UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-2113

RONALD A. DAVIS,

 Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

BSI FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 

REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, (MERS),

 Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District 

Judge. (1:15-cv-01155-JFM)

Submitted: February 25, 2016 Decided: February 29, 2016

Before SHEDD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ronald A. Davis, Appellant Pro Se. Bizhan Beiramee, BEIRAMEE LAW 

GROUP, P.C., Bethesda, Maryland; Mary Seminara Diemer, NELSON 

MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP, Washington, D.C., for 

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Ronald A. Davis appeals the district court’s order 

dismissing, for failure to state a claim, his complaint

asserting claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 

15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 to 1692p (2012), and several other theories of 

recovery. Davis sought to enjoin BSI Financial Services, Inc., 

(“BSI”) from foreclosing on his real property; claimed that BSI 

engaged in intentional misrepresentation, negligence, fraud, and 

unjust enrichment; and sought to quiet title and cancel all 

financial instruments between the parties. He also alleged 

fraud and sought a declaratory judgment against Mortgage 

Electronic Registration Systems (“MERS”). On appeal, Davis 

challenges the district court’s dismissal of his complaint on 

several grounds.

“We review de novo the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Epps v. JP Morgan Chase 

Bank, N.A., 675 F.3d 315, 320 (4th Cir. 2012). “To survive a 

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007)).

We first consider Davis’ contention that, under Maryland 

law, BSI cannot enforce the note against Davis because the note 
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had been separated from the deed of trust for the property in 

question. But as the Court of Appeals of Maryland has

explained, a “deed of trust cannot be transferred like a 

mortgage; rather, the corresponding note may be transferred, and 

carries with it the security provided by the deed of trust.” 

Anderson v. Burson, 35 A.3d 452, 460 (Md. 2011) (emphasis 

added). Thus, the district court rightly rejected Davis’ 

contention.

Davis also seeks to invalidate the assignment of the note 

to BSI because, he claimed, it had been mechanically signed, or 

robo-signed. Regardless of the truth of this assertion, Davis

was not a party to the assignment and fails to demonstrate

either that he has standing to challenge the assignment or that

robo-signing renders the assignment void. 

Next, Davis challenges the district court’s failure to 

address or “provide standards to cure” many of the legal 

theories alleged in his complaint. But our review of the record 

reveals that Davis did not support any of these theories with 

factual allegations sufficient to “state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

Consequently, the district court did not err in dismissing them.

Finally, we review the denial of Davis’ motion for leave to 

amend for abuse of discretion. Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 

761 F.3d 346, 370 (4th Cir. 2014). “Leave to amend need not be 
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given when amendment would be futile.” In re PEC Solutions, 

Inc. Sec. Litig., 418 F.3d 379, 391 (4th Cir. 2005). And after 

reviewing the record, we conclude that amendment would indeed 

have been futile. Davis provides no basis for believing that, 

with the benefit of more particularized allegations, his 

complaint could survive a motion to dismiss. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order 

dismissing Davis’ complaint. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before this court and argument would not aid 

the decisional process.

AFFIRMED