UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RICHARD ALLEN HAMMONDS, : 4:14-CV-00527

 :

Plaintiff :

 : (Judge Brann)

v. :

 : (Magistrate Judge Schwab)

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT :

OF CORRECTIONS, et al., :

 :

Defendants :

 :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Introduction.

In the present action, pro se plaintiff Richard Allen Hammonds 

(“Hammonds”), an inmate presently incarcerated at the State Correctional 

Institution at Smithfield in Huntington, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Smithfield”) raises 

claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on alleged constitutional violations that 

occurred within multiple Pennsylvania correctional facilities. The defendants are 

current and former employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

(“DOC”) and other contract medical personnel who provide services at state 

prisons. Currently pending before the Court is Hammonds’s fourth motion for a

temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Because Hammonds has 

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not met his heavy burden to demonstrate that he merits receiving the extraordinary 

relief he seeks, we recommend that his motion be denied.

II. Background and Procedural History.

Hammonds commenced the present action on March 20, 2014, by filing a 

complaint against 30 defendants. Doc. 1. In his complaint, Hammonds contends, 

among other things, that he was denied mental health treatment while he was 

incarcerated at the State Correctional Institutions in Frackville and Fayette, 

Pennsylvania (“SCI-Frackville” and “SCI-Fayette” respectively). Id. at 4-9. He 

also claims that officials at SCI-Frackville poisoned his food and that he was 

denied medical treatment for the conditions and symptoms caused by the 

poisoning. Id. at 6-7.

The present motion, filed on September 11, 2015, represents Hammonds’s

fourth attempt1to seek injunctive relief. Doc. 102 (Hammonds’s fourth motion). 

 

1 Hammonds’s first motion for a preliminary injunction, which he filed on May 2, 

2014, was denied on January 7, 2015. See Doc. 8 (Hammonds’s first motion); 

Doc. 34 (report and recommendation); Doc. 52 (order adopting report and 

recommendation and denying first motion). Hammonds then filed his second 

motion for a preliminary injunction on January 13, 2015, which was subsequently 

denied on October 7, 2015. See Doc. 53 (Hammonds’s second motion); Doc. 94

(report and recommendation); Doc. 107 (order adopting report and 

recommendation and denying second motion). Hammonds filed a third motion for 

a preliminary injunction on July 22, 2015, which was deemed withdrawn on 

February 29, 2016. Doc. 90 (Hammonds’s third motion); Doc. 113 (order 

deeming Hammonds’s third motion withdrawn).

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He began by filing a motion, declaration and brief in support. Doc. 102 (motion); 

Doc. 103 (declaration); Doc. 104 (brief in support). In his declaration and brief in 

support, Hammonds suggests that he is currently experiencing serious and 

potentially life-threatening medical ailments stemming from the alleged poisoning 

at SCI-Frackville and that he requires immediate medical attention.

2

 Doc. 103 at 1; 

Doc. 104 at 2-3. 

Hammonds states that he has visited prison medical facilities3to receive 

care, and that bloodwork taken during those visits showed that his bilirubin levels 

were elevated. Doc. 103 at 1; Doc. 104 at 2-3. He next avers that his elevated 

bilirubin levels indicate the presence of a severe medical issue, but “due to the 

complexity of the symptoms he is [experiencing, he is] unable to receive 

treatment” and the nurses have not made arrangements to get him the treatment he 

seeks. Doc. 103 at 2. In terms of relief, Hammonds suggests that his symptoms

require immediate gastroenterological intervention and he requests a “temporary 

restraining order requiring the defendants to arrange for an examination and a plan 

 

2

In documents relating to the present motion, Hammonds does not specify where 

the poisoning occurred. However, Hammonds is clear in his original complaint in 

contending that the positioning occurred at SCI-Frackville. Doc. 1 at 6. 

3 Hammonds does not specify from which facility he has sought medical attention, 

and as a result, we will construe Hammonds’s present motion as referring to prison 

medical facilities at the State Correctional Institution in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania 

(“SCI-Camp Hill”), the facility in which he was incarcerated when he filed the 

present motion. Doc. 102 at 1; Doc. 104 at 4; Doc. 106 at 4.

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of treatment by a qualified specialist and a preliminary injunction requiring the 

defendants to carry out that plan of treatment.” Id.; Doc. 104 at 2. 

On September 25, 2015, the defendants filed a brief in opposition to 

Hammonds’s motion. Doc. 105. Hammonds then filed a reply brief. Doc. 106.

III. Discussion.

A. Legal Standards.

Motions for preliminary injunctive relief are governed by Rule 654of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are judged against exacting legal standards. 

To obtain a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order, a movant 

“must satisfy the traditional four-factor test: (1) a likelihood of success on the 

merits; (2) he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) 

granting relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) 

the public interest favors such relief.” Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d 

Cir. 2010). It is the movant’s burden to show a likelihood of success on the merits. 

Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1992).

 

4

 Pursuant to Rule 65(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a “court may 

issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

65(a)(1). In contrast, a “court may issue a temporary restraining order without 

written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney” if certain conditions are 

met. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).

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Preliminary injunctive relief is not granted as a matter of right. Kershner v. 

Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Thomas v. Pennsylvania 

Dep’t of Corr., 3:13-CV-2661, 2014 WL 3955105, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2014) 

(“An injunction is an ‘extraordinary remedy’ that is never awarded as of right.”). 

Rather, the decision to grant or deny such relief is committed to the discretion of 

the district court. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 1982). 

Generally, preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that 

places precise burdens on the moving party, and “[t]he preliminary injunction must 

be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. 

C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989). “It has been well stated 

that upon an application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny.” Madison 

Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1937). Further, 

where the requested preliminary injunctive relief “is directed not merely at 

preserving the status quo but . . . at providing mandatory relief, the burden on the 

moving party is particularly heavy.” Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 

1980). Mandatory injunctions should be used sparingly. United States v. Price,

688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982). 

For a party to sustain his burden of proof that he is entitled to preliminary 

injunctive relief under Rule 65, he must demonstrate both a reasonable likelihood 

of success on the merits and irreparable harm if the requested relief is not granted. 

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Abu-Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1998); Kershner, 670 F.2d at 443. 

“As these elements suggest, there must be ‘a relationship between the injury 

claimed in the party’s motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.’” Ball v. 

Famiglio, 396 F. App’x 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 

1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th 

Cir. 1994)). “To establish a reasonable probability of success on the merits, the 

moving party must produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the essential elements of 

the underlying cause of action.” Sutton v. Cerullo, 3:CV-10-1899, 2014 WL 

3900235, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2014). To establish irreparable injury, “the 

moving party must establish that the harm is imminent and probable.” Stilp v. 

Contino, 629 F. Supp. 2d 449, 466 (M.D. Pa. 2009). “The mere risk of injury is 

not sufficient to meet this standard.” Id. And the burden of showing irreparable 

injury “is not an easy burden” to meet. Moore v. Mann, 3:CV-13-2771, 2014 WL 

3893903, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2014). In assessing a motion for preliminary 

injunctive relief, the court must also consider the harm to the defendants and 

whether granting the preliminary injunction will be in the public interest. New 

Jersey Retail Merchants Ass’n v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374, 388 (3d Cir. 

2012).

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B. Hammonds Has Failed to Establish a Reasonable Likelihood of Success 

on the Merits.

Hammonds’s underlying § 1983 action5appears to raise an Eighth 

Amendment claim by alleging that various prison officials were deliberately 

indifferent toward his medical needs. Doc. 104 at 3. Hammonds avers that he has 

“a great likelihood of success on the merits [because of] what the defendants have 

done” to allegedly deposit chemicals in his food, infect him with hepatitis and 

possibly cirrhosis, and to deny him necessary medical treatment. Id. Hammonds 

further suggests that the defendants’ actions amount to cruel and unusual 

punishment. Id. In response, the defendants contend that Hammonds “cannot 

demonstrate that prison staff were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs 

when he is regularly meeting with medical professionals to monitor and treat his 

aliments and [he] merely suspects that he needs to see a gastroenterologist.” Doc. 

105 at 7. 

The Eighth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from cruel and 

unusual punishment inflicted by the Government. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 

“The primary concern of the drafters [of the Eighth Amendment] was to proscribe 

‘torture(s)’ and other ‘barbar(ous)’ methods of punishment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 

 

5 As we have previously noted in an earlier report and recommendation issued 

during the course of this litigation, Hammonds’s Eighth Amendment claim is not at 

all precise. We have liberally construed Hammonds’s complaint, and to the extent 

any distortions have occurred, they have not been by design. See Doc. 94.

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429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). In the Twentieth Century, however, the Supreme Court 

held that the Amendment prohibits more than physically barbarous punishments 

“embod[ying] ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, 

humanity, and decency...,’ against which [federal courts] must evaluate penal 

measures.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the Supreme Court has since held 

repugnant to the Eighth Amendment “punishments which are incompatible with 

the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society ... 

or which involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. (quoted cases 

omitted). Under this broad standard, the government has an obligation to provide 

adequate, or basic, medical care for those whom it is punishing by imprisonment. 

See id. at 103, 105; Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). Thus, 

when a government official acts, or fails to act, with deliberate indifference to an 

inmate’s serious medical needs, unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain is 

inflicted: pain that is proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 104. 

Accordingly, to state an Eighth Amendment claim based on a denial of 

medical care, a plaintiff must plausibly show “(i) a serious medical need, and (ii) 

acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that 

need.” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). 

This deliberate-indifference state of mind is more blameworthy than mere 

negligence. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). To establish deliberate 

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indifference, a plaintiff must show that a prison official was aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed, 

and that the official drew the inference. Id. at 837; Beers–Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 

F.3d 120, 131 (3d Cir. 2001). Thus, “an official’s failure to alleviate a significant 

risk that he should have perceived but did not. . . cannot . . . be condemned as the 

infliction of punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. Also, a complaint that a 

physician “has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does 

not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment [as] 

medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the 

victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Furthermore, it is important that 

the movant “establish[es] a nexus between the injury claimed in the motion and the 

conduct asserted in the underlying complaint.” Watson v. Fisher, No. 09-87J, 2013 

WL 3733591, at *3 (W.D. Pa. July 16, 2013).

Here, even if we were to assume that Hammonds has established a nexus 

between the injury claimed in his motion – elevated bilirubin levels – and the 

conduct asserted in the underling complaint – the alleged poisoning and subsequent 

failure of medical staff to treat his injuries – Hammonds does not demonstrate that 

prison officials acted with the requisite culpability for his Eighth Amendment 

denial of medical care claim to succeed. Although Hammonds states that he has 

serious medical needs, he does not demonstrate that prison officials have ignored 

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those needs. To the contrary, Hammonds admits that he has received medical care

on numerous occasions. Doc. 103 at 1; Doc. 104 at 5, 9. See Clark v. Doe, No. 

CIV. A. 99–5616, 2000 WL 1522855, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct.13, 2000) (“[C]ourts 

have consistently rejected Eighth Amendment claims where an inmate has received 

some level of medical care.”); see also Walker v. Fayette County, 599 F.2d 573, 

n.2 (3d Cir.1979) (“We will distinguish between cases where the complaint alleges 

a complete denial of medical care and those alleging inadequate medical treatment. 

‘Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the 

adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess 

medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.’”)

(quoting Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976)).

If Hammonds is attempting to argue that the medical treatment he has 

received to address his elevated bilirubin levels has been insufficient, he has not 

illustrated that such insufficiency rises to the level of deliberate indifference. 

Hammonds does not allege, for example, that medical officials referred him to a 

gastroenterologist, and that prison officials maliciously curtailed his attempts to 

seek gastroenterological care. Similarly, though he may disagree with the care 

medical professionals have provided, such disagreements also fall short of the 

deliberate indifferent standard. “‘[M]ere allegations of malpractice’ or 

‘disagreement as to the proper medical treatment’ do not constitute deliberate 

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indifference.” Viera v. Williams, No. 1:13-CV-02424, 2015 WL 5913193, *3 

(M.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2015) (quoting Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. 

Lanzaro (MCCII ), 834 F.2d 326, 346–47 (3d Cir. 1987)).

As a result, Hammonds has not alleged facts to demonstrate that medical 

professionals exhibited the type of “more blameworthy than mere negligence” 

culpability standard required to make a finding of deliberate indifference. 

Accordingly, because Hammonds has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable 

likelihood his claim will succeed on the merits, this factor does not weigh in favor 

of granting Hammonds preliminary injunctive relief. 

C. Hammonds Has Not Established That He Will Incur Irreparable 

Injury.

Hammonds appears to allege that his elevated bilirubin levels have subjected 

him to, among other conditions, extreme pain and that if those levels are left 

untreated without gastroenterological intervention, he may be subjected to further 

life-threatening injuries. Doc. 103 at 1-2; Doc. 104 at 1-3. Hammonds also 

contends that the deprivation of his constitutional rights constitutes irreparable 

harm. Id. In response, the defendants aver that Hammonds “cannot demonstrate 

that he will be irreparably harmed when he is regularly meeting with medical 

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professionals to monitor and treat his ailments and merely suspects that he needs to 

see a gastroenterologist.” Doc. 105 at 9. 

“Irreparable injury is established by showing that [p]laintiff will suffer harm 

that ‘cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following trial.’ Instant 

Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989) (‘The 

preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from 

harm’).” Messner v. Bunner, No. 07–112E, 2009 WL 1406986, at *4 (W.D. Pa. 

May 19, 2009). In this context, the word irreparable has a specific meaning and 

connotes “that which cannot be repaired, retrieved, put down again, [or] atoned for 

. . . .” Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations 

omitted). Thus, an injunction will not issue “simply to eliminate the possibility of 

a remote future injury . . . .” Acierno, 40 F.3d at 655 (citation omitted). 

Here, because Hammonds admits that he has frequented the prison’s medical 

facilities and has been cared for by one or more medical professionals, he cannot 

then suggest that he has incurred irreparable harm because of a lack of medical

treatment. Doc. 103 at 5, 9; Doc. 104 at 1. Further, since filing the present 

motion, it appears that Hammonds has since been transferred to SCI-Smithfield. 

Doc. 105 at 1. Thus, to extent Hammonds’s present motion seeks relief from a 

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lack of medical treatment provided at SCI-Camp Hill6, Hammonds cannot show 

that he is still subject to the condition that he suggests entitles him to preliminary 

injunctive relief. In other words, because Hammonds is no longer incarcerated at 

SCI-Camp Hill, he cannot show that he will be irreparably injured because of a 

lack of medical treatment provided at SCI-Camp Hill. Accordingly, this factor 

does not weigh in favor of granting Hammonds preliminary injunctive relief. 

D. Providing Hammonds With Injunctive Relief May Harm Both the 

Defendants’ and the Public’s Interests.

Hammonds avers if he is granted injunctive relief, the defendants will not 

incur any harm because “taking the plaintiff to a suitable doctor and then carrying 

out the doctors[’s] orders . . . amounts to no more than business as usual.” Doc. 

104 at 2. In response, the defendants suggest, however, that transporting 

Hammonds, a maximum security prisoner, to a “non-secure hospital with no 

showing of a need for treatment . . . implicates numerous safety, security, staffing 

and cost concerns to both the Department of Corrections and the public.” Doc. 105

at 11. 

 

6

See, supra, n.3. Because Hammonds does not specify in which facility he 

experienced a lack of medical treatment vis-à-vis his elevated bilirubin levels, we 

construed Hammonds’s present motion as referring to prison medical facilities at 

SCI-Camp Hill because that was the facility in which he was incarcerated when he 

filed the present motion. Doc. 102 at 1; Doc. 104 at 4; Doc. 106 at 4. 

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Granting the injunctive relief requested by Hammonds, i.e., an order 

specifying how Hammonds’s medical condition should be handled, would 

“effectively have the federal courts making ad hoc, and individual, decisions 

concerning the treatment of a single prisoner, [which] could harm both the 

defendants’ and the public’s interest.” Kelly v. Merrill, No. 1:14-CV-2322, 2014 

WL 7740025, at *9; see generally Jenkins v. Crayton, No 12-1533, 2013 WL

3467191, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 10, 2013) (“The federal courts are not overseers of 

the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary 

authority as the ‘operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily 

difficult undertaking.’” (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974))). 

In the prison context, the interest in penological order could be adversely affected 

if the Court began dictating the specific course of treatment for Hammonds, who is 

one inmate out of thousands in Pennsylvania’s prison system. Accordingly, 

because issuing such an order may harm both the defendants’ and the public’s

interest, these two factors also do not weigh in favor of granting Hammonds 

preliminary injunctive relief. 

E. Conclusion.

In sum, Hammonds has not demonstrated that he is entitled to the extraordinary 

relief that he seeks. All four factors that govern issuance of such relief under Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 65 weigh against Hammonds and compel us to recommend that the Court 

deny his motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction.

IV. Recommendations.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we recommend that Hammonds’s 

motion (doc. 102) for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction be 

denied. We further recommend that the case be remanded to the undersigned for 

further proceedings.

The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings, 

recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 

28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the 

disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within 

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party 

shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and 

all parties, written objections which shall specifi0cally identify the 

portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to 

which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The 

briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A 

judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the 

report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which 

objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in 

part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 

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The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her 

discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record 

developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own 

determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive 

further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the 

magistrate judge with instructions.

Submitted this 26th day of July, 2016.

S/Susan E. Schwab

Susan E. Schwab

United States Magistrate Judge

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