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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

REVEREND BRIAN THOMAS : No. 4:05-cv-1630

:

Plaintiff, :

: Judge Jones

v. :

:

JUDGE ROBERT CONWAY, :

:

Defendant. :

ORDER

January 18, 2006

THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:

Pending before this Court is Defendant Honorable Robert J. Conway’s

(“Judge Conway”) Motion to Dismiss (“the Motion”) (doc. 11) filed on November

3, 2005. Judge Conway moves this Court to dismiss the complaint (doc. 1) filed by

Plaintiff Reverend Brian Thomas (“Plaintiff”) on August 11, 2005.

For the following reasons, we will grant the Motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Plaintiff filed a complaint (doc. 1) with this Court on August 11, 2005. The

complaint states that the Plaintiff seeks “declaratory and injunctive relief and relief

for damages,” arising from “the depravation of Plaintiff’s constitutionally

guaranteed rights and conspiracy to violate those rights.” (sic) (Rec. Doc. 1 at 12). 

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From the obtuse language of the complaint, we have discerned that Plaintiff is

dissatisfied with the manner in which Judge Conway, who is a judge on the Wayne

County Court of Common Pleas, disposed of a case which came before him and

which involved Plaintiff. 

The instant Motion was filed on November 3, 2005. The Motion has been

fully briefed by the parties and is therefore ripe for review.

STANDARD OF REVIEW: 

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6), a

court must accept the veracity of a plaintiff's allegations. See Scheuer v. Rhodes,

416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 106 (3d Cir.

1990). In Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996), our Court of Appeals for

the Third Circuit added that in considering a motion to dismiss based on a failure

to state a claim argument, a court should "not inquire whether the plaintiffs will

ultimately prevail, only whether they are entitled to offer evidence to support their

claims." Furthermore, "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a

claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also District Council 47 v. Bradley, 795 F.2d2 310 (3d

Cir. 1986).

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 An adjudication involves “the application of existing law to particular facts.” Valenti v.

Mitchell, 962 F. 2d 288, 297 (3d Cir. 1992).

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DISCUSSION:

Judge Conway moves this Court to dismiss the Plaintiff’s complaint on two

grounds: first, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to review state

court proceedings and second, this suit is barred by judicial immunity. We shall

deal with each argument in turn.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiciton

Pursuant to Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) and District

of Columba Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n. 16 (1983), federal

district courts do not have jurisdiction over challenges to state trial and appellate

court adjudications. The United States Supreme Court, not federal district courts,

can review state court adjudications.1

 See Exxon Mobil Corp. V. Saudi Basic

Industries, Corp., 544 U.S. ____ (2005). 

Inasmuch as all of Plaintiff’s claims are challenges to state court

adjudications, this court lacks jurisdiction to review those adjudications pursuant to

Rooker-Feldman. While there are certain exceptions to the Rooker-Feldman bar to

our consideration of state adjudications, we will not labor further on this point,

since in any event Plaintiff’s action fails based on Judge Conway’s immunity from

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suit.

B. Judicial Immunity

Judicial immunity is “immunity from suit,” and it is “of the highest

importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in

exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own

convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” Miereles

v. Waco, 502 U.S 9, 11 (1991)(quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347

(1872).

There are two circumstances in which a judge is not immune from suit. 

First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions (i.e. actions not

taken in the judge’s judicial capacity). See Miereles, 502 U.S. at 11 (citation

omitted). Second, a judge is not immune for judicial actions taken in the complete

absence of all jurisdiction. See id. at 12.

Judge Conway argues, and we wholly agree, that the Plaintiff has not and

cannot make an allegation that Judge Conway acted in any other way towards

Plaintiff than in his judicial capacity and within his jurisdiction. Obtuse though

they are, there is no way to read the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint other than

that all of the conduct attributed to Judge Conway relates to his judicial duties. 

Therefore, we find that Judge Conway has judicial immunity from this lawsuit

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brought against him by Plaintiff.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Motion (doc. 11) is GRANTED.

2. The Clerk shall close the file on this case.

s/ John E. Jones III

John E. Jones III

United States District Court

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