Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

CASE STUDIES IN INSURGENCY

AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE:

ALGERIA 1954–1962

REVISED EDITION

United States Army Special Operations Command

Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

CASE STUDIES IN INSURGENCY 

AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE:

ALGERIA 1954–1962

REVISED EDITION

Paul J. Tompkins Jr., Project Lead

Erin M. Richardson, Editor

United States Army Special Operations Command

Layout by The Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Laboratory
This publication is a work of the United States Government in 

accordance with Title 17, United States Code, sections 101 and 105. 

Published by:

The United States Army Special Operations Command

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Revised Edition 

First Edition published by Special Operations Research Office, 

American University, December 1963

Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of 

the US government.

Nonmateriel research on special warfare is performed in support of 

the requirements stated by the US Army Special Operations Command, 

Department of the Army.

Comments correcting errors of fact and opinion, filling or 

indicating gaps of information, and suggesting other changes that may 

be appropriate should be addressed to:

United States Army Special Operations Command

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2929 Desert Storm Drive

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When citing this book, please refer to the version available at 

www.soc.mil. 

All ARIS products are available from USASOC at www.soc.mil 

under the ARIS link. 
ASSESSING REVOLUTIONARY AND 

INSURGENT STRATEGIES

The Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) 

series consists of a set of case studies and research conducted for the 

US Army Special Operations Command by the National Security 

Analysis Department of The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics 

Laboratory.

The purpose of the ARIS series is to produce a collection of academically rigorous yet operationally relevant research materials to 

develop and illustrate a common understanding of insurgency and 

revolution. This research, intended to form a bedrock body of knowledge for members of the Special Forces, will allow users to distill vast 

amounts of material from a wide array of campaigns and extract relevant lessons, thereby enabling the development of future doctrine, 

professional education, and training.

From its inception, ARIS has been focused on exploring historical and current revolutions and insurgencies for the purpose of identifying emerging trends in operational designs and patterns. ARIS 

encompasses research and studies on the general characteristics of 

revolutionary movements and insurgencies and examines unique adaptations by specific organizations or groups to overcome various environmental and contextual challenges.

The ARIS series follows in the tradition of research conducted by 

the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of American University in the 1950s and 1960s, by adding new research to that body of 

work and in several instances releasing updated editions of original 

SORO studies.

VOLUMES IN THE ARIS SERIES

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume I: 1927–1962 (Rev. Ed.)

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009

Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (2nd Ed.)

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (2nd Ed.)

Irregular Warfare Annotated Bibliography

The Legal Status of Personnel in Resistance

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia (1964–2009)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka (1976–2009)

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II (pub. 1961)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Cuba 1953–1959 (pub. 1963)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Guatemala 1944–1954 (pub. 1964)

SORO STUDIES

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Vietnam 1941–1954 (pub. 1964)
INTRODUCTION TO REVISED EDITION

This study was originally published by the US Army Special Operations Research Office in December 1963. As we developed the Assessing Resistance and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) project and work began 

on the new studies, we determined that this study is still important and 

relevant and thus should be republished. The two major factors that 

contributed to the revolution—the economic plight of the masses and 

the political frustration of the intellectual elite—are present still in 

modern-day revolutions.

The majority of the book was reproduced exactly as it appeared 

originally, with some minor spelling and punctuation corrections as 

well as changes in formatting to conform to modern typesetting conventions and to match the new ARIS studies in presentation. The process for creating this revised edition entailed scanning the pages from 

a copy of the original book; using an optical character recognition 

(OCR) function to convert the text on the scanned pages to computerreadable, editable text; refining the scanned figures to ensure appropriate resolution and contrast; and composing the document using 

professional typesetting software. Then, word by word, the revised text 

was compared to the original text to ensure that no errors were introduced during the OCR and composition processes.

These efforts resulted in the creation of this revised edition in the 

following formats: a softbound book, a hardbound book, a PDF, and an 

EPUB. The EPUB was generated by creating a new set of files from the 

print-ready files, adjusting various settings in the files to facilitate maximum compatibility with e-readers, exporting the files to .epub, and 

reviewing and revising the code to allow for optimal viewing on standard e-reading devices. The final step was to test the book on multiple 

e-readers and then repeat the entire process as necessary to address 

any remaining issues in the code.

Although the processes for creating the various formats of this edition are for the most part straightforward, they take several weeks to 

complete and require considerable attention to detail. Several staff 

members from the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory devoted time and effort to making the various formats of this 

revised edition possible: Kelly Livieratos, Annie Marcotte, Magda 

Saina, and Erin Richardson.

This study and the other products from the ARIS project are essential learning tools developed to enhance Special Operations Forces personnel’s understanding of resistances and insurgencies. For more than 

fifty years, Special Operations Forces have conducted missions to support resistances or insurgencies (unconventional warfare); to counter 
them (counterinsurgency operations); or to support a partner nation 

in eliminating them (foreign internal defense). These operations are 

collectively referred to as special warfare. Special Operations doctrine 

gives general principles and strategies for accomplishing these operations but in most cases describes the resistance or insurgency only in 

generalities. The ARIS project was designed to serve as an anatomy 

lesson. It provides the necessary foundational material for the special 

warfare practitioner to learn the elemental structure, form, and function of rebellions, thus enabling him or her to better adapt and apply 

the doctrine professionally. Additionally, these products inform doctrine, ensuring that it is adapted to meet modern social and technological changes.

When citing this study in scholarly work, please refer to the PDF version available at www.soc.mil.

Paul J. Tompkins Jr.

USASOC Project Lead

CASE STUDIES IN INSURGENCY 

AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE:

ALGERIA 1954–1962

Primary Research Responsibility

Paul A. Jureidini

SPECIAL OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE 

The American University

Washington, D.C. 20016

December 1963
ii

FOREWORD

This is the third publication in a series of studies by the Special 

Operations Research Office on insurgencies and revolutions. The first 

report is a Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary 

Accounts. Three of these revolutions which were of particular interest 

were selected for more detailed analysis: this study of the Algerian 

Revolution (1954–1962); a previously published study of the Cuban 

Revolution (1953–1959) and the forthcoming Vietnamese Revolution 

(1941–1954). A related study on the Guatemalan situation between 

1944 and 1954 is underway.

Like its predecessors, this book deals with its subject analytically 

and is organized in support of the objective of portraying the Algerian 

Revolution’s essential causes, persons, movements, actions and consequences in such a way as to make possible the systematic comparison of one revolution with another. In this way it is hoped that we and 

other social scientists of similar interest may develop a more general 

and valid understanding of revolutionary processes. Until this goal is 

achieved, the reader of the studies in this series may make his own 

cross-comparisons and draw generalizations for his own use in understanding, coping with, or teaching about revolutions.

Readers’ comments and suggestions on this study will be gratefully 

received.

Theodore R. Vallance
iii

PREFACE

A few words concerning the style of this case study of the Algerian 

Revolution are required in order to avoid misunderstandings about its 

concept and intent.

The case study is not a chronological narrative of the revolution 

from beginning to end. That type of historical case study is valuable 

for many purposes and a number have been published (see Bibliography). Rather, this study attempts to analyze, individually and successively through time, a number of factors in the revolutionary situation 

and the revolutionary movement itself which, on the basis of prior studies of revolutions, have been identified as being generally related to 

the occurrence, form, and outcome of a revolution. The case study, 

then, is devised to test the “explanatory power” of certain statements of 

relationships in terms of their applicability to the Algerian Revolution 

in particular. For this reason the reader is urged to read the definition 

of terms and the conceptual framework underlying the study which 

appear in the Technical Appendix.

Such an approach has both advantages and disadvantages to the 

reader. One who is interested in a particular topic (e.g., social antagonisms, revolutionary organization) need only read that section to get 

all the essential information on that topic. The reader who is interested in the entire case study will inevitably notice some redundancy 

from section to section, although every attempt has been made to keep 

unnecessary repetition to the absolute minimum. But some redundancy is inevitable for two reasons: a given historical event can have 

multiple significance (e.g., both social and economic significance, or 

both psychological operations and sabotage significance) and there is 

an interaction among events in a given society (e.g., political actions 

may be related to economic actions, or underground supply effectiveness may be related to guerrilla interdiction effectiveness).

The rationale for using such a systematic approach goes beyond 

the quest for analytic understanding of the Algerian Revolution itself. 

Companion case studies also have been prepared on the Vietnamese 

Revolution (1954–1962) and the Cuban Revolution (1953–1959) using 

the same conceptual framework and evaluating the same factors.a

 At 

the same time, a case study of the situation in Guatemala between 1944 

and 1954 is being prepared, using a different approach more suitable 

to that situation. Thus, a basis is being prepared for comparative analyses that will, hopefully, provide generalizations applicable to more than 

a single revolution. The net result of this approach for this case study 

a As a final note on redundancy. It should be noted that this Preface and the Technical Appendix are identical with those in the companion case studies.
iv

is a series of related analytic conclusions regarding the character and 

dynamics of the Algerian Revolution, but not a smoothly rounded literary story.

All of the sources used in preparation for this study are unclassified, and for the most part secondary sources were used. Again, certain 

advantages and disadvantages accrue. As an unclassified document, 

the study will be more widely distributed and whatever contribution to 

understanding it contains will be put to wider use. Reliance on unclassified secondary sources, however, may have led to the exclusion of 

certain significant considerations or to the use of unreliable information and thus to factual and interpretative errors. It is believed, however, that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. If, because of 

its sources, the study adds no new information about the revolution, it 

does claim that maximum, systematic, analytic use of already available 

open information is a meaningful contribution to the study of insurgency and revolutionary warfare.

Finally, the intent of this case study is not to present any particular “slant” on the Algerian Revolution, the actors and parties in it, or 

the role of foreign (to Algeria) powers. Rather, the intent is to present 

as objective an account as possible of what happened in terms of the 

hypotheses being evaluated. Thus, some of the case study necessarily 

deals with how the Algerians perceived events, or, more accurately, how 

it is believed they perceived events.

The aim has been to prepare the case study from the viewpoint of 

an impartial, objective observer. Perhaps such an aspiration is beyond 

grasp—the events may be too recent, the sources too unreliable, the 

“observer” too biased toward objectives compatible with Western democratic interests. For these reasons, no infallibility is claimed and it 

is readily conceded that this study cannot be the final word on the 

Algerian Revolution. Subsequent events always have a way of leading 

to reinterpretation of prior events. However, any errors of omission or 

commission are not deliberate, but truly errors—and they certainly are 

not a result of an intent to foster any particular political “slant.”

At the same time, there is no question that many of the subjects 

discussed are “politically sensitive.” It must be recorded, therefore, that 

the above denial of any deliberate intent to “slant” the case study also 

means that there was no intent to “cover up” historical facts and interpretations which might be perceived as reflecting unfavorably on any 

party. Little is to be gained in terms of increased understanding of 

revolutions if justification of past particular policies, or advocacy of any 

given current policy, was the real intent under the guise of objective 

analysis. An effort was made, however, to avoid use of a style and language which in itself would be unnecessarily offensive or in poor taste.
v

Beyond the resolve of objective analysis in the preparation of the 

study, sources were selected on the basis of their judged reliability. A 

balance was sought among sources of known persuasion in order not to 

unwittingly bias the case study in one direction or another. As a final 

check, the study draft was submitted to five area specialists, Dr. Bernard 

Fall of Howard University, Dr. Abdel Aziz Said of The American University, Dr. Hisham B. Sharabi and Dr. William H. Lewis of Georgetown 

University, and Mr. James R. Price of the Special Operations Research 

Office. The experts reviewed the manuscript for accuracy of fact and 

reasonableness of interpretations and their comments and criticisms 

provided the basis for final revisions. Although their contributions were 

substantial, final responsibility for the manuscript, both with respect 

to substantive content and methodology, rests solely with the Special 

Operations Research Office.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD ..........................................................................................ii

PREFACE...............................................................................................iii

SUMMARY

Purpose of Study.................................................................................3

Organization of Study ........................................................................3

Synopsis ...............................................................................................3

Selected Analytic Conclusions ...........................................................7

PART I—FACTORS INDUCING REVOLUTION

Economic Maladjustment................................................................. 17

Foreign Control of Economy........................................................ 17

Concentration of Land and Landless Peasants...........................22

Absence of a Diversified Economy ...............................................24

Unemployment and Underemployment......................................26

Social Antagonism............................................................................28

Tension Within the Social Structure ...........................................28

Demise of Traditional Society......................................................31

Marginality of Intellectuals..........................................................33

Political Weaknesses .........................................................................35

Political Imbalance: Representation, Participation, 

and Discrimination.............................................................35

Political Fragmentation of Ruling Elite 

and Opposition Groups......................................................38

Inefficiency of Governmental Machinery....................................47

PART II—DYNAMICS OF REVOLUTION

Composition of Revolutionary Actors..............................................71

Leadership.....................................................................................71

Following .......................................................................................72

Overall Strategy and Goals ..............................................................73

Ideology or Myth...............................................................................75

National Orientation ....................................................................75

International Orientation ............................................................77

Religious Emphasis.......................................................................78

Mystique of Revolution .................................................................79

Organization.....................................................................................79

Political Apparatus........................................................................80

Underground ................................................................................83

Trade Unions.................................................................................84

The Rebel Army ............................................................................88
viii

Table of Contents

Techniques ........................................................................................90

Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency Operations.............90

Recruiting......................................................................................95

Terrorism.......................................................................................96

Intelligence....................................................................................98

Propaganda: Media and Themes.................................................98

Strikes and Demonstrations.......................................................100

Active Involvement of Foreign Powers (on Both Sides) ................ 101

Number of Countries Involved .................................................. 101

Military Aid by Foreign Powers..................................................103

Political Intervention ..................................................................104

Direct Military Intervention.......................................................108

Granting of Bases from Which to Operate ...............................109

Permitting Revolutionary Propaganda to be Disseminated.....109

PART III—EPILOGUE

The First Four Months of Independence ...................................... 113

FOOTNOTES .................................................................................... 119

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................... 122

TECHNICAL APPENDIX

Introduction....................................................................................127

Conceptual Frame of Reference ....................................................127

Revolution Defined.....................................................................127

General Approach ......................................................................128

Factors Inducing Revolution ......................................................128

Economic Maladjustment...........................................................129

Social Antagonism ......................................................................130

Political Weakness....................................................................... 132

Organic Factors of the Revolutionary Movement .....................133

Actors .........................................................................................133

Overall Strategy and Goals.........................................................133

Ideology or Myth.........................................................................134

Organization ...............................................................................134

Techniques ..................................................................................134

Foreign Involvement ...................................................................134

General Summary of Procedures...................................................135

Development of Case Study Format...........................................135

Identification and Selection of Sources.....................................135

Information Synthesis and Analysis: Drafting of Report .........135

Expert Reviews and Revision .....................................................136

Footnotes to Technical Appendix..................................................136

Bibliography to Technical Appendix.............................................137

INDEX ............................................................................................ 141
Table of Contents

ix

ILLUSTRATIONS

Genesis of the Algerian rebellion .......................................................50

An ALN land mine crippled and nearly overturned this French halftrack in the Blida region .....................................................53

Instruction in the use of a French-manufactured 24/29 automatic 

rifle in a rebel camp ............................................................53

An example of ALN sabotage—blowing up a power relay tower......54

Weapons, including U.S.-manufactured captured by the ALN in 

engagements with French units..........................................54

ALN soldiers mining a railway line. Note the French paratroop 

uniform and hat...................................................................55

An instance of an escorted civilian convoy 

in the Aures Mountains.......................................................56

A hunter-killer paratroop unit of the 5th French Foreign Legion 

Regiment seeking rebel bands in Djebel Bou Zegana 

in the Kabyle Mountains..................................................... 57

Muslim Algerian laborers constructing the Maurice Line ................58

An assortment of weapons...................................................................59

Another example of terrorism perpetrated by the FLN against 

Muslim Algerians.................................................................60

The body of Doumene Abdelkader lies on a street in Algiers .......... 61

Rubble litters the streets in the Algiers Casbah following the Muslim 

riots of December 11–14, 1960 ............................................62

Algerian students and workers demonstrating in Paris, 

October 1956........................................................................63

Ben Bella, Khider, Ait Ahmed, and Boudiaf (in the background 

from left to right) talking with Prince Moulay Hassan (in 

uniform)...............................................................................64

Members of the first Algerian Provisional Government....................65

French troops unloading from the ship, “Athos” ...............................66

“The road to friendship. YES to the new Algeria.” A referendum 

poster depicting Muslim and French workers facing an 

industrial future together in Algeria..................................67

Organization of rebel command in Algeria .......................................86

Nationalist military activity November 1954–1958.............................87

SUMMARY

Summary

3

PURPOSE OF STUDY

The objective of this case study is to contribute to increased analytic 

understanding of revolutionary (internal) war. Specifically, the study 

analyzes the Algerian Revolution by examining two types of information in terms of their relationship to the occurrence, form, and outcome of the revolution:

(1) social, economic, and political factors in the prerevolutionary 

and revolutionary situations;

(2) structural and functional factors of the revolutionary 

movement, such as the composition of actors and followers, 

revolutionary strategy and goals, organization and 

techniques.

The study is not focused on the strategy and tactics of countering 

revolutions. On the premise that development of U.S. policies and 

operations for countering revolutions—where that is in the national 

interest—will be improved by a better understanding of what it is that 

is to be countered, the study concentrates on the character and the 

dynamics of the revolution.

ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

The first two parts contain the major analyses of the case study. 

Part I presents an analysis of social, economic, and political factors in 

the revolution, Part II, an analysis of the revolutionary movement. For 

the benefit of the reader, a brief Epilogue of events after independence 

is presented in Part III.

This Summary is for readers who must restrict their reading and is 

focused primarily on major analytic conclusions. For those readers who 

wish to study more deeply the aspects of the revolution, a Bibliography is provided which contains references to the source materials used 

in the preparation of this report. The Technical Appendix contains a 

description of the rationale and the study procedures used, reserving 

this Summary and the other parts of the study for substantive content 

and analysis.

SYNOPSIS

In 1830 a French military expedition began the limited occupation 

of the coastal zone of what today is Algeria proper. Sporadic, fierce 

resistance by the indigenous population and uncertainty over longterm objectives delayed French expansion; by 1837 only Bône, Oran, 
4

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

Mostaganem, Arzew, Bougie, and Constantine had fallen. In 1840 the 

policy of limited expansion was abandoned when it became apparent 

that the safety of these cities depended on the pacification of the interior. In 1857 all of Algeria was finally occupied; however, pacification 

was not achieved until 1881, and much of the unrest of this period 

resulted from the influx of settlers and the process of colonization. 

Friction between settlers and the indigenous population over land 

rights caused uprisings in 1871–1872 and in 1881. Nevertheless, by the 

beginning of the 20th century the settlers had acquired a large portion 

of Algeria’s most fertile land.

The indecisiveness of French policy also produced friction. Paris 

wavered between two alternatives: outright annexation, or the possibility of granting Algeria some degree of autonomy. The ordinances of 

1833 and 1834 proclaimed the occupied sections of Algeria an extension of France. This implied that French law, without major modifications, would be applied in Algeria. French citizenship, however, was 

not extended to the Arabs and Berbers of Algeria at this time;a

 they 

continued to be subject to special police and military regulations. In 

1871 a Governor General was appointed, but Paris maintained direct 

control over Algerian affairs until 1896. At this time the Governor General assumed major responsibility for administration, with the exception of education and justice. In 1898 a measure of self-determination 

was granted; Algerians were given a direct vote in the financial, fiscal, 

and economic affairs of the country through the establishment of the 

Délégations Financières. The indigenous population, nonetheless, benefited very little. Denunciation by some 500,000 French settlers, who by 

now had become the entrenched political, economic, and social elite, 

forced their national government to limit Muslim participation.

Indigenous political ferment began at the end of World War I. A 

small number of French-educated Muslims and former Muslim officers of the French Army demanded political equality. The disparity 

between the rights of a French citizen and those of a French subject 

became their focal issue. Returning Muslim soldiers and factory workers, on the other hand, focused their attention on economic disparity. 

This demand for political and economic equality influenced the development of three major movements within the Muslim community during the interwar period.

The first movement, the Fédération d’Élus Musulmans d’Algérie (Federation of the Elected Muslims of Algeria), was composed of Frencheducated intellectuals. It sought total assimilation with France and 

political equality within Algeria. It never developed mass support, but 

a The Crémieux Law of October 1870 granted French citizenship to all Algerian Jews.
Summary

5

such members as Ferhat Abbas and Dr. Ben Djelloul achieved widespread recognition and stature.

The second movement, the Etoile Norde Africaine (North African 

Star—ENA), under the leadership of Messali Ahmed Ben Hadj sought 

complete independence from the French while advocating Islamicproletarian economic and social reforms. It developed more of a popular base than was achieved by the Muslim intellectuals. Alongside the 

ENA there developed a religious organization, the Association of Ulema

(religious teachers). This third movement was made up of orthodox 

Muslims who were offended by French controls over their religion; this 

association had originally developed as an Islamic reform movement. 

It shared three points in common with the ENA: independence from 

France, opposition to French culture, and designation of Arabic as the 

official language.

Pressure from these movements met with resistance from the settlers. The acceptance of any program, or even part of any program, 

sponsored by any of the three movements would have upset the special 

status which the European community had come to enjoy. Response in 

Paris was divided. The conservatives and the business lobbies opposed 

any concession to the Muslim community, while the liberals and the 

Left supported Muslim demands for equality within the framework of 

the French Republic. With the advent of the Popular Front Government

of Léon Blum in 1936, a reform proposal (the Blum-Violette Plan) was 

introduced in the French National Assembly to extend French citizenship to some 25,000 Muslims. The resignation of all the French mayors 

of Algeria prevented this bill from even being debated.

Under the Vichy regime, which came to power after the fall of 

France in 1940, the Muslim community lost many of the small benefits which it had acquired over a period of years. The settlers were 

given a free hand. Muslim leaders were jailed, and all of the nationalist 

movements were banned and persecuted. After the Allied landings, in 

November 1942, attempts by the Free French to enlist the support of 

the Muslim community in the war were met by the Algerian Manifesto. 

In it, the nationalist leaders demanded self-determination and agrarian reforms (to solve the crisis in the rural areas where unemployment, 

underemployment, and food shortage were rampant) as a precondition to their full participation in the war. These demands were brushed 

aside with vague promises. In 1944 Ferhat Abbas organized the Amis 

de Manifeste Algérien (Friends of the Algerian Manifesto—AMA), to 

press for social reform within the French political framework, while 

the Parti du Peuple Algérien (Algerian People’s Party—PPA), the newly 

reconstituted ENA, advocated direct action in the countryside as the 

only way of achieving improvements. On May 8, 1945, “Liberation Day,” 
6

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

the settlers and the government bloodily put down what was thought 

to be a nationalist uprising in Sétif. The official figures listed the Muslim deaths below 4,000 while unofficial figures put that number over 

40,000. The suppression of this incipient uprising was to have a lasting 

effect on the younger Algerian nationalists.

In 1947 a small number of young militant members of the Mouvement Pour le Triomphe de Libertés Démocratiques (Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties—MTLD), organized in 1946 by Messali 

Hadj to replace the outlawed PPA, created within the structure a paramilitary organization called the Organization Speciale (Special Organization—OS). Disgusted by the lackadaisical attitude of the nationalist 

parties, including the MTLD, and their apparent inability to unite in 

effective opposition against France, especially after the passage of the 

Algerian Statute of 1947 and the rigged elections in Algeria of 1948; 

their aim was to prepare for a general revolution which would achieve 

these aims. The discovery of the OS by the authorities in March 1950 

split the MTLD and precipitated a crisis which paralyzed party activity. 

When it became apparent that the unity of the party and the nationalist movement could not be effected, nine former members of the OS 

created the Comité Révolutionnaire Pour L’Unité et L’Action (Revolutionary 

Committee For Unity and Action—CRUA), in July 1954, with the avowed 

purpose of launching a revolution. In the latter part of October 1954, 

the members of the CRUA met for the last time and set November 1 

as the date for the uprising. On the morning of that day they adopted 

a new name: Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front—

FLN). Then the revolution began.

During the night of October 31 and the early hours of November 1, 

1954, bomb explosions and attacks on French military and Gendarmerie 

posts were reported throughout Algeria, while the Voice of the Arabs

from Cairo announced that the Algerian war of independence had 

been launched by the FLN. In more than 71⁄2 years of bitter and bloody 

fighting, the FLN grew from a small band of 2,000 to 3,000 militant 

nationalists to a revolutionary force of about 130,000. The vast majority 

of the Algerian people who were uncommitted at the beginning eventually rallied to its cause, and opposing nationalist leaders also joined 

its ranks. It was able to create what the French claimed did not exist: a 

separate and distinct Algerian personality.

The Algerian Revolution was not without repercussions in France. At 

first dismayed by their inability to stem the course of the revolution, and 

then by the desire of the French governments of the Fourth Republic to 

seek negotiations with the rebels, the French Army in Algeria staged a 

virtual coup d’etat on May 13, 1958, which toppled the Fourth Republic 

and brought General Charles de Gaulle back to power. Convinced that 
Summary

7

a protracted conflict would turn the French Army into a political force 

and aware that the rebels had effectively demonstrated that an “Algérie 

Française” was nothing but an illusion, de Gaulle—after what seemed to 

be an initial hesitation—sought to end the war by negotiating with the 

FLN. Feeling betrayed again, the French Army elements attempted two 

abortive coups which gave rise to the formation of a dissident group, 

the Organisation de L’Armée Secrète (Secret Army Organization—OAS), 

dedicated to the maintenance of a French Algeria by fighting both the 

FLN and de Gaulle. On March 18, 1962, the government of President 

de Gaulle formally accepted the political fact that Algeria was indeed a 

separate personality, despite a favorable military stalemate, and recognized the right of the Algerian people to self-determination. On July 1, 

1962, after a national referendum, Algeria became an independent 

nation.

SELECTED ANALYTIC CONCLUSIONS

Given the surging tide of nationalism which has characterized 

the 20th century, one may ask whether the Algerian revolution and, 

indeed, Algerian independence were inevitable. Would the implementation of timely French economic, social, and political reforms have 

proved futile, or would they have succeeded in reversing the trend and 

keeping Algeria under French control. Algerian scholars are divided in 

their opinions on this question. Some hold that no amount of reform 

could have stemmed the tide; that Algerian nationalism did not arise 

from the inequities of the French regime but was nurtured by the ideological theories of the 20th century, especially self-determination, 

Pan-Arabism, and Pan-Islamism; and that the concessions which were 

granted to Tunisia and Morocco in 1954 and 1955 were bound to influence the Algerians to seek similar rectification of their grievances. On 

the other hand, implementation of reforms would have had a salutary 

effect. Charles-André Julien, a noted French authority on North Africa, 

believes that timely political reforms would have kept for France her 

North African territories, while Jacques Soustelle, an outspoken conservative, states emphatically that widespread economic reforms and 

improvements would have stifled the revolutionary impetus. The arguments which they present are logical and clear, but they are divided in 

the assessment of which aspects of their proposed reforms needed the 

most urgent consideration; and in a sense this has been the dilemma of 

most of the French governments. There is no way of resolving the question categorically, but an analysis of the social, economic, and political 

weaknesses of the French regime in Algeria, and the dynamics of the 

revolutionary movement may provide a partial answer.
8

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

Environmental Factors

The significance and the interplay of the environmental factors 

which contributed to the revolution can best be understood if analyzed 

from the point of view of the MTLD, the initial members of the CRUA–

FLN, and the principal actors of the revolution who subsequently came 

to form the leadership. In the planning and early stages of the revolution, these men all came from the Algerian lower class, and had in 

common similar educational backgrounds, social status, and aspirations. In the intermediary and latter stages of the revolution, the principal actors came to include intellectuals from the Algerian middle 

and upper classes. As a group, these actors shared one common goal: 

national independence. Ideologically, however, they represented a variety which ranged from extreme Left to extreme Right. They were able, 

nonetheless, to avoid fundamental division on issues and to compromise on points in question, with the understanding that these would be 

clearly formulated in the independence era.

Economic Maladjustment

Economic maladjustment is one of the factors on which the revolutionary actors could not wholly agree. The MTLD had made agrarian 

and socioeconomic reform one of its main objectives, but it was never 

clarified and remained a fuzzy concept and, as such, won the group 

only a nominal following in the rural areas. In fact, all that the MTLD 

advocated to alleviate the economic plight of the peasant was distribution of land, most likely land belonging to the settlers. The question of 

land reform remained unformulated in the FLN platform as well. There 

was among the FLN, however, a growing realization that an equitable 

redistribution of land would not materially increase the total agricultural productivity of the country, and indeed that it might even prove 

harmful. Toward the latter stages of the revolution, the FLN accepted 

the formula that distribution of land would not necessarily alleviate the 

problem, maintaining only that all large estates which remained uncultivated would be nationalized and distributed to the peasants.

Notwithstanding the above, there was consensus on one point: that 

the fruits of production fell largely into the hands of the settlers, and 

that more than 90 percent of the production was jointly controlled by 

settlers and Metropolitan French concerns. The fact that the economic 

development of Algeria was largely due to the settlers—and that in an 

overall sense it brought relative economic prosperity to Algeria—was 

disregarded by the nationalists. They were quick to point out that the 

economic development of Algeria had benefited only the settlers. The 

settlers received the majority of all profits, and the money was not reinvested in the country to further its economic growth. Participation 
Summary

9

by Muslim Algerians was limited to unskilled labor because no labor 

training centers had been created, and thus there was no opportunity 

to develop a skilled native working class. It was also pointed out that 

the tariff or customs agreement with France tended to stifle Algerian 

economic growth. Agricultural diversification and industrial developments were in most cases only undertaken when they did not compete 

with French agriculture and industry. What the nationalists wanted was, 

in fact, a chance to develop the Algerian economy in a manner which 

they judged to be the best suited for alleviating the economic problems 

of the country. It was by denying them this opportunity that France 

contributed to the development of revolutionary potential in Algeria.

France contributed heavily to the overall economic development 

of Algeria. Extensive road and railway networks were built, along with 

modern ports and airports. Short- and long-range loans were extended 

for land development, agricultural modernization, and industrial development. Most of these projects tended to benefit the settlers inasmuch 

as they controlled the means of production. There was, on the other 

hand, little effort to resolve the socioeconomic problems which the 

introduction of a modern economic system into an underdeveloped 

area tends to create. Modern hygiene gave rise to a tremendous population growth which, by 1939, had outstripped Algeria’s agricultural output; nor could full employment be achieved in the agricultural rural 

areas due to the archaic exploitation methods which were still in use 

at the time. The chance of a better life in the urban centers attracted 

an ever-increasing number of migrants from the countryside. But their 

hopes never materialized. Industries in the urban centers could absorb 

no more than 30,000 unskilled workers by 1954, and many of them 

could only provide seasonal employment because they were mainly 

concerned with food-processing. With no other outlets available, these 

immigrants became a discontented and restive subproletariat. From 

this subproletariat the FLN was able to draw its human resources, and 

there is much to be said for the contention that timely economic reform 

projects might well have deprived the nationalists of a potent weapon, 

be it propaganda or human.

Social Antagonism

Social antagonism in the form of race hatred was aimed at the settlers and the privileged status which they enjoyed, but had no antiFrench overtones. In the rural areas, the traditional society resented 

the sudden and forceful attempts of the French administration to 

introduce in the late 1940’s, after more than a century of negligence, a 

French culture which because of its secular and linguistic characteristics (the administration sought to eliminate the teaching of the Koran
10

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

and the Arabic language in the newly erected schools) was regarded by 

the population as anti-Muslim. Very much under the influence of the 

orthodox reformist Association of Ulema and their religious schools, 

the rural society, more often than not, refused to send their children to 

the new secular schools and viewed with a jaundiced eye the efforts of 

the administration to eliminate the Muslim religious schools.

In the urban areas, the native lower class, composed of unemployed 

and underemployed workers and their families, resented their inferior 

status—a status lower than that of the European lower class—and the 

efforts of the settlers to maintain an advantageous status quo. The transformation of resentment into racial hostility was due to a large extent 

to the political agitation of the indigenous political parties and movements, especially the ENA–PPA–MTLD, which more than the other 

native parties resembled the mass-type parties of Europe with its educational and indoctrination programs. In an effort to develop a dedicated following among the urban workers and to drive a wedge between 

the two major communities the MTLD, in city and village meetings and 

discussions, constantly highlighted the efforts of the settlers to keep 

the native Algerian in his inferior position. At the same time, the settlers contributed to the growing social tension by believing themselves 

to be and behaving as the superior race; they felt that they had been 

able to create what the natives had not been able to do in centuries—a 

modern Algeria. Settlers constantly referred to the Muslims as “coons” 

and “simpletons,” and counter attempts to educate them on the basis 

that the natives were simply incapable.

The position of the native intellectuals was frustrating. Mostly 

French-educated with strong pro-French leanings, this group, which 

developed in the 1930’s, found itself in a social vacuum in the postWorld War II era. Opposed by the settlers who refused to accept them 

as equals and leaders of the native element and threatened by the rise 

of a younger and more nationalistic class of intellectuals who considered their theories outmoded, these men, seeking to maintain their 

status and role joined the rebel side in 1955 and 1956, thus giving the 

revolutionaries an added aura.

Political Weaknesses

Perhaps the political imbalance that existed in Algeria contributed 

the most to the development of a revolutionary potential. The native 

movements of the interwar period were essentially protests. The Fédérations des Élus Musulmans d’Algérie sought political equality and integration with France; the ENA–PPA advocated basic socioeconomic reform 

as its primary objective, despite the fact that it sought some form of 

political autonomy; and the Association of Ulema demanded that it be 
Summary

11

allowed to implement religious reforms which would give the practice 

of Islam its orthodox purity. Conscious awareness of Algeria as a separate and distinct entity had not jelled, and the desire for nationhood 

remained an undefined concept except in the minds of a very few. Ferhat Abbas and the intellectuals of his group were in fact completely 

opposed to separation of any sort. This desire for integration within 

France transcended the World War II period, despite the actions of the 

Vichy regime.

Even after the incipient uprising of May 8, 1945, the local political 

parties agreed to confine their activities to legal methods, in the hope 

that the proposed forthcoming French political reforms would prove 

satisfactory. When the Algerian Statute of 1947—a document which 

disappointed most of the nationalists—was succeeded by the rigged 

elections of 1948, the younger nationalists began to question the wisdom of adopting legal methods in their search for reform. It became 

increasingly evident to them that the French governments, buffeted by 

the French Right and pressured by the settlers, would never be able to 

implement reforms, be they economic, social, or political. And yet a 

large segment of the nationalists continued, through legal methods, to 

seek some political formula, which in most instances envisaged autonomy within the framework of the French Republic. The revolution was 

launched by a small number and it failed to get widespread support 

in its first 15 months. In the last instance, it appears that the FLN was 

able to enlist the support of all the native nationalist factions when the 

French governments refused to make political concessions, and instead 

emphasized economic reforms. Evidence indicates that if the French 

Government had, during the very early stages of the revolt, made drastic political concessions—the FLN having advocated autonomy as a 

first step—the revolution might never have taken a violent course.

Revolutionary Dynamics

Actors and Organization

The desire for direct action on the part of the nine members of 

the CRUA and their small following reflected the impatience of the 

younger nationalist militants with the general course of the nationalist movement as a whole. The movement in the early 1950’s had been 

paralyzed by two major factors: the decision to adopt legal devices as 

the best means of achieving reforms, and the inability of the various 

factions within the nationalist movement to agree on some unity of 

purpose and action. By launching their revolution these men hoped 

to force unity on the nationalists by presenting them with a fait accompli. The revolution was intended to bring the nationalist movement out 
12

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

of its lethargy; with the outbreak of hostilities the nationalists could 

either join or support France. To facilitate unity, the FLN adopted an 

open-house policy, and its platform was moderated to appeal to all factions. Yet this policy did not imply that political parties could, as such, 

associate themselves with the revolutionaries while maintaining their 

separate entities. The leadership of the FLN intended the movement 

to represent a departure from previous nationalist movements; unity 

could only be achieved and maintained if other parties disbanded and 

urged their members to join the FLN as free individuals.

The changing of the infrastructure of the FLN in 1956, and the 

constant expansion in the leadership of the movement, was undertaken 

in response to the influx of new members. The organization of the 

MTLD which the FLN had adopted as its own in the early stages of the 

revolution proved to be narrow and inflexible. It created problems in 

communication and could not accommodate the new members that 

joined, especially the nationalist leaders, in accordance with the openhouse policy. The changes undertaken at the Soummam Valley Congress allowed the FLN to overcome its communication problems, and 

maintained the unity of the movement by giving all known nationalist 

leaders prominent leadership positions.

Techniques

Although the revolution was hastily organized, its leadership 

included veterans of many European campaigns and of the FrancoVietminh war in Indochina who had gained experience in conventional 

and unconventional warfare. The FLN thus demonstrated from the very 

first its understanding of the military requirements. They launched a 

two-pronged war against the French administration in Algeria: guerrilla warfare in the rural areas and terrorism in the urban centers.

With very little support and practically no modern weapons, the 

guerrilla units withdrew to the inaccessible mountain ranges of Algeria. In this area they recruited the population to their support, and 

engaged small French patrols in the hope of capturing their arms. 

At the same time they began to organize their supply lines and established two safe bases of operations in Tunisia and Morocco after these 

two countries had achieved their independence. By 1957 the guerrilla 

units had succeeded in clearing the Aures and Kabyle Mountains and 

had developed their strength to the point where they could engage the 

French forces on the battalion level.

That they developed into a strong revolutionary movement was 

due in part to inadequacy of the initial French military reaction. The 

French Command refused to recognize the revolution for what it was, 

considering it another manifestation of tribal warfare. Accordingly, 
Summary

13

classical large-scale operations—bombing, strafing, and mopup operations—were launched against areas in which rebel activity had been 

reported, but yielded practically no positive results. Lack of discrimination between passive civilians and rebels alienated the population and 

forced them into the rebel camp. By the end of 1957 the French Army, 

recognizing the magnitude of the revolution, developed counterinsurgency tactics which stemmed the growth of the revolution. Nevertheless, all that was achieved from 1958 to the cease-fire in 1962 was a 

military stalemate. The inability of the French Army in Algeria to win 

over the population during this stalemate, despite its civic action programs and its attempted coups d’etat, convinced de Gaulle that Algeria 

was not and could not be a part of France, and that continued fighting 

in Algeria would be detrimental to the national cohesion of France.b

Terrorism and the counterterror which it generated served the purposes of the FLN admirably. These tactics made cooperation between 

the European and Muslim communities impossible, silenced most of 

the Muslim opposition to the FLN, and committed a large segment 

of Muslim population to support of the FLN as a result of the indiscriminate methods which the French authorities used in their counterterrorism campaign. The FLN, in a sense, was able to achieve its main 

objectives not solely by military means but by effectively enlisting the 

support of the people, on whom France had based its thesis that Algeria was French.

Summary to Selected Analytic Conclusions

Charles-André Julien has attributed the loss of Tunisia and Morocco 

to the French politics of “lost opportunities.” This theory applies to 

Algeria as well. Basically, two major factors contributed to the revolution: the economic plight of the masses, and the political frustration 

of the intellectual elite. In the interwar period these two factors were 

transformed into political movements which sought solution to their 

problems independently of each other, but within the framework of 

the French political parties and the French political system. The ENA–

PPA, which came to represent the Algerian proletariat, first developed 

as an adjunct of the French Communist Party, and sought economic 

reform through the French parties of the Left. The Fédérations des Élus 

Musulmans d’Algérie, and subsequently Ferhat Abbas’ Young Algeria, 

b As result of the attempted coups d’etat by elements of the French Army in Algeria, 

de Gaulle feared the immersion of the entire French Army in national politics. In late 

1960 he suspended the application of assimilationist policies and concomitant civic action 

programs. That makes it difficult to pass final judgment on the effectiveness of the French 

Army civic action program.
14

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

associated themselves with the French liberals in their search for political equality. Frustrated by their unrewarding association with the 

French political parties, these representative movements began to fuse 

in the post-World War II era. The launching of the revolution proved to 

be the necessary catalyst. United, the FLN could rely on the masses for 

its human resources and on the intellectuals for leadership.

It would be unfair to state that the French governments made no 

attempt to alleviate the grievances of the masses and the intellectuals. Certainly, the Blum-Violette proposal and the Algerian Statute 

are indicative of the cognizance of these governments and their good 

intentions. The fact that the many reform proposals were never or only 

partially implemented should be blamed on the French political system. France, until the Fifth Republic, was almost always equally divided 

between Left and Right, but its governments were always of the Center. 

Having to rely on either the Left or the Right for parliamentary support, these governments were obligated to compromise on all sensitive 

issues, of which Algeria was one. The French Right, in general, represented the settler viewpoint. The Left, divided between radical, Socialist, and Communist, could not present a solid front to counteract the 

Right. As a result, most of the legislation dealing with Algeria tended to 

favor the Right and the settlers.

It would also be a mistake to credit Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism 

with being the major causes of the revolution, although once the revolution was launched, they provided the FLN with an important ideological weapon. More than anything else, it was the “immobilisme” of France’s 

Algerian policies—brought about by the void between France and the 

realities of Algeria which created a gap between the needs of the Muslim masses and the expectation that these needs would be met—that 

precipitated the revolution. The rise of Nasserism in the Arab World, 

the nationalist struggle in Tunisia and Morocco, the French debacle in 

Indochina, and the independence of numerous former colonial possessions also contributed to the revolutionary process.
PART I—FACTORS INDUCING 

REVOLUTION

Factors Inducing Revolution

17

ECONOMIC MALADJUSTMENT

Foreign Control of Economy

In 1954, after more than a century of French control, Algeria had 

50,000 miles of roads, of which 27,000 were considered first-class routes, 

and 3,000 miles of railroad tracks. More than 30 airports handled the 

international and domestic air traffic, while 6 modern ports channeled 

most of Algeria’s shipping, which in 1960 amounted to 221⁄2 million 

tons. Iron, phosphates, lead, zinc, antimony, copper, and other mineral 

deposits were being exploited. Locally extracted coal and oil partially 

supplied the country’s 35 power stations, and the 800 million kilowatt 

hours of electricity which they generated helped power a burgeoning 

light industry which employed more than 30,000 workers. Despite these 

achievements, however, Algeria remained predominantly an agricultural country. The agricultural output, which accounted in exports for 

over one-third of the national income and used 72 percent of the labor 

force, could support only two-thirds of the population. Unemployment and underemployment were at a high level, and this problem was 

aggravated by an extremely high rate of population growth—250,000 

yearly. The Muslim standard of living was much lower than that of the 

European community, which controlled 90 percent of the industry and 

commerce and owned 40 percent of the most fertile and amble land. 

To the Algerian nationalists, this foreign control of the economy was 

one of the most distasteful aspects of the situation. “What interests the 

Algerian nationalist leaders in our time is . . . the fact that the fruits of 

production fell into European hands in large proportion.”1

Review of France’s Land Appropriation and Resettlement Policies 

Since 1830

After the initial French landings in Algeria on June 14, 1830, Minister of War Gerard explained the proposed limited conquest as follows:

It was based on the most important imperatives, those 

most intimately connected with the maintenance of 

public order in France, and even in Europe: the opening of a vast outlet for the excess of our population 

and the marketing of our manufactured products, in 

exchange for other products foreign to our soil and 

climate.2

Despite the “most important imperatives,” however, the French 

Government had undertaken this conquest without devising a colonization plan for the country. The decade 1830–1840 was a period of free 

colonization. The captured coastal cities of Bône, Oran, Mostaganem, 
18

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

Arzew, Bougie, Constantine, and their environs attracted a hoard of 

mercenaries and land speculators. “French soldiers settled with government encouragement; wealthy investors bought estates; Spanish peasants migrated to Western Algeria; and Italian, Maltese, and Corsican 

peasants and fishermen found their way to Eastern Algeria.”3 By 1839 

Algeria had 25,000 European settlers, of which only 11,000 were of 

French origin.

In 1840 limited occupation was abandoned in favor of total conquest. This marked the beginning of a period of “official,” or government-sponsored, colonization. The French Government believed that 

official assistance would encourage the development of small French 

peasant settlements, and hoped that with the presence of a large number of French settlers the Gallic civilization would spread more easily, 

and that Algeria would soon become genuinely and thoroughly French. 

Free land was made available to individuals by the arbitrary confiscation of indigenous holdings. In 1840 certain Algerian tribes were 

placed on restricted reservations (cantonments) and their remaining 

land was appropriated. All lands belonging to Algerians who had taken 

arms against France were confiscated on November 1 of that year. In 

1843 the lands of the Dey and the habous (church lands)a

 were also 

confiscated. All nondeveloped properties for which no justifiable titles 

were held prior to July 1, 1830, were proclaimed to be government land 

in 1844 and 1846. In 1872, as a result of a Kabyle uprising, 1,120,000 

acres of land were further sequestrated and assigned for colonization.

By 1874 it had become apparent that the attempt to populate Algeria with Frenchmen had failed: out of a total of 109,400 Europeans only 

47,274 were French. In that year large land concessions were made to 

private investment companies,b

 in the hope that they would be able to 

stimulate immigration by establishing settlements on their holdings. 

This effort by the government was no more successful than previous 

attempts, but the overall effect of the policy of confiscation was to press 

back the Algerians from the fertile coastal zone into the less fertile 

mountainous hinterlands.5

The government of Napoleon III attempted in 1863 to safeguard 

the interests of the indigenous population by applying French property 

concepts to land still held by the natives. An imperial decree proclaimed 

a “The habous were lands or other donations made in perpetuity to the Muslim cult. 

The incomes derived therefrom supported the mosques, Muslim officials, and other religious activities, thus permitting the Independence of Islam.”4

b Thus the Compagnie Genevoise received close to 50,000 acres of land in the Sétif area 

on condition that it install 500 settlers on its estates. The Société de l’Habra et de la Macta

obtained over 50,000 acres of land to build a dam on the Sig River, and the Société Générale 

Algérienne (later Compagnie Algérienne) was awarded 247,000 acres in return for giving the 

state credit.
Factors Inducing Revolution

19

the tribes to be the inalienable owners of their lands, and at the same 

time, “recognized and established both individual property rights.” 

Communally held lands (arch) could no longer be bought by settlers 

until they became private property. However, the salutary effects of the 

decree were negated in the surveying operations to delimit ownership 

and distinguish between public domain and tribal lands. Some of the 

boundaries drawn were made to cut across tribal lands and divested 

the indigenes of some of their remaining property.6

Ten years later the French Government again attempted to introduce 

French property concepts. Communal tribal lands were made available 

for sale. But once sold, these lands “remained thereafter under French 

land codes and could not return to a previous status under Muslim 

property law oven if bought by a Muslim.”7

 This measure proved to be a 

total failure. The indigenes were again victimized by land speculators:

In one notorious transaction of 1885, a settler bought 

for twenty francs a small share of a 700-acre parcel of 

land belonging jointly to 513 Arabs; he divided the 

whole parcel into shares for each holder, charging for 

his troubles 11,000 francs; when that fee could not be 

met, he acquired in payment the whole 700 acres.8

The “differences between French and Muslim property ownership 

laws,” which were exploited by land speculators, resulted in Muslim 

discontent.9

Economic Relations with France: Nondevelopment of a Viable Economy

Algeria, prior to the French occupation, was an undeveloped but 

an agriculturally self-sufficient area. Exploitation of land and resources 

was archaic, but it was adequate to feed and clothe the indigenous population.c

 Internal and external trade was active. French colonization, 

however, through the process of modernization disrupted this traditional economic system, and replaced it with one that benefited the 

settler without correspondingly improving the lot of the indigene.

During the first 30 years of French rule the Algerian economy was 

made to form a direct part of the French economic system. Tariffs, in 

particular, were determined by France. In the 1860’s the adoption of 

free-trade policies by the French Government led to a relaxation of 

economic attachment, and in 1866 the Algerian Council General was 

permitted to impose tariffs of its own. In the 1880’s, however, free trade 

was abandoned. France was becoming industrialized, and the need for 

industrial outlets assumed even greater importance. A regime of tariff 

c In 1830 the total population of Algeria was only about 2,000,000.
20

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

assimilation was introduced in Algeria whereby added taxation was 

imposed without reciprocal and corresponding benefits. Non-French 

goods entering Algeria were thus subjected to French duties without 

any attempt being made to facilitate or increase Algerian exports. As 

a result, trade with other countries declined, and Algeria became the 

safety valve of French industry. In 1905 the policy of tariff assimilation 

was abandoned after settler agitation forced the government to grant 

certain economic concessions especially as far as manufactures, tariffs, and foreign investments were concerned. Association rather than 

assimilation became the temporary aim of some of the reform-minded 

governments. But since association implied some measure of autonomy 

along the lines of British colonial policy—a policy which ran contrary to 

French colonial tradition—it was never seriously implemented. Assimilation remained the basic theme, and the lack of an independent tariff 

system stifled the development of industry.

The economic concessions granted to Algeria were in keeping with 

the policy of assimilation. French commercial and financial interests 

allied themselves with settler interests to shape the Algerian economy 

to their mutual profit. Concentration on cereal and wine production 

allowed the settlers to exact subsidies from the French Government. At 

the same time, French interests prevented the development of sugar 

and cotton production in order to guarantee the Algerian markets for 

French textiles and sugar.

Algeria is kept as a preserve of metropolitan France 

by means of a customs union, which benefits chiefly 

big exporters among the settlers and big capitalists 

among the importers, and of a “monopoly of the flag” 

whereby almost the entire maritime traffic is reserved 

to big French and Algerian companies.10

Attempts by the French administration, after World War II, to create a more viable economyd were largely undermined by the continued 

application of a regime of tariff assimilation, and by settler opposition. This customs union prompted “French competitors to resist any 

change,”11 and any change in the bases of the Algerian economy, which 

tended to lower the standard of living of the settlers, prompted these 

settlers to actively seek to maintain the status quo.

d Between 1940 and 1957 two 4-year plans were initiated to modernize the agricultural system, increase grain production, and develop industrialization through long-range 

credits and tax exemption; in 1956 land-reform programs were initiated to encourage the 

development of small Muslim farms.
Factors Inducing Revolution

21

Failure to Integrate Algerians into the Modern Economic System

At the outbreak of the revolution two contrasting economies existed 

in Algeria. On the one hand, the large and rapidly increasing Muslim population, poor and undernourished, derived a scant living from 

subsistence-type farming and nomadic sheepherding. On the other 

hand, a small European community—numbering about one-tenth of 

the population—had succeeded in developing modern farms, small 

industries, commerce, and finance to the point where a few of them 

had been able to accumulate huge fortunes, and the remainder were 

able to maintain a standard of living considerably higher than that of 

the Muslim population.

The plight of the indigenous population was largely the result of 

the failure of the French administration to integrate the Muslims into 

the modern economic system which was introduced into Algeria by 

the settlers. Deprived of some 5 million acres of the most fertile land,e

unable to rely on the old communal tribal lands,f and plagued by a 

galloping population growth, the position of the Muslim peasant did 

not improve proportionately to that of the French settler. In almost all 

instances the Muslim peasant worked a plot of land too small and too 

poor to suffice his needs and those of this family, used archaic agricultural equipment and techniques, and continued to rely “on the bounty 

of nature to determine whether he shall eat or starve.”12

Not until after World War II did the French administration attempt 

to correct the economic situation in Algeria. Programs of irrigation, 

drainage, and soil conservation13 were initiated, and special fiscal policies were adopted to give impetus to industrial development. However, 

the agricultural programs were aimed at increased productivity and 

were not accompanied by sweeping land reform, while industry—most 

of which was related to food processing—absorbed only a small part 

of the surplus labor and failed to produce skilled labor. As a result, 

increased productivity and employment were easily offset by the 

e In many instances the land acquired by the settler was not per se fertile, but was 

made so through the constant application of modern European agricultural methods.

f Prior to the French occupation four types of landed property existed in Algeria: 

state lands, church lands, tribal lands, and private holdings. The tribal lands, which 

accounted for the greatest acreage, were in themselves large enough to sustain a whole 

tribe. The French appropriated most of these lands by declaring them vacant and ownerless and broke up the remainder into small lots in which the future use of modern 

agricultural machinery proved to be economically unprofitable to the owner and the 

state. Muslim inheritance law, which provides for the equal division of property among 

male heirs, further reduced the size of these holdings. French policy, on the other hand, 

encouraged the growth of large holdings among the European settlers. In the early years 

of the French occupation, plots of about 20 acres were made available to settlers. After 

1870 big French companies and societies were awarded vast holdings and were encouraged 

to buy out the smaller holdings and regroup them into large estates.
22

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

tremendous population growth, and the problem of unemployment 

and underemployment remained.

Summary

In the 1950’s European settlers in Algeria controlled 90 percent of 

industry and commerce, and owned 40 percent of the most arable Algerian land. French control of the Algerian tariff system along with land 

confiscations in the 19th century stifled the development of Algerian 

industry, and drove the Algerians from the fertile coastal lands to the 

mountainous hinterlands. Over a period of 130 years in Algeria a European community developed; 10 percent of the population accumulated 

and controlled most of the wealth, while a growing community of Muslims lived at a subsistence level.

Concentration of Land and Landless Peasants

Discrepancy Between Settler and Algerian Land Tenure

Algeria has 32 million acres of arable land, of which only 171⁄2 million can be cultivated by modern methods due to irrigation problems. 

Five to seven million acres of the most fertile land belonged to the 

European settlers. In 1944 there were 26,000 European landowners. 

By 1951 this number had dropped to 21,650 and in 1957 it amounted 

to only 19,400.g

 With their families, these 19,400 landowners formed a 

population of about 80,000 people.h More than 1 million Muslim families—about 7 million people—lived on the remaining 10 million acres. 

Of these 1 million families, only 600,000 owned land, and the remainder constituted a population of about 3 million landless peasants, “an 

agricultural proletariat who have work only for a few days every year.”14

With the exception of some 7,400 European settlers who owned less 

than 25 acres, the average holding of the European settler amounted 

to about 250 acres, and 8 percent of the total land owned by the settlers belonged to French companies with holdings of 15,000 acres and 

above. On the other hand, 70 percent of the Muslim holdings averaged 

10 to 15 acres,i and only a small number owned large European-type 

estates. The position of the Muslim farmer was further aggravated by 

the generally poor quality of the land he worked, as indicated by the 

g Although the number of landowners decreased, there was no corresponding 

decrease in land tenure.

h The average European family is composed of four persons and the average Muslim 

family of six.

i The minimum of nonirrigated land in Algeria on which a family can subsist is 

60 acres.15
Factors Inducing Revolution

23

fact that the average yield per acre of Muslim land was one quarter that 

of an acre of European-owned land.16

French Agrarian Reform Policies Since 1944

The French Government turned to agrarian reform in 1937, after 

it became evident that Algeria could not produce enough food for its 

people. The years from 1937 to 1940 were spent in the study of agricultural problems, but World War II interrupted even that effort. After 

the war agrarian reform was tackled once again. A Reforms Commission, set up by Governor General Yves Châtaigneau, concluded that it 

was impossible to assure minimum existence and work for all Algerians 

without reorganizing the agricultural system. Three main recommendations were submitted: (1) development of new lands, (2) reclamation 

of land through irrigation and soil restoration, and (3) improvement 

of agricultural techniques and the yield of the small Muslim peasant. 

Of these three recommendations, only the third became the focus of 

greater attention. To resettle 600,000 Muslim families on lots of 25 

acres would have necessitated the acquisition and development of some 

15 million acres of land, and France, at that time, was unable to assume 

the financial costs which such a project would involve. One hundred 

and three Sectors of Rural Amelioration (SAR) were created to provide 

the small Muslim farmer with short-term loans with which to purchase 

seed and seedlings, medium-term loans for livestock and equipment, 

and long-term loans for land improvement, and to supervise the implementation of better agricultural techniques. From 1946 to 1956 greater 

emphasis was placed on modernization of techniques and equipment. 

Programs of irrigation, drainage, and soil conservation were initiated, 

and new heavy agricultural equipment was introduced. These projects 

met with only partial success and failed to halt the downward trend in 

the position of the Muslim farmer. The SAR, operating on a limited 

budget (21⁄2 percent of the total capital investment for Algeria) affected 

only about 75,000 to 80,000 Muslim families, or less than 10 percent of 

the total number. Furthermore, the financial aid and the modernizing 

projects which were initiated tended generally to benefit the traditional 

peasantry—those already established on land—and failed to reach the 

others, while the introduction of agricultural equipment reduced the 

number of employed agricultural laborers. These projects brought 

about an increase in agricultural production, but the per capita production of the Muslim farmer decreased due to population growth.17

In 1956 the French administration turned to the problem of land 

reform proper. Decrees were issued to limit irrigated holdings to 

125  acres, irrigate 75,000 acres of land, appropriate estates of more 

than 2,500 acres that had been abandoned or left uncultivated, redeem 
24

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

155,000 acres of the Compagnie Algérienne lands and 37,500 acres of the 

Compagnie Genevoise, and distribute 650,000 acres of state land and 

common land. The main object of these decrees was to resettle as large 

a number of landless peasants as possible on productive small farms 

of about 20 to 25 acres. Yet, by early 1958 only 100,000 acres had been 

redeemed and only 5,000 Muslim families resettled.18

Summary

Approximately 3 million Algerian peasants and agricultural laborers 

who were seldom employed were landless in the 1950’s. The best arable 

lands were in the hands of European settlers. Reforms to improve the lot 

of the Muslims were studied by the French in the late thirties, and some 

were instituted after World War II. By 1957 these reforms had included 

the establishment of irrigation projects, the extension of rural credit, 

the introduction of improved agricultural methods, and the institution 

of resettlement programs. The reforms were only partially successful 

however, and failed to halt the downward trend of Muslim farming. 

The problem was aggravated by the growing Muslim population.

Absence of a Diversified Economy

Two-Crop Agricultural Economy Geared for Export

The production of cereals and the cultivation of wine grapes 

accounted for the greatest part of Algeria’s agricultural revenue and 

constituted about one third of its gross national product. Secondary 

crops—citrus fruits, cork, cotton, alfalfa, and vegetables—though 

important, represented a small, almost insignificant percentage of the 

total exports and gross national product of the country.

Cereals constituted the main staple food as well as one of the country’s important export items. Wine production accounted for 30 percent of Algeria’s total agricultural revenue and over 40 percent of the 

country’s agricultural exports.19 About 9 million acres—80 percent 

of the cultivated land—were planted annually with hard wheat, soft 

wheat, barley, oats, and maize, and one million acres were planted with 

vineyards. Hard wheat, and barley, which grow on marginal land, were 

the Algerian crops. Very little of these was exported, since the total 

production could not even suffice the needs of the native population. 

Wine grapes were not cultivated by the indigenes because of the poor 

quality of their land, and because Islam prohibits the consumption of 

alcohol. However, soft wheat, oats, and wine, which were introduced by 

the settlers and which require the fertility of the European farms, were 

exported in large quantities to France.
Factors Inducing Revolution

25

In a colonial economy such as Algeria’s, the production of cereals 

and wine for export purposes would not have tended to be profitable, 

were it not for the subsidies which the settlers received from the French 

Government in the form of direct compensation or the above-worldmarket prices which France paid for Algerian grain and wine.j

 The 

price of Algerian grain in French markets depended on the market 

conditions in France (France generally has no export surplus of grain) 

rather than on the volume of production in Algeria. Although the price 

of Algerian grain was generally 10 to 20 percent below the price of 

French grain, the European settler was able to derive a profit because 

of the above-world-market prices and the compensation received from 

the French Government.

Algerian wine, because of its poor quality, did not rival that of 

France, but equaled that of Greece, Spain, or Portugal. Yet France purchased the Algerian wine at prices 45 percent higher than the price it 

would have paid for similar wines from the above-mentioned countries. 

This arrangement tended, of course, to encourage the continued production of wine.

The trade arrangement between the two countries was not without 

benefit to France, of course. Non-French goods imported into Algeria 

were subjected to prohibitive tariffs, quotas, and licenses; this allowed 

France to sell Algeria French textiles, mechanical and electrical products, and certain foodstuffs at prices above average world prices. However, the fact remains that the European settlers and certain French 

industrialists, rather than the French Government, benefited most 

from these tariff and trade arrangements.k

Two-Crop Economy as a Hindrance to Diversification

The tariff and trade arrangements have been detrimental to local 

industrial expansion.l

 The continued free entry of French commodities into Algeria, tended to favor French industrial competition and 

restricted the growth of local industry. It was observed that, in 1956, 

some industries which had thrived in the immediate postwar period 

were forced to close down as a result of increased French competition 

j The French Government subsidized its farmers and certain industries by fixing the 

price of French grain above that of the world market and protected them against world 

competition by tariff restrictions.

k Algerian nationalists used these tariff and trade arrangements as a basis on which 

to accuse France of exploiting Algeria. This position is not totally justified. Although the 

balance of trade generally favored France, it was France that covered the Algerian trade 

deficit with budgetary allocations.

l Industrialization of Algeria has been restricted, too, by the physical makeup of the 

country, the absence of cheap energy, the distribution and insufficiency of certain basic 

materials, inadequate transportation facilities, and the absence of skilled native labor.20
26

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

in the 1950’s. Others were vulnerable to French penetration since they 

existed only on the sufferance of metropolitan industry.21

The French Government had, since the end of World War II, 

attempted to correct this condition,m but Algerian Gros Colons (large 

landowners and big businessmen) and certain powerful French industries (sugar beet and textiles) to whom these tariff and trade arrangements were beneficial, prevented their repeal or modification. Private 

capital, as a result, was found to be more profitable when invested in 

France; thus, expansion in the cultivation of Algerian sugar beet and cotton, which would have opened new occupational outlets for the unemployed and led to the development of new industries, was frustrated.

Summary

Algeria derived its revenue primarily from the production of cereals and wines, which constituted the country’s major items for export. 

Although the production of these items would not have been economically feasible, the French Government subsidized them and offered the 

European settlers who were producing them higher than world market 

prices. Furthermore, France imposed tariff and trade restrictions on 

Algeria’s imports and exports that not only favored the European settler and the French industrialist, but also hindered industrialization 

and diversification in Algeria.

Unemployment and Underemployment

Underemployment in Rural Areas

The problem of underemployment existed mainly in the rural 

areas and those affected were Muslim agriculturists. Unable to sustain 

their families on the meager yields of their small farms, the majority 

sought extra work on European farms. Most failed to find additional 

employment because at the seasons when they might have found it they 

needed to work their own land. Their problem was further complicated 

by the fact that they were unskilled in modern farm techniques. In 

1955 the number of underemployed was estimated at close to 1 million 

(one-third of the agricultural work force). This number has undoubtedly increased since, due to the population growth and the dislocation 

which the revolution has brought about.

m France awakened to the military and political importance of North Africa, to which 

the bulk of her armed forces withdrew, after her defeat in 1940. Postwar military and 

political needs, along with economic and social considerations, motivated the desire to 

industrialize Algeria. Serious efforts at industrialization, however, did not come until after 

the outbreak of revolution.22
Factors Inducing Revolution

27

Unemployment in Urban Areas

In the urban areas the vast majority of the unemployed were also 

Muslim Algerians. In 1955 French estimates placed the number of 

unemployed at over 100,000 out of a grand total of 450,000.n This number has increased constantly because the labor market could not absorb 

the increase of surplus workers. The situation was made worse by the 

fact that 90 out of 100 able bodied men were unskilled laborers.23

Mass Emigration to France: France’s Impact on Algerian Workers

The emigration of Algerian Muslim workers to France began during World War I, in response to the manpower needs in French mining and other industries. This practice was not stopped at the end of 

the war because few of the immigrant workers showed any desire to 

settle in France permanently, and because it provided French industry with cheap labor, while alleviating the growing unemployment 

problem in Algeria. Attracted by the higher wages paid to workers in 

France, and the metropolitan family allowance system, more people 

emigrated, until in 1954 it was estimated that the number had reached 

150,000. During the revolution, emigration reached a peak of 400,000 

workers.o It was encouraged by the French Government partly to relieve 

the pressing unemployment created by the virtual cessation of work in 

Algeria, but principally to prevent the unemployed masses from joining 

the ranks of the revolution.

Emigration to France had a marked impact, on Algerian Muslim 

workers. The higher wages and better labor conditions made them more 

conscious of the economic inequalities in Algeria. Most of the early 

arrivals joined, or came under the influence of, the French Communist 

and other leftist parties. Late in the 1920’s a number of them withdrew 

from these parties to form, in France, an Algerian labor political movement. In the 1930’s nationalist agitation in Algeria coincided with the 

establishment of this movement which had been created in France.p

Summary

Unemployed and underemployed Muslims in 1955 comprised 

approximately one third of the agricultural work force and close to 

one fifth of the urban labor force. Muslim emigration to France, where 

n This figure should actually be much higher. French authorities considered as 

employed all persons who worked for a period of 90 days. Also, this figure does not take 

into account the number of women (960,000) that were also unemployed.

o During that time, it was reported, some 2 million people in Algeria depended upon 

the remittances and allowances of these workers.

p See section on Political Imbalance, below.
28

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

employment and comparatively high wages were to be found, was 

encouraged by the French, especially during the revolutionary period, 

when the French authorities were attempting to prevent the unemployed from joining the ranks of the revolutionaries.

SOCIAL ANTAGONISM

Tension Within the Social Structure

The Relationship of Wealth to Ownership and Social Mobility Among 

Settlers and Algerians—Its Effects on Both Communities

Although Algeria became legally and administratively a part of 

France, her social structure continued to reflect the stereotype divisions 

and lack of cohesion of a colonial society. The Algerians of European 

origin stood apart from, and well above, the indigenous Algerian society.

At the outbreak of the revolution the existence of two separate 

economies was paralleled by the existence of two distinct civilizations. 

About 1 million Algerians of European ancestry, French in cultural 

outlook and enjoying a French standard of living, had come to dominate the social, economic, and political life of the country. In fact, the 

upper and middle classes of Algeria had become predominantly European in composition. Approximately 15,000 Gros Colons,

q

 high administrators, and civil servants constituted the effective social, economic, 

and political elite, while more than 700,000 clerks, teachers, shopkeepers, and skilled laborers formed the middle class. Only about 7,500 

Europeans, mainly unskilled agricultural laborers, could be classified 

as lower class. The Algerian indigenous society, on the other hand, 

numbering about 9 million, could be classified as lower class, with the 

exception of a small number of wealthy landowners and a somewhat 

larger middle class.

The 50,000 wealthy Muslims, referred to sometimes as Beni Oui Ouis

(yes men), had practically no influence. They were completely servile 

to the dicta of the French administration, and were not fully accepted 

in either Gros Colon or Muslim circles. The traditional Muslim middle 

q The Gros Colons included such a man as Henri Bourgeaud, Senator from Algiers, 

“king” of wine, owner of the newspaper Dépéche Quotidienne, of the Domaine de la Trappe

(1,056,720 gallons of wine per year), and of the apéritif el Borjo, administrator of the Société 

Anoyme du Chapeau de Gendarme, Compagnie Generale Nord Africaine, Union Fonciée Nord 

Africaine, Domaine de Beni, Nord-Africaine Commercial (agricultural), Compagnie Ceres, Establishments Jules Vinson, Peugeot Latil, Usines Nord-Africaines de Casablanca, Mouline de Chetir, 

Distillerie d’Algiers, Liéges et Produits Nord-Africaines, Chantiers Warot (lumber), Cargos Algériens, Societe Lucien Borgeaud et Cie (textiles), Nord-Africaine de Ciments Lafrage, Manufacture de 

Tabacs Bastos, Indochinoise de Tabacs, Credit Foncier d’Algerie et du Tunisia, and Compagnie de 

Phosphates de Constantine.
Factors Inducing Revolution

29

class, eliminated during the 19th century, was in the process of reconstituting itself. Yet, its average income placed it a level lower than that 

of the European middle class; hence it was in fact a lower-middle class.r

Social mobility in these trio civilizations differed radically. Among 

the Europeans, the class structure was rigidly defined. Wealth was the 

determining factor; and unless a person substantially improved his 

financial status, mobility was virtually nonexistent. Thus there existed 

a definite distinction between Gros Colons and Pieds Noirs (large landowners and average middle-class men). Social rigidity among the Europeans did not cause social tensions because the upper class had been 

elected and accepted as the leaders of the European community. In 

the ever increasing hostility of the Algerian environment, the Europeans were united in their efforts to maintain their overall advantageous 

social status.

In the Muslim society, education and profession, rather than wealth, 

were the factors which determined the social structure. Although the 

wealthy generally found it easier to acquire a higher education, a number of Muslim leaders have risen from the lower classes. The social 

tension that existed in the Muslim community was generated by racial 

considerations. The Berber population, although Muslim in religion, 

had resisted the efforts of the majority to Arabize them. The Algerian 

revolution appears to have unified, for the time being, the Berbers and 

the Arabs.

Social tension in Algeria was due mainly to friction generated by 

the interaction of the two major communities: the Muslim who was 

determinedly seeking to improve his lowly status, and the European 

who was insensitive to the welfare of the Muslim inhabitant.

The Feeling of Racial Superiority Among the Settlers, and Their Fears of 

Being Inundated by the Muslim Masses: the Impact on the Algerians

Two main factors prevented the cohesive integration of the two 

major Algerian communities: (1) the racial superiority complex of the 

European settler and his contempt for the Muslim,s

 and (2) settler fear 

of the future revenge of the Muslim. In 1892 the French Prime Minister, Jules Ferry, described the settler in the following terms:

r The average income of the European middle class in 1951 was $502 per person 

while the average income of the native Algerian middle class was $240.24

s Joseph Kraft illustrated this point with the following paragraph: “In a well-known 

trial the judge was told that there were five witnesses: ‘two men and three Arabs.’ In the 

settler lingo the Muslims were ‘melons’ (simps), ‘ratons’ (coons). ‘They weigh in the scales,’ 

a settler mayor, Raymond Laquiere, once told me, ‘as feathers against gold.’ Another 

reporter recalls hearing on European lips the phrase: ‘He was an Arab, but dressed like a 

person.’ ”25
30

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

. . . He is not wanting in virtues; he has all those of the 

hard worker and patriot: but he does not possess what 

one might call the virtue of the conqueror, that equity 

of spirit and of heart, and that feeling for the right 

of the weak. It is hard to make the European colon

understand that other rights exist besides his own, in 

an Arab country, and that the native is not a race to be 

enslaved and endentured at this whim.26

Some 50 years later, Gen. Georges Catroux had this to say about the 

settlers:

They have remained, through atavism, that which 

their fathers were at the beginning of their settlement in Africa, pioneers, men of action and isolated 

men. There is lacking in these men . . . a sentiment 

of spiritual values, a less materialistic and egotistical 

conception of relations among men and therefore of 

the native problem.27

The settlers derived their sense of racial superiority from the fact 

that they had been able to achieve, in the span of a few decades, what 

the indigenous population had been unable to achieve in centuries: a 

modernized society. This ability to develop Algeria had given them economic, political, and social preeminence—a special status which they 

sought to preserve at all costs. They effectively blocked major legislation which would have improved the lot of the Muslims and upset the 

status quo.

When, in the immediate post-World War II era, the nationalists 

concluded that no agreement or satisfaction of their grievances could 

be obtained from the settlers, the Muslim leadership began to advocate open rebellion. For the propaganda aspect of their agitation they 

selected the settlers as a prime target. Reports received by Governor 

General Marcel-Edmond Naegelen from the French administrators 

and prefects, late in 1948, revealed that nationalist slogans (“the suitcase or the coffin”; “we will divide the lands of the Colons, every one of 

us getting his share”; and “the French will be thrown into the sea”) had 

not only created a feeling of insecurity among the Europeans, but had 

engendered a civil war psychosis which manifested itself in tendencies 

to leave Algeria for France, or to arm and fortify their communities.28

Summary

European settlers made up most of the upper and middle classes in 

Algeria. Muslims, with few exceptions, made up the bulk of the lower 

class. The two elements of Algerian society were mutually exclusive, 
Factors Inducing Revolution

31

each having its own social structure; the European element, however, 

dominated the economic, social, and political life of the country and 

stood apart and well above the indigenous Algerian society. The air of 

superiority which the Europeans maintained throughout the colonial 

period was challenged by the Muslims after World War II.

Demise of Traditional Society

The Gradual Elimination of an Algerian Middle Class

During the period of Turkish suzerainty, the traditional urban Algerian middle class, ancient in origin, highly intellectual, and influential 

in the rural areas, dominated the Turkish ruling class, especially in the 

cultural field.29 It was thus able to limit and absorb the impact of Turkish culture. The virtual elimination of this middle class, during the 

first 17 years of French occupation, deprived the French governments 

of this important cultural conveyor. As a result of this, and also because 

of the forcible measures which the settlers adopted throughout, the 

diffusion of French culture was resisted, and cultural assimilation was 

never achieved.

The development of a new, small Muslim middle class in the 20th 

century coincided with the development of Algerian nationalist movements. By then, opposition to French and Colon was crystalizing, and 

continued Colon intransigence prevented this new middle class from 

moderating the course of Algerian nationalism.t

 In the end, from 1945 

to 1956, to maintain their position in the Muslim society, they joined the 

ranks of the nationalists in advocating and supporting open rebellion.

Breakup of the Traditional Social Structure

Before the French invasion, the extended family formed the basic 

unit of the Muslim society. Obedience was demanded by the senior 

male, and primary loyalty was given to the family unit. The next unit 

commanding the loyalty of the individual was the village, and finally 

the tribe. Tribes formed distinct groups and, although they lived in 

close physical proximity, there was little contact between them. The 

first 40  years of French rule disrupted this pattern in many areas. 

Deprived of their lands and facing impoverishment, an ever increasing 

number of rural Algerians began to leave their families, villages, and 

tribes for the urban coastal areas, reaching France ultimately in the 

1900’s. Adjustment to this new environment, devoid of the traditional 

t This small Algerian middle class was composed mainly of moderates but included a 

number of nationalists.
32

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

social structure and loyalties, was impossible, and this mass of immigrants began to develop into a dissatisfied proletariat.

Hopes for a better life in the urban centers never materialized, but 

population pressure continued to feed the cities with new immigrants. 

Close contact, however, with a larger portion of the Muslim population began to foster a sense of belonging and loyalty to a new, larger 

entity, different from that of the traditional social structure. The idea 

of an Algerian nation began to develop. In the early 1920’s, particularly 

in the urban centers of France, this new sense of belonging began to 

translate itself into nationalism:

This time an urban nationalism came into being 

among Algerians in Paris; here they were stimulated by mixing with the French proletariat and were 

brought into contact with the stirring world events 

of the moment—the birth of Communism, the class 

struggle, the French mandate in Syria, the Turkish 

revolution of the Mustafa Kemal, the war in the Rif.30

Thus exposed to new political ideas in the urban centers in which 

they had not been allowed to compete with the Europeans, this new 

proletariat rejected the offer of assimilation with France and the narrow restrictive traditional social pattern. At the same time, those who 

returned could no longer accept the leadership of the traditional 

French appointed Caids (chieftains) and religious teachers because of 

the latter’s servility to France. They were, in fact, awaiting a new radical 

leadership.

Islam: Its Pan-Arab Effect on the Algerians

The Arab conquest of North Africa began in 647 A.D. It was not, 

however, until the 12th century, after the majority of the inhabitants 

of the area were converted to Islam, that North Africa became an integral part of the Middle East. During the following 7 centuries in which 

North Africa underwent political separatism from the Arab Empire, 

Turkish suzerainty, and French occupation, Islam continued to function as the principal conveyor of Middle Eastern culture.u Thus it is not 

surprising that the theories of Pan-Islamism and Pan Arabism, political movements which originated in the Middle East in the latter part 

of the 19th and early part of the 20th centuries, found advocates in 

North Africa.

u The teachings of the Egyptian religious reformist Sheikh Djamal ed-Din el-Afghani 

(1839–1897), his disciple Sheikh Mohammed Abdo (1849–1905), and the Syrian theologian Sheikh Rashid Rida (1865–1935) were well known in North Africa and were used in 

the reform movement there. El-Afghani, moreover, advocated the liberation of all Islamic 

states.31
Factors Inducing Revolution

33

Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism found expression in Algeria in the 

Association of Ulemas (Muslim scholars). The Association of Ulemas 

began as a reform movement—the revival of Islam in Algeria through 

a modernization of its practices—but it took on sociopolitical overtones 

when its teachings came into conflict with the assimilationist efforts 

of the French administration. These teachings based on the Wahabiv

reform movement of Saudi Arabia and the doctrines of el-Afghani and 

Abdo, tended to generate nationalist feelings, they stressed the unity of 

the Islamic world, brought about by a common, religion, language, and 

history, and the impossibility of unity between Algeria and non-Muslim 

France. But the appeal of the Ulemas was limited to the traditionalist 

society which opposed Western-oriented secularism.

Summary

Through the colonization of Algeria the French gradually eliminated the traditional middle class and broke up the traditional social 

arrangement (family, village, and tribe). These developments brought 

the individual Muslims together, and a new feeling of loyalty developed 

among them which began to translate itself into nationalism. PanIslamism and Pan-Arabism also tended to generate nationalist sentiment; they stressed the unity of the Islamic world, and also rejected 

Western-oriented secularism.

Marginality of Intellectuals

The marginality of the Algerian Muslim intellectuals resulted from 

the fact that they were never accepted by the settlers as Frenchmen, and 

were suspected and rejected by the Muslim community for their proFrench orientation. For these reasons, they were unable to moderate 

the radical course of Algerian nationalism.

Inacceptability of a Westernized Muslim Elite in the Inner Circles of the 

European Community

Most of the Muslim intellectuals, except the religious leaders, were 

the products of the French officer corps or graduates of French institutions of higher learning. In the late 1920’s and early 1930’s they were 

antinationalist, and manifested their pro-French tendencies by advocating the total assimilation of Algeria with France—a fact which, in itself, 

implied total political, social, and economic equality with the Colons. 

The Colons refused to accept this concept. In 1936 the implementation 

v The Wahabi reform movement swept Saudi Arabia in the latter part of the 18th century and advocated a return to the fundamentals of Islam.
34

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

of the assimilationist Blum-Violette proposal, which would have given 

some 25,000 Muslims French citizenship without a priori abandonment 

of their personal status under Muslim laws,w was blocked by the resignation of all the European mayors of Algeria. The Colons insisted on the 

abandonment of the personal status as a precondition to the acquisition of French citizenship by Muslim Algerians—a precondition which 

most Muslims rejected because it would have set them apart from the 

Muslim community. By 1946, when it became apparent that meaningful assimilation would never be implemented, these intellectuals began 

to press for a federation of a free Algeria with France, and on the basis 

of this platform most of them were elected to office. In April 1948 the 

Colons, in connivance with Governor General Naegelen, blocked their 

reelection. Denied French citizenship and their leadership position, 

these intellectuals gradually turned against France; by 1956 most of 

them had joined the nationalist rebels.

Inability of a Western-Oriented Muslim Elite To Influence a Traditionalist 

Society

The emergence of the intellectuals in Algeria coincided with the 

development of a nationalist movement strongly influenced by PanIslamism and Pan-Arabism. The pro-French orientation of these intellectuals, their habit of speaking French and frequenting French circles, 

brought them into conflict with the nationalist leaders who advocated 

independence for Algeria, preached the distinguishing and uniting 

virtues of Islam, and stressed the use of the Arabic language as the 

mother tongue of all Algerians. In the 1930’s these intellectuals were 

not rejected—opposition to France had not as yet polarized—but their 

cause found little appeal in the Muslim community. In the post-World 

War II era these intellectuals found themselves totally rejected. A new 

generation of Algerians, more radical than the previous generation 

and more highly influenced by political theories and developments in 

the Middle East, engulfed and overcame these intellectuals. At the outbreak of the revolution in 1954, and with nothing tangible to show for 

more than 30 years of being pro-French, these intellectuals chose to 

join the revolution as the only alternative open to them.

w Muslim law forms part of the Islamic religion: and since the French Government 

guaranteed the free practice of the Islamic religion by the Act of 1830, the Muslim community continued to be governed by these laws which deal primarily with marriage, 

divorce, inheritance, and the like. French law, however, applied to all Muslims in criminal 

and other cases. The Colons came entirely under the French Code Civil.
Factors Inducing Revolution

35

Summary

The Western-oriented Muslim intellectuals were faced with a conflict that was not resolved until the outbreak of hostilities in the 1950’s: 

they were discriminated against by the European community because 

they preferred to remain Muslims, and rejected by the Muslim community for their pro-French tendencies. Within this tension-building 

environment, they could neither influence French policies nor moderate the course of Algerian nationalism.

POLITICAL WEAKNESSES

Political Imbalance: Representation, Participation, and 

Discrimination

Many of the causes of the 1954 revolution can be traced to the lack 

of political foresight of the French:

. . . since the earliest days the French government has 

been struggling to find a workable means of assimilating the territory to France. The systems adopted have 

varied between military and civilian government, the 

methods have been by turn autocratic and conciliatory. The common factor is that they were all, and continue to be, experimental.32

One of the major causes of political weakness was the low degree 

of political integration—the discontinuities in political communication and an uneven reach of political power. The ordinances of 1833 

and 1834 proclaimed Algeria an extension of France; this implied that 

French law, without major modifications, would be applied. French 

citizenship, however, was not extended to the Arabs and Berbers of 

Algeria at this time. They continued to be subject to special police and 

military regulation. In 1848 only the settlers “were given the opportunity to exercise their rights as citizens and send representatives to 

the [French] Constituent Assembly.”33 In 1865, the Senatus Consulte of 

Napoleon III, a decree intended to calm the growing discontentment 

of the Muslims, defined the citizenship of the Algerians and the conditions under which they could become French citizens. “Muslims were 

offered French citizenship, with the possibility of serving in the French 

armed forces or the civil administrative bodies, on condition they 

renounced their Islamic personal status including plural marriage and 

subjected themselves to French civil and judicial regulation.”34 This 

offer was prompted by the best of intentions, but it demonstrated the 

extent to which the French Government had failed to understand the 
36

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

local customs and religion of Algeria; very few Muslims accepted this 

offer which, in their eyes, was tantamount to apostasy.

In 1898 a measure of self-determination was granted when Algerians were given a direct vote in the financial, fiscal, and economic 

affairs of the country through the establishment of the Délégations 

Financières—an advisory body consisting of 24 Colon representatives, 

24 representatives of the administration, and 24 Muslim representatives. The indigenous population benefited very little. Denunciation by 

some 500,000 Colons, who by now had become the entrenched political, economic, and social elite, forced the government to delay Muslim 

participation until 1922; and even then the Muslims were ineffectual 

because their representatives were continually outvoted by the Colonadministration majority.x

 Under the Algerian Charter of 1919, French 

Premier Georges Clemenceau attempted to give the Muslims full voting rights. This attempt was defeated by a coalition of rightist deputies 

and Colon lobbyists, and a watered-down version gave the Muslims the 

right to elect the members of the Délégations Financières only. In 1936 

the implementation of the assimilationist Blum-Violette proposal was 

blocked by Colon agitation.

The military importance of Algeria, so well demonstrated during 

World War II, prompted the French Government to consider decisive 

political measures for Algeria. The May 1945 Constantine uprising 

indicated the necessity for such action.y

In 1947 the French National Assembly granted Algeria an Organic 

Statute which attempted to strike a balance between the interests of 

France in that country and the demands of the Algerians. It recognized 

the special political status of the country, and sought, at the same time, 

to integrate it with metropolitan France. Algerians received a measure 

of self-determination with the creation of an Algerian Assembly composed of two colleges—one elected by Europeans and certain special 

categories of Muslims, and the other elected by the indigenous population. Also, the presence of Algerian deputies in the French National 

Assembly plus other representatives in the French Council of the 

Republic and the Assembly of the French Union purportedly guaranteed Algerian interests at the national level. French interests, on the 

x In the 1920’s and early 1930’s the French administration made sure of Muslim compliance by “ensuring” the election of handpicked candidates.

y On May 8, 1945, V-E Day, the Colons reacted swiftly to nationalist pressure and 

attempted reforms by the French Government. Provoked by Muslim extremists, and fearing that the violence which had hitherto marked the celebration was the signal for an 

uprising, the European community resorted to massive repression. Police, citizens’ militia, 

and army invaded the Muslim sections of the major cities and at the end of the blood bath 

an estimated more than 4,000 Muslims had perished. Unofficial sources estimated the 

number of Muslim dead at 40,000.
Factors Inducing Revolution

37

other hand, were safeguarded by the Paris appointment of a French 

Governor General, who was endowed with extensive executive powers, 

to head the French administration in Algeria.

The powers of the Algerian Assembly were limited. Articles 9–12 of 

the Statute expressly excluded deliberation of “all laws guaranteeing 

constitutional liberties, all laws of property, marriage, and personal status, treaties made by France with foreign powers, and in general all laws 

applying to military and civilian departments or posts.”35 Moreover, 

although the Governor General was responsible for the implementation of all legislation enacted by the Algerian Assembly, he could, by 

invoking Articles 39 or 45 of the Statute, veto any decision which he 

judged to be detrimental to French interests or beyond the competence 

of the Assembly.36 The real power of the Assembly was related to the 

financial field; all legislation proposed by the Assembly’s Finance and 

General Commissions regarding the budget and all fiscal modifications 

and new governmental expenditures were contingent on its approval.

The Organic Statute was never fully implemented, thus reaffirming 

in the minds of the nationalists the insensitivity of the French Government to local conditions. Meaningful application was circumvented by 

fraudulent elections, frequent suspensions of the Algerian Assembly, 

and disparity in representation whereby 9 million Muslims equaled 

1 million Europeans. The severe repression which came in the wake 

of the 1945 uprising had estranged the Muslims. The urgent passage 

of the Statute was, in itself, an attempt to redress the situation. But the 

establishment of two colleges perpetuated the estrangement, whereas 

the creation of a single house elected on the basis of universal suffrage 

without ethnic and religious distinction would have led to greater political integration. The fraudulent elections of Beni Oui Ouis, who obviously did not represent the Muslim masses, prevented the emergence 

and understanding of Muslim aspirations, and placed the attainment 

of political power beyond the reach of the true Muslim elite. Thus the 

Muslim masses had, in reality, no voice in the administration of the 

country and were not fully represented in the Algerian Assembly.

Summary

One of the major Muslim dissatisfactions in Algeria was the lack 

of meaningful Muslim representation at both the local and the metropolitan levels. Being unable to obtain French citizenship without first 

giving up certain Islamic practices, Muslims generally did not have the 

rights accorded to Europeans in Algeria. Muslim participation in political affairs was ineffectual: European representation outnumbered and 

outvoted Muslim representation in policy-making bodies and advisory councils. The overriding powers of the French Governor General 
38

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

diluted Muslim demands in the postwar attempts to integrate Algeria 

with France.

Political Fragmentation of Ruling Elite and Opposition 

Groups

Discord in Algerian and French Governments

Another major cause of political weakness in Algeria was the discord 

which arose at different times over a span of years between the French 

Army, the French governments, the Governors General, and the Colons, 

over the initiation and implementation of policies for Algeria.

The government of Charles X began the conquest of Algeria without any plans for its future, and as a result the army assumed the task of 

pacifying and governing the country. Under the military regime, and 

in the absence of a show of firmness by the French Government, France 

was, in 1840 embroiled in the total conquest of Algeria. The territories 

which came under military rule were treated as part of the colonial 

empire rather than an integral part of France, despite the ordinances 

of 1833 and 1834. As such, European colonization was controlled by 

the army, and a department for native affairs and the Bureaux Arabes

(Arab Bureaus)z were set up to act as a regulatory arm of the military 

authority. In 1848 some 52,000 French settlers, “chafing under the military regime and demanding some sort of political representation in 

France,” pressured the French Government into replacing the military 

regime with a civilian Governor General. Nevertheless, in 1852 the military regime was restored and continued until 1858, when the office of 

Governor General was abolished and a Ministry of Algeria was created 

within the French cabinet. In 1871 Algeria was, once again, “placed 

under the authority of a Civilian Governor General, appointed by, and 

responsible to, the French Ministry of the Interior. Algerian affairs 

were allotted to the various French Ministries, with the result that the 

Algerian administrative services became almost completely dependent 

on decisions made in Paris.”38

The cause underlying the above changes in the nature of the 

French administration of Algeria was a latent power struggle which had 

developed within French political circles since the beginning of the 

occupation. The liberals had opposed any form of occupation, limited 

z The duties of the Arab Bureaus “included the settlement of tribal quarrels, the 

administration of justice both French and native, the latter through native judges, the 

assessment and collection of taxes, the supervision of education, and the collation and 

forwarding of military intelligence. The Bureaus were never popular with the French civil 

population in Algeria, to whom they were constant reminders of the arbitrary character of 

the regime.”37
Factors Inducing Revolution

39

or otherwise, and once occupation had been accomplished, they had 

demanded that the country be made a part of France rather than a colony and that it be placed under civil authority. The army, on the other 

hand, and later advocates of a military regime, wanted to keep Algeria as a colonial preserve and transform the country into French territory by gradual rural colonization.aa The upshot of this power struggle 

was that Algeria came to be ruled more and more by an uninformed 

French National Assembly, while the Governors General became executive agents of the Paris Ministries. In 1892 Jules Ferry had this to say:

The Governor-General had no longer any authority, 

and could not even study proposed measures to see 

if they were practicable. The Governor-General was 

nothing but a “decor couteux et inutil” (a costly and useless ornament) Instead of being, like the British Viceroy of India, the director of the country’s welfare.39

This situation led to the passage of unrealistic legislation which displeased both settlers and Muslims, and encouraged the settlers to bypass the Governor General and seek satisfaction of their demands in 

the lobbies of the National Assembly.

Between 1896 and 1902, as a result of the report of the Senate commission of inquiry of 1892 which denounced the “fundamental error 

of considering Algeria as an extension of France, and of having seen 

it as anything else than a colony,”40 the French Government passed a 

series of laws which recognized the separate character of Algeria. The 

administrative responsibility for Algeria was reinvested in the Governor 

General, and Algeria was given a large measure of fiscal and budgetary autonomy. From 1900, and during the interwar period, the settlers 

were powerful enough to block the passage or application of any proposed legislation which would have tended to correct the social, economic, and political imbalances in Algeria. In 1898 settler agitation had 

prevented the meaningful participation of Muslims in the Délégations 

Financières; in 1919 they were equally successful in watering down Premier Georges Clemenceau’s Algerian Charter; and, in 1936 they were 

also successful in blocking the assimilationist Blum-Violette proposal. 

After World War II Colon vested interests, in association with the French 

political parties of the center and the right, were able to secure the dismissal of liberal and the appointment of amenable Governors General. 

In 1947 the settlers, in collusion with Finance Minister René Mayer, 

deputy from Constantine and a member of the Parti Républican Radical Socialiste (RRS), were able to effect the removal of reform-minded 

aa After the defeat of France by Germany in 1871, the discredited French Army 

retired from the political scene.
40

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

Governor General Yves Châtaigneau and secure the appointment in his 

stead of Socialist Marcel-Edmond Naegelen—a man well-liked by the 

settlers for his antinationalist tendencies. “Within a matter of months, 

the settlers and M. Naegelen had contrived to empty the Algerian Statute of all content. Their weapon was systematic, unblushing electoral 

fraud.”41 In 1956 the Colons again secured the dismissal of General 

Georges Catroux as Resident Minister and obtained the appointment 

in his stead of Robert Lacoste, who was well known for his pro-Colon

sympathies. The tragedy here was that most of the Governors General, 

and the Army after 1954, became imbued with the settler spirit, and 

then proceeded to undermine the efforts of the French governments 

to arrive at an equitable solution.

During the course of the revolution, the Colons organized themselves into semiclandestine movements such as the Union Française NordAfricaine (UFNA), Organisation de Resistance de l’Algérie Française (ORAF), 

Front National Français (FNF), which sought to keep Algeria “French.” 

These movements, and a number of others, were behind the terrorism which was aimed at the Muslims and Muslim sympathizers, the 

bazooka attack on General Raoul Salan in January 1957, the demonstrations of May 13, 1958, and the plots against General de Gaulle in 

1959 and 1960.42 From 1957 on, these movements received increasing 

support and cooperation from the French Army in Algeria.

The French Army, as a whole, has always been interested in the 

overseas territories of France, especially those in Africa. “In Algeria, 

particularly, the Army has been intimately concerned with colonization. Pacification followed the conquest of Algeria. The Army not only 

provided protection for the settlers but was involved in colonizing itself. 

Fighting and working the land always went together.”43 After 1871, its 

role in political affairs was reduced to a minimum; therefore, it did not 

contribute directly to the political imbalance which came to exist in 

Algeria prior to the outbreak of the revolution. But its attempt to dictate policy to the French governments after 1956, prolonged the course 

of the revolution and made earlier and more advantageous settlements 

with the rebels impossible.

The French Army looked upon Algeria as the battlefield on which 

it could not only vindicate its honor,ab but also apply the lessons which 

it had learned in Indochina. It was, therefore, determined not only 

to suppress the revolution, but also to institute reforms which would 

ensure Algeria against future revolutionary outbreaks. General Henri 

Navarre commented as follows in 1956:

ab The French Army has blamed the politicians in general, and the French democratic system in particular, for the fall of France in 1940, their defeat in Indochina, and 

the loss of Lebanon, Syria, Morocco, and Tunisia.
Factors Inducing Revolution

41

As in Indochina we are dealing with nationalisms of 

which we have not foreseen the inevitable rise, which 

we have not channeled by reforms made at the right 

time, which we have not allowed to be led by elites 

formed in our own school, and which we have not 

brought to our side in a place that would have linked 

their fate to ours. Not more than in Indochina have we 

been able to define a coherent policy.44

The policy which the French Army advocated, and which was 

imposed on the French governments,ac was assimilationistad in nature. 

The rebels were offered a cease-fire, which was to be followed by elections and then negotiations. “But the stress was entirely on the first term, 

which became a primary condition to which the others were increasingly forgotten appendages.”45 Unrealistic as this policy and peace offer 

were, the army pursued them to the point of obsession. In the meantime, the army also scuttled all attempts by the governments to reach 

negotiated political agreements with the rebels;ae thus, wresting more 

and more power for itself in Algeria, while blaming the ineffectiveness 

of the French governments for its military failures. On May 13, 1958, 

after about 4 years of fighting, when it became apparent that the government of Premier Pierre Pflimlin might negotiate a settlement with 

ac This was particularly true of the government of Premier Guy Mollet and those that 

succeeded him. Upon taking office, early in January 1957, Mollet spoke of restoring peace 

in Algeria, whereupon he appointed General Catroux as Resident Minister in Algeria. 

Catroux hinted at the creation of an Algerian Assembly composed of one college, and the 

future possibility of endowing this Assembly with limited executive power. A few days later, 

while in Algeria, Mollet fired Catroux and replaced him with Robert Lacoste, and enunciated his new cease-fire—elections—negotiations policy.

ad The French Army spoke of a “New Algeria” in which the Muslim would be given 

full equality with the Colon in the social, economic, and political fields. Algeria, however, 

was to remain French.

ae On October 23, 1956, the French Army Command in Algeria ordered the interception, over international waters, of a Royal Moroccan Airways DC-3 which was carrying four 

top rebel leaders from Morocco to Tunisia. This act was carried out at the time when the 

government of Guy Mollet had enlisted the support of President Bourguiba of Tunisia, and 

the Moroccan monarch to bring about negotiations with the rebels, and the presence of 

the rebel leaders aboard was in response to the invitation of King Mohammed V. Although 

the interception was committed without the knowledge or permission of the French Government, Guy Mollet, nonetheless, chose to take credit for it. On February 8, 1958, the 

French air force in Algeria, once again without the knowledge or permission of the French 

Government, bombed the Tunisian city of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef. This time the government 

of Premier Felix Gaillard chose to assume the responsibility. The effect of these two acts 

was to discredit the French governments in the eyes of the Moroccan and Tunisian Governments who had repeatedly offered their good offices in attempts to settle the Algerian 

problem. The bombing of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef, however, cut infiltrations by 40 percent for 

about a year because of Tunisian fears of further reprisals.
42

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

the rebels if invested, the Army of Algeria staged a virtual coup d’etataf

which toppled the Fourth Republic. De Gaulle was returned to power 

on the assumption that he would keep Algeria French by underwriting 

the policy and programs of the mutineers. When the new President of 

the Fifth Republic gave indications that he was considering independence for Algeria, the generals who had been instrumental in putting 

him in office felt that they had been betrayed once more. On April 22, 

1961, elements of the Army of Algeria, led by Generals Raoul Salan, 

Maurice Challe, Edmond Jouhaud, and André Zeller and a number of 

colonels, and supported by the Colons attempted another coup. “Their 

plan was to seize Algiers, to rally the armed forces in the name of army 

unity and French Algeria, and then to seize Paris, driving De Gaulle 

from office.”46 Algiers was seized, but the coup fizzled when the navy, 

the air force, and the draftee units failed to support the generals. 

Challe and Zeller surrendered to the authorities, but the rest went into 

hiding, and subsequently created the terrorist Secret Army Organization (OAS). The aim of the OAS was to keep Algeria French despite 

de Gaulle, through counterrevolution; and it was strongly supported 

by the Colons. The counterrevolution never materialized, because the 

OAS failed to establish a foothold outside the large Algerian cities. Terrorism in the Algerian cities and in France was used instead. Assassinations and bombings became daily occurrences. After the conclusion 

of the Evian Agreement, the OAS stepped up its terrorist campaign, 

singling out the Muslim population in an attempt to provoke communal strife and the intervention of the French Army on the side of the 

settlers. With the apprehension of Jouhaud and Salan, the movement 

lost much of its impetus, and final secret agreements with the rebels 

put an end to its activity.

Lack of Unity of Purpose Among Nationalist Parties, and Intraparty Splits

The lack of unity of purpose among the indigenous Algerian political parties and movements throughout contributed indirectly to the 

political imbalance which plagued the country. Differences in ideological orientation, personality clashes, and intraparty splits prevented 

the formation of a viable opposition which, by presenting a concerted 

political platform, might have enabled the French Government and the 

administration to better gauge the extent and magnitude of Muslim 

discontent. As it was, these movements and parties worked at cross purposes, dividing the people, and their separate activities yielded meager 

af The May 13, 1958, coup d’etat was preceded by two similar attempts: one in February 1956, led by General Faure, and the other in 1957, led by Generals Cherrides and 

Chassin. Although foiled in their attempts, these generals were able to get off with a light 

reprimand. In a sense, therefore, the servility of the French governments invited the coup 

of 1958.
Factors Inducing Revolution

43

results. It was not until 1956, approximately 2 years after the outbreak 

of the Algerian revolution, that unity was finally achieved.

In the immediate post-World War II era, opposition to French rule 

in Algeria centered around three political groupings: the Movement 

Pour Le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (Movement for the Triumph 

of Democratic Liberties—MTLD), the Union Démocratique du ManifesteAlgérien (Democratic Union for the Algerian Manifesto—UDMA), and 

the Association of Ulema.

ag The MTLD was founded in the latter part 

of 1946 by Messali Ahmed ben Hadj, former member of the French 

Communist Party and “father” of Algerian nationalism, to replace the 

outlawed Algerian People’s Party (PPA) and its predecessor, the North 

African Star (ENA).ah The structural organization of the MTLD was 

patterned along Communist lines. Cells formed the basic unit, and they 

were grouped into a Fawdj (group). The lowest territorial designations 

included the Fara (section), Kasma (locality), Dijha (region), and Wilaya 

(province). The territorial organization of the MTLD, furthermore, 

extended to and divided France into the seven provinces of Marseilles, 

Lyon-Saint-Etienne, Western France, Paris and suburbs, Lille-North, 

the Ardennes, and Strasbourg-East. Leadership of the party resided 

in a Central Committee and a Political Bureau; Commissions named 

by the former dealt directly with leaders at the local level through the 

Kasma, where officials for Local Organization (ROL), Propaganda and 

Information (RPI), Local Assemblies (ARL), Trade Union Affairs, and 

Finances were to be found. A General Assembly, which met on an ad hoc

basis and represented the different sections, was convened whenever it 

was deemed necessary to define and approve the policy of the MTLD.47

ag The Algerian Communist Party is not included among the opposition because 

its policies, along with those of the French Communist Party, were at best ambiguous 

and contradictory. In the late twenties and early thirties, the Communists supported the 

claims of the Algerian nationalists. In 1936, with the advent of the Popular Front Government of Léon Blum, the Communists, in an about-face, supported the assimilationist 

Blum-Violette proposal. The French Government which ordered the repressions, in the 

wake of the 1945 Constantine uprising, included two Communists: Maurice Thorez and 

Charles Tillon. It was the latter who, as Air Minister, ordered the aerial bombing of native 

villages in Algeria. The Algerian Communist Party, on the other hand, denounced the 

uprising as Fascist-inspired and its members participated actively in its suppression. At the 

outbreak of the revolution in 1954, the Communists once more denounced the nationalists. Less than 2 years later, the Algerian Communists sought to join the rebels, while the 

French Communist Party supported the rebels in the French National Assembly.

ah The ENA movement was founded in France in 1925 by Hadj Abdel Kader, a member of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party, as an adjunct to that party. 

In 1927 Messali Hadj assumed the leadership of the movement, and his Communist background left a deep imprint on the structural organization of the ENA. It is not surprising, 

therefore, that the PPA and the MTLD should have had structural organizations patterned along Communist lines.
44

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

The type of following which the MTLD attracted gave it its proletarian and revolutionary character. Membership consisted mostly of poor 

disgruntled Algerian workers, students, and young intellectuals who 

were always ready to resort to violence and direct action. This brought 

about severe repressions in the form of arrest, incarceration, and banishment—which, by necessity, imposed on the MTLD a cloak of secrecy. 

By 1954 its membership was estimated at over 14,000.

The MTLD program demanded election by universal suffrage, without racial or religious distinction, of a sovereign Algerian constituent 

assembly; evacuation of Algeria by French troops; return of expropriated land; Arabization of all secondary education; and abandonment 

of French control over the Muslim religion and religious institutions. 

Although this platform represented a more cautious and prudent 

approach to practical Algerian politics than that of its predecessor, the 

PPA, it was by far the most radical of all the postwar opposition platforms, for it demanded in essence full self-determination and proletarian Islamic social reforms.48

In 1946 also, Ferhat Abbas, a pharmacist from Sétif and an intellectual in his own right, founded the UDMA. In 1921 he had founded the 

Young Algeria Movement, and in 1944 he had joined in creating the 

Friends of the Algerian Manifesto. The UDMA was a cadre type organization with little mass support. Its membership was drawn chiefly 

from the French-educated Muslim intellectuals and from the professional class. In general, the UDMA program called for federation of 

a free Algeria with France. Ferhat Abbas stated his positionai in the 

following terms:

Neither assimilation, nor a new master, nor separatism. A young people undertaking its social and democratic education, realizing its scientific and industrial 

development, carrying out its moral and intellectual 

renewal, associated with a great liberal nation: a young 

democracy in birth guided by the great French democracy: such is the Image and the clearest expression of 

our Movement for Algerian renovation.50

The Association of Ulema was founded in the 1930’s by Sheikh 

Abdel Hamid ben Badis, a graduate of the Islamic Zeitouna University

ai In the 1930’s Ferhat Abbas had supported direct assimilation of Algeria with 

France. He had declared that he was French, and that there was no foundation for Algerian nationalism, since a historical Algerian fatherland had never existed. “We are,” 

he concluded, “children of a new world, born of the French spirit and French efforts.49

The defeat of France in 1940, the anti-Algerian repressions which the Vichy government 

initiated, and the Atlantic Charter influenced the adoption of this new position toward 

France.
Factors Inducing Revolution

45

in Tunis. The objective of the Association was religious and, as such, it 

appealed mainly to the traditionalist class. The program of the Ulema

advocated: “liberation of the Muslim religion—equality with Christianity and Judaism; liberty for instruction in the Arabic language; liberation of Koranic law; and liberation of the Arab Press.”51 Politically, 

however, the Ulema supported the MTLD because of basic agreement 

on some aspects of their programs.

Major attempts at alliances were made in 1943, 1947, and 1951, but 

these attempts were frustrated by disagreement between those who 

favored revolution through evolution—generally the older generation—and those who advocated evolution through revolution—generally the younger generation. In 1943 Ferhat Abbas, the PPA, and the 

Ulema joined together in drawing up the Algerian Manifesto, which 

set forth Muslim demands and expectations. In March 1944, the three 

parties merged, forming an organization which became known as the 

Friends of the Algerian Manifesto (AMA), and whose membership 

reached ultimately 500,000. To men like Ferhat Abbas, the AMA represented a nonviolent mass movement, but to younger men like Belkacem 

Krim, of the PPA it represented a front behind which they could arm 

and plan for direct action. When the PPA was clearly implicated in the 

1945 abortive uprising, Abbas withdrew from the now outlawed AMA.

In 1946 the MTLD and the UDMA (having ostensibly renounced 

direct action)aj “concentrated their efforts on elections to various 

assemblies, and both scored marked success. . . . But the passage of the 

disappointing Algerian Statute at the end of 1947, and the initiation 

of systematic election rigging under Naegelen in April 1948 precipitated within Messali’s movement a new drive for direct action.”52 The 

creation of an armed organization—Organisation Secrète (OS)—within 

the structural organization of the MTLD followed. Its discovery by the 

authorities, in March 1950, broke the tacit alliance between the UDMA 

and the MTLD, split the MTLD, and the crisis which it precipitated 

paralyzed party activity.

In 1951 the Central Committee of the MTLD, after having dissolved 

the OS and publicly renounced the use of direct action in 1950, concluded an alliance with the Algerian Front of the Defense and Respect 

of Liberty, composed of the UDMA, the Algerian Communist Party, 

and the Association of Ulema. Sensing in the action of the Central 

aj At the MTLD’s first congress, held in March 1947, a disagreement arose between 

the moderate and radical wings of the party. The former advocated abandonment of 

direct action in favor of cautious reform more in line with the UDMA, while the latter 

favored the creation of paramilitary organizations and direct action. The congress voted 

in favor of a policy of political activity only, adopting a wait-and-see attitude, and postponed consideration of whether to create a paramilitary organization.
46

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

Committee a threat to his absolute leadership, Messali Hadj chose to 

take an opposite stand. Over the protest of the Central Committee, he 

launched a personal tour of Algeria, which resulted in demonstrations 

and clashes. Deported to France in 1952 for subversive activity, Messali 

Hadj then proceeded to convene at Hornu, Belgium, on July 15, 1954, 

an MTLD congress which voted him full powers and excluded the 

Central Committee. The latter retaliated by convening, on August 13, 

another congress in Algiers, which invested it with full powers and 

declared the unique leadership of Messali Hadj to be outmoded. When 

it became clear that the partisanship between Messalists and Centralists had immobilized the activities of the MTLD, Mohammed Boudiaf, 

a member of the OS, attempted to effect a reconciliation. Messali Hadj, 

however, remained adamant in his demands for full powers and a vote 

of absolute confidence. Disgusted with both factions, Boudiaf called a 

meeting of old OS members in Berne, Switzerland, in July 1954, from 

which the Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action (CRUA) and 

a plan for separate and direct action resulted. When further attempts 

by the CRUA in August and September of 1954 failed to bring about a 

reconciliation within the MTLD, a decision to launch a revolution was 

adopted. Its date: November 1, 1954.53

With the outbreak of the revolution, the nationalist alliance, forced 

to choose between support of the rebels and support of France, broke 

up and by 1956 its members had joined the rebel ranks. Only Messali 

Hadj and his new party, the Algerian Nationalist Movement (MNA), 

refrained. For all practical purposes, unity had been achieved.

Summary

Political fragmentation was characteristic of both the ruling elite 

and the opposing Muslim nationalists in Algeria. On the one side, 

political factions in Metropolitan France opposed each other on the 

question of Algeria’s status within the French system; and since the 

turn of the century, especially after winning meaningful political and 

economic powers, the increasingly conservative European settlers in 

Algeria blocked many attempts on the part of the French Government 

to institute reforms which would have broadened the Muslims’ role in 

Algerian politics. The French Army joined the settlers in the 1950’s 

and undermined French efforts to solve the Algerian question without 

violence.

On the other side, Muslim nationalist groups were also divided in 

opposing French rule. Generally, they were split into two major factions: 

a radical proletarian-type faction, and a relatively moderate cadre-type 

faction. Internal divisions among the nationalist groups, which greatly 

weakened their ability to influence French policy, were based as much 
Factors Inducing Revolution

47

on personal differences as on differences of action. By 1956, however, 

most of the groups were united in action against the French.

Inefficiency of Governmental Machinery

Neglect or Failure to Change Old Institutions To Meet New Needs

Failure to Extend Control Beyond Urban Center. Since the occupation, 

the French administration in Algeria had preoccupied itself with urban 

centers, and had failed to extend proper administrative control to the 

rural masses. As a result, the rural areas lacked adequate educational 

and hygienic services.ak In some remote areas of the Kabyle and Aures 

Mountains the population had not seen a Frenchman since the middle 

of the 19th century, and viewed with suspicion post-World War II efforts 

by the administration to improve conditions. Eighty percent of the 

indigenous population still lived in rural areas, so this apparent neglect 

tended to isolate the local communities while frustrating cultural assimilation. There was, in other words, no identification with France. Thus, 

in 1954, it was easier for these communities to accept the presence of 

rebels among them than it was to accept sudden French “protection.”

The absence of a rural administration, with all its ramifications, 

was in part due to the aspect which colonization took. The Europeans 

settled the coastal area, and the administration was initially set up to 

protect them from rebellious tribes. It therefore centered itself in the 

urban centers, and failed to extend its control to areas where colonization had made practically no inroads. Later on the administration, usually imbued with the Colon contempt for the Muslim, did little to bring 

France to the masses. Education in the rural areas suffered as a result 

of the same spirit, but here the problem was compounded by a singular lack of imagination on the part of the French. Since Algeria was 

legally considered part of France, the educational standard—luxurious 

schools and French certified teachers—had to reflect that of France. 

The cost of undertaking such a vast program would have been prohibitive, but nothing was done even to implement Jules Ferry’s more realistic 

goal: “a school in every hamlet; a modest hut, mats, no tables or chairs, 

a blackboard and slates.”54 Moreover, in rural areas where schools were 

built, the almost entirely French curriculum offered tended to arouse 

resentment in a traditionalist society.

It was not until after the outbreak of the revolution that the French 

Army effectively undertook to bring the French administration into 

ak In 1954, the illiteracy rate in Algeria was above 90 percent, and only 9 percent of 

the Muslim males could write. Less than 2,000 doctors were available to tend to the needs 

of an indigenous population of over 9,000,000.
48

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

the rural areas through the Specialized Administrative Sections (SAS). 

French Arabic-speaking officers were specially trained in Algerian 

affairs and then sent to SAS posts. There they built schools, supervised 

the educational system, provided the population with medical and 

dental services, initiated work projects to provide employment for the 

inhabitants, and arbitrated local complaints. Even the army conceded 

that the success of the SAS had come too late.

In the urban centers, where education was pushed more vigorously, 

the administration failed to provide employment for the educated 

unemployed. From the point of view of Franco-Algerian relations, the 

importance of a numerically small group of educated Muslims was not 

appreciated. “Of all the civil servants in Algeria, only 5,000 [were] Muslim and of those all but a handful [were] in very minor positions.”55

Failure to Gauge Extent of Discontent. Population growth in Algeria, 

an essentially agrarian country with a poor soil and a hostile climate, 

resulted in chronic unemployment and underemployment and an exodus from the countryside to urban shantytowns. This contributed to 

the misery and despair of an increasing mass of individuals and families. While this proletariat grew larger and more bitter, a small Frencheducated Muslim bourgeoisie was seeking not only an economic, but 

more important, an administrative and political outlet which was being 

denied it. All of the French reforms and promises, from the BlumViolette proposal to the Algerian Statute and the rigged elections of 

1948, were systematically abandoned, sabotaged, or violated. Thus two 

kinds of discontent arose: the social uneasiness of the masses and the 

political uneasiness of the Muslim elite. When united, these two factors 

created an enormous explosive force.56 And yet the administration and 

the government failed to gauge the potentiality of this force, although 

indicators abounded.

The previously pro-French moderates, represented by Ferhat Abbas, 

had changed their stand vis-a-vis France. In the years after 1943 they 

began to accept, more and more, the idea of a totally independent Algeria and they became progressively more alienated by French intransigence. The masses had also begun to show a political preference: the 

AMA which demanded the recognition of a separate Algerian entity 

attracted over a million members. But above all, the impatience of the 

masses was being demonstrated daily by their readiness to resort to 

direct action and violence. The May 1945 uprising was a manifestation 

of this trend, as were the crowds which came to listen to Messali Hadj’s 

polemics and the disturbances and clashes which resulted from them. 

The numerous incidents of anti-Colon terrorism and the discovery of 

the OS should have alerted the authorities, but until the very eve of 

the revolution the French refused to recognize these indicators and 
Factors Inducing Revolution

49

instead advocated applying the “Peace of Algeria” to rebellious Tunisia

and Morocco. In a sense, it is this apparent failure to gauge the magnitude of the situation that undermined the effectiveness of the initial 

reaction to the revolution.
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Factors Inducing Revolution

51

Inadequacy of Government’s Initial Reaction to Revolutionary Movement: 

the Military Aspect

The Algerian revolution caught France totally by surprise. On the 

very eve of its outbreak the Governor General had received word from 

his prefects and mayors that the situation was calm and normal. The 

relatively quiet years that followed the May 1945 uprising had lulled the 

French administration into a false sense of security. Accordingly, the 

extent of the revolution and the number of troops required to quell it 

were grossly underestimated. The French administration was convinced 

that it was facing another tribal uprising which could be crushed in a 

matter of a few months. Thus, on November 20, 1954, 50,000 tracts with 

the following message were dropped in the Aures:

Agitators and strangers have brought bloodletting to 

our country and have settled in your territory. They live 

off you . . . exact tribute and take your men into criminal adventure. . . . Soon a terrible calamity will befall 

the rebels, after this French Peace will again reign.57

When it became apparent that this was indeed a revolution, the 

French Army found itself unprepared. It lacked units in France suitable for this kind of warfare. The veterans of the war in Indochina

had not yet returned, and the units that were initially sent to Algeria 

were unable to cope with the situation. They were NATO-type divisions, created for a European war. Heavy and massive, equipped to 

fight a frontal war, they proved to be unadaptable to the geographic 

conditions of combat, and ineffectual against the extremely flexible 

objectives of guerrilla warfare.58 In February 1955, Jacques Soustelle, 

the newly appointed Governor General, described the military situation in these terms:

. . . The resistance to terrorist aggression disposed of 

very feeble means: regular troops were few and poorly 

trained for the purpose; little or no extra means; practically no helicopters, few light aircraft, almost no 

radio equipment. . . . 59

During the first 15 months of the revolution, the French Army

resorted to small-scale combing operations—several battalions were 

noisily massed to encircle and search a given area where guerrilla 

action had taken place—while the Gendarmerie (constabulary) arrested 

all known nationalists, regardless of political affiliation, and disarmed 

all of the clans and tribes, leaving the pro-French defenseless and at the 

mercy of the rebels. These classical methods of fighting a tribal uprising yielded almost nothing, and served to alienate more and more Muslims. In April 1956, the French Army adopted new countermeasures. 
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The pacification of Algeria was to be achieved by applying quadrillage

tactics—“a grid operation garrisoning in strength all major cities and, 

in diminishing force, all towns, villages, and farms of Algeria.”60 Accordingly, French effectives were increased to 400,000 men; supersonic jet 

fighters were replaced with slower ground-support planes and helicopters; the Tunisian and Moroccan borders were thoroughly fenced off 

to cut the supply lines of the rebels; and areas of heavy rebel concentration were declared security zones. The inhabitants of these security 

zones were moved to resettlement camps; all villages and hamlets were 

burned; and only French troops were allowed in, with orders to shoot 

anything that moved. The tracking down of rebel units was then left 

to small and mobile handpicked units, generally paratroopers, whose 

total number never exceeded 50,000 men—a number roughly equal to 

the effectives of the rebels. The success of these tactics brought about 

a military stalemate in 1958, but by then the psychological advantage 

had passed to the rebels, and French efforts to win the population over 

by civic action came too late to be really effective.

Summary

The performance of French governmental machinery in Algeria 

was less than satisfactory in some critical areas: French administration did not extend its authority to the rural areas where 80 percent 

of the population lived; it was unable to measure the social discontent 

of the masses and the political discontent of the educated elite, and 

did not see the revolution coming; when French Army officers were 

sent to introduce civic action programs in the rural areas after hostilities broke out, they were successful but too late; and the French Army, 

being committed elsewhere and totally unprepared for the type of war 

being fought in Algeria, was slow to improve its methods and win the 

military advantage.
Factors Inducing Revolution

53

(Courtesy of The Ministry of Information of the Algerian Government)

An ALN land mine crippled and nearly overturned this French half-track in the 

Blida region. Note the fertile Metidja plain in the background.

(Courtesy of The Ministry of Information of the Algerian Government)

Instruction in the use of a French-manufactured 24/29 automatic rifle in a rebel 

camp.

Note the use of French.
54

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

(Courtesy of The Ministry of Information of the Algerian Government)

An example of ALN sabotage—blowing up a power relay tower.

(Courtesy of The Ministry of Information of the Algerian Government)

Weapons, including U.S.-manufactured captured by the ALN in engagements with 

French units.
Factors Inducing Revolution

55

(Courtesy of The Ministry of Information of the Algerian Government)ALN soldiers mining a railway line. Note the French paratroop uniform and hat.
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

(United Press International photo)An instance of an escorted civilian convoy in the Aures Mountains. The area became heavily infested with rebels soon after the outbreak of the revolution, and was considered unsafe for travel by Europeans.
Factors Inducing Revolution

57

(United Press International Photo)A hunter-killer paratroop unit of the 5th French Foreign Legion Regiment seeking rebel bands in Djebel Bou Zegana in the Kabyle Mountains.
58

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

(United Press International Photo)Muslim Algerian laborers constructing the Maurice Line—an electrified fence running some 400 kilometers along the Algerian-Tunisian border on either side of the Bône-Tebessa railway line. Construction of this barrier began in 1957, and is credited with substantially reducing the number of ALN infiltrators from Tunisia.
Factors Inducing Revolution

59

(United Press International Photo)An assortment of weapons, ranging from the modern British-made automatic Sten gun to the obsolete flintlock, seized by French troops and police in the Casbah of Algiers. Note the picture of former Egyptian Premier, General Mohammed Naguib, in the foreground.
60

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

(United Press International Photo)Another example of terrorism perpetrated by the FLN against Muslim Algerians. The body of Dr. Mohammed Medir lies beside his automobile, wrecked by explosion.
Factors Inducing Revolution

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(United Press International Photo)The body of Doumene Abdelkader lies on a street in Algiers after having been executed by order of the FLN for his support of the rival nationalist organization, MNA.
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

(United Press International Photo)Rubble litters the streets in the Algiers Casbah following the Muslim riots of December 11–14, 1960. Note the pro-rebel—“Long live the FLN” and “Long live Krim”—slogans scribbled on the wall.
Factors Inducing Revolution

63

(United Press International Photo)Algerian students and workers demonstrating in Paris, October 1956, against the proposal of the Mollet Government to grant the French Administration special powers with which to crush the rebellion. Note the FLN nationalist flag.
64

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

(United Press International Photo)

Ben Bella, Khider, Ait Ahmed, and Boudiaf (in the background from left to right) 

talking with Prince Moulay Hassan (in uniform), son of the Sultan of Morocco just 

before boarding the plane which was to carry them to captivity.
Factors Inducing Revolution

65

(United Press International Photo)Members of the first Algerian Provisional Government. Left to right in the back row: Mohammed Yazid, Abdelhamid Mehri, Dr. Mohammed Lamine-Debaghine, Benyoussef ben Khedda, Lakhdar Ben Tobbal. In the front row: Dr. Ahmed Francis, Belkacem Krim, Ferhat Abbas, Abdelhafid Boussouf, and Tewfik el Madani.
66

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

(United Press International Photo)French troops unloading from the ship, “Athos,” some of the 70 tons of arms which the French authorities claimed came from Egyptian Army depots and allegedly consigned to the FLN-ALN. The “Athos” was 

intercepted by the French Navy off the coast of Algeria.
Factors Inducing Revolution

67

(United Press International Photo)

“The road to friendship. YES to the new Algeria.” A referendum poster depicting 

Muslim and French workers facing an industrial future together in Algeria. This 

poster appeared on the streets of Paris on December 29, 1960.

PART II—DYNAMICS OF REVOLUTION

Dynamics of Revolution

71

COMPOSITION OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTORS

Leadership

The leadership of the OS, the precursor of the CRUA and the FLN, 

was composed of four men: one national chief (Hussein Ait Ahmed, 

1947–49; Mohammed Ben Bella, 1949–50) and three regional chiefs 

who were to direct and supervise the Organization in their respective areas. These men, in cooperation with Mohammed Khider of the 

MTLD Central Committee and OS liaison with the party, were responsible for defining and expanding the structural organization of the 

OS. With the creation of the CRUA in 1954, and until August 1956, 

the leadership of the revolutionary movement was expanded to include 

nine members, divided into two coequal bodies collectively responsible for the conduct of the revolution. Mohammed Ben Bella, Mohammed Khider, Mohammed Boudiaf, and Hussein Ait Ahmed formed 

the External Delegation, or political leadership, with, headquarters in 

Cairo, Egypt. Mustapha Ben Boulaid, Mourad Didouche, Rabah Bitat, 

Mohammed Larbi Ben M’Hidi, and Belkacem Krim formed the Internal Regional Delegation, or military leadership in the wilayas of the 

Aures, Constantine, Algiers, Oran, and the Kabyle respectively. This 

group was essentially drawn from the lower-middle and lower classes, 

and did not include intellectuals or politicians of stature. They were all 

in their late twenties or early thirties, had been militants in the PPA

and MTLD, and a number of them had gained experience in warfare 

while serving in the French Army (Ben Bella, Boudiaf, and Krim had 

risen to the rank of sergeant, and had served in various European campaigns). Apart from the various positions of importance which members of the group held in the MTLD or the OS, Khider served as deputy 

from Algiers to the French National Assembly; he was the only one of 

the group to hold an official position.

In August 1956 the revolutionary leadership underwent major 

expansion and modification at the FLN Soummam Valley Congress. 

The CRUA was abolished and replaced with two new governing bodies: 

the National Council of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA), composed 

of 17 full members and 17 associate members, and the Committee for 

Coordination and Execution (CCE), composed of five military leaders 

then in Algeria whose names at that time were kept secret. These two 

bodies were later to develop into the legislative and executive branches 

respectively of the FLN.a

 The creation of the CNRA represented the 

most important political decision reached at Soummam. In a sense, it 

affirmed the predominance of the political over the military, but most 

a See “Organization” on page 79.
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

important of all, it established a representative form of government, 

and avoided the pitfalls of unique leadership which had previously paralyzed the activities of the MTLD under Messali Hadj. Another important aspect of the CNRA was the fact that it gave representation to all of 

the factions within the FLN, some of which had joined the revolution 

after 1954, by including in its membership intellectuals and politicians 

of stature such as Ferhat Abbas and Dr. Ahmed Francis, formerly of 

the UDMA; Tewfik el-Madani, former leader of the Ulema; and Dr. 

Lamine-Debaghine, Mohammed Yazid, and Abdelhamid Mehri of 

the MTLD.

At the second annual conference of the CNRA, held at Cairo in 

August 1957, consideration of the establishment of a future Algerian 

parliament prompted the expansion of the CNRA and the CCE from 

34 to 54 members, and 5 to 14 members respectively; and on September 18, 1958, the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria

was constituted. Composed of 18 members, and headed by a President 

of the Council, Ferhat Abbas, this body integrated within itself both 

political and military functions by giving representation to all the factions within the FLN. With the exception of a change of government in 

August 1961—Benyoussef ben Khedda replaced Ferhat Abbas as President of the Council—this form of leadership remained in effect until 

after conclusion of the Evian Agreement.

Following

During the initial planning stage, 1948–1954, the revolutionary following was estimated at 2,000 to 3,000 persons, mostly drawn from the 

ranks of the MTLD and OS, although some outsiders were included. As 

a whole, these came from the rural lower class because the revolutionary leadership purposely avoided enrolling revolutionaries who might 

be suspected by the authorities. The revolution itself was launched 

by these 2,000 to 3,000 ex-members of the MTLD and the OS, but it 

enjoyed practically no popular support. By 1962, however, the ranks 

of the revolutionaries had swelled to an effective force of some 40,000 

to 60,000 regulars,b

 and the FLN came to enjoy large-scale popular 

support among the Muslims. Political parties such as the UDMA and 

the Association of Ulema, which had disassociated themselves from 

the revolutionary movement in 1954, voluntarily disbanded and urged 

their members to join the FLN as free individuals. Students and labor 

union members also joined the revolution, and the population, which 

b The FLN put the number at over 180,000. Although exaggerated, this number 

could have included the auxiliary and irregular fighters, and the members of the terrorist 

groups in the urban centers.
Dynamics of Revolution

73

had been apathetic at the beginning, enthusiastically supported the 

FLN directives to strike and to demonstrate. A complete cross section, 

in other words, of the Algerian indigenous society came to be represented in the FLN.

Summary

The revolutionary leadership in Algeria was young and drawn 

essentially from the lower-middle and the lower classes. Until 1956 no 

intellectuals were included in the leadership, and only one leader had 

held an official position—in the French Assembly. After 1956, however, 

the leadership expanded and included a number of intellectuals and 

politicians of some stature. The revolutionary following, drawn mostly 

from the rural lower class in the early years of the revolution, included 

a cross section of the entire Muslim population in the later years.

OVERALL STRATEGY AND GOALS

Four considerations prompted the creation of the OS: fear that 

political action alone would immobilize the MTLD in legalism at a 

time when armed resistance elsewhere was beginning to prove effective; belief that the time for resistance was at hand in view of the failure 

of legal methods; belief that armed resistance alone could dramatize 

the political problems sufficiently; and finally, the vulnerable position 

in which the MTLD had placed itself by seeking the legal approval of 

an authority which it denounced as illegitimate, thus losing among the 

masses the benefits which only an intransigent attitude could procure. 

The specific objectives and strategy of the OS were not enunciated. At 

no time was it made clear by the OS leadership whether they supported 

the political program of the parent MTLD, or whether they had goals 

and strategies of their own.

The motivations which prompted the creation of the CRUA, in 

July 1954, and the launching of the revolution, on November 1, 1954, 

were the belief that action alone could bring unity of purpose among 

the nationalist parties, and that the time for resistance was ripe. The 

main political goal of the revolution, as set forth on November 1, 1954, 

was national independence, and the “restoration of the sovereign, 

democratic and social Algerian state within the framework of Islamic 

principles.” The internal objectives of the political program of the FLN 

called for (1) “Political reorganization by restoring the national revolutionary movement to its rightful course and by wiping out every vestige 

of corruption,” and (2) “the rallying and organization of all the sound 

forces of the Algerian people in order to liquidate the colonial system.” 

The external objectives called for (1) “The internationalization of the 
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

Algerian problem,” (2) “the fulfillment of North African unity within 

the natural Arab-Muslim framework,” and (3) “within the framework 

of the United Nations, the affirmation of active sympathy with regard 

to all nations supporting [the] liberation movement.”61

The political aims of the FLN leadership, however, were: (1) to gain 

the support of the Algerian masses and that of influential Algerian 

leaders; (2) to create a cleavage between the Algerians and the French, 

thus establishing the concept of an Algerian nation as a separate and 

distinct entity; (3) to become the only interlocuteur valable (valid negotiator) for this Algerian nation; and (4) to force France to recognize the 

separateness of the Algerian nation. Hence, the emphasis was on sovereignty rather than independence in the political program.

To achieve these aims, the primary objective of the FLN in this 

early stage of the revolution was to keep the uprising alive and develop 

it from mere rebellion to full-scale civil war.

The uprising, launched by a small number of ill-equipped and isolated Algerians scattered in small bands over the country, had yielded 

the FLN very little materially. But, it had signaled a decisive turn of 

events in Franco-Algerian relations by bringing the Algerian nationalist movement out of its paralysis. If the uprising could be kept alive, it 

would ultimately leave Algerian nationalists with only two choices—siding with France, or actively supporting the FLN. Attacks, therefore, of 

the November 1 variety were not to be kept up. With the element of 

surprise gone, such attacks against an alerted French Army and other 

security units stationed in and around the urban centers would have 

resulted in the annihilation of the rebel army, and the FLN movement 

with it. The task of the rebel army in that stage was to fall back on 

the practically inaccessible rural areas, where French influence was virtually nonexistent, engage in guerrilla warfare to give effective demonstrations of its continued existence, develop its organization, and 

recruit the local population in the cause of the FLN.

By 1958 most of the FLN objectives and aims had been achieved. 

Yet, the FLN had failed to attain the strength required to eject the 

French forcibly from Algeria. France, meanwhile, had refused to grant 

Algeria any form of sovereignty. The bitterness generated by the war 

of attrition that followed, from 1958 to 1962, caused the FLN to shift 

the emphasis in its program from sovereignty to independence. From 

1958, therefore, the major goal of the revolution became unequivocally 

total independence.

Summary

FLN goals from 1954 to 1968 included the establishment of a sovereign Algerian state headed by a popular organization whose leaders 
Dynamics of Revolution

75

could make decisions independent of French influence. To achieve 

these goals the FLN launched a guerrilla war against the French, a 

war which became stalemated by 1958. The French refused to grant 

any form of sovereignty to Algeria, and from 1958 the FLN fought for 

total independence.

IDEOLOGY OR MYTH

National Orientation

A rudimentary form of Algerian nationalism found early expression in the war (1832–1847) which the Amir Abdelkader waged against 

France, and the subsequent peasant uprisings which broke out in Algeria during the 35 years that followed. The unity and patriotism of the 

Algerian nation in its resistance to France was inspired by a common 

religion, “community spirit and the instinct of self-preservation.”62 With 

the pacification of Algeria in 1882, and the destruction of the Arabic 

cultural centers and the traditional society, this early manifestation of 

nationalism failed to survive the onslaught of French culture. Not until 

the early 20th century did new expressions of Algerian sentiment begin 

to be evidenced.

These new expressions differed radically from those of the first five 

decades of French rule in that the Muslims sought “change within the 

framework of the French State and French political parties.”63 Algerian sentiment was not anti-French, but rather assimilationist in nature: 

what was sought was political and economic equality, French citizenship and participation in local government, and a united tax system 

which would equally apply to Muslims and Europeans. In essence, these 

demands were voiced by two distinct groups—a small French-educated 

elite which sought political equality, and a large number of Algerian 

workers in France who demanded economic equality. In the interwar 

period, however, such “elements as a revival of Islamic religion and culture combined with increased political consciousness (itself a result of 

visits and work periods in France), higher education, activities in political, revolutionary, and labor movements.”64

The educated elite, imbued with the spirit of French liberalism 

and rationalism, continued to favor assimilation. The Algerian workers, on the other hand, having first come under the influence of the 

French Communist and Socialist parties, then under the influence of 

Pan-Islamic theories, began to agitate for separatism. Thus Algerian 

nationalism, as it came to be represented by the movements which were 

founded by Messali Hadj, first reflected the Communist influence under 

which the ENA had come. The main emphasis of the ENA platform was 
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on colonial emancipationc and Marxist socioeconomic reforms. Nevertheless, in 1937 the nationalists shifted their ideological orientation 

from Marxist to Pan-Islamic. Messali Hadj had split with the Communists over the assimilationist Blum-Violette proposal, and had, through 

the influence of Pan-Islamism, formed a tacit alliance with the Ulema. 

The PPA, accordingly, demanded recognition of a separate status for 

Algeriad on the basis that its religion, culture, and language made it a 

separate and distinct entity which could never become a part of France.

The nationalist movement gained strength during and after World 

War II when the educated Muslim elite, in an about-face, began to voice 

demands for separatism. The anti-Algerian repressions of the Vichy government, the Atlantic Charter, the rejection by the Free French of the 

Algerian Manifesto, the repression of May 8, 1945, the 1947 Algerian 

Statute, and the rigged elections of 1948, had convinced these elites of 

the futility of their cause.e

 They were only able to exert a moderating 

influence. Thus, in the immediate post-World War II period, Algerian 

nationalism did not take on violently anti-French overtones, but came 

to represent a desire for autonomy within the framework of the French 

state, which would give the indigenous population an important role 

in the administration of their country. The revolution broke out only 

after this desire was frustrated by France’s inflexible and outmoded 

colonial policy. It could be said, therefore, that “Algerian nationalism, 

in the sense of ‘a living and active corporate will’ to independence and 

an overriding loyalty of any large number of Algerians to that goal, is a 

product rather than a cause of the 1954 rebellion.”65

Throughout the revolution, nationalist ideology was vague on all 

points except the greater goal of independence. The FLN referred to 

social and agrarian reforms, the collective responsibility of the Algerian people, and equal rights, but there were “no allusions as to how the 

economy will be developed, to what form justice will take, or indeed, 

what form of government will be established, beyond the declaration that it will be ‘a democratic regime exclusively in the service of 

the people; a social regime up to this time unknown in the history of 

c In this case independence for North Africa, which included Tunisia, Algeria and 

Morocco.

d Two main considerations motivated this shift: first, the legal status of Algeria differed from that of Tunisia and Morocco—Algeria was a part of France, whereas Tunisia 

and Morocco were protectorates; second, the nationalist movements which had evolved in 

these countries were seeking independence within a purely local context.

e President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s sympathy for North African Independence, which 

evolved from his discussions with Sultan Mohammed V at Casablanca in January 1943, the 

independence of Syria and Lebanon in 1943—former French mandates and the espousal 

by the Arab League of North African nationalism were considerations which equally motivated this change of attitude.
Dynamics of Revolution

77

Algeria.’ ”66 The absence of a defined ideology was due largely to the 

fact that the FLN included within its ranks persona of widely divergent 

views, ranging from extreme left to extreme right, and lacked institutional groupings. Nationalist unity, in other words, rested on the common desire to attain independence, and this desire overrode all social, 

economic, and political differences.

International Orientation

Since the 12th century Algeria has had strong religious, cultural, 

and linguistic ties with Tunisia and Morocco in particular, and to a 

lesser degree, with the Arab Middle East; it is these factors which influenced the international orientation of Algerian nationalism in the 

20th century.

In 1927, when Messali Hadj began his political agitation in France, 

his movement, although it reflected Marxist ideology, was strongly connected with Tunisian, Moroccan, and Arab-Islamic nationalist movements, and had an essentially pan-North African scope. His conversion 

to Arabism and Islam in 1935 marked the turning point in the future 

course of Algerian nationalism.

Messali Hadj, like Salah Cherif and Abdel Aziz Taalibi of Tunisia, 

and Abdel Khalek Torres and Mekki Naciri of Morocco, became a disciple of Chekib Arslan, the Lebanese “father” of Pan-Arabism and PanIslamism who preached total independence for, and the complete and 

indivisible unity of, the Arab countries. This conversion enabled Messali 

Hadj to reach a tacit alliance with the Islamic reform-minded Ulema, 

and identified the Algerian independence movement with the greater 

Arab and Islamic struggle against colonialism. In 1937 the political 

platform of the PPA contained “suggestions of fraternity and solidarity 

with North Africa as a whole and Arab and Islamic worlds.”67 Algerian 

nationalism thus came to receive its spiritual inspiration from developments in the Middle East. In 1948, for instance, the Arab League

formally espoused the cause of Algerian independence, and in 1952 a 

number of Algerians were reported being trained at commando centers in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.

With the outbreak of the revolution, North African unity within 

the “natural Arab-Muslim framework” was reaffirmed by the FLN, 

and the ties with Tunisia, Morocco, and the Arab world were strengthened. Egypt, in particular, came to have a dominant influence on the 

ideological orientation of the revolution. As the revolution progressed, 

the FLN leadership adopted an increasingly neutralistic stand in the 

ideological struggle between East and West. Following in the footsteps 

of Egypt, they identified themselves with the Afro-Asian bloc, and 
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attended the Bandung and Belgrade Conferences. Pro-Western Tunisia and, to a lesser extent, Morocco exerted a moderating influence on 

the ideology of the revolution, as was demonstrated by the desire of the 

FLN leadership to maintain their ties with the West.f

Religious Emphasis

Islam played a major role in promoting Algerian nationalism, first 

by contributing to the development of a conscious awareness of an 

Algerian political entity among the Muslims, and second by stressing 

the unity of Islam and the Islamic world. During the revolution, it provided the FLN with a moral force and a morale factor in the conduct 

of the war.

The revival of Islam, as carried out by the Ulema, owes much of 

its impetus to French intrusion. “Aiming at a return to the pure principles of Islam, they ran athwart France, as the standard-bearer of 

modernity.”68 By attacking the Marabouts (administration-appointed 

religious leaders) as auxiliaries of the French Government who had 

underwritten the controls placed on the Islamic religion, the Ulema 

were able to undermine the position and authority of the Marabouts

and to win over the hitherto faithful to their own school of thought. 

Their teachings (“Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria 

is my country.”69) were expounded in their madaress (religious schools), 

which were located in most cities and villages. By stressing the unique 

and distinct qualities of Islam and Arabism, these madaress became a 

“breeding ground of young nationalists.”70 With the conclusion of the 

tacit alliance with the PPA, Islam became an ideological component of 

Algerian nationalism.

Islam again proved to be a potent weapon during the course of the 

revolution. To the masses, the FLN represented the revolution as a jihad

(holy war) in defense of Islam and the Arab heritage. The launching 

of a holy war binds all Muslims to the cause, and demands of them 

the ultimate sacrifice if necessary; although the response of the Algerians was by no means total, it nonetheless provided the revolutionaries 

with additional recruits, and morally obligated those who did not join 

to assist the revolutionaries because of their religious affinity. Islam, 

moreover, proved to be a major disciplinary factor in the conduct of 

the revolution. The rebels were governed by its stringent rules. They 

were forbidden alcohol and women, and were expected to obey orders 

blindly. “Disobedience, desertion, a hint of disloyalty, meant death.”71

f It must be pointed out in this respect that by this time the Communist bloc had 

adopted a new strategy of lending support and encouragement to nationalist bourgeoisie 

revolutionary movements.
Dynamics of Revolution

79

Yet with all this austerity, morale remained high—“a kind of hard, confident fatalism”72 which derived from religious belief and observance.

Mystique of Revolution

The choice of the term “front” was in itself a deliberate attempt by 

the revolutionaries to create a mystique which would embody the aspirations of the Algerians. This was an attempt to disassociate themselves 

from the disunited nationalist past, and to represent the revolution as 

a new movement, united and all inclusive, which would be the real vanguard of a new era. “The term ‘Front’ was deliberately employed to 

indicate that they represented not one specific clique or program, but 

wished to be an amalgamation of all political opinion in Algeria.”73

Disunity among the nationalists had discouraged a large number 

of Algerians from joining the cause of nationalism. Presented with 

a united front, it was hoped that they would forget their misgivings 

and join. This was a fortunate choice, for it really came to represent a 

fighting brotherhood, and not just another movement, after the FLN 

absorbed the other parties.

Summary

A unified demand for separatism was not voiced until the 1940’s. 

Up to that time the educated elite were, ideologically, assimilationists: 

they wanted French citizenship, and political and economic equality. 

On the other hand, the workers, guided by leftist ideologies and PanIslamic theories, were separatists: they wanted “colonial emancipation” and radical socioeconomic reforms. Islam promoted nationalism 

and became integrated in the revolutionary ideology. It not only gave 

nationalism a touch of spirituality and provided the FLN with a moral 

force and a morale factor, but it promoted a feeling of solidarity and 

fraternity with other Arab states.

ORGANIZATION

During the first 20 months of the revolution the organization of the 

FLN evolved from a rudimentary and highly decentralized structure to 

an efficient machine, in which the political and military functions were 

well integrated. This was a transitional trial-by-error period, but the 

FLN had the advantage of being able to fall back on the organizational 

structure of the PPA–MTLD, and the experience gained from the OS 

and the CRUA, to see them through. The organizational structure 

which emanated from the Soummam Valley Congress embodied the 
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principles of what was to become later, through constant refinement, a 

democratic form of government.

Political Apparatus

Structural

On the eve of the revolution, the rebel command structure consisted of one body—the CRUA—in which the military and political 

functions were unified. With the outbreak of the revolution, the CRUA 

changed its name to FLN and split into two distinct bodies: the External (political) and the Internal (military) Delegations. In August 1956 

the Internal and External Delegations were replaced with two newly 

created bodies: the CNRA, the highest and policy-making organism of 

the FLN; and the CCE, the FLN war council charged with the conduct 

of the revolution within the framework of the policies laid down by the 

CNRA. Thus, the CCE, was subordinate to the CNRA. In August 1957 

the two bodies were placed on a near-equal footing when the CCE was 

given broader executive powers, and made responsible to the CNRA. In 

September 1958 the CCE was abolished and replaced with a Provisional 

Government which assumed executive functions. The CNRA assumed 

the legislative functions. With the exception of a change of government 

in August 1961, the FLN structure remained unchanged after 1958.

The territorial organization of the MTLD—five wilayas in Algeria and seven autonomous wilayas in France—was adopted by the 

CRUA as its own. This territorial organization remained in effect until 

August  1956, when the Soummam Valley Congress added another 

wilaya and the autonomous zone of Algiers. In 1957 the East Base and 

West Base, along the Algerian-Tunisian and Algerian-Moroccan borders 

respectively, were added as autonomous zones. The decision to make 

Algiers and its environs an autonomous zone was dictated by military 

circumstances. As a major urban center, Algiers was well garrisoned by 

French troops and, thus, beyond the potential of the rebel army. The 

city, however, had a powerful rebel underground. To maintain security, 

and because of the nature of its functions, the underground was given 

a large measure of freedom of action—hence the autonomous zone; 

but it continued to be controlled by the CCE and its successor, the Provisional Government.

Functional

The Internal Delegation was concerned primarily with directing 

the military phase of the revolution; accordingly, it held power over 

local decisions. The main responsibility of the External Delegation was 

to procure arms for the revolution, establish lines of supply, and secure 
Dynamics of Revolution

81

financial, military, and diplomatic aid from “friendly” states. The lack 

of communications between these two bodies created tensions which, 

by August 1956, threatened to open a rift in the ranks of the FLN. Three 

main factors contributed to these tensions. Arms, a major requirement, 

remained in critical shortage, thus endangering the course of the revolution in a number of wilayas. This cast suspicion on the motives of Ben 

Bella, “the principal controller of the arms flow,” who had meanwhile 

gained enormous prestige and power. “The leaders of the interior, still 

bitterly mindful of Messali’s domination and with grievances over arms 

shortages to boot, came to look on Ben Bella’s rising star with deep 

misgivings.” Of greater importance, however, was the need for some 

centralized organization which would be able to reach decisions and 

impose them on all concerned.74

These problems were resolved at Soummam. The FLN Congress 

voted to grant the interior priority over the external in the allocation 

of resources while recognizing the priority of the political over the military. Moreover, it endorsed the principle of collective leadership as a 

means of combatting the rise of personal power. It was also a means 

of uniting the leadership of the party by including in the membership 

of the CNRA the Interior and Exterior leaders and the new figures 

who had subsequently joined the FLN. The following responsibilities 

became the major functions of the CNRA:

The C.N.R.A., the highest organ of the Revolution, 

guides the policy of the [FLN] and is the sole body 

authorized in the last resort to make decisions relative 

to the country’s future. For example, only the C.N.R.A. 

is capable of ordering a cease-fire.75

The CCE, on the other hand, was given the following functions:

The C.C.E. is a real war Council, and is responsible 

for guiding and directing all branches of the Revolution: military, political or diplomatic. It controls all the 

organized bodies of the Revolution (political, military, 

diplomatic, social and administrative).76

Inadequate communications between the CNRA, located in Cairo

and Tunis, and the CCE, centered in Algeria, perpetuated the internalexternal division. Tensions, aggravated by two divergent positions vis-avis possible negotiations with France, generated a power struggle within 

the FLN. The politicians, led by Ferhat Abbas, opposed the attachment 

of a prealable (precondition)—that France give advance notice of its 

intentions to recognize Algerian independence—to these negotiations, 

while the military, led by Mohammed Lamine-Debaghine, demanded 

this a priori guarantee. The inability of the military to convince the 
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FLN leadership of the desirability of this hardline policy set the stage 

for the CNRA conference in August 1957.

At Cairo, the conference eliminated the distinctions between internal and external. The membership of the CCE was expanded to 14, of 

whom more than half were former externalists, and given broad executive powers.

The CCE “has extensive powers on all problems, 

except those which engage the future of the country, 

for example: negotiations, end of hostilities, alignment 

with one bloc or another, and international solution to 

the Algerian problem, intervention of a third party in 

the Franco-Algerian conflict, etc. . . .”77

The CNRA, on the other hand, suffered a slight decline in power. 

Its membership was expanded to 54 full voting members, and it now 

took a two-thirds vote to overrule CCE actions. Thus, in a sense, the 

political achieved predominance over the military. The power struggle over negotiations continued, and was not resolved until September 1958, when the Provisional Government was created.

A number of factors precipitated the creation of the Provisional 

Government, the most important of which were the declaration of 

France of its right to hot pursuit, and the bombing of the Tunisian village of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef. President Bourguiba of Tunisia, fearing that 

the war might spread to Tunisian soil, pressured the FLN into moderating their terms for an agreement with France. The FLN demanded, in 

return, Tunisian and Moroccan recognition of a provisional Algerian 

government which could negotiate with France as the sole representative of the Algerian people. The moderate tone which the FLN adopted 

in April 1958 came after a placating agreement which gave the military 

key positions in the forthcoming provisional government, and an equal 

say in its policies. Krim received the Vice Premiership and the Ministry 

of the Armed Forces; Lakhdar Ben Tobbal, former chief of Wilaya II, 

became Minister of the Interior; and Abdelhafid Boussouf, former 

chief of Wilaya V, became Minister of Communications and Liaison.78

In order to affirm the predominance of the political over the military, 

political commissars were attached at all levels of command. The task 

of these political commissars was not only “preparing the ground for 

a military operation through propaganda and informational activities, 

but also of setting up local administrations to take care of non-military 

problems during the Army’s stay in a given area and thereafter.”79

The policy of political moderation influenced military developments. Military operations were reduced to a minimum, and this created resentment among some of the field commanders. Some of the 
Dynamics of Revolution

83

political cadres, on the other hand, continued to favor a policy of 

no compromise with France. Their position had, all the more, been 

strengthened by Communist overtures, and it was “felt that concessions 

to the Communists would bring quick and decisive military support.” 

When, therefore, in the latter part of 1958 and during 1959, France 

submitted unsatisfactory negotiating terms, they precipitated a showdown with the Provisional Government.80

At the meeting of the Provisional Government in Libya, in December 1959–January 1960, the hard-line advocates were defeated, and 

Abbas remained in firm control. The importance of this moderate victory was the fact that the army came under the stricter control of a 

three-man general staff composed of Bel Kacem Krim, Ben Tobbal, and 

Abdelhafid Boussouf. Thus, the military remained subservient to the 

political. In 1961 another showdown precipitated once more by intransigent French negotiation terms resulted in the downfall of Abbas. 

Benyoussef ben Khedda, who replaced Abbas as Premier, was a “partisan of negotiation but differed in being more willing to back up his 

position by recourse to Communist diplomatic support.”81 Thus the primary function of the Provisional Government remained unchanged. It 

continued to act as the sole representative of the FLN and the Algerian 

people in the negotiations with France. On March 18, 1962, a truce 

agreement was reached with France, and the revolution came to an end 

on March 19, 1962.

Underground

From November 1954 to June 1957, the structural hierarchy of the 

Algiers underground was relatively simple. Cells, the basic unit, were 

of two functional types: military and political-administrative. These 

were headed by two deputies who in turn were responsible to a chief in 

whom the military and political functions were combined. In June 1957 

the underground was reorganized. Collective responsibility was introduced at the highest level, and another type of cell (liaison intelligence) 

was added. Cells of each functional type were then grouped into districts, three districts into a sector, and three sectors to a region. Algiers 

was divided into three regions: Region 1 included the two largest sections of the Casbah; Region 2 included the remainder of the Casbah 

and Western Algiers and its suburbs; and Region 3 included Eastern 

Algiers and its suburbs. These three regions formed the Autonomous 

Zone. The zonal political, military, and liaison intelligence activities 

were directed by three men who were responsible to the Council of the 

Autonomous Zone of Algiers, the underground’s supreme authority. 

The Council, composed of a political-military chief and three deputies 
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

charged respectively with political, military, and liaison intelligence 

responsibilities, directed the terrorist network.82

The regional military branch in each region was made of three 

groups, each of which included 11 men—a chief, his lieutenant, and 

three cells of three men each. Including the regional chief and his 

deputy, there were 35 armed men per region, 105 in all Algiers. Besides 

these “military” persons charged with protecting FLN members and 

their activities were the 50–150 hard-core terrorists who formed the 

bomb-network. The bomb-network, in many instances, used known 

gangsters or unemployed persons to carry out terrorist activities.83

The political branch in each region consisted of 50–70 persons, 

according to the particular region. These were entrusted with the distribution of tracts, the delegation of assignments, and clandestine transportation. Another unit, the “choc group” was charged with enforcing 

the directives of the FLN by means ranging from intimidation to beatings and assassination. Moreover, each region also had a propaganda 

printing-diffusing unit. The principal equipment of this unit consisted 

of a typewriter and a mimeograph machine. All tracts prepared at the 

zonal echelon had to be mimeographed in every region so as to minimize the dangerous transportation of tract packets in Algiers.84

Each regional-level political branch also enjoyed the services of a 

financial commission which, in theory, was composed of five businessmen well established in the region. This commission performed essentially three tasks: it assessed the taxes which were to be levied on other 

businessmen, kept a running account of the revenue thus derived, and 

acted as a banking institution by depositing the revenue in the accounts 

of its members’ respective establishments. In practice, however, the system was generally directed by one of the political or business leaders 

of each region.85 The specific function and organization of the intelligence-liaison branch remains, to this date, unclear.

Trade Unions

The revolution began without the support of any of the existing 

trade unions—the Communist-dominated Confédération Générale du 

Travail (GT), the Socialist Force Ouvrière (FO), and the Catholic Confédération Française de Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC)—none of which 

was nationalist-oriented. In March 1956 the FLN created the Union 

Générale des Travailleurs Algériens (UGTA) to counter the Messali Hadj 

sponsored Union Syndicale des Travailleurs Algériens (USTA), and also 

because of the dawning importance on the FLN leadership of trade 

union activity. In July 1956 the UGTA was admitted to the International 

Confederation of Trade Unions (ICFTU)—an American-influenced 
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85

organization—because of the pressure which the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) exerted on the ICFTU, and because the UGTA 

commanded greater support in Algeria than any of its rivals as a result 

of its close association with the FLN. Within a month after its formation, 

the UGTA claimed to have enrolled 18 unions, and its membership was 

estimated at between 55,000 and 100,000. Ostensibly, the UGTA was 

headed by a General Secretariat and an Executive Committee which 

represented the different unions. Its leadership, however, “overlapped 

high-level F.L.N. personnel.”86 In the Autonomous Zone of Algiers, for 

instance, it took its directives from the underground, while its activities 

in Algeria were directed by the CCE and, later on, by the Provisional 

Government.

The importance of the UGTA lay in the fact that it provided the 

FLN with additional funds, intelligence, and recruits. Even after severe 

repressions pushed it underground in 1957, it continued to perform 

these duties. Sabotage and strikes were also within the realm of UGTA 

activities, but these did not prove very successful.
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 
Dynamics of Revolution

87

From January 1956 on, black sectors indicate zones secured by nationalist forces. In the crosshatched 

areas nationalist forces are able to introduce a considerable degree of insecurity.

Nationalist Military Activity November 1954–1958.
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

The Rebel Army

During the first 20 months of the revolution, the organization of a 

rebel army was left to the wilaya commanders. The task of these men 

was to build and organize an army in their respective wilayas as they 

saw best. Thus they were the ultimate authority. They did their own 

recruiting, organized their own lines of supply, foraged for their own 

arms, dictated their own military operations, and named their own 

subordinates. Liaison and coordination between wilaya commanders 

was virtually nonexistent. By August 1956 the insurgents had succeeded 

in establishing themselves in almost all of Algeria, and the FLN Soummam Valley Congress undertook the organization of these insurgents 

along purely military lines.

The rebel forces were formally designated as the National Liberation Army (ALN), and a regular command structure was created. 

Algeria was divided into six operational theaters, or wilayas, identical 

with the earlier civil divisions. These were: Wilaya I, Aures Nementcha; 

Wilaya II, North Constantine; Wilaya III, Kabylia; Wilaya IV, Algiers

region; Wilaya V, Oran; and Wilaya VI, Aumale. Wilayas were in turn 

subdivided into zones—Wilaya I–6; Wilaya II–3; Wilaya III–4; Wilaya

IV–3; Wilaya V–9; and Wilaya VI–2 (regions and sectors). The city of 

Algiers was made an autonomous zone. In 1957 the East Base (SoukAhras) and the West Base (Nador), along the Algerian-Tunisian and 

Algerian-Moroccan borders, respectively, were added as autonomous 

zones.g

The regular forces of the army (moudjahiddine), estimated at 40,000,h

were organized into battalions consisting of 350 men (three companies 

and 20 officers), companies of 110 men (three platoons and 5 officers), 

platoons of 35 men (three groups plus a platoon leader and his assistant), groups of 11 men which included a sergeant and two corporals, 

and half-groups composed of five men and a corporal.87 In 1957 the 

battalion was enlarged to 600 men and the company to 150 to allow 

for coordinated major engagements. In 1958 these major engagements 

proved too costly to the ALN, and the large units which were heavy 

and vulnerable were broken up and reorganized into light, companysize (100 men), self-sufficient, and highly mobile commando units. The 

irregular (moussabiline), estimated at between 55,000 and 100,000, were 

not affected by this reorganization. Their prime function continued to 

be that of assisting the regulars in certain limited operations, in gathering intelligence, and acting as advance guards.

g France made up Wilaya VII. Although no military action was undertaken, France 

experienced FLN-directed terrorism.

h Of these, an estimated 35,000 were outside of Algeria.
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89

The ranks, grades, and insignia that became standardized in the 

ALN were:

a. Corporal—red inverted V

b. Sergeant—two inverted V’s

c. Sergeant Major—five inverted V’s

d. Adjutant (Warrant Officer)—red V underlined by a white 

stripe

e. Cadet—white star

f. Second Lieutenant—red star

g. First Lieutenant—one red star and one white star

h. Captain—two red stars

i. Commandant (Major)—two red stars and one white star

j. Colonel—three red stars

The badges which were worn on all caps consisted of a star and a red 

crescent.88

Levels of responsibility for the various ranks came to be almost 

identical with those of the French Army. Colonels, in the absence of 

the rank of general (the nationalists did not want to name anyone 

a general because, they feared the growth of personal power), were 

included in the membership of the CCE, and commanded the wilayas. 

Each was assisted by three majors. The zones were commanded by captains, each of whom was assisted by three first lieutenants. The regions 

were commanded by second lieutenants who were each assisted by 

three cadets, and the sectors were commanded by adjutants assisted 

by three sergeants major each.89 The three assistants at all of the levels 

of command represented the three main branches in the ALN: political affairs (the political commissar assumed the same rank as those of 

the other assistants, regardless of the echelon), military affairs, and 

liaison-intelligence. Appointment, dismissal, and demotion of officers 

were handled by the CCE at the recommendation of the commanding 

colonel, while noncommissioned officers were promoted or demoted 

by the head of the wilaya.

Logistics was mainly concerned with the supply of weapons and 

ammunition. Food was no problem since the restricted diet of the 

ALN—unleavened bread, peppers, cous cous, rice, mutton, and goat’s 

milk—enabled it to live off the land. The ALN acquired arms—

ordnance rifles, submachineguns, machineguns, 20-mm. bofor cannons, mortars, and bazookas—through direct purchases from any 

source, or as gifts from countries such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Yugoslavia. An estimated 10 percent of the total weapons of the ALN came 

from French sources, either as a result of losses in direct combat or as 
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

“gifts” which deserters brought with them. The purchase of weapons 

was generally undertaken by members of the governing body of the 

FLN; the arms were shipped to Tunisian or Moroccan ports, and then 

transferred to the borders. Some of the Egyptian arms shipments took 

a somewhat more direct line via Libya, into southern Tunisia, and then 

Algeria. Since the ALN lacked vehicles and air transportation, most of 

the armies were ferried across the Tunisian and Moroccan borders by 

mule caravans. After 1957 the ALN’s main supply depots became the 

East and West Bases.

The major logistical problem which the ALN encountered, other 

than French interception and tight control measures,i

 grew out of the 

heterogeneous nature of the arms which were acquired. The variety 

of calibers, makes, and models made it impossible to maintain an adequate supply of spare parts and ammunition. This often delayed operations until the proper spare parts, ammunition, and weapons were 

received.

Summary

The FLN comprised the main revolutionary effort in Algeria in 

the 1950’s. Its precursor was the OS, an illegal armed group organized 

secretly by a radical wing of the MTLD political party. When the existence of the OS was discovered by French authorities, the MTLD was 

driven underground and some of its members reconstituted the OS as 

the CRUA in the summer of 1954. The CRUA changed its name to FLN 

for propaganda purposes at the outbreak of the revolution in November of that year. The FLN, with its military arm, the ALN, was highly 

centralized and combined political and military functions.

From November 1954 the FLN underwent a series of political and 

military modifications. In September 1958 the FLN created the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, a government-in-arms 

which included a premier, several vice premiers, and a number of cabinet posts. Decisions reached by the Provisional Government were binding on all Algerians inside and outside of Algeria.

TECHNIQUES

Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency Operations

ALN strategy appears to have drawn on—and reversed—the tache 

de l’huile (grease spot) strategy of Marshal Lyautey of France. Lyautey 

i These, in many instances, created acute supply shortages especially in the areas farthest from the borders.
Dynamics of Revolution

91

succeeded in pacifying Morocco in 1925 by massing his troops in settled areas and then spreading “in widening circles a French peace.”90

The ALN, on the other hand, planted a few rebels in remote villages 

outside the French peace. The task of these rebels was to win over and 

indoctrinate the villagers, thus enabling the ALN to acquire recruits, 

food, and hiding places. From these initial “grease spots,” the penetration would move, in widening circles, to neighboring areas and eventually reach the settled outposts under French control. Here the French 

hold on the Muslim population would be broken (1) by rebel guerrilla 

and terrorist action (direct attacks on French troops; assassinations; 

bomb throwing; strikes; boycott of French goods, settlers, and Francophile Muslims; and economic sabotage) which would force the French 

administration to evacuate the area; or (2) as a result of the severity of 

French repression which generally followed such attacks and tended 

to cast the population into the rebel camp. In the urban centers and 

cities, which were mainly inhabited by settlers and which were strongly 

defended by French forces, terrorism alone was used.91 Terrorism aimed 

at Francophile Muslims, rural Muslim politicians, and settlers created 

an atmosphere of anxiety favorable to the FLN. It silenced the Francophile Muslims, drove a wedge between settlers and Algerians, and 

forced the French administration to adopt sterner security measures, 

which meant that more troops were tied down defending the cities and 

maintaining order.

In the early stages of the revolution, guerrilla action was generally 

uncoordinated. Small units of less than 20 men, armed mostly with 

shotguns and obsolete rifles, engaged isolated French patrols only for 

the purpose of seizing their weapons. The main concern then was to 

work out the organization of the future ALN. In Wilaya I, for instance, 

Ben Boulaid had launched the revolution with 150 men divided into 

five units. During the next few months, these units were withdrawn to 

the fastness of the Aures mountains, where the guerrilla organization 

took form and the “grease spot” strategy was put into effect. Ben Boulaid made contact “with two nomadic bandit groups on the fringes of 

the Sahara, and organized a southern supply line: from Egypt through 

Libya south of Tunisia, then up through a string of Saharan oases to 

the Aures.”92 By March 1955, the rebel stronghold in the Aures, extending some 2,000 square miles, included a special headquarters staff, a 

rudimentary liaison network, and a supply group. In April, ambushes 

once again broke out in Wilaya I. On April 13 a small French convoy was 

ambushed and 17 rifles and one machinegun were seized; 3 days later 

the occupants of a jeep—a major and a chaplain—were slain; and on 

April 24, the ambush of a convoy yielded the rebels 30 Muslim deserters 

and their weapons. Sallies of this type continued throughout the countryside, and by 1956 guerrilla activities began to be evidenced in the 
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

environs of the major cities of the Aures. At the same time, the boycott 

of French goods in these cities indicated that the FLN had penetrated 

the urban centers.93

This pattern of development characterized the formation of the 

other wilayas. The objectives remained the same: acquisition of arms, 

raising guerrilla units, and organizing the ALN. And in most of these 

wilayas, the successful application of the “grease spot” strategy brought 

the rebels into the environs of the major urban centers. The early success of the rebels was due in part to the inadequacy of the initial French 

countermeasures. The 55,000-man French Army which garrisoned 

Algeria in 1954, and which was eventually increased to 200,000 men in 

1956, was too small to effectively defend the urban centers and track 

down the guerrillas at the same time. Moreover, the reluctance of the 

French Government to recognize the revolution for what it was, prevented the implementation of sound counterguerrilla tactics. In most 

instances the classical military operations initiated between 1954 and 

1957 more often than not disrupted guerrilla activities but allowed the 

rebels to escape unharmed.

The initial French response consisted of four major types of ripostes: 

military posts; self-contained commando units or patrols sent out from 

these posts; isolated ambushes; and large-scale operations. In most 

cases these failed to achieve positive results. The military posts, built 

at great cost in zones to be pacified, had no rayonnement (did not cover 

large areas), and often the surrounding villages were heavily infested 

by the enemy. As a result, all post activities were carefully watched, 

noted, and reported to the guerrilla units operating in the area. Moreover, the fact that most of these posts were erected at strategic points to 

ensure the safety of essential lines of supply meant that the guerrillas 

could easily avoid them, while the large areas which separated them 

remained open to guerrilla activity.

The self-contained commando units or patrols that were sent out 

from the military posts to ferret out the guerrilla bands caused some 

uneasiness, but failed to accomplish their mission. For one thing, the 

patrols or units rarely exceeded 60 men in number, so they were too 

small to effectively engage the guerrillas. Second, the patrol was of short 

duration and the units constantly on the march. They did not stay in a 

given area long enough to afford the population any sort of protection. 

Hence, they were unable to destroy the guerrilla military-political organization because the inhabitants refused to risk retaliation for providing the French with necessary vital information. Finally, these patrols 

or commando units could not vary their itinerary, especially in difficult 

terrain. This proved to be detrimental to the purpose of the mission 

inasmuch as these units or patrols had to remain on well-known trails, 
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93

and therefore were vulnerable to prepared ambushes in force. The isolated ambushes suffered from the same inherent weakness. Guerrilla 

bands were warned well in advance by the population and were able to 

avoid the trap or even to lay a countertrap.

Large-scale operations, because of their very nature, yielded meager 

results. The massing of large numbers of troops generally preempted 

the element of surprise, giving the guerrillas time to disperse. In most 

instances these large-scale operations failed to encircle and destroy the 

enemy along with his political-military organization.94

During 1957 a number of factors prompted the FLN–ALN to 

change its tactics from small, seemingly uncoordinated guerrilla 

actions to coordinated major engagements at the battalion level. For 

one, the ranks of the ALN had swelled and armament had become 

more readily available. This factor, along with the apparent weakness 

of the initial French reaction, had led certain wilaya commanders to 

believe that the time was ripe to step up the campaign from guerrilla 

warfare to a frontal-type war, similar to the latter stages of the war in 

Indochina. Second, with the internationalization of the Algerian conflict—the Algerian problem having been placed on the agenda of the 

United Nations—the rebels needed to demonstrate their power and 

the effectiveness of their organization. Third, the new French tactic 

of quadrillage,

j

 still in its initial stage of implementation, threatened to 

wrest from the rebels their initiative, the loss of which might have serious morale implications.

Major engagements thus took place in the Collo Peninsula, El Milia 

and Kabyle, Ouarsensis, and the southern section of the Department 

of Oran in late 1957 and early 1958. ALN battalions composed of three 

or four reinforced companies of 150 men armed with 60- and 81-mm. 

mortars, 50- and 30-caliber machineguns, BAR’s, and a varied assortment of semiautomatic and ordnance rifles engaged French units of 

smaller or equal strength in continuous fighting. In these types of 

engagements, however, the French Army was able to bring to bear its 

overwhelming superiority in artillery, armor, and in the air, and severely 

maul the ALN units.

In the second half of 1958, the ALN reverted to what became known 

as the “mosquito war”—hit-and-run tactics “against the shifting fringe 

of French strength”95 by units seldom larger than a company. Daylight 

and fair-weather combat, in which the overall superiority of the French 

forces could be brought to bear, were avoided. Guerrilla ambushes 

and attacks on French units, convoys, and outposts took place, in 

most instances, at night and during bad weather; and in almost every 

j See page 52 for definition of quadrillage.
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

engagement they were able to achieve surprise due to the help of the 

civilian population.

In every operation, the Algerians enjoy a basic advantage: their seemingly omnipresent civilian auxiliary, 

who serve as “human radar,” scouts, intelligence 

agents, and guides.96

This reversion to hit-and-run tactics resulted from a number of factors: (1) the major engagements at the battalion level had proved to be 

too costly; (2) there were clear and definite indications that the Algerian conflict would be eventually settled by political negotiations on 

the basis of a formula which would recognize Algerian sovereignty; and 

(3) the French quadrillage tactics. When the French strongly garrisoned 

the urban centers, it soon became evident that it would be impossible for the ALN to dislodge them. At the same time, the 50,000 handpicked men who the French Army selected to track down ALN units in 

the rural areas threatened, with the formidable support to which they 

had recourse, to eliminate the ALN from these areas unless it could 

adjust to this new situation. Therefore, the ALN was reorganized into 

small, self-sufficient units which were capable of marching more than 

25 miles a day. They purposely avoided major contacts with the French 

Army, but reoccupied areas evacuated by the French. Strikes against 

French units were undertaken only when the ALN was assured of success, and dispersal was mandatory upon completion of such action. 

This, in essence, characterized ALN operations from 1958 to the end 

of the conflict on March 19, 1962.

The counterinsurgency device of quadrillage, used to such telling 

effect against the Algerian rebels, was first formulated by the French 

Army in 1956, and fully implemented in 1957. It enabled the French to 

stem the course of the revolution, and produced a favorable military 

stalemate by the middle of 1958. To facilitate fully coordinated militarycivilian administrative operations, its hierarchical organization was 

based on the civil administrative structure. Thus the administrative 

department became a military zone, the arrondissement (district) a sector, and the canton a quartier (subsector). Most of the military activity 

took place at the sector level, and sector activities were coordinated by 

the zone commander. Basically, quadrillage tactics were utilized to isolate the guerrillas by denying them popular support, but included civic 

action to win over the population. At the sector level French troops garrisoned all major cities to assist the local police in combatting terrorism 

and prevent the underground from supplying the guerrilla units in the 

adjacent rural areas. In the rural areas, troops in diminishing force garrisoned all major and strategic villages, hamlets, and farms, living with 

the inhabitants. They organized the defenses of the places—erecting 
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barbed-wire fences, watchtowers, pillboxes, and other weapon emplacements, and recruiting the inhabitants in harkis (self-defense units)—

moved in the inhabitants of neighboring villages, launched “police” 

operations to eliminate subversive elements, and issued new identity 

cards which entitled the holder to subsistence allowances. Medical 

treatment was provided, schools were built, and paid work was made 

available. With the organization of these defenses, especially at the village level, garrison troops were liberated to undertake patrols aimed at 

tracking down the guerrilla units operating in the village. Of battalion 

size, broken up into four infantry companies of 150 men each, able 

to travel on foot or by truck, these troupes d’intervalle (troops operating between one village and the other), were strong enough to engage 

guerrilla bands independently or in conjunction with other such units. 

Their mission was to destroy the rebel political organization in the sector, and to eliminate the guerrillas.

The zone commander performed two major tasks: (1) he coordinated all phases of the counterinsurgency operations at the sector 

level, coordinated inter- and intra-sector activity, established for each 

sector its plan of operation, gave precise directives concerning “police” 

operations in the villages, and ensured the organization and control of 

the population; (2) initiated major military operations which brought 

the war to the practically inaccessible zones de refuge (redoubts) of the 

rebels. The zone commander disposed of large zonal reserve troops, 

the troupes d’intervention, which could be reinforced by theater of operations reserves, so they could undertake counterguerrilla operations. 

Occasionally the troupes d’intervention assisted the troupes d’intervalle in 

larger than anticipated engagements at the sector level.97

Recruiting

In the rural areas the guerrilla units acted on the population 

through persuasion and the use of terror. Their main targets were 

the recalcitrant communities; the local leadership, generally Frenchappointed and therefore presumed to be hostile, was eliminated by 

assassination, and the population was then forced to pay taxes, provide 

recruits and supplies, and participate in acts of terrorism and sabotage. 

Once compromised, these communities had no alternative but to make 

common cause with the FLN, providing the ALN units with safe bases 

of operations and necessary lookouts and informants. However, these 

units ingratiated themselves with the local population and gained their 

continued support and confidence by providing them with an efficient 

administration which settled their feuds, protected them from neighboring raiders, and in many cases, established elementary schools and 
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medical clinics.98 Frequently the ALN units would strike an alliance 

with a particular tribe or hamlet against its rival, eliminate that rival 

by force of arms, and then rule the area through this tribe or hamlet.

Recruitment was not a problem since most of the guerrillas were 

natives of the area in which they operated, and their influence in that 

particular locale could always be counted upon to provide the ALN 

with the necessary manpower. It was more the shortage of arms that 

limited the potential of the ALN. Notwithstanding this shortage, the 

ALN devised a system of recruitment which assured it of vast reserves. 

Algerians who wished to join were never turned down. They were asked 

first to serve as auxiliaries in their own locale to prove their worth. 

Only when the need for additional men arose, either because of death 

on the battlefield or capture, were the auxiliaries enrolled as regulars 

in the ranks of the ALN. After 1957, when the French initiated their 

quadrillage tactics, many of the auxiliaries were sent to the East or West 

Bases to train as regulars in order to escape being interned in relocation camps.

Likewise, recruitment for the underground in the urban centers, 

limited in itself because of security regulations, proved to be no problem. The initial members of the underground were generally former 

members of the PPA–MTLD. When the need for additional members 

arose, it was not difficult to find willing Algerians in the labor or student 

unions. It was not uncommon for a particular member of the underground to seek the assistance of nonmember friends in the execution 

of missions. Once compromised, these workers, students, and friends 

became by force of circumstances members of the underground. 

Whenever certain members of the underground were suspected and 

sought by the French authorities, they were smuggled out of the urban 

centers and attached to the ALN units in the rural areas as regulars. 

Educated members of the underground whose identity became known 

to the police were sent out of the country and attached to the different 

FLN missions abroad.

Terrorism

Terrorism took the form of intimidation, assassination, and indiscriminate bombing. Francophile Muslims and rival nationalist leaders 

were at first warned by letters, bearing ALN letterhead and crest, to 

desist from cooperating with the French administration, or cease all 

political activity not in conformity with FLN directives. Those who persisted were then assassinated and the order of execution, bearing ALN 

letterhead and crest, was left on the victim. The nephew of Ferhat Abbas

was executed in that manner in 1955, and an order for the execution of 
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Ferhat Abbas himself was found on the body of the slain executioner. 

By this method, the FLN silenced its opposition and weakened the position of the French administration by depriving it of the support of some 

of the Muslim population and leaders. At the same time, assassination 

enhanced the prestige of the FLN among the masses by affording tangible proof of the organization’s effectiveness and intrepidity.

Indiscriminate bombing—lobbing of hand grenades into crowds 

and the placing of delayed-action bombs in streetcars, cafes, stadiums, 

etc.—was aimed at the European population. It created an atmosphere 

of anxiety and suspicion which deepened the cleavage between the two 

main communities and made cooperation almost impossible. It also 

forced the French to institute harsh repressive measures which further 

antagonized the Muslim population and necessitated the stationing of 

more troops in the cities, thus relieving some of the pressure on the 

ALN forces in the rural areas.

These two kinds of terrorist actions were planned and carried out 

by two different branches of the underground. Assassination of individuals and the indiscriminate shooting of Europeans were the responsibility of the military branch. In the case of political assassination, the 

habits of the individual to be assassinated were carefully noted and a 

plan which afforded the “executioners” the best chances of escape was 

devised. Two hard-core terrorists (the underground preferred to use 

two men because it improved the chance of success) were then selected, 

instructed as to the plan, and given the appropriate weapons. Weapons 

were issued just prior to the execution of the mission and the executioners were required to return them upon completion of their task. 

The indiscriminate shooting of Europeans generally took place in the 

areas closest to the Casbah, or Muslim section of the city. The executioners were instructed to empty their clips, mingle in the crowds, and 

make their way back to the Casbah with utmost haste.

Indiscriminate bombing, the responsibility of the special bomb 

network, was more complicated. In the initial stage of the revolution, 

the underground did not have the materials or technical knowledge 

needed for making bombs. Not to be outdone by the Communists, who 

enjoyed these facilities and who had joined the revolution on their own, 

the FLN underground struck an alliance with them. The Communists 

provided the bombs and the rebel underground deposited them in the 

desired places. By late 1955 and early 1956, however, the underground 

was able to function independently of the Communists. It had learned 

to make its own bombs; furthermore, explosives, detonators, and casings were more readily obtainable, both internally and from outside. 

Algerians who worked in drugstores, pharmacies, and agricultural centers were instructed to steal chemicals (e.g., potassium chlorate) which 
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could be used in making explosives. The compounding of explosives 

was generally delegated to chemists or chemistry students, while casings 

were entrusted to welders. Another group made the detonators—generally crude timeclocks attached to electric batteries—and yet another 

group assembled the weapons. Later, when modern explosives such as 

plastic and detonators began to be channeled in from the exterior, the 

necessity for the above process was almost entirely eliminated.99

The placement of bombs was the responsibility of another group in 

the bomb network. Locale and time were carefully chosen to assure the 

maximum number of victims. The depositors were apprised of their 

mission just prior to its actual execution, and the bombs were timed 

to allow them to escape. The underground used a high percentage of 

women and juveniles for these missions because they were less likely to 

be suspected and almost never searched by French patrols.100

Intelligence

The intelligence techniques of the FLN–ALN were rudimentary but 

effective. In the field, the ALN maintained a large number of civilian 

auxiliaries who acted both as quasi-military units and as intelligence 

agents. These auxiliaries “infiltrated French held villages, prowled 

ahead of regular ALN columns, and provided a steady stream of fresh 

information.”101 They were specifically instructed to note the number 

of French troops in their area, their respective armament, and their 

projected direction. They were, furthermore, briefed on how to distinguish between the different units and the variety of arms. These 

auxiliaries generally reported to the liaison and intelligence officer 

attached to the ALN unit operating in their area. Additional information was supplied by Muslim, and occasionally French, deserters from 

the French Army. The information was relayed to ALN headquarters 

and other units by courier or by radio.

In the major urban centers “the FLN instructed people to report 

on the daily activities of French police and armed forces.”102 It also 

used a large number of double agents to gather further information on 

French administrative measures, troop movements, and materiel. This 

information was passed on to higher echelons and the CCE by courier.

Propaganda: Media and Themes

Propaganda was given special consideration by the FLN in and outside of Algeria. Political officers were attached to the ALN at all levels of command to indoctrinate the soldiers and the public under its 

control. Special broadcasts, beamed from Tunis, Cairo, and Damascus, 
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and the constant distribution of leaflets, tracts, and the weekly FLN 

newspaper El Moudjahid constituted some of the other media used to 

influence the Algerian masses.

In its overseas efforts the FLN employed a variety of techniques. 

In France, particularly, it relied on sympathetic journalists and writers 

such as the existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre for books and pamphlets supporting its cause. It made use of a number of church groups who were 

horrified at the repressive measures of the French Army. In the major 

capitals of the world, the FLN opened offices of information. Through 

them propaganda literature was made available to the public. Also, the 

staffs of these offices made every attempt to establish contacts with the 

press and important officials, and took every opportunity to expound 

the FLN cause in public speeches and debates. It was hoped that these 

influential groups would be able to exert pressure on their respective 

governments either to support the FLN directly or persuade France 

to negotiate.

Propaganda themes, as well as techniques, varied according to the 

target audience. In Algeria, great stress was placed on propaganda tasks 

that tended to elicit the support of the masses. To the educated Muslim, 

the FLN attempted to explain the causes of the revolution in historical, 

economic, social, and political terms. To the masses, the FLN represented the revolution as a holy war in defense of Islam and the Arab 

heritage. In the ALN, the propaganda officers used themes that were 

calculated to bring about a conscious awareness of an Algerian entity 

which would lead the soldiers to accept the sacrifices imposed by war. 

To the world at large, FLN themes tended to center on proving that 

the revolution was justified, that Algeria was not really part of France, 

and that it ought to be granted complete independence. Propaganda 

appeals to the French liberals, the main target audience in France, 

attempted to convince them that the war in Algeria was an unjust war, 

and that the FLN action arose from the same principles and aspiration 

that had led to the French Revolution. In the United States, a primary 

target because it was presumed that Washington exerted strong influence on France, the FLN tended to appeal to the masses on the basis 

that both the Algerian and American revolutions were prompted by 

very similar causes. The appeals, however, were moderate in that they 

sought to have Washington persuade France to negotiate a reasonable 

settlement. The United Nations was also an excellent target audience 

and provided “press coverage the FLN might not have had otherwise.”103

Another major target audience, to which the FLN paid particular attention, was big business. Emphasis was placed on the benefits 

which would accrue from an independent Algeria. Oil companies, in 
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particular, were asked for support, financial and other, in return for 

promises of concessions in a future independent Algeria.

Strikes and Demonstrations

Strikes and demonstrations were utilized by the FLN as a political 

weapon to draw outside attention to its cause and to create a cleavage 

between the Muslim and European communities. But their success was 

limited, and therefore they were resorted to infrequently. For the most 

part, FLN-sponsored strikes and demonstrations were called to accentuate political events, in and outside of Algeria, which had a direct 

bearing on the outcome of the war and were likely to influence it. The 

strikes in Algeria, on 20 August 1955, were timed to coincide with the 

demonstrations in Morocco which marked the anniversary of the ousting of France to give effective evidence of the solidarity of the North 

African people. The demonstrations and violence which erupted in 

September 1955, when the Algerian question was placed on the agenda 

of the United Nations, were organized to show that the Algerian people, and not simply the rebels, were opposed to French rule; the strong 

demonstrations in December 1960 were launched by the FLN to show 

the unified opposition of the Algerians to de Gaulle’s early offer of an 

Algerian Algeria.

The demonstrations were also used to provoke severe repressions 

by the French. The technique used was as follows: a small number of 

FLN members organized a small demonstration. When the police or 

the army arrived on the scene to quell it, the FLN members fired on 

them and disappeared, whereupon the full retaliation was directed 

against the demonstrators and their families—which tended to alienate them and cast them into the rebel camp. Although successful in the 

early stages of the revolution, this method was abandoned when the 

French authorities refrained from firing on the crowds and took limited legal action against the participants and their families. It should 

be noted that most demonstrations took place in the urban centers 

and their environs, and were controlled by the political branch of the 

FLN underground.

Summary

The FLN–ALN employed tried techniques of guerrilla warfare and 

underground terrorism. The overall objectives were to keep the revolution viable by systematically attacking French outposts in the rural 

areas, and by attracting an increasing revolutionary following from the 

Algerians who found themselves the target of French repressions which 
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generally followed guerrilla attacks. Terrorism was aimed at Francophile Muslims and European settlers.

Hit-and-run ambushes characterized guerrilla operations. The 

guerrilla units avoided head-on encounters with the French and usually attacked at night or during bad weather, when they were least 

expected. The civilian population furnished the guerrillas information on French positions and movements. Terrorism, which included 

assassinations and indiscriminate bombings, weakened the support 

of the French within the Muslim population and its leaders, and created anxiety within the European community. FLN propaganda offices 

were opened throughout the world, and propaganda themes brought 

the FLN inestimable prestige and support.

The French were caught by surprise when hostilities broke out and 

grossly underestimated the character and extent of the revolutionary 

movement. The initial French countermeasures were thus ineffectual: 

French units were too massive and heavy and unadaptable to the terrain and type of warfare that was being fought in Algeria. Combing 

operations, where a guerrilla-held area was encircled and flushed out 

by several French battalions, were typical of the French techniques at 

that time.

In 1956 the French adopted new measures—quadrillage tactics—

which proved so effective that the FLN had to step up its terrorist activities in the cities in order to relieve the pressure on its army in the 

rural areas. Antiterrorist techniques were also very effective; by September 1957 Algiers was completely under French control and eventually terrorism in other major cities came to a halt. In 1958 the French 

effected a military stalemate.

Civic-action programs, instituted by the Specialized Administrative 

Sections in French-held rural areas and headed by Arabic-speaking 

French Army officers, included resettlement, rehabilitation, and construction projects. The SAS also set up self-defense units made up of 

local inhabitants to defend the Algerians won over by the French from 

guerrilla terrorism. These units protected their respective installations 

and often engaged in antiguerrilla operations.

ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT OF FOREIGN POWERS 

(ON BOTH SIDES)

Number of Countries Involved

In the wake of World War II, the Arab League, composed of the 

Arab countries of the Middle East, created the Maghreb Office to 
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further the cause of North African independence. Egypt in particular, and to a lesser extent Syria and Iraq, the three member states of 

the League most imbued with Arab nationalism and most directly concerned with the creation of the Pan-Arab State—from the Atlantic to 

the Arab (Persian) Gulf—were destined to play an active role in the 

planning stage. The Maghreb Office in its early days was more concerned with the Tunisian and Moroccan causes. Broadly based and 

anti-French nationalist movements had emerged in these two countries, whereas it was felt, particularly by the Egyptian leaders, that the 

“Algerians were not seriously enough engaged in the Pan-Arabic movement against colonialism.”104 Thus Abdel Krim, the Moroccan leader 

of the Rif war, was granted asylum in Egypt in 1947 when he jumped 

the French ship which was bringing him back to Morocco from his 

Madagascar exile as it passed through the Suez Canal; some of the 

North Africans who he subsequently recruited were sent to commando 

schools in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. With the discovery and breakup of the 

OS in 1950, Cairo became the safe refuge of Algerian nationalists. In 

1954, with the accession of President Gamal Abdel Nasser to power in 

Egypt, Ben Bella became the chief beneficiary of the Egyptian leader’s 

support. This was due, in all probability, to the fact that Ben Bella was 

of Arab origin—as opposed to Berber—and, therefore, most likely to 

accept Egyptian leadership. In any event, Majors Fathi el Dib and Ezzat 

Souleiman, of the Special Service Branch of the Egyptian Army, were 

assigned to work with Ben Bella in planning the Algerian revolution.

In this planning stage, Switzerland became unwittingly another center of Algerian revolutionary activity. To avoid growing Egyptian interference and supervision, which some former OS members resented, 

and because of its proximity to France where other former members 

were hiding or working, Switzerland was selected. It was in this country, 

in 1954, that the CRUA was created and attempts made to reconcile 

Messali Hadj and the Central Committee members of the MTLD. Yet 

evidence indicates that the Swiss Government was unaware of these 

clandestine activities.

With the outbreak of the revolution, Egypt became the principal 

military, political, diplomatic, and economic supporter of the FLN. The 

other members of the Arab League limited their support to financial 

contributions, and political and diplomatic support. After obtaining 

their independence in 1955, Tunisia and Morocco, because of common 

cultural and religious affinities, gave the Algerian rebels extensive diplomatic and political support, and limited military assistance. Yugoslavia became an active supporter in 1957, in that it supplied the FLN 

with military materiel and medical supplies. In general, political and 

diplomatic support came from three main sources: (1) the Afro-Asian 
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bloc; (2) former colonial territories; and (3) the Communist bloc. Some 

unofficial support came from elements within countries whose governments tended to side with France, and even from within France itself.

France received support from most of the NATO partners, the 

majority of the countries of the British Commonwealth as it was constituted at the outbreak of the revolution, and most of the Latin American 

countries.k

 The inability of France to end the war and the reported 

cruelties that were being perpetrated caused a number of countries to 

either withhold or qualify their support. France came under increasing 

pressure by those who had originally supported her to end the war in a 

manner that would satisfy both sides.

Military Aid by Foreign Powers

Egypt and Yugoslavia were the two principal suppliers of military 

materiel. Estimates of the total value of this military aid are unavailable, although the value of some which the French authorities were able 

to intercept gives an idea of its magnitude. It is not known if arms were 

purchased outright from these governments or donated by them.

On October 16, 1956, French naval units intercepted the ship Athos

off the Cap des Trois-Fourches, a point near the Algerian-Moroccan 

border, and confiscated 70 tons of arms, enough to arm 1,500 men 

and worth $5,700,000. Two weeks later, the French representative to 

the United Nations presented the Security Council with the official 

protest of his government which charged Egypt with direct interference in the internal affairs of France. The protest alleged that the vessel had left the “port of Alexandria during the night of October 4–5, 

piloted by an officer of the Egyptian Navy, and bound for the military 

base of Alexandria, where seven carloads of arms and ammunition 

were on dock. . . .”105 The ship’s log placed Italy as its final destination. 

In August 1957 the French Government claimed that the Yugoslavian 

ship Srbija had deposited at Casablanca “seven tons of arms and seventy tons of ammunition” destined for rebel use although the “bill of 

lading placed Saudi Arabia as the final destination.”106 On the basis of 

this allegation, the French Navy intercepted another Yugoslavian ship, 

the Slovenija, 6 months later off Oran; the vessel was loaded with arms 

which the French again claimed were for rebel use.

The rebels did not limit themselves to official sources in their search 

for arms and ammunition. FLN purchasing agents traveled in all countries that would admit them seeking arms dealers who could provide 

them with arms at hand, or in many cases act as middlemen. In the 

k See section on United Nations, below.
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early stage of the revolution, Libya and Tunisia became the principal 

targets of these purchasing agents. Usually they bought arms of World 

War II vintage which had been left on the battlefields of North Africa 

from tribes which had collected them. Later, when the need for modern equipment, especially transmitters and explosives became more 

pressing, these agents turned to arms dealers in Europe. In the case of 

the Slovenija, the “Zurich import-export house of Felix was involved.”107

Military materiel was also purchased from Belgium, Italy, and the Scandinavian countries.108

France’s industrial complex rendered her self-sufficient in supplying her military needs. Under the NATO agreements she also received 

substantial military equipment from the United States. The use of some 

of these weapons and equipment to quell the rebellion in Algeria—a 

fact which the FLN used in its propaganda to show that the United 

States was a supporter of colonialism, thereby forcing the U.S. Government to take a defensive position—caused uneasiness in Washington. 

It prompted Senator John F. Kennedy, in July 1957, to demand that the 

U.S. Government use its influence to bring about an equitable solution of the problem, and it led Senator Dennis Chavez, in considering 

the Defense Appropriations Bill, which included military assistance to 

France, to demand that the aid “be used for the purposes it is supposed 

to serve; but not for the purpose of killing Algerians in North Africa.”109

Political Intervention

Diplomatic Pressure

The diplomatic support which the FLN received took a variety of 

forms. In most instances, the interests of the Algerian rebels were represented in the capitals of the world by one of the Arab states or by 

Tunisia or Morocco. In their travels, FLN representatives generally 

enjoyed the immunity of the diplomatic passport of one of these countries. The embassies of these states concentrated in creating (in the 

countries to which they were accredited) an atmosphere favorable to 

the FLN by disseminating FLN propaganda or by attempting to pressure the governments into adopting a less stringent, neutral, or more 

friendly attitude. Many times the Arab states of Tunisia and Morocco 

acted collectively to bring pressure on the governments of major powers. In 1957, “eleven Arab states asked the United States to stop supplying France with economic and military aid which was being used 

to suppress Algerian liberty.”110 At stake and underlying these requests 

were the interests of those major powers in the Arab world, and the fact 

that the anticolonial policy of the Communist bloc was reaping substantial ideological benefits. At the Afro-Asian and neutralist conferences 
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105

held at Bandung and Belgrade, Egypt was able to introduce and secure 

the passage of resolutions which bound the represented governments 

to support the Algerian revolution, particularly in the United Nations

where the inscription of the “Algerian Problem” on the agenda of the 

General Assembly, in 1955, represented a major breakthrough for 

the FLN.

The diplomatic support which France received came from her 

NATO allies and other countries linked to the different members of 

NATO. This support was most evident in the voting on the “Algerian 

Problem” in the United Nations, which is discussed in the section that 

follows. The French Government went to great lengths to solicit the 

continued support of these nations when the prolonged war began to 

be embarrassing. The major target of these solicitations was the United 

States because of its influence. The French countered the demand submitted by the 11 Arab states by playing up the atrocities perpetrated 

by the rebels and their lack of unity, as evidence that the Algerians 

were not yet ready for independence. On the other hand, French propaganda magnified the proposed political, social, and economic reforms 

as an indication of the good intentions of France; they had the help of 

leading personalities from U.S. societies.

Pressure Through United Nations

On September 30, 1955, the General Assembly of the United 

Nations voted 28 to 27, with 5 abstentions,a to include the “Question of 

Algeria” on its agenda, thereby reversing the recommendation of the 

Assembly’s General Committee. Thereupon France walked out of the 

General Assembly on the grounds that the question was one of domestic jurisdiction and, therefore, beyond the competence of the General 

Assembly. The request to include Algeria on the agenda had been submitted by 14 Afro-Asian countries in accordance with the resolution of 

the Bandung Conference of April 1955.

During the discussion period in the Assembly before the Algerian question was put to a vote, representatives from several countries 

defended France’s position. Antoine Pinay, the French delegate, had 

a The 28 countries voting to reverse the General Committee’s recommendation and 

inscribe the Algerian question on the Assembly’s agenda were: Afghanistan, Argentina, 

Bolivia, Burma, Byelorussia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Greece, Guatemala, India, 

Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Ukraine, U.S.S.R., Paraguay, Yemen, and Yugoslavia.

The 27 nations opposing the inscription of the matter were: Australia, Belgium, 

Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, 

Haiti, Honduras, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, 

Panama, Peru, Sweden, Turkey, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, and 

Venezuela.

Abstaining were: China, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iceland, and Paraguay.
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warned that a debate on the Algerian matter “would endanger the 

future of the United Nations,” for it would give the United Nations “the 

right to intervene whenever a racial, religious, or linguistic minority 

existed within the boundaries of a certain state,” and that “the territorial unity of any state old or new or treaties concerning frontiers, could 

be questioned.”111 Further, the representative of France had claimed 

that the Muslim population of Algeria already enjoyed universal suffrage and representation in the Algerian Assembly, that the Muslims 

had the same rights as other French citizens, and that they were better 

off than peoples in other states which were France’s opponents. The 

representatives of Belgium, the United Kingdom, the United States, 

Colombia, Norway, and the Netherlands rose to speak in support of the 

French case.

Paul-Henri Spaak, the representative of Belgium, emphasized his 

view that there can be “no responsible international life and no viable 

international organization if each country is entitled to intervene in 

matters within the domestic jurisdiction of other countries.” Before 

a country is admitted as a member to the United Nations, the other 

members should examine the domestic situation in the prospective 

member’s country to see if it is in accordance with the principles of the 

Charter, but once admitted, Spaak pointed out, the members’ domestic 

matters should not be questioned.112

Citing the legal connection between France and Algeria, the representative of the United Kingdom claimed there could be no “international” dispute between France and Algeria, and said that neither 

threatened international peace and security. In answer to charges of a 

violation of “self-determination of peoples,” it was pointed out by the 

United Kingdom that a legal right of “self-determination” had not been 

incorporated in the Charter. Henry Cabot Lodge, in stating the U.S. 

position, added that this was strictly a case of domestic jurisdiction as 

covered under Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter, 

since Algeria was a part of France.

The 14 Afro-Asian nations that had proposed consideration of the 

Algerian question in the General Assembly claimed that France controlled Algeria solely by a show of force, that the Algerian situation was 

deteriorating and was creating a serious threat to peace in the Mediterranean, that a virtual state of war existed between France and Algeria, 

and that France’s sovereignty was never fully recognized or accepted 

by the Algerian people. The principle of self-determination of peoples 

was also cited by the proposing nations.

The representative of India, V. K. Krishna Menon, based his argument for support of the motion to include Algeria in the agenda on the 

inapplicability of Article 2, paragraph 7, to this matter. He said that 
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there was no violation of this clause because the motion did not call 

for collective action or impose sanctions against France, but rather an 

Assembly discussion which would allow some of the pent-up steam to 

be released without explosions. Menon, in putting forward his interpretation of the domestic jurisdiction clause, held that a debate on the 

question did “not per se constitute intervention.”113

Other speakers favoring the inclusion of the Algerian question said 

that the issue was mainly a colonial one that should be debated by the 

United Nations. The representative of Lebanon claimed that it was “the 

natural right of people to be masters of their own destiny.” The sponsors were motivated by the spirit of the Charter, Iraq stated, in desiring 

an association of Algeria with France based on “freedom, equality, and 

the free will of peoples themselves.” The main principles upon which 

the request of the 14 nations were based were “respect for the principle 

of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, respect for natural 

cultures, and respect for basic human rights.”114

National interests, to a certain extent, explain the reasons behind 

some of the votes. The Middle East bloc of Muslim countries were interested in seeing the eventual independence of Algeria. North Africa 

was the only Muslim area of the world that had not achieved its full 

independence. The Arab League, with headquarters in Cairo, openly 

advocated the establishment of a Muslim state in Algeria. Pan-Arabism, 

a strong movement active throughout the Middle East, viewed with disfavor the dominance of the Arabs of North Africa by France and Spain. 

These reasons explain why Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, 

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen voted against France.

Burma, India, Indonesia, Philippines (to a lesser extent), and Thailand are anticolonial countries that may be expected to vote anti-colonial 

on every issue because of past experience or strong convictions. The 

votes of the Communist bloc of Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, 

Ukraine, and the U.S.S.R. reflected these countries’ opposition to the 

Western bloc. Greece’s vote was, in all probability, a reprisal to France’s 

earlier vote against debate on the Cyprus question.

Except for Greece and Iceland, which abstained, France’s NATO

partners upheld her position. Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and Canada

voted against debating an issue embarrassing to their ally, by upholding France on purely jurisdictional grounds. With the exception of 

India and Pakistan, which were in the Afro-Asian bloc, the members of 

the British Commonwealth of Nations generally tended to vote as the 

United Kingdom voted, although South Africa was more concerned 

with possible future U.N. interference in her domestic race relations. 

The 12 Latin American states which voted with France probably did so 
108

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

because some of them were dependent on the United States for foreign 

trade and economic aid, because some of their own domestic situations 

left much to be desired (e.g., the Dominican Republic and to some 

extent Nicaragua), or because some of them maintained strong cultural ties with France (Haiti).

The Algerians, it is clear, did not expect U.N. action to settle the 

issue. The submission of the Algerian question was part of an effort to 

internationalize their cause in accordance with their platform. They 

hoped eventually, through the resubmission of the question, to build 

enough support and favorable world public opinion to force France 

into negotiations. In this they were successful.

The Algerian question was submitted by the Afro-Asian bloc in all 

succeeding sessions of the United Nations. Although in most instances 

the draft resolutions failed to achieve marked results, the debate on the 

length of the war and its consequences and the failure of the French 

to implement their promised reforms put France and her supporters 

on the defensive. By 1958–59 a majority of the members of the United 

Nations, including some of France’s allies, were willing to vote for 

amended drafts which called upon both parties to negotiate. France 

came under increasing pressure to find an equitable solution, while 

the Algerians received increasing support. In 1961 when negotiations 

between the French Government and the Algerian Provisional Government took a turn for the worse, a draft resolution, submitted by the 

United Arab Republic and 30 Afro-Asian countries, calling upon the 

parties concerned to resume negotiations, was approved by a vote of 

62 to 0, with 28 abstentions. This marked the last time that the Algerian question was submitted. Algeria received its independence on 

July 1,1962.

Direct Military Intervention

Direct military intervention by other nations did not occur in 

the Algerian revolution. Although a number of ALN personnel were 

trained in Egypt and other Arab countries, these countries refrained 

from sending “advisers” or volunteers to fight alongside the ALN units 

in Algeria. In the latter phase of the revolution the People’s Republic of 

China offered the FLN the use of Chinese “volunteers.” This offer was 

dismissed as pure propaganda and the FLN wisely declined to accept 

the offer for fear of weakening their present and future status in Western circles.
Dynamics of Revolution

109

Granting of Bases from Which to Operate

The FLN–ALN was able to establish two safe bases of operations: 

the East Base on Tunisian soil along the Tunisian-Algerian border; and 

the West Base on Moroccan soil in the vicinity of the border towns 

of Nador and Oudja. Whether the establishment of these two bases 

resulted from the tacit approval of the Tunisian and Moroccan Governments, or whether they simply represented mere acquiescence on their 

part to a fait accompli, remains to be determined. In all probability it 

represents a combination of both. It is safe to assert that the traffic in 

contraband arms was undertaken with the knowledge of these two governments. The establishment of these two bases seems to have been the 

result of circumstances. The implementation of the tactic of quadrillage

by the French forces late in 1956 and early 1957 forced a number of 

ALN fighters and Muslim civilians to seek safety outside Algeria. Eventually, the number of refugees was to increase to 200,000 in Tunisia

and 100,000 in Morocco. Sympathy for the Algerian nationalist cause, 

and the size of the ALN units— outnumbering their national armies—

on their soil, forced these two governments to acquiesce. In any event 

it is clear that both Morocco and Tunisia viewed the existence of these 

bases with anxiety, especially after France invoked the doctrine of hot 

pursuit and the Tunisian village of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef was bombed.

France was allowed to maintain her naval base at Bizerte by virtue of the independence treaty arrangement concluded with Tunisia. 

French naval units operating from the naval bases of Bizerte and Oran

(Algeria) were able to maintain a close watch on all shipping in the 

North African sea lanes.

Permitting Revolutionary Propaganda to be Disseminated

Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria provided the FLN with the facilities with 

which to develop and maintain an efficient propaganda effort.

The FLN, through Radio Cairo and Radio Damascus, was able to 

keep the Algerians informed. Printing plants in Egypt and Tunisia 

published all of the FLN pamphlets, tracts, literature, and the weekly 

newspaper El Moudjahid. In the early phases of the revolution, dissemination of this propaganda material was undertaken by friendly embassies. Later a number of countries, including the United States, allowed 

the opening of Algerian Offices of Information.

France used her embassies abroad, more precisely the Service de 

Presse et d’Information attached to the diplomatic missions, to disseminate her own propaganda.
110

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

Summary

Both sides received support—military aid, political and diplomatic 

support, granting of foreign bases, etc.—from individual countries, 

power blocs, and international organizations. The revolutionary organization, with its extensive and effective propaganda machine, outdid 

France in soliciting support. Egypt and Yugoslavia were its principal 

suppliers of arms and ammunition. From Tunisia and Morocco, where 

Algerian rebel bases were established, came extensive military support 

and assistance; arms were smuggled across their borders into Algeria. 

Political and diplomatic support came particularly from the Afro-Asian 

bloc, former colonial nations, and the Communist bloc. The United 

Nations brought increasing pressure on France to settle its problems 

with the Algerian Provisional Government.

France, on the other hand, received most of its support from its 

NATO allies. Through this body France received military supplies from 

the United States. NATO support of France became embarrassing for 

the individual member nations; as the revolution wore on France found 

it increasingly difficult to solicit strong support within the NATO alliance and in the United Nations. The international situation became 

favorable to the idea of an independent Algeria.
PART III—EPILOGUE

Epilogue

113

THE FIRST FOUR MONTHS OF INDEPENDENCE

On March 18, 1962, after protracted negotiations, an agreement was 

concluded between the French Government and the FLN at Evian-les 

Bains, France. Both parties agreed to order a cease-fire on March 19, 

and France recognized the right of the Algerian people to self-determination. By virtue of this agreement a transitional period was to follow 

the conclusion of the treaty, at the termination of which a national referendum was to be held to determine the future of Algeria. Until selfdetermination was realized, a provisional government and a court of 

public law were to be set up to administer and maintain law and order. 

A High Commissioner was to represent France and be responsible for 

the defense of the country and the maintenance of law and order in 

the last resort. Also included in the terms were provisions for a general 

amnesty, guarantees for individual rights and liberties, and clauses concerning future cooperation between France and Algeria, settlement of 

military questions, and settlement of litigations. On July 1, 1962, the 

national referendum was held in Algeria and the overwhelming majority of the population voted for independence.

Independence, unfortunately, brought to the surface two major 

latent differences within the FLN: collegial versus individual responsibility, and centralism versus regionalism. The emergence of these was 

precipitated by the lack, during the transitional period, of government 

continuity, “logical progression,” and “tranquil transfer of power,” 

which resulted from the OAS-inspired departure of qualified Europeans, the inability of the FLN to replace them with associational groups 

of their own, and the destruction of administration files, records, documents, and necessary equipment.115

The 1956 FLN Soummam Valley Congress had been convened by 

the internal delegation to settle the pressing issue of individual versus 

collegial responsibility. At the root of the question lay the fear which 

the growing power of Ben Bella evoked in the hearts of those who had 

strenuously opposed the divisive influence of Messali Hadj’s absolute 

leadership. Subsequently, the decision to establish a collegial leadership was denounced by Ben Bella, but his capture and internment in 

October 1956 prevented him from making a direct bid for power. After 

his release during the transitional period, the question was reopened 

and became the major issue of the FLN Tripoli (Libya) Congress of 

June 1962. Ben Bella and his supporters favored the establishment of a 

single-party dictatorship which was to be led by hard-core revolutionaries who would best be suited to implement the FLN platform. Opposition to Ben Bella’s bid for power came from Ben Khedda, head of the 

GPRA and a relative newcomer to the revolution, Krim, and Boudiaf. 

They tended to favor a parliamentary form of government in which the 
114

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

FLN would become the dominant party without explicitly excluding 

or prohibiting the growth and participation of other parties.a During 

the ensuing debates, Ben Khedda and his supporters walked out of 

the conference and returned to Tunis, seat of the Provisional Government, when it became apparent that Ben Bella would receive the necessary two-thirds vote. Anticipating an army coup inside Algeria, Ben 

Khedda then dismissed Colonel Houari Boumedienne, Chief of Staff 

and a strong supporter of Ben Bella, and two officers of the General 

staff on charges of conspiring against the “legitimate authority of the 

FLN.”116 The GPRA, without visible support except for a few wilaya leaders, became a shadow government devoid of the means of enforcing its 

decisions. A few days later it found itself facing the challenge of Boumedienne’s army—the external army, some 30,000 to 40,000 strong, which 

had been fenced out by the French electrified barricades—which was 

marching on Algiers from the East and West Bases. On August 2, 1962, 

without bloodshed Ben Khedda surrendered his powers to Ben Bella, 

and a six-man Political Bureau which was to ride Algeria until the election of a Constituent Assembly. With the civilian leadership of the FLN 

weakened by internal squabbles, the army emerged as the only organized and disciplined force in the nation.

One of Ben Bella’s first acts upon assuming power was to issue an 

order which effectively whittled down the power and authority of the 

guerrilla forces and their commanders, and which triggered the centralism versus regionalism crisis. The real causes were “a unique blend 

of historically-rooted ethnocentricities, personality clashes and narrow 

self-interests engendered by the struggle for liberation.”117 In its open 

manifestation “the challenge to the central authority was characterized 

as ‘willayaism’, i.e., the desire of certain wilaya chiefs, particularly in 

the Kabylie Berber region and the area around Algiers, to maintain virtual unrestrained control over their zones.”118 To placate these guerrilla 

commanders and the army, which for the first and last time had joined 

hands with the guerrillas in a bid to strengthen its position vis-a-vis the 

civilians, Ben Bella agreed to a list of candidates for the Constituent 

Assembly elections of whom 140 out of 196 were army officers, former 

army officers, or army nominees. When the commanders of Wilaya III 

and Wilaya IV sought to pressure the Political Bureau into further concessions, Ben Bella fled Algiers for Oran and Sétif where he sought 

once more the support of the army. In August–September 1962, Algeria faced the prospect of another civil war as the Algerian army battled 

guerrilla units. But a modus vivendi reached between Ben Bella, who 

a For a discussion of the role of the single-party dictatorship and the dominant party, 

see H. B. Sharabi, “Parliamentary Government and Military Autocracy in the Middle 

East,” Orbis, IV (Fall 1960), 338–355.
Epilogue

115

had slipped into Algiers ahead of the army, and the commanders of 

the insurgent wilayas put an end to the armed clashes. The army chose 

to disregard the cease-fire and Ben Bella’s promise to make Algeria a 

demilitarized zone long enough to enter Algiers and assert its control. 

These crises left Ben Bella and the Political Bureau, and Boumedienne

and the army, as the two principal forces in Algeria. In all probability, 

it was Boumedienne’s lack of prestige (unknown until the crisis) which 

prevented the army from staging a virtual coup, if indeed coup was contemplated. But until the Political Bureau “reconstructs the FLN party 

structure real power will lie with the Army.”119

On September 16, 1962, after several postponements and changes 

in the one-party candidacy list, the nation elected a 196-member Constituent Assembly. The election did not make allowance for competition from within or outside the FLN, and was “regarded as a request 

for a national vote of confidence in the Political Bureau.”120 Shortly 

thereafter, Ben Bella and his cabinet were invested by the Assembly, 

and the government settled down to fulfill the country’s most pressing 

requirement: economic revival.

From an economic point of view the war had ravaged Algeria. Land 

had gone uncultivated for years. Farming machinery was left unattended and in dire need of repair. Food was in critical shortage. The 

departure of the Europeans—skilled labor, civil administrators, engineers, and entrepreneurs—deprived the new country of the qualified 

personnel which could have kept it a going concern. It also resulted in 

the shutdown of almost all industries, thereby contributing to the everincreasing pool of unemployed which reached the 70 percent mark. 

Taxes had not been collected since March 1962, and the treasury was 

virtually bankrupt. To alleviate the economic crisis Algeria turned to 

France, the United States, and the West in general. The Algerian Government made lucrative offers to former European residents in order 

to lure them back, while borrowing $400,000,000 from the French Government. The United States stepped up its shipment of surplus food, 

and in all likelihood will contribute financially to the economic recovery of the country. As trends develop, it is becoming clearer that the 

Algerian Government has decided that it can turn only to the West for 

the massive assistance which will be required in order to develop its 

economy.

FOOTNOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Footnotes and Bibliography

119

FOOTNOTES

1 Richard and Joan Brace, Ordeal in Algeria (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 

1960), pp. 21–22.

2 Colette and Francis Jeanson, L’Algérie Hors La Loi (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1955), p. 28.

3 Joan Gillespie, Algerian Rebellion and Revolution (New York: Praeger, Inc., 1960), p. 6.

4 Ibid., p. 28.

5 Jeanson, L’Algérie, p. 53; and Gillespie, Algerian, pp. 6–7, 20–21.

6 Gillespie, Algerian, p. 20.

7 Ibid., p. 21.

8 Joseph Kraft, The Struggle for Algeria (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1961), 

p. 32.

9 Gillespie, Algerian, p. 21.

10 Nevill Barbour, A Survey of North West Africa (The Maghrib) (London: Oxford University 

Press, 1959), p. 248.

11 Ibid., p. 247.

12 Subcontractor’s Monograph, HRAF-54, J. Hop-1, “Algeria” (New Haven: Human Relations 

Area Files, Inc., 1956), p. 465. [Hereafter referred to as HRAF.]

13 Ibid., p. 465.

14 Barbour, A Survey, p. 242.

15 Ibid.

16 J. Gillot, “Le Dêveloppement Économique de L’Algérie,” Cahiers de L’Institute de Science Économique Appliqué, No. 108 (December 1960), pp. 18–19; and Barbour, A Survey, 

pp. 241–243.

17 Gillot, “Le Dêveloppement,” pp. 30–43; and Barbour, A Survey, pp. 241–243.

18 Barbour, A Survey, p. 244.

19 HRAF, p. 469.

20 Ibid., p. 495.

21 Ibid., p. 469.

22 Ibid., p. 494.

23 Ibid., p. 253.

24 Gillespie, Algerian, p. 34.

25 Kraft, The Struggle, p. 37.

26 Gillespie, Algerian, p. 12. 

27 Ibid., p. 13 (quoting General Catroux).

28 Charles-André Julien, L’Afrique Du Nord en Marche (Paris: René Juiliard, 1952), pp. 322–323.

29 Gillespie, Algerian, p. 22.

30 Barbour, A Survey, p. 219.

31 Julien, L’Afrique, p. 16.

32 HRAF, p. 359.

33 Ibid., p. 362.

34 Ibid., p. 363.

35 Gray L. Goway, “New Face for Algeria,” Political Science Quarterly, LXVI (1951), p. 352.

36 Ibid.

37 HRAF, p. 361.

38 HRAF, pp. 360–364.

39 Ibid., pp. 368–369.
120

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

40 Ibid., p. 363.

41 Kraft, The Struggle, p. 47.

42 Ibid., pp. 53–54.

43 Blanche Joy MacFadyen, “The Algerian Conflict: French Policy 1954–1960” (unpublished Master’s thesis, Graduate Faculty of the University of Virginia, 1961), p. 49.

44 Ibid., p. 48.

45 Kraft, The Struggle, p. 155.

46 Ibid., p. 247.

47 Charles-Henri Favrod, La Revolution Algérienne (Paris: Librairie Plon, Inc.. 1960), p. 106.

48 Gillespie, Algerian, p. 66.

49 Rolf Italiaander, The New Leaders of Africa (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 

Inc., 1961), p. 18.

50 Gillespie, Algerian, p. 63.

51 Favrod, La Revolution, p. 68.

52 Kraft, The Struggle, pp. 64–65.

53 Ibid., pp. 66–69.

54 Barbour, A Survey, p.238.

55 HRAF, p. 247.

56 Favrod, La Revolution, pp. 82–83.

57 Brace, Ordeal, p. 94.

58 Gabriel G. M. Bonnet, Les Guerres Insurrectionelles et Revotutionnaires (Paris: Payot, 1958), 

p. 254.

59 Brace, Ordeal, p. 254.

60 Kraft, The Struggle, p. 94.

61 Gillespie, Algerian, pp. 112–113.

62 Barbour, A Survey, p. 247.

63 Gillespie, Algerian, p. 39.

64 Brace, Ordeal, p. 28.

65 Gillespie, Algerian, p. 39.

66 MacFadyen, “The Algerian Conflict.” p. 76.

67 Gillespie, Algerian, p. 44.

68 Kraft, The Struggle, p. 59.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid., p. 59.

71 Peter Braestrup, “Partisan Tactics—Algerian Style,” Readings in Guerrilla Warfare (Fort 

Bragg, N.C.: US Army Special Warfare School).

72 Ibid.

73 Lorna Hahn, North Africa: Nationalism to Nationhood (Washington, D.C.: Washington Public Affairs Press. 1960), p. 157.

74 Kraft, The Struggle, pp. 80–81.

75 El Moudjahid, Special Issue, p. 3.

76 Ibid.

77 Gillespie, Algerian, p. 100.

78 Kraft, The Struggle, pp. 82–88.

79 Gillespie, Algerian, p. 106.

80 Kraft, The Struggle, p. 80.
Footnotes and Bibliography

121

81 Ibid., p. 90.

82 Serge Bromberger, Les Rebelles Algériens (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1958), pp. 149–152.

83 Andrew Molnar, et al, Undergrounds Insurgency, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, 1963). See chapter on Algeria.

84 Bromberger, Les Rebelles, p. 154.

85 Ibid.

86 Brace, Ordeal, p. 113.

87 El Moudjahid, p. 6.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid.

90 Kraft, The Struggle, p. 70.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid., p. 71.

93 Ibid., pp. 71–72.

94 R. Trinquier, La Guerre Moderne (Paris: La Table Moderne, 1961), pp. 97–104.

95 Braestrup, “Partisan Tactics.”

96 Ibid.

97 Trinquier, La Guerre Moderne, pp. 123–157.

98 Bonnet, Les Guerres, pp. 250–251.

99 Bromberger, Les Rebelles, passim.

100 Ibid.

101 Molnar, Undergrounds.

102 Ibid.

103 Ibid.

104Brace, Ordeal, p. 85.

105Current History, “French Statement on Egyptian Aid to Algeria,” XXXI (December 1956), 

p. 364.

106Brace, Ordeal, p. 171.

107 Ibid.

108Bromberger, Les Rebelles, p. 106.

109Brace, Ordeal, p. 159. (Quoted from Congressional Record, Vol. 103, part 8, 85th Congress, 1st Session, July 2, 1957, p. 10780.)

110 Brace, Ordeal, p. 157.

111 United Nation’s Review, “Question of Algeria Inscribed on Agenda” (November 1955), 

p. 65. (Quotes Pinay.)

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid., p. 66.

114 Ibid.

115 William H. Lewis. “Algeria: The Plight of the Victor,” Current History, XLIV (January 

1963), p. 25.

116 Ibid., p. 26.

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid., p. 26.

119 G. H. Jansen, “Algeria Analysed,” Middle East Forum XXXVIII (October–November, 

1962), p. 17.

120Lewis, “Algeria,” p. 26.
122

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Barbour, Nevill. A Survey of North West Africa (The Maghrib). London: 

Oxford University Press, 1959.

Bonnet, Gabriel G. M. Les Guerres Insurrectionelles et Revolutionnaires. 

Paris: Payot, 1958.

Brace, Richard, and Joan Brace. Ordeal in Algeria. Princeton: D. Van 

Nostrand Company, Inc., 1960.

Bromberger, Serge. Les Rebelles Algériens. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1958.

Favrod, Charles-Henri. La Révolution Algérienne. Paris: Librairie Plon, 

1959.

Gillespie, Joan. Algerian Rebellion and Revolution. New York: Praeger, 

Inc., 1960.

Hahn, Lorna. North Africa: Nationalism to Nationhood. Washington, D.C.: 

Public Affairs Press, 1960.

Italiaander, Rolf. The New Leaders of Africa. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961.

Jeanson, Colette, and Francis Jeanson. L’Algérie Hors La Loi. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1955.

Julien, Charles-Andre. L’Afrique Du Nord en Marche. Paris: René Julliard, 

1952.

Kraft, Joseph. The Struggle for Algeria. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1961.

Molnar, Andrew, et al. Undergrounds in Insurgency, Revolutionary and 

Resistance Warfare. Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research 

Office, 1963.

Soustelle, Jacques. Aimée et Souffrante: Algérie. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1956.

Subcontractor’s Monograph, HRAF-54, J. Hop-1. “Algeria.” New Haven: 

Human Relations Area Files, Inc., 1956.

Trinquier, Roger. La Guerre Moderne. Paris: La Table Moderne, 1961.

Periodicals

Braestrup, Peter. “Partisan Tactics—Algerian Style,” Readings in Guerrilla Warfare. U.S. Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, N.C.

Guillot, J. “Le Développement Économique de L’Algérie,” Cahiers de 

L’Institut de Science Économique Appliqué, No. 108 (December 1960). 
Footnotes and Bibliography

123

Goway, Gray L. “New Face for Algeria,” Political Science Quarterly, LXVI 

(1951).

Jansen, G. H. “Algeria Analysed,” Middle East Forum, XXXVIII (October–November, 1962).

Lewis, William H. “Algeria: The Plight of the Victor,” Current History, 

XLIV (January 1963).

Sharabi, H. B. “Parliamentary Government and Military Autocracy in 

the Middle East,” Orbis, IV (Fall 1960).

“French Statement on Egyptian Aid to Algeria,” Current History, XXXI 

(December 1956).

“Question of Algeria Inscribed in Agenda,” United Nations Review, 

November 1955.

Newspapers

El Moudjahid

Unpublished Material

MacFadyen, Blanche Joy. “The Algerian Conflict: French Policy 1954–

1960.” Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Graduate Faculty of the University of Virginia, 1961.

Books Reviewed

Abbas, Ferhat. Le Jeune Algérien. Paris: Aux Editions de la Jeune Parque, 

1931.

Alquier, Jean-Yves. Nous Avons Pacifir Tazalt. Paris: Robert Laffont, 1957.

Behr, Edward. The Algerian Problem. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1962.

Bromberger, Merry, and Serge Bromberger. Les 13 Complots Du 13 Mai. 

Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1959.

Camus, Albert. Resistance, Rebellion and Death. New York: Alfred A. 

Knopf, 1961.

Clark, Michael K. Algeria in Turmoil. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 

1959.

Ehrhard, Jean. Le Destin Du Colonialisme. Paris: Editions Eyrolless, 1958.

France and Algeria: Complementary Enemies. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 

1961.

Larteguy, Jean. The Centurions. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1962.
124

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

Luethy, Herbert. France Against Herself. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 

1955.

Mammeri, Mouloud. The Sleep of the Just. Boston: Beacon Press, 1956.

Mausell, Gerhard. Tragedy in Algeria. London: Oxford University Press, 

1961.

Paret, Peter, and John W. Shy. Guerrillas in the 1960’s. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.

Pendar, Kenneth. Adventure in Diplomacy. New York: Dodd, Mead and 

Company, 1945.

Planchais, Jean. Le Malaise De L’Armée. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1958.

Roosevelt, Elliot. As He Saw It. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948.

Roy, Jules. The War in Algeria. New York: Grove Press Inc., 1961.

Savary, Alain. Nationalisme Algérien et Grandeur Française. Paris: Librairie 

Plon, 1960.

Simon, Pierre Henri. Portrait D’un Officer. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1958.

Tillon, Germaine. L’Algérie En 1957. Parise Les Editions de Minuit, 1957.
TECHNICAL APPENDIX

Technical Appendix

127

INTRODUCTION

Three case studies were prepared on the Algerian (1954–62), Cuban 

(1953–59), and Vietnam (1941–54) Revolutions using a common conceptual framework and study procedures, in order to facilitate subsequent comparative analyses among the three. This appendix contains:

(1) a summary statement of the conceptual frame of reference 

underlying the studies;

(2) a general summary of the procedures used in preparation of 

the case studies.

At the same time, a case study of the situation in Guatemala between 

1944 and 1954 is being prepared, using a different approach more suitable to that situation.

CONCEPTUAL FRAME OF REFERENCE

Revolution Defined

The word revolutiona is frequently used interchangeably with such 

terms as rebellion, coup d’etat, insurgency, and insurrection. Various 

writers, Webster’s Dictionary, and the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences disagree on a precise meaning of the word. Except in the natural sciences, 

“revolution” usually refers to any sudden change with far-reaching consequences, but may sometimes refer to a gradual change which has suddenly been recognized as having had far-reaching consequences. The 

particular change is usually indicated by adjectives such as cultural, scientific, economic, industrial, and technological. Used without a qualifying adjective, the word most often describes political revolution; it is 

so used in these three case studies.

More precisely, in the case studies revolution means the modification, or 

attempted modification, of an existing political order partially at least by illegal 

(or unconstitutional) force used primarily by persons under the jurisdiction of 

the political order. The terms revolutionary dynamics and revolutionary effort 

are both used to refer to activities of all kinds of revolutionary actors 

and organizations. Revolutionary movement is used generically to refer 

to all the revolutionary actors and organizations operating against a 

government during defined time periods, unless specific organizations 

or actors are identified in the text. Finally, revolutionary situation refers 

to a continuum of tensions within a country in which revolutionary 

a This definition appears in a longer discussion of definitions in the Casebook on 

Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Seminary Accounts (Washington: Special Operations 

Research Office, 1963).
128

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

conflict has emerged as a major problem requiring direct allocation of 

resources and effort by a government.

General Approach

A general, heuristic study model with two basic premises was 

adopted. It was assumed, first, that a revolution is a complex interaction of socio-economic-political factors (revolution-inducing factors) 

and organic factors of the revolutionary movement. It was also assumed 

that particular factors do not necessarily remain unchanged and that 

changes in the factors and in their interaction are significant.

On the basis of the previous SORO study of 23 revolutions and a 

review of other studies in the literature, a number of general and specific examples of these two kinds of factors were identified; they have 

been offered in the past by other writers as “explanations” of revolutionary phenomena, and they are discussed in the next two sections. All of 

these examples were treated as hypotheses for the three case studies 

and were tested for their applicability to each revolution. They were not 

judged a priori to be causes of revolutions. They were studied to determine their presence or absence in a revolution and to determine their 

operation in time. The latter determination was accomplished by submitting each factor to a crude trend analysis—that is, organizing the 

information relevant to each hypothesis through chronological periods.

A distinction between immediate causes of revolution and long 

range causes is not relevant to this type of approach to the study of revolution. The importance of historical circumstance as a precipitant of 

revolution is not denied; it is simply not accorded the central role here 

that some students of revolution have attributed to it. The operation 

of historical circumstance is discussed in terms of revolution-inducing 

factors and revolutionary movement factors. The trend analysis records 

the development of situations in which the potential for revolutionary 

warfare may be latent, but not primarily dependent upon historical 

circumstances. Thus, historical necessity is not implied by the trend 

analysis approach—changes in both the socio-economic-political environment and in the structure and function of revolutionary movements 

can occur depending upon the actors involved.

Factors Inducing Revolution

It is suggested that factors inducing revolution may be broadly categorized under three general hypotheses which may be descriptive of 

a prerevolutionary situation: economic maladjustment, social antagonism, and political weakness. While no attempt has been made to assign 
Technical Appendix

129

relative weights to these various factors in a positive numerical sense, it 

appeared initially that political weakness as defined should rate highest 

on any scale devised to measure the revolutionary potential of a society. 

However, such conceptual refinements must await further analysis and 

are not reflected in the three case studies.

In the discussion below, each factor (and subfactor) is discussed 

as a conditional hypothesis regardless of evidence available concerning its validity. The purpose of the discussion is to describe briefly the 

hypotheses as used in the study of the three cases. It will be noted 

that the hypotheses are stated broadly to allow identification of all the 

information unique to each revolution and, consequently, an evaluation of the hypotheses.

Economic Maladjustment

The economy of a country may be considered to be a situation of 

maladjustment when one or more of the following conditions is present: foreign control of economic life, concentration of land ownership 

and a large population of landless peasants, lack of a diversified economy, and chronic unemployment or underemployment. These conditions may have concomitants that provide revolutionary motivations. 

They may affect the economic standard of living of the population in 

general, the distribution of wealth, and the form of the social structure.

Foreign control over the economy of a colonial or so-called semicolonialb

 country may entail certain socio-economic troubles for that 

country, even though, in a strictly economic sense, the relationship 

may appear to work to the country’s advantage. Higher standards of 

living enjoyed by resident foreigners and by those natives who are affiliated with foreign economic interests may have a powerful demonstrative effect on the native population; resultant dissatisfaction with their 

lower living standards and their frustration over foreign influences 

in the economic life of the country may produce social antagonisms 

directed against both foreigners and native beneficiaries of foreign 

interests. If a native middle class is deprived of full participation in the 

economic life of the country, foreign control may drive the social element best prepared to assume the role of a political opposition into a 

revolutionary movement.

A system of land tenure in which “landlordism” predominates 

may be fraught with revolutionary potential. The national economy 

may suffer as a whole from the inefficiency in agricultural production 

b Semicolonial countries are politically independent states which are economically 

dependent on industrialized countries, as some Latin American countries have been economic dependencies of the United States.
130

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

sometimes associated with a high concentration of land ownership. The 

wealthy landlord may often be less interested in yields-per-acre than 

in rents and interest payments from his tenants and peasant debtors. 

The landless peasants may lack incentive to produce, since experience 

may have shown them little connection between efforts and rewards. 

Thus, poverty and low productivity can perpetuate themselves in a 

cyclical process.

A low level of purchasing power in a country may hinder the development of local industry and reinforce economic dependence on one 

or two cash crops or mineral products for export. The economic position of raw-material-producing countries in relation to exporters of 

industrial goods has tended to deteriorate over recent decades due to 

world trade conditions. A more diversified economy has thus become 

a matter of economic necessity for most raw-material-exporting countries. The lack of a diversified economy may subject a country to the 

vagaries of world market conditions and threaten its economic stability; 

the socio-economic effect usually is to narrow the range of economic 

opportunities, thus tending to perpetuate a paternalistic type of society.

Another condition indicative of economic maladjustment is chronic 

and widespread unemployment or underemployment. Such a situation 

may result from the impact of world market conditions on a single-crop 

economy or from the seasonal nature of the main cash crop. The socioeconomic effects of unemployment may be more likely to reach a critical point when those out of work are urban workers or at least are living 

on a money economy rather than a subsistence economy. Generally, it 

can be hypothesized that the higher the level of industrialization the 

greater would be the revolutionary potential in a period of unemployment, for idle workers frequently make up the mass following of revolutionary movements. Native middle-class and intellectual elements tend 

to blame periods of unemployment on foreign control of the economy 

and on the lack of a diversified economy; this type of agitation around 

economic issues may be used to rally broad mass support for the revolutionary movement.

Social Antagonism

Tensions within the social structure, a demise of a traditional way 

of life, and the marginality of intellectuals may be regarded aspects of 

social antagonism which may be related to revolutions.

Tensions within the social structure may include conflicts between 

economic classes, clashes along ethnic, religious, cultural, and racial 

lines, and generational cleavages. Revolutionary potential may be greatest when those divisions happen to be superimposed on one another, as 

when one element of that population is defined along the same racial, 
Technical Appendix

131

religious, and economic lines. Such is the case in colonial territories 

and in some semicolonial countries in which a nonnative population 

element dominates economic life. Social tensions in racially homogeneous societies may take the form of a so-called “class-struggle” between 

those in control of economic and political power and the out-groups. 

Economically underdeveloped areas may be particularly vulnerable to 

extreme social tensions between a dynamic and emergent new middle 

class and a static traditional elite. The introduction of Western education and modern mores into these areas may greatly exacerbate already 

existing generational cleavages.

The demise of traditional society, which many countries are experiencing as a result of urbanization and industrialization or of social and 

political revolution, may have important psychological implications 

for the growth of a revolutionary movement. Traditionally accepted 

social values and social attitudes which support the status quo tend to 

be undermined by such historical developments as de-colonization, the 

emergence of new nationalisms, and the expansion of the Sino-Soviet 

power bloc. One function of the demise of traditional society has been 

the emergence of a new class of Western-educated intellectualsc to challenge the tradition-oriented older intellectual class.

These new intellectuals, many of whom find themselves in a condition of social marginality, may be a critical factor in the revolutionary 

process. Marginality in the sociological sense in which the term is used 

here implies a state of being “incompletely assimilated and denied full 

social acceptance and participation by the dominant [political] group 

or groups in a society because of racial or cultural conflict.”1

 The marginal intellectual may tend to become spiritually disenchanted with, 

or alienated from, the prevailing ethos of the socio-political system to 

which he is denied access. Students of revolution have noted a correlation between the alienation of intellectuals from the ruling elite and 

the development of a revolutionary movement.2

The term intellectual when applied to underdeveloped areas generally has broader application than it has in more advanced countries. 

In the Cuban case study, the term is used in a narrower sense and is 

applied only to those who have had university education, or to middleclass professional groups. In the Algerian and Vietnam case studies, 

however, it applies to anyone with a secondary education or more.

This is in no way condescension toward the new states. 

It is only an acknowledgement of the smaller degree 

of internal differentiation which has until now prevailed within the educated class in the new states, and 

c In the Sino-Soviet bloc this new class is the Communist-educated class.
132

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

to greater disjunction which marks that class off from 

the other sections of the society.3

Thus the emergent middle class in colonial and semicolonial societies may be regarded as an intellectual class, since the members of this 

group have some familiarity with Western values and modern economic 

methods and, most important of all, are politically conscious.

Political Weakness

Included under this general heading are factors of political imbalance, political fragmentation, and inefficiency of governmental 

machinery.

The political system of a country may be regarded as being in a state 

of imbalance when the mass of the population is deprived of representation and participation in the government. Thus, colonial institutions 

may have an inherent weakness because of their inevitable discrimination against the native population in favor of metropolitan interests. 

Native participation in the administration of colonial government without native political responsibility may intensify revolutionary potential. 

If for any reason a country’s political institutions fail to function as a 

clearinghouse for conflicting claims from all elements of society, then 

that country’s political system may be in imbalance and a certain element of revolutionary potential present.

Political fragmentation, as the expression is employed here, refers 

to hostility among opposing elements in the political elite and the 

political opposition groups of such violent proportions that these elements are unable to operate within the normal channels of political 

compromise and coalition. The expression does not imply the type of 

loyal opposition that has been characteristic of Anglo-American political experience.

Governmental inefficiency may be regarded as a factor related to 

the development of a revolutionary movement and to the efficiency of 

the movement once started. It may not be enough for a governmental apparatus merely to maintain order and administer routine public 

services and utilities; perhaps it must function in a capacity of “honest broker” between conflicting elements in the society and the polity. Thus, political imbalance and fragmentation may seriously detract 

from the efficiency of a government, although on the surface it may 

appear to function quite efficiently. When normal administrative operations, such as police protection and communications services, become 

impaired, then the latent revolutionary potential generated by political imbalance and fragmentation may rise to critical proportions. The 

dynamics and timing of governmental response to the revolutionary 

movement may be of the utmost importance in the efficiency of that 
Technical Appendix

133

response which may have to include political and institutional adjustment as well as restoration and maintenance of public order and governmental control.

Organic Factors of the Revolutionary Movement

For each revolution, historical and descriptive data have been 

collected under the following six aspects of revolutionary warfare: 

actors, strategy and goals, ideology and mystique, organization, techniques, and foreign influence. Within these categories data have 

generally been presented in chronological sequence. Since these are 

self-defining terms, it will only be necessary to point out some of the 

conceptual refinements and generalizations developed in the course of 

this study. A more elaborate delineation of these concepts must await 

further analysis.

Actors

The leadership cadre and the followers of that revolutionary organization which ultimately came into power in each situation is the group 

primarily treated under the category of actors. Thus, the actors of a revolutionary movement are defined by the results of the movement; the 

question of how one group of leaders gains control of a revolutionary 

movement to the exclusion of another group of revolutionists is not the 

main focus in this study but does receive some attention. Revolutionary 

actors are discussed in terms of (1) the socio-political composition of 

the leadership and mass following; (2) the historical continuity of personnel and the effects of a revolutionary tradition; and (3) the impact 

of conditions in the world at the time of the revolution, or the effects 

of the so-called Zeitgeist (spirit of the times) on the revolutionary actors.

Overall Strategy and Goals

The category of strategy and goals is concerned with the overall 

manner in which the successful revolutionary organization attempts to 

secure its revolutionary objectives. Strategy, which seems to be flexible 

and highly variable in most revolutions, is discussed within the context 

of time and circumstances rather than in terms of consistency with 

doctrinaire principles. This approach permits changes in strategy to be 

directly related to situational factors. These factors may be dependent 

upon purely local developments such as a change in the strategy and 

tactics of the security forces, or upon a major international development of a military, diplomatic, or political nature.

Revolutionary objectives, or goals, are discussed in terms of appeals 

for political change, socio-economic reform, or a combination of these, 
134

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

often expressed in nationalist slogans—particularly in colonial revolutions. Where there are different appeals made to various segments of 

society, these are discussed and compared.

Ideology or Myth

It is generally accepted that an essential part of any revolutionary 

movement is its “social myth” or revolutionary ideology. Generally, 

ideology in a revolutionary situation functions as a synthesis embodying both a critique of prerevolutionary society and policy and a sociopolitical program for postrevolutionary development. In the discussion 

of ideology in these studies, particular attention is paid to (1) national 

orientation, (2) international orientation, (3) socio-economic emphasis, 

(4) religious emphasis, and (5) the “mystique.” What has been termed 

the “mystique of a revolution” is similar in many respects to esprit de 

corps, and is composed of intangible elements such as the revolutionary 

tradition of the country, the charismatic quality of the leadership, and 

the revolutionary movement’s prospects of success.

Organization

It appears from other studies that no specific organizational form 

is necessary to insure the success of revolutionary movements. They 

have included paramilitary units, regular military and auxiliary organizations, clandestine cells or an underground movement, legal and 

illegal political parties, labor organizations, social organizations, paragovernmental organs of state power, governments-in-exile, or a combination of these. In each of the revolutions studied, attention has been 

focused on both the organizational and functional aspects of the above 

types of groups which made up the revolutionary organization ultimately coming to power.

Techniques

This category discusses the wide variety of techniques which revolutionists use, including: psychological, diplomatic, economic, and 

political warfare; conventional military operations and unconventional 

paramilitary operations; terror, sabotage, propaganda, strikes and 

demonstrations; and the recruitment and training of revolutionists. 

Because the specific techniques used by the revolutionists interact with 

the countertechniques used by the government or security forces, both 

are discussed within the same context.

Foreign Involvement

The question of foreign involvement is of crucial importance to 

the course of a revolution. Considerations related to this question may 
Technical Appendix

135

affect both the strategy and the techniques adopted by the revolutionary actors. For instance, the advantages for a revolutionary movement 

of a sanctuary and of diplomatic, economic, and military support 

from a foreign power are well-known. The number of foreign powers 

involved, the extent of the aid, political intervention by states or international organizations, and direct military intervention are discussed 

under this category.

GENERAL SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES

The procedures used to prepare the three case studies were straightforward and standard for each.

Development of Case Study Format

The first step, described in the previous section, consisted of the 

development of hypotheses and the preparation of a standard format 

for the organization of each case study.

Identification and Selection of Sources

As a second step, a systematic search for sources of information was 

conducted. This consisted of two parts: identification of the sources, 

and selection of sources. To identify sources, the SORO open-library 

files and Library of Congress files were reviewed, available bibliographies perused, and knowledgeable persons consulted. Sources were 

selected on the basis of their relevance, in terms of the information 

they contained, to the hypotheses formulated and on the basis of recommendations of the subject experts consulted. Selection was limited 

to unclassified secondary sources. However, some use was made of primary materials, when readily available, to fill in gaps in coverage. In 

the selection of sources every effort was made to obtain a “balance” 

among known political viewpoints of those who have written on the 

subject revolution.

Information Synthesis and Analysis: Drafting of Report

Information relevant to each hypothesis was systematically culled 

from the various sources, synthesized, and put in the standardized case 

study format. Generally speaking, attempts were made to use only information which appeared in more than one source independently; in 

practice, this independence was very difficult to ascertain. Conflicting 
136

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

or inconsistent information was resolved by checking for consistency 

with other sources considered reliable.

Expert Reviews and Revision

As a final check on the substance of each case study, it was submitted separately to a number (2–6) of subject experts. Each consultant 

reviewed the study in terms of accuracy of facts and reasonableness of 

interpretation. Each study was then revised on the basis of a synthesis of the experts’ comments. When conflicts in fact or interpretation 

could not be resolved through discussion, both viewpoints were presented in the text.

FOOTNOTES TO TECHNICAL APPENDIX

1 Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, 1961, p. 514.

2 Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), pp. 41–52.

3 Edward A. Shils, “The Intellectual in Political Development,” in Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism, ed. John H. Kautsky (New York: John 

Wiley and Sons, 1962), p. 199.
Technical Appendix

137

BIBLIOGRAPHY TO TECHNICAL APPENDIX

Almond, Gabriel and James S. Coleman. The Politics of the Developing 

Areas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

Brinton, Crane. The Anatomy of Revolution. New York: Vintage Books, 

1960. (First published in 1938; revised edition published in 1952.)

Crozier, Brian. The Rebels; A Study of Post-War Insurrections. London: 

Chatto and Windus, 1960.

Edwards, L. P. The Natural History of Revolution. Chicago: 1927.

Emerson, Rupert. From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian 

and African Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.

Gross, Feliks. Seizure of Political Power in a Century of Revolutions. New 

York: Philosophical Library, 1958.

Hooper, Rex D. “The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference 

for the Study of Revolutionary Movements,” Social Forces, 28, 3 

(March 1950), 270–279.

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts. 

Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1963.

Kautsky, John H., (ed.). Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: 

Nationalism and Communism. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 

1962.

Paret, Peter and John W. Shy. Guerrillas in the 1960’s. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.

INDEX

Index

141

INDEX

A

Abbas, Ferhat, 5, 11, 13, 44, 45, 48, 65, 

72, 81, 83, 96

Abdelkader, Amir, 75

Abdelkader, Doumene, 61

Abdo, Sheikh Mohammed, 32, 33

Afghanistan, 107

Afro-Asian Bloc, 77, 102

Agriculture, 17, 21, 24, 25, 26, 115

Ait Ahmed, Hussein, 64, 71

Alexandria, 103

Algerian Assembly, 36, 37, 106

Algerian Charter of 1919, 36, 39

Algerian Front of the Defense and 

Respect of Liberty, 45; See 

also UDMA; Communist Party 

(Algeria); Association of Ulema

Algerian Manifesto, 5, 43, 44, 45, 76

Algerian Nationalist Movement 

(MNA), 46

Algerian Offices of Information, 109

Algerian Provisional Government, 108, 

110

Algerian Statute of 1947, 6, 11, 14, 40, 

45, 48, 76

“Algérie Française”, 7

Algiers, 71, 80, 83, 84, 85, 88, 101, 114

AMA; See Amis de manifeste Algérien

Amis de manifeste algérien (Friends of 

the Algerian Manifesto—AMA), 

5, 48

Arabic Language, 10, 45

Arab League, 76, 77, 101, 102, 107

Ardennes, 43

Army of Algeria, 42

Arslan, Chekib, 77

Arzew, 4, 18

Assembly of the French Union, 36

Association of Ulema, 5, 10, 33, 43, 44, 

45, 72

Athos, 66, 103

Atlantic Charter, 44, 76

Aumale, 88

Aures Mountains, 12, 47, 51, 56, 91

Aures Nementcha, 88

Aures (wilaya), 71

Autonomous Zone, 83, 85

B

Bandung, 78, 105

Bandung Conference, 105

Belgium, 46, 104, 106, 107

Belgrade, 105

Belgrade Conferences, 78

Ben Badis, Sheikh Abdel Hamid, 44

Ben Bella, Mohammed, 64, 71, 81, 113, 

114, 115

Ben Boulaid, Mohammed, 71, 91

Beni Oui Ouis, 28, 37

Ben Khedda, Benyoussef, 72, 83, 113

Ben M’Hidi, Mohammed Larbi, 71

Ben Tobbal, Lakhdar, 65, 82, 83

Berbers, 4, 29, 35, 102, 114

Berne, 46

Bitat, Rabah, 71

Bizerte, 109

Blida, 53

Blum, Léon, 5, 43

Blum-Violette Plan, 5, 14, 34, 36, 39, 

43, 48, 76

Bône, 3, 17

Bône-Tebessa Railway, 58

Boudiaf, Mohammed, 46, 64, 71, 113

Bougie, 4, 18

Boumedienne, Houari, 114, 115

Bourgeaud, Henri, 28

Bourguiba, President, 41, 82

Boussouf, Abdelhafid, 65, 82, 83

British Commonwealth, 103, 107
142

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

Bureaux Arabes (Arab Bureaus), 38

Burma, 107

Byelorussia, 107

C

Cairo, 6, 71, 72, 81, 82, 98, 102, 107

Canada, 107

Casablanca, 76, 103

Catroux, Georges, 30, 40, 41

CCE; See Committee for Coordination 

and Execution

Challe, Maurice, 42

Charles X, 38

Chassin, General, 42

Châtaigneau, Yves Governor General, 

23, 40

Chavez, Dennis, 104

Cherif, Salah, 77

Cherrides, General, 42

Civic Action, 101

Clemenceau, Georges, 36, 39

CNRA; See National Council of the 

Algerian Revolution

Collo Peninsula, 93

Colombia, 106

Comité Révolutionnaire Pour L’Unité 

et L’Action (Revolutionary 

Committee For Unity and 

Action—CRUA), 6, 8, 11, 46, 71, 

73, 79, 80, 90, 102

Committee for Coordination and 

Execution (CCE), 71, 72, 80, 81, 

82, 85, 89, 98

Communism, 43; See also Communist 

Party, Marxism

Communist Bloc, 103, 104, 107, 110

Communist Party [Algerian], 43, 45

Communist Party [French], 13, 43, 75

Compagnie Algérienne, 18, 24

Compagnie Genevoise, 18, 24

Confédération Françoise de 

Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC), 

84

Confédération Générale du Travail 

(GT), 84

Constantine, 4, 18, 36, 43, 71

Constituent Assembly, 114, 115

Constituent Assembly [French], 35

Council General (of Algeria), 19

Council of the Autonomous Zone of 

Algiers, 83

Counterinsurgent Operations, 13, 

51–53, 90–94, 101

CRUA; See Comité Révolutionnaire 

Pour L’Unité

Cyprus, 107

Czechoslovakia, 107

D

Damascus, 98

de Gaulle, Charles, 6, 13, 40, 42, 100

Délégations Financières, 4, 36, 39

Denmark, 107

Didouche, Mourad, 71

Djebel Bou Zegana, 57

Djelloul, Ben, 5

Dominican Republic, 108

E

Egypt, 71, 77, 89, 91, 102–104, 107, 108, 

109, 110

el-Afghani, Sheikh Djamal ed-Din, 32, 

33

Elections, 6, 34, 37

El Milia, 93

El Moudjahid, 99, 109

Emigration, 27

ENA; See Etoile Norde Africaine 

(North African Star—ENA)

Etoile Norde Africaine (North African 

Star—ENA), 5, 10, 13, 43, 75

Evian Agreement, 42, 72, 113

F

Fathi el Dib, 102

Faure, General, 42
Index

143

Fédération d’Élus Musulmans 

d’Algérie (Federation of the 

Elected Muslims of Algeria), 4, 

10, 13

Ferry, Jules, 29, 39, 47

Fifth Republic, 14, 42

Finance and General Commissions, 37

FLN; See Front de Libération Nationale 

(National Liberation Front—

FLN)

Force Ouvrière (FO), 84

Foreign Support, 101–110; See 

also United Nations; names of 

countries

Fourth Republic, 6, 42

Francis, Ahmed, 65, 72

Free French, 5, 76

French Administration; See French 

colonial policy

French Army, 4, 6, 13, 38–41, 46, 47, 

51, 52, 71, 74, 89, 92, 93, 94, 98, 

99, 101

French colonial policy, 3–6, 11, 17–19, 

38–42, 47

French Council of the Republic, 36

French Investment in Algeria, 8, 19, 20

French Ministry of the Interior, 38

French National Assembly, 5, 36, 39, 

43, 71

French Navy, 66, 103, 109

Friends of the Algerian Manifesto 

(AMA), 45

Front de Libération Nationale 

(National Liberation Front—

FLN), 6–9, 11–14, 60–63, 66, 

71–74, 76–85, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 

95–104, 108, 109, 113, 115

Front National Français (FNF), 40

G

Gaillard, Felix, 41

Gerard, Minister of War, 17

GPRA, 113

Greece, 25, 107

Gros Colons, 26, 28, 29

Guerrilla Warfare, 12, 51–52, 74–75, 

95–96, 100–101, 114

H

Haiti, 108

Hassan, Moulay, 64

Hornu, 46

I

Iceland, 107

Immigration, 18

India, 39, 106, 107

Indochina, 12, 40, 41, 51

Indonesia, 107

International Confederation of Trade 

Unions (ICFTU), 84

Iraq, 77, 89, 102, 107

Islamic Zeitouna University, 44

Italy, 103, 104

J

Jihad, 78

Jouhaud, Edmond, 42

Julien, Charles-André, 7, 13

K

Kabyle Mountains, 12, 18, 47, 57, 71, 93

Kabylia, 88

Kader, Hadj Abdel, 43

Kennedy, John F., 104

Khider, Mohammed, 64, 71

Koran, 9

Krim, Belkacem, 45, 62, 65, 71, 82, 83, 

102, 113

L

Lacoste, Robert, 40, 41

Lamine-Debaghine, Mohammed, 65, 

72, 81

Land Distribution, 17–19, 21–22

Land Reform, 8, 18, 76; See also Sectors 

of Rural Amelioration (SAR)
144

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

Latin America, 103, 107

Lebanon, 40, 76, 107

Libya, 83, 90, 91, 104

Lille-North, 43

Lodge, Henry Cabot, 106

Luxembourg, 107

Lyautey, Marshal, 90

Lyon-Saint-Etienne, 43

M

Madagascar, 102

Maghreb Office, 101

Marseilles, 43

Marxism, 76, 77

Maurice Line, 58

Mayer, René, 39

Medir, Mohammed, 60

Mehri, Abdelhamid, 65

Menon, V. K. Krishna, 106

Messali Ben Hadj, Ahmed, 5–6, 43, 46, 

48, 72, 75–77, 84, 102, 113

Ministry of Algeria, 38

MNA; See Algerian Nationalist 

Movement

Mohammed V, 41, 76

Mollet, Guy, 41

Morocco, 7, 12–14, 40–41, 49, 64, 76, 

77, 91, 100, 102, 104, 109, 110

Mostaganem, 4, 17

Mouvement Pour le Triomphe de 

Libertés Démocratiques 

(Movement for the Triumph of 

Democratic Liberties—MTLD), 

6, 8, 10, 12, 43–45, 71, 72, 73, 79, 

80, 90, 96, 102

MTLD; See Mouvement Pour 

le Triomphe de Libertés 

Démocratiques (Movement for 

the Triumph of Democratic 

Liberties—MTLD)

Mustafa Kemal, 32

N

Naciri, Mekki, 77

Nador, 88, 109

Naegelen, Marcel-Edmond, 30, 34, 40, 

45

Naguib, Mohammed, 59

Napoleon III, 18, 35

Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 102

National Council of the Algerian 

Revolution (CNRA), 71, 72, 

80–82

National Liberation Army (ALN), 53–

55, 58, 66, 88–100, 108–109

NATO, 51, 103–104, 105, 107, 110

Navarre, Henri, 40

Netherlands, 106, 107

Nicaragua, 108

North Constantine, 88

Norway, 106, 107

O

OAS; See Organisation de L’Armée 

Secréte (Secret Army 

Organization—OAS)

ORAF, 40; See Organisation de 

Resistance de l’Algérie Française

Oran, 3, 17, 71, 88, 93, 103, 109, 114

Organic Statute, 36–37

Organisation de L’Armée Secréte 

(Secret Army Organization—

OAS), 7, 42, 113

Organisation de Resistance de 

l’Algérie Française (ORAF), 40

Organisation Secrète (OS), 45, 48, 

71–73, 90, 102

Organization Speciale (Special 

Organization—SO), 6, 79

Organized Labor, 84

OS; See Organisation Secrète or 

Organisation Speciale

Ouarsensis, 93

Oudja, 109

P

Pakistan, 107

Pan-Arabism, 7, 14, 33–34, 77, 107
Index

145

Pan-Islam, 7, 14, 32–33, 33, 75, 76, 77, 

79

Paris, 4, 5, 43, 63, 67

Parti du Peuple Algérien (Algerian 

People’s Party—PPA), 5, 6, 10, 

13, 43–45, 71, 76–79, 96

Parti Republican Radical Socialiste 

(RRS), 39

People’s Republic of China, 108

Pflimlin, Pierre, 41

Philippines, 107

Pieds Noirs, 29

Pinay, Antoine, 105, 121

Poland, 107

Political Bureau, 114, 115

Political Reforms, 7–8, 11, 14, 35–37, 

38; See also Blum-Violette Plan; 

Algerian Statute

Popular Front Government, 5, 43

Portugal, 25

PPA; See Parti du Peuple Algérien

Propaganda, 43, 98–99

Provisional Government of the 

Republic of Algeria, 65, 72, 

80–84, 90, 114

R

Radio Cairo, 109

Radio Damascus, 109

Reforms Commission, 23

Rida, Sheikh Rashid, 32

Rif, 32

Rif War, 102

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 76, 124

RRS; See Parti Républican Radical 

Socialiste

S

Sahara, 91

Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef, 41, 82, 109

Salan, Raoul, 40, 42

Sartre, Jean-Paul, 99

Saudi Arabia, 33, 103, 107

Scandinavian, 104

Sectors of Rural Amelioration (SAR), 

23

Senatus Consulte, 35

Service de Presse et d’Information, 109

Sétif, 6, 18, 44, 114

Slovenija, 103, 104

Socialist Parties, 75

Social Welfare, 47–48

Société de l’Habra et de la Macta, 18

Souk-Ahras, 88

Souleiman, Ezzat, 102

Soummam Valley Congress, 12, 71, 

79–80, 88, 113

Soustelle, Jacques, 7, 51

South Africa, 107

Spaak, Paul-Henri, 106

Spain, 25, 107

Specialized Administrative Sections 

(SAS), 48, 101

Srbija, 103

Strasbourg-East, 43

Strikes Demonstrations, 100

Switzerland, 46, 102

Syria, 40, 77, 89, 102, 107, 109

T

Taalibi, Abdel Aziz, 77

Terrorism, 13, 42, 91, 95–98, 101

Tewfik el-Madani, 65, 72

Thailand, 107

Thorez, Maurice, 43

Tillon, Charles, 43

Torres, Abdel Khalek, 77

Tripoli (Libya) Congress, 113

Tunis, 45, 81, 98, 114

Tunisia, 7, 12–14, 28, 40–41, 49, 58, 

76–77, 82, 90–91, 102–104, 

109–110

Turkey, 107
146

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Algeria 

U

UDMA; See Union Démocratique du 

Manifeste-Algérien

Ukraine, 107

Ulema, 45, 72, 76, 77, 78

Underground, 83–84

Unemployment, 26–27

Union Démocratique du ManifesteAlgérien (Democratic Union 

for the Algerian Manifesto—

UDMA), 43–45, 72

Union Française Nord-Africaine 

(UFNA), 40

Union Générale des Travailleurs 

Algériens (UGTA), 84–85

Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail 

(UGTT), 85

Union Syndicale des Travailleurs 

Algériens (USTA), 84

United Arab Republic, 108; See 

also Egypt; Syria

United Kingdom, 106, 107

United Nations, 74, 93, 99, 100, 103, 

105, 106, 107, 108, 110

United States, 99, 104–107, 109, 110, 

115

U.S.S.R., 107

V

Vichy Regime, 5, 11, 44, 76

Voice of the Arabs, 6; See also Radio 

Cairo

W

Wahabi, 33

Washington, 99, 104

Weapons, 53–55, 59, 89–90

Western France, 43

Y

Yazid, Mohammed, 65, 72

Yemen, 107

Young Algeria, 13

Young Algeria Movement, 44

Yugoslavia, 89, 102, 103, 110

Z

Zeller, André, 42

Zurich, 104