79–006 

115TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 115–795 

ENHANCING GRID SECURITY THROUGH PUBLIC-PRIVATE 

PARTNERSHIPS ACT 

JUNE 28, 2018.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of 

the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. WALDEN, from the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany H.R. 5240] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on Energy and Commerce, to whom was referred 

the bill (H.R. 5240) to provide for certain programs and developments in the Department of Energy concerning the cybersecurity 

and vulnerabilities of, and physical threats to, the electric grid, and 

for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably 

thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as 

amended do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

Purpose and Summary ............................................................................................ 3 

Background and Need for Legislation .................................................................... 3 

Committee Action .................................................................................................... 7 

Committee Votes ...................................................................................................... 7 

Oversight Findings and Recommendations ........................................................... 7 

New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures ............. 7 

Congressional Budget Office Estimate ................................................................... 8 

Federal Mandates Statement ................................................................................. 9 

Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives .................................... 9 

Duplication of Federal Programs ............................................................................ 9 

Committee Cost Estimate ....................................................................................... 9 

Earmark, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff Benefits ............................. 9 

Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings ..................................................................... 9 

Advisory Committee Statement .............................................................................. 9 

Applicability to Legislative Branch ........................................................................ 9 

Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation ...................................................... 9 

Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ..................................... 11 

The amendment is as follows: 

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: 


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SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Enhancing Grid Security through Public-Private 

Partnerships Act’’. 

SEC. 2. PROGRAM TO PROMOTE AND ADVANCE PHYSICAL SECURITY AND CYBERSECURITY OF 

ELECTRIC UTILITIES. 

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with State regulatory authorities, industry stakeholders, the Electric Reliability Organization, and 

other Federal agencies the Secretary determines appropriate, shall carry out a program to— 

(1) develop, and provide for voluntary implementation of, maturity models, 

self-assessments, and auditing methods for assessing the physical security and 

cybersecurity of electric utilities; 

(2) provide training to electric utilities to address and mitigate cybersecurity 

supply chain management risks; 

(3) increase opportunities for sharing best practices and data collection within 

the electric sector; 

(4) assist with cybersecurity training for electric utilities; 

(5) advance the cybersecurity of third-party vendors that work in partnerships 

with electric utilities; and 

(6) provide technical assistance for electric utilities subject to the program. 

(b) SCOPE.—In carrying out the program under subsection (a), the Secretary of 

Energy shall— 

(1) take into consideration different sizes of electric utilities and the regions 

that such electric utilities serve; 

(2) prioritize electric utilities with fewer available resources due to size or region; and 

(3) to the extent practicable, utilize and leverage existing Department of Energy programs. 

(c) PROTECTION OF INFORMATION.—Information provided to, or collected by, the 

Federal Government pursuant to this section— 

(1) shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United 

States Code; and 

(2) shall not be made available by any Federal, State, political subdivision or 

tribal authority pursuant to any Federal, State, political subdivision, or tribal 

law requiring public disclosure of information or records. 

SEC. 3. REPORT ON CYBERSECURITY AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with State regulatory 

authorities, industry stakeholders, and other Federal agencies the Secretary determines appropriate, shall submit to Congress a report that assesses— 

(1) priorities, policies, procedures, and actions for enhancing the physical security and cybersecurity of electricity distribution systems to address threats to, 

and vulnerabilities of, such electricity distribution systems; and 

(2) implementation of such priorities, policies, procedures, and actions, including an estimate of potential costs and benefits of such implementation, including any public-private cost-sharing opportunities. 

(b) PROTECTION OF INFORMATION.—Information provided to, or collected by, the 

Federal Government pursuant to this section— 

(1) shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United 

States Code; and 

(2) shall not be made available by any Federal, State, political subdivision or 

tribal authority pursuant to any Federal, State, political subdivision, or tribal 

law requiring public disclosure of information or records. 

SEC. 4. ELECTRICITY INTERRUPTION INFORMATION. 

(a) INTERRUPTION COST ESTIMATE CALCULATOR.—The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, State regulatory authorities, industry stakeholders, and other Federal agencies the Secretary determines appropriate, shall update the Interruption Cost Estimate Calculator, as often as appropriate and feasible, but not less than once every 2 years. 

(b) INDICES.—The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission, State regulatory authorities, industry stakeholders, and 

other Federal agencies the Secretary determines appropriate, shall, as often as appropriate and feasible, update the following: 

(1) The System Average Interruption Duration Index. 

(2) The System Average Interruption Frequency Index. 

(3) The Customer Average Interruption Duration Index. 


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(c) SURVEY.—The Administrator of the Energy Information Administration shall 

collect information on electricity interruption costs, if available, from a representative sample of owners of electric grid assets through a biennial survey. 

SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS. 

In the Act, the following definitions apply: 

(1) ELECTRIC RELIABILITY ORGANIZATION.—The term ‘‘Electric Reliability Organization’’ has the meaning given such term in section 215(a)(2) of the Federal 

Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824o(a)(2)). 

(2) ELECTRIC UTILITY.—The term ‘‘electric utility’’ has the meaning given such 

term in section 3 of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 796). 

(3) STATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY.—The term ‘‘State regulatory authority’’ 

has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the Federal Power Act (16 

U.S.C. 796). 

PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

H.R. 5240, the Enhancing Grid Security through Public-Private 

Partnerships Act of 2018, was introduced by Rep. Jerry McNerney 

(D–CA) and Rep. Robert Latta (R–OH) on March 9, 2018. This legislation would require the Secretary of Energy to establish a program to facilitate and encourage public-private partnerships to promote and advance physical security and cybersecurity of electric 

utilities. 

The Secretary of Energy is directed to carry out a program to (1) 

develop, and provide for voluntary implementation of, maturity 

models, self-assessments, and auditing methods for assessing the 

physical security and cybersecurity of electric utilities; (2) provide 

training and technical assistance to electric utilities to address and 

mitigate cybersecurity supply chain management risks; and (3) increase opportunities for sharing best practices and data collection 

within the electric sector. 

The Secretary is also required to take into consideration different 

sizes of electric utilities and the regions they serve and to prioritize 

electric utilities with fewer available resources due to size or region. Any information an electric utility provides to the Federal 

government through this program will be exempt from public disclosure under Federal, State, or tribal law. 

The bill also provides for a report to Congress addressing cybersecurity as it relates to the electric distribution system. H.R. 5240 

directs the Secretary to assess priorities, policies, procedures, and 

actions for enhancing the physical and cybersecurity of the electric 

distribution system, including the costs and benefits of implementing these priorities, policies, procedures, and actions. 

Finally, H.R. 5240 directs the Department of Energy (DOE) to 

update the Interruption Cost Estimate Calculator, a tool designed 

for and utilized by electric reliability planners at electric utilities, 

government organizations, or other entities that are interested in 

estimating interruption costs and benefits associated with infrastructure improvements. 

BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

The United States’ energy infrastructure is comprised of a vast 

network of energy and electricity systems that deliver uninterrupted electricity from producers to consumers. These intricate and 

highly interdependent systems enable every aspect of our daily 

lives. Our nation’s economy, security, and the health and safety of 

its citizens depend upon the reliable and uninterrupted supply of 

fuels and electricity. Since the inception of the Department of EnVerDate Sep 11 2014 06:23 Jun 30, 2018 Jkt 079006 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR795.XXX HR795

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1See Section 215A of the Federal Power Act, the term ‘‘Grid Security Emergency’’ means the 

occurrence or imminent danger of (A)(i) a malicious act using electronic communication or an 

electromagnetic pulse, or a geomagnetic storm event, that could disrupt the operation of those 

electronic devices or communications networks, including hardware, software, and data, that are 

essential to the reliability of critical electric infrastructure or of defense critical electric infrastructure; and (ii) disruption of the operation of such devices or networks, with significant adverse effects on the reliability of critical electric infrastructure or of defense critical electric infrastructure, as a result of such act or event; or (B)(i) a direct physical attack on critical electric 

infrastructure or on defense critical electric infrastructure; and (ii) significant adverse effects on 

the reliability of critical electric infrastructure or of defense critical electric infrastructure as a 

result of such physical attack. 

ergy in 1977, the manner in which energy and power is generated, 

transmitted, and delivered continues to rapidly change and evolve. 

As advances in digital and information technologies continue to 

layer onto existing practices and energy infrastructures, new risks 

emerge, and vulnerabilities are exposed. Recent high-profile attempts by foreign actors to infiltrate our nation’s energy systems 

and infrastructure further highlight the need for legislation aimed 

at mitigating these significant and growing threats to the reliable 

supply of energy in the United States. 

The Department of Energy’s authorities for cybersecurity, energy security, and emergency response 

When the Department of Energy was organized in 1977, energy 

security concerns revolved around oil supply shortages. As a result, 

energy security emergency functions in the Department of Energy 

Organization Act focused on distributing and allocating fuels in an 

emergency. Over time, these functions in DOE’s organic statute remained largely unchanged, but DOE’s responsibilities and authorities have evolved substantially beyond what was envisioned forty 

years ago. Energy delivery systems have become increasingly interconnected and digitized, while society has become more dependent 

on energy in all its forms—expanding the opportunities for cybersecurity threats and other hazards that may require emergency response. 

Today, DOE’s mission to advance the national, economic, and energy security of the United States requires it to act as the lead 

agency for the protection of electric power, oil, and natural gas infrastructure. DOE has authority and responsibilities for the physical security and cybersecurity of energy delivery systems from 

laws that Congress has passed and Presidential directives. Congress has provided DOE with a wide range of emergency response 

and cybersecurity authorities affecting multiple segments of the energy sector, beginning with the Department of Energy Organization 

Act, and most recently with the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act). 

The FAST Act, which was signed into law in 2015, designated 

DOE as the Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) for the energy sector and 

provided the Department with several new energy security authorities to respond to physical and cyberattacks to energy systems. Section 61003 of the FAST Act amended section 215 of the Federal 

Power Act (FPA) and created a new section 215A entitled, ‘‘Critical 

Electric Infrastructure Security.’’ This new section 215A of the FPA 

provided definitions for the terms ‘‘bulk power system,’’ ‘‘critical 

electric infrastructure,’’ ‘‘critical electric infrastructure information,’’ and ‘‘grid security emergency,’’ 1 among other terms. Section 

215 of the FPA states that when the President issues or provides 


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2Federal Power Act § 215A, 16 U.S.C. § 824o-1. 

3See Press Release, U.S. Department of Energy, ‘‘Secretary of Energy Rick Perry Forms New 

Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response.’’ (Feb. 14, 2018), https:// 

www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-energy-rick-perry-forms-new-office-cybersecurity-energysecurity-and-emergency. 4Department of Energy. Energy Sector Cybersecurity Preparedness. 

5P.L. 109–58. 

6See North American Electric Reliability Corporation for further information. 7See Electric Subsector Coordinating Council for further information. 

to the Secretary of Energy a written directive or determination 

identifying a grid security emergency, the Secretary may, with or 

without notice, hearing, or report, issue orders for emergency measures to protect or restore the reliability of critical electric infrastructure or of defense critical electric infrastructure during an 

emergency.2 Section 215A also includes protections for the sharing 

of critical electric information. 

DOE’s cybersecurity roles and responsibilities are also guided by 

the Federal government’s operational framework, as provided by 

the Presidential Policy Directive 41 (PPD–41) issued in 2016 addressing ‘‘United States Cyber Incident Coordination.’’ A primary 

purpose of PPD–41 is to improve coordination across the Federal 

government by clarifying roles and responsibilities. Under the 

PPD–41 framework, DOE serves as the lead agency for the energy 

sector, coordinating closely with other agencies and the private sector to facilitate the response, recovery, and restoration of damaged 

energy infrastructure. 

On February 14, 2018, the Energy Secretary formed a new Office 

of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response 

(CESER) at DOE. The CESER office will be led by an Assistant 

Secretary who will focus on energy infrastructure security, support 

the expanded national security responsibilities assigned to DOE, 

and report to the Under Secretary of Energy.3

Physical security and cybersecurity of the electric grid 

With respect to its responsibilities for security of the electric 

power system, DOE works closely with electric sector owners and 

operators to detect and mitigate risks to critical electric infrastructure. DOE collaborates with the electric sector to develop technologies, tools, exercises, and other resources to assist the energy 

sector in evaluating and improving their security preparedness.4

Along with DOE, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

(FERC) has authority over the reliability of the electric grid. Congress, through the Energy Policy Act of 2005,5 provided FERC with 

the authority to approve mandatory cybersecurity standards proposed by the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO). The North 

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) currently serves 

as the ERO. NERC proposes reliability standards for planning and 

operating the North American bulk power system. These critical infrastructure protection (CIP) reliability standards 6 address physical security and cybersecurity of critical electric infrastructure. 

Cooperation between the Federal government and electricity sector extends beyond mandatory and enforceable standards. The 

Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council (ESCC) serves as the 

principal liaison between the Federal government and the electric 

power sector in coordinating efforts to prepare for national-level incidents or threats to critical infrastructure.7 The Cybersecurity 


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8See Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center for further information. 9Department of Energy. Cybersecurity for Critical Energy Infrastructure. 

10See Written Testimony of Under Secretary Mark Menezes, U.S. Department of Energy, Before the Subcommittee on Energy, Committee on Energy and Commerce, March 14, 2018. 11See Statement for the Record by the American Public Power Association (APPA) and the 

National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) for Subcommittee on Energy, 12See Written testimony of Mr. Scott Aaronson, Vice President, Security and Preparedness for 

the Edison Electric Institute, Before the Subcommittee on Energy, Committee on Energy and 

Commerce, March 14, 2018. 

Risk Information Sharing Program (CRISP) is a public-private 

partnership, funded by DOE and industry. CRISP is managed by 

the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E–ISAC) 8

and facilitates the timely bi-directional sharing of unclassified and 

classified threat information with energy sector partners.9

Need for legislation 

The Committee finds that section 2 of H.R. 5240 would facilitate 

and strengthen public-private partnerships to promote and advance 

the physical security and cybersecurity of electric utilities that 

have fewer resources due to size or region. According to the testimony of Undersecretary Mark Menezes: 

The cyber-attacks on the Ukrainian grid underscored the 

urgency of the cyber threat to everyone involved in the 

protection and operation of the Nation’s power grid. Continuing to build off current work is critical in mitigating 

the risks that the electric grid faces. Sharing and promoting best practices, including maturity model assessments, physical and cyber risk assessments, and training 

are all important components of this risk mitigation.10

The Edison Electric Institute (EEI), American Public Power Association (APPA) and the National Rural Electric Cooperatives Association (NRECA) supported section 2 of H.R. 5240. APPA and 

NRECA, in a statement submitted for the hearing record, stated, 

‘‘[p]ublic-private partnerships like those between DOE, APPA and 

NRECA are vital to help needed resources reach the smaller utilities in the sector.’’ 11

The Committee finds section 3 of H.R. 5240 would help mitigate 

against threats and vulnerabilities to electricity distribution systems by assessing priorities, policies, procedures, and actions for 

enhancing the physical and cybersecurity of electric distribution 

systems. 

The testimony of Scott Aaronson, Vice President, Security and 

Preparedness for the Edison Electric Institute supported this section and stated, ‘‘[t]he number of distribution assets—including distributed energy resources and customer devices ‘behind the 

meter’—is growing and can impact the broader electricity system, 

the security of these interconnected devices must be considered to 

prevent cybersecurity incidents from impacting reliability.’’ 12

The Committee finds section 4 of H.R. 5240 would help improve 

electric infrastructure resilience by updating a program that assists 

grid planners at utilities, government organizations and other entities with estimating interruption costs and benefits associated with 

infrastructure improvements. 

According to the testimony of Undersecretary Mark Menezes: 


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13See Written Testimony of Under Secretary Mark Menezes, U.S. Department of Energy, Before the Subcommittee on Energy, Committee on Energy and Commerce, March 14, 2018. 

The Interruption Cost Estimate (ICE) Calculator tool, 

which was developed by Lawrence Berkley National Laboratory and Nexant, Inc. and funded by DOE–OE, is designed for electric reliability planners at utilities, government organizations, or other entities that are interested in 

estimating interruption costs and/or benefits associated 

with reliability improvements in the United States. For 

any hazard, including cyber events, the ICE Calculator 

provides analytical foundations for reliability investments.’’ 13

COMMITTEE ACTION

On March 14, 2018 the Subcommittee on Energy held a hearing 

on H.R. 5240 entitled, ‘‘DOE Modernization: Legislation Addressing 

Cybersecurity and Emergency Response.’’ The Subcommittee received testimony from: • Mark Menezes, Under Secretary of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy; • Scott Aaronson, Vice President, Security and Preparedness, Edison Electric Institute; • Mark Engels, Senior Enterprise Security Advisor, Dominion Energy; • Tristan Vance, Director, Office of Energy Development, 

State of Indiana on behalf of the National Association of State 

Energy Officials; • Zachary Tudor, Associate Laboratory Director for National 

and Homeland Security, Idaho National Laboratory; and, • Kyle Pistor, Vice President of Government Relations, National Electrical Manufactures Association. 

On April 18, 2018, the Subcommittee on Energy met in open 

markup session and forwarded H.R. 5240, without amendment, to 

the full Committee by a voice vote. 

On May 9, 2018, the full Committee on Energy and Commerce 

met in open markup session and ordered H.R. 5240, as amended, 

favorably reported to the House by a voice vote. 

COMMITTEE VOTES

Clause 3(b) of rule XIII requires the Committee to list the recorded votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments 

thereto. There were no recorded votes taken in connection with ordering H.R. 5240 reported. 

OVERSIGHT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X and clause 3(c)(1) of rule 

XIII, the Committee held a hearings and made findings that are reflected in this report. 

NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, ENTITLEMENT AUTHORITY, AND TAX

EXPENDITURES

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII, the Committee finds that 

H.R. 5240 would result in no new or increased budget authority, 

entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or revenues. 


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CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII, the following is the cost 

estimate provided by the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to 

section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974: 

U.S. CONGRESS, 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 

Washington, DC, May 23, 2018. 

Hon. GREG WALDEN, Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 5240, the Enhancing Grid 

Security through Public-Private Partnerships Act. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Megan Carroll. 

Sincerely, 

MARK P. HADLEY

(For Keith Hall, Director). 

Enclosure. 

H.R. 5240—Enhancing Grid Security through Public-Private Partnerships Act 

H.R. 5240 would direct the Department of Energy (DOE) to establish a program to promote collaborative efforts—among federal, 

state, and private stakeholders of the electricity sector—to assess 

and improve the physical security and cybersecurity of electric utilities. The bill would authorize DOE to provide guidance, training, 

and technical assistance to utilities and specify other reporting and 

administrative requirements. 

Using information from DOE, CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 

5240 would not significantly affect the federal budget. The activities authorized by the bill are largely consistent with DOE’s existing efforts related to the security of the energy infrastructure. As 

a result, CBO expects that any changes in federal spending under 

the bill—which would be subject to appropriation—would be small. 

H.R. 5240 would not affect direct spending or revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. 

CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 5240 would not affect direct 

spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10- 

year periods beginning in 2029. 

H.R. 5240 would impose an intergovernmental mandate, as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA), by preempting state, local, and tribal laws that could otherwise cause 

government agencies to disclose information collected by DOE 

under the bill, such as plans to enhance cybersecurity. Although 

the preemption would limit the application of state, local, and tribal laws, CBO estimates that it would impose no duty on those governments that would result in additional spending or a loss of revenue. 

H.R. 5240 contains no private-sector mandates as defined in 

UMRA. 

The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Megan Carroll (for 

federal costs) and Jon Sperl (for mandates). The estimate was reVerDate Sep 11 2014 06:23 Jun 30, 2018 Jkt 079006 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR795.XXX HR795

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viewed by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant Director for 

Budget Analysis. 

FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT

The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office 

pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the general performance 

goal or objective of this legislation is to provide programs and developments in the Department of Energy concerning the cybersecurity and vulnerabilities of, and physical threats to, the electric grid, 

and for other purposes. 

DUPLICATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII, no provision of H.R. 5240 

is known to be duplicative of another Federal program, including 

any program that was included in a report to Congress pursuant 

to section 21 of Public Law 111–139 or the most recent Catalog of 

Federal Domestic Assistance. 

COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE

Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII, the Committee adopts as 

its own the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional 

Budget Act of 1974. 

EARMARK, LIMITED TAX BENEFITS, AND LIMITED TARIFF BENEFITS

Pursuant to clause 9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of rule XXI, the Committee 

finds that H.R. 5240 contains no earmarks, limited tax benefits, or 

limited tariff benefits. 

DISCLOSURE OF DIRECTED RULE MAKINGS

Pursuant to section 3(i) of H. Res. 5, the Committee finds that 

H.R. 5240 contains no directed rule makings. 

ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT

No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the 

Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. 

APPLICABILITY TO LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the 

terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or 

accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION

Section 1. Short title 

This section provides the short title of ‘‘Enhancing Grid Security 

through Public-Private Partnerships Act of 2018.’’ 


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Section 2. Program to promote and advance physical security and 

cybersecurity of electric utilities 

The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with State regulatory 

authorities, industry stakeholders, and other Federal agencies the 

Secretary determines appropriate, shall carry out a program to (1) 

develop, and provide for voluntary implementation of, maturity 

models, self-assessments, and auditing methods for assessing the 

physical security and cybersecurity of electric utilities; (2) provide 

training and technical assistance to electric utilities to address and 

mitigate cybersecurity supply chain management risks; (3) increase 

opportunities for sharing best practices and data collection within 

the electric sector; (4) assist with cybersecurity training for electric 

utilities; (5) advance the cybersecurity of third-party vendors that 

work in partnerships with electric utilities; and (6) provide technical assistance for electric utilities subject to the program. 

Section 2(b) states that in carrying out the program under section 2(a), the Secretary of Energy shall (1) take into consideration 

different sizes of electric utilities and the regions that such electric 

utilities serve; (2) prioritize electric utilities with fewer available 

resources due to size or region; and, (3) to the extent practicable, 

utilize and leverage existing Department of Energy programs. 

Section 2(c) states that information provided to, or collected by, 

the Federal government pursuant to this section, (1) shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United 

States Code; and (2) shall not be made available by any Federal, 

State, political subdivision, or tribal law requiring disclosure of information or records. 

Section 3. Report on cybersecurity and distribution systems 

Section 3(a) directs the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with 

State regulatory authorities, industry stakeholders, and other Federal agencies the Secretary determines appropriate, shall submit to 

Congress a report that assesses (1) priorities, policies, procedures, 

and actions for enhancing the physical security and cybersecurity 

of electricity distribution systems to address threats to, and 

vulnerabilities of, such electricity distribution systems. Section 

3(a)(2) further clarifies that this report will assess implementation 

of such priorities, policies, procedures, and actions, including an estimate of potential costs and benefits of such implementation, including any public-private cost-sharing opportunities. 

Section 3(b) states that information provided to, or collected by, 

the Federal government pursuant to this section, (1) shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United 

States Code; and (2) shall not be made available by any Federal, 

State, political subdivision, or tribal law requiring disclosure of information or records. 

Section 4. Electricity interruption information 

Section 4(a) directs that the Secretary of Energy, in consultation 

with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, State regulatory 

authorities, industry stakeholders, and other Federal agencies the 

Secretary determines appropriate, shall update the Interruption 

Cost Estimate Calculator, as often as appropriate and feasible, but 

not less than once every 2 years. 


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Section 4(b) instructs that the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, State regulatory authorities, industry stakeholders, and other Federal agencies the Secretary determines appropriate, shall, as often as appropriate and feasible, update the following: (1) The System Average 

Interruption Duration Index, (2) The System Average Interruption 

Frequency Index, and (3) The Customer Average Interruption 

Index. 

Section 4(c) directs the Administrator of the Energy Information 

Administration to collect information on electricity interruption 

costs, if available, from a representative sample of owners of electric grid assets through biennial survey. 

Section 5. Definitions 

For this legislation the term ‘‘electric utility’’ has the meaning 

given such term in section 3 of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 

796). The term ‘‘State regulatory authority’’ has the meaning given 

such term in section 3 of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 796). 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

This legislation does not amend any existing Federal statute. 

Æ 


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