Reversed and Rendered and Memorandum Majority Opinion filed August 29, 

2023. Concurring Opinion to Follow.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-19-00372-CR

NO. 14-19-00373-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V.

JASPER ROBIN CHEN, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 16 

Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 2233753 & 2250796 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this appeal, which returns to us on remand from the court of criminal 

appeals, we reconsider a facial challenge to Penal Code section 42.07(a)(7), 

otherwise known as the electronic-harassment statute, in light of recent opinions 

from the court of criminal appeals. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.07(a)(7). We 

conclude that the challenged version of the electronic-harassment statute is not

facially unconstitutional. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and
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render judgment that appellee Jasper Chen’s application for pre-trial habeas-corpus

relief is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

The charging instrument in this case alleged that:

on or about April 15, 2018 continuing through October 29, 2018, 

[appellee] did then and there unlawfully, with intent to harass, annoy, 

alarm, abuse, torment and embarrass another, namely, [the 

complainant], send repeated electronic communications, to-wit: 

electronic mail and instant message in a manner reasonably likely to 

harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment and embarrass.

Appellee filed an application for writ of habeas corpus and motion to quash 

the information, arguing that the statute under which he was charged, Penal Code 

section 42.07(a)(7) (the “electronic-communications-harassment statute”), is 

facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to him under the First 

Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. I; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.09 (“If 

a person is confined on a charge of misdemeanor, he may apply to the county 

judge of the county in which the misdemeanor is charged to have been committed, 

or if there be no county judge in said county, then to the county judge whose 

residence is nearest to the courthouse of the county in which the applicant is held 

in custody.”). Specifically, he argued it was vague and overbroad. The trial court 

granted the application, a writ of habeas corpus was issued, and appellee and the 

State appeared for a hearing on the application. After the hearing, the trial court 

concluded the statute is facially unconstitutional and granted habeas-corpus relief 

and the motion to quash the information, thereby discharging the appellee. See

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.40. This appeal followed.1

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In a unitary notice of appeal, the State appealed both “from the trial court’s order 

dismissing the information in cause number 2233753,” which has been assigned case number 

14-19-00373-CR by this court, “and from its order granting habeas relief in cause number 
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Upon original submission, we concluded that the electronic-harassment 

statute was unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. See 

State v. Chen, 615 S.W.3d 376, 385 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020), 

vacated and remanded sub nom. Ex parte Chen, 665 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2022). But after we issued our judgments, the court of criminal appeals decided Ex

parte Barton, 662 S.W.3d 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) and Ex parte Sanders, 663

S.W.3d 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022), and in both of those related cases, the court of

criminal appeals determined that earlier versions of the electronic-harassment

statute were not facially unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment.

In light of its decisions in Barton and Sanders, the court of criminal appeals

vacated the judgment in this case and remanded the case back to us for

reconsideration.

II. ANALYSIS

The State asserts that the trial court erred by granting the motion to quash 

and granting appellee’s requested habeas relief because the electronic-harassment 

statute is constitutional. Specifically, the State argues the electronic-harassment 

statute: (1) does not implicate the First Amendment; (2) satisfies intermediate 

scrutiny because it serves a legitimate state interest; and (3) is not overbroad or 

vague. The State additionally claims that the present case is controlled by our 

court’s recent decision in Ex parte Ordonez, No. 14-19-01005-CR, 2023 WL 

4711526, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 25, 2023, no pet. h.). We 

agree.

In Ordonez, this court concluded that the electronic-harassment statute was 

unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. See Ex parte 

2250796,” which has been assigned case number 14-19-00372-CR by this court.
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Ordonez, No. 14-19-01005-CR, 2021 WL 245219, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] Jan. 26, 2021) (mem. op., not designated for publication), vacated,

No. PD-0145-21, 2022 WL 16626255 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2022) (per

curiam). Just as here, the court of criminal appeals granted the State’s petition for 

discretionary review in Ordonez, vacated this court’s judgment, and remanded the 

case to this court for further consideration in light of Sanders and Barton.

On remand in Ordonez, our court concluded that the 2017 version of the 

electronic-harassment statute does not implicate the First Amendment, despite its

expanded definition of “electronic communication”:

This expanded definition may have broadened the types of electronic 

communications that can be used to complete the offense, but the 

gravamen of the offense itself did not change. As with the 2001 

version in Barton and the 2013 version in Sanders, the gravamen is 

still the repeated sending of electronic communications in a manner 

reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, 

or offend another. That “repeated sending of electronic 

communications” is noncommunicative conduct, even when such 

conduct is accompanied by speech—just as the Sanders court 

explained with its examples involving e-mails and computer code.

Accordingly, we conclude that the 2017 version of the electronic 

harassment statute does not implicate the First Amendment.

Ex parte Ordonez, 2023 WL 4711526, at *3 (internal quotation omitted).

Because the First Amendment was not implicated, our court then reviewed 

Ordonez’s constitutional challenge under the rational-basis test. See id. Under that

test, the statute is presumed to be valid, and a reviewing court must uphold the

statute if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See Barton, 662

S.W.3d at 884. Our court noted that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting

the substantial privacy interests of individuals from harassment, and that the 2001

version of the electronic-harassment statute served that interest. Ex parte Ordonez,
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2023 WL 4711526, at *3. Accordingly, because “[t]he same reasoning applies here

to the 2017 version of the electronic harassment [statute,]” we concluded that the

electronic-harassment statute was presumed to be valid. Id.

In Ordonez, we also observed that because the First Amendment was not

implicated, Ordonez could not maintain an overbreadth challenge to the

electronic-harassment statute. See id. (quoting Barton, 662 S.W.3d at 885

(“Since § 42.07(a)(7) does not regulate speech, and therefore does not implicate

the free-speech guarantee of the First Amendment, the statute is not susceptible to

an overbreadth challenge.”)).

As for Ordonez’s vagueness challenge, because the First Amendment was

not implicated, we observed that Ordonez was required to show that the 2017 

version of the electronic-harassment statute was unduly vague as applied to her 

own conduct. See Ex parte Ordonez, 2023 WL 4711526, at *3 (citing Barton, 662

S.W.3d at 885). But because she did not present any argument regarding her own 

conduct, we concluded that her vagueness challenge failed. See Ex parte Ordonez,

2023 WL 4711526, at *3.

Following our precedent in Ordonez, we conclude that the 

electronic-harassment statute does not implicate the First Amendment. Likewise, 

we presume the electronic-harassment statute is valid because the statute is 

rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Because the First Amendment is not 

implicated, appellee cannot maintain an overbreadth challenge to the 

electronic-harassment statute. See Barton, 662 S.W.3d at 885; Ex parte Ordonez,

2023 WL 4711526, at *3. Also, appellee’s vagueness challenge fails because he

does not present any argument regarding his own conduct. See Barton, 662 S.W.3d 

at 885; Ex parte Ordonez, 2023 WL 4711526, at *3.

Through supplemental briefing, appellee urges our court—despite Sanders
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and Barton—to rely on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Counterman v. 

Colorado, No. 22-138 (U.S. June 27, 2023) to conclude that the

electronic-harassment statute is unconstitutional. However, this court has already 

considered and rejected this argument in Ordonez. See Ex parte Ordonez, 2023 

WL 4711526, at *4 (“Counterman did not specifically examine whether the 

sending of repeated electronic communications in a manner reasonably likely to 

harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend another was 

noncommunicative, as the Court of Criminal Appeals held in Barton and 

Sanders.”).

We therefore sustain the State’s sole issue.

III. CONCLUSION

The trial court reversibly erred in granting appellee’s application for pretrial

habeas-corpus relief and granting the motion to quash in each of these two criminal

cases. Therefore, in each of the appeals, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and

render judgment that appellee’s application for pretrial habeas-corpus relief be

denied. We reinstate the information in trial court cause number 2233753 so that

the trial court may conduct further proceedings on this information.

/s/ Charles A. Spain

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Zimmerer, Spain, and Hassan (Hassan, J., concurring

with concurrence to follow).

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).