IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs July 18, 2018

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. GREGORY EIDSON

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Robertson County

No. 74CC2-2016-CR-275 William R. Goodman, III, Judge

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No. M2017-01808-CCA-R3-CD

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The Defendant, Gregory Eidson, was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence

(“DUI”) and received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the 

Defendant argues that (1) the trial court committed reversible error by failing to appoint a 

court reporter; (2) he and his counsel were improperly excluded from the grand jury 

proceedings; (3) counsel was ineffective at the preliminary hearing; (4) the trial court 

erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made to an officer before being read 

his Miranda warnings; (5) the trial court erred in admitting the results of his blood test; 

(6) the trial court was biased, failed to correct prosecutorial misconduct, and denied the 

Defendant his right to a speedy trial; and (7) the trial court erred in dismissing his petition 

for writ of habeas corpus in a separate case. After a review of the record and applicable 

law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES 

CURWOOD WITT, JR., and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY,JR., JJ., joined.

Gregory Eidson, Wartburg, Tennessee, Pro Se (on appeal); Benjamin K. Dean, 

Springfield, Tennessee (at trial), for the appellant, Gregory Eidson.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Brent C. Cherry, Senior Counsel;

John W. Carney, District Attorney General; and Jason White, Assistant District Attorney 

General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

10/12/2018
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OPINION

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Defendant was indicted for DUI, DUI per se, driving without a seatbelt, and 

driving without insurance. The charges of driving without a seatbelt and driving without 

insurance were dismissed. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was found guilty of both 

DUI and DUI per se, and the trial court merged the counts into one conviction. 

The Defendant did not hire a court reporter but filed a statement of the evidence in 

the trial court. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c). The State objected, and the trial court filed an 

approved statement of the evidence, see Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c), (e), which we summarize 

below. 

Mr. Wesley McWilliams testified that on August 9, 2015, he and his friends were 

driving on Highway 31W when they noticed a car that had crashed into a ditch. They got 

out of their vehicle and approached the Defendant, who exited the driver’s side of the car. 

The Defendant asked Mr. McWilliams to call for a tow truck but requested that he not 

call the police. Mr. McWilliams believed “things did not seem right,” so he called law 

enforcement. He did not observe the Defendant drinking any alcoholic beverages at the 

scene, nor did he observe any alcoholic beverage containers at the scene.

Tennessee State Trooper Jason Flatt testified that he responded to the scene of the 

accident. He spoke first with Mr. McWilliams and his friends and then with the 

Defendant. Trooper Flatt asked what happened, and the Defendant responded that he had 

been driving when his female passenger got angry with him and grabbed the steering 

wheel, causing the car to go into the ditch. Trooper Flatt smelled alcohol on the 

Defendant and noticed “other signs of possible intoxication.” He asked the Defendant to 

perform field sobriety tests and, based on the Defendant’s performance, concluded that 

the Defendant was intoxicated. The Defendant told Trooper Flatt he had consumed a 

twelve-pack of beer that day. Trooper Flatt arrested the Defendant for DUI, and the 

Defendant consented to a blood test. 

Trooper Flatt testified that he did not observe the Defendant drinking alcohol at 

the scene of the wreck, nor did he observe any alcoholic beverage containers at the scene. 

He stated that the Defendant did not tell him that the Defendant had consumed alcohol 

after he wrecked. He acknowledged that he did not see the Defendant driving the car 

prior to the wreck, nor did he know how long the car was in the ditch prior to his arrival.
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Special Agent April Hager, a forensic scientist with the Tennessee Bureau of 

Investigation (“TBI”), testified that the Defendant’s blood collected after the wreck had a 

blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) of 0.171.

The Defendant testified that he worked on the day of the accident and had 

consumed “at most four regular size beers” throughout the day. He explained that he had 

exaggerated when he told Trooper Flatt he had consumed twelve beers. He maintained 

that he was driving the car that evening when his passenger grabbed the steering wheel 

and caused the car to veer into the ditch. He said he was in such a state of shock from the 

wreck that he “grabbed some ‘tall boys’ (beer) and drank them quickly.” He hid the 

empty cans in the woods near the ditch. He believed that drinking these beers after the 

wreck occurred caused his BAC to be above the legal limit. 

The statement of the evidence approved by the trial court stated that portions of a 

video and audio recording from Trooper Flatt’s patrol car were introduced into evidence. 

These portions show Mr. McWilliams and his friends indicating to Trooper Flatt that the 

Defendant was the driver of the car in the ditch. Trooper Flatt approached the Defendant 

and asked him to step out of the ditch and onto the shoulder of the road, and the 

Defendant complied. Trooper Flatt asked the Defendant what happened, and the 

Defendant explained that his passenger “yanked the wheel and jerked it toward the 

ditch.” Trooper Flatt requested the Defendant’s license. After looking at the Defendant’s 

license, Trooper Flatt asked him to sit on the edge of the shoulder of the road while 

Trooper Flatt spoke to the passenger, who was still inside the car. Trooper Flatt returned

to the Defendant, and the Defendant again explained that the passenger “got mad and 

grabbed the wheel.” Trooper Flatt asked the Defendant to “step up here with me for a 

minute” and indicated for the Defendant to stand in front of the patrol car. The 

Defendant complied. Trooper Flatt spoke with Mr. McWilliams and his friends and 

returned to the Defendant. Trooper Flatt asked the Defendant how much alcohol he had 

consumed, and the Defendant responded he had consumed a twelve-pack of beer. 

Trooper Flatt asked how the passenger had become impaired, and the Defendant said he 

did not know. The Defendant consented to performing field sobriety tests.

1

 

The jury convicted the Defendant of both DUI and DUI per se, and the trial court 

merged the counts into one conviction. The Defendant was sentenced to eleven months 

and twenty-nine days, suspended after ten days of incarceration. This sentence was to 

 

1

The statement of the evidence indicated that the jury viewed the portion of the video 

where the Defendant performed the field sobriety tests; however, our review shows that the time 

segments listed as being shown to the jury in the statement of the evidence do not include the 

Defendant’s performance of the tests. 
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run consecutively to his sentences from a prior case. The Defendant filed pro se motions 

for a judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. He also filed a pro se petition for writ of 

habeas corpus regarding his sentences from a separate case. The trial court denied all of 

the Defendant’s motions and dismissed the habeas corpus petition, and the Defendant 

now timely appeals.

ANALYSIS

The Defendant argues that: (1) he is denied effective appellate review by the trial 

court’s failure to appoint a court reporter; (2) he and his counsel were improperly 

excluded from the grand jury proceedings, during which illegal evidence was presented; 

(3) counsel at his preliminary hearing was ineffective due to a conflict of interest; (4) the 

trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made to an officer before 

being advised of his rights; (5) the trial court erred in admitting the results of his blood 

test when the blood sample was destroyed before he could have it independently tested 

and in light of this court’s recent decision in State v. Rosemary L. Decosimo, No. E2017-

00696-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 733218 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 6, 2018), reversed by 

2018 WL 4022338 (Tenn. Aug. 23, 2018); (6) the trial court was biased, allowed 

prosecutorial misconduct, and denied the Defendant the right to a speedy trial; and (7) the 

trial court improperly dismissed his petition for writ of habeas corpus in a separate case.

I. Failure to Appoint a Court Reporter

The Defendant asserts he is denied effective appellate review due to the trial 

court’s failure to have a court reporter present during the trial and post-trial proceedings. 

The State responds that the Defendant failed to show he was indigent prior to trial, or 

alternatively, that any deficiency was remedied by the trial court’s approval of the 

statement of the evidence.

Generally, a defendant tried for a misdemeanor offense is not automatically 

provided with a court reporter at the State’s expense. See T.C.A. §§ 40-14-307(a) 

(providing that a court reporter “shall attend every stage of each criminal case before the 

court”); 40-14-301(3) (defining “criminal case” in pertinent part as “the trial of any 

criminal offense which is punishable by confinement in the state penitentiary”). 

Although the Defendant was tried for misdemeanor offenses, see Tennessee Code 

Annotated sections 55-10-401 and 402(a)(1)(A), the record on appeal shows that the 

Defendant was declared indigent and appointed counsel approximately nine months 

before his trial. The Defendant maintains that because he was indigent, he was entitled to 

a court reporter at trial and during the post-trial proceedings. See State v. Nail, 963 

S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (stating that “a court reporter [is] not provided 

at state expense for a misdemeanor unless a defendant [is] unable to afford one based 
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upon indigency”). He further maintains that the due to the absence of a court reporter, a 

complete verbatim transcript could not be prepared, and the reporter’s absence precludes 

effective appellate review of his claims.

As a matter of equal protection, indigent defendants must be afforded with “the 

basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when such tools are available for a price to 

other defendants.” State v. Gallagher, 738 S.W.2d 624, 625 (Tenn. 1987) (citing Britt v. 

North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971); State v. Elliott, 524 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tenn. 

1975)). The distinction between felony and misdemeanor cases “is not a valid 

constitutional basis for denial of such tools.” Id. (citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 

U.S. 189, 195-96 (1971)). The State must provide an indigent defendant with a “‘record 

of sufficient completeness’ to permit proper consideration of [his] claims.” Draper v. 

Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 499 (1963) (quoting Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 

446 (1962)). “A ‘record of sufficient completeness’ does not translate automatically into 

a complete verbatim transcript.” Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194; see Gallagher, 738 S.W.2d at 

625. Rather, “alternative methods of reporting trial proceedings are permissible if they 

place before the appellate court an equivalent report of the events at trial from which the 

appellant’s contentions arise.” Draper, 372 U.S. at 495; see Gallagher, 738 S.W.2d at 

625.

Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c) provides for the filing of a statement 

of the evidence when a transcript of the evidence is unavailable. In such situations, “the 

appellant shall prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available 

means, including the appellant’s recollection.” Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c). “The statement 

should convey a fair, accurate and complete account of what transpired with respect to 

those issues that are the bases of appeal.” Id. An appellee may object to the statement as 

filed, and any differences regarding the accuracy of the statement shall be settled by the 

trial court. Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c), (e). “Absent extraordinary circumstances, the 

determination of the trial court is conclusive.” Tenn. R. App. P. 24(e). 

The Defendant filed a statement of the evidence, which included a few sentences 

describing some of the trial testimony but primarily consisted of blanket assertions that 

the trial court erred in various respects. The State objected and filed a separate statement. 

The trial court subsequently approved its own statement, which was largely consistent 

with that filed by the State. In light of the trial court’s compliance with the procedure 

mandated by Rule 24, we conclude that the statement of the evidence approved by the 

trial court constitutes “an equivalent report of the events at trial from which the 

appellant’s contentions arise.” Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194. The Defendant had the 

opportunity to provide a summary of the proceedings below but instead filed a document 

containing legal arguments. Accordingly, the Defendant is not entitled to relief regarding 

this issue. 
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II. Grand Jury Proceedings

The Defendant argues that his case was presented to a grand jury without the 

Defendant or his counsel present “to prevent the State from presenting illegal evidence” 

in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth amendments to the United States 

Constitution. The Defendant failed to cite to the record or any authority in his brief to 

support his claim. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b) (“Issues which are not supported by 

argument, citation to authorities, or appropriate references to the record will be treated as 

waived in this court.”). Moreover, the Defendant failed to raise this issue in either his 

initial or amended motion for a new trial. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e) (providing that 

issues not specifically stated in a motion for new trial are waived). Accordingly, this 

issue is waived.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Preliminary Hearing Counsel

The Defendant argues that counsel at his preliminary hearing had a conflict of 

interest, which he asserts constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. However, in his 

brief, the Defendant does not identify any conflicts of interest that he maintains existed, 

and the only reference the Defendant makes to the record is to a court order appointing a 

different attorney, who was neither trial counsel nor the attorney the Defendant maintains 

represented him at the preliminary hearing. No other citation to authority or reference to 

the record is included. Therefore, this issue is waived. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 

10(b). 

IV. Motion to Suppress

The Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress 

statements made to Trooper Flatt because he was in custody when he made the statements 

and had not been advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 

(1966). Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,

section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution, the accused may not be compelled to incriminate 

himself. These protections are “concerned with the inherently coercive atmosphere that 

accompanies interrogation (or its functional equivalent) by the police.” State v. Sanders, 

452 S.W.3d 300, 311 (Tenn. 2014). When a defendant is subjected to custodial 

interrogation, law enforcement must inform the defendant of his constitutional rights, 

including that he has the right to remain silent, that his statement may be used against 

him, that he has the right to the assistance of an attorney, and that he will be appointed an 

attorney if he cannot afford one. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79. The suspect must have 

the opportunity to either assert these rights or to knowingly and intelligently waive them. 

Id. at 479. “‘But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the 

prosecution at trial,’ statements given during custodial interrogation are not admissible in 
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the prosecution’s case-in-chief.” State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 557 (Tenn. 2013) 

(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479). Even statements that are voluntarily made will be 

excluded if they are the result of custodial interrogation without adequate warmings. 

State v. Payne, 149 S.W.3d 20, 32 (Tenn. 2004). “To constitute a ‘custodial 

interrogation,’ (1) the subject must be ‘in custody’; (2) there must be an interrogation; 

and (3) the interrogation must be conducted by a state agent.” State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 

450, 453 (Tenn. 1996) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). “As the Miranda Court 

emphasized, however, these warnings are not required in the absence of custodial 

interrogation.” State v. Northern, 262 S.W.3d 741, 749 (Tenn. 2008).

The Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress his statements made to Trooper 

Flatt. The trial court filed a written order granting the Defendant’s motion with respect to 

his statement that he had consumed twelve beers and denying the motion with respect to 

his statement that he had been drinking alcohol all day. The statement of the evidence, 

inconsistently with the written order, states that the trial court denied the motion, holding 

that the Defendant was not in custody when Trooper Flatt approached the wreck and 

inquired of the Defendant what happened. The statement likewise indicates that the 

evidence regarding the twelve beers was put before the jury while the evidence regarding 

drinking alcohol all day was not. 

The statement of evidence does not describe what testimony or evidence, if any, 

was presented during the hearing on the motion to suppress. Neither does it indicate the 

basis upon which the Defendant’s statement about consuming twelve beers was initially 

suppressed and later admitted at trial. In his proposed statement of the evidence, the 

Defendant never sought to include any testimony taken during the suppression hearing, 

the trial court’s findings regarding suppression, or any explanation regarding the

admission of the evidence that had previously been suppressed. The appellant has the 

duty to prepare a record which conveys “a fair, accurate and complete account of what 

transpired with respect to those issues that are the bases of appeal.” Tenn. R. App. P. 

24(b). In the absence of such a record, we presume that the trial court’s judgments were 

correct. See State v. Richardson, 875 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). Here, 

we are unable to review the trial court’s decisions regarding the suppression of the 

evidence without knowing what evidence was introduced on the issue or the trial court’s 

reasoning regarding suppression. State v. Bobadilla, 181 S.W.3d 641, 643 (Tenn. 2005) 

(“What is in the record sets the boundaries for what the appellate courts may review, and 

thus only evidence contained therein can be considered.”). Accordingly, the Defendant is 

not entitled to relief regarding this issue. See generally State v. Ramey Michelle Long, 

No. W2016-02471-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 3203124, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 

2018) (citing cases for the proposition “that when a person is detained temporarily for a 

traffic stop, even when the stop is to investigate a driver’s intoxication, the person is not 

‘in custody’ for the purposes of Miranda”).
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V. Blood Test

The Defendant argues that he was denied his right to have an independent analysis 

performed on his blood sample because the TBI destroyed it prior to his preliminary 

hearing. He also asserts that the results of his blood test should have been suppressed 

under this court’s opinion in State v. Rosemary L. Decosimo, 2018 WL 733218, at *1.

1. Destruction of Blood Evidence

The Defendant asserts that the TBI’s destruction of his blood test kit prior to his 

preliminary hearing denied him his right to have an independent analysis of the blood test 

performed. The Defendant filed a pro se pretrial motion to suppress the results from his 

blood test, which was denied by the trial court. In his motion, the Defendant merely 

challenged the chain of custody of the blood sample, and he did not mention the 

destruction of the sample. The Defendant contends that Special Agent Hager testified at 

trial regarding the destruction of the blood sample. However, the trial court’s approved 

statement of the evidence does not include such testimony and explicitly notes that the 

Defendant failed to raise this issue in either a pretrial motion or at trial. Consequently, 

this issue is waived on appeal. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be 

construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to 

take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of 

an error.”); Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b); State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349, 357 (Tenn. 2007). 

2. State v. Decosimo

The Defendant argues that the results of his blood test should have been 

suppressed in light of this court’s recent decision in Rosemary L. Decosimo, 2018 WL 

733218, at *1, which held unconstitutional a statute that imposed a fee upon defendants 

convicted of certain drug and alcohol offenses when TBI forensic scientists conducted 

chemical tests to determine blood alcohol or drug content. However, the Tennessee 

Supreme Court has since reversed this court’s holding. See State v. Decosimo, No. 

E2017-00696-SC-R11-CD, __ S.W.3d __, 2018 WL 4022338, at *1 (Tenn. Aug. 23, 

2018). Accordingly, the Defendant is not entitled to relief regarding this issue.

VI. Bias, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and Right to a Speedy Trial

The Defendant argues that the trial court “was biased,” improperly denied his right 

to a speedy trial, and “allowed prosecutorial misconduct to go uncorrected.” Regarding 

the assertion that the trial court was biased, the Defendant provides no citation to 

authority, no reference to the record, and no explanation as to how the trial court was 

biased. The Defendant also fails to identify any occurrence of prosecutorial misconduct 
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in the record. These issues are accordingly waived. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b). 

Moreover, the Defendant has waived his claims of a speedy trial violation due to his 

failure to raise the issue in either his initial or amended motion for a new trial. See Tenn. 

R. App. P. 3(e). 

VII. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

The Defendant argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for writ of 

habeas corpus regarding his prior convictions for aggravated assault and attempted 

second degree murder. In 2012, the Defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault and 

attempted second degree murder in Sumner County. Gregory Eidson v. State, No. 

M2015-01657-CCA-R3-HC, 2016 WL 4252360, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 

2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017). He received consecutive sentences of 

three and eight years, respectively and was ordered to serve his sentences on Community 

Corrections, which was revoked in 2014. Id. 

Following his trial for the DUI in this case, the Defendant filed a pro se petition 

for writ of habeas corpus to the Robertson County Circuit Court. In his petition, the 

Defendant alleged his convictions in Sumner County were void because “the trial court 

did not have jurisdiction to sentence a ‘violent offender charged with a violent criminal 

offense’ to Community Corrections.” The trial court denied the petition for lack of 

jurisdiction. 

Article I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution provides that “the privilege of 

the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or 

invasion, the General Assembly shall declare the public safety requires it.” Habeas 

corpus relief may be sought by “[a]ny person imprisoned or restrained of liberty ... to 

inquire into the cause of such imprisonment and restraint.” T.C.A. § 29-21-101(a). The 

right to relief is available “only when ‘it appears upon the face of the judgment or the 

record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered’ that a convicting court 

was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or that a defendant’s 

sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has expired.” Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 

251, 255 (Tenn. 2007) (quoting Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993)). We 

review the grant or denial of habeas corpus relief de novo with no presumption of 

correctness given to the findings and conclusions of the trial court. Id. at 255. 

While the statutory language “appears broad, in fact, ‘[h]abeas corpus under 

Tennessee law has always been, and remains, a very narrow procedure.’” Edwards v. 

State, 269 S.W.3d 915, 919 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 162). A habeas 

corpus petition is used to challenge void and not merely voidable judgments. Summers, 

212 S.W.3d. at 255-56. “A void judgment is one in which the judgment is facially 
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invalid because the court lacked jurisdiction or authority to render the judgment.” Taylor 

v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999); Dykes v. Compton, 978 S.W.2d 528, 529 

(Tenn. 1998). A petitioner bears the burden of proving a void judgment or illegal 

confinement by a preponderance of the evidence. Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319, 322 

(Tenn. 2000). The habeas corpus court has authority to dismiss a petition when the 

petition shows the petitioner “would not be entitled to any relief.” T.C.A. § 29-21-109. 

If the petition fails to establish that a judgment is void, the habeas corpus court is not 

obligated to hold a hearing on the allegations. Hogan v. Mills, 168 S.W.3d 753, 755 

(Tenn. 2005). 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-105 states that a petition for habeas 

corpus relief “should be made to the court or judge most convenient in point of distance 

to the applicant, unless a sufficient reason be given in the petition for not applying to 

such court or judge.” Because the Defendant was incarcerated in Morgan County, he

should have filed his petition in Morgan County, rather than in the Robertson County 

Circuit Court. 

Moreover, the Defendant failed to comply with the formal requirements in his 

petition for writ of habeas corpus because he failed to attach his prior habeas corpus 

petitions to his current petition seeking relief. See Gregory Eidson, 2016 WL 4252360, 

at *1-2 (noting that the Defendant filed a petition on May 28, 2014, which was dismissed, 

and another petition on July 2, 2015). A petition must state “[t]hat it is first application 

for the writ, or, if a previous application has been made, a copy of the petition and 

proceedings thereon shall be produced, or satisfactory reasons be given for the failure so 

to do.” T.C.A. § 29-21-107(b)(4). A petition for relief may be denied by a habeas corpus 

court where a petitioner fails to comply with the statutory procedural requirements. 

Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 260; see Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 21 (Tenn. 2004) 

(providing that the procedural requirements are mandatory and must be scrupulously 

followed); Gary E. Aldridge v. State, No. M2005-01861-CCA-R3-HC, 2006 WL

1132073, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2006) (noting that the failure to follow the 

mandatory requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107(b)(4) justifies 

dismissal of habeas corpus petition). Accordingly, the Defendant is not entitled to relief.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

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JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, PRESIDING JUDGE