IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MICHEL CHALHOUB, 

Plaintiff 

v. 

COMMONWEAL TH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA; COLONEL 

ROBERT EVANCHICK, 

Commissioner of the Pennsylvania 

State Police; PENNSYLVANIA STATE : 

POLICE TROOPER LUKASZ OLSZAR;: 

COUNTY OF PIKE; and CRAIG A. 

LOWE, Warden Pike County 

Correctional Facility, 

Defendants 

No. 3:23cv592 

(Judge Munley) 

............................................................................................................ 

............................................................................................................ 

MEMORANDUM 

Before the court is a motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment filed 

by Defendants Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Colonel Robert Evanchick and 

Trooper Lukasz Olszar (collectively "PSP Defendants"). Having been fully 

briefed, this motion is ripe for a decision. 1 

Background 

On Sunday, May 23, 2021, at approximately 10:30 AM, Defendant 

Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Lukasz Olszar ("Trooper Olszar") responded 

1 The Honorable Robert D. Mariani transferred this case to the undersigned on November 7, 

2023. 

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to Plaintiff Michel Chalhoub's residence in Dingman Township, Pike County, 

Pennsylvania for a report of a "physical domestic." (Doc. 1-2, Exh. A. to Pl. 

Compl., Police Crim. Compl. , Aff. of Prob. Cause, ECF p. 4). Per Trooper 

Olszar's affidavit of probable cause, the police communications operator ("PCO") 

advised there was an active Protection From Abuse order ("PFA order") issued 

against plaintiff for the protection of a person at the residence. (kl) 

On scene, another trooper interviewed the purported victim of physical 

abuse, and she indicated that plaintiff threw an ashtray at her causing burn 

marks on the back of her shirt. (kl) Per Trooper Olszar's narrative, the PFA 

Order was issued for the protection of that person, and he indicated in his 

affidavit that the expiration date of that order was August 12, 2023. (kl) After 

burn marks on the alleged victim's shirt were reportedly observed and 

photographed, Trooper Olszar placed plaintiff into custody and charged him with 

violating an active PFA order. (kl) 

The PFA order had actually expired months earlier, on February 26, 2021 . 

(Doc. 1 ,I 20). Plaintiff alleges that he told Trooper Olszar that the PFA order 

expired, but Trooper Olszar accused plaintiff of lying and still placed him into 

custody. (kl ,I 18). 

Per the complaint, Trooper Olszar told the arraigning state magisterial 

district judge that the PFA order remained active, and the judge credited the 

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trooper's incorrect statements and not the plaintiff's accurate statements. (~ ,i 

22). 

The magisterial district judge set bail at $40,000, which plaintiff could not 

post. (~ ,i 24 ). Plaintiff was committed to the Pike County Correctional Facility 

("Pike CCF") based on Trooper Olszar's false statements that plaintiff violated 

the PFA Order. (kl ,I 25). 

Plaintiff spent three days at Pike CCF. (kl ,i 28). On May 26, 2021, a Pike 

CCF employee told plaintiff to gather his belongings to leave the jail without 

further explanation. (kl ,i 29). 

Plaintiff further alleges in his complaint that he had open heart surgery in 

August 2020. (kl ,i 8). During that surgery, plaintiff's ribs were wired together. 

(kl) He needed another surgery on May 8, 2021 from the constant pain in his 

ribs. (kl ,i 9). During that surgery, plaintiff had metal plates placed in his chest. 

(kl ,i 10). When Trooper Olszar placed plaintiff into custody, a drainage tube 

was still attached to the bottom of plaintiff's chest from the most recent surgery. 

(kl) 

Upon release, plaintiff took the train to his son's house in New Jersey. (kl ,i 

30). The next day, plaintiff suffered severe pain and went to an emergency 

room. (kl ,i 35). As a result, plaintiff received an operation due to a "serious lifethreatening" internal infection, which continues to occur. (kl ,i 35, 42). He further 

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alleges that the infection occurred because he could not attend the scheduled 

medical procedure to remove his drainage tube during his incarceration. (kl ,m 

11 , 34-35). 

Based on the above allegations, plaintiff filed the complaint on April 6, 

2023. He asserts two causes of action: Count I - a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 ("Section 1983") for alleged Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations 

against all defendants; and Count II - a state law claim for false imprisonment 

against Trooper Olszar. 2 (kl ,m 45-56). 

PSP Defendants responded to the complaint with the instant motion to 

dismiss, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment. Among other 

arguments raised in the motion, Trooper Olszar asserts that he is entitled to 

qualified immunity. The parties have briefed their respective positions and this 

matter is ripe for disposition. 

Jurisdiction 

Because this case is brought pursuant to Section 1983, the court has 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ("The district courts shall have original 

jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 

2 By way of a separate memorandum and order, the court granted a motion to dismiss filed by 

Defendants Pike County and Warden Lowe and afforded plaintiff leave to file an amended 

complaint as to his Section 1983 claim against Pike County and his state law false 

imprisonment claim against Warden Lowe. 

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the United States."). The court has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's statelaw false imprisonment claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). ("In any civil 

action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall 

have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims 

in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case 

or controversy under Article Ill of the United States Constitution."). 

Legal Standard 

Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b )(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. In the alternative, defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The standard for a motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim and the standard for a motion for summary judgment differ 

in significant ways. Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resol., L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 

772 (3d Cir. 2013). 

A threshold question in this case is whether the court should address 

defendants' motion as one under Rule 56 or exclude the matters raised outside 

the pleadings and proceed under Rule 12(b)(6). On one hand, the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure require that "[a]II parties be given a reasonable opportunity to 

present all the material that is pertinent to the motion[,]" when treating a motion to 

dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(d). On the other 

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hand, defendants refer to matters outside the pleadings to advance Trooper 

Olszar's claim of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is "an entitlement not to 

stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation[.]" Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 

511, 526 (1985). And the Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly 

"stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible 

stage in litigation." Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991 )(citations omitted). 

Furthermore, plaintiff has received ample notice of the possibility that the 

court could treat portions of the motion to dismiss regarding qualified immunity as 

a motion for summary judgment. In opposition to PSP Defendants' motion, 

plaintiff filed a counter statement of material facts. (Doc. 22). Plaintiff has not 

indicated that he cannot present facts essential to justify his opposition to the 

motion nor has he requested a period of discovery to appropriately respond. 

Rather, he has also directly countered Trooper Olszar's qualified immunity 

arguments in his brief in opposition and commented on the documents submitted 

by the defendants in conjunction with Trooper Olszar's affidavit. Under these 

circumstances, the court will treat the motion to dismiss regarding qualified 

immunity as a motion for summary judgment. See Carver v. Plyer, 115 F. App'x 

532, 536 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[M]otions for summary judgment that are presented to 

the court as motions in the alternative constitute sufficient notice to a non-moving 

party that the court may convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 

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judgment.") (citation omitted). As for the remainder of the arguments raised by 

PSP Defendants, the court will not treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for 

summary judgment since these defendants do not refer to any matters outside 

the pleadings in support of their position. 

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must 

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility 

when factual content is pied that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. kl (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." kl (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts accept all 

factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the 

complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 

( citations omitted). Furthermore, courts may "generally consider only the 

allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and 

matters of public record" when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Pension Ben. 

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Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 

1993)(citations omitted). 

Granting summary judgment under Rule 56 is proper" 'if the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' " See Knabe v. 

Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 410 n. 4 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c)). 

"[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute 

between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for 

summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material 

fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in 

original). 

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine the 

facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. lnt'I Raw 

Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 898 F.2d 946, 949 (3d Cir.1990). The 

burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 248 (1986). A fact is material when it might affect the outcome of the 

suit under the governing law. ill Where the non-moving party will bear the 

burden of proof at trial, the party moving for summary judgment may meet its 

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burden by showing that the evidentiary materials of record, if reduced to 

admissible evidence, would be insufficient to carry the non-movant's burden of 

proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322 (1986). Once the 

moving party satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who 

must go beyond its pleadings, and designate specific facts by the use of 

affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers to interrogatories showing that 

there is a genuine issue for trial. kl at 324. 

Analysis 

Plaintiff asserts a Section 1983 claim against the PSP Defendants for 

violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and a state law claim 

for false imprisonment against Trooper Olszar. In addition to Trooper Olszar's 

qualified immunity claim, PSP Defendants argue that plaintiff's Fourteenth 

Amendment claims should be dismissed pursuant to the explicit textual source 

rule. PSP defendants also argue that the claims against Colonel Evanchick 

should be dismissed due to factual deficiencies in the complaint. The court will 

address whether plaintiff can proceed with a claim under both the Fourth and 

Fourteenth Amendments before turning to Trooper Olszar's qualified immunity 

claim and the other arguments raised in the motion. 3 

3 The court notes that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not raised any arguments in 

support of dismissal of plaintiff's Section 1983 claim. Consequently, plaintiff's Section 1983 

claim against the Commonwealth survives the motion. 

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a. Whether Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Claim Can Proceed 

In asserting his Section 1983 action, plaintiff alleges that he was "illegally 

arrest[ed]. .. without justification or cause and falsely imprison[ed.]" (Doc 1, 

Compl. ,I 49). Plaintiff relies on both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 

and PSP Defendants move for the dismissal of plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment 

claims as a matter of law. PSP Defendants argue that the Fourth Amendment's 

guarantee against unreasonable seizures provides the explicit text undergirding 

the action instead of the more general protections of the due process clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment. 

The Fourth Amendment provides, in part: "The right of the people to be 

secure in their persons . .. against unreasonable ... seizures, shall not be 

violated[.]" U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, also in 

part: "No State shall. .. deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 

process of law[.]" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 

The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular Amendment 

provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular 

sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion 

of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims." 

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Put another way, "when government behavior is governed by a specific 

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constitutional amendment, due process analysis is inappropriate." Berg v. Cnty. 

of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261,268 (3d Cir. 2000). 

"A false imprisonment claim under [Section] 1983 which is based on an 

arrest made without probable cause is grounded in the Fourth Amendment's 

guarantee against unreasonable seizures." Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 

F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995)(citations omitted); see also James v. City of WilkesBarre, 700 F.3d 675, 683 (3d Cir. 2012). Moreover, "[a]lthough not all actions by 

police officers are governed by the Fourth Amendment. .. the constitutionality of 

arrests by state officials is governed by the Fourth Amendment rather than due 

process analysis." Berg, 219 F.3d at 268-69; see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 

U.S. 137, 142 (1979) (interpreting Section 1983 false imprisonment claim as 

grounded in Fourth Amendment rights); Groman, 47 F.3d at 636 (same). 

Deprivation of liberty and due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment 

are seen as duplicative to Fourth Amendment claims when a plaintiff alleges 

false arrest and false imprisonment. See Bradley v. Kuntz, 655 F. App'x 56, 59 

(3d Cir. 2016). 

Because plaintiff's averments of false arrest and false imprisonment are 

grounded in the Fourth Amendment, the court will dismiss the portion of his 

Section 1983 claims relying upon the Fourteenth Amendment. 

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b. Whether Trooper Olszar is Entitled to Qualified Immunity 

Turning next to Trooper Olszar, he asserts that he is entitled to qualified 

immunity in this action. As noted above, the court will consider this portion of 

PSP defendants' motion as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Both 

parties have submitted statements of material facts. 4 (See Docs. 16, 22). A 

reading of both sides' statements indicates that there are no material factual 

disputes. Rather, the dispute is one of law: whether Trooper Olszar had 

probable cause to arrest plaintiff and whether his conduct was reasonable under 

the circumstances. Per plaintiff, Trooper Olszar did not have probable cause and 

thus qualified immunity does not attach. Based on the undisputed facts of this 

case, however, the court disagrees. 

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials performing 

discretionary functions from liability for civil damages "insofar as their conduct 

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

4 The Rules of Court for the Middle District ("Local Rules") require a party seeking summary 

judgment to file "a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered 

paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried." 

M.D.PA. LR. 56.1. PSP Defendants have complied with the Local Rules by filing their concise 

statement. (Doc. 16). The Local Rules requires a party opposing summary judgment to 

respond to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement by the moving party, as to 

which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried. Plaintiff filed a 

counterstatement of material facts but did not directly respond to the PSP Defendants' 

statement. (Doc. 22). Rather than strike plaintiffs counterstatement for noncompliance with 

the Local Rules, the court will read the parties' filings together to determine which facts are 

disputed and which facts are not. 

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reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 

(1982). The doctrine "protects 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who 

knowingly violate the law.' " Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quoting 

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). 

The two-part test to determine whether government officials should receive 

qualified immunity is well settled. Montemuro v. Jim Thorpe Area Sch. Dist., 99 

F.4th 639, 642 (3d Cir. 2024) (citing Anglemeyer v. Ammons, 92 F.4th 184, 188 

(3d Cir. 2024)). Under the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, a court 

must decide whether the facts that plaintiff has alleged (under Rule 12(b )(6)) or 

shown (under Rule 56) make out a violation of a constitutional right. Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)(citation omitted). Under the second prong, 

"the court must decide whether the right at issue was 'clearly established' at the 

time of defendant's alleged misconduct." kl (citation omitted). To be clearly 

established, "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." 

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). In considering qualified 

immunity, the court may address the prongs of this test in any order. See 

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242. The defendant bears the burden of establishing that 

he is entitled to qualified immunity. Burns v. PA Dep't of Corr. , 642 F.3d 163, 176 

(3d Cir. 2011 )( citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819). 

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Under the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the court asks "if 

the facts, '[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, ... 

show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right."' Lozano v. New Jersey, 

9 F.4th 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2021 )(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 

(2001 )). The court first discusses whether the undisputed facts of this case 

establish a violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. 

Since the Fourth Amendment protects '"[t]he right of the people to be 

secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures[,]' [a]n 

arrest. .. qualifies as a 'seizure' of a 'person' . .. and so must be reasonable under 

the circumstances." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 , 736 (2011 )(citations 

omitted). To determine Fourth Amendment "reasonableness," courts ask 

whether, when objectively viewed, the circumstances justify the challenged 

action. See id. (citations omitted). If so, that action is reasonable regardless of 

the subjective intent motivating the relevant officials. kl (citation omitted). Under 

this reasonableness standard, a seizure "may be permissible even though the 

justification includes a reasonable factual mistake." Heien v. North Carolina, 574 

U.S. 54, 57 (2014). 

Moreover: 

Far from demanding proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt, "[p]robable cause exists if there is a 'fair probability' 

that the person committed the crime at issue." Wilson v. 

Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting 

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Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997)). 

Put another way, "probable cause to arrest exists when the 

facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's 

knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a 

reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or 

is being committed by the person to be arrested." Orsatti v. 

N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995). The 

probable cause standard thus provides individuals 

protection "against unreasonable searches and seizures," 

U.S. Const. amend. IV, while simultaneously enabling 

investigating officers to act quickly-before necessarily 

obtaining evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt-to effect an arrest. "[T]he standard 

does not require that officers correctly resolve conflicting 

evidence or that their determinations of credibility, were, in 

retrospect, accurate." Wright v. City of Phila., 409 F.3d 595, 

603 (3d Cir. 2005). 

Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 467 (3d Cir. 2016). 

All told, "officers are entitled to qualified immunity when they 'reasonably 

but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present[.]' " Lozano, 9 F.4th at 

246 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641 ). 

In this matter, Trooper Olszar has supplied a declaration indicating that he: 

1) conducted a National Crime Information Center ("NCIC") query prior to 

responding to the domestic violence call from plaintiff's residence and found an 

active PFA order against plaintiff that did not expire until August 12, 2023; and 2) 

confirmed with a dispatcher that the PFA order was active. (Doc. 16-1 , Deel. of L. 

Olszar ,m 1-4 ). On scene, Trooper Olszar encountered the person protected by 

the PFA, who advised the officer that plaintiff threw an ashtray at her causing 

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burn marks on the back of her clothing. (Doc. 1-2, Exh. A. to Pl. Compl. , Police 

Crim. Compl., Aff. of Prob. Cause, ECF p. 4). Based upon the information 

available to Trooper Olszar, he arrested plaintiff for violation of the PFA order. 

(kU 

Trooper Olszar has also supplied the NCIC record available to him on the 

date of his response to plaintiff's residence. That record reflects an entry 

showing that the PFA order expired on August 12, 2023. (Doc. 16-2, NCIC 

Record). Additionally, Trooper Olszar has submitted the victim statement from 

the protected party detailing that she confronted plaintiff over his use of money 

she was saving for herself, and plaintiff responded by hitting her on her head and 

throwing an ashtray at her. (Doc. 16-3, Victim/Witness Statement Form). 

Plaintiff has not provided anything to the court to dispute these facts. In 

response to Trooper Olszar's affidavit and the PSP records, plaintiff emphasizes, 

however, the following contents of the NCIC record: "WARNING - THE 

FOLLOWING IS A PSP PROTECTION ORDER RECORD. DO NOT SEARCH, 

DETAIN, OR ARREST BASED SOLELY ON THIS RECORD. CONTACT 

ENTERING AGENCY TO CONFIRM STATUS AND TERMS OF PROTECTION 

ORDER." (Doc. 16-2, NCIC Record). Per plaintiff, this is evidence that Trooper 

Olszar's actions were objectively unreasonable or otherwise negates his 

probable cause to arrest plaintiff without a warrant. 

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This disclaimer in the NCIC record, however, even construed in a light most 

favorable to plaintiff, is insufficient to defeat the objective reasonableness 

principles inherent in the Fourth Amendment. Per his unrebutted evidence, 

Trooper Olszar did not arrest solely based on this record. He interviewed the 

purported victim of physical abuse, obtained a statement from her, and 

documented her injuries. 

Moreover, the entering agency referred to in the NCIC record is the 

Pennsylvania State Police, Trooper Olszar's employer. See id. It is undisputed 

that Trooper Olszar radioed a communications operator to cross-check the NCIC 

result. (Doc. 16-1, Deel. of L. Olszar ,r,r 4 ). And to the extent that it might be 

reasonable for Trooper Olszar to contact the issuing authority, i.e., the court, 

Trooper Olszar responded to a domestic violence call on a Sunday morning 

when county courthouses are closed. A response to domestic violence cannot 

wait until court is in session. 

Plaintiff also overreads the requirements imposed upon police officers by 

the PFA Act. The Pennsylvania State Police are required to maintain "a 

complete and systematic record and index of all valid temporary and final court 

orders of protection," including information reflecting the names of protected 

parties and defendants, relationships between the parties, the dates orders were 

entered, and the dates that orders expire. 23 PA CONS. STAT. § 6105(e)(1 )(i)-(ix). 

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That information is shared with the NCIC. See 28 U.S.C. § 534(f); 28 C.F.R. 

§20.30, et. seq; see also PA. R. CIv. P. § 1905 & expl. cmt. 1997 (requiring 

standardized PFA form orders so that all PFA orders can be properly registered 

with the federal Protection Order File established by NCIC). 

But the registry is only as good as the information received and inputted. 

Pursuant to the PFA Act, prothonotaries are required to transmit information 

regarding the entry of protection orders, amendments, and any revocation within 

twenty-four (24) hours. 23 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 6105(e)(2). Here, Trooper Olszar 

has indicated that removing incorrect information from the NCIC required 

coordination between the Pike County Prothonotary's Office and Pennsylvania 

State Police personnel after any discrepancy was discovered. (Doc. 16-1 , Deel. 

of L. Olszar ,I 10). 

Additionally, the court notes that the PFA Act expressly mandates arrests 

for violations of PFA orders and authorizes arrests without a warrant upon 

probable cause for a violation. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6113(a). Although the 

statute mandates arrests, officer verification of PFA orders remains discretionary 

under the PFA Act. See id. ("The police officer or sheriff may verify the existence 

of a protection order by telephone, radio or other electronic communication with 

the appropriate police department, Pennsylvania State Police registry, protection 

order file or issuing authority. A police officer or sheriff shall arrest a defendant 

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for violating an order issued under this chapter by a court within the judicial 

district[.]")(emphasis added). 

"The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the 

government official's error is 'a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake 

based on mixed questions of law and fact.' " Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (quoting 

Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004)(Kennedy J., dissenting)(further 

citation and explanatory parenthetical omitted). In light of the undisputed facts, 

plaintiff has failed to establish that Trooper Olszar lacked probable cause to 

arrest him for violation of a PFA order or that a reasonable officer in Trooper 

Olszar's position would have known that probable cause was lacking. Plaintiff 

has thus failed to demonstrate that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. 5 

5 These same undisputed facts would support a conclusion under the second prong of the 

qualified immunity analysis that Trooper Olszar did not violate a clearly established right which 

every reasonable officer would have known. If Trooper Olszar did not have probable cause, 

the law was not so well-settled in May 2021 that Trooper Olszar would have known that his 

actions were unlawful, i.e., he was required by decisional precedent to eliminate all possibilities 

that the NCIC record was inaccurate prior to arresting plaintiff for violation of a PFA order 

shown as active in that system. Existing case law supports the opposite conclusion. See e.g. 

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009)(holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply 

when police mistakes leading to an unlawful search are the result of isolated negligence from 

the failure to update a police database, and not systemic error or reckless disregard of 

constitutional requirements); United States v. McDowell, 745 F.3d 115, 121-22 (4th Cir. 

2014)("The pervasive use of NCIC reports throughout the criminal justice system further 

indicates that such reports may be trusted."); United States v. McDonald, 606 F.2d 552 (5th 

Cir. 1979) ("NCIC printouts are reliable enough to form the basis of the reasonable belief which 

is needed to establish probable cause for arrest.") (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

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Accordingly, Trooper Olszar is entitled to qualified immunity and the Section 

1983 claim against him will be dismissed.6 

c. Whether Plaintiff's Complaint States a Section 1983 Claim Against 

Colonel Evanchick 

Having addressed Trooper Olszar's qualified immunity arguments, plaintiff 

also specifically names Colonel Evanchick as a defendant, asserting that he and 

the other defendants "knew or should have known that there was no outstanding 

[PFA Order] against [p]laintiff and that the [p]laintiff had not violated any 

outstanding [PFA Order]." (kl 1J 47). PSP Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's 

Section 1983 claim against Colonel Evanchick due to his lack of personal 

involvement. 

In Section 1983 actions, a plaintiff must plausibly plead facts that 

demonstrate a defendant's personal involvement in the alleged misconduct and 

cannot rely solely on a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Dooley v. 

Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020)(citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 

1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). Pleading personal involvement requires particular 

6 This conclusion does not result in the dismissal of plaintiffs state law claim against Trooper 

Olszar for false imprisonment. See El v. City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 334, n. 3 (3d Cir. 

2020)("Had the officers raised qualified immunity as a defense to the state-law claims, the 

argument would have failed, because qualified immunity is a defense only to violations of 

federal law under § 1983. Immunity from state law claims is governed by the state's immunity 

doctrine."). 

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allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. kl_; 

see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (explaining that "[b]ecause vicarious liability is 

inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official 

defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the 

Constitution"). 

Plaintiff's complaint is silent as to the alleged action or inaction of Colonel 

Evanchick. There are no particular allegations of direct wrongful conduct. There 

are no allegations that Colonel Evanchick directed state troopers to do or not do 

anything related to plaintiff's claims. Likewise, the complaint does not contain 

allegations that Colonel Evanchick had any actual knowledge of plaintiff's 

circumstances. The facts of the complaint, even when assumed true and 

construed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, only sets forth a Section 1983 

claim against Colonel Evanchick under principles of respondeat superior. 7 

Accordingly, the court must dismiss the Section 1983 claim against Colonel 

Evanchick in Count I of the complaint for lack of personal involvement. 

7 Plaintiffs brief in opposition argues that Colonel Evanchick is liable under Section 1983 for 

failure to train and supervise state troopers so that people would not be illegally arrested when 

troopers fail to verify whether PFA orders were in effect. (Doc. 23 at 11-13). Plaintiff, 

however, has not made any factual allegations against Colonel Evanchick in the complaint that 

would support this argument. (See Doc. 1 ). The court will not address arguments by the 

parties that extend beyond the facts pied in the complaint regarding plaintiffs claims against 

Colonel Evanchick. 

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d. Leave to Amend 

Before dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted, a court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend, unless 

amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245 (citing 

Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002)). "In 

assessing futility [of amendment], the district court applies the same standard of 

legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6)." In re Burlington Coat Factory 

Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997)(citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

Although the complaint contains serious factual deficiencies regarding 

claims against Colonel Evanchick, the court will permit amendment. Plaintiff may 

be able to plausibly allege a Section 1983 claim against the Commissioner of the 

Pennsylvania State Police by pleading additional facts. Furthermore, the 

Commonwealth did not move to dismiss the Section 1983 claim brought against 

it in Count I of plaintiff's complaint and this claim would survive the motion to 

dismiss. Accordingly, the best course of action is to afford plaintiff an opportunity 

to file an amended complaint against Colonel Evanchick within the next twenty 

(20) days. Should plaintiff fail to file an amended complaint, his claims against 

Colonel Evanchick will be dismissed with prejudice. 

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Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, PSP Defendants' motion to dismiss/motion 

for summary judgment (Doc. 18) will be granted. Trooper Olszar is entitled to 

qualified immunity on plaintiff's Section 1983 claim. PSP Defendants did not 

move for dismissal of the state law false imprisonment claim against Trooper 

Olszar and thus that claim will move forward. Additionally, plaintiff will be 

afforded twenty (20) days to amend his Section 1983 claim against Colonel 

Evanchick. Should plaintiff fail to file an amended complaint within that 

timeframe, the Section 1983 claim against Colonel Evanchick in Count I will be 

dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate order follows. 

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