forth from Alaska.

The War Department, still facing a critical

shortage of transports and wishing to test

both the route and Soviet intentions before committing itself completely, offered

only ten. The Soviet Government first

agreed on this basis that ferrying operations should commence on a reduced scale

in September, and then suddenly on

21 September, after the AAF had started

the movement of planes to Fairbanks,

Alaska, Maj. Gen. Alexander I. Belyaev,

head of the Russian military mission in

Washington, announced that only the

planes then at Fairbanks would be delivered by the ferry. The War Department,

quite irritated, decided the route was

closed, and refused to turn the ten transports over to the Russians. Just as suddenly on 6 October 1942, Belyaev again

reversed his position and said the USSR

was ready to go ahead with the program.36

There seems little explanation for these

turnabouts beyond some mysterious policy

35

 (1) State Dept Msg 2066, Kuibyshev and Faymonville to Spalding, 16 Dec 41, Cables From Russia

file, ID. (2) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-

1942, Ch. XV. 36

 (1) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-

1942, Ch. XV. (2) For more detailed account, see Edwin M. Snell, The USSR in U.S.-British Plan's and

Operations in 1942, research draft MS, OCMH. (3)

OPD Diary, 9, 12, 15, 21, 27, 28 Aug, 24, 27 Sep, and

5-7 Oct 42 entries, OPD Hist Unit File. (4) Msg 135,

Marshall to Bradley, 6 Sep 42, AG 400.3295 (9-6-42)

(1).
566 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

decisions in the inner councils of the Politburo. Be this as it may, there was no further Soviet opposition to delivery of planes

by the Alaskan route as long as Soviet

pilots and crews took delivery in Alaska.

Bradley proposed, and the JCS agreed,

that the route be developed by May 1943

so that it could handle all the planes assigned to the Soviet Union, and about half

the monthly assignment in the meantime.

Immediate results were disappointing.

There were insufficient transport planes to

ferry the Soviet pilots and crews. Delays

developed in providing proper winterization equipment and navigational apparatus for flights over the Bering Sea. Deliveries continued meager during the fall and

winter of 1942-43 and failed to take the

major burden off the Atlantic route. Only

eighty-five planes were actually delivered

via Alaska through the end of 1942. Nor

could the South Atlantic ferry route carry

more than a small number of light and

medium bombers. The rest had still to be

transported by water to the Persian Gulf

or over the northern convoy route if they

were to be delivered at all.37

Thus, the Persian Gulf remained the

only alternative to the northern route for

all types of war material. By August 1942

the Persian Gulf had come to occupy the

most important place in Anglo-American

plans for continuing supply to the USSR.

In September the CCS agreed that the

U.S. Army should assume responsibility

for development of port and transportation facilities there, and it is necessary to

pause briefly here to review the background for this decision.

Development of the Persian Gulf

January-July 1942

The Persian Gulf lay within the British

area of strategic responsibility and the initial American conception was that the

British should develop and operate the

supply line there with American material

aid and the technical assistance of General

Wheeler's Iranian mission. But the British

had only limited means available, and

were concerned with supplying their own

forces in Iran and Iraq as well as with developing a supply line to the Soviet Union.

Pursuit of the two objectives together was

not always compatible. Beyond this, the

Russians themselves were difficult to deal

with and slow to accept the necessity for

deliveries via the Persian Gulf rather than

over the exposed northern convoy route.

When the British took over southern

Iran in August 1941, they faced a formidable task in developing the line of communications. The only port in the area

with any considerable capacity (outside

that on Abadan Island, reserved almost

exclusively for handling the products of

the large oil refinery there) was Basra in

Iraq. The British needed nearly all Basra's

capacity for their own military use. The

Iranian ports proper—Khorramshahr,

Bandar Shahpur, Tanuma, Bushire, and

Ahwaz—lacked dock and handling facilities. The Iranian State Railway, which

ran northward from Bandar Shahpur to

the Caspian Sea, was constructed on modern lines, but lacked rolling stock and was

capable of carrying only 6,000 tons

monthly. Motor roads northward from the

ports were poor and undeveloped. (See

Map 7.) The capacity of the British truck

assembly plant at Bushire and plane assembly facilities at Shubaiba near Basra

were little more than sufficient to meet

37

 (1) Snell MS cited n. 36(2). (2) OLLA rpt cited

n. 34. (3) Rpt, SW to President, 9 Dec 42, sub:

Progress on Soviet Protocol, AG 400.3295 (9-1-42) (3)

Sec 12. (4) Rpt, SW to President, 10 Feb 42, ID 031.1,

II.
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—I 567

requirements of the British Army.

By an aggressive program of development, the British proposed to increase facilities in the Persian Gulf so that by the

spring of 1942 some 60,000 to 100,000

tons of material could be forwarded to the

USSR monthly. The achievement of this

goal was predicated on extensive American aid, plans for which were submitted

in Washington by General Wheeler in December 1941 and January 1942. It will be

recalled that in these plans the larger

assembly and distributing centers were to

be in Karachi, India. These centers were

not only to serve the British in India but

also as points for storage and transshipment of lend-lease supplies for both the

British and the Russians via the Persian

Gulf, and as a direct point of supply for a

secondary route to the USSR running

from Karachi via Zahidan and Meshed

to Ashkhabad on a rail line within the

Soviet Union. At the head of the Persian

Gulf itself, the Americans would undertake improvement of port facilities at

Umm Qasr in Iraq and at Khorramshahr

and Bandar Shahpur in Iran, and adjacent road and rail connections; they would

operate a plane assembly plant at

Abadan, two TUP truck assembly plants

at Andimeshk, Iran, and ordnance repair

and assembly centers at Umm Qasr. It

was also seriously proposed that the Americans operate the Iranian State Railway

in the British zone.38

The failure of the War Department to

provide either the personnel or supplies

required for Wheeler's projects in the

period immediately following Pearl Harbor and the reasons therefor have already

been noted.39 First priority within the

limited resources available went to projects designated for support of the British.

The reason lay not only in the fact of British control in the Persian Gulf, but also in

Soviet insistence on the use of the northern route. In late December, the Soviet

ambassador in Iran informed Wheeler

that only 2,000 trucks and 100 light

bombers should be delivered monthly

through the Persian Gulf, all other war

supplies by the northern ports. The USSR

objected to the Zahidan route, claiming

that it would provide supplies too far from

the combat zone, and that it was too

poorly developed for use in the near future. This insistence on limited use of the

Persian Gulf route seemed to justify postponement of projects for Soviet aid save

for truck and plane assembly plants. The

first American personnel to arrive were

assigned the task of developing the port of

Umm Qasr in Iraq. The suggestion that

the Americans take over the Iranian State

Railway was dropped. General Wheeler

centered most of his attention on Karachi

in India and in February was given additional duties as head of General Stilwell's

SOS.40

Shipments of material via the Persian

Gulf during the early months of 1942 were

accordingly very limited and were cut

back from the December 1941 schedule,

when some seven fully loaded and five

38

 (1) For a fuller story of project planning, see

Motter, Persian Corridor, pp. 44-59, 63, 143-45, 124-

27. (2) See also above, Ch. XVIII. (3) Brig R. Micklem, Army: Transportation, THE SECOND WORLD

WAR, 1939-1945 (London, His Majesty's Stationery

Office, 1950), pp. 73-92. (4) Ltr, Gen Spalding to

Gen Greely, 28 Nov 42, USSR Mis 617, ID. (5) Ltr,

Wheeler to Moore, 19 Jan 42, Iranian Mis 600.12, ID. 39

 See above, Ch. XVIII. 40

 (1) Motter, Persian Corridor, pp. 56-57, 63-64,

335-37. (2) Msg MASTA NOSSY 1295, London to

Salter, 4 Dec 41. (3) Msg MASTA NOSSY 1307,

London to Salter, 4 Dec 41. (4) Msg VVY/802/Q,

ARMINDIA to War Off, London, 14 Jan 42. Last

three in USSR Mis 635, ID. (5) Msg VVY/757/Q,

Wheeler to Moore [via Br channels], 13 Jan 42, Iranian Mis 600.12, ID.
568 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

partially loaded ships sailed from the

United States carrying mainly trucks and

planes. During January 1942 the only

cargo for the Russians dispatched to the

Persian Gulf was some deck-loaded

planes; during February the total, on two

fully loaded and twelve partially loaded

ships, was only 6,000 tons. In accordance

with Soviet wishes, plans were laid on the

basis of maximum shipments of 2,000

trucks, one hundred planes, and perhaps

400 tons of miscellaneous cargo monthly.

Pending the development of American

facilities at Andimeshk and Abadan, the

British had to assemble the trucks at

Bushire and the planes at Basra. Port

facilities at Basra had to carry the bulk of

the load. Native drivers operating under

the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation (UKCC), a government sponsored transportation agency, delivered the

assembled trucks over rough roads to the

Russians at Tehran. The RAF handled

the planes. The Russians complained of

slow deliveries and of defects in the trucks

and planes when they arrived. Soviet inspectors would accept nothing less than

perfection, and the British were obviously

unable to deliver equipment in perfect

condition. The Americans, who had a

measure of responsibility for these deliveries, found themselves without the power

to substantially affect them since they

could dictate to neither the British nor the

Russians.41

The existence of a second American

mission in the area specifically charged

with expediting the flow of materials to

the USSR further complicated the picture. The U.S. Military Mission to the

USSR under General Greely had originally expected to enter the Soviet Union

and there render technical advice and assistance to the Russians on the use of

American lend-lease, but the Russians

showed no inclination to accept such assistance. General Greely and his small

party arrived in Basra in mid-February

1942 and then moved to Tehran, but were

unable to obtain visas from the Soviet

Government to permit them to enter the

USSR. At Tehran, Greely inevitably became involved in expediting the flow of

supplies through Iran.42

The effects of this early confusion and

neglect were increasingly felt as the need

for routing shipments via the Persian

Gulf mounted during March, April, and

May 1942. The Russians agreed that some

general supplies might be sent that way in

addition to trucks and planes; the tonnage

shipped in March mounted to eighteen

thousand and to twenty-one thousand in

April.43

When the SOS decided in early April

to limit the objectives of the Middle East

missions to realizable projects, first priority was shifted from the projects for the

British in Iraq to the Soviet aid projects

in Iran. The Americans moved their small

construction force from Umm Qasr to

Khorramshahr. Simultaneously, General

41

 (1) Report on War Aid to USSR, 28 Nov 45. (2)

Ltr, Gen Moore to Brig W. E. R. Blood, Br Army Stf,

22 Jan 42, sub: Deliveries to Russia via Persian Gulf

and India, G-4/33388. (3) State Dept Msg 82, Faymonville to McCabe, 24 Mar 42, ID 451 Russia, I. (4)

Msg 16, Tehran to AGWAR, 27 Mar 42, AG 400.-

3295 (8-14-41) Sec 1. (5) Msg 100, AMSIR to

AGWAR, 31 Mar 42, AG 400.3295 (8-9-41) Sec 4.

(6) For fuller account of early assembly and delivery

problems, see Motter, Persian Corridor, pp. 124-55. 42

 (1) For formation of Greely mission, see above,

Ch. IV. (2) For full account of Greely mission, see

Motter, Persian Corridor, pp. 65-81. 43

 (1) Report on War Aid to USSR, 28 Nov 45. (2)

Ltr, L. A. Razin, Soviet Purch Comm, to W. C. Armstrong, OLLA, 12 Mar 42. (3) Ltr, Armstrong to

Razin, 17 Mar 42. (4) Ltr, William O. Hart, WSA, to

Armstrong, 21 Mar 42. Last three in USSR Mis 635,

ID. (5) See below, App. D.
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—I 569

Wheeler was assigned exclusively as commanding general of Stilwell's SOS in India, and his deputy, Col. Don G. Shingler,

was appointed chief of the Iranian mission. In addition, the Greely mission was

dissolved in early May, General Greely

reassigned as military adviser to the Iranian Government, and his duties with regard to Soviet lend-lease transferred to

Shingler. These steps at least made the

forwarding of supplies to the USSR the

primary mission of the Americans in Iran,

though the original conception that they

should only aid the British and not assume

responsibility for these deliveries themselves remained unchanged. Also, Shingler

was not yet assured of any considerable

number of service troops or quantities of

supplies to carry out his mission.44

There was a certain lack of realism,

therefore, in the decision at the end of

April, when the convoys over the northern

route were curtailed, to divert large tonnages to the Persian Gulf. In a conference

held by Harry Hopkins and General

Burns with WSA and SOS officials, it was

decided that twelve ships should be dispatched there in May and twelve in June.

Then, at the instigation of the Russians,

who now reversed their previous position,

Hopkins proposed that eight more should

be allocated monthly if the Persian Gulf

could handle them. Previous restrictions

on types of cargo were lifted, and May

shipments included all sorts of munitions

and some civilian supplies in addition to

trucks and planes. Actual tonnages

shipped zoomed upward from 21,000 in

April to 87,000 in May and 91,000 in

June. As noted earlier, plans for the Second Protocol were shaped on the basis of

forwarding one million short tons of cargo

via the Persian Gulf over a twelve-month

period.45

These decisions were hastily made in an

atmosphere of sudden crisis, and not based

on any studied conclusions of what port

and inland clearance capacities in the

Persian Gulf actually were. Hopes that

twenty ships might be accommodated in

any one month in the near future were

soon dashed. Shingler reported that Iranian ports could not possibly handle

twenty ships (120,000 tons of Soviet cargo)

until the end of October 1942, when

planned improvements were scheduled

for completion. Even then inland clearance would be limited to 78,000 tons

monthly, and there would be insufficient

storage to take care of the excess pending

improvement in clearance capacity.

American and British shipping authorities

agreed that maximum capacity for Soviet

lend-lease in July and August, when the

heavy May-June shipments would start

to arrive, would be much less. The British

Ministry of War Transport tended to be

somewhat more pessimistic than Shingler

about the possible pace of development.46

Authorities in Washington were reluctant, nevertheless, to curtail the rate of

44

 (1) For the story of the early plan for militarization of the Middle East missions and the cutback in

personnel in April, see above, Ch. XVIII. (2) See also,

Motter, Persian Corridor, pp. 63-64, 79-81. (3) Msg

100, AGWAR to AMSIR, 10 Apr 42, AG 400.3295

(8-9-41) Sec 4. 45

 (1) Memo, Col Baird for Gen Aurand, 8 May 42,

sub: Russian Shipts in May and June, Iranian Mis

563.5, ID. (2) Report on War Aid to USSR, 28 Nov

45. (3) Msg, AGWAR to AMSIR, 20 May 42, CMOUT 4018. (4) Msg, Basrah to IMMEDIATE

AMSIR, 26 May 42, CM-IN 7325. (5) Ltr, McCabe

to Land, 5 May 42, Russian Shipg Matters 17 Mar31 May 42 folder, WSA Douglas File. 46

 (1) Msg, AMSIR, Basra, to AMSIR, Washington, 17 May 42, CM-IN 4571. (2) Msg, AMSIR,

Basra, to AMSIR, Washington, 7 Jun 42, CM-IN

2226. (3) Msg, Seaholm, WSA Basra, to Wilcox, WSA

Washington, 6 May 42. (4) Msg MAST 14188

SABLO 7, BMWT, London, to BMWT, Washington,

10 May 42. Last two in Iranian Mis 563.5, ID.
570 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

TRUCKING SUPPLIES TO TEHRAN through the Persian Corridor. The mountainous

terrain necessitated the construction of many switchbacks on this highway.

shipment, and there was only a moderate

cutback in July and August 1942 (to

63,000 and 66,000 gross long tons, respectively). Meanwhile, there was an inevitable time lag in applying the other possible

remedy—acceleration in the pace of

development of facilities. The main result

was heavily increased pressure for accomplishment, but there was no over-all plan

and divided responsibilities in the Persian

Gulf area continued to cause confusion.

Shipments of necessary transportation,

construction, and port equipment, both to

the British and to Shingler's command,

were expedited, but the effects of earlier

neglect could not be erased by this belated

action. Also, too frequently delays developed in shipping the most critical items—

for example, port cranes, rail equipment,

and heavy construction supplies. In no

particular did progress during the three

months following the May decision justify

optimism about the capacity of the Persian Gulf, and the heavy shipments to the

Gulf ports inevitably brought an increasing threat of port congestion.

Shingler's predictions proved highly

optimistic. Development of the ports

lagged behind the schedule on which these

predictions were based. Inland clearance,

which as Shingler pointed out was the

biggest bottleneck, lagged even further.

The Iranian State Railway, necessarily

the primary reliance, had to fulfill certain

normal obligations for the Iranian civilian

economy and for hauling supplies for the
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—I 571

TRAIN LOADED WITH TANKS FOR THE USSR winds through the hills in Iran.

British Army in Iran, Polish forces the

British were evacuating from the USSR

through Iran, and oil from coastal refineries, as well as material from the United

States for the USSR. Shipment of rolling

stock and rails from the United States,

promised in 1941, was not well under way

until July 1942; operation by native labor

under British supervision was far from

satisfactory; construction of line extensions fell behind schedule. As late as August 1942, the Iranian State Railway

carried only 35,770 long tons of supplies

for all purposes, of which only 12,440 were

Soviet lend-lease. The trucking operations of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation were but a poor supplement. UKCC operations were handicapped by bad roads or lack of roads,

insufficient trucks, poor handling by

native drivers, and inefficiency in management. Both Somervell and Shingler suggested, as early as May 1942, that an

American trucking fleet be sent to supplement that of the UKCC, but the proposal

received little immediate consideration.

In fact, since road construction lagged

further behind than any other single activity (for lack of heavy construction equipment), the supplementary trucking fleet

could have had little appreciable effect

without a concomitant program of road

development. While the two U.S. truck

assembly plants at Andimeshk and Bandar Shahpur and the plane assembly plant

at Abadan were in operation by the end of

April, it took time to develop efficient operation, and truck assembly was further

THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—I 573

limited by the lack of port and inland

clearance capacity.47

Such was the situation in the Persian

Corridor when the cancellation of the

northern convoys in July 1942 convinced

the highest authorities in Washington and

London that it would have to serve as the

only dependable route for forwarding military supplies to the USSR. This new

urgency meant that the May target of one

million short tons over the Second Protocol year would have to be pushed upward

before there was any assurance, in the

light of the actual state of facilities in the

Persian Gulf, that this one-million-ton figure could be met. The only possible answer lay in the development of a co-ordinated plan for improvement of Iranian

facilities and the commitment of additional resources to the task. In the opinion of

all concerned, only the Americans were

capable of accomplishing this feat. (Map 7)

47

 (1) Report on War Aid to USSR, 28 Nov 45. (2)

Motter, Persian Corridor, pp. 101-55 and App. A,

Table 5. (3) Micklem, Army: Transportation, pp. 74,

81-88. (4) Msg, AGWAR to AMSIR, 9 May 42, CMOUT 1887. (5) Msg, Basrah to AMSIR, Washington,

18 May 42, CM-IN 4957. (6) Msg, Basrah to AMSIR,

Washington, 7 Jun 42, CM-IN 2226. (7) Msg,

AGWAR to AMSIR, 9 Jun 42, CM-OUT 1957. (8)

Msg, Basrah to AMSIR, Washington, 1 Jul 42, CMIN 0483. (9) Msg, AGWAR to AMSIR, 4 Jul 42,

CM-OUT 1005. (10) Msg, Basrah to AMSIR, Washington [Spalding to Burns], 1 Aug 42, CM-IN 0028.

(11) Msg, Somervell to Spalding, 10 Aug 42, CMOUT 2907.
CHAPTER XXI

The Long Road to Russia—II

The Persian Gulf

Decision on U.S. Responsibility

In anticipation of the British decision to

suspend the northern convoys during

July and August 1942, Averell Harriman

suggested to Harry Hopkins on 13 July

that to increase the flow of supplies

through the Persian Gulf the Americans

should offer to take over the Iranian State

Railway. In replying on 16 July to

Churchill's formal notification of the suspension, the President endorsed Harriman's proposal. Meanwhile, Brig. Gen.

Sidney P. Spalding, General Burns' assistant on the MAB executive staff, had been

dispatched to the Persian Gulf to report at

first hand on means of improving operations. Though initially concerned with the

goals set up in May, Spalding soon turned

his attention to projects for a much greater

increase in the capacity of the supply line

through Iran. Brig. Gen. Philip R. Faymonville flew down from Moscow to lend

his advice, and both Churchill and Harriman came to Cairo and Tehran after

their visit to Stalin in August. All except

Faymonville assembled in Cairo in late

August, and Shingler came over from

Basra to join the conclave. The result of

their studies, estimates, and consultations

was a recommendation from Maj. Gen.

Russell L. Maxwell to the War Department on 22 August 1942 that the United

States take over responsibility not only for

the Iranian State Railway but also for the

Iranian ports and operate a truck fleet to

supplement that of the UKCC. A day

later, Churchill formally proposed this

solution to the President. "Only in this

way," he said, "can we insure an expanding flow of supplies to Russia while building up the military forces which we must

move into Northern Persia to meet a possible German advance."

 1

On 25 August the President directed

the War Department to prepare a plan,

and the detailed task was assigned the

SOS. The SOS Plan, prepared by the

Strategic Logistics Division, was ready by

4 September. General Somervell himself

dictated the conclusions and recommendations.2

 The task of the SOS was to formulate definite and realistic goals For performance, calculate the manpower, materials, and shipping necessary to accomplish

them, and evaluate the possibilities of furnishing these resources in relation to other

approved programs and plans. The recommendations drawn up at Cairo formed

the foundation on which the SOS Plan

1

 Msg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 22 Aug 42, quoted

in Motter, Persian Corridor, p. 190; see also, pp. 175-

91. (2) Msg AMSME 857, to AGWAR, 23 Aug 42,

CM-IN 9806. 2

 Plan for the Operation of Certain Iranian Communications Facilities Between Persian Gulf Ports

and Teheran by U.S. Army Forces, 3 Sep 42, Persian Gulf 235 folder, OCMH. Papers relating to

the formulation of the plan are in Control Division,

ASF, folder of same title (hereafter cited as SOS Plan

folder, Contl Div ASF).
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—II 575

was built. These recommendations were

based on a minimum goal of 200,000

tons of Soviet aid monthly via the Persian

Gulf, more than twice the amount contemplated in May. Maxwell proposed

U.S. operation of Iranian rail facilities

south of Tehran, dock facilities at Bandar

Shahpur, Khorramshahr, Tanuma, and

Bushire, and the establishment of an

American trucking organization to operate out of these ports. The British would

remain responsible for the ports of Basra

in Iraq, Abadan and Ahwaz in Iran, and

for continuing their existing truck lines.

(See Map 7.) The conferees agreed on the

target for the four U.S.-operated ports as

261,000 tons monthly, for the railroad as

180,000 tons monthly north of Andimeshk,

and for combined American, British, and

Russian trucking operations as 172,000

tons monthly. Accomplishment of these

objectives would provide capacity for

200,000 tons of Soviet aid monthly in addition to tonnages necessary to supply

British and Polish forces and the Iranian

civilian economy, with some reserve capacity remaining.3

The troop requirements calculated at

Cairo to meet these objectives were three

port battalions, two railway operating

battalions, one engineer battalion, and

two truck regiments—a total of approximately 8,365. Material requirements in

addition to organizational equipment for

the service troops were set at 75 additional

steam locomotives, 2,200 20-ton freight

cars or their equivalent in 40-ton cars for

the railway, and 7,200 trucks, averaging

seven tons in capacity, for the trucking

fleet.4

SOS planners accepted the proposed

division of responsibility, the tonnage targets, and material requirements agreed at

Cairo, but found it necessary to expand

the troop basis to nearly three times that

of the Maxwell estimates to provide for a

balanced service command. The final

troop requirement was set at 23,876,

though 4,515 road maintenance personnel

were placed in a contingent category to be

shipped only if experience in the field

proved them necessary. Meeting these

troop and matériel requirements posed

serious problems. The pool of service

troops available was small and production

of heavy transportation equipment limited. A large proportion of the service

troops activated had either been earmarked for BOLERO, or would be necessary for TORCH. Outside of domestic requirements, the major portion of heavy

transportation equipment under production had been earmarked for the British.

And shipping to transport both troops and

matériel was the most critical factor of all.

As the SOS Plan noted, "all troops and

cargo ships have been assigned missions,

any new operation must be at the expense

of other projects." Only because the invasion of the Continent had been postponed

was the project to develop the Persian

Gulf feasible.

The SOS Plan proposed that of the

minimum essential troops, 8,969 could be

made available by diversion from BOLERO,

8,002 from other troop units already activated, and 1,501 from new activations. It

was thought that one port battalion of 889

men might be diverted from Karachi,

where, Maxwell claimed, it was not doing

3

 (1) Msg cited n. 1(2). (2) Detailed calculations

made at Cairo included estimates that an additional

50,000 tons of Soviet aid might be handled monthly

at Basra and 30,000 at Karachi for forwarding over

the Zahidan-Meshed route. See memo, Spalding for

Somervell, 4 Sep 42, sub: Target Ests of Persian Gulf

Routes, SOS Plan folder, Contl Div ASF. 4

 (1) Msg cited n. 1(2). (2) Msg AMSME 924,

Spalding and Maxwell to Burns and Somervell, 28

Aug 42, SOS Plan folder, Contl Div ASF.
576 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

port work. Of the matériel, it appeared

that trucks would be the most difficult to

provide. While ultimate production of

locomotives and rail cars would have to

be increased to meet over-all requirements, it appeared that 50 locomotives

could be procured in the near future by

diversion from domestic use and from the

British in Egypt, and 1,200 freight cars,

originally destined for British use in Iraq,

could be obtained from Karachi. There

was also a possibility of repossession of 500

10-ton trucks from the British and diversion of 600 of unknown capacity from

Chinese lend-lease material at Karachi,

but it would be necessary to substitute

21⁄2-ton cargo trucks for the rest of the requirement of 7,200 of 7-ton capacity.

Scheduled production of heavy trucks was

totally inadequate.

Shipping requirements for men and

materials, according to Transportation

Corps estimates, amounted to 471,000

ship tons. The SOS Plan provided for

movement of 11,000 men on the West Point

or Wakefield in late October, the rest on

British troopships in January 1943 after

they had completed movement of the

Ninth Air Force to the Middle East. Cargo shipments would begin on 1 October

and continue through January at the rate

of 110,000 tons monthly, approximately

ten ships. Both troop and cargo shipping

would in effect be a diversion from

BOLERO, though the pool of cargo shipping

would be increased by releases from the

northern convoy route.5

The most critical issue was timing, for

the need of a secure route to the USSR

was immediate and urgent. At Cairo,

Colonel Shingler presented estimates

worked out with American and British

transportation experts, and set the date

for meeting the final port and inland

clearance targets as June 1943. The British were not convinced that even this

deadline could be met. But both General

Spalding and Averell Harriman insisted

that the target date could be moved forward to February 1943, and Spalding presented estimates on this basis to Somervell

on his return. The SOS planners refused

to commit themselves definitely, but postulated a "material advancement" of the

June target date set by Shingler.6

The whole SOS Plan was geared to this

"material advancement." Proposed priorities were: rail operations first, ports second,

and road operations third. The troops required for the railroad and ports could be

taken care of in the first movement scheduled in October. Equipment could be

made available and shipped in co-ordination with the troops, which should be in

the theater and ready to take over operation of the ports and railroads by the end

of the year. The truck regiments, in third

priority, would follow in January and

should be in the theater at least by early

March. Either heavy trucks or smaller

substitutes could probably be made available by this time. General Somervell concluded that the Persian Gulf could be developed to meet the goal of 200,000 tons of

Soviet aid monthly if high enough priority

were given to the movement of troops and

supplies.

5

 See memo, Gross for Somervell, 30 Aug 42, sub:

Trans Sv For Persian Gulf, SOS Plan folder, Contl

Div ASF, on which SOS transportation plan was

based. 6

 (1) Plan, par. 4, cited n. 2. (2) Memo cited n. 3(2).

(3) Memo, Gen Spalding for Col Dabney O. Elliott,

5 Sep 42, with incl comments by Lt. Col W. E. V.

Abraham, Br Middle East Comd, SOS Plan folder,

Contl Div ASF. (4) For Shingler's detailed calculations on port and inland clearance capacities, somewhat broader than those included in Maxwell's cable,

see Bykofsky and Larson, Trans III, Ch. VI.
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—II 577

As it was a matter of combined concern,

General Marshall referred the SOS Plan

to the CCS for consideration and approval.

Before CCS approval was given on 22 September, the Combined Staff Planners added Ahwaz to the list of Iranian ports to be

operated by the Americans and modified

the movement plan to provide that five

cargo ships monthly rather than ten should

be accepted as the maximum rate at the

outset, to be increased progressively as port

and rail facilities were developed. This latter change was made at the behest of the

British members of the Combined Military

Transportation Committee, who insisted

that the discharge capacity at the Persian

ports would not be sufficient to accommodate 110,000 tons of U.S. military cargo

monthly (for development of Iranian facilities) without cutting into Soviet lendlease or other essential shipments. The

CPS noted that on the assumption that 44

cargo sailings would be required to complete the move, the cost to BOLERO would

be a total of 110 sailings, since turnaround

time to the Persian Gulf was two and a

half times that to England. The CCS was

willing to accept this sacrifice, recognizing

that "if shipping losses continue at their

present excessive rate along the Northern

Russian route, it may become necessary to

use the Persian Gulf entirely."

 7

In proposing American operation of

ports and rail facilities in the Persian Gulf,

Churchill stipulated that the British

should continue to exercise strategic responsibility for the defense of the area

against attack and for internal security.

Consequently, he said, the British must retain control of movement priorities. OPD

strategic planners, never very enthusiastic

about this diversion of American resources

from the primary objective of a crossChannel invasion, were reluctant to accept the American mission under this condition, but in the end a compromise was

worked out. The British Commander-inChief, Persia-Iraq Command, was granted

control of "priority of traffic and allocation of freight," but in recognition of the

primary American objective of supplying

the Soviet Union, it was "definitely understood that the British control . . . must

not be permitted to militate against the attainment of such objective, subject always

to the requirements for preparing to meet

a threat to the vital Persian Gulf oil

areas."

 8 The U.S. commanding general in

the Persian Gulf was granted the right of

appeal through the JCS to the CCS on any

British decision that he thought would

prejudice the flow of supplies to the Soviet

Union. Under normal circumstances,

those supplies would have highest priority

once the relatively static British requirements for forces deployed in Iran and essential civilian needs were met.9

The Persian Gulf: Plans Versus

Accomplishments

An entire new command headquarters

was formed to be sent to the Persian Gulf

to carry out the SOS Plan. On 1 October

1942 Brig. Gen. Donald H. Connolly was

chosen to head this new Persian Gulf

7

 (1) CCS 109/1, rpt by CPS, 22 Sep 42, title: Development of Persian Trans Facilities. (2) CMT 27/1,

12 Sep 42, same title. (3) CMT 27/2, 15 Sep 42, same

title. 8

 CCS 109/1 cited n. 7(1). 9

 (1) CCS 109, 2 Sep 42, title: Development of Persian Trans Facilities. (2) Memo, Col Elliott for Gen

Lutes, 4 Sep 42, OPD 334.8 CCS, Case 16. (3) Snell,

The USSR in U.S.-British Plans and Operations in

1942, OCMH. (4) For discussion of the practical

workings of the arrangement, see Motter, Persian

Corridor, pp. 233-39.
578 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Service Command, and told his primary

mission would be to "insure the uninterrupted flow of an expanding volume of

supplies to Russia." He was to be permitted "wide latitude" in carrying out this

mission, but was to be subject to "the administrative supervision" of the Commanding General, USAFIME (then General

Maxwell).10 On 2 October 1942 the President directed that "the project for the

operation and enlargement of the Persian

Corridor be given sufficient priority and

support in the form of men, equipment and

ships to insure its early and effective accomplishment."

 11

 This was essentially the

priority General Somervell had postulated

as necessary for the fulfillment of the SOS

Plan. Yet only after numerous vicissitudes

and delays, and long after the February

1943 deadline, was the SOS to find it possible to achieve the goals set for itself in

that plan.

To provide a center for co-ordination of

planning, Somervell activated Headquarters 1616 in Washington with Col. Stanley

L. Scott as chief of staff, even before Connolly was appointed commander of the

Persian Gulf Service Command. Headquarters 1616 remained in Washington

until March 1943, acting as a home office

for Persian Gulf activities. Connolly and

Scott, before departing for Iran, worked

out a more detailed analysis of requirements and priorities. They asked for an increase in the troop basis to twenty-nine

thousand through the addition of miscellaneous service units, but when this was refused they tentatively dropped some of the

units scheduled for late shipment. Connolly also juggled the order of shipment so

that, in general, troops and material for

port operations were given first priority

and those for the railroad second, leaving

the motor transport service, as before, in

third. However, he shifted three engineer

truck companies, set up originally in the

contingent group for road maintenance,

into first priority.12

The movement of men and materials

was generally carried out in the order prescribed by Connolly, but encountered a

series of delays. On 4 October the Transportation Corps submitted a new shipping

plan in keeping with the modifications

made by the CMTC and by the interim

developments in the shipping situation.

Personnel would be moved in four groups:

5,500 about 1 November, 4,000 about 14

November, 6,000 about 15 December,

and the remainder in January 1943. Cargo shipments would proceed at the rate of

five or six ships per month, beginning on

15 October. This would provide 15,500

men and 160,000 tons of cargo in the Persian Gulf by 18 February 1943. But this

plan, premised on the availability of one

of the British Queens for a December sailing to India (troops for the Persian Gulf

would be transshipped by smaller boats to

Khorramshahr) and on cargo shipments

from the United States' east coast, had to

be redrafted on 17 October because of the

10

 Ltr, CofS to Gen Connolly, 1 Oct 42, sub: Ltr

of Instns, 12a Persian Gulf folder, Plng Div ASF. The

arrangement for placing Connolly's command under

USAFIME, viewed by many as undesirable at the

start, never proved satisfactory. Maxwell and his

successors at Cairo were primarily concerned with

matters other than aid to the USSR, and Cairo was

one thousand miles from the Persian Gulf. Communications were as difficult as with Washington. But

despite Connolly's continuing complaints, his command was not completely separated from USAFIME

until December 1943. See Motter, Persian Corridor, pp.

226-33. 11

 Memo, President for SW, 2 Oct 42, AG 400.3295

(9-1-42) Sec 12. 12

 (1) Memos, Scott for Somervell, 5 and 6 Oct 42,

subs: Mvmt of Trs, Equip, and Sups to Persian Gulf

Sv Comd, Abstracts, Persian Gulf 262 file, OCMH.

(2) Plng Div SOS Diary, 19 Oct 42 entry, Plng Div

ASF.
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—II 579

submarine threat off the Gape of Good

Hope. The British were forced to cancel

the sailing of one of the Queens, and many

cargo shipments had to be shifted from

the east to the west coast. While the new

schedule, providing for three troop shipments instead of four, still promised to put

15,500 men and 150,000 tons of cargo in

the Persian Gulf by the end of February

1943, the effects of cumulative delays

were becoming evident even in the planning phase.13

Meantime troops and material were

readied to meet this schedule, but here too

there were unforeseen difficulties. Most of

the service units listed in the SOS Plan

were neither at full strength nor had they

completed their training. Maj. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler refused to permit even

the temporary loan of the port battalion

at Karachi. More new activations were

required than originally planned, and in

many cases untrained or semitrained

units had to be shipped. It proved impossible, as in the case of the port battalion,

to extract the material the SOS planners

had thought would be available in the

Middle East and India from the tenacious

grip of commanders in those areas. Also,

the British had already shipped most of

the 500 10-ton trucks proposed for repossession. But with the cargo shipment

schedule cut back by the CMTC, it

proved possible to furnish material to meet

it from U.S. sources. The rolling stock requirements were met by diversion of

1,000 20-ton freight cars and gondolas

and 650 40-ton cars, originally set up in

the Army Supply Program for BOLERO. At

the suggestion of Harriman, himself once

a railroad executive, 57 high-powered

diesel locomotives from U.S. railroads

were substituted for the 75 steam locomotives requested. MAC(G) on 24 September assigned 150 10-ton trucks, 656 21⁄2-

ton tractors with 7-ton trailers, and 2,600

21⁄2-ton cargo trucks to the Persian Gulf

Service Command, the heavier types by

repossession from the British. On 19 October 1942 supply service representatives

reported that with the exception of a few

items, the required supplies or adequate

substitutes would be available in accordance with the shipping schedule.14

In the end it proved impossible to find

shipping to meet the troop and cargo

schedules. Approximately 5,500 troops,

including part of those for port operations,

departed on 1 November 1942 from New

York on the West Point and arrived in

Khorramshahr in mid-December. The

second shipment was carried out on the Île

de France from San Francisco on 8 December, and the third on the Mauretania from

the same port in mid-January. All these

vessels carried troops for India as well as

those for the Persian Gulf. There were

about 11,000 troops in the Persian Gulf

by the end of February instead of the 15,-

000 planned, but those from the Mauretania, about 6,500, arrived in mid-March.

There were no troop shipments in February, and in the meantime Connolly had

increased his requirement again to around

28,500. The remainder went out in small

shipments in March, May, and June. Assigned strength in the theater reached 25,-

13

 (1) Memo, Gross for Somervell, 4 Oct 42, sub:

Proposal for Mvmt to Persian Gulf. (2) Memo, Gross

for Somervell, 17 Oct 42, sub: Revision of Mvmt to

Persian Gulf. Both in OCT 370.5 Persian Gulf. 14

 (1) Ltrs, Scott to Connolly, 20 and 28 Oct 42,

extracts in Persian Gulf notes, Logis File, OCMH. (2)

Diary, 27 Sep, 4 and 19 Oct 42 entries, cited n. 12(2).

(3) Papers in SOS Plan folder, Contl Div ASF. (4)

Harold H. Dunham, U.S. Army Transportation in

the Persian Corridor, 1941-1945, Monograph 25, pp.

51-56, 66-67, OCT HB. (5) Min 941 and 942, 51st

mtg MAC(G), 24 Sep 42.
580 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

423 by the end of June, and 28,584 by the

end of August 1943.15

Meantime, the delay in cargo shipments was far more serious. Whereas at

least five vessels per month had been

scheduled, none sailed in October, only

two in November, three in December, and

three in January 1943. WSA proved unable to allocate the required vessels, primarily because of the cumulative effects

of submarine sinkings and the expansion

of demands from North Africa and the

Pacific. There was the added and somewhat ironical fact that delays in unloading in the Persian Gulf caused by congestion of ships carrying Soviet aid discouraged the allocation of ships to carry

materials for the very purpose of clearing

up that backlog. Some additional space

for Army cargo was provided on vessels

carrying lend-lease, but by the end of January movements were far behind, and no

vessels were provided to remedy the situation in February. Shipments were finally

stepped up during March and April, but

at the end of April some 54,000 measurement tons of cargo remained on hand for

shipment.16

These delays in the movement of men

and materials to the Persian Gulf were the

principal cause of corresponding delays in

expanding the flow of supplies to the

USSR. Brig. Gen. Stanley L. Scott wrote

in June 1943, "The rate at which the capacity of the Corridor is developed and

has been is governed by the rate the War

Department furnishes us men and equipment."

 17

 Yet there were other factors that

must not be entirely ignored. Even had

the movement of men and materials lived

up to the SOS Plan, it does not seem likely

that the target of two hundred thousand

tons to the Soviet Union could have been

met before mid-1943. It took time for the

Americans to become accustomed to their

tasks and to iron out difficulties in operating ports, railroads, and truck lines. Many

of the troop units, dispatched with little

specialized training, had to learn while on

the job in the theater. They also had to

adjust themselves to climate and other

local conditions. Then Maj. Gen. Donald

H. Connolly's planning in Washington

proved faulty in that first priority was

given port development while inland

clearance was actually the worst bottleneck. Connolly wrote to General Gross on

1 December 1942:

My biggest mistake in estimating the situation before I left Washington was in thinking the ports were the bottleneck. I find that

at present the rate of removing cargo from

shipside determines the rate of unloading . . . . If I had known the above before leaving

Washington I would have arranged my priorities of men and equipment differently."

 18

This miscalculation is not entirely understandable in view of the fact that as early

as May 1942 Shingler had pointed out

15

 (1) Monograph, pp. 44-45, cited n. 14(4). Figures given by Dunham here are erroneous, however,

in that they include the full load of each ship and

not just those troops destined for the Persian Gulf. (2)

Memos, OPD for CG SOS, 10, 20, 30 Oct, and 9 Nov

42, subs: Priorities for . . . Shipt of Trs to India and

Middle East, OCT 370.5 Persian Gulf. (3) Rpts, SW

to President, 10 Mar and 9 Apr 43, subs: Progress on

Soviet Protocol, ID 031.1, III, Pt. 2. (4) Rpt, SW to

President, 8 May 43, same sub, ID 031.1, IV. (5) Operational Summary, Persian Gulf Sv Comd, 1 Jun 43,

12a Persian Gulf folder, Plng Div ASF. (6) Motter,

Persian Corridor, App. A, Table 12. 16

 (1) Operational Summary cited n . 15(5). (2)

Monograph, pp. 45-47, cited n. 14(4). (3) Ltr, Col

Vissering to Maj Gokay, 28 Dec 42, sub: Shipg to

Persian Gulf, OCT 563.5 Persian Gulf. (4) Rpt, 8

May 43, cited n. 15(4). (5) Ltr, Col Raymond M.

Hicks, Water Div OCT, to WSA, 2 Apr 43, Persian

Gulf Comd Plng folder, OCT HB. 17

 Ltr, Gen Scott to Col John B. Luscombe, Persian Gulf Sv Comd Plans Br Opns Div ASF, 19 Jun

43, 12a Persian Gulf folder, Plng Div ASF. 18 Ltr, Connolly to Gross, 1 Dec 42, Gross Day File,

Middle East.
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—II 581

LIBERTY SHIPS UNLOADING at the port of Khorramshahr.

that inland clearance would lag far behind port capacity.19

The low priority given trucks and motor

transport personnel also proved unfortunate. The rail line offered the best possibilities for developing inland clearance in

the long run and required proportionately

less expenditure of men and material, but

the increase in rail capacity was bound to

be gradual. The ideal solution would have

been an emergency trucking fleet, as both

Shingler and Somervell had proposed in

May 1942. By the end of October, Colonel

Scott had recognized this: "The development of railroad tonnage will lag behind

the development of port tonnage with the

result that there will be great need for

movement away from port by trucks in

order to prevent congestion."

 20

 But there

were obstacles in the way of emergency

trucking operations that could hardly have

been overcome, even if Connolly and

Scott had recognized the need earlier.

Heavy trucks of the type needed in Iran

were just not available, and production

had to be hurriedly boosted in the fall of

1942. Connolly did not look with favor on

the smaller 21⁄2-ton cargo trucks the SOS

Plan proposed as a substitute. They would

require more drivers, maintenance, gas,

and tires; convoys over the dusty roads in

Iran had to be held to a minimum length

to permit adequate intervals between

trucks. The shipping situation being what

it was, the 21⁄2-ton trucks assigned in September were held back for several months

19

 See above, Ch. XX. 20

 Ltr, Col Scott, no addressee, 28 Oct 42, Persian

Gulf notes, Logis File, OCMH.
582 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

in favor of higher priority cargo. The 150

10-ton trucks and some of the 656 7-ton

tractor-trailers were shipped, but a competing demand for the latter came from

the Alcan Highway. Attempts to secure

further allocations of 10-ton trucks were

blocked by the British, who had prior requirements. There was no new production

of tractor-trailers until January 1943, and

total production of 10-ton trucks reached

only 320 in that month. It was not until

after the Casablanca Conference that the

British would agree to release 828 tractortrailers that in August 1942 had been assigned to the UKCC for use in Iraq and

Iran. Assignments were finally made in

the early months of 1943 that would give

Connolly a trucking fleet capable of moving 40,000 tons monthly, but at the end of

April many of these were still to be floated.

The movement of trucking personnel

was equally slow. The U.S. Motor Transport Service in the Persian Gulf began operations in March 1943 with one of the

dump truck companies that came on the

first troopship, a Negro trucking battalion

that came on the second, and another provisional company organized from other

personnel in the command. The rest of the

two trucking regiments promised did not

arrive until May and July, respectively.

Though Connolly had recognized the importance of the roads by advancing the

priority of road maintenance personnel, it

was difficult to make up the previous delays in road construction. The net result

was that movement of cargo through Iran

by truck, like that by rail, expanded but

slowly during the critical months from

August 1942 to March 1943, the period of

greatest need for emergency means of inland clearance. By the time the truck fleet

was in full operation, the Iranian State

Railway was also reaching its peak, and

no attempt was ever made to expand the

Motor Transport Service to meet the goals

originally set up in August 1942.21

Other errors and miscalculations were

made. Wharves built at Bandar Shahpur

and Khorramshahr were too narrow; insufficient attention was given to dockside

storage; heavy equipment that had to be

discharged first at Abadan, the only port

in 1942 with sufficient heavy lift, was often

stowed below other cargo; the proportion

of unassembled trucks and aircraft shipped

was much less than expected.22 Difficulties of this sort were almost inevitable,

given the haste with which the project was

conceived. The truth was that in their

anxiety to provide some immediate substitute for the northern route, the Allied

leaders allowed themselves to be overoptimistic about the rate at which the Persian Gulf could be developed. The transition from British to American operation

took longer than planned, and the Americans also took longer to make their operation effective. Under British operation,

21

 (1) Monograph, pp. 187-88, cited n. 14(4). (2)

Motter, Persian Corridor, pp. 309-17. (3) Cables exchanged between the War Department and General

Connolly on truck requirements are conveniently collected in Trucks for Persian Gulf Sv Comd Cable file,

ID. (4) Min 1040, 53d mtg MAC(G), 8 Oct 42; Min

1059, 54th mtg, 15 Oct 42; Min 1103D, 55th mtg, 22

Oct 42; Min 1114, 56th mtg, 29 Oct 42; Min 1359,

66th mtg, 17 Dec 42; Min 1367, 68th mtg, 31 Dec 42;

Min 1422, 69th mtg, 7 Jan 43; Min 1653, 81st mtg, 27

Feb 43: Min 1696, 83d mtg, 11 Mar 43; Min 1726,

84th mtg, 18 Mar 43; Min 1770, 86th mtg, 24 Mar 43;

Min 2158, 101st mtg, 6 Jul 43, with Ord Tab 7 to

agenda. (5) Diary, 7, 26 Oct, and 22 Dec 42 entries,

cited n. 12(2). (6) Rpt, 8 May 43, cited n. 15(4). (7)

Min of Highway Div OCT conf, Pentagon, 9 Nov

43, p. 1, Persian Gulf Motor Trans Sv folder, OCT

HB.

22

 Report on Transportation at Persian Gulf Ports

by Lt Col Benjamin C. Allin and Capt Robert G.

Stone, no date, with accompanying memo for Gen

Gross. 10 Jul 43, Persian Gulf Comd Plng folder,

OCT HB.
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—II 583

improvement was slow during the latter

half of 1942. Approximately 40,000 long

tons of Soviet aid were delivered through

the Corridor in September 1942, only

51,000 in January 1943. Total tonnage on

the Iranian State Railway expanded only

from 36,000 in August 1942 to 52,000 in

January 1943. Between January and May,

the Americans assumed operation step by

step, and the turnover was generally complete by 1 May. During this transition period, total tonnage delivered to the Russians expanded to 101,000 in April, while

the railroad carried 65,000 tons in March.

Under complete American operation, the

figure for tonnage delivered to the USSR

had nearly doubled by September 1943 to

199,000, and the railroad achieved a capacity of 175,000 tons in October. This

achievement of the target loads came six

months after the date predicted by Harriman and Spalding and three months after

that proposed by Shingler in August

1942.23

Meantime, overoptimism both in the

theater and in Washington led to the dispatch of more vessels during the latter

part of 1942 than Persian Gulf facilities

could unload and clear. In October eleven

vessels reached the Gulf ports and only

seven left them; in November ten arrived

and only nine departed; in December sixteen arrived and only five departed. Discharge time per vessel averaged fifty-five

days, and the number awaiting discharge

reached thirty-two by mid-January. Some

19,000 tons of steel had to be diverted to

Karachi to make way for unloading

higher priority cargoes, a diversion the

Russians vigorously protested. The unloading bottleneck in the Persian Gulf

ports represented a serious waste of the

most critical resource in the whole AngloAmerican war effort—ships.24

Second Protocol Deliveries Fall Behind

At the same time that the performance

of the Persian Gulf was most disappointing, the Germans continued to make the

operation of the convoys over the northern route so expensive that they could not

be maintained. After two months during

which no convoys sailed, the British tried

again in September 1942 using a very

heavy escort, only to lose some thirteen

cargo vessels out of forty. Neither this rate

of loss nor this scale of convoy escort could

be sustained during the early stages of

TORCH and therefore convoys had to be

canceled again during October and November. This decision, though inevitable,

was an extremely embarrassing one for the

President and Prime Minister, for Stalin

felt that the Western Allies had already

reneged on their promise of a second front

in 1942. As Churchill told Roosevelt on

22 September, it was a "formidable moment in Anglo-American-Soviet relations." "My persisting anxiety is Russia,"

he said, "and I do not see how we can reconcile it with our consciences or with our

interests to have no more PQ's till 1943,

no offer to make joint plans for Jupiter

[the invasion of Norway], no signs of a

spring, summer or even autumn offensive

in Europe."

 25

The President proved willing, on this

23

 Estimate for August 1942 is based on msg,

AMSIR to AGWAR, 12 Oct 42, CM-IN 05027. All

other figures are from Motter, Persian Corridor, App.

A, Tables, 4-5. 24

 (1) Status of the Soviet Aid Program as of November 30, 1942, rpt by OLLA to President. (2) JCS

191, 11 Jan 43, title: Soviet Sup Progs. (3) Memo,

Adm Land for JCS, 30 Jan 43, sub: Shipg Prog of

Aid to Russia, ABC 400.3295 Russia (4-19-42) Sec 1.

(4) CCS 162/2, 27 Feb 43, title: U.S. Aid to Russia. 25

 (1) Msg 151, Prime Minister to President, 22

Sep 42, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B. (2) Morison, Battle

of the Atlantic, pp. 360-65.
584 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

occasion, to accept some sacrifice to the

protocol shipping program in order to put

American troops in active combat against

the Germans, and to gamble that Stalin

would not make a separate peace because

of Allied failure to fulfill supply commitments on time. He showed some confidence that the Battle of Stalingrad, then

mounting to its full fury, would be won by

the Russians. In laying down policy for

the War Department, he informed Stimson on 2 October:

Because of enemy action on convoys to

North Russia, it has not and may not be

feasible to send the full tonnage of supplies

contemplated in this protocol. It is therefore

of importance that every effort be made to

utilize to the maximum the supply routes

that may be available to us.26

He directed that ships be made available

for such convoys as might sail the northern

route, and for lifting all cargo that could

be cleared through the Persian Corridor;

that cargoes be furnished to load such

ships as might be dispatched to the USSR

by all routes; that planes be delivered in

accordance with protocol schedules; and,

as noted earlier, that the Persian Gulf

project be given sufficient priority to insure its early accomplishment. Meantime,

in replying to the Prime Minister, he suggested that the project, then under consideration, for placing an Anglo-American

air force in the Caucasus be pushed and

that single vessels be sent over the northern route without convoy escort. He

thought Stalin should not be informed of

the cancellation of the October convoys

until the last minute.

The real reaction of Stalin to these developments can only be conjectured. His

reply to Churchill's cable informing him

of the cancellation of the northern convoys was only a curt "Thank you," followed by an ominous silence. Yet some

days earlier he cabled Roosevelt that the

Soviet Union "in order to relieve the tonnage situation" would be willing to agree

to some curtailment of delivery of war

matériel—tanks, artillery, munitions, pistols—in return for shipment of 500 "pursuit planes of a modern type," 8,000 to

10,000 trucks, 5,000 tons of aluminum,

4,000 to 5,000 tons of explosives monthly,

and 2 million tons of grain within twelve

months. He suggested that the foodstuffs

could be imported via Vladivostok if the

Americans would agree to turn over

twenty or thirty ships to reinforce the Soviet merchant marine in the Pacific.27

 In

the end this message proved more significant than the ominous silence that followed the cable to Churchill, for it presaged the change in the Soviet situation

that was to follow the decisive victory at

Stalingrad.

Except for the planes, the materials

Stalin requested were already part of the

Second Protocol schedules, though trucks

and grain had previously had a low priority compared with tanks, guns, and ammunition. Yet Stalin regarded the planes

as most vital, and it was this part of his

request that the Americans were most reluctant to meet. Soviet requests for an increase in plane deliveries had been pending with the MAB and JCS since July,

while the existing rate of 212 monthly had

been continued. The request from Stalin,

with American-Soviet relations at such a

critical point, naturally generated a terrific additional pressure. Hopkins wrote

Marshall that although he realized it was

impossible to furnish the requested 500

26

 (1) Memo cited n. 11. (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and

Hopkins, pp. 638-41. 27

 Msg, Stalin to Roosevelt, 7 Oct 42, quoted in

Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 639-40.
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—II 585

SOVIET AND AMERICAN OFFICIALS at Qaleh Morgeh airport, Iran, 1943. Left to

right: Brig. Gen. Stanley L. Scott, Chief of Staff, Persian Gulf Service Command; Col. Leonid I.

Zorin, Chief, Iran-Soviet Transportation; Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly, Commanding General,

Persian Gulf Service Command; Maj. Gen. Ivan V. Kargin, Chief of Soviet Transportation

Department in Iran; Brig. Gen. Philip R. Faymonville, Office of Lend-Lease Administration

representative in the USSR; Donald M. Nelson, Chairman, U.S. War Production Board; Vasili P.

Migunoff, Chief Commercial Representative, USSR; Mikhail A. Maximov, acting Soviet

Ambassador to Iran.

planes monthly, he thought the United

States ought to send at least 100 additional fighters monthly over the next three

months. On this point the JCS were adamant. They felt they could not permit any

additional diversions of aircraft without

crippling the development of the AAF,

and argued that the dispatch of an AngloAmerican air force to the Caucasus would

be of greater value than any slight increase. The President this time accepted

the advice of his military chiefs, and put

the main emphasis on furnishing the air

force in the Caucasus, a solution generally

along the lines of that adopted in the midsummer agreement with the British on air

allocations. After long and fruitless negotiations, Stalin ended any possibility of this

step in January 1943, saying that the Russians too had more pilots than they had

planes to fly. There was continued Soviet

pressure for more planes and in January

1943 the JCS did finally give in to the

extent of promising the Russians that 200

transport planes would definitely be allocated them during 1943, and an addi-
586 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

tional 100 if production schedules would

permit.28

Stalin's request for additional shipping

in the Pacific brought a more ready response. The President promised the Soviet

leader that the United States would transfer to the Soviet flag five cargo ships a

month beginning 1 November 1942. By

the end of October, General Belyaev was

asking that all twenty be transferred immediately, but with concurrent demands

for shipping from the South and Southwest Pacific mounting to a crisis in November, even Harry Hopkins was forced

to admit it could not be done. Nonetheless, with presidential pressure behind

them, the transfers were made on an accelerated schedule. In December Lewis

Douglas deliberately accepted the risk of

failure to meet the Navy's stated requirements in order to provide nine ships for

the Vladivostok run. Before the transfer

of the original twenty, all old steamers, was

completed in February 1943, an additional commitment to deliver five new Liberty

ships had been accepted. The whole program, however essential, inevitably

weighed heavily on the shipping shortage

to meet military requirements in the Pacific. Diversions from the Alaskan run

brought bitter complaints from General

De Witt.29

These transfers and the high priority

that the Russians now placed on foodstuffs

and petroleum products made the Pacific

route of equal or greater importance than

the Persian Gulf. Yet there were delays in

the Pacific also as Soviet-operated vessels

took a longer turnaround time than anticipated and were unable to meet shipment

schedules. Together these two alternate

routes gave promise of eventually fully

compensating for failure to maintain the

northern convoys, but neither was ready

for full operation during the autumn

months of 1942. While the great Battle of

Stalingrad hung in the balance, the shipment of supplies from the United States

fell far behind Second Protocol schedules.

As of the end of November 1942, only

840,000 short tons had been shipped

against a scheduled 1,608,000.

In December 1942 the prospects brightened somewhat as the British resumed

convoy service on the northern route. The

interim diversion of German naval and

air strength to North Africa gave some

hope of success. While the single December

convoy of eighteen vessels, PQ-19, was

composed principally of ships loaded

earlier, loading in the United States for

future convoys over the northern route

began again in December. The problem

shifted once again to the matter of finding

cargo vessels and escort craft to maintain

these convoys.30

28

 (1) Ltr, Hopkins to Marshall, 10 Oct 42, MS

Index to the Hopkins Papers, Bk. V, Aid to Russia, p.

24, Item 72(q). See also, p. 27, Item 84, and p. 32,

Item 95. (2) For more detailed treatment of these negotiations, see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning:

1941-1942, Ch. XV. (3) On aircraft agreement with

the British, see above, Ch. XI. 29

 (1) Ltr, Hopkins to Douglas, 13 Oct 42. (2) Ltr,

Douglas to Hopkins, 26 Nov 42. Both in Russian

Shipg 1 Jun-31 Dec 42 folder, WSA Douglas File. (3)

Memo, Cushing for Douglas, 5 Jan 43, sub: Pac Coast

Lend-lease Ship Deliveries, Russian Shipg 1 Jan 43

folder, WSA Douglas File. (4) Douglas' notes on conf

with President, Hopkins, and Land, 21 Oct 42, and

on conf with Hopkins, 7 Dec 42, Hopkins folder, WSA

Douglas File. (5) Memos, Douglas and Land for President, 11 Jan and 10 Feb 43, Russia-Rpts to President

folder, WSA Douglas File. (6) Memo, Burns for Hopkins, 28 Oct 42. (7) Memo, Hopkins for Burns, 29 Oct

42. Last two in MS Index to Hopkins Papers, Bk. VII,

Lend-lease Aid to Russia (1942), p. 4, Item 38. (8)

Ltr, Gen De Witt to CofS, 1 Dec 42, OCT 565.4

Alaska. (9) Related papers in same file. (10) On Pacific shipping situation at the time, see above, Ch. XV. 30

 (1) Rpt cited n. 24(1). (2) Status of the Soviet Aid

Program as of December 31, 1942, rpt by OLLA to

President.
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—II 587

The Casablanca Decisions

In early January 1943 the President

turned his attention once again to the

problem of getting Soviet aid shipments

back on schedule. On 6 January he wrote

Stimson:

I understand both the Army, and Navy

are definitely of the opinion that Russian

continuance as a major factor in the war is of

cardinal importance, and therefore it must

be a basic factor in our strategy to provide

her with the maximum amount of supplies

that can be delivered to her ports. I fully endorse this concept . . . in executing the

Second Protocol and in planning the overall

program to the end of the fiscal year 1944,

the necessity of meeting Soviet needs in accordance with the above strategical viewpoint must be regarded as a matter of paramount importance.31

As a follow-up to this directive, the President on the 9th forwarded to the JCS a report from the Lend-Lease Administration

pointing out that Second Protocol shipments were only 55 percent of schedule at

the end of 1942 and that with the reopening of the northern route, "opportunity

arises for reinstituting delivery at Protocol

rates."

 32

The implication that protocol shipments must be brought up to schedule in

the months following was as embarrassing

to the Army in January 1943 as it had

been a year earlier. Military estimates

made in December 1942 on the availability of shipping and the possibility of moving troops, naval forces, supplies, and

equipment during 1943 allowed for no

ships for the northern route, and a total of

276 sailings during the first six months of

1943 over the Pacific and Persian Gulf

routes (15 per month to the Persian Gulf,

31 per month to Vladivostok). Even this

program, General Gross calculated in late

December, would result in cutting the

number of troops whose equipment could

be moved to Europe by some 375,000. As

a result of the President's directive, the

Combined Military Transportation Committee made a further study and reported

that fulfilling the requirements of the Second Protocol within the capacity of all

routes would require 432 sailings during

the first six months of 1943. This was 156

more than the Army and Navy had allowed in their calculations, 120 on the

northern route and 36 to the Persian

Gulf. To fulfill this additional requirement

would divert 105 cargo ships from their

military employment for six months, reducing the number of troops whose

equipment and maintenance could be

carried to the European and North African theaters by an additional 176,000.33

This dilemma presented by the Soviet

aid program was one of the major problems confronting the grand conference at

Casablanca in mid-January. With the decision made there to invade Sicily (Operation HUSKY) in the summer of 1943,

there was little further possibility of a

cross-Channel invasion in 1943. The Soviet Union in Admiral King's words remained the "main reliance in Europe."

 34

There was little the conference could do

31

 Memo, President for SW, 6 Jan 43, ID 031.1, II. 32

 JCS 191 cited n. 24(2), with note by Secys incl

rpt by OLLA to President and referred by President

to JCS. 33

 (1) Memo, Gross for CG SOS, 31 Dec 42, sub:

Effect of Increase in Russian Shipts on Current Opns,

NATOUSA TORCH Plng folder, OCT HB. Gross'

estimates were based on 300 sailings rather than 276.

(2) CCS 162, 19 Jan 43, title: U.S. Aid to Russia. (3)

CCS 143, rpt by CMTC, 11 Jan 43, title: U.S. Aid to

Russia—Implications of Shipg Prog. 34

 Min, 56th mtg JCS, 20 Jan 43. The question,

King said, was not one of "placating Stalin," as many

were prone to represent it, but of "implementing the

Russians to our own interest."
588 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

but agree that Soviet aid should have a

priority second only to the antisubmarine

campaign.35 Nevertheless, both General

Marshall and Admiral of the Fleet Sir

Dudley Pound of the British Navy opposed

continuance of Soviet aid at "prohibitive

cost" to Anglo-American operations and

suggested that running the northern convoys might prove as expensive in 1943 as

it had in 1942.36 The British Navy reported that the best it could do with destroyer escort at its disposal was one convoy of twenty-eight ships every forty-two

days, and naval officers doubted that this

rate could be maintained during the invasion of Sicily. A study by the CPS revealed it would be impossible for the U.S.

Navy to supplement the British escort

without curtailing other convoy services.

So, accepting the forty-two-day convoy

cycle, General Somervell produced a shipping schedule, which he and Lord Leathers presented to the conference on 20 January. Under Somervell's proposal, protocol shipments would be brought up to

schedule not by the end of June 1943, but

by spreading the deficit over the rest of

the year, on the assumption that Third

Protocol commitments would be the same

as those for the second. A total of 376 sailings during the first half of 1943 would

leave a deficit of 56 sailings at the end of

June 1943 to be more than compensated

for by an increase from 288 to 346 during

the second half of the year.

Adherence to this schedule, Somervell

thought, would reduce troop deployments

by 128,000 during the first half of 1943

and 187,000 for the whole year, if the

monthly shipping loss was 2.6 percent.

But if that rate could be brought down

even to 2.4 percent, the Soviet aid program could be carried out without lessening troop movements; if the rate were reduced yet lower, movements might actually be increased.37

In the discussion of Somervell's proposal, Marshall contended that if the 2.6

percent loss rate were accepted then the

whole problem must be re-examined to

consider its effect on the troop lift, and Sir

Dudley Pound challenged the assumption

that the northern convoys could be run

throughout the year. Finally, both accepted Somervell's assurances on the one

hand that a loss rate of 2.4 percent could

be expected with reasonable certainty,

and on the other that the Persian Gulf

could easily compensate by July for any

interruption of the northern convoys. The

CCS finally approved the schedule,

though with the distinct understanding

that the northern convoys might have to

35

 CCS 170/2, 23 Jan 42, title: Final Rpt to President and Prime Minister Summarizing Decisions by

CCS. 36

 Min, 63d mtg CCS, 20 Jan 43, Item 1. 37

 (1) CCS 160, Rpt by CPS, 19 Jan 43, title: Minimum Escort Reqmts To Maintain Sea Communications of the United Nations. (2) CCS 162 cited n.

33(2). Since the report was primarily concerned with

U.S. shipping, Leathers' participation was only perfunctory. In the 63d meeting of CCS, 20 January

1943, he said he was not in full agreement. The revision that was approved, CCS 162/1, 20 January

1943, contained only a minor change. The detailed

schedule was as follows:
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—II 589

be interrupted. In the final report to the

President and Prime Minister, they said:

We have examined the extent of shipments

to Russia required to fulfill the United States

and British obligations throughout 1943 with

a view to estimating the effect of these ship- ments on other commitments. Our conclusion is that, providing a shipping loss rate of

not more than 2.4% per month can be relied

on, it will be possible to meet full commitments by the end of the calendar year 1943;

and we have approved a program of shipments on this basis subject to the proviso that

supplies to Russia shall not be continued at

prohibitive cost to the United Nations effort.38

New Disappointments

The War Shipping Administration, the

organization actually responsible for allocating shipping for the Soviet aid program, was not represented at Casablanca

and in the meantime had been doing its

own planning in Washington. While the

Joint Chiefs themselves were absent, their

representatives in Washington considered

the earlier CMTC report on shipping requirements for the Second Protocol, were

unable to resolve the conflict with requirements for military operations, and consequently asked WSA to investigate the

feasibility of getting ships from other than

U.S. military allocations. Admiral Land

replied on 30 January that WSA had included the necessary sailings to meet arrears in protocol shipments in its program

since early January, and considered they

could be accomplished, but that shipments

over the northern route would depend on

convoys and those to the Persian Gulf on

capacity of facilities there. He understood

the WSA obligation in regard to the Persian Gulf to be only "to keep the route full

with respect to ability to discharge the

cargo with reasonable dispatch," and

called attention to the "serious congestion

in the Persian ports since last autumn. . . .

caused principally by the dispatch of more

ships for Russian and Army account . . .

than these ports have been able to

handle."

 39

When the Casablanca schedule was referred to WSA, these doubts were reiterated and expanded. WSA contended the

schedule for the first half of 1943 could not

be met because of congestion in the Persian Gulf and slow turnaround time in the

Pacific. Its own estimates of the maximum

sailings possible during the first half of

1943 were 63 on the northern route, 94 to

the Persian Gulf, and 152 to Vladivostok,

a total of 309 instead of the 376 proposed

by Somervell. This would increase the

deficit at the end of the Second Protocol

period to 123, and require 411 sailings during the second half of the year to make it

up.40 WSA pointed to the 175,000 tons of

cargo on ships tied up in the Persian Gulf

at the end of January, as opposed to the

discharge of only 90,000 tons in that

month—a record high. While the civilian

shipping officials admitted that conditions

would improve with U.S. Army operation,

they did not think this improvement

would be rapid enough to clear up the

backlog and permit sailings at the rate

proposed. Accordingly, they cut back

shipments in February to the Persian

Gulf to seven sailings in contrast to the

eighteen proposed in the Casablanca

schedule, and insisted that March sailings

be limited to fourteen.

Somervell, on the other hand, continued to be optimistic, even after his return 38

 (1) CCS 170/2 cited n. 35. (2) See min cited n.

36. (3) See also discussion in min, 3d mtg ANFA

Conf, 23 Jan 43. 39

 (1) Memo cited n. 24(3). (2) Min, 50th mtg JCS,

13 Jan 43, Item 1. 40

 CCS 162/2 cited n. 24(4).
590 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

from a personal visit to the Persian Gulf

after Casablanca. He thought the estimate

of the combined Anglo-American capacity committee in Iran that twenty-one

ships could safely be dispatched in March

was if anything too modest, and told the

JCS that if necessary twenty-nine ships

could be sent in that month for June discharge in the Persian Gulf. Somervell's

contention was generally supported by a

study made in the Strategic Logistics Division, SOS, in mid-February. The CMTC

also reported to the CCS that the theater

estimate of twenty-one ships should be accepted. WSA gave in, and nineteen ships

actually sailed for the Persian Gulf during

March.41

Thus, as the situation stood at the end

of February, fulfillment of the Casablanca

schedule for the first half of 1943 depended on maintaining the northern convoys,

cleaning up the congestion in the Persian

Gulf, and expanding the volume of shipments in the Pacific. Hopes for maintaining the northern convoys were soon

dashed. On 18 March 1943 Churchill informed Roosevelt that the renewed German naval concentration at Narvik presented a danger so great that he deemed

it inadvisable to risk further convoys to

Murmansk. Roosevelt again acquiesced,

and it soon became apparent that no more

would sail until autumn because the invasion of Sicily would absorb all available

escort during the summer. On 30 March

Churchill informed Stalin of the decision,

stressing the compensation that the Persian Gulf and Pacific routes would offer.

Stalin was unimpressed, calling the action

a "catastrophic diminution of supplies,"

which could not fail to affect the position

of Soviet troops. He thought the Pacific

and Persian Gulf routes could in no measure compensate because of lack of shipping in the Pacific and "small transit capacity" through Iran.42

Despite Stalin's critical reaction, no

other decision was possible without jeopardizing the whole naval position in the

Atlantic, and no more convoys were to sail

over the northern route until September

1943. In contrast to the proposed sixtyfour vessels from the United States for the

northern route during the first half of

1943, only thirty-six sailed, and of these

twenty-nine were unloaded in the United

Kingdom. In the light of the waste that

the retention of loaded ships in England

during 1942 had caused, this time Lewis

Douglas of WSA insisted that the ships be

unloaded. Vigorous Soviet protests were

to no avail. The Russians then turned to

demand compensating shipments via the

Persian Gulf and Pacific. Unfortunately,

developments in the Persian Gulf were

bearing out WSA's pessimism as to clearance capacity. In response to Somervell's

request on 27 February for an "all-out

effort . . . to unload and release ships,"

Connolly bent every resource to the task,

but as shown earlier, the obstacles were

too great.43 At the end of April a survey

made by SOS officers confirmed the need

for cutting shipments drastically in order

to clear up the backlog, and the SOS had

to accept the inevitable. Only four fully

41

 (1) Ibid. (2) See below, App. D. (3) Memo, Col

Elliott for ACofS Opns SOS, 11 Feb 43, sub: Communications in Iran, 12a Persian Gulf folder, Plng Div

ASF. (4) Min, 64th mtg JCS, 2 Mar 42, Item 2. (5)

Memo, Land and Douglas for President, 10 Mar 43,

Russian-Rpts to President folder, WSA Douglas File. 42

 (1) Msg, Premier Stalin to Prime Minister, 2 Apr

43, as quoted in Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 755. See

also, pp. 752-57. (2) Msg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 18

Mar 43, MS Index to the Hopkins Papers, Bk. V, Aid

to Russia, p. 38, Item 107. 43

 Msg AMPSC 309, AGWAR to CG Persian Gulf

Sv Comd. 27 Feb 43, Persian Gulf 26-A File, OCMH.
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—II 591

TABLE 16—SOVIET AID SHIPMENTS TO PERSIAN GULF VERSUS CASABLANCA PROGRAM:

JANUARY-JUNE 1943

Source: (1) CCS 162/1, 20 Jan 43, title: U.S. Aid to Russia. (2) Report on War Aid to USSR, 28 Nov 45.

loaded Soviet ships were dispatched in

June. Total shipments to the Persian Gulf

between January and June 1943 were far

below the Casablanca schedule and even

below WSA's February estimates.44 (Table

16)

There remained the Pacific route.

Soviet representatives at first proposed

that the United States transfer to the

USSR vessels in the Pacific in equal tonnages to those unloaded in England.

Though the Americans would not accept

this proposition, they did agree to transfer

twenty more Liberty ships to the Russians

in the Pacific during April, May, and

June, and added several tankers in response to Soviet representations that aviation fuel was urgently needed. The total

transfers to the Soviet flag in the Pacific

reached fifty-three cargo vessels and six

tankers by the end of June 1943. With this

additional fleet, performance in the Pacific

(including shipments to Soviet arctic

ports) was considerably above the Casablanca schedule and even the WSA estimates, but it was still far from sufficient to

make up for cancellation of the northern

shipments and the disappointing performance of the southern route.45

 (Table 17)

The net tonnage deficit for all routes at

the end of the Second Protocol period,

June 1943, was nearly a million long tons,

not including cargoes unloaded in England, a considerably greater deficit than

either the SOS or WSA had estimated.

This does not mean, however, that the

Casablanca planning for protocol ship44

 (1) Ltr, Gen Belyaev to Hopkins, 17 Apr 43, MS

Index to the Hopkins Papers, Bk. VII, Lend-lease Aid

to Russia (1942-43) p. 4, Item 40. (2) Ltr, Hopkins

to Belyaev, 20 Apr 43, MS Index to the Hopkins Papers, Bk. VII, Lend-lease Aid to Russia (1942-43) p.

5, Item 42. (3) For Soviet complaints, see also MS

Index to the Hopkins Papers, Bk. V, Aid to Russia,

pp. 41-43, Items 113-114, 116, and 120. (4) Memo,

Douglas for Hopkins, 25 Mar 43, Russian Shipg 1 Jan

43 folder, WSA Douglas File. (5) Allin-Stone rpt cited

n. 22. (6) For a fuller discussion of the Allin-Stone

mission, see Motter, Persian Corridor, pp. 400-408. (7)

Ltr, Gen Wylie, Asst CofTrans, to W. S. MacPherson,

WSA, 16 May 43, OCT 333.1 Persian Gulf. 45

 (1) See above, n. 44(1)-(4). (2) Memo, Douglas

and Land for President, 10 Apr 43, Russia-Rpts to

President folder, WSA Douglas File. (3) Status of the

Soviet Aid Program as of March 31, 1943, rpt by

OLLA to President; Status . . . as of April 30, 1943;

Status . . . as of May 31, 1943; and Status . . . as

of June 30, 1943.
592 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

TABLE 17—SOVIET AID SHIPMENTS VIA PACIFIC VERSUS CASABLANCA PROGRAM:

JANUARY-JUNE 1943

Source: (1) CCS 162/1, 20 Jan 43, title: U.S. Aid to Russia. (2) Report on War Aid to USSR, 28 Nov 45.

ments must be dismissed as totally visionary. By June 1943 the Persian Gulf and

the Pacific were finally ready to carry the

necessary load. The shipping loss rate had

fallen considerably below the 2.4 percent

monthly figure stipulated at Casablanca.

While much of the excess thus made available was absorbed by increased British

and American needs, shipments to the

USSR were to be brought up to schedule

by the end of 1943.

War Department Supply Agencies

and the Second Protocol

During the Second Protocol period, the

shipping problem held the center of the

stage. The difficulties the War Department had encountered earlier in making

materials available for the Soviet aid program became less and less serious. The

very fact that shipping was limited reduced the pressure for production, although the full commitment under the

protocol had to be accepted as the production goal. The President directed that materials should be made available in the

exact priorities the Russians desired for

loading the ships sailing by any and all

routes. The SOS, with the task of procuring and delivering the supplies for which

the War Department was responsible,

geared its actions to this end.46

Measured against its total commitments

under the Second Protocol, the War Department could report, by November

1942, that it was on or ahead of schedule

in furnishing 70 percent of the items involved, and behind on 30 percent. The

principal shortages were tanks, antiaircraft guns, submachine guns, scout cars,

field repair shops, trucks, armor plate,

toluol, communications equipment, webbing, leather, and medical supplies. Production officials in SOS regarded few of

these shortages as serious for there were

unshipped backlogs of many of these very

items, and they felt that if shipping were

made available, production deficits could,

in most cases, be made good by the end of

46

 (1) MS Index to the Hopkins Papers, Bk. V, Aid

to Russia, p. 17, Item 65. (2) Memo cited n. 11.
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—II 593

the protocol year. Many of the shortages

were due only to delays in delivery of

complementary equipment and did not affect major items. The most serious shortages resulted from delays on the part of

the Russians in furnishing specifications

and a continuing obdurate Soviet insistence that the War Department meet these

specifications to the letter regardless of the

difficulty involved.47

The largest continuing problem was

signal communications equipment. It was

of utmost concern to the USSR, for the

evidence indicates that it was the area in

which Soviet production and technical

knowledge were weakest. In January 1943

General Belyaev registered strong complaints with the War Department regarding delays in the delivery of radio equipment, complaints reminiscent of the early

period of the First Protocol when they

were an everyday affair. In the SOS view,

however, the major fault lay with the Russians themselves. They had changed completely the distribution of radios by types

as computed for them by the Signal Corps;

they demanded metal radio tubes requiring special production facilities at a time

when the total American usage was of

glass tubes; they failed to present timely

specifications for radio components, measuring and-testing equipment, and direction finders (radar). Nevertheless, SOS

agreed to make a strenuous effort to meet

their needs and, as a result of certain Soviet compromises on types, it was able to

solve the problem of radio sets and tubes,

though production of direction finders,

measuring and testing equipment, and

radio components continued to lag. Radar

equipment presented a distinct problem.

In addition to specification troubles there

was also a serious question of release for

reasons of military secrecy and of heavy

competing demands from the U.S. services and the British.48

Despite these continuing difficulties on

signal equipment, by late 1942 SOS was

far more concerned with the obverse of

the coin, the accumulation of unshipped

material on protocol account. Though

available shipping was little more than

half that anticipated during the last six

months of 1942, factory deliveries continued to be based on total protocol quantities. A much higher proportion of shipping than expected moved over the Pacific

route where munitions could not be carried, and, beginning in September 1942,

the Russians began to shift their priorities

from ground munitions to foodstuffs and

petroleum products. Stalin's message to

the President in October confirmed this

shift. Of military materials, only planes,

trucks, and communications equipment

continued in the highest priority, and the

lack of means of delivery seriously curtailed the number of trucks that could be

shipped. These factors combined to make

a backlog of immobilized equipment in

idle storage inevitable. Yet in the autumn

of 1942 the Soviet representatives in

Washington showed little inclination to

accept curtailment of delivery of items

placed in low priority and insisted that the

47

 (1) Rpt, SW to President, 9 Nov 42, sub: Progress

on Soviet Protocol, AG 400.3295 (9-1-42) (3) Sec 12.

(2) Memo, Col Franks for Dir of Procurement, 31 Oct

42, sub: Shortages on 2d Russian Protocol. (3) Memo,

Gen Harrison for Col Franks, 9 Nov 42, same sub.

Last two in ID 031.1, I. (4) Memo, Somervell for

President's Soviet Protocol Com, 16 Nov 42, sub: Rpt

of WD Concerning Status of Russian Protocol, ID

031.1, II. 48

 (1) Memo, Clay for Somervell, 22 Feb 43, sub:

Rpt to President's Soviet Protocol Com, ID 031.1,

III, Pt. 1. (2) Ltr, Gen Belyaev to Maj Gen Dawson

Olmstead, CSigO SOS, 12 Jan 43. Ltr, Belyaev to

Burns, 13 Jan 43. Last two in ID 031.1, II. (4) Other

detailed corresp in same file.
594 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

total protocol commitment be readied for

shipment.49

From July to November 1942, while the

shipping situation was at its worst, both

the War Department and the MAB followed the policy of allowing military items

on the protocol to accumulate. The embarrassing protocol shortages in early

1942 were of too recent memory to permit

of any other course, and the main emphasis continued to be on making the materials available. The MAB and its ground

committee did make some adjustments in

assignments in view of the shipping situation, and did enforce the 45-day rule

when there was no strenuous objection

from the Russians. Assignments of trucks,

for instance, were held well below the 10,-

000 monthly scheduled since average

monthly shipments were only 2,520, and

at the end of October there was an unshipped backlog of 26,000. Also, assignments of medium tanks to the Soviet

Union were cut back, with Soviet permission, to permit meeting certain British and

American needs in the light of a general

shortfall in production. There was inevitably some slackening of pressure on and

within the supply services on protocol

items because of a general feeling that the

Russians could not ship what was being

made available.50

These mild palliatives were insufficient

to avert the threat of a very large backlog

of immobilized material by the end of

1942. In a mid-November report to the

President's Soviet Protocol Committee,

General Somervell boldly recommended

that "unshipped accumulations of any

War Department item be limited to one

and one-half times the monthly Protocol

commitment, and that no obligation be

assumed to make available any materials

withheld in accordance with this policy."

 51

 The protocol committee agreed to

application of this forty-five-day backlog

principle in certain cases, but it would

never accept the stipulation that there was

no obligation to replace materials so withheld. To have done so would have been

tantamount to conceding the War Department the power to cut back protocol commitments in the categories of articles not

shipped. The protocol committee preferred to tread more lightly on Soviet toes,

proceeding by negotiation rather than by

unilateral action.52

The one and a half months' backlog

policy was applied with the sanction of the

MAB to the supply of trucks and proved

an adequate solution, but no satisfactory

remedy was found for perhaps the most

troublesome accumulation, that of chemicals. There was still a backlog of four

49

 (1) Rpts cited n. 24(1) and n. 30(2); Status of the

Soviet Aid Program as of September 30, 1942, rpt

by OLLA to President; Status . . . as of October 31,

1942; and Status . . . as of January 31, 1943. (2) MS

Index to the Hopkins Papers, Bk. V, Aid to Russia, p.

21, Item 72(e). (3) Memo, Somervell for Clay, 28

Oct 42, AG 400.3295 (10-28-42) (2).

The problem was by no means confined to military

items. The greatest accumulations were of carbon

steels. 50

 (1) Memo cited n. 47(4). (2) Min 10, 41st mtg

MAB, 11 Nov 42. (3) For a case history in leniency,

see corresp in ID 319.1 Rpts Storage. (4) Memo,

OQMG for ID, 16 Jan 43, sub: 2d Russian Protocol.

(5) Memo, Franks for Clay, 26 Jan 43, sub: 2d Russian Protocol-Weekly Rpt on ... Deficiencies

. . . . Last two in ID 031.1, II. (6) For tanks, see

above, Ch. XI. 51

 Memo cited n. 47(4). 52

 (1) Min, mtgs of President's Soviet Protocol Com

Subcom on Sups, 10 and 26 Dec 42. (2) Memo, Clay

for Chm President's Soviet Protocol Com Subcom on

Sups, 12 Dec 42, sub: Rpt on Accumulated Chemicals

and Proposed Solution. (3) Memo, Somervell for Chm

President's Soviet Protocol Com, 5 Jan 43, sub: Rpt

of WD Concerning Status of Russian Protocol. All in

ID 031.1, II.
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—II 595

months' supply in July 1943.53 On other

items the International Division pressed

Soviet representatives for a clear statement of what they did and did not want

to ship in view of the impossibility of floating all the material promised. Such a clear

statement was never forthcoming, but the

Soviet representatives did show a measure

of co-operation by canceling from time

to time items they no longer desired. By

the end of April they had canceled in

whole or in part their Second Protocol requirements for light and medium tanks,

57-mm. antitank guns, scout cars, armor

plate, 37-mm. and 90-mm. antiaircraft

guns, and Thompson submachine guns.

These cancellations reflected clearly the

shift in Soviet needs and the effects of the

victory at Stalingrad. The most surprising

cancellation was that of light and medium

tanks, for the Russians had placed such

emphasis on them in 1941 and 1942 as to

seriously interfere with the British and

American armored programs. There was

an accumulated backlog of 2,583 tanks

unshipped by February 1943 and the cancellation was welcome indeed to the War

Department. With the cancellation of

tank and gun requirements went as a

corollary reduction in Soviet requirements

for ammunition of American caliber. The

cancellations considerably eased the production problem and made possible the

repossession of sizable backlogs. Suspension of tank shipments made additional

shipping space available for trucks.54

There was thus no real policy solution

to the backlog crisis, but the improvement

in the shipping situation, Soviet cancellations, partial application of the 45-day

backlog principle, and various pressures

on the Soviet repesentatives to release materials at least alleviated it. The final record of the War Department on the Second

Protocol reveals a reasonable degree of

success in meeting Soviet needs and also

in regulating the flow of material to avoid

undue accumulations. Of the fifty-four

items for which it was responsible, eight

were canceled. Of the forty-six outstanding, the full commitment was made available on twenty-nine, and on six more supply was in accord with reduced Soviet requirements (dry cells and various chemicals). Of the remaining eleven where

commitments were not met, on five it was

because material had to be withheld in

accordance with the 45-day backlog policy

(other chemicals, field repair shops, army

cloth, and webbing). Also 94,047 cargo

trucks were made available out of the total

commitment of 120,000, the shortage

being solely due to the slow rate of shipment during 1942. Leather deliveries were

delayed and only 74 percent complete because of the shortage of shipping to bring

it from South American sources. On the

other four items, all signal equipment, delays in obtaining specifications were in

large measure responsible. The only flat

53

 (1) Memo, Franks for Clay, 12 Jan 43, sub: Status

of Motor Vehicles . . . Under 2d Protocol, ID 031.1,

II. (2) See succeeding reports of the same nature in

ID 031.1, II-V. (3) Min 1319, 65th mtg MAG(G), 10

Dec 42; Min 1472, 70th mtg, 14 Jan 43; Min 1524,

73d mtg, 28 Jan 43. (4) On the chemical problem,

see min cited n. 52(1), and min, mtg of President's

Soviet Protocol Com Subcom on Sups, 6 Jul 43, ID

031.1, V. (5) Ltr, Gen Wesson to Gen Belyaev, 6 Apr

43, ID 031.1, II, Pt. 2. 54

 (1) Ltr, Col Willet J. Baird to Gen Belyaev, 30

Jan 43, ID 031.1, III, Pt. 1. (2) Related papers in

same file. (3) Ltr, Molchanov to Franks, 12 Jan 43, ID

031.1, IV. (4) Memo, Burns for Hopkins, 23 Feb 43,

MS Index to the Hopkins Papers, Bk. VII, Lendlease Aid to Russia (1942-43), p. 2, Item 19. (5) Ltr,

Belyaev to Spalding, 17 Apr 43. (6) Ltr, Hazard to

Baird, 19 May 43. Last two in ID 031.1, IV. (7) Rpt,

SW to President, 6 Jul 43, sub: Progress on Soviet

Protocol, ID 031.1, V.
596 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

SOVIET FREIGHTER docked at Portland, Oregon, 1943.

failure was in the case of radar, where deliveries were only 12 percent complete. The

Combined Communications Board finally

decided to release radar to the Russians,

but U.S. and British demands plus specification difficulties continued to prevent

deliveries of any sizable quantities. In all,

the War Department made available some

783,000 short tons of supplies out of its

commitment of 1,100,000. Of this some

127,363 short tons of armament and a

considerable but undetermined tonnage

of miscellaneous supplies remained unshipped at the end of June 1943.

A word must be added with regard to

aircraft, for the USSR put the utmost emphasis upon them. Aircraft were not furnished in the quantities the USSR desired,

but were furnished to the full extent of

commitments both for American account

and for British as far as they were a charge

against U.S. production. In addition 80

transports, 30 trainers, and one heavy

bomber were delivered over and above

these protocol promises. Of these, all but

141 on U.S. account and 135 on British

account had departed the United States

by the end of June. Some 1,151 went via

the Alaskan ferry, 375 via the South Atlantic ferry, and 2,071 by water to northern Soviet ports or the Persian Gulf. In

truth the planes shipped seem to have
THE LONG ROAD TO RUSSIA—II 597

been, as in the case of other materials,

about all that the available delivery routes

could handle.55

During the first two protocol periods,

the United States proved unable, despite

the tremendous effort exerted, to deliver

supplies to the Soviet Union on the scale

promised. (See Appendix C.) Shipments

over the northern route, the main reliance

in the beginning, could not be continuously maintained at the heavy cost in merchant shipping and naval convoy involved. Alternate routes—the Pacific and

the Persian Gulf—were not ready to assume the burden. In the Pacific only civilian-type supplies could be carried and

these in ships flying the Soviet flag. Soviet

flag shipping was scarce during 1942 and

the Russians placed primary emphasis on

munitions of war rather than civilian materials. The Persian Gulf area lacked the

port and transport facilities necessary for

any extensive supply program. The tremendous political pressure behind the Soviet aid program, however, resulted in a

concentration of American effort on the

development of facilities in the Persian

Gulf and in transfer of a sizable fleet of

American vessels to the Soviet flag in the

Pacific. Improvement in the Soviet military situation after the Stalingrad victory

brought about a shift of emphasis from

munitions of war to foodstuffs, petroleum

products, and raw and industrial materials, all of which could be shipped over

the Pacific route. By mid-1943 capacities

of the Persian Gulf and Pacific routes

alone appeared adequate to meet commitments during the following year on the

scale of those of the Second Protocol, and

the relative decline of German naval and

air power presaged a period when the

northern route also might again be used

without excessive losses. The fall in the

shipping loss rate to well below the 2.4 percent monthly figure stipulated at Casablanca and the booming American ship

production promised that in the foreseeable future ships could be furnished for

carrying supplies to the USSR without

impinging on Anglo-American plans for

major operations. In short, by the end of

the Second Protocol period the problems

of delivering supplies over the long hard

route to Russia seemed to be well on their

way to solution.

55

 (1) Rpt cited n. 54(7). (2) Memo, Somervell for

President's Soviet Protocol Com, 23 Jul 43, sub: Rpt

of WD Concerning Status of Russian Protocol, ID

031.1, V.

PART SIX

THE CASABLANCA PERIOD

STRATEGIC PLANS

AND LOGISTICAL METHOD

CHAPTER XXII

War Production and Shipping:

Year's End Outlook

The logistical war, from the Army's

vantage point, entered an unmistakably

new phase late in 1942 and early in 1943.

This phase had many characteristics not

easily described by a single adjective or as

a single trend. The magnitudes were

greater, of course—in numbers of troops to

be supplied, transported, and serviced, in

quantities of material and shipping available, in the range of operations to be supported. There was somewhat less improvisation, less wasteful haste, less misdirected

effort, and somewhat more action planned

in detail, co-ordinated with other concurrent action, reduced to standardized

methods, and made routine. Efforts were

made in such fields as the joint and combined committees and interservice coordination overseas to rationalize logistical

organization and methods—though with

but limited success. There was considerable talk of and some real striving for

economy. The general trend seemed to be

toward more economy of force, the accomplishing of more for each unit of effort.

These trends in logistics coincided with

the basic change that was occurring in the

military position of the Anglo-American

coalition—the regaining of the strategic

initiative. The shift was heralded by the

limited offensives launched in the Pacific

and North Africa, and by the meeting of

military and political leaders at Casablanca in January 1943 to chart the future

course of offensive strategy. To a large degree the improvement in the military situation was a result of the huge outpouring

of munitions from American factories and

of ships from American yards. The new

strategic outlook and the vast output of

the implements of war were, at the end of

1942, the two massive and overriding facts

of the situation.

But between strategy and the logistical

plans and systems that made it possible to

implement strategy, there was scarcely

more harmony or direct correlation than

there had been during the tumultuous first

half of 1942. With the shelving of plans for

an early attack on German-dominated

Europe across the English Channel, Allied

strategy had embarked upon a more diffuse effort, involving major operations in

several widely separated theaters, thus

enormously complicating the problems of

co-ordinating deployment and distributing shipping. This new course of action,

moreover, had been launched without any

clear agreement between the major Allies

or even among their respective staffs as to

its ultimate objectives. At Casablanca the

leaders tried without success to draw up a

master plan for winning the war with

which their current projects could be har-
602 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

monized. It was only with difficulty, indeed, that they reached agreement upon

the next concrete steps on the strategic

agenda, for which it was imperative to inaugurate detailed planning and preparations immediately. All this uncertainty,

both before and after Casablanca, as to

goals lying beyond the immediate future,

forced the logistical planners to proceed

blindly in drawing up deployment, production, and distribution programs, without any guidance other than their own

independent assumptions and speculations.

From late 1942 until mid-1943, in fact,

the planning of war production was

shaped in broad outline, not by strategic

goals but by the estimated limits of national productivity. The cuts in supply

programs these limitations dictated, weeks

before the strategic planners met at Casablanca, had already predetermined to an

important degree the volume of overseas

deployment and the relative weight of

land, sea, and air power to be employed in

the great offensives of 1943 and 1944.

The Cutback in Military Supply

War production in 1942, as Donald

Nelson reported to the President, "forged

ahead mightily."

 1 Its aggregate dollar

value (munitions, construction, and nonmunitions for war purposes) was $58.7 billion, as compared with only $16.5 billion

in 1941, and it engrossed about 31 percent

of the total national production, as against

only 9 percent in 1941. In the last quarter

of the year war production amounted to

almost 40 percent of the national product.

But the advance had been uneven. In

April munitions output increased 19 percent over that of the previous month, but

September registered a gain of only 10

percent over August, and October only 4

percent over September. Not until the

very end of the year did output rise again

sharply. Only in naval and merchant ship

construction, including landing craft, did

the "hump" occur during the middle

months, from early spring through the

summer. Only a few of the President's

spectacular end-item goals had been attained—notably tanks (but not all tanktype units) and certain antiaircraft guns.

Aircraft, the largest single item, had fallen

far behind early schedules and machine

guns for ground forces had also lagged.

Merchant ship construction, despite ample

yard capacity and spectacular speed records in output of mass-produced types

such as the Liberty, had been held back

by a shortage of steel.2

It was becoming apparent by the end of

1942 that strenuous and generally illco-ordinated pushing toward maximum

production in all categories was causing

serious imbalance. The armed services

placed the blame upon faulty control of

the flow of materials to the producers of

end-items; production officials insisted

that the shortage of materials had not

been sufficiently acute to account for the

leveling off of output in September and

October, and that the fault lay in defective scheduling of components and enditems by the services. Before the end of the

year, however, arrangements were concluded between the WPB and the services

that held out good prospects of remedying

these difficulties. WPB had adopted and

was soon to put into effect the Controlled

Materials Plan, a "vertical" system of

allocating key materials to claimant agencies, which the services had favored over

the "horizontal" method of allocating di1

 CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War, p. 533. 2

 (1) Ibid., Pt. III, Ch. XV. (2) See also below,

App. B.
WAR PRODUCTION AND SHIPPING: YEAR'S END OUTLOOK 603

rectly to producers that was embodied in

the Production Requirements Plan in

effect during most of 1942. On the other

hand WPB, through its new Production

Executive Committee headed by Charles

E. Wilson, had succeeded in securing

closer control over production scheduling,

though this remained within the procurement function of the services. In the next

few months scheduling and materials control were to be the foremost production

problems.3

Production plans and objectives during

the first half of 1942 had reflected a widespread adherence to the theory of "incentive" goals; no real effort had been made

to bring programs within the limits of productive capacity, and the experts differed

widely among themselves as to where

those limits actually lay. Studies of the

feasibility of the early programs for 1942

and 1943 were undertaken as early as

February 1942 by the Planning Committee of the War Production Board. The

President was not overly impressed by the

committee's recommendations for reductions, submitted to him by Mr. Nelson. In

May he even raised some of his "must"

objectives and also gave a general endorsement to the complementary supply programs of the military services. Nelson

thereupon allowed the question of feasibility to lapse.4

Through the spring and summer the

gap between actual production and quotas

necessary to meet 1942 objectives steadily

widened. In August Simon Kuznets of the

WPB Planning Committee completed and

Nelson approved a detailed analysis indicating that war production in 1942 would

probably fall short of objectives by about

$15 billion (a remarkably accurate prediction), and that the goals for 1943 were

even less attainable. This report brought

from General Somervell (to whom, among

others, it had been forwarded for comment) an explosion of wrath and the retort

that it ought to be "carefully hidden from

the eyes of thoughtful men."

 5 The whole

issue came at once to a head since the

WPB experts had warned that an immediate cutback of existing goals was imperative to avert serious dislocation among the

various programs and misdirection of

effort that might make impossible even the

objectives they thought feasible.

Somervell vigorously disputed the

WPB's specific findings and in particular

scoffed at the technique of measuring productive capacity in dollars. He argued

that even if the goals should prove to be

excessive, this would mean only that they

would be postponed; to reduce them at the

outset would relax the pressure that in an

economy geared to war was essential in

order to achieve maximum effort.6

On this matter his own civilian superior,

Under Secretary Patterson, thought otherwise. "Production objectives," Patterson

told him, "ought not to be far in front of

estimated maximum production . . . otherwise our scheduling of production cannot represent reality, and . . . without

realistic scheduling we will continue to

suffer from maldistribution of materials,

thus cutting down the actual output of

finished weapons."

 7 In his mind, the important point was that reduction of objec- 3

 CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War, Chs. XIIXIII, XV. 4

 (1) See Com on Pub Admin Cases, Feasibility Dispute, Ch. III. (2) See also above, Ch. VIII. 5

 Memo, Somervell for Robert R. Nathan, Chm

Plng Com WPB, 12 Sep 42, WPD 1942(2) folder, Hq

ASF. 6

 (1) See Com on Pub Admin Cases, Feasibility Dispute, Chs. IV-V. (2) See also, Millett, ASF, Chs.

XIII-XV. 7

 Memo, Patterson for Somervell, 7 Oct 42, quoted

in Com on Pub Admin Cases, Feasibility Dispute, pp.

102-03.
604 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

tives should be made by the Joint Chiefs,

who alone were qualified to evaluate the

pertinent strategic considerations. Most

WPB officials were willing to concede this

point.8

Somervell backed down, and it was on

his suggestion that Nelson, on 19 October,

referred the problem to the Joint Chiefs,

asking them for guidance "in deciding

which part of the program can be extended

to 1944 with least damage to the war

effort."

 9 Existing objectives, for munitions,

facilities, and war construction, had been

estimated at a total value of $92.9 billion

for 1943, to which was added an estimated

deficit from the 1942 program (excluding

aircraft) of another $5 billion, bringing the

whole to almost $98 billion. The national

economy, Nelson stated, would be unable

to produce in these categories more than

a total of $75 billion. Twenty-three billion,

evidently, would have to be eliminated or

postponed.10

This attack upon the military supply

programs coincided with an equally determined one upon military demands for

manpower. By late summer of 1942 labor

shortages throughout the country, while

still local or regional rather than general,

had become a serious embarrassment to

production, and the pool of unemployed,

which heretofore had served to cushion

the impact of military and industrial expansion upon the nation's manpower, had

for practical purposes disappeared. Talk of

national service legislation was in the air,

criticism of manpower waste in the armed

services mounted in volume, and investigating committees in both the Senate and

the House were examining the whole

manpower problem. As the largest military user of the nation's manpower, the

Army naturally was the principal target of

the critics. During the first eight months of

1942 the Army's estimates of its ultimate

manpower needs had remained indefinite.

Only the mobilization Troop Basis for

1942 had the stamp of presidential approval; the larger and rather theoretical

Victory Program goals for 1943 and beyond served primarily as guides for supply

planning. Rumors of these latter formidable figures filtered down to the public, and

in September a statement by Maj. Gen.

Lewis B. Hershey, Director of Selective

Service, that the armed services might

eventually have to mobilize 13 million

men was widely misinterpreted to mean

that the Army alone had its eye on that

number. Like the WPB, the civilian manpower agencies were becoming impatient

with both the vastness and the vagueness

of the armed services' long-range objectives. In mid-September Paul V. McNutt,

Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, asked the Joint Chiefs to join with

the commission and WPB in settling upon

the ultimate manpower needs of industry,

agriculture, and the armed services.11

8

 Ibid. and pp. 100-104. 9

 Memo, Nelson for JCS, 19 Oct 42, sub: U.S. War

Pdn Objective 1943, circulated as JCS 134, in CCS

400.17 (7-6-42) Sec 3. 10

 (1) Ibid. (2) Com on Pub Admin Cases, Feasibility Dispute, pp. 104-05. (3) CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War, pp. 284-89.

The $75 billion maximum was the Planning Committee's estimate. Nelson believed the maximum lay

somewhere between $75 and $85 billion. Nonmunitions expenditures were expected to add another $18

billion to existing objectives, making a total war production goal for 1943 of $115 billion—about 75 percent of the estimated national product. 11

 (1) Maj William P. Moody, "Manpower Becomes a Problem: Conflict Between the JCS and

Civilian War Agencies, September-December 1942,"

Ch. VI, Sec II-C of Mobilization and Demobilization of Military Manpower, JCS study, pp. 1-12, JCS

Hist Sec. (2) Jonathan Grossman, Industrial Relations

and Labor Problems, a volume in preparation for the

series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II, draft chapter, "Size of the Army."
WAR PRODUCTION AND SHIPPING: YEAR'S END OUTLOOK 605

Under these pressures the Army and

Navy in September rushed to completion

their detailed troop requirements for 1943.

The Army's needs were set at 8,208,000

officers and enlisted men, in a grand total

for all the armed services of 10.9 million.

Requirements for 1944 and beyond remained under study. To the 1943 troop

bases, as submitted by the JCS, the President promptly gave provisional approval

on 30 September, holding out the possibility of later increases if needed.12

These objectives, particularly the

Army's strength goals, immediately came

under bitter attack from the civilian production and manpower agencies. These

officials challenged both the feasibility and

the need for mobilization of ground forces

on such a scale. They argued that the national economy, including both civilian

and war production, would be seriously

weakened by the drain of men from factories and farms, and questioned whether

the Army could in fact transport its forces

overseas in numbers sufficient to prevent

the accumulation at home, as the WPB

Planning Committee put it, of "a stagnant pool of manpower, contributing

neither to the defense of the country in a

military sense nor to its productive output."

 13

 Manpower ceilings for the armed

forces were suggested that would hold the

size of the Army in 1943 to a limit as low

as 6.5 million.

In the midst of the controversy the President himself, late in October, startled his

military advisers by suggesting, with overtones of command, a new set of military

strength objectives which, as General

Marshall and his staff interpreted the

somewhat devious wording, would limit

the Army by mid-1944 to the 7,533,000 enlisted men and 675,000 officers already

approved on 30 September as the goal for

the end of 1943. A little later the President

further muddied the water by commenting that the Army would be "lucky if it

gets over 7,000,000 [enlisted men] by December 31, 1943."

 14

 But before the end

of November, after "much correspondence and many conferences," as General

McNarney described it, the President was

persuaded to reaffirm his earlier approval

of a 7.5-million-man Army for 1943 (8.2

million including officers), though this

time with the warning that in all probability there would be no further expansion

after 1943.15 "We should stop talking,"

observed Brig. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards,

the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, "about

increasing beyond this figure."

 16

 A few

days later the Joint Chiefs decided that a

subcommittee report setting the Army's

ultimate personnel requirements at 13,-

594,000 men and women (in a total of

17,497,145 for all services) had better be

kept discreetly under cover.17

For the now solidly approved 1943 objectives military spokesmen made no

apologies. If those objectives had not been

pared down to the bone of every precisely

calculable need, it was argued, neither

were they hastily contrived or heavily

padded guesses, and there was no convinc12

 Memo, Adm Leahy for President, 30 Sep 42,

with ind by President, CCS 320.2 (7-25-42) Sec 1. 13

 Moody chapter, pp. 13-14, cited n. 11(1). 14

 Memo, President for Marshall, 10 Nov 42,

WDCSA 320.2 (11-10-42) Sec 1942-43. 15

 Min, WD Gen Council mtg, 23 Nov 42. 16

 Ibid.

17

 (1) Memo, President for Dir of the Budget, 29

Oct 42, quoted in E. Roosevelt, ed., F. D. R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, II, 1358. (2) Ltr, Dir of the

Budget to SW, 4 Nov 42, WDCSA 020 (11-7-42) SW

Open Files. (3) Memo cited n. 14. (4) Min cited n. 15.

(5) JPS 57/6, 22 Oct 42, title: Tr Bases for All Svs

. . . . (6) Min, 44th mtg JCS, 1 Dec 42.

Part of the confusion over approved Army goals in

October grew out of the President's reference to average strengths for fiscal years 1943 and 1944, instead of

to terminal strengths for calendar year 1943.
606 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ing evidence that the national economy

could not support them. The Joint Chiefs

in November sharply challenged the

charge by WPB that the planned expansion of the armed forces would cripple the

war economy by siphoning off too much

labor from industry. The estimates, General Marshall publicly declared in December, were the fruit of exhaustive study

over a period of six months, and no factor

had been more carefully studied than the

prospects of overseas deployment. In any

case, he boldly asserted, the risks of overexpansion were trivial as compared to

those of underexpansion.

It would be far better to have more trained

men than we could ship than to have empty

bottoms for which there were no trained

troops, to support commanders whose forces

might be wiped out for lack of them . . . . It

would be utterly impossible to improvise

troops on short notice. A year or more is

required to build fighting divisions.18

Army officials, on the whole, were not

unduly concerned over the limitation

placed upon the Army's growth. The year

1944 was far in the future, and even if no

further numerical expansion were permitted after 1943, the Army would continue to develop its fighting power—by

plowing overhead personnel back into the

ranks as training programs shrank, and

by squeezing out the residual fat, "of

which," as General McNarney privately

admitted, "we have plenty."

 19

The armed services were less successful in weathering the assault upon their

supply programs for 1943. The Joint

Chiefs, indeed, seemed little inclined to

dispute the findings set forth in Nelson's

letter of 19 October 1942, although

Somervell continued to insist that the dollar yardstick was not a valid measure of

productive capacity and to argue that the

proper function of the War Production

Board was not to question military requirements but to help meet them by providing raw materials and expediting production—duties he felt the WPB was not

performing satisfactorily. The Joint Strategic Committee was put to work to review

the whole military program and recommend possible cuts. On 24 November its

recommendations, only slightly amended,

were approved by the JCS and forwarded

to Nelson. The total objective of the 1943

program was reduced, by elimination or

deferment of various items, from $92 billion to $80.15 billion, presumably including the expected $5 billion carry-over from

1942. The WPB Planning Committee decided that this program was "within the

realms of possible accomplishment."

 20

(Table 18)

Almost seven weeks earlier Judge Patterson had predicted:

If a cut in military production objectives

is to be made, it will be borne by the Army

and the Navy. It is safe to say that with the

shipping situation what it is, the program of

the Maritime Commission will not be

touched, and it is also plain enough that the

program for expansion of production of raw

materials will not be cut below its present

size. . . . I should suppose, in the light of

the most recent military developments, that

no reduction in the aircraft program would

be considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.21

Patterson was a good prophet, his only

major error being the anticipation that

18

 (1) Statement by Marshall quoted in Time (December 21, 1942), p. 83. (2) Ltr, Leahy to Nelson, 24

Nov 42, CCS 400.17 (7-6-42) Sec 4. 19

 Min cited n. 15. 20

 (1) Memo, Nathan to Charles E. Wilson, 11 Dec

42, quoted in CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War, pp.

289-90; quote is from p. 290. (2) Memo, Somervell

for CofS, 30 Oct 42, filed with JPS 74/2, 29 Oct 42,

title: Price Levels in Connection With Pdn Prog, in

CCS 400.17 (7-6-42) Sec 3. (3) Ltr, JCS to Nelson, 24

Nov 42, same file. (4) Related papers in same file. (5)

JPS 74/10, 21 Nov 42, title: U.S. War Pdn Objective

for 1943. (6) Min, 43d mtg JCS, 24 Nov 42. 21

 Memo cited n. 7.
WAR PRODUCTION AND SHIPPING: YEAR'S END OUTLOOK 607

TABLE 18—REVISED 1943 MILITARY PROGRAM

(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

Source: JPS 74/10, 21 Nov 42, title: U.S. War Pdn Objective for 1943.

the aircraft program would be left intact.

Before Mr. Nelson demanded the over-all

reduction, in fact, the Joint Chiefs had

agreed to curtail the AAF program for

1943. The approved total program represented slashes in major categories as follows:22

Percent

Aircraft program........................ . 10

Army ground program ................... . 21

Navy program .......................... . 17.8

Lend-lease ............................. . 24.3

Under these reduced programs, the Joint

Chiefs hoped to be able to provide some

109,000 aircraft, munitions for an army

22

 The 17.8 percent of Navy program includes naval lend-lease procurement, a relatively small item.

Percentages for both Army ground and Navy programs exclude military construction and facilities expansion; if these are included, the percentage reductions are 21.5 and 20.6 for Army ground and Navy,

respectively. Lend-lease excludes Russian protocol

and Navy lend-lease. For merchant shipping program, see below, pp. 624-31.
608 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

of 7,500,000 enlisted men (with 50 percent

allowances for troops in training), naval

ship construction of 227 major combat

vessels and many minor types, and supplies and construction for the Navy's shore

and base establishment.

Evidently the old problem of balance

was far from being solved. The items in

the revised program, according to the

JCS, were "balanced within themselves

and against each other."

 23

 But the "must"

items, formerly 52 percent of the whole

military program, now engrossed 57 percent of it. The emphasis, more than ever,

was upon air power, ocean transportation,

and aid to the USSR, at the expense of

ground and naval power (in major combat vessels) and lend-lease to countries

other than the Soviet Union. The aircraft

objective alone had risen relatively, despite its absolute reduction, from 40 to almost 42 percent, while the ground army

program had dropped from 20 to about

18 percent. The augmented merchant

ship and antisubmarine vessel programs

did represent balance in the sense that they

were expected to enable overseas deployment to keep pace with the expansion of

the Army in the United States. Otherwise

the new program, even more than the old,

was selective rather than balanced.

The crux of the debate on balance was

air power. More than any other group, its

partisans argued for a concentrated—that

is, unbalanced—effort in production and

strategy alike, as against a balanced one

among all arms. Their blueprint for victory, presented in September 1942 and

centering upon the strategic bombing offensive against Germany, recognized the

need for support by other arms (including

naval air), for shipping, and for maintaining the civil economy. But it proposed to

place air power at the center of the national war effort. General Arnold candidly denied, as inconsistent with any scheme

of selective emphasis, the principle advanced by the Joint Planners that all the

major parts of the military program

should be considered "of equal importance."

 24 The exponents of air power

held, in effect, that aircraft should be

given precedence over other items whenever a conflict arose over materials or facilities; at the same time, they insisted that

this arrangement would not cripple the

other programs. Whether it would or

would not, unfortunately, only the event

would demonstrate, and the production

experts, military and civilian, could not

agree. The Joint Chiefs, in any case, faced

the inconvenient fact that the President

had laid down, as objectives that "must"

be fulfilled, not only the aircraft program

but several others as well. Even with a reduced aircraft program, Nelson told them

late in October, only about 70 percent of

the "nonmust" programs probably could

be completed in 1943. Hoping to persuade

the President to modify his "must" objectives, the JCS had directed the planners to

disregard these and to draw up a "balanced" program. But somewhere in the

process this aim was abandoned. The cuts,

in the end, were made almost entirely in

the "nonmust" categories.25

In October the Air Forces shifted the

battle for air power from the question of

objectives to that of priorities, demanding

an overriding and exclusive rating for aircraft alone. This demand the Navy met

head on, proposing instead to place in

23

 JCS 134/3, 26 Nov 42, title: U.S. War Pdn Objectives 1943. 24

 Min, 41st mtg JCS, 10 Nov 42. 25

 (1) Craven and Cate, AAF II, pp. 288-95. (2)

Memo, Nelson for JCS, 20 Oct 42, CCS 452 (8-27-42)

Sec 1. (3) Min, 38th mtg JCS, 20 Oct 42. (4) JPS

74/D, 21 Oct 42, title: U.S. War Pdn Objective 1943.
WAR PRODUCTION AND SHIPPING: YEAR'S END OUTLOOK 609

what the working committees called the

first order of "emphasis" not merely aircraft but a large part of the naval and

some of the maritime construction as well.

Other claimants clamored for equal attention. Unable to agree, the Joint Chiefs,

on 25 November, took the problem to the

White House. There, the President settled

it in his own fashion. Making a few

changes in some notes Admiral King had

brought along, he handed it back as a new

"must" list, now labeled "Number One

Group":

(a) 82,000 combat aircraft, 25,000 training

aircraft—with necessary accessories and related equipment, sufficient for active oper- ations during next six months.

(b) Munitions and miscellaneous expend- able ground supplies (Sections I and III of

Army Supply Program)—sufficient for active

operations during next six months.

(c) Naval construction program for 1943, together with sufficient additional construction to ensure completion of scheduled units

in 1944.

(d) Maritime Commission construction

scheduled for 1943.

The President directed the Joint Chiefs

to ask Mr. Nelson if this program could be

accomplished.26 Mr. Nelson's verdict,

which he rendered on 3 December, seemed

to the JCS "somewhat noncommittal,"

 27

and a second report at the end of the

month was little more illuminating. As

Nelson pointed out, the "Number One

Group" could hardly stand alone. The

critical raw materials expansion program

at least would have to be included—synthetic rubber, aluminum, alloy steel—

along with aviation gasoline, and with all

these the total came to over $50 billion,

more than the original "must" list. Most

of Nelson's experts were dubious, but Nelson himself and his vice chairman, Charles

Wilson, were inclined to think that the objectives might be "well within feasible

limits."

 28

In general the military leaders could

not view the prospects for production in

1943 with any great confidence. "We are

entering into 1943," reported General

Somervell and Admiral Horne, "with our

procurement and production objectives

ill-defined, and with an immediate need

for a clarification in the priority ratings to

be assigned to the several production programs." Production was going ahead, in

fact, under interim priority directives,

which generally favored aircraft but

which, Somervell and Horne warned,

"may not be in accord with important

strategical considerations."

 29

 Mr. Bernard

Baruch had recently issued an alarming

report on the rubber situation indicating

a need for rapid expansion of synthetic

rubber plants in 1943, which would probably have a serious effect upon highoctane gasoline and naval escort production. Production during the first quarter

of 1943 was to lag in many lines, most

seriously in aircraft, and there were a

number of cutbacks in these and other objectives. No solution had been found for

the overloading of top priorities. The

26

 (1) Min, 44th mtg JPS, 4 Nov 42; 45th mtg, 11

Nov 42. (2) Min, 41st mtg JCS, 10 Nov 42; 43d mtg,

24 Nov 42. (3) JPS 51/3, 13 Nov 42, title: Priorities in

Pdn of Mun . . . . (4) See JCS 146 series and related correspondence in CCS 400.17 (2-20-42) Sec 2.

(5) Notes on JCS mtg in exec off of President, 25 Nov

42, filed with JCS min, JCS Hist Sec. 27

 JCS 146/6, 5 Dec 42, title: Priorities in Pdn of

Mun . . . . 28

 (1) Ltr, Nelson to Leahy, 3 Dec 42, CCS 400.17

(2-20-42) Sec 2. (2) CPA, Industrial Mobilization for

War, pp. 290-92. (3) JCS 146/5, 31 Nov 42, title: Priorities in Pdn of Mun . . . . (4) JCS 146/6 cited n.

27. (5) Ltr, Nelson to Leahy, 31 Dec 42, circulated as

JCS 151/10, in CCS 561.4 (11-12-42) Sec 2. 29

 Memo, Horne and Somervell for JCS, 4 Jan 43,

sub: Pdn Priorities, circulated as JCS 186, in CCS

400.17 (2-20-42) Sec 2.
610 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

President's "Number One Group" had

proved to be, not a smaller and more feasible "must" list, but only one of a number

of programs that, for practical purposes,

had to be considered as of equal importance. Somervell and Horne felt no assurance that all of them could be completed

in 1943, and warned, "if any program, or

parts thereof, are placed ahead of other

programs, the latter will necessarily be

delayed."

 30

Finally, war production evidently

would have to continue in 1943, as it had

done in 1942, without a solid basis in

strategy. Military requirements were not

correlated closely with strategic plans,

which indeed were still not projected far

enough ahead to permit a firm and detailed calculation of requirements. Among

the working committees, the absence of

fixed strategic plans was as vexing as it

was to the civilian production officials. In

November 1942 the JUSSC, laboring to

draw up a program of requirements that

would be both balanced and feasible, tried

again, as it had tried the preceding spring,

to bring home to the Joint Chiefs the difficulties they faced:

The lack of an overall strategic plan upon

which to base production planning is deplored. Production programs are now geared

to the equipment and employment of forces

for which no general strategic plan has been

enunciated. The size and general composition of the forces which will result may not

be adequate or suitable for successful conduct of the war.

In the early part of the war, such production planning was justified. However, the

time has now arrived when this type of planning is dangerous and unsound. It is vital that

broad strategic plans be developed which

will determine objectives, troop strength,

shipping, and advanced bases necessary.

Until such plans are developed and promulgated, our production planning is on an unsound basis.31

The Joint Planners deleted these passages

from their report to the JCS.

Even if the chiefs had been able to give

their logistical staffs a firm over-all strategic plan, it may be doubted whether the

production program would have been

much affected. The American method of

mobilizing war resources was by this time

fixed. It aimed at providing not a collection of special tools each designed for a

specific purpose, but a balanced "kit" of

components and general-purpose tools—

trained manpower and finished munitions. The interpretations of "balance"

were many, and the committee system

had produced inevitable compromises

among the advocates of various strategies,

at times almost to the point of precluding

any kind of emphasis. Yet the production

and manpower programs that emerged

late in 1942 had a definite emphasis and

a definite shape. The most obvious emphasis was upon air power. This was in

part a recognition of the danger that, despite the phenomenal expansion of shipbuilding, the enemy might still be able to

prevent the deployment of massive ground

armies overseas. This possibility, together

with practical limitations upon the manpower available to the armed forces,

necessitated a continued emphasis upon

foreign aid to arm the trained manpower

of other anti-Axis nations, above all the

massive armies of the Soviet Union.

The attacks upon the military production and manpower goals were accompanied by renewed demands from many

quarters for a more thoroughgoing "arsenal of democracy" strategy, in which

30

 (1) Ibid. (2) CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War,

pp. 599-606. (3) Craven and Cate, AAF II, p. 295.

(4) See below, App. B. 31

 JPS 134/2, 23 Nov 42, title: U.S. War Pdn Objective 1943, with rough draft prepared by JUSSC, in

CCS 400.17 (7-6-42) Sec 3.
WAR PRODUCTION AND SHIPPING: YEAR'S END OUTLOOK 611

the United States would drastically curtail its contribution of ground forces to the

anti-Axis war. The WPB Planning Committee, for example, expressed the opinion,

. . . the United States could contribute

more toward a successful termination of the

war by producing and shipping to our Allies

the great quantities of munitions needed,

than by shipping and supplying large numbers of American troops, which would interfere with our munitions production. . . .

Although foreign labor cannot be brought in

to relieve our industrial manpower shortage,

foreign soldiers can be substituted for American soldiers in many of the theaters of war.

A true combined strategy of the United Nations would free shipping and rationalize the

use of manpower.32

General Marshall suspected that this

"fallacious and humiliating proposition,"

as his staff immediately styled it, lay behind the President's perplexing oscillations during October and November on

the matter of the 1943 troop basis. Marshall now vigorously reasserted, in words

reminiscent of those he had used in September 1941 when the same issue had

been raised, the Army's insistence upon a

major American contribution in ground

armies as well as in weapons. "The morale

of the hostile world must be broken," he

declared, "not only by aggressive fighting

but, as in 1918, by the vision of an overwhelming force of fresh young Americans

being rapidly developed in this country."

 33

Before many weeks had passed, however,

the Army was to launch a substantial program for rearming French troops that

would carry it well along the path the

WPB committee desired. At this juncture

of the war, with British manpower mobilized to the hilt, there were in fact no other

foreign troops available who might be substituted for American soldiers in overseas

theaters.

These concepts of emphasis and balance, shaped largely by the estimated

limits of the country's capacity to produce

for war while preserving its economic

health, went far to mark out the broad

channels strategy would have to follow in

1943. The military leaders at Casablanca

and later could only maneuver within

them.

Shipping and the New Drift of Deployment

One immediate consequence of the shift

of logistical effort that accompanied the

Allied offensive in North Africa was the

temporary disappearance of the shipping

shortage in the Atlantic area. Shipping in

the Atlantic as a whole was now called on

to support a smaller aggregate deployment, both of troops and of matériel, than

would have been required had the BOLERO

program continued at an ascending tempo

as originally planned. August was the

great month of BOLERO deployment. One

hundred and two thousand troops and

773,000 ship tons of cargo were then

launched across the North Atlantic; another 80,000 tons of cargo were sent to the

Middle East. Nothing like this volume of

deployment was attained, during any of

the four months following, to the three

principal areas—the British Isles, North

Africa, and the Middle East—that Atlantic shipping had to serve. The amount of

shipping actually in Army service in this

region declined, as a result, from a peak of

3,991,500 dead-weight tons in September

to 3,621,500 tons in November.34

32

 Min, WPB Plng Com mtg, 5 Nov 42, p. 99. 33

 (1) Draft memo, Marshall for President, 7 Nov

42, marked "not sent." (2) Memo, Marshall for President, 9 Nov 42, WDCSA 320.2 (11-10-42) Sec

1942-43. (3) See above, Ch. V. 34

 (1) See below, Charts 15-19 in Ch. XXVII. (2)

ASF Monthly Progress Report, Transportation, Feb

43. Sec 3.
612 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

What limited deployment during these

months, as has been shown in earlier

chapters, was not an over-all shortage of

shipping but a combination of impediments to its effective employment. Convoy

restrictions limited the number of ships

that could be used, long turnarounds

lengthened the time required to deliver a

given amount of cargo or a given number

of troops, some of the ports in North Africa

could not have accommodated more ships

even if convoys had been run more frequently, ports in the Persian Gulf could

not handle as much cargo as they received. In August, because of the change

in strategic plans, the Army found itself

unable to use all the cargo tonnage assigned to the North Atlantic run. Troop

and cargo movements to the British Isles

dropped sharply in the months following,

held back partly by lack of escorts, partly

by lack of ready troop units, the latter

shortage serving automatically to curtail

the movement of accompanying cargo. In

September and October shipping was immobilized in the convoys assembling for

North Africa. These did not get under way

until late in October. Also, the last three

months of the year saw a marked upswing

in troop and cargo shipments around the

Cape, principally to the Persian Gulf, removing a large block of tonnage for many

weeks from Atlantic service altogether.

In all this deployment, moreover, shipping performance was far from efficient.

The sudden shift in strategy disrupted and

complicated the flow of troops and material, preventing careful scheduling of

movements and levying a heavy toll in

delays, last-minute changes, and uneconomical improvisation. Ships were held

idle in harbor while being refitted, waiting for convoys to be assembled, or waiting for an open berth. Time was consumed

in combat loading and in reloading ships

that had been improperly loaded. Ships

had to be completely discharged, on the

eve of sailing, because a plan had changed

or troops had failed to arrive at port.

Ships sailed partly loaded; a few returned

only partly unloaded. Supply moved circuitously from the United States to England and thence, after being discharged,

warehoused, and loaded once more, to

North Africa. TORCH was a brilliant

achievement in overriding logistical obstacles, but it also provided a classic object

lesson in the costs of improvisation and

hasty planning. Much of the cost was reflected in the uneconomical use of shipping. Some suggestion of this cost is conveyed by the downward trend in the

volume of cargo moved by each deadweight ton of cargo shipping in the Atlantic area. (Table 19)

The Atlantic pool of shipping was thus

fully employed, or almost so, in supporting even the relatively small deployment

of the last four months of 1942. To the

planners, expecting losses of 20 to 30 percent in the North African convoys and an

enemy attempt to cut communications

through the Strait, an acute shortage

seemed both imminent and inevitable.

Since midyear, shipping losses had fluctuated erratically, belying predictions

from week to week. Allied losses of dry

cargo shipping declined from 936,000

dead-weight tons in June to 597,000 in

August and, after a rise in September, to

519,000 tons in October. But in particular

sectors the toll was heavy. In July the

northern convoy route to the USSR became so costly that movements there were

suspended. August saw the beginning of

U-boat "wolf-pack" tactics in the central

Atlantic, where the convoys lacked air

cover, and in September submarine at-
WAR PRODUCTION AND SHIPPING: YEAR'S END OUTLOOK 613

TABLE 19—MEASUREMENT TONS OF CARGO MOVED PER DEAD-WEIGHT TON OF SHIPPING:

JUNE-DECEMBER 1942

a

 In these months eastward cargo shipments moved mainly to the British Isles. b

 In these months eastward cargo shipments moved in considerable volume to North Africa and the Middle East as well as to the British

Isles.

c

 The relatively high efficiency shown here is misleading in that it reflects in part the movement of convoys to North Africa that had

been loading during the two preceding months. It also reflects the dispatch of over 100,000 ship tons of cargo to the Middle East.

Source: ASF Monthly Progress Report, Sec 3, Transportation, Jun 42-Jan 43.

tacks were stepped up in the South Atlantic, where cargo vessels were not then sailing in convoy. During September, also,

the undersea craft penetrated into the Gulf

of St. Lawrence with deadly effect, and

the large convoy (PQ-18) to northern Soviet ports suffered losses out of proportion

to its heavy escort. New enemy submarines were coming into action in growing

numbers during the autumn, and new

techniques, such as the use of large supply

submarines ("milch cows"), promised to

become more effective with practice. In

November losses from all causes swung

upward to an appalling total of 1,202,000

dead-weight tons; sinkings on the North

Atlantic route during October and November occurred at a rate of almost one

ship a day. Toward the end of the year,

too, submarines began to operate just east

of the Brazilian bulge. The North African

convoys, surprisingly, escaped with fairly

light punishment; the slow convoys from

the United States, through March, suffered only 3.4 percent losses by enemy

action. On the other hand, British shipping was hard hit, as an indirect result of

the North African operation, on the routes

where convoying had to be abandoned.

Sinkings averaged 10 percent, and one

group of ships lost seventeen out of fortyfour. The experiment proved too costly

and was shortly terminated.35

In the Pacific, losses of merchant shipping were relatively inconsequential. On

the other hand, tonnage available in that

35

 (1) Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, Ch. XIV. (2)

See below, App. H. (3) For losses in UG convoys, see

above, Ch. XVII. (4) Min, 55th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43.
614 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

THE WAR AGAINST THE U-BOAT German submarine being blasted by a depth charge

from a Coast Guard cutter on escort duty. Convoy is visible in background.

area had to carry a heavier burden proportionately than shipping in the Atlantic.

Distances were vast, and most of the routes

were entirely over water, involving repeated transshipment. Shipping thus had

to carry part of the load which, on the

Atlantic side, was passed on to the roads

and railroads. Interisland and coastal

shipping played a vastly larger role than

in the Atlantic area. Above all, the lack of

adequate port facilities in Alaska and west

of Hawaii, except for the New Zealand

and southeast Australia ports far from the

front, reduced immeasurably the effectiveness of shipping performance. Forces

throughout the Pacific had to depend for

support largely on the tonnage there available, supplemented by some new construction from the west coast yards—transfers

from the Atlantic area, except for fast

troop transports, were seldom practicable

and always exorbitantly expensive in voyage time. Supply of garrisons in relatively

quiet areas, moreover, absorbed relatively

more of the available shipping in the Pacific than in the Atlantic. Many of these

forces, to be sure, were in the comparatively accessible Alaska-Hawaii-Panama

triangle, a circumstance that helps to explain the fact that the volume of cargo

moved by each dead-weight ton of shipping compared favorably with that in the

Atlantic area. (See Table 19.) But the forces

fighting Japan were far less generously

supported by shipping than were those on

the other side of the world. At the end of

1942 each American soldier deployed

against the European Axis was backed up

by 5.9 dead-weight tons of shipping (troop

and cargo), while each soldier against
WAR PRODUCTION AND SHIPPING: YEAR'S END OUTLOOK 615

Japan was supported by only 3.3 deadweight tons.36

Before the end of 1942 the shipping

shortage in the Pacific was serious, considering the area as a whole, and was becoming more so. The limited offensives

launched there in the latter half of the

year were more or less impromptu reactions to enemy moves, undertaken without

adequate advance preparation. By the end

of the year American forces were deeply

committed in both South and Southwest

Pacific areas, and the operations had

proved far more costly than anticipated.

In the Southwest Pacific the shortage of

shipping was acute. In the South Pacific,

to which more had been allotted, huge

tonnages clogged the harbor at Noumea

and some of the smaller bases, held up by

inadequate discharge facilities. In both

areas the need for construction materials

was still unsatisfied, and the increased volume of troop deployment had brought

with it additional heavy demands for

maintenance supplies and special equipment.37

 Congestion in Persian Gulf ports,

meanwhile, was immobilizing shipping

that might otherwise have helped to relieve the worsening situation in the Pacific.

From a year's end vantage point, the

world-wide shipping situation showed

some improvement. During the last six

months of 1942, new construction more

than balanced total losses of Allied shipping, and there was even an absolute decline in the total volume of losses as compared with the first half of the year. Dry

cargo shipping losses were somewhat

heavier, tanker losses considerably lighter

in the second half than in the first half of

the year. The average monthly loss for the

entire year (percentage of tonnage in use)

was slightly over 2.16 percent for all types,

2.39 percent for dry cargo shipping and

1.98 for tankers. Considerably more ship

tonnage had been placed at the disposal

of the Army than its planners had expected early in the year. In contrast to

General Somervell's "bold" estimate in

January 1942 that about 300 cargo vessels

would be made available to support Army

deployment in 1942, the number actually

in Army service at the end of August was

432. At the end of the year, despite reduced allocations, the Army still had at its

disposal 391 cargo vessels aggregating 3.1

million dead-weight tons.38

One source of shipping for military use

was drying up. Late in October War Shipping Administration warned "the end has

about been reached in the process of

diverting WSA ships from less to more

essential services."

 39

 Some of the essential

import services, in fact, had been expanded—bauxite, for example—as had

most of the lend-lease services, canceling

out some of the gains from compression. In

the aggregate, U.S. tonnage employed for

the war economy and lend-lease had declined from about 4.5 million to 4.1 million, but by mid-October lend-lease shipments alone were employing 1,986,000

dead-weight tons of shipping, as against

1,219,000 the preceding March, while

shipping in the import services as a whole

had been pared down from 1,991,000 to

1,063,000 dead-weight tons. Army planners were now resigned to the probability

that foreign aid shipments were to be a

permanent burden upon U.S. merchant

36

 (1) See below, Charts 18 and 19. (2) For comparison of maintenance tonnages, see below, App. A-3. 37

 See above, Chs. XV, XXI. 38

 (1) CCS 174, rpt by CMTC, 4 Feb 43, title: Loss

Rate for 1943. (2) Contl Div, ASF, Statistical Review,

World War II. (3) Rpt cited n. 34(2). 39

 Memo, Land and Douglas for President, 27 Oct

42, sub: Reqmts for Additional Tonnage, Shipg

1941-43 folder, Hq ASF.
616 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

shipping. Even with the diminution of deployment during the last four months of

1942, they were alarmed by the extent to

which allocations of shipping for Army use

dwindled. In November, especially, as the

Battle of the Atlantic reached its climax,

the Army had only 216 vessels to carry its

cargo in that area, 46 fewer than the

month before. "Any strategic concepts,"

an OPD officer noted in that bleak month,

"that envisage new movements of major

forces overseas must necessarily face the

fact that there are available neither the

transports to handle personnel, cargo vessels to maintain them, nor tankers to

supply fuel to their tanks, trucks and

planes."

 40

 Late in October, even before

losses had reached their peak, WSA

warned that there was "no surplus of shipping in the Atlantic," and that there were

"not enough ships to sustain two major

military operations simultaneously in

widely separated theatres."

 41

The Pressure for Economy in Ship Operations

Since spring of 1942 the War Shipping

Administration, while conscripting merchant tonnage for war uses, had also been

energetically seeking economies in ship

employment. Ship repair operations were

accelerated, U.S. shipping laid up in

American yards declining from over 14

percent in April to less than 8 percent in

September. Imports of nonessential goods

were rigidly restricted, routings were more

carefully planned. WSA improved its own

loading operations in U.S. ports to a point

where ships were being loaded to within

2 percent of their full weight capacity, and

broken stowage (unused space) was reduced from a normal peacetime average

of 25 percent to about 16 percent. Overseas the WSA organization was shaken up

and expanded during the latter part of

1942 in an effort to speed American shipping operations in foreign ports. Through

continuous collaboration with the British

Ministry of War Transport, the merchant

tonnage of the two countries was pooled to

a growing degree, routes and sources of

supply were rearranged in the interests of

shipping economy—for example, meat

was imported by the United Kingdom

from the United States instead of from

Australia and New Zealand. Ships loaded

mixed American and British freight in

order to balance their cargoes—for example, U.S. Army equipment and British

lend-lease steel. WSA even exerted pressure upon British shipping authorities to

improve their own operations—for example, to reduce congestion in Indian Ocean

ports.42

After mid-1942 WSA became increasingly critical of the operating practices of

the military services, particularly during

the period of administrative confusion attendant upon the new operations in North

Africa and the Pacific. In his joint report

with Harriman to the President and Prime

Minister on 2 August, following a study of

the flagging BOLERO program, Douglas set

forth his main objective: to program and

co-ordinate all cargo movements, freely

mixing and interchanging cargoes, so that

available shipping space might be utilized

to the maximum. The movement of military cargo lay at the heart of the problem.

40

 Shipg Sit tab, with OPD Weekly Strategic Resume, 14-28 Nov 42, ABC 381 (9-25-41) Sec 6. 41

 (1) Memo cited n. 39. (2) Shipg Sit tab cited

n. 40. (3) Ltr, Douglas to Leahy, 28 Oct 42, filed with

JCS 143 in ABC 570 (2-14-42) Sec 3. 42

 (1) Memo cited n. 39. (2) Memos, Douglas for

Hopkins, 18 and 25 May 42. (3) Ltr, Douglas to Hopkins, 15 Jul 42. Last two in Hopkins folder, WSA

Douglas File. (4) Corresp in Anglo-American Mis

folder and WSA Gen folder, WSA Douglas File. (5)

See above, Ch. XVII.
WAR PRODUCTION AND SHIPPING: YEAR'S END OUTLOOK 617

Military cargo, at best, was wasteful of

space because of its many irregular shapes

and its high proportion of bulk to weight.

The demands of military supply (the right

item, in the right amount, at the right

time, at the right place) were not easily

reconciled with the demands of economy,

and the services were prone to construe

broadly the claims of military necessity.

Under the agreements reached with WSA

in May and June, finally, the independent

pools of shipping and the large port facilities controlled by the two services virtually

defied assimilation into any integrated system of cargo pooling and ship utilization.43

On 9 October Douglas wrote to Somervell citing evidences of inefficient performance in the Army's ship operations and

urged that the Army co-ordinate its loading operations with those of WSA and

British agencies in the United States. In

the plan he set forth, all Army cargo except that of the ships under its permanent

control and that involved in amphibious

expeditions and other special combat operations would be pooled with other export cargo in a "bank" distributed among

all the ports. Shipments would be scheduled and cargo loaded with a view to

maximum utilization of space, short routings, and efficient discharge at destination.

Loading ports would be assigned, irrespective of agency, in the light of the

destinations of each voyage; most voyages

would have multiple destinations. The

keynote of the proposal was co-ordinated

planning and programing, among all

the agencies concerned. Douglas suggested

that a co-ordinating group be appointed,

under WSA chairmanship, representing

the three principal agencies.44

Somervell and Gross immediately

scented danger. Douglas' plan, on the face

of it, was merely an extension of the arrangements already in force for mixing

Army cargo and lend-lease steel on the

North Atlantic run. Nevertheless, while

proposing no more than informal interagency co-ordination to bring about desired economies, Douglas' plan obviously

pointed in the direction of the kind of rational management and planning of all

overseas cargo movements that Britain

had achieved through centralized civilian

control. The mere suggestion of emulating

British methods roused Somervell to derision. Moreover, Douglas had ventured

to suggest, as a "natural corollary" of

cargo pooling, "that vessels should load

their entire cargo at one berth and under

the same continuous supervision"—which

sounded to Somervell and Gross like a

move to abrogate the Army's control of

its own loadings, a central feature of the

June 1942 modus operandi with WSA.45

Somervell waited ten days before sending

a singularly offhand, almost flippant reply.

Noting that he had given his "best efforts

to discovering some advantage that might

be gained" from the measures 'suggested,

he called Douglas' conclusions "non

sequiturs," implied that his statistics bore

"no relation to actualities," reminded him

that commercial standards of stowage

could not be expected in emergency shipments and combat loadings (explicitly

exempted from Douglas' proposals), devoted a disparaging paragraph to alleged

43

 (1) For Army-Navy logistical co-ordination, see

above, Ch. XV, and below, Ch. XXIV. (2) For the

Douglas-Harriman report, see above, Ch. XIV. (3)

See also, Rpt by WSA and BMWT to CSAB, 17 Aug

42, in OCT 565.2 England. (4) For comparison of

space requirements of various types of cargo, see below, App. A-1. 44

 (1) Ltr, Douglas to Somervell, 9 Oct 42, with

atchd memo, unsigned, no addressee, 8 Oct 42. (2)

Ltr, Douglas to Somervell, 22 Oct 42. All in Shipg

1941-43 folder, Hq ASF. 45

 Memo, 8 Oct 42, cited n. 44(1).
618 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

waste in Britain's ship operations, opined

that the hoped-for savings (estimated by

Douglas at over half a million tons of shipping) would be "a small business," objected to "forming any more committees"—and finished by inviting Douglas

to lunch.46

Douglas came to lunch, and the meeting—after Somervell's blast—proved both

anticlimactic and inconclusive. Both principals jovially agreed they had been "silly"

and "cantankerous" and that they would

be well advised in future to write no more

letters. Somervell hinted that their chief

subordinates were really responsible for

the friction—General Gross in his own

establishment, and Capt. Granville Conway, the WSA official at the New York

port—which suspicion, as far as Conway

was concerned, Douglas politely rejected.

The specific WSA proposals, it was decided, would be approached "very slowly"

and put into effect only to the extent that

experience on the operating level proved

them to be practicable.47

This was the first round. At New York,

where outbound traffic was heaviest,

Army port officials showed during subsequent weeks that they were conscious of

being under WSA's critical eye. Emphasis

on "full and down" loadings from the east

coast during that autumn and winter was

carried to the point where shipments to

the United Kingdom and North Africa

finally became badly unbalanced. The results of combining Army with nonmilitary

cargo at New York during November

were, from WSA's point of view, most

promising—"an extraordinary loading

performance," Douglas told Hopkins.48

But WSA officials, rightly or wrongly,

were convinced that this performance had

been achieved largely at their own piers,

not the Army's. Meanwhile, the worsening congestion at Noumea and other

Pacific ports, along with the general turmoil of initial movements to North Africa,

did little to inspire confidence in the efficiency of the Army's ship operations. By

December, in fact, WSA was ready to intervene in the Noumea crisis. In general,

the huge volume of ship losses during November, together with upward climbing

requirements, seemed to herald a new and

general shipping crisis.49

At the beginning of December General

Gross, without warning, terminated the

policy of mixed loading at New York, indicating that henceforth the Army would

load with its own cargo the ships assigned

to it. Whatever the reasons for this decision (Army officials in the theater had

complained that packages in commercially loaded cargoes could not be identified), Douglas regarded it as the last straw.

To Hopkins he declared, "I am about at

the end of my rope" in the effort to secure

economies through persuasion. Hopkins

expressed full accord and advised him to

go to the President. "These fellows," Hopkins commented, "will not be persuaded."

 50

Douglas acted swiftly. On the 16th he

sought an audience with the President

and two days later appeared at the White

House, armed with a draft presidential

order reaffirming the authority of WSA, 46

 (1) Ltr, Somervell to Douglas, 19 Oct 42. (2)

Memo, Gross for Somervell, 21 Oct 42, sub: Memo

From Mr. L. Douglas. Both in Shipg 1941-43 folder,

Hq ASF. (3) Ltr cited n. 44(2). 47

 This account is based on Douglas' notes, dated

27 October 1942, in Loading of Ships folder, WSA

Douglas File. 48

 Douglas' notes on conf with Hopkins, 7 Dec 42,

Hopkins folder, WSA Douglas File. 49

 (1) For the Noumea crisis and WSA's intervention, see above, Ch. XV. (2) See below, App. H-1. 50

 (1) Douglas' notes cited n. 48. (2) Douglas' notes

on conf, 16 Dec 42, WSA Dir 12-18-42 folder, WSA

Douglas File.
WAR PRODUCTION AND SHIPPING: YEAR'S END OUTLOOK 619

under its original charter, to control the

"operations, including loading" of all

merchant vessels other than those used in

special task and assault forces and those

that could "truly be classed as fleet auxiliaries." Roosevelt listened approvingly to

Douglas' exposition of the problem, read

the directive, and wondered whether it

should not first be shown to the Army and

Navy. Douglas vehemently objected,

arguing that such a step would produce

only "violent dissent," that the services

were bent on taking over control of the

merchant fleet, and that the directive

merely made more explicit the authority

already vested in the WSA—authority the

services had "refused to obey." Apparently

convinced, the President signed the directive, remarking only, "If this doesn't work

you will catch hell."

 51

As expected, the directive brought an

explosion of wrath from the services. Secretary Stimson flatly refused to put the

order into effect until its implications had

been studied since the War Department

had not been consulted in advance. Considered by itself, the directive seemed unequivocally to assert the authority of WSA

to control, as part of the "operations" of

merchant shipping, the loading of all military cargo except that in combat loaded

and similar tactical shipping. Even the

loading of regular Army and Navy transports, for lack of explicit exemption, would

appear to fall under WSA jurisdiction. So

construed, the directive abrogated at a

stroke the basic division of functions between WSA and the services as embodied

in the agreements of May and June 1942.52

Douglas did not so construe the directive. In a clarifying statement issued less

than a week after the President had signed

the order he took a far more moderate

position, and on the 28th, when Douglas

and Admiral Land appeared before the

Joint Chiefs (Somervell and Rear Adm.

Robert M. Griffin, head of the Naval

Transportation Service, also attended) to

discuss the directive, Douglas explained

his stand in full. The wording, he confessed, was perhaps unfortunate, though

in a literal sense accurate. He reassured

the JCS on two points: first, that the directive was not intended to go beyond the

terms of WSA's charter—the executive

order of February 1942, which exempted

the military transport fleets from WSA's

control—and second, that WSA had no

desire to take over any of the actual loading functions of the military transport

services. "Operations," he continued to

insist, did include loading, and in a broad

sense WSA claimed the power under its

charter to co-ordinate the loading of military along with other cargo in merchanttype shipping—including that permanently controlled by the Army and Navy.

But the primary aim of WSA was economy in the use of shipping and shipping

facilities, which meant, among other

things, making maximum use of the military transport services in their accustomed

spheres. WSA wanted merely to participate with the services in the over-all planning of military cargo movements in order

to ensure that, as far as was consistent with

strategic necessity, all merchant shipping

would be operated in a liquid pool and all

51

 (1) Douglas' notes on conf with President, 18 Dec

42, WSA Dir 12-18-42 folder, WSA Douglas File. (2)

Memo, President for Chm Maritime Comm and

WSA, 18 Dec 42, ABC 570 (12-21-42). (3) Related

papers in same file. (4) For concurrent pressure on the

Navy, see Ballantine, Shipping in Naval Logistics, pp.

103-05, Naval Hist Div, OCNO. 52

 (1) Ltr, Stimson to Land, 23 Dec 42, Shipg

1941-43 folder, Hq ASF. (2) Other corresp in WSA

Dir 12-18-42 folder and Reading File Dec 42-Jan 43

folder, WSA Douglas File; and MS Index to the Hopkins Papers, Bk. V, Orgn of WSA, pp. 1-2, Items 6-7.
620 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

cargo movements of a "nontactical" character brought under a single co-ordinated

program. The aim would be to consolidate

shipments destined for a single area, use

the most direct routes, bank cargo at loading ports, and mix heavy with bulky cargo

to achieve maximum utilization of space.

The military services could continue as

before to load all combatant vessels, all

vessels carrying cargo and personnel in

initial movements, all vessels under their

permanent control, and, in addition, other

vessels carrying military cargo "in conformity with satisfactory stowage and

loading plans arrived at through intimate

cooperation" with WSA.53

The military leaders were not mollified.

While Admiral Leahy maintained a judicious, if frosty, calm, King's comments

were sharp, and even General Marshall

was obviously unhappy. All pointedly

stressed the discrepancy between what the

directive stated and what Douglas now

said he construed it to mean. There must

have been some reason for issuing it,

Somervell remarked, and he bluntly demanded why, if the directive added nothing to the executive order of February

1942, it should not be rescinded forthwith.

All, including Marshall, were outspokenly

resentful because Douglas and Land had

appealed to the President. The atmosphere of the meeting was charged with

hostility, and a supplementary proposal

that Douglas later sent to Somervell and

Griffin was instantly rejected "with some

heat."

 54

One reason, at least, for the resistance

to Douglas' proposals was a strong feeling

that economy should not be made an

overriding consideration in military supply. The point of departure in Douglas'

economy program was that only a small

part of military supply, that flowing directly to the scene of operations (as in an

amphibious assault) rather than through

a graded system of stocks and transshipment points (Douglas lumped this category loosely under the term "maintenance") really required emergency handling and strict adherence to strategic

priorities without consideration of economy in shipping. Even to this principle he

admitted exceptions, but argued that

"reasonable men" should be able to reach

agreement in specific instances.55 Somervell rejected—indeed, ignored—this whole

conception. Against it he advanced the

theory of the integrity of all military supply. The movement of supply from factory

to troops, he insisted, was an unbroken

chain subject at every point to the guiding

impulse of strategic need. Economy must

be sought within this conception, never in

defiance of it. Commercial methods of

loading and mixing military and nonmilitary cargo often resulted in intolerable delays in delivery of needed items; banking

of all types of cargo in port areas might

congest military terminal facilities, and

make it difficult to find particular items

for prompt shipment; programing of cargo

movements by destination might make it

impossible for theater commanders to

divert shipments at the last moment to

another port of entry. Commercial terminal operators could not follow swiftly

53

 (1) Proposal Submitted to Gen Somervell and

Adm Griffin, 28 Dec 42. (2) Memorandum re the

President's Directive . . . , 23 Dec 42. (3) Min of mtg

in Adm Leahy's off, 28 Dec 42. All in WSA Dir

12-18-42 folder, WSA Douglas File. (4) The official

transcript of this meeting and Douglas' notes (both in

same file) are in substantial agreement. (5) Memo,

Douglas for Hopkins, 23 Dec 42, MS Index to the

Hopkins Papers, Bk. V, Orgn of WSA, p. 6, Item 36. 54

 (1) Min cited n. 53(3). (2) Douglas' notes cited

n. 53(4). (3) Other corresp in WSA Dir 12-18-42

folder and Reading File Dec 42-Jan 43 folder, WSA

Douglas File. 55

 Min cited n. 53(3).
WAR PRODUCTION AND SHIPPING: YEAR'S END OUTLOOK 621

changing military priorities, and were unfamiliar with the technicalities of military

supply and loading. In any case, Somervell

argued, the contention that civilian control would necessarily bring greater economy and efficiency would not bear examination. The military services would

have to maintain large standby port establishments in the States, under any system,

to handle emergency situations; overseas

ports would have to remain under military control; and the personnel making

up the military transportation organization were as experienced and competent

as those employed by WSA.56

The integrity and effectiveness of military supply, Somervell concluded, depended upon military control over the

whole process—an assumption he derived

from the principle that authority must be

commensurate with responsibility. That

WSA might indeed meet military needs,

as the President's order stated, "in accordance with the detailed requirements

and priorities . . . established and presented by the Army and Navy," Somervell was unwilling to concede. If the President's order were enforced, he declared,

it would "cause a violent dislocation of

our supply system" and perhaps "jeopardize the success of our overseas operations."

In effect, it destroys the authority of the

armed services over the movement of supplies

essential to their success and substitutes for

an existing extensive and effective system

. . . a complicated arrangement controlled

by an agency unfamiliar with military requirements and equipment and one with

which the services have found mounting dissatisfaction. It injects into the chain of supply

. . . another agency having no direct re- sponsibility for that supply or for the military

success of those forces. Such a break can only

result in confusion and failure . . . . The

Joint Chiefs cannot escape, nor would they

wish to, the full responsibility for active operations overseas. They must therefore have

the necessary authority, including full con- trol of the flow of their supplies.57

The controversy had thus become laden

with all the emotional overtones of the

classic issue of civilian versus military control. Admiral King, at the meeting on the

28th, objected to Douglas' direct appeal

to the President on the ground, as he put

it, that the JCS had "authority" in the

matter—to which Douglas tartly retorted

that WSA derived its authority from the

President, not the JCS. He further rejected

King's proposal to refer the matter to the

Joint Strategic Survey Committee, since

this would simply mean allowing the military to judge its own case. Admiral Griffin

ran into a sharp verbal bout with Admiral

Land, on the same occasion, when he asserted that the military services should not

have to submit their shipping requirements to WSA. On both sides the animosity threatened almost to prevent discussion

of the substantive issues. Douglas complained bitterly to Leahy and Marshall of

the rebuffs he had received from Army

and Navy officers—"even personal insults"—and at first refused to talk with

Somervell and Griffin unless they were

formally designated to represent their

civilian superiors, the two service secretaries, to whom the President's directive

had been sent originally. Somervell sought

to make repeal of the directive a prior

condition to any discussions, but finally,

at Admiral Leahy's insistence and under

56

 (1) Min cited n. 53(3). (2) Draft memo for President, [for Adm Leahy's signature], 6 Jan 43, JCS

1942-44 folder, Hq ASF. This draft, prepared by

Somervell, was not approved. See corresp between

Somervell and Hopkins in MS Index to the Hopkins

Papers, Bk. V, Orgn of WSA, p. 7, Item 38. 57

 Draft memo cited n. 56(2).
622 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

protest, yielded. Admiral Griffin continued vehemently to argue that the two

services should be allowed complete freedom to handle all military cargo movements, without interference by any "third

party."

 58

Gradually the air cleared. In private

talks with Admiral Leahy and General

Marshall, neither of whom had been fully

briefed before the stormy meeting of 28

December, Douglas succeeded in allaying

their suspicions and in persuading them

that an effort should be made on the operating level to carry out WSA's economy

program. While declining to ask the President to modify his directive, Douglas

agreed to rephrase his supplementary proposals to remove any implication that the

loading of military cargo by the two services was done on sufferance of WSA. On

the other hand he firmly rejected a move

by the military to create a joint ArmyNavy-WSA inspection service that might

have given to the military services much

of the influence over the utilization of merchant shipping that WSA, under its charter, exercised as its exclusive prerogative.

Douglas was also able, through his contacts with Hopkins, Wayne Coy, Harold

D. Smith, Oscar S. Cox, and others close

to the President, to prevent any weakening in that quarter. Within the service departments, Secretaries Stimson and Knox

do not appear to have taken an active hand

in the matter, and Assistant Secretary of

War McCloy supported Douglas. In the

end, indeed, the intransigent opponents

of WSA in both services stood isolated

from their own superiors and the issue was

a foregone conclusion.59

In effect, Douglas had maneuvered his

opponents into a position where acceptance of his rather moderate proposal for

a joint exploration on the operating level

of the possibilities of shipping economies—

under stipulations by the services that he

was willing to accept—could be regarded

as a face-saving escape from an awkward

situation. On 9 January Douglas received

word from Coy that the President stood

firm on his executive order, but wanted

Douglas, Gross, and Griffin to sit down together "every day for the next three

weeks" and reach an agreement on the

basis of day-to-day operating experience.60

 Apparently similar instructions

had already gone to Somervell, for when

Douglas met the latter at lunch later that

same day (Gross, Styer, and McCloy were

also present), he found him in a genial

mood. Somervell playfully chided Douglas

and Gross as "cantankerous" characters

and urged them to see more of each other;

Douglas replied that he would be delighted to hobnob with Gross, but doubted

whether Gross could stand it. With the ice

thus broken, Douglas pressed his desire for

a joint loading program, though conceding the necessity for deviations in accordance with changing military needs, and

alluded to the promising joint planning

already under way at San Francisco between General Gilbreath and the WSA

representative, Frazer Bailey. Somervell

agreed there should be more co-operation

of this kind.61

58

 (1) Min cited n. 53(3). (2) Douglas' notes on telephone conv with Somervell, 28 Dec 42. (3) Douglas'

notes on conf with Leahy, 31 Dec 42. (4) Douglas'

notes on conf with Marshall, 4 Jan 43. (5) Douglas'

notes on conf in Adm Horne's off, 16 Jan 43. Last four

in WSA Dir 12-18-42 folder, WSA Douglas File. 59

 Corresp in WSA Dir 12-18-42 folder and Reading File Dec 42-Jan 43 folder, WSA Douglas File. 60

 Douglas' notes on telephone conv with Wayne

Coy, 9 Jan 43, WSA Dir 12-18-42 folder, WSA

Douglas File. 61

 (1) Douglas' notes on lunch conf in Somervell's

off, 9 Jan 43, WSA Dir 12-18-42 folder, WSA Douglas

File. (2) See above, Ch. XV, and below, Ch. XXIV.
WAR PRODUCTION AND SHIPPING: YEAR'S END OUTLOOK 623

Somervell thereupon departed for the

Casablanca Conference, and during the

week following WSA and Army representatives quickly reached agreement on

an operating procedure. The Navy held

out longer. As late as 15 January McCloy

told Douglas "the admirals had dropped

anchor and had concluded to be very

firm" (in demanding modification of the

President's directive).62 But on the next

day Douglas, at a meeting in the office of

the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Horne (with Under Secretary Forrestal and several admirals present), received a promise of complete co-operation

from Horne, who courteously but firmly

quashed every objection raised by the still

obdurate Admiral Griffin. (Griffin, in fact,

was forthwith replaced as chief of the

Naval Transportation Service by Rear

Adm. William W. Smith.) On the 18th

Douglas was able to report to the President that WSA and the military services

had agreed upon a comprehensive plan

for the programing of cargo movements.

Under this plan, the Army and WSA at

San Francisco and all Atlantic ports were

jointly to work out on a continuous basis

"a consolidated loading program embracing all cargo moving to identical destinations," subject, of course, to modification

in the light of overriding military needs.63

Whether the actual loading was to be

done by WSA or Army agencies would be

determined in each case on the basis of the

most effective use of terminal facilities. It

was further stipulated that the local joint

committees carrying out this programing

were not to constitute an echelon in the

chain of command. At San Francisco, by

a separate agreement with the Navy, the

joint committee was to include naval representatives as well and work out a cargo

loading program along tripartite lines.64

Douglas' victory was more form than

substance. The directive of 18 December,

still on the books, gave WSA a more solid

basis than that provided by its charter for

the power to exercise over-all co-ordination of all merchant shipping operations,

including the loading of military cargo.

But in view of Douglas' repeated disclaimers of any design to encroach upon the accustomed operations of the military transport services, this power remained largely

theoretical as far as the actual loading of

most military cargo was concerned.

Whether the joint committees at the ports,

with purely advisory functions, could succeed in working out effective cargo movement programs, pooling all types of cargo

as extensively as Douglas desired, depended in the main on the degree to which

Army and Navy officials were willing to

co-operate in the endeavor. There was

more pooling of cargo from January 1943

on than before, mainly because the logistical support of military operations overseas from the United States took on a more

routine character that lent itself more

readily to fairly stable programs. The

military may have also been influenced by

the thought that WSA might at any time

reinvoke the formidable 18 December directive, and the President had left little

doubt as to his views on the issues involved. To instill such a thought may well

have been Douglas' whole purpose.

62

 Douglas' notes on telephone conv with McCloy,

15 Jan 43, WSA Dir 12-18-42 folder, WSA Douglas

File.

63

 (1) WSA Progress Report to the President, 18

Jan 43, WSA Dir 12-18-42 folder, WSA Douglas

File. (2) Douglas' notes cited n. 58(5). 64

 (1) Rpt cited n. 63(1). (2) Memo, Frazer Bailey

for Douglas, 12 Jan 43, WSA Dir 12-18-42 folder,

WSA Douglas File. (3) See papers in ABC 570.

(12-21-42).
624 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Enlarging and Balancing

the Merchant Fleet

Parallel with the drive by WSA for

economy in ship utilization, the Maritime

Commission had been working tirelessly

to reverse the President's decision of July

1942 cutting back ship construction goals

to less than indicated yard capacity. The

commission asserted that at least 2.8 million more dead-weight tons, perhaps 4

million, could be built if the necessary

steel were forthcoming. Admiral Land

took his case first to Mr. Nelson and then,

through Hopkins, to the President. In August and again in September the British

also supported the plea for more construction, and in the latter month the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, of

which Admiral Land was chairman,

strongly urged upon the Joint Chiefs the

military advantages to be gained by adding four million tons to the 1943 program.

"Every extra ship built," declared the

board, "or made available by recommended economies, may be rightly regarded as meaning as much more military

equipment in the sphere of combat as that

ship can transport, and therefore a corresponding addition to U.S. troops in

action."

 65

 The 3,400 tons of steel that

went into a freighter, it pointed out, would

thereby make it possible, in the course of

a year, to transport overseas seven times

that weight of military stores. In mid-October Land and Douglas appealed directly

to the President. They rested their case on

the argument that shipping was the limiting factor in the war effort.

The intricate chain of war activities is as

weak as its weakest links. The two weakest

links are merchant shipping and escorts. Many of the services demanding steel and

other facilities will be unable to bring their

forces to bear on the enemy unless the shipping shortage is relieved. Increased shipping

tonnage will make our army more mobile,

and increase the strength that can be concentrated against the enemy. Accordingly, the

additional merchant shipping and escort ves- sels that can be produced in existing shipyard

facilities should be, with a few other critical

items such as a considered airplane program, the constants in relation to which other factors in

war production should be adjusted.66

They urged a 2,856,000-ton increase in

the 1943 merchant ship program and immediate construction of seventy corvettetype escort vessels.67

The escort vessel program by now had

widespread support. Escort construction

had suffered hitherto in competition with

the landing craft program, which in July

had been first on the Navy's precedence

list, while escorts had been only tenth. By

September escorts had moved up to third

place, and the Joint Chiefs formally supported the Navy's contention that more

must be built, even if at the expense of

merchant ship construction. Merchant

ships were being destroyed faster than

they could be built, Admiral Leahy wrote

the President in October, and enemy submarines were being built faster than they

could be destroyed. Increased protection

for shipping, Leahy pointed out, would

not only reduce attrition but shorten turnaround (through more efficient scheduling), thus bringing more cargoes safely to

their destinations. The President agreed

and on 23 October added seventy more

65

 Memo, Land and Salter for CPRB, 28 Sep 42,

with incls, filed with JPS 66/1/D, 1 Oct 42, title: Steel

Alloc for Merchant Shipg, in ABC 411.5 (10-4-42)

Sec 1. 66

 Memo, Land and Douglas for President, 16 Oct

42, ABC 411.5 (10-4-42) Sec 1. Italics are the authors'. 67

 (1) Ibid. (2) JCS 121, 4 Oct 42, title: Steel Alloc

for Merchant Shipg. (3) William Chaikin and Charles

H. Coleman, Shipbuilding Policies of the War Production Board, WPB Sp Study 26, pp. 43-45.
WAR PRODUCTION AND SHIPPING: YEAR'S END OUTLOOK 625

escort vessels to the Maritime Commission's program.68

There were other contenders for the

role of "constant" in the mobilization program, and the common denominators of

steel and facilities brought merchant

shipping into competition with practically

all of them. The Navy above all, fighting

a rear guard action in defense of its program for major combat vessels, had to

yield to the President's determination that

air power must be favored, but strenuously resisted any addition to the merchant shipping program. Not merely

steel, but many components—propulsion

units, instruments, valves, turbines,

gears—were involved in this conflict.

Other programs became critical toward

the end of the year—a proposed emergency "big inch" oil pipeline to run from

Illinois to the East Coast, extending the

existing line from the Texas oilfields, and

synthetic rubber and high-octane gasoline

plants. Naturally enough, the champions

of any of these programs were ill disposed

to accept the proposition that any other

should be regarded as the "constant" to

which their own should be adjusted. Army

officials, for example, otherwise favorable

to more merchant ship construction as

likely to permit a larger troop deployment, lost some of their enthusiasm when

it appeared that the necessary steel plate

probably would have to come from the

Army's allotment.69

There was no meeting of minds among

the experts as to the precise extent to

which additional merchant ship construction would conflict with other programs.

Opinions differed, above all, as to

whether the steel shortage would continue

into the second quarter of 1943. When

the emergency pipeline was approved in

October, Nelson informed the JCS that

the military programs would necessarily

be affected. Meanwhile, the decision on

over-all production, demanded by WPB's

verdict that existing programs exceeded

the country's capacity to produce, could

not wait. In the slimmed-down war production program that the Joint Chiefs approved on 24 November, $4.4 billion was

tentatively included, pending later confirmation, for the Maritime Commission's

several programs; the cost of the original

two-year program of 24 million deadweight tons of construction had been only

$3.6 billion. The larger figure was expected to provide in 1943 about 18.8 million dead-weight tons of merchant shipping, 50 to 70 escort vessels, and 50 light

aircraft carriers. This was the only item of

the military program representing an increase in goals.70

The military shipping experts, meanwhile, had been studying the implications

of the proposed increase in terms of deployment. On 12 November the Joint Military Transportation Committee submitted to the Joint Chiefs a study revealing

that, if the increased construction were

68

 (1) JCS 121/1, 24 Oct 42, title: Steel Alloc for

Merchant Shipbuilding. (2) Memo, CofS for Army

members JPS, 23 Oct 42, CofS WDGS Oct-Dec 42

(3A) folder, Hq ASF. (3) Memo, Leahy for President,

16 Oct 42, JCS 1942-44 folder, Hq ASF. (4) WPB Sp

Study 26, pp. 18-20, 85-86, cited n. 67(3). (5) Mowry,

Landing Craft and the War Production Board, WPB

Sp Study 11, p. 74. (6) Corresp in ABC 570 (2-14-42)

Sec 2. 69

 (1) Corresp in CCS 400.17 (7-6-42) Sec 3; CCS

452 (8-27-42) Sec 2; CCS 679 (10-22-42); and CCS

561.4 (9-29-42). (2) Memo, Somervell for Gross, 23

Sep 42. (3) Memo, Plng Div OCT for Gross, 7 Oct 42,

with charts. Last two in Plng Div Studies folder, OCT

HB. (4) Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 24 Sep 42,

CofS WDGS 1942 (2) folder, Hq ASF. 70

 (1) Ltr, Nelson to JCS, 30 Oct 42. (2) Memo,

Secy JPS for Secy JCS, 24 Oct 42. Both in CCS 679

(10-22-42), (3) JCS 121/1 cited n. 68(1). (4) JCS

121/2, 26 Oct 42, title: Steel Alloc for Merchant Shipbuilding. (5) Related corresp in CCS 561.4 (9-29-42).

(6) JPS 74/10 cited n. 20(5). (7) Ltr cited n. 20(3).
626 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

given entirely to dry cargo shipping, much

of this shipping would be left idle for lack

of balancing troop-carrying capacity.71 In

any case, there were other categories of

shipping in which additional tonnage was

badly needed. One of these was small interisland freighters, needed primarily in

the Southwest Pacific but also in the Alaskan area, the South Pacific, the Caribbean, and Iceland. Aggregate requirements, in November, were estimated at

135 vessels.72

There was also an indicated need for

more tankers, despite the favorable trend

of losses and construction during the second half of 1942. More than 3 million

dead-weight tons, out of the 16 million set

in July as the goal for 1943, represented

tanker tonnage. In August OPD noted

that tanker losses were still running at a

rate which, if continued, would reduce the

Allied tanker fleet by the following June

by 16 percent. If Middle East oil were

lost, the necessary changes in routing

might require 140 more tankers than were

now available. In October the British also

were worried over their shrinking domestic stocks of petroleum products. The "big

inch" pipeline was expected to bring

economies after mid-1943 equivalent to a

hundred or more tankers, largely for the

benefit of United Kingdom imports. Even

so, the Joint Military Transportation Committee predicted a deficit of about 82

"notional" tankers, equivalent to more

than 900,000 dead-weight tons, by the end

of 1942. Somervell told the Secretary of

War at the end of October that "the shortage of tanker construction is more serious

than in all other types of ships."

 73

The Joint Military Transportation Committee proposed, therefore, to divide the

2.8 million tons of additional construction

among several types of vessels—troop

transports, tankers, small and large cargo

vessels—besides the authorizations already

given for escorts and auxiliary aircraft

carriers:

(a) 10 troop transports per month, by conversion of EC-2 (Liberty) hulls;

(b) about 100 "notional" tankers, mostly

by conversion of EC-2 hulls;

(c) 80 small cargo ships, about 400 deadweight tons each, diesel powered; new construction;

(d) EC-2 freighters up to the remaining

capacity of yards, steel allocations, and aux- iliary components.

Through the remainder of November

and all of December the Joint Chiefs

vainly sought to pry from the experts a

clear "yes" or "no" to the question: Could

the additional merchant shipping be built

without interfering with other primary

programs? On 3 December Mr. Nelson

said that all the top-priority programs

"would appear to fall within feasible

limits," but that bottlenecks had to be

overcome in raw materials, machine tools,

and common components; much depend71

 JCS 151, rpt by JMTC, 13 Nov 42, title: Modification of 1943 Shipbuilding Prog . . . . 72

 See above, Ch. XV. 73

 (1) Memo, Col R. H. Givens for Brig Gen Albert

C. Wedemeyer, 27 Aug 42, sub: Tanker Capacity of

United Nations, ABC 570 (2-14-42) Sec 2. (2) Msg

3869, London to AGWAR, 21 Oct 42, OCT 565.3-

900 England. (3) Memo, Somervell for SW, 30 Oct

42, Shipg 1941-43 folder, Hq ASF. (4) Memo, unsigned, no addressee, no date, sub: World-Wide

Tanker-Borne Petroleum Reqmts, Incl C to JPS 74/9,

19 Nov 42, title: Tanker Needs To Meet Reqmts of

Our Armed Forces. (5) JCS 151 cited n. 71.

Tanker estimates at this time varied widely, with

respect to availability as well as to requirements. The

tanker situation, therefore, is difficult to describe in

terms of precise figures. The "notional" tanker was a

fictitious stereotype used in planning, having 11,000

dead-weight tons, a speed of 10 knots, and operating

for 320 days out of the year (the British allowed only

300 days). Tanker statistics, when actual vessels are

meant, are difficult to reconcile owing to differences

in categories.
WAR PRODUCTION AND SHIPPING: YEAR'S END OUTLOOK 627

ed on proper scheduling and expediting.74

On the 23d he wrote Admiral Leahy that

the additional shipping could be built

without "unduly clashing" with other programs.75

 On the 31st he thought that completion of the augmented shipping program was "a reasonably safe expectancy."

 76

 None of these answers satisfied

the military leaders, but nothing more

definite was to be had. Meanwhile, Admiral Land late in November again came

out strongly for additional construction,

not of 2.8 million, but of 4 million deadweight tons over the original 16 million

tons authorized for 1943. On 5 January,

finally, the Joint Chiefs conditionally approved the 18,890,000-ton modified program—"provided it does not conflict with

or delay the accomplishment of the 'Number 1 Group Program.' " 77

The President was not troubled by any

of these doubts. On 21 October Land and

Douglas had discussed with him and Hopkins their recommendation for an increase

in merchant shipbuilding, along with the

question of naval escorts. The President

expressed confidence that there would be

plenty of steel to go around—if necessary,

more could be taken from the public

works program—and, after reading the

Douglas-Land paper of 16 October, said

that it "made sense" and should be approved.78

 Hopkins favored referring the

matter to the JCS. Douglas objected that

if this were done the proposal "would soon

sink from sight in a swamp of military procedure."

 79

 The thing to do, he urged, was

to summon the Joint Chiefs and tell them

that the shipbuilding program had been

decided upon. At the close of the meeting

the President seemed to have decided to

follow this course. Evidently one of the

first to learn of the decision to expand the

building program was Churchill, who

cabled back his congratulations to the

President within a few days after the

White House meeting of the 21st. With the

Joint Chiefs the President apparently was

not quite so forthright. On the 28th Admiral Leahy, on behalf of the JCS, advised

him to withhold decision on the building

program until it could be studied in conjunction with the other war production

programs. To this the President blandly

replied, two days later, that he was "very

glad that it appears likely that the steel

will be available for the increased merchant shipping" since this program was

the "most important unfinished business

we have from a production point of view."

"Every day's delay in getting it started,"

he pointedly added, "means that the ships

will come out at a later date on the other

end."

 80 Almost simultaneously Douglas

was able to report that the British had offered to waive some 300,000 tons of their

allocation of American steel during the

next five months "on the understanding

that this steel will be used to augment the

shipbuilding program here."

 81

 More steel

74

 Ltr cited n. 28(1). 75

 Ltr, Nelson to Leahy, 23 Dec 42, CCS 561.4

(11-12-42) Sec 2. 76

 Ltr cited n. 28(5). 77

 (1) Min, 49th mtg JCS, 5 Jan 43. (2) Ltr, JCS to

Nelson, 6 Jan 43, CCS 561.4 (11-12-42) Sec 2. (3)

Other corresp in same file and in CCS 561.4

(11-12-42) Sec 1. (4) On 3 March 1943 the JCS told

Adm Land it was thought inadvisable to construct

more than the 2.8 million tons additional. Ltr, Leahy

to Land, 3 Mar 43, ABC 411.5 (10-4-42) Sec 1.

Actual maritime construction in 1943 came to

19,209,991 tons, including 632,293 tons of military

types. See Lane, Ships for Victory, p. 343. 78

 Douglas' notes on conf with President, Hopkins,

and Land, 21 Oct 42, Hopkins folder, WSA Douglas

File.

79

 Ibid.

80

 (1) Memo, President for Leahy, 30 Oct 42. (2)

Memo, Leahy for President, 28 Oct 42. Both in CCS

561.4 (9-29-42). 81

 Ltr, Douglas to Isador Lubin, 2 Nov 42, Construction folder, WSA Douglas File.
628 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ARMY, NAVY, AND CIVILIAN CHIEFS at lunch, 8 December 1942. Left to right:

General Arnold, Admiral Land, Harry Hopkins, Admiral William D. Leahy, Paul V. McNutt,

Admiral King, Donald Nelson, Elmer Davis, and Brig. Gen. John R. Deane.

also seemed likely to be forthcoming from

other programs held up by other shortages.

And on 30 November, following the decision on the total war production program

for 1943, the President wrote Churchill:

. . . we are moving aggressively here to increase [merchant shipping] . . . and have

given [it] . . . the highest priority for maté- riel and machine tools . . . . we have, after

reexamination of our steel plate problem and

other facilities, determined to increase it to

18,800,000 deadweight tons in 1943. I intend

to raise this to 20 million if ... it should

prove possible.82

Finally, early in December, the President wrote Land authorizing him "to

make plans at once and to obtain approval

from the Bureau of the Budget to build an

additional 2,889,000 tons of merchant

shipping." Curiously enough, in view of

his earlier actions, he sent this memorandum first to Admiral Leahy with a covering note, "I am going to send this to Land

unless the Joint Board [sic] protests. Let

me know."

 83

 Leahy received the letter on

the 8th. This apparently was the first unequivocal intimation to the military chiefs

that the President had decided to go

ahead with the augmented shipping program. As recently as the 5th, Brig. Gen.

82

 (1) Ltr, President to Prime Minister, 30 Nov 42,

ABC 400 (11-19-42). (2) Douglas' notes cited n. 78.

(3) Corresp in Construction folder, WSA Douglas

File. (4) Lane, Ships for Victory, p. 339. 83

 Memo, President for Land, no date, cited in WPB

Sp Study 26, p. 16, n. 42, cited above n. 67(3), and in

Lane, Ships for Victory, p. 340, n. 19. The WPB study

gives the two dates of transmission of this memo. Lane

dates it before 24 November, on the assumption that

the JCS action on that date on the over-all production

program constituted final approval of the Maritime

Commission program. It seems more likely (to the

present author) that it was written early in December,

shortly before its actual delivery.
WAR PRODUCTION AND SHIPPING: YEAR'S END OUTLOOK 629

John R. Deane, the secretary of the JCS,

had noted that the 18.8 million tons of

shipping had not yet been approved by

the JCS nor, to his knowledge, by the

President. At any rate, the Joint Chiefs

bowed at once to the President's desires,

and on the 14th Leahy forwarded the

President's letter to Land with the added

comment: "Joint Chiefs of Staff approve."

In the light of this sequence of events,

their conditional approval of the program

three weeks later, on 6 January, seems

somewhat anticlimactic.84

The Fever Chart of Deployment

Forecasting

Approximately 1,060,000 Army troops

were overseas at the end of 1942. In August of that year Somervell's staff, heartened by the decline in shipping losses and

not anticipating the costs of TORCH and its

affiliated enterprises in longer sea voyages

and less efficient use of shipping, had

hoped to have 1,200,000 troops overseas

by the end of the year and 2,900,000 at

the end of 1943. But in September, as

losses took an upward turn and these

costs began to manifest themselves, the

staff lowered its estimates for both 1942

and 1943. Under various assumptions, the

staff produced forecasts for end-1943 overseas strength ranging from 1,560,000 to

2,470,000—all based on the estimated

sustaining capacity of cargo shipping. A

deficit was expected in troop-carrying capacity, but it was hoped that borrowed

British transports would make up the difference.85

In November the planners took a new

reading to determine the probable effects

of the proposed augmentation of merchant ship construction in 1943. In the

light of the earlier studies, the elaborate

calculations of the Joint Military Transportation Committee (submitted to the

JCS on 12 November) were scarcely

needed to show that little would be gained

by building more cargo shipping unless it

were balanced by additional troop-carrying tonnage. The proposed augmentation,

if it were to consist entirely of new dry cargo shipping, would build up a tremendous

sustaining capacity in 1943, sufficient to

support a troop population of over 2.8

million overseas—which was almost 400,-

000 more than could be built up by all the

troop transport in sight.86 The committee

recommended that part of the increased

construction be used to build troop-carrying capacity so that, with expected British

assistance, it would approximately balance

the sustaining capacity of cargo shipping.

Under the most favorable assumptions, it

appeared that troop strength overseas

might now be brought up to 2.7 million.

Even as these studies were being prepared and debated, enemy submarines

and the drift of strategic plans were demolishing their basic assumptions. When

the staffs looked anew into the crystal ball

in December and January, they had to

84

 (1) Ibid. (2) Memo, Deane for Leahy, King, Marshall, and Arnold, 5 Dec 42, CCS 400.17 (2-20-42)

Sec 2. (3) On 26 December the Joint Chiefs saw for

the first time a copy of the President's 30 November

letter to Churchill, revealed to them "very unofficially

and confidentially" by the British military representatives. Memo, Deane for Marshall, King, and

Arnold, 26 Dec 42, CCS 400 (11-30-42). At Sir John

Dill's suggestion to Hopkins, the President finally sent

them a copy formally two weeks later. Memo, President for Marshall, 8 Jan 43, same file. 85

 (1) Memo, Somervell for G-3, 26 Aug 42, Plng

Div Studies folder, OCT HB. (2) Related papers in

same file. (3) Memo cited n. 69(2). (4) JPS 57/4, 23

Sep 42, title: Availability of United Nations Shipg for

Mil Trans. 86

 JCS 151 cited n. 71.
630 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

start from a lower base figure for existing

tonnage and to assume a higher rate of

losses for 1943 than they had in their previous calculations. Campaigns in the

Mediterranean could be expected to

bring heavy attrition, and expanding operations in the Pacific meant a longer average turnaround. These pessimistic assumptions, mainly affecting cargo shipping, tipped the balance again. It now

appeared that cargo shipping in 1943

might be barely sufficient to support two

million troops overseas, while troop shipping, even with heavier losses and longer

turnarounds than assumed in November,

would have the capacity to build up overseas strength to 2.6 million.87

Deployment forecasting had come full

circle. Once again, as in late summer

1942, cargo shipping loomed as the limiting factor. But it was not until 5 January

that the Joint Chiefs finally decided to approve the modified building program that

in November had appeared necessary to

preserve balance in the merchant fleet. By

this time the modification seemed likely to

throw it completely out of balance. This

was only one of many matters hurriedly

disposed of on the eve of the Casablanca

Conference. During January deployment

planning floundered or remained in abeyance, awaiting the firm decisions on grand

strategy that it was hoped would emerge

from the conference. A subcommittee of

the Joint Planners, given the task of

matching deployment requirements

against available shipping during the first

half of 1943, confirmed the general impression given by the December studies

that cargo shipping would be the bottleneck in overseas deployment, particularly

during the first half of the year, even

though there would be local shortages in

troop shipping. On 10 February, accordingly, the Joint Chiefs wrote Admiral

Land that they thought a "more flexible

viewpoint" was now in order and that

they desired to suspend the program for

converting freighter hulls to troop transports.88

But events would not stand still. At

Casablanca it had been decided to adopt

common shipping loss factors in all British and American deployment planning.

Early in February the Combined Military

Transportation Committee recommended

separate loss rate factors for the first and

second half of 1943, broken down in percentages by type as follows:89

Dry Cargo Tankers

Average. ............. . 2.15 1.58

1st half 1943 ........ . 2.39 1.78

2d half 1943 ........ . 1.91 1.38

These figures, which the CCS accepted

forthwith, were well under the actual loss

rates of 1942 (weighted average 2.16 percent).90

 Cargo shipping forecasts for 1943

87

 (1) Capabilities of Dry Cargo Shipg . . . 4 Jan

43 tab, 18 Shipg file, II, Case 36, Plng Div ASF, Job

A46-371. (2) Shipg Implications of Certain Proposed

Opns 8 Jan 43 tab, Incl IX in Proposed Opns in Certain Theaters, 4 Dec 42, study prepared by Strategic

Logis Div SOS, in Plng Div ASF, Job A47-147. (3)

Plng Div OCT paper, 12 Jan 43, sub: Basic Data for

Possible Growth of U.S. Forces Overseas 1943 and

1944. (4) Plng Div OCT paper, 12 Jan 43, sub: U.S.

Dry Cargo Shipg Employment and Availability 1943

and 1944. Last two in Plng Div Studies folder,

OCT HB. 88

 (1) Ltr, JCS to Land, 10 Feb 43, ABC 570

(2-14-42) Sec 4. (2) Related papers in same file. (3)

JPS 92/2, rpt by JPS subcom, 2 Feb 43, title: Trans

Reqmts to 1 Jul 43. (4) Min, 60th mtg JCS, 2 Feb 43;

61st mtg, 9 Feb 43. (5) Memo, Col Vissering for Plng

Div OCT, 26 Jan 43, sub: Availability of Shipg, 18

Shipg file, II, Case 46, Plng Div ASF. (6) For Casablanca Conference, see below, Ch. XXV. 89

 The dry cargo category included all cargo vessels

other than tankers and other than nontankers permanently controlled by the fighting services. Tankers,

however, included those controlled by the fighting

services (for example, Navy oilers). 90

 (1) CCS 174 cited n. 38(1). (2) Min, 55th mtg

CCS, 14 Jan 43; 70th mtg, 5 Feb 43.
WAR PRODUCTION AND SHIPPING: YEAR'S END OUTLOOK 631

accordingly climbed upward again. Using

an average loss rate of 2 percent, instead

of the 2.6 percent used in the studies that

influenced the Joint Chiefs to adopt their

"more flexible viewpoint," the SOS staff

produced estimates early in February

(even before the JCS decision on the 10th)

indicating that cargo shipping in 1943

would be able to support almost 300,000

more troops overseas than troop shipping

could transport. Moreover, OPD was

working out plans for reducing overseas

garrisons and shifting troops from static to

active areas; the troops thus moved would

engage passenger tonnage, but relatively

little cargo tonnage, without adding to

total strength overseas. Late in February

Gross informed Somervell that, on the

basis of all these considerations, he expected an increase of less than 1.1 million

in the overseas troop population during

1943, though cargo shipping would support many more. He suggested that it

might be advisable to resume the conversion of cargo vessels to troop transports in

order to restore the balance. Precisely sixteen days earlier the Joint Chiefs had

hoped to achieve balance by suspending

conversion.91

The logistical planners might reasonably have concluded after this experience

that the effort to keep up with the bewildering oscillation of the factors on which

their planning had to rest was not worth

the candle, and that long-range logistical

planning was an art better forgotten. Nevertheless their long-range estimates of deployment capabilities were the most upto-date and best-informed predictions

available, and certainly afforded a more

reliable guide than some of the wishful estimates then being produced by the strategic planners. It was perhaps no coincidence that the whole function of logistical

planning was at this time undergoing critical re-examination in the JCS committee

system, with a view to enabling it to contribute more effectively to the formulation

of strategy.

91

 (1) On the reduction of overseas garrisons, see

corresp in ABC 320.2 (3-14-43) Sec 1, and in ABC

370.5 (2-2-43). (2) Memo, Col Marcus B. Stokes, Jr.,

for Col Chamberlain, 2 Feb 43, Plng Div Studies

folder, OCT HB. (3) Memo, Gross for Somervell, 26

Feb 43, sub: Deployment of U.S. Army Forces in

1943, Item 16, Exec 1. (4) Eventually more than 400

freighters—Libertys and standard types—were fitted

with temporary or permanent accommodations for

troop service. See Wardlow, Trans I, Ch. VIII.
CHAPTER XXIII

Economy and Stabilization

Economy and system could hardly be

called the keynotes of the Army's logistical

operations during 1942. But to recognize

this is not to disparage the significance of

the trend that became evident toward the

end of that year. By the following spring

the trend had become more positive. Administrative reform, especially in the development of routine procedures, was

marching forward on a broad front and

there was much talk of economy and conservation, accompanied by some effective

action. Most significant, the probable

limits of war production had been authoritatively defined, and the scale of military

mobilization had been compressed to fit

within those limits. The trend was far from

orderly, however, and was accompanied

by much misdirected effort and interagency friction. In the spring of 1943 the

economy drive, at least, could show few

tangible results. Not until late 1943 and

1944 was the whole movement toward

economy and system to reach full tide, as

the period of mobilization yielded to one

of stabilized and more carefully regulated

effort.

The Reduced Army Supply Program

The great cutback in military supply

finally ordered in November 1942 was reflected in two revisions of the Army Supply

Program: that of 12 November 1942 (already in preparation while the committees

were working out the Joint Chiefs' reply to

Mr. Nelson's letter of 19 October), and

that of 1 February 1943. The two may

conveniently be analyzed together. (See

Table 20.)

In the main, the reduction in requirements was accomplished by reducing the

size offerees to be supplied and equipped,

especially the heavily accoutered elements.

Late in August the SOS staff was computing Army supply requirements for 1943 on

the basis of a terminal strength of 8.2 million enlisted men. For the 1 September revision of the equipment program this figure was reduced for procurement of critical items to 7.8 million enlisted men, and

for procurement of essential items to 7.5

million. Reductions were also ordered in

the troop bases used for computation of

the 1944 program, bringing these figures

down from 9.8 million enlisted men to less

than 9.5 million. The 1 September Army

Supply Program formed part of the total

war production program for 1943 which,

despite these reductions, the WPB attacked

in October as too large for the national

economy to support. Accordingly, procurement goals for critical items of equipment were reduced to the amounts required for 7.5 million enlisted men, conforming to the level already ordered with

respect to essential items, and the presidential "must" items in this category,

wherever they exceeded computed requirements for the troop basis, were cut

back to this level. The Army Supply Program that emerged from this ordeal of

purgation in November had thus been
ECONOMY AND STABILIZATION 633

shrunk to the general proportions indicated by the 1943 troop mobilization program of 8.2 million officers and men finally

approved by the President in the same

month.1

The composition of the 1943 Army was

also a subject of lively debate. As late as

August 1942 it had been intended to mobilize 143 divisions by the end of 1943,

and 192 by 1944, heavily weighted with

armored, motorized, and airborne elements. By the end of 1942 the objective

had been lowered to a hundred divisions

for 1943, the deepest cuts having been

made in armored, motorized, and mountain divisions, and in nondivisional tankdestroyer, tank, artillery, and infantry

units. Earlier goals of 1.2 million service

troops were reduced to about a million.

The Air Forces' planned strength of over

2 million remained untouched. Of the

total 7.5 million enlisted men planned for

1943, .5 million were to be set aside as an

unassigned pool for unexpected contingencies; for these personnel, therefore, no

organizational equipment requirements

were included in the supply program.2

The supply program was not held in its

entirety to the level of computed requirements for a 7.5-million-man army. In the

February 1943 supply program were included sixteen additional divisional sets of

initial equipment for 1943, and forty-eight

additional sets for 1943-44, along with

similar requirements for a number of other

additional nondivisional units. In effect,

these additional requirements added a 20

percent surplus or strategic reserve to the

supply program, part of which was expected to be used to outfit troops of Allied

and liberated countries, notably the Fighting French.3

Nevertheless, the new supply programs

marked a turning point of no little significance in the development of the war economy, for they represented the first attempt

to use the yardstick of productive capacity

to limit the aggregate volume of military

supply. After requirements had been computed, they were checked by major categories both against the capacity of industrial facilities and against the amounts of

critical raw materials expected to be available, and necessary reductions were made.

Lend-lease requirements, other than those

of the Soviet protocol, were drastically cut,

and the 50 percent allowances of critical

items of equipment (other than rifles)

already applied to troops in training in

1942 were extended to the bulk of the

forces expected to be in training during

1943; some twenty divisions, thirty-two

tank-destroyer battalions, fourteen tank

battalions, and seventy assorted artillery

units, besides other components, were so

affected.4

The computation of maintenance allow1

 (1) Frank, Army Supply Requirements, pp. 34-36

and Docs 40, 42, OCMH. (2) See above, Ch. XXII. 2

 Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, AGF I, pp.

214-17.

Actually, the unassigned pool was absorbed before

the end of 1942 by allocations to AAF, the Women's

Army Auxiliary Corps, and the Army Specialized

Training Program. 3

 (1) Frank, Army Supply Requirements, Doc 72,

OCMH. (2) See also, Robert R. Palmer, "Ground

Forces in the Army, December 1941-April 1945: A

Statistical Study," in Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley,

AGF I.

In order to provide a statistical basis for computing

this strategic reserve, the 1944 Troop Basis, for supply

purposes, was assumed to total over 9 million enlisted

men, even though there was no expectation that more

than 7.5 million would actually be mobilized. Equipment actually assigned to French and other Allied

forces in 1943 naturally would have to come from

existing stocks and current production. The strategic

reserve in the supply program merely provided for

eventual absorption of these and similar requirements.

For French rearmament, see above, Ch. XVIII. 4

 (1) Frank, Army Supply Requirements, pp. 35-36,

52-55, and Docs 47, 51, 73, OCMH. (2) For effect on

assignments to the British, see above, Ch. XI.
634 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ances in the new supply program was also

more economical in some particulars than

in previous programs. Allowances for combat maintenance not only were based on

estimated average instead of year-end

overseas strengths but also were applied

only to active theatres. Hawaii and overseas areas in the Western Hemisphere—

since subject only to "sporadic raids"—

were considered to be part of the zone of

interior. By this last expedient some

400,000 troops per year were lopped off

the total number for which combat maintenance would otherwise have been provided. Calculations of maintenance were

also based upon an expectation that the

troop population overseas would reach

about 2.5 million by the end of 1943 and

4 million by the end of 1944—more realistic figures than those used in the September and earlier programs. Rates of combat

maintenance remained generally unchanged—averaging about 4 percent per

month for all types of equipment.

As in earlier programs, allowances for

maintenance actually included some for

filling the pipeline and making good losses

incurred in the process of distribution,

over and above a separate distribution or

"pipeline" allowance labeled as such. The

latter was a flat percentage of total initial

equipment requirements (applied to the

7.5-million and 9-million troop bases). In

addition, provision was made for four and

a half months of reserve stocks in all overseas theaters, based on terminal overseas

strength in 1943 and 1944, besides the regular flow of maintenance. Finally, to absorb shipping losses, an allowance of 2

percent of all material expected to be

shipped overseas was added. This 2 percent was roughly equivalent to the planning factors established early in 1943 by

agreement with the British.

The whole theory of distribution allowances had been for some time under critical examination. The most significant

result of this study was the development,

by the requirements staff of the Office of

The Quartermaster General, of the socalled carry-over method of computing

distribution allowances. Under this method the Quartermaster staff proposed to

change the current system of computing

distribution allowances as flat percentages

of initial allowances. Pointing to the obvious fact that distribution allowances actually served to set up stocks throughout the

pipeline during one period to meet maintenance needs that would emerge in the

period following, the staff suggested that

distribution allowances be merged with

maintenance allowances, and that both be

expressed in terms of numbers of days or

months of use or consumption. Under the

same assumption, the allowances would be

computed on the basis of the troop strength

during the period when the stocks were

actually to be used. As proposed by the

Office of The Quartermaster General in

September 1942, this method would actually have provided more generous distribution allowances than those currently

embodied in the supply program, but it

was combined with certain economies in

the computation of maintenance allowances. Whether the net result of applying

this plan would have been more or less

economical than the current methods is

uncertain. At all events, the September

and November revisions of the supply program carried forward the old system of

distribution and maintenance allowances.

In the February revision, however, the

Office of The Quartermaster General was

permitted to compute its own supply requirements by a method that embodied

the carry-over principle, merging distribu-
ECONOMY AND STABILIZATION 635

tion with maintenance allowances. In the

computations for the next revision, scheduled for August 1943, distribution allowances, as such, were abandoned for the

whole program.5

The February revision also marked the

first attempt to determine total assets of

material on hand—that is, in the pipeline

and in the possession of troops—in order

to arrive at net requirements for production. The effort was not very successful.

Inventory records were fragmentary, inaccurate, or nonexistent, especially at

levels below the depots, and there was no

practicable means of inventorying material in the hands of troops or in the distribution system overseas. The only reasonably accurate relevant data for 1942 were

the amounts of material produced, number of troops inducted, and certain known

losses such as ship sinkings. It was necessary therefore to combine these data with

estimates of aggregate "wastage" during

1942 and with what few reliable inventory

records existed to produce a hypothetical

"on hand" figure as of 1 January 1943. A

simpler method by which "on hand"

amounts would have been defined solely

in terms of quantities available for issue in

depots in the United States (arbitrarily

assuming that the remaining quantities in

the pipeline and in the hands of troops

were adequate for purposes of distribution) was rejected because it was believed

desirable to have a statement of total

(gross) requirements in the supply program. Only in the case of ammunition

were "on hand" quantities defined as

stocks available for issue in the United

States. Computed requirements for ammunition accordingly omitted allowances

for reserves for the one-million-odd troops

already overseas at the end of 1942. The

deplorable state of stock records revealed

in the course of the effort to determine "on

hand" assets was one of the factors leading,

in the spring of 1943, to a wholesale reform of the stock control system.6

Subsistence requirements were based on

the mobilization troop basis of 7.5 million

for 1943 and 1944, but with the addition

of several other categories of personnel

that would have to be fed: officers, Army

nurses, Women's Army Auxiliary Corps,

and prisoners of war. The total strength,

for both 1943 and 1944, came to about 8.7

million. Allowances were also provided

for clothing and individual equipment to

be sold to officers and to be issued to prisoners of war, and an additional allowance

of 18 percent ("attrition" factor) was provided to absorb losses through severance of

personnel from the service.7 (Table 20)

The Attack on Waste

The slashes made in the great military

supply programs late in 1942 were the

most conspicuous products of a growing

pressure, evident within the Military Establishment as well as exerted upon it from

without, to abate the extravagance attendant upon mobilization and deployment

pushed at full speed. This economy drive

had many facets. In one important respect

it was merely a continuation of the unending effort to maximize the effectiveness of

shipping—through more efficient administration of ship operations and rigorous

subordination of less to more essential de5

 (1) Donald F. Bradford, Methods of Forecasting War

Requirements for Quartermaster Supplies, QMC Hist

Study 14 (Washington, 1946), pp. 100-109. (2) Erna

Risch, The Quartermaster Corps: I, Organization, Supply,

and Services, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1953), pp. 224-25. 6

 Frank, Army Supply Requirements, pp. 42-44,

57-58, and Doc 75, OCMH. 7

 Ibid., pp. 58-60, and Docs 77-78.
636 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

TABLE 20—REDUCTION OF 1943 ARMY SUPPLY PROGRAM: NOVEMBER 1942

(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

a

 For revision of the total war production program, see table 18. The figures shown for the specific programs listed represent only

those portions of the programs covered by the Army Supply Program. The Army ground program was the only one entirely covered

by the ASP, and must be narrowly defined in order to be so covered. Construed somewhat more broadly, as it is on page 000, the Army

ground program was cut back by about 23.6 percent; the reduction indicated in the table above is about 21 percent.

Source: Adapted from Doc 44 in Frank, Army Supply Requirements. OCMH.

mands upon shipping. The ramifications

of this last line of endeavor were virtually

boundless, since it implied a critical scrutiny of the essentiality of every item of military equipment and supply that might

ever have to be shipped overseas. Moreover, economy of supply was coming to be

regarded by spring of 1943 as an end in
ECONOMY AND STABILIZATION 637

TABLE 21—SHIPPING SPACE REQUIRED FOR MOVING A DIVISION OVERSEAS: LATE 1942

Dash equals inapplicable. a

 Includes thirty days' gasoline and oil. Gasoline requirements based on 1.2 gallons per man per day for infantry, about 4.1 gallons for

armored elements.

b

 These figures based on 3.75 ship tons per man (FM 101-10, 1941 edition, par. 116). c Maintenance on a basis of 1.1 ship tons per man per month, excluding ammunition, gasoline, and oil; armored elements include 25

percent replacement of vehicles per month besides normal maintenance.

Infantry Division: 15,514 personnel, 2,322 vehicles.

Armored Division: 14,643 personnel, 3,698 vehicles.

Source: Miscellaneous Shipping Data, Logis File, OCMH.

itself, apart from its impact upon the specific problem of shipping; there was a

growing feeling that waste, whether or not

the item wasted was plentiful, could no

longer be tolerated.

The most direct road to economy in

shipping was by reduction of the tonnages

that were to be shipped. Since Army cargo

tended to be bulky in proportion to its

weight, two approaches were involved—

reduction of items and quantities required

and compression of bulky items, through

efficient stowage, packing, and crating,

into smaller space. The main hope for

economy, ironically enough, lay in reducing the very element by which the modern army had striven to make itself mobile—motor transport—since the human

body was an irreducible item, and the

soldier's individual equipment and supply, even his weapons and ammunition,

while more elaborate than at any other

time in history, still represented a relatively small part of the Army's total paraphernalia. The great bulk of it was made

up of vehicles and the fuel that they consumed. (Table 21)

Since early in 1942 the necessity of

reducing organic allowances of equipment,

especially of vehicles, in order to permit

maximum troop deployment with available shipping had been apparent to everyone. There were even those, such as General McNair, the AGF commander, who

believed that judicious pruning of motor

transport, if accompanied by rigorous
638 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

pooling, reductions in unessential equipment, and abandonment of the effort to

make the division completely self-sufficient, would not merely reduce weight and

bulk but would actually make American

ground forces, unit for unit, more mobile

and effective in combat. Looming shortages of rubber, in spring of 1942, indicated

that motor transport would have to be

reduced in any case, and the first attempts

to draw up shipping schedules for BOLERO

revealed in concrete terms the extent to

which capacity to deploy forces overseas

on a large scale and over a long period

could be defined in terms of the capacity

to move cargo. In June 1942 the Chief of

Staff ordered Army Ground Forces to

make the "maximum practicable reduction of motor transport and of administrative overhead in all types of units to save

cargo space."

 8

But each truck and each weapon, in the

existing tables; had its vehement defenders who were convinced it was indispensable. In March 1942 the infantry division,

following months of study, was actually

enlarged, receiving additional personnel,

weapons, and 219 more motor vehicles

than in earlier tables. In April and May

AGF made certain reductions in organic

motor transport for infantry and artillery

units, substituting light vehicles for some

heavy ones and eliminating others. By

agreement with SOS, moreover, AGF

succeeded in reducing somewhat the scale

of maintenance vehicles assigned to the

infantry regiment. But the mountainous

backlog of equipment left behind by the

Western Task Force for lack of shipping to

move it vividly demonstrated the inadequacy of the economies thus far achieved.

On 2 October the War Department ordered the three major commands to review

their tables of organization with a view to

eliminating 20 percent of the motor transport and 15 percent of the personnel. This

order, as G-3 admitted, remained essentially an exhortation, since no machinery

of enforcement—no board of "No-Men,"

as General McNair had urged—was provided to overrule pleas to retain or augment equipment allowances. Each command, in effect, was told to provide its

own "No-Men." When the War Department a little later reduced the troop basis,

notably in armored, mobile, and heavily

equipped components, it confessed in effect

that the Army was still equipped on a

scale too lavish to permit its full deployment overseas in available shipping. The

trend, it was announced, must be "toward

light, easily transportable units."

 9

Pressure to add armament to units was

heavy and continuous. A proposal by

General Somervell in spring of 1943, for

example, would have quadrupled the

number of truck-mounted .50-caliber machine guns and provided many 3-inch

antitank cannon for protecting motor convoys and advanced depots. There were

other demands to assign heavier weapons

organically to divisions, which meant

adding more organic transport as well.

Partly because of the growing emphasis

on air power, partly because of the temperament and convictions of General

McNair, the task of making units light

and transportable fell mainly upon the

Army Ground Forces. An AGF Reduction

Board early in 1943 proposed sweeping

8

 (1) Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, AGF I, pp.

281-82. (2) JAdC 7, 15 May 43, title: Measures for

Effecting Economies in Cargo Shipg. (3) JCS 339, 26

May 43, same title. 9

 (1) Memo, G-3 for AGF and SOS, 25 Oct 42, sub:

Tr Basis 1943, WDGCT 320.2 Gen (10-25-42). (2)

AG ltr to maj comds, 2 Oct 42, sub: Revision of Orgn

and Equip Reqmts, AG 400 (9-30-42). (3) Greenfield,

Palmer, and Wiley, AGF I, pp. 286-89.
ECONOMY AND STABILIZATION 639

alterations in the organization tables of

virtually all ground combat units, involving a reduction of the infantry division's

vehicles, for example, from 2,149 to 1,640,

its antitank and field artillery pieces from

181 to 129. These reforms were accepted

only in part. In revised tables issued in

July 1943, the infantry division emerged

with 2,012 vehicles and 123 artillery

pieces. The armored division, however,

which in March 1942 had 490 tanks and

3,630 wheeled noncombat vehicles, was

pared down drastically in 1943 to 263

tanks and 2,653 noncombat vehicles.10

In the service establishment, economy

came even more slowly. Service support in

most overseas theaters was inadequate

throughout 1942, and the SOS fought persistently to build it up. Economies were

sought primarily by elimination of units

of regimental and brigade size (too large

for most overseas areas) and by creating

general purpose, composite organizations

with interchangeable parts rather than

specialized units. But this program was

hardly more than well under way in

spring of 1943.11

Standardization of equipment and supplies and of the quantities in which they

were issued was itself a potential source of

wasted shipping space whenever the planners failed to give adequate consideration

to the peculiar local conditions under

which the material was to be used. The

problem was not as simple, perhaps, as

the more flagrant mistakes—stockpiling

of antifreeze fluid and wool shirts in Puerto

Rico, for example—would indicate. Specialization to fit local conditions could be

carried too far—as commanders in the

Pacific found when they equipped their

troops lightly in the Japanese manner—

and it might require more, not less shipping. Nevertheless, it seemed difficult to

justify the shipping of full allowances of

trucks to Pacific islands that were devoid

of roads, or full allowances of ground radio equipment to air squadrons in the

United Kingdom where the British communications net was at their disposal. And

the overburdening of the individual soldier going overseas (a composite evil

resulting both from overspecialization and

overstandardization) remained generally

unremedied in the spring of 1943. Officers

as highly placed as General McNair considered it scandalous, but were apparently

unable to do anything about it. In general, the War Department had to depend

on overseas commanders to request whatever departures from standard equipment

tables they considered appropriate for

their particular areas, but overseas commanders, while quick to ask for additional

equipment and supplies, both standard

and special, seldom bothered to specify

which items troops coming into their areas

might leave behind. In April 1943 the

War Department was still admonishing

them to do so. "The issue of equipment to

individuals and units," an investigating

committee observed later in the summer,

"simply because the documentary tables

call for it, is sheer waste."

 12

10

 (1) Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, AGF I, pp.

290ff and tables on pp. 274-75, 320-21.

All these changes involved changes in personnel

strength as well. (2) See below, Apps. A-4, A-5. 11

 (1) See above, Ch. XIII. (2) Memo, Marshall for

McNair. Somervell, and Edwards, 29 Dec 42. (3)

Memo, Somervell for CofS, 31 Dec 42, sub: Orgn of

Sv Trs. Last two in CofS WDGS (3A) folder, Hq

ASF. (4) Memo, Lutes for CofS ASF, 5 May 43, sub:

Proposed Orgn of Sv Activities, Sv Trs 1942-43

folder, Case 55, Lutes File. (5) Memo, G-3 for CG

SOS, 12 Jan 43, sub: Reorgn of Sv Units, WDGCT

320 (1-12-43). 12

 (1) Report of WD Procurement Review Board,

p. 54. (2) JCS 339 cited n. 8(3). (3) WD ltr to overseas

comdrs, 5 Apr 43, sub: Equip and Sup To Accommodate Overseas Tr Mvmts, AG 400 (3-4-43).
640 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Economy through packing and crating,

especially of motor vehicles, was energetically pursued and loudly debated

through 1942. Early British estimates for

the BOLERO program looked forward to

massive savings by shipping vehicles completely knocked down (CKD) in crates,

but the problem of assembling the vehicles

at the receiving end created difficulties.

Before the end of 1942 some vehicles were

being shipped CKD to the British Isles,

though in limited numbers because of the

shortage of labor, and also to India, Australia, and New Zealand; plans to set up

CKD assembly facilities in the Red Sea

area did not materialize. The more widely

used method of shipment was the more

easily assembled twin-unit pack (TUP),

or medium knocked down pack (MKD),

which by the end of 1942 had been developed to the point where it occupied only

about a third of the space occupied by a

fully erected truck. This technique, by

which two vehicles were broken down sufficiently to be crated in from two to five

separate packs, superseded earlier variants, such as the single-unit pack (SUP),

and was used to ship large numbers of

standard vehicles to practically all the

theaters, except where adequate CKD facilities existed and in combat-loaded

movements. TUP shipments offered the

advantage that they could be erected by

comparatively inexperienced personnel

without heavy tools; two mechanics with

eight unskilled helpers performed satisfactorily in one test. At the beginning of

1943 plans envisaged crating of 80 percent

of all vehicles to be sent overseas in that

year, a goal that in fact was almost attained.

Economy in the shipment of vehicles

was also sought through the provision of

sufficient spare parts to ensure maximum

use of all vehicles sent overseas. The major

problem here was in maintaining the large

number of old-model nonstandard vehicles overseas that were used by British

forces. A General Motors representative

returning from the Middle East in February 1943 reported that out of 120,000

(largely American-type) vehicles in that

whole area, 20,000 were laid up for repairs. American forces in the Pacific were

also plagued by the "old-model" problem.13

Improvements in stowage and packing

were sought in many other ways. By mid1943, for example, the Ordnance Department reported an 8 percent saving in

space through better-designed ammunition containers. A new "V"-type fiber box

had allegedly brought about a 16 percent

saving in the packing of subsistence. By

removing one wheel of motorcycles and

rearranging other parts in packing, shipping space had been reduced by a third,

and a similar saving had been made in

packing the Browning .50-caliber machine

gun. Savings in shipping space by such

means were reported in June 1943 to have

amounted to 10 percent of the total tonnage of Army supplies shipped overseas.14

Construction materials, an important

category of military cargo, were used in

13

 (1) Min, 3d mtg U.S.-Br Planners, 12 Apr 42,

ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42) Sec 5. (2) Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 20 Oct 42, CofS WDGS 1942 (3A)

folder, Hq ASF. (3) Memo, Somervell for Marshall,

24 Sep 42, CofS WDGS 1942 (2) folder, Hq ASF. (4)

CCS 110/4, 22 Oct 42, title: Shipt of Motor Vehicles.

(5) See other papers in the CCS 110 series. (6) See 451

Vehicles Misc 1943 folder, Plng Div ASF. (7) Plng Div

SOS Diary, 19 Feb 43 entry, Plng Div ASF. (8) Wardlow, Trans II, Ch. V, table on p. 91, showing 76 percent of 1943 vehicle shipments made in boxes. (9)

MBW 29, 14 Sep 42, title: Shipg Reqmts for Automotive Equip. (10) See other papers in the MBW 29

series. 14

 Annual Report of the Army Service Forces, 1943, pp.

78-79. Basis for figures is not given.
ECONOMY AND STABILIZATION 641

enormous quantities in the development

of outposts in the Western Hemisphere

and along lines of communications during

1942. By the end of the year, the course

of the war had left a backwash of tens of

thousands of troops, elaborately housed

and fortified in areas far from combat.

Merely to maintain these forces was a

heavy drain on shipping, a cost that had

to be weighed against the tonnages required to redeploy them elsewhere; redeployment did not really get under way

until early 1943. It also proved difficult to

curb lavish construction in static areas,

despite repeated orders from the War Department to abandon unessential projects

and to employ only "theater of operations"

types of building. As late as March 1943,

The Inspector General, after touring the

Caribbean Defense Command, found that

planned construction for the coming year

in that area had been reduced by only

about $11 million out of a total outlay of

$162 million, a result, it appeared, of General Brett's uncertainty as to the strategic

role of his command. "No nation," an investigating committee declared severely in

summer of 1943, referring to this persistent

problem, "is rich enough or productive

enough to supply and maintain battlefronts where there is no longer a battle."

 15

After more than a year of war the effort

to build up reserve and operating stocks

overseas, "filling the pipeline," was bearing fruit. The pipeline, to be sure, was in

no literal sense full. There were shortages

of specific critical items, such as signal

equipment, in most theaters, and general

shortages in some theaters. But there were

also huge and embarrassing accumulations—subsistence and small arms ammunition in North Africa, aircraft bombs in

the United Kingdom. Admiral King

wrote indignantly in February 1943 of the

stagnation of supplies in theater reservoirs,

both Army and Navy, and of the excessive

stockages resulting from overindulgence

in Washington and the greed of theater

commanders.16 Inordinately high authorized levels of supply were partly responsible for this condition, but few reductions

were made before mid-1943. Imbalance,

however, was a result of many causes—

fluctuating expenditures, emergency shipments and issues, lax control over the

more plentiful categories of supply, and

rudimentary stock control methods. Indeed, as far as stock control was concerned, it was not until spring of 1943 that

the War Department put its own house in

order and began to institute effective controls overseas. Of all the overseas theaters,

only the United Kingdom and Australia,

before the end of 1942, had reasonably efficient supply systems. A War Department

letter late in February 1943, confessing

that supply had been "relatively uncontrolled," directed theater commanders to

survey their establishments and to "seek

out overstockage and stagnation."

 17

The winter and spring of 1943 saw the

beginning of an organized movement for

economy and conservation in the Army,

15

 (1) Report of WD Procurement Review Board,

pp. 56-58. (2) WD ltr to various comdrs, 16 Apr 42,

sub: WD Construction and Real Estate Policy, AG

600.12 (4-15-42). (3) Other ltrs in same series. (4) WD

Memo W100-3-42, 14 Oct 42, sub: Jt Use of Construction Mats . . . . (5) WD Memo W100-11-43,

27 Apr 43, sub: Rpts on Overseas Construction. (6)

JCS 339, App. A, cited n. 8(3). 16

 (1) Report of WD Procurement Review Board,

pp. 35-36, 41-44, 50. (2) Memo, Lutes for Gross, 27

Mar 43. (3) Ltr, Magruder to Lutes, 28 Mar 43. Last

two in Misc Notes, Lutes File. (4) Memo, COMINCH

for CINC's Pac and Atlantic Fleets, and Vice CNO,

11 Feb 43, G-4/400. 17

 (1) WD Memo W700-11-43, 24 Feb 43. (2) WD

ltr, 1 Oct 42, sub: Excess Issues of Equip, AG 400

(9-25-42).
642 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

coinciding with the considerable public

attention then being focused upon proposals to remove military procurement from

the control of the armed services. Assistant

Secretary McCloy's tour of some of the

battle fronts in the spring focused public

and governmental attention upon waste

and overstockage in overseas theaters. In

ASF there was some discussion of creating

an "economy" officer with wide authority

similar to the highly placed British Comptroller General of Economy. This British

official was responsible not merely for

maintenance policies, salvage, and conservation through use of substitutes—activities supervised in the United States by

separate ASF agencies—but more broadly

for making the British Army economyminded. General Lee wrote Somervell

that American troops coming to the European theater had been guilty of shocking

"wastefulness and wanton destruction of

property, equipment and supplies," and

suggested that the British Comptroller

General of Economy, Maj. Gen. J. Buckley, be invited to tour Army installations

in the United States in order to indoctrinate American troops in British economy measures.18

 This suggestion aroused

no enthusiasm in Somervell's headquarters, where it was argued that the American system of making economy a function

of command would not lend itself to the

British method of supervision. It was felt

that the gospel of economy had made

more headway in the States than overseas,

and that the first place to attack waste

should be on the battlefield. Lee's suggestion was tactfully rejected, and General

Marshall addressed new and strongly

worded orders to theater commanders to

instill supply discipline in their troops.

Greater pressure was also applied to have

scrap metal and other salvage in overseas

theaters collected and returned to the

United States. In ASF a poster display

program was launched to make troops in

the zone of interior more economyminded, and the editing of requisitions at

ports of embarkation became noticeably

"tougher."

 19

Administrative Improvements in

Overseas Supply and Deployment

A parallel effort, the development of

standing operating procedures, probably

yielded more substantial economies than

the measures directly aimed at economy.

The late winter and spring of 1943 saw a

general stabilization of the procedures of

overseas supply and deployment, rounding off the improvements and experimentation of the year preceding.20

 The most

significant development was the abandonment of unregulated automatic supply. In

May 1943 subsistence and fuel joined the

controlled list on a status report basis.

Three reports were prescribed: the monthly Materiel Status Report, now shorn of

its ammunition items; a monthly Automatic Supply Report for subsistence, some

medical supplies, and fuel; and an Ammunition Supply Report submitted every

ten days. The job of preparing them was

assigned primarily to the ports (except for

certain data inserted in the Materiel Status

18

 Ltr, Lee to Somervell, 11 May 43, ETO (6)

1942-43 folder, Hq ASF. 19

 (1) Corresp in ETO (6) 1942 folder, Hq ASF. (2)

Memo, G. H. Chambers for Gen Clay, 18 Mar 43,

Misc Notes, Lutes File. (3) ASF Circular S850-19-43,

1 Apr 43, sub: Conservation Indoctrination Through

Medium of Display Posters. (4) Annual Report of the

Army Service Forces, 1943, pp. 106-07. (5) Leighton,

Overseas Supply Policies and Procedures, pp. 2 10-13,

OCMH. 20

 See above, Ch. XIII.
ECONOMY AND STABILIZATION 643

Report at technical service headquarters),

and overseas commanders were finally required to forward to the ports, under a

prescribed schedule, the necessary information relating to supply status in their

commands. OPD similarly was required

to provide the ports with timely troop

basis data. The new reports, finally, were

to serve not merely as instruments of statistical control but as a basis for automatic

supply action as well. Thus ended the experiment launched the preceding October, though some time passed before the

procedures of status report supply were

fully clarified. Control of these items was

still lodged in OPD, which had the allocating power, and in AAF and ASF headquarters and the technical services, which

administered their distribution; petroleum products were controlled through

the machinery of the Army-Navy Petroleum Board. But control of all these commodities, as well as of those which the

ports shipped independently, depended

absolutely on the supply status information that now funneled into the ports.

With the shutting off of unregulated shipments to North Africa in the spring, the

bulk of all overseas supply came under the

requisition method, and most automatic

shipments, whether of scarce or plentiful

categories, were based on the new periodic

status reports. Unregulated automatic

supply was reserved for the critical early

stages of new operations.21

Procedures of ammunition supply underwent other changes. Early in 1943

theater ammunition levels, like other

categories, were redefined in terms of days

of supply; the unit of fire was retained

only for tactical computations within a

theater, and theater commanders were

permitted to adjust its content to suit their

own operating conditions. The War Department prescribed a uniform ammunition day of supply, applying to all theaters, for each category. Later in the spring

a reporting system was instituted designed

to amass expenditure data from each theater in order to provide a basis for eventually establishing separate days of supply

for each theater. Before midyear the War

Department was acting upon theater recommendations to change prescribed levels,

the number of rounds in the day of supply,

and percentages by types, though separate

days of supply for each theater were not

developed. In the spring, too, arrangements were made to send overseas teams

of trained officers, familiar with the mysteries of the Army Supply Program and

the uses of statistics, to study conditions

affecting expenditure of ammunition and

wear and attrition of equipment. In June

these teams were placed at the disposal of

theater commanders, who were made responsible for collecting and forwarding

expenditure and maintenance data of all

kinds.22

Prescribed levels of all overseas reserves

underwent wholesale revision in July 1943.

(See Appendix F-1.) Reductions were modest, but operating levels (working stocks)

over and above minimum reserves were

now restricted to subsistence (Class I supply), noncontrolled equipment (Class II),

and fuel (Class III), and were not normally to exceed ninety days of supply.

21

 (1) See WD ltr, 5 May 43, sub: Materiel Status

Rpt, Automatic Sup Rpt, Am Sup Rpt, AG 400

(4-25-43). (2) See also, History of the Planning Division, ASF, Vol. II, Ch. X, OCMH. (3) Leighton,

Overseas Supply Policies and Procedures, pp. 198-

201, OCMH. 22

 (1) WD ltr, 16 Feb 43, sub: Am Sup Policy, AG

400 (2-13-43). (2) Report of WD Procurement Review Board, p. 49. (3) FM 101-10, Staff Officers' Field

Manual: Organizational, Technical and Logistical

Data, Oct 43, par. 321. (4) See above, Chs. XII-XIII.
644 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Their determination was left to the port,

by agreement with the theater.23

Port reserves, another cushion against

emergency, were also acquiring new uses.

By 1943 the expanding system of filler

depots backing up the ports was fulfilling

most of the purposes of port reserves, even

the provision of filler cargo on short notice.

During March and April an experiment

was run at San Francisco, using the stock

at the port essentially as a filler depot during normal and slack periods and drawing

upon other filler depots when the workload became heavier. A regular flow of replenishment shipments into the port stocks

was maintained and, through careful

scheduling, part of the work of marking

and packing for overseas shipment was

shifted to the filler depots. Port stocks of

this kind were generally authorized in

July, quantities being left to the discretion

of the port commanders. In effect, a backwash was eliminated from the flow of supply—the concept of the flowing pipeline

was replacing that of reserves stocked in

echelon.24

During the first half of 1943 the marking system for overseas shipments finally

approached a point of refinement that permitted theater officials to identify the

item shipped with the item requested. The

theaters in 1942 had been given the task

of developing their own marking codes,

and it was the European theater that developed the basic elements of the system

finally adopted. The essence of the plan

was the use of a single code symbol in all

shipping papers and correspondence pertaining to shipments based on a single

requisition. The common denominator

was the symbol identifying the originating requisition. Thus, "A007" might be

the seventh in the series "A" of Quartermaster requisitions (assigned the block of

numbers 001 to 099). In front of the requisition symbol was placed the four-letter

symbol of the overseas base, together with

the abbreviations of the procuring service

and the class of supply—"BOBO-QMIIA007." Further letter and number symbols might be added to the requisition

symbol to designate a partial shipment on

a requisition, or a specific depot in the

theater to which it was destined—highly

important refinements from the theater's

point of view. To the supply organization

in the European theater this system promised to remedy the chronic delays and

other defects in the current procedures by

which the theater was notified of the status

of its requests and of the movement of incoming shipments. It would permit

prompt notification by cable of all items

in a shipment before it left New York,

without danger of confusion over nomenclature. It would also permit the routing

of incoming shipments promptly to their

users.

The system encountered strong opposition in the Transportation Corps, which

placed its trust in improving the existing

manifest procedures and feared that the

new method would require complete reindoctrination of supply and shipping personnel with resulting disruption of operations. General Lutes, while more favorably inclined, objected that the theater

wanted the ASF to "go into the retail

business" by documenting its shipments

23

 (1) See WD ltr, 10 Jul 43, sub: Levels of Sup

. . . , AG 400 (7-8-43). (2) See also, History of the

Planning Division, ASF, Vol. II, Ch. XI, OCMH.

(3) Leighton, Overseas Supply Policies and Procedures, pp. 201-02, OCMH. 24

 (1) Memo, Lutes for Gross, 21 Jul 43, SPDDI

323.91 POE file, OCT. (2) Leighton, Overseas Supply Policies and Procedures, pp. 144-47, OCMH.

(3) Larson, Role of the Transportation Corps in

Oversea Supply, pp. 46-52, OCT HB.
ECONOMY AND STABILIZATION 645

for direct delivery to a specific depot.25

The whole system of overseas supply, of

course, rested on the principle of wholesale distribution from the United States to

the theater, which in turn implied a system

of graded distribution in the theater. In

Australia such a system had been developed, but in the United Kingdom short

distances, crowded facilities, and other

factors made it necessary to rely more

heavily on direct movement of shipments

from the ports to the interior depots.

The European theater pressed its case

with vigor, however, and in May the new

marking system was formally offered to

overseas commanders and shortly thereafter put into effect. Under this system, it

was explained, "separate shipments may

be identified by container and . . . shipping papers may be dispatched and connected with the shipments concerned."

 26

In July, as a corollary of standardization

in marking shipments, the War Department put into tentative operation a single

standardized shipping document, prepared in multiple copies at the depot originating a shipment and replacing most of

the multitude of shipping papers formerly

used at various stages of the journey.

About the same time, finally, a significant

distinction was established between supply

and transportation channels in the flow of

information connected with shipments. As

the official instructions stated:

The limitation of information flowing

along the transportation channels . . . will

simplify tremendously the processing and

preparation of shipping papers. It is apparent that transportation agencies should be

basically interested only in packages, and become interested in contents or identification by article only when such information is

necessary to identify shipments.27

"Marking is a step child of many War

Department agencies," General Lutes

wryly commented in May 1943 in the

midst of these administrative reforms. "It

is considered so simple that it is everybody's business, until the real work of developing policies begins, at which time

these agencies begin to drop out."

 28

 By

the middle of the year, happily, the process had been virtually completed.

The general movement toward administrative stabilization brought two important improvements in the procedures for

equipping troops going overseas. The first

was a change in the procedures for transferring equipment from units in training

to alerted units. Until September 1942 an

alerted unit, after exhausting normal local

sources of supply at and near the home

station, drew first upon units near at hand

and then upon more distant ones. This

involved complex administrative channels, and alternating action by supply and

tactical agencies—the station supply officer, after drawing upon local sources, reported shortages to the unit commander,

who relayed them to the major command

to which the unit belonged, which filled

them as far as possible from other units

under control of the major command before reporting the remaining shortages

(back into supply channels) to the supply

services. Thus units in training had to give

up equipment before the supply services

had the opportunity to draw upon depot

25

 Ltr, Lutes to Lee, 6 Mar 43, ETO folder, Lutes

File.

26

 WD ltr, 26 May 43, sub: Identification of Separate Shipts to Overseas Destinations, AG 400.161

(5-22-43). 27

 (1) Quoted in Leighton, The Problem of Troop

and Cargo Flow in Preparing the European Invasion,

pp. 75-76, OCMH. (2) Papers in AG 400.161

(3-19-43). (3) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the

Armies, Ch. III. 28

 Ltr, Gen Lutes to Maj Gen Everett S. Hughes,

9 May 43, Misc Notes, Lutes File.
646 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

stocks beyond the immediate orbit of the

alerted unit. A revision of standard instructions (Inclosure No. 1 to movement

orders) issued on 1 September 1942 established a new sequence of action: station

supply officers reported shortages directly

to the supply services immediately after

exhausting local station and depot stocks,

and the supply services tapped all their

depot resources before referring remaining shortages to SOS headquarters, which

in turn referred them to the major commands to fill by transfers from other units.

The new procedure, happily, went into

effect before the turmoil of troop movements for North Africa began.29

Largely as a reaction to that turmoil,

the system of status reporting on readiness

of alerted units was tightened in November 1942 to include specific reports on

readiness in terms of equipment. Commanders making the reports were admonished to be precise ("remarks such as 25

per cent equipment shortages; so and so

has fulfilled responsibilities; and lists of

shortages have been submitted to proper

agencies, will not be used since they fail to

indicate the true status of equipment.")30

A whole system of supporting reports soon

grew up within the SOS establishment

with a view to providing an up-to-date

picture of the equipment status of highpriority units and of sources available for

filling shortages. Early in January 1943

inspections of alerted units by The Inspector General, formerly made sporadically or on request, became regular procedure.31

This last measure was part of the whole

effort to establish an orderly and synchronized process of organization, training,

and equipping for troops in the United

States, in order that deployment plans

might be based upon reasonably reliable

knowledge of the forces that would be

ready for overseas service at a given date.

Basic to the whole system was the War

Department's Six Months' List, a periodic

forecast of units expected to move overseas within that period, based upon a balancing of requirements laid down by

OPD and the major commands' expectations of meeting them. The procedural

monument of the system was "POM"

(Preparation for Overseas Movement), a

thirty-four-page pamphlet of instructions

setting forth in detail the duties of all

agencies concerned in overseas movement.

A composite product of many hands in

the three major commands and the General Staff (the provisions dealing with

equipment and transportation naturally

originated mainly in SOS), the first edition appeared on 1 February 1943. POM

was widely distributed, unlike the classified Inclosure No. 1 to movement orders

which it replaced, and was placed in the

hands of unit and station commanders

well in advance of the date when preparations were to begin. (Chart 10) Those

preparations, as far as completion of

equipment was concerned, normally could

now be expected to begin at least three

months before the unit sailed, when its

commander, or the station commander,

was notified of its assignment to an A-4

priority for equipment. This inaugurated

the process of equipment inspections and

29

 (1) Incl No. 1, 1 Sep 42, AG 370.5. (2) See Charts

8,9.

30

 Ltr, SOS, 26 Nov 42, sub: Shortage Rpts, SPX

400 (11-25-42). 31

 (1) Memo, OPD for AGF, AAF, and SOS, 29

Nov 42, sub: Status Rpts for Units Scheduled for

Overseas Mvmt, and revision of 4 Feb 43, OPD 370.5.

(2) WD ltr, 5 Jan 43, sub: Orgn, Tng, and Equipg of

Units for Overseas Sv, AG 320.2 (1-2-43). (3) Distrib

Div, ASF, History of Supply in the Zone of Interior,

Ch. IV, OCMH.

648 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

progressive filling of shortages leading up

to final readiness.32

All this was only a beginning; sterner

measures were over the horizon. The

cumulative net effect of all efforts to reduce the continuing logistical overhead of

war can scarcely be measured since so

much of it consisted of immeasurable administrative economies and more efficient

performance of routine functions. By

spring of 1943 some effect could be seen in

the reduced cargo space required for the

complex apparatus of weapons, equipment, and supplies accompanying troops

moving overseas; these were now estimated to occupy, together with the space

needed by the troops themselves, an average of seven measurement tons per man,

which was probably somewhat less than

that needed a year earlier.33 This was a

net result of reductions in equipment allowances and economies in packing and

stowage, largely counteracted by the remorseless advance of the technology of

war, especially in the demand for more

mobility and fire power. The principal

hope, indeed, for further increasing the

amount of effective fighting power that

each ship could deliver overseas lay in the

trend of deployment itself to become more

routine, involving a growing proportion of

troops and matériel ferried, in mass and in

bulk, to established bases overseas, with

fewer combat-loaded and task force movements from the United States. Only a

wholesale type of deployment offered

much scope for compressing the bulk of

military cargo by improvements in packing and stowage and other economies in

cargo space utilization. Moreover, the

support of a growing troop population

overseas imposed a mounting overhead

cost in shipping that was far more difficult

to curtail. Despite all efforts to economize,

the American soldier overseas in spring of

1943 still required for his support an average of 1.3 ship tons of cargo each month,

slightly more than he had needed a year

earlier. Eventually, of course, reductions

in initial requirements would be reflected

in maintenance requirements, but only to

a limited degree since food was a wellnigh irreducible item and the expenditure

of fuel and ammunition in 1943 was on

the increase. On the whole, the demand

for economy had not yet become a pervasive pressure in the military organization

by spring of 1943. In May the Joint Administrative Committee (JAdC), reporting on steps taken by both services to curtail overseas construction, reduce organically assigned equipment to "bare essentials," and lower prescribed levels of overseas reserves, gave a long "correctivemeasures-are-being-taken" review of the

progress made, and concluded with the

recommendation that "no action by the

JCS appears necessary."

 34

32

 (1) See Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, AGF II, pp.

581-91. (2) Preparation for Overseas Movement

(POM), 1 Feb 43, AG 370.5 (1-16-43). (3) Troop

Movements in World War II, 31 Oct 45, OCMH. (4)

Distrib Div, ASF, History of Supply in the Zone of

Interior, Ch. IV, OCMH. (5) Memo, Gen Lutes for

OPD, 3 Dec 42, in Frierson, Preparations for "Torch,"

App. I, OCMH. (6) See Chart 10. 33

 (1) In 1949 (the most recent published data)

Army planners assumed that only four measurement

tons of initial equipment were needed by a soldier

going overseas. See FM 101-10, Staff Officers' Field

Manual: Organizational, Technical and Logistical

Data, Aug 49, par. 287c. (2) See also below, App. A-5. 34

 (1) JCS 339, App. A, cited n. 8(3). (2) See below,

Apps. A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5.
CHAPTER XXIV

Joint Logistical Planning

and Co-ordination

By the end of 1942 the JCS committee

system was solidly established, but it still

offered no assured method for securing

swift and decisive action in the face of interservice disagreement. In most such

cases the Joint Chiefs chose the outlet of

compromise, however unsatisfactory to

both services, rather than brave the President's annoyance by appealing to him to

break a deadlock. To each service (and to

the Army Air Forces as well), the committee method offered insurance against undue domination or coercion by the other.

Any reform aimed at unification, therefore—whether by departmental merger or

merely by creation of some form of joint

general staff under a single commander—

stood very little chance of acceptance, at

least as a wartime measure. Most efforts at

reform, in fact, were designed to improve

the existing machinery of planning, rather

than at developing a unified system of

central command. In the field, by contrast, operations involving forces of both

services normally were carried out under

unified command arrangements; this lesson of Pearl Harbor had been taken to

heart. Unity of command in the field,

however, had not been extended into administration, especially supply and transportation, which remained sacrosanct preserves of service prerogative.

Logistics in Joint Strategic Planning

Since the central U.S. committee system

represented a partnership rather than a

merger of the services, it was not surprising that strategic planning at that level

was largely a process of reconciling fully

formed points of view and objectives

rather than integrated thinking based on

an approach free from service-rooted preconceptions. As a practical matter, the

Army ground, Army air, and Navy members of the lower committees assumed that

their proper business was to see to it that

joint plans reflected, as faithfully as possible, the desires of their respective chiefs.

To the extent that these desires were generalized and flexible, there was room for

compromise, and when a paper, with or

without accompanying minority reports,

finally reached the Joint Staff Planners, it

was often possible for the latter, after individually consulting their chiefs, to reach

agreement. But this system was scarcely

calculated to achieve a dispassionate balancing of ends against means. In the combined committees, the American members usually managed to present at least

the semblance of a united front to their

British allies. In their own house, the U.S.

committees more often than not debated

questions of logistical capabilities in terms
650 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

of the clashing interests of the Army and

the Navy. The dispute during November

and December 1942 over assignment of

the Monticello and the Navy combat loaders used in the Casablanca landings was

one of many such instances, and the following March and April the effort of the

JMTC and JPS to cut down projected

overseas deployment for 1943 to the indicated capacity of shipping dissolved in a

virtual anarchy of fruitless interservice recriminations over the apportionment of

the cuts. As the JCS Secretariat, analyzing the working of the joint committee

system early in 1943, cautiously observed

with respect to the Joint Planners:

At times they have become factional re- garding the interests of their respective services as a cumulative result of attempting to

compose disagreements.

They have sometimes entered on their deliberations with instructions from higher authority or with fixed and preconceived ideas.1

Factionalism, of course, could infest

any type of organizational structure. The

JCS Secretariat put its finger on another

problem of the joint committee system

which, to its critics from late 1942 on,

seemed to call for structural change:

Their [referring to the JPS] studies and

recommendations have, perhaps, not always

represented the best and most expert thought

on the subject at hand.2

In the early development of the JCS system the claims of the expert—and especially the logistical expert, since his province was so broad—to a voice in the final

stages of strategic planning had been stubbornly resisted.3

 The strategic planners

held generally to the doctrine that while

the expert's knowledge was indispensable,

his conclusions were likely to be too narrow and inflexible to be useful in framing

a bold and imaginative strategy. Yet the

widening gulf between military supply

programs and the estimated limits of national productivity, and the strong tendency of the planning staffs to overreach

logistical capabilities, shed a glaring light

during the latter half of 1942 upon the

difficulties, under the existing system, of

producing logistically feasible strategy.

Production officials were increasingly

concerned over the lack of machinery for

keeping strategic planning in line with

logistical limitations. One of the proposals

advanced by the WPB Planning Committee in August 1942, in connection with its

analysis of production possibilities for the

coming year, was to set up a supreme war

production council consisting of representatives responsible for "military strategy, production strategy, and social and

political strategy," on a higher plane of

authority than the Joint Chiefs themselves.4

 This plan General Somervell denounced as an "inchoate mass of words."

 5

"What good," he demanded, "would be a

board composed of an economist, a politician, and a soldier who does not know

production?"

 6 The military services similarly resisted suggestions that civilian production officials should "sit in" when strategy was being formulated. At a stormy

meeting between military and WPB offi1

 (1) JCS 202, 16 Jan 43, title: War Plng Agencies,

Annex B, title: Draft Proposal Prepared by JCS Secy

Suggesting That It Be Referred to JCS by CofS, U.S.

Army, 16 Jan 43. (2) See discussion in Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 234ff. (3) For the Monticello

affair, see above, Chs. XV, XIX. (4) For deployment

discussion of March-April 1943, see below, Ch.

XXVI. 2

 Annex B to JCS 202 cited n. 1(1). 3

 See above, Ch. IX. 4

 Com on Pub Admin Cases, Feasibility Dispute, p.

71.

5

 Memo, Somervell for Nathan, 12 Sep 42, WPB

1942 (2) folder, Hq ASF. 6

 Com on Pub Admin Cases, Feasibility Dispute, p.

93.
JOINT LOGISTICAL PLANNING AND CO-ORDINATION 651

cials on 6 October, General Somervell appeared as the War Department's designated representative "for the interpretation of strategy to the War Production

Board"

 7

—a note of condescension that

perhaps helps to explain Leon Henderson's bitter remark on that occasion that

"maybe if we can't wage a war on 90 billions, we ought to get rid of our present

Joint Chiefs, and find some who can," and

the violent personal attack that he then

launched against Somervell himself.8

 A

few days later the WPB Planning Committee considered the advisability of attempting to force Somervell to demonstrate the specific strategic need for this or

that requirement. "The minute these

questions really get discussed in the War

Production Board," a member predicted,

"you will find the Chiefs of Staff appearing and not General Somervell."

 9 But the

attempt was not made, and the plan for a

supreme strategy-production board was

quietly dropped.10

Somervell's stand in this matter did not

grow out of unawareness of the need for a

more informed consideration of logistical

factors on the top planning levels. On 9

September he urged General Marshall to

support a proposal that the Joint Chiefs

create a standing supply committee composed of himself and the top Navy supply

officer, Admiral Horne, to which they

would refer all matters specifically pertaining to logistics; General Macready of

the British Army Staff would join the

group when combined matters were discussed. Somervell bluntly declared that

the JPS and CPS were not competent to

appraise logistical capabilities. "There is

no one among the Staff planners who

knows much about supply, and the views

they express must therefore be those of

others, with consequent delay . . . or

else their own opinions which are predicated neither on knowledge or experience."

 11

 Somervell's blast naturally

brought a strong reaction from OPD,

which provided the Army members of the

JPS and JUSSC. General Handy thought

that any logistics committee that reported

directly to the JCS would inevitably usurp

the functions of the JPS, "since supply

matters have a definite bearing on all subjects dealing with strategy."

 12

 Wedemeyer

argued, "our planning must still be based

on operations, and not on logistical factors

alone. Otherwise we will have the tail

wagging the dog."

 13

Meanwhile Harry Hopkins had come

up with a proposal that the powers of the

U.S. members of the Munitions Assignments Board be broadened to include determination of requirements, and that

each service add a director of requirements as an ex officio member of that board,

these directors also to attend meetings of

the JPS and JCS in an advisory capacity.

Under this plan the MAB would have become the principal joint and combined

logistical plans agency, and the directors

of requirements the top logistical authorities in each service. OPD endorsed the

plan as preferable to Somervell's, but it

was a greatly watered down version of

this scheme that the JCS finally adopted.

Four requirements representatives from

each service were appointed to serve as

liaison officers with the civilian produc7

 Ibid., p. 91. 8

 Ibid., p. 95. 9

 Ibid., p. 96. 10

 (1) Ibid., pp. 70-104. (2) See above, Ch. XXII. 11

 Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 9 Sep 42,

WDCSA 400 (1942). 12

 Memo, ACofS OPD for CofS, 27 Sep 42, sub:

Standing Com . . . , OPD 334.8 JCS, 17. 13

 Memo, Wedemeyer for Handy, 14 Sep 42, OPD

334.8 JCS, 17.
652 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

tion agencies and to sit in JPS meetings in

an advisory capacity. Representation on

the Army side was from SOS, AAF, G-1,

and OPD's Logistics Group. Somervell

thus gained a nonvoting representative on

the JPS, but the system still lacked a joint

supply planning agency. With the requirements representatives and other ad hoc

members, moreover, the JPS was becoming an unwieldy body.14

By the end of 1942 the joint planning

machinery was badly in need of being

tightened. The Americans found themselves at a serious disadvantage in working

with the smoothly functioning British organization, especially at Casablanca in

January 1943, where the British operated

with steam-roller efficiency. In that

month, at the instigation of Lt. Gen.

Joseph T. McNarney, a special committee

of the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff (which

had been created late in 1942 to relieve

the JCS of decisions on administrative and

routine matters) and the JCS Secretariat

was appointed to study the workings of

the entire joint committee system. The

committee submitted to the JCS at the

end of March new draft charters of all existing JCS agencies, including the JCS itself, the Joint Deputy Chiefs, the secretariat, the JPS, JMTC, Joint Strategic

Survey Committee (an "elder statesmen"

long-range planning group created late in

1942), Joint Intelligence Committee, Joint

Communications Board, Joint Committee

on New Weapons and Equipment, Joint

Meteorological Committee, ANPB, and

the U.S. representatives, MAB. To these

the committee proposed to add a Joint

War Plans Committee to replace the

JUSSC as a working committee for the

JPS, and a Joint Administrative Committee. To this last group were assigned,

rather vaguely, all matters "not primarily

concerned with war plans," and it was to

serve, with the Joint Deputy Chiefs, to relieve the JCS and the Joint Planners of the

burden of "problems of production, and

administrative and miscellaneous planning."

 15

 The JPS and their working committee could thus devote their exclusive

attention to strategic plans, though this

would evidently continue to include whatever aspects of logistical planning that

pertained thereto.16 Clearly, the JAdC

was not to be the kind of agency Somervell

had recommended in September. (Chart

SOS membership, in the committee's

plan, was limited to the specialized logistical agencies—the JMTC, ANPB, and

MAB. The JAdC was to be composed of

one Army, one Navy, and one AAF representative, the Army member to come from

OPD. Even on the JMTC, SOS membership was to be limited to General Gross,

Chief of Transportation—omitting General Somervell—and a member from G-4

was added. To Somervell the whole reorganization plan appeared as an OPD

move to have its Logistics Group drive

SOS out of the logistical planning field.

He protested bitterly to General Marshall:

Owing to our exceptionally long supply

lines, the location of our theaters of operation

around the entire globe, and critical short- ages in shipping, logistics are, in most cases,

the final governing factors in decisions involving action in the field. If this war has

demonstrated anything, it has shown that

14

 (1) Papers in JCS 98 series. (2) Min, 31st mtg

JCS, 1 Sep 42; 32d mtg, 8 Sep 42; 33d mtg, 15 Sep 42.

(3) Min, 36th mtg JPS, 23 Sep 42; 37th mtg, 30 Sep

42; 38th mtg, 7 Oct 42. (4) Memo, Secy JCS for Clay

and Tompkins, 31 Aug 42, sub: Determination of

Reqmts. (5) Ltr, JCS to Nelson, Hopkins, Richard,

Stettinius, McNutt, Land, and Hershey, 16 Oct 42.

Last two in CCS 334 JR and MAB (8-31-42). 15

 JCS 202/2, 25 Mar 43, title: War Plng Agencies. 16

 JCS 202 cited n. 1(1).

654 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

our efforts to launch attacks on the enemy

have, in every case, been governed by logistics—transportation and supply. When these

factors have not been given due weight, confusion, delay and disaster have come only too

rapidly . . . . Unless you are represented

on the Planners by an able officer who

KNOWS supply, its ramifications, requirements, adaptability, production, availability,

etc. and our capabilities in transportation,

and moreover by one who has intimate

touch with all sources of information, you

will be badly served, the Army will suffer,

the war will suffer, and America will suffer.17

Somervell also lashed out at the proposed

structure of the JAdC and at the assignment of matters of production and administration to the Joint Deputy Chiefs, and

he complained of being "thrown off' the

JMTC. Finally, he recommended that instead of the proposed JAdC a Joint Logistics Committee be constituted with membership from the Navy, the AAF, and the

SOS.18

Somervell's attack did not shake the

insistence of the OPD staff that the proper

function of the SOS was to provide technical advice to the planners, not share in the

making of policy and strategy. With some

acerbity General Wedemeyer pointed out

that if logistical planning in the past had

been based on inadequate knowledge, the

SOS, which had been consulted in every

case, must be to blame. Representation of

OPD on the JAdC and of G-4 on the

JMTC, he insisted, was both "competent

and proper." He rejected the implication

that no other agency in the Army except

the SOS recognized the importance of

logistics or was capable of intelligent

logistical planning.19

In the end a compromise was reached.

The proposed charters for supporting

agencies of the JCS were all approved

early in May 1943, but with only the

number of Army and Navy members on

each committee specified, not the particular agencies to be represented. General

Marshall later granted the SOS a member

on the JAdC, and returned Somervell to

his place on the JMTC. But only OPD

and AAF officers were placed on the JPS

and the Joint War Plans Committee.

Somervell had won half a loaf.20

Strategic planning thus remained an

integrated rather than a compartmented

function, in which logistical specialists did

not take part. The reorganization of spring

1943 reduced the process of strategic planning in its final stages to an orderly and

graded system, as far as the committee

method of operation permitted; strategic

plans passed through a series of stages in

which the JPS, Joint War Plans Committee, and Joint Strategic Survey Committee

had fairly well-defined responsibilities and

the JCS Secretariat played an increasingly

important guiding role. This machinery

was to remain intact for the remainder of

the war.

The process of logistical planning, which

in its specialized aspects remained outside

this sphere, was not similarly regularized

by the reorganization. The JAdC, in its

charter, was responsible for matters "which

do not come under the jurisdiction of one

17

 Memo, Somervell for CofS, 27 Mar 43, sub:

Reorgn of Supporting Agencies of JCS—JCS 202/2,

CofS (Jt and Combined) folder, Hq ASF. 18

 Ibid. 19

 Memo, Wedemeyer for CofS, 5 Apr 43, sub:

Comments on Gen Somervell's Memo to CofS . . . ,

WDCSA 334 JCS, II. 20

 (1) JCS 202 series, May 1943. (2) Min, 77th mtg

JCS, 4 May 43; 79th mtg, 10 May 43. (3) Memo, McNarney for Secy JCS, 5 May 43, ABC 334.8 JAdC

(5-5-43). (4) Memo, McNarney for Secy JCS, 13 May

43, sub: Army Reps on JCS Coms, WDCSA 334 JCS.

(5) Papers in ABC 381 (12-19-42) Secs 1-3. (6) For

a detailed study of the reorganization of the JCS committees at this time, see Vernon E. Davis, Development of the JCS Committee Structure, Vol. II of History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organizational Developments, pp. 590-683, JCS Hist Sec.
JOINT LOGISTICAL PLANNING AND CO-ORDINATION 655

of the other committees."

 21

 Other logistical functions were assigned variously to

the JMTC, the U.S. representatives on the

MAB, the ANPB, and other committees.

The JAdC did not gain control of the

activities of these committees, and despite

Somervell's efforts it did not become the

principal logistical planning group for the

JCS. While the language of the charters

implied a relationship of equality between

the JPS and the JAdC, both reporting

directly to the JCS, the JAdC was never

able, in fact, to function on that plane because the planners had become indispensable as the group that filtered plans and

problems for final decision by the Joint

Chiefs, and this function spread over the

whole field of strategic-logistical planning.

At the level at which both JPS and JCS

considered problems, functional demarcation had proved to be impracticable. As an

OPD study expressed this philosophy:

Sound planning requires that strategy and

logistics be integrated in the preparation of

plans. There exists an obvious weakness when

the two essential factors of planning are considered separately on a lower echelon and

suddenly find themselves vis-a-vis on a higher

level. Thus, it is essential that strategy and

logistics be integrated as the plan progresses,

and that when a plan reaches the JCS level,

the factors should be completely married.22

To this principle Somervell might have

shouted a loud "Amen," but he saw no

hope for a happy marriage between strategy and logistics, progressive or otherwise,

as long as the latter was relegated to the

role of an obedient housewife, with no

voice in the running of the business.

The Army-Navy Basic Logistical Plan

To a large degree the difficulties of joint

strategic planning in the JCS committees

had their origin in the field. Even in the

system of unified commands under which

the bulk of American forces overseas were

organized in 1942, the lines of administrative control and support for Army and

Navy forces remained separate. Thus all

the data on requirements, available resources, and projected movements and

operational plans, on which central strategic planning had to be based, flowed into

the JCS system from overseas through

separate channels. "No joint procedure

exists," complained a joint subcommittee

in February 1943, "for determination of

the relative needs of various areas, nor is

there available any coordinated statement

of future plans for troop movements."

 23

 As

a minimum prerequisite to orderly longrange planning, the committee urged,

there should be a joint priority list of troop

movements for each overseas area, together

with co-ordinated joint data on resources

controlled by each service in the various

areas.24

In April 1942, when both services had

flirted briefly with the idea of a joint supply line in the Pacific, it was Army opposition that had killed the proposal, then

favored by the Navy. By the time the issue

came up again at the end of the year, the

two services had each undergone a change

of heart, reversing their respective former

positions.25 The phenomenon can be explained, in large part, by the organizational development of the services. The

Army's Services of Supply, emerging uncertainly in April from the War Depart21

 JCS 202/10/D, 5 May 43, title: Charter JAdC. 22

 (1) OPD study, no date, title: Proposed Integration of a Jt Logis Com into JCS Orgn, ABC 334.8

JAdC (5-5-43) Sec 1A. (2) Cline, Washington Command Post, p. 238. 23

 JPS 92/2, 2 Feb 43, title: Trans Reqmts to 1 Jul

43.

24

 Notes on 58th mtg JPS, 4 Feb 43, ABC 570 (2-

14-42) Sec 4. 25

 See above, Ch. VII.
656 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ment reorganization, by the end of the

year was far surer of its powers and interests. The Navy's supply organization, by

contrast, had undergone no fundamental

reorganization; the bureaus remained relatively more independent than their Army

counterparts, the supply arms and services, while the Naval Transportation Service, created shortly after Pearl Harbor,

was weaker and more circumscribed in its

functions than the Army's rapidly expanding Transportation Corps. The Naval

Transportation Service was a port and

shipping agency only; movements into

port were controlled by the Bureau of

Supplies and Accounts, while within the

ports Naval Transportation Service shared

control with the several bureaus. The

whole system was decentralized, and it developed in 1942 less by plan than for lack

of one. It reflected, above all, the peculiar

nature of the Navy's supply problem. For

the Navy, logistics involved mainly support of mobile fleet units that operated in

task forces of fluctuating size, moving rapidly over immense distances; supply requirements for such operations were almost

impossible to calculate far in advance.

Naval supply had to be flexible in the

highest degree, and was best served by decentralizing authority and dispersing the

means of logistical support. Navy leaders, probably with justice, felt that a union

with the more centralized, massive, and

relatively inflexible Army system would

require too drastic a readjustment of their

own system.26

A new impetus to unified supply came

late in 1942 from the demonstrated waste

and confusion attendant on operation of

separate supply lines to the South Pacific.

General Lutes, no apostle of unification

before making his trip to the Pacific in

October 1942, returned to Washington an

ardent convert. He recommended to

Somervell

. . . that a unified Services of Supply be organized in all theaters for the supply of

Army, Navy and Marine forces ashore, and

that a unified control of cargo shipping, exclusive of those vessels normally under the

fleet commander for supply of vessels afloat, be established for the supply of both fleet and

shore forces.27

In each theater Lutes envisaged a unified

theater SOS under a single commander

with a mixed Army-Navy staff, and a

joint organization at the stateside ports for

forwarding supplies. The theater commander would determine the total requirements for his area and establish priorities within total allocations of shipping;

the joint port commander would be responsible for meeting the theater's requests. Lutes proposed to assign the Army

primary responsibility for overland transportation and port operations both in the

United States and overseas, with the Navy

to control all military shipping. His plan

presupposed that WSA would allocate

shipping permanently to the military services, not for single voyages as it was then

doing.28

General Gross objected to turning over

the Army's transport fleet to the Navy.

His plan, drawn up at Somervell's request,

called instead for the Coast Guard to man

all military shipping, the Army Transport

Service to control and operate it, the

Navy's role to be confined to routing and

escort. Col. J. H. Graham, a close adviser

of Somervell, also warned against the loss

26

 Ballantine, Naval Logistics, pp. 45-54, 76-93,

126-28, 162-66. 27

 (1) Memo, Lutes for CG SOS, 12 Nov 42, sub:

Recommendations for a Jt SOS in the Pac Theater,

Unified Sup: Army-Navy 1942-43 folder, Lutes File.

(2) See above, Ch. XV. 28

 Memo cited n. 27(1).
JOINT LOGISTICAL PLANNING AND CO-ORDINATION 657

of "independence of action" that might

result from turning over Army shipping to

the Navy. The SOS, he declared, should

not "trade its birthright for a mess of pottage."

 29

Evidently Somervell overruled Gross,

for the latter drew up another plan that

in general followed Lutes' thinking. This

plan became the basis for discussion with

the Navy.30 Meanwhile, the Navy had

been studying the matter independently.

In October 1942, at the invitation of Secretary Knox, Walter Franklin, vice president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, undertook a survey of naval transportation.

Franklin's recommendations, submitted

on 13 November, became the basis for a

Navy counterproposal. Franklin recognized the need for unified supply arrangements in the theaters, determination of

shipping priorities by theater commanders, and a single channel for the flow of

requisitions and supplies. He suggested

turning over to the Army the loading of

shipments for overseas shore establishments, and to the Navy operation of all

military shipping. Rail movement of

naval freight to port would remain under

Navy jurisdiction.31

Gross felt that if the Navy would not

surrender control over movement of supplies, the Army should certainly not surrender control over shipping. He returned

forthwith to his original position:

Nothing less than the full control over the

use of all transports and dry cargo ships by

the Army to move all troops and cargo in ac- cordance with theater priorities and within

allocations set from time to time by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff would do the job effectively. Conflicting decisions as to the use of ships

cannot be satisfactory to the Army in view of

its supply responsibility.32

Gross recommended that the agreement

with the Navy be limited to the question

of priorities and staff organization in the

Pacific and necessary co-operation in supply arrangements at the ports. Lutes, evidently seeing no use in further argument

on the matter of shipping, agreed.33

Somervell still had hopes of agreement

on a broader basis. On 13 December 1942

he proposed to Admiral Horne that the

two services go beyond the Navy plan and

consolidate the two ocean transportation

services. The constituent agencies would

continue to perform separately those functions peculiar to each, and supply of the

fleet would be totally excepted. The Navy

would handle the manning and repair of

vessels, control of vessels in port, routing,

and escorting; the Army (through SOS)

movement of supplies to port, storage, and

loading. The all-important control of shipping would be vested in the joint service

29

 (1) Memo, JHG [Col J. H. Graham] for Somervell, 20 Nov 42. (2) Memo marked in Gross' handwriting "To Gen Somervell, Gross 11/9." Both in

Trans 1941-43 folder, Hq ASF. 30

 (1) The documentary evidence on this point is

incomplete. In Trans 1941-43 folder, Hq ASF, immediately following Gross' 9 November memo, is a second plan of unidentified authorship dated 12 Nov 42

providing for manning of ships by the Coast Guard

or the Navy and for operation by the Navy. This memo

bears Somervell's initials, and is similar to the later,

more detailed outline plan. (2) In the same file is an

undated draft plan for "Army-Navy Unified System

of Supply," which also appears in the Gross Day File,

16 November 1942, indicating Gross' authorship. (3)

For evidence that Gross was accepting the whole

scheme reluctantly, see his undated handwritten

memo for Somervell, subject: Conference With Navy

on Plan for Overseas Supply, in Trans 1941-43 folder,

Hq ASF. Also, Gen Lutes in an interview on 13 September 1949 stated his opinion that Gross at this conference ruined for a year the chances of unifying

Army-Navy supply by insisting on Army control of

all military shipping. 31

 (1) Ballantine, Naval Logistics, pp. 124-25. (2) Digest of Navy counterproposal, atchd to memo, Gross

for Somervell, 23 Nov 42, Gross Day File. 32

 Memo cited n. 31(2). 33

 (1) Ibid. (2) Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 22 Nov

42, sub: Unified Supply . . . , Unified Sup: ArmyNavy 1942-43 folder, Lutes File.
658 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

commander. And Somervell thought that

since 75 to 90 percent of all forces overseas

would belong to the Army, the consolidated service should be headed by an

Army officer (presumably Gross), responsible to him. Somervell, in turn, would

have a dual responsibility, as Gross' superior, to the Chief of Staff and the Chief

of Naval Operations.34

On 30 December General Styer forwarded a detailed draft to the Navy. In

theaters of joint operations, under the

plan, theater commanders would institute

unified logistical planning, determine joint

requirements of Army and Navy forces

under their command, and establish shipping priorities. In the United States a unified transportation service would be set up

along the lines of Somervell's suggestion

to Horne, except that its chief (not necessarily an Army officer) would be directly

responsible jointly to the Chief of Staff

and the Chief of Naval Operations, with

the JCS reconciling any differences in directives sent to him individually by the

two service chiefs. Movement of supplies

to port would continue under separate

auspices as before, but the joint service

would plan all overseas movements. The

JMTC would be supplanted by a planning and allocation committee of which

the chief of the Army-Navy transportation

service would be chairman. This committee would advise the JCS on shipping allocations among the various theaters.35

Despite the modifications of Somervell's

first proposals, the joint organization as

outlined still closely resembled the Army's

supply system, and would require drastic

readjustments of the Navy's logistical organization. The Franklin plan itself had

many enemies within the Navy, as had

Lutes' earlier proposals within the Army.

Both plans had been based at first on the

assumption that WSA would make permanent allocations of shipping to the military services, but all hopes for such allocations had been dashed by the end of

December. To most Navy officials the SOS

plan looked like a thinly disguised formula

for Army control of naval overseas supply.

On 7 January 1943, Rear Adm. Oscar

C. Badger came back with another counterproposal, stressing co-ordination rather

than unification. He suggested "closely

coordinated, possibly unified" supply systems in theaters of joint operation, "full

and complete coordination of effort" between Army and Navy supply and shipping agencies in the United States, "cooperation and mutual understanding" between these military agencies and WSA.36

He would create a chief co-ordinator of

Army-Navy overseas transportation to act

as agent of the JCS and head up a transportation control board on which there

would be, for each service, a deputy coordinator and four other members. District co-ordinators reporting to the board

would be stationed at domestic and overseas ports.37

Somervell's Control Division, after

studying the Navy's proposals, concluded

that they were drawn in "such general

terms that it is impossible to determine

what the Navy's detailed intentions

34

 Memo, Somervell for Horne, 13 Dec 42, Trans

1941-43 folder, Hq ASF. This was evidently based on

a draft by Gross. 10 Dec 42, in Gross Day File. 35

 (1) Contl Div ASF, Rpt 34, Unified Supply Service and Unified Transportation Service for Army and

Navy, 30 Dec 42. (2) Memo, CofS SOS for Rear Adm

Oscar C. Badger, 30 Dec 42, sub: Unified Sup Sv for

A&N, Unified Sup: Army-Navy 1942-43 folder,

Lutes File. 36

 Ltr, Asst CNO to Vice CNO for Logis Plans, 7

Jan 43, sub: Plan for Co-ord . . . , Jt A&N Logis

folder, OCT HB. 37

 (1) Ibid. (2) Ballantine, Naval Logistics, pp. 125-

28.
JOINT LOGISTICAL PLANNING AND CO-ORDINATION 659

are."

 38

 It also thought that the JMTC

could co-ordinate better than a cumbersome control board. Perceiving that the

Navy was not ready to accept a unified

transportation system, SOS fell back on

the more limited plan for unified supply

systems overseas (when joint operations

were involved) and co-operative arrangements at ports of embarkation.39

A "Basic Logistical Plan" along these

lines was formally published early in

March 1943, over the signatures of Admiral King and General Marshall. It began with the statement:

The key idea of this plan is to insure coordinated logistical effort and procedure in

each command area . . . involving joint

Army-Navy operations in which unity of

command and responsibility has been estab- lished to the end that combined personnel,

equipment, supplies, facilities, shipping and

other services of the Army and Navy are

most effectively utilized and adequately pro- vided.40

Each theater commander was to determine joint requirements for personnel and

matériel and prepare a single consolidated

priority list. Either through organization

of a joint logistical staff or by providing

for joint staff planning by Army and Navy

staffs, he was to set up a unified supply

system in the theater, details to be left to

his discretion. Existing Army and Navy

seaboard shipping agencies were expected

to co-ordinate their actions in loading and

scheduling ships to meet fully the combined theater requirements.

The Basic Logistical Plan was intended

mainly as a blueprint for the South and

Central Pacific, where the problem of

joint operations was most acute. In the

Atlantic theaters naval operations were

largely confined to the fleet at sea and its

supply was necessarily separate. In the

Southwest Pacific General MacArthur

had already established a tight control

over priorities for all forces in his area and

his system remained relatively intact. And

even in the South and Central Pacific the

immediate effects of the plan were not impressive. Both Admiral Halsey and Admiral Nimitz chose at first to set up joint

logistical boards rather than joint staffs.

In neither area was a unified SOS command established. The joint priority lists

developed slowly and uncertainly. In general, co-ordination moved along the lines

on which it was already proceeding. In

the South Pacific, where the confusion of

1942 had amply demonstrated the necessity, an effective degree of co-ordination

was achieved at the working level despite

the lack of any genuine joint logistical

staff.41 In the Central Pacific, the forces of

inertia were far stronger. The Army and

Navy had long maintained separate supply facilities in Hawaii, and there were as

yet no active joint operations to jolt commanders into a realization of the necessity

for joint supply. Until these active operations began in the fall of 1943, the establishment of the joint logistical board provided more the form than the substance

of co-ordination.42

The plan, nevertheless, did provide a

framework within which a unified logistical system could take shape in the theaters. Its real defect lay in the failure to

38

 Memo, Contl Div SOS and Contl Div TC for

CofS SOS, 13 Jan 43, sub: Navy Dept Paper of 7

Jan . . . , Unified Sup: Army-Navy 1942-43 folder,

Lutes File. 39

 (1) Ibid. (2) Memo, Styer for Badger, 16 Jan 43,

sub: Plans for Co-ord of A&N Logis, Unified Sup:

Army-Navy 1942-43 folder, Lutes File. 40

 TAG ltr to all comds, 7 Mar 43, sub: Bsc Logis

Plan for Comd Areas Involving Jt A&N Opns, AG

381 (3-5-43). 41

 See above, Ch. XV. 4 2

 (1) Ballantine, Naval Logistics, pp. 129-31. (2)

Bykofsky and Larson, Trans III, Ch. VII.
660 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

provide for anything beyond the most elementary co-ordination in the operation of

the supply system in the United States.

Immediately following the issuance of the

plan in March 1943, the Chief of Transportation directed all port commanders to

take the initiative in establishing committees representing the Army, Navy, and

WSA "with the mission of the discussion

of common problems in the employment

of shipping."

 43

 As noted earlier, such a

committee had already been formed in

San Francisco in January, and indeed arrangements made by the military services

with WSA at that time provided for similar committees in the other ports. The

Basic Logistical Plan made no fundamental change in these arrangements, though

the committees were now charged more

specifically with assuring Army-Navy coordination. The committee at San Francisco achieved considerable success in

pooling shipping space and in joint scheduling of shipping to Pacific destinations,

but in itself could not provide the genuine

unified supply line to the Pacific that

Lutes and others had envisaged since separate channels for routine supply requisitions for Army and Navy continued to be

used. The degree of co-ordination at the

other ports varied with the situation. Back

of the ports, there was no provision at all

in the plan for co-ordination in storage or

internal movement of supplies. With the

Navy depot system almost entirely concentrated in port areas, and with a very

loose system of Navy requisitioning, Army

port authorities thought there was an inevitable tendency for Navy shipping requirements to be shaped in terms of cargo

available for shipment rather than theater

requirements or priorities. In addition, no

provision was made, except in the highlevel decisions of the Joint Military Transportation Committee and the JCS, for allocation of shipping and supplies among

the several theaters of the Pacific war. It

was the conviction of General Lutes and

many other Army officers that only with

the unification of all Pacific theaters under

one joint command could a satisfactory

system of unified logistics for that area be

developed.44

43

 Ltr, Gen Wylie to POE's, 24 Mar 43, sub: ArmyNavy-WSA Com, Jt A&N Logis folder, OCT HB. 44

 (1) Ballantine, Shipping in Naval Logistics, pp.

174-75, Naval Hist Div, OCNO. (2) Ltr, Wylie to

CG SFPOE, 7 Mar 43. (3) Ltr, Lt Col Richard D.

Meyer to C. C. Wardlow, 21 Jul 49. Last two in Jt

A&N Logis folder, OCT HB. (4) Memo, Gen Lutes

for Maj Gen Walter A. Wood, Jr., 31 Oct 44, sub:

Contl of Dry Cargo Shipg in POA, 10a Shipg-Central Pac folder, Plng Div ASF, Job A46-371. (5) For

Army-Navy co-ordination in procurement, see Millett, ASF, Ch. XVIII.
CHAPTER XXV

Casablanca and the StrategicLogistical Debate

TORCH not only failed to settle, but further unsettled, the fundamental issue of

Anglo-American strategy—the division of

effort between the European and the Pacific-Asiatic wars—as well as the subsidiary division among the theaters of each of

those wars. This was essentially a logistical

problem, belonging to the realm of planning where final evaluations of logistical

assets and liabilities enter into the formulation of strategy—what Somervell's planners aptly referred to as "strategic logistics." The issue became more urgent as

1942 drew to an end, because the material

means—munitions, merchant shipping,

naval escorts, and landing craft—appeared likely to be more abundant in the

months to come, offering the Allies their

long-awaited opportunity to seize the initiative. But the prospect of relative plenty,

while widening the range of alternatives,

also complicated the problem of selection.

The initiative could not be grasped and

held without a long-range strategic program on the order of the short-lived

BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan of the preceding

spring. The staffs were no more able than

they had been then to foresee with assurance the availability of critical resources a

year or more in advance, and the uncertainty of their long-range estimates operated fully as effectively as the natural

clash of competing views on strategy to

prevent agreement on a single long-range

program. Through the last four months of

1942 the effort to chart the course of coalition strategy for 1943 dragged on. At

Casablanca, where the Allied political

and military leaders met in January 1943,

it reached a climax but not an end. Disagreeing not only on the basic division of

effort but also on the sequence and timing

of specific operations, the Allied chiefs

were able to make no concrete decisions

except those necessary to maintain the

momentum that by now had been gained

in all major theaters. Beyond these next

steps, a broad pattern of strategy was outlined and certain operations were tentatively scheduled, but definite decisions

were postponed.

Apart from the basic issue of over-all division of effort, three subsidiary logistical

problems were involved in this long debate on strategy. The first grew out of the

threat to the sea communications into and

through the Mediterranean, which decisively influenced American views on

proposed operations in that region. A second problem centered in the now familiar

competition for shipping and escorts between the great build-up and "war econ-
662 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

omy" programs (BOLERO, the Soviet aid

program, and British imports) and the demands of current or imminent operations.

Finally, with amphibious operations being contemplated in the Mediterranean

and the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific

Oceans, landing craft again loomed as a

potential limitation.

The Two Wars

The Japan-first alternative to concentration in northwestern Europe remained

very much alive in the thinking of Army

planner's for more than three months following the decision on TORCH. As the

great battle raged over Stalingrad and

German armies pushed into the Caucasus,

the planners faced the possibility that the

alternative of an Allied invasion of Europe

might soon disappear altogether, leaving

no choice except to seek a decision in the

Pacific. Meanwhile, the bloody struggles

in the southern Solomons and New

Guinea, "going" operations that must be

sustained and followed up, threatened

also to suck in American forces and drain

off the substance of TORCH. Then, during

late October and November, the tide

turned in all three critical areas—the

USSR, North Africa, and the Solomons—

and the urgent question became one not

of whether, but of how the war in Europe

should be pressed forward. Primacy between the two wars was no longer a serious issue, but there remained the important question of degree. During December

the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a program of action that called for further limited offensives in the Solomons-Bismarck

Archipelago-eastern New Guinea area

and reconquest of Burma and the land

bridge to China.1

Measured against the goals of the BOLERO-ROUNDUP plans of the preceding

spring, the effort poured into the war

against Japan during 1942 was already

impressive. Admiral King asserted, on the

eve of Casablanca, that only 15 percent of

American military strength was then marshaled against Japan. The facts scarcely

bore him out. Army forces deployed

against Japan at the end of the year numbered about 464,000, as against only about

378,000 against Germany and Italy. The

latter figure was well below the 435,000

set the preceding March as the goal of deployment to the European area, and the

forces deployed against Japan exceeded

by some 200,000 the number earlier

planned. It was now intended to build up

these forces to about 635,000 in 1943.

Since July, to be sure, the preponderant

movement of Army forces overseas had

been into the theaters of the European

war, but the balance had not yet tipped in

this direction. Army-controlled shipping

was already heavily concentrated in the

Atlantic area, though by no means in an

85-15 ratio; about 61 percent of all merchant tonnage, and 63 percent of the cargo tonnage used by the Army was operating in the theaters of the European war.

To these theaters had been sent 59 percent

of the Army's cargo shipments during the

last four months of the year. To be sure,

the bulk of the Navy's whole effort went

into the war against Japan. On the other

hand, lend-lease shipments, an important 1

 (1) JSSC 1, 11 Dec 42, title: Bsc Strategic Concept for 1943. (2) JCS 167, 11 Dec 42, same title. (3)

JCS 167/1, 20 Dec 42, same title. (4) JCS 167/2, 23

Dec 42, same title, circulated as CCS 135 on 26 Dec

42. (5) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-

1942, Chs. XVI-XVII. (6) See above, Ch. XV. (7)

John Miller, jr., CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of

Rabaul, a volume in preparation for the series

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
CASABLANCA AND THE STRATEGIC-LOGISTICAL DEBATE 663

part of the total American war effort,

flowed primarily into the European war.2

The feeling of American military leaders that the war against the European

Axis was absorbing too much of the total

Allied effort, while reflecting a change in

perspective since the preceding spring, did

not signify (least of all, for Marshall and

Arnold) an abandonment of their belief

that the major effort should be made

against Germany. They held, rather, that

the war against Germany had been diverted into a peripheral, encircling line of

action that would long delay the decisive

attack upon the German citadel. The

strategy of concentration that had been

accepted in April 1942, only to be rejected

a few weeks later, might have justified

taking certain risks in the war against

Japan, but the American chiefs were unwilling to take these same risks to further

the current indecisive course of action, as

they regarded it, in the Mediterranean.

Beyond this, the situation in the Pacific

had changed. Operations of considerable

scope were in progress and would have to

be pressed forward; these would lead inevitably to other operations. Japan was

trying with some success to consolidate

her gains, and this process must be arrested before it was too late.

The Joint Chiefs were worried, moreover, by what they regarded as a dangerous drift toward complacency in the British attitude toward this "other" war. The

full extent of the drift became clear early

in January when the British presented a

paper setting forth a startlingly optimistic

analysis of the present status and future

prospects of the war against Japan. They

were confident that Japan's offensive

power had been blunted, and they

warned that Germany might soon become

unbeatable if allowed to crush the Soviet

Union, whereas Japan's downfall would

be ensured by defeat of Germany. Offensive pressure on Japan now would give the

Russians no comfort and might require so

much naval strength that the Germans

might drive Allied shipping from the Atlantic altogether. To rescue China would

not contribute to the defeat of Germany,

whereas Soviet help might be decisive in

defeating Japan. Operations against Japan

in 1943, the British therefore thought,

should be "on a scale sufficient only to

contain the bulk of Japanese forces" in the

Pacific; an invasion of Burma should be

attempted only "as soon as resources permit." In Europe the Allies should bring

their full strength to bear—"we must now

agree on a plan that will lead to victory,

quickly and decisively."

 3

The American staff found this analysis

disturbing. It grossly underestimated

Japan's capabilities, they thought, for organizing outposts, communications, and

defenses in depth, exploiting conquered

territories, and otherwise entrenching herself during the coming year. A current intelligence report estimated:

2

 (1) Min, 39th mtg JCS, 5 Jan 43. (2) Strength of

the Army Report, STM-30, 1 Jan 48. (3) Matloff and

Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941 -1942, Ch. XVI. About

half the ground divisions overseas and about one third

of the combat air groups overseas were arrayed

against Japan. (4) Shipping figures are from ASF

Monthly Progress Report, Transportation, Feb 43,

Sec 3. (5) For cargo shipments, see below, App. E-1.

(6) Statisticians near the end of the war estimated that

only slightly more than half of American production

of combat munitions, in the period 1938-44, had gone

into the European war. See World Production of Munitions at the End of the War in Europe, WPB Doc 25

(Washington, June 15, 1945), p. 8. (7) For division

of effort, see below, Charts 15-19. 3

 CCS 135/2, 3 Jan 43, title: American-Br Strategy

in 1943.
664 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Japan's only urgent need is time. Greater

East Asia's as yet undeveloped resources and

as yet untrained manpower are sufficient for

creation and maintenance of a far greater

and more dangerous military and industrial

power. . . . During 1943 Japan cannot

hope to grow in strength as we will grow, but

she may well intrench herself so that effective

action against her will become very much

more difficult and costly. She will beyond all

doubt do so, unless the rate of attrition im- posed on her is sufficient to absorb in current

operations all her industrial capacity.4

The Joint Chiefs accordingly reaffirmed

their strong statement of late December

on the necessity for more aggressive action

against Japan in 1943.5

The British, meanwhile, had taken the

offensive in the debate on European

strategy. Fired by the success of Allied

arms in Egypt, Morocco, and Algeria, the

Prime Minister in November toyed joyously with all sorts of Mediterranean projects to follow the expected victory in

Tunisia. On the 18th he wrapped up all of

them in an eloquent message to the President urging that the Allies "strike at the

underbelly of the Axis . . . in the shortest time."

 6 Descents on Sardinia and/or

Sicily seemed to be obvious first steps, to

be followed by intensified air attacks on

Italy and, if necessary, a land invasion, to

knock her out of the war. Churchill also

thought it was time to bring Turkey into

the war, as a base for attacks on the Balkans and to gain access to the Black Sea.

This ambitious program, Churchill himself insisted, need not rule out a crossChannel invasion in the late summer of

1943 under the conditions he imposed for

attempting it, namely a marked deterioration in German morale and capacity for

resistance. Churchill declared he would

not abandon this hope "without a massive

presentation of facts and figures which

prove physical impossibility."

 7 Up to the

end of November he put strong pressure

on the President to accelerate the waning

BOLERO program, intermittently pleaded

for American help in a diversionary landing in Norway, and persistently needled

his own staff for its "unduly negative"

 8

view of the opportunities for a blow across

the Channel in 1943. "We have pulled in

our horns," he complained "to an almost

extraordinary extent."

 9 By early December he was convinced that Germany could

spare no more troops from the East to

meet an attack in the West. Even after the

Tunisia Campaign bogged down later

that month, the British still contended

that their Mediterranean program, together with an intensified air bombardment of Germany and an amphibious

campaign in Burma late in the year, could

all be carried out without interfering with

the assembling of twenty-one British and

American divisions in time for an opportunistic attack across the Channel in

August or September.10

There were plenty of American champions of further action in the Mediterranean. Some Navy strategists favored it

as a course less likely than a rapid build4

 Est by Off of Strategic Sv, in JPS 106, 7 Jan 43,

title: Bsc Strategic Concept for 1943. 5

 (1) Memo, JSSC for JCS, sub: Bsc Strategic Concept for 1943, in JCS 167/3, 5 Jan 43, title: Bsc Strategic Concept for 1943—The European Theater. (2)

Min, 49th mtg JCS, 5 Jan 43. (3) Papers in ABC 381

(9-25-41) Sec 4. 6

 Msg 195, Prime Minister to President, 18 Nov

42, circulated as JCS 153, 18 Nov 42, title: Plans and

Opns in Mediterranean, Middle East, and Near East. 7

 Churchill's comments to Br CsofS, 18 Nov 42, as

quoted in Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 651. 8

 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 649. 9

 Churchill's comments, p. 650, cited n. 7. 10

 (1) Msg cited n. 6. (2) Churchill, Hinge of Fate,

Bk. II, Ch. 13. (3) CCS 135/1, 2 Jan 43, title: Bsc

Strategic Concept for 1943—The European Theater.

(4) See above, Ch. XVII.
CASABLANCA AND THE STRATEGIC-LOGISTICAL DEBATE 665

up in the British Isles to interfere with an

expanding effort against Japan. Most of

General Marshall's own staff were resigned to at least a limited campaign in

the western Mediterranean in order to

maintain pressure on Germany and possibly to knock out Italy, though not to undertaking an invasion of the peninsula.

Above all, they regarded as imperative

the protection of sea communications to

North African ports. It might even be possible to reopen a passage through the

Mediterranean to Suez. But they took a

dim view of any undertaking in the Balkans, fearing that Turkish belligerency

at this juncture would cost more than it

was worth, and they flatly disagreed with

the British contention that an offensive

could be mounted in Burma late in 1943

if major operations were in progress in the

West during the summer and autumn.

The airmen and some of Marshall's other

advisers opposed any post-Tunisia amphibious operations in the Mediterranean

or retention of ground forces there beyond

the minimum needs of security, and

urged that the build-up of invasion forces

in the British Isles be resumed with all

speed. This group looked to co-ordinated

strategic bombardment, from the northwest, south, and southeast, to soften Germany for the kill; General Arnold asserted the job could be done within six

months.11

The Joint Chiefs themselves, on the eve

of the Casablanca Conference, opposed

further amphibious ventures in the Mediterranean as probably incompatible with

a cross-Channel invasion in 1943 and

dangerous to one early in 1944. The Joint

Strategic Survey Committee declared further that any attempt to seize Sardinia or

Sicily would be "unwarranted, uneconomical and possibly a disastrous venture."

 12

 As Marshall presented the case,

the basic problem was still, as it had been

the preceding spring, one of logistics.

Troops were relatively plentiful; shipping

was not. Therefore, the strongest attack

that could be mounted would be one based

on the British Isles. Shipping losses in such

an attack would probably be acceptable,

whereas in a Mediterranean operation

they might be crippling. "To state it

cruelly," Marshall told the President, "we

could replace troops, whereas a heavy loss

in shipping . . . might completely destroy any opportunity for successful operations against the enemy in the near future."

 13

Marshall, King, and Arnold reached

something like agreement on a "party

line" to follow at Casablanca. Marshall

and Arnold would help King in insisting

on a larger effort against Japan in 1943,

particularly on an invasion of Burma in

order to enlist British participation. King

would support Marshall and Arnold in

urging full resumption of the invasion

build-up in the British Isles and in resisting

the British Mediterranean program. Arnold's strategic air program would also be

supported. This agreement was shaky at

best, and did not extend to details. Among

the staffs there was wide disagreement.

The President, moreover, did not dictate

11

 (1) For Navy views, see min, 26th mtg JCS, 28

Jul 42; 28th mtg, 11 Aug 42; min, 24th mtg JPS, 22

Jul 42; and memo, Wood for Somervell, 5 Dec 42,

sub: Opns Subsequent to TORCH, 20 Sup Gen Security folder, Case 19, Plng Div ASF, Job A46-371. (2)

For AAF views, see Craven and Cate, AAF II, pp.

277-88. (3) JCS 167/3 cited n. 5(1). (4) JPS 106 cited

n. 4. (5) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-

1942, pp. 365-66, 379-80. 12

 JCS 167/3 cited n. 5(1). 13

 Min of mtg at White House, 7 Jan 43, Item 45,

Exec 10.
666 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

AT CASABLANCA, JANUARY 1943. Seated left to right: General Marshall, President

Roosevelt, Admiral King; standing left to right: Harry Hopkins, General Arnold, General

Somervell, Averell Harriman.

an agreed strategy, nor did he even promise to support the principle of concentration in northwestern Europe, toward which

his chief advisers seemed to be leaning.

The American chiefs had to go to Casablanca, therefore, with only the thin shell

of a united front.14

At Casablanca the British exploited the

initiative they had already seized in the

debate on European strategy. By midconference the Americans had agreed to push

on in the Mediterranean by invading

Sicily. This decision rendered almost inevitable the postponement of a crossChannel invasion to 1944—late 1944,

many American planners thought—although all agreed that if a good opportunity offered in 1943 it should be grasped.

The Allied leaders also agreed to begin at

once a heavy bombing offensive against

Germany by combined British and U.S.

14

 (1) JCS 167/3 cited n. 5(1). (2) JCS 167/5, rpt

by JSSC, 10 Jan 43, title: Bsc Strategic Concept for

1943—The European Theater. (3) Min of mtg at

White House, 10 Dec 42, Tab 42, Item 2, Exec 5. (4)

Min cited n. 13. (5) For discussions at Casablanca

concerning the war in southeast Asia and aid to the

USSR, see above, Chs. XIX and XXI, respectively.
CASABLANCA AND THE STRATEGIC-LOGISTICAL DEBATE 667

strategic air forces in order to disrupt her

economy and undermine her morale.15

For the war against Japan in 1943,

the Americans presented a program that

called for seizure of the Rabaul area

(Tasks Two and Three of the July 1942

plan), occupation of Kiska and Agattu in

the Aleutians, and, after Rabaul, a drive

through the Central Pacific to occupy the

Gilberts, Marshalls, and Carolines, together with an extension of New Guinea

operations westward to the Dutch border.

Of this program, only the Rabaul operation had been agreed to by the Army and

Navy before the conference, and even

there the line of approach and command

arrangements were still in dispute. The

Americans also wanted the British, in conjunction with the Chinese, to undertake a

major invasion of Burma late in 1943, to

which currently planned limited operations in the spring were to serve as a

prelude.16

Over the division of resources among

these operations, and between them and

those of the European war, the American

and British representatives staged a lively

debate. General Marshall proved a tower

of strength in supporting the Pacific program and, more generally, Admiral King's

effort to play up the war against Japan in

Allied strategy; none of the real disagreement between them came out into the

open. Though he was mildly skeptical of

King's "85-15" arithmetic, it was Marshall who proposed, at the opening meeting of the conference, that the 15 percent

"effort" ought to be at least doubled. He

reminded the British that during the preceding year a hand-to-mouth strategy in

the Pacific had brought the Americans to

the brink of disaster and, in turn, through

emergency diversions to save the situation,

had jeopardized Allied strategy in Europe.

To risk further disasters in the Pacific,

Marshall warned, might lead to a "huge

diversion of U.S. effort" to that theater.17

The United States "could not stand another Bataan."

 18

The discussion moved in a kind of a

vacuum, for no one could predict at this

point what would be needed or what

would be available to carry out the program. The British feared, in general, that

the proposed line of action in the Pacific

would interfere with the conquest of

Burma, and that both together would

drain away too many resources from the

war in Europe. In reply, the Americans

argued that in the Pacific, owing to long

lines of communications, shipping already

committed was a fixed overhead that

could scarcely be reduced even if no further offensives were undertaken. Enemy

submarines, on the other hand, were a

minor threat. Therefore, few escorts were

needed, movements could be scheduled

efficiently, and shipping could run on

direct routes. In the Atlantic, until the

submarine menace abated, it was doubtful

whether deployment could be accelerated

much with any amount of shipping; no

real improvement could be expected there

before October. The Americans also

agreed to underwrite the Burma opera15

 (1) CCS 116/1/D, 21 Jan 43, title: Bombing Offensive From U.K. (2) Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack,

pp. 38-45. (3) Craven and Cate, AAF II, pp. 300-307. 16

 (1) CCS 153 (revised), 17 Jan 43, title: Sit To Be

Created in E Theater (Pac and Burma) in 1943. (2)

Min, 56th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43. (3) See above, Ch.

XV.

17

 Min, 60th mtg CCS, 18 Jan 43. 18

 (1) Min, 59th mtg CCS, 17 Jan 43; 55th mtg, 14

Jan 43; 56th mtg, 14 Jan 43; 60th mtg, 18 Jan 43. (2)

Min, JCS mtg with President, 16 Jan 43. (3) CCS

153/1, memo by Br JPS, 17 Jan 43, title: Sit To Be

Created in E Theater (Pac and Burma) in 1943. (4)

See Churchill's shrewd comment on the MarshallKing co-operation at Casablanca in Hinge of Fate, p.

676.
668 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

tion, as far as landing craft requirements

were concerned.19

The British remained stubbornly dubious to the end, and agreed to the American

program only with reservations underlining the primacy of the war against Germany. They undertook to push their

limited drive in Burma, and tentatively

scheduled the full-scale offensive there for

November 1943, after the monsoon season,

but final decision was to be withheld until

summer. The Americans agreed, despite

some grumbling from Admiral King, that

after Rabaul further operations in the

Pacific would be undertaken only "with

the resources available in the theater" and

only "if time and resources allow."

 20

 The

Aleutians were to be made "as secure as

may be"; how, was not specified.21 There

was also some discussion of possible attacks

on the Japanese homeland by the "verylong-range" B-29 and B-32 bombers, not

yet in mass production, and Roosevelt and

Churchill admonished the military chiefs

to build up Chennault's air forces in China

more rapidly in order to intensify attrition

of Japanese shipping (already pared down,

it was estimated, by a sixth during the past

year). These hopeful allusions to air power

reflected British misgivings, shared by the

President, over the costs of an islandhopping strategy.22

The Americans probably succeeded, at

any rate, in convincing the British of their

determination to press the war against

Japan more aggressively. Brig. Gen. Albert

C. Wedemeyer, in an otherwise pessimistic

summary, credited Admiral King with

this achievement. Churchill, with a keen

eye to American sensibilities, declared in

midconference his willingness to sign a

pact that the British Empire would throw

all its resources into the struggle with

Japan once Germany had been defeated.

Becomingly, the President refused, remarking, "the American people accept the

word of a great English gentleman."

 23

The Mediterranean Life Line

In November and December jubilation

among the Army planning staffs over the

enemy's failure to maul the early convoys

to North Africa was tempered by uneasiness. Up to this point Allied efforts to move

shipping within range of enemy shorebased power had been invariably expensive and often disastrous. Convoys to northern USSR ports had been suspended, resumed, and suspended again; Malta had

been kept alive, but at fearful cost. In the

discussions following Churchill's "underbelly" proposals of November, even those

of the Army staff who believed that some

further post-Tunisia operations in the

Mediterranean would be necessary

thought of them primarily as measures to

secure the line of communications.24

19

 (1) CCS 153 cited n. 16(1). (2) CCS 153/1 cited

n. 18(3). (3) Min, 54th mtg JCS, 18 Jan 43. (4) Min,

59th mtg CCS, 17 Jan 43; 60th mtg, 18 Jan 43. (4)

For landing craft, see below, pp. 61-73. 20

 Min cited n. 17. 21

 CCS 168, 22 Jan 43, title: Conduct of the War in

Pac Theater in 1943. 22

 (1) CCS 153 cited n. 16(1). (2) Min, 60th mtg

CCS, 18 Jan 43; 61st mtg, 19 Jan 43; 67th mtg, 22

Jan 43. (3) CCS 155/1, 19 Jan 43, title: Conduct of

the War in 1943. (4) CCS 168 cited n. 21. (5) CCS

170/2, 23 Jan 43, title: Final Rpt to President and

Prime Minister Summarizing Decisions by CCS. (6)

Min, final mtg ANFA Conf, 22 Jan 43. (7) See John

Miller, jr., "The Casablanca Conference and Pacific

Strategy," Military Affairs, Vol. XIIII, No. 4 (Winter

1949), pp. 209-15. 23

 (1) Roosevelt's remark on 12 Feb 43, quoted in

Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 702. (2) Min, 2d

mtg ANFA Conf, 18 Jan 43. (3) Msg, Prime Minister

to Deputy Prime Minister and War Cabinet, 20 Jan

43, as quoted in Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 683-84.

(4) Ltr, Wedemeyer to Handy, 22 Jan 43, Item la,

Exec 3. 24

 (1) CPS 49/1, 27 Nov 42, title: Plng for Opns

Subsequent to TORCH. (2) Related papers in ABC

381 (11-17-42). (3) Min, 39th mtg CPS, 20 Nov 42;

41st mtg, 4 Dec 42. (4) Papers in Item 10a , Exec 1.
CASABLANCA AND THE STRATEGIC-LOGISTICAL DEBATE 669

The staff already had a large bundle of

outline projects addressed to this problem.

A prerequisite would be the amassing of

larger forces in North Africa itself, after

the enemy's expulsion from Tunisia—as

many as 1.25 million, according to one

estimate—with ten divisions to be poised

along the Spanish Moroccan frontier

alone, others to watch Sicily, and 200,000

service troops to man ports and overland

communication lines. Other projects envisaged major onslaughts and minor forays

into Spain, descents upon the Canaries,

the Cape Verdes, the Azores, the Balearics,

and Madeira, and, of course, an occupation of Sicily and/or Sardinia. These

schemes lacked reality, for shipping studies in early December indicated that only

about three hundred thousand troops,

over and above current plans, could be

deployed to the Mediterranean in 1943,

primarily after midyear. It was assumed,

too, that shipping used in the Mediterranean would be sunk at the rate of 15 to 20

percent each month.25

The implications of an effective closure

of the Strait, for example by a sudden

enemy occupation of Spain, were grim to

contemplate. Allied forces in North Africa,

from Tunisia westward, would then have

to depend on the long overland route from

the Atlantic coast across the Atlas Mountains. (See Map 6.) East of Petitjean the

trunk rail line had a smaller capacity than

to the west, and, since use of the tramontane highway for continuous supply would

require more motor transport than the

staffs then thought it feasible to bring into

the theater, the capacity of this long eastern span of the railroad determined the

size of the forces that could be sustained

east of the mountains. Indeed most of the

capacity of the western span as well would

be absorbed in this task, throwing upon

the highways of Morocco most of the burden of supporting forces west of the mountains. The staff estimated that more than

3,000 trucks and trailers (21⁄2-ton) would

be needed solely to sustain five divisions

assigned to occupy Spanish Morocco.26

(Table 22)

According to deployment schedules current in December 1942, Allied forces in

Northwest Africa were expected to reach

a total of 750,000 by July 1943, with

678,000 disposed forward in Algeria and

Tunisia (including 300,000 British and

150,000 French, but not the British Eighth

Army or Fighting French troops). If the

Strait was closed, 568,000 troops would

evidently have to be evacuated across the

mountains to the eastern seaboard, and

from 270,000 to 366,000 (assuming the

150,000 French were self-sustaining) evacuated from the theater altogether. This

would be a costly and dangerous operation, requiring full utilization of all avail25

 (1) See outline plans in SYMBOL: Casablanca Bk.,

Vol. I, Tab F, Exec 6. (2) Memo, ACW [Wedemeyer] for Handy, 1 Dec 42. (3) Memo, Lt Gen Stanley D. Embick for Gen Marshall, 1 Dec 42, sub: Minority Rpt on Future Action in Mediterranean. (4)

CPS 49 series. Last three in ABC 381 (11-17-42). (5)

Memo, Chief of Strategy and Policy Group OPD, no

addressee, 16 Nov 42, sub: Consideration of Offensive Opns in Mediterranean . . . , ABC 381 (7-25-

42) Sec 4-B, 80. (6) Memo, Gross for Somervell, 7 Dec

42, sub: Shipg Implications of Certain Proposed

Opns, with atchd study, Baumer file, Item 20, OPD

Hist Unit File. (7) Related papers in same file. (8)

Strategic Logis Div study, 4 Dec 42 (revised to 7 Jan

43), title: Proposed Opns in Certain Theaters, Plng

Div ASF, Job A47-147. 26

 (1) Memo, Lutes for Strategic Logis Div, 8 Jan 43,

sub: Communications in N Africa . . . , 20 Sup Gen

Security folder, Case 51, Plng Div ASF, Job A46-371.

(2) Strategic Logis Div study, 9 Feb 43, title: Sup of

United Nations Forces in N Africa by Overland

Routes from Atlantic Ports, same file. Both the

assumptions and the basic data used in this study

differ in many respects from those in the September

and October studies mentioned in Ch. XVII, above;

for example, the planners now assumed 20 percent

curtailment of port and rail operations by enemy

bombardment.
670 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

TABLE 22—ESTIMATED CAPACITY To SUPPORT FORCES IN NORTH AFRICA THROUGH

MOROCCO: JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1943

a

 Casablanca, Safi, and Fedala. b

 Truck requirements for road transport over so great a distance were considered prohibitive. See table 12. c

 Using residual rail capacity not employed in supporting forces east of the mountains, supplemented by road capacity west of the mountains, up to limits of port intake capacity.

Source: (1) Strategic Logis Div Study, 9 Feb 43, title: Sup of United Nations Forces in N Africa by Overland Routes from Atlantic

Ports, and (2) Memo, Lutes for Strategic Logis Div, 8 Jan 43, sub: Communications in N Africa . . ., both in 20 Sup Gen Security folder,

Case 51, Plng Div ASF.

able road and rail transport strung out

along a thirteen-hundred-mile defile, exposed throughout its length to enemy air

power. The overland movement, it was

estimated, would require about a month

and a half; to outload the troops at Atlantic ports from four to five and a half

months. In short, if these calculations had

any validity, it appeared that the enemy,

merely by sealing the Strait passage, could

win the battle for Tunisia, drive the Allies

out of most of Algeria as well, if not back

into Morocco, and force them to carry out

a difficult and costly logistical operation

that, however successful, could produce

only the negative result of salvaging the

bulk of Allied forces committed to North

Africa. The Allied timetable would be set

back a year or more.

While the logistical staffs were oppressed

by these gloomy forebodings, the President, catching Churchill's mood, was

buoyantly urging his military advisers to

give thought to Allied operations in the

eastern Mediterranean and suggesting

that, while the Tunisia Campaign was being wound up, large additional American

forces should be assembled simultaneously

in North Africa and the British Isles in

readiness for whatever enterprise might

seem profitable a few months hence. Marshall's staff produced figures showing that,

under existing convoy restrictions, a double build-up was virtually out of the question. Only about 180,000 more troops,

they pointed out, could be shipped to

North Africa alone during the next four

months, but considerably larger forces

could be deployed to the British Isles

within the same period if movements to
CASABLANCA AND THE STRATEGIC-LOGISTICAL DEBATE 671

North Africa were suspended. During December and early January Marshall soberly warned the President against further

wasteful "dabbling" in the Mediterranean.27

 To keep open communications in

the western Mediterranean would be

costly enough. All forces not needed there,

Marshall wanted to pour into the British

Isles with a view to being ready, by March

or April, for a quick assault on Brest or

Boulogne if the Germans showed signs of

weakening, or, as seemed more likely, if

they should invade Spain. Concentration

in the British Isles, he thought, could thus

help to provide security in the western

Mediterranean. The President evidently

was not impressed. On the eve of Casablanca he still talked of massing strong

forces in both England and North Africa,

postponing the decision as to where to

strike.28

The staffs, for their part, had failed to

find in any purely defensive line of action

real insurance against a cutting of the

Mediterranean life line. Indeed, a bold

course seemed scarcely more dangerous,

and possibly more profitable than any

other. The situation resembled that in the

Pacific, where the only means of offsetting

the enormous disadvantage of exterior

lines was to seize and hold the strategic

initiative. The British, after a long history

of defending exposed sea communications,

had learned to live with the problem. At

Casablanca, as five months earlier, they

were convinced that aggressive action by

the Allies would strengthen Spain's resistance to any German incursion. Even if the

enemy should gain the northern shore of

the Strait, British naval representatives

thought that, with airfields in Spanish

Morocco and Majorca in Allied hands,

convoys could get through without prohibitive losses. German coastal guns on the

Pas-de-Calais, Sir Dudley Pound reminded the Americans, had failed to sink

a single ship. On the positive side, there

was the lure of opening a passage through

the whole length of the Mediterranean.

The British planned, as soon as the tip of

Tunisia was won, to begin running thirtyship cargo convoys through to Suez every

ten days, counting on the shorter turnaround (as compared with the Cape route)

to offset losses. Over a period of five

months perhaps 225 sailings, the equivalent of about 1,825,000 tons of shipping,

might be saved by using the shorter route.

Personnel and tanker movements would

have to wait until cover could be provided

from the north shore, but troop movements to the Middle East were on the

wane in any case. Access to Middle East

oil, on the other hand, through the pipeline terminus at Haifa, would be a great

prize.29

Enemy air power based on Sicily and

Sardinia posed the most dangerous threat

to Allied shipping movements through the

Mediterranean, and the discussion of

"next steps" in the Mediterranean centered mainly upon these two objectives.30

27

 Min cited n. 14(3). 28

 (1) Ibid. (2) Min cited n. 13. (3) Memo, Dill for

Prime Minister, 14 Dec 42, as quoted in Churchill,

Hinge of Fate, pp. 658-59. (4) Memo, Handy for Marshall, 18 Dec 42, sub: Shipt of Trs to U.K., ETO

folder, Lutes File. (5) OPD draft memo, CofS for

President, no date, Item 54, Exec 10. 29

 (1) Min, 50th mtg JCS, 13 Jan 43; 51st mtg, 14

Jan 43; 52d mtg, 16 Jan 43. (2) Min, 55th mtg CCS,

14 Jan 43; 57th mtg, 15 Jan 43; 58th mtg, 16 Jan 43;

60th mtg, 18 Jan 43. (3) Min, 1st mtg ANFA Conf, 15

Jan 43. 30

 War Department and SOS staffs had not studied

these operations carefully as planning for Mediterranean operations was the responsibility of the theater

staff. Since General Eisenhower himself did not bring

a large staff or much planning data with him to the

conference, the Army representatives found themselves at a disadvantage. General Somervell, the only
672 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

The Sardinia operation (BRIMSTONE)

seemed likely to be a smaller undertaking

than an attack on Sicily (HUSKY)—four

divisions as against seven or more, by

British reckoning—and it probably could

be mounted earlier. Either operation

would probably require diversion of Navy

combat loaders from the Pacific. As a ferrying operation, either was theoretically

within the capacity of cargo shipping in

1943, though the margin was slim. Shipping time would be lost, as it had been lost

in TORCH, in assembling the large initial

convoys; convoying would have to be curtailed all over the world; and the problems

of transshipping from bases in North Africa were still unexplored. Limited port

capacity on both islands promised to restrict the build-up in the early stages;

much supply would have to flow over the

beaches. In general, the logistical problems

were similar, though looming somewhat

larger for HUSKY. On the other hand, better air cover could be provided for an attack on Sicily than for one on Sardinia.

Even if taken, Sardinia might turn out to

be a dangerous salient, which the Germans

could isolate by sea and air while invading

Spain. To hold Sardinia, it would probably be necessary to go on to Corsica and

Sicily. Most important, possession of Sardinia would offer little protection to the

Mediterranean convoy route as long as the

enemy held Sicily. And, as General Marshall put it, to strike at "the softest spot

before turning to the hardest spot" was

likely merely to "make the hard spot

harder."

 31

The British wanted Sardinia, in fact,

less as a flanking guardpost for the Mediterranean convoy route than as a steppingstone to Italy. From Sardinia, Italy could

be bombed and harried by amphibious

forays, and, conceivably, driven to surrender without an invasion. Sicily offered

some of these advantages, but at greater

cost. From this point of view, BRIMSTONE

seemed the quicker and cheaper alternative, a means of maintaining momentum

and of gaining results early. It left open

the possibility of a sudden leap across the

English Channel in midsummer, if the

opportunity offered, while it could also

provide a springboard for a major effort

against Italy. "BRIMSTONE in June," Air

Marshall Portal remarked, "would be

better than HUSKY in September."

 32

To the Americans this seemed a perverted strategy. To knock out Italy, Marshall bluntly told the British, was less

important than to open the Mediterranean

to shipping, and to this BRIMSTONE would

contribute little. Allied possession of Sicily,

American logistical expert accompanying Marshall,

was not permitted to bring any staff officers with him

and had to borrow two of Eisenhower's staff to help

him. The logistical studies and data available to the

Army representatives at Casablanca are contained in

one of three black loose-leaf notebooks made up by

the OPD staff. Somervell's copies are filed in Planning Division, ASF, files. Somervell's correspondence

and work papers for the Casablanca Conference are

filed in Ltrs, Memos, and Msgs Between Somervell

and Styer folder, Planning Division, ASF. Lack of

prepared logistical studies and data on the American

side was probably one of the considerations that lay

behind General Wedemeyer's rueful remark that the

British "swarmed down on us like locusts with a

plentiful supply of planners and various other assistants with prepared plans . . . ." Ltr, Wedemeyer to

Handy, 22 Jan 43, Item 1a, Exec 3.

31

 (1) Min, 66th mtg, CCS, 22 Jan 43. (2) Outline

plans in SYMBOL: Casablanca Bk., Vol. I, Tabs F-1,

F-2, Exec 6. (3) Study cited n. 25(8). (4) Strategic

Logis Div study (11-17-42), Sec 1-B. (5) Min, 50th

mtg JCS, 13 Jan 43; 52d mtg, 16 Jan 43; 54th mtg, 18

Jan 43; 57th mtg, 21 Jan 43. (6) Min, 57th mtg CCS,

15 Jan 43; 58th mtg, 16 Jan 43. (7) JPS 106 cited n. 4. 32

 (1) Min cited n. 31(1). (2) Min, 52d mtg JCS, 16

Jan 43. (3) Min cited n. 18(2). (4) Min, 64th mtg

CCS, 20 Jan 43; 66th mtg, 22 Jan 43. (5) Min, 3d mtg

ANFA Conf, 23 Jan 43. (6) CCS 135/2, Annex III,

cited n. 3. (7) CCS 161, 20 Jan 43, title: Opn HUSKY.

(8) CCS 161/1, 21 Jan 43, same title.
CASABLANCA AND THE STRATEGIC-LOGISTICAL DEBATE 673

on the other hand, might reduce the losses

of convoys moving through the narrows by

as much as a third. The British themselves

were divided on the question, and Churchill had always favored HUSKY. Their chief

objection to this operation was that it

would require too long to mount. In the

first plan presented by the British staff, the

assault date was set for late in September

on the assumption that training and the

assembling of forces and shipping could

not begin until ports and base facilities in

Tunisia were available. The alternative,

considered too dangerous, was to send

most of the assault forces from the United

Kingdom, passing a large convoy through

the Sicilian narrows on D Day. Instructed

to re-examine their figures, the planners

came back a day later with a 30 August

assault date, which the chiefs still considered too late. The chiefs pushed the planners; the President and Prime Minister

pushed the chiefs. In the end the date for

the assault was set, more or less by fiat, in

the period of the favorable July moon,

with the stipulation that strenuous efforts

would be made by "contrivance and ingenuity" to advance the date to June.33

HUSKY was on; it remained to work out a

plan.

Bolero Renewed

Agreement on Sicily did not mean

agreement on European strategy. Sicily

undeniably would be a substantial prize;

its capture would free the passage through

the narrows and perhaps jolt Italy out of

the war. But the American chiefs were

worried about what was to follow. Recently the Joint Strategic Survey Committee had characterized an operation against

Sicily as one "of major magnitude" that

would absorb "all available means through

a large part of 1943"—possibly an exaggerated estimate, but an ominous one

nonetheless.34 Even while accepting HUSKY, the Americans wondered, as General

Marshall said, whether the British regarded it "as a part of an integrated plan

to win the war or simply taking advantage

of an opportunity." What was the "main

plot"? How was HUSKY to be prevented

from becoming a "suction pump," draining Allied strength away from the main

effort?

 35

 That effort was against Germany,

not her satellites, and must eventually be

made from the northwest, not the south.36

Agreeing with this general proposition,

the British nevertheless painted vistas beyond the capture of Sicily that the Americans found disturbing. The British saw

Sicily, like Sardinia, as a steppingstone to

Italy; Italy must be knocked out at whatever cost in effort and time. They estimated

the cost to Germany of Italy's defection at

fifty-four divisions and 2,250 first-line aircraft. If Turkey could be drawn into the

war, there would be a further diversion of

German forces. Meanwhile, Germany

could be pounded from the air on all sides.

In this way, the British argued, the Allies

could create in 1943 the second front they

lacked the strength to mount in northwestern Europe. Germany's main logistical

strength lay in her east-west communications. In two weeks, the British asserted,

she could move seven divisions across the

Continent to any threatened point in the

West, as against only one to the Mediterranean over a route exposed to Allied air

attack. In any case, the Germans already

33

 (1) CCS 171/2/D, 23 Jan 43, title: Dir to CINC

Allied Exped Forces in N Africa. (2) Min cited n.

31(1). (3) See above, n. 32. (4) Churchill, Hinge of

Fate, pp. 654-55, 678. 34

 Memo, JSSC for JCS, 31 Dec 42, sub: Opns Subsequent to TORCH, SYMBOL: Casablanca Bk., Vol. II,

Tab F, Exec 6. 35

 Min, 58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43. 36

 (1) Min cited n. 23(2). (2) Min cited n. 17.
CHURCHILL ON SHIPPING LOSSES. At the Casablanca Conference Churchill

followed closely the discussion by the staffs of the problem of shipping losses, which decisively

influenced Mediterranean and European strategy.
CASABLANCA AND THE STRATEGIC-LOGISTICAL DEBATE 675

had forty-four divisions in the West. Any

bridgehead that the Allies could win there

in 1943 would be hemmed in "with wire

and concrete" during the winter while the

Germans built up their power.37 Only internal disintegration in Germany would

offer any chance of success to an Allied

invasion from the northwest in 1943, but

such a condition might yet be produced,

the British still felt, by their program in

the Mediterranean and by continued German setbacks in the USSR. To the skeptical Americans, this looked like postponing

the invasion to the Greek Kalends.38

But what was the alternative? For weeks

before the conference, the American staffs

had been exploring the possibilities of

various "modified" cross-Channel operations that might be undertaken in 1943 as

a prelude to a major invasion in 1944. The

limitations upon build-up of forces were

discouraging enough, apart from the difficulties to be overcome in the operation

itself. Even if movements to North Africa

were stopped in January 1943, convoy restrictions would permit no more than half

a million American troops to be assembled

in the United Kingdom and made ready

to cross the Channel by July—about eight

divisions with supporting troops (assuming

a 4-to-l ratio of ground to air). If convoy

restrictions were lifted, eleven divisions in

a force of about 680,000 might be assembled, cargo shipping constituting the limiting factor. After midyear, cargo-carrying

capacity was expected to overbalance passenger capacity. For a September 1943

operation, perhaps twelve American divisions could be ferried to Britain, to join

some thirteen British divisions—a force

not likely to shatter Germany's fixed defenses and forty-four divisions in western

Europe.39

At Casablanca General Somervell and

the British shipping expert, Lord Leathers,

were asked to take a fresh look at the

whole problem of building up an invasion

force in the British Isles. The most uncertain assumptions that had to be made

related to the ability of the navies to protect ocean movements. Shipping losses had

declined somewhat in December from

their November peak, but the U.S. Navy,

currently engaged in a bitter dispute with

the Army Air Forces over policies and

division of responsibility in combating

enemy attacks on shipping, anticipated no

early relief. The Combined Planners reported that "minimum acceptable requirements" for convoying would not be

met by new construction until August or

September 1943, and that the battle

against the submarine could not be expected to take a favorable turn until the

end of the year.40 Meanwhile, the convoy system in the Atlantic was still suffering from disruption caused by TORCH, and

the British import program faced a crisis.

There was every reason to believe that the

Sicily operation would similarly disrupt

convoy service. If, as the experts predicted,

escorts were engaged in that operation for

four months, the Murmansk convoys, re37

 Min, 58th mtg CGS, 16 Jan 43. 38

 (1) Min, 55th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43; 58th mtg, 16

Jan 43; 60th mtg, 18 Jan 43. (2) Min, 52d mtg JCS,

16 Jan 43. (3) Min cited n. 18(2). 39

 (1) Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 22 Dec 42, sub:

Summary of ROUNDUP 1943, Opns SOS 1942-43

folder, Hq ASF. (2) Memo cited n. 28(4). (3) OPD

draft memo, CofS for President, 15 Dec 42, Item 54,

Exec 10. (4) JPS 106 cited n. 4. (5) Outline Plan, title:

Modified ROUNDUP, in SYMBOL: Casablanca Bk., Vol.

I, Tab F-5a, Exec 6. (6) Paper, no date, sub: Gen

Concept of Opns, T-1 Trs folder, Plng Div ASF, Job

A47-147. (7) CCS 135/1 cited n. 10(3).

As usual, the figures are difficult to reconcile, but

the conclusions regarding the September operation

seem to be supported by all the estimates. 40

 CCS 160, rpt by CPS, 19 Jan 43, title: Minimum

Escort Reqmts To Maintain Sea Communications of

the United Nations.
676 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

sumed in December, would have to be

suspended again. In making this proposal

the military leaders drew upon their heads

the displeasure of the President and Prime

Minister, who were determined to increase

rather than diminish shipments to the Soviet Union. Sharp words were exchanged,

and General Marshall bluntly declared

that it was folly to accept prohibitive losses

on the northern route "simply to keep Mr.

Stalin placated."

 41

Somervell and Leathers could do no

more than note this problem and assume

that convoy arrangements would be

worked out to permit full use of available

shipping. On this basis, and on the additional assumption that considerable British assistance in troop and cargo shipping

would be provided, Somervell drew up a

schedule of U.S. Army deployment in

1943—allowing for the movement of close

to a million troops to the British Isles.

(Table 23) The chiefs accepted it as a starting point for more detailed deployment

planning.42

The BOLERO deployment in this schedule represented the estimated maximum

capacity of cargo shipping during the first

half of 1943, and of troop shipping during

the second half. It assumed, further, a continuous inflow of cargo to British ports at

a rate of 150 ships per month, a rate that,

Lord Leathers warned, could not be sustained during the late fall and winter

months and to maintain which American

dock labor and locomotives would be

needed even in the summer.

Shelved for the present, this problem

was to cause trouble later. Allowing as it

did for a substantial deployment to the

Mediterranean and for an accelerated deployment of air forces to the United Kingdom for the combined bomber offensive,

Somervell's schedule anticipated that only

seven or eight ground divisions would be

ready in the British Isles by mid-September instead of the twelve divisions predicted in preconference estimates. This

brought the total force that might be

available for a late-summer cross-Channel

operation well under even the twenty-one

divisions that the British had estimated in

conjunction with their earlier four-division

Sardinia project. It was, in fact, no more

than a fair beginning in a build-up for a

1944 invasion.43

41

 (1) Min cited n. 23(2). (2) CGS 160 cited n. 40.

(3) Related papers in ABC 560 Atlantic (1-19-43) Sec

1. (4) Min, 56th mtg JCS, 20 Jan 43. (5) Min, 55th

mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43; 63d mtg, 20 Jan 43. (6) Min

cited n. 32(5). (7) Craven and Cate, AAF I, Ch. XV;

AAF II, Ch. VIII. (8) Morison, Battle of the Atlantic.

(9) For shipping losses, see above, Ch. XXII, and below, Apps. J, K. (10) For the Soviet aid program, see

above, Ch. XXI. 42

 CCS 172, note by Somervell, 22 Jan 43, title:

Shipg Capabilities for BOLERO Build-up. For other

current deployment estimates, see above, Ch. XXII.

The following were the principal assumptions in this

estimate:

(a) British aid to BOLERO: 345,000 personnel lift, mainly during spring and summer; 1,600,000 ship

tons cargo lift, mainly in last quarter. (b) Conversion of Liberty hulls to troop transports to be suspended, but some conversion to tankers. Total new U.S. construction in 1943, 18,562,000 tons. Five cargo vessels to be converted to Navy combat

loaders each month through April 1943. (c) Initial movement requirements: 8 ship tons per man; maintenance, 1.3 ship tons per man per month

(but 1 ton per man in U.K.). (d) Navy use of dry cargo shipping increased by

300,000 dead-weight tons each quarter, reaching

2,360,000 tons in last quarter 1943. (e) 4,000,000 dead-weight tons shipping reserved

for war economy and defense aid, and 170 sailings additional in 1943 for Soviet aid. (f) No shipping to be withdrawn from British import program.

(g) Average cargo ship turnaround, 21⁄2 months.

(h) 121⁄2 percent of dry cargo fleet constantly under repair. (i) Average losses, 2.6 percent. 43

 This estimate was based on a "division slice" of

from 40,000 to 50,000 ground troops, declining to the

former figure as the build-up proceeded. It also reflected an allowance of forty-five days between sailing

and final readiness of troops. See (1) Min cited n.

32(5); (2) Min, 68th mtg CCS, 23 Jan 43; and (3)

CCS 170/2 cited n. 22(5). (4) Msg, Leathers to Somervell, 21 Jan 43, Ltrs, Memos, and Msgs Between

Somervell and Styer folder, Plng Div ASF.
CASABLANCA AND THE STRATEGIC-LOGISTICAL DEBATE 677

TABLE 23—PROPOSED U.S. ARMY DEPLOYMENT FOR 1943: JANUARY 1943

a

 Includes troops en route.

b

 One division (16,000) combat loaded from United States for HUSKY. c

 Movements to bases during 1943 to be limited to 17,400 to Persian Corridor.

Source: CCS 172, note by Somervell, 22 Jan 43, title: Shipg Capabilities for BOLERO Build-up.

British Imports

The Six-Million-Ton Misunderstanding

Even so, Somervell's whittled-down

BOLERO program was more optimistic

than he knew. It depended heavily upon

expectations of British assistance in shipping during 1943, and these in turn were

bound up with assumptions concerning

the British import program that were

startlingly at variance with the facts.

In March 1942, at a dark hour in the

battle for shipping, Churchill had written

to Roosevelt, "When I reflect how I have

longed and prayed for the entry of the

United States into the war, I find it difficult to realise how gravely our British affairs have deteriorated by what has happened since December 7."

 44

 Throughout

that year Britain continued to suffer

heavier proportionate losses in shipping

than her ally, and far more than in the

year preceding when she had been fighting the war at sea alone. The organizing

of American antisubmarine defenses owed

much to British help, which involved a

thinning-out of Britain's own escort coverage and a lengthening of convoy cycles

with consequent reductions in the flow of

imports. During the latter half of 1942,

while the American shipping situation

was gradually improving, the British merchant fleet, operating in more exposed

areas and possessing only a limited replacement capacity, continued to dwindle.

By the end of April 1943 Britain's dry

cargo tonnage had fallen from 16.2 million gross tons in November 1941 to about

14 million.45

The effort to meet the growing demands

of military operations upon Britain's shipping resulted in a steady encroachment

during 1942 upon the flow of her imports.

These had declined from a prewar average of over 50 million dead-weight tons

to 42 million in 1940 and 31 million in

1941; in 1942 they fell to 23 million. Desperate efforts were made in this year to

arrest the decline. Shipping space was

44

 Msg, Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt, 5 Mar 42, as quoted in Churchill, Hinge of Fate,

p. 191. 45

 (1) Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy,

pp. 412-14, 416-17. (2) See above, Chs. VIII, XVII.
678 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

LORD LEATHERS on British port

capacity.

saved by crating vehicles, improvements

in spare parts supply, reduction in military vehicle allowances, more efficient

stowage and cargo handling. Ship routings were carefully arranged with a view

to drawing upon near sources of supply.

At the same time, the needs that imports

filled were curtailed. A new milling ratio,

adopted in March 1942, promised to save

400,000 tons of imported grain per year.

Domestic food production was increased

by an estimated 50 percent over prewar.

Imported materials for nonmilitary production and services were cut to low

levels—newsprint by 80 percent, for example. Production of munitions was

stepped up (though this required more

raw materials), so that imported finished

munitions in 1942 amounted to less than

10 percent of the total volume of imports.46

These expedients failed to close the gap.

Britain had to eat into her stocks, which

by the end of 1942 had fallen an estimated

2.5 million tons, to a level dangerously

near what the War Cabinet had decided

must be regarded as irreducible. Relatively little help was given by American

shipping during 1942. New construction

in the United States did not appreciably

outpace losses until midyear, conversion

of merchant shipping to essential war

services was slow, and British import needs

were subordinated, both in British and

American policy, to those of military lendlease and military services. By late summer American officials as well as British

were growing uneasy over the trend.

Lewis Douglas, deputy administrator of

WSA, visited London in July and he and

Averell Harriman, the President's lendlease representative there, submitted a

special report to the President on 2 August, supplementing a more comprehensive one by the two Combined Shipping

Adjustment Boards (Washington and London), warning that substantial American

aid in shipping would be needed if Britain

were to continue her war effort on its present scale. Early in October the United

States, through the CSAB, formally accepted the principle that, as the merchant

shipbuilder for the United Nations, it

would undertake to assign an "appropriate portion" of the surplus tonnage

(over losses) being produced by American yards "to relieve the burden on the

war services of each of the other United

Nations."

 47

 Before the end of that month

46

 (1) Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy,

pp. 418-23. (2) Memorandum on U.K. Import Requirements Submitted to CSAB by Joint Economic

Analysts, 8 Feb 43, U.K. Imports folder, WSA Douglas File. (3) CCS 183/3, 18 Mar 43, title: Note . . .

on Br Import Prog. 47

 WSA paper, 6 Oct 42, sub: Employment of U.S.

Tonnage . . . , Employment of Shipg Corresp folder,

WSA Douglas File.
CASABLANCA AND THE STRATEGIC-LOGISTICAL DEBATE 679

the President had decided to expand the

merchant shipbuilding program for 1943.

But the British Government, while reasonably confident that Britain would be the

largest foreign beneficiary of this expansion, felt that the clear drift of the national

economy toward disaster called for more

specific assurance and concrete action. It

decided to seek from its ally "a solemn

compact, almost a treaty," setting forth

the amount of shipping Britain could

expect.48

In November Sir Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of Production, came to Washington to negotiate such a settlement in

the whole field of munitions and shipping.

Depletion of domestic stocks, he pointed

out, had gone so far that imports had little

or no margin left for fluctuation; henceforth the flow must keep pace with consumption. Lyttelton requested that the

United States guarantee enough shipping

in 1943 to enable Britain to bring her dry

cargo imports up to 27 million tons, a figure that would not, indeed, restore depleted stocks but would suffice to keep

them just above the danger level—involving further depletion by 1.6 million tons

during 1943—while providing raw materials for an expanded output of munitions.

The proposal envisaged an actual transfer

of U.S. shipping to the British flag equivalent to an average carrying capacity

throughout the year of 2.5 million tons.49

The President's response was prompt

and sympathetic. "In all probability," he

wrote to Admiral Land, "the British are

going to lose again in 1943 more ships

than they can build. If we are going to

keep England in the war at anything like

this maximum capacity, we must consider

the supplementing of their merchant fleet

as one of the top military necessities of the

war."

 50

 His principal civilian advisers

concurred, and there is no indication that

the military were consulted on the matter.

Replying formally to the Prime Minister

on 30 November, Roosevelt noted that the

U.S. shipbuilding program was being augmented to at least 18.8 million deadweight tons in 1943, possibly 20 million.

The British goal of 27 million tons of imports in 1943 he thought "substantially

correct," and he promised that the War

Shipping Administration would make

available (though not by transfer of flag)

sufficient ship tonnage to meet this goal,

along with requirements for military supply and essential war services, to the extent

that British shipping proved inadequate.51

Since the British estimated their own carrying capacity for imports in 1943 at about

20 million tons, the President thus committed American shipping to carry some

7 million tons of imports to the United

Kingdom during 1943. This requirement

the experts estimated would mean turning

over each month, and leaving in continuous service thereafter, an average of 300,-

000 dead-weight tons of shipping—in all,

perhaps 30 percent of the expected net

increase in the American merchant fleet.

The President warned that transfers would

lag during the next three months because

of current commitments in the Mediterranean, and expressed the hope that

48

 (1) Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy,

pp. 423-26. (2) Msg, Harriman and Douglas to President, 2 Aug 42. (3) Douglas' notes on conf with President, Hopkins, and Land, 21 Oct 42. Last two in

Hopkins folder, WSA Douglas File. (4) Paper cited n.

47. (5) Memo, Sir Arthur Salter, no addressee, 26 Oct

42, Br Merchant Shipg Mis Misc folder, WSA Douglas File. (6) Corresp in U.K. Imports folder, WSA

Douglas File. (7) See above, Chs. XIV, XXII. 49

 (1) Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy,

pp. 421, 428-29. (2) Memorandum on U.K. Import

Requirements . . . , cited n. 46(2) For agreement

on munitions allocation, see above, Ch. XI. 50

 Memo, FDR for Land, 30 Nov 42, MS Index to

the Hopkins Papers, Bk. VII, Shipg, p. 4, Item 3(f). 51

 Ltr, President to Churchill, 30 Nov 42, ABC 400

(11-19-42).
680 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

smaller tonnages would be sufficient to

maintain the flow of imports after the

Mediterranean passage had been cleared.

He also made the reservation that in an

emergency it might be necessary to divert

tonnage temporarily from British imports,

and that other cases might arise "in which

we shall wish jointly to confer." But he assured Churchill "that any important

diversions of tonnages will be made only

with my personal approval."

 52

The President's warning of a probable

lag in early deliveries was immediately

borne out. The first schedules worked up

by WSA envisaged that most of the movement would be postponed to the second

half of 1943, with only 1.8 million tons of

imports to be delivered by American shipping during the first half. Shipments during December 1942 were hardly more

than token in character, and in January

Douglas, confronted by multiplying military demands for shipping in all theaters,

suggested that the scheduled 1.8 million

tons of imports might have to be reduced

to about 1,150,000 tons, leaving over 6

million to be carried after June. But the

British, meanwhile, were also running into

difficulties. Their military requirements in

the Mediterranean proved "more onerous

and more prolonged" than expected, with

a resulting additional drain upon importcarrying tonnage that made it necessary to

revise downward by some 2.7 million tons

the previous estimate of 20 million tons of

imports to be carried in British shipping

during 1943.53 Fearing new military demands and uneasy over the lag in American aid, the British Government began

to doubt the wisdom of permitting domestic stocks to drop a full four million tons

below their end-1941 level. In January

Churchill took the drastic step of shifting

fifty-two out of the ninety-two vessels engaged in supporting British forces in the

Indian Ocean area back to the Atlantic

to carry import cargoes from nearer

sources of supply in order, as he put it, not

to make Britain "live from hand to mouth,

absolutely dependent on the fulfillment of

American promises in the last six months

of the year."54 The British argued that the

savings from this rerouting of shipping

must be used to retard the depletion of

their stocks rather than to lighten the burden upon American tonnage. American

officials in London, studying the situation,

not merely agreed with this position but

recommended that, far from reducing the

American contribution of shipping during

the first six months of 1943, it would be

prudent to increase it to some three million

tons. If too large a portion of the total import burden were pushed forward past

midyear, British ports and railroads might

prove unable to carry the load.55

The Casablanca Conference took place

in the midst of these negotiations. Among

the military problems that made up the

agenda of the conference, the British import program, a "civil" matter, had no

place, and the military leaders merely reaffirmed the maintenance of Britain's war 52

 (1) Ibid. (2) Memo, Nelson, Wickard, and Harriman for FDR, 10 Nov 42, MS Index to the Hopkins

Papers, Bk. VII, Shipg, p. 4, Item 3(d). (3) Memo,

Nelson, Wickard, and Harriman for FDR, 19 Nov 42,

U.K. Imports folder, WSA Douglas File. (4) Paper, 19

Nov 42, sub: Allocs Needed To Maintain Br Sv, with

notes, Allocs Gen folder, WSA Douglas File. (5)

Memo, Land, Douglas, and Harriman for FDR, 20

Nov 42, Reading file, WSA Douglas File. 53

 Memo, Salter for Douglas, 25 Feb 43, Allocs Gen

folder, WSA Douglas File. 54

 Ltr, Prime Minister to Gen Ismay, 5 Jan 43, as

quoted in Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 926. 55

 (1) Memorandum on U.K. Import Requirements . . . , cited n. 46(2). (3) Memo cited n. 53. (4)

Ltr, Nathan to Douglas, 16 Feb 43, U.K. Imports

folder, WSA Douglas File. (5) Related corresp, Douglas with Lubin, same file. (6) Memo, Douglas for Salter, 11 Feb 43, Reading file, WSA Douglas File. (7)

Corresp in Salter Memoranda folder, WSA Douglas

File. (8) Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy,

pp. 429-30.
CASABLANCA AND THE STRATEGIC-LOGISTICAL DEBATE 681

economy as one of the "first charges" upon

the Allied war effort. On the American

side, the Joint Chiefs had not even learned

of the President's commitment until late

in December, when a copy of his letter of

30 November was shown to them "very

unofficially and confidentially" by the

British military representatives.56 Presumably this tardy intelligence was passed on

to General Somervell, but that officer displayed at Casablanca a degree of confusion over the precise terms of the

President's letter and of the program set

up to implement it that Lord Leathers,

representing British shipping interests at

the conference, must have found puzzling.

And, unfortunately, the WSA officials who

alone could have spoken with authority

on the matter were not present.57

The result was one of the most curious

misunderstandings in the whole course of

Anglo-American wartime collaboration.

Somervell's first, and more general, misconception was in regarding the American

commitment as being aimed at replacing

British net shipping losses (a conception

dating back to the Victory Program of

1941) rather than at meeting British marginal requirements for shipping. The difference could mean much or little, in

actual tonnages, depending on the course

of ship losses in 1943. Somervell's second

misconception, however, was both more

specific and more fundamental: he interpreted the implied ceiling of 300,000 tons

upon the monthly American contribution

of shipping for British use, stated in the

President's letter, in terms of equivalent

single-voyage sailings, rather than a tonnage that would remain in British service. The carriage of British imports in

American bottoms during 1943, he thus

calculated, would amount at most to only

3.6 million tons, not 7 million. Somervell

was optimistic, moreover, on the basis of

current loss trends, that the total might be

far less. "If there is a reduction in the

number of sinkings," his final deployment

paper (CCS 172) noted, "the assistance

required will be reduced. As a reduction

is expected, in some measure there will be

a credit on this account."

 58

The substantial movement of American

troops and matériel to Britain that Somervell held out as a possibility for 1943 rested

not merely upon this optimistic assumption, but also upon an alleged promise by

the British to help out to the extent of

some 1,600,000 measurement tons of

cargo shipping. Somervell did indeed

elicit from Lord Leathers a tentative

undertaking to contribute shipping to the

BOLERO program, but it was heavily qualified to protect both Britain's import program and her major operational needs

from encroachment. It was, in fact, conditional upon Britain having a surplus of

shipping over and above her needs—a

wholly unreal condition, as Leathers subsequently pointed out, since, as he understood the President's commitment of 30

November, Britain was to receive only

enough American shipping to fill whatever marginal requirements her own shipping proved insufficient to fill. There

could, therefore, be no "surplus" to give

back to the Americans. In any case, the

figure of 1,600,000 was a rapid estimate

"subject to check." Somervell, Leathers

asserted, "fully understood this and repeatedly acknowledged his understanding." As Sir Arthur Salter, Leathers' 56 Memo, Deane for Marshall, King, and Arnold,

26 Dec 42, CCS 400 (11-30-42). 57

 Ibid.

58

 (1) CCS 172 cited n. 42. Curiously enough, CCS

172 omitted any reference to the 300,000-ton ceiling,

and thus might be interpreted (as the British later

pointed out) to commit the U.S. to unlimited replacement of British losses. (2) CCS 162, 19 Jan 43, title:

U.S. Aid to Russia. (3) CCS 162/1, 20 Jan 43, same

title. (4) CCS 160 cited n. 40.
682 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

representative in the United States,

summed it up:

Lord Leathers gave an overoptimistic estimate (safeguarded because slated to be

checked) on an unreal assumption given by

General Somervell. It was in any case a provisional estimate (even on that unreal basis)

and not a commitment, and it was all on the

repeatedly stated, and acknowledged, basis

that it was only an estimate of what, on a

given assumption, might be available after

British import requirements had been met.59

The shipping discussions at Casablanca

must repeatedly have come within a hair's

breadth of revealing to both sides how far

apart their fundamental assumptions

were. The British counted on American

shipping to carry over 7 million tons of

their imports in 1943, whereas, in Somervell's expectations, considerably less than

half, perhaps only a third, of this amount

was to be carried and the British themselves were to turn back, for BOLERO shipments, enough tonnage to offset a large

part of the American import contribution.

Between the two sets of expectations

stretched a gap roughly equivalent to

almost 6 million dead-weight tons of carrying capacity over the span of the coming

year, or almost a fourth of the entire tonnage of cargo that was actually to be

shipped overseas to the U.S. Army in that

year.60 So gigantic a misunderstanding

could not long endure, and the longer its

duration the more explosive must be the

effects of terminating it. The revelation,

when it came, was to nearly upset the

whole Casablanca strategy.

Limitations on Amphibious Assault

Technological change in amphibious

warfare had kept well ahead of operations

during 1942. As Rear Adm. Charles M.

Cooke, Jr., remarked early in the Casablanca Conference, it would be unwise to

look back to the experience of the past

year in weighing capabilities in the year to

come. General Somervell expatiated with

enthusiasm on the new means for attacking an enemy-held shore with the large

types of landing vessels, especially the tank

landing ship (LST), the large personnel

carrier (LCI(L)), and the tank landing

craft (LCT(5)). Using these vessels, an assaulting force could move directly from

nearby base ports to the target area and

there land troops and heavy equipment

over the beaches rapidly and in large

numbers. By June 1943, Somervell

thought, it would be possible to assemble

enough large landing ships and craft in

the Mediterranean to shuttle almost 90,-

000 troops ashore with heavy equipment

in the first wave. Combat loaders, brought

in wherever protection could be provided,

could land additional troops in small

boats. So large an effort, of course, would

require absolute priority over every other

operation. A survey by OPD late in January indicated a reasonable possibility of

concentrating enough British and American amphibious shipping in the AtlanticMediterranean area to land about 63,000

59

 (1) Memo cited n. 53. (2) CCS 172 cited n. 42. (3)

Msg, Harriman to Douglas, 23 Feb 43, Allocs Gen

folder, WSA Douglas File. (4) Br JPS paper, 22 Jan

43, sub: BOLERO Build-up, Ltrs, Memos, and Msgs

Between Somervell and Styer folder, Plng Div ASF. 60

 Precisely how much shipping aid Somervell expected would have to be provided is not clear; Gross,

on separate later occasions, mentioned 3 million and

2.4 million tons of imports. See memo, Gross for Marshall, 17 Mar 43; and handwritten notes on msg,

Douglas to Harriman, 9 Mar 43. Both are in Shipg

1941-43 folder, Hq ASF. The 1,600,000 measurement

tons of cargo shipping allegedly promised by Leathers

(and therefore to be deducted from the above figures)

were perhaps equivalent to about 1,120,000 deadweight tons of imports, assuming single voyages and

not cumulative employment. Army cargo shipped

overseas in 1943 was about 28.5 million measurement

tons, or about 24 million dead-weight tons. For conversion factors, see below, App. A-1.
CASABLANCA AND THE STRATEGIC-LOGISTICAL DEBATE 683

troops and 2,300 tanks in a single wave.61

Behind these estimates lay a substantial

production achievement. Between August

and December 1942 production had been

lifted from its summer doldrums and accelerated at a rate unprecedented in the

history of naval construction. LST's had

begun to emerge from U.S. yards in October; 43 were completed in December, 46

in January, and production was to reach

a peak of 61 in February 1943. Of the

large infantry craft (LCI(L)), over 150

had been completed by the end of 1942,

and a peak of 70 was reached in January

1943. Production of the tank lighters

(LCT(5)'s) had attained a high volume in

September and before the end of the year

the July 1942 program of 470 had been

substantially completed. About 90 of these

craft were already in the United Kingdom. Completion of the LST and LCI(L)

programs was expected during the spring.

Small personnel and vehicle craft (LCP's

and LCV's) were available in large numbers; production of the slightly larger

LCM(3) was lagging. Amphibious vehicles and tractors were coming into production. Total tonnages delivered rose

from 24,443 in September to 57,863 in

November and 85,000 in December; production in the last half of 1942 was twenty

times that in the first half. Before the end

of the year the diminishing urgency of the

landing craft program was reflected in its

decline on the Navy's Shipbuilding Precedence List from first to third place. In

December a large part of the LST program, already reduced from 490 to 390

units, was removed from the category of

programs demanding expediting, and in

January landing craft disappeared from

the President's "Number One" list.62

Two of the newer types of craft deserve

mention. The landing craft, assault (LCA),

was a small armored vessel, about forty

feet long, equipped with a ramp and

capable of rapidly discharging thirty-six

men onto a beach. Developed by the

British, and as yet without an American

counterpart, it was considered by British

experts as indispensable to any attack on a

well-defended beach. Its range was limited—fifty miles at the most—making it

primarily an instrument of ship-to-shore

assault, requiring combat loaders to transport it to the scene of action. The Americans had developed a new vessel, the landing craft, vehicle and personnel (LCVP),

combining the functions of the small personnel and vehicle craft. It had the additional feature that it could be completely

knocked down for shipment overseas and

assembled with light tools by inexperienced personnel. As many as five hundred

LCVP's could be loaded on one Liberty

ship. The range of the LCVP was short,

however, and while it was seaworthy

enough, its passengers in a choppy sea

would soon be unfit for combat. It had

been designed primarily with an eye to

operations in the Pacific, where shipping

space was at a premium and small boats

were needed in large numbers, and at

Casablanca was not considered suitable

for the forthcoming Mediterranean operations.63

61

 (1) Min cited n. 32(2). (2) Min cited n. 35. (3)

Memo for file, Capt Warren, 16 Dec 42, sub: Availability of Landing Craft, 18 Shipg file, I, Case 95,

Plng Div ASF, Job A46-371. (4) Memo, Col Maddocks for ACofS OPD, 24 Jan 43, sub: Availability of

Landing Craft . . . , Case 6, Item la, Exec 3. (5)

See below, App. A-7. 62

 Mowry, Landing Craft and the War Production

Board, WPB Sp Study 11, pp. 12-22 and App. C. 63

 (1) CCS 161 cited n. 32(7). (2) Min, 53d mtg

JCS, 17 Jan 43; 57th mtg, 21 Jan 43. (3) Min cited n.

31(1). (4) Memo, Capt Warren for Col Appleman, 18

Dec 42, sub: Landing Craft, OCT 370.5 Mvmt BOLERO. (5) Coll and Rosenthal, Engr I, draft ch., "The

Engineer Amphibian Command," OCMH. (6) See

below, App. A-7. (7) Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack,

pp. 60-61.

The original model of the LCA dated back to 1938.
684 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Abundance, as always, was relative.

The offensives contemplated for 1943

would almost all have to be launched

from or across the water—in the Pacific,

the Mediterranean, the English Channel,

and the Bay of Bengal. At Casablanca it

was too early to fix requirements for all

these proposed operations, but certain

limitations became clearly evident. British plans for HUSKY indicated a need for

over 1,000 craft of various sizes, including

100 LST's, 120 LCI(L)'s, and 72 LCT's,

besides 26 combat loaders and several

more specialized vessels. The requirement

for LST's, at least, seemed likely to conflict with the U.S. Navy's plans in the Pacific and with training in the United Kingdom. The British promised to produce

ample numbers of LCA's (30 to 40 per

month) to meet any Mediterranean requirements by summer, but engines would

have to come from the United States—

about 400 during the next four months, a

stiff demand. A major bottleneck, of uncertain dimensions, was looming in crewtraining, largely because of dislocations in

the United Kingdom during the mounting of TORCH. In the States, the Navy was

unwilling for the Army engineers to continue to train boat crews, but was unable

to give an unequivocal commitment to

meet the requirements for impending operations in the Mediterranean. All these

problems were discussed at Casablanca;

none was settled. Landing craft stood near

the top of the headache list passed on to

the HUSKY planners.64

A 1943 ROUNDUP or SLEDGEHAMMER

was an even more uncertain, and certainly

a bigger, proposition. At Casablanca General Eisenhower indicated his belief, based

mainly on the experience of TORCH, that

a cross-Channel assault would have to be

twice as strong as earlier planned, and

that most of the craft used in the first wave

probably would be lost. The strong commando forces maintained by the British

in home waters would be inadequate for

such an effort, and their even larger mobile amphibious forces were earmarked

for operations in the Mediterranean during the summer. If a cross-Channel operation was to be mounted in late summer,

following amphibious operations in the

Mediterranean, it evidently would be necessary to shift most of the landing vessels

used in the Mediterranean back to the

British Isles and refit them. Lord Louis

Mountbatten was sure this task would

consume three months. The problem of

timing thus posed would be baffling

enough if only a relatively modest undertaking such as the attack on Sardinia were

in view. With the decision to attempt

Sicily instead, the problems became virtually insoluble—at any rate, Casablanca

produced no solution. Three types of crossChannel operations, it was agreed, were

hypothetically possible in 1943—hit-andrun raids, an opportunistic attack with

whatever forces were available, and the

seizure of a bridgehead on the Cotentin

peninsula preliminary to a major invasion

the following spring. The U.S. Joint

Chiefs recorded that they saw no prospect

of finding or manning the landing vessels

needed for the two larger types of operations, if HUSKY were to be carried out.

Cross-Channel attacks in 1943 receded far

back into the realm of the improbable.65

64

 (1) Min, 32d mtg JGS, 16 Jan 43; 53d mtg, 17

Jan 43. (2) Min, 58th mtg CGS, 16 Jan 43; 67th mtg

with annex, 22 Jan 43; 68th mtg, 23 Jan 43. (3) CCS

161 cited n. 32(7). (4) CCS 161/1 cited n. 32(8). (5)

Coll and Rosenthal, Engr I, draft ch., "The Engineer

Amphibian Command," OCMH. 65

 (1) Memo cited n. 28(4). (2) Memo cited n.

39(1). (3) Outline plan cited n. 39(5). (4) CCS 135/1

cited n. 10(3). (5) JPS 106 cited n. 4. (6) Min, 52d mtg

JCS, 16 Jan 43; 59th mtg, 23 Jan 43. (7) Min, 58th

mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43; 67th mtg, 22 Jan 43. (8) Min

cited n. 23(2). (9) CCS 167, 22 Jan 43, title: Continental Opns in 1943.
CASABLANCA AND THE STRATEGIC-LOGISTICAL DEBATE 685

TABLE 24—TENTATIVE ALLOCATIONS OF AMERICAN LANDING CRAFT AT CASABLANCA

CONFERENCE

British allocations included those for India. Allocations for 1944 were highly tentative. The British had requested, by August 1943,

150 LST's, 194 LCI's, 150 LCT's, and 646 LCM(3)'s, as well as smaller types. Note that not all of production of LCT(5)'s was allocated.

Source: (1) Min, 67th mtg CCS, with annex, 22 Jan 43. (2) Memo, Somervell for Styer, no date, Annex 2, JCS 1942-44 folder, Hq

ASF.

The amphibious operations in Burma,

tentatively scheduled for November, posed

an even more difficult problem of timing

in the movement of amphibious shipping

and landing craft to the Bay of Bengal

from the Atlantic and Mediterranean.

Before Casablanca the American staffs

doubted whether the transfer could be

made in time, if either a cross-Channel

operation or further campaigns in the

Mediterranean were undertaken in 1943.

But since the JCS made an issue of the

Burma offensive, as part of their insistence

upon a stronger effort against Japan, they

were driven into the position of having

to underwrite ANAKIM, the Burma operation, with respect to those requirements

the British could not themselves meet—

notably landing craft. Estimated requirements included thirty LST's, ten LCT(5)'s,

and twenty LCM(3)'s. The British, indeed, sought concrete assurances on this

score, and expressed pointed fears lest the

proposed American operations in the Pacific following Rabaul might compete with

ANAKIM. The Americans were confident

that output would meet all requirements

by the end of 1943. Pressed further, they

promised to divert vessels from the Pacific

to Burma if necessary. The British persisted: would the United States, Sir Alan

Brooke asked, provide all the craft "over

and above those needed in all other operations under consideration, including

Roundup?"

 66

 Admiral Cooke assured him

that they would be provided.67 (Table 24)

To the world in general the Allied leaders at Casablanca proclaimed their hope

that Germany would be defeated in 1943.

But their program of action scarcely supported this aim. It was agreed that the assembling of an invasion force in the British

Isles was to proceed as rapidly as possible,

but subject to the prior claims of operations in the Mediterranean, the Pacific,

66

 Min, 65th mtg CCS, 21 Jan 43. 67

 (1) Outline Plan, title: Retaking Burma, in SYMBOL: Casablanca Bk., Vol. I, Tab F-8, Exec 6. (2)

Min, 53d mtg JCS, 17 Jan 43; 54th mtg, 18 Jan 43.

(3) Min, 58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43; 59th mtg, 17 Jan

43; 60th mtg, 18 Jan 43; 65th mtg, 21 Jan 43. (4) CCS

145, rpt by Br JPS, 17 Jan 43, title: Opns in Burma.

(5) CCS 164, 20 Jan 43, title: Opn ANAKIM, Provision

of Forces. (6) CCS 164/1, 21 Jan 43, same title.
686 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

and the Far East and an enlarged program of aid to the Soviet Union. The necessity of protecting and exploiting the sea

route in the Mediterranean and the conquests in North Africa demanded further

operations in that region, with a further

investment of forces, shipping, and landing craft. This the American chiefs recognized, despite their misgivings over being

drawn more deeply into a theater they regarded as "neither vital nor final," by

agreeing to the attack upon Sicily as the

next step in that region.68 Fearing, moreover, that Japan, if given a respite, might

be able in the coming year to make her

new conquests impregnable, the JCS were

determined to press the war in the Pacific

and the Far East more vigorously than had

been done in 1942, even at the risk of

prolonging the war in Europe. They succeeded in winning from the British a tentative commitment to contribute to this

effort by an offensive in Burma.

This program for 1943, even though its

requirements could not yet be precisely

measured, promised to spread Allied resources at least as widely as they had been

spread in 1942, and, in effect, to carry forward both wars on several fronts rather

than seek an overwhelming concentration

of effort upon either one—or, still less,

upon a single front of one war. The final

decision in Europe, the Americans expected, would be sought only in 1944

through an invasion across the English

Channel, after Germany had been weakened by more than a year of heavy bombing, blockade, campaigns of attrition in

the Mediterranean, perhaps the loss of her

chief satellite, Italy, and the enormous

drain of the war in the USSR. Somervell's

tentative schedule for deploying U.S.

Army forces, approved as a basis for the

development of detailed schedules, envisaged that by the end of 1943 the build-up

of American strategic air forces in the

United Kingdom would be substantially

completed, the administrative establishment for U.S. forces there greatly expanded, and the amassing of an invasion force

well advanced by the shipment (mainly

during the last three or four months of the

year) of as many as nineteen U.S. ground

divisions.

Casablanca thus foreshadowed, if it did

not clearly delineate, a compromise strategy for the European war, blending the

British concept of attrition and peripheral

attacks with the American concept of

frontal assault in overwhelming force.

Some of the American planners lamented

this compromise as a surrender to British

views. As General Wedemeyer remarked:

"We lost our shirts . . . we came, we listened and we were conquered."

 69

 But

given the American insistence upon an

augmented effort in the Pacific, the implication that a decisive cross-Channel invasion could have been mounted in 1943

under any reasonable allotment of resources to other theaters was not borne out

by the best available estimates. In early

1943 it was all too easy to forget how

flimsy had been the logistical basis of the

original BOLERO-ROUNDUP plans of March

and April 1942. The logistical estimates of

the Casablanca planners, it almost immediately appeared, were just as flimsy.

68

 Min cited n. 32(2). 69

 Ltr cited n. 30.
CHAPTER XXVI

After Casablanca

In the weeks immediately following the

Casablanca Conference, the strategic program there laid down—build-up in the

British Isles, overwhelming air bombardment of Germany, relentless offensive

against the submarine, aggressive advance

in the western Mediterranean, preparation

for an offensive in Burma, a rapid close-in

upon Rabaul, and a push into the Central

Pacific—seemed to be faltering. In the

Pacific, the Guadalcanal and Buna-Gona

operations came to a successful conclusion

early in the year, and in February forces

from Guadalcanal occupied the Russell

Islands, next step up the Solomons ladder

on the way to Rabaul, without opposition.

But the theater commanders' estimates of

the forces required to push rapidly on and

take Rabaul, largely glossed over in the

optimistic timetable drawn up at Casablanca, now demanded attention. The

whole Pacific program remained in suspense, early in March, awaiting the verdict of a conference in Washington (the

Pacific Military Conference) between

Army and Navy planners there and representatives from the theaters. In Burma,

meanwhile, the British drive toward Akyab, down the coast from the Indian

border, had made no progress, Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell was becoming

more and more reluctant to undertake the

planned offensive in the Chindwin valley,

and the feud between Stilwell and Chennault was reaching a critical stage. On the

other side of the world plans were maturing for the attack on Sicily, but the campaign in Tunisia during February and

March held small promise of the early termination upon which those plans hinged.

In the Kasserine-Feriana area in midFebruary, the 1st Armored Division suffered severe reverses and the enemy held

the initiative throughout that month and

well into March. The British Eighth

Army, meanwhile, was halted before the

formidable Mareth Line defenses in the

south. With troops and shipping being diverted to this theater, the build-up of

American forces in the British Isles slowed

almost to a standstill.1

Deployment Planning Adrift

With operations thus going awry, the

deployment schedule approved at Casablanca began to break down. Troop movements during the first three months of

1943 flowed in different directions from

those planned, and, in the aggregate,

lagged behind the Casablanca forecast.

(Chart 12) Late in February a committee

of Army planners under OPD's direction

drew up a new schedule, purportedly in

consonance with changing requirements

1

 (1) Memo, Wedemeyer for Marshall, 16 Mar 43,

sub: Conf on Opns in Pac, ABC 370.26 (7-8-43), 4.

(2) Churchill, Hinge of Fate, Bk. II, Ch. 19. (3) Howe,

Operations in Northwest Africa. (4) Miller, CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul, Ch. II. (5) See

above, Chs. XV, XIX.
688 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

CHART 12—DISSOLUTION OF THE CASABLANCA DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM: FIRST QUARTER 1943

Source: (1) CCS 172, Note by Somervell, 22 Jan 43, title: Shipg Capabilities for Bolero Build-up (2) Contl Div, ASF, Statistical Review, World War II, App. G, pp. 121-22.

and with recent slashes of about 137,000

troops in authorized garrison strengths in

various areas. It provided for a somewhat

heavier deployment to the Mediterranean

and for an enormous increase in strength

in the South and Southwest Pacific Areas,

while in the European theater it sought to

meet the expanded strategic bombardment program of the Army Air Forces (involving an increase in AAF deployment

from the 172,000 troops estimated at Casablanca to about 500,000) without wrecking the movement of balanced ground

forces to the British Isles.2 (Chart 13)

Somervell's characterization of the new

schedule was outspoken. "This deployment," he told OPD, "was obviously made

without regard to shipping."

 3 Admittedly

the committee's aim had been to make up

a schedule "to implement the plans agreed

on at Casablanca," and its examination of

current shipping estimates had been somewhat cursory.4

 The result was a deployment curve that ran diametrically counter

to the curve of indicated shipping capabilities. It provided for an enormous volume

of movements—over 600,000—during the

second quarter, when all shipping certainly

would be tight, and a diminishing volume

during the second half of the year, when

2

 Memo, OPD for listed offs, 23 Feb 43, sub: Deployment of U.S. Army Forces in 1943, with atchd

Apps. A and C, ABC 320.2 (3-14-43) Sec 1. 3

 Memo, Somervell for Handy, 3 Mar 43, sub:

Scheme of Deployment for U.S. Army Forces in 1943,

ACofS OPD 1942-44 folder, Hq ASF. 4

 Memo, unsigned, no addressee, 6 Mar 43, sub:

Comments on Recommendations of SOS and AAF,

Item 16, Exec 1.
AFTER CASABLANCA 689

CHART 13—THE EFFORT TO FORMULATE A DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM: FEBRUARY-MARCH 1943

OPD VERSUS SOS ESTIMATES

Source: (1) Memo, OPD for listed offs, 23 Feb 43, sub: Deployment of U.S. Army Forces in 1943. with atchd Apps. A and C, ABC 320.2 (3-14-43) Sec. 1. (2) Memo. Somervell for Handy, 3 Mar 43, sub: Scheme of Deployment for U.S. Army Forces in 1943, ACofS OPD 1942-44 folder, Hq ASF.

cargo shipping almost certainly would become increasingly abundant. In an effort

to maintain the flow of ground forces to the

United Kingdom, the committee hoped to

ship 325,000 troops there in the second

quarter alone and almost as many in the

third quarter, taking advantage of more

ample port capacity during the spring and

summer months. These second-quarter

objectives were astronomical, and the

scheduling of heavy movements during the

third quarter, as well, nullified any chance

of spreading a deficit. The SOS staff calculated that in the second quarter, even with

reduced shipments to static areas, there

would be a deficit in troop-carrying capacity of 250,000, with a proportionate dearth

of cargo space. In the last quarter a surplus loomed. The new program thus

meant waste at both ends—troops and

equipment waiting for transport early in

the schedule, unused space going begging

late in the schedule.5

In his counterplan Somervell tried to

set up a schedule more in conformity with

shipping expectations. (Chart 13) He drastically pared down the planned deployment to the Pacific in the second and third

quarters in order to augment that to the

Mediterranean and to salvage part of the

5

 (1) Memo cited n. 3. (2) Memo, Gross for Somervell, 26 Feb 43, sub: Deployment of U.S. Army Forces

in 1943, Item 16, Exec 1.
690 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

larger ground force objective in the United

Kingdom. This would require a transfer

of shipping from the Pacific to the Atlantic. Convinced of the necessity for a larger

American contribution to the war in

Burma, he urged that U.S. troops be

transferred there from the Pacific. By the

end of March, he pointed out, there would

be in the South and Southwest Pacific

340,000 U.S. troops, including marines,

not to mention four Australian and New

Zealand divisions, available for unlimited

service, and seven militia divisions, for

home defense. The scale of the proposed

effort in the Pacific seemed to him out of

all proportion to the ends in view. It appeared that the Navy intended to move

250,000 more of its own forces into the

Pacific during 1943. "It is impossible for

me to understand," Somervell bluntly declared, "how they can possibly use this

number."

 6

Somervell's suggestions were not kindly

received in OPD. The charge that the

committee had ignored obvious shipping

limitations provoked evident resentment,

and his views on strategy were dismissed

with the curt comment: "This was not

provided for in the Casablanca Conference."

 7 But the shipping problem could

not be so cavalierly dismissed. Since November, when losses had reached a catastrophic level, the main trend had been

downward during December, January,

and part of February. But late in February the wolf packs struck with deadly

effect in the North Atlantic, and in March

losses shot upward beyond the one-million

ton mark. While this, as it proved, was the

expiring gasp of the U-boat, so much could

hardly be known at the time. At this juncture, when shipping losses were soaring,

the whole question of shipping assistance

to Britain came unexpectedly to a head.8

British Imports: The "Bombshell"

For almost seven weeks after the Casablanca Conference, the monumental misunderstanding concerning the scale of

American shipping aid to Britain in 1943

remained undisturbed. Somervell left the

conference on a tour of North Africa, the

Middle East, and India still under the impression that the United States was committed to carry only about 2.5 million

dead-weight tons of British imports, instead of the 7.2 million tons that War Shipping Administration, under the President's

instructions, had actually undertaken to

carry. Somervell's deployment schedule

for U.S. Army forces in 1943, and therefore, in considerable measure, the whole

Casablanca strategic program, rested upon

this erroneous assumption.9

The awakening came in stages and

almost by accident. On 19 February Lewis

Douglas of WSA had a talk with Somervell, just returned from his trip. Somervell

wanted to set up a special convoy of

twenty-five ships to carry matériel and

supplies to the French in North Africa.

Douglas was dubious—if the demand were

met in full, he said, ships would probably

have to be taken from British imports, and

this, under the arrangement Somervell no

doubt knew of, could only be done with

the President's consent. Somervell looked

blank, asked "What arrangement?" and,

when reminded of the President's letter of

30 November, suggested that this had now

been superseded by his agreement at Casablanca with Lord Leathers.10

 He showed

6

 (1) Memo cited n. 3. (2) See above, Ch. XIX. 7

 Memo cited n. 4. 8

 (1) Ibid. (2) For shipping losses, see below, App.

H.

9

 See above, Ch. XXV. 10

 Douglas' notes on conf with Somervell, 19 Feb 43,

Army Reqmts folder, WSA Douglas File.
AFTER CASABLANCA 691

Douglas a copy of CCS 172, his Casablanca deployment paper, containing the

heavily qualified British offer to contribute

1.6 million measurement tons of cargo

shipping to the BOLERO program. Douglas

discreetly refrained from argument, promised to do what he could to find ships for

the North Africa convoy, and, after some

desultory talk about Somervell's trip, hurried back to his office.11

Within a few days, after a quick check

with Sir Arthur Salter in Washington and

an exchange of cables with Harriman in

London, Douglas had the British version

of the Casablanca bargain—namely, that

any British assistance to the BOLERO program would depend on their having a surplus of shipping after meeting all their own

needs. This, as Douglas himself well knew,

was a somewhat unreal condition, since

those needs could not be met without the

loan of American shipping—though Douglas may have wondered why Lord Leathers, who now stressed its unreality, had

been persuaded at Casablanca to agree to

it. Meanwhile, faced by an alarming lag in

the flow of British imports, WSA was

drawing up new schedules greatly increasing the amount of American tonnage to be

diverted to British use during the critical

first half of the year.12

Yet almost two more weeks passed before

Somervell and Gross realized what had

happened. Douglas had told Somervell

enough on the 19th to indicate the actual

scope of the American commitment to

maintain British imports; he may have assumed that Somervell now understood the

situation. As for the special convoy, with

most of the needed vessels in sight, Douglas was anxious to avoid asking the President to invoke the escape clause of the

30 November commitment in order to take

the remainder from the British import

program. While this matter was still pending, Gross notified Douglas on the 27th

that the Army would appreciate WSA

pressure upon the British to make good

their "commitments" of BOLERO assistance. Douglas replied that the latest messages from Harriman offered little hope on

this score in the light of the current deterioration of the British import program. Still

later Douglas (according to his own account) again explained the British position

to Somervell, and Somervell, on 9 March,

approved a cable Douglas sent to Harriman noting his (Somervell's) understanding of that position. But what neither Gross

nor even Somervell (despite his discussions

with Douglas on 19 February and subse11

 (1) Ibid. (2) For the North African convoy (UGS61⁄2), see above, Chs. XVII-XVIII. 12

 (1) Douglas' notes on conf with Salter, 19 Feb 43,

Army Reqmts folder, WSA Douglas File. (2) Msg,

Harriman to Douglas, 23 Feb 43. (3) Memo, Salter for

Douglas, 25 Feb 43. Last two in Allocs Gen folder,

WSA Douglas File.
692 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

quently) understood up to this point, apparently, was the extent of the gap, in

terms of actual tonnages, between the

amount of American shipping they, and

the amount that the British, expected

would have to be loaned to meet Britain's

full import requirements. Precisely what

caused the light suddenly to dawn is not

clear, but on the 10th Gross scribbled a

startled notation to Somervell:

Lord Leathers made his promise to you

with U.S. help to the extent of lifting

7,000,000 tons in mind. You accepted it with

that help reduced to 30 sailings a month in

mind, or about 2,400,000 tons lift. The whole

matter of U.S. help in the U.K. import pro- gram must come out in open for decision by

the CCS.13

The British, meanwhile, were growing

worried. Late in February Eisenhower

sent in a request for still another special

convoy (UGF-71⁄2) of from thirty to thirtyeight ships to sail in April. This made a

decision on the import program unavoidable at a time when other decisions for

combined allocations of shipping were

pressing for attention—for the ANAKIM and

HUSKY build-up movements, which must

shortly begin, and for reviving the flagging

BOLERO program. Finally, there was a

growing feeling in British Government circles that a new and definitive division of

shipping resources between the two countries was imperative. A War Cabinet paper

stated about this time:

Our tonnage constantly dwindles, the

American increases. We have undertaken

arduous and essential operations encouraged

by the belief that we could rely on American

shipbuilding to see us through. But we must

know where we stand. We cannot live from

hand to mouth on promises limited by pro- visos. This . . . may in the long run even

imperil good relations. Unless we can get a

satisfactory long-term settlement, British

ships will have to be withdrawn from their

present military service even though our

agreed operations are crippled or prejudiced.14

On 12 March Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden arrived in Washington to discuss this and other matters, and on the

same day the British brought before the

Combined Chiefs their estimated shipping

requirements for carrying out their share of

the Casablanca strategic program for 1943.

Their presentation was masterly. Its point

of departure was that the import program

of 27 million tons was above discussion,

and there was no allusion to current estimates, then under discussion with WSA,

that up to 9 million of the 27 million tons

of imports might have to be carried in

American shipping. The paper emphasized that the maintenance of Britain's

domestic war economy had always been

recognized by the leaders of both countries

as a first charge on coalition resources, and

it warned that the current rate of imports

held out little prospect of meeting even a

12-million-ton total by midyear, which

the British considered imperative if the

quota for the entire year were to be met.

Over and above import assistance and

13

 (1) Note dated 10 Mar 43 on msg, Douglas to

Harriman, 9 Mar 43, Shipg 1941-43 folder, Hq ASF.

(2) Douglas' notes on telephone conv with Hopkins,

19 Feb 43. (3) Douglas' notes on conf with Gross, 1

Mar 43. Last two in Army Reqmts folder, WSA

Douglas File. (4) Douglas' notes on telephone conv

with Hopkins, 22 Feb 43, Hopkins folder, WSA Douglas File. (5) Memo, Land and Douglas for President,

23 Feb 43. (6) Ltr, Gross to Douglas, 27 Feb 43. (7)

Msg, Douglas to Harriman, 3 Mar 43. (8) Msg, Harriman to Douglas, no date. Last four in Allocs Gen

folder, WSA Douglas File. 14

 (1) Douglas' notes cited n. 13(3). (2) Douglas'

notes on telephone conv with Somervell, 5 Mar 43,

Army Reqmts folder, WSA Douglas File. (3) Memo,

Salter for Douglas, 3 Mar 43, Allocs Gen folder, WSA

Douglas File. (4) Msg cited n. 13(8). (5) Cabinet

paper quoted in Hancock and Gowing, British War

Economy, p. 430.
AFTER CASABLANCA 693

other current commitments of American

aid in the Indian Ocean, Africa, and Australasia, the British listed the following

additional requirements for American

shipping:

(a) Fourteen sailings per month to the

eastern Mediterranean in April, May, and

June for maintenance of HUSKY in its early

stages;

(b) twenty-five sailings per month in

April, May, and June, and nineteen per

month in July and August, to the Indian

Ocean for ANAKIM build-up.15

Moreover, no British cargo shipping would

be forthcoming for BOLERO. Without the

requested American aid, it was stated,

Britain would be able only to carry out her

share of the attack on Sicily (but not sustain it), maintain her forces in the Mediterranean and elsewhere on the current

meager scale, and continue through May

only her present contribution of ten ships

a month to the Murmansk convoys. The

war in southeast Asia would come to a

standstill. As for the implications of carrying out the planned major operations in

the Mediterranean and Burma without

the requested American aid and regardless

of the cost, the British regarded this as an

academic question since it would mean,

they said, abandoning the Murmansk

convoys immediately and putting their

forces in North Africa (other than those to

be used in Sicily) on half rations of everything throughout the spring and summer.16

To the American staffs, hurriedly calculating the probable effects upon the American part of the Casablanca program if the

British demands were met, the implications seemed equally disastrous. The Casablanca deployment schedule had contemplated that some 1.4 million Army troops

would go overseas in 1943, and recent

tentative cuts in planned Navy deployment promised to add another 150,000 to

this figure—or, alternatively, to permit

raising British import assistance to about

five million tons. To divert American cargo

shipping to carry a further 2 million tons

of imports would reduce the Army's deployment by 225,000; to grant the tonnage

requested for building up British forces in

the Mediterranean and India would reduce it by 375,000. Taken together, the

British proposals thus threatened to cut a

potential American deployment of over

1.5 million in 1943 down to .8 million, or

by almost half. Moreover, the cut would

be made primarily in the critical spring

months, when shipping would be at its

tightest and when, according to present

plans, the battle in Tunisia was to reach its

climax, preparations for HUSKY were to be

completed, and the build-up of air forces

in Britain was to hit full stride. During

these months, if British demands were met

in full, the movement of American forces

overseas would virtually cease.17

The American reaction to the British

proposals, therefore, was violent. Subcommittee members referred to them as "the

British bombshell."

 18

 In CCS conclave the

Americans held that the irreducible minimum of British imports was not a question

to be determined unilaterally by the Brit15

 CCS 183/1, memo by Br CsofS, 12 Mar 43, title:

Review of Availability of United Nations Shipg. 16

 (1) Suppl to min, 75th mtg CCS, 12 Mar 43. (2)

CCS 183/1 cited n. 15. (3) Incl B to CCS 183/2, rpt

by JMTC, 18 Mar 43, title: Review of Availability of

United Nations Shipg. (4) For Eden's mission, see

Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 707ff.

The proposal also included the use of thirty U.S.

vessels in the Indian Ocean-Red Sea area for the

British build-up for HUSKY, in exchange for an equivalent number of sailings to be deducted from U.S.-toU.K. movements; and an indeterminate number of

sailings for supply shipments to Turkey. 17

 (1) Memo, Gross for Marshall, 17 Mar 43, sub:

CCS 183/1 . . . , ABC 560 (2-26-43) Sec 1A. (2)

CCS 183/2 cited n. 16(3). 18

 Notes on 66th mtg JPS, 24 Mar 43, ABC 560 (2-

26-43) Sec 1A.
694 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ish, but should be weighed in the light of

other demands. Admiral King even challenged the premise that maintenance of

the British economy at a given level was a

first charge on Allied resources. Somervell's view was that American shipping for

British imports should be provided only

"to the extent that the United States thinks

is necessary,"

 19

 and the staffs, in presenting their estimates, pointedly noted that if

American shipping assistance to Britain

were held to current commitments, U.S.

Army deployment in 1943 might reach

two million. General Gross, according to

Douglas who saw him immediately after

the British submitted their proposals, was

"very much disturbed and upset,"

 20

 and

in a meeting of the Combined Military

Transportation Committee three days later

his complaints against the British (in the

presence of their representatives), for having concealed at Casablanca the extent of

their dependence on American shipping,

were couched in language so blunt that

the committee decided to consider most of

the discussion off the record. Gross saw no

reason why the British import program

should be sacrosanct. "If they were to exert

their utmost endeavors," he wrote to Marshall, pointing to the 4-million-ton gap

between 1942 imports and the 1943 goal,

"the call upon us would be equal to ...

shipping to lift 3,400,000 tons of imports,"

not seven or nine million.21 A sacrifice of

even three million tons of imports, according to staff estimates, would free enough

shipping to meet Britain's military needs

in full.22

General Marshall showed Gross' suggestion to Sir John Dill. The latter remarked, with exquisite tact, that it was "a

good straightforward and objective review

of this baffling problem" and merely reminded Marshall that the War Cabinet

decision on a 27-million-ton import quota

for 1943 was his "Bible," and that the program imposed deep cuts upon civilian

production in Britain in order to build up

the production of munitions by some 50

percent. "I am most anxious," Dill concluded, "that all our cards should be put

on the table. The shipping problem is terribly serious and time is rushing by."

 23

Military Operations Versus War Economy

American military leaders needed no

such reminder. The Casablanca strategic

program for 1943 seemed, in mid-March,

to be going up in smoke. While the staffs

were working out their estimates, the Pacific Military Conference in Washington

was struggling with General MacArthur's

new plan for the reduction of Rabaul

(ELKTON). This called for a series of five

operations in which forces from Southwest

Pacific and South Pacific were to converge

on New Britain, Bougainville, and New

Ireland, and finally take Rabaul on New

Britain. The plan lacked a timetable, but

listed the ground and air forces needed

and stipulated that they must all be assembled in the theater in advance—22-2/3 Allied ground divisions and 45 Allied air

groups, which was 7 more divisions and

30 more air groups than were then in the

two areas.24

19

 Suppl cited n. 16(1). 20

 Douglas' notes on conf with Gross, 12 Mar 43,

Army Reqmts folder, WSA Douglas File. 21

 Memo cited n. 17(1). 22

 (1) Suppl cited n. 16(1). (2) Douglas' notes cited

n. 20. (3) Memo, Keating for Douglas, 30 Mar 43,

CMTC folder, WSA Douglas File. (4) Memo cited n.

17(1). (5) Notes cited n. 18. (6) CCS 183/2 cited n.

16(3). (7) Rpt by JSSC, 23 Mar 43, sub: Review of

Availability of United Nations Shipg, ABC 560 (2-26-

43) Sec 1A. 23

 Note, Dill to Marshall, 18 Mar 43, Shipg 1941-

43 folder, Hq ASF. 24

 (1) See min, 76th mtg CCS, 19 Mar 43. (2) See

also notes cited n. 18. (3) ELKTON Plan for Seizure

and Occupation of New Britain-New Ireland-New

Guinea Area, 28 Feb 43, Item 1H, Exec 2. (4) Miller,

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul, Ch. II.
AFTER CASABLANCA 695

The Army planners regarded this formidable list with dismay. Sufficient ground

troops could be provided, but to meet the

air requirements seemed out of the question; in any case, shipping was not available to move and supply all these combat

forces and the elaborate supporting establishment that would have to go with them.

Landing craft and combat shipping could

not be released from the Mediterranean

until after the Sicily operation; to do so

even then would interfere with further

operations there, in northwestern Europe,

and in Burma. After re-examining the

shipping situation the JPS concluded that

by skimping and careful scheduling it

might be possible either to send one additional division to the South Pacific and

two to the Southwest, along with a few

additional aircraft, or to build up air

strength in the South Pacific at the expense of the additional division. There was

also a faint possibility, under the second

alternative, of building up air strength

somewhat in both areas with no more than

the existing scale of service support. Preferring the second alternative, the Joint

Chiefs asked the Pacific representatives

what they could accomplish with these resources. The latter replied that they would

only be able to gain a lodgment on southeastern Bougainville, occupy the eastern

part of New Guinea as far as Madang,

push on to Woodlark and Kiriwina in the

Trobriand Islands, and advance to Cape

Gloucester in western New Britain. This

program (in essence, Task Two of the July

1942 directive) was embodied in a JCS

directive to MacArthur and Halsey on

28 March, and became the strategic

agenda for 1943 in the South and Southwest Pacific. MacArthur was given strategic direction of the whole operation, leaving Halsey in direct command of forces

operating in the South Pacific. Admiral

Nimitz was to retain control of all naval

forces in the Pacific except those assigned

by JCS for these operations. Rabaul evidently had become an objective for 1944,

not the spring of 1943, and the Navy's

plans for an advance into the Central

Pacific remained undefined. Preparations

for the more limited task, laid down at

Casablanca, of making the Aleutians "as

secure as may be," meanwhile moved forward the impending attack on Attu.25

With the Pacific timetable thus stretching into the indefinite future, American

interest in Burma now became more

pointed. But, despite Somervell's optimism

regarding the possibility of creating an

American ground sector in that theater, all

studies of the problem of moving forces

there emphasized the enormous logistical

costs of even a modest undertaking and, by

contrast, the far greater forces that could

be built up either in the British Isles or in

the Mediterranean by a comparable logistical effort.26

 The war against the European Axis, meanwhile, seemed to have

settled down to a localized effort against

Germany's satellite, Italy. BOLERO clearly

was faltering. By March the flow of American troops across the North Atlantic had

dwindled almost to the vanishing point for

lack of the escorts diverted to North African convoys, and the promise of British

assistance in cargo shipping starting in

April had now evaporated. In view of the

magnitude of Britain's shipping needs, and

the expanding demands of the strategic air

25

 (1) CCS 168, 22 Jan 43, title: Conduct of the War

in Pac Theater in 1943. (2) Miller, CARTWHEEL: The

Reduction of Rabaul, Ch. II. (3) Memo, Col Blizzard

for Gen Wedemeyer, 19 Mar 43, sub: Est of Sit in Pac

1943-44, ABC 381 Strategy Sec Papers (1-7-43), 2-

95. (4) Min cited n. 24(1). (5) Craven and Cate, AAF

IV, pp. 129-35, 151-53, 207-09. (6) JCS 238/5/D, 28

Mar 43, title: Plan for Opns for the Seizure of the

Solomon Islands-New Guinea-New Britain-New Ireland Area. 26

 See above, Ch. XIX.
696 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

offensive, BOLERO seemed likely to remain

in virtual suspense until late in the year.

On 17 March the OPD planners concluded that a six-division balanced force

was probably the maximum expectation

for the build-up of American ground

troops in Britain by the end of the year,

and that only two or three divisions could

be ready for an August 1943 operation.27

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee,

reviewing the whole situation late in

March, listed eight developments that had

upset the Casablanca strategic program:

the alarming increase in shipping losses,

the stubborn resistance of the enemy in

Tunisia, the mounting costs of HUSKY, the

revived German offensive in the USSR,

the collapse of plans for an early capture

of Rabaul, the consequent retarding of the

Pacific timetable, the British slow-down in

Burma, and the delay in amassing American air forces in the British Isles. "The

overall strategic situation," the committee

observed, "or more exactly the capabilities

of the Allies to control that situation have

considerably deteriorated since Casablanca," largely because the planners at that

time had "overestimated prospective resources, particularly shipping, and underestimated the demands on them."

 28

In this perspective, many of the American military began to feel that the time

had come to challenge the sacrosanct

character of the "war economy" programs.

Unless these could be made to yield up

some of the shipping frozen in their service,

the Casablanca strategic program seemed

likely to be crippled. The temper of this

feeling in the Army staff was revealed in

the outburst that greeted a proposal by the

Joint Strategic Survey Committee late in

March to distinguish between what it

called "commitments" and "undertakings." In "commitments" the committee

included such "first charges" as the battle

against the submarine, maintenance of

forces overseas, Soviet aid, and the war

economy programs. The committee suggested that "strategic undertakings"—that

is, military operations—be limited to what

could be supported by residual shipping

not needed for "strategic commitments."

 29

To some members of OPD this was "indicative of a state of mind which is highly

dangerous to the successful prosecution of

the war"—it smacked of "hoisting a white

flag" and "fleeing the battlefield."

 30

 General Handy, conceding the difficulties

raised by shipping losses and the recent

British demands, insisted nevertheless that

strenuous efforts must be made to find

shipping to carry out the Casablanca military program, if necessary by imposing

"severe cuts" on the nonmilitary programs.31

In the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the

Americans were pressing the same point.

In a wrangle over strategic priorities, they

sharply dissented from the British interpretation of the "first charge" label attached at Casablanca to the British war

economy and Soviet aid programs—

though they concentrated their attack

upon the former. These programs, they

argued with some heat, should not be

allowed to become irreducible fixed

charges but, like military requirements,

should be subject to adjustment. Strategy

must not be made the residuary legatee of

"war economy" arbitrarily sustained at a

27

 OPD Strategy Sec paper, 17 Mar 43, sub: Study

of Effects . . . , ABC 381 (9-25-41) Sec 6. 28

 JSSC 11, memo by JSSC for JCS, 22 Mar 43,

sub: Survey of Present Sit, ABC 381 (9-25-41) Sec 4. 29

 JSSC 11 cited n. 28. 30

 Notes atchd to memo, Handy for Marshall, 28

Mar 43, Case 55, Item 1 A, Exec 3. 31

 (1) Memo cited n. 30. (2) Related papers in Case

55, Item 1A, Exec 3.
AFTER CASABLANCA 697

level that, in a deteriorating military situation, might seem relatively luxurious.32

The American military leaders, however, were conscious that they were fighting a losing battle. In the argument over

priorities the British refused to budge. The

Americans secured only a devious amendment to the effect that the "first charge"

programs were somehow to be supported

"concurrently" with the other military

operations. At this juncture the problem

was snatched from them. Before the Joint

Chiefs could get their teeth into the substance of the new British shipping requirements, they were informed the President

had appointed a "special board" headed

by Harry Hopkins to look into the matter,

and there was nothing to do but await the

decision. Since, as Admiral King glumly

remarked, "shipping [is] at the root of

everything," it seemed not unlikely that

the new board would "reorientate strategic

policy" and "in effect supersede the Combined Chiefs."

 33

As it happened, the JCS were granted

one more move. Hopkins asked Somervell

to draw up a scheme of shipping allocations along the lines that the military

thought the situation demanded. Somervell proved a faithful spokesman for the

Joint Chiefs. His first plan, completed in

three days, offered little aid to the British

import program, and that little mainly at

the expense of the Soviet aid program.

Military operations, both American and

British, were to receive full support. This

scheme would leave only enough American shipping to move about 3.9 million

tons of British imports during 1943, almost

all in the final quarter of the year—or, if

the requested aid for ANAKIM were eliminated, about 5.4 million tons. It was not

pointed out that in the latter case, presumably, the British would then have to

divert some of their own shipping to India

at the expense of domestic imports.34

This plan Somervell replaced almost

immediately by a second one, dealing still

more harshly with British imports but

more tenderly with Soviet aid shipments.

Probably this was done in response to

hints from above that, in view of the recent

decision to suspend the northern convoys,

the President was not likely to be receptive to suggestions that, if adopted, would

further exacerbate the Russians. Somervell's second plan therefore provided a

handsome quid pro quo for Stalin by raising

the quota of sailings to the Persian Gulf

during the second half of 1943 well above

even the earlier estimates of the maximum

capacity of that route. He proposed to find

some of the shipping for this program and

for planned military operations by paring

down or eliminating various Western

Hemisphere services, lopping off twentythree sailings from the British ANAKIM

build-up in expectation of savings from

the opening of the Mediterranean, and reducing military shipments to Alaska and

areas of passive defense. The deepest cut

would be made in the allotment of American tonnage to carry British imports.

These were to be reduced to about 2.3

million tons during the last three quarters

of 1943, possibly supplemented by another

1.7 million tons sandwiched in with Army

32

 (1) See min cited n. 24(1). (2) See also, notes cited

n. 18. 33

 Min cited n. 24(1). 34

 (1) Memo, Somervell for Hopkins, 22 Mar 43. (2)

Memo, Somervell for CofS, 23 Mar 43. (3) Chart,

"Demands on U.S. Cargo Shipping . . . ," 22 Mar

43. All in ABC 560 (2-26-43) Sec 1A. The import figures included 800,000 tons allegedly delivered by

American shipping in the first quarter; Hancock and

Gowing, British War Economy, pp. 429-30, indicate

only 366,000 tons were delivered. (4) Memo, Maj Gen

Lucius D. Clay for Gen Styer, 20 Mar 43, sub: Conf

With Hopkins, Shipg 1941-43 folder, Hq ASF.
698 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

cargoes to the United Kingdom—making

an estimated grand total, with first quarter shipments, of 4.8 million tons. As in

the first plan, the bulk of the shipments

would be made in the last quarter of the

year.35

These recommendations were forwarded through the Chief of Staff, whom

Somervell also urged, in vigorous language, to assert the primacy of military

over war economy needs:

To divert shipping in excess of that required to meet the bare necessities of living

is indefensible on any ground. To do so will

jeopardize the success of the campaigns approved by the President at Casablanca, devitalize our offensive spirit, unnecessarily

prolong the death and destruction of the war,

and may well weaken the will of the Russians

to continue the struggle. We must strike in

1943 and 1944 and with all the force at our

command. Our troops must meet the Germans and Japanese on the battlefield and in

such numbers as to deliver telling and decisive blows. Shipping must be provided,

provided now and throughout the year, if

this is to be done.

The shipping recommended, Somervell

insisted, was the bare minimum needed

for planned military operations. "If we

are in this war to win, [the shipping] must

be provided. It is recommended that we

press for Presidential approval."

 36

The Joint Chiefs found Somervell's plan

wholly to their liking, but were uncertain

as to how to put the case to the President.

Admiral Leahy, who had consulted Hopkins, believed it would be tactless to recommend specific reductions in lend-lease

shipments or in British imports, since the

allocation of shipping belonged to WSA

jurisdiction; better merely to spell out

military requirements, leaving it to the

President to make the obvious inference

that nonmilitary programs must be cut.

King and Marshall, however, thought it

their duty to advise the President on the

whole problem, and their view prevailed.

Admiral Leahy accordingly wrote to the

President on 10 April that "drastic curtailment of civilian commitments as well

as reductions in U.S. shipping allocations

to the British import program" would be

necessary if the Casablanca decisions were

to be carried out.37 He appended Somervell's recommended scheme of allocations.38

The President Disposes

The military chiefs' plea came almost

two weeks late. The President, characteristically, had already made up his mind,

and the influences that shaped his decision did not stem from the military. Soon

after the British demarche of 12 March,

Lewis Douglas had set quietly to work to

find a solution that would not force the

President to void his original commitment

to Churchill. Douglas had strong convictions on the matter. He was worried by

the rebellious mood developing among the

military and by the recrudescence of

latent anti-British feeling that he had

noted as long ago as March 1942. The

drying up of the British import program,

the reality of which competent American

observers in England had confirmed beyond any doubt, in his opinion menaced

the entire Allied war effort. He was determined, therefore, as he wrote Harriman,

to do what he could "to prevent our mili35

 (1) Table, "Proposed Allocation of U.S. Cargo

Shipping . . . ," atchd to memo, Somervell for CofS,

25 Mar 43, ABC 560 (2-26-43) Sec 1A. (2) For Soviet

shipments, see above, Ch. XXI. 36

 Memo cited n. 35(1). 37

 Memo, Leahy for President, 10 Apr 43, Incl A in

JCS 251/2, 10 Apr 43, title: Alloc of Allied Shipg. 38

 (1) Notes on 72d mtg JCS, 6 Apr 43. (2) Notes on

73d mtg JCS, 9 Apr 43. (3) Memo, Secy JCS for JPS,

20 Mar 43, sub: Alloc of Allied Shipg. All in ABC 560

(2-26-43) Sec 1A. (4) Memo cited n. 37.
AFTER CASABLANCA 699

tary from successfully pressing home their

claims . . . . They do not seem to realize

. . . that the U.K. import program is as

important to the military success of our

armies as is, for example, the bauxite

movement to the United States."

 39

 He

also suspected that the vehement opposition of the military to further loans of

shipping to bolster British imports portended a new challenge to civilian control

over the allocation of American shipping.

His representative sitting in the CMTC

had reported to him, on the 15th, an imprudent remark by General Gross that

WSA should have consulted the Joint

Chiefs before complying with the President's instructions on shipping allocations—and Douglas promptly passed the

remark on to Hopkins.40

It was evidently Douglas' warning that

a concerted attack by the military upon

the British import program was in the

making that led Hopkins on the 19th to

take personal charge of the negotiations

over the British proposals. There was no

"special board." Hopkins merely consulted the various individuals who could

give him the essential information bearing

on the question—Douglas, Somervell, Sir

Arthur Salter, and others. Douglas, standing at the very center of the shipping picture and enjoying close personal relations

with Hopkins, held the key. During the

last week of March he evidently succeeded

in convincing Hopkins, first, that "the

President had already made a commitment and that we had to look at the matter in that light," and, second, that since

the military were unlikely to concede this

as a valid point of departure, nothing

would be gained by drawing them into

the negotiations.41 Meanwhile, the President was being pressed by Anthony Eden

not merely to fulfill the original commitment of assistance to the British import

program, but to expand it.42

On 29 March Hopkins, Douglas, and

Eden met with the President at the White

House. No military representatives were

present and Douglas, with occasional

promptings from Hopkins, held the floor.

He presented two main arguments—that

the British import program must be sustained, and that this, the warnings of the

military notwithstanding, could in fact be

done without crippling the Casablanca

strategic program. Douglas explained that

the present rate of importation would

bring only 16 million tons to the United

Kingdom by the end of the year, and that

even if American commitments were met

in full the decline in British carrying capacity would result in a year's total almost

two million tons less than the 27 million

tons upon which both governments had

agreed in November. The program, he

argued, was an "essential part of the productive processes" of the United Nations,

and any serious shortfall "would at last

come back to us" in the form of a weakening of the total Allied war effort. Douglas stressed further the dangers, inherent

in the Army's proposed allocations, of accumulating a deficit in the spring and

summer that might be too heavy to handle

in the autumn.43

Speaking to his second point, Douglas

39

 Ltr, Douglas to Harriman, 27 Mar 43, Reading

file, WSA Douglas File. 40

 (1) Ibid. (2) For Douglas' earlier views, see memo

of 19 March 1942, in Contl of Trans folder, WSA

Douglas File; and reference to "the isolationist crowd

here in the military establishment" in his notes on

conference with Radner et al., in WSA Gen folder,

WSA Douglas File. (3) Douglas' notes on lunch conf

with Hopkins, 19 Mar 43, Hopkins folder, WSA

Douglas File. (4) Memo cited n. 22(3). 41

 Douglas' notes cited n. 40(3). 42

 Memo cited n. 34(4). 43

 Douglas' notes on conf at White House, 29 Mar

43, Allocs Gen folder, WSA Douglas File.
700 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

remarked that the Navy had not even

submitted its requirements beyond the

second quarter, and that the Army had

never allowed WSA to see the "inner

guts" of its cargo requirements. In practice, Douglas bluntly charged, the military services' stated requirements had

always turned out to be inflated. He

thought they probably were inflated now.

Beyond midyear, he was certain, both

military and nonmilitary programs could

be carried out, if shipping were carefully

budgeted. The problem was really localized in the second quarter—April, especially, was "very, very tight." Douglas believed, nevertheless, that if military needs

were discounted somewhat, particularly

in their regular maintenance services, it

would be possible not merely to accelerate

the British import program, but also to

carry forward all the planned military

operations and programs, including requested military assistance to the British,

with the exception of the ANAKIM buildup. The latter, he said, hinged largely on

the opening of the Mediterranean and, in

any case, probably would have to be delayed at least a month.44

The President apparently needed little

convincing, for, before Douglas had got

well into his discussion of capabilities for

carrying out military operations, he

abruptly announced, "Well, we can consider the import program settled." Turning to Eden, he added, "You can tell the

Prime Minister it's a settled matter and

we will . . . make good our commitment." Neither Douglas nor even Eden

(who had said virtually nothing during

the meeting) pressed the demand for an

enlargement of the American commitment beyond seven million tons—evidently, as Hopkins later telephoned Douglas,

Eden had been "educated."

 45

It remained, as the President remarked

at the end of the meeting, "to settle it with

the military."

 46

 With the agreement to

fulfill British import commitments now

fixed as a point of departure, and in the

light of Douglas' analysis of the shipping

situation, the question centered upon the

build-up for ANAKIM. Paradoxically, the

American military leaders now stood virtually alone in insisting that this operation, almost wholly a British undertaking,

be carried forward. British enthusiasm for

it had waned almost to the vanishing

point, and the President (probably after

his briefing by Douglas on the 29th) went

so far as to attempt to persuade his military advisers to abandon it and to divert

the shipping to BOLERO. Marshall and

King stood their ground, arguing that it

was imperative to maintain heavy pressure on the Japanese in southeast Asia,

and the President was unwilling to overrule them. Douglas' own analysis of the

shipping problem, on the 29th, tended to

support the thesis that it was usually possible to scrape together a few more ships

by skimping here and there. Presently,

therefore, Douglas received instructions

from Hopkins to try to meet at least the

April requirement for ANAKIM, which the

military thought could be reduced to

twenty sailings; by May, perhaps, the

Mediterranean would be open and more

shipping might be available. Douglas

doubted the wisdom of making a heavy

commitment of American tonnage to the

other side of the world where it could not

be promptly retrieved in an emergency,

at least until the outcome of the impend44

 Ibid. 45

 (1) Ibid. (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp.

716-17. (3) Ltr, Douglas to Harriman, 30 Mar 43,

Reading file, WSA Douglas File. 46

 Douglas' notes cited n. 43.
AFTER CASABLANCA 701

TABLE 25—PROPOSED VERSUS SCHEDULED U.S. SHIPPING ASSISTANCE TO BRITISH IMPORTS

a

 Estimated tonnage to be carried in U.S. shipping, including 800,000 tons allegedly delivered during first quarter. b

 Information not supplied in source.

Source: (1) Memo, Somervell for Hopkins. 22 Mar 43, ABC 560 (2-26-43) Sec 1A. (2) Table, "Proposed Allocation of U.S. Cargo

Shipping . . . ," atchd to memo, Somervell for CofS, 25 Mar 43, same file. (3) Douglas' notes on conf at White House, 29 Mar 43, Alices

Gen folder, WSA Douglas File. (4) Table, 28 Mar 43, same file. (5) Table I, 6 May 43, atchd to Notes on Statements of Dry Cargo Shipping Position, 10 May 43, signed by Salter and Douglas, Shipg 1941-43 folder, Hq ASF.

ing Mediterranean operations could be

foreseen. On the other hand, he saw the

value of sweetening the bitter pill—the

decision on British imports—that the

military had been made to swallow. To

this end, in assembling the ANAKIM ships,

he not merely contrived to spare the principal military operational programs,

squeezing instead the military and civilian

maintenance services, but also persuaded

the British to share the burden by contributing nine sailings, for five of which

they were to be compensated by equivalent space in American tonnage added to

British services in the North Atlantic and

Anzac areas. Thus the twenty sailings for

April were found.47

Undeniably, the whole action taken on

the British "bombshell" of 12 March constituted a serious rebuff—comparable in

significance to that in the dispute over war

production programs the preceding autumn—to the American military leaders'

views on the proper distribution of American merchant tonnage. With respect to

American assistance to the British import

program, the rebuff can be measured

in terms of the gap between what the

Joint Chiefs had recommended and what

the President decided should be given.

(Table 25)

Nor could American military leaders

take much comfort in the decision to proceed with the ANAKIM build-up since, according to their own staff calculations, the

shipping for it, and that requested for British forces in the Sicily operation, would

now have to be taken from American military operations. Somervell and Gross, at

least, did not disguise their chagrin over

the President's decisions. Douglas, conferring with them on the final arrangements

for the April ANAKIM shipments, found

them both in a disgruntled mood, Somervell grumbling that the British "were getting off very light,"

 48

 Gross still insisting

that Britain could manage very well in 47

 (1) See above, Ch. XIX. (2) Corresp in Allocs

Gen folder and Army Reqmts folder, WSA Douglas

File. 48

 Douglas' notes on conf with Adm Smith, Gens

Somervell, Gross, and Wiley, 7 Apr 43, Army Reqmts

folder, WSA Douglas File.
702 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

1943 with only sixteen million tons of imports. A few days later Somervell made a

final appeal to the President, complaining

that the shipping allocations made by

WSA, contrary to Douglas' claims, would

not provide the shipping needed for American military operations.49

The President held to his course. The

British import program, spurred by American aid, rapidly revived during the

spring. Imports rose from their low point

of 4.5 million tons in the first quarter to

7.2 million tons in the second quarter,

making a total only 300,000 tons short of

the 12 million that had seemed so unattainable in March. On the eve of the

TRIDENT Conference in May, when the

Army's logistical staffs were darkly predicting huge shipping deficits after midyear, shipping schedules envisaged not

only undiminished support of British imports but also 107 more cargo sailings to

British forces assigned to the Sicily and

Burma operations—not far short of the

116 originally requested for May through

August. And later in May the President

took a more far-reaching step, directing

WSA to transfer to Britain, under bareboat charter for the duration of the war,

fifteen to twenty cargo vessels a month

over the next ten months. This placed the

capstone on the series of measures, flowing

from the policy enunciated on 6 October

1942, by which the United States had

progressively assumed the role of merchant shipbuilder for the anti-Axis coalition.50

"For Planning Purposes Only"

This whole massive shift of American

shipping into British services, decided

upon during a crisis in the war at sea, was

admittedly a gamble—one the American

military leaders naturally resisted, since

their operations stood to lose if the gamble

did not pay off. Under the circumstances,

it was hardly to be expected that they

would shave their estimated needs as close

as WSA officials demanded they should.

The Army's logistical planners, indeed,

found themselves pulled in opposite directions—by the civilian shipping authorities,

who insisted upon the closest possible calculation of military requirements, and by

their own strategic planners, who were

projecting a deployment of Army forces

overseas far beyond the most optimistic

estimates of shipping capabilities. Deployment planning fluctuated erratically during March while the crisis precipitated by

the British proposals of the 12th was at its

height. A subcommittee of the Joint Staff

Planners submitted two proposed deployment schedules during that month, each

of which became obsolete before it could

be discussed by the Joint Chiefs. In general these schedules followed the pattern of

the one prepared by OPD at the end of

February, with a great second-quarter

"hump" followed by a steep decline in

movements during the second half of the

year—the very features Somervell and

Gross had criticized so sharply. Yet the

JCS were reluctant to make the necessary

cuts and adjustments to bring the schedules into conformity with indicated ship49

 (1) For British import sailings, see table, 28 Mar

43, Allocs Gen folder, WSA Douglas File; Douglas'

notes cited n. 43; and Table I, 6 May 43, atchd to

Notes on Statements of Dry Cargo Shipping Position,

10 May 43, signed by Salter and Douglas, Shipg

1941-43 folder, Hq ASF. (2) Douglas' notes cited n.

48. (3) Memo, Douglas for Hopkins, 13 Apr 43, Army

Reqmts folder, WSA Douglas File. (4) Draft memo

for signature of President, Somervell for Hopkins, 12

Apr 43, Reading file [under "H" ], Hq ASF. 50

 (1) Table I cited n. 49(1). (2) Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy, table on p. 357; see also p.

431. (3) Ltr, President to Prime Minister, 28 May 43,

MS Index to the Hopkins Papers, Bk. VII, The TRIDENT Conf, p. 4, Item 23. (4) Corresp in Br Merchant

Shipg Mis Misc folder, WSA Douglas File.
AFTER CASABLANCA 703

CHART 14—COMPARISON OF "AGREED DEPLOYMENT" PROGRAM WITH ACTUAL ARMY

DEPLOYMENT: APRIL-DECEMBER 1943

Source: (1) JCS 249, 27 Mar 43, title: Strategic Deployment of U.S. Forces for 1943. (2) Contl Div,

ASF, Statistical Review, World War II, App. G, pp. 121-22.

ping capacity, desiring, for one thing, to

retain some margin against the across-theboard cuts in deployment they anticipated

would be dictated by the British request

for shipping. In the planning committees

the attempt to "integrate" deployment

schedules with shipping capacity bogged

down amid charges and countercharges

between representatives of the two services

that each was seeking to shift the burden

of reductions to the other.51

At the end of March the JCS finally decided to accept the latest deployment

schedule provisionally as an "agreed deployment," pending completion of the

shipping studies by the JMTC that would

show whether it could be carried out.

(Chart 14) When these studies, as predicted by the SOS staff, indicated a large

probable deficit of shipping capacity in

the second quarter and surpluses late in

the year, the Joint Planners after a fruitless debate referred both the JMTC studies

and the "agreed deployment" to the

Joint Chiefs without change. It was argued that deployment plans would continue to fluctuate and could be used, anyhow, "for planning purposes only."

 52

 The

JCS had no better solution. Their "agreed

51

 (1) Notes on 66th mtg JCS, 24 Mar 43. (2) Notes

on 7 1st mtg JCS, 30 Mar 43. Both in ABC 320.2 (3-

14-43) Sec 1. (3) CCS 183/2, cited n. 16(3). (4) Notes

on 69th mtg JPS, 14 Apr 43, ABC 560 (5-8-43). 52

 JPS 142/1, approved "for planning purposes" as

JCS 249, 27 Mar 43, title: Strategic Deployment of

U.S. Forces for 1943.
704 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

deployment" remained "unintegrated"

with shipping capacity and the revised

joint schedules early in May merely reflected cumulative additions made by

both services since March.53

Against the counsel of its own logistical

experts, the Army's "planned" deployment for 1943 thus came to reflect hopes

rather than expectations. By contrast

WSA, focusing its attention for the present

upon the immediate problem of meeting

current requirements, had real ships in

view—those to be saved when the Mediterranean was opened and those its officials

felt the Army could easily do without in

some of the military maintenance services.

After a canvass of the situation in March

Douglas told the President and Hopkins

bluntly that, with 80 to 90 percent of the

merchant fleet engaged in military services, little or no tonnage remained to be

squeezed from the commercial trades,

which were mainly employing "old

crocks" anyway.54 Of the thirty-odd ships

finally earmarked to make up the twenty

ANAKIM sailings in April, almost two

thirds were to be taken from military

maintenance services. Douglas was further determined to press vigorously his

drive for greater economy in the utilization of shipping generally by the armed

services, the issue that had lain behind the

crisis precipitated by the President's directive of 18 December 1942. And in April,

when Somervell and Gross complained to

the President that WSA was not meeting

the Army's current requirements, Douglas retorted that these requirements, as

stated, were purely "theoretical"—that

WSA was in fact providing enough shipping space to move all the cargo the Army

had to move, even though the number of

ships provided fell short of the Army's

demands.55

The actual course of Army deployment

during April, May, and June, while falling far short of the strategic planners'

schedules, did in fact belie the gloomy

predictions of the SOS staff. (See Chart 14.)

What brought this about, however, was

not the squeezing of military services and

the economies in military ship operations

that WSA had hoped for. Beginning in

April the war against enemy submarines

took a sudden and decisive turn. Ship

losses dipped to less than half those in

March, and in June reached a level (182,-

000 tons) that by comparison with the

whole experience since Pearl Harbor

seemed insignificant. New construction,

meanwhile, continued to climb, in May

and June making net gains over losses of

more than 1.5 million tons a month in all

types of merchant shipping. The military

shipping staffs continued to shake their

heads—the trend would not last. Early in

May they still foresaw huge deficits of

cargo shipping. As late as July the Combined Military Transportation Committee, analyzing monthly average losses

during the first five months of 1943, which

had fallen well below the agreed planning

factors set up in February, were suspicious

as to the meaning of "the present lull in

Axis submarine action."56 They recom53

 (1) Ibid. (2) Plng Div OCT table, "Comparison of

Proposed U.S. Army Deployment . . . ," 29 Mar 43,

Plng Div Studies folder, OCT HB. (3) JCS 249 (revised), 12 May 43. (4) JMT 13/2, rpt by JMTC, 7

May 43, title: Shipg Necessary for Tr and Cargo Lift

1943. (5) JPS 160/1, 8 May 43, same title. (6) JCS 266

(revised), 11 May 43, same title. 54

 Douglas' notes cited n. 43. 55

 (1) Memo cited n. 49(3). (2) Ltr, Douglas to Hopkins, 26 Mar 43, Hopkins folder, WSA Douglas File.

(3) Douglas' notes cited n. 43. (4) Memo, Douglas for

President, 7 Apr 43, Army Reqmts folder, WSA

Douglas File. 56

 CCS 174/1, rpt by CMTC, 2 Jul 43, title: Loss

Rate for 1943.
AFTER CASABLANCA 705

mended the planning factors be reduced

now but another reading of the situation

be taken the following September.57

The whole experience of the planning

staffs since Casablanca had been of such a

character as to discourage excursions in

long-range planning. The civilian shipping experts, indeed, had always been

skeptical of predictions of shipping availability farther than six months in the future—approximately the length of the

longest turnaround—and on the eve of

the TRIDENT Conference Douglas and Salter sounded a general note of caution to

the strategic planners:

All estimates of available shipping and requirements . . . covering a long period extending into the future are necessarily unprecise and subject to all the changing fortunes

of war. Shipping availabilities fluctuate with

the progress of submarine warfare, routing,

loss of shipping in assault operations, and a

variety of additional factors. Military re- quirements vary in accordance with developments in the theaters of war and modified

strategic plans.

The alarming deficits of shipping currently predicted by the military staffs,

they thought, were "within the margin of

error inherent in a forward projection"

and "may well prove to be manageable."58

Evidently the strategic planners had

been acting upon a similar assumption,

though with less caution, ever since Casablanca, for in their deployment planning

they had cast adrift of logistical calculations to a degree not equaled in 1942

when the outlook had been even more obscure. Strategy for 1943 still had not been

mapped—Allied leaders were to have

another go at this task at TRIDENT—but

"agreed deployment" schedules on the eve

of the conference envisaged a lavish provision offerees in every theater, far beyond

any indicated capabilities of shipping. Despite the favorable turn of the war at sea,

deployment during April and early May

lagged well behind the planners' goals,

piling a deficit upon the already grandiose

objectives of the second half of the year.

But in the long run the gamble paid off.

The phenomenal decline in shipping

losses during the spring proved to be a

permanent victory, releasing the flood of

American munitions and troops that

poured into the major overseas theaters

after mid-1943.

57

 (1) Ibid. (2) Notes on Statements of Dry Cargo

Shipping Position, 10 May 43, signed by Salter and

Douglas, Shipg 1941-43 folder, Hq ASF. (3) See below, Apps. J, K. The following table illustrates the relation between planning factors and actual losses in

percentages: Nontankers Tankers

Agreed Factors (Feb 43)

1st half 1943. ....................... . 2.4 1.8

2d half 1943. ....................... . 1.9 1.4

Losses Jan-May 43 (monthly average)...... 1.6 1.0

Recommended Factors (Jul 43)

2d half 1943....... . ................ . 1.7 1.2

1st half 1944..... . .................. . 1.5 1.1

Source: CGS 174/1, rpt by CMTC, 2 Jul 43, title:

Loss Rate for 1943. 58

 Notes on . . . Cargo Shipping Position, cited n.

57(2).

PART SEVEN

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER XXVII

Logistical Planning and

Its End Products

However diluted by improvisation,

logistics is essentially a planned and organized activity. Every armed soldier

placed and sustained on the firing line is

an end product of many months of logistical preparation—the long process of designing, manufacturing, and distributing

his weapons and supply, the somewhat

shorter one of training him and moving

him to the scene of action. The need for

the soldier and his weapons and supply at

a particular time and place, therefore,

must be anticipated.

From this circumstance grows a fundamental dilemma. During the period dealt

with in this volume, the length of logistical

"lead time," covering the process of logistical preparation, varied widely according

to circumstances, types of matériel, and

character of training; the industrial processes alone were usually estimated to require eighteen months to two years. The

specific military operations that this preparation made possible could, of course,

seldom be even dimly envisaged so far

ahead; to foresee their material requirements in detail was out of the question.

The process of fashioning, mobilizing, and

distributing the tools of war had to begin,

therefore, and invariably was well advanced, long before the specific purposes

for which the tools were to be used could

be known. Had it been necessary to perform the entire process of logistical preparation after the initial decision was made,

the North African operation, which was

decided upon in July 1942, might have

been carried out some time in 1944 instead of November 1942. "Lead time," in

other words, was far longer than planning

time.

How, then, could the logistical process

itself be planned in advance of that late

stage when specific objectives finally were

determined? The Army's answer to this

problem was the system, described at

length in some of the foregoing chapters,

by which it shaped its long-range requirements. These estimates, compiled in the

Army Supply Program and the War Department Troop Basis, for the most part

did not attempt the probably impossible

task of anticipating far in advance the

needs of specific military operations. The

aim was rather to create a general fund or

pool of ingredients—finished munitions,

supplies, organized and equipped manpower—along with the capacity for replenishing or enlarging the fund, from

which specific needs might be met as they

arose. The ingredients were varied and

represented a judicious balance between

general-purpose items, such as the infantry division or the 21⁄2-ton cargo truck, and
710 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

such specialized ones as the mountain division or the ambulance, thus covering a

wide range of possible uses. In its distribution system, the Army similarly sought to

complete as much as possible of the logistical process before specific objectives were

finally determined. Except for equipment

and supplies that troops took overseas

with them, matériel was distributed

wholesale to the established overseas bases

to be stocked in areas immediately behind

the combat zones and at intervals along

lines of communications. For the bulk of

their needs, troops at the front could thus

be supplied retail from stocks near at

hand, these in turn being replenished

wholesale from stocks farther to the rear.

Relatively few needs, under this system,

had to be filled directly by the time-consuming process of sending special requisitions back to the supply organization in

the States.

Such a system of requirements, procurement, and distribution involved a penalty.

A large part of the logistical process had

to be carried through without knowledge

of the specific purposes it was to serve.

Broad assumptions had to be made, therefore, and large, general objectives laid

down, based upon what little guidance

was afforded by the general orientation of

strategy. Inevitably, assumptions and objectives often proved to be wide of the

mark; unforeseen needs arose that could

not be met from the general fund of ingredients. Much of the haste and waste of

logistical preparations in 1942 was caused

by last-minute efforts to improvise from

insufficient or unsuitable materials the

means for carrying out military operations. The only defense against such waste

was another kind of waste—the calculated

oversupply produced by general estimates

of maintenance and resupply requirements and other "cushions" built into the

Army Supply Program. In the distribution pipeline overseas, stagnant backwaters of supply were left behind by the

advance of the fighting fronts and the

shifting of supply routes.

Whether any other logistical system,

based on a more specific prediction of future requirements, would have worked

better can only be conjectured. The most

likely alternative in 1942, and seemingly

the only method by which concrete requirements could be projected at long

range in the absence of a fully formed

strategic program, was the one employed

by the British. They calculated their requirements theater by theater on the basis

of projected deployment and predicted intensity of combat in each area. From 1941

onward, they tried to persuade their

American allies to adopt this method, as

part of a combined requirements program

based on present and projected theater

deployments, which would provide a firm

guide to the allocation of both American

and British munitions, administered as a

pool. For the British the system worked

well enough, since their theater establishments were well developed and they had

few forces remaining at home that could

be shipped overseas. Major redistribution

of their forces already overseas seemed unlikely. The bulk of the U.S. Army in 1942

was still in training, with millions of soldiers still to be mobilized. Any predictions

as to the timing, scale, and direction of its

eventual overseas deployment might run

counter to strategic plans yet unborn. Beyond this consideration, the Americans

feared that a combined program of theater requirements, if tied in as the British

wished with the actual allocation of munitions by Anglo-American agencies, might

syphon off the bulk of American muni-
LOGISTICAL PLANNING AND ITS END PRODUCTS 711

tions production into overseas theaters

still manned predominantly by British

forces, starve the great American army

mobilizing at home, and tie the United

States to British concepts of strategy.

This danger weighed more heavily with

some influential American planners than

the defects of the method per se. General

Patrick Tansey, chief of the OPD Logistics

Group during a large part of the war, concluded in 1945 that the British system of

calculating requirements was superior to

the American, but that it could not have

been adopted by the U.S. Army in 1942

because of the "existence of the present

form of munitions assignments machinery."

 1 Army programs, from the start, did

reflect in a general way the broad expectations of overseas deployment based

upon rather generous estimates of future

shipping capacity. There was some sentiment among Army logistical planners,

too, that supply programs should include

allowances calculated in detail from specific, even though hypothetical, operational

plans. In 1943 the programs began to

show some of this kind of leavening in the

form of bills of requirements for specific

construction projects for which theater

commanders anticipated a need. The

dominant feeling among the logistical

staffs, however, was that individual theater requirements could take form only

within the framework of a settled longrange strategy and detailed operational

plans. Failing these, the over-all troop

basis combined with rough predictions of

total overseas deployment over a given

period of time seemed to offer the most

solid foundation for calculating longrange supply requirements.

The British plan for combined requirements, one facet of their effort to place

their expectations from American production on a stable and predictable basis,

thus broke down, as did other attempts to

peer into an uncertain future. Each country computed its own requirements by its

own methods, and British and other

foreign claims upon American military

production, insofar as they were accepted,

were included in the American military

supply programs. But these long-range

foreign requirements provided only an

upper limit for actual allocations of finished munitions. The combined assignments committees had to make their

decisions from month to month according

to the relative urgency of the demands

that came before them. Even the Soviet

aid program, embodied in protocols that

rendered it immune to adjustments on administrative levels, sometimes had to yield

to the exigencies of the shipping situation.

Disappointed in the operation of this system, the British were able, late in 1942, to

secure a long-range allocation agreement—almost a "British Protocol"—

embodying specific allotments of American munitions to be made under a definite

schedule during the coming year. These

allotments reflected the British staffs own

long-range calculations, though adjusted

downward in the course of negotiations.

The new policy moved definitely in the direction of binding the distribution of lendlease material to a firm long-range program, even though not a specifically strategic one. Among some of the American

planners, however, the agreement inspired

misgiving, precisely because the stability

it promised might preclude later adjustments to a changing military situation

and new strategic plans. As 1943 wore on,

the Army's planners in OPD generally in1

 Memo, prepared by Tansey, no addressee, no

date, sub: Alloc of Mun for Logis Support of Global

Strategy, ABC 400 (2-17-42) Sec 6.
712 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

sisted that assignments of military matériel, even under the above agreement,

must be justified by destined use on the

battlefield under specific operational

plans that fitted into the evolving pattern

of Allied strategy. Since plans of this sort

were seldom crystallized far in advance,

allocation policy continued, as in 1942, to

be shaped primarily by short-term considerations, and the prospect of developing a system in which requirements and

distribution would flow harmoniously out

of a firm long-range strategic program

seemed as remote as ever.

Forced to proceed more or less blindly,

as far as specific objectives were concerned,

the logistical process was also hampered

by its own uncertainties. The war economy was a growing and changing thing,

and while the volume of output in 1942—

both in munitions and in shipping—was

phenomenal, it surged forward too jerkily

to permit accurate predictions of deliveries far in advance. (See Appendixes B, H.)

To a very considerable degree, of course,

performance actually exceeded expectations—the spectacular rise in output of

Liberty ships in spring of 1942 was a notable example. In sharp contrast, production programs for the less standardized

items of matériel tended to be both erratic

and sluggish—as witness the landing craft

program, launched belatedly in spring of

1942 and plagued thereafter by chronic

disagreements over types, objectives, and

priorities.

Yet the most unstable element in the

logistical process was not the capacity to

produce, but the capacity to deliver fighting power to the firing line. Through 1942

and into spring of 1943 the war at sea was

a continuous crisis, and in mid-1942 no

great effort of the imagination was needed

to foresee a day when German submarines

might succeed in sealing off the eastward

flow of American deployment altogether.

From the latter part of 1942 on, to be sure,

the attrition of shipping failed to match

the swelling output of American shipyards,

but the drain of ships and cargoes could

not be sustained indefinitely. Surface and

air protection had to be provided for the

sea routes, to some degree at the expense

of new ship construction, and the whole

system of convoying, scheduling, and evasive and circuitous routing, developed to

meet the submarine menace, constituted

in effect a bottleneck to overseas deployment more restrictive than the shortage of

shipping itself.

Had ocean transport been a predictable

bottleneck, its limitations might at least

have provided strategy with a solid basis

of expectation. But because its capabilities

were shaped so largely by the course of the

fighting war itself—the war at sea—it remained perhaps the most baffling single

question mark in the whole logistical equation, though numerous others—reception

and clearance capacity of overseas ports

and beaches, capacity of overland communications, rates of expenditure, wear and

loss of matériel—were elusive enough. For

a year and a half following Pearl Harbor,

the most basic expectation upon which

any plan of operations had to rest—the

number of troops and the amount of armament that could be made available at the

time and place needed—could never be

much more than a wishful estimate.

Uncertainty and instability during 1942

were largely inherent in the general situation, and thus beyond remedy. The

logistical staffs did make a determined

attack, however, upon disorder that grew

out of purely administrative causes. There

was much shifting and buckling in the
LOGISTICAL PLANNING AND ITS END PRODUCTS 713

organizational structure throughout 1942

and early 1943, but from it emerged a

more efficient division of labor and clearer

jurisdictional relationships, notably in the

allocation of U.S. merchant shipping,

the assignment of munitions, supply and

transportation for U.S. Army forces, and

logistical planning in the JCS committees.

Logistical method was improved and

standardized—a many-sided endeavor involving such disparate measures as the

refinement of procedures for drawing up

the Army Supply Program, the application of workload measurement techniques

in the Military Establishment, the use of

tested stock-control procedures in depot

operations, and the development of spacesaving methods of crating military vehicles

for shipment. The underlying purpose here

was to standardize method in those large

areas of the logistical process where operations were routine and repetitive, applying

to each operation the procedures and techniques that scientific analysis showed to be

most efficient. By spring of 1943 the Army

had made substantial improvements in

these areas of logistical administration,

particularly in the procedures of overseas

supply and control of military traffic. Yet

the tendency of logistical operations to become more stable about this time undoubtedly owed less to procedural and

organizational improvements than to

larger developments—the gradual levelling-off of war production, crystallization

of the ultimate goals of production and

troop mobilization, and the providential

absence of major shifts in strategy and of

large, hastily prepared undertakings like

the invasion of North Africa. In spring of

1943 the routine shipments of troops and

supplies overseas to support operations

already in progress was the principal business of the Army's logistical staffs.

The major obstacle to effective logistical

planning and preparations lay outside the

logistical process itself and beyond the

jurisdiction of the logistical agencies: specific strategic objectives could not be fixed

far in advance. Throughout 1942 the civilian production, shipping, and manpower

authorities and the military logistical staffs

themselves pleaded repeatedly for a longer

projection and greater stability in strategic

and operational planning—not, indeed,

for a projection equivalent in length to the

whole span of logistical "lead time," but

rather for a settled strategic program of

perhaps a year's duration, fixed in its general orientation and the sequence of major

operations, with operational plans worked

out in some detail for several months

ahead. Unfortunately, as long as the

enemy held the strategic initiative all

planning was necessarily highly provisional; the Allies could only counter enemy

moves as they were made. The program of

amassing forces for an invasion of northwestern Europe in spring 1943, which

American and British leaders adopted as

their major course of action in April 1942

during a lull in the war in the Pacific and

the Middle East, met some of the specifications laid down by the logistical planners. But this program, of doubtful logistical feasibility from the beginning, was soon

elbowed from the top rank of Allied undertakings and the date for its consummation was postponed indefinitely. Operations during the remainder of the year—

limited offensives in the Pacific and the

Mediterranean which spelled no irrevocable commitment to any specific course of

action beyond—were planned at short

range and preparations for them, rushed

to completion amid a flurry of eleventhhour changes of plan, were largely extemporized from resources at hand.
714 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

As the end of 1942 drew near, many

pressures came into play seeking to replace

this hand-to-mouth strategy by a more

stable long-range program. The year to

come held out the promise of vast resources

for offensive action. It was imperative to

decide upon the direction and nature of

that action. The ultimate limits of war resources had been fixed, in October and

November 1942, in terms of the country's

estimated capacity to produce. Within

these limits, the military supply and construction programs now had to compete

with one another and with nonmilitary

programs for materials, facilities, and

manpower. The probable limits of mobilization of military manpower were also in

sight. Hence the urge for balance among

the tools of war, and balance could only

be defined in terms of the strategic purposes for which those tools were to be used.

Adequate logistical preparations depended

on early answers to many questions. Was

the deployment of forces to be oriented

primarily to one theater, or was it to be

more widely dispersed? Would it be directed to near or to distant theaters? Would

it take the form primarily of ferrying massive and balanced land and air forces to

large overseas bases, or would it involve a

high incidence of amphibious operations

by relatively small, special-purpose task

forces? To what extent would strategic

bombardment be employed as a substitute

for land campaigns against an enemy still

greatly preponderant in land power?

What specific operations were to be undertaken? What forces would be required?

When?

What emerged from the Casablanca

Conference of January 1943 could hardly

be called a long-range strategic program,

and its answers to the above questions

were both incomplete and tentative. Beyond certain immediate "next steps" such

as the attack on Sicily, for which the timing and specific arrangements were still

unsettled, the leaders could agree only on

strategic concepts too broad and generalized to give much help in logistical planning. Almost immediately the whole program began to dissolve as undertakings

proved larger and available means smaller

than anticipated. March 1943 brought a

new shipping crisis. Strategy, deployment

plans, and logistical calculations all drifted

in separate orbits during the late winter

and early spring of 1943—strategy almost

at a standstill, awaiting new decisions, deployment planning conjuring up bright

and patently unattainable visions, logistical planning producing sober predictions

which the strategic planners chose generally to ignore and which the course of the

war at sea soon began to demolish. At the

TRIDENT Conference in May Allied leaders

were to attempt again to fill in and sharpen

the blurred lineaments of the strategic outlook. But few felt any confidence, on the

eve of that conference, that the recent setbacks to the German submarine offensive

would prove to be a permanent and

crushing victory offering a relatively stable basis for long-range planning in the

most critical segment of the long logistical

process.

At the beginning of May 1943 the Army

had 1,399,643 troops in position overseas

or on the way. This was almost entirely an

achievement of the seventeen months following Pearl Harbor.2

 Compared with the

achievement of 1918—the Army's only

previous experience in overseas deployment on a massive scale—the numbers

were not in themselves overly impressive.

2

 Less than 200,000 troops were overseas at the

time of Pearl Harbor.
LOGISTICAL PLANNING AND ITS END PRODUCTS 715

The magnitude of the performance must

be measured, of course, in the light of the

immense distances, wide dispersion, and

other factors that held down the volume of

movement.

Whatever the point of view, this deployment constituted a spectacular reversal of

the "Arsenal of Democracy" theory of limited, mainly air and naval participation in

the anti-Axis war, toward which military

policy, on the eve of Pearl Harbor, had

appeared to be drifting. Allied forces had,

indeed, been supplied on a generous scale.

Lend-lease material was enabling the British, as Churchill later acknowledged, to

fight as though they were a nation of 58

million instead of 48 million.3 British victories in the Middle East owed much to

this aid, and by mid-1943 the French in

North Africa were ready to put three divisions in the field, equipped with American

matériel, for the impending campaigns in

the Mediterranean and northwestern

Europe. American matériel had also contributed substantially, if not decisively, to

the Soviet victory at Stalingrad and promised in the future to provide Soviet armies

with increased mobility, larger reserves,

and better communications. Two large

American establishments overseas, in the

Persian Corridor and in China-BurmaIndia, had as their major tasks the forwarding of war matériel, over long and

difficult routes, to the Soviet Union and to

China. During the first year of American

participation in the war, approximately

20 to 25 percent of the matériel procured

by the Army had been assigned to or earmarked for the armies of Allied nations.

The Army's almost 1.5 million troops

overseas in May 1943 were scattered far

and wide—among six major active theaters and many rear and intervening areas.

Through June 1942, the movement of

forces and matériel, and the assignment of

shipping to move them, had been preponderantly into the theaters of the Japanese

war, broadening out from the limited

build-up in the Philippines inaugurated in

September 1941. The decision in April

1942 to begin preparations for an invasion

of northwestern Europe had scarcely affected this trend. Not until July did the

tide begin to flow more strongly toward

the theaters of the European war. Only

briefly, during July and August, was it

concentrated heavily on the amassing of

invasion forces in Britain, and from October on the North African theater absorbed

the bulk of the Army's eastbound shipments of troops and cargo. Army forces

arrayed against Japan meanwhile were

being steadily augmented, and, if major

areas alone are considered, were not outnumbered by those in the major theaters

of the European war until May 1943. The

balance in shipping, however, as well as in

forces present in all overseas areas of each

war (and also in air power), had tipped in

this direction considerably earlier. (See

Charts 15-19.)

In the extent of its dispersion and the

multiplicity and length of its lines of communications, this deployment was a far

cry from the relatively cautious conceptions of ABC-1 and RAINBOW 5. Two major supply lines extended to the Antipodes—the route around the Gape of Good

Hope to the Persian Gulf and Indian

Ocean, and the route through the South

Pacific to Australia and the New Guinea

and Solomons battle fronts. (See Map 8.)

Along these routes, as well as in the North

Atlantic, the Caribbean, and the North

Pacific, thousands of troops were scattered

3

 (1) Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 7-8. (2)

Strength figures are from Strength of the Army Report, STM-30, 1 Jan 48.
716 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

CHART 15—THE TWO WARS

THE DIVISION OF EFFORT: JANUARY 1942-MARCH 1943

a

 Assigned strength at the end of the last month in each quarter.

b

 Monthly average number of measurement tons in each quarter.

c

 European, African, and Middle Eastern areas.

d

 Pacific and Asiatic areas, including Alaska

in small outposts which, to a large extent,

could be kept alive only by the costly logistical method of transshipping supplies and

replacements from ocean-going vessels plying the main routes into other carriers—

smaller ships, transport planes, barges, and

rail and road transport.

These logistical commitments had not

been assumed as a matter of choice. They

were a legacy of Japan's attack and the

partnership with Britain, which, in conjunction, had drawn the United States

into a global rather than merely a North

Atlantic war. American troops in spring of

1943 were fighting in the Solomons and

New Guinea largely because of the decisions, in 1941, to develop the Philippines

as the American bastion of the Far East

and, immediately after Pearl Harbor, to

attempt to support the bastion, now beleaguered, through a base in Australia.

Since then the Pacific war, on the American side, had been primarily an effort to

develop and make secure the Australian

base and the long lines of communications

leading to it, an investment too heavy to

abandon even after the Philippines fell.

The other globe-girdling route, around the

Cape, was Britain's main imperial supply

line before the opening of the Mediterranean in mid-1943. By the Americans it was

used primarily to ship military equipment

and supplies to British, Soviet, and Chinese forces, only secondarily to support the
CHART 16—THE TWO WARS

THE FLOW OF ARMY TROOPS OVERSEAS: DECEMBER 1941-APRIL 1943

Excludes embarkations by air, but includes a small number of Navy personnel and Allied military and civilian personnel.

Source: Contl Div, ASF, Statistical Review, World War II, App. G, pp. 121-22.

CHART 17—THE TWO WARS

THE FLOW OF ARMY CARGO OVERSEAS: DECEMBER 1941-APRIL 1943

Source: Contl Div, ASF, Statistical Review, World War II, App. G, pp. 131-31.
CHART 18—THE TWO WARS

BUILD-UP OF ARMY STRENGTH OVERSEAS: 31 DECEMBER 1941-30 APRIL 1943

Troops in the Caribbean Defense Command, South Atlantic bases, Bermuda, Greenland, Iceland, and Newfoundland.

Source: Strength of the Army Report, STM-30, 1 Jan 48.

CHART 19—THE TWO WARS

BUILD-UP OF ARMY ASSIGNED SHIPPING: MARCH 1942-MARCH 1943

Source: ASF Monthly Progress Report, Transportation, 28 Feb 43, Sec 3.
LOGISTICAL PLANNING AND ITS END PRODUCTS 719

small U.S. Army contingents in China,

India, and the Persian Gulf. Army logisticians chafed under the necessity of operating these long and costly routes, and seldom missed an opportunity to emphasize

to their superiors how much more powerful a punch could be delivered over the

short and direct routes across the North

Atlantic. For one circumstance, at least,

they could be grateful. The costs of the

long routes grew chiefly out of the time required for ships to reach their destinations

and to return, rather than out of the number of ships sunk en route. After mid-1942,

losses on the Cape route, except for a short

time at the very end of the year, were not

severe, and in the Pacific shipping was virtually unmolested.

The Army's main logistical effort, in

any case, was in the relatively accessible

Atlantic-western Mediterranean area. To

a very large extent the debate over the

strategy of the war against Germany had

revolved about the problem of lines of

communications. The champions of the

strategy of an early large-scale invasion of

northwestern Europe from the British

Isles, toward which Allied preparations

were briefly directed in the spring and

summer of 1942, had argued persuasively

that no other course offered supply routes

so short, direct, or potentially secure, so

firmly based upon the major industrial

centers of both countries and accessible to

the vital heart of German power. These

arguments remained generally valid, but

by summer of 1942 continued heavy shipping losses in the North Atlantic and the

draining away of Allied strength to the

Pacific and Middle East had made it patently impossible to achieve at any early

date the necessary ratio of superiority over

the forces Germany could mass to oppose

a cross-Channel attack. For these and

other reasons it was decided to postpone

the invasion. Still, the British Isles remained the most favorably situated and

most richly endowed base for decisive

operations against the Continent.

When the decision was made at the end

of July 1942 to launch a major coalition

effort in the Mediterranean—inevitably

at the expense of the concentration of

forces in the British Isles—the line-ofcommunication factor again decisively

shaped the specific character that American strategists imposed upon the new venture. The center of gravity in the North

African landings was placed in the west,

covering both eastward and westward approaches to the vital Strait of Gibraltar,

and securing the communications inland

from the Atlantic Moroccan coast over

which, if worst came to worst, the invading forces might have to retreat. For these

advantages the Americans were willing to

jeopardize, indeed virtually to abandon,

the opportunity of gaining an early lodgment in Tunisia. At Casablanca the following January, security of sea communications was again a paramount consideration, on the American side, in the selection

of Sicily rather than Sardinia as the next

target for Allied attack, and in the resolute

American opposition to more ambitious

undertakings against Italy or in the eastern Mediterranean. Without the lure of a

possible opening of the whole inland sea to

Allied traffic, indeed, the Americans might

have rejected further Mediterranean

offensives in any form.

The Army's logistical effort in the European war, by spring of 1943, thus had

been neither concentrated nor economical.

Two great bases for operations against

Europe had been developed and manned.

They were supported by separate lines of

communications, and the main effort had
720 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

gone into the less favorably situated of

those bases—more distant, less developed,

with more hazardous sea and land communications. Elaborate amphibious operations had been required to gain the North

African base, massive ferrying operations

to develop it. Further amphibious landings in the Mediterranean were to follow.

In an effort to compensate for postponement of the cross-Channel invasion, American air power was being built up at

maximum speed in the British Isles in

order to intensify the strategic air offensive

against Germany. But in spring of 1943

this program had hardly more than begun. Throughout the Atlantic region, dispersion of. effort and abrupt changes in

basic plans had disrupted production and

training programs and necessitated immobilizing and rerouting of shipping. Escort

protection had been concentrated on certain routes, resulting in higher losses on

others. Supply had flowed along circuitous

routes, retarded by transshipment and rehandling. Inadequate planning and hurried preparations had caused confusion

and waste.

Army forces arrayed against Germany,

as a net result, were still relatively few in

number and widely dispersed. Against the

original goal of more than a million American troops to be massed against Germany

by April 1943 (a goal the planners too

readily assumed to have been realizable

from the beginning), only 508,000 had

been deployed by that date to the areas of

the European war, including troops scattered along communication lines and in

rear areas in Africa and the Middle East.

About 110,000 were in the British Isles,

about 334,000 in North Africa, The American military leaders in resisting this

"scatterization" had succeeded only in

orienting part of the total deployment in

another direction, into the theaters of the

war against Japan where, by April 1943,

some 525,000 Army troops were still

deployed.4

In two fundamental respects the logistical basis of Anglo-American power, by

spring of 1943, had been solidly laid. The

enemy's hold on the most vital segment in

Britain's historic life line, the Mediterranean, had finally been broken, and May

saw the arrival at Suez of the first through

cargo convoy from Gibraltar since early in

the war. (See Map 8.) With the lopping off

of some eight thousand miles from the

longest line of communications, the Allies

gained the equivalent of many hundreds

of thousands of tons of shipping for the

planned offensives in Burma and the central Mediterranean and for the flow of

American supplies to the Soviet Union

and to the Middle and Far East. And after

more than two years of close collaboration,

the two economic centers of gravity on

each side of the North Atlantic basin—the

British Isles and the eastern seaboard of

Canada and the United States—had been

firmly knit together by an unprecedented

concentration of maritime shipping plying

the North Atlantic routes, protected by an

effective combination of naval and air

power. The North Atlantic had become,

as faintly foreshadowed in the ABC-1 conversations of February 1941, securely an

Anglo-American lake, and both the war

production and the shipping resources of

the two countries had been co-ordinated

in the common cause to a degree that, at

many points, amounted to a genuine pooling of effort. The military power generated

by this North Atlantic merger was to prove

4

 Strength figures are from Strength of the Army

cited n. 3(2).

LOGISTICAL PLANNING AND ITS END PRODUCTS 721

sufficient, before long, to profit fully by

the mobility inherent in control of the sea

and to overcome the handicaps of distance—permitting the two countries the

luxury of fighting an aggressive two-front

war on opposite side of the globe. (Map 8)

By spring of 1943 the deployment of the

U.S. Army was perceptibly moving toward

this phase. April and May saw the quickening of tempo, the spectacular increase in

delivery of men and matériel at the overseas end of the distribution pipeline, that

had been heralded somewhat prematurely

at Casablanca. War material continued to

flow in growing volume into the Pacific

and Asiatic theaters, and shipments into

the theaters of the European war swelled

suddenly, and for the first time, beyond

even the record amounts shipped the preceding August. This upsurge in cargo

movements at first went mainly to the

Mediterranean, but the British Isles received some of it. Troop deployment also

leaped spectacularly upward in these

months, mainly to the Mediterranean but

substantially also to the Pacific areas. (See

Appendix E.) These movements of troops

and matériel in April and May were the

real beginning of a new period of build-up

in both wars—for the converging operations against Rabaul and the drive into

the Central Pacific, for the descent on

Sicily and Italy, and, over the horizon, for

the invasion of northwestern Europe.
Appendix A

SHIPPING TERMINOLOGY AND PLANNING DATA: 1942-43

APPENDIX A-1—WEIGHT AND SPACE

Weight Measurements

1 nautical mile....................................... . 1.1516 statute or land miles. 1 knot. ............................................. . A speed of 1 nautical mile per hour. 1 ship ton or measurement ton (M/T).................. . 40 cubic feet of cargo or ship's cargo space. 1 register ton. ....................................... . 100 cubic feet of ship's space. Gross tonnage....................................... . Entire enclosed space on a ship expressed in register tons Net tonnage......................................... . Entire useful cargo capacity of a ship expressed in register tons. Dead-weight tonnage.. ............................... . Ship's total carrying capacity, including ship's gear, supplies, and personnel, expressed in long tons. Dead-weight effective lift. ............................ . Effective cargo lift of a ship expressed in long tons; approximately 80 percent of the dead-weight tonnage. 1,000 gross tons...................................... . Approximately 1,500 dead-weight tons, or approximately 1,200 dead-weight effective lift, or 1,775 measurement tons.

Approximate Shipping Space Required for One Long Ton of Various Types of Cargo

*No valid corresponding figure can be given for commercial cargo because of the extremely wide variation in its composition from one area to another. In general, commercial cargo had a considerably lower cubic content in relation to its weight, as compared to military cargo.

Source: Strategic Logis Div rpt, 1 Oct 42, sub: Logis Implications of Opns of Sp Task Force, Plng Div ASF.

Selected Cargo Ship Capacities: 1941-42

a

 The C-type cargo vessels were standard types developed by the Maritime Commission, not specifically for wartime use.

b

 The EC-2 (Emergency Cargo, popularly called Liberty ship) was considered, for military planning purposes, to be the "average" or "notional" type of dry cargo vessel. This term had no statistical significance, since the Liberty, whether measured by cargo capacity, dis- placement tonnage, or any other standard, was far from being the arithmetical average vessel in the U. S. merchant fleet. In 1941-42 it was not even the most commonly employed carrier of Army cargo, and was far outnumbered by the older, mostly smaller vessels. More- over, the planning yardstick contained no allowance for the shortfalls from maximum capacity that were normal rather than exceptional in the loading of military cargo because of the bulky character of most such cargo, haste in loading, sailing of vessels before loading was com- pleted, and similar circumstances. As a result, actual performance repeatedly fell short of advance estimates. The present authors have noted some cases, within the period covered by this volume, where planners discounted their estimates to allow for the above factors, but the practice does not appear to have been general. For long-range estimates, projected into 1943 and beyond, the Liberty-ship yardstick

had somewhat more validity.
APPENDIX A 723

APPENDIX A-2—MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERSEAS FORCES: 1942-43

a

 Based on average cubage for each item. Ship tons (40 cu. ft.) of any one item can be found by multiplying its short-ton (2,000 lbs.)

weight by that item's conversion factor. b

 These figures represent only 10 percent of total liquid fuel and lubricant requirements; the remaining 90 percent normally was shipped

by tanker, and was calculated separately. c

 Arctic requirements for solid fuel were twice as great as those for the Temperate Zone. Solid fuel was shipped 50 percent coal and

50 percent coke by volume.

Source: FM 101-10, Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organization, Technical and Logistical Data, 10 Oct 43, par. 312. A number of obvious errors in the source have been corrected in the above table. The corrected table eventually appeared, substantially as shown above, in the 21 December 1944 edition of FM 101-10.

APPENDIX A-3—TONNAGE REQUIREMENT FACTORS FOR OVERSEAS SHIPMENTS: JULY 1941-

JUNE 1943

(Ship TONS PER SOLDIER)

 a

—Data not available. a

 In general, initial requirements factors include allowances for the individual soldier and his personal equipment, for average requirements in organizational equipment, and for 60 days accompanying maintenance supplies. Maintenance requirements factors represent allowances of subsistence, ammunition, and fuel normally sufficient to support one soldier for one month. b

 1941 factors for specific areas were used in early RAINBOW 5 calculations. Over-all factors for 1941 were those agreed upon by the Army and Navy in March 1941.

Source: These estimated factors have been compiled from numerous sources and represent, in many cases, only the factors used at a particular time for a particular calculation. No significance, therefore, should be attached to differences of one and two decimal points. Source documents include FM 101-10, Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organization, Technical and Logistical Data, Jun 41 and Oct 43; ASF Manual M-409, Logistical Planning and Reference Data, Dec 43.
724 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

APPENDIX A-4—INITIAL CARGO SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS FOR SELECTED UNITS:

LATE 1942

APPENDIX A-5—INITIAL CARGO SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS FOR SELECTED UNITS:

LATE 1943

a

 With all vehicles on wheels.

b

 Computed on a basis of 1.1 ship tons per man per month, excluding ammunition and gasoline and oil. Armored elements have an added allowance of 25 percent replacement of vehicles monthly. c

 Computed on a basis of 1.2 gallons per man per day for ground troops. Armored elements use based on armored force data. d

 With all general purpose vehicles boxed. During 1943 most of the general purpose vehicles were shipped in this manner.

Source: (1) For 1942, Misc Shipg Data, Logis File, OCMH. (2) For 1943, ASF Manual M-409, Logistical Planning and Reference Data, 14 Dec 43.
APPENDIX A 725

APPENDIX A-6—CARGO VESSEL TURNAROUND TIME IN DAYS: 1943 a

a

 Turnaround time is a cycle of days; time in U.S. port plus outbound sailing time plus time in foreign port plus inbound sailing time. b

 For planning purposes sailing time was based on a speed of 15 knots, or 360 nautical miles per day, for transports and 10 knots, or 240

nautical miles per day, for cargo vessels. Ten percent was added to chart distances for zigzagging, weather, and other delaying circumstances.

A total of 20 days (10 days at each end) was allowed cargo ships for loading and unloading. The theoretical character of the planning

figures is indicated by a comparison with the actual time involved. The differences were mainly due to varying port capacities and facilities. c

 The average turnaround is given. These figures are based upon all ships that ended their return voyage during the period 1 Jan 43-30

Jun 43. Time spent at intermediate points of call and time spent awaiting convoys at points other than the home and end ports is included. d

 Data not available.

e

 Average turnaround during first half of 1944, by which time regular traffic had been resumed through the Mediterranean.

Source: (1) Planning factors are from ASF Manual M-409, Logistical Planning and Reference Data, 14 Dec 43, p. 26. (2) Actual

turnaround figures are from ASF Monthly Progress Report, Sec 3, Transportation, 30 Jun 43 and 31 Jul 44.
726 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

APPENDIX A-7—SELECTED TYPES OF LANDING CRAFT AVAILABLE IN 1941-42

a

 British types. b

 British assault craft with ramp and armor. c

 The 1941 tank lighter. d

 A modification of the LCP(L) to provide narrow bow ramps. e

 Bow ramps only. f

 Companion to the LCP(L). g

 First appeared in November 1942 to replace the LCP(L) and the LCV as the standard United States small assault craft. h

 British equivalent to the assault troop ship (APA). i

 Small cross-Channel vessels. j

 Infantry assault ships, convened "Glen" class vessels. k

 Ex-Dutch cross-Channel vessels. l

 Ex-Belgian cross-Channel vessels. m

 The original Roebling "Alligator."

Source: Chart prepared by JCS Hist Sec.
APPENDIX A 727

APPENDIX A-8—PRINCIPAL U.S. AND BRITISH CONVOYS: AUTUMN 1939-SPRING 1943

a

 Most cargo convoys included some tankers. Mixed convoys included tankers, troopers, and cargo vessels. UGF/GUF and

KMF/MKF included a few fast cargo vessels. b

 As set up by the Atlantic Convoy Conference 2/1, App. A. c

 Until March 1942 the average interval was 8 days; thereafter it was increased to 10. d

 Beginning in August 1942, HX convoys sailed in two sections, the major one leaving New York, the other leaving Halifax, and

rendezvousing at sea. SC convoys also sailed in two sections, the major one leaving Halifax, the other leaving Sydney and rendez- vousing at sea. e

 On 1 May 43 escort responsibility passed to British-Canadian control. f

 From August 1942 to October 1942 the interval was 10 days; thereafter it was 7. g

 Odd-numbered SC convoys took ships bound for Iceland. h

 Established in February 1943. i

 Data not available. j

 Variable.

k

 The Interlocking Coastal Convoy System was set up in August 1942 and was tied to the terminal point of New York. The key convoys of this system were the GN and KN, scheduled to arrive in New York one to two days before the departure of the HX and

SC convoys. The local convoys in this system were scheduled to arrive at the terminal points of Guantanamo and Key West in time to catch the northbound GN and KN convoys. Other smaller convoys are not mentioned here. l

 The TB/BT convoy was inaugurated on 15 Dec 42 and was under U.S. control as far as Belem, Brazil, and then passed to Brazilian control. Ships bound for South Africa, Suez, and the Far East traveled with this convoy to Bahia (with the inception of

the Trinidad-Rio de Janeiro (TJ/JT) convoys in July 1943 to Rio de Janeiro) and then sailed independently for Capetown. Source: (1) Metcalf draft study, May 45, title: Hist of Convoy and Routing, Off of Naval Hist. (2) Min, Atlantic Convoy Conf, 1 Mar 43-12 Mar 43, Convoy and Routing folder, Misc file, OCT

HB.
Appendix B

PROCUREMENT: 1940-43

APPENDIX B-1—DELIVERIES OF SELECTED ITEMS OF MUNITIONS TO THE ARMY: 1940-43

a

 Includes all types listed under this heading in Whiting, Statistics, and comprises the great bulk of the types produced in this category. b

 The four types listed here comprise the bulk of small arms am- munition production; production of the other types was relatively insignificant and the data are uncertain. c

 Data not available. d

 Totals for 1941; half-year totals not available.

Source: Data in the above table were obtained from a variety of sources. The most recent official Department of the Army figures on World War II procurement by the Army have been published tentatively in Statistics, Procurement Section, 9 April 1952 draft. This draft was prepared by Richard H. Crawford and Lindsley F.

Cook under the direction of Theodore Whiting. Since, with certain exceptions, it does not contain item totals for periods shorter than a year, the data in the above table, except those for aircraft, were ob- tained from other sources. These include various supporting work papers to the Crawford and Cook draft, and an unpublished report, ''Procurement Issues and Stock,"prepared in 1945 by Headquarters, ASF, copies filed in Office of the Comptroller of the Army; "Official

Munitions Production of the United States, By Months, July 1- 1940-August 31, 1945," prepared by Civilian Production Adminis, tration, May 1,1947; the "Monthly Progress Reports," Section 1-A, Procurement, prepared by Headquarters, ASF. See also Biblio- graphical Note.
APPENDIX B 729

APPENDIX B-2—ESTIMATED VALUE OF WAR DEPARTMENT PROCUREMENT DELIVERIES:

JANUARY 1942-30 JUNE 1943

 a

(IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

a

 The estimated total value of War Department procurement deliveries for the period 1 July 1940 through 31 December 1943 was

$56,835,734 thousand. This amount includes the following estimates for 1940 and 1941 (in thousands of dollars): 1940, third

quarter, $390,000; fourth quarter, $566,000; 1941, first quarter,

$773,000; second quarter, $1,032,000; third quarter, $1,378,000; and

fourth quarter, $1,735,000. These dollar amounts were computed

from physical quantities delivered and unit costs as of 1945; they

do not take into consideration price changes or contract renegotiations, and do not measure exact cost to the government.

Source: Whiting, Statistics, Procurement Sec, 9 Apr 52 draft, pp.

14-20.
Appendix C

LEND-LEASE TRANSFERS

APPENDIX C-1—WAR DEPARTMENT PROCUREMENT DELIVERIES AND LEND-LEASE SHIPMENTS: JANUARY 1942-JUNE 1943

(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

a

 Actual shipments (not the total scheduled in the period for lend-lease beneficiaries) do not include transfers by theater of operation

commanders. b

 Includes $189,216,000 of shipments made between 11 March and 31 December 1941, for which distribution by agency by recipient

country is not available. c

 Rounded figure. d

 Excludes subsistence.

Source: Whiting, Statistics, Procurement and Lend-Lease secs, 9 Apr 42 draft.

APPENDIX C-2—LEND-LEASE SHIPMENTS COMPARED WITH WAR DEPARTMENT PROCUREMENT

DELIVERIES: 1 JANUARY 1941-30 JUNE 1943
Appendix D

NUMBER OF VESSELS AND CARGO TONNAGE SHIPPED FROM UNITED STATES

TO USSR: 22 JUNE 1941-30 JUNE 1943

(CARGO IN THOUSANDS OF LONG TONS)

*In addition, 74 vessels sailed for the Persian Gulf and 15 for the Soviet Far East carrying cargo, a minor portion of which was consigned to the USSR.

Source: Report on War Aid to USSR, 28 Nov 45.


Appendix F

OVERSEAS

APPENDIX F-1—AUTHORIZED LEVELS OF

Class I, II, III, and IV Days of Supply

 a

a

 Minimum levels. Maximum levels determined as follows: Class I (subsistence and forage) Maximum levels defined as minimum

level plus quantity (operating level or working stock), determined by port commander in collaboration with overseas commander, required

for normal consumption until expected arrival of next supply shipment. July 1943 instructions stipulated that operating levels might be

authorized by the War Department when shipping or tactical situation demanded. Exceptions similarly permitted for icebound stations.

Class II (items of supply issued under Allowance Tables) Maximum level defined as minimum level plus 90 days of supply. July 1942

instructions permitted higher operating levels, with approval of CG SOS, when shipping or tactical situation demanded. July 1943 instructions stipulated War Department approval in such cases, and made provisions for icebound stations as under Class I. Class III (fuels and

lubricants) Maximum level determined by port commander and overseas commander, as for Class I, with reference to shipping or tactical

situation and also to available storage capacity in the theater. Class IV (items of supply not issued under Allowance Tables, other than

Classes I, III, and V, such as construction equipment) Requirements to be based on mission and tactical situation; no provision for operating

level. July 1943 instructions emphasized the importance of early submission of requirements to permit procurement and stockpiling. Class

V (ammunition) as released by the War Department. b

 For the area in general, but see notes g, h, and j. c

 Emergency rations included in Class I level of supply.
APPENDIX F 735

SUPPLY

OVERSEAS SUPPLIES: JULY 1942 AND JULY 1943

 a

Class V Months of Supply (M/S) or Units of Fire (U/F)

 a

d

 Not indicated in source document. e

 Overseas commanders were authorized to recommend to the War Department the number of civilians for whom an equivalent level of

supply should be established. f

 For SOS troops only. Movement orders would establish the levels for all other troops within this area. g

 Zone of interior maintenance levels only in the Persian Gulf Command. h

 90 days of supply only for Australia and New Zealand. i

 8 months of supply for the 30-caliber rifle only. j

 270 days of supply only in China, the balance to be held in reserve in India. k

 10 months of supply for the 30-caliber rifle only. l

 Puerto Rico, Antigua, Cuba, Jamaica, St. Croix, St. Thomas. m

 Trinidad, Aruba, British Guiana, Dutch Guiana (Surinam), Curacao, and St. Lucia. n

 Fort Chimo, Frobisher Bay, Goose Bay, and Mingan (all weather stations).

Source: (1) WD ltr, 19 Jul 42, sub: Levels of Sup ... . AG 400 (7-11-42). (2) WD ltr, 10 Jul 43, same sub, AG 400 (7-8-43).
736 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

APPENDIX F-2—AMMUNITION: THE UNIT OF FIRE

(IN

*Does not apply to the armored division or the medium tank battalion. In 1942 the Armored Force had a separate Unit of Fire,

adjusted to the number of rounds carried in vehicles of the Armored Force units, and therefore on a per-vehicle rather than a per-weapon

basis. The Day of Supply was the lame for all elements.
APPENDIX F 737

AND THE MONTH OF SUPPLY, OCTOBER 1942

ROUNDS)

Source: (1) Armored Force Units of Fire bated on FM 101-10, Staff Officers Field Manual: Organizational, Technical and Logistical

Data, 15 June 41, par. 127; Tables of Basic Allowances No. 7, 1 Oct 42, No. 5, 1 Dec 42, and No. 11, 1 Aug 42. (2) Unit of Fire for other

units, and Days of Supply for all units, are based on data in Misc Shipg folder, Logis File, OCMH, and on the Tablet of Organization cited.
738 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

APPENDIX F-3—AMMUNITION: THE UNIT OF FIRE

(IN

*In 1943 the Unit of Fire was standard for Armored Force and other elements on a per-weapon basis.
APPENDIX F 739

AND THE DAY OF SUPPLY, OCTOBER 1943

ROUNDS)

Source: (1) Days of Supply and Units of Fire for individual weapons cited in FM 101-10, Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organizational,

Technical and Logistical Data, 10 Oct 43, par. 322. (2) Days of Supply and Units of Fire for selected units are computed from cited Tables

of Organization and Equipment, using the applicable per-weapon Days of Supply and Units of Fire. (3) Tables, similar to those shown here,

in ASF Manual M-409, Logistical Planning and Reference Data, Dec 43, contain numerous errors, and therefore have not been used.
Appendix G

SUPPLY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PORTS OF EMBARKATION
Appendix H

SHIPPING LOSSES AND GAINS

APPENDIX H-1—CONSTRUCTION AND LOSSES OF DRY CARGO SHIPS, UNITED STATES, ALLIED,

AND NEUTRAL: SEPTEMBER 1939-JUNE 1943

* Ocean-going steam and motor ships of 1,600 gross tons and over, under United Nations control, includ- ing Bristish-controlled merchant ships, commissioned for naval service or used as fleet auxiliaries, and merchant ships controlled by the U.S. Army and Navy. Exclude vessels in the Baltic and Black Seas and on the Great Lakes.Source: (1) WSA, Shipping Summary, Vol. II, No. 6, Jun 45. (2) ASF Monthly Progress Report, Transportation, Mar 42, Sec III.

APPENDIX H-2—CONSTRUCTION AND LOSSES OF TANKERS, UNITED STATES, ALLIED, AND

NEUTRAL: FOURTH QUARTER 1939-JUNE 1943

Source: ASF Monthly Progress Report, Transportation, Mar 42-Aug 43, Sec lII.
Appendix I

GROWTH OF THE SERVICE ESTABLISHMENT: 1942

—Inapplicable.

General officers, General Staff Corps, Inspector General's Department, Military Intelligence Division, USMA professors, warrant and

flight officers; plus all WAAC's, Corps of Chaplains, Finance Department, Judge Advocate General's Department, Detached Lists, and

miscellaneous personnel.

Source: Whiting, Statistics, Military Personnel sec, 9 Apr 52 draft.
Bibliographical Note

and Guide to Footnotes

Global Logistics and Strategy, like the previous volumes published in the series

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II, is based largely, though far from

exclusively, upon records of various agencies of the War Department, most of them

at present in the physical custody of the

Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant

General's Office, Department of the Army

(DRB AGO). These records are generally

described in Federal Records of World War II,

Vol. II, Military Agencies, prepared by the

General Services Administration, Archives

and Records Service, The National Archives (Washington, 1951). The range of

records consulted has necessarily been

broad, ranging from those of the joint and

combined agencies for strategic planning

at the top to the lower agencies in the War

Department charged with logistical operations. The enormous volume of logistical

business in which the War Department was

involved is reflected in the bulky and generally amorphous bodies of records of this

business that have been preserved. In sifting this mass of records, the authors have

been aided to a limited degree by the

monographic studies prepared during the

war and afterward under the supervision

of the Office, Chief of Military History, or

other staff agencies, and by the researches

of their colleagues on various volumes in

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II, published and unpublished.

Information in the footnote citations of

documents and manuscript histories is designed to identify each sufficiently for the

needs of researchers having a passing

familiarity with Army files. File references

have not been given in cases where documents can be readily located in certain

master serial files. In this category fall the

minutes and papers of the Joint Board

(JB), Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS), Combined

Chiefs of Staff (CCS), and other joint and

combined committees, the Munitions Assignments Board (MAB) and the Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground)

(MAC (G)); certain letters and directives

issued by The Adjutant General's Office;

general orders and memoranda of various

Army headquarters. Messages identified

only by CM-IN and CM-OUT numbers

with date may be located in the Classified

Message Center serial file. In general, file

references at present can be located

through the Historical Records Section,

DRB AGO, and manuscript drafts prepared by Army agencies through the General Reference Section, Office of the Chief

of Military History (OCMH). If, as is

anticipated, these materials are eventually

retired to National Archives, the fundamental arrangement of files will in all

probability remain the same.

The files of the various staff agencies of

Headquarters, Army Service Forces

(ASF), make up the most important single group of records used in preparation of

this volume (see Federal Records, pp. 252-
744 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

302). These files were retired to DRB

AGO at various times during and after the

war, and the process of indexing and cataloguing them is still far from complete.

There is no central ASF file. The file identified in the footnotes as the Hq ASF file

consists of a collection of official and personal papers of General Somervell, extremely valuable when used in connection

with other materials but seldom providing

by itself a complete story of action on any

given problem. The Chief of Staff, ASF,

file consists largely of stayback copies of

Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer's correspondence and memoranda. The Hq ASF staff

conferences fall into a separate group filed

serially in DRB AGO.

The files of the various staff divisions

under the supervision of Maj. Gen. LeRoy

Lutes, wartime Director of Operations,

ASF, provide the most important materials for a detailed story of ASF logistical

planning and operations. These are described in Federal Records under the headings Plans and Operations, Planning Division, Mobilization Division, and Requirements and Stock Control Division, in

accordance with the way in which these

records are grouped in DRB AGO. Of

these, the most important for purposes of

this volume are those of the Planning Division, including as they do records of its

predecessor organizations, the General

Planning Branch and the Strategic Logistics Division. General Lutes' own personal

files, identified in the footnotes as Lutes

File, have not been retired to DRB AGO

but remain in his personal custody. General Lutes kindly granted access to them

at various times during the war and afterward. Footnote references to folders in this

file follow the arrangement at the time

they were consulted. The classification

"Misc Notes, Lutes File" covers certain

notes taken by researchers during the war

from these files for which no folder reference could be given.

Of the records of the Office of the Director of Materiel, the central files of Maj.

Gen. Lucius D. Clay's office (Director of

Materiel file) and those of the International Division have been most useful. The

International Division (ID) files are the

most important source for any study of

War Department lend-lease activities. The

International Division inherited the files

of its predecessor organizations, the Office

of the Defense Aid Director, the Defense

Aid Division of the Office of the Under

Secretary of War (DAD), the Clearance

Committee of the Army and Navy Munitions Board (CC ANMB), the Defense Aid

Section, G-4 (DAS, G-4) as well as those

of the home offices of the various overseas

lend-lease missions. The files of the Defense Aid Division and those of the Office

of the Defense Aid Director are completely

consolidated and form one file identified

in the footnotes by the symbol DAD. Each

home office for the overseas lend-lease

missions maintained its own files and these

have been identified separately in the footnotes, for instance, "N African Mis" for

the files of the U.S. Military Mission to

North Africa. Also among the records of

the International Division are the minutes

and papers of the Munitions Assignments

Committee (Ground) and a virtually complete file of those of the Munitions Assignments Board. Though the minutes of the

board have been identified with the standard abbreviation MAB, the serial papers

have been listed, as originally designated,

by the symbol MBW.

The files of the Distribution Division,

ASF, have also been of value, as have

those of the Control Division. In addition

to studies made of various ASF activities
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE AND GUIDE TO FOOTNOTES 745

during the war, Control Division files also

contain various materials collected as a

result of that agency's responsibility during the war for administering the ASF historical program. An additional group of

notes taken from various sources by this

historical unit of the Control Division

during and immediately after the war has

fallen into the custody of the authors and

where the original sources of these notes

have not been identifiable they have been

cited as part of the Logistics File, OCMH.

These notes will eventually be deposited in

the custody of the General Reference Section, OCMH.

As a part of this ASF historical program

a number of histories of staff agencies and

monographs on various subjects were prepared. Several contain elaborate documentary supplements. Though most of

these studies were hastily done and vary

greatly in both accuracy and extent of

coverage, many have proved useful. The

following are particularly worthy of note:

History of the Planning Division, Army

Service Forces (2 volumes text and 10 volumes appendixes), prepared by the Planning Division, Office of the Director of

Plans and Operations, ASF.

The Determination of Army Requirements (1 volume text and 4 volumes documentary supplement), prepared by Lt.

Col. S. M. Frank, Requirements and Stock

Control Division, Office of the Director of

Plans and Operations, ASF.

History of the Movements Branch, Mobilization Division, Army Service Forces,

20 volumes, prepared by the Movements

Branch, Mobilization Division, Office of

the Director of Plans and Operations,

ASF.

Troop Units Activated by the Army

Service Forces for Overseas Use, prepared

by the Troop Unit Branch, Mobilization

Division, Office of the Director of Plans

and Operations, ASF.

Lend-Lease as of September 30, 1945

(2 volumes text and 10 volumes documentary supplement); History of Reciprocal

Aid, 9 May 1941-31 December 1945 (1

volume text and 1 volume documentary

supplement); and Civilian Supply: A History of the Civilian Supply Branch, International Division, Army Service Forces,

all prepared by the International Division,

Office of the Director of Materiel, ASF.

History of Preshipment; History of Supply in the Zone of Interior; and History of

Stock Control in the Army Service Forces,

all prepared by the Distribution Division,

Office of the Director of Supply, ASF.

History of the Control Division, Army

Service Forces (1 volume text and 1 volume appendix); and Development of

Overseas Supply Policy and Procedures,

both prepared by Richard M. Leighton,

Control Division, ASF.

Organizational Problems of the ASF,

1942-45 (1 volume text and 4 volumes

documentary supplement); and Overseas

Movement of the 1st Infantry and 1st

Armored Divisions, both prepared by John

D. Millett, Control Division, ASF.

Preparations for "Torch," prepared by

William Frierson, Control Division, ASF.

Army Service Forces Activities in the

Supply of China, Burma, and India; and

The United States Supply Echelon in

Australia, both prepared by Mrs. Elizabeth Bingham, Control Division, ASF.

Development of the United States Supply Base in Australia, prepared by Mrs.

Elizabeth Bingham and Richard M.

Leighton, Control Division, ASF.

Movement of U.S. Army Troops and

Supplies to the South Pacific Theater of

Operations, prepared by Mrs. Jesse Roach,

Control Division, ASF.
746 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

In addition to these wartime and immediate postwar studies, two more finished

monographs by Mrs. Susan Frost Parrish,

Logistical Support of the Pacific Campaign: Early Task Force Deployment to

the Line of Communications; and Growth

of a Pacific Supply Structure, have served

as a primary basis for Chapter VII and

part of Chapter VI.

Of the records of the various technical

services of the ASF, most are too voluminous and of too technical a nature to warrant extensive consultation in a broad

study of logistics. The records of the Transportation Corps are an exception, since

transportation was the most important

single facet of logistics during World War

II. Extensive use has been made of the

various collections of Transportation Corps

records made by its Historical Branch and

identified in the footnotes as OCT HB

files. Other material from regular files of

the Office of the Chief of Transportation

deposited in DRB AGO are identified by

the symbol OCT. The OCT HB files contain a number of historical monographs

prepared during the war and immediately

afterward that have also been quite useful. All these Transportation Corps records

and studies are further identified in the

"Bibliographical Note" and "Guide to

Footnotes" in Chester Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization,

and Operations (Washington, 1951), pp.

426-31. Wardlow's published volume and

the drafts of the two succeeding volumes of

the Transportation Corps history provide

extensive information on transportation

operations both in the United States and

in overseas theaters. A broader view of

wartime transportation in the United

States, in both its military and civilian aspects, is given in Joseph R. Rose, American

Wartime Transportation (New York, Thomas

Crowell Co., 1953). Some use has also

been made of published volumes, special

studies, and selected draft chapters of histories of the Quartermaster Corps and the

Corps of Engineers.

For the period preceding the War Department reorganization of March 1942,

supervision and staff planning of logistical

matters rested with the Supply Division of

the War Department General Staff, G-4,

and with the Office of the Under Secretary of War. Records of the Under Secretary's office deal largely with procurement

matters and are fragmentary. (See Federal

Records, pp. 70-74.) G-4 records, on the

other hand, are relatively complete, well

arranged and indexed in accordance with

the prewar General Staff system of filing

by serial numbers. G-4 records for the period following March 1942, filed according

to the Dewey decimal system, are of considerably less value since with the reorganization of the War Department, the ASF

absorbed most of G-4's functions.

The records of the Adjutant General's

Office (Federal Records, pp. 63-67), the central office of record for the War Department, are another important group. These

records are filed and carefully crossindexed by subject according to the Dewey

decimal system. They are most valuable

for the period 1940-41 and the early part

of 1942. Afterward a far smaller proportion of records of the various agencies and

commands was forwarded to The Adjutant General for central filing. As far as

possible, documents in The Adjutant General files have been identified by the folder

in which they are actually to be found

rather than by the formal classification at

the head of the letter, memorandum, or

directive.

For matters involving strategy, high

policy, and the relation of logistics thereto,

main reliance has been placed on the records maintained by the Operations Divi-
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE AND GUIDE TO FOOTNOTES 747

sion, War Department General Staff, and

its predecessor, the War Plans Division,

and secondarily on those of the Office of

the Chief of Staff (WDCSA or OCofS)

and of the Secretary, of War (SW). Five

different groups of the OPD files may be

distinguished: (1) the official central file

of the War Plans Division, identified by

the symbol WPD; (2) the official central

file of the Operations Division, identified

by the symbol OPD; (3) the WPD and

OPD Message Center file; (4) the plans

file of the Strategy and Policy Group,

OPD, identified by the symbol ABC; (5)

the informal policy file of the Executive

Office, OPD, identified by the symbol

Exec. All these files, with the exception of

the Executive Office files (still in the custody of the G-3 division of the General

Staff) are located in DRB AGO, though

access to them is controlled by G-3. No

separate file of the records of the Logistics

Group, OPD, exists; some of its papers

may be found scattered among the various

groups outlined above. Several detailed

monographs prepared by the OPD History Unit, OCMH, based on material in

these files have been of considerable value.

Both the files and the monographs are

further described in Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division

(Washington, 1951) and in Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning

for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942 (Washington, 1953). These two works, in themselves, have obviated the necessity for

much detailed research on strictly strategic

matters. Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff:

Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington,

1950) is similarly important as a source of

information for the period preceding

Pearl Harbor.

The ABC files contain virtually a complete set of JCS and CCS papers, those of

the various subordinate parts of the JCS

and CCS organization such as the Joint

Staff Planners (JPS) and Combined Staff

Planners (CPS), the Joint Strategic Survey

Committee (JSSC), and the Joint and

Combined Military Transportation Committees (JMTC and CMTC), and records

of the major Anglo-American wartime

conferences. Except in isolated instances,

use of the official files of the joint and combined organizations, in the custody of the

JCS, has not been necessary. Some use has

been made, however, of the various studies

under preparation in the Joint Chiefs Historical Section, notably those on logistical

matters prepared by Lt. Col. S. E. Otto,

Maj. Edward Katzenbach, 1st Lt. Bernard

Weisberger, and the study on amphibious

craft prepared by Col. A. T. Mason.

The War Shipping Administration

(WSA), operating agency for the Maritime Commission, controlled the allocation and operation of the bulk of the U.S.

merchant shipping during World War II.

WSA records, under the jurisdiction of the

Commerce Department, are at present

housed in the Federal Records Center at

Lawrence Avenue N.E., Washington, D.C.

The segments of these files used most extensively in the preparation of this volume

are the letters, papers, and other documents of Lewis Douglas, who was Admiral

Land's deputy administrator for the WSA

during the period covered. For the work

of the Maritime Commission itself,

Frederic C. Lane, Ships for Victory: A History of Shipbuilding Under the U.S. Maritime

Commission in World War II (Baltimore,

Md., The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951) is a

detailed and important study.

In supplementing the documentary

record of wartime decisions, some of the

memoir literature has been of great assistance, notably three volumes of Winston

S. Churchill's series, THE SECOND

WORLD WAR—Their Finest Hour (Bos-
748 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

ton, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949),

The Grand Alliance (Boston, Houghton

Mifflin Company, 1950), and The Hinge of

Fate (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company,

1950)—and Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New

York, Harper & Brothers, 1950). The

Manuscript Index to the Hopkins Papers,

loaned to the Office of the Chief of Military History by Robert E. Sherwood, has

provided additional information on material in Hopkins' papers (located in the

Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park) beyond

that to be found in the printed biography.

The main reliance for material particularly relating to overseas theaters of operations has been on the theater volumes (or

drafts thereof) of the series UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

and on various manuscript histories prepared in the theaters under the wartime

history program. Particularly useful have

been T. H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia (Washington, 1952),

Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, The China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell's Mission to China (Washington, 1953),

and Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical

Support of the Armies (Washington, 1953),

the last in the European theater subseries.

Another special study in the European

theater subseries, Marcel Vigneras, The

Rearmament of the French Forces, has

been the primary source for the account of

French lend-lease in this volume. The first

volume of the Western Hemisphere subseries under preparation by Stetson Conn

and Byron Fairchild, The Framework of

Hemisphere Defense, has been valuable

not only for its treatment of development

of adjacent Atlantic and Pacific bases but

also for that of strategy and high policy in

1940-41.

The various volumes of THE ARMY

AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II,

edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James

Lea Cate, have served as the main source

of information on Air Forces operations

and incidentally on Air Forces logistics.

The most recent publication in this series,

Volume VI, Men and Planes (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1955), surveys

part of the latter field, and a more detailed

treatment of the AAF procurement program is being written for the present series,

by Dr. Irving Holley, under the title Buying Air Power: Procurement of Matériel.

Similarly, information on naval operations has been largely drawn from the

series of volumes written by Samuel

Eliot Morison. For naval logistics, the

volume by Duncan S. Ballantine, U.S.

Naval Logistics in the Second World War

(Princeton, .N.J., Princeton University

Press, 1947) is the best summary. Certain

of the more detailed studies on this subject

prepared as part of the Navy's history

program during and after World War II

have also been useful, notably Ballantine's

Shipping in Naval Logistics: The History

of the Naval Transportation Service,

Monograph 5 in the series U.S. NAVAL

ADMINISTRATION IN WORLD

WAR II, and Building the Navy's Bases in

World War II: History of the Bureau of Yards

and Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps, 1940-

1946 (Washington, 1947), prepared by the

Bureau of Yards and Docks.

The story of Army procurement will be

the subject of a separate volume in this

series, Army Procurement and Economic

Mobilization, by R. Elberton Smith.

Some of the material on production problems and priorities has been drawn from

draft chapters of this volume. However,

more extensive use has been made of the

War Production Board study prepared by

the Civilian Production Administration,

Industrial Mobilization for War: Program and

Administration (Washington, 1947), and of

various unpublished War Production

Board historical monographs. On the sub-
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE AND GUIDE TO FOOTNOTES 749

ject of production priorities, a special debt

is due to Colonel Otto's study, 1942 Production Priorities for 1943, a monograph

prepared as part of the JCS historical program.

Information on British problems and

the British point of view has been gleaned

from records of the combined organizations, from British papers included in U.S.

Army records, from Churchill's memoirs,

and from published volumes in the British

series HISTORY OF THE SECOND

WORLD WAR. In the last, there is as yet

no study dealing specifically with military

logistics, but the histories in the United

Kingdom Civil Series have been of inestimable value. Two published works, W.

K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing, British

War Economy (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949) and M. M. Postan,

British War Production (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952), particularly the former, throw much light on both

British and combined economic problems

that had to enter into every calculation of

the military logisticians. In addition, the

British have kindly permitted us to see two

of their works as yet unpublished, H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply, in galley proof, and H. Duncan Hall and C. C.

Wrigley, Studies of Overseas Supply, in

typescript draft, both of which are excellent studies dealing primarily with American supply to Britain as seen from the

vantage point of the British themselves.

Unfortunately these studies were not

available until the manuscript of this book

was undergoing final revision and therefore were not used as extensively as they

might have been. Footnote references to

North American Supply are to the galleys,

the form in which the study was used.

Another recent publication in the British

official series, Capt. S. W. Roskill's, The

War at Sea: 1939-45, Volume I, The Defensive (London, Her Majesty's Stationery

Office, 1954), covering the period 1939-

41, also appeared too late to be used to

full advantage.

While the present volume contains its

share of statistics, it is concerned in the

main with broad trends of war activity

that can be demonstrated without detailed

statistical analysis. Consequently, there

has been no need for the kind of systematic

study of original raw data that would call

into play the skills of the professional

statistician. For the most part, standard

recent official compilations have been relied upon. The best and most important

of these is the collection prepared under

the direction of Theodore E. Whiting, of

the Office of the Comptroller of the Army,

and released in draft form in 1952 for

eventual publication in the UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

series. It is cited in this volume as Whiting,

Statistics. The sections on procurement

and lend-lease have been used most extensively herein. Other major sources include Strength of the Army (STM-30),

published by The Adjutant General, Department of the Army; the War Shipping

Administration Shipping Summary; Statistical Review, World War II (Control Division,

ASF, 1946); and Official Munitions Production of the United States By Months, July 1,

1940-August 31, 1945 (Civilian Production

Administration, May 1, 1947). Less generally used sources, cited primarily for detail not shown in the larger compilations,

include the Army Service Forces Monthly

Progress Reports for the years 1942-44,

especially Section 1-A, Procurement, and

Section 3, Transportation; the President's

Reports to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations;

Summary Report of Acceptances, TankAutomotive Materiel, 1940-45 (ASF,

Office, Chief of Ordnance, Detroit Engineering-Manufacturing Division, December 1945); and various statistical progress

reports prepared in 1941 and 1942 by the
750 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Statistics Branch of the War Department

General Staff, by the several supply services, and by Headquarters, Services of

Supply. These and other sources less frequently used are cited in footnotes in the

text and in notes on sources appended to

each statistical table.

Even in the limited kind of statistical

analysis attempted in the present volume,

certain problems have been encountered

against which the reader should be forewarned, particularly the reader who may

himself expect to work with the statistics

of this period. Even the best and most recently compiled data, which in the case of

the major sources cited above reflect years

of painstaking research by trained statisticians, cannot pretend to absolute and

literal accuracy, and for the historian the

choice between conflicting figures not infrequently becomes a question of judgment based on inconclusive, though voluminous, evidence. Part of the difficulty

can be laid to the shortcomings of wartime reporting caused by a lack of sufficient trained statisticians to record accurately so huge a volume and variety of

activity. Wartime figures were also shaped

by the enormous administrative pressure

put on lower echelons during the war to

"come up with a figure" on short notice,

the result being a heavy admixture of

what one statistician has called "midnight

estimates." But beyond these factors, the

historian encounters discrepancies and

contradictions in the statistical record

arising solely from the sheer complexity of

the materials, processes, and events recorded. He finds it difficult, for example,

to combine data on merchant ship losses

within a given period, since some losses

were reported on a notification basis and

some on an occurrence basis; in addition,

the various kinds of weight and space tonnage used in the data cannot all be converted accurately to a common unit of

measure. The multiplicity of types in the

weapons of modern war in itself poses innumerable variants of the classic problem

of adding together apples and potatoes,

and this is further complicated by the intricate processes of design change and

modification, which sometimes caused a

single item of equipment to migrate

through a whole series of reporting categories, repeatedly changing its nomenclature and generating duplicating statistics

as it went. For soldiers and troop units the

statistical record is equally complex.

The historian is fortunate indeed if the

standard official compilations meet his

needs, for in them all these problems are

concealed behind a solid facade of totals,

representing the end products of many

more manhours of more highly skilled

labor than he can hope to bring to bear

on the subject. When the official compilations disagree (as they occasionally do), or

when they lack the specific details of item

and time coverage that the historian requires, he must either revise his requirements or "go behind the totals" into a

morass of case histories of individual items

or categories. In the latter instance, he

faces the probability that he will be unable to trace back through the entire

course of research by which his predecessors arrived at their final figures, and will

merely uncover fragmentary data that

further complicate his problem. Fortunately, the areas of statistical doubt are

only marginal and do not affect the massive facts and trends of war activity that

emerge from a study of the synthesized

data in readily available secondary

sources. In the end, though perhaps agreeing with Mark Twain's views on statistics,

the historian will probably find these

sources sufficient for his needs, round off

the discrepant figures, and leave the last

three digits to the statisticians.
List of Abbreviations

AAF Army Air Forces

ABC American-British Conversations (Jan-Mar 41)

ABDA (Comd) Australian-British-Dutch-American (Command)

ACofS Assistant Chief of Staff

Actg Acting

Admin Administration, administrative, administrator

AFHQ Allied Force Headquarters

AG Adjutant General

AGF Army Ground Forces

AGWAR Adjutant General, War Department

AKA Cargo ship, attack

Alloc (s) Allocation (s)

Am Ammunition

AMMDEL American Military Mission, Delhi. Designation for American

headquarters at New Delhi, India

AMMISCA American Military Mission to China. Designation for American headquarters at Chungking, China

AMSEG Cable designation for Cairo messages

AMSIR American Military Mission, Iran, and its home office in

Washington

AMSME American Military Mission, Middle East

A&N Army and Navy

ANMB Army and Navy Munitions Board

ANPB Army-Navy Petroleum Board

APA Transport, attack

App. (s) Appendix (es)

AR Army Regulations

ASF Army Service Forces

Asgmt (s) Assignment (s)

ASN Assistant Secretary of the Navy

ASP Army Supply Program

Asst Assistant

ASW Assistant Secretary of War

Atchd Attached

Atchmt (s) Attachment (s)

Auth Authority

BCC(L) BOLERO Combined Committee, London

BCC(W) BOLERO Combined Committee, Washington

Bd (s) Board (s)

BMWT British Ministry of War Transport

Br British, branch

Bsc Basic

C ('s) Chief (s) (in combination)
752 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

CBI China-Burma-India

CC ANMB Clearance Committee, Army and Navy Munitions Board

CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff

CDS China Defense Supplies, Inc.

CG ('s) Commanding General (s)

Chm Chairman

CINC Commander in Chief

CM-IN Classified message, incoming

CM-OUT Classified message, outgoing

CMTC Combined Military Transportation Committee

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

CO Commanding Officer

C(s)ofS Chief (s) of Staff

Com (s) Committee (s)

Comd (s) Command (s)

Comdr (s) Commander (s)

COMINCH Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet

Comm Commission

Conf (s) Conference (s)

Cong Congress

Contl Control

Conv (s) Conversation (s)

Co-ord Co-ordination, co-ordinated

Corresp Correspondence

CPA Civilian Production Administration

CPOE Charleston Port of Embarkation

CPRB Combined Production and Resources Board

CPS Combined Staff Planners

CSAB Combined Shipping Adjustment Board

CWS Chemical Warfare Service

DAD Defense Aid Division (to 1 Oct 41), Defense Aid Director

(1 Oct 41-Mar 42)

DAS Defense Aid Section, G-4

DCofS Deputy Chief of Staff

DDAR Division of Defense Aid Reports

Def (s) Defense (s)

Deleg Delegation

Dir (s) Directive (s), director

Distrib Distribution

Div (s) Division (s)

DRB AGO Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant General's Office

Engr (s) Engineer (s)

EO Executive Order

Equip (g) Equipment (equipping)

Est (d) Estimate (d)

Estab Establish, establishment, establishing
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 753

ETO European Theater of Operations

ETOUSA European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

Exch Exchange

Exec Executive

Exped (s) Expedition (s), expeditionary

FM Field Manual

G-1 Personnel division of the War Department General Staff

G-2 Intelligence division of the War Department General Staff

G-3 Operations division of the War Department General Staff

G-4 Supply division of the War Department General Staff

GHQ General Headquarters

GO General Orders

Gt Brit Great Britain

HD Hawaiian Department

Hist History, historical

HR House of Representatives

HRPOE Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation

ID International Division, Army Service Forces

Incl (s) Inclosure (s), inclosed, inclosing

Ind (s) Indorsement (s)

Info Information

Instn (s) Instruction (s)

ISC International Supply Committee

JAdC Joint Administrative Committee

JB Joint Board

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JMTC Joint Military Transportation Committee

JPC Joint Planning Committee

JPS Joint Staff Planners

JSSC Joint Strategic Survey Committee

Jt Joint

JUSSC Joint U.S. Strategic Committee

KCRC Kansas City Records Center

LMAB Munitions Assignments Board, London

Ln Liaison

Logis Logistics, logistical

MAB Munitions Assignments Board, Washington

MAC(A) Munitions Assignments Committee (Air)

MAC(G) Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground)

MAC(N) Munitions Assignments Committee (Navy)

Mat (s) Material (s)

MBW Alternate abbreviation for MAB

Mil Military

MILID Military Intelligence Division

Min Minutes

Mis ('s) Mission (s)
754 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

MS Manuscript

Msg (s) Message (s)

Mtg Meeting

Mun Munitions

Mvmt (s) Movement (s)

Natl National

NATOUSA North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

NDAC Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense

NYPOE New York Port of Embarkation

O Office, officer (in combination)

OCMH Office of the Chief of Military History

OCT Office of the Chief of Transportation

OCT HB Historical Branch, Office of the Chief of Transportation

Off (s) Office (s), officer (s)

OLLA Office of Lend-Lease Administration

OPD Operations Division

Opn (s) Operation (s)

Ord Ordnance

Orgn Organization

Pac Pacific

Pdn Production

PL Public Law

Plng Planning

PMP Protective Mobilization Plan

POA Pacific Ocean Area

POE ('s) Port (s) of embarkation

Prob (s) Problem (s)

Proced Procedure, procedural

Prog (s) Program (s)

PTO Pacific Theater of Operations

Pub Public, publication

Purch Purchasing

QMC Quartermaster Corps

QMG Quartermaster General

RAF Royal Air Force

Rcd (s) Record (s)

Regt (s) Regiment (s)

Reinf (s) Reinforcement (s), reinforce

Reorgn Reorganization

Rep (s) Representative (s)

Reqmt (s) Requirement (s)

Ret Retired

Rpt (s) Report (s)

SAS Supply Arms and Services

Sec (s) Section (s)

Secy Secretary, secretariat
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 755

Ser Serial, series

SFPOE San Francisco Port of Embarkation

SG Surgeon General

SGS Secretary of the General Staff

Shipg Shipping

Shipt (s) Shipment (s)

Sig Signal

Sit Situation

SN Secretary of the Navy

SOS Services of Supply

Sp Special

Stf Staff

Sub (s) Subject (s)

Sup (s) Supply (supplies)

Suppl Supplement

Sv (s) Service (s)

SW Secretary of War

SWPA Southwest Pacific Area

TAG The Adjutant General

TC Transportation Corps

TIG The Inspector General

Tng Training

TQMG The Quartermaster General

Tr (s) Troop (s)

Trans Transport, transportation

Trf (s) Transfer (s)

Trfd Transferred

U.K. United Kingdom

UKCC United Kingdom Commercial Corporation

Ult Ultimate

USAFBI U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles

USAFFE U.S. Army Forces in the Far East

USAFIA U.S. Army Forces in Australia

USAFIME U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East

USAFISPA U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area

USFOR U.S. Forces in London

USN Under Secretary of the Navy

USNR U.S. Naval Reserve

USW Under Secretary of War

Vic Victory

WD War Department

WDCSA Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

WDGS War Department General Staff

WPB War Production Board

WPD War Plans Division

WSA War Shipping Administration
Glossary of Code Names

ANAKIM

ANFA

ARCADIA

BOBCAT

BOLERO

BRIMSTONE

ELKTON

FREEDOM

GRAY

GYMNAST

HUSKY

INDIGO

MAGNET

POPPY

RAINBOW

ROUNDUP

SLEDGEHAMMER

SUPER-GYMNAST

SYMBOL

TORCH

TRIDENT

"X"

X-RAY

YOKE

Plan for recapture of Burma.

Sometimes used by OPD officers as a code name for the

Casablanca Conference of January 1943.

U.S. -British conference in Washington, December 1941-

January 1942.

Bora Bora.

Build-up of U.S. forces and supplies in United Kingdom for

cross-Channel attack.

Plan for capture of Sardinia.

Mac Arthur's 12 February 1943 plan for recapture of

Rabaul.

Cable designation for Algiers messages.

Plan for capture and occupation of the Azores.

Early plan for invasion of North Africa, referring to either

the American plan for landing at Casablanca or the

British plan for landing farther eastward on the Mediterranean coast. (See SUPER-GYMNAST.)

Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943.

Plan for movement of troops to Iceland.

Movement of first U.S. forces to Northern Ireland.

New Caledonia.

Various plans prepared between 1939 and 1941 to meet

Axis aggression.

Plan for major U.S. -British attack across the Channel in

1943.

Plan for limited cross-Channel attack in 1942.

Plan for Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa,

combining U.S. and British plans and often used interchangeably with GYMNAST.

Casablanca Conference, 14-23 January 1943.

Allied invasion of North and Northwest Africa, November

1942.

International conference at Washington, 12-25 May 1943.

Australia.

Chinese Army in India.

American sponsored Chinese force in Yunnan Province.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published:

The War Department

Chief of Staff : Prewar Plans and Preparations

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945

The Army and Economic Mobilization

The Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground Forces

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops

The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service Forces

The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western Hemisphere

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense

Guarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in the Pacific

The Fall of the Philippines

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive

Victory in Papua

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls

Campaign in the Marianas

The Approach to the Philippines

Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

Triumph in the Philippines

Okinawa: The Last Battle

Strategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy

Salerno to Cassino

Cassino to the Alps

The European Theater of Operations

Cross-Channel Attack

Breakout and Pursuit

The Lorraine Campaign

The Siegfried Line Campaign

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge

The Last Offensive

The Supreme Command

Riviera to the Rhine

The Supreme Command

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II
758 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

The Middle East Theater

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India Theater

Stilwell's Mission to China

Stilwell's Command Problems

Time Runs Out in CBI

The Technical Services

The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War

The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field

The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat

The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany

The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor

Theaters

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War

The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply

The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany

The Signal Corps: The Emergency

The Signal Corps: The Test

The Signal Corps: The Outcome

The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations

The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Special Studies

Chronology: 1941-1945

Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945

Rearming the French

Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt

The Women's Army Corps

Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors

Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces

The Employment of Negro Troops

Manhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb

Pictorial Record

The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Japan
Index

Abadan, 566, 567, 568, 571, 575, 582

ABC-1, 52n, 55, 56, 57, 73, 74, 76, 195, 715. See

also American-British Conversations.

ABC-2, 52n, 89n, 90n

ABC-4/CS-1, 196. See also ARCADIA Conference.

ABC-4/CS-4, 214n

ABDA Command, 149, 172, 173, 496, 525

Adak, 415

Adelaide, 168

Advisory Commission to the Council of National

Defense, 29, 38

Afghanistan, 48

Africa, 46, 273. See also East Africa; North

Africa, French; West Africa, French.

Afrika Korps, 50, 134

Agattu, 667. See also Aleutian Islands.

Ahwaz, 566, 575, 577

Air ferry routes, 60, 124, 150, 372, 373, 565-66,

596

Air Force Ferrying Command, 509

Air Forces, U.S. See Army Air Forces.

Air offensive, planning for, 133, 312, 355, 525, 542,

664, 665, 666-67, 668, 673, 720

Air Service Command, 221, 244, 245, 309

Aircraft, 21, 36, 584, 596. See also Bombardment

aircraft; Pursuit aircraft; Transport aircraft;

countries and geographic areas.

allocation of, 36-37, 39, 86, 87, 89-90, 99, 101,

103-04, 275-77, 284, 535, 565, 566, 584-

85, 596-97. See also Arnold-Slessor-Towers

Agreement,

production objectives, 29, 36-37, 39, 602, 607-

08, 609

Aircraft carriers, 625

Akyab, 539, 541, 542, 687

Alaska, 146, 273, 393, 415, 565, 566, 614, 697.

See also Aleutian Islands; North Pacific.

Alaska-Hawaii-Panama triangle, 28, 42, 148, 165,

614

Alcan Highway, 294, 393n, 582

Aleutian Islands, 392, 668, 695

Algeria, 152, 419, 669, 670

Algiers, 387, 419, 422, 423, 427, 445

Allied Supply Council, 176, 501

Amchitka, 415. See also Aleutian Islands.

American Chiefs of Staff. See Joint Chiefs of

Staff (JCS).

American Military Mission to China, 108-09, 526

American Volunteer Group, 40, 526, 538, 539

American-British Conversations, 44, 46, 48, 52-53,

89, 90, 720. See also ABC-1.

Ammunition, 33-35, 294, 299, 334n, 422, 554, 643

shortage of, 34, 35, 42, 69, 73, 87, 93, 145, 306,

314, 318-19

Ammunition Supply Report, 642

Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, 65, 68

Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet, 66

Amphibious operations, planning for, 61-62, 134,

136-37, 446, 662, 684, 685, 720

Amphibious training, 60, 65-68, 378, 380, 382,

408, 424, 425, 684

Amtorg Trading Corporation, 97

ANAKIM, 542, 543-47, 550, 685, 692, 693, 697,

700, 701, 704. See also Burma, planning for

offensive in.

Andimeshk, 567, 568, 571

Anglo-American Co-ordinating Committee in Ankara, 521

Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 509

Anglo-French Purchasing Board, 31, 32. See also

British Purchasing Commission.

Antigua, 335

Aquitania, 158, 158n, 163, 203, 357, 362, 364,

457

ARCADIA Conference, 144, 151, 195, 200, 213, 248-

49, 250, 270, 275, 504, 525, 551

Archangel, 113, 114, 564

Arctic Ocean, 564

Areas of strategic responsibility, 54, 56, 56n, 68,

151, 174-75, 491, 497, 520, 525, 526, 566,

577

Argentia. See Atlantic Conference.

Armored Divisions, U.S.

1st, 362, 363, 368, 422, 425, 448, 470, 687

2d, 365, 372, 422, 425, 426, 439, 440, 507

3d, 422, 425, 426, 439

6th, 100

Armored Force, U.S., 29, 104

Armored forces, 21, 100, 101, 104

Army, Chinese. See Chinese Army.

Army, U.S., 10, 22-23, 76, 99, 104, 136, 137, 138,

139, 140, 633, 633n, 655

combat readiness, 22, 28, 43, 57, 68, 71, 73-75,

119, 138, 144-45, 146

state of equipment, 21-22, 72-73, 144-45,

638-39

strength, 13n-14n, 14, 21, 27, 41, 72, 75, 302, 605,

629, 632-33, 714, 714n, 715. See also

Deployment of U.S. forces; Troop Basis, 1942;

Troop Basis, 1943; Victory Program Troop

Basis.
760 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Army Air Corps, 21, 37, 78, 131, 131n. See also

Army Air Forces.

Army Air Forces, 5, 103, 123, 207, 223, 228, 230,

232n, 339, 348, 358, 384, 608-09, 633n, 665,

675. See also Army Air Corps; Arnold, Lt.

Gen. Henry H.

and Alaska-Siberia ferry route, 565-66, 596

and allocation of aircraft, 99, 149-50, 584

Anglo-American air force for Caucasus, 584-85

deployment of, 52, 151, 155, 366, 372, 508

expansion of, 29, 90, 103, 275, 276, 277, 607.

See also Aircraft, allocation of; Arnold-SlessorTowers Agreement.

planned strength of, 1943, 14n, 633

and strategic bombardment of Germany, 355,

384, 608, 665

supply functions of, 244-46, 262, 317, 318, 337,

643

and TORCH forces, 427, 439

and transport route to China, 528-30, 531

Army Ground Forces, 223, 228, 230, 232n, 315,

339, 371, 371n, 393, 411, 637-38

Army Ground Forces Reduction Board, 638

Army Service Forces, 12, 314, 315, 642, 643. See

also Services of Supply.

Army Specialized Training Program, 633n

Army Supply Program, 198, 261, 262, 263, 264,

277-78, 278n, 281, 282, 284, 287, 293, 295,

296, 296n, 297-302, 303, 314, 494, 516, 517,

633-34, 643, 709, 710, 713

computation of, 261, 264, 277-78, 298-303,

632-35

reduction of, 632-33, 635

revisions of, 632-33, 634-35

Army Transport Service, 68, 233, 656

Army-Navy joint logistics. See Joint logistics,

Army-Navy.

Army-Navy Munitions Board. See Joint Army and

Navy Munitions Board.

Army-Navy Petroleum Board, 320, 643, 652

Army-Navy-British Purchasing Commission Joint

Committee. See Joint Aircraft Committee.

Army-Navy-WSA Committee. See Joint ArmyNavy-WSA Ship Operations Committee.

Arnold, Lt. Gen. Henry H., 103, 201, 275, 276, 388,

393, 456, 543, 608, 663, 665. See also ArnoldSlessor-Towers Agreement.

Arnold-Portal Agreement, 275, 275n

Arnold-Slessor-Towers Agreement, 276, 276n, 457,

508. See also Aircraft, allocation of; Army

Air Forces, expansion of.

"Arsenal of democracy" policy, 103, 127, 128, 132,

209, 247, 610, 715

Arthur Middleton, 180, 181, 182

Aruba, 152

Ascension Island, 335

Asiatic Fleet, U.S., 53

Assam, 528, 547

Assignments Subcommittee (MAC(G)), 286

Assistant Secretary of War, 23, 25-27. See also

McCloy, John J.

Assistant Secretary of War for Air. See Lovett,

Robert A.

Atlantic, 27, 41, 53, 62, 153, 611, 662

area of British-American responsibility, 56, 68,

174-75 coast of North Africa, plan for landings on,

153, 417, 719. See also Casablanca; GYMNAST; North Africa, French; TORCH.

deployment of U.S. troops in 56-57, 151-52,

153, 362. See also Deployment of U.S. forces,

major military effort in, 51, 52, 132, 151-52.

See also BOLERO; RAINBOW War Plans; Strategic planning.

naval strength in, 52, 60, 118

security of lines of communication in, 42, 143,

151-52, 153, 719

shipping losses in, 612-13, 616, 690, 719

Atlantic, Battle of, 58, 118, 616

Atlantic Conference, 98, 117, 119, 134

Atlas Mountains, 153, 468, 669

Attu, 392, 415, 695

Auchinleck, General Sir Claude J. E., 353, 504,

507

Auckland, 178, 390

Aurand, Brig. Gen. Henry S., 79, 80, 82, 92, 92n,

93, 102, 106, 107, 107n, 127, 132, 212, 222,

238, 249n, 254, 262, 263, 264, 266, 271, 272,

291, 298, 505, 506, 532

Australia, 47, 48, 124, 149, 167-68, 170, 172-73, 174, 176, 389, 396, 412-13, 496-97, 500, 716

on air ferry route, 124, 168

air operations from, 167, 168-69, 171

and defense of the Philippines, 149, 150, 166-

67, 169. See also Plan "X."

establishment of base in, 149, 150, 165, 166, 167,

168, 169, 172, 176, 177, 716

Japanese threat to, 155, 165, 173-74

lend-lease aid to, 498-99, 500

local procurement in, 173, 188, 258, 501-02

port facilities in, 167, 168, 185, 390, 398

reinforcement of, 173-74, 176, 177. See also

Deployment of U.S. forces.

and return of divisions from Middle East, 173-

74, 353, 504

security of line of communications to, 53, 155,

165, 716

supply plans for, 166-67, 172-73, 497-99.

See also Plan "X."

Australia Munitions Assignments Committee, 502

Automatic Supply Report, 642

Azores, 43, 46, 60, 68-70, 74, 75, 117, 118, 152,

669

Badger, Rear Adm. Oscar C., 658

Baghdad, 505
INDEX 761

Bailey, Frazer A., 402, 403, 622

Baker, Newton D., 26, 242

Balance sheet technique, 83. See also Great Britain, statement of requirements.

Balkans, 50, 68

Baltimore, 475

Bandar Shahpur, 566, 567, 571, 575, 582

Barnes, Maj. Gen. Julian F., 149, 170, 176, 412

Baruch, Bernard, 609

Bases-for-destroyers transaction, 36

Basic Logistical Plan, March 1943 (for joint operations), 659-60

Basra, 566, 568, 575n

Bay of Bengal, 353, 528, 540, 685

Bazooka. See Rocket launchers.

Beaverbrook, Lord, 99, 100n, 197-98, 251, 555

Belyaev, Maj. Gen. Alexander I., 565, 586, 593

Bering Sea, 566

Bering Strait, 564

Bermuda, 69

Béthouart, Maj. Gen. Marie Émile, 513, 515, 517,

520

Bhamo, 546

"Big Five." See Hawaiian Islands.

Bismarck Archipelago, 391

Blair, Col. Shiras A., 363n

Blarney, General Sir Thomas, 176

Bland Act, March 1942, 268

Block stowage, 404

Block system of assignments, 286-87, 293. See

also Munitions Assignments Committee

(Ground), policies and procedures.

Blockade, 171-72

Bloemfontein, 170

Boatner, Maj. Haydon L., 108

Boats, small, 407, 409-10, 414, 471, 502

BOBCAT, 179-85. See also Bora Bora; POPPY

Force.

Bogart, Lt. Col. Frank A., 443n

BOLERO, 286, 361, 376, 677. See also Marshall

Memorandum; ROUNDUP; SLEDGEHAMMER.

British attitude toward, 360, 361, 365, 482, 483,

484

estimate of forces for, 366-67, 481, 482, 483

landing craft for, 360, 377, 483-84

planning for in Washington, 364, 366

shipping for, 367, 369, 372, 372n, 373, 374, 375-

76, 383, 421, 421n, 457, 482, 486-87, 676,

676n, 681, 682, 691, 692, 693

slow-down, 364, 457, 462, 480-81, 483, 484, 486, 664, 695-96

timing of, 361, 363

versus other operations, 274, 361, 365, 368, 372,

373, 374, 383, 385, 387, 456, 458, 460, 481,

482, 486, 500, 503, 506, 507, 560, 561, 562, 576, 587

BOLERO Combined Committees, 363, 363n, 367,

368, 483

BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan, 365, 661, 662, 686

Bombardment aircraft, 33, 35, 101, 123, 146-47,

150, 167, 366, 388, 392, 393, 508, 538, 561, 668. See also Aircraft; Army Air Forces;

Strategic bombing.

Bombardment of Germany. See Air offensive, planning for; Strategic bombing.

Bombay, 528, 535

Bone, 423

Bora Bora, 151, 177, 179-85. See also BOBCAT.

Bougainville, 694, 695

Boulogne, 671

Bradley, Maj. Gen. Follett, 565, 566

Brahmaputra River, 536

Brazil, 28, 43, 50, 75, 89, 119

Breene, Maj. Gen. Robert G., 401, 402, 406, 413

Brereton, Maj. Gen. Lewis H., 167, 170, 457, 508,

538

Brest, 671

Brett, Lt. Gen. George H., 164, 166-67, 168-69,

172, 176

BRIMSTONE, 672. See also Sardinia.

Brisbane, 167, 169, 390, 398

British Chiefs of Staff, 52, 53, 119, 151-52, 195,

213n, 457, 668, 673. See also Dill, Field

Marshal Sir John; Great Britain,

at ARCADIA Conference, 152, 195, 250

at Casablanca Conference, 666-68, 671

defeat of Germany as ultimate aim, 456, 668

on eliminating Italy from war, 672, 673

on invasion of North Africa, 152, 386-87, 417-

20, 421, 422. See also GYMNAST; TORCH.

on invasion of northwestern Europe, 195, 384

jurisdiction over Indian Ocean and Middle East,

174, 491, 503

on limited offensives in Mediterranean, 671

on operations in 1943, 664, 667, 668, 673-75,

685-86

on post-TORCH operations in Mediterranean,

672-75

on production planning, 277-78, 279, 280, 281,

282, 285

on rearmament of French forces in North Africa,

516

on strategy in war against Japan, 663

strategy review at Atlantic Conference, 119, 134

British Comptroller General of Economy, 642

British Import Program, 48, 49, 49n, 118, 209,

209n, 284, 357-58, 383, 462, 675, 677-82,

690-94, 696-702

British Isles. See Great Britain.

British Joint Staff Mission, 84, 213n, 249

British Merchant Shipping Mission, 58

British Ministry of War Transport, 112, 267, 569,

616

British Navy. See Navy, British.

British Purchasing Commission, 32

British Supply Council in North America, 83, 84
762 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

British War Cabinet, 38, 678, 692

British War Office, 494

Brooke, Field Marshal Sir Alan, 521, 685

Brown, Douglas, 111

Buckley, Maj. Gen. J., 642

Budge, Alexander, 163n

Buna, 389, 407, 408

Buna-Gona operations, 687

Bundy, Lt. Col. Charles W., 132

Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, USN, 656

Burma, 53, 397, 525, 541, 544, 545, 695

British offensive in, 539, 541, 542, 543, 547, 687,

693, 696, 700, 701

Japanese successes in, 527, 528, 536, 549

planning for offensive in, 532-33, 535, 537-38,

539-40, 541, 542-43, 547, 662, 667, 668,

685, 686, 687, 720

supply route to China through, 527, 533, 540,

545-46, 547

Burma Road, 86-87, 108, 108n, 109, 526, 527, 546

Burns, Maj. Gen. James H., 78, 95, 95n, 97n, 109,

131n, 253, 562n

Bushire, 566, 568, 575

Cairns, 168

Cairo, 574

Calcutta, 528, 535

Calvert, 444

Campion, Brigadier Donald, 249n, 254n, 271

Canada, 254, 273

Canadian Munitions Assignments Committee, 254-

55

Canary Islands, 75, 152, 669

Canton Island, 124, 150, 151, 161, 178, 186, 187,

334

Cape Gloucester, 695

Cape of Good Hope, 16, 47, 54, 120, 579, 715, 716

Cape Verde Islands, 74, 152, 669

Cargo, 369, 370, 371

discharge, 182-83, 218, 398, 402, 449-52, 583

loading, 157, 181-82, 218, 236, 404, 441-45, 616

Cargo manifest, 331, 332

Cargo shipping. See Shipping, cargo.

Carib Plan, 66

Caribbean, 143, 715

Caribbean Defense Command, 641

Caroline Islands, 56, 667

Casablanca, 153, 386n, 387, 417, 419, 420, 423,

468. See also GYMNAST; TORCH; Western

Task Force.

Casablanca Conference, 285, 414, 474, 484, 514,

515, 521, 542, 582, 587, 588, 591, 680, 682,

684, 687, 690, 693

strategic planning at, 601-02, 661, 666, 685-86,

687, 692, 694, 696, 699, 714, 719

Caucasus, 662

Cavalry Division, 6th, 71n

Cavalry Regiment, 101st, 308

CCS. See Combined Chiefs of Staff.

CCS 5/2, 353n CCS 19/1, 253n, 278n, 285n

CCS 39/1, 207n, 357n

CCS 50, 272n

CCS 50/2, 273, 273n, 274, 275, 276, 278, 279, 280,

284, 285, 291, 296n, 500, 500n, 504, 512n,

520n, 560n

CCS 50/3, 275n

CCS 57/2, 175n, 491n

CCS 58/2, 362n

CCS 68/1, 498n

CCS 69, 363n

CCS 72, 364n

CCS 72/1, 365n

CCS 78, 380n

CCS 82, 279n

CCS 82/1, 279n

CCS 82/2, 281n

CCS 84, 365n

CCS 87, 373n, 457n

CCS 87/4, 458n

CCS 91, 280, 280n

CCS 94, 387n, 392n, 483n

CCS 100/1, 457n

CCS 102, 280n

CCS 102/1, 281n

CCS 103, 421n, 422

CCS 103/10, 466n

CCS 104/3, 539n

CCS 105, 484n

CCS 109/1, 577n

CCS 110, 640n

CCS 110/4, 640n

CCS 115, 499n

CCS 116/1/D, 667n

CCS 117, 281n

CCS 135, 662n

CCS 135/1, 664n, 675n, 684n

CCS 135/2, 663n, 672n

CCS 143, 587n

CCS 145, 685n

CCS 153, 668n

CCS 153/1, 667n, 668n

CCS 157, 521n

CCS 160, 675n, 676n, 681n

CCS 161, 672n, 683n, 684n

CCS 161/1, 672n, 684n

CCS 162, 587n, 588n, 681n

CCS 162/1, 588n, 591n, 681n

CCS 162/2, 583n, 589n

CCS 164, 685n

CCS 164/1, 685n

CCS 167, 684n

CCS 168, 668n, 695n

CCS 170/2, 543n, 588n, 589n, 668n, 676n

CCS 171/2/D, 673n
INDEX 763

CCS 172, 676n, 681, 681n, 682n, 691

CCS 174, 615n, 630n

CCS 174/1, 704n, 705n

CCS 181, 516n

CCS 181/2, 516n

CCS 181/3, 516n

CCS 181/5, 516n

CCS 183/1, 693n

CCS 183/2, 693n, 694n, 703n

CCS 183/3, 678n

CCS 206, 522n

CCS 242/6, 516n, 522n, 547n

Center Task Force, 423, 427, 428, 429, 463, 466,

467. See also TORCH.

Central Pacific, 124, 147, 148, 151, 175, 186, 242,

353, 383, 415, 659, 667, 687, 695, 721. See

also Hawaiian Islands.

Central Shipping Administration, 216-17

Chamberlin, Brig. Gen. Stephen J., 167, 176

Chancy, Maj. Gen. James E., 111

Charleston, S. C., Port of Embarkation, 157, 179,

180, 181, 182, 182n. See also BOBCAT.

Chennault, Brig. Gen. Claire L., 40, 40n, 526, 541-

42, 687

Cherbourg, 385

Chiang Kai-shek, 85, 105, 108, 525, 526, 527, 533,

538-39, 541, 542, 546, 550

Chief of Naval Operations. See Stark, Admiral

Harold R. See also King, Admiral Ernest J.

Chief of Staff, 25, 34, 79, 91, 627. See also Marshall, General George C.; Summerall, General

Charles P.

Chief of Transportation, Office of, 185, 326, 345,

660

Chief of Transportation, SOS, 232, 244. See also

Gross, Maj. Gen. Charles P.

Army-wide transportation activities centralized

under, 232

jurisdiction over ports of embarkation, 233-34

China, 40, 86, 87, 94-95, 108, 108n, 109, 252, 273,

334, 524-25, 538, 539, 543, 662, 668, 715

allocation of aircraft to, 86, 87, 103, 535

area of American strategic responsibility, 491,

526

and collaboration with British forces, 532-33,

546-47, 667

lend-lease aid to, 76, 85-88, 103, 105, 491, 526-

28, 530-32, 535, 539, 547

local procurement in, 541, 549

Munitions Assignments Board representation

sought by, 252, 526

and offensive in Burma, 532-33, 535, 542-43

operations against Japan from, 525, 542, 546

overland supply routes to, 86-87, 527-28, 533,

540, 541, 545-46, 549-50. See also Burma

Road; Ledo Road.

policy on use of American forces in, 525, 532

Stilwell's mission to, 526, 543n

China—Continued

strategic aim to support, 40, 76, 525, 530, 539,

549

supply of, by air, 528-30, 531, 532, 533, 538,

541-42, 543, 549

Thirty-division program for, 87, 526, 533

China-Burma-India theater, 16, 526, 528, 533, 538,

539, 541, 543-44, 549, 550, 715

China Defense Supplies, Inc., 85, 109, 531, 533,

534, 535

China National Aviation Corporation, 530, 533,

535

"China Theater," 525-26

Chindwin River, 539, 541, 542, 547, 687

Chinese Air Force, 86

Chinese Army, 108, 525, 526, 538

Christmas Island, 124, 150, 151, 161, 178, 186,

187

Churchill, Winston S., 32, 44, 47, 48, 54n, 55,

195, 270, 281, 356, 377, 555, 574, 627, 628,

629n, 668, 676, 680, 715

on aid to Soviet Union, 97, 551, 555-56

at ARCADIA Conference, 144, 151-52, 195

on area of TORCH landings, 422-23

at Atlantic Conference, 98-99, 377

on BOLERO, 484, 664

on British shipping needs, 49, 57, 58, 59, 204,

209

on cross-Channel invasion in 1943, 664

on defense of Middle East, 353, 356-57, 365,

508 on emergency offensive against Germany in 1942,

376 on Mediterranean operations after TORCH, 664,

673 on northern convoys to Soviet Union, 557, 574,

583, 584, 590 on operations in French North Africa, 152, 387,

417. See also GYMNAST.

on operation in Norway, 386, 664

on ROUNDUP, 484-86

on a second front, 387

on striking at the "underbelly of the Axis," 664,

668 on troop shipments to Ireland and Iceland, 159,

353, 356-57 on Turkey's entry into the war, 520, 521, 664

Civilian contractors, 505, 507

Civilian employees, 109, 110, 412, 413

CKD (completely knocked down) shipments, 370,

640

Clark, Maj. Gen. Mark W., 435, 436, 438, 442,

463n, 465, 512

Clausewitz, Karl von, 8-10

Clay, Brig. Gen. Lucius D., 228, 262, 264, 266,

266n, 293

Clearance Committee, ANMB, 30, 31, 32, 32n

Coal, shipment of, to North Africa, 464-65
764 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Coast Guard, 656

Combat loaders, 122, 122n, 155, 157, 203, 357, 397,

421, 461, 682, 683, 684

Combined Chiefs of Staff, 147-48, 156, 159, 214,

263-64, 275, 279, 280, 281, 282, 285, 353,

458, 483, 560, 577, 588-89. See also British

Chiefs of Staff; CCS; Joint Chiefs of Staff,

and aid to Turkey, 520, 521-22

on allocation of war matériel, 252, 254, 271-72,

296, 498, 499

jurisdiction over European-Atlantic area, 174-

75, 491

jurisdiction over grand strategy, 175, 252

jurisdiction over Munitions Assignments Boards,

252, 257

on North African operation, 159, 161

and offensive in Burma, 539, 543, 544

on operations in 1943, 685-86

organization and functions of, 144, 213, 214

and rearmament of French forces in North Africa,

512, 516

on relief of British troops in Iceland and Ireland,

363-64

and shipping priorities, 368, 457

and strategic priorities, 696-97

Combined Communications Board, 596

Combined Food Board, 255

Combined Military Transportation Committee, 215,

368, 372, 562, 577, 578, 579, 587, 589, 590,

630n, 694, 699, 704

Combined Production and Resources Board, 215n,

255, 257n, 264, 266, 279, 279n, 280, 281, 282. See also Munitions, production planning.

Combined Raw Materials Board, 255, 257

Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, 255, 375,

561, 562, 624, 678

Combined Staff Planners, 214, 215n, 272, 273, 278,

279-80, 357-58, 577, 588, 675

Command, 56, 144, 149-50, 176, 178, 179, 221,

388-89, 414, 509, 525, 526, 655, 695

Command and General Staff School, 10

Commanding General Shipments, 268-69, 499,

518, 533. See also Lend-lease, control of by

theater commander.

Communications zone, 241, 242

Commercial Traffic Branch, OQMG, 267, 557

Composite loading, 404

Congress, 28-29, 32, 33-34, 40, 89, 124

Connolly, Maj. Gen. Donald H., 577, 578, 579,

580, 590

Connor, Col. Voris H., 479

Consolidated Balance Sheet, 248

Contessa, 444-45

Control Division, 262, 264, 658

Controlled items of equipment and supply, 304.

See also Equipment, distribution policy for

controlled items.

Controlled Materials Plan, 602. See also War

Production Board.

Convoys, 60, 157, 207-08, 364, 367-68, 369, 459,

612-13, 670, 671, 672, 673, 675, 676, 695,

702

Arctic, 369, 383, 420, 460, 461, 556, 557-58,

561-62, 564, 569, 573, 583-84, 586-87, 588-

89, 590, 613, 668, 675-76, 697

Atlantic, 158-59, 362, 461, 675

Central Pacific, 125, 147, 163

Mediterranean, 671, 673

for North Africa, 397, 421, 428, 429, 431-33,

434-37, 438, 445, 452, 458, 459, 460-61, 462- 65, 466, 467-78, 515, 517, 612, 613, 668, 690,

692

Southwest Pacific, 149, 154-55, 174

Conway, Capt. Granville, 618

Cooke, Rear Adm. Charles M., Jr., 682, 685

Coral Sea, 173

Corps areas, 23, 221, 305, 337

Corps of Chaplains, 22

Corps of Engineers, 22, 23, 221, 232, 378

Corregidor, 171, 172

Corsica, 672

Cotentin peninsula, 385, 684

Cox, Oscar S., 622

Coy, Wayne, 622

Crain, Maj. Gen. James K., 254n, 495

Crawford, Brig. Gen. Robert W., 254n, 271

Credit balance system, 294. See also 45-day rule.

Credit items of equipment and supply, 304

Crete, 50

Cross-Channel attack. See Northwestern Europe.

Culebra Island, 65

Curaçao, 152

Currie, Lauchlin, 85-86, 87-88, 94, 105, 538, 539

Curtin, John, 174

Curtin-Wasserman-MacArthur Agreement, 498n,

501n

Cyrenaica, 50, 353

Dakar, 75, 118, 152, 445

Dardanelles, 48

Darwin, 168, 176

Day of supply, 299, 299n, 300, 301, 334, 334n, 643

Deane, Brig. Gen. John R., 628-29

Defense Aid Director, Office of, 80, 111, 261, 261n,

262. See also International Division, SOS.

Defense Aid Division, OUSW, 78, 79

Defense aid program. See Lend-lease.

Defense Aid Section, G-4, 79. See also Aurand,

Brig. Gen. Henry S.

Defense Aid Supply Committee, 79, 80, 248, 261,

263. See also International Supply Committee.

de Gaulle, General Charles. See Gaulle, General

Charles de.
INDEX 765

Delta Area Service Command, 509, 510

Deployment of U.S. forces, 121, 122, 135, 145, 146,

165, 312, 541, 611, 662, 721. See also Ship- ping, troop; Troop movements; geographical

areas.

Army-Navy to Pacific, 178

in Atlantic, 146, 151-52, 153, 159, 165, 362,

457, 481, 483, 486-87, 611-12

to Middle East, 457, 510, 579-80, 611

to Pacific, 21, 125, 146, 155, 161, 163, 165, 174,

176, 177-78, 392, 392n, 393, 406

planning for, 52, 56, 75, 125, 145-46, 147, 151-

52, 165, 353, 356, 363, 392, 507, 601, 611-12,

615, 629-31, 637-38, 662, 669, 670-71, 676,

676n, 686, 687-90, 693-94, 702-04, 705, 720

pool of equipped units for emergency movements,

310, 311-12, 313, 314, 343. See also Equipment, for outbound units.

projected, 629, 634, 693

strength overseas, 21, 41, 75, 629, 714, 714n,

715

Depot system, 14, 375, 406-07, 429-30, 505

Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements and Resources, SOS, Office of, 227, 228n

Destroyers-for-bases transaction, 36

DeWitt, Lt. Gen. John L., 239, 305, 415, 586

Dill, Field Marshal Sir John, 104, 364, 387, 543,

629n, 694

Dillon, Brig. Gen. Theodore H., 448

Dinjan, 528

Director of Procurement and Distribution, SOS,

227, 228

Distribution allowances, 634-35. See also Army

Supply Program.

Distribution Branch, SOS, 228

Distribution Division, SOS, 231

Distribution factors, 299, 300, 301

Division of Defense Aid Reports, 78, 80, 112. See

also Office of Lend-Lease Administration.

Divisions, 14, 22, 27, 43, 131, 144, 145, 196, 197,

302, 638, 695. See also Armored Divisions,

U.S.; Armored forces; Cavalry Division, 6th;

Infantry Divisions, U.S.

for amphibious corps, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65-66, 71

for BOLERO, 675, 676, 696

for Pacific, 163, 174, 178, 392, 393, 396, 456,

663n, 695

for TORCH, 425

Dodecanese Islands, 522

Doolittle, Brig. Gen. James H., 422

Dorr, Goldthwaite H., 223, 295

Douglas, Lewis W., 218, 219n, 369, 373, 374, 401,

515, 558, 562, 586, 590, 616, 617, 618-20,

621-23, 624, 627, 678, 680, 691, 698-701,

704-05

DUKW. See Vehicles, amphibian.

Dutch East Indies. See Netherlands Indies.

East Africa, 47, 50

East Indies. See Netherlands Indies.

Eastern Front, 551.

Eastern Task Force, 423, 427, 428, 429, 463, 467.

See also Algiers; TORCH.

Ecker, Frederick W., 523

Eden, Anthony, 692, 699, 700

Edward Rutledge, 446

Edwards, Brig. Gen. Idwal H., 605

Efate, 177, 178, 185, 186, 398, 399

Egypt, 47, 48, 50, 118, 365, 366, 372, 505

Eighth Air Force, 366, 374, 493

Eighth Army, British, 152, 159, 365, 372, 418, 422,

458, 511, 669, 687

Eisenhower, Maj. Gen. Dwight D., 149, 166, 172,

243, 272, 354, 355, 358, 477, 477n, 671n,

684, 692

and rearmament of French forces in North Africa,

512, 513, 514, 515, 518, 524

on TORCH, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 427, 431,

432, 459-60, 465-66, 467, 484

El Alamein, 365, 511

Electra, 446

ELKTON, 694. See also Rabaul.

Ellsworth, Lt; Col. Robert A., 164n

Emergency expeditionary forces (1940-41), 28, 46-

47, 60-63, 66-72, 74, 75, 118

Emmons, Lt. Gen. Delos C., 162, 165, 187, 189,

239-40

Engineer Amphibian Brigades, 408, 409

Engineer Amphibian Command, 382, 408

Engineers. See Corps of Engineers.

Equipment, 637, 638, 639

credit method of distribution, 304, 313

distribution policy for controlled items, 304, 306,

307, 308-09, 310, 311, 313, 314, 323, 337-39

for French forces in North Africa, 511-20

for jungle warfare, 391, 410-12

for outbound units, 305, 306, 309, 313, 336-46,

440-41, 646-48

priorities structure, 40, 303-04, 305, 306, 307,

308, 308n, 310, 311, 313, 343

shortage of, 21-22, 72-73, 305, 306, 307, 308,

310, 314, 641

standardization of, 16, 36, 37, 38, 83-84, 639

for troop training, 305, 306, 307, 313, 314, 343,

344

Eritrea, 505, 506

Eritrea Service Command, 509, 510

Escorts, naval. See Naval escort vessels.

Espiritu Santo, 178-79, 394, 398, 399, 403

Eureka landing boats, 447

European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

(ETOUSA), 493, 495

General Purchasing Board in, 494

Services of Supply in, 495

Evill, Air Marshal Douglas C. S., 253
766 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Expenditure programs, 295

Export Control Act of 1940, 32

Export-Import Bank of Washington, 40

Fairbanks, 565

Fanning Island, 177, 186, 187

Far East, 27, 42, 46, 47, 52, 53-54, 104, 149, 154,

155, 166, 167

Far East Air Force, 167

Faymonville, Brig. Gen. Philip P., 111, 574

Fedala, 153, 446

Fellers, Col. Bonner F., 457

Ferry routes. See Air ferry routes.

Fighter aircraft. See Pursuit aircraft.

Fiji Islands, 124, 150, 151, 155, 178, 186, 388, 392,

398

First Army, British, 466

1st Joint Training Force, 65

Floating warehouses, 399, 403

Flying Tigers. See American Volunteer Group.

Forrestal, James V., 162, 164, 164n, 623

45-day rule, 291, 292, 293, 294, 558, 594

France, 27, 32, 68

France, Vichy, 42, 61, 68

Franklin, Walter, 657, 658

Free French, 151, 273, 491, 512

Fremantle, 167

French, in North Africa, 152, 417, 445-46, 448, 473,

511-20, 611, 633, 633n, 669, 715

French Air Force, 514

French fleet. See Navy, French.

French Morocco. See Morocco, French.

French Nickel Company, 399, 402

"Full and down" loading, 618

G-1, 25, 224

G-2, 25, 221

G-3, 25, 224, 228, 348

G-4, 23-25, 26, 33, 34, 61, 63, 72, 74, 78, 79, 80,

121, 122, 123, 135-36, 166, 169, 172-73,

221, 221n, 222, 223, 224, 228, 246, 314, 317, 318n, 327

G-4 Availability List 1941, 93, 104, 106, 112

Gaulle, General Charles de, 511, 512

General Depot Service, SOS, 227

General Headquarters, India, 525

General Headquarters, U.S. Army, 29, 221-23

General Headquarters Air Force, 73

General Plans Branch, SOS, 231

General Purchasing Agent. See Roop, Brig. Gen.

James C.

General Purchasing Board, 173, 176, 258, 501.

See also Australia, local procurement in; Lendlease, reverse; U.S. Army Forces in Australia.

General Staff. See War Department General

Staff.

George Goethals, 471

George Washington, 159

Germany, 14, 27, 28, 30, 47, 50, 52, 68, 82, 133,

384, 503, 507, 511, 664, 686, 696

air offensive against, planning for, 133, 482, 665,

666-67, 673, 720

attack on Soviet Union, 97, 117

British strategy for defeating, 54, 55, 673-75

defeat of first, Allied strategic aim, 46, 52, 54,

143, 177, 195, 353, 456, 551, 663, 668, 685.

See also ABC-1; ARCADIA Conference,

emergency offensive against in 1942, plan for,

358, 359, 360, 361, 365, 376, 383-84. See

also BOLERO; Marshall Memorandum; SLEDGEHAMMER.

strategy of encirclement of; 54-55, 133

strength of forces in northwestern Europe, 384,

673-75

submarine operations, 15, 16, 368, 556, 579, 583,

612-13, 712, 714

threat to French North Africa, 42, 46, 68, 117

threat to line of communication in Mediterranean, 42, 669-70, 671

threat to Middle East, 133, 507

threat to Western Hemisphere, 27-28, 42, 60

Gerow, Brig. Gen. Leonard T., 71, 127, 129-30,

131, 179, 196, 310

Ghormley, Vice Adm. Robert L., 187, 190, 192,

389, 392, 393, 499, 501

GHQ. See General Headquarters, U.S. Army.

Gilbert Islands, 415, 667

Gilbreath, Maj. Gen. Frederick, 238, 240, 622

Giraud, General Henri, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517

Gneisenau, 53

Goethals, Maj. Gen. George W., 223

Goodman, Brig. Gen. William M., 235

Graham, Col. J. H., 656

Great Britain, 28, 30, 35-36, 37, 49-50, 54, 82,

129, 195, 274-75, 423, 512, 663, 666, 667,

671. See also British Chiefs of Staff;

Churchill, Winston S.

ability to withstand invasion, 30, 35, 49

aid to Soviet Union, 97, 99, 100, 101, 104, 561n

allocation of aircraft to, 36-37, 39, 89-90, 103,

275, 275n, 276

areas of strategic responsibility, 54, 68, 151, 503,

520, 521, 523, 524, 525, 566, 577

assistance requirement in Middle East, 91-92,

109-10

build-up of American forces in, 56, 354, 359,

359n, 363, 364, 366, 367, 384, 457, 481, 482,

483, 486, 676, 686, 687, 695-96, 715, 720.

See also BOLERO.

deployment of British troops, 47, 503

deployment of U.S. forces to, 56, 364, 366, 457,

458, 481, 483, 486, 611, 612, 676, 686, 720

destroyers-for-bases transaction, 36, 62

division of lend-lease allotments, 82-83

Far Eastern policy, 48, 53
INDEX 767

Great Britain—Continued

Import Program. See British Import Program.

and landing craft, 684, 685

lend-lease aid to, 76, 82, 89-90, 94, 102-03, 104,

210, 210n, 491, 492, 493

local procurement in, 258, 376, 493-96

logistics of imperial defense, 47-49

as main invasion base, 354-55, 376, 383, 492,

719

Middle East policy, 360, 361, 503

and munitions for China, 527

and northern convoys to Soviet Union, 369, 420,

458, 459, 460, 556, 557, 558, 561, 564, 574,

583, 586, 693

offensive in Burma, 535, 536-37, 539, 540, 541,

542-43, 546, 547, 550, 663, 667, 668, 685,

686, 687, 693, 696, 700, 701

offensive in Europe, willingness to launch, 195,

201, 358, 360, 365, 384, 385, 484. See also

ROUNDUP.

port capacity, 361, 361n, 363, 367, 368, 374, 676

protege nations, 249, 491, 524

and rearmament of French forces in North Africa,

511, 512

release of ammunition to, 33, 34, 35

reliance on American aid, 27, 32, 33, 34, 44, 46,

57, 248, 270, 493

and security of Australia and New Zealand, 48,

53, 353

security of line of communication to, 46, 47, 52

and shipping, 49, 58, 58n, 59, 118-19, 152, 153,

158, 158n, 203-04, 360-61, 364, 421, 423-24,

457, 458-59, 460, 461, 473, 576, 578-79, 613,

676n, 677, 681, 682, 682n, 691, 692-93, 694, 695

and Singapore, 53, 54

statement of requirements, 37, 59, 83-85, 99-100,

102-03, 129

strategy of encirclement of Germany, 54, 55,

134, 136, 195, 673-75

strength of U.S. forces in, December 1942, 487

and supply of Commonwealth nations, 497, 498

transfer of forces to TORCH from, 423, 425, 487

U.S. assistance to, 91-92, 104, 503-05, 507,

508, 509, 511, 543-44, 566, 567

U.S. munitions for, 33, 34, 35, 282-83

and U.S. rearmament program, 55, 76, 103

U.S. ships transferred to registry of, 58, 58n, 59,

702

and Victory Programme, 129, 277

view of theater control of lend-lease aid, 523, 537

Greece, 50, 82

Greely, Maj. Gen. John N., 111, 568, 569

Greenland, 56n, 60, 273, 334, 335

Gregory, Maj. Gen. Edmund B., 318n

Griffin, Rear Adm. Robert M., 619, 621, 622, 623

Gross, Maj. Gen. Charles P., 153, 189n, 204-05,

215n, 216, 232, 232n, 237, 238, 240, 336, 374,

396, 460, 587, 587n, 617, 618, 622, 631, 652,

656-57, 657n, 682n, 691-92, 694, 699, 701,

702

Groups, air combat, 149, 392, 393, 456, 457, 508,

663. See also Army Air Corps; Army Air

Forces.

Guadalcanal Campaign, 191, 274, 388, 389, 390,

393, 396, 403, 414, 687

Guam, 124, 150, 151

Gura, 505

GYMNAST, 152-53, 154, 159-61, 196, 353, 417,

424. See also North Africa, French; TORCH.

Hagood, Brig. Gen. Johnson, 241

Haifa, 671

Halsey, Admiral William F., Jr., 396, 402, 659, 695

Hampton Roads, 439, 443, 444, 475

Hamul, 181, 182

Handy, Maj. Gen. Thomas T., 426, 651, 696

Harbord, Maj. Gen. James G., 242

Harbord Board, 12, 221

Harmon, Maj. Gen. Millard F., 187, 191, 253, 254,

392, 393, 406-07, 413

Harriman, W. Averell, 100, 109, 111, 115, 494,

523, 574, 576, 579, 678, 691

Harrison, Col. William K., Jr., 230

Harry Lee, 444

Hart, Admiral Thomas C., 171

Hartle, Maj. Gen. Russell P., 484

Hawaiian Department, 186, 187

Hawaiian Islands, 51, 146-47, 148, 150, 161-64,

165, 177, 273, 388, 392, 393, 415, 634

Headquarters 1616, 578

Heliopolis, 505, 506

Hemisphere defense. See Western Hemisphere.

Henderson, Leon, 651

Hendren, Capt. Paul, 249n

Hermitage, 397, 461

Hershey, Maj. Gen. Lewis B., 604

Hewes, 446

Higgins landing craft, 447. See also Landing craft,

vehicles and ships.

Hipper, 53

Hong Kong, 47

Hopkins, Harry, 57, 78, 85, 95, 98, 105, 156, 201,

248, 251, 253, 290, 358, 360, 385, 538, 554,

558, 560, 584-85, 586, 622, 627, 651, 697,

699, 700

Horne, Vice Adm. Frederick J., 191, 380, 609, 610,

623, 651, 657

Hugh L. Scott, 446

Hughes-Hallett, Capt., RN, 378

Hukawng Valley, 540

Hull, Brig. Gen. John E., 348, 358, 361, 361n,

363n, 382, 483
768 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Hump, The, 528, 538, 541, 543. See also China,

supply of, by air.

Hurley, Col. Patrick J., 171

HUSKY, 517, 587, 672, 673, 684, 692, 693, 693n,

696. See also Sicily.

Husted, William H., 162-63

Hyde Park Declaration of 1941, 84

Iceland, 70, 75, 117, 119, 151, 153, 159, 159n, 273,

335, 360, 362, 364, 372, 556, 557

Ickes, Harold L., 162

Île de France, 158, 158n, 579

Imphal Road, 528

Imphal-Kalewa line, 540

India, 16, 48, 53, 274, 353, 491, 503, 504, 505,

506, 507, 525, 527, 528, 532, 535-37, 538,

547, 548-49. See also China-Burma-India

theater.

India Munitions Assignments Committee, 548

Indian Army, 536

Indian Lend-Lease Requirements Committee, 523,

548

Indian Ocean, 174, 503, 715

INDIGO, 153, 159

Indochina, 42, 117

Industrial production, 13, 14, 17, 25, 26, 27, 41,

76, 602

balance in, 199-202, 602, 608, 610, 714

basis for planning, 602, 603, 610

feasibility concept, 198, 283n, 602, 603, 606, 609

priorities for, 200, 202

objectives, 29, 36, 43, 132, 197-98, 603, 604,

604n, 606, 607, 607n, 608, 609

Infantry Divisions, U.S. See also Divisions.

1st, 60, 61, 65, 71, 71n, 72, 73, 343, 371, 372,

374, 376, 422, 424, 425

2d, 71, 71n

3d, 60, 65, 66, 71, 71n, 376, 422, 425, 426, 439

4th (Motorized), 426, 439, 472

5th, 71, 71n, 362

9th, 422, 423, 425, 426, 439

25th, 393, 396, 399, 405

26th, 308

27th, 163, 165

29th, 481, 483, 486

30th, 61

32d, 174, 178, 343, 389, 392n, 407

34th, 362, 422

36th, 425, 426

37th, 174, 178, 392, 392n

40th, 392

41st, 71n, 174

43d, 393, 394, 399, 413, 456

44th, 61

45th, 71n, 372, 425, 426, 439, 481

Americal, 394, 399

Inönü, Ismet, 521

Inspector General, The, 22, 310, 320, 337, 641, 646

Interdepartmental Committee for Co-ordination of

Foreign and Domestic Purchases. See President's Liaison Committee.

International Division, SOS, 262, 263, 264, 266,

285, 287, 518, 548, 595

International Supply Committee, 263, 264, 266.

See also Defense Aid Supply Committee.

Intervention in the war, U.S., 28, 43, 46, 52, 55-56,

57, 76, 103, 118, 119, 127, 131, 132, 134, 137-

38, 139

Iran, 48, 110, 111, 113, 503, 505, 506, 507, 566,

569, 571, 575, 577. See also Persian Corridor; Persian Gulf; Persian Gulf Service Command; U.S. Military Iranian Mission.

Iranian State Railway, 114, 566, 567, 570, 571,

574, 575, 582, 583

Iraq, 48, 50, 505, 506, 568, 575

Italy, 14n, 50, 55, 664, 672-73, 695, 719, 721

Japan, 14n, 27, 42, 54, 56, 88, 117, 123, 129, 143,

146, 147-48, 149-50, 151, 154, 165, 166,

173-74, 388-89, 392, 415, 503, 527, 528,

536, 542, 549, 662, 667, 668

Java, 170, 172

JCS. See Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JCS 23, 354n, 357n, 392n

JCS 30, 377n

JCS 48, 383n

JCS 98, 652n

JCS 121, 624n

JCS 121/1, 625n

JCS 121/2, 625n

JCS 134, 604n

JCS 134/3, 608n

JCS 143, 396n, 616n

JCS 143/1, 396n

JCS 143/2, 396n

JCS 143/3, 396n

JCS 146, 609n

JCS 146/5, 609n

JCS 146/6, 609n

JCS 151, 626n, 629n

JCS 151/10, 609n

JCS 53, 664n

JCS 158, 461n

JCS 158/1, 397n

JCS 162, 539n

JCS 167, 662n

JCS 167/1, 662n

JCS 167/2, 662n

JCS 167/3, 664n, 665n, 666n

JCS 167/5, 666n

JCS 186, 609n

JCS 191, 583n, 587n

JCS 194, 398n

JCS 202, 650n, 652n

JCS 202/2, 652n, 654n

JCS 202/10/D, 655n
INDEX 769

JCS 206/1, 517n

JCS 238/5/D, 695n

JCS 249, 704n JCS 266, 704n

JCS 339, 638n, 639n, 641n, 648n

Johnston Island, 124, 150, 151, 186

"Joint Action of the Army and Navy," 23n

Joint Administrative Committee, 648, 652, 654, 655

Joint Aeronautical Board, 23

Joint Aircraft Committee, 36-37, 78, 83, 87, 90,

261, 266

Joint Army and Navy Board, 23, 23n, 28, 87, 95-96,

106, 119, 120, 128, 146, 149, 248. See also

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Joint Army-Navy Advisory Board on American Republics, 40, 89

Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board, 23, 30, 32,

202

Joint Army-Navy-WSA Ship Operations Committee, 402

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28, 143-44, 174, 201, 214,

215, 250, 281, 312, 354, 390, 398, 408, 517,

566, 585, 630, 631, 649, 663-64, 665-68,

681, 695, 697, 698. See also Arnold, Lt. Gen.

Henry H.; JCS; King, Admiral Ernest J.;

Leahy, Admiral William D.; Marshall, General George C.

on build-up in British Isles, 354, 357, 383, 456

and deployment schedules for 1943, 702-04

on joint supply in the Pacific, 188, 189-90

jurisdiction over Pacific area and operations, 175,

491, 498

and landing craft, 483, 684

on North African operation, 456

on offensive in Burma, 397, 537-38, 539, 540,

543, 667, 685

on operations in 1943, 662, 664, 667, 668, 675,

684, 686

on post-TORCH operations in Mediterranean, 665,

666, 671, 672

and production objectives, 604, 606, 607-08, 625

reorganization of, May 1943, 652, 654

and shipbuilding program, 626, 627, 628, 628n,

629, 629n, 630

and shipping priorities, 397, 457

Joint Chiefs of Staff Secretariat, 650, 652, 654

Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment,

652

Joint Communications Board, 652

Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff, 652

Joint Economy Board, 23

Joint Intelligence Committee, 652

Joint Logistical Plan for the Support of United

States Bases in the South Pacific Area, 191-

92, 398

Joint logistics, Army-Navy, 66-68, 178, 179-85,

187-92, 391, 399-403, 655-60

Joint Meteorological Committee, 652

Joint Military Transportation Committee, 215,

625-26, 629, 650, 652, 655, 703

Joint Planning Committee, 23, 43, 51, 106, 153,

159

Joint Purchasing Board for the South Pacific, 190,

191, 502

Joint Rearmament Committee, Allied Force Headquarters, 513, 515, 518

Joint Staff Planners, 188, 189, 200, 214, 215, 377,

396, 397, 562, 563, 630, 649-50, 652, 654,

655, 695, 702, 703

Joint Strategic Survey Committee, 621, 652, 654,

665, 673, 696

Joint Supply Committee, 249, 249n. See also

ARCADIA Conference.

Joint U.S. Strategic Committee, 201, 214-15, 354,

355, 356, 357, 606, 652

Joint War Plans Committee, 652, 654

Jomini, Antoine Henri, 3, 3n, 4, 8-9, 10, 11

Jungle warfare, 391, 410-11

JUPITER, 583

Karachi, 528, 535, 567, 575n

Kasserine-Feriana area, 687

Kennedy, Joseph P., 211n

Khorramshahr, 566, 567, 568, 575, 579, 582

Kilpatrick, Brig. Gen. John R., 443

King, Admiral Ernest J., 152, 179, 180, 181, 188,

199, 201, 207, 383, 387, 388, 389, 390, 392,

397, 415, 420, 421, 547, 562, 587, 587n, 620,

621, 622, 641, 662, 667, 668, 694, 697, 698,

700

Kiriwina, 695

Kiska, 392, 415, 667. See also Aleutian Islands.

Knox, Frank, 44, 128, 657

Knudsen, William S., 197

Kungsholm, 157n, 203

Kunming, 105

Kuznets, Simon, 603

Labor, shortage of, 604

Labrador, 372

Lae, 388

Lakehurst, 445, 447, 448

Land, Rear Adm. Emory S., 64, 158, 211, 211n, 216,

217, 373, 374, 589, 619, 624, 627, 627n. See

also Maritime Commission, U.S.

Landing craft, vehicles and ships, 211, 360, 376-

82, 408, 409, 409n, 422, 446, 447, 448, 448n,

473-74, 477, 483-84, 542, 668, 682, 683, 684,

685

production of, 359, 377, 682-83, 712

for ROUNDUP, 378, 379-80, 408, 684

shortage of, 407, 408, 662, 684

for SLEDGEHAMMER, 378, 382n, 384, 408, 684

for SWPA, 378, 408, 409

for TORCH, 446-48

Langley, 171
770 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Larkin, Brig. Gen. Thomas B., 435, 463n

Lashio, 527, 546

Latin America, 40, 76, 88-89, 103, 273, 491

Lautoka, 398

Layton, Sir Walter, 37, 38

"Lead time," 709, 713

Leahy, Admiral William D., 214, 620, 622, 624,

627, 628, 629, 698

Leary, Rear Adm. Herbert F., 176

Leathers, Lord Frederick, 369, 369n, 588, 588n,

675, 676, 681, 682, 690, 691, 692

Ledo Road, 528, 540, 541, 542, 546

Lee, Maj. Gen. John G. H., 238, 242, 243, 370,

430, 642

Lend-lease, 16, 21, 27, 28, 29, 30-41, 44-45, 55,

76, 83, 84, 97, 105-07, 112-13, 129, 209, 248,

267-69, 715

administration of, 77-82, 261-67

allocation of, 247-53

appropriations for, 77, 83, 102, 259, 260

civilian versus military control of, 76-77, 80-82

control of by theater commander, 518, 522-24,

526, 533, 534, 535

division into military and civilian components,

259, 261, 267

military missions, 107-12. See also American

Military Mission to China; U.S. Military

North African Mission; U.S. Military Mission

to the USSR; U.S. Military Iranian Mission.

munitions allocations policy, 77, 90-91, 92-96,

104

policy on aircraft allocations, 89-90

priorities among recipients, 88, 89

requirements programs, 102-03

reverse, 257-59, 376, 491, 493-96, 501-02, 541,

547-48, 549

suspension of, after Pearl Harbor, 247, 270, 552

versus U.S. rearmament, 76, 91, 96, 103, 104,

106-07, 112, 126, 139, 140, 145, 247, 270-71

Lend-Lease Act, 45, 57, 77, 82, 85, 90, 91, 257,

492

Billion Three clause, 77, 77n, 90, 91, 92, 103

Lend-Lease Administrator. See Hopkins, Harry;

See also Stettinius, Edward R., Jr.

Lend-Lease Board of Review in U.K., 523

Liberty ships, 59, 369, 586, 591, 602, 631n, 712

Libya, 47, 50, 68, 353, 503, 504, 511

List, Friedrich, 4

Little, Admiral Sir Charles J. C., 253

Litvinov, Maxim M., 563

Logistics, 3, 3n, 7-8, 9, 10, 11-13, 22, 23-26, 65,

295, 709. See also Army Service Forces; G-4;

Services of Supply; Supply.

of hemisphere defense versus global, 46-49, 50-

52

Logistics—Continued

and strategy, 136-37, 297, 354-55, 601, 602,

650, 654, 655, 661, 713

Logistics Group, OPD, 226, 652, 711

London Conference, September 1941, 99-101, 113-

14, 129, 132, 289

London Conference, April 1942, 278-79, 360-61,

368, 377, 383

London Conference, July 1942, 385, 387

Lovett, Robert A., 80

Luftwaffe, 30, 42, 49

Lurline, 147

Lutes, Brig. Gen. LeRoy, 188, 222, 226-27, 228,

230-31, 231n, 232, 236-38, 240, 245, 246,

298, 307, 308, 310, 311, 311n, 312n, 314, 318n,

329, 349, 400-401, 401n, 402, 407, 429-30,

431, 438, 442, 443, 444, 467, 478, 479, 481,

482, 483, 644-45, 656, 657, 657n, 660

Lyttelton, Sir Oliver, 255, 279, 283, 284, 290, 679

MacArthur, General Douglas, 105, 123, 124, 125,

149, 150, 150n, 164, 167, 171, 174, 176, 383,

388, 389, 392, 393, 396, 407-08, 409-10, 411,

412-13, 414, 500, 501, 694, 695

Macauley, Capt. Edward, 211n

MacMorland, Lt. Col. Edward E., 41, 78

Macready, Lt. Gen. George N., 249, 249n, 250, 287,

293, 651

Madang, 695

MAGNET, 153, 159. See also Northern Ireland.

MAGNET-INDIGO convoy, 155, 156, 157, 158

Magruder, Lt. Col. Carter B., 363n, 424-25, 438,

441, 465, 479, 481

Magruder, Brig. Gen. John, 108-09, 111, 526, 527,

530, 530n

Maintenance allowances, 633-34, 635. See also

Army Supply Program.

Maintenance factors, 298-99, 300, 301, 302-03

Major généraux des logis, 11

Majorca, 671

Malay Barrier, 53, 133, 353

Malaya, 117, 154

Malony, Brig. Gen. Harry J., 68, 95

Malta, 420, 445, 668

Manipur, 547

Manpower mobilization, 13, 17, 29, 43, 72, 604-05

Mao-Chennault requests, 41

"Maracaibos," 448

Marine Corps, 60, 70, 177

Marine Divisions, 65, 69, 376, 396. See also Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet; 1st Joint Training Force.

Maritime Commission, U.S., 59, 63, 64, 69, 121,

125, 155n, 202, 203, 205, 216, 217, 606, 609,

624, 625, 627, 627n, 628n
INDEX 771

Marshall, General George C., 28, 39, 43, 65, 71,

75, 101, 102, 106, 154, 157, 170, 174, 177,

181, 203, 216, 218, 358, 364-65, 383, 385,

387, 390, 392, 414, 415, 504, 507, 538, 539,

562, 563, 577, 588, 611, 642, 667, 670, 676,

694, 698

authority to release equipment to foreign governments, 33-34, 35-36, 77, 82, 91

on basis for determination of production objectives, 128

on BRIMSTONE versus HUSKY, 672

on build-up of U.S. forces in British Isles, 482,

483, 671

at Casablanca Conference, 588, 667, 676

on civilian versus military control of munitions

allocations, 251

on cross-Channel attack, 361, 366, 377, 383

on defeat of Germany first, 353, 663

on deployment of air forces to Pacific, 388, 393,

456

on emergency operation in 1942, 384, 385

on Emmons' criticism of supply policy for

Hawaii, 162, 164

on Emmons' proposal for Pacific coast communications zone, 239

on expansion of the Army, 139-40

at London Conferences, 201, 360, 361, 377, 385,

387, 455

on munitions allocations policy, 93, 95, 95n, 104,

104n, 272

on munitions for China, 95, 532

on offensive in Burma, 532, 540, 547, 700

on offensive operations in Southwest Pacific, 389,

414

on Pacific deployment, 392, 395

on post-TORCH operations in Mediterranean, 417, 665, 670-71, 673

on rearmament and defense aid conflict, 29-30,

91

on rearmament of French forces in North Africa,

514, 517

on reinforcement of Hawaii, 146, 147

on release of munitions to Soviet Union, 97-98

on strategic defensive in the Pacific, 383

and support of the Philippines, 146, 149

on tanks and guns for Middle East, 91, 94, 104,

507-08

on transport planes for Soviet Union, 554

and Troop Basis, 1943, 606

on Turkey's entry into the war, 521, 522

on WSA control of ship loading, 620, 622

Marshall Islands, 51, 56, 415, 667

Marshall Memorandum, 359, 359n. See also

BOLERO.

Martinique, 61

Massaua, 505

Mast, Brig. Gen. Charles, 512

Master Lend-Lease Agreements, 259, 259n, 549

Matériel. See Equipment; Munitions; Supply.

Materiel Status Report, 318, 325, 326, 327, 328,

642-43

Matson Navigation Company, 162, 239n, 402

Matsonia, 147

Mauretania, 158, 158n, 457, 579

Maxwell, Maj. Gen. Russell L., 110, 504-05, 506,

509, 510, 523, 574, 575

May, Stacy, 127

McCloy, John J., 80, 132, 162, 622, 623, 642

McNair, Lt. Gen. Lesley J., 42, 139, 221, 223, 224,

306, 310, 314, 315, 371-72, 637-38

McNarney, Lt. Gen. Joseph T., 230, 377, 605, 606,

652

McNutt, Paul V., 604

Mediterranean, 47, 52, 54, 669, 671, 671n, 693,

713, 720. See also GYMNAST; North Africa,

French; TORCH.

American view of offensive operations in, 417,

456, 663, 664-65, 668, 673, 685, 719, 720

planning for operations after TORCH in, 669.

671-73, 687

security of line of communications in, 661, 668,

671, 672, 686

Melbourne, 390

Message 1949, 429, 430, 432, 433, 434, 463, 465. See also TORCH, supplies and equipment for.

Michelier, Vice Adm. François, 445

Middle East, 16, 47-48, 49, 91, 104, 109, 119, 174,

273, 274, 276, 353, 359, 365-66, 372, 373,

383, 457, 491, 503, 504, 507, 508, 511

Middle East Supply Center, 523

Midway Island, 51, 124, 150, 151

Midway, Battle of, 388, 392

Miles, Brig. Gen. Sherman, 53

Military mission to China. See American Military

Mission to China.

Military mission to Iran. See U.S. Military Iranian

Mission.

Military mission to London, U.S. See Special

Army Observer Group.

Ministery of War Transport. See British Ministry

of War Transport.

MKD (medium knocked down) shipments, 640

Molotov, Vyacheslav M., 562, 563

Monnet, Jean, 83, 127, 197

Monterey, 147

Montgomery, Lt. Gen. Sir Bernard L., 365, 511

Month of supply, 299n

Monticello, 397, 461, 540, 541n, 650, 650n

Moore, Maj. Gen. Richard C., 35, 41, 80, 92, 93,

107, 111, 249n, 250, 253, 271, 506

Morgenthau, Henry L., Jr., 31

Morocco, French, 417, 420, 449

Morocco, Spanish, 669, 671

Moscow Conference, September 1941, 101-02, 289

Moscow Protocol. See Soviet Protocols.

Mount Vernon, 203
772 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Mountbatten, Vice Adm. Lord Louis, 384, 684

Movements Branch, Operations Division, SOS, 228

Muller, Col. Walter J., 451

Munitions, 13, 27, 33, 34, 35, 97, 279, 280, 663n

allocation of, 90-91, 92-96, 104, 247-52, 270-

75, 277, 491. See also Munitions Assignments Board, London; Munitions Assignments

Board, Washington; Munitions Assignments

Committee (Air); Munitions Assignments

Committee (Ground).

common pool concept, 252, 270, 271, 284, 285

priorities structure, 270, 271, 271n, 272-73, 274-

75, 280

production objectives, 43, 126, 132, 144-45,

202, 602, 609

production planning, 277-85. See also Combined Production and Resources Board;

Weeks-Somervell Agreement,

strategic allocations principle, 77, 250, 263, 270

Munitions Assignments Board, London, 213, 252,

253n, 254, 491, 492, 494, 497, 498, 524, 548

Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, 215n,

252, 254, 269, 272n, 275, 276, 278, 280, 281,

284, 314, 491, 492, 531, 533, 544, 544n, 554,

584, 594, 651

organization and functions, 213, 253-54, 257,

278, 285

policy and procedures, 261, 263-64, 271, 277,

284, 291-92

Munitions Assignments Committee (Air), 254, 261,

275, 276, 286, 553

Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground), 254,

261, 263, 264, 271, 272, 274, 282, 289, 290,

292, 495, 523, 531, 544, 553, 579, 594 on aid to China, 533, 534

policies and procedures, 285-88, 292, 293

on rearmament of French forces in North Africa,

515, 516, 518

Munitions Assignments Committee (Navy), 254

Munitions Program of 30 June 1940, 29

Murmansk, 113, 564, 590

Myitkyina, 528, 540

Napier, Brigadier Vernon M. C., 155, 157, 361n

National Defense Act, 1920, 25, 26

National Guard, 21, 27, 29, 139

Native labor, use of, 391, 398, 402, 413, 480, 507,

510, 530, 540, 547, 568, 571

Naval escort vessels, 180, 207, 208, 367, 431, 434,

435, 436, 473, 475, 515, 624, 625, 627, 675-

76, 695

Naval Transportation Service, 656

Navy, British, 43, 588

Navy Department. See Navy, U.S.

Navy, French, 28, 30

Navy, U.S., 14n, 16, 27, 29, 42, 44, 52, 55, 56,

65, 68, 73, 101, 124, 125-26, 131n, 137-38,

139, 151, 162, 167, 177-78, 357, 389, 397,

403, 404n, 421, 650, 664-65, 675, 690. See

also Joint Army and Navy Board; Joint Chiefs

of Staff; King, Admiral Ernest J.; Stark,

Admiral Harold R.

antisubmarine operations, 206-07, 207n

Army transports transferred to, 69, 70, 121-23

and basing U.S. fleet in Pacific, 27, 42, 43, 56

and BOBCAT task force, 179-81

conversion program, 122-23, 125, 126, 202-03,

216

convoying in the Atlantic, 44, 60, 117, 118

convoying in the Pacific, 125, 147

ferrying versus amphibious transport, 122-23

joint logistical arrangements with Army. See

Joint logistics, Army-Navy,

and landing craft, 377, 378, 380, 483-84, 683

on offensive operations in Central Pacific, 415,

695

and plan for unified supply in Pacific, 655, 657

policy and schedule for movement of convoys,

207-08, 468

shipbuilding program, 208, 602, 608, 609, 624-

25

on shipping control, 216, 218

supply organization, 656

Navy's Shipbuilding Precedence List, 683

Nelson, Donald M., 162, 198, 211, 255, 279, 280,

282, 602, 603, 604, 604n, 608, 609, 625, 626

Netherlands, 54. See also Netherlands Indies.

Netherlands Indies, 40, 41, 124, 149, 496

lend-lease aid to, 76, 88, 106, 496

Neutrality Act, November 1939, 27, 59

New Britain, 388, 694, 695

New Caledonia, 150, 151, 155, 156, 157, 177, 178,

186, 388, 392, 393, 398, 399, 406

New Guinea, 274, 388, 389, 390, 391, 393, 662,

695, 715

New Hebrides, 177

New Ireland, 694

New Orleans Port of Embarkation, 233

New York Port of Embarkation, 233, 235, 557

New Zealand, 47, 48, 53, 151, 174, 188, 273, 390,

497, 499, 500, 501, 502

Newfoundland, 56n

Newfoundland Base Command, 221, 334

Newport News, 443, 531

Nieuw Amsterdam, 158, 158n

Nile Delta, 503

Nimitz, Admiral Chester W., 175, 189, 190, 389,

414, 659, 695

Ninth Air Force, 508, 509

Noncommon articles. See Equipment, standardization of.
INDEX 773

Norfolk, 443, 444

Normandie, 68, 158, 203

North Africa, French, 196, 280, 353, 373, 388, 420,

423, 449, 480, 512, 611, 669

American view on operations in, 152, 386, 387,

417, 422. See also GYMNAST; French, in

North Africa.

Anglo-American operations in, planning for, 118,

420-24. See also TORCH.

area of initial landings, 719

British advocacy of operations in, 152, 386-87,

417

British plans for operations in, 152, 417-19

difficulty of overland supply in, 669-70

estimate of forces for operation in, 423, 425

French sentiment in, 152, 419, 445-46, 448

German threat to, 42, 46, 68, 117

invasion of, 445-46, 447-48

port capacity in, 435, 468, 612

revival of planning for operation in, 417, 424

security of line of communication to, 419, 665,

668

North African Economic Board, 524

North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier, 207

North Pacific, 175, 383, 415, 556, 558, 564, 584,

586, 715

Northern Ireland, 151, 153, 159, 356n, 362, 363

Northwestern Europe, 133, 135, 356, 358, 359, 360,

361, 365, 376, 385, 388, 587, 684, 713, 719.

See also BOLERO; ROUNDUP; SLEDGEHAMMER.

Norway, 385, 664

Nouméa, 390, 394, 398-403, 615, 618

Number One Group, 609, 610, 627, 683. See also

Industrial production, objectives; Roosevelt,

Franklin D., and production objectives.

Office of Lend-Lease Administration, 80, 102, 260-

61, 502, 522, 523, 535, 557, 564

Office of Production Management, 197

Oil. See Petroleum.

Oil pipelines, 541, 625, 626

Operations, Assistant Chief of Staff for, SOS, 228-

31, 237, 238. See also Lutes, Brig. Gen.

LeRoy.

Operations Division, War Department General

Staff, 224-27, 230, 282, 285, 296, 314, 377,

408, 425, 426, 471-72, 482, 504, 514, 631, 651, 652, 654, 655, 696

and deployment, 392, 392n, 687-89, 702

on pool of equipped units for emergency deployment, 310, 311, 312, 312n, 314

on synchronization of troops and equipment in

overseas deployment, 363, 368, 372

Operations Division, SOS, 227-28. See also Lutes,

Brig. Gen. LeRoy.

Oran, 420, 421, 422, 423, 427, 431, 432, 448. See also GYMNAST; TORCH.

Ord, Brig. Gen. Garesché J., 71

Organized Reserve, 29

Ostrom, Brig. Gen. Charles D. Y., 179, 184, 185

Overseas supply. See Supply of overseas theaters

and departments.

Overseas supply divisions, ports of embarkation,

235, 237, 238

Overseas Troop Basis, 296, 297

Pacific, 145, 166, 613, 615, 713 area of American strategic responsibility, 56,

174, 491

deployment policy in, 392-94

island bases, 177-78, 186

joint supply in, 187-92, 655, 659, 660

offensive operations in, planning for, 389, 392,

662, 695

security of lines of communications in, 143, 150,

151, 166, 178, 388

strategic defensive in, 44, 52, 144, 383, 388, 392,

497, 525

Pacific Fleet, U.S., 27, 53, 124

Pacific Military Conference, 687, 694, 695

Pacific Ocean Area, 175, 177, 186, 695

Pago Pago Harbor, 150

Palestine, 506, 509

Palestine Service Command, 509, 510

Palmyra, 124, 150, 151, 186

Pan American Airways, 124

Panama Canal Zone, 146

Pang-tzo, Maj. Gen. Mao, 40, 40n-41n

Papua, 176, 389, 407

Papua Campaign, 389, 407, 414

Parachute troops, 396

Pasteur, 366, 457

Patch, Maj. Gen. Alexander M., 173, 177, 399, 400

Patterson, Robert P., 79, 80, 86, 88, 95, 127, 164, 506, 603-04, 606-07

Patton, Maj. Gen. George S., Jr., 424, 426

Pearl Harbor attack, 143-44, 165, 166, 270

Pensacola convoy, 126, 149, 150, 167

Pershing, General John J., 242

Persian Corridor, 16, 347, 573, 583, 715

Persian Gulf, 16, 294, 566-67, 568-69, 570-71,

574-75, 575n, 576, 577, 579, 580, 583, 589-

90, 612, 615, 715

supply route to Soviet Union, 113, 114, 556,

558, 561, 562, 566, 567-68, 569, 573, 575,

575n, 697

Persian Gulf Service Command, 321, 347, 509,

577-78, 578n, 580-82

Perth, 167

Pétain, Marshal Henri, 68

Petroleum, 319, 320, 643. See also Army-Navy

Petroleum Board.

Philippeville, 423
774 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Philippine Islands, 15, 53, 117, 124, 146, 150, 166,

167, 170

policy on defense of, 50, 56, 117, 119, 123, 134,

166, 715, 716

reinforcement of, 123-24, 125, 146, 149, 150,

166-67, 171-72

Philippine Scouts, 126

"Pipeline" factors, 300, 301, 634

Pittman Resolution, 40

Plan Dog, 43n

Plan "X," 166, 167, 173

Planning Committee, WPB, 603, 604n, 605, 606,

611, 650, 651

Planning Division, SOS, 231

Pleiss, 2d Lt. Walter H., 184, 184n

POM (Preparation for Overseas Movement), 646

POPPY Force, 155, 156, 157, 173, 177, 178, 181, 555.

See also BOBCAT; Bora Bora; New Caledonia.

Port commanders, 233, 235, 328, 644

Port-Lyautey, 153, 445

Port Moresby, 173, 176, 388, 389, 407

Port of embarkation, 233, 233n, 236-41. See

also New York Port of Embarkation; San

Francisco Port of Embarkation.

conflict between supply and transportation functions of, 236, 237, 240, 328, 329, 330, 331

function in overseas supply system, 233, 235-36,

238, 239-40, 241, 317, 318n, 319, 320, 321,

322-25, 326, 327-28, 329-30, 337-39, 340-

42, 642-43, 644

transportation function, 233, 240-41, 329

Portal, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles, 275, 672

Portugal, 117

"Pot of Gold," 28. See also Brazil.

Pound, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley, 588

Preshipment, 345-46, 369, 371, 371n, 374, 481

President. See Roosevelt, Franklin D.

President Coolidge, 394, 406

President Garfield, 147

President Polk, 150

President Tyler, 180

President's Liaison Committee, 30n, 31, 32

President's Soviet Protocol Committee, 560, 594

Prickett, Brig. Gen. Fay B., 472

Primary port. See Port of embarkation.

Prime Minister, British. See Churchill, Winston S.

Prince of Wales, 154

Procurement Policy Board, WPB, 261

Production Executive Committee, WPB, 603

Production Requirements Plan, 603

Protective Mobilization Plan force, 22, 26, 34, 36,

39, 43, 50, 72, 91, 104, 128, 138, 144, 145

Protege system, 249-50, 253, 491, 524. See also

Great Britain, protege nations.

Purchase Negotiation Reports, 32

Pursuit aircraft, 40, 101, 149, 150, 151, 170-71,

276, 366, 538, 554, 555, 584, 585, 695

Purvis, Arthur B., 31, 36, 197. See also AngloFrench Purchasing Board.

Quartermaster General, Office of, 22, 23, 320, 634

Quartiermeister, 11

Queen Elizabeth, 158, 158n, 203, 344, 360, 364,

367, 368n, 458, 482, 487

Queen Mary, 158, 158n, 159, 203, 344, 357, 360,

362, 364, 367, 368n, 458, 482, 486

Rabat, 153

Rabaul, 173, 388, 414, 415, 667, 668, 687, 694,

695, 696, 721. See also ELKTON.

Radar and Communications Coordinating Committee, 286

RAINBOW War Plans, 16, 28, 42-43, 43n, 50, 56,

57, 73, 74, 93, 121, 146, 151, 152, 165, 715

Ramgarh, 532

Rampura, 364

Rangoon, 86, 527, 542, 545

Reciprocal aid. See Lend-lease, reverse.

Red Sea, 16, 60

Redeployment, 641

Reeves, Admiral Joseph M., 253n, 284

Regimental Combat Team, 39th, 423, 428, 429,

432, 434, 439

Regular Army. 21, 27, 61. See also Army, U.S.

Replacement factors. See Maintenance factors.

Repulse, 154

Requirements Division, SOS, 262, 263, 264, 296,

298, 301

Resupply, 5-6, 7, 14

Reybold, Brig. Gen. Eugene, 108, 135

Richardson, Maj. Gen. Robert C., Jr., 392, 392n,

412

Ridgway, Col. Matthew B., 152

Robinson, Brig. Gen. Clinton F., 227, 240

Rocket launchers, 440

Rommel, Generalfeldmarschall Erwin, 50, 134, 152,

159, 503, 504, 507

Roop, Brig. Gen. James C., 173, 501

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 28, 59, 60, 61, 75, 76, 82,

85, 88, 89, 92, 109-10, 120, 126-27, 128,

132-33, 151, 201, 203, 204, 216, 358, 396,

457, 507, 512, 524, 543, 546, 574, 668, 679,

697, 700, 704

aid to Britain policy, 29, 30, 32, 36

on aid to Soviet Union, 97, 98-99, 101, 102, 129,

355, 383, 551, 552, 553, 555-56, 560, 562-

63, 583-84, 587, 592, 676

and Anglo-American air force for Caucasus, 584-

85

at ARCADIA Conference, 151-52, 556

and arsenal of democracy policy, 103

on Azores operation, 68, 70, 75, 117

on BOLERO slow-down, 383, 486

at Casablanca Conference, 543, 668
INDEX 775

Roosevelt, Franklin D.—Continued

on cross-Channel attack, 484, 486

on landing craft, 377, 377n, 378-79, 380

and lend-lease aid, 28, 29, 30-31, 33, 35, 40,

44-45, 76, 77-78, 78n, 80, 95-96, 247, 270-71

and merchant shipping program, 624-25, 627,

628, 629, 629n, 679

military policy in 1942, 44, 52, 62

on North African operation, 152, 386, 456

on northern convoys to Soviet Union, 557, 583,

584, 587, 590

orders U.S. naval patrol in the Atlantic, 60

on Pacific strategy, 386, 395

on participation of American troops in active

fighting in 1942, 383-84, 385, 386, 583-84

and plan for munitions assignments board, 251-

52

pre-Casablanca meeting with JCS, 630, 665-66

and priorities for development for Persian Corridor, 578, 584

and production objectives, 29, 100, 101, 198, 199,

201, 205, 211, 281, 288, 290, 602, 603, 608, 609

and rearmament and defense aid conflict, 30, 36,

76

on rearmament of French forces in North Africa,

514, 515

on reinforcement of Australia, 174

on relief of British garrison in Iceland and

Northern Ireland, 70, 117, 151, 153, 159

on second front in 1942, 562-63

on shipping, 63-64, 120, 174n, 356, 504, 556,

586, 623, 624-25, 627, 628-29, 629n, 679-

80, 681, 690, 691, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702,

on strategy as a basis for production objectives,

201-02

support of Chennault, 542, 543, 543n, 550

on support of the Philippines, 149

and "three demands" of Chiang Kai-shek, 539

on TORCH, 152, 386, 421, 423, 456, 670-71

and Troop Basis, 1943, 605, 605n, 611

on Turkey's entry into the war, 521

and Victory Program, 126-28

on WSA loading of overseas military supplies,

619, 622, 623

Ross, Col. Frank S., 333

ROUNDUP, 360, 361, 362, 365, 376, 378, 379-80, 384, 387, 484, 684

Rubber, shortage of, 302, 609, 638

Russell Islands, 413, 687

Russia. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Rutledge, 446.

Safi, 153, 445, 447, 448

Salamaua, 388

Salter, Sir Arthur, 58, 681, 691, 699, 705

Samoa, 150, 151, 177, 186

San Francisco Port of Embarkation, 186, 187, 191,

233, 235

Sanders, Comdr. Carl H., 180, 181, 182

Santa Cruz Islands, 389

Sardinia, 664, 669, 671, 672, 684, 719

Scharnhorst, 53

Scott, Brig. Gen. Stanley L., 578, 580, 581

Seabees, 184

Seatrains, 154, 155n, 205

Second BOLERO Key Plan, 481

Second front, 387, 551, 560, 562, 563, 583, 673

2d Joint Training Force, 66

Secretary of the Interior. See Ickes, Harold L.

Secretary of the Navy. See Knox, Frank.

Secretary of State, 33, 501

Secretary of the Treasury. See Morgenthau,

Henry L., Jr.

Secretary of War, 33, 34, 79, 80, 82, 98-99. See

also Baker, Newton D.; Stimson, Henry L.;

Woodring, Harry H.

Selective Service, 29, 139

Service commands. See Corps areas.

Service Force Subordinate Command, Pacific

Fleet, 191

Service forces and troops, 22, 41, 110, 346, 347-

49, 366-67, 391, 392, 396, 397, 398, 412-13,

425, 428, 432, 475, 480, 482, 505-06, 509-10,

575, 579, 633

Service Squadron, South Pacific, 189

Services, administrative, 22

Services, supply arms and, 22, 23, 26, 72, 78, 100,

232n, 261, 321, 640

Services, technical, 12

Services of Supply, 12, 228, 230, 246, 282, 317-

18, 335-36, 339, 468, 506, 537, 568, 575,

576, 639. See also Army Service Forces;

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B.

and administration of lend-lease aid, 262-67

and BOLERO, 370-71, 481-82

deployment studies, 629, 631

and equipment for outbound units, 340, 646

establishment and functions, 144, 223-24, 226,

231, 317-18. See also Army Service Forces;

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B.

headquarters organization, 227-28, 231

on mounting Western Task Force, 424-26, 439-

40, 441 and preparation of troop movement directives,

228-30

relationship with OPD, 226-27, 472

representation on joint planning agencies, 652,

654

on status reporting for supplies, 327

and TORCH, 435, 455, 463, 473, 475

Services of Supply in World War I, 241, 242, 243

Shafroth, Rear Adm. John F., 182, 183

Shingler, Col. Don G., 569, 570, 571, 574, 576,

576n, 581
776 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Ship turnaround, 364, 367, 368n, 386, 400, 401-

02, 544, 586, 589, 676n

Shipping, 47, 58, 60, 62, 63-64, 65, 73-74, 121,

135-36, 153, 202-03, 215-19, 364, 397-98,

457, 457n, 616, 695

in Army service, 62, 63, 121, 611, 615

for Burma operation, 540-41, 543-44, 546-47

construction of, 202, 375, 602, 615, 627, 627n,

676n. See also Maritime Commission, U.S.

and deployment of U.S. forces, 601, 611-12,

615, 629-31, 637, 638, 676, 676n, 688-89,

693, 694, 702-04, 705

effort to maintain balance in, 625-26, 629, 630

loss rate factors, 630, 630n, 631, 634, 669, 676n losses, 49, 156, 206, 208, 357, 369, 373, 591,

612-13, 615, 618, 629, 675, 690, 696, 704,

705, 705n

pooling principle, 64, 210, 461-62, 616

ratio of losses to new construction, 156, 208, 615,

678, 704, 712, shortage of, 69, 152, 154, 162, 165, 356, 359-60,

364, 376, 397, 586, 611, 615, 696

Shipping, cargo, 156, 190, 390, 506, 517, 672

for BOLERO, 366, 368-69, 372, 372n, 373, 376,

461, 676, 676n, 677

for British Import Program, 676, 678, 679, 680,

681-82, 690-94, 701-02

for Chinese lend-lease, 530-31

construction of, 58, 59, 205, 205n, 206, 206n,

210, 211, 625

conversion to troop carriers, 630, 631, 631n,

676n

efficient utilization of, 404-05, 616, 635-38.

See also War Shipping Administration,

limiting factor, 205-06, 357, 358n, 359, 359n,

361, 368, 630

for Persian Gulf, 576, 578, 580

for Philippine reinforcement, 125-26, 172

shortage of, 69, 154, 156, 157, 159, 205-06,

291-94, 357, 358, 391, 395-96, 396n, 397,

506, 562, 688-89

for Soviet aid program, 555, 556, 557-58, 559-

60, 562, 564, 586, 587, 676n, 697

for TORCH, 428, 458, 460

transfer to British registry, 58, 58n, 59, 702

transfer to Soviet registry, 584, 586, 591

withdrawal of, from lend-lease service, 357, 395,

396

Shipping, troop, 68, 156, 202-03, 204-05, 206,

206n, 312, 358, 362, 461, 675

for BOLERO, 364, 367-68, 482-83, 486-87, 676, 676n, 677

conversion of to combat loaders, 62, 122, 122n,

373, 421, 424, 676n

for movement of British troops to Middle East

and India, 122-23, 174n, 356-57, 458, 461, 504

Shipping, troop—Continued

for movement of U.S. forces to British Isles, 357,

358, 358n, 364-65, 458

for movement of U.S. forces to Middle East and

India, 458, 458n, 506, 576, 578, 579-80, 580n

shortage, 68, 69, 121, 145, 145n, 153, 154, 155,

202-03, 357, 358, 363-64, 391, 396-97, 505,

506, 688-89

for TORCH, 421, 424, 458, 460, 461, 462

Short, Lt. Gen. Walter C., 124, 146, 147, 151, 162

Siberian Railway, 113, 114

Sicily, 474, 477, 480, 587, 588, 590, 664, 666, 669,

671, 672, 673, 684, 686, 687, 693, 714, 719,

721

Singapore, 47, 53, 54, 117, 154

Slack, Lt. Col. James E., 181, 182

SLEDGEHAMMER, 360, 361, 362, 365-66, 376, 378,

380, 382n, 384-85, 387, 388, 417, 424, 684

Slessor, Air Vice Marshal J. C., 276

Smith, Harold D., 622

Smith, Rear Adm. William W., 623

Solomon Islands, 389, 391, 392, 662, 715

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 145, 158, 160, 199,

215n, 263, 266, 266n, 281, 290, 291, 348, 373,

374, 380, 382, 397-98, 400, 506, 521-22,

522n, 543, 544, 545, 546, 590, 594, 626, 638,

650-51, 654, 655, 695

on allocation of munitions, 271, 287, 291

on BOBCAT and POPPY convoys, 181

at Casablanca Conference, 588, 671-72, 675,

676, 681, 682, 690

on centralization of supply functions in War

Department, 222-23, 262

commands SOS, 223-24

deployment schedule for U.S. forces in 1943, 676-

77, 681, 686, 688, 689-90, 691, 702

on development of Persian Gulf supply route to

Soviet Union, 576, 578

on Emmons' criticism of supply policy for Hawaii,

162n, 163

inspection tours, 340, 545, 589-90, 690

on joint supply in the Pacific, 189, 190, 657-58

on logistical control controversy between GHQ

and WDGS, 222, 222n

on mounting of Western Task Force, 427, 445

plan for emergency trucking fleet for Persian

Gulf Service Command, 571, 581

and principle of separate national supply lines,

494-95, 496

on production objectives, 603, 604, 606, 609,

610. See also Industrial production, feasibility concept.

on production planning, 200, 282

on rearmament of French forces in North Africa,

514, 690

on reorganization of JCS system, 651, 652-54
INDEX 777

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B.—Continued

on shipping, 152-53, 155, 156, 203, 208-09,

210-11, 216, 217, 369, 393, 396, 397, 588, 588n, 589-90, 615, 681, 682, 682n, 690, 691-

92, 694, 697-98, 699, 701-02 on strategic logistics, 297, 655

and supply arrangements for Australia, 498-99

on supply requirements, 295, 296, 298, 303

on theater supply organization, 242, 243

on TORCH, 432, 467, 475, 515

on WSA control of ship loading, 617-18, 620-

21

Soong, T. V., 85, 86, 87, 105, 108, 526, 530, 531

South Africa, 505

South America, 50, 131-32, 273

South Atlantic, 152

South Pacific, 124, 166, 175, 186, 190, 191, 192, 354, 383, 388, 391, 392, 392n, 413, 414, 615, 695, 715

defense of bases in, 150, 155, 388

deployment of U.S. troops to, 393, 456

offensive operations in, planning for, 388-89,

694

port capacity in, 390, 398, 403

revision of Navy supply and administrative system in, 186-87. See also U.S. Army Forces

in the South Pacific Area.

supply of, 186, 187, 190-92, 390-91, 659

South Pacific Amphibious Force, 408

South Pacific Area Command, 186-87

Southwest Pacific, 174, 175, 176, 321, 353, 354,

388, 390, 392, 392n, 393, 396, 397, 415, 615, 659, 695

amphibious forces for, 393, 396, 408

engineer amphibian brigades for use in, 396, 408, 409

offensive operations in, planning for, 389, 415, 694

port capacity in, 390, 398, 403

supply problem, 390-91

unified command in, 176, 414

Soviet Military Mission, 555

Soviet Protocols, 101-02, 107, 113, 273, 552, 553,

555, 558, 559-60, 561, 561n, 563-64, 569,

573, 584-85, 586, 587, 588, 589, 591, 592-93, 595

Soviet Purchasing Commission, 560

Soviet Union. See Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics.

Spain, 417, 420, 669, 671

Spalding, Brig. Gen. Sidney P., 574, 576

Special Army Observer Group, 111

Stalin, Marshal Joseph V., 98, 102, 508, 584-85, 590

Stalingrad, Battle of, 584, 586, 662, 715

Standley, Admiral William H., 253, 253n

Stark, Admiral Harold R., 33, 43, 43n, 54, 57, 65,

77, 95n, 146, 154, 203n

State Guards, 34

Statistical Branch, War Department, 318

Steel, shortage of, 602, 624, 625, 627

Stettinius, Edward R., Jr., 80, 82

Stilwell, Lt. Gen. Joseph W., 347, 397, 526, 530,

532-35, 538, 539-40, 541, 542-43, 549-50

Stimson, Henry L., 38, 44, 57, 64, 78, 79, 80, 91,

105, 128, 133, 156n, 526, 538, 552, 553, 555,

561, 619, 622

Stimson-Soong Agreement, 533

Stock Control Branch, SOS, 236

Strait of Gibraltar, 68, 417, 468, 477-78, 612,

669, 671, 719

Straithaird, 155

Stokes, Lt. Col. Marcus B., 358, 359, 359n, 361n

Strategic bombing, 131, 665, 666-67, 688, 714

Strategic Logistics Division, SOS, 231, 546, 574,

590

Strategic Munitions Board, 248, 249, 270n

Strategic planning, 152, 164, 165, 196, 201, 353, 354, 359, 361, 365-66, 376, 383, 385, 389,

391, 420, 421, 423-24, 425-26, 455, 456-57,

525, 662, 663, 666-67, 668, 673-75, 685,

686, 687, 694-95, 700, 701, 713-14, 715, 719,

720

Strategic responsibility. See Areas of strategic

responsibility.

Strategic Shipping Board, 216, 218, 237, 238. See

also Central Shipping Administration.

Strength of the Army. See Army, U.S.

Styer, Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D., 237, 349, 426, 475,

622

Suez, 50, 386n, 671, 720

Summerall, General Charles P., 26-27

SUP (single unit pack) shipments, 370, 405, 640

Supervised items, 304n

Supply, 5, 22, 23, 390-91, 632-33. See also Army

Service Forces; G-4; Logistics; Services of

Supply.

of AAF, 244-46

calculation of requirements, 298-301, 709-11

Class I, 319, 336, 643

Class II, 319, 336, 643

Class III, 319, 336, 643

Class IV, 297, 319, 336

Class V, 318

controlled by two agencies, 25-26, 222

direct shipment of, 390, 406, 407

levels of, 166, 334-36, 406, 407, 437, 464, 641

local procurement of, 257, 258-59, 320, 334,

335. See also Lend-lease, reverse.

marking and packaging of, 181, 183, 331-33,

404-06, 430, 452, 644-45
778 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

Supply—Continued of overseas theaters and departments, 186, 234,

236, 237, 239-40, 241-44, 248-57, 317-28, 634, 641, 642-46, 709-10, 712-13. See also

Port of embarkation, function in overseas supply system.

policy for distribution of scarce material, 303-

09. See also Equipment. theater control of, 498, 499, 501-02. See also

Commanding General Shipments.

unified, planning for, 391, 655-60

Supply Branch, G-4, 318n

Supply flow, 321, 329, 330, 331

Supply Priorities and Allocations Board, 127

SUPER-GYMNAST, 161n

Suva, 398

Sydney, 390, 398

Syria, 50, 503, 507

Tables of Equipment, 639

Tables of Organization, 638-39

Tangier-Ceuta area, 461, 461n, 462

Tankers, 59, 206, 208, 435, 435n, 626, 630n

Tanks, 36, 37, 94, 100, 104-05, 288-89, 290, 422,

440, 447, 561

Tansey, Brig. Gen. Patrick H., 282, 711

Tanuma, 566, 575

Task Force "A." See Western Task Force.

Task Force "X," 442, 444

Task Force "Y," 442, 443, 444

Task Force "Z," 442, 444

"Task Force, South Pacific." See Pensacola

convoy.

Task force operations, 136, 137, 178, 312

Tasker H. Bliss, 147, 446

Taylor, Col. Victor V., 105

Tehran, 568

Tel Litwinsky, 505

Ten Division Program (British), 38, 39, 44, 83, 91

Tenth Air Force, 508, 538

Texas, 363, 372

Theater Group, OPD, 226

Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1942, 259

Tobruk, 50, 365

Todd-Kaiser Company, 58, 59

Tonga Islands, 177

Tongatabu, 177, 178, 185, 186

TORCH, 280, 387, 392, 417, 420, 424, 425, 457, 511, 612

area of initial landings, 417-20, 421, 425-26

forces for, 421-22, 423-24, 425, 429, 463

naval escort for, 420, 431, 434, 435, 436-37

462, 464

planning for, 417, 420-21, 422, 423-24, 425-26, 427, 431, 432, 435

shipping for, 421, 423, 428, 457-58, 460, 461

TORCH—Continued

supplies and equipment for, 421, 422, 423-24,

425, 427-28, 429, 437-38, 448-49, 495

supply plan, 462-68, 478, 479

timing of, 421-22, 423, 424, 431

training for, 421-22, 424

Torres Strait, 173

Towers, Rear Adm. John H., 276

Townsville, 168, 176, 390

Training, shortages of equipment for, 34-35, 303,

305, 306-07, 308, 312-13, 314-15, 347

Transport aircraft, 87, 205, 366, 410, 528-30, 531,

541, 543, 554, 565, 566, 585-86, 596

Transportation Branch, G-4, 232, 233

Transportation Control Committee, 233

Transportation Corps, 232, 267, 268, 330, 342, 472,

578, 644, 656

Transportation Division, Quartermaster Corps, 232

Transportation Division, SOS, 227

Trans-Siberian Railway, 113, 564

Treasury Department, 38

TRIDENT Conference, 516, 517, 521, 542n, 544n,

547, 550, 702, 705, 714

Trobriand Islands, 695

Troop basis, 346, 347, 348, 349. See also Overseas

Troop Basis; Victory Program; Victory Program Troop Basis; Weekly Status Map.

Troop Basis, 1942, 301, 346, 347, 604

Troop Basis, 1943, 302, 312, 315, 349, 605, 633

Troop Basis, 1944, 633n

Troop movements, 125, 149, 155, 161, 228-30,

362, 392n, 393, 396, 457, 458, 662, 687, 689,

693, 695, 715, 720-21

Troop Movements Section, Theater Group, OPD,

226, 230

Troop and Supply Movements Section, Operations

Division, SOS, 228

Troop training. See Training.

Troop transports. See Shipping, troop.

Troops, restriction on use outside Western Hemisphere, 68, 71, 110

Trudeau, Col. Arthur G., 408

Truk, 51, 415

Tulagi, 388, 389

Tunis, 153

Tunisia, 418, 419, 468, 474, 480, 511, 664, 668,

669, 670, 671, 693, 696, 719

TUP (twin unit pack) shipments, 370, 371, 405,

475, 640

Turkey, 48, 82, 520-22, 664, 665, 673, 693n

Umm Qasr, 567, 568

Under Secretary of the Navy. See Forrestal,

James V.

Under Secretary of War. See Patterson, Robert P.

Under Secretary of War, Office of, 78, 79, 222, 224
INDEX 779

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 16, 27, 97, 102,

117, 273, 507, 551, 564, 565, 584-85, 595

aircraft allocations to, 101, 103-04, 584-85,

596-97

and Alaska-Siberia air route, 565-66, 596

allocation of tanks to, 290

American estimate of ability to resist Germans,

97, 117, 129, 133, 356

and Anglo-American air force for Caucasus, 584

British plans for sustaining, 97, 99, 100, 101, 104

Greely mission to, 111, 568

lend-lease aid to, 76, 102, 103-04, 355, 359, 491,

552, 553

lend-lease shipments to, reduction of, 114-15,

156-57, 158

statements of requirements, 97, 97n, 100, 101,

119, 584, 593

supply route to Murmansk and Archangel, 113-

14, 556, 557-58, 561-62, 567, 587. See also

Convoys, Arctic.

supply route across across North Pacific, 113,

114, 556, 558, 564

supply route via Persian Gulf, 113-14, 556, 558,

561, 567-68, 569, 573, 697

suspension of northern convoys to, 369, 383, 420,

458, 459, 460, 462, 557, 564, 574, 583, 612,

668

transport aircraft for, 530, 554, 565, 585-86

U.S. ships transferred to registry of, 564, 586, 591

Unit of fire, 318, 318n, 334, 334n, 437, 643

Unit loading, 404

United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, 568,

571, 574, 582

U.S. Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA), 150,

167, 169, 170, 172, 173, 176, 186

U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, 123

U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME),

509, 578, 578n

U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East, SOS, 509,

510

U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area

(USAFISPA), 187

U.S. Asiatic Fleet. See Asiatic Fleet, U.S.

U.S. Forces in the Philippines, 176

U.S. Maritime Commission. See Maritime Commission.

U.S. Military Iranian Mission, 110-11, 114, 504-

05, 506-07, 508-09, 566, 569. See also Persian Gulf; Persian Gulf Service Command.

U.S. Military Mission to the USSR, 111, 568

U.S. Military North African Mission, 110-11, 504-

05, 506, 507, 508-09, 510

U.S. Motor Transport Service, Persian Gulf Service

Command, 582

U.S. Pacific Fleet. See Pacific Fleet, U.S.

U.S. Steel Corporation, 33

Use factors, 300, 301

Vehicles, 306-07, 370, 374, 374n, 405, 474, 637,

638-39, 640

amphibian, 410, 448, 449, 449n, 451

maintenance, 320-21, 638

for Persian Gulf, 575, 576, 579

reduction of organic allowances of, to troop units,

637-38

for TORCH, 463, 464, 474, 475, 477n

Vickery, Rear Adm. Howard L., 211, 211n, 217

Victory Program, 95n, 118, 126-32, 133-34, 196,

197, 278n, 302, 346

Victory Program Troop Basis, 129-31, 131n, 132,

135, 196, 298, 302, 346, 604

Vinson Priorities Act, 89

Vladivostok, 113, 114, 561, 564, 584, 586, 589

Wainwright, Lt. Gen. Jonathan M., 176

Wake Island, 124, 150, 151

Wakefield, 203, 576

Waldron, Col. Albert W., 104n

Wansbrough-Jones, Col. Llewelyn, 368, 483

War Department, 25, 76-77, 82, 89, 97, 99, 102,

224, 259, 291, 317, 498, 506, 513-16, 522, 526, 561, 565, 638, 639

and Chennault-Stilwell controversy, 542, 543

on civilian versus military control of lend-lease

aid, 76-77

goal of consolidated military production program,

45, 76-77, 82, 89, 259

logistical organization, 23-25, 219-27

organization for administration of lend-lease aid,

78, 79-80, 261-62

policy on standardization of equipment, 36-38

relationship with Maritime Commission, 64, 216

relationship with OLLA, 259, 260

reorganization, March 1942, 143-44, 223, 224-

26, 261, 317, 339

responsibility for administration of lend-lease aid,

77-78, 86-87. See also Lend-lease, administration of.

War Department General Staff, 23-25, 26-27, 78,

79, 219-23. See also G-1; G-2; G-3; G-4.

War Department Pool of Task Force Units, 71

War Department's Six Months' List, 646

War Department Special Staff, 25

War Department Troop Basis, 709

War Munitions Program, 198, 199, 296, 296n, 303.

See also Army Supply Program.

War Plans Division, 38, 40, 54, 62, 75, 92, 93, 106-

07, 169, 221-22, 272, 273-74, 281. See also

Operations Division, War Department General Staff.

War Production Board, 162, 164, 202, 213, 602- 03, 604, 606, 611, 625, 628n

War Shipping Administration, 210, 236, 317, 369,

373-74, 395, 396, 397, 409, 460, 481, 544,

564, 580, 617, 618, 624, 702, 704. See also

Douglas, Lewis W.
780 GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943

War Shipping Administration—Continued

controversy over control of ship loading, 371, 402,

616-23

and efficient utilization of cargo shipping, 616,

619-20

jurisdiction over allocation of shipping, 217-19,

267, 268, 396, 615, 616, 698

modus operandi with SOS, 13 June 1942, 210,

218-19, 617, 619 and shipping for British Import Program, 679,

680, 691, 692 and shipping for Soviet aid program, 556, 589,

589n, 590

War Shipping Administrator. See Land, Rear

Adm. Emory S.

War Supplies Limited, 255

Warfare, revolution in, 3-4, 4n, 8, 11, 13

Washington conference, January-March 1941. See

American-British Conversations.

Wasserman, William, 501

Wavell, Field Marshal Sir Archibald, 50, 149, 169,

171, 540, 541, 547, 687

Wedemeyer, Lt. Col. Albert C., 119, 130, 131, 131n,

651, 654, 668, 672n, 686

Weekly Status Map, 296

Weeks, Lt. Gen. Sir Ronald M., 283, 287, 290

Weeks-Somervell Agreement, 283-84, 285, 287,

290, 293, 512, 516, 544. See also Great

Britain, U.S. munitions for; Munitions, production objectives.

Wellington, 390

Wemyss, Lt. Gen. H. C. B., 253

West Africa, French, 46, 118, 152. See also Dakar.

West coast, U.S., 146, 147, 148, 165

West Point, 203, 397, 458n, 461, 576

Westbrook, Col. Lawrence, 190, 501

Western Defense Command, 239, 305

Western Hemisphere, 15-16, 21, 28, 42-43, 45, 46,

50, 51, 52, 56, 60, 68, 75, 89, 138, 139, 148, 334, 634, 697. See also RAINBOW War Plans.

Western Task Force, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428,

431, 432, 438-45, 463, 465, 466, 467, 638

Wheeler, Maj. Gen. Raymond A., 110-11, 114,

504-05, 506, 523-24, 528, 537, 545-46, 548, 567, 568-69

White Sea, 113

Whiteley, Brig. J. F. M., 91

Whiteley List, 92

Willard A. Holbrook, 171

Williamson, Brig. Gen. Raymond E. S., 402

Wilson, Brig. Gen. Arthur R., 173, 176, 412, 451,

480

Wilson, Charles E., 603, 609

Wilson, Col. Erle M., 254n Winant, Frederick, 523

Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, 349, 633n

Wood, Brig. Gen. Walter A., Jr., 298

Woodlark Island, 695

Woodring, Harry H., 26, 31, 33

World War I, 4, 6

Wylie, Brig. Gen. Robert H., 232

X-RAY Force, 532, 533, 543

YOKE Force, 532, 533, 541, 542, 543

Young, Col. Charles D., 228

Younger, Brig. J. M., 279, 280

Yugoslavia, 50, 82

Yunnan Province, 533. See also YOKE Force.

Yunnan-Burma Railway, 86, 109, 526, 531

Zahidan-Meshed route, 575n

Zone of interior commands, 224-26

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