Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

CASE STUDIES IN INSURGENCY

AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE:

CUBA 1953–1959

REVISED EDITION

United States Army Special Operations Command

Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

CASE STUDIES IN INSURGENCY 

AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE:

CUBA 1953–1959

REVISED EDITION

Paul J. Tompkins Jr., Project Lead

Erin M. Richardson, Editor

United States Army Special Operations Command

Layout by The Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Laboratory
This publication is a work of the United States Government in accordance with Title 17, United States Code, sections 101 and 105.

Published by:

The United States Army Special Operations Command

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Revised Edition

First Edition published by Special Operations Research Office, 

American University, September 1963

Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of 

the US government.

Nonmateriel research on special warfare is performed in support 

of the requirements stated by the US Army Special Operations Command, Department of the Army.

Comments correcting errors of fact and opinion, filling or indicating gaps of information, and suggesting other changes that may be 

appropriate should be addressed to:

United States Army Special Operations Command

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When citing this book, please refer to the version available at

www.soc.mil.

All ARIS products are available from USASOC at www.soc.mil 

under the ARIS link.
ASSESSING REVOLUTIONARY AND 

INSURGENT STRATEGIES

The Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) series 

consists of a set of case studies and research conducted for the US Army 

Special Operations Command by the National Security Analysis Department of The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

The purpose of the ARIS series is to produce a collection of academically rigorous yet operationally relevant research materials to develop 

and illustrate a common understanding of insurgency and revolution. 

This research, intended to form a bedrock body of knowledge for members of the Special Forces, will allow users to distill vast amounts of 

material from a wide array of campaigns and extract relevant lessons, 

thereby enabling the development of future doctrine, professional education, and training.

From its inception, ARIS has been focused on exploring historical and current revolutions and insurgencies for the purpose of identifying emerging trends in operational designs and patterns. ARIS 

encompasses research and studies on the general characteristics of 

revolutionary movements and insurgencies and examines unique adaptations by specific organizations or groups to overcome various environmental and contextual challenges.

The ARIS series follows in the tradition of research conducted by 

the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of American University in the 1950s and 1960s, by adding new research to that body of work 

and in several instances releasing updated editions of original SORO 

studies.

VOLUMES IN THE ARIS SERIES

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume I: 1927–1962 (Rev. Ed.)

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009

Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (2nd Ed.)

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (2nd Ed.)

Irregular Warfare Annotated Bibliography

The Legal Status of Personnel in Resistance

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia (1964–2009)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka (1976–2009)

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II (pub. 1961)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Cuba 1953–1959 (pub. 1963)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Guatemala 1944–1954 (pub. 1964)

SORO STUDIES

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Vietnam 1941–1954 (pub. 1964)
INTRODUCTION TO REVISED EDITION

This study was originally published by the US Army Special Operations Research Office in September 1963. As we developed the Assessing Resistance and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) project and work began 

on the new studies, we determined that this study is still important and 

relevant and thus should be republished. The Foreword to the original 

edition cites the following reasons for conducting the study: (1) the 

close relation of Cuban interests and those of the West; (2) the profound effect of action or the lack of action by powers outside Cuba; (3) 

concern that the Cuban Revolution become a prototype for Communist revolutions elsewhere; and (4) because the final form of the Cuban 

Revolution was so different from its initial manifestations. This final 

point is interesting even today. While the Cuban Revolution appeared 

originally to be a political protest movement with moderate aims, it 

grew into a major upheaval that changed the foundations of Cuban life. 

The majority of the book was reproduced exactly as it appeared originally, with some minor spelling and punctuation corrections as well as 

changes in formatting to conform to modern typesetting conventions 

and to match the new ARIS studies in presentation. The process for 

creating this revised edition entailed scanning the pages from a copy of 

the original book; using an optical character recognition (OCR) function to convert the text on the scanned pages to computer-readable, 

editable text; refining the scanned figures to ensure appropriate resolution and contrast; and composing the document using professional 

typesetting software. Then, word by word, the revised text was compared to the original text to ensure that no errors were introduced 

during the OCR and composition processes. In addition, the original 

edition included a fold-out map that was re-created at a smaller scale 

for this updated edition.

These efforts resulted in the creation of this revised edition in the 

following formats: a softbound book, a hardbound book, a PDF, and an 

EPUB. The EPUB was generated by creating a new set of files from the 

print-ready files, adjusting various settings in the files to facilitate maximum compatibility with e-readers, exporting the files to .epub, and 

reviewing and revising the code to allow for optimal viewing on standard e-reading devices. The final step was to test the book on multiple 

e-readers and then repeat the entire process as necessary to address 

any remaining issues in the code.

Although the processes for creating the various formats of this 

edition are for the most part straightforward, they take several weeks 

to complete and require considerable attention to detail. Several 

staff members from the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics 
Laboratory devoted time and effort to making the various formats of 

this revised edition possible: Kelly Livieratos, Annie Marcotte, Magda 

Saina, and Erin Richardson.

This study and the other products from the ARIS project are essential learning tools developed to enhance Special Operations Forces personnel’s understanding of resistances and insurgencies. For more than 

fifty years, Special Operations Forces have conducted missions to support resistances or insurgencies (unconventional warfare); to counter 

them (counterinsurgency operations); or to support a partner nation 

in eliminating them (foreign internal defense). These operations are 

collectively referred to as special warfare. Special Operations doctrine 

gives general principles and strategies for accomplishing these operations but in most cases describes the resistance or insurgency only in 

generalities. The ARIS project was designed to serve as an anatomy lesson. It provides the necessary foundational material for the special warfare practitioner to learn the elemental structure, form, and function 

of rebellions, thus enabling him or her to better adapt and apply the 

doctrine professionally. Additionally, these products inform doctrine, 

ensuring that it is adapted to meet modern social and technological 

changes.

When citing this study in scholarly work, please refer to the PDF version available at www.soc.mil.

Paul J. Tompkins Jr.

USASOC Project Lead

CASE STUDIES IN INSURGENCY 

AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE:

CUBA 1953–1959

Primary Research Responsibility

Norman A. LaCharité

SPECIAL OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE 

The American University

Washington D.C., 20016

September 1963
ii

FOREWORD

This report on the recent Cuban Revolution is the first in a series of 

studies analyzing the rapid, often violent, change in political and socioeconomic order which is usually called revolution. Companion studies 

on the revolutions in Algeria (1954–1962) and in Vietnam (1941–1954) 

will be published in the near future, as will a related study on the Guatemalan situation between 1944 and 1954. Another study, Casebook on 

Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts, has already 

been published.

This is a social science research study in which historical information is treated as data to be used in the examination of hypotheses 

about the causal factors of revolution. It is not, therefore, a historical 

study in the traditional sense of recreating the past. Our focus rather, 

is on understanding the varied aspects of a revolution. Hopefully this 

might lead to a methodology for forecasting revolutions and to essential knowledge about revolutionary movements and processes.

From the many instances of modern revolution, the Cuban revolution was selected for these reasons: Cuban interests and those of the 

West are closely related and have so been for a long time. Second, events 

subsequent to the revolution have shown that the action or the lack of 

action by powers outside Cuba had a profound effect on the outcome of 

the revolution. Third, because the external powers involved in the postrevolutionary situation in Cuba are Communist, there is concern that 

the Cuban Revolution become a prototype for Communist revolutions 

elsewhere in Latin America. Lastly, the final form of the Cuban Revolution was so different from its initial manifestations. It appeared originally to be a political protest movement with moderate aims; it grew 

into a major upheaval which changed the foundations of Cuban life.

Because the Special Operations Research Office has a continuing 

research program on revolutionary processes, comments from readers 

will be welcomed.

 

 THEODORE R. VALLANCE,

Director
iii

PREFACE

A few words concerning the style of this case study of the Cuban 

Revolution are required in order to avoid misunderstandings about its 

concept and intent.

The case study is not a chronological narrative of the revolution 

from beginning to end. That type of historical case study is valuable 

for many purposes and a number have been published (see Bibliography). Rather, this study attempts to analyze, individually and successively through time, a number of factors in the revolutionary situation 

and the revolutionary movement itself which, on the basis of prior studies of revolutions, have been identified as being generally related to 

the occurrence, form, and outcome of a revolution. The case study, 

then, is devised to test the “explanatory power” of certain statements 

of relationships in terms of their applicability to the Cuban Revolution 

in particular. For this reason the reader is urged to read the definition 

of terms and the conceptual framework underlying the study which 

appear in the Technical Appendix.

Such an approach has both advantages and disadvantages to the 

reader. One who is interested in a particular topic (e.g., social antagonisms, revolutionary organization) need only read that section to get 

all the essential information on that topic. The reader who is interested in the entire case study will inevitably notice some redundancy 

from section to section, although every attempt has been made to keep 

unnecessary repetition to the absolute minimum. But some redundancy is inevitable for two reasons: a given historical event can have 

multiple significance (e.g., both social and economic significance, or 

both psychological operations and sabotage significance) and there is 

an interaction among events in a given society (e.g., political actions 

may be related to economic actions, or underground supply effectiveness may be related to guerrilla interdiction effectiveness).

The rationale for using such a systematic approach goes beyond 

the quest for analytic understanding of the Cuban Revolution itself. 

Companion case studies are also being prepared on the Algerian Revolution (1954–1962) and the Vietnam Revolution (1941–1954) using the 

same conceptual framework and evaluating the same factors.a

 At the 

same time, a case study of the situation in Guatemala between 1944 and 

1954 is being prepared, using a different approach more suitable to that 

situation. Thus, a basis is being prepared for comparative analyses that 

will, hopefully, provide generalizations applicable to more than a single 

revolution. The net result of this approach for this case study is a series 

a As a final note on redundancy, it should be noted that the Preface and the Technical Appendix are identical with those in the companion case studies.
iv

of related analytic conclusions regarding the character and dynamics 

of the Cuban Revolution, but not a smoothly rounded literary story.

All of the sources used in preparation for this study are unclassified, and for the most part secondary sources were used. Again, certain 

advantages and disadvantages accrue. As an unclassified document, 

the study will be more widely distributed and whatever contribution to 

understanding it contains will be put to wider use. Reliance on unclassified secondary sources, however, may have led to the exclusion of 

certain significant considerations or to the use of unreliable information and thus to factual and interpretative errors. It is believed, however, that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. If, because of 

its sources, the study adds no new information about the revolution, it 

does claim that maximum, systematic, analytic use of already available 

open information is a meaningful contribution to the study of insurgency and revolutionary warfare.

Finally, the intent of this case study is not to present any particular 

“slant” on the Cuban Revolution, the actors and parties in it, or the role 

of foreign (to Cuba) powers. Rather, the intent is to present as objective 

an account as possible of what happened in terms of the hypotheses 

being evaluated. Thus, some of the case study necessarily deals with 

how Cubans perceived events, or, more accurately, how it is believed 

they perceived events.

The aim has been to prepare the case study from the viewpoint of 

an impartial, objective observer. Perhaps such an aspiration is beyond 

grasp—the events may be too recent, the sources too unreliable, the 

“observer” too biased toward objectives compatible with Western democratic interests. For these reasons, no infallibility is claimed and it is 

readily conceded that this study cannot be the final word on the Cuban 

Revolution. Subsequent events always have a way of leading to reinterpretation of prior events. However, any errors of omission or commission are not deliberate, but truly errors—and they certainly are not a 

result of an intent to foster any particular political “slant.”

At the same time, there is no question that many of the subjects 

discussed are “politically sensitive.” It must be recorded, therefore, that 

the above denial of any deliberate intent to “slant” the case study also 

means that there was no intent to “cover up” historical facts and interpretations which might be perceived as reflecting unfavorably on any 

party. Little is to be gained in terms of increased understanding of 

revolutions if justification of past particular policies, or advocacy of any 

given current policy, was the real intent under the guise of objective 

analysis. An effort was made, however, to avoid use of a style and language which in itself would be unnecessarily offensive or in poor taste.
v

Beyond the resolve of objective analysis in the preparation of the 

study, sources were selected on the basis of their judged reliability. A 

balance was sought among sources of known persuasion in order not to 

unwittingly bias the case study in one direction or another. As a final 

check, the study draft was submitted to two area specialists, Dr. John J. 

Finan of the American University and Nicolas Rivero, a former Cuban 

Government official who served first under Batista and later under 

Castro. The experts reviewed the manuscript for accuracy of fact and 

reasonableness of interpretations and their comments and criticisms 

provided the basis for final revisions. Although their contributions were 

substantial, final responsibility for the manuscript, both with respect 

to substantive content and methodology, rests solely with the Special 

Operations Research Office.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD ..........................................................................................ii

PREFACE...............................................................................................iii

SUMMARY

Purpose of Study.................................................................................3

Organization of Study ........................................................................3

Synopsis ...............................................................................................4

Selected Analytic Conclusions ...........................................................5

PART I—FACTORS INDUCING REVOLUTION

Economic Maladjustment................................................................. 17

Foreign Control of the Economy ................................................. 17

Concentration of Land and Landless Peasants...........................19

Absence of Diversified Economy..................................................21

Unemployment and Underemployment......................................24

Social Antagonism............................................................................27

Tensions Within the Social Structure..........................................27

Demise of Traditional Society......................................................30

Marginality of Professional Groups.............................................32

Political Weaknesses .........................................................................34

Inefficiency of Governmental Machinery....................................34

Political Fragmentation of Ruling Elites and 

Opposition Groups.............................................................40

Political Imbalance: Representation, Participation, and 

Discrimination ....................................................................44

PART II—DYNAMICS OF REVOLUTION

Composition of Revolutionary Actors..............................................63

Overall Strategy and Goals ..............................................................65

Ideology or Myth...............................................................................67

National Orientation ....................................................................67

International Orientation ............................................................69

Socio-Economic Emphasis ...........................................................69

Mystique of Revolution .................................................................71

Organization: Functional and Structural Types.............................71

Paramilitary Organization ...........................................................73

Underground ................................................................................81

Labor Organization......................................................................84

Political Parties or Organizations—Legal, Illegal......................85

Social Organizations.....................................................................86

Religious Organizations...............................................................87
viii

Table of Contents

Techniques ........................................................................................88

Guerrilla Warfare..........................................................................88

Strikes............................................................................................92

Demonstrations.............................................................................93

Sabotage ........................................................................................94

Terrorism.......................................................................................94

Propaganda ...................................................................................95

Active Involvement of Foreign Powers (on Both Sides) ..................97

Countries Involved........................................................................97

Military Aid by Foreign Powers..................................................100

Political Intervention: U.S. Diplomatic Pressure....................... 101

PART III—EPILOGUE

Revolutionary Environment ...........................................................105

Revolutionary Economics...........................................................105

Revolutionary Society .................................................................107

Revolutionary Politics .................................................................108

Consolidation of the Revolution.................................................... 110

Leadership................................................................................... 110

Strategy And Goals..................................................................... 110

Ideology .......................................................................................112

Organization of Anti-Castro Movements ..................................112

Summary ......................................................................................... 116

FOOTNOTES .................................................................................... 119

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................... 125

TECHNICAL APPENDIX

Introduction....................................................................................131

Conceptual Frame of Reference ....................................................131

Revolution Defined.....................................................................131

General Approach ......................................................................132

Factors Inducing Revolution ......................................................132

Economic Maladjustment............................................................133

Social Antagonism .......................................................................134

Political Weakness........................................................................136

Organic Factors of the Revolutionary Movement .....................137

Actors ...................................................................................................137

Overall Strategy and Goals..........................................................137

Ideology or Myth..........................................................................138

Organization ................................................................................138

Techniques ...................................................................................138

Foreign Involvement ....................................................................138
Table of Contents

ix

General Summary of Procedures...................................................139

Development of Case Study Format...........................................139

Identification and Selection of Sources.....................................139

Information Synthesis and Analysis: Drafting of Report .........139

Expert Reviews and Revision .....................................................140

Footnotes to Technical Appendix..................................................140

Bibliography to Technical Appendix............................................. 141

INDEX ......................................................................................................... 145
x

Table of Contents

ILLUSTRATIONS

President Fulgencio Batista .................................................................46

Fidel Castro (center) and his younger brother Raúl (left), with some 

of the other rebel chiefs at their stronghold in the Sierra 

Maestra Mountains in April 1958 ....................................... 47

Teenagers, arrested by Cuban police, accused of being terrorists 

of the 26th of July Movement and the Communist Party, 

August 17, 1957 ....................................................................48

Suitcase full of bombs seized by Cuban police in August 1957.........49

Map of Havana locates principal points involved in the abortive 

strike of April 9, 1958 ..........................................................50

Rebels operating in mountains near the southern coast of Las Villas 

Province................................................................................ 51

A group of Cuban rebels making Molotov cocktails at a rebel 

stronghold in Western Oriente ...........................................52

U.S. officials stand around the boat, “Orion,” captured early in 1958 

by U.S. Coast Guard Agents................................................53

Cuban rebel commanders Capt. Victor Bordon (second from left, 

in campaign hat) and Che Guevara (second from right, in 

beret) ....................................................................................54

Fidel Castro rebels form a ring around natives suspected of being 

government followers in the mountain jungles of the Sierra 

del Cristal, April 1958..........................................................55

The Cuban Army frequently used artillery in attacking or repelling 

rebels in eastern Oriente Province .....................................56

The son of Fidel Castro rides atop a tank during a parade honoring 

his father .............................................................................. 57

Mass meeting of the Cuban teachers’ union, April 1962...................58

Photo purportedly shows leaders of anti-Castro guerrillas meeting 

somewhere in the Escambray Mountains to coordinate 

their respective military zones............................................59

Map of Cuba.........................................................................................60
SUMMARY

Summary

3

PURPOSE OF STUDY

The objective of this case study is to contribute to increased analytic 

understanding of revolutionary (internal) war. Specifically, the study 

analyzes the Cuban Revolution by examining two types of information 

in terms of their relationship to the occurrence, form, and outcome of 

the revolution:

(1) social, economic, and political factors in the prerevolutionary 

and revolutionary situations;

(2) structural and functional factors of the revolutionary 

movement, such as the composition of actors and followers, 

revolutionary strategy and goals, organization and 

techniques.

The study is not focused on the strategy and tactics of countering 

revolutions. On the premise that development of U.S. policies and 

operations for countering revolutions—where that is in the national 

interest—will be improved by a better understanding of what it is that 

is to be countered, the study concentrates on the character and the 

dynamics of the revolution.

ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

The first two parts contain the major analyses of the case study. 

Part I presents an analysis of social, economic, and political factors in 

the revolution, Part II, an analysis of the revolutionary movement. For 

the benefit of the reader, a brief Epilogue of events after 1959 (some to 

1962) is presented in Part III.

This Summary is for readers who must restrict their reading and is 

focused primarily on major analytic conclusions. For those readers who 

wish to study more deeply the aspects of the revolution, a Bibliography is provided which contains references to the source materials used 

in the preparation of this report. The Technical Appendix contains a 

description of the rationale and the study procedures used, reserving 

this Summary and the other parts of the study for substantive content 

and analysis.
4

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

SYNOPSIS

The Cuban Revolutiona is considered to have begun in July 1953 

when the government of Fulgencio Batista was threatened with the first 

open revolt, and to have ended in January 1959 when Batista was forced 

to leave the country. The fighting stage of the revolution, upon which 

a great deal of attention is focused, began in December 1956 when the 

first of several expeditionary groups successfully established a guerrilla 

base in the rural areas of Cuba.

In 1933 the aspiration of new political forces in Cuba, mainly university students and a new generation of political leaders (whose spokesmen 

were the followers of the former Havana University professor, President 

Ramón Grau San Martín), coincided to a large extent with the aims 

of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbor Policy.” It can be 

said that the overthrow of President Gerardo Machado in 1933 and the 

upsurge of new political leaders termed as moderate leftwing nationalists marked the end of an era for Cuba. Until that time Cuba had been 

less than fully independent. The Platt Amendment, passed by the U.S. 

Congress in 1901 and then incorporated into the Cuban Constitution 

under pressure from Washington, granted the United States the right 

to intervene in Cuban affairs for adequate protection of U.S. life and 

property. It also gave the United States the right to ratify Cuban treaties 

with other nations and to establish military bases in Cuba. The repeal 

of the Platt Amendment in 1934 was a decision of the U.S. Government 

in accordance with the new approach to Latin American affairs by the 

Roosevelt administration. At the Montevideo Conference (December 

1933) the U.S. Government supported the principle of nonintervention 

in the political affairs of Latin America.

The beginning of Cuba’s new era also marked the rise of Fulgencio 

Batista. The first phase of his rule lasted from 1933 to 1944. Until 1940 

he controlled Cuba through handpicked Presidents; from 1940 to 1944 

he assumed the Presidency himself. Under Batista the Cuban economy 

made definite progress. Roads were improved, the educational system 

was enlarged, and the press enjoyed considerable freedom.

In 1944 Batista retired voluntarily and took up residence in Florida. 

Under the succeeding presidents, Ramón Grau San Martín and Carlos 

Prío Socarrás, there was an increase in gangsterism and public disorder in Cuba. In March 1952 Batista returned to campaign for the Presidency, but in the midst of the campaign seized power again in a coup 

d’etat that lasted less than 2 hours. While his earlier regime had been 

a A summary of the Cuban Revolution is included in the Casebook on Insurgency and 

Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts (Washington: Special Operations Research 

Office, 1963).
Summary

5

relatively moderate, he now suspended the Constitution drawn in 1940 

and ruled more authoritarianly.

Batista’s return to power dashed the hopes of the young lawyer, 

Fidel Castro, for election to Congress. He asked the courts to declare 

Batista’s rule illegal, but they failed to act and Fidel Castro determined 

to overthrow the “dictator” by force. On July 26, 1953, Castro and a 

group of Cuban revolutionaries attacked the Moncada barracks with 

its garrison of one thousand soldiers. The attack failed, but it marked 

the beginning of a revolutionary movement, named after the day of 

the attack, “the 26th of July Movement.” During the ensuing years 

this movement constituted the major opposition to the authoritarian 

regime of Batista. After a bitter struggle, which during its final phases 

took the form of a civil war, Fidel Castro and his movement gained 

complete control over Cuba in January 1959. His success was due primarily to the widespread dissatisfaction with the government of Batista, 

and secondarily to the appeal of his program of political and social 

reform. After Castro became head of state, he first appointed moderate 

leftwing nationalists to key positions, but by the end of his first year in 

power he had replaced many of these with extreme leftists. By the end 

of the second year Castro and his government had adopted MarxismLeninism as the state ideology for Cuba.

SELECTED ANALYTIC CONCLUSIONS

The question often arises as to why a social revolution occurred 

in Cuba in the 1950’s and not in a more economically downtrodden 

and politically oppressed Latin American country. In looking over the 

Cuban record, the analyst finds that during the revolutionary period 

Cuba was enjoying relative prosperity: the island was one of the leading 

industrial countries in Latin America and it offered its population one 

of the highest living standards in the area. Moreover, Batista certainly 

was not the harshest dictator in Latin America. The restrictions that 

he imposed and the extreme counterrevolutionary measures that he 

employed and the manner in which he employed them were the results 

of the growing revolutionary movement and not the causes. A tentative answer to the question may lie in analyses of the weaknesses of the 

political system, socio-economic conditions, and the form and dynamics of the revolutionary movement.b

b No assumption is made that any given set of social, economic, or political conditions will inevitably lead to a revolution. Such conditions are assumed only to provide 

a favorable environment for a revolutionary movement, although they may be directly 

related to the formation of a revolutionary movement in many cases.
6

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

Environmental Factors

To understand the significance and the interplay of the environmental factors that contributed to the revolution, the analyst must 

attempt to look at them from the point of view of the principal actors 

of the revolution—the middle-class intellectuals and professionals. As 

a group, these actors may be partially characterized by similarities in 

education, aspirations, and social status. They were young idealists and 

carried with them an eclectic body of Socialist and nationalist convictions. Some courted a Marxist interpretation of history and its criticisms of capitalism, which they identified with concentration of wealth 

and political power in Cuba.

Economic

The more radical actors attributed what they viewed as inequalities 

and injustices in Cuban society to basic economic weaknesses that had 

remained unchanged since Cuba had become a nation. For this reason 

the issues of heavy foreign investment in Cuba, the concentration of 

land, the single-crop character of the economy, or other economically 

related questions held primary importance in the charges made against 

Batista, and later against Cuba’s powerful northern neighbor, the 

United States. It matters little if the objective conditions of the Cuban 

economy were comparable to conditions in other societies where no 

revolutionary situation existed; political consciousness of these objective conditions led to subjective motivations and contributed to development of a revolutionary situation.

It is difficult to weigh the importance of Cuban sentiment against 

foreign investments, particularly those of the United States, as a factor in the Cuban Revolution. However, three facts are apparent: (1) 

U.S. private investments in Cuba were extensive, and in protecting 

these investments the U.S. Government exerted considerable influence 

in Cuban domestic politics; (2) reciprocal trade agreements with the 

United States, though advantageous to Cuba, placed the island in the 

category of semicolonial nations; and (3) though tactfully subdued during the actual fighting stage of the revolution, resentment against “foreign control” of the Cuban economy remained a live issue.

Despite the fact that the Platt Amendment, which gave the U.S. 

Government legal influence over Cuban politics, was repealed in 1934, 

many Cuban intellectuals maintained that in terms of economics, “Plattism” was still in effect in the 1950’s. This attitude carried the thesis 

that “true” Cuban independence could not be achieved until the nation 

was free from foreign economic domination. To many it seemed that 
Summary

7

Batista’s government had willingly committed itself to the service of 

foreign business interests in return for self-enrichment.

Postrevolutionary preoccupation with extensive agrarian reform 

programs gives the impression that a land problem had been basic 

prior to the period of the revolutionary struggle. This problem, however, was incidental and only a part of a much more elemental problem: 

the overwhelming dependence of the economy upon sugar cultivation.

Although sugar cultivation brought relative prosperity to Cuba, it 

also gave rise to a number of economic problems with attendant social 

instabilities. First, efficient and profitable sugar production called for 

the concentration of large tracts of land around plantations and sugar 

mills. Consequently, numerous small landholders lost their land and 

were compelled to seek job opportunities in the overcrowded cities 

and around the expanding sugar mills; others remained in isolated 

rural areas and became virtually cut off from health and educational 

opportunities. Second, Cuban industry became so engrossed in growing and milling sugar that many important food items as well as nonsugar manufactures were neglected and had to be imported. This in 

turn reinforced dependence on sugar production. Third, the price 

received for sugar on a fluctuating world market determined boom or 

depression in Cuba. Finally, sugar production offered only seasonal 

employment to the sugar workers so that during the dead season nearly 

a quarter of the working people remained idle.

Cuban governments attempted to solve the problems arising out of 

its lopsided economy by legislation intended to diversify agriculture and 

to develop non-sugar industry. The 1940 Constitution included provisions to control sugar production, limit the size of landholdings owned 

by sugar plantations, and distribute unused land to landless peasants. 

The government also set up protective tariffs to encourage the development of non-sugar industry. These gestures were usually weak and 

poorly timed, however, and a balanced economy was never achieved. 

The provisions of the Constitution were seldom enforced, and despite 

the protective tariffs, Cuban industries were never able to compete 

with U.S. imports. Individuals in the government received their share 

of profits derived from the status quo and were reluctant to change it.

The radical revolutionists used the issue of agrarian reform to 

strike at the economic and social roots of their powerful enemy, the 

Batista government. Although land reform (i.e., wide distribution of 

land) became the basis of Castro’s revolutionary program for postrevolutionary Cuba and won him a nominal following, objective agricultural conditions indicate that the Cuban “land problem” per se was 
8

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

not critical.c In the first place, the majority of Cubans were urbanized 

workers and as such would be highly unaffected by a large-scale program of land distribution. Secondly, most Cubans who worked in the 

rural areas were transient wageworkers living in an industrial monetary 

society, not self-sufficient peasants who depended on subsistence farming and who would have benefited most from wide distribution of land. 

Agrarian reform would have involved only a small portion of the population. Thirdly, the large estates (especially sugar) could not be broken 

up without destroying the entire Cuban economy. The revolutionary 

government presumably realized this fact and it is perhaps the reason 

why it kept the estates intact and placed them under the supervision 

of a governmental agency. After the revolution very little land was parcelled out to “landless peasants.”

Unlike the 1933 uprising, in which the working class joined with 

intellectuals and the lower echelon of the military to overthrow the government, the revolution of the fifties noticeably lacked the mass participation of the workers. Prior to the 1933 uprising, labor conditions 

were deplorable and organized labor was denied legal status. Post-1933 

social and labor legislation had so improved the general well-being of 

the working class, and organized labor had become so politically influential that as a class the workers were hesitant to participate in a movement that could possibly jeopardize their newly won relative wealth and 

power. Although the revolution was eventually declared by the revolutionary government to have been made in the name of the working 

class, objective indicators of the workers’ economic situation since the 

revolution show a drop in their standard of living. For example, wages 

are lower, workers often work overtime without pay, workmen’s compensation programs have been abandoned, etc.

Social

While there seems to have been little economic justification for the 

urbanized workers to rise against the government in the 1950’s, Cuban 

society over the years appears to have generated some degree of dissatisfaction among elements of the urban middle and rural lower classes. 

The aspirations of the members of the middle class for a standard of 

living and social status commensurate with their education and their 

own estimate of their capabilities were continually frustrated by two 

obstacles: The success of the upper class in maintaining its wealth and 

political power and the inability of the Cuban economy to provide “adequate” employment and other opportunities especially for the members of the professional middle class. Highly educated professionals 

c One noted area specialist writes: “Cuba did not have an agrarian problem.”1
Summary

9

were underemployed and many took on jobs outside their professions 

to maintain what they considered a standard of living consistent with 

their social status. These middle-class professionals formed the nucleus 

of the revolutionary movement against Batista, but the majority of them 

did not benefit from the success of the revolution.

The people who benefited from the revolution were those who 

were most neglected prior to the revolution—the rural lower class. In 

general, they lacked medical facilities, educational opportunities, and 

adequate housing; they were illiterate, plagued with nutritional deficiencies and parasitical diseases, and lived in huts made of grass and 

mud. Some refused to migrate to the cities or around the sugar mills 

and remained isolated in inaccessible places, having little contact with 

the outside world. They were eventually won over by the guerrillas who 

operated in the countryside during the revolution, and some actively 

participated in guerrilla operations during the fighting.

Political

However, it was the elements of the intellectual and professional 

middle class, the marginal group, that initiated the revolutionary 

movement against the Batista government. In its primary stages this 

far-reaching social revolution gave no evidence of being more than 

a “simple” protest movement against political oppression. This is one 

of the most important lessons of the Cuban Revolution. From 1940 to 

1952, Cuba, for the first time in its history as an independent nation, 

had experienced a form of democratic political process. During this 

period the political climate was such that those who had previously 

been denied political status were able to organize the electorate into 

political parties and to assert their influence in governing the nation. 

Three times—in 1940, 1944, and 1948—popular and relatively honest elections were held. The campaign for the elections of 1952 promised even greater political reform. In March 1952, however, Fulgencio 

Batista, a presidential candidate running behind other candidates in 

a pre-election poll, ended this democratic development by organizing 

elements of the army and overthrowing the incumbent government in 

a relatively bloodless coup d’etat. He immediately dissolved congress, 

suspended the Constitution, and moved against his critics.

Although Batista’s illegal seizure of power was the immediate concern of those who led the revolution, the revolutionary situation was 

intensified by other inveterate, unresolved political weaknesses. Outstanding among them was the government’s ineptitude which generally 

included: its failure to institute machinery to cope with the exigencies 

of changing political and economic situations; a contradiction between 

constitutional theory and governmental practice; the government’s 
10

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

dependence on a foreign power, namely the United States, to maintain 

economic stability; its half-hearted attempts to establish a sound economic base independent of a foreign power by legislation unsupported 

by effective enforcement. All of these elements of ineptitude were perpetuated by the traditional regard of political office as an opportunity 

for self-enrichment.

Another major weakness in the political system was the instability 

generated by certain conditions in party politics. Most recognizable 

was personalismo, a situation in which a political movement is formed 

around the personality of its founder rather than around a sound 

political philosophy. This personalismo inevitably resulted in the fragmentation of established national parties and factionalism within the 

ruling elite. The jealous competition between political leaders to gain 

personal control of the government, the attendant distrust and violence between competing political groups, and the lack of a tradition 

of restraint and compromise all contributed to the instability of the 

governmental process.

Dynamics of Revolution

Actors and Organization

The fragmentation and factionalism which engendered jealous 

competition among political groups was also prevalent among the 

various revolutionary organizations which made up the total revolutionary effort in the 1950’s. The initial actions of several small conspiratorial groups who attempted to overthrow Batista shortly after he 

seized power inspired other groups to organize and follow the same 

pattern. By the end of 1958 there existed a variety of underground 

organizations, several of them supporting small guerrilla armies in the 

mountains, each operating independently, each attempting to establish 

predominance over the revolutionary situation. There was some genuine cooperation between these groups, especially after July 1958 when 

most of them signed an agreement pledging unified action, but in general they tended to preserve their independent efforts throughout most 

of the fighting phase of the revolution.

Opposition to Batista began almost immediately after he seized 

power in March 1952. The years 1952–56 saw a number of sporadic and 

disjointed uprisings growing out of local conspiracies, gaining little 

popular support, and easily put down by the government forces. During this time various revolutionary organizations took form. Leaders 

emerged to train recruits in operational techniques of guerrilla warfare and to establish supporting underground networks throughout 

the island and in foreign countries.
Summary

11

The strongest and most publicized paramilitary organization during the Cuban Revolution was the 26th of July Movement, headed by 

Fidel Castro and encamped in the mountains of the Sierra Maestra. 

Although its operations were small and concentrated in the easternmost part of Oriente Province, the movement was extensive compared 

with other guerrilla groups in other areas of Cuba. Its functions were 

both military and political: combatant and noncombatant units, organized along military lines, met the enemy in small skirmishes and performed auxiliary duties; a civil organization under military command 

organized the local population in support of military operations, and 

also governed through an administrative council which took on executive, legislative, and judicial functions.

Underground organizations operating in urban centers in Cuba 

and in over 60 foreign cities in the Western Hemisphere supported 

or complemented the guerrilla groups operating in the rural areas. 

Some, student groups mostly, were loosely organized and operated sporadically. Others, such as the 26th of July Movement and its close ally, 

the Civic Resistance Movement, were the largest, the most elaborately 

organized, and the most effective. They worked in conjunction with the 

guerrilla groups by continually supplying them with arms, ammunition, and manpower. The majority of Cubans actively involved in revolutionary activities belonged to underground groups.

Techniques

The fighting stage of the revolution, which began in December 

1956 when Fidel Castro and a small expeditionary force invaded Cuba 

from Mexico, was a two-pronged war on the government forces: guerrilla warfare in the rural areas and underground activities in the cities.

The guerrilla units operating in the rural areas of Cuba did not 

defeat Batista’s army of over 30,000 men in any military sense. Instead, 

they succeeded in having Batista defeat himself. For over one year the 

guerrilla units, highly dependent on the local population for supplies, 

intelligence, and recruits, remained in the mountains concentrating 

mainly on preserving and expanding their numbers and waiting for a 

mass uprising that never materialized. The sole military tactic used at 

this time was to ambush military outposts and patrols to capture arms 

and ammunition.

In the spring of 1958, the guerrillas changed their strategy and 

shifted into full-scale revolutionary warfare which included hit-and-run 

raids, sabotage, and bombings. Guerrilla targets at this time were generally the island’s communication system. The general objective was 

to isolate government outposts and to curtail economic activity in the 
12

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

eastern part of the island. Military engagements between the two sides 

were few and indecisive.

This activity in the rural areas was accompanied by increased sabotage and terror in the cities, gnawing away at the foundations of the 

government.2

 Although the underground failed to initiate a nationwide strike, propaganda, assassinations, bombings, and acts of sabotage effectively kept more than half of the security forces occupied in 

the cities.

Batista met terror with terror. His police force and Rural Guard 

indiscriminately arrested, tortured, and murdered countless victims 

(primarily students), and created a wave of revulsion among the entire 

Cuban population, including the army. Batista’s own countermeasures were, in effect, working against him. Loyalties were weakened 

and many Cubans felt only contempt for their “incompetent” government. When Batista launched an offensive against the guerrillas in May 

1958, his army failed to carry it out successfully. Military disaffection 

and disputes within the high command and the lower ranks became 

widespread. The three strong pillars upon which the power of Batista’s 

regime rested—the army, organized labor, and the conservative elements—gradually withdrew their support and in December 1958 left 

him with little choice but to leave Cuba.

Thus, the action of the underground forces in the cities more than 

the action of the guerrillas in the mountains was responsible for bringing about the downfall of the Batista government. Revolutionary warfare in Cuba was a waiting game. Its tactics were not aimed at defeating 

the enemy in the military sense, but at provoking him into retaliatory 

methods so extreme that they alienated the entire population and promoted the demoralization of the soldiers and officers.3

 The “conspicuous military virtue” of the guerrilla forces, on the one hand,

was their ability to maintain a high volume of fire 

under conditions which could have discouraged less 

motivated fighters. This virtue fully exploited the 

major weaknesses of the well-equipped government 

forces, which was a near paralysis of the will to fire 

at all.4

The conspicuous virtue of the underground forces, on the other hand, 

was their ability not only to support the guerrilla forces in the mountains but to endure the bulk of the extreme countermeasures inflicted 

on them by the government forces until the government collapsed.
Summary

13

Summary to Selected Analytic Conclusions

In some respects the Cuban Revolution of the late 1950’s may be 

considered as a revitalization of the gradual revolution that had been 

taking place since 1930, which in the eyes of some had been interrupted by the military coup of Batista in 1952. While the population in 

general did not consider Batista a detriment to its well-being, one sector, the students and young professionals, viewed Batista as an obstacle 

to the attainment of their rightful political position. While it is true 

that the most radical elements of the revolutionary leadership thought 

that Cuba needed deep economic and social changes in order to find 

a solution to the problem of unemployment and a semicolonial economy based on a one-crop system, the greater part of the opposition to 

Batista wanted political changes. At no time did any of the revolutionary groups offer a platform of a major social, political, and economic 

upheaval along Communist lines. The majority of Cuban people who 

supported the revolution were thinking not in terms of radical economic and social reforms, but the return to constitutionality, honesty 

in government administration, and the breaking of the vicious circle of 

terror and counterterror.

Some members of Batista’s opposition, unable to arouse popular 

support for their protest or to achieve success in the political arena, 

devoted themselves to underground terrorist activity and guerrilla warfare. These tactics proved successful not as military operations, but as 

a means of provoking Batista into the use of harsh restrictive measures 

and counterterrorism which, in the end, further alienated the general 

population. With his base of support thus disaffected, Batista had no 

choice but to leave Cuba. Fidel Castro, who controlled the best organized and most publicized revolutionary group, was on hand to fill the 

power vacuum left by Batista.

PART I—FACTORS INDUCING REVOLUTION

Factors Inducing Revolution

17

ECONOMIC MALADJUSTMENT

Foreign Control of the Economy

Spanish Legacy

By the time Cuba had achieved its independence from Spain, an 

economic system had developed on the island that was to remain characteristically Cuban for over half a century. Agriculture and commerce 

dominated economic activities, and manufacturing and food processing were at a low stage of development. Sugar was the most important 

cash crop and the United States was Cuba’s biggest sugar market.

Between 1763 and 1823 the Spanish Crown instituted moderate 

administrative and economic reforms, and Cuba experienced a period 

of rapid economic expansion and a free exchange of goods with Europe 

and North America. After 1823, however, Spanish rule became more 

severe, and Spain saddled Cuba with trade restrictions and a heavy system of taxation which protected Spanish goods from foreign competition. The burden of these economic policies fell on the large group of 

rural proprietors who were well-to-do and desirous of economic progress and political autonomy. Moreover, Cuban commerce until 1898 

was largely in the hands of Spanish monopolists, a fact which became 

the economic basis for the independence movement in the 1890’s. The 

rural proprietors, allying themselves with middle-class groups, supported an independence movement, and with the active participation 

of the United States they overthrew Spanish rule in 1898.

Foreign Influence After 1898

The only foreign investor “of any consequence” in Cuba after 1898 

was the United States. U.S. private investment had risen from $205 

million in 1911 to $919 million in 1929. Investment declined between 

1929 and 1946, but moved upward again after 1946 so that in 1954 the 

United States had approximately $713 million invested in Cuba,5

 and 

between $800 million and $1 billion by 1958.6

The United States began to play a major role in the economic and 

political development of Cuba even before the turn of the century. The 

pattern of Cuban-United States relations, however, was not established 

until after Cuba won its independence from Spain. To the United 

States Cuba was important in two ways: it was a strategic military outpost for the protection of the Panama Canal, and an excellent outlet for 

capital. Although the U.S. Government resisted pressure from business 

groups to annex Cuba after Spanish rule was overthrown, a U.S. military mission was sent to prepare the island for the creation of a Cuban 

Government friendly to the United States. And as U.S. investment and 
18

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

Cuban-United States trade increased after the turn of the century, the 

U.S. Government took on the role of guarantor of stability and order in 

Cuba for the protection of U.S. life and property.

U.S. military rule in Cuba ended in 1902, but U.S. economicpolitical influence persisted even after the newly elected Cuban Government took office. The controversial Platt Amendment,a

 which was 

a political result of increasing foreign economic investment, “provided 

the basis for later United States intervention in Cuba and became the 

focus for Cuban nationalist reaction against the United States.”7 Article 

three of the Amendment stipulated that the United States retained the 

right to intervene in Cuban affairs “for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty. . . .”8

 U.S. business interests 

in Cuba often sought the use of the Amendment for the protection 

of their investments. In a series of instances in which Cuban political 

groups violently opposed each other, the U.S. Government regarded 

such situations with concern and sent marines to “guard” U.S. property. 

The last of such incidents occurred in 1917 when an allegedly fraudulent election provoked a political group into an open revolt. Some U.S. 

Marine units were landed in Oriente Province, but they did not participate in the revolt; the Cuban Government itself was able to put it down.

Cuban-United States economic ties were altered in the early thirties 

after Cuba had experienced both economic prosperity and economic 

disaster in the 1920’s. The U.S. Government under the administration 

of Franklin D. Roosevelt signed a treaty in May 1934 whereby the United 

States relinquished its right to intervene in Cuba’s internal affairs. A 

reciprocity treaty which made possible considerable tariff reductions, 

and sugar quotas which granted Cuba higher than world market prices 

for its sugar further enhanced “good neighbor” relations.9

From that time Cuban-United States ties remained relatively 

unchanged until 1959; and the United States, as a market for sugar and 

a source of imports, continued to carry much influence in Cuba. In 

1955, for instance, U.S. business interests were purchasing 73.4 percent 

of Cuba’s total exports, while Cuba was purchasing 68.9 percent of her 

imports from the United States.10 At that time sugar and its derivatives 

accounted for 79.8 percent of Cuba’s exports.11 U.S. business by the 

middle fifties controlled over 90 percent of the telephone and electric services, about 50 percent in public service railways, about 40 percent of raw sugar production, and its banks were entrusted with nearly 

a The Platt Amendment was part of a military appropriations bill which was passed 

In the U.S. Congress for the fiscal year 1901–02. It was incorporated into the first Cuban 

Constitution.
Factors Inducing Revolution

19

25 percent of Cuban bank deposits.12 Other investments such as mining 

and oil refining increased to high levels in the late fifties.13

Cuban governments, prompted by strong nationalist elements, at 

times set up protective tariffs for its small and slowly developing domestic non-sugar industry; but despite these efforts Cuban producers were 

never able to compete with imports from the United States. “ . . . over 

the years private Cuban and American commercial arrangements 

tended to restrict Cuban trade to the United States and to discourage 

the development in Cuba of import-substituting industries.”14 Cuban 

ties with the United States brought obvious prosperity to many of the 

island’s inhabitants, but only at the sacrifice of developing Cuban 

national potentiality and economic independence.

Summary

Spain controlled Cuba’s economy through systems of trade restrictions and taxation until its rule was overthrown late in the 19th century. After the turn of this century, U.S. business investment in Cuba 

and close Cuban-United States commercial ties shaped the island’s economic system. The Platt Amendment, until 1934, and the extent of U.S. 

investment gave the United States a large hand in Cuban economics 

and politics. Consequently, a strong undercurrent of Cuban nationalism was directed at what was regarded by the Cubans as undue U.S. 

interference.

Concentration of Land and Landless Peasants

Rise of Large Sugar Estates (Latifundias) and Land Concentration

In the colonial period the Spanish Crown awarded large land grants 

to colonists. During the last half of the 18th and the first half of the 

19th centuries many of the large haciendas were subdivided. In this 

period of change in land ownership in Cuba a large class of well-to-do 

and enterprising rural proprietors became firmly established and solidly organized.15

There were, however, economic forces at work militating against 

this wide distribution. During the same period the sugar industry was 

expanding rapidly to a position of dominance in the Cuban economy. 

The application of steampower to industry, other great technological 

advances of the 18th and 19th centuries, and the opening of new markets increased the efficiency of the methods of sugar production and the 

incentive for further expansion. However, sugar production received its 

greatest impetus in the late 19th century, when railroad construction 

was stimulated by a drop in steel prices. Until then primitive means of 

transporting cane to the mills had limited the areas which a single mill 
20

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

could serve. With railroads, the organization of sugar production was 

improved and the areas of operations were enlarged throughout most 

of the island.

In the late 19th and 20th centuries sugar corporations felt it necessary to acquire their own land in order to assure the centrales (sugar 

mills) an adequate supply of cane and to increase the efficiency of 

sugar production. Many small proprietors who held legal titles to their 

land were bought out by the corporations. Those who held questionable titles were brought to court and lost their land through legal procedures. Small proprietors of cane farms were largely eliminated in 

the process, and the corporations effected complete control of sugar 

production from the field to the mill.

Although sugar production increased rapidly during the same 

period the number of sugar mills decreased considerably, indicating 

a steady concentration of land. Between 1877 and 1915 the number of 

mills went down from 1,190 to 170. In the years 1925–26 it was reported 

that the centrales owned 20 percent of Cuba’s total land area. In the 

1940’s four sugar companies owned 25 percent of Cuban lands that 

were in the hands of the centrales.16 At that time 7.9 percent of the centrales and other plantations occupied 71.1 percent of the land.17

Thus in the long course of Cuban history the land that 

once was distributed widely among the inhabitants, 

either in the form of separate holdings or in communal ranches, became concentrated in the twentieth 

century in the hands of a few.18

The sugar centrales expanded and the rural population, once composed 

of small proprietors, was uprooted and became a class of tenant farmers, wageworkers, and landless peasants.

The Agrarian Reform Question

During the 1920’s, and especially after the U.S. depression brought 

disaster to the Cuban economy in 1930, newly rising political elements 

from the professional middle class increasingly demanded stringent 

governmental control over sugar production and urged wide distribution of large estates among the landless peasants. This was one of the 

major issues responsible for the overthrow of the Machado government 

in 1933. As a result, a series of sugar control acts was instituted in the 

years that fo1lowed, but influential domestic and foreign sugar corporations, politically powerful since the late 19th century, nevertheless 

remained largely in control of sugar production. A provision in the 

1940 Constitution to reduce the size of large sugar estates was never 

enforced.
Factors Inducing Revolution

21

Demands for agrarian reform and wide distribution of land were 

again heard with increasing force from 1953 to 1959. One of the most 

outspoken proponents of land distribution at this time was Fidel Castro. He supported a land program (based on the principle that those 

who cultivate the land should own it) whereby land would be distributed to small planters and peasants, with indemnification to former 

owners. Appeals for land distribution and the implementation of the 

neglected agrarian reform provision in the 1940 Constitution seemed 

to have won him some support from the landless peasants, but he had 

no very strong following among rural wage laborers, tenant farmers, 

and rural landowners. Nevertheless, Castro continued to build propaganda based upon the ills of the agricultural economy during the 

fighting stage of the revolution and his proposed remedies became one 

major foundation for his revolutionary platform.

Summary

Toward the end of the 19th century expanding sugar corporations 

in Cuba began to acquire large tracts of land that previously had been 

widely distributed among Cuban agriculturists. By 1920 much of the 

tillable land was in the hands of large plantations. From the late twenties on, in reaction to this concentration, there were demands for strong 

governmental controls over the operations of sugar corporations and 

a redistribution of land to landless rural workers; but these demands 

were ignored. Although Fidel Castro made agrarian reform the theme 

of his revolutionary movement in the 1950’s, it did not attract him a 

large following.

Absence of Diversified Economy

Factors Which Prompted the Development of Sugar Production

It was not by chance alone that Cuba became the world’s leading 

producer and exporter of sugar. A number of factors, both natural and 

political, combined to make sugar cultivation the dominant feature of 

the island’s economy. Cuba has land that is ideally suited to agriculture. 

Fifty-two percent, or 23,000 square miles (approximately 15 million 

acres), of the land is “suitable for cropping,” giving Cuba an unusually 

high ratio of tillable land.19 Spanish colonists first planted sugar on this 

land in the 16th century, but sugar cultivation did not gain importance 

until the 18th century.

World social and economic changes in the 18th century drastically 

altered the use of land in Cuba. The application of steampower to 

industry which revolutionized the milling process of sugar was mentioned earlier. But the most important changes were brought about by 
22

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

the upheavals in France and the Anglo-American colonies. The revolution in France slackened French rule over Haiti—which had been, until 

then, Europe’s greatest source of sugar and coffee—and precipitated 

an uprising of slaves in 1789. As a consequence, prices of these commodities rose sharply. French colonists fled to Cuba, taking with them 

many technical improvements in sugar refining, and the Cuban sugar 

industry expanded on a grand scale. The American Revolution, on the 

other hand, ended British rule of the Anglo-American states, offering 

Cuba a welcome “next door” sugar market. These social and economic 

changes occurred during the period between 1763 and 1823, when 

the Spanish Crown instituted moderate reforms. As a result, Cuban 

trade restrictions were relaxed and there was a free exchange of goods 

between Cuba and her foreign markets.

A good supply of slave labor and extensive railroad construction in 

the 19th century further stimulated sugar production. Slaves had been 

imported into Cuba in small trickles from West Africa for nearly two 

centuries, but the increased labor demands of expanding sugar and 

coffee production stepped up slave trading in the early 1800’s. After 

Cuban slavery was abolished in 1886, Jamaican, Haitian, Chinese, and 

Mexican immigrants supplied the necessary labor for Cuban agriculture. Railroad construction, as mentioned earlier, added another and a 

very important impetus to sugar cultivation.

Sugar Cultivation; Investment of Land, Labor, and Capital

At least since the turn of the 20th century, the Cuban economy has 

been built largely around growing and milling sugar. Sugar not only 

became the main industry, but it also became the basis for the national 

economy and Cuba’s main source of income. Consequently, the development of other basic foodstuffs and export crops was sorely neglected.

Before the advent of Castro, more than one-half of the cultivated 

land was devoted to sugar, and close to one-fourth of the labor force 

was employed in sugar cultivation; sugar and its by-products comprised 

approximately 80 percent of the value of Cuban exports.20 Much of the 

land that could have been utilized to grow other crops lay idle during 

periods of low sugar demand; and in periods of high demand, forest 

lands were destroyed and millions of fine tropical hardwoods were cut 

down and burned to clear new areas for sugar growing.

There is no doubt that after 1920 sugar was responsible for making Cuba the fifth-ranking industrial country in Latin America21 and 

for extending relative prosperity to the island’s population. However, 

concentrating on sugar cultivation also presented Cuba with a number of serious problems. The sugar industry is seasonal: it offers 4 to 

6 months of full employment to farmworkers during the period when 
Factors Inducing Revolution

23

sugar is harvested and brought to the mills, but there are 6 to 8 months 

of unemployment during the dead period between harvests. Moreover, 

profits from sugar depend on a fluctuating world market price. This 

offers high returns for sugar when the demand is high, but seriously 

drains foreign exchange reserves used to purchase food imports and 

other foreign manufactures when sugar demand is low. Cuba was so 

dominated by sugar from 1920 to 1950 that the quantity produced and 

sold determined the employment situation, the volume of national 

retail sales and purchases, and the amount of traffic over railroads 

and in harbors. In other words, sugar commanded nearly the entire 

Cuban economy.

There were times when the government, prompted by protectionistnationalist elements, encouraged diversification of agriculture and 

industry and attempted to solve the basic economic problems resulting from overdependence on sugar production. But these efforts were 

ill-timed. During times of prosperity when the government had at its 

disposal the means and opportunity to diversify and expand its economic base, it failed to do so. Only during times of economic crises did 

it adopt remedial measures, “which provided the motive but not the 

means for change.”22 Attracted by greater and faster returns, private 

investors, both domestic and foreign, plowed their capital into sugar 

production and showed little or no interest in promoting and developing non-sugar export industries and home-market consumer goods for 

the home market.

In an effort to expand Cuba’s economic base the government 

took on greater economic responsibility in the 1950’s and established 

a number of credit institutions and a grand scale development plan. 

The National Bank, legally authorized in 1948, became fully operative in mid-1950. The Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank 

was established in 1950 to promote rural credit and industrial development. Many new autonomous government credit institutions flourished 

during the period up to 1959. Batista’s new Economic and Social Development Plan which included tax incentives and easier credit was put 

into effect in 1954 to reduce unemployment and increase production. 

This ambitious plan called for the expenditure of 350 million Cuban 

pesos (1 peso=l dollar) over a 4-year period.23

These measures did not result in more industrial and agricultural 

diversification, however. Economic plans to promote short-term public 

works programs were initiated, and although large sums were spent, 

many of the projects were extravagant and unsound. The International 

Bank for Reconstruction and Development declared the construction 

of a tunnel under Havana harbor uneconomical and advised the Cuban 

Government against it.24 The government went ahead nevertheless and 
24

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

spent $30 million on the project.25 Public works programs temporarily 

eliminated widespread unemployment and contributed to the general 

prosperity during the fifties, but they also contributed to an inflationary trend that had not been halted by the time Castro came to power. 

Furthermore, the government’s loose and easy credit facilities only led 

to patronage and privilege which resulted in corruption within the 

government.26

There was some diversification and new investment 

in these years, but at no time were the changes introduced by the government and private enterprise of 

such a scope as to overcome the dominance of sugar 

in an otherwise static economy.27

Summary

Fertile soil and world social and economic changes gave Cuba an 

opportunity to develop a prosperous economy based on the cultivation of a single export crop—sugar. Over the years land, labor, and 

capital were heavily invested in sugar cultivation while the production 

of other basic needed items were neglected. The problem in this type 

of lopsided economy is that the whole country, in order to maintain 

economic stability, depends on world demand and world prices for its 

one product; little demand and low prices for sugar on the world market brought economic disaster to Cuba. The government made some 

attempts to expand the country’s economic base in the 1950’s; but its 

efforts were directed toward large-scale public works programs which 

contributed to increased prosperity but also contributed to patronage, 

government excesses, and inflation. Sugar production continued to 

dominate the Cuban economy.

Unemployment and Underemployment

Chronic Unemployment

Each year prior to 1959 thousands of Cubans faced unemployment 

and poverty as a consequence of the seasonal character of sugar cultivation, Cuban’s major source of income. A potentially full employment 

situation existed only during the 4 to 6 month periods of each year 

when sugar was harvested and brought to the mills. At the close of the 

harvest, the seasonally employed found themselves without work. They 

were unable to save enough of their income to carry them from one season to another, and unless they were fortunate enough to find alternate 

job opportunities during the dead season, they lived on credit until the 
Factors Inducing Revolution

25

next harvest. One bad harvest or a low sugar demand on the world market brought disastrous results to thousands of Cuban workers.

According to U.S. Department of Commerce figures, an estimated 

400,000–450,000 workers (over 20 percent of the total labor force of 

over 2 million) were unemployed during the 1952 dead season. Even at 

the peak of the 1953 harvest, unemployment was still at 174,000 or over 

8 percent of the labor force.28

The unemployment situation was certainly much more acute in the 

rural areas than in the cities where employment was steadier; only about 

12 percent of the rural workers were employed throughout the year.29

However, even the cities faced the prospect of job shortages when large 

numbers of unemployed sugar workers arrived during the dead season 

in search of alternate employment. Moreover, the urban labor force 

was increased yearly when rural workers, attracted by higher wages and 

better working conditions, migrated to the cities and added to the list 

of underemployed and unemployed. They settled in city slums and took 

on whatever odd jobs they could find.

Thus, a 20–25 percent unemployment figure was normal in prerevolutionary Cuba. This is a relatively high figure considering that 

only during the worst year of the depression did unemployment in the 

United States reach 25 percent, and has ranged from 5 to 8 percent 

during the last decade.

Social Legislation Subsequent to the 1933 Uprising

Labor conditions were relatively bad in Cuba during the late twenties. The country was in a critical economic state and the government, 

attempting to stabilize the economy, often instituted measures that 

eliminated the rights and protections of workers and showed little consideration for their welfare. Agricultural and industrial workers who 

were fortunate enough to find jobs worked long hours under arduous 

conditions at very low salaries. Labor unions were outlawed and labor 

organizers were persecuted by government authorities. Labor conditions became so intolerable by 1933 that the workers struck against 

the government and helped to overthrow President Gerardo Machado. 

The strike paralyzed industries in Havana and later spread to the sugar 

mills as workers took complete control over a number of them. Labor 

unrest continued and chaos prevailed during 1934 and 1935 until the 

army, under the leadership of Fulgencio Batista, checked the revolutionary aspects of organized labor, arrested its leaders, and dissolved 

the National Labor Confederation (CNOC). Since then no “regime has 

failed to manifest interest in and concern for the working classes.”30

After the feud between government and organized labor ended 

in the late thirties, a close association that had advantages for both 
26

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

sides developed and was maintained until 1959. In exchange for supporting the government and its allied political parties, organized labor 

received numerous privileges and favorable decisions in disputes with 

its employers. Frequent government interventions, chiefly in favor of 

urban labor, placed management in an inferior position and “undermined the principle of collective bargaining.”31 Labor’s excessive 

demands often discouraged new investments, prevented many small 

home-market consumer goods industries from expanding, and led others into bankruptcy.

Labor conditions improved considerably as many important social 

and labor measures were adopted or expanded in the thirties and 

incorporated into the 1940 Constitution. The 8-hour day was introduced (6 hours for workers between 14 and 18 years of age), a minimum wage scale was established, and workers were protected from 

being dismissed by their employers. Equal pay for equal work, “paid” 

vacations and holidays, and Christmas bonuses were among the benefits received by all workers. Women workers also received maternity 

benefits and were restricted by law from taking dangerous jobs. Laws 

restricted the employment of children under 14. A number of provisions for the protection of the aged and unemployed were embodied 

in the 1940 Constitution, but by the middle fifties they had not been 

enforced. Workmen’s compensation for injuries, sickness, and death 

was expanded. In general, these measures represented a body of labor 

legislation comparable to those existing in many advanced industrial 

countries. These measures were designed essentially for urban labor, 

however, and a large segment of the rural population was left without 

the benefit and protection of social and labor legislation.

Workers continued to benefit from the government’s pro-labor policies under the administrations of Ramón Grau San Martín and Carlos Prío Socarrás. Fulgencio Batista, however, attempted to bring the 

interests of organized labor into line with the interests of management 

after his coup d’etat in 1952b and “made some notable departures from 

the pro-labor practices of previous administrations.”32 His government 

refrained from intervening in labor-management disputes, permitted management to limit featherbedding arrangements, allowed some 

wages to be lowered and production bonuses to be eliminated. Despite 

these departures, working conditions were generally good and living 

standards had improved so that by the middle fifties Cuban urban 

laborers were experiencing one of the highest standards of living in 

Latin America, and Batista maintained the support of urban labor 

throughout his second regime (1952–58).

b Batista overthrew the government headed by Prío in March 1952.
Factors Inducing Revolution

27

Summary

Following the revolution in 1933 a mutually beneficial alliance 

between government and labor was established and maintained during the succeeding years until 1959. Although organized urban labor 

received many benefits and the general standard of living was raised, 

the basic problem of chronic unemployment and the lack of equivalent 

social benefits for rural labor remained unchanged.

SOCIAL ANTAGONISM

Tensions Within the Social Structure

Class

Class characteristics of Cuban society. Except for the rise of urban 

labor in the twenties and thirties and the slow development of professional and commercial groups resulting from the shift in the organization of sugar production, the social structure (particularly rural) did 

not change in the years before Castro. Three classes were evident from 

an economic point of view: an upper class composed of the wealthy 

landowners and owners and operators of large business enterprises; a 

middle class of educated professionals, small merchants, army officers, 

and the government bureaucracy; a lower class of uneducated peasants 

and agricultural and urban wageworkers.

The upper and lower classes were well defined. Those who “worked 

with their hands” or hired other people to do their work belonged to 

the upper class. They were the landed and the moneyed class—remnants of the old colonial aristocracy, and self-made individuals who 

had accumulated their fortunes in this century through a combination 

of business and politics. Their power and prestige were based mainly 

on their economic position. Those who “worked with their hands” and 

hired themselves out to do other people’s work were in the lower class. 

The urban lower class, developing in size and power in this century, 

included the industrial workers both in city centers and in sugar centrales. They experienced a much higher standard of living than their 

rural counterparts—a situation which promoted the growth of the 

urban population.33

The middle class was not so well defined, however.34 It was composed mainly of professional and commercial bureaucratic groups 

whose members came from the prosperous lower class and the younger 

generation of the upper class, whose values they carried with them. 

Although it was possible to move from the lower middle class to the 

upper middle class (largely dependent on university training in traditionally esteemed fields such as law and medicine), the middle class 
28

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

was generally unstable and aspired to a better life and progress. Its 

members showed little interest in overthrowing the social order, but 

they also showed little interest in supporting an arbitrary government 

resting on the military and the rural status quo.

Interacting class tensions from 1933 to 1959. The general unrest 

which prevailed in the late twenties and culminated in the 1933 uprising followed a period of post-World War I prosperity that was referred 

to by Cubans as the “Dance of the Millions.” This era witnessed the 

rapid expansion of the sugar industry and the creation of new wealth. 

Prosperity was not widely distributed, however. Profits remained largely 

in the hands of mill owners and landed proprietors, both Cuban and 

foreign, who united to form a new elite similar to the old colonial upper 

class which was based on a plantation economy. The revolution in 1933 

destroyed this new class before it became firmly established.

Three elements combined to carry out the revolution in 1933: 

Socialist-minded middle-class intellectuals, Communist-led labor 

unions, and the military rank-and-file. The new aspirants to power, 

young professionals and labor leaders, brought to the struggle new 

leftwing convictions of central control and governmental initiative to 

raise the economic, social, and cultural levels of all Cubans. The lower 

ranks of the army, led by Batista, united with the other two groups in 

pursuit of its own interests. This military group likewise entered the 

revolution with a left-of-center ideology. It helped to topple a strongly 

entrenched conservative government and an old conservative officer 

corps as well. From that time Batista and the army “ran Cuba and held 

the real power,” but gave more attention to previously neglected urban 

labor.35

Social conditions prevalent during the resistance to Batista in the 

fifties were very unlike those which prevailed prior to the 1933 uprising. Cuba was enjoying a period of relative prosperity brought about 

by the demands of the Korean war; the world market was able to 

absorb a large share of Cuba’s sugar production at high prices. During 

this period Cuban wage earners were receiving a larger share of the 

national income. The share rose from 59 percent to 65 percent between 

1950 and 1954.36 Per capita income averaged $312 during those years. 

This is a low figure by U.S. and Western European standards, but it 

represented one of the highest per capita incomes in Latin America. 

Cuba not only maintained this relatively high standard of living for its 

growing population, but upon occasion managed to improve it to some 

degree.37

Cuba was by no stretch of the imagination a paradise before the 

advent of Castro; it was a country faced with serious social problems. 

Although subsistence living did not characterize the island, there were 
Factors Inducing Revolution

29

extremes of wealth and poverty well marked between the rich in the cities and the “casually employed” agricultural laborers in the rural areas. 

Educational facilities and health services were concentrated in urban 

centers, to the neglect of the rural areas; the rural population was 41.7 

percent illiterate,38 and was plagued with nutritional deficiencies and 

parasitic infection. The housing situation was extremely bad: “Nearly 

half of the city dwellings and three-fourths of all rural dwellings were 

in fair or poor condition.”39

Two groups contributed the largest share of the revolutionary effort 

to overthrow Batista: the professional middle class and some members 

of the rural lower class. Middle-class interests were entirely political 

while the rural lower class sought social and economic benefits. The 

larger part of the working class, well-organized under politically influential labor unions, had achieved a number of labor and social reforms 

since the thirties, and thus saw little or nothing to be gained from a 

revolution. It took no part in the fighting until the last few days of 

Batista’s rule.

Race

A certain degree of racial discrimination and segregation was practiced in Cuba before 1959, although there were no strict caste lines 

or formal regulations which barred nonwhites from social activities or 

occupations. The upper class, which was almost entirely white and primarily of Spanish extraction, kept nonwhites from attending its private schools and clubs. The upper middle class avoided any type of 

relationship with Negroes, except on an employer-employee basis, and 

prevented Negroes from moving into newer residential districts. Membership in Negro societies, labor unions, and the Communist Party 

were the only means through which Negroes were able to obtain social 

status. In the professional groups, and the managerial, proprietorship 

and office forces, nonwhites were underrepresented. Of the total population in 1953 (5,829,029), an estimated 27.2 percent was nonwhite 

(Negro, oriental, and mixed). Whites outnumbered Negroes 5 to 1 in 

urban districts as compared with a 7 to 1 ratio in rural areas.40 Intermarriage among the various races was common as was evidenced by a 

large mestizo, or mixed, population.

Except for one incident in 1911, there had been no serious racial 

disturbances by 1959. Extreme discriminatory practices of the colonial 

period persisted after independence, and as a result of Negro demands 

for recognition of Negro rights, an open revolt broke out in 1911; it was 

immediately suppressed. Three thousand Negroes were killed.41
30

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

Religion

Roman Catholicism, the principal religion of Cuba, lost much of its 

influence and source of monetary support when the colonial order was 

overthrown in 1898, and was constitutionally separated from the state 

in 1902. It was further weakened in the 1930’s when the Batista government took over many of its welfare functions. The Church had never 

developed a “base of popular support” under Spanish rule, and after 

independence the Cuban masses remained indifferent, often showing 

outward signs of disrespect and hostility. The Church was generally 

associated with the upper class, whose wealthy members continued to 

regard religious ceremonies an indispensable feature of “upper class 

living.” It was labeled as foreign and reactionary by middle-class nationalists. Although nominal Church membership was estimated in the 

1950’s at 85 percent, only about 10 percent of the Cubans participated 

in Church activities.42

Summary

The pre-1959 social structure in Cuba was composed of the upper, 

middle, and lower classes as defined in terms of economic wealth 

and political power. Generally, the position of the middle and lower 

classes improved considerably between the years 1933–59. Except for 

two groups, the professional middle class and some members of the 

rural lower class, the majority of Cubans were relatively content with 

the existing order under Batista. The tension that arose within the 

social structure during the 1950’s was attributable on one hand to the 

efforts of the professional middle class to further its political influence, 

while on the other hand some members of the rural lower class, long 

neglected by the government, increased their demands for equitable 

social and economic benefits. The issues of race and religion were not 

significant points of social tension in recent Cuban society.

Demise of Traditional Society

The demise of Cuba’s traditional society is defined in terms of a 

society in transition—developing from a society based on a plantation 

economy to one based on an industrializing economy. This transition 

could be partly described by what has already been discussed above—

that is, by the broadening of the cash economy; greater participation, 

at least psychologically, in the island’s destiny; greater mobility within 

the social structure; etc. In addition to the above, the transition could 

also be discussed in terms of sources of relative personal security and 

urbanization.
Factors Inducing Revolution

31

Sources of Relative Personal Security: Land and Sugar Mills

Land was widely distributed in separate landholdings or in communal ranches by the middle of the 19th century, and represented a 

source of livelihood to a large number of Cuban peasants. While it is 

doubtful that holdings under this system of landownership were profitably valuable to most of the individual landowners, these landowners 

derived a certain measure of economic security arising out of direct 

ownership of and contact with the soil. Moreover, the Cuban economy 

was not yet geared to the cultivation of a single crop and the Cubans 

were enjoying the security of a relatively well-developed and diversified 

agricultural economy (for that time-period).

Technological changes in the sugar industry brought on the expansion of the sugar latifundia, and along with this the peasants gradually 

lost possession of their land and thus the security related to it. Sugar 

centrales acquired vast areas of arable land in order to grow profitably 

one export crop. Peasants no longer directed the use of the land and 

either hired themselves out to the sugar mills as seasonal agricultural 

laborers, or became renters of land that remained under the supervision of sugar mills. Instead of experiencing the relative security that is 

derived from an economy of many individual proprietorships and the 

production of diversified crops, the Cuban peasants faced the insecurity that comes from land concentration in the hands of a few and the 

cultivation of a single crop that is dependent on a fluctuating world 

market.43

Urbanization and Government Protection of Lower Classes Through 

Social Legislation

By 1920 the expanding sugar corporations had appropriated 

most of Cuba’s arable land in order to grow sugar and thereby gave 

a tremendous push to urban growth. Many peasants who could not 

acquire small holdings left the countryside in search of better jobs and 

higher wages available in the cities and around the sugar mills. The 

trend toward urbanization continued so that by 1953 the two kinds of 

urban settlements, the ordinary city and the bateyes (small communities 

located around the sugar mills), accounted for 57 percent of the total 

population.44

The new government under Batista took greater interest in bringing protection to the lower classes through social legislation after 1933. 

This legislation offered the people who moved to the urban areas an 

agreeable standard of social security in lieu of the older source of security from direct contact with the land. Prior to 1933 these people had 

received scant attention from the government and bureaucrats. Their 

“bitter frustration” grew so that eventually they participated in a revolt 
32

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

that overthrew the government.c The new security offered by the government after 1932 tended to provide a stabilizing force in Cuban society; the working class generally supported the incumbent government 

and failed to respond to the call for general strikes against Batista in 

the 1950’s. Those Cubans who did not choose to move to the cities or 

batey settlements and maintained their existence in scattered and isolated huts, received none of the social and economic benefits won by 

their urban counterparts. They were the Cubans who were most susceptible to Fidel Castro’s revolutionary appeals.

Summary

The concentration of land for the production of sugar beginning 

in the 19th century forced the gradual migration of former landowners 

to urban centers and sugar mills. The resulting social pressures culminated in a general upheaval in 1933. Thereafter, the succeeding governments devoted more attention to the social and economic needs of 

urbanized Cubans and offered these people an acceptable standard of 

social security. A few sectors of society, particularly the isolated rural 

dwellers, did not share in this general improvement of living standards.

Marginality of Professional Groups

Heroes of revolutionary movements in Cuba generally have been 

“intellectuals.”d Coming from well-to-do families of the commercial 

upper middle class, many of these young revolutionaries had the opportunity to receive a good education at private schools and universities 

and to become members of the professional groups. They were seldom 

satisfied with their society and were often anxious to alter it. Because of 

the impracticality of their idealistic programs, the intellectuals, when 

in power, usually failed in administration. The disillusionment and 

c “The advance of industrialization vastly expands the urban strata of the population 

and even gradually draws the formerly inert rural strata into politics. The rise of different 

organized groups conscious of their different interests and of their collective strength is 

bound to produce conflict,” and tend toward “democratization.” Any regime establishing 

an authoritarian system that fails to recognize these interests in an industrializing society 

is bound to be attacked and its survival threatened by labor and the intellectuals.45

d The Cuban poet, José Martí, who became the martyr of the independence movement, acquired his revolutionary enthusiasm from his private school teacher. Martí spent 

much time in prison and in exile for defying Spanish authority in Cuba. He was killed 

while leading a revolutionary expedition in 1895. 

Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín, physician and professor at Havana University, was the 

leader of a radical group of students and professors in the 1933 revolution.

Fidel Castro, lawyer and revolutionist, exemplifies the recent Cuban leadership. (See 

Composition of Revolutionary Actors for Castro’s background.)
Factors Inducing Revolution

33

frustration resulting from their failures frequently laid the groundwork 

for further revolutionary movements.

Role of Intellectuals in the Revolution Against Spain

Cuba had her own philosophes during the movement against Spain; 

they were called pensadores.e These intellectuals (Cuban and Spanish liberals) were writers, and nearly all of them wrote poetry. Many 

wrote articles for the short-lived revolutionary papers and circulars that 

existed in Cuba during the 19th century. Their literary tirades against 

Spanish rule kept them in and out of exile throughout the revolutionary period. Toward the end of the century they launched an uprising 

after having allied themselves with the landowning and commercial 

classes, who most felt the pinch of Spanish mercantile policies.

Attitude of the Professional Groups vis-a-vis Their Society Under 

the Republic

Members of professional groups became increasingly bitter and 

dissatisfied with their political position in Cuban society and disappointed with the general economic situation after 1920.f

 They believed 

themselves to be an elite, but were aware that their position of political power and prestige was inferior to that of the landholding and 

industrial upper class. The only way in which they could maintain 

their prestige was through university training in the esteemed fields of 

law, medicine, and teaching. However, the undiversified nature of the 

Cuban economy during the first 50 years after independence tended to 

produce an overabundance of all professionals, especially lawyers, doctors, and teachers. Such individuals became underemployed and many 

were forced to seek jobs outside their professions in order to provide 

the income they believed was consistent with their social status.

Summary

Professionals appear to have formed a generally unwanted element 

in Cuban society. Because they continually advocated change they 

e The three most eloquent spokesmen for Cuban independence were Father Felix 

Varela y Morales (1787–1833), José de la Luz y Caballero (1800–1862), and José Antonio 

Saco y López (1797–1879). They have been called the “forefathers of Cuban national consciousness” by Cuban historians.46

f Jorge Mañach was a middle-class intellectual of the twenties and thirties. He 

received a science degree from Havana University and founded a small literary magazine. 

He joined the successful revolutionary movement of the early thirties and thereafter 

advanced socially as a senator, cabinet minister, and editor of a national newspaper. Raúl 

Roa, Minister of Foreign Affairs under Castro, was one of the many underemployed lawyers of more recent times who were politically frustrated and who set about to change their 

society during the 1950’s.47
34

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

were politically unreliable and formed a very unstable sector of their 

society. Because the Cuban economy could not absorb their numbers 

they became economic misfits. Partly in an endeavor to better their 

economic position, and partly in protest to their marginal position in 

the existing political order, many young intellectuals became leaders of 

revolutionary movements.

POLITICAL WEAKNESSES

Inefficiency of Governmental Machinery

Neglect or Failure to Change Old Institutions to Meet New Needs

For more than 50 years after the Republic was established in 1902, 

the Cuban Government was noted for two failures: the failure to enact 

and enforce major policies to meet the nation’s changing needs, and 

the failure to close the wide gap that existed between the letter of constitutional theory and governmental practice.

Many individuals who manned the governmental posts at all levels 

and in all branches were responsible for these failures. To them the 

government was a prize awarded the victor of a political struggle. Political office was a means of achieving wealth and social status. “At most 

times . . . the government . . . was used in many ways by many persons 

to buy support, to placate opposition, to threaten, and to ensure the 

support of powerful interest groups.”48 Thus, these same individuals 

tended to preserve the malpractices and the legal loopholes which protected their profiteering. Reformers who opposed them ended up by 

redistributing the “spoils of office” instead of reforming the system.49

The result of all this was the failure on the part of the successive 

governments “to enact or implement laws ensuring such essentials of 

democratic governments as an independent judiciary, a nonpolitical 

civil service and a legislature able to check abuse of executive power.”50

Moreover, the governments also failed to take “effective action” in the 

way of curing the basic social and economic ills of the island. Constitutions were filled with idealistic goals, but their provisions were rarely 

enforced. The governments, especially after the economic disaster of 

the late twenties and the revolution of 1933, attempted and partially 

succeeded in assuming greater social and economic responsibility. 

However, many of their policies intended to broaden public welfare 

merely appeased special interest groups and further extended government control over social and economic life.

Failure to develop stable political system under the 1901 Constitution. During the first 30 years of independence from Spain, Cuba failed 

to develop a stable political system under the 1901 Constitution. The 
Factors Inducing Revolution

35

period was marked with elections, revolts, and U.S. intervention. Two 

major political groups dominated the political arena and competed for 

office: the Conservative Party, which received the support of business 

interests and the rural population; and the Liberal Party, which drew 

the urban and Negro vote. “Each used all the techniques available in 

Cuban life to attain power: the outright buying of votes; the sweeping 

use of amnesties and pardons; the careful distribution of patronage; 

cultivation of the army; control of the national lottery; and appeals to 

the United States Government.”51 Political loyalties were based on the 

extent of control and influence of a party rather than on differences of 

policies and programs. Out of six national elections held between 1908 

and 1933, each party won three.

Election time in Cuba was generally a period of unrest during which 

disaffected elements threatened to revolt or actually resorted to force 

of arms in attempts to settle political disputes. Three times—in 1906, 

1912, and again in 1917—revolts flared in various parts of the island 

when the “out” group charged the “in” group with having manipulated 

the elections. Each time, the United States intervened to restore order 

and revise the Cuban electoral code. A new code which was formulated 

in 1919 failed to solve the problem, however, and the opposition party 

again charged the party in power with irregularities and threatened 

to revolt during the elections of November 1920. The United States 

intervened and sent General Enoch Crowder to investigate the alleged 

irregularities. After his findings indicated that there had been no 

irregularities, he remained in Cuba and became very influential in the 

island’s internal politics, serving first as financial advisor to the Cuban 

Government and later as U.S. Ambassador to Cuba.

Political developments from 1925 to 1933 resulted in dictatorship 

and revolution. Gerardo Machado, who was elected President in 1924, 

pledged honest government and promised to serve only one term of 

office. Early in his first term, however, he began to lay the foundations for an extension of his career: the Machado-dominated Congress 

extended presidential and congressional tenure and abolished the Vice 

Presidency. Reports of corruption and despotism became widespread, 

opposition groups formed, terrorism and counterterrorism increased. 

In 1933, when Machado was forced to surrender the Presidency, the 

entire island was near civil war. New political aspirants emerged to 

engage in violent conflict with the remnants of the Machado regime 

and with each other. Chaos prevailed until the army took control in 

March 1935 and restored some semblance of order.

Political developments under the 1940 Constitution. Many Cubans 

expressed the need for a new constitution during the late thirties. The 

1901 Constitution was restored shortly before national elections were 
36

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

held in 1936, but it was felt inadequate to curb government violations 

of constitutional provisions and to meet new national needs. It had provided political equality and individual liberties, but failed to outline 

the responsibility of the government in providing individual social and 

economic rights as well. The new Constitution, established in 1940, 

adopted most of the social and labor legislation that had been enacted 

from 1933 to 1940. Provisions dealing with other social and economic 

matters, however, “were statements of purpose requiring additional 

legislation.”52

As became evident in the years that followed, the central government 

failed to make the new Constitution “fully operative” and was criticized 

by Cubans for not establishing institutions called for by its provisions. 

Moreover, political patronage, which had always been a source of graft 

in the Cuban political system, was not eliminated by the new Constitution. Teachers, policemen, and civil servants at all levels could not be 

appointed without some political influence.53 The government became 

Cuba’s second largest employer—next to the sugar industry.

Batista was the first President to be elected under the provisions 

of the 1940 Constitution. He resigned his post as chief of the Armed 

Forces and ran as a candidate in July 1940 on a coalition ticket of the 

Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, and the Communist Party (legally 

recognized for the first time in 1938). Batista defeated Ramón Grau 

San Martín, one of the leaders of the 1933 revolution, who was supported by a coalition of revolutionary parties. However, wartime emergencies compelled Batista to shelve constitutional guarantees and 

exercise complete and arbitrary control over politics and the economy.

The next two administrations, led by Presidents Ramón Grau San 

Martín (1944–48) and Carlos Prío Socarrás (1948–52), both of the 

Auténtico Party, “formed a critical period of expectation and disillusionment in the development of Cuban political attitudes.”54 Batista had 

promised and given the Cubans stability, a constitution, free elections, 

and a better government than any Cuban had ever known. Grau and 

Prío, putting the “outs” into government, promised economic progress and social reform. Grau failed to persuade Congress to adopt his 

reforms and also failed to control the graft, so that corruption increased 

and a steady deterioration pervaded all levels. He was also accused of 

misappropriating funds. Prío was more successful in establishing institutions that were called for by the 1940 Constitution: they were used to 

create new wealth and to increase employment. “They were also used, 

however, for political patronage and were the means by which favored 

individuals grew wealthy by taking enormous profits for industries 

operating largely on government-supplied capital.”55 Toward the end of 
Factors Inducing Revolution

37

Prío’s term of office, there was an increase in gangsterism and public 

disorder which threatened business and frightened foreign investors.

The Batista coup d’etat of March 1952 shocked the Cuban public, 

and almost immediately there began a campaign of bitter opposition 

to unseat him. This opposition was led by university students and by 

followers of ousted President Prío. Many industrialists and merchants 

were pleased by the Batista coup, however, because they felt that he 

would control labor. Batista did preserve labor peace and he also sponsored much needed public works programs that had been promised 

earlier by numerous political leaders. He suspended the Constitution 

and the Congress for over 2 years, however, and during most of the 

period up to 1959 he ruled through emergency and extralegal powers.

Inadequacy of Government’s Initial Reaction to the 1953–1959 

Revolutionary Movement

Origins of the revolutionary movement immediately after the 1952 

coup d’etat. The initial reaction to the coup among interest groups and 

the Cuban masses in general was varied. For the most part there was 

no effective opposition. Big business, strongly conservative and primarily interested in maintaining economic stability and public order, welcomed Batista with relief. There had always been a close relationship 

between the business community and government; business received 

favorable tax concessions and contract awards in return for political 

contributions. Specific groups, such as the sugar industry, did not deal 

directly with government; they supported semiautonomous government 

agencies, such as the Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute, composed 

of representatives from sugar associations which acted as lobbies and 

usually dealt with matters directly affecting their individual industries. 

The Association of Cane Planters, represented in the Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute, “was the first organization to announce its support 

of Batista after the 1952 coup d’etat. It was followed by similar statements 

from the banks and from the labor confederations.”56

Labor made peace with Batista very shortly after the coup. Eusebio 

Mujal, head of the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC),g

 called a 

strike in protest against Batista’s illegal seizure of power, but it failed. 

Batista banned strikes and arrested Mujal. Mujal was soon released, 

g Labor unions joined together in federations and the majority of union federations, 

such as the National Federation of Sugar Workers, the National Federation of Workers 

in the Construction Industry, the National Federation of Commercial Workers, and the 

National Federation of Transport Workers, were members of the CTC. The exact number 

of workers in the CTC in 1952 is not known, but it could be presumed to have been close 

to one million.
38

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

however, and was allowed to resume leadership of the CTC with the 

agreement that CTC would remain politically neutral.

The army, from whose ranks Batista rose to political power, had 

been used traditionally by governments to put down internal disorders 

rather than to fight major wars outside the island.

Batista’s reliance upon the army made it a power which 

no one might seriously threaten. Presidents Grau San 

Martín and Prío Socarrás each altered the personnel 

of the high command to promote men more sympathetic to themselves, but no serious effort was made 

to reduce the size of the establishment or the funds, 

usually 20 percent of the budget, absorbed by the 

military.57

The army aided Batista in his 1952 coup and was well-rewarded with pay 

increases and various other benefits. The high command was replaced 

with men loyal to Batista.

In contrast to the general acceptance of Batista’s coup by other 

groups, university students appear to have raised the greatest protest. 

The students had always been politically conscious and took sides on 

political issues, often violently divisive among themselves. A traditional understanding between Havana University and the government 

allowed the university complete freedom from government interference in its activities—a form of extraterritorial right guarded by both 

faculty and students. But whenever this right was threatened by the 

government, students and faculty banded together and the university 

became the seedbed of revolutionary activity. President Machado, for 

example, violated the autonomy of the university when students criticized his regime in 1933; the students rose against him and joined the 

successful revolutionary effort that overthrew him. In 1952 university 

students attempted to organize a general strike protesting Batista’s illegal seizure of power, but it was nipped in the bud by the army and 

police forces. The university was closed and the students again took 

arms in a continued struggle against the government.

Fidel Castro led a small force of approximately 165 men on July 26, 

1953, to the Moncada barracks, the principal fortress of Oriente Province in Santiago de Cuba. Earlier, as a politician, Castro had presented 

himself as a congressional candidate for the Ortodoxo Party, an outgrowth of the Auténtico Party, in elections that were interrupted by 

Batista’s coup. He filed a brief with an urgency court (antigovernment 

activities generally were referred to an urgency court), protesting Batista’s seizure of power and declaring it unconstitutional, but the courts 

refused to act.58 It was then that Castro organized his group, later to be 
Factors Inducing Revolution

39

known as the 26th of July Movement, to plot the nighttime attack. The 

attack, which consisted of plans to take over the fortress, seize arms, 

announce the victory to the people, and establish a revolutionary government in Santiago, failed.59 The element of surprise so important to 

the success of the attack was removed when an alarm bell was sounded 

and awakened the sleeping soldiers. Many of the attackers were killed, 

and others, Castro among them, eventually surrendered, were tried, 

and sent to prison.60

Government’s political efforts to counter opposition. Until November 1954, when national elections were held, Batista ruled Cuba with an 

iron hand. One of his first official acts was to suspend the 1940 Constitution. Shortly thereafter, he decreed a new provisional Constitution 

which modified the older document for the purpose of consolidating 

his rule and at least temporarily eliminating legal opposition. Congress 

was indefinitely dissolved and replaced by a Consultative Council whose 

members were appointed by Batista. The press was restricted, and critics either went into exile or were imprisoned.

According to Batista, the restrictions he imposed on the Cuban 

people were merely temporary and were to be lifted as soon as new 

elections were held. Elections were postponed until November 1954. 

At that time Batista was elected President for a 4-year term. The 1940 

Constitution was reinstated and Congress reconvened.

Elections did not quiet dangerous opposition and consequently 

Batista felt compelled to make further concessions to forestall criticism 

of his regime. In early 1955 he established a Civic Dialogue, a group 

composed of representatives of all political and other organizations, 

whose primary function was to seek a “peaceful political solution.” The 

group charged Batista with election fraud and concluded that “nothing 

could be settled without new and genuinely free, honest elections.”61 A 

new election was not acceptable to Batista. Because of domestic and 

international pressure, however, he did approve a general amnesty in 

May 1955 which freed hundreds of political prisoners including the 

group that had taken part in the Moncada attack in 1953.

Political groups and civic institutions after 1956 insisted that the 

only way to eliminate tension and the threat of civil war in Cuba was to 

have Batista step down in favor of a new and popularly elected government. Batista eventually acceded to these demands, promised “free” 

and “honest” elections, but refused to step down until his term of office 

ended in February 1959. After several postponements, elections were 

held in November 1958 which resulted in the election by 25 percent 

of the electorate62 of Batista’s candidate, Dr. Andres Rivero Aguero. 

Batista was charged with engineering the elections and attempting to 

perpetuate his rule through a puppet president.
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

Summary

The Cuban Government, rarely free from graft from 1902 to 1959, 

was a means by which politicians could achieve economic wealth and 

social status. Its major function as a reward of political struggle made 

those who manned governmental posts reluctant to reform the system which had tended to perpetuate dishonesty over the years. Consequently, basic social and economic problems were seldom dealt with 

effectively and constitutional provisions were usually disregarded.

Although most of the major interest groups soon adjusted to Batista’s illegal seizure of power in 1952, a small minority initially resisted 

violently. To counter this reaction Batista resorted to a combination of 

military and political measures: he employed force to snuff out conspiracies and open revolts, and extended his presidential powers to meet 

political opposition.

Political Fragmentation of Ruling Elites and Opposition 

Groups

Distrust Between Ruling Groups: Politics and Personalismo

Cuban governments, whether they achieved power through peaceful and constitutionally outlined procedures or through violence, have 

never gained the lasting confidence of competing political groups and 

seldom have been free from violent opposition. There are two reasons 

for this: the political groups not in power lacked faith in the government’s intention to hold honest elections; and politics was usually based 

on the rivalry between personalities who struggled with each other to 

gain personal control of the government.

Cuban constitutions specifically spelled out the manner in which 

the exchange of power between political groups should take place. 

Moreover, these constitutional procedures were supplemented and 

revised at various times in order to develop a successful electoral system 

free from corruption.

But to a great extent the electoral system, like other 

procedures established by law to limit arbitrary exercise of power, was in practice regarded as something 

to be manipulated. Opposition parties often assumed 

that the ruling group would use the machinery of the 

state to control elections and to perpetuate its power. 

They would then withdraw from the campaign in protest rather than participate in what they considered the 

government’s plan to legitimize itself by fraud. Such a 

step was intended to draw domestic and international 
Factors Inducing Revolution

41

criticism upon the government—particularly from 

the United States—and at times it was a prelude to 

violence.63

The number of instances when such techniques were applied during national elections were more frequent prior to the 1933 uprising, 

but there are several incidents which occurred in the 1950’s that should 

be mentioned. During the 1952 presidential campaigns, for example, 

Batista claims to have discovered a plot whereby President Prío Socarrás 

planned to extend his tenure by carrying out a coup with the aid of several military leaders.64 This discovery, according to Batista, prompted 

him to execute his own coup. A less serious incident occurred during 

the 1954 presidential campaign when Grau San Martín, Batista’s only 

opponent, charged that the elections were rigged in favor of Batista 

and withdrew his candidacy in order to discredit the elections. A similar incident occurred in 1958 when most of Batista’s political opponents and at least 75 percent of the Cuban electorate did not take part 

in the elections.h,65

Violent opposition in political activity was intensified by the personal rivalries and ambitions of the national leaders. A leader’s role in 

the political system became so important that the movement which his 

party represented carried his name. This situation is called personalismo; political parties were viewed as the personal creation of their leaders, rather than being built around a solid core of political philosophy. 

“Thus, such designations in Cuba as Zayistas, Machadistas, Batistianos, 

and Fidelistas have often been more accurately descriptive of a political following than have the names of the political parties led by these 

men.”67 The leader’s political influence, contacts, and acquaintances, 

and the distribution of patronage frequently determined the size of 

his following. “Political loyalties were also based on real differences 

with regard to politics and programs, but these differences were often 

obscured in the struggle to gain control of government.”68

National Parties, Coalitions, and Splinter Groups Prior to 1952

Although a number of political parties emerged and disappeared 

rapidly after 1933, there were several national parties whose existence 

could be traced throughout the period until 1952. The struggle for 

power in that period centered around four major groupings: the nonCommunist left-of-center, the conservative wing, opportunistic coalitions, and the Communist left-of-center. It was common practice for 

various parties to combine in coalitions in order to achieve common 

h A no-election law decreed from the Sierra Maestra, Castro’s mountain refuge during the 1950’s, made it a criminal offense to participate in the “electoral farce.”66
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

short-run objectives. Party splintering was not infrequent as dissident 

leaders broke away to form rival parties.

Non-Communist left. The Cuban Revolutionary Party (Auténtico), 

the parent party of the democratic left, was organized by Grau San Martín in 1934 from members of his administration of 1933. It was known 

as the Auténtico because followers of Grau in 1933 called themselves the 

“authentic” revolutionaries to be distinguished from other groups that 

participated in the struggle against the Machado government.

In its formative years the party remained outside legal political 

activity and did not take part in electoral politics until 1939. The party 

was left-of-center and strongly nationalistic. It drew much of its support from the lower class. Many of its social and economic programs 

which stressed social and labor reforms, government regulation of the 

economy, agrarian reform, and an equitable distribution of wealth 

were included in the 1940 Constitution. Grau San Martín brought his 

Auténticos to power in the relatively free elections of 1944 with this program, and he was succeeded by his chosen candidate, Prío Socarrás, 

in 1948. Auténtico Party members divided their loyalty between the two 

leaders and greatly weakened party solidarity. Despite their promises 

of political reform, the Auténticos continued the unethical practices of 

former governments.

In protest, Eddy Chibas, a follower of the Auténtico Party since its 

beginning, founded a splinter reform party in 1946. The Ortodoxo Party, 

as it was called, adopted a platform essentially identical to that of its 

parent organization, but strongly stressed honesty and the elimination 

of dishonesty in the government. By 1948 Chibas had won wide support 

among the younger generation and attracted a large number of competent political leaders. Despite his suicide in 1951, his party’s popularity 

continued to increase to the point that the Ortodoxo candidate, Roberto 

Agramonte, was leading the field in a preelection poll during the presidential campaign of 1952. Fidel Castro, then a young practicing lawyer, 

was an Ortodoxo candidate running for Congress.

The conservative wing. The Conservative wing was divided between 

the Democratic Party (formerly the Conservative Party in the pre-1933 

era) and the Liberal Party during most of the period between 1933 

and 1952; a third party, the Republican Party, appeared in 1944 but by 

1950 had been dissolved. Their programs and platforms were similar: 

they supported private enterprise with some governmental regulation 

“for the purposes of economic development and public welfare,”69 and 

strongly opposed radicalism espoused by the Communists. The conservative following was made up chiefly of the wealthy upper class.

The conservative wing was united in its support of Batista’s candidate in the 1948 election. Following the election, intraconservative 
Factors Inducing Revolution

43

rivalry led Batista to form his own party, the Party of Unitary Action, the 

only major conservative party to support his candidacy in the 1952 campaign. Following the coup in 1952 the Party of Unitary Action was dissolved only to be revised later under the name of the Progressive Action 

Party with Batista as its candidate for the 1954 election. Although split 

into factions, the Democratic and Liberal Parties joined the Progressive 

Action Party in support of Batista in the campaign of 1954.

Opportunistic coalitions. Although the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party were ideologically opposed to the Auténticos, for tactical 

reasons they supported the Auténtico candidate in the 1952 campaign. 

They had formed part of the Batista coalition in 1940 and supported 

the Batista candidates in 1944 and 1948, but after being out of office 

for two terms, the party leaders decided to throw in their lot with a 

more popular candidate.

The Democratic Party split in 1944 when several members charged 

Batista with attempting to perpetuate his rule by pushing the candidacy 

of his chosen successor, Carlos Saladrigas. The leader of the faction, 

Guillermo Alonso Pujol, established the Republican Party. Although it 

was reportedly the most conservative party in Cuba,70 it allied itself with 

the left-of-center Auténticos in the 1948 election.

The Communist left. The existence of the Communist Party, 

known as the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) after 1944, can be traced 

to the year 1925 when it was founded. The party remained illegal until 

1938 when it came to terms with Batista. From then until 1952, the PSP 

regularly sent elected representatives to Congress. “During its period of 

legality, the Party’s main antagonist was the Auténtico Party which supported much the same program, and except for short periods, rejected 

collaboration with the Communists.”71 The party’s strength was greatly 

weakened after 1947 when it adopted the Cominform “hard” line, or 

the “left” strategy,i

 and came under strong government attack.

Summary

Although specific procedures were laid down for the peaceful 

transfer of power in Cuba, politics was seldom free of violence. Political 

groups not in power suspected the incumbent government’s promises 

to hold honest elections. Furthermore, politics was largely characterized by personalismo and jealous rivalry among politicians constantly 

engaged in a struggle to gain personal control of the government. 

i The “right” strategy, or the strategy of united front cooperation between Communist an non-Communist parties or groups against fascism, prior to and during World 

War II, was abandoned at the onset of the cold war in 1947. From then on, “foreign imperialism,” a term synonymous with the United States, became the target for Communist 

attacks.72
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

Thus the ruling and opposition parties, loyal to leaders rather than 

ideals, often splintered and entered into temporary alliances with other 

groups for pragmatic considerations, none of which were enduring.

Political Imbalance: Representation, Participation, and 

Discrimination

Only a small group of professional politicians who had gained 

prominence in the war against Spain were active in government and 

politics in the years before Machado was overthrown in 1933. The 1901 

Constitution extended voting rights and proportional representation 

to all male adults. However, the interests of several population groups 

were omitted from major consideration in the formulation of government policy. Some conservative elements remained aloof from politics; 

others were barred from political representation because they had not 

favored complete independence from Spain. The peasants, because 

they were scattered and unorganized, either had no wish to participate 

in politics and thus did not vote, or if they did vote, their interests did 

not influence the making of national policies. Machado strengthened 

the position of the political elites by silencing political opposition, and 

persecuting the leadership of the emerging labor movement and of 

critical university students.

The 1940 Constitution reaffirmed the role of the popular masses 

in policymaking. Relatively honest elections were held in 1940, 1944, 

and 1948. They were not free from vote-buying and political bargaining, but as a whole the politically influential power groups represented 

the interests of a larger share of the population. The new Constitution 

made it obligatory for all citizens over 20 years of age to register and 

vote. From 70 to 80 percent of the eligible voters cast their votes in 

the three elections mentioned above.73 After the Batista coup of 1952, 

however, Cuba was governed for 21⁄2 years under a fundamental law 

which excluded representative government; the functions of Congress 

were assumed by an 80-member Consultative Council appointed by 

Batista. Critics of the regime were suppressed. The Constitution and 

the Congress were reinstituted in 1955, but under Batista political representation had little meaning; the 1954 and 1958 elections were considered rigged and aroused little popular interest. The major interest 

groups, such as labor, business, and the army, either dealt personally 

with Batista or through special lobby organizations.

Summary

The Cuban Constitutions of 1901 and 1940, and subsequent revisions of the electoral codes, were written so as to permit wide popular 
Factors Inducing Revolution

45

participation in the electoral process and the formulation of national 

policies. Political realities such as personalismo, extralegal political pressure, and the occasional use of force, however, counterbalanced the 

outlined democratic procedures and frequently denied certain population groups participation in the political process.
46

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

(United Press International Photo)

President Fulgencio Batista during an exclusive United Press interview at the Presidential Palace, April 1958, at which time he predicted that the rebels and their proCommunist activities would be put down before the November national elections.
Factors Inducing Revolution

47

(United Press International Photo)Cuban rebel leader Fidel Castro (center) and his younger brother Raúl (left), with some of the other rebel chiefs at their stronghold in the Sierra Maestra Mountains in April 1958.
48

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

(Wide World Photos)Teenagers, arrested by Cuban police, accused of being terrorists of the 26th of July Movement and 

the Communist Party, August 17, 1957, following the discovery and seizure of a factory of bombs on Galiano Street in Havana’s shopping district.
Factors Inducing Revolution

49

(Wide World Photos)Suitcase full of bombs seized by Cuban police in August 1957 when they discovered a bomb factory in Havana’s shopping district. Police arrested a group of teenagers and accused them of attempting to overthrow the Batista government.
50

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

(Wide World Photos)

Map of Havana locates principal points involved in the abortive strike of April 9, 

1958. Some rebels opened their forays in the Old Waterfront Section, while others 

seized the radio and television center.
Factors Inducing Revolution

51

(Wide World Photos)

Rebels operating in mountains near the southern coast of Las Villas Province used 

horses and mules for transporting supplies and for riding to attack government 

posts late in 1958.
52

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

(United Press International Photo)A group of Cuban rebels making Molotov cocktails at a rebel stronghold in Western Oriente on the eve of a foray against the town of Manzanillo.
Factors Inducing Revolution

53

(Wide World Photos)U.S. officials stand around the boat, “Orion,” captured early in 1958 by U.S. Coast Guard Agents. Arms and ammunition were seized and 36 rebels were arrested. In the background is one of the two Coast Guard boats used in the chase.
54

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

(United Press International Photo)Cuban rebel commanders Capt. Victor Bordon (second from left, in campaign hat) and Che Guevara (second from right, in beret) are shown outside seized army headquarters in Fomento, December 1958, as their troops occupy the town.
Factors Inducing Revolution

55

(Wide World Photos)Fidel Castro rebels form a ring around natives suspected of being government followers in the mountain jungles of the Sierra del Cristal, April 1958. The suspects were seized by rebel forces led by Raúl Castro.
56

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

(World Wide Photos)The Cuban Army frequently used artillery in attacking or repelling rebels in eastern Oriente Province. Troops are receiving instruction on operating a field piece in 1958.
Factors Inducing Revolution

57

(World Wide Photos)The son of Fidel Castro rides atop a tank during a parade honoring his father as the leader of the forces that overthrew Batista. The son, also named Fidel, flew to Havana from New York in January 1959 to meet with his father.
58

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

(World Wide Photos)Mass meeting of the Cuban teachers’ union, April 1962. Members agreed to “donate” 4 percent of their salary to a Cuban industrialization program. From left to right, Dr. Francisco Jimenez, Deacon of Havana College of Teachers; Armando Hart, Minister of Education; President Osvaldo Dorticós; Lester Rodríguez, Dean of the National College of Teachers; Dr. Felix Adams, President 

of the Venezuelan College of Teachers; and Capt. José Nibaldo Cauca, Sub-Secretary of Labor.
Factors Inducing Revolution

59

(United Press International Photo)Photo purportedly shows leaders of anti-Castro guerrillas meeting somewhere in the Escambray Mountains to coordinate their respective military zones. Man at front right center is identified as Capt. Everardo Sales, leader of the Second National Front of Escambray.
60

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

Map of Cuba. 
PART II—DYNAMICS OF REVOLUTION

Dynamics of Revolution

63

COMPOSITION OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTORSa

Active opposition to Batista increased steadily from the date of his 

coup d’etat in 1952.b

 During the period from 1952 to 1956, most of 

the opposition was divided and passive. The activists were banded into 

small clandestine organizations whose ranks were limited in number 

and varied in character. Leaders emerged from such organizations 

and individually plotted revolution against Batista. Most of these leaders were young middle- and upper-class intellectuals who had recently 

graduated from a university or at least had received formal university 

training: they were doctors, lawyers, professors, engineers, accountants, 

and students. A few were army officers and politicians.

The composition of the revolutionary following generally matched 

the leadership. However, after 1957 the revolution gained the peasantry 

as another source of manpower. Several organizations established guerrilla units in the rural areas of Cuba in 1956 and 1957 and relied on the 

local peasants for support. Many peasants were recruited into the guerrilla bands as fighters. By mid-1958 the revolutionary organizations 

in the mountainous rural areas, composed of middle-class elements 

and peasants, numbered fewer than one thousand followers.c,74 Most 

of the activists in the underground organizations of the urban centers, composed of middle-class intellectuals and professionals, brought 

thousands (exact number unknown) into active participation against 

Batista by 1959. The masses did not rise spontaneously to overthrow the 

government as some of the leaders in the early stages of the revolution 

had envisioned; but as the revolution gained momentum and Batista’s 

rule became more suppressive, his major supporters defected so that he 

was left with no other choice but to abdicate.76

There was a conflict of policies among the various revolutionary 

groups—primarily in terms of the difference in the revolutionary techniques the leaders were willing to employ, the confidence they had in 

an armed struggle against the Batista forces, and the willingness to 

organize it77—which persisted throughout the revolution. This conflict 

was manifested in the rivalry which existed between the radical leadership in the rural areas and the moderate leadership in the urban 

a Unless otherwise specified, the terms “revolutionary leadership” and “revolutionary followers” will be used in a general sense and will refer to all leaders and followers 

who took part in the revolutionary movement. The “revolutionary movement” refers to all 

actors and organizations which took part in the anti-Batista revolution of 1953–59.

b Batista took over the entire island in little over 1 hour with a junta of 15–20 captains 

and lieutenants. The military barracks in Havana were seized first and the provincial garrisons were taken by long distance telephone and telegraph messages to insurgent officers.

c In December 1958 there were an estimated 7,300 troops in uniform, organized into 

guerrilla fighting units.75
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

areas.78 Urban leaders had gained more prestige than the rural leaders 

up to the spring of 1958. This prestige was based on the urban leaders’ roles as professionals within their society prior to the revolution, 

and their direct contacts with the revolutionary following during the 

struggle. However, the urban leadership was indecisive and met with 

several setbacks in the cities. As communications between the rural 

leadership and the urban following improved, the rural leadership was 

able to publicize a series of minor military successes against the Batista 

forces. Thus, the relative importance of the rival groups in the eyes of 

the people was reversed.79 In July 1958 most of the urban leaders conceded that the revolution had to be centralized and securely based in 

the rural areas. The revolution then achieved a relatively centralized 

leadership. The conflict of policies was not solved but it did not become 

a crucial issue again until the victory was being consolidated.

Fidel Castro, often referred to by his close associates as “Maximum 

Leader,” rose from relative obscurity to lead the Cuban Revolution from 

his mountain headquarters in Oriente Province. There is much controversy among various sources concerning Castro’s personal qualities as 

a “truly great” revolutionary leader, and much doubt about his sincerity 

in instituting political, social, and economic reforms in the interest of 

the Cuban masses. As a law student at the University of Havana, then as 

a practicing attorney and later as a revolutionary leader, Castro molded 

his public image so that Cubans who followed him believed him to 

have “super-human strength” and “miraculous powers.” Members of all 

classes served him faithfully through many setbacks before the revolution succeeded.

There is a mystique about his capacity to overcome 

adversities. His preference for a combat uniform likewise casts him in the role of a self-denying defender of 

deprived groups . . . He thus lays the claim to the magical qualities of the charismatic leader.”80

Fidel Castro’s oratorical skill alone gained him a significant following. However, no one could mistake him for a “creative political 

thinker.” He depended on the superior intellect of others, especially 

Ernesto “Che” Guevara and another revolutionary leader, Carlos Rafael 

Rodríguez. He is a popularizer and a demagog, but not an original 

social revolutionary.81

Castro “was a rebel by and in reality long before Batista’s second 

period of power.”82 As president of the Law School student body, he 

became involved in campus politics, which many times reached violent 

proportions at the University of Havana. He was also one of the founders of Uníon Insurreccional Revolucionaria (UIR), a terroristic organization which allegedly dealt in political assassination. Castro was arrested 
Dynamics of Revolution

65

several times in connection with murder, but was never convicted.83 In 

1947 he took part in an abortive plot to overthrow Rafael Trujillo, then 

dictator of the Dominican Republic. The Cayo Confites expedition, as it 

is called, was stopped before it got underway. And in April 1948 Castro 

took part in “one of the most controversial episodes” of his career. He 

headed a delegation of students that was attending a student congress 

in Bogotá, Colombia, during the Ninth Conference of the American 

States. A citywide riot was triggered by the assassination of a Colombia 

liberal, and Castro has since been accused by some observers of instigating the riot to undermine the conference.84

Castro and his small band of revolutionaries in the mountain 

redoubt of the Sierra Maestra provided the “focus and the symbols” 

that inspired the revolutionary activity throughout the island. His 

movement was well publicized by the North American press and was 

brought to the attention of the world.

By 1958 he had emerged from his former position as 

a young hero of a kind familiar in Cuba to assume 

the symbolic role of national leader, vacant since the 

death of José Martí. Within the rebel army, power was 

vested in Castro and the two men he had come to trust 

most completely, his brother, Raúl, and the Argentine 

Che Guevara.85

OVERALL STRATEGY AND GOALS

The overall strategy of the revolutionary organization that overthrew the Batista government was altered several times between 1953 

and 1958. By attacking the Moncada Barracks in 1953 the revolutionary leadership hoped to inspire the people of Oriente Province to rise 

against the provincial forces, cut off the Province from the rest of the 

island, and continue the struggle until the central government was 

overthrown. The same strategy was used in 1956 when a small expedition landed in Cuba from Mexico. In the latter case, however, underground action squads, not used in 1953, were depended upon to scatter 

government security forces and create confusion in the cities.

A new strategy was employed in early 1957 when the revolutionary 

organization went into a two-fisted attack against the Batista forces: 

guerrilla warfare in the rural areas, and underground activities in the 

urban centers. The guerrilla bands were to preserve their forces until 

strong enough to attack and destroy the government forces. At the same 

time the underground units were to hit at the government forces with 
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

terror and sabotage, all the while preparing the masses for a general 

strike which was to culminate in Batista’s defeat.

The strike, to go off in April 1958, was unsuccessful, and the overall 

strategy was again revised. The new plan called for a general military 

counteroffensive to a government spring offensive which was to involve 

all the scattered guerrilla bands in a combined and centralized effort. 

It included cutting the communication lines in central Cuba to isolate 

the eastern half of the island, taking over Oriente Province, and marching on to Havana. The counteroffensive got under way in August 1958, 

and by January 1959 the Batista government had fallen, less from the 

military success of the counteroffensive than from the government’s 

own social, economic, and political failures.

The goals, or objectives, which were announced by the various leaders varied little throughout most of the revolution. They were generally broad utopian statements of political philosophies which covered 

all the freedoms and liberties found in democratic documents; they 

contributed very little in the formulation of a coherent program for 

postrevolutionary reconstruction. In some respects, the stated goals 

were identical to those of the original independence movement against 

Spain and the 1933 uprising against Machado: constitutional government along with some social and economic changes. The statements 

were designed primarily to attract popular support for the anti-Batista 

movement and were therefore relatively moderate. Until the Caracas 

Pactd was signed in July 1958, the various revolutionary organizations 

in Cuba and in exile each issued their own proposed “future” for 

Cuba. After the pact was signed, future programs were issued from the 

“central revolutionary headquarters” in the Sierra Maestra, and were 

endorsed by most of the revolutionary organizations.

None of the revolutionary leaders included in their pronouncements, during 1953–59, a goal of complete government control of the 

political, social, and economic aspects of Cuban life. In general the 

leaders stated that they merely wanted a return to constitutionalism—

to replace Batista with a democratic government and to restore the 

1940 Constitution. Some leaders waged the revolution in the name of 

“democratic humanism” or “social justice,” all-encompassing phrases 

which were taken to mean that the leaders were seeking full guarantees 

of human rights, even distribution of the national wealth, and ways to 

end chronic unemployment. The order to confiscate “all holdings and 

ill-gotten gains” of all the malfeasants of previous governments, and to 

nationalize the foreign-owned telephone and telegraph company were 

d The Caracas Pact was a unity agreement signed by most of the revolutionary organizations whereby the leaders agreed to form a united front organization which would centrally coordinate political and military action against the government.
Dynamics of Revolution

67

some of the most extreme measures proposed during the earlier stage 

of the revolution.86 A land program advocating limited holdings for 

agricultural enterprises and a minimum distribution of land to peasant 

families was also advanced.

Programs were modified during the fighting stage of the revolution in order to reconcile points of disagreement between the diverse 

organizations. For example, a program for government ownership of 

public utilities, viewed as a fundamental measure in the early fifties by 

the 26th of July Movement, was suspended at a later date. Also, statements of the same group indicated that the leadership was not only 

prepared to respect foreign holdings in Cuba, but would even welcome 

more extensive foreign investment as a prelude to rapid industrialization. The programs continued to advocate Batista’s removal, the restoration of the 1940 Constitution, the popular election of a democratic 

government in the “shortest possible time,” and the distribution of 

reclaimed barren lands to peasant families with “just” compensation to 

the former owners. Two “fundamental guiding principles” were added 

during the late fifties: respect for private property, and the fulfillment 

of international obligations.87

Other and more specific goals were disclosed before 1959: elimination of inefficiency, graft, and corruption in government; requirement 

of large companies and corporations to pay their “fair” share of taxes; 

and ridding Cuba of gambling, racketeering, and other vices. With 

funds saved from operating an efficient and honest administration, the 

leaders felt that education, medical care, unemployment compensation, and other social programs could be expanded.88

IDEOLOGY OR MYTH

National Orientation

The ideas of liberalism and rationalism emanating from France and 

Great Britain inspired Cuban nationalism in the 18th century. Teachers, essayists, and political activists came to question Spain’s authority over Cuba; under the patronage of Cuban landowners they formed 

societies for the promotion of political and economic liberalism. At 

that time, Cubans were excluded from political influence; their foreign 

trade was restricted by Spanish trade policies and they were heavily 

taxed to support a foreign bureaucracy on their own soil. Nationalism 

thus grew out of a reaction against the mercantile policies of Spain.

However, there were two factors which hindered Cuban nationalism from ever developing into an integrative force, unifying all 

Cubans under one national front. First, nationalism espoused an 
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

antiauthoritarian attitude which ran counter to a dominant cultural 

tradition of Spanish origin. Second, much of the population was composed of recent arrivals who held on to a “strong foreign orientation,” 

and consequently were not receptive to a Cuban “code of values.”89 As 

the nationalist movement developed in the latter half of the 19th century, the nationalists were divided into two factions: autonomists, who 

favored Cuban autonomy within the Spanish empire; and separatists, 

who demanded complete independence from Spain. An annexationist 

group desired formal annexation to the United States.

Twentieth-century Cuban nationalism developed as a reaction 

against the influence of U.S. interests in Cuba. The provisions of the 

Platt Amendment, which gave the United States the right to intervene 

in Cuban affairs, provided a focus for hostility toward the United States. 

The nationalists felt that the Amendment impaired Cuban sovereignty 

and therefore they called for its abrogation.

After the sugar market collapsed in the late twenties, and the Machado government was overthrown in 1933, nationalist agitation increased 

and themes from the colonial period were revived. A new generation 

of political leaders and university students, leftwing nationalists whose 

ideological convictions were suppressed under the Machado regime, 

emerged with a new force and “engaged in violent conflict with the old 

order and with one another.” Most of them felt that economic problems 

were responsible for existing “injustices” which led them to make the 

United States the target of their resentment over conditions in Cuba. 

Foreign business interests, they felt, were non-Cuban and exploitative 

and, therefore, threats to Cuban nationalism and progress.90 The 

nationalists began to accept the idea that the government should play 

a greater role in managing Cuba’s economic life and regulating foreign business interests. Cuban nationalism was often expressed in the 

terms Cubanidad and Cuba Libre. “Part of the ideal of ‘Cuba Libre’ is 

the expectation that, when freed of the immoral limitations imposed 

by foreign domination and domestic corruption, the resurgent souls of 

Cubans will be expressed in unprecedented cultural vitality.”91

Nationalism during the fighting stage of the revolution emphasized Cuba’s destiny and national potential, and deemphasized U.S. 

business interests. It served primarily as a device to gain the support 

and loyalty of special interest groups. Political reform was stressed to 

attract the support of moderate middle- and upper-class groups, and 

economic and social reform to draw mass support. “The Castro revolution was described by its adherents as a true social revolution designed 

to change the structure and the values of Cuban society and to realize 

the true potential of the Cuban people.”92
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69

International Orientation

Marxist ideology, as it developed from the discontent of the late 

twenties and early thirties, became so interwoven with Cuban nationalism that the mixture appeared as one consistent philosophy. Marxists 

felt that Cuba’s political and social problems were determined entirely 

by economic factors; because U.S. policies influenced Cuba’s economy, 

the Marxists, especially those who were in the Communist movement, 

lashed out at the United States for the existing economic and social 

“injustices.” This was “a theme presented within Cuba primarily in 

nationalist terms, but explained more elaborately in Communist theory as the destruction of a capitalist nation by removing its sources of 

raw materials.”93 The more extreme Marxists went further and called 

for a classless society by rallying the underprivileged in a great effort to 

destroy the upper and middle classes. Individuals seeking such extreme 

solutions to Cuban problems were usually found in the Popular Socialist Party (Communist), or in other groups at least partially sympathetic 

to the Communist cause.

Although the extreme Marxists justified the use of violence in their 

own struggle for power, during the fighting stage of the anti-Batista revolution their official line (originating from the Soviet Union in 1953 as 

a basic policy for semicolonial countries and advanced by the PSP) was 

that Batista would not fall by force of arms as advocated by Castro, but 

by mass insurrection of the working class against the regime. In a step 

toward establishing a Socialist state, “the PSP called for a National Liberation Democratic Government, integrated by the working class, the 

peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, founded 

on the alliance of workers and peasants and led by the workers.”94

Domestic changes desired by the PSP were not unlike those advocated 

by Cuban nationalists. Cubans who followed the PSP line either supported Batista or were passive during the war and contributed little to 

the revolutionary effort until the last few weeks of the fighting.

Socio-Economic Emphasis

The Cuban Revolution as a “Peasant Revolution”

The Cuban Revolution has been described as, among other things, 

a peasant revolution. The peasant character of the revolution was 

stressed by revolutionary propagandists almost from the beginning of 

the insurrection. Guerrilla units operating in the rural areas depended 

on the local population for food, supplies, intelligence, and fresh 

recruits. Practical dealings between the guerrillas and the peasants 

during the insurrection resulted in an agrarian reform movement in 
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the Sierra Maestra. And from January 1959 on, Castro repeatedly paid 

tribute to the role of the peasants in “winning” and “consolidating” 

the revolution.

The role of the peasants has often been exaggerated, however, and 

has resulted in a tendency to obscure the true composition and strength 

of the guerrilla force. To begin with, the nucleus of the guerrilla force 

was essentially middle class and remained so throughout the insurrection. The handful of young intellectuals who reached the Sierra Maestra dwindled until March 1957 when more middle-class recruits came 

from the cities to give the fighting force a “second wind.” The peasants 

in the mountains were “utterly alien to most of them.”95

Relations between the guerrillas and the peasants improved as the 

months passed. The city-bred guerrillas understood the need to win 

over the peasants in order to receive food, protection, intelligence, and 

new recruits. They were also impressed by the poverty, disease, and illiteracy that was prevalent among the rural population. Out of necessity 

and compassion, the insurgents became determined to raise the low 

standards of the peasants to a “level of well-being and human dignity.”96

The peasants did increase the size of the guerrilla force; however, 

“even the influx of the last four or five months failed to give it anything 

like a mass character.”97 Castro has revealed that he had only 180 men 

with him in April 1958.98 By mid-1958 there were less than one thousand guerrillas in the field. The two columns that were given the single 

biggest operation in August 1958 amounted to only 220 men. And the 

total guerrilla force during the entire campaign against Batista was 

estimated to be between 3,000 and 7,300 men. “Castro’s fighting force 

was until the end so minute that it hardly deserves to be called an army, 

let alone a ‘peasant army’.”99

Middle-class intellectuals instigated and controlled the revolution 

before and after the insurrection. They fought Batista “first in the 

name of the entire people, then of the peasants, and finally of the workers and the peasants.”100 The peasants received benefits as a result of 

the revolution, but it was not the peasantry that was the driving force 

behind the revolution.

“Humanism . . . Liberty With Bread Without Terror”

“Democratic humanism,” an ideology in which Marxist solutions 

could be found for Cuban problems, defined the revolutionary program in the few weeks before and after victory. The revolutionaries saw 

a great gap between the wealthy who sought to “exploit,” and the poor 

who sought “social justice,” and they wanted to eliminate that gap to 

make both groups equal. They also wished to improve the “well-being” 

and the “happiness” of all Cubans and distribute widely the means of 
Dynamics of Revolution

71

access to the national wealth in a manner which serves social interests 

above individual interests.101 Revolutionary leaders who continued to 

subscribe to this ideology, after Castro felt that it was outdated, were 

soon purged, however, and the ideology was replaced with one that was 

more radical.

Mystique of Revolution

One of the vital elements contributing to the success of the revolutionary movement of the 1950’s was the mystique, a spiritual dynamism 

emanating from Cuba’s history of radicalism, the charismatic qualities 

of Fidel Castro, and the crusading drive shared by the revolutionary 

groups. From the beginning of their education, Cuban youths were 

inculcated with a respect for and a desire to emulate the radical revolutionary leaders of the past.

Fidel Castro is not only a product of this national attitude, but is in 

himself an embodiment of the spirit of the past. Youthful, idealistic, 

and audacious, he captured the imagination of his followers as they 

carried on the struggle against Batista in the tradition of their revolutionary forebears.

ORGANIZATION: FUNCTIONAL AND 

STRUCTURAL TYPES

The greater part of the revolutionary effort in Cuba during the late 

1950’s was organized into the Civilian Revolutionary Front. The unity 

pact which formed the Front, as originally advocated by Fidel Castro, 

was signed by the political and rebel leaders in Caracas in July 1958. 

The terms of the pact were laid down by Castro and called for the “popular mobilization of all labor, civic, professional and economic forces, 

culminating in a great general strike on the civilian front; while on the 

military front, action will be coordinated throughout the country.”102

From that time on, the mountain ranges of the Sierra Maestra became 

the headquarters for (with Fidel Castro as the leader of) the entire 

Cuban revolutionary effort.

Fidel Castro indicated early that he favored a revolutionary front 

which would unite all the resistance groups under one organization. In 

1957 he rejected continued efforts of civic institutions urging a truce 

between the dictatorship and the revolutionary groups; he proposed 

instead that the struggle continue under the Civilian Revolutionary 

Front, a formal alliance composed of all groups opposing Batista. He 

drafted a manifesto in the summer of 1957 along these lines, but the 
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

opposing groups were so filled with mutual suspicions and mistrust 

that the agreement was not reached until July 1958.103

Representatives of opposition groups, including the 26th of July 

Movement, met in Miami in November 1957 and agreed on the formation of a “Council of Liberation” which brought together most of 

the anti-Batista political elements. The Council named a provisional 

president who was to head a coalition government that was to assume 

power after Batista’s downfall. But the provisions of the pact failed to 

meet with Castro’s personal approval and he rejected the terms in a bitter letter that was sent to the signatories in December of the same year. 

The Council was willing to cede to Castro’s demands, but his rejection 

nevertheless became a setback in the unified campaign against the government. “Batista was so elated over the news of the rejection that for 

the first time in months the name of Castro was permitted over the 

radio as excerpts of the letter were reported.”104

Most of the independent guerrilla and underground units scattered 

throughout Cuba ostensibly became unified under one command by 

virtue of the July 1958 agreement. However, although the leaders had 

reached an agreement on a common strategy, the units continued to 

operate more or less independently as they had done previously. Only 

in several instances were operations, plans, administrative dispositions, 

and military organizations coordinated between the 26th of July Movement high command and other revolutionary forces. When a guerrilla 

column led by Che Guevara reached Las Villas Province in the fall of 

1958, for instance, the various groups operating there at the time integrated into one army corps. Complete integration of the guerrilla and 

underground units did not actually take place until after the fighting. 

Although unity was superficial and the groups that formed the Front 

continued to mistrust each other, the announcement that the pact had 

been signed was a great psychological blow to the government forces.e

It must be kept in mind throughout this treatment of the paramilitary organization that although it appears to be extensive and well 

organized, the total number of participants had not exceeded one 

thousand by the summer of 1958. Guerrilla ranks did not swell appreciably until December of that year.

e The Front could be described as a “federalistic” type of organization whereby the 

independent and autonomous groups were loosely interconnected by a centralized leadership and multifunctional purpose.
Dynamics of Revolution

73

Paramilitary Organization

Several guerrilla organizations working independently of each 

other and totaling less than one thousand troops by mid-1958 were 

established in different areas of Cuba. During the greater part of 

the revolution these diverse organizations were not responsible to a 

supreme commander; they were military arms of political and underground organizations operating in the urban centers, and acted independently. They were usually survivors of small landing expeditions 

originating either from Mexico or the United States, and remained on 

the defensive in the mountains for most of the 2 years of actual war.

Terrain and supply were among the two most important factors 

which influenced the development of the guerrilla organizations. It is 

perhaps significant that the 26th of July Movement, based in the Sierra 

Maestra in Oriente Province, was able to preserve and expand its forces 

with relative security. The area is an ideal redoubt for guerrilla armies; 

the mountain ranges, the tallest in Cuba, fall into wooded foothills 

surrounded by thick brush and lowland jungle. It is highly defensible 

against regular armies, and the growth offers good cover for guerrilla 

troop movements. Oriente Province has been the traditional refuge for 

Cuban revolutionary movements.

Moreover, the civilian population in Oriente Province provided 

depots and stable supply lines from the underground groups in the 

cities to the guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra. The guerrillas needed 

food, clothing, and other supplies in order to sustain themselves for 

prolonged guerrilla operations. The urban underground covertly supplied the guerrillas in the mountains with manufactured goods, but 

the guerrillas had to depend almost entirely on the local population 

within the surrounding areas for basic materials, especially food.

Other rebel groups were operating in the Sierra de la Trinidad and 

Sierra del Escambray in Las Villas Province, and in the Sierra de los 

Organos in the Province of Pinar del Río.

Combat Units

Guerrilla organizations were established along military lines, i.e., 

the composition and the structure of the combat units and the chains 

of command closely resembled those of a regular army. The units were 

flexible and allowed for variations in size and equipment according to 

the surroundings within which they operated. In areas that were considered favorable by the rebel leaders (mountains, hills, and jungles) 

and where the guerrillas were not forced to be continually on the move, 

the tactical units did not exceed 150 men. The ideal number, according 
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to Che Guevara, is one hundred men.105 These constituted the columns, 

and were headed by column commanders with the rank of major.

The column was divided into platoons of 30 to 40 men, each headed 

by a captain. On marches the column usually consisted of five platoons: 

platoon number one was the advanced guard, platoon number three 

was the command platoon, and platoon number five was the rearguard. The care and distribution of medication, medical instruments, 

extra food and clothing, general supplies, and heavy weapons were the 

responsibilities of the platoon leader.

The platoon was in turn divided into squads of 8 to 12 men; the 

smaller the number, the leaders felt, the greater the mobility—an 

important quality of the squad.106 On unfavorable ground, where there 

is unbroken terrain, where there are highways and junctions, or in suburban areas, the squad was considered the tactical unit. Rapid mobility 

and absolute secrecy was necessary and could be achieved only if the 

units remained small. When fighting in these areas, the squad rarely 

exceeded 15 men. The squad was headed by a lieutenant. Other guerrilla organizations, not at first linked with the 26th of July Movement 

and smaller than the Sierra Maestra organization, operated in squad 

size. Their numbers remained small throughout the war and they were 

unable to muster enough men to form large columns.

Aside from combat duties, some special units were assigned various auxiliary functions. Maintaining troop discipline, promoting soldiers for valor, and educating new recruits were the responsibilities of 

the Commission on Internal Order. Special teams were assigned to 

transport, watch, and advanced guard and rearguard duties. An extracombat utility platoon composed of volunteers, referred to by the guerrillas as the “suicide platoon,” was held in readiness to assume the most 

dangerous of duties, such as holding off an enemy counteroffensive.

The guerrilla organization of the 26th of July Movement was headed 

by a commander in chief, Fidel Castro, who appointed the column commanders. After a permanent guerrilla base was firmly established in the 

Sierra Maestra, the commander in chief appointed base commanders 

who established bases in other areas. In early 1958, for instance, Raúl 

Castro was sent by his brother with a small contingent to the Sierra 

del Cristal in northeastern Oriente to establish a new base. Under the 

base commander were columns of varying sizes, each headed by a column commander. At this stage of the revolution the organization was 

becoming more complex and the commander in chief relegated to the 

base commanders the authority to appoint the column commanders 

serving under them. The column commander named the captains and 

the lieutenants under him. The guerrilla planning staff, in charge of 

operations, was made up of the commander in chief and several column 
Dynamics of Revolution

75

commanders. Its number was increased late in the fighting stage of the 

revolution when several of Batista’s officers defected to the rebel army.

Civil Organizations Under Military Command

A civil organization, headed by members of the military organization, was established in guerrilla-held territory when the 26th of July 

Movement military organization expanded its bases and incorporated 

a large number of Cuban civilians. Tasks were simple at first and consisted primarily of collecting taxes and donations, distributing propaganda material, and maintaining a supply line between city and 

mountain. Later, as military needs increased, the organization became 

more complex: it regulated all civilian life within the guerrilla-held territory and coordinated military and civilian efforts.

An administrative council, which took the executive, legislative, 

and judicial functions, became the vital feature of the civil organization. It was usually headed by someone with legal training. Aside from 

collecting taxes and donations, it organized the peasants and workers, 

and set up a civil health administration and an accounting department 

in charge of supplies. It issued penal codes, civil codes, and agrarian 

reform laws which were enforced by a military tribunal. “Subsequently, 

the laws fixing qualifications of candidates in the elections that were 

to be held later throughout the country were established . . .” by the 

council.107 The council allocated many of its functions to noncombatant guerrilla agencies when the organization was further expanded. A 

finance commission and a supply procurement agency are two examples of such noncombatant guerrilla agencies which were established.

Peasant organizations similar to those established within guerrilla 

territory were established in adjacent areas. These organizations served 

the revolutionary effort in two ways: they provided a channel through 

which crops grown in guerrilla territory could be sold at a profit in 

other areas; and they made it possible for guerrillas to penetrate and 

infiltrate the areas and to enlarge the guerrilla front. Word of the 

good that was being done for the inhabitants in guerrilla-held territory 

spread in these adjacent areas and aided in psychologically conditioning the population for a guerrilla advance.

Recruiting, Training, and Indoctrination

Basic training in the fundamentals of guerrilla warfare became an 

important aspect of the Cuban Revolution. Training bases were established in several foreign countries as well as in Cuba during the revolution; and when the recruits completed courses in the handling of arms, 

commando-type fighting, and political orientation, they were flown or 

shipped to join the forces in Cuba. The recruits who trained in the 
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mountainous regions of Cuba often received practical combat experience while training.

Initially, when guerrilla groups began to organize, the leaders relied 

on whatever volunteers were available: in Cuba the leader depended 

on close friends and associates; in foreign countries, he depended on 

long-time exiles or those who made themselves available. There were 

no facilities for making a complete investigation of individuals. As the 

guerrilla bands developed and their ranks were sizably increased, however, a selection process was established whereby volunteers were individually screened for possible recruitment. Usually the volunteers filled 

out applications which were individually reviewed by a recruitment section of the guerrilla units. The application revealed the full personal 

history of each recruit including past political activities. If favorably 

judged by the recruitment section, a recruit was admitted into the guerrilla army. He was classified as either top quality, regular, or third rate. 

If the investigation of the recruit revealed that he was an informer for 

the enemy, he was tried as a traitor by a war tribunal.108 There were 

some desertions in spite of the rigorous selection process.

Many of the recruits who were accepted into the guerrilla organizations could not immediately be assigned positions in combat units 

because of a lack of military weapons. In such cases, the recruits were 

organized into units employed in secondary missions such as guard, 

police, or counterintelligence. As soon as weapons became available, 

these recruits became full-fledged guerrilla fighters if they were trained 

as such.109 Noncombatants continued to fill the ranks of the guerrilla 

armies; up to one-third of the members of some columns were unarmed 

late in the fighting stage because of the lack of guns and ammunition.

Training and indoctrinating recruits was the fundamental task of 

the revolutionary leaders; and until secure guerrilla bases were established in Cuba in 1957, this task was performed under the most difficult conditions. Fidel Castro and the group that invaded the Moncada 

barracks in 1953 employed a chicken farm in Siboney, on the outskirts 

of Santiago de Cuba, to prepare for their July 26 attack. Training was 

almost confined to short political briefings and revolutionary exhortations rather than extensive gun handling and firing and military tactics.

The survivors of the Moncada episode were sent to prison on the 

Isle of Pines where they established a school for revolutionaries. Castro 

taught Cuban history and politics while Pedro Miret, another revolutionary leader, conducted refresher courses in weapons and military 

tactics.110 While in prison, Castro became convinced that a successful 

revolution could only be organized and launched from a foreign base.

With the aid of General Alberto Bayo, a Spanish Civil War veteran 

who fought in the Republican armed forces in the late thirties, over 
Dynamics of Revolution

77

80 Cuban exiles established a revolutionary school on the outskirts of 

Mexico City in 1956. Led by Fidel Castro, who had been released along 

with other political offenders when Batista declared a general amnesty 

in the spring of 1955, the small band received extensive field training 

and instruction in guerrilla warfare. The ranch on which the school 

was established, protected by towers and walls, had an area of 60 square 

miles and was broken with mountains and jungle growth—ideal for 

guerrilla training.

Guns, ammunition, and other supplies were purchased with funds 

received from former Cuban President Prío Socarrás, and Bayo’s students were started on a rigorous training program which included 

target practice with pistols, rifles, and machineguns, and care of the 

wounded. Later the men were taken on forced marches of up to 5 hours, 

increasing gradually to 15 hours. They marched up and down hills and 

mountains, cut trails, simulated ambush attacks and withdrawals.111 The 

selection of courses for classroom instruction included operations and 

formation for light campaigns, defense against air attack, manufacture 

of bombs and explosives, topography, and other information pertinent 

to the conduct of irregular war against a superior force.112

In June 1956 the young trainees were discovered by the Mexican 

authorities; some were detained for several weeks and their guns, 

ammunition, and supplies confiscated. They were able to reorganize 

very shortly thereafter, and though under police observation, purchased more arms and supplies and set up arsenals in various apartment houses in Mexico City. Meanwhile, the rebels continued to hold 

classes on revolutionary warfare: they drew maps of Cuba, studied 

geography, and listened to Castro lecture on political philosophies. 

They also listened to radio broadcasts and held discussions on current 

affairs. Field exercises were held on another ranch near the U.S. border—a 3 days’ trip from Mexico City. The Mexican authorities, acting 

on information given them by a Cuban informer, again captured the 

guns and ammunition.113 And once again work began to replace the 

lost arms while preparations were made to purchase an invasion yacht. 

Even under the watchful eyes of the Mexican police, Cuban exiles continued to be trained in Mexico and to be transported individually to 

Cuba throughout the war.

Bayo maintained contacts with all the military organizations. After 

training the 26th of July Movement expeditionary force, he trained the 

leaders of a smaller force in early 1957 that was connected with the 

Organización Auténtica, an organization headed by Prío Socarrás. The 

courses in guerrilla warfare were brief and lasted only several weeks; 

during the previous year most of the men had received field training in 
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the Dominican Republic with the tacit approval of that government.114

Bayo continued his work in Florida.

A school system was organized and directed by Che Guevara in 

1957–58 after the insurgents established a permanent guerrilla base 

in the Sierra Maestra. Within 2 years the insurgents expanded their 

system to include 30 schools.115 The schools offered courses in reading, writing, history, and political science as well as gymnastics and 

guerrilla-type training to recruits and the local population alike. The 

students had their own medical section and served in rotation in taking 

care of their own supply needs. Many were trained to be teachers and 

served in the school system rather than in combat teams.116 William A. 

Morgan, a U.S. war veteran from Ohio, instructed the nucleus and the 

fresh recruits of the Second National Front of Escambray organization 

in the art of guerrilla warfare while in the Sierra de la Trinidad in 1958.

Intelligence

The men and women who made up the intelligence network that 

gathered the information necessary for the conduct of guerrilla warfare were usually local inhabitants. They maintained direct contact 

with Batista’s front lines and forwarded coded information, via a postal 

system, on the enemy’s forward encampments and rear troop movements. In this way the guerrilla bands avoided places where there was 

large enemy troop concentration and attacked the smaller units in the 

most unexpected places.

Prior to an assault on a populated area, advance information on 

telephone and telegraph lines, radio stations, railroads, airfields, 

number of enemy troops if any, and terrain was necessary to plan the 

operation, avoid surprises, and operate with the greatest possibility of 

success. Information received from the local inhabitants was analyzed 

by the intelligence sections of the guerrilla organizations.

Supply

The guerrilla bands had three essential sources of supply; local 

inhabitants, friendly parties outside the theatre of operations, and 

Batista’s army.f

 The various guerrilla bases were generally able to 

solve their food problems; but such items as leather, cloth, paper, and 

machinery were usually transported from distant cities to the bases. 

War material that could not be produced locally, such as heavy arms 

f Leaders of the 26th of July Movement insisted that only about 15 percent of the arms 

and weapons were imported from foreign sources. Their chief source of arms and weapons 

was Batista equipment captured on the field.117
Dynamics of Revolution

79

and equipment, was either imported from external sources or captured 

from Batista’s army.

The insurgents collected direct or indirect taxes, accepted donations, or confiscated property from the local inhabitants to satisfy their 

basic supply needs. In the Sierra Maestra, most of the cultivated land 

and farm animals that could produce meat, milk, butter, and cheese 

were collectivized. In this way the guerrilla army requisitioned whatever supplies were necessary to maintain itself and distributed what 

remained to the inhabitants through guerrilla agencies.

Supplies received from outside the area of operations were purchased with funds collected by the underground organizations working in various cities of Cuba and foreign countries. Wealthy benefactors 

and sympathizers contributed heavily to all the revolutionary organizations, regardless of their political affiliations. Prío Socarrás bought arms 

for various revolutionary groups from 1952 to 1959; he is said to have 

spent five million dollars for the purpose of ousting Batista. However, 

most of the arms shipped from Mexico and the United States to Cuba 

were seized by the Cuban authorities.118 Several organizations printed 

revolutionary bonds, a type of promissory note, with which to purchase 

materials. Supply terminals linked the distant cities to the guerrilla 

bases through which the much needed equipment, transported during the night, reached the insurgents. Pack mules and local peasants 

carried the supplies up the mountain trails, and the guerrillas cleared 

landing strips to receive supplies shipped by air from foreign countries.

The guerrillas always faced the problem of keeping up an adequate 

supply of ammunition. For this reason the guerrillas usually planned 

operations against an encampment or fortification where they would 

always be assured of capturing enemy arms and ammunition.119 Ammunition was not plentiful enough for target shooting until mid-1958 in 

the Sierra Maestra. “Dry shooting” (target practice without firing) was 

widespread in the early months of the war. By mid-1958, the guerrillas 

had also acquired a pool of stolen trucks and jeeps.120

Propaganda

Special sections of the guerrilla units dealt with propaganda.g In 

the early months of the war, when the guerrilla bands had few means of 

diffusing revolutionary ideas among the local inhabitants, propaganda 

was disseminated almost entirely by word of mouth. Small presses, ink, 

and paper eventually reached the mountain areas from the cities, and 

the first rebel newspaper, El Acusador, was published along with an 

assortment of bulletins and pamphlets. By early 1958, a small radio 

g See Section E, Techniques, for content and themes of propaganda.
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transmitter was set up in the Sierra Maestra which began to broadcast 

news of the military skirmishes as well as revolutionary exhortations 

throughout Cuba on the shortwave 40-meter band.121

Weapons

Weapons, especially the heavy type, were scarce during the early 

months of the war. Much of the arms and ammunition had been captured by the authorities in the foreign countries; more were lost when 

expeditions bogged down upon landing on the Cuban coast. However, 

arms shipments arriving from foreign countries and arms captured 

from the enemy during 1957 and 1958 increased the supply.

Cuban guerrillas favored long range weapons requiring small 

expenditures of bullets supported by a group of automatic or semiautomatic weapons during their skirmishes with the Batista army.122

The Garand rifle was preferred over other arms, but it had the disadvantage of expending too much ammunition when fired by inexperienced guerrillas. Twenty-two caliber rifles, used primarily for target 

shooting, double-barreled shotguns loaded with large shot, Belgian 

sporting rifles, some revolvers, and an occasional vintage Krag or Winchester were also available. An ideal composition of arms for a guerrilla 

unit of 25 men, according to Che Guevara, would be between 10 to 

15 single-shot rifles, and about 10 automatic or semiautomatic pieces 

which would include the Garand, Browning, or the more modern Belgian FAL and M-14 rifles.123 Sixteen caliber sawed-off shotguns were 

used to hurl “Molotov Cocktails.” Bombs, grenades, and mines, often 

manufactured within the guerrilla bases, were also included in the 

guerrilla arsenals.

War Industry

Several small cottage industries were developed in the Sierra Maestra after the guerrillas had established a secure base. Two of the most 

important were leatherworks and gunsmithing.124 The leatherworks 

consisted of a small shop where shoes and boots, damaged by the long 

marches over rough and rocky terrain, were repaired. When the industry expanded, hides were tanned within the base and the guerrillas 

began to manufacture their own shoes, cartridge belts, and knapsacks.

The repair of small arms and the manufacture of special weapons, grenades, bombs, and mines were features of the revolution that 

were not peculiar to the Sierra Maestra operations. General Bayo had 

instructed all Cuban groups in the methods of constructing grenades, 

incendiary and time bombs, and a number of devices to obtain maximum delays in bomb explosions.125 These bombs were particularly useful when assaulting military barracks and garrisons.
Dynamics of Revolution

81

Shoes for pack mules and water canteens for guerrilla troops were 

also fabricated in the Sierra Maestra. Ramón Castro, brother of Fidel, 

devised a formula for the manufacture of jeep and truck fuel which 

became widely used in transport operations. A small shop manufactured cigars and cigarettes. Miles of telephone lines were strung and 

roads were constructed in the mountain areas. An engine and dynamo 

generated electric power for the small industries.126

Medical

Care for the sick and wounded was generally limited to the application of first aid and use of whatever medical supplies were available. A 

medical section was responsible for all medicines and first aid kits. In 

a few instances guerrilla units had the fortune of having medical students within their group; some instruments were available and minor 

surgery was performed. The sick and wounded were usually left to the 

care of friendly peasants.

Some of the guerrilla bases established small hospitals. Volunteers 

who had medical experience were used as corpsmen. In the Sierra Maestra, medical care became more extensive than in the other guerrilla 

bases; hospitals and aid stations, established for the guerrilla army, 

also served the civilian population. Diagnostic and X-ray facilities were 

available, and major operations were performed. Female nurses cared 

for the convalescing patients.

Underground

Internal

The overwhelming majority of Cubans who participated in the 

revolutionary movement against Batista were members of the various 

underground organizations that harassed the police and the military in the cities. These organizations kept more than half of Batista’s 

security forces occupied in the cities during most of the revolution. 

In 1956 the Cuban underground “was an unknown quantity at best 

compounded of diverse, unstable and often incompatible elements”;127

and until some sort of agreement to coordinate the activities of these 

diverse groups was concluded in mid-1958, they recognized no central 

leadership and generally operated independently.

Members of one underground organization often held membership in other organizations. A certain amount of unofficial cooperation 

between groups was achieved through this type of dual membership. 

Frequently, an individual concurrently exerted political pressure 

through a professional association, engaged in clandestine activities 

for an illegal organization, and retained political loyalties in a party 
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

that predated the revolution. Allegiance to any one group was often 

incidental, and many of the young men who participated in terrorist 

acts did not identify themselves with any particular party.128

Cells of the 26th of July Movement and the Civic Resistance Movement, two closely allied underground groups, were organized throughout the island.h The 26th of July Movement underground organization, 

the urban branch of Fidel Castro’s organization in the mountains, dealt 

primarily in sabotage and other subversive operations in the cities. 

Operations were planned by the “National Direction,” a staff composed 

of a national leader and his chief coordinators. The chief coordinators 

in turn headed the branch organizations in various large cities. The 

deputy leader of the “National Direction” was a woman; she organized 

and led the women’s underground units of the organization. Militias 

were organized by chief coordinators in several cities and were held 

in readiness for the possibility of a mass insurrection. In Havana, for 

example, two thousand militiamen were armed for an abortive general 

strike that was called for April 1958.129

The Civic Resistance Movement, whose members included some of 

the most prominent citizens in Cuba, performed important logistical 

and economic functions along with its terroristic activities. It developed 

into a quasi-agency through which many Cubans lent support to the 

various guerrilla armies in the mountains. Two of its leaders in Havana 

coordinated the activities of the underground stations that were established in other large cities. Many of its conservative members acted 

as a moderating force on the radical revolutionary programs of the 

26th of July Movement. Its organization was divided into three major 

sections: propaganda, fundraising, and supply.i

 The propaganda section, charged with printing and distributing propaganda materials, 

employed nearly four hundred persons. It had at its disposal a printing plant, and multilith, ditto, and mimeograph machines with which 

to print its many thousand pamphlets and bulletins. Three bulletins a 

week were published with as many as 65,000 copies each in the spring 

of 1958.131 The fundraising section collected dues from its members 

and sold “freedom bonds” to nonmembers in its effort to help finance 

the revolution. Twenty thousand dollars was raised in dues alone by the 

end of March 1958—an increase of $18,000 from the previous November.132 The supply section purchased, stored, and forwarded military 

provisions to the guerrilla armies in the mountains.

h Cells were usually designated by a letter of the alphabet, and members of the cells 

operated under fictitious code names.

i These sections were divided into cells of approximately 10 persons each. Dr. Leopoldo Hernandez who headed the propaganda section knew only 12 of the 400 persons it 

employed.130
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83

Other underground organizations which conducted sabotage and 

terrorist activities were not as strong as the 26th of July Movement 

and the Civic Resistance Movement, but they added to the nuisance 

value of the total Cuban underground operations. Moreover, some of 

their members were mature political leaders whose influence brought 

wider Cuban and international support to the revolution. Prío Socarrás’ Organización Auténtica, which had professional and business support, headed a substantial underground network in the cities, a small 

guerrilla army in the mountains, and was financing the operations of 

other organizations as well. Triple A, headed by Dr. Aureliano Sánchez 

Arango, former member of Prío’s Cabinet, was a small and closely-knit 

group that began operations in 1953. It was quartered in Havana and 

specialized in sabotage.j

 The Montecristi group, headed by a former 

president of the Cuban Bank for Industrial and Agricultural Development under Prío’s administration, allied itself with high-ranking military officers and attempted a military coup in April 1956. It continued 

operations throughout the war.

Students from the University of Havana were organized under the 

Federation of University Students (FEU), a small loosely knit group 

which dealt in assassination and distributed pamphlets denouncing the 

government. FEU had pledged its support to the 26th of July Movement 

in 1956 when its president, José Antonio Echevarria, signed a pact with 

Fidel Castro in Mexico. The Revolutionary Directorate, an outgrowth 

of FEU, was founded as a fighting organization in early 1957 before an 

abortive attempt was made to assassinate Batista in March of that year. 

It extended its membership to a broad spectrum of insurgent youth 

which included students and alumni, and supported a small army in 

Las Villas Province. It had approximately one thousand men under its 

leadership in Las Villas.134

Several other groups were organized and either dissolved or merged 

with stronger groups during the revolution. The Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, for example, plotted with the connivance of dissident army officers to capture a large military installation as early as 

April 1953. It failed and was later dissolved in 1955. From this organization grew the Revolutionary Action Movement which merged with the 

26th of July Movement in 1956.

External

Exiled and resident Cubans operated 62 branches of the Cuban 

underground in the United States, several Latin American countries, 

j Triple A had an organization of approximately 18 persons in Havana in 1957. The 

organization operated in groups of “threes” or “fours,” each assigned a leader and a specific target.133
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

and Puerto Rico prior to and during the revolution.135 Fidel Castro laid 

the groundwork for his external organization in the fall of 1955. He 

obtained a visa from the U.S. Embassy in Mexico and flew to Florida 

and New York where he met with other Cubans and established an 

underground network. Other groups also established external underground systems, but the 26th of July Movement organization appears to 

have been the most extensive. Underground units were also formed in 

Mexico, Costa Rica, and Venezuela. Distributing propaganda material, 

gathering information useful for the conduct of guerrilla operations 

in Cuba, soliciting funds from sympathizers, recruiting and training 

guerrilla fighters, and smuggling arms and supplies into Cuba were the 

main functions of the external underground network.

The most important centers in the United States were established 

in Washington, D.C., and Miami. In Washington, an agent was planted 

as chief clerk in the Cuban Office of Military and Air Attache in early 

1957 to gather and photostat information concerning Cuban arms purchases and delivery orders. Through Washington contacts the information was flown to other agents in Miami, sent to Castro, and delivered 

to the various underground units in Cuba to be used for propaganda 

purposes.136 Two agents, one representing the 26th of July Movement 

and the other the Auténticos, acted as lobbyists to protest shipments of 

war material to Batista. One, Ernesto Betancourt, was Castro’s agent 

and was registered with the Department of Justice; and the other, Carlos Piad, representing the Prío group, was not officially registered.

The functions of the Miami organization were twofold—military 

and political. The military function consisted of soliciting contributions with which to buy arms and supplies, securing arms from all over 

the United States and Central America with the aid of the chief of the 

rebel air force, and expediting shipment of military items and men to 

Cuba.k

 Distributing propaganda material and laying the groundwork 

for the unification of political and revolutionary opposition groups 

were the political functions.

Labor Organization

Organized labor was one of the most powerful political forces in 

Cuba under Batista. It had a successful working relationship with the 

government which continued until Batista was overthrown. Unsuccessful pro-Castro attempts were made to attract labor to the revolutionary cause; but except for a few small unions that formed a national 

k Approximately 90 percent of the supplies sent to Cuba during the insurrection 

came from the United States and were financed by funds raised in the United States.137
Dynamics of Revolution

85

underground labor front, organized labor did not join the revolution 

until victory had been achieved by the revolutionary forces, and then 

only “as a mechanical result of nationalization from above.”138

Approximately one-half of the Cuban workers of a labor force of 

two million belonged to labor organizations before 1959.l

 Local unions 

were usually linked with nationwide federations of the same or related 

industries whose central organs had headquarters in Havana. Some 

federations had provincial branches that exerted more influence over 

labor policies than their nationwide parent organizations. The majority of federations were joined in a Confederation of Cuban Workers 

which “exercised considerable control over most of its affiliates” prior 

to 1959.140

Political Parties or Organizations—Legal, Illegal

Several existing political parties and organizations, thrown into a 

state of confusion after Batista took power in 1952, offered weak but 

open opposition during the insurrection. The opposition parties were 

first dissolved by Batista, but they later reemerged when he announced 

that elections would be held in 1954. Batista consolidated his political 

power around the Progressive Action Party, the Democratic Party, and 

the Liberal Party. The maneuverings of other parties produced no unified opposition. Except for the Popular Socialist Party, whose organization remained intact, opposition parties were splintered by factional 

disputes over questions on participation in government, passive resistance, or violent opposition during the revolution.

The two most important non-Communist parties opposing Batista 

after 1952 were the Auténtico and Ortodoxo. Both parties were organized 

on the national, provincial, municipal, and ward levels. Leaders of 

organized civic or professional groups supported the national party 

leaders if their views were represented. Ward sergeants mobilized local 

support for the parties at the ward level.

The Auténticos split into two major factions after 1952, and each 

group carried with it its own support from all levels. Grau San Martín 

headed one group that campaigned against Batista in the 1954 presidential election before he withdrew his candidacy on the eve of the election. Prío Socarrás headed the other faction, but he remained in exile 

throughout most of the revolution and his group remained politically 

inactive. The Auténtico had operated clandestinely as the Organización 

l It has been estimated that there were from 800,000 to 1,500,000 Cuban workers organized into labor unions before 1959. However, the source of this information is 

inclined to believe that the higher figure is inflated.139
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

Auténtica during most of the 1930’s, and it did the same in the 1950’s 

under Prío’s leadership. It maintained an underground group in the 

cities and a guerrilla army in the mountains. Many of its members 

joined with various other insurgent groups during the revolution.

The Ortodoxo split into three major factions in 1953.

The “electoralists” were dismissed by the rest because 

they advocated participation in elections held by the 

Batista government. The independents, loyal to the 

Ortodoxo tenet of non-alliance with other parties, 

refused to cooperate. The Montrealists, who sought 

agreement with the Auténticos and of whom a faction . . . proposed a common front of all opposition 

groups including the Communists, were unable to 

work out an acceptable alliance.141

Despite their early reluctance to join the revolutionary movement, 

many of the Ortodoxo leaders became active members of the movement. 

The party had several representatives in the original Castro group that 

attacked the Moncada barracks in 1953.

The organizational structure of the Popular Socialist Party, headed 

by Secretary-General Blas Roca, was similar to Communist parties in 

other countries. A Political Bureau, made up of top Communist leaders, 

headed the larger Central Committee of leaders and other party functionaries. Provincial and municipal committees, organized according 

to government territorial divisions, ran party activities in cells within 

their respective jurisdictions. During the periods when the party held 

legal status, it kept an underground network of cells in readiness for 

use in insurrectionary activities. It had a number of allied organizations such as Socialist Youth, composed of university students, and it 

infiltrated other legal organizations, such as labor unions.

The party was publicly critical of the Batista coup, but it adjusted 

readily in order to maintain its legal status. It was declared illegal in 

October 1955, however, and went underground with its organization 

intact. In the last few months of the war, the party ordered its members 

to join other insurrectional groups.

Social Organizations

Membership in professional associations was required of most practitioners during Batista’s rule. These associations which the government supervised had great influence over their members; they not only 

controlled professional standards but also ensured the loyalty of their 
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87

members to the government. Individuals who belonged to professional 

associations also joined other civic or religious groups.

The professional associations, along with religious, fraternal, civic, 

and cultural associations, did not actively oppose Batista but gradually 

withdrew their support of the government during the revolution. By 

March 1958 they had joined together to form the Joint Committee of 

Cuban Institutions and to propose formulae of compromise between 

Batista and the rebel groups. When these failed, the top leaders, who 

represented 40 national institutions, met in Havana in March 1958 and 

issued a petition which demanded in unmistakable terms the resignation of the Batista government.142 The document contained no personal signatures, but merely listed the institutions which subscribed to 

its terms. These people who were suspected of having anything to do 

with its publication were immediately sought by Batista’s police.

During the same month, a number of judges in Havana felt that 

they could no longer tolerate the abuse and ridicule that the administration of justice was receiving from Batista’s police during the revolution. They sent a weak petition to the Chamber of Administration of 

the Court of Appeals pleading that the Chamber pass a resolution in 

order to strengthen the judiciary, but no action was taken.

Religious Organizations

The Roman Catholic Church, the principal church of Cuba, had 

fairly insignificant political influence and played a minimal role during the course of the revolution. Although it had an extensive organization with its clergy, schools, convents, and laymen’s groups in the 1950’s 

along with an increasing number of loyal members, it deliberately 

abstained from taking an active part in the political process except 

when it denounced communism and asked its following not to vote for 

the Popular Socialist Party.

The Church hierarchy threw aside its political aloofness, however, 

when the situation between Batista and the revolutionaries reached a 

pitch in 1958, and “authoritative intervention, which the Church was 

in a position to provide, was thought to be the only means of inducing 

both sides to come to some arrangement that would allow the country 

a respite.”143 The hierarchy met in Havana to discuss the national situation and issued an episcopal statement, one of the Church’s strongest 

weapons, asking for the “establishment of a government of national 

unity which might prepare the return of our Fatherland to a peaceful and normal political life.”144 Batista, although much surprised by 

the Church’s attitude, responded to the plea by setting up a four-man 
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

commission, appointed by the Church, with a view to negotiating with 

the rebels. Batista later ignored the commission.

TECHNIQUES

Guerrilla Warfare

December 1956 Invasion: Fighting Stage Begins

A small conspiratorial movement of 82 revolutionists, members of 

the 26th of July Movement led by Fidel Castro and trained on Mexican 

soil, boarded a seagoing motor cruiser hiding on the Tuxpan River in 

Mexico and set sail for Oriente Province on November 25, 1956. According to the original invasion plan, the vessel was to land on November 30 

near Niquero, west of Santiago de Cuba, where the insurgents expected 

to link up immediately with one hundred waiting men. They were then 

to proceed to the city of Manzanillo to meet other rebel groups and 

attack army detachments in that city. Meanwhile, underground action 

squads in Santiago, Holguín, and other cities where government forces 

maintained military garrisons were to create confusion with shootings 

and bombings. The rebels believed that hundreds of volunteers, armed 

with weapons seized from Manzanillo, would join the uprising.

The uprising did not go according to plan. The yacht carrying the 

expeditionaries was 2 days off schedule. It was designed to carry eight 

passengers plus crew but instead carried 82 men, the crew, and a cargo 

of heavy equipment. Rough seas added to the delay. Furthermore, communication between the underground action squads which were to create confusion in Santiago and Holguín was faulty: some squads went 

into action on November 30 as planned, while others, when news of a 

successful invasion failed to arrive, decided to await developments and 

remained inactive. Underground units that did go into action in Santiago were defeated by a well-equipped infantry sent in by the General 

Staff of Batista’s army to reinforce army and police units already there. 

In Holguín, an action squad attempted and failed to seize a warehouse 

stored with dynamite. And finally, the yacht had been sighted by government aircraft, and the guerrilla troops were attacked by the Rural 

Guard 5 days after landing. Casualties were high and only 12 men survived to initiate the fighting stage of the revolution.

The survivors had reached the Sierra Maestra by January 1957, and 

for over a year they concentrated on preserving and expanding their 

forces, continually on the run from government bombing missions. 

Other organizations established guerrilla units in other areas of Cuba 

and they also were concerned primarily with preserving their forces. 

Occasionally, small guerrilla bands came down from the mountains 
Dynamics of Revolution

89

to conduct hit-and-run raids against military garrisons and enemy columns during the night hours.m

These attacks seldom varied. Against a military garrison, the guerrilla band was divided into three units; one unit protected the rear from 

enemy reinforcements while the other two units attacked the garrison 

from both flanks. In no more than an hour or two, the band retreated 

with stolen provisions to its mountain redoubt which was never more 

than a day’s march away. Against an enemy column, the guerrillas provoked the government troops into an attack and forced them headlong 

into a trap; if the government troops attempted to avoid the trap, they 

found themselves in another, encircled and attacked from behind. Road 

mines and delayed time bombs destroyed enemy vehicles. Sugar plantations were burned to cripple the economy, but this scorched-earth 

policy was revoked by Castro when it antagonized Cubans against him.

Although guerrilla attacks on government troops and military 

installations did not result in victories for the revolutionaries, they were 

embarrassing to the government and caused anxiety within the military 

high command. Until the 26th of July Movement guerrillas successfully 

attacked a military garrison in Ubero in May 1957, government sources 

had attempted to create the illusion that no rebel forces existed in the 

mountains. Government troops in Oriente, far outnumbering the rebels, were unable to cope with the military situation. Campaigns against 

the guerrillas in the mountains were fruitless and the army fell back 

on a strategy of containment. The guerrillas seldom defended the terrain on which they fought; therefore aviation and armor against them 

was useless, artillery had little effect, and recoilless rifles seldom found 

a target. Hand grenades and submachineguns proved to be the most 

useful weapons.

Guerrilla Operations Expanding: Batista Launches Offensive

A new phase of guerrilla operations began in the spring of 1958. 

By then, a firm base had been established in the Sierra Maestra, and a 

second front was opened in Oriente Province when Raúl Castro led a 

column to the northeastern mountain ranges of the Sierra del Cristal 

in March. He established another guerrilla base there, similar to the 

base in the Sierra Maestra, and operated within the surrounding area.

Still lacking arms, however, the guerrillas could not expand their 

units into a potent military striking force, but managed to create the 

illusion that one already existed. They operated in small groups, sniping 

m “During the early months of the fighting, the only military tactic used by the rebels 

was to ambush small government patrols for their weapons. As the patrols grew larger, the 

rebel underground furnished mines and the Fidelistas were able to turn back several punitive thrusts made at them in the mountains by ringing their strongholds with mines.”145
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

military outposts and convoys, all the while adding to the rebel arsenal. 

In this phase of operations, the guerrillas increased acts of sabotage, 

inflicting some damage on the country’s communication system, and 

harassing transport and highways.n Government military operations, 

concentrated on keeping the transport arteries open, held the guerrillas within a limited perimeter in the spring of 1958, and in early 

summer of that year succeeded in forcing some units operating in the 

countryside back into the Sierra Maestra.

Government forces launched an offensive against the rebels in May 

1958. By this time Batista appears to have had two choices of action: 

abdicate or fight the rebels with all the resources he could muster. 

Between twelve and fifteen thousand troops were committed to the 

general offensive in the Oriente operations. Equipped with armored 

trucks and half-tracks and supported by aircraft, they continued to 

pour into Oriente and camped along the foothills of the mountain 

ranges. Fortified posts were built with concrete emplacements, light 

artillery moved up, and armored helicopters carried soldiers up into 

the hills. The army, employing regular warfare methods, contained 

the guerrillas operating in the Sierra Maestra, but were less successful with the stronger units under the command of Raúl Castro in the 

Sierra del Cristal. His units were able to inflict considerable damage 

on military outposts and commercial transport lines. Government aircraft, which were used in strafing and bombing missions, were unable 

to hit the guerrillas’ vital bases. Intermittent fighting between the army 

and guerrilla units in Oriente and Las Villas continued throughout the 

summer with no significant victories scored for either side. The situation became static and remained so until the last few weeks of the war.

Meanwhile, government military affairs worsened. Disloyal officers 

plotted conspiracies, many others were inept and conducted themselves 

badly, and still others defected to the rebel army. Military operations 

dragged on without satisfactory results causing the supreme commander of the Oriente operations to be changed several times. Rivalry 

between the Chief of Operations and the chief of the military territory 

in which tactical forces were operating arose over the dispute of territorial commands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff divided Oriente into two 

military districts, and assigned one to each man in an attempt to settle 

the dispute.146

n The general objective of this tactic was to isolate the government military outposts 

by halting all traffic over highways.
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Guerrilla Counteroffensive

Advance preparations for the guerrilla counteroffensive began in 

August. Two columns led by Che Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos, Castro’s top commanders, marched from the Sierra Maestra and entered 

Las Villas Province in October. The columns had broken through the 

government cordon surrounding the Sierra Maestra, and except for 

several brushes with government troops which scattered some of the 

guerrilla units, they reached the Escambray mountains fairly intact. 

Guevara met with leaders of other guerrilla organizations and all 

agreed to combine forces in an offensive that was designed to capture 

the entire province. The Las Villas campaign began on December 20.

Encounters between government troops and guerrilla units in 

Oriente continued in November and December. The Castro brothers 

widened their perimeters of operations and, avoiding the major government outposts, attacked some of the smaller ones. They never fought 

the regular army on a defined front.o

 Several outposts were taken by 

the guerrillas,p often requiring house-to-house combat, but were abandoned when government reinforcements were sent in. The major garrisons were held by the government, but the army’s entire effort to keep 

the Central Highway open and prevent the garrisons from being isolated failed. The guerrillas succeeded in holding their own against a 

rapidly disintegrating army and in paralyzing the trading towns of Oriente by isolating them from the rest of the country.

The largest single guerrilla operation, under the command of Che 

Guevara, began toward the end of December. Columns which had 

increased in size with an influx of new volunteers headed in three 

directions to capture the strategic cities of Sancti-Spíritus, Cienfuegos, 

and Yaguajay. From those points, the guerrillas marched toward their 

main objective, the city of Santa Clara. The guerrillas met resistance 

from the remnants of Batista’s die-hard units making a last stand, but 

by the last day of the year had succeeded in virtually cutting the island 

in half. When there was no longer an army to fight, Castro insisted 

on carrying out his plans for an invasion of Santiago and his guerrilla 

forces took the provincial capital without a struggle. The takeover of 

the country by the revolutionary groups was orderly and well-organized 

by the time Castro arrived in Havana on January 8.

o “By early December, the roads and most of the countryside had come under rebel 

control after dark; by daylight, nothing moved but Batista’s forces in not less than company strength and usually with tanks and air cover.”147

p One source had this to say about guerrilla assaults: “The tactic which the rebels 

called an assault was not an assault at all as we use the word. It meant the rebel commander would infiltrate their troops by dark to positions as close to an objective as they 

could find concealment. They would then keep it under uninterrupted small arms fire 

24 hours a day. But they would not advance nor would they use demolitions.”148
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

Strikes

Revolutionary leaders firmly believed that the Batista government 

would be overthrown by a mass uprising precipitated by a general revolutionary strike led by the urban resistance movement and seconded by 

armed action.q The strike, then, was considered a very important revolutionary technique. Two important strikes had been planned prior to 

the fighting stage, one to support the attack on the Moncada barracks 

in 1953 and the other to support the December 1956 invasion, but neither got off to a start.

Two general strikes were called during the fighting stage. The first, 

in August 1957, began in Santiago de Cuba and quickly mushroomed 

and spread to other cities, most of them in Oriente. It did well considering that it had no prior planning or prior organization. It appeared 

to have been spontaneous; it began when the population of Santiago 

closed shop for the funeral of a revolutionary leader.r The police and 

Rural Guard were immediately sent into the trouble spots by the government and the strike was put down. Santiago was paralyzed for several days despite police efforts to bring things back to order. Batista’s 

censorship kept the news of the strike from reaching the entire island 

and was thus able to keep the disturbance localized.

The April 1958 strike was planned and announced almost a month 

ahead. Castro revealed on March 12 that a strike would be called sometime in April. The underground units were alerted, and they distributed bulletins in the cities instructing the workers on how to conduct 

themselves during the strike. The strike began in Santiago on the night 

of April 8. It spread to other areas on April 9, but in many cities was 

put down in several hours by the police. Batista had made use of the 

month-long warning. Congress had granted him special powers to take 

severe measures against the strikers. The morale of the revolutionaries reached a low ebb after the strike was put down. Batista might have 

been able to give the guerrillas a devastating blow had he been ready 

to launch a major offensive at this time.

The failure of this strike underscored a number of important facts. 

The underground was not prepared for this type of large-scale coordinated effort because its various organizations lacked unity and cooperation. More important, it indicated that the workers and the trade 

unions did not wish to carry off a general strike; they were doing very 

q Thus the revolution was to be a “frontal assault” or a revolution from “below”: a 

revolution whose strategy and tactics were to be based on the actions of the masses outside 

the ruling elite against the instruments of power.

r Frank Pais, a leader of the 26th of July Movement underground organization, was 

shot by the police on July 30, 1957.149
Dynamics of Revolution

93

well under Batista and were not willing to jeopardize their close ties 

with the government. Moreover, the Popular Socialist Party deliberately 

sabotaged the strike because it had not been consulted and no attempt 

was made to obtain its official approval. The key transport workers’ 

unions, whose participation was necessary to conduct a successful 

nationwide strike, were under the influence of the PSP.150

The last strike to be called in direct connection with the insurrection began on New Year’s Day in 1959 after Batista had resigned 

and fled. When Batista resigned, he delivered the government to the 

“constitutional substitute.” But because the top government heads had 

resigned also, a military junta was left in control. As soon as Castro got 

wind of this coup d’etat, he ordered his troops not to stop fighting. He 

declared that the revolution had not yet triumphed and that he would 

only settle for unconditional surrender. At the same time he told the 

entire Cuban population to go on strike.s

 The Civic Resistance Movement emerged into the open to organize the strike and mobilize a militia to maintain order.

Demonstrations

Overt popular opposition to the government was often expressed in 

the numerous demonstrations that were staged by students and women. 

Antigovernment demonstrations were generally peaceful, but large 

police units were required to disperse the participants. Student demonstrations and antigovernment activity at the University of Havana 

prompted Batista to close the University in 1956, and it remained 

closed for the remainder of the war. Several protest marches staged 

in Santiago de Cuba in 1957 began when groups of women dressed 

in mourning marched in the streets. More women carrying banners, 

shouting slogans, and blocking traffic joined the original marchers. 

On-the-scene army and police units attempted to drive the women 

back, arrested some, and turned firehoses on others to disperse them. 

U.S. Ambassador, Earl E. T. Smith, who was present in July 1957 when 

a demonstration was in process, criticized police methods and his comments made newspaper headlines and radio newscasts. This incident 

attracted attention to the revolutionary cause, at the same time discrediting Batista.

s The strike appears to have been relatively successful in the sense that people left 

their work and homes to go out into the streets and demonstrate. It is not clear, however, 

that such demonstrations were not a result of yuletide celebrations and jubilance over 

Batista’s resignation rather than as a reaction to direct orders from Castro.
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

Sabotage

Urban underground organizations conducted much of the sabotage since most of it was carried out in the cities. Industrial plants, the 

nation’s communications system, and public utilities were the primary 

targets of the sabotage groups. Few cities were spared the bombings, 

raids, and fires, but such activity appears to have been more intense in 

areas east of Camagüey, especially Oriente Province. Sabotage sections 

of the guerrilla units damaged enterprises and communications close 

to the fighting fronts.

Sabotage began in the early stages of the revolution, but it was intensified during 1958. Telephone lines were cut, bridges were blown up, 

and railroads and culverts were damaged. Many vital industrial properties, especially those owned by Batista’s supporters, were destroyed. Sabotage almost completely paralyzed transportation east of Camagüey. 

Saboteurs blew up a power station in Havana that cut off a whole section of the city from its source of electricity. Armed members of an 

underground group raided the central office of the National Bank and 

destroyed cancelled checks and bank drafts, creating chaos in the capital’s business and financial house. Saboteurs also burned canefields, 

but this produced adverse effects: farm laborers who depended on the 

sugar crop for a living expressed their indignation over this technique 

and it was halted. By the end of 1958, economic activity in some parts 

of Cuba was at a virtual standstill.

Batista responded with an increase in repressive measures. Police 

and army units roamed the city streets in patrol cars and often prevented would-be saboteurs from destroying property. Police also raided 

homes suspected of harboring saboteurs and bombs, and such raids 

frequently resulted in the death of Cuban students and prominent 

citizens. In Oriente, Batista’s close friend and ally, Senator Rolando 

Masferrer, had a personal army of two thousand men who wore army 

uniforms and rode in khaki-colored shortwave radio patrol cars. In 

times of crisis such as December 1956, August 1957, and April 1958, 

this vigilante force, known as the Socialist Revolutionary Movement, 

worked hand-in-hand with the army in suppressing disorders and eliminating revolutionaries.151 Masferrer became one of the most hated men 

in Cuba and his patrol cars the express targets of “Molotov Cocktails” 

and other bombs thrown by rebels.

Terrorism

Terrorism, which according to Che Guevara is a “negative 

weapon” because it often produces results that are detrimental to the 
Dynamics of Revolution

95

revolutionary cause,152 included indiscriminate bombings of public 

places and assassination of public officials.t Restaurants, marketplaces, 

and theaters were the targets for bomb-throwing students, who conducted the greater part of the terrorist acts. Innocent victims who happened to be on the scene of bomb explosions were killed or injured, 

and the Cuban population was kept in a constant state of tension. 

Several important heads of the government’s “repressive instruments” 

became victims of assassins. Members of the Revolutionary Directorate 

planned a grandscale invasion of the executive offices to assassinate 

Batista and topple his regime in March 1957, but this plan misfired 

badly: Batista happened to have stepped out of his office momentarily, 

and the would-be assassins were almost immediately surrounded by a 

police cordon. Few escaped.

Armed forces and police answered terrorism with a vengeful wave 

of reprisals that turned some of Batista’s strongest supporters against 

him. Cuban youths merely suspected of terrorism were arrested, killed, 

and left in the streets as a warning to others. As terrorism increased 

in 1958, civic institutions offered to play a conciliatory role between 

the government and the rebel forces. Batista became annoyed when a 

number of these institutions suggested that he should resign, however, 

and he went ahead with his harsh measures. Although both sides used 

terrorism as a technique, Batista’s side suffered more from the negative 

aspects of terrorism.

Propaganda

Propaganda, a technique which aided in weakening the public confidence in the government, originated from two sources: the 

underground organizations in the cities, and the guerrilla bases in 

the mountains. The underground organizations distributed newspapers, bulletins, and leaflets devoted to matters of general interest to 

the country. News items depicted Batista as a tyrant and murderer, 

and indicted the “dictatorship” on grounds of moral cowardice, official ineptitude, and military impotence. Pictures of dead students were 

printed to emphasize Batista’s extreme measures and harsh “acts of 

barbarism” committed on the defenseless civilian population. Leaflets 

informed Cuban workers on how to conduct themselves during strikes.

t Terrorism, according to Sergius Stepniak, a 19th-century Russian terrorist, is 

not employed to overthrow the government but to compel it to neglect everything else: 

if terrorists can force the government to concentrate on the repression of terror for a 

long period of time, the government’s position in respect to its other duties will become 

untenable.153
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Word-of-mouth communication, or radio bemba, as it is called in 

Cuba, was another effective means of distributing propaganda. Slanderous remarks about public officials and distorted news of the government’s activities were spread by telephone. Rumors that Batista would 

confiscate all bank deposits and safe-deposit boxes to save the country 

from bankruptcy caused a 3-day run on banks during which millions 

of dollars were withdrawn.

In propaganda originating from the guerrilla bases and directed 

at the local population close to the fighting front the rebel leaders diffused revolutionary ideas and, posing as social reformers, tried to convince the peasants that this was their revolution and that they would 

receive the benefits. Rebel newspapers sent out to the cities from the 

mountains told exaggerated accounts of guerrilla military victories and 

created the illusion that the guerrillas in the mountains had an irresistible force. The trickle of fighters was made to resemble a “flood of rebel 

troops.” Loudspeakers aimed at the government troops on the fighting front were very effective in accelerating disillusionment within the 

army; they said that Batista was pitting Cubans against Cubans merely 

to maintain his “corrupt dictatorship” and that the revolution was not 

the army’s enemy, but Batista’s enemy.

Radio Rebelde, transmitting newscasts from the Sierra Maestra on 

a shortwave band, was put into operation in February 1958. Radio 

gave Fidel Castro an excellent tool of a personal nature with which to 

reach the Cubans in the cities. In great oratorical style, he broadcast 

exaggerated news of guerrilla victories and revolutionary exhortations 

throughout the island. Castro also convinced many members of the 

middle and upper classes that they need not fear his revolution; he 

denied categorically Batista’s charges that he was a Communist and 

that the 26th of July Movement advocated socialization or nationalization of industries. Batista found it necessary to jam rebel broadcasts 

and simulate rebel newscasting over the same frequency to counter the 

revolutionary propaganda.

The government held firm control over Cuba’s newspapers and 

therefore eliminated the possibility of the revolutionaries ever using 

them as their own propaganda organs. This press control was not exercised as “outright” censorship until the end of Batista’s rule. Instead, 

the botella (bottle),

the name applied to government sinecures and other 

forms of official bribery, provided a highly effective 

means of curtailing criticism of the government. The 

majority of Cuban newspapers were dependent on the 

botella for their existence and were unwilling to risk 
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losing their source of support by pointing up weaknesses in the regime.154

ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT OF FOREIGN POWERS 

(ON BOTH SIDES)

Countries Involved

The United States, several Latin American countries, and at least 

one European country were actively involved in the Cuban Revolution 

during its fighting stage. Close Cuban-United States economic ties, 

which persisted until 1959, and the hemisphere policy of the U.S. Government during the Cuban revolutionary period undoubtedly determined the extent of U.S. intervention in the revolution.

At that time, the hemisphere policy of the U.S. Government was 

centered on the desire for political stability in and political cooperation from individual Latin American countries in an attempt to ward 

off Communist subversion. However, many government officials, along 

with part of the U.S. press, felt that “repressive dictatorships” such as 

Batista’s were, in the long run, only transitory dikes against communism, and that with their collapse the Communist takeover would be 

that much more forceful. These officials perceived inherent dangers 

in the situation and, though not pro-Castro, felt that resentment was 

building up in Latin America because of U.S. support of dictatorial 

regimes not only in Cuba but throughout the hemisphere as well.

U.S. public opinion eventually added its weight to the opposition to 

Batista. The U.S. press capitalized on the romantic aspects of the young 

rebels in the mountains who had vowed never to shave their beards 

until liberty and equality had been achieved. Some U.S. citizens were 

motivated to the degree that they attempted to join the forces of the 

26th of July Movement. Others inquired as to how they could aid the 

Castro guerrillas financially.

The involvement of other foreign powers was relatively limited. 

Within the hemisphere the various governments which were headed 

by authoritarian governments tended to align their official policies in 

regard to the Cuban Revolution in favor of Batista, whereas nations 

like Costa Rica and Venezuela (after the overthrow of General Marcos Pérez Jimenez in early 1958) were generally supporting the Cuban 
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Revolution.u One authoritarian president, Luis Samosa of Nicaragua, 

claimed in December 1957 that he had prevented a rebel invasion of 

Cuba from Nicaragua. He added that the rebels had planned the invasion with arms sent by Prío Socarrás.155

Batista’s relations with Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo followed 

a violently shifting course. The Dominican press was conducting a “vitriolic” campaign against Batista, and Cuban guerrillas were training 

on Dominican soil preparing for an expedition against him. Trujillo 

indicated to Batista in January 1957 that he wanted to make peace and 

the two dictators signed a pact which secured Batista’s eastern sea and 

air flank from invasion.156

Trujillo’s friendship with Batista was not unquestionable, however. 

In August 1957 three Cubans were arrested in Costa Rica and charged 

with plotting to assassinate President José Figueres. When they were 

later released, the Cubans claimed that they had been hired by Trujillo 

for a large reward of money and weapons to be used by the Cuban rebels in the war against Batista.157

Costa Rica also participated in the shipment of arms and materials 

to Cuba. The sympathies of President Figueres lay with the insurgents. 

After the Venezuelan dictator Pérez Jimenez was overthrown in January 

1958, Caracas also became a center of activity for Cuban revolutionaries. Rear Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal, who was President of Venezuela after the overthrow of the Pérez Jimenez government, allowed 

Venezuela to become the headquarters of Cuban underground groups. 

Rómulo Betancourt, elected President of Venezuela in December 1958, 

also spoke out in favor of the Cuban Revolution and promised to allow 

his country to become headquarters of an anti-Batista government-inexile.158 By the time he was inaugurated in February 1959, however, 

Castro had already seized power in Cuba.v

The efforts of the 26th of July Movement to obtain weapons and 

ammunition were extensive and sometimes desperate. Among the many 

supply channels investigated, one particularly novel attempt to secure 

u The Latin American countries that supported the Cuban Revolution have, since 

1959, developed uneasy relations with Cuba and some, especially Venezuela, have become 

violently opposed to the Castro regime. Several governments since Castro came to power 

have charged that invasion of their respective countries were being prepared in Cuba and 

have asked the U.S. Government for aid. “Castro Cuban” bands operating clandestinely 

in a number of countries have been broken up, and in several instances propaganda and 

other subversive materials denouncing various Latin American governments and advocating their overthrow have been discovered in Cuban diplomatic pouches and consignments 

to Cuban embassies by the respective authorities. On numerous occasions Cuban diplomats and delegates have been declared persona non grata by Latin American governments.

v Since the spring of 1960 Cuban propaganda has been violently denouncing the liberal leadership in several Latin American countries. President Betancourt, who formerly 

supported the Cuban Revolution, has been a frequent target of Castro’s propaganda.
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99

arms and foreign support came to light in a United Press dispatch carried in the daily bulletin of the Cuban Navy. It was reported that Haiti’s 

recently-elected President, François Duvalier, had been loaned funds 

by Castro for use in his presidential campaign in 1957 in hopes that 

upon his inauguration a revolutionary base could be established in 

Haiti in support of the rebels in the Sierra Maestra. The dispatch further reported that Duvalier returned these funds to Castro representatives and forced all suspected revolutionaries to leave the country.159

Mexico’s position in regard to the Cuban Revolution was formally 

stated in August 1957 upon the confiscation of two ships and the arrest 

of a group of revolutionaries attempting to invade Cuba from Mexico. The Ruiz Cortines government expressed its intention to remain 

neutral. It would respect political asylum but would not tolerate abuse 

of the asylum privileges by revolutionaries who organized revolutions 

within its territories against countries with which it maintained friendly 

relations.160

It will be recalled that Fidel Castro had originally invaded Cuba 

aboard the yacht Granma which sailed from Tuxpan, Mexico, in November 1956. During the previous year of arming and training in Mexico, 

Castro and his band had been taken into custody and later released 

by Mexican police, and his arsenals had been confiscated. Mexican 

authorities continued to break up training centers and confiscate arsenals throughout the Cuban Revolution.

Official foreign involvement in the Cuban Revolution was fairly 

limited on the part of the governments concerned although individuals did participate in aid to Cuba. Costa Rica committed itself to the 

greatest extent in the actual shipment of arms. Other leaders expressed 

their favor of the struggle against Batista but limited their involvement 

to occasional speeches and the extension of political asylum to those 

who were persecuted by him. The greatest concern over Cuban developments centered among the Caribbean republics, but one instance 

demonstrates wider reaching involvement.

A “brief flurry” was caused among the Latin American delegations 

to the United Nations when it was learned in September 1957 that 3 

of the 27 Cuban naval officers who had participated in an anti-Batista 

uprising in Cienfuegos were sentenced to death in a court-martial. The 

head of the Uruguayan delegation called a meeting of the Latin American group to consider interceding with the Cuban Government to have 

the sentences commuted. The Cuban delegate warded off any further 

action by announcing that Batista had already decided to commute the 

sentences.161

The number of European countries that were actively involved 

in the Cuban Revolution is uncertain. Great Britain is on record. It 
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maintained a “business as usual” policy throughout the revolution and 

during 1958 sold arms to Batista. Castro allegedly received financial 

and arms support from the Soviet Union and other Communist countries from behind the Iron Curtain. “Lavish” subsidies, according to 

only one source, were channeled to Cuba through several Latin American countries, and on at least two occasions Russian submarines delivered an unspecified amount of arms to the Castro forces before the 

end of the revolution.162

Military Aid by Foreign Powers

In a long speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations 

in September 1960, Fidel Castro, as chief of the Cuban delegation, 

berated the United States for its support of the Batista regime during 

the revolutionary struggle. Among various charges of U.S. “hostility” 

and “duplicity” Castro maintained that the fall of Batista was delayed 

because of U.S. assistance of tanks, planes, and weapons supplied to the 

Cuban Government. He charged that the United States had not only 

provided Batista’s army with weapons but had trained and instructed 

officers of the Cuban Army in their use to combat the Cuban revolutionary forces.

Three weeks after the speech the U.S. delegation to the United 

Nations replied to Castro’s allegations.163 The chief points of the U.S. 

rebuttal outlined the form of U.S. military aid to Cuba:

(1) The U.S. military missions and the shipment of arms to Cuba 

had been pursuant to the Mutual Security Act of 1951 which had been 

negotiated and signed before Batista had come to power. (Through 

this agreement Cuba received approximately one million dollars a year 

in U.S. military aid during the years 1952–58.)164

(2) Batista’s use of the Security Agreement arms in his fight against 

Castro had not been in compliance with the terms of the agreement. 

Furthermore, the United States had halted the shipment and sale of 

arms to Batista when it became apparent that he had been using them 

to suppress an internal rebellion. The arms embargo was announced 

in March 1958, almost 10 months before the overthrow of Batista. Aid 

for fiscal year 1959 amounted to $543,000, which was used to purchase equipment (no weapons) and to support Cubans in U.S. military 

schools. In fiscal year 1960 the allocation dropped to $249,000.165

(3) The U.S. military missions had been established to give technical military advice, to help procure the arms and equipment necessary 

for “common defense” and defense of the hemisphere, and to arrange 

for the admission of Cubans to U.S. military academies. The members 

of the missions did not participate in and did not prepare soldiers for 
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101

action against Cuban guerrillas. They did not appear in zones of action 

during the revolution.

During the revolution U.S. Customs agents did their best to stop 

arms smuggling from the United States to the revolutionaries in Cuba. 

Many shipments of arms, ammunition, and men were prevented from 

leaving U.S. territory and on a number of occasions revolutionary 

agents were arrested for gunrunning in violation of U.S. neutrality visa-vis Cuban internal affairs.

It was revealed in testimony before a U.S. Congressional subcommittee that President Figueres of Costa Rica had supplied arms to Castro in the Sierra Maestra. One of the shipments, delivered in March 

1958 by a Costa Rican National Airlines plane, consisted of 125,000 

rounds of ammunition, mortars and mortar shells, 2 machineguns, 15 

submachineguns, 13 or 15 M-3 machineguns, and some Mauser rifles. 

The shipment was a gift from President Figueres.166

Another source discloses that Castro allegedly received $50 million 

from Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela.167 After the U.S. arms embargo, 

Trujillo of the Dominican Republic promptly shipped Batista five planeloads of Dominican arms.168

Great Britain delivered 17 British Sea Fury fighter planes along with 

11 tanks in October 1958. The cost was reported at $1.8 million. The 

new planes put Batista’s air force combat wing up to 85 planes.169 Two 

months later, shortly before his fall, Batista received fifteen 30-ton British tanks. Meanwhile, the ship, “Sarmiento,” took on at Hull, England, 

100 tons of rockets destined for Cuba. The ship was prevented from 

sailing, however, because of strong anti-Batista sentiment in the British 

Labor Party.170

Political Intervention: U.S. Diplomatic Pressure

There were no major examples of U.S. intervention in Cuba’s internal affairs after the Platt Amendment was abrogated in 1934, but the 

possibility of intervention remained. The economic influence of the 

United States was great, and many Cubans were aware of it. They 

blamed the United States for the actions of the Cuban Government 

and its failure “to correct abuses.”171

During the fighting stage of the revolution, both the incumbent 

government and the revolutionaries competed with each other “to get 

American support as one of the determinants of their relative power 

and in the struggle to influence Cuban opinion.”172 While Batista 

enjoyed the backing of the United States, he held a psychological advantage. U.S. approval meant a great deal to the Cubans and especially the 
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military elite—one of Batista’s chief sources of power. The discontinuation of U.S. arms shipments in March 1958 had a somewhat demoralizing effect on the Cuban Army. Ambassador Smith later pointed out 

that the U.S. embargo was intervention “by innuendo (which was persuading other friendly governments not to sell arms to Cuba) [and] 

that these actions had a moral, psychological effect upon the Cuban 

armed forces which was demoralizing to the nth degree.” Ambassador 

Smith implied that the United States had even contributed to the rise 

of Castro as the embargo had “built up the morale of the revolutionary 

forces. Obviously when we refused to sell arms to a friendly government,” Smith continued, “the existing government, the people of Cuba 

and the armed forces knew that the United States would no longer support Batista’s government.”173

One final act of intervention on the part of the United States was the 

effort to keep Castro from coming to power so as to salvage whatever 

was possible from the status quo. After the arms embargo was imposed 

in March, Ambassador Smith “pressured Batista to restore civil rights 

as a prelude to the holding of general elections June 1.”174 The State 

Department felt that if Batista held honest elections free of emergency 

restrictions and if he stepped down in favor of a popularly elected government, the revolutionaries would end their struggle to overthrow the 

regime and peace would soon follow.

One of Cuba’s leading citizens, representing the Cuban civic institutions, approached Ambassador Smith in March and objected to the 

short notice given opposition groups concerning the June elections. He 

claimed that 3 months was too little time for the candidates and officials to prepare for a “democratic electoral process.” Civic groups sent 

a petition, requesting that the elections be postponed, to the Supreme 

Electoral Tribunal, whose members had final authority on the supervision of the electoral process, but the request was denied. Ambassador 

Smith then arranged for the elections to be postponed until the fall of 

1958.175

Finally, it appears that many last minute efforts were made to have 

Batista step down long before his term of office expired in February 

1959. Former Ambassador William D. Pawley, one of Batista’s close 

American friends, flew secretly to Havana to appeal to Batista to resign 

and turn the government over to a neutral caretaker junta—neutral in 

the sense that it would be neither pro-Batista nor pro-Castro.176 Batista 

resisted this scheme until the last few days of December when it then 

proved to be too late.
PART III—EPILOGUE

Epilogue

105

INTRODUCTION

The events which followed the fighting in Cuba moved rapidly and 

it soon became apparent that the revolution in its consolidation stage 

was developing into a social upheaval that was dedicated to the transformation of practically all aspects of Cuban society. The entire Cuban 

economy has been nationalized; the upper class has been virtually 

eliminated and its functions assumed by a minority of the middle class; 

a new dictatorship composed of middle-class revolutionary leaders supported by the Cuban Communist Party apparatus has replaced the old 

regime and has adopted Marxism-Leninism as a state ideology. The 

general welfare of most of those for whom the revolution was purportedly waged—the urban and rural wageworkers—has worsened. Within 

this matrix of revolutionary events, guerrilla units and underground 

groups both at home and in exile set in motion an anti-Castro and antiCommunist movement that was still very much alive in 1962.

REVOLUTIONARY ENVIRONMENT

Revolutionary Economics

Nationalization of Foreign Holdings After 1959

Political conditions in Cuba during the period from 1957 to 1959 

were not favorable to private foreign investments; and after 1959, disinvestment took place as Fidel Castro was reorienting his economic 

planning toward the Soviet bloc.177 U.S. and most other foreign-owned 

industries were nationalized, and although United States and Cuban 

officials discussed the manner in which U.S. private investors were to 

be compensated for their lost holdings, the talks broke down and little 

or no compensation was made.

Nationalization of foreign holdings did not sweep away Cuba’s 

susceptibility to foreign influence however. By 1962 the island still 

depended on foreign markets for consumption of sugar products and 

on foreign imports for many manufactured items and foodstuffs. Economic ties had been transferred to the Soviet bloc and did not offer the 

advantages formerly available in the United States, i.e., the closeness to 

the markets of eastern United States, availability of standard U.S. spare 

parts for Cuban machinery, high prices for sugar purchased under a 

special quota arrangement, etc.

Revolutionary Government and Distribution of Land

Castro’s basic provisions of agrarian reform are proclaimed in the 

Agrarian Reform Act of May 1959. The purpose of this act was to abolish 
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all large estates, limit the size of landholdings, and place all excess land 

under cooperative management or parcel it out to farm workers. The 

entire program of agrarian reform was placed in the control of what 

became a gigantic government agency, the National Agrarian Reform 

Institute (INRA).

What the revolutionary government created in the rural areas of 

Cuba after 1959 was a new economy of cooperatives under state supervision and managed by former personnel of the rebel army. Most of the 

privately owned farmland that was expropriated by the new government was not distributed widely among the small holders and the landless peasants as was the stated purpose of Cuban agrarian reform, but 

instead was organized into a system of cooperatives that closely resemble the farm systems of the Soviet Union. Farmers still had no control 

or voice over the land they worked. Only one million acres of the expropriated land had been deeded out to peasants and small holders by 

May 1961, leaving 121⁄2 million acres of the most desirable farmland—

out of a total of approximately 15 million acres of tillable land—in the 

hands of the government.178

Investment and Industrial Development as a State Function After 1959

Instead of relying on the independent decisions of private businessmen “acting within a free enterprise system” the revolutionary government took on the entire responsibility for economic planning.179

Investment and industrial development became state functions. Basically, economic planning was geared to diversifying and increasing 

agricultural production and establishing new industries that would produce items formerly imported from the United States without decreasing sugar production.

Success was not immediate, however, and by 1962 was still far from 

being realized. Sugar continued to be the major cash crop whose profits were depended upon to pay for imported goods from the Soviet 

bloc. Farmworkers who had spent their lives cutting sugarcane had 

to be taught new types of cultivation which resulted in extremely low 

productivity.

Experienced industrial managers and technicians fled the country leaving factories to the supervision of inexperienced personnel. 

The major source of raw materials and replacement parts for Cuban 

plants was lost when the United States imposed an embargo on exports 

to Cuba in October 1960. Consequently, the costliness of changing a 

single-crop agricultural economy into a diversified industrial economy 

has made the transition difficult, and the burden has been placed on 

the Cuban masses through higher taxes and belt-tightening austerity 

programs.
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Labor Conditions After 1959: State Control over Organized Labor

Fidel Castro came to power in 1959 with no support from organized 

labor. He attempted to mobilize the support of the workers behind him 

in April 1958, when he urged them to rise against Batista in a general revolutionary strike. But labor leaders did not support the strike, 

the workers were disinterested or uninformed, and the strike failed. In 

1959 Castro sought to reorganize and control labor. He replaced most 

of the old labor leadership with trusted revolutionaries and mobilized 

all Cuban wage earners under state-controlled labor unions.

By the end of 1961 it appeared quite unlikely that the revolutionary government had solved the problem of chronic unemployment. 

Labor conditions worsened: the government had reported an estimated 550,000 unemployment figure by the end of 1960.180 The shortage of sugar workers reported during the 1960–61 harvest period 

was caused by increased recruitment into the militia and youth corps 

which absorbed many of the Cubans who would otherwise have been 

unemployed. Basically the government did not alter the wage rates, but 

through the unions it reduced the amount of take-home pay by obtaining wage freeze and wage cuts, and by accepting “volunteer” elimination of fringe benefits. The workers were compelled by the government 

to work free overtime in the interest of increased production and to 

make “voluntary” contributions to a government-established fund for 

industrial development, also “voluntary.”181

Revolutionary Society

Social Structure

Cuban classes after 1959. A sweeping social reorganization reshuffled the Cuban society. The revolution

overthrew not only the government of Fulgencio 

Batista, but, as became increasingly apparent, the 

entire social order upon which all previous government had been based since the Spanish conquest of 

the island. Early in 1961 the new social order was still 

highly unstable, and it was impossible to predict the 

form it would eventually take.182

The privileged class was abolished and its functions as the retainer 

of the nation’s sources of wealth and power were assumed by the new 

revolutionary government. The new Cuban society could best be 

described as a society of the “humble” and the “modest.” The “humble” 

are the farmers and the wageworkers, and the “modest” are those “who 

control a small capital investment, but employ little or no wage labor.”183
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Racial discrimination after 1959. Discriminatory practices against 

nonwhites were completely abolished and racial equality was achieved in 

1959, according to the assertions of the revolutionary government. All 

Cubans of all classes, including Negroes, were given access to beaches, 

resorts, schools, and clubs that were formerly closed to members of 

the lower classes. “Perfect freedom” had been achieved by virtue of the 

revolution, according to the government, and societies which advanced 

the promotion of minority rights, especially those of the Negroes, were 

no longer needed. “They were encouraged to wither away by administrative actions which deprived them of their income and office space.”184

Effects of the revolution on the church. There was no rapprochement between Church and state after Batista was overthrown. The 

Church openly supported many of the revolutionary government’s 

social programs, but its continued hostility toward the Communist 

Party placed it in an unfavorable position vis-a-vis the new political 

heads who were either Communists or extreme leftists. There were 

open clashes between the Church and the government in 1960–61 and 

Castro announced that the government was taking determined steps 

to nationalize the Church schools and expel those of the clergy who 

opposed the revolution. However, Castro assured the Cubans in 1961 

that the “Socialist revolution was not opposed to religion,” and was 

in fact favorable to it if it remained outside the realm of politics and 

ceased to promote “counterrevolutionary” activities.185

Attitude of Professional Groups vis-a-vis Their Society Under the Castro 

Government

Many members of the intellectual class were greatly disillusioned 

and frustrated by the political makeup of the new revolutionary government and by their part in the new society. They lost their social position, and they lost their prestige; economics, the sciences, and industrial 

engineering began to overshadow law, architecture, and metaphysics. 

The government increasingly intruded in the professional and personal lives of the professional groups and required them to support the 

views of the regime. Consequently, they left the island in hordes so that 

by 1962 Cuba had a marked shortage of professional persons as well as 

some of the lesser educated persons.

Revolutionary Politics

The Fundamental Law of 1959 and Revolutionary Institutions

The Fundamental Law of 1959 incorporated most of the 1940 

Constitution except for the provisions dealing with the separation of 

powers. Under the 1940 Constitution, executive power was vested in a 
Epilogue

109

president whose authority was expressed through a cabinet. Under the 

new law, power was vested in a Council of Ministers whose Prime Minister was to “direct the general policy of the Government. . . .”186 The 

Law was drawn primarily to give sanction to the ad hoc decisions of the 

revolutionary government. Elections were never held because the leaders who controlled the revolutionary apparatus felt that many social 

and economic changes needed to precede an elected government.

Various new institutions were established by decree during the early 

months of the revolutionary government in an effort to fulfill Fidel Castro’s promises and improve living standards. Most important of these 

was the INRA, whose general duties were to limit the size of landholdings by expropriating land from large landholders and distributing 

a small acreage to each landless peasant. INRA went far beyond the 

provisions of the law which brought it into being, however. On its own 

initiative it expropriated cattle and machinery as well as land. Although 

the law provided that landowners should be compensated with government bonds, INRA gave no bonds and no receipts in exchange for the 

land, and no hearings were held for those who tried to appeal.187

The new government also undertook a crash program to raise living 

standards by providing low-income housing, schools, health services, 

and public recreation facilities.a New construction projects erupted 

all over Cuba. To finance these costly projects, the government reorganized the old National Lottery into the new National Institute for 

Savings and Housing (INAV). The Institute sold numbered tickets for 

prizes and financed INAV projects with the profits. However, profits 

were only marginal, and many projects were abandoned due to lack 

of funds.

Political Imbalance After 1959

The revolutionary leaders promised the Cuban people during the 

revolution against Batista that Cuba would have a popularly elected 

government which would represent the “true” voice of the people. By 

1963, however, no elections had been held. Instead, the radical leaders 

a Aside from reducing rents by 50 percent, the new government constructed ten thousand apartment units and single family houses at a cost of $24 million in 1959 alone. The 

government had planned to construct twenty thousand more in 1960. Many units were 

constructed near beaches and resorts to provide easy access to recreational facilities.188 In 

1960 the government enacted the Urban Reform Law, a long-term program whereby tenants were to receive title to the property they occupied after continuing to pay rent to a 

state agency over a specified number of years.189

In its goal to educate the entire Cuban population, the government constructed 

ten thousand new one-room schoolhouses in the rural areas in 1960. Most of the $90 million appropriated for education in that year was earmarked for increased construction of 

schools.190 These schools were to supplant the large urban educational centers that were 

housed in former Batista military camps.
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eventually established a dictatorial government which placed decisionmaking power solidly into the hands of a small clique at the top level, 

and eliminated almost the entire population from major consideration 

in national policy formulation.

CONSOLIDATION OF THE REVOLUTION

Leadership

The conflict of policies that plagued the revolutionary leadership 

during the fighting stage of the revolution became critical after the 

fall of Batista. From January to November 1959, the radical leadership 

(Fidel Castro, Raúl Castro, Che Guevara, et al.) sponsored a series of 

programs which aroused opposition among the moderate middle-class 

leaders who had previously offered the strongest support to the revolution. One political crisis followed another until the balance of power 

within the revolutionary leadership shifted from moderate to extreme 

left. Moderates were dismissed from their governmental posts and 

many went into exile to form political opposition to the revolutionary 

government.

In exile the anti-Castro groups have “suffered the same type of 

division that had plagued the opposition to Batista.”191 The leadership, 

composed of intellectuals and professionals, is divided into two major 

groups: conservative military officers and politicians, former supporters of Batista, who made up the first wave of political exiles to leave 

Cuba; and moderate former officials and supporters of the revolutionary government, who made up the second wave. The anti-Castro following is small and composed of exiles across the wide strata of Cuban 

society.

Strategy and Goals

Within the first few months of 1959 the program designed for Cuba 

differed little from earlier programs. Fidel Castro’s 20-point program, 

issued in February, advocated agrarian reform, protective tariffs, and 

rapid industrialization to provide jobs for four hundred thousand 

Cubans within 2 years. It also included a reduction in housing costs, 

rents, ministerial salaries, and public service rates, and a general salary 

increase for Cuban workers.192

In July, 6 months after Batista was overthrown, an open letter was 

sent to President Eisenhower from the nonofficial Joint Committee of 

Cuban Institutions, a prorevolutionary institution made up of the leading professional citizens of Cuba. The letter was specifically written to 
Epilogue

111

dispel fears that the revolution was being undermined by communism. 

Through agrarian reform and government-encouraged industrial and 

agricultural diversification, the leaders were seeking better distribution 

“of the means of access to the national wealth.” Communism, they felt, 

threatens only those countries where national wealth is concentrated in 

the hands of a few. Cuba was prepared to take all measures necessary to 

solve its economic problems. The leaders also reassured the President 

that they had no intention of exporting the Cuban Revolution.193

Some of the expressed social and economic aims of the revolution 

have been accomplished. New schools have been established and lowcost housing has been constructed. Health services and public recreational facilities have been expanded. Land has been confiscated and 

some acreage has been distributed to the landless peasants. Some 

attempts at diversification of agriculture and industrialization have 

been made.

The political record of the revolutionary regime, however, displays 

a “consistent betrayal” of the revolution’s original aims. All aspects of 

Cuban society have been placed under the direct control of the regime. 

No elections have been held, and the country is ruled by a council 

composed of the extreme elements of the 26th of July Movement and 

leaders of the Popular Socialist Party led by Fidel Castro. All forms of 

opposition to the regime have been declared illegal. The regime has 

nationalized domestic and foreign enterprises and has reneged on its 

original promises to fulfill its international obligations.

The various anti-Castro groups in exile have issued a number of 

programs for Cuba contingent upon a successful overthrow of the Castro government. The content and purpose of these programs closely 

resemble those that were advanced during the anti-Batista movement 

of the 1950’s. The leaders in exile wish to overthrow Castro’s regime, 

restore the 1940 Constitution, outlaw the Popular Socialist (Communist) Party, and hold free and general elections within 18 months. They 

have assured those who were dispossessed of their properties that their 

assets would be returned “except for those to be constitutionally expropriable for national interest.” They advocate agrarian reform with “fair” 

compensation to former owners of confiscated lands, abolition of state 

control over labor, low-cost housing, and guarantees of free enterprise 

and private ownership. Traditional relations with democratic countries 

are to be resumed. One of the more radical exile groups has maintained 

a separate position on two points: government control of all public utilities, including public transportation, with “fair” compensation to the 

former owners; and continued national direction of foreign banks.194
112

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

Ideology

Radicalism appeared after Batista was overthrown, and the urgent 

pace of events forced the leaders to explain the revolution in terms 

different from those used throughout the war. Increasingly, Fidel Castro and his associates adopted Communist definitions of class interests 

and theories of history and society which provided the revolutionary 

program a much more consistent rationale than did earlier statements. 

This was a result of a fusion between the revolutionary government 

and the Popular Socialist Party, which became the government’s main 

base of support. Cuba had achieved economic liberation from its chief 

enemy, the United States, according to the speechmakers, and was well 

on its way to economic progress and social reform. They spoke of the 

peasants and the workers in their struggle against “capitalist exploiters and the bourgeoisie.” They declared that the Cuban masses were 

“marching relentlessly toward the creation of a socialist state.”

By early 1961, the revolutionary government committed itself to the 

Communist doctrine by adopting “Marxism-Leninism” as the official 

Cuban state ideology. It expressed its agreement with the Moscow Declaration, which contained a reaffirmation of the Soviet bloc countries 

to communize the world and was issued at the close of the world conference of Communist Parties (December 1960), and it hailed the support of the Socialist world headed by the Soviet Union. In international 

affairs, fighting “United States imperialism” became synonymous with 

fighting for world peace. “In domestic affairs the national goal was the 

development of socialism. The main emphasis was on teaching the peasants and the workers that their historic role was to achieve the Socialist 

revolution by hard work and sacrifice in the interest of increased production.”195 The type of socialism to be developed is the second stage of 

the “proclaimed Communist three-stage theory of political evolution: 

national liberation, socialism, and Communism.”196

Organization of Anti-Castro Movements

Underground Units

Internal. Anti-Castro underground units were formed during 1959 

by Castro’s former supporters who were expelled from the revolutionary government because of their anti-Communist attitudes. They were 

organized along the lines of the old anti-Batista groups; although membership overlapped, they recognized no centralized leadership and 

usually worked independently. By the fall of 1960, the combination of 

underground and guerrilla activity in Cuba was creating a situation of 

open rebellion.
Epilogue

113

One of the first underground groups to organize was the Movement of Revolutionary Recovery, launched clandestinely by former 

military and civilian supporters of Castro. The organization received 

supplies from persons in the United States, and was closely linked with 

another group, the Catholic Groupment, made up of young professionals and Roman Catholic youths. The People’s Revolutionary Movement, 

an outgrowth of the Movement of Revolutionary Recovery, established 

national, provincial, and local underground chapters that reached 

throughout Cuba. It collected money from its supporters, dispensed 

anti-Castro propaganda material, and committed acts of sabotage in 

the cities. It received no aid from external sources. Smaller and less 

important underground units were formed after exile groups dropped 

thousands of leaflets over Cuban cities urging on Cubans to form 

“phantom cells” of three or four members to commit acts of sabotage. 

The leaflets instructed the groups to hit at commercial and industrial 

enterprises owned by the government.197

External. For months following the overthrow of Batista, a strong 

but not dominant wing of Cuban exiles sought the support of the U.S. 

Government to establish an anti-Castro organization. The U.S. officials 

ignored this pressure for approximately one year. By the spring of 1960, 

pushed by the events in Cuba, the United States decided to become a 

partner in a plan to organize a force of Cuban exiles, not necessarily to 

use it immediately against the Castro regime, but at least to hold it in 

readiness. “The implementation of this decision, requiring the greatest 

secrecy, was entrusted to the Central Intelligence Agency.”198

The political framework of the anti-Castro force was provided by a 

unity pact signed in Miami in May 1960, which established the Democratic Revolutionary Front headed by a five-man directorate. The Front 

excluded Cubans who were once connected with the Batista government, and included such organizations as the Auténtico Party, the Montecristi group, Triple A, the Movement of Revolutionary Recovery, and 

the Christian Democratic Party. In effect the Front “represented the 

Center of the exile world at a time when the Right was still unduly 

prominent and the Left had not yet arrived in large numbers.”199

When the “Left” did arrive during the latter half of 1960, however, 

the Front had already been weakened by internal dissension and was 

now being seriously threatened by newcomers whose political platform 

had more appeal for the recent influx of Cuban emigration. The political struggle continued between the two factions in the months that 

followed, but they were finally joined together in a political marriage 

in March 1961 after much prodding from U.S. officials. A seven-man 

council, known as the Revolutionary Council of Cuba, was set up and 

headed by Castro’s former Prime Minister, Dr. José Miro Cardona. By 
114

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

this time, however, priority was being given to an invasion army that 

was being prepared secretly with heavy involvement of U.S. officials; 

and the Council, still split over basic differences and not consulted on 

Cuban policy, “was not in command of the situation.”200

The Revolutionary Council of Cuba served as a political “fig leaf” 

for an invasion army that was being prepared in the United States and 

Guatemala. The military plans began to take shape in the spring of 

1960. A series of guerrilla training camps were established in Guatemala and the United States, and the “most promising guerrilla leaders, some of them veterans of the Sierra Maestra campaign at Castro’s 

side, were sent for advance training to the U.S. Army’s Jungle Warfare 

School at Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone.”201

The invasion, launched from Guatemala in April 1961, resulted in 

a complete disaster for the invading anti-Castro forces.202 The effects 

of the defeat intensified the divisions that had existed among the exile 

groups.

Guerrilla

Anti-Castro guerrilla units were formed by ex-Castro war veterans 

within months after the revolutionary government was established. 

Their leaders became disenchanted with the revolution because of 

the increasing influence of the Popular Socialist Party, and returned 

to the mountains of Las Villas and Camagüey Provinces. Other organizations later erupted in Pinar del Río. Local inhabitants aided the 

rebels and Catholic student organizations sent supplies and volunteers. 

Exiled leaders toured the United States to seek arms and supplies, and 

weapons were flown or smuggled by boat to Cuba to support the rebel 

groups. Castro’s drive to wipe out the guerrilla units with his armed 

militia paid off well, and by spring of 1961 most of the scattered antiCastro groups were weak and fighting for mere survival. Since then, 

however, several groups have resurged and have continued to do considerable damage through acts of sabotage in the rural areas.

Labor Organizations

Labor organizations made up the major force behind the antiMachado revolution in 1933. Batista placated organized labor and it 

remained progovernment until the last days of the fighting in the late 

1950’s.

Castro, however, instituted complete central control over labor after 

he came to power and thereby removed its revolutionary potential. He 

unionized the entire Cuban labor force and increased the number and 

size of labor organizations. Top union leaders who did not support the 

revolution were purged; some were ousted and others were brought to a 
Epilogue

115

lower level of power. High level slots were filled by members of the 26th 

of July Movement and the Popular Socialist Party; later they were filled 

almost entirely by party members. Labor organizations thus became 

completely subservient to the state and developed into mechanisms 

through which Castro was able to indoctrinate the workers.

Political Parties and Groups

The Popular Socialist Party was the only party to support fully Castro’s social revolution after January 1959. It penetrated the 26th of July 

Movement guerrilla army and labor unions, and worked toward expanding its public role by setting forth the prospect of fusing together under 

PSP auspices all the revolutionary groups that favored a radical social 

revolution. Fidel Castro supported this role. All moderates of other parties and organizations which formed anti-Communist movements in 

Cuba were purged and either went into exile or were prosecuted for 

taking part in counterrevolutionary activities. By February 1960 anticommunism was equated with treason.

Political exiles flooded Miami and brought with them a “staggering 

number and variety” of movements, associations, fronts unions, and 

other categories of organizations which ranged over both sides of the 

political scale. Many of the groups were “little more than cliques of 

self-appointed leaders.”203 Scores of pamphlets and periodicals either 

denouncing the revolution as a whole or Castro’s betrayal of the revolution were issued from their printing presses. Attempts were made to 

unify these groups in exile under U.S. auspices, but factional disputes 

made these attempts generally unsuccessful.

Social Organizations

The professional associations threw in their lot with the revolutionary government after Batista was overthrown; however, by August 1960 

purges under Castro had reached the professional associations, and 

those who had not fled the country and whose interests were formerly 

linked to the Batista government were held suspect by the regime. 

Castro further tightened his control over the Cuban professionals by 

requiring them to join government-controlled professional unions as 

well as associations.

Religious Organizations

The Church supported much of Castro’s early reform program, 

but renewed its denunciation of communism in 1959. In 1960–61 the 

revolutionary government moved against the Church by taking over its 

schools, papers, and other organizations, and labeled it as a reactionary 

organization conspiring with pro-Batista sympathizers and the United 
116

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

States. The government met with some success in reducing the prestige 

of the Church. In May 1961 non-Cuban priests were expelled from Cuba 

and all schools were nationalized. The government offered “nationalist 

rationalism” for a moral alternative to Roman Catholicism.204

SUMMARY

After 1960 political power in Cuba was consolidated into a proSoviet one-party dictatorship of revolutionary leaders and the Communist Party, and the entire Cuban society underwent radical change. 

Only months after the fighting had ended and Batista had left the 

country, Fidel Castro and his followers moved rapidly to eliminate 

political opposition, to nationalize the economy, and to incorporate all 

economic and social groups into the state machinery to serve as supporters of state policies.

A large segment of Cubans who opposed the revolutionary government left the island to form anti-Castro exile groups in foreign countries. The majority have found their way to the United States where they 

have continually attempted, with strong support from the U.S. Government, to form an anti-Castro united front organization whose strategic 

objective is to overthrow Castro’s pro-Soviet government and to revive 

constitutionality in Cuba.
FOOTNOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Footnotes and Bibliography

119

FOOTNOTES

1 Frank Tannenbaum, “Castro and Social Changes,” Political Science Quarterly, LXXVII 

(June 1962), 194–195.

2 Theodore Draper, Castro’s Revolution: Myths and Realities (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 

1962), p. 14.

3 Ibid., p. 15; Irving Peter Pflaum, “Fidel of Cuba: Portrait of a Controversy” (American 

Universities Field Staff Reports Service, Mexico and Caribbean Area Series), Vol. V, 

No. 2, pp. 12–13.

4 Dickey Chapelle, “How Castro Won,” Modern Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka 

(New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 335.

5 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Investment in Cuba: Basic 

Information for United States Businessmen (Washington: Government Printing Office, 

1956), pp. 9–10.

6 Foreign Areas Studies Division, Special Warfare Area Handbook for Cuba (Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1961), p. 503.

7 Ibid., p. 37.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., p. 51.

10 Robert F. Smith, The United States and Cuba: Business and Diplomacy, 1917–1960 (New York: 

Bookmen Associates, 1960), p. 166.

11 Department of Commerce, Investment, p. 139.

12 Ibid., p. 10.

13 FASD, Handbook, p. 504.

14 Ibid., p. 503.

15 Lowry Nelson, Rural Cuba (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1950), 

pp. 88–92.

16 Ibid., pp. 94–96.

17 Smith, United States and Cuba, p. 175.

18 Nelson, Rural Cuba, p. 103.

19 Department of Commerce, Investment, p. 174.

20 Ibid., passim.

21 Ibid., p. 71.

22 FASD, Handbook, p. 497.

23 Ibid., p. 507.

24 Ibid.

25 Nicolas Rivero, Castro’s Cuba: An American Dilemma (Washington: Robert B. Luce, 1962), 

p. 103.

26 Ibid.

27 FASD, Handbook, p. 501.

28 Department of Commerce, Investment, p. 23.

29 FASD, Handbook, p. 246.

30 Nelson, Rural Cuba, p. 149.

31 FASD, Handbook, p. 262.

32 Ibid., p. 283.

33 Ibid., p. 123; see also Nelson, Rural Cuba, pp. 139–140.

34 Nelson, Rural Cuba, p. 159.
120

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

35 Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics and Latin America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 

1960), pp. 61–62.

36 Department of Commerce, Investment, p. 184.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid., p. 181.

39 FASD, Handbook, p. 305.

40 Ibid., pp. 81–82.

41 Nelson, Rural Cuba, p. 158.

42 FASD, Handbook, p. 209.

43 Nelson, Rural Cuba, p. 103.

44 Department of Commerce, Investment, p. 178.

45 John H. Kautsky (ed.), Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 92.

46 Ibid., pp. 176–177.

47 Ibid., pp. 176–177.

48 Ibid., p. 331.

49 Ibid., p. 330.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid., p. 42.

52 Ibid., p. 337.

53 Ibid., p. 341.

54 Ibid., p. 55.

55 Ibid., p. 343.

56 Ibid., p. 381.

57 Ibid., p. 378.

58 Robert Taber, M-26: Biography of a Revolution (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1961), pp. 28–30.

59 Ibid., pp. 33–34.

60 Jules Dubois, Fidel Castro: Rebel-Liberator or Dictator (New York: The New Bobbs-Merrill 

Company, Inc., 1959), pp. 30–37.

61 Taber, M-26, p. 49.

62 Dubois, Castro, pp. 327–328.

63 FASD, Handbook, p. 356.

64 Fulgencio Batista, Cuba Betrayed (Washington: Vantage Press, 1962), pp. 237–239.

65 Dubois, Castro, pp. 327–328.

66 Ibid., pp. 316–317.

67 FASD, Handbook, p. 365.

68 Ibid., pp. 355–356.

69 Ibid., p. 365.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid., p. 369.

72 Kautsky, Political Change, pp. 73–75.

73 FASD, Handbook, p. 361.

74 Ibid., p. 394.

75 Chappelle, “How Castro Won,” p. 327.

76 FASD, Handbook, p. 384.
Footnotes and Bibliography

121

77 Theodore Draper, “Castro’s Cuba: A Revolution Betrayed?” The New Leader (March 27, 

1961), sec. two, p. 27.

78 Theodore Draper, “The Runaway Revolution,” The Reporter (May 12, 1960), 15.

79 Ibid., p. 15.

80 Merle Kling, “A Case Study of a Successful Attempt to Seize Political Power by the Application of Unconventional Warfare,” The Annals (May 1962), 46.

81 Draper, Myths, p. 91.

82 Brian Crozier, The Rebels: A Study of Post-War Insurrections (London: Chatto and Windus, 

1960), p. 71.

83 Herbert L. Matthews, The Cuban Story (New York: George Braziller, 1961), p. 139.

84 Dubois, Castro, p. 145; Matthews, Cuban Story, pp. 140–143; Nathaniel Weyl, Red Star Over 

Cuba: The Russian Assault on the Western Hemisphere (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 

1960), pp. 1–21.

85 FASD, Handbook, pp. 390–391.

86 Fidel Castro, History Will Absolve Me (New York: Liberal Press, 1959), pp. 36–37.

87 Dubois, Castro, pp. 167–172, 227–228, 262–263; Draper, “Castro’s Cuba,” pp. 9–10.

88 Ray Brennan, Castro, Cuba and Justice (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), pp. 82–83.

89 FASD, Handbook, p. 3.

90 Ibid., p. 47.

91 Ibid, p. 164.

92 Ibid., p. 144.

93 Ibid., p. 268.

94 Ibid., p. 423.

95 Draper, Myths, p. 11.

96 Ibid., p. 12.

97 Ibid., p. 13.

98 Ibid., p. 41.

99 Ibid., p. 13.

100 Ibid., p. 44.

101 Irving Peter Pflaum, Tragic Island: How Communism Came to Cuba (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 

Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), p. 55.

102Dubois, Castro, p. 282.

103FASD, Handbook, p. 395.

104Dubois, Castro, p. 206.

105Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961), p. 56.

106Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, p. 56; General Alberto Bayo, One Hundred Fifty Questions Asked 

of a Guerrilla Fighter, tr. Joint Publication Research Service L–1775–D, Photoduplication 

Service, Washington Library of Congress, July 14, 1959, p. 2.

107Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, p. 85.

108Bayo, Questions, pp. 2, 6.

109 Ibid., p. 6; Taber, Biography, pp. 92–93.

110 Brennan, Castro, p. 73.

111 Dubois, Castro, p. 113.

112 Ibid., p. 112.

113 Brennan, Castro, p. 81; Teresa Casuso, Cuba and Castro, tr. Elmer Grossberg (New York: 

Random House, 1961), pp. 101–118.

114 Dubois, Castro, pp. 160–161; Bayo, Questions, pp. 6–7.
122

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

115Brennan, Castro, p. 127.

116 Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 100–103.

117 Chappelle, “How Castro Won,” p. 334.

118 Taber, M-26, p. 210.

119 Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 33–34.

120Time (July 14, 1958), 29.

121Taber, M-26, p. 210.

122Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, p. 30.

123 Ibid., p. 31.

124 Ibid., pp. 95–97.

125Bayo, Questions, pp. 15–18.

126Brennan, Castro, p. 141.

127Taber, M-26, p. 76.

128FASD, Handbook, p. 396.

129Dubois, Castro, p. 254.

130 Ibid., p. 250.

131 Ibid.

132 Ibid., p. 249.

133Brennan, Castro, p. 135.

134FASD, Handbook, p. 395.

135Dubois, Castro, p. 212.

136Brennan, Castro, p. 195.

137Pflaum, “Fidel,” p. 12.

138Draper, “Castro’s Cuba,” p. 23.

139FASD, Handbook, p. 261.

140 Ibid., p. 267.

141 Ibid., p. 388.

142Dubois, Castro, pp. 225–229.

143Chatham House Memoranda: “Cuba: A Brief Political and Economic Survey,” for the 

Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Oxford University Press, September 

1958), p. 9.

144Dubois, Castro, p. 216.

145Chappelle, “How Castro Won,” p. 330.

146Batista, Betrayed, pp. 81–82.

147Chappelle, “How Castro Won,” p. 331.

148 Ibid.

149Dubois, Castro, p. 174.

150Draper, “Castro’s Cuba,” p. 7.

151Taber, M-26, p. 82.

152Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, p. 26.

153Feliks Gross, The Seizure of Political Power in a Century of Revolutions (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958), p. 106.

154FASD, Handbook, p. 470.

155Hispanic American Review, X, 12 (January 1958), 662.

156Dubois, Castro, pp. 148–149.

157Hispanic American Review, X, 11 (December 1957), 596.
Footnotes and Bibliography

123

158FASD, Handbook, p. 450.

159Hispanic American Review, X, 11 (December 1957), 596, quoting Diario de la Marina 

(Cuba), October 31, 1957.

160Hispanic American Review, X, 8 (September 1957), 414–415.

161Hispanic American Review, X, 9 (October 1957), 468.

162Weyl, Red Star, pp. 141–143.

163Press release by U.S. delegation to General Assembly at United Nations, October 31, 

1960.

164FASD, Handbook, p. 447.

165New York Times, February 27, 1961, p. 1.

166U.S. Senate Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Rept., Communist Threat to the United States through the Caribbean (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959–1960).

167Weyl, Red Star, p. 141.

168Hispanic American Review, XI, 4 (May 1958), 203.

169Hispanic American Review, XI, 9 (October 1958), 497; Hispanic American Review, XI, 10 

(November 1958), 552.

170 Hispanic American Review, XI, 12 (January 1959), 670–671.

171 FASD, Handbook, p. 446.

172 Ibid., p. 447.

173 U.S. Senate, Communist Threat, part 9, p. 687; and Rivero, American Dilemma, p. 199.

174 Dubois, Castro, p. 211.

175 Ibid., pp. 223–224.

176 Rivero, American Dilemma, pp. 202–203.

177 U.S. Department of State, The Castro Regime in Cuba (Washington: Department of State), 

p. 8.

178 Pflaum, Tragic Island, p. 131.

179 FASD, Handbook, p. 570.

180 Ibid., p. 235.

181 Ibid., p. 259.

182 Ibid., p. 105.

183 Ibid., p. 127.

184 Ibid., p. 90.

185 Ibid., p. 232.

186Organization of American States, Pan American Union, Fundamental Law of Cuba 1959 

(Washington, 1959), p. 41.

187Draper, Runaway Revolution, p. 17.

188FASD, Handbook, pp. 307–308.

189 Ibid., p. 307.

190 Ibid., p. 205.

191 Ibid., p. 415.

192Dubois, Castro, pp. 375–376.

193Pflaum, Tragic Island, pp. 54–58.

194 Ibid, p. 188; Karl E. Meyer and Tad Szulc, The Cuban Invasion: A Chronicle of a Disaster 

(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 107–108.

195FASD, Handbook, pp. 425–426.

196Department of State, Castro Regime, p. 2.
124

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

197 “Castro Foes Drop Leaflets in Cuba,” New York Times, December 2, 1961.

198Draper, Myths, p. 69.

199 Ibid., p. 70.

200Ibid., p. 100.

201Meyer, Cuban Invasion, p. 84.

202Ibid, pp. 116–141.

203Draper, Myths, p. 61.

204FASD, Handbook, p. 232.
Footnotes and Bibliography

125

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Foreign Commerce. Investment in Cuba: Basic Information for United States Businessmen. Washington: Government Printing Office, July 1956.

U.S. Department of State. The Castro Regime in Cuba. Washington: 

Department of State, n.d.

U.S. Department of Labor. Summary of the Labor Situation in Cuba. Washington: Department of Labor, December 1956.

U.S. Senate. Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on 

the Judiciary. Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean. Senate Repts., parts I, III, 7, 8, 8A, and 9. 86th Cong., 1st and 

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Chester, Edmond A. A Sergeant Named Batista. New York: Henry Holt 

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Footnotes and Bibliography

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St. George, Andrew. “A Visit with a Revolutionary,” Coronet, XLIII, 4 

(February 1958), 74–79.

Tannenbaum, Frank. “Castro and Social Changes,” Political Science 

Quarterly, LXVII, 2 (June 1962).

Shapiro, Samuel. “Cuba: A Dissenting Report,” The New Republic (September 12, 1960), 8–26.

“Cuba: A Peasant Revolution,” The World Today, XV, 5 (1959), 183–195.

Time (July 14, 1958), 29.

Newspapers

The New York Times, February 27, 1961, p. 1.

The Christian Science Monitor.

Other

Bayo, General Alberto. One Hundred Fifty Questions Asked of a Guerrilla

Fighter. Tr. Joint Publication Research Service L–1775–D, Photoduplication Service, Washington: Library of Congress, July 14, 1959.

Pflaum, Irving Peter. “Castro Cuba in Mid-1960”; “Fidel of Cuba”; and 

“By Voice and Violence,” American Universities’ Field Staff Reports 

Service (Mexico and Caribbean Area Series, V.; 1, 2, and 3). New 

York: American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1960.

“Cuba: A Brief Political and Economic Survey,” Chatham House Memoranda. Prepared by the Information Department for Royal Institute 

of International Affairs. London: Oxford University Press, September 1958.

Foreign Area Studies Division. Special Warfare Area Handbook for Cuba. 

For the Department of the Army. Washington: Special Operations 

Research Office, June 1961.

TECHNICAL APPENDIX

Technical Appendix

131

INTRODUCTION

Three case studies were prepared on the Algerian (1954–62), Cuban 

(1953–59), and Vietnam (1941–54) Revolutions using a common conceptual framework and study procedures, in order to facilitate subsequent comparative analyses among the three. This appendix contains:

(1) a summary statement of the conceptual frame of reference 

underlying the studies;

(2) a general summary of the procedures used in preparation of 

the case studies.

At the same time, a case study of the situation in Guatemala between 

1944 and 1954 is being prepared, using a different approach more suitable to that situation.

CONCEPTUAL FRAME OF REFERENCE

Revolution Defineda

The word revolution is frequently used interchangeably with such 

terms as rebellion, coup d’etat, insurgency, and insurrection. Various 

writers, Webster’s Dictionary, and the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences disagree on a precise meaning of the word. Except in the natural sciences, 

“revolution” usually refers to any sudden change with far-reaching consequences, but may sometimes refer to a gradual change which has suddenly been recognized as having had far-reaching consequences. The 

particular change is usually indicated by adjectives such as cultural, scientific, economic, industrial, and technological. Used without a qualifying adjective, the word most often describes political revolution; it is 

so used in these three case studies.

More precisely, in the case studies revolution means the modification, or 

attempted modification, of an existing political order partially at least by illegal 

(or unconstitutional) force used primarily by persons under the jurisdiction of 

the political order. The terms revolutionary dynamics and revolutionary effort 

are both used to refer to activities of all kinds of revolutionary actors 

and organizations. Revolutionary movement is used generically to refer 

to all the revolutionary actors and organizations operating against a 

government during defined time periods, unless specific organizations 

or actors are identified in the text. Finally, revolutionary situation refers 

to a continuum of tensions within a country in which revolutionary 

a This definition appears in a longer discussion of definitions in the Casebook on 

Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Seminary Accounts (Washington: Special Operations 

Research Office, 1963).
132

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

conflict has emerged as a major problem requiring direct allocation of 

resources and effort by a government.

General Approach

A general, heuristic study model with two basic premises was 

adopted. It was assumed, first, that a revolution is a complex interaction of socio-economic-political factors (revolution-inducing factors) 

and organic factors of the revolutionary movement. It was also assumed 

that particular factors do not necessarily remain unchanged and that 

changes in the factors and in their interaction are significant.

On the basis of the previous SORO study of 23 revolutions and a 

review of other studies in the literature, a number of general and specific examples of these two kinds of factors were identified; they have 

been offered in the past by other writers as “explanations” of revolutionary phenomena, and they are discussed in the next two sections. All of 

these examples were treated as hypotheses for the three case studies 

and were tested for their applicability to each revolution. They were not 

judged a priori to be causes of revolutions. They were studied to determine their presence or absence in a revolution and to determine their 

operation in time. The latter determination was accomplished by submitting each factor to a crude trend analysis—that is, organizing the 

information relevant to each hypothesis through chronological periods.

A distinction between immediate causes of revolution and long 

range causes is not relevant to this type of approach to the study of revolution. The importance of historical circumstance as a precipitant of 

revolution is not denied; it is simply not accorded the central role here 

that some students of revolution have attributed to it. The operation 

of historical circumstance is discussed in terms of revolution-inducing 

factors and revolutionary movement factors. The trend analysis records 

the development of situations in which the potential for revolutionary 

warfare may be latent, but not primarily dependent upon historical 

circumstances. Thus, historical necessity is not implied by the trend 

analysis approach—changes in both the socio-economic-political environment and in the structure and function of revolutionary movements 

can occur depending upon the actors involved.

Factors Inducing Revolution

It is suggested that factors inducing revolution may be broadly categorized under three general hypotheses which may be descriptive of 

a prerevolutionary situation: economic maladjustment, social antagonism, and political weakness. While no attempt has been made to assign 
Technical Appendix

133

relative weights to these various factors in a positive numerical sense, it 

appeared initially that political weakness as defined should rate highest 

on any scale devised to measure the revolutionary potential of a society. 

However, such conceptual refinements must await further analysis and 

are not reflected in the three case studies.

In the discussion below, each factor (and subfactor) is discussed 

as a conditional hypothesis regardless of evidence available concerning its validity. The purpose of the discussion is to describe briefly the 

hypotheses as used in the study of the three cases. It will be noted 

that the hypotheses are stated broadly to allow identification of all the 

information unique to each revolution and, consequently, an evaluation of the hypotheses.

Economic Maladjustment

The economy of a country may be considered to be a situation of 

maladjustment when one or more of the following conditions is present: foreign control of economic life, concentration of land ownership 

and a large population of landless peasants, lack of a diversified economy, and chronic unemployment or underemployment. These conditions may have concomitants that provide revolutionary motivations. 

They may affect the economic standard of living of the population in 

general, the distribution of wealth, and the form of the social structure.

Foreign control over the economy of a colonial or so-called semicolonialb

 country may entail certain socio-economic troubles for that 

country, even though, in a strictly economic sense, the relationship 

may appear to work to the country’s advantage. Higher standards of 

living enjoyed by resident foreigners and by those natives who are affiliated with foreign economic interests may have a powerful demonstrative effect on the native population; resultant dissatisfaction with their 

lower living standards and their frustration over foreign influences 

in the economic life of the country may produce social antagonisms 

directed against both foreigners and native beneficiaries of foreign 

interests. If a native middle class is deprived of full participation in the 

economic life of the country, foreign control may drive the social element best prepared to assume the role of a political opposition into a 

revolutionary movement.

A system of land tenure in which “landlordism” predominates 

may be fraught with revolutionary potential. The national economy 

may suffer as a whole from the inefficiency in agricultural production 

b Semicolonial countries are politically independent states which are economically 

dependent on industrialized countries, as some Latin American countries have been economic dependencies of the United States.
134

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

sometimes associated with a high concentration of land ownership. The 

wealthy landlord may often be less interested in yields-per-acre than 

in rents and interest payments from his tenants and peasant debtors. 

The landless peasants may lack incentive to produce, since experience 

may have shown them little connection between efforts and rewards. 

Thus, poverty and low productivity can perpetuate themselves in a 

cyclical process.

A low level of purchasing power in a country may hinder the development of local industry and reinforce economic dependence on one 

or two cash crops or mineral products for export. The economic position of raw-material-producing countries in relation to exporters of 

industrial goods has tended to deteriorate over recent decades due to 

world trade conditions. A more diversified economy has thus become 

a matter of economic necessity for most raw-material-exporting countries. The lack of a diversified economy may subject a country to the 

vagaries of world market conditions and threaten its economic stability; 

the socio-economic effect usually is to narrow the range of economic 

opportunities, thus tending to perpetuate a paternalistic type of society.

Another condition indicative of economic maladjustment is chronic 

and widespread unemployment or underemployment. Such a situation 

may result from the impact of world market conditions on a single-crop 

economy or from the seasonal nature of the main cash crop. The socioeconomic effects of unemployment may be more likely to reach a critical point when those out of work are urban workers or at least are living 

on a money economy rather than a subsistence economy. Generally, it 

can be hypothesized that the higher the level of industrialization the 

greater would be the revolutionary potential in a period of unemployment, for idle workers frequently make up the mass following of revolutionary movements. Native middle-class and intellectual elements tend 

to blame periods of unemployment on foreign control of the economy 

and on the lack of a diversified economy; this type of agitation around 

economic issues may be used to rally broad mass support for the revolutionary movement.

Social Antagonism

Tensions within the social structure, a demise of a traditional way 

of life, and the marginality of intellectuals may be regarded aspects of 

social antagonism which may be related to revolutions.

Tensions within the social structure may include conflicts between 

economic classes, clashes along ethnic, religious, cultural, and racial 

lines, and generational cleavages. Revolutionary potential may be 

greatest when those divisions happen to be superimposed on one 

another, as when one element of that population is defined along the 
Technical Appendix

135

same racial, religious, and economic lines. Such is the case in colonial 

territories and in some semicolonial countries in which a nonnative 

population element dominates economic life. Social tensions in racially 

homogeneous societies may take the form of a so-called “class-struggle” 

between those in control of economic and political power and the outgoing. Economically underdeveloped areas may be particularly vulnerable to extreme social tensions between a dynamic and emergent new 

middle class and a static traditional elite. The introduction of Western 

education and modern mores into these areas may greatly exacerbate 

already existing generational cleavages.

The demise of traditional society, which many countries are experiencing as a result of urbanization and industrialization or of social and 

political revolution, may have important psychological implications 

for the growth of a revolutionary movement. Traditionally accepted 

social values and social attitudes which support the status quo tend to 

be undermined by such historical developments as de-colonization, the 

emergence of new nationalisms, and the expansion of the Sino-Soviet 

power bloc. One function of the demise of traditional society has been 

the emergence of a new class of Western-educated intellectualsc to challenge the tradition-oriented older intellectual class.

These new intellectuals, many of whom find themselves in a condition of social marginality, may be a critical factor in the revolutionary 

process. Marginality in the sociological sense in which the term is used 

here implies a state of being “incompletely assimilated and denied full 

social acceptance and participation by the dominant [political] group 

or groups in a society because of racial or cultural conflict.”1

 The marginal intellectual may tend to become spiritually disenchanted with, 

or alienated from, the prevailing ethos of the socio-political system to 

which he is denied access. Students of revolution have noted a correlation between the alienation of intellectuals from the ruling elite and 

the development of a revolutionary movement.2

The term intellectual when applied to underdeveloped areas generally has broader application than it has in more advanced countries. 

In the Cuban case study, the term is used in a narrower sense and is 

applied only to those who have had university education, or to middleclass professional groups. In the Algerian and Vietnam case studies, 

however, it applies to anyone with a secondary education or more.

This is in no way condescension toward the new states. 

It is only an acknowledgement of the smaller degree 

of internal differentiation which has until now prevailed within the educated class in the new states, and 

c In the Sino-Soviet bloc this new class is the Communist-educated class.
136

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

to greater disjunction which marks that class off from 

the other sections of the society.3

Thus the emergent middle class in colonial and semicolonial societies may be regarded as an intellectual class, since the members of this 

group have some familiarity with Western values and modern economic 

methods and, most important of all, are politically conscious.

Political Weakness

Included under this general heading are factors of political imbalance, political fragmentation, and inefficiency of governmental 

machinery.

The political system of a country may be regarded as being in a state 

of imbalance when the mass of the population is deprived of representation and participation in the government. Thus, colonial institutions 

may have an inherent weakness because of their inevitable discrimination against the native population in favor of metropolitan interests. 

Native participation in the administration of colonial government without native political responsibility may intensify revolutionary potential. 

If for any reason a country’s political institutions fail to function as a 

clearinghouse for conflicting claims from all elements of society, then 

that country’s political system may be in imbalance and a certain element of revolutionary potential present.

Political fragmentation, as the expression is employed here, refers 

to hostility among opposing elements in the political elite and the 

political opposition groups of such violent proportions that these elements are unable to operate within the normal channels of political 

compromise and coalition. The expression does not imply the type of 

loyal opposition that has been characteristic of Anglo-American political experience.

Governmental inefficiency may be regarded as a factor related to 

the development of a revolutionary movement and to the efficiency of 

the movement once started. It may not be enough for a governmental apparatus merely to maintain order and administer routine public 

services and utilities; perhaps it must function in a capacity of “honest broker” between conflicting elements in the society and the polity. Thus, political imbalance and fragmentation may seriously detract 

from the efficiency of a government, although on the surface it may 

appear to function quite efficiently. When normal administrative operations, such as police protection and communications services, become 

impaired, then the latent revolutionary potential generated by political imbalance and fragmentation may rise to critical proportions. The 

dynamics and timing of governmental response to the revolutionary 

movement may be of the utmost importance in the efficiency of that 
Technical Appendix

137

response which may have to include political and institutional adjustment as well as restoration and maintenance of public order and governmental control.

Organic Factors of the Revolutionary Movement

For each revolution, historical and descriptive data have been 

collected under the following six aspects of revolutionary warfare: 

actors, strategy and goals, ideology and mystique, organization, techniques, and foreign influence. Within these categories data have 

generally been presented in chronological sequence. Since these are 

self-defining terms, it will only be necessary to point out some of the 

conceptual refinements and generalizations developed in the course of 

this study. A more elaborate delineation of these concepts must await 

further analysis.

Actors

The leadership cadre and the followers of that revolutionary organization which ultimately came into power in each situation is the group 

primarily treated under the category of actors. Thus, the actors of a revolutionary movement are defined by the results of the movement; the 

question of how one group of leaders gains control of a revolutionary 

movement to the exclusion of another group of revolutionists is not the 

main focus in this study but does receive some attention. Revolutionary 

actors are discussed in terms of (1) the socio-political composition of 

the leadership and mass following; (2) the historical continuity of personnel and the effects of a revolutionary tradition; and (3) the impact 

of conditions in the world at the time of the revolution, or the effects 

of the so-called Zeitgeist (spirit of the times) on the revolutionary actors.

Overall Strategy and Goals

The category of strategy and goals is concerned with the overall 

manner in which the successful revolutionary organization attempts to 

secure its revolutionary objectives. Strategy, which seems to be flexible 

and highly variable in most revolutions, is discussed within the context 

of time and circumstances rather than in terms of consistency with 

doctrinaire principles. This approach permits changes in strategy to be 

directly related to situational factors. These factors may be dependent 

upon purely local developments such as a change in the strategy and 

tactics of the security forces, or upon a major international development of a military, diplomatic, or political nature.

Revolutionary objectives, or goals, are discussed in terms of appeals 

for political change, socio-economic reform, or a combination of these, 
138

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

often expressed in nationalist slogans—particularly in colonial revolutions. Where there are different appeals made to various segments of 

society, these are discussed and compared.

Ideology or Myth

It is generally accepted that an essential part of any revolutionary 

movement is its “social myth” or revolutionary ideology. Generally, 

ideology in a revolutionary situation functions as a synthesis embodying both a critique of prerevolutionary society and policy and a sociopolitical program for postrevolutionary development. In the discussion 

of ideology in these studies, particular attention is paid to (1) national 

orientation, (2) international orientation, (3) socio-economic emphasis, 

(4) religious emphasis, and (5) the “mystique.” What has been termed 

the “mystique of a revolution” is similar in many respects to esprit de 

corps, and is composed of intangible elements such as the revolutionary 

tradition of the country, the charismatic quality of the leadership, and 

the revolutionary movement’s prospects of success.

Organization

It appears from other studies that no specific organizational form 

is necessary to insure the success of revolutionary movements. They 

have included paramilitary units, regular military and auxiliary organizations, clandestine cells or an underground movement, legal and 

illegal political parties, labor organizations, social organizations, paragovernmental organs of state power, governments-in-exile, or a combination of these. In each of the revolutions studied, attention has been 

focused on both the organizational and functional aspects of the above 

types of groups which made up the revolutionary organization ultimately coming to power.

Techniques

This category discusses the wide variety of techniques which revolutionists use, including: psychological, diplomatic, economic, and 

political warfare; conventional military operations and unconventional 

paramilitary operations; terror, sabotage, propaganda, strikes and 

demonstrations; and the recruitment and training of revolutionists. 

Because the specific techniques used by the revolutionists interact with 

the countertechniques used by the government or security forces, both 

are discussed within the same context.

Foreign Involvement

The question of foreign involvement is of crucial importance to 

the course of a revolution. Considerations related to this question may 
Technical Appendix

139

affect both the strategy and the techniques adopted by the revolutionary actors. For instance, the advantages for a revolutionary movement 

of a sanctuary and of diplomatic, economic, and military support 

from a foreign power are well-known. The number of foreign powers 

involved, the extent of the aid, political intervention by states or international organizations, and direct military intervention are discussed 

under this category.

GENERAL SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES

The procedures used to prepare the three case studies were straightforward and standard for each.

Development of Case Study Format

The first step, described in the previous section, consisted of the 

development of hypotheses and the preparation of a standard format 

for the organization of each case study.

Identification and Selection of Sources

As a second step, a systematic search for sources of information was 

conducted. This consisted of two parts: identification of the sources, 

and selection of sources. To identify sources, the SORO open-library 

files and Library of Congress files were reviewed, available bibliographies perused, and knowledgeable persons consulted. Sources were 

selected on the basis of their relevance, in terms of the information 

they contained, to the hypotheses formulated and on the basis of recommendations of the subject experts consulted. Selection was limited 

to unclassified secondary sources. However, some use was made of primary materials, when readily available, to fill in gaps in coverage. In 

the selection of sources every effort was made to obtain a “balance” 

among known political viewpoints of those who have written on the 

subject revolution.

Information Synthesis and Analysis: Drafting of Report

Information relevant to each hypothesis was systematically culled 

from the various sources, synthesized, and put in the standardized case 

study format. Generally speaking, attempts were made to use only information which appeared in more than one source independently; in 

practice, this independence was very difficult to ascertain. Conflicting 
140

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

or inconsistent information was resolved by checking for consistency 

with other sources considered reliable.

Expert Reviews and Revision

As a final check on the substance of each case study, it was submitted separately to a number (2–6) of subject experts. Each consultant 

reviewed the study in terms of accuracy of facts and reasonableness of 

interpretation. Each study was then revised on the basis of a synthesis of the experts’ comments. When conflicts in fact or interpretation 

could not be resolved through discussion, both viewpoints were presented in the text.

FOOTNOTES TO TECHNICAL APPENDIX

1 Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, 1961, p. 514.

2 Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), pp. 41–52.

3 Edward A. Shils, “The Intellectual in Political Development,” in Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism, ed. John H. Kautsky (New York: John 

Wiley and Sons, 1962), p. 199.
Technical Appendix

141

BIBLIOGRAPHY TO TECHNICAL APPENDIX

Almond, Gabriel and James S. Coleman. The Politics of the Developing 

Areas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

Brinton, Crane. The Anatomy of Revolution. New York: Vintage Books, 

1960. (First published in 1938; revised edition published in 1952.)

Crozier, Brian. The Rebels; A Study of Post-War Insurrections. London: 

Chatto and Windus, 1960.

Edwards, L. P. The Natural History of Revolution. Chicago: 1927.

Emerson, Rupert. From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian 

and African Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.

Gross, Feliks. Seizure of Political Power in a Century of Revolutions. New 

York: Philosophical Library, 1958.

Hooper, Rex D. “The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference 

for the Study of Revolutionary Movements,” Social Forces, 28, 3 

(March 1950), 270–279.

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts. 

Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1963.

Kautsky, John H., (ed.). Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: 

Nationalism and Communism. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 

1962.

Paret, Peter and John W. Shy. Guerrillas in the 1960’s. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.

INDEX

145

INDEX

A

Adams, Felix, 58

Agramonte, Roberto, 42

Agrarian reform, 7, 20–21, 42, 67, 

75, 105–106, 109, 110–111; See 

also Landholding

Agrarian Reform Act (1959), 105

Agricultural and Industrial 

Development Bank, 23, 83

Anti-Castro forces, 105, 110–115

Army (Cuban), 12, 28, 35, 38, 56, 63, 

78, 83, 90, 100–101

Association of Cane Planters, 37

Auténtico Party, 36, 38, 42, 43, 85, 113;

See also Organización Auténtica

B

Banking, 19, 37, 96, 111; See 

also Agricultural and Industrial 

Development Bank, Foreign 

investments, National Bank of 

Cuba

Batista, Fulgencio, 4–7, 9–13, 23, 25–

26, 28, 32, 36, 38–41, 42–44, 46, 

57, 63, 69–72, 77, 79, 81, 83, 84–

85, 87, 89–90, 92–97, 98–102, 

107, 110, 112, 114–115

government of, 7, 9, 12, 30–32, 37–

38, 63–66, 86, 92, 97, 113

Bayo, Alberto, 76, 77, 78, 80

Betancourt, Ernesto, 84

Betancourt, Rómulo, 98, 101

Bogotá, 65

Bordon, Victor, 54

Bribery; See Corruption, political

C

Camagüey (province), 94, 114

Caracas, 98

Caracas Pact (1958), 66, 98

Castro, Fidel, 5, 7, 11–12, 13, 21, 22, 

28, 32, 38, 41, 42, 47, 57, 64–65, 

68, 70–72, 74, 76, 77, 83–85, 88, 

91–93, 96, 99–100, 107, 109–110, 

112, 114, 115, 116

followers of, 55, 86, 89, 101–102

government of, 33, 105–106, 110–112

Castro, Ramón, 81

Castro, Raúl, 47, 55, 65, 74, 90, 110

Catholic Groupment, 113

Cayo Confites expedition (1947), 65

Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.), 113

Chibas, Eddy, 42

Chinese, 22

Christian Democratic Party, 113

Cienfuegos, 91, 99

Cienfuegos, Camilo, 91

Civic Resistance Movement, 11, 82, 83, 

93

Civilian Revolutionary Front, 71

Cominform, 43

Commission on Internal Order, 74

Communism, 13, 28, 42, 43, 69, 96–97, 

111, 112; See also Cominform, 

Marxism-Leninism, Popular 

Socialist Party

Communist bloc, 100, 106, 112

Communist Party, 36, 43, 48, 105, 

108, 112, 116; See also Popular 

Socialist Party

Confederation of Cuban Workers 

(CTC), 37, 85

Congress, 39–40, 43, 44

Conservative Party, 35; See 

also Democratic Party

Constitution (1901), 18, 34–35, 44

Constitution (1940), 4, 5, 7, 9, 20, 21, 

26, 35–36, 39–40, 42, 44, 66, 67, 

108, 111

Constitution, provisional (1954), 39

Consultative Council, 39, 44
146

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

Corruption, political, 36, 39, 43, 67; See 

also Elections

Costa Rica, 84, 97, 98–99, 101

Council of Liberation, 72

Counterinsurgency, 5, 12–13, 88–89, 

91, 93–95, 114; See also Army 

(Cuban), Uprising (1933)

Crowder, Enoch, 35

Cuba Libre, 68

Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute, 37

Cuban Teachers’ Union, 58

Cuban-U.S. relations, 4, 10, 17–19, 

34–35, 68, 97, 100, 101–102; See 

also Foreign investment, Platt 

Amendment

D

Democratic Party, 36, 42, 43, 85; See 

also Conservative Party

Democratic Revolutionary Front, 113

Demonstrations; See Underground

Dominican Republic, 65, 78, 98, 101

Dorticós, Osvaldo, 58

Duvalier, François, 99

E

Echevarria, José Antonio, 83

Economic and Social Development 

Plan, 23

Education, 4, 29, 67, 78, 109, 111

Eisenhower (Dwight D.), 110

El Acusador, 79

Elections, 9, 34–36, 38–41, 43, 85, 102, 

109, 111

Embargo (U.S.)

on arms, 102

on exports, 106

Expropriation, 105–106, 109, 111–112

F

Federation of University Students 

(FEU), 83

Figueres, José, 98, 101

Finance (of revolution), 75, 77, 78–81, 

84, 97–99; See also Military aid

Florida, 4, 78, 84

Fomento, 54

Foreign intervention, 34, 35, 97–102, 

113–114; See also Cuban-U.S. 

relations

Foreign investment, 6–7, 17, 19, 67–68, 

105–106

Foreign relations, 17–19, 67–68, 

98, 111; See also Cuban-U.S. 

relations, Foreign intervention, 

Foreign investment

France, 22, 67

Fundamental Law of 1959, 108

G

Grau San Martín, Ramón, 4, 26, 32, 

36, 38, 41, 42, 85

Great Britain, 67, 99–100

Guatemala, 114, 131

Guerrilla warfare, 9, 10–12, 51, 52, 63, 

65, 69–70, 72, 73–81, 88–92, 98, 

112, 114

Guevara, Ernesto “Che”, 54, 64, 65, 72, 

74, 78, 80, 91, 94, 110

H

Haiti, 22, 99

Hart, Armando, 58

Havana, 23, 25, 48–50, 57, 63, 64–65, 

82, 83, 85, 87, 91

Havana College of Teachers, 58

Havana University, 4, 32, 38, 83, 93

Health, 29, 67, 75, 81, 109, 111

Hernandez, Leopoldo, 82

Holguín, 88

I

Industry, 19–20, 22–24, 110; See 

also Sugar

INRA, 109
Index

147

Intellectuals, 6, 9, 32, 33–34, 63–64, 

70, 108; See also Professions and 

professional groups

International Bank for Reconstruction 

and Development, 23

Invasion (1961), 114

Isle of Pines, 76

J

Jamaica, 22

Jimenez, Francisco, 58

Joint Committee of Cuban Institutions, 

87, 110

Jungle Warfare School (U.S. Army), 

114

K

Korean war, 28

L

Labor legislation, 8, 25–26, 36, 107

Labor, organized, 8, 25–26, 28, 37, 

84–85, 92, 107, 114

Landholding, 6–7, 19–21, 31–32, 105

Larrazabal, Wolfgang, 98

Las Villas (province), 51, 72, 73, 83, 91, 

114

Latifundia, 19, 31; See also Landholding

Liberal Party, 35, 36, 42, 43, 85

Living standards, 5, 9, 26, 28, 31, 33, 

107, 109, 110

Luz y Caballero, José de la, 33

M

Machado, Gerardo, 4, 25, 35, 36, 38, 

44, 45, 66, 68, 114

Mañach, Jorge, 33

Manzanillo, 52, 88

Martí, José, 32, 65

Marxism-Leninism, 5, 6, 69, 70, 105, 

112; See also Communism

Masferrer, Rolando, 94

Mexico, 11, 22, 65, 73, 77, 79, 83, 84, 

88, 99

Mexico City, 77

Miami, 72, 84, 115

Military aid

to anti-Castro forces, 114

to Batista, 100

to rebels, 76–77, 78–80, 84, 98, 

100–101

Militia (revolutionary), 82, 93, 114

Miret, Pedro, 76

Miro Cardona, José, 113

Moncada (barracks), 5, 38, 39, 65, 76, 

86, 92

Montecristi group, 83, 113

Montevideo Conference (1933), 4

Morgan, William A., 78

Moscow Declaration (1960), 112

Movement of Revolutionary Recovery, 

113

Mujal, Eusebio, 37

Mutual Security Act of 1951, 100–101

N

National Agrarian Reform Institute 

(INRA), 106, 109

National Bank of Cuba, 23, 94

National College of Teachers, 58

National Direction, 82

National Federation of Commercial 

Workers, 37

National Federation of Sugar Workers, 

37

National Federation of Transport 

Workers, 37

National Federation of Workers in the 

Construction Industry, 37

National Institute for Savings and 

Housing (INAV), 109

Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, 

83

Nationalization; See Expropriation

National Labor Confederation 

(CNOC), 25
148

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Cuba 

National Liberation Democratic 

Government, 69

National Lottery; See National Institute 

for Savings and Housing

New York, 57, 84

Nibaldo Cauca, José, 58

Nicaragua, 98

Ninth Conference of the American 

States, 65

Niquero, 88

O

Organización Auténtica, 77, 83, 84, 85;

See also Auténtico Party

Oriente (province), 11, 18, 38, 52, 56, 

64, 65, 66, 73, 74, 88, 89, 90, 91, 

92, 94

Ortodoxo Party, 38, 42, 85, 86

P

Pais, Frank, 92

Panama Canal, 17

Panama Canal Zone, 114

Party of Unitary Action, 43; See 

also Progressive Action Party

Pawley, William D., 102

Peasants, 20, 27, 29, 30–31, 63, 69–70, 

75, 79; See also Landholding

Pensadores, 33

People’s Revolutionary Movement, 113

Pérez Jimenez, Marcos, 97, 98

Personalismo, 10, 40, 41, 43, 45

Piad, Carlos, 84

Pinar del Río (province), 73, 114

Platt Amendment, 4, 6, 18, 19, 68, 101

Police, 48, 49, 87, 92, 93–95; See 

also Rural Guard

Political parties, 10, 35–36, 41–43, 

85–86, 115

Political theory, 10–11, 34–36, 

39, 40, 64–65, 66–71; See 

also Constitution (1940), 

Elections, Personalismo

Popular Socialist Party (PSP), 43, 69, 

85, 86, 87, 93, 111–112, 114, 115;

See also Communist Party

Press, 4, 65, 79, 92, 96–98; See 

also Propaganda

Prío Socarrás, Carlos, 4, 26, 36, 37, 38, 

42, 43, 77, 79, 83, 85, 98

Professions and professional groups, 

6, 8–9, 28–29, 30, 33–34, 63, 

86, 108–109, 110, 115–116; See 

also Intellectuals

Progressive Action Party, 43, 85; See 

also Party of Unitary Action

Propaganda, 79–80, 82, 84, 95–97

Public works, 23, 24, 37, 109

Puerto Rico, 84

Pujol, Guillermo Alonso, 43

R

Race and racial relations, 29–30, 108

Radio Rebelde, 96

Religion; See Roman Catholic Church

Republican Party, 42

Revolutionary Action Movement, 83;

See also 26th of July Movement

Revolutionary Council of Cuba, 113

Revolutionary Directorate, 83, 95

Rivero Aguero, Andres, 39

Roa, Raúl, 33

Roca, Blas, 86

Rodríguez, Carlos Rafael, 64

Rodríguez, Lester, 58

Roman Catholic Church, 30, 87–88, 

108, 115

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 4, 18

Ruiz Cortines, 99

Rural Guard, 12, 88, 92

S

Sabotage, 11, 12, 66, 83, 94, 113

Saco y López, José Antonio, 33

Saladrigas, Carlos, 43

Samosa, Luis, 98
Index

149

Sánchez Arango, Aureliano, 83

Sancti-Spíritus, 91

Santa Clara, 91

Santiago de Cuba, 38, 76, 88, 92–93

Second National Front of Escambray, 

78

Siboney, 76

Sierra de la Trinidad, 73, 78

Sierra del Cristal, 55, 74, 89, 90

Sierra del Escambray, 73, 91

Sierra de los Organos, 73

Sierra Maestra, 11, 41, 47, 65, 66, 70, 

71, 73–74, 78–81, 88–90, 99, 101, 

114

Slavery, 22

Smith, Earl E. T., 93, 102

Socialism, 6, 28

Socialist Revolutionary Movement, 94

Socialist Youth, 86; See also Popular 

Socialist Party

Social welfare; See Education, Health, 

Living standards

Spain, 17, 19, 33, 34, 44, 66, 67, 68

Stepniak, Sergius, 95

Strikes, 12, 25, 32, 38, 50, 66, 82, 

92–93, 95

Students, 4, 11, 12, 37, 38, 63, 93

Sugar, 7–8, 18–19, 20–25, 28, 31–32, 

106

T

Terrorism, 12, 13, 64, 81–82, 94–97

Trade agreements

with Spain, 17

(with the U.S.), 6

with the U.S., 18, 105

with the U.S.S.R., 106

Treaties; See Foreign relations

Triple A, 83, 113

Trujillo, Rafael, 65, 98, 101

Tuxpan (Mexico), 99

Twenty-sixth of July Movement, 5, 11, 

38, 48, 67, 72–75, 77, 78, 82–84, 

88–89, 92, 96–98, 115

U

Ubero (garrison), 89

Underground, 10–13, 63, 65, 81–86, 

88, 92–93, 112, 113

Unemployment, 7, 13, 23, 24–25, 27, 

33, 67, 107; See also Public works

Uníon Insurreccional Revolucionaria

(UIR), 64

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

(U.S.S.R.), 69, 100, 105, 106, 112, 

116, 126, 135

United Nations, 99, 123

United States, 4, 6, 7, 10, 17, 18, 19, 

25, 28, 29, 34–35, 41, 43, 44, 

68–69, 73, 79, 83, 84, 97, 98, 

100–102, 105, 112–114, 115, 116;

See also Cuban-U.S. relations, 

Foreign investment, Platt 

Amendment

Coast Guard, 53

Department of Commerce, 25

Department of Justice, 84

Department of State, 102

Uprising (1933), 8, 25, 27, 28, 32, 34, 

36, 41, 66, 68, 114

Urban Reform Law, 109

Uruguay, 99

V

Varela y Morales, Felix, 33

Venezuela, 84, 97, 98, 101

Venezuelan College of Teachers, 58

W

Washington (D.C.), 84

World War II, 43

Y

Yaguajay, 91