J. S70012/18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

DAVID W. DICKSON, : No. 3582 EDA 2017

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the PCRA Order, October 6, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at Nos. 9307-3271-3273,

CP-51-CR-0732711-1993

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 20, 2018

David W. Dickson appeals pro se from the October 6, 2017 order 

denying his second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”)1 as untimely. After careful review, we affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history 

of this case as follows:

In December of 1995, the Honorable Juanita Kidd 

Stout presided over [appellant’s] second jury trial in 

which [appellant] was found guilty of murder in the 

second degree and robbery.[2] [Appellant] had 

previously been tried on identical charges and that 

trial ended in a mistrial when the jury failed to reach 

a verdict. In May of 1997, Judge Stout imposed 

[appellant’s] judgment of sentence. [Appellant] is 

 

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b) and 3701(a), respectively.
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now serving a life sentence for second degree 

murder and robbery.

The operative facts supporting the judgment of 

sentence entered against [appellant] arose from the 

murder of Deborah Wilson and subsequent abuse of 

her corpse. Deborah Wilson was a student at Drexel 

University who had been studying alone in a 

basement computer lab on Drexel University’s 

campus when she was murdered in the hours after 

midnight on November 30, 1984. Her barefoot body 

was discovered outside a basement door of a 

campus building. Her sneakers and socks were 

never found, and the subsequent investigation 

revealed that various sexual acts were performed on 

her feet. [Appellant], employed by Wells Fargo 

Security, was working as a security guard for Drexel 

University when Ms. Wilson was murdered. He was 

assigned to the [sic] patrol the area of campus 

where Ms. Wilson was murdered and where her body 

was ultimately found. [Appellant] was not arrested 

until June of 1993, following a grand jury 

presentment, and the record is replete with evidence 

establishing [appellant’s] longstanding fetish for 

women’s sneakers and feet.

PCRA court opinion, 12/8/17 at 1-2.

As noted, the trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of 

life imprisonment on May 27, 1997. On March 17, 2000, a panel of this 

court affirmed appellant’s judgment of sentence, and our supreme court 

denied allowance of appeal on October 20, 2000. Commonwealth v. 

Dickson, 757 A.2d 991 (Pa.Super. 2000), appeal denied, 764 A.2d 1065 

(Pa. 2000). On July 3, 2001, appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. 

Thereafter, on August 29, 2001, appellant filed an amended pro se petition

and James Bruno, Esq. (“PCRA counsel”), was appointed to represent him. 
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On April 28, 2005, PCRA counsel filed an amended PCRA petition on 

appellant’s behalf, which was ultimately dismissed by the PCRA court on 

April 13, 2006.

On October 23, 2007, a panel of this court affirmed the dismissal of 

appellant’s petition, and our supreme court denied allowance of appeal on 

September 15, 2009. Commonwealth v. Dickson, 943 A.2d 311 

(Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 980 A.2d 605 (Pa. 2007). On March 22, 

2016, appellant filed the instant pro se PCRA petition, his second. On 

July 18, 2017, the PCRA court provided appellant with notice of its intention 

to dismiss his petition without a hearing, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). 

Appellant filed a pro se response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice on 

July 31, 2017. Thereafter, on October 6, 2017, the PCRA court dismissed 

appellant’s petition as untimely. This timely appeal followed on October 24, 

2017.3 

Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition 

is limited to the examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is 

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 

102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s 

findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in 

the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa.Super. 

 

3 The PCRA court did not order appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On 

December 8, 2017, the PCRA court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion.
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2014) (citations omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings 

of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the 

record could support a contrary holding.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 

799 A.2d 136, 140 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citation omitted). Additionally, we 

note that, “[a]lthough this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed 

by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the 

appellant[.]” Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 498 (Pa.Super. 

2005) (citation omitted).

All PCRA petitions, including second and subsequent petitions, must be 

filed within one year of when a defendant’s judgment of sentence becomes 

final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “[A] judgment becomes final at the 

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the 

Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 

or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(3). If a PCRA petition is untimely, a court lacks jurisdiction over 

the petition. Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 120-121 

(Pa.Super. 2014).

Here, appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on January 18, 

2001, 90 days after our supreme court denied allowance of appeal and the 

deadline for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States 

Supreme Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Accordingly, 

appellant had until January 18, 2002, to file a timely PCRA petition. See
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant’s instant petition, filed over 14 years 

later on March 22, 2016, is patently untimely. As a result, the PCRA court 

lacked jurisdiction to review appellant’s petition, unless appellant alleged 

and proved one of the statutory exceptions to the time-bar, as set forth in 

Section § 9545(b)(1).

4

 

In his pro se brief to this court, appellant fails to properly invoke any 

of the statutory exceptions to the PCRA time-bar set forth in 

Section § 9545(b)(1). Rather, the crux of appellant’s argument is that PCRA 

counsel, who was the subject of disciplinary suspension in 2014, rendered 

ineffective assistance of counsel in appellant’s first PCRA petition. Appellant 

frames his issues as follows:

I. Was [PCRA counsel] ineffective when he 

admitted to the Pennsylvania Bar to 

misconduct, misconduct due to his being 

diagnosed with Attention–Deficit Hyperactivity 

Disorder and Dysthymic Disorder[;] 

misconduct which also occurred while [PCRA 

counsel] was representing [appellant?]

II. While representing [appellant] did [PCRA 

counsel] violate the Rules of Professional 

Conduct 1.3, 1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 

1.4(b) and 1.16(d)[?]

III. Did [PCRA counsel] prejudice [appellant] by 

failing to provide [appellant] with requested 

 

4 The three narrow exceptions to the one-year time bar are as follows: 

“(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim; 

(2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional right.” 

Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-234 (Pa.Super. 2012), 

citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii).
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trial transcripts, thus hindering [appellant] 

from properly preparing and filing his appeal[?]

Appellant’s brief at 1 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

“[I]t is well-settled that couching a petitioner’s claims in terms of 

ineffectiveness will not save an otherwise untimely filed petition from the 

application of the time restrictions of the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. 

Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 186 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that appellant has failed to 

explicitly plead or prove any of the statutory exceptions to the PCRA 

time-bar required to invoke and preserve an otherwise timely petition. 

Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review the merits of appellant’s claims. 

See Callahan, 101 A.3d at 123 (holding, if a PCRA petition is untimely on 

its face, or fails to meet one of the three statutory exceptions to the 

time-bar, we lack jurisdiction to review it). Thus, the PCRA did not err in

dismissing appellant’s PCRA petition as untimely.5

Order affirmed.

 

5

In reaching this conclusion, we recognize, as the PCRA court did in its 

opinion, that “PCRA counsel was not suspended from the practice of law until 

well after he ceased representation of [appellant] in 2007 . . . [and] nothing 

in the record indicates that [appellant’s] first PCRA petition was dismissed 

based on attorney misconduct.” (PCRA court opinion, 12/8/17 at 4.)
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/20/18