IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ROBERT PEOPLES, :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : CIVIL NO. 4:CV-14-487

:

VINCENT MOONEY, : (Judge Brann)

:

Respondent :

MEMORANDUM

June 16, 2015

Background

This pro se habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 was

initiated by Robert Peoples, an inmate presently incarcerated at the State

Correctional Institution, Graterford, Pennsylvania, (SCI-Grateford). Named as

Respondent is Superintendent Vincent Mooney who is employed at Petitioner’s

prior place of confinement, State Correctional Institution, Coal Township,

Pennsylvania, (SCI-Coal Twp.) .1

 

Peoples entered a guilty plea to charges of disseminating photos/films

depicting child sex acts (4 counts); possession of child pornography (4 counts);

1

 This action was initiated while Petitioner was still held at SCI-Coal Twp.

1

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criminal attempt of disseminating photos/films depicting child sex acts (8 counts)

and criminal use of a communication facility (2 counts) on July 14, 2004 in the

Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania. Petitioner was

sentenced to serve a fourteen and a half (14 1⁄2) to thirty-four (34) year, five (5)

month term of confinement on February 9, 2005.2

Peoples’s motion for reduction of sentence was filed and denied on

February 16, 2005. Petitioner acknowledges that he did not file a direct appeal. 

See Doc. 1, ¶ 8. However, on February 9, 2006, he filed a petition pursuant to

Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).3

 Petitioner’s PCRA action

argued that his guilty plea was unlawfully induced and he was provided with

ineffective assistance of counsel. The petition was denied by the Court of

Common Pleas on December 6, 2006, following an evidentiary hearing. 

Petitioner appealed that decision to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. By

decision dated March 3, 2008, the Superior Court remanded Peoples’ case to the

2 Respondent indicates that it was actually 35 years and 4 months. See Doc.

23, ¶ 3.

3 The PCRA permits motions for post-conviction collateral relief for

allegations of error, including ineffective assistance of counsel, unlawfully induced

guilty pleas, improper obstruction of rights to appeal by Commonwealth officials, and

violation of constitutional provisions." Hankins v. Fulcomer, 941 F.2d 246, 251 (3d

Cir. 1991). 

2

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Court of Common Pleas with instructions to supplement the record to include

transcripts from the oral guilty plea colloquy, sentencing proceedings and the

December 5, 2006 PCRA hearing. In accordance with the Superior Court’s

decision, new counsel was appointed for Peoples and it is undisputed that the

PCRA action on remand is still pending. 

In his pending action, Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief on the

grounds that: (1) the Commonwealth breached the terms of the plea agreement. 

(Ground One); (2) the plea agreement breach claim was not thereafter pursued due

to ineffective assistance of counsel (Ground Two); (3) trial counsel was

ineffective for failure to investigate and present viable defenses (Ground Three);

and (4) PCRA counsel was deficient for not pursing claims of vindictive and

selective prosecution (Ground Four). Petitioner argues that although his claims

were not exhausted before the Pennsylvania state courts, non-exhaustion should be

excused on the grounds of inordinate delay.

The Respondent ‘s initial response sought dismissal of Petitioner’s action

on the basis that he failed to exhaust his state court remedies with respects to the

claims asserted in Grounds One, Two and Three and that Ground Four was subject

to dismissal because an allegation of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel

cannot be pursued under § 2254.

3

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By Order dated May 6, 2015, the request for dismissal of Ground Four was

granted and the parties were directed to file supplemental written status reports

indicating the present status of Peoples’ PCRA action and addressing their

respective positions with respect to the inordinate delay issue in regards to

Petitioner’s surviving claims.4

 See Doc. 40.

Discussion

As previously discussed by this Court’s May 6, 2015 Order, Respondent 

contends that Petitioner’s remaining claims are subject to dismissal because he

failed to exhaust his state court remedies. See Doc. 23, pp. 7-8. Specifically, 

Respondent argues that since Grounds One, Two and Three of this action were

solely raised in Peoples’ PCRA petition which remains pending before the Court

of Common Pleas, those contentions are unexhausted and should not be permitted

to proceed. Petitioner counters that the exhaustion requirement should be excused

due to the inordinate delay in disposition of his remanded PCRA action by the

Court of Common Pleas. See Doc. 33, p. 13.

4 The Order observed that since a period of more than seven years lapsed since

the Superior Court’s March 3, 2008 remand, Petitioner’s argument of inordinate delay

has arguable merit. However, on the flip side it was noted since the filing of a

response in this matter, a video status conference was conducted by the Court of

Common Pleas and an Amended PCRA petition was filed. 

4

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“A state prisoner is generally barred from obtaining federal habeas relief

unless the prisoner has properly presented his or her claims through one ‘complete

round of the State’s established appellate review process.’” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 

U.S. 81, 92 (2006) (internal citations omitted); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.

838, 844-45 (1999)(while exhaustion does not require state prisoners to invoke

extraordinary remedies, the state courts must be afforded one full opportunity to

resolve any constitutional issues via completion of the State's established appellate

review process). The United States Supreme Court added that, in determining

whether a state prisoner has preserved an issue for presentation in a federal habeas

petition, it must be determined not only whether a prisoner has exhausted his state

remedies, but also whether he has properly exhausted those remedies, i.e., whether

he has fairly presented his claims to the state courts. See id. at 848.

Fair presentation requires that the “substantial equivalent” of both the legal

theory and the facts supporting the federal claim are submitted to the state courts,

and the same method of legal analysis applied in the federal courts must be

available to the state courts. Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, 959 F. 2d 1227,

1230 (3d Cir. 1992); Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997). 

Moreover, to satisfy exhaustion, the state court must be put on notice that a federal

claim is being asserted. Keller v. Larkins, 251 F.3d 408, 413 (3d Cir. 2001). The

5

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exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the petitioner’s claims are presented through

a collateral proceeding, such as a petition under the PCRA, and it is not necessary

to present federal claims to state courts both on direct appeal and in a PCRA

proceeding. Evans, 959 F.2d at 1230.

Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are made when: (1) the state

corrective process is so deficient as to render any effort to obtain relief futile, 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b); (2) acts of state officials have, in effect, made state remedies

unavailable to the petitioner, Mayberry v. Petsock, 821 F.2d 179, 184 (3d Cir.

1987); or (3) "inordinate delay" in state proceedings has rendered state remedies

ineffective. Story v. Kindt, 26 F.3d 402, 405 (3d Cir. 1994); Schandelmeier v.

Cunningham, 819 F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1986).

Respondent’s supplemental status report asserts that although Petitioner’s

remanded PCRA action “has been pending for some time” an evidentiary hearing

has been scheduled on the PCRA action for June 22, 2015. Doc. 42, p. 1. 

Petitioner likewise acknowledges that an evidentiary hearing has been scheduled

to be convened in approximately one week. Although the prolonged delay in

disposition of Peoples’ PCRA action is a matter of concern, in light of the

scheduling of an imminent evidentiary hearing by the Court of Common Pleas and

recognizing that state courts should be afforded an initial opportunity to review the

6

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merits of Peoples’ claims, Petitioner’s request that exhaustion be excused on the

basis of inordinate delay will be denied.5

The request for dismissal of Grounds One, Two, and Three on the basis of

non-exhaustion of state remedies will be granted. Petitioner’s remaining claims

will be dismissed without prejudice and he may seek federal habeas corpus review

of said arguments upon exhaustion of his state court remedies or if there is further

unwarranted, prolonged delay in the disposition of his PCRA action. An

appropriate Order will enter.

BY THE COURT: 

 s/ Matthew W. Brann 

Matthew W. Brann

United States District Judge

5

 The exhaustion requirement "is not a mere formality. It serves the interests of

comity between the federal and state systems by allowing the state an initial

opportunity to determine and correct any violations of a prisoner's federal rights."

Gibson v. Scheidemantel, 805 F.2d 135, 138 (3d Cir. 1986).

7

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