NASA CONTRACTOR 

WHISTLEBLOWERS 

Steps Taken to 

Implement Program 

but Improvements to 

Timeliness and 

Guidance Needed

Report to the Ranking Member, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

March 2018

GAO-18-262

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-18-262, a report to the 

Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, U. S.

Senate

March 2018

NASA CONTRACTOR WHISTLEBLOWERS

Steps Taken to Implement Program but 

Improvements to Timeliness and Guidance Needed

What GAO Found

From 2008 through June 2017, National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA) contractor and grantee employees submitted 48 reprisal complaints such 

as alleged firing or demotion for reporting fraud, waste, or abuse within the 

government. NASA’s Inspector General addressed all 48 complaints, completed 

investigations for 6 of those complaints, and forwarded investigation reports to 

the NASA Administrator, who is responsible for making a final determination of 

whether reprisal occurred. The Administrator determined that none of the 

complaints qualified for protection under the law.

Further, in 5 of the 6 cases forwarded by the OIG, the Administrator was required 

by statute to make a final determination of reprisal within 30 days. GAO found 

that the Administrator did not meet this required time frame for all 5 cases and 

had no documented response for one of them (see figure for all 5 cases). 

According to officials from NASA’s Office of General Counsel, each case must 

be handled on a case by case basis to ensure due process and 30 days is 

insufficient time to issue an order of final determination of reprisal. However, in 

order to ensure that whistleblower reprisal complaints are handled within 

required timeframes, NASA would have to monitor and evaluate its processes for 

making final determinations of reprisal, but it has not yet taken this step. 

Consequently, NASA does not know what changes may be needed to ensure 

that it is meeting the statutory 30-day requirement.

Figure: Timeline for NASA Administrator’s Response for 5 Investigated Reprisal Cases 

Subject to Statutory 30-Day Final Determination from 2008 through June 2017

NASA communicates whistleblower protections to contractors through inclusion 

of a required contract clause. For example, GAO found that almost all—98 

percent—of contracts would be expected to include a whistleblower clause as 

required by statute. However, certain elements of NASA whistleblower protection 

guidance have contributed to a different understanding of reprisal protections 

among officials at headquarters, a NASA center, and the Inspector General. For 

example, a July 2014 procurement notice and contract clause language resulted 

in different interpretations about when the protections apply. Federal internal 

control standards require that an entity should communicate necessary quality 

information internally to meet the objectives of its mission. Without additional 

clarity in its guidance on when the protections apply, NASA centers and 

procurement officials will be at risk of inconsistent implementation of the law.

View GAO-18-262. For more information, 

contact Shelby S. Oakley at (202) 512-4841 or 

oakleys@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

NASA obligated over $18 billion in 

contracts and more than $1 billion in 

grants in fiscal year 2016, and it relies 

on a significant number of contractor 

and grantee employees to accomplish 

its work. These employees are legally 

protected from reprisal—such as 

demotion or firing—for whistleblowing.

GAO was asked to review NASA’s 

whistleblower reprisal protections for 

contractor and grantee employees. 

This report addresses, among other 

things, the extent to which (1) NASA’s 

Inspector General investigated 

contractor and grantee whistleblower 

reprisal complaints; (2) NASA’s 

Administrator reviewed reprisal 

complaints in a timely manner; and (3) 

NASA communicated the applicable 

whistleblower reprisal protections to

contractors. GAO reviewed NASA and 

its Inspector General’s policies and

guidance; reviewed a generalizable 

sample of 100 contracts from all NASA 

centers with contracts in fiscal year 

2016; and interviewed relevant officials 

and contractors, grantees, and 

advocacy groups. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making three

recommendations to NASA, including

evaluating the process for reviewing

reprisal complaints to ensure it is

meeting the required timeframe and 

clarifying guidance on when

protections apply to contractor 

employees. NASA agreed with the 

recommendations and plans to 

develop a documented process to 

ensure it reviews reprisal complaints in 

a timely manner and clarify guidance 

as appropriate, among other things. 
Page i GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

Letter 1

Background 4

NASA OIG Investigated Reprisal Complaints within Required Time 

Frames and Recently Updated Incomplete Guidance 9

NASA Administrator Did Not Meet the Required Time Frames for 

Reprisal Complaint Review 13

NASA Almost Always Communicates Whistleblower Protections to 

Contractors, but Internal Guidance Is Unclear 16

NASA Has Not Established a Mechanism to Communicate 

Whistleblower Protections to Grantees 21

Conclusions 22

Recommendations for Executive Action: 22

Agency Comments And Our Evaluation 23

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 24

Appendix II Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 28

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 30

Tables

Table 1: Selected Summary of Amendments to the Whistleblower 

Reprisal Protections for NASA Contractor and Grantee 

Employees 5

Table 2: Description of Two Whistleblower Reprisal Protection 

Clauses 19

Figures

Figure 1: Disclosure and Reprisal Complaint Investigation and 

Review Processes for NASA Contractor and Grantee 

Employees 7

Figure 2: NASA Office of Inspector General (OIG) Process for 

Investigating Reprisal Complaints 10

Figure 3: Disposition of Reprisal Complaints Received by NASA’s 

Office of Inspector General (OIG) from 2008 through 

June 2017 12

Contents
Page ii GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

Figure 4: Timeline for NASA Administrator’s Response for 5 

Investigated Reprisal Cases Subject to Statutory 30-Day 

Final Determination from 2008 through June 2017 14
Page iii GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

Abbreviations

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation

FPDS-NG Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation

JSC Johnson Space Center

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NSSC NASA Shared Services Center

NFS NASA FAR Supplement

NFS clause NFS 1852.203-71

OIG Office of Inspector General

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

March 8, 2018

The Honorable Claire McCaskill

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

Dear Senator McCaskill:

When contractor and grantee employees report fraud, waste, abuse, and 

mismanagement, agencies should ensure they are prepared to fully 

investigate reprisal complaints—such as demotion or firing—for 

whistleblowing. Agencies also need to make a formal determination on 

whether reprisal occurred. Employees of contractors and grantees 

conduct a significant amount of work for the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration (NASA). Given the sometimes enormous safety 

risks involved in space exploration, having an established process in 

place to investigate reprisal claims helps ensure NASA is able to act 

quickly whenever a whistleblower reports experiencing reprisal. In fiscal 

year 2016, NASA obligated over $18 billion in contracts to support 

acquisitions such as satellites and the construction of a solar plant; and 

more than $1 billion in grants for things such as science, technology, 

engineering, and math education initiatives and a student stipend for 

space-related research.

Although some protections for contractor employee whistleblowers have 

existed for years, section 2409 of Title 10, U.S. code (the statute), was 

amended in 2008, 2013, and 2014 to give contractor and grantee 

employee whistleblowers at NASA enhanced protection from reprisal. The 

statute establishes that an employee of a contractor, subcontractor, 

grantee, subgrantee, or personal services contractor may not be subject 

to reprisal for disclosing certain whistleblower complaints to certain 

authorities.1

You asked us to evaluate NASA’s implementation of whistleblower 

reprisal protections. This report addresses the extent to which (1) NASA’s 

Inspector General has investigated contractor and grantee whistleblower 

 1

In this report, we use the term “contractors and grantee employees” to also include both 

subcontractors and subgrantees.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

reprisal complaints, including meeting statutory timeliness requirements, 

and developed guidance for the investigations; (2) NASA’s Administrator 

meets statutory timeliness requirements to review reprisal complaints; (3) 

NASA communicated externally and internally about the applicable 

contractor whistleblower reprisal protections; and (4) NASA 

communicated with grantees the applicable whistleblower reprisal 

protections.

To assess the extent to which NASA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) 

investigated reprisal complaints and developed guidance for the 

investigations, and the NASA Administrator met timeliness requirements, 

we obtained NASA guidance and relevant documentation. We conducted 

interviews with agency officials, including officials from the OIG and the 

Office of General Counsel on behalf of the Administrator about their 

processes and practices to conduct duties outlined in the statute. We 

reviewed data provided by the NASA OIG on the total number of 

whistleblower allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, misconduct, or 

mismanagement and reprisal complaints; the number of contractor and 

grantee employee whistleblower allegations and reprisal complaints; and 

the outcomes or decisions reached by the OIG of a reprisal complaint 

from fiscal years 2008, the year the enhanced protections were put in 

place, through 2017.2 We assessed the reliability of these data by asking 

the NASA OIG to describe the source(s) of information used and steps 

taken to identify the numbers provided, and limitations and caveats that 

would affect our use of these data—such as the data being self-reported 

by the OIG and Administrator. Based on these steps, we determined the 

data to be sufficient for our purposes of determining the extent to which 

the complaints were addressed.

To assess the extent to which NASA communicates whistleblower 

protections externally, to contractors and grantees, we identified new 

fiscal year 2016 contract awards over $300,000 as reported in the 

Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG). We 

selected contracts that were not only over the simplified acquisition 

threshold (generally $150,000), but were over $300,000 to account for 

 2

While OIG officials track whistleblower reprisal complaints, they do not specifically track 

disclosures as a separate category. The numbers are based on a search of their database 

using key terms such as “disclosure” or “contractor employee” in the complaint field. 

Officials pointed out that complaints made through the OIG hotline may qualify for 

whistleblower protections, but the complainant may not identify him or herself as a 

whistleblower or even want to be considered a whistleblower.
Page 3 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

possible exceptions and to ensure that we were sampling contracts that 

would be required to include a whistleblower reprisal clause. To 

determine whether the required NASA Federal Acquisition Regulation 

(FAR) Supplement clause 1852.203-71 (NFS clause) or other potentially 

applicable clauses were included in NASA contracts, we selected for 

review a generalizable random sample of 100 contracts from a total of 

270 contracts.3 The sample is projectable to NASA fiscal year 2016 

contracts; however, making a legal determination of compliance would 

require a case by case review, which we did not do for contracts not in 

our sample. The 100 contracts consist of a random selection of 10 

contracts from each NASA center that awarded new contracts in fiscal 

year 2016; for those centers that did not have 10 contracts, we selected 

all contracts.4 The remaining contracts were pulled from NASA Shared 

Services Center (NSSC), because that center does the most contracting. 

We estimated the percent of NASA contracts expected to include 

whistleblower clause(s) as the weighted average of results from the 10 

contracting centers. Additionally, we selected a non-generalizable random 

sample of 10 grants awarded by NASA in fiscal year 2016 for review to 

determine whether NASA grants included a mechanism notifying grantee 

employees of their whistleblower rights and reprisal protections.5 For both 

the sample of contracts and grants, we conducted data reliability checks 

by comparing the data to the documentation and concluded the data were 

sufficiently reliable for our purposes to determine if relevant whistleblower 

reprisal protections information was communicated externally.

To assess internal communication about whistleblower protections, we 

reviewed relevant documentation, including guidance, and conducted 

interviews with procurement officials, NASA Headquarters, NASA’s Office 

of General Counsel, and Chief Counsels at Johnson Space Center (JSC), 

NSSC, and Marshall Space Flight Center. We also conducted interviews 

with contractors, grantees, and whistleblower advocacy groups. For 

additional information on our scope and methodology, see appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from March 2017 to March 2018 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

 3

FAR clauses 52.203-15, 52.203-17, and 52.212-4.

4

NASA is comprised of 12 centers and 7 facilities located throughout the United States.

5

We selected 10 random grants from 2016 with positive dollar values to avoid grants 

captured in FPDS-NG as negative numbers due to deobligations.
Page 4 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

For contractor and grantee employees at NASA, whistleblower 

protections have changed over time. For example, by statute, in 2007, 

NASA contractor employees were protected against reprisal if they 

disclosed information relating to a substantial violation of law related to a 

contract. However, in 2008, amendments to the whistleblower statute 

provided protections only to those contractor employees at NASA who 

reported “a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.” In 

2013, the statute was amended again to include disclosures of gross 

mismanagement of a NASA contract or grant, a gross waste of 

Administration funds, and abuse of authority relating to a NASA contract 

or grant, or a violation of law, rule, or regulation related to a NASA 

contract or grant. In 2014, the statute was further amended with the only 

significant change to protect grantee and subgrantee employees. See 

table 1 for detailed description of the 2008, 2013, and 2014 amendments 

of the statute.

Background

Disclosure: An allegation to certain bodies 

and individuals made by an employee who 

believes he or she has witnessed certain 

wrongdoing, such as gross mismanagement 

or gross waste.

Source: GAO analysis based on 10 U.S.C. § 2409(a) | 

GAO-18-262

Reprisal Complaint: Following a disclosure, 

a complaint that an employee has 

experienced reprisal as a result of the 

disclosure, such as demotion or discharge. 

Source: GAO analysis based on 10 U.S.C. § 2409(b) | 

GAO-18-262
Page 5 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

Table 1: Selected Summary of Amendments to the Whistleblower Reprisal Protections for NASA Contractor and Grantee 

Employees

10 U.S.C. § 2409 After fiscal year 2008 

National Defense 

Authorization Act 

(NDAA) amendmentsa

After fiscal year 2013 

NDAA amendmentsb After fiscal year 2014 NDAA amendmentsc Summary of selected changes

Employees covered Contractor employees, 

same as previous.

Contractor and 

subcontractor 

employees.

Contractor, 

subcontractor, grantee, 

and subgrantee 

employees.

Expanded protections to 

subcontractor, grantee, 

and subgrantee 

employees. 

Protected 

whistleblower

disclosures

A substantial and specific 

danger to public health or 

safety.

Same as 2008, plus 

gross mismanagement of 

NASA contract or grant, 

a gross waste of 

Administration funds, an 

abuse of authority 

relating to an 

Administration contract or 

grant, or a violation of 

law, rule, or regulation 

related to an 

Administration contract 

(including the competition 

for or negotiation of a 

contract) or grant.

Same as previous Extended protected 

disclosures to include 

gross mismanagement, 

waste, or abuse of funds, 

among other things for 

NASA contractor and 

grantee employees.d

Length of investigation 180 days/no limit 

Office of Inspector 

General (OIG) and 

complainant may agree 

to additional time to 

investigate.

180 days/360 maximum 

OIG may request up to 

an additional 180 days, 

with complainant 

approval.

Same as previous Limited OIG to an 

extension up to 180 days 

in addition to the initial 

180 day investigative 

time frame. 

Agency head review 30 days Same as previous Same as previous No change 

Employee notification No requirement for 

contractors to 

communicate 

whistleblower protections 

to their employees. 

NASA must ensure that 

its contractors and 

subcontractors inform 

their employees in writing 

of the rights and 

remedies provided by the 

statute in the 

predominant language of 

the workplace.e 

Same as previous

Although grantees 

protections were added, 

no requirement to ensure 

grantees inform 

employees of rights and 

remedies provided by 

statute. 

NASA now includes a 

NASA Federal 

Acquisition Regulation 

Supplement clause in 

contracts requiring that 

its contractors and 

subcontractors inform 

their employees of 

whistleblower 

protections. 

Source: GAO analysis of amendments to 10 U.S.C. § 2409 | GAO-18-262

a

Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 846 (enacted January 28, 2008). 10 U.S.C. § 2409 also applies to the 

Department of Defense and Coast Guard. For purposes of this table, we selected information specific 

to NASA.

b

Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 827 (enacted January 2, 2013; amendments effective 180 days after 

enactment).

c

Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 856(a) (enacted December 19, 2014).
Page 6 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

d

Prior to the 2008 amendments, NASA contractor employees were protected for disclosing 

information relating to a substantial violation of law related to a contract (including the competition for 

or negotiation of a contract). 10 U.S.C. § 2409 (2007).

e

The statute does not include a requirement to inform grantee and subgrantee employees of their 

whistleblower reprisal protections.

Under the current statute, the NASA Office of Inspector General and 

Administrator have different responsibilities. Since the 2014 amendments, 

contractor, subcontractor, grantee, and subgrantee employees are 

protected from reprisal if they disclose to certain persons or bodies 

information they reasonably believe is evidence of gross mismanagement 

of a federal contract or grant, a gross waste of federal funds, an abuse of 

authority relating to a federal contract or grant, a substantial and specific 

danger to public health or safety, or a violation of law, rule, or regulation 

related to a federal contract or grant. Additionally, contractor employees 

may make whistleblower disclosures to several entities, including a 

management official at the contractor. Figure 1 depicts the disclosure 

process and the complaint process.

Requirements under the 

Current Statute
Page 7 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

Figure 1: Disclosure and Reprisal Complaint Investigation and Review Processes for NASA Contractor and Grantee 

Employees

a

An employee has three years from when the alleged reprisal took place to file a complaint.
Page 8 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

NASA OIG Role: Upon receiving a reprisal complaint, the OIG must 

evaluate whether a reprisal complaint is covered under the statute. In 

addition to the steps described in figure 1 for investigating complaints, 

there are instances when the OIG does not investigate. The OIG might 

not investigate for a variety of reasons, such as in cases where the 

complaint is already under investigation by another authority such as 

another OIG, or otherwise does not allege a violation of the law, such as if 

whistleblower disclosure does not constitute gross fraud, waste, abuse or 

mismanagement. If the OIG determines the case is not covered under the 

statute, it may then notify the complainant that no further action will be 

taken on the reprisal complaint.

Administrator Role: Upon receipt of the NASA OIG investigation report, 

the NASA Administrator (the head of agency) has 30 days to determine 

whether the contractor made a prohibited reprisal and issue an order 

denying or granting relief. According to NASA officials, during the 30-day 

period after the agency head receives the OIG report, the agency practice 

has been to ask the OIG for any additional investigative work and also 

afford the complainant and the contractor an opportunity to submit a 

written response to the OIG report. Any person adversely affected or 

aggrieved by the administrator’s order may, within 60 days of issuance, 

obtain a limited review by the U.S. circuit court of appeals.

Agency Procurement Official Role: Under the NFS regulations, NASA 

contracting officers are also responsible for inserting an NFS 

whistleblower clause into applicable contracts that requires contractors 

communicate to their employees their rights under the statute.6 The NFS 

whistleblower clause lays out the responsibility of contractors to 

communicate to their employees their rights under the statute, in writing 

and in their predominant native language. All contracts over the simplified 

acquisition threshold awarded on or after July 29, 2014, require a 

whistleblower clause. The statute also requires NASA to make best 

efforts to include a clause providing for the applicability of the 2013 

amendments in contracts awarded before July 1, 2013—the effective date 

of the 2013 amendments—that have undergone major contract 

modifications. The terms “best efforts” and “major modifications” are not 

 6

NFS 1852.203-71.
Page 9 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

defined in the statute.7 Unlike provisions affecting contractors, the statute 

does not require NASA to ensure that grantees or subgrantees notify 

employees in writing of their rights under the statute.

From 2008 to June 2017, NASA OIG addressed whistleblower reprisal 

complaints within required time frames, according to OIG officials. At the 

time we initiated this review, the OIG’s guidance for handling reprisal 

complaints had been updated to reflect most statutory changes; however, 

it did not include guidance regarding subgrantees. During the course of 

our review, the OIG updated the investigation guidance in October 2017 

to include subgrantee employees.

NASA OIG completed 6 reprisal investigations within required time 

frames.8 The OIG received 277 whistleblower disclosures leading to 48 

reprisal complaints from 2008 through June 2017, and handled those 

complaints within required time frames, according OIG officials.9 For the 6 

of those reprisal complaints that were investigated, the OIG used 

extensions. OIG officials said that extensions may be necessary for a 

number of reasons, including that the complaint may be highly technical 

in nature, requiring the OIG to find subject matter expertise to better 

understand the nature of the whistleblower complaint and whether it 

constitutes gross fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement.

 7

Several different whistleblower protections exist in the FAR and agency supplements, 

with each applicable depending on considerations such as the agency in question, 

acquisition procedures, and source of funding. For some contracts, the FAR clause 

52.203-17 is applicable. For all commercial item acquisitions, contracting officers must 

insert the FAR clause 52.212-4 that requires the contractor to comply with 10 U.S.C. § 

2409. Contracts that obligate American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 funds 

require whistleblower protections unique to the Act found in FAR clause 52.203-15.

8

For those reprisal complaints covered under the 2013 amendments, the investigations 

must be completed within the time frame of 180 days, and an allowable, mutually agreed 

upon, one-time extension of 180 days for a total of up to 360 days.

9

Reprisal complaints included instances of firing and demotion for reporting fraud, waste, 

or abuse.

NASA OIG 

Investigated Reprisal 

Complaints within 

Required Time 

Frames and Recently 

Updated Incomplete 

Guidance

NASA OIG Handled 

Reprisal Complaint 

Investigations within 

Required Time Frames
Page 10 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

When the OIG receives a reprisal complaint, complainants are asked to 

fill out a whistleblower complaint form and an investigation is initiated. 

See figure 2 below for the process by which the OIG conducts its 

investigations.

Figure 2: NASA Office of Inspector General (OIG) Process for Investigating Reprisal Complaints
Page 11 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

In addition, there were 5 complaints currently under investigation and 37 

complaints during this time frame that the NASA OIG did not investigate 

because the OIG deemed them to be frivolous, determined they were not 

covered under the statute, or the complaint was handled in another 

forum, such as the court system or by another OIG.10 Complaints were 

deemed frivolous for several reasons, including if the complainant did not 

want to disclose his or her identity and proceed with the claim, or the 

whistleblower disclosure happened after the reprisal. OIG officials told us 

that when cases are disposed of without an investigation, the OIG notifies 

the complainant of the decision in writing. Figure 3 shows the disposition 

of the 48 reprisal complaints received from 2008 through June 2017.

 10OIG officials said that all 37 complaints not investigated were closed before the 180 day 

time frame requirement for investigations.
Page 12 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

Figure 3: Disposition of Reprisal Complaints Received by NASA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) from 2008 through June 

2017

Note: Of the 48 reprisal complaints received by the OIG, one was made by the employee of a 

grantee; the rest were made by employees of contractors.

The OIG has developed guidance for conducting investigations, which 

includes a chapter on contractor and grantee whistleblower reprisal 

complaints. Although most changes to the statute (such as to whom 

reprisal may be reported) had been incorporated into the investigation 

The OIG Updated 

Investigation Guidance
Page 13 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

guidance, the initial guidance provided to us by the OIG did not include a 

2014 statutory requirement to extend protections to subgrantees. During 

the course of our review, in October 2017, the OIG updated its guidance 

for investigating reprisal complaints to include subgrantee employees. 

Because subgrantees are now protected by statute, including them in the 

investigation policy will help ensure they are consistently extended 

protections through OIG investigations.

In addition to its guidance, OIG officials said they have developed training 

specific to whistleblower investigations for new investigators, conducted 

internal training for investigators, and external training for contractor 

employees. Additionally, the OIG Investigators’ Central Field Office 

conducts periodic training for investigators that includes any updates to 

whistleblower protections.11 With regard to external training, the OIG 

officials said that investigators at some of the NASA centers—with the 

largest contract activity—have conducted on-site training for some 

contractors. This training is conducted as part of general fraud awareness 

training.

The Administrator failed to meet the required review time frame and issue 

an order of final determination of reprisal for 5 completed investigations 

received from the OIG from 2008 through June 2017.12 In all 5 cases, the 

Administrator took longer than the 30 days to issue an order. In one of 

those 5 complaints, an official from the Office of General Counsel was 

unable to provide us with the issued order and said he did not believe one 

was completed, and could not provide an explanation as to why an order 

was not completed. For the 5 reprisal complaints, figure 4 shows the 

number of days from when the Administrator received an OIG report of 

findings to the time when an order of final determination was 

documented.

 11The OIG Investigators’ Central Field Office includes JSC, Marshall Space Flight Center, 

Kennedy Space Center, and Stennis Space Center.

12During this time period, the Administrator received 6 reports; however, only 5 were 

subject to the requirement that the Administrator make final determination of reprisal 

within 30 days. The sixth report of findings was based on a complaint made before the 

2008 amendment to the statute was in effect; therefore, the 30-day requirement was not 

applicable.

NASA Administrator 

Did Not Meet the 

Required Time 

Frames for Reprisal 

Complaint Review
Page 14 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

Figure 4: Timeline for NASA Administrator’s Response for 5 Investigated Reprisal Cases Subject to Statutory 30-Day Final 

Determination from 2008 through June 2017

In addition to the 5 complaints mentioned above, there was another OIG 

investigation of a reprisal complaint that did not require response from the 

administrator within 30 days, but was finalized within our review time 

frame, for a total of 6 completed OIG investigations of reprisal complaints. 

For 3 of the 6 complaints, the OIG found that reprisal had occurred and 

reported those findings to the administrator for final determination of 

reprisal. The Administrator determined that none of these 3 complaints 

qualified for protection under the law. For 2 of these complaints, the 

Administrator found that they did not qualify for protections because they 

fell under the 2008 version of the statute and failed to allege a violation 

specific to public health and safety.13 In 2017, a court affirmed the 

Administrator’s position.14 For the third complaint, the Administrator 

 13After the 2008 amendments, 10 U.S.C. § 2409 provided protections to those contractor 

employees at NASA who disclosed “a substantial and specific danger to public health or 

safety.” Whistleblower complaints made about general fraud, waste, abuse, and 

mismanagement alone, but not related to a substantial and specific danger to public 

health or safety, were not protected disclosures under the statue at that time.

14Javery v. Bolden, No. 16-60221, 2017 WL 2703790 (5th Cir. June 21, 2017).
Page 15 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

determined reprisal could not be substantiated due to the complainant not 

meeting the standards of evidence under the statute.15

Further, we found that NASA does not have a standard process in place 

for the Administrator to review cases that qualify for protections under the 

statute and issue an order of final determination. According to an official 

from the Office of General Counsel, the agency has no standard process 

to ensure the contractors are afforded due process, among other things. 

The official from Office of General Counsel said the Administrator may 

need to conduct an additional investigation in some cases.16 He said that 

each case is different and would have to be handled on a case by case 

basis. In addition, the official said the Administrator may need to conduct 

hearings, independent of the OIG. Moreover, the official from Office of 

General Counsel highlighted concern that the Administrator’s office does 

not have the resources to conduct additional investigative work, which he 

said is a key contributor for the office’s inability to meet the 30-day 

timeline to issue an order of final determination. Despite acknowledging 

these challenges, the Administrator does not have a formal process or 

criteria to monitor and evaluate the way the office handles issuing an 

order of final determination of reprisal to ensure that it meets the statutory 

time requirements.

Because the Administrator took longer than 30 days to respond to all 

reprisal complaints, including one where the Office of General Counsel 

failed to provide evidence that the Administrator responded at all, there 

may be the unintended consequence of disincentivizing future 

whistleblowers from making disclosures who fear their complaint will not 

be handled timely. Internal controls require that management should 

establish and operate monitoring activities to monitor the internal control 

 15The Administrator determined the OIG report of findings and subsequent responses did

not contain sufficient grounds to clearly support a finding that the complainant had been 

reprised against.

16NASA General Counsel explained that in its view there is not a one-size-fits-all answer 

to what process is due, because it is necessarily a fact-driven question. NASA General 

Counsel said its concerns stem from the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Business 

Communications, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Ed., 739 F.3d 374 (8th Cir. 2013). In that case, the 

Department of Education determined that a contractor had retaliated against a 

whistleblower in violation of section 1553 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 

of 2009, which provides substantively similar whistleblower protections to the NASA 

Whistleblower statute. The contractor appealed. The court held that before the department 

could order relief for the whistleblower, it had to provide the contractor due process, 

including a hearing and the opportunity for the contractor organization to confront and 

cross examine adverse witnesses.
Page 16 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

system, evaluate the results, and take appropriate action to address 

issues on a timely basis.17 Without monitoring, evaluating, and taking 

appropriate corrective action based on the way the Administrator or his or 

her designee makes a final determination of reprisal, there is no 

assurance that whistleblower reprisal complaints will be handled within 

required time frames in the future.

In almost all of the contracts we reviewed, NASA had met its obligation to 

ensure its contractors are communicating whistleblower protections to 

their employees through a whistleblower contract clause. We also found 

that NASA has put in place guidance to its contracting workforce on the 

protections, and guidance on when to include the whistleblower clause in 

contracts. However, we found that some NASA officials have interpreted 

this guidance differently. Further, NASA’s guidance does not reflect an 

agency-wide policy on when to include the whistleblower clause when 

modifying a contract.

In most cases, NASA included a clause regarding whistleblower reprisal 

protections in applicable contracts to ensure contractors communicate 

rights to its employees. But we found that the clause was not included in 

all relevant contracts in our review. Based on our review of a 

generalizable sample of contracts, we estimate that 98 percent of 

contracts would be expected to include a whistleblower clause at the time 

new contracts were awarded in applicable contracts in 2016, and 2 

percent would not.18 Within our sample, 4 contracts did not have a 

 17GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO 14 704G 

(Washington, D.C.: September 2014).

18To assess legal compliance we would have to make a determination on case by case 

basis, which we did not do.

NASA Almost Always 

Communicates 

Whistleblower 

Protections to 

Contractors, but 

Internal Guidance Is 

Unclear

Whistleblower Clause 

Included in Almost All 

Contracts, but a Few Were 

Missing the Required 

Clause
Page 17 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

whistleblower reprisal clause.19 After we shared our contract file review 

findings with NASA officials, they modified 3 of the 4 contracts to include 

the missing required whistleblower clause. For the remaining contract, the 

contractor performance was complete, the contract had been closed, and 

no further action will be taken.

According to NASA procurement officials, human error, combined with its 

former contract writing system, could explain why the contracts in our 

sample did not have the required clause. They explained that the former 

contracting writing system relied on templates and did not automatically 

include the NFS clause into all contracts. Under this system, contracting 

officers used templates that included a list of all potential or applicable 

NFS and FAR clauses, which are incorporated through a manual process. 

Officials said that if a clause were included in the templates, it is unlikely 

that it would be removed because doing so would require supervisory 

approval.

NASA procurement officials told us that the agency launched a new 

contract writing system in June 2017. They said that under the new 

contract writing system, contracting officers use a logic system that 

prepopulates each contract with required clauses. They said that the new 

automated system will likely lead to fewer human errors because inserting 

the clause will not be a manual process. Because the new system is still 

being implemented, we were unable to evaluate whether the risk of 

human error has been reduced or eliminated to ensure applicable 

contract awards have the clause.

Under the previous and current systems, NASA contracts are to undergo 

various levels of review prior to award—including attorney review—at the 

centers or headquarters based on risk level and dollar thresholds. For 

example, contracts awarded by JSC valued at over $50 million are to be 

reviewed by headquarters. NASA procurement officials stated that they 

conduct procurement management reviews, and centers conduct annual 

 19Our review of a generalizable sample of 100 contracts found that 96 contracts in the 

sample included whistleblower language while 4 did not. The weighted estimate of the 

percentage of NASA contracts that would be expected to include whistleblower language 

is 97.7 percent, with a 95 percent confidence interval of 92.5 to 99.6 percent. The 

weighted estimate of the percentage of NASA contracts that would not be expected to 

include whistleblower language is 2.3 percent, with a 95 percent confidence interval of 0.4 

to 7.5 percent. See Appendix I for more information on sampling error. Of the 96 contracts 

with a whistleblower clause, 84 had the NFS clause and 12 had an alternative 

whistleblower clause.
Page 18 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

self-assessments; however, at one center, officials pointed out that these 

reviews have not previously included whether a whistleblower clause is 

included in new contracts or major modifications. They said this is 

because reviews typically focus on known issues or program risk, and 

inclusion of the whistleblower clause has not been previously identified as 

an issue or risk. Contractors we spoke with were generally aware of their 

responsibilities to communicate reprisal protections to their employees 

because their contracts with NASA included the required NFS 

whistleblower clause. In response to our review, NASA procurement 

officials said they plan to include a review of the inclusion of NFS 

whistleblower clause in future compliance reviews as an area of 

emphasis and will instruct centers to include whether the clause is 

included in applicable contracts as part of the centers’ self-assessment 

process.

Three elements of NASA’s whistleblower reprisal protection guidance—its 

procurement notice, NFS clause, and definition of major modification—

contribute to potential confusion or inconsistent application of 

whistleblower reprisal protections.

First, in July 2014, NASA notified its contracting officials of the changes to 

the NFS required by the 2013 amendments to section 2409 Title 10 of the 

U.S. code through a procurement notice 04-80, but this notice has been 

interpreted differently by officials in NASA Headquarters, a NASA center, 

and the OIG. Procurement notices are drafted by NASA Headquarters, 

reviewed and approved by NASA general counsel and NASA’s Office of 

Procurement. The NASA centers, acting through their procurement 

offices and, as needed their legal counsel, review and implement the 

notices.

After the procurement notice was issued, some NASA officials interpreted 

it differently. For example, in one instance, a NASA center Chief 

Counsel’s office attorney advised a center procurement official that 

reprisal protections found in the 2013 amendments extend to contractors’

employees working on contracts awarded before the effective date of the 

amendments. This is true, he said, regardless of whether the contract 

contains any clause explicitly making the 2013 amendments applicable. 

However, both the OIG and the Administrator’s counsel have expressed a 

different understanding of the statute conveyed in the notice, stating that 

a clause making the 2013 amendments applicable must be in a contract 

in order for the complainant to be protected under the statute. Later, the 

attorney from the center Chief Counsel’s office revised his understanding 

NASA’s Guidance 

Contributes to Different 

Understanding of Reprisal 

Protections
Page 19 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

of the statute and concluded the procurement notice was not accurate as 

written.

Second, NASA personnel have different understandings about whether 

the NFS clause is sufficient for contractor employees to be covered by the 

statute. The NFS clause instructs contractors to inform their employees in 

writing of contractor whistleblower employee rights; but, unlike the FAR 

clause that is used to implement similar legislation for other agencies, the 

NFS clause does not state that employees working on the contract are 

subject to the whistleblower rights and remedies. The attorney from a 

NASA center said that the NFS clause is enough to ensure contractor 

employees are given rights under the statute. However, OIG officials have 

said that without including that element of the clause, employees working 

under NASA contracts awarded prior to the effective date of the 2013 

amendments may not be covered by those amendments. See table 2 for 

description of the clauses and their differences.

Table 2: Description of Two Whistleblower Reprisal Protection Clauses

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Clause

52.203-17

NASA FAR Supplement Clause 

1852.203-71

Difference

Contractor Employee Whistleblower Rights and 

Requirement to Inform Employees of Whistleblower 

Rights (Apr. 2014)

(a) This contract and employees working on this 

contract will be subject to the whistleblower rights and 

remedies in the pilot program on Contractor employee 

whistleblower protections established at 41 U.S.C. 

4712 by section 828 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Pub. L. 112-

239) and FAR 3.908.

(b) The Contractor shall inform its employees in writing, 

in the predominant language of the workforce, of 

employee whistleblower rights and protections under 

41 U.S.C. 4712, as described in section 3.908 of the 

Federal Acquisition Regulation.

(c) The Contractor shall insert the substance of this 

clause, including this paragraph (c), in all subcontracts 

over the simplified acquisition threshold.

Requirement To Inform Employees Of 

Whistleblower Rights

(Aug. 2014)

(a) The Contractor shall inform its 

employees in writing, in the predominant 

native language of the workforce, of 

contractor employee whistleblower rights 

and protections under 10 U.S.C. 2409, 

as described in subpart 1803.9 of the 

NASA FAR Supplement.

(b) The Contractor shall include the 

substance of this clause, including this 

paragraph (b), in all subcontracts.

The NASA clause does not 

explicitly state that contractor 

employees will be subject to 

whistleblower remedies. 

Source: GAO analysis of Federal Acquisition Regulation and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) FAR Supplement whistleblower protection clauses. | GAO-18-262
Page 20 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

Third, the lack of agency-wide guidance for when to include the clause in 

major modifications leads to different implementation of the requirement. 

The 2013 amendments require that NASA makes best efforts to include a 

whistleblower clause in contracts undergoing a major modification. 

NASA’s July 2014 procurement notice also encourages contracting 

officers to include the NFS whistleblower clause when issuing major 

modifications to contracts awarded before July 29, 2014. However, it 

does not specify what a major modification is under this statute, and the 

statute itself does not define “major.” According to NASA procurement 

officials at headquarters and at two NASA centers, it is at the discretion of 

the NASA Centers’ offices of procurement and contracting officers to 

decide if a clause is inserted into modifications, and whether they are

considered major. Procurement officials and the contracting officers we 

spoke with told us that there is no definition of major modifications in the 

law, regulation, or NASA Headquarters or Center policies or guidance. 

NASA procurement officials said this is because it could be different for 

each contract and the contracting officer makes the determination based 

upon the facts related to the situation. Nevertheless, without 

communicating the factors to consider when determining whether a 

modification is major and whether that contract should or should not 

include the clause, NASA and the Centers’ procurement officials are at 

risk of potential inconsistent incorporation of the clause among applicable 

contracts.

One attorney in NASA’s General Counsel’s Office said there may be 

costs associated with asking a contractor to insert new clauses—such as 

the whistleblower clause—into an existing contract during a major 

modification because it would require a bilateral negotiation between the 

contractor and the agency. However, one contractor we spoke with said 

that there would be no cost to adding the clause and that doing so would 

not be an issue because the whistleblower clause is consistent with the 

internal whistleblower policies and practices of the institution. Further, he 

said that the institution he represents would be hesitant to argue against 

inclusion of the NFS clause in its contracts with NASA.

Internal control standards require that an entity should internally 

communicate necessary quality information in order to meet requirements 

of the mission. These 3 areas of potential confusion related to NASA’s 

current guidance could result in different application of the law, unless 

they are clarified.
Page 21 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

Although whistleblower protections are now extended to grantee 

employees by statute, NASA does not have a mechanism in place to 

communicate the protections to grantees or subgrantee employees. 

Unlike the requirement for NASA to ensure contractors communicate 

whistleblower reprisal rights to their employees in writing and in the 

employees’ predominant language, the statute does not prescribe a 

similar requirement for NASA to ensure that grantees communicate 

whistleblower reprisal rights to their employees. During the grant 

application process, NASA requires grantees to attest that they will not 

require grantee employees to sign confidentiality agreements that would 

prohibit them from reporting fraud, waste, and abuse.

NASA officials said that grant awards do not include a mechanism, such 

as a term or condition, to encourage NASA grantees to notify their 

employees of their whistleblower reprisal protections. In the 10 NASA 

grants from fiscal year 2016 that we reviewed, there was no requirement 

included for grantees to communicate these protections to employees. 

However, we found that all 10 grants included a statement that each 

award was subject to all applicable laws and regulations of the United 

States in effect on the date of award, including the Uniform Guidance. For 

federal grants in general, the Uniform Guidance provides a governmentwide framework for grants management.20 Within this guidance, there is a 

reference to the whistleblower protections in the statute; however, it does 

not explicitly describe the statute’s requirements.21

The grant advocacy group and representatives of three NASA grantees 

we spoke with were aware that some protections exist and noted that 

many grantees have their own whistleblower policies, but were not aware 

of the specific protections provided by the statute, which indicates that 

opportunities exist for improving communications between NASA and its 

grantees about these protections. Further, representatives of the grant 

advocacy group noted that the whistleblower protections for grantee 

employees were not specifically mentioned at recent annual meetings 

where grantees and federal officials discuss issues that affect grantees. 

Internal controls require that management externally communicate the 

 20Office of Management and Budget produces the Uniform Administrative Requirements, 

Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards also referred to as “Uniform 

Guidance.”

212 CFR § 200.300(b).

NASA Has Not 

Established a 

Mechanism to 

Communicate 

Whistleblower 

Protections to 

Grantees
Page 22 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

necessary quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives. Without 

additional communication about the protections provided by the statute, 

grantees may not fully understand or appreciate the significance of the 

rights afforded to their employees, and grantee employees may not be 

aware of their whistleblower reprisal protections, which could hinder their 

willingness to report instances of fraud, waste, and abuse.

Because contractor and grantee employee whistleblowers risk reprisal 

after disclosing potential fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement, 

ensuring they are protected from retaliation or adverse consequences is 

critical. Without monitoring and evaluating the timeliness of reviewing and 

responding to reprisal complaints, the Administrator may not be prepared 

to determine reprisal on future cases within the statutorily required 30 

days.

Additionally, although NASA has developed guidance related to 

contractor protections, this guidance has led to inconsistent interpretation 

of the law and could potentially lead to inconsistent application of how 

contractor protections for employees are conveyed. More clear guidance 

would help contracting officers determine when to incorporate the NFS 

clause into major modifications to ensure consistency throughout the 

agency.

Finally, because unlike contracts, there is no similar clause for grants, 

NASA is in the position to help ensure grantees know their employees’

rights against reprisal if they observe and disclose fraud, waste, abuse or 

mismanagement. However, NASA has not effectively communicated to 

grantees information about these provisions and as a result grantees and 

their employees may not be fully aware of these protections. 

Consequently, if they witness fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, 

they may not be willing to disclose those for fear of reprisal.

We are making three recommendations to NASA:

The Administrator should monitor, evaluate, and make appropriate 

corrective actions, such as a documented process, to ensure it reviews 

reprisal complaints in a timely manner. (Recommendation 1)

The Administrator should review NASA’s guidance or develop other 

guidance, including defining major modification, to clarify when 

whistleblower protections are conveyed. (Recommendation 2)

Conclusions

Recommendations for 

Executive Action:
Page 23 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

The Administrator should communicate whistleblower protections to 

grantees and subgrantees and their employees. (Recommendation 3)

We provided a draft of this product to NASA for review and comment. 

NASA provided written comments on a draft of this report. In its written 

comments, reprinted in appendix II, NASA concurred with all three 

recommendations. In its response to our recommendations NASA agreed 

to develop and document a process to ensure it reviews reprisal 

complaints in a timely manner to ensure all parties’ due process rights are 

protected, review existing procurement policy and clarify guidance as 

appropriate, and update NASA grant guidance to communicate 

whistleblower protections to grantees, sub-grantees and their employees.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate 

congressional committees and members. In addition, the report is 

available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4841 or oakleys@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Shelby S. Oakley

Director, Contracting and National Security Acquisitions

Agency Comments 

And Our Evaluation
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 24 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

To assess the extent to which National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration’s (NASA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) has 

investigated contractor and grantee whistleblower reprisal complaints and 

developed guidance for the investigations, we reviewed data provided by 

the NASA OIG on the total number of whistleblower allegations of fraud, 

waste, abuse, misconduct, or mismanagement and reprisal claims. We 

also reviewed the number of contractor and grantee employee 

whistleblower allegations and reprisal complaints provided by the OIG 

and the outcomes or decisions reached by the OIG of a reprisal complaint 

from fiscal years 2008 through 2017.1 We assessed the reliability of these 

data by asking the NASA OIG to describe the source(s) of information 

used and steps taken to identify the numbers provided, and limitations 

and caveats that would affect GAO’s use of the data—such as the data 

being self-reported by the OIG and Office of General Counsel. Based on 

these steps, we determined the data to be sufficient for our purposes of 

determining how the complaints were addressed. Additionally, we 

reviewed relevant documentation to assess the extent to which the NASA 

OIG was conducting investigations and communicating findings to the 

NASA Administrator within required time frames. To determine the extent 

NASA OIG developed guidance, we interviewed or obtained written 

answers from OIG officials about their processes and practices for 

investigating whistleblower reprisal complaints. We reviewed the 

guidance and training and other materials that NASA OIG uses to 

implement whistleblower protection investigations. We also visited 

Johnson Space Center (JSC)—selected because it had the highest 

number of reprisal cases from 2008 through 2017—to discuss policies 

and procedures specific to that center with OIG investigators and the OIG 

program manager for whistleblower protections. Because they are also a 

part of the Investigators’ Central Field Office, we also spoke with 

investigators at Marshall Space Flight Center and Kennedy Space 

Center.

To assess the extent to which NASA’s Administrator meets the statutory 

timeliness requirements to review reprisal complaints, we reviewed the 

timeliness of the Administrator’s final determination to ensure that NASA 

 1 While OIG officials track whistleblower reprisal complaints, they do not specifically track 

disclosures as a separate category. The numbers are based on a search of their database 

using key terms such as “disclosure” or “contractor employee” in the complaint field. 

Officials pointed out that complaints made through the OIG’s hotline may quality for 

whistleblower protections, but the complainant may not identify him or herself as a 

whistleblower or even want to be considered a whistleblower.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 25 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

was meeting statutory requirements. Specifically, we reviewed relevant 

documentation to assess the extent to which the Administrator was 

making final determination of reprisal in 30 days—the required review 

period specified by statute. We reviewed the Administrator’s 

documentation on the final disposition of reprisal investigations and 

compared the date of the Administrator’s final decision to the date of 

receipt of the reprisal investigations from the NASA OIG. We also 

conducted interviews with the Office of General Counsel, who spoke on 

behalf of the Administrator.

To assess the extent to which NASA communicated the applicable 

whistleblower reprisal protections externally with contractors, we reviewed 

a generalizable sample of NASA contracts to determine the extent a 

required whistleblower clause was included. We used the Federal 

Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) to generate a 

sample of contract actions over $300,000 that were awarded by NASA in 

fiscal year 2016. We selected contracts that were not only over the 

simplified acquisition threshold (generally $150,000), but were over 

$300,000 to account for possible exceptions and to ensure that we were 

sampling contracts that would be required to include a whistleblower 

reprisal clause. From the 270 contracts identified, for purposes of 

examining the inclusion of NASA Federal Acquisition Regulation 

Supplement (NFS) clause 1852.203-71 (or other potentially applicable 

clauses) in NASA contracts, a legal requirement, we selected a 

generalizable random sample of 100 contracts. The sample is projectable 

to NASA fiscal year 2016 contracts; however, we did not make a case by 

case legal determination for contracts not in our sample. We randomly 

selected 10 contracts from each center that awarded new contracts in 

2016, and for those centers that did not have 10 contracts, we selected all 

contracts.2 The remaining contracts were then pulled from the NASA 

Shared Services Center (NSSC) because that center does a majority of 

NASA’s contracting. We asked for contracts awarded in fiscal year 2016 

to ensure we were sampling contracts that are required to have the 

clause and would be reasonably accessible by NASA. We excluded 

interagency contracts and task or delivery orders awarded using blanket 

purchase agreements to ensure we sampled base contracts awarded by 

NASA, not other agencies.

 2 NASA is comprised of 12 centers and 7 facilities located throughout the United States.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 26 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

We estimated the percentage of NASA contracts expected to include 

whistleblower clause(s) as the weighted average of results from the 10 

contracting centers. Because we followed a probability procedure based 

on random selections, our sample is only one of a large number of 

samples that could have been drawn. Because each sample could have 

provided different estimates, we express the uncertainty associated with 

any particular estimate as a 95 percent confidence interval. This is the 

interval that, with repeated sampling, would be expected to contain the 

actual population value for 95 percent of the samples we could have 

drawn. As a result, we are 95 percent confident that this confidence 

interval contains the true percentage of contracts expected to include 

whistleblower clause(s); however, to assess legal compliance we would 

have to make a case by case determination, which we did not do. We 

conducted data reliability checks on the FPDS-NG dataset by comparing 

it to contract documentation obtained from contract files and determined it 

was sufficiently reliable for our purposes. Additionally, we conducted 

interviews with NASA procurement officials and contracting officers at 

multiple locations including NASA Headquarters, NSSC and JSC to 

discuss any additional measures NASA takes to communicate 

whistleblower protections to its contractors and their contractor 

employees. To further assess internal communication, we reviewed 

relevant documentation, including guidance, and conducted interviews 

with procurement officials, NASA’s Office of General Counsel, and Chief 

Counsels at JSC, NSSC, and Marshall Space Flight Center.

To assess the extent to which NASA communicated the applicable 

whistleblower reprisal protections with grantees, we reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of grants awarded by NASA in fiscal year 2016 to 

determine whether NASA grants included a mechanism notifying 

grantees of their employees’ whistleblower rights and reprisal protections. 

We used FPDS-NG to identify a non-generalizable random sample of 10 

grants awarded by NASA in fiscal year 2016 for review to determine 

whether any of the selected grants included a mechanism to 

communicate whistleblower reprisal protections to grantee employees.3

We conducted data reliability checks on the FPDS-NG data by comparing 

it to grant documentation obtained from grant awards and determined it 

was sufficiently reliable for our purposes. Additionally, we conducted 

interviews with NASA grant making officials to discuss any additional 

 3 We selected 10 random grants from grants awarded in 2016, with positive dollar values 

to avoid grants captured in FPDS-NG as negative numbers due to deobligations.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 27 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

measures NASA takes to communicate whistleblower reprisal protections 

to its grantees and their grantee employees.

Finally, in order to learn about contractor and grantee experiences during 

NASA’s implementation of enhanced whistleblower protections, we 

conducted interviews with or received written answers to questions from a 

selected group of NASA contractors and grantees. Using FPDS-NG data, 

we selected institutions with the highest and lowest contracts (including 

small business contracts) and grants by obligations in 2016.4 Using these 

selection criteria, we selected three contractors and three grantees to 

meet with based on the amount of funds obligated in 2016. We ultimately 

interviewed or obtained written answers from all selected contractors and 

grantees. Additionally, we spoke with two advocacy groups, one about 

grants and one about contracts.

We conducted this performance audit from March 2017 to March 2018 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 4 “Low” grant obligations starts at $150,000. We selected a figure that is consistent with 

the simplified acquisition threshold. This number was also selected because it reflects an 

organization that still has some significant spending, and would therefore benefit more 

from being aware of these protections.
Appendix II: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration

Page 28 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

Appendix II: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration
Appendix II: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration

Page 29 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 30 GAO-18-262 NASA Whistleblower Protections

Shelby S. Oakley, (202) 512-4841 or oakleys@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Penny Berrier (Assistant 

Director), Mary Diop, Lorraine Ettaro, Alexandra Gebhard, Kurt Gurka, 

Stephanie Gustafson, Julia Kennon, Jordan Kudrna, Kate Lenane, 

Roxanna Sun, and Khristi Wilkins made key contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(101929)
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and investigative 

arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 

responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the 

federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public 

funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, 

recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed 

oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government 

is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is 

through GAO’s website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday afternoon, GAO 

posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products, go to http://www.gao.gov

and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of production and 

distribution and depends on the number of pages in the publication and whether 

the publication is printed in color or black and white. Pricing and ordering 

information is posted on GAO’s website, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537.

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, MasterCard, 

Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, LinkedIn, Twitter, and YouTube.

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov and read The Watchblog.

Contact:

Website: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Orice Williams Brown, Managing Director, WilliamsO@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125, 

Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

James-Christian Blockwood, Managing Director, spel@gao.gov, (202) 512-4707

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7814, 

Washington, DC 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Phone

Connect with GAO

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Congressional 

Relations

Public Affairs

Strategic Planning and 

External Liaison

Please Print on Recycled Paper.