49034 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 181 / Thursday, September 18, 1997 / Notices

or written statements may be presented

by members of the public and

representatives of the nuclear industry,

electronic recordings will be permitted

only during the open portions of the

meeting, and questions may be asked

only by members of the Committee, its

consultants, and staff. Persons desiring

to make oral statements should notify

Mr. Sam Duraiswamy, Chief, Nuclear

Reactors Branch, at least five days

before the meeting, if possible, so that

appropriate arrangements can be made

to allow the necessary time during the

meeting for such statements. Use of still,

motion picture, and television cameras

during this meeting may be limited to

selected portions of the meeting as

determined by the Chairman.

Information regarding the time to be set

aside for this purpose may be obtained

by contacting the Chief of the Nuclear

Reactors Branch prior to the meeting. In

view of the possibility that the schedule

for ACRS meetings may be adjusted by

the Chairman as necessary to facilitate

the conduct of the meeting, persons

planning to attend should check with

the Chief of the Nuclear Reactors Branch

if such rescheduling would result in

major inconvenience.

In accordance with Subsection 10(d)

Pub.L. 92–463, I have determined that it

is necessary to close portions of this

meeting noted above to discuss matters

that relate solely to the internal

personnel rules and practices of this

Advisory Committee per 5 U.S.C.

552b(c)(2), and to discuss information

the release of which would constitute a

clearly unwarranted invasion of

personal privacy per 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(6).

Further information regarding topics

to be discussed, whether the meeting

has been cancelled or rescheduled, the

Chairman’s ruling on requests for the

opportunity to present oral statements

and the time allotted therefor, can be

obtained by contacting Mr. Sam

Duraiswamy, Chief, Nuclear Reactors

Branch (telephone 301/415–7364),

between 7:30 A.M. and 4:15 P.M. EDT.

ACRS meeting notices, meeting

transcripts, and letter reports are now

available on FedWorld from the ‘‘NRC

MAIN MENU.’’ The Direct Dial Access

number to FedWorld is (800) 303–9672

or ftp.fedworld. These documents and

the meeting agenda are also available for

downloading or reviewing on the

internet at http://www.nrc.gov/

ACRSACNW.

Dated: September 12, 1997.

John C. Hoyle,

Acting Advisory Committee Management

Officer.

[FR Doc. 97–24804 Filed 9–17–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–245, 50–336, and 50–423

and Docket No. 50–213]

Northeast Utilities, Millstone Nuclear

Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 and

Haddam Neck Plant; Issuance of

Partial Director’s Decision Under 10

CFR 2.206

Notice is hereby given that the

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation, has issued a Partial

Director’s Decision with regard to a

Petition dated November 25, 1996, as

amended on December 23, 1996, filed

by Ms. Deborah Katz and Mr. Paul

Gunter on behalf of the Citizens

Awareness Network (CAN) and the

Nuclear Information and Resource

Service (NIRS), hereafter referred to as

‘‘Petitioners.’’ The Petition pertains to

the Millstone Nuclear Power Station,

Units 1, 2, and 3, and the Haddam Neck

Plant.

The Petitioners requested that the

NRC: (1) Immediately suspend or revoke

Northeast Utilities’ (NU’s or Licensee’s)

licenses to operate its nuclear facilities

in Connecticut; (2) investigate possible

Licensee material misrepresentations to

the NRC; (3) continue the shutdown of

the Licensee’s facilities until the

Department of Justice completes its

investigation and the results are

reviewed by the NRC; (4) continue the

shutdown until the NRC evaluates and

approves the Licensee’s remedial

actions; (5) continue listing the

Licensee’s facilities on the NRC’s

‘‘Watch List’’ should any facility resume

operation; (6) bar any

predecommissioning or

decommissioning activity at any of the

Licensee’s nuclear facilities in

Connecticut until the Licensee and the

NRC take certain identified steps to

assure that such activities can be safely

conducted; (7) initiate an investigation

into how the NRC allowed the asserted

illegal situation at the Licensee’s

nuclear facilities in Connecticut to exist

and continue for more than a decade;

and (8) immediately investigate of the

need for enforcement action for alleged

violation of 10 CFR Part 50, appendix B,

with respect to nitrogen calculations.

The bases for the assertions are

Licensee and NRC inspection findings

and Licensee documents referred to in

the Petition and a VHS videotape,

Exhibit A, which accompanied the

Petition. The videotape records an

August 29, 1996, Citizens Regulatory

Commission televised interview of a

former Millstone Station employee

expressing his views on Licensee

management. Areas identified in the

Petition include inadequate surveillance

testing, operation outside the design

basis, inadequate radiological controls,

failed corrective action processes, and

degraded material condition. The

Petition asserts that this information

demonstrates that there are inadequate

quality assurance programs at the

Licensee’s nuclear facilities in

Connecticut, that the Licensee has made

material false statements regarding its

Millstone units, and that safe

decommissioning of the Haddam Neck

facility is not possible because of the

deficiencies in the design and licensing

bases of the facility.

The Director of the Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation has partially granted

the Petition. The reasons for this partial

grant are explained in the ‘‘Partial

Director’s Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR

2.206’’ (DD–97–21), the complete text of

which follows this notice and is

available for public inspection at the

Commission’s Public Document Room,

the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street,

NW., Washington, DC, at the local

public document rooms located at the

Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers

Community-Technical College, New

London Turnpike, Norwich,

Connecticut, and at the temporary local

public document room located at the

Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince

Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road, Waterford,

Connecticut, for Millstone Units 1, 2,

and 3; and at the Russell Library, 123

Broad Street, Middletown, Connecticut,

for the Haddam Neck Plant.

A copy of the Partial Director’s

Decision will be filed with the Secretary

of the Commission for the Commission’s

review in accordance with 10 CFR

2.206(c) of the Commission’s

regulations. As provided for by this

regulation, the Decision will constitute

the final action of the Commission (for

Requests 1, 2, 5, 6, and 8) 25 days after

the date of issuance unless the

Commission, on its own motion,

institutes a review of the Decision in

that time.

Dated at Rockville, MD, this 12th day of

September.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.,

Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

Partial Director’s Decision Pursuant to

10 CFR 2.206

[DD–97–21]

I. Introduction

On November 25, 1996, as amended

on December 23, 1996, Ms. Deborah

Katz and Mr. Paul Gunter filed a

Petition on behalf of the Citizens
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 181 / Thursday, September 18, 1997 / Notices 49035

1Petitioners requested copies of the Licensee’s

calculations performed in response to the event at

the Haddam Neck Plant that resulted in the

introduction of a nitrogen bubble into the reactor

vessel. The calculations requested were discussed

during a predecisional enforcement conference held

on December 4, 1996. The calculations were

provided to the Petitioners on July 21, 1997.

Awareness Network (CAN) and the

Nuclear Information and Resource

Service (NIRS), hereafter, referred to as

Petitioners. These two submittals will

hereafter be referred to as the Petition.

The Petition was filed with the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

and the NRC Executive Director for

Operations pursuant to § 2.206 of Title

10 of the Code of Federal Regulations

(10 CFR 2.206).

The Petitioners requested that the

NRC take the following actions: (1)

Immediate suspension or revocation of

Northeast Utilities’ (NU’s or Licensee’s)

licenses to operate its nuclear facilities

in Connecticut; (2) investigation of

possible NU material misrepresentations

to the NRC; (3) continued shutdown of

the NU facilities until the Department of

Justice completes its investigation and

the results are reviewed by the NRC; (4)

continued shutdown until the NRC

evaluates and approves NU remedial

actions; (5) continued listing of the NU

facilities on the NRC’s Watch List

should any facility resume operation; (6)

prohibition of any predecommissioning

or decommissioning activity at any NU

nuclear facility in Connecticut until NU

and the NRC take certain identified

steps to assure that such activities can

be safely conducted; (7) initiation of an

investigation into how the NRC allowed

the asserted illegal situation at NU’s

nuclear facilities in Connecticut to exist

and continue for more than a decade;

and (8) an immediate investigation of

the need for enforcement action for

alleged violation of 10 CFR part 50,

Appendix B.1

The bases for the Petitioners’

assertions are NU and NRC inspection

findings and NU documents referred to

in the Petition and a VHS videotape,

Exhibit A, which accompanied the

Petition. No new information regarding

Licensee activities was provided by the

Petitioners except for the alleged

violation referred to in Request 8. The

Petitioners assert, in Request 8, that NU

relied partly on draft calculations in its

presentation at a public predecisional

enforcement conference with the NRC

staff, which included a discussion of an

event at the Haddam Neck Plant. The

Petitioners further assert that the

calculations had not been reviewed and

approved in accordance with the

requirements of 10 CFR part 50,

appendix B.

The areas of concern identified in the

Petition include inadequate surveillance

testing, operation outside the design as

specified in the updated Final Safety

Analysis Report (UFSAR), inadequate

radiological controls, failed corrective

action processes, and the degraded

material condition of the plants. The

Petitioners also assert that this

information demonstrates that there are

inadequate quality assurance programs

at NU’s nuclear facilities in Connecticut,

that NU has made material false

statements regarding its Millstone units,

and that safe decommissioning of the

Haddam Neck Plant is not possible

given the defective nature of the design

and licensing bases for the facility. The

videotape records an August 29, 1996,

Citizens Regulatory Commission

televised interview of a former

Millstone Station employee expressing

his views on NU management. The tape

has been transcribed and placed on the

dockets of the facilities cited. The

videotape interview included the former

employee’s views relating to NU’s poor

management in allowing degradation of

the material condition of the plant; poor

radwaste practices resulting in potential

radiation exposure to employees; and

harassment, intimidation, and

subsequent illegal termination of

employees raising safety concerns.

On January 23, 1997, the NRC

acknowledged receipt of the Petition

and informed the Petitioners that the

Petition had been assigned to the Office

of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to prepare

a response and that action would be

taken within a reasonable time

regarding the specific concerns raised in

the Petition. The Petitioners were also

informed that the requests for

immediate action were denied. The

Petitioners were further informed that

copies of the Petition and videotape

were sent to the NRC’s Office of the

Inspector General (OIG) in response to

Petitioners’ Request 7 and parts of

Requests 5, 6, and 8.

II. Discussion

The NRC staff has reviewed the

Petition and, with the exception of

Request 8, has not identified any new

information regarding either the

Millstone or the Haddam Neck facilities.

Both of the facilities have been the

subject of close NRC scrutiny for several

years.

Millstone Facility

With regard to the Millstone units, the

NRC staff has been concerned for the

last several years about the number and

duration of violations at the Millstone

site in the broad programmatic areas of

design and licensing bases, testing, and

radiological controls. Programmatic

concerns in these areas, along with

concerns in other areas, were major

contributors to the decline in

performance at the Millstone site. In the

most recent systematic assessment of

licensee performance (SALP) report of

August 26, 1994, the NRC staff stated in

the cover letter that it had noted several

performance weaknesses, common to all

three Millstone units. Among these were

continuing problems with procedure

quality and implementation, the

informality in several maintenance and

engineering programs (contributing to

instances of poor performance), and the

failure to resolve several longstanding

problems at the site. In addition to these

programmatic problems, the Licensee

has had significant problems in dealing

with employee concerns involving

safety issues at the site.

On November 4, 1995, the Licensee

shut down Millstone Unit 1 for a

scheduled refueling outage. The NRC

sent a letter to the Licensee on

December 13, 1995, requiring the

Licensee, before restarting Millstone

Unit 1, to inform the NRC, pursuant to

section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act

of 1954, as amended (the Act), and 10

CFR 50.54(f), of the actions taken to

ensure that in the future the Licensee

would operate that facility according to

the terms and conditions of the unit’s

operating license, the Commission’s

regulations, and the unit’s FSAR.

In January 1996, the NRC designated

the three Millstone units as Category 2

on the NRC’s Watch List. Plants on the

Watch List in this category have

weaknesses that warrant increased NRC

attention until the licensees

demonstrate improved performance for

an extended period of time.

On February 20, 1996, the Licensee

shut down Millstone Unit 2 when it

declared both trains of the high-pressure

safety injection (HPSI) system

inoperable because of a design issue.

There was a potential that the HPSI

throttle valves could become plugged

with debris when taking suction from

the sump during recirculation mode.

On March 30, 1996, the Licensee shut

down Millstone Unit 3 after finding that

containment isolation valves for the

auxiliary feedwater turbine-driven

pump were inoperable because the

valves did not meet NRC requirements.

In response to a Licensee root cause

analysis of inaccuracies in the Millstone

Unit 1 FSAR, identifying the potential

for similar configuration control

problems at Millstone Units 2 and 3 and

the existing design configuration issues

identified at these units, the NRC issued

10 CFR 50.54(f) letters to the Licensee

on March 7 and April 4, 1996. These
49036 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 181 / Thursday, September 18, 1997 / Notices

2The NRC’s approach to protecting public health

and safety includes the philosophy of defense-indepth, which supports the identification and

correction of degraded or nonconforming

conditions discussed above. Briefly stated, this

philosophy (1) requires the application of

conservative codes and standards, to establish

substantial safety margins in the design of nuclear

plants; (2) requires high quality in the design,

construction, and operation of nuclear plants to

reduce the likelihood of malfunctions, and

promotes the use of automatic safety system

actuation features; (3) recognizes that equipment

can fail and operators can make mistakes and

therefore requires redundancy in safety systems and

components to reduce the chances that

malfunctions or mistakes will lead to accidents that

release fission products from the fuel; and (4)

recognizes that, in spite of these precautions,

serious fuel damage accidents can happen and

therefore requires containment structures and safety

features to prevent the release of fission products.

In the unlikely event of an offsite fission product

release, emergency plans are in place to provide

reasonable assurance that protective actions can

and will be taken to protect the population around

nuclear power plants. These emergency plans are

coordinated with local and State officials and the

Federal Emergency Management Agency.

letters required that the Licensee inform

the NRC of the corrective actions taken

regarding design configuration issues at

Millstone Units 2 and 3 before the

restart of each unit.

In June 1996, the NRC designated the

three units at Millstone as Category 3 on

the NRC’s Watch List. Plants in this

category have significant weaknesses

that warrant maintaining them in a

shutdown condition until the Licensee

can demonstrate to the NRC that it has

both established and implemented

adequate corrective actions to ensure

substantial improvement. This category

also requires Commission approval

before operations can be resumed.

On August 14, 1996, the NRC issued

a Confirmatory Order directing the

Licensee to contract with a third party

to implement an Independent Corrective

Action Verification Program (ICAVP) to

confirm the adequacy of its efforts to

reestablish the design basis and

configuration controls for each of the

three Millstone units. The ICAVP is

intended to provide additional

assurance, before a unit restart, that the

Licensee has identified and corrected

existing problems in the design and

configuration control processes for that

unit.

On April 16, 1997, the NRC issued

another 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter, which

superseded the previously mentioned

10 CFR 50.54(f) letters and consolidated

its requests for information and periodic

updates. The information requested

included: (1) The identification of

significant items needed to be

accomplished before restart; (2)

identification of items to be deferred

until after restart; (3) NU’s process and

rationale for deferring items; and (4) a

description of the actions taken by NU

to ensure that future operation will be

conducted in accordance with the terms

and conditions of the operating licenses,

the Commission’s regulations, and the

FSARs. The Licensee provided the

initial information requested by letter

dated May 29, 1997. Additional

information and updates will be

provided in accordance with the time

intervals specified in the 10 CFR

50.54(f) letter.

During eight NRC inspections

conducted between October 1995 and

August 1996, more than 60 apparent

violations of NRC requirements were

identified at the Millstone site. These

apparent violations were discussed at a

public predecisional enforcement

conference held at the Millstone site on

December 5, 1996. During the meeting,

the Licensee stated that management

failed to provide clear direction and

oversight, performance standards were

low, management expectations were

weak, and station priorities were

inappropriate. The NRC staff is nearing

completion of its evaluation of potential

enforcement action to address these

apparent violations and their overall

impact on the safe operation of the

Millstone units.

Additionally, the Licensee has had a

chronic problem of not dealing

effectively with employee concerns at

the Millstone site. On December 12,

1995, the NRC established a review

group to conduct an independent

evaluation of the history of the

Licensee’s handling of employee

concerns related to licensed activities at

the Millstone facility. The review group

determined that, in general, an

unhealthy work environment, which

did not tolerate dissenting views and

did not welcome or promote

questioning attitudes, has existed at the

Millstone facility for the last several

years. To address this problem, the NRC

issued an Order on October 24, 1996,

that directed NU to devise and

implement a comprehensive plan for

handling safety concerns raised by

Millstone employees and to ensure an

environment free from retaliation or

discrimination. In addition, the Order

required NU to have an independent

third party oversee its employee

concerns program. The third party is

responsible for providing periodic

reports to NU and the NRC detailing its

findings and recommendations. The

third-party findings and the NU

responses to them will be assessed by

the NRC staff for any restart issues.

The NRC regards compliance with

regulations, license conditions, and

Technical Specifications (TSs) as

mandatory. However, the NRC also

recognizes that plants will not operate

trouble-free.2 This is clearly articulated

in Criterion XVI, Appendix B, Part 50,

‘‘Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear

Power plants and Fuel Reprocessing

plants.’’ Criterion XVI states that

‘‘measures shall be established to assure

that conditions adverse to quality, such

as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies,

deviations, defective material and

equipment, and nonconformances are

promptly identified and corrected.’’

The appropriate response to an

identified deficiency can and should

vary, depending on the safety

significance of the deficiency. For

example, for rapidly developing

situations, when prompt action is

required to assure plants are not in an

unsafe condition, automatic safety

systems are in place to shut down the

reactor. In other, less time-critical

situations, TSs relating to structures,

systems, and components (SSCs) vital to

the safe operation of a nuclear plant

require that specific actions be taken

within a predetermined time period

when the SSC is determined to be

inoperable. The time period is

dependent on the safety significance of

the SSC. NRC Generic Letter 91–18,

‘‘Information to Licensees Regarding

Two NRC Inspection Manual Sections

on Resolution of Degraded and

Nonconforming Conditions and on

Operability,’’ provides guidance for

licensees to determine what actions are

required and when they need to be

taken for identified degraded or

nonconforming conditions.

The conduct of NRC regulatory

oversight at the Millstone site is based

on the recognition that it is the

Licensee’s primary responsibility to

demonstrate that corrective actions have

been effectively implemented. Thus, the

Licensee must determine that a unit is

in conformance with applicable NRC

regulations, its license conditions, and

its FSAR and that applicable licensing

commitments have been met before the

NRC staff can recommend that the

Commission approve the restart of any

unit. The Licensee’s conformance with

NRC regulations, license conditions,

and licensing commitments is

fundamental to NRC’s confidence in the

safety of licensed activities. In short, the

Licensee has the primary responsibility

for the safe operation of its facilities.

In a June 20, 1996, letter to the NRC,

the Licensee described its Configuration

Management Plan (CMP), which is its

principal program to provide reasonable

assurance that weaknesses at the

Millstone units have been effectively

corrected. The CMP includes efforts to

understand and correct the licensing
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 181 / Thursday, September 18, 1997 / Notices 49037

and design bases issues that led the NRC

to issue the 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters and

Order actions to prevent recurrence of

those issues. The Licensee stated that

the objective of the CMP was to

document and meet the licensing and

design bases requirements of each unit

and to ensure that adequate programs

and processes are in place to maintain

control of these requirements.

The Licensee’s CMP must either

correct each FSAR deficiency or

evaluate it to ensure that the change to

the facility does not involve any

unreviewed safety question or change to

the facility TSs. NU has documented a

large number of deficiencies, which

vary in scope and safety significance for

each unit. These lists contain significant

deficiencies that must be corrected

before restart and others that the

Licensee is planning to correct after the

restart. In its continuing reviews of the

deficiency lists, the NRC staff will

determine whether the Licensee has

appropriately scheduled safetysignificant items for completion before

restart and whether those items that the

Licensee will defer until after restart are

appropriate for each unit. The results of

these efforts will be documented in NRC

inspection reports.

The NRC’s regulatory oversight of the

Licensee’s corrective actions requires

extensive planning and program

integration. To focus more regulatory

attention on all of the restart issues

related to the Millstone units, the NRC

has established a Special Projects Office

(SPO) within the Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation to oversee these

activities. The SPO has developed a

comprehensive and multifaceted

oversight program to verify the

adequacy of NU’s corrective actions,

programs, and processes. The breadth

and significance of the problems

identified at the Millstone site require

this program. The SPO has developed a

Restart Assessment Plan (Assessment

Plan) for each of the Millstone units,

which includes: (1) the appropriate

aspects of NRC Inspection Manual,

Manual Chapter (MC) 0350, ‘‘Staff

Guidelines For Restart Approval’’; (2)

oversight of NU’s ICAVP; and (3)

oversight of NU’s corrective actions

relating to employee concerns involving

safety issues. The activities associated

with the Assessment Plan are in

addition to the normal inspection and

licensing activities being carried out at

the Millstone site.

MC 0350 establishes the guidelines

for approving the restart of a nuclear

power plant after a shutdown resulting

from a significant event, a complex

hardware problem, or serious

management deficiencies. The primary

objective of the guidelines in MC 0350

is to ensure that NRC’s restart review

efforts are appropriate for the individual

circumstances, are reviewed and

approved by the appropriate NRC

management levels, and provide

objective measures of restart readiness.

The Assessment Plan for each unit

includes those issues listed in MC 0350

that the NRC staff has identified as

relevant to the shutdown of the unit.

Each Assessment Plan also includes

additional issues determined to be

applicable to the specific situation. The

Assessment Plans include all actions the

NRC expects NU to take before the NRC

staff recommends to the Commission

that a unit be permitted to restart.

Accordingly, the staff will use the

Assessment Plan for each Millstone unit

to track and monitor all significant

actions necessary to support a decision

on restart approval of the unit.

The Assessment Plan for each

Millstone unit includes the requirement

to review the NU Operational Readiness

Plan, the deficiency lists associated with

the Assessment Plan, including restart

and deferred items, the corrective action

program, work planning and controls,

the procedure upgrade program, the

nuclear oversight function (quality

assurance), outstanding enforcement

items, and a Significant Issues List (SIL),

which includes issues identified by both

NU and the NRC as issues requiring

resolution before restart. NRC MC

93802, ‘‘Operational Safety Team

Inspection’’ (OSTI), provides the

framework for a team inspection to be

performed during the later stages of the

restart process. The inspection will be

structured to focus on the pertinent

issues at each of the Millstone units.

Within the SPO, a Millstone Restart

Assessment Panel (RAP) has been

formed in accordance with MC 0350.

The RAP meets to assess the Licensee’s

performance and its progress in

completing the designated restart

activities. The RAP is composed of the

Director, SPO (chairman); the Deputy

Directors of Licensing, Inspections, and

Independent Corrective Action

Verification Program Oversight; the

Project Managers for the three Millstone

units; the Inspection Branch Chief; the

Senior Resident Inspectors for the three

Millstone units; and the appointed

Division of Reactor Safety

representative. The RAP holds periodic

meetings with the Licensee to discuss

the Licensee’s corrective actions and

schedules of each Millstone unit. These

meetings are noticed and are open to the

public. An additional meeting with the

public is usually held that same day in

the evening to summarize the meeting

with the Licensee, provide an update on

NRC activities, and address comments

from the public.

The purpose of the ICAVP, as stated

in the Confirmatory Order, is to confirm

that the plant’s physical and functional

characteristics are in conformance with

its licensing and design bases. The

ICAVP audit required by the NRC is

expected to provide independent

verification, beyond NU’s quality

assurance and management oversight,

that the Licensee has identified and

satisfactorily resolved existing

nonconformances with the design and

licensing bases; documented and

utilized the licensing and design bases

to resolve nonconformances; and

established programs, processes, and

procedures for effective configuration

management in the future. NU has

started programs to identify and

understand the root causes of the

licensing and design bases issues that

led to NRC issuance of the 10 CFR

50.54(f) letters to NU and to implement

corrective actions that will ensure that

NU maintains the design configuration

and that each unit is in conformance

with its licensing basis. NU has

indicated that the scope of its corrective

programs will include those systems

that it has categorized as either Group

1 (safety-related and risk-significant) or

Group 2 (safety-related or risksignificant). The ICAVP audit must

provide insights into the effectiveness of

NU’s programs so that the results can be

reasonably extrapolated to the

structures, systems, and components

that were not reviewed in the audit.

As a practical matter, the NRC cannot

do a 100-percent verification of the

Licensee’s corrective actions, processes,

and programs for each Millstone unit.

However, a comprehensive and

multifaceted oversight process has been

developed by the NRC staff to provide

a high level of confidence that the

Licensee has implemented required

corrective actions and that all of the

issues on the SILs have been resolved.

The independent third-party

evaluations required by the NRC will be

used to enhance NRC confidence that

the Licensee’s corrective action

programs have been effectively

implemented at each unit.

NRC activities (including oversight of

the ICAVP) to ensure that effective

corrective actions are being taken by the

Licensee will provide additional

assurance that the Licensee’s corrective

action programs have been effectively

implemented. These activities will

include in-process reviews of the ICAVP

contractor’s activities, reviews of the

ICAVP results, and additional

independent reviews of compliance

with the design and licensing bases of
49038 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 181 / Thursday, September 18, 1997 / Notices

3 In this Partial Director’s Decision, Petitioners’

Requests have been identified as Requests 1 through

8. These requests correspond to Requests A.1

through 5, B and C in the initial Petition, and

Request II.A in the amendment to the Petition.

selected systems. The State of

Connecticut’s Nuclear Energy Advisory

Council has provided input to the NRC

staff for selecting the systems which

will be reviewed by the ICAVP

contractor and has been invited to

observe the NRC staff’s ICAVP

inspections.

When the restart review process has

identified, corrected, and reviewed

relevant issues regarding each Millstone

unit, a restart authorization process will

be initiated for that unit. Upon receipt

of a staff recommendation and a briefing

on any ongoing investigations, the

Commission will meet to assess the

recommendation and vote on whether to

allow the restart of the unit. The same

process will be followed for the

remaining units.

Haddam Neck Facility

With regard to the Haddam Neck

Plant, the Licensee shut down the plant

on July 22, 1996, as required by the

facility’s TSs, because of concerns that

the containment air recirculation fans

service water piping may exceed design

loads during certain accident scenarios.

The Licensee determined that these

concerns and other hardware and

programmatic problems identified

before and during the forced outage

should be resolved before restarting the

plant. Thus, the Licensee decided to

begin Refueling Outage 19 on August

17, 1996. On October 9, 1996, the

owners of the Haddam Neck Plant stated

that a permanent shutdown of the plant

was being considered by the Board of

Trustees based on an economic analysis

of operations, expenses, and the cost of

replacement power. Subsequently, all

fuel assemblies were removed from the

reactor and placed in the spent fuel

pool.

From November 21, 1995, to

November 22, 1996, the NRC conducted

numerous inspections at the Haddam

Neck Plant to review several facets of

plant performance. These inspections

included a Special Team inspection by

NRC headquarters staff focused on

engineering performance; a special

Augmented Inspection Team (AIT)

inspection of a reactor vessel nitrogen

intrusion event in late August and early

September 1996 that lowered the reactor

vessel water level; a special radiation

protection inspection of a significant

contamination event in November 1996;

an emergency preparedness inspection

to observe the Licensee’s response

during an emergency exercise held in

August 1996; and several resident

inspections. Numerous violations, as

well as several significant regulatory

concerns, were identified during these

inspections. Most of the violations were

discussed at a transcribed public

predecisional enforcement conference at

the Millstone training building in

Waterford, Connecticut, on December 4,

1996. The December 4 conference was

open to the public and focused on the

broader programmatic deficiencies

underlying the violations that

contributed to the problems at Haddam

Neck. A Notice of Violation and

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties

in the amount of $650,000 was issued

on May 12, 1997, and subsequently paid

by the Licensee.

The restart process described for the

three Millstone units is not applicable to

the Haddam Neck Plant. By letter dated

December 5, 1996, the Licensee certified

to the NRC, pursuant to 10 CFR

50.82(a)(1)(i) and 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii),

that it had decided to permanently cease

operations at the Haddam Neck Plant

and had permanently removed the fuel

from the reactor. The Licensee further

noted that a Post-Shutdown

Decommissioning Activities Report

(PSDAR) and a site-specific

decommissioning cost estimate would

be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR

50.82, ‘‘Termination of License.’’

It is important to note that the NRC

continues to identify problems at both

the Millstone site and the Haddam Neck

Plant, as documented in inspection

reports issued after this Petition was

filed. These findings indicate that the

corrective actions required to restart the

Millstone units have not yet been fully

implemented. The NRC staff will not

recommend that the Commission allow

the restart of a Millstone unit until the

Commission has determined, in

accordance with the Assessment Plan,

that the necessary corrective actions

have been effectively implemented for

the unit.

As for Haddam Neck, a Confirmatory

Action Letter (CAL) was issued to the

Licensee on March 4, 1997, concerning

radiological-control problems at the

Haddam Neck Plant. This CAL is an

example of the type of action that the

NRC takes to assure that the limited

activities at the site will be conducted

in a safe manner and in accordance with

regulatory requirements. The CAL

prohibits the Licensee from performing

any radiological work except that

required to maintain the plant in a safe

configuration until the corrective

actions identified in the CAL have been

implemented.

III. NRC Response to Requested Actions

In summary, the Licensee’s

implementation of its Configuration

Management Plan (CMP) for each

Millstone unit, response to the elements

in the NRC staff’s Restart Assessment

Plan (Assessment Plan) for each

Millstone unit, implementation of

actions to improve programs to address

employee concerns at the Millstone site,

and the implementation of the

decommissioning process specified in

10 CFR 50.82 for the Haddam Neck

Plant, as discussed above, are the bases

for the NRC staff’s responses discussed

in this Partial Director’s Decision to the

specific actions that the Petitioners

requested be taken against NU. The

Petitioners’ requested actions and the

NRC staff’s responses are discussed

below.3

1. Petitioners request that the NRC

immediately suspend or revoke NU’s

license to operate Connecticut Yankee

(Haddam Neck) and the Millstone

Nuclear reactors due to chronic,

negligent management of the reactors

which, for over a decade, has

endangered and continues to endanger

occupational and public health and

safety and the environment due to

resultant and cumulative major safety

problems and violation of NRC

regulations.

The Petitioners base their request to

suspend or revoke the operating licenses

of Haddam Neck and the three Millstone

units on NU reports and NRC inspection

findings referred to in the Petition and

on a videotape in which a former

Millstone Station employee expresses

his views on NU management and plant

conditions. As previously noted, based

on the NRC staff review of these

materials, the Petitioners have identified

no new information.

With regard to the Millstone units, the

units are currently in an extended

shutdown and significant management

changes at NU have been made in the

past year. The NRC’s focus is on

evaluating improved performance,

hardware and programmatic upgrades,

and corrective actions. Specifically,

NRC review and inspection emphasis

will be directed toward the results of

NU’s actions to correct identified

weaknesses in areas such as design

controls, radiological controls, quality

assurance, work control practices,

corrective action processes, and the

handling of employee concerns.

The previous discussion provides an

overview of the Assessment Plans that

the SPO has developed for assessing the

adequacy of NU’s corrective actions

being taken prior to Commission

approval of restart for any of the

Millstone units. The NRC staff will have

to reach a determination that the
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 181 / Thursday, September 18, 1997 / Notices 49039

corrective actions taken by NU provide

reasonable assurance that future

operation will be conducted in

accordance with the terms and

conditions of the operating license, the

Commission’s regulations, and the

design basis, as documented in the

FSAR, of each unit before

recommending that the Commission

approve the restart of any one of the

units. Upon receipt of an NRC staff

recommendation and a briefing on

ongoing investigations, the Commission

will hold a meeting to assess the

recommendation and then vote on

whether to approve the restart of each

unit.

The restart process discussed for the

Millstone units does not apply to

Haddam Neck. The Licensee has

certified to the NRC that operations at

the facility have permanently ceased

and that fuel has been permanently

removed from the reactor.

The Petitioners’ request to take

immediate action was denied in the

letter of January 23, 1997, which

acknowledged receipt of the Petition.

The request to suspend or revoke the

licenses for the three Millstone units is

denied based on the NRC staff’s

conclusion that such action is not

warranted by the facts. Programmatic

and review efforts are in place. If these

efforts are successful, the NRC would

allow the Millstone units to resume

operation. The request to suspend or

revoke the license to operate the

Haddam Neck Plant is moot since the

Licensee has certified to the NRC that

the plant has permanently ceased

operation and the fuel has been

permanently removed from the reactor.

2. The Petitioners request that the

NRC investigate the possibility that NU

made material misrepresentations to the

NRC concerning engineering

calculations and other information or

actions relied upon to assure the

adequacy of safety systems at the

Haddam Neck and Millstone reactors.

The Petitioners said NU made possible

material misstatements either through

lack of rigor and thoroughness or by

providing intentionally misleading

information.

The NRC has ongoing investigations

related to alleged wrongdoing by NU

personnel. The investigative results will

be reviewed for possible enforcement

action. Depending on the results of the

ongoing evaluations of inspections and

investigations, both NU as an

organization and NU employees found

to have engaged in deliberate

misconduct will be subject to

appropriate enforcement action.

Consistent with the General Statement

of Policy and Procedures for NRC

Enforcement Actions (NUREG–1600),

some enforcement action is normally

taken against a licensee for violations

caused by significant acts of wrongdoing

by its employees. Such action could

include a civil penalty or an order. In

deciding whether to also take action

directly against the responsible

employees, the NRC considers a number

of factors such as the employee’s level

in the organization, the employee’s

training and experience, the degree of

supervision, the employee’s attitude,

and the degree of management

responsibility or culpability. A decision

to take action directly against an

individual is significant and normally

will be taken only when the NRC is

satisfied that the individual has engaged

in deliberate misconduct. The action

taken could include prohibiting the

individual from involvement in licensed

activities for a period of years.

As the NRC is currently evaluating

alleged wrongdoing by NU personnel,

the Petitioners’ request is granted.

3. Petitioners request that the NRC

revoke NU’s operating licenses for the

Haddam Neck and the Millstone Units

1, 2, and 3 reactors if an investigation

determines that NU deliberately

provided insufficient and/or false or

misleading information to the NRC. If

the NRC chooses not to revoke NU’s

licenses, the Petitioners specifically

request that the reactors remain off-line

until a United States Department of

Justice (DOJ) independent investigation

is complete and the NRC reviews the

conclusions and recommendations

contained therein for potential

consequences to the Licensee and its

agents under NRC regulations. The

Petitioners note in a footnote that a DOJ

report will likely produce information

essential to the NRC’s evaluation of

NU’s management problems. The

Petitioners further stated that such

information should influence any NRC

decision concerning NU’s future

operation of nuclear reactors in

Connecticut.

Since the NRC investigations are

ongoing, the NRC cannot respond to the

first portion of the request to revoke the

licenses of the three Millstone units at

this time.

The response to the Petitioners’

Request 1 applies to the part of Request

3 asking that the reactors remain off line

until the investigations are complete. As

noted, the Commission will consider the

status of all ongoing investigations,

including any referrals to DOJ, in its

deliberations before voting on the restart

of any of the Millstone units.

The part of the request relating to

revoking the licenses of the three

Millstone units is deferred until all

investigations are complete. The request

that the reactors remain off line until the

investigations are complete is denied.

This request does not apply to the

Haddam Neck Plant, which has already

permanently ceased operation.

4. The Petitioners request that, if NRC

chooses not to revoke NU’s licenses to

operate the Haddam Neck Plant and the

Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3 reactors and

allows the reactors to return to

operation, the reactors remain on the

NRC’s Watch List to oversee reactor

operations until NU management

demonstrates to the NRC that:

a. NU is able to fulfill NRC regulatory

requirements;

b. NU has met all prior commitments

concerning the repair, modification,

maintenance, and documentation of the

nuclear power stations;

c. NU has retrained all staff in the

application and interpretation of NRC’s

regulations; and

d. NU has removed from any

positions of responsibility for operation

and/or management of the reactors all

persons whom DOJ, NRC, or other

government investigators and/or civil or

criminal prosecutions find to have made

material misrepresentations to the NRC

during the past decade of

mismanagement.

Due to the significance and

programmatic nature of the concerns

evolving from the various NRC reviews

and inspections at the Millstone Station

and the fact that each unit is shut down

pending resolution of these issues, the

Commission put the Millstone units in

Category 3 of the Watch List.

Accordingly, restart of any of the units

is subject to Commission approval. SIL

issues, which require resolution for safe

operation, will have been addressed and

a process will be in place to resolve any

deferred items. If the Commission

approves restart of any unit, that unit

will be placed in Category 2 of the

Watch List, where it will remain until

the Licensee has demonstrated that

satisfactory operational performance can

be sustained at the unit.

The restart process, as previously

discussed, will assure that the

management attributes identified by the

Petitioners in Request 4.a, b, and c, will

be adequately considered within the

context of the SPO’s Assessment Plans

before the NRC staff recommends that

the Commission allow the restart of any

unit. Request 4.d will be considered in

the restart process when the

Commission is briefed regarding

investigation efforts and

recommendations.

The request to retain the Millstone

units on the NRC’s Watch List, if the

Commission approves restart, is granted.
49040 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 181 / Thursday, September 18, 1997 / Notices

Any unit permitted to restart will be

placed in Category 2 of the Watch List,

where it will remain until the Licensee

has demonstrated that satisfactory

performance can be sustained at the

unit. Request 4.a, b, c, and d will be

considered as set forth above.

This request does not apply to the

Haddam Neck Plant because the

Haddam Neck Plant has permanently

ceased operation. The NRC will

continue its oversight of the defueled

facility.

5. Petitioners request that, as a

minimum, the NRC keep Haddam Neck

and the Millstone 1, 2, and 3 nuclear

reactors off line until NU’s chronic

mismanagement has been analyzed,

remedial management programs have

been implemented, and the NRC has

evaluated and approved the

effectiveness of the Licensee’s actions.

As a minimum, NU should:

a. Thoroughly analyze root causes for

deficiencies in NU’s FSARs, its

documentation of licensing and design

bases, its safety analysis, its engineering,

its quality assurance, its as low as

reasonably achievable (ALARA)

programs, and other necessary or

required documentation.

b. Create a complete, accurate FSARmere ‘‘reform’’ is impossible when the

basic document is inadequate and

inaccurate;

c. Reevaluate of any of its activities

initiated under (or which NU should

have initiated under) 10 CFR 50.59 in

order to confirm the validity of such

activities, particularly to determine the

extent to which the FSAR does not

match ‘‘as built’’ configurations. This

reevaluation requires more than a paper

audit; it requires checking actual

physical plant against the existing

documentation, component by

component and system by system and

creating correct documentation where it

is lacking and/or inadequate;

d. Institute and document an effective

ALARA review of all operational and

nonoperational activities that expose

workers and/or the public to radiation;

e. Thoroughly document the root

causes of NU’s chronic and systemic

mismanagement including,

documentation of the NRC Region I

inspection program’s staff and

management failures over the past

decade to detect and deal with this

problem;

f. Demonstrate, over a substantial

period of time to the satisfaction of the

NRC, NU’s commitment to respect NRC

regulatory requirements and

consistently follow them;

g. Retrain all personnel involved in

day-to-day operations so that they are

thoroughly conversant with NRC

regulations; and

h. Update and document Plant Design

Change Requests (PDCRs) to include all

changes to the reactor’s design, and

verification by the NRC staff of these

design changes, with closeouts of

PDCRs receiving the highest priority.

As previously noted, NRC regulatory

oversight programs at the Millstone

Station are based on the recognition that

the Licensee is primarily responsible for

demonstrating that corrective actions

have been effectively implemented.

Before the NRC staff can recommend

that the Commission approve the restart

of a Millstone unit, the Licensee must

determine that the unit conforms with

applicable NRC regulations, license

conditions, and the FSARs and that

applicable licensing commitments have

been met. The Licensee’s conformance

with NRC regulations, license

conditions, and licensing commitments

is fundamental to the NRC’s confidence

in the safety of licensed activities.

The significant actions that the NRC

is taking to monitor the Licensee’s

activities have been discussed in detail

earlier in this Decision. Based on that

discussion, the actions requested in

Request 5.a through h, with the

exception of the part of 5.e relating to

NRC staff performance, will be

adequately addressed within the context

of the SPO’s Assessment Plan for each

of the Millstone units.

With regard to Request 5.e, the part of

5.e relating to the performance of the

NRC staff is beyond the scope of the

2.206 process and will not be addressed

in the Director’s Decision relating to this

Petition. This issue has been referred to

the NRC’s OIG for action as appropriate.

The request to keep the Millstone

units off line until the items identified

in Request 5.a through h, with the

exception of the part of Request 5.e

relating to NRC’s previous actions in

dealing with the Licensee, is granted to

the extent that the issues will be

considered within the SPO’s

Assessment Plan for each of the units.

This request does not apply to the

Haddam Neck facility, which has

permanently ceased operation.

6. Petitioners request that, if NU

decides to shut down any or all of the

nuclear power reactors at issue herein

with the intent to commence the

decommissioning process, the NRC not

permit any decommissioning or

predecommissioning activity to take

place until:

a. All the documentation mentioned

in earlier requests is available to the

NRC and on site at the reactors;

b. All personnel involved in the

decommissioning process have been

retrained (or trained) in the use and

interpretation of the applicable NRC

regulations in Title 10 of the Code of

Federal Regulations;

c. The NRC has appropriately

evaluated and replaced personnel and

has restructured the NRC Region I

inspection program, its management,

and the supervising NRC directorate to

eliminate the regulatory anarchy that

plagued the Connecticut nuclear

reactors during the past 10 years; and

d. The NRC makes certain that NU

does not employ any persons in

management or operations who made

material misrepresentations to the NRC

about the status of operations, repairs,

modifications, or maintenance of NU’s

Connecticut reactors.

On October 9, 1996, the owners of the

Haddam Neck Plant stated that the

Board of Trustees was considering a

permanent shutdown of the plant, based

on an economic analysis of operations,

expenses, and the cost of replacement

power. All fuel assemblies were

removed from the reactor and placed in

the spent fuel pool for temporary

storage. By letter dated December 5,

1996, the Licensee certified to the NRC,

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and 10

CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii), that it had

determined to permanently cease

operations at the Haddam Neck Plant

and that the fuel had been permanently

removed from the reactor. The Licensee

further noted that a Post-Shutdown

Decommissioning Activities Report

(PSDAR) and the site-specific

decommissioning cost estimate would

be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR

50.82, ‘‘Termination of License.’’ The

PSDAR will be submitted to the NRC

and a copy sent to the affected state(s)

within 2 years after operations have

permanently ceased. The report must

include, among other things, a

description of the planned

decommissioning activities and a

schedule for their implementation. No

major decommissioning activities may

be performed until 90 days after the

NRC receives the PSDAR.

The current activities at the site

include the operation, monitoring, and

maintenance of the spent fuel pool;

radioactive waste management;

radiological protection; and fire

protection. These activities, including

any activities relating to

decommissioning, must be in

compliance with the current license

requirements, which apply when the

reactor is defueled.

The degree of regulatory oversight

required during decommissioning of a

nuclear power reactor is considerably

less than during its operational phase.

When the reactor is operating, the fuel
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 181 / Thursday, September 18, 1997 / Notices 49041

in the reactor core undergoes a

controlled nuclear fission reaction that

generates a high neutron flux and large

amounts of heat. Safe control of the

nuclear reaction involves the use and

operation of many complex systems,

adherence to operational limits, testing

of components and systems to assure

their operability, specified procedure

adherence, and operator actions. Once

the fuel has been permanently removed

and temporarily stored in the spent fuel

pool, the fuel is still highly radioactive

and generates heat caused by

radioactive decay. However, no neutron

flux is generated and the fuel slowly

cools as its energetic decay products

diminish. Since the spent fuel is stored

in a configuration that precludes the

nuclear fission, no generation of new

radioactivity can occur. However, the

same areas of the facility contain

radioactive contamination and those

areas must still be controlled to

minimize radiation exposure to

personnel and to control the spread of

radioactive material.

The NRC staff continues to be

concerned about the failures of the

Haddam Neck radiological controls

program (which recently resulted in the

unplanned exposure of two

individuals), long-standing

discrepancies in the calibration of

several radiation monitors that are used

to monitor and control radiological

effluent releases, and the inadequate

control of radioactive material that

resulted in the undetected release of

contaminated equipment to a

nonlicensed vendor.

In response, the NRC has taken

comprehensive and significant actions

to resolve concerns in the area of

radiological controls, including the

issuance of a CAL on March 4, 1997,

confirming the Licensee’s commitment

to respond to the findings in Inspection

Reports 50–213/96–12, dated December

19, 1996, and 50–213/97–02, dated

March 21, 1997. The CAL restricts the

Licensee from performing any

radiological work except that required

to maintain the plant in a safe

configuration. The CAL identifies four

significant activities required of the

Licensee to bring its management and

implementation of radiation control

programs up to a standard acceptable to

the NRC. The activities are to (1)

identify, in writing, specific

compensatory measures that the

Licensee will establish to assure

sufficient management control and

oversight of ongoing or planned

activities that require radiological

controls; (2) engage the services of an

independent assessor to assess the

quality and performance of the

Licensee’s radiological control programs

and their implementation; (3) by May

30, 1997, based on the results of that

independent assessment, (a) identify

problems, determine root causes, and

develop broad-based and specific

corrective actions; (b) identify

performance measures that may be used

to determine the effectiveness of

radiological control programs; and (c)

submit a plan and schedule to the

Regional Administrator, NRC Region I,

for implementing improvements in the

radiological control programs; and (4)

before eliminating any interim

compensatory measures, meet with the

Region I Administrator to describe

program implementation and

performance improvements achieved or

planned.

In summary, the NRC is following the

decommissioning process as specified

in 10 CFR 50.82, which requires that no

major activities may be performed until

90 days after the NRC receives the

PSDAR. The Licensee must comply with

all the applicable operating license

requirements in effect for the defueled

reactor relating to activities currently

being performed at the Haddam Neck

Plant. Further, the NRC will take

appropriate actions for any defueled

reactor to assure compliance with its

license and license conditions, such as

the actions described above for the

failure of adequate radiological controls

at Haddam Neck. The Haddam Neck

Plant is the only reactor that the

Licensee has determined to permanently

shut down and decommission.

The request to forbid

decommissioning activities or

predecommissioning activity at any NU

nuclear power reactor until all the

requested actions identified in the

Petition, including items a, b and d, of

Request 6, have been completed is

denied for the reasons stated above. The

NRC staff has determined that the NRC

requirements that govern

decommissioning and the activities

being undertaken by the Licensee in

response to the CAL are sufficient to

assure that the activities at the Haddam

Neck facility are being conducted in a

safe manner. Request 6.c, relating to the

performance of the NRC staff, is beyond

the scope of the 2.206 process and will

not be addressed in the Director’s

Decision relating to this Petition. This

issue has been referred to the NRC’s

OIG.

7. The Petitioners request that the

NRC commence an investigation into

how it allowed the illegal situation at

NU’s Connecticut reactors to exist and

to continue over a decade. Particularly,

Petitioners request that the Commission

order its staff (directors of the

responsible directorates, managers, and

Region I management and staff) to

answer the following questions, and

hold these persons accountable for their

answers and actions regarding the past

10 years at NU’s Connecticut nuclear

power reactors:

a. What documents did Region I

inspectors, their supervisors, and NRC

Project Directors and Project Managers

review during 10 years of NU’s out-ofcompliance operation?

b. If NU provided documents that

somehow deceived the Region I

inspector, how does the information in

these documents relate to the everyday

workings and activities conducted

during the otherwise undocumented

decade of operations at the Millstone

and Haddam Neck plants?

c. How did Region I inspectors, their

supervisors, and NRC Project

Directorates and Managers find that NU

was conducting operations in a way that

keeps worker and public exposures to

radiation ALARA when NU was not

adequately documenting either its

licensing basis or the basis of reactor

operations?

d. Knowing, as Region I inspectors

must have known, of excessive worker

exposures (for example, due to a long

standing problem with leaking pipes as

documented by an NU worker in the

video tape provided with this Petition

Exhibit A), how did the Region I

inspectors certify that operations at the

Millstone and Haddam Neck plants

were being conducted ALARA? How

did the supervisors, and those in the

NRC Project Directorate, make the same

certifications?

e. During the undocumented decade,

how did Region I inspectors, their

supervisors, and NRC Project Directors

and Managers manage to track NU’s

activities at the Millstone and Haddam

Neck plants under 10 CFR 50.59?

f. To what extent have NRC Region I

inspectors, their supervisors, and NRC

Project Directors and Managers allowed

the same type of problems to develop at

other nuclear power reactors in New

England (i.e., Maine Yankee, Pilgrim,

Seabrook, Vermont Yankee, and Yankee

Rowe)?

g. Is there any connection between

licensees employing Yankee Atomic

Electric Company’s consulting and

engineering services and the serious

problems with documentation and lack

of compliance with the licensing and

design bases nuclear power stations in

New England or in other parts of the

country?

This request is beyond the scope of

the 2.206 process. It concerns the

performance of the NRC staff and will

not be addressed in the Director’s
49042 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 181 / Thursday, September 18, 1997 / Notices

Decision relating to this Petition. This

request has been referred to the NRC’s

OIG.

8. In the amendment to the Petition,

the Petitioners request that the NRC take

the following actions to enforce its

regulations against NU. As part of the

2.206 process, the NRC should provide

copies of Haddam Neck’s nitrogen

calculations to the Petitioners and

conduct an independent review to see if

the calculations meet the requirements

of 10 CFR part 50, appendix B. If

appendix B requirements were violated,

the Petitioners are concerned that the

Licensee cannot safely decommission

the Haddam Neck Plant. Accordingly,

NU’s operating licenses for its

Connecticut reactors should be revoked,

and NU should not be permitted to

commence decommissioning until it has

complied with the conditions outlined

in the main body of the original

Petition. Finally, the Commission

should inquire into the NRC staff’s

failure to discern this situation and its

continuing failure to enforce the terms

and conditions of NU’s license and NRC

regulations.

As noted above, the assertion by the

Petitioners that the calculations

performed by the Licensee violated NRC

requirements is a new issue not

previously considered by the NRC staff.

The subject calculations were

performed subsequent to an event at the

Haddam Neck Plant that resulted in the

formulation of a nitrogen bubble in the

reactor vessel. The results of the

calculations, which were one of several

methods used to confirm the water level

during the event, were discussed by the

Licensee during a public predecisional

enforcement conference held on

December 4, 1996.

By letter dated July 3, 1997, the

Licensee provided information,

including the requested calculations,

relating to the different methods used

for determining the reactor vessel water

level resulting from the nitrogen

intrusion event. This information has

been placed in the NRC’s Public

Document Room and the Local Public

Document Rooms. The Petitioners were

provided a copy of the calculations as

an enclosure to a Petition status letter

dated July 21, 1997, since the

calculations are relevant to the

Petitioners’ concern, are not proprietary,

and are in the public domain.

On September 5, 1996, while

investigating the root cause of the

undetected accumulation of nitrogen gas

in the reactor vessel, the Licensee

performed a special test (ST 11.7–197,

‘‘Determination of Reactor Vessel

Level’’) to verify reactor vessel level.

This test was necessary because the

reactor vessel level indication system

and the core exit thermocouples had

been removed from service in

accordance with the Licensee’s refueling

procedures. The reactor level

measurement problem had been

exacerbated by the nitrogen gas

intrusion, which displaced water from

the reactor vessel into the pressurizer,

resulting in an unquantified decrease in

reactor vessel inventory. During the

course of the event, the shift manager

had requested that the worst-case

(lowest) reactor vessel level achieved

during the event be determined. As

noted in NRC Inspection Report No. 50–

213/96–80, ‘‘NRC Augmented

Inspection Team Review of the

Undetected Introduction of Nitrogen

Gas into the Reactor Vessel During Plant

Shutdown,’’ the plant staff completed a

preliminary analysis on September 4,

1996. It was further noted that, at the

end of the onsite inspection activities,

the Licensee had yet to complete a final

volumetric inventory balance

calculation. In the Notice of Violation

and Proposed Imposition of Civil

Penalties in the amount of $650,000

issued on May 12, 1997, the Licensee

was cited for failure to take timely

corrective actions following the nitrogen

intrusion event, including the failure to

timely establish the actual lowest

reactor vessel level resulting from the

event.

Subsequently, the Licensee completed

two calculations: (1) Calculation 96–

MDE–1515–MY, ‘‘Reactor Vessel Level

Determination,’’ prepared on October 2,

1996, independently reviewed on

November 1, 1996, and approved on

November 5, 1996; and (2) Calculation

96–MDE–1536-MY, ‘‘Reactor Vessel

Level Determination,’’ prepared on

October 4, 1996, independently

reviewed on November 22, 1996, and

approved on December 1, 1996. These

calculations were performed consistent

with the requirements of 10 CFR part

50, appendix B.

Also, during the December 4, 1996,

predecisional enforcement conference,

the Licensee presented the results of

reactor vessel water level simulations,

which were calculated using the

RELAP5/MOD3 code. These simulation

results were presented by the Licensee

to corroborate, with a diverse

methodology, the lowest reactor vessel

water level determined by Calculations

96–MDE–1515–MY and 96–MDE–1536–

MY. The results of the RELAP5/MOD3

reactor vessel water level simulations

presented by the Licensee during the

predecisional enforcement conference

were only used to corroborate and

provide additional insight into the

reactor vessel water level that had been

determined through Calculations 96–

MDE–1515–MY and 96–MDE–1536–

MY. These two calculations had been

independently reviewed and performed

consistent with the applicable

provisions in the Licensee’s 10 CFR part

50, Appendix B, ‘‘Quality Assurance

Program,’’ and are considered by the

NRC staff to suffice to demonstrate the

reactor vessel water level.

Under these circumstances, the

RELAP5/MOD3 simulations were not

required to have been independently

verified.

Thus, the assertion by the Petitioners

that the calculations discussed during

the predecisional enforcement

conference violated 10 CFR part 50,

appendix B, requirements is unfounded

and no further actions by the NRC are

required. The part of Request 8 relating

to the performance of the NRC staff is

beyond the scope of the 2.206 process

and will not be addressed in the

Director’s Decision relating to this

Petition. This part of Request 8 has been

referred to the NRC’s OIG.

IV. Conclusion

The NRC staff has determined, for the

reasons provided in the above

discussion, that: Request 2 is granted for

both the Millstone units and the

Haddam Neck Plant; Requests 4 and 5

are partially granted for the Millstone

units; Request 1 and parts of Requests

3, 4, 6, and 8 are denied for the three

Millstone units; Requests 6 and 8 are

partially denied for the Haddam Neck

Plant; Request 3 is partially deferred for

the three Millstone units; Requests 1, 3,

4, and parts of Request 5 are not

applicable to Haddam Neck; and

Request 7 and parts of Requests 5, 6,

and 8 are beyond the scope of the 2.206

process and are not addressed. The

deferred parts of Request 3 will be

addressed in a Final Director’s Decision

after any possible wrongdoing is fully

considered by the NRC staff.

As provided for in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a

copy of this Partial Decision will be

filed with the Secretary of the

Commission for the Commission’s

review. This Partial Decision will

constitute the final action of the

Commission (for Petitioners Requests 1,

2, 5, 6, and 8) 25 days after issuance

unless the Commission, on its own

motion, institutes review of the Decision

in that time.

Dated at Rockville, MD, this 12th day of

September.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 181 / Thursday, September 18, 1997 / Notices 49043

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Frank J. Miraglia Jr.,

Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 97–24807 Filed 9–17–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD

Sunshine Act Meeting

Notice is hereby given that the

Railroad Retirement Board will hold a

meeting on September 23, 1997, 1:30

p.m., at the Board’s meeting room on the

8th floor of its headquarters building,

844 North Rush Street, Chicago, Illinois,

60611. The agenda for this meeting

follows:

Portion Open to the Public:

(1) Proposed Flexitime/Variable

Workweek Changes

(2) Federal Ban on Smoking on

Federal Property

(3) Employee Service—Environmental

Contractors with CSX

Transportation Company

(4) Coverage Determination—Pioneer

Railroad Equipment Company, Ltd.

(5) Regulations—Part 230 (Reduction

and Non-Payment of Annuities by

Reason of Work)

(6) Local Area Network (LAN)

Proposal for the Board Offices

(7) Year 2000 Issues

(8) Labor Member Truth in Budgeting

Status Report

Portion Closed to the Public:

(A) Last Person Employment

Deductions for Dual Annuitants

(Marie A. Fese and Frank J. Fese)

The person to contact for more

information is Beatrice Ezerski,

Secretary to the Board, Phone No. 312–

751–4920.

Dated: September 15, 1997.

Beatrice Ezerski,

Secretary to the Board.

[FR Doc. 97–24907 Filed 9–16–97; 8:57 am]

BILLING CODE 7905–01–M

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

COMMISSION

Issuer Delisting; Notice of Application

To Withdraw From Listing and

Registration; (Forest City Enterprises,

Inc., Class A Common Stock, $0.331⁄3

Par Value; Class B Common Stock,

$0.331⁄3 Par Value) File No. 1–4372

September 12, 1997.

Forest City Enterprises, Inc.

(‘‘Company’’) has filed an application

with Securities and Exchange

Commission (‘‘Commission’’), pursuant

to Section 12(d) of the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934 (‘‘Act’’) and Rule

12d2–2(d) promulgated thereunder, to

withdraw the above specified securities

(‘‘Securities’’) from listing and

registration on the American Stock

Exchange, Inc. (‘‘Amex’’ or

‘‘Exchange’’).

The reasons cited in the application

for withdrawing the Securities from

listing and registration include the

following:

According to the Exchange, trading in

the Company’s Security on the New

York Stock Exchange, Inc. (‘‘NYSE’’)

commenced at the opening of business

on July 17, 1997 and concurrently

therewith the Security was suspended

from trading on the Amex.

The Company has complied with

Amex Rule 18 by filing with the

Exchange a certified copy of the

preambles and resolutions adopted by

the Board of Directors of the Company

authorizing the withdrawal of the

Security from listing and registration on

the Amex, setting forth in detail the

reasons for such proposed withdrawal,

and the facts in support thereof.

Any interested person may, on or

before October 3, 1997, submit by letter

to the Secretary of the Securities and

Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street,

NW., Washington, DC 20549, facts

bearing upon whether the application

has been made in accordance with the

rules of the exchange and what terms,

if any, should be imposed by the

Commission for the protection of

investors. The Commission, based on

the information submitted to it, will

issue an order granting the application

after the date mentioned above, unless

the Commission determines to order a

hearing on the matters.

For the Commission, by the Division of

Market Regulation, pursuant to delegated

authority.

Jonathan G. Katz,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 97–24758 Filed 9–17–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 8010–01–M

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

COMMISSION

[Investment Company Act Release No.

22819; 812–10434]

Frank Russell Investment Company, et

al.; Notice of Application

September 12, 1997.

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange

Commission (‘‘SEC’’ or ‘‘Commission‘‘).

ACTION: Notice of application under

sections 6(c), 12(d)(1)(J), and 17(b) of the

Investment Company Act of 1940 (the

‘‘Act’’) for exemptions from sections

12(d)(1) (A) and (B), and 17(a) of the

Act, and under section 17(d) of the Act

and rule 17d–1 to permit certain joint

transactions.

SUMMARY OF APPLICATION: The requested

order would permit nonmoney market

funds of Frank Russell Investment

Company and Russell Insurance Funds

(‘‘Investment Funds’’) to purchase

shares of one or more affiliated

investment companies that are money

market funds (the ‘‘Money Market

Funds’’) for cash management purposes.

The requested order would supersede a

prior order.

Applicants: Frank Russell Investment

Company (‘‘FRIC’’), Russell Insurance

Funds (‘‘RIF’’), Frank Russell

Investment Management Company

(‘‘FRIMCo’’), and Russell Fund

Distributors, Inc. (the ‘‘Distributors’’).

Filing Dates: The application was

filed on November 14, 1996, and

amended on August 14, 1997.

Hearing or Notification of Hearing: An

order granting the application will be

issued unless the SEC orders a hearing.

Interested persons may request a

hearing by writing to the SEC’s

Secretary and serving applicants with a

copy of the request, personally or by

mail. Hearing requests should be

received by the SEC by 5:30 p.m. on

October 7, 1997, and should be

accompanied by proof of service on

applicants, in the form of an affidavit,

or, for lawyers, a certificate of service.

Hearing requests should state the nature

of the writer’s interest, the reason for the

request, and the issues contested.

Persons may request notification of a

hearing by writing to the SEC’s

Secretary.

ADDRESSES: Secretary, SEC, 450 Fifth

Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20549.

Applicants, 909 A Street, Tacoma. WA

98402.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Elaine M. Boggs, Senior Counsel, at

(202) 942–0572, or Christine Y.

Greenlees, Branch Chief, at (202) 942–

0564 (Division of Investment

Management, Office of Investment

Company Regulation).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The

following is a summary of the

application. The complete application

may be obtained for a fee from the SEC’s

Public Reference Branch, 450 Fifth

Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20549

(telephone (202) 942–8090).

Applicants’ Representations

1. FRIC and RIF are registered openend management investment companies

organized as Massachusetts business