*

 The Honorable R. Leon Jordan, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Tennessee, sitting by

designation.

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 08a0026p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ELBERT G. NICHOLS,

 Defendant-Appellant.

X

-

-

-

-

>

,

-

-

N

No. 06-5862

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.

No. 05-00104—Robert L. Echols, District Judge.

Argued: October 25, 2007

Decided and Filed: January 15, 2008 

Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; KENNEDY, Circuit Judge; and JORDAN, District Judge.*

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Michael C. Holley, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Nashville,

Tennessee, for Appellant. Blanche B. Cook, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,

Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michael C. Holley, Caryll S. Alpert, FEDERAL

PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Philip H. Wehby,

ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. 

_________________

OPINION _________________

BOGGS, Chief Judge. Elbert Nichols entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of being

a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924, reserving his right

to appeal the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. On appeal, he raises three arguments:

(1) that the police officer’s decision to run a warrant check on him was based on his race, violating

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) that the search of his vehicle incident

to his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment; and (3) that the questioning by the police after his

arrest violated his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Finding

no constitutional violations that would vitiate Nichols’s conviction, we AFFIRM the judgment of

the district court.

1
No. 06-5862 United States v. Nichols Page 2

1

 The parties dispute whether Officer Deslauriers personally witnessed any “avoidance behavior” by the men

around the car. Officer Deslauriers was not asked about, nor did he testify to, such behavior at the suppression hearing,

but Officer Wigginton testified that Officer Deslauriers radioed to him and said, “I don’t think they are now [sic]. They

saw me, I think — I think they are going back toward the house.” The record, while not crystal clear, is sufficient to

support the district court’s finding that Officer Deslauriers did, in fact, witness the suspicious behavior.

2

 There is nothing in the record that indicates where the officer found the keys.

I

In the early morning hours of September 9, 2004, Metro Nashville Police Department

Officers Aaron Wigginton and Yannick Deslauriers were on patrol in the West Nashville area near

Tennessee State University. Officer Wigginton “saw a vehicle that kind of grabbed [his] attention.”

There were some men standing around the car who “quickly walked away” as the officer drove by.

Officer Wigginton radioed to Officer Deslauriers: “I kind of alerted him that there was a vehicle up

here that appeared as the people were kind of standing around it and didn’t want to hang around,

they avoided me. I gave him the tag off the car . . . .” Responding to this radio call, Officer

Deslauriers then “ran the tag over [his] computer in the car,” which provided information from two

systems—the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and a Tennessee state system. The NCIC

system responded first, and “nothing came back as suspicious,” so the officers “moved on” and

continued patrolling the area for a few minutes. Officer Deslauriers passed by the location where

the vehicle was parked and apparently saw the men trying to avoid him as well.1

After a few minutes, the state system in Officer Deslauriers’s patrol car responded and

reported that the vehicle was registered to “Elbert Nichols.” Officer Deslauriers then “decided to

run Elbert Nichols on our warrant system . . . [and] it came back with having a [robbery] warrant

on a male black. We had driven by the location and seen that there was two black guys in the yard

next to the car.” The officers positioned themselves to watch the vehicle. After a few minutes, the

car started to drive away, and the officers executed a stop by turning on their blue lights. As they

approached the vehicle, they could see that the passenger was quite agitated and kept yelling at the

driver to “stomp it” or “punch it.” Officer Deslauriers recognized the passenger as Elbert Nichols

from the mug shot that had come up on his computer system. The driver made clear that he was not

going to try to run, and Officer Deslauriers then took Nichols into custody and placed him in the

back of his patrol car. Officer Deslauriers informed Nichols of his Miranda rights and advised him

he was under arrest for the outstanding robbery warrant. Nichols stated that he understood his

rights, but denied that he was Elbert Nichols, even when the officer pointed out his mug shot on the

computer system.

Officer Deslauriers then proceeded to search the vehicle and discovered a loaded .38-caliber

handgun in the glove box directly in front of where Nichols had been sitting. The glove box was

locked, but the officer opened it with a set of keys found at the scene.2

 Officer Deslauriers testified

that the search lasted “[a] couple minutes. Not very long.” After recovering the gun, Officer

Deslauriers returned to his patrol car and confronted Nichols with it. Initially, Nichols continued

to deny that he was Elbert Nichols. However, as Officer Deslauriers began to do the arrest report,

and engaged Nichols in “general conversation about the paperwork,” Nichols soon dropped the

charade and admitted his identity, but insisted that the robbery warrants were a mistake. In response

to the district court’s inquiry regarding how long the defendant had denied his identity, Officer

Deslauriers testified, “Several minutes while I spoke to him initially. Even after I searched the car.

He finally admitted — I think he had a mole on his face. Finally he just got tired, I assume.” Later,

as he was being transported back to the police station, Nichols “refused to be interviewed any

further.”
No. 06-5862 United States v. Nichols Page 3

3

 Similarly, in an unpublished case, this court has “assume[d] that the equal protection clause would . . . prohibit

a law enforcement officer from running computer checks of vehicle license plates in an intentionally racially

discriminatory manner.” United States v. $14,000 in U.S. Currency, 2000 WL 222587, at *3 n.2 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 2000).

On the basis of these facts, the district court refused to suppress any of the evidence.

Regarding the alleged equal protection violation, the court held that the defendant had failed to

establish a prima facie case that race was a motivating factor in the actions of the officers since the

defendant’s evidence was essentially no more than “that [the officers were] white and [were]

patrolling in a predominantly black neighborhood . . . .” The court next summarily rejected

Nichols’s argument that the search of a locked glove box exceeded the proper scope of a search

incident to arrest, citing Seventh Circuit cases holding that such a search was permissible under

prevailing Supreme Court precedent. Finally, the district court rejected Nichols’s Miranda

argument, concluding that the “Defendant’s repeated denials of his identity were not refusals to

answer all police questions. Rather, Defendant wished to, and did, communicate affirmatively with

the police officers by making statements to them which he believed furthered his self-interest.” The

court therefore concluded that Nichols impliedly waived his right to remain silent.

Having failed in his motion to suppress, Nichols entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant

to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2) and appealed to this court. 

II

“When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, [this court] review[s] the district court’s

findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.” United States v. Foster, 376 F.3d

577, 583 (6th Cir. 2004). “A factual finding will only be clearly erroneous when, although there

may be evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Navarro-Camacho, 186 F.3d

701, 705 (6th Cir. 1999). Additionally, the evidence produced at a suppression hearing must be

viewed “in the light most likely to support the district court’s decision.” Ibid.

A

Nichols first contends that Officer Deslauriers’s decision to run a warrant check on the name

“Elbert Nichols” was motivated by race, claiming that Officer Deslauriers presumed Nichols to be

black. Appellant’s Br. at 19-20. Nichols relies principally upon United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d

343 (6th Cir. 1997), in asserting this claim. Avery involved the surveillance of a young black male

by narcotics officers in the Cincinnati airport based on what they perceived to be suspicious

behavior. 137 F.3d at 346. The defendant in that case was eventually discovered to be transporting

illegal drugs; he moved to suppress the evidence claiming that the “officers targeted, pursued and

interviewed him solely due to his race.” Id. at 346-47. Although the court ultimately determined

that there was no equal protection violation, it elaborated on the applicable doctrine in an oftrepeated dictum: 

[W]e find that citizens are entitled to protection of the laws at all times. If law

enforcement adopts a policy, employs a practice, or in a given situation takes steps

to initiate an investigation of a citizen based solely upon that citizen’s race, without

more, then a violation of the Equal Protection Clause has occurred.

Id. at 355.3

 Avery, in turn, relied on earlier dicta in this court’s decision in United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 173-74 (6th Cir. 1995), where we noted that consensual encounters initiated solely on

the basis of race may violate the Equal Protection Clause. Although not binding, these cases support

the view that checking individuals for outstanding warrants in an intentionally racially
No. 06-5862 United States v. Nichols Page 4

4

 The New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted an equal protection exclusionary rule, but did so under the New

Jersey state constitution. See State v. Segars, 799 A.2d 541, 548-49 (N.J. 2002). A smattering of other jurists and

commentators have proposed such a rule, see, e.g., Navarro-Camacho, 186 F.3d at 711 (Moore, J., concurring); Brooks

Holland, Safeguarding Equal Protection Rights: The Search for an Exclusionary Rule Under the Equal Protection

Clause, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1107 (2000); Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001 (1998), but there does not appear to be any case in which a court has ever actually applied

suppression as a remedy, at least in the absence of a concomitant Fourth Amendment violation.

discriminatory manner may violate the Equal Protection Clause. See also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (noting that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits “selective enforcement

of the law based on considerations such as race”).

While we, of course, agree with the general proposition that selective enforcement of the law

based on a suspect’s race may violate the Fourteenth Amendment, we do not agree that the proper

remedy for such violations is necessarily suppression of evidence otherwise lawfully obtained. The

exclusionary rule is typically applied as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations, which

Amendment does not apply to pre-contact investigatory steps like that presented here (the decision

to run a warrant check). See Avery, 137 F.3d at 353 (“[A]n officer’s actions during the pre-contact

stage cannot give rise to Fourth Amendment constitutional concerns because the citizen has not yet

been ‘seized.’”). Even if the Fourth Amendment were implicated, any challenge to a search or

seizure based on legitimate probable cause, but in which it is alleged the officer’s subjective motive

was discriminatory, is doomed to fail. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (unanimously rejecting such a

challenge and holding that “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth

Amendment analysis”). Though the Court left open the door to equal protection challenges in the

same context, it gave no hint as to what the appropriate remedy would be. See ibid. Since we know

from Whren that the evidence against Nichols would not be suppressed under the Fourth

Amendment (even if the officers were improperly motivated by race), we are reluctant to graft that

Amendment’s traditional remedy into the equal protection context. Indeed, we are aware of no court

that has ever applied the exclusionary rule for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal

Protection Clause4

 and we decline Nichols’s invitation to do so here. Rather, we believe the proper

remedy for any alleged violation is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the offending officers. See,

e.g., Farm Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting

officer’s qualified immunity defense and affirming partial summary judgment in favor of Hispanic

motorists who brought equal protection challenge under § 1983).

The Supreme Court has recently affirmed the adequacy of such suits to vindicate

constitutional rights, and specifically rejected suppression as a remedy, in the context of a violation

of the “knock-and-announce” rule under the Fourth Amendment. See Hudson v. Michigan, — U.S.

—, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006). Speaking of the exclusionary rule in broad terms, the Court cautioned

that “suppression of evidence . . . has always been our last resort, not our first impulse” and

emphasized that the rule’s “costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents

a high obstacle for those urging its application.” Id. at 2163 (internal quotation omitted). The Court

rejected the argument that a civil suit under § 1983 was an inadequate remedy for knock-andannounce violations, pointing out the “greatly expanded” number of public-interest law firms and

lawyers specializing in civil rights grievances, and further noted that “increasing professionalism

of police forces, including a new emphasis on internal police discipline” could provide a sufficient

deterrent against abuses. Id. at 2167-68. Hudson reinforces our view that suppression is an extreme

remedy, and that—prior to adopting such a remedy—a court must be convinced of the inadequacy

of civil suits to safeguard against constitutional violations.

In contrast to Hudson, we note that here there was no intrusion at all on Nichols’s personal

liberties by the initial actions of the officer. There was no search, no seizure, and only the use of

the officer’s powers of observation from a place where he had a right to be, and his obtaining of
No. 06-5862 United States v. Nichols Page 5

5

 No one at the suppression hearing ever asked Officer Deslauriers specifically why he decided to check for

outstanding warrants on Elbert Nichols, and the issue of a possible racial motivation was raised only after the hearing

in Nichols’s Post-Hearing Brief on Motion to Suppress. It is thus disingenuous for Nichols to imply that Officer

Deslauriers’s failure to offer a specific reason for running the warrant check is evidence of a racial motive. 

information lawfully in the possession of the state. This contrasts strongly with the more intrusive

and constitutionally invalid police actions in Hudson, where violation of the “knock-and-announce”

rule still did not lead to the remedy of suppression of the evidence otherwise lawfully obtained. In

sum, Nichols offers us no reason why, if civil suits are an adequate remedy for violation of the

“knock-and-announce” rule, they cannot be for the decidedly less intrusive constitutional violation

he alleges.

Moreover, even if suppression were an appropriate remedy in the abstract, it is clear that it

would not be warranted on the facts of this case. In order to prevail on an equal protection claim,

it is well established that a defendant “has the burden of proving the existence of purposeful

discrimination.” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (internal quotation omitted). More

specifically, he “must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.”

Ibid.; see also Avery, 137 F.3d at 355. Because it is often “difficult to prove directly the invidious

use of race[,] . . . inferences can be drawn from valid relevant statistical evidence of disparate impact

or other circumstantial evidence.” Avery, 137 F.3d at 355. Only after the defendant meets this

initial burden of establishing a prima facie case must the government then “articulate a race-neutral

reason for its action, or identify a compelling governmental interest in the race-based [action].” Id.

at 356. We have previously cautioned and reiterate now that “[t]he defendant retains the ultimate

burden of proving discrimination” and that “[o]nly in rare cases will a statistical pattern of

discriminatory impact conclusively demonstrate a constitutional violation.” Ibid. (citing McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293-94 n.12).

Nichols cites no direct evidence of discrimination in his case and only the barest of

circumstantial evidence. He asserts that “[t]he officer’s knowledge boils down to three criteria:

early-morning hours, a congregation [of men], and black. Had this been a white congregation at

1:15 a.m. near another university [instead of the historically black Tennessee State University],

would an officer decide to run a check for warrants? No.” Appellant’s Br. at 20. Nichols then cites

statistical data demonstrating that “roughly one third of young black men are under control of the

criminal-justice system.” Ibid. But bald accusations and irrelevant generalized statistics do not even

come close to constituting what is necessary to establish a prima facie case of an equal protection

violation. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297 (rejecting a statistical analysis far more detailed than that

presented here as inadequate to establish a prima facie case). Nichols, however, states that “most

significantly, in the face of this equal-protection claim, the Government failed to identify any

nondiscriminatory reason for undertaking the warrant check. It offered no reason whatsoever.”

Appellant’s Br. at 21. But absent the defendant establishing a prima facie case, the government is

not required to offer any reason for its allegedly discriminatory action. See McCleskey, 481 U.S.

at 296 n.18 (noting the “Court’s longstanding precedents that hold that a prosecutor need not explain

his decisions unless the criminal defendant presents a prima facie case of unconstitutional conduct

with respect to his case”); see also Avery, 137 F.3d at 356. Moreover, while it is true that Officer

Deslauriers never cited any specific reason in his testimony for requesting the warrant check on

Nichols, it is reasonably clear from the entire context of the proceeding that, as the district court

found, he did so based on the suspicious behavior of the individuals in attempting to avoid the police

officers as they drove by, especially given the late hour and the number of individuals congregating

around a vehicle with no apparent purpose.5 Other than assertion, no argument at all is offered that

a black officer would not have taken the same actions, or that a late-night congregation of whites

who took evasive action would not have elicited the same response.
No. 06-5862 United States v. Nichols Page 6

Nichols argues that young black men attempting to avoid the police is “unremarkable” and

cites two cases holding that such behavior fails to establish “reasonable suspicion.” Appellant’s

Reply Br. at 15. But in deciding to simply run a check for outstanding warrants, an officer is not

held to a “reasonable suspicion” standard. See Avery, 137 F.3d at 358 (“An officer is not held to a

suspicion of criminal activity standard when he embarks to investigate someone. The officer merely

is prohibited from his pursuit if he acts based solely on race.”). Thus, the decision to check for

outstanding warrants on Elbert Nichols did not require “reasonable suspicion”—indeed, it did not

require any suspicion at all. All it required was that the decision not be based solely on Nichols’s

race. See ibid. To hold otherwise would be to prohibit police from taking even the most basic initial

investigatory steps absent some articulable suspicion, such as when officers simply have a “hunch”

or are just following routine procedure—steps which, in this case, led to the apprehension of a

dangerous fugitive. 

Given Nichols’s failure to establish a prima facie case that Officer Deslauriers acted with

discriminatory purpose, and our refusal to adopt his preferred remedy even if he had, his equal

protection claim fails.

B

Nichols next argues that Officer Deslauriers’s search of the vehicle’s locked glovebox

exceeded the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest under prevailing Supreme Court

precedent. We disagree.

In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), the Supreme Court drew a bright-line rule vis-àvis the search of an automobile incident to the arrest of one of its occupants: the search extends to

“the passenger compartment of that automobile,” including “any containers found within the

passenger compartment . . . .” Id. at 460. The Court then more precisely defined the term

“container”:

“Container” here denotes any object capable of holding another object. It thus

includes closed or open glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located

anywhere within the passenger compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags,

clothing, and the like. Our holding encompasses only the interior of the passenger

compartment of an automobile and does not encompass the trunk.

Id. at 460 n.4 (emphasis added). Nichols argues that Belton left open the question of whether a

locked glove box is also included within its definition of “container.” He urges this court to find that

it is not, arguing that a locked glove box is more like the trunk of an automobile—the search of

which Belton prohibits—than it is like a “closed or open” (but presumably unlocked) glove box—the

search of which Belton permits. Appellant’s Br. at 25-26.

The Court justified the rule in Belton on the twin bases of officer safety and the need to

preserve evidence. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460-63. Although it certainly seems impossible that Nichols

could have, in a Houdini-like fashion, extricated himself from his handcuffs and escaped the patrol

car to retrieve a weapon from a locked glove box, this court has made clear that, under prevailing

Supreme Court precedent, the search-incident-to-arrest authority applies even where an item “is no

longer accessible to the defendant at the time of the search[, s]o long as the defendant had the item

within his immediate control near the time of his arrest . . . .” Northrop v. Trippett, 265 F.3d 372,

379 (6th Cir. 2001). This interpretation has been affirmed in Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S.

615 (2004), which held that the rule in Belton applies even where a police officer does not make

contact with a suspect until after he has already left his vehicle. The Court emphasized the brightline nature of the rule, stating that “[t]he need for a clear rule, readily understood by police officers
No. 06-5862 United States v. Nichols Page 7

and not depending on differing estimates of what items were or were not within reach of an arrestee

at any particular moment, justifies the sort of generalization which Belton enunciated.” Id. at 622.

In light of this precedent, it is no surprise that those circuit courts of appeal that have

considered the specific question of a locked glove box are unanimous in holding that the Belton rule

allows a search. See United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v.

Woody, 55 F.3d 1257 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868 (8th Cir. 1985). This

court does not appear to have addressed the issue, but has approvingly cited a commentator’s

proposed rule that “a passenger compartment for Belton purposes is properly viewed as including

all space reachable without exiting the vehicle, excluding areas that would require dismantling the

vehicle.” United States v. Pino, 855 F.2d 357, 364 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing 2 W. La Fave, SEARCH

AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 7.1, at 132 n.9.2 (Supp. 1982)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). This rule would encompass a locked glove box.

Prevailing Supreme Court precedent logically dictates this conclusion. We therefore join

the unanimous view of our sister circuits in holding that the search-incident-to-arrest authority

permits an officer to search a glove box, whether open or closed, locked or unlocked. Nichols’s

Fourth Amendment claim therefore fails.

C

Lastly, Nichols argues that the inculpatory statements he made to Officer Deslauriers shortly

after his arrest should be suppressed under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The

government argues that Nichols impliedly waived his Miranda rights by voluntarily speaking with

Officer Deslauriers after affirming that he understood these rights. It is the government’s burden

to establish a waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168

(1986). We agree with the district court that the government met its burden in this case.

Since the government concedes that Officer Deslauriers never obtained an express

waiver—either oral or written—from Nichols, this case is governed by the doctrine of implied

waiver as set forth by North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979), and its progeny. In Butler, the

Supreme Court held that, absent an express waiver, a court must presume that a defendant has not

waived his right to remain silent. Id. at 373. Nevertheless,

[t]hat does not mean that the defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding of

his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver, may never support a conclusion

that a defendant has waived his rights. The courts must presume that a defendant did

not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great; but in at least some cases

waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated.

Ibid. One such case where waiver may be clearly inferred is when a defendant, after being properly

informed of his rights and indicating that he understands them, nevertheless does nothing to invoke

those rights. For, while it does not require much to invoke the right to silence, it does require

something that indicates a desire not to be questioned. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445 (“If the

individual . . . indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not

question him.”). Thus, a failure to invoke one’s right to remain silent—after being informed of and

indicating an understanding of that right—functions as the equivalent of a waiver. See United States

v. Washington, 462 F.3d 1124, 1134 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A person waives the right to remain silent if,

after being informed of that right, the person does not invoke that right.”); United States v. Cardwell, 433 F.3d 378, 389-90 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[The defendant]’s failure to invoke his rights . . . left [the

officer] free to interrogate him. . . . Because [the defendant] had been fully informed and indicated

his understanding of his Miranda rights, his willingness to answer . . . question[s] is as clear an

indicia of his implied waiver of his right to remain silent as we can imagine.”) The question, then,
No. 06-5862 United States v. Nichols Page 8

is whether Nichols here did anything to invoke his right to remain silent (i.e., to “indicate[] in any

manner that he [did] not wish to be interrogated,” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445). We conclude that he

did not.

Nichols argues that his initial “refusal [to admit his identity] . . . functioned as an invocation

of his right to silence because he demonstrated a refusal to cooperate.” Appellant’s Br. at 32.

Accordingly, he cites two cases that stand for the proposition that a refusal to give basic identifying

information may serve as an invocation of one’s right to remain silent. Appellant’s Br. at 31 (citing

United States v. Montana, 958 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1992), and Jacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282

(11th Cir. 1992)). These cases, however, are easily distinguished. In Montana, the suspect refused

to utter any words at all in response to any questions initially put to him by the officers and only

made inculpatory statements hours later. Montana, 958 F.2d at 517-18. In Jacobs, the defendant

refused to respond to the officer’s repeated questions about her name, telling him only that “it didn’t

matter” and that “it didn’t make any difference.” Jacobs, 952 F.2d at 1292. The officer continued

to hound her for her name but “she repeatedly refus[ed] to speak at all” to the officer. Ibid. The

defendants in both Montana and Jacobs simply refused to answer any questions put to them by the

police. This is fundamentally different than affirmatively responding to an officer’s questions by

lying, as Nichols did in this case. The district court understood this distinction, finding that

Nichols’s “repeated denials of his identity were not refusals to answer all police questions. Rather,

Defendant wished to, and did, communicate affirmatively with the police officers by making

statements to them which he believed furthered his self-interest.” 

There also is no evidence of any coercion on the part of the officers that would make

Nichols’s action anything less than fully voluntary. After recognizing that Nichols would not be

immediately forthcoming about his identity, Officer Deslauriers simply moved on to filling out the

arrest paperwork and engaged Nichols in “general conversation” about it. At some point during this

conversation regarding the paperwork, Nichols voluntarily confessed his identity but explained that

the outstanding warrants were a “mistake.” He then made inculpatory statements about his

ownership of the gun, stating that he kept it for self-protection. Nichols points to Officer

Deslaurier’s statement that the defendant “got tired” as evidence of coercion, Appellant’s Br. at 35,

but this comment is at best ambiguous. The officer may simply have meant that Nichols eventually

realized how ridiculous it was for him to continue to deny his identity despite his own mug shot

staring him in the face. Moreover, the record illustrates that Nichols denied his identity for only a

relatively short time before ultimately confessing (“several minutes”).

Finally, Nichols argues that Officer Deslauriers’s checking a box on some paperwork

indicating “no waiver” of Miranda means that the officer recognized that Nichols did not waive his

rights, either expressly or impliedly. Appellant’s Br. at 35. It seems obvious, however, that this box

on a standard police form is meant to apply to some kind of express waiver of Miranda, e.g., a

signed waiver form or perhaps at least an affirmative statement on the part of the suspect that he

agrees to speak. It is difficult to imagine that the Metro Nashville Police Department designed this

form so that, in the moments following an arrest, an officer would make an independent assessment

of the defendant’s words and conduct, consider the principles elucidated by Butler and its progeny

relating to implied waivers, then decide whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the

defendant’s actions amounted to an implied waiver of his Miranda rights and check the box

accordingly. Nichols’s argument on this point is thus unpersuasive.

Viewing the facts “in the light most likely to support the district court’s decision,” NavarroCamacho, 186 F.3d at 705, the district court correctly determined that Nichols—having been

properly informed of and asserting that he understood his rights—did nothing to invoke those rights,

and the government therefore met its burden of establishing that Nichols had impliedly waived his

right to remain silent.
No. 06-5862 United States v. Nichols Page 9

III

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.