# /V7//5

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS 

# IGINAL

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REl'IEbJ WITH A PETITION 

# «8£gH©JS,

VINCENT PASCO, Appellant pro se V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Trial Case No. F-1259DD1-Y On Appeal From The Criminal District Court No. 7 Dallas County Texas C 0 A No: 05-14-D0413-CR In the Honorable Dudge MIKE SHIPES C 

## DEC 02 

# ^belAcosta,Cterk
FILEDiN 

# COURTOFCRIMINALAPPEALS
AbelAcosta, Clerk

Parties: Vincent Pasco, #192D73B Conn ally Unit B99 FM 632 Kenedy, TX 78119 The State Of Texas

ORAL ARGUMENTS REQUESTED

Page 1 of 13TABLE OF CONTENTS
Parties Index of Authorities Statement of the Case Issues Presented: Point of Error Number One 

### \louiDid the Court Df Appeals abuse its 

### discretion by claiming the appelant did not show the evidence to be legally insufficient in order to sustain a conviction? Point of Error Number Two: 

### Did the Court of Appeals err by denying the ground that the Court erred by informing the jury about good conduct timePoint of Error Number Three: 

### Did the Court of Appeals err by denying the ground that the Trial Court did have jurisdiction to hear the instant case without a transferred order* Prayer Certificate of Service Inmate Unsworn Declaration

Page 2 of 13 PAGE 

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# H_d /*yj 

# JS_ JL 11.

15INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Jackson v. Virginia Fisher v. State Narvaiz v. State Guevara v. State Matson v. State Robertson v. State Timothy Scott v. State Dues v. State King v . State Lazano v. Lozano Louis v. State Urbano v. State Murray v. State Navarro v. State Moore v. State Wilson v. State Drovio v. State Almanza v. State Rogers v. State Daniell v. State Hoang v. State Ex parte Seidel Heath v. State Marin v. State Mills v . State Garcia v. State Wynn v. State

Page 3 of 13 PAGE



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## 12STATEMENT QF THE CASE Appellant was charged with murder by an indictment on or 

### about the 27th of July A.D. 2012. (CR p.10). The indictment includes a second paragraph alleging the existence of a prior 

### felony conviction. (CR p.10). Appellant pled not guilty to the indictment before the selected jury. (RR Vol.3, p.7). The jury 

### found appellant guilty of the indicted offense. (RR Vol.4, p.114). The jury found the enhancement paragraph true and set sentence at life in prison. (RR Vol.4, p .141 ) . Appellant's appeal was affirm ed on October 26, 2015, from the Fifth District Court of Appeals in Dallas, Texas. Point of Error Number One: 

## Viou) Dicl tne CoLJI"t Qf Appeals abuse its discretion by claiming the appellant did not show the evidence to be legally insufficient in order to sustain a conviction? 

### Appellant humbly submits that the evidence is legally in sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction. When conducting 

### a legal sufficiency review, the court assesses the evidence "in the light most favorable to the prosecution" and must ask, whether 

### "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt". Jackson v. Virginia, 44 3 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). "If based on all the evidence, a reason able doubt of the defendant's guilt, due process requires that 

### the court reverse and order a judgment of acquittal." Fisher, 851 

### SU2d at 302 (quoting Narvaiz v. State, 840 SU2d 415, 423 (Tex. 

### Crim.App. 1992); see also Guevara v. State, 152 SU3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim.App. 2004). The legal sufficiency of the evidence is a

Page 4 of 13question of law. Matson v. State, 819 Sw2d B39, B46 (Tex.Crim. App. 1991); Robertson v. State, 16 SW3d 156, 165 (Tex.App
- Austin 2000 pet. ref'd). 2ina Shaw's testimony The Court of Appeals claims that appellant "confessed the murder" to Zina Shaw in a phone call shortly after the murder of Brown. "A 'confession' is generally regarded as an acknowledgement of all facts necessary to constitute guilt of the crime at issue." 41 George E. Dix & Robert 0. Dawson, Criminal Practice and Proced 

### ure § 13.02 (2nd ed. 2001). In Shaw's testimony she asked appell ant, "Was that you running across the freeway?". Shaw then stated that "Appellant was mumbling and did not reply to her question". 

### (RR Vol.3, p.279). Shaw testified that she began the conversation by asking "Why would you put yourself in a situation like this?". Shaw said appellant responded by saying "It was either me or him. They tried to hoe me." (RR Vol 3, p.279). These statements recalled by Shaw did not supply the who, where, when, or how of the murder offense charged against appellant. Shaw's testimony merely provides information describing a quote, "either'me or him" situation and clearly, in the instant matter that is not the case. (Id) . Shannon Liright testimony Included in the evidence relied upon is Shannon Wright's testimony inferring that appellant and Brown were the only ones in the apartment at the time Brown was shot with a firearm. How ever, when viewing the evidence shows that: (1) Banks and his people had motive in killing Brown, (2) Banks had a gun, (3) Banks
Page 5 of 13attended, the drug house numerous times on the day of the murder, (4) the apartment had a front door and a bock door, was access ible to Banks and his people, (5) there was a spacious time gap ample enough for Banks and his people to enter the back door inbetween the time Wright stepped out of the apartment and the time Wright heard "rambling" and "gunshots", there also being a sign ificant time gap in-between the time Wright stepped out of the apartment and the time Wright finally kicked the door in, this, giving the perpetrator plenty of time to flee the scene unnoticed, and (6) the firearm that killed Brown was not discovered. It could not be distinguished whether the bullets were fired from one
or more than one gun. According to Wright's testimony, Banks told Wright and Brown, "I'm going to tell you like this, the people I mess with, they ain't too happy that this dope came up missing." (RR Vol.3, p.41-43, 77). Wright said that "Banks was more upset 

### than anyone else and he believed Banks was the one behind 'Man' being shot". (RR Vol.3, p.7B). Wright stated that "Banks was the main person causing difficulty". (RR Vol. 3, p.76) . Wright testi fied "Banks was bickering about missing drugs throughout the day". 

### (RR Vol.3, p.78). Wright "said that "Banks left quite a few times 

### on the day of the murder." (RR Vol .3 , p.. B3) . Wright stated that "appellant was a quiet person and was not arguing about the missing drugs". (RR Vol.3,. p.. 76). Wr ight"-'.indicated that him and appellant 

### had a mutual relationship describing appellant as someone who, if 

### there was a problem, would talk about it and then figure it out. (RR Vol.3, p.76). And finally, Ms. Thomas (a firearm and toolmark examiner) was unable to determine whether the bullets were fired 

### from one or more than one gun. (RR Vol.3, p.245-46).
Page 6 of 13In Wright's testimony he sits outside the front door for a minute and smokes a cigarette, then hears the door close, then hears "rambling", then tries the screen door but it's locked, then yells out for appellant to open the door, still hears rambling, yanks the screen door open, knocks on the door nine times, then finally hears gunshots. Wright says that afterwards he goes to his mother's apartment, asks for the phone, calls Iron, then fin ally goes back to the apartment to kick the door down to find Brown deceased and appellant running out the back d Wright's testimony, seemingly, incriminates appellant and
can only compel speculation. "Although a jury may accept or reject any or all evidence adduced, a jury may not reach a verdict based
on speculation." "A jury's verdict must be supported by evidence providing beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense of which a defendant is convicted." Timothy Scott v. State, 946 SW2d 166; 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 2684. 

### Intentional1y_or_knowinjgljy "Intent may be inferred from acts, words, and the conduct of 

### the accused." Guevana . 152 SW3d at 50; Pat_rick __y_._ St_ate , 906 SW2d 4B1, 4B7 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995); Dues v. State, 634 SW2d 304, 305 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982). The- use of a firearm to cause death would establish that the perpetrator acted with intent to cause death. In the instant case, the deficiency in the State's evidence is that i '. did notestablish that appellant was the person who used 

### the firearm to kill Brown. Coupled with the fact of there being 

## a window of time enabling Banks and his people to enter through the back door and murder Brown unnoticed by Wright, contrary to 

# 4$ 

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Page 7 of 13

### Banks, appellant was not arguing about missing drugs. Appellant 

### shows no animosity or any expressions of angsr, in fact, the record shows the contrary. Wright--described appellant as someone who talk 

### ed his problems out. The State's evidence merely places appellant at the scene of the crime. "Mere presence at the scene or in the vicinity of a crime, or even flight from the scene, either standing alone or combined, is insufficient to sustain a conviction. King v . State, 63B SW2d 903, 904 (Tex.Crim.App. 19B2). Jordan Price testimony The testimony of Jordan Price describing a "bright" skinned male running across the freeway cannot be overlooked. The State claims that Price identified appellant as the person who ran across the freeway. However, when going to the record, Price is asked to identify appellant in trial and Price's answer is "I don't know".. When Price admits to painting appellant out in a line-up it shows that thephoto selected by Price is marked with the notation "I'm not sure." (RR Vol 4. p . 6B) . Whether Evidence Presented uas Sufficient The evidence in the instant case contains a number of infer
ences that do not by themselves constitute proof of guilt. "A jury may not reasonably infer an ultimate fact from meager circum stantial evidence that simply raises a number of inferences, none 

### more probable than another." Lozano v. Lozano, 52 SW3d 141, 142; 

### 44 Tex.Sup. Ct .J . 499 (Tex. 2001). When viewing the evidence as a whole in the scope of the 

### record, a rational trier of fact can only speculate about who did the "rambling" and the shooting in apartment 204. "If circumstan 

### tial ,euidence ..provides .no ,morB.,;thBn .§-< iuapicion, the jury is not

Page 8 of 13permitted to SW3d 236, 246 (Tex.App.

as a whole in the "Proof that

. . „..-.. amounts to only a strong suspicion of guilt or a mere probability of guilt is insufficient to sustai |I_l„„„ ., r-4-~4-_ all n tin -i a a / i i ^r / -r _ .. i^_i_ n n a conviction." 

### Urbano v. State, B37 SW2d 114, 116 (Tex.Crim.App . 1992); Murry v State , 138 Tex.Crim, 53, 134 SW2d 286, 2B7 (Tex.Crim.App . 1939); 

### Wynn v. State, 847 SW2d 357, 359 (Tex.App.- Houston[1st Dist]), Tex.Crim.App. 1993); Navarro v. Stat pp. - San Antonio 1991 aff'd, 864 SW2d 539 ( SW2d 432, 435 (Tex.A Moore v. Statte, 640 SW
over, mere o 81 0

J2d 300, 302 (Tex.Cri opportunity to commit the fact of the accused's commis 

### [214 5W3d 586] State/ 147 Tex. Crim. 653, 184 SW2d 141, 143 (T Crim.App . 1944) . „ , 

## v £ Finally, as the Supreme Court put it, criminal substantial I C
A 

### due process "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitpet.ref'd)(citing
m. App. 19B7) ) . More

a crime does not tend t commission of th

reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constite crime with which he is charged. Michelena -Orono, 702 F ute th ; see also Gollihar, 46 SW3d at 245-46. With th in the instant case being legally insufficient, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process requires that the. Court rev and order an acquittal. Point of Error Number Tuio Did the Court of Appeals err by denying the ground that the Court 

### erred by informing the jury about good conduct time^

Page 9 of 13 2d

e evidence
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### reach a speculative conclusion." Louis v. State, 159 *— ^ Beaumont 2005, pet.ref'd). The evidence ^L^ instant case only causes a strong suspicion.

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### e crime. Wilson v. ^ ^ 

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rfFacts In The Record 

### Please look at the (CR p.7 2- 73) and (RR Vol.4, p.89). 

### This clearly shows that the State and Court of Appeals erred on this ground. Appellant contends the trial court comments amounted to supplemental jury charge and we should therefore review the egregious harm standard of Almanza v. State , 686 SW2d 157 (Tex. Crim.App. 1984). In support, he relies on Rogers v. State, 38 

### SW3d 725 (Tex.App.- Texarkana 2001, pet.ref'd). During the punishment phase in Rogers, the trial court did not provide a jury instruction on the effect of a life sentence on parole 

### eligibility; Ijd ,at 729; see Tex.Code Crim.Proc. art. 37.07 § 4(a). Then, during deliberations the trial court failed to provide a full and complete instruction in response to the jury's question
on the same matter. Id. The appellate court did not apply the Almanza standard because substantive responses to jury questions during deliber ations amount to supplemental jury charges. Id. (citing Daniell
v. State, 848 SW2d 145, 147 n.2 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). Unlike Rogers and the cases cited therein, the trial court's comments in the present case occurred during jury deliberations. This ground should be granted for relief.
Point of Error Number Three Did the trial court lack jurisdiction to hear the instant case
an.d render a judgment because the case, was not transferred to its d o c k e t4*

Page 10 of 13Summary Of Argument Criminal District Court Number Seven had no jurisdiction over this
case. Its judgment is void. Argument The Texas Constitution provides that a court is vested with jurisdiction over a criminal case by the presentment of an indict ment or information. Tex.Const. art.V, sec.12(b). An indictment is presented when it has been duly acted on by the grand jury and received by the trial court. Tex.Code Crim.Proc. art.12.06. Statu tory provisions also codify the necessary result, implied by Art.V sec .12; above that the trial court lacks jurisdiction in the absence of proper presentment. Tex.Code Crim.Proc. art.32/01 (requiring an indictment to be dismissed if not presented to the trial court by date certain). Once the indictment is presented jurisdiction is exclusive in the receiving court unless it is transferred to another
court. Id. art. 4 .16. The only mechanism for transferring the power to try a felony is by an order of transfer combined with an order of receiving. Combined, these constitute a written agreement between the two courts involved. The transferring court issues an order formally transferring jurisdiction over the case. The second court accepts 

### rt~he7:case by' issuing a formal order receiving. See Tex.Govt.Code, sec.24.003/ The instant case was presented to- Criminal District Court Number Three of Dallas County Texas. Jurisdiction was thus invest ed in that court. The instant case later appeared on Criminal Dis'trict Court; Number Seven where it remained through the entry

Page 11 of 13

### of judgment. However, there is nothing in the record showing that jurisdiction was ever transferred by Criminal District Court Number Three to Criminal District Court Number Seven. Therefore, it 

### appears that the Criminal District Court Number Three "retains" jurisdiction, just as art .4 .16 states. Appellant contends that Criminal District Court Number Seven never acquired jurisdiction in this matter. 

### Lack of jurisdiction over a case renders a trial court's 

### judgment void. Ex parte Seidel, 39 SW3d 221 (Tex.Crim.App . 2001); Hoang v. State, B72 SW2d 694 (Tex. Crim.App . 1993). A defect which renders a sentence void may be raised for the first time on appeal. 

### Heath v. State, B17 5W2d 335 (Tex.Crim.App . 1991). The right to be tried in a court that has properly acquired 

### jurisdiction over a case is absolute. See Marin v. State, 851 SW2d 275 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). Such a right to cannot be waived or 

### forfeited, even with consent. Id_. Implementation is not optional, it is always required. _Id_. at 279. Error in this regard is not subject to further analysis. Thus, a defendant may complain about this violation of an absolute right on appeal without having raised the question in the trial court. Id . at 2B0. 

### Appellant now complains that Criminal District Court Number Seven never acquired jurisdiction over the instant case, but he acknowledges that authority is against his position. See e.g., 

### Mills V. 5tate, 742 SW2d B32, B35 (Tex.App.- Dallas 1987); Garcia 

## v. State, 901 SW2d 731, 732-33 (Tex.App.-Houston[14th Dist.] 1995). These cases all hold that the present issue must be raised by the trial counsel or it is waived. However, they simply cite to their

Page 12 of 13

### antecedents without any constitutional or statutory authority for 

### the proposition that a jurisdictional defect can be cured by procedural default.

PRAYER Petitioner PRAYS for relief deem just.

DECLARATION 

# "I, Vincent Pasco, TDCJ # |4l-C>7J% , presently incarcer ated in the TDCJ-CID at the Connally Unit in Karnes County 

### Texas, declare under penalty of perjury that the facts stated in this PDR are true and correct and that I placed this docu 

### ment in the prison mailbox on this date." 

## "Executed on this the ol3CcAday of November 2015."

Vincent Pasco, prose
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

# I certify that on this the <k-><&day of November 2015, I sent the following parties a true and correct copy of this PDR by U.S. mail thru the prison mail system in a postage paid package to the addressed listed below: Court of Criminal Appeals "P.O.Box 12308, Capitol Station

Austin, TX 78711 Attn: Abel Acosta, Clerk 

## 'A 

# fate jPM&irS Vincent Pasco, pro se

Page 13 of 13

### AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed October26, 2015.

In The 

## GLauvt ofAppeals 

## Mitty Btstrtctof (toaa at Dallas
No. 05-14-00413-CR 

### VINCENTPASCO, Appellant V. 

### THE STATE OFTEXAS, Appellee 

### OnAppealfrom the CriminalDistrictCourtNo. 7 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-1259001-Y MEMORANDUM OPINION 

### Before Justices Lang-Miers, Brown, and Schenck Opinion by Justice Schenck 

### Vincent Pasco appeals his conviction and life sentence for murder. In three issues, 

### appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to prove he was the person who committed the offense, he was denied due process by an instruction in the punishment charge about good-time 

### credit andparole, and the trialcourt lackedjurisdiction. We affirm hisconviction. Because all issues are settled in law, we issue thismemorandumopinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4. Background 

## Appellant (known as"Grinch") became acquainted with thevictim, DerrickBrown, in connectionwith the sale of drugs at anapartmentlocated insouthernDallas. On July 26, 2012, 

### Brown was at theapartment withappellant, aman known as "Banks," Shannon Wright, and 

## ChadrickKennedy. Appellant,WrightandBrownstayedovernight;BanksandKennedydidnot. 

## The next day, itwas business asusual atthe apartment. Customers arrived, and appellant,

### Wright, and Brown sold them drugs. At some point appellant left to serve acustomer. He left behind a pack ofdrugs, and Brown took it. Brown left the apartmentfor a short period oftime, 

### taking appellant's drugs with him. When Brown returned to the apartment, appellant and Wright were there. Banks appeared shortly thereafter with more drugs. Banks argued with Wright aboutthe missingdrugs, andthenhe left. 

### Wright's mother, who lived in the same complex in which the apartment was located, came by to get some money from her son. At that time, only appellant, Wright, and Brown were 

### in the apartment. Wright stepped outside to talk to his mother. He gave her some money, and she returned to her residence in the complex. While Wright stayed outside to smoke a cigarette, 

### he heard twogunshots. He tried to get into theapartment, but the door waslocked. He looked 

### throughtheblinds and sawbloodon thewalls. Wrightwent to his mother'sresidenceand told her hethoughtGrinchhadjust shotBrown. Wrightreturnedto theapartmentandkicked in the door. He found Brown on the couch, bleeding from ear to ear. He saw appellant running out of the back door. Wright called out to appellant, but he did not stop. Discussion Identity ofthe Murderer 

### In his firstissue, appellant challenges thelegal sufficiency of theevidence toprove he was the gunman who shot Brown. LegalSufficiencyoftheEvidence 

### Whenconductingalegal-sufficiencyreview, a court must askwhether"anyrationaltrier of fact could have found the essential elements ofthe crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 

## Jacksonv. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). Inso doing, we assesstheevidence "inthe 

## light most favorable to the prosecution." Id. This same standard applies equally to circumstantial and direct evidence. Burden v. State, 55 S.W.3d 608, 613 (Tex. Crim. App.
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### 2001). Thejury is the exclusivejudge ofthe credibility ofthe witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. See Bonham v. State, 680 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Thejury is free to accept or reject all or any part ofa witness's testimony. See id; Dumas v. 

### State, 812 S.W.2d 611, 615 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. refd). This Court is only to ensure that thejury reached a rational conclusion, not to re-evaluate the weight and credibility ofthe evidence. See Munizv. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Because appellant 

### challengesthe sufficiency ofthe evidencetoprove identity, we examinethe evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier offact could have found 

### beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in fact the person who shot the victim. See Cardenasv. State,971 S.W.2d 645, 648-49 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, pet. refd). Viewedthrough this lens, 

### we find ample evidence to support a reasonablejuror's conclusion that appellant was the person who shot Brown. 

### Wright, who was present at the apartment on the day ofthe shooting, testified that the 

### only people at the apartment at the time Brown was killed were Wright, Brown, and appellant. Wright knew appellant as Grinch. Wright stepped outside the apartment before Brown was shot. 

### Wright heard two gunshots. He kicked in the door and found Brown on the couch bleeding from ear to ear. Wright saw appellant running out of the back door. He called out to him, but appellant did not stop or respond. Wright told the jury that he believed appellant shot and killed
Brown.

### Wright's mother also testified she heard the gunshots and saw appellant fleeing from the 

### back of the apartmentwhile holding a phone up to his ear. Wright's motheridentified appellant in open court as that person and testified she knew him as Grinch. Jordan Price testified that he was at a family gathering at the same apartment complex 

### when the offense occurred. He heard the gunshots and saw a man with "bright" skin coming out
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### from the backofthe complexthroughthe parking lot. Hetestifiedthe man had a guntuckedinto 

### the back ofhis pants. Price describedthe man as having long hair and wearing apeach colored shirt and baggy bluejeans. The man ran in front ofPrice and then across the freeway as he fled 

### the scene. Price identified appellant as the man he saw fleeing from the apartment complex in a photo lineup. 

### Kennedy testified that he was not at the apartment on the day Brown was murdered. Cell phone records associated with Kennedy's cell phone number were introduced into evidence and showed that his phone made a call from a location in Irving, Texas, at the time ofthe offense. 

### The evidence further established that neither Banks nor Kennedy physically resemble appellant. Zina Shaw testified that she started dating appellant in March or April of2012. Shaw stated appellant calledher afterBrown was murdered and talked to her aboutthe offense. This 

### led her to ask him why he did this and he replied, "It was me or him." "Theytried to hoe me." Then Shawasked appellant, "Wasthatyou runningacrossthe freeway?" He said, "Yes." In summary, three witnesses identified appellantand testifiedthatthey saw him flee from the scene ofthe crime shortly after hearingthe gunshots. One witness saw a gun in appellant's 

### waistband as appellant ran past him. Wright established a motive for the shooting, that being retribution for the theft ofdrugs, and established appellant and Brown were the only people in the apartment at the time ofthe shooting. Appellanttold a girlfriend he shotBrown. Fromthis 

### evidence, thejury could have found, beyond areasonable doubt, thatappellantwas the gunman who shot Brown. Weoverrule appellant's first issue. Instruction Concerning Good ConductTime 

### In his second issue, appellant argues because he was ineligible for good conduct time, the trial court erred by including ajuryinstruction about good conduct time. 

### The complained of instruction tracks the language in article 37.07, section 4(a) of the
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### codeofcriminalprocedure. This instruction is mandatedby the code ofcriminalprocedure. See 

### Campbellv.State,No. 05-14-00563-CR, 2015 WL4550678, at * 1-2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 28, 2015, no pet), (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 4(a) (West Supp. 2014)). The article sets out the exact language the trial courts are required to include. Id. As described 

### by the court ofcriminal appeals, the statutory parole charge instructs ajury in general terms about the existence and possible grant ofparole. Luquis v. State, 72 S.W.3d 355, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The instruction also refers to the conceptof"good conducttime" and states that a person sentenced to prison might earn some reduction in his period of incarceration through the discretionary award ofgood-conducttime. Id. The instruction also warns thejury that it cannot accurately predict how the concepts ofgood-conduct time and parole might be appliedto any particularperson and thus it may not considerhow those concepts mightapplyto 

### the defendant. Id. The overall purpose ofthe instruction is to generally informjurors ofgood conducttime and parole, butprohibitthem from using the notions ofthese concepts inassessing the appropriatepunishment. Id. 

### Appellant maintains that because he is not eligible for good-conduct time, the parole 

### charge was unconstitutional as applied to him. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 508.149(a)(5) (West Supp. 2014). In Luquis, the court ofcriminal appeals rejected the argument appellant makes. Luquis, 72 S.W.3d at 365. In Luquis, and in this case, thejury was instructed not to 

### consider how good-conduct time or the parole law may be applied to the defendant. We assume 

### the jury followed theseinstructions, and we will not find constitutional error unless we conclude that a reasonablejury probably was actually confused by this charge. Seeid. at 366-67. 

### Appellantdid not object to the court's charge onpunishmentand thus bears the burdento 

### show that any errorresulted inegregious harm such that he did notreceive a fair andimpartial trial. SeeJiminez v. State, 32 S.W.3d 233, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000);Atkinson v. State, 107
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### S.W.3d 856, 859-60 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). Appellantclaims there is a reasonable probability the parole charge mislead thejury. He does not elaborate on how or why the jury 

### was misled. As in Luquis, nothing in the record suggests thejurors discussed, considered, or tried to apply what they were told about good-conduct time and parole. See id. at 367. For 

### example, thejurydid not send out any notes on the subject and the prosecution did not mention parole or good-conduct time during closing arguments. Appellant has not demonstrated a 

### reasonable likelihood that thejury was in fact misled by the instruction or that it assessed a higher punishmentbased on anymisconstructionofthe parole law charge. See id.at 368. Under 

### these circumstances, the parole instruction did not violate appellant's right to due process, and we cannot conclude that appellant suffered egregious harm. See id.;Atkinson, 107 S.W.3d at 860. Weoverruleappellant's secondissue. Trial Court's Jurisdiction 

### Inhis third issue, appellant argues Criminal District Court Number 7 lacked jurisdiction
overhis case becausethe case was nottransferredto itsdocket. More particularly, he claimsthat 

### the indictment was presented to Criminal District Court Number 3 and invested that court with 

### jurisdictionover thecase. Basedon theabsenceof atransferorderfrom CriminalDistrictCourt Number 3 to Criminal District Court Number 7, appellant contends Criminal District Court Number7neveracquiredjurisdiction. 

### The failure to file a written transfer order is a procedural error, not ajurisdictional one. Lamasurier v. State, 91 S.W.3d 897, 899 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. refd). This 

## procedural error does notrender theactions of thelater court void, butmerely makes them subjectto atimely pleaidentifyingtheissue. Garcia v. State, 901 S.W.2d 731, 732-33 (Tex. 

## Crim.App. 1995). Asaresult,adefendantwhodoesnotfileatimelypleaforfeitsanycomplaint

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### about the lack ofa written transfer order. Mills v. State, 742 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex. App.— Dallas 1987, no pet.). 

### In this case, appellant never filed a plea concerning the lack ofa transfer order to the Criminal DistrictCourtNumber7 nor in any otherway challengedthe competence ofthat court 

### over the indictment. In fact, he entered a pleaofnot guilty to the indictmentin that court, and he
was tried, convicted, and sentencedinthatcourt. By failingto raise the issue in the districtcourt 

### and entering a plea and participating through counsel at trial, appellant forfeited his complaint about the lack ofa transfer order. Accordingly, appellant's third issue as to the trial court's jurisdictioniswithoutmerit and isoverruled. Conclusion 

### Having resolved all of appellant's issues against him, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

/David J. Schenck/

DoNotPublish Tex. R. App. P. 47 140413F.U05 DAVID J. SCHENCK JUSTICE

## (ftnixrt nfAppeals 

## ififftfj Btstrictnf (teas at Ballas JUDGMENT 

### VINCENTPASCO, Appellant
No. 05-14-00413-CR V. 

### THE STATEOFTEXAS, Appellee OnAppealfrom the CriminalDistrictCourt No. 7, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court CauseNo. F-1259001-Y. 

### OpiniondeliveredbyJustice Schenck. JusticesLang-Miers and Brown participating. 

### Based on theCourt'sopinion of this date, thejudgmentofthe trial court isAFFIRMED. Judgmententered this 26th dayofOctober, 2015.

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