U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

30–020 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

S. HRG. 115–231 

TESTIMONY FROM OUTSIDE EXPERTS ON 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A FUTURE 

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2017 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

BEN SASSE, Nebraska 

LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

NOVEMBER 30, 2017 

Page 

TESTIMONY FROM OUTSIDE EXPERTS ON RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A FUTURE

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY ............................................................................ 1 

Eaglen, Mackenzie, Resident Fellow of the Marilyn Ware Center for Security 

Studies, The American Enterprise Institute ...................................................... 4 

Karlin, Mara E., Ph.D., Associate Professor of the Practice of Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies ........................ 17 

Spoehr, Lieutenant General Thomas W., U.S. Army, Ret., Director of the 

Center for National Defense, Heritage Foundation .......................................... 21 

Ochmanek, David A., Senior Defense Research Analyst, Rand Corporation ...... 27 

Mahnken, Thomas G., Ph.D., President and Chief Executive Officer, Center 

for Strategic Budgetary Assessments ................................................................. 36 

(III)

(1) 

TESTIMONY FROM OUTSIDE EXPERTS ON 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A FUTURE 

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2017 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:32 a.m. in Room 

SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Rounds, 

Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Sasse, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, 

Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, 

Heinrich, Warren, and Peters. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. The Senate Armed Services 

Committee meets today to receive testimony from outside experts 

on recommendations for a future National Defense Strategy. 

We welcome our witnesses: Thomas Mahnken, president and 

CEO of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; David 

Ochmanek, senior defense research analyst at the RAND Corporation; Thomas Spoehr, director at the Heritage Foundation; Mara E. 

Karlin, associate professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; and Mackenzie Eaglen, resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. 

Last year, this committee wrote into the National Defense Authorization Act a requirement for the Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a National Defense Strategy. The intent of 

this document was to prioritize a set of goals and articulate a strategy for the U.S. military to achieve warfighting superiority over 

our adversaries. The National Defense Strategy is part of this committee’s broader effort to help guide the Pentagon to develop a 

more strategic approach in response to an increasingly dangerous 

world. 

Today’s hearing will afford us the opportunity to hear recommendations from our distinguished panel of defense experts on 

how the Secretary should rise to the challenge of crafting a National Defense Strategy. We will look to you for advice on how the 

department should best allocate its resources to enhance the capacity and capability of the U.S. military in the era of great-power 

competition. 

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To that end, we must begin by explicitly recognizing that greatpower competition is not a thing of the past. The post-Cold War era 

is over. 

Russia and China’s rapid military modernization programs 

present real challenges for the American way of the war. Because 

of decisions we have made, and those we have failed to make, our 

military advantages are eroding. Congress is far from blameless, as 

we have, for years, prioritized politics over strategy when it comes 

to our budgeting decisions. 

Next, we must recognize that the window of opportunity to reverse the erosion of our military advantage is rapidly closing. Just 

as Congress has been part of this problem, so, too, do we have an 

obligation to be part of the solution. We must start doing our job 

again—pass budgets; go through the normal appropriations process; and provide our military with adequate, predictable funding. 

As the negotiations on the budget deal to increase the spending 

caps proceed, I know that members of this committee will be advocates for a defense budget at the level that an overwhelming bipartisan majority of Congress voted to authorize in the NDAA, nearly 

$700 billion for the current fiscal year. 

But we must be clear. We cannot buy our way out of our current 

strategic problem. Even after Congress appropriates adequate 

funds, the department will have a tough road to reverse current 

trendlines. Restoring readiness, modernizing the force, and reforming acquisition will all be necessary to renew American power. 

But ultimately, all of these efforts will be in vain without clear 

strategic direction. 

The Secretary of Defense and his civilian leadership team must 

exercise real leadership when it comes to strategy, planning, and 

force development. They will have to make difficult choices and set 

clear priorities about the threats we face and the missions we assign to our military. That is what we have asked the department 

to do in the National Defense Strategy. 

As Secretary James Mattis and the rest of the Department of Defense make those hard choices, and especially as they identify necessary tradeoffs, they will find allies in this chairman and this 

committee. 

We ask our witnesses to help this committee and the department 

think through these tough questions: How should the National Defense Strategy focus on building an effective force to counter 

threats from near-peer competitors, such as Russia and China, as 

well as midlevel powers such as Iran and North Korea? How 

should the NDS address the challenges of counterterrorism and articulate a strategy for sustainable security in the Middle East region? Even as we advocate for increased defense spending, how do 

we realistically confront hard choices about tradeoffs? Simply put, 

what must we do to restore or enhance our ability to deter and defeat any adversary in any scenario and across the spectrum of military competition? How should we devote our finite taxpayer dollars 

wisely to accomplish these goals? 

Our global challenges have never been greater. Our strategic environment has not been this competitive since the Cold War. Without the margins of power we once enjoyed, we cannot expect to do 

everything we want everywhere around the globe. We must choose. 

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We must prioritize. That is what the National Defense Strategy 

must do. 

I thank our witnesses for their attention to these important 

issues and look forward to their testimony. 

Senator Reed? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding 

the National Defense Strategy hearing. This strategy is currently 

being developed by the Department of Defense, so this is a crucial 

moment. 

Let me welcome the witnesses. Your work has been important to 

guide us in the past and will be very important as we move 

through this process. 

The Department of Defense faces many complicated and rapidly 

evolving challenges. This is not the first time in our Nation’s history we have had to confront multiple threats from abroad, but it 

is an incredibly dangerous and uncertain time. 

Russia remains determined to reassert its influence around the 

world, most recently by using malign influence and active measures activities to undermine America’s faith in our electoral process, as well as other Western countries. North Korea’s nuclear and 

ballistic missile efforts are an immediate and grave national security threat, and the U.S. continues to grapple with the fact that 

there are no quick and certain options. China continues to threaten 

the rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific region by economic coercion of its smaller, more vulnerable neighbors, and by undermining 

the freedom of navigation. Iran continues their aggressive weapons 

development activities, including ballistic missile development efforts, while pursuing other destabilizing activities in the region. 

Likewise, countering the security threat from the Islamic State 

of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria, and its spread beyond 

the Middle East, must remain a high priority, while at the same 

time we must build the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces and deny any safe haven for extremism. 

Crafting a defense strategy that provides guidance to policymakers on how to most effectively confront the aforementioned 

challenges, and I would add challenges that are emerging through 

artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, and cyber innovations, 

is not a simple task. 

In fact, during the fall of 2015 when this committee held a series 

of hearings to evaluate potential revisions to the Goldwater-Nichols 

Act, one of the predominant themes was that the department suffered from a tyranny of consensus when crafting defense strategy. 

In other words, too often, the department is consumed by the need 

to foster agreement among all interested parties regarding strategic policy goals rather than focusing on the most critical and 

pressing threats facing our country, along with the strategies necessary to thwart those threats. 

While consensus should not be discounted, crafting a strategy 

that focuses on the lowest common denominator often means difficult strategic choices and alternative policy decisions are deferred. 

To address this imbalance, this committee carefully reviewed 

how the department crafts and generates strategy documents. The 

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fiscal year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision mandating a new National Defense Strategy intended to address the highest priority missions of the department, the enduring 

threats facing our country and our allies, and the strategies that 

the department will employ in order to address those threats. 

The committee understands that the department is working diligently to finalize the National Defense Strategy by early 2018. To 

help inform the department’s mission, I hope our witnesses today 

will give their assessment of the threats facing our country; the anticipated force posture required to address those threats; the challenges confronting military readiness and modernization; and, finally, the investments necessary for the U.S. to retain overmatch 

capability against near-peer competitors. 

Finally, I believe the effectiveness of the National Defense Strategy may be adversely impacted by circumstances outside the control of senior civilian and military leadership within the Department of Defense. While it does not fall within the purview of this 

committee, I am deeply concerned about the Department of State 

and the health of our Foreign Service. Robust international alliances are critical to keeping our country safe. 

That requires a diplomatic corps ready and able to coordinate 

closely with allies and partners. It is also critical that they have 

the tools necessary to help partner nations proactively across political and social challenges that give rise to conflict and extremism. 

Rather than prioritize the State Department’s mission, the current 

administration has sought draconian budget cuts that have devastated morale and created a mass exodus of seasoned diplomats. 

Let me be clear. Weakening the State Department makes the Defense Department’s mission that much more difficult. This should 

be a concern for every member of the committee. 

In addition, President Donald Trump has consistently shown a 

fondness for foreign leaders who have been dismissive of core 

American values like human rights and the rule of law. At the 

same time, the President has discounted the importance of longtime allies and the global order the United States helped establish 

following World War II. As I have stated previously, such actions 

tend to isolate the United States and weaken our influence in the 

world, ultimately leading to uncertainty and risk of miscalculation. 

Therefore, I would be interested in the views of our witnesses on 

these issues, as well as the current interagency process for developing national security policy. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

We will begin with you, Ms. Eaglen. 

STATEMENT OF MACKENZIE EAGLEN, RESIDENT FELLOW OF 

THE MARILYN WARE CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES, THE 

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Ms. EAGLEN. Thank you, Chairman McCain, Ranking member. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Not with those jerks on your right. 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. EAGLEN. Thanks for the chance to be here this morning and 

to talk about the crisis of confidence in defense strategy-making. 

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We can point to both parties, both administrations, both 

branches of government, as you already outlined this morning, Mr. 

Chairman, in your remarks. But the outcome today is that we have 

a problem, and this is the last best chance to fix it. 

So as the Pentagon has been slowly dialing down strategy over 

the years and dialing up strategic risk, the pace of operational 

tempo has remained largely the same, and there is a disconnect between the reality as it is in the world and what U.S. forces are told 

that they should be doing on paper. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Can you give us an example of that disconnect? 

Ms. EAGLEN. Sure, Mr. Chairman. So, for example, in the last 

administration [the Obama Administration], at the tail end, there 

was strategic guidance that U.S. military commitments in the Middle East would significantly lessen. The administration spent the 

last 3 years focused, frankly, on mostly fights in the Middle East, 

in Syria and Iraq and elsewhere. But it is not limited to the last 

administration either, I should say, this challenge. 

The truth is that the reality as it is, Mr. Chairman, is as you 

have outlined, both of you, the committee as a whole, in this year’s 

NDAA. It is that the Pentagon planning and the force posture 

around the world is one of three theaters. It is not about X wars 

or X-plus-one or one-plus-some-other-number. But the truth is that 

the U.S. military focus and emphasis is going to remain constant 

in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. That is not going to change 

in the foreseeable future. 

Chairman MCCAIN. In the last year, would you say things have 

improved or deteriorated? 

Ms. EAGLEN. Around the world? 

Chairman MCCAIN. Especially the Middle East. 

Ms. EAGLEN. I would say they have deteriorated, and the challenge here, of course, is that we still have this gap in strategy. It 

is okay, because it is the first year of the Trump Administration, 

and so they are getting their bearings and crafting it. 

I think we will see more continuity than change, and a more 

muscular status quo in the defense strategy. But that is what concerns me, because we have a combination of a deteriorating security situation and increased difficulty in our ability to deal with it 

here in Washington, both at the Pentagon and up here on Capitol 

Hill. 

Chairman MCCAIN. You saw the announcement that we were 

going to stop arming the Kurds? 

Ms. EAGLEN. Yes. 

Chairman MCCAIN. What is that all about? 

Ms. EAGLEN. I do not know, Senator. I wish I was in the mind 

of the administration on that question. It seems like it warrants 

more public debate up here on Capitol Hill, for certain, as a key 

ally. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. We can save time for questionand-answer, but what do you think the impact of that is on the 

Kurds? 

Ms. EAGLEN. Well, I think there are a variety of impacts that 

could happen here that are all worrisome, all troublesome. The 

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first is, of course, who they will make their bets with, who they will 

get in bed with that is not the United States or our key allies. 

So if they need to hedge their bets or cut their losses, that is not 

in the favor of the interests that we are looking for in the region. 

That is number one. 

Number two is our credibility. We saw this with the redline, but 

we have seen it in other presidential decisions, again, spanning 

both parties. When we say we are going to do one thing and we 

turn around and do something different, we lose credibility. When 

we lose credibility, we cannot call upon our friends and allies to 

help us when the next crisis happens. I think it feeds into the narrative in the region that Russia and Iran are gaining power and 

the United States is losing it. 

Chairman MCCAIN. The impact psychologically of 305 Egyptians 

getting killed in one raid? 

Ms. EAGLEN. It is really devastating. I think that, in terms of 

Pentagon planning, this is one of the key challenges. It is the balance between these ongoing, metastasizing terror threats and all 

the other challenges that they have to face, and putting what emphasis where, how much to push down on the pedal or not, regarding counterterror efforts. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Eaglen follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MACKENZIE EAGLEN

Thank you, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the Committee on Armed Services for the opportunity to evaluate how the 

Department of Defense should effectively develop and implement a new National 

Defense Strategy. 

STOP REPEATING PAST MISTAKES

It’s long past time for a new National Defense Strategy that seeks to break the 

mold in honesty, clarity, conciseness, and fresh thinking. Since the end of the Cold 

War, these documents have repeatedly served as opportunities to redefine American 

force structure and interests globally. Unfortunately, the most recent generation of 

strategies has become increasingly unmoored from the strategic reality the country 

faces. Since the end of the Cold War, the Pentagon’s force-sizing construct has 

gradually became muddled and watered down at each iteration—from the aspirational objective of fighting two wars at once to the declinist ‘‘defeat-and-deny’’ approach—without enough substantive debate over the wisdom of the progressive 

abandonment of the two-war standard. 

Even before debt reduction became a Washington priority in 2011, defense planning became increasingly divorced from global strategic realities. American experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan exposed the limited utility of a force-sizing construct 

based on wars. The challenge in prosecuting two large stabilization and counterinsurgency campaigns during the past decade-and-a-half laid bare the discrepancy 

between our stated defense capabilities and our actual strength. The wars that planners envisioned were not the ones the military was called upon to fight. 

A lack of definitional clarity and policy consensus about terms like ‘‘war,’’ ‘‘defeat,’’ 

‘‘deny’’ and even now ‘‘deter’’ is far from the only problem with previous strategies. 

A combination of shrinking global posture, force reductions, overly optimistic predictions about the future, and a deteriorating security environment have led to a 

crisis of confidence in defense strategy making. The Budget Control Act further compounded the difficulty of aligning resources with strategy through clear and 

thoughtful prioritization and adjudication between tradeoffs. The need to build a defense program to fit declining spending caps accelerated the reduction in relevance 

and scope of Pentagon strategy documents. 

Even with declining force-sizing constructs, U.S. forces have largely continued to 

do all that they have done under previous super-sized strategies. Consequentially, 

there is now a general dismissal of strategy because the reductions in force structure proposed in each iteration have not resulted in substantive changes in operations of the force. Instead, the armed forces have been asked to do more with less 

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and continue to plan campaigns, conduct global counterterrorism, reassure allies, 

and provide deterrence as operational tempos remain unwaveringly high. 

Meanwhile various missions and efforts are being shortchanged, ignored or 

dropped altogether as the supply of American military power is consistently outstripped by its demand. Some uniformed leaders would argue that the challenge is 

broader, and that the real issue is a military endstate-policy outcome incongruity 

that exists where policymakers expect military power to achieve outcomes beyond 

its scope. Both interpretations are correct, and each contributes to the lack of credibility in new strategic guidance in the minds of its consumers. This lack of faith 

in defense strategy making and planning has contributed to America’s global retreat 

and the worsening international security situation. 

CRAFTING AN IMPACTFUL NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY

The writers of the newest strategy need to face some hard truths. 

• Policymakers cannot wish away the need for strong American presence in Asia, 

Europe, and the Middle East. This includes assuming America’s commitments 

in the Middle East will go away, get easier or eventually become a lesser burden on the military. 

• Constructing budgets and then divining strategies, as the Budget Control Act 

has encouraged, is putting the cart before the horse. 

• Pentagon reforms and efficiencies are noble goals and should become standard 

operating procedure to encourage good governance. But the belief that ongoing 

organizational changes will result in tens of billions in potential savings that 

can be reinvested elsewhere within the defense budget has yet to be proven. 

• An obsessive hunt for technological silver bullets could be our military’s ruin, 

not its salvation—if it comes at the expense of medium-term needs. 

To endure as a global power, the United States must never be in the position— 

as it is now in danger of finding itself—of committing its last reserves of military 

power to any single theater. Instead, force planners need to grow the size of the 

armed forces using the capabilities on hand. American forces must commit to permanent forward presence where they can effectively deter threats before they rise 

to the level of hostilities. 

To facilitate these goals, the strategy should focus not only on the need to decisively defeat our enemies, but also to support the steady-state operations American 

forces undertake each day to deter our adversaries and reassure our allies in priority theaters abroad. 

What follows are various thoughts on how to break from a status quo in defense 

planning that has failed policymakers and military leaders alike, in order to construct a National Defense Strategy that is both useful and able to be executed by 

our nation’s armed forces: 

The National Defense Strategy must answer what missions the military 

should prioritize—by extension, it must clearly delineate what it can stop 

doing. In the last decade, the United States military outsourced airlifting of 

troops to Iraq to Russian companies, NASA hitched rides into space also from Russia, Marines embarked on allied ships for missions patrolling the African coast, 

cargo shipments to Afghanistan were delayed due to inadequate lift during hurricane relief efforts, a private contractor evacuated United States and Nigerian troops 

after the recent ISIS ambush in Niger, and the Air Force has outsourced ‘‘red air’’ 

adversary training aircraft to contractors. This is just a sample of tasks that are 

being curtailed as the military struggles with fewer resources and finds it cannot 

actually do ‘‘more with less.’’ 

Yet not all of these capabilities need to be restored—in some instances, it may 

be more efficient to continue to outsource ancillary assignments that don’t necessarily require military forces to prosecute. Instead of papering over these realities, 

the new strategy should spell out explicitly what sacrifices the force could make, 

and signal to allies and partners where they could be most helpful, in order to allow 

the Department of Defense to concentrate on its most critical missions. 

Rosy assumptions need to go. Assumptions about international affairs that 

underpinned the last administration’s force planning—that Europe would remain 

peaceful, that the United States was dangerously overcommitted across the Middle 

East, and that a ‘‘rebalance’’ to East Asia could be accomplished without a substantial increase in forces—have all proven incorrect. 

The new strategy also has to combat unrealistic assumptions about the Department of Defense—such as the belief that reforms and efficiencies will generate significant savings that can be reinvested elsewhere in the defense budget, and that 

the Pentagon will certainly become more innovative when money is tight. 

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1Thomas Donnelly, Gary Schmitt, Mackenzie Eaglen et al., To Rebuild America’s Military, 

American Enterprise Institute, 2015, http://www.aei.org/publication/to-rebuild-americas-military/. 

Global force management is not a substitute for strategy. Because campaigns can now occur across geographic boundaries and within multiple domains of 

warfare at the same time, the default strategy-in-motion has become global force 

management. Despite the flexibility it generates, centrally-overseen crisis management is not a substitute for strategy. The world is not one global combatant command, nor does any one leader, commander, or service have the ability to manage 

complex contingencies as if it were. The forthcoming strategy must restore classic 

force planning and development to Pentagon processes and build up a new generation of policymakers and uniformed leaders used to operating within these constructs. 

Claiming the ‘‘five challenges’’ of China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and 

persistent counterterrorism operations are all equally important is not 

strategy—it is the absence of one. Former Defense Secretary Ash Carter’s list 

of five challenges—synonymous with the Joint Chiefs’ ‘‘four-plus-one’’ list—has persisted into this administration. This construct identifies threats, but it needs to rank 

their relative severity in order to have strategic meaning. Given the finite supply 

of American defense capacity, not all of these threats can receive the same amount 

of attention or bandwidth—nor should they. Our force deployments must be rationalized to prevent the use of capabilities intended for high-end wars or deterrence 

being worn down in the long grind of ongoing anti-terror operations. Stealth aircraft 

should not be performing fire support missions against the Taliban that could be 

handled by robust army artillery, for example. 

The Pentagon is bigger than a Department of War; it is a Department of 

Defense. Fighting and winning the nation’s wars is an essential core mission of 

America’s military. Preventing them is equally important. Daily, the U.S. military 

is active in maintaining a regular presence around the globe, cooperating with allies, and checking potential aggression. These ‘‘peacetime’’ presence and steady state 

activities are the most effective—and certainly the cheapest—use of military power. 

The Pentagon must more accurately size the military to not only fight and win multiple contingencies at once, but also to conduct the multitude of routine missions, 

deployments, and forward presence that advance and protect American interests 

overseas. 

It’s getting harder to differentiate between war and peace. The forcesizing construct should reflect this reality. The dangers of assuming Europe 

is a net producer of security became apparent the moment Russia annexed Ukrainian sovereign territory. In a single stroke, the Pentagon’s last strategy was rendered 

moot. The rise of ISIS further showcased the perils of American withdrawal from 

the Middle East. Coupled with increasing Chinese and North Korean bellicosity, 

three theaters are obviously vital considerations for United States military planning, even if active hostilities involving American troops are not underway in all of 

them simultaneously. 

Each of the five challenges to American security is unique and requires tailored 

responses to mitigate, even in peacetime. Ballistic missile defenses have immense 

use against North Korea, but little utility against ISIS. As each of our competitors 

focus on a particular suite of niche capabilities—from Chinese maritime capabilities 

to Russian land power and electronic warfare—America is in the unenviable position of needing to respond to all of them. To manage the expense of this endeavor, 

efficiencies must be found to deter and mitigate certain threats within an acceptable 

margin of risk in order to concentrate additional resources on more pressing ones. 

The clearest example is terrorism, which is a relative threat and not an existential one. The National Defense Strategy must recognize that countering terrorism 

will be a generational struggle that can be managed more gradually and cheaply 

than efforts to counter immediate and monumental threats, such as North Korean 

ICBMs. 

Organize for three theaters, not two wars. The degradation of the two-war 

standard since the end of the Cold War has left the nation with a one-plus-something strategy that is neither well understood nor universally accepted by policymakers or service leaders. Planners should size forces to maintain robust conventional and strategic deterrents in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, and equip a 

force for decision in the event deterrence fails. 1 The National Defense Strategy must 

make a clear distinction between the forces, capabilities and posture required to prevent a war against a near-peer state versus those needed to win one should it break 

out. 

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While deterring further Russian and Chinese aggression requires advanced aerospace capabilities, the principal presence missions would fall on maritime forces in 

the Pacific and land forces in Europe. In the Middle East, the situation is quite different; there is no favorable status quo to defend. Securing our regional interest requires not just presence, but an active effort to reverse the rising tide of adversaries: 

Iran, ISIS, al Qaeda and its associates, and now Russia. If we hope to remain safe 

and prosperous, America cannot swing among these theaters, nor can we retreat to 

the continental United States. This does not mean each theater requires the same 

amount of assets; forces can and should be tailored to the needs of each. 

Conventional military deterrence is changing. The calculus of deterrence is 

never certain as success is measured in the mindset of the adversary, not by a simple count of troops, planes, or ships. Thus as situations change, the U.S. military 

must possess both ample and heavy operational reserves and the logistical ability 

to rapidly deploy large and fully joint forces in times of crisis or conflict. This force 

for decision would supplement forward forces to either bolster deterrence or successfully prosecute a major conflict if it fails. 

These forces must be of a size and quality to be operationally decisive. Given the 

global interests of the United States and complex and divergent terrains of Asia, 

Europe, and the Middle East, this reinforcing force for decision must possess a wide 

array of capabilities across the air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains. Such a balanced ‘‘capacity of capabilities’’ is necessary to provide the widest possible set of options to campaign planners (and the president). Although the forward deployed 

forces in any given theater can be more readily tailored to steady-state missions, 

in times of crisis or conflict the need for effectiveness and overmatch supplants the 

need for efficiency. In order to maintain the ability to intervene both quickly and 

decisively, defense planners should favor maintain active-duty, highly trained units 

in both the forward-deployed forces and the force for decision based in the continental United States. 

Development of new capabilities should concentrate on securing tactical 

overmatch. Presence missions and train-and-advise efforts are crucial to support 

our allies, but firepower is ultimately what deters our foes. The new defense strategy should concisely outline the core competencies required of each service by region 

and threat, and over varying time horizons and levels of risk. It should concentrate 

development of new capabilities to restore as much technological overmatch as is 

possible. Planners should also seek opportunities to generate efficiencies when possible. For example, introducing a series of Armored Cavalry Regiments permanently 

stationed in Eastern Europe comprised of combined arms units would not only provide a powerful United States presence to counter Russia, but would allow regional 


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partners to better develop their domestic capabilities through increased opportunities for bilateral training and exercises. 

The American military needs more inter-service competition, not less. In 

some respects, the individual services have become too dependent on one another. 

Having the entire military rely on an individual service as the sole provider of a 

given capability can introduce risks and decrease the efficiency of U.S. forces. One 

obvious example is the degradation of U.S. Army short range air defense (SHORAD) 

and an overreliance on increasingly scant air force interceptors to maintain air superiority. Competition among the services—for missions and for resources, for example—is the key to innovation. Beyond the advantage of having redundant tactical 

and operational tools at hand in the event one fails or proves to be easily countered, 

competition fosters a richer and more diverse discussion of the nature of war and 

serves as a check on the American propensity to rely too heavily on technological 

solutions to military problems. As much as the new administration needs to put 

more forces in the field and modernize weapons systems, its most important task 

may be to rebuild the service’s institutional capacities that are essential for sustaining the breadth and depth of military leadership that global power demands. 

The Budget Control Act must no longer be the scapegoat. By attributing 

most or all of the current force’s problems to sequestration and ignoring their historical context, policymakers wrongly assume that solutions are simple (e.g., higher defense toplines alone will solve the military’s woes). The next National Defense Strategy will need to account for two compounding problems. First, the international situation is deteriorating. Second, our fiscal ability to support all instruments of national power is declining. Higher spending can alleviate the latter challenge, but 

new investments will need to be tied to clear strategic goals in order to address the 

former. We cannot repeat the mistakes of the early 2000s where billions were 

squandered on cancelled research and development programs that fielded little to 

nothing because they were not tied to the threats America faced. 

11 

Investments must balance between the immediate needs of today, the medium term, and wars of the 2030s. To alleviate strain on the current force, it 

will need to grow. This expansion of capacity should be undertaken immediately and 

with currently available equipment and technology rather than forestalled in pursuit of tomorrow’s super weapons. Overly investing in near-term readiness and speculative capabilities not only introduces a large amount of acquisition risk, it also 

creates a dangerous situation where adversaries know we are weak today and will 

be strong tomorrow. Facing this scenario, they would see that it’s better to strike 

now than later. In this way, more investment in our military could worsen American security unless it is properly managed to alleviate any potential gap in American readiness to deter and, if necessary, defeat our foes. Policymakers must avoid 

a ‘‘barbell’’ investment strategy that deemphasizes the medium-term needs of the 

2020s. 


17-91_Eaglen_2.eps
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2Mackenzie Eaglen, Repair and Rebuild: Balancing New Military Spending for a Three-Theater Strategy, American Enterprise Institute, 2017, http://www.aei.org/publication/repair-andrebuild-balancing-new-military-spending-for-a-three-theater-strategy/. 

REPAIRING AND REBUILDING THE ARMED FORCES BY 2023

In my new report, Repair and Rebuild, I present a Future Years Defense Program 

(FYDP) highlighting the needs of our Armed Forces over the next five years in addition to the last official FYDP conducted by the Obama Administration in 2017. 2

While that report contains my complete recommendations for a force sized for three 

theaters, the top five programmatic priorities emphasized in the report can be summarized as follows: 

1. Embrace stealth and sensor fusion en masse. 

• Purchase an additional 316 F–35As above the 431 aircraft planned over the 

FYDP, accelerate crucial F–22 upgrades, provide extra funding for the B–21 

Raider, and expand that program of record beyond 100 bombers. 


17-91_Eaglen_3.eps
13 

2. Disperse power projection. 

• Procure an additional 64 F–35Bs above the 102 planned, accelerate aviationfocused America-class production instead of developing a light carrier, expand 

KC–130J procurement, and buy five extra ESBs. 

3. Allow the Navy to focus on sea control. 

• Free up destroyers and attack subs to focus on sea control while accelerating 

new large surface combatant development. 

• Heavily invest in small surface combatants (with unmanned craft) to conduct 

lower-end naval missions. 

• Expand ground-based ballistic missile defense capacity to lessen burden on 

Navy surface combatants. 


17-91_Eaglen_4.eps
14 

4. Build sustainable long-term fire support capacity. 

• Move away from using expensive, high-demand assets (e.g. carriers, fourthgeneration fighters, bombers) for fire support. 

• Expand and upgrade Army tube and rocket artillery to improve organic fire 

support. 

• Expand Reaper buy and procure two wings of light attack fighters for air support in permissive environments. 

5. Increase Army lethality. 

• Upgrade Abrams, Bradley, Stryker, and Paladin at scale; ensure LRPF fields 

on time; rapidly invest in electronic warfare; and accelerate FVL helicopter 

replacements. 

• Expand United States Army Europe presence to incorporate heavier units 

prepared to act as more than a tripwire in the event of hostilities with Russia 

and otherwise capable of boosting regional capabilities of partners through increased opportunities for training and exercises. 


17-91_Eaglen_5.eps
15 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

If you will allow me to interrupt, since a quorum is now present, 

I ask the committee to consider the nominations of John Rood to 

be Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Randall Schriver to be 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, and a 

list of 275 pending military nominations. 

All these nominations have been before the committee the required length of time. 

Is there a motion to favorably report these two civilian nominations and list? 

Senator REED. So moved. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Is there a second? 

All in favor, say aye. 

[Chorus of ayes.] 

The information referred to follows: 

MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE’S CONSIDERATION ON NOVEMBER 30, 

2017. 

1. In the Air Force there are 14 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins 

with Dane V. Campbell) (Reference No. 951) 

2. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Ashley R. Sellers) 

(Reference No. 956) 

3. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Elias M. Chelala) 

(Reference No. 958) 

4. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of brigadier general 

(Douglas F. Stitt) (Reference No. 1116–2) 


17-91_Eaglen_6.eps
16 

5. Capt. Michael E. Boyle, USN to be rear admiral (lower half) (Reference 

No. 1124) 

6. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Cathleen 

A. Labate) (Reference No. 1144) 

7. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with 

Rebecca J. Cooper) (Reference No. 1147) 

8. RADM Lisa M. Franchetti, USN to be vice admiral and Commander, 

SIXTH Fleet/Commander, Task Force SIX/Commander, Striking and 

Support Forces NATO/Deputy Commander, US Naval Forces Europe/ 

Deputy Commander, US Naval Forces Africa/Joint Force Maritime 

Component Commander Europe (Reference No. 1192) 

9. BG Arthur E. Jackman, Jr., USAFR to be major general (Reference No. 

1218) 

10. BG Josef F. Schmid III, USAFR to be major general (Reference No. 

1219) 

11. In the Air Force Reserve there are 12 appointments to the grade of 

brigadier general (list begins with John M. Breazeale) (Reference No. 

1222) 

12. Col. Darlow G. Botha, Jr., ANG to be brigadier general (Reference No. 

1225) 

13. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of 

brigadier general (list begins with Steven J. deMilliano) (Reference No. 

1226) 

14. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of 

brigadier general (list begins with Michele K. LaMontagne) (Reference 

No. 1227) 

15. In the Air Force Reserve there are 25 appointments to the grade of 

brigadier general (list begins with Travis K. Acheson) (Reference No. 

1229) 

16. In the Air Force Reserve there are 12 appointments to the grade of 

major general (list begins with Ondra L. Berry) (Reference No. 1230) 

17. In the Air Force Reserve there are 8 appointments to the grade of 

major general (list begins with George M. Degnon) (Reference No. 1231) 

18. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of 

major general (list begins with Douglas A. Farnham) (Reference No. 

1232) 

19. In the Air Force there are 69 appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with Joseph Benjamin Ahlers) (Reference No. 1234) 

20. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Erika R. Woodson) (Reference No. 1236) 

21. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Michael S. 

Stroud) (Reference No. 1237) 

22. In the Air Force there are 17 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins 

with Lance A. Aiumopas) (Reference No. 1238) 

23. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Robert Sarlay, Jr.) (Reference No. 1239) 

24. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(Brantley J. Combs) (Reference No. 1240) 

25. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with 

Mark E. Query) (Reference No. 1241) 

26. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Victor 

A. Pachecofowler) (Reference No. 1242) 

27. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (James M. Brumit) 

(Reference No. 1243) 

28. In the Air Force Reserve there are 88 appointments to the grade of colonel 

(list begins with Richard G. Adams) (Reference No. 1253) 

29. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Melvin J. Nickell) 

(Reference No. 1254) 

30. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Erica L. 

Herzog) (Reference No. 1255) 

17 

31. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Adam W. Vanek) 

(Reference No. 1256) 

32. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Jason Park) (Reference No. 1257) 

33. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (John T. Huckabay) 

(Reference No. 1258) 

TOTAL: 275 

Chairman MCCAIN. The motion carries. 

Dr. Karlin, you are up. 

STATEMENT OF MARA E. KARLIN, Ph.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF THE PRACTICE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, JOHNS 

HOPKINS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Chairman McCain and 

Ranking Member Reed and members of the committee. It is a real 

opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the National Defense Strategy [NDS]. 

I have three points to make that cover the 2018 National Defense 

Strategy, how the committee can shape future strategies, and reconciling the last 15-plus years of war. 

The 2018 National Defense Strategy should prioritize preparing 

the future force for conflict with China and Russia while limiting 

the stressors of countering violent nonstate actors. To be sure, the 

U.S. military must be able to credibly confront challenges across 

the spectrum of conflict, including nuclear, high-end conventional, 

gray zone, and counterterrorism. 

While the United States military remains preeminent, the imbalance is worsening. China and Russia are making it harder for the 

United States to project power. 

Our military generally operates under two principles: fighting 

away games and maintaining unfair advantages. Both are growing 

harder. 

Steps like enhancing forward posture in Asia and Europe will 

have real operational benefits, as will investments in undersea; 

long-range strike; combat Air Force, particularly modernizing 

fourth-generation aircraft and balancing the portfolio more broadly; 

Counter Unmanned Autonomous Systems; short-range air defenses; 

and munitions. 

The U.S. military must lean forward to exploit the benefits of 

emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence and autonomy, but it must do so consonant with the American way of 

war. Technology is changing how the U.S. military fights, but not 

why it fights nor what it fights for. 

As you read the next NDS, I urge you to consider the following. 

Everybody, every service, every combatant command cannot be a 

winner, and a classified strategy should be clear about that tally. 

The committee and those of us involved in defense strategy and 

budgeting in recent years know sequestration’s pernicious damage. 

We have a special responsibility to ensure it is not a partisan issue, 

but instead a bipartisan effort. 

Second, the committee can shape future national defense strategies in a few important ways regarding coherence, assessment, and 

roles and missions. Changing the name of the Quadrennial Defense 

Review to the National Defense Strategy was a crucial first step for 

18 

coherence. It will mitigate the cacophony of guidance, which resulted in confusion over strategic direction. 

As a next step, the committee should consider codifying a vision 

of the department’s hierarchy of strategic guidance documents, 

which includes a singular, overarching strategy broken into classified documents for force development and force employment. 

Legislating an annual assessment of the defense strategy was a 

critical step for this committee. Strategies will always be flawed. 

Recognizing in which ways they require adjustment is essential. 

As a next step, the committee should consider codifying who is 

involved in the assessment and how it is conducted to ensure a 

broad, deep, and meaningful review. 

The committee has, in its laudable exploration of GoldwaterNichols, begun an important conversation about roles and missions. 

Broadening the chairman of the Joint Chiefs’ role to become a global integrator, and striking the right balance between Defense Department, civilians, and military leaders in producing and implementing strategy, can have profound consequences for mil-mil and 

civil-mil relations. 

These issues require serious debate, consideration, and active 

congressional involvement. 

Finally, as the committee looks to the future, I urge you to consider the recent past. Simply put, we all must reconcile the inheritance of the last 15-plus years of war. The opportunity costs are profound. They include a force whose predominant experience has 

been countering terrorists and insurgents; frayed equipment; a 

readiness crisis; a bias for ground forces; muddled accountability; 

a disinterested American public; a nadir of civil-military relations; 

and, above all, neuralgia over the conflicts’ loss of blood, treasure, 

and inconclusive results. 

I fear that all of our successors will look askance if we do not 

meaningfully examine this inheritance. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Karlin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MARA KARLIN, PH.D. 

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee, thank 

you for this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss recommendations for 

a future National Defense Strategy. The Committee’s leadership on this topic is essential, and I am grateful for the opportunity to share my expertise and assist with 

your mission. 

Today’s global security landscape is littered with national security challenges 

spanning the continuum of conflict. I would characterize it as chaotic and competitive with power increasingly dynamic and distributed. The nature of national security challenges is diversifying considerably, and the technological landscape is evolving in ways that diminish traditional U.S. strengths. While the U.S. military generally operates under two key principles—fighting ‘‘away’’ games and maintaining 

unfair advantages—both are growing harder. Of course, domestic disarray works to 

the advantage of those who seek to harm America. 

DEFENSE DILEMMAS: 

As the Defense Department pulls together the 2018 National Defense Strategy in 

an effort to outline the ambition and contours of the future U.S. military, it is wrestling with the following dilemmas, many of which will remain relevant for years to 

come: 

• Conflict Spectrum: The United States military must be able to credibly confront challenges across the spectrum of conflict, including nuclear, high-end conVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:00 Aug 08, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\30020 WILDA
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1 RAND’s Scorecards is the preeminent unclassified study of Chinese military modernization. 

Heginbotham, Eric, et. al. The United States-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and 

the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015. 

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research—reports/RR392.html. 2 Excerpted from author’s quote in Tony Bertuca, ‘‘Pentagon team working National Defense 

Strategy sizing up return to ‘two-war’ paradigm,’’ Inside Defense, August 30, 2017. 

ventional, gray zone, and counter-terrorism. These potential challengers include 

China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and violent non-state actors (e.g.; ISIL 2.0; 

Hizballah). It should prioritize countering the former while limiting the 

stressors of the latter. 

• Regional Focus: The Asia-Pacific and Europe are the priority theaters for 

the United States military as it competes with rivals; however, the United 

States cannot remain a global power if it dismisses other regions. China is the 

long-term challenge for the United States given its consequential military modernization over two decades. While the U.S. military remains preeminent, the 

imbalance is worsening. China is making it harder for the United States military to project power across Asia, and neither time nor geography work to the 

United States advantage. 1 Russia is a medium-term challenge for the United 

States. Moscow’s use of force in Europe and the Middle East has been rotten, 

but more worrying is its military’s modernization over the last decade and its 

dangerous doctrine euphemistically known as ‘‘escalate to deescalate.’’ In reality, its doctrine is ‘‘escalate to escalate’’ as no clear-eyed observer would consider limited nuclear use de-escalatory. Moreover, the Russian way of war considers society and military fair game, blurs the line between conflict and peace, 

and wields cyber tools to sow doubt and faith in United States institutions. In 

the wake of the 2011 uprisings, the Middle East will remain fragile for decades 

to come. The counter-terrorism fight there and in Africa will continue, degrading readiness. Containing the regional chaos when and where possible, and limiting the toll it takes on the military, should be a priority. 

• Today vs. Tomorrow: The U.S. military must be able to counter near-term 

threats and exert U.S. presence globally while also preserving readiness and 

modernizing the future force to effectively fight and win future wars. It should 

prioritize the latter. 

• Nuclear vs. Conventional Investments: The U.S. military must maintain 

a credible nuclear deterrent while not allowing it to overwhelm investment in 

conventional capabilities. Nuclear weapons must not be hived off in budget, 

strategy, or future force discussions; trade space between the nuclear and conventional portfolios requires meaningful adjudication. 

• Reliance on Allies/Partners: Allies and partners are the United States’ comparative global advantage. The U.S. military will always fight alongside allies 

and key partners; however, some will be more capable than others and the 

United States will perennially face an expectations mismatch between our 

needs and capabilities, and theirs. 

• Inheritance from 15+ Years of War: The U.S. military must reconcile all it 

has inherited from the longest period of war in United States history, particularly given the inconclusive nature of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 

opportunity costs of this inheritance are profound. They include a force whose 

predominant experience has been countering terrorists and insurgents; frayed 

equipment; a readiness crisis; a bias for ground forces; muddled accountability, 

a disinterested American public, a nadir of civil-military relations; and, above 

all, neuralgia over the conflicts’ loss of blood, treasure, and limited results. 

There is no binary answer to these dilemmas. Instead, the National Defense 

Strategy (NDS) will invariably bet and hedge across them. I urge the Committee 

to review the National Defense Strategy with an eye toward efforts to make meaningful, not marginal, change. Everybody—every service, every combatant command—cannot be a winner, and the classified version of the NDS should be clear 

about that tally. The U.S. military is facing serious modernization shortfalls that 

will only grow uglier and it has spent 15+ years in conflicts that look dramatically 

different from the future. It needs to catch up—fast. 2

To be sure, the resource picture has exacerbated these dilemmas. This Committee 

and those of us involved in defense strategy and budgeting in recent years know 

the pernicious damage that sequestration has done. We have a special responsibility 

to ensure it is not a partisan issue, but instead a bipartisan effort to rebuild the 

nation’s defenses in a prudent and practical manner. 

20 

3Mara Karlin and Christopher Skaluba, ‘‘Strategic Guidance for Countering the Proliferation 

of Strategic Guidance,’’ War on the Rocks, July 20, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/ 

strategic-guidance-for-counteringthe-proliferation-of-strategic-guidance/. 

FORCE SIZING AND SHAPING CONSIDERATIONS

The Committee should engage in a classified dialogue with the Department to ensure it fully understands the future force’s abilities. The Committee should consider 

the following: 

• Scenario Selection. While the scenarios used to size and shape the force are 

illustrative—not exhaustive—their contours are crucial. They should align with 

U.S. national security interests and an appropriate level of American strategic 

ambition, incorporating varying challenges across the conflict spectrum while 

balancing between likelihood and consequence. • Scenario Pairing: The U.S. military must be able to fight and win multiple 

conflicts. Anything short of that is reckless. A force that can only wage one conflict is effectively a zero-conflict force since employing it would require the president to preclude any other meaningful global engagement. In considering scenario pairing, their separation in time and distance should be realistic (not least 

because the theory behind preparing for simultaneous conflicts hasn’t borne 

fruit: an opportunistic aggressor has not taken advantage of U.S. distraction to 

attack—indeed, the period since 2001 would have been an ideal opportunity). 

• Scenario Execution: Scenario analysis must focus on how the military will 

fight and win a conflict—jointly. Risk should be delineated as specifically as 

possible, and underscore when and where the force will face ‘‘heart burn’’ (an 

uglier conflict with higher losses in blood and treasure) and ‘‘heart attack’’ (losing the conflict). 

• Posture: The United States—thankfully—is generally far from the conflicts it 

wages. Maintaining this distance requires the U.S. military to be much closer, 

however. Forward posture enables a rapid response when conflict erupts, can 

deter rivals or adversaries from launching a conflict, and magnifies the force’s 

capacity, capability, and readiness. In the near-term, modest improvements in 

forward posture in Asia and Europe will have significant operational benefits. 

The United States military must be able to get anywhere around the globe at 

any time, which in these regions increasingly involves poking holes in Chinese 

and Russian attempts to impede United States power projection. 

• Investments: Technology is changing how the U.S. military fights, but not 

why it fights nor what it fights for. The U.S. military must lean forward to exploit the benefits of emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence 

and autonomy, but it must do so responsibly by developing a shared understanding of its prospects and how to field such systems consonant with the 

American way of war. Key areas of investment for the future force should include undersea, long-range strike, combat air force (particularly modernizing 

4th generation aircraft and balancing the portfolio more broadly), counter-unmanned autonomous systems, short range air defenses, munitions, cyber resilience, and technology that facilitates operations in contested environments with 

degraded communications. 

STRATEGIC GUIDANCE COHERENCE AND ASSESSMENT

I commend the Committee for changing the name of the Quadrennial Defense Review to the National Defense Strategy, thereby making clear to the entire national 

security apparatus that it represents the governing guidance for the Defense Department. This crucial step will mitigate the cacophony of strategies across the Department’s guidance landscape, which has resulted in confusion over strategic direction, cherry-picking for parochial agendas, and discordant dialogue on the strategy’s 

implementation and efficacy. 3 As a next step, the Committee should consider codifying a vision of the Department’s hierarchy of strategic guidance documents along 

with which entity should lead them. That framework should include a singular overarching strategy broken into classified documents for force development and force 

employment. 

I also commend the Committee for legislating a new requirement for the secretary 

of defense to annually assess the strategy and its implementation. Strategies will 

always be flawed; recognizing in which ways they require adjustment is crucial. As 

a next step, the Committee should consider codifying who is involved in this assessment and how it is conducted to ensure a broad, deep, and meaningful review. I recommend an inclusive approach at the senior level, potentially using the deputy secretary of defense and vice chairman of the joint chiefs’ regular forum with the DeVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:00 Aug 08, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\30020 WILDA
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4 James Golby and Mara Karlin, ‘‘Why ‘Best Military Advice’ is Bad for the Military—and 

Worse for Civilians,’’ Orbis, Winter 2018 (forthcoming). 

partment’s leadership (the deputy’s management action group). The assessment 

should be classified with unclassified portions released at the secretary of defense’s 

discretion, and should diagnose the current state of affairs (and how it differs from 

earlier expectations), and outline in what ways the Department’s trajectory will now 

shift. 

ROLES AND MISSIONS

The Committee has, in its laudable exploration of Goldwater-Nichols, begun an 

important conversation about roles and missions. It should continue to do so, particularly as it takes steps to enhance the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff’s role. 

Broadening his role to include global integration can have profound consequences 

for mil-mil and civil-mil relations. Similarly, the increasing resonance of the term 

‘‘best military advice’’ across the military merits reflection about how its continued 

use is influencing defense strategy development and civil-mil relations. 4 These 

issues require serious debate and consideration, and active Congressional involvement. 

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

As the Committee’s Members review the next NDS and consider future iterations, 

I urge you to consider the following questions: 

1) What are the primary areas of debate and disagreement in pulling together 

the NDS? Who are the winners and losers in the NDS? 

2) In what ways does the NDS differ from the chairman of the joint chiefs’ National Military Strategy, and why? What’s the right balance between Defense 

Department civilians and military leaders in producing and implementing 

strategy? 

3) How does the Department plan to implement the NDS? How does the Department plan to fulfill the Committee’s annual requirement to assess it and 

make course corrections as necessary? 

4) In what ways does the NDS influence roles and missions? 

5) How is the Department assessing the last 15+ years of conflict and their impact on the force, including its biases, structures, and processes? 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

General? 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS W. SPOEHR, 

U.S. ARMY, RET., DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR NATIONAL 

DEFENSE, HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

General SPOEHR. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for 

the opportunity. 

So, is the Pentagon on the cusp of producing a real defense strategy, or will the forthcoming National Defense Strategy be attractive, but no more than another coffee table book to put in your office? 

A real defense strategy—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. How does it look? 

General SPOEHR. Based on history, sir, it is not looking good. I 

am optimistic about the current leadership, and so I would like to 

remain optimistic at this point. 

A real defense strategy will provide clear priorities, identify 

America’s competitive advantages and how to capitalize them, and 

how to deal with the world and the enemies it offers as it is. 

Since the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Chinese 

militarization of islands in the South China Sea starting in 2015, 

America has been operating without a real defense strategy, thus 

22 

the need for a new defense strategy could not be more acute. But 

previous efforts have had decidedly mixed results. 

So what would contribute to the creation of a seminal defense 

strategy that would guide our efforts for years to come? Above all 

else, the strategy must lay out clear choices. Strategies that articulate that we are going to do this and not do that. U.S. defense 

strategies often fail by endeavoring to be completely inclusive of all 

parties and valuing their contributions equally. 

Assuming the Congress succeeds in appropriating additional, 

desperately needed defense funding in 2018 and beyond, the Pentagon will still not be able to afford everything on its vast wish list, 

as they must contend with crushing needs for facility repairs and 

maintenance backlogs. Some capabilities, some organizations, and 

some elements of infrastructure are not as important as others, 

and a strategy should not pull back from identifying those. 

Turning to the contents of the strategy, as a prisoner of my education at the Army War College, we like to talk about strategy in 

terms of ends, ways, and means, so I will briefly lay out some 

thoughts on those. 

First, the ends, or the objectives. The strategy should flow from 

a clear and understandable goal that the military needs to be ready 

and able to defend America’s interests with decisive and overwhelming military strength. 

The only logical and easily understood strategic construct for the 

United States is to maintain the capability to engage and win decisively in two major regional contingencies near simultaneously. 

The basis for that construct is, fundamentally, deterrence. If the 

adversaries know that America can engage in two major fights 

with confidence, they will be less inclined to take advantage of a 

United States committed elsewhere. 

Now I would like to look at the ways, or the actions the strategy 

should describe. 

First, the strategy should call for more forward presence for U.S. 

forces. The end of the Cold War led to massive reductions in forward presence, but forward-stationed forces demonstrate a resolve 

that no other action can make. 

Second within the ways, the strategy should not propose approaches that contradict the very fundamental nature of war. The 

Obama Administration attempted this when they wishfully prescribed in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review that our forces 

will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability 

operations. United States history not confined to Iraq and Afghanistan reflects that wars have a way of drawing American forces into 

prolonged stability operations. 

Simply put, it is foolhardy not to prepare and size our forces for 

a type of operation which history tells us American Presidents have 

repeatedly seen fit to engage the military, even when it is not specifically prepared for it. 

Third, to support the objective to counter terrorist and violent extremist threats in the Middle East and elsewhere, America should 

maintain certain lower end capabilities, such as non-fifth-generation attack aircraft and advise-and-assist capabilities, such as the 

Army’s new Security Force Assistance Brigades, which can allow us 

to conduct these operations at a much lower overall cost. 

23 

Then finally within the ways, you should be able to see the key 

competitive advantages that the United States brings to win. 

America’s unmatched ability to fight as a joint team probably 

would rank as one of those. A well-nourished network of alliances 

and partners would be another. I, personally, hope not to see artificial intelligence, swarms of mini-drones, robots, railguns, and directed energy weapons proposed as the keys to our military’s future 

success. That has become very fashionable in Washington, DC, but 

these advantages are transitory, and they cannot be relied upon to 

provide a long-term, enduring advantage to the United States. 

So I have talked about the ends and the ways. I would like to 

close with the means, or the resources, if you will. Nothing will 

doom a strategy quicker than an imbalance between the ends, 

ways, and the means. That is exactly where we find ourselves 

today, with the smallest military we have ever had in 75 years, 

equipped with rapidly aging weapons, and employed at a very high 

operational pace, endeavoring to satisfy undiminished global defense requirements. 

Tragically, due to overuse, underfunding, and inattention, American military capabilities have now markedly deteriorated to a dangerously low level. 

For example, the Air Force is now short over 1,000 fighter pilots. 

Part of the reason for that crisis is dissatisfaction, stemming from 

the fact that fighter pilots now fly less sorties per week than they 

did during the hollow years of the Carter Administration. 

I draw your attention to the chart that should be attached to my 

testimony. It shows the aircraft sorties per month between now 

and the Carter Administration. Recent pilot interviews with over 

50 current fighter pilots confirm this trend continues to today. 

Recent tragic ship mishaps—why they are not flying more, sir? 

Chairman MCCAIN. Why they are not happy? 

General SPOEHR. Most of the reason is they are not doing the job 

they signed up to do. They came in to fly. They love to fly. Now 

they are being told they will fly, but two times a week. The rest 

of the week is taken up with administrative duties, like the safety 

officer or the morale officer for their squadron. That is not what 

they want to do. 

Chairman MCCAIN. So the answer is not money. It is ability to 

fly. 

General SPOEHR. You are right, sir. But, of course, in some cases, 

money helps the ability to fly. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

General SPOEHR. Yes, sir. 

Recent ship collisions, aircraft mishaps, submarine maintenance 

backlogs, and an anemic Army modernization program all reflect 

the results of what happens when a military tries to accomplish 

global objectives with only a fraction of the necessary resources. 

Unfortunately, there are no shortcuts to rebuild the military. It 

took us years to get in this position, and it is going to take us years 

to get out of it. 

I draw your attention to a second handout I provided, which reflects Heritage research on the number of forces needed to deal 

with two major regional contingencies compared to how the military stands today. You will note, although Heritage assesses that 

24 

the Army needs 50 active brigade combat teams, they only have 31. 

Of those 31, only 10 are ready, and out of those 10, only 3 are 

ready to fight tonight. That is a serious problem. It reflects a significant risk to America and its interests. 

My most important point that I would like to stress is the strategy should be budget-informed and not budget-constrained. There 

is a big difference. 

The strategy should take a realistic look at the national security 

threats facing the country and propose realistic solutions to those 

threats. While acknowledging that the U.S. cannot dedicate an infinite amount of resources to national defense, the strategy should 

not fall victim to accepting the views of the Office of Management 

and Budget or others as to what can or should be spent on national 

defense. 

Already, some advance the notion that because of structural economic problems, the United States is unable to spend more on defense even though spending on the Armed Forces stands at a historic low percentage of the gross domestic product, 3.3 percent, and 

a historic low percentage of the Federal budget at 16 percent. 

How many times, ladies and gentlemen, have you heard that the 

United States spends more than the next six or eight countries 

combined? Such arguments, however, fall apart very quickly upon 

examination. No other country in the world needs to accomplish as 

much as we do with our military. Second, a huge amount of the difference in defense spending can be traced down to purchasing 

power parity and other economic factors, such as it only costs 

China about $300 million to build a ship that in the United States 

costs over $1.5 billion. 

Notwithstanding those facts, national interests and objectives 

must always drive America’s military requirements and not cold financial calculations. 

In summary, there is room for optimism about the opportunity 

the new defense strategy affords. Authoritatively defining how the 

U.S. military will protect America’s interests and methods to be 

used is something that has not been done in recent memory. Done 

correctly, it has a great chance of having put the ends, ways, and 

means of our strategy back in balance. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General Spoehr follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS W. SPOEHR

Lieutenant General Thomas Spoehr, U.S. Army, retired, served for 36 years in the 

Army until 2016. As the Director for the Center for National Defense at The Heritage 

Foundation, Spoehr leads a team of defense experts responsible for researching and 

forming policy recommendations to promote a strong and enduring U.S. national defense. As part of their efforts, they publish the annual authoritative Index of U.S. 

Military Strength providing a comprehensive assessment of U.S. military power and 

are currently engaged in the Rebuilding America’s Military Project (RAMP), designed 

to inform decisions regarding the future direction of the U.S. military. While in uniform, Spoehr was responsible for forming recommendations for the Army’s annual 

fiscal program, equipment investments and strategies, and the Army’s business strategy. In those roles, he participated in several Quadrennial Defense Reviews, the development of the DOD’s Defense Strategic Guidance, and other strategies. In 2011 

Spoehr served as Deputy Commanding General-Support for United States Forces 

Iraq with responsibilities for transition and logistics. The following is adapted from 

an October 3, 2017, article published in War on the Rocks, titled: ‘‘Rules for Getting 

Defense Strategy Right.’’ 

25 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this committee on this important 

subject. 

So, is the Pentagon on the cusp of generating a real defense strategy? Or will the 

forthcoming National Defense Strategy (NDS) be like so many strategic documents 

of the past: attractive, but of little intrinsic value, like coffee-table books? 

A real defense strategy would provide clear priorities, identify America’s competitive advantages and how to capitalize on them, and deal with the world—and the 

enemies it offers as it is. Since the August 2014 Russian invasion of the Ukraine, 

and the Chinese militarization of man-made islands in the South China Sea in 

2015–2016, the United States has been operating without a relevant defense strategy. Thus, the need for a new NDS could not be more acute, but previous efforts 

have had decidedly mixed results. Will this one succeed where others have failed? 

We are about to find out. 

Done correctly, the NDS can put the United States on a sound strategic footing. 

But a couple of challenges loom. 

First, the Pentagon is writing the NDS in parallel with the White House’s development of the National Security Strategy (NSS). Even though the writing teams are 

closely collaborating, it would be better for them to be tackled sequentially. 

The NSS should provide the framework for the NDS with sufficient intervening 

time for the NSS to be digested and analyzed. Congress should ensure that future 

national security and defense strategies are separated by time in their development. 

Second, the Pentagon’s senior policy leadership team is only just starting to arrive, with the Principal Deputy to the Under Secretary for Policy only arriving in 

the last couple of weeks and the appointed Under Secretary and relevant Assistant 

Secretary still not in place. There is a capable team in place developing the strategy, 

but their leaders missed the opportunity to weigh in on the strategy. 

So, what would contribute to the creation of a seminal defense strategy that can 

guide our defense efforts for years to come? 

Above all else, the NDS must lay out clear choices. As Harvard Business School 

professor Michael Porter puts it: ‘‘Strategy is about choices.’’ Strategies articulate 

that we are going to ‘‘do this, and not this.’’ American defense strategies often fail 

by endeavoring to be completely inclusive of all parties and valuing their contributions equally. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) fell in that category. 

Every ‘‘tribe’’ successfully inserted their organizations as a high priority into the 

document, which consequently was irrelevant the moment it was signed. 

Assuming that Congress succeeds in appropriating additional desperately needed 

defense funding in 2018 and beyond, the Pentagon still will not be able to afford 

everything on its vast ‘‘wish lists,’’ as the military must also contend with crushing 

needs for facility repairs and maintenance backlogs. Some capabilities, organizations, and elements of infrastructure are not as important as others, and the NDS 

should not pull back from identifying those that are less critical for success. 

Turning to the contents of the NDS, I am a prisoner of my education at the Army 

War College which instills that good strategy is comprised of ends, ways, and 

means, each linked and in balance. Just to be clear, the ‘‘Ends’’ represent the objectives you seek to accomplish, ‘‘Ways’’ the actions you will employ in the pursuit of 

the objectives, and ‘‘Means’’ the resources you require to execute the strategy. I will 

therefore organize my comments in that manner. 

FIRST, THE ENDS OR OBJECTIVES

The NDS should flow from a clear and understandable goal: The U.S. military 

needs to be ready and able to defend America’s interests with decisive and overwhelming military strength. 

The only logical and easily understood strategic construct for the United States is 

to maintain the capability to engage and win decisively in two major regional conflicts near simultaneously. America’s force-sizing construct has changed over time. 

During the peak of the Cold War, the United States sought the ability to fight two 

and a half wars simultaneously against the Soviet Union, China, and another smaller adversary. Successive Administrations have modified this construct based on 

their assessments of threats, national interests, priorities, and perceptions of available resources. The real basis for the two-war construct is deterrence. If adversaries 

know that America can engage in two major fights with confidence, they will be less 

inclined to take advantage of the United States or an ally committed elsewhere. 

Fortunately, the United States need not size its forces to take on an adversary 

the size of the Soviet Union but instead a smaller, albeit still very dangerous and 

capable, Russia. The bad news is that the United States also needs to stand ready 

to deter and defeat China, which is making massive investments in its military 

forces and has chosen belligerence in Asia. 

26 

The NDS must not overlook the need to continue to remain engaged to counter 

terrorist and violent extremist threats in the Middle East, Africa, and South and 

Southeast Asia, as well as confront rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran. 

WHEN CONSIDERING THE WAYS, OR THE ACTIONS AND METHODS TO BE EMPLOYED

First, the NDS should call for more forward presence by U.S. forces. The end of 

the Cold War led to massive reductions in the United States military posture in Europe and elsewhere. These reductions were not based on an empirical or strategic 

review of U.S. force requirements, but rather on two factors: the opportunity to save 

money and the politically less contentious choice to close overseas military installations, not ones at home. Then-European Command Commander General Philip 

Breedlove testified as much in 2015: ‘‘[P]ermanently stationed forces are a force 

multiplier that rotational deployments can never match.’’ If our goal is to deter war, 

we must demonstrate both our will and capability. Forward stationed forces demonstrate both to the degree that no other action can match. U.S. forces stationed 

abroad should be configured, trained, and equipped to provide a real, versus symbolic, warfighting capability. 

Secondly, the NDS should not propose approaches that contradict the very nature 

of war. The Obama Administration attempted this when it wishfully prescribed in 

the 2014 QDR that ‘‘our forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale prolonged stability operations.’’ United States history, not confined to Iraq and Afghanistan, reflects the way wars have a way of drawing American forces into prolonged 

stability operations. Critics correctly argue that some of these stability operations 

were conducted by choice and that America should be more judicious in deciding 

whether to enter into future conflicts with the potential for stability operations. 

While appealing, such reasoned arguments ignore the reality that modern conflict 

usually presents either gradually, like Vietnam, or as crisis, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, and in neither case allowing for extended deliberation of questions 

like ‘‘How does this end?’’ 

To put it simply, it is foolhardy not to prepare or size our forces for a type of operation which history tells us American presidents have repeatedly seen fit to engage 

the military, even when not specifically prepared for it. 

Third, to support the objective to counter terrorist and violent extremist elements 

in the Middle East and elsewhere, the United States should maintain certain ‘‘lowend’’ capabilities such as non-fifth generation attack aircraft and Advise and Assist 

capabilities such as the Army’s new Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB) in 

order to conduct these type operations at lower cost. 

Finally, within the strategy, Washington should be able to see the key competitive 

advantages that the United States intends to employ to win. America’s unmatched 

ability to fight as a joint team certainly would rank as one. A strong and well-nourished network of alliances and partners would certainly be another. I hope not to 

see artificial intelligence, swarms of drones, robots, railguns, and directed energy 

weapons proposed as the keys to our military’s future success—as has become fashionable—because the advantages those and other technologies convey are transitory. 

They are important, but are not key U.S. advantages for the long haul. 

THE MEANS MUST BE IN BALANCE TO THE ENDS AND WAYS

Nothing will doom a strategy faster than an imbalance between the ends, ways, 

and means. This is the situation we find ourselves in today, with the smallest military we have had in seventy-five years, equipped with rapidly aging weapons, and 

employed at a very high operational pace endeavoring to satisfy our global defense 

objectives. 

The NDS should chart the path to the development and maintenance of a strong 

military with the ability to dominate likely opponents in all domains: land, air, sea, 

space, and cyber. Tragically, due to overuse, underfunding, and inattention, American military capabilities have now markedly deteriorated to a dangerously low 

level. Fighter pilots now fly less sorties per week than they did during the ‘‘hollow’’ 

years of the Carter Administration. Recent tragic ship collisions, aircraft mishaps, 

fighter pilot shortages, and reports on dilapidated shipyards show what happens 

when a military tries to accomplish global objectives with only a fraction of the necessary resources. 

The NDS should acknowledge the growing gap between the military’s needs and 

what the nation has seen fit to resource. There are no shortcuts to accomplish the 

rebuilding that is now necessary. The NDS should acknowledge the true state of the 

military as it relates to the broad requirements of protecting our national interests. 

In that regard, it is critical that the NDS should be budget-informed, not budgetconstrained. There is a big difference. The strategy should take a realistic view of 

27 

the national security threats facing the country and propose realistic ways and 

means to deter and defeat those threats. While acknowledging the United States 

cannot dedicate an infinite amount of resources to national defense, the strategy 

should not fall victim to the trap of accepting the Office of Management and Budget’s views as the upper limit for what the country should or can spend on its defense. 

Already some seek to advance the notion that because of our structural economic 

problems the United States will be unable to increase defense spending, even 

though the spending on its armed forces stands at a historically low percentage of 

both gross domestic product (3.3 percent) and overall federal spending (16 percent). 

Skeptics employ superficial spending comparisons between nations to argue the 

United States already spends enough on defense. 

How many times, for example, have you heard that the United States spends 

more on its military than the next seven or eight countries combined? You might 

take from that observation that Washington is spending too much hard-earned taxpayer money on a bloated military, but you would be wrong. Such arguments fall 

apart quickly on examination. First, there is no other nation in the world that needs 

to accomplish as much with its military as the United States. Washington depends 

on a globally deployed force that upholds the pillars of the international order by 

defending access to the commons, protecting trade routes (that benefit the American 

people more than anyone else), and deterring those who seek to disrupt peace and 

security. Therefore, the U.S. military must be superior everywhere we are challenged. Second, some of the difference in spending among nations can be traced to 

purchasing power parity. For example, a ship that costs $1.2 billion to produce in 

the United States may cost only $300 million in China. Notwithstanding these factors, national interests and objectives must drive America’s military requirements, 

not cold financial calculations. 

The NDS should find the balance between identifying the resources that are required and acknowledging that tough resourcing choices are still inevitable. 

SUMMARY

It is a military maxim that nothing happens until someone is told to do something. The NDS should therefore be directive, not just descriptive. Strategic objectives should lend themselves to tracking, and appropriate individuals should be held 

accountable. For example, if one objective is to increase readiness, the strategy 

should specify how much of a gain, by when, and who is responsible. 

When Congress created the requirement for the NDS, it specified that it should 

be classified, with an unclassified summary. That direction is liberating, as the NDS 

can be more narrowly focused than if it were forced to serve as both strategy and 

public relations tool. Hopefully, the Pentagon embraces that aspect. 

There is room for optimism about the opportunity the NDS affords. Authoritatively defining how the U.S. military will protect America’s interests and the 

methods to be employed is something that has not been done in recent memory. 

Done correctly, it has a great chance of helping put the military back on a path to 

being a formidable force for the foreseeable future. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Ochmanek? 

STATEMENT OF DAVID A. OCHMANEK, SENIOR DEFENSE 

RESEARCH ANALYST, RAND CORPORATION 

Mr. OCHMANEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Reed. I appreciate the opportunity to share with you insights about 

what my colleagues and I at RAND have been learning from our 

analyses and gaming. 

DOD’s development of a new defense strategy is an opportunity 

to reverse adverse trends in the national security environment and 

to develop a plan of action to reverse them. But even a perfectly 

formulated strategy and plan will do little to ameliorate our problems unless the department is given more resources soon and on 

a sustained and predictable basis. 

28 

Put simply, our forces today, and for some time, have been given 

too little money with which to prepare for the missions assigned to 

them. 

You were all here when Chairman Martin Dempsey 4 years ago 

testified on his views of the Quadrennial Defense Review from 

2014. This is what he said: In the next 10 years, I expect the risk 

of interstate conflict in East Asia to rise, the vulnerability of our 

platforms and basing to increase, our technology to erode, instability to persist in the Middle East, and threats posed by violent 

extremist organizations to endure. 

That was not a very optimistic view of the future, but that was 

in January of 2014, before Russia had invaded Ukraine, before the 

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had overrun large parts of 

Syria and Iraq, and before it was decided that we were going to 

leave large contingents of United States combat forces in Afghanistan. 

So we were on the ragged edge in January 2014. The security environment has deteriorated since then. Yet our resources are still 

constrained by the Budget Control Act of 2011. 

It should come as no surprise that, again and again, when we 

run war games against China and Russia, United States forces lack 

the capabilities they need to win. That is where we are today. 

Chairman MCCAIN. The gap is widening. 

Mr. OCHMANEK. The gap is widening, without question. 

Your invitation letter to this hearing asked us to provide views 

on the new force-planning construct. That is easily done. 

Top priority should be given to ensuring that United States 

forces have the capability to defeat any single adversary, including 

Russia and China. That probably sounds obvious, but it is not actually what we are doing today. We do not set that as a priority. 

As resources permit, we should also have the capacity to defeat 

a second adversary elsewhere. But pretending that you can spread 

the peanut butter across all of these challenges and have an adequately modernized force for the future is, as we have seen, an illusion. 

Again, the hard part, and the part that in the end will determine 

the success or failure of our defense strategy and program, will be 

generating the money needed to build a force that can meet these 

requirements, and then applying those resources in ways that do 

the most to move the needle against our most capable adversaries. 

The challenges that our adversaries pose are serious, but they 

are not intractable. Just as our gaming shows that we lack important capabilities with the programmed force, it also shows that we 

have real opportunities to change that, not through investments in 

highly exotic things like artificial intelligence and robots, but hereand-now weapons that are either available for purchase or very far 

along in the development process. Let me give you some examples. 

So to counter the anti-access/area denial threat, our forces really 

need to be able to do two things. One, from the outset of a war, 

reach into these contested land, maritime, and air areas and kill 

things. Right? Kill the amphibious fleet that could be invading Taiwan or the 30 battalion tactical groups that could be coming from 

Russia into the Baltic States. 

29 

We have options to do that. The Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile 

is one. Guided anti-armor weapons like the Sensor Fuzed Weapon, 

which existed 20 years ago but we are only buying in very small 

numbers, is another way to, again, move that needle. 

Two, we need to strengthen our military posture in key theaters. 

I agree with what the general said. You cannot fight Russia and 

China with a purely expeditionary posture. You need more combat 

power for it, particularly heavy armored forces on NATO’s eastern 

flank, but also stocks of advanced munitions, mature commandand-control and communications infrastructures, and more survivable bases. 

Our bases could be subject to attack by hundreds of accurate ballistic and cruise missiles. We have techniques and investment priorities to address those threats, but we have not had the resources 

to actually put them into the field. 

Number three is improve capabilities to rapidly suppress and destroy the enemy’s air defenses. No one wants to fight in a battlefield where you do not have air superiority. Our forces in our 

games against Russia and China do not have that in the opening 

phases of these wars, and we need to reinvest in ways to kill the 

most sophisticated surface-to-air missiles, things we lack today. 

Finally, our forces have to be equipped and trained to enable 

them to win the fight for information superiority. China and Russia 

are investing heavily in capabilities that can improve their understanding of the dynamic battlespace and to deny us that understanding. Our forces have to have more survivable sensor platforms, communication links, cyber defenses, and cyber offensive 

systems. 

Again, plenty of options exist for meeting these needs. It is a 

question of investment. 

The good news is that, for the most part, the additions to the defense program that are called for are not major platforms or new 

force structures, and they are not exotic, futuristic Third Offset 

technologies. 

The greatest leverage comes from things like advanced munitions; more robust enablers, such as intelligence, surveillance and 

reconnaissance (ISR) systems and communication links; posture, 

which is about where we place our assets and how survivable our 

base infrastructures are. These sorts of things tend to cost a lot 

less than major platforms and increases in force structure. 

To close, I believe we have it within our means, technically, operationally, and financially, to field forces that are capable of confronting even our most capable adversaries with the prospect of defeat, if they choose aggression. This is the gold standard of deterrence, and it is the standard to which we should aspire. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ochmanek follows:] 

30 

1The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should 

not be interpreted as representing those of the RAND Corporation or any of the sponsors of its 

research. 2The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy 

challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and 

more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. 3 Research and analysis upon which this testimony draws is documented, among other places, 

in David Ochmanek, Peter A. Wilson, Brenna Allen, John Speed Meyers, and Carter C. Price, 

U.S. Military Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World: Rethinking the U.S. Approach to 

Force Planning, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR1782–IRD, Forthcoming. 4 Research and analysis upon which this testimony draws is documented, among other places, 

in David Ochmanek, Peter A. Wilson, Brenna Allen, John Speed Meyers, and Carter C. Price, 

U.S. Military Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World: Rethinking the U.S. Approach to 

Force Planning, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR1782–RC, forthcoming. 5For a succinct assessment of the military balance between Russia and NATO and the prospects for a defense of the Baltics, see David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing 

Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics, Santa Monica, 

Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR–1253–A, 2016. For an assessment of trends in China’s armed 

forces and their implications for United States defense strategy and planning, see David 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DAVID OCHMANEK 1, THE RAND CORPORATION 2

Good morning Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, members of the committee, and staff. I appreciate the opportunity to share with you insights that my 

colleagues and I have gained from our analyses of emerging threats to U.S. military 

operations. Nine months ago, I had the honor of appearing before this committee 

to testify on the state of the U.S. armed forces’ ability to counter threats posed by 

the nation’s adversaries. On that occasion, like others who joined me on that day, 

I pointed to some serious and growing gaps that war gaming and analysis have 

identified in the capabilities of U.S. forces, voicing concerns about the eroding credibility of U.S. security guarantees in the face of these unfavorable trends. In the intervening months, I have seen little to change my assessment of the situation. 

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)’s efforts to develop a new National Defense Strategy (NDS) and accompanying guidance to components for force development are opportunities to reverse these trends, and it will be important that the 

Department get these right. But even a perfectly articulated NDS will do little to 

ameliorate the problem unless the Department is given more resources soon and on 

a sustained and predictable basis. Put simply, U.S. forces today and for some time 

have been given too little money with which to prepare for the missions assigned 

to them. 

U.S. MILITARY CAPABILITIES: A SUMMARY ASSESSMENT 3

The security environment in which U.S. forces are operating and for which they 

must prepare is, in important ways, more complex and more demanding than the 

familiar post-Cold War world in which most of us have formed our expectations 

about what constitutes an appropriate level of investment in military power. 4 To 

wit: 

• United States force planning prior to Russia’s attacks on Ukraine did not take 

account of the need to deter large-scale aggression against the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO). • DOD has not moved quickly enough to provide the capabilities and basing posture called for to meet the manifold challenges posed by China’s rapidly modernizing armed forces. • The prospect of nuclear weapons in the hands of North Korea and, potentially, 

Iran poses challenges for which United States forces do not currently have satisfactory answers. • United States forces face the prospect of a geographically widespread campaign 

of indefinite duration against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al 

Qaeda, and other violent extremist groups. 

As these threats have emerged and U.S. forces have engaged in unremitting combat for 16 years, the nation has not committed the resources called for to build and 

sustain the capabilities that the forces need if they are to succeed in this more demanding environment. As a result, the United States now fields forces that are, at 

once, larger than needed to fight a single major war, failing to keep pace with the 

modernizing forces of great-power adversaries, poorly postured to meet key challenges 

in Europe and East Asia, and insufficiently trained and ready to get the most operational utility from many of DOD’s active component units. Put more starkly, 

RAND’s war games and simulations suggest that U.S. forces could, under plausible 

assumptions, lose the next war they are called upon to fight. 5 In light of this, it 

31 

Ochmanek, Sustaining United States Leadership in the Asia-Pacific Region: Why a Strategy of 

Direct Defense Against Antiaccess and Area Denial Threats Is Desirable and Feasible, Santa 

Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, PE–142–OSD, 2015. 

is a matter of increasing urgency that the nation invest in new military capabilities, 

posture, and operational concepts designed to meet the manifold challenges presented by U.S. adversaries. 

Peer Adversaries and A2/AD Threats 

The means that the United States’ most capable adversaries—China and Russia— 

use to create those challenges (ballistic and cruise missiles, sophisticated air defenses, anti-satellite weapons, electro-magnetic and cyber attacks, and so forth) are 

well known and do not need to be repeated here. It is, however, important to understand how U.S. and allied forces can and should be evolving their capabilities, posture, and operational concepts to address these challenges. 

Our research points to four independent but complementary lines of capability development: 

1. Damage, disrupt, and destroy the enemy’s operational centers of gravity in contested domains. Specifically, this means finding ways to ‘‘reach 

into’’ contested airspace and maritime zones to locate, identify, engage, and attack the surface ships that would be part of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or 

the mechanized ground forces that would constitute the spearhead of a Russian 

invasion of the Baltic states. U.S. adversaries seek to use their anti-access/area 

denial (A2/AD) capabilities to create a window of opportunity during which 

they hold U.S. combat power at bay so that they can conduct campaigns of aggression. The United States must be able to deny them this sanctuary from the 

outset of a conflict, even before U.S. forces have suppressed the enemy’s A2/ 

AD threats. This approach differs in important ways from the joint operational 

concept that U.S. forces have used successfully against less capable adversaries 

since Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and implementing the approach will require new capabilities. 

2. Strengthen U.S. military posture in key theaters. Since Operation Desert 

Storm, U.S. forces have become accustomed to relying heavily on an expeditionary approach to power projection, in which the vast bulk of U.S. combat 

power employed in a conflict is deployed forward following warning or the actual initiation of hostilities. This approach is less appropriate for theaters in 

which U.S. and allied forces face threats from highly capable adversaries, especially in NATO member countries in Europe, where heavy ground forces will 

play important roles in an effective defense. Strengthening posture also means 

investing in base infrastructure that is more resilient in the face of large-scale 

attacks by accurate ballistic and cruise missiles. 

3. Improve capabilities to suppress and destroy enemy air defenses. In 

every conflict since Korea, United States forces have operated virtually without 

regard to the threat of enemy air attacks and have enjoyed freedom of maneuver in enemy airspace, allowing them to observe and attack targets of value 

to the enemy. Dense arrays of modern, mobile, surface-to-air missile systems 

and modern fighter aircraft give China and Russia the ability to deny United 

States forces this crucial advantage, at least during the critical opening phase 

of a conflict, and U.S. capabilities to counter these have not kept pace with the 

threat. Adversaries’ heavy investments in these defenses reflect their fear of 

what modern air forces with precision weapons can do on the battlefield. Accordingly, fielding improved capabilities to suppress enemy air defenses should 

have outsized effects on deterrence of aggression. 

4. Win the fight for information superiority. Recognizing the critical importance of accurate, timely information and agile command and control in modern military operations, U.S. adversaries are investing heavily in capabilities 

intended to improve their understanding of the battlefield and to deny the 

United States the same. These capabilities include space-based and airborne 

sensors, robust communication systems and command facilities, electronic jamming systems, anti-satellite weapons, and cyber weapons. This makes it imperative that DOD invest in more survivable sensor platforms and communication 

links, cyber defenses, and offensive systems. U.S. forces, which have become accustomed to operating in environments that pose no threats to their information superiority, must also find ways to operate effectively in disrupted, ‘‘low 

bandwidth’’ environments. 

32 

6See David Ochmanek and Lowell H. Schwartz, The Challenge of Nuclear-Armed Regional 

Adversaries, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG–671–AF, 2008. 7David Ochmanek, Andrew R. Hoehn, James T. Quinlivan, Seth G. Jones, and Edward L. 

Warner III, America’s Security Deficit: Addressing the Imbalance Between Strategy and Resources in a Turbulent World: Strategic Rethink, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR– 

1223–RC, 2015, pp. 26–27. 

Nuclear-Armed Regional Adversaries 

Repeated war games consistently show that deterring a nuclear-armed regional 

adversary, such as North Korea, poses unique challenges that make it anything but 

a lesser-included case of deterring a more capable adversary, such as Russia or 

China. Ironically, the relative weakness of North Korea’s conventional forces means 

that, in a conflict or deep crisis, a North Korean leader may perceive that he and 

his regime have little to lose in using nuclear weapons against military targets, 

making it difficult to deter such use through the threat of retaliation in-kind. This 

reality means that U.S. and allied forces are driven to find ways to improve capabilities to prevent nuclear-armed regional adversaries from effectively using their 

nuclear weapons. 6 Given the challenges associated with locating and destroying 

weapons in deep underground facilities, hunting and destroying dispersed mobile 

missiles, and intercepting ballistic missiles once launched, the United States should 

not have high confidence in its nuclear prevention capabilities today. 

Salafist-Jihadis and Other Violent Extremist Groups 

Even as U.S. forces are faced with the need to quickly and significantly ‘‘raise 

their game’’ vis-a ́-vis peer and nuclear-armed regional adversaries, they must also 

continue with the ongoing fight against the most threatening violent extremist 

groups, including the Taliban in Afghanistan, ISIS in its various manifestations, 

and Al Qaeda. A central tenet of U.S strategy against such groups has been to keep 

them under constant pressure over long periods of time, so as to keep them off-balance and to prevent them from effectively recruiting and expanding their influence 

and power. Extensive experience in battling such groups over the past 16 years has 

allowed U.S. and partner forces to devise increasingly effective approaches to defeating quasi-states, such as ISIS, and taking leadership cadres off of the battlefield 

through targeted capture or kill operations. Key capabilities in these fights going 

forward will be specialized forces (often from the special operations community) to 

train, advise, and assist partner forces; robust means for gathering and analyzing 

intelligence about adversary groups; and more-affordable precision attack capabilities that can dwell close to areas of ongoing operations and deliver on-call fires 

against emerging targets. 7

CRAFTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY AND FORCES TO IMPLEMENT IT

Individually and in combination, the challenges outlined earlier constitute an extremely demanding set of requirements for this nation’s armed forces. Those tasked 

with developing the new NDS and the forces to implement it surely understand that 

a ‘‘business as usual’’ approach to planning and resourcing U.S. forces will not suffice. New priorities must be chosen and additional resources, focused on investments 

of greatest relevance to those priorities, must be made available if the nation is to 

reverse the decline in the credibility of its conventional deterrent. 

As a foundational step in this endeavor, DOD’s leaders should consider directing 

each component to build its force so that it can, as part of a joint and combined 

operation, defeat any single adversary, including the most capable of them. This 

may seem an obvious requirement, but the fact is that, today, the United States 

should not have confidence that the joint force can meet it. For several years now, 

gaming and analysis of plausible future warfights have revealed serious and growing shortfalls in the capabilities of programmed U.S. forces. If not reversed, these 

adverse trends will have profound and unavoidable strategic consequences. 

A Revised Force Planning Construct 

The following force planning construct would be consistent with the approach advocated here: 

1. Defend the homeland. 

2. Deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression by any single adversary state. 

3. Sustain operations against selected violent extremist groups. 

4. Deter opportunistic aggression by a second state adversary. 

Inherent in the construct would be the requirement that DOD components resource each of the four elements in descending order of priority. That is, they would 

33 

8The research on which this testimony is drawn focused on understanding and countering the 

threats posed by state adversaries (such as China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran) and SalafistJihadi groups. My work has not delved deeply into issues of the readiness of U.S. forces or the 

stresses that high operational tempos may be imposing on people and units. I have also not addressed the need to recapitalize U.S. nuclear forces. The absence of recommendations in these 

areas should not be taken as implying that investments there are not warranted. 

be directed to accept risk in elements 3 and 4 until it was judged that sufficient 

resources had been devoted to elements 1 and 2 to achieve a reasonable degree of 

confidence that those elements could be achieved. 

The key to making this approach work is to size and equip each major force element—Army combat brigades, Air Force and Marine Corps fighter squadrons, Navy 

carrier strike groups, and so forth—so that it can meet the demands posed by the 

most stressing scenario for that force element. As examples, the Army’s armored brigade combat teams would be sized to meet the demands of their biggest fight (a 

Korea scenario) but equipped to successfully combat their most sophisticated foe 

(Russian ground forces), USAF fighter squadrons would be sized and equipped to 

prevail against the largest and most capable threat they face (Chinese forces), and 

so on. This would have the effect of promoting force modernization as the highest 

priority for resourcing while ensuring adequate capacity for at least one war—something that has been lacking in U.S. force planning heretofore. 

Investment Priorities 

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Strategic Capabilities Office, service labs, and industry are developing new capabilities that can address many, if not most, of the operational challenges facing U.S. forces today and 

in the future. Much can be done to reverse adverse trends by investing in near-term, 

here-and-now systems and adapting key aspects of established operational concepts. 

Attached at the end of this statement is a table summarizing the types of military 

capabilities that gaming and analysis suggest can do the most to strengthen the 

joint force’s ability to defeat aggression by the four state adversaries of greatest concern and to support a sustained campaign against violent extremist organizations. 8

Highlights from that list, keyed to the four lines of capability development and the 

non-peer adversaries outlined earlier, are as follows: 

• Damage, disrupt, destroy the enemy’s operational centers of gravity in 

contested domains. Develop and field sensors that can survive and operate 

in the A2/AD environment. Examples include unattended ground- and sea-based 

sensors; small, swarming unmanned aerial vehicles; and stealthy air vehicles. 

Accelerate and expand procurement of standoff weapons, such as the Joint Airto-Surface Standoff Missile—Extended Range (JASSM–ER), the Long-Range 

Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), and powered dispensers with guided anti-armor 

munitions so that long-range bombers can effectively and survivably attack key 

enemy targets from the outset of a conflict. Aggressively explore options for 

lower-cost weapon delivery from undersea (e.g., large unmanned underwater vehicles). Defer plans to retire selected cluster weapons until cost-effective replacements are available in sufficient numbers. • Strengthen U.S. military posture in key theaters. Station more U.S. heavy 

armored forces and artillery along NATO’s northeastern flank. Increase forward-based stocks of preferred munitions in both the U.S. Pacific Command and 

U.S. European Command areas of responsibility. Improve the resiliency of air 

bases with investments in low-cost shelters, fuel bladders, and other passive 

protection measures, decoys, and modern cruise missile defenses (e.g., Indirect 

Fire Protection Capability Increment 2). • Improve capabilities to suppress and destroy enemy air defenses. Accelerate development and fielding of a longer-range, fast-flying, anti-radiation missile and a longer-range air-to-air missile. Explore new concepts for disposable, 

stand-in jamming systems and swarming, autonomous weapons. • Win the fight for information superiority. Continue to explore ways to use 

civil-sector communications and imaging satellite constellations in military operations. Continue to develop and test, and begin to field, new systems that can 

enhance the resiliency of selected military satellites, including through improved situational awareness, maneuver, stealth, active defense, redundancy, 

and responsive launch. Invest selectively in airborne and terrestrial backups to 

key space-based capabilities. Expand anti-satellite capacity, especially in systems (such as jammers and lasers) that can disrupt or disable adversary satellites without creating debris. Added investments in both defensive and offensive cyber capabilities can help here. However, the gaming and analysis that 

I have seen provide little hope that cyber alone can be decisive in defeating conventional military aggression if deterrence fails. 

34 

9Michael J. Lostumbo, ‘‘A New Taiwan Strategy to Adapt to PLA Precision Strike Capabilities,’’ in Roger Cliff, Phillip C. Saunders, and Scott Harold, eds., New Opportunities and Challenges for Taiwan’s Security, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, CF–279–OSD, 2011, pp. 

127–136. 10 Andrew Radin, Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: Threats and Potential Responses, Santa 

Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR–1577–AF, 2017, pp. 33–34. 

• Prevent nuclear use. Develop or adapt an air-to-air missile and associated 

sensor suite for intercepting theater ballistic missiles in boost-phase. Continue 

to explore options for improved discover and tracking of nuclear weapons and 

mobile delivery vehicles. Continue investments to improve the reliability of 

ground-based interceptors to protect the United States. 

• Defeat Salafist-Jihadis and other violent extremist groups. Continue to 

expand intelligence collection and analysis capacity. Acquire two to three wings 

of light reconnaissance-attack aircraft for more cost-effective air operations in 

permissive and semi-permissive air defense environments. Continue to grow the 

end strength of special operations forces (SOF) at a deliberate pace to ease the 

tempo of operations experienced by these warriors. 

CONTRIBUTIONS OF ALLIES AND PARTNERS

Obviously, countering the threats that potential adversary states pose is not solely 

a problem for the United States. In fact, it would be unwise and infeasible for the 

United States to attempt to address these challenges unilaterally. Allies and partners, particularly those directly or indirectly threatened by adversary activities or 

in the same region, have a strong interest in ensuring that their forces can impose 

a high price on an aggressor and contribute effectively to combined regional operations that the United States might lead. 

A host of options—many of them rather low-cost and low-tech—are available to 

allies and partners seeking to increase their contributions to the common defense. 

Taiwan, for example, could significantly strengthen its defenses against an invasion 

by investing in short-range unmanned aerial vehicles, anti-ship cruise missiles, 

shallow water mines, rocket artillery, mobile short-range air defenses, and communications jamming gear. 9 The government of the Philippines could help U.S. forces 

to increase the resiliency of its base structure by granting access to air bases on 

its territory and providing host nation support services to deployed forces. The Baltic states could invest in border monitoring and secure communication systems, 

while other NATO allies could raise the readiness levels of their armored maneuver 

forces. 10 U.S. force planners should work closely with allies and partners to identify 

ways in which their planned investments and those of the United States can maximize complementarity and interoperability. 

I will also note that the additions to the defense program described here are not, 

by and large, major platforms or new force structures. Rather, what emerges from 

our gaming and analysis is the value of investments in such things as advanced munitions; more-robust enablers (such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR) systems; communication links; and command and control nodes); posture, 

which is about the placement of assets and the resiliency of base infrastructures; 

and novel operating concepts. This is not to say that adding force structure in some 

areas would not have value. Surely, many elements of the force (not only SOF) have 

experienced excessively high operations tempos. But, in general, investing in new 

ways to equip, enable, and employ U.S. forces seems to offer the greatest leverage 

in restoring credible conventional deterrence. 

It is also worth noting that most of the force enhancements highlighted here are 

not high-tech. Many, such as fuel bladders and expedient aircraft shelters, are quite 

low-tech. Others (e.g., JASSM–ER, guided anti-armor munitions, stationing additional ground forces on NATO’s eastern flank) are here-and-now capabilities in 

which investments could be increased. Still others (e.g., longer-range anti-radiation 

and air-to-air missiles, better exploitation of civil sector satellites) involve adapting 

or integrating existing technologies into new systems or new ways of operating. In 

short, we need not and should not wait for the maturation of exotic new technologies 

in the Third Offset or other long-term research and development initiatives before investing in things that can make major differences in the ability of U.S. forces to deter 

and defeat aggression by even the most capable adversaries. 

CONCLUSION

The adverse trends in the relative military capabilities of U.S. and adversary 

forces outlined here have been known to the defense analytic community for some 

years now. Gaming and analysis have yielded growing insight into promising apVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:00 Aug 08, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\30020 WILDA
35 

proaches to addressing many of the resulting challenges. The two things that are 

needed now are money and focus—in particular, additional money to allow the Department to move swiftly to develop, acquire, and field new systems and postures 

and a focus on fielding capabilities that can make the greatest and most enduring 

contributions to a robust defensive posture vis-a ́-vis China, Russia, and other adversaries. The Trump Administration and the 115th Congress have the opportunity to 

rectify the strategy-forces mismatch that has arisen over the past several years and 

put the United States back on a path toward fielding forces that can defeat any adversary. 

One note of caution: Fielding the sorts of capabilities I have highlighted here 

should not, in most cases, be expected to restore to U.S. forces the degree of overmatch that they enjoyed against regional adversaries of the past, such as Iraq and 

Serbia. Any major conflict involving China, Russia, or North Korea is bound to be 

a costly and bloody affair. But I believe that it is within the United States’ means— 

technologically, operationally, and fiscally—to field forces capable of confronting 

even the most capable adversaries with the prospect of defeat if they choose aggression. That is the gold standard of deterrence, and it is the standard to which I believe the United States should aspire. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Table. Priority Enhancements to U.S. Forces and Posture 

China • Accelerated development and fielding of a longer-range, fast-flying, radar-homing air-tosurface 

missile* and a longer-range air-to-air missile* 

• Forward-based stocks of air-delivered munitions, including cruise missiles (e.g., JASSM and 

JASSM–ER, LRASM)*, surface-to-air missile suppression missiles (e.g., homing anti-radiation missile, miniature air launched decoy)*, and air-to-air missiles (e.g., AIM–9X and AIM–120)* 

• Prepositioned equipment and sustainment for ten to 15 platoons of modern short-range air defense systems (SHORADS) for cruise missile defense 

• Additional base resiliency investments, including airfield damage repair assets and expedient aircraft shelters, and personnel and equipment to support highly dispersed operations 

• Accelerated development of the Next-Generation Jammer* . A high-altitude, low-observable unmanned aerial vehicle system* 

• More-resilient space-based capabilities (achieved by dispersing functions across increased numbers of satellites and increasing the maneuverability, stealth, and ‘‘hardness’’ of selected assets)* 

• Counter-space systems, including kinetic and nonkinetic (e.g., lasers, jammers) weapons* 

Russia • *Items listed under ‘‘China’’ marked with an asterisk 

• Three heavy brigade combat teams and their sustainment and support elements forward based or 

rotationally deployed in or near the Baltic states 

• One Army fires brigade permanently stationed in Poland, with 30-day stock of artillery rounds, and 

one additional fires brigade set prepositioned 

• Forward-based stocks of artillery and multiple launch rocket system rounds, plus anti-tank guided 

missiles 

• Forward-based stocks of air-delivered anti-armor munitions (e.g., SFW/P3I) 

• Eight to 12 platoons of SHORADS forces stationed or rotationally deployed in NATO Europe 

• Increased readiness and employability of mechanized ground forces of key NATO allies 

Iran • Improved, forward-deployed mine countermeasures 

• High-capacity close-in defenses for surface vessels 

North Korea • Improved ISR systems for tracking nuclear weapons and delivery systems 

• Exploratory development of boost-phase ballistic missile intercept systems 

• Continued investments to improve the reliability and effectiveness of the ground-based intercept 

system to protect the United States 

Salafist-Jihadi • Improved intelligence collection and analysis capabilities and capacity 

Groups • Light reconnaissance and attack aircraft 

• Gradually expanded SOF end strength toward a goal of 75,000–80,000 

• Powered exoskeleton, also known as the Talon Project 

• Swarming and autonomous unmanned vehicles 

SOURCE: Ochmanek et al., forthcoming. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Dr. Mahnken? 

36 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS G. MAHNKEN, Ph.D., PRESIDENT AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC 

BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS 

Dr. MAHNKEN. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to 

appear before you today to discuss the National Defense Strategy 

(NDS). 

The National Defense Strategy can serve as a powerful tool to 

focus and organize the Department of Defense to ensure that the 

United States maintains and bolsters its competitive advantages in 

an increasingly challenging environment. In the brief time I have, 

I would like to touch on six topics that the NDS should address and 

then conclude with one topic that undergirds them all. 

First, the NDS should address the threats and challenges the 

United States faces and determine the priority for addressing 

them. 

As has previously been mentioned, we find ourselves today, once 

again, in a period of great-power competition with an increasing 

possibility of great-power war. It is the most consequential threat 

that we face, and failure to deter, failure to prepare adequately for 

it, would have dire consequences for the United States, our allies, 

and global order. Because of that, I believe that preparing for 

great-power competition and conflict should have the highest priority. 

At the same time, we face increasingly capable regional foes, to 

include North Korea and Iran. So while great-power competition 

and conflict should have the highest place, we also need to stress 

test our forces against these regional threats. 

Finally, now and for the foreseeable future, we will need to wage 

a global counterinsurgency campaign against jihadist terrorist 

groups. We need to acknowledge that reality and plan accordingly. 

Second, the NDS should provide both a global and a regional look 

at U.S. defense strategy and set priorities there. 

The reality is that the United States is a global power with interests that span the world. Moreover, we face competitors who are 

active not only in their backyards, in their home regions, but also 

far beyond them. China is building up its military not only in the 

Western Pacific but also is active in the Middle East and Africa. 

Russia is not only using force in Ukraine but also in Syria. 

That having been said, not all regions carry the same strategic 

weight. 

Asia’s strategic weight continues to grow, and it is increasingly 

the locus of economic, military, and political activity for the world. 

In my view, it is the most consequential region. 

Europe is also extremely important. Its strategic salience has 

grown as threats to it and to American interests there have increased. 

The United States cannot afford to ignore the Middle East, however much some may want to. History shows vividly that failure to 

address terrorism and instability far from our shores will eventually lead to those very same problems being visited on us at home. 

Third, the NDS should provide focus on spending priorities, on 

readiness, force size, and modernization. The readiness deficiencies 

of the U.S. Armed Forces are on stark display on an all too regular 

37 

basis, and Secretary of Defense Mattis justifiably made improving 

readiness his first priority. 

However, it has also become obvious that the Navy and the Air 

Force are smaller than is prudent in an increasingly competitive 

environment. Our forces, as has previously been noted, are also in 

dire need of modernization after a long hiatus. 

While the United States was focused on defeating insurgents in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia and China were focused on acquiring 

capabilities to defeat us. As a result, we find ourselves a step behind in a number of key warfighting areas. I would agree with 

what Dave Ochmanek said just before me. 

Fourth, the NDS should balance the need to fight and win wars 

with the need to deter and compete in peacetime. We must prepare 

for both the reality of great-power competition and the increasing 

possibility of great-power war. 

One manifestation of the former is the development and refinement by China and Russia of approaches to compete with us below 

the threshold that they calculate will draw a major U.S. response. 

We need to develop strategies to compete and win in peacetime. 

Just as our competitors are using many tools to do so, to include 

political warfare, information, economic incentives, and so forth, so 

do we have many available to us. What has all too often been lacking on our side, however, has been the political will to use them, 

to incur risk, to demonstrate our resolve, and, thus, to deter. 

Fifth, the NDS should speak to how the United States can work 

more effectively with our allies. Our allies represent a long-term 

competitive advantage for the United States. We need to devise 

ways to work more closely with them, to develop and share capabilities more effectively with them, and to increase interoperability. 

Sixth, the NDS should put forward a force plan and construct to 

guide and shape the size of U.S. forces. Here, I would commend to 

you CSBA’s recent Force Planning for the Era of Great Power Competition, which explores the topic in depth. 

But in my view, the force-planning construct should focus on the 

need to both compete in peacetime with great powers but also to 

fight and win a great-power war, if only to bolster deterrence. The 

United States should also be able to do these things while deterring or fighting a regional foe. The force-planning construct should 

acknowledge the reality that the United States will be engaged in 

a global counterinsurgency campaign for the foreseeable future. 

One of the keys to doing these things is likely to be innovative 

operational concepts and capabilities, and here, there is room for 

considerable creative thought and action. 

Now, I have outlined six considerations for the NDS, and the answers that the NDS provides to these six questions will help answer one that is much greater and far more consequential. And 

that is this: What role will the United States play in coming decades? Will we continue to lead and defend the international order, 

an order that has benefited us greatly? Or will we retreat into a 

diminished role? Will we compete? Or will we sit on the sidelines 

as states who seek to reshape the world to their benefit and to our 

detriment take the field? 

38 

If we answer in the affirmative, then we need to acknowledge the 

magnitude of the task ahead. It will take time. It will take resources, and it will take political will. 

I, for one, hope the answer is in the affirmative and that we 

muster what is needed for the competition that lies ahead of us. 

Thank you, and I await your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Mahnken follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY THOMAS G. MAHNKEN

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the 

Committee, thank you for your invitation to appear before you today to discuss the 

National Defense Strategy. 

This is a vitally important topic. In recent years, it has become apparent that we 

are living in a world characterized by the reality of great-power competition and the 

growing possibility of great-power war. At the same time, the United States faces 

increasingly capable regional rogues, such as North Korea and Iran, which possess 

or are developing nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver them to great distances. 

We also face the need, today and into the future, to wage a global counterinsurgency 

campaign against jihadist terrorist groups. At the same time, it has become painfully obvious that the United States possesses limited resources—or more accurately 

limited political will to muster the resources—to meet this increasingly competitive 

environment. 

The National Defense Strategy can serve as a powerful tool to focus and organize 

the Department of Defense to ensure that the United States maintains and bolsters 

its competitive advantages in an increasingly challenging environment. 

I would first like to discuss six topics topics that the NDS should address, and 

conclude with one topic that undergirds them all. 

First, the NDS should address the threats and challenges that the United States 

faces and determine the priority for addressing them. 

As I noted at the outset, we find ourselves today once again in a period of greatpower competition with an increasing possibility of great-power war. It is the most 

consequential threat that we face, and failure to deter and prepare adequately for 

it would have dire consequences for the United States, our allies, and the global 

order. Because of that, I believe that preparing for great-power competition and conflict should have the highest priority. 

At the same time, we face increasingly capable regional foes, to include North 

Korea and Iran. We need to stress test our forces against these threats. 

Finally, now and for the foreseeable future, we will need to wage a global counterinsurgency campaign against jihadist terrorist groups. We need to acknowledge that 

reality and plan accordingly. 

Second, the NDS should provide both a global and regional look at U.S. defense 

strategy and set priorities there. 

The United States is a global power, with interests that span the world. Moreover, 

we face competitors who are active not only in their home regions, but also far beyond them as well. China is not only building up its military in the Western Pacific, 

but is also active in the Middle East and Africa. Russia is not only using force in 

Ukraine, but also in Syria. That having been said, not all regions carry the same 

strategic weight.. Asia’s strategic weight continues to grow, and it is increasingly 

the locus of global economic, military, and political activity. In my view, it is the 

most consequential region. Europe is also extremely important. Its strategic salience 

has grown as threats to it, and to American interests there, have increased. The 

United States cannot afford to ignore the Middle East, however much some may 

want to. History shows vividly that failure to address terrorism and instability far 

from our shores will eventually lead to those very same problems being visited on 

us at home. 

Third, the NDS should provide focus on spending priorities on readiness, force 

size, and modernization. 

The readiness deficiencies of the U.S. armed forces are on stark display on an alltoo-regular basis, and Secretary of Defense Mattis justifiably made improving readiness his first priority. However, it has also become obvious that the Navy and Air 

Force are also smaller than is prudent in an increasingly competitive environment. 

Our forces are also in dire need of modernization after a long hiatus. While the 

United States was focused on defeating insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia 

and China were focused on acquiring capabilities to defeat us. As a result, we find 

ourselves a step behind in a number of key warfighting areas. 

39 

Fourth, the NDS should balance the need to fight and win wars with the need to 

deter and compete in peacetime. 

We must prepare for both the reality of great-power competition and the increasing possibility of great-power war. One manifestation of the former is the development and refinement by China and Russia of approaches to compete with us below 

the threshold that they calculate will draw a major U.S. response. We need to develop strategies to compete and win in peacetime. Just as our competitors are using 

many tools to do so, so do we have many available to us. What has all too often 

been lacking on our side, however, has the political will to use them, to incur risk, 

to demonstrate our resolve, and thus to deter. 

Fifth, the NDS should speak to how the United States can work more effectively 

with our allies. 

America’s allies represent a long-term competitive advantage. We need to devise 

ways to work more closely with them, to develop and share capabilities more effectively with them, and to increase interoperability. 

Sixth, the NDS should put forward a force planning construct to guide the shape 

and size of U.S. forces. 

Here I would commend to you CSBA’s recent Force Planning for the Era of Great 

Power Competition, which explores the topic in depth. 

In my view, this force planning construct should focus on the need to both compete in peacetime with great powers, but also to fight and win a great-power war, 

if only to bolster deterrence. The United States should also be able to do these 

things while deterring or fighting a regional foe. The force planning construct should 

acknowledge the reality that the United States will be engaged in a global counterinsurgency campaign for the foreseeable future. One of the keys to doing these 

things is likely to be innovative operational concepts and capabilities, and here 

there is room for considerable creative thought and action. 

In conclusion, the answers the NDS provides to these six questions will help answer one that is much greater and more consequential, and that is this: What role 

will the United States play in coming decades? Will we continue to lead and defend 

the international order—an order that has benefited us greatly—or will we retreat 

into a diminished role? Will we compete, or will we sit on the sidelines as states 

who seek to reshape the world to their benefit and our detriment take the field? 

If we answer in the affirmative, then we need to acknowledge the magnitude of the 

task ahead. It will take time, resources, and political will. 

I, for one, hope that we answer in the affirmative, and that we muster what is 

needed for the competition that lies ahead of us. 

About the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an independent, 

nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and 

debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s analysis focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters 

of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Doctor. This has been very helpful to the committee, and I think we can discuss it in light of the 

events of the last couple days, and I am talking about North Korea’s missile launch. 

I know of no expert who believed that it would happen this 

quickly and this high. 

So we will begin with you, Ms. Eaglen. 

Ms. EAGLEN. So I think from the testimony here this morning, 

there is a consensus that, actually, everyone up here and on the 

committee actually knows what the Defense Department needs to 

do. It is only if they will do it, whether or not they will answer the 

questions honestly that we have outlined. 

Of course, that includes North Korea, one of the big five challenges, as coined by the last administration [the Obama Administration] and endorsed by this one, which includes North Korea. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Wouldn’t you agree this is the first time that 

there is a capability of hitting the United States of America? 

40 

Ms. EAGLEN. I would agree. I think the Air Force a couple years 

ago may have been the only service that predicted something along 

this timeline in classified reports. 

But it has clearly shown its capability. As you mentioned, Mr. 

Chairman, the trajectory, in particular, is what is important. It is 

a wakeup call to remind the American people and Congress, again, 

what we already know. 

Every time we think it is going to take longer than it does, it 

usually happens faster and more quickly. 

So what can we do about it now? Some of the solutions that we 

have talked about up here already, about basing and posture and 

infrastructure, more missile defense in the region, and other recommendations in detail are also in my testimony. 

But the core assumption that things will take longer, that others 

will mature slower than we hope because that is what is in our 

plan and in our strategy, should be thrown out the window. 

Chairman MCCAIN. So if you and I had been having this discussion 2 years ago, you would not have predicted this? 

Ms. EAGLEN. I would say our track record as a country, as a Defense Department, and as an intelligence community is dismal in 

predicting what will happen and how quickly, not just the occurrence of events like the Arab Spring, which was completely not predicted at all, but also the timeline of capability development by enemies and potential foes. 

We have been wrong almost every single time, and it is usually 

because it has been faster than we have predicted. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Karlin? 

Dr. KARLIN. Unfortunately, our options vis-a-vis North Korea are 

terrible, and anyone who tells you differently is a foolish optimist. 

So what we need to do in the near term is we need to rebuild 

our defenses, we need to—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. You are talking about antimissile capabilities? 

Dr. KARLIN. Writ large, absolutely, anti-missile capabilities. We 

need to rebuild our readiness. We need to improve our base posture, but also our resilience and dispersal across Asia. Because if 

there is a conflict, we will see U.S. bases in places like Guam, in 

places like South Korea, and in places like Japan under heavy, 

heavy fire. We need to do all we can to get close to our allies like 

Japan and South Korea. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I know you have seen the RAND study that 

shows closure between their capabilities and ours. That is of concern? 

Dr. KARLIN. Absolutely. 

We need to find a way to minimize the toll that the Middle East 

chaos will continue to take on our force. It is sucking away readiness. It is prioritizing capacity over meaningful capability. It is also 

not going away. 

Chairman MCCAIN. We are asking our servicemembers to work 

100-hour workweeks. 

General? 

General SPOEHR. Exactly right. I think 100 is probably a low estimate for some of them, sir. 

41 

But I would concur with the panelists here. We need to increase, 

as this committee and the House did, missile defense, global midcourse defense interceptors in Alaska and California, Aegis destroyers and cruisers. 

We need to ensure that our stocks of precision-guided munitions 

are where they need to be, in case we do have to do one of those 

options, which would be unthinkable. But we need to make sure we 

have enough Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) and small-diameter bombs to prosecute the war. Today, I am not entirely certain that we have that. 

We just need to ensure the fundamental readiness of our Armed 

Forces. We need to make sure that our forces are ready, if the 

President calls on them, to do what needs to be done, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. One of the aspects of this that is so frustrating to us is that, as predicted, the workweeks are longer, the 

readiness suffers, the availability of aircraft suffers, because that 

is the easy part. To ask any servicemember to work a 100-hour 

workweek is sooner or later going to have a significant effect on retention. 

General SPOEHR. Recruiting as well, sir, I would add. It is a 

tough year, I think, for the Army and other services for recruiting. 

If people see what we are asking of our servicemembers, I think 

they will be less likely to join our service. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Mr. OCHMANEK. Sir, without doubt, an intercontinental ballistic 

missile (ICBM) capability in the hands of the likes of Kim Jong Un 

is a big deal. But the capability to hold at risk U.S. forces, allied 

forces, and the populations of our allies in South Korea and Japan 

with a nuclear weapon already was a game-changer in that scenario. It drives us to—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Were you surprised at the capability that 

Kim Jong Un has developed? 

Mr. OCHMANEK. No, sir. We started gaming the consequences of 

a potentially nuclear-armed North Korea in 2001. We learned a lot 

about the options available to him and the behavior of a leader like 

that under the stress of conflict. We are not optimistic about the 

ability to deter nuclear use once conflict breaks out on the Korean 

Peninsula. 

So it drives us to want capabilities to actually prevent him from 

using those weapons, shooting down the missiles before they leave 

North Korean airspace, killing them on the ground before they can 

be launched. That is going to require some investment and some 

new capabilities. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Mahnken? 

Dr. MAHNKEN. Mr. Chairman, the situation with North Korea, to 

my mind, just is the most recent demonstration of the allure of 

wishful thinking. So I would agree with David Ochmanek. I mean, 

it should not be a surprise that North Korea is where it is now. 

But we have spent decades first imagining that North Korea was 

just going to collapse on its own, then imagining that they would 

not be able to master nuclear weapons, then imagining that they 

would not be able to master the ability to deliver them over longer 

ranges. 

42 

We are where we are, but I think we need to pay attention to 

this allure, which still exists, of wishful thinking, to imagine a 

world as we wish it was, not the world as it is. 

As far as North Korea is concerned, I think we are going to have 

to be more active in deterring North Korea. We are also going to 

need to be more active in reassuring our allies. In the end, that 

may prove to be the more difficult of the two tasks. As we go about 

it—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. After yesterday’s news, I would agree. 

Dr. MAHNKEN. Yes. No, we need to talk to them very forthrightly 

about what their concerns are, what would reassure them, and 

what we can do to help. 

But all through this, I want to go back to priorities and focus. 

We shouldn’t let ourselves get distracted overly by this. North 

Korea is a concern. It is a threat. But it is a less consequential 

threat than the challenges we face from China and from Russia. 

So my view is, again, we start with the biggest threats, and then 

we look. We stress test dealing with North Korea and others in 

that context. 

Chairman MCCAIN. But you would agree that this test has proven that they can hit the United States of America. 

Dr. MAHNKEN. They will seek to derive every benefit from that. 

So the talk of negotiations with the North Koreans now is coming 

more and more onto the table. I could expect all sorts of fallout 

from that. 

They are competing with us. Historically, they have done a pretty good job of it. We need to be aware of that. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I am taking way too much time, but how can 

a country with the 125th largest economy be able to acquire this 

capability and pose a direct threat to the United States of America? 

Dr. MAHNKEN. They are focused, right? Their economy is not focused on the well-being of their people. It is focused on the military. 

North Korea has derived a lot of benefits, historically, from being 

able to threaten its neighbors. It has derived economic benefits, 

food aid, and so forth. So they have every motivation to continue 

this type of behavior, because it is paid off for them in the past. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Jack? 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for your very, very thoughtful and insightful comments. 

One of the issues, I think, that resonates in everything you said 

is a perennial question in Washington: Do budgets drive strategy, 

or does strategy drive budgets? Most times, budgets drive strategy. 

So let’s talk about budgets. 

Dr. Mahnken, stepping back and looking at the unavoidable 

costs, as I like to call them, we are talking about renovating the 

triad. We have to do that. It is not an option. We want to build 

a 355-ship Navy. We have to increase end-strength, because otherwise we are going to have sailors working 100 hours a week and 

other things like that. 

What is the cost of that over a 10-year period, in your view? 

Dr. MAHNKEN. There are various estimates out there, right? But 

I think it is going to—well, there is the cost if we go back to doing 

43 

business as we should, not ruling by continuing resolution, but actually passing budgets. I would say that the American taxpayer’s 

dollar will actually get substantially more—— 

Senator REED. I concur, but what is the rough cost? Let’s say we 

get our act together and we do this. 

Dr. MAHNKEN. It is going to require a sustained commitment, 

sustained increases over—— 

Senator REED. Over a trillion dollars over 10 years? 

Dr. MAHNKEN. I would want to take a closer look at it. But the 

cost is substantial. The cost is substantial. 

We are digging out of a long period of underinvestment. That is 

why I concluded the way I did. It will require the political will. It 

is not an economic issue. It is ultimately an issue of—— 

Senator REED. I concur with you. 

Mr. Ochmanek, what is your estimate for these unavoidable costs 

over a decade? 

Mr. OCHMANEK. Senator Reed, in the Pentagon, planners talked 

about the capability-capacity-readiness triangle. You have to pay 

attention to all three of those things. My colleagues and I at RAND 

have been focused on the capability side, so I cannot talk authoritatively to the bills that need to be paid in readiness and about capacity. 

But on the capability side, to buy the sorts of preferred munitions, ISR platforms, base resiliency, communications sets, et 

cetera, we are talking on the order of $20 to $30 billion a year 

above what we are spending now sustained through the 10 years, 

12 years—— 

Senator REED. So, roughly, just for the portion of capabilities you describe, that is $300 billion, roughly? 

Mr. OCHMANEK. Yes, sir. That order of magnitude. 

Senator REED. Then you add readiness, and you add something else. So we are bumping up pretty quickly to around $1 trillion, 

perhaps. 

Mr. OCHMANEK. It is conceivable. If you want to buy a bigger 

force as well as—— 

Senator REED. Well, I think based on General Spoehr’s comments 

about the readiness issue, recruiting issue, operational issue, I 

think we need a bigger force. 

So what is your ballpark figure, General? 

General SPOEHR. It is absolutely over $1 trillion for the nuclear 

triad plus to get to the 355-ship Navy, sir. 

The only thing I would balance that against is the cost to rebuild 

a city like Kansas City, or something like that, recovering from a 

nuclear strike. 

Then I would echo what General Milley often says, and that is 

that it is a huge cost to fight a war. The only thing more costly 

than that is to fight and to lose. 

Senator REED. So we are talking roughly $1 trillion to get ready, 

and even that might not prevent an enemy from inflicting damage 

upon us. 

Dr. Karlin, quickly, and Ms. Eaglen. 

Dr. KARLIN. I would agree with my fellow panelists. But I might 

urge you to question if we do want to build a bigger force in the 

near term, because of the opportunity costs. A 355-ship Navy would 

44 

be terrific if it is a 355-ship Navy that can fight and win wars. If 

it is very capacity-heavy, can only exert presence, and will not be 

helpful if we have a conflict with China, with Russia, with North 

Korea, I, perhaps, might not prioritize it in the near term. 

Senator REED. Ma’am? 

Ms. EAGLEN. I would agree with the budget assessments and yours, Senator, that it is roughly $1 trillion to restore all three legs 

of the stool, readiness, capacity, capability. If you have to trim 

those costs, the most likely one is people. 

Senator REED. That was good neighborly advice. We are former 

neighbors. 

My rough sense, too, is that if we really are serious about this, and we want strategy to drive our policy, it is about $1 trillion over 

10 years. We cannot avoid it. 

That is why I find it, let me say, ironic that in the next few days we might contemplate borrowing $1.5 trillion to provide tax cuts 

rather than investing—we have to borrow it; we do not have the 

money—$1 trillion for the defense of the United States. Because 

after we put ourselves $1.5 trillion further in the hole, the ability 

of this country and the willingness of people to go again to the 

ATM is going to be severely constrained. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ernst? 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you to our panelists for being here today. This has been 

a very enlightening conversation. 

Mr. Ochmanek, I would like to start with you please, sir. Your 

focus is military force planning and through a traditional defense 

lens. Most analysts have viewed Europe as primarily land-centric 

and the Asia-Pacific as more maritime-centric. However, in recent 

meetings, I had an Army general that told me about the importance of land forces in Asia, as well as a maritime expert discussing naval deficiencies in Europe. 

So in light of that observation, how do we properly posture the 

joint force in these two regions to make sure that our adversaries 

are forced to reckon with us as a multidomain force? 

Mr. OCHMANEK. Senator Ernst, I spent the early part of my career in the Air Force. So if I may, I would offer the view that a 

fight against China is primarily an air-maritime fight; a fight 

against Russia in defending NATO would be an air-land fight. But, 

absolutely, there are roles for naval forces in Europe and roles for 

ground forces in the Pacific. 

Our priorities for posture are as follows. In Europe, you want 

more U.S. heavy forces on the ground near the eastern flank of the 

NATO alliance every day. We have taken some steps in that regard 

with our allies to do that, but more is required. Something like 

three heavy brigades available all the time, as well as artillery in 

place to counter the Russian land forces, would be very appropriate. 

In both theaters, Europe and Asia, we need to pay attention to 

the fact that our air bases and sea bases will be under attack from 

the outset of the conflict. When we fight Iraq, when we fight Serbia, we are used to having our air bases and rear areas in sanctuary. Russia and China will ensure that that is not the case. 

45 

So buying cruise missile defenses, for example, should be a high 

priority for both theaters. Buying fairly prosaic things like runway 

repair assets; shelters for airplanes that are transportable, they are 

called expedient shelters; fuel bladders, so that if they attack our 

fuel tanks, we still have fuel to put in our jets; and positioning preferred munitions forward in hardened storage bunkers. These 

things, again, are not high-tech, but they can make a big difference 

in the survivability and effectiveness of our force in conflict. 

Senator ERNST. Very good. I appreciate that. 

Going back to that eastern flank in Europe, then, I have had conflicting opinions on whether the rotational force that we have there 

now is adequate or whether we need to have a more permanent 

force structure. What would your opinion be? 

Mr. OCHMANEK. Forward-stationing versus rotation is basically a 

question of efficiency. If you forward-base the force permanently, 

you only need to pay for that force, although you have to build 

some infrastructure for it. Rotating the force means having probably two units in reserve to sustain the rotation. 

So on an efficiency basis, generally, if the politics of the region 

permit, and in NATO they do, forward-stationing would be more 

cost-effective. 

Senator ERNST. Okay. Thank you for that opinion. 

Then, Mr. Ochmanek, as well, as chair of the Emerging Threats 

and Capabilities Subcommittee, I have oversight of unconventional 

warfare, and I am particularly concerned about Russia’s activity in 

the gray zone, especially against Ukraine and other allies in Europe’s eastern flank. 

What is your assessment of the United States’ current strategy 

to counter unconventional warfare and the growing security challenges in the gray zone posed by our adversaries like Russia and 

perhaps other near-peer competitors? 

Mr. OCHMANEK. Senator, we are doing a lot with our NATO allies to beef up their, if I can call it that, resilience to gray zone and 

subversion kinds of threats. 

Our special forces work a lot with the special forces of the three 

Baltic States, for example. We have created special cyber units to 

help our allies and partners do a better job of detecting and attributing cyberattacks, and defending against those. 

There is a lot more that can be done, but I know the department 

is cognizant of this sort of threat and is working on a variety of 

ways to counter it. 

Senator ERNST. Absolutely. 

My time is expiring. Thank you very much for being here today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King? 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to follow up on the point that Senator Reed made. 

Each of you testified that the cost over and above the current 

budget to modernize the military and to get us to a place where 

we should be, and we all agree around this table that we should 

be, is around $1 trillion or something over $1 trillion. 

The Senator used the word ‘‘ironic.’’ I use the word ‘‘preposterous’’ that later today or tomorrow, we are going to pass a bill 

that is going to take between a minimum of $1.5 trillion and probVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:00 Aug 08, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\30020 WILDA
46 

ably more like $2.2 trillion once the cuts are extended, which everyone knows they will be, out of the budget, which I believe will 

make it flat impossible to do the work that you are suggesting is 

necessary for us to do. The implications of what we are doing today 

or tomorrow to try to achieve the level of defense of this country 

that you all have told us is absolutely necessary, it just cannot happen. 

So that is not a question. That is an observation. 

I want to move now to the question. I am somewhat astonished 

and disappointed that not a single one of you talked about anything other than military hardware. Defending the national security of the United States involves a continuum, it seems to me, that 

goes from diplomacy to war. War is the most expensive and least 

desirable of those outcomes. 

I think of Afghanistan. Our success there will ultimately depend 

upon the success of the government in Afghanistan to gain the confidence of its people. 

In Iraq, the relationship between the Government of Iraq and the 

Kurds and the Sunni population is going to determine whether 

Iraq, ultimately, is a successful state. 

North Korea, the solution to North Korea lies through diplomacy 

with China. I think everyone appreciates and understands that. 

The reason Iran is not North Korea today is because of the Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that was passed 2 years 

ago. Otherwise we would be, according to the intelligence services, 

we would be dealing with an Iran with a nuclear weapon today, 

about 2 years from when we passed that bill. 

Israel, Palestine, a major flashpoint in terms of conflict in the 

Middle East, is all about diplomacy. 

Don’t we have to talk about that as part of a National Defense 

Strategy? This is the tyranny—we are the Armed Services Committee, and we have a Foreign Affairs, Foreign Relations Committee. But that is part of the strategy. I am very disappointed 

that that is not part of the discussion. 

Dr. Karlin, talk to me about this. 

Right now, by the way, under the current dispensation, this part 

of the strategy—that is, diplomacy—is being drastically downgraded. Budgets cut at the State Department. We do not have an 

Ambassador to South Korea, for example, or even a nominee. 

Dr. Karlin, talk to me about this problem. 

Dr. KARLIN. Sir, unfortunately, you are spot on. 

When you look at the senior diplomats who have left the State 

Department in the last year, it is almost equal to about 30 percent 

of the U.S. general officer or flag officer corps. I suspect if about 

30 percent of the general officers or flag officers left, this committee 

would be having a set of really serious hearings. Unfortunately, 

that is not just a today problem. That is a real future problem. 

I also suspect that if you asked most of us, as much as we want 

more money for defense, we would be delighted if that could go to 

the State Department. What will probably keep happening is that 

we will see an increased neutering of the State Department and of 

diplomacy more broadly. 

47 

Senator KING. By the way, what is going on now with people 

leaving and being driven out, I understand it is already reflecting 

itself in people who are applying for the Foreign Service. 

Dr. KARLIN. Yes. 

Senator KING. Applications are down something like 30 percent. 

Dr. KARLIN. Indeed. I think it was actually about 50 percent. It 

is pretty substantial. So this has really long-ranging consequences 

for the future of American national security. 

As you know, no one takes these jobs for the money. They take 

these jobs because they want to help make the world better. If they 

do not see that opportunity, they will go do something else. 

So it is really profoundly worrying across-the-board. I think a lot 

of us are not really terribly sure what to do about it. 

But what will likely happen is, you will see the State Department get increasingly neutered. Everyone will turn to the Pentagon 

and ask the military to fill those roles. The military will salute, 

and they will try to fill those roles. But they are not as capable to 

do so. 

Moreover, there will be a real opportunity cost. Because they will 

not actually be focused on fighting and winning wars or preparing 

for the future. They will be trying to be pseudo-diplomats. 

Senator KING. Dr. Mahnken, do you have a thought on this 

point? 

Dr. MAHNKEN. Diplomacy is undoubtedly important. 

Senator KING. It is not undoubtedly important. It is important. 

Dr. MAHNKEN. I had the pleasure of working for a Secretary of 

Defense who worked very hard to increase the size of the State Department. 

However, diplomacy is much more effective when it is backed by 

credible military power. Nor can diplomacy be a substitute for the 

military. 

Senator KING. I am certainly not asserting that. 

Dr. MAHNKEN. Yes. 

Senator KING. But what I am asserting is that, if you have two 

pieces here, we are talking about strengthening one while the other 

is atrophying before our eyes. I think that is a serious national security concern. 

Dr. MAHNKEN. I would agree. I think, unfortunately, it has been 

a long-term trend across administrations, both in terms of funding 

of the State Department and attracting the best and the brightest. 

I think it is an issue that needs to be addressed. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Peters? 

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to each of our witnesses today. 

Again, really thoughtful testimony. I appreciate the discussion. I 

want to get into a little more discussion on an area that I think 

there is some disagreement on the panel. 

But before I do that, I want to concur with my colleagues who 

have already spoken about the cost of doing what is going to be 

necessary to secure the future of this country. I hope that every 

one of the members of the Armed Services Committee really takes 

to heart what he or she heard today, that we may be talking about 

48 

a $1 trillion additional investment. A vote taken later today or tomorrow that cuts $1.4 trillion or more, depending on what number 

you look at, is fundamentally inconsistent with what we heard 

today. 

So I am hoping every member of this committee, in particular, 

will understand where we are. 

We obviously face significant current threats, which all of you 

have articulated very clearly. But there are also future threats that 

are going to evolve. One thing that really stuck with me in talking 

with Secretary Mattis was he was very clear that he believed his 

success on the battlefield was really as a result of decisions that 

were made 10 years prior to when he was engaged in that role. We 

need to be thinking forward as to what that world is going to look 

like in 10 years. 

We know that we are probably on the cusp of one of the most 

exciting and perhaps frightening both times of human history in 

terms of technological advances that are coming very, very rapidly. 

In my home State with automation and self-driving cars, a couple years ago, people thought it was fantasy. It is going to be reality very soon, which will transform the auto industry in every 

way as big as when the first car came off the assembly line. It is 

going to have implications, through artificial intelligence (AI), of 

every single industry you can possibly imagine. 

You have nanotechnology. We have synthetic biology. We have 

additive manufacturing. 

The only thing we know for sure is, 10 years from now, this 

world will look dramatically different than it does today. That 

means the future of warfare is likely to also look dramatically different than it does today. 

So I have heard a couple folks say that we shouldn’t be looking 

at AI and some of these other technologies, so I am going to want 

some clarification on that because, as Ms. Eaglen said, everything 

seems to happen quicker than people anticipate. 

We had AI recently beat the international Go champion. That 

sounds kind of trivial, but it is a game that was thought to be 

uniquely human, and it would be at least a decade before AI would 

have the capability of doing that. It did it. 

AI systems are now creating encryption systems on their own. 

I mean, this is incredibly fascinating. But it is certainly one that 

we have to be ahead of the curve, because other countries are doing 

it. 

So, Ms. Karlin, my first question to you, because you brought up 

how we have to be particularly leaning forward when it comes to 

exploiting these technologies and concerned about our adversaries, 

will you tell me why it is important that we lean in, in AI and 

these technologies, and we have to be thinking about that, too? 

Dr. KARLIN. Absolutely, sir. We should lean in because there will 

be opportunities in that field, but above all, our adversaries and 

competitors are also pursuing them rigorously. So we need to know, 

if we engage in a potential conflict in the future with countries like 

Russia or China, they are going full steam ahead in the AI field. 

In fact, there was a piece in the New York Times recently about 

how China is really planning to dominate that field in about 10 

49 

years. So if we are not thinking about the opportunities it offers 

us, we need to know what challenges it will also present. 

Senator PETERS. Thank you. 

General and Mr. Ochmanek, I think you both mentioned in your 

testimony, correct me if I’m wrong, these kind of trends are a fad 

now to talk about. AI, we shouldn’t be talking about that. If you 

would just tell me more about what your thinking is, that would 

be very helpful. 

General SPOEHR. Yes, sir. I mean, I do not mean to imply that 

AI and things like that are not important, and they are, and we 

need to keep up with the technology. But they cannot substitute for 

a ready and capable force. 

So for example, you can have all the artificial intelligence and 

swarms of mini-drones, but it does not replace, for example, a soldier on a street corner in a contested city or a destroyer on-station 

in the South China Sea. You cannot substitute high-end technology 

for presence and the ability to deter on-station. 

Senator PETERS. I would say, I do not know if anyone is arguing 

that we have a substitute. It is an understanding that it leverages 

it. In fact, AI systems working with a soldier on that street corner 

can be incredibly powerful. 

So we have to do both, is my understanding. 

Mr. Ochmanek, I know you mentioned it as well in your testimony. 

Mr. OCHMANEK. Yes. Thank you, Senator, for the opportunity to 

clarify that. 

My point was that we need not and should not wait for the maturation of exotic Third Offset technologies to begin filling serious 

gaps in our capabilities today. We have to, of course, continue to 

invest in that Research and Development (R&D) and those future 

systems, but at the same time, there are mature technologies, 

available systems today, that can go a long way toward addressing 

the threats that we face. 

I would hate to see us again delay needed investments now while 

we wait for this next generation of capability. 

Thank you. 

Senator PETERS. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to each of you for being here. 

Let me just echo the concerns that have been raised by my colleagues about what passing this tax bill will do to our ability to 

deal with so many other priorities that we have in this country, 

particularly defense. I think it is a nonstarter to think we are going 

to pass a $1.5 trillion tax bill and have another $1 trillion in the 

next 10 years for defense. So I think several of you have said we 

are trying to define the world the way we want it to look. Well, I 

think that is a situation of defining the world the way we want it 

to look, as opposed to the way it is. 

I very much appreciated you, Dr. Karlin, and I think it was, I 

am not sure, maybe Mr. Ochmanek, who talked about the need to 

prioritize what we are doing. Part of a strategy is saying there are 

some things we can do and some things that we cannot do. 

50 

I found it distressing to hear most of you continue to talk about, 

or as I understood your testimony, to talk about conflict in the future the way we have looked at conflict in the past. While you 

pointed out that there were going to be differences in terms of what 

you are suggesting we need to do through the Department of Defense, it did not sound like major differences in terms of what we 

ought to be thinking. 

Mr. Ochmanek, I think you were the first person to talk about 

the importance of information and cyber. As I look at what we are 

facing in the future and think about how we have seen warfare 

change through Russia and China and Iran and the terrorist 

groups, our ability to compete on information and cyber has been 

woefully lacking. We do not seem to have, notwithstanding what is 

in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that we have 

passed, to begin to address that. 

We do not seem to have a strategy in either of these areas that 

is comprehensive, that is cross-government, that has everybody 

pulling at the same rate. 

So I wonder, Mr. Ochmanek, you talked about special cyber 

units. I am not aware that we have special cyber units. So maybe 

you could delineate that a little bit and tell us more about those 

special cyber units. 

Mr. OCHMANEK. I would be happy to, Senator. I am not an expert 

in cyber, but I am aware that, some years ago, we started creating 

small teams of cyber experts that both work here in the United 

States and deploy abroad to work hand-in-glove with partners. This 

includes actual day-to-day operations on their nets, to monitor traffic coming in, teach techniques about how to attribute the source 

of attacks, which, of course, is very important to how you respond, 

and also how to use cyber as a tool to enable other military operations. 

That is about as much as I can share with you in this forum. But 

there is a lot of activity going on here and with our allies abroad 

in that area. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, I appreciate that. But I will tell you, we 

have had people before this committee, and I have had the chance 

to ask the question about who is in charge of those operations, and 

I have not been able to get anybody so far to tell me who is in 

charge. 

Do you know the answer to that? 

Mr. OCHMANEK. I would not speculate on it. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Does anybody else know the answer to that? 

General SPOEHR. The commander of USCYBERCOM, Senator. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, in fact, I was told that is not where the 

center is. If you would look at, government-wide, how we are responding to cyber threats and disinformation, that is not where 

that command is placed. 

General SPOEHR. I would agree. For the whole-of-government, 

U.S. Federal response, he is not in charge of that aspect. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Do you know who is? 

General SPOEHR. Other than the President, ma’am, I do not. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I think that is exactly right. We do not have 

someone who is in charge. Yet we are dealing with, as you all point 

out, not just regional threats, terrorist groups, but nation-states 

51 

who are superpowers, again, where they have made a major focus 

in these two areas, and we are not on the playing field, at this 

point. 

So I would hope, as you are making recommendations about 

what we need to be looking at in a National Defense Strategy, that 

they should be major pieces of that National Defense Strategy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Warren? 

Senator WARREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to our witnesses for being here today for this important topic. 

There has been a lot of debate about the relationship between 

the budget and the strategy, whether we should have a budgetdriven strategy or a strategy-driven budget. But I think it is not 

just about how much money we spend, but how we spend that 

money. According to many estimates, the Russians spend about $70 billion annually on their defense budget. That means they are spending about one-tenth of what this committee authorized for the Pentagon in 2018. But they have parlayed their investment into a 

whole lot of disruption all around the world, and one way they 

have done that is through leveraging asymmetric power. Things 

like gray zone warfare in the Crimea, cyberattacks on elections 

here in the United States. 

Similarly, the Chinese have invested in areas where they believe 

they have a relative advantage, areas like space or anti-access/area 

denial. 

So, Dr. Karlin, I want to ask, how should any new defense strategy take into account these kinds of asymmetric investments, both 

at the low end and the high end of the spectrum? 

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you for that question. 

If I might first start with your point on the Russians, one thing 

to recall is that the Russians do not have to think globally the way 

that the United States does. That is part of why things get a little 

more complicated. 

Senator WARREN. Fair enough, but let me just point out, they are 

having an impact globally. 

Dr. KARLIN. Quite profoundly, indeed. I mean, when we look at 

them going into Syria, I do not think that had been in anyone’s 

paradigm, that a country would actually want to become involved 

militarily in what was occurring in Syria. As you know, ma’am, the 

options changed considerably the minute they started to do so. 

So in terms of thinking about asymmetric warfare, I think the 

Defense Department has very much put it on the priority list in recent years. 

The irony is, from a Russian and Chinese perspective, we actually conduct gray zone warfare all the time. What they see as our 

use of special operations forces, what they see as our use of drone 

strikes, what they see even as the U.S. free media is all considered 

gray zone warfare, which is, of course, ironic since I suspect none 

of us would actually put any of those efforts into that category. 

So gray zone warfare as the Russian and as the Chinese think 

about it does not play to our comparative advantage. The U.S. military operates legally. The U.S. military will use its members in 

52 

uniform. We will not have them go out and become like little green 

men the way the Russians will. That is something we should be 

proud of, in terms of how we operate. 

So as I think about how we can be more effective, it comes more 

down to how we are managing the force rather than developing the 

force. We do not need a whole lot of new whiz-bang gizmos to actually compete well. What we need to do is do more snap exercises. 

We need to take steps to show that, at any time, the U.S. military 

can get anywhere and anyplace, to remind countries like Russia 

and China that the U.S. military is preeminent. 

Senator WARREN. So I am a little frustrated with this. Even if 

Congress provided a $700 billion budget tomorrow, it would be several years before the Navy reached 355 ships or DOD could deploy 

2,000 F–35 fighter jets. Let’s face it, in the short term, the U.S. will 

be operating with something like our current size and structure. 

This is important to acknowledge, because the services’ readiness 

challenges, like the recent collisions in the Seventh Fleet, indicate 

that after 16 years of combat, we may currently be badly overstretched. 

So, Dr. Karlin, in your previous role at the Pentagon, you were 

responsible for helping make the tradeoffs across the services 

among the geographic commands and between the near-term and 

long-term investments. So I do not want to just hear that we need 

to prioritize. 

What I am trying to ask is a more systemic question. That is, 

how do we go about this process of prioritizing, of assessing risk, 

and making tradeoffs in a disciplined way? 

Dr. KARLIN. Absolutely. I would urge the committee to have a 

classified hearing with those who are working on the National Defense Strategy about what the force-planning construct says, because that is exactly what the process is. What happens is the department tries to assess what the future looks like. Based on that, 

it looks at the conflicts that are most worrisome in that future, and 

you can imagine what those are. 

Based on those conflicts, it says, across the entire department, 

‘‘Combatant command services, how do you fight that conflict? 

What do we do?’’ Then it has to adjudicate, and that involves a lot 

of betting and hedging, because we will probably call it wrong, as 

we often do, and then try to put money toward that situation. That 

ends up being a rather significant negotiated process, where, to 

placate some corners, perhaps some will win, and some will not 

lose as much as they need to. 

This is also, as I said earlier, I think the committee needs to 

have—you know, one of the great decisions of this committee recently was to make the National Defense Strategy classified. That 

will allow a serious conversation about who wins and who loses, 

and why those occurred. 

Senator WARREN. I just have to say, when we are talking about 

words like ‘‘strategic decisions,’’ hearing you answer with a word 

like ‘‘placate’’ makes me very uneasy. 

I just want to underline that I think we need to be focused on 

not just the inputs, the number of ships or marines or aircraft, but 

also on the outputs, the goals we are trying to achieve with the 

force we have. I think that means thinking creatively and expandVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:00 Aug 08, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\30020 WILDA
53 

ing our own use of asymmetric tactics and leveraging our 21st century technologies here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe? 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I had to be at another meeting, so I did not get in all the opening 

statements, and I did not hear all the questions. 

But to me, I think we ought to, just in my narrow view, what 

we need to be talking about right now is what happened last Tuesday. 

I think most people here know who James Woolsey is. You may 

not know. He is from my City of Tulsa, Oklahoma, and we have 

been good friends for a long time. He said way back in 1993, this 

is a quote that he made, he said, ‘‘We have slain a large dragon,’’ 

the Soviet Union, ‘‘but we live now in a jungle with a bewildering 

variety of poisonous snakes.’’ That was his quote. 

He said, the most vexing of those poisonous snakes has proven 

to be North Korea—this is 1993—and despite China and Russia 

representing the greatest threats to military supremacy, many experts have agreed with me that North Korea is the most imminent 

threat. 

I understand that Dr. Mahnken, perhaps, did not agree with this 

when this statement came out. 

But David Wright said, and this was pretty well-publicized, on 

Tuesday afternoon—he is an analyst in the Union of Concerned 

Scientists. He wrote that Tuesday’s test indicates that, ‘‘Such a 

missile would have more than enough 

range to reach Washington, D.C., and, in fact, any part of the 

continental United States.’’ Then, of course, you heard the statements by General Mattis. 

So I consider this to be—it is going to have to really be addressed 

in a very heavy way. I would say, other than the statement that 

was made by Dr. Mahnken, the rest of you, do you pretty much 

agree that, in terms of imminent threat, [North Korea] would be 

the most imminent threat right now? 

Is that yes for you guys? Okay, thank you. 

Dr. MAHNKEN. Senator, I would actually also agree with that 

statement. 

Senator INHOFE. Would you? 

Dr. MAHNKEN. In terms of imminent, yes. The point that I made 

earlier was about most consequential over the long term. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay, well, this is an imminent threat, and that 

is why I wanted to word it that way. 

I would like to ask each one of you, should this be included in 

our strategic framework of the new National Defense Strategy? If 

so, how? 

Let’s go ahead and start with you. 

Dr. MAHNKEN. In my view, we should really start by looking at 

the challenges that we face from great-power competitors, from 

Russia and China. We should figure out the force requirements 

there. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. 

Dr. MAHNKEN. Then what we should do is stress test that force 

posture against threats like North Korea. It very well may be that 

54 

you would have some special requirements that would come out for 

having to deter North Korea that might not emerge from the previous case. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay, I am running out of time here. 

Just kind of a quick answer and ideas you might have. 

Mr. OCHMANEK. Yes, sir. North Korea absolutely needs to be a 

consideration in our National Defense Strategy, and we should 

focus our efforts in dealing with it on improving our capabilities to 

actually prevent them from using and delivering a nuclear weapon, 

specifically with a ballistic missile. 

Senator INHOFE. General? 

General SPOEHR. Sir, I would say that the National Defense 

Strategy does not have the luxury of having a single threat like a 

great power. It is going to have to consider terrorism, rogue nations 

such as North Korea and Iran, and the smaller threats from terrorism. So, yes, I think you are right. It has to consider these 

threats. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. Any other comments? 

Dr. KARLIN. Absolutely, sir. It has for years. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. Very good. 

The other thing, and I might go just a little bit over here. It is 

no secret that our readiness has eroded over the past 8 years. 

Budget cuts, sequestration, we have had a lot of meetings on this 

of this committee, and the idea that our President had a policy that 

he did not want to put anything in that would take care of sequestration in the military unless you put an equal amount in other 

programs, which I disagreed with, a lot of people on this committee 

did agree with that. 

But how would you prioritize the capability gaps confronting the 

military when compared to Russia and China? The Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs, General Dunford, said, in just a few years, if we 

do not change our trajectory, we will lose our qualitative and quantitative competitive advantage. That is a very disturbing statement. 

Any comments, in this remaining time, that you would make concerning prioritizing that capability gap when we are looking at the 

somewhat starvation period we went through at the same time of 

the very ambitious programs of both Russia and China. 

Senator INHOFE. Start with Ms. Eaglen. 

Ms. EAGLEN. Yes, sir. I would step back for a moment and offer 

some principles, because there is no doubt we are depending on the 

capability set or even the domain. It is differing by service and domain. But I would just get back to Senator Warren’s comments 

that mass and attrition are back as force-planning principles. I 

think we need to consider that when we are looking at our capability gaps against China and Russia, in particular. 

Then we are on the wrong side of the cost exchange ratio. This 

is something Dr. Mahnken has written about with the NDS in 

2008. It is something we have all thought about up here on the 

committee. 

But those were two fundamental principles I would return to the 

defense strategy to address your question. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. Any other comments on that? 

55 

Dr. KARLIN. To the extent possible, we should double down on 

areas of strength like undersea. That is particularly valuable visa-vis China and Russia. Our ability to conduct long-range strike, 

our short-range air defenses, balancing our Air Force more broadly, 

being cognizant that we are not going to have all the F–35s one 

might want, instead being able to mature fourth-generation aircraft, missile defense also being critical. 

But in particular, we do need to recognize that the conflicts of 

the future are going to be uglier than what we faced in the last 

15 or so years. While we have thought about Iraq and Afghanistan 

as big conflicts in some way, they are really not, when we begin 

to envision what a potential war with Russia or China might look 

like. 

Senator INHOFE. I cannot think of anything uglier than an ICBM 

coming. 

My time has expired. But I want to compliment you, General, on 

a statement that you made. It is one sentence. I will read it. ‘‘This 

is the situation we find ourselves in today with the smallest military we have had in 75 years equipped with rapidly aging weapons 

and employed at a very high operational pace, endeavoring to satisfy our global defense objectives.’’ Good statement. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Blumenthal? 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here today. Let me begin by joining a 

number of my colleagues in expressing regret, I guess is the understatement of the morning, about the tax 

plan that the United States Senate may approve in the next 24 

hours, which would increase our debt astronomically and probably 

undercut most of the very insightful suggestions that you have 

made. 

I am reminded that a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, I think it was Mike Mullen, said that the greatest threat to 

our national security is our national debt. The greatest threat to 

our national security is our national debt. 

It has implications across the spectrum of American life that undermine our will to defend ourselves and to invest the kinds of resources that are necessary to build a national defense that is worthy of the greatest Nation in the history of the world. 

The national debt is not about just numbers, it is about faces, 

General, the young men and women who we recruit to serve and 

sacrifice for our Nation. You know better than any of us who are 

in the room today, except perhaps for the chairman and the ranking member who have served with such distinction in our armed 

services. So to the extent that you have a voice in this process, I 

would urge you to use it and hope that you will. 

There has been very little mention of the attack by Russia on the 

United States of America. 

Is there anyone on this panel who questions that Russia attacked 

the United States, in fact, attacked our elections and our democracy in 2016? 

I take it by your silence that you agree. In fact, of course, the 

intelligence community is unanimous on that point. 

56 

I would wonder whether anyone on this panel believes that we 

have responded sufficiently to make Russia pay a price for that aggression, a real attack on our democracy. Have we made Russia 

pay a price for that attack? 

Again, I would take it that you all agree that the answer is no. 

In fact, this administration, in my view, has failed to oppose, condemn, or hold Russian President Vladimir Putin accountable for 

that attack, or the invasion of Ukraine, or intervention in Syria. 

The lack of an articulated, clear strategy on Russia belies the 

commitment of blood and treasure, as the United States is doing 

now in so many parts of the world without sufficient resources. In 

fact, General Waldhauser of AFRICOM came to testify before us in 

March of this year and said, ‘‘Only approximately 20 to 30 percent 

of Africa Command’s ISR requirements are met,’’ referring to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. 

We are failing to support right now, not 10 years from now, but 

right now, the troops that we have deployed around the world. 

In my view, the investment of cyber—Senator Shaheen referred 

to it in terms of the command. But is there anybody on this panel 

who feels that we are investing sufficiently in cyber right now? 

Again, I take it that your silence indicates you agree, we are in- sufficiently investing in cyber where $1 trillion is unnecessary to 

have an impact. Far less dollars are necessary to defend against 

the kinds of threats that we see in cyber, including most prominently from Russia, China, and North Korea, but all kinds of asymmetric threats as well. 

So my time is expiring. But we have focused on the dollars necessary, the dollars versus the strategy. I would suggest that a 

much more focused and deliberate strategy is necessary in many 

parts of the world and in many parts of our defense. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I thank the Senator. Could I just point out 

that when you are having your enlisted people working 100-hour 

workweeks, you cannot dismiss that, and I am sure that you are 

clearly aware of that. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I am not only aware, Mr. Chairman, but 

I very much support the comments that you made about it. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I thank you. 

Anything else? Anyone would like to correct the record? 

Well, this has been very helpful, this hearing. I thank all the witnesses. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:12 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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