alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 171 (Thursday, September 4, 1997)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 46708]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-23441]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 73

[MM Docket No. 97-190; RM-9139]


Radio Broadcasting Services; Ipswich, SD

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Commission requests comments on a petition filed by 
Mountain Tower Broadcasting proposing the allotment of Channel 300A at 
Ipswich, South Dakota, as the community's first local aural 
transmission service. Channel 300A can be allotted to Ipswich in 
compliance with the Commission's minimum distance separation 
requirements at city reference coordinates. The coordinates for Channel 
300A at Ipswich are North Latitude 45-26-42 and West Longitude 99-01-
48.

DATES: Comments must be filed on or before October 20, 1997, and reply 
comments on or before November 4, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Federal Communications Commission, Washington, DC 20554. In 
addition to filing comments with the FCC, interested parties should 
serve the petitioner, his counsel, or consultant, as follows: Victor A. 
Michael, Jr., President, Mountain Tower Broadcasting, c/o Magic City 
Media, 1912 Capitol Avenue, Suite 300, Cheyenne, Wyoming 
82001(Petitioner).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sharon P. McDonald, Mass Media Bureau, 
(202) 418-2180.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a synopsis of the Commission's 
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, MM Docket No. 97-190, adopted August 
20, 1997, and released August 29, 1997. The full text of this 
Commission decision is available for inspection and copying during 
normal business hours in the FCC Reference Center (Room 239), 1919 M 
Street, NW., Washington, DC. The complete text of this decision may 
also be purchased from the Commission's copy contractor, International 
Transcription Service, Inc., (202) 857-3800, 1231 20th Street, NW., 
Washington, DC 20036.
    Provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 do not apply 
to this proceeding.
    Members of the public should note that from the time a Notice of 
Proposed Rule Making is issued until the matter is no longer subject to 
Commission consideration or court review, all ex parte contacts are 
prohibited in Commission proceedings, such as this one, which involve 
channel allotments. See 47 CFR 1.1204(b) for rules governing 
permissible ex parte contacts.
    For information regarding proper filing procedures for comments, 
see 47 CFR 1.415 and 1.420.

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 73

    Radio broadcasting.


Federal Communications Commission.
John A. Karousos,
Chief, Allocations Branch, Policy and Rules Division, Mass Media 
Bureau.
[FR Doc. 97-23441 Filed 9-3-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1896 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1896

To permit access to Federal crime information databases by educational 
                     agencies for certain purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 19, 2005

 Mr. Santorum introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To permit access to Federal crime information databases by educational 
                     agencies for certain purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Schools Safely Acquiring Faculty 
Excellence Act of 2005''.

SEC. 2. ACCESS TO FEDERAL CRIME INFORMATION DATA BASES BY EDUCATIONAL 
              AGENCIES FOR CERTAIN PURPOSES.

    (a) In General.--The Attorney General of the United States shall, 
upon request of the chief executive officer of a State, conduct 
fingerprint-based checks of the national crime information databases 
(as defined in section 534(e)(3)(A) of title 28, United States Code), 
pursuant to a request submitted by a local educational agency or State 
educational agency in that State, on individuals under consideration 
for employment by the agency in a position in which the individual 
would work with or around children. Where possible, the check shall 
include a fingerprint-based check of State criminal history databases. 
The Attorney General and the States may charge any applicable fees for 
these checks.
    (b) Protection of Information.--An individual having information 
derived as a result of a check under subsection (a) may release that 
information only to an appropriate officer of a local educational 
agency or State educational agency, or to another person authorized by 
law to receive that information.
    (c) Criminal Penalties.--An individual who knowingly exceeds the 
authority in subsection (a), or knowingly releases information in 
violation of subsection (b), shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years 
or fined under title 18, United States Code, or both.
    (d) Definition.--In this section, the terms ``local educational 
agency'' and ``State educational agency'' have the meanings given to 
those terms in section 9101 of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7801).
                                 <all>
```
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ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 

Appeal of -- ) 

) 

EMTA Insaat A.S. ) 

) 

Under Contract No. W912GB-09-D-0069 ) 

ASBCA No. 60031 

APPEARANCE FOR THE APPELLANT: John M. Manfredonia, Esq. 

Manfredonia Law Offices, LLC 

Cresskill, NJ 

APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: Thomas H. Gourlay, Jr., Esq. 

Engineer Chief Trial Attorney 

Brett R. Howard, Esq. 

Engineer Trial Attorney 

U.S. Army Engineer District, Europe 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

On 4 December 2015, the parties advised the Board that they settled this appeal, 

and jointly moved to dismiss the appeal with prejudice. The parties' motion is granted. 

ASBCA No. 60031 is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 

Dated: 18 December 2015 

Administrative Judge 

Armed Services Board 

of Contract Appeals 

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Order of Dismissal of the Armed 

Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA No. 60031, Appeal of EMT A Insaat A.S., 

rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. 

Dated: 

JEFFREY D. GARDIN 

Recorder, Armed Services 

Board of Contract Appeals
# dep

west virginia department of environmental protection Division ofAir Quality 601 57th ST SE Charleston, WV 25304 August 27, 2012 Ms. DianaEsher, Director Air ProtectionDivision U.S. EPA Region 3 1650 Arch Street (3APOO) Philadelphia, PA 19103-2029 Re: WestVirginiaNegative Declaration for Existing SSI Units Dear Ms. Esher: Earl Ray Tomblin, Governor Randy C. Huffman, Cabinet Secretary dep.wv.gov

As youknow, EPA promulgated Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and Emission Guidelines for ExistingSources: Sewage Sludge Incineration Units in the March 21, 2011 FederalRegister (76 FR 15372). The State ofWestVirginia had only one permitted SSI unit which qualified as an existing unit. This unit was ownedbythe Huntington Sanitary Board (HSB) and was originally intended to treat sewage sludge from the vicinity ofHuntington, West Virginiapursuant to WVDAQ Permit: 13-846A, issued September 5, 2001. The HSB has issued written notification to our agency (by letter from Executive Director Kit Anderson, dated August 9, 2012) thatthe unithas been permanently shut down. One ofour inspectors conducted an inspection onAugust 23, 2012 and confirmed that the unit is inoperable. Therefore, I am formally submittingto EPA a negative declaration under our Clean Air Act Section 111d/129 plan, withrespect to the above referenced federal rule for any existing units in West Virginia. Ifyou or your staffhave any questions or would like additional information, please feel free to contact me at (304) 926-0462 orFred Durham, Deputy Director, at (304) 926-0499 ext. 1242.

cc: Marcia Spink Mike Gordon Promoting a healthy environment.
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h Marilyn Kell y Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y Mary Beth Kell y Brian K. Zahra,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk September 6, 2011

y0829 

# Order

September 6, 2011

142720

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 142720 COA: 301123 Jackson CC: 06-004505-FC ROMMEL RAY REED, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 21, 2011 order of the Court of Appeals is considered , and it is DENIED, because the defendant has
failed to meet the burden of establishi ng entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
#### STATE of Florida ex rel. Jack R. LUND, D.O., Relator, v. The Honorable Lawrence E. KEOUGH and the Honorable Edward H. Bergstrom, Jr., Respondents.

No. 77-1655.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Nov. 30, 1977.

*573Peter 0. Brick, Port Richey, for relator.

John J. Lazzara of Lazzara & Gomez, Tampa, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

This is a petition for writ of mandamus in a case which is similar in many respects to *State ex rel. Mercy Hospital, Inc. v. Vann,*342 So.2d 1073 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Here, as in *Vann,*the judicial referee had stayed the malpractice mediation proceedings on his own motion pending the determination of the constitutionality of Section 768.133, Florida Statutes (1975). After the constitutionality of this statute had been upheld, the judicial referee determined that he had had no authority to extend the period of time within which the mediation panel could meet beyond ten months from when the claim was filed, and he dismissed the panel.

A subsequent civil action in malpractice was filed, and the defendant doctor filed a motion for a stay order to permit further medical mediation proceedings. The circuit judge observed that the cause should be stayed so as to permit the medical mediation proceedings to resume but concluded that he did not have the power to overrule a fellow circuit judge acting in the capacity of a judicial referee and denied the motion for a stay order.

Pursuant to the rationale of *Vann,*we agree with the second judge’s views on whether the mediation panel should have been dismissed. *See also State ex rel. McGuirk v. Cowart,*344 So.2d 624 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). We respectfully disagree with his conclusion that he could not grant a stay pending medical mediation proceedings. *Cf. Richards v. Foulk,*345 So.2d 402 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). We do not suggest that the circuit judge should be in a position to second-guess the judicial referee in the procedures followed during mediation, but the order which terminated the panel’s jurisdiction in this case had the effect of denying the relator due process. *Vann, supra.*The medical mediation proceedings, in which the first circuit judge participated solely in the capacity of a judicial referee, were necessarily subordinate to the malpractice action in the sense that the second circuit judge had the right to consider whether the mediation proceedings were properly terminated in order to determine his own jurisdiction to proceed.

We have chosen to treat the petition for mandamus as a petition for certiorari which is hereby granted. The order denying the motion to stay is quashed with directions to enter an order staying the case pending prompt and timely medical mediation proceedings.

BOARDMAN, C. J., and GRIMES and SCHEB, JJ., concur.
255 La. 245

#### Ted KOGOS v. Louis J. RITTINER et al.

No. 50298.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 20, 1970.

In re: Louis J. Rittiner applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 228 So.2d 62.

Not considered. Application was not timely filed. See Art. 7, Sect. 11, La.Const.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

ALEJANDRO OROZCO

- MADRIGAL,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 16

- 50120

D.C. No. 3:15

- cr

- 00215

- BEN

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 26, 2017 **

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN

, and N.R. SMITH , Circuit Judges

.

Alejandro Orozco

- Madrigal appe als from the district court’s judgment and

challenges the 5 1

- month sentence imposed following his guilty

- plea conviction for

attempted reentry of a removed alien , in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

SEP 29 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 16

- 50120

Orozco

- Madrigal contends that his prior conviction for assault with a

semiautomatic firearm under C alifornia Penal Code § 245(b) is not a “ crime of

violence ” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) ( 2014) . This argument is

foreclosed

. See United States v. Grajeda , 581 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2009)

(violation of section 245 “is ca tegorically a crime of violence” under § 2L1.2 ).

Contrary to Orozco

- Madrigal’s contention, our decision in Grajeda is not “clearly

irreconcilable” with either Descamps v. United States , 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) , or

Almanza

- Arenas v. Lynch , 815 F.3d 469 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)

. See Miller v.

Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)

.

AFFIRMED.
#### Maurilia ALVAREZ, Appellant, v. JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 77-2463.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Aug. 15, 1978.

Stabinski, Funt, Levine & Vega and Manuel Vega, Jr., Miami, for appellant.

Kurtz & Cooper and Robert E. Kurtz, Miami, for appellee.

Before PEARSON, BARKDULL and KEHOE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The single arguable issue presented on this appeal from a summary final judgment for the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company is the argument of the appellant (an insured employee under a group insurance policy between the employer and the insurer, John Hancock) that a group insurance policy may not be amended to decrease benefits without notification to insured employees. We think this position is *361not well taken in view of the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Florida in *Kimbal v. Travelers Insurance Company,*151 Fla. 786, 10 So.2d 728 (1942). We hold that in the absence of an allegation of fraud or misrepresentation, the contract between the insurance company and the employer for the benefit of the employees may be altered by negotiations between the insurance company and the employer. Under such circumstances, the law does not require a notification by the insurance company to the employees. See 68 A.L.R.2d 249 at 266 (1959),1 citing cases from several jurisdictions, including *Kimbal*v. *Travelers Insurance Company,*supra. We make no holding with regard to the duty of the employer to notify the employee of a change in the policy, as that issue is not involved in this case.

Affirmed.

1

. “ . . . the question [arises concerning] whether the employer may cancel or modify the master group policy without knowledge of or notice to the insured employee or his beneficiary.

> “In a number of cases the view has been expressed, mostly in the form of dicta, that an employer may, before liability has attached as to an insured employee, validly cancel or modify a master group policy without notice to such employee unless the policy or an applicable statute provides otherwise.”
|    | **JIMMY                  C.H. CHEUNG & CO.**Certified                  Public Accountants(Amember                  of Kreston International) |   | Registered                  with the Public Company Accounting                  Oversight Board |
|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

**CONSENT          OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

**TO          THE BOARD OF DIRECTOR OF**

**EVER-GLORY          INTENATIONAL GROUP, INC.**

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|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Telephone:                                                                    | (852)                    25295500    Fax: (852) 28651067 |   |
| Email:                                                                                  | jimmycheung@jimmycheungco.com                                           |   |
| Website:                                                                                | http//www.jimmycheungco.com                                             |   |

----
#### Charles BRIGHT, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-154.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

June 29, 1971.

Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Alan S. Becker, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and J. Robert Olian, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, BARK-DULL and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

On appeal by the defendant from conviction for second degree murder reversal is sought on a claim of insufficiency of the evidence and a contention that the admission of testimony as to a prior inconsistent statement of a witness was error for the claimed reason that no predicate was laid therefor. On consideration thereof we find no error, and affirm.

The conviction and judgment were supported by competent substantial evidence. The killing occurred outside of a building, in the night time. A witness related that the two men were seen by her together, partially obscured by a stairway and by the poor lighting; that they were heard in altercation over a debt owed by the defendant to the victim; that a gunshot was fired and the men ran off in different directions, and that the victim did not proceed far and subsequently fell to the ground. It appears he remained there until he expired, having been shot in the back.

 The witness involved in the question relating to prior inconsistent statement was not present at the killing and knew nothing about the circumstances thereof. His testimony was to the effect that he had been with the victim early in the evening, where he was drinking and the victim was gambling, until fifteen minutes before the shooting occurred; that he next saw the victim when he was on the ground, after having been shot; that after the shooting, when he observed people running to the scene he did likewise, stopping, however, to telephone for an ambulance. On *11cross-examination at trial that witness was asked if he had not been taken to the police station for questioning, to which he assented. He was asked if he recalled having been questioned there by police, to which he answered affirmatively. He then was asked, and denied, if he had there stated that he had not seen or been with the victim earlier prior to the shooting. In our view that was substantial if not full compliance with the requirements of § 90.-10 Fla.Stat., F.S.A. requiring, as a predicate for impeachment by prior inconsistent statement, that the witness be informed of “the circumstances of the supposed statement sufficient to designate the particular occasion,” and “be asked whether or not he made such statements.” Moreover, the testimony of the witness in question was immaterial, in the sense that it had no bearing on the circumstances of the shooting or the issue of guilt of the accused. Therefore, if it should be considered that the prior inconsistent statement evidence was allowed without adequate predicate, the error would have been harmless in the circumstances of this case.

Affirmed.