### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Fe br ua ry 10, 200 9 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. RIC KEY E. HU TCH INGS
Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Willi am son Coun ty No. I-594-137 R obbi e T. Beal, Judge

No. M2008- 00814-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Jun e 16, 2009

Th e De fe nd ant, Rickey

E. Hutc hin g s, a

pp e a ls a s o f r ig ht f

ro m th e Willi a mso n Co un ty Cir c uit Court’s revoc ation of his 1994 probationar y sentenc e for

possession of contra

band in a pe nal instit ution. On J une 22, 1998, a warra nt was iss ued aga inst the Defenda nt, alleg ing a

violation of pr ob a tio n b a se d u

po n th e De fe nd a

nt ’ s a r r e s t i n Gu l f p o r t , M i s s iss ipp i f

or po sse ssi on

of a pp ro xima te ly
o ne hundre d pounds of marijuana with the intent to sell. The war rant wa s not served on the Def endant until November

27, 2007, and wa s therea fter a mended to include a dditio nal cr iminal behavior

. On appea l, the Def endant argues that the delay betwee n the issuance of t h e p robation violation warra

nt and his revoc ation hear ing violate d his right to a spe edy revoc ation hear ing a nd, there fore , that the trial cour t erre d by deny i n g h i s motion to di smiss t he wa rra nts. Bec ause the Def endant wa s denied the r ight to a spe edy probation revocation hearing , the j udg ment of t he trial court is re verse d, and the wa rra nts ag ainst the Def

endant a re dismissed.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Reve rsed; P robation Violation Warrants Dism issed

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

F . Sh ay ne B ra sf ie ld, F ra nk lin , T e nn e sse e , f

or the a pp e lla nt, Ric ke y

E. Hutc hin g s.
Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; L e sli e E. Pr ic e , As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Ki m R. He lpe r, Di str ic t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; and De re k K. Smit h, As sis tant D ist

ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.W e n o t e that M r. S m i t h is also t he p ro sec uto r i n the p rese nt p ro ce ed i ng s. 1

It i s u n c le a r fro m the re c o rd w h o S a n d ra R u tlan d is an d w h a t he r ro le w a s in th e D e fen d a n t’s ca se

. 2

-2- OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound This case has a r ather

complicated pr ocedur al hi story that we will set out in detail. On Aug ust 8, 1994, in the W illiamson C ounty Circuit Court, the Defe ndant pleade d g uilty to possession of contra band in a p enal inst itution, a Cl ass C felony . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-16- 201. Th e re a ft e r, the tr ia l cour t im po sed a se nte nc e of

e ig ht ye ars in t

he De pa rtme nt o f C or

re c tio n; t his sentenc e wa s suspended, a nd the Def

endant wa s place d o n t en y ear s of intensive probation. The probation orde r re flec ts that the probationar y period be g an on Oc tober 31, 1994, a nd was to end on October 31, 2004. J u d gm en t was e ntere d ag ainst the Def endant on Nove mber 11, 1994. Af ter
succe ssfully

completing ten months of intensive probation, the De fenda nt was transf

err ed to re g ular probation.

On J u n e 1 7 , 1 9 9 8 , t h e D ef en d an twa s arre s t edi nGu l fp o rt , M i s s i s s i p p i o na f ed er al ch ar ge fo r p os se ssi on

of a pp ro xima te ly on e hund

re d p ound s o f m ari

jua na wi th t he int e nt t o s e ll. As a

re su lt of his arr est in Missis sippi, a revoc ation war rant was issued in Wi lliamson Count y on J une 22, 1998. The De fenda

nt was convic ted of the f

eder al cha rg e. Phone re cords indicate that, wh ile the Def endant was inca rce rate d in Missi ssippi on the c o nv ic ti o n, his attorney spoke with Assistant District Attorney Gene ral De rek Smith on J anuar y 22, 1999, and J une 23, 1999. J ust two day s afte r t he J une 23, 1999 1 phone ca ll, on J une 25, the De fenda nt was plac ed on fe dera l probation, which included random drug testing, outpatient substance abuse counseling , and pay ment of a $1,000 fine . Acc ording to phone
rec ords, on J une 29, 1999, followingthe Def endant’ s relea se fr om fed er al custody and plac ement
on fe de ra l pr ob a tio n, the Defen da nt’ s atto rn e y

ta lke d w ithSand

ra Rut land “ re : r e po rt ingto

2 pr ob a tio n in

TN ,” and he a lso ha d a

ph on e c on fe re nc e wi th Sand ra Rut land and Ag e nt Joe y Ki mbl e of the Te nnessee DrugTask F orce . Phone rec ords re flec t another phone call by the Def en d ant’s
a tto rn e y on July 1, 19 99 , s ho wi nga

dis c us sio n w iththe De fe nd ant a nd his pr ob a tio n o ff

ic e r i n Tenne ssee and a phone call to the “US Attorne y and Ag ent.” L ater

in J uly 1999, the Def

endant met with Ag ent Kimble in Tenne ssee; howe ver, the Def endant wa s not served wi th the outstanding
war rant at this t ime. The De fenda nt suc cessf

ully completed his fe dera l probationary period a nd was rele ased f rom probation on June 24, 2002.

I n 2005, the Def

endant was arr ested in Putnam and White Counti es in Tenne ssee. He was convicted in White County for a g g ravated assault o n Au gu s t 22, 2006, and in Putnam County for theft over $1,000 on Dec ember 19, 2006. Under the terms of the plea a g ree ment, he re ceive d three y ear s of probation for these off enses. The rea fter, the Def endant wa s arr ested on Oc tober 24, 2007, in Jones County , Geor g ia for possession of burg lary tools a nd theft. He was extradited to Tennessee for the pe nding w arr ant cha rg ing him with vi olation of probation for the possession of contra band in a pena l insti tution conviction.-3-

The June 22, 1998 violation warra nt was finally serve d on the Def endant on Nove mber 27, 20 07 . T he wa

rr ant w a s th e n ame nd e d to inc lud e the De fe nd ant’ s convic tio ns in Putn a m and Whit e Counties and his Georg ia ar rest. On December 11, 2007, the Def endant a ppear ed in cour

t and was
serve d with the amende d violation warra nt, at which time t he parties ag ree d to continue the matter until a later date.

The De fenda

nt filed a motion to dismiss on Fe bruar y 14, 2008, on the basis that the leng thy delay betwee n the issuance and ser vice of t he wa

rra nt violated his constituti onal rig ht to a speedy probation revocation hearing

. At the request of t he defense due t o the fa ct that the De fenda nt was in court in Putnam County , the par ties ag ree d to a continue the matter ag ain from F ebrua ry 19, 2008, to March 31, 2008. Following a hear ing on the motion to di smiss on March 31, the trial c ourt denied the motion, and the hea

ring on the probation violation was continued.

At the April 3, 2008 revoc ation hear ing, the Def endant, while not a dmitti ng to the violation, stipulated to the fac ts c ontained in the war rants. He reque sted, howeve r, that the court consider the time delay

in serving the war

rant a nd his curre nt health issues.

The De fenda

nt testified that he ser

ved one year

and one w eek in f

eder al custody

on the Mississ ippi drug conviction. He stated that this was a r educe d sentenc e due to the f act that he had assisted authorities with catching a “kingpin[ ]” who had skipped out on his bond.

When asked if he was infor med of a ny war rants or holds f

ollowing his relea se fr om fede ral custody , the Def

endant testified that there had been multipl e conver sations be tween his attorney and law e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic ia ls, pa rt ic ula rl y Ag e nt Joey Ki mbl e in Te nn e sse e , wh e re he “ c ou ld d o s ome more c ooperation work along those lines[.] ” He was told to repor t to Age nt K i m b l e wh en he returne d to Tennesse e. Upon his return, the Def endant located Ag ent Kimble and sig ned a “conf idential informant contr act” with him, for a per iod lasting ten y ear s, and he w as not to inform any one of his confide ntial informant st atus. The Defenda nt stated that, at some point in time, at the reque st of Ag ent Kimble and Customs Office r Randy Walsh, he g ather ed some infor mation about
a lle g e d c ri min al deali ng s and re lay e d th is i nf

or matio n to the m; h ow e ve r, the y ne ve r r e sp on de d to him. The Def

endant pr oduced a

n old car d with a pag er numbe r for Ag ent Kimble on it. Following his incarc eration in Mi ssissippi , the Def endant r eturne d to his home in S parta, Te nn e sse e , w he re he ha d li ve d f or thi rt y y e ars . H e re po rt e d to a fe de ra l p rob atio n o ff

ic e in Cookeville; his probation office r was Bur ton Putnam. When asked if he re ported to state pr obation at that time, the Def

endant replied that he informed Mr. Putnam he was also on state probation but believed that his feder al and state probation “we re run toge ther sort of hit—y ou know, hand in hand tied at the hip at that par

ticular point.” More over, a ccor ding to the Defe ndant, Mr. Putnam explained to him that he chec ked NCI C every six months and that, if there wer e outstanding war rants for the De fenda nt, then they

would be aw are of that information. W hen he suc cessf ully completed pr ob a tio n w ithMr . Putna m, t he De fe nd ant a sk e d if

he ha d a ny oth e r o bli g a tio ns , a

nd Mr . Putna

m, replied, “No. . . . You know, f rom what I

see w ith my rec ords and my chec ks,

. . . y ou’re fre e to g o, . . . y ou’re a fr ee ma

n, y ou can c ontinue to travel a s y ou have in the pa st.”-4-

The De fenda

nt affir med that he was arr ested in Putnam and Whi te Counties in 2005, that he pleade d g uilty

to these cha

rg es, and that he was place d on state probation as a re sult. The Def endant testified that he only

serve d a few day s in jail on these off enses a nd that he re ported to his probation office r as directed. Acc ording to the Defenda nt, he had three differ ent probation office rs while on
s t a t e p r o b a t i o n

. T h e f

i r s tp r o b a t i o no f

f i c e r m a d e h i m f

i l l o u tf o r m s d o c u m e n t i n g h i s c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y, and he inc luded his Wi lliamson Count y conviction. At all times, he reported to the same probation office , which also wa s the same of fice he re ported to whe n he was on probation out of Willi amson County . Acc ording to the Def endant, no pr obation office r eve r informe d him of any outstanding
war rants; the De fenda

nt believed that he did not have “a ny thing still out there.”

The De fenda

nt testified that he was pulled over in Geor g ia on a routine traff ic stop in October 20 07 . U lti mate ly , th e po lic e se arc he d th e ve hic le and dis c ov e re d th e De fe nd ant’ s “ wo rk too ls” in it; he “ did some contra cting .” The police ra n an NCI C chec k on him and found a hold on him. He
was a rre sted and take n to jail. Accor ding to the D efe ndant, Georg ia officials said that “this doesn’t quite play out the way

. . . we thought it did” seeing that it was the De fenda nt’s work truc k, that the Def endant should sig n extradition papers bac k to Tennesse e, and that Georg ia offic ials were “g oing to forg et about this . . . .” I t was then he lear ned that the hold wa s due to the c o n v i ction out of Wil liamson County . The De fenda nt believed the G eorg ia cha rg es had be en droppe d.

The De fenda

nt the n d escr ibed his my

riad of me dical proble ms: testicular ca ncer requiring him to underg o radiation treatments, Hepatitis C requiringhim to take I nterfe ron, cirr hosi s of the liver, post-traumatic stress disorder , and diabe tes. The Def endant introduced a letter fr om his doctor at t he Vetera

ns Administration (VA) Hospital, whe rein the doc tor listed the Def endant’ s numerous medical issues a

nd conclude d that the Def endant “ has complex medical and psychiatric issues that
wo uld be be st m ana g e d if he wa s not inc arc e ra te d. ” He te sti fi e d that he ha d me dic a l c ov e ra g e wi th the VA a nd that, if he was incar cer ated, then he and his f amily would lose his V A benef its. He wa s unsure what would happen with his TennCar e cove rag e. Additionally , the Defenda nt testified t hat he was the pr imary car etake r for

his very ill mot her. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a th i s w i f

e , h i s s e v e n
- ye ar
- o l d

d a u g h t e r , an d

o n e o f h i s e i g h t e e n
- ye ar
- o l d

t w i nb o ys lived with him.

On cr oss-examination, the Defe ndant ac knowledg ed that he was a persistent off

ender at the time he was se ntence d on the pos session of contraband in penal inst itution conviction. He conce ded that his criminal history

included convictions for ag g ravated assault, attempted kidna pping, g rand theft, possession of coc aine, thef t over $500, simple a ssault, simple possession of dr ug s, assault and battery , and re sisting ar

rest. The Def

endant a g ree d that he wa s now a c are er of fende r.
On re direc t, the Def

endant testified that he had a drugand alc ohol problem, for w hich he sa w an addic tionologist monthly . He state d that he we nt throug h outpatien t t re atm ent and attended
a lc oh oli c s and

na rc oti c s ano ny

mou s ( AA and NA ) on a re g ula r ba sis

. Ac c or din g to the De fe nd ant, his family attended A A and NAmeeting s with him to support him. He c laimed he ha d been “ clea n”-5-

fo r e le ve n y e ars be fo re he “ ha d a sli p” and that he ha d no w “ be e n c le an” a g a in f or a lmo st thr e e y e ars

. The trial c ourt noted that the De fenda nt’s wife ha d been pr esent throug hout the proce eding s.
A t th e c o n c lu s io n o f th e h e ar in g , th e tr ia l c o u rt r e v o k e d th e D e f e n d an t’ s p r o b a ti o n and order ed him to serve the rema inder of his eight-year sentenc e in the De partment of Corr ection. The
re vo c a tio n o rd e r p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s: [T] he [c]ourt f

i n d s i t v ery

rele vant that following the Def endant’ s completion of [f]e de ra l [p]r ob a tio n in

20 02 , the De fe nd ant sti ll ha d ano the r tw o (2 ) y e ars of [s]tate [p] robation in which he did not repor t to a probation officer . The c ourt finds that the [m ]ot ion was prope rly

filed, but is without m erit based upon the Def endant not
re po rt ing fo r two (2 ) y e ars

. Th e [c]o ur t fin ds that the De fe nd ant did no t atte mpt

to allude or e vade a

nd was in esse nce hidingin plain sight. The [c]ourt fu rt her f inds that a y ear

delay in the servingof t he probation violation does not t rig g er a basis for dismiss al.

Th e tr ia l c ourt

a lso g a ve the De fe nd ant j a il “ c re dit fo r t ime in f

e de ra l pr iso n” and “ c re dit fo r any tim e serve d any

wher e.” T his appea l followed.

Ana lys is On appe al, the De fenda

nt argues that the tri al cour t abused its discretion in re voking probation bec ause the proce eding s were unnece ssarily delay ed. He contends that the State has not been timely

in its pursuit of re vocation and, the ref o re , t hat the trial c ourt should have g rante d the motion to di smiss t he violation war rants for violation of his right to a spe edy hear ing.
A p ro batio n r e vo c a tio n p ro c e e din g is a co nti nu a tio n o f a c ri min a l pr os e c uti on

and thu s f a lls wi thi n a de fe nd ant’ s c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht to a sp eedy tria l. U .S. C O N ST . ame nd s. XI , X I V; T EN N

. C O N ST . art. I , § 9; Allen v. State, 505 S.W .2d 715 (Tenn. 1974). A t rial cour t must caref

ully balanc e s o c i e t a l i n t e r e s t i n p u n i s h i n g c r i m i n a l s a g a i n s t a d e f e n d an t ’ s i n t e r e s t i n a s p e e dy t r i a l , be c a us e dismiss al of c harg es is the only available reme dy

for violation o f t he rig ht. State v. Bishop, 493 S.W .2d 81, 83 (Tenn. 1973). I n Bishop, our Supreme Court adopte d fac tors articulated by the United States Supreme Court as the r eleva nt analy tical fra mew o rk fo r al leg ed violations of the rig ht to a sp e e dy tr ia l: (1 ) T he le ng th o f t he de lay ; (2 ) t he re a so n f

or that de lay ; (3) the de fenda

nt’s asser tion to his rig ht to speedy trial; and (4) the pr ejudice to the de fenda nt.

I d. at 83-84 (c iting B arke r v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) ).

I n Bishop, the de lay

occur red a fter a rre st and arr aig nment of the defenda nt, see id. at 82-83, in contrast to the instant interval be tween issuanc e of the probation violat i o n war rant a nd theJu dge T i pt on di s agr eed wi t h t he op i ni on’ s an al y s i s an d concl uded t hat t he def endan t ’ s s peedy t r i al r i gh t was 3

t r i g g er ed wh en t h e d et ai n er f r om B l ou n t Coun t y w as l odg ed wi t h t h e D epa r t men t of Cor r ec t i on

. T i l l er y , 2001 W L 9 2 1 7 5 4 , at *6 (T ip to n , J., c o n c u rr ing ). T h e trial c o u rt in this c a se a lso to o k a d iff e re n t vie w , f

ind ing tha t t h e D e fen d a n t’s

s peedy t r i al r i gh t bega n w hen he was pl ace d on s t at e probat i on aga i n i n Aug us t 200 6 and t he war r ant was not di s cover ed at t hat t i me. -6- revoc ation hear ing. Our S upreme Court has ex pressly held that “a

probation re vocation proc eeding is a co n t i n u at ion of the cr iminal prosecution,” mer iting conside ration of the e numerated
c on sti tut ion a l sa fe g ua

rd s. Al le n, 50 5 S.W. 2d a t 71 9. Al tho ug h the Al le n ana ly sis did no t e xplic itl y apply the B ishop fa ct o rs , a p anel of our Court in Blac kwell v. State, 546 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976), ap p l i ed t hem in a subseque nt analy sis of a dela y of a pr obation revoc ation hear ing. We apply those fac tors in the instant case

. The question of whether the rig ht to a speedy trial has bee n denied is a mixed question of law and fac t and, therefor e, subj ect to de novo re view. See State v. Hawk, 170 S.W.3d 547, 549 (Tenn. 2005)

. I. Length of

delay After the proba t i o n violation warra nt was issued on June 22, 1998, eight y ear s and five months passed befor e the war rant was serve d on the Defenda nt. Ultimately , on Marc h 31, 2008, a hear ing w as held on the motion to dismis s, and the re vocation hea ri n g o ccur

red on A pril 3, 2008. Any de lay a pp ro a c hin g on e y e ar g e ne ra lly tr ig g e rs fu

rt he r i nq uir y int o the re ma ini ngthr e e fa c tor s. See State v. Utley , 956 S.W .2d 489, 494 (Tenn. 1997)

.
T h e St a te c it e s to St ate v

. T im o thy T il le r y , N o

. E 2 0 0 0

- 0 1 9 9 6

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 1 WL 921754, (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxvi lle, Aug .16, 2001), for the proposition that the Def endant’ s rig ht to a sp ee d y t ri al was not i mplicated until the war rant wa s actua lly

serve d on November

27, 2007. Be cause the de l ay b et ween his arre st and revoc ation hear ing did not appr oach one y ear , further analy sis on the remaining factor s would be unnecessar y if we credit t his argument. First we note that Tillery ’s pre cede ntial value is diminis hed due to the f act Judge Tipton wrote a se parate conc urring
o p i n i o n an d

J u d g e W i t tc o n c u r

r e d i nr e s u l t s o n l y. 3

Th e Ti lle ry

op ini on re lie d o n U tle y , 9 56 S.W. 2d 48 9, in su pp or

t of its c on c lus ion

that a de fe nd ant’ s r ig ht t o a

sp e e dy pr ob a tio n r e vo c a tio n h e ari ngis n ot t ri g gered un ti l th e de fe nd ant i s arr e ste d o n th e pr ob a tio n v iol a tio n w arr ant: [I ]n Utley , 956 S.W .2d 489, a case which post-dates Allen by twenty -three y ear s, our supreme court explicitl y

held “that the issuanc e of a n arr est war

rant a lone does not tr ig g e r a sp e e dy tr ia l ana ly sis and

that the ri g ht to a s pe e dy

tr ia l is no t im

pli c a te d unti l the re is a n arres t or

a fo rm a l g ra

nd jur y a c c us a tio n. ” 95 6 S. W.2 d at 49 1. B e c a us e the re is n o f

or ma l grand jury

a c c us a tio n in

a pr ob a tio n r e vo c a tio n p ro c e e din g , it would appea

r that an actual a

rre st for the probation violation would be the trigg ering fac tor for a

speedy trial rig ht.O n ce a de f en dan t i s brou g h t i n t o cu s t ody on t h e wa r r an t , t h e t r i al ju dg e s h al l i n qu i r e i n t o t h e al l eg at i on of 4
a p rob at i o n vi o l at i o n “ at t he earl i est practi cab l e t i m e. ” See T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 3 1 1 (b).
-7- Tillery , 2001 WL 921754, at *2. We first note that in Utley , the issue pre sented did not involve a spe ed y h ea ri n g on a pr ob a tio n v iol a tio n w arr ant. Th e iss ue in Utl e y inv olv e d a spe e dy tr ia l on ori g ina l c ri min a l c ha rg e s. We decline to adopt t he rationale of Tillery and ins tead conclude that Allen i s still the pre vailing la w under the circ umstances pr esente d here in. I n Allen, a de lay of two y ear s and eig ht months between i s s u ance of a

revoc ation war

rant a nd the re vocation hea

ring merited c onsideration under the defe ndant’ s ri gh t t o a spee dy trial. See Allen, 505 S.W.2d 715. The def endant in Allen wa s not
serve d with the probation violation warr ant until the day of the probation revocation hear ing. He had been inc arc erated on other c harges , an d n o action wa s taken re g ardingthe probation violation
war rant until the defe ndant inquired a bout it. I d. at 716.

This issue was s q u ar ely

addre ssed in Allen, and we decline to e x tend Utley to probation
re vo c a tio n p ro c e e din g s in the cont e xt of

wh e n a de fe nd ant’ s sp e e dy

tr ia l r ig ht i s tr ig g e re d. I t is prec isely beca

use t here is no formal gr and jury acc usation in probation revoc ation proce eding s, as opposed to a c riminal char ge, t h at we will not extrapolate the ra tionale from Utley

to the prese nt sit ua tio n. Pr ob a tio n r e vo c a tio n p ro c e e din g s are c omm e nc e d w he n th e tr ia l judg e iss ue s th e wa rr ant; the war rant ser ves as the for

mal acc usation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-311( a). N o further action is r e qu ir e d. I n o ur

vie w, the iss ua

nc e of the wa rr ant i s th e tr ig g e ri ngme c ha nis m. 4
Additionally , in Tillery , it was noted that re cent c ases o f t h i s C o u rt cited Allen f or the proposition t h at a l engthy delay betwee n the issuance of a pr obation violation warra nt and the hear ing on the probation revoc ation may violate a defe ndant’s rig ht to a speedy trial. Tillery , 2001 WL 9 2 1 7 5 4 , a t * 2 n

. 6 ( c it in g St a te v

. Ra n dy R. Wi ls o n , N o

. M 2 0 0 0

- 0 1 5 3 7

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 1 WL 523368, at *2 (Te nn. Crim. App., Nashville, May 16, 2001); State v. L awr ence Ra l p h , J r., No. M1999-01635-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL775592, at *1-2 (T enn. Crim. App., Nashville, Jun e 16, 20 00 )) . We fi nd thi s to be the pr e va ili ng vie w a ft e r the Ti lle ry de c isi on a s w e ll. Se e State v. Mathi s L amar Meadow s, No. W2006-02534-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1215050, at *2-3 (T enn. Crim. App., J ackson, A

pr. 24, 2007); S tate v. John W illiam Matkin, I I I , No. E2005-02701- CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 120048, at *5 (Te nn. Crim. App., Knox ville, J an. 18, 2007); State v. Mar kettus L . Br oy ld, No. M2005-00299-CCA-R3-C O, 2005 WL 3543415, at *1-2 (T enn. Crim. App., Nashville, De c. 27, 2005).

I t follows, then, t hat t he almost nine-y ear delay betwee n the i ssuance of t he warra nt and the Def endant’ s probation re vocation hear ing is “ presumptively prejudicia l.” See B arke r, 407 U.S. at 530. The leng th of the dela y , there fore , require s us to inquire into the remaining fac tors.

II. Reasons f

or the D elay I n State v. Wo o d , 9 2 4 S. W. 2 d 3 4 2 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 6 ) , th e T e n n e s s e e Su p r e me Co u rt i d e n ti f

ie d
se ve ra l po ssi ble re a so ns fo r d e lay :-8- (1) I ntentional delay for the purpose of tactica l advanta g e over the def ense or to h ara ss t

he de fe nd ant; (2 ) b ur e a uc ratic ind if

fe re nc e or ne g lig e nc e ; (3) de lay nece ssary

to the fair a

nd eff ective pr osecution of the c ase; a nd (4) de lay acquie sced in or c aused by the def endant.

9 2 4 S

. W

. 2 d

a t3 4 6

- 4 7

. F a c t o r s ( 1 ) an d ( 2 ) ar e w e i g h e d , h e a v i l y an d s o m e w h a tl e s s h e a v i l y, respe ctively , ag ainst the state. I d. at 346-47. Fa ctor (3) is weig hed ag ainst neither pa rty , and fa ctor (4) is we ighe d ag ainst the defe ndant. I d. at 347.

H e r e , t h e d e l ay a

p p e ar s t o b e a t t r i b u t a

b l e t o b u r e a

u c r a t i c i n d i f

f e r e n c e o r n e g l i g e n c e

. “ D e l ays betwee n indictment and trial which a re oc casione d . . . by

the prosec ut i n g attorney . . . must be considere d the re sponsibili ty of the State.” State v. Kolb, 755 S.W .2d 472, 474 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) (c itations omi tted). The State ne g lects to point out that a “hold” c ould have be en plac ed upon the Def endant dur ing the time he was in fe dera l custody if the State intended to pursue the alleg ation of a pr obation violation following his r elea se. I n fac t, de fense counsel conver sed with the Tenne ssee district attorn ey

g ener al’s off

ice while the Def

endant wa s incarc erated; their last conve rsation
oc c ur re d ju st two da

y s b e fo re the De fe nd ant’ s r e le a se fr om j a il. Af te r h is i nc arcerat io n in Mis sis sip pi, the De fe nd ant r e tur ne d to his ho me in Spart a , Te nn e sse e , whe re he ha d live d f or thi rt y y ear s. He re ported to fe dera l authorities and appa rently worke d as a confidential informa nt for the Tenne ssee Dr

ug Task Force

. The Defenda nt testified t hat, based on the information he ha d rec eived, he be lie ve d th a t hi s f

e de ra l and

state pr ob a tio n “ we re ru

n to g e the r so rt of

hit —you kn ow , h and

in hand tied at the hip a

t that pa rticular point.” Also, acc ording to the Def endant he asked his fe dera l pr ob a tio n o ff

ic e r B ur ton Putnam i f he had any

oth e r o bli g a tio ns a ft e r s uc c e ssf ull y c omp le tin g his probation in 2002, and Mr. Putnam re plied, “No.

. . . You know, from what I see with my rec ords and my chec ks, . .

. y ou’re fre e to g o,

. . . y ou’re a free man, y ou can continue t o trave l as y ou have in the past.” F urthermor e, followinghis convictions in White and Putnam Counties, the De fenda nt
wa s a g a in p la c e d on state pr ob a tio n, and the wa rr ant w e nt u

nd isc ov e re d b y

the State . T he State
o f f e r e d n o v a l i d r e a s o nf o r t h e d e l ay.
The inordinate delay

betwee n J une 22, 1998, and se rvice of the wa rra nt on November

27, 20 0 7 , c an o n ly b e c h ar g e d to la c k o f d u e d il ig e n c e b y th e St a te

. T h e d e la y in this case wa s unnece ssary

and “the product of b u re au cr ati c miscommunication or indiffe renc e . . . which,
rea sonably

speaking , was not unavoida ble.” See State v. Matthew M el ton J ackson, N o. M2005-01374-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 1896350, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, J uly 7, 2006) (citing Kolb, 755 S.W .2d at 4 74-75); see also Dicke y v. Florida , 398 U.S. 30, 51-52 (1970) (B renna n, J ., concur

ring ). “[ S ]heer bure aucr atic indiffe renc e we ighs he avily ag ainst the g overnme nt.” United States v. Mac Donald, 632 F .2d 258, 262 (4th Cir.1980). Due to the de g ree of neg lige nce involved in this case , this fa ctor must be assig ned considera ble weig ht. See State v. Mo nty Ea rl Pic kle sim e r, No . M 20 03 -0 30 87 -C CA -R 3- CD , 2 00 4 WL 26 83 74 3, a t *4 (T e nn . Cr im. App., Nashville, Nov. 24, 2004)

.At t h e mot i on t o di s mi s s h ea r i n g , t h e St at e ar g u ed t h at t h e D ef en dan t c ou l d n ot c ompl ai n a bou t h i s s pee dy 5 tria l righ ts d u e to the two c o n tinu a n c e s a g re e d to a n d so u g h t b y the d e fen se . T h e trial c o u rt d id no te tha t b o th

co nt i nuances were “ no t i n any way m eant f o r t he p urpo ses of d el ay. ” W e agree wi t h t he t ri al co urt t hat val i d reas o ns exi s t ed f or bot h c ont i nu anc es

. T he mo t i on t o di s mi s s he ar i ng occur r ed j us t f our mo nt hs af

t er t he D ef

endan t r ece i ved t he p rob at i o n vi o l at i o n warrant

. T he D ef end ant ’ s d e m a n d fo r a s p eed y t ri al was not negat ed by t he subseque nt
co nti nu an ce s. -9- III. Th e De fend ant’s Dem and f or Speedy Trial A def endant must seek a swift trial by timely asser ting that r ight. Both the Te nnessee and

5 United States Supreme Courts have rec og nize d t h at “a n acc used who is unawa re that char g es ar e pending ag ainst him or her, as is often the case wher e an indictment ha s been se aled a nd not served, cannot be penalized for his or he r failure to a ssert the speedy trial rig ht.” Wood, 924 S .W.2d at 351 n. 13 (citing Dog g ett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652-54; Wright v. State, 405 S.W .2d 177, 180 (Tenn. 1966) ). The D efe ndant is under no duty to bring himself to trial; the “primar y burden, a fter
a ll, is o n th e c ourt s and

pr os e c uto rs to a ssu

re that c a se s are bro ught t o tr ia l.” I d. a t 34 7; s e e a lso J ackson, 2006 W L 1896350, at *4 . I t appea rs from the r ecor d that the Def endant wa s unawa

re of the probation violation war rant until after his Oc tober 2007 a rre st in Georg ia; over e ight y ear s and fi ve mon ths ha d p a sse d a ft e r t he warra nt ’s issua

nc e bu t be fo re it w a s se rv e d o n th e De fe nd ant. The r e f o r e , th e D e f

e n d an t “ c an n o t b e p e n a li ze d f o r f a il in g to a s s e rt h is s p e e dy tr ia l r ig h t e arlier .” State v. Simm ons, 54 S.W .3d 755, 760 (Tenn. 2001). J ust two and half months afte r ser vice of the
war rant, the D efe ndant filed a motion to di smiss t he wa rra n t al l egi n g a violation of his rig ht to a sp e e dy tr ia l. O nc e he be c a me awa re of the a lle g a tio n, he tim e ly made a de mand fo r t he ri g ht. There fore , this factor a lso weig hs in favor of dismiss al of the w arr ant.

IV . P r e ju dic e Ag ain stth e De fend ant The fina l and most important factor in the B arke r ana ly sis is whether the accused ha s suffer ed prejudice from the de lay . 407 U.S. at 532. When e valuating this fa ctor, courts must be awa re that the ri g ht t o a

sp e e dy tr ia l is de sig ne d ( 1) to p re ve nt u nd ue and op pr e ssi ve inc arc e ratio n pri or to t ri a l, (2) to minimiz e anxiety and conc ern a ccompa

nying public a ccusation, and (3) to limit the p o s s i b i l i t i e s t h a tl o n g d e l ay w i l l i mp a i r t h e d e f e n s e

. B i s h o p , 4 9 3 S

. W

. 2 d at8 5 ; s e e S m i t h v

. H o o e y, 393 U.S. 374, 378 (1969). The Def endant a rg ues t hat he suffe red prejudice by the delay beca use he lost the possibi lity

of ser ving this sentenc e conc urre n t l y wi t h the sentenc e he se rved in fe dera l custody and that the c orre ctional sy stem is not equipped to handle his prese nt medical nee ds.

Whil e the pr e

jud ic e fa c tor

is the mos t im

po rt ant o f t

he fa c tor s ide nti fi e d in

B ark e r, c ourt s mus t e xami ne the tot a lity

of the fa c tor s and e a c h and e ve ry c ir c ums tanc e re latin g to t ho se fa c tor s in d e te r mi n in g w h e nth e d e f

e n d an t ha s b e e n d e n ie d h is r ig h t to a s p e e dy tr ia l. Pi c k le s im e r , 2 0 0 4 WL 26 83 74 3, a t *5 . In H oo e y , 3 93 U.S

. 37 4, the Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Court

de te rm ine d th a t a “def endant a lrea dy in prison might re ceive a sente nce at least partially concur rent with the one he is serving . . . [unl ess] trial on the pending char g e is postponed . . . .” 393 U.S. at 378. In that case , the Court identified the lost possibili ty of conc urre nt sentencingas one ha rm that could re sult to an incar cer ated pri s o ner a

nd said this lost possibili ty relates to the interest in avoidingundue and oppressive pr etrial inca

rce ration. Simmons, 54 S .W.3d at 755. Similarly , in this ca se, the De fenda ntT he t ri al co urt i n t hi s case, p res um ab l y i n an at t em p t t o m i ni m i ze t he p rejudi ce t o t he D ef end ant , gave t he 6
D e fen d a n t cr e d it fo r tim e se rv e d in fe d e ra l p riso n a n d fo r t im e se rv e d “a n yw h e re .” A s n o te d b y the S ta te in its b rie f, this

wa s n ot pe r mi t t ed by s t at u t e. Se e T en n

. Code Ann

. § 40- 23- 101( c)

. M or eov er , g i v en t h e l en g t h of t i me t h at h as pa s s ed, the e x te n t o f t h e p re ju d ic e is un c le a r. -10- could have addre ssed the issue of conc urre nt sentencingor ea rly parole had the State c onducted the prosec ution with due diligenc e. See Picklesimer, 2004 WL2683743, at *5. 6

The De fenda

nt was unaw are of the alleg ation until Nove mber 2007; the evidenc e, ther efor e, is not particularly

compelling as to whethe r he experience d undue anxiety or conce rn as a result of public acc usation. There was e vidence , howeve r, that the De fenda nt suffer ed fr om num erous me dic a l c on dit ion s wh ic h he a c qu ir e d duri ng the a lmo st nin e -ye ar de lay and that hi s tr e a tme nt c ou ld be compr omised if incar cer ated. See id. As for the third f actor , while it was not conc lusively established that the defe nse would have be en impaire d, . . . an adve rse e ffe ct u p o n p reparations is not essential to the establishment of the denial o f a right to speedy trial. I n Dog g ett, for e x ample, the Supre me Court dismiss ed the pr osecution, finding a dela y of over eig ht year s due to the neg lige nce of the pro s ecution to be ‘ eg reg ious’ and involving the presumption of pre judice, ‘compromis[ing] the reliability of a tria l in a

way s that neither pa

rty can pr ove or, f

or that matter, identify .’
See Picklesimer, 2004 WL 2 6 83743, at *5 (quoting Dog g ett, 505 U.S. at 655). More over, “ the pr e sumpt ion

that pr e tr ia l de lay ha s p re

jud ic e d th e a c c us e d in te ns if ie s o ve r t ime .” Do g g e tt, 50 5 U .S. at 655. We find Dog g ett applicable to fac ts presente d in this case.

I n our view, a

n examination of the Ba rk er fa ct o rs establishes that the D efe ndant has be en denied his rig ht to a speedy probation re vocation he ar i n g d u e to the nine-y ear delay betwee n the issuance of

the probation violat i o n wa rrant and the De fenda nt’s revoc ation hear ing. Adismiss al on g rounds of the de nial of a spe edy trial is warr anted.

Conclusion Be cause the Def

endant wa s denied his rig ht to a speedy trial, the judgme nt of

the Will iamson County Circuit Court is reverse d. The probation violation warrants a re dismissed.

______________________________ DAVI D H. WEL L ES, J UDGE