BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION | SEPTEMBER 2021

The Consumer Credit Card 

Market
1 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Message from

the Acting Director

Credit cards are one of the most commonly-held and widelyused financial products in America — over 175 million 

Americans hold at least one credit card. During the COVID-19 

pandemic, credit cards played a vital role as both a source of 

credit in emergencies and a payment method as more 

transactions occurred online.

As the fifth biennial report to Congress onthe credit card 

market, this report details how swift actions by both the public and private sectors likely 

impacted how many consumers used their credit cards and managed their debts during the 

pandemic. To address hardships caused by COVID-19, the Federal government provided 

consumers direct relief by issuing a series of economic impact payments, providing enhanced 

unemployment benefits, suspending student loan payments and interest accrual for federally 

held loans, offering mortgage forbearance, and enacting a moratorium on evictions. At the same 

time, credit card issuers provided voluntary relief to consumers by offering payment deferral 

and fee waivers.

Supported by these efforts, this report finds that the decline in credit card debt during the 

pandemic was unprecedented in speed and magnitude. Measures of consumer stress, such as 

late payment incidence and the share of accounts delinquent, hit record lows. 

This report also highlights areas in the credit card market that may entail risks for consumers 

such as system deficiencies related to implementing relief programs and automatic payment 

processes. The Bureau continues to monitor indicators of credit card use, cost, and availability 

to identify potential for consumer harm, as well as study the impact of new, innovative products.

Our credit card market report is intended to present the latest research on this vital market to 

consumers, issuers, and policymakers. As many consumers, particularly those with non-prime 

credit scores, still face numerous hardships due to COVID-19, this report remains critical. The

Bureauwill carry out its mission in ensuring this market continues to benefit all participants

during these times of heightened uncertainty.
2 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Sincerely, 

David Uejio
3 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Table of contents

Message from the Acting Director .................................................................................1

Table of contents ..............................................................................................................3

Executive summary..........................................................................................................5

1. Introduction ..............................................................................................................13

1.1 Review mandate........................................................................................13

1.2 Report scope............................................................................................. 14

1.3 Methodology..............................................................................................15

2. Use of credit .............................................................................................................25

2.1 Product prevalence ..................................................................................25

2.2 Debt levels................................................................................................27

2.3 Purchase volume.......................................................................................31

2.4 Repayment...............................................................................................33

2.5 Delinquency.............................................................................................. 41

2.6 Charge-off.................................................................................................44

3. Cost of credit............................................................................................................46

3.1 Total cost of credit....................................................................................46

3.2 Interest charged.......................................................................................48

3.3 Fees assessed............................................................................................52

4. Availability of credit ................................................................................................61

4.1 New accounts ........................................................................................... 61

4.2 Existing accounts .....................................................................................77
4 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

5. Practices of credit card issuers ............................................................................86

5.1 Rewards....................................................................................................87

5.2 Deferred interest...................................................................................... 91

5.3 Balance transfers....................................................................................100

5.4 Cash advances........................................................................................104

5.5 COVID-19 response................................................................................108

5.6 Card agreements .....................................................................................121

6. Credit card debt collection...................................................................................127

6.1 Debt collection markets..........................................................................127

6.2 Collections prior to charge-off................................................................ 131

6.3 Recovery following charge-off............................................................... 144

6.4 Litigation .................................................................................................153

6.5 Credit card debt collection during COVID-19........................................155

7. Innovation ...............................................................................................................158

7.1 Product innovation ................................................................................ 158

7.2 Consumer adoption of innovative technologies ................................... 169

Appendix A: Supporting figures ............................................................................177
Executive summary

Credit cards are central to the financial lives of over 175 million American consumers. Over the 

last few years and through 2019, the credit card market, the largest U.S. consumer lending 

market measured by number of users, continued to grow in almost all measures until suddenly 

reversing course in March 2020. Despite macroeconomic shocks to the financial system, credit 

card market conditions remain relatively stable at the time of this report writing, with that 

stability likely supported by robust fiscal measures, lower consumer discretionary spending, and 

voluntary industry relief programs.

The COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted how many consumers used and interacted with 

credit cards. Far fewer consumers applied for new credit cards in 2020 than the year prior. 

During the pandemic, existing cardholders paid off the highest share of their credit card debt in 

recent years. Additionally, late payment and default rates fell to historic lows, most notably for 

consumers with below-prime scores. 

At the same time, credit cards continued to play a vital role as both a payment method and 

source of credit. Consumers still used their cards to facilitate transactions, smooth consumption, 

and earn rewards. As physical stores closed and a greater share of commerce was transacted 

digitally, cardholders benefited from the consumer protections afforded to credit cards such as 

limitations on liability and enhanced security.

In response to pandemic-related hardship, issuers provided a considerable number of payment 

deferrals and fee waivers to their cardholders in 2020. However, consumers calling their credit 

card issuers often faced long wait times to access these relief programs. Additionally, complaints 

submitted to the Bureau regarding credit cards spiked in the second quarter of 2020 and 
6 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

remained elevated throughout the year. 1Overall reported satisfaction with credit cards issuers 

fell significantly during the pandemic but remained higher than post-Great Recession levels.2

Despite these indicators of lower consumer satisfaction, credit card issuers continue to generate 

profitable annual returns consistent with historic levels relative to other market lending 

activities even with an initial decline during the first half of 2020. 3

In 2019 and 2020, innovation continued to reshape the credit card market for both users and 

providers. New providers, including large and small financial institutions as well as startup and 

mainstream technology companies have entered—or are in the process of entering—the market 

with competing products, features, and methods for issuing credit cards.4

This executive summary provides some background for the report, then summarizes key 

findings.

BACKGROUND

In 2009, Congress passed the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act 

(CARD Act or Act). 5 The Act made substantial changes to the credit card market. The CARD Act 

mandated new disclosures and underwriting standards, curbed certain fees, and restricted 

interest rate increases on existing balances. Among the CARD Act’s many provisions was a 

1Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Consumer Response Annual Report, at 39 (Mar. 2021), 

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_2020-consumer-response-annual-report_03-2021.pdf.

Billing disputes remain the largest complaint category.

2See Press Release, J.D. Power, Customers Losing Faith in Credit Card Issuers as COVID-19 Pandemic Lingers, J.D. 

Power Finds (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.jdpower.com/business/press-releases/2020-us-credit-cardsatisfaction-study.

3Bd. of Governors for the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Report to the Congress on the Profitability of Credit Card Operations of 

Depository Institutions (July 2021), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/ccprofit2021.pdf.

4 Reference in this report to any specific commercial product, service, firm, or corporation name is for the information 

and convenience of the public and does not constitute endorsement or recommendation by the Bureau.

5 The Act superseded a number of earlier regulations that had been finalized, but had not yet become effective, by the 

Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and the Board of Governors 

of the Federal Reserve System. Those earlier rules were announced in December of 2008 and published in the 

Federal Register the following month. See 74 FR 5244 (Jan. 29, 2009); 74 FR 5498 (Jan. 29, 2009). The rules were 

withdrawn in light of the CARD Act. See 75 FR 7657, 75 FR 7925 (Feb. 22, 2010).
7 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

requirement that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) report every 

two years on the state of the consumer credit card market. With the passage of the Dodd-Frank 

Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) in 2010, that requirement 

transferred to the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau) alongside broader 

responsibility for administering most of the CARD Act’s provisions. This is the fifth report 

published pursuant to that obligation, building on prior reportspublished by the Bureau in 

2013, 2015, 2017, and 2019.6

The CARD Act was enacted over ten years ago. 7 Since its passage, researchers, including the 

Bureau, have studied the effects of the CARD Act on the cost and availability of credit to 

consumers. This year the Bureau conducted a review of rules implementing the Act per section 

610 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act,8 and the Bureau expects to release its determination this 

fall.

THE 2021 REPORT

This report continues the approach of the Bureau’s previous reports. The Bureau revisits similar 

baseline indicators to track key market developments and trends. It also revisits some in-depth 

topics to assess how the market has changed. For example, the current report updates the 

deferred interest analysis last conducted in the 2017 Report. The Bureau also discusses the 

6 See Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Card Act Report (Oct. 1, 2013) (2013 Report), 

http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201309_cfpb_card-act-report.pdf; Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., The 

Consumer Credit Card Market (Dec. 2015) (2015 Report), 

http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201512_cfpb_report-the-consumer-credit-card-market.pdf; Bureau of 

Consumer Fin. Prot., The Consumer Credit Card Market (Dec. 2017) (2017 Report), 

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_consumer-credit-card-market-report_2017.pdf; Consumer 

Fin. Prot., The Consumer Credit Card Market (Aug. 2010) (2019 Report), 

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_consumer-credit-card-market-report_2019.pdf. The Bureau 

also held a conference in 2011 in which numerous market stakeholders contributed information and perspective on 

developments in the credit card market. See Press Release, Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., CFPB Launches Public 

Inquiry on the Impact of the Card Act (Dec. 19, 2012), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-launches-public-inquiry-on-the-impact-of-the-card-act.

7 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Public Law 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009).

8 Public Law 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.).
8 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

effects of COVID-19 throughout the report and specifically adds a section about its impact on 

credit card issuers and their responses to consumers’ needs.

Below is a summary of the core findings from each section of the report:

 Total outstanding credit card balances continued to grow and peaked in 2019 at $926 

billion, but, by the second quarter of 2020, consumers reduced card balances to $811 billion, 

the largest six-month reduction in U.S. history. At the end of 2020, debt crept back up to 

$825 billion. The share of accounts with a revolving balance declined in 2020, and more 

consumers paid down their card debt in 2020. Utilization rates declined across credit score 

tiers, and the share of consumers with below-prime scores who used 90 percent or more of 

their general purpose credit line fell to record lows. A declining share of consumers were late 

in making their payments as of the second quarter of 2020.

 The total cost of credit (TCC) on revolving accounts continued to increase through 2019 but 

declined modestly in 2020. The 2020 declines in TCC for general purpose and private label 

cards were 0.8 and 1.5 percentage points, respectively. Recent TCC decreases are largely a 

result of decreases in the indices underlying variable rates, such as the prime rate, and lower 

overall fees assessed. The Bureau estimates that the five rate decreases by the Federal 

Reserve from early-2019 through 2020 led to a cumulative roughly $18 billion that credit 

card borrowers did not pay over that period.Accountsheld by consumers with deep 

subprime credit scores saw the greatest drop in fee-to-balance ratios in 2020.

 Most measures of credit card availability decreased in 2020 after continued growth since the 

Great Recession. Application volume for credit cards decreased sharply in 2020 from its 

peak level in 2019, likely due to the interaction between reduced acquisition efforts by 

issuers and a decline in consumer demand.Approval rates also declined modestly in 2020. 

Driven by these contractions in both supply and demand, annual growth in the number of 

credit card accounts opened and the amount of credit line on new accounts reached its 

lowest level since 2013. Total credit line across all consumer credit cards fell slightly in 2020 

from a post-Great Recession high of over $4.5trillion in 2019 but remained above 2018 

levels.Existing accounts held by consumers with subprime and deep subprime scores saw 
9 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

the greatest constriction in available line. 9 While credit line decrease (CLD) incidence 

increased for consumers with below-prime credit scores, issuers did not substantially deviate 

from previous line management trends during the pandemic.

 Digital engagement is growing consistently across all age groups and nearly every platform 

type. The share of consumers electing to receive statements digitally (e-statements) rather 

than by mail is continuing to increase, though the pace of adoption tapered in 2020. Estatement adoption has been surpassed by mobile app adoption as a method to engage with 

issuers.

 Many consumers received some form of relief on their credit card debts from their credit 

card providers during the pandemic. The Bureau estimates that over 25 million consumer 

credit card accounts representing approximately $68 billion in outstanding credit card debt 

entered relief programs in 2020, figures vastly higher than in prior years. The Bureau also 

estimates that surveyed issuers’ cardholders were able to forgo principal payments of 

anywhere from $0.5 billion to $1.5 billion against their credit card debts in 2020 due to 

these relief programs.Entries into payment deferral relief were spread fairly evenly across 

credit score tiers, but accounts held by consumers with lower scores received payment 

deferrals at the highest rate.

 Since the 2019 Report, issuers have lowered the range of their daily limits on debt collection 

phone calls for delinquent credit card accounts while increasing the use of emails in 

collection. However, survey respondents reported that, on average, only 31.9 percent of 

accounts that received email clicked open their emails.

 Innovations aimed at expanding credit access, particularly for less creditworthy borrowers, 

continued to grow in both the number of offerings and users. Buy Now, Pay Later (BNPL) 

products are offering a new form of purchasing with payments spread out over time, 

typically in four installments. Credit card issuers are offering similar plans, providing 

consumers more ways to manage their cash flow.

9 These trends of constricting credit availability do not appear to continue in 2021. See Corinne Candilis & Ryan 

Sandler, Credit card limits are rising for most groups after stagnating during the pandemic, Bureau of Consumer 

Fin. Prot.(Aug. 11, 2021), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/credit-card-limits-rising-for-mostgroups-after-stagnating-during-pandemic/. 
10 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

CURRENT AND FUTURE BUREAU WORK IN THIS MARKET

Over the past two years, the Bureau has been actively engaged in the credit card market and is 

taking measures to address regulatory uncertainty, identify compliance deficiencies as well as 

research new emerging technologies and products to ensure the adequacy of consumer 

protection and a transparent and competitive marketplace for all consumers.

 In June of 2020, the Bureau released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) concerning 

the anticipated discontinuation of LIBOR, 10 including proposing examples of replacement 

indices that satisfy Regulation Z requirements. 11As proposed, the rule wouldallow credit 

card issuers to replace the LIBOR index used in setting variable rates on many existing 

accounts with a replacement index before LIBOR becomes unavailable, if certain conditions 

were met. To the Bureau’s knowledge, there are millions of consumer credit card accounts 

indexed on LIBOR. The proposed rulemaking shouldhelp credit card providers transition 

those affected accounts to a replacement index in an orderly manner. The Bureau expects to 

issue a final rule in January 2022. 12

 Through the Prioritized Assessments conducted in May of 2020, the Bureau found that 

credit card issuers generally provided some form of relief to consumers experiencing 

hardships as a result of COVID-19, such as “skip-a-pay” or payment deferrals for one to six 

months, with or without interest accrual. 13 Other relief options included lowered interest 

rates, waivers of annual and other fees, and extended deferred interest periods for credit 

card accounts that had already received deferred interest. However, the Bureau also 

identified certain issues that may raise the risk of consumer harm such as system 

10 Press Release, Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., CFPB Takes Steps to Facilitate LIBOR Transition (June 4, 2020), 

https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-facilitates-libor-transition/.

1185 FR 36938 (June 18, 2020), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-06-18/pdf/2020-12239.pdf.

12Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Amendments to Regulation Z to Facilitate Transition From LIBOR (2021), 

https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202104&RIN=3170-AB01.

13Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Supervisory Highlights COVID-19 Prioritized Assessments Special Edition, Issue 

23 (Jan. 2021), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_supervisory-highlights_issue-23_2021-

01.pdf.
11 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

deficiencies related to implementing relief programs and automatic payment processes, as 

well as delays in timely delivery of certain disclosures and responding to billing disputes.

 The Bureau continues to monitor the expansion of credit access, especially when new and 

innovative technologies are used. Credit access expansion can be positive but should be done 

responsibly and in a way that is understandable to consumers. Consumers will be better 

served if the use of such technologies are clearly explained in case of adverse actions. 14

Forms of point-of-sale financing, such as BNPLproducts, offer not only convenience but a 

new way of financing for many consumers. The Bureau encourages all providers in this space 

to take steps to make sure users of these products are adequately informed of the risks of 

such products.

 The Bureau encourages study into the effects of certain lending practices and their impact on 

credit scores, particularly for those consumers with non-prime credit scores. Practices such 

as credit line decreases (CLD) and account closure not only reduce consumers’ access to 

credit but also potentially inflate their credit utilization rate. This could adversely affect 

consumers’ credit scores without any other changes in their behavior. Additionally, over the 

past decade, a declining share of credit card issuers reported information onaborrower’s 

actual payment amount to nationwide consumer reporting agencies, which may have 

implications for consumer access to credit. 

 As indicated in its January 28, 2021 announcement, 15 the Bureau intends to take bold and 

swift action on racial equity in financial services, including in the areas of credit card 

marketing and lending. Existing data available to the Bureau do not allow the Bureau to fully 

examine the disparity in use, cost, and availability of credit cards by racial groups. The 

Bureau intends to explore options to incorporate racial data in its data sources to inform its 

future work.

14 Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Tech Sprint on Electronic Disclosures of Adverse Action Notices (Oct. 2020), 

https://www.consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/innovation/cfpb-tech-sprints/electronic-disclosures-tech-sprint/.

15Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., The Bureau is taking much-needed action to protect consumers, particularly the 

most economically vulnerable (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/the-bureau-istaking-much-needed-action-to-protect-consumers-particularly-the-most-economically-vulnerable/.
12 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

 As described in the new technical specifications issued on August 20, 2021, the Bureau’s 

“Collect” website will be the mandatory vehicle issuers must use to submit credit card

agreements and their associated data in 2022 and beyond. Not only does Collect provide a 

simplified submission process and robust audit trail for issuers, it will allow the Bureau and 

other organizations to expand their current research on credit card agreements. 16

16 Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Technical Specifications for Credit Card Agreement and Data Submission 

Required under TILA and the CARD Act (Regulation Z) (Aug. 20, 2021), 

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_tech-specs-credit-card-agreement-data-submissions_finalrule_2021-08.pdf. 
13 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

1. Introduction

1.1 Review mandate

The CARD Act became law on May 22, 2009.Its stated purpose was to “establish fair and 

transparent practices related to the extension of credit” in the credit card marketplace. 17The 

Dodd-Frank Act, which became law on July 21, 2010, established the Bureau and, one year later, 

transferred authority and responsibility for implementing and enforcing the CARD Act from the 

Board to the Bureau.

Among those responsibilities Congress originally assigned the Board was a mandate to “review, 

within the limits of its existing resources available for reporting purposes, [the] consumer credit 

card market [every two years].” 18 In 2012, the Board and the Bureau agreed that responsibility 

for the review passed to the Bureau under the terms of the Dodd-Frank Act. This report 

represents the Bureau’s fifth mandated biennial report on its review of the consumer credit card 

market, following the Bureau’s reports on the market in 2013, 2015, 2017, and 2019. 19

17 See supra note 5, at 1. A full summary of the CARD Act rules implemented by the Board is at pages 11 through 13 of 

the Bureau’s 2013 Report. See 2013 Report, supra note 6. The Bureau subsequently reissued these rules without 

material changes in December 2011. The Bureau later revised one CARD Act rule issued by the Board. On November 

7, 2012, the Bureau proposed selected revisions to the ability-to-pay rules, which were intended to address a 

number of unintended impacts of the prior rule on consumers who did not work outside the home. The final rule 

implementing this revision became effective on May 3, 2013, with an associated compliance deadline of November 

4, 2013. See 78 FR 25818 (May 3, 2013). On March 22, 2013, the Bureau finalized another revision to the CARD Act 

rules in response to a federal court ruling in 2012 that had granted a preliminary injunction to block a part of the 

Board’s 2011 rule from taking effect. The final rule became effective March 28, 2013. See 78 FR 18795 (Mar. 28, 

2013). See also Press Release, Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., CFPB Finalizes Credit CARD Act Rule (Mar. 22, 

2013), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-finalizescredit-card-act-rule. 

18 15 U.S.C. § 1616(a) (2012).

19 See generally, supra note 6.
14 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

1.2 Report scope

This report fulfills Congress’sdirective to review the consumer credit card market in two 

overlapping ways. First, it responds to the general congressional mandate in section 502 of the 

CARD Act to review and report on the “consumer credit card market.” Second, it addresses 

“within the limits of [the Bureau’s] existing resources available for reporting purposes” topics 

explicitly enumerated by Congress for inclusion in this review, including: 

1. the terms of credit card agreements and the practices of credit card issuers;

2. the effectiveness of disclosure of terms, fees, and other expenses of credit card plans;

3. the adequacy of protections against unfair or deceptive acts or practices relating to credit 

card plans; and

4. whether or not, and to what extent, the implementation of this Act and the amendments 

made by this Act have affected:

a) the cost and availability of credit, particularly with respect to non-prime borrowers;

b) the safety and soundness of credit card issuers;

c) the use of risk-based pricing; or

d) credit card product innovation. 20

The CARD Act also requires the Bureau to “solicit comment from consumers, credit card issuers, 

and other interested parties” in connection with its review. 21As in past years, the Bureau has 

done so through a Request for Information (RFI) published in the Federal Register, and the 

20 15 U.S.C. § 1616(a) (2012). While this report presents information which may be relevant to assessments of safety 

and soundness issues relating to credit card issuers, the Bureau does not produce any further analysis on this 

subject in this report. The prudential regulators (e.g., the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the National Credit 

Union Administration) have the primary responsibility for monitoring the safety and soundness of financial 

institutions.

21 15 U.S.C. § 1616(b) (2012).
15 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Bureau discusses specific evidence or arguments provided by commenters throughout the 

report. 22

1.3 Methodology

This section reviews several aspects of the Bureau’s general methodology in compiling this 

report. Methodological approaches used in specific sections of this report are explained in more 

detail in those sections.

1.3.1 Data sources

This report leverages several data sources.It primarily relies on sources already held by the 

Bureau, by other Federal regulators, and by industry stakeholders.All results reported from data 

throughout this report aggregate results from multiple industry participants. 23

Sources include the following:

1. Data from the Bureau’s Consumer Credit Panel (CCP), which is a comprehensive, national 1-

in-48 longitudinal sample of de-identified credit records maintained by one of the three 

nationwide consumer reporting agencies. Other Bureau products, such as the Consumer 

Credit Trends reports, rely on these data. 24 These data contain no personal identifiers, such 

as name, address, or Social Security number.

22 Request for Information Regarding Consumer Credit Card Market, 85 FR 53299 (Aug. 28, 2020). The RFI also 

separately solicited comment on the Bureau’s review of the CARD Act consistent with section 610 of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act (RFA). Public Law 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980). That review is out of the scope of this report.

23 No results in this report can be used to identify the outcomes or practices of individual entities. At the same time, 

outcomes and patterns observed in the market as a whole may not be true for (or may only apply in a limited degree 

to) any particular industry player.

24 See Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Consumer Credit Trends, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/dataresearch/consumer-credit-trends/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2021). For CCP research related to COVID-19, see also Ryan 

Sandler & Judith Ricks, Special issue brief: The early effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on consumer credit, 
16 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

2. De-identified information that the Board collects as part of its “Y-14M” (Y-14) data 

collection. The Board collects these data monthly from bank holding companies that have 

total consolidated assets exceeding $50 billion. 25The Board shares with the Bureau data 

from Y-14 banks. The data received by the Bureau cover the period from the middle of 2012 

through the present and accounted for just under 70 percent of outstanding balances on 

consumer credit cards as of year-end 2020. 26

Information in the Y-14 data do not include any personal identifiers.Additionally, accounts 

associated with the same consumer are not linked across or within issuers. The Y-14 does not 

include transaction-level data pertaining to consumer purchases. In addition, this study 

reports only aggregate measures and reveals no information about any specific issuer.

These data replace loan-level credit card collections that the Bureau previously collected. 27

The Bureau no longer requires or oversees the collection of any loan-level credit card data on 

an ongoing basis.

Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot. (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/researchreports/special-issue-brief-early-effects-covid-19-pandemic-on-consumer-credit/; Éva Nagypál, Special issue brief: 

The Recovery of Credit Applications to Pre-Pandemic Levels, Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.(July 27, 2021), 

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_recovery-of-credit-applications-pre-pandemiclevels_report_2021-07.pdf; and Ryan Sandler, Delinquencies on credit accounts continue to be low despite the

pandemic, Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot. Blog (June 16, 2021), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/blog/delinquencies-on-credit-accounts-continue-to-be-low-despite-the-pandemic/.

25 See Bd. of Governors. of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Report Forms FR Y-14M, 

https://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/reportforms/reportdetail.aspx?sOoYJ+5BzDYnbIw+U9pka3sMtCMopzoV

(last visited Jan. 11, 2021) (for more information on the Y-14M collection).

26 The Board has expanded the fields it collects from banks over time; therefore, some results reported below do not 

extend all the way back to 2012. Additionally, these data are periodically revised retroactively, and are therefore not 

fully static. These issuers represent a large portion of the market but are not necessarily representative of the 

portion of the market not covered by the data the Bureau receives. The remainder of the market, representing a 

substantial number of consumer credit cards, are outside the scope of the Y-14 data used by the Bureau because, 

among other reasons, they are issued by banks with assets of less than $50 billion, or are issued by non-banks, such 

as credit unions. Results reported from Y-14 data throughout this report should be interpreted accordingly.

27 See generally Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Sources and Uses of Data, at 57-58 (Sept. 26, 2018), 

https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-reports/sources-and-uses-data-bureau-consumerfinancial-protection/.
17 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

3. Information provided in response to a series of data filing ordersmade to several industry 

participants, comprised of two distinct sets:28

a) Data requested from a broad and diverse group of issuers to address a range of topics 

that neither CCP nor Y-14 data can address. This report refers to these data as Mass 

Market Issuer (MMI) data. These data cover application and approval volumes, rates, 

and channels, deferred interest, digital account servicing, certain aspects of the impact of 

COVID-19 on consumers and issuers, and loss mitigation policies and practices, 

including debt collection.

b) Data requested from a diverse group of specialized issuers. These summary data, which 

focus on basic indicators of usage and cost, in places supplement the Y-14 to allow for a 

broader or more detailed perspective into certain facets of the market than either the Y14 or CCP allow.Where these data supplement Y-14 data, those data are collectively 

called “Y-14+”. 29

4. The CFPB’s Credit Card Agreement Database, an online database available to the public at 

http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/agreements, was created pursuant to the 

CARD Act. It contains most credit card agreements available to consumers as of quarter’s 

end for each quarter from the third quarter of 2011 to the fourth quarter of 2014, and from 

the first quarter of 2016 to present. 30After the fourth quarter of 2014, the Bureau 

temporarily suspended collection of agreements for one year to reduce burden while the 

Bureau developed a more streamlined and automated electronic submission system. 31

Submission and publication resumed in the first quarter of 2016.Agreements in the second 

quarter of 2019 are incomplete due to technical submission issues at the Bureau, and 

28 The Bureau notes that many players in the credit card industry are also entities with which the Bureau has one or 

more institutional relationships, such as a research partnership or membership on a Bureau-convened body.

29 As discussed in note 26 supra, the Y-14 data cover a large but not representative portion of the credit card market. 

The Y-14+ data cover a larger and more representative portion of the credit card market, but the remaining 

uncovered portion is still substantial, and the Y-14+ data should similarly not be considered representative of that 

uncovered portion.

30 Credit card issuers are not required to submit any credit card agreements to the Bureau if the card issuer has fewer 

than 10,000 open credit card accounts as of the last business day of the calendar quarter. 12 CFR 1026.58(c)(5).

31 80 FR 21153 (Apr. 17, 2015); 12 CFR 1026.58(g).
18 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

agreements in 2020 and 2021 may include omissions due to the Bureau’s previous COVID19 regulatory flexibility statement.32

5. Responses to the RFI, which sought comment on all aspects of the review described in 

Section 1.2 above. 33The RFI generated 11 comments. 34 That total includes six letters from 

trade associations representing credit card issuers and other market participants, two letters 

from individual issuers, one letter from an industry-side market participant, one letter from 

a consumer advocacy group, and one letter froma consumer.

6. Credit card complaints that consumers have submitted to the Bureau’s Office of Consumer 

Response. 35

7. Commercially available data sources to which the Bureau subscribes that focus on the credit 

card industry, including mail volume monitoring reports, industry analyst reports, and data 

services and analytics from industry consultants.

8. Numerous public sources, including but not limited to Securities and Exchange Commission 

(SEC) filings, analyst reports, studies and data produced by other regulators, academic 

scholarship, and the trade press.

9. Other information gathered informally through Bureau market monitoring activities.

1.3.2 Credit scores

Throughout this report, the Bureau refers to consumer credit scores. Lenders use these scores to 

predict a consumer’s relative likelihood of default compared to other consumers.Credit scores 

32 Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Statement on Supervisory and Enforcement Practices Regarding Bureau 

Information Collections for Credit Card and Prepaid Account Issuers (Mar. 26, 2020), 

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_data-collection-statement_covid-19_2020-03.pdf.

33 82 FR 13313 (Mar. 10, 2017).

34 As noted in note 22 supra, the RFI also solicited comment on the Bureau’s review of the CARD Act consistent with 

the RFA, which is out of the scope of this report. The count of comments above includes all responses to the RFI, 

including those that addressed that RFA review, as well as certain other comments which were removed due to 

privacy concerns.

35 Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Consumer Complaint Database, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/dataresearch/consumer-complaints/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2021).
19 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

provided by major national consumer reporting agencies are used by most credit card issuers to 

determine consumers’ eligibility for credit and to set pricing for credit lines. 36 Data relied upon 

in this report include widely-used, commercially-available credit scores.

There are two important limitations to the way the Bureau uses credit scores in this report.

Different credit score models, while fundamentally similar, may include or exclude different 

data points or weight them differently. First, this means that data are aggregated on the basis of 

credit score even though not all consumer credit scores are computed using identical 

methodologies. Second, it means that, when reporting certain measures over longer time 

horizons, the introduction of new models and changes in the prevalence of various models 

complicates comparisons between different points in time. In some cases, one or both of those 

two issues could affect which “credit score tier” applies to a certain account or consumer. 

(“Credit score tiers” are defined further below). The Bureau believes that different credit scoring 

methodologies, over the time periods and set of market participants examined in this report, are 

sufficiently consistent that it remains informative and useful to report aggregated results and 

changes over time by credit score. The Bureau nevertheless proceeds with caution when 

assigning precision, beyond a reasonable degree, to certain results.

When reporting results by credit score in this report, scores are grouped into five tiers. This fivetier grouping aligns with the groupings used in the Bureau’s 2017 and 2019 Reports on the credit 

card market and the Bureau’s Consumer Credit Trends reporting, as well as other Bureau 

research and reports. Table 1 shows the distribution of adults, scored adults, and scored 

cardholders in each credit score tier.

TABLE 1: CREDIT SCORE RANGE SHARES AS OF Q4 2019 (CCP)

Credit score tiers U.S. adult 

population

U.S. scored

population

U.S. scored credit 

cardholding 

population

Superprime 

(scores of 720 or 

greater)

41% 54% 64%

Prime 

(scores from 660 to 719) 12% 16% 16%

36 Section 7.1.1 discusses the increased reliance of some credit card lenders on data and/or scores other than those 

provided by the major national credit bureaus.
20 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Near-prime 

(scores from 620 to 659) 6% 8% 8%

Subprime 

(scores from 580 to 619) 5% 7% 6%

Deep subprime 

(scores of 579 or less) 12% 16% 7%

Thin or stale score file 12% -% -%

Credit invisible37 11% -% -%

Credit scores in the CCP and Y-14 are refreshed regularly. Unless noted otherwise, accounts and 

consumers are classified into score tiers based on their credit score at that time. As a result, 

when analyzing trends over time within a particular credit score tier, the set of accounts or 

consumers in a tier changes over time. This fact is especially important to note given that many 

consumers experience changes in their credit score that are large enough to move them from 

one credit tier to another. 38

An additional note of caution in interpreting credit scores is warranted due to COVID-19. In past 

reports, the Bureau has noted a general trend of increase in consumer credit scores. 39 However, 

research suggests that the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act’s (CARES Act) 

forbearance provisions, in combination with income support programs and reduced 

consumption during the pandemic, accelerated a decline in the share of borrowers with 

subprime credit scores. 40This pronounced improvement in credit scores complicates analyses of 

credit measuresusing the above classificationsduring 2020.

37 This estimate of the percentage of the U.S. adult population who are credit invisible is based on data from 2010. See

Kenneth P. Brevoort, Philipp Grimm, & Michelle Kambara, Data Point: Credit Invisibles, Bureau of Consumer Fin. 

Prot., at 6 (May 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201505_cfpb_data-point-credit-invisibles.pdf.

38 See 2015 Report, supra note 6, at 53-55.

39 See 2019 report, supra note 6, at 22.

40 See Sarena Goodman, Geng Li, Alvaro Mezza, & Lucas Nathe, Developments in the Credit Score Distribution over 

2020, Bd. of Governors. of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. (Apr. 2021), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/fedsnotes/developments-in-the-credit-score-distribution-over-2020-20210430.htm.
21 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

1.3.3 Other definitions

This subsection defines certain additional terms used frequently throughout this report. This is 

not exhaustive of all remaining defined terms in this report; for example, other defined terms 

more particular to certain sections or subsections of this report are introduced in those sections 

or subsections.

Throughout most of this report, the term “general purpose credit card” refers to credit cards that 

can transact over a network accepted by a wide variety of merchants, including the Visa, 

Mastercard, American Express, and Discover networks. The term “private label” refers to cards 

that can only be used at one merchant or a small group of related merchants. 41 In some 

instances, mainly in certain parts of Sections 4 and 5, the term “retail” refers to a combined 

category of private label cards and some network-branded cards that are managed by a business 

unit that specializes in retail credit cards. 42

There are many ways to take a snapshot of consumer credit card indebtedness. The Bureau 

relies on two of the most prevalent, using nominal figures unless otherwise indicated. The first 

one entails measuring the current amount owed by consumers on a specific date, regardless of 

where in any individual consumer’s billing cycle that date falls. Debt calculated in this manner is 

referred to as “outstandings.” For example, if one were to report the total amount owed by 

consumers on credit cards as of December 31, 2020, it would be referred to as outstandings.

The second method entails measuring the amount owed by consumers at the end of their billing 

cycles, regardless of whether those cycles fall on a certain date. The Bureau refers to debt 

calculated in this manner as “balances,” and in most cases as “cycle-ending balances.” For 

example, if one were to report the total amount owed by consumers at the end of their billing 

41 Private label cards generally transact over a private network maintained by the issuer to which the merchant is 

granted access. Some cards can transact over both a private label network and a general purpose network. For 

example, a consumer may be issued a card that features a merchant’s brand as well as a general purpose network 

brand. When used at the merchant, the transaction may be routed over the issuer’s private network, but at other 

merchants the transaction is routed over the general purpose network. For the purposes of this report, those cards 

are considered to be general purpose credit cards except where explicitly noted otherwise.

42 Retail cards do not include network-branded cards that carry hotel or airline branding, even if those cards are 

managed by a business unit that specializes in retail credit cards.
22 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

cycles that concluded in December 2020, it would be referred to as cycle-ending balances and, 

for some accounts, would calculate balances as of, e.g., the 10th of the month.

This report also uses the term “debt” to refer to both of these amounts interchangeably. Note 

also that consumer debt on credit cards (whether calculated as month-end outstandings or 

cycle-end balances) includes both “revolving” debt—the amount owed on accounts for which the 

balance was not paid in full by the immediately prior statement due date—and “transacting” 

debt—charges incurred on accounts for which the balance was paid in full by the immediately 

prior statement due date.While transacting accounts represent a large share of all credit card 

purchase volume, revolving accounts generally represent a large share of all credit card debt at 

any given point in time. More detail on revolving and transacting patterns is provided in the 

subsequent sections of this report.

Throughout this report, the Bureau refers to “COVID-19.” While a full recounting of the onset of 

COVID-19 is beyond the scope of this report, it is important to reiterate here both the speed and 

the breadth with which the pandemic took hold. Within a period spanning just a few weeks, 

from mid-March to early-April of 2020, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 to 

be a pandemic;43 the United States declared a nationwide emergency;44 and most U.S. states and 

territories promulgated mandatory stay-at-home orders.45As described elsewhere in this report, 

this period was characterized by sharp declines of movements of persons and activities entailing 

person-to-person interaction across the United States, with sharp attendant economic 

consequences too broad and varied to recount in full here. In summary, however, the total 

number of employed persons in the country dropped from approximately 150 million to 130 

million from February to April 2020,46 and the total annualized rate of wage and salary 

43 See World Health Organization, WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 

(Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarksat-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020. 

44 See 85 FR 15337 (Mar. 18, 2020). 

45 See Moreland, Amanda, et. al., Timing of State and Territorial COVID-19 Stay-at-home orders and changes in 

population movement, CDC (Sep. 4, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6935a2.htm.

46 Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis, Total Nonfarm Payroll, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYNSA(last visited Aug. 

18, 2021).
23 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

disbursements to all employees dropped from $9.7 trillion to $8.7 trillion,47 accompanied by an 

even starker decline in the annualized rate of personal consumption expenditures, from $14.9 

trillion to $12.1 trillion.48

Except where otherwise and explicitly noted, all such references to “COVID-19” are used as 

shorthand for the period of economic crisis and broad social disruption beginning in 2020 

associated with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, not the illness caused by the SARS-CoV-2 

coronavirus. For example, the sentence “COVID-19 led to credit card issuers expanding their 

relief programs,” signifies that issuers expanded their relief programs in response to the 

economic crisis precipitated by the pandemic, not because of the direct impact of the illness on 

issuers. In contrast, the sentence “Fears of contracting the COVID-19 disease appear to have led 

to increased use of contactless payments by consumers,” does, in fact, refer directly to the 

impact of the pandemic on consumers.

Throughout this report, the Bureau refers to the “Great Recession,” which officially began in the 

final quarter of 2007 and ended in the second quarter of 2009. 49 The Bureaualso refers to the 

“COVID-19 recession,” which officially began in February 2020 and concluded in April 2020. 50

Those references are generally used for convenience and should not be interpreted as a 

statement as to precisely when the recession beganor concluded. Discussions of these time 

periodsmay also include broader commentary on economic conditions following the official

trough in gross domestic product.

47 Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis, Compensation of Employees, Received: Wage and Salary Disbursements,

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A576RC1 (last visited Aug. 18, 2021).

48 Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis, Personal Consumption Expenditures, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCE (last 

visited Aug. 18, 2021). 

49 Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Business Cycle Dating Committee Announcement September 20, 2010 (Sep. 20, 

2010), https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-september-20-2010.

50 Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Business Cycle Dating Committee Announcement July 19, 2021 (July 19, 2021), 

https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021.
24 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

1.3.4 Limitations

The limitations inherent to the Bureau’s methodology in this report are substantially similar to 

those inherent in the Bureau’s previous reports on the credit card market. 51Those limitations 

are restated here briefly.

First, while the Bureau would ideally like data and evidence that allows it to definitively identify 

the causes of certain outcomes, the data available generally do not allow it to do so. The Bureau 

cautions against interpreting factual observations in the study as definitively proving or 

disproving particular causal relationships.Correlations presented throughout this report do not 

necessarily indicate causation.

Second, each of the data sources the Bureau analyzes have particular limitations. Some sources 

are not a comprehensive view of the market; some are limited to the account level or the 

aggregate level; and some are purely qualitative. Not all data sources use consistent definitions 

or delineations or cover the same periods, products, or phenomena. To the extent possible, the 

Bureau mitigates these limitations.Every attempt is made to harmonize definitions and to 

identify those places where the Bureau is unable to do so.

51 See, in particular, the 2015 Report, supra note 6, at page 27.
25 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

2. Use of credit

To provide a foundation for analyses in subsequent sections, this section reviews market 

measures that cover several aspects of the consumer credit card market. 

First, this section describes the prevalence of credit cards and the size of the market. By some 

measures, such as total credit card debt outstanding, the market has generally contractedover 

the course of the pandemic as consumers paid down balances, in part due to federal stimulus 

measures. 52By other indicators, such as the total number of open general purpose card 

accounts, the market has never been so expansive.

Second, this section looks at spending and repayment behavior. Some of these data point to 

potentially significant differences between the credit card debt held by consumers prior to the 

pandemic and the debt they hold today.

Last, this section reports on delinquency and charge-off rates. These remain below historic 

norms even as widely relied-upon macroeconomic indicators—like the unemployment rate—

have spikedand remain elevated relative to pre-pandemic periods.

2.1 Product prevalence

The Bureau estimates that 181 million of the 258 million adults in the United States (70 percent)

had a credit card account in their name as of the end of 2020. 53Around 90 million consumers 

52 See Matthew Dalton & AnnaMaria Andriotis, Consumers, Flush With Stimulus Money, Shun Credit-Card Debt, 

Wall St. J. (Aug. 2, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/consumers-flush-with-stimulus-money-shun-credit-carddebt-11596373201.

53 This estimate is according to coverage of credit records present in the CCP sample, though this does not include 

authorized users, who are individuals designated by the primary account holder to use the same credit account. A 

recent report from the Federal Reserve finds 83 percent of consumers report having at least one credit card. See Bd. 

of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2020, at 42 (May 2021), 
26 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

hold at least one general purpose and at least one private label card. Some 79 million hold only 

general purpose cards. Just under 9 million hold only private label cards.

General purpose cards remain prevalent, while private label cardholding has become relatively 

less common. By year-end 2020, there were 485 million open general purpose card accounts 

and 214 million openprivate label accounts. For general purpose card accounts, that represents 

the high-water mark for open accounts since at least 2005, while the number of open private 

label accounts has remained nearly unchanged since 2013. General purpose cardholding is just 

as common today as it was prior to the Great Recession, though that share is down from 63 

percent on the eve of the pandemic. In contrast, 36 percent of adults held at least one private 

label card in 2020, compared to 52 percent in 2005. Consumers in all credit score tiershave 

seen declines in private label card account holding. Most general purpose and private label cards

are held by consumers with superprime scores, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: CREDIT CARD ACCOUNTS, YEAR-END 2020 (CCP)

https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2020-report-economic-well-being-us-households-202105.pdf. A 

recent report from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta stated that 78 percent of consumers reported holding a 

credit card, seeKevin Foster, Claire Greene, & Joanna Stavins, The 2020 Survey of Consumer Payment Choice: 

Summary Results (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 21-1, 2021), https://www.atlantafed.org/-

/media/ documents/banking/consumer-payments/survey-of-consumer-payment-choice/2020/2020-survey-ofconsumer-payment-choice.pdf. For estimates of the adult population in the United States, see Stella Ogunwole et. 

al, Population Under Age 18 Declined Last Decade, Census Bureau (Aug. 12, 2021), 

https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/08/united-states-adult-population-grew-faster-than-nations-totalpopulation-from-2010-to-2020.html. 

0 100M 200M 300M 400M 500M

Private label

General purpose

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime Deep subprime No score
27 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

The share of consumerswith below-prime scoresholding at least one open credit card account

fell in 2020 following several years of moderate growth. Cardholding dropped significantly 

across these credit score tiers during and shortly after the Great Recession. This metric has 

grown in recent years in the lower credit tiers but fell in 2020 and has yet to return to preCOVID-19 recession levels for cardholders in any below-prime credit tier.As of year-end 2020, 

fewer than half of consumers with deep subprime scoresheld a credit card, while near-prime 

and subprime cardholding remains significantly more common than deep subprime 

cardholding, at 91 percent and 78 percent respectively.

Figure 2: SHARE OF CONSUMERS WITH NON-PRIME SCORES WITH AT LEAST ONE CREDIT CARD 

(CCP)

Cardholders carry fewer cards as of year-end 2020 than they did in 2018. The average 

cardholder carried3.8 cards in 2020, compared to 4 in 2018. This decrease may reflect reduced 

demand for new cards during the pandemic, but it may also reflect an increase in card closures 

as issuers endeavored to reduce their exposure to potential losses during uncertain economic 

times.

2.2 Debt levels

Consumer credit card debt had been increasing every year since 2011, before reversing course

suddenly following the onset of the pandemic. Credit card debt peaked in 2019 at $926 billion, 

but by the second quarter of 2020 consumers had reduced card balances to $811 billion, the 

largest six-month reduction in U.S. history.By the end of 2020, debt had crept back up to $825

billion.Adjusted for inflation, current debt stands at 2016 levels, as shown in Figure 3.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

Near-prime Subprime Deep subprime
28 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 3: AVERAGE CREDIT CARD BALANCES, NOMINAL AND INFLATION-ADJUSTED (CCP, BLS) 54

Generalpurpose credit card debt declined sharply in 2020, reversing a long-term trend of 

balance growth.In its last report the Bureau noted that balances had more-or-less steadily 

increased since the end of 2010 to nominal pre-Great recession levels.By the fourth quarter of 

2020, however, general purpose credit card debt stood at $745 billion, well belowthe $793

billion mark reached in the fourthquarter of 2018. The decrease in balances is significant for 

cardholders in all score tiers – deep subprime cardholders reduced their balances by 24 percent 

in the second quarter of 2020 alone. This result has likely been caused by a temporary reduction 

in spending during the first few months of the pandemic, coupled with the impact of federal 

relief programs such as Economic Impact Payments and payment suspensions on other 

products such as federally heldstudent loans.

Private label credit card debt had also been growing rapidly in recent years, before declining in 

2020. After rising to $91 billion in the fourth quarter of 2018, private label debt fell to $82

billion in the fourth quarter of 2020, adecline of 10 percent. Similar to general purpose cards, 

private label balance declines were most significant for cardholders withdeep subprime scores, 

who reduced balances by 36 percent in 2020, the largest year-over-year decline since at least 

2005.

54 This chart displays average cycle-ending balances calculated across each full year, which decreases the effect of 

seasonality. See Bur. Of Labor Stat., Series CUUR0000SA0, https://www.bls.gov/ (last accessed June 14, 2021).

$500B

$600B

$700B

$800B

$900B

$1,000B

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

CCP credit card balances (real) CCP credit card balances (nominal)
29 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

GENERAL PURPOSE

Indebted general purpose cardholders in every credit score tier reduced their average balances 

significantly in 2020, but cardholders with prime scores remain the most indebted. For 

consumers who held at least one such card with a balance, average general purpose credit card 

balances were roughly $5,700 as of the end of 2018. At the end of 2019, that figure had risen to 

$5,800, before declining to roughly $5,000 by the end of 2020. Average balances declined for 

cardholders in all credit score tiersby 13 to 20 percent year-over-year in 2020, as shown in 

Figure 4. However, cardholders with prime credit scores continue to show significantly higher 

credit card balances on average than cardholders in any other credit score tier, at more than

$8,000 per indebtedgeneral purpose cardholder as of the end of 2020.

Figure 4: AVERAGE PER-CARDHOLDER CREDIT CARD BALANCES, GENERAL PURPOSE (CCP)

Many events and consumer behavioraltrends may have contributed to the declines in general 

purpose card debt in 2020. As discussed in the next section, the beginning of the pandemic saw

declines in spending, which may have enabled some cardholders to use those funds to pay down 

debt. Unprecedented levels of direct government assistance, such as Economic Impact

Payments, enhanced unemployment benefits, and payment and interest suspensions on 

federally-held student loans may have provided some consumers with additional disposable 

income usable to reduce balances. 55Reductions in payments on other credit products, such as 

mortgages following a refinance to lower rates, may also have been a factor. However, some 

55 See, e.g., Stefan Lembo Stolba, Credit Card Debt in 2020: Balances Drop for the First Time in Eight Years, 

Experian (Nov. 2020), https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/state-of-credit-cards/.

$0

$2,500

$5,000

$7,500

$10,000

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

Superprime Prime Near-prime

Subprime Deep subprime Overall
30 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

evidence also suggests that, rather than reduce debt, some consumers may have simply shifted 

purchasing behavior away from credit cards to debit cards or other forms of credit, such as buynow pay-later or personal loan products. The debt paydown was also likely unevenly distributed, 

with those individuals that lost their jobs reporting a greater likelihood to have increased 

balances in the prior twelve months. 56 Similarly, cardholders did not equally benefit from 

CARES Act provisions. 57

PRIVATE LABEL

In contrast to general purpose card trends, average per-cardholder balances for private label 

cardholders rose during the first and second quarters of 2020, before declining somewhat by the 

end of the year. Average private label balances for all credit tiers reached new peak nominal 

levels in late 2019 and 2020. Average per-cardholder private label balances rose to its highest 

level of more than $1,600 in mid-2020 before falling to less than $1,500 by the end of the year.

While private label balances are lower on average then general purpose cards, cardholderswith 

prime scores remain the biggest carriers of private label debt. Average private label balances for 

cardholders with prime scorespeaked at $2,300 in mid-2020 before declining to roughly 

$2,200 by year-end 2020.

56 See Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2020, at 42 

(May 2021), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2020-report-economic-well-being-us-households202105.pdf. Bureau research finds some evidence that support this finding. See Sandler & Ricks, supra note 24, at 

24-25.

57 See AnnaMaria Andriotis & Orla McCaffrey, Pausing Loan Payments During Coronavirus Is Producing Uneven 

Results, Wall St. J. (Nov. 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pausing-loan-payments-during-coronavirus-isproducing-uneven-results-11606559401.
31 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 5: AVERAGE PER-CARDHOLDER CREDIT CARD BALANCES, PRIVATE LABEL (CCP)

2.3 Purchase volume

Purchase volume on general purpose cards grew steadily for several years before declining 

rapidly in the early part of the pandemic, but volumes returnedto previous levels by the end of 

2020. For all of 2019 and early 2020, general purpose card purchase volumes for card issuers in 

the Bureau’s sample typically exceeded $500 billion each quarter. Yet, general purchase

volumes fell 21 percent in the second quarter of 2020. 58 In contrast, private label card spending 

is much lower at roughly $40 billion per quarter and has remained relatively flat since at least 

2015. Some of the declines in general purpose purchase volumes can be attributed to reductions 

in spending on travel, restaurants, and entertainment, categories of activities that became much 

less common during the pandemic. 59

58 The Bureau’s 2019 Report relied on Nilson data, which considers a wider range of products and purchases than the 

Y-14+ data.

59 For more information on COVID-19, see Section 5.5.

$0

$500

$1,000

$1,500

$2,000

$2,500

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

Superprime Prime Near-prime

Subprime Deep subprime Overall
32 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 6: CREDIT CARD PURCHASE VOLUME (Y-14+)

Cardholders in all credit score tiers contributed to the decline in purchase volumes in the second 

quarter of 2020, but most tiers saw purchase volumes rebound to previous highs by the end of 

the year. Cardholders with superprime scores accounted for 83 percent of all general purpose 

card purchase volume in 2020, and in the last quarter of the year their spending was 67 percent 

higher than in the first quarter of 2015. Cardholders with prime scores made up 11 percent of 

spending in 2020 but saw spending decline in the second quarter of 2020 to only 6 percent 

higher than in the first quarter of 2015, and volumes have yet to return to where they were prior 

to the pandemic. While growth in spending since 2015 was greatest for cardholderswith deep 

subprime scores in percentage terms, these cardholders account for less than 1 percent of 

general purpose purchase volume.

Figure 7: CREDIT CARD PURCHASE VOLUME, GENERAL PURPOSE (Y-14+) (INDEXED TO Q1 2015 = 100)

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

$0B

$100B

$200B

$300B

$400B

$500B

$600B

General purpose Private label

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

75

100

125

150

175

200

Superprime Prime Near-prime

Subprime Deep subprime Overall
33 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

2.4 Repayment

2.4.1 Revolving rates

Accounts with balances can be identified as exhibiting one of two basic patterns in any given 

cycle. “Transacting” accounts pay off the previous cycle’s balance in full before the end of the 

next cycle. “Revolving” accounts pay some amount less than that. 60Although an account can 

move back and forth between transacting and revolving, many accounts reveal persistent 

payment behavior over time. 61The Bureau calculates the share of accounts revolving in a given 

cycle as the number of accounts that revolve divided by the total number of revolving and 

transacting accounts. The denominator excludes accounts thatfail to satisfy either conditionand 

are “neither transacting nor revolving.”

Over the past two years, a decreasing share of general purpose accounts revolveda balance from 

one month to the next. Figure 8 shows the decline in revolver activity from 2018 to 2020 was 

true for every credit tier except prime. For cardholders with lower scores, this trend is 

particularly noteworthy as the share of revolving subprime and deep-subprime general purpose

accounts fell 6 and 7 percentage points respectively from 2018 levels. The decrease in revolver

activity is a significant shift in payment behavior that predates but may have been accelerated by 

the pandemic.

60 The methodology for determining whether an account is revolving has changed from when the Bureau reported on 

this in 2017 or 2019. In this report, an account is considered “revolving” in a cycle if its beginning balance is larger 

than the sum of payments received in a cycle. If the sum of payments is equal to or exceeds a non-zero beginning 

balance, it is considered “transacting.” If an account does not satisfy either condition (for example if the beginning 

balance is zero) it is “neither transacting nor revolving.”The denominator excludes accounts in a transitioning 

status. Figures that use Y-14 and Y-14+ data are based only on accounts that are “open and active” in a given month 

or cycle

61 See 2015 Report, supra note 6, at 50-52 (citing Benjamin J. Keys & Jialan Wang, Minimum Payments and Debt 

Paydown in Consumer Credit Cards (U. of Chicago Harris Sch. of Pub. Pol’y, Working Paper 2016),

https://www.nber.org/papers/w22742.
34 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 8: SHARE OF ACCOUNTS REVOLVING, GENERAL PURPOSE (Y-14+)

In contrast to general purpose, Figure 9 shows thatthe overall share of private label accounts 

that revolve increased in 2019 and remained at an elevated level in 2020. Over three-fourths of 

private label accounts now pay less than the previous cycle’s balance each cycle. An increase in 

revolver activity by consumers with near-prime scores or higher drove the expansion in the total 

share of revolving accounts. There was no significant change in revolving rates for subprime and 

deep subprime accounts from 2018 levels. For all credit tiers, a greater share of private label 

accounts revolves a balance each month than general purpose accounts.

Figure 9: SHARE OF ACCOUNTS REVOLVING, PRIVATE LABEL (Y-14+)

While the Bureau can only quantify the share of accounts that revolve, recent data from the 

Survey of Consumer Payment Choice suggests that the share of consumerswho revolve is at its 

lowest point since 2015.At the time of the survey in October 2020, 51.3 percent of consumers

with a credit card reported carrying a balance at some point in the last 12 months, down one 

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime Deep subprime Overall

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime Deep subprime Overall

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
35 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

percentage point from 2019, while 40.7percent reported carrying a balance within the last 

month, down six percentage points from 2019. 62Federal Reserve Board data from the annual 

Survey of Household Economics and Decisionmaking (SHED) support this conclusion, with 48 

percent of survey cardholders in 2020 reporting that they never carried an unpaid balance 

during the preceding 12 months, a two percentage point increase from 2019 levels. 63

2.4.2 Payment rates

Payment rates provide an additional measure of consumer reliance on credit cards as a source of 

consumer credit.64The payment rate is the share of total cycle-beginning balances paid that 

cycle. 65

General purpose card payment rates continue to grow, driven by steadily increasing payments 

by cardholderswith superprime scores in 2019 and a marginal rise in payments by cardholders

with lower scores in 2020. About one-third of total general purpose cycle beginning balances are

now paid by cycle’s end, but repayment differs by credit score. Superprime accounts pay half of 

their total balances each cycle. In contrast, all other tiers pay less than one-sixth. Yet, payment 

rates for subprime and deep subprime accounts slightly increased in 2020. Higher payment 

amounts coupled with lower purchase volume contributed to a decline in debt starting in the 

second quarter of 2020.As purchase volumes began to rise in the latter half of the year, 

62 See supra note 53 and Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Atlanta, 2020 SCPC Tables (Jan. 2021), https://www.atlantafed.org/-

/media/documents/banking/consumer-payments/survey-of-consumer-paymentchoice/2020/tables_scpc2020.pdf. 

63 See Bd. Of Governors for the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2020, at 42 

(May 2021), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2020-report-economic-well-being-us-households202105.pdf. See also Bd. Of Governors for the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. 

Households in 2019, at 30 (May 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2019-report-economicwell-being-us-households-202005.pdf. 

64 Payment measures cannot be shown at the consumer level because the CCP does not contain payment data. The Y14 is used instead for these views.

65 Thus, a payment rate of 100 percent corresponds to all account balances being paid in full, and a payment rate of 

zero percent indicates that no one is paying any credit card bill even in part.
36 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

payment rates remained comparatively elevated, explaining the decline in average balances. 66

Economic Impact Payments and the deferral of other debt obligationsduring the pandemic

supported higher payment rates. Payment rates in 2020 were also affected by issuer relief 

programs like “skip-a-pay.” 67

Figure 10: PAYMENT RATE, GENERAL PURPOSE (Y-14+)

Private label payment rates rose for the first time in five years.While the overallincrease was 

small in magnitude, the trend reversal is significant, as it was driven by consumers with lower 

credit scores.As the share of subprime and deep subprime revolvers did not substantively 

change from2019 to 2020, it is likely these consumers paid down a portion of previously 

incurred retail card debt less than the total balance. Private label payment rates for consumers 

with superprime scores continue to be double that of all other tiers. One explanation for lower

private label payment rates may be the prevalence of deferred interest promotions, which 

incentivize consumers to pay less than the full balance prior to promotion expiration. 68

66 See Sections 2.2 and 2.3 for further data on average debt and purchase volumes.

67 See Section 5.5 for further information on short-term payment deferral programs.

68 See 2017 Report, supra note 6, at 58 (finding that deferred interest promotional balances outstanding for 

consumers with superprime scores were equivalent to over half of private label balances owed by those same 

consumers). For more information regarding deferred interest promotions, see Section 5.2.

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime Deep subprime Overall

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
37 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 11: PAYMENT RATE, PRIVATE LABEL (Y-14+)

The distribution of payment rates is bimodal. About two-fifths of accounts pay their balances in 

full. Over one-third pay less than 10 percent of their balances. In comparison, Figure 12 shows a 

much smaller percentage pay between 10 percent and 100 percent of their balances each month.

This is likely driven by persistent transacting and revolving activity over time. Payment amount 

is used by reporting agencies to calculate credit score, partially explaining the stark difference in 

payment behaviors among tiers. However, recent research by the Bureau suggests that only 

about half of the largest credit card issuers furnish actual payment data. 69

69 Logan Herman, Jonah Kaplan, & Austin Mueller, Quarterly Consumer Credit Trends: Payment Amount 

Furnishing & Consumer Reporting, Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot. (Nov. 12, 2020), 

https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-reports/quarterly-consumer-credit-trends-paymentamount-furnishing-consumer-reporting/.

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime Deep subprime Overall

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
38 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 12: DISTRIBUTION OF PAYMENT AMOUNTS ACROSS HIGH, LOW, AND INTERMEDIATE 

PAYMENTS, 2020 (Y-14)

2.4.3 Payment methods

More consumers than ever are paying their credit card bills online or via mobile app. 

Concurrently,the use of paper-based paymentshas declined. These trends are true overall and 

for each age group. Yet adoption of digital payments for older consumers accelerated in 2020 as 

technologicalliteracy increased during the pandemic. When using an issuer’s online portal or 

mobile app, consumers can generally authorize non-recurring “one-time” payments or recurring 

“automatic” payments. For all methods, consumers can choose any payment amount and date 

but often choose the minimum payment or full statement balance as prominently displayed 

payment options. 

The share of consumers enrolled in automatic payments continues to increase.In 2020, 20

percent of active accounts within the scope of the MMI survey were enrolled in automatic 

payments at year-end compared to 16 percent in 2018. 70Automatic payment eliminates late fee 

70 Some studies have reported markedly higher consumer-reported rates of automatic payment. See, e.g., Mercator 

Advisory Group, U.S. Consumers and Credit: Rising Usage, at 38 (Dec. 2018), 

https://www.mercatoradvisorygroup.com/Reports/Consumers-and-Credit--Rising-Usage/. It is possible that 

consumers who self-report overstate the extent of their use of automatic payment. Consumers may also be including 

pre-authorized one-time payments as automatic payments.

Less than 10% of

payment in full

At least 10% but less than

payment in full

Payments in full

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%
39 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

charges which has been reported in surveys as the main benefit of enrollment. 71However, it

could potentially lead to overdraft charges on checking accounts. The Bureau has not attempted 

to quantify this impact or to determine fee incidence rates associated with automatic payment.

Figure 13: SHARE OF ACTIVE ACCOUNTS THAT MADE A PAYMENT IN THE LAST CYCLE OF THE YEAR BY 

PAYMENT METHOD, GENERAL PURPOSE (MMI) 72

In 2019 and 2020, the use of automatic and non-automatic online payments continued to 

increase while payment of general purpose card statements by paper fell into single-digits.As 

shown in Figure 14, the age group with the highest share of accounts making an automatic 

payment (at 18 percent) are cardholders aged 25 to 64. Consumersunder age 25 are about as 

likely to use automatic payments as those 65 years and older—roughly 15percent for both 

groups. Despite increasing adoption of automatic payments for all demographics over the past 

two years, barriers to adoption remain. Surveys reportthat those who do not enroll in automatic 

payments express a desire to maintain manual controls, such as varying payment amount or 

checking statements first. 73

71 See Auriemma Consulting Group, Buy Now, Pay Later, Instant Issuance and Automatic Payments, The Payments 

Report, at 12 (Mar. 2021).

72 Values do not sum to 100 percent as certain forms of payment, such as telephone and payments from a third-party, 

are not included.

73 See Auriemma Consulting Group, supra note 71.

Automatic Non-Automatic online Paper

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

2017 2018 2019 2020
40 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 14: SHARE OF ACTIVE PAYMENT-MAKING ACCOUNTS THAT MADE AT LEAST ONE AUTOMATIC 

PAYMENT IN THE LAST CYCLE OF THE YEAR VIA ONLINE PORTAL OR MOBILE APP BY AGE, 

GENERAL PURPOSE (MMI)

There was little change in the use of non-automatic online payments in 2019, yet the total share 

of accounts utilizing this payment method jumped for consumers over 25 in 2020. Three-fifths 

of accounts in 2020 made at least one electronic payment via online portal or mobile app. 

Younger consumers are still significantly more likely to use one-time digital payments, but 

evidence suggests other age groups may be rapidly enrolling in digital servicing platforms.

Figure 15: SHARE OF ACTIVE PAYMENT-MAKING ACCOUNTS THAT MADE AT LEAST ONE “ONE-TIME” 

ELECTRONIC PAYMENT IN THE LAST CYCLE OF THE YEAR VIA ONLINE PORTAL OR MOBILE 

APP BY AGE, GENERAL PURPOSE (MMI)

Paper-based payments remain a prominent payment method for older Americans, but that 

appears to be changing. In 2017, 31 percent of consumers 65 and older that made a payment in 

the final month of the year used a paper check at least once that cycle. In 2020, that figure had 

fallen to 21 percent. Yet, the difference between age groups remains stark—only 1percent of 

Under 25 25 - 64 65+ Overall

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

2017 2018 2019 2020

Under 25 25 - 64 65+ Overall

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

2017 2018 2019 2020
41 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

consumers under 25 and 4 percent of consumers between the ages of 25 and 64 used a paper 

check to pay their credit card bill in the last payment cycle of 2020.Additionally, one academic 

researcher has found the use of active choice formats like digital, as opposed to paper, payments 

may increase the amount consumers pay, which could lead to lower debt levels. 74

Figure 16: SHARE OF ACTIVE PAYMENT-MAKING ACCOUNTS THAT MADE AT LEAST ONE PAPER 

PAYMENT IN THE LAST CYCLE OF THE YEAR BY AGE, GENERAL PURPOSE (MMI)

2.5 Delinquency

General purpose and private label card delinquency rates continued to increase throughout 

2019, maintaining their upward trend following the Great Recessionand reaching a peak at the 

end of the year. 75From the first quarter of 2020 onward, however, both general purpose and 

74 “Our findings that minimum required payment rates, statement balance payoff rates, and average payment 

amounts are higher in active choice formats typical of credit card account portals (versus traditional open choice 

formats on credit card paper billing statements) suggest that online repayment may impact debt levels. Downward 

shifts toward the minimum required amount increase long-term debt, while upward shifts toward the full balance 

decrease debt, so the relative propensity of each behavior will influence the degree to which aggregated debt levels 

increase or decrease over time.” See Salisbury Comment Letter, at 2-3.

75 When a consumer fails to make a required minimum payment by the due date, the credit card account becomes 

“delinquent.” Because credit scores are heavily influenced by delinquency and charge-offs, these measures are not

shown by credit score.

Under 25 25 - 64 65+ Overall

0%

10%

20%

30%

2017 2018 2019 2020
42 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

private label delinquency rates started to decline and continued to fall up until the final quarter 

of the year, erasing six years of increases. 

This trend most likely reflects the impact of government financial relief enacted to offset the 

financial hardship imposed by COVID-19 and the resulting recession. 76 Bureau researchutilizing

survey data also implies that the falling delinquency rate over the course of the pandemic 

reflects both private and public relief, including unemployment relief and loan forbearance 

programs. Additional Bureau research suggests the share of accounts actively receiving 

assistance increased through the first half of 2020. 77

Figure 17: SHARE OF ACCOUNTS 60 OR MORE DAYS DELINQUENT (CCP) 78

Convergence in account delinquency rates for general purpose and private label card continued 

throughout 2019 and 2020, with rates moving in near lockstep throughout 2020. One 

explanation for the convergence over the past decade may be that private label card issuers are 

76 For more information regarding issuer response to the COVID-19, see Section 5.5. See also Scott Fulford, Marie 

Rush, & Eric Wilson, Data Point: Changes in consumer financial status during the early months of the pandemic: 

Evidence from the second wave of the Making Ends Meet survey, Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot. (Apr. 2021), 

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_making-ends-meet-wave-2_report_2021-04.pdf.

77 See Sandler & Ricks, supra note 24, at 24-25.

78 Figures 17 and 18 use the delinquency definition “60 or more days delinquent,” meaning that the account is at least 

three minimum monthly payments behind on debt repayment. This is considered “severe” delinquency.

0%

0.5%

1.0%

1.5%

2.0%

2.5%

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

General purpose Private label
43 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

increasingly offering cards to consumers with lower credit scores. In addition, COVID-19 related 

financial relief and interventions may impact accounts uniformly across card type.

The share of balances 60 or more days delinquent also decreasedin 2020, although general 

purpose card balances exhibiteda sharper decline than that of private label. Private label 

balance delinquency rates fell from a peak of 2.4 percent at end of year 2019 to just under 3 

percent by third quarter 2020, undoing three years of upward trends. General purpose balance 

delinquency rates also peaked in 2019, although at a lower rate of 2.4 percent, and then fell to 

1.6 percent by third quarter 2020, a low not seen since 2016.

Even as account delinquency rates for general purpose and private label cards converged in the 

wake of the Great Recession, delinquency rates as shares of balances diverged, as shown in 

Figure 18. However, throughout 2020, the measured disparity between rates by card type fell 

from a maximum of 2 percentage points in 2019 to closer to one percentage point in 2020. This 

slight convergence may reflect uniform impacts of policy interventions and consumer behavior 

in response to the COVID-19 recession across card types, similarly to the increased convergence 

of the share of delinquency rates by accounts for both general purpose and private label cards.

Figure 18: SHARE OF BALANCES 60 OR MORE DAYS DELINQUENT (CCP)

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

General purpose Private label
44 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

2.6 Charge-off

Charged-off balances also declined through the COVID-19 recession, but less uniformly than 

delinquency rates. 79 Private label charge-offs reached a peak of around 15 percent at the end of 

2019 and fell throughout 2020 to around 5 percent. This observed pattern reflects the higher

volatility of private label charge-off rates in comparison to general purpose. General purpose 

charge-offs remained roughly consistent around 6 percent until mid-year 2020, then fell to 

around 3.5 percent. Private label charge-offs and general purpose charge-offs exhibit a 

convergence over the period similar to that of delinquency rates. 

Declines (or moderation, in the case of general purpose cards) in charged-off balances began 

before the pandemic and subsequent financial relief, but, over the course of 2020, charge-offs 

across both card types fell in lockstep. This decline likely reflects the economic impact of 

government and private interventions in response to COVID-19. Forward-looking statements 

made by several major issuers suggest issuers expect that charge-offs could return to prepandemic levels in the medium term, based on recent increases in delinquency rates. 80

79 Accounts that remain delinquent for 180 days must be “charged off,” meaning that the issuer can no longer 

consider the outstanding balance as an asset on its balance sheet. Delinquent accounts may have to be charged off 

prior to 180 days in certain circumstances as, for example, with a bankruptcy. See Off. of the Comptroller of the 

Currency, Policy Implementation – The Guidance Attached to this Bulletin Continues to Apply to Federal Savings 

Associations, OCC Bulletin 2000-20 (June 20, 2000), https://occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2000/bulletin2000-20.html.

80 Issuers note losses have remained low but may rise in the next year or two. “[W]e now expect our card net chargeoff rate to be around 250 basis points for the year. ... pre-COVID, we would have thought that our loss rate in card 

this year would have been 3.3%, 3.5%. So it just gives you a sense there that tailwind on credit is significant.” 

JPMorgan Chase & Co., Q1 2021 Results – Earnings Call Transcript, Seeking Alpha (Apr. 14, 2021), 

https://seekingalpha.com/article/4419102-jpmorgan-chase-and-co-jpm-ceo-jamie-dimon-on-q1-2021-resultsearnings-call-transcript; “With respect to credit, delinquencies are expect to increase from the current levels. So, we 

now believe the peak will occur later than we anticipated, likely in early 2022. While current delinquencies will 

result in lower net charge-offs in the second quarter, we expect net charge-offs to rise resulting from the increases in 

delinquencies as we move through 2021.” Synchrony Financial, Q1 2021 Results – Earnings Call Transcript, 

Seeking Alpha (Apr. 27. 2021), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4421546-synchrony-financial-2021-q1-resultsearnings-call-transcript; “The increase in card net charge-offs from the prior quarter was driven by accounts that 

had been in Skip-a-Pay and did not gear. ... Looking forward, we expect minimal impact to charge-offs from this 

population.” Discover Financial Services, Q1 2021 Results – Earnings Call Transcript, Seeking Alpha (Apr. 22. 

2021), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4420711-discover-financial-services-dfs-ceo-roger-hochschild-on-q1-

2021-results-earnings-call.
45 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 19: ANNUALIZED RATE OF GROSS OUTSTANDING BALANCES CHARGED OFF (CCP)

0%

3%

6%

9%

12%

15%

18%

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

General purpose Private label
46 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

3. Cost of credit

As its predecessors did, this report assesses overall costs to credit card consumers using the 

Bureau’s total cost of credit (TCC) measure. TCC captures the totality of payments by consumers 

to issuers as an annualized percentage of cycle-ending balances on their accounts.81 This section

also looks separately at the main components of TCC—interest charges and fees.82Cardholders 

revolving debt from one month to the next pay the majority of fees and interest. This analysis 

focuses primarily (but not exclusively) on costs to revolving cardholders.

3.1 Total cost of credit

TCC on accounts that carried a balance increased in 2019, but 2020 saw total cost returnto 

2018 levels. The general purpose card cost of creditincreased from 15.3 percent in 2015 to 18.5 

percent in 2019, but costs declined to 17.7 percent in 2020.As discussed in more detail below, 

both the prior-year cost increases and the 2020 decrease were driven by broader shifts in the 

interest rate environment; fee costs in every credit tier have been flat.Between August 2019 and 

March 2020, the prime rate decreased a total of 2 percentage points, which drove the decline in 

TCC, because most consumer credit cards have variable rates that are tied to changes in the 

prime rate. 83

81 Cost data are from the Y-14, augmented by summary data that the Bureau collected from a range of issuers not 

included in that source. Y-14 data do not permit consumer-level cost reporting. For more detail on Y-14 data, see 

Section 1.3.1. Although this report uses broader cost data than previous iterations did, the Bureau does not claim 

that these data are representative of the market not covered by the data. TCC does not include the cash value of any 

rewards that may have been earned by the cardholder.

82 The TCC metric was initially introduced in the 2013 Report and has since been used in the 2015 Report, 2017 

Report, and 2019 Report. See 2013 Report, supra note 6, at 19; 2015 Report, supra note 6, at 76; 2017 Report, 

supra note 6, at 72; 2019 Report, supra note 6, at 55.

83 For further discussion of variable rates, see Section 3.2.2.
47 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 1: TOTAL COST OF CREDIT, REVOLVING ACCOUNTS, GENERAL PURPOSE (Y-14+)

On the private label side, TCC on revolving accounts similarly rose in 2019 before receding in 

2020, both overall and for every credit tier except superprime. Despite some narrowing over the 

last few years, TCC remains consistently higher, both overall, and within every credit tier, on 

private label accounts, as compared to general purpose accounts.As with general purpose cards, 

fee costs on private label cards have also been roughly stable on net or declining between 2017

and 2020.In 2015, the overall gap in TCC was 8.2 percentage points between the two card types. 

By 2020, this had fallen to 4.6 percentage points.

Figure 2: TOTAL COST OF CREDIT, REVOLVING ACCOUNTS, PRIVATE LABEL (Y-14+)

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime Deep subprime Overall

0%

10%

20%

30%

2017 2018 2019 2020

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime and

deep subprime

Overall

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

2017 2018 2019 2020
48 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

3.2 Interest charged

Interest charges increased in 2019 before receding in 2020. Both non-promotional retail annual 

percentage rates (APR)s and effective interest rates (EIR) on consumer credit cards followed 

this pattern.84 In 2020 the average APR for general purpose and private label cards fell to 19.2

percent and 25.7 percent, respectively. As with TCC, the fall in interest charges is in part the 

result of changes in prevailing market interest rates. 85

Figure 3: AVERAGE APR, GENERAL PURPOSE (Y-14+)

84 For closed-end loan products, the APR captures certain fees as well as the interest rate. 15 U.S.C. § 1606(a)(1) 

(2012); 12 CFR 1026.22(b). However, for open-end credit, including credit cards, the APR is calculated using the 

periodic rate. 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (a)(4), (b)(5) (2012); 12 CFR 1026.2(a)(21), 1026.14.

85 “Data from form FR 2835a indicate that the average credit card interest rate across all accounts decreased to 14.5 

percent during 2020 before inching up to 14.7 percent in the fourth quarter of 2020. At the same time, the two-year 

Treasury rate—a measure of the baseline, or “risk free,” rate—fell to less than 0.2 percent.” Bd. Of Governors for the 

Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Report to the Congress on the Profitability of Credit Card Operations of Depository Institutions -

July 2021 (July 2021), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/ccprofit2021.pdf.

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime Deep subprime Overall

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

2017 2018 2019 2020
49 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 4: AVERAGE APR, PRIVATE LABEL (Y-14+)

3.2.1 Effective interest rates

While APR is a useful barometer of issuer pricing strategies, “effective interest rate” may provide 

a better measure of the cost of interest to cardholders because EIR incorporates the effect of 

short-term promotions and cash advances. An EIR is computed by annualizing the total of all 

interest charges consumers paid divided by those consumers’ cycle-ending balances. 86 Figure 3

shows that EIRs for general purpose cards with revolving balances increased roughly 70 basis 

points from 15.6 percent in 2018 to 16.3 percent in 2019, before falling 60 basis points to 15.7

percentin 2020. Eachcredit tier experienced similar movements over that period.

86 EIRs differ from nominal rates for two reasons. First, consumers may have various balances on a single account 

(such as cash advances and balance transfers), not all of which are subject to the APR typically applied to purchases 

on that account. Second, consumers may have different patterns of payment and spending within a cycle. Due to the 

average daily balance method that most credit card issuers use to calculate interest charges, this means that two 

accounts subject to the same retail APR that conclude a cycle with identical balances may nevertheless properly be 

assessed different interest charges as a result of differences in the composition and fluctuation of those balances 

over the course of the cycle.

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime and

deep subprime

Overall

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

2017 2018 2019 2020
50 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 5: EFFECTIVE INTEREST RATE, REVOLVING ACCOUNTS, GENERAL PURPOSE (Y-14+)

The picture for private label is different, with EIRs across the period staying mostly flat from 

2015 to 2018 before declining slightly in 2020. As the next subsection shows, this contrast is 

partly because fewer private label cards are priced with a variable rate, so fewer private label 

cards benefitted from the index interest rate declines in 2020.

Figure 6: EFFECTIVE INTEREST RATE, REVOLVING ACCOUNTS, PRIVATE LABEL (Y-14+)

3.2.2 Upward repricing

Upward repricing declined to near-zero in 2019 and 2020, both because index interest rates 

have declined over this period and the CARD Act continues to restrict upward repricingoutside 

of certain limited exceptions.Bureau data suggests that most account repricing is driven by the 

variable rate exception, which permits card issuers to increase the APR when the rate varies 

according to a publicly-available index not under the issuer’s control and there is an increase in 

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime Deep subprime Overall

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

2017 2018 2019 2020

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime and

deep subprime

Overall

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

2017 2018 2019 2020
51 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

that index. 87As of the end of 2020, more than 90 percent of general purpose and less than half 

of private label balances in the Y-14 were carried on “variable rate” cards of this kind.

Unlike in prior years, declines in interest rates have reduced the APRs on many cards in the past 

two years, reducing the cost of credit card borrowing for many consumers. The Bureau estimates 

that the five rate decreases by the Federal Reserve from early-2019 through 2020 led to a 

cumulative roughly $18billion that credit card borrowers did not pay over that period. 88

A second notable exceptioncalled the “delinquency exception” permits issuers to increase rates

when a consumer does not pay at least the minimum periodic payment within 60 days after it is 

due. 89 Issuers are also required to provide consumers experiencing repricing due to delinquency 

a notice including a statement of the reason for the increase, and include notification that the 

increased rate will cease to apply if the issuer receives six consecutive required minimum 

periodic payments on or before the payment due date. 90 For consumers that meet the six timely 

minimum payments requirement, issuers are required to reduce that rate. 91 Issuers must also 

conduct a periodic review based on certain factors, and reduce the annual percentage rate 

applicable to the consumer’s account, as appropriate 92.

87 12 CFR 1026.55(b)(2). For more on CARD Act limits on repricing, see the 2013 Report, supra note 6, at pages 11, 

27-29. Issuers that use variable rate pricing mostly rely on The Wall Street Journal’s U.S. prime rate. A small 

percentage of the accounts, however, are linked to the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR). The status of LIBOR 

is in flux, which creates certainrisks for cards linked to LIBOR. See Appendix A at Figure 1 for a chart showing 

changes in the federal funds rate and the associated prime rate.

88 This calculation uses historical quarterly balances multiplied by the cumulative declines in rates from 2019 to 

2020, assuming no consumer response to the rate changes. If consumer borrowing patterns changed in response, 

the actual impact may be different

89 12 CFR 1026.55(b)(4).

90 Id.

91 Id. 

92 12 CFR 1026.59. Some issuers have failed to implement this provision and have since provided compensation to 

impacted cardholders. See Consent Order at 3-9, In re CITIBANK N.A., 2018-CFPB-0003 (Jun. 29, 2018), 

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/bcfp_citibank-na_consent-order_2018-06.pdf
52 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

3.3 Fees assessed

Collectively, fees comprise just under one-fifth of total consumer costs and for consumers who 

exclusively transact,fees are the primary source of direct cost. In 2020, cardholders were 

assessed $20.8 billion in fees, downfrom $23.6 billion in 2019, due in large part to significant 

increases in fee waivers during the pandemic. 93 Fees take a variety of forms including annual 

fees, transactional fees (e.g., for cash advances), and penalty fees (such as late fees or over-limit 

fees). The CARD Act imposed several substantive pricing controls on both the amounts of 

penalty fees consumers could be charged and the conditions under which such fees could be 

imposed.94

3.3.1 Total fees

Measured as a share of overall account balances, total fees on revolving accounts declined in 

2020 on both general purpose and private label accounts but remain higher for private label 

accounts. Relative to balances, fees incurred on private label accounts that revolve are higher 

than on general purpose accounts that do so.95 For private label accounts, fees were equivalent

to 5.2 percent of balances as of the end of 2020, down from 6.2 percent in 2019; ongeneral 

purpose, they were 2.0 percent of balances, down from 2.2 percent. 

Within certain credit tiers, however, the fee picture is changing. Figure 7 shows that general 

purpose accounts held by consumers with deep subprime credit scores saw fee-to-balance ratios 

fall the most in 2020, from 10.9 to 9.8 percent, continuing a trend observed since 2015 when the 

ratio was 12.1 percent.Even so, these tiers have fee ratios that are several multiples of those for 

93 Total fee amount is based on data collected from banks represented by the Y-14+ collection. See Section 1.3.1 for 

more information about the Bureau’s data sources.

94 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637(k), (n), 1665d (2012). CARD Act pricing restrictions have resulted in a substantial 

decline in overall fee costs to consumers since the pre-CARD Act period. See 2013 Report, supra note 6, at 34. 

CARD Act fee restrictions, of course, may have led to compensating changes in interest rates. For example, one 

commenter asserts that changes brought about by the CARD Act have resulted in higher interest rate margins “as 

issuers sought alternative ways to manage portfolio-wide risk.” SeeABA Comment Letter, at 2.

95 This is in part the product of lower average balances on private label accounts. (Section 2.2.1 contains data on 

average account balances for different card types, by credit tier.) The Bureau’s 2019 Report contains more 

information on this point. See 2019 Report, supra note 6, at 32-33.
53 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

accounts held by consumers with higher credit scores. Similarly,fee-to-balance ratios for private 

label accounts dropped in 2020 for all credit score tiers. Total balances decreased in 2020 as 

discussed in Section 2.2, but fees fell further as a result of, among other pandemic-era effects, 

fee waivers. 96

Figure 7: TOTAL FEES INCURRED IN THE YEAR AS A PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE CYCLE-ENDING 

BALANCES, REVOLVING ACCOUNTS, GENERAL PURPOSE (Y-14+)

3.3.2 Fee composition

Over the last few years, fee composition has changed relatively little. Figure 8 shows trends for 

general purpose cards over this period. The largest change is the increase in annual fees as a 

share of total fees. Annual fee trends are covered in more detail in the next subsection below. 

This increase comes largely at the expense of late fees and balance transfer fees, even as the 

number and volume of annual fees have increased. Figure 8 also shows that several other fees 

remain prevalent on general purpose cards, including fees for balance transfers and cash 

advances. 97

96 For more on fee waivers, see Section 5.5.

97 For more information on cash advance and balance transfer trends, see Sections 5.2 and 5.3.

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime Deep subprime Overall

0%

3%

6%

9%

12%

2017 2018 2019 2020
54 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 8: SHARE OF TOTAL FEES COSTS INCURRED BY TYPE OF FEE, GENERAL PURPOSE (Y-14+)

For private label cards, late fees make up the overwhelming majority of all fees assessed—89

percentin 2020. This represents a slight decrease over the last two years, from 91 percentin 

2018.

3.3.3 Late fees

In a reversal of consistent growth trends,total late fee volume decreasedin 2020. Late fee 

reductions can be attributedto a combination of factors related to the pandemic, such as 

economic impact payments, shifts in consumer behavior such as spending, saving, and 

repayment, and late fee reversals and waivers. 98 Issuers in the Y-14+ assessed nearly $14 billion 

in late fees in 2019, compared to less than $12 billion in 2020, as shown in Figure 9. The share 

of card accounts held by consumers in each credit tier declines steeply with scores, but late fee 

volumes are relatively similar across these tiers.Consumers with superprime scoreshold 59 

percent of card accounts but pay only 21 percent of late fee volumes; by contrast, consumers 

with deep subprime scores hold about 6 percent of card accounts but generate 24 percent of late 

fee volumes.

98 For more information on card issuer responses to COVID-19, see Section 5.5.

Late fee Annual fee Balance

transfer fee

Cash advance

fee

Debt

suspension fee

Other fee

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

2017 2018 2019 2020
55 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 9: LATE FEE VOLUME (Y-14+)

Issuers generally assess a late fee to consumers who do not make at least their minimum 

payment by the monthly due date. These and other “penalty” fees were targeted by specific 

CARD Act provisions, and the dollar amounts of such fees are now subject to CARD Act 

restrictions.99 In general, these fees have to be “reasonable and proportional.”100 There is a 

regulatory “safe harbor” for specific fee amounts, which the Bureau adjusts for inflation 

annually. 101 Initially, the safe harbor was set at $25 for an initial late fee and $35 for a second 

late fee within six billing cycles of a prior late fee. In 2021, the safe harbors are $29 and $40

respectively. 102

Since 2018, average late fees have continued to increase, from about $28to $31 in 2020. They 

nevertheless remain below their nominal pre-CARD Act level of $33 in 2008, and well below the 

99 15 U.S.C. § 1665d(a) (2012). 

100 Id.; 12 CFR 1026.52(b).

101 Regulation Z requires the Bureau to annually adjust the safe harbors to reflect changes in the Consumer Price 

Index. 12 CFR 1026.52(b)(1)(ii)(D). The Bureau has also introduced a tool to promote transparency in this 

calculation. Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Office of Compliance & Guidance, Calculating Adjustments to the Safe 

Harbor Limits on Credit Card Issuer Fees, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/compliance/complianceresources/consumer-cards-resources/truth-lending-annual-threshold-adjustments/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2021). The 

most recent safe harbor amounts went into effect in January 2021. 83 FR 43503 (Aug. 27, 2018).

102 12 CFR 1026.52(b)(1)(ii); Comment 52(b)(1)(ii)-2.i.

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

$0B

$1B

$2B

$3B

$4B
56 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

$40 inflation-adjusted figure in 2020 dollars. 103Since 2014, when the original penalty safe 

harbors first increased for inflation, most large issuers have taken advantage of the increased 

safe harbors by increasing their fee amounts. However, issuers appear to vary in the speed and 

consistency with which they implement increases across their products and portfolios. 

Additionally, issuers may as a courtesy offer to reverse late fee charges if the cardholder has a 

history of paying on time, particularly for cardholderswith superprime scores. In combination 

with the two-tier safe harbor (one amount for the first instance, and a different amount for 

subsequent instances within one of the next six billing cycles), these practices make it 

challenging to assess what drives changes in average late fee amounts overall.

Late fee incidence declined somewhat in 2020 likely due to federal pandemic relief and card 

issuer fee waivers, but late fees continue to represent the highest share of total fee costs 

incurred, especially for cardholders with lower credit scores or those who carry balances on 

private label cards. 104On average, consumers incur less than one late fee per year per general 

purpose account. This rate remained steady from 2015to 2019, before declining in 2020. 

Accounts held by consumers in lower credit score tiers incur more late fees than those in higher 

tiers. For example, accounts held by consumers with deep subprime credit scores average more 

than three late fees a year. Accounts held by consumers with superprime or prime scores 

average less than one. Late fee incidence rates are higher for private label accounts, both overall 

and within every credit tier. For example, private label accounts held by consumers with deep 

subprime scores averagedmore than four late fees per year in 2020.

103 See 2013 Report, supra note 6, at 23. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports the average CPI-U in 2008 was 215.3, 

compared to 258.8 in 2020. See supra note 54.

104 For more information regarding card issuer responses to COVID-19, see Section 5.5.
57 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 10: LATE FEE INCIDENCE, GENERAL PURPOSE (Y-14+)

3.3.4 Annual fees

Annual-fee volume has risen significantly over the last few years. For issuers in the data set, 

annual-fee revenue totaled roughly $600 million in the first quarter of 2015; annual-fee revenue 

topped$1.3 billionin every quarter of 2020. 105As discussed further below, this is a function of 

increases in the average annual fee for accounts charged a fee, but is also due to steady quarterly 

increases in the total number of accounts incurring an annual fee, even while the percentage of 

accounts with such feeshas decreased.

105 As used in this report, an “annual fee” refers to any participation or maintenance fee assessed to the consumer as a 

condition of holding the general purpose card account, regardless of any pattern of usage.

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime Deep subprime Overall

0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

2017 2018 2019 2020
58 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 11: ANNUAL-FEE VOLUME, GENERAL PURPOSE (Y-14+)

Average annual fees have been rising in all credit tiers, but the products received differ across 

credit score tiers.As shown in Figure 12, annual fees averaged roughly $94 per card with a fee in 

2020, and that number has been increasing steadily for all credit score tiers. In particular, 

annual-fee accounts held by consumers with superprime scores averagednearly $111 in annual 

fees in 2020, reflecting the increased prevalence in the past two years of richer rewards credit 

cards that carry higher annual fees. Revenue from cards held by consumers with prime scores is 

typically returned to cardholders to varying degrees in the form of rewards. 106 In contrast, 

cardholders in lower credit tiersmay pay annual fees to offset credit risk or higher operating 

costs relative to lower revolving balances. 107

106 For more on rewards, see Section 5.1.

107 See 2017 Report, supra note 6, at 91-92.

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

$0B

$0.25B

$0.50B

$0.75B

$1.00B

$1.25B

$1.50B
59 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 12: AVERAGE ANNUAL FEE, GENERAL PURPOSE ACCOUNTS CHARGED AN ANNUAL FEE (Y-14) 108

While average annual fees have been rising, annual feeshave steadily become less common for 

general purpose card accounts held by cardholders in every credit tier except superprime since 

2015. Roughly 22 percent of subprime and deep subprime card accounts had an annual fee in 

2020, compared to nearly 39 percent in 2015. Similarly, 19 percent of near-prime accounts 

carried an annual fee in 2020, compared to 27 percent in 2015. In part, the reduction in annualfee prevalence for cardholders with below-prime scores was driven by an increase in the share of 

no-annual-fee card originations to consumers in these score tiers. Since 2016, however, most of 

that increase was due to originations of no-annual-fee secured cards which, while they do not 

charge a fee, still require some money be held as a deposit.

108 Average annual fee is calculated as the total number of months in each year and credit tier that an account with an 

observed annual fee is open times the annual fee observed for those accounts divided by the total number of account 

months in each year and credit tier that those annual fee-paying accounts are open.

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime and

deep subprime

Overall

$0

$20

$40

$60

$80

$100

$120

2017 2018 2019 2020
60 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 13: ANNUAL-FEE PREVALENCE, GENERAL PURPOSE (Y-14)

3.3.5 Other fees

The quarterly volume of other fees issuers collect on credit cards has not changed significantly in 

recent years. This fee category includes fees for payments returned for insufficient funds (NSF 

fees) or exceeding the credit limit (over-limit fees); debt suspension fees; balance transfer fees; 

and cash advance fees, among others. The 2015 Report showed that these fees, considered 

collectively, have steadily declined in prevalence since 2008. 109 Over-limit fees that were 

common prior to the implementation of the CARD Act remained almost nonexistent in 2019 and 

2020. 110

109 See 2015 Report, supra note 6, at 71-72.

110 Section 3.3.5 of the 2017 Report notes that many issuers appear to have simply ceased assessing over-limit fees 

altogether, rather than maintain an opt-in regime. See 2017 Report, supra note 6, at 96-97.

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime and

deep subprime

Overall

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

2017 2018 2019 2020
4. Availability of credit

As in prior reports, this section examines measures relating to credit card availability. It 

explores two broad areas: first, new account origination; second, credit limits and line changes 

after origination. 111To do so, it tracks the credit card account life cycle. It starts with marketing 

and consumer applications across a range of channels. Next, it addresses issuer approvals as 

well as new account and line origination. Finally, this section ends with credit lines available to 

consumers and issuer line management of existing accounts. The interaction betweenreduced 

marketing efforts, fewer applications, and lower approval rates caused a dramatic decrease in 

originations in 2020. While credit line decreases (CLD) increased for consumers with belowprime credit scores, issuers did not substantially deviate fromprevious line management trends

during the pandemic.

4.1 New accounts

The analysis below examines patterns of credit card marketing and consumer credit shopping,

consumer applications, approval rates for new accounts, and the volume of new account and line 

origination. Where possible, the analysis reviews how these measures vary by credit score tier as 

well as by product and marketing channel.

111 Issuers assign a credit line limit to each new account that determines how much a consumer generally is permitted 

to borrow on the account, at least initially. In subsequent periods issuers may adjust the credit line, as discussed in 

more detail in Section 4.2.3.
62 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

4.1.1 Marketing and comparison shopping

Credit card issuers adjust their marketing and origination practices based onchanges in

consumer behavior, industry competition, and the economy. Issuers primarily solicit consumer 

demand for credit cards through broad-based advertising like television commercials, and 

through targeted marketing. For years, issuers have increased credit card marketing across 

digital platforms, and credit card advertising on social media is becoming more prominent, as 

consumers spend more time online. 112Yet in 2020, issuers reduced marketing across the board 

in accordance with the increased pandemic-related economic uncertainty. 113

While credit card issuers have generally sent less mail to consumers since the Great Recession, 

direct mail solicitations fell to new lows after the pandemic’s onset and persistedat this reduced

levelfor the remainder of 2020. On average, issuers sent 311million direct mail solicitations per 

month in 2019, up 12.2 percent from 2017 levelsbut still less than half of pre-2009 monthly 

volumes. However, in May 2020, this metric dropped to 121 million then further plummeted48 

percentin June. Mail volume related to acquisitions reacheda low of 61.6 million in July, 

declining more than 80 percent from its March 2020 level.As shown in Figure 1, direct mail 

solicitations had yet to recover by the end of 2020 and remained below 100 million. 114

112 For more information on digital servicing and adoption of new technologies, see section 7.2. See also Michael J. 

Wolf, How Covid-19 Has Transformed the Amount of Time We Spend Online, Wall St. J. (Aug. 7, 2020), 

https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-covid-19-has-transformed-the-amount-of-time-we-spend-online-01596818846.

113 Issuers note decreasing card acquisition efforts in Q2 2020. “The majority of the expense reduction was in brand 

marketing and card acquisition costs as we align marketing spend with the impacts of the economic environment 

and tightened credit criteria.” Discover Financial Services, Q2 2020 Results – Earnings Call Transcript, Seeking 

Alpha (July 23, 2020), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4360233-discover-financial-services-dfs-ceo-rogerhochschild-on-q2-2020-results-earnings-call; “[W]e dramatically reduced our proactive marketing efforts for new 

card acquisition and reinvested in value proposition enhancements, resulting in a 16% decline in marketing 

expenses in the second quarter.” American Express, Q2 2020 Results – Earnings Call Transcript, Seeking Alpha 

(July 24. 2020), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4360706-american-express-axp-ceo-steve-squeri-on-q2-2020-

results-earnings-call-transcript.

114 Data made available to the Bureau byMintel Comperemedia and Competiscan.
63 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 1: MONTHLY MAIL VOLUME (COMPETISCAN, MINTEL COMPEREMEDIA) 115

Once a consumer is actively looking for a new credit card, third-party comparison sites (TPC 

sites) offer information intended to make it easier for consumers to compare credit cards. 116

Some sites let consumers personalize the card offerings shown by using data provided by the 

consumer or third-party information authorized by the consumer. While that information helps 

personalize recommendations, some consumers may ultimately find their application does not 

get approved for a site-listed card for which they apply.

4.1.2 Applications

U.S. consumers submitted over 140 million credit card applications in 2020, a significant 

decline from the over 172 million applications submitted in 2019. 117To apply for a card, 

consumers submit an application through one of several channels, such as going online, using a 

mobile app, calling the issuer, or by walking into a bank branch or retail store to fill out a paper 

or digital application in-person. The issuer then decides whether to issue a credit card based on 

115 Data following October 2019 were supplied by Competiscan. Data prior to this date were supplied by Mintel 

Comperemedia.

116 For more on third-party comparison sites, see 2017 Report, supra note 6, at page 265.

117 Bureau research on credit applications found that, by the spring of 2021, credit card applications were back to prepandemic levels. See Nagypál, supra note 24, at 3.

0

200M

400M

600M

800M

1,000M

2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime Deep subprime No score
64 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

its internal underwriting process. 118 Issuers consider economic and market conditions when 

determining whether to loosen or tighten underwriting standards for approving individual card 

applicants.

Figure 2 shows that trends in application volume in 2019 differed by credit tier but that the 

pandemic led to a dramatic and generalizable decrease in demand for general purpose cards. 119

Compared to 2017 levels, application volume remained steady or increased for all tiers but nearprime in 2019, as application volume for consumers with no score and with subprime or deep 

subprime scores surpassed2016 highs. 120 Application growth halted for general purpose cards in 

2020, as the total volume for mass market issuers was 59 million, falling in every score tier and 

26 percent overall. Near-prime, subprime, and deep subprime credit score tiers saw the greatest 

percent change year-over-year. The previously discussed, industry-wide reduction in marketing 

expenditure could explain part of this decline. Additionally, decreasedhousehold spending and 

increasedgovernment support could reduce the need for credit and partially explainthe decline 

in applications during the pandemic. 121

118 In addition to an issuer’s internal processes, issuers are required to consider an applicant’s ability to pay the 

minimum monthly payment on an account prior to opening a credit card account under an open-end (not homesecured) consumer credit plan or increasing a credit line on such an account. 12 CFR 1026.51(a)(1)(i) (2019).

119 “MMI” data are provided by a set of larger issuers that make up the substantial majority of the credit card market. 

Even so, these issuers may not be representative of other issuers.

120 MMI data account for a smaller share of the overall market as they reach deeper into the credit spectrum. 

Accordingly, approval rate data in the two lowest score tiers has been combined. 

121 See Alison Felix & Samantha Shampine, Consumer Spending Declines, Shifts in Response to the Pandemic, Fed. 

Rsrv. Bank of Kansas City (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.kansascityfed.org/research/economic-bulletin/consumerspending-declines-shifts-in-response-to-the-pandemic/; Survey data suggest that demand for credit cards fell in 

2020 and there was no meaningful increase in unmet credit need. See also Jessica Lu & Wilbert van der Klaauw, 

Consumer Credit Demand, Supply, and Unmet Need during the Pandemic, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of New York (May 20, 

2021), https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2021/05/consumer-credit-demand-supply-and-unmetneed-during-the-pandemic.html. 
65 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 2: APPLICATION VOLUME FOR MASS MARKET ISSUERS, GENERAL PURPOSE (MMI)

The pandemic-related decline in retail application volume was smaller in magnitude than that of 

general purpose cards and driven by consumers with near-prime or higher credit scores. 122 In 

2020, consumers submitted over 81 million applications for retail cards to mass market issuers, 

down from 92 millionretail card applications the year prior. As shown in Figure 3, both 2019 

and 2020 application volume increased relative to 2018 levels for consumers with subprime and 

deep subprime credit scores and consumers with no score. Both overall and in every credit score 

tier, there were more applications for retail cards than general purpose cards in 2020, as has 

been historically true.

122 Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 divide the market into “general purpose” and “retail,” which is slightly different from the 

“general purpose” and “private label” categorization used elsewhere in the report. See Section 1.3 for more 

information on these differences.

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime and

deep subprime

No score

0M

5M

10M

15M

20M

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
66 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 3: APPLICATION VOLUME FOR MASS MARKET ISSUERS, RETAIL (MMI)

DIGITAL APPLICATIONS

Applications can be submitted via a number of channels, though importantly there is some 

overlap (for example, a consumer may apply for a card digitally using a mobile device). In 2020, 

88 percent of general purpose card applications were submitted digitally. In stark contrast, 55

percent of 2020 retail card applications were via digital channels. However, digital channel 

volume grew 34 percent year-over-year for retail applications, as this was the first year less than 

half of retail applications were submitted in person. This was largely affected by store closures 

during the pandemic as retail sales plunged. 123

One subset of digital channel that has become increasingly prominent is mobile devices, as the 

majority of applications for general purpose cards are now submitted via phone or tablet. The 

mobile channel accounted for 52 percent of new applications in 2020, up from 43 percent in 

2018. 124 As shown in Figure 4, the increasing percentage of applications from consumers with 

higher scores drove growth, as the share for consumers with bothprime and superprime credit

scores increased 7 percentage points in 2020. Despite this expansion, the share of superprime 

123 See Section 5.5 for more information on the impact of COVID-19. See also Alina Selyukh, Pandemic Hits Spending 

Hard; 79% Dive In Clothing Sales Leads A Record Plunge, Nat’l Pub. Radio (May 15, 2020), 

https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/05/15/856253115/retail-wipeout-sales-plunge-arecord-16-4-in-april. 

124 Figures 4 through 11 rely on MMI data. The Bureau’s MMI survey grouped mobile phones and tablets as “mobile 

devices.”

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime and

deep subprime

No score

0M

5M

10M

15M

20M

25M

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
67 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

applications via mobile device remains about half that of consumers with subprime or deep 

subprime scores. Meanwhile, the share of mobile applications for consumers with lower or no 

scores may be plateauing, as two-thirds of subprime and deep subprime applications are now 

submitted via mobile device. A decline in prescreened offers via mail and fewer applications 

submitted in persondue to bank branch closures could explain the growing share of mobile 

applications. 125Additionally, some new credit cards exclusively accepted applications through 

the mobile channel at their initial launches. 126

Figure 4: SHARE OF CREDIT CARD APPLICATIONS SUBMITTED VIA MOBILE DEVICES, GENERAL 

PURPOSE (MMI)

For retail cards, overall levels of mobile penetration remain lower than for general purpose 

cards, yet the trend toward mobile channels accelerated in 2020 after years of steady growth. 

Most retail applications by consumers with subprime and deep subprime scores now come from 

mobile devices. As shown in Figure 5, mobile penetration for applicants with higher scores 

remained at or below 40 percent. However, these tiers saw an increased share of applications 

125 See Orla McCaffrey, People Aren’t Visiting Branches. Banks Are Wondering How Many They Actually Need, Wall 

St. J. (June 7, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/people-arent-visiting-branches-banks-are-wondering-howmany-they-actually-need-11591531200. 

126 See Katie Deighton, Venmo’s New Credit Card Puts QR Codes Front and Center, Wall St. J. (Oct. 7, 2020), 

https://www.wsj.com/articles/venmos-new-credit-card-puts-qr-codes-front-and-center-11602064801; see also

Press Release, Apple, Apple Card launches today for all US customers (Aug. 20, 2019), 

https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2019/08/apple-card-launches-today-for-all-us-customers/. 

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

0%

20%

40%

60%

Superprime Prime

Near-prime Subprime and deep subprime

No score Overall
68 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

submitted via the mobile channel. The year-over-year growth from 2019 to 2020 may reflect the 

diminished impact of point-of-sale applications due to pandemic-related store closures and an 

increased adoption of mobile apps by retailers. 127

Figure 5: SHARE OF CREDIT CARD APPLICATIONS SUBMITTED VIA MOBILE DEVICES, RETAIL (MMI)

TPC SITE APPLICATIONS

For the first time in 2020, the share of general purpose applications via the TPC site channel 

decreased. 128 Figure 6 reflects that, previously, consumers with lower scores were more likely to 

apply via a TPC site than those with higher scores. Now, both overall and for each credit score 

tier, about one in five consumers apply via TPC sites. Typically, TPC sites assist consumers in

finding cards for which they are likely qualified when they seek credit. Additionally, some TPC 

sites advised consumers it might be more difficult to get approved for a credit card during the 

127 See Press Release, Synchrony, Synchrony Expands Arsenal of Digital Payment Technology Solutions for 

Partners; Provides Touchless Shopping Options for Customers (Sep. 29, 2020), 

https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/synchrony-expands-arsenal-of-digital-payment-technologysolutions-for-partners-provides-touchless-shopping-options-for-customers-301140043.html.

128 An additional number of consumers review TPC sites before applying directly with the issuer. Those applications 

are not reflected in the TPC data below.

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

Superprime Prime

Near-prime Subprime and deep subprime

No score Overall
69 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

pandemic. 129 Warnings by TPC sites of lower issuer approval rates could partially explain the 

decrease in applications by consumers with subprime or deep subprime scores beyond a general 

decline in credit demand. In tandem, the increasing share of consumers with superprime scores

applying via TPC site may be partially attributed to the decrease in direct card offers via mail 

typically aimed at this tier.

Figure 6: SHARE OF CREDIT CARD APPLICATIONS SUBMITTED VIA TPC SITES, GENERAL PURPOSE 

(MMI)

4.1.3 Approvals

Since 2015, approval rates on general purpose cards have declined.As shown in Figure 7, the 

pandemic accelerated this trend. The overall approval rate decreased from 41 percent in 2019 to 

36 percent in 2020. Consumers with prime and near-prime credit scores saw the greatest 

reduction in approval rates of 11 and 10 percentage points respectively as institutions tightened 

underwriting in response to the pandemic. The Federal Reserve Board’s quarterly Senior Loan 

Officer Survey foundthat in the third quarter of 2020, 71.7 percent of senior loan officers at 

129 See Kimberly Palmer, How to Increase Your Chances of Credit Card Approval, NerdWallet (July 30, 2020), 

https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/credit-cards/how-to-increase-your-chances-of-credit-card-approval; see also

Ethan Steinberg, Why banks are struggling to assess creditworthiness during the coronavirus pandemic, The 

Points Guy (July 7, 2020), https://thepointsguy.com/news/why-banks-are-struggling-to-assess-creditworthinessduring-the-coronavirus-pandemic/. 

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

0%

10%

20%

30%

Superprime Prime

Near-prime Subprime and deep subprime

No score Overall
70 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

domestic banks reported tightening standards on credit card loans—the highest share in the 

survey’s two-decade history. 130

Figure 7: APPROVAL RATE, GENERAL PURPOSE (MMI)

Retail card approval rates were stable in 2019 and then dropped overall and in every credit tier 

in 2020, similar to general purpose. Consumers with near-prime scores experienced the largest 

decline, dropping from 58 percent in 2019 to 48 percent in 2020. For consumers with 

superprime scores, the approval rate for retail card applications decreased by 2 percentage 

points. Approval rates for subprime and deep subprime tiers and consumers dropped year-overyear but were on par with 2018 levels. While issuers tightened underwriting overall, this 

suggests that consumers with prime and near-prime scores were most affectedby increased 

rejection rates as their applicationsmay have been approvedin prior years.

130 However, the deterioration in credit performance feared early in the pandemic did not materialize, and issuers 

reported a net loosening of standards in 2021. Bd. Of Governors for the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Senior Loan Officer Opinion 

Survey on Bank Lending Practices (May 20, 2021), https://www.federalreserve.gov/data/sloos/sloos-202104-

chart-data.htm.

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime and

deep subprime

No score Overall

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
71 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 8: APPROVAL RATE, RETAIL (MMI)

Approval rates vary substantially by application channel. Pre-screened solicitations and mail 

channels tend to have the highest approval rates. Rates for mobile and digital channels are 

typically lower but vary by credit tier. TPC site approval rates remain higher than mobile 

approval rates both overall and in every score tier for general purpose cards.

MOBILE APPROVALS

Slightly under one quarter of all consumers applying via mobile device are now approved for 

both general purpose and retail cards. However, approval trendsdiffer by card type and credit 

score tier.As shown in Figure 9, higher approval rates of near-prime and lower credit score tiers

drove an overallmarginal increase in generalpurpose approvals in 2019. Yet this trend reversed

in 2020 as all consumers except those with no score saw a substantial drop in approvals for 

applications submitted via mobile device.

Figure 9: APPROVAL RATE FOR APPLICATIONS SUBMITTED VIA MOBILE DEVICES, GENERAL PURPOSE

(MMI)

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime and

deep subprime

No score Overall

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime and

deep subprime

No score Overall

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
72 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

On the retail side, the overall rate has remained steady since 2015 but its composition by credit 

score tier has shifted. As shown in Figure 10, the share of superprime approvals increased in 

2020 as the approval rate for every other credit score declined. For consumers with near-prime 

scores and above, mobile approval rates remain higher for retail than for general purpose card 

applications.

Figure 10: APPROVAL RATE FOR APPLICATIONS SUBMITTED VIA MOBILE DEVICES, RETAIL (MMI)

TPC SITE APPROVALS

TPC sites directly facilitatedan all-time high of over 7 million approvals in 2019, but the number 

of mass market approvals via TPC site decreased49 percent in 2020. This decline can be almost 

entirely attributed to the 48 percent reduction in applications via the TPC site channel discussed 

above. The approval rate via TPC site channel approvals overall is 32 percent, which has been 

consistent for the past four years. Approval rates declined for every credit tier in 2020 yet 

consumers with lower scores still had a greater chance of approval via TPC site than overall.

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime and

deep subprime

No score Overall

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
73 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 11: SHARE OF CREDIT CARD APPROVALS FACILITATED BY TPC SITES, GENERAL PURPOSE 

(MMI)

4.1.4 Account origination

A significant drop in new applications by consumers and moderate declines in the percentage of 

approvals by issuers led to the origination of 21.5 percent fewer new credit cards in 2020 than 

the year prior.In 2020, consumers opened 84.8 million new credit card accounts: 53.7 million 

general purpose and 31.1million private label. 131

General purpose origination account volume overall reachedits lowest point since 2013, as 

account origination for all credit tiers dropped in 2020. As shown in Figure 12, originations for

consumers with superprime scoresdecreased 25 percent and fellto their Great Recession-era 

low. Yet, application volumes for consumers with subprime and deep subprime scores remained 

above 2017 levels. Roughly 24 million cards were issued to consumers with superprime credit 

scores, 13 million to prime, seven million to near-prime,five million to subprime, and five 

million to consumers with deep subprime scores.

131 The data source used in this subsection is the CCP, which offers a broader view of the market but does not allow the 

Bureau to identify all “retail” cards. As a result, this subsection uses “private label” as it does in other sections that 

reference the CCP. See Section 1.3 for more on the data sources used in this report.

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime and

deep subprime

No score Overall

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
74 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 12: ANNUAL NEW ACCOUNT VOLUME, GENERAL PURPOSE (CCP)

Private label origination trends differ as origination volume continued to decrease from 2016 

highs in every tier. Figure 13 shows that the overall decrease in 2020 was driven by a drop in 

superprime volume to twenty-first century lows. Originations to consumers with prime scores

fell to lows not seen since the Great Recessionwhile those with near-prime or lower scores 

remained closer to Great Recession highs.

Figure 13: ANNUAL NEW ACCOUNT VOLUME, PRIVATE LABEL (CCP)

The share of consumers opening cards declined in 2020, and for consumers with prime and 

superprime scores, that share is now belowGreat Recession lows. In 2020, 20 percent of 

consumers in the CCP openeda credit card, compared to roughly 25 percentin the three 

preceding years. For the superprime tier, its 20 percent share is the lowest it has been since at 

least 2006. The share was highest in 2020 for consumers with prime scores at 25 percent, but 

even that remains the tier’s lowest share in recent history. In contrast, a greater share of 

consumers with near-prime and subprime scores openedcards than did consumers with 

0

20M

40M

60M

80M

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime Deep subprime

0

10M

20M

30M

40M

50M

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime Deep subprime
75 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

superprime scores in 2020. Despite the credit tightening indicated in surveys, consumers with 

below-prime scores were more likely to open a new card in 2020 than they did prior to the 

CARD Act in 2009.

4.1.5 New account credit line

In 2019, the total credit line on new accounts was almost $500 billion, slightly surpassing 2016 

levelsbut still far below its pre-Great Recessionhighs; this value dropped over 30 percentin 

2020 to $331 billion. The decline in overall new line is a result of a complex interaction between 

consumer demand for credit during the pandemic and issuer willingness to supply it. 

Superprime credit lines saw the largest decrease in total new line of $118 billion, a 33 percent 

change. This accountedfor over three-fourths of the total reductionin new account credit line.

This appears to be driven by a decrease in credit demand by consumers with superprime scores 

as applications fell but approval rates remained fairly strong. In comparison, consumers with

deep subprime scores saw the second highest percent change as total new account credit line

decrease 33 percent or by slightly over one billion dollars,from2019. However, this change at 

the extensive margin may not fully explain the pandemic-related decline in credit line volume, 

as some issuers limited risk by offering smaller credit lines to new applicants in 2020.

In 2020, general purpose cards accountedfor over three-fourths of new line volume but

represented 86 percent of the year-over-year decline in new line. After reaching a new postGreat Recession high in 2019, total new generalpurpose line dropped by over 30 percent in 

2020. Previously, line growth was driven by superprime accounts; subsequently, one can 

attribute most of the line reduction to this tier. 

The average new line for general purpose cards fell by 18 percent in 2020. Figure 14 shows that 

the average new line for all consumers increased every year from 2010 to 2018 and remained 

steady in 2019. The average initial line for consumers with superprime scores still exceeded

Great Recessionlevelsdespite falling from$9,208in 2019 to $7,842 in 2020. For consumers 

with deep subprime scores, pandemic-relatedtightening of credit lines was a continuation of a 

five-year decline for general purpose accounts.
76 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 14: AVERAGE CREDIT LINE ON NEW ACCOUNTS, GENERAL PURPOSE (CCP)

While the interaction between consumer demand and issuer supply was ambiguous for general

purpose cards, the 22 percent drop in new private label credit lines can be explained primarily 

by fewer superprime applications as approval rates and average credit line did not decrease to 

the same degree. Total new private label credit lines decreased to $78 billion in 2020 from $100 

billion the year prior. Over $15 billion of this decrease was a reduction in credit lines for new 

superprime accounts. Superprime lines also saw the greatest percent change in 2020 with a 25

percent reduction, with deep subprime a close second with a 24 percent decline. New nearprime and subprime lines declined from 2019 levels of $7.4 and $2.7 billion to $6.4 and $2.2 

billion respectively. However, this decrease accounts for a small percentage of the overall decline 

in new private label credit lines.

Average new private label lines reached their highest nominal value since 2005of $2,553 in 

2019. In 2020, they remained above 2018 levels despite a two percent reductionoverall.As 

shown in Figure 15, average line by credit tier remained stable in 2020. This contrasts with a 

decrease in average credit lines for all credit score tiers for general purpose cards. Since new 

average line for private label cards did not dramatically change in 2020 while the total new line 

fell by almost a quarter, the change in private label credit line is likely due to fewer new accounts 

in 2020 as stores closed and discretionary spending dropped during the pandemic. 132

132 See Selyukh, supra note 123. For more on credit card purchase volumes, see Section 2.3.

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

$0

$2,000

$4,000

$6,000

$8,000

$10,000

Superprime Prime Near-prime

Subprime Deep subprime Overall
77 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 15: AVERAGE CREDIT LINE ON NEW ACCOUNTS, PRIVATE LABEL (CCP)

4.2 Existing accounts

Total credit line across all consumer credit cards exceeded$4.5trillion in 2019. In 2020, it 

decreased slightly, as driven by a decline in private label lines, but still far exceeded 2018 levels. 

The total credit line for general purpose was $3.9 trillion in both 2019 and 2020. Most of this is 

accounted for by total unused line on accounts held by consumers with superprime scores

equaling $3.2 trillion in 2020. 133 In comparison, unused line on accounts held by consumers 

with subprime and deep subprime scores equaled $24.4 billion, and total general purpose credit 

line for each other credit tier except superprime decreasedin 2020. Total credit line available 

for private label cards fell in both 2019 and 2020. The present subsection examines this issue in 

more detail by looking at a range of account-level and cardholder-level measures on existing 

accounts for each score tier and card type.

4.2.1 Average credit line 

Average general purpose credit line per account increased slightly in 2019 before finishing lower 

in 2020 at about $8,000. These changes were mirrored across all credit score tiers. The average 

133 Unused line on superprime accounts totaled more than $3.2 trillion in 2020. Almost all of that was on general 

purpose cards.

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

$0

$1,000

$2,000

$3,000

$4,000

Superprime Prime Near-prime

Subprime Deep subprime Overall
78 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

general purpose line per cardholderincreased in 2019 and then decreased in 2020 for all credit 

scores, as the average value overall returned to 2018 levels. As Figure 16 shows, consumerswith 

mid-range and lower scores were most affected by issuers tightening of credit supply during the 

COVID-19 national emergency.Average line for consumers with near-prime, subprime, and 

deep subprime scores across all cards decreased over 10 percent. In comparison, average credit 

line for superprime cardholders fell by 5 percent.

Figure 16: AVERAGE CREDIT LINE PER CARDHOLDER, GENERAL PURPOSE (CCP)

The private label picture is very different, as cardholders in all tiers reached new high average 

credit lines in 2019 and remain high in 2020. In 2020 average private label credit line per card 

was almost $2,700, marking a new high. The average private label card has about one-third 

more line now than in 2012. Accounts held by consumers in lower credit tiers show slower 

growth over the same period, but no tier remains below its pre-recessionhigh. At the cardholder 

level, after reaching new highs in 2019, in 2020 average line declined to 4 percent below where 

they were on average in 2018. Coupled with higher average lines at the card level, it is likely this 

represents an increase in account closures. 134

134 For more information regarding account closures, see Section 4.2.3.

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

$0

$5,000

$10,000

$15,000

$20,000

$25,000

$30,000

Superprime Prime Near-prime

Subprime Deep subprime Overall
79 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

4.2.2 Utilization

Revolving credit for general purpose cards in 2020 amounted to less than one-fifth of total line 

available for the first time since before the Great Recession. Despite overall increases in the total 

dollar value of line available over the past decade, utilizationhas been remarkably stable as 

unused line rose in tandem. Therefore, the overall decrease in the utilizationrate to 18.5 percent 

in 2020 from 21.4 percent the two prior years is a significant deviation from the mean. As shown 

in Figure 17, general purpose utilization decreased in every credit tier.In 2020, credit limits for 

general purpose cards stayed relatively constant while total debt fell; this lead to a decrease in 

the utilizationrate. 135As utilization rate is used of credit scoring, it will be interesting to see how 

the distribution of credit scores shift if credit card debt continues to contract.

Figure 17: AVERAGE UTILIZATION RATE BY CREDIT SCORE TIER, GENERAL PURPOSE (CCP)

In addition to an overall decline in total utilization, the share of consumers with below-prime 

scores who have used 90 percent or more of their general purpose credit line reached record 

lows in 2020. Since 2015, slightly above three-fifths of consumers withbelow-prime scores met 

or exceeded this thresholdof limited available credit as shown in Figure 18. This measure 

dropped to 56.8 percent in the second quarter of 2020. During this time the CARES Act 

Economic Impact Payments, Pandemic Unemployment Assistance Program, mortgage 

135 See sections 2.2.1, 2.4, and 4.2.3

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Superprime Prime Near-prime

Subprime Deep subprime
80 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

forbearance, student loan payment suspension and other programs provided consumers with 

additional cash or lower payments. In addition, consumer spending dropped sharply.

Figure 18: QUARTERLY SHARE OF BELOW-PRIME CARDHOLDERS WITH AT LEAST 90 PERCENT

UTILIZATION ACROSS ALL CARDS, GENERAL PURPOSE (CCP)

4.2.3 Credit line management

Credit lines on existing accounts are not static. Issuers can increase or decrease them without 

consumer consent. Credit line increases (CLI) are somewhat restricted by the CARD Act’s 

ability-to-pay requirements, but issuers confront a range of more substantial regulatory 

restrictions on repricing existing balances. 136 Previous research published by the Bureau studied 

whether issuers may use line management to respond to risk revealed post-origination or 

changes in nationwide economic conditions. 137

CREDIT LINE INCREASE

As shown in Figures 19 and 20, annual CLI incidence in 2020 was around 3 percent for both 

general purpose and private label cards. Prior to the pandemic, 4 percent of accounts receiveda

136 The ability-to-pay rules require that issuers consider an applicant’s ability to pay the minimum monthly payment 

on an account prior to opening a credit card account under an open-end (not home-secured) consumer credit plan 

or increasing a credit line on such an account. 12 CFR 1026.51(a)(1)(i). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1665e (2012). Repricing 

of existing balance is only allowed under a set of relatively narrow circumstances. See 12 CFR 1026.55(b).

137 See 2017 Report, supra note 6, at 158-162.

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

50%

55%

60%

65%

70%

75%
81 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

CLI each year.While this decline may indicate some hesitancy on the part of issuers to initiate 

new CLIs during the pandemic, yearly incidence remained at or close to post-Great Recession 

norms for all credit tiers.

The median general purpose CLIin 2020 was $1500 compared to $2000 in 2019. This was the 

first overalldecrease in median value in a decade, as issuers offered every credit tier smaller line 

increases on par with 2012 levels. Yet this trend masks tier differentials as the median increase 

for consumers with superprime scores is still ten times that of consumers with deep subprime 

scores. However, consumers with prime scores saw the greatest change as their median CLI 

dropped from $1550 to $1000 in 2020.

Figure 19: ANNUAL CREDIT LINE INCREASE INCIDENCE, GENERAL PURPOSE (CCP)

For private label cards, the median line increase was $700 in both 2019 and 2020. Consumers 

with superprime, near-prime, and deep subprime scores saw no change in their median line 

increases over the past four years while each lower credit score tier was offered a lower median 

line in 2020 than a year prior.

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

Superprime Prime Near-prime

Subprime Deep subprime Overall
82 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 20: ANNUAL CREDIT LINE INCREASE INCIDENCE, PRIVATE LABEL (CCP)

CREDIT LINE DECREASE

Generalpurpose card issuers did not meaningfully change their line management of existing 

accounts in response to economic uncertainty during the pandemic, despite media reports to the 

contrary. In the second quarter of 2020, 0.9 percent of generalpurpose accounts saw a decrease 

in available credit line from issuers. This did not change year over year and remained far below 

its highest quarterly value of 3.7 percent of general purpose accounts experiencing CLDs at the 

height of the Great Recession. As has been the norm, a higher percentage of consumers with

below-prime scores experienced CLDs while cardholders with superprime and prime scores 

were less likely to experience a change in their credit lines. All tiers followed a similar trend of a 

moderate increase in CLDs as shown in Figure 20. Yet, both overall and for all credit tiers, a 

higher percentage of consumers still saw their general purpose credit lines increased than 

decreased in 2020. One explanation may be that card issuers resisted reducing credit lines to 

avoid angering their customers. 138

138 See, e.g., Kevin Wack, Credit card lenders clamp down to mitigate coronavirus risk, American Banker (May 29, 

2020), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/credit-card-lenders-clamp-down-to-mitigate-coronavirus-risk.

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

Superprime Prime Near-prime

Subprime Deep subprime Overall
83 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 21: ANNUAL CREDIT LINE DECREASE INCIDENCE, GENERAL PURPOSE (CCP)

Evidence suggests that private label card issuers may be reacting to heightened risk of belowprime borrowers in their portfolios by using CLDs to limit their exposure. For private label 

cards, CLDs increased from a quarterly value of 2.1 percent in 2019 to 4.3 percent in the third 

quarter of 2020 before returning to 2.2. percent in the fourth quarter but were still far below the

2008 peak of 13.4 percent. As shown in Figure 22, consumers with subprime and deep subprime 

scoreshave beenmuch more likely to see private label CLDs since the Great Recession than 

those in higher credit tiers. However,this differential expanded in 2020 as CLD incidence for 

consumers with deep subprime scores increased by two percentage points to 10 percent 

annually and exceeded its 2008peak while that of superprime only saw half a percentage point 

increase. Continuing previously reportedtrends, the annual rate of CLDs was only higher than 

that of CLIs for private label accounts with subprime or lower credit scores.

Figure 22: ANNUAL CREDIT LINE DECREASE INCIDENCE, PRIVATE LABEL (CCP)

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

Superprime Prime Near-prime

Subprime Deep subprime Overall

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

Superprime Prime Near-prime

Subprime Deep subprime Overall
84 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

While the incidence of CLDs marginally increased during the pandemic, the magnitude of these 

line decreases was on par with or lower than in previous years. Like the median CLI value in 

2020, the dollar value of CLDsper account decreased for both card types. The median CLD for 

general purpose cards is now slightly above $2500 as driven by an increase in CLDs on prime 

consumers. For private label cards, this value decreased 13 percent in 2020 and is now about

$1000. 

There is little evidence to support an unprecedented, industry-wide slashing of existing credit 

limits as widely reported during the COVID-19 national emergency. 139 Research on the early 

effects of the pandemic on consumer creditfound borrowers with superprime and prime scores

experienced relatively more reductions on existing account limits. 140This is likely driven 

primarily by reductions in line for consumers with significant unused credit, such as cardholders 

with superprime and prime scores. However, for consumers who did experience a CLD during 

the pandemic, this reduction in credit availability was surprising and often acutely felt, as

evidenced by a 65 percentincrease in complaints related to CLDs in 2020. 141CLDs may also 

have long-term effects on credit scores. FICO estimated that a severe CLD could result in a 9

point reduction of a cardholder’s credit score. 142The Bureau intends to further study the effects

of CLD and its impact on credit utilization and credit scores, in particular for those consumers 

with non-prime credit scores.

ACCOUNT CLOSURE

About 2 percent of both general purpose and private label accounts are closed each year. This 

has been true for the past decade, and it remainedtrue in 2020. Accounts can be closed by the 

139 See, e.g., Kristopher Brooks, 70 million people just had their credit card limits cut or accounts closed, CBS News 

(July 22, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/credit-card-limits-reduced-closed-70-million-cardholders/.

140 See Sandler & Ricks, supra note 24, at 22.

141 See Cons. Fin. Prot. Bur., Consumer Response Annual Report, at 118 (Mar. 2021), 

https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-reports/2020-consumer-response-annual-report/.

142 9 points was the average decline in FICO score for an up to 50 percent decrease in available credit limit based on 

simulations using data from prior downturns. See FICO, North America What FICO Score Dynamics from Prior 

Downturns and Natural Disasters Can Tell Us About the Road Ahead (Oct. 2020), 

https://www.fico.com/en/latest-thinking/demand-webinar/north-america-what-fico-score-dynamics-priordownturns-and-natural. 
85 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

consumer, closed by the creditor, or closed for inactivity. For all card types, the annual account 

closure incidence for consumers with deep subprime credit scores are two to three times more 

likely than those in higher credit tiers as shown in Figures 23 and 24. Yet other research

suggests that the slight increase in account closures from March to June 2020 primarily affected 

superprime and prime borrowers. 143 In those months, there were higher account closures by 

creditors and closures for inactivity.

Figure 23: ANNUAL ACCOUNT CLOSURE INCIDENCE, GENERAL PURPOSE (CCP)

Figure 24: ANNUAL ACCOUNT CLOSURE INCIDENCE, PRIVATE LABEL (CCP)

143 See Sandler & Ricks, supra note 24, at 22.

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

Superprime Prime Near-prime

Subprime Deep subprime Overall

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

0%

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4%

5%

6%

Superprime Prime Near-prime

Subprime Deep subprime Overall
86 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

5. Practices of credit card 

issuers

In the CARD Act, Congress directs the Bureau to review “the terms of credit card agreements 

and the practices of credit card issuers” and “the effectiveness of disclosure of terms, fees, and 

other expenses of credit card plans.” 144 Therefore, this section describes trends and 

developments in issuer practices related to four common credit card features: credit card 

rewards, deferred interest promotions, balance transfers, and cash advances. For each feature, it 

discusses its prevalence in the market, costs associated with utilizing the feature, and any 

changes issuers or third parties have made in supporting consumers who choose to use them.

The section then describes changes in issuer practicesmade in response to COVID-19, such as

the promulgation of consumer relief programs, and adjustments made to operations considering 

safety concerns. Finally, this section reviews changes to credit card agreements observed over 

time.

In particular, for the four account featuresdiscussed below, the impact of the pandemic on 

credit card issuers is large and clear. Consequently, the direct issuer response to COVID-19 had 

a similarly large impact on consumers, primarily through widely available payment deferral.

144 15 U.S.C. § 1616(a)(1)-(2).
87 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

5.1 Rewards

Credit cards offering rewards remain popular with cardholders, despite pandemic-related

declines in travel that temporarily reduced the utility of some forms of rewards. 145This section 

reviews recent rewards trends.

5.1.1 Prevalence

The share of credit card spending accounted for by rewards cards has continued to increase 

since 2018. That is true both overall and for each credit score tier, with growth particularly 

notable for consumers with lower credit scores. By the end of 2020, even consumers with deep 

subprime scores put more than 60 percent of their credit card purchase volume on rewards 

cards, and consumers with near-prime scores put nearly three-fourths of their spendingon 

rewards cards. 146 Trends in reward-card purchase volume as a share of total spending are shown 

in Figure 1.

Figure 1: SHARE OF PURCHASE VOLUME ON A REWARDS CARD, GENERAL PURPOSE (Y-14+)

145 For a detailed discussion of what aspects are generally shared by those credit card account features commonly 

denoted as “rewards,” see 2015 Report, supra note 6, at 209-212.

146 J.D. Power reported in 2020 that consumers who self-report as “fully understanding how to earn and redeem 

points” have an average spend that is $307 more than the average spend of consumers who self-report as not fully 

understanding their rewards programs. See J.D. Power Satisfaction Study, supra note 2.

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime Deep subprime Overall

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2017 2018 2019 2020
88 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Rewards cards remain popular, driven by the higher end of the credit spectrum. Shifting 

preferences towards rewards cards reflect survey findings that show rewards as the predominant 

factor in choosing a card. 147While cardholders with subprime and deep subprime scores are less 

likely than consumers with superprime scores to originate rewards cards, these cardholders still 

put more than one-half of their credit card spending on rewards cards, as shown in Figure 2. 148

Cardholders continue to embrace rewards cards, and increasingly prefer cash rewards to 

miles. 149 In 2020, cash rewards card spending increased the most of any group, accounting for 

one third of general purpose card spending. Spendingon miles rewards cards fell to 18 percent 

in 2020, which coincided with a sharp decline in travel spending as a result of pandemic-related 

travel restrictions. 150Cards that earn other types of rewards, such as points, special offers, or 

discounts, remain the most common by purchase volume at 39 percent.

147 Similarly, J.D. Power’s 2018 survey found that 47 percent of credit card customers who switched to a new card 

within the past 12 months did so for a better rewards program. See J.D. Power, Credit Card Rewards Battle 

Continues as Customers Seek Better Programs (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.jdpower.com/business/pressreleases/2018-us-credit-card-satisfaction-study. In its 2013 Report, the Bureau references a 2011 Mercator 

Customer Monitor Survey showing rewards were the number one reason to apply for a selected card at that time as 

well. 2013 Report, supra note 6, at 82 n.94.

148 For information on the share of new accounts with rewards by credit tier, see 2015 report, supra note 6, at 100.

149 Issuers’ new card offerings post-pandemic recession reflect this shift. See, e.g., Jennifer Surane, Credit Cards 

Revive Rewards battle with New Cash-Back Offerings, Bloomberg (July 19, 2021), 

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-19/rewards-war-returns-with-a-spate-of-new-cash-backcredit-cards?sref=25rnPxpS.

150 Visa reported travel spending fell about 80 percent in March of 2020, with restaurant and entertainment segments 

down at least 50 percent. Emily Bary, Visa sees ‘significant deterioration’ in spending but some areas are showing 

improvement, MarketWatch (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/visa-earnings-topexpectations-but-coronavirus-prompts-significant-deterioration-in-spending-2020-04-30.
89 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 2: SHARE OF PURCHASE VOLUME BY REWARD TYPE, GENERAL PURPOSE (Y-14+)

5.1.2 Developments

Card issuers altered rewards programs in response to changes in consumer spending and 

reward redemption behavior during the pandemic, especially those rewards cards that focused 

on travel, entertainment, and restaurants, and that carry an annual fee. During the pandemic, 

several issuers made changes to bonus earning by increasing rewards for spending in areas such 

as grocery and home delivery and by offering statement credits or redemption options for items 

people were more likely to use while staying home such as video streaming services and 

cellphone bills. 151Some issuers also extended the time allowed to meet spend requirements to 

earn sign-up bonuses. 152These programmatic changes were likely aimed at keeping customers 

from moving spending away from their card, downgrading to lower-fee products, or canceling 

their card altogether. However, at the time of this writing, most restrictions have been lifted, and 

151 See AnnaMaria Andriotis, Travel Bans Take Shine Off Banks’ Premium Rewards Cards, Wall St. J.(June 28, 

2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/travel-bans-take-shine-off-banks-premium-rewards-cards-11593336600. See 

also Katie Deighton, Credit-Card Providers Scramble to Update Customer Benefits as International Travel Ban 

Drags On, Wall St. J. (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/credit-card-providers-scramble-to-updatecustomer-benefits-as-international-travel-ban-drags-on-11599040800.

152 See Alexandria White, Amex is offering new cardholders 3 more months to earn welcome bonus, CNBC (Updated 

May 6, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/select/amex-extends-welcome-bonus-for-new-cardholders/.

Cash Miles No rewards Other

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

2017 2018 2019 2020
90 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

issuers are shifting the focus of rewards programs back towards travel and entertainment, 

suggesting issuers anticipate a return to previous spending behavior. 153

Rewards remain important to cardholders, but consumer reward preferences have changed 

significantly since the Bureau’s previous report;it remains unclear how much of that change is 

temporary due to pandemic restrictions. 154 Among cardholders who opened a new card, the 

three most-cited reasons for doing so were attractive rewards, benefits, and sign-up offers. 155

Cardholders also tend to use rewards cards more – the share of cardholders reporting a nonrewards card as their most frequently used card declined from 23 percentin 2019 to 17 percent 

in 2020. 156 Consumers continue to favor cash rewards in 2020 – 55 percent of consumers 

preferred to redeem rewards for charges or a check, compared to 44 percent in 2019 and 26 

percent in 2016. 157 However, at least one issuer has also observed increases in reward points 

levels, indicating many consumers may be accumulating points to use once they resume 

travel. 158

New forms of rewards announced since the Bureau’sprior report, such as cryptocurrency and 

student loan repayment, may prove attractive to some consumers.In late 2020 and early 2021, 

Gemini, BlockFi, and SoFi announced credit cards that offer cash back in the form of 

153 See Kevin Wack, Card issuers reliant on miles, hotel rewards await travel rebound, American Banker (Mar. 22, 

2021), https://www.americanbanker.com/payments/news/card-issuers-reliant-on-miles-hotel-rewards-awaittravel-rebound. “As vaccinations continue and more people return to traveling, card issuers are anticipating that 

rich sign on bonuses and flexibility with rewards will spark new interest with consumers.” Competiscan, Travel 

Consumer Cards (Q1 2021), at 3.

154 See AnnaMaria Andriotis & Alison Sider, Airline Cards Lose Luster as Coronavirus Persists, Wall St. J. (Dec. 3, 

2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/airline-cards-lose-luster-as-coronavirus-persists-11606991400. 

155 Auriemma Research, Impact of Credit Line Changes and Loan Forbearance, Attitudes toward Low or No-APR 

Cards, and ‘Refer a Friend’ Programs, Cardbeat US (Apr. 2021), at 53.

156 Auriemma Research, 2020 Trend Database, Cardbeat US (Mar. 2021), at 6.

157 Auriemma Research, 2020 Trend Database, The Payments Report (Mar. 2021), at 16.

158 See Wack, supra note 153.
91 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

cryptocurrency stored in an affiliated investment account. 159 One survey found that nearly fourin-ten cardholders report they would be likely to redeem points for cryptocurrency. 160These 

preferences are inversely correlated with age, as younger consumers expressed greater 

likelihood to redeem points for cryptocurrency. 161 In addition to its crypto option, SoFi also gives 

users the option to put cash toward student loan balances. 162As a reward for card repayment, 

SoFi states they will lower the APR of the card by one percentage point after 12 timely 

payments. 163Laurel Road also introduced a card for students that provides greater cashback 

redemption if used to pay down student loans. 164 Similar to affinity cards that generate rewards 

with spending but pass the funds to social causes or affiliated organizations, Aspiration

introduced a card that rewards users by planting trees to offset the user’s carbon footprint. 165

5.2 Deferred interest

Deferred interest (“DI”) promotions are a large feature of the retail consumer credit card 

market. Almost always associated with private label and retail co-brand cards, deferred interest 

159 BlockFi Blog, Join the Waitlist for the World’s First-Ever Bitcoin Rewards Credit Card (Dec. 1, 2020), 

https://blockfi.com/bitcoin-card-crypto-rewards; Gemini Blog, Gemini to Offer Credit Card with Crypto Rewards

(Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.gemini.com/blog/gemini-to-offer-credit-card-with-crypto-rewards; SoFi, SoFi Credit 

Card, https://www.sofi.com/credit-card/ (last accessed May 26, 2021). In 2014, the Bureau issued a consumer 

advisory warning to consumers about the risks of virtual currencies such as Bitcoin. See Cons. Fin. Prot. Bur., CFPB 

Warns Consumers About Bitcoin (Aug. 11, 2014), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpbwarns-consumers-about-bitcoin/.

160 This statistic is from interviews with 803 credit card users conducted in 2020. See Auriemma Research, Impact of 

Credit Line Changes and Loan Forbearance, Attitudes toward Low or No-APR Cards, and ‘Refer a Friend’ 

Programs, Cardbeat US (Apr. 2021), at 52.

161 Id.

162 See SoFi supra note 159.

163 Competiscan, Consumer Credit Cards Overview (Q4 2020), at 7.

164 See Laurel Road, Laurel Road Student Loan Cashback Card, https://www.laurelroad.com/healthcarebanking/cash-back-credit-card/ (last accessed May 28, 2021).

165 See Aspiration, Zero, https://www.aspiration.com/zero (last accessed May 27, 2021).
92 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

promotions are generally presented to consumers as an option to finance larger purchases. 

Consumers are given a fixed period of at least six months during which all interest charges are 

“deferred”—the issuer calculates how much interest the consumer would owe at the account’s 

retail APR, but does not immediately charge it to the consumer. 166 If the consumer pays down 

the full promotional balance during the promotional period, the deferred interest is never 

charged, and the consumer has gained the benefit of low-cost financing—almost always zero 

percent. 167Conversely, a consumer who does not pay in full during the promotional period will 

generally have all the deferred interest capitalized into their balance at the promotion’s 

conclusion. As noted above, in the case of private label cards, the average retail APR is roughly 

24 percent. 168

This section builds on prior work to identify new and emerging trends in the prevalence and cost

of deferred interest programs. The Bureau’s 2015 Report analyzed the legal background and 

current status of deferred interest promotions. It also reported findings from promotional-level 

data covering the full portfolios of several large DI issuers over a period of several years. The 

Bureau’s 2017 Report looked at promotional spending, payoff rates, and amount of deferred 

interest assessed by merchant category, promotion duration, and credit score. For 2021,the 

Bureau again solicited information to analyze spending, payoff rates, and deferred interest 

assessed.

The Bureau also solicited information regarding issuers’ response to COVID-19 with respect to 

deferred interest programs and found that issuers generally made few-to-no changes to their 

166 Deferred interest promotions of less than six months are effectively prohibited by the CARD Act and Regulation Z. 

15 U.S.C. § 1666i-2(b); 12 CFR § 1026.55(b)(1); Comment 55(b)(1)-3.

167 Generally, minimum payments alone are insufficient to repay the balance within the promotional period. In some 

cases, promotional balances are subject to an interest rate greater than zero percent during the promotional period, 

but by far the most common promotional interest rate is zero percent. In some cases issuers may also assess an upfront fee for enrollment in deferred interest programs. 

168 One industry trade group pointed to deferred interest promotions as providing value to consumers. See ABA 

Comment Letter, at 16. Consumer advocates, by contrast, have called for deferred interest to be banned or, barring 

that, substantially restructured. See NCLC Comment Letter, at 12-14. One study by Wallethub found that 74 percent 

of people think “deferred interest” is unfair, 61 percent think it should be illegal, and 52 percent of people don’t 

know how it works. Alina Comoreanu, Deferred Interest Study: Which Retailers Use It?, Wallethub (Nov. 17, 

2020), https://wallethub.com/edu/cc/deferred-interest-study/25707.
93 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

deferred interest-specific marketing, underwriting, and product structure. This does not account 

for issuers who made broader changes to how they marketed, underwrote, or otherwise offered 

retail credit cards; such changes may have had indirect effects on the marketing and availability 

of deferred interest products. Most issuers reported providing DI-specific relief to consumers 

impacted by COVID-19, generally on a by-request basis. Such relief generally took the form of 

extensions of promotional periods, in some cases alongside broader forbearance measures and 

in some cases as independently offeredrelief. Extensions were generally two-to-three months in 

length.

5.2.1 Prevalence

Deferred interest promotions remain generally popular with consumers, with purchase volumes 

relatively high despite pandemic-era disruptions in retail sales. Total purchase volume, as 

shown in Figure 3, was over $60 billion in 2020, flat since 2019 but an increase of 16 percent 

from 2017. Growth since 2017 was driven by consumers with superprime scores, which saw 

aggregate purchase amounts increase 20 percent from 2017 to 2020. Consistent with the 

findings of previous Bureau reports, consumers with higher credit scores comprise the bulk of 

deferred interest purchase activity.In 2020, the number of deferred interest purchases 

increased more than 50 percent overall from 2018 levels. In 2020, the number of transactions

for promotions with a durationof less than a year was twice that of two years prior while the 

number of purchases with longer term length promotions remained close to previous levels.

Figure 3: TOTAL PURCHASE VOLUME ON DEFERRED INTEREST PROMOTIONS (DI)

Deferred interest promotions are generally used to finance larger purchases. As a result, they 

tend to be used most at merchants that specialize in offering larger-ticket goods or services. In 

2017 2018 2019 2020

$0

$10B

$20B

$30B

$40B

$50B

$60B

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime Deep subprime No score
94 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

2017 the Bureaureported that four-fifths of all deferred interest dollars were spent at merchants 

that specialize in five specific product or service categories, with the remainder spent either at 

merchants that specialize in other types of goods or services, or at merchants without a clear 

specialization. 169 In 2020 that figure has risen to six-sevenths. The largest driver of deferred 

interest consumer use is spending on home improvement; that sector, in contrast to travel and 

entertainment spending, saw an increase in spending driven by COVID-19, 170 which may help 

explain the relative persistence of deferred interest promotion volume in 2020 even as overall 

credit card purchase volume and indebtedness declined.

Figure 4: TOTAL PURCHASE VOLUME ON DEFERRED INTEREST PROMOTIONS BY MERCHANT 

CATEGORY (DI)

The mix of spending across merchants varies substantially by credit score tier as well as over 

time. Figure 4 displays the deferred interest promotional spending consumers made at each type 

of merchant. Figure 5 breaks down that spending by credit score tier in 2020. The Bureau’s 2017

report noted that consumers with superprime scores tend to concentrate their deferred interest 

169See 2017 Report, supra note 6, at 103. “Other” includes department stores and shopping channels, where many of 

the actual products offered and sold may fall under one or more of the five enumerated categories. The actual share 

of spending on those types of goods and services, therefore, may be even higher than the merchant share may imply.

170 See, e.g., Kermit Baker, Despite Devastating Effects on the Broader Economy, Pandemic has been a Boon for US 

Home Improvement, Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard Univestity (Mar. 25, 2021), 

https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/blog/despite-devastating-effects-broader-economy-pandemic-has-been-boon-ushome-improvement.

2017 2018 2019 2020

$0

$10B

$20B

$30B

$40B

$50B

$60B

Home improvement Healthcare Electronics Furniture Jewelry Other
95 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

spending at home improvement merchants. 171That remains the case, but consumers with 

subprime and deep subprime scores now also concentrate more of their deferred interest 

purchases on home improvement, rather than healthcare which was a significant category in 

2017. In fact, the share of deferred interest promotional spending on home improvement had 

risen from 38 percent in 2018 to nearly half of all deferred interest spending in 2020, reflecting 

pandemic-era changes in spending behavior. By contrast,the share of promotional spending on

electronics fell in 2020 for consumers in all tiers and now ranksbelow healthcare.

Figure 5: SHARE OF PROMOTIONAL SPENDING BY MERCHANT CATEGORY, 2020 (DI)

Over the past several years, the Bureau has observed a shift toward shorter promotions, as seen 

in Figure 6. While purchase volume on promotions of 12 to 17 months and promotions 

exceeding 18 months have remained consistent at about $15 billion and $19 billion per year

respectively, purchase volume on promotions of 6 to 11 months has grown from $20 billion in 

2017 to nearly $28 billion in 2020.In 2020, these shorter duration promotional purchases 

increased while medium and longer-term durationpurchases decreased, possibly due to 

concerns surrounding the longer-term impact of the pandemic on consumer finances.

171 See 2017 Report, supra note 6, at 104.

Deep subprime

Subprime

Near-prime

Prime

Superprime

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Home improvement Healthcare Electronics Furniture Jewelry Other
96 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 6: TOTAL PURCHASE VOLUME ON DEFERRED INTEREST PROMOTIONS BY DURATION (DI)

Consumers in lower credit score tiers increasingly utilize shorter promotions on average than 

consumers with higher credit scores. In 2020, 65 percent of promotional purchase volume made 

by consumers with deep subprime scores had a promotion duration of less than 12 months, 

compared to 45 percent for superprime. That share has increased from 50 percent in 2017. One 

explanation may be that promotion length usually increases with the size of the purchase. For 

example, a $500 appliance might be six or 12 months, while a $3,000 furniture purchase could 

offer a promotional period of several years. The average promotional purchase amount for a 

consumer with a superprime score is roughly twice that of a cardholder with a deep subprime 

score.Another reasonmay be that promotional offers are becoming more common for smaller 

purchase amounts. The average promotional purchase amount declined from $899 to $637 

between 2018 and 2020, as shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7: AVERAGE PURCHASE AMOUNT ON DEFERRED INTEREST PROMOTIONS (DI)

2017 2018 2019 2020

$0

$10B

$20B

$30B

$40B

$50B

$60B

6-11 months 12-17 months 18+ months

2017 2018 2019 2020

$0

$200

$400

$600

$800

$1,000

$1,200

Superprime Prime Near-prime

Subprime Deep subprime Overall
97 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

5.2.2 Repayment

Rates of promotion repayment within the promotional period have generally increasedsince the 

Bureau last reported this rate. 172The Bureau’s 2015 Report found that overall promotion-level 

and balance-level payoff rates from 2009 to 2013 lay between 76 and 82 percent. 173The Bureau’s 

2017 Report found that promotion payoff rates on six to 17 month promotions originated in 

2015 were 72 percent, and balance payoff rates were 74 percent. This report finds promotion 

payoff rates of 81 percent and balance payoff rates of 82 percent in 2020, amarked increase 

from previous years. 174

Cardholders of all credit score tiers increased payoff rates in 2020, but the effect was most 

notable for consumers with below-prime scores. The Bureau’s 2013, 2015, and 2017 Reports 

found deferred interest payoff rates to be strongly correlated with credit score. 175The correlation 

between payoff rates and credit score generally persists into the current observation period, as 

shown in Figure 8. 176 On one end of the spectrum, 89 percent of superprime balances were paid 

off in 2020,the same percentage as in 2019.In contrast, 62 percent of subprime and deep 

subprime balances were paid off during the promotion period in 2020, up from 54 and 51 

percent respectively in 2019.In terms of the number of promotions, in 2020 cardholders in all 

172 The methodology the Bureau uses has evolved. Payoff rates on deferred interest products can be expressed in 

several ways, including: (1) the number of total deferred interest promotions in which the full balance is repaid prior 

to the end of the deferred interest period divided by the total number of deferred interest products originated; and 

(2) the dollar volume of promotional balances paid in full during the promotional period divided by the total dollar 

volume of deferred interest balances originated. The 2013 Report generally used the second measure, referred to 

here as the “balance payoff rate.” The 2015 Report used both the first measure, referred to here as the “promotion 

payoff rate,” and the second measure. This report again uses both measures. The rates reported in this report, 

however, are not directly comparable to those in prior reports for two reasons. First, the issuer samples are 

different, with the 2017 Report covering a wider range of DI issuers. Second, the 2017 Report generally split the 

lowest credit tier from the 2015 Report into two separate tiers, with deep subprime now beginning below 580 rather 

than below 620.

173 2015 Report, supra note 6, at 164.

174 2017 Report, supra note 6, at 108.

175 2017 Report, supra note 6, at 107-108; 2015 Report, supra note 6, at 167-169; 2013 Report, supra note 6, at 80.

176 Consumers with no credit score demonstrated payoff rates in line with the overall averages. They are therefore not 

shown here.
98 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

credit score tiers reached their highest payoff rates since at least 2015, with cardholderswith 

below-prime scores repaying two thirds of their deferred interest promotions within the 

promotional period, consistent with increased payment rates on credit cards generally as noted 

in Section 2.4.2.

Figure 8: BALANCE PAYOFF RATE ON DEFERRED INTEREST PROMOTIONS (DI)

5.2.3 Cost

Consumers who pay off the deferred interest promotion prior to expiration do not pay deferred 

interest. However, consumers who do not repay, generally incur the full amount of the deferred 

interest, often incurring significant costs. Those costs have generally been rising over the period 

for which the Bureau has data: the aggregate amount of deferred interest assessed to consumers 

increased by 45 percentfrom 2015 to 2020, to just over $2.5 billion in total. 177

177 Bureau data do not currently allow for a determination of how much of this growth is driven by volume growth, 

and how much, if any, is driven by deterioration in payoff rates.

2017 2018 2019 2020

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Superprime Prime Near-prime

Subprime Deep subprime Overall
99 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 9: TOTAL DEFERRED INTEREST ASSESSED (DI)

Consumers who fail to pay the balance prior to the end of the promotion are assessed deferred 

interest at roughly the same effective interest rates regardless of credit score, as shown in Figure 

10. Deferred interest promotions are typically conducted on private label cards, which carry 

APRs that do not vary much between credit score tiers. Naturally, longer promotions carry 

higher deferred interest amounts at expiration, but on an annualized basis the costs are the 

same for those that fail to repay during the promotional period.

Figure 10: DEFERRED INTEREST ASSESSED AS A SHARE OF PROMOTIONAL PURCHASE AMOUNT FOR 

PROMOTIONS THAT INCURRED DEFERRED INTEREST (DI)

Consumers in lower score tiers pay relatively more to finance purchases with deferred interest 

than do cardholderswith superprime scores because they are less likely to repay within the 

promotional period. However, effective costs are declining for cardholderswith below-prime 

scores as their repayment rates increase. Figure 11 shows the amount of deferredinterest 

2017 2018 2019 2020

$0

$0.5B

$1.0B

$1.5B

$2.0B

$2.5B

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime Deep subprime No score

2017 2018 2019 2020

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

Superprime Prime Near-prime

Subprime Deep subprime Overall
100 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

assessed in a year as a share of the totaldeferred interest purchase volume for all promotions in 

that year by consumer credit score tier. This metric serves as a proxy for expected cost at the 

time the purchase was made for consumers in each credit score tier. Figure 11 shows cardholders

with below-prime scores in 2020 have an expected cost of about 8 percent of the purchase price, 

while cardholderswith superprime scoresmay expect to pay about 3 percent of the deferred 

interest purchase amount on average. Rising repayment rates among cardholderswith belowprime scores increases the probability that these consumerswill repay within the promotional 

window. Concurrently, private label interest rates have remained steady. Together, these trends

result in a lower expected cost for consumers in below-prime credittiers.

Figure 11: DEFERRED INTEREST ASSESSED AS A SHARE OF ANNUAL PURCHASE VOLUME FOR ALL 

DEFERRED INTEREST PROMOTIONS (DI)

Deferred interest promotions continue to provide consumers with complex challenges when 

they decide how to finance a purchase, as well as in making payments on their balances. The 

Bureau continues to monitor this area for risks to consumers.

5.3 Balance transfers

Balance transfer offers enable the consumer to potentially reduce the cost of carrying their 

debts. Some credit cards offer promotional balance transfers rates to incentivize consumers to 

apply for or increase their use of a credit card account. Generally, balance transfers shift existing 

balances from other cards onto the new one; consumers are typically offered a lower interest 

rate on the transferred balance (often zero percent) but generally are also required to pay an 

2017 2018 2019 2020

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

Superprime Prime Near-prime

Subprime Deep subprime Overall
101 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

upfront fee assessed as a share of the transferred balance. In addition to transfers of debt from 

another credit card, most balance transfer offers allow consumers to pay off debt related to other 

loans and bills. 178By the conclusion of the promotional period, if the consumer does not execute 

another balance transfer or has not repaid the balance, the remainder of the balance becomes

subject to a non-promotional interest rate, which is almost always higher than the balance 

transfer promotional rate.

5.3.1 Prevalence

Balance transfers became significantly less commonduring the pandemic, though evidence 

suggests those offers may be returning as the economic outlook stabilizes. Following four years 

of growth, balance transfer volume fell 36 percent year-over-year to $35billionin 2020, and

quarterly balance transfer incidence fell from 0.9 percentin 2019 to 0.4 percent at year’s end in 

2020, as issuers lookedto limit exposure to potential future losses given the uncertain economic 

outlook. 179 In 2019, over half of total acquisition mail volume included promotional balance 

transfer offers.180 In 2020, the minority of direct mail offers included promotional rates, in 

tandem with a rapid decline in mail volume overall. 181By year-end 2020, balance transfer

incidence began to tick back up and appears to be returning to pre-pandemic levels as the 

economy recovers. 182

178 Many transactions effectuated using a “convenience check” may also be treated as balance transfers by issuers. 

However, not all such transactions are so treated; depending on how it is used, some may be treated similarly to 

cash advances. The Bureau therefore excludes convenience check transactions from this analysis (and from its 

analysis of cash advances in Section 5.4), acknowledging that this likely excludes at least some volume that may be 

identical or near-identical from the consumer perspective.

179 See AnnaMaria Andriotis & Veronica Dagher, Credit-Card Balance Transfers Are Harder to Come By, Wall St. J. 

(June 6, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/credit-card-balance-transfers-are-harder-to-come-by-11591435801. 

180 Data provided by Competiscan.

181 Id. See Section 4.1 for further information on direct mail volume in 2020.

182 See Sara Rathner, Why Balance Transfer Credit Cards Are Starting to Blossom Again, Nerdwallet (June 4, 2021), 

https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/credit-cards/balance-transfer-credit-cards-starting-to-blossom-again.
102 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

As shown in Figure 12, balance transfers are primarily utilized by consumers with prime and 

superprime credit scores. This remained the case even as balance transfer incidence declined 

sharply across all credit score tiers in 2020–as a percentage of total balance transfer volume in 

2020, cardholders with prime scores made up 78 percent and 20 percent respectively.

Figure 12: QUARTERLY BALANCE TRANSFER INCIDENCE, GENERAL PURPOSE (Y-14+)

The average size of balance transfershas not changed significantly since the Bureau’s last report. 

Balance transfers for cardholders with superprime scores averaged roughly $5,600 in the fourth 

quarters of both 2019 and 2020.Balance transfersby cardholders with prime scores averaged 

about $4,300 in the fourth quarter of 2020, down slightly from just under $4,500 in the same 

quarter a year prior. 

5.3.2 Cost

Measured as a percentage of the amount that cardholders transfer, the average fee for balance 

transfers has increased since 2018. Balance transfers generally charge an initial fee, followed by 

a low interest rate on the transferred balance for a set periodof time or until the balance is 

repaid. 183From 2015 to 2018, the average balance transfer fee declined from 3.2 to 2.8 percent.

In 2019 and 2020, the average balance transfer fee was 3.0 percent.Consumers use balance 

transfers to take advantage of low promotional interest rates. In both 2019 and 2020, the vast 

183 Some issuers offer introductory no fee balance transfers for new cards, but this does not appear to be a common 

practice in the industry.

0%

0.5%

1.0%

1.5%

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Superprime Prime Near-prime

Subprime Deep subprime Overall
103 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

majority of credit card solicitations sent to new prospects included an introductory 0 percent 

balance transfer rate. 184 Depending on the duration of the promotion and the degree of interest 

rate reduction, as well as the consumer’s repayment behavior, this cost savings can be 

significantly higher than the upfront cost of the initial balance transfer fee.

Besides the initial fee and interest, consumers may also incur costs associated with the loss of a 

grace periodon their purchase balances when making a balance transfer, which can result in an 

increase in interest charges on other purchases.Cardholders who were using the card to transact 

prior to the balance transfer stand to lose their grace period on new purchases, even if they 

continue to repay the full amount of new purchases each month. For example, a “transacting” 

consumer that routinely spends around $500 on their credit card each month and pays that 

balance in full, that then transfers a balance to that card and does not pay that balance in full, 

may begin incurring interest charges on their monthly $500 spending at the card’s retail APR 

rate, even if the transferred balance is subject to a zero percentinterest rate. 185While transacting 

accounts represent only a minority of all accounts that effect balance transfers, as noted in a 

prior report, most of these formerly-transacting cardholders went on to make purchases before 

the balance transfer was paid, incurring interest charges on those new purchases and increasing 

the effective cost of the transfer. 186

184 Data provided by Competiscan.

185 Some issuers permit consumers to enjoy a grace period on new purchases while revolving a transferred balance 

during the promotional period, but the prevailing practice appears to be that revolving balance transfers does 

eliminate the grace period on regular purchases. Issuers are required to provide certain disclosures to consumers 

which include information regarding the potential loss of a grace period when balances are not paid in full. 12 C.F.R. 

§ 1026.6(b)(2)(v). Issuer disclosures on balance transfers show that some issuers have revised their applicable grace 

period policies. These disclosures show that some issuers now allow consumers to retain their grace period while 

revolving a transferred balance so long as they pay the balance generated by new purchases in full each month. 

Although issuers lose some interest revenue from this type of change, consumers stand to benefit from balance 

transfer costs being clearer. In addition, issuers may realize some benefits. The decreased cost of new purchases 

may cause increased use of the card for such purchases. In addition, the issuer may avoid any customer service costs 

associated with the prevailing grace period policy on balance transfers. See 2017 Report, supra note 6, at 193.

186 See 2015 Report, supra note 6, at 126; see also 2017 Report, supra note 6, at 191-193.
104 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

5.4 Cash advances

The cash advance feature, offered on many general purpose credit cards, allows consumers to 

obtain cash or cash equivalents using a portion of their card’s credit line (20 percent of the line 

is common), sometimes called the “cash line.” 187 Unlike balance transfers, cash advances are 

available to any cardholder with sufficient available cash credit line on a card that has the 

feature. Consumers can access cash advances through a variety of means; ATM withdrawals may 

be the most well-known form of cash advance, but they are not the only one. Issuers may treat 

certain credit card purchases as cash advances; this can include such uses as the purchase of 

chips at a casino, gold at a bank, foreign currency, traveler’s checks, gift cards, prepaid cards, 

convenience checks, and virtual currencies;188 The funding of peer-to-peer transfersmay also be 

treated by some issuers as a cash advance. 189 In some cases, when a consumer links a credit card 

to a deposit account in order to cover overdrafts on the latter, the credit card issuer will treat 

that overdraft as a cash advance.

5.4.1 Prevalence

Cash advance volumeswere mostly flat leading up to the pandemic but fell sharply during the 

pandemic and remain well below previous levels. Prior to the pandemic, cash advance volume 

averaged roughly $3 billion per quarter with some seasonalfluctuations, typically showing 

slightly higher volumes in the third quarter of each year.As shown in Figure 13 below,the 

second quarter of 2020 saw cash advance volume decline to less than $2 billion before rising to 

roughly $2.5 billion for the remainder of 2020. One explanation for the decline in cash advance 

187 To the Bureau’s knowledge, some private label cards provide a cash advance feature at the point of sale, but the 

practice is not common and does not fall within the scope of this section.

188 Many transactions effectuated using a “convenience check” may also be treated as cash advances by issuers. 

However, not all such transactions are so treated; depending on how it is used, some may be treated similarly to 

balance transfers. The Bureau therefore excludes convenience check transactions from this analysis (and from its 

analysis of balance transfers in Section 5.2), acknowledging that this likely excludes at least some volume that may 

be identical or near-identical from the consumer perspective.

189 See Ann Carrns, Beware the Fees That Come With Some Money Transfers on Apps, N.Y. Times (Apr. 24, 2020), 

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/24/your-money/fees-mobile-app-payments.html. See also Aaron Hurd & Dia 

Adams, Using A Credit Card To Send Money On PayPal—Should You?, Forbes (June 3, 2021), 

https://www.forbes.com/advisor/credit-cards/using-a-credit-card-to-send-money-on-paypal-should-you/.
105 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

volume may be that measures aimed at mitigating the economic impact of COVID-19, such as

economic stimulus payments and enhanced unemployment benefits, met some of the need 

consumers may otherwise have had for cash during the pandemic. This is generally a positive 

sign for consumers, as cash advances can be a relatively costly form of credit, as discussed in 

Section 5.4.2.

Figure 13: QUARTERLY CASH ADVANCE VOLUME, GENERAL PURPOSE (Y-14+)

Cash advance usage has continued its decline for consumers in all credit score tiers, even 

omitting the singular decline in the second quarter of 2020.Cash advance volumes may have 

beensteady prior to the pandemic, but as the number of credit cards has increased, the 

incidence of cash advance feature usage has declined. Cash advance incidence is relatively 

uniform across credit score tiers, except for consumers with superprime scores who use cash 

advances markedly less than all other cardholders. Cash advance incidence has continued to

decline over the last few years, particularly in the below-prime market segment, as shown in 

Figure 14.

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

$0

$1B

$2B

$3B

$4B
106 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 14: QUARTERLY CASH ADVANCE INCIDENCE, GENERAL PURPOSE (Y-14+)

Average cash advance line is greater for consumers with higher scores, with superprime 

cardholders averaging $3,000 per card, while below-prime score tiers average $1,000 or less. 

Most credit cards restrict access to the cash advance feature by stipulating a separate smaller 

cash advance line that is also part of the cardholder’s overall line. Cardholders may utilize the 

cash advance feature in an amount that is the smaller of either the remaining available line or 

the maximum cash advance line on the card. Given the utilization rate for cards held by 

consumers in below-prime tiers tends to be high, cash advances are likely more limited by the 

remaining card balance than the cash advance line amount. With minimum per-use fees, this 

might mean a cash advance may be more expensive as a share of the amount consumers receive, 

as discussed in Section 5.4.2.

Figure 15: AVERAGE CASH ADVANCE LINE, GENERAL PURPOSE (Y-14)

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Superprime Prime Near-prime

Subprime Deep subprime Overall

Superprime Prime Near-prime Subprime and

deep subprime

Overall

$0

$1,000

$2,000

$3,000

$4,000

2017 2018 2019 2020
107 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

5.4.2 Cost

The cash advance cost structure can be complex, and costs depend on the amount advanced, 

upfront fees, interest rates, and the timing of repayment. 190 Fee structures can be relatively 

complex, with some card agreements stipulating different cash advance fee percentages and 

minimum fee amounts for different cash advance transactions, such as lower fees for ATM 

transactions and higher fees for cash equivalents like casino chips. 191 Cash advance APRs are 

typically higher than purchase APRs, and these transactions are not usually subject to any kind 

of grace period, meaning they begin accruing interest at that higher APR at the point that the 

cash advance is taken, even if the cardholder pays their balance in full every month. 192

Cash advance fees overall fell in 2020 as a result of decreased usage, while remaining steady as a 

share of cash advance volume. Fee volumes had been stable prior to the pandemic, totaling just 

under $750 million per year for issuers in the Y-14+ data. 193 In 2020, due to declines in usage, 

cash advance fee volume fell to roughly $550 million, a decline of nearly 27 percent.As a share 

of volume, cash advance fees averaged 5.0 percentin 2019 and 2020, slightly lower than the 5.2-

5.3 percent seen from2016 to 2018. Cash advance fee ratios are noticeably higher for 

cardholders in lower score tiers, as shown in Figure 16. Minimum fixed fee amounts for cash 

advances in a two-way pricing structure, such as “$10 or 5%,” can translate to high cash advance 

fee ratios for cardholderswho take a small dollar amount cash advance. This is more oftenthe 

case for cardholders with little remaining available credit on their cards.

190 While the vast majority of credit cards charge an upfront fee for cash advances, the Bureau is aware of at least one 

card that does not.

191 See, e.g., U.S. Bank, Cardmember Agreement for U.S. Bank National Association Visa® and Mastercard® 

Classic, Gold and Platinum Accounts, 

https://applications.usbank.com/oad/teamsite/decisioning/usbank/docs/global_default/FR006213482_03_USB.

pdf. 

192 Indirect costs to cardholders such as interest on balances from purchases that would otherwise be treated as 

interest free due to a grace period are not included in calculations of cash advance fee costs, but remain an 

important consideration.

193 Due to a technical error, the aggregate cash advance fee volume figure was misreported in the 2019 Report and has 

therefore been restated correctly here.
108 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 16: QUARTERLY CASH ADVANCE FEES RELATIVE TO CASH ADVANCE VOLUME, GENERAL 

PURPOSE (Y-14+)

5.5 COVID-19 response

The onset of COVID-19 across the United States in the second half of the first quarter of 2020 

triggered a sharp response from consumers, businesses, and government entities. The sum 

effect of those responseswas to abruptly render many ordinary activities prohibited or 

impracticable, which severely impacted the financial security of many consumers.As described 

below, individuals were advised to avoid unnecessary travel outside the home, many businesses 

closed temporarily or permanently, and many workers were laid off or furloughed.

That economic crisis had two significant impacts for credit card issuers. First, as described in 

more detail below, credit card issuers’ operational models suddenly became untenable, 

necessitating a drastic and rapid shift to new ways of doing business. Second, the widespread 

cessation of a great deal of in-person activity sparked the swiftest deterioration in economic 

conditions in modern history, imperiling the ability of millions of consumers to make adequate, 

timely payments of their debts.

This report generally focuses on the state of the consumer credit card market, and in particular 

the impact of COVID-19 on consumer cardholders. The pandemic also had a significant effect on 

the companies that issue credit cards to consumers;how those issuers responded to the crisis 

was a major factor in the ultimate effects of the pandemic on consumer cardholders. This 

section therefore summarizes the impact of COVID-19 on the largest credit card issuers, as well 

as the responses by those issuers to the pandemic. First, this section examines the operational 

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Superprime Prime Near-prime

Subprime Deep subprime Overall
109 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

response of issuers to COVID-19, including actions relating to staffing, risk management, and 

account servicing. Second, it focuses on issuers’ relief efforts.194

With regard to issuers’ operational posture, issuers moved quickly to adjust operations in 

response to the new conditions precipitated by COVID-19; while issuers generally responded 

similarly in some ways (e.g., shifting employees to remote work wherever possible),their 

mitigation attempts varied more in others (e.g., existing credit line management). Issuers 

struggled to maintain existing levels of account servicing, especially at the onset of the 

pandemic. Issuers’ relief efforts likely resulted in consumers preserving billions of dollars in 

liquidity following, and especially immediately following, the onset of the pandemic.

Overall, consumers expressed heightened dissatisfactionwith their credit cards following the 

onset of the pandemic; complaints to the Bureau relating to credit cards rose significantly 

beginning in the first quarter of 2020, and remain at levels elevated relative to the recent prepandemic years, as shown below in Figure 17. 195

194 Except where noted, data supporting this section come from the Bureau’s MMI survey. Therefore, and as noted 

elsewhere in this report, it only represents the experiences of the largest credit card issuers, with the attendant 

caveats also noted elsewhere in this report. While out of scope, the Bureau notes significant evidence for operational 

impacts and relief efforts made by smaller banks and credit unions. See, e.g., Laura Alix, Small-dollar loans 

highlight banks’ coronavirus relief efforts (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/small-dollarloans-highlight-banks-coronavirus-relief-efforts.

195 See supra note 2.
110 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 17: MONTHLY CREDIT CARD COMPLAINTS

However, overall complaints to the Bureau rose significantly; the total volume of complaints 

received by the Bureau in 2020 exceeded 2019 volumes by over 50 percent, and certain sectors 

saw much larger increases in complaint volume, either in raw totals, relative to previous 

volumes, or both. 196

5.5.1 Operational impacts and response

COVID-19 necessitated a sharp adjustment in the operational posture of major credit card 

issuers. Credit card issuers were faced with a series of challenges in how to address demand for 

credit, the need for relief, and the servicing of existing accounts. Issuers were forced to contend 

with all of these challenges simultaneously, in a compressed timeframe, with a high degree of 

uncertainty regarding the short and long-term impact of the pandemic on the economy. Actions 

taken by issuers to address these challenges varied significantly, making a comprehensive 

picture of issuers’ response to COVID-19 difficult to assemble, especially in those areas where 

issuers’ responses proved more varied. 197

196 See Consumer Response Annual Report, supra note 1, at 9.

197 Note that, while drawing on a different source of data representing a different group of issuers, the Bureau’s 

Winter 2021 Supervisory Highlights draws many similar conclusions about issuers’ operational challenges and 

responses in the wake of COVID-19, as well as relating to issuer relief efforts. See Supervisory Highlights, supra

note 13, at 13-14.

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

2018 2019 2020

General purpose Private label
111 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

UNDERWRITING AND CREDIT MANAGEMENT

All surveyed issuers reduced new credit availability in response to the onset of the pandemic. 

Among the most common measures were raising underwriting standards on new accounts and 

pausing or raising underwriting standards on credit line increases (both proactive and 

reactive). 198 Many issuers also reported limiting or raising underwriting standards on certain 

secondary features on accounts, such as balance transfers, cash advances, or over limit 

transactions.

Issuers’ approach to the lines of credit already available to their cardholders varied. Some 

issuers reported decreasing credit lines and closing inactive or high-risk accounts at a higher 

frequency. 199 However, other issuers reported at least temporarily pausing credit line decreases,

certain types of account closures, and certain types of pricing increase activity as well as 

providing other forms of targeted credit expansion.

ACCOUNT SERVICING

COVID-19 led to a large and sudden increase in consumer servicing needs. This spike was driven 

by requests for relief (discussed in the following subsection) and by a wave of disputed 

transactions. While MMI data on disputes are limited and varied, they nonetheless point to a 

sharp uptick in the volume of consumer disputes around the onset of the pandemic compared to 

the prior year, with an even sharper increase in dollars at stake in those disputes. These disputes 

were disproportionately driven, by higher-score consumers disputing transactions on general 

purpose cards; transactions directly related to travel expenditures experienced an even larger 

relative spike in transactions and dollar disputedcompared to other categories. 

198 See supra note 193.

199 For more on credit line management, see Section 4.2.3. Some issuers also discussed these actions in earnings calls 

early in the pandemic. See, e.g., Synchrony Financial, Q1 2020 Results – Earnings Call Transcript, Seeking Alpha 

(Apr. 21, 2020), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4421711-synchrony-financials-syf-ceo-brian-doubles-on-q1-

2021-results-earnings-call-transcript;(“[W]e're continuing to utilize internal and credit bureau triggers to 

dynamically reevaluate the customers' creditworthiness to manage credit exposure, as well as leveraging the latest 

technology to passively authenticate customers and more selectively target high risk behavior.”); American Express, 

Q2 2020 Results – Earnings Call Transcript, Seeking Alpha (July 24, 2020), 

https://seekingalpha.com/article/4360706-american-express-axp-ceo-steve-squeri-on-q2-2020-results-earningscall-transcript. (“[W]e have been very diligent about looking at people who are inactive card members and canceling 

those cards.”).
112 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

At the same time consumer servicing needs were increasing, the pandemic also severely 

impacted the ability of credit card issuers to process consumer servicing requests. This impact 

was most sharply felt at call centers both domestic and abroad, which issuers reported were 

largely closed or extremely restricted in their operations for an extended period following the 

onset of the pandemic due to safety concerns and public health-driven closure orders. However, 

similar impacts also reverberated through other aspects of relevant “back office” operations—

issuers reported difficulties and delays in processing both inbound and outbound mail, 

difficulties maintaining digital servicing portals, and inadequate levels of total or appropriatelytrained staff to handle certain types of disputes or aspects of the dispute process.

Issuers responded to these servicing constraints by implementing measures to bolster capacity 

and reduce customer wait times. Some measures included allowing staff to work from home 

where feasible, adding training to allow more staff to handle disputes, hiring new staff, 

increasing allowances for staff to work overtime, increasing dollar-amount thresholds for certain 

forms of expedited dispute resolution, and making adjustments to customer communications 

across various channels. In many cases issuers reported deploying these measures rapidly, 

within weeks or even in some cases days of the March 13, 2020 federal emergency declaration.200

Consumers who requested to speak with a customer service representative nevertheless

experiencedmuch longer wait times around the onset of the pandemic. On average, consumers 

experienced wait times in the second quarter of 2020 that were many multiples of both the first 

quarter of 2020 and the second quarter of 2019, and in some cases an order of magnitude 

longer. These wait times generally fell substantially over the course of the year; by the fourth 

quarter of 2020, while most issuers reported higher wait times than the comparable quarter of 

2019, those wait times were nevertheless much closer to levels observed in 2019 in most cases. 

200 See 85 FR 15337. Notably, issuers almost wholly abstained from availing themselves from the flexibility offered by 

the Bureau’s May 3, 2020 “Statement on Supervisory and Enforcement Practices Regarding Regulation Z Billing 

Error Resolution Timeframes in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” which “inform[ed] creditors of the Bureau’s 

flexible supervisory and enforcement approach during this pandemic regarding the timeframe within which 

creditors complete their investigations of consumers’ billing error notices.” See Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., 

Statement on Supervisory and Enforcement Practices Regarding Regulation Z Billing Error Resolution 

Timeframes in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic (May 3, 2020), 

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_statement_regulation-z-error-resolution-covid-19_2020-

05.pdf. 
113 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

There was not, however, an apparent spike in the total volume of consumer calls to surveyed 

issuers following the onset of the pandemic. Most issuers reported a decline in total call volumes 

in the second quarter of 2020 from the prior quarter, with none reporting more than a slight 

uptick. This contrastswith 2019, when quarter-over-quarter volumes were much more stable in 

the first half of the year. This decline persisted into the remainder of the year, with surveyed

issuers reporting (in aggregate) receiving only about five-sixths of the total incoming call volume 

in the second half of 2020 as they did in 2019. This decline was also observable for the subset of 

calls in which a consumer requested to speak with a customer service representative. Such calls 

also represented a relatively constant share of all calls over 2019 and 2020. These findings 

suggest that wait time spikes were largely driven by decreased capacity by issuers to field calls, 

rather than an increase in such calls, though Bureau data cannot rule out the possibility that the 

composition of calls made to issuers increased in complexity or difficulty. 201

In some ways, the consumer impact of the acute destabilization in issuer customer service might 

have been worse if issuers had not established digital servicing channels prior to the pandemic. 

As described in more detail in Section 7.2.1 below, increasing numbers of consumer credit card 

accounts are enrolled in digital servicing portals. While Bureausurvey data do not directly allow 

for measuring this, other information indicates that consumers expanded their use of digital 

servicing channels for their financial accounts. 202 If consumers increasingly substituted such 

channels for servicing activity they may have previously done via phone or at a branch location, 

this could explain why issuers did not report a large spike in consumer calls.

ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL IMPACTS

Issuers reported a variety of other operational changes in response to COVID-19 and its effects. 

For example, many issuers made significant changes to their overall marketing and solicitation 

posture, reducing, or eliminating solicitations and messaging with themes that may have been 

seen as dissonant with the moment (e.g., exhortations to spend on travel). Issuers refocused

201 For example, the Bureau’s debt collection-specific data indicates that issuers saw a large influx of calls relating 

specifically to consumer relief, which may have been more complex or time-consuming to resolve than many 

common pre-pandemic call subjects. See Section 6.5 infra.

202 See e.g., Ellen Sheng, Coronavirus crisis mobile banking surge is a shift that’s likely to stick, CNBC (May 27, 

2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/27/coronavirus-crisis-mobile-banking-surge-is-a-shift-likely-tostick.html. 
114 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

efforts on more consonant themes and on messaging specific to relief. Several issuers reported 

accelerating existing efforts to transition their portfolios to contactless cards. 203Several issuers 

also made significant changes to their rewards programs; for example, several issuers extended 

the timeframes for earning sign-up bonuses or avoiding rewards expiration, or allowed 

accumulated rewards to be redeemed in ways perceived as better suited to the moment. 

5.5.2 Consumer relief

Data show that a large and likely-unprecedentednumber of consumers received some form of 

relief on their credit card debts following the onset of COVID-19, all of which was provided 

voluntarily by issuers. Unlike servicers of federally-backed mortgages, which were mandated by 

the CARES Act to provide certain types of forbearance to mortgagors, card issuers were not 

subject to any federal mandate to provide relief on consumers debts. This section discusses first 

the form of consumer relief offered by major credit card issuers and second the impact of that 

relief.204This section describes only relief provided to consumers by issuers that directly 

impacted their credit card accounts; other forms of relief which may have been offered and 

which could have indirectly impacted consumers’ ability to manage their credit card debts are 

not considered here. While this section relies solely on MMI data, other sources of information 

supplement and generally support reported findings. 205

203 Usage of contactless payment methods increased significantly after the onset of COVID-19 (both in the U.S. and in 

other jurisdictions), likely due to public perceptions that such methods entailed a lower risk of transmission of 

COVID-19. For more information regarding contactless payment adoption, see Section 7.2.2.

204 Issuers represented by these data represent a large portion of the market but are not necessarily representative of 

the portion of the market not covered by the data the Bureau receives. Additionally, issuer practices regarding the 

measurement and tracking of the scope and impact of their relief efforts varied considerably, limiting the Bureau’s 

ability to draw precise conclusions from the data provided. The COVID-19 crisis was unprecedented in severity and 

swiftness as well as in its impact on issuers’ operations, but the Bureau expects this experience will inform the 

ongoing efforts of credit card issuers and other consumer finance companies to design strategies to both directly 

address future crises as well as more-robustly track the impacts of those strategies to better allow for their 

evaluation and improvement.

205 See, e.g., Auriemma Research, Impact of Credit Line Changes and Loan Forbearance, Attitudes toward Low or 

No-APR Cards, and ‘Refer a Friend’ Programs, at 34-42(Apr. 2021). N.b. that many credit card issuers are also 

publicly-traded, and many such issuers provided information regarding the structure, take-up, and impact of their 

relief efforts in mandatory filings as well as associated materials.
115 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

FORM OF RELIEF

Issuers generally reported offering relief programs to consumers affected by natural disasters or 

other hardships prior to COVID-19. These programs vary widely across a number of key criteria, 

including eligibility, form of relief and benefit, length, other conditions of receiving the benefits, 

and terms of exit, with different programs serving different purposes or functions in managing 

consumer accounts. While some commonalities were prevalent across issuers’ programs, no two 

issuers offered exactly the same suite of relief programs.

Many surveyed issuers offered short-and long-term payment plans, which generally allowed 

consumers to address outstanding debtsby reducing interest rates and payment amounts due 

for the duration of the program; these programs were structured to allow distressedconsumers 

to escape delinquency and reduce their indebtedness, but also generally restricted a consumer’s 

use of the card during enrollment.

Some issuers also reported offering a variety of short-term relief programs for consumers 

affected by natural disasters. The most common such type of program generally allowed 

consumers in areas affected by natural disasters to reduce or skip a required payment, to 

temporarily suppress certain fees, and/or to forestall certain other activities and events 

associated with their account (for example, blocking credit line decreases that may have 

otherwise occurred). Other issuers offered programs with similar benefits, but not explicitly 

targeted or limited to consumers affected by natural disasters. 

All surveyed issuers reported offering relief specific to COVID-19. Issuers reported developing 

and deploying new relief programs, and/or modifying existing relief programswithin weeks of 

the March 13, 2020 federal emergency declaration. All issuers offered a program which allowed 

consumers to skip payments, with some issuers also offering COVID-19-specific programs 

allowing for relief on a longer timescale. No issuer reported freezing access to, discarding, or 

otherwise substituting COVID-19 relief for existing programs. Issuers generally reported 

engaging in significant marketing campaigns around their relief programs, especially following 

the onset of the pandemic, using a variety of channels to inform consumers about the existence 

of these programs and key details, such as eligibility and impact on account status.

Upon request, all issuer “skip-a-pay” programs allowed consumers to forgo making monthly 

minimum payments, including any finance charges, without any impact on an account’s 

delinquency status. Issuers generally allowed for broad eligibility, though some issuers 

restricted access to skip-a-pay programs to accounts that were not already severely delinquent 
116 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

and/or in certain other statuses (for example, bankruptcy). 206 Issuers generally reported 

requiring applicants to attest to COVID-19-induced hardship, but did not require consumers to 

provide documentation or other evidence of such hardship in order to obtain relief.

While issuers generally waived any late or insufficient funds (NSF) fees associated with the 

account in that cycle, issuers varied more in how they handled interest charges. Some issuers 

waived finance charges as part of their skip-a-pay programs, while others did not (while still 

allowing payment of those charges to be deferred while consumers were enrolled); still other 

issuers handled different types of interest charges differently (for example, waiving monthly 

finance charges generally while assessing-and-deferring certain promotional interest charges ). 

Most issuers waived payments for a single cycle upon request, though some waived more, and 

all issuers allowed consumers to re-enrollin skip-a-pay programs for several consecutive cycles. 

Some issuers reported modifying or withdrawing certain aspects of their COVID-19 relief 

approach over the course of 2020. For example, some issuers who initially waived finance 

charges for skip-a-pay consumers later reinstated them on a deferred basis; some issuers 

reduced the number of cycles for which a consumer qualified after a single enrollment, or 

capped the total number of consecutive cycles for which a consumer could be enrolled.

Among the Bureau’s statutory objectives is to ensure “outdated, unnecessary, or unduly 

burdensome regulations are regularly identified and addressed in order to reduce unwarranted 

regulatory burdens.” 207As part of its MMI survey, the Bureau asked issuers whether any 

provision of any federal consumer financial law (as defined in 12 U.S.C. § 5481(14)) inhibited, 

impeded, or prevented them from offering any relief program they considered, or impacted the 

scope or terms of any relief program they offered. All issuers responded in the negative. The 

Bureau continues to monitor consumer financial markets for indications that provisions of 

206 While Bureau data does not allow for determining whether consumers who had been struggling previously with 

their indebtedness had access to relief programs in practice, other data suggest a significant share of such 

consumers were able to access issuer relief — per Auriemma, “As of Q3-20, 55% of cardholders who had missed a 

payment in the past 12 months were offered a forbearance option from a credit card issuer. 75% of those individuals 

took their credit card issuer up on the offer, likely contributing to the lower proportion who missed a payment by 

Q4-20.” See Auriemma Research, 2020 Trend Database, Cardbeat, at 7.

207 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(3).
117 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

federal consumer financial law or their implementing regulations may cause undue burden or 

otherwise entailunintended adverse consequences for consumers. 208

IMPACT OF RELIEF

Large numbers of consumers benefitted from issuers’ relief programs in 2020. Bureau data 

indicate that approximately 25 million consumer credit card accounts entered relief programs in 

2020, representing approximately $68 billion in consumer debt subject to voluntary issuer 

relief. Entry into relief was concentrated around the onset of the pandemic; the second quarter 

alone saw over two-fifths of the year’s entry into relief by number of accounts (and over half by 

amount of consumer debt); by the fourth quarter, entry into relief had declined to levels closer 

to pre-COVID-19 levels, though it was still elevated.

Payment-deferral programs were the major driver of the robustincrease in relief, though fee 

reversals and waivers or interest rate reductions were also more common in 2020. 209 Over 13 

million accounts received some form of payment deferral (interest-accruing or non-interest 

accruing) representing over $50 billion in consumer indebtedness. 210These figures were well 

over an order of magnitude higher than the comparable figures for 2019. The bulk of the 

remaining relief consisted of fee reversals or waivers, which were also elevated compared to 

2019, with accounts and debts receiving such relief in 2020 representing an approximate 20 

208 See e.g. Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Statement on Supervisory and Enforcement Practices Regarding 

Electronic Credit Card Disclosures in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic (June 3, 2020), 

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_e-sign-credit-card_statement_2020-06.pdf; see also Bureau 

of Consumer Fin. Prot., Open-End (not Home-Secured) Rules FAQs related to the COVID-19 Pandemic (May 13, 

2020), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_faqs_open-end-rules-covid-19_2020-05.pdf. 

209 While payment deferrals were by far the largest overall component of overall relief efforts, that does not mean that 

other relief efforts were not impactful for consumers. See, e.g., Auriemma, “Among these who were offered and took 

a temporary interest rate reduction, 19% of them were able to increase the number [or] amount of credit card 

payments they could make.” See supra note 205, at 8).

210 The structure of the MMI survey entailed some potential double-counting (or triple-counting, etc.) of accounts if 

such accounts received more than one type of relief during a quarter. However, in practice this appears to have been 

limited, with the sum total of all individual relief types reported representing approximately 29 million accounts 

and $78 billion in consumer debt, numbers not much greater than the total reported receiving any relief (a figure 

which counts each account only once). Therefore, it appears that most accounts only received one type of relief 

during a quarter, with most of the double-counting likely coming from accounts that received both payment 

deferrals and fee reversals or waivers.
118 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

percent and 50 percent increase over 2019, respectively. Accounts and debt enrolled in interest 

rate reduction relief or other forms of relief were mostly in line with 2019 levels. General 

purpose accounts represented roughly six-in-ten accounts granted a payment deferral in 2020, 

with retail accounts representing the balance, but general-purpose accounts represented nearly 

four-fifths of the consumer debt subject to a payment deferral in 2020. 211

Based on those findings and subject to certain assumptions, the Bureau estimates that surveyed 

issuers’ cardholders were able to forgo principal payments of anywhere from $0.5 billion to $1.5 

billion against their credit card debts in 2020 due to these relief programs. While making 

similar inferences regarding the interest payments consumers were permitted to forgo is more 

challenging, it is plausible that the figure may be comparable to the above estimate for principal 

payments. 212,213Especially when incorporating information about the relief utilized by 

cardholders of other issuers not within the MMI survey, it is likely that all consumer cardholders 

were able to forgo several billion dollars in otherwise-mandatory payments to credit card 

companies over the course of 2020. This relief came at a time when many consumers found 

themselves suddenly facing joblessness or reduced incomes while simultaneously at risk from 

COVID-19. The scale of this relief and the speed with which it was deployed therefore likely 

represented substantial benefits to the consumers who received it, allowing them to redeploy 

their limited and, likely in many cases, interrupted or diminished flow of income and other 

incoming funds towards other urgent needs.

Entries into payment deferral relief were spread fairly evenly across credit score tiers. In 2020, 

nearly four million prime accounts held by surveyed issuers received payment deferrals, 

compared to nearly three million superprime and near-prime accounts and closer to two million 

211 Consumers carry higher balances on average on general purpose accounts. See Section 2.2.1.

212The Bureau’s MMI survey did not indicate how many consumers were presently revolving at the time they entered 

relief, which means Bureau data cannot determine what share of consumers who were permitted to skip a 

mandatory payment were skipping payments which included a finance charge as well as a principal payment.

213 In most cases the interest nonetheless accrued, meaning the benefit to consumers was primarily one of preserved 

liquidity at a moment of crisis, not a discount on their costs of indebtedness. However, a not-insignificant share of 

payment deferrals were accompanied by interest waivers, meaning that inthose cases issuers permanently forewent 

that income to the benefit of consumers. 
119 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

subprime and deep subprime accounts. 214 However, accounts held by consumers with lower 

scores received payment deferrals at the highest rates of any credit score tier – nearly one-in-six 

subprime and deep subprime accounts received a payment deferral, compared to roughly onein-ten among near-prime, one-in-twenty among prime, and just one-in-one-hundred among 

superprime accounts. As a share of balances, lower-score consumers showed an even greater 

relative impact from deferral programs. Rates of overall payment deferral peaked in the second 

quarter of 2020, with about 3 percent of consumer accounts (and nearly 7 percent of consumer 

credit card debt) receiving such a deferral in that period.

Available data suggest broad-based access to issuers’ relief programs generally, but it remains 

unclear how many consumers were unaware of or unable to take advantage of issuer relief 

programs. While the Bureau’s data provide limited further visibility into whether morevulnerable consumers were able to fully and equally benefit from relief efforts, other evidence 

suggests that large numbers of such consumers were indeed able to access relief from their 

credit card issuers. Data from the August 2020 Survey of Consumer Financial Expectations 

found that 11 percent of those surveyed reported receiving some assistance from their credit 

card company. 215Nonwhite cardholders were much more likely to receive credit card debt relief 

than white cardholders at 19.7 percent and 9.7 percent respectively. 216 Additionally, a greater 

share of consumers with incomes less than $60 thousand per year received relief than those 

with higher incomes. Cardholders who faced an income drop in 2020 were also more likely to 

receive relief. 217

214 Unsurprisingly given the higher average balances held by consumers with higher credit scores (see Section 2.2 

above), this distribution was more skewed towards higher-score accounts when examined through the lens of 

consumer debt, with prime accounts representing nearly two-fifths of all debt receiving payment deferrals, nearly 

twice as much as deep subprime and subprime accounts combined.

215 Beyond payment forbearance, this also includes fee and interest rate reductions and credit card limit increases. See

Rajashri Chakrabarti, Jessica Lu, Joelle Scally, and Wilbert van der Klaauw, Who Received Forbearance Relief?, 

Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Aug. 2, 2021), https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2021/08/whoreceived-forbearance-relief/. 

216 Id.

217 Id.
120 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Unlike the Great Recession, cardholders have largely avoided delinquency and charge off, as of 

the time of this report writing. As noted above in Section 2, overall rates of delinquency and 

charge-off declined significantly following the onset of COVID-19. 218 Several factors likely played 

a role in this development, such as extensive public aid to consumers (including Economic 

Impact Payments, increased unemployment insurance payments and expanded unemployment 

insurance coverage, and the Paycheck Protection Program), government-mandated forbearance 

on certain types of loans (including some mortgages and student loans), an increase in 

charitable giving, 219 state and federal moratoria and other limitations on tenant eviction, and 

other forbearance and relief voluntarily offered by financial institutions, as well as the recovery 

in employment and income over the latter half of 2020. However, much of that aid may not have 

made its way to struggling consumers with credit card debts until weeks or months after those 

consumers experienced a sudden and unexpected loss in income. 220As noted earlier, surveyed 

issuers made payment deferral widely and rapidly available after the onset of the pandemic. This 

may have served to tide many consumers over until they could access those supports and 

programs outlined above.

218 See Sections 2.5 and 2.6.

219 See, e.g., AFP Foundation for Philanthropy, FEP Reports, https://afpglobal.org/fepreports (last visited Aug. 18, 

2021).

220 To take one such aid program as an example, the IRS reported distributing nearly 90 million Economic Impact 

Payments totaling over $160 billion between the passage of the CARES Act on March 27, 2020 and April 17, 2020. 

See IRS, Treasury, IRS deliver 89.5 million Economic Impact Payments in first three weeks, release state-by-state 

Economic Impact Payment figures (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/treasury-irs-deliver-89-point5-million-economic-impact-payments-in-first-three-weeks-release-state-by-state-economic-impact-paymentfigures. Those figures reached approximately 127 million and $216 billion, respectively, by May 8th, and 159 million 

and $267 billion by June 3rd, 2020, with distribution continuing after that point as well. See IRS, Treasury, IRS 

release latest state-by-state Economic Impact Payment figures (May 8, 2020), 

https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/treasury-irs-release-latest-state-by-state-economic-impact-payment-figures and 

see also IRS, 159 million Economic Impact Payments processed; Low-income people and others who aren’t 

required to file tax returns can quickly register for payment with IRS Non-Filers tool (Jun, 3, 2020), 

https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/159-million-economic-impact-payments-processed-low-income-people-andothers-who-arent-required-to-file-tax-returns-can-quickly-register-for-payment-with-irs-non-filers-tool. As noted 

earlier in this subsection, the economic deterioration brought on by COVID-19 was extremely swift, with 20 million 

jobs vanishing by the end of April 2020. It is therefore plausible that at least some consumers with credit card debt 

who experienced a sudden loss of job or other income in late March or early April of 2020 may not have received 

their Economic Impact Payments until several months later, highlighting the potential impact to those consumers of 

being able to defer their credit card payments during that intervening period.
121 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

5.6 Card agreements

Pursuant to the CARD Act and the Bureau’s implementing regulations, theBureau has collected

agreements for open-end consumer credit card plans on a quarterly basis since 2011. 221Recent 

technological investments in text analysis software allow the Bureau to present some initial 

findings from more than 10,000 cardholder agreements submitted by credit cardissuers

pursuant to those CARD Act requirements over the past five years. These documents from the 

CFPB’s Credit Card Agreement Database (“Database”) represent most agreements and their 

associated pricing addenda for general purpose cards based on submissions at year’s end from 

2016 through 2020. 222Previous Bureaureports utilized only a sample of documents from the 

Database to examine agreement length, readability, and late fee terms. 223This sectionis broader 

in scope than those prior efforts and examines agreement length and grade level alongside 

Spanish-language presence and arbitration-clause incidence, while also showing how credit card 

agreements change over time.

Relying on text analysis software rather than manual reviewposes new difficulties. If none of an 

issuer’s agreements for a given quarter could be successfully scanned by optical character 

recognition(OCR), then the institutionis excluded from analysis. Some 11.8 percent of 

submissions were not possible to transformusingOCR. On average each quarter, 21.8 percent of 

issuers had at least one agreement that did not scan, and 10.6 percent of institutionshad zero 

agreements that successfully scanned. Due to the submission practice of severalissuers where

an agreement includes pricing information for multiple distinct credit card products,the Bureau 

cannot currently determine the share of products or consumers impacted by specific agreement 

provisions.Card issuers are also not required to submit any agreements to the Bureau if that 

issuer has fewer than 10,000 open card accounts as of the last business day of the calendar 

221 Prior to July 21, 2011, this responsibility belonged to the Board. The Bureau suspended this collection for a oneyear period in order to pursue certain process improvements. 80 FR 21153 (Apr. 17, 2015); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.58(g).

222 The fourth quarter of 2020 may include omissions due to regulatory flexibility due to the Bureau’s COVID-19 

regulatory flexibility statement. See supra note 32.

223 The 2013 report reviewed a sample of cardholder agreements for large issuers to examine potential CARD Act 

impacts on agreement length and form, and the 2015 report expanded this analysis by relying on a bigger sample 

from different classes of issuer. In the 2019 report, the Bureau examined the late fee terms of credit card 

agreements from banks included in the Y-14+ panel.
122 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

quarter. 224 Taken together, while these challengesmay limit the representativeness of the 

results, the Bureau believes the volume of agreements analyzed is sufficient to reliably draw 

certain conclusions from these data, presentedherein.

5.6.1 Readability

The decisions issuers make when drafting cardholder agreementsdetermine which consumers

can be expected to be able to read and understandtheir credit card’s terms and conditions. 

Three barriers to comprehension of cardholder agreements explored in this section include 

length, complexity, and English proficiency.

Larger issuers tend to offer longer agreements, as measured by the number of sentences in each 

document. Figure 18 depicts the length of agreements for different issuer groups over time. The 

bars illustrate the median number of sentences per document for each credit card issuer group.

The black vertical lines for each bar show the 25th and 75th percentiles.While the median 

agreement length for smaller banks has increased slightly since 2016, its variance has as well. In 

contrast, credit unions outside the top 20 issuers by outstandings tend to have shorter 

cardholder agreements than any other group – the 75th percentile sentence length for credit 

unions is below the median value of all other institutions over the past five years.

224 12 CFR § 1026.58(c)(5).
123 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 18: MEDIAN SENTENCE COUNT OF GENERAL PURPOSE CARDHOLDER AGREEMENTS

While the top issuers’ agreements may be longer on average, they are also easier to read. Figure 

19 shows the median Flesch-Kincaid grade level by issuer class. This metricapproximates 

complexity and calculates expected reading level by considering the average number of words 

per sentence and syllables per word in a document. The median Flesch-Kincaid grade level of 

12.4 in the 2020 data indicates fewer than half of all agreements should be readable by a highschool graduate. This has steadily increased from a value of 12.0 in 2016. However, agreements 

in the top quartile for smaller banks and credit unions now equal or exceed the expected reading 

level of cardholderswho have completedtwo years of post-secondary education. Previous 

research foundthat about half of adults could not read a book at an eighth-grade level; this 

analysis suggests that most Americans would find the median agreement above their reading 

level. 225

225 These estimates correspond with findings from previous reports, see generally supra note 6. See also Institute of 

Education Sciences National Center for Educational Statistics, The Health Literacy of America’s Adults, U.S. 

Department of Education (Sep. 2006), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/2006483.pdf. 

Top 20 issuers by outstandings Other banks Other credit unions

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
124 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 19: MEDIAN FLESCH-KINCAID GRADE LEVEL OF GENERAL PURPOSE CARDHOLDER 

AGREEMENTS

As over one-fifth of the U.S. population over the age of five speaks a language other than English 

at home, and more than 26 million people have limited English proficiency (“LEP”), a wide 

swath of consumers may face difficulties understanding credit card terms and conditions if 

agreements are only available in English. 226 Since Spanish speakers constitute the largest share 

of the LEP population, the analysis focused specifically on the availability of agreements in 

Spanish.

While not requiredby regulation, about a dozen issuers submitted Spanish-language 

agreements to the database in 2020. Half of these are banks located in Puerto Rico, two are 

smaller institutions located in California and New York, and the remainder are major issuers. To 

explore the larger question of the prevalence of Spanish-translated agreements, the Bureaualso 

examined agreements published on the top 20 issuers’ public websites and found that less than

one-third provided easily-accessible Spanish translations of cardholder agreements. This limited 

analysis does not consider other methods through which institutions may service the LEP 

population such as interpretation services or Spanish-speaking customer service lines.

Additionally, the rise of digital servicing and mobile banking has led to greater access to credit 

226Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean, and Tagalog speakers sequentially represent the largest LEP populations in the 

United States after Spanish. See 82 FR 53482.

Top 20 issuers by outstandings Other banks Other credit unions

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
125 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

card services for the LEP populationover the past decade as issuers increasingly include 

functionality that allows consumers to change their language preferences. 227

5.6.2 Arbitration clauses

The use of arbitration clauses in general purpose agreements offeredby credit card issuers 

appears to have increased over the past five years, as measured by the percentage of institutions

who included at least one reference to arbitration in their submissions to the database at year’s 

end. As shown in Figure 20, large issuers are more likely than smaller banks and credit unions 

to include arbitration clauses in cardholder agreements, but credit unions are increasingly 

adopting this practice. A previous manual reviewof 423 credit card contracts submitted to the

Database in 2013 found that 15.8 percent of issuers included arbitration clauses in their credit 

card contracts. 228As of 2013, 75 percent of the 20 largest bank issuers used arbitration clauses 

while only 3.3 percent of credit unions did so. 229 These values are nearly identical to 2016 levels 

in a sample of agreements from 535 issuers. Since then, the percentage of the top 20 largest 

issuers that include arbitration clauses in at least one of their contracts has remained largely 

static while the percentage of credit unions with at least one arbitration clause at year’s end has 

227 See Payments Dive, Us Bank adds functionality to mobile app, including Spanish language and account insights

(Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.paymentsdive.com/ex/mpt/news/us-bank-adds-functionality-to-mobile-appincluding-spanish-language-and-account-insights/; Hilary Burns, Bank of America redesigns mobile app, adds 

Spanish-language option, Charlotte Business Journal (July 21, 2016), 

https://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/news/2016/07/21/bank-of-america-redesigns-mobile-app-addsspanish.html; Chase, Press Release, Chase Launches New Spanish Online Banking Experience (Oct. 4, 2012), 

https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20121004005714/en/Chase-Launches-New-Spanish-Online-BankingExperience.

228 Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Arbitration Study, at 10 (Mar. 2015), 

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf.

229 Id. 
126 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

tripled. 230While some institutions allow consumers to opt-out of arbitration provisions within a 

stated period after signing an agreement, the process to do so may be burdensome. 231

Figure 20: ARBITRATION CLAUSE INCIDENCE IN GENERAL PURPOSE CARDHOLDER AGREEMENTS

230 The change in the percentage of top 20 issuers using arbitration clauses in 2020 is due to the practices of one 

issuer. See Emily Flitter, JPMorgan Chase Seeks to Prohibit Card Customers From Suing, N.Y. Times (June 4, 

2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/business/jpmorgan-chase-credit-card-arbitration.html.

231 The communication expressing this intent to reject an arbitration clause often must be printed and physically 

mailed to the company, although there are reports of at least one issuer allowing consumers to opt-out via text 

message. See Barbar Krasnoff, You should opt out of the Apple Card’s arbitration clause—here’s how, The Verge 

(Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/20/20813800/apple-card-pay-arbitration-clause-goldmansachs-credit-how-to-opt-out.

Top 20 issuers by outstandings Other banks Other credit unions

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
127 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

6. Credit card debt collection 

As part of its review of the practices of credit card issuers, the Bureau surveyed several large 

issuers to better understand practices and trends in credit card debt collection. These same large 

credit card issuers were also surveyed for the Bureau’s reports published in 2015, 2017, and 

2019. Findings from the Bureau’s current survey (the MMI dataset) are reported in this section. 

First, this section provides background information on the overall market for consumer debt 

collection. Second, this section reviews issuer policies and practices with respect to resolving 

delinquent debt prior to charge-off, including communication practices, use of first-party and 

third-party collectors, and loss mitigation programs. Third, this section reports on the recovery 

of debt following charge-off, including measures of recovery of charged-off debt through various 

channels, such as third-party agency collections, debt sale, and litigation. Finally, this section 

highlights COVID-19-pandemic-related developments in credit card debt collections practices.

6.1 Debt collection markets

After several years of growth, consumer debt surpassed its 2008 peak in 2017, rising to a new 

high of $14.3 trillion in the first quarter of 2020, according to the New York Federal Reserve. 232

Non-housing debt, which comprises most of the debt in third-party collections, rose to a new 

high of $4.2 trillion in the first quarter of 2020. During the pandemic, non-housing debt saw a 

record decline of $86 billion in the second quarter of 2020, followed by $15 billion and $37 

232 These consumer debt figures are in nominal dollars and are unadjusted for inflation and population growth, which 

have both increased over time. See Fed. Rsrv. Bank of New York, Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit 

2020: Q4 (Nov. 2020), 

https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/hhdc_2020q4.pdf.
128 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

billion increases in the third and fourth quarters of 2020 and an $18 billion decline in the first 

quarter of 2021, respectively.233This change was primarily driven by a record $76 billion decline 

in credit card debt during the second quarter.234

DEBT COLLECTION INDUSTRY SIZE

Most large credit card issuers use their own employees and resources to collect some portion of 

their delinquent debts. Many creditors also engage third parties to collect debts on their behalf 

or sell uncollected debts to debt buyers who then collect the debts themselves or through a third 

party. Third-party debt collection industry revenue has declined in recent years, decreasing from 

an estimated $14.1 billion in 2013 to $12.7 billion in 2019.235After years of decline, employment 

in the third-party debt collection industry has leveled off since 2017 to roughly 141,000 US 

workers as of 2019.236The industry continues to consolidate, with the number of debt collection 

enterprises declining by 30 percent and the number of debt collection establishments declining 

by 28 percentfrom 2011-2019, as can be seen in Figure 1.237

233 See Section 2.2 for further discussion of repayment trends.

234 Auto loan debt, student loan debt, and other types of non-housing debt have seen relatively modest changes during 

2020.

235 See Gabriel Schulman, Debt Collection Agencies in the US, IBISWorld (Dec. 2020).

236 Id.

237 Id.
129 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 1: DEBT COLLECTION INDUSTRY SHRINKAGE BY ENTERPRISES AND ESTABLISHMENTS, 2010-

2020 (IBISWORLD) 238

TYPES OF CONSUMER DEBT

Debt collection affects millions of Americans. About 26 percent of consumers have a third-party 

collection tradeline furnished to their credit report, according to the Bureau’s Consumer Credit 

Panel (CCP). A Bureau survey on consumers’ experiences with debt collection found that about 

one-in-three consumers with a credit file — over 70 million consumers — indicated that they 

had been contacted by at least one creditor or collector trying to collect one or more debts 

during the year prior to the survey.239Debt collection efforts include phone calls, letters, emails, 

filing lawsuits, and other methods to collect alleged debts from consumers. 

Most consumers with collection tradelines on their credit files have medical, 

telecommunications, retail, or banking and financial services debt.240 In 2018, healthcare debt 

made up 58 percent of third-party collections tradelines in the Bureau’s CCP.241 However, 

238 “Enterprises” refers to the number of debt collection businesses in operation. Each enterprise may have multiple 

locations; thus, “establishments” is a larger figure.

239 Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Consumer Experiences with Debt Collections: Findings from the CFPB’s Survey of 

Consumer Views on Debt (Jan. 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/documents/2251/201701_cfpb_DebtCollection-Survey-Report.pdf. 

240Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Releases Report on Third-Party Debt 

Collections (July 2019), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/bureau-releases-report-thirdparty-debt-collections/.

241 Id.

2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

Establishments Enterprises
130 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

several debt types may be underreported because they are furnished by the creditor and hence 

do not appear as collections tradelines. In particular, credit card debt likely accounts for a much 

larger share of accounts in third-party collections than the below figure suggests.

Figure 2: DISTRIBUTION OF ORIGINAL CREDITOR TYPE AMONG THIRD-PARTY COLLECTIONS 

TRADELINES IN Q2 2018 (CCP) 242

A large majority of the industry’s revenue is generated by firms contracting with creditors and 

debt buyers to collect their debts on a contingency fee basis. In contingency fee collections, the 

creditor and the collector each receive a share of the amount collected. A small share of 

collectors employs fixed fee collections. 

The three largest debt buyers’ share of total revenue increased by 27 percent from 2015 to 

2019.243A significant source of industry revenue comes from debt buyers, who purchase 

accounts (usually contained in portfolios) from the original creditor or other debt buyers and 

then generally seek to collect on the debt, either by themselves or through third-party debt 

collectors. Whereas third-party contingency collectors receive only a percentage share of 

recoveries, debt buyers purchase the debt at a fraction of the account balance, and their revenue 

consists of the total amount recovered. If debt buyers use third-party debt collectors to recover 

for them, the debt buyers typically pay a share of the amount collected to the third-party debt 

collectors.According to the CCP, debt buyers furnished 12.5 percent of third-party collections 

242 Id.

243 See Schulman, supra note 235.

Unknown

Banking

Other

Financial

Utilities

Retail

Telecommunications

Medical

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
131 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

tradelines. The Bureau has found that portfolios of charged-off debt may also be available to 

purchase through online debt marketplaces.244During much of 2020, participants in the debt 

collection industry reported an increase in consumer contacts and payments. Some states 

instituted pandemic measures that impacted the debt collection industry and consumers, such 

as include prohibitions on new wage garnishments or bank attachments, and requirements that 

consumers be offered the option to defer scheduled payments.245

6.2 Collections prior to charge-off

This section reviews surveyed issuers’ policies, procedures, and practices with respect to 

resolving delinquent debt prior to accounts reaching 180 days of delinquency. In response to the 

Bureau’s survey, issuers provided information regarding restrictions on contacting consumers, 

use of electronic communications (e.g., email or SMS), technology and software used as part of 

their collection strategies, use of first-and third-party collectors, and loss mitigation practices 

for collection activities prior to charge-off.246

All respondents reported conducting some pre-charge-off collection activities in-house. An 

issuer’s in-house collection efforts may include such methods as calling, texts, emails, letters, 

web chat, and social media. Most of the issuers also supplemented the activities of their inhouse agents with first-party collectors: outside collectors who work under the name and the 

direction of the creditor when collecting on delinquent debt. An issuer may also turn to a thirdparty agency to collect in the agency’s own name and not in the name of the original creditor. 

More than half of the surveyed issuers worked with third-party collectors prior to charge-off.

244 Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Market Snapshot: Online Debt Sales (Jan. 2017),

https://www.consumerfinance.gov/documents/2249/201701_cfpb_Online-Debt-Sales-Report.pdf/. 

245 Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Supervisory Highlights COVID-19 Prioritized Assessments Special Edition, Issue 

23 (Jan. 2021), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_supervisory-highlights_issue-23_2021-

01.pdf. 

246 Most issuers use proprietary case management software for their internal collections. Issuers rely on a small 

number of vendors for their dialer software and hardware, mainly Avaya and Aspect dialers.
132 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

6.2.1 Pre-charge-off communications

Issuers reported having policies in place that specify the frequency with which their collectors 

can call, leave voicemails, email, text, and otherwise contact a consumer regarding a delinquent 

account. Table 1 below provides the ranges of issuers’ policy limits on consumer contact via 

various media and actual average attempts for each of those media. Issuers reported that their 

call intensity strategies depended on an account’s stage of delinquency and risk level, among 

other factors. 

TABLE 1: RANGES OF CONSUMER CONTACT POLICY LIMITS AND ACTUAL AVERAGE ATTEMPTS IN 

2020 (MMI)

Policy limit or 

actual attempts

Phone call 

attempts per 

day 

Phone calls 

after right party 

contact

Voicemails per 

day

Postal letters 

per month 

Policy limit 3 to 11

No additional 

calls on contact 

date

1 to 2 1 to 4

Actual average 

attempts247 1.25 to 2.99 Zero per account on contact date 0.04 to 0.90 0.23 to 1.64

Issuers reported far fewer contact attempts on average per account than allowed by policies. All 

surveyed issuers reported that their policies included daily caps per account on phone calls. 

Daily contact attempt policy limits ranged from three calls to 11 calls per account. Noticeably, 

the ends of this range increased from their previous values of two and nine, respectively, as 

discussed in the Bureau’s 2019 Report.248A minority of respondents also set a weekly cap on 

telephone call attempts at 21 to 77 calls per week per account, and a minority set customer-level 

caps, which ranged from six to nine attempts per day. While most issuers surveyed allowed no 

more than one voicemail per account per day, a small minority reported allowing two voicemails 

247 Average attempts via the telephone and voicemail channels were defined as the number of calls made or voicemails 

left to all accounts that were called divided by the number of unique delinquent accounts that were called in a given 

period of time. For postal letters sent, average attempts by letter was defined as the number of letters sent to 

delinquent accounts divided by the number of unique delinquent accounts. The time frames were daily, weekly, or 

monthly, depending on common practices in that channel.

248 See 2019 Report, supra note 6, at 314.
133 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

per account per day. This differs from the findings in the Bureau’s 2019 Report, at which time all 

respondents reported a policy limit of one voicemail per account per day.249The actual average 

number of voicemails per account per day ranged from 0.04 to 0.90 in 2020. Issuers averaged 

between 1.3 and 3.0 contact attempts via telephone per day. Even though policy maximums 

increased since the 2019 report, actual average attempts decreased from the range in the 2019 

report of 1.4 to 3.5. However, no issuer allowed calls to continue within a given day once “right 

party contact” has been made. Right party contact occurs when the issuer or collector can reach 

and speak with the consumer whom the issuer believes is responsible for the debt via telephone. 

The majority of respondents reported that they did not track in-house and first-party contact 

attempts separately for pre-charge-off collections. Quarterly right party contact rates in 2020 

averaged between 0.6 percent and 8.1 percent for in-house and first-party collections and 

between o.5 percent and 7.0 percent for third-party collections.250 Issuers who placed precharge-off accounts with third-party collection agencies stated that they often assign “high risk,” 

late-stage delinquent accounts to third-party collectors, reducing right-party contact rates. 

All the issuers surveyed also reported using email as part of their credit card collection strategy, 

but the degree to which they used it varied widely. The reported percentage of email-eligible 

accounts (defined as accounts for which the consumer provided a valid email address and 

agreed to be contacted at that address) ranged from 71.5 to 92.6 percent. The monthly average 

percent of email-eligible accounts increased from 68.3 percent in 2018 to 84.1 percent in 2020. 

Roughly two-thirds of accounts with eligible email identification received an email related to 

debt collection.251Therefore, the percent of all pre-charge off delinquent accounts that received 

an email increased from 45.8 percent in 2018 to 52.8 percent, implying greater adoption of the 

email channel by card issuers. However, survey respondents reported that on average, only 31.9 

percent of accounts that received email clicked open their emails.252 This low click-open rate 

249 Id.

250 The survey defined “right party contact rate” as the number of times live contact with the primary or joint account 

holder or power of attorney of the debt was made during the quarter divided by the total number of outbound dialer 

attempts made to delinquent accounts in the quarter. 

251 This figure is similar to the figure in the 2019 Report, supra note 6.

252 The click-open rate was not tracked in the prior report.
134 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

could be attributed to consumer concerns about email spam. An average of less than one percent 

of emails bounced back, potentially indicating that issuers generally have valid emails on their 

files. Many issuers reported using email proactively for account servicing (e.g., sending

reminders about a pending withdrawal from a consumer’s bank account for a recurring 

payment) as part of their pre-charge-off communication strategy. Fewer issuers stated that they 

used email only reactively, such as when a consumer initiated a conversation online or requested 

that documents be sent by email. Issuers who reported using email typically restricted the 

number of emails that could be sent to 2 or 3 emails per week. 

TABLE 2: EMAIL, TEXT, AND WEB CHAT ELIGIBILITY AND ENGAGEMENT RATES, MONTHLY AVERAGES 

2020 (MMI)

Email Text Web chat 

Percent of accounts 

eligible for the 

channel 253

84.1% 60.3% Not applicable

Percent of eligible 

accounts engaged254 62.8% 36.6% 1.40%

Click-open rate255 31.9% Not applicable Not applicable

Bounce-back rate256 0.9% Not applicable Not applicable

The share of issuers using text messages as part of their credit card collection strategy has 

continued to increase since the Bureau began tracking this figure in its 2017 Report. While in the 

2019 Report, less than two-thirds of those surveyed said they sent mobile text messages to 

253 Defined as the total number of unique delinquent accounts with a consented email address or text-consented 

cellphone number in a month divided by the total number of unique delinquent accounts in that same month.

254 Defined as the number of unique delinquent accounts that were emailed in a month divided by the total number of 

unique delinquent accounts with a consented email address in that same month.

255 Defined as the number of emails sent to delinquent accounts that were clicked open in a month divided by the total 

number of emails sent to delinquent accounts in that same month.

256 Defined as the number of emails sent to delinquent accounts returned undeliverable in a month divided by total 

number of emails sent to delinquent accounts in that same month.
135 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

communicate with delinquent consumers, almost all respondents said they used text messages 

during the latest survey period. Two-thirds of issuers surveyed also reported engaging with 

delinquent consumers via “web chat,” where a consumer can click a chat button on the issuer’s 

webpage to communicate about their debt with a collections agent, which remained stable from 

the last report. In addition to account management, most issuers allowed consumers to handle 

settlement negotiations and payment arrangements via web chat. Some issuers restricted the 

use of web chat services to pre-charge off collections only. Surprisingly, the percent of eligible 

accounts engaged via web chat declined since the 2019 report from 2.5 percent to 1.4 percent, 

contrary to industry-wide trends towards greater adoption of digital channels. Most issuers did 

not track data on the use of electronic channels (email, text, and web chat) by their third-party 

collectors. All respondents reported not utilizing social media communication as a collection 

tool for obtaining information about or communicating with consumers.

COLLECTING FROM LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY (LEP) CUSTOMERS 

All surveyed credit card issuers had the capacity, within their collections function, to 

accommodate consumers with Limited English Proficiency or consumers that express the desire 

to communicate in a language other than English. A minority of respondents indicated 

providing web chat services in Spanish. Most issuers had a unit of bilingual collectors to 

communicate with consumers with a Spanish-language preference. For communicating with 

consumers with preferences for other foreign languages, all issuers leveraged translation 

services. In cases where the third-party collectors cannot provide such services, they are 

required to return the accounts back to the card issuer. For the two-thirds of surveyed issuers 

that tracked consumer language preferences, the share of pre-charge-off delinquent balances 

owed by consumers that expressed a preference for a language other than English averaged 3.7

percent in 2020, while it varied from a low of 2.2 percent to a high of 7.6 percent among issuers.

PRE-DELINQUENT COLLECTIONS 

While only some issuers reported having pre-delinquent collections strategies in the 2019 

survey, almost all issuers reported having such strategies in place in the current survey. The predelinquent collections strategies involved pursuing collections on accounts that were current 

and past the payment due date (i.e., had not become delinquent yet). These issuers focused on 

subsets of these accounts that were tagged as high-risk, based on factors such as risk score, high 

balance, over-limit condition, and past delinquency. While most issuers pursue softer contact 

strategies on such accounts, such as email and text reminders, a few respondents did not 

differentiate these accounts from other pre-charge off delinquent accounts in collections.
136 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

6.2.2 First-party collections

Pre-charge off, two-thirds of issuers used first-party collectors to support in-house collection 

activities. Those issuers typically reported allocating work randomly between in-house and firstparty collectors based on collector availability, requiring that first-party collectors place 

outbound calls, handle inbound calls, and document their work using issuers’ own case 

management system and dialer technology. Issuers reported that they generally do not track 

pre-charge-off account placements separately between in-house and first-party collections. Most 

issuers that used first-party collectors noted that they do not place any specific sub-segments of 

accounts with first-party agencies. However, a minority of respondents allocated higher-risk 

accounts to first-party collectors.

First-party collection companies were typically paid on a full-time employee (“FTE”) basis, 

unlike the contingency fee model used to compensate third-party collectors. On average, issuers 

reported keeping 96 percent of pre-charge-off debt balances to be worked in-house and by firstparty collectors, with the remaining 4 percent placed with third-party collectors.257 The number 

of unique first-party agencies used across issuers remained relatively stable year-over-year 

between 2019 and 2020, with 18 unique agencies in 2019 and 17 in 2020. These figures marked 

a significant increase from the 11 unique agencies reported for 2018. Banks that used first-party 

agencies reported employing four unique first-party agencies on average in 2020, witha low of 

one to a high of six. The services of one particular agency were used by half of the respondents.

6.2.3 Third-party contingency collections

More than half of the surveyed issuers worked with third-party contingency collectors prior to 

charge-off, which remained the same compared to the Bureau’s 2019 Report.258All surveyed 

issuers reported using a combined total of 62 unique third-party agencies in 2019 and 55 in 

2020. For issuers that used third-party collection agencies prior to charge-off, the average share 

of pre-charge-off debt placed with third-party collectors remained flat at 4 percent between 

257 These figures represent the percentage of pre-charge off balances that each issuer retained for in-house and firstparty collections and placed with third-party collectors, averaged across all issuers. 

258 See 2019 Report, supra note 6.
137 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

2019 and 2020. The share of pre-charge off third-party placements declined significantly from 

the 11 percent reported in 2018. A minority of respondents placed specialized account types with 

third-party collectors, such as debt consolidation, deceased, and pending bankruptcy accounts. 

Issuers that used third-party agencies reported employing 12 unique third-party agencies on 

average in 2020, with a low of five to a high of 20. The services of five particular agencies were 

used by half of the respondents in 2020.

AGENCY COMPENSATION

Most issuers that contracted with third-party agencies for pre-charge-off collections paid a 

contingency fee that was a percentage of the amount collected. These fees ranged from 9.5 

percent to 23.0 percent, which is likely attributable to differences in the risk profile of the 

accounts being placed with third-party collectors. The average third-party pre-charge off 

contingency fee was 15.7 percent in 2020, which compares to 15.3 percent in 2018. Generally, 

highly collectible accounts command lower contingency fees compared to those perceived as 

being more difficult to collect. For instance, some respondents placed specialized account types 

with third-party collectors, such as debt consolidation, deceased, and pending bankruptcy 

accounts, thereby impacting the contingency fees offered. Most issuers also provided additional 

incentives to third-party collectors based on their performance relative to a set financial target 

or to the performance of other collection agencies. 

6.2.4 Performance

Prior to charge-off, issuers generally kept debts that were in an early stage of delinquency or 

were assessed as having a relatively high likelihood of recovery for in-house collections. Issuers 

generally placed accounts in the later stages of delinquency, closed accounts, and accounts 

where no contact had been made with the primary account owner for an extended period of 

time. Accounts placed with third-party collectors had an average balance 12 percent higher and 

a FICO score 12 percent lower than accounts kept in-house. Respondents also noted that they 

may assign accounts with special circumstances to third-party collection agencies with 

specialized collections expertise in the relevant area, such as those where the consumer was 

engaged with debt settlement companies, the accountholder was deceased, or bankruptcy 

applications were pending. As a result, in-house collections generally had higher liquidation and 

cure rates but lower charge-off-rates, relative to third-party collections, as seen in Figure 3 
138 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

below.259These performance indicatorshave all remained relatively stable year-over-year since 

2017.

Figure 3: AVERAGE QUARTERLY PERFORMANCE FOR INTERNAL AND THIRD-PARTY COLLECTIONS, 

2020 (MMI)

6.2.5 Loss mitigation and re-aging practices

Credit card issuers used re-aging and various loss mitigation practices, including short- and 

long-term forbearance programs, debt management plans offered by consumer credit 

counseling agencies, and debt settlement. Issuers reported that they generally structured their 

loss mitigation practices conforming to guidance issued by the Federal Financial Institutions 

259 The quarterly liquidation rate is defined as total pre-charge-off delinquent dollars collected in a given quarter as a 

percent of total pre-charge off delinquent dollars in that same quarter. Cure rate is defined as the percent of precharge off delinquent dollars in a given quarter that were repaid to current status by the end of the same quarter. 

Charge-off rate is defined as the percent of pre-charge off delinquent dollars that charged off (representing 

contractual charge-offs as well as accounts charged off for bankruptcy, notice of decease, etc.) as of the end of the 

same quarter. These quarterly rates are averaged across all issuers and weighted by issuer’s share of total precharge-off delinquent dollars. Finally, the 2018 quarterly average was calculated across all four quarters.

Liquidation rate Cure rate Charge-off rate

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Internal Third-party
139 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Examination Council (“FFIEC”) and the federal banking agencies on the use of these collections 

tools.260

RE-AGING

Re-aging returns a delinquent, open-end credit card account to current status without collecting 

the total amount of principal, interest, and fees that are contractually due. Issuers’ policies allow 

re-aging of open-end accounts when a borrower makes at least three consecutive minimum 

monthly payments or an equivalent amount in a lump-sum payment. The number of re-ages on 

an account is limited to one in 12 months and two in five years. An account that is enrolled in a 

long-term internal forbearance or debt management program may be eligible for a third re-age 

within the five-year period. All surveyed issuers’ re-aging policies aligned with the guidance 

offered by the FFIEC and federal banking agencies.261

According to the current survey, re-aged balances as a percentage of total delinquent dollars 

have continuedto remain below two percent for each quarter since 2017,262with the average at 

1.6 percentin 2020. However, there was considerable variation among the card issuers in terms 

of the share of pre-charge-off balances that were re-aged: the 2020 quarterly average ranged 

from as low as 0.4 percent to a maximum of 5.9 percent. This wide range may reflect variation in 

each issuer’s underlying portfolio composition. 

FORBEARANCE PROGRAMS

Forbearance programs are designed to assist borrowers experiencing financial hardship. These 

programs can be “temporary” or “short-term,” aimed at assisting borrowers experiencing 

hardships expected to last 12 or fewer months, or “long-term,” intended to aid borrowers 

experiencing continued hardships lasting longer than 12 months. Issuers reported that their 

260 See generally FFIEC, Uniform Retail Credit Classification and Account Management Policy: Policy 

Implementation, 65 FR 36903 (June 12, 2000); Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Governors of 

the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit insurance Corporation, Office of Thrift Supervision, Credit Card 

Lending: Account Management and Loss Allowance Guidance, OCC Bulletin 2003-1 (Jan. 8, 2003), 

https://occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2003/bulletin-2003-1.html.

261 Id.

262 See 2017 Report, supra note 6, at 318. 
140 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

long-term programs generally require borrowers to repay their credit card debt within 60 

months. In order to meet this amortization timeframe, creditors may need to substantially 

reduce interest rates, eliminate fees, and lower monthly required payment amount. All issuers 

surveyedgenerally reported assessing borrower’s willingness and ability to pay as per the terms 

of the forbearance program including documenting the reason, severity, and duration of the 

cardholder’s financial difficulty. All surveyed issuers’ forbearance policies aligned with the 

guidance offered by the FFIEC and federal banking agencies.263

More than half of the survey respondents did not offer short-term forbearance programs over 

the last several years. Instead, these issuers generally offered long-term programs as an 

alternative regardless if borrower's hardship is short term or long term in nature. However, all 

issuers reported accommodatingCOVID-19 related hardship assistance requests by offering 

various temporary short-term assistances such as skip-a-pay. Most issuers also reported that 

that they do not allow their third-party collection agencies to offer and enroll borrowers in 

hardship programs, due to the complexity of managing these programs. 

CREDIT COUNSELING AGENCIES

Issuers work with consumer credit counseling agencies (“CCAs”) to help borrowers resolve their 

financial hardships, as an additional component of their loss mitigation efforts. CCAs work with 

borrowers to develop a budget and a debt management plan (“DMP”) for all the consumer’s 

enrolled debts, which may be owed to multiple creditors. These plans generally involve paying 

creditors a fixed payment amount at a reduced interest rate.

Most respondents reported funding CCAs through a “fair share” payment, which is a payment 

based on a percentage of the amount the consumer has paid back to the issuer. However, a few 

of the respondents fund their CCAs through grant funding. Several issuers reported working 

with CCAs on debt relief pilot programs such as “less-than-full-balance programs” and DMPs 

with extended amortization that extend beyond the traditional DMP. 

263 Id.
141 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 4: QUARTERLY FORBEARANCE NEW ENROLLMENT AND ACTIVE INVENTORY AS A SHARE OF 

DELINQUENT BALANCES (MMI) 264

All issuers reported offering one or more types of forbearance or debt management programs 

with varying interest rates, monthly fixed payment amounts, and amortization periods. The total 

new enrollment rate, measured as a percent of pre-charge-off delinquent dollars newly enrolled 

in various forbearance programs and DMPs, increased by 76 percent from 2019 to 2020. Most of 

this increase came from the significant increase in short-term program enrollment in the second 

quarter of 2020 asmany issuers responded to COVID-19. New enrollmentin short-term 

programs jumped by 240 percent in 2020 compared to 2019: 1.7 percent in 2019 and 5.8 

percent in 2020. In contrast, the long-term internal program enrollment rate registered only a 

modest 14 percent increase during the same period. Interestingly, the enrollment rate in DMPs 

declined by 20 percentin 2020. The average quarterly new enrollment rate among individual 

issuers ranged widely from a low of 0.5 percent to a high of 14.2 percent in 2020.

While the total forbearance inventory increased moderately in 2018 and 2019, it increased by 

almost 50 percent in 2020 compared to 2019 mostly due to the significant increase in shortterm program enrollment in 2020 in response to the pandemic.

DEBT SETTLEMENT

Debt settlements occur when an issuer agrees to accept less than the full balance owed by the 

borrower as full satisfaction of the balance owed. Such settlements can occur either pre- or -

264 “Inventory” refers to total balances for all accounts that are in active status in a forbearance program as of the end 

of the quarter. 

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

2019 2020

Total inventory Short term new enrollment

Long term new enrollment DMP new enrollment
142 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

post-charge off. Most issuers have policies in place to proactively offer settlements directly to 

consumers who meet the standardized risk criteria set by the creditor. These offers are extended 

via in-house operations or through third parties. The settlement enrollment rate, the percent of 

balances enrolled in settlement, increased from 2019 to 2020 by 21 percent and 9 percent for

pre- and post-charge off, respectively, with most of the increases occurring in the secondand 

third quarters of 2020. These increases align with reported gains in consumer liquidity from 

various economic stimulus payments and relateddebt pay-down by consumers during the 

pandemic. The settlement enrollment rate was higher for post-charge off balances (1.8 percent

in 2020) than pre-charge off balances (0.8 percentin 2020). Among surveyed issuers,the

quarterly pre-charge-off settlement enrollment rate ranged from 0.1 percent to 1.6 percent, and 

quarterly post-charge off settlement enrollment rate rangedfrom 0.5 percent to 3.4 percent. 

Pre-charge off settlement enrollment occurs when an account seriously past due – i.e.,130 days 

past due, on average, while post-charge off settlement occurs at 443 days past the charge-off 

date, on average.

Figure 5: PERCENT OF BALANCES ENROLLED IN SETTLEMENT (MMI)

Pre-charge-off balances are settled with a single lump-sum payment or multiple installments. 

Installment settlements typically consist of three payments, but pursuant to guidance from the 

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency for national banks and federal savings associations the 

2019 2020

0%

0.5%

1.0%

1.5%

2.0%

Pre-charge-off balances settled Post-charge-off balances settled
143 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

total duration of the payments should not exceed three months.265 However, post-charge-off 

settlements can be structured over any length of time. Average account settlement rate —the 

amount paid as a percent of the of the balance owed by the borrower for accounts that were 

settled—remained steady between 2019 and 2020 at about 51 percent pre-charge-off and 50 

percent post-charge-off in 2020, though there was some variation in the rates among individual 

respondents. 

DEBT SETTLEMENT COMPANIES 

Borrowers sometimes work with debt settlement companies (“DSCs”), which are typically forprofit entities with the primary objective of enrolling qualified borrowers in a debt settlement 

program.266These firms do not receive any compensationfrom issuers. Instead, they typically 

assess the borrower a fee based on the original debt balance and contingent upon completing a 

settlement with the creditor. Since enrolled consumers stop making payments to creditors, 

borrowers who work with the DSCs typically find that their accounts continue to grow in 

delinquency and are reported to the credit reporting agencies.267 Issuers may also pursue legal 

collections on these accounts. DSCs often advise consumers to send a cease and desist 

communication letter to creditors as part of the program. Those issuers who sell debt often sell 

charged-off debt with a cease and desist communication order to debt buyers because such 

orders generally make it more difficult to recover debt.

All the surveyed issuers have established policies and procedures on how to manage accounts 

enrolled with DSCs. Most issuers maintain a policy of not working directly with DSCs. Some 

issuers have policies that allow the accounts placement with special third-party agencies for 

265 See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller’s Handbook: Credit Card Lending, Version 1.2 (Jan. 

2017), https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/credit-cardlending/pub-ch-credit-card.pdf.

266 See Greg J. Regan, Options for Consumers in Crisis: An Updated Economic Analysis of The Debt Settlement 

Industry (Data as of Mar. 31, 2017), American Fair Credit Council (Feb. 5, 2018),

https://americanfaircreditcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018.02.05-AFCC-Report-Consumers-in-Crisis.pdf.

267 One RFI commenter wrote that consumers have “limited niche choices in debt relief assistance,” while also lacking 

data necessary to make informed choices about debt relief products and services. The commenter advocated greater 

disclosure of performance data for non-profit and for-profit debt relief providers, including “success rate, the 

impact to future retirement savings, credit report/score impact, protection from legal action, and cost of the 

solution.” See Steve Rhode Comment Letter, at 2.
144 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

potential litigation. Most issuers that work with DSCs reported that they offer DSCs the same 

settlement policies available to consumers who call the creditor directly to request settlements. 

The share of balances enrolled in settlement by DSCs to the total was 54 percent and 44 percent,

respectively,for pre-and post-charge-off balances in 2020. This relative share of balances 

enrolled in DSCs settlement varied significantly among the issuers. For instance, in 2020, this 

share ranged from a low of 9 percent to a high of 60 percent for pre-charge-off debt andfrom 23

percentto 62 percent in post-charge-off debt.268

6.3 Recovery following charge-off

Once an account charges off, it is placed into one of a variety of channels to facilitate further 

recovery of the balance owed, such as internal collections, third-party agency placement, 

litigation, and debt sale.Issuers may also warehouse certain accounts where balances are 

considered unlikely to be repaid.269 In 2020, issuers in the sample charged off $38 billion in 

debt, a 10 percent decline from 2019. In general, the current survey found that: 

• All issuers warehoused a significant portion of their overall post-charge-off inventory;

• All issuers used third-party agencies throughout the entire review period to collect at 

least a portion of their charged-off debt;

• Most issuers engaged in internal collections, though for a relatively small portion of their 

charged-off debt;

• Most issuers engaged in post-charge-off litigation to collect debt from consumers; 

268 If the forgiven debt exceeds $600, issuers may file a 1099-C for “Cancellation of Debt” with the Internal Revenue 

Service. Most issuers disclose to the consumer, at the time of settlement offer, the potential tax implications of the 

settlement, either as part of a telephone script or via letter. 

269 Warehoused balances are generally those that issuers do not actively seek to collect and generally include accounts 

issuers considered to be uncollectible or unlikely to be repaid, including older accounts that may be past the statute 

of limitations. Some issuers also reported that they may place accounts in warehouse status when transitioning 

these accounts between placements.
145 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

• Mostissuers reported holding a sizeable amount of debt past the statute of limitation in 

their inventory;and

• A minority of issuers, the same ones as reported in Bureau’s 2019 Report, sold debt in 

the current survey period as well.

Surveyed issuers reported holding an average of 28 percent of their overall post-charge-off 

balance inventory in warehouse status, as shown in Figure 6.270

Issuers reported placing nearly 18 percent of their post-charge-off inventory with third-party 

agencies in any given quarter between 2019 and 2020. While there was significant variation in 

third-party placements between issuers, the percentage of debt that each issuer placed with 

third-party agencies remainedstable during the survey period. Among issuers, third-party 

placement share ranged from one percent to 50 percent of an issuer’s total post-charge-off 

inventory in 2019 and 2020. This range has narrowed comparedto the range of eight percent to 

73 percent reported in 2017 and 2018. The range of placement into internal recovery was 

similarly varied among issuers. 

Most issuers sued some consumers to recover unpaid balances after charge-off. On average, 

issuers litigated almost 12 percent of their post-charge-off balance inventory. Issuers reported 

holding 13 percent of their inventory in time-barred status. Finally, as noted in the Bureau’s 

2015, 2017, and 2019 Reports, few issuers reported leveraging debt sales as part of their postcharge-off recovery strategy. Those issuers who sold debt reported selling an average of five 

percent of their post-charge-off balance inventory. 

270 The warehouse category includes accounts that are considered uncollectible for various reasons (e.g., accounts 

lacking current contact information for the accountholder despite many attempts to locate them).
146 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 6: SHARE OF CHARGE-OFF BALANCE INVENTORY BY RECOVERY CHANNEL IN 2019 AND 2020 

(MMI) 271

6.3.1 Internal recovery 

Internal recovery is not a significant piece of most issuers’ overall recovery strategy for postcharge-off debt. A minority of the issuers used internal recovery as a significant piece of their 

overall recovery strategy, while the majority generally retainedonly those accounts that were 

ineligible for third-party placement or that were awaiting placement in another channel. On 

average about eight percent of an issuer’s post-charge-off inventory was pursued through 

internal recovery in 2019 and 2020; however, one issuer chose to retain and internally recover 

29 percent of its post-charge-off inventory during the survey period. 

6.3.2 Third-party recovery 

All issuers employed third-party agencies to recover post-charge-off debt, all on a contingencyfee basis. Most surveyed issuers placed between one percent and 50 percent of their charged-off 

271 Green bars represent the average share of post charge-off balances inventory. The issuers provided the status of 

post-charge-off balance inventory as of the end of each quarter in 2019 and 2020. The distributions for 2019 and 

2020 were averaged by issuer, and then averaged across issuers. Black lines running through each bar represent the 

range of the share of post charge-off balances only for issuers that used that channel. In other words, the ranges do 

not include zero values, since some issuers did not use that channel. “Other” category includes accounts in Probate 

and Bankruptcy statuses.

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%

Sales

Internal

Other

Litigation

Time-barred

Third-party

Warehoused
147 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

balances with third-party collectors during the current survey period. Issuers described a 

number of reasons for placing charged-off debt with third-party agencies, including improved 

recovery, internal resource constraints, and the need for specialized expertise in recovering 

certain “special segments” of debt (e.g., debt owed by deceased consumers, accounts in 

bankruptcy status and accounts with cease communication requests from the debtor). If an 

agency cannot recover money or establish contact on an account in the specified period, the 

creditor will generally recall the account and place with another agency. 

PERFORMANCE 

Recovery performance is measured by the “cumulative recovery rate,” which is the share of the 

charged-off balance that has been recovered over an extended period. Recovery on charged-off 

debt can occur over several months or years. As the debt ages and the account moves from one 

placement to another, the incremental share of the charged-off balances that the issuer expects 

to recover from that account generally decreases.

For debt that charged off in the first quarter of 2017, issuers recovered an average of 17 percent 

of the charged-off balance within a four-year period. Nearly two-thirds of this recovery occurred 

within the first two-years following charge-off. Quarterly vintages show stable performance over 

the review period, although the latest vintage (Q3 2020) appeared to be lagging other vintages.

As debt ages, incremental gains in recovery decline. Figure 7 below shows the average 

cumulative recovery rates for balances that charged off each quarter between the first quarter of 

2017 and the fourth quarter of 2020.272While issuers recovered 8.3 percent in the first-year 

post-charge-off for the Q1 2017 vintage, they recovered an additional 4.3 percent, during the 

second year and recovered only 4.1 percent during the next two years combined.

272 These rates reflect the cumulative recovery on the debt across all potential placement channels, including internal 

placement, third-party agency placement, litigation, and any proceeds from debt sales. Longer recovery periods 

mean that the issuers have had more time to collect on the debt, so the cumulative recovery rate rises over time.
148 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 7: CUMULATIVE RECOVERY RATES FOR QUARTERLY VINTAGES BY MONTHS FOLLOWING 

CHARGE-OFF (MMI) 273

AGENCY COMPENSATION

Issuers who used third-party agencies to collect on post-charge-off debt typically paid a 

contingency fee that was a percentage of the amount of debt collected. Contingency fees are 

based on the level of placement (e.g., primary, secondary, tertiary, and quaternary), with later 

placements typically receiving higher contingency fees as the debt ages and recovery becomes 

more difficult. In 2020, contingency fees ranged from 18 to 25 percent for primary placement, 

from 22 to 37 percent for secondary placement, from 28 to 45 percent for tertiary placement, 

and from 23 to 47 percent for quaternary placement. Some issuers reported higher contingency 

fees for some earlier placement than for later placement. These respondents noted that they 

engaged third party collectors who leverage digital-only approaches to collections for some older 

placements which incurred overall lower collection costs and hence lower contingency fees. 

273 Here, each “quarterly vintage” represents balances for all accounts which charged off at any time during the given 

quarter. Cumulative recovery includes all proceeds collected post-charge-off, including through third-party 

collections, litigation, and debt sales.

3 9 15 21 27 33 39 45

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

Q1 2017 Q3 2017 Q1 2018 Q3 2018

Q1 2019 Q3 2019 Q1 2020 Q3 2020
149 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

VENDOR MANAGEMENT

Issuers manage their third-party vendors’ compliance with the issuers’ policies, procedures, 

applicable regulatory requirements, and financial performance targets using a variety of 

methods. These included: 

• Monitoring of randomly sampled collection calls on a periodic basis;

• Periodic audits, including on-site visits; and 

• Complaint intake, tracking, investigation, resolution, and trend analysis. All issuers have 

limits on consumer contact attempts that they extend to their third-party contingency 

agencies and monitor through quality assurance testing, routine audits, and call 

sampling.

Most issuers either prohibit or strictly limit their third-party collectors from using email and 

text to initiate contact with borrowers in post-charge-off collections, although information may 

be sent via these channels if a borrower specifically requests it. Only a minority of the surveyed 

issuers reported that they sent an agency placement notification letter to alert the borrower that 

their debt had been placed with a third-party agency. These letters informed borrowers that 

their debt had been transferred andprovided the name and contact information of the thirdparty agency. All surveyed issuers monitored their third-party agencies’ collections 

performance, both relative to the issuer’s stated targets and to the performance of other agencies 

in the network. 

6.3.3 Debt sales

As part of their post-charge-off recovery strategy, some credit card issuers may sell credit card 

debt at a discounted rate to pre-selected debt buyers, receiving a fraction of the outstanding 

account balances sold. Typically, these sales are structured as “forward-flow” contracts, where a 

pool of accounts that meet pre-determined criteria (e.g., at charge-off or post-primary 

placement) are sold to the debt buyer on an ongoing (e.g., monthly) basis. Issuers may also 

occasionally identify additional segments of accounts and sell them on an ad-hoc basis 

depending upon market conditions. Finally, issuers may employ specific debt sale strategies for 

special segments like accounts where the issuer has received a notice of bankruptcy, where 

specialized expertise may be required to recover the amount owed. Generally, after the sale, 

creditors update the accounts to credit reporting agencies as “Sold/Transferred” with a$0 

balance.
150 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

MARKET STRUCTURE

The debt-buying market for credit card debt remains highly concentrated among a few buyers 

that purchase debt from many of the same issuers. Most of the surveyed issuers that sold debt 

reported selling to an average of 10 buyers year-over-year. However, there is a general trend of 

consolidation among surveyed issuers’ debt buyer networks: the Bureau’s 2017 Report found 

that in 2016, 20 unique debt buyers bought debt from the surveyed issuers that sold debt, while 

the current survey found that there were 17 unique buyers in 2020.274Nine buyers purchased 

debt from two or more issuers, while six buyers bought debt from all the issuers that sold debt. 

DEBT SALE VOLUME

Fewer than half of issuers surveyed sold debt in 2019 and 2020, and these issuers were the same 

ones that reported selling debt in the Bureau’s 2017 and 2019 Reports. Issuers that reported that 

they did not sell debt in 2019 and 2020 also indicated that they have no plans to do so in 2021. A 

majority of issuers that sold debt during 2020 reported that they planned to sell roughly the 

same amount as in prior years while a minority of the issuers reported planning for a lower 

percentage of debt to be sold in 2021 compared to 2020. In general, issuers that planned to 

reduce their debt sale in 2021 are expecting lower delinquencies and losses. The survey 

respondents that sold debt in 2020 indicated that they planned to sell between 38 percent and 

50 percent of their freshly-charged-off debt in 2021 at an expected average price ranging from 

$0.10 to $0.12 per dollar of debt. 

Issuers that sold debt in 2019 and 2020 reported that in that period, roughly 5 percent of total 

post-charge-off inventory was sold to debt buyers. Figure 4 compares the distribution of total 

post-charge-off inventory by recovery channel for issuers that did and did not sell debt in 2019 

and 2020.Issuers that did not sell debt kept a greater portion of their post charge-off balances 

in the internal recovery channel. All issuers held a significant share of debt in the warehouse 

category though sellers kept relatively higher percentages at any given time, perhaps, awaiting 

ad hoc sales decisions.It appears that those issuers who sell debt do so well before accounts 

reach time-barred status as the share of post charge-off inventory in time-barred status is much 

lower (2 percent) compared to the share (31 percent) for those who do not sell.

274 See 2017 Report, supra note 6, at 327. 
151 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 8: SHARE OF CHARGED-OFF BALANCE INVENTORY BY CHANNEL FOR ISSUERS THAT DID AND 

DID NOT SELL DEBT (MMI) 275

DEBT PRICE

The overall average price of debt decreased from 12 percent to 11 percent of face value between 

2019 and 2020. Figure 9 shows the average price of debt by type. Charged-off debt generally 

sells for a fraction of the account balance owed or “face value,” at a price largely dependent upon 

the age of the debt. Additionally, certain special segments of debt, such as accounts for which 

the issuer has received notice of bankruptcy, may command higher prices. The price of 

bankruptcy accounts may be above the overall average price of debt sold because the buyer may 

be able to recover a larger portion of the debt by filing proofs of claim as part of the bankruptcy 

process. However, the price of freshly-charged-off debt increased from 12 percent to 13 percent 

of face value over the same period. The price of freshly-charged-off debt is now three percentage 

points lower than its previous high of 16 percent reported in 2016.276

275 Bars represent the average share of total charged-off balance inventory in each of the five recovery channels. The 

issuers provided the share of balances placed in each channel by quarter as of the end of the quarter for 2019 and 

2020. The distributions for 2019 and 2020 were averaged by issuer, and then averaged across issuers that sold debt 

and issuers that did not sell debt. “Other” category includes accounts in Probate and Bankruptcy statuses.

276 See 2017 Report, supra note 6, at 329. 

Internal Third-party Warehoused Litigation Time-barred Other Sales

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

Issuers that sold debt Issuers that did not sell debt
152 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Figure 9: AVERAGE PRICE OF DEBT SOLD AS A PERCENTAGE OF ACCOUNT BALANCE BY TYPE OF 

DEBT SOLD (MMI)

Debt sold after one or more placements fetched lower prices (11 percent for post-primary and 7 

percent for postsecondary and beyond). Accounts where the collector received a request to cease 

and desist communications were priced at 13 percent in 2020 while accounts with power of 

attorney on file sold at much higher price (22 percent in 2020). Accounts in for which there was 

a chapter 13 bankruptcy notice sold for a significantly higher price of 23 percent in 2020 

compared to a 14 percent price received in 2018, suggesting higher expected recoveries from 

such accounts. 

DEBT SALE CONTRACTS

All survey respondents that sold debt reported that they provide buyers with key documents and 

account information at the time of sale, including the account’s last 12 statements, amount and 

date of the last account payment, etc. After the debt is sold, issuers reported that they may 

provide additional documentation at the buyer’s request, including cardholder agreements, 

written applications, affidavits, and earlier account statements. While most issuers who sold 

debt reported that debt buyers do not pay a fee to access these documents, a minority reported 

charging a fee to provide additional documentation.

All surveyed issuers that sold debt also stated that they send out “goodbye” letters to the 

cardholder. These letters inform borrowers of the sale and provide the name and contact 

information of the buyer. 

Overall Fresh

charge-off

Post-primary PostsecondaryCease and

desist

Power of

attorney

Bankruptcy

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

2019 2020
153 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Contractual restrictions imposed on buyers by all surveyed issuers that sold debt are generally 

consistent with OCC Bulletin 2014-37, and include:277

• Restrictions on resale of the debt, which is limited to special circumstances (e.g., the 

buyer exiting the market);

• Restrictions on buyers’ ability to litigate purchased accounts; and

• Prohibitions on litigation by buyers on debt that is past the statute of limitations.

Debt sale contracts generally do not restrict debt buyers from reporting to credit reporting 

agencies. Instead, the contracts require that the buyer adhere to all Fair Credit Reporting Act 

requirements.

6.4 Litigation 

As of 2020, all surveyed issuers reported using litigation strategies for both pre- and postcharge-off accounts, although only a minority of issuers reported initiating litigation 

proceedings prior to charge-off. According to the Bureau’s current survey, issuers may select 

accounts for litigation based on factors such as account balance and estimated likelihood of 

payment (indicated by the presence of assets and employment income). All issuers in the survey 

that litigated credit card debt reported that they used an external network of attorneys. A 

minority of issuers also reported that they leverage an internal attorney network to execute their 

litigation strategies. As observed in the Bureau’s 2017 and 2019 Reports, a few issuers noted that

they may litigate accounts upon notification that a consumer is working with a debt settlement 

company. 

All issuers that litigated debt reported that the volume of new balances placed in the litigation 

channel declined significantly during the survey period, with year-over-year decline ranging 

from nearly 5 to 49 percent across issuers. These declines came mainly in the second and third 

quarters of 2020 in response to pandemic-related developments including court closures. Since 

277 See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Consumer Debt Sales - Risk Management Guidance, OCC Bulletin 

2014-37 (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2014/bulletin-2014-37.html.
154 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

then, issuers have increased litigation volume, though not up to pre-pandemic levels. For issuers 

that used the litigation channel, litigated balances as a percentage of total post-charge-off 

inventory ranged from a low of five percent to a high of 24 percent. Survey respondents 

generally selected higher-balance accounts from their portfolios for litigation, with average 

litigated account balances ranging from $2,700 to $12,300 across issuers during the current 

survey period, compared to average pre-charge-off balances ranging from $940 to $5,800.

DEFAULT JUDGMENTS

A default judgment is a ruling in favor of the plaintiff collector when the defendant consumer 

has failed to respond to a summons or to appear in court. More than half of the issuers that use 

litigation as a strategy did not report default judgments separately. However, respondents who 

do track default judgments separately reported that more than 69 percent of all judgments 

entered were default judgments. This ratio was consistent with the Bureau’s previous reports 

and remained relatively flat between 2017 and 2020 among issuers who reported default 

judgments separately.278

LITIGATION RECOVERY 

After a creditor has won a judgment on a litigated account, recovery may occur over a prolonged 

period. To recover the debt, the issuer may exercise a wage garnishment against the debtor or 

ask the debtor to enroll in a payment plan. Thus, litigation generally produces a steady stream of 

recoveries from accounts with judgments against them, spread over a longer time period that 

may span several years. Figure 10 shows the cumulative recovery rate by months since judgment 

for vintages of accounts where a judgment was obtained between 2017 and 2020. Issuers 

recovered an average of 34 percent of all judgment balance at 48 months since the judgment was 

received, the longest performance window captured in the survey). The average four-year 

cumulative recovery rate for accounts with judgments was twice the overall four-year cumulative 

recovery rate for all charged-off accounts (compare with Figure X). Accounts with judgments 

may have higher cumulative recovery rates because issuers disproportionately litigate more 

accounts with a higher ability to repay, which depends on borrowers’ assets, employment, and 

other income. Cumulative recoveries from judgment accounts increased steadily over time as 

278 See 2017 Report, supra note 6, at 326.
155 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

each vintage aged and a consistent flow of payments were applied to the account. Accounts with 

default judgments generally had lower cumulative recovery rates than those with non-default 

judgments (29 percent compared to 45 percent at 48 months since judgment).

Figure 10: CUMULATIVE RECOVERY RATES BY MONTHS SINCE JUDGMENT WAS RECEIVED (MMI)

6.5 Credit card debt collection during 

COVID-19

COVID-19 brought significant disruption to credit card issuers. 279 Issuers responded to these 

disruptions and related pressures in varying ways, entailing both operational changes as well as 

(at least temporary) changes to debt collection policies, procedures, and practices. 

In response to various state and federal restrictions including stay-at-home orders and other 

business restrictions, all card issuers reported migrating from on-site to work-from-home 

arrangements for their collections operations. Some issuers reported temporarily closing several 

brick-and-mortar collections operations sites due to state and local restrictions.All issuers 

adopted remote monitoring of these work-from-home agents, while implementing added 

information security measures, such as restrictions on printing documents at home from 

279 For a broader discussion of the impact of COVID-19 on credit card issuers and their response to the pandemic, see

Section 5.5.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45 48

Non-default judgment Default judgment Overall
156 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

employer-provided computers.While issuers allowed remote work as a temporary response to 

the pandemic, many issuers indicated that they would continue to provide work-from-home 

options to at least some employees on a permanent basis. The Bureau’s supervisory prioritized 

assessments also identified similar responses by debt collectors.

Issuers noted an uptick in inbound call volumes, especially in the second quarter 2020, from 

impacted consumers seeking relief.280 Issuers deployed several tactics to meet this increased 

demand, including increasing hiring, reducing outbound calls, further leveraging digital 

channels, encouraging consumers to use self-servicing options on their interactive voiceresponse (IVR) platforms, and online enrollment into consumer relief programs. At least some 

issuers reported that some of these measures may be made permanent.

Pursuant to COVID-19, many issuers suspended placing accounts with third parties in states 

where there were various state-mandated debt collections restrictions, including making 

outbound calls. Many issuers also paused legal collection efforts, such as lawsuits, judgments, 

garnishments, and bank levies, in response to various state restrictions and court-closures. 

While many issuers reported resuming filing new lawsuits starting in the second half of 2020, 

some still have not restarted new wage garnishments as of December 2020 and bank levies due 

to the difficulties in identifying the source of stimulus funds in consumer’s bank account. 

In addition to offering the existing suite of short-term and long-term hardship programs, all 

issuers reported offering some version of a skip-a-pay program with varying lengths. 281 Some 

issuers reported expanding proactive settlement offer campaigns, along with lowering the 

settlement threshold by five to 10 percent, in order to accommodate pandemic-impacted 

consumers.All issuers reported modifying their agency-placement recall strategy to 

accommodate non-payment due to enrollment in pandemic related hardship programs. All 

issuers reported adhering to CARES Act credit reporting requirements by ensuring that 

accounts that meet the terms of various accommodation programs did not advance from their 

current level of delinquency while enrolledin those programs.

280 For more on call volumes and wait times, see Section 5.5.

281 See section 5.5 for more information on issuer relief programs.
157 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Those issuers who used debt sales as part of their recovery strategy reported adjustments to the 

timing and volume of sales in response to the pandemic. A minority of issuers who sold debt 

reported temporarily suspending sales in stateswith various restrictions on debt collections. 

These issuers also reported receiving generally lower prices for sold debt during initial period of 

the pandemic. Issuers who sold debt generally report that bothsales volume and prices 

recovered fully to pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2020. 
158 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

7. Innovation

The Bureau’s Congressional mandate to review the credit card marketplace specifically instructs 

the agency to “assess card product innovation.” 282As noted in the 2019 Report, consumer and 

provider access to digital technology continues to affect the design and offering of consumer 

credit products and change the ways in which consumers obtain and use credit cards. 

This section covers some recent developments in more detail. Section 7.1 reviews new products 

and developments in the credit card market since the 2019 Report, including the growth of 

certain point-of-sale lending products. Section 7.2 discusses consumer adoption of innovative 

technologies, particularly those that have seen rapid growth as a result of COVID-19. 

7.1 Product innovation

The Bureau’s statutory mission includes facilitating innovation in markets for consumer 

financial products and services. 283Since issuing the 2019 Report, the Bureau has observed, and 

in some cases directly facilitated, the development and expansionof new products and features 

in the credit card market. Some of these innovations implicate a broad array of regulatory 

282 15 U.S.C. § 1616(a)(4)(D) (2012). Congress established the Bureau's statutory purpose as ensuring that all 

consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products and services and thatmarkets for consumer 

financial products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive. See 12 U.S.C. 5511(a) (2012). The Bureau’s 

objective includes exercising its authorities for the purpose of ensuring that markets for consumer financial 

products and services operate transparently and efficiently to facilitate access and innovation. See 12 U.S.C. 

5511(b)(5) (2012).

283 See 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(5).
159 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

provisions that card issuers working in this space must navigate carefully. In general, recent 

innovations fall in and into three categories:

• Credit access and availability, particularly for less creditworthy borrowers;

• Fixed-payment features and non-card ‘buy-now-pay-later’ point-of-sale credit products, 

and

• Other innovations, including virtual cards and new forms of rewards redemption.

7.1.1 Credit access and availability

Recent innovations have opened new options for thin-file or credit invisible borrowers to 

acquire credit cards and build or repair their credit history. 284 These new offerings leverage a 

number of innovative approaches, including the use of new types of data to facilitate 

underwriting as well as new types of product structures and features. In some cases, these new 

offerings make use of consumer authorized access to account data held at other institutions. 285

Consumer authorized access to account data supports the collection of cash flow information 

used in underwriting by some creditors. 286

284 Kenneth P. Brevoort et al., Data Point: Credit Invisibles, Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot. (May 2015), 

http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201505_cfpb_data-point-credit-invisibles.pdf. The Bureau estimates 26 million 

U.S. adults lack sufficient data to generate a typical credit bureau score, either because they do not possess any 

reported credit history or because their credit history is limited or stale.

285 The Bureau is considering a rulemaking to implement section 1033 of the Dodd-Frank Act to address the 

availability of consumer financial account data in electronic form. In November 2020, the Bureau released an 

Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) concerning consumer data access to implement section 1033, 

accepting comments until early February 2021. The Bureau is reviewing comments received in response to the 

ANPRM and considering those comments in assessing potential next steps. Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Spring 

2021 Rulemaking Agenda (June 11, 2021), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/spring-2021-

rulemaking-agenda/. 

286 Consumer authorized access to account data also supports several other provider use cases such as identity 

verification, authentication, and facilitation of payments and disbursements.
160 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

Some providers are offering new types of secured credit cards to consumers lacking credit scores 

or credit files. 287For example, issuer Varo Bank introduced a credit card which reserves the 

amount spent from a linked bank account to ensure users never miss a payment. According to 

Varo, the card is aimed at consumers seeking to establish or improve their credit score. 288

Similarly, fintech provider Chime offers a secured credit card that features a variable spending 

limit based on the amount the consumer places in its secured account, without requiring a credit 

check. 289 Another example is fintech provider Self, whichoffers a secured credit card to 

borrowers of its credit builder installment loan who allocate a portion of their secured loan 

funds to the secured credit card account without requiring a credit check or additional 

deposit. 290

As noted above, some recent credit card innovation has occurred at least in part due to Bureau 

engagement. One such example relates to a proposed design for a secured credit card offered by 

issuer Synchrony Financial. Pursuant to an application by Synchrony, in 2020 the Bureau issued 

a compliance assistance sandbox (CAS) approval order to Synchrony Financial regarding their 

proposal to develop a “dual-feature credit card” (DFCC) designed for consumers with limited or 

damaged credit history. 291Synchrony’s application describes a process whereby a card would be 

provided to consumers as a secured card with a required security deposit but may become 

eligible to be converted to an unsecured card following 12 months of satisfactory repayment 

activity. Unlike a typical secured card, the terms of both secured use and unsecured use would 

287 The 2017 Report discusses secured credit cards in more detail, including the potential for secured credit cards to 

facilitate thin- or no-file consumers’ efforts to build or rebuild their credit profiles. See 2017 Report, supra note 6, 

Section 6.

288 Varo Bank, Varo Bank Introduces Varo Believe, a New and Better Way for Millions of Americans to Build Credit

(Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.varomoney.com/press_release/varo-bank-introduces-varo-believe-a-new-and-betterway-for-millions-of-americans-to-build-credit/. 

289 Chime. Chime Credit Builder, https://www.chime.com/credit-builder/. 

290 Self, Introducing the Self Visa Credit Card, https://www.self.inc/visa-secured-credit-card. 

291 Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Issues Approval Order to Facilitate the 

Use of Dual Usage Credit Cards (Dec. 30, 2020), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-issues-approval-order-to-facilitate-the-use-of-dual-usagecredit-cards/. See also Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Policy on the Compliance Assistance Sandbox (Sept. 10, 

2019), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/documents/7989/cfpb_final-policy-on-cas.pdf.
161 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

be disclosed at the opening of the “dual-feature credit card” account. The terms would then be 

redisclosed with the opportunity to ‘opt in’ to unsecured use. Synchrony applied for a CAS 

approval order because the product structure of the DFCC raised questions about the 

applicability of existing law both to Synchrony’s disclosure of the two modes of use and to the 

substance of the envisioned graduation mechanism. The Bureau is monitoring the consumer 

impact of this product through data Synchrony provides on a quarterly basis.

Other providers have introduced novel structures or features into their credit card offerings for 

borrowers with limited credit history. For example, in 2020 fintech TomoCredit introduced a 

credit card that does not require applicants to have a credit score. The card has a mandatory 

seven-day automatic payment mechanism designed to allow users to build credit without 

carrying a balance.292Further, Acima, a subsidiary of rent-to-own retailer Rent-A-Center, 

announced a “lease-to-own” payments card for credit constrained customers that can be used to 

complete lease transactions at participating Acima merchants for certain purchases. 293

Additionally, Apple announced a feature called “Apple Card Family” that would allow partners 

and families to build a shared credit history. 294 Apple states that the card can be shared or 

merged by eligible spouses or partners over age 18 as co-owners. Eligible co-owners must have 

an Apple device with the latest version of iOS that supports Apple Card and meet all other 

eligibility requirements for Apple Card. Parents can also share their card with children over 13 

years of age with optional spending limits and controls (like ‘authorized users’), but co-owners 

are responsible for repayment. Payment history is furnished to the credit bureaus for co-owners 

as well as other users who ‘opt in’ to credit reporting. Existing Apple Card users can also merge 

their accounts, creating a credit line with a higher shared limit while keeping the lower APR of 

the two accounts.

292 See TomoCredit, Frequently Asked Questions, https://tomocredit.com/faq.

293 BusinessWire, Acima Unveils Industry’s First Lease-to-Own Anywhere Virtual Payments Card (Apr. 14, 2021), 

https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20210414005272/en/Acima-Unveils-Industry%E2%80%99s-FirstLease-to-Own-Anywhere-Virtual-Payments-Card. 

294 Apple Inc., Press Release, Apple introduces Apple Card Family, enabling people to share Apple Card and build 

credit together (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2021/04/apple-introduces-apple-card-familyenabling-people-to-share-apple-card-and-build-credit-together/. 
162 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

About 10 of the largest U.S. banks will collaborate to share data on customers’ deposit accounts 

as part of an initiative to extend credit to thin-file or credit invisible borrowers. 295The banks will 

use bank account data from other financial institutions to help underwrite credit card 

applications from borrowers who may have insufficient credit history. The collaboration began 

through a project launched by the OCC in 2020 called Project REACh, or the Roundtable for 

Economic Access and Change and is designed to help banks lend to individuals who do not have 

credit scores but are financially responsible. 

Credit access expansion can be positive but should be done responsibly and in a way that is 

understandable to consumers. In its 2019 Report, the Bureau discussed the potential of new 

technology in underwriting, such as machine learning and alternative data, to expand credit 

access. 296 The Bureau’s market monitoring indicates use of these technologies has continued to 

grow since 2019, including in the offering of consumer credit cards. 297 However, published 

295 See Peter Rudegeair et al., JPMorgan, Others Plan to Issue Credit Cards to People With No Credit Scores, Wall St. 

J. (May 13, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/jpmorgan-others-plan-to-issue-credit-cards-to-people-with-nocredit-scores-11620898206. 

296 See 2019 Report, supra note 6, at 182. The Bureau also issued a joint statement with four other federal financial 

regulatory agencies on the use of alternative data in underwriting. Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Federal 

Regulators Issue Joint Statement on the Use of Alternative Data in Credit Underwriting (Dec. 2019), 

https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/federal-regulators-issue-joint-statement-use-alternativedata-credit-underwriting/.

297 For example, a fintech startup called Deserve launched a digital-only credit card which uses machine learning and 

alternative data in its underwriting. Another credit card company called Petal uses alternative data in its 

underwriting. Petal recently spun off underwriting unit in an effort to market its alternative data underwriting 

services to other lenders. Zachary Miller, ‘Financial providers need actionable insights, not raw data’: Credit card 

company Petal spins off B2B data unit, Prism Data, Tearsheet (Apr. 27, 2021), https://tearsheet.co/data/financialproviders-need-actionable-insights-not-raw-data-credit-card-company-petal-spins-off-b2b-data-unit-prism-data/; 

Businesswire, Deserve Launches Digital First Card on Mastercard Network for Mobile-First Experience (Apr.28, 

2021), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20210428005653/en/. The Bureau understands that in many 

cases, data to support such alternative data-powered underwriting is procured via consumer-permissioned data 

access, a subject of the Bureau’s recent Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on “Consumer Access to Financial 

Records.” 85 FR 71003 (Nov. 6, 2020).
163 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

findings from a New York Department of Financial Services investigation describe common 

consumer confusion related to the use of these technologies. 298

7.1.2 Buy now, pay later loans

In recent years, the market and reach of certain point-of-sale lending products — widely referred 

to as “buy now, pay later” (“BNPL”) loans — have grown significantly and now may compete 

with credit cards at both the online and the physical point of sale. 299 BNPL lenders such as 

Affirm, Klarna, and Afterpay offer consumers the opportunity to “split” a purchase into a 

number of installments at the point-of-sale of merchant partners. Consumers generally repay 

BNPL loans through debit and credit cards, typically by automatic repayment. In the 2019 

Report, the Bureau noted that “[s]ome of these products have shown rapid growth—and 

attracted calls for more regulatory attention—in foreign markets.” 300 Since that time, the 

popularity of BNPL has continued to grow, both abroad and in the United States. One market 

observer estimates that U.S. BNPL lending jumped from $3 billion in 2019 to $39 billion in 

298 The NY DFS noted these findings in its investigation of allegations of discrimination against women in the 

underwriting of the Apple Card, issued by Goldman Sachs. That investigation noted consumer misconceptions 

regarding credit underwriting for people with shared finances and a lack of transparency in the explanations of 

credit decisions presented to consumers. The investigation also noted a six-month waiting period on responses to 

credit decision appeals. New York State Dept. of Fin. Serv., Report on Apple Card Investigation (Mar. 2021), 

https://www.dfs.ny.gov/reports_and_publications/202103_report_apple_card_investigation. Currently, federal

law mandates that lenders explain only credit denials to applicants, not the reasons for the amount and terms of 

credit granted. In response to the perceived lack of transparency, Goldman introduced new consumer education 

tools explaining what factors are used in setting credit terms and providing step-by-step instructions that 

consumers can complete to become eligible for the Apple Card. SeeApple Inc., Designed to support your financial 

health, https://www.apple.com/apple-card/financial-health/.

299 Estimates for the size of the entire BNPL market vary. However, some of the largest BNPL lenders saw significant 

growth in 2020. For example, Afterpay financed over $9.8B in loans in North America during the second half of 

2020, up 106 percent year-over-year. By the end of 2020, Afterpay had 8.1M active North American users, up 127 

percent Year-over-year. Similarly, Klarna reached 14M U.S. consumers by the end of 2020, up 115 percent Yearover-year. See Afterpay, ASX Announcements (2021), https://corporate.afterpay.com/investors/asxannouncements#. See also Klarna, Annual financial statement release (2021), 

https://www.klarna.com/assets/2021/02/25062747/Annual-Financial-Statement-Release-Klarna-Bank-AB-publ2020-Final.pdf. 

300 2019 Report, supra note 6, at 177.
164 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

2020, and will exceed $100 billion annually within three years. 301BNPL lending has also 

continued to attract regulatory attention (as well as calls for further regulatory attention) 

domestically and internationally. 302BNPL providers are among the growing number of nonbanks that utilize consumer-authorized access to account data to deliver their service. Access to 

information from consumer accounts at financial institutions is used by BNPL providers for 

several purposes, including to verify consumer information and to facilitate payments.

The increased pace of adoption of BNPL has been partially attributed to COVID-19, during 

which many consumers shifted spending online. 303This shift presented an opportunity for 

retailers partnering with financial companies to offer BNPL at digital point of sale—the primary 

channel by which the product is offered. 

301 Brian Riley, Buy Now, Pay Later: Gaining Scale and the Disrupting Status Quo in Lending, Mercator Advisory 

Grp. (May 07, 2021), https://www.mercatoradvisorygroup.com/Reports/Buy-Now_-Pay-Later--Gaining-Scale-andthe-Disrupting-Status-Quo-in-Lending/.

302 For example, The U.K. announced that BNPL credit agreements would be regulated by the Financial Conduct

Authority, the country’s financial regulator. In Sweden, new rules were passed which would discourage online 

shoppers from paying with credit—including BNPL products. In California, BNPL lenders have come under scrutiny 

from state regulators for making loans without state lending licenses. Press Release, CA Dep’t of Fin. Prot. and 

Innovation, Point-of-Sale Lender QuadPay Agrees to Cease Illegal Loans, Pay Refunds in Settlement with the 

California Department of Business Oversight (Apr. 22, 2020), https://dbo.ca.gov/2020/04/22/point-of-salelender-quadpay-agrees-to-cease-illegal-loans-pay-refunds-in-settlement-with-the-california-department-ofbusiness-oversight/;Press Release, CA Dep’t of Fin. Prot. and Innovation, Point-of-Sale Lender Sezzle Agrees to 

Cease Illegal Loans, Pay Refunds in Settlement with the California Department of Business Oversight (Jan. 16, 

2020), https://dfpi.ca.gov/2020/01/16/point-of-sale-lender-sezzle-agrees-to-cease-illegal-loans-pay-refunds-insettlement-with-the-california-department-of-business-oversight/; Ketharaman Swaminathan, Sweden bids to 

steer customers away from installment payments amid fears over mounting debt, Finextra (July, 02, 2021), 

https://www.finextra.com/newsarticle/36141/sweden-bids-to-steer-customers-away-from-installment-paymentsamid-fears-over-mounting-debt. 

303 Peter Rudegeair et al., Covid-19 Economy Boosts ‘Buy Now, Pay Later’ Installment Services, Wall St. J. (Dec. 30, 

2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/covid-19-economy-boosts-buy-now-pay-later-installment-services11609340400; Stuart Condie, ‘Buy Now Pay Later’ Is Having a Moment as Pandemic Changes Shopping Habits, 

Wall St. J. (July 11, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/buy-now-pay-later-is-having-a-moment-as-pandemicchanges-shopping-habits-11594459800. 
165 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

The extent to which BNPL competes directly with credit cards — either as a means of payment 

for consumers’ purchases or as a means of purchase financing — is unclear. 304 While BNPL loans

are offered at the point-of-sale to facilitate quick extensions of credit and likely capture some 

volume from other payment methods like credit cards, it is possible that a portion of BNPL 

volume comes from de novo sales originating from the availability of BNPL itself. 

Certain key differences between BNPL loans and credit cards may present risks to consumers. 

Unlike credit card providers,BNPL lenders are not required to consider ability to repay before 

extending credit. 305Additionally, BNPL loans may not provide the same disclosures as other 

types of consumer credit. 306 BNPL late fees are not associated with specific regulations like 

credit card late fees, and BNPL users do not have the same billing error resolution procedures 

that are available to credit card users.

Traditional credit card issuers are investing in more ways to offer their own “fixed-payment” 

features, possibly in response to BNPL’s explosive growth. In the 2019 Report, the Bureau 

discussed fixed-payment features offered on some credit cards which utilize a card’s existing line 

304 A recent consumer survey appeared to indicate that consumers view BNPL as a potential alternative to credit 

cards. In that survey, 62 percent of respondents said that BNPL could replace their credit cards, but only 27 percent 

would like for that to happen. See Maurie Backman, Study: Buy Now, Pay Later Services Continue Explosive 

Growth, Motley Fool(July 20, 2020), https://www.fool.com/the-ascent/research/buy-now-pay-later-statistics/. 

Furthermore, not all card issuers support BNPL transactions. Capital One blocked its customers from using its 

credit cards to pay off BNPL loans, citing risks associated with BNPL transactions. See Byron Kaye, Capital One 

stops 'risky' buy-now-pay-later credit card transactions, Reuters (Dec. 07, 2020), 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-capital-one-fin-payments-idCAKBN28H0OR.

305 BNPL loans that are structured as zero-interestloans of four payments or less typically are not reported to credit 

bureaus. As a result, users can potentially “stack” BNPL loans across different providers, leading to potential 

situations in which consumers may face difficulty repaying one or many loans. There is some evidence that BNPL 

loans pose a risk of overextension. In Australia, a country where the market for BNPL loans is mature and the 

product is well-established in the consumer financial ecosystem, the country’s financial regulator found that BNPL 

users with credit cards were much more likely to be revolvers than other credit card users. Additionally, survey data 

showed that 20% of BNPL users cut back on essentials and 15% took out additional credit to make BNPL payments. 

Austrl. Sec. & Inv. Comm’n, REP 672 Buy now pay later: An industry update (Nov. 16, 2020), 

https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/reports/rep-672-buy-now-pay-later-an-industryupdate/. 

306 For BNPL loans that are structured as zero-interest loans of four payments or less, some providers state that they 

do not meet the TILA definition of “creditor” and therefore do not have to provide TILA disclosures. Some BNPL 

loans are structured as longer-term installment loans; these loans are subject to TILA and other requirements.
166 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

for a repayment plan that is separate from payments made towards the revolving feature in the 

account. 307American Express’s “Plan It” feature was recently added to the point of sale of 

American Express’s travel website. 308Alliance Data Systems acquired a BNPL provider and 

partnered with financial services provider Fiserv to enable point-of-sale lendingproducts for 

merchants using Fiserv’s merchant acquiring services. 309 Synchrony Financial announced plans 

to offer a short-term installment loan product to its retail partners in late 2021. 310Barclays also 

announced a partnership with a BNPL provider to offer “white-label” point-of-sale financing 

options to merchants. 311

Two card networks are developing capabilities to facilitate point-of-sale lending options. Visa is 

piloting ‘Visa Installments,’ a four-payment installment solution that will allow issuers to 

streamline merchant integration at the merchant’s digital POS. 312Visa Installments turns 

already-approved credit lines into installment payment options for Visa cardholders. The pilot 

program involves TSYS, the first issuer technology partner to offer Visa’s new solution enabling 

participating financial institutions to offer installment plans to their cardholders. Similarly, 

Mastercard announced it would develop installment capabilities with TSYS to deliver 

installment capabilities to issuers, who could then offer installment solutions to Mastercard 

307 See 2019 Report, supra note 6, at 177-179.

308 Previously, “Plan It” was only available retroactively for card purchases that were already made. 

309 PR Newswire-Alliance Data, Alliance Data's Bread To Enable Point-of-Sale Lending for Fiserv Merchant Clients

(Apr. 2021), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/alliance-datas-bread-to-enable-point-of-sale-lendingfor-fiserv-merchant-clients-301279942.html, PR Newswire-Alliance Data, Alliance Data Completes Acquisition of 

Bread (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/alliance-data-completes-acquisition-of-bread301186414.html. 

310 See Polo Rocha, Synchrony’s new ‘Pay in 4’ loan borrows from buy now/pay later upstarts, American Banker

(Sep. 9, 2021), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/synchronys-new-pay-in-4-loan-borrows-from-buy-nowpay-later-upstarts. 

311 Barclays, Barclays US Consumer Bank Expands Point-of-Sale Financing Suite to Include Installment Options 

Powered by Amount (Apr. 27, 2021), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/barclays-us-consumer-bankexpands-point-of-sale-financing-suite-to-include-installment-options-powered-by-amount-301277216.html.

312 See PYMNTS, Visa Launches Visa Installments Pilots in the US (July 14, 2020), https://www.pymnts.com/digitalpayments/2020/visa-launches-visa-installments-pilots-in-the-us/.
167 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

cardholders. 313 In 2019, Mastercard acquired Vyze, a POS platform that connects merchants 

with multiple lenders. 314 Through Vyze, merchants can connect with lenders and consumers can 

access those credit options both in-store and online. 

The Bureau continues to monitor the developing market for new forms of point-of-sale 

financing, both those offered independently from and in conjunction with credit card products, 

in order to ensure consumers are adequately informed about financial offerings, that consumers 

are protected from risky practices, and that markets continue to provide consumer-friendly 

innovation and competition. 

7.1.3 Other innovations

Card issuers and other financial services companies continue to innovate in ways that aim to

attract or serve consumers. For example, several card issuers now offer instant issuance of credit 

cards upon approval. 315Some card issuers also offer virtual credit card features which allow 

users to transact on their main credit card account through a separate, unique credit card 

number. Generally, users can limit a virtual card number to a specific merchant, transaction, or 

dollar amount. According to card issuers, virtual cards can help reduce fraud and give users 

more control over their online spending. 316 In 2019, Mastercard announced its “True Name” 

313 See Mastercard, Mastercard Expands Installment Offerings Through Global Partnerships, Empowers More 

Consumers to Choose When to Pay with Pre-Sale, Point of Sale, and Post-Sale Payment Options (Sept. 2, 2020), 

https://investor.mastercard.com/investor-news/investor-news-details/2020/Mastercard-Expands-InstallmentOfferings-Through-Global-Partnerships-Empowers-More-Consumers-to-Choose-When-to-Pay-with-Pre-SalePoint-of-Sale-and-Post-Sale-Payment-Options/default.aspx. 

314 See PYMNTS, Mastercard buys POS Financing Provider Vyze (Apr. 15, 2019), 

https://www.pymnts.com/mastercard/2019/acquisition-vyze-pos-financing/.

315 After approval, Users can add a new credit card to their digital wallets, access their card number through a bank’s 

website or mobile app, or—in some cases, for private label cards—receive a scannable barcode to use at the retailer 

associated with the card. Barclays, Barclays US Consumer Bank Expands Point-of-Sale Financing Suite to Include 

Installment Options Powered by Amount (Apr. 27, 2021), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/barclaysus-consumer-bank-expands-point-of-sale-financing-suite-to-include-installment-options-powered-by-amount301277216.html.

316 See, e.g., Capital One, Virtual Numbers, https://www.capitalone.com/applications/eno/virtualnumbers and 

Citibank, Virtual Account Numbers, https://www.cardbenefits.citi.com/Products/Virtual-Account-Numbers.
168 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

initiative, which permits cardholders to use their preferred name instead of their legal name on 

credit and debit cards, a common issue for transgender and gender non-binary individuals 

whose preferred names may differ from their legal ones. 317Two major card-issuing banks 

announced they have implemented this feature. 318 Lastly, Venmo, a digital payments platform 

with a social media component owned by PayPal, introduced a credit card imprinted with a QR 

code which users can scan to activate their card or allow others to scan to send or request funds 

through Venmo. 319

The Bureau continues to note ongoing innovation in rewards programs, which are central to 

how many credit card products are marketed to consumers. These innovations include 

delivering rewards value in new forms. For example, at least three providers—SoFi, BlockFi, and 

Gemini—have announced plans to offer credit card rewards redeemable for virtual currencies. 320

Another provider allows users to pay rent through their card without additional fees and redeem 

rewards for a down payment on a home. 321Additionally, SoFi allows credit card rewards to be 

317 See Mastercard, Who we are, https://www.mastercard.us/en-us/vision/who-we-are/pride.html, last accessed Aug. 

23, 2021).

318 Citigroup, Citi Launches “True Name” Feature With Mastercard Across the U.S. (Oct. 19, 2020), 

https://www.citigroup.com/citi/news/2020/201019a.htm; https://www.bmoharris.com/main/personal/truename/.

319 PYMNTS, Venmo Launches Credit Card Featuring User QR Codes (Oct. 5, 2020), 

https://www.pymnts.com/news/payment-methods/2020/venmo-launches-credit-card-featuring-user-qr-codes/. 

320 BlockFi Blog, Join the Waitlist for the World’s First-Ever Bitcoin Rewards Credit Card, BlockFi Blog (Dec. 1, 

2020), https://blockfi.com/bitcoin-card-crypto-rewards. Tyler Winklevoss, Gemini Blog, Gemini to Offer Credit 

Card with Crypto Rewards, Gemini Blog (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.gemini.com/blog/gemini-to-offer-creditcard-with-crypto-rewards. In 2014, the Bureau issued a consumer advisory, warning consumers about the risks of 

virtual currencies such as Bitcoin. See supra note 159.

321 The provider, Bilt Technologies Inc., says it will mail landlords paper checks on behalf of the tenant (and card user) 

and then charge the renter’s credit card account with no additional fee. Will Parker, Renters Could Collect Home 

Down-Payment Points With Credit Card, Wall St. J. (Updated June 25, 2021), 

https://www.wsj.com/articles/renters-could-collect-home-down-payment-points-with-credit-card-11624356000. 
169 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

redeemed for repayment of other non-card debt held by SoFi, including SoFi Student Loan 

Refinance and SoFi Personal Loans. 322

7.2 Consumer adoption of innovative 

technologies

Consumer adoption of innovative technologies related to credit card payments and account 

servicing continued to grow over 2019 and 2020 and was likely accelerated by COVID-19. 

Pandemic-driven concerns around the use of cash or touching a payment terminal appeared to 

further the digital evolution at the point of sale, driving enablement and adoption of contactless 

payment methods such as “tap and pay” and digital wallets. 323

7.2.1 Digital servicing tools

Consumer enrollment in digital account servicing grew at least partially in response to some of 

the disruptions caused by the pandemic. For example, bank branch closures, shortened hours, 

postal service delays, or social distancing may have further incentivized consumers to use online 

or mobile tools to check balances or cash a check more frequently than in pre-pandemic periods. 

Difficulty reaching customer service representatives by phone due to call center adjustments 

may have led consumers to try virtual assistants to meet their needs. 324 Data show that despite 

the pandemic, some cardholders continue to interact with banks via traditional non-digital 

channels, but the trend toward adoption of digital servicing overall indicates these cardholders 

322 SoFi, Once my SoFi Points are redeemed into a SoFi Personal Loan payment, when and how can I expect the 

payment to be applied? https://support.sofi.com/hc/en-us/articles/360051403531-Once-my-points-areredeemed-into-a-SoFi-Student-Loan-Refinance-payment-when-and-how-can-I-expect-the-payment-to-be-applied

(last visited Aug. 17, 2021).

323 Telis Demos and Dan Gallagher, Is This the Year You Finally Stop Swiping Your Credit Card? The pandemic has 

accelerated usage of ‘contactless’ payments in U.S. stores. The ultimate winners from this transition remain far 

from certain, Wall St. J. (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-this-the-year-you-finally-stop-swipingyour-credit-card-11597397428?PostID=18397976. 

324 For more information regarding call center volume, see Section 5.5.
170 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

increasingly represent a minority. This section uses MMI data to examine how consumers use 

digital account servicing platforms—online account servicing portals (online portals) and mobile 

apps.

ONLINE BANKING AND MOBILE APPS

Basic account servicing features are found in almost all online banking portals and mobile apps. 

Cardholders can review transactions (and dispute fraudulent ones), make payments, transfer 

balances, request cash advance PINs, activate new cards, request replacement cards, download 

full account statements, receive information about other card benefits, add or remove an 

authorized user from their accounts, inform their issuer of upcoming travel, report a card lost or 

stolen, change their account’s due date, or send and read messages to and from account 

servicing professionals or chat with them in real-time.325

In recent years, the Bureau has noted additional functionality related to mobile apps, including 

card freezing, management of recurring card payments, additional card usage controls, and 

interactive digital interfaces for card balance payments. 326 Many of these service features likely 

proved particularly useful to some during the pandemic, as many banks closed branches or 

limited operating hours, and customers experienced longer call wait times. To assist with longer 

wait times, card companies have introduced AI-powered chatbots to navigate and execute digital 

account management functions and make transactions. 327User engagement with these chatbots 

rose significantly through the pandemic. 328 Chatbots provide an alternative method of accessing 

the apps’ features in addition to providing higher-order functionality, such as responding to 

questions about spending patterns. Cardholders can use voice or text to direct a chatbot to 

search for certain transactions, display basic account information, add an authorized user, 

325 See 2019 Report, supra note 6, at 173.

326 See 2019 Report, supra note 6, at 172.

327 Dawn Allcot, Artificial Intelligence is Changing Credit Cards and Banking, Bankrate.com (Feb. 4, 2019), 

https://www.bankrate.com/credit-cards/artificial-intelligence-banking-credit-card-rewards/. 

328 One such chatbot, Bank of America’s virtual assistant ‘Erica,’ saw engagement jump 67 percent year-over-year to 

17.2 million users in the fourth quarter of 2020. Rachel Green, Bank of America ends 2020 with rising digital 

engagement despite squeezed margins, Business Insider (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com/bofaq4-earnings-missed-mark-but-digital-engagement-rose-2021-1. 
171 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

summarize and plot monthly spending, or send alerts for upcoming bills, among other options. 

Many chatbots are responsive to both voice and text, with voice recognition requiring an 

additional layer of technology. 

Digital engagement is growing consistently across all age groups and nearly every platform type. 

The share of people electing to receive statements digitally (e-statements) rather than by mail is 

continuing to increase, though the pace of adoption growth tapered in 2020. E-statement 

adoption has been surpassed by mobile app adoption as a method to engage with banks.

Figure 1 shows the share of active mass market credit card accounts enrolled in issuers’ online 

portals and/or mobile apps. 329 As of 2020, 80 percent of active accounts are enrolled in online 

portals for general purpose cards, with increases across all age groups. That share is significantly 

higher than the 55 percent the Bureau reported as of 2014. 330

Figure 1: SHARE OF ACTIVE ACCOUNTS ENROLLED IN ONLINE PORTAL, MOBILE APPS, AND 

RECEIVING ONLY E-STATEMENTS, GENERAL PURPOSE (MMI)

Also noteworthy is the rise in the share of accounts enrolled in mobile apps, which has more 

than doubled in only five years, from 30 percent in 2015 to 64 percent in 2020. Mobile app 

adoption is more common among younger consumers but increases in adoption can be seen 

329 A consumer may be enrolled in an online portal and may also have the mobile app. In fact, some issuers require 

online enrollment before mobile app use can be engaged.

330 2015 Report, supra note 6, at 133.

Online Mobile E-statement

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

2017 2018 2019 2020
172 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

across all age groups. In 2020, 93 percent of active accounts held by consumers under age 25 

were enrolled in the issuer’s mobile app. For consumers between the ages of 25 and 64, and over 

65, mobile enrollment share was 71 percent and 36 percent, respectively. Overall, the Bureau 

expects the trend toward increasing mobile app adoption to continue.

Figure 2: SHARE OF ACTIVE ACCOUNTS ENROLLED IN MOBILE APPS BY AGE, GENERAL PURPOSE 

(MMI)

ELECTRONIC STATEMENTS

As the Bureau noted in 2019, the share of people electing to receive statements digitally (estatements) rather than by mail is continuing to increase significantly. The number of mass 

market accounts that receive only e-statements from their issuer has risen over the last five 

years and in 2020 was 56 percent. While electronic statements can be a convenient way to 

access account information, it is important consumers review electronic statements as 

thoroughly as they wouldpaper statements.

As discussed in Section 2.4.3, a sizeable but declining portion of consumers still rely on paper to 

manage their accounts. Americans above age 65 tend to rely more on paper, with 21 percent 

choosing to make a paper payment in the last cycle of 2020, compared to 4 percent for ages 25-

64. These findings generally align with the lower adoption rate of digital servicing tools among 

older Americans discussed earlier. As one commenter noted, paper statements remain an 

important mechanism to prompt payment for many consumers, particularly lower-income 

Under 25 25 - 64 65+ Overall

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2017 2018 2019 2020
173 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

families, and those without access to broadband internet, which includes 55 percent of 

Americans 65 years or older. 331

7.2.2 Physical point-of-sale

In the 2019 Report, the Bureau identified three significant developments at the point-of-sale 

which provided greater speed, security, or convenience for consumers and merchants: 

elimination of signature requirements for EMV “chip” card transactions; near-field 

communication (NFC) acceptance at the physical POS, which supports the mobile wallet 

technologies and applications incorporated into most smartphones used by American 

consumers; and contactless card issuance and adoption. Since 2019, the popularity of 

contactless payments (both through contactless cards and NFC mobile wallets) has continued to 

grow, aided by health concerns about physical contact during COVID-19.

The increasing availability of contactless cards and terminals, coupled with pandemic-driven 

anxiety around high-touch surfaces, drove consumer adoption of contactless payments during 

the pandemic. 332Visa and Mastercard reported approximately 40 percent year-over-year global 

growth in tap-to-pay or contactless transactions in the first quarter of 2020. 333By the third 

quarter of 2020, contactless transactions accounted for over 40 percent of in-person 

331 “[W]e again urge the CFPB to protect the right and ability of consumers who want to keep receiving paper 

disclosures and billing statements by mail. Credit card issuers and other banks have aggressively pushed consumers

to receive these important documents via electronic delivery but, as documented in our report Paper Statements: 

An Important Consumer Protection, these efforts can be harmful to consumers.” See NCLC Comment Letter, at 21. 

See also Chi Chi Wu and Lauren Saunders, Paper Statements: An Important Consumer Protection (Mar. 2016), 

http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/banking_and_payment_systems/paper-statements-banking-protections.pdf.

332 A study conducted by Forrester and the National Retail Federation and released in mid-2020 found that 58 

percent of surveyed retailers accept contactless card payments, up from 40 percent the prior year. The same survey 

found that 67 percent of retailers surveyed now accept some form of no-touch payment. See National Retail 

Federation, Coronavirus leads to more use of contactless credit cards and mobile payments despite cost and 

security concerns (Aug. 6, 2020), https://nrf.com/media-center/press-releases/coronavirus-leads-more-usecontactless-credit-cards-and-mobile-payments. 

333 See Telis Demos & John Gallagher, Is This the Year You Finally Stop Swiping Your Credit Card?, Wall St. J. (Aug. 

14, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-this-the-year-you-finally-stop-swiping-your-credit-card11597397428?PostID=18397976.
174 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

transactions globally for both Visa and Mastercard. 334 In a survey conducted in the third quarter 

of 2020, nearly half of respondents said the pandemic prompted them to use contactless 

payments more often or for the first time. 335 In the last several years, the number of retail 

locations supporting NFC mobile wallets and contactless cards has grown significantly – over 70

percent of face-to-face transactions in the U.S. now occur at a contactless-enabled merchant 

location. 336 Card issuers are also accelerating plans for contactless distribution. 337

In late 2020 and early 2021, both Visa and Mastercard announced services which would allow 

businesses of any size to turn any Android smartphone or tablet into a contactless payment 

acceptance device without any additional hardware. 338 The features could allow merchants to 

more easily accelerate the transition to contactless payments by providing a method for 

334 Chris Reid, Mastercard: “In 2020Q3, contactless transactions represented 41% of in-person purchases globally (up 

30% year-over-year)” at Card Forum 2021, Mar. 16, 2021. Visa 2020 10-K, at 8; U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Annual 

Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Nov. 19, 2020), 

https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001403161/0504ac14-a3a0-4506-9352-aa15cd087268.pdf.

335 See S&P Global, 451 Research: 2020 Year-In-Review Infographic, S&P Market Intelligence Blog (Feb. 17, 2021), 

https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/blog/451-research-2020-year-in-reviewinfographic.

336 For example, in early 2017, several years after its launch, Apple Pay was accepted at 36 percent of retail locations. 

As of early 2019, Apple reported that Apple Pay is accepted at 65 percent of retail locations. Retailers that support 

Apple Pay also support other mobile wallets such as Google Pay. See Press Release, Apple, Apple Pay coming to 

Target, Taco Bell and more top US retail locations (Jan. 22, 2019), 

https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2019/01/apple-pay-coming-to-target-taco-bell-and-more-top-usretaillocations. See also Juli Clover, Apple Pay Now Supported by 36% of Merchants in the United States, 

MacRumors (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.macrumors.com/2017/02/07/apple-pay-36-percent-united-states/. In its 

2020 Annual Report, Visa reported that more than 70 percent of face-to-face transactions at checkout in the U.S. 

occur at a merchant that has the ability to accept contactless payment, and more than 80 of the top 100 merchants 

by transactions are enabled for tap to pay. (2020 Visa 10-K, at 8)

337 See Payments Journal, Card networks have stepped up their contactless distribution (Jan. 6, 2021), 

https://www.paymentsjournal.com/card-networks-have-stepped-up-their-contactless-distribution/. See also

Section 5.5.

338 See Press Release, Mastercard, Mastercard Pioneers Cloud Tap on Phone, its First Pilot of Cloud Point of Sale 

(POS) Acceptance Technology (Jan. 11, 2021), 

https://www.mastercard.com/news/press/2021/january/mastercard-pioneers-cloud-tap-on-phone/; John Adams, 

MOBILE POINT-OF-SALE: Visa debuts in-phone card acceptance as contactless takes off (Oct. 21, 2020), 

https://www.paymentssource.com/news/visa-debuts-in-phone-card-acceptance-as-contactless-takes-off.
175 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

contactless payment acceptance without requiring a terminal. Mastercard’s service is in pilot; 

Visa’s service is expected to roll out in the U.S. in 2021.

Challenges to further adoption of contactless payments remain. There are several competing 

digital wallet networks and some retailers do not accept some major wallets. For a contactless 

transaction through a digital wallet to work, the retailer needs to accept both the digital wallet 

and the card stored in the digital wallet. 339 Additionally, many mobile phones utilize facial 

recognition for authentication, which is hampered by masks, often mandated in store 

locations. 340 Furthermore, some retailers have not upgraded their POS systems to accept 

contactless EMV transactions. 341Finally, some consumers are reluctant to adopt contactless 

payments. One survey showed that, when asked, only one-third of respondents who reported 

they have a contactless card said they use tap-and-pay frequently to make purchases. 342

For consumers who adopt mobile wallets, certain potential risks remain. For example, one 

commenter suggested that consumers who initiate card-on-file transactions through a mobile 

339 AnnaMaria Andriotis, Apple Pay Offers Germ-Free Shopping—If Only We Could Figure Out How it Works, Wall 

St. J. (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-pay-offers-germ-free-shoppingif-only-we-could-figureout-how-it-works-11611771110.

340 An Apple software update (iOS 14.5 beta) provides a potential workaround for the issue of facial recognition with a 

mask for users who also use an Appl Watch. When a user raises their phone to their face to unlock it and the user is 

wearing an Apple Watch, the watch will communicate with the phone to unlock it. Lauren Goode, The iPhone's Face 

ID Will Soon Work With a Mask—if You Have an Apple Watch (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.wired.com/story/iphoneface-id-mask-ios-beta/.

341 A study conducted by Forrester and the National Retail Federation (cited earlier in this report) found that 58% of 

surveyed retailers accept contactless card payments, indicating some runway for further adoption by merchants. In 

addition, a survey indicated that a third of gas stations were likely to miss their extended deadline of April 2021 to 

upgrade EMV-enabled POS systems. See supra note 332, and Ted Rossman, Deadline approaches for gas stations 

to upgrade to EMV chip technology (Mar. 22, 2021), https://nrf.com/media-center/press-releases/coronavirusleads-more-use-contactless-credit-cards-and-mobile-payments. The negative impact of COVID-19 on small 

businesses in particular could reduce the incentive and resources such businesses have to improve their point-ofsale systems.

342 The authors of the paper which describes the survey’s results cite a number of potential reasons for this hesitancy: 

1) consumers who have the tool are not adopting it, 2) The conversion of cash may not be as high as hoped, and 3) 

consumers need a push to break their payment habits. See Tom Akana and Wei Ke, Contactless Payment Cards: 

Trends and Barriers to Consumer Adoption in the U.S., Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Philadelphia (May 2020), 

https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/frbp/assets/consumer-finance/discussion-papers/dp20-03.pdf.
176 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

wallet may not be aware of the way their data are being collected and used. In this example, a 

consumer initially “registers” their payment credentials with a merchant. When the consumer 

uses a mobile wallet instead of a credit card to initiate a card-on-file transaction, the wallet can 

create a token with the merchant, which is then used to facilitate future transactions. Once 

established, the token directs all future transactions with that merchant through the mobile 

wallet—even though the wallet may not appear prominently (or at all) in the transaction flow. 

Consumers may not realize that the wallets will continue to collect data. 343

343 See letter from Akerman to Wei Zhang (Markets) re: CFPB CARD Act Study of Credit Card Market (June 10, 

2021).
177 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION — CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET REPORT

APPENDIX A: SUPPORTING FIGURES

Figure 1: FEDERAL FUNDS RATE COMPARED TO WSJ PRIME RATE (WSJ, FEDERAL RESERVE) 344

344 Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Effective Federal Funds Rate, 

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/fedfunds (last visited July 11, 2021); Wall St. J., Market Data Center, 

https://www.wsj.com/market-data/bonds/moneyrates (last visited July 11, 2021).

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

WSJ Prime Rate Federal funds rate