1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

HERBERT SCHMINKEY, : Civil Action No. 4:14-CV-01945 

 : 

 : 

 Plaintiff, : (Judge Brann) 

 : 

 v. : 

 : 

MARK ADAMS, : 

 : 

 Defendant. : 

MEMORANDUM 

August 8, 2016 

 Pending before this Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by 

Defendant Mark Adams (hereinafter “Trooper Adams”) against Plaintiff Herbert 

Schminkey (hereinafter “Mr. Schminkey”). The motion seeks to dismiss Mr. 

Schminkey’s complaint in its entirety, which now consists of one count of 

unreasonable/false arrest and one count of false imprisonment, both pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983.1

 The matter has been fully briefed and is now ripe for disposition. 

In accordance with the following reasoning, Trooper Adams’ motion for summary 

judgment is denied. 

 

1

 ECF No. 1. Mr. Schminkey’s complaint lists the following counts: Count I: Unreasonable Arrest, 18 U.S.C. § 

1983; Count II: False Imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 1983; Count III: Malicious Prosecution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count 

IV: False Arrest/False Imprisonment (state law); Count V: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (state law); 

Count VI: Defamation (state law); Count VII: Malicious Prosecution (state law). Mr. Schminkey voluntarily 

dismissed Counts IV and VII (ECF No. 9) and subsequently Counts III, V, and VI (ECF No. 22). 

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I. BACKGROUND 

 Mr. Schminkey’s complaint arises from an incident resulting in his arrest. 

On June 24, 2014, Mr. Schminkey reported to the Stonington State Police 

Barracks, Northumberland County, Pennsylvania, in order to be fingerprinted in 

connection with a prior DUI arrest. Upon arrival, he presented his driver’s license 

to the officer at the front desk, later identified as Officer Clayton Hubler, who 

instructed him to have a seat in the lobby. While he waited, Officer Hubler ran Mr. 

Schminkey’s license and informed Trooper Adams, who had been asked to 

fingerprint Mr. Schminkey, that his license had come up associated with an 

individual named “Stanley Lesnefsky,” a fugitive wanted in New Jersey. 

 Trooper Adams then escorted Mr. Schminkey into the fingerprint room and, 

after several failed attempts, obtained Mr. Schminkey’s fingerprints. Mr. 

Schminkey was then told to wait in the room for his fingerprints to be processed. 

While he waited, Corporal Gerald Hughes entered the room and began asking Mr. 

Schminkey questions about Stanley Lesnefsky. 

 Forty-five minutes later, after Mr. Schminkey’s fingerprints had been 

processed, Trooper Adams placed Mr. Schminkey under arrest and prepared a 

criminal complaint, charging him as the fugitive Stanley Lesnefsky. Mr. 

Schminkey was shackled to the floor of the patrol room and remained shackled for 

four hours until he was arraigned by a magisterial district judge and then, 

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curiously, released on his own recognizance. Throughout this time, Mr. Schminkey 

repeatedly maintained that he was not Stanley Lesnefsky. 

 Three weeks later, on July 14, 2016, after making a request through the 

Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center, Trooper Adams received a report 

which included a license photograph for Stanley Lesnefsky. The photograph 

revealed that Mr. Schminkey was clearly not Stanley Lesnefsky, prompting 

Trooper Adams to withdraw the charges against Mr. Schminkey the following day. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.”2

 A fact is “material” where it “might affect the outcome of the suit 

under the governing law.”3

 A dispute is “genuine” where “the evidence is such 

that a reasonable jury,” giving credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant 

and making all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor, “could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party.”4

 

 The burden of establishing the nonexistence of a “genuine issue” is on the 

party moving for summary judgment.5

 The moving party may satisfy this burden 

by either (i) submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of 

 

2

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

3 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 4 Id. 5 In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 237 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986) 

(Brennan, J., dissenting)). 

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the nonmoving party’s claim; or (ii) demonstrating to the Court that the nonmoving 

party’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving 

party’s case.6

 

 Where the moving party’s motion is properly supported, the nonmoving 

party, to avoid summary judgment in his opponent’s favor, must answer by setting 

forth “genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact 

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”7

 For movants 

and nonmovants alike, the assertion “that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed 

must” be supported by “materials in the record” that go beyond mere allegations, 

or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of 

a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to 

support the fact.”8

 

 “When opposing summary judgment, the non-movant may not rest upon 

mere allegations, but rather must ‘identify those facts of record which would 

contradict the facts identified by the movant.’”9

 Furthermore, “[i]f a party fails to 

properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s 

 

6 Id. at 331. 7 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. 8

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–50. 9 Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2003). 

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assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact 

undisputed for purposes of the motion.”10 

 In deciding the merits of a party’s motion for summary judgment, the 

Court’s role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but 

to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.11 Credibility determinations 

are the province of the factfinder, not the district court.12 Although the Court may 

consider any materials in the record, it need only consider those materials cited.13 

III. DISCUSSION 

As stated above, Trooper Adams seeks to dismiss Mr. Schminkey’s 

remaining counts of unreasonable/false arrest and false imprisonment under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. To succeed on a count of false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the 

proper inquiry is whether the arresting officers had probable cause to believe the 

person arrested committed an offense, regardless of whether that person actually 

committed the offense.14 Furthermore, when an arrest is based upon a valid 

warrant, there is no automatic Fourth Amendment violation even if the wrong 

person in arrested.15 Similarly, a “false imprisonment claim under § 1983 . . . is 

 

10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). 

11 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. 12 BWM, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). 13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). 

14 Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988). 15 Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802 (1971). 

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based on an arrest made without probable cause.”16 Hence, the determining factor 

in both counts hinges on whether the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest 

the plaintiff, regardless of whether the arrest turned out to be erroneous. 

The United States Supreme Court has held that probable cause exists where 

“the facts and circumstances within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of 

which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves 

to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that” an offense has been 

committed.17 In considering whether probable cause exists, courts must look to 

“the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and 

prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”18 In other words, courts must apply “[a] 

‘common sense’ approach . . . and a determination as to [the existence of probable 

cause] must be based on ‘the totality of the circumstances.’”19 

Trooper Adams contends that even though the arrest of Mr. Schminkey was 

in error, he nevertheless had probable cause to arrest him. Trooper Adams points to 

two “facts” which, he argues, were adequate, without more, to establish probable 

cause: first, that Mr. Schminkey’s driver’s license came back associated with 

 

16 Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 

F.3d 809, 820 (3d Cir.1994)). 

17 Draper v. U.S., 358 U.S. 307, 333 (1959) (citing Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 (1925)). 18 Id.

19 Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 436 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 

1997)). 

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Stanley Lesnefsky, and second, that his fingerprints came back as belonging to 

Stanley Lesnefsky. 

Mr. Schminkey does not dispute the contention that the name Stanley 

Lesnefsky came up “associated” with his license when it was initially run after his 

arrival at the police barracks on June 24, 2014.20 He strongly disputes, however, 

that his fingerprints came back as belonging to Stanley Lesnefsky. Mr. Schminkey 

also argues that Trooper Adams had knowledge of both Mr. Schminkey’s and 

Stanley Lesnefsky’s physical attributes and, therefore, should have known that 

they were in fact different people. 

A. Whether Mr. Schminkey’s fingerprints came back as belonging to Stanley 

Lesnefsky is a question of material fact for the jury. 

 It is undisputed that, after Mr. Schminkey’s driver’s license had been run, he 

was taken to another room to be fingerprinted and told to wait until the results of 

the fingerprints were processed. Approximately forty-five minutes later, the results 

were received and Mr. Schminkey was then arrested as Stanley Lesnefsky. 

 

20 After a throughout review of the documents provided to this Court for consideration of this motion for summary 

judgment, this Court is still unclear as to the significance of this initial “hit confirmation.” In his deposition and in 

the brief supporting his motion to dismiss, Trooper Adams indicates that, after Mr. Schminkey’s license was run, the 

results indicated that his name was “associated” with the name Stanley Lefnseky. See ECF No. 27-2, Deposition of 

Trooper Mark Adams, at 12 (“I was told prior to printing Mr. Schminkey that he had come up associated with this 

other name, Stanley Lesnefsky, when they ran his driver’s license.”) On the other hand, in his deposition, Corporal 

Gerald Hughes seemed to indicate that after Mr. Schminkey’s license was run, it indicated that he was “wanted.” 

When asked who the individual was who was wanted in New Jersey, he indicated “Stanley Lesnefsky with an alias 

of Herbert Schminkey and alias date of birth of Mr. Schminkey’s and an alias soc of Mr. Schminkey’s.” ECF No. 

27-3 at 19. The parties produced what has been referred to as the “hit confirmation,” a one-page form that has 

almost no information. ECF No. 25-5. The form states “HIT CONFIRMATION RESONSE. . . THE RECORD 

BELOW IS CONFIRMED . . . ***WANTED PERSON*** NAM/LESNEFSKY, STRANLEY, 

DOB/19591115.SEX/M.” However, as the parties both indicated that Mr. Schminkey’s name came up “associated” 

with Stanley Lesnefsky, this Court will adopt this language. 

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 According to Trooper Adams, Corporal Hughes first viewed the results and 

then passed them on to Trooper Adams. The results consisted of a Pennsylvania 

rap sheet for Herbert Schminkey and an “additional sheet” that listed names for 

Stanley Lesnefsky and included the name “Herbert Schminkey” as an alias.21 All 

of the officers present reviewed the paperwork and agreed that Mr. Schminkey 

appeared to be Stanley Lesnefsky. 

 Mr. Schminkey submits copies of both of these documents, the Pennsylvania 

rap sheet for Herbert Schminkey22 and the “additional sheet” referred to by 

Trooper Adams as part of his deposition.23 Trooper Adams further cites to ECF 

No. 27-3, at page 173 (also identified as Exhibit H-11) as the form that he saw in 

addition to Herbert Schminkey’s rap sheet. This document, upon close examination 

by this Court, however, does not support Trooper Adams’ claim that he viewed this 

document prior to arresting Mr. Schminkey. 

 First, Mr. Schminkey’s Pennsylvania rap sheet states that it is the 

“RESPONSE TO FINGERPRINT SUBMISSION PAPS5900 MILTON STATE 

POLICE TCN: 1371400138.”24 The date is clearly stated as “20140624,” or June 

 

21 Q: And then what did you do once you had this - - - when you were handed this rap sheet by Corporal Hughes? A: 

I looked at it. Following the Pennsylvania rap sheet, there was an additional sheet that said Stanley Lesnefsky and 

then Herbert Schminkey at the bottom of all those names. Q: So there was a PA rap sheet? A: There’s a PA rap sheet 

generated. Then an additional sheet generated which identified Lesnefsky and Schminkey as a match . . . Q: And the 

PA rap sheet, who is that on? A: That was on Herbert Schminkey, Jr. Q. And then I believe you had indicated that 

the additional sheet was where the first reference to Stanley Lesnefsky was? A: Correct.” ECF No. 27-2 at 24-25. 22 ECF No. 27-4. 

23 ECF No. 21-3 at 173. 

24 ECF No. 27-4. 

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24, 2014, the date of Mr. Schminkey’s arrest.25 There is no mention of the name 

Stanley Lesnefsky anywhere on the Pennsylvania rap sheet. 

Conversely, the “additional sheet” states that “THIS IS THE RESULT OF 

FINGERPRINT SUBMISSION FOR TCN: 1371400142.”26 It further states the 

number “PAPSP7800” and indicates the date as “20140701,” or July 1, 2014.27

While the parties do not describe the significance of the numbers, this Court would 

assume that if the document had been generated from the same fingerprint 

submission yielding the Pennsylvania rap sheet, the fingerprint submission 

numbers would match. Even if this is not the case, this document was clearly 

retrieved on July 1, 2014, six days after Mr. Schminkey was arrested and released 

on his own recognizance. This is not to say that the “additional sheet” Trooper 

Adams refers to in his deposition does not exist; it is apparent, however, that the 

Court cannot rely on this particular document, Exhibit 11-H, as evidence that Mr. 

Schminkey’s fingerprints came back as Stanley Lesnefsky at the time of Mr. 

Schminkey’s arrest.28 

 

25 Id. 26 ECF No. 21-3 at 173. 

27 Id. 28 The following reference is made: 

AKA/LASNEFSKY, STANLEY 

AKA/LASNEFSKY, STANLEY JOSEPH 

AKA/LESNEFSKI, STANLEY K 

AKA/LESNEFSKY, STAN 

AKA/LESNEFSKY, STAN J 

AKA/LESNEFSKY, STANLEY 

AKA/LESNEFSKY, STANLEY JOSPEH (sic) 

AKA/SCHMINKEY, HERBERT 

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B. Whether Trooper Adams should have known that Mr. Schminkey and Mr. 

Lesnefsky were different people is a question of material fact for the jury. 

 It is undisputed that, at the time of the arrest, Trooper Adams had the 

following information available to him: the information on Mr. Schminkey’s 

driver’s license, the “hit confirmation” generated after running the license and 

revealing that Mr. Schminkey was “associated” with Stanley Lesnefsky, the 

information on Mr. Schminkey’s Pennsylvania rap sheet which was provided in 

response to the fingerprint request, and a physical description of Stanley Lesnefsky 

from a thirty-year-old arrest. 

 In light of these documents, Trooper Adams knew that Mr. Schminkey was 

5’11’’ tall, weighed 210 pounds, had gray hair, had brown or hazel eyes, and had 

tattoos on both of his upper arms, his left forearm, and his back. According to his 

deposition, Trooper Adams was also aware that Stanley Lesnefsky was born on 

November 15, 1959, was 5’7’’ tall, weighed 130 pounds, had brown hair and eyes, 

and had unspecified tattoos on at least one arm. Accordingly, the Court must 

determine if this information, in conjunction with the “hit confirmation,” was 

enough to establish probable cause for the arrest of Mr. Schminkey. 

In essence, this is a case of mistaken identity. In considering whether an 

arrest was reasonable, albeit mistaken, “the test appears to be whether defendants 

knew or should have known of the mistaken identity or ‘acted with something akin 

to deliberate indifference’ as to whether plaintiff was the person named in the 

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indictment.”29 As the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio 

explains: 

There are circumstances where it would be clearly unreasonable not to 

investigate a claim [of] mistaken identity. For example, if the person 

arrested did not match the physical description of the defendant on the 

warrant or readily available to the arresting officers because of a large 

difference in height, weight, racial characteristics, tattoos or the like, it 

would be unreasonable for the officers to arrest him without further 

investigation.30

For example, in Brinson v. Syas,

31 plaintiff Kendale Brinson was pulled over 

for a routine traffic violation. After running a name check on the computer inside 

the police vehicle, officers were notified that a warrant existed for an individual 

named “Jerry Talley.” The warrant listed Jerry Talley, born in May 1963, as being 

5’9’’ tall, 160 pounds. Kendale Brinson, on the other hand, was born in 1966, was 

6’5’’ and weighed 198 pounds. Mr. Brinson was nevertheless arrested pursuant to 

the warrant. The court determined that there was a question of material fact as to 

whether the arrest was reasonable: 

Here, the Officers encountered an individual with the same name as 

an alias listed in a warrant for another individual. Both individuals 

were African–American males and were roughly the same age. The 

crucial discrepancy, however, is the substantial physical difference 

between the two. Brinson was a full eight inches taller than Jerry 

Talley and weighed over forty pounds more. As the Seventh Circuit 

observed in [Maxwell v. City of Indianapolis], “[w]hile weight is a 

 

29 Morales v. Franklin Co. Sheriffs, 2014 WL 1576916 (S.D. Ohio April 17, 2014) (citing Gant v. Co. of Los 

Angeles, 765 F.Supp.2d 1238, 1248 (C.D. Ca. 2011), Gray v. Cuyahoga Co. Sheriff’s Dept., 150 F.3d 579, 583 (6th

Cir. 1998)). 

30 Morales, 2014 WL 1576916 at *4 (citing Maxwell v. City of Indianapolis, 998 F.2d 431, 434–35 (7th Cir.1993)). 31 735 F. Supp. 2d 844 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 

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mutable characteristic, the size of the difference here should have 

given the police officers pause.” [998 F.2d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 

1993)] (affirming the denial of summary judgment where the person 

arrested was six inches taller than the suspect). This case presents 

more than a trivial difference between a birth date or a name; it 

presents a significant difference between an unusually large individual 

and a fairly average one. . . 

Moreover, it is noteworthy that Brinson did not have the same name 

as the person listed in the warrant, as the Officers suggest. Brinson's 

name was merely one of Jerry Talley's aliases; it was not the primary 

name . . . This testimony, coupled with the significant physical 

discrepancies, the name of the alias and the Officers' failure to 

investigate further, is enough to undermine the reasonableness of the 

Officers' decision to arrest Brinson. This is not to say conclusively 

that the Officers acted unreasonably. The Court merely finds that 

Brinson has put forth enough evidence to create a triable issue as to 

the reasonableness of the Officers' decision to make an arrest.32

Similarly, in Grant v. County of Los Angeles,

33 plaintiff Jose Ventura was 

pulled over for a traffic violation, during which a warrant check revealed an 

outstanding warrant for a “Jose Ventura” bearing not only the plaintiff’s name but 

also his date of birth.34 The court nevertheless held that a triable issue of fact as to 

the reasonableness of the arrest existed because, while the warrant described the 

individual as 6’1’’ tall and 200 pounds, the plaintiff was 5’6’’ and weighed 320 

pounds.35 

 

32 Id. at 853. 33 Grant v. County of Los Angeles, 765 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1250-51 (C.D. Ca. 2011) (reversed in part on other 

grounds). 

34 Id. 35 Id.

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 On the other hand, some courts have granted summary judgement in cases of 

mistaken identity. In these cases, however, the discrepancies were less drastic than 

in Brinson and Grant. In Martinez v. City of New York,

36 the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Second Circuit granted summary judgment when the plaintiff had 

the same name and birthdate as the wanted individual and only had a height and 

weight discrepancy of two inches and twenty pounds. Likewise in Brass v. County 

of Los Angeles,

 37 the plaintiff and the wanted individual were “the same race and 

coloring, were within three years of the same age, and were within one inch in 

height and twenty pounds in weight.” Even here, however, the court held that 

“physical similarities alone . . . are not enough to establish probable cause”38 and 

summary judgment was only granted because of the fact that plaintiff and the 

wanted individual used the same residential address, in conjunction with the 

physical similarities between the two. 

In Rodriguez v. Farrell,

39 the plaintiff shared the identical name, sex, race, 

and age of the wanted person and additionally had similar birth dates, social 

security numbers, addresses, birth places, and tattoos.40 The Eleventh Circuit 

distinguished this case from other cases of mistaken identity (including the case at 

 

36 340 Fed. Appx. 700 (2d Cir. 2009). 

37 10 Fed. Appx. 412, 415 (9th Cir. 2001). 38 Id.

39 280 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2002). 40 Id. at 1350. 

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hand) in that Rodriguez involved an “on-the-spot” decision to arrest the plaintiff by 

an officer in the field.41

 Having considered these well-reasoned opinions, both granting and denying 

summary judgment in this area, this Court finds that the issue of whether the arrest 

of Mr. Schminkey was reasonable is one for the jury. While Mr. Schminkey and 

Stanley Lesnefsky share the same race, similar birthdates, and each have a tattoo 

on at least one of their arms, there is a height difference of at least four inches and 

a weight difference of eighty pounds.42 Furthermore, Mr. Schminkey has lived in 

Northumberland County, Pennsylvania for over thirty years. He even told the 

officers that he lived next door to a state trooper also stationed at the Stonington 

Barracks and that another trooper played with his son growing up. While he did 

inform the officers that he lived in New Jersey for a short time when he was very 

young, he made it clear that he lived in South Plainfield, not Camden, where 

Stanley Lesnefsky’s warrant stems from, and that relocated from the Garden State 

when he was only five years old. 

 

41 Id. (“no precedent had decided that the nighttime arrest, in conjunction with a traffic stop, of a person—who had 

been riding in an automobile in which unlawful drugs were being carried, and who was admittedly within five 

inches of the height of a fugitive for which a valid warrant for arrest (for offenses including a drug offense) was in 

existence and known to the arresting officers—violated the Federal Constitution when the arrested person shared 

with the fugitive (1) similar birth dates, social security numbers, addresses, birth places and tattoos as well as (2) the 

identical name, sex, race and age.”) 

42 Mr. Schminkey also argues that he has hazel eyes and grey hair while Stanley Lesnefsky was reported as having 

brown eyes and brown hair. These differences can, however, be attributed to age or lighting and fail to add much 

support for this argument. 

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 Moreover, despite having all of this information available at the time of the 

arrest, deposition testimony suggests that this case may be one in which the wish 

was the father to the thought. Both Trooper Adams and Corporal Hughes testified 

that Trooper Adams began compiling the criminal charges against Mr. Schminkey 

“in anticipation for a match” before the fingerprint results were even received.43

Both Trooper Adams and Corporal Hughes also indicated that Mr. Schminkey was 

escorted from the fingerprint room to the patrol room before the fingerprint 

response came back.44 In the patrol room, Mr. Schminkey was “detained” by a leg 

shackle. While neither Trooper Adams nor Corporal Hughes could recall who 

shackled Mr. Schminkey, the testimony seems to indicate that he was likely 

shackled before the receipt of the fingerprint results.45 The evidence here suggests 

that the officers thought that Mr. Schminkey was Stanley Lesnefsky, despite the 

evidence to the contrary. Whether this thought was reasonable is for the jury to 

decide. 

 

43 ECF No. 27-2, Deposition of Trooper Mark Adams, at 26 (“Q: And what did you do in response to looking over 

this report and evaluating it? A: I was already starting the criminal complaints in anticipation for a match . . .”); see 

also ECF 27-3, Deposition of Corporal Hughes at 41 (“Trooper Adams is the one who typed up the charges. He 

typed up the charges at my request while we were waiting for the fingerprints to come back, I believe. But if it came 

back not to be him, we would have just, you know, torn them up, throw them away, thrown them away and send him 

on his way.”). 

44 ECF No. 27-2 at 29 (“Q: How long he (sic) been there at the time that he was moved by Corporal Hughes? A: He 

came in after he was fingerprinted but before the fingerprint response came back.”); ECF No. 27-3 at 35. 45 ECF No. 27-2 at 29; ECF No. 27-3 at 35-6 (“he would have been escorted into the patrol room. We do not have a 

holding cell just for liability purposes, so we have a bench in our patrol room. So he would have been placed on the 

bench and detained there. . . Q: Do you recall how long Mr. Schminkey was at the patrol room bench until you got 

your fingerprint results back? A: I do not recall, no.”) 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

Consequently, and in accordance with the foregoing reasoning, Defendant’s 

motion for summary judgment is denied. 

 An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT: 

 /s Matthew W. Brann 

 Matthew W. Brann 

 United States District Judge 

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