U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

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HOUSTON STRONG: HURRICANE HARVEY LESSONS 

LEARNED AND THE PATH FORWARD 

FIELD HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 9, 2018 

Serial No. 115–56 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 


Congress.#13
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

RON ESTES, Kansas 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

J. LUIS CORREA, California 

VAL BUTLER DEMINGS, Florida 

NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGA ́ N, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

STEVEN S. GIAIER, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

HOPE GOINS, Minority Staff Director 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

Mr. George A. ‘‘Tony’’ Robinson, Regional Administrator, Region VI, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

Rear Admiral Paul F. Thomas, Commander, Eighth Coast Guard District, 

United States Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12 

Colonel Lars N. Zetterstrom, Commanding Officer, Galveston District, United 

States Army Corps of Engineers (ACE), Department of the Army, U.S. 

Department of Defense: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 15 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 18 

Ms. Beth Van Duyne, Regional Administrator, Region VI, U.S. Department 

of Housing and Urban Development (HUD): 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 22 

PANEL II 

Mr. R. Jack Cagle, Commissioner, Harris County, Texas: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 51 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 53 

Hon. Sylvester Turner, Mayor, Houston, Texas: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 57 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 59 

Hon. Allen Owen, Mayor, Missouri City, Texas: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 60 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 63 

Mr. Mark Sloan, Emergency Management Coordinator, Office of Homeland 

Security And Emergency Management, Harris County, Texas: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 74 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 75 

Ms. Carol Moore, Disaster Chair, Texas State Conference, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 77 

Page

IV 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 78 

FOR THE RECORD 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Map ....................................................................................................................... 25 

The Honorable Michael C. Burgess, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas: 

Statement of the American Hospital Association .............................................. 40 

Letter Submitted by the Texas Hospital Association ........................................ 45 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Statement of George P. Bush, Commissioner, General Land Office, State 

of Texas ............................................................................................................. 79 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas: 

Article, 2018 Hurricane Season Will Bring Another Battery of Storms .......... 93 

Article, Houston police chief recalls drowned officer as ‘‘sweet, gentle’’ .......... 108 

Photos .................................................................................................................... 110 

The Honorable John Culberson, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas: 

Article, Flood Threat Known Early—Corps Predicted the Reservoir Spill 

Before Harvey Hit ............................................................................................ 97 

The Honorable Al Green, a Representative in Congress From the State of 

Texas: 

Information Submitted by the Texas State Conference of NAACP Units ....... 102 

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Al Green, a Representative in Congress From the State of 

Texas: 

Article, Survey Finds Unprecedented Psychological Distress After Harvey ... 115 

Article, Record reservoir flooding was predicted even before Harvey hit 

Houston ............................................................................................................. 117 

Article, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to release water from two Houstonarea dams: statement ....................................................................................... 120 

Article, $500 million in Ike relief is still unspent. Will Texas do better 

after Harvey? .................................................................................................... 120 

Article, Climate change displacement is becoming the new gentrificationhere’s how to stop it ......................................................................................... 123 

Article, Federal housing agency announces $57.8 million to Texas for Harvey recovery ...................................................................................................... 128 

Article, Four months after Hurricane Harvey, four major questions about 

recovery for 2018 .............................................................................................. 129 

(1) 

HOUSTON STRONG: HURRICANE HARVEY 

LESSONS LEARNED AND THE PATH FORWARD 

Monday, April 9, 2018 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Cypress, TX. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:12 a.m., at the 

Berry Center, 8877 Barker Cypress, Cypress, Texas, Hon. Michael 

T. McCaul [Chairman of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives McCaul [presiding], Bacon, Thompson, 

and Jackson Lee. 

Also present: Representatives Burgess, Culberson, Gene Green, 

and Al Green. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Committee on Homeland Security will 

come to order. 

The committee is meeting today as a follow-up to our previous 

hearing in March on the lessons learned from the 2017 hurricane 

season by specifically focusing our efforts to respond to and recover 

from Hurricane Harvey. 

Before I begin, I would like to note that we have a number of 

Members that are not on the Committee of Homeland Security attending today, and I would ask unanimous consent that they be allowed to participate in today’s hearing. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

In accordance with committee rules, the Chairman and Ranking 

Member are entitled to an opening statement of 5 minutes each. 

Other Members may submit opening statements for the record. 

I appreciate the effort taken on behalf of all those involved to 

have this important field hearing take place, and I especially want 

to thank the Berry Center for hosting us. 

This is an official Congressional hearing, so we must abide by 

certain rules of the Committee on Homeland Security and the 

House of Representatives. I kindly wish to remind our guests today 

that demonstrations from the audience, including applause and 

verbal outbursts, as well as any use of signs or placards, are a violation of the rules of the House of Representatives. It is important 

that we respect the decorum and the rules of this committee. 

I have also been requested to state that photography and cameras are limited to accredited press only. 

I now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

We are here today to ensure that we continue to shine a light 

on the needs of our region post-Hurricane Harvey in a building 

that was integral to the response efforts. When the waters were 

2 

rising, everyone was paying attention, but now that they have receded, we must not forget. 

There were many cities and towns across the country that felt 

the wrath of a devastating natural disaster in 2017. However, few 

were impacted like the communities in this area where we sit. 

When Harvey hit last August, it was the first Category 4 hurricane to make landfall on the continental United States since 2004. 

Approximately 34 trillion gallons of rainwater punished our State. 

This led to 1.4 million Texans evacuating their homes and 300,000 

households without power. In the aftermath, over $160 billion in damage was left behind. 

It was the second most expensive storm in American history and 

the most expensive storm in our State’s history. 

But these are numbers and stats anyone can read about. I was 

on the ground during the hurricane to oversee response efforts and 

toured many neighborhoods immediately afterwards. Roads had 

turned into rivers and front yards looked like lonely islands. Cars 

were abandoned, homes were destroyed, and despair was everywhere I looked. 

But as I visited shelters and met with the victims, I could see 

with my own eyes just how personally and emotionally devastating 

this storm had been. 

Moms and dads, brothers and sisters, even small children were 

taken from us. I will never forget how painful it was to see so 

many people suffer. 

While this has been one of the greatest natural disasters known 

to mankind, it was one of the most compassionate humanitarian 

missions I have ever witnessed and even though our State was 

hurting, I have never been more proud to call myself a Texan. 

Brave first responders rescued people who were stranded on rooftops or stuck in vehicles. Thousands of ordinary citizens became extraordinary heroes, hopping into their own boats and searching for 

anyone who needed help. 

There are so many untold stories of heroic actions of bravery. It 

really was a shining light during such a dark time. Seeing our communities come together, Texans saving Texas, is a true testament 

to what our State is really all about. 

But this went beyond Texas. I was proud of our country’s efforts 

and the outpouring of support we received during this tragedy. 

There was strong coordination between Federal, State, and local 

officials, with FEMA, the Coast Guard, and the Army Corps of Engineers playing key roles. Not only were about 20,000 lives saved— 

think about that, 20,000 lives saved. My grandfather survived the 

Galveston hurricane where 10,000 lives were taken, but these 

brave heroes saved 20,000 lives. Over 5 million meals and 5 million 

liters of drinking water were delivered to those in need. This is the 

kind of teamwork that is vital to a successful recovery, and I am 

proud that my State has the great capacity to carry that out. 

Since that time, I am proud to say also that both parties in 

Washington have come together, and those here on this panel, to 

pass supplemental relief packages that provide billions of dollars 

for FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund, HUD’s Community Development 

Block Grants, and Army Corps of Engineers flood mitigation 

projects. We must always make sure that FEMA and other relVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:30 Aug 17, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18FL0409\18FL0409 HEATH
3 

evant agencies have the resources they need to respond to these 

disasters. 

Last July, the House passed the first-ever comprehensive reauthorization of the Department of Homeland Security with bipartisan support. This will strengthen our first responders and frontline defenders, and I am encouraged the Senate is finally taking action. This bill has many key provisions that will help the Department of Homeland Security better prepare for natural disasters. 

So while recovering from Harvey continues to be a struggle and 

a challenge for people affected in Texas, I want Texans to know 

that the Nation is still behind them, and I and these Members remain here to help. 

I would like to personally thank each of today’s witnesses for 

being here to discuss how we are continuing to work to recover 

from Harvey and how we can better prepare for the next dangerous 

natural disaster. This committee is grateful for your service and for 

all of your hard work during Hurricane Harvey, and we look forward to hearing your testimony. 

[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL

APRIL 9, 2018 

We are here today to ensure that we continue to shine a light on the needs of 

our region post-Hurricane Harvey in a building that was integral to the response 

efforts. When the waters were rising, everyone was paying attention, but now that 

they’ve receded, we must not forget. 

There were many cities and towns across the country that felt the wrath of a devastating natural disaster in 2017. However, few were impacted like the communities 

in this area. 

When Harvey hit last August, it was the first Category 4 hurricane to make landfall on the continental United States since 2004. Approximately 34 trillion gallons 

of rainwater punished our State. This led to 1.4 million Texans evacuating their 

homes and 300,000 households were without power. 

In the aftermath, over $160 billion in damage was left behind. It was the second 

most expensive storm in American history and the most expensive storm in our 

State’s history. 

But these are numbers and statistics anyone can read about. I was on the ground 

during the hurricane to oversee response efforts and toured many neighborhoods immediately after. Roads had turned into rivers and front yards looked like lonely islands. Cars were abandoned, homes were destroyed, and despair was everywhere I 

looked. 

As I visited shelters and met with victims, I could see with my own eyes just how 

personally and emotionally devastating this storm had been. 

Moms and dads, brothers and sisters, even small children were taken from us. 

I will never forget how painful it was to see so many people suffer. 

While this was one of the greatest natural disasters known to mankind, it was 

one of the most compassionate humanitarian missions. Even though our State was 

hurting, I have never been prouder to call myself a Texan. Brave first responders 

rescued people who were stranded on rooftops or stuck in flooded vehicles. 

Thousands of ordinary citizens became extraordinary heroes, hopping into their 

own boats and searching for anyone who needed help. 

There are so many untold stories of heroic actions of bravery. It really was the 

shining light during the dark times. 

Seeing our communities come together—Texans saving Texas—is a true testament to what our State is all about. 

But this went beyond Texas. I was proud of our country’s efforts and the outpouring support we received during this tragedy. 

There was strong coordination between Federal, State, and local officials, with 

FEMA, the Coast Guard, and the Army Corps of Engineers playing key roles. Not 

only were about 20,000 lives saved, but over 5 million meals and 5 million liters 

4 

of drinking water were delivered to those in need. This is the kind of teamwork that 

is vital to a successful recovery. 

Since that time, I am proud to say that both parties in Washington have come 

together to pass supplemental relief packages that provide billions of dollars for 

FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund, HUD’s Community Development Block Grants, and 

Army Corps of Engineers flood mitigation projects. We must always make sure 

FEMA and other relevant agencies have the resources they need to respond to disasters. 

Last July, the House passed the first-ever comprehensive reauthorization of the 

Department of Homeland Security with overwhelming bipartisan support. This will 

strengthen our first responders and front-line defenders and I am encouraged the 

Senate has finally started to take action on this. This bill has many key provisions 

that will help DHS better prepare for natural disasters. 

While recovering from Harvey continues to be a struggle and challenge for people 

affected in Texas, I want Texans to know that the Nation is still behind them and 

I remain here to help. 

I would like to personally thank each of today’s witnesses for being here today 

to discuss how we are continuing to work to recover from Harvey and how we can 

better prepare for the next dangerous natural disaster. 

This committee is grateful for your service and for all of your hard work during 

Hurricane Harvey and we look forward to hearing your testimony. 

Chairman MCCAUL. With that, the Chair recognizes the Ranking 

Member, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today’s 

hearing on lessons learned and a path forward from Hurricane 

Harvey. 

I would like to begin today by recognizing two Houston-area 

Democratic Members joining us for today’s hearing, Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee, a senior Member of the Committee on 

Homeland Security who represents the 18th District of Texas, and 

Congressman Al Green, a former Member of this committee who 

represents the 9th District of Texas, including part of the city of 

Houston and other communities in Harris and Fort Bend Counties. 

I am sure that Congressman Gene Green, who also represents a 

part of Houston, might come before this hearing is over. 

We are pleased to have these Members participate in today’s 

hearing as they continue to advocate on behalf of their constituents 

in the wake of Hurricane Harvey, which made landfall as a Category 4 storm in August, causing approximately $125 billion in 

damages. Harvey was just one of 17 named storms in 2017. Last 

year’s Atlantic hurricane season was one of the most active on 

record. Compared to the debacle in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 

Islands after Hurricane Maria, the Federal response to Hurricane 

Harvey in support of State and local efforts was, in a word, better. 

FEMA had supplies and personnel pre-positioned before Harvey 

made landfall. FEMA also provided 3 million meals and 3 million 

liters of water for Harvey survivors. Soon after the storm made 

landfall, there were more than 31,000 Federal employees on the 

ground in support of the response. 

That said, we know there is still significant room for improvement for how FEMA and its Federal partners responded to Harvey, 

particularly in underserved communities with vulnerable populations and in outlying areas. Often those with the least means live 

in the areas hardest hit by disasters, so we must be particularly 

cognizant of the needs of these communities during both response 

and recovery. 

For the witnesses on the panel, I hope to hear about your support to and coordination with State and local partners on response 

5 

and recovery efforts after Hurricane Harvey. I also want to hear 

about the lessons Harvey and other 2017 storms have to teach us 

as we approach the 2018 hurricane season. 

For the witnesses on the second panel, I hope to hear your perspectives on the Federal response efforts and learn what can we do 

to support your recovery going forward. 

Finally, I note reports of troubling failures by the American Red 

Cross to provide expected assistance to those affected by Harvey to 

the point of being a no-show in many communities. For an agency 

chartered by Congress and authorized in the Stafford Act to provide much-needed assistance to Americans in times of disaster, this 

is unacceptable. I hope to hear from our witnesses today about 

their experiences with the Red Cross after Harvey. 

Mr. Chairman, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from 

natural disasters like Hurricane Harvey takes all stakeholders 

coming together and doing their part on behalf of survivors. Of 

course, the Federal Government plays an important role in that effort. 

As I said when Administrator Brock Long testified before this 

committee recently, FEMA’s mission is supposed to be helping people before, during, and after disasters. It is our job to conduct the 

oversight necessary to ensure the agency fulfills that mission. 

I look forward to our discussion today, as well as the testimony 

from the witnesses, and I yield back. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

APRIL 9, 2018 

Hurricane Harvey made landfall as a Category 4 storm in August and caused ap- proximately $125 BILLION in damages. Harvey was just one of 17 named storms 

in 2017, last year’s Atlantic hurricane season one of the most active on record. 

Compared to the debacle in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands after Hurricane Maria, the Federal response to Hurricane Harvey in support of State and local 

efforts was, in a word, ‘‘better.’’ 

FEMA had supplies and personnel pre-positioned before Harvey made landfall. 

FEMA also provided 3 million meals and 3 million liters of water for Harvey survivors. 

Soon after the storm made landfall, there were more than 31,000 Federal employees on the ground in support of the response. 

That said, we know there is still significant room for improvement in how FEMA 

and its Federal partners responded to Harvey, particularly in underserved communities, with vulnerable populations, and in outlying areas. 

Often those with the least means live in the areas hardest hit by disasters, so 

we must be particularly cognizant of the needs of these communities during both 

response and recovery. 

For the witnesses on the first panel, I hope to hear about your support to and 

coordination with State and local partners on response and recovery efforts after 

Hurricane Harvey. 

I also want to hear about what lessons Harvey and the other 2017 storms have 

to teach us as we approach the 2018 hurricane season. 

For the witnesses on the second panel, I hope to hear your perspectives on the 

Federal response efforts and learn what we can do to support your recovery going 

forward. 

Finally, I would note reports of troubling failures by the American Red Cross to 

provide expected assistance to those affected by Harvey, to the point of being a ‘‘noshow’’ in many communities. 

For an agency chartered by Congress and authorized in the Stafford Act to provide much-needed assistance to Americans in times of disaster, this is unacceptable. 

I hope to hear from our witnesses today about their experiences with the Red 

Cross after Harvey. 

6 

Preparing for, responding to, and recovering from natural disasters like Hurricane 

Harvey takes all stakeholders coming together and doing their part on behalf of survivors. 

Of course, the Federal Government plays an important role in that effort. 

As I said when Administrator Brock Long testified before this committee recently, 

FEMA’s mission is supposed to be ‘‘helping people before, during, and after disasters.’’ 

It is our job to conduct the oversight necessary to ensure the agency fulfills that 

mission. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Other Members are reminded they may submit opening statements for the record. 

We are pleased to have two distinguished panels of witnesses before us today on this important topic. 

Our first panel includes Mr. Tony Robinson, the Regional Administrator for FEMA, Region VI. I want to thank you, sir, for your 

efforts. We worked very closely both here and when we were in 

Austin with the Department of Public Safety, and the response efforts were done so well. 

Rear Admiral Paul F. Thomas, the Commander of the United 

States Coast Guard, Eighth District. Thank you for all of your efforts in saving lives in Texas. 

Colonel Lars Zetterstrom, the Commanding Officer of the United 

States Army Corps of Engineers, Galveston District. Thank you, 

sir. 

Finally, Ms. Beth Van Duyne, the regional administrator for the 

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Region VI. 

I want to thank all of you for being here. Your full written statements will appear in the record. 

The Chair now recognizes Administrator Robinson for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF GEORGE A. ‘‘TONY’’ ROBINSON, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR, REGION VI, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Mr. ROBINSON. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the committee. My name is Tony 

Robinson, and I am the regional administrator of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency’s Region VI. Thank you for holding this hearing in the Houston area and providing this opportunity to discuss the lessons learned from Hurricane Harvey and 

the path forward for FEMA and our State and local partners. 

A number of Members of this committee, including Chairman 

McCaul and Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee, have districts 

that were severely impacted when Hurricane Harvey made landfall 

in the State of Texas last August. 

When Harvey hit Texas as a Category 4 hurricane, it caused a 

great deal of wind damage and record-breaking lingering rainfall 

equivalent to approximately 33 trillion gallons falling in less than 

a week. By the time it exited Texas, Harvey was like three weather 

events combined in two separate landfalls, and unprecedented 

flooding. 

Recovering from Hurricane Harvey will take a number of years, 

and FEMA is committed to being responsive to our State and local 

partners as they continue the recovery process. There is still much 

7 

work left to do, but working in a continued partnership at all levels 

of government, including partners from the voluntary agencies and 

private sector, we will recover ‘‘Texas Strong.’’ 

Because of Hurricane Harvey’s size and scale, we learned a number of valuable lessons, not least of which was the resiliency and 

bravery of the people of Texas. Neighbors helping neighbors saved 

the lives of untold numbers of Texans in cities like Houston and 

Corpus and the suburbs of Montgomery and Jefferson Counties, 

and in small towns like Rockport and Nederland. Citizens are our 

greatest assets, and just as they played a crucial role in response, 

they must also be the drivers of the recovery. 

Governor Abbott’s leadership and the Texas Division of Emergency Management, along with local governments and municipalities and other State agencies, should be commended for the work 

they did in saving lives as the storm struck and lingered over the 

State. Their sound preparations were highly effective, and they 

were organized in ways that enabled FEMA and others to be highly 

effective partners in the response and recovery efforts. 

Working with our partners in the face of the largest storm to hit 

the continental United States since 2005, FEMA has deployed 

thousands of workers and billions of dollars to help Texas with response and recovery. We have paid over $8.6 billion to handle over 

90,000 flood insurance claims. We have handled over 895,000 registrations for FEMA assistance. We have completed over 600,000 

home inspections. We have approved over $1.5 billion in housing 

and other disaster-related expenses. Together with our Federal 

partners like the Small Business Administration, we have placed 

$13.5 billion into the hands of survivors. 

Last month, Administrator Long testified to you about his vision 

of disasters being Federally-supported, State-managed, and locallyexecuted. To that end, we continue to innovate how we carry out 

our programs. An example of this concept can be seen in how we 

approached the housing mission in Texas, FEMA supporting the 

State with funds, expertise, and resources to deliver a more flexible 

housing approach. For Hurricane Harvey, a multi-pronged approach to the housing mission has been implemented, allowing a 

number of different options including a permanent housing repair 

program and recreational vehicles that were not available in 2016. 

These options were added with programs designed to allow people 

to return home and shelter there as they completed the needed repairs. 

These options, along with the State taking a lead role, were implemented to provide scalability and flexibility to work with local 

jurisdictions on solutions that best matched their needs. 

We recognized early in the event that solutions that work in 

Houston are different than what is needed in Victoria or Beaumont, and applying lessons learned from the 2016 floods in Louisiana provided additional options to meet those different needs. 

While the housing mission has not been without its challenges, 

the lessons learned at the State, local, and Federal level will allow 

us to further reform and reduce the complexity of the program of 

the future. I commend the effort and the courage of the State of 

Texas and the General Land Office for partnering with FEMA to 

address temporary housing solutions. 

8 

Lessons learned from this historic season and FEMA’s strategic 

plan will help us and our State and local partners handle the emergency management needs of our country to build a culture of preparedness, enhancing our capability to respond to catastrophic 

events, and reducing the complexity of our program delivery. 

Some of the lessons we learned in Harvey reiterate these goals, 

such as a level of planning, training, and exercise together we did 

at all levels in Texas. This builds capacity and capability that 

serves survivors and communities. 

We also learned we need to close the insurance gaps for individuals and public facilities, and we need to invest more in mitigation 

prior to a disaster. 

At FEMA, we are constantly reviewing our program delivery, decision-making processes, and responses to ensure that we improve, 

minimize errors, and better serve survivors on their worst day. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to 

any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Robinson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEORGE A. ‘‘TONY’’ ROBINSON

APRIL 9, 2018 

INTRODUCTION

Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of 

the committee. My name is Tony Robinson, and I am the regional administrator of 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Region 6. Region 6 is comprised of five States, Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico. I’d 

like to thank you for holding this hearing in the Houston area and providing this 

opportunity to discuss the lessons learned from Hurricane Harvey and the path forward for FEMA and our State and local partners. 

Many Members of this committee, including Chairman McCaul and Congresswoman Jackson Lee, have districts that were severely impacted when Hurricane 

Harvey unleashed massive amounts of rain on the State of Texas last August. 

Together, in close partnership with the State of Texas, ably led by Governor Abbott and his excellent team at the Texas Division of Emergency Management, 

known as TDEM—and their partnership with mayors, county judges, and local 

emergency managers—we have built strong response and recovery capabilities to 

serve Texans. FEMA’s regional and National assets integrated into this structure 

to work across an impacted area of more than 37,000 square miles to assist in response and recovery operations. 

When Hurricane Harvey hit Texas as a Category 4 hurricane, it caused a great 

deal of wind damage and record-breaking rainfall equivalent to approximately 33 

trillion gallons in less than the span of a week. That flooding directly impacted millions of people from our Nation’s fourth-largest city, Houston, as well as small and 

medium-size communities along the coast and into the interior of the State. 

Recovering from Hurricane Harvey will take a number of years, and FEMA is 

committed to being responsive to our State and local partners as they continue the 

recovery process. There is still much work left to do, but working in a continued 

partnership at all levels of government, including partners from the voluntary agencies and private sector, we will recover ‘‘Texas Strong.’’ 

HURRICANE HARVEY—LESSONS LEARNED

Because of Hurricane Harvey’s size and scale, we learned a number of valuable 

lessons, not least of which was the resiliency and bravery of the people of Texas. 

The flooding caused by the unprecedented rainfall transformed many everyday Texans into heroes and first responders. Neighbors helping neighbors, whether in cities 

like Houston, or Corpus Christi, or in the suburbs of Montgomery and Jefferson 

counties, or small towns from Rockport to Nederland, saved the lives of untold numbers of Texans. At FEMA Region 6, we are constantly reminding those we serve 

that, ‘‘You are the help until help arrives,’’ and Texans can be very proud of the 

way that they rose to the challenges created by Hurricane Harvey. 

9 

Texans weren’t the only ones who answered the call. Volunteers from across the 

Nation, in particular those from Louisiana, including the Cajun Navy, added their 

boats and supplies to the rescue efforts of so many volunteers in Texas. Through 

their actions and unrelenting efforts, Texans, and those volunteers who came in 

from across the Nation, showed that ‘‘Texas Strong,’’ was not just a slogan, but a 

fact. That strength was also visible in the people from the coastal bend to the border 

with Louisiana, who were willing to risk their lives to help out friend and stranger 

alike in those crucial early hours of the disaster. 

The State of Texas, and TDEM in particular, along with local governments and 

municipalities, should be commended for the work they did in saving lives as the 

storm struck and lingered over the State, creating immense challenges across such 

a wide swath of land. The State clearly takes emergency management very seriously 

and it has spent considerable resources preparing for dealing with natural and manmade disasters. Their sound preparations were highly effective, and they were organized in ways that enabled FEMA and others to be highly effective partners in the 

response and recovery efforts. 

Another important lesson that we have taken away from the impact of Hurricane 

Harvey is the importance of pre-disaster preparation. When FEMA’s Administrator 

Brock Long spoke to you last month about the agency’s strategic plan, he mentioned 

that building a culture of preparedness and readying the Nation for catastrophic 

disasters are two of our three main strategic goals. Hurricane Harvey is a prime 

example of what a difference being prepared can make. 

One area where we have made progress in building a culture of preparedness is 

the strong relationship that was already in place between FEMA and TDEM. We 

worked so well together in this disaster because we have spent years developing a 

strong partnership. That was crucial as we supported the State of Texas in its response and rescue efforts. Because our leadership and staff already had strong 

working relationships, our ability to communicate and coordinate was greatly enhanced. 

One area where we have not made nearly enough progress in building a culture 

of preparedness is in educating the public of the value of purchasing flood insurance. Too many people in Texas, and throughout the Nation, do not understand the 

importance of carrying flood insurance, regardless of whether they are in a floodprone area or not. Ensuring the public knows the value of the protections provided 

by carrying flood insurance, which in most cases is a low-cost protective measure, 

would help ensure those affected by flood are made as whole as possible. As seen 

with Hurricane Harvey, many of us learned very painful lesson about the need to 

have flood insurance. As people work on their own personal recoveries they are coming to the unfortunate realization that Stafford Act programs offered through FEMA 

are not a form of insurance and the grant dollars we have available are not sufficient to make them whole, nor in fact was that ever the purpose of FEMA’s Individual Assistance programs. 

As we work to better educate the public about what assistance is available after 

a disaster, we must do more to promote awareness of the National Flood Insurance 

Program and other options to purchase flood insurance. Our agency’s goal is to double the number of flood insurance policies. Hurricane Harvey provides a powerful 

lesson about the importance of having flood insurance with the average payout 

being more than $80,000, compared to an average Individual Assistance grant that 

was under $7,000. Clearly, $80,000 is going to get you a lot further along the path 

of recovery than $7,000 will. That should help us drive home the importance of investing in a flood insurance policy. 

Administrator Long also testified last month about his vision of disasters being 

‘‘Federally-supported, State-managed, and locally-executed.’’ To that end, Hurricane 

Harvey also taught us that we need to do more to empower the States to handle 

the challenge of a disaster-created housing mission. Texas stepped up to the plate 

in response to Harvey and sought to have a multi-pronged approach to the housing 

mission, allowing local jurisdictions to pick from a number of different options including mobile housing units and other programs designed to allow people to return 

home and shelter there as they completed the needed repairs. This brings us to our 

agency’s third strategic goal: To reduce the complexity of FEMA programs. There 

is still much work left to be done, but the partnership we have with the General 

Land Office of the State of Texas provides an innovative approach to streamline how 

we address disaster housing. While the housing mission has not been without its 

challenges, the lessons learned at the local, State, and Federal level will allow us 

to further reform and reduce the complexity of our housing missions in the future. 

Another important lesson learned was the changing nature of communications 

during both the short-term response and long-term recovery phases of a disaster. 

The challenges and opportunities created by cellular technology, the internet, and 

10 

social media provided FEMA, TDEM, and local emergency mangers new ways to 

interact with the general public. The public has also grown more diverse leading to 

additional focus on languages beyond just English and Spanish, to be inclusive of 

those with different communication needs such as the deaf community. During the 

initial response phase, people used social media to provide the locations of people 

needing rescue, to report on conditions, and to facilitate the coordination of volunteer activities and resources. During the recovery phase, FEMA employed tools such 

as the FEMA mobile application and Facebook Live to provide real-time updates 

and disseminate important information. As we prepare for future disasters FEMA 

must be mindful of changing communities and methods of communication to be certain that accurate and timely information is distributed and useful information is 

received. 

At FEMA, we are constantly reviewing our program delivery, decision-making 

processes, and responses to ensure that we improve, minimize errors, and better 

serve survivors on their worst day. We also are eager to work with Congress, and 

this committee in its oversight capacity, to determine if legislative changes are required, and to ensure that we are executing our programs consistent with Congressional intent. We have learned, and will continue to learn, from this historic disaster. 

THE PATH FORWARD

As we plan for the future and work on the long-term recovery from Hurricane 

Harvey, we must also consider future threats. We are less than 60 days out from 

the start of the 2018 hurricane season and we have to be cognizant of very real 

threats that may be on the horizon. 

In response to the historic nature of Hurricane Harvey, FEMA’s response will be 

larger and longer-lasting than normal. We are opening a Long-Term Recovery Office 

so that we can be an effective and responsive partner to State and local officials 

as they drive the recovery efforts. This office will hire additional staff and will remain open for the next few years to ensure that we can respond to the extraordinary 

needs generated by this disaster. 

Additionally, FEMA will be working closely with our partners at all levels to increase the promotion of flood insurance so that individuals and businesses are better 

able to manage and fund their own recoveries from future disasters. Greater emphasis on the importance of flood insurance will be key to creating the culture of preparedness that is one of our agency’s strategic goals. 

We are working with our Federal, State, and local partners to review and revise 

procedures to streamline and simplify the delivery of our programs, so that we can 

provide a process that is easier for the public, eliminates duplication of effort, and 

will allow for a more timely response to their concerns. 

To help our local and State partners build communities that are more resilient 

we will work on making sure that mitigation funding and planning receives greater 

emphasis. As an area that is no stranger to natural disasters, we must do more to 

ensure that construction and development takes place in a way that is consistent 

with mitigating the impact of future hurricanes and other potential disasters. 

We will also work with our stakeholders and partners on a communication strategy meant to empower individuals and communities to prepare for the disasters 

that are inevitable in our region. FEMA will continue to work to improve our programs, communication strategies, and to support our partners. But from response 

to recovery it is local communities and individual citizens who must lead the way. 

We will do all we can to empower them to do so. 

CONCLUSION

Hurricane Harvey caused significant damage to many jurisdictions throughout 

Texas. FEMA remains committed to working with our Federal, State, and local partners to make the State more resilient and to support the recovery no matter how 

long it takes. Through our mutual efforts, we will benefit by having learned many 

valuable lessons that will allow us to build a culture of preparedness in Texas and 

throughout the Nation. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to any questions you 

may have. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Robinson. 

The Chair now recognizes Rear Admiral Thomas. 

11 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL PAUL F. THOMAS, COMMANDER, EIGHTH COAST GUARD DISTRICT, UNITED STATES 

COAST GUARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Admiral THOMAS. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking 

Member Thompson, distinguished Members of the committee. It is 

my pleasure to be with you today to discuss the Coast Guard’s response to Hurricane Harvey. 

As the Federal Government’s maritime first responder and an 

armed service within the Department of Homeland Security, the 

Coast Guard is uniquely positioned to operate across the response 

spectrum and serve as a bridge between the Department of Defense 

and local, State, and other Federal agencies in any disaster response, and we did that during Harvey. 

When Harvey formed in the Gulf of Mexico, Coast Guard crews 

worked around the clock to ensure the safety of our people, assets, 

and facilities to direct actions in order to minimize the risk to commercial ports and to prepare for the search-and-rescue missions 

that we knew were to come. Even before Harvey made landfall in 

south Texas, Coast Guard air crews rescued a dozen mariners from 

the motor vessel Gulf Justice as she was aground and foundering 

in high winds and heavy seas at the leading edge of the storm. 

Harvey raged on for the next 5 days, and Coast Guard crews and 

aircraft and shallow water boats battled tropical storm winds and 

near-zero visibility in a treacherous urban environment to rescue 

stranded victims, many of whom suffered from serious medical conditions and needed immediate treatment. 

While our Coast Guard crews directly effected the rescue of more 

than 11,000 people in that time period, using our facilities, our 

command-and-control capability, and the on-scene initiative that 

defines our enlisted work force, Coast Guard men and women directed and facilitated the rescue of tens of thousands. 

Even before the storm cleared Texas, our crews were on the 

water, working with partner agencies to restore critical channels 

and aids to navigation, and to ensure the port facilities were able 

to safely receive ships and restart operations here in the Port of 

Houston and throughout Texas. Those efforts ensured that the area 

refineries not severely damaged by the storm were able to receive 

feedback and continue to operate. 

In the weeks and months following the storm, Coast Guard 

women and men responded to more than 670 pollution sites and removed over 58,000 gallons of oil and more than 8,500 pounds of 

hazardous materials that were spread through coastal Texas by the 

storm and the floods. 

As the commander responsible for Coast Guard operations in a 

26-State region, including all of Texas, I am tremendously proud of 

what our Coast Guard men and women accomplished in the face 

of this historic storm, even while many of them suffered damage 

to their own homes and properties alongside their fellow Texans. 

But I am also acutely aware that these efforts did not come without significant costs that impacted our ability to maintain a proper 

response posture and to execute all missions throughout the eighth 

Coast Guard district. Certainly, there is a readiness cost as we operated boats and aircraft well above planned rates, and we deferred 

12 

maintenance and training in order to surge forces from around the 

eighth district and around the Nation here to Texas. 

As you know, Coast Guard facilities along the coast of Texas suffered significant damage and must be rebuilt in order to restore the 

full function of those units. Of course, there is an opportunity cost 

associated with diverting Coast Guard resources from other missions, particularly our interdiction missions where adversaries take 

advantage of reduced Coast Guard presence. 

Thanks to the support of this Congress and the administration, 

we are beginning to offset those costs. Over $100 million of the supplemental funding provided by Congress to the Coast Guard in the 

wake of this hurricane season will be put to work right here in 

Texas. We are restoring the readiness of our aircraft and air crews, 

recapitalizing our shallow water rescue equipment, and rebuilding 

destroyed Coast Guard facilities to standards intended to withstand the storms of the future. 

We have also taken steps to ensure we are even better prepared 

for hurricanes and all contingencies in the future. Here in Texas, 

we have coordinated with the Governor’s staff, the National Guard, 

and Texas Task Force 1 to improve our joint operations for urban 

search and rescue, and we have engaged Marine Corps Amphibious 

Unit 4 in Galveston so that we can plan and train together and 

very quickly bring their tremendous high-water operations capability into the fight. 

Throughout the Coast Guard we are working to better track and 

respond to calls for help that come to us through social media, and 

to use social media heat maps to focus our response efforts. 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, the men and women 

of the eighth Coast Guard district are proud and privileged to be 

members of the world’s greatest Coast Guard, and we appreciate 

your continued strong support of our service. We continue to stand 

with Texas, alongside Texans, ready for whatever comes next. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be with you this morning, and 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Thomas follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL F. THOMAS

APRIL 9, 2018 

INTRODUCTION

Good morning Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished 

Members of the committee. It is my pleasure to be here today to discuss the Coast 

Guard’s preparations for the next Atlantic hurricane season, lessons learned from 

the 2017 hurricane season, and the demands contingency responses place on the 

Coast Guard. 

First, let me thank you for the outstanding support this committee has given the 

Coast Guard, especially as it relates to the supplemental funding for hurricane response activities. This critical infusion allows the Service not only to rebuild damaged and destroyed facilities, but also provides the ability to rebuild to modern resiliency standards, ensuring the best chance of withstanding future disasters. 

The U.S. Coast Guard is the world’s premier military, multi-mission, maritime 

service responsible for the safety, security, and stewardship of U.S. waters and hundreds of miles seaward. At all times, a military service and branch of the U.S. 

Armed Forces, a Federal law enforcement agency, a regulatory body, a first responder, and a member of the U.S. intelligence community, the Coast Guard stands 

the watch and serves a Nation whose economic prosperity and National security are 

inextricably linked to broad maritime interests. 

13 

1 Using CRS method of Shoreline Measurement: Texas: 367 mi, Louisiana: 397 mi, Florida: 

1,350 mi, Puerto Rico: 311 mi, USVI: 117 mi. 

As the Nation’s maritime first responder, the Coast Guard has unique capabilities, capacity, and authorities that allow it to play a critical role in disaster response. Today I would like to discuss the Coast Guard’s primary missions in disaster response, its strengths, limitations, and some issues that demand our focus 

as we look toward the 2018 hurricane season. 

PRIMARY MISSIONS IN DISASTER RESPONSE

The Coast Guard’s primary missions in domestic disaster response are: 

1. Saving lives in distress, and ensuring the safety and survivability of its own 

forces and assets for immediate post-disaster response operations; 

2. Security and reconstitution of ports, waterways, and critical maritime infrastructure; 

3. Environmental response operations (oil, chemical, and hazardous material); 

and 

4. Support to other agencies in a whole-of-Government response effort. 

Saving lives in distress remains our first priority. During Hurricanes HARVEY, 

IRMA, MARIA, and NATE, Coast Guard women and men in vessels, aircraft, vehicles, and on foot rescued nearly 12,000 people and over 1,500 pets. 

For each of these storms and all natural disasters along our coastline, Coast 

Guard crews are typically the first Federal responders to enter an impacted area, 

right alongside our State, local, Tribal, and territorial responders, to conduct rescues 

and assess damage. I should note that in an average year, the Coast Guard saves 

3,600 lives. The Coast Guard tripled that number during HARVEY alone in a matter of days. 

In addition to search and rescue operations, the Coast Guard flows forces into the 

impacted regions to restore ports and waterways, respond to pollution, provide security and additional law enforcement capability where necessary, and protect offshore petrochemical platforms. Within 5 weeks, Hurricanes HARVEY, IRMA, 

MARIA, and NATE impacted over 2,500 miles of shoreline.1 The Coast Guard responded to 1,269 aids to navigation discrepancies, handled 290 pollution cases, and 

targeted and assessed thousands of grounded vessels, with more than 4,200 removed 

to date. Coast Guard damage assessment teams were on-scene within hours determining the status of ports and waterways, documenting environmental hazards, assessing the impacts to Coast Guard facilities and capabilities, and leveraging technology, such as the employment of electronic aids to navigation, to facilitate the reopening of key ports and waterways. 

The Coast Guard response during the 2017 hurricane season was historic and 

overwhelmingly successful. However, as an organization dedicated to continuous improvement and increased resiliency the Coast Guard inherently knows there are lessons to be learned, even after a successful contingency response. The Coast Guard 

has identified several strategic and over 100 tactical-level lessons learned. The 

Coast Guard is tracking, and will continue to track, these issues until they have 

been resolved. The Service is updating policies and plans, improving capabilities, 

sharing best practices, and working with FEMA and State partners to improve processes. As we approach the start of the Atlantic hurricane season on June 1, 2018, 

the Coast Guard will conduct fifty-two natural disaster exercises at its District and 

Sector Commands. 

OUR STRENGTHS

The Coast Guard has several key strengths that enable quick and effective response to natural disasters. The first of these strengths begins with its people, 

whose bias for action and adaptability to rapidly changing circumstances and uncertainty never ceases to fill me with pride and admiration. 

Coast Guard cutters, aircraft, and boats are built to respond to a variety of missions without the need for any significant reconfiguration. Cutters conducting 

counter-drug patrols in the Transit Zone can quickly divert to disaster areas to provide command and control, deliver rotary-wing air capability from the sea, conduct 

refueling, and provide forward staging facilities. Coast Guard aircraft that normally 

perform law enforcement surveillance to thwart transnational maritime criminal activities can be dynamically repositioned and re-tasked to deliver disaster relief supplies, additional responders, and equipment to affected areas. 

Additionally, Coast Guard forces are on station at key locations around the Nation, most of them on short-notice recall, which can respond quickly to emergent 

14 

events. When a major catastrophe occurs or is anticipated, the Service can reposition forces quickly to that area to optimize the response. 

The Coast Guard enjoys an agile and decentralized command-and-control structure, which provides operational commanders the authority to move forces quickly 

to respond to large contingencies. Two Area Commanders, and their nine subordinate District Commanders, can shift and reallocate forces from one region to another based on levels of risk and anticipated demand for operational capabilities. 

The Coast Guard has also developed and regularly exercises Continuity of Operations Plans for relocating command and control functions out of harm’s way to strategically advantageous positions to effectively conduct response and recovery operations. During the 2017 hurricanes, seven major shore commands and one District 

command shifted out of the path of the storms to alternate facilities, resulting in 

only minor disruptions and no loss of command and control. 

In addition to fielding flexible, multi-mission forces and effective command-andcontrol systems, the Coast Guard also benefits from a unique mix of broad standing 

authorities, as well as extensive experience operating within both military and other 

interagency response organizations. 

As a military service, the Coast Guard can be a supported or supporting commander, and its forces are frequently integrated with U.S. Department of Defense 

(DOD) services in Joint Task Force organizations. The Service regularly provides 

forces in support of DOD exercises, Combatant Commander contingency plans, and 

theater security cooperation activities. This routinely exercised relationship develops 

close cooperation at the service level, enabling Coast Guard and DOD forces to integrate seamlessly during disaster response operations. 

In addition to its military role, the Coast Guard routinely works with other Federal agencies, State and local governments, non-governmental agencies, and international organizations under its U.S. Code, Title 14 law enforcement and regulatory 

responsibilities. 

The Coast Guard is the Nation’s ‘‘maritime first responder’’ and has a leading role 

in executing the National Response Framework (NRF) for disaster situations. Its 

personnel are well-trained and experienced in response operations, which make 

them a sound choice to be designated for key leadership positions in the NRF structure. This ability to operate concurrently in both military Joint Task Force and civilian NRF structures enhances unity of effort during whole-of-Government responses 

across organizations and dramatically improves the effectiveness of disaster response, which makes the Coast Guard a truly unique Federal agency. 

OUR LIMITATIONS

Despite the many strengths the Coast Guard brings to disaster response, the 

Service has limitations that must be considered. 

Across the 2017 hurricane response operations, more than 3,000 Coast Guard 

women and men, and 200 assets or platforms from across the service, from places 

as far away as Alaska, Hawaii, and Maine responded to save nearly 12,000 citizens 

in distress. The hurricane response had a significant impact on Coast Guard operations. The Coast Guard is small in comparison to the other Armed Services. With 

only 40,600 active duty, 7,000 reserve, and 8,500 civilian personnel, responding to 

a major natural disaster requires balancing risk in other geographic regions and 

mission areas in order to flow forces and capabilities into the major disaster response. 

Residual risk was spread across the Coast Guard, with a keen eye toward meeting 

minimal mission standards in most, but not all, locations. Given the heavy demand 

for aviation capabilities following each of the storms, all aviation training was 

stopped until the later stages of recovery efforts were reached. The level of forces 

typically allocated to performing counter-drug, fisheries enforcement, and migrant 

interdiction operations in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, Caribbean Sea, and Florida 

Straits were reduced as well. 

The Service has a limited capacity to respond to prolonged and sequential events. 

While the Coast Guard is well-positioned for immediate and effective first response, 

plans to sustain operations and hand-off responsibilities once a crisis has been stabilized are primary considerations for Coast Guard commanders responding to natural disasters. During 2017, the initial hurricane response spanned multiple 

months, with some response operations continuing today. The Coast Guard endured 

risk exposure across all 11 missions with service-wide impacts to training, personnel 

readiness, and maintenance of equipment. To sustain prolonged response operations, the Service had to sacrifice preparedness for the next contingency response. 

When discussing resiliency, infrastructure and assets immediately come to mind. 

However, the resiliency of the Coast Guard as an organization is equally critical to 

15 

mitigating the secondary effects of responding to emergent events. The Coast Guard 

must be able to meet the needs of the Nation, through a resilient and well-trained 

workforce, while simultaneously answering the call for help during a disaster. 

The age and condition of the Coast Guard’s assets is another concern, and is one 

that the administration, with the support of Congress, is working hard to improve. 

As more modern and capable cutters repositioned for hurricane response, the Coast 

Guard Cutter ALERT, a 48-year-old cutter, held the line in the Eastern Pacific 

Ocean. The crew performed admirably, including a 2-week period as the only cutter 

operating in the Eastern Pacific. 

ISSUES TO FOCUS ON GOING FORWARD

Last, there are several areas that will require continued energy and focus in the 

months and years ahead in order to enhance the Coast Guard’s National disaster 

response capacity and capability. 

When the Coast Guard has the opportunity to recapitalize its facilities, it needs 

to make them more storm-resilient and survivable. In fact, several shore facilities 

that were rebuilt following Hurricane IKE suffered minimal damages along the 

paths of HARVEY and IRMA, a testament to modern building codes and standards. 

Continued investment in recapitalizing Coast Guard resources is paramount. The 

need for modernized assets, such as the Offshore Patrol Cutter and Waterway Commerce Cutters, to replace an aging fleet is highlighted by the National Security Cutter’s superior ability to coordinate and communicate with Coast Guard, Department 

of Defense, and interagency resources during contingency responses. 

Investing in the Coast Guard’s infrastructure supports its greatest resource: Its 

people. Although the Service deployed approximately 3,000 additional Coast Guard 

women and men to support response operations, many more Coast Guardsmen from 

within the impacted areas responded to help those that were displaced and distressed, even as they and their loved ones were also displaced. The Coast Guard 

had to relocate over 700 Coast Guard members and dependents after their homes 

were damaged to the point of being uninhabitable. 

Many do not realize the residual risk associated with surging resources to an incident. No amount of response capacity and capability will be effective without a foundation of preparedness. Having enough well-trained and properly-equipped personnel, the right assets, and adequate contingency infrastructure in place prior to 

an event is vital to sustained success during a major disaster response, and to the 

reconstitution of the impacted area. It is too late to train responders, procure new 

equipment, or find alternate command posts when a hurricane is barreling toward 

the coast. As has been shown time and again, investment in the Coast Guard pays 

dividends when they are needed most. 

CONCLUSION

The Coast Guard is well-positioned to respond to natural disasters due to its 

unique blend of authorities, capabilities, and capacity. Flexible, multi-mission forces 

and agile command-and-control systems provide the solid foundation from which we 

can respond to major catastrophes. When combined with broad authorities and extensive experience operating with diverse partners, the Coast Guard provides a vital 

service to our Nation. As an organization that strives to better serve the Nation 

through continual improvement, the Coast Guard evaluates its successes and failures to optimize performance through applying both strategic and tactical-level lessons learned. The Coast Guard’s dedication to on-going self-improvement will ensure 

that it is best positioned to deliver the level of service the Nation expects and deserves well into the future. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today and for your on-going 

support of the men and women of the Coast Guard. I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, Admiral. The State of Texas is 

forever grateful. We appreciate what you did. 

The Chair recognizes Colonel Zetterstrom. 

STATEMENT OF COLONEL LARS N. ZETTERSTROM, COMMANDING OFFICER, GALVESTON DISTRICT, UNITED STATES 

ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS (ACE), DEPARTMENT OF THE 

ARMY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Colonel ZETTERSTROM. Good morning, Chairman McCaul and 

Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of the 

16 

committee. I am honored to testify before you today to discuss the 

authorities and responsibilities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers during disaster response and recovery operations, focusing on 

Hurricane Harvey and its impacts to the coast of Texas. I am Colonel Lars Zetterstrom, and I am the Commander of the Galveston 

District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 

The Corps conducts its emergency response and recovery operations under two authorities, the Stafford Act and Public Law 84– 

99. Under the Stafford Act, we and other Federal agencies support 

FEMA under the National Response and Recovery Framework. In 

this capacity, the Corps is the lead Federal agency for Emergency 

Support Function 3, Public Works and Engineering. ESF–3 provides temporary emergency power, temporary roofing, debris management, emergency infrastructure assessment, critical public facility restoration, temporary housing, and demolition and structural 

stabilization. Under Public Law 84–99, we prepare for disasters 

through planning, coordination, and training with local, State, and 

Federal partners. The Corps can also assist State and local entities 

in flood fight operations or through implementation of advanced 

measures to prevent or reduce storm incident outcomes. Public Law 

84–99 authorizes the Corps to repair damage to Federal flood infrastructure projects, and works with States and municipalities to rehabilitate and restore eligible non-Federal flood infrastructure to 

pre-storm conditions. 

When disasters occur, Corps teams and other resources are mobilized from across the Nation to assist the local Corps district. As 

part of this mission, the Corps has more than 50 specially-trained 

response teams, supported by contracting, to perform the wide 

range of missions that I just described. 

On the 25th of August, 2017, Category 4 Hurricane Harvey made 

landfall near Rockport, Texas. Large amounts of rainfall fell across 

southeastern coastal Texas, causing record flooding. FEMA tasked 

27 total mission assignments totaling $126 million to the Corps to 

assist in Harvey response and recovery efforts. Since August 22, 

2017, nearly 1,000 Corps personnel have deployed to support response and recovery efforts. Currently, 78 Corps employees are deployed supporting 11 active recovery mission assignments. Active 

mission assignments currently total $39 million, and we are expected to complete them no later than the end of June. 

In our housing mission, in 31 of the disaster-impacted Texas 

counties, we have responded to 3,100 applicants that are approved 

for FEMA Temporary Housing Assistance to date. We have inspected approximately 400 haul-and-install unit installations, and 

certified approximately 150 mobile housing units as ready for occupancy each week. To date, the Corps has assessed over 3,300 private sites and over 1,200 commercial sites. The Corps assessed 

more than 330 potential group sites and completed the construction 

or improvements to one existing group site. 

Corps subject-matter experts continue to provide State and county officials with technical assistance for debris removal and disposal. 

The Corps installed a temporary school and a city hall, and we 

are currently installing a volunteer fire department and an additional temporary school. 

17 

We provided over 1 million sandbags to local governments, and 

we are currently designing repairs to three flood damage reduction 

projects, and assessing seven more impacted by Harvey. 

The Galveston District is tasked with maintaining over 1,000 

miles of Federally-authorized navigation channels in Texas. We accomplish this through our hydrographic surveys and maintenance 

dredging. 

In a normal year we dredge more than 25 million cubic yards of 

sediment accumulation, known as shoaling. An additional 9 million 

cubic yards of shoaling have been identified post-Harvey so far. 

Harvey impacted nearly all of the Nation’s navigation projects 

within the Galveston District’s area of responsibility. We are an active member of the Gulf Coast Joint Hurricane Response Team 

since its inception in 2005. This team, in advance of each hurricane 

season, conducts monthly meetings to prepare for navigation impacts due to coastal storms. 

Within days of Hurricane Harvey’s landfall, we had mobilized 

more than 15 dredges and 24 hydrographic survey vessels to ensure that we could rapidly survey and restore navigation to the 

coast of Texas. A few channel restrictions persist today, some within the upper reaches of the Houston Ship Channel and currently 

at the Port of Brownsville Entrance Channel. 

The Galveston District has partnered with the Harris County 

Flood Control District since the 1930’s on reducing risks in the 

Houston area. Before Harvey reached the Houston area, the District deployed staff to the Addicks and Barker Reservoir Dams for 

24-hour-a-day condition inspections. The dams were operated in accordance with the Water Control Manual during Harvey, which 

was an episodic, record-breaking rainstorm event that dropped approximately 36 inches of rain within the Addicks and Barker watersheds, and as much as 51 inches of rain in locations across the 

Houston region. The Addicks and Barker Dams structures performed as designed during the event. The District also embedded 

members of its staff in regional Emergency Management Centers 

during Harvey to communicate the risk with those agencies, the 

media, and the public. 

In addition to the Buffalo Bayou and Tributaries, also known as 

the Addicks and Barker Dams flood risk reduction projects, the 

Corps has or is partnering with the Harris County Flood Control 

District on a number of additional flood damage reduction projects. 

The District and Harris County Flood Control District physically 

completed construction of the Sims Bayou project in July 2016. 

While the project did incur some erosion damage, no flooding of 

structures occurred along Sims Bayou during Harvey. The Greens 

Bayou Flood Risk Management Project is currently under construction and is scheduled for completion in 2020. The Corps has also 

reimbursed Harris County Flood Control District for its completed 

increments of work along the Brays Bayou project. 

For the path forward, in response to a 2013 dam safety modification study, the District is currently constructing new outlet structures and outlet channels at both the Addicks and Barker Dams. 

This current construction project is scheduled for completion in 

April 2020. Additional studies to analyze the needs for rehabilitation of the Addicks and Barker spillways and the return flow 

18 

ditches of the existing authorized project, and also to assess the potential for additional nonstructural or structural measures to reduce the risks of flooding in the vicinity of Addicks and Barker reservoirs, or to develop tools to identify best practices in flood plain 

management are also contemplated. The Corps continues to partner closely and discuss current and future opportunities with Federal, State, and local partners. 

The Corps remains fully committed and capable of executing its 

civil works activities across the Nation despite our heavy involvement in these on-going response and recovery operations due to 

Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. We also remain ready and 

poised to assist in future incidents as they may occur. 

This concludes my testimony, and I look forward to answering 

your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Colonel Zetterstrom follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LARS N. ZETTERSTROM

APRIL 9, 2018 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the committee: I am honored to testify before you today to discuss the authorities and responsibilities of the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers (Corps) during disaster response and recovery operations, focusing on Hurricane Harvey and its impacts to the Houston, Texas area. I am Colonel 

Lars Zetterstrom, Commander, Corps Galveston District. 

The Corps conducts its emergency response and recovery activities under two 

basic authorities: The Stafford Disaster and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford 

Act); and Public Law 84–99 Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies, 33 U.S.C. 701n, 

as amended (Pub. L. 84–99). Under the Stafford Act, we and other Federal agencies 

support the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the National 

Response and Recovery Framework. In this capacity, the Corps is the lead Federal 

agency for Emergency Support Function 3 (Public Works and Engineering), and Recovery Support Function (RSF)—Infrastructure Systems but works under the Federal Coordinating Officer’s (FCO) direction. ESF–3 provides temporary emergency 

power, temporary roofing, debris management, emergency infrastructure assessment, critical public facility restoration, temporary housing, demolition/structural 

stabilization, and support to FEMA command and control Nodes/ESF–3. The Infrastructure Systems RSF works to efficiently facilitate the restoration of infrastructure systems and services to support a viable, sustainable community and improves 

resilience to and protection form future hazards. Under Pub. L. 84–99, we prepare 

for disasters through planning, coordination, and training with local, State, Federal 

partners. The Corps can also assist State and local entities in flood fight operations 

or through implementation of advance measures to prevent/reduce storm incident 

damages. After the emergency incident, Pub. L. 84–99 authorizes the Corps to repair damage to Federal flood infrastructure projects, and work with States/municipalities to rehabilitate and restore eligible non-Federal flood infrastructure to prestorm conditions. 

When disasters occur, Corps teams and other resources are mobilized from across 

the country to assist the local Corps districts that are responding to the incident. 

As part of this mission, the Corps has more than 50 specially-trained response 

teams, supported by emergency contracts, to perform the wide range of public works 

and engineering-related support missions I just described. Additionally, the Corps 

uses pre-awarded contracts that can be quickly activated for missions such as debris 

removal, temporary roofing, generator installation, and dredging. 

2017 Hurricane Season.—With regard to hurricane activity, 2017 was an unusually active season. The Corps was, and continues to be, involved in the FEMA-led 

Federal response and recovery operations in support of multiple incidents, including 

Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. 

Hurricane Harvey.—On August 25, 2017, Category 4 Hurricane Harvey made 

landfall along the central Texas coast near Rockport, Texas, between Port Aransas 

and Port O’Connor and the President approved a Major Disaster Declaration for 

Texas. Large amounts of rainfall fell across the greater Houston metropolitan area 

causing record flooding. FEMA tasked 27 total mission assignments totaling $126 

million to the Corps to assist in Hurricane Harvey response and recovery efforts. 

19 

Since August 22, 2017, nearly 1,000 Corps personnel have been deployed to support 

response and recovery efforts. Currently, 120 Corps employees are deployed supporting 11 active recovery mission assignments. Active mission assignments total 

$39 million and are expected to be completed no later than June 30, 2018. 

Temporary Emergency Power.—The Corps completed its temporary emergency 

power mission assignment in Texas by completing 45 generator installations. 

Temporary Housing.—In the 31 disaster-impacted Texas counties, more than 

3,100 applicants are approved for FEMA Direct Temporary Housing Assistance to 

date. The Corps is inspecting approximately 400 haul and install unit installations 

a day and certifying approximately 150 mobile housing units as ready for occupancy 

per week. To date, the Corps has assessed over 3,300 private sites (homeowner property) and over 1,200 commercial mobile home parks. In addition to installing units 

on individual home sites, the Corps assessed more than 330 potential group site locations and completed construction of improvements to an existing group site. 

Debris Management Oversight.—Debris teams led by Corps subject-matter experts 

continue to provide State and county officials with technical assistance in defining 

requirements and monitoring debris removal and disposal operations in 10 counties. 

Critical Public Facilities.—The construction of critical public facilities temporary 

buildings are still on-going. The Corps was assigned a mission to construct four public facilities—installation of two temporary schools, a city hall and a volunteer fire 

department. Two of these facilities have been completed and two are on-going. 

Pub. L. 84–99 Assistance.—In anticipation of Harvey’s landfall the Corps increased its flood fight supplies from 500 thousand to 2 million on hand including 

sandbags and sand barriers. The Corps provided over 1 million sandbags to local 

governments for Hurricane Harvey. The Corps is currently designing repairs for 

three flood damage reduction projects damaged during Harvey and assessing seven 

additional projects for repairs. 

Navigation Restoration.—The Galveston District is tasked with monitoring and 

maintaining over 1,000 miles of Federally-authorized navigation channels located 

within the Texas Coast. Sediment is naturally and continually deposited within 

these channels. The Galveston District monitors these channels through hydrographic surveys, and performs maintenance of these channels by removing sediment 

through maintenance dredging. 

In a normal year, the Galveston District removes approximately 25 million cubic 

yards of regularly recurring sediment accumulation (or shoaling) from Federally-authorized navigation channels, most of which results from normal tidal fluctuations, 

river flows, wave energies, and similar phenomena. This year, an additional 9 million cubic yards of shoaling—over one-third of the average annual requirement— 

was observed within Coastal Texas as a result of Hurricane Harvey. The storm was 

unique in that Harvey affected the majority of the 400 miles of the Texas Coast, 

and impacted nearly all of the navigation projects within the Galveston District’s 

area of responsibility. 

Galveston District staff was prepared to respond to Hurricane Harvey in part because the district has been an active member of the Gulf Coast Joint Hurricane Response Team since its inception in 2005. This team consists of representatives from 

Federal, State, and local agencies that share roles in ensuring that maritime commerce and military vessels are provided safe access to gulf coast port facilities. 

Members include the United States Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, local Port Authorities, pilots associations, and the 

brownwater (tug) industry. In advance of each hurricane season, the team meets to 

discuss protocols and conduct monthly dry-run exercises, which simulate hurricanes 

entering the Gulf of Mexico. 

Within days of Hurricane Harvey’s landfall, the Galveston District had mobilized 

15 pieces of dredging equipment to areas most affected by hurricane-related 

shoaling. At the peak of the assessment phase, the Galveston District was managing 

24 hydrographic survey vessels, and was able to perform assessment surveys of 95 

percent of the high and moderate use channels within 2 weeks of Hurricane Harvey’s landfall. 

The majority of draft restrictions were alleviated through maintenance dredging 

within the first 90 days of response efforts. However, Harvey-related dredging operations are still on-going. A few channel restrictions persist, mostly within the upper 

reaches of the Houston Ship Channel. Repairs to dredged material placement areas 

and shoreline erosion are anticipated to commence in late fiscal year 2018 and extend through fiscal year 2019. 

To date, The Galveston District has received approximately $65 million to address 

navigation damages from Hurricane Harvey. 

20 

Flood Risk Management.—The Galveston District has partnered with the Harris 

County Flood Control District (HCFCD) since the 1930’s on reducing flood risks in 

the Houston area. 

Before Hurricane Harvey reached the Houston area, the District deployed staff to 

the Addicks and Barker (A&B) Reservoir Dams for 24 hrs/day condition inspections. 

The A&B dams were operated according to the Water Control Manual during Hurricane Harvey, which was an episodic, record-breaking rainstorm incident. It dropped 

approximately 36 inches of rain in the A&B watersheds, and as much as 51 inches 

in locations across the Houston region. The A&B Dams structures performed as designed during the incident. The District also deployed members of its staff to regional Emergency Management Centers in Houston during Harvey to communicate 

the risk of A&B Dam operations with agencies, media, and public, as conditions unfolded. 

In addition to the Buffalo Bayou and Tributaries (Addicks and Barker Dams) flood 

damage reduction project, the Corps has or is partnering with the HCFCD on the 

construction of three additional flood damage reduction projects. Each of these 

projects performed as designed to reduce flood risk during Hurricane Harvey. The 

District and HCFCD physically completed construction of the Sims Bayou project in 

July 2016. While the project did incur erosion damage, no flooding of structures occurred along Sims Bayou during Harvey. The Greens Bayou was funded to completion in 2016 and mitigation work is scheduled to complete in 2020. The Corps has 

also reimbursed HCFCD for completed construction on the Brays Bayou project. 

Path Forward.—In response to a 2013 dam safety modification study, the District 

is constructing a new outlet structure, parabolic spillway, stilling basin, and outlet 

channels and grouting and abandoning the existing outlet structure at both the 

A&B. This action is under way after completing a dam safety modification study in 

2012. The current construction work is scheduled for completion in April 2020. Additional studies to analyze the needs for rehabilitation of the A&B spillway structures 

and return flow ditches of the existing authorized project, to assess the potential for 

additional non-structural or structural measures to reduce the risks of flooding in 

the vicinity of A&B reservoirs, and/or to develop tools to identify best practices in 

flood plain management may be warranted. The Corps continues to discuss current 

and potential future efforts with the HCFCD. 

The Corps remains fully committed and capable of executing its other Civil Works 

activities across the Nation despite our heavy involvement in these on-going response and recovery operations. We also remain ready and poised to assist in future 

incidents as they may occur. This concludes my testimony and I look forward to answering any questions you might have. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, Colonel. 

The Chair recognizes Ms. Van Duyne. 

STATEMENT OF BETH VAN DUYNE, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR, REGION VI, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND 

URBAN DEVELOPMENT (HUD) 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman McCaul, 

Ranking Member Thompson, and Congress Members, thank you for 

inviting the Department of Housing and Urban Development to 

discuss our efforts to assist the people of Texas recover from Hurricane Harvey. 

There has been exceptional collaboration, cooperation, and communications between HUD and FEMA, the Governor’s Office, the 

Texas General Land Office, the Governor’s Commission to Rebuild 

Texas, and other Federal and local partners. 

In the response phase of a disaster, FEMA is the Federal agency 

responsible for providing emergency short-term housing assistance. 

During this phase, HUD staff has worked tirelessly with FEMA to 

rapidly re-house Texans, many of whom lost everything. Nearly 

100 HUD employees from across the country volunteered to help 

Texas families deployed to FEMA’s joint field office, emergency 

shelters, and disaster recovery centers. Working together, they 

21 

managed to secure temporary and, in many cases, permanent housing for survivors. 

Immediately after a Presidentially-declared disaster, HUD offers 

flexibilities to assist the urgent needs of affected families. These include providing State and local governments the ability to redirect 

their existing block grant assistance to meet the urgent needs of 

their citizens, simplifying the notification process for regulatory 

waivers aimed at cutting red tape in the recovery process. For example, HUD reduced the comment period on certain formula funding from 30 days to 7, suspended rules to allow CDBG grantees to 

replace affordable housing units, and allowed grantees to pay for 

additional support services. 

Immediately following the declaration, HUD also issued a 90-day 

foreclosure moratorium for homeowners with mortgages insured by 

the Federal Housing Administration. FHA subsequently extended 

this moratorium until February 21, and even introduced a new option to help struggling homeowners remain in their homes through 

an interest-free second loan covering up to 12 months of missed 

payments. 

All of this is done to give borrowers the breathing room they 

need to stay in their homes and begin to rebuild. 

HUD created a long-term recovery strike team last November to 

stimulate and augment the recovery planning in smaller areas like 

Rockport, Port Arthur, and Newton, which were severely impacted 

by Harvey. The concept was simple: Reach out to these communities, cut red tape, and help them put together plans and leverage 

available resources based on their needs and priorities. HUD did 

not ask them to travel to Austin or to the District of Columbia; we 

went to them. 

The strike team brought together leaders from other Federal 

agencies including HUD, FEMA, SBA, USDA, along with the GLO 

disaster recovery staff and emergency management officials from 

the State and local partners to identify Federal and State resources 

and share best practices to empower local leaders to immediately 

begin to plan the long-term recovery of their communities. 

At some point following a major disaster, response gives way to 

recovery, and it is during the disaster recovery phase when HUD 

plays a more direct role. HUD’s primary disaster assistance, the 

Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Grant, is 

designed to address unmet needs as communities work toward 

their long-term recovery strategies. 

In September, President Trump signed legislation that appropriates $7.4 billion through HUD’s CDBGDR program. HUD 

promptly allocated $5 billion of these funds to the State of Texas 

to help hard-hit areas recover, and an additional $58 million remaining from a prior appropriation. In allocating CDBGDR funds, 

HUD relies on information from FEMA and SBA and the number 

of seriously damaged homes that lack insurance and businesses 

that fail to qualify for SBA’s disaster loan program. 

CDBGDR grants support a wide variety of activities, including 

housing redevelopment, business assistance, and repair of damaged 

infrastructure. Unfortunately, Texas is no stranger to natural disasters, and that means that the State, through the GLO, has considerable expertise in administering CDBGDR. 

22 

The GLO submitted a plan for the $58 million and is currently 

preparing an action plan for the $5 billion that will be informed by 

comments from Texas citizens. Once finalized, this plan will be 

submitted to HUD for review. HUD will expedite its review and 

plan to ensure the funds are put to work on behalf of the people 

as quickly as possible. 

In February, President Trump signed a budget agreement with 

an additional $28 billion to support long-term recovery in areas impacted by disasters in 2017, as well as mitigation investments in 

areas that experienced disasters dating back to 2015. This week, 

HUD will announce an allocation of disaster recovery funds consistent with statutory directives. Texas will share in this funding 

based on the Department’s analysis of unmet housing, business, 

and infrastructure needs. 

In closing, our prayers continue to be with those families and individuals still recovering from these devastating hurricanes. HUD 

will continue to work with Congress and alongside local partners 

to ensure that the long-term housing recovery needs of the people 

of Texas are met. 

I thank you for the opportunity to be here today to represent 

HUD. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to answer any questions 

you or the other Members may have at this time. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Van Duyne follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BETH VAN DUYNE

APRIL 9, 2018 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of this committee, 

thank you for inviting the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 

to discuss our efforts to assist the people of Texas recover from Hurricane Harvey. 

Before Harvey even made landfall, HUD’s Washington and Texas offices were 

working with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Governor 

Greg Abbott’s office on response and recovery preparation. HUD staff was immediately sent to FEMA’s Regional Office in Denton, Texas, and then to its Joint Field 

Office in Austin to coordinate efforts with Federal, State, and local partners. 

There has been exemplary collaboration, cooperation, and communications between HUD and FEMA, the Governor’s office, the Texas General Land Office (GLO), 

and other Federal and local partners. HUD is in constant contact with Governor Abbott, GLO Commissioner George Bush, FEMA field coordinating officer Kevin 

Hannes, senior deputy director of GLO’s Community and Revitalization Office Pete 

Phillips, and chair of the Governor’s Commission to Rebuild Texas John Sharpe. 

HUD’S INITIAL RESPONSE

In the response phase of a disaster, FEMA, not HUD, is the Federal agency responsible for providing emergency, short-term housing assistance through its Individual Assistance (IA) and Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA) programs. 

HUD’s primary disaster assistance, the Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery (CDBG–DR) grant, is intended to facilitate long-term recovery needs 

after all other disaster assistance—from FEMA, the Small Business Administration 

(SBA), other Federal agencies, the National Flood Insurance Program, and private 

insurers—has been exhausted. CDBG–DR funds are designed to address unmet 

needs as communities work toward their long-term recovery strategies. 

However, there are steps HUD can and did take in the wake of Hurricane Harvey. 

Immediately after a Presidentially-declared major disaster, HUD offers States and 

local governments, homeowners, public housing authorities, and private owners of 

HUD assisted housing certain program flexibilities to assist the urgent needs of 

families impacted by the disaster. 

Some of those flexibilities include: 

• Providing State and local units of government the ability to redirect their existing block grant assistance to meet the urgent needs of their citizens; 

23 

• Offering and simplifying the notification process for 19 regulatory and administrative waivers aimed at cutting red tape in the disaster recovery process. For 

example, HUD reduced red tape by reducing the comment period on certain 

HUD formula funding from 30 days to 7 days, suspending rules to allow CDBG 

grantees to replace affordable housing units that were lost as a result of the 

hurricanes and flooding, suspending the cap limiting CDBG expenditures for 

public services to 15 percent, and allowing CDBG grantees to pay for additional 

support services for individuals and families affected by the hurricanes; and 

• Immediately issuing a 90-day foreclosure moratorium for homeowners with 

mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). FHA subsequently extended this moratorium until February 21, 2018, and even introduced 

a new option to help struggling homeowners remain in their homes through an 

interest-free second loan covering up to 12 months of missed payments. All of 

this is done to give borrowers the breathing room they need to stay in their 

homes and begin to rebuild. 

The work of HUD’s staff has been commendable. They worked tirelessly with 

FEMA to rapidly rehouse Texans, many of whom lost everything. Working together, 

they managed to secure temporary—and, in many cases, permanent—housing for 

survivors. 

Moreover, nearly 100 HUD employees from other parts of the country volunteered 

to help Texas families, deploying to FEMA’s Joint Field Office, emergency shelters, 

and Disaster Recovery Centers. 

HUD played an integral role in initial response and recovery and will continue 

to support, along with the help of Congress, the people of Texas through the longterm recovery process. 

DISASTER STRIKE TEAM

HUD created a Federal/State Long-Term Recovery Strike Team last November to 

support the long-term planning needs of smaller, more rural areas severely impacted by Harvey. The concept was simple: Reach out to these communities, cut red 

tape, and get them help. HUD did not ask that they travel to Austin or Fort 

Worth—HUD went to them. The strike team brought together top leaders from 

other Federal agencies, along with disaster recovery staff and emergency management officials from the State, with local partners to raise awareness of available 

Federal resources and share best practices. 

LONG-TERM DISASTER RECOVERY

Mr. Chairman, at some point following a major disaster like Harvey, response 

must give way to recovery. It is during the disaster recovery phase when HUD plays 

a larger, more direct role, as the Coordinating Agency for the Housing Recovery 

Support Function (RSF). 

On September 8, 2017, President Trump signed legislation that appropriated $7.4 

billion through HUD’s CDBG–DR program. HUD promptly allocated $5 billion of 

these funds to the State of Texas to help hard-hit areas recover. 

In allocating CDBG–DR funds, HUD relies on information from FEMA and the 

Small Business Administration (SBA) on the number of seriously-damaged homes 

that lack insurance and businesses that failed to qualify for SBA’s disaster loan program. HUD’s analysis found approximately 65,000 which had serious damage that 

was not covered by other funding sources. Similarly, more than 4,000 businesses 

suffered serious damage from flooding that was not covered by insurance or other 

resources. 

CDBG–DR grants support a wide variety of activities including housing redevelopment, business assistance, and repair of damaged infrastructure. Congress directed 

HUD to make these funds available for residents in the ‘‘most impacted and distressed’’ areas in the State. In early February, HUD published a notice identifying 

these hard-hit areas requiring that 80 percent of the $5 billion be targeted to 16 

East Texas counties: Harris, Jefferson, Orange, Galveston, Fort Bend, Brazoria, 

Montgomery, Liberty, Hardin, Chambers, Aransas, Wharton, San Patricio, San 

Jacinto, Nueces, and Victoria, and 11 Zip Codes with relatively concentrated damage. 

In addition, HUD staff contacted hundreds of local public housing authorities 

throughout Texas and private owners of HUD assisted multifamily rental housing 

to determine their damage and continues to work with the public housing authorities and private owners to rebuild these affordable rental housing units. HUD is 

committed to working with State, local, and private-sector partners to address the 

unmet housing needs of all families including individuals with disabilities. 

24 

RECOVERY PLANNING

Unfortunately, Texas is no stranger to natural disasters, and that means the 

State, through the GLO, has considerable expertise in administering CDBG–DR. 

To date, HUD made two CDBG–DR allocations to the State in response to Harvey—the $5 billion previously mentioned and an additional $58 million remaining 

from a prior appropriation. The GLO submitted a plan for the $58 million and is 

currently preparing an action plan for the $5 billion that will be informed by public 

comments received from Texas citizens. Once finalized, this plan will be submitted 

to HUD for review. HUD will expedite its review and approval of these plans to ensure the funds are put to work on behalf of the people as quickly as possible. 

In February, President Trump signed a budget agreement that included $28 billion in CDBG–DR funding to support long-term recovery in areas impacted by disasters in 2017, as well as mitigation investments in areas that experienced disasters 

dating back to 2015. Congress directed HUD to allocate these funds quickly and 

that is precisely what HUD intends to do. Very shortly, HUD will announce an allocation of disaster recovery funds consistent with statutory directives. Texas will 

share in this funding based on the Department’s analysis of unmet housing, business, and infrastructure needs. 

In closing, our prayers continue to be with those families and individuals still recovering from these devastating hurricanes. HUD will continue to work with Congress and alongside local partners to ensure the long-term housing recovery needs 

of the people of Texas are met. I thank you for the opportunity to be here on behalf 

of HUD today Mr. Chairman, and I would be more than happy to answer any questions you or the committee Members may have at this time. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, Ms. Van Duyne. 

The Chair recognizes himself for questions. 

Before I begin, I do want to say this was one of the best recovery 

efforts I have witnessed. The picture on the far right side there embodies that effort. It has a Department of Public Safety official, an 

active-duty Special Forces, a Coast Guardsman, a Texas Guardsman, all working together in the same boat with the American flag 

in this area to save lives. So I want to thank everybody in the room 

responsible for that. 

Now we are in the recovery/rebuilding phase, which includes, in 

my judgment, flood mitigation, as the FEMA Director mentioned. 

I want to refer to this map. This goes back to 1940. The Army 

Corps of Engineers produced this map that created the Barker and 

Addicks Reservoir, but it also addressed another issue that they 

recognized was a problem or an issue back in 1940, and it was the 

Cypress Creek, which is outlined in the red there. At the time, that 

point in time, they recommended that a levee system be built to 

contain further flooding into Barker and Addicks. 

[The information follows:] 

25 

Chairman MCCAUL. What happened in Hurricane Harvey? I 

think it is very instructive, looking at this map, because when Hurricane Harvey hit, we had a watershed moment, a watershed waterfall moment, from Cypress Creek into Barker and Addicks, into 

Buffalo Bayou, and into downtown Houston. 

So as we look at flood mitigation projects, we have had three 

floods in 2 years. I can’t think of anything more important. In fact, 

it is my highest priority to build that third reservoir that should 

have been built a long time ago in the Cypress Creek area. 

As I talked to the Governor, Governor Abbott, he tells me it is 

his highest priority as well for the greater Houston area. 

So, Colonel, you and I have talked about this, but can you describe and explain to me where we are in the process of building 

this third reservoir? 

Colonel ZETTERSTROM. So currently, Chairman, we are in the 

process of proposing to conduct a 216 study that is authorized 

under Award 86 to be able to evaluate existing flood control 

projects to determine any impacts and any environmental changes 

associated with that project. As you are aware, for the Corps to undertake any type of activity, we need to have authority, appropriations, and a non-Federal sponsor. In this case we have a non-Federal sponsor, the Harris County Flood Control District, that has expressed their intent to partner with the Corps, and we have the authority to be able to conduct this study. Certainly, Congress has appropriated $17 billion additional in the bipartisan budget act. At 

this time, headquarters, assistant secretary of the Army for Civil 

Works and Administration, are determining what studies and 

projects will be allocated to funding by that bipartisan budget act. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, and you are correct. We appropriated $132 billion in the three supplementals to assist in this reVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:30 Aug 17, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18FL0409\18FL0409 HEATH

h:\seals\1155316.eps
26 

covery and rebuilding effort, and it was the intent of Congress to 

include flood mitigation projects in that appropriations bill. 

I know the first step is a study. But again, there is a sense of 

an emergency here, a feeling of an emergency in this area, the 

third time in 2 years that this has happened. So can you tell me 

where is the study in the process, and how long will that study 

take? Then how soon can we expect this reservoir to be built for 

the people of Texas? 

Colonel ZETTERSTROM. First I would like to just highlight that 

the original third reservoir was in Wide Oak. As your diagram depicted, the area that was highlighted was a levee structure that 

was envisioned to prevent water from jumping the Cypress Creek 

Watershed into the Addicks Watershed. So the modern third reservoir really would potentially be a modification of a plan called 

Plan 5, which was initially studied by a study that was funded by 

the Texas Water Development Board and the Harris County Flood 

Control District. 

That study really was looked at localized retention and wasn’t 

envisioned to have a systems beneficial impact outside of the Cypress Creek Watershed. So we really need to evaluate the third 

reservoir to determine if it is the best alternative to be able to account for the dynamic that you described where water flows from 

the Cypress Creek Watershed into Addicks and Barker Watershed, 

and to evaluate all the other various alternatives that could potentially be studied and evaluated and proposed as future alternatives, 

and to then present to Congress in a report for potential authorization by a future Water Resources Development Act. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I know there is some expedited language in 

the supplemental, but moving forward—I am not an engineer, but 

I know from my constituents what happened in Hurricane Harvey, 

and I also know that it flooded the Barker and Addicks Reservoirs, 

after which there was a controlled release into the neighborhoods 

below. That was on Monday, August 28, and I heard this a lot— 

it happened at 1:30 in the morning. 

I know there are 2 p.m., every afternoon there are conference 

calls. Can you explain to these residents why such little advanced 

notice was given when a controlled release dumped all this water 

into the neighborhood? Especially, couldn’t this have been foreseen 

earlier where notification could have been given more in advance 

and in the daytime? 

Colonel ZETTERSTROM. OK. I would like to describe the process 

that we used with the local governments to share information, in 

association with the Addicks and Barker Dams and Reservoirs. 

For recollection, on the 24th of August, Hurricane Harvey was 

still out over the Gulf. It did not make landfall until late in the 

evening on the 25th of August, and didn’t reach the Houston area 

until the 26th of August. We began communicating and sharing information with our local partners on the 24th of August. We conducted our first Addicks and Barker emergency coordination team 

call and provided the modeling conducted for the Addicks and 

Barker Reservoirs with our partners on the 25th of August, and 

then continued to share that information throughout the entire 

storm. 

27 

We also embedded liaisons with city, county, and State emergency operation centers to ensure that we were sharing information 

as seamlessly as possible. 

Chairman MCCAUL. My time has expired. We are going to hear 

testimony from the Mayor of Houston after this panel, and we may 

hear a different version of that story; I don’t know. But I know this 

is a matter that is under investigation, and we will see how that 

plays out. But I know that a lot of residents were very upset with 

that decision at that point in time, and I will work with my Department of Homeland Security partners at FEMA and the Coast 

Guard moving forward with lessons learned, how we can do a better job moving forward, and also how we can streamline the process of FEMA and maybe have some legislative proposals to make 

FEMA work even better after these types of disasters. 

With that, the Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Robinson, are you aware of any outstanding reimbursements 

that units of Government have in your shop relative to this disaster? 

Mr. ROBINSON. Sir, in reference to the public assistance program? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes. 

Mr. ROBINSON. We are working continuously with local governments and non-profits to be able to help with our program delivery 

managers, work through the public assistance program to scope 

their damages. So we are kind-of in that phase right now. We have 

gone out and done some advance funding for their emergency protective measures. The debris removal operations are now working 

toward those permanent work projects, working with them to develop the scope of the damages and cost estimates on those. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So you are aware. 

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Is it your testimony that those reimbursements 

are not, in your mind, outstanding, that they are just normal? 

Mr. ROBINSON. The process of how the public assistance programs work, we are still working on some of those scopes of work, 

collecting documentation. We have advanced some funds to be able 

to take care of the most immediate needs. On the permanent work, 

some of that process is just now starting. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So have you shared that information with those 

units of Government that they could get advanced monies for this? 

Mr. ROBINSON. Working with the State of Texas, we have advance money. We have regularly scheduled calls and meetings with 

local jurisdictions, along with State of Texas and their program delivery managers working at the public assistance program. 

Mr. THOMPSON. FEMA does not do it; the State of Texas is responsible. 

Mr. ROBINSON. We provide the money to the State of Texas, who 

then provides the money to the local governments or non-profits. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So what kind of oversight do you provide the 

State of Texas in terms of making sure that they do this? 

Mr. ROBINSON. We work very closely with them developing that 

scope of work, looking at the cost estimating—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. Oversight. 

28 

Mr. ROBINSON [continuing]. And then the grant management of 

that, of those grants. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So if somebody made a request as to the status 

of any of those requests, you would have information on it? 

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Can you provide the committee the status of that 

information? 

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. Are you aware of the Red Cross 

being a no-show in certain areas during this storm? 

Mr. ROBINSON. Sir, I am not. The Red Cross works directly with 

local governments, and we partner with them on ESF–6, mass 

care, mass response framework. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So it is just your—— 

Mr. ROBINSON. I am not. 

Mr. THOMPSON. You don’t have any information—— 

Mr. ROBINSON. I do not. 

Mr. THOMPSON. OK. Thank you very much. 

Colonel, taking off from what the Chairman talked about on his 

concerns from an after-action standpoint, are there things that you 

think that could have been done differently or better given what 

occurred? 

Colonel ZETTERSTROM. Ranking Member, I think one of the big 

lessons learned was just the fact that the various levels of government and the public partnered very closely to ensure that the impacts of Hurricane Harvey were minimized to the greatest extent 

possible. We have the Addicks and Barker emergency coordination 

team call process. It is a process that we are constantly updating 

with our partners. We will continue to use that process to ensure 

that the appropriate information is shared to ensure that the right 

decisions are being made at the appropriate levels of the government in the future. 

With regard to some other lessons, obviously with navigation and 

restoration, navigation is responsible for more than one-third of 

Texas’ gross domestic product. So we will leverage contracting capability, specifically multiple order task order contracts for both hydrographic surveying, hopper dredging, and we are working on a 

new contract mechanism for pipeline dredging to ensure that we 

can restore navigation back to all of the industry that operates off 

of those navigation channels in Texas. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So is your testimony that, from an after-action 

standpoint, everything worked? 

Colonel ZETTERSTROM. Harvey was an episodic event. It is being 

referred to as the largest rainfall event in the history of the continental United States. We made concerted efforts to ensure that all 

the appropriate information was shared with all of the decision 

makers and the public. I would say that no risk communication 

program is ever perfect, but we did make appropriate notifications, 

and we did provide the information necessary. 

In addition to what I have already described, we leveraged social 

media extensively to communicate directly with the public. We also 

published multiple news releases and press releases, and I deployed my civilian deputy to conduct multiple-times-a-day press 

conferences. 

29 

Mr. THOMPSON. I understand what you did. I am saying that 

looking at it after the fact. The only thing I will ask you to do is 

if you have anything in writing relative to your review of what the 

Corps’ mission was in this respect, that you think you need to do 

better, would you provide it to the committee? 

Colonel ZETTERSTROM. Yes, Ranking Member. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 

Nebraska, General Bacon. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you, and thank all four of you for being here, 

and thanks to your organizations for working hard for fellow citizens in a crisis emergency situation. 

The data I heard this morning, 5 feet of rain in many places, 6 

feet in some—I mean, that is just a tremendous amount and just 

puts in perspective the emergency this whole area encountered. So 

I thank you all for—to your organizations for the work you did. 

My first question is, if all four of you could think about a shortcoming or two that you encountered, whether it was in your planning, maybe resources, and just share it with us up here, and what 

have you done to alleviate, perhaps, those shortcomings. 

We will start off with the Director. Thank you. 

Mr. ROBINSON. Thanks. So, a couple of things. I think Administrator Long, when he was here, unveiled the strategic plan, and I 

think it is really spot-on, that this can’t just be FEMA’s strategic 

plan but it has to really be adopted by the whole community, because it really does have to focus the emergency management community, and that starts with the private citizen. So how do we 

build a culture of preparedness? Because what we have seen here 

is Texans helping Texans, and that really is the culture of preparedness we need to build. 

How do we get in the schools’ basic first aid so that you can put 

a tourniquet on somebody, you can stop the bleeding, you can open 

an airway, you know how to make a calm and collected 9–1–1 call 

with the right information to get the responders there quickly, and 

then continue to build that on the community level as we move forward? I think that is first and foremost. 

Then, how do we ready the Nation for catastrophic events? So 

what you have heard here, it is about partnerships, not only at this 

table at the Federal level but at the local, State, and Federal level, 

with our private sector and our volunteer agencies all have to work 

together. 

Then finally, reducing the complexity of the FEMA programs, 

how do we work together and continue to learn from this event so 

that we reduce the complexity of our programs? 

Mr. BACON. Because rest assured, we will have to do this again 

somewhere, so we want to build on it. 

Admiral Thomas. 

Admiral THOMAS. Congressman, thank you for the question. I 

know that you know from your Air Force time that when a military 

organization undertakes an operation like this, we follow it up with 

a comprehensive lessons learned, and we developed literally hundreds of tactical lessons learned and dozens at the strategic level. 

30 

I will touch on just a few that are really important to me as an 

operational commander. 

In the Coast Guard, we were not ready for the 9–1–1 system to 

essentially become overwhelmed and for those calls to roll over to 

our operation center here in Houston, in my office in New Orleans, 

in Norfolk, and our headquarters in Washington, DC. So we are 

working hard to make sure we are ready for that to happen again, 

if it does. We were not ready to dispatch those calls and to track 

the resources that we dispatched. We are working hard to do that. 

We were not ready to take calls for help on social media, and we 

are working hard to fix that. 

Mr. BACON. A new mode of communication we have to build on. 

Admiral THOMAS. Yes, sir. 

One of the key lessons that I really want to highlight to this committee because it is so important, and it is really thanks to your 

efforts that we were able to be successful in Houston because we 

had a facility that was rebuilt, and it was rebuilt to the right 

standards of resiliency. I know, Congressman Jackson Lee, you 

were there with us. Because of that, and despite the rapid rainfall, 

we were able to continue to operate. 

So a lot of lessons learned. For me as an operator, the keys are 

around our urban search-and-rescue mission and the fact that we 

need the right facilities in order to be able to serve the people when 

they need us. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you for your candor. I think it is important 

we always build on lessons learned so we are ready for the next 

one. 

Colonel Zetterstrom. 

Colonel ZETTERSTROM. So, yes, Congressman. I briefly discussed 

our navigation authority. So expanding our contracting capabilities 

certainly is a key lesson learned, to be able to rapidly award new 

contracts or modify existing ones, and also to increase our hydrographic survey capability, and we are proposing to do that in conjunction with other Federal partners like NOAA, to leverage their 

hydrographic survey capability. 

Obviously for flood risk management, there is inherent residual 

risk in any flood risk management project. So when a project is 

constructed, it is never possible to completely ameliorate all the 

risk associated with future flooding. So that remains a challenge, 

the ability to communicate that there is inherently always residual 

risk. It is not flood control or flood prevention, it is flood risk reduction. 

Certainly, our ability to do that as an agency is tied back to our 

authorities and appropriations. The Corps of Engineers Nationwide has $96 billion of authorized but unconstructed civil works 

projects. So our ability to be able to partner with our local partners 

is tied directly to our authorities and our appropriations. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you. When I was a commander, we had a 100- 

year flood in the Missouri, and the Army Corps was very important 

to that. We did 400,000 sandbags, so I appreciate partnering with 

your team. 

Ms. Van Duyne. 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. Thank you very much. I would say, first and 

foremost, it would be wonderful if we could put more education into 

31 

allowing our citizens to know the need for flood insurance. I think 

that would have helped a number of our homeowners that were affected by that. 

I would say No. 2 is trying to get more of our local leaders that 

empowerment that they need to start working on their planning as 

soon as the accident happens, as soon as the disaster happens. 

Having those relationships, having them know exactly who to call 

for questions, would be wonderful. We waited a few months, and 

I think if we had actually gone to some of these areas sooner, their 

plans could have already been in action. 

I think another thing that we need to do is start looking at technology and taking advantage of the opportunities that brand-new 

technology puts into our hands. For example, an Airbnb model and 

having a database of available housing units, and having an app 

that people can go to, I know that Rebuild Texas is working on 

that, and I know that after this disaster we are going to be looking 

at best practices of being able to put more of those things together. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you. 

It looks like I am out of time, so I will yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chair recognizes the gentle lady from 

Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, let me express my deep appreciation for your presence here today, and hopefully I can capture the pain of those who are not able to be here, 

because my community is still in pain and still hurting, and I believe that this hearing hopefully will emphasize their pain and that 

they will have the opportunity to have the engagement of all the 

resources here while they are still suffering from Hurricane Harvey. 

I want to acknowledge how quickly the city of Houston stood up 

a shelter in the immediate moments of Hurricane Harvey when the 

amount of water was not expected. The NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory indicated that there were 275 trillion pounds of water 

which caused the crust in and around Houston to deform and sink 

nearly 1 inch because of the weight. 

Mr. Chairman, I hope at the conclusion of the first panel you will 

allow me to just read some names into the record, probably unheard-of names, who were so crucial in and around our community. 

I think it is important to note that in the midst of our hearing, 

researchers have already indicated that 14 tropical storms are 

going to come in 2018. There will be about seven that will be Category 3 or higher. In 2017, there was a total of 17 tropical storms, 

but only 11 were predicted. I think we have great reason to be concerned today, and also to be prepared, and I think that will be part 

of the line of questioning that I will now proceed with. 

In the waning days of the hurricane, I introduced H.R. 3686 for 

$174 billion to help this region, which I believe still is the amount 

to help us going forward because it will be many years before we 

repair. 

We also introduced H.R. 3990 to help our small businesses, and 

I am hoping that, working with Congressman Brady, that this will 

be a part of our plan submitted to HUD under the block grant distribution. 

32 

We also believe that there needs to be a FEMA modernization 

bill that establishes both response and recovery. Mr. Robinson, I 

will be asking you questions on the recovery that we are dealing 

with right now. 

Most people don’t know the name of Dr. Leroy Gillam, but Dr. 

Gillam was in a parking lot with about 200 people, 50 children that 

were sick who had not had food for over 2 days. An infant was sick 

and vomiting with a fever. There were four Vietnam vets with 

PTSD, and Dr. Gillam himself was a heart patient. We scrambled 

to get him the rescue of the Coast Guard. 

These are many stories that we will not hear. 

Right now, the people that were probably rescued are in hotels, 

and some of them are in apartments. In a meeting that I held on 

March 5, those people came and said they are desperate because 

they believe they will be evicted around April 23 or 28. 

Mr. Robinson, I am asking for an extension. I am asking for a 

response to these people who are frightened and fearful that they 

will have no place to go. Can you help me with that, Mr. Robinson? 

Mr. ROBINSON. Ma’am, we are working with the State of Texas 

for the transition of the shelter assistance program. We do expect 

that they will give us an extension request probably sometime in 

the next week. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Will that include individuals that are in 

apartments, that have been placed in apartments? We are defining 

whether they have been placed by Red Cross or FEMA, but I believe they have been—I think you saw some of them at our hearing. 

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes. If we are looking at if they are in a direct 

lease program, that may be up to 18 months. We are working with 

your office to see if there are any cases that we need to look into. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. 

Let me thank the Admiral for your leadership. Obviously, we 

were having two phones to our ears, trying to work with you, and 

you were rescuing—Dr. Gillam was rescued by dump trucks and 

the Coast Guard. 

What do you need from the command site perspective, from the 

outreach perspective, to be able to get to crisis areas during the 

time of the crisis? 

Admiral THOMAS. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman, 

and thanks again for being there with our crews and helping us 

understand the needs of your constituents while we were trying to 

triage all those calls for help. 

We are very grateful as an organization for the money that we 

have gotten recently in our supplemental that will help us restore 

our readiness and do things like improve our command-and-control 

capability and our ability to work across all the agencies. We will 

continue to work with your office through our staff to let you know 

what our additional needs may be in that regard. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I look forward to it. 

Let me ask Colonel Zetterstrom and Ms. Van Duyne the questions together. 

Thank you, Colonel, for your work. As you well know, this was 

devastating. People are frightened. In a town hall meeting or a 

civic club meeting that I was at, I met one father who reminded 

33 

me of his experience of being in dark and dirty water with his children, unexpectedly having water come in where it had never come 

before, and that even when it rains now, his family panics. That 

is what a lot of people are, panicking in their homes. 

So my question to you following up with Chairman McCaul is the 

question of retention pools, and when will you begin the study that 

so many of us have advocated for and put in legislation for, to 

study how the bayous work, Green Bayou in particular? 

Ms. Van Duyne, we are needing direct payments. I think you are 

well aware of the requests by our county and city governments and 

Members of Congress advocating that direct funding down to the 

city and county so they begin to help people who do not have resources for their houses who are still in disrepair, as it is in northeast Houston, large parts of my district. 

Mr. Zetterstrom, can you answer the retention pool and the 

study, please? 

Colonel ZETTERSTROM. Yes, Congresswoman. So, with regard to 

the study, I described with Chairman McCaul the 216 study. I 

think the study you are referring to is the Greater Regional Watershed Assessment that we have discussed many times. Again, the 

district has expressed the studies and projects that it has determined it thinks it is eligible for consideration under the legislation 

approved by Congress and the bipartisan budget act. 

So every district has communicated those studies and projects 

that they believe are eligible, and currently headquarters and Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, and ultimately the 

administration, are still determining the final allocation of those 

funds to provide to the district so we can begin the great work that 

the Corps does when it is given the resources. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Is that the Army Corps headquarters in 

Washington? Because we really can’t wait. Is that where we need 

to put pressure on, Colonel? 

Colonel ZETTERSTROM. Yes, Congresswoman. But, I mean, the 

Corps is working this initiative as quickly as possible, but this is 

$17 billion, and so certainly we want to ensure that the funds are 

allocated prudently and allocated to the most high-priority requirements. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me just say, we are hurting, and we will 

put the pressure where it needs to be. We thank you for your service. 

Ms. Van Duyne, on the housing direct payments, direct payments 

of community block grant dollars into the county and city governments? 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. I appreciate that, and I want to thank your 

staff, by the way. In the weeks and the months following the hurricane, not only did they participate in all the calls that we had 

when I came to your office to visit them, but they have reached out 

to us with any questions and concerns that they have, and I appreciate that level of communication. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. As you know, we have been in contact with both 

the city of Houston and the county, Harris County, regarding payments. We had a meeting recently in Washington with the GLO’s 

office at those meetings. We are waiting right now for the GLO’s 

34 

office to provide their State plan. They have the ability within the 

State plan to have sub-grantees, which could include the city or the 

county. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, we will be working to make sure that 

we can just maybe—the Texas Land Board Commissioner has been 

very helpful. I want to make that very clear. But I do believe that 

we want just a direct payment from HUD to those counties and cities, with obviously the affirmation of the State and the Texas Land 

Commission. So we will be working with you. We know we are 

working on some matters to get that word to you from Members 

of Congress, and we hope that you can push word back to Washington that they need to move as quickly as possible. There is just 

a long line of people everywhere you go who are living in homes 

that are in disrepair. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I hope I will be able 

to cite these names because we are still very much in pain. Thank 

you so very much. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentlelady yields back. 

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Culberson, is recognized. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I want to thank each one of you for your service to 

the country and the extraordinary efforts that you have put forth 

to help people in Texas, Louisiana, and Florida, and Puerto Rico 

and the Islands, to recover from these terrible storms. 

The most urgent need we face today is to make sure that the 

money that Congress appropriated reaches the people who have 

lost so much. We, each one of us that represent the Houston area, 

have got constituents living on the second floor of their homes with 

all the sheetrock torn out on the ground floor. My brother was living in a driveway—in his trailer in a driveway up until a few 

weeks ago. He is just now back in the house, living upstairs. 

One of our greatest frustrations as Members of Congress is when 

we pass legislation and appropriate money, and we are aiming it 

at disaster recovery, is the length of time that it takes to reach the 

hands of the people who are hurting the most. 

So I am following up on Congressman Lee’s question, because 

she is exactly right, we have a lot of people here who are really 

hurting. 

Administrator Robinson, I wanted to ask about something you 

have authority yourself to do right away, and that is to waive this 

rental assistance problem that we have where if a homeowner’s 

housing costs are less than 30 percent of their monthly income, 

they are denied rental assistance. But the Stafford Act and Disaster Assistance Act that Congress passed many years ago says 

that disaster assistance has to be based on whether you suffered 

a disaster. If you are flooded, you are flooded. 

I represent a lot of folks who are absolutely not wealthy. They 

have all their money tied up in their house. A family, for example, 

of four, with $210,000 in income, has to continue to pay their mortgage on a home that is flooded while they are renting an apartment and they have a number of kids who are going to school in 

that school district. So they have all those costs involved, and they 

are denied rental assistance, and this has happened many times. 

35 

Another individual who is single who has the same income but 

doesn’t have the same costs is granted rental assistance. Now, that 

is a rule that you have the authority to waive. 

When will you waive that rule, and what do we need to do to 

help ensure that that rule is waived so people can get the rental 

assistance they desperately need? 

Mr. ROBINSON. The 30 percent or less, if that is what you are 

paying for housing, current policy doesn’t allow for recertification 

of rental assistance. I was on the call when Governor Abbott and 

yourself met with Administrator Long. We are working right now 

with our headquarters policy and counsel to work through that, 

and we will be following up with you right after this hearing. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Actually, your FEMA rules say that you are not 

going to take income into account. FEMA guidelines say you are 

not supposed to take income into account. The Stafford Act says 

you are not supposed to take income into account. So you are still 

studying about when or how you are going to waive this rule? 

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CULBERSON. OK. That needs to be expedited. Whatever 

needs to happen, we need to get it done right away. I am privileged 

to have—my constituents have given me the time and the seniority 

to become a subcommittee chairman on Appropriations, and we all 

worked together as a team. The Texas delegation worked with the 

Florida delegation to pass these emergency hurricane supplemental 

appropriations bills. They totaled $141 billion. I spearheaded the 

effort in the House. I made sure that we dealt with a lot of things 

in this legislation. In fact, Colonel Zetterstrom, the commanding 

general said this is the largest appropriation for flood mitigation 

repair and rebuilding that he has ever seen. 

So we have a variety of financial tools at our disposal, Mr. Robinson. I really need your help in ensuring that the rental waiver, that 

rental assistance rule is waived so people can get help right away, 

and I will do everything I can to help expedite that. But that has 

to happen just as quickly as possible. 

Ms. Van Duyne, if I could ask about the money that the Congress 

appropriated, there is an additional $5 billion slug of disaster relief 

funding that has been allocated to Texas that is headed our way. 

What needs to happen for that money to be distributed as quickly 

as humanly possible? 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. We are working with the GLO’s office right now 

to make sure that they have their plan in. As you know, Congress 

requires that CBDG funding be provided to the most impacted in 

the distressed areas. Gathering that does take, unfortunately, a little bit of time. But Congress also requires that grantees develop 

plans for the use of those funds. So we are working with the GLO’s 

office to approve their plan. We have cut in time the amount of 

time necessary to review that from 90 days to 45 days. 

Mr. CULBERSON. For public comment. 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. It is our—— 

Mr. CULBERSON. We thank you for that. 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. Not just for public comments but for actually 

HUD’s review. 

Mr. CULBERSON. To review. 

36 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. We have also cut down the public comment period, but that was something requested by the GLO’s office. We are 

expecting that once the action plan has been approved, it will be 

1 to 2 weeks before they can actually start receiving funds. 

Mr. CULBERSON. I know that HUD—for people here in the audience who are from flooded neighborhoods, if they are going to be 

communicating with their neighbors and family members, when 

Congress passes legislation, it authorizes the Treasury to release 

the money, in this case to HUD for the CDBG for disaster relief 

funds, and then the grantee you are referring to is the General 

Land Office. 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. Right. 

Mr. CULBERSON. So you then send the money to the General 

Land Office, and it is up to the General Land Office to distribute 

the money to individual homeowners, correct? 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. Based on the plan that HUD approves, yes. 

Mr. CULBERSON. The GLO is expediting that plan, but they 

haven’t gotten it to you yet. 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. Yes. 

Mr. CULBERSON. That is where they would need the help, do everything we can to encourage Commissioner Bush and the GLO to 

get these plans put together and get them approved by HUD as 

quickly as possible, get money in the hands of people who have 

been injured. 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. Absolutely. 

Mr. CULBERSON. You also have authority at HUD to waive a rule 

that says that 70 percent of those CDBG disaster relief funds have 

to go to low to moderate income. Again, I represent an area of west 

Houston where people have got their entire life savings sunk in 

their home. They are not wealthy, but their homes have been destroyed, and that is their biggest source of equity in their life. I 

have asked—I know the members of the Texas delegation have 

asked that the 70 percent rule be waived. 

What is the status of that waiver request so that 50 percent of 

the money can go to low to moderate income, and the other 50 percent can go to everybody else who has been flooded? 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. At this time we are waiting for the plan to actually come in for applications. So we haven’t received any applications to be able to have any kind of evidence to move that number. 

If, at the time—— 

Mr. CULBERSON. What are you waiting on? 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. We haven’t gotten any applications yet. 

Mr. CULBERSON. From who? 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. We are waiting for the evidence base to be able 

to change that, to say that the 70 percent is not a reasonable 

amount. If at some point in time, when we actually start getting 

applications, we realize that that number is too high and it does 

need to be changed, we can always review that. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Are you waiting on the General Land Office, or 

who? 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. We are waiting on the General Land Office, yes, 

to create their plan, but applications for that money, when it comes 

in. So if there is a need for additional monies beyond the 30 percent of the $5 billion for more than the low to moderate income, 

37 

we will have an opportunity to review that at the time when we 

have data. 

Mr. CULBERSON. We need to work with and encourage Commissioner Bush to get that plan done as quickly as possible. 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. Yes. At this point in time we don’t have any 

data to be able to change that ruling, but that can be revisited. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Another intense source of frustration—and 

thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the extra time—is that there is still 

$5 million sitting around from Hurricane Ike. That is just inexcusable. I mean, things have got to change. I can tell you, as a senior 

member of the Appropriations Committee, I am going to use every 

financial tool at my disposal to light a fire under every bureaucracy 

that I can find that is sitting on this money. It is not acceptable. 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. I understand the $5 million has been allocated 

to projects. It has not been spent. 

Mr. CULBERSON. That is 2008. This is not going to happen on 

Hurricane Harvey. Things are going to change. 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. We have actually put in stop-gaps for that 

which require that the funds, from the time they are actually appropriated and obligated, be spent within 2 years. 

Mr. CULBERSON. OK, and I look forward to working with you on 

that, because I intend to do whatever it takes to light a fire under 

whoever is necessary. 

As a subcommittee chairman on Appropriations, we are sort of 

like the CFO of these agencies, and we have the ability to stop the 

flow of money within the agency, and I do intend to do whatever 

it takes to make sure that people that are hurting get their money 

as quickly as humanly possible. 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. Appreciate that. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, sir. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gene 

Green. 

Mr. GENE GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this 

hearing. I guess in Texas we would call it the shoulda, woulda, 

coulda hearing. Hopefully we learn from this. 

I am a native Houstonian. In the last number of years, we had 

Tropical Storm Allison that dropped 36 inches of rain over north 

and east Houston, Harris County. Of course, we had the tax day 

floods that devastated certain members, and also the Memorial 

Day floods. 

But in 2001 we had Allison, in 2008 we had Ike, and here we 

have Harvey, and it seems like every 7 years the Lord blesses us 

with these catastrophic events, and we need to do better in responding. 

My first question for FEMA, the decision to go to the State to get 

the GLO involved in it, I served 20 years in the legislature in the 

1970’s and 1980’s, and I never knew the State land office to have 

any kind of disaster experience. Why the decision this time? Because that didn’t happen in Ike, it didn’t happen in Allison, to go 

to the General Land Office. 

Mr. ROBINSON. Sir, I think we looked at the 2016 floods and the 

experience we had in Louisiana and we felt, as the Administrator 

said, that providing the option where these events are locally-exeVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:30 Aug 17, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18FL0409\18FL0409 HEATH
38 

cuted, State-managed, and Federally-supported makes a lot of 

sense, because a one-size-fits-all doesn’t fit communities, and it certainly wouldn’t fit an area 41,000 square feet with different demographics. 

So we went to the State, asked them. The General Land Office 

has a lot of experience with HUD Community Development Block 

Grants, so they partnered with us to deliver housing programs 

jointly so that we did that together. 

Mr. GENE GREEN. I know from the next panel, the mayor and the 

county commissioners, I don’t remember the State land office having any interface at all with local governments on a regular basis, 

much less all of a sudden in a disaster doing that. That is why I 

think if you have a relationship with the city of Houston or anyone 

in CDBG, with HUD, if you send that money to the county or the 

city, and this is a disaster, I don’t see why we would get the State 

involved, because the State, as you know, is having trouble getting 

their plans together and is keeping that money from getting to the 

local community who has a regular way that they deal with their 

constituents. I would think that maybe in Louisiana they have it, 

but in Texas we don’t have that. The State doesn’t have that much 

experience except for the law enforcement and, of course, when we 

have the flooding, every law enforcement, every EMS, everybody 

else is out there. 

I was just wondering why—what works in Louisiana may not 

work in Texas, and I had to tell that to a lot of my new constituents after Katrina. They would say, well, we don’t do this thing in 

Louisiana. I would say, well, you are in Texas now. So I think our 

local governments can be responsible for the direct more than having another level in the State that has no experience in doing disaster recovery. 

The other thing, and I am glad that Congressman Culberson 

talked about it, up until literally Harvey, with some of our flood 

control projects with the Corps of Engineers, I was told on many 

projects in my area of north and east Houston that the cost/benefit 

analysis would not work. Our houses may be worth $60,000, and 

if you have a $200,000 house you can get more bang for your 

money. 

But now I understand, and I know through my county commissioner, Ellis—in fact, I have three county commissioners I work 

with, Commissioner Cagle who I see out there, Commissioner 

Morman, and Commissioner Ellis—that all of a sudden that cost/ 

benefit analysis has changed, particularly on the hunting bayou. I 

was in a meeting before this this morning that we do every month 

in that area, and we are still having issues with why the hunting 

bayou that goes into the Houston ship channel, the cost/benefit 

analysis, I am glad it has been changed. Again, just because you 

are poor and you get flooded, the problem we have in our neighborhood—and I know that all of us should have flood insurance, but 

if you have a constituency who typically are seniors and not 

wealthy, flood insurance is a luxury, and sometimes they are living 

in those flood-prone areas. So their premiums are so high, they 

can’t afford it. 

So Federal law right now says that if you have received a FEMA 

grant from 2001 or 2008 or any of these, then you are supposed to 

39 

cover yourself with flood insurance. Well, after a few years and you 

get low into it and your premiums go up because you are in a floodprone area, you can’t afford it. I have constituents who are both 

Medicaid and Medicare who had to cancel their flood insurance because they couldn’t afford it, and they are not receiving any help. 

Thank goodness we had a lot of non-profits, churches, communities 

helping those folks get back in their homes, because they can’t afford to move either. 

So I am hoping that we will look at something on flood insurance 

and look at the affordability of the flood insurance for some of the 

areas where the property may not be worth a quarter of a million 

dollars, but it is also that people can’t afford the premiums on the 

flood insurance. I think that needs to be considered. 

One of the things on FEMA, like I said, I have been through lots 

of disasters, and it seemed like that we were reinventing the wheel. 

I was on the conference calls every day for the first couple of 

weeks, and I remember when we had Allison that we had FEMA 

centers, one-stop centers in the communities. I kept hearing on the 

phone we were going to do that, but then I understand the county 

decided to do—and I talked to the county judge, who is a friend— 

we would have a big center in Baytown, one in Katie, and then one 

at Green Point Mall, which is great. That is near our district; in 

fact, actually in Congressman Lee’s district. 

But it took us a while to get FEMA locations in the district. In 

fact, I was at the church this morning. You had one that was the 

first one there, and then you had one in Congressman Lee’s district. But I remember at one time we had five of these, and the people could go to their neighborhood and do it without having somebody from near east-end Houston or near north side. They can’t go 

to Katie. They can’t even get to Green Point even, much less Baytown. 

So I would hope FEMA would look at what was successful in previous storms that would do it. I want to thank FEMA because we 

were in session trying to come up with money for disaster relief, 

and I would be home on Saturdays and I would work with my 

State legislators, and I thank FEMA for sending a lot of these 

young folks with laptops to different churches in our district on a 

Saturday to be able to help people who may not be internet-friendly. In fact, some of my constituents probably have to call their 

grandchildren to figure out how to file something. My grandkids 

tell me that, too. 

But I would hope that FEMA would look at some of the successes 

in earlier disasters instead of trying to reinvent the wheel all of a 

sudden. That is a concern. 

But, Mr. Chairman, I don’t serve on the committee, and I thank 

you for the courtesy of letting me be here today. I serve on Energy 

and Commerce, so I work on energy and health care. But when the 

water is up to your door, you don’t worry about what committee 

you are on. So, thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Dr. Burgess. 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

40 

Although I am not from the Houston area, I did spend 3 years 

at Texas Medical Center many, many years ago, so I am familiar 

with the terrain and the weather in the Houston area. 

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that you have called this hearing 

today. I certainly want to thank our witnesses on this panel and 

the next panel. They were crucial in the response efforts. 

But I also just want to take a minute to recognize the work done 

by our hospitals and medical personnel to ensure that their involvement is included in the record. I have testimony from the 

American Hospital Association, and I have a letter from the CEO 

of the Texas Hospital Association and the Associations’ Hurricane 

Harvey Analysis Report outlining Texas hospitals’ preparation 

strategies and priorities for future disaster response, and I would 

ask unanimous consent to include those items in the record. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 

STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION

APRIL 9, 2018 

On behalf of our nearly 5,000 member hospitals, health systems, and other health 

care organizations, and our clinician partners—including more than 270,000 affiliated physicians, 2 million nurses and other caregivers—and the 43,000 health care 

leaders who belong to our professional membership groups, the American Hospital 

Association (AHA) appreciates the opportunity to submit comments on emergency 

preparedness and lessons learned from Hurricane Harvey. 

On August 25, 2017, Hurricane Harvey made landfall on San Jose Island, Texas, 

south of Houston, as a Category 4 hurricane. After striking land, Harvey weakened 

to a tropical storm and, for 2 days, dropped heavy rainfall, causing wide-spread 

flash flooding. Over the course of a week, the storm caused record-breaking destruction, with more than 60 inches of rain and entire communities destroyed by flooding. 

Tragically, the storm caused 90 deaths and an untold number of injuries, both physical and psychological. 

The Nation witnessed the best of humanity as neighbors saved each other from 

flood waters, emergency officials plucked stranded citizens from the roofs of their 

cars and homes, and strangers came to one another’s rescue. Throughout the storm 

and its aftermath, the women and men of Houston’s hospitals tended to their patients and provided care, even when their own families were being ravaged by the 

storm. These heroes cared for premature babies and patients just out of surgery 

during the worst of the storm and subsequent flooding. When hospital personnel 

could no longer operate due to safety concerns, they evacuated their patients to safety. Whenever possible, they kept the hospital doors open throughout the storm, even 

when they had to ration supplies to ensure every patient received high-quality care. 

These hospital heroes saved lives under the most difficult circumstances. We are incredibly proud of the women and men that provided care for those in need before, 

during, and after Hurricane Harvey. 

LESSONS LEARNED FROM HURRICANE HARVEY

Hurricane Harvey was atypical in that it morphed into a massive storm in a very 

short amount of time. In previous hurricanes, communities have had more time to 

prepare and evacuate. It also moved slowly rather than quickly passing over the 

Houston area, allowing record rainfall to pile up and cause severe flooding. 

While Hurricane Harvey was atypical, the lessons learned from the storm are not. 

We have discovered similar findings from other storms in other States and in previous storms in Texas. While we have seen vast improvement in emergency preparedness since Hurricane Katrina in 2005, there remain issues that have yet to 

be resolved. 

Summaries of some of the main lessons learned by hospitals during Hurricane 

Harvey follow. 

41 

1. Lack of Availability of General Population Shelter Facilities to Take Medically 

Fragile People 

During Hurricane Harvey many people with medical needs, such as those requiring dialysis or those who are ventilator-dependent, were turned away from shelters 

because the shelters were not equipped to handle their medical needs. This population turned to hospital emergency departments, despite not requiring acute medical attention, which stressed hospital resources, including personnel, food, and 

linen. 

The lack of shelters for medically fragile populations has been a consistent challenge for hospitals during emergency situations. While there are laws that require 

general population shelters to be staffed and equipped to meet the needs of medically fragile populations, such as having the ability to provide dialysis and medical 

oxygen, the reality is that general population shelters rarely have these capabilities. 

There needs to be focused attention, planning, and resources by local, State, and 

Federal Government, and key partners to ensure that general population shelters 

are staffed, funded, and equipped to be able to meet the needs of medically fragile 

populations in the future. 

2. Inappropriate Reliance on Hospitals as Shelters 

As people were rescued from flood waters, hospitals were used as evacuation sites 

by emergency officials and ordinary citizens. The large number of people seeking 

shelter, in addition to the hospitals’ existing patient populations, compounded by a 

shortage of hospital staff and the length of the storm, created serious resource challenges for hospitals and imposed additional burden on the limited number of hospital employees who were able to get to work. 

The use of hospitals as shelters for the general population has been a consistent 

challenge for hospitals in emergency situations. Key partners need to educate their 

communities about appropriate evacuation sites before and during a storm. 

3. Availability of Security 

The availability of adequate security varied for hospitals during Hurricane Harvey. For those without adequate security, there were concerns about safety. With 

incredible demand for private security across the entire region, hospitals faced 

logistical challenges obtaining private security. This also has been an issue for hospitals during previous disasters that needs to be addressed with appropriate stakeholders. 

4. Delivery of Supplies 

Hospitals have a limited availability of supplies on hand at any given time. While 

they are used to having 3 to 4 days of ‘‘ride out’’ provisions, hospitals were challenged during Hurricane Harvey due to the amount of rainfall, which made many 

hospitals inaccessible for 5 to 7 days. Key community stakeholders throughout the 

country need to convene to develop strategies for delivering necessary supplies during emergencies. 

5. Communication 

During Hurricane Harvey, there were communication failures and challenges with 

State and Federal officials and the military. There was confusion about which hospitals were operational and which ones were evacuating, creating problems with resource allocation and placement of patients. In addition, there was confusion about 

hospital employees being exempt from mandated curfews due to being ‘‘essential’’ 

when traveling to and from work. In some circumstances, police turned away muchneeded hospital personnel when they were traveling to work, even though these hospital employees had proper identification. Communication has been a consistent 

problem during previous emergencies. Local, State, and Federal Government and 

the military need to work with key stakeholders to ensure clear, timely, and consistent communication during disasters. 

6. Effective Use of Volunteers and Donations 

Coordinating the extraordinary outpouring of volunteers and donations during 

Hurricane Harvey was a challenge for hospitals. Getting credentials checked was an 

onerous manual process for out-of-State medical professionals and there were questions about the scope of liability protection for all medical volunteers. In addition, 

there were logistical challenges for the massive amounts of food, clothing, toys, and 

other items donated. Key stakeholders need to make the volunteer registry more robust so that volunteers from out-of-State can be effectively used during an emergency. States need to address and make clear the liability protections afforded to 

volunteers. In addition, planning for donations of large quantities of goods needs to 

42 

be completed in advance at the local level, including a plan for clearly communicating which goods are needed. 

7. Recovery 

When entire communities are devastated by a disaster, there are significant needs 

for mental health services. Engaging with local social workers, chaplains, psychologists, and other mental health providers to assist the community is paramount. In 

some instances, mental health providers from outside the community will be needed. 

Hospital employees face the strain of being separated from family and being in the 

middle of a highly stressful emergency, with unknown outcomes and dramatic episodes. In order to reduce anxiety and burnout, hospital employees must be offered 

mental health support in a timely manner. 

Other important recovery measures include flood mitigation, building inspector 

guidelines for those hospitals that are recovering from flooding, and ensuring public 

health threats are mitigated. 

Financial support is also critical in the recovery from disasters. In addition to the 

increased costs incurred as a direct result of the disaster, hospitals have lost revenue from closures, interrupted billing and claims filing, canceled patient care services, and decreased patient flow. 

8. Stafford Act Modernization 

The Stafford Act of 1988 was designed to bring an orderly and systematic means 

of Federal disaster assistance for State and local governments in carrying out their 

responsibilities to aid citizens. 

The act prohibits investor-owned hospitals from qualifying for Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) assistance. During Hurricane Harvey, numerous investor-owned hospitals provided critical resources to their communities and other 

not-for-profit hospitals, including taking in evacuated patients. The allocation of 

FEMA assistance should not be determined by the status of a hospital. The AHA 

strongly recommends that the Congress modernize the Stafford Act to allow all hospitals to recoup financial losses from a disaster. 

PRIORITIES FOR 2018 REAUTHORIZATION OF THE PANDEMIC AND ALL HAZARDS

PREPAREDNESS ACT

Congress recognized hospitals’ and health systems’ critical role during disasters 

in the Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA) by creating the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP), the primary Federal funding mechanism for 

emergency preparedness. Since 2002, the HPP has provided critical funding and 

other resources to aid hospitals’ response to a wide range of emergencies. The HPP 

has supported greatly enhanced planning and response; facilitated the integration 

of public and private-sector emergency planning to increase the preparedness, response, and surge capacity of hospitals; and improved State and local infrastructure 

that help hospitals and health systems prepare for public health emergencies. These 

investments have contributed to saving lives during many emergencies, including 

Hurricane Harvey, the Boston Marathon bombing, the Ebola crisis and hurricanes 

in New York, Florida, and Puerto Rico. 

Reauthorization of PAHPA must occur by Oct. 1, 2018. Below we outline our priorities for future investment to help prepare and equip our health care system in 

advance of disasters and public health emergencies. 

1. Preparedness Programs Should Be Authorized at Sufficient Levels 

The HPP and Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) programs are key 

to the foundational capabilities of health care and public health preparedness, respectively. These programs must be resourced at sufficient levels to ensure every 

community is prepared for disasters. In particular, HPP’s highest level of appropriation was $515 million; yet, in recent years, the program has eroded to only $255 

million, a vastly insufficient level given the task of preparing the health care system 

for a surge of patients, continuity of operations, and recovery. Following a year in 

which the Nation experienced record-setting natural disasters, and with projection 

of an increase in the severity and frequency of extreme weather events, we must 

do everything we can to ensure that the health care system has the resources needed to prepare for and respond to future disasters. In order to keep pace with the 

ever-changing and growing threats faced by hospitals, health care systems, and 

their communities, the AHA recommends that HPP be authorized to at least $515 

million per year. Furthermore, as the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 

emergency preparedness rule goes into effect, the Department of Health and Human 

Services (HHS) expects as many as 50,000 health care facilities to seek inclusion 

in health care coalitions. This level of authorized funding would allow rebuilding of 

43 

the program as it transitions from capacity building to operationalizing health care 

coalitions. The AHA has endorsed H.R. 4776, the Hospital Preparedness Program 

Reauthorization Act of 2018, which would increase the level of authorized funding 

for the HPP to $515 million for fiscal years 2019–2023, doubling its current level 

of appropriated funding. We strongly believe that this investment would go a long 

way to help better prepare and equip our health care system Nation-wide in advance of future disasters and public health emergencies. 

2. Preparedness Programs Should Be Nation-wide 

The HPP and PHEP must continue to provide funding to all existing awardees— 

all States, territories/freely associated States, and four directly-funded large cities. 

There has been no evidence that drastically changing the program’s formulas would 

provide any meaningful benefit or that the current formula is flawed. On the contrary, greatly reducing or eliminating funding from some jurisdictions puts other 

States at risk: Those States that border the eliminated State would take on additional burden from the unmet public health and medical needs in neighboring communities. Further, funding formulas that lean too heavily on risks from prior natural disasters ignore universal risks, such as an influenza pandemic or other outbreaks, and unpredictable threats such as acts of terrorism and mass shootings. Because disasters can and do occur everywhere in the U.S. States and territories, all 

jurisdictions must be properly resourced in order to have an adequate level of preparedness for all hazards. 

3. Preparedness Programs Should Remain Distinct 

The HPP and PHEP programs should continue to be aligned and coordinated but 

should be maintained as separate, distinct programs. The two programs serve a different but complementary purpose. PHEP, administered by the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention (CDC), builds the capacity of State and local health departments to prevent, detect, and respond to emergencies. HPP, administered by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), prepares the 

health care delivery system to provide essential care to patients by ensuring continuity of care during disasters. Both programs are needed to save lives and protect 

the public from emergency-related illnesses and injuries and each should remain 

under the jurisdiction of the agency that currently oversee its administration. 

4. Broadening the Definition of Eligible Awardees under the HPP 

The AHA supports introducing competition into determining HPP’s awardees in 

order to permit HHS to fund innovation and improve the Nation’s health security. 

In addition to States’ and directly-funded cities’ public health departments, we recommend that State and local hospital associations, as well as academic medical centers, be permitted to apply to serve as the awardee for their jurisdiction. This will 

allow HPP to fund those entities that present the most innovative approaches to 

health care delivery system readiness. A second benefit of introducing competition 

is the potential to address the misalignment between HPP’s health care mission and 

its current awardees’ public health mission. While most of the HPP’s public health 

department awardees work well with their private-sector health care delivery system counterparts to enhance preparedness and response, others struggle to work 

collaboratively with the private health care system that they also regulate. Through 

this proposal, private health care entities or hospital associations that have the organizational capacity and initiative to lead sector-wide preparedness and response 

activities also would be able to compete for HPP funds for their State or jurisdiction, 

not just health departments. 

5. Improving the Efficiency of the HPP through Limits on Awardee-level Direct Costs 

According to data collected by ASPR, public health department awardees have 

taken an average of 21 percent of the HPP award off the top for direct costs (i.e., 

personnel, fringe, and travel), in addition to their indirect costs, for overseeing 

award and subcontracts. Some awardees have taken far more than 21 percent of the 

HPP award for their direct costs. Further, ASPR has reported that high-performing 

awardees tend to have lower awardee-level direct costs (ALDC). With the substantial reductions in HPP appropriations in recent years, we are concerned that this 

level of skimming of limited program funds for ALDC leaves inadequate amounts 

for use by health care coalitions and health care providers to meet the critical capabilities of the HPP program. We support the efforts that ASPR’s team has undertaken during the current project period to ensure the appropriate use of HPP funds. 

In particular, for the 2017–2022 HPP project period, we are pleased that ASPR is 

improving the efficiency of the program and better supporting its partners in health 

care by limiting ALDC to no more than 18 percent of the HPP cooperative agreement award, which will gradually decrease to 15 percent by the last HPP budget 

44 

period. The AHA supports permanently capping the ALDC to 15 percent of the HPP 

award moving forward. 

6. Immediate Response Fund 

A pre-approved standing fund of emergency resources that would speed the public 

health response to disasters is necessary. We support the following principles in an 

immediate response fund for public health emergencies: Such a fund should supplement and not supplant existing, base public health and preparedness funds; it 

should not preclude supplemental emergency funding based on the scope, magnitude, and duration of the emergency at hand; and it should come with a mechanism to automatically replenish funds. Such a fund should be used in the short-term 

for acute emergencies that require a rapid response to saves lives and protect the 

public. The Secretary of HHS should administer the fund, with Congressional oversight, to ensure relevant agencies receive dollars when needed for response. 

7. Medical Countermeasures 

The Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise strategy and 

implementation plan should be strengthened to require coordination with State and 

local entities to ensure the products being developed reach the end-users in a timely 

and well-coordinated manner. Several programs created in previous authorizations 

have been successful and should be maintained, including emergency use authorization, the Strategic National Stockpile, and the Shelf-Life Extension Program for 

State and local stockpiles. 

8. Environmental Health 

Environmental health is a branch of public health that examines all the physical, 

chemical, and biological factors external to a person and incorporates the assessment and control of those environmental factors that can potentially affect health. 

Environmental Health professionals are extremely important in all-hazard emergency preparedness response, recovery, and mitigation due to their understanding 

of how disasters impact the environment. Environmental health professionals function in areas of controlling disease-causing vectors, food safety inspections, safeguarding drinking water, preventing chemical and radiation exposure, protecting 

the public from bioterrorism, and ensuring healthy working and living environments. Environmental health workforce should be included in the National health 

security strategy and workforce development. 

9. Planning for Whole of Community 

HHS should move away from an ‘‘at-risk individuals’’ definition to a more functional approach, including the functional needs of children and persons with disabilities. The current statutory definition of and references to ‘‘at-risk individuals’’ 

throughout PAHPA are insufficient at improving the preparedness and response of 

communities to each of the populations encompassed by that term. HHS (ASPR and 

CDC) should develop a strategic plan for addressing each of the key sub-population 

groups, e.g., pregnant women, children, and individuals with access and functional 

needs. PHEP and HPP must ensure awardees are engaging in meaningful planning 

and coordination with each of these subpopulations and the institutions that serve 

them. 

10. Advisory Committees and Experts 

The National Advisory Committee on Children and Disasters should be reauthorized and utilized as an important resource for the Secretary of HHS. Federal representatives should be ex officio, non-voting members, and the committee should incorporate additional expertise, such as mental and behavioral health and children 

with special health care needs. The National Preparedness and Response Science 

Board (previously called the National Biodefense Science Board) also should be reauthorized and strengthened to serve as a resource for the Secretary. CDC’s Children’s Preparedness Unit (CPU) should be authorized to ensure the unit becomes 

permanent. CPU should provide technical assistance to PHEP awardees to assist 

with their plans. 

ALWAYS THERE, READY TO CARE—THE 24/7 ROLE OF AMERICA’S HOSPITALS

Hospitals are at the center of every emergency that our Nation confronts, from 

natural disasters to deadly diseases to biological warfare, terrorism, and radiological 

and nuclear events. Readiness is an imperative for America’s hospitals, one of the 

cornerstones of their essential commitment to safeguard the health of the public. 

The women and men of America’s hospitals are critically important resources in 

responding to a disaster. It is when communities are pushed to the limits, such as 

when Hurricane Harvey hit, that we recognize that these everyday heroes’ dedicaVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:30 Aug 17, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18FL0409\18FL0409 HEATH
45 

* The report is retained in the committee files and available at: https://www.tha.org/Harvey. 

tion to their patients and communities is beyond measure. We applaud their 24 

hours a day, 7 days a week commitment and dedication. 

LETTER SUBMITTED BY THE TEXAS HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION

The Honorable MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, 

Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, United States House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515. 

The Honorable BENNIE THOMPSON, 

Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security, United States House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515. 

DEAR CHAIRMAN MCCAUL AND RANKING MEMBER THOMPSON: On behalf of the 450 

hospitals and health systems that comprise the Texas Hospital Association, I am 

pleased to submit, as written testimony before the House Homeland Security Committee, THA’s report on hospitals’ response and recovery experiences during and 

after Hurricane Harvey. 

As you know, Hurricane Harvey was a storm of historic proportions. Its size, 

scale, and economic impact are unparalleled in the Nation’s history. Nonetheless, 

just 20 Gulf Coast hospitals closed or evacuated during the storm—a remarkable 

feat given the storm’s impact and a testament to hospitals’ on-going emergency 

readiness investment and preparation and the industry’s resiliency. 

During the historic Category 4 hurricane, THA worked with hospitals all along 

the Gulf Coast and with local, State, and Federal authorities to coordinate response 

and relief efforts. THA is incredibly proud of every hospital in the affected areas 

that went above and beyond to prioritize care not only of patients but also of those 

seeking shelter from the storm in what was a protracted, challenging event. 

Findings in THA’s report are the result of feedback shared by hospitals from Harvey-affected areas and agency partners. The report identifies areas for improvement 

to better equip hospitals, governmental agencies and other organizations for the 

next disaster and to delineate specific next steps to take in the improvement process. 

The report* includes specific recommendations on: 

• Clarifying shelter facility requirements to care for residents with medical challenges. 

• Providing adequate security for hospital facilities. 

• Coordinating communications with law enforcement, military, and civilian 

groups. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to submit written testimony. Texas hospitals 

were and continue to be integral in the recovery efforts of our Gulf Coast communities, and THA appreciates the committee’s work on this issue. 

If you have any questions about the report or Texas hospitals’ response and ongoing needs, please contact THA or THA’s Federal representative. 

Sincerely, 

TED SHAW, 

President/CEO, Texas Hospital Association. 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Robinson, you were kind enough to take a phone call from 

me the Friday before the storm sequence really got under way, and 

I appreciated you doing that, and I felt it was important. 

Mr. Robinson, the FEMA Region VI headquarters is in Texas, the 

area that I represent. Mr. Robinson, on Monday, the following 

Monday, I went down to the Region VI headquarters and saw firsthand your personnel deep in their activities with the response. I 

guess the question comes as far as the staffing. It looked like there 

were a lot of people. There were a lot of hands on deck. But this 

was a storm of the magnitude that no one had ever seen before. 

So with respect to staffing, what are your thoughts, what are your 

conclusions, having gone through this and looking forward to what 

is the next hurricane season? How are you doing from a staffing 

perspective? 

46 

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you, Dr. Burgess, and thank you for your 

focus on preparedness. I know you have an event coming up at the 

end of the month, so thanks for focusing on preparedness. 

For Hurricane Harvey, as you said, we had a pretty big footprint 

here in Texas, and I can’t say enough about our partners at the 

local and State levels. There is a lot of great capability here, so 

that really is a force multiplier for us as well. 

As an agency, we are currently looking at our force strength and 

what are the things we need to do going into the 2018 season. Obviously, the 2017 hurricane season and the wildfires really taxed 

our system. One of the things that we did employ was a surge capacity force, which is members of the DHS family volunteered, 

came to work, got some just-in-time training, went out to the field. 

That was highly successful, it really was, and I want to thank the 

men and women of DHS and other Federal agencies who stepped 

up and came to the plate. 

We also reached out to State emergency managers and brought 

them in to augment our work force, and that was another very successful thing, so we can continue to build on those as we look at 

what are our continued staffing needs as we go into the 2018 season. 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you for that. 

I will just, Mr. Chairman, make the observation that in September, the Energy and Commerce Committee had a field hearing 

in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and I think there it was like 17,000 Federal employees in Puerto Rico at that time. At the same time you 

were working so hard here to recover, they had obviously been significantly impacted. 

It brings up the question, Administrator Robinson, and I have 

unfortunately seen a number of times where we have been through 

disasters—Rita; Katrina, of course, down here; Sandy in the upper 

East Coast—and it always seems like we are rebuilding structures 

that were damaged by the last storm, and yet you are required to 

rebuild to the current code. Is that a problem in going forward? 

Should we be building for greater resiliency, expecting the next 

storm might be worse? 

Mr. ROBINSON. I think that fits right into our Administrator’s 

strategic plan where we talk about building a culture of preparedness. We do have to look at building more resiliency as we build 

back. So we are really looking, as we scope and cost-estimate the 

projects here in Texas for permanent work, as we are building in 

our mitigation programs, when we are building those, we are building back to higher codes and standards. We think that is vitally 

important. 

Mr. BURGESS. Good. 

Admiral Thomas, you mentioned social media heat maps, a 

phrase I had not heard before. So you actually were monitoring the 

Twitter feeds and the Facebook feeds while this was going on? 

Admiral THOMAS. Congressman, thanks for the question. It 

points out the incredible innovation, ingenuity, and flexibility of 

our Coast Guard work force. It became apparent to us pretty early 

on that people were reaching out to the Coast Guard through 

Facebook, through Twitter and Instagram. We had Coast Guard 

men and women around the country on their own develop heat 

47 

maps and send them to our office in New Orleans so we could see 

where the concentration of those social media outreaches were coming from. 

We are going to try to do that in a more structured way in the 

future. But it just is another example of how the entire Coast 

Guard team pitched in to help us out here in Houston. 

Mr. BURGESS. I would encourage the structure, because if you 

watch cable news coverage of this event, and an interviewer would 

be interviewing a very sympathetic figure, and at the conclusion of 

the interview, of course, the interviewer is going off to something 

else, but the sympathetic figure is still waiting on help to arrive 

and worried that they are going to survive the storm sequence. So 

I thank you for that effort, and I thank the people who took their 

own initiative to do that, and I think it is extremely important that 

we use all possible means. 

Then finally, Ms. Van Duyne, let me just ask you a question on 

the Community Development Block Grant issue. I always thought 

the Community Development Block Grant was a way to get money 

to the local level faster than going through State agencies. Is that 

not correct? Are the CDBG funds not going directly to municipalities and county facilities? 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. There is CDBG, and then there is CDBGDR. 

Disaster recovery grants can go to a number of different places. 

They have additional restrictions on them, and when dealing with 

the scope and the size of the various cities, communities, small and 

rural that were affected, our relationship with the GLO is actually 

quite extensive, and they have spent billions of dollars on CDBG 

and CDBGDR moneys within the State of Texas. It was a natural 

fit, and I think the Governor agreed that that was a natural fit for 

the CDBGDR program to be run through. 

Again, we provide them with a number of flexibilities, including 

the idea of being able to grant to States and counties as they see 

fit. But we believe the local level is the best level to know what 

their needs are. 

Mr. BURGESS. I agree with that, and I think that was Mr. 

Culberson’s point, that the money has to get to the place where it 

is needed as fast as it possibly can. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me be here. I will yield 

back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you. 

The gentleman yields. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Al Green. 

Mr. AL GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We were informed 

that the mics would always be hot. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. AL GREEN. I also thank the Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson, for his outstanding work in this area as well. Thank you for 

allowing me to be an interloper today. 

Thank you to the witnesses for appearing. 

I also want to thank many of the persons who will have a handson experience with much of what we will do going forward, the 

county commissioners, city council persons, persons who are associated with hospitals, persons who are on the ground and have an 

48 

understanding of what is going on, which may be a good segue into 

this CDBGDR funding. 

In 2015, when we had the Memorial Day flood, is it your recollection that the funds were allocated to Houston directly, or were they 

sent to Houston by and through some other entity? 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. I believe that they were sent through—quite 

honestly, I have been with the agency for a year, so that would be 

beyond my scope. I apologize for that. 

Mr. AL GREEN. I would like to have someone check. 

Ms. VAN DUYNE. If you let me know the information, I am happy 

to get that to you. 

Mr. AL GREEN. Please do. I greatly appreciate it. 

I am concerned about the funds going through an entity as opposed to coming directly to Houston, and the rationale would be 

better shared with you, I am sure, when the mayor testifies. But 

Houston has shown that it is responsible. Houston is not unlike 

many other large urban areas where these funds have been directly 

sent to them such that they can get them to the points of need immediately. So I want to add my voice to those who are calling for 

Houston to receive direct funding. I think it is exceedingly important that we do so. 

Moving now to previous disasters, we spent a lot of money on recovery after Harvey, tax day, Memorial Day, a lot of money on recovery. This really is a time for us to spend a lot of money on prevention. It is my hope that we will give serious consideration to 

some legislation that I sponsored and my colleagues, over 100 of 

them, co-sponsored, and that was to deal with the various creeks 

and tributaries, Greens Bayou, Brays Bayou, Huntington White 

Oak Bayou. All of these, if properly completed, will allow us to 

eliminate some and mitigate a lot of the flooding. We just have to 

complete them. 

We have tried to craft legislation working with Congressperson 

Culberson such that areas that have been repeatedly inundated 

will receive some attention. 

We have a place called Meyerland in Houston, Texas. Persons 

are repeatedly having to move out of their homes. 

So, Colonel, in terms of dealing with these preventive measures, 

can you give me some sense of how you will approach this question 

of prevention that has plagued us not for just this year or the last 

3 years but literally decades in some cases with some of these 

projects? Your response, please. 

Colonel ZETTERSTROM. Yes, Congressman. Thank you for the 

question. 

The Corps calculates that flood risk management projects return 

$9 in flood risk mitigation for every dollar spent in structural solutions. However, I have previously testified that the Corps has more 

than $96 billion of authorized but yet unconstructed projects at this 

time. Some of it, I think, is tied to Congressman Gene Green’s comments about cost/benefit ratios and the National economic development threshold where a flood risk management project has to ensure that the benefits outweigh the costs and that we propose alternatives that have the highest net excess benefits. 

There are some creative ways. You mentioned Greens. We are actually constructing Greens Bayou project because of some creative 

49 

solutions to require the contractors to actually re-sell the borrowed 

material from the excavated detention basins or the channels, and 

therefore reduce the cost of the projects. 

Some of this, as you have indicated in the legislation of the bipartisan budget act, was specifically directed to the five States and 

two territories directly impacted by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and 

Maria. So the Galveston District is still waiting on the allocation 

of what funds it will receive from that legislation. 

Mr. AL GREEN. May I, Colonel, ask you about Brays? 

Colonel ZETTERSTROM. So Brays actually is an on-going—it is a 

Section 211–F project. It is a project that the Galveston District receives Federal funds typically on an annual basis to reimburse increments of completed construction by the Harris County Flood 

Control District. In fiscal year 2017, for instance, I think we received approximately $11 million to reimburse the flood control district. Obviously, the 2018 omnibus was recently passed, so I don’t 

yet know what the future funding might be to complete that 

project. But certainly what you described in your question about 

these authorized flood risk management projects that haven’t been 

completed I think is at the heart of the discussion about our ability 

to be able to partner and to complete these projects in the future. 

Mr. AL GREEN. Well, when we worked on these projects to include all of these various projects, these bayous, if you will, we 

worked with the Corps, we worked with the local, the county, and 

we came up with the number of $311 million: $311 million spent 

to save billions makes a lot of sense. I am sure it makes sense to 

you, too. So let’s see what we can do to get the $311 million quickly. 

Let me share this with you. I have small cities also, Stafford and 

Missouri City, and the reimbursement for them is a problem. Mr. 

Robinson, these small cities, you will hear more about their concerns in a moment, but can you give me some sense of how you are 

going to expedite help to the small cities? 

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes, sir. We signed an auxiliary manager agreement with the city that is working with the Texas Division of 

Emergency Management that is meeting with them regularly to 

look at their scope and cost and disasters. We have expedited some 

funding for emergency protective measures, so the Category A and 

B, the emergency removal and emergency protective measures. We 

will continue to work with them as we get the documentation put 

together to reimburse them, or even provide some advance reimbursement. 

Mr. AL GREEN. If I have a small city that contends that they 

have gone through all of the paperwork and they are still not getting the help, who do I need to talk to to expedite things? 

Mr. ROBINSON. I can give you a point of contact at our field office 

to be able to work with, and we will work with your office to make 

sure we address that. I think we are going to have a discussion tomorrow with the Missouri City mayor so we can work through 

their reimbursement. 

Mr. AL GREEN. Mr. Chairman, I just want to ask one more question. 

NFIP, tell me where we are in terms of the balance in the coffer. 

Mr. ROBINSON. The National Flood Insurance Program? 

50 

Mr. AL GREEN. Yes. 

Mr. ROBINSON. I will have to get back with you on that. 

Mr. AL GREEN. You know that is exceedingly important. NFIP 

has to be shored up, and that is a Congressional responsibility. I 

am not eschewing our responsibility, but I do need to know what 

is there so that we can propose appropriate legislation for NFIP. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for being generous with the time. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentle lady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee, is recognized for the submission of questions for the record. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Colonel, one of the questions that I asked was about retention 

ponds, and I don’t think you were able to get that, if my recollection serves well. So I would like to see where they are in terms of 

having that back in writing. 

Let me collectively indicate as well a process, Colonel, for expedited work and repair. Greens Bayou I would put in your eye primarily because it is a bayou that has begun work or had work 

begun before Hurricane Harvey. I would appreciate a written response back on that. 

Direct payment, I appreciate a response in terms of HUD listening to our plea and getting that done. 

Finally, maybe I was in Washington but I don’t recall Administrator Brock being here in Houston. You know, I have invited him. 

We are in the midst of recovery. I think it would be more than appropriate for him to visit and understand what recovery is and the 

people who are still suffering. So I would appreciate you carrying 

forward that request. 

Mr. Chairman would be gracious enough to allow me to call off 

the names of some of those who were working so intensely, from 

first responders to cities and others, at the end of the hearing. I 

thank Mr. Chairman. I put those requests into the record. 

The last one is I gave you numbers about future floods or future 

hurricanes. I would like to have a response from all of you of how 

prepared you think we are for the hurricane season coming up in 

2018. I would appreciate if all of you would give a response to that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentle lady yields back. 

In the spirit of bipartisanship, the Chair recognizes Mr. Culberson for one question. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Since I know everyone in the room has their cell phones turned 

off, if there was a kidnapping in the area, we would all get an 

Amber alert, even with your phones turned off. I want to ask, since 

we have all these State and county officials here, and city officials 

here in the room, with your help and guidance, could we all come 

up with a plan to create a flood alert system? The technology is so 

good. The Corps knew several days in advance, and I know was 

communicating with local officials, what neighborhoods were going 

to get flooded when the water spilled around the dam. 

We should be able to create a flood alert system that can alert 

your phone, whether you have a flip phone or a smart phone, depending on where you live, that water is coming, because that 

51 

water that hit everybody early Monday morning is what caused the 

problem. 

So why don’t we all work together, Mr. Chairman, to find a way 

to pass legislation, working with our State and local partners, to 

create a flood alert system for people whose homes are in danger 

of being flooded? It needs to be done. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Excellent idea. 

I want to thank the witnesses for your valuable testimony. Lessons learned is more of a looking at things through a critical eye. 

But I just want to thank all four witnesses and who you represent, 

and everybody in the room who was part of the response and recovery effort, for your service to not only this Nation but to this great 

State of Texas. 

So with that, we are going to take a short break and then come 

back for a second panel. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman MCCAUL. We are pleased to welcome our second panel 

of witnesses. Our second panel includes the Honorable R. Jack 

Cagle, commissioner for Harris County, Texas, Precinct 4; the Honorable Sylvester Turner, the mayor of Houston, Texas; the Honorable Allen Owen, the mayor of Missouri City, Texas; Mr. Mark 

Sloan, the emergency management coordinator for Harris County, 

Texas; and finally, Ms. Carol Moore, the disaster chair of the Texas 

State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement 

of Colored People. Thank you all for being here today. 

Your full statement will appear in the record. 

The Chair now recognizes Commissioner Cagle for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF R. JACK CAGLE, COMMISSIONER, HARRIS 

COUNTY, TEXAS 

Mr. CAGLE. Chairman McCaul, thank you. Ranking Member 

Thompson and the fellow Members of this panel, I appreciate you 

being here so much. 

In preparation for my thoughts today, those of you—and I have 

six U.S. representatives in Precinct 4 here in Harris County that 

I deal with—you know that I tend to try to read a little more obscure works of literature to break those normally wasted hours between midnight and 4 in the morning. In preparation for the day 

I was reading St. Augustine. 

He made a comment that in his reflection of God, that even 

though there were many words that he could use in his books to 

try to describe God, it was as if he was still mute. 

Today, as we have been hearing this testimony before you, as we 

described the wonders of what has occurred in our midst with Harvey, all of these words are but a droplet when we compare it 

against those things that occurred when we had 14 months of rain 

in 4 days here in Harris County and along our coast. 

Chairman, as you came in, and, Ranking Member, as you came 

in, you noticed some pieces of equipment that were outside. As the 

storm started to come into Harris County, we were utilizing those 

bits of equipment to try to ready ourselves for what we knew would 

come, a Gradall machine which picks up and clears our ditches, our 

dump trucks to where we would saw and cut those things that 

52 

might impede. So we utilized that equipment to ready for the blast 

that would become Harvey. 

As Harvey came, then we began to continue to use that equipment to bring out our barricades and to move them, and move 

them again as the storm began to rise, and to clear the pathway 

so our first responders could be there. Your road and bridge crews 

were the ones that were there, like the old Seabees of World War 

II that cleared the pathway for the infantrymen. Your road and 

bridge crews in this county and in the city were the ones that were 

there first, responding before the first responders so that the first 

responders could do their job, putting up the barricades, moving 

them, and moving again. 

As the storms rose, we began to do our rescue operations, and 

the first rescue we had to do was we had to rescue the rescuers, 

because the courthouse where the sheriffs and the constables were 

operating out of, it flooded. So we moved them into our road and 

bridge camps, which actually turned out to be a wonderful thing 

since I was living there at the road and bridge camp at the time, 

and those guys were well-fed. 

So as we began to come together to find resources that were 

there. We then also, as Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee mentioned, began to use our dump trucks as our rescue vehicles, designed normally to haul debris. Now we used them to haul people 

in the midst of the storm. We began to call it Operation Dunkirk. 

We didn’t know what we had, but whatever it was that we had, we 

used it every opportunity. 

You noticed out there those dump trucks. You also noticed outside our buses, which are normally reserved for our senior adult 

program. But during the storm, they were the people movers. We 

would use the dump trucks to move in, to pick up folks, haul the 

folks out, and then put them in our buses to take them to the shelters that were springing up everywhere. 

We are so grateful to the partnership of our school districts. I 

have nine in Precinct 4 that I serve. In that zone we were able to 

work with them, to work with the city of Houston, to work with the 

NRG Center, so as there was a need that arose, people came together. As we needed to rescue people, we found an amazing thing 

occurring in our midst. 

I would get the phone call from a city council member, which we 

have had a number who have been here today with the city of 

Houston, saying we have a group of folks over here, we need your 

help. But by the time we got there, in Kingwood or in Spring 

Branch or in other areas, we found that neighbors helped neighbors, and we did not as often have to go into the high water as we 

would have normally expected. 

Let me share with you something else, that we have a unique situation here in Harris County that is different from anywhere else 

in the country. You see, Precinct 4 is one-fourth of Harris County. 

I worked with a body in Harris County which, if Harris County 

were a State, it would be larger than the entire population of Louisiana. We heard from Louisiana earlier. 

Precinct 4, if it were a State, would be larger than 10 States. I 

have seven cities that I serve. Earlier, Congressman Green was 

making a reference to his smaller cities, but they are only smaller 

53 

cities in comparison to the city of Houston. They are actually significant cities in comparison to other cities throughout the State of 

Texas. 

On the west, I represent a part of Katy. Off of 290, I represent 

Jersey Village. Off of 249, Tomball. Off of 45, I represent the Township of Woodlands and Old Town Spring. Off of 59, I represent 

Humboldt. Then all through the region, I welcome and nestle the 

beautiful city of Houston within the arms of Harris County Precinct 4 and Harris County. 

But where there is not a city, we have more than 2 million people in this county that do not have a mayor, and your county has 

to render those services directly to those people. That is why I welcome the comments of Congressman Green and of Sheila Jackson 

Lee with regard to the desire to bring funding directly to the city 

of Houston, but do not forget the unincorporated Harris County. 

The city of Houston would be the fourth-largest city in the country, but unincorporated Harris County, if it were a city, would be 

the fifth-largest city in the country, in the Nation. So bring it directly to the county as well as to the city. Do not forget those populations to which we have as many underserved populations outside 

Beltway 8 as we have within Beltway 8 within the county, and we 

need to not forget their needs as well. 

So as the rescue continued, then we began the operation of the 

removal, and the removal operation was serious. But through cooperation with the city, with the county, with the contractors that 

we had in place, we began to remove debris at a remarkable rate. 

We were able to remove more debris every 2 days than we removed 

in the tax day flood. 

The tax day flood we have heard reference to was a 500-year 

flood event. Memorial Day is a 500-year flood event. We in Harris 

County actually, in the last 3 years, we were in a drought, and during that drought we talked, Congressman McCaul and Congressman Culberson—Congressman Poe is not here, he could not be 

with us today, but he was involved in this—of trying to come up 

with ways of trying to create some means of creating a multi-purpose leg, a third reservoir that might have water for us when we 

were in the drought, as well as having storm protection. 

But there was not that public support at the time. I would submit to you that after Harvey we have the public support, and the 

time is now for us to begin to look forward, to ready ourselves for 

the future and to cooperate with the State, with the county, with 

the cities, and with all others that are here so that we can make 

our place a safer place, so that we do not have to ready ourselves 

nor reach in the moan of heroic endeavor but that we can hail the 

wisdom of these bodies coming together to prepare for the future. 

I yield the rest of my time. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cagle follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF R. JACK CAGLE

APRIL 9, 2018 

IT CAME

Hurricane Harvey was the worst flood event to ever impact the Harris County region. A few statistics helps put the storm in perspective: 

54 

• The storm dumped about 1 trillion gallons of water over Harris County, producing the largest recorded rainfall event in the continental United States and 

flooding 8 percent of the county. • Damage estimates range from $120 billion to $180 billion. • In Precinct 4, nearly 11,000 homes flooded with more than 2 feet of water. More 

than 130,000 homes and businesses throughout Houston and Harris County 

flooded and 600,000 cars were damaged. • The hurricane killed 36 people. • The storm generated an estimated 8 million cubic yards of debris in Houston. 

By comparison, Hurricane Ike produced more than 5 million cubic yards of debris in the area. That’s nearly the same amount of debris caused by Hurricane 

Alicia (1983) and Tropical Storm Allison (2001) combined. 

WE CAME

During the worst of the storm, Precinct 4 employees worked to provide essential 

services, even while some dealt with flooding in their own homes. Some of these 

services included operating a 24-hour phone bank the week of Harvey, providing updates to the public through social media, and rescuing flood victims. Precinct 4 also 

had staff at the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), providing updates on the latest disaster developments 24 hours per day for 9 days of EOC operation. 

Precinct 4’s Road & Bridge Department started preparing for Harvey days before 

the storm hit and stayed busy through the clean-up phase. Although their official 

duties included clearing roadways for emergency responders and closing flooded 

roads, Road & Bridge crews did much more. Many staff members willingly put 

themselves at risk rescuing flood victims. In the mean time, other staff members 

located staging areas and emergency supplies until permanent shelters could be established. 

Precinct 4 deployed 14 maintenance trucks for rescue service and two Senior 

Adult Program passenger buses to transport flood victims throughout the precinct. 

Additionally, Precinct 4 mobilized its 18-wheeler and flatbed trailer, usually utilized 

to haul equipment, to relocate the Office of Emergency Management’s equipment to 

NRG Park. 

The high waters threatened the integrity of several levees throughout Harris 

County. One harrowing moment concerned the evacuation of the Inverness Forest 

subdivision. Harris County Flood Control District discovered that the levee had been 

compromised. Precinct 4 Road & Bridge crews along with deputies from the Harris 

County Sheriff’s Office and the Constable’s Office rushed into the neighborhood to 

evacuate the remaining citizens under the threat of a complete levee collapse. 

Thankfully, the water began to recede and flood control staff along with community 

engineers were able to shore up the compromised portions of the levee before a full 

breach occurred. 

WE OVERCAME

Once the storm passed, Precinct 4 opened a self-help storm debris drop-off site 

for the public that eased demand on county debris removal services and benefitted 

constituents who did not wish to wait for county pickup. We are grateful for U.S. 

representatives Michael McCaul and Kevin Brady for petitioning FEMA to allow us 

to operate the self-help storm debris drop-off site at 13928 Humble Road in Tomball. 

We operated the site daily from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. through December and collected 

194,648 cubic yards of debris. Of that number, 21,803 cubic yards was dropped off 

by the public. 

One of the FEMA requirements of the self-help storm debris drop-off site was that 

owners must accompany their load. This requirement made it extremely difficult for 

nonprofits, community organizations, volunteers, and church groups mucking out 

and removing debris from the homes of constituents unable to help themselves. Requiring homeowners to accompany those loads impeded the process and made it 

much more difficult. 

We also managed to remove a record 534,109 cubic yards of debris in three passes 

in partnership with contractors and TxDOT. During the first pass of debris removal, 

Precinct 4 cleared approximately 260 homes per day and completed debris removal 

in record time. In comparison, Precinct 4 took 3 weeks to complete the first pass 

of debris removal after the Tax Day Flood. After Harvey, our Road & Bridge crews 

in conjunction with our contractors removed about the same amount of volume in 

2 days. 

Our progress was slowed by high demand for contractors and the FEMA requirement that homeowners needed to wait for inspectors before we could remove their 

debris. 

55 

In addition, Precinct 4 helped organize two Disaster Recovery Fairs and assigned 

staff to work at food distribution sites. We are grateful for cooler donations from 

RTIC and water donations from HEB, Kroger, and Wal-Mart. Other duties included 

building temporary roads at the self-help storm debris drop-off site in Tomball as 

well as cleaning up damaged parks and flooded county buildings. Some staff even 

volunteered at food banks and shelters or were diverted to other tasks during the 

storm. 

The county also moved quickly to help residents rebuild after Harvey. FEMA requires owners of flooded homes to have a permit to rebuild. To expedite the process, 

county staff went door-to-door in all flooded areas to issue permits. 

During the recovery phase, Harris County Public Health offered free water testing 

at 4 locations in Precinct 4, while Harris County Flood Control District gauged interest in a home buyout program. 

TO CONTINUE OVERCOMING

As we near the next hurricane season, it’s now imperative to begin work on additional flood control projects and repair the systems we already have. 

My top priorities include the following: 

1. Build a third reservoir that takes into consideration the anticipated growth 

of the region and the lessons learned from the might and size of Harvey. 

2. Expedite the buyout process, so local entities can raise the funds, buy the 

homes, and wait for Federal reimbursement. This will free homeowners from 

the prolonged agony of waiting to see whether they will be approved for the 

Federal buyout program and aid them in deciding whether they need to rebuild 

or not in anticipation of being bought out. 

3. Floodplain planning. 

4. Fund the big four projects: White Oak Bayou, Hunting Bayou, Brays Bayou, 

and Clear Creek. 

5. Make improvements to Barker/Addicks reservoirs and pursue home buyouts 

to remove homes from the flood pool. 

6. Remove the ‘‘checkerboard’’ problem and allow the acquisition of streets 

through the FEMA buyout program. 

7. Control flooding and alleviate drought through the Drainage Reuse Initiative. 

8. Expand the Office of Emergency Management’s ability to serve regionally. 

9. Grant the county ordinance-making power to establish flood-safety protocols 

and enforce regulations preventing fill violations in the floodplain. 

10. Acquire additional greenspace. 

11. Streamline FEMA rules while taking into consideration how the most efficient solution, at many times, is in the volunteer and private sector and allowing volunteers and nonprofits to serve constituents without having to wait for 

Federal approval. 

12. Reduce the match required of local entities to receive aid during disasters. 

56 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman has no time. 

I am just kidding. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman MCCAUL. We appreciate your remarks. I appreciate 

your great leadership during this crisis, and your friendship as 

well. 

The Chair recognizes Mayor Turner. 


h:\seals\115561.eps h:\seals\115562.eps
57 

STATEMENT OF SYLVESTER TURNER, MAYOR, HOUSTON, 

TEXAS 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Chairman McCaul, and to the Ranking 

Member, Ranking Member Thompson, and to the other Members of 

the Homeland Security Committee, and also to Congressman 

Green, who is here as well. I want to thank you for the opportunity 

to be with you today and to speak to the on-going recovery efforts 

from Hurricane Harvey. 

First, the scope of this disaster. In the city of Houston, over 

135,000 single-family homes were impacted. Over 209,000 apartment units were affected. The total number of households runs up 

to approximately 345,000. 

As you have no doubt heard, more homes flooded in Houston during Hurricane Harvey than in New Orleans during Katrina or New 

York City during Super Storm Sandy. While we in Government 

refer to such human suffering in terms like ‘‘unmet need,’’ I can tell 

you the needs of so many will require all of our efforts to help people overcome Harvey’s effects on their lives. This includes not only 

the lost homes and lost jobs, but the impact on behavioral health 

and childhood trauma. 

The immediate efforts were on rescuing people from harm’s way, 

and to that I want to thank again the men and women of the Houston Police Department, the Fire Department, and the municipal 

employees who consistently went above and beyond to help their 

communities. But as we segue from rescue to recovery, we have not 

lost that same sense of urgency. 

When FEMA said it would be Christmas before we were able to 

remove debris, the city finished its first wave in the month of October. I want to acknowledge the work that the county did in this regard, because we both worked hand-in-hand. That urgency was displayed by our Solid Waste Department employees, who worked 7 

days a week teaming up with crews from other cities like San Antonio and Dallas, along with private contractors. People cannot recover with debris in their yards, and the city of Houston worked 

overtime, again with a sense of urgency. 

The next item was planning for the recovery, and quite frankly 

that has meant changing the way we do business. I named Marvin 

Odum, the former CEO of Shell Oil, as our chief recovery officer, 

reporting directly to me and serving and speaking with my authority. Marvin’s recovery team has worked across city departments to 

break down silos and stress the urgency of recovery, and has also 

worked with outside groups as well. 

My charge to Marvin Odum was to be transformational, to make 

the city stronger, to make the city more resilient, and to make me, 

if necessary, uncomfortable in the changes being proposed, and he 

has not shied away from bringing me tough decisions. 

One of those decisions was to make significant changes to our 

Chapter 19 Flood Plain Ordinance, where we as a city will require 

all new construction to be at the 500-year flood plain, plus 2 feet. 

Homes in Houston flooded in Presidentially-declared disasters in 

2015, 2016, and in 2017. Suffering three 500-year floods in a row 

to me means there is a new normal, and Government should catch 

up. 

58 

We now communicate, cooperate, and plan better with our partners at Harris County, and I echo everything that Commissioner 

Cagle had to say. I would be remiss not to mention my partnership 

with Harris County Judge Ed Emmett, who has been a fantastic 

partner during and since the storm. Our flooding czar, Steve Costello, works to make sure our city’s Public Works Department is in 

sync with Harris County’s Flood Control District to get the most 

protection out of every dollar spent. 

I am often asked by members of our delegation what more we 

could be doing, and I would like to take this opportunity to be specific on a request that we have with FEMA on a productive conversation. That is, FEMA has had productive conversations with 

Marvin’s office on using volunteer hours to serve as our local match 

for FEMA Categories C through G. We anticipate that the local 

match would be about $250 million. We both acknowledge those efforts and thank FEMA for working with us in this volunteer program. 

Now is the time for FEMA to start this match program. Expanding the volunteer match will not only lower project cost for all levels of government, it would encourage further community involvement with the recovery, aligning with FEMA’s ‘‘whole community’’ 

approach. Essentially, the goal is for the city of Houston to put 

forth a volunteer program of accumulating 2 million volunteer 

hours in 1 year, and that would be used to offset the $250 million 

match that we are required. I would ask that as Members of Congress you join us in this novel approach and ask FEMA to begin. 

Know that local taxpayers would be thankful for what you can do 

to make this match happen. 

Moving forward, there are two programs the city of Houston will 

be actively engaged in. First, as we work with our partners at HUD 

and GLO to get the $5 billion in Community Development Block 

Grants Disaster Recovery dollars allocated to Texas into the communities affected, I know that my office will continue to work with 

local stakeholders and community partners to develop the best locally-run programs that we can operate. Conversations and consultation are on-going for this, and I believe we will be able to report on progress on action plans very soon. 

Congressman Green, you asked whether or not the CDBGDR appropriation in 2015 was direct to the city of Houston, and the answer is yes. Based on what we have been told, the current time line 

is that the $5 billion will not reach either Houston or Harris County until sometime probably in August or early September. I would 

ask that we move with a greater degree of urgency in speeding up 

that time line. 

Second, it is my hope that the State of Texas will consider joining Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, Oklahoma, Virginia, 

Georgia, and Colorado in helping to provide a local match for our 

Hazard Mitigation Grants Program. The State should use either 

the Economic Stabilization Fund or any other source to fully participate at 100 percent of the local cost share for FEMA 404 Hazard 

Mitigation Grants. Under the declaration, FEMA will fund up to 75 

percent of the costs for mitigation measures undertaken by the 

city. 

59 

By funding the cost share for theprojects, the State will be directly contributing to flood mitigation. This sends the right message and will protect homes and commercial property from the 

flood threat of these repeated storms across all areas of the State. 

We cannot ask people to rebuild and deepen their roots in our 

community unless they know we, collectively as different levels of 

government, are working to mitigate the threat of future floods. We 

need another reservoir and, Chairman McCaul, not necessarily a 

study. We need the plows to start working now. We need the channels to be widened. We need more regional on-site detention. We 

need the dredging. We need these things to take place now. More 

studies just lead to more studies that lead to more flooding and will 

not result in any meaningful mitigation. 

As mayor of the largest city in Texas, I want to thank the people 

of Texas for their support during this unprecedented disaster. During Hurricane Harvey, approximately 27 trillion gallons of rain fell 

in Texas. But that was only the initial surge. Police officers from 

Arlington and Fort Worth, solid waste crews from San Antonio and 

Dallas, and volunteers from faith-based organizations came to 

Houston. We thank them. We will never forget those who came to 

us in our time of need. 

We have looked to our Federal Government for resources, and as 

the initial tranche of CDBG monies makes its way through HUD 

to the GLO, know that we are working with urgency to get resources to those who need the dollars right now. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SYLVESTER TURNER

APRIL 9, 2018 

Thank you, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member, Members of the House Homeland Security Committee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be with you today and speak to the on-going 

recovery efforts from Hurricane Harvey. 

First, we must level set around the scope of this disaster: 

• In the city of Houston, over 135,000 single-family homes were impacted. 

• Over 209,000 apartment units were affected. 

The total number of households runs up to 345,000. 

As you have no doubt heard as we have been advocating for recovery dollars, more 

homes flooded in Houston during Hurricane Harvey than in New Orleans during 

Katrina or New York City during Superstorm Sandy. While we in Government refer 

to such human suffering in terms like ‘‘unmet need,’’ I can tell you the needs of so 

many will require all of our efforts to help people overcome Harvey’s effects on their 

lives. 

The immediate efforts were on rescuing people from harm’s way, and to that I 

want to thank again the men and women of the Houston Police Department, Fire 

Department, and Municipal employees who consistently went above and beyond to 

help their communities. But as we gave way from rescue to recovery, we have not 

lost that same sense of urgency. 

When FEMA said it would be Christmas before we were able to remove debris, 

the city finished 2 weeks into October. That urgency was displayed by our Solid 

Waste Department employees, who worked 7 days a week teaming up with crews 

from other cities like San Antonio and Dallas along with private contractors. People 

cannot recover with debris in their yards, and the city of Houston worked overtime, 

again, with urgency. 

The next item was planning for the recovery, and quite frankly that has meant 

changing the way we do business. I started off by naming Marvin Odum as our 

Chief Recovery Officer reporting directly to me and serving and speaking with my 

60 

authority. Marvin’s Recovery Team has worked across city departments to break 

down silos and stress the urgency of recovery. 

My charge to Marvin was ‘‘to make me uncomfortable,’’ and he has not shied away 

from bringing me tough decisions. 

One of those decisions was to make significant changes to our Chapter 19 Flood 

Plain Ordinance, where we as a city will require all new construction to be at the 

500-year flood plain, plus 2 feet. Homes in Houston flooded in Presidentially-declared disasters in 2015, 2016, and in 2017. Suffering three 500-year floods in a row 

to me means there is a new normal, and Government should catch up. 

We now communicate, cooperate, and plan better with our partners at Harris 

County. I would be remiss not to mention my partner in this effort, Harris County 

Judge Ed Emmett. Our flooding czar, Steve Costello, works to make sure our city’s 

Public Works Department is in sync with Harris County’s Flood Control District to 

get the most protection out of every dollar spent. 

I’m often asked by members of our delegation what more we could be doing, and 

I would like to take this opportunity to be specific on a request that we have. FEMA 

has had productive conversations with Marvin’s office on using volunteer hours to 

serve as our local match for FEMA Categories C–G. We both acknowledge those efforts and thank FEMA for working with us. Now is the time for FEMA to start this 

match program. Expanding the volunteer match will not only lower project cost for 

all levels of government—it would encourage further community involvement with 

the recovery, aligning with FEMA’s ‘‘Whole Community’’ approach. I would ask that 

as Members of Congress you join us in asking FEMA to begin. Know that local taxpayers are thankful for what you can do to make this match happen. 

Moving forward, there are two programs the city of Houston will be actively engaged in: First, as we work with our partners at HUD and GLO to get the $5 billion in 

Community Development Block Grants Disaster Recovery (CDBG–DR) dollars allocated to Texas into the communities affected, I know that my office will continue 

to work with local stakeholders and community partners to develop the best locallyrun programs that we can operate. Conversations and consultation are on-going for 

this and I believe we will be able to report on progress on actions plans very soon. 

Second, it is my hope that the State of Texas will consider joining Florida, North 

Carolina, South Carolina, Oklahoma, Virginia, Georgia, and Colorado in helping to 

provide a local match for our Hazard Mitigation Grants Program (HMGP). 

The State should use the ESF to fully participate (at 100 percent) of the local cost 

share for FEMA 404 Hazard Mitigation Grants. Under the declaration, FEMA will 

fund up to 75 percent of the costs for mitigation measures undertaken by the city. 

By funding the cost share for HMGP projects, the State will be directly contributing to flood mitigation. This sends the right message and will project homes and 

commercial property from the flood threat of these repeated storms across all areas 

of the State. 

We cannot ask people to rebuild and deepen their roots in our community unless 

they know we, collectively as different levels of government, are working to mitigate 

the threat of future floods. 

As Mayor of the largest city in Texas, I want to thank the people of Texas for 

their support during this unprecedented disaster. During Hurricane Harvey, approximately 27 trillion gallons of rain fell in Texas. But that was only the initial 

surge: 

Police officers from Arlington and Fort Worth, solid waste crews from San Antonio 

and Dallas, and volunteers from faith-based groups flooded Houston. We will never 

forget those who came to us in our time of need. 

We have looked to our Federal Government for resources, and as the initial 

tranche of CDBG monies makes its way through HUD to the GLO, know that we 

are working with urgency to get resources to those who need it. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, Mayor, and thank you for your 

great leadership through this crisis as well. I am so with you and 

the commissioner. The time for studies I think is over. We need to 

move forward with this reservoir as soon as possible. 

The Chair recognizes Mayor Owen. 

STATEMENT OF ALLEN OWEN, MAYOR, MISSOURI CITY, TEXAS 

Mr. OWEN. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, 

other Members of Congress, and especially my Congressman, Congressman Green, thank you for asking me to come today. We tell 

61 

people that Houston is a suburb of Missouri City, but we are right 

adjacent to it. 

We have a major problem in my city, and it is called the Brazos 

River. I can tell you that when we first started hearing about this 

storm, we prepared our emergency operation center which, again, 

my Congressman was in many times. I think he had my number 

on speed dial, wanting to know what he could do. But we have inundation maps that show water being in certain houses when the 

Brazos River reached 52, 54, 56, 58 feet. We were getting projections that the Brazos River would peak at 59 feet and would be 

there for 9 days. 

I can tell you that at 52 feet, we already would have had water 

in it. We saw this happen in the tax day flood, and we reached a 

peak in the Brazos River at 54.7. We finally, thank God, received 

news that the Brazos River would only be at 55.6 when it finally 

peaked. 

I will tell you that my inundation maps only went to 58 feet. Had 

the Brazos River reached 58 feet, I would have had water in 9,500 

homes in my city, which is basically a third of all the homes that 

are in the city. As it was, we ended up with water in about 1,500 

homes. We did 1,300 high-water rescues. I housed 60 State Troopers and 17 National Guardsmen in one of my buildings that we fed 

and housed for over a week. I didn’t have the resources to do that. 

So with the Governor giving me the ability to do it, I commandeered stuff. I went down to the Academy and I took $24,000 

worth of stuff out of that Academy—boots, waders, kayaks, ropes, 

life vests. I went into HEB, got food. I went into Walmart, got 

sleeping material for these officers to spend the night and work 24 

hours. I spent 7 days in our operations center, and I never will forget where I was on August 26, because that was my 50th wedding 

anniversary, and I was in that operations center for 7 days, but I 

couldn’t get into my own home. My family was there, but I had 

people in that center working 24 hours a day. 

The reason I say this, Chairman, is that we have to pay those 

people. We pay them overtime. My expenses during that storm 

were over $1 million in overtime. Ranking Member Thompson 

knows that you have to pay people when they work, and I had people in that operations center working 12-hour shifts, many of them 

with water in their own homes. But they were there, dedicated to 

do what they needed to do for the city. 

Our concern is that we spend our money up front, and then we 

wait to be reimbursed. Not only did I have flooding, I had two tornadoes that hit my city, tornadoes that destroyed 58 homes and 

one subdivision, two shopping centers and a bank building and the 

rest of it that are still not finished today because of reimbursement 

requests that are needed. 

Unfortunately, and I think we talked about it earlier, when I 

talked to the people who got flooded, they did not live in a 100-year 

flood plain, or thought they didn’t, so they didn’t have flood insurance. Ninety-five percent of these people did not have flood insurance. They have to apply for assistance somewhere else. Unfortunately for FEMA, that is $33,000 for those people. That doesn’t 

even start to repair some of the damage. 

62 

We have to do a better job of educating people that flood insurance is cheap, especially if you don’t live in a flood zone. We need 

to get more of them to do that so they are prepared for something 

like that. 

We weren’t prepared for anything like this storm. We had never 

seen it. I have been in office 32 years. I have been through a lot 

of rodeos. This was the worst. Ike was all wind and no rain. Harvey was all rain and no wind. But I will just tell you that during 

Hurricane Ike, I was out $390,000 out of my budget in 2010. We 

didn’t receive the final payment until 2013. The tax day request is 

$100,000 or more, and we haven’t even heard when we are going 

to get that money yet. 

The most important thing for you all to remember—and I chair 

a coalition of 13 multi-cities in the Harris County area, and I also 

chair a coalition of 18 cities that are in Fort Bend County. We talk 

about this, that none of us received a penny, that I am aware of, 

but yet we paid that money up front. 

Here is the important part that you need to remember. Ranking 

Member Thompson knows this. When we take money out of our 

general fund, we are taking money out of the required reserve that 

our bonding agencies require us to have. Twenty-five percent of our 

capital improvement projects and 25 percent of our budget needs 

to be in our reserves. When I take money out of that reserve, the 

bonding agencies come in—and we have reduced that amount of 

money—and they look at my bonding rating differently. 

That affects us all. These small cities don’t have that. I am in 

the process right now of spending $25,000 to hire a consultant to 

tell us how to fill out the forms that are needed for FEMA. We submitted our Rebuild Texas submittal to the State of Texas. It is $97 

million. I haven’t heard a word where we are on that. Part of that 

is flood mitigation that we are prepared to spend money to make 

sure it doesn’t happen again. 

There is a levy district that protects Missouri City from the Brazos River; 59 feet is the limit on that levy. I can tell you that I sat 

there during that period of time, and I cried one night thinking 

what would happen to the rest of my city had that levy broke or 

exceeded the percent. 

So we are doing our part. What I am asking for today, and I am 

asking on behalf of the small cities, we can’t wait 3 years to get 

our money back. We can’t wait 3 years for it to affect our bond rating when we take money out of our pocket to pay for this stuff and 

then we don’t get a response back early enough for us to protect 

ourselves. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Owen follows:] 

63 

REBUILD TEXAS WORKSHEET 

Prioritized Requests for Federal Funding 

Requesting Entity Name: Missouri City, Texas 

Rank 

Order Project Name 

Description 

Est. Cost 

(Dollars) 

No. of Units 

(if Applicable) 

Other Possible Funding 

Sources 

(Insurance, Local, Etc.) 

Economic Redevelopment Incentives of Hurricane Harvey 

Substantially Damaged Structures thru Public/Private 

Partnerships in a Economically Distressed Areas 

(Ranked Projects No. 1–7) 

1 ........... Texas Parkway Corridor 

Commercial Improvements.

Missouri City Central— 

Movie Theater Building—2416 Texas Parkway.

$3,000,000 

2 ........... Texas Parkway Corridor 

Commercial Improvements.

Quail Corner Shopping 

Center—King Dollar— 2192 Texas Parkway (Old Kroger).

$3,000,000 

3 ........... Texas Parkway Corridor 

Commercial Improvements.

Wells Fargo Office Building (Texas Parkway @ 

Court Rd.).

$2,900,000 

4 ........... Texas Parkway Corridor 

Commercial Improvements.

KFC Building Damaged 

Facade Improvements.

$80,000 

5 ........... Cartwright Rd. Corridor 

Commercial Improvements.

Meadow Creek Village 

Building (Old HEB).

$1,500,000 

6 ........... Cartwright Rd. Corridor 

Commercial Improvements.

Quail Valley Town Center—2601 Cartwright 

Rd.

$2,400,000 

7 ........... Cartwright Rd. Corridor 

Commercial Improvements.

Village Walk Center 

(Palais Royal) 3819 Cartwright Rd.

$1,200,000 

64 

REBUILD TEXAS WORKSHEET—Continued 

Prioritized Requests for Federal Funding 

Requesting Entity Name: Missouri City, Texas 

Rank 

Order Project Name 

Description 

Est. Cost 

(Dollars) 

No. of Units 

(if Applicable) 

Other Possible Funding 

Sources 

(Insurance, Local, Etc.) 

Economic Redevelopment Incentives of Hurricane Harvey 

Substantially Damaged Structures thru Public/Private 

Partnerships in a Economically Distressed Areas 

(Ranked Projects No. 1–7) 

8 ........... Rehabilitation of housing 

damaged during the disaster.

Supplemental funding 

(without duplication) for homes and buildings up to a maximum of $20,000 per home, that were impacted by the storm.

$30,900,000 2049 (based on initial assessment). Private Insurance. 

9 ........... Acquisition of new housing units. Undertake new housing construction to provide 

housing stock for displaced residents.

$4,000,000 20.

10 ......... Fac ̨ade and Infrastructure 

Improvement Program.

Implement Fac ̨ade and Infrastructure Improvement Program within 

core corridor areas, including low-moderate income CDBG areas, such as Texas Parkway, Cartwright Rd., FM 1092, and 5th Street that sustained damage during the storm event.

$2,500,000 

65 

11 ......... Emergency Preparedness Disaster Notification 

Technology (i.e., reverse 9–1–1) for special needs populations regarding potential evacuation and emergency notification purposes.

$175,000 

12 ......... Develop a Flood Alert System and Increase Public 

Awareness of Hazards.

Installation of rainfall and 

stream level gauges in critical streams for public awareness and information, more efficient emergency response, more timely warnings to the general public, hydrologic and hydraulic model calibration and more efficient use of emergency assets. Outreach to public thru various communication channels to increase awareness of flood hazards.

$500,000 

66 

REBUILD TEXAS WORKSHEET—Continued 

Prioritized Requests for Federal Funding 

Requesting Entity Name: Missouri City, Texas 

Rank 

Order Project Name 

Description 

Est. Cost 

(Dollars) 

No. of Units 

(if Applicable) 

Other Possible Funding 

Sources 

(Insurance, Local, Etc.) 

Economic Redevelopment Incentives of Hurricane Harvey 

Substantially Damaged Structures thru Public/Private 

Partnerships in a Economically Distressed Areas 

(Ranked Projects No. 1–7) 

13 ......... Brazos River Interactive 

Inundation Maps for Emergency Preparedness and Response.

Backwater effect from 

Brazos River has the potential to impact over 5,000 properties within Missouri City. During Hurricane Harvey, approximate evacuation areas were identified based upon static innudation maps. However, these maps will need to be expanded/enhanced to include different Brazos Tailwater Scenarios, and to also include actual ground/ building elevation data for better accuracy. This will allow residents to obtain site-specific information on their homes vs. river elevations.

$250,000 

67 

14 ......... Localized Ponding Maps 

for Emergency Preparedness.

Several areas within Missouri City were inundated from local rain 

during the Harvey Event, which includes flooded structures. Identifying potential lowlying areas within the city that are more prone to flooding/inundation during extreme rain events will aid in emergency preparedness and response. Utilizing the existing ground topography/Lidar Data, ponding maps will be developed city-wide, for various (5) rainfall frequencies and tailwater effect from the Brazos River.

$250,000 

15 ......... Gate Closure for isolating 

Flat Bank Creek Diversion/Oyster Creek from the Brazos River Flood Levels.

This project entails implementing a flood control 

alternative for preventing the backflow of the Brazos River flood waters from entering the existing developed areas within Missouri City. Improvements include a Flat Bank Creek Diversion Closure (Flap Gated Culverts) to prevent intrusion of Brazos River flood waters into Oyster Creek and other upstream areas.

$5,000,000 

Estimated City’s 

share of funding 

to this project. 

Other potential 

sources of 

funding include 

Fort Bend 

County and 

local 

jurisdictions. 

68 

REBUILD TEXAS WORKSHEET—Continued 

Prioritized Requests for Federal Funding 

Requesting Entity Name: Missouri City, Texas 

Rank 

Order Project Name 

Description 

Est. Cost 

(Dollars) 

No. of Units 

(if Applicable) 

Other Possible Funding 

Sources 

(Insurance, Local, Etc.) 

Economic Redevelopment Incentives of Hurricane Harvey 

Substantially Damaged Structures thru Public/Private 

Partnerships in a Economically Distressed Areas 

(Ranked Projects No. 1–7) 

16 ......... Emergency Operations 

Center Back-up.

Acquire property which 

has dormitory accommodations to serve as a back-up emergency operations center and housing for emergency operations crews, i.e. Global Geophysical, 13927 S. Gessner Rd., Missouri City TX.

$10,000,000 1.

17 ......... Grants for training first 

respondents with all necessary disaster preparedness knowledge and skills: $100,000.

Grants for training first 

respondents with all necessary disaster preparedness knowledge and skills.

$100,000 

69 

18 ......... Emergency Preparedness The purchase and installation of emergency generators on city facilities. 

Specifically, the City Centre which served as housing for over 60 National Guard, police officers, and other first responders during the last event; the City Hall Facility which serves as the back-up Emergency Operations Center, and the Public Works Service Center which serves as fleet maintenance and operational center for disaster response.

$900,000 3.

19 ......... Emergency Preparedness—Hazard Mitigation Project No. 1. Channel improvement for Mustang Bayou from the GCWA Canal 

through the Thunderbird North Subdivision.

$1,500,000 1.

20 ......... Emergency Preparedness—Hazard Mitigation Project No. 2. Channel improvements along Mustang Bayou from the Thunderbird 

North Subdivision to the confluence with the old channel; including pipeline relocations and a sheet pile structure.

$2,500,000 1.

21 ......... Emergency Preparedness—Hazard Mitigation Project No. 3. Extend the Brisco Canal Flume over Lower Oys- ter Creek to enable excavation of the widening 

of the channel; plus allow for channel improvements upstream of the flume.

$1,500,000 1.

70 

REBUILD TEXAS WORKSHEET—Continued 

Prioritized Requests for Federal Funding 

Requesting Entity Name: Missouri City, Texas 

Rank 

Order Project Name 

Description 

Est. Cost 

(Dollars) 

No. of Units 

(if Applicable) 

Other Possible Funding 

Sources 

(Insurance, Local, Etc.) 

Economic Redevelopment Incentives of Hurricane Harvey 

Substantially Damaged Structures thru Public/Private 

Partnerships in a Economically Distressed Areas 

(Ranked Projects No. 1–7) 

22 ......... Emergency Preparedness—Hazard Mitigation Project No. 4. Channel Improvements along the Long Point Creek Overflow Channel 

upstream of the Brisco Canal.

$850,000 

23 ......... Emergency Preparedness—Hazard Mitigation Project No. 5. NFIP Repetitive Loss structures. Pursue ac- quisition, elevation, or 

flood proofing projects and structural solutions to flooding for repetitive loss structures.

$1,600,000 11.

24 ......... Emergency Preparedness Funding for generators to 

energize key traffic signals within city.

$20,000 20.

25 ......... Emergency Preparedness Funding for traffic signal 

cabinets to replace storm-damaged cabinets.

$200,000 10.

26 ......... Emergency Preparedness Provide daily meals to 

emergency operations personnel.

$80,000 1,600.

27 ......... Emergency Preparedness High Water Rescue Vehicles. $525,000 3.28 ......... Emergency Preparedness Rescue Boats with life 

jackets.

$60,000 6.

71 

29 ......... Emergency Preparedness Sand hopper for making 

sand bags necessary for interim flood control set-up.

$50,000 2.

30 ......... Emergency Preparedness Portable high GPM 

stormwater pumps and accessories for flood mitigation applications.

$1,000,000 

31 ......... Emergency Preparedness ′′Tiger Dams’’—Temporary 

tubular dams that can be used for flood control to secure critical facilities.

$1,000,000 100.

32 ......... Emergency Preparedness Quick dam—expandable 

sand bag.

$5,000 100.

33 ......... Damage to City-owned 

Buildings/Infrastructure.

Damaged signal cabinet 

and signal heads.

$35,000 2 ......................................... City’s Insurance from 

TML may cover a portion these losses. 

34 ......... Damage to City-owned 

Buildings/Infrastructure.

Surface Water Treatment 

Plant, Wastewater Treatment Plant, and Associated Facilities.

$200,000 7 ......................................... City’s Insurance from 

TML may cover a portion these losses. 

35 ......... Damage to City-owned 

Buildings/Infrastructure.

Estimated repair cost for 

vehicles damaged during the storm event.

$150,000 15 ....................................... City’s Insurance from 

TML may cover a portion these losses. 

36 ......... Damage to City-owned 

Buildings/Infrastructure.

Surface Water Treatment 

Plant, Wastewater Treatment Plants, Lift Stations and Associated Facilities.

$200,000 7 ......................................... City’s Insurance from 

TML may cover a portion these losses. 

37 ......... Damage to City-owned 

Buildings/Infrastructure.

Estimated damage to 

other city buildings.

$500,000 6 ......................................... City’s Insurance from 

TML may cover a portion these losses. 

.............. *Administrative Expenses Funding for administrative costs (estimated at 

20% of the total project costs).

$16,000,000 

.............. ............................................. ............................................. $96,630,000 

72 

NON-MITIGATED RECORDS 

Community Name CID Bldg. Payments Contents Payments Total Payments Average Payment Losses Properties 

Missouri City, City Of ............ 480304 1,605,645.04 377,928.82 1,983,573.86 17,099.11 116 35 

MITIGATED RECORDS 

Community Name CID Bldg. Payments Contents Payments Total Payments Average Payment Losses Properties 

Missouri City, City Of ............ 480304 9,154.61 0.00 9,154.61 2,288.65 4 2 

RESIDENTIAL VALIDATED SEVERE REPETITIVE LOSS 

Community Name CID Bldg. Payments Contents Payments Total Payments Average Payment Losses Properties 

Missouri City, City Of ............ 480304 738,921.07 154,673.90 893,594.97 24,151.22 37 5 

ALL REPETITIVE LOSS 

Community Name CID Bldg. Payments Contents Payments Total Payments Average Payment Losses Properties 

Missouri City, City Of ............ 480304 1,614,799.65 377,928.82 1,992,728.47 16,606.07 120 37 

73 

HARVEY-RELATED COSTS REPORTED IN FUND 800 

Amount 

Personnel Costs for Harvey including benefits and overtime .......................................................................................................... $708,897 Wearing Apparel .................................................................................................................................................................................. $21,698 Minor Tools, Furn & Equipment ........................................................................................................................................................ $4,947 Eoc Supplies ......................................................................................................................................................................................... $52,116 Contractual Services ............................................................................................................................................................................ $57,682 Fleet Repair Costs ................................................................................................................................................................................ $91,348 Machinery & Equipment ..................................................................................................................................................................... $42,440 

Total ........................................................................................................................................................................................... $979,128 

74 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you for that testimony. It was very 

passionate. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Sloan. 

STATEMENT OF MARK SLOAN, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS 

Mr. SLOAN. Thank you, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member 

Thompson, and committee Members, for the opportunity to brief 

today. 

Harris County is unique throughout the country. We have 1,777 

square miles and 4.7 million residents that reside here. We have 

an urban population of approximately 2 million in the unincorporated area, meaning they don’t live within a city limit. 

There are also 34 cities within Harris County, including the city 

of Houston. During times of a disaster, it is our responsibility to 

support each of those cities equally, including our partners in the 

unincorporated Harris County. 

Harris County is home to 57 fire departments, over 125 law enforcement agencies, all of them heroes during this event. 

We have quite a bit of critical infrastructure. As you are well 

aware, it needs to be supported in order to get our economy back 

on-line. 

Since 1979, Harris County has had 46 Federally-declared disasters. That is an average of one every 9 months, some of them large 

like Harvey, others smaller like Memorial Day or tax day, or the 

fires of 2011. 

In Texas we say a lot of things like ‘‘neighbors helping neighbors.’’ Well, we are proud of that because there is a hero on every 

porch in Texas. In the emergency management authority in all 

counties throughout Texas, we have the authority that we need to 

be able to manage disasters. It is that coordination that we do with 

our jurisdictions and our first responders. It is absolutely essential 

that we have to manage the scarce resources that are available to 

us at the local level, from our State partners, and from our Federal 

partners in order to react and respond accordingly. 

We have lots of plans, we do a lot of training, and the way we 

practice is the way we play. That is not important just before a disaster, but during and also in the recovery process. 

As we learn lessons in the recovery and the mitigation, Harris 

County was capable of inspecting 180 county buildings within the 

first 6 days. Within 72 hours, over 900 traffic signals were inspected and repaired to safe conditions. Within 5 days, 13,000 lane 

miles and 800 bridges were inspected. Within 2 weeks, all road 

washouts and damaged bridges were repaired to safe conditions. 

Harris County started hauling debris in the first 4 days after 

Harvey, on schedule to maintain three passes within a 90-day period. For a while we removed the equivalent of the tax day flood 

debris every 2 days, as the Commissioner mentioned. We have 

hauled over 1.2 million cubic yards to date, not including what 

flood control has done within our systems. Harris County inspected 

over 500,000 homes visually and issued almost 30,000 permits and 

25 full inspections within 5 weeks. Our courthouse and jury assemVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:30 Aug 17, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18FL0409\18FL0409 HEATH
75 

bly buildings were completely damaged and continue to be repaired, a challenge at this time. 

These statistics were for the unincorporated area of Harris County. The FEMA mitigation funds are crucial to restoring these efforts as we are now looking ahead to the upcoming storm season. 

We appreciate FEMA’s review of mitigation money. We hope Congress provides pre-mitigation funding opportunities instead of waiting for a disaster to fund these things. We have seen that this is 

extremely beneficial and have seen the return on that investment 

of mitigation money now at not only 4-to-1 but at 6-to-1. 

Other lessons learned include warnings and communications. 

Our regional joint information center was activated with personnel 

from all over the region and the State. We pushed out over 2,400 

social media notifications and posts, 650 media interviews, 259 

news releases, and 25 press conferences. But we saw that even that 

was not enough, and recovery and planning, which now includes 

new backup opportunities for our 9–1–1 system and other public 

alerting systems. 

Lessons learned include sheltering for urban populations. We 

sheltered almost 20,000 people in mega-shelters being open at the 

George R. Brown in the city of Houston, and the NRG Center, including persons from other counties seeking refuge that came to us 

when we averaged almost 3 feet of rain across our entire county. 

The shelter at NRG with community partner Baker Ripley has become a model, having included medical, pharmacy services, child 

care, veterinary care, and FEMA at a registration site. 

We appreciate the work the GLO and the delegation are doing 

on the CDBGDR funding allocations with Harris County and the 

city of Houston. 

Another lesson learned was multiple overlapping National disasters. As we have done other disasters here on numerous occasions, 

the opportunities for disaster recovery centers have been able to be 

provided to our community within the community. The fact is we 

had Irma and Maria impacting the country, so we received three 

mega disaster recovery centers, and eventually we got up to 20. 

There were many delays during the critical first few weeks when 

FEMA became stretched thin to manage these additional events in 

multiple jurisdictions. We urge Congress to look at ways to better 

equip FEMA to handle multiple overlapping disasters in the future. 

Thank you for the opportunity to brief today. I would be happy 

to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sloan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK SLOAN

APRIL 9, 2018 

BACKGROUND

Briefly describe urban and complexity of Harris County. We are unique in the 

country in that we have a dense, urban population of approximately 2 million that 

are in unincorporated Harris County, meaning they do not live within a city limit. 

There are also 34 cities inside the county, including the city of Houston. During 

times of disaster, it our responsibility to support each of those cities equally—including our partners in unincorporated Harris County. 

Harris County is home to 57 fire departments, more than 125 law enforcement 

agencies, with quite a bit of critical infrastructure and key resources, as you may 

76 

know. Since 1979, Harris County has had 46 Federally-declared disasters. In fact, 

we average 1 disaster every 8 or 9 months. 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY—HARRIS COUNTY

• Harris County, and all counties, has the authority it needs but it needs to be 

followed 

• This is of particular concern to Harris because 34 cities, dense urban region 

City to County to State to Feds... Feds to State to County to City 

• Absolutely essential to managing scarce resources during a disaster 

• Practice how you play 

• Important not only before disaster and during, but also during recovery 

FEDERAL JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER FIELD OFFICE—POST-DISASTER

• These FEMA field offices to support a disaster response 

• They typically house at the State in Austin 

• That makes sense for them pre/during disaster but not after 

• For increased coordination with locals, the Joint Operations Center should be 

sent to local communities where the disaster occurred for better integration 

(State can request this) 

• State support is needed for this because the State is FEMA’s client, not the 

locals 

• The purpose of a Joint Field Office, according to the Federal plan, is to integrate all Federal agencies to improve the overall Federal response. But no matter how well the Federal response is coordinated—if it is not integrated with 

local efforts, it is not working as well as it can. 

RECOVERY AND MITIGATION

• Harris County inspected 180 county buildings in 6 days 

• Within 72 hours over 900 traffic signals were inspected and repaired to safe 

conditions 

• Within 5 days over 13,000 lane miles and 800 bridges were inspected. 

• Within 2 weeks all road washouts and damaged bridges were repaired to safe 

conditions 

• Harris County started hauling debris 4 days after Harvey on schedule for 3 

passes in 90 days. 

• For a while we removed the equivalent of the Tax Day flood debris every 2 

days. We have hauled over 1.2 million cubic yards to date, not including the 

Flood Control District’s debris. 

• Harris County inspected over 500,000 homes visually and issued almost 30,000 

permits and 25,000 full inspections within 5 weeks. 

• Our courthouse and jury assembly were completely damaged and continue to 

be a challenge. 

• All of these statistics were for the unincorporated area of Harris County. 

• The FEMA mitigation funds are crucial to restoring these efforts as we are now 

looking ahead to the upcoming storm season. 

LESSONS LEARNED—WARNINGS AND COMMUNICATIONS

The Regional Joint Information Center was activated with personnel from all over 

the region and State. This included 2,418 social media posts, 650 media interviews, 

259 news releases, and 25 news conferences. But we saw that even that was not 

enough and recovery planning now includes new back-ups for our 9–1–1 system and 

other public alert systems. 

LESSONS LEARNED—SHELTERING FOR URBAN POPULATIONS

Harris County sheltered almost 20,000 people with the mega shelters being 

opened at George R Brown Center and NRG center, including persons from other 

counties seeking refuge. The shelter at NRG with community partner Baker Ripley 

has become a model, having included medical and pharmacy services, child care, 

veterinarian care, and FEMA registration on-site. 

LESSONS LEARNED—MULTIPLE, OVERLAPPING NATIONAL DISASTERS

Harris County originally received 3 mega DRCs and eventually housed appox. 20 

DRCs, both fixed and mobile. There were delays during the critical first few weeks 

when FEMA became stretched thin to manage additional events in Florida. We urge 

77 

Congress to look at ways to better equip FEMA to handle multiple, overlapping 

events in the future. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, Mark. 

The Chair now recognizes Ms. Moore for her testimony. 

STATEMENT OF CAROL MOORE, DISASTER CHAIR, TEXAS 

STATE CONFERENCE, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE 

Ms. MOORE. Thank you so much for having me. Chairman 

McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the Committee, I am Carol Moore, chair of the Texas State NAACP disaster 

committee. 

Hurricane Harvey was devastating, and with the storm, we, like 

so many organizations, faced the daunting task of helping those in 

need, and still are helping those in need. 

The Texas State NAACP has an MOU with the Red Cross and 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA. Working in 

tandem with these two organizations has allowed us to continue 

our mission of advocacy. There were many calls and emails and 

meetings which allowed us to partake in disaster response and the 

recovery process. 

What happened for this very first time with the MOUs with the 

Red Cross and FEMA and the NAACP, we were actually at the discussion table to talk about issues that had priority and had not had 

impact on our community in a very positive way. So this is a very 

important structure for us, to have these MOUs. 

We knew that Hurricane Harvey was historic, and to capture 

that work, we created a documentary. The documentary is called 

‘‘NAACP Harvey’’ and is publicly available for those who wish to 

view it. I would be honored if those on the committee would like 

to see it, and we would be glad to produce that documentary for 

you. 

After Hurricane Harvey made landfall, we quickly learned that 

rescue for our community meant that helping each other was the 

only way we were going to get through it. This catastrophic event 

was historic in our community. Fear and panic seemed to rule the 

whole community. We were surrounded by high water and confusion as to where help was coming from, and added to the state of 

panic. We are still in a state of panic. 

Members of the community did not wait for Federal assistance 

before we took action. Local first responders worked for days to 

save lives. Business owners opened their doors to help provide 

goods and services. Churches provided refuge for storm survivors. 

There were countless individuals who stepped up and helped others 

in the face of the storm aftermath, and for that we are grateful and 

take great pride. 

From the lessons learned from Hurricane Harvey, the Houston 

NAACP Branch Disaster Recovery Center was created. Our disaster recovery center provided many residents with assistance, including mucking supplies, finding housing, filing FEMA applications and appeals, Red Cross assistance, and outreach to the elderly and families with children. These are examples of the many lives 

we have touched. 

78 

One of the lessons Hurricane Harvey taught and/or reminded the 

community is that preparation is key. Preparation in policy is nothing if the people in the community are not prepared. People need 

to know that in a crisis, you are your own first responder. You 

must have plans for your families in case of an emergency. Community leaders must be prepared for the storms and know how to 

provide instructions to those who need them. 

Looking forward, and we all want to do that, the NAACP Branch 

Disaster Recovery Center is looking to establish a block-by-block 

campaign in conjunction with churches and create a State-wide certified emergency response team. We believe that this emergency response team will use existing relationships between communities 

and residents to create a robust network for those in need after a 

disaster. 

Many times we forget that many people live every day in a disaster. Therefore, the rescue and recovery process after Hurricane 

Harvey continues. The Texas State NAACP stands ready to work 

with those here today and those listening from afar to increase 

community preparedness and speed the recovery for Hurricane 

Harvey survivors. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Moore follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAROL MOORE

APRIL 9, 2018 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the committee, 

I am Carol Moore, chair of the Texas State NAACP Disaster Committee. 

Hurricane Harvey was devastating and with the storm, we, like so many organizations faced the daunting task of helping those in need. 

The Texas State NAACP has Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with the 

Red Cross and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Working in tandem with these two organizations has allowed us to continue our mission of advocacy. There were many conference calls, emails, and meetings which allowed us to 

be part of the disaster response and recovery process. 

We knew that Hurricane Harvey was historic and to capture our work, we created 

a documentary. The documentary is called NAACP Harvey and is publicly available 

for those who wish to view it. I would be honored if Members of the committee 

would view the documentary as it would give you a sense of the challenges we faced 

on the ground. 

After Hurricane Harvey made landfall, we quickly learned that rescue for our 

community meant that helping each other was the only way we were going to get 

through this catastrophe. Fear and panic seemed to rule as whole communities were 

surrounded by high water. Confusion as to where help was coming from added to 

the state of panic. 

Members of the community did not wait for Federal assistance before we took action. Local first responders worked for days to save lives. Business owners opened 

their doors to help provide goods and services. Churches provided refuge for storm 

survivors. There were countless individuals who stepped up and helped others in 

the face of the storm aftermath and for that we are grateful and take great pride. 

From the lessons learned from Hurricane Harvey, the Houston NAACP Branch 

Disaster Recovery Center was created. Our Disaster Recovery Center provided many 

residents with assistance, including mucking supplies, finding housing, filing FEMA 

applications and appeals, locating Red Cross assistance, conducting outreach to the 

elderly and families. 

One of the lessons Hurricane Harvey taught and/or reminded the community is 

that preparation is key. Preparation in policy is nothing if the people in the community are not prepared. People need to know that in a crisis you are your own first 

responder. You must have plans for your families in case of an emergency. CommuVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:30 Aug 17, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18FL0409\18FL0409 HEATH
79 

nity leaders must be prepared for the storms and know how to provide instructions 

to those who need them. 

Looking forward, the NAACP Branch Disaster Recovery Center is looking to establish a block-by-block campaign in conjunction with churches and create a Statewide certified emergency response team. We believe that this emergency response 

team will use existing relationships between communities and residents to create 

a robust network for those in need after a disaster. 

Many times we forget that many people live every day in a disaster, therefore the 

rescue and recovery process after Hurricane Harvey continues. The Texas State 

NAACP stands ready to work with those here today and those listening from afar 

to increase community preparedness and speed the recovery for Hurricane Harvey 

survivors. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to any questions you 

may have. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, Ms. Moore. 

I recognize myself for questioning, but before doing so I ask 

unanimous consent to insert in the record a statement from Commissioner George P. Bush of the Texas General Land Office. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 

STATEMENT OF GEORGE P. BUSH, COMMISSIONER, GENERAL LAND OFFICE, 

STATE OF TEXAS

APRIL 9, 2018 

Chairman McCaul, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to share lessons learned by the State of Texas in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from Hurricane Harvey. 

As you know, after Hurricane Harvey made landfall Governor Abbott approached 

the General Land Office (GLO) for taking the lead on short-term housing programs 

for hurricane victims. This meant that for the first time, short- and long-term housing would fall under the same agency. 

When Hurricane Harvey finally dissipated, it affected 49 counties and prompted 

over 890,000 Texans to apply for FEMA assistance. Of those, FEMA qualified 

371,000 for individual assistance and of those 6,000 qualified for direct housing. Additionally, FEMA and the GLO identified 87,000 Texans as potentially qualified for 

assistance through our Partial Repair and Essential Power for Sheltering (PREPS) 

program. Approximately 19,000 Texas households chose to take part in that program. So far, we have repaired more than 11,000 homes through our PREPS program, and nearly 8,000 families continue to receive temporary housing. 

In the past, Texas conducted recovery under the traditional FEMA-led program 

model. In comparison, after the flooding in March 2015, it took until late May for 

the placement of the first Manufactured Housing Unit (MHU). That 3-month time 

line was unacceptable to me. Under the new decentralized Harvey short-term recovery model, we placed MHU’s much faster than ever before in Texas. In this case, 

Governor Abbott designated the GLO as the State’s lead for short-term housing recovery on September 14. (Historically, the GLO handled long-term recovery through 

administration of CDBG funds but had no role in short-term housing.) Despite the 

compressed time line, the GLO placed the first MHU within 22 days of being designated to lead the State’s short-term housing program. From 3 months to less than 

1—the fastest recovery in history was under way. Federal dollars fund recovery as 

always, but it is State-administered and locally-led for the first time. 

FEMA has never passed the administration of the short-term housing programs 

over to a State. Historically the General Land Office, or any other State agency in 

Texas has taken on this aspect of recovery. Through my team at the GLO, Texas 

created an innovative model for the rest of the Nation to emulate. For the first time, 

short-term housing is administered on the State level, implemented on the local 

level, and led by local officials. 

As a model for the Nation, we have recorded important lessons learned, and put 

these lessons to use so we can better serve Texans on the road to recovery. I am 

proud to be able to outline some of the ways we have innovated the disaster response process at the General Land Office since we were given the lead on this crucial mission. 

First, we have pushed for and received important regulatory reforms. Originally, 

it was impossible to temporarily house survivors of this storm at commercial sites 

80 

due to regulatory restrictions on using private assets. We faced a similar issue as 

we tried to implement the Direct Lease program. Previously, FEMA regulations dictated we could only place storm victims in apartments not available for general use. 

This obviously and unnecessarily slowed down recovery. After working on these 

issues with our partners at FEMA, they granted Texas the ability to lease any available properties or commercial sites that met the standard requirements outlined in 

our agreements with FEMA. This change in policy allows Texans and other Americans affected by future storms placement in temporary housing even faster. This 

Texan innovation will improve recovery Nation-wide. 

We have also made significant changes to the way our staff handles the Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of disaster survivors. Due to the Federal Privacy 

Act of 1972, the PII of those impacted by a disaster and access to that data are significant challenges in any locally-led and State-sponsored recovery from a disaster 

like Hurricane Harvey. We have repeatedly heard this from our local officials as 

well. To ease this bottleneck, I have directed that every member of our agency staff 

that uses this data, and every member who may in the future, undergo a Federal 

background check to allow our team to access and utilize the data necessary to get 

Texans back home. Additionally, each of our recovery professionals is receiving a 

PIV card that meets Homeland Security requirements. These cards will be used to 

access their office buildings and to access their email and other sensitive information requiring a background check. It is important that we can access this data efficiently to speed recovery, but it is vital that we protect this data to guard Texans 

from identity theft and other data-related crimes. We are committed to doing both. 

Additionally, we have been inovative in how we utilize technology to recover from 

a disaster. We have created a disaster recovery domain in which each employee in 

the recovery program area gets a Microsoft 365 Cloud account that meets Federal 

security requirements. We use Microsoft HUBS and video teleconferencing to share 

information and documentation in real time from our headquarters in Austin to our 

field staff across the State in the disaster areas. This saves taxpayer money by cutting travel costs and staff time on the road. It allows information to move in real 

time. 

On the ground, we brought in Andrew Natsios to be our Recovery Czar. Andrew 

is the former head of USAID’s disaster recovery world-wide. His mission will be 

identifying shortfalls, improvements, and changes we can make to future housing 

recovery efforts. We will publish his findings as a report so we do not repeat mistakes in future disasters and so others can learn from our recovery. 

We have also assigned a significant number of GLO staff to the field. We learned 

that while most communities plan for disaster response, they do not always plan 

for disaster recovery. Having our staff in the field helps communities recover more 

efficiently from Hurricane Harvey and future disasters. These field staff have established important relationships with local leaders and Councils of Government 

(COGs). These relationships allow us to start educating Texas’ coastal communities 

on how to recover from the next storm. In fact, one of our teams led the first disaster recovery training in the Rio Grande Valley and is hosting another training in 

Austin. 

One of our biggest lessons in this disaster was discovering areas where there are 

needs for updates and modernization in the Stafford Act should the ‘‘Texas model’’ 

become the National standard for disaster recovery in the future. We have three 

main recommendations: 

First, block grants should be the preferred method of distribution of funds in place 

of intergovernmental service agreement (IGSA). An IGSA can slow recovery, no matter how well-intentioned. This would also allow for the use of innovative housing 

programs such as Rapido, Kasitas, and 3–D printed homes, which we requested permission to use in the aftermath of Harvey. 

Second, any State’s lead agency for disaster recovery should have prepositioned 

Indefinite Duration, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts. We encourage every other 

State to pre-position those relationships for an expedited disaster response. 

Last, there should be pre-prepared waivers for Federal procurement guidelines to 

allow a State impacted by a disaster to move as quickly as possible to get the goods 

and services their citizens are in critical need of while the details get worked out— 

so disaster survivors are not waiting on bureaucracy. 

I am proud of the work the GLO has done on behalf of all Texans, but we know 

there is significant work left. Although it was not without challenges, we have managed to forge a productive partnership with FEMA throughout the administration 

of our recovery. We have worked with our Federal partners, but we have made unilateral innovations where possible to expediate recovery for all Texans affected by 

this historic event. We appreciate the committee’s and Congress’ support as we continue working to get Texans back home. 

81 

Chairman MCCAUL. I now recognize myself for questions. 

Commissioner Cagle, you and I and Mayor Turner and Mark 

Sloan, we have lived through this tragedy, but we are looking for 

solutions to prevent the next one from occurring. Three of these in 

the last 2 years is unacceptable. 

So my question has to do with this third reservoir. We have all 

seen the map. It was actually in 1940 that the map was made by 

the Army Corps of Engineers, and here we are in 2018, and that 

levy—not even a levy, much less a reservoir, has been constructed. 

President Kennedy said we will land a man on the moon by the 

end of the decade, and that was less than 10 years. So for me to 

hear it is going to take 10 years is unacceptable. 

Most homeland security issues aren’t Republican or Democratic. 

They are all about the American people and what is best for Texans and the American people and how we can protect the American 

people from threats, whether they be man-made or natural disasters. 

So I want to start with you, Commissioner, and then the Mayor 

and Mark, in terms of how important is this third reservoir, and 

what do we need to do working together with the Army Corps of 

Engineers to get this done as expeditiously as possible? 

Mr. CAGLE. First of all, thank you, Chairman McCaul, for your 

leadership in showing the Corps map. The Corps map is actually 

an outgrowth from a map that the county put together a few years 

before called the Rafferty Plan with the tri-corridors, 1939. Before 

that, in 1910, there were discussions about how we needed to provide for spaces for our water to go by a gentleman by the name of 

Comey. 

So what we are discussing today is something that we have 

known is needed since the great hurricane that occurred in 1900 

that you referenced earlier. So it is appropriate that we bring forth 

the lessons of history and learn them this time. 

How important is it? One hundred years’ worth of important lessons that we have neglected until now, and I want to thank you, 

each and every one, for saying the time is now. 

What occurs with Cypress Creek, as you know, is that the water 

comes north-south, and there is a natural bank that is there. That 

is why they had the proposed levy in the Corps of Engineers’ map, 

to try to catch it before it jumped the curve, as it were, and then 

flooded Barker and Addicks, and then Fort Bend and the other 

counties that are down below. 

So if we can keep the water from hitting down Cypress Creek, 

which is now developed, from jumping the curve, as it were, and 

flooding and overpowering our Barker and Addicks, we can make 

great strides. There are models that are elsewhere in the world 

that we can look to. 

Chairman, you have been very tolerant of me as you have heard 

me talk about Plan 7. There is no such thing right now as a Plan 

7. There is a Plan 5, which is a regional solution. But a Plan 7 

would be something that would take what we need to do that 

would be interactive with our other reservoirs and be part of a system of flood protection that protects more than just that little region that is out there, because downstream of that region is the 

city of Houston and the other cities that we have. So we would 

82 

much rather fight the battle against the floods at the curb, as it 

were, than at our curb at our homes. 

The second part of why I say instead of Plan 6, to go ahead with 

Plan 7, is it is anticipated that the population in our region will 

double in the next 15 years. We need a plan not for what we needed 5 years ago, or a plan for just what we needed for Harvey. We 

need a plan for what we need in 15 years when all the rooftops and 

the concrete and the streets are all in place. 

So to that extent, I would urge that we make a plan which would 

be a Plan 7: No. 1, that integrates it as a system; and No. 2, that 

would allow it to be built for the future. 

Internationally, in Holland, they take wide expanses of land and 

farmers and they enter into agreements with their farmers, so that 

instead of having deep reservoirs that can have flat-out zones to 

where they pay them for the right to use their fields, and when 

there is a flood event they go up on the hill of their house, they 

herd their cattle up on the hill and they wait for the waters to go 

down again. 

In China, where they have had the big dams, they divided it up 

into a series of seven smaller sisters instead of one big mama of 

a dam. Perhaps by using the technology and the knowledge that is 

done elsewhere in the globe and bringing it to home, we can protect 

everyone who is downstream. 

Is it urgent? Yes. What is there to do? To fund it. We need to 

make sure, with all due respect to the Corps that normally takes 

a study, and then a study on the study, and then it takes 20 to 

30 years for the Corps to do something, we need to do something 

together that is more like what occurred in New Orleans with the 

rebuilding of the levy, because every year we are going to face what 

Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee mentioned earlier, 18 events, 

18 risks. Do we want to wait 20 to 30 years to see if the dice rolls 

in our favor again? I would urge you, no. 

Let us act. Let us act now. Let us act directly. Let us plan for 

the future, and let’s make sure that our plans integrate with our 

other plans so that we have a robust system. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you. 

Mayor. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Congressman McCaul. I certainly share 

the sentiments of Commissioner Cagle. 

I will tell you, it is all about mitigation. We have faced 3 500- 

year floods in the last 3 years, and now that is becoming the norm. 

So it is about mitigation. It does require a general plan, even for 

the city of Houston that sits within Harris County, that sits within 

this area. Unless we address these flooding issues from a regional 

point of view, the city will continue to flood. So we do need the reservoir. 

Where it will be? I will leave that up to the Corps and others. 

But something needs to be done, the reservoir needs to be done, 

and it needs to be done now, or at the very minimum we need to 

talk about excavation or dredging, something that will increase the 

capacity even outside of the city of Houston to mitigate the amount 

of water that flows down, whether it is coming north to south or 

whether it is coming from west to east. 

83 

What we do know is that thousands of homes flooded, not from 

the water falling from the sky, but thousands of homes flooded 

when water was released from the dams, OK? That is what we do 

know. We do know that. 

So we have to come up with a solution, quicker rather than later, 

in order to mitigate the risk of flooding. So whether that is the reservoir, whether that is doing dredging or excavation, that needs to 

take place. 

I think we make a serious mistake if we take additional time, for 

example, in studying all of this. Because, let me tell you, the enemy 

of coming up with something effective is studies, and people don’t 

want to hear studies anymore, because you can always study a 

study a study. What people want to see is they want to see us now 

taking action. It doesn’t have to be the perfect plan. It just needs 

to be a darn good plan, and that is what people are requiring. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I think it is referred to as paralysis by analysis. 

Mr. TURNER. Then even the additional steps we are taking in the 

city, whether it is about expanding the bayous or elevating homes 

or more on-site or regional detention, all of that will be reduced, 

the effectiveness will be reduced if we don’t mitigate the risk of 

flooding coming from outside of Houston coming in. 

Chairman MCCAUL. My time has expired, but I want to ask just 

two really quick questions. 

Would it be helpful to you, Mayor, to have these Community Development Block Grants Disaster Relief block-granted directly to 

Harris County and get around the bureaucracy? 

Mr. TURNER. I think it would be helpful to everyone. I think it 

would be helpful to the State, I think it would be helpful to local 

government, but more importantly I think it would be helpful to 

the people who need the dollars the most right now. That is what 

took place in 2015. The CDBGDR dollars came directly to the cities, and I think it is only a question of who can best do the job. 

But I think we all benefit when the people who are impacted get 

the dollars that they need as soon as they can. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I agree. 

One last question. The controlled spill, a very important issue. 

When did you three—Cagle, Mayor, Sloan—when did you get notification that was going to happen? It happened at 1:30 in the 

morning. 

Mr. TURNER. We had press conferences several times a day, at 

a minimum twice a day. What I was told by the Corps, for example, was that they were going to release water from the Barker and 

Addicks Dam, 4,000 cubic feet per second, ratchet up to 8,000. That 

was what we were told. They were going to ratchet up to 8,000. 

It was in the wee hours of the night that a decision was made 

that instead of going up to 8,000, to go up to about 14,000. That 

information was not provided to us. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Prior to the controlled spillage? 

Mr. TURNER. That is correct. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Commissioner Cagle, the same? 

Mr. CAGLE. The division of labor in the county is that the county 

judge, Ed Emmett, who held the helm, as it were, with the Office 

of Emergency Management and the mayor and the Trans-Star CenVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:30 Aug 17, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18FL0409\18FL0409 HEATH
84 

ter that we have, they were all giving information to those of us 

who were out in the county—Commissioner Riley, Commissioner 

Morman, Commissioner Ellis—and we were then taking our directions. 

Had we been given or had they been given the information what 

would occur, we would have done toward those neighborhoods the 

same thing that we did in Inverness Forest neighborhood when we 

were told that their levy was in danger of breaching. That is that 

we would have gone in there with our trucks, horns blaring, telling 

everybody to get out, if we knew that there was an emergency. We 

were not informed that that level of water was going to be imminent, and as a consequence we had to go into the high water to rescue people. It would have been much better to have gone in, horns 

a-blaring, telling people to get out now, letting them get into their 

cars so that we wouldn’t have 600,000 cars that got drowned, and 

allow folks to be removed from the region. 

So the answer to the question is we didn’t know until it was already done in terms of precincts. 

Chairman MCCAUL. So you didn’t know about this until after the 

spillage. 

Mr. Sloan, what was your recollection? 

Mr. SLOAN. As the Mayor indicated, we were aware of the 4,000. 

That is what they are authorized to do at the local level, up to 

8,000, without getting information out of the District of Columbia 

in order to increase the amount of volume that they can release 

from the reservoirs. 

Things were rapidly changing. As they run models on the 

amount of rain that is actually falling and then actually impacting 

the reservoirs, things evolved very, very fast throughout the 

evening. All of a sudden, they realized at some point that they had 

to increase the outflow to protect the levy systems, but they also 

knew that the volume of water that was coming in was going to 

start coming around the outside at some point. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I agree that it was probably necessary. Just 

1:30 in the morning is not very good timing. 

Mr. SLOAN. Unfortunately, Mother Nature doesn’t work 8 to 5, 

and it did not make it easy to notify the public, to push information, as we tried to do to the best of our ability. I know that it also 

takes a great number of hours for the Corps to run their models 

based on the volume of water that is entering the system. We are 

working very closely with them in our operations center, along with 

our Harris County Flood Control District, in order to have a good 

understanding of what the potential impacts are going to be to the 

community. 

No, we didn’t get all the information probably as fast as we 

would have hoped in order to prepare the community on that 

evening. 

Chairman MCCAUL. My time has more than expired. 

Ranking Member? I appreciate your indulgence. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I guess my comment about what I just heard is 

have we fixed the communication problem now, Mr. Mayor? 

Mr. TURNER. I can’t tell you with exactness that the communication issue has been fixed. I will say to you that I know what the 

Corps was telling me, that they have their protocol, and they folVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:30 Aug 17, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18FL0409\18FL0409 HEATH
85 

lowed their protocol. No. 1 was to protect the integrity of their system, as Mr. Sloan said. 

I do think it will be helpful that we do come up with a notification system that when these decisions are made, even if they have 

to be made at the last minute based on information that they are 

providing, that there is a way that they can get the information to 

us so that we can get the information out to homeowners and businesses who will be directly impacted, regardless of what time it 

might be. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Absolutely, because I think we heard something 

a little different from the first panel when that question was presented by a couple of Members on this committee. 

Mr. Chair, I think it would be something that, just from a broader public policy perspective—it might be Atlanta, Georgia at another time, or it might be Denver, Colorado. We get told time and 

eternity that communication is never a problem, that we train, we 

do all these things. But clearly, there is a disconnect in this notification process, and I would encourage some letter or something 

that will go from the results of this hearing with the Members here 

to kind of highlight it, especially to the Corps, since they have primary mission in this instance. 

Chairman MCCAUL. That would be good oversight. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

The other thing is that one of my experiences has been behind 

disasters is opportunity—good, bad, and otherwise. You know, people come into your community. They say we are here to save the 

day, and they have large contracts, and then they beat your local 

citizens down to a pulp trying to get the work done. I would just 

like to hear how you stop that from occurring in your community. 

You can talk about debris removal, you can talk about a lot of 

things. But we have a challenge when you put the large contracts 

out, and then the little guy with the dump truck in your community is getting 10 percent of what the guy who has the contract and 

no trucks is getting. 

Mr. Cagle. 

Mr. CAGLE. We were really blessed in Precinct 4 with the coordination that was provided by the Office of Emergency Management. 

We had contracts prior to the storm that were already in place 

with a number of major contractors, with prices that were set per 

load, not quite as nice as the contracts that the city of Houston had 

in place or some of the other areas, but decent rates that were in 

place. 

As we were in the scramble to try to find resources, because 

there were multiple disasters that were going on in the country at 

the same time—Marie was coming in as we were trying to remove 

our debris in the area of Florida—we built additional staging areas, 

actually, in Precinct 4. We had five staging areas, which made our 

contracts a little more lucrative. So we were able to get a lot of the 

smaller businesses who had come in and joined into our contract 

system because they could stage off, and I want to thank FEMA 

for working with us to allow us to build these staging areas that 

allowed us to actually bring in. In Precinct 4, we had 107, I believe, 

at its peak of the 300 Big Bertha machines, the ones with the 

cranes in the middle that chase the storms all across the country. 

86 

So by being able to work with FEMA, and by being able to work 

with our staging areas, we were able to do more. 

Another thing that we did that helped a lot of the smaller contracts is that for the first time we had self-help debris centers. 

That is, if you had a small truckload and you wanted to pay one 

of the smaller guys that were out there to come in and pick up your 

debris, take it out of your yard, and you wanted to help yourself 

instead of waiting because you had one of the big yards filled with 

debris, such as the photos here, you could actually do it yourself 

and FEMA, although initially they said we could not do it, then allowed us to do that. I think in the testimony you will see there that 

we had almost 21,000, 22,000 cubic yards by the debris which were 

smaller loads of people filling up their own dump trucks, filling up 

their own pickup truck and taking their neighbors’ loads to help 

each other out, which then took the pressure off of us having to remove the bigger debris in the bigger yards. 

That is a program that needs to be replicated elsewhere, because 

people are willing to help their neighbors when you give them a 

chance. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I think you are correct, and it goes toward the 

volunteer effort that the Mayor talked about also, which I think we 

also, Mr. Chair, need to look at. 

The only other question I have, Mr. Cagle, is the Red Cross has 

a national contract with us, and some of us think that they could 

do a better job. We just want to get it right. You can’t sanitize the 

disaster. It has to be where you roll up your sleeves and go in. 

What was your experience in the beginning? 

Mr. CAGLE. In the beginning we found difficulties in dealing with 

the Red Cross in that although they had resources and great heart, 

they weren’t prepared for what we had locally. So as with many endeavors, we started to work with what we had and started to utilize other resources in order to get the job done. 

We had training requirements that the Red Cross has, which are 

important training requirements, but required weeks of training 

when we had hours to try to open up a center. So we just began 

opening up shelters, finding other resources, and moving in and 

amongst ourselves. 

I commend the Red Cross for their endeavors, but we in the early 

days found that we were able to get service to the people that needed it. We could wait, or we could take care of the people as we 

found them. We chose to not wait but to take care of the people 

as we found them, to find places, whether they be schools from 

school districts, to find our partners at George R. Brown or at our 

center that we opened, the NRG, and just do it ourselves until they 

could catch up to us. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Right, and my only comment is that they have 

a national contract, and all those things are expected in the contract, and we want them to get to the communities as fast as possible. I went through Katrina, and they kept telling us this is not 

an approved shelter. What do you mean? It is the only place left 

standing. 

Mr. CAGLE. You couldn’t get to the approved shelters because the 

high water was in the way. 

87 

Mr. THOMPSON. Right. So I think if you could share your experience, we can get them to be a little more tolerant of the circumstances that they find themselves in, especially for vulnerable 

populations. They are the ones who really, really need a helping 

hand at those moments. If you would share that experience with 

us, I think it would be really helpful as we go forward. 

Mr. CAGLE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Mayor. 

Mr. TURNER. One thing we have found to be helpful is that setting up, having pre-positioned shelters prior to the storm. For example, when I came into office in 2016, the first major storm was 

the tax day flood on April 17, and there were a number of individuals in the north side of Houston in low-income areas that we 

couldn’t reach soon enough. So they were out on the bridges and 

everything, waiting for help. 

What we did this time, even prior to Harvey, is that with the 

Red Cross, we did set up some pre-positioned shelters. So when we 

got the weather report that there was going to be three bands of 

rain coming carrying 79 inches, we then went into the Campbell 

Center in northeast, and we set up pre-positioned shelters there 

and in a couple of other locations, and that worked out well. 

With the George R. Brown, we ended up setting that up. The director of housing and community development went and set that 

up, and then the Red Cross came in and joined with us later on. 

I think what would be helpful now is that especially when we are 

anticipating these types of storms, for people in vulnerable communities, those who are elderly, those in low-income communities, 

those with special needs, that we pre-position or pre-establish shelters throughout the city in different quadrants, especially with 

those vulnerable communities, in collaboration with, for example, 

the Red Cross, who is already pre-prepared and pre-stocked, so you 

know you are ready to go just in case you need that to happen. I 

think that would be very, very helpful, and everyone can move very 

quickly, and you know ahead of time where these potential shelter 

locations will be, especially for people in vulnerable populations, 

and senior citizens in particular. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Good recommendations. 

The Chair recognizes General Bacon. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you. Thank you all for being here. 

I want to start off by thanking our two mayors, our county commissioner, for the leadership. Our Federal system is designed to, at 

the local level, have the most impact. So I respect the responsibilities you have taken on. 

I also thank Mr. Sloan and Ms. Moore for the leadership you give 

your organizations. 

My first question is to our elected officials. Is there specific legislation you think we need to be looking at in this committee, to pass 

legislative fixes that would help the Federal Government, like 

FEMA or Coast Guard or Army Corps, to do a better job? 

Mr. CAGLE. There are a number of things that I think would be 

helpful, one of which would be to eliminate the problem in our 

buyouts, what is called the checkerboard system. Right now, when 

you have your FEMA buyouts, they are voluntary. When you go 

through the process of the voluntary buyouts, you end up with a 

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checkerboard of houses when many times you need to have a street 

that needs to be bought out, or a neighborhood, a small strip within a neighborhood, so that you can then remove the houses which 

are impediments to the flow of the water, create green space in 

there so that it will be beautiful and a park and a nice amenity, 

but also have that other benefit of being able to, when there is a 

water event, to be able to clear through. 

Currently in the rules, it is a little bit more difficult to operate 

in that system because you have those who choose not to be bought 

out, or to take money and to try to live and rebuild there. Their 

houses are still blocking the ability to improve the flow of the 

water—— 

Mr. BACON. You can’t do a patchwork. 

Mr. CAGLE. A checkerboard, patchwork. So having some streamlining there would be beneficial. 

Second, to figure out a way to help us—and this was alluded to 

earlier—be proactive. We have this huge gap. We now have almost 

$850 million worth of homes that need to be bought out, and the 

process is one where all of these folks are sitting there wondering, 

do I qualify? Am I going to be bought out? Am I not? Is the county 

going to raise enough money for its match, the 25 percent match? 

Is the city going to raise their money for the match that they can 

come in and get the Federal funds to come in? 

So as we are trying to raise money to join with your money, 

those folks’ lives are held in limbo. So if somehow or another we 

could front-end-load that where there is an opportunity so that instead of—and then when it comes time to buy them out, many of 

those folks have already rebuilt. So the home that you could have 

taken them, located them somewhere else, just paid for the damaged home in its condition, moved them into a similar house to 

what they had with a mortgage, you now have to pay twice because 

you also have to pay for the improvement. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Commissioner. 

In the interest of time, I want to give the mayors a chance to add 

in. 

Mr. TURNER. Let me just say, and remind me not to go too long, 

but FEMA has these home elevation grants where they are expending anywhere from $300,000, $400,000, $500,000 a home to raise 

them up. It might be better when people qualify maybe to allow 

them to go and buy a home someplace else instead of spending a 

whole lot of money to just elevate. 

My major thing is mitigation, mitigation, mitigation. That is the 

main thing. That is the best way—— 

Mr. BACON. It is a good word. 

Mr. TURNER. Because whether you are building a reservoir, it is 

regional detention, on-site detention basin, that is important. We 

talk about Project Brays, Congressman Green, those three projects, 

$311 million, to spend $311 million on mitigation projects where 

you can save billions of dollars to me just makes good sense. 

The coastal spine, we haven’t talked about that at all today. But 

if that storm had hit the Galveston Bay with the refineries and 

what is in the Gulf, that would have been horrendous. I know it 

is a high-dollar item, about $12 billion, but let me tell you, it would 

save quite a bit if that storm had hit the Galveston Bay. 

89 

So for me, it is mitigation, mitigation, mitigation. If you want to 

save in the future, put forth the dollars right now. 

Mr. BACON. Mayor Owen. 

Mr. OWEN. I would have to echo what both of them said. But I 

will tell you that, speaking of mitigation, when we did our Rebuild 

Texas worksheet that we submitted to the State, much of this $97 

million is so we mitigate our own problems. Much of the flooding 

that I had in Missouri City was outside of the levy. It wasn’t inside 

the levy. It was water that actually backed up into the streets and 

was inside, backed up next to the levies and flooded these houses. 

During the Memorial Day flood, I actually got police officers, 

when I thought the flooding was going to affect some 450 homes 

that were in one subdivision, they actually went door to door and 

warned people that it could possibly happen. Fortunately for us, it 

didn’t. 

In this particular case, we were trying to tell people that we saw 

this happening because, as I said, I had inundation maps, and I 

knew what was going to happen. But I had 450 homes that flooded 

that were controlled by a municipal utility district, and it was 

Wednesday before they finally put in a pump, a 12-inch line that 

pumped the water out of the lake that had overflowed and was 

backed up to that levy. Had they done that on Monday, I probably 

would not have had those 450 homes flooded. 

In the plan that we sent that we are asking FEMA to help us 

with, it is so that the city has those pumps on hand. I know what 

happened. They couldn’t get the pumps because the city of Houston 

was flooded by that time. They probably had to go out of State. 

Mr. BACON. To have it there early. 

Mr. OWEN. Yes. The question came up about Red Cross. They 

were communicating with us, but the problem we had with the Red 

Cross is that I opened shelters and I couldn’t get the beds. As a 

matter of fact, I finally took a SWAT vehicle and went downtown 

Houston to load up beds to bring back to my shelters because Red 

Cross had them here, but they weren’t getting them to the distribution centers where we needed them, so we took it on ourselves. 

But I have to agree with Mayor Turner. We need to do our own 

work, and if we could get some funding to do our own work for 

some of these pumps and for some of the work that we need to get 

done, and we cut out the bureaucracy of filling out forms that take 

3 years to get us reimbursed, we can prevent the next flood from 

happening. 

Mr. BACON. You are going to use that word ‘‘mitigation’’ again, 

aren’t you? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Mayor. 

I am going to yield back, minus 2 minutes. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes Ms. Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. 

Let me join my local colleagues and say that the red tape will 

kill you, and that means red tape for the Red Cross and FEMA and 

Federal entities. I believe in regulation when it helps us and enhances us and protects the American people, but I like that phrase 

‘‘waiver and emergency.’’ When you are in an emergency, we need 

90 

to have a simple provision that hits a red button, and the local 

community can begin to receive funds, they can receive beds, beds 

can go where they are supposed to be, shelters can be determined 

by the local community that this is adequate and safe, because I 

don’t think you would do anything to hurt your people. If it does 

not meet Red Cross criteria, let them get in here and utilize it. 

Let me thank Mayor Turner for standing up. I saw it with my 

eyes, as someone would say, my own eyes. The George R. Brown 

Convention Center, within seconds and minutes and moments, and 

what a powerful scene to see wet, downtrodden people from everywhere coming with their simple belongings in a pillowcase. I thank 

the county for ultimately partnering and opening the NRG, a pristine, beautiful building, and you just said let’s open it up. You 

partnered with the city. 

I think that is what we need to take back from this field hearing, 

but we also need to take back those who lost their lives. These are 

not the only persons, the Salvador family. We know them because 

there were six of them trying to flee. I don’t want to lose our recognition of Sergeant Perez and the municipal worker, sanitation 

worker, public works worker. These individuals were saying, ‘‘I 

have just got to get to work.’’ 

Of course, this is not an immigration hearing. We know some lost 

their life, but this is a Dreamer who lost his life, whose mother was 

trying to get here for his funeral. 

So I want to pose these questions because, first of all, let me say 

to all of you, you know our parents have always told us we can 

multi-task, do those things at the same time. So that third reservoir, I am so glad I have been hearing it, the reservoir, fixing the 

dam, retention ponds. I indicated on the record because I don’t 

think the Army Corps answered my question about that. In the 

east part of my district they were asking the question why can’t 

we do retention ponds? You might comment on that. I am going to 

pose a specific question. 

I guess the multi-task is, all of you mentioned the word ‘‘studies,’’ 

we have been asking for the study 5 years, 10 years ago. So we 

don’t want to hold you up. But my multi-task is let’s do the repair, 

the studies, and the central spine at the same time. I would ask 

local leadership, including Mr. Sloan, to write that letter that says 

we need the central spine, we need the central spine. It would help 

all of us. Even though I might not be right by the reservoir, I represent downtown Houston, and the mayor of the city of Houston 

knows he was evicted almost from his building, as well as my arts 

community was devastated because that water came down the Buffalo Bayou. We are still suffering, the arts community is still recovering, and people are still recovering. 

So let me indicate, Mayor, you had a strong recognition that this 

was the most devastating strike on housing of any disaster probably in the continental United States. We know our friends in 

Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and in Florida. Tell me how 

you are going to deal with low-income housing individuals in light 

of the devastation of the housing being so heavily destroyed in 

many areas, but northeast Houston right outside of Greens Bayou 

was one area, and I know there are many other areas. 

91 

Mr. TURNER. Right, and we still, Congresswoman, we still have 

about a couple of thousand who are still in hotels. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Absolutely. 

Mr. TURNER. There are hundreds, if not thousands, who are living in homes that need to be remediated. I am especially sensitive 

to our elderly population, people with special needs, people in lowincome communities and, quite frankly, mentally incompetent individuals who have exhausted a lot of their savings and are wondering what is next. 

We do have to quickly move to build as many affordable housing 

units as we can, single-family units as well as multi-family units. 

It is important that we repair people’s homes. We are thankful for 

people who contributed to both the county and the city local relief 

fund. That ended up raising about—I want to say close to $115 million. So those dollars, most of those dollars have already gone to 

non-profits, and one of the major objectives is for home repair. But 

for it, these homes would not be repaired, so I am thankful for 

that. 

I am thankful to the corporate business community. For example, 

one of the companies has taken on 300 homes in Independence 

Heights and making those repairs. Other businesses have stepped 

up as well. 

Right now there is $424 million provided from FEMA to GLO 

that is readily available right now. Those contracts are being let as 

we speak. There are no income requirements for that $424 million, 

so that is currently available, and we are working that. The other 

$5 million, as indicated earlier, that tranche of dollars right now 

is not expected to reach us until sometime in August or September. 

Hopefully we can expedite that. Then that third tranche probably 

won’t come until much later in the year. 

So that is where we are. As soon as we are able to get the resources, we will turn it around. Contractors have already been 

identified, and we will spend dollars to repair and rebuild homes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you so very much. 

Commissioner Cagle—and I am going to pose this to Mr. Sloan 

and Ms. Moore—what is the most important public and private assistance that the county needed? While you answer that question, 

I want to make sure that we are advocating for direct payments 

to the county and the city, and you can reinforce that. 

Mr. Sloan, let me understand what is the best way for long-term 

recovery for the Federal Government to work with local entities. I 

hope you as the county will reinforce doing all the Army Corps 

projects, moving them and expediting them. But what would be the 

best long-term? 

Ms. Moore, this question I would ask to you and to Mr. Owens, 

if you want to comment. But, Ms. Moore, if you want to talk about 

the denials in low-income areas by FEMA and how devastating 

that was, and the great work that the NAACP did. 

Mr. Cagle, I think I was going to you on the public-private assistance. 

Mr. CAGLE. Public-private assistance. Congresswoman Jackson 

Lee, I think you are asking how we can work together, and I would 

consider myself—— 

92 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. What is the best public assistance that helps 

you in the county? 

Mr. CAGLE. Third reservoir, buyout program, fund the four big 

projects. We are beyond shovel-ready. The shovel is in the ground. 

We have had a problem where we get the trickle of money and 

then we have to wait, and that is White Oak, Hunting, Brays, and 

Clear Creek. We need to have Barker Addicks improved—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And Green. 

Mr. CAGLE. And Green. Green we share. But there are projects 

that are already shovel-ready projects that are already under way, 

which is what I was referring to here. They are already approved 

and shovel in the ground. We need to have those additional 

projects, such as Green. 

Barker Addicks need to be improved, dredged, and the buyouts 

need to be done there so we don’t have folks who are in the pool 

anymore. 

We need to protect the port, as you said, and then we have so 

many different Federal programs. Some sort of coordination would 

be beneficial for us to know which pot will help pay for what 

project. That would be helpful to us because we have several different Federal programs that each have their own, if I could use 

the mayor’s term, tranche of funding. That would be helpful for us 

as well, so that we are not always having to make multiple applications and then not getting any because we are dispersed in that regard. 

Thank you for your leadership during all this time, Congresswoman. I saw you out there taking care of our people, and I appreciate it. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. We are all working together. 

Mr. Sloan and Ms. Moore. 

Mr. SLOAN. Thank you for the question. Long-term recovery, it 

is very important that we have a relationship not only with our 

Federal partners but also through the State. That partnership has 

to be in place in order to make sure that we get back to a new state 

of normal, whatever the effects of the disaster are. We support, obviously, anything that is going to reduce risk to our community and 

to the residents. If that is Corps of Engineers projects, flood control 

projects, along with the numerous other mitigation issues that need 

to be put in place, which may be raising computer systems that are 

in low-level buildings in order to secure our infrastructure with the 

government systems, there is a variety of things that I have always 

been in support of to reduce that risk and threat, not only to our 

local governments but also to our community. 

So our Federal relationships need to be in place with FEMA, 

with HUD, with Ag. It doesn’t matter, as long as we can maintain 

those communications, the flow of funds in order to expedite recovery. I always look at recovery as the disaster within the disaster. 

We always can respond very effectively, but we forget about what 

it takes in order to get our people and our residents back to a new 

state of normal. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Ms. Moore. 

Ms. MOORE. Thank you so much for your question. What we have 

done with appeals and denials is almost mind-boggling. People 

were sent letters that they couldn’t read, and they were asked to 

93 

put appeals in a framework that didn’t even have answers to the 

questions. We had people that were denied such simple things if 

they had only filed an appeal. They didn’t understand what they 

were reading. If you are 80 years old and you get a paper in the 

mail and they don’t have a clear explanation, and you don’t have 

a person who is going to explain it to you, that is what we did at 

the disaster recovery center. That is what we did all day long, is 

help people with appeals and denials and understanding what it is 

they needed to do. 

We had people that were coming in that were young, didn’t really 

understand what they meant by the property they lived in, whether it was grandma’s house or an aunt or uncle’s house that they 

happened to get, how do they do what they needed to do. We had 

people that lived on county roads in trailers that got denied. So 

when we talk about people getting denied and then they do an appeal, there is such a lag time in that process that the date from 

your final appeal is 90 days. If you had an appeal in September 

and you finally got your first response from them in the middle of 

November and you got denied, and you had some time to fill out 

that paperwork, some people are still waiting for an answer from 

that denial from the appeal. 

So we just, in a round-robin circle, with these appeals, and I am 

glad you asked that question because it is a horrific thing in our 

community and people not understanding what it is they need to 

do and how they need to do it. The computer is not everybody’s 

friend if you don’t know how to use it, or if you don’t have access 

to one. All the information that they ask for is just terrible. It 

doesn’t make sense to ask some of these simple questions that people don’t have answers to and you have to dig and get paperwork 

and all of these things just to prove that it is your house. Some 

people have to go down to the tax office and try to present documents that this is really my home. I get people to write letters to 

say, yes, you really live there. 

So the questions that they send back and the denials are just so 

unworthy and unnecessary. But in our community, as you know, it 

is very, very difficult, and we continue to process until today. Even 

though the recovery center is dormant, our work is still going on. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. 

Can I ask unanimous consent to put into the record NPR 2018 

‘‘Hurricane Season Will Bring About Battery of Storms’’? 

Chairman MCCAUL. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 

ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY HON. SHEILA JACKSON LEE

2018 HURRICANE SEASON WILL BRING ANOTHER BATTERY OF STORMS

Vanessa Romo, NPR, April 6, 2018, 5:48 PM ET. 

https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/06/600193418/2018-hurricaneseason-will-bring-another-battery-of-storms 

While images of destruction caused by last year’s battery of hurricanes are still 

fresh in the minds of many Americans, including those living on Puerto Rico where 

after 6 months power is not fully restored, forecasters are cautioning the public to 

brace themselves for another busy hurricane season. 

Researchers at Colorado State University predict this will be a slightly above-average season, with 14 tropical storms in 2018. Seven are expected to become hurricanes, which have a wind speed of at least 74 mph. Three of those 7 are expected 

94 

to be major hurricanes, Category 3 or higher, with winds reaching a minimum of 

111 mph. 

The Atlantic Hurricane season runs from June 1 through the end of November. 

‘‘Coastal residents are reminded that it only takes one hurricane making landfall 

to make it an active season for them, and they need to prepare the same for every 

season, regardless of how much activity is predicted,’’ researchers say. 

By comparison, 2017 had a total of 17 named storms—with 10 becoming hurricanes and 6 of them major hurricanes—including Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and 

Maria, which ravaged Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico. But that number exceeded 

forecasters’ expectations, including the team from CSU. The university had only anticipated 11 tropical storms with four becoming hurricanes. 

Before Harvey made landfall it was predicted as merely a tropical storm or Category 1 hurricane with wind speeds up to 85 mph. But within a few days and by 

the time it hit the ground near Corpus Christi, Texas, it had developed into a Category 4 with 132 mph winds. 

‘‘We issue these forecasts to satisfy the curiosity of the general public and to bring 

attention to the hurricane problem,’’ the university said. ‘‘There is a general interest 

in knowing what the odds are for an active or inactive season.’’ 

The report also includes the probability of major hurricanes making landfall: 

• 63 percent for the entire U.S. coastline (average for the last century is 52 percent) • 39 percent for the U.S. East Coast, including the Florida Peninsula (average for 

the last century is 31 percent) • 38 percent for the Gulf Coast from the Florida Panhandle westward to Brownsville (average for the last century is 30 percent) • 52 percent for the Caribbean (average for the last century is 42 percent) 

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration will issue its forecast in 

May. 

For readers curious about the names of this year’s storms the monikers are selected by the World Meteorological Organization and are usually common names associated with the ethnicity of the basin that would be affected by the storms. When 

a storm is particularly deadly or costly, its name is retired and replaced by another 

one. Here are the names you can expect this year: 

Alberto 

Beryl 

Chris 

Debby 

Ernesto 

Florence 

Gordon 

Helene 

Isaac 

Joyce 

Kirk 

Leslie 

Michael 

Nadine 

Oscar 

Patty 

Rafael 

Sara 

Tony 

Valerie 

William 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. I will just finish by putting on the 

record that I wish Harris County would use their CERT emergency 

response teams, particularly in the inner-city areas. I know that 

Mr. John Branch, Mr. Charles White, and a number of others are 

involved in what I guess you would call the Citizen Emergency Response Teams, which come under Homeland Security, and we are 

very proud of it. We would like to make sure that they are utilized. 

Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentle lady yields. 

Mr. Culberson is recognized. 

95 

Mr. CULBERSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Moore, you put your finger right on it. We really have to 

make sure the money gets into the hands of the people that need 

it just as quickly as humanly possible and simplify things. Thank 

you very much. 

Two questions, Mr. Chairman, in two very important areas, if I 

could. I will be as brief as I can and encourage the witnesses to 

be brief in their answers. 

One is on mitigation and the local share, and the second is on 

the time line about what the Army Corps told you and when they 

told you. 

The first is, as Mayor Turner and I served together in the Texas 

House, we are House-trained, learned a great deal, worked together 

so well. It is so good to see you where you are, and it has been a 

pleasure to work with you on this. 

We learned over the years that the city is responsible when it 

comes to draining water off of each lot, the curbs, the water that 

drains down the street and as it goes into the system. The city is 

responsible for carrying the water to the bayou, and the city’s responsibility ends there. Is that correct? 

Mr. TURNER. The water that comes from the street, that is our 

responsibility, to the bayous. 

Mr. CULBERSON. To the bayou. You are using the drainage fee. 

I know the city began a number of years ago collecting a drainage 

fee. You are using that as fast as possible to enhance drainage to 

mitigate, right? 

Mr. TURNER. Yes, to pay off the past debt, and it goes for streets 

and drainage. 

Mr. CULBERSON. That local match, that local match for mitigation, Commissioner Cagle, is critical. For every local dollar, the 

Federal Government will provide 3. The Army Corps of Engineers 

is only authorized to send Federal flood control dollars to Harris 

County. So every dollar the county provides, there will be 3 additional Federal dollars, so we are limited. 

One thing that we need to do, Members, is when it comes to a 

flood control project, I think it is important if we get a request from 

a State or local official, that we be able to submit that flood control 

project to the Appropriations Committee, put it in the Appropriations bill at the subcommittee level with your name on it, it goes 

all the way through the process, does not increase spending, and 

it is a flood control project at State or local request, and that would 

allow us to target spending for these projects like the third reservoir and get them done in a rapid manner. So I would be grateful 

for your help in trying to get that rule change. That is going to 

have to be done in the U.S. House, and it will make a big, big difference. 

But the other question I had, Commissioner, is we are limited in 

how many Federal dollars we can send to Harris County for flood 

control if you are limited. It is based on how many local dollars you 

can provide. I note that in 2000, the flood control—— 

Mr. CAGLE. If I may add, Congressman, from property tax owners—— 

Mr. CULBERSON. Correct. 

96 

Mr. CAGLE [continuing]. Many of which, 11,000 in Precinct 4 

alone just got hit with their home being flooded. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Correct, and appreciate the work I know that 

you are doing and the mayor is doing and all of our subdivisions 

are doing to reduce the property valuations so people are not having to pay so much property taxes, because their valuation has 

gone down. That is critical. 

But I wanted to ask about that local. The city of Houston, of 

course, can rely on property taxes, sales taxes, fees. But Commissioners Court, as the mayor and I remember from the legislature, 

the legislature will not provide county commissioners with ordinance banking authority, so your hands are pretty well tied. The 

only source of revenue the county has is property taxes. 

Mr. CAGLE. That is correct. There are a few little minor fees that 

nip at the edges, but by and large that is a true statement. 

Mr. CULBERSON. So the money you need for Brays Bayou, to finish out all these bayous and flood control structures in the bayou 

system has got to be paid for with the Harris County flood control 

property tax dollars. 

Mr. CAGLE. That is, by and large, correct. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CULBERSON. I just want to ask you what lies ahead, because 

I note that since 2000 the Harris County flood control property tax 

rate has gone down by 65 percent, which severely limits your ability. Whatever local match you come up with, the Federal dollars, 

there are 3 Federal dollars for every 1 local dollar. Nobody likes 

paying property taxes. We are all concerned about it. But, Commissioner, what do you think lies ahead? What is the Commissioner 

Court planning to do, if anything, about the Harris County flood 

control tax rate? 

Mr. CAGLE. In Harris County, because there are five members of 

the Commissioners Court, we don’t really get to talk to each other 

like other bodies that engage in the legislative process, because of 

our Open Meetings Act. So many times, we just kind of hear 

through what we hear others are saying at large, and it makes it 

difficult for us to get work done, and that is something that our 

friends in the legislature who are here may, when it comes to 

emergency-type matters, allow us a little more latitude in the future. 

But I think you are looking for us to have a bond election, because we are going to have to raise funds locally to be able to bring 

up our matches so that we can make systemic infrastructure 

changes that are going to protect our region. 

We will also be calling upon the legislature as they go into session this next year to help us with their rainy-day fund. I think everybody would agree that Harris County has had a rainy day. So 

working with our State friends, they will assist us with regard to 

potentially getting some of those matches. But those are off in the 

future. 

Mr. CULBERSON. You anticipate a bond election to help with the 

effort? 

Mr. CAGLE. I do, sir. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Let me ask quickly if I may, Mr. Chairman, because this is really important. I appreciate the committee putting 

together a time line for Hurricane Harvey. 

97 

If I may also, Mr. Chairman, I want to be sure to enter into the 

record, if there is no objection, a Houston Chronicle story from February 22, 2018, if I may. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 

ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN CULBERSON

FLOOD THREAT KNOWN EARLY—CORPS PREDICTED THE RESERVOIR SPILL BEFORE

HARVEY HIT

By Lise Olsen, Houston Chronicle, February 22, 2018. 

Water is released from the Barker Reservoir on Aug. 29 in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey. Five days earlier, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had projected 

that the storm would fill the reservoir to record levels and would flood nearby neighborhoods. 

A day before Hurricane Harvey made landfall on the Texas coast last August, an 

internal U.S. Army Corps of Engineers forecast predicted that the storm would fill 

Houston’s Barker Reservoir to record levels, flooding neighborhoods on the reservoir’s western border, government records show. 

That projection was made Thursday, Aug. 24, 2017, as Harvey barreled toward 

Houston. The next day’s Army Corps forecast was even more worrisome: Both Barker and Addicks reservoirs would spill beyond government-owned land, engulfing 

nearby homes and businesses. 

THE CORPS DID NOT SHARE THESE PREDICTIONS WITH THE PUBLIC. 

It wasn’t until Saturday, Aug. 26, that authorities in Fort Bend County—after 

being briefed on the latest Army Corps forecast—issued the first flooding advisory 

for neighborhoods adjacent to Barker. 

It took Harris County officials until late Sunday, Aug. 27, to begin issuing similar 

warnings for communities upstream of both Barker and Addicks. By then, some 

neighborhoods were already inundated. Many residents ended up fleeing on foot or 

being rescued in boats or military vehicles. 

The forecasts, closely held internal records, have emerged 6 months after Harvey 

through discovery in a lawsuit in which thousands of homeowners are seeking compensation from the Army Corps, which operates Barker and Addicks dams and their 

reservoirs. The Houston Chronicle obtained copies of the documents. 

They are sure to revive debate about whether the Corps and local officials acted 

quickly enough to alert homeowners to the danger of reservoir flooding and to urge 

evacuations. 

Ultimately, the forecasts proved largely accurate. More than 9,000 homes and 

businesses were flooded by the reservoirs—at least 4,000 upstream of Barker and 

5,000 to 6,000 upstream of Addicks, according to a Chronicle analysis of damage reports. 

COUNTY MADE ADVISORY

Fort Bend and Harris County officials said they were not informed of the Corps’ 

initial Aug. 24 forecast. 

‘‘If they were predicting that on Thursday, they were not advising us of that fact,’’ 

Fort Bend County Judge Robert Hebert said in an interview. 

Hebert said the county received the next day’s forecast, but he said the Corps 

characterized it as internal and preliminary. County officials say the forecast issued 

Saturday, Aug. 26, was so alarming that they decided to issue an advisory the same 

day, citing the Corps’ projections. 

Hebert said the county did so despite objections from Corps officials, who wanted 

the forecast kept confidential. Fort Bend County also activated its reverse 9–1–1 

system to reach out to thousands of property owners near Barker Reservoir. 

Harris County Judge Ed Emmett declined to comment. People familiar with his 

role in the emergency response say Emmett was not briefed on the Corps’ forecasts. 

Efforts to obtain comment from the Corps were unsuccessful. The Chronicle 

emailed questions to a Corps spokesman on Tuesday. He had not provided responses 

as of Wednesday night. 

One of the reservoir-adjacent homes that was flooded during Harvey belongs to 

Harry Ershad, a computer programmer and musician. He said it was frustrating to 

learn that as early as Aug. 24, the Corps had developed a detailed picture of how 

Barker Reservoir would fill his Canyon Gate neighborhood. He said that with just 

98 

a few hours’ notice, he, his wife, and their two sons could have saved their four cars, 

most of their musical instruments and their home recording studio. Instead, nearly 

everything was ruined, he said. 

By the time Fort Bend County issued its Aug. 26 advisory, Ershad’s neighborhood 

had been swamped. He and his family had to wade out through neck-high water, 

he said. 

‘‘We got out with our laptops and our passports, and that’s it,’’ he said. 

The flooding forecasts were generated by the Corps Water Management System, 

which crunches information about rainfall, weather forecasts, river conditions, and 

other data to guide the Army Corps in managing its dams and reservoirs. 

The Aug. 24 forecast showed that Harvey would cause the volume of water in 

Barker Reservoir to exceed what could be stored on Government-owned land, beginning on Tuesday, Aug. 29, and lasting for more than 2 weeks. 

When that forecast was issued, Fort Bend and Harris counties were preparing to 

open emergency operations centers and Harvey’s rains had not yet arrived. 

Once the emergency centers opened Aug. 25, the Corps sent staff members and 

gave daily updates to Harris and Fort Bend county officials and Houston city officials. But the Corps told the local officials not to make any of the Corps Water Management System forecasts public, said Jeff Braun, emergency management coordinator for Fort Bend County. 

FLOODING OF HOMES BEGINS

The Aug. 25 forecast showed the water level in Barker Reservoir reaching 100 

feet. Water begins to spill into neighborhoods when the level exceeds 95 feet, according to Corps records. 

The forecast generated on Saturday, Aug. 26, said homes upstream of Barker 

would begin to flood on Monday, Aug. 28—a day earlier than previously predicted. 

The projection for Addicks indicated that some homes in low-lying neighborhoods 

could fill with 7 or more feet of water and remain flooded for weeks. 

Both Harris and Fort Bend counties issued formal evacuation orders Aug. 30. By 

then, neighborhoods near the reservoirs had been inundated for days. 

Attorneys representing homeowners in flood-related lawsuits in the U.S. Court of 

Claims want to know why the forecasts weren’t shared with the public sooner. 

‘‘The tragedy is an earlier warning could have allowed people to get out and get 

their property out,’’ said Charles Irvine, of Irvine & Conner, one of the lead lawyers 

for property owners upstream of the reservoirs. 

‘‘This confirms that when a storm comes, the Corps can use its own modeling to 

predict exactly how much government-stored water will impact the upstream community. I can’t speak to why the Corps didn’t give the residents an earlier warning. 

But clearly the Corps anticipated the flooding on upstream private land from the 

Addicks and Barker dams before the rains even really started.’’ 

James Blackburn, another Houston attorney who has long been active in flooding 

matters and who recently founded a related nonprofit called the Bayou City Initiative, said a congressional investigation was warranted. 

‘‘This is a bona fide public policy debacle,’’ he said. ‘‘Were Harris County and Fort 

Bend County officials getting information and not alerting the public—or were they 

not getting the information? Or did they get the information and did the Corps ask 

them not to spread it around?’’ 

RETURNED TO RUIN

Thousands of people like Ershad hunkered down to wait out Harvey because they 

were not told to evacuate and didn’t know their neighborhoods could be flooded by 

the reservoirs. When Ershad left Canyon Gate, the streets were impassable, but 

only his garage had flooded. He and his family returned 13 days later to find their 

home ruined. They had no flood insurance. 

‘‘I lost 15 years of compositions of music,’’ he said. 

Addicks and Barker dams were built in the 1940’s to protect downtown Houston 

from flooding. The earthen structures are designed to hold storm runoff from the 

vast Buffalo Bayou watershed and release it into the bayou at a controlled rate. 

The government acquired thousands of acres of land behind the dams to serve as 

reservoirs, but the dams can hold back more water than can fit on that land. Over 

the decades, tens of thousands of homes were built on the edges of the governmentowned property. 

When the reservoir pools exceed the government-owned land—an extremely rare 

occurrence—water has nowhere to go but into adjacent neighborhoods. That’s what 

happened during Harvey. 

99 

As far back as 1995, the Corps studied ways to reduce this risk. The options included deepening the reservoirs, buying out thousands of properties and building 

more reservoirs. The Corps never acted on any of them. 

Mr. CULBERSON. The Chronicle reports that the day before Hurricane Harvey made landfall—this would be on August 24—that the 

Corps had an internal forecast that the storm would fill Barker and 

Addicks to record levels and flood neighborhoods on the western 

side of the reservoir, and then the very next day, on Friday the 

25th, the Corps forecasted that both Addicks and Barker would 

spill beyond government-owned land, in the Gulf nearby neighborhoods. I know that you guys were getting briefings on a regular 

basis from the Corps. Do you recall when the Corps told you about 

this prediction that water would breach the dam and go around the 

spillway? 

Mr. CAGLE. I am going to pass that one to Mr. Sloan with regard 

to a particular memory of when we were informed of that information. I know that operationally, I was out there fishing people out 

of the water. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Oh, yes, we all were dispatching people. I am 

just trying to get an idea of when the Corps told you guys about 

this prediction they had. 

Mr. SLOAN. I know that they spoke with Harris County Flood 

Control District and our folks in the operation center on various 

models that were being run as we were on Friday, going into Saturday and the rain started a little bit, and then lulled on Saturday 

until Saturday evening. There were a variety of scenarios that we 

looked at, from where was the volume of rain actually going to fall. 

Would it be to the south? Was it going to be north of the reservoirs? I know that there was discussion of the potential of hitting 

some of the non-government lands behind the reservoirs. I don’t recall them ever discussing increasing the volume over leases. 

Mr. CULBERSON. What about this forecast? They had a forecast 

on August 24 that the—— 

Mr. SLOAN. I personally never saw the forecast that they had put 

together in a model. I believe that flood control may have had access, and they looked at that as another model. We were working 

with the National Weather Service on a variety of scenarios. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Sure. What about on Friday, the 25th? Did the 

Corps tell you that they had a model that would show all the 

neighborhoods downstream of Addicks and Barker would flood? 

Mr. SLOAN. Downstream? No, I did not have that information. 

Mr. CULBERSON. That is really important, Mr. Chairman, because the information that people had in those neighborhoods was 

do not evacuate, don’t leave. According to this Houston Chronicle 

article, the Corps knew on August 24 that water was going to fill 

up to flood the back end of the reservoirs, and then the day after 

they had a prediction that the neighborhoods downstream were 

going to flood, and I just want to be clear about when they told you 

about all that. 

Mr. SLOAN. I think that flood control came to me and said that 

with the volume of rain that has already happened in the system, 

I believe it would have been—I would have to go back and look at 

some of my notes, when they came to me and said we are impacting downstream now with additional water. I believe it would have 

100 

been that Sunday night into Monday. We were aware of a variety 

of models, but which one was going to play out was not clear. 

Mr. CULBERSON. The time line the Chairman has given us is 

very helpful. On Sunday, the 27th, the local word from the Harris 

County Flood Control District was evacuate only if you have been 

told to do so, and that continued to be the recommendation. At 6:37 

a.m. on Sunday morning, evacuate only if you need to. Then on 

Monday early in the morning, again the recommendation from local 

authorities was only evacuate if you need to. The Corps, basically 

even on Tuesday, residents were advised to just remain alert and 

take precautionary measures. 

It is a real worry. We do need an alert system. The minute that 

you guys find out, that there is something like an Amber Alert that 

can go out if you have a flip phone or a cell phone, your home is 

likely to flood over this next time period. I think that is one of the 

biggest lessons learned here, Mr. Chairman, that there was inadequate warning given to people, and they didn’t know where to go 

once they were told to evacuate. Once they finally figured out to 

evacuate, they didn’t know where to go. 

But we are looking forward to working with you to help resolve 

this for the future. 

Thanks for the extra time. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Yes, thank you. We will follow up on that 

issue for sure. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chair recognizes Mr. Green. 

Mr. AL GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Having thanked a good many people, I think that there are still 

a couple of others that I have to thank. 

Commissioner Rodney Ellis, Precinct 1. Commissioner Ellis and 

I worked together. He extended the hand of friendship, opened up 

his good offices, and had tele-town meetings, brought in persons 

who could accord intelligence information, if you will, to people 

such that they could understand this unfriendly process. He did an 

outstanding job, and in his absence I think it appropriate to say 

something kind about him. 

Jerry Strickland worked with the Governor’s Office. Sometimes 

it can be difficult reaching people, but Jerry Strickland answers his 

phone and has been available to be of great assistance to us when 

we needed to access information from the top down. 

Mayor Turner. There was this term that we used to use, and still 

do, ‘‘shelter in place.’’ How do you shelter in place when you have 

no place to shelter? Grateful to you for what you did for the homeless. Would you just take a moment and explain what you did to 

help people who were living under bridges have a place to shelter? 

Mr. TURNER. Congressman Green, what we ended up doing when 

we opened up, for example, at George R. Brown, we invited everybody to come. If you were homeless, in fact, first responders, law 

enforcement and others, we are going out and talking to and communicating with people who were homeless and bringing them to 

the George R. Brown, into our shelter. We did that during the 

storm, and then immediately after we ended up putting about 250 

to 300 in this particular location that used to be housed by the Star 

of Hope, and we turned that into Residents of Emancipation. 

101 

I will say that was done in conjunction with FEMA, with the Red 

Cross, the city of Houston Housing Community Development, and 

that facility still remains. In fact, we are getting ready now to turn 

that into one of the homeless shelters, period. 

Mr. AL GREEN. I am grateful to you. 

Mayor Owen, I am grateful to you for a multiplicity of reasons, 

none of which will exceed what you did in bringing your entire 

team on-line, and you had a 24/7 operation, a smaller city, but you 

stepped up in a big way, and I am grateful. 

You mentioned the tornadic activity. There are complications associated with that that haven’t been dealt with. You mentioned the 

bank building. Many people don’t know some of the offices that 

were housed in that building. If you would, just talk about some 

of the offices that would help you in a time of emergency that were 

housed there, because we need people to know that others were hit, 

too, that were trying to be of assistance to you. 

Mr. OWEN. Well, I thank you yourself, because your office was 

one of those that has been displaced, and you are still not back in 

it. 

Mr. AL GREEN. Yes, I was homeless. 

Mr. OWEN. He was homeless, along with a State senator and a 

State representative who all represent me, who even in spite of 

being homeless took a very active part in trying to do what we 

needed to do in the city. 

You are right, the office, the bank building, is still not open, has 

not been repaired. 

Mr. AL GREEN. That was by virtue of the tornado, the storm but 

the tornadic activity hit it head-on. 

Mr. OWEN. Right, $4 million worth of damage to that building 

that had nothing to do with the flood, along with the two shopping 

centers that were adjacent to it that displaced those local business 

people who depend on that, and they are still not back in some of 

those businesses. 

Mr. AL GREEN. Now, you made commentary about the shelters 

that you opened, but I think you should say a bit more about those 

shelters because I was there to see you in those shelters helping 

people. Say a bit more about them, the school. 

Mr. OWEN. Right. Well, we had a great partnership with our 

schools. When we knew we were going to have a shelter, we called 

Fort Bend Independent School District, the superintendent, and 

said we need some space. We have people that we need to get into 

those shelters, so he gave us Marshall High School. We called Stafford. Stafford gave us their high school, and we were transporting 

those people ourselves. We had staging areas within the city. If 

they could get from their homes to a staging area, are we transporting? I said we did 1,300 high-water rescues, and we were taking those people to a staging area, putting them on a bus, taking 

them to those shelters. 

Both of those shelters were feeding them. The cafeterias were 

open. But as I said earlier, the main problem we had with the shelters was that we didn’t have the beds for the people. They were 

sleeping on the floor. The biggest concern that we had were some 

of our disabled people, both mentally and physically, who were 

102 

scared to death. We had them in particular rooms to take care of 

themselves. 

I have to tell you a story that kind-of relates to this. I was in 

one of those rooms where we had those people, and I saw a man 

standing, and he was talking to a mirror, because this was in a 

room that had been a recreational room. He was carrying on a conversation with what he thought was another man on the other side 

of that glass, but he was, in fact, talking to himself—scared to 

death, didn’t know where he was, didn’t know what was happening. We had people there who were taking care of him. 

I go back to what Ms. Moore said. I think if we do nothing else, 

I think those operation centers that we opened up where people 

went and made application for reimbursement, ask them what the 

biggest reasons were that they were turned down, because I can 

tell you, I echo what she said. They just received a letter in the 

mail that they were turned down. We were asked to tell them to 

reapply. That should not have been our responsibility. 

When they went to those centers and they filled out those forms 

or they got those forms, I think it would help you all and it would 

help FEMA to understand what are the major reasons for applications being turned down so that the people who make those applications know that, OK, here is what I need to do, and here are reasons that I may get turned down, and then they were told that 

they could reapply, and some of those people have still not received 

reimbursement when they did reapply. 

I have a lady that had $13,000 worth of remediation in her house 

for mold. She took money out of her retirement. She has not been 

reimbursed for that $13,000 yet, and that has been 4 months ago. 

So I go back to what my original statement was as a small city. 

We depend on getting our money as quickly as we can, and the 

residents do too. I did make the point earlier, but 50 percent of my 

entire budget is public safety, and 72 percent of my budget is personnel costs. That doesn’t leave a whole lot of money for everything 

else. So when I take 72 percent of my budget to pay personnel, and 

then I have another million dollars’ worth of excess for overtime, 

and then I have to wait 3 years to get it, I can’t accept that. 

Mr. AL GREEN. Let me hurry quickly to Ms. Moore, because as 

a former NAACP branch president, I have great respect for the organization. 

Ms. Moore, I would like to, with your consent and permission, 

have this report that you presented to me placed in the record, if 

there are no objections, Mr. Chairman. In this report that I would 

add that the NAACP identifies problems with the system. Ms. 

Moore, your report indicates that there is a problem with the application process, that it is not user-friendly. You indicate that people 

are rejected for minor reasons. You talk about the claims process. 

But I want you to do this—do I have that unanimous consent, 

Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman MCCAUL. Yes, no objections. 

[The information follows:] 

INFORMATION SUBMITTED BY THE TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP UNITS

Texas NAACP State Conference of Units Contact Information 

State President, Gary L. Bedsoe 

103 

Disaster Committee, Carol Moore 

State Staff, Lonzo Kerr, Jr. 

NAACP LIST OF IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS REGARDING HURRICANE HARVEY AND RECOVERY

EFFORTS

Poverty 

• Lack of Insurance • Areas Less Profitable for Rebuilding • Lack of Access to Capital • Failure to Enforce CRA • Desire for Gentrification of Areas • Desire to Change Political Character of Communities as in Galveston 

System 

• designed to prefer the rich and the well educated • up front investments too often required • application process not user-friendly • monitoring system seems to be designed only to meet an administrative necessity of simply having a system of some kind, as calls handled seem to be handled in a cursory manner • rejection for minor reasons discourage applicants and lead to a windfall so 

funds will default to Government or be available to use in other areas • inadequate number of culturally sensitive reps in a variety of areas • no methodology to identify the disaffected who for reasons of lack of requisite 

knowledge or understanding, literacy, language impediments, extreme poverty, 

or similar obstacle have not entered the system • claims process not user-friendly • renters seem to be highly at risk • homeownership rules don’t recognize instances where family members clearly 

own property but have not formally transferred ownership • contracts for major services seemed to be locked up prior to bids even being 

opened up, as some have said—this is a cottage industry 

Other 

• people having to live in hazardous conditions while the system fails to move 

• no or inadequate regulation of companies with hazardous chemicals, some not 

publicly named 

• new laws in Texas limiting ability to recover insurance that went into effect on 

9/1/2017 

• Corps of Engineers providing inadequate notice to residents about release of 

water from reservoirs 

• Corps of Engineers releasing water on thousands of unsuspecting residents 

when cooperation with community could have greatly reduced ultimate damage 

and harm from release (note how Congresspersons called at our request to seek 

a delay so we could go door-to-door and the water was then released 2 hours 

early) 

• Desire for Gentrification or other exploitation 

• Potential political dynamics that encourage slow and different Recovery 

• ??need to take politics out of rebuilding process 

• the need to get people dislocated back home before 2020 Census. Smaller communities like Port Arthur will need exemption to continue receiving certain 

Federal funding if population falls below 50,000 in next Census 

• There needs to be a technology-based system that can do a holistic and cumulative impact of infrastructure and housing projects funded by the Federal Government 

• There is also a need for mental health care services for those impacted by Harvey who are now suffering from post-traumatic stress (See, e.g., Todd Ackerman, ‘‘Survey: Harvey’s distress unrivaled,’’ Houston Chronicle) 

Lack of access to technology 

• Realization that publication on web is not altogether adequate 

• We need a very comprehensive medical monitoring program which includes air 

and soil testing especially in some of our low-lying areas and we need to be in 

a position to have residents, especially children and senior citizens screened for 

asthma and other respiratory diseases every 6 months. 

• Use the new version of Visionlink that will do just about everything that can 

be done in case management including locating and deploying spontaneous volunteers. It can locate materials needed for recovery and invoice for shipping. It 

104 

will allow us to gather real-time data on response efforts which will make it 

easier to tell if any discriminatory practices are being done. 

• We need the Congress’ help in getting sheltering standards set across the board. 

The Geneva Conference requires all Red Cross Shelters to be set up as ‘‘Sanctuary’’ shelters. However, the other agencies, including Government agencies 

don’t operate with those standards. As a result, many immigrants are being intimidated and harassed by ICE and other Law Enforcement agencies (like running a background check on the 5-year-old in Dallas). 

• A uniform credentialing system to protect victims from people preying on their 

misfortunes. This system would require all disaster workers to be registered 

into a databank and display an accepted credential to victims they are trying 

to help. 

• FEMA has a routine of sending out denial letters on over 90% of all initial 

claims filed. The method they use to contact a claimant results in too many African Americans giving up completely on their claim. We have asked them, to 

no avail, to explain to the claimant what was lacking in the notice of claim, and 

guide them on what they should do to file the claim properly, but FEMA has 

not responded. 

• We need to make sure HUD adheres to the one-for-one rule which requires cities to provide or build one low-income housing unit for every low-income housing unit that is destroyed or condemned. We also need to stop HUD from automatically voiding Section 8 Vouchers when a storm hits leaving HUD recipients 

completely homeless, while HUD landlords use HUD money to remodel and 

double, sometimes triple the rent so that the tenant can afford to return to the 

renovated unit. 

These are my SEVEN most critical items to recovery. 

1. We must have or developed a scientific mathematical recovery system that 

tracks dollars and outcomes for all Federal/State and non-profit dollars. 

This should be used. NETS.—Please review LJA proposal... AskCongress/ 

FEMA/DHA to Fund. 

2. We must have a Case Management system that is connected to resources 

that provides immediate resources. I know we have VOAD... but we certainly want to make sure they have the resources inside the VISION LINK or 

CAN system to track recovery efforts and success stories and makes adjustments as needed. 

3. There are Four Pillars of a Community. (1) Housing, (2) Infrastructure, (3) 

Economic Development and (4) Community Enrichment (Parks, Services, etc.) 

• (A) All Housing Types/Needs must be addressed immediately. Week Numbers 

(Housing is Number 1—It affects Voting) 

Repair Programs 

Manufactured Housing Units—We must place an emphasis on getting people back to communities. 

Rebuilds 

Buyout’s and New Construction at the same time allowing people to live in 

their community and grow. 

Note. Local Communities should be given incentives to move faster. (Extra 

7% admin fee for local government) Units=Dollars 

• (B) Infrastructure—CRITICAL All Infrastructure should be in accordance 

within a comprehensive plan and harden to withstand another storm. 

• (C) Economic Development—A list of all businesses affected should be collected who have applied for SBA and been denied. We should advocate a 

small business package for targeted zip codes. 

• (D) Civic Enrichment. This would be critical role for the NAACP. Identification of all community support entities inside targeted zip codes. 

We should speak to our Federal partners about these four bullet points. 

4. All Federal Dollars should have a MWBE/SBE/HUB and Section 3 Tracking 

component. All Cities/Counties and the State should have an administrator/consultant to monitor and or select vendors for total community recovery. Harvey 

should be tracked this way. 

5. All Fair Housing Laws should apply. Any government violating fair housing 

should forfeit all recovery dollars. 

6. The Federal Government should use Harvey to identify (best Practices for Recovery in the Building and Trades Industry). 

These items should be used to mitigate from another storm. 

7. A competition for a Demonstration Project between Public, Private and NonProfits for Disaster Recovery would encourage innovation at a local level. We 

should encourage CIG grant process used at USDA. 

105 

Mr. AL GREEN. Thank you. 

I want you to do this, Mr. Moore, if you would. Talk about how 

you had the intentionality to present notices to people. You had a 

system that you were ready to run with to let people know what 

the impending circumstances were. Could you say something briefly on this, please? 

Ms. MOORE. Yes, I will. Thank you so much. We have a project 

that we are beginning called Block by Block, if that is what you 

are referring to? 

Mr. AL GREEN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. MOORE. It engages everybody that is a partner within the 

community. As you know, most people say in our community we 

have beauty shops, barber shops, liquor stores, and churches, and 

there is a church on every corner. So we are going to utilize that 

church on every corner to communicate with the people on that 

street. There is a four-corner block, and there is a church on every 

corner, and they went to those churches already to get what they 

needed, and they still go. They are getting food, they are getting 

counseling at the church on the corner. They are not members of 

that church, but they are in that community. 

So when you do Block by Block, the people on the street go to 

Mt. Zion, they are going to go in there, they are going to have 

whatever problem that they have. So when we call Mt. Zion when 

there is a disaster, they already know that the lady across the 

street in Apartment 11, she gets dialysis on Monday, Wednesday, 

and Friday. So when the street is flooded or whatever is going on, 

somebody knows to get her, or to get the individual who is there. 

It is very important that we understand that we cannot drop the 

neighbor by neighbor process because the hurricane is over. Block 

by Block continues, and as we get into our system of understanding 

the people and the process, we can make changes within our community. It is about building a circular process, not being told what 

we need to do top-down. People help each other when they are trying to get up, and we are going to strengthen that block by block. 

Mr. AL GREEN. Bottom up. 

Mr. Sloan, quickly, if I may ask, how can the NAACP foster a 

relationship with you such that the Block by Block concept can be 

integrated into the methodology that you currently utilize? 

Mr. SLOAN. I think we had a conversation before we even started 

today about integrating Community Emergency Response Team 

and training within the NAACP and helping our communities build 

on their personal well-being by understanding that they need to 

take care of themselves, their families, their property, and then be 

able to reach out and help their neighbors. We look forward to providing the Train the Trainer, to be able to provide that assistance 

back to our residents. 

We are very fortunate. We have trained over 35,000 individuals 

in Harris County. But with 4.7 million people, the gap is large, and 

that has to continue to grow. We have to convince our residents 

that personal preparedness is a priority and not a reaction, and 

that is a partnership that we look to build upon. 

Mr. AL GREEN. Thank you, and I am going to ask that I have 

an opportunity to get the name of the contact person that you will 

be working with. I would like to stay engaged in this process with 

106 

the NAACP. As I said, I am a former branch president, and it 

means a lot to me. 

Just in closing, finally this. This was so important to the NAACP 

that the president of the State conference is here today. That is Mr. 

Gary Bledsoe. He is a lawyer, and also the Dean over at the 

Thurgood Marshall School of Law currently. Thank you, Mr. 

Bledsoe, for being here. We appreciate you very much. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Gary, it is good to see you again as well. 

Dr. Burgess is recognized. 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you for letting me be a part of this hearing. It has been a long day, 

but I have learned a lot listening to the panel. 

The figures on debris removal, Mayor Turner and Commissioner 

Cagle, that is an astounding amount of stuff. What did you do with 

all that stuff? 

Mr. TURNER. To the landfills, Dr. Burgess. But it all has to be 

sorted. You can’t just go in there and put it all in there. It is a very 

complex operation. I do want to give a great deal of credit to Harry 

Hayes, who is the Solid Waste Director and the Chief Operating 

Officer for the city. He has been through a number of these storms. 

I know during the tax day flood we moved at a rapid rate. When 

FEMA told us that it would take from the end of December into 

January to do the first wave, that was just not acceptable for us. 

So Solid Waste employees worked 7 days a week, every single day, 

all day. 

I do want to thank the Governor as well because I asked for him 

to allow the landfills to stay open past 7, and he did, and it was 

very instrumental in waiving a lot of the requirements on that end. 

The contractors that stepped up, San Antonio and Austin. I do 

want to give them a great deal of credit because they stepped in 

with mutual aid agreements to help us out. 

But once you pick it up, it still has to be sorted. You can’t just 

send everything there. But the county, the city, working collaboratively, we both worked with similar contractors, they just did an 

incredible job. 

Mr. BURGESS. You were able to separate out the hazardous stuff 

and get it to where it was supposed to be? 

Mr. TURNER. Yes. 

Mr. BURGESS. So it didn’t get comingled with less hazardous 

stuff? 

Mr. TURNER. That is correct. 

Mr. BURGESS. Very good. My first mortgage, Mr. Mayor, was in 

your fair city, so I have a lot of affinity and affection for it. I did 

pay it off. I don’t want to tell you how long ago or how much it 

was for, but it was very small. 

Let me just ask you this, Mayor Turner. You mentioned about 

pre-positioning shelters, and Ms. Moore referenced a dialysis patient. Probably 10 days after the storm I came down to a dialysis 

clinic with the administrator for the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. I have to tell you, I was struck by the fact that, for 

the people who were on dialysis, it is not something that could happen; I mean, it is going to happen. Two or three times a week you 

have to make that trip, so the conditions are going to be very bad. 

107 

Do you have any way of not just pre-positioning a shelter but 

perhaps proactively reaching out to that population—because they 

are readily identifiable. Everybody knows who they are—and 

maybe getting them to a different location? I heard about this one 

bus driver who braved floods and wind to get the patients in so 

that they could be dialyzed, but really he was putting himself at 

risk for an activity that was quite predictable that it was going to 

have to happen. 

Is there any way to mitigate that, to pre-mitigate that? 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Burgess, I think the answer is yes. We got all 

these databases that are out there. It is just a matter of making 

sure we get the information so that we know ahead of time, and 

then we know how we can set up and where we need to set up accordingly. At all of the major shelters, it was not just housing, providing clothing, but providing medical assistance as well. I know 

that was done at NRG, and I commend what was taking place at 

NRG, and Baker Ripley, what they were doing. The same thing at 

the George R. Brown, and the same thing was at the Campbell 

Center, the shelter. 

So it was the pharmaceutical centers, it was other medical assistance all being provided at these shelters. It was pretty much holistic. 

Mr. BURGESS. Could they provide dialysis at these shelters? 

Mr. TURNER. I can’t say whether or not they were providing that 

or they were being transported to hospitals in other areas where 

those services could be provided. 

Mr. BURGESS. Mr. Cagle, let me just ask you, and this will be the 

last question. I know we have all had a long day. 

You talked about the buyout programs and the checkerboard 

phenomenon. So someone who remains in one of those areas, one 

of the checkerboards, one of the squares of the checkerboard, are 

they still eligible to purchase the Federal flood insurance? 

Mr. CAGLE. I am not sure. That is a good question. 

Mr. BURGESS. How many times can they be flooded out before 

perhaps they can’t buy it? I am just asking, because I don’t know 

the answer to that. 

Mr. CAGLE. I don’t know the answer to that either. That could 

be an incentive to encourage people to no longer be part of the 

checkerboard. Dr. Burgess, I hate to horn in on something that the 

Mayor said, but when you talked about picking up debris, today, 

although it has been long, we have not had a chance to sing the 

praises of private folks who came in to help. 

Rotech donated their coolers so that HEB, Kroger, and Walmart 

donated water. When our folks were out there in the field picking 

up debris, where people’s stuff was in their front yard—and I know 

this because that third picture over there is me with my library 

and my reading chair. So I know what it is like to have your life 

on the curb. Our folks that were picking up the debris were handing out bottles of water to be that little kind act of mercy in the 

midst of the pain. The cool water went a long way. 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you all for your efforts during that time, 

and your continued efforts. 

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman yields back. 

108 

Ranking Member Thompson is on his way home, so I recognize 

the gentle lady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for a closing statement. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Let me add my appreciation to Ranking Member Thompson, who 

himself has been exposed to a number of hurricanes, coming from 

Mississippi. I thank him for his leadership working with you, Mr. 

Chairman. I think you will say this in your closing remarks, that 

if there is a bipartisan committee in the U.S. Congress, non-partisan, it is the Homeland Security Committee, which I have been 

privileged to serve on for a good period of time, and I enjoy the seniority on this committee. So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and look 

forward to working together. 

We deal with the homeland, and we deal with North and South 

Korea. So you may see us on the DMZ because we are securing the 

homeland. 

But I do want to acknowledge the stupendous local leadership, 

from Commissioner Cagle representing the county; and, of course, 

the judge. Mayor Turner, it is well-known that you have redesigned 

how we deal with hurricane recovery, and I thank you for your astuteness. Your chairwoman of the Homeland Security Committee 

remained throughout the committee, Councilmember Stardick. I 

am in her district, she is in my district, we work together. 

Mayor Owens, we are neighbors, and so we are committed to you, 

and we believe the work you have done has been stupendous as 

you have worked with your Congressman, Congressman Green. 

To Mr. Sloan, let me as well look forward to working with you 

as we focus on local preparedness and enhancing that CERT team 

that is so very important, and particularly as it relates to minority 

communities, to multi-lingual populations, from Asians and Hispanics to others. It is very important to have that local team. 

You have done a stupendous job, Ms. Moore. Let me as a lifetime 

member as well applaud you and President Bledsoe and our local 

president as well here in Houston, the Dean. Let me just say that 

from the Urban League to the NAACP to a number of other entities, we have done well. 

The Chairman has allowed me, I want to do a real speed read. 

Please allow me to do that. But I would like to put into the record 

an article from the Boston Herald speaking about recalling the 

drowned officer as sweet and gentle, Sergeant Perez. I ask unanimous consent to do that. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 

ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY HON. SHEILA JACKSON LEE

HOUSTON POLICE CHIEF RECALLS DROWNED OFFICER AS ‘‘SWEET, GENTLE’’ 

http://www.bostonherald.com/news/national/2017/08/houstonlpolicelchieflrecallsldrownedlofficerlaslsweetlgentle 

Owen Boss, Wednesday, August 30, 2017, Boston Herald. 

The heartbroken chief of the Houston Police Department choked back tears while 

confirming the tragic drowning death of Sgt. Steve Perez, a 34-year veteran he said 

set out into the raging storm despite pleas from his wife to stay home because the 

longtime officer felt there was ‘‘work to do.’’ 

‘‘The wife told me she asked him not to go in,’’ Houston police Chief Art Acevedeo 

said of Sgt. Steve Perez. ‘‘His response was, ‘We got work to do.’ ’’ 

109 

Acevedo, who described the 60-year-old as ‘‘a sweet and gentle public servant’’ 

who ‘‘laid down his life’’ said Perez died after becoming trapped in floodwaters while 

driving to work in the early morning hours Sunday. 

‘‘Unfortunately, in the darkness, Sgt. Perez drove into an underpass that’s around 

161⁄2 (feet deep), drove into the water and he died in a flood, drowning-type event,’’ 

Acevedo said, adding that local officials struggled with the decision to hold off on 

recovering his body, which was found yesterday morning. 

‘‘Once our dive team got there it was too treacherous to go under and look for 

him so we made a decision to leave officers there waiting until the morning because 

as much as we wanted to recover him last night, we could not put more officers at 

risk for what we knew in our hearts would be a recovery mission,’’ Acevedo said. 

In a statement yesterday, the Houston Police Department said Perez’s death ‘‘reminds us of the dangers that police officers willingly face every day in order to serve 

this great City. We will go through this extremely difficult and trying time with 

heavy hearts sadly reminded of the ultimate sacrifice one of our own paid. Words 

cannot adequately express the sense of loss of the Perez family and their extended 

Houston Police family are experiencing.’’ 

Perez, who leaves behind his wife, Cheryl, and a grown son and daughter, was 

hailed for the courage he showed in the face of an unprecedented weather emergency. 

‘‘Like Steve, we will not (waver) and we will not stop until we meet the immediate 

safety and security needs of the community Steve and his HPD family love to 

serve,’’ the statement read. 

In a message posted to Twitter, Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner wrote, ‘‘Sergeant 

Perez fulfilled his purpose. His mission is complete. This city ought to celebrate his 

life.’’ 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. As well to make mention of the public works 

employee and all of the employees, all of the employees. The Mayor 

reminds us all the time, they were stupendous, from the public 

works, and I will mention police and fire. 

But I also want to put in the picture of Sergeant Perez. I ask 

unanimous consent. The picture of the Salvador family, the picture 

of this young Dreamer. Please note that this is not reflective of all 

those tragically who lost their lives, but I wish to put them in as 

a symbol of the loss of life that we had, Mr. Chairman. I ask unanimous consent. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Without objection. 

[The information follows:] 

110 

PHOTOS SUBMITTED BY HON. SHEILA JACKSON LEE

HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, SGT. STEVE PEREZ, 60, HAD WORKED 34 YEARS WITH

THE DEPARTMENT


H:\seals\1155610.eps
111 

ALONSO GUILLEN


H:\seals\1155611.eps
112 

SALDIVAR FAMILY

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Then let me just read from—this hearing was 

entitled ‘‘Houston Strong,’’ and I know that the Mayor of Houston 

would not mind me adding ‘‘Region Strong’’ because we have so 

many friends and partners. As my colleague Congressman Green 

did, let me acknowledge Commissioner Ellis, Commissioner Cagle, 

and that is because we worked together so hard to expand the supplemental nutrition program and managed to serve an additional 

30,000 people who were food insecure, without food, and I want to 

thank him for the hard work on that, working with the county. 

I already acknowledged President Bledsoe, but the Coast Guard 

and the Federal entities that were here before, they were the bird 

flying in the air, pulling us out, Coast Guard, Army Corps, FEMA, 

Red Cross. Even though we need to get them untangled, they were 

here, and they need to listen to you to get untangled. But I do want 

to put my thanks to them on the record because they had good 

hearts. They had a lot of people here. 

So in the Red Cross, I want to thank Charlotte Camacho, 

Charles Blake. They were two staff members who were battling on 

the battlefield, out there just trying to do the good work they were 

doing. 

The Mayor of the city of Houston Turner, Mayor of Humboldt, 

Texas, Mayor Aaron working with Congressman Ted Poe was not 

able to be here today. The Central City Mayor, working with myself and Congressman Gene Green. Mayor Diaz, the county judge, 

the commissioners that are not here, all of the city council members, Coast Guard, Army Corps, Chief Acadedo of the police department, Chief Pena of the Fire Department. 

Then, of course, the Urban League, Baker Ripley, Fifth Ward Redevelopment, Lodge Point, the Muslim Alliance. So many different 


H:\seals\1155612.eps
113 

faiths were involved, the Protestant faith, Catholics, the Jewish 

community were stupendous, Adventist Services was stupendous. 

Tray the Truth and all singers and artists and people who were 

entertaining and comforting people in their time of need. 

Dickey’s Barbecue, which was out in northeast Houston trying to 

feed people when they could not be fed. New Light Christian Center, Reverend Taylor and Mrs. Taylor, Grace Cathedral, Dr. Gillam, 

the Texas Military Museum was using their dump trucks. 

Finally, if I might—and if I forgot anybody, it is of the mind and 

not the heart. The amazing volunteers. Every one of you are 

unnamed, nameless, but I tell you, if we could hug all of you, we 

would do so. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to say that we have learned a 

lot today, and we particularly learned that we want our Federal 

Government to do studies and do work at the same time, central 

spine, bayous, fixing repairs, we want that to be done at the same 

time. 

Then, of course, we have learned that there were a lot of heroes 

and sheroes. Some lost their lives. Some didn’t get their name out, 

but their heart was there for so many people when it came to providing them with relief. 

To the Mayor of the city of Houston, since I was at the George 

R. Brown, I don’t know how many city departments you had there, 

mayor, but you literally lifted the city of Houston down to the 

George R. Brown. Parks and Recreation, your City Health Department. I want to make sure I thank the MASH unit that came in 

from Health and Human Services. 

I leave you with we closed a hospital that I am hoping we can 

work together. I think it is in the city limits, and that is East 

Houston Memorial that my constituents are calling about that they 

have down I–10 near Pleasantville, no hospital services because 

that hospital finally said we can’t take it. I am pleading to East 

Houston Hospital, let us work with you, let us try to get you back 

open again, and again, let us get the monies to where they need 

to be, to the county and the city. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your diligence, but also for your 

passion and commitment to have this hearing here, and all of the 

Members, from Mr. Al Green, Mr. Gene Green, Mr. Burgess, our 

friend from Nebraska, and of course our friend from Texas, Mr. 

Culberson. All of us worked on one page, and our senators who are 

not here as well. 

So thank you very much for this hearing. Again, whatever I 

missed is of the mind and not the heart. We are all still working 

together for those who are still suffering. We have not forgotten 

you. 

I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I thank the gentle lady. I think you have 

named just about everybody on my list. I think you saved me a lot 

of time in my closing remarks, but I appreciate your kind words 

on the way we try to govern on this committee, and that is in a 

bipartisan way. This is a Texas issue, it is not a Republican or a 

Democratic issue. I stand by that. 

I want to also thank the committee staff and the personal staff. 

This doesn’t happen by chance. It took a lot of work and preparaVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:30 Aug 17, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00117 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18FL0409\18FL0409 HEATH
114 

tion to get to this point. I am proud of everybody on this panel because you were in the thick of this day in and day out, 24/7. We 

were there as Members of Congress being liaisons, trying to get 

how can we help you. But you were the guys removing the debris, 

dealing with the victims, and everybody in this room who was a 

part of it, thank you as well for being patriots and heroes. 

As we say, Texans Helping Texas, but also Houston Strong. I 

thought it was very fitting that the Houston Astros won the championship game, because probably that is the best way I can think 

of to close. 

So, without objection, this committee stands adjourned. 

[Applause.] 

[Whereupon, at 2:41 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(115) 

A P P E N D I X 

ARTICLE SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY HON. AL GREEN

SURVEY FINDS UNPRECEDENTED PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS AFTER HARVEY

Todd Ackerman, Houston Chronical, Thursday, April 5, 2018. 

Harris County residents affected by Hurricane Harvey are experiencing serious 

psychological distress at levels rarely seen in the United States, according to a survey released Wednesday. 

The survey, conducted by the University of Texas School of Public Health in late 

December and early January, found signs of distress in 48 percent of those respondents who suffered major damage to their homes, nearly double the amount reported 

among Gulf Coast residents displaced by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. 

‘‘Except in still-devastated flood areas, people’s everyday lives appear to have returned to normal, but our findings from this survey suggest otherwise,’’ said Stephen Linder, director of the school’s Institute for Health Policy and co-author of the 

report. ‘‘That serious psychological distress is still lingering is most concerning. I expected some elevation, but not this much.’’ 

The survey found serious psychological distress, or SPD, in 18 percent of all respondents, compared to the region’s 8 percent rate reported in the same team’s 2010 

survey and the average national rate of 4 percent. The previous Houston rate and 

latest national rate did not come in the aftermath of disasters. 

Linder called for post-Harvey conversations—mostly focused on changing the 

physical environment to mitigate future flooding—to include ‘‘less visible but lasting 

psychological effects.’’ He said the SPD numbers reflect ‘‘damage to people’s sense 

of well-being that will take much longer to repair’’ than property and housing recovery. 


h:\seals\115563.eps
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At St. Mary’s Episcopal Church in northwest Houston, the Rev. Beth Fain reports 

that post-Harvey anxiety continues unabated. The church is home to 18 families, 

representing about 70 people, whose homes flooded as a result of Harvey. All are 

still either living with friends or families, in rented units or in their home’s upstairs 

rooms. ‘‘During worship one Sunday, it started raining, and you could just feel the anxiety rising,’’ said Fain, whose home flooded on both Tax Day and Harvey and said 

she shares the unease. ‘‘Since Harvey, the congregants feel a lack of safety and certainty I’ve never seen despite all the previous flooding in the area. No one feels safe 

from being flooded out of their home.’’ 

Fain said congregants talk about trouble sleeping, lost weight, thinking difficulties and increased sickness. 

The psychological distress is also reflected in a Facebook group ‘‘for those who 

were affected by Hurricane Harvey and struggling with anxiety, depression, anger, 

pain, etc., as they rebuild their lives or support friends and family. The focus will 

be on sharing solutions, talking through problems, sharing experiences.’’ 

THE HARRIS COUNTY SURVEY

Linder’s team surveyed 500 Harris County respondents between 18 and 54 years 

old to gauge their experience and recovery, using questions posed in previous postdisaster surveys. He acknowledged his confidence level in the survey is not as great 

as it would be for the Katrina/Rita survey because it is significantly smaller. The 

Katrina/Rita survey included 2,700 displaced people. But after adjusting for the 

sample size difference, he said the Houston survey results could range from a high 

of 53 percent to a low of 30 percent. The Katrina/Rita survey found a SPD of 25.7 

percent. 

SPD is a scientific term used in population-based studies, not a psychiatric diagnosis. It uses a scoring system indicating the likelihood that subjects have a mental 

illness such as anxiety, depression, or post-traumatic stress disorder. 

Dr. Jair Soares, chair of psychiatry and behavioral sciences at McGovern Medical 

School at UTHealth, called the Harvey survey findings ‘‘remarkable.’’ 

‘‘Those numbers are cause for great concern,’’ Soares said. ‘‘They suggest major 

disasters impact the mental health of people even more than we thought and that 

we need to be more proactive in identifying red flags and linking people with social 

services.’’ 

Dr. Julie Kaplow, director of Texas Children’s Hospital’s Trauma and Grief Center 

and Harvey Resiliency and Recovery Program, added that the survey responses are 

‘‘consistent with what we’re seeing.’’ She said the outside world may expect ‘‘everything to be back to normal 8 months after the event, but that’s not the case for 

those still suffering, particularly kids.’’ 

‘‘Post-traumatic stress doesn’t typically show up until 6 months and then typically 

needs longer-term intervention—say, two to 5 years,’’ Kaplow said. ‘‘Kids struggling 

the most are the those with previous conditions, often undiagnosed because they’re 

in underserved communities.’’ 

Kaplow said Harvey’s one silver lining is that more children are gaining access 

to mental health services and getting help for trauma for the first time. 

BY THE NUMBERS

Harvey damaged more than 200,000 Harris County homes and apartment buildings, according to the latest flood data released by public officials. Many are still 

in limbo, flooded out of homes and living with friends or in hotels or in short-term 

rental apartments. 

The UT survey found Harvey took a serious toll on people’s physical health, too, 

with nearly 22 percent experiencing a worsening of an existing health condition, 

physical injury or a new illness during or immediately after the hurricane. Of that 

group, 39 percent reported physical injuries, 26 percent infections, 22 percent respiratory problems and 10 percent worsening of chronic conditions. 

But the psychiatric distress was the survey’s most striking finding, evidenced also 

in those whose automobiles suffered major damage. Thirty-seven percent of such respondents also showed signs of SPD. 

The SPD rate was highest among Hispanic residents and lowest among Asian 

residents. The rate in women was nearly twice that of men, a departure from trends 

in previous studies. But it also was higher in Houston women in the 2010 survey. 

Linder expressed unease about the low level of concern by survey respondents 

about their mental health issues. Among those who suffered serious damage and reported signs of psychological distress, only 30 percent said they considered mental 

health care a pressing need. 

117 

The UT School of Public Health survey is a companion piece to a larger health 

survey currently in the works and due to be released this summer. Linder said he 

expects—or at least hopes—that survey will show a decline in the latest SPD numbers. The study will be broken down by pre- and post-Harvey responses, the latter 

taken between February and April. 

‘‘I think this survey shows not just the emotional impact of disasters like Harvey 

on people, it shows the need for more preparedness,’’ Linder said. ‘‘Planning relative 

to your social network—Is someone going to check on you? Where can you go to 

stay?—are as important as stockpiling batteries and food, making sure the radio 

works.’’ 

ARTICLE SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY HON. AL GREEN

RECORD RESERVOIR FLOODING WAS PREDICTED EVEN BEFORE HARVEY HIT HOUSTON

By Lise Olsen, Houston Chronicle, February 21, 2018; Updated: February 22, 2018 

10:28am. 

Water is released from the Barker Reservoir on Aug. 29 in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey. Five days earlier, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had projected 

that the storm would fill the reservoir to record levels and would flood nearby neighborhoods. Photo: Brett Comer, Staff/©2017 Houston Chronicle 

A day before Hurricane Harvey made landfall on the Texas coast last August, an 

internal U.S. Army Corps of Engineers forecast predicted that the storm would fill 

Houston’s Barker Reservoir to record levels, flooding neighborhoods on the reservoir’s western border, government records show. 

That projection was made Thursday, Aug. 24, 2017, as Harvey barreled toward 

Houston. The next day’s Army Corps forecast was even more worrisome: Both Barker and Addicks reservoirs would spill beyond government-owned land, engulfing 

nearby homes and businesses. 

The Corps did not share these predictions with the public. 

It wasn’t until Saturday, Aug. 26, that authorities in Fort Bend County—after 

being briefed on the latest Army Corps forecast—issued the first flooding advisory 

for neighborhoods adjacent to Barker. 

It took Harris County officials until late Sunday, Aug. 27, to begin issuing similar 

warnings for communities upstream of both Barker and Addicks. By then, some 

neighborhoods were already inundated. Many residents ended up fleeing on foot or 

being rescued in boats or military vehicles. 

The forecasts, closely held internal records, have emerged 6 months after Harvey 

through discovery in a lawsuit in which thousands of homeowners are seeking compensation from the Army Corps, which operates Barker and Addicks dams and their 

reservoirs. The Houston Chronicle obtained copies of the documents. 


h:\seals\115564.eps
118 

THE LAWSUIT: RESIDENTS ARGUE THE ARMY CORPS KNEW FOR DECADES ABOUT KATY

FLOODING RISKS

They are sure to revive debate about whether the Corps and local officials acted 

quickly enough to alert homeowners to the danger of reservoir flooding and to urge 

evacuations. 

Ultimately, the forecasts proved largely accurate. More than 9,000 homes and 

businesses were flooded by the reservoirs—at least 4,000 upstream of Barker and 

5,000 to 6,000 upstream of Addicks, according to a Chronicle analysis of damage reports. 

DEVELOPING STORM: FOR BUYERS WITHIN ‘‘FLOOD POOLS,’’ NO WARNINGS FROM

DEVELOPERS, PUBLIC OFFICIALS

County made advisory 

Fort Bend and Harris County officials said they were not informed of the Corps’ 

initial Aug. 24 forecast. 

‘‘If they were predicting that on Thursday, they were not advising us of that fact,’’ 

Fort Bend County Judge Robert Hebert said in an interview. 

Hebert said the county received the next day’s forecast, but he said the Corps 

characterized it as internal and preliminary. County officials say the forecast issued 

Saturday, Aug. 26, was so alarming that they decided to issue an advisory the same 

day, citing the Corps’ projections. 

Hebert said the county did so despite objections from Corps officials, who wanted 

the forecast kept confidential. Fort Bend County also activated its reverse 9–1–1 

system to reach out to thousands of property owners near Barker Reservoir. 

Harris County Judge Ed Emmett declined to comment. People familiar with his 

role in the emergency response say Emmett was not briefed on the Corps’ forecasts. 

Efforts to obtain comment from the Corps were unsuccessful. The Chronicle 

emailed questions to a Corps spokesman on Tuesday. He had not provided responses 

as of Wednesday night. 

One of the reservoir-adjacent homes that was flooded during Harvey belongs to 

Harry Ershad, a computer programmer and musician. He said it was frustrating to 

learn that as early as Aug. 24, the Corps had developed a detailed picture of how 

Barker Reservoir would fill his Canyon Gate neighborhood. 

Ershad said that with just a few hours’ notice, he, his wife and their two sons 

could have saved their four cars, most of their musical instruments and their home 

recording studio. Instead, he said, nearly everything was ruined. 

By the time Fort Bend County issued its Aug. 26 advisory, the streets in Ershad’s 

neighborhood already had been swamped. He and his family later waded out 

through neck-high water, he said. 

‘‘We got out with our laptops and our passports, and that’s it,’’ he said. 

HARVEY SURPRISE: MANY HOMEOWNERS UNAWARE THEY LIVED IN RESERVOIR ‘‘FLOOD

POOLS’’ 

The flooding forecasts were generated by the Corps Water Management System, 

which crunches information about rainfall, weather forecasts, river conditions, and 

other data to guide the Army Corps in managing its dams and reservoirs. 

The Aug. 24 forecast showed that Harvey would cause the volume of water in 

Barker Reservoir to exceed what could be stored on government-owned land beginning Tuesday, Aug. 29, and lasting for more than 2 weeks. 

When that forecast was issued, Fort Bend and Harris counties were preparing to 

open emergency operations centers and Harvey’s rains had not yet arrived. 

Once the emergency centers opened Aug. 25, the Corps sent staff members and 

gave daily updates to Harris and Fort Bend county officials and Houston city officials. But the Corps told the local officials not to make any of the Corps Water Management System forecasts public, said Jeff Braun, emergency management coordinator for Fort Bend County. 

Flooding of homes begin 

The Aug. 25 forecast showed the water level in Barker Reservoir reaching 100 

feet. Water begins to spill into neighborhoods when the level exceeds 95 feet, according to Corps records. 

The forecast generated on Saturday, Aug. 26, said homes upstream of Barker 

would begin to flood on Monday, Aug. 28—a day earlier than previously predicted. 

The projection for Addicks indicated that some homes in low-lying neighborhoods 

could fill with 7 or more feet of water and remain flooded for weeks. 

119 

Both Harris and Fort Bend counties issued formal evacuation orders Aug. 30. By 

then, neighborhoods near the reservoirs had been inundated for days. 

Attorneys representing homeowners in flood-related lawsuits in the U.S. Court of 

Claims want to know why the forecasts weren’t shared with the public sooner. 

Homeowners want to know why their neighborhoods were built inside a reservoir 

flood pool. 

‘‘The tragedy is an earlier warning could have allowed people to get out and get 

their property out,’’ said Charles Irvine, of Irvine & Conner, one of the lead lawyers 

for property owners upstream of the reservoirs. 

‘‘This confirms that when a storm comes, the Corps can use its own modeling to 

predict exactly how much government-stored water will impact the upstream community. I can’t speak to why the Corps didn’t give the residents an earlier warning. 

But clearly the Corps anticipated the flooding on upstream private land from the 

Addicks and Barker dams before the rains even really started.’’ 

James Blackburn, another Houston attorney who has long been active in flooding 

matters and who recently founded a related nonprofit called the Bayou City Initiative, said a congressional investigation was warranted. 

‘‘This is a bona fide public policy debacle,’’ he said. ‘‘Were Harris County and Fort 

Bend County officials getting information and not alerting the public—or were they 

not getting the information? Or did they get the information and did the Corps ask 

them not to spread it around?’’ 

Thousands of people like Ershad hunkered down to wait out Harvey because they 

were not told to evacuate and didn’t know their neighborhoods could be flooded by 

the reservoirs. When Ershad left Canyon Gate, the streets were impassable but only 

his garage had flooded. He and his family returned 13 days later to find their home 

ruined. They had no flood insurance. 

‘‘I lost 15 years of compositions of music,’’ he said. 

Addicks and Barker dams were built in the 1940’s to protect downtown Houston 

from flooding. The earthen structures are designed to hold storm runoff from the 

vast Buffalo Bayou watershed and release it into the bayou at a controlled rate. 

LIKE A BATHTUB: HOW THE ADDICKS AND BARKER DAMS WORK

The government acquired thousands of acres of land behind the dams to serve as 

reservoirs, but the dams can hold back more water than can fit on that land. Over 

the decades, tens of thousands of homes were built on the edges of the governmentowned property. 

When the reservoir pools exceed the government-owned land—an extremely rare 

occurrence—water has nowhere to go but into adjacent neighborhoods. That’s what 

happened during Harvey. 

As far back as 1995, the Corps studied ways to reduce this risk. The options included deepening the reservoirs, buying out thousands of properties and building 

more reservoirs. The Corps never acted on any of them. 

IGNORED: A FORT BEND ENGINEER’S WARNING, 25 YEARS OLD, COMES TRUE DURING

HARVEY

DEVELOPING STORM

Hurricane Harvey was the most destructive storm in Houston’s history. The lateAugust storm dumped up to 60 inches of rain on southeast Texas, but the resulting 

damage was multiplied by actions taken—and not taken—during the past 50 years. 

Our seven-part series explains why the storm’s damage was both a natural and 

man-made disaster. 

Part 1: Nature ruled, man reacted. Hurricane Harvey was Houston’s reckoning 

Part 2: Build, flood, rebuild: flood insurance’s expensive cycle 

Part 3: What’s in Houston’s worst flood zones? Development worth $13.5 billion 

Part 4: Harvey overwhelmed some levee systems. Future storms could do worse 

Part 5: Officials patched and prayed while pressure built on Houston’s dams 

Part 6: For buyers within ‘‘flood pools,’’ no warnings from officials 

Part 7: In ‘‘eternal struggle’’ with water, Dutch have much to teach 

120 

ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY HON. AL GREEN

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS TO RELEASE WATER FROM TWO HOUSTON-AREA

DAMS: STATEMENT

David Gaffen; Reuters, August 28, 2017. 

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is starting to release water from two Houstonarea reservoirs, which will cause flooding of homes in the surrounding communities, 

because the reservoirs have risen too quickly due to Tropical Storm Harvey, the 

agency said in a statement. 

The Corps of Engineers said it needs to release water now to prevent uncontrolled 

water flowing from the dams. Water is being released from the Addicks and Barker 

into Buffalo Bayou, the primary body of water running through Houston. 

‘‘If we don’t begin releasing now, the volume of uncontrolled water around the 

dams will be higher and have a greater impact on the surrounding communities,’’ 

said Col. Lars Zetterstrom, Galveston District commander of the Corps. 

The release is expected to start flooding homes around the Addicks and Barker 

reservoirs on Monday morning, the Harris County Flood Control District said. 

ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY HON. AL GREEN

$500 MILLION IN IKE RELIEF IS STILL UNSPENT. WILL TEXAS DO BETTER AFTER

HARVEY? 

Morgan Smith and Brandon Formby, Texas Tribune, Nov. 3, 2017. 

U.S. Air Force member conducted search and rescue operations on Galveston Island after Hurricane Ike on Sept. 13, 2008. Staff Sgt. James L. Harper Jr. 

The billions in long-term disaster relief dollars that will fund Texans’ recovery 

from Hurricane Harvey’s devastating blow are still far from reaching state coffers. 

But there’s already tension brewing over how much federal money should be spent 

to fix flood victims’ homes and how much should go toward repairing government 

buildings and launching new flood control projects. 

Those critical choices will hinge on a key decision: Who will control how the 

money is spent, the federal government or Texas? 

State leaders want as few limitations as possible on what could be the biggest influx of federal recovery money to ever hit the state, arguing that officials in cities 

and counties battered by the storm know best whether money should go to individual households or public works projects. 

The state’s requests for flexibility—followed by Gov. Greg Abbott’s Tuesday trip 

to Washington to deliver a $61 billion wish list predominantly made up of Harveyrelated infrastructure projects—have sparked alarm from veterans of previous battles over long-term recovery funding. 

With the recent past as their guide, they fear homeowners and impoverished communities will get shortchanged in favor of large-scale infrastructure projects that 

could have little connection to disaster recovery. 

They point to Hurricane Ike, which struck Galveston in 2008 and flooded an estimated 100,000 homes along the Texas coastline not long after Hurricane Dolly hit 

the Rio Grande Valley. 

At the time, the state received $3 billion from the Department of Housing and 

Urban Development, the federal agency that oversees long-term rebuilding from natural disasters. A Texas Tribune review of projects funded with that money found 

it went to a wide range of purposes that local officials tied to disaster recovery, including building new community centers in at least eight different counties, replacing lights at a Little League baseball field, putting a new roof on a sports stadium, 

and restoring a beach pavilion. Yet almost 10 years later, more than $500 million—most of it earmarked for housing-related projects—for Ike and Dolly recovery still hasn’t been spent. 

‘‘The hard truth of this is there aren’t going to be enough resources to make everyone whole, there aren’t going to be enough resources to harden all the infrastructure, there just aren’t,’’ said Maddie Sloan, a lawyer for Texas Appleseed, an advocacy nonprofit. ‘‘So there have to be priorities set, and how priorities get set is a 

big deal.’’ 

Some local officials have already begun to push for using long-term recovery 

money from the federal housing department for infrastructure projects. 

At a meeting in Houston’s flood-prone Meyerland neighborhood last month, the 

city’s chief resilience officer told a crowd of hundreds that officials are ‘‘actively purVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:30 Aug 17, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00124 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18FL0409\18FL0409 HEATH
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suing’’ HUD money to use as the local contribution toward flood control projects that 

would also be funded through other federal sources. 

‘‘We can use HUD money for local shares of other stuff,’’ Stephen Costello said. 

Meanwhile, more than 51,000 southeast Texans are still displaced and living in 

hotel rooms, more than two months after Harvey slammed into the coast, dumped 

more than 50 inches of rain in some areas and damaged more than 563,000 homes. 

More than 149,000 people have qualified for rental assistance while they wait out 

repairs or look for a long-term place to call home. An unknown number are living 

with family or friends or paying for their own short-term housing needs. 

‘‘It’s often the case that the needs of Texans to rebuild and recover don’t rise to 

the same level of some of those government projects that people have in mind,’’ said 

John Henneberger, co-director of the Texas Low Income Housing Information Service. 

HOW THE MONEY WILL FLOW

Abbott split long-term disaster recovery efforts between the land office and a commission headed by Texas A&M University Chancellor John Sharp. The two entities 

have told federal officials they need a collective $121 billion to help cities, counties 

and families recover, though it’s still unclear how much overlap there could be in 

the two requests. State leaders have also been clear that they aren’t expecting to 

get all they ask for. 

The land office is overseeing housing assistance programs, including long-term recovery dollars that typically go toward rebuilding houses or repairing damaged 

apartments. But the land office is also overseeing infrastructure projects that could 

be funded from the same pot of money. 

The commission Sharp leads is focusing on flood control, roadways, water services 

projects and buying out or elevating flood-prone houses. While Sharp’s commission 

compiled a 301-page report detailing money needed for public works projects across 

the Texas coast, no state or federal agency has put together a comprehensive account of the damage Harvey did to Texans’ homes. 

Instead, state officials’ request for long-term housing money is an estimate based 

on the number of households requesting immediate emergency aid, the average cost 

of a Texas house and how much money it cost to rebuild houses in previous disasters. 

Land office leaders readily admit that many Texans may not receive federal assistance to cover their losses from Harvey. They also say that for the cost of rebuilding a handful of damaged homes, they can pay for projects that can protect many 

more homes from future floods. 

‘‘So the locals need the ability to make that determination on what’s the best way 

to benefit that particular area,’’ said Pete Phillips, a senior director with the state’s 

General Land Office. 

But giving local elected leaders that level of discretion is what has some housing 

advocates worried. 

‘‘That’s absolutely what created the problems before,’’ Henneberger said. 

STATE PRIORITIES CHALLENGED AFTER IKE, DOLLY

In many ways, concerns about the rebuilding process are rooted in Texas’ problematic history of disaster relief spending. 

The lump-sum relief funds HUD gives states and local governments comes with 

some restrictions on how the money can be used. Those stipulations usually include 

how long the public has to weigh in on state and local plans for the funds, thresholds for how much must go toward housing rather than infrastructure and a minimum amount that must be spent to help low- and moderate-income disaster victims. 

‘‘The goal is not to hand everybody a little bit of money,’’ Henneberger said. ‘‘The 

goal is to make sure that the limited amount of money can help those who could 

not otherwise recover.’’ 

After Ike and Dolly, the state put two separate agencies—one for housing and one 

for non-housing projects—in charge of overseeing local governments’ use of the 

money. 

Local officials quickly used that money to rebuild infrastructure, while a large 

portion of the money that should have gone to help Texans rebuild their homes remains unspent nearly a decade later. 

At the time, monitoring reports from the federal housing department blamed that 

slow trickle of money for housing on bureaucratic chaos at the state level. Gov. Rick 

Perry blamed the delays on the federal government. 

122 

A year after Ike and Dolly hit, Henneberger’s and Sloan’s nonprofits accused 

Texas officials of violating fair housing laws and HUD’s own rules for spending disaster funds. 

The advocacy groups said in a complaint to HUD that the state used flawed data 

in deciding how to split relief money between public works projects and Texans 

whose homes were damaged by the hurricanes. They also said the state effectively 

‘‘steered resources away’’ from hurricane victims by awarding a $16.6 million contract to a consulting firm that helped local governments understand how disaster 

grants work and identify infrastructure projects that would qualify. 

In a May 2010 agreement between the state and the nonprofits, the federal housing department forced Texas to rework its plan for the relief funds. The department 

also increased the amount of money that Texas was required to spend on lower-income residents and ordered the state to use more than $200 million to rebuild, replace, buy out or construct housing for lower-income Texans. 

Today, $297 million of unspent Ike and Dolly money is earmarked for housing recovery. That includes money set aside for public housing in Galveston, where plans 

for affordable units have been mired in opposition from other residents, politics and 

federal complaints for years. 

While the state holds the money and ensures recipients spend it according to 

HUD’s parameters, it’s up to local governments like cities and counties to turn those 

dollars into construction projects. The General Land Office has managed the funds 

since 2011, and officials there say they plan to close out remaining projects by the 

end of 2019. 

Sloan, with the Texas Appleseed Project, said the state’s performance has improved since the state land office began overseeing the second round of hurricane 

relief funding. 

‘‘There’ve been dramatic increases in the amount of home repair money going to 

low-income households, better benefits to renters of different income levels, and the 

state has said every infrastructure project needs to benefit low- and moderate-income people,’’ she said. 

But Henneberger said the lack of a comprehensive plan to help Texans put their 

lives back together after Harvey—and the overwhelming focus on infrastructure in 

the state’s wish list released this week—is frustrating and worrisome. 

‘‘We want to see that the money is targeted fairly between infrastructure and individual benefits to disaster survivors who need to recover their lives and rebuild 

their homes,’’ Henneberger said. 

WORRY IN MEYERLAND

In the past two months, Congress has agreed to spend more than $51.8 billion 

on disaster relief following a string of natural calamities including three hurricanes 

and California’s deadly wildfires. 

The federal housing department has yet to determine how to divide the money 

among the affected states and territories, but the agency said it will do so based 

on which areas have the greatest ‘‘unmet need,’’ said spokesman Brian Sullivan. 

They make that evaluation using data from insurance claims, FEMA, and the Small 

Business Administration, which provides disaster relief loans to homeowners. 

‘‘Everybody is collecting information about the places that were hit the hardest, 

who suffered the greatest degree of serious or maybe even severe housing damage, 

how many families were insured or uninsured, it’s like you’ve got to untangle this 

ball of yarn,’’ Sullivan said. 

While government officials continue taking stock of the overall impact, hundreds 

of thousands of Texans are still slogging through their individual recoveries. At last 

month’s meeting in Meyerland about flood control projects, tensions boiled over inside a church packed with hundreds of residents listening to officials discuss infrastructure and federal funding. 

The houses in that neighborhood straddling Houston’s Brays Bayou were inundated with feet of water after Harvey battered southeast Texas—some for the third 

time in as many years. Many residents are waiting to see if their repeatedly-flooded 

homes will be targeted for buyouts, while others who flooded for the first time this 

year are months or years from learning if there will be federal money to help them 

fully rebuild. 

Some Meyerland residents asked officials about particular flood-control projects 

during the meeting’s question-and-answer portion. Others had more immediate 

needs on their mind. 

‘‘Some people don’t care about long-term plans,’’ Larry Zomper said once he got 

a turn at a microphone. ‘‘We wanna know how to live now, what decisions to make 

now.’’ 

123 

Disclosure.—Texas Appleseed and Texas A&M University have been financial supporters of The Texas Tribune. A complete list of Tribune donors and sponsors is 

available here. 

ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY HON. AL GREEN

CLIMATE CHANGE DISPLACEMENT IS BECOMING THE NEW GENTRIFICATION—HERE’S

HOW TO STOP IT

Stephen Zacks, December 6, 2016. 

Nathan Weyiouanna’s house falls victim to climate-change-related coastal erosion in 

Shishmaref, Alaska, from the series The Last Days of Shishmaref (2008). (©Dana 

Lixenberg ) 

Partisan political discourse still pretends as if there’s a climate change ‘‘debate,’’ 

yet the government is already acting extensively to prevent crises from rising global 

temperatures. Across the country, local and Federal agencies are working with architects and planners to protect communities and redevelop neighborhoods in the 

aftermath of climate-related natural disasters. But what happens to residents who 

are too poor to get out of the way of storms—and too poor to return—and why is 

anyone rushing to live in disaster zones? 

Catastrophic natural disasters share a common feature with accelerated processes 

of economic development: at vastly different rates, both can result in large-scale displacement. An article by Brentin Mock on environmental news site Grist uses a 

pithy phrase for the disparate impact climate change can have on lower-income residents: it’s the ‘‘ultimate gentrifier,’’ he wrote, citing the exodus of more than 300,000 

low-income residents from New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. 

The description may be provocative, but studies by environmental scientists at the 

EPA’s Climate Change Division partly support the notion. Within the 6,000-squaremile area at high risk of flooding by 2100 due to a mid-range two-foot sea-level rise, 

almost 750,000 residents belong to the most socially vulnerable groups. These are 

most likely to be disproportionately impacted by storms and least likely to have the 

resources to move. 

But are rich people really moving into areas where low-income residents are being 

displaced by storms? Sadly, in some cases, yes. A New York Times story on highVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:30 Aug 17, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00127 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18FL0409\18FL0409 HEATH

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rise condo construction in Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn, reports that, far from retreating from flooded areas, a building boom is driving up prices. 

Currently, local and Federal agencies only spottily provide the necessary infrastructure and policy frameworks to protect against climate-related catastrophes 

ranging from forest fires in Southern California, earthquakes along the Pacific 

Coast, tornados and flash flooding in the Midwest, and hurricanes in the Gulf of 

Mexico. Adequate planning, Federal aid, and environmental regulations can and 

should prevent disparate impacts of climate-change related severe weather events 

on low-income residents. In practice, prioritizing where to improve infrastructure 

falls to local governments that have worse financial constraints and often carry an 

implicit economic bias toward the most financially important areas. 

Shishmaref. (Courtesy Bering Land Bridge National Preserve) 

In Alaska, higher temperatures are increasing erosion and thawing the permafrost, causing homes to sink in the mud. More than a dozen Inuit towns have already voted to move, including Newtok, which has acquired a relocation site through 

an act of Congress, and the 650-person Bering Sea village of Shishmaref, which 

commissioned AECOM’s Anchorage office to study the feasibility of relocation sites. 

Yet the cost of these moves, estimated at $214 million for Shishmaref alone, is far 

beyond the means of the inhabitants; a U.N. report on climate change and displacement notes the lack of State and Federal governance structures to support these 

moves. 

Some low-lying neighborhoods in New Orleans are undergoing a similar policy of 

unofficial abandonment, swallowed up by nature through neglect. These places are 

not gentrifying—they’re simply disappearing. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), reorganized in 2003 under 

the Department of Homeland Security and reformed since 2009 by Obama Administration appointee Craig Fulgate, now talks about what it calls a ‘‘whole community’’ 

approach, emphasizing participation and engagement of a wide range of stakeholders. It needs to do more. 

‘‘FEMA has changed its rhetoric,’’ said Deborah Gans, who has conducted planning studies for low-lying neighborhoods in New Orleans and Red Hook, Brooklyn, 

most of which flooded in 2012 during Hurricane Sandy. ‘‘They don’t really know how 

to do it yet, but at least they’re talking the talk.’’ 

In 2008, Homeland Security established the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness 

Grant program to encourage collaborative emergency planning in America’s ten 

largest urban regions. In New York’s combined statistical area, which includes New 

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ning Team coordinated a series of Participatory Urban Planning workshops that included city and State agencies, nonprofits, community groups, private-sector representatives, and even local Occupy affiliates to streamline emergency preparedness, 

housing recovery plans, and recovery processes in five types of communities. 

In the New York area, Hurricane Sandy has increased the sense of urgency. ‘‘In 

New York, about a third of our housing is within our six evacuation zones,’’ said 

Cynthia Barton, who participated in the workshops as manager of the Housing Recovery Program for the New York City Office of Emergency Management. 

Urban Post-Disaster Housing Prototype. (Courtesy Andrew Rugge/Archphoto/Open 

House New York) 

Barton leads the FEMA-supported initiative to prototype interim housing units, 

designed by James Garrison, which would substitute for the improvised mesh of hotels that sheltered displaced low-income residents in the aftermath of Sandy. The 

interim housing units, IKEA-like prefab condo boxes that stack up to three stories 

high in various configurations, facilitate an urban density allowing vulnerable residents to remain within their neighborhoods in the aftermath of severe storms. 

‘‘The basis for the project has always been that none of the Federal temporary 

housing options would work in cities and that it’s very important to keep people 

close to home after a disaster,’’ Barton said. ‘‘In terms of economic stability for people and for neighborhoods, it’s important to keep people close to their jobs. It’s important for mental health reasons to keep people close to schools and close to their 

support networks.’’ 


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In 2015, DLANDstudio was selected to develop a green infrastructure master plan 

for the St. Roch neighborhood of New Orleans. (Courtesy DLANDstudio) 

But on the Federal level, long-term infrastructure improvements are not adequately funded. In New Orleans, landscape architect Susannah Drake of 

DLANDstudio is working on a gray and green streetscape program for 20 blocks of 

the St. Roch neighborhood. ‘‘The issue is that the base condition was low in terms 

of the infrastructure that existed,’’ Drake said. ‘‘We’re adding basic amenities for 

what would be a normal streetscape in New York, but we’re also dealing with the 

challenge of having very little infiltration and having a lot of water to 

manage... They’re not things the Federal Government is necessarily willing to 

pay for.’’ 

Without Federal insurance and public investment in infrastructure, wealthy 

homeowners don’t tend to move into flood zones. But storm protection, unevenly 

funded by Federal grants, frequently has to be supported by local real-estate development tax revenues that provide lopsided advantages to upper-income residents. 

‘‘There’s a historical inequity environmentally in a lot of these neighborhoods in 

need, and it’s exacerbated by climate change,’’ said Gans, who led a Pratt Institute 

planning study on how to locate emergency housing in low-lying Red Hook, Brooklyn. ‘‘New York City Housing Authority projects were generally located on land that 

wasn’t that valuable, and guess what? It tended to be low-lying and out of the way.’’ 

The problem centers on whether to save the threatened neighborhoods or rezone 

them to exclude residential use. Shoring up a city’s flood defenses can become an 

opportunity to improve a neighborhood’s environmental equity, but using the prevailing market-based model, focusing stormwater infrastructure in a waterfront 

community will only push more housing into vulnerable areas. 

‘‘As long as we keep allowing people to build market-rate waterfront property, 

there will be gentrification,’’ Gans said. ‘‘Any development that takes place on the 

water will be so expensive that it will necessarily gentrify the waterfront. There’s 

just no doubt about it.’’ 


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127 

AECOM’s plan for Red Hook. (Courtesy AECOM) 

In Red Hook and Sunset Park, AECOM recently released a plan to place 30– 

50,000 units of new housing on the waterfront—25 percent of it affordable—as well 

as subsidize a new subway stop, and implement green and gray infrastructure for 

coastal protection and flood management. Arguing for the plan as a boost to Mayor 

de Blasio’s OneNYC ambition to build 200,000 affordable units by 2020, the proposal also runs counter to the idea of limiting exposure to areas of growing risk. 

‘‘Why would you build more housing in an area that’s underserved by transportation and that’s in a really dangerous zone, a flood area,’’ asked Drake, who designed the Sponge Park concept as a green infrastructure element for the Gowanus 

Canal. ‘‘I’m not an economist, but I’m very pragmatic and down on building in flood 

plains.’’ 

Officially, there is no means testing of emergency planning or recovery aid. Eligibility for the National Flood Insurance Program and high insurance rates affect individual decisionmakers. Not so for public housing, where residents’ lack of access 

to resources makes issues of planning that much more grave. Because of its 6,500 

public housing residents, two-thirds of the Red Hook is below the poverty line. Economically, the light-manufacturing industries scattered among its low-rises generate 

relatively little revenue for the city to justify hundreds of millions in flood protection. 

The conflict between access to revenues and local needs seems to underlie the rapidly advancing East Side and Lower Manhattan Coastal Resiliency projects, sections 

of Bjarke Ingels Group’s winning Rebuild by Design competition proposal for the 

protection of Lower Manhattan up to 59th Street. The projects essentially erect a 

wall adorned with parks as a bulwark against the sea. They implicitly prioritize the 

centrally important economic drivers of New York City. 

‘‘Ultimately there’s a cost-benefit analysis,’’ said Drake. ‘‘I’m not saying that lives 

are less valuable in other parts of the city, but when you do an economic cost-benefit 

analysis between Lower Manhattan and Red Hook, and you’re looking on purely financial terms, then Lower Manhattan wins because it’s an economic driver of the 

city.’’ 


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128 

Rendering of the Stuyvesant Cove section of the East Side Coastal Resiliency Project 

(ESCR). (Courtesy city of New York) 

If it can really be done for that amount, the estimated cost for the Lower Manhattan projects is negligible in comparison to the economic benefit. The Office of Recovery and Resiliency and the Economic Development Corporation of New York have 

dedicated $100 million to an integrated flood protection system (IFPS) for Red Hook. 

City capital is supporting a $109 million Raise Shorelines City-wide project that 

would mitigate sea level rise in Old Howard Beach, Gowanus Canal, East River Esplanade, Mott Basin, Canarsie, Norton Basin, and the North Shore of Coney Island 

Creek. 

‘‘Emergency planning should really be about future planning,’’ Gans said. ‘‘The 

way you avert an emergency is by making sure you have integrative future plans 

that don’t put people in harm’s way and mitigate all of the bad decisions you made 

historically.’’ 

In contrast to the oblivious political climate change ‘‘debate,’’ local governments 

have already learned from recent extreme weather events that they need to act to 

improve their planning capacity and infrastructure. Federal agencies are also acting, putting limited resources into protecting against climate change-related disasters. Highly engineered solutions are possible, but they’re unwise as a long-term 

strategy in the absence of a leveling off of global temperatures and will be cost-prohibitive for low-income communities. Unless the next Congress is prepared to fund 

a national infrastructure program, the best way to equitably protect low-income 

residents will be to downzone vulnerable areas and build new public housing on 

higher ground. Otherwise, we’ll need to accept the fact that our celebrated revitalized waterfront is mainly for the rich. 

ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY HON. AL GREEN

FEDERAL HOUSING AGENCY ANNOUNCES $57.8 MILLION TO TEXAS FOR HARVEY

RECOVERY

Morgan Smith and Brandon Formby, Texas Tribune, October 20, 2017. 

Federal housing officials announced Friday what they called ‘‘another down payment’’—an additional $57.8 million—to support long-term recovery efforts from Hurricane Harvey in Texas. 

The new funding from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 

is separate from the State’s yet-to-be-determined share of the $7.4 billion in HUD 

disaster recovery dollars Congress appropriated in September. Federal housing officials are currently deciding how to divide that sum among the U.S. States and terriVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:30 Aug 17, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00132 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18FL0409\18FL0409 HEATH

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tories hit by hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria. It is unclear how long it that will 

take. 

‘‘We are literally poring over this information right now with the hope that we 

can allocate that $7.4 billion as quickly as possible. The challenge of course is that 

data don’t become available immediately,’’ said Neal Rackleff, the department’s assistant secretary for community planning and development, who added that there 

was still ‘‘virtually no’’ damage assessment available for Puerto Rico. 

The $57.8 million will go to Texas as early as mid-December. The State will then 

administer the grants at the local level. This process will allow money to reach families in need faster than if it went directly to county or city governments, Rackleff 

said, because the State already has an action plan in place. 

Rackleff said the Federal housing department had identified 13 Texas counties 

where housing needs were going unmet by either private insurance or various 

sources of Federal aid. Those needs were ‘‘especially severe’’ in Harris, Galveston, 

and Jefferson counties. 

The Federal housing funds, which are a specialized form of community block development grants aimed at disaster recovery, can go toward rebuilding houses, businesses, roads, other buildings and infrastructure. But Rackleff said Federal officials 

hoped the money would primarily go toward housing. 

‘‘While these funds can support a variety of recovery activities,’’ he said, ‘‘we believe and would strongly encourage the State of Texas to use these resources in a 

manner that helps families with their housing needs.’’ 

ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY HON. AL GREEN

FOUR MONTHS AFTER HURRICANE HARVEY, FOUR MAJOR QUESTIONS ABOUT RECOVERY

FOR 2018 

By Dave Harmon, Jan. 4, 2018 Updated: 8 PM. 

Clarification: This story was updated to more accurately explain the Army Corps 

of Engineers’ assessment of the integrity of the Addicks and Barker reservoirs. 

Houston and the Gulf Coast are learning hard lessons about their vulnerability 

to flooding after Hurricane Harvey—which was the latest and by far the biggest in 

a 3-year stretch of major inundations for Houston that included the Memorial Day 

and Tax Day floods. 

People who didn’t think they needed flood insurance—because they weren’t in a 

designated flood zone—have learned that the flood maps are increasingly irrelevant. 

Local leaders and flood control planners are learning that 500-year floods may become regular occurrences. 

Four months after Harvey stormed ashore and dumped historic rains on the coastal flatlands, major questions remain. The Tribune has reported on each of these (you 

can read all of our Harvey coverage here), and we’ll keep following these storylines 

in 2018: 

HOW WILL TEXAS SPEND BILLIONS IN FEDERAL LONG-TERM RECOVERY MONEY?

So far, the State is leaning hard on the Federal Government to fix what Harvey 

broke. Despite enduring the rainiest day in recorded history—up to 50 inches fell 

in parts of Houston at Harvey’s peak—Texas’ top leaders have resisted tapping the 

so-called Rainy Day Fund (which currently stands at about $10 billion) to help with 

the recovery. 

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has announced Texas 

will receive just over $5 billion for long-term rebuilding efforts. Texas leaders would 

like more. They have estimated the State needs as much as $121 billion—and they 

want as few limitations on how to spend that money as possible. 

They argue that officials in cities and counties battered by the storm know best 

whether money should go to individual households or public works projects. But the 

State’s requests for flexibility—along with an infrastructure-heavy wish list—have 

sparked alarm among housing advocates who fear homeowners and impoverished 

communities will get shortchanged in favor of large-scale infrastructure projects 

that could have little connection to disaster recovery. 

A bigger question: How long will it take the money to get where it’s supposed to 

go? After Hurricanes Ike and Dolly struck the Texas coast, the State received $3 

billion in 2008 from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development for 

long-term rebuilding. 

130 

WHEN WILL HOUSTON’S JUSTICE SYSTEM GET BACK TO NORMAL?

After Harvey hit in late August, trials in one of the country’s busiest criminal justice systems were delayed for months. Damage from the storm left the city’s Criminal Justice Center—a 20-story building that houses 40 courtrooms, the district attorney’s office and enough holding cells to accommodate 900 inmates—out of commission for months, and swamped its jury assembly building perhaps beyond repair. 

Jury trials resumed October 16, but the backlog in pending cases persists. Judges 

continue to double up on courtrooms, with trial courts allocated on a rotating basis. 

The system is churning—but haltingly. And that will be the status ‘‘for the foreseeable future,’’ said Judge Bob Schaffer, administrative judge for the Harris County 

district courts. 

Court officials said proceedings are not likely to return to normal until the facilities are restored to full occupancy, which could take as long as another year and 

will cost tens of millions of dollars. 

But the justice system is slowly coming back to life: Cases are being heard, albeit 

slowly, and verdicts are being handed down. Well over 5,000 people already have 

reported for jury duty. 

‘‘Things aren’t back to normal yet,’’ Harris County Court Manager Ed Wells said. 

‘‘But we’re making the best of what we have available and moving forward.’’ 

HOW WILL THE GULF COAST ADDRESS THE FLOOD RISKS THAT HARVEY EXPOSED?

The State has a list of big-ticket infrastructure projects for flood mitigation and 

prevention. And officials are hoping the feds will pay for all or most of it. 

Reservoir improvements.—The Addicks and Barker reservoirs west of downtown 

Houston—which are essentially earthen berms designed to temporarily hold back 

floodwaters before releasing them into Buffalo Bayou—are considered ‘‘high risk’’ by 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which maintains and operates them (the Army 

Corps says the dams are structurally sound, and that designation reflects the dams’ 

proximity to a major population center). To make matters worse, developers have 

plopped about 14,000 homes inside their flood basins (many of those homes flooded 

during Harvey) and all that new development is sending more runoff into the reservoirs during storms. The reservoirs need major upgrades, and there’s serious talk 

of building another one to take the pressure off Addicks and Barker. That’ll take 

a lot of land and a lot of money—and years of work to complete. 

Buyouts.—After three flood events in 3 years, lots of Houstonians are talking 

about buyouts. But as we discovered through our investigation with ProPublica in 

November, buyouts aren’t likely to be a large-scale solution to the city’s flooding 

problems, mainly because of a lack of money and narrow criteria that disqualify 

many homeowners who are willing to sell. 

The Ike Dike.—A coastal barrier built just off the coast to blunt a hurricane storm 

surge remains the holy grail for protecting Houston, Galveston and the area’s vast 

and vulnerable refineries and petrochemical plants. But the price tag could run as 

high as $11 billion to protect a six-county stretch of coastline—and it wouldn’t help 

in a major rain event like Harvey. 

HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE FOR DISPLACED PEOPLE TO RETURN HOME?

This is probably the most pressing question for the people whose lives have been 

uprooted by Harvey—and the most difficult to answer because it plays out one home 

at a time. About a month after Harvey struck, more than 24,000 families were living in FEMA-funded hotel rooms; that number dropped to about 11,300 families by 

mid-December as homes were repaired, renters found new apartments and others 

found better long-term housing options. 

But the FEMA hotel statistics don’t capture the full extent of the need, because 

they don’t include countless people still living with family or friends, in tents, in 

recreational vehicles or in rented apartments or rooms. 

More than 90,000 people have filed insurance claims through the National Flood 

Insurance Program, also managed by FEMA. That’s equivalent to the entire population of Sugar Land. 

How long it takes for that many people to get back to normal involves a complicated calculus—the amount of damage, whether they rented or owned their home, 

whether they had flood insurance, and how long it takes for insurance adjustors, 

demolition crews and contractors to do their work. But for many Harvey victims, 

recovery will be measured in years. 

Æ