United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-40668

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Alfredo Avalos-Sanchez, also known as Chore, also known as

Jose, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 7:17-CR-588

Before Davis, Jones, and Willett, Circuit Judges.

Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge:

Alfredo Avalos-Sanchez served as lookout during an armed home 

invasion gone awry. The plan was to steal drugs and money from a known 

drug dealer. But Avalos-Sanchez and his crew invaded the wrong house. 

Instead of hightailing it, as some might have done,1 they robbed the four non1 See Jenna Laine, Bad House Call: Buccaneers’ Tom Brady Mistakenly Enters Wrong 

Home, ESPN (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/29086979/buccan

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 11, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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drug-dealing occupants anyway. Avalos-Sanchez pleaded guilty to, and was 

convicted of, interference with interstate commerce by robbery, in violation 

of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The district court sentenced AvalosSanchez to 87 months in prison.

Avalos-Sanchez challenges his guilty-plea conviction and sentence on 

two grounds: (1) that the factual basis for his guilty plea was insufficient, in 

violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, because the Government 

failed to establish the commerce element of the Hobbs Act robbery charge; 

and (2) that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary, in violation of the 

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, because he did not know the 

factual basis for his guilty plea was insufficient. Neither argument has merit, 

and we affirm. 

I

In June 2017, Avalos-Sanchez and several others attempted to rob a 

McAllen, Texas residence. Avalos-Sanchez and his crew “believed that 

hundreds of pounds of marijuana and/or over five kilograms of cocaine were 

being stored at the private residence,” and they intended to obtain by force, 

and then distribute, those controlled substances. The plan was 

straightforward: Some of the crew would enter the home to steal the

controlled substances at gunpoint, while Avalos-Sanchez and others would 

watch for law enforcement. But the June 6 robbery went sideways; the crew 

had hit the wrong house. Instead of fleeing, the robbers held the four

occupants at gunpoint and stole $700 cash and two cell phones.

eers-tom-brady-mistakenly-enters-wrong-home (“Brady immediately apologized before 

darting out the door.”).

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The next day, some of the crew—not including Avalos-Sanchez—ran 

the same play and tried to rob the correct residence. The crew never made it 

to the front door. They encountered law enforcement on their way. 

A grand jury issued a four-count indictment against Avalos-Sanchez 

and several other defendants involved in the June 6 robbery and the June 7 

attempted robbery. Count Three of the indictment charged Avalos-Sanchez

with violating the Hobbs Act:

On or about April 24, 2017 through June 7, 2017, . . . [AvalosSanchez] did unlawfully obstruct, delay, and affect commerce 

and the movement of articles and commodities in commerce by 

robbery and attempt to obstruct, delay, and affect commerce 

and the movement of articles and commodities in commerce by 

robbery, as the terms robbery and commerce are defined in 

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951(b), in that the 

defendants did unlawfully take and attempted to take 

controlled substances and drug proceeds from individuals 

against their will by means of actual or threatened force, 

violence, or fear of immediate or future injury.2

Avalos-Sanchez pleaded guilty to Count Three and entered a written 

plea agreement with the Government. At his re-arraignment, AvalosSanchez admitted that he had conspired with other defendants with the 

intent to steal and sell controlled substances. Avalos-Sanchez also admitted 

that he was involved in the June 6 robbery and that, even though no drugs 

were stolen, the intent had been to enter the residence and steal drugs 

believed to be there. Avalos-Sanchez admitted that he and his crew believed 

that hundreds of pounds of marijuana or five-plus kilograms of cocaine were 

stored at the targeted residence. Avalos-Sanchez denied that he attended or 

knew the plan for the June 7 attempted robbery. But he did not refute the 

2Avalos-Sanchez was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 

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Government’s statement that a June 7 telephone call among many of the crew 

alerted Avalos-Sanchez and others to the planned robbery that day. 

The district court sentenced Avalos-Sanchez to 87 months in prison. 

Avalos-Sanchez timely appealed, challenging his guilty-plea conviction and 

sentence.3

II

Because Avalos-Sanchez did not challenge the adequacy of the factual 

basis for his guilty plea in district court, we review for plain error.4 And the 

plain-error bar, while not insurmountable, is high. Avalos-Sanchez must 

show “(1) there is an error, (2) that is clear and obvious, and (3) that affects 

his substantial rights.”5 Even when all three requirements are met, we have 

discretion to correct the error and will do so only if “the error seriously 

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”6

III

Avalos-Sanchez raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends that 

the factual basis supporting his guilty plea is insufficient as a matter of law

because it does not establish an effect on interstate commerce, an element of 

a Hobbs Act robbery. Second, he argues that his guilty plea was not voluntary 

and knowing because he did not know that the factual basis for his guilty plea 

was insufficient. We address, and reject, each in turn.

3 We have jurisdiction for this appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

4 United States v. Walker, 828 F.3d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Marek, 

238 F.3d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citations omitted).

5 Marek, 238 F.3d at 315 (citation omitted).

6 Id.

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A

Before accepting a guilty plea, a district court must first determine 

there is a factual basis for the plea.7 This factual basis must be in the record 

and “sufficiently specific.”8 To analyze the sufficiency of the factual basis 

under plain-error review, we must first determine if the district court erred

in accepting Avalos-Sanchez’s guilty plea. To do so, we compare the 

elements of the crime for which Avalos-Sanchez was convicted to the 

conduct he admitted in the factual basis.

9

First, we consider the elements of the crime. A Hobbs Act violation10

has two elements: (1) robbery, extortion, or an attempt or conspiracy to rob 

or extort (2) that affects commerce.11 Avalos-Sanchez only challenges the 

commerce element.

12 The Hobbs Act’s language is “unmistakably broad,”

however, and the scope of its commerce element is no exception: The Act 

“reaches any obstruction, delay, or other effect on commerce, even if small,” 

7 Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3) (“Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the 

court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.”).

8 United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 546 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 

9 Marek, 238 F.3d at 315.

10 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). 

11 United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1212 (5th Cir. 1997). 

12 Avalos-Sanchez was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, committing or 

attempting to commit a robbery, but his counsel states, “It is noteworthy that Mr. Avalos 

was not charged with and did not plead guilty to any conspiracy crime.” Of note, the 

Government also seems to suggest that Avalos-Sanchez was convicted for aiding and 

abetting a Hobbs Act robbery. But because Avalos-Sanchez does not challenge his 

conviction and sentence based on the first element of a Hobbs Act violation, we need not 

address that issue. 

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and defines “commerce” to its constitutional limit.

13 For the Government to 

satisfy the Act’s commerce element, then, “it is enough that a defendant 

knowingly stole or attempted to steal drugs or drug proceeds.”14

Next, we consider the conduct Avalos-Sanchez admitted in the factual 

basis. At the re-arraignment hearing, the Government orally presented the 

factual basis for Avalos-Sanchez’s guilty plea. Avalos-Sanchez admitted he 

knew of the unlawful purpose of the conspiracy to rob the home for controlled 

substances and joined in it willingly. He also admitted involvement in the

June 6 robbery. And, importantly, he admitted that he intended to steal 

drugs—the hundreds of pounds of marijuana or five-plus kilograms of 

cocaine believed to have been there. Based on Avalos-Sanchez’s admissions, 

the Government satisfied the Hobbs Act’s commerce element, and there was 

a sufficient factual basis to accept Avalos-Sanchez’s guilty plea.

Avalos-Sanchez and the Government debate the scope of the record 

that we may review when determining the factual-basis sufficiency of his 

guilty plea. Avalos-Sanchez argues that it should be limited to the facts 

admitted by him during his re-arraignment because the district court did not 

reference other sources when determining whether there was a sufficient 

factual basis for his guilty plea. The Government counters that, in addition 

to the re-arraignment hearing, we may also review the plea agreement, PreSentence Report, indictment, and reasonably drawn inferences from the 

facts.15 The Government gets it right: When we examine factual-basis 

13 Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2079 (2016). See 28 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(3) 

(defining commerce as “all . . . commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction”).

14 Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2081. 

15 The Government cites incidents that took place before the April 24–June 7, 2017 

timeframe for which Avalos-Sanchez was indicted. In addition to the June 6 and 7 incidents, 

the PSR references a March 12, 2017 carjacking committed with the purpose of stealing 

controlled substances (Avalos-Sanchez was the lookout) and an April 6, 2017 double 

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sufficiency under plain-error review, “we may look beyond those facts 

admitted by the defendant during the plea colloquy and scan the entire record 

for facts supporting his conviction.”16 What the district court relied on in 

accepting Avalos-Sanchez’s guilty plea is relevant but does not limit the 

scope of our plain-error review. The entire record unmistakably 

demonstrates that Avalos-Sanchez participated in the June 6 robbery with the 

intent to obtain controlled substances. 

But our determination of factual-basis sufficiency need not comb the 

entire record. Avalos-Sanchez’s admissions at re-arraignment, standing 

alone, support his conviction under the Hobbs Act in light of the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Taylor v. United States. There, the defendant was charged 

with two Hobbs Act violations for robbing drug dealers’ homes, although 

neither drugs nor proceeds from drug sales were stolen.

17 Even though the 

defendant procured no drugs or drug money, the Supreme Court held that 

the prosecution met its burden by introducing evidence that Taylor’s gang 

intentionally targeted drug dealers to obtain drugs and drug proceeds.18

When “robberies were committed with the express intent to obtain illegal 

carjacking where Avalos-Sanchez and others robbed two individuals and stole 14 kilograms 

of cocaine. 

16 Broussard, 669 F.3d at 546 (quoting United States v. Trejo, 610 F.3d 308, 313 (5th 

Cir. 2010)). 

17 In the first attempted drug robbery, Taylor failed to locate drugs at the drug 

dealer’s home but took jewelry, $40 cash, two cell phones, and a marijuana cigarette. 

Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2078. In the second attempt, he broke into another drug dealer’s home 

but did not find any drugs, taking instead a cell phone. Id.

18 The Government introduced evidence that one intended robbery victim had 

been robbed of drugs at his home in the past and the second was believed to possess 

marijuana. Id. at 2081. And the robbers made explicit statements in the course of the 

robberies revealing they believed the intended victims possessed drugs and drug proceeds.

Id.

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drugs and the proceeds from the sale of illegal drugs,” this “is sufficient to 

meet the commerce element of the Hobbs Act.”19

Like the defendant in Taylor, Avalos-Sanchez did not obtain drugs or 

drug proceeds from the June 6 home robbery. More importantly, like the 

defendant in Taylor, Avalos-Sanchez expressly intended to obtain illegal drugs

and proceeds from drugs from the June 6 robbery. For purposes of the Hobbs 

Act’s commerce element, it does not matter whether Avalos-Sanchez’s 

robbery in fact affected interstate commerce.20 The prosecution need only 

show that Avalos-Sanchez committed a robbery with the intent to obtain 

controlled substances, which it did when Avalos-Sanchez admitted exactly 

that in his re-arraignment hearing. 

Avalos-Sanchez argues that Taylor is distinguishable because there is 

no evidence that the actual June 6 robbery victims, as opposed to the intended 

victims, were drug dealers or that any drugs or drug proceeds were stolen.

But the evidence is uncontroverted that Avalos-Sanchez intended to target 

the home of a drug dealer—where he and his crew believed they would find

hundreds of pounds of marijuana or five-plus kilograms of cocaine. AvalosSanchez and his crew simply hit the wrong house. Targeting the home of a 

drug dealer, not actually invading the home of a drug dealer, is what matters 

under Taylor.

Avalos-Sanchez also contends that Taylor is distinguishable because 

he pleaded guilty to an actual robbery, not an attempted robbery. But, as the 

Taylor Court noted, “to satisfy the Act’s commerce element, it is enough 

19 Id. at 2081–82 (emphasis added).

20 In dissent in Taylor, Justice Thomas would construe the Hobbs Act so that “the 

Act punishes a robbery only when the Government proves that the robbery itself affects 

interstate commerce.” Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2082 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 

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that a defendant knowingly stole or attempted to steal drugs or drug 

proceeds.”21 The defendant in Taylor was convicted for Hobbs Actrobberies, 

and it was his knowing, albeit unsuccessful, attempt to steal drugs that 

satisfied the Hobbs Act’s commerce element. Because Avalos-Sanchez had 

the requisite intent to steal controlled substances during the June 6 robbery, 

the Government satisfied the commerce element of the Hobbs Act, and the 

district court had a sufficient factual basis for accepting his guilty plea. 

Avalos-Sanchez also argues that his involvement in the June 6 robbery 

fails to satisfy the Hobbs Act’s commerce element because the actual victims 

of the robbery—individuals not involved in the drug trade—were not in a 

business engaged in or affecting interstate commerce. He relies on our 

decisions in United States v. Collins22 and United States v. Johnson23 for the 

argument that, when individuals rather than businesses are the victims of 

Hobbs Act robberies, courts are more reluctant to find that the Government 

has satisfied the commerce element.24 But his reliance is misplaced: Neither 

case involved Hobbs Act robberies (or attempted robberies) of drugs.25 Plus,

21 Id. at 2081. See also United States v. Milsten, 814 F. App’x 244, 246 (9th Cir. 

2020) (unpublished) (“Whether [defendant] was charged with an attempted crime or 

not,” defendant’s “attempt to rob a drug dealer satisfies the ‘affecting commerce’ element 

of the Hobbs Act.”) (citing Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2078). 

22 40 F.3d 95 (5th Cir. 1994).

23 194 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 1999).

24 Avalos-Sanchez also relies on Second Circuit caselaw concluding that, in cases 

involving individual victims, the commerce element of a Hobbs Act robbery is met only 

under limited circumstances. See United States v. Rose, 891 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2018). But 

these circumstances do not apply to this case; moreover, we are not bound by the caselaw 

of our sister circuits. 

25 In Collins, the defendant was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1) for robbing a Denny’s restaurant employee at gunpoint, robbing another 

individual at gunpoint, and absconding with cash, jewelry, clothes, and that individual’s

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the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor forecloses Avalos-Sanchez’s

arguments. While no drugs were stolen in the June 6 robbery—just cash and 

cell phones—Avalos-Sanchez’s intent to target a drug dealer’s home to steal 

drugs, not his success, matters for purposes of satisfying the Hobbs Act’s 

commerce element.26

Because the district court had a sufficient factual basis for accepting 

the guilty plea, the district court committed no error, plain or otherwise, and

we affirm.27

B

Avalos-Sanchez next challenges the validity of his guilty plea. This too 

we review for plain error since Avalos-Sanchez failed to raise this issue in the 

district court.28

“Because a guilty plea involves the waiver of constitutional rights, it 

must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent” to be valid.

29 To enter a valid 

guilty plea, the “defendant must have full knowledge of what the plea 

connoted and of its consequences.”30 Avalos-Sanchez argues that his guilty 

plea was not valid because, had he known of the alleged factual-basis 

Mercedes-Benz. 40 F.3d at 98. In Johnson, the defendant was charged under a different 

statute entirely, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). 194 F.3d at 658.

26 Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2081–82.

27 Even assuming that there was error, Avalos-Sanchez has failed to show that the 

other requirements for plain error are present. “It goes without saying that meeting all 

[plain-error] requirements is difficult as it should be.” Trejo, 610 F.3d at 319 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

28 United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002). 

29 United States v. Lord, 915 F.3d 1009, 1016 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Brady v. United 

States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). 

30 Id. (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969)). 

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insufficiency regarding the Hobbs Act’s commerce element, he would not 

have pleaded guilty. 

Avalos-Sanchez predicates the validity of his guilty plea on his first 

challenge: the basis for his guilty plea. But as discussed above, there is no 

question that there was a sufficient factual basis for the commerce element. 

And the colloquy between the court and Avalos-Sanchez at his rearraignment shows that Avalos-Sanchez had full knowledge of what his guilty 

plea connoted and of its consequences: The district court explained the 

maximum punishment, the elements of the Hobbs Act charge, the evidence 

proving a violation of the Hobbs Act, Avalos-Sanchez’s trial rights, and the 

consequences of a guilty plea. And the district court questioned AvalosSanchez as to each of these. Here too, there is no error, much less plain error.

* * *

For all these reasons, we AFFIRM.

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