3611-13

Approved for Public Release 

13-MDA-7397 (8 August 13)
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

D EPA RT M E NT OF D EFE N SE

*

**

Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO)

1984 – 1994

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO)

1994 – 2002

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY

DEPART M ENT OF DEFENSE

Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 

Established January 2, 2002

BA

LLISTIC MISSILE DEFEN

SE

D E P A R T M E N T O F D E F E N S E
1

Preface

The mission of the Missile Defense Agency History Office is to document the 

official history of America’s missile defense programs and to provide historical support 

to the MDA Director and staff.

This pamphlet, one in a series intended to quickly acquaint interested readers 

with the history of America’s missile defense programs, provides an overview of the 

first seventy years of active missile defense. It describes the many ambitious, and 

often controversial, anti-ballistic missile (ABM) development programs and how they 

contributed to today’s Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). These developments can 

be divided into two eras, the first that featured nuclear-armed missiles and the second, 

the era of the hit-to-kill, nonnuclear type of interceptor that is currently deployed.

Dr. John R. Dabrowski, MDA Historian, welcomes constructive comments and 

suggestions from readers regarding the content of this booklet.

E-mail: john.dabrowski@mda.mil

Telephone: 256-450-5488 

Dawn of the Missile Age–1944

During World War II, United States Army staff planners recognized the need for a 

defense system against a weapon like 

the German A-4 (Aggregate-4), later 

called the V-2 (Vergeltungswaffe Zwei

or Revenge Weapon-2), the world’s 

first ballistic missile, and that available 

conventional weapons were not 

capable of combating this threat. The 

Germans fired their first operational 

V-2, with a range of about 200 miles, 

against Great Britain on September 8, 

1944. It was not a decisive weapon. It 

was inaccurate and carried a limited 

payload; however, by the end of the 

war more than 1,000 had fallen on 

Great Britain. They also hit targets in Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 

There was no defense against them, other than bombing or occupying their launch sites.

The Germans attempted to improve the V-2 through 

redesign and innovation. They produced a 466-mile 

extended-range, modified-winged version, the A-4B, which 

was intended to glide to its target after the engine’s power 

cutoff. Although the A-4B reached the flight test stage in 

January 1945, it never became operational.

A larger version of the V-2 called the A-9 also was 

conceived, but never built. It was expected to have a 

375-mile range and also would glide to its target. One 

version of the missile included a pressurized cabin for a 

pilot who would have dropped the warhead on its target and returned to base using 

a retractable landing gear. 

In 1944, the Germans developed plans to attack targets in the United States with 

V-2s. One plan, Project Laffarenz, conceived of employing Germany’s latest Type XXI 

snorkel-equipped U-Boats to tow three V-2s, each in special displacement containers, 

across the Atlantic within striking range of the American coast. The containers, equipped 

with special ballast cells, would be trimmed to neutral buoyancy and towed to the 

launch location by the submarines. The cells would be flooded to elevate the container 

A-4B A-9

V-2 Ballis tic Missi le
2 3

into a vertical or angular position and held 

there by special stabilizers. The U-boat 

would then pump fuel into the V-2 and fire 

the missile. By late 1944, at least one of the 

containers was reportedly completed at the 

Baltic port of Elbing, but it was never tested 

with a live firing. 

When the war in Europe ended, 

Germany’s most ambitious plan to surpass 

the V-2 involved an intercontinental-range missile still on the drawing board. It was 

a two-stage 3,350-mile range missile called the A-9/A-10. The first stage A-10 booster 

would have separated at about a 110-mile altitude and been recovered with the aid 

of special parachutes. The second stage A-9 would then have continued under its 

own power to an altitude of about 215 miles before descending to 28 miles, where 

the density of the air would have permitted its wing controls to guide it on its final 

glide path to the target. The Germans also considered using a manned A-9 version, in 

which a pilot would have steered the missile on its final glide path, then ejected and 

parachuted to safety as the missile slowed down and neared its target.

Some Germans believed that had the war 

lasted another six months, they would have 

been able to produce the A-9/A-10 and strike 

targets in the United States, such as New York 

City. Some also believed that if the war had lasted 

another two years, they could have developed a 

15,000-mile range intercontinental ballistic missile 

(ICBM). The implications for the future were clear. 

While longer-range ballistic missiles might not 

be decisive weapons, they would pose a serious 

military and terror threat.

First Missile Defense “Architecture”–1945

On May 14, 1945, a week after the war in Europe ended, U.S. Army Brigadier General 

William A. Borden, Director of the Army Staff’s New Developments Division, assigned 

a team of officers to study Allied efforts at countering the V-2. They went to Europe to 

investigate any techniques to detect, track, and destroy V-2 missiles, particularly the 

use of predicted or barrage antiaircraft artillery fire against V-2s. They found the British

Type XXI U-Boat

Project Laffarenz (1944)

A-9 A-10

had devised several operational 

concepts for defending London against 

V-2 attacks, using radars to detect V-2 

launches, applying updated data to 

grid coordinates to plot and determine 

the missiles’ trajectories, and then, at 

the proper moment using a massive 

antiaircraft artillery barrage to destroy a 

small percentage of the incoming V-2s. 

General Sir Frederick Pile, chief of Britain’s Anti-Aircraft 

Command, estimated it would have taken about 12,000 

antiaircraft rounds to destroy one V-2 with existing 

means. He believed his defense initially could have 

destroyed between three and ten percent of attacking 

V-2s, and would have improved capability over time. 

However, the Allies overran the V-2 launch sites before 

he could try out his defense system, and his superiors 

were reluctant to let him test it unless it offered a better 

success rate.

General Pile’s plan had significant practical limitations, 

including an incredibly short reaction time and an 

enormous expenditure of antiaircraft artillery, but it marked a significant starting point 

in coming to grips with the tremendous challenges of missile defense. It is especially 

noteworthy that his command developed a workable missile defense concept in the 

middle of a war using available weapons and equipment. In retrospect, his vision to 

seek an initial missile defense capability, and build upon it in the face of seemingly 

impossible odds, represented an innovative if controversial approach to missile defense.

Origins of the U.S. Missile Defense Program–1945

A U.S. Army Ground Forces Equipment Review Board, headed by Major General Gilbert 

R. Cook, first recognized the need to develop a means of defending against ballistic 

missiles with more advanced weaponry than conventional antiaircraft artillery. On June 

20, 1945, the Cook Board submitted its report on equipment for the postwar Army 

that recommended: “High velocity guided missiles, preferably capable of intercepting 

and destroying aircraft flying at speeds up to 1,000 miles per hour at altitudes up to 

60,000 feet or destroying missiles of the V-2 type, should be developed at earliest 

Pile

Britis h Missi le Defe nse Concep t
4 5

practicable date.” When General Borden’s team of 

officers submitted their report on July 4, 1945, they 

recommended a development program to defend 

against “V-2 type missiles” and suggested exploring 

all possible countermeasures for missile defense, 

“particularly the use of guided counter-missiles.” Yet, 

neither the Cook Board nor Borden’s team of officers 

could have anticipated that the atomic bombing of 

Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, would dramatically alter 

the calculus for missile defense as the possibilities of an 

atomic-armed ballistic missile quickly became apparent.

General of the Army Henry H. Arnold, Commanding 

General, U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF), was in a pivotal 

position to influence a decision on missile defense as his 

service developed and produced surface-to-air guided 

missiles for the Army. Although the technical challenges 

and costs of missile defense were clearly formidable, 

he championed the cause of seeking a missile defense 

capability in his comprehensive November 1945 report 

on airpower and the future, which noted: “Although 

there now appear to be insurmountable difficulties in an 

active defense against future atomic projectiles similar to 

the German V-2 but armed with atomic explosives, this 

condition should only intensify our efforts to discover 

an effective means of defense.”

The following month, an Army Air Forces Scientific 

Advisory Group study called “Toward New Horizons,” 

reflected General Arnold’s vision for a future Air Force 

and endorsed seeking an active missile defense solution. 

The multipart study suggested the possibility of using 

atomic-armed missile interceptors, and kinetic energy, 

or hit-to-kill missile interceptors, among several missile 

defense possibilities.

A January 1946 War Department Equipment Board 

report concurred with the earlier findings on missile 

defense. Headed by U.S. Army General Joseph W. Stilwell, 

Arnold

Hiros hima

the Stilwell Board recognized that “intercontinental missiles capable of carrying atomic 

explosive over a range in excess of 3,000 miles, are probable within the predictable 

future,” and recommended developing an antiaircraft missile that could intercept and 

destroy both high-performance aircraft and V-2 type ballistic missiles. The next step 

was to begin developing such a missile.

Projects Wizard and Thumper–1946

In March 1946, the USAAF initiated two 

study programs, Projects Wizard (MX-794) 

and Thumper (MX-795), to undertake a basic 

design for an antiballistic missile (ABM). The 

ABM was to operate at altitudes up to 500,000 

feet against V-2 type missiles traveling 

between 4,000 and 5,000 miles per hour. 

Later, both programs broadened to include 

all supersonic targets flying above 60,000 

feet. Initially, Wizard and Thumper planners 

envisioned designs for two-stage, liquid-fuel 

interceptors armed with conventional blast 

fragmentation warheads. Thumper had the distinction of using the World War II German 

Wasserfall antiaircraft guided missile as the basis for its design with the possibility of 

later adopting an atomic warhead. These ambitious programs were significant for 

being the first efforts focused on seeking an active missile defense solution.

In 1947, the USAAF, which became the U.S. Air Force that year, reviewed Projects 

Wizard and Thumper, and recognized the complex technical challenges of developing an 

ABM system; a task they assessed would take at least five to ten years. They determined: 

“If these missile programs as such are supported to the maximum intelligent extent, 

the financial drain on the AAF program would be such as to seriously compromise 

the development of all other types of missiles.” As a result, the Air Force subsequently 

combined its two ABM programs, closing Thumper in 1949, and consolidating its 

findings in the Wizard program, which continued on a long-term study basis.

Theater Missile Defense Gets Under Way–1949

While the Air Force worked on its interceptor concept, the Army established a 

formal requirement for a theater ABM system in 1949. This requirement led to Project 

Stilwell Plato in the early 1950s, the Army’s first effort to develop such a system. Ever-changing

Proje ct Wizard Proje ct Thumpe r
6 7

requirements eventually led to Plato’s 

replacement by a succession of systems that 

included the Field Army Ballistic Missile Defense 

System (FABMDS), the Army Air Defense System 

for the 1970s (AADS-70s), which became the 

Surface-to-Air-Missile—Development (SAM-D). 

SAM-D was ultimately renamed Phased Array 

Tracking Radar Intercept On Target (PATRIOT) in 

honor of the 1976 U.S. Bicentennial celebration. 

These systems provided the building blocks for 

developing a reliable theater ballistic missile 

defense (BMD) system in more advanced versions 

of the PATRIOT.

The Army’s Strategic Missile 

Defense Mission – 1958

As the Cold War unfolded after World War 

II, America determined that it faced a hostile 

and expansionist Soviet Union. The growing threat of Soviet long-range missiles in 

the 1950s posed an unprecedented challenge to defending America against attack. In 

1955, intelligence reports of an impending Soviet ICBM threat spurred the Department 

of Defense to launch a major ballistic missile development program to match the 

Soviets. Several redundant, high-priority offensive missile programs were mounted 

by the Army, Navy, and Air Force, which blurred distinctions among the services’ roles 

and missions. It was in this environment that the Army sought to compete with the Air 

Force’s Project Wizard for a role in strategic missile defense.

The Army had been developing several air 

defense missiles since the end of World War II and 

used this experience to initiate development in 

February 1957 of the nuclear-capable Nike Zeus 

ABM interceptor. Nike Zeus was intended to be part 

of an integrated defense system, which included 

advanced radars for acquisition and tracking and 

battle management communications equipment 

that would protect U.S. cities. From the outset, the 

Nike Zeus program’s shortcomings and potential 

high costs made it a focal point of criticism and

Patrio t

debate, notably from the Air Force and 

the scientific community. In the midst of 

this growing controversy, the Soviet Union 

announced a successful test flight of an 

SS-16 ICBM in August 1957; and on October 

4, 1957, the Soviets launched Sputnik, the 

world’s first artificial satellite. These catalytic 

events heightened concerns about American 

vulnerabilities to a Soviet ICBM attack and 

created a political environment more 

supportive of developing and fielding an 

ABM system.

By early 1958, the Army and Air Force rivalry over dominance of the strategic 

missile defense program led Defense Secretary Neil H. McElroy to settle the dispute. On 

January 16, 1958, he assigned the active strategic defense mission to the Army. Later that 

month, a National Security Council position paper on continental defense, NSC 5802, 

called for “an anti-ICBM weapons system as a matter of the highest national priority.”

Project Defender – 1958

Secretary McElroy also established the Advanced 

Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in early 1958 to identify 

new means for advancing defense capabilities. In missile 

defense, ARPA’s Project Defender, took an unconventional, 

far-sighted approach to the perplexing problems anticipated 

from a mature Soviet ICBM threat in the 1970s. As one ARPA 

official put it, researchers were encouraged “to forget about 

present engineering limitations and let their scientific 

imaginations roam 

wide and high.” 

Project Defender 

looked beyond 

the capabilities of Nike Zeus and examined 

all phases of BMD, including the use of spacebased, hit-to-kill interceptors to destroy 

attacking missiles during their boost phase. 

Collectively, these interceptor concepts were 

known as BAMBI, for Ballistic Missile Boost 

Intercept. Despite its unconventional and

Nike Zeus (a-mode l)

Nike Zeus (b-mode l)

McElroy

BALLISTIC MISSILE BOOST INTERCEPT 

(BAMBI) Satellite

Interceptor

Trajectory

ICBM

Trajectory

Intercept Prior 

to ICBM 

Burnout

BAMBI
8 9

exotic approaches to missile defense, however, Project Defender’s recommendations 

had to be technically feasible and economically practical in meeting threats that might 

evolve far in the future.

The Nike-X ABM System – 1963

The October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis brought the United States and Soviet Union 

close to the brink of nuclear war when the Soviets, lacking an effective ICBM capability, 

placed medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba to threaten the 

continental United States. The crisis inadvertently provided an impetus to the Soviets, 

who were forced to back down and withdraw the missiles, to aggressively improve 

their ICBM program.

Although Nike Zeus tests in 1962 

demonstrated the system’s ability to 

intercept enemy warheads, by early 

1963, its technical and operational 

shortcomings scuttled it as a viable 

ABM system. Notable among these 

was the inability of the mechanically 

steered Nike Zeus acquisition radars 

to cope with the type of massive Soviet 

attack envisioned for the 1960s, and the 

inability of the system to adequately 

discriminate between warheads and decoys. Consequently, in January 1963, the 

Defense Department reoriented its ABM efforts in an improved and more robust 

system called Nike-X. 

Initially, the key components 

of the Nike-X ABM system included 

a new family of advanced phasedarray radars that could detect and 

track a large number of objects 

simultaneously; a new nucleararmed, high-acceleration, terminal 

defense missile called the Sprint, 

which made possible the use of 

atmospheric filtering to discriminate 

between decoys and warheads; and the longer-range Nike Zeus interceptor, which 

was subsequently modified and renamed Spartan, for high altitude targets. Together, 

the two interceptors promised a potential layered defense for intercepting enemy 

warheads within and above the atmosphere.

The decision to develop Nike-X coincided 

with intelligence reports that the Soviets were 

developing an ABM capability that could be 

operational by 1966. President Lyndon B. 

Johnson and Defense Secretary Robert S. 

McNamara believed the best way to counter 

the deployment of a Soviet ABM system was 

through an arms control agreement or by 

overcoming it with offensive weapons. They 

resisted calls from members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and members of Congress to 

match the Soviets and deploy the Nike-X ABM system, which they believed would 

have fueled a new and expensive arms race, until a different potential ballistic missile 

threat emerged.

Following the detonation in October 1964 of Communist China’s first atomic 

explosive, the debate over a Nike-X ABM system deployment began shifting in favor of a 

limited, or thin, ABM deployment to counter China instead of a heavy ABM deployment 

to counter the Soviets.

Sentinel, SABMIS and ABMIS–1967

In 1967, Secretary McNamara 

settled the debate over deploying the 

Nike-X ABM system. The failure of the 

Johnson Administration to reach an 

arms control agreement with the Soviets 

in June 1967, and China’s detonation of 

its first hydrogen bomb that month, 

influenced Secretary McNamara to 

announce the deployment of a thin 

anti-Chinese ABM system based on the 

Nike-X system in September 1967. In 

November, he subsequently announced that the new ABM system would be renamed 

Sentinel.

In 1967, the Navy and Air Force also developed ABM system concepts. The Navy 

examined a midcourse ABM system concept called the Sea-Based Anti-Ballistic Missile 

Sprint Zeus / Spa rtan

Johnso n & McNama ra

SENTINEL Dep loyme nt
10 11

Intercept System (SABMIS), which envisioned employing radars and interceptors 

mounted on surface vessels and interceptors on submarines. These vessels would 

have been deployed in the Northwestern Pacific and the North Atlantic to protect 

the continental United States from Soviet or Chinese attack, as well as helping defend 

America’s allies from off-shore positions

The Air Force had a similar concept called the Airborne Ballistic Missile Intercept 

System (ABMIS), which would have been used against low-trajectory attacks from 

submarine-launched ballistic missiles. ABMIS envisioned radars and interceptors 

mounted on specially equipped aircraft, such as the C-5A, on around-the-clock patrols 

adjacent to major cities overseas.

Sentinel Controversy–1968

In June 1968, the Johnson Administration and its Senate supporters began shifting 

the justification for the Sentinel ABM system away from its “thin” urban defense 

against Chinese missiles and expanded its orientation towards defense of land-based 

ICBMs and a “thick” ABM system to save American lives against a large-scale Soviet 

attack. The shift coincided with a Soviet agreement to begin long-sought arms control 

negotiations and reflected the political viability of the Sentinel system as a potential 

arms control “bargaining chip” with the Soviets. This shift in rationale, however, fueled 

debate, criticism and confusion over the intended purpose of the Sentinel system, 

which became a topic of increasing controversy.

President Nixon Reorients Missile Defense–1969

In 1969, President 

R ichard M . Ni xon, 

responding partly to 

the public backlash over 

locating nuclear-armed 

missiles near urban areas, 

reoriented the Sentinel 

ABM s ys tem away 

from urban defense to 

protecting the nation’s 

strategic deterrent silo-based Minuteman ICBMs against a Soviet attack. Emphasizing 

this reorientation, President Nixon renamed the system Safeguard. Although controversy 

continued over deploying the ABM system, Safeguard became an important “bargaining

chip” during recently initiated arms control negotiations with the Soviets, the Strategic 

Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Initially, there were to have been up to twelve Safeguard 

sites deployed in phases depending upon how well talks with the Soviets proceeded.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty–1972

In May 1972, arms control talks with the 

Soviets produced the Anti-Ballistic Missile 

(ABM) Treaty, which restricted the deployment 

of any strategic space-based, sea-based, or 

mobile ABM systems, such as SABMIS and 

ABMIS. The treaty allowed each side only 

two fixed missile defense sites: one to defend 

national command authorities, and one to 

defend a missile field, with no more than 

100 total interceptors for both sites. A 1974 

protocol subsequently reduced the number of 

sites to one, still allowing each to have up to 100 interceptors. Since the United States 

was already deploying Safeguard to protect an ICBM field at Grand Forks Air Force 

Base in North Dakota, this was the only U.S. ABM site allowed until June 2002, when 

the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty. 

Safeguard’s Deployment–1975-1976

Having served its purpose as a political 

bargaining chip, the Safeguard site at Grand 

Forks was only operational from October 

1975 to February 1976. The site was closed 

at the direction of Congress because it 

could be easily overwhelmed by a Soviet 

attack, and because it had a major technical 

problem: the detonation of its nucleararmed warheads would blind its own radars.

The Homing Overlay Experiment–1983-1984

By the late 1970s, the continued growth in the quantity and quality of Soviet ICBMs, 

which included impressive accuracy improvements in the SS-18 missile, threatened 

the survivability of U.S. land-based ICBMs. At the same time, the United States was

Nixon

ABM Trea ty (1972)

Safegua rd Grand Forks
12 13

unable to find a politically acceptable, secure 

basing mode for its next generation ICBM, 

the MX. These circumstances prompted U.S. 

strategic planners to revisit the possibilities of 

deploying a missile defense system for its landbased ICBM force with nonnuclear interceptors.

The Army had been working on developing 

a nonnuclear hit-to-kill interceptor prior to 

the deployment of Safeguard. It held a series 

of tests in 1983 and 1984 called the Homing 

Overlay Experiment (HOE) to demonstrate this 

capability. On June 10, 1984, in the last of four 

tests, a HOE vehicle successfully intercepted a 

dummy warhead outside the atmosphere in 

the first successful demonstration of hit-to-kill 

technology in space.

Directed Energy and Missile Defense–1980

While the Army continued its BMD research and development, ARPA’s successor, 

the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), formed the Directed Energy 

Office in 1980 to exploit newly emerging laser and particle beam technologies for 

applications that included BMD. The office initiated the space defense TRIAD program, 

composed of three separate research projects, with an objective of determining 

the feasibility by 1988 of developing a space-based laser battle station that could 

target Soviet ICBM launch sites. DARPA also envisioned possible ground-based and 

space-based particle beam weapons for terminal defense and boost or midcourse 

defense, respectively.

President Reagan Launches the Strategic Defense Initiative–1983

President Ronald W. Reagan desired a strategic 

alternative to the national security policy of nuclear 

deterrence and mutual assured destruction that left 

America defenseless against Soviet missile attacks. At 

the same time, U.S. land-based ICBMs were growing 

more vulnerable to a Soviet first strike, and the 

United States was unable to satisfactorily field the 

MX (renamed “Peacekeeper”) missile. These factors 

SS-18 MX

influenced the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 1983 to unanimously recommend that 

the president begin pursuing a national security strategy with an increased emphasis on 

strategic defenses. In concert with the Joint Chief’s recommendation, several prominent 

missile defense advocates had been persuading the president to embrace strategic 

defense; these included physicist Edward Teller, known as the “Father of the Hydrogen 

Bomb,” and retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, who headed High 

Frontier, a citizen’s organization dedicated to leading the U.S. toward a secure future 

in space. Consequently, on March 23, 1983, President Reagan announced his decision 

in a nationally televised speech to launch a major new program, the Strategic Defense 

Initiative (SDI), to determine whether or not missile defenses were technically feasible.

An unexpected consequence of President Reagan’s SDI speech occurred the following 

day when the Washington Post quoted a critical comment from Senator Edward M. 

Kennedy of Massachusetts, who labeled the speech as “reckless Star Wars schemes.” 

The term “Star Wars” derived from the science fiction film of the same name and 

had been used previously in references to various exotic Pentagon space weaponry 

projects. Senator Kennedy’s remark, however, gave the term new meaning and SDI 

became widely identified thereafter as “Star Wars.”

The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization–1984

In April 1984, following a year of studies, the 

Defense Department chartered the Strategic Defense 

Initiative Organization (SDIO). Headed by U.S. Air Force 

Lieutenant General James A. Abrahamson, SDIO managed 

a consolidated and expanded missile defense program 

that was created largely by combining existing projects 

under way in several government agencies. Ultimately, 

SDIO’s programs, which included plans for space-based 

missile defenses, would have required altering or possibly 

withdrawing from the ABM Treaty.

The Strategic Defense System Phase I Architecture–1987

 By the autumn of 1987, SDIO had developed a national missile defense 

concept called the Strategic Defense System (SDS) Phase I Architecture, composed of 

a space-based interceptor; a ground-based interceptor; a ground-based sensor; two 

space-based sensors; and a battle management system. Using hit-to-kill interceptors, 

the architecture’s goal was to destroy a given percentage of warheads in a massive 

Soviet missile attack against the United States, while improvements in its later phases

Homing Ove rlay Intercep tor

Reagan

Abrahamso n
14 15

would increase the system’s operational effectiveness. 

From the outset, however, the architecture fueled 

controversy since its adoption would require 

withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, and because its 

space-based component had two major shortcomings: 

its expense, and vulnerability to Soviet antisatellite 

weapons.

Brilliant Pebbles–1990

In 1990, a new hit-to-kill interceptor 

concept called Brilliant Pebbles offered 

potential solutions to the space-based 

interceptor’s cost and survivability issues. 

Brilliant Pebbles was based on many small, 

autonomous, space-based interceptors and 

replaced the original space-based interceptor 

concept in the SDS Phase I architecture.

Global Protection Against Limited Strikes–1991

The improvement of SDIO’s Phase I architecture with 

Brilliant Pebbles coincided with a shift in strategic planning. 

Following the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 

1989, which signaled the ending of the Cold War, President 

George H.W. Bush ordered a review of the SDI program. 

The review, completed in March 1990, recommended 

reorienting the program to develop strategic defenses 

against limited attacks on the United States and theater 

defense against attacks by short-range ballistic missiles 

on overseas forces.

The president formally announced this new system, Global Protection Against 

Limited Strikes (GPALS), in his January 1991 State of the Union Address. Its principal goal 

was to defend America against limited missile attacks and protect deployed United 

States forces and America’s friends and allies against shorter-range ballistic missiles. 

GPALS was an integrated architecture with three components: a global, space-based 

system of Brilliant Pebbles interceptors; a force of ground- and sea-based theater missile 

defenses; and a limited, ground-based national missile defense element.

President Clinton Reorients Missile Defense–1993

The trend toward greater emphasis on Theater Missile 

Defense (TMD) in this new architecture continued into the 

presidency of William J. Clinton, who emphasized compliance 

with the ABM Treaty. The Clinton Administration broke up the 

GPALS architecture into separate components, cancelled the 

Brilliant Pebbles program, and changed the name of SDIO to 

the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) in May 1993 

as a reflection of the program’s reorientation. The name change 

became official in June 1994.

The Theater Missile Defense portion of BMDO encompassed 

several Army, Navy, and Air Force programs. These included improvements in the 

Army’s PATRIOT missile, known as PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3, or PAC-3; and 

a new Army missile initially known as the Theater High Altitude Area Defense, or 

THAAD. Also included were the Air Force’s Airborne Laser project; and the lower-tier 

Navy Area Defense and upper-tier Navy Theater Wide programs, both of which were 

based upon significant modifications to the shipborne Aegis air defense system and 

Standard Missile (SM) interceptor.

 

By 1996, new intelligence estimates of ballistic missile threats to America, and 

a Republican-controlled Congress, gave a new impetus to strategic missile defense, 

now called National Missile Defense (NMD). By the end of President Clinton’s second 

term, NMD overshadowed Theater Missile Defense as Congress pressed the president 

to deploy an NMD system with implications for altering the ABM Treaty. Consequently, 

in July 1999, President Clinton signed the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, which 

made it “the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible 

an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the 

United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized 

or deliberate).” The president had four criteria for making a deployment decision: the 

NMD system had to be operationally effective, cost-effective, enhance U.S. security, 

Strategic Defense System Phase 1

Architecture

Brillia nt Pebb les

G.H.W. Bus h

Clinton

THAAD PAC-3 AEGIS AIRBORN E LASER
16 17

and be in accordance with achieving arms control objectives, which included amending 

the ABM Treaty to accommodate a possible NMD deployment. On September 1, 2000, 

however, he announced that he would defer a deployment decision to his successor 

following a series of missile defense test failures, delays in some program elements, 

and a new wave of controversy over deploying an NMD system that included debate 

on altering the ABM Treaty.

President Bush Reorients Missile Defense–2001

Upon taking office in 2001, President George W. 

Bush brought to his presidency a strong commitment 

to deploying missile defense in the shortest possible 

time. On December 13, 2001, he gave Russia the 

six-month notice of U.S. intent to withdraw from the 

ABM Treaty, which became effective on June 13, 2002. 

Subsequently, on December 17, 2002, he issued a 

statement announcing the national policy on ballistic 

missile defense that required the Secretary of Defense 

to “proceed with fielding an initial set of missile defense 

capabilities” in 2004.

Under President Bush’s leadership, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and 

BMDO Director, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, reoriented the 

missile defense program with a concept for an integrated, layered defense that 

would be capable of attacking warheads 

and missiles in all phases of their flight—

boost, midcourse, and terminal—and 

was expected to eventually provide 

global defenses against missiles of all 

ranges. As a reflection of these changes 

Secretary Rumsfeld issued a January 2, 

2002 memorandum changing the name 

of BMDO to the Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA).

By the end of 2004, sixty years after the first V-2 missiles struck Great Britain, MDA, 

under the leadership of its new director, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Henry A. 

“Trey” Obering, III, began limited defensive operations of its Ballistic Missile Defense 

System (BMDS) after deploying five long-range Ground-based Midcourse Defense 

(GMD) interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska. Together 

with the PAC-3 interceptor for short-range BMD, and 

the Aegis SM-3 for medium-range BMD, for protecting 

deployed United States forces, friends and allies, the 

GMD interceptors enabled midcourse engagement of 

intermediate- and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, 

and a limited defense of the United States against nearterm ballistic missile threats as the BMDS continued 

development. 

Missile Defense Under the Obama Administration

One of the first efforts of the new Barack Obama 

Administration in 2009 was to hold a first-ever Ballistic 

Missile Defense Review. Early into his first term, 

President Obama cancelled former President George 

W. Bush’s plans to station a radar facility in the Czech 

Republic and 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland. 

Instead, he planned to deploy smaller SM-3 interceptors 

by 2011, first aboard ships and later in Europe, possibly 

even in Poland and the Czech Republic.

European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)

On September 17, 2009, President Obama announced that the U.S. would pursue 

a “Phased Adaptive Approach” to missile defense in Europe. The new approach 

centered on the Aegis missile defense system and was to be deployed in four main 

phases from 2011 to 2020. This system, initially sea-based, was to be also based on 

land as “Aegis-Ashore” in later phases. The Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor 

technology was also to be upgraded gradually, and the system was to be integrated 

with an evolving network of land and space-based sensors.

The EPAA was designed to deal with the threat posed by Iranian short-and 

intermediate-range ballistic missiles to U.S. assets, personnel and allies in Europe. 

This new direction for European missile defense broke with the plans pursued by the 

Bush Administration. The Bush plans had called for deployment of a ground-based 

missile defense system in Europe, similar to the system deployed in California and 

G.W. Bus h

Rumsfeld Kadish

Obering

Barack Obama
18 19

Alaska. This included bilateral agreements to station ground-based interceptors in 

Poland and a radar installation in the Czech Republic.

At the NATO Lisbon Summit in 2010, President Obama and his fellow NATO heads 

of state and government approved a new strategic concept which took the historic 

step of committing to the defense of European NATO populations and territory against 

the growing threat of ballistic missiles.

Probably the highlight of U.S. Army Lieutenant 

General Patrick J. O’Reilly’s tenure as the Director of the 

Missile Defense Agency, (2008-2012) was the conduct 

of Flight Test Interceptor-01 (FTI-01) at the U.S. Army 

Kwajalein Atoll (USAKA/Reagan Test Site) in October 

2012. Testifying before a Senate Appropriations 

Committee on April 18, 2012, General O’Reilly told the 

committee that MDA “will conduct the largest missile 

defense test in history involving the first simultaneous 

intercept of multiple short and medium-range ballistic 

missiles and cruise missiles by PATRIOT Advanced 

Capability-3, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 

(THAAD), and Aegis BMD systems, integrated with a forward-based radar.”

General O’Reilly’s testimony became a reality when FTI-01 commenced at Kwajalein 

on October 25, 2012. It was held to demonstrate regional Ballistic Missile Defense 

System (BMDS) ability to defend a raid of up to five near-simultaneous threats in 

an operationally relevant scenario. FTI-01 was a combined Developmental Test/

Operational Test of BMDS regional/theater, integrated operations. The exercise was 

an unprecedented integrated, systemlevel, live-fire event that was conducted 

at Kwajalein. It demonstrated 

interoperability among three currently 

fielded weapons platforms: Aegis 

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), THAAD, 

the AN/TPY-2 Terminal Mode, and the 

PATRIOT. Representative threats for 

the exercise included three ballistic 

missiles and two air-breathing (cruise 

missile) targets. Targets were flown at 

multiple ranges and trajectories in an 

operationally realistic scenario. The engagement scenario was as follows: FTI-01 

began with the launch of a medium-range ballistic missile, E-LRALT (Extended Long 

Range Launched Target). A USAF C-17 airdropped the E-LRALT over the ocean north 

of Wake Island. The BMDS radars, including the AN/TPY-2 detected and tracked the 

E-LRALT providing information to C2BMC. An MQM-107 (cruise missile) launched from 

Roi-Namur Island (Marshall Islands) on an attack run towards Meck Island (Marshall 

Islands). A BQM-74E (cruise missile) dropped from a Gulfstream aircraft and initiated 

an attack run towards an Aegis destroyer, the USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) Following the 

BQM-74E launch, an Aegis Readiness Assessment Vehicle (ARAV)-B, representing a 

short-range ballistic missile, launched form Wake Island. The Aegis destroyer detected 

and tracked the ARAV-B with its onboard AN/SPY-1 radar. The THAAD system, located 

on Meck Island, detected, tracked, developed a fire-control solution, and engaged 

the E-LRALT with a THAAD interceptor. The USS Fitzgerald tracked the ARAV-B, 

developed a fire-control solution, and engaged the target with a SM-3 Block 1A missile.

On Meck Island, PATRIOT radar, command and control systems detected and 

tracked the MQM-107, engaging it with a PATRIOT interceptor, launched from PATRIOT’s 

on nearby Omeleck Island (Marshall Islands). A short time later, the Aegis BMD ship 

engaged and intercepted the BQM-74E with an SM-2 Block IIIA missile. Lastly, the third 

ballistic target, a short-range ballistic missile, launched from a mobile platform located in 

the broad ocean area northeast of Kwajalein. The Meck/Omeleck PATRIOT emplacement 

detected, tracked, and engaged the SRBM target with a second PATRIOT intercept.

Threats from Iran and North Korea

As President Obama began his second term in January 

2013, new threats emerged on the horizon from both Iran 

and North Korea. North Korea’s young, new ruler, Kim 

Jong-un, son of the late Kim Jong-Il, became increasingly 

bellicose in threats made against the United States and 

the Republic of Korea. Events leading up to this bellicosity 

began in 2011, when North Korea completed a 10-year 

construction project at Sohae Satellite Launching Station. 

The new base included a movable launch pad and a 

10-story tall tower exceeding the needs of North Korea’s 

largest ballistic missile and space launch vehicles. The base 

was comprised of several missile assembly and testing 

structures, a launch warehouse, and observation tower, and 

O’Rei lly

SOHAE SATELL ITE 

LAUNCH ING STATION
20 21

a rocket engine test pad. The site far outpaced North Korea’s Toghae facility, where it 

tested short-range, medium-range, and intercontinental missiles.

On December 12, 2012, just one month prior to President Obama’s second inaugural, 

North Korea re-tested its Unha-3 (“Milky Way 3”) rocket from Sohae launching facility, 

successfully putting a satellite in orbit. While North Korea referred to its rocket as a 

space launch vehicle, the technology was very similar to that of a long-range missile. 

With minor changes to allow for re-entry, Pyongyang could deliver a WMD payload. 

In February 2013, North Korea declared it had miniaturized a nuclear warhead and 

also put on display what appeared to be a road-mobile ICBM. In March 2013, North 

Korea fired two short-range missiles, tests which appeared to be in response to annual 

U.S.-ROK military exercises. North Korea’s sudden and unexpected advances caught 

the U.S. off-guard. A statement released by the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies noted that “After North Korea’s successful December 2012 [orbital] launch and 

third nuclear test, threats are not completely empty.”

It was those threats that prompted President Obama, in his State of the Union 

Address in February 2013 to specifically refer to the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System:

“America will continue to lead the effort to prevent the spread of the world’s most 

dangerous weapons. The regime of North Korea must know that they will only achieve 

security and prosperity by meeting their international obligations. Provocations of 

the sort we saw last night will only isolate them further, as we stand by our allies, 

strengthen our own missile defense, and lead the world in taking firm action in response 

to these threats.”

On March 15, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel 

held a news conference at the Pentagon and announced 

the Obama Administration’s decision to reinstate 14 

ground-based interceptors which it reduced in its first 

term, to Ft. Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg AFB, California 

(for a grand total of 44) by the year 2017. An additional AN/

TPY-2 forward-based radar would be placed in Japan, and 

the administration would continue to move forward with 

an environmental study of a third U.S. missile defense site, 

as well as the restructuring of the future SM-3 Block IIB 

missile program that was originally scheduled for European 

deployment in 2020. The restructuring of the SM-3 Block 

IIB program will result in greater support for a new and 

enhanced kill vehicle for the modernization of missile defense interceptors.

Iran’s continued efforts to develop nuclear capabilities and long-range ballistic 

missiles were not as advanced as those of North Korea. However, as with the case 

of North Korea, the gravest threat from Iran was the possible confluence of future 

nuclear capability with ballistic missile technology. Iran has the largest ballistic missile 

inventory in the Middle East. It has a modified Shahab 3 medium-range ballistic missile 

to extend its claimed range of some 2,000 kilometers.

On January 26, 2013, the Missile Defense 

Agency successfully completed a flight test of 

a three-stage Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI), 

launched from Vandenberg AFB, California. This 

event was designated Ground-Based Midcourse 

Defense Control Test Vehicle (GM CTV)-01. Data 

from this flight test was used to evaluate the 

Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle system performance 

in a flight environment. If a target were present, the 

Exoatmospheric 

K i l l V e h i c l e 

would collide 

directly with the 

threat warhead to 

perform a hit-to-kill intercept. A target missile launch 

was not planned for this flight test. After performing 

fly out maneuvers, the three-stage booster deployed 

the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle executed a variety of 

pre-planned maneuvers to collect performance data 

in space. Flight test results show that all components 

performed as designed. In the aftermath of the test, 

the new MDA Director, VADM James Syring, sent out 

a congratulatory message to the personnel of the 

MDA, which read in part, “Today, I especially want to 

thank those responsible for making CTV-01 flight test mission a reality. . .Your success 

and its importance to our GMD return to flight test campaign cannot be overstated.”

On February 13, 2013, a unitary medium-range ballistic missile target was launched 

from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Hawaii. The target flew northwest towards a 

broad ocean area of the Pacific. The in-orbit Space Tracking and Surveillance SystemDemonstrators (STSS-D) detected and tracked the target, and forwarded the track data 

back to the USS Lake Erie. The ship, equipped with the second-generation Aegis BMD 

Hagel

Syring

GBI lAUNCH (CT V-01)
22

weapons system, used Launch on Remote 

doctrine to engage the target. The ship 

developed a fire control solution from 

the STSS-D track and launched the SM-3 

Block 1A guided missile approximately five 

minutes after the target launch. The SM-3 

maneuvered 

to a point in 

space and released its kinetic warhead. The kinetic warhead 

acquired the target reentry vehicle, diverted into its path, 

and using only the force of a direct impact, engaged and 

destroyed the target. This event was designated Flight Test 

Standard Missile-20 (FTM-20), the “Stellar Eyes” mission, and 

demonstrated the ability of space-based assets to provide 

mid-course fire control quality data on an Aegis BMD ship, 

extending the battlespace, providing the ability for longer 

range intercept and defense of larger areas.

From its establishment in early 2002 to the present, the Missile Defense Agency 

has fielded a Ballistic Missile Defense System of an integrated “layered” architecture 

that provides multiple opportunities to destroy missiles and their warheads before they 

can reach their targets. The system’s architecture includes: networked sensors and 

ground-and sea-based radars for target detection and tracking; ground-and sea-based 

interceptor missiles for destroying a ballistic missile using either the force of a direct 

collision, called “hit-to-kill” technology, or an explosive blast fragmentation warhead; 

and a command, control, battle management, and communications network that 

provides the warfighter with the needed links between the sensors and interceptor 

missiles.

The United States is developing increasingly proven, comprehensive, and 

integrated missile defenses. If hostilities break out, missile defenses can protect 

U.S. and allied critical infrastructure, population centers, and military capabilities for 

responsive operations. Over the next decade, the Missile Defense Agency will continue 

to execute a program that builds on the technological and engineering achievements 

of the past and will continue to perform a vital role in our national defense strategy.

SM-3 BLOCK 1a

STSS-D