1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MICHAEL BEENICK, JR., : Case No. 4:14-CV-01562 

 : 

 Plaintiff, : (Judge Brann) 

 : 

 v. : 

 : 

Mr. LEFEBVRE, et al., : 

 : (Magistrate Judge Saporito) 

 Defendants. : 

MEMORANDUM 

September 26, 2016 

 Before the Court for disposition are Plaintiff Michael Beenick, Jr.’s 

(hereinafter “Plaintiff”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendants 

Michael Lefebvre, Lee Mandichak-McConnell, Wallace Dittsworth, John 

Weaverling, and Tammy Fagan’s (hereinafter “Defendants”) Motion for Summary 

Judgment. Magistrate Judge Joseph F. Saporito, Jr. has prepared a Report and 

Recommendation concerning these matters. For the following reasons, this Report 

and Recommendation will be adopted in its entirety. Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment will be granted. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment will be denied. 

I. BACKGROUND/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On July 13, 2013, Plaintiff Michael Beenick, Jr., then an inmate of SCICase 4:14-cv-01562-MWB Document 57 Filed 09/26/16 Page 1 of 22
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Benner Township, was employed in the prison kitchen. Plaintiff was assigned by 

food service instructor Michael LeFebvre to slice watermelons using an electric 

slicing machine, a Globe Slicer Model 3600P. Two other inmates were also 

assigned to slice watermelons on electric slicing machines. While Plaintiff used 

the electric slicer, Defendant LeFebvre was in and out of the prep area, supervising 

Plaintiff and other inmates working in the kitchen. 

Plaintiff had trouble manipulating the wet watermelon into the electric 

slicer’s blade. The watermelon was placed in the electric slicer’s “food chute,” 

which had an “endweight” designed to hold it in place. Plaintiff found, however, 

that, when his right hand was placed on the “food chute handle,” the endweight did 

not hold the watermelon in place. Beenick thereafter used his left hand—his 

dominant hand—to hold the watermelon in place. His left hand then slipped off 

the watermelon and into the electric slicer’s rotary blade. Plaintiff sustained 

lacerations to his ring and pinky fingers, and was taken to the local hospital for 

medical treatment. 

 At the hospital, the wound on Plaintiff’s pinky finger was closed with 

stitches. Because some bone at the tip of his ring finer had been severed by the 

blade of the slicer, a bone fragment was removed, some nonviable skin was 

trimmed, and the wound was closed with stitches. Plaintiff was prescribed pain 

medication and instructed on wound care before he was returned to prison. Back at 

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SCI-Benner Township, Plaintiff claims that Defendant LeFebvre ridiculed him by 

yelling “Finger check!” whenever he saw him. Defendants, however, dispute this 

accusation.1

 

Prior to the July 13, 2013 incident, Plaintiff and other inmates at SCI-Benner 

Township had sliced watermelons manually with a knife. Defendant LeFebvre, 

however, previously had inmates at another institution use an electric slicer, 

without incident, to slice watermelons. Plaintiff and other inmates were not 

provided with access to an instruction manual or any safety equipment, such as 

cut-resistant gloves. No warning labels were affixed to the electric slicer, nor were 

any safety charts posted on nearby kitchen walls. The electric slicer was, however, 

equipped with a “knife cover” that shielded much of the rotary blade’s 

circumference. The portion of exposed rotary blade permitted the slicing of food 

products. The slicer would not operate without the knife cover in place. 

On June 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint2

 alleging five counts 

against Defendants under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 

States Constitution. Plaintiff specifically alleged in Count I that Defendants 

violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments state-created danger doctrine. In 

Count II, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment through 

a deliberate indifference in failing to protect him against harm. In Count III, 

                                                            

1

 Plaintiffs cite these insensitive comments as evidence of LeFebvre’s state of mind. 

2

 ECF No. 21. 

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Plaintiff asserted, against Defendant Mandichak-McConnell, a violation of the 

Eighth Amendment through deliberate indifference in failing to intervene. Count 

IV constituted an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Dittsworth, 

Weaverling, and Fagan alleging deliberate indifference through failure to 

supervise. Finally, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Dittsworth, Weaverling, and 

Fagan violated the Eighth Amendment through their deliberate indifference to 

violations of his constitutional rights by his subordinates. 

On February 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment.3

 On April 1, 2016, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.4 

Magistrate Judge Saporito subsequently issued a Report and Recommendation on 

July 29, 2016 recommending that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

be denied and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be granted.5

 Plaintiff 

timely filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation on August 4, 2016;6

 the 

matter has since been fully briefed. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

A. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Upon designation, a magistrate judge may “conduct hearings, including 

evidentiary hearings, and ... submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact 

                                                            

3

 ECF No. 37. 

4

 ECF No. 45. 

5

 ECF No. 53. 

6

 ECF No. 54. 

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and recommendations.”7

 Once filed, this Report and Recommendation is 

disseminated to the parties in the case who then have the opportunity to file written 

objections.8

 When objections are timely filed, the District Court must conduct a de 

novo review of those portions of the report to which objections are made.9

 

Although the standard of review for objections is de novo, the extent of review lies 

within the discretion of the District Court, and the court may otherwise rely on the 

recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper.10 

For portions of the Report and Recommendation to which no objection is 

made, the court should, as a matter of good practice, “satisfy itself that there is no 

clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.”11

Regardless of whether timely objections are made by a party, the District Court 

may accept, not accept, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.12

B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

                                                            

7

 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B). 

8

 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1). 

9

 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1); Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). 

10 Rieder v. Apfel, 115 F.Supp.2d 496, 499 (M.D.Pa. 2000) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 

U.S. 667, 676 (1980)). 

11 Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), advisory committee notes; see also Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Intern., 

Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 469 (M.D.Pa. 2010) (citing Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878 

(3d Cir. 1987)) (explaining that judges should give some review to every report and 

recommendation).

12 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Local Rule 72.31. 

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Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.”13 A fact is “material” where it “might affect the outcome of the 

suit under the governing law.”14 A dispute is “genuine” where “the evidence is 

such that a reasonable jury,” giving credence to the evidence favoring the 

nonmovant and making all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor, “could return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party.”15

The burden of establishing the nonexistence of a “genuine issue” is on the 

party moving for summary judgment.16 The moving party may satisfy this burden 

by either (i) submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of 

the nonmoving party’s claim; or (ii) demonstrating to the Court that the nonmoving 

party’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving 

party’s case.17 

Where the moving party’s motion is properly supported, the nonmoving 

party, to avoid summary judgment in his opponent’s favor, must answer by setting 

forth “genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact 

                                                            

13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

14 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

15 Id. 16 In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 237 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 331 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 

17 Id. at 331. 

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because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”18 For movants 

and nonmovants alike, the assertion “that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed 

must” be supported by “materials in the record” that go beyond mere allegations, 

or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of 

a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to 

support the fact.”19 

“When opposing summary judgment, the non-movant may not rest upon 

mere allegations, but rather must ‘identify those facts of record which would 

contradict the facts identified by the movant.’”20 Furthermore, “[i]f a party fails to 

properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s 

assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact 

undisputed for purposes of the motion.”21 

In deciding the merits of a party’s motion for summary judgment, the court’s 

role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but to 

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.22 Credibility determinations 

                                                            

18 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. 

19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–50. 

20 Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2003). 

21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). 

22 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. 

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are the province of the factfinder, not the District Court.23 Although the court may 

consider any materials in the record, it need only consider those materials cited.24

III. DISCUSSION 

Having reviewed those portions of the Report and Recommendation to 

which no objections were made, the Court is satisfied that, on its face, it has no 

clear error. Furthermore, following a de novo review of those portions of the 

Report to which an objection was made, the Court will adopt the Report and 

Recommendation in its entirety and thus grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment. 

1. The Report and Recommendation Did Not Err In Advising the 

Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment “State-Created 

Danger” Claim. 

Plaintiff first objects to the Report and Recommendation’s finding that his 

“state-created danger” claim under the Fourteenth Amendment should be 

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff 

specifically contests the Report’s determination, following PLRA screening,25 that 

                                                            

23 BWM, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). 

24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). 

25 Under 42 U.S.C. §1997e(c)(1), a District court shall "dismiss any action brought with respect 

to prison conditions . . . if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune." 42 U.S.C. §1997e(c)(1). The Court has reviewed de novo Plaintiff's objections 

concerning the Report and Recommendation's screening process and its recommendation of 

dismissal. The Court finds no error in this conclusion. See Thomas v. Brockbank, 195 F.App’x. 

804, 809 (10th Cir. 2006) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment where plaintiff’s 

claims were frivolous under Section 1997e(c)(2)); Fitzgerald v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 403 F.3d 

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his state-created danger claim should be dismissed under the “more specific 

provision rule.”26 Following de novo review, the Court agrees with this finding. 

Furthermore, the Court has reviewed the factual record and concludes that, even 

when viewing the facts in the light most favorable at the summary judgment stage, 

Plaintiff has failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a 

favorable verdict on this claim. 

The state-created danger theory stipulates that “liability may attach where 

the state acts to create or enhance a danger that deprives the plaintiff of his or her 

Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process.”27 To prevail on a statecreated danger claim, a plaintiff must prove: 

(1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct; 

(2) a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the 

conscience; 

(3) a relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such that 

the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant's acts, or a 

member of a discrete class of persons subjected to the potential harm 

brought about by the state's actions, as opposed to a member of the 

public in general; and 

(4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a way that 

created a danger to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more 

vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all.28

                                                                                                                                                                                               

1134, 1145 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment where 

plaintiff’s claims were frivolous under Section 1997e(c)(2)). 

26 Pl.’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (“Objections”), 

ECF No. 54, at 3-10. 

27 Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2006); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1201 (3d 

Cir. 1996). 

28 Sanford, 456 F.3d at 304–305 (citing Bright v. Westmoreland County, 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d 

Cir. 2006)). 

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The second prong, that of culpability, is often the most difficult element for a 

plaintiff to prove in a state-created danger case.29

Plaintiff has not adduced evidence from which a reasonable jury could find 

that Defendants acted “with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience.” In 

Sanford v. Stiles, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 

considered the standard of culpability required under this second element.30 

Specifically, the Sanford Court found that the level of culpability required to shock 

the conscience “increases as the time state actors have to deliberate decreases.”31 

In “hyperpressurized situations,” a plaintiff must prove “intent to harm.”32 As time 

to deliberate increases and allows for “unhurried judgments,” the standard of 

culpability which must be proved decreases to “deliberate indifference.”33 In 

between the temporal extremes when “hurried deliberation” over the course of 

“hours or minutes” is possible, the plaintiff must show that the state officer 

“consciously disregarded a great risk of harm.”34

A reasonable jury would not conclude that Plaintiff exhibited “deliberate 

indifference” in this matter. Specifically, the undisputed facts indicate that 

Defendant LeFebvre previously had inmates at another institution slice 

                                                            

29 See Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 153 (3d Cir. 2005) (focusing its analysis on the 

culpability element because it is often determinative of a state-created danger case). 

30 See generally Sanford, 456 F.3d at 305–309. 

31 Id. at 309. 

32 Id. 33 Id. 

34 Id.

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watermelons on an electric slicer without incident.35 It was not until Plaintiff 

supposedly voiced36 his difficultly that Defendant LeFebvre became aware of a 

risk of harm.37 Even assuming that Plaintiff had voiced his difficulty to Defendant 

LeFebvre, however, no reasonable jury could find that Defendant LeFebvre acted 

with “deliberate indifference to an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”38 

While Defendant LeFebvre may have become negligent by not acting at that 

point,39 this failure does not shock the conscience considering the uncontested 

evidence that he had previously made such an assignment without incident, did not 

believe it to be unreasonably dangerous assignment, and stated that he would not 

knowingly put workers in harm’s way.40 Furthermore, the electric slicer had the 

blade guard in place at the time of Plaintiff’s injury.41 Finally, Plaintiff has offered 

no facts demonstrating that Defendants Dittsworth, Weaverling, Fagan, and 

Mandichak-McDonnell had knowledge that Plaintiff was slicing watermelons with 

                                                            

35 LeFebvre Decl. ¶¶ 10, 17. 

36 The Court notes that there is a genuine dispute as to whether Plaintiff expressed concern about 

using the slicer. See LeFebvre Decl. ¶ 16. 

37 Beenick Dep. 68:11-69:10. 

38 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

39 Claims of negligence do not constitute “deliberate indifference.” Innis v. Wilson, 334 F.App’x. 

454, 457 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 193 n.2 (3d Cir. 

2001)); see also Brickell v. Clinton County Prison Bd., 658 F.Supp.2d 621, 629 (M.D.Pa. 2009) 

(finding that county’s negligence was not sufficiently shocking to support inmate's statecreated danger theory based on inmate's allegation that she suffered severe burns while 

transferring hot container from stove to top shelf of upright warmers). 

40 LeFebvre Decl. ¶¶ 10, 17-18. 

41 Beenick Dep. 57: 15-19. 

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an electric slicer.42 Having no knowledge of this “danger,” they cannot be held 

culpable for disregard or indifference. 

Therefore, having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable, the 

Court finds that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for Plaintiff. Defendants 

are therefore entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment 

state-created danger claims. 

2. The Report and Recommendation Did Not Fail To Consider 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 

Plaintiff further argues that the Report and Recommendation neglected to 

consider each motion for summary judgment separately.43 Specifically, Plaintiff 

maintains that, although the Report and Recommendation cited the correct law 

concerning cross motions for summary judgment,44 the Magistrate Judge failed to 

abide by these instructions. The Court finds this objection to be without merit. 

Plaintiff’s motion was explicitly given separate consideration on pages 34 and 35 

of the Report. In that passage, Magistrate Judge Saporito stated that, “based on the 

foregoing discussion, and viewing the record in the light most favorable to 

                                                            

42 Beenick Dep. 52:20-53:8; Mandichak-McConnell Decl. ¶ 10, at 2; Dittsworth Decl. ¶ 8, at 2; 

Weaverling Decl. ¶ 8, at 2; Fagan Decl. ¶¶ 13-13-15. 

43 Objections, at 10-11. 

44 When considering cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court considers each motion 

separately, applying the standard set forth above. See Transportes Ferreos de Venezuela II CA v. 

NKK Corp., 239 F.3d 555, 560 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 402 F.2d 

241, 245 (3d Cir. 1968) (cross-motions for summary judgment “are no more than a claim by each 

side that it alone is entitled to summary judgment”); Borrell v. Bloomsburg University, 63 

F.Supp.2d 941, 946 (M.D.Pa. 2010). 

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Beenick,” Plaintiff had failed to show his entitlement to judgment as a matter of 

law. Plaintiff’s objection is therefore overruled. 

3. The Report and Recommendation Did Not Err By Considering The 

Declarations Cited By Defendants in Support of Their Motion for 

Summary Judgment. 

Plaintiff next objects to the Report and Recommendation’s conclusion 

that the declarations cited by Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment posed no 

evidentiary issues.45 Plaintiff specifically argues that the declarations (1) cannot be 

credited because corresponding records are not attached, (2) contain inadmissible 

statements, and (3) cannot be credited to the extent made by an incompetent 

declarant. 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4) requires that a declaration used to 

support or oppose a summary judgment motion must (1) be based on personal 

knowledge, (2) contain otherwise admissible facts, and (3) be made by a declarant 

who is competent to testify on the matters asserted.46 Here, Plaintiff first argues 

that the declarations cannot be considered because the business records imparting 

personal knowledge on the declarants were not attached.47 In support of this 

                                                            

45 Objections, at 11-24. 

46 Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4). 

47 Objections, at 13-17. Plaintiff appears to concede, on page 13 of his Objections, that “personal 

knowledge” may be based on “a review of relevant business records.” York Intern. Corp. v. 

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:10-CV-0692, 2015 WL 4162981, at *5 (M.D.Pa. July 9, 2015) 

(citing Wash. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 830 F.Supp. 1343, 1353 (E.D.Wash. 1993)). 

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proposition, Plaintiff cites a Note of the Advisory Committee concerning a 2010 

amendment. That note specifically states: 

The requirement that a sworn or certified copy of a paper referred to in an 

affidavit or declaration be attached to the affidavit or declaration is 

omitted as unnecessary given the requirement in subdivision (c)(1)(A) 

that a statement or dispute of fact be supported by materials in the 

record.48

The Court has reviewed the declarations and notes that no specific documents are 

referenced, nor are any attached. Plaintiff cites Del Rosario v. Labor Ready, 

Southeast, Inc.,

49 Washington Cent. R.R. Co. v. National Mediation Bd.,50 and 

Kohadara Envtl. II, Inc. v. Chest Twp.51 to support the proposition that a 

“declaration asserting personal knowledge based on records is not to be credited 

for summary judgment unless the records themselves are in evidence.” However, 

in those cited cases, any documents attached are specifically referenced and relied 

upon in the affidavits or declarations. Here, as in the Report and 

Recommendation, I find that each declaration52 was based on the declarant’s 

personal experience and that no specific document was referenced. Defendants 

were therefore not required to attach any documents and did not run afoul of the 

Rule 56(c)(4)’s advisory comments. 

                                                            

48 Note to Subdivision (c)(4), 2010 Amendments, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (emphasis added). 

49 124 F.Supp.3d 1300, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2015). 

50 830 F.Supp. 1343, 1353 (E.D. Wash. 1993). 

51 Civil Action No. 3:2002-96, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79612, at *4 (W.D.Pa. Oct. 26, 2007). 

52 The Shambaugh Declaration specifically refers to the Inmate grievance policy and all 

referenced records are attached. 

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 Plaintiff also argues that the declarations cannot be considered because they 

contain otherwise inadmissible material.53 Plaintiff specifically contends that (1) 

the Fagan Declaration contains inadmissible hearsay because it references a 

statement made by Plaintiff, and (2) the LeFebvre Declaration contains irrelevant 

speculation about a future event. I find both of these contentions to be without 

merit. First, Plaintiff’s statement within the Fagan Declaration at paragraph 19 

would be admissible as an opposing party’s statement under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 801(d)(2)(A).54 Second, paragraph 20 within the LeFebvre Declaration 

is admissible because it satisfies the relevance test outlined in Federal Rule of 

Evidence 401.55 Specifically, this speculation concerning possible punishment for 

voicing a concern is relevant because (1) it makes it more or less probable that a 

prisoner would be punished for same, and (2) possible punishment is consequential 

in determining whether Plaintiff and other inmates felt free to voice concerns. 

 Third and finally, Plaintiff argues that the LeFebvre and Fagan Declarations 

should not be considered because both witnesses were incompetent. Under Federal 

Rule of Evidence 601, every person is deemed competent “unless of the rules 

                                                            

53 Objections, at 18. 

54 “(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the following conditions is 

 not hearsay: . . . 

 (2) An Opposing Party's Statement. The statement is offered against an opposing party and: 

 (A) was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity;” 

Fed.R.Evid.801(d)(2). 

55 Federal Rule of Evidence 401 states that evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to 

make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of 

consequence in the determining the action.” Fed.R.Evid. 401. 

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provide otherwise.”56 Plaintiff has failed to cite a rule of evidence which calls into 

question Defendant LeFebvre or Defendant Fagan’s competence. Rather, Plaintiff 

simply cites evidence contradicting portions of their declarations. This citation to 

conflicting evidence does not impugn declarants’ competence. 

 Having reviewed de novo the declarations cited by Defendants, I find that 

the Report and Recommendation did not err in considering said declarations for 

purposes of deciding the motions for summary judgment. 

4. The Report and Recommendation Did Not Err By Finding No 

Genuine Disputes As to Material Fact. 

In Plaintiff’s fourth objection, he argues that genuine disputes of material 

fact concerning Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment “conditions of confinement” claims 

were overlooked by the magistrate judge. The Court finds this objection to be 

without merit as the Plaintiff has failed to come forward with evidence from which 

a reasonable jury could find that Defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference 

to a substantial risk of serious harm. 

 The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment” and 

imposes upon prison officials a duty to provide “humane conditions of 

confinement.”57 A claim challenging the “conditions of confinement” does not, 

however, constitute an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) the prison official 

                                                            

56 Fed.R.Evid.601. 

57 Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). 

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deprived the prisoner of the minimal measures of life’s necessities, and (2) the 

prison official acted with “deliberate indifference” as to the “substantial risk of 

serious damage” this deprivation would have on his future health.58

 In the context of a “conditions of confinement” claim, “deliberate 

indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm” may be demonstrated by 

showing that the risk of harm was “longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or 

expressly noted by prison officials such that the defendants must have known 

about the risk.”59 It is not enough for a plaintiff to show that a reasonable person 

would have or should have known that a substantial risk exists.60 Rather, the 

plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant prison officials were “aware of facts 

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and 

that they also drew the inference.”61 At the summary judgment stage specifically, 

a plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable factfinder can infer “ 

‘that the defendant-officials were . . . knowingly and unreasonably disregarding an 

objectively intolerable risk of harm.’ ”62 

 Although ascertaining a defendant’s “deliberate indifference” is a subjective 

inquiry, the question of whether a “substantial risk of serious harm” exists is an 

                                                            

58 Parkell v. Danberg, F.3d , 2016 WL 4375620 at *12 (3d Cir. Aug. 17, 2016) (quoting 

Chavarriga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 226 (3d Cir. 2015)). 

59 Parkell, 2016 WL 4375620 at *12 (quoting Betts, 621 F.3d at 259). 

60 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8. 

61 Parkell, 2016 WL 4375620 at *12 (quoting Betts, 621 F.3d at 259). 

62 Betts, 621 F.3d at 259 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846). 

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objective inquiry.63 This objective inquiry requires an assessment of whether it 

“violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such 

a risk.”64 Under the test promulgated by the Supreme Court in Helling v. 

McKinney and adopted by the Third Circuit in Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 

a plaintiff demonstrates a substantial risk of serious harm by showing (1) the 

seriousness of the injury, (2) a sufficient likelihood that serious injury will result, 

and (3) that the risks associated with the activity violate contemporary standards of 

decency.65

 In his Objections, Plaintiff specifically argues that there is evidence that (1) 

Plaintiff told Defendant LeFebvre that the watermelon was too heavy for the 

electric slicer, (2) Defendant Fagan knew of the dangers of the electric slicer, (3) 

Defendant Mandichak-McConnell was present on July 13, 2013 and knew inmates 

were using the electric slicer, and (4) Defendants Dittsworth and Weaverling 

encouraged unsafe work assignments in the kitchen and turned a blind eye to 

danger.66 First, the Court finds that, although Plaintiff has presented evidence 

suggesting Defendant LeFebvre knew of Plaintiff’s difficulty slicing the 

watermelon,67 this knowledge would not allow a reasonable factfinder to infer 

deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. The facts indicate that 

                                                            

63 Id. at 256 (citing Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 2003)). 

64 Id. at 257 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993)). 

65 Id.

66 Objections, at 24-29. 

67 Objections, at 24 (citing Beenick Dep. Tr., at 68:11-69:10). 

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Defendant LeFebvre previously supervised the use of an electric slicer to cut 

watermelon at another institution.68 Because this supervison occurred without 

incident or accident,69 Defendant LeFebvre’s mere awareness of Plaintiff’s 

difficulty would not lead to an “inference . . . that a substantial risk of harm 

exists.”70 The facts further indicate that Defendant did not actually draw that 

inference, stating “[b]ased on my prior experience, I did not believe the assignment 

to be unreasonably dangerous.”71 

Furthermore, under the Heller test concerning when a substantial risk of 

serious harm is present, I find that Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence from 

which a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff has satisfied the third factor. 

Specifically, no reasonable factfinder could find that the risk associated with 

slicing watermelons on an electric slicer “violate[s] contemporary standards of 

decency.”72 The Court therefore concludes that no reasonable factfinder can infer 

                                                            

68 LeFebvre Decl. ¶ 10, at 2. 

69 Id. 

70 See Brown v. Williams, 399 F.Supp.2d 558, 566 (D. Del. 2005) (finding that, “[e]ven though 

State defendants knew of the inmates' concern about the water conditions,” summary judgment is 

appropriate because there is “no evidence from which a fact finder could conclude that State 

defendants both were aware of a substantial risk . . . and then affirmatively disregarded this 

risk”). 

71 Id. ¶ 17, at 3. 

72 See Betts, 621 F.3d at 259 (affirming a district court’s imposition by finding that risk of injury 

of playing football without protective equipment “does not satisfy the legal standard of deliberate 

indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm”). 

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that Defendant LeFebvre exhibited deliberate indifference, or knowing and 

unreasonable disregard for an objectively intolerable risk of harm.73 

 Second, the Court also finds that the Report and Recommendation did not 

err in finding that Defendant Fagan did not exhibit deliberate indifference to a 

substantial risk of serious harm. As noted throughout, a showing of deliberate 

indifference requires more than mere negligence.74 Although Plaintiff argues that 

Defendant Fagan knew of the dangers from the warnings in the electric slicer’s 

instruction manual, her tours of the kitchen, and the lack of training records, the 

Court concludes that this knowledge and failure to act does not rise about mere 

negligence such that a reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference.75 

 Third, I find that the Report and Recommendation did not err by finding that 

Defendant Mandichak-McConnell (1) had no interaction with Plaintiff that 

morning, (2) did not enter the prep room where he was working, and (3) was not 

made aware that Plaintiff and other inmates were using an electric slicer to slice 

watermelons. In support of his objection, Plaintiff disputes the validity of 

                                                            

73 Betts, 621 F.3d at 259 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846). 

74 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (“To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct 

that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care 

for the prisoner's interests or safety.”); Jones v. County Jail C.F.C.F., 610 F.App’x. 167, 168 (3d 

Cir. 2015). 

75 Bowie v. Procunier, 808 F.2d 1142, 1143 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of 

complaint alleging failure to provide adequate safety equipment and where a piece of bark put 

out one of the inmate-plaintiff’s eyes while chopping wood); Brown v. Richmond County Corr. 

Inst., No. CV 105-118, 2006 WL 1431488, at *2 (S.D. Ga. May 22, 2006) (dismissing complaint 

alleging failure to provide safety helmet on work detail involving cutting trees where tree branch 

broke and struck inmate-plaintiff on the head). 

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Defendant Fagan’s declaration and cites to undisputed facts that Defendant Fagan 

is a food instructor at SCI-Benner Twp and was working in the kitchen at the time 

of the injury.76 Citation to these facts, however, does not create a dispute 

concerning Defendant Fagan’s interaction with Plaintiff on that day or her 

awareness that the inmates were using an electric slicer. 

 Finally, Plaintiff objects to the Report and Recommendation’s determination 

that Defendants Dittsworth and Weaverling were not present the morning of 

Beenick’s injury and that Plaintiff failed to identify any evidence of their deliberate 

indifference. Again, however, Plaintiff fails to cite to specific portions of the 

record which put these findings into dispute. Instead, Plaintiff again contests the 

validity of the declarations and cites to a portion of the record which fails to 

directly contradict these findings. 

Having reviewed de novo Plaintiff’s objections to the Report and 

Recommendation’s conclusion concerning his Eighth Amendment claims, the 

Court finds no error and thus will grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment as to these claims. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Based on the above discussion and analysis, the Court adopts in its entirety 

the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Saporito. Defendants’ 

                                                            

76 Objections, at 28-29. 

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Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment is denied. 

An appropriate Order follows. 

BY THE COURT: 

 s/ Matthew W. Brann 

 Matthew W. Brann 

 United States District Judge 

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