J-A15035-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

VINCULUM, INC 

Appellant

v.

GOLI TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2048 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment Entered September 22, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s): 

No. 2015-06333

VINCULUM, INC

v.

GOLI TECHNOLOGIES, LLC 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2127 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment Entered September 22, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s): 

No. 2015-06333

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 29, 2021

Vinculum, Inc. (“Vinculum”), Appellant/Cross-Appellee, and Goli 

Technologies, LLC (“Goli”),

1 Appellee/Cross-Appellant, appeal from the 

Judgment entered in favor of Vinculum for $32,145, and in favor of Goli for 

____________________________________________

1 Nagavardha Goli (“Mr. Goli”) and his wife are the co-owners of Goli. N.T., 

7/6/20, at 12-13. 
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$42,525, on its counterclaim, resulting in a net award for Goli in the amount 

of $10,380. We affirm.

The trial court set forth the following background underlying this appeal:

Vinculum and Goli [] are both IT consulting companies. 

Both parties hire computer software professionals, send those 

individuals to companies and government agencies in need of such 

work, and retain a portion of the contractor’s wages. On 

December 16, 2014, the parties entered into a consulting and 

non-competition agreement (hereinafter the “Consulting

Agreement”).

Under the Consulting Agreement, Goli [] agreed to abide by 

a non-solicitation clause under which, “Vendor [Goli] and 

Consultant [“Mr. Goli”] agree not to solicit or conduct business at 

Vinculum’s Client[, Computer Aid, Inc./Pennsylvania Department 

of Transportation (“PennDOT”),] for a period of one (1) year from 

termination of this contract.” Under the Consulting Agreement, 

for a period of about one year, Goli[,] [] through Vinculum[,]

worked full time as a software architect for PennDOT. At the end 

of December 2015, Mr. Goli and Goli [] decided to leave 

Vinculum’s employ and began working for PennDOT.

Shortly thereafter, Vinculum withheld $42,525 in 

outstanding wages from Mr. Goli and Goli [], filed suit, and moved 

for a preliminary injunction to prohibit Mr. Goli and Goli [] from 

working for PennDOT. Goli [] subsequently filed a counterclaim 

seeking recovery of the unpaid wages. Vinculum’s request for a 

preliminary injunction was denied by this [c]ourt on March 28, 

2016.

Following the denial of the preliminary injunction, Goli []

continued working for PennDOT. About four years later, after the 

close of discovery, Goli [] moved for partial summary judgment. 

In response to the arguments raised, the [c]ourt denied the 

[M]otion on December 19, 2019. A bench trial was held on July 

6, 2020, to rule on both Vinculum and [Goli’s] claims. At the 

conclusion of the bench trial, this [c]ourt found that the 

[Consulting Agreement] between Vinculum and Goli [] was 

enforceable. As a result of [Goli’s] breach, Vinculum was entitled 

to $32,145 (the amount it would have received had Goli [] been 
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employed for a one[-]year period through Vinculum). Regarding 

the counterclaim, this [c]ourt found that Vinculum owed Goli []

$42,525, less the $32,145. Therefore, the net verdict of this 

[c]ourt was that Vinculum owed Goli [] $10,380. Following the 

entry of the verdict, both parties filed Motions for Post-Trial Relief

and [the trial court] denied both Motions and [J]udgment was 

entered on the verdict....

Trial Court Opinion, 12/22/20, at 1-2. Thereafter, both parties filed timely 

Notices of Appeal, followed by court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise 

Statements of Matters complained of on appeal. This Court subsequently 

consolidated the appeals, designating Vinculum as the lead appellant.

Vinculum presents the following questions for our review:

1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law by 

finding that [Vinculum] proved the elements of its claim for 

breach of contract, and yet refusing to enforce the injunctive 

relief stipulated in the parties’ [Consulting Agreement]?

2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law by 

finding that [Vinculum] proved the elements of its claim for 

breach of contract, and yet refusing to enforce the 

nondiscretionary attorney’s fees provision in the [Consulting 

Agreement]?

3. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law by 

applying case law which addressed employee restrictive 

covenants, whereas [Goli] was not an employee, but a 

competing company?

4. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law by 

refusing to enforce the contractual injunctive relief clause 

where (a) the elements of injunctive relief were satisfied 

through the evidence at trial[;] (b) an injunction was 

appropriate because damages were impossible to 

calculate[;] (c) an injunction was appropriate because [Goli] 

concealed info[rmation] that would have made damages 

calculable[;] (d) an injunction would not deprive [Goli] of 

[the] right to work at PennDOT, through [Vinculum;] (e) an 

injunction would not deprive [Goli] of its right to place 
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consultants at PennDOT under the parties’ contract[;] (f) an 

injunction would not deprive [Goli] of the right to work or 

compete anywhere else in the world, except for PennDOT;

(g) an injunction would not deprive [Goli] of [the] right to 

place IT consultants anywhere else in the world, including 

other Pennsylvania state agencies[;] and (h) an injunction 

was the only remedy capable of deterring [Goli’s] willful 

contractual breach?[2]

5. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law by 

sustaining [Goli’s] objections to questions at trial concerning

profits beyond one-year post-breach, and thereby imposing 

an arbitrary one-year limitation on [Vinculum’s] damages?

6. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law by not 

drawing an adverse inference from [Goli’s] admissions at 

trial that it (a) concealed consulting agreements it used to 

compete with [Vinculum] at PennDOT, and (b) copied the 

agreements from [Vinculum]?

7. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law by 

denying [Vinculum’s] Motion to Strike Deposition 

Objections, which was filed to obtain discovery concerning 

the extent of [Goli’s] profits arising from the breach?

Brief for Appellant at 2-3 (footnote added).

Goli presents the following questions for our review:

1. Was [the Consulting Agreement] reasonably related to the 

protection of a legitimate business interest?

2. Should Vinculum be awarded damages for [Goli’s] violation 

of its non-competition agreement, when Vinculum has failed 

to prove that the profits obtained by Goli [] during the noncompetition period would have otherwise been obtained by 

Vinculum but for [Goli’s] breach?

____________________________________________

2 Although Vinculum included this issue in its Statement of Questions Involved, 

there is no corresponding argument section discussing this question in its 

brief. It appears the issue was subsumed into Vinculum’s first issue.
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3. On [Goli’s] successful counterclaim for breach of contract, 

was pre-judgment interest awardable as of right?

Brief for Appellee at 5. 

Preliminarily, we set forth the relevant clause of the Consulting 

Agreement containing the non-compete agreement:

10. SOLICITATION AND NON-COMPETITION: [Goli] and [Mr. 

Goli] agree not to solicit or conduct business at Vinculum’s Client 

for a period of one (1) year from termination of this contract. 

Violation of this covenant will result in legal action to prohibit such 

solicitation and[/]or conducting of business. The stipulations in 

this paragraph will survive the termination of this agreement. 

[Goli] agrees that the Client [PennDOT] revealed in Addendum 

Exhibit A, Individual Work Order, or any client introduced by 

Vinculum to [Goli] or [Goli’s] consultant is a client of Vinculum. 

Once the name of the Client is revealed to [Goli], and for a period 

of one (1) year thereafter, whether or not the services of [Goli]

are engaged by Vinculum, it shall not compete with Vinculum in 

any manner, either directly or indirectly, through any other vendor 

or company, whether for compensation or otherwise, or assist any 

other person or entity to compete with Vinculum with this client 

or any other Client so revealed to [Goli] with which Vinculum does 

business.

Should [Goli] breach any of the covenants of solicitation and noncompetition, Vinculum shall have the right to immediately 

terminate this agreement and to seek legal and/or equitable relief, 

including injunctive relief against [Goli]. [Goli] understands and 

acknowledges that a breach of this covenant would cause 

substantial harm to Vinculum, which would be difficult to calculate. 

Therefore, as liquidated damages, and not a penalty, [Goli] agrees 

to pay Vinculum as decided by a court of [l]aw for each violation 

in addition to all damages, costs, including court costs and 

reasonable attorney fees incurred by Vinculum in enforcing the 

provisions of this Agreement. [Goli] further agrees and authorizes 

Vinculum to withhold payment up to the damages incurred in case 

of any violation by [Goli] or [Mr. Goli]. It is the intention of the 

parties that if any court construes any of these covenants or any 

portion thereof to be illegal[,] void or unenforceable because of its 

duration or scope, such court shall reduce the duration or scope 
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of the covenant or provision, and [in] its reduced form, the 

covenant or provision shall be enforced.

[Goli] agrees that [] [Mr. Goli] [] will represent only Vinculum and 

[Mr. Goli] will not disclose [Goli’s] company name, pay rate to the

Client and any other consultant per this clause.

Consulting Agreement, 12/16/14, at 2-3.

In its first issue, Vinculum argues that the trial court erred when it 

denied its request for injunctive relief, where Vinculum proved that Goli had 

breached the Consulting Agreement.3 Brief for Appellant at 13. Vinculum 

claims, without citation to the record, that Goli breached the Consulting 

Agreement by placing Mr. Goli and a second consultant at PennDOT. Id. 

According to Vinculum, the trial court’s failure to grant the injunction has 

“granted a license to any company willing to pay a small price for intentionally 

flouting its own commitment.” Id.

Goli counters that the trial court properly denied Vinculum’s request for 

a preliminary injunction. Brief for Appellee at 40. Goli asserts that, pursuant 

to the terms of the Consulting Agreement, the right to injunctive relief had 

expired before Vinculum filed the instant action. Id. at 41 (citing Hayes v. 

Altman, 266 A.2d 269, 271 (Pa. 1970) (holding that “[a]n injunction will not 

be granted to enforce a restrictive covenant when the restrictive period has 

____________________________________________

3 We note that Vinculum cites no Pennsylvania case law in support of its claim. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring discussion and citation of authorities 

deemed pertinent). Vinculum also fails to address the fact that the noncompete clause of the Consulting Agreement expired one year after the 

termination of the Consulting Agreement. 
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by its terms expired.”)). Goli points to the language in the Consulting 

Agreement, which barred Goli from soliciting or conducting business for a 

period of one year from the termination of the Consulting Agreement. Id. at 

43 (citing Section 10 of the Consulting Agreement). Goli asserts that the trial 

court’s finding that the Consulting Agreement terminated at the end of 

December 2015 was amply supported by the record. Id. (citing N.T., 7/6/20, 

at 45-46). Thus, Goli contends that the period of non-competition ended in 

December 2016. Id. Goli further claims that pursuant to Hayes, Vinculum’s

remedy for breach of the covenant lies in an action for damages, not injunctive 

relief in the form of specific performance. Id. 

“Appellate review of the grant or denial of a permanent injunction is 

limited to whether the trial court committed an error of law. In reviewing a 

question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is 

plenary.” Wellspan Health v. Bayliss, 869 A.2d 990, 995-96 (Pa. Super. 

2005). Moreover, restrictive covenants in an employment agreement should 

be strictly construed. Harry Blackwood Inc. v. Caputo, 434 A.2d 169, 170 

(Pa. Super. 1981).

In this case, the trial court determined that the one-year period set forth 

in the Consulting Agreement expired after January 2017; therefore, Vinculum 

was not entitled to an injunction. Trial Court Opinion, 12/22/20, at 5 (citing 

Davis v. Buckham, 421 A.2d 427, 431 (Pa. Super. 1980)). In Davis, the 

covenant not to compete applied for a period of five years, in a specific 
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geographical area, if the appellant left the physical therapy practice group of 

which he was a member. Davis, 421 at 429. The appellant in that case left 

the group in 1970 and violated the non-compete agreement. Id. The 

appellees became aware of the breach in 1974 and brought suit in equity 

seeking to enjoin the appellant from practicing. Id. Following a hearing 

which took place in 1977, the chancellor entered a decree nisi and adjudication

in 1978, and inter alia, entered an order enjoining the appellant from engaging 

in the practice of physical therapy in the restricted area for a period of five 

years following the entry of the decree nisi. Id. 

On appeal, this Court concluded that the chancellor erred because “[a]n 

injunction will not be granted to enforce a restrictive covenant when the 

restrictive period has by its terms expired.” Id. at 431 (quoting Hayes v. 

Altman, 266 A.2d 269, 271 (Pa. 1970)). This Court explained that, by 

enjoining the appellant from practicing for five years after the entry of the 

decree, the chancellor essentially extended the covenant not to compete from 

a five-year term to a thirteen-year term. Id. This Court further noted that 

by doing so, the chancellor went against the norm of courts interpreting the 

terms of restrictive covenants narrowly, and instead erroneously expanded 

the terms of the covenant. Id. at 432. 
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In the instant case, the covenant not to compete was limited to one year 

after December 2015, when Goli left Vinculum. N.T., 7/6/20, at 40.4 Given 

that the noncompete portion of the Consulting Agreement was limited to a 

single year, the effective period ended in December 2016. Thus, to extend 

injunctive relief beyond that time period would be an improper expansion of 

the terms of the noncompete agreement. We therefore conclude that the trial 

court properly refused to grant injunctive relief beyond December 2016. 

Consequently, we cannot grant Vinculum relief on this claim. 

In its second issue, Vinculum argues that the trial court erred when it 

refused to award attorneys’ fees, as required under the Consulting Agreement, 

even though the court found that Goli had breached the Consulting 

Agreement. Brief for Appellant at 16. Vinculum argues that “a court cannot 

modify the terms of a contract under the guise of interpretation[,] because 

the written terms are the best indication of the parties’ intent.” Id. at 17 

(citing McMullen v. Kutz, 985 A.2d 769 (Pa. 2009)).5 Vinculum compares 

____________________________________________

4 Mr. Goli testified that he worked pursuant to the Consulting Agreement 

through the end of 2015. N.T., 7/6/20, at 40; see also id. at 71 (wherein 

Vinculum’s Director of Legal Affairs testified that Mr. Goli provided his 

resignation at the end of 2015). Mr. Goli further testified that he began 

working for PennDOT again in January 2016. Id. at 45-46.

5 Vinculum misstates its claim that the Supreme Court “observed” the above 

language. Rather, the Supreme Court stated that the appellant had made the 

observation, and not the Court. McMullen, 985 A.2d at 773. Ultimately, the 

Court held that, although parties may contract for a breaching party to pay 

attorneys’ fees, the trial court may consider whether those fees are 

reasonable. Id. at 776-77.
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this case to the situation in McMullen, a case involving a marriage and 

property settlement agreement. Brief for Appellant at 16-17. In McMullen, 

Vinculum argues, our Supreme Court upheld the award of attorneys’ fees, 

where there was no dispute as to whether the husband had breached the 

agreement and the parties had agreed to a fee-shifting agreement. Brief for 

Appellant at 17. Because the Consulting Agreement contained a provision 

entitling Vinculum to recover attorneys’ fees and costs arising from Goli’s 

breach, Vinculum asserts that the trial court had no basis to override the 

parties’ express agreement. Id. However, Vinculum has failed to provide any 

information or analysis of the attorneys’ fees it seeks to collect and the 

reasonableness of those fees.

Goli counters that, in this case, the trial court found that Vinculum had 

withheld more money from Goli, than Goli owed to Vinculum. Brief for 

Appellee at 49. Goli asserts that, although Vinculum won a partial victory on 

its breach of contract claim against Goli, Judgment ultimately was entered 

against Vinculum. Id. 50. Thus, Vinculum was not a prevailing party and was 

not entitled to attorneys’ fees. Id. Finally, Goli argues that the trial court did 

not err because, despite discovery requests, Vinculum failed to disclose the 

amount of its attorneys’ fees until the day before trial, denying Goli the 

opportunity to review them. Id. at 53-54. Goli argues that, because 

Vinculum never sought to have evidence of its attorneys’ fees admitted, Goli 
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was unable to object to the same, as reflected by the trial transcript. Id. at 

54 (citing N.T., 7/6/20, at 133).

“Whether to award attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in bringing an 

action are within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse a 

trial court’s decision on the matter in the absence of an abuse of discretion.” 

Regis Ins. Co. v. Wood, 852 A.2d 347, 349-50 (Pa. Super. 2004); see also 

In re Bridgeport Fire Litig., 8 A.3d 1270, 1289 (Pa. Super. 2010) (same). 

Error “is found where the award is based either on factual findings for which 

there is no support in the record or legal factors other than those that are 

relevant to such an award.” Gilmore by Gilmore v. Dondero, 582 A.2d 

1106, 1108 (Pa. Super. 1990). 

The rationale behind this limited scope of review is sound. It is 

the trial court that has the best opportunity to judge the attorney’s 

skills, the effort that was required and actually put forth in that 

matter at hand, and the value of that effort at the time and place 

involved.

Id. at 1108-09. Finally, the burden is on the party claiming the right to 

attorneys’ fees to justify those fees. Id. at 1110.

In its Opinion, the trial court explained that its award of attorneys’ fees 

was made after it had reviewed the reasonableness of the fees. Trial Court 

Opinion, 12/22/20, at 5-6. The trial court found that, based upon “provisions 

of the Consulting Agreement and the findings of the [c]ourt, attorneys’ fees 

were neither appropriate nor reasonable to award here.” Id. at 6. Our review 

of the record confirms that, although Vinculum was successful in its breach of 
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contract claim, Judgment ultimately was entered against Vinculum for

$10,380.00, the amount of the net verdict in favor of Goli. Because Vinculum 

failed to provide any analysis of the reasonableness of the fees at issue, and 

because the record supports the trial court’s decision not to award attorneys’ 

fees, we cannot grant Vinculum relief on its Claim.

In its third issue, Vinculum argues that the trial court improperly applied

case law applicable to employee restrictive covenants, where the record 

establishes that Goli was not an employee, but a competing company. Brief 

for Appellant at 17.6 Vinculum asserts that the trial court erred because Goli 

was not an employee of Vinculum; Goli did not receive wages from Vinculum;

and the trial court improperly equated Mr. Goli with Goli. Id. at 18.

Vinculum is not entitled to relief. Indeed, as the trial court noted in its 

Opinion, Vinculum, by its own admission, refers to Goli’s relationship with 

Vinculum as an “employment relationship.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/20/20, at 

6 (citing Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Deposition Objections, [5/31/19], at 1 

(wherein Vinculum refers to the “employment relationship” between the

parties)). “Admissions ... contained in pleadings, stipulations, and the like are 

usually termed ‘judicial admissions’ and as such cannot later be contradicted 

____________________________________________

6 Vinculum devotes a total of two paragraphs to this issue, and its analysis is 

devoid of any citation to the record or relevant case law. See Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(a). Thus, we could find Vinculum waived the issue. However, as the 

trial court addressed the issue, we will review the trial court’s determination.
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by the party who made them.” Silco Vending Co. v. Quinn, 461 A.2d 1324, 

1326 (Pa. Super. 1983). Moreover, the trial court analyzed the factors set 

forth in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992),

and determined that Goli was an employee of Vinculum.7 Trial Court Opinion, 

12/20/20, at 6-8. We discern no error or abuse of discretion in this regard. 

See id. Consequently, Vinculum is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

In its fifth issue, Vinculum asserts that the trial court improperly 

excluded evidence relating to profits beyond one-year post-breach, because 

the trial court had improperly imposed an arbitrary, one-year limitation on 

damages. Brief for Appellant at 18. Vinculum argues that the Consulting 

Agreement includes no limitation on the measure of damages arising from a 

breach. Id. at 20. Therefore, according to Vinculum, the trial court’s one-

____________________________________________

7

In applying Darden, a court looks to

the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which 

the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to 

this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the 

instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration 

of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party 

has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the 

extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to 

work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and 

paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business 

of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the 

provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired 

party. 

Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24.
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year limitation is arbitrary and lacks any case law to support it.8 Id. at 20-

21. Vinculum further argues that courts in other jurisdictions have allowed 

for “head start” damages where a breaching party begins competing before 

the non-compete period was over. Id. at 20 (citing Insureone Indep. Ins. 

Agency, LLC. v. Hallberg, 976 N.E.2d 1014 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). 

In response, Goli argues that “[t]he aim of the law in awarding 

compensatory damages is to put the injured party in the position he would 

have been in had there been full performance of the contract throughout the 

period of its duration.” Brief for Appellees at 58 (quoting Maxwell v. 

Schaefer, 112 A.2d 69, 73 (Pa. 1955)). Goli asserts that because the 

noncompetition period was for one year from the termination of the Consulting 

Agreement, Vinculum was entitled to be put in the position it would have been

in had Goli not obtained any PennDOT positions for a period of one year. Id.

Thus, any evidence relating to damages suffered beyond that one-year period 

would be irrelevant, and the trial court did not err when it excluded that 

evidence. Id. at 59. 

Goli also distinguished Hallberg, arguing that it is not a case applying 

Pennsylvania law and is factually distinct. Brief for Appellant at 60. 

____________________________________________

8 Vinculum again refers to events that occurred at the hearing but fails to 

provide corresponding citations to the record. Brief for Appellant at 19. 

Vinculum also fails to cite any cases applying Pennsylvania law. Indeed, of 

the three cases upon which Vinculum relies, two apply Arkansas law and the 

third applies Illinois law. Id. at 18-21. 
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Specifically, Goli points out that the Hallberg case involved the sale of an

established business, and a promise from the defendant-seller that it would 

not open a competing business for a period of time. Id. In Hallberg, Goli 

asserts, the plaintiff was harmed during the period of non-competition, as well 

as after, because it was competing against a fully developed competitor 

instead of a fledging start-up. Id. at 60. In the instant case, Goli argues that 

Vinculum presented no evidence that it had contracted for a lessening of Goli’s 

ability to compete, nor did it provide evidence that it would have been better 

off had Goli begun competing a year after the termination.9 Id. at 61. 

The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial 

court, and will not be reversed absent a showing that the trial court abused 

that discretion. Schuenemann v. Dreemz, LLC., 34 A.3d 94, 100-01 (Pa. 

Super. 2011). 

In its Opinion, the trial court explained its ruling, stating that the 

restrictive covenant in the Consulting Agreement was for a period of one year, 

“and therefore, Vinculum’s damages were limited to a period of one year.” 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/22/20, at 9. This Court is unable to find any 

Pennsylvania case law supporting Vinculum’s argument that damages should 

be awarded beyond the time period agreed to by the parties in the Consulting 

____________________________________________

9 During trial, Vinculum admitted that Goli “was set up and soliciting business 

through PennDOT before” it entered into the contract with Vinculum. N.T., 

7/6/20, at 54.
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Agreement. Thus, we discern no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court 

in limiting Vinculum’s damages to the one-year period specified in the 

Consulting Agreement. See Schuenemann, supra. Consequently, Vinculum 

is due no relief on these grounds. 

In its sixth issue, Vinculum argues that the trial court erred by not 

drawing an adverse inference from Goli’s admissions, at trial, that it had 

copied Vinculum’s consulting agreements and had used Vinculum’s 

agreements to compete with Vinculum. Brief for Appellant at 21. An adverse 

inference charge is a matter “within the trial court’s discretion[,] which this 

Court will not overturn absent manifest abuse.” Hawkey v. Peirsel, 869 

A.2d 983, 986 (Pa. Super. 2005). Before we reach the merits of the issue, 

however, we note that Vinculum has failed to provide any citation to the record 

where it sought such an inference, or lodged an objection that one was not 

drawn by the trial court.10

Upon our review of the certified record, there is no evidence that 

Vinculum had lodged an objection or requested an adverse inference 

instruction. Because Vinculum failed to object or seek such an inference, it 

____________________________________________

10 Vinculum’s failure to provide citation to the record could result in waiver of 

this claim. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (providing that “[i]f reference is made to ... 

any other matter appearing in the record, the argument must set forth, in 

immediate connection therewith, or in footnote thereto, a reference to the 

place in the record where the matter referred to appears ...”); J.J. DeLuca 

Co. Inc. v. Toll Naval Assoc., 56 A.3d 402, 411 (Pa. Super. 2012) (finding 

waiver where the appellant failed to provide citation to the record which would 

support his claim); However, we decline to find waiver on this basis.
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cannot complain of the alleged error on appeal. See Hinton v. Waste 

Techniques Corp., 364 A.2d 724, 729 (Pa. Super. 1976) (concluding that 

appellant was due no relief because it failed to seek specific instructions and 

failed to bring other alleged errors to the trial court’s attention at the proper 

time); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dill, 108 A.3d 882, 885 

(Pa. Super. 2015) (stating that “one must object to errors, improprieties, or 

irregularities at the earliest possible stage of the adjudicatory process to afford 

the jurist hearing the case the first occasion to remedy the wrong and possibly 

avoid an unnecessary appeal to complain of the matter” and the failure to do 

so results in waiver); Summers v. Summers, 35 A.3d 786, 790 (Pa. Super 

2012) (finding waiver where party failed to object to admission of hearsay 

statement). Thus, we find Vinculum is due no relief on this claim of error.

In its final issue on appeal, Vinculum argues that the trial court erred as 

a matter of law by denying its Motion to Strike Deposition Objections. Brief 

for Appellant at 22. Vinculum argues that Goli went to great lengths to hide 

relevant evidence concerning its violations of the Consulting Agreement, and 

“that the deposition transcript of Mr. Goli contains close to one hundred 

objections (and corresponding instructions not to answer questions) in 

response to straigh[t]forward questions....” Brief for Appellant at 23. 

Vinculum does not identify the objections it now challenges, nor does it 

engage in any discussion of any individual objections, beyond the boilerplate 

statement that the questions asked were straightforward. Id. at 22-23. 
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Moreover, the transcript of Mr. Goli’s deposition, which was attached to the 

Motion to Strike and appears to be the only version in certified record,

11 is 

illegible and provides no basis upon which this Court could find an abuse of 

discretion by the trial court. Because Vinculum’s claim is not supported in the 

record, we find this issue waived, and cannot grant relief on this claim. 

Hackett v. Indian King Residents Assoc., 195 A.3d 248, 255 (Pa. Super. 

2018) (finding issue waived where appellant failed to provide citations to the 

record and support her argument with citation to relevant case law). 

We next address Goli’s cross-appeal.

12 Goli first argues that the trial 

court’s award of damages to Vinculum should be reversed, because the noncompetition agreement was not reasonably related to the protection of a 

legitimate business interest, and the court should have found it unenforceable. 

Brief for Appellee at 69. Specifically, Goli argues that to be enforceable, the 

restrictive covenant must be “designed to protect the legitimate interest of 

the employer.” Id. (citing Trial Court Opinion, 12/22/20, at 11-12). Goli 

asserts that these interests have included “trade secrets, confidential 

information, good will, and unique or extraordinary skills.” Id. (citing Hess 

v. Gabbard & Co., 808 A.2d 912, 920 (Pa. 2002)). Goli argues that, unless 

____________________________________________

11 We note that the certified record in this case contains multiple parts and 

thousands of pages. 

12 Vinculum did not file a reply to Goli’s cross-appeal or otherwise address the 

issues raised in Goli’s cross-appeal. 
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a protectable interest is established, the non-competition agreement is 

unenforceable. Brief for Appellee at 70-71 (citing Bayliss, 869 A.2d at 990).

According to Goli, there is no evidence demonstrating that Vinculum had any 

“good will” or other business interest worthy of protections. Id. at 71. 

In its Opinion, the trial court found that “during [Goli’s] employ with 

Vinculum, [Goli] worked extensively and closely with ... PennDOT. It is 

reasonable that Vinculum would want to protect its ongoing business 

relationship with its clients upon [Goli’s] future departure from Vinculum’s 

employ.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/22/20, at 12. The trial court’s finding is 

supported in the record. 

At trial, Kailash Kalantri (“Kalantri”), the Director of Vinculum’s Legal 

Affairs, testified that without the non-competition clause, Vinculum could not 

exist. N.T., 7/6/20, at 85. Kalantri explained that, without the non-compete 

agreement, consultants would begin working at an agency through Vinculum, 

develop a relationship with that agency, and then begin independently working 

for the agency, cutting Vinculum out of the process. Id. at 66. Our Supreme 

Court noted that covenants have developed into important business tools to 

allow employers “to prevent their employees and agents from learning their 

trade secrets, befriending their customers and then moving into competition 

with them.” Hess, 808 A.2d at 918. Thus, the trial court’s findings are 

supported in the record, and we discern no error or abuse of discretion in this 

regard. 
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In its second issue, Goli argues that the trial court erred in determining 

the amount of damages awarded to Vinculum. Brief for Appellee at 75. In 

support of its claim, Goli argues that the trial court improperly found that 

Vinculum would have obtained, and earned profits from, the two consultation 

jobs that Goli had worked in violation of the restrictive covenant. Id. at 76. 

Goli asserts that, because there were over 300 competing companies, there 

is no way of knowing whether Vinculum would have been awarded the 

positions. Id. Goli further posits that under Pennsylvania law, Vinculum was 

required to prove that, although Goli was awarded two jobs (one which Mr. 

Goli kept for himself and a second which was obtained by S.A., an 

associate/employee of Goli), Vinculum “came in second” and would have been 

awarded the contracts if Goli had not. Brief for Appellee at 77 (citing Scobell 

Inc. v. Schade, 688 A.2d 715, 719 (Pa. Super. 1997)). Goli does not 

challenge the trial court’s calculation of profits that Goli earned from the two 

PennDOT jobs in 2016. 

Our standard when we review claims involving damage 

awards is well settled.

The determination of damages is a factual question to be 

determined by the fact-finder. The fact-finder must assess the 

testimony, by weighing the evidence and determining its 

credibility, and by accepting or rejecting the estimates of the 

damages given by the witnesses.

Although the fact-finder may not render a verdict based on 

sheer conjecture or guesswork, it may use a measure of 

speculation in estimating damages. The fact-finder may make a 

just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant 
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data, and in such circumstances may act on probable, inferential, 

as well as direct and positive proof.

Omicron Sys., Inc. v. Weiner, 860 A.2d 554, 564-65 (Pa. Super. 2004).

As our Supreme Court has explained, damages in a case involving the 

breach of a non-compete agreement “are difficult to calculate with absolute 

precision[.]” Aiken Indus., Inc. v. Estate of Wilson, 383 A.2d 808, 812 

(Pa. 1978) (plurality). Although damages may not be based on a mere guess 

or speculation, where the amount may be estimated from the evidence, “a 

recovery will be sustained even though such amount cannot be determined 

with entire accuracy.” Id. 

In its Opinion, the trial court addressed this claim as follows:

Contrary to what [counsel for Goli] seems to think, I think this 

contract is enforceable. I think as a result of the breach of the 

contract that [Vinculum] is entitled to get the amount they have 

received had Mr. Goli and [] S.A. [has] been for one year period 

through [Vinculum], and based on my calculations that amount ... 

on [Vinculum’s] claim against [Goli], that amount comes to 

$32,145. I calculated that by using the number of hours that was 

established that Mr. Goli worked for PennDOT in the year after his 

contract was terminated and multiplied by $15 per hour. And I 

calculated that by also looking at the amount that the person 

identified as S.A. earned during that period ... Mr. Goli indicated 

that was 38- to $3900. I assumed the larger of those two 

numbers. 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/22/20, at 13 (citing N.T., 7/6/20, at 219-20). 

Thus, the trial court properly reviewed the profits earned by Goli during 

the breach, and made a reasonable estimate of damages based on the 

evidence. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/22/20, at 13. Further, the verdict 

bears “a reasonable resemblance to the damages proven[.]” See 
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Witherspoon v. McDowell-Wright, 241 A.3d 1182, 1187 (Pa. Super. 2020) 

(concluding that, “[i]f the verdict bears a reasonable resemblance to damages 

proven, we will not upset it merely because we might have awarded different 

damages.”). Accordingly, Goli is due no relief on its second claim.

In its final issue on appeal, Goli argues that the trial court erred in 

denying prejudgment interest on Goli’s successful counterclaim for unpaid 

hourly fees. Brief for Appellee at 79. Goli asserts that the interest award in 

this case was not subject to the trial court’s discretion, but was required. Id.

at 79-80. Goli argues that it should have been awarded interest because “the 

sum due is sufficiently definite ... if it is ascertainable from the terms of the 

contract, as where the contract fixes a price per unit of performance, 

even though the number of units performed must be proved and is 

subject to dispute.” Id. at 80 (quoting Cresci Const. Servs., Inc. v. Martin, 

64 A.3d 254, 260 (Pa. Super. 2013) (emphasis in original)). Goli argues that 

the price per unit was identified in Exhibit A to the Consulting Agreement as 

$135/hour. Id. at 81. Goli also asserts that it proved the number units or 

hours that were set forth on the written invoices and time sheets. Id. 

Our review of a trial court’s decision whether to award prejudgment 

interest is for an abuse of discretion. Cresci Const. Servs, 64 A.3d at 258. 

“[P]rejudgment interest is a matter of right where the amount is ascertainable 

from the contract. Where the amount due and owing is not sufficiently 

definite, prejudgment interest is awardable at the discretion of the trial court.” 
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Ely v. Susquehanna Aquacultures, Inc., 130 A.3d 6, 15 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(citations omitted). 

In its Opinion, the trial court addressed this claim as follows:

This [c]ourt did not err in denying Goli Technologies’ post-trial 

request for pre-judgment interest on the net verdict. “Comment 

c to Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 354 underscores that 

prejudgment interest is awarded as a matter of right only on 

breach-of-contract damages ascertainable from the terms of the 

contract.... In all other circumstances, prejudgment interest is 

awarded at the court’s discretion.” [Cresci Const. Servs., 64 

A.3d at 260]. Given that a calculation of damages was not readily 

ascertainable from the terms of the contract, this [c]ourt found 

that an award of prejudgment interest was not appropriate.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/22/20, at 13-14 (emphasis added). 

After review of the record, we agree. Pursuant to Cresci Const. Servs., 

“as prerequisites to running of prejudgment interest, the debt must have been 

liquidated with some degree of certainty and the duty to pay it must have 

become fixed.” Cresci Const. Servs., 64 A.3d at 262 (emphasis added). 

In this case, Exhibit A to the Consulting Agreement fixed the price per unit, or 

hour in this case, at $135/hour, and Goli presented testimony and 

documentation regarding the numbers of hours worked by its two consultants. 

However, the Consulting Agreement expressly states, “[Goli] further agrees 

and authorizes Vinculum to withhold payment up to the damages incurred in 

case of any violation by [Goli] or [Mr. Goli].” Consulting Agreement, 

12/16/14, at ¶ 10. Consequently, Vinculum was authorized to withhold 

payment up to the amount of damages incurred—an amount not readily 

ascertainable until the trial court calculated the exact damages suffered by
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Vinculum as a result of Goli’s breach of the Consulting Agreement. As such, 

Vinculum’s duty to pay was not fixed until that time. 

Given that the amount due to Goli was not ascertainable from the terms 

of the Consulting Agreement, the trial court properly exercised its discretion 

in deciding not to award prejudgment interest. Accordingly, Goli is due no 

relief on those grounds.

Judgment affirmed.

Judge Stabile joins the memorandum.

Judge Bowes files a dissenting memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/29/2021