ST. MIHIEL

12–16 SEPTEMBER 1918

THE U.S. ARMY 

CAMPAIGNS OF WORLD WAR I

•••

•••
THE U.S. ARMY CAMPAIGNS OF WORLD WAR I 

COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Series Editor: Brian F. Neumann

The U.S. Army in the World War I Era

The Mexican Expedition, 1916–1917

Joining the Great War, April 1917–April 1918

Into the Fight, April–June 1918

The Marne, 15 July–6 August 1918

Supporting Allied Offensives, August–November 1918

St. Mihiel, 12–16 September 1918

Meuse-Argonne, 26 September–11 November 1918

Occupation and Demobilization

The Russian Expeditions, 1918–1920

Cover: The Tanks at Seicheprey, by Harvey Dunn

(Smithsonian Institution, National Museum of American History) •••••••••••••••

CMH Pub 77–7
•••

ST. MIHIEL

12–16 SEPTEMBER 1918

by

Donald A. Carter 

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2018

•••• 5 ••••

•••

INTRODUCTION

A century ago, the great powers of Europe became engulfed 

in what was then called the Great War. It signaled a new age in 

armed conflict in which mass armies supported by industrial mass 

production brought an unprecedented level of killing power to the 

battlefield. By the time the United States entered the war in 1917, 

the combatants were waging war on a scale never before seen 

in history. The experience defined a generation and cast a long 

shadow across the twentieth century. In addition to a tremendous 

loss of life, the war shattered Europe, bringing revolution, the 

collapse of long-standing empires, and economic turmoil, as 

well as the birth of new nation-states and the rise of totalitarian 

movements.

The modern U.S. Army, capable of conducting industrialized 

warfare on a global scale, can trace its roots to the World War. 

Although the war’s outbreak in August 1914 shocked most 

Americans, they preferred to keep the conflict at arm’s length. 

The United States declared its neutrality and invested in coastal 

defenses and the Navy to guard its shores. The U.S. Army, 

meanwhile, remained small, with a regiment as its largest standing 

formation. Primarily a constabulary force, it focused on policing 

America’s new territorial possessions in the Caribbean and Pacific 

as it continued to adapt to Secretary of War Elihu Root’s reforms 

in the years following the War with Spain. It was not until June 

1916 that Congress authorized an expansion of the Army, dual 

state-federal status for the National Guard, and the creation of a 

reserve officer training corps.

In early 1917, relations between the United States and Germany 

rapidly deteriorated. The kaiser’s policy of unrestricted submarine 

warfare threatened American lives and commerce, and German 

meddling in Mexican affairs convinced most Americans that Berlin 

posed a danger to the nation. In April 1917, the president, out of 

diplomatic options, asked Congress to declare war on Germany. 

But the U.S. Army, numbering only 133,000 men, was far from 

ready. The president ordered nearly 400,000 National Guardsmen 

into federal service, and more than twenty-four million men 

eventually registered for the Selective Service, America’s first 
•••• 6 ••••

conscription since the Civil War. By the end of 1918, the Army had 

grown to four million men and had trained 200,000 new officers 

to lead them. As it expanded to address wartime needs, the Army 

developed a new combined-arms formation—the square division. 

Divisions fell under corps, and corps made up field armies. The 

Army also created supporting elements such as the Air Service, the 

Tank Corps, and the Chemical Warfare Service. The war signaled 

the potential of the United States as not only a global economic 

power, but also a military one.

In June 1917, the 1st Division deployed to France, arriving in time 

to parade through Paris on the Fourth of July. The first National 

Guard division, the 26th Division from New England, deployed in 

September. By war’s end, the American Expeditionary Forces, as 

the nation’s forces in Europe were called, had grown to two million 

soldiers and more than forty divisions. During 1918, these American 

“doughboys” learned to fight in battles of steadily increasing scale: 

Cantigny, the Marne, Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel, and Meuse-Argonne, 

adding thirteen campaign streamers to the Army flag. Overall, in 

roughly six months of combat, the American Expeditionary Forces 

suffered more than 255,000 casualties, including 52,997 battle 

deaths (as well as more than 50,000 nonbattle deaths, most due to 

the influenza pandemic). The war that the United States entered to 

“make the world safe for democracy” ended with an armistice on 

11 November 1918, followed by a controversial peace. American 

soldiers served in the Occupation of the Rhineland until 1923, before 

withdrawing from Europe altogether. 

The United States will never forget the American soldiers 

who fought and died in the World War. America’s first unknown 

soldier was laid to rest on 11 November 1921 in the Tomb of the 

Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery, where soldiers 

still stand guard. The United States created permanent American 

military cemeteries in France, Belgium, and Britain to bury the 

fallen. To this day, memorials to their sacrifice can be found across 

America, and the date of the armistice has become a national 

holiday honoring all those who serve in defense of the nation. 

The last surviving U.S. Army veteran of the war died in 2011. It is 

to all the doughboys, those who returned and those who did not, 

that the U.S. Army Center of Military History dedicates these 

commemorative pamphlets.

JON T. HOFFMAN

Chief Historian
•••• 7 ••••

•••

ST. MIHIEL

12–16 SEPTEMBER 1918

Early in the morning of 12 September 1918, nearly half a million 

American soldiers crouched in forward trench lines along a sixtyfive-kilometer section of the Western Front, waiting for the signal 

to advance. The target of the American-planned and Americanexecuted operation was a massive salient that had bedeviled the 

Allies since late 1914. Until this point in the World War, members 

of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) had not fought in a 

formation larger than a corps, and then only under French or British 

leadership. Now, as part of the newly formed American First Army 

under the command of General John J. Pershing, they prepared to 

launch an operation that was, according to one historian, “America’s 

first truly great modern battle.” The four-day offensive would not only 

serve as a baptism of fire for the First Army but also demonstrate to 

the Allies and the Germans alike that the Americans were capable 

of operating as an independent command. The action showed how 

far the U.S. Army had progressed in its evolution from a frontier 

constabulary to a modern combined arms maneuver force, and it 

helped set the stage for the grand Allied offensive that would seize 

the initiative all along the Western Front and blaze a path toward 

ultimate victory in the war.

Strategic Setting

By the summer of 1918, war had raged across Western Europe 

for nearly four years. What had started in August 1914 with a 

sweeping German maneuver to envelop the French Army and take 

Paris turned quickly into a bloody stalemate. Troops advancing 

in the open proved no match for the lethality of modern military 

technology, forcing armies on both sides to dig in for protection and 

survival. An extensive series of parallel trenches soon stretched 

from the English Channel in the northwest to the Swiss border 

in the southeast, with infantry strongpoints protected by barbed 

wire and machine gun nests and supported by devastating artillery 

fire. The opposing armies hurled waves of men against these 
•••• 8 ••••

trench lines, and the results were horrific. In 1916 alone, battles at 

Verdun and the Somme each resulted in nearly one million killed 

and wounded. Both sides applied new weapons and tactics in 

desperate attempts to break the deadlock, but neither proved to be 

a decisive solution. As a result, the fighting continued, a wasteful 

war of attrition with no end in sight.

Over the course of 1917, however, the war’s strategic balance 

began to shift. The United States entered the war on 6 April, and 

American troops began arriving in Europe in June, but the pace of 

their arrival was slow, and by the end of the year the AEF had less 

than 250,000 men on the Western Front. In the east, the situation 

was even more critical for the Allies; in Russia, a revolution had 

overthrown Tsar Nicholas II in March, and as the months went 

by the Russian Army slowly disintegrated as the provisional 

government struggled to hold the country together. In November, 

another revolution installed a Bolshevik-led Communist, or Soviet, 

government under Vladimir I. Lenin. The new Soviet government 

began peace negotiations with the Central Powers, and on 3 March 

1918 the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ended Russia’s participation in the 

war. The slow rate of the American buildup and the elimination of 

the Eastern Front led General Erich Ludendorff, the German Army’s 

operational commander, to redeploy significant forces from the 

east in the hope of achieving victory on the Western Front before 

American forces arrived in numbers too great to overcome.

A series of German offensives, beginning with Operation 

Michael on 21 March 1918, posed the greatest threat to the Allies 

since 1914. To improve their unity of effort in the face of the renewed 

German advance, the Allied commanders met on 26 March to discuss 

the crisis. They named General Ferdinand Foch, chief of the French 

General Staff, as the “generalissimo” to coordinate all Allied armies 

on the Western Front, albeit without direct command authority. 

General Pershing symbolically placed all American forces then 

in France at Foch’s disposal. In April, large numbers of American 

troops began entering the lines to help stop the Germans. In May, 

the 1st Division captured the town of Cantigny, the first small-scale 

attack of the war solely planned and executed by American troops. 

In June, the U.S. 2d and 3d Divisions were instrumental in defending 

the area around the town of Château-Thierry, blocking an attack at 

Belleau Wood and preventing the Germans from securing a foothold 

south of the Marne River. The following month, the 1st and 2d 

Divisions spearheaded an assault at Soissons that helped reduce a 

massive salient in the line created by the German offensives. Despite 
•••• 9 ••••

the Americans’ vital role on the Western Front through the spring 

and early summer, they had yet to achieve their national objective 

of fighting as an independent army.

Creating the American First Army

In mid-July, the bulk of American divisions was concentrated 

on two sectors of the line (Map 1). One was an active portion of the 

front in Champagne, near Château-Thierry. The other was a quiet 

sector in the Woëvre Plain area, extending from Nomeny, east of 

the Moselle River, to a point north of the German-occupied town of 

St. Mihiel. The AEF stationed its newer, not yet fully combat-ready 

divisions there to acclimate them to frontline conditions. The 

sector also provided an area where units fresh from combat could 

reconstitute and absorb replacements. The concentration of forces 

in these two regions enabled American corps headquarters, such 

as Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett’s I Army Corps and Maj. Gen. Robert 

L. Bullard’s III Army Corps, to gain experience exercising tactical 

and administrative control over multiple divisions. Although these 

corps still required more training and experience in combined 

arms operations as well as staff planning and execution, Pershing’s 

goal was to use the corps and their divisions as the base upon 

which to form an American field army.

The creation of an independent American field army had been 

an objective for Pershing ever since he assumed command of the 

AEF. The basic structure had been developed as early as July 1917, 

and its component parts, such as the First Army Artillery and First 

Army Air Service, were organized during the early months of 1918. 

As the AEF grew, Pershing created the I Corps in late January 

1918 and hoped to build a full field army by 1 June. The German 

spring offensives temporarily derailed these plans, but after the 

initial crisis passed the AEF commander once again returned to 

the effort. In early June 1918, Pershing and General Henri Philippe 

Pétain, the French Army’s commander-in-chief, agreed to base an 

American corps near Château-Thierry, establishing it as a stepping 

stone toward a full army. Even General Foch, who had strenuously 

pushed for the amalgamation of American forces into Allied armies 

during March and April, admitted on 10 July: “The American army 

must become an accomplished fact.” With the AEF strength rising 

to 1.2 million men in July, and with an additional 250,000 troops 

arriving each month, Pershing felt that the time had finally come 

to achieve his goal.
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NETHERLANDS

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AMERICAN ORDER OF BAT TLE

11 August 1918

WESTERN FRONT

Front Line

American Unit Locations

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ELEVATION IN METERS
•••• 12 ••••

On 21 July, Pershing conferred with Foch and Pétain at 

Bombon, the site of Foch’s headquarters, and proposed forming 

an independent American army with responsibility for part of the 

Allied line. Foch approved, based on the expectation that as soon 

as it was formed, the American First Army would relieve the French 

Sixth Army north of Château-Thierry. On 24 July, the AEF General 

Headquarters (GHQ) issued the orders that formally announced 

the organization of the First Army, effective on 10 August, with an 

order of battle that included the I and III Corps headquarters and 

the 3d, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32d, and 42d Divisions.

In addition to specifying an initial order of battle, the orders 

also assigned key personnel to the First Army staff. Pershing 

took on the position of commanding general while he maintained 

his role as AEF commander. Col. Hugh A. Drum, who had been 

quietly developing the plans for forming the First Army since the 

beginning of the month, became the chief of staff. With Pershing 

dividing his time between headquarters, it would fall to Drum to 

direct the planning and preparation for the First Army’s initial 

major operations. Other members of the primary staff included 

Col. Robert McCleave as the assistant chief of the general staff for 

operations, or “G–3.” McCleave had worked well as the assistant to 

Brig. Gen. Fox Conner, the GHQ operations officer. Pershing later 

assigned Lt. Col. Walter S. Grant to the G–3 section, and appointed 

Col. William L. “Billy” Mitchell as chief of the First Army’s air arm, 

the First Army Air Service. As the staff came together, American 

maneuver units prepared to function as an independent national 

force, although they still needed heavy Allied support, particularly 

from French aviation, artillery, and tank units.

With the First Army becoming a reality, Pershing immediately 

began looking for a location for its first combat operation. The most 

promising was the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient in Lorraine. 

Fortunately, this idea aligned with Foch’s plan for the Allies to 

maintain the initiative on the Western Front. With operations 

already underway to eliminate the Marne salient, on 24 July Foch 

announced a plan to conduct operations against several other 

German salients in the coming months. The goal was to straighten 

the front and secure vital rail lines for a general Allied offensive in 

1919. When Pershing requested the mission of reducing the St. Mihiel 

salient, Foch readily agreed, but the generalissimo could not set a 

date for its start until the Allies successfully concluded the ongoing 

Aisne-Marne Offensive. When operations along the Vesle River 

stabilized on 6 August, Pershing decided to concentrate the units 
•••• 13 ••••

that would constitute the First Army in the St. Mihiel area rather 

than on the Vesle, and forgo the planned relief of the French Sixth 

Army. Foch concurred, and directed Pershing and Pétain to develop 

the necessary plans to reflect the change. The two commanders 

agreed that three or four American divisions would remain on the 

Vesle, but shifted all the other combat-ready ones to form the First 

Army in the Woëvre Plain region in preparation for the St. Mihiel 

operation. The stage was now set for the Americans to take their 

place as an independent force on the Western Front.

The Salient and Its Defenses

Reducing the St.  Mihiel salient was a natural choice for 

employing the First Army in a dramatic and decisive action. 

Created during the initial German invasion of 1914, the salient 

had withstood multiple French efforts to regain the territory 

and remained an impediment to Allied operations in the sector. 

Pershing optimistically believed that in reducing the salient, the 

First Army might continue the attack northeastward toward 

the city of Metz. Such an advance would threaten not only the 

strategic Briey Iron Basin, a key to German war production, but 

also the lateral rail network that ran through the city and the 

nearby Saar coal fields. Perhaps most important, Pershing thought 

that a successful attack would validate the decision to create an 

independent American army and convince the British and French 

to recognize the Americans as equal partners in the war effort. 

Twenty-five kilometers at its deepest, the V-shaped salient 

occupied roughly three hundred square kilometers, with its base 

running between Pont-à-Mousson along the Moselle River and the 

town of Haudiomont to the northwest. The village of St. Mihiel was 

located near its tip, astride the Meuse River. Along the western 

side of the salient, the wooded heights of the Meuse dominated 

the terrain, while lesser hills, forests, and a 380-meter camel hump 

elevation called Montsec highlighted the southern edge. The Woëvre 

Plain constituted a large portion of the remaining ground within 

the salient. Although the low area of the plain was a natural avenue 

of approach for an advancing army, the September rainy season 

threatened to make the terrain swampy and possibly impassable 

to wheeled-vehicle traffic. The Germans had the advantage of 

occupying the highest ground in most of the area along the salient 

front, on which they had constructed strong defensive positions 

supplemented by vast stretches of barbed wire.
•••• 14 ••••

The German high command recognized that the St.  Mihiel 

salient was the most likely target of the imminent American 

attack. In September, the German defense consisted of eight full 

divisions and two separate brigades along the forward face of the 

salient. The force, known collectively as Army Detachment C, was 

under the command of Lt. Gen. Georg Fuchs, who had a reputation 

among the Allies as a clever and capable leader. The Gorz Group, 

which consisted of the 77th and 10th Divisions of the I Bavarian 

Corps, held the German left flank. The Mihiel Group, made up 

of the 5th Landwehr Division and the 31st Division, also of the 

I Bavarian Corps, held the forward tip of the salient. As the time 

for the offensive grew near, however, the 192d Division began 

to replace the 31st Division in the forward area. The Combres 

Group, consisting of the 35th Austro-Hungarian and the 8th and 

13th Landwehr Divisions, held the German right flank. Outside 

of Fuchs’ direct tactical control, the Metz Group, with the 255th 

Division and the 84th and 31st Landwehr Brigades, held positions 

in the area of the Moselle River to the left of the Gorz Group. The 

Metz Group also exercised control of the 195th Saxon and 123d 

Divisions, positioned farther to the rear in reserve.

Although the number of units looked impressive on paper, 

the German forces were actually understrength and war-weary. 

Furthermore, compared to the 28,000-man American divisions 

they would face, even full-strength German divisions averaged 

less than 15,000 troops. Ascertaining reliable figures on German 

forces in and around the salient proved difficult, as estimates of 

actual German strength ranged between 50,000 and 100,000 men. 

The Landwehr divisions, in many cases composed of older men 

between the ages of thirty-seven and forty-five, had been organized 

primarily to hold static positions, and demonstrated little initiative 

or aggressiveness. Fuchs considered the 10th Division, which had 

been in combat during the recent Somme and Aisne offensives, as 

his only fully reliable formation.

The German defenses within the salient were heavy and 

elaborate, consisting of three zones. (See Map 2.) The rear position, 

known as the Michel Line, ran along the base of the salient and 

included that sector’s portion of the Hindenburg Line. The forward 

position, called the Wilhelm Line, was an eight-kilometer-deep 

defensive zone running from Pont-à-Mousson in the east to the 

town of St. Mihiel itself, a distance of about sixty-five kilometers, 

then northward up the heights of the Meuse to Grimaucourt, just 

southeast of Verdun. The third zone, known as the Schroeter Line, 
•••• 15 ••••

made up the interior sector of the Wilhelm Line. Still unclear 

as to the size of the force being assembled against them, Fuchs 

announced to his forces that preparations for an attack against 

the salient were underway, and declared, “Composite Army C will 

prepare to repulse these attacks.”

Although the Germans had defended the salient against 

French attacks since late 1914, they had few illusions regarding the 

security of the position. Its wedge shape made it highly vulnerable 

to a pincer attack. Allied successes in the north also indicated that 

the static nature of positional warfare no longer defined tactical 

realities on the Western Front. Moreover, the Germans needed to 

conserve manpower in the light of their losses earlier in the year, 

requiring them to shorten the line wherever possible. As early 

as June 1918, the high command began work on a planned troop 

withdrawal from the salient, code-named Loki. So long as the 

sector remained quiet, they would hold their current positions, but 

as soon as they detected a major Allied assault in the offing, the 

defenders would withdraw to the shorter, more defensible Michel 

position across the base of the salient to make their stand.

Planning the Attack

For the Americans, much of the initial responsibility for 

developing the plan to reduce the salient fell on Colonel Conner and 

German trenches in the Bois de Esparges (National Archives)

•••••••••••••••
12 SEP (A.M.)

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ST. MIHIEL

Map 2
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ST. MIHIEL SALIENT

GERMAN DEFENSIVE ORGANIZATION

 12 September 1918

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•••• 18 ••••

his GHQ staff, as the First Army planning staff was just starting 

to assemble. One of his key subordinates was Lt. Col. George C. 

Marshall, who until 24 July had been the operations officer for 

the 1st Division. Marshall had already developed a reputation 

throughout the AEF as an outstanding planner; he also knew the 

St. Mihiel area from his early days in France, when the 1st Division 

had been stationed there as part of its introduction to combat. 

Conner and Marshall worked closely with McCleave, the First 

Army G–3, to develop a plan for the upcoming operation.

Throughout August, both the GHQ and First Army staffs 

wrestled with their complex assignment (Map 3). The buildup 

for the St. Mihiel attack involved over half a million Americans 

and 110,000 Frenchmen. Supporting the attack would require 

some 3,000 guns, 200,000 tons of supplies, and 50,000 tons of 

ammunition. Some of the men and equipment were already in 

position, but most would have to be transported into the area. The 

staff officers needed to prepare detailed march tables to make the 

best use of the available roads. While part of the staff worked on 

those problems, others planned the battle, figuring how many units 

should be employed in which sectors to attain specific objectives. 

At the request of the Allies, the Americans had focused on shipping 

infantry and machine gun battalions to Europe, leaving the First 

Army well short of the artillery, aircraft, and support units it would 

need to execute the attack. Pershing spent considerable time in 

negotiations with Foch, who was named Marshal of France on 6 

August, to arrange French support for the attack. As the plans 

proceeded, the French provided transportation for almost all 

troop and supply movements. The French also were particularly 

generous with air support and placed a number of aircraft under 

Pershing’s command for the operation. Finally, Foch agreed to 

provide one French corps to conduct a supporting attack.

On 30 August, Pershing and the First Army officially assumed 

responsibility for the St. Mihiel sector. As the staff worked at their 

headquarters at Ligny-en-Barrois, Foch arrived unexpectedly and 

threw the process into disorder by announcing a new mission for 

the First Army. Since their meeting at Bombon, the Allies had not 

only successfully concluded the Aisne-Marne Offensive, but had 

launched three others. One at Amiens began on 8 August, another 

on the Oise-Aisne front started on 18 August, and the last opened 

in the Ypres-Lys region the next day. All achieved marked success. 

With the reduction of these salients, Foch began formulating a 

more ambitious plan for operations on the Western Front for the 
•••• 19 ••••

remainder of the year; one which no longer necessarily included 

the attack at St.  Mihiel. After consulting with Britain’s Field 

Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, the generalissimo postulated that 

the entire German position in France and Belgium represented 

a large salient, and advocated a massive pincer attack with the 

British advancing toward Cambrai while the French drove toward 

Mézières. Concurrent secondary attacks along the Western Front 

would prevent the Germans from shifting forces from quiet sectors 

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ST. MIHIEL PONT-ÀMOUSSON

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ORDER OF BAT TLE

 12 September 1918

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to reinforce threatened areas of the line. The Germans, he believed, 

could not be strong everywhere at once. 

To support this new plan, Foch wanted the Americans to 

operate on the French right flank, driving north into the area 

bounded by the Meuse River and the Argonne Forest. Instead 

of acting under the command of the U.S. First Army, most 

American divisions would serve as reinforcements for the French 

Second and Fourth Armies. Foch’s plan minimized the attack 

through St. Mihiel, which he now believed of limited necessity, 

and eliminated the drive on Metz that Pershing desired. Not 

surprisingly, the American commander opposed the new plan. Not 

only did it diminish the operation that Pershing and his staff were 

working feverishly to carry off, but it also threatened to break up 

the newly formed First Army and place American units once again 

under Allied control. In the long and acrimonious meeting, Foch 

pushed his plan while Pershing refused to abandon his goal of 

keeping the American army independent. Finally, the exasperated 

Foch demanded, “Do you wish to take part in the battle?” Pershing 

sternly replied, “Most assuredly, but as an American Army and in 

no other way.”

Three days later, on 2 September, Pershing and Pétain met 

Foch at the latter’s headquarters to seek some resolution. Foch 

agreed to postpone the grand offensive until 25 September if the 

Americans agreed to participate. Under the new plan, the First 

Army would take part in the attack by operating in the MeuseArgonne region. In return, Pershing agreed to curtail the St. Mihiel 

Offensive, scheduled to begin the second week of September. The 

operation would commence on or near 10 September against the 

southern and western faces of the salient, with limited objectives 

and duration. Instead of driving on Metz, the First Army would 

have three or four days to advance to the Vigneulles–Thiaucourt–

Regniéville line. Once achieved, Pershing would shift the First 

Army’s primary operational area to the Meuse-Argonne sector. 

All available American divisions would concentrate for an attack 

on 20–25 September in what would become known as the MeuseArgonne Offensive. Although Foch had misgivings regarding 

the Americans’ ability to conduct two major attacks in such a 

truncated timeframe, he agreed to the plan.

The scale and difficulty of the tasks to which Pershing 

committed the First Army is hard to overstate. This revised plan 

required the Americans to conduct the attack at St. Mihiel while also 

preparing for an even larger operation to commence in two weeks’ 
•••• 21 ••••

time. The First Army would need to move most of its forces over 

ninety-five kilometers north, and in order to be in position to attack 

at Meuse-Argonne, some of them would need to begin moving before 

the St. Mihiel operation was completed. As Pershing later noted in 

his memoirs, “We had undertaken to launch with practically the 

same army, within the next twenty-four days, two great attacks on 

battlefields sixty miles apart.” Pershing’s insistence on conducting 

the St. Mihiel operation also meant that the First Army would be 

limited in which forces it could use at the beginning of the MeuseArgonne. Having committed many of the most experienced and 

highly trained divisions to St. Mihiel, it would take time to reassign 

these units to Foch’s grand offensive. Consequently, the AEF would 

use its best units in a limited but significant operation at St. Mihiel, 

and employ less proven units to initiate a much larger offensive in 

terms of numbers committed and objectives.

After Pershing and Foch reached their agreement, the GHQ and 

First Army staffs set to work revising their plans and developing new 

timetables. Colonel Drum later noted that from this point onward 

the two operations “should not be looked upon as separate and 

distinct,” but rather as “interdependent.” The First Army planning 

staff effectively stopped working on St. Mihiel and began developing 

the Meuse-Argonne operation. This left Conner’s GHQ G–3 staff 

with the job of overseeing the final preparations for the St. Mihiel 

attack. The new limited objectives required some changes in the 

direction of the assault but no major reshuffling of units. The First 

Army had grown considerably by the end of August, so that Pershing 

now had three American army corps and one French corps under 

his command. The offensive required two simultaneous attacks by 

the Americans, one against the western face of the salient and the 

other through the rolling farmland and pockets of woods between 

the Moselle River and Montsec. Between the two American attacks, 

a French corps would attack the tip of the salient, and exploit the 

success of the units on its flanks.

To better coordinate the attack with all units operating on the 

same schedule, the First Army planners developed a simple control 

measure. They designated the date on which an operation would 

begin as “D-day,” and the time as “H-hour.” The means of measuring 

time before and after the designated start date or hour used the 

minus (−) or plus (+) signs, respectively. Therefore, the day before 

D-day would be written as “D−1,” and two hours before H-hour would 

be expressed as “H−2.” Conversely, the day after the operation began 

would become “D+1,” and two hours past the start time as “H+2.” 
•••• 22 ••••

These control measures appeared for the first time in American 

military history on the First Army order for the St. Mihiel Offensive.

The Americans planned to attack on two converging axes 

that would meet to cut off the salient. The main attack would 

advance into the salient from the south with two American corps. 

The I Corps, commanded by General Liggett, would be on the 

easternmost corner along the southern side of the salient from 

Pont-à-Mousson on the east to Limey on the west. The corps’ four 

divisions, the 82d, 90th, 5th, and 2d, arrayed respectively from 

right to left, or east to west, with the 78th Division in reserve. 

The 82d Division would hold the shoulder as the rest of the corps 

attacked to the northwest toward the village of Thiaucourt, and 

would continue on that axis to pinch off the base of the salient. 

The IV Army Corps, under Maj. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman, held 

the line from Limey west to Xivray-et-Marvoisin and would array 

its subordinate units, the 89th, 42d, and 1st Divisions, from east 

to west respectively, while keeping the 3d Division in reserve. 

Initially, the IV Corps would protect the left flank of the advancing 

I Corps, then wheel to the west to contain German forces 

attempting to retreat from the forward portion of the salient.

Members of 328th Machine Gun Battalion, 82d Division, 

training for the offensive (National Archives)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 23 ••••

The French II Colonial Corps, composed of the French 39th 

and 26th Infantry Divisions and 2d Dismounted Cavalry Division 

(DCP), would support the principal drive from the south by holding 

the attention of the maximum number of enemy troops at the 

tip of the salient between Xivray-et-Marvoisin and Mouilly. Maj. 

Gen. George H. Cameron’s V Army Corps would begin the attack 

against the salient’s western face from Mouilly to Watronville with 

the American 26th and 4th Divisions along with the French 15th 

Colonial Division (DIC). In this corps’ sector, the 26th Division 

would advance deep into enemy-held territory toward the village 

of Vigneulles, and then drive southeast to link up with advancing 

IV Corps units and trap German forces in the point of the salient. 

The French 15th DIC and the 8th Infantry Brigade of the U.S. 4th 

Division would conduct supporting attacks, while the corps held 

the rest of the 4th Division in reserve. Pershing retained the 35th, 

80th, and 91st Divisions as the First Army’s reserve (Map 4).

Coordinating the Supporting Arms

Artillery was the most important of the supporting arms, but 

also one of the most time-consuming to train properly. Therefore, 

field artillery brigades in the AEF trained on a separate schedule, 

and consequently they took longer to achieve combat readiness than 

the infantry they supported. However, Pershing’s decision to utilize 

his most experienced divisions at St. Mihiel meant that all but one of 

his frontline units would go on the attack with the support of their 

own artillery. Only the 90th Division would fight without its organic 

artillery brigade, which was still in training and would not be ready 

for action for several months. In its place, the 78th Division’s 153d 

Field Artillery Brigade and 303d Ammunition Train would support 

the 90th Division during the operation. 

As the battle plans neared completion, the duration of the 

preliminary artillery bombardment became an issue of concern. 

Pershing felt that utilizing a multiday preparatory artillery 

barrage—as the Allies had done in previous years—would 

eliminate any chance of surprise and allow the enemy to plan 

counterstrokes. He therefore decided to allow only enough of an 

artillery preparation to encourage and embolden the attacking 

troops while disrupting the enemy, denying the Germans time to 

either withdraw or commit large numbers of reserves. A shorter 

bombardment would be particularly important in the event of 

rain, where prolonged shelling would turn the wet ground into 
X X

1

X X

X X

26

X X

4

X X

Fr 39 DIC

X X

Fr 26(-)

X X

Fr 26(-)

X X

Fr 15 DIC

X X

Fr 2 DCP

XXX

V

XXX

II Fr CAC

XXXX 

FIRST

XXX

XXX

A

R

M

Y

O B J E C T I V 

1 S T

D A Y

O B J E C T I V E

1 S T D 

to Verdun

G R A N D E TR A N C H ÉE D E C A LO N N E

Butte

de Montsec

H

E

I

G

H

T

S

O

F

T

H

E

M E U S E

Rupt d

Madine Cr

Meuse R

Meuse R

Vigneulles-

 les-Hattonchâtel

Combres

Xivray-et-Marvoisin

Mouilly

Fresnes-

 en-Woëvre

Haudiomont

Doncourt-aux-Templiers

Nonsard

Montsec

Loupmont

Seicheprey

Hattonchâtel

ST. MIHIEL

Map 4
X

42

X X

89

X X

2

X X

5 X X

90

X X

82

XXX

I

X X X

IV

XXX

V E

D AY O B J E C T I V E

to Metz

PLAINE

D E

WOËVRE

de Mad Cr

Rupt de Mad Cr

Moselle R

Moselle R

Thiaucourt

Chambley

Mars-la-Tour

Limey

Vandières

Rembercourt-sur-Mad

y

PONT-À-MOUSSON

ST. MIHIEL SALIENT

FIRST ARMY PLAN OF AT TACK

 12 September 1918

0 200 300 400 and Above

ELEVATION IN METERS

Axis of Main Attack

Axis of Secondary Attack

Front Line

0

0 1 4 Kilometers

Miles 1 2 3 4

2 3
•••• 26 ••••

an impassable morass. After lengthy consultations with his staff, 

Pershing allotted a period of no longer than four hours for the 

preattack artillery fires.

To be effective, the preparatory fires had to be intense. 

Realizing that the First Army needed additional fire support, 

Foch provided Pershing units from various French armies and the 

artillery reserve. In some cases the American divisions received 

double or even triple their standard allotment of artillery. To 

further increase the number of guns available, Pershing approved 

shifting the 58th Field Artillery Brigade from the 33d Division and 

the 76th Field Artillery from the 3d Division to support the 1st 

Division’s attack on the center of the salient’s southern edge. The 

concentration of firepower was the largest in American history to 

that point. As the First Army prepared for its advance, hundreds 

of artillery batteries, from the fast and mobile 75-mm. guns to 

massive 400-mm. railway cannon, stood ready to fire.

In addition to infantry and artillery, the Americans would 

also employ units from the service’s newer branches on an 

unprecedented scale. St. Mihiel provided an introduction to combat 

for several elements of the AEF’s fledgling Tank Corps. Brig. Gen. 

6th Field Artillery piece at St. Mihiel (National Archives) •••••••••••••••
•••• 27 ••••

Samuel D. Rockenback, commander of all AEF tank units and 

training centers, assigned Lt. Col. George S. Patton Jr. and the 

Tank Corps’ 304th Brigade to the First Army for the operation. The 

brigade consisted of the 326th and 327th Battalions, commanded 

by Captains Sereno Brett and Ronulf Compton, respectively. Each 

battalion included seventy-seven French-built light Renault FT 

tanks. Rockenback also wanted to assign the Tank Corps’ 301st 

Battalion, equipped with forty-five British-built Mark V models, 

but it would not complete training in England in time. To increase 

the number of tanks in the First Army, the French also assigned 

the 1st Assault Artillery Brigade to the operation. It included 

the 13th, 14th, and 15th Battalions equipped with 225 Renault 

FTs, two battalions of the 505th Mobile Artillery Regiment with 

twenty-four Schneider CA1 medium tanks, and one battalion of the 

11th Groupment of Mobile Artillery with twelve Saint-Chamond 

heavy tanks.

The tanks utilized in the St. Mihiel operation varied in size 

and capabilities. The Renault FT had a two-man crew and was 

five meters in length and about two meters in height. It weighed 

six-and-a-half tons, could travel at a speed of eight kilometers per 

hour, and held either a 37-mm. Puteaux SA 18 gun or 8-mm. M1914 

Hotchkiss machine gun in its cramped turret. The somewhat 

box-shaped Schneider CA1 had a crew of six. Weighing thirteenand-a-half tons, it stood over two meters in height and six meters 

in length, and could reach a speed of almost thirteen kilometers 

per hour. For armament, the Schneider had a short-barreled 

75-mm. blockhouse gun and two Hotchkiss machine guns. In 

contrast to the Renault and Schneider, the Saint-Chamond was 

a behemoth. Served by as many as eleven men, it measured 

roughly eight meters in length, stood two-and-a-half meters in 

height, and moved at eleven kilometers per hour. For armament, 

it carried four Hotchkiss machine guns and an M1897 75-mm. 

gun. Understandably, given its pointed bow, large size, and heavy 

firepower, many soldiers described the Saint-Chamond as a “land 

battleship.”

All of the American and some of the French tank units were 

committed to support the IV Corps. Patton assigned Compton’s 

327th Tank Battalion, minus twenty-five Renaults held in brigade 

reserve, to support the 42d Division. To make up for the Renaults 

in reserve, the French augmented the battalion with six SaintChamond and twelve Schneider tanks. Brett’s 326th Tank Battalion, 

meanwhile, supported the 1st Division, which was the only 
•••• 28 ••••

American division that had worked closely with the new machines. 

The plan alerted infantry commanders to expect to see tanks in 

their sectors, but directed the infantry not to follow the tanks 

unless they were sure that both they and the tanks were heading in 

the same direction. As Patton planned it, the brigade would attack 

across the 1st and 42d Division fronts in three groups. The 326th, 

supported by the brigade reserve, would advance on the left, cross 

the Rupt de Mad creek, and lead the 1st Division to its objectives. 

The French heavy tanks would follow the infantry in the center. 

On the right, the 327th initially would follow the infantry, then 

pass through their lines and lead the 42d Division to its objectives 

at the villages of Essey-et-Maizerais and Pannes. As with their 

commitment of artillery, the Americans and the French intended 

to use mass to overcome the German defenders.

Finally, the First Army would receive strong support from Allied 

air units, with French, British, and Italian elements all participating 

in the operation. The First Army Air Service contributed twelve 

pursuit, ten observation, three day bombardment, and one night 

bombardment squadrons. Added to these were twelve observation, 

four pursuit, and two night bombardment squadrons from the French 

as well as three night bombardment squadrons from the Italians. 

The French also provided an aerial division of two brigades that 

contained a total of twenty-four combat (pursuit) squadrons, fifteen 

bombardment squadrons, and two protection (bomber escort) 

squadrons. Rounding out the forces were eight night bombardment 

squadrons from the British, who operated as an independent force 

but coordinated their activities with the Air Service. With a total of 

1,481 aircraft, including 366 observation airplanes, 323 day bombers, 

91 night bombers, and 701 pursuit aircraft, the St. Mihiel Offensive 

was the largest assembly of aviation assets committed to a single 

operation to that date. In addition, the First Army employed fifteen 

U.S. and six French balloon companies.

The U.S. units accounted for about 40 percent of the total, with 

the French providing most of the rest. American forces consisted 

of primarily Spad XIII pursuit aircraft; Salmson 2–A2, DeHavilland 

4 (DH–4), and Breguet 14 A.2 observation planes; and Breguet 14 

B.2 day bombers. Colonel Mitchell, chief of the First Army Air 

Service, was concerned that many of the American units had only 

recently been formed and lacked combat experience. To overcome 

these deficiencies, he tried to group together his more experienced 

squadrons with those new to the battlefield, or to put veteran pilots 

in charge of green units. Yet the lack of battle-hardened officers 
•••• 29 ••••

and units meant that many American pilots would gain their first 

taste of combat operations over the skies of St. Mihiel.

Planning the air component of the St.  Mihiel attack fell 

primarily to Mitchell and his staff. Although the head of the AEF 

Air Service, Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick, reviewed the plans and 

reported them to General Pershing, both senior leaders gave 

Mitchell and his staff broad discretion. With the support of his 

superiors, Mitchell developed a campaign plan to control the skies 

over the battlefield, spelled out in a detailed memorandum issued 

on 20 August. It identified the “general mission of aviation” to 

“absolutely prevent access to our lines by enemy reconnaissance 

aviation,” and to “secure complete information about hostile 

formation[s].” Mitchell noted in his memoirs: “Air forces are the 

eyes of the army, and without their accurate reports, ground 

forces cannot operate.” He recognized that the air above the 

battlefield was a new medium, offering a wide scope for action, 

and that controlling this medium was essential to the successful 

employment of combat forces on the ground.

Prior to the operation, intelligence estimates of German air 

forces in the sector ranged between 213 and 295 aircraft, but 

Mitchell believed that they could mass upward of a thousand planes 

in the area within three days of the start of the battle. He therefore 

anticipated having “a preponderance in the air for at least two 

days before the Germans could concentrate [their forces].” With 

this small window, Mitchell organized his forces to dominate the 

skies. Over half of his planes would attack the enemy and deny 

reconnaissance by shooting down observation planes flying over 

the lines and “busting” enemy observation balloons. Initially, 

Mitchell intended to rely on the French Aerial Division, which he 

directed to alternate striking each side of the salient with a full 

brigade, maintaining constant pressure on German air and ground 

units. If the Germans responded to these attacks in force, Mitchell 

would be ready. He organized most American attack elements in 

the First Pursuit Wing, commanded by Maj. Bert M. Atkinson. It 

included two pursuit groups and a day bombardment group, and 

would counter German efforts to control any part of the battlefield. 

In this manner Mitchell looked to maximize his combat power 

during the battle’s crucial first days.

Mitchell organized the remainder of his forces to serve as direct 

support for the ground units. The largest formation, the Corps 

Observation Wing under the command of Maj. Lewis H. Brereton, 

contained three American air groups and one French group, 
•••• 30 ••••

each assigned to one of the four corps involved in the operation. 

Although Mitchell maintained overall control over these units, 

they took their operational directions from their respective corps 

headquarters. This ensured that each corps, and in practice each 

attacking division, had a dedicated air element providing direct 

support. Their principal duties were to provide observation for 

attacking infantry and spotting for supporting artillery, through 

the use of either reconnaissance aircraft or observation balloons. 

In addition to these units, Mitchell had at his disposal the First 

Army Observation Group, made up of American aircraft under 

the direction of First Army Headquarters; an Army Artillery 

Observation Group composed of mostly French units spotting for 

the First Army’s artillery; a French Night Bombardment Group that 

included the Italian units; and five squadrons of pursuit aircraft 

organized into 1st Pursuit Group, which roamed the battlefield 

2d Lt. J. H. Snyder receiving an observation camera

(National Archives)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 31 ••••

protecting reconnaissance aircraft and attacking German ground 

forces if the opportunity presented itself.

Mitchell codified his vision of the air campaign in an annex to 

the First Army’s Field Order No. 9, issued on 7 September, which 

laid out the operational plan for the St. Mihiel attack. It specified 

that air operations would consist of four phases. First was the 

early preparation phase, which lasted from the day the order was 

issued to the day before the attack. During this period, pursuit 

and bomber aircraft would carry out their normal activities so 

as not to alert the Germans to the impending operation, while 

observation squadrons gathered “all information necessary to the 

preparation of the attack, especially for the artillery preparation.” 

The second phase covered the period between the beginning of the 

artillery preparation and the start of the infantry attack, during 

which Air Service bombardment and pursuit units set out to attack 

prearranged targets behind the lines and to clear the skies of enemy 

aircraft. These missions continued into the attack phase, covering 

Mitchell’s two-day window, with the added mission of attacking 

enemy “troops, trains and important targets on the ground.” The 

orders specifically called on pursuit units to “attack with bombs and 

machine guns, either enemy reinforcements marching to the attack, 

or enemy elements retreating.” Once the two-day window closed, the 

Air Service would move into the exploitation phase, continuing the 

attack based on “the necessities of the moment.” With the plan in 

place, the Air Service set about making final preparations. Mitchell 

would have to wait to see if his untested force could achieve his 

ambitious plan. Unfortunately, despite his efforts to control every 

aspect of the upcoming operation, Mitchell could not account for 

the weather, which would make its own mark on the battle.

Deception Plans

As the American operational plan came together and the troops 

began moving, rumors of the impending attack began to spread. 

Even though it was impossible to hide the offensive from the 

Germans, the Americans went to great lengths to conceal the exact 

time and location of their attack. Using borrowed French radios 

in the area around the Belfort Gap, American operators set up a 

decoy communications network over which they sent thousands of 

coded messages for the benefit of German monitoring stations. To 

make the fictitious transmissions more credible, they included the 

assorted slang and profanity that Germans had come to associate 
•••• 32 ••••

with American signal soldiers. German intelligence interpreted the 

increased message traffic and concluded that they had located the 

presence of a new American corps in the area.

To further deceive the Germans that the American attack 

would take place through the Belfort Gap, General Conner, the 

AEF operations officer, created an elaborate ruse. He gave Maj. 

Gen. Omar Bundy, commanding general of the VI Army Corps, 

detailed plans for a fictitious offensive leading out of Belfort in the 

direction of the heights to the southeast. The letter of instructions 

mentioned seven divisions as having been designated for the 

attack, and directed the general to proceed to Belfort with his staff 

and representatives from each of the divisions to begin planning 

and to conduct initial reconnaissance. One of Conner’s assistants, 

Maj. Arthur L. Conger, checked into an expensive hotel in Belfort 

and “accidentally” left a piece of crumpled carbon paper identifying 

plans for the coming attack in the wastepaper basket. Knowing the 

hotel to be a virtual den of German espionage agents, Conger was 

pleased to find that the carbon paper disappeared shortly after he 

planted it. The ruse was effective, at least to a point. Although the 

Germans wisely considered an operation to clear the Belfort Gap a 

foolish idea, they could not completely discount the possibility that 

the Americans, whom they considered inexperienced amateurs, 

would try such a thing anyway. As a result, they evacuated villages 

in the nearby areas, reinforced defenses, and positioned additional 

artillery to defend the area.

Operations

The Americans Attack

The First Army Field Order No. 9 set D-day for the operation 

as 12 September, with H-hour at 0500. In the days leading up 

to the attack, French night and British day and night bombers 

conducted routine missions in the attack sector. Hours before 

the attack, Allied bomber units launched more intense raids 

concentrating on a more detailed list of targets. The Allied 

bombers under Mitchell’s control hit the roads in the vicinity of 

the town of Vigneulles, targeting enemy transports and troops to 

impede German movements. To further block traffic, Allied units 

also bombed targets well behind the German lines, including the 

railroad yards and ammunition dump at Chambley-Bussières, and 

the road junction just to the south. Other Allied bombers struck 
•••• 33 ••••

munitions dumps at Gondrecourt-Aix, Valleroy, and St. Jean-lèsBuzy. At the same time, British bombers struck the railroad center, 

supply dumps, and the airfield near Mars-la-Tour, and the railroad 

yards at Metz. Immediately before the attack, the bombers shifted 

to medium-range targets to disrupt rail traffic and track repair at 

the Chambley-Bussières, Dommary-Baroncourt, and Longuyon 

railheads; the railroad yard and ammunition dump at DommaryBaroncourt; and the Meuse River bridges between Verdun and 

Sedan. Allied air units also attacked German command posts and 

airfields throughout the salient. 

Meanwhile on the ground, in order to preserve the element of 

surprise, nothing moved along the American line until after dusk 

on 11 September. Infantry and artillery units stood in the assembly 

areas concealed by woods some six kilometers behind the frontline 

positions. Soon after dark, everything started to move. Much to 

the chagrin of the doughboys, it also began to rain. A long column 

of American-manned Renault tanks rumbled along the roads. 

Batteries of artillery moved from their wooded concealment toward 

the Rambucourt-Flirey-Limey highway. Battalions of infantry 

trudged through the rain toward the front.

Both the artillery and the infantry were to bypass the more 

recently dug and sturdy mainline trenches, and instead take 

up positions amid a maze of older, unoccupied, mud-choked 

ones farther forward. As the artillery units usually arrived first, 

battery commanders discovered that other than occasional sentry 

posts, nothing stood between them and the Germans. They sent 

detachments of gunners forward to establish local security with 

skirmish lines that could protect the batteries from enemy patrols 

until the infantry was in place. Some units had difficulty reaching 

their assault positions. The 16th Infantry of the 1st Division, for 

example, later reported that its lead battalion got into position later 

than expected “owing to engineer guides going astray,” but was 

ready well before the time to attack. The steady rain continued 

throughout the night as Signal Corps wiremen ran telephone lines 

from the battalion positions back to regimental command posts. 

With all other preparations completed, infantry assault units lay 

on the wet ground between the inundated old trenches and waited 

for H-hour.

At precisely 0100, all of the Allied guns simultaneously opened a 

massive volley, as some 3,000 pieces commenced firing. Doughboys 

recalled that the intensely black night suddenly seemed to burst 

into a sheet of flame. Infantrymen who had occupied the trenches 
•••• 34 ••••

on previous occasions looked across to the German-held Montsec 

and wondered when the enemy guns would respond with deadly 

counterbattery fire. The hours seemed to drag on as the combat 

veterans among them who had patrolled no-man’s-land pondered 

what real effect the artillery would have on the well-prepared 

enemy positions they had often observed. The green troops, 

whether serving in the newer divisions or as replacements in older 

ones, waited apprehensively in the darkness and drenching rain, 

imagining what the day would bring. The engineer guides then 

led the doughboys through the maze of protective barbed wire to 

the line of departure, most often marked with white linen tape, to 

make it easier for the infantrymen to find their jumping-off place 

in the predawn darkness. The artillerymen continued firing salvos 

aimed primarily at the enemy’s artillery positions. Allied pursuit 

squadrons took to the sky to destroy hostile aviation and balloons 

throughout the zone of attack from five kilometers in front of 

the line of departure to as far as the line of exploitation, and on 

the flanks from eleven kilometers north of Pont-à-Mousson to as 

far as Étain to the west of Metz. With bombs and machine guns, 

low-flying air patrols attacked enemy reinforcements marching to 

counterattack as well as retreating defenders. Despite these efforts 

by the airmen, increasing rain and fog would severely hinder Allied 

air maneuvers for the first two days of the operation.

Although the Germans anticipated an attack, the opening 

bombardment still took them by surprise. They had begun 

preparations to evacuate the salient, removing some of their 

ammunition and supply stockpiles first and displacing artillery 

batteries to the rear, when it struck. General Fuchs had ordered 

two divisions to withdraw to a secondary line formerly occupied 

by artillery, but one of the commanders misinterpreted the 

instructions and left two-thirds of his infantry in its old positions 

with virtually no supporting artillery. Aerial strafing and bombing 

along with artillery shells created particular havoc among German 

units caught on the move. Teams of horses the Germans had 

brought in to extract the remaining forward artillery batteries 

were themselves unable to move. Withdrawal routes soon became 

blocked by craters and fallen trees, and littered with mutilated 

human bodies and horse carcasses. Movement ground to a halt 

in many places.

At 0500, the artillery changed the form of its fire. The heavy 

guns continued to suppress enemy batteries and machine guns, 

but the 75-mm. field guns of the divisional artillery began firing 
•••• 35 ••••

direct support for the infantry. Along the American line, company 

commanders watched as the first rounds of the protective rolling 

barrage hit the ground in front of them. They need not have even 

looked at their watches to know that H-hour had arrived. The men 

knew it as well, rising to their feet and shaking off the stiffness 

from waiting for hours in the rain on the soaked ground. As their 

officers signaled the advance, the doughboys crossed the line of 

departure at H-hour, with daylight still twenty minutes away. They 

moved forward under the protective curtain of fire that advanced 

one hundred meters toward the enemy trenches every four minutes. 

The attack waves moved steadily forward until they reached the 

first belt of enemy barbed wire. Teams of infantrymen with wire 

cutters and engineers with explosive Bangalore torpedoes went 

forward to work on the obstacles. They quickly opened lanes that 

allowed their comrades to continue moving ahead. 

After the American barrage passed over them, German 

artillerymen came out of their shelters, manned their guns, and 

opened fire. However, having stripped the forward defensive belt 

of much of its artillery, the remaining batteries had too few guns 

to seriously impede the determined advance. Still, the attackers 

Ambulance stuck in a ditch (National Archives) •••••••••••••••
•••• 36 ••••

encountered pockets of deadly resistance. Braving machine gun 

nests and rifle fire, the doughboys overran the forward enemy 

positions and pressed on behind the barrage to surround and 

capture the remaining batteries. As the Americans cleared the 

third line of the Wilhelm defense zone, they broke through the 

last strong line of resistance. The 1st Division reported that the 

enemy trench system was not difficult to pass, “having been greatly 

demolished by the rains and shell fire.” By 0900, the infantry along 

the southern front of the salient had advanced steadily, although 

they were slowed by the wet, mud-caked ground and the need to 

escort groups of German prisoners to the rear.

The IV Corps Advances

The IV Corps, operating at the center of the salient’s southern 

edge, provided the primary thrust of the opening attack. It also had 

the farthest to go and generally made good progress despite serious 

opposition in the last line of trenches located in the Quart de 

Réserve, a small wood of about one square mile midway between 

Seicheprey and Nonsard. The 42d Division, commanded by Maj. 

Gen. Charles T. Menoher, “had been given the main effort,” as the 

New York Times later reported, and attacked in the direction of the 

heights overlooking the Madine creek to “deliver the main blow” 

of the corps. Made up of National Guard units from several states 

and the District of Columbia, the 42d or “Rainbow” Division formed 

the center of the corps. At that point in the war, it was one of the 

more experienced First Army units. The 1st Division, commanded 

by Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall, advanced on the corps’ left 

flank. Composed of Regular Army units, the 1st Division—also 

known as the “Big Red One” for its shoulder sleeve insignia—had 

been the first American formation to deploy and see combat in 

France in 1917. Although as a unit it had more combat experience 

than any other division in the AEF, its ranks included many new 

replacements. Lastly, the 89th Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. 

William M. Wright, advanced on the corps’ right. A National Army 

division, its enlisted ranks were filled mostly by men drafted from 

Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska.

In the Rainbow Division’s zone, its 83d and 84th Infantry 

Brigades advanced abreast with two regiments in line. In their 

assault formation, each regiment had two of its three infantry 

battalions in the first line with their companies forming two waves 

about twenty meters apart. Elements of the brigade’s machine 
•••• 37 ••••

gun battalion and attached trench mortar and 37-mm. gun units 

followed in support. To the rear of these followed the regiments’ 

third infantry battalions with their attached units. The supporting 

battalions were ready to reinforce those to their front or mop 

up any resistance that remained behind once the assault waves 

pressed forward.

The 83d Infantry Brigade advanced with the 166th and 165th 

Infantry on line, and breached what reports called the enemy’s 

“shell of defense” with “little difficulty.” The 1st Battalion of the 

165th Infantry—formerly known as the “Fighting 69th” Regiment 

of New York—moved forward on the brigade’s right flank. Its 

commander, Lt. Col. William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan, knew that 

the Germans occupied good defensive positions and feared 

that his men would suffer frightful casualties once the enemy 

opened fire. He felt some relief when the German artillery did 

not respond with its characteristic fury. The barbed wire, which 

had everyone worried, also did not cause much of a problem. 

Although present in great abundance, much of it was old and 

rusty, and the breaching teams quickly opened lanes through the 

obstacles. Except for some pockets of resistance, the advancing 

waves overwhelmed the defenders. Realizing that they had caught 

the Germans on the point of withdrawal, Donovan urged his men 

forward, and they took all of the battalion’s first-day objectives 

by 1400.

The entire 83d Brigade advanced eight kilometers and occupied 

the villages of Essey-et-Maizerais and Pannes against relatively 

light resistance. Local inhabitants were relieved to see their 

liberators after almost four years of German occupation. Pvt. 

Albert M. Ettinger of the 165th Infantry recalled that “French 

civilians wept joyously and offered what little provisions they had 

to our men.” To the left of the 165th, the 166th Infantry, originally 

composed entirely of Ohio National Guard soldiers, also made 

good progress. Fighting along with elements of the 1st Division, 

the 166th took the town of Lahayville before reaching its first-day 

objective by 1630.

The going was not quite so easy for the 42d Division’s 84th 

Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Douglas MacArthur. 

The 167th and 168th Infantry and the Tank Corps’ 327th Battalion 

experienced “slower going” and encountered a “more vigorous 

resistance.” The men of the 168th Infantry ran into elements of 

the German 10th Division entrenched in the Bois de la Sonnard. 

Machine gun fire cut into the assault waves from front and flank 
•••• 38 ••••

while short-range heavy mortars called minenwerfers (mine 

throwers) lobbed high-explosive projectiles that created large 

craters on impact and showered the advancing doughboys with 

deadly shell fragments. Despite the carnage, their officers urged 

the men forward. With the support of the attached Stokes trench 

mortars and 37-mm. guns, the infantrymen came on in rushes 

toward the first belt of barbed wire, outflanked the machine gun 

nests, and overcame the strongpoints. Although many of its officers 

fell in the advance, the regiment surged into the woods and over 

the German front line. By 0630, the 168th Infantry had made short 

work of the defenses and was advancing to what seemed to be a 

weaker second line. The battle for the Bois de la Sonnard cost the 

regiment more than 200 casualties, but the attackers captured 

more than 300 prisoners and another 600 surrendered to follow-on 

units. No one bothered to count the German dead. By 1630, all 

Rainbow Division units had broken through the German defenses 

and secured their objectives. (See Map 5.)

Elsewhere in the IV Corps, the 1st Division attack made rapid 

headway. From a tactical standpoint, the division had drawn 

the most difficult assignment in the corps. Not only did it have 

to screen its own flank against German forces holding the high 

ground to its left, but it also had to advance across the rainswollen Rupt de Mad, a tributary of the Moselle River which ran 

northwest across the division front. The division advanced across 

Supply train and infantry (National Archives)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 39 ••••

no-man’s-land in a series of waves with the 1st Infantry Brigade 

on the left and 2d Infantry Brigade on the right. The supporting 

artillery preparation had targeted enemy machine gun positions 

with noticeable effect, and the infantry advanced behind a rolling 

barrage, reaching the German wire against light resistance. In fact, 

the advancing doughboys suffered more casualties from following 

their protective artillery screen too closely than from enemy fire. 

As expected, the division met serious opposition in the last trench 

of the Quart de Réserve. Despite the determined machine gun fire, 

they finally cleared the woods at the cost of 600 casualties.

Following that engagement, the 1st Division troops found the 

going much easier as they secured the third objective of the first 

phase of the operation. The corps commander ordered Summerall 

to resume the advance as soon as all of his units were ready. The 

final objective planned for the day included the towns of Lamarche 

and Nonsard, as well as the Bois de Gargantua. As artillery fire fell 

on the objective, the support battalions passed through the assault 

battalions to advance. They found the Madine fordable, but the 

high banks delayed the crossing of the tanks. Even so, the division 

occupied its first-day objectives in depth shortly after noon.

In general, as the tanks lumbered forward to provide support, 

they often had difficulty keeping pace with the advancing infantry 

on the broken and soggy ground. When Colonel Patton received 

word at 1000 that such “bad ground”—interlocking shell craters, 

gaping trenches, and the ever-present mud—was delaying the 

327th Tank Battalion and accompanying infantry, he left his 

headquarters and made his way on foot to Essey-et-Maizerais. He 

found General MacArthur, and the two calmly stood talking about 

the situation as the battle raged. Meanwhile, at 1045, Air Service 

balloon observers reported seeing American troops “flat on their 

stomachs in front of the trench at Moulin under heavy machine gun 

fire,” with a “number of tanks behind them.” Patton got five of the 

Renaults moving, but all but one ran out of fuel before they reached 

the intermediate objective of Pannes ahead of the 42d Division. 

Tanks pulling sledges brought forward a supply of gasoline and 

topped off the vehicles so they could continue. The five tanks 

formed a line abreast and led the infantry advance north to Beney, 

which the Americans captured along with a battery of four field 

guns and sixteen machine guns. At other times, the Renault FTs 

pulled ahead of the infantry. The 326th Tank Battalion reached 

Xivray before elements of the 1st Division. The tanks experienced 

similar logistical problems to those in its sister units. The 1st 
X X

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X X

42

X X

89

XXX

IV

XXX

I

XXX

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XXX

V

12 SEP (A.M.)

14–16 SEP

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Rupt de Mad Cr

Madine Cr

Bois de Thiaucourt

Bois de Nonsard

Bois de 

Gargantua

Bois de le Sonnard

Bois de Mort-Mare

Quart

de Réserve

Bois de 

Vigneulles

Thiaucourt

Chambley

Vigneulles-

 les-Hattonchâtel

Hattonville

Seicheprey

Heudicourt

Montsec Lahayville

Esseyet-Maizerais

Pannes

Xiray-et-Marvoisin

Nonsard

Lamarcheen-Woëvre

St. Benoîten-Woëvre

Xammes

Beney-

 en-Woëvre

Euvezin

Flirey

Limey

Jaulny

Rembercourtsur-Mad

Dampvitoux

Jonville

Doncourt-aux-Templiers

St. Hilaire

Woël

Hattonchâtel

BAT TLE OF ST. MIHIEL

IV CORPS SECTOR

 12–16 September 1918

0 200 300 and Above

ELEVATION IN METERS

Front Line, Date

0

0 1

Miles 1 2 3

2 3 Kilometers

Map 5
•••• 41 ••••

Division took Nonsard with the assistance of twenty-five tanks 

just before they too ran out of gas.

On the IV Corps’ right, the 89th Division also had a difficult 

assignment. It attacked in the general direction of Dampvitoux, 

supporting the 42d Division on its left and assisted by the 2d 

Division of the I Corps on its right. The Bois de Mort-Mare extended 

across almost the entire divisional front with only a narrow strip 

of open ground to the east. German defenses included strongpoints 

with trenches, concrete machine gun nests, and deep dugouts. The 

division advanced with its 178th Infantry Brigade on the left and 

the 177th Infantry Brigade on the right. Both brigades suffered 

heavy casualties as they approached the woods, but as they came 

within sight of the German positions, doughboys rushed forward 

individually and in small groups to take on the Germans. An 

exploding shell knocked 2d Lt. J. Hunter Wickersham, a platoon 

leader in Company H, 353d Infantry, 177th Brigade, to the ground 

with a severe wound. With his right arm disabled, he continued 

to lead his platoon in the attack, firing his revolver with his left 

hand until he collapsed and died. He received the Medal of Honor 

posthumously for his bravery in action. Under such pressure, the 

German line cracked, and soon hundreds of enemy prisoners 

were streaming to the rear. By 0800, the Mort-Mare woods were 

in American hands and the division was advancing toward the 

next defensive line.

By 1230, the IV Corps reached the southern edge of the Bois 

de Nonsard and Bois de Thiaucourt and captured the town of 

Nonsard. The infantry had advanced eight kilometers through the 

muddy fields and paused to rest. Aside from active patrols, they 

temporarily halted their advance, having achieved almost all of 

their first-day objectives.

With the IV Corps making good progress, General Dickman 

requested and received permission to continue the attack toward 

the second day’s objectives. Sensing that the German line was 

in complete disarray, he turned to Lt. Col. Oliver P. M. “Happy” 

Hazard, who commanded a provisional squadron of cavalry, to 

continue the advance. Hazard’s men were part of the American 

2d Cavalry. As in the French and British armies, the Americans 

consigned cavalry to limited roles on the Western Front. They 

generally performed security, liaison, and reconnaissance duties 

in previous operations, but could fight as dismounted infantry if 

the situation demanded. Each trooper carried a Springfield M1903 

.30 caliber rifle, and the unit also had a number of the newly arrived 
•••• 42 ••••

M1918 Browning Automatic Rifles (BAR), which enabled the men 

to deliver a disproportionate amount of firepower. Of greater 

importance to Dickman, however, was that the cavalrymen were 

rested and available to make a renewed attack. Hazard’s squadron 

initially consisted of Troops B, D, F, and H, but Troop B was 

performing patrol and liaison for the IV Corps’ assault divisions. 

Because of the distinct nature of a cavalry unit’s organization, 

Hazard’s three troops would have at most 240 fighting men between 

them to make the assault, less than a standard infantry company. 

Moreover, even if the cavalry reached the railroad, they lacked 

demolition equipment with which to destroy the line.

Even so, with reports that the Germans were starting to break, 

the squadron was ordered to move forward of the 1st Division’s line 

to reconnoiter the railroad and highway between Heudicourt and 

Vigneulles and block the Germans’ escape. The troopers reached 

Nonsard by about 1600, and Hazard ordered Capt. Ernest N. Harmon 

of Troop F to lead the advance guard. The men rode forward nearly 

two kilometers before entering the woods, encountering burning 

huts and loose-running livestock along the way.

An American tank in trouble (National Archives)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 43 ••••

Once in the woods, the cavalry units became disorganized, 

with the advanced guard losing contact with the main body and 

one of the troops moving forward along an adjacent route. The 

advance elements soon located an enemy wagon train preparing 

to withdraw. As they formed from column into “line of foragers” 

and drew their pistols in order to advance, they received fire 

from advancing enemy infantry and machine guns hidden in the 

woods to their flank and rear. Taken by surprise, the cavalrymen 

retreated about 300 meters to where they could dismount under 

cover and form a skirmish line with their M1903 rifles in order to 

advance—the heavy woods being unsuitable for mounted action. 

They initially conducted this retirement in good order, even though 

they had many green horses unaccustomed to heavy fire. Under 

continued machine gun fire, however, some of the less-well-trained 

horses became skittish. The machine gunners, trained to shoot 

low, caused few casualties among the men, but their bullets hit 

some horses in the legs, while other horses panicked and became 

difficult to control. The troopers returned fire and killed most of 

the enemy machine gun crews on their flanks in their retreat. The 

officers reformed their units as the riders calmed their horses 

when they reached the wood line. Not strong enough to block the 

road without additional support, the cavalry withdrew behind the 

safety of the 1st Division.

Refusing to be dissuaded by the failure of the cavalry advance, 

Dickman ordered the 1st Division to continue the attack that 

evening. The movement was slow and difficult through the darkness 

in the Bois de Nonsard followed by the Bois de Vigneulles, but 

the infantry advanced in relatively good order. By early the next 

morning, 13 September, elements of the 28th Infantry, 2d Infantry 

Brigade, began taking up positions to the east, southeast, and south 

of the town, including positions astride the Vigneulles–St. Benoît 

road. Additionally, Dickman rushed a brigade of the 3d Division 

from the corps reserve to guard the left flank in order to allow 1st 

Division to continue its push forward in the morning.By the morning 

all were ready for the final push into Vigneulles to meet up with the 

26th Division from General Cameron’s V Corps, thus closing the gap 

on any German forces remaining in the apex of the salient.

The I Corps’ Attack

To the right of the IV Corps, General Liggett’s I Corps conducted 

a supporting attack, smashing into the southeastern section of the 
•••• 44 ••••

German line. Three of his divisions, the 2d, 5th, and 90th, began their 

assault at 0500 on 12 September while the 82d remained in position 

to anchor the right flank along the Moselle River. Liggett’s primary 

objective was the high ground north of Thiaucourt, which, next to 

St. Mihiel, was the largest town in the salient. Since the town sat 

on a major railroad line, the Americans considered it to be one of 

the most important objectives of the offensive. Liggett’s divisions 

had much the same experience as those in Dickman’s IV Corps. The 

2d Division, reconstituted and reinforced after the bitter fighting 

at Soissons, cleared a series of wood lines defended by degraded 

German units. Enemy morale was so low that many surrendered or 

fled at the first sight of the approaching assault waves. By noon, the 

division had taken its primary objective of Thiaucourt and by the 

end of the day had captured the fortified high ground to the north 

of the town (Map 6).

Elsewhere in the I Corps zone of attack, the 5th and the 90th 

Divisions protected the 2d Division’s flank and advanced apace as 

German resistance crumbled. The going was relatively easy in the 

5th Division’s sector, but the doughboys of the 90th Division faced 

some of the fiercest fighting of the battle. The division’s 179th Infantry 

Brigade attacked on the division’s left, with the 357th and 358th 

Infantry advancing through machine gun–infested woods where 

the Germans had erected iron gratings between trees to channel the 

attackers into fire zones. On the division’s right, the 180th Infantry 

Brigade assigned its 359th Infantry to take a well-defended piece 

of ground known as Quarten Reserve, which had been the scene 

of bitter fighting in previous years. Crawling ahead, the doughboys 

reached a series of German barbed-wire entanglements as machine 

gun bullets snapped over their heads. As a call went out for someone 

to bring up a pair of wire cutters, Cpl. Jesse M. Grisham climbed out 

of his hole and calmly walked forward. Seemingly oblivious to the 

battle around him, Grisham cut one path through the entanglements, 

and then another. He had moved on to a third location when his 

luck ran out and a burst of machine gun fire cut him down. For his 

bravery, he was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service 

Cross. Despite the stiff opposition, the assault rolled on, and by the 

end of the day the troops of both the 5th and 90th Divisions were 

up against the initial defenses of the Michel Line. On the far right, 

the 82d Division did not advance, but sent out aggressive combat 

patrols and raiding parties to confuse the enemy and to hold the 

defenders in place and keep them from interfering with the rest of 

the corps’ advance.
X X

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90

X X

82

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IV

12 SEP (A.M.)

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to Metz

Quarten

Reserve

Bois de Mort-Mare

Moselle R

Thiaucourt

Viévilleen-Haye

Regniéville-

 en-Haye

Vilceysur-Trey

Vandières

Chambley

Xammes

Flirey

Limey

Mamey

Jaulny

Rembercourtsur-Mad

Dommartinla-Chaussée

Onville

Prény

PONT-À-MOUSSON

BAT TLE OF ST. MIHIEL

I CORPS SECTOR

 12–16 September 1918

0 200 300 and Above

ELEVATION IN METERS

Front Line, Date

0

0 1

Miles 1 2 3

2 3 Kilometers

Map 6
•••• 46 ••••

The V Corps’ Supporting Attack

Along the western edge of the salient, General Cameron’s V 

Corps initiated a planned secondary attack at 0800, three hours 

behind the attack on the southern face. As elsewhere, the artillery 

preparation began firing at deep targets at 0100, and at 0500, when 

the main attack began, the artillery supporting the V Corps dropped 

to fire on enemy positions to its front. At H+3, following seven 

hours of artillery preparation, the infantry attack commenced. The 

corps’ primary assault force was the 26th Division, nicknamed the 

“Yankee Division” because it had been organized with National 

Guard units from New England. Under the command of Maj. Gen. 

Clarence R. Edwards, the 26th Division advanced along a front 

of just over three kilometers, on a line stretching between Les 

Éparges to the north and a position in the woods southeast of the 

town of Mouilly. Edwards placed the 104th and 103d Infantry of the 

52d Infantry Brigade on his left, with the 101st Infantry from the 

51st Infantry Brigade on the right. Edwards held back the brigade’s 

remaining regiment, the 102d Infantry, as divisional reserve. The 

French 15th DIC attacked on the 26th Division’s left, protecting 

its flank. Farther to the north, the American 4th Division’s 8th 

Infantry Brigade conducted a supporting attack while the rest of 

the division remained in corps reserve. The French 2d DCP of the 

French II Colonial Corps advanced to support the American 26th 

Division’s right flank (Map 7).

Unlike the more open terrain facing troops to the south, the 

26th Division moved forward into dense forests and rolling hills 

that extended off the Meuse River to the west. Although German 

resistance was sporadic, the attacking infantry encountered 

extensive barbed-wire obstacles and hundreds of shell holes and 

craters, caused by the opening bombardment, that further impeded 

the advance. When Pershing learned at midafternoon that the 

division had yet to reach its day’s objective, he sent instructions 

urging the corps commander to push forward. Despite the difficult 

terrain, the doughboys moved through the thick woods of the Bois 

de St. Rémy and La Chanot Bois. The Germans made their principal 

defense with well-placed concrete machine gun nests, or pillboxes, 

within the woods, as well as determined machine gun fire from the 

small village of Dommartin-la-Montagne that stymied the attack 

on the division’s left. Noticeably absent, however, was the enemy’s 

artillery, having been either withdrawn or silenced by the American 

artillery preparation. The Yankee Division soldiers finally reached 
X X

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Fr 39

X X

4

X X

Fr 39

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Fr 26

X X

Fr 15 DIC

X X

Fr 2 DCP

X X

Fr 2 DCP

XXX

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XXX

IV

XXX

II Fr CAC

12 SEP (A.M.)

12 SEP (A.M.)

12 SEP (A.M.)

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13 SEP

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12 SEP 13–14

15–16

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to Verdun

G R A N D E TR A N C H ÉE D E C A LO N N E

Meuse R

Meuse R

Rupt de Mad Cr

Madine Cr

La Chanot 

Bois

Bois de 

St. Rémy

Bois de 

Vigneulles

Vigneullesles-Hattonchâtel

Hattonville

St. Mauricesous-les-Côtes

Thillotsous-les-Côtes

Dommartinla-Montagne

St. Rémy

Les Éparges

Mouilly

Seicheprey

Heudicourt

Creuë

Hattonchâtel

Spada

Buxerulles

Montsec

Lahayville

Esseyet-Maizerais

Pannes

Nonsard

Lamarcheen-Woëvre

St. Benoîten-Woëvre

Jonville

Fresnesen-Woëvre

Haudiomont

Watronville

Moranville

Doncourtaux-Templiers

St. Hilaire

Manheulles

Woël

Apremont

Loupmont

Xivrayet-Marvoisin

Rambucourt

ST. MIHIEL

BAT TLE OF ST. MIHIEL

V CORPS SECTOR

FRENCH II COLONIAL CORPS SECTOR

 12–16 September 1918

0 200 300 400 and Above

ELEVATION IN METERS

Front Line, Date

Axis of Movement

0

0 1

Miles 1 2 3 4 5

2 3 4 5 Kilometers

Map 7
•••• 48 ••••

their assigned objectives during the afternoon and early evening 

of 12 September, but the work was far from complete.

On the 26th Division’s flanks, the French had varying degrees of 

success. To the south, the French 2d DCP’s advance initially made 

greater gains than the Americans. However, the French launched 

their attacks in stages, hoping to hold the German units further to 

the south in place while the American attacks burrowed into the 

salient. Once the French started to move in the early afternoon, 

they rapidly caught up to the Americans as the Germans were 

beginning to withdraw. Unfortunately, the French 15th DIC on 

the 26th Division’s left did not enjoy similar success. Although 

the French were able to seize the town of St. Rémy by 1400, stiff 

German resistance prevented them from moving much further.

Member of the 101st Field Signal Battalion stringing telegraph 

wire in captured German position (National Archives)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 49 ••••

At the First Army headquarters, Pershing was concerned 

that the pace of the V and IV Corps’ advances, although steady, 

would allow the Germans to withdraw their forces from the 

apex of the salient before the Americans could close the gap. As 

with Dickman’s forces to the south, Pershing pressed Cameron 

to continue the advance. The general needed little motivation, 

ordering Edwards to have his 51st Brigade make a drive toward 

Vigneulles. Edwards complied, calling up his reserves and having 

the brigade reform into a column of march during the early 

evening. The brigade was ordered to conduct a night march along 

the Grande Tranchée de Calonne, a road running through a dense 

forest straight toward the village of Hattonchâtel to the southeast. 

The race was on to link up with the IV Corps before the Germans 

could affect their withdrawal.

Meanwhile, the 52d Brigade received orders to vigorously 

renew its advance, which had stalled just past La Chanot Bois. 

The night attack succeeded, forcing the enemy to withdraw rapidly 

toward St.  Maurice-sous-les-Côtes, on the edge of the Woëvre 

Plain. As the Germans fell back, the 52d Brigade expanded its axis 

of advance to include the village of Thillot-sous-les-Côtes, pushing 

the Germans off the high ground northeast of Hattonchâtel in 

preparation for the 51st Brigade’s final push.

Along the Apex

The II French Colonial Corps held the point of the salient between 

the U.S. IV and V Corps, and had great success in accomplishing its 

mission. An hour after the main attack began, the French launched a 

number of limited objective attacks that kept the German defenders 

busily engaged on that front and prevented their withdrawal. The 

French 39th Division, positioned on the southern edge of the salient 

to the left of the American 1st Division, kept pressure on the Germans 

occupying the critical high ground at Montsec and Loupmont. This 

prevented the Germans from hitting the 1st Division’s left flank in 

force and enabled its push to Nonsard. Units of the French 39th 

Division followed the left flank of the American 1st Division until it 

reached the Heudicourt-Vigneulles road and established a blocking 

position astride it. At the same time, the French 26th Division met 

stern resistance outside of the town of St. Mihiel, which would not 

fall to the attackers until the morning of 13 September. Finally, as 

described previously, the French 2d DCP protected the flank of the 

American advance along the western edge of the salient. Once the 
•••• 50 ••••

American attack was well underway, the French corps launched a 

series of vigorous raids that penetrated the German front lines. As 

the Germans began to realize the dire nature of the situation, their 

resistance within the salient slowly started to disappear.

Closing the Gap

The initial American attacks on 12 September accomplished 

their missions, pushing into the sides of the salient and punishing 

the German defenders. Pershing and his GHQ and First Army staffs 

learned that the Germans were burning the supplies they could not 

move and pulling back from the forward portions of the salient. 

Retreating soldiers, artillery, and support trains soon flooded the 

roads between the two American attacks. With the Germans initially 

holding out against the French attacks along the point of the salient, 

all that remained was to link the American attacks, preferably before 

the Germans could withdraw.

Playing on the rivalry between the Regular Army and National 

Guard, General Cameron goaded General Edwards to have the 26th 

Division “try to beat the 1st Division in the race and clean up.” Lead 

elements of the 102d Infantry reached the town of Hattonchâtel 

around 0200 on 13 September, followed by the remaining elements 

of the 51st Infantry Brigade and assorted divisional units. By seizing 

Hattonchâtel, the Americans could view the entire Woëvre Plain 

before them, including Vigneulles a kilometer to the south and a 

hundred meters below them. They immediately sent out patrols to 

close off the roads and to make contact with units from IV Corps. 

On the other side of the gap, the 1st Division began its advance 

toward Vigneulles and Hattonchâtel shortly after midnight, closing 

any roads that remained open from the west. About 0900, Brig. Gen. 

Frank E. Bamford, commander of the 1st Division’s 2d Infantry 

Brigade, received a message that scouts from the 28th Infantry had 

noticed activity in and around the village of Hattonville, just to the 

east of Hattonchâtel (Map 8).

From a distance, it appeared to the scouts that enemy units of 

various sizes were moving into the town, possibly concentrating to 

counterattack or make a firm resistance. The regimental commander 

soon requested artillery support. Not long afterward, 1st Division 

patrols established contact with those of the 26th Division. The Big 

Red One soldiers soon learned that the Yankee Division occupied 

both towns, and the scouts actually had witnessed groups of 

German prisoners being marched to holding areas in the town. 
X X

26

X X

42

X X

1

X X

Fr 39

X X

Fr 26

X X

Fr 15 DIC

X X

Fr 2 DCP

XXX

V

XXX

IV

XXX

II Fr CAC

12 Sep

13 SEP

12 SEP

12 SEP

13 SEP

13 SEP

12 SEP

12 SEP

12 SEP

12 SEP

(A.M.)

XXX

XXX

XX

XX

XXX

XXX

La Chanot 

Bois

Bois de Nonsard

Bois de 

Gargantua

Bois de 

Vigneulles

Quart

de Réserve

Vigneullesles-Hattonchâtel

Hattonchâtel Hattonville

St. Maurice-sousles-Côtes

St. Rémy

Heudicourt

Buxerulles

Nonsard

Lamarcheen-Woëvre

Fresnesen-Woëvre

Wadonvilleen-Woëvre

Woël

Creuë

Thillot-sous- les-Côtes

Dommartinla-Montagne

Manheulles

St. Benoîten-Woëvre

BAT TLE OF ST. MIHIEL

CLOSING THE GAP

 12–13 September 1918

0 200 300 400 and Above

ELEVATION IN METERS

Axis of Main Attack

Axis of Secondary Attack

Front Line, Date

Cavalry Action

0

0 1

Miles 1 2 3

2 3 Kilometers

Map 8
•••• 52 ••••

At 0930, the 1st Division and IV Corps headquarters received the 

message, “Objective reached, held by 26th Division.” Both divisions 

established defenses and made contact with units of the French 39th 

Division advancing from the south. Looking to redeem the honor of 

the mounted arm, the three troops of the 2d Cavalry advanced and 

achieved better results, capturing an enemy battery and a number 

of prisoners. Mopping up continued for the rest of the day, but the 

First Army had closed the St. Mihiel salient.

The War in the Air

As American and French forces battered the Germans on the 

ground, the war in the skies got off to a slow start. Despite Colonel 

Mitchell’s plan to use an overwhelming number of aircraft to support 

the ground campaign, the weather severely limited what his units 

could do. On 12 and 13 September, low clouds, heavy rain, and 

high winds made the simple act of flying extremely dangerous, let 

alone in combat. The American First Army Air Service could not 

launch the mass attacks that Mitchell desired, and had to settle for 

limited sorties of small groups or individual flights. Because of the 

low cloud ceiling, which forced pilots to fly less than 300 meters 

above the ground, pursuit aircraft generally abandoned trying to 

View of Vigneulles from Hattonchâtel, with Montsec in the distance 

(National Archives)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 53 ••••

take on the German fighters en masse, and instead engaged in 

ground strafing and targeting enemy reconnaissance planes. The 

cloud cover similarly restricted Allied bombers and observation 

aircraft to low-level flying, making them susceptible to both enemy 

small-arms fire and friendly artillery fire.

Making matters worse, a number of the American flyers struggled 

not only with the weather, but with operating their aircraft. Many 

of the DH–4 bombers, fitted with a new American 400-horsepower 

Liberty V–12 engine, had only recently arrived on the battlefield, 

leaving little time for pilots to become accustomed to the new planes’ 

capabilities. Even for those pilots who understood their aircraft, 

nearly half of the American squadrons lacked significant combat 

experience. The men soon found that Mitchell’s intent that pursuit 

units protect reconnaissance and bomber aircraft proved difficult 

because of the performance characteristics of the various planes. 

Bombers could barely match the pursuits’ minimal safe speed 

necessary to stay aloft, and the pursuit fighters did not have the range 

to stay with the bombers or observation planes, which flew up to sixty 

kilometers beyond the front lines. Meanwhile, the reconnaissance 

crews encountered their own problems. The poor weather prevented 

photographic reconnaissance until 14 September, limiting the pilots 

to conducting visual observations only. Moreover, while they could 

report their findings to ground forces via air-to-ground radios, they 

could not receive messages themselves and thus had no way to verify 

receipt of their reports. Some pilots tried to coordinate with ground 

forces to relay information back behind the lines, but many of the 

infantrymen were ill-trained in the correct procedure for signaling 

aircraft and were reluctant to expose themselves to enemy fire by 

putting out marker panels in any case.

By 14 September, the weather began to clear and Mitchell’s 

forces finally could take to the skies in large numbers. By this 

point, however, the battle had changed. With the Germans 

withdrawing behind the formidable defenses of the Hindenburg Line, 

Mitchell shifted to longer-range bombing missions and air-to-air 

engagements. The Germans, meanwhile, had reinforced their air 

units in the area. Even though they did not commit as large a force 

as Mitchell had anticipated, they were still able to mount a bloody 

defense as they covered their reforming ground units, inflicting 

significant losses in what would be one of the costliest months of 

the war for Allied air units.

Considering the disparity of air units committed to the battle 

by both sides, the outcome was never really in doubt. The Germans 
•••• 54 ••••

remained capable of attaining air superiority anywhere they chose 

on the Western Front, but at this point in the war the St. Mihiel 

salient did not warrant the resources required to defend it. This 

is not to say that Mitchell’s forces did not do commendable work. 

Over four days, American aviation conducted 3,300 flights over 

the battle lines, totaling 4,000 hours in the air, while firing 30,000 

rounds of machine gun ammunition and dropping over 1,000 

individual bombs, delivering seventy-five tons of high explosives. 

In combination with the British and French, Mitchell’s forces shot 

down twelve enemy balloons and over sixty planes. The Americans 

lost fifty-three planes and suffered ninety-five casualties, including 

thirty-six killed in action. Among these was 2d Lt. David E. 

Putnam, who at the time of his death on 12 September was the 

leading American ace with twelve kills. The battle also saw the 

beginning of 2d Lt. Frank Luke Jr.’s short but spectacular career. 

The 21-year-old pilot scored his first career kill on 12 September, 

shooting down a German balloon. Between then and his death 

on 29 September, he would rack up eighteen kills (fourteen of 

them balloons) in ten sorties over eight days of combat. Like their 

2d Lt. Frank Luke Jr. and his Spad XIII fighter plane

(National Archives) •••••••••••••••
•••• 55 ••••

counterparts on the ground, the American airmen were quickly 

learning the realities of combat and gaining the experience 

necessary to mount ever-larger campaigns.

Wrapping Up the Offensive

On the German side of the line, the Army Group C commander, 

General Fuchs, considered the evolving situation. By 1100 on 12 

September, he recognized that his forces faced a major offensive. 

Although the troops at the apex of the salient initially repelled 

the French assaults, the Americans had deeply penetrated the 

southern and western flanks. Fuchs recognized that the situation 

was untenable and sent orders to execute a general retreat to the 

Michel position at once. Buoyed by their apparent success against 

the French, German commanders were reluctant to depart—

unaware that the attacks primarily were intended to hold them in 

place. In lieu of a full withdrawal, they issued orders to pull back 

to an intermediate position still within the salient. Fuchs quickly 

intervened and had them retreat before the two attacking pincers 

could close. He understood that a rapid withdrawal could result in 

heavy losses of men and materiel, but he also recognized that any 

delay in the withdrawal invited an even greater catastrophe for the 

Germans trapped in the salient.

Despite the American breakthroughs, the Germans withdrew in 

good order. The rapid American advances had virtually annihilated 

the 77th Reserve Division and shattered elements of the 10th 

Division and the Austrian 35th Division. Still, the 107th Division

and the 28th Reserve Division managed to hold their positions on the 

Combres Heights along the western side of the salient long enough 

to allow most of the defenders around St. Mihiel to escape before 

the trap shut completely. By the evening of the 12th, the Germans 

were able to mount scattered local counterattacks, supported by 

increasing heavy artillery, indicating a stiffened enemy defense.

Despite the growing resistance, the Americans resumed the 

attack on the 13th, although fatigue, bad weather, soggy ground, 

and enemy defenses sapped much of the men’s strength and slowed 

their momentum. The advance continued steadily through the 

areas that the Germans had abandoned, but slowed as the men 

approached the new German defenses along the Michel Line. 

Patrols sent to reconnoiter the new enemy positions met more 

determined resistance. Soldiers of the 89th Division watched in 

horror as interlocking machine guns and direct-fire artillery cut 
•••• 56 ••••

an advance by the adjacent 2d Division to ribbons. Elements of the 

42d and 89th Divisions also tried to continue their advance, but 

were soon brought to a halt by heavy artillery fire. All along the 

American line, the doughboys dug in and prepared to hold their 

recently won positions.

During the limited fighting that occurred through 14 September, 

American units consolidated their new lines. The previous two days 

of fighting had brought the First Army to the Michel Line. The three 

American corps now held a line roughly forty-two kilometers long, 

extending from Vandières in the I Corps sector through Jaulny, 

Doncourt-aux-Templiers, and Fresnes-en-Woëvre to Haudiomont 

in the V Corps sector. Given his men’s successes over the previous 

two days, General Pershing was sorely tempted to press the attack 

beyond the limited objectives that he and Marshal Foch had agreed 

to during their meeting on 2 September. If he ignored the agreement, 

the American First Army could push on for Metz, threatening the 

Briey Iron Basin and the critical railway net beyond. When he 

put the suggestion to his staff, however, they vigorously opposed 

Entrance to German tunnels built in 1914, leading to the top 

of Montsec from the inside (National Archives)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 57 ••••

continuing the attack. The First Army’s best divisions were 

exhausted and needed relief. Moreover, many of the reserve units 

supporting the St. Mihiel operation were to begin moving north 

for the upcoming Meuse-Argonne Offensive. General Liggett, the 

I Corps commander, likewise expressed his doubts about pressing 

the attack. He believed the defenses around Metz to be far stronger 

than those encountered at St. Mihiel and felt that the First Army, 

despite its recent success, was not yet ready for such an effort. 

In the end, Pershing decided to honor his commitment to Foch 

and by 15 September began withdrawing some of his divisions 

and moving them north. One week later, on 22 September, the 

American First Army assumed control over the Meuse-Argonne 

sector in preparation for Marshal Foch’s offensive.

Analysis

Although sporadic fighting continued until 16 September, the 

First Army attack closed the salient in thirty-six hours and achieved 

several important objectives. One of the offensive’s original goals 

Sign revised by American soldiers (National Archives)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 58 ••••

was to open the Paris-Avricourt rail line for Allied use. Furthermore, 

as Pershing included in his report, the Americans “released the 

inhabitants of many villages from enemy domination.” By driving the 

Germans out of the St. Mihiel salient, the Americans also deprived 

the enemy of a base from which he could harass the American rear 

in the upcoming Meuse-Argonne Offensive. Although unable to push 

their way through the Michel Line, the Americans were now in a 

position to threaten Metz, the Longwy-Briey industrial complex, and 

the crucial railroads passing through that area. More important to 

Pershing and his staff, however, was the proof that the Americans 

could successfully plan and conduct an independent operation of 

this magnitude, even though the 7,000 casualties that the Americans 

suffered reflected the operation’s limited scale in comparison to 

other battles of the Western Front.

Although a senior German leader characterized the battle as 

a “severe defeat of Composite Army C,” from the enemy’s point of 

view it had not been a complete catastrophe. They had lost some 

2,300 men killed or wounded and another 16,000 captured, but 

the bulk of the defending force escaped the converging American 

spearheads and reestablished defensive lines along the base of the 

salient. Still, in making their withdrawal the Germans lost about 

450 artillery pieces and a considerable amount of ammunition and 

supplies. After four long years of war, none of these were losses 

they could easily afford.

On the whole, the implications of the American victory were 

dire for Germany. Four years of war had significantly weakened 

German manpower. Advancing American soldiers at St.  Mihiel 

noted that many of the enemy soldiers they encountered were old 

men or young boys. Prior to the St. Mihiel attack, many Germans 

had regarded the American soldiers as amateurs, a foe they could 

easily repulse. The Americans’ success convinced the Germans 

that the Americans were tough fighters that they could not dismiss 

so readily, especially because they knew that thousands more 

doughboys were arriving in France every day. 

The AEF’s success at St. Mihiel had repercussions at multiple 

levels. As previously noted, the reduction of the salient removed the 

threat of German interference on the flank of the Allied offensive 

to the northwest. More important, considering the threat that the 

Americans now posed to the area surrounding Metz, the Germans 

would need to maintain enough reserve forces in the area to repulse 

any further attack. Consequently, those reserves would not be 

available to prevent Allied forces breaking through the German 
•••• 59 ••••

defenses in the coming months. Yet Pershing’s decision was not 

without consequences; he utilized many of his most experienced 

divisions at St. Mihiel, and they would be sorely missed in the 

opening phases of the upcoming Meuse-Argonne Offensive. In 

truth, when considering the level of planning that went into the 

operation, the units involved, and the Germans’ resigned willingness 

to abandon the salient, the First Army’s performance at St. Mihiel 

may have, as one historian noted, “represented the high point of the 

AEF.” The question remained as to how well the First Army could 

operate on a larger scale against more determined resistance.

During the St. Mihiel Offensive, the U.S. Army learned a number 

of operational and tactical lessons that had a great impact on 

the service’s development. For the first time since the Americans 

entered the trenches, they had superiority in the air. Although 

weather limited the impact, air support was effective and proved its 

utility in helping the ground forces achieve their objectives. Army 

officers also learned valuable lessons for using tanks. At times, 

tanks lagged behind the infantry, and at other times they moved 

German prisoners and captured machine guns (National Archives)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 60 ••••

far in front of it. When out of contact, the only way the tanks and 

infantry could communicate with each other was by runner. When 

tanks found themselves fighting alone against enemy machine 

guns and infantry, they had to withdraw. Infantry and tank corps 

officers had to learn how to better cooperate. Many, but not all, of 

the deficiencies experienced during St. Mihiel would be corrected 

with the additional experience gained during the Meuse-Argonne 

Offensive. Cavalry was a different story. Although the 2d Cavalry 

Regiment enjoyed some success, St. Mihiel provided further proof 

that cavalry had become obsolete on battlefields dominated by 

artillery, rapid-fire weapons, and barbed wire.

The successful advance against the St. Mihiel salient bore a 

larger significance for the legacy of the U.S. Army. The deployment 

of the American First Army into battle was the single largest 

concentration of U.S. military power since the Civil War. It 

demonstrated the enormous military potential of a nation that, 

throughout its history, had neglected its military readiness 

and avoided any semblance of a large standing army. To many 

observers, the American success once again validated the nation’s 

reliance on citizen soldiers in times of national crisis. 

Furthermore, the ability of the American staffs to plan and 

coordinate operations also illustrated a growing professionalism 

among the American officer corps. The service’s 1903 reforms under 

Secretary of War Elihu Root had increased training for officers and 

had established the School of the Line and Staff College at Fort 

Leavenworth, where attendees learned to communicate with a 

common language and grappled with issues related to the control 

of large units in battle. Colonel Drum, the First Army’s chief of staff, 

and Colonel Marshall, its assistant operations officer, exemplified 

the value of the Leavenworth education as they planned the 

St. Mihiel attack and then coordinated the subsequent movement 

northward to participate in another offensive one week later.

Finally, the U.S. Army’s success at St. Mihiel signaled some 

important changes for the Army’s role in the rest of the war. The 

successful attack indicated to the British and French that the 

American army could operate as an independent force, that its staff 

could prepare and execute detailed plans in a competent manner, 

and that American soldiers had sufficient training to contribute 

significantly to the upcoming Allied grand offensive. The doughboys’ 

success also seemed to vindicate General Pershing’s insistence that 

the Americans must operate as an independent army. The AEF had 

taken an important step in achieving President Woodrow Wilson’s 
•••• 61 ••••

goal of securing a seat at the negotiating table once the Germans 

were finally defeated. Although criticisms continued, the AEF’s 

ability to wage war on par with the Allies signified the arrival of 

the U.S. Army as an equal player on the modern battlefield, and the 

United States’ position as a formidable actor on the world stage.

St. Mihiel. Illustration by Maurice Toussant (Library of Congress)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 62 ••••

•••

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Donald A. Carter was born in Albany, New York, and grew 

up in Oneida, New York. He graduated from the United States 

Military Academy in 1977 and served as a Field Artillery Officer 

until 1992. During that time, he received a Ph.D. in history from 

Ohio State University in 1985 and served as a military instructor 

at West Point and at the U.S. Army Field Artillery School at Fort 

Sill, Oklahoma. After leaving the Army, he joined the U.S. Army 

Center of Military History (CMH) as an archivist. In 1995, he left 

CMH to serve with the Gulf War Declassification Project and the 

U.S. Army Declassification Activity. He returned to CMH in 2003 

as a historian. His publications include “Eisenhower Versus the 

Generals,” in the Journal of Military History (October 2007);

“The U.S. Military Response to the 1960–1962 Berlin Crisis” for a 

National Archives pamphlet commemorating the release of Cold 

War records; “War Games in Europe: The U.S. Army Experiments 

with Atomic Doctrine,” in Blueprints for Battle (University Press 

of Kentucky, 2012); Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 

1951–1962 (CMH, 2015); and The City Becomes a Symbol: The 

U.S. Army in the Occupation of Berlin, 1945–1949 (CMH, 2017). 

He is married with two children and lives in Dale City, Virginia.
•••• 63 ••••

•••

FURTHER READINGS

Coffman, Edward M. The War to End All Wars: The American 

Military Experience in World War I. Madison: The University 

of Wisconsin Press, 1986.

Eisenhower, John S. D. Yanks: The Epic Story of the American 

Army in World War I. New York: The Free Press, 2001.

Guitiérrez, Edward A. Doughboys on the Great War: How the 

American Soldiers Viewed Their Military Experience. 

Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2014.

Hallas, James H. Squandered Victory: The American First Army 

at St. Mihiel. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995.

Hudson, James J. Hostile Skies: A Combat History of the 

American Air Service in World War I. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse 

University Press, 1968.

Shay, Michael E. The Yankee Division in the First World War: In 

the Highest Tradition. College Station: Texas A&M University 

Press, 2008.

Woodward, David R. The American Army and the First World 

War. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

For more information on the U.S. Army in World War I, please 

visit the U.S. Army Center of Military History Web site (www.

history.army.mil).
PIN : 203672–000

ST. MIHIEL 1918