Filed 8/23/17

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

RIDDELL, INC. et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE 

COMPANY et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

 B275482

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC482698)

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. John Shepard 

Wiley Jr., Judge. Petition granted.

Covington & Burling, David B. Goodwin, Gretchen A. Hoff 

Varner, Reynold L. Siemens and Jeffrey A. Kiburtz for 

Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.
2

Duane Morris, Ray L. Wong, Amanda Graham; Nicolaides 

Fink Thorpe Michaelides Sullivan, Sara M. Thorpe, Jeffrey N. 

Labovitch; Duplicki Keller, George J. Keller and Jeffrey E. 

Duplicki for Real Parties in Interest.

__________________________

Riddell, Inc. and other football helmet manufacturers and 

affiliates (collectively Riddell) are defendants in lawsuits filed by 

numerous former professional football players alleging personal 

injuries resulting from their use of Riddell football helmets (the 

third party actions). Riddell filed suit against numerous insurers 

(collectively the Insurers) alleging that they owe Riddell a 

defense and indemnity in the third party actions.1

 

1 The plaintiffs in the superior court and petitioners in this 

writ proceeding are Riddell, Inc.; All American Sports 

Corporation; Riddell Sports Group, Inc.; Easton-Bell Sports, Inc.; 

Easton-Bell Sports, LLC; EB Sports Corp.; and RBG Holdings 

Corp.

The Insurers are Ace American Insurance Company, 

Allianz Underwriters Insurance Co., American Home Assurance 

Co., Arrowood Indemnity Company, Aspen Specialty Insurance 

Co., Associated International Insurance Co., Century Indemnity 

Company, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London and Certain 

London Market Insurance Companies, Chartis Specialty 

Insurance Co., Columbia Casualty Company, Continental 

Insurance Co., Employers’ Fire Insurance Company, First 

Specialty Insurance Corporation, First State Insurance 

Company, Illinois National Insurance Co., Insurance Company of 

North America, Mt. McKinley Insurance Co., National Union Fire 

Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa., New England 

Reinsurance Co., OneBeacon Insurance Co., Pacific Employers 
3

In Riddell’s action against the Insurers (the coverage 

action), the Insurers propounded discovery seeking information 

relating to prior claims against Riddell, which model of Riddell 

helmet each of the plaintiffs in the third party actions wore, and 

the dates of use. Unsatisfied with Riddell’s responses to some of 

the discovery requests, the Insurers moved to compel further 

responses, including privilege logs of documents Riddell had 

withheld in discovery responses that had already been provided. 

Riddell moved for a protective order staying the discovery at 

issue. The trial court granted the motions to compel and denied 

the motion for a protective order. Riddell filed the instant

petition for a writ of mandate challenging those rulings with 

respect to some of the discovery requests.

We agree with Riddell that the discovery at issue is 

logically related to factual issues in the third party actions and 

that a stay of that discovery is therefore appropriate. We agree 

with the Insurers, however, that Riddell must provide privilege 

logs of documents withheld in document productions that have 

already occurred. We accordingly grant the petition and direct 

the trial court to vacate its order on the Insurers’ motions to 

compel and enter a new order granting the motions as to the 

privilege logs only. We also direct the trial court to grant 

Riddell’s request for a stay of the discovery at issue.

 

Insurance Co., Transcontinental Insurance Co., Transport 

Indemnity Company, Twin City Fire Insurance Co., Westchester 

Fire Insurance Co., and Westport Insurance Corp.
4

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Third Party Actions

Former professional football players and their 

representatives and spouses filed numerous lawsuits against 

Riddell alleging that the former players suffered long-term 

neurological damage from repeated head injuries as a result of 

wearing Riddell helmets while playing football. The plaintiffs 

allege causes of action for negligence and strict products liability 

based on defective design and failure to warn.

Most of the lawsuits have been consolidated in a federal 

multidistrict proceeding entitled NFL Players’ Concussion Injury 

Litigation, MDL No. 2323 (the MDL), which is pending in the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania. The federal district court in the MDL has stayed 

all discovery pending the resolution of certain issues, so no 

discovery on the merits has taken place in the MDL.

B. Riddell’s Complaint and the Insurers’ Responses

On April 12, 2012, Riddell filed the coverage action against 

the Insurers. The operative first amended complaint alleges

claims for declaratory relief, breach of contract, and breach of the 

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Riddell alleges 

that the Insurers issued primary and excess liability insurance 

policies to Riddell, including coverage for commercial general 

liability and products liability. Riddell further alleges that the 

Insurers have a duty to defend the third party actions and 

indemnify Riddell for any losses suffered. According to Riddell,

some of the Insurers have agreed to provide a defense but others 
5

have not, and none of the Insurers has agreed to indemnify 

Riddell.

The Insurers filed answers alleging numerous affirmative 

defenses, including that Riddell expected or intended the injuries 

alleged in the third party actions, that Riddell had prior 

knowledge of the alleged injuries but failed to disclose that

knowledge when purchasing liability insurance, and that the 

injuries did not occur during the policy periods. Some Insurers 

also cross-complained for declaratory relief concerning the duties 

to defend and indemnify and for reimbursement of defense costs.

C. The Discovery Stay, Protective Order, and Lifting of the

Stay

The trial court initially stayed all discovery in the coverage 

action. On August 10, 2012, the court partially lifted the stay, 

allowing discovery to proceed only on the existence and terms of 

insurance, self-insurance, captive insurance, exhaustion of 

insurance policy limits and self-insured retentions, formation and 

dissolution of insured entities, and foundational matters 

pertaining to the duty to defend.

On December 13, 2012, the trial court entered a stipulated 

protective order providing that the parties may designate 

documents, information, or other material as “Protected 

Material” and must maintain the confidentiality of such material. 

The stipulated protective order defined the term “Protected 

Material” as “[i]nformation or materials that constitute or 

contain trade secret or other personal or confidential commercial 

information” or “‘protected health information’” as defined by 

federal regulations for purposes of the Health Insurance 

Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.
6

On June 19, 2015, the trial court lifted the discovery stay in 

its entirety but cautioned counsel for the Insurers to avoid any 

discovery that would prejudice Riddell in the third party actions.

D. Discovery, Motions to Compel, and Motion for Protective

Order

On September 11, 2015, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 

London and Certain London Market Insurance Companies 

(collectively LMI) propounded a set of four document requests on 

Riddell. Request number 1 sought “all documents relating to the 

defense of prior bodily injury claims, including but not limited to, 

correspondence with or from insurers, defense counsel and 

counsel for the claimant(s).” (Block capitals omitted.) Request 

number 2 sought “all documents relating to the settlement or 

resolution of prior bodily injury claims, including but not limited 

to, correspondence with or from insurers, defense counsel and 

counsel for the claimant(s).” (Block capitals omitted.) Request 

number 3 sought all documents relating to the defense of 15 

claims identified in a spreadsheet previously produced by Riddell 

in the coverage action. And request number 4 sought all 

documents relating to the settlement of the same 15 claims. All 

four requests are at issue in this writ proceeding.

Riddell responded to LMI’s requests by asserting various 

objections and also identifying 450 responsive documents that 

had been produced in response to previous requests. Riddell also 

conducted an additional review, produced some previously 

withheld documents, and produced again but in less-redacted 

form some documents that had previously been produced. On 

April 14, 2016, LMI moved to compel further responses to its 

document requests. LMI contended that Riddell’s responses were 
7

untimely and that Riddell had consequently waived all objections 

and should be compelled to produce all responsive documents 

“regardless of Riddell’s objections.” In the alternative, LMI 

sought an order compelling Riddell to provide a privilege log.

On November 13, 2015, the Insurers propounded a second 

set of document requests and a second set of special 

interrogatories on Riddell. Of the document requests, only 

numbers 73, 74, and 79 to 86 are at issue in this proceeding.2

Those requests sought all documents relating to: the dates when 

each plaintiff in the MDL played football in the National Football 

League (NFL) or certain other professional football leagues 

(number 73); the dates when each of those plaintiffs wore a 

Riddell helmet and the model worn (number 74); and every claim 

against Riddell in which Santana Insurance Company (Santana) 

or certain other insurers provided a defense (numbers 79 and 86), 

the insurance provided by Santana or certain other insurers was 

impaired or exhausted (numbers 80 and 84), Riddell funded its 

own defense (number 81), or Santana or Riddell or certain other 

insurers paid part of the settlement or judgment (numbers 82, 83, 

and 85).

Of the interrogatories, only numbers 86 and 87 are at issue 

in this proceeding. They ask Riddell to state all facts relating to: 

the dates when each plaintiff in the MDL played football in the 

NFL or certain other professional football leagues (number 86) 

and the dates when each of those plaintiffs wore a Riddell helmet 

and the model worn (number 87).

 

2 Riddell’s writ petition also identifies document request 

numbers 75 to 78 as being at issue, but Riddell clarifies in its 

reply that it is not challenging the trial court’s order with respect 

to those requests.
8

Riddell responded to those document requests and 

interrogatories by asserting various objections and contending 

that insofar as the document requests sought documents relevant 

to the existence and terms of insurance, self-insurance, captive 

insurance, exhaustion of insurance policy limits and self-insured 

retentions, formation and dissolution of insured entities, and 

foundational matters pertaining to the duty to defend, such 

documents had previously been produced. On April 14, 2016, the 

Insurers moved to compel further responses, including production 

of a privilege log.

Also on April 14, 2016, Riddell moved for a protective order. 

Riddell argued that the discovery requests described above3

sought information that was logically related to factual issues 

affecting Riddell’s liability in the third party actions, as well as

information protected by the attorney-client privilege and work 

product doctrine. Riddell sought “an order relieving [Riddell] 

from responding to” the discovery at issue, and Riddell requested 

an award of sanctions against the Insurers for discovery abuse.

E. The Trial Court’s Ruling

On May 20, 2016, the trial court rejected LMI’s argument 

that Riddell had waived its objections to LMI’s document 

requests, but the court otherwise granted the motions to compel 

and denied Riddell’s motion for a protective order and sanctions. 

The court reasoned that the Insurers “contend that they are only 

obligated to defend and indemnify Riddell for the actions within 

 

3 Namely, LMI’s first set of document requests, numbers 1 to 

4; the Insurers’ second set of document requests, numbers 73, 74, 

and 79 to 86; and the Insurers’ second set of special 

interrogatories, numbers 86 and 87.
9

the multidistrict litigation in which the former football players 

contend their injuries stem from a period for which the insurers 

issued policies. The coverage issue in this case thus depends 

primarily on when the underlying claims arose. The question of 

when the underlying claims arose ‘is logically unrelated to the 

issues of consequence in the underlying case.’” (Quoting 

Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 

302 (Montrose I).)

The trial court acknowledged that the Insurers’ discovery 

sought evidence concerning whether and when the former players 

wore Riddell helmets and the model worn when the players were 

injured, and the MDL plaintiffs bear the burden of proof on all of 

those facts. But the court accepted the Insurers’ arguments that 

(1) Riddell can respond to the discovery without confirming or 

admitting the truth of any allegations or information provided, 

and (2) the existing protective order “is sufficient to prevent 

prejudice to Riddell in its defense of the underlying action.”

The court also ordered Riddell to produce privilege logs, 

excluding only “communications with its counsel in this action 

after the date it filed this action, or any work product its counsel 

created in anticipation of this action or in the course of this 

action. Riddell must list all other documents it withholds.”

F. Riddell’s Ex Parte Application and Writ Petition

On June 1, 2016, Riddell filed an ex parte application 

seeking a stay of the order granting the motions to compel

further responses to the discovery at issue in Riddell’s motion for 

a protective order, so that Riddell could file a writ petition in this 

court. Riddell also asked the trial court to certify the issues for 
10

appellate resolution under section 166.1 of the Code of Civil

Procedure.

On June 2, 2016, the trial court granted Riddell’s request 

for a stay through June 13. The court declined to certify any 

issues for appellate review under Code of Civil Procedure section 

166.1.

Riddell filed the instant petition for writ of mandate, 

asking that we direct the trial court to vacate its order of May 20, 

2016. We issued a stay of that order and requested opposition to 

the petition. We subsequently issued an alternative writ, 

directing the trial court to vacate its order or show cause why the 

petition should not be granted. The trial court did not vacate its 

order.

DISCUSSION

Riddell argues that the trial court erred by denying 

Riddell’s request to be relieved from responding to the disputed 

discovery, because the discovery is logically related to unresolved 

factual issues affecting liability in the third party actions and a 

confidentiality order would not realistically protect Riddell from 

potential prejudice. We agree. We also agree with LMI, however, 

that Riddell must produce privilege logs for document 

productions that have already occurred.

A. Governing Legal Principles

“It is by now a familiar principle that a liability insurer 

owes a broad duty to defend its insured against claims that create 

a potential for indemnity. [Citation.] . . . ‘[T]he carrier must 

defend a suit which potentially seeks damages within the 
11

coverage of the policy.’ [Citation.] Implicit in this rule is the 

principle that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to 

indemnify; an insurer may owe a duty to defend its insured in an 

action in which no damages ultimately are awarded. [Citations.]”

(Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 

1081.)

“The determination whether the insurer owes a duty to 

defend usually is made in the first instance by comparing the 

allegations of the complaint with the terms of the policy.” 

(Horace Mann Ins. v. Barbara B., supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) In 

addition, “facts known to the insurer and extrinsic to the third 

party complaint can generate a duty to defend, even though the 

face of the complaint does not reflect a potential for liability 

under the policy.” (Montrose I, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 296.) 

Extrinsic facts can also negate the duty to defend, but only if the 

facts are undisputed and conclusively eliminate the potential for 

coverage. (Id. at pp. 298-299.)

“Normally, the insurer must defend until the underlying 

action is resolved by settlement or judgment. However, 

circumstances may change such that there is no longer a 

potential for coverage by, for example, (1) the discovery of new or 

additional evidence, (2) a narrowing or partial resolution of 

claims in the underlying action, or (3) the exhaustion of the 

policy. [Citations.] When any such circumstances exist, an 

insurer may bring a declaratory relief action, in order to 

conclusively establish that there is no longer a duty to defend. 

[Citation.]” (Great American Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2009)

178 Cal.App.4th 221, 234-235 (Great American).) Alternatively, if 

the insurer has refused to defend, then the insured may bring a 

declaratory relief action in order to resolve the issue and secure a 
12

defense. (See, e.g., Haskel, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 

Cal.App.4th 963, 971 (Haskel).)

Litigation of the declaratory relief action when the 

underlying action is pending may, however, create a risk of 

prejudice to the insured. For example, “[i]f the declaratory relief 

action is tried before the underlying litigation is concluded, the 

insured may be collaterally estopped from relitigating any 

adverse factual findings in the third party action, 

notwithstanding that any fact found in the insured’s favor could 

not be used to its advantage.” (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. 

Superior Court (Canadian Universal Ins. Co.) (1994) 25 

Cal.App.4th 902, 910 (Montrose II).)

Consequently, “[i]f the factual issues to be resolved in the 

declaratory relief action overlap with issues to be resolved in the 

underlying litigation, the trial court must stay the declaratory 

relief action.” (Great American, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 235; 

see Montrose I, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 301; United Enterprises, 

Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1012.) “If 

there is no such factual overlap and the declaratory relief action 

can be resolved on legal issues or factual issues unrelated to the 

issues in the underlying action, the question as to whether to 

stay the declaratory relief action is a matter entrusted to the trial 

court’s discretion.” (Great American, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 235-236; see Montrose I, 6 Cal.4th at p. 302; United 

Enterprises, at p. 1012.)

In Haskel, the Court of Appeal held that the foregoing 

principles apply not only to a request for a stay of the declaratory 

relief action but also to a request for “a stay of all discovery in the 

declaratory relief action which is logically related to issues 

affecting [the insured’s] liability in the underlying action.” 
13

(Haskel, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 980.) Justice Croskey 

explained that although narrower than a request for a stay of the 

declaratory relief action itself, the request for a discovery stay in 

that action presents “essentially . . . the same basic question.” 

(Ibid.) Accordingly, discovery in the declaratory relief action that 

is logically related to issues affecting the insured’s liability in the 

underlying action “should be stayed pending resolution of the . . . 

underlying action unless . . . a confidentiality order will be 

sufficient to protect [the insured’s] interests.” (Ibid.)

The same year that Haskel was decided, a plurality of the 

Supreme Court, in discussing a related issue, cited with apparent 

approval Haskel’s holding that discovery that is logically related 

to liability in the underlying action should be stayed. (See 

Adams v. Paul (1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, 593 (plur. opn. of Arabian, 

J.).) The following year, Republic Indemnity Co. v. Schofield

(1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 220 likewise agreed with Haskel on that 

point. (Republic Indemnity Co., at p. 228.) But in the ensuing 21 

years, no published California case has addressed the issue.

We agree with Justice Croskey’s reasoning in Haskel that a 

request for a stay of discovery in the declaratory relief action 

presents “essentially . . . the same basic question” as a request for 

a stay of the action itself. (Haskel, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 980.) Under the Montrose I line of cases, if the factual issues to 

be resolved in the declaratory relief action overlap with 

unresolved issues in the underlying action, then the declaratory 

relief action must be stayed because of the risk of prejudice to the 

insured, including the risk of collateral estoppel. Discovery in the 

declaratory relief action that is logically related to issues 

affecting liability in the underlying action poses a similar risk of 

prejudice. Moreover, the insured will inevitably be prejudiced by 
14

having to pay the costs of discovery in the declaratory relief 

action that would, if it had taken place in the underlying action,

have been paid for by any insurers with a duty to defend.

The upshot of these legal principles is that an insurer 

cannot, over the insured’s objection, use a declaratory relief 

action as a forum to litigate factual issues affecting the insured’s 

liability in the underlying action. Rather, such issues must be 

litigated in the underlying action. If the allegations in that 

action, together with the facts known to the insurer, show a 

potential for coverage, then the insurer must provide a defense in 

that action. If, in the course of defending that action, the insurer 

learns of additional, undisputed facts that conclusively eliminate 

the potential for coverage and thus negate the duty to defend, 

then the insurer may seek declaratory relief on that basis. But 

the insurer cannot use the discovery process in the declaratory 

relief action to investigate or develop those facts if they are 

logically related to issues affecting the insured’s liability. Rather, 

that factual investigation and development must take place in 

the underlying litigation, where any insurer with a duty to 

defend should be paying for the insured’s defense, including 

discovery costs. (See generally Haskel, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 975-980.)

B. Riddell’s Request for a Partial Stay of Discovery

Riddell argues that the discovery at issue in the coverage 

action is logically related to issues affecting Riddell’s liability in 

the third party actions. We agree.

The document requests seek all documents relating to 

various prior claims against Riddell, the defense or settlement of 

certain claims, or the dates when the MDL plaintiffs played 
15

professional football and wore Riddell helmets, and the models 

worn. The interrogatories similarly concern the dates when the 

MDL plaintiffs played professional football and wore Riddell 

helmets, and the models worn. All of that discovery is 

straightforwardly related to issues affecting Riddell’s liability in 

the third party actions. As the trial court acknowledged, the 

MDL plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that they played, when 

they played, that they wore Riddell helmets, and which models

they wore. In addition, the discovery concerning prior claims 

against Riddell will yield evidence of what Riddell knew about 

the risks of playing football wearing Riddell helmets, and when 

Riddell knew it. The extent and timing of Riddell’s knowledge of 

those risks are, of course, facts at issue in the third party

actions—the MDL plaintiffs allege that Riddell “‘knew or should 

have known of the substantial dangers involved in the reasonably 

foreseeable use of the helmets.’” Consequently, all of the 

discovery at issue is logically related to issues affecting Riddell’s 

liability in the third party actions.

Riddell’s request for a stay of that discovery should 

therefore have been granted unless a confidentiality order would 

have been sufficient to protect Riddell’s interests. Riddell argues 

that the existing confidentiality order does not provide adequate 

protection and no revision of the order would remedy that defect.4 

Again, we agree.

 

4 We grant the Insurers’ motion to take additional evidence, 

namely, the exhibits to the declaration of attorney George J. 

Keller. According to the declaration, the exhibits are alternative 

versions of the confidentiality order that were proposed in 

negotiations between the parties.
16

For the reasons already explained, all of the discovery at 

issue is intimately related to factual issues affecting Riddell’s 

liability in the third party actions. If the Insurers use evidence 

obtained through this discovery to litigate those factual issues in 

the coverage action, then Riddell will suffer prejudice by being 

collaterally estopped from relitigating any adverse findings in the

third party actions while being unable to use any favorable 

findings to its advantage. (Montrose II, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 910.) Moreover, if Riddell is compelled to respond to this 

discovery in the coverage action rather than in the third party

actions, then Riddell rather than any insurers with a duty to 

defend will be forced to bear the costs of collecting and producing 

all of this evidence. No confidentiality order can solve either of 

these problems. Moreover, the federal district court hearing the 

MDL is not bound by a state court confidentiality order in the 

coverage action. (See Baker v. General Motors Corp. (1998) 522 

U.S. 222, 225, 238 [118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580].) It might 

show deference to such an order, but it might not. Riddell’s reply 

brief summarizes the situation well: “[N]o confidentiality order, 

no matter how broad, can protect Riddell from the prejudice 

caused by having to build the underlying plaintiffs’ case for them, 

bear investigation and discovery costs that should be borne by 

the Insurers . . . , and risk collateral estoppel.”

Because the discovery at issue is logically related to issues 

affecting Riddell’s liability in the third party actions and no 

confidentiality order would adequately protect Riddell’s interests, 

the trial court should have granted Riddell’s request for a stay.

The Insurers’ arguments for a contrary conclusion lack 

merit. First, the Insurers assert that the disputed discovery does 

not “seek any information logically related to” the third party
17

actions, but they present no intelligible argument in support of 

that claim. In particular, they do not attempt to explain how 

their requests for all documents relating to various categories of 

prior claims against Riddell, or to the defense or settlement of 

those claims, or to the dates when the MDL plaintiffs played 

football using Riddell helmets, could possibly be logically 

unrelated to issues affecting Riddell’s liability in the third party

actions.

Both in their briefs and at oral argument, the Insurers 

contended that, for many of the discovery requests at issue, their 

intention was merely to obtain information related to erosion or 

exhaustion of policy limits, self-insurance, captive insurance, and 

other coverage issues that are unrelated to liability in the third 

party actions. Some of the discovery requests, for example, 

concern prior claims in which the insurance provided by Santana 

(Riddell’s captive insurer) was impaired or exhausted, or in which

Santana paid all or part of a settlement or judgment. Assuming 

for the sake of argument that the Insurers’ description of their 

intentions is accurate, the discovery is still logically related to 

issues affecting liability in the third party actions, because the 

discovery requests sweep much more broadly than the Insurers 

purportedly intended. The requests involving Santana, for 

example, do not merely ask for information or documents 

concerning erosion or exhaustion of policy limits. Rather, they 

identify various prior claims in which Santana was involved and 

request all documents relating to those claims. When questioned 

on this point at oral argument, counsel for the Insurers failed to 

present any argument for the conclusion that such broad requests 
18

are logically unrelated to issues affecting liability in the third 

party actions.

5

Second, the Insurers argue that under Haskel, a stay of 

discovery that is logically related to issues affecting liability in 

the third party actions is not required unless “the insured will 

suffer prejudice if forced to respond to that discovery.” That is, 

the Insurers interpret Haskel as holding that before granting a 

request for a discovery stay the court must determine both that 

the discovery is logically related to liability in the underlying 

litigation and that responding to the discovery would be 

prejudicial. Haskel does not so hold. Rather, it holds that if 

discovery in the declaratory relief action is logically related to 

 

5 We also note that some of the correspondence from the 

meet-and-confer process concerning the discovery requests at 

issue suggests that the Insurers did not intend the discovery to 

be as narrowly targeted as the Insurers now contend. 

Correspondence from Riddell’s counsel sought to clarify whether 

the Insurers sought only “payment/impairment/exhaustion 

information,” and counsel expressed Riddell’s willingness to 

comply if that were all the Insurers sought. In response, counsel 

for LMI asserted “there should not be any dispute that the [c]ourt 

lifted any limitations on the scope of discovery in June 2015. 

Therefore, LMI is entitled to seek discovery regarding all 

potential issues in this matter, including the payment of defense 

and indemnity of prior claims.” Thus, despite Riddell’s expressed 

willingness to comply if the discovery were appropriately confined 

to coverage issues, and despite the trial court’s admonition, upon 

lifting the discovery stay, that the Insurers should be careful to 

avoid discovery that could prejudice Riddell in the third party 

actions, LMI defended its requests on the ground that it could 

seek discovery on “all potential issues in this matter” because 

there were no longer “any limitations on the scope of discovery.”
19

issues affecting liability in the underlying action, then “such 

discovery should be stayed pending resolution of the liability 

claims asserted against [the insured] in the underlying action 

unless the court finds that a confidentiality order will be 

sufficient to protect [the insured’s] interests.” (Haskel, supra, 33 

Cal.App.4th at p. 980.)

Third, the Insurers argue that compelling Riddell to 

respond to the disputed discovery would not prejudice Riddell. 

The argument fails both because Haskel does not require a 

separate finding of prejudice and because compelling Riddell to 

respond to the disputed discovery would severely prejudice 

Riddell, for the reasons we have already described. The Insurers’ 

arguments concerning prejudice never mention the collateral 

estoppel problem or the shifting of discovery costs from insurers 

who have a duty to defend (in the third party actions) to Riddell 

(in the coverage action).6

 

6 An example illustrates the frivolous nature of the Insurers’ 

arguments concerning prejudice. One of the disputed document 

requests seeks “[a]ll documents relating to each and every claim 

against Riddell where Riddell paid any amount to fund a 

settlement or judgment.” (Block capitals omitted.) The Insurers’ 

entire argument concerning the potential prejudice from that 

request consists of the following two sentences: “The underlying 

actions have nothing to do with whether [Riddell] has paid any 

prior claim. Thus, the disclosure of such information would not 

prejudice [Riddell’s] defenses in the underlying actions.” The 

request is not, however, limited to “information” concerning 

whether Riddell paid a prior claim. Rather, the request identifies 

a particular category of claims against Riddell (i.e., those for 

which Riddell paid part of a settlement or judgment) and asks for 

all documents relating to those claims. Those documents are 

likely to include evidence showing what Riddell knew about the 
20

Fourth, the Insurers argue that the disputed discovery 

requests are unproblematic because they “call for objective facts 

(which do not depend on conflicting legal theories), or, at a 

minimum, alleged facts, that any insurer would need when 

considering a claim for coverage (similar to seeking the date of 

the accident or the model of the car in an automobile liability 

claim).” The argument lacks merit. The rule requiring a stay of 

discovery that is logically related to liability in the underlying 

action (unless a confidentiality order would provide adequate 

protection) does not contain an exception for “objective or alleged 

facts that any insurer would need when considering a claim for 

coverage.” Such an exception would swallow the rule, because 

discovery that is logically related to liability in the underlying 

action will usually be related to objective or alleged facts that an 

insurer would need when evaluating coverage. Moreover, the 

Insurers’ argument reflects a misunderstanding of the general 

legal principles reviewed ante. Either the allegations in the third 

party actions, together with extrinsic facts presently known to 

the Insurers, show a potential for coverage and thereby trigger a 

duty to defend, or they do not. If they do, then the Insurers 

cannot use discovery in the coverage action to investigate and 

develop additional facts to defeat that duty if those facts are 

logically related to liability in the third party actions.

 

risks of playing football wearing Riddell helmets, and when 

Riddell knew it. If the Insurers use that evidence in support of 

their affirmative defense that Riddell “expected or intended” the 

injuries suffered by the MDL plaintiffs, then Riddell will suffer 

prejudice by being collaterally estopped from relitigating any 

adverse findings in the third party actions.
21

Fifth and finally, the Insurers argue that before imposing a 

stay, the court must consider not only the potential prejudice to 

the insured if the stay is denied but also the potential prejudice 

to the insurer if the stay is granted, and the Insurers argue that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in conducting this 

“balancing of interests.” The argument fails because the case law 

does not call for any such balancing under the circumstances of 

this case. If the factual issues to be resolved in the declaratory 

relief action and in the underlying liability action do not overlap, 

then a stay is discretionary and “the trial court should consider 

the possibility of prejudice to both parties.” (Great American, 

supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 236.) But if there are overlapping 

factual disputes, then a stay is mandatory. (Id. at p. 235.) 

Similarly, if discovery in the declaratory relief action is logically 

related to issues affecting liability in the underlying action, then 

the discovery must be stayed unless a confidentiality order would 

adequately protect the insured’s interests. (Haskel, supra, 33 

Cal.App.4th at p. 980.) The stay in the instant case is 

mandatory, not discretionary, so no balancing is necessary or 

appropriate.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial 

court erred by granting the motions to compel further responses 

to the discovery at issue and denying Riddell’s request for a stay 

of that discovery.

C. The Insurers’ Requests for Privilege Logs

In their motions to compel, the Insurers sought an order 

requiring Riddell to provide privilege logs identifying documents 

withheld from previous productions as well as documents 

withheld from the future productions that the Insurers sought to 
22

compel. The trial court granted the request. Because we 

conclude that, putting aside the issue of privilege logs, the 

motions to compel should have been denied, the request for 

privilege logs with respect to future productions is moot. The 

only remaining issue is the request for privilege logs identifying 

documents withheld from previous productions.

In its petition, Riddell raises only two arguments 

concerning privilege logs: (1) Riddell should not be required to 

log privileged documents generated in connection with the third 

party actions that post-date the filing of those actions, because a 

privilege log of such documents cannot be required in the MDL; 

and (2) production of privilege logs would be unduly burdensome.

The Insurers present no arguments on the first point, and 

we agree with Riddell. The federal district court in the MDL is 

prohibited from requiring Riddell to log its post-filing 

communications with its attorneys. (See Grider v. Keystone 

Health Plan Central, Inc. (3d Cir. 2009) 580 F.3d 119, 139,

fn. 22.) The case management order in the coverage action

likewise provides that “[n]o party is required to identify on its 

respective privilege log any privileged correspondence between it 

and its coverage counsel regarding this coverage action if such 

correspondence took place after the filing date of this coverage 

action.” We see no reason why Riddell should be required in the 

coverage action to log attorney-client communications from the 

pending third party actions that it cannot be required to log in 

those actions. The Insurers have articulated none.

On the second point, however, we agree with the Insurers.

They correctly point out that under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 2031.240, subdivision (c)(1), if an objection to a document 

request is based on a claim of privilege or work product, then the 
23

response to the request “shall provide sufficient factual 

information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, 

including, if necessary, a privilege log.” Again, the only 

argument in Riddell’s petition against providing a privilege log of 

documents Riddell has withheld from document productions 

Riddell has already undertaken is that it would be burdensome. 

Riddell cites no authority for such an exception to the statutory 

requirement of producing a privilege log, and we are aware of 

none. Moreover, given that Riddell has already performed the 

document review necessary to produce the documents it has 

produced and withhold the documents it has withheld, the 

additional burden of producing a log of the withheld documents 

should be relatively light.

For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court 

correctly granted the Insurers’ request to compel Riddell to 

produce privilege logs of documents withheld from previous 

productions, but the court should have excluded privileged 

documents generated in connection with the third party actions 

that post-date the filing of those actions.
24

DISPOSITION

The petition is granted. Let a peremptory writ of mandate 

issue directing respondent to (1) vacate its order of May 20, 2016, 

with respect to LMI’s first set of document requests, numbers 1 to 

4; the Insurers’ second set of document requests, numbers 73, 74, 

and 79 to 86; and the Insurers’ second set of special 

interrogatories, numbers 86 and 87; and (2) enter a new order (a) 

granting the Insurers’ motions to compel Riddell to produce 

privilege logs of documents withheld in previous productions, 

excluding documents generated in connection with the third 

party actions that post-date the filing of those actions, (b)

otherwise denying the Insurers’ motions to compel, and (c)

staying the discovery at issue. Riddell is entitled to recover its 

costs incurred in this writ proceeding.

MENETREZ, J.*

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

SEGAL, J.

 

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.