FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT APRI L4, 2007 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [ P U B L I S H ] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ N o. 04- 1653 4

____ ____ ____ _ D. C. Docket N o. 01-00437 -CV -BE -S 2: 01 -cv -4 37 -KOB LLOYD N OLAND FOUN DATION, INC., T HE, anA la ba m a nonp ro fi t c or

por at ion , Pl ai nt iff , ve rs us TENET HEALT H CARE CORPORATION, a co rp or at ion , De fendantThird Party -PlaintiffCounter-De fendantApp el la nt , FA IRFI EL D H EA LT HCA RE AU TH ORI TY , C IT Y O F, Third Party -D efendantCounter-Claim antApp el le es , HEALTH SOUTH CORPORATION, Third Party -D efendantApp el le e.Honora ble L loy d D. Geor g e, United States District Judge f or the District of N evada , * sitti ngby desig nation. 2 ____ ____ ____ _ 2: 01 -cv -1 90 4- KOB TENET HEALT HSYSTEM MEDICAL, INC., a co rp or at ion , Plaintiff- Counter-D efendantThird Party -PlaintiffApp el la nt , ve rs us LLOYD N OLAND FOUN DATION, INC., anA la ba m a nonp ro fi t c or

por at ion , De fendantCo un te r-Cl ai m an t, FAIRF IELD HEAL THCARE AUTHORITY, Third Party -D efendantCounter-Claim antApp el le e.

____ ____ ____ __ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court f o r th e N o rt h e rn D i s t r i c to f

A l ab a ma

____ ____ ____ _ Before TJO FL AT and PRY OR, Circuit Judges, and GE ORG E, District Judge. *3

TJO FL AT , C ircuit Judg e: Thi s ap pe al ask s u s t o i nt erp retan in de m ni ty pro vi si on un de r Alaba m a la w. T he dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d su m m ar y j udgm en t i n f

av or of the thi rd -p ar

ty de fe ndants on a c la im ba se d onthi s in de m

nity pr ovi sio n, but

le ft a nothe r co unt

of the thi rd party com plaint un decided. T hat count also sough t indem nity but was prem ised on Alabam a com

m on law rather than the indem nity provisio n itself. T he district court entered partial j udgm ent on the contractual indemnity claim under Federa l Ru le of C iv il Pro cedur e 5 4( b) , and th e th ird -p art y pl ai nt iff ap pe al ed . Becau se we fi nd tha t e ntr

y of part ia l f ina l j udgm en t un de r Ru le 54( b) w as im pr ope r, w e ha ve no j ur isd ic tio n and m

ust dis m iss thi s a

ppe al . I. T he larg er

c as e he re inv olv es num er ous cl ai m s, c ount er -c la im s and thir dparty c la im s ari sin g f

ro m ase ri es of

bus ine ss transa ct ion s r el at ing to the sa le and operation of a hospi tal in Fairf ield, A labam a. Bec ause we ultim ately conclude that w e ha ve no j ur isd ic tio n ov er thi s a ppe al , w e es ch ewade ta ile d e xa m inatio n of the som ewha t c onvo lut ed

f ac ts i n f av or of abr ie f ove rv ie wof

tho se f ac ts p er tin en t here. In199 6, the L loy d N oland F ound at ion , I nc . ( “ LN F” ) sol d th e hosp ita l i nAlthough the hospital-related transa ctions descr ibed her ein involved var ious subsidi ary 1 e nti tie s o f T e ne t in

a dd iti on to t he pa re nt c or po ra tio n, the pa

re nt c or po ra tio n is the pa

rt y in t his case and the a

ppellant her e. B eca

use our jurisdictional holdingdoes not depe nd on distinctions amongthe Tene t entities, we re fer to Tenet g ener ally

throug hout this opi nion. 4 que sti on t o asub sid iary

of T en et H ea lth care Co rp or at ion( “ T en et ”) . A s a 1 co ndi tio n to c los ing the tr an sa ct ion , T en et e xe cu te d aG uaranty

A gr ee m en t, in w hic h it guarante ed

the pe rf orm an ce of

c er ta in o bli ga tio ns t o LN F as sum ed by Te net’ s subs idiaries as part of the tr ansaction. G enerally , these obligations relate d to an opti on for LN F to lease space in the hosp ital and repurchase beds from Te net fo r the ope ratio n of

an a cu te c ar e uni t, a nd T en et ’ s a ssu m pti on o f ce rt ai n r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f

o r an LN F r e t i r e e b e n e f

i tp r o g r a m. Thre e y ears late r, the City of Fair field He althcare Authority (“ FH A” ) pur ch as ed

the hos pit al f

ro m T en et , e xe cu tin g asix -m onth pr om iss or y not e fo r the purchase price and a security agree m ent. F HAassum ed the oblig ations, as described above, that w ere owed to LNF by Te net’ s subs idiaries and guaranteed by Te net (the “ Assum ed Obligations”). F HA ’ s partner in the transaction wa s H ea lth So uthCo rp or at ion( “ H ea lth So uth ”) , w hic h e xe cu te d w ithT en et ase parate agreem ent guaranteeing FHA ’ s paym ent of the prom issory note. Whe n th e not e cam e due six m onths l at er , F H A a nd H ea lth So uthw er e not pr ep ar ed to pay . A cc or din gly , T en et , F H A a nd H ea lth So uthtog ethe r ex ec ute d th eTo what e x tent the Amendment wa s solely an ame ndment of the promissory note, or 2 whether some of its provisions went further and imposed oblig ations independe nt of the terms of the note, is the hea

rt of the dispute in this appea l. Be cause we hold that we have no jur isdiction, we do no t c on sid e r t

he me ri ts. Ac c or din g ly , o ur us e of the sh or tha nd “ Am e ndme nt” to r e fe r t o this document is not meant to impl y any opinion by

this court about the prope r interpr etation of the do c ume nt. 5 “ A gr ee m en t R eg ar din g A m en dm en t of S ec ur ed P ro m iss or

y N ote ” (the

“ A m en dm en t” ). I ts t itl e notw ith standi ng, the part ie s a ct ua lly a gr ee about 2 relatively little with regar d to thi s docum ent. O ne thing they do not dispu te is that the A m en dm en t e xte nde d th e te rm of the pr om iss or

y not e, giv ing F H A a nd H ea lth So uthsix a ddi tio na l m onths i n w hic h to pay T en et . H ea lth So uthult im at el y pa id the pr om iss or

y not e in f ull a ft er the e xte nsi on. T he part ie s do dis ag re e, how ev er , about the sc ope of

a n in de m nity pr ovi sio n co nta ine d inthe A m en dm en t. T he pr ovi sio n m ad e FH A a nd H ea lth So uthj oin tly an d se ve ra lly

li ab le to ind em

nif y T en et f or a ny c la im by LN F ba se d onthe A ssu m ed O bli ga tio ns. B y

it s te rm s, the ind em

nity pr ovi sio n sp ec if

ie d it s e ff ec tiv e da te , but it c ont ai ne d no e xpi ratio n date . I n sh ort, T en et c ont en ds tha t, in the ab se nc e of

an e xpi ratio n pr ovi sio n, the ind em nity c lause r em ai ne d e ff

ec tiv e ind ef ini te ly unt il expr es sly

te rm inate d by

the part ie s. F ai rf

ie ld and H ea lth So uth ar gue that the e nti re A m en dm en t w as ti ed to the te rm

of the pr om iss or

y not e, and that all the provisi ons of the Am endm ent – includ ing th e indem nity clause – expir ed w he n th e not e w as pa id i n f ull .6

In200 1, thi s law sui t be gan. LN F sue d T en et in the N orthe rnD istri ct

of A la ba m a fo r da m ag es und er

the te rm s of

T en et ’ s G uaranty

A gr ee m en t, a lle gin g that FHAhad failed to car ry out the Assum ed Obligations. T enet in turn filed an an sw er and thir d- party

c om pla int a ga ins t bo th F H A a nd H ea lth So uth , ini tia lly al le gi ng on ly one co un t fo r in de m ni fic at io n u nd er t he ter m s o f th e Am en dm en t. L at er , T en et

a m en de d it s answ er

a nd thir d- party

c om pla int to al le ge ase co nd co unt of “ Co m m on L awI nde m

nif ic at ion ” unde r A la

ba m a law . T he part ie s di sput e w he the r T en et

pr ope rl y a lle ge d th is s ec ond co unt a ga ins t bo th F H A a nd Heal th So ut h; on it s fa ce, t he co un t n am es on ly FHA. O n M ar ch7, 200 2, the dis tr ic t c ourt f ile d asc he dul ing or de r se tti ng deadlines for discovery

and m otion s “ regarding liability ” and stay ing all oth er proceedings in th e case “pendin g the resolutio n of the liabilityissues.” I n response to a request from counsel seeking clarif

ication of the order, the district court filed a letter

to counsel on Marc h 18, 2002 , specif y ing th at “ ‘ liability ’ [as use d inthe Marc h 7, 200 2 sc he dul ing or de r] m eans c ontra ct ua l l ia bil ity und er the ind em nif ic at iona gr ee m en t. ” T en et , F H A a nd H ea lth So uthpr oc ee de d to f ile co m pe tin g m oti ons fo r sum

m ar y j udgm en t onthe c ontra ct ua l i nde m nif ic at ion co unt of T en et ’ s am en de d th ir d- party c om pla int , ne ve r ad dr es sin g T en et ’ s se co nd co unt f or c om m on- lawind em

nif ic at ion .Rul e 54 (b ) p ro vid e s: 3 Whe n mo re tha

n o ne c la im f

or re lie f i s p re se nte d in

an a c tio n, wh e the r a s a

c la im, counter claim, cr oss-claim, or third-pa rty claim, or whe n multipl e par ties are involved, the court may direc t the entry

of a f inal judgme nt as to one or more but fewe r than a ll of the claims or par

ties only upon an express dete rmination that there is no just rea son for de lay and upon an e x press dire ction for the e ntry of judg ment. In the abse nce of such deter mination and direc tion, any order or other f orm of dec ision, however de signated, wh ic h a dju dic ate s f

e we r t ha n a ll the c la ims or

the ri g hts and

lia bil iti e s o f f

e we r t ha n a ll the claims or the r ights a

nd liabiliti es of f

ewe r than a ll the parties shall not terminate the action as to a

ny of the c laims or parties, a nd the orde r or other

form of de cision is subject to revision at any

time before the entry

of judg ment adjudicatingall the claims and the ri g hts and lia bil iti e s o f a ll the pa

rt ie s. Fe d. R. Civ. P . 54(b). 7 By or de r on N ove m

be r 9, 200 4, the dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d F H A ’ s and H ea lth So uth ’ s m oti ons fo r sum m ar y j udgm en t onthe c ontra ct ua l i nde m nif ic at ion co unt and d en ie d T en et ’ s m oti on, hol din g init s a cc om pany ing Me m or an dum O pin ionthat, und er

A la ba m a law , the ind em

nity pr ovi sio n of

the A m en dm en t expir ed upo n paym en t of

the pr om iss or

y not e. T he c ourt f

urthe r or de re d th at ,

“ [b] ecause no claim s rem ain against [FH A and HealthSouth] , the c ourt dism isses the m w ithpr ej udi ce f

ro m the c as e. ” T he dis tr ic t c ourt no w he re m en tio ne d th e out standi ng c om

m on- lawind em

nif ic at ionc ount

of T en et ’ s am en de d th ir d- party co m pla int . De siring to appeal im

m ediately to this cou rt, Te net m oved the dis trict court unde r Fe de ra l R

ule of Ci vil P ro ce dur e 54( b) f

or e ntr y of apart ia l f

ina l j udgm en t on the Novem

ber 9 sum m ary j udgm ent order. In T enet’ s estim ation, as re flected 38

in i ts R ule 54( b) m oti on, the N ove m be r 9 O rd er

“ dis m iss [e d] w ithpr ej udi ce Co unt [O ne] ” of its am ended third-party com plaint. O n Dec em

ber 7, 2004 , the district co urt gr an te d T en et ’ s m oti on w ithatw o- se nte nc e or de r. T he or de r’ s op er at ive se nte nc e re ad s: “ Fi ndi ng n o j ust r ea son fo r de lay , the c ourt G RA N T S the m oti on an d di re ct s th e en tr

y of f ina l j udgm en t i n f

av or of T hir d P ar

ty D ef en dants Ci ty

of Fa ir fi el d H ea lth care A uth or ity and H ea lth So uthCo rp or at iona nd D IS MI SS E S the th ird pa rty com

pl ai nt wit h p reju di ce.” T he re af te r, T en et appe al ed , r ai sin g tw o is sue s. F ir st, it a rg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in its int er

pr et at ionof

the c ontra ct

ua l i nde m nity pr ovi sio n in the A m en dm en t. S ec ond, T en et c ont en ds tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in “ sua spon te ” gr an tin g su m

m ar y j udgm en t i n f

av or of the thi rd -p ar

ty de fe ndants on the co m m on- lawind em

nity c la im in Co unt T w o of T en et ’ s am en de d th ir d- party com plaint withou t givin g Tenet an opp ortunityto present evidence on and brief that issu e. II. Although no party

on appeal directly

question s the propriety

of the district co urt’ s e ntr

y of f ina l j udgm en t un de r Ru le 54( b) , w e do s o su a spon te “ be ca useAlthough not f rame d in terms of Rule 54(b), T enet’ s argument reg ardingthe “sua 4 sponte” grant of summar

y judgme nt on Count Two of its amended third-pa rty complaint indirectly raises the issue. 9 suc h c er tif ic at ion s im

pli cate the sc ope of

our appe llate j ur isd ic tio n. ” E br ah im i v. 4 Ci ty of Hun ts vi ll e Bd . of Educ ., 11 4 F .3d16 2, 1 65 (11 th Cir . 19 97 ) (p er cu ria m ). T he part ie s su gge st tha t this c ourt ha s j ur isd ic tio n un de r 28 U . S. C. § 12 91 b ec au se t h i s ap p e a l i s t a k e n f

r o m a “f i n a l d e c i s i o n ” o f

th e d i s t r i c tc o u rt . Or d i n a r i l y, how ev er , an or de r ad

j udi catin g f

ew er than a ll the c la im s inasui t, or a dj udi catin g the r igh ts and l ia

bil iti es of f ew er than a ll the part ie s, is not af ina l j udgm en t f

ro m w hic h an a

ppe al m ay

be take n. L ex T ex L td. v. U nif i, I nc . ( Inr e Y ar

n P ro ce ssi ng Patent V alidity

Litig. ), 680 F.2d 1338 , 1339 (11th Cir. 1982) (per c uriam ). U nder suc h c ir cum stanc es , appe llate j ur isd ic tio n li es w he n th e dis tr ic t c ourt pr ope rl y ce rt if ie s a s “ fi na l, ” unde r Ru le 54( b) , aj udgm en t onf ew er than a ll cl ai m s or parties. Id. He re, the district court’ s order on the third-party contractual ind em nif ic at ionc la im

ha d no e ff

ec t onthe und er ly ing c la im s be tw ee n LN F an d T en et that i nit ia te d th is l aw sui t, so T en et c oul d no t have appe al ed w ith out aRu le 5 4 (b ) c er t i fi ca t i o n . As s u ch , we m u s tco n s i d erwh et h erth e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s de te rm inatio ns unde r Ru le 54( b) “ fi t w ith in the sc ope of the r ule . ” Br an dt v . Ba sse tt (I n r e Se . Banki ng C or p. ), 69 F . 3d 1 539, 154 6 ( 11th C ir . 199 5) . I f the y do not , thi s c ourt l ac ks j ur isd ic tio n to c onsi de r the m er its a nd m ust dis m iss the10

ap pe al . A. A district court m

ust follo w a

two-step analy sis in d eterm ining whether a partial final j udgm ent m ay properly be cer tified under Rule 54(b). First, the court m ust determ ine that its final judgm ent is, in fac t, both “ final” and a “ j udgm ent.” Cu rti ss -Wrigh t Co rp . v. Gen . Elec. Co ., 44 6 U.S. 1 , 7, 1 00 S. Ct. 1 46 0, 1 46 4, 6 4 L. E d. 2d 1 ( 1980 ). T ha t i s, the c ourt’ s de ci sio n m ust be “ ‘ fi na l’ in the se nse that i t i s

‘ anult im at e dis posi tio n of an in div idu al c la im

e nte re d inthe c our se of

am ult ipl e cl ai m s a ct ion , ’ ” an d a“ ‘ j udgm en t’ in the se nse that i t i s ade ci sio n up on a co gni za ble c la im f or r el ie f. ” I d. ( ci tin g S ears , Ro eb uc k & Co . v. Ma ck ey , 351 U . S. 427 , 436 , 76 S . Ct . 895 , 900 , 100 L . E d. 129 7 ( 1956 )) . S ec ond, havin g f ound that the decision wa s a final j udgm ent, the district court m ust then d eterm ine that the re is no “

j ust r ea son fo r de lay ” in c er

tif y ing it a s f ina l and i m

m ed ia te ly ap pe al ab le . I d. a t 8, 100 S . Ct . a t 14 65. T his inquir y is re qui re d be ca

use “ [n ] ot a ll fi na l j udgm en ts o n in div idu al c la im s sh oul d be im m ed ia te ly appe al ab le . ” I d. T he dis tr ic t c ourt m

ust a ct a s a“ dis pa tc he r” a nd e xe rc ise it s di sc re tio n inc er tif y ing part ia l j udgm en ts i n c onsi de ratio n of “ j udi ci al a dm ini str at ive int er es ts” – i nc lud ing

“ ‘ the histo ric fe deral policy against piecem eal appeals’ ” – and “ the equities invo lved.” I d. (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 U.S . at 438, 76 S. C t. at 901).11

As a thresholdquestion , w e consider whether the district court’ s Novem ber 9, 2004 order granting su m m ary j udgm ent to FHAand Hea lthSouth wa s a “ final j udgm en t” e lig ibl e fo r ce rt if ic at ionund er

Ru le 54( b) . I f it w as not , w e ne ed not fret over whether the district court abused its discretion in determ ining there w as no “ j ust r ea son fo r de lay ” in e nte ri ng j udgm en t. S ee I n r e Se . Banki ng C or p. , 69 F. 3d at 15 46 ( not ing that “ w he the r the dis tr ic t c ourt c om ple te ly dis pose d of

one or m or e cl ai m s . . . is a pr er equis ite f or a n a ppe al und er

the r ule ”) ; I nd. H ar

bor Be lt R. R. Co . v. A m . Cy an am id C o. , 860 F . 2d 1 441, 144 3–44 ( 7thCi r. 198 8) ( “ If the j udgm en t w as f

ina l, w e the n de te rm ine w he the r the dis tr ic t c ourt a buse d it s dis cr et ionin fi ndi ng the re w as ‘ no j ust r ea son fo r de lay . ’ ” (e m

pha sis a dde d) (quot ing Curt iss -W

ri ght , 446 U . S. a t 8, 100 S . Ct . a t 14 65) ). W e re vie wde nov o the district court’ s determ ination that its partial adj udication am ount ed to a final j u d g me n t . S e e M a t h i s v . Z a n t , 9 0 3 F . 2 d1 3 6 8 , 1 3 7 1 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 0 ) ( p e r c u r i a m) (d es cr ibi ng the standard

a s “ple nary

r ev ie w ”) ; se e al so G en . A cquis iti on, I nc . v. G en Co rp , I nc . , 23 F . 3d 1 022, 102 7 ( 6thCi r. 199 4) ( “ de nov o” ); I nd. H ar bor Be lt R. R. Co ., 8 6 0 F. 2 dat 1 4 4 4 (“de n o v o ”) ; 1 0 J ames Wm . M o o re et al ., M o o re ’s Fed eral Prac ti ce § 54 .22 [2 ][a] (3d ed . 20 06 ); 1 0 C ha rle s Al an Wrig ht et a l., Fed eral Prac ti ce an d P ro cedur e § 26 55 (3d ed . 19 98 ); c f. Sear s, Ro eb uc k & Co ., 351 U . S. a t 43 7, 76 S . Ct . a t 90 0 ( “ T he D istri ct Co urt c an not , in the e xe rc ise of it sWe note that this court has pre viously formulated the applicable standard of revie w for 5 the first prongof the Rule 54(b) analy sis as “appr oach[ing ] de novo,” explaining that while “ we have a duty to ‘scrutinize’ the district cour t’s deter mination in order to ensure that limit s on our jurisdiction are obse rved[,] . . . t here is some room for de fer ence particula rly wher e the district court ha s made its rea soning c lear .” In re Se. B ankingCorp., 69 F.3d at 1546. This formulation is somewhat cur ious, as the first prongof the Rule 54(b) analy sis – whether the district court’s decision wa s a “f

inal judgme nt” – direc tly

aff ects our a ppellate jurisdiction. Withouta “f inal judgme nt,” we simply

have no jur isdiction under § 1291. See Sea rs, Roebuck & Co., 351 U.S. at 438, 76 S. Ct . at 901 (obser ving that Rule 54(b) does not alter the “statutory

require ment of a ‘final de cision’ under

§ 1291 as a ba sic requir ement for an appe al to the Court of Appe als”). We rec og nize, of course , the Supreme Court’s instruc tion that the second prongof the analy sis – whether the re is “a ny just reason for

delay” in ce rtifying the partial judg ment for appea l – is withi n the district court’s discr etion. I d. at 437, 76 S. Ct. at 900–01 (“[T] he District Court may , by

the exercise of

its discretion in the interest of sound judicial a dminist ration, re le a se fo r a

pp e a l f ina l de c isi on s u

po n o ne or

mor e , b ut l e ss t

ha n a ll, c la ims in m

ult ipl e c la ims actions. The timingof such a rele ase is, with g ood rea son, vested by the rule pr imarily

in the discretion of the District Court . . . . Wi th equally g ood rea son, any

abuse of that discretion rema ins reviewa

ble by the Court of Appe als.”); se e Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 11, 100 S. Ct. at 14 66 (o bs e rv ingthat c ourt of a pp e a ls mus t “ sc rutin ize ” the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s e va luatio n o f c e rt a in “juridica l conce rns,” but that those a spects of the trial court’ s judgme nt that are “discre tionary ,” s u c ha s i t s “ a s s e s s m e n to f th e e qu i t i e s , ” ar e t o b e ar e t o b e g r an t e d “ s u b s t an t i a l d e f

e r e n c e ” ) . In these discr etionary

matters, def

ere nce to the district c ourt rema ins appropriate, but it would be pe c uli ar f or thi s c ourt

to d e fe r t o a

dis tr ic t c ourt

in p oli c ingthe bo un da

ri e s o f o ur

a pp e llate jurisdiction. See Sears, Roebuc k & Co., 351 U.S. at 443–44, 76 S. Ct. at 904 (Fr ankfur ter, J., concur ring ) (“ Of c ourse, a s the Court’s opinion appea rs to rec og nize, . . . [ i] t is one thing for a dis tr ic t c ourt

to d e te rm ine wh e the r i t is or is n ot t hr ou g h w itha

po rt ion of a lit ig atio n. I t is qu ite another thing f or it to determine whe ther the r equire ments of § 1291 ar e satisfied so a s to give j uri s d i ct i o nt o th e c o urto f ap p ea l s . . . . Ina p art i cu l ar l i t i gat i o nth e o p i n i o no f t h e d i s tri ctj u d ge may pr op e rl y be de e me d a

va lua ble guid e . B ut f

le xibil ity wo uld be a str ang e name fo r a

uth or ity in the district court to command the c ourt of appe als to exercise jurisdiction.”). In any event, this court in In re Southea st BankingCorp. ultimately applied a pur e de novo standard in r eviewingthe first prongof the Rule 54(b) analy sis, noting that “[i] f the district c ourt do e s n ot e xpla in i tse lf

, a s is the c a se he re , w e do no t g e t th e be ne fi t of its e xpe ri e nc e and

its rea soning. In such a c ase, . . . a ny defe renc e we might other wise ac cord suc h a rulingwill be nullified . . . .” 69 F .3d at 1546. As such, our decision in In re Southea st BankingCorp. does not conflict with our pr ior prec edent in Mathis, 903 F.2d at 1371. 12 discretion, treat as ‘ final’ that which is not ‘ final’ within the m eaning of § 1291 .” ). 5 B.13

B y d e f i n i t i o n , e n t ry o f

p a rt i a l j u d g me n tu n d e r

R u l e 5 4 ( b ) r e s u l t s i n s o me cl ai m s inac as e be ing im m ed ia te ly appe al ab le w hil e oth er

c la im s r em ai n pe ndi ng in the dis tr ic t c ourt. I n or de r to r ev ie wthe pr opr ie ty of the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s R

ule 54( b) c er tif ic at ion , w e m

ust f ir st d et er m ine w ha t e xa ct ly

the c ourt di d and d id n ot ac co m pli sh b y that c er tif ic at ion . I n th is c as e, that j ob i s no t m ad e an y e as ie r by the re co rd on a ppe al . Whe n th e dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d su m m ar y j udgm en t t o F H A and H ea lth So uthand d en ie d su m m ar y j udgm en t t o T en et

by it s or de r of

N ove m be r 9, 2004 , the c ourt r es olv ed

the iss ue of

li ab ili ty und er the ind em

nity pr ovi sio n of

the Am endm ent. T hat order determ ined that FHAand Hea lthSouth we re not obliged to i nde m nif y T en et und er T en et ’ s c ontra ct

ua l i nde m nity the or y a lle ge d inCo unt O ne of the a m en de d th ir d- party

c om pla int . T he N ove m

be r 9 or de r did

not , how ev er , r es olv e T en et ’ s c la im f or i n d emn i fi ca t i o n u n d erAl ab ama c o m m o n l aw , a l l eg ed as Co u n tTwo i n Te n et ’s am en de d th ir d- party

c om pla int . I n r es pons e to the part ie s’ r eque st f or clarific ation, the district court explicitlylim ited the scope of briefing on su m m ary jud gm en t t o t he is su e o f co nt ract ua l i nd em ni fic at io n u nd er t he Am en dm en t. Ac cordingly , the c om

peting m otion s for sum

m ary j udgm ent exclusivelyaddressed the A m en dm en t’ s in de m

nif ic at ionc lause . N otw ith standi ng the li m ite d sc ope of the sum m ar y j udgm en t i nqui ry , the dis tr ic t c ourt, by it s or de r of

D ec em be r 7,14

2004 , gr an te d e ntr

y of part ia l j udgm en t un de r Ru le 54( b) a s to F H A a nd Heal th So ut h a nd di sm is se d “ th e th ird pa rty com pl ai nt ” wit h p reju di ce. Thu s, we a r e p r e s e n t e dap u r

p o rt e de n t ry o f

p a rt i a l j u d g me n to n a l l th i r d - p a rt y c l a i ms ag ai nst F H A and H ea lth So uth , y et the se co nd c ount

of T en et ’ s am en de d th ir dpa rty com

pl ai nt – s eek in g c omm on -la w in de m ni fic at io n –rem ai ne d u nr es ol ve d. Under these c ircum stances, the R ule 54(b) certific ation was im proper. W e ha ve int er

pr et ed the f ir st p ro ng o f Ru le 54( b) to re qui re that a j udgm en t

“ dis pose s e nti re ly

of ase para ble c la im or dis m iss es aparty

e nti re ly ” in o rd er

to be co n s i d er ed “ fi n al .” In re Se . B an k i n g Co rp ., 6 9 F. 3 dat 1 5 4 7 . Th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s or de r dis posi ng o f the c ontra ct ua l i nde m nif ic at ionc la im

a lon e did ne ith er of the ab ove . T he inquir

y tur ns o n th e int er

pr et at ionof

“ cl ai m f or r el ie f” und er

Ru le 54( b) . I nd. H ar

bor Be lt R. R. Co . , 860 F . 2d at 14 44. T he te xt o f the r ule establishes th at a third-party claim can be a “ claim

for r elief” as to which a district court m ay direct the entry

of partial j udgm ent. F ed. R . C iv. P. 54(b); see also In re Yarn Proce ssing Patent V alidity Litig. , 680 F. 2d at 134 0 (noting that the district co urt e nte re d part ia l f

ina l j udgm en t ondis m iss al of thi rd -p ar ty c om pla int s) ; I nd. H ar bor Be lt R. R. Co . , 860 F . 2d at 14 44. B ut the e rr or he re doe s no t r el at e to the third-party

nature of the contrac tual indemnification coun t on which the court gr an te d su m

m ar y j udgm en t. I nst ea d, the e rr or li es in the f

ai lur e of the c ourt, byIn Bonne r v. City of Prichar d, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 ( 11th Cir. 1981) (en ba nc), this cour

t 6 a do pte d a s b ind ingpr e c e de nt a ll d e c isi on s o f t he fo rm e r F if

th C ir c uit ha nd e d d own p ri or

to October 1, 1981. 15 re sol vin g th at

c ount a lon e, to ad

j udi cate the e nti re sub stanti ve “ cl ai m f or r el ie f” to w hic h th e co unt

w as a ddr es se d. Although this court has no ted that “ the line between dec iding one of several claim s and deciding only part of a singl e claim

is very obscure,” we have held that

“ w he n th e pla int if

f pr es en ts m or e than on e le ga l the or y , but w ill be pe rm itt ed

to re co ve r on o nly

one of the m [, ] . . . the re is onl y

asin gle ins ep ar ab le c la im f or re lie f. ” I n r e Se . Banki ng C or p. , 69 F . 3d at 15 47; se e al so S ch ex nay dr e v. T rave le rs I ns. Co . , 527 F . 2d 8 55, 856 ( 5thCi r. 197 6) . T hus, the tou ch sto ne f or 6 de te rm ini ng whe the r ane nti re “ cl ai m ” ha s be ena dj udi cate d f or the pur pose s of Ru le 54( b) is w he the r that c la im is “ se parate ly

e nf or ce ab le ” w ith out

“ m utu al ly ex cl u[ din g] ” or

“ subs tanti al ly

ove rl ap [p ing ] ” w ithr em ed ie s be ing sou ght by the rem aining claim s pendin g in the dis trict court. In re Se. Banking Corp., 69 F.3d at 1547 . It f oll ow s, the re fo re , that a

part ia lly a dj udi cate d “ cl ai m ” cannot se rv e as the ba sis f or aRu le 54( b) c er

tif ic at ion ; e ve n if

adis tr ic t c ourt ha s a dj udi cate d on e co unt of ac om pla int , but

anothe r co unt

se ek s su bst an tia lly

sim ilar re lie f, the ad j udi catio n of

the f ir st c ount doe s no t r ep re se nt a

“ fi na l j udgm en t” be ca

use bothThis rule applies e qually whether the only pendingcounts are those formingpart of the 7 same “ c la im” un de r R

ule 54 (b ) a s th e c ount u

po n whic h th e c ourt

e nte re d p art ia l f

ina l ju dg me nt, or wh e the r t he re are a lso e nti re ly

se pa rate “ c la ims ” pe nd ingin t he dis tr ic t c ou

rt . Ind . H arb or

B e lt R.R. C o., 860 F.2d at 1444. 16 counts are functionally

part of the sam e claim

under Rule 54(b). See Pitney Bo w es , I nc . v. Me str e, 701 F . 2d 1 365, 136 9 ( 11th C ir . 198 3) ( “ [A ] c er tif ic at ionof fi na l j udgm en t c an not

f or pur pose s of appe al r en de r fi na l a

j udgm en t w hic h is int er loc uto ry . T he r equir em en t of f ina lity sti ll ap pli es , . . . tur

nin g onw he the r the en tr y of j udgm en t c om

ple te ly dis pose s of

one of the c la im s. ”) ; se e al so I nd. H ar bor Be lt R. R. Co . , 860 F . 2d at 14 44 ( “ [I ] f tw o c ount s c onst itu te one c la im f or re lie f . . . the dis tr ic t c ourt m ust r es olv e both c ount s inor de r fo r the r ule to ap ply . ”) ; T ols on v . U nit ed S ta te s, 732 F . 2d 9 98, 999 ( D . C. Ci r. 198 4) ( G ins bur g, J. ) (h old ing that the dis tr ic t c ourt i m pr ope rl y inv oke d R

ule 54( b) w he re it

ha d “ not y et f ina lly a dj udi cate d any

c la im , ” but

ins te ad ha d “ ru le d onpart

of asin gle claim ”). 7 Fo r ex am pl e, in Sch ex na y dr e, 52 7 F .2dat 8 56 , th e p la in ti ff p le d t wo al te rn at e tort the or ie s inaone -c ount c om pla int . T he dis tr ic t c ourt di sm iss ed onl y one of the tw o th eo ri es of

li ab ili ty , le av ing the oth er the or y und ec ide d. I d. T he co urt the n e nte re d part ia l j udgm en t onthe dis m iss ed tor t the or y und er Ru le 54( b) an d th e pla int if

f ap pe al ed . I d. T he f

orm er F if th C ir cu it dis m iss ed

the appe al f

or17

want of jur isdictio n, holding that the Rule 54(b) certification was im proper be ca use the tw o ba se s f

or li ab ili ty w er e m er el y

“ al te rn at ive the or ie s, dr awn f ro m the lawof

the sam e sove re ign , by

w hic h th e sa m e se t of

f ac ts m igh t gi ve r ise to a sin gle li ab ili ty . ” I d. ; se e al so I nd. H ar bor Be lt R. R. Co . , 860 F . 2d at 14 45 (d ism iss ing appe al f

ro m e ntr y of part ia l f ina l j udgm en t onastr ic t l ia bil ity c ount of the c om pla int w he n ape ndi ng n eg lig en ce c ount w as a n a lte rn at ive the or

y f or ide nti ca l r el ie f) . R es olu tio n of one the or

y did not c onst itu te a“ fi na l j udgm en t” conferr ing appellate jurisdiction while the alternate theory for the sam e re lief re m ai ne d ou tst an din g. S ch ex nay dr e, 527 F . 2d at 85 6. Inli ght of the f or eg oin g, our

r es olu tio n of

the ins tant c as e is str ai ght fo rw ar d. T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t t o th e de fe ndants on the iss ue of contractual indem nification did not “ dispo se[] entirely of a se para ble c la im . ” S ee I n r e Se . Banki ng C or p. , 69 F . 3d at 15 47. T he se co nd c ount of the a m en de d th ir d- party

c om pla int , se ek ing c om

m on- lawind em

nif ic at ion , re pr es en te d m er el y

an a lte rn at e le ga l the or

y f or ar ec ove ry

ide nti ca l t o th at

sou ght by Co unt O ne . T houg h it

ple d tw o c ount s init s c om pla int , T en et

w oul d be entitled to recover its losses th rough in dem nification onl y

once, at m ost. See In re Se . Banki ng C or

p. , 69 F . 3d at 15 47; S ch ex nay dr e, 527 F . 2d at 85 6. T he se co nd co unt r em ai ns una dj udi cate d be ca use the dis tr ic t c ourt, in its Marc h 18 , 200 2On its face , Count Two of the ame nded third-pa rty complaint names only

FHA , wher eas 8 Count O ne name s b oth

F HAand He a lth South. He a lth South d isp ute s whe the r C ount T wo is proper ly alleg ed ag ainst it. I f Count Two is not properly pled ag ainst Hea lthSout h, then Hea lthSout h would only

be subjec t to Tenet’s c laim for contr actua l indemnification under Count On e , a s to wh ic h th e dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt i n H e a lth South’ s f avo r. Thus , arguably , the district court’s e ntry of par tial judgment c ould have be en prope r as to He althSouth, which would allow us to re view Te net’s appe al on the mer its as ag ainst Hea lthSout h. On the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s un c le ar r e c or d, ho we ve r, we wo uld have to m ake c e rt a in assumptions in order to rea ch that re sult. I n the above scena rio, the ana ly ses for the district court’s e ntry

of par tial judgment would be quite differ ent as be tween F HA and H ealthSouth. The d i s tr i c tc o urt ’ s o r d e r

e n t e r i n gp art i a l j u d g m e n t , h o w e v e r , g i v e s n o e x p l an at i o no f i t s r e a s o n i n g . It does not eve n acknow ledg e the e x istence of the common-lawindemnification count, let a lone discuss how that count does or does not apply

to the case ag ainst eac h third-par ty defe ndant. The 18 cl ar if ic at ionor de r, e xpl ic itl y

li m ite d th e inquir

y on s um m ar y j udgm en t t o

“ contractual liability

under the indem

nification agreem ent.” Although th e district co urt’ s R ule 54( b) or de r pur

ports t o di sm iss the a m en de d th ir d- party c om pla int in its entirety , the c ourt never addressed the com m on-law indem

nity count of that co m pla int , and R

ule 54( b) “ doe s no t c ont em plate ‘ im pli ci t a dj udi catio n’ of claim s.” See Lam

p v. A ndrus, 657 F.2d 1167 , 1169 (10th Cir. 1981) (per c uriam ), ove rr ule d onoth er

gr ound s by

L ew is v . B. F. G oodr ic h C o. , 850 F . 2d 6 41, 645 (1 0thCi r. 198 8) ( enbanc ). S o lo ng a s th at c ount r em ai ns unr es olv ed , the f ir st re qui re m en t f

or e ntr y of part ia l j udgm en t un de r Ru le 54( b) is unsatis fi ed be ca use the re is no “ fi na l j udgm en t” on any one “ cl ai m

f or r el ie f. ” F or

the sam e re as on, the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r fa ile d to dis m iss a ny party e nti re ly , be ca

use aRu le 54( b) certific ation cannot m ake appealable a partial j udgm ent as to a single party if that j udgm en t do es not

f ina lly de te rm ine a ll the c la im s a ga ins t tha t party . S ee L oc ke tt 8district court neve r re solved the under lying que stion of whether Count Two of the ame nded third-par ty complaint was prope rly

alleg ed ag ainst Hea lthSout h in the first instance. U pon rema nd followingour dismissal of this appeal, the district cour t will be in a position t o consider that question. 19 v. G en. F in. L oan Co. of D owntown, 623 F.2d 112 8, 1129 (5th Cir. 1980). Be ca use the gr an t of

sum m ar y j udgm en t i n th e thi rd -p ar ty de fe ndants ’ f

av or on the c ontra ct

ua l i nde m nif ic at ionc ount

f ai le d to a dj udi cate f

ina lly the ind em

nity cl ai m a s aw hol e, the f

ir st r equir em en t f

or e ntr y of part ia l j udgm en t un de r Ru le 54(b) was not satisfied. As such, we need not reach the second requirem ent that t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt fi n dn o ju s tre as o n fo r d el ay i n en t er i n g p ar t i al ju d g m en t . We m ust sim ply dis m iss the c as e fo r w an t of j ur isd ic tio n. III . L am en ta bly , the j ur isd ic tio na l de fe ct in thi s a ppe al w as not

ide nti fi ed

unt il af te r br ie fi ng and o ra l arg um en t onthe m er its . N ev er the le ss, la ck

of j ur isd ic tio n gives us no autho rity

to go forwar d. O n rem and, however , the par ties will be fr ee to seek partial j udgm ents with proper Rule 54(b) ce rtifications once the district co urt r es olv es e ith er

( a) any one c la im

in its e nti re ty , or

( b) a ll the c la im s a s to any one party . L ex T ex L td. v. U nif i, I nc . ( Inr e Y ar

n P ro ce ssi ng P at en t V al idi ty L iti g. ), 680 F . 2d 1 338, 134 0 ( 11th C ir . 198 2) ( pe r curi am). T he part ie s m ay a lso de sir e to m iti ga te the w as te d e ff ort onthi s a

ppe al by r eque sti ng tha t, to the e xte nt20

ap pli ca ble , any f uture appe al to thi s c ourt f ro m apr ope rl y

c er tif ie d R ule 54( b) part ia l j udgm en t be sub m itt ed on the r ec or ds and b ri ef

s pr ep ar ed

in thi s a ppe al , supp lem ented with the new j udgm ents, and on the oral argum ent previousl y heard be fo re thi s pane l. I d. DISMI SSED.