[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 17-10622

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D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-03432-WSD

JAMIE LEE ANDREWS,

as surviving spouse, and as administrator of the estate,

of Micah Lee Andrews,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

AUTOLIV JAPAN, LTD.,

Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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(March 16, 2018)

Before WILSON and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and GOLDBERG,* Judge.

PER CURIAM:

 * The Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, Judge for the United States Court of International 

Trade, sitting by designation.

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Plaintiff Jamie Lee Andrews appeals from the district court’s entry of 

summary judgment in favor of Defendant Autoliv Japan, Ltd. (“Autoliv”). We 

review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Williams v. Mast 

Biosurgery USA, Inc., 644 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 2011).

Under Georgia law, “[t]he manufacturer of any personal property sold as 

new property directly or through a dealer or any other person shall be liable in 

tort . . . [for personal injury resulting] because the property when sold by the 

manufacturer was [defective] and its condition when sold is the proximate cause of 

the injury sustained.” Ga. Code. Ann. § 51-1-11(b)(1). 

Plaintiff challenges the district court’s ruling that Autoliv, a manufacturer, 

cannot be held liable under § 51-1-11 unless it was “actively involved” in the 

design of the allegedly defective product. In reaching its conclusion, the district 

court relied on Davenport v. Cummins Alabama, Inc., 284 Ga. App. 666, 644 

S.E.2d 503 (2007). However, the court in Davenport derived this proposition from 

Georgia’s “product seller” provision, Ga. Code. Ann. §§ 51-1-11.1(a), (b), which 

states that certain non-manufacturer entities, i.e. mere product sellers, are not liable 

“as” manufacturers under § 51-1-11. See Davenport, 284 Ga. App. at 670–71, 644 

S.E.2d at 507–08 (holding non-manufacturer Cummins Alabama was not liable “as 

a manufacturer” because it was not actively involved in design or manufacturing); 

see also Alltrade, Inc. v. McDonald, 213 Ga. App. 758, 758–60, 445 S.E.2d 856, 

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857–58 (1994) (ruling Defendant Alltrade was a mere product seller because it 

“did [not] make or assemble [the allegedly defective product] or any of the

component parts.”). The “product seller” provision expressly does not apply to 

actual manufacturers such as Autoliv. § 51-1-11.1(a) (stating that the “definition 

[of exempt product seller] does not include a manufacturer” that would also fit the 

definition of product seller). 

Autoliv manufactured seatbelt components in the deceased’s Mazda and 

Plaintiff alleges that those components were defective when sold. Consequently, 

Autoliv can be held liable under § 51-1-11 if a component it manufactured was 

defective “when sold by the manufacturer” and if the component’s “condition 

when sold is the proximate cause of the injury sustained.” § 51-1-11(b)(1). That 

said, even if Plaintiff were required to establish that Autoliv was “actively 

involved” in the design of the seatbelt assembly in order to show that Autoliv can 

be held liable under § 51-1-11, the record reflects a genuine issue of material fact 

precluding summary judgment on this issue. 

We therefore reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for proceedings in 

accordance with this decision. Specifically, we reverse the district court’s 

dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 51-1-11 claim, and, as a result, reverse the district court’s 

dismissal of Plaintiff’s negligence and punitive damages claims. However, we 

affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s failure to warn claim because it is 

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not plausibly pled in her complaint. See Stillwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 663 F.3d 

1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (explaining the plausibility pleading 

standard applied in federal court).

AFFIRMED in Part, REVERSED in Part, and REMANDED.

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