UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LATCHMIE TOOLASPRASHAD, :

: No. 4:CV-05-0168

Plaintiff, :

vs. : Complaint filed 07/30/99 

:

BUREAU OF PRISONS, : (Judge Muir)

:

Defendant : (Magistrate Judge Smyser)

ORDER

September 2, 2005

THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:

On July 30, 1999, Plaintiff Latchmie Toolasprashad, an

inmate in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, filed

this action in the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia. The proceedings in that court included the filing

of dispositive motions and an appeal by Toolasprashad to the

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit. See Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 286 F.3d 576

(D.C. Cir. 2002). Toolasprashad is proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis.

As a result of the rulings in those courts, all but one of

Toolasprashad’s claims were resolved in favor of the Defendants. 

In his only remaining claim, Toolasprashad alleges that the

Bureau of Prisons violated the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, when

it transferred him to a correctional institution far from his

parents’ home, and it reclassified him as a “special offender”

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based upon false information in a Bureau of Prisons’s memorandum.

On October 18, 2002, the Federal Bureau of Prisons filed in

the United States District Court for the District of Columbia a

motion for summary judgment with respect to that claim or, in the

alternative, to transfer the case to this court. By order dated

July 29, 2003, the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia transferred the matter to this court. In its order

the court “decline[d] to reach the merits of the case and

therefore [left] resolution of the summary judgment motion to the

transferee court.” (Order of July 29, 2003, p. 2, n.1)

The Clerk of Court assigned this case to us but referred it

to Magistrate Judge J. Andrew Smyser for consideration. Although

the order transferring this case was entered on July 29, 2003,

the case file was not received in this court until March 22,

2005. On April 15, 2005, Magistrate Judge Smyser filed a report

recommending that the summary judgment motion be granted and the

case closed.

After being granted an extension of time in which to do so,

on July 18, 2005, Toolasprashad filed the following documents: 1)

“Plaintiff’s Request to Accept Overlength [sic] Combined

Objections and Brief to the Report and Recommendation and Notice

to Court”; 2) “Plaintiff’s Combined Objections and Brief to the

Report and Recommendation”; and 3) exhibits in support of those

objections. On August 2, 2005, the Bureau of Prisons filed a

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brief opposing Toolasprashad’s objections. On August 3, 2005,

Toolasprashad filed “Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion and Brief To

Plaintiff’s Combined Objections and Brief to the Report and

Recommendation.” On August 11, 2005, Toolasprashad filed

“Plaintiff’s Second Supplemental Combined Motion and Brief to

Plaintiff’s Combined Objections and Brief to the Report and

Recommendation.” On August 22, 2005, Toolasprashad filed a reply

brief, thereby ripening his objections for disposition.

When objections are filed to a report of a Magistrate Judge,

we make a de novo determination of those portions of the report

or specified proposed findings or recommendations made by the

magistrate judge to which there are objections. United States v.

Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); M.D. Pa.

Local Rule 72.31. Furthermore, district judges have wide

discretion as to how they treat recommendations of the Magistrate

Judge. Id. In providing for a de novo review determination

rather than a de novo hearing, Congress intended to permit

whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound

discretion, chooses to place on a Magistrate Judge’s proposed

findings and recommendations. Id. See also Mathews v. Weber, 423

U.S. 261, 275 (1976); Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 7 (3d Cir.

1984).

As a threshold matter we note that the Bureau of Prisons has

not objected to the length of Toolasprashad’s combined objections

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and supporting brief (consisting of forty-two pages) or to the

documents he filed on August 3, 2005 (entitled “Plaintiff’s

Supplemental Motion and Brief To Plaintiff’s Combined Objections

and Brief to the Report and Recommendation”), or the document

filed on August 11, 2005 (labeled “Plaintiff’s Second

Supplemental Combined Motion and Brief to Plaintiff’s Combined

Objections and Brief to the Report and Recommendation”). In the

absence of any objection to those documents, and in light of

Toolasprashad’s pro se status, we will reluctantly consider those

filings in their entirety in our de novo review of the Bureau of

Prisons’s motion for summary judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no

genuine issue of material fact which is unresolved and the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c). Summary judgment should not be granted when there is a

disagreement about the facts or the proper inferences which a

fact finder could draw from them. Peterson v. Lehigh Valley Dist.

Council, 676 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1982). “When a motion for

summary judgment is made and supported as provided in ...[Rule

56], an adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or

denials of the adverse party’s pleading....” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e).

Initially, the moving party has a burden of demonstrating

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex

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Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This may be

met by the moving party pointing out to the court that there is

an absence of evidence to support an essential element as to

which the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Id. at 325. 

Rule 56 provides that, where such a motion is made and

properly supported, the adverse party must show by affidavits,

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e). The United States Supreme Court has commented

that this requirement is tantamount to the non-moving party

making a sufficient showing as to the essential elements of his

or her case that a reasonable jury could find in its favor.

Celotex Corporation vs. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

When addressing a motion for such a judgment, our inquiry

focuses on “whether the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is

so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52

(1986)(emphasis added). As summarized by the Advisory Committee

On Civil Rules, “[t]he very mission of the summary judgment

procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56 advisory committee note to 1963 Amendment.

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We will apply those principles to the Bureau of Prisons’s

motion for summary judgment. Before doing so, however, we will

set forth the undisputed material facts relating to

Toolasprashad’s sole remaining claim. 

Toolasprashad arrived at the Federal Correction Institution

at Allenwood (hereinafter “Allenwood”) on October 17, 1994. On

January 27, 1995, he received an Incident report charging him

with, inter alia, “insolence towards staff.” The underlying

incident is described in the report as follows: 

On 01/27/95 at approximately 09:10 a.m. I was giving Inmate

Toolasprashad a legal call. I informed him that he could

call his lawyer but not his congressman as he requested. 

Inmate Toolasprashad became irate stating I’ll get you

motherfuckers give me a BP8.

(January 27, 1995, Incident report, p. 1) The Disciplinary

Hearing Officer concluded that Toolasprashad had committed the

charged offense and he sentenced Toolasprashad to two weeks of

extra duty and the loss of commissary privileges for two weeks.

In an incident report dated March 10, 1995, Toolasprashad

was charged with “conduct which disrupts or interferes with the

orderly running of the institution which most resembles lying or

providing false information to a staff member.” The underlying

incident at issue in that report is described as follows: 

... [T]he S.I.S. received a copy of a written correspondence

sent from Inmate Toolasprashad to his Unit Team in which he

alleges he was “sexually and brutally molested by my unit

team, ....” On 02/24/95 at approx. 1:30 p.m., Inmate

Toolasprashad signed a medical treatment refusal which

stated, [sic] “... I have not been sexually attacked or

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molested by anyone at this institution, ....” This is the

second time Inmate Toolasprashad provided false information.

...

(March 10, 1995, Incident Report, p. 1) At the disciplinary

hearing on that charge, Toolasprashad stated that he did not

intend the statement that he was “sexually and brutally molested”

to be taken literally. The Disciplinary Hearing Officer

concluded that Toolasprashad had committed the offense as charged

and sentenced Toolasprashad to 15 days disciplinary segregation

and loss of commissary privileges for 60 days.

While incarcerated at Allenwood, Toolasprashad worked in the

Education Department assisting inmates. On December 22, 1995,

Jack Marquis, then Acting Supervisor of the Education Department,

wrote a memorandum in which he requested that Toolasprashad’s job

be changed. Marquis states the following in the memorandum:

“[t]his job change is based on Toolasprashad being resentful and

hostile to supervision and instruction”; Toolasprashad’s “ability

to work with education staff is negative, hostile, and annoying”;

and Toolasprashad’s “conduct is having a negative affect on his

ability to be a liaison between students and staff in the

department.” (Marquis Memorandum of December 22, 1995)

On June 12, 1996, Warden Margaret Harding sent a memorandum

to the Regional Director of the Northeast Region of the Bureau of

Prisons requesting that Toolasprashad be transferred to another

institution. Warden Harding requested the transfer

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based on Mr. Toolasprashad’s poor adjustment at this

facility since his arrival on 10-17-1994. Mr. Toolasprashad

is unable or unwilling to properly relate to a significant

number of staff despite our sincere efforts to establish a

professional relationship. He will not communicate verbally

to members of his unit team and believes that the

administration is not responsive to his needs. We believe

that his unwillingness to communicate hinders his

programming here. A transfer to another appropriate

facility will allow him to develop a more positive

relationship with staff and provide an atmosphere more

conducive to programming.

Toolasprashad was not transferred as a result of that request.

On November 1, 1996, Toolasprashad was placed in

Administrative Detention pursuant to an order

for INSOLENCE TOWARDS STAFF. Insolence towards a staff

member creates disrespect for authority and undermines

staff’s ability to control their area of responsibility, and

properly maintain the security of their area and the

institution. Such conduct will not be tolerated.

(Memorandum of November 1, 1996)(Emphasis in original)

On August 25, 1997, Lieutenant Joseph Reed, a Special

Investigative Supervisor, prepared a memorandum recommending that

Toolasprashad be transferred to another institution. Reed states

in the memorandum that the transfer is sought because of

Toolasprashad’s poor institutional adjustment, his familiarity

with and attentiveness towards certain staff members and prior

incidents involving Toolasprashad. Reed further asserts that

Toolasprashad continually harassed and attempted to intimidate

staff at Allenwood. Reed’s memorandum notes that

[d]ocumentation exists within Inmate Toolasprashad’s Central

File, the Education Department, and the [Special

Investigative Supervisor] Office to support the position of

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the [Special Investigative Supervisor] Office that Inmate

Toolasprashad has continually harassed and attempted to

intimidated [sic] staff since his arrival to [sic] this

institution.

(Reed Memorandum of August 25, 1997, p. 2) 

The final item to consider is the memorandum written by J.

Adami and submitted to the Northeast Region of the Bureau of

Prisons on or about September 8, 1997, which is the only document

Toolasprashad cites in support of his Privacy Act claim. Adami

prepared the memorandum “based upon [his] belief that inmate

Toolasprashad was having problems adjusting to the institution,

and a report of the Special Investigative Supervisor (SIS) which

confirmed [his] belief.” (Adami Declaration, p. 1, ¶4) Because

it forms the entire basis of Toolasprashad’s Privacy Act claim,

we will quote the entire relevant portion of the document. The

document provides in relevant part as follows:

Rationale for Redesignation: On August 25, 1997, the SIS

completed an investigation regarding the disruptive behavior

displayed by Inmate Toolasprashad. Specifically, Inmate

Toolasprashad has a significant documented history of

harassing and demeaning staff members at this institution. 

Inmate Toolasprashad arrived at this facility on October 17,

1994. Since his arrival, there have been four (4) separate

SIS investigations relating to his manipulative behavior. 

Staff members at this facility have sincerely encouraged

Inmate Toolasprashad to program properly at this facility. 

However, he has continued to demonstrate a personal

vendetta. It should be noted that he has been denied a

transfer for Adjustment purposes, Code 330, on two (2)

separate occasions. In his most recent denial it was

recommended that he be submitted as a Close Supervision

Transfer, if appropriate. Although we are not suggesting

that Inmate Toolasprashad is prohibited from expressing his

opinions, he has clearly disrupted the orderly running of

this institution. We concur with the SIS Office, and

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recommend a Close Supervision Transfer, Code 323.

(Memorandum of September 8, 1997) A “Close Supervision

Transfer,” or “Code 323 Transfer,” 

is used to remove an inmate from an institution as a result

of disciplinary problems which are not severe enough to

warrant an incident report, or which do not fit into any

specific code of misconduct. In other words, inmate

Toolasprashad was transferred from FCI-Allenwood because of

his generally disruptive nature to the security and safe

operations of the institution.

(Adami declaration, p. 1-2, ¶¶4, 5) In further support of the

September 8, 1997, memorandum, Adami asserts in his declaration

that “[a]dditionally, inmate Toolasprashad had given the

impression to both staff and inmates that he may have been

involved in an improper relationship with a staff member.” (Id.,

p. 2, ¶10)

With those facts in mind, we turn to the elements of a

Privacy Act claim. A plaintiff pursuing such a claim is required

to establish that

(1) he has been aggrieved by an adverse determination; (2)

the [agency] failed to maintain his records with the degree

of accuracy necessary to assure fairness in the

determination; (3) the [agency]'s reliance on the inaccurate

records was the proximate cause of the adverse

determination; and (4) the [agency] acted intentionally or

willfully in failing to maintain accurate records.

Deters v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 85 F.3d 655, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(citing Dickson v. Office of Personnel Management, 828 F.2d 32,

37 (D.C. Cir.1987); Rose v. United States, 905 F.2d 1257, 1259

(9th Cir.1990)).

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For the purposes of this order, we will consider

Toolasprashad to have fulfilled the first element. His transfer

and redesignation were adverse determinations.

The second element, concerning the accuracy of the

questioned record, “depends on whether the ‘truth’ underlying the

challenged statements ‘is clearly provable or relatively easily

discernible.’” Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 286 F.3d 576,

583 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Courts have held that “where truth can

readily be ascertained, it is ‘feasible, necessary, and proper,

for the agency and, in turn, the district court to determine

whether each filed item of information is accurate.” Id. (quoting

Deters v. United States Parole Comm’n, 85 F.3d 655, 658 (D.D.C.

1996); Doe v. United States, 821 F.2d 694, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 

In other cases, 

where truth is harder to determine, “neither the agency nor

the court ... is required to ‘find and record truth.’ 

Instead, it suffices to ‘adjust [the] file equitably to

reveal actual uncertainty.’”

Id. (quoting Doe, 821 F.2d at 701).

The Privacy Act distinguishes “records” from “decisions” and

it “does not permit a court to alter documents that accurately

reflect an administrative action, no matter how contestable the

conclusion may be.” Douglas v. Agricultural Stabilization &

Conservation Service, 33 F.3d 784, 785 (7th Cir. 1994). The

statute “is not ... a vehicle for amending the judgments of

federal officials or of other parties as those judgments are

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reflected in records maintained by federal agencies.” Pellerin v.

Veteran’s Admin., 790 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1986).

We are of the view that Adami’s memorandum of September 8,

1997, contains a combination of subjective judgments and

objective, factual assertions. We will apply the appropriate

standard to each challenged aspect of the document.

Toolasprashad contends that Federal Bureau of Prisons should

not have relied upon the September 8, 1997, memorandum to

transfer him from Allenwood or reclassify his inmate status. He

specifically alleges that

[t]he “entire” memo of September 8, 1997, was completely

fabricated by the defendants which was adversely used

against the plaintiff, ie [sic], midnight retaliatory

transfer, catagorized [sic] as a special offender,

discriminated against for work and program assignments, etc.

(Complaint, p. 7, ¶13)

Magistrate Judge Smyser reasoned that the Bureau of Prisons

is entitled to summary judgment on Toolasprashad’s Privacy Act

claim because the evidence of record sufficiently confirms each

material assertion set forth in the September 8, 1997,

memorandum. Because Toolasprashad’s objections track the

Magistrate Judge’s analysis, we will also consider each

challenged statement in the memorandum of September 8, 1997.

Before doing so, we are compelled to address one additional

threshold matter. Toolasprashad states in the second paragraph

of his objections that he

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does not have in possession the necessary records to file

this objections [sic] and in order to meet the Court’s

deadline he is submitting same. During searches of

plaintiff’s living area over the years the records/files

have been taken by guards, [a] little at a time.

(Objections, p. 1) 

Toolasprashad has filed literally hundreds of pages of

documents in this case, including a substantial number of

documents in response to the Bureau of Prisons’s summary judgment

motion. He fails to identify either the guards allegedly

responsible for the thefts, or the type of documents allegedly

taken. Because the record to be considered is essentially the

one developed before the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia, we summarily reject Toolasprashad’s

contention that he was, for any reason, unable to respond

adequately to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. 

We will proceed to consider the merits of his objections, all of

which focus on the information presented by the Bureau of Prisons

to support the assertions made by Adami in his memorandum of

September 8, 1997.

Toolasprashad challenges the Bureau of Prisons’s ability to

rely on any of the documents it references and has presented to

the court. The specific documents are the Incident Report dated

January 27, 1995; the Incident Report dated March 10, 1995; the

decision issued by the Disciplinary Hearing Officer as a result

of that report; the December 22, 1995, memorandum in which

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Marquis requests that Toolasprashad’s job be changed; the June

12, 1996, memorandum from Warden Harding in which she requests

that Toolasprashad be transferred to another institution; the

November 1, 1996, detention order; and the August 25, 1997,

memorandum concerning the S.I.S.’s investigations into

Toolasprashad’s conduct while at Allenwood. We hereinafter refer

to those documents collectively as the “supporting documents.”

Toolasprashad contends that each supporting document is

“inaccurate,” “incorrect,” “blatantly false,” an “outright lie,”

a “pure fabrication,” or does not actually exist in his file. In

essence, Toolasprashad’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s

Report and Recommendation constitute an attempt to splinter his

one Privacy Act claim into numerous separate Privacy Act

challenges to the accuracy of each and every supporting document

cited by the Bureau of Prisons. 

As a matter of law, he is precluded from challenging the

supporting documents because he has not addressed, let alone

fulfilled, the requirement that he exhaust his administrative

remedies with respect to each and every challenged document. See

5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(d)(2) and (d)(3); Duke v. U.S. 305 F. Supp.2d

478, 488 (E.D. Pa. 2004)(DuBois, J.)(“Although the Privacy Act

does not expressly require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative

remedies prior to filing a civil suit,‘that requirement has been

imposed by the courts as a general principle of administrative

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law.’”) The only document referenced throughout Toolasprashad’s

complaint and administrative documents is the memorandum of

September 8, 1997, the memorandum from Adami to the Northeast

Region of the Bureau of Prisons. 

Moreover, as a factual matter, the majority of the sources

that Toolasprashad references to dispute the accuracy of the

supporting documents are hearsay statements from other

individuals. With respect to the precise contents of his file he

concedes that he “does not control the file and could only tell

the Court what his review of the records yield [sic] and what his

Unit Team guards also informed him of.” (Objections, p. 27) 

Toolasprashad has failed to support with competent evidence his

challenges to the supporting documents.

For the reasons stated above, Toolasprashad may not expand

the scope of his claim as he has attempted to do in his

objections. The sole remaining claim in this case is based

strictly on whether the representations asserted by the Bureau of

Prisons in Adami’s memorandum of September 8, 1997, are

sufficiently accurate to withstand the scrutiny imposed by the

Privacy Act. We will deny Toolasprashad’s implicit effort to

expand the scope of this case to encompass a challenge to the

accuracy of each and every supporting document cited by the

Bureau of Prisons. That conclusion, in and of itself, is

sufficient to overrule all of Toolasprashad’s objections, adopt

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Magistrate Judge Smyser’s Report and Recommendation, and grant

the Bureau of Prisons’s motion for summary judgment. 

However, out of an abundance of caution we will proceed to

review the substantive merits of Toolasprashad’s claim that he is

entitled to damages because of the inaccuracies in the memorandum

of September 8, 1997. 

The first comment in the memorandum to consider is that

“[s]pecifically, Inmate Toolasprashad has a significant

documented history of harassing and demeaning staff members at

this institution.” The Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit emphasized by italicizing the word “documented”

in its review of that statement. Toolasprashad v. Bureau of

Prisons, 286 F.3d 576, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 

The issue of whether or not documents exist to support that

conclusion is a factual one. The supporting documents in the

record establish the accuracy of the factual component of that

statement. The issue of whether those documents pertain to

Toolasprashad “harassing and demeaning staff members” is a

subjective determination that is not necessarily based on

historical facts. We are of the view that the manner in which

Adami characterized the behavior at issue in the supporting

documents constitutes an opinion or a judgment which is not

subject to review under the Privacy Act. See Reinbold v. Evers,

187 F.3d 348, 361 (4th Cir. 1999)(an agency official’s opinions

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“may be subject to debate, but they are not subject to alteration

under the Privacy Act as long as the opinions are recorded

accurately”); White v. office of Personnel Management, 787 F.2d

660, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(discussing agency’s ability to retain

and rely upon a record containing a subjective evaluation). 

The next statement to consider is that “[s]ince his arrival,

there have been four(4) separate SIS investigations relating to

his manipulative behavior.” The portion of statement concerning

the number of investigations is purely factual. It is adequately

supported by the August 25, 1997, memorandum written by Reed, in

which each investigation is discussed. The portion describing

Toolasprashad’s behavior as “manipulative” is a subjective

judgment. Magistrate Judge Smyser determined that the Bureau of

Prisons’s description of Toolasprashad’s behavior as

“manipulative” is a subjective assessment that is not subject to

judicial review under the Privacy Act. Such a determination is

supported by the record and we agree with it.

The next two statements to consider are that “[s]taff

members at this facility have sincerely encouraged Inmate

Toolasprashad to program properly at this facility. However, he

has continued to demonstrate a personal vendetta.” (Memorandum of

September 8, 1997, p. 1) Although Toolasprashad attempts to

characterize those sentences as being directed at the number of

classes he has taken and how well he has done in them, there are

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other ways to interpret that text. The Privacy Act does not

require an agency to support every conceivable manner in which a

record may be interpreted. 

Adami explains the thrust of those statements in his sworn

declaration. He states that “Toolasprashad often sabotaged his

own attempts at programming by harassing staff and making false

accusations.” (Adami Declaration, p. 2, ¶9) We are of the view

that the cited sentences read together relate more to

Toolasprashad’s behavior and attitude, as opposed to any other

objectively verifiable facts. When viewed as such the statements

constitute an opinion. Based on the evidentiary record submitted

to us the opinion is sufficiently accurate.

The final statements to consider in the September 8, 1997,

memorandum are that Toolasprashad “has clearly disrupted the

orderly running of [Allenwood],” and that he “is considered to be

a management problem based on his blatant disrespect for

authority.” (Memorandum of September 8, 1997, pp. 1-2) The

former statement is supported by the four investigations

conducted by the Special Investigative Supervisor into

Toolasprashad’s conduct. The latter reflects an opinion which is

sufficiently accurate to withstand Toolasprashad’s Privacy Act

claim.

No reasonable trier of fact could conclude that any material

statement in the memorandum of September 8, 1997, is sufficiently

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inaccurate to entitle Toolasprashad to any relief pursuant to the

Privacy Act. The Bureau of Prisons is entitled to summary

judgment on Toolasprashad’s Privacy Act claim. We will grant its

motion for that relief. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT ORDERED THAT:

1. Toolasprashad’s objections (Document 14) to Magistrate

Judge Smyser’s Report and Recommendation are overruled.

2. Magistrate Judge Smyser’s Report and Recommendation

(Document 2) is adopted in toto.

3. The Bureau of Prisons’s motion filed on October 18,

2002, for summary judgment is granted.

4. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of the

Federal Bureau of Prisons.

5. The Clerk of Court shall close this case.

6. Any appeal of this order shall be deemed frivolous,

without probable cause, and not taken in good faith.

s/Malcolm Muir 

MUIR, U.S. District Judge

MM:ga

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