II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1993 

To provide for a comprehensive, new strategy for success in Iraq that includes 

a sustainable political solution and the redeployment of United States 

forces tied to specific political and military benchmarks. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

NOVEMBER 10, 2005 

Mr. KERRY introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To provide for a comprehensive, new strategy for success 

in Iraq that includes a sustainable political solution and 

the redeployment of United States forces tied to specific 

political and military benchmarks. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Strategy for Success 

5 in Iraq Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 The Senate makes the following findings: 
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1 (1) The men and women of the Armed Forces 

2 have performed with valor, honor, and courage in 

3 Iraq. 

4 (2) United States military commanders and in5 telligence community personnel agree that the insur6 gency in Iraq draws substantial support from dis7 affected Iraqi Sunnis. 

8 (3) The new Iraq constitution was adopted in a 

9 national referendum on October 15, 2005, despite 

10 the opposition of a great majority of Iraqi Sunnis. 

11 (4) Iraq cannot be stable without a sustainable 

12 political solution embraced by the Sunni minority as 

13 well as the majority Shias and Kurds. 

14 (5) Senior United States military commanders 

15 and Administration officials have acknowledged that 

16 the insurgency cannot be defeated without a political 

17 solution. 

18 (6) The commander of the Multinational 

19 Forces-Iraq, General George Casey, told the Com20 mittee on Armed Services of the Senate on Sep21 tember 29, 2005, that ‘‘[i]ncreased coalition pres22 ence feeds the notion of occupation . . . contributes to 

23 the dependency of Iraqi security forces on the coali24 tion . . . [ and ] . . . extends the amount of time that 
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1 it will take for Iraqi security forces to become self2 reliant’’. 

3 (7) General Casey also said that ‘‘[r]educing 

4 the visibility and, ultimately, the presence of coali5 tion forces as we transition to Iraqi security self-reli6 ance remains a key element of our overall 

7 counterinsurgency strategy’’. 

8 (8) The United States Armed Forces have es9 tablished a training program for the security forces 

10 of Iraq that continues to make possible the assump11 tion of security responsibilities by such security 

12 forces. 

13 (9) The number of members of the United 

14 States Armed Forces in Iraq has risen to more than 

15 160,000 to provide protection for the recent con16 stitutional referendum and the upcoming December 

17 elections in Iraq. 

18 (10) The people of Iraq will elect their first per19 manent government since the 2003 invasion on De20 cember 15, 2005. 

21 (11) The success of the December elections will 

22 constitute an important benchmark in transferring 

23 political responsibilities to the people of Iraq. 

24 (12) The phased redeployment of United States 

25 Armed Forces based on achieving benchmarks for 
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1 the transfer of political and security responsibilities 

2 to Iraq is a critical part of a successful strategy in 

3 Iraq. 

4 SEC. 3. STRATEGY FOR SUCCESS. 

5 To complete the mission in Iraq and bring our troops 

6 home, the President must implement a comprehensive new 

7 strategy for success in Iraq that simultaneously pursues 

8 a sustainable political solution and the redeployment of 

9 United States forces tied to specific political and military 

10 benchmarks. 

11 SEC. 4. IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGY. 

12 To implement the strategy under section 3, the Presi13 dent must undertake aggressive diplomatic, political, mili14 tary and economic measures, including actions to achieve 

15 the following: 

16 (1) Reduce the sense of United States occupa17 tion of Iraq by— 

18 (A) committing publicly not to establish 

19 permanent United States military bases in Iraq, 

20 or to maintain a large United States combat 

21 force on Iraq soil indefinitely; 

22 (B) drawing-down at least 20,000 United 

23 States troops upon the successful completion of 

24 the December 2005 elections as the first step in 

25 the process of reducing the United States force 
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1 presence in Iraq as political and military bench2 marks are met; and 

3 (C) reducing the visibility of United States 

4 forces by placing as many as possible in rear 

5 guard, garrisoned status for security backup 

6 purposes. 

7 (2) Give Sunnis a real stake in the future of 

8 Iraq by— 

9 (A) convincing Iraqi Shias and Kurds to 

10 address legitimate Sunni concerns about re11 gional autonomy and the allocation of oil reve12 nues; 

13 (B) hosting a conference of the neighbors 

14 of Iraq, the United Kingdom, other key mem15 bers of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, and 

16 the Russian Federation, immediately after the 

17 December elections, to develop a collective 

18 strategy to bring the parties in Iraq to a sus19 tainable political compromise that also includes 

20 mutual security guarantees among the peoples 

21 of Iraq; and 

22 (C) urging the Sunni neighbors of Iraq to 

23 immediately set up a reconstruction fund tar24 geted to the majority Sunni areas to show Iraqi 
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1 Sunnis the benefits of participating in the polit2 ical process. 

3 (3) Appoint a high-level presidential envoy to 

4 strengthen United States diplomatic efforts with re5 spect to Iraq. 

6 (4) Develop a new regional security structure 

7 with United States participation to enlist the sup8 port of the Sunni neighbors of Iraq. 

9 (5) Accelerate reconstruction efforts in Iraq by 

10 providing the necessary civilian personnel to do the 

11 job, establishing civil-military reconstruction teams 

12 throughout Iraq, streamlining the disbursement of 

13 funds to the provinces of Iraq, expanding job cre14 ation programs in Iraq, and strengthening the ca15 pacity of Iraqi government ministries. 

16 (6) Create the military conditions for the rede17 ployment of United States forces by— 

18 (A) intensifying the training of Iraqi secu19 rity forces through expanded in-country train20 ing and the acceptance of outstanding offers 

21 from other countries to do more training; 

22 (B) transferring military and police re23 sponsibilities on a phased basis to Iraqi security 

24 forces as their capabilities increase; and 
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1 (C) working with the new Iraq government 

2 to secure international support for a multi3 national force to help protect the borders of 

4 Iraq until a capable national army is formed. 

5 SEC. 5. REPORTS TO CONGRESS. 

6 (a) REPORTS REQUIRED.—Not later than June 30, 

7 2006, and every six months thereafter, the President shall 

8 submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report 

9 the actions taken to implement the strategy set forth in 

10 section 3 including the actions specified in section 4. 

11 (b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE12 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit13 tees of Congress’’ means— 

14 (1) the Committees on Foreign Relations and 

15 Appropriations of the Senate; and 

16 (2) the Committees on International Relations 

17 and Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 

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