alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

 Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

670 

OP 13-02006 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, PERADOTTO, SCONIERS, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ. 

 

 

IN THE MATTER OF SHAWN A. PARKER, PETITIONER, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

 

HON. DOUGLAS A. RANDALL, MONROE COUNTY COURT 

JUDGE, RESPONDENT. 

 

JAMES L. RIOTTO, II, ROCHESTER, FOR PETITIONER. 

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (JONATHAN D. HITSOUS OF 

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in the Appellate 

Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department pursuant 

to CPLR 506 [b] [1]) to annul the determination of respondent. The 

determination denied petitioner=s application for a pistol permit. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the determination is unanimously annulled 

on the law without costs, the petition is granted, and the matter is 

remitted to respondent for further proceedings in accordance with the 

following Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 

proceeding seeking to annul the determination denying his pistol permit 

application. A licensing officer, such as respondent herein, has broad 

discretion to grant or deny a permit under Penal Law ' 400.00 (1) (see 

Matter of Fromson v Nelson, 178 AD2d 479, 479; Matter of Covell v Aison, 

153 AD2d 1001, 1002, lv denied 74 NY2d 615; Matter of Anderson v Mogavero, 

116 AD2d 885, 885). Under section 400.00 (4-a), the licensing officer 

must Aeither deny the application for reasons specifically and concisely 

stated in writing or grant the application and issue the license applied 

for.@ If the licensing officer denies the application, A[t]he petitioner 

must be given the specific reasons for the denial . . . and be given an 

opportunity to respond to the objections to [his] application@ (Matter 

of Savitch v Lange, 114 AD2d 372, 373; see Matter of Anderson v Mulroy,

186 AD2d 1045, 1045; see also Matter of DiMonda v Bristol, 219 AD2d 830, 

831). Here, although respondent issued two written decisions denying 

petitioner=s applicationCa preliminary, prehearing decision and a final, 

posthearing decisionChe never provided a reason for the denial, despite 

a specific request from petitioner to do so. Thus, respondent failed 

to comply with the requirement set forth in section 400.00 (4-a). We 

therefore annul the determination and remit the matter to respondent to 

provide petitioner Awith the specific reasons . . . for the denial of 

[his] application . . . and [to] afford [him] the opportunity to present 

evidence in response@ (Savitch, 114 AD2d at 373; see Anderson, 186 AD2d 

at 1045). After receipt and review of any such evidence, respondent shall 
-2- 670 

OP 13-02006 

make a new determination on petitioner=s application (see Savitch, 114 

AD2d at 373).

Entered: August 8, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
#### Carl T. JEANSONNE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 11663.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Dec. 28, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 13, 1978.

Writ Refused March 27, 1978.

Richard E. Burton, Baton Rouge, of counsel for plaintiff-appellant Carl T. Jean-sonne.

Joseph F. Keogh, Parish Atty., Charles E. Pilcher, Asst. Parish Atty., Baton Rouge, of counsel for defendant-appellee Parish of East Baton Rouge.

Before LANDRY, SARTAIN and ELLIS, JJ.

SARTAIN, Judge.

Plaintiff brought this action for workmen’s compensation benefits alleging that he had been injured while serving as a juror in the 19th Judicial District in East Baton Rouge Parish. Defendant filed an exception of no cause of action on the ground that a juror is not an employee of the parish within the contemplation of the Louisiana Workmen’s Compensation Law and, therefore, the parish owes no benefits to a juror. The trial judge sustained this exception and dismissed plaintiff’s action. Plaintiff thereupon appealed. We affirm.

*620The single issue for our determination is the application of R.S. 23:1034 to a juror. This section provides:

> “The provisions of this Chapter [Workmen’s Compensation] shall apply to every person in the service of the state or political subdivision thereof, or of any incorporated public board or commission authorized to hold property and to sue and be sued, under any appointment or contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, except an official of the state or other political subdivision thereof or of any such incorporated public board or commission; and for such employee and employer the payment of compensation according to and under the terms, conditions, and provisions set out in this Chapter shall be exclusive, compulsory, and obligatory. * * *”

These provisions require that a worker must be an “employee” of the state or other political subdivision before he is covered by the compensation act. *Jones v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.,*134 So.2d 377 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1961). We do not believe that a juror is employed by the parish. Employment presupposes an agreement entered into between two parties. In the relationship between a juror and the parish there is no agreement. Both sides are bound by statute to perform as they do. The mere fact that the parish is required to pay some slight compensation to jurors is not sufficient to constitute them its employees. Prisoners likewise receive some compensation for their labor but this does not make them state employees. *Parker v. State,*353 So.2d 333 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1977); *Jones v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., supra.*

In reaching our conclusion that a juror is not covered by our Workmen’s Compensation Law, we note that such result has been reached by the overwhelming majority of states deciding the question. *Metropolitan Dade County v. Glassman,*341 So.2d 995 (Fla.1976); 1-A Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation, § 56.35 (1973).

For the reasons assigned, the judgment is affirmed at appellant’s cost.

AFFIRMED.
#### STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Daniel GASKIN, Jr., Appellee.

No. 70-901.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

June 11, 1971.

Richard W. Seymour, Asst. State’s Atty., Bradenton, for appellant.

Earl W. Baden, Jr., Bradenton, for ap-pellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

PIERCE, C. J., and LILES, J., concur.

MANN, J.,

concurs specially.

The State comes here without a transcript, with an appendix which gives the testimony supporting their side, uncerti-fied, leaving us to wonder on what testimony the trial judge suppressed the pistol taken from Gaskin’s pocket. Terry v. Ohio, 1968, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889, held that an officer having probable cause to know that a suspect has a concealed weapon and might use it, can pat *40him down and take the gun. The State contends that the trial judge overlooked *Terry,*but doesn’t bring before us for review the proceedings on motion to suppress. We must therefore assume that there is some evidence in the missing portion of the record which sustains the trial judge’s findings. The burden of showing error is on the appellant. The State has not met this burden, so I must concur in affirmance.
#### LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v. W. D. ATKINS, Jr., Respondent.

No. 60881.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 25, 1977.

Order Nov. 11, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 5, 1977.

*606ORDER

Based upon the Court’s concurrence with the opinion of the Committee on Professional Responsibility that the crime of which W. D. Atkins, Jr. has been convicted constitutes a serious crime, the necessary element of which reflects upon said attorney’s moral fitness to practice law:

IT IS ORDERED BY THE COURT, that W. D. Atkins, Jr. be and he is hereby suspended from the practice of law and said attorney’s license to practice is hereby suspended.

It is further ordered that the Committee institute the necessary disciplinary proceedings against W. D. Atkins, Jr., seeking his disbarment or other remedy deemed appropriate, all in keeping with Article XV of the Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar Association, provided however, that the disciplinary proceedings so instituted will not, unless requested by the accused, be brought to a hearing until all appeals from the conviction are concluded.

REHEARING DENIED.

SUMMERS, J.,

was of the opinion a rehearing should be granted. *In re Ming,*7 Cir., 469 F.2d 1352.
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1961 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 18, 2005 

Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

AN ACT 

To extend and expand the Child Safety Pilot Program. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Extending the Child 

5 Safety Pilot Program Act of 2005’’. 
2 

S 1961 RFH 

1 SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF THE CHILD SAFETY PILOT PRO2 GRAM. 

3 Section 108 of the PROTECT Act (42 U.S.C. 5119a 

4 note) is amended— 

5 (1) in subsection (a)— 

6 (A) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking ‘‘A 

7 volunteer organization in a participating State 

8 may not submit background check requests 

9 under paragraph (3).’’; 

10 (B) in paragraph (3)— 

11 (i) in subparagraph (A), by striking 

12 ‘‘a 30-month’’ and inserting: ‘‘a 60- 

13 month’’; 

14 (ii) by striking subparagraph (B) and 

15 inserting the following: 

16 ‘‘(B) PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS.— 

17 ‘‘(i) ELIGIBLE ORGANIZATIONS.—Eli18 gible organizations include— 

19 ‘‘(I) the Boys and Girls Clubs of 

20 America; 

21 ‘‘(II) the MENTOR/National 

22 Mentoring Partnership; 

23 ‘‘(III) the National Council of 

24 Youth Sports; and 
3 

S 1961 RFH 

1 ‘‘(IV) any nonprofit organization 

2 that provides care, as that term is de3 fined in section 5 of the National 

4 Child Protection Act of 1993 (42 

5 U.S.C. 5119c), for children. 

6 ‘‘(ii) PILOT PROGRAM.—The eligibility 

7 of an organization described in clause 

8 (i)(IV) to participate in the pilot program 

9 established under this section shall be de10 termined by the National Center for Miss11 ing and Exploited Children according to 

12 criteria established by such Center, includ13 ing the potential number of applicants and 

14 suitability of the organization to the intent 

15 of this section.’’; 

16 (iii) by striking subparagraph (C) and 

17 inserting the following: 

18 ‘‘(C) APPLICANTS FROM PARTICIPATING

19 ORGANIZATIONS.—Participating organizations 

20 may request background checks on applicants 

21 for positions as volunteers and employees who 

22 will be working with children or supervising vol23 unteers.’’; 

24 (iv) in subparagraph (D), by striking 

25 ‘‘the organizations described in subpara-
4 

S 1961 RFH 

1 graph (C)’’ and inserting ‘‘participating or2 ganizations’’; and 

3 (v) in subparagraph (F), by striking 

4 ‘‘14 business days’’ and inserting ‘‘10 busi5 ness days’’; and 

6 (2) in subsection (c)(1), by striking ‘‘and 2005’’ 

7 and inserting ‘‘through 2008’’. 

Passed the Senate November 18, 2005. 

Attest: EMILY J. REYNOLDS, 

Secretary.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CANDY S. ORNER, : Case No. 4:13-cv-0837

 :

:

Plaintiff, : (Judge Brann)

:

v. :

: (Chief Magistrate Judge Carlson)

NATIONAL BEEF PACKAGING, :

COMPANY, LLC, :

:

Defendant. :

ORDER

March 23, 2015

The undersigned has given full and independent consideration to the

thorough February 26, 2015 report and recommendation of Chief Magistrate Judge

Martin C. Carlson (ECF No. 60). Neither Party filed an objection. 

Because this Court agrees with Chief Magistrate Judge Carlson’s

recommendation, the Court will not rehash the reasoning of the Chief Magistrate

Judge and will adopt the report and recommendation in its entirety. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Chief Magistrate Judge Carlson’s report and recommendation is

ADOPTED (ECF No. 60).

1

Case 4:13-cv-00837-MWB Document 61 Filed 03/23/15 Page 1 of 2
2. The Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

3. The Court will schedule a telephone status conference call with the

Parties in due course.

BY THE COURT: 

/s Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann 

United States District Judge 

2

Case 4:13-cv-00837-MWB Document 61 Filed 03/23/15 Page 2 of 2
Jan 22, 2016

U.S. Department of Transportation

Docket Management System

West Building Ground Floor, Room w12-140

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE

Washington, DC 20590

Re: Addendum of aircraft for operation under approved Exemption No. 13333, Regulatory 

Docket No. FAA-2015-1848 (Exemption Request Pursuant to Section 333 of the FAA Reform 

Act and 14 C.F.R. Part 11of the Federal Aviation Regulations)

Dear Sir or Madam:

WinTec Arrowmaker, Inc. (WinTec) respectfully requests an Addendum for the E384, to our 

previously approved exemption. WinTec will adhere to the same rules and regulation as 

previously approved for Exemption No. 13333, Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2015-1848.

Reference approved exemptions:

Exemption No. 11939, Regulatory Docket No. FAA–2015–1398

Appendix A: Manufacturer Small Unmanned Aerial System Information

Joseph T. (Todd) Madison, Chief Pilot

WinTec Arrowmaker

MadisonT@arrowmaker.com,

(813) 805-2714
Appendix A:
254 La. 811

#### Irvin PEARL v. ASSOCIATED INDEMNITY CORPORATION and Pearce & Leblanc, Inc.

No. 50051.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 23, 1969.

In re: Irvin Pearl applying for certio-rari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge. 224 So.2d 29.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, there is no error of law in its judgment.
#### The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Teofilo BABUN and Santiago Babun, Appellees.

No. 69-682.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 24, 1970.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Harold Mendelow, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richard E. Gerstein, State Atty., and Milton Robbins, Asst. State Atty., for appellant.

Pearson & Josefsberg and Donald I. Bierman, Miami, for appellees.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and BARKDULL, JJ.

BARKDULL, Judge.

The State appeals an order dismissing an information charging the appellees with a violation of § 552.101, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. It is apparent that the trial court concluded that before the State could prosecute the

*172appellees for an alleged violation of the statute [making it unlawful to possess explosives in certain situations] it would be necessary for the administrative procedures, provided for in §§ 552.151, 552.161, 552.171 of Chapter 552, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., be exhausted.

We fail to perceive the intent of the Legislature to be that before a criminal prosecution could be instituted against one alleged to be unlawfully in possession of highly dangerous explosives, a member of the executive department, to wit: the State Fire Marshal, would first have to conclude administrative hearings. This would be an unwarranted and unreasonable conclusion as to the meaning of the statute. In construing statutes, the courts are required to give a reasonable or normal construction to legislative intent [Hanson v. State, Fla. 1952, 56 So.2d 129; George v. State, Fla. App.1967, 203 So.2d 173] and are not to construe a statute to reach an absurd and unreasonable result. Johnson v. State, Fla. 1956, 91 So.2d 185; Sharon v. State, Fla. App.1963, 156 So.2d 677; State v. Schell, Fla.App.1969, 222 So.2d 757. To do as the appellees urge in this case would be to follow the latter course. We think the alternatives permitted by the administrative procedures of § 552.151 of Chapter 552, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., are for the purposes of revoking a duly issued license or of providing a civil penalty for one possessing or not possessing a license who violates the provisions of the Chapter or the rules and regulations of the State Fire Marshal, and further provides certain equitable relief to protect the public. The State has cited United States v. Borden Company, 308 U.S. 188, 84 L.Ed. 181, 60 S.Ct. 182; Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Association, Inc. v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 4 L.Ed.2d 880, 80 S.Ct. 847. We have examined these decisions and find them persuasive. These, together with the reasoning set forth above, require us to reverse the trial judge’s order here under review, with directions to reinstate the cause in the trial court on the information as filed. The appel-lees’ contention that it would be a denial of due process and equal protection under the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Florida [to prosecute them without exhausting the administrative remedies] has been examined and found to be without merit.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2089 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2089

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 1271 North King Street in Honolulu, Oahu, Hawaii, as the ``Hiram L. 
                      Fong Post Office Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           December 13, 2005

 Mr. Akaka (for himself and Mr. Inouye) introduced the following bill; 
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security 
                        and Governmental Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 1271 North King Street in Honolulu, Oahu, Hawaii, as the ``Hiram L. 
                      Fong Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. HIRAM L. FONG POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 1271 North King Street in Honolulu, Oahu, Hawaii, shall be 
known and designated as the ``Hiram L. Fong Post Office Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Hiram L. 
Fong Post Office Building''.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 32.2  CERTIFICATION  Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code)  Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each of the undersigned officers of Innocom Technology Holdings, Inc., a Nevada corporation (the "Company"), does hereby certify, to such officer's knowledge, that:  The Annual Report on Form 10-Q/A for the period ended March 31, 2009 (the "Form 10-Q/A") of the Company fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in the Form 10-Q/A fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Innocom Technology Holdings, Inc. and will be retained by Innocom Technology Holdings, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.  Date: January 21, 2011/s/ Cheung Wai Hung, EddieCheung Wai Hung, Eddie,
Chief Financial Officer
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2095 

To ensure payment of United States assessments for United Nations 

peacekeeping operations in 2005 and 2006. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

DECEMBER 13, 2005 

Mr. BIDEN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To ensure payment of United States assessments for United 

Nations peacekeeping operations in 2005 and 2006. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON THE UNITED STATES SHARE OF 

4 ASSESSMENTS FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACE5 KEEPING OPERATIONS. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 404(b)(2)(B) of the For7 eign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 

8 1995 (22 U.S.C. 287e note) is amended by adding at the 

9 end the following new clause: 
2 

•S 2095 IS

1 ‘‘(v) For assessments made during 

2 calendar year 2005 and 2006, 27.1 per3 cent.’’. 

4 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 411 of the 

5 Department of State and Related Agency Appropriations 

6 Act, 2005 (title IV of division B of Public Law 108–447; 

7 22 U.S.C. 287e note) is repealed. 

Æ
**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
      SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Inform Worldwide Holdings, Inc., (the
      “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended December 31, 2007, as filed with
      the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,
      Ashvin Mascarenhas, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of
      the
      Company, certify the following pursuant to Section 18, U.S.C. 1350, as adopted
      pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002:





1.
            The
                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
                of
                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
                and





2.
            The
                information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the consolidated financial condition and consolidated results
                of
                operations of the Company.











/s/  Ashvin
      Mascarenhas


_______________________________


Ashvin
      Mascarenhas,


Chief
      Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer





February
      13, 2008
#### Elmore FLOYD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. L-203.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District.

May 13, 1969.

Elmore Floyd, in pro. per.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

*241PER CURIAM.

The briefs and the record on appeal having been read and given full consideration, and appellant having failed to demonstrate reversible error, the judgment of the lower court hereby appealed is affirmed.

WIGGINTON, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD K., and RAWLS, JJ., concur.