Filed 12/16/22

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

GEOFFREY S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D077999

 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2020-

00014589-CU-PT-CTL)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Judy S. Bae, Judge. Affirmed.

Geoffrey S., in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

Mara W. Elliott, City Attorney, John C. Hemmerling, Assistant City 

Attorney, and Nicole R. Crosby, Deputy City Attorney for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

In Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Wilson (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 550 

(Kaiser), we held that hearsay evidence is admissible at a hearing on a 

workplace violence restraining order (WVRO). (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.8.) 

Other courts have reached the same conclusion for a hearing on a civil 

harassment restraining order (CHRO). (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6; see 
2

Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 728–729 (Duronslet); Yost v. 

Forestiere (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 509, 521 (Yost).) 

We must now decide the same question for a hearing on a gun violence 

restraining order (GVRO) under Penal Code section 18175.1 We hold that 

hearsay evidence is likewise admissible at a GVRO hearing. We further 

conclude that the evidence submitted to the trial court was sufficient to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that appellant Geoffrey S. posed a 

significant danger of causing personal injury by gun violence.2(§ 18175, 

subd. (b)(1).) Because we reject Geoffrey’s other claims, we affirm the oneyear GVRO issued against him. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. GVRO Petition and Attachments

On April 22, 2020, the San Diego Police Department (Department) filed 

a GVRO petition against Geoffrey with an attached declaration and four 

redacted police reports. The attached declaration of Detective Justin Garlow 

stated: “Based on the content of the attached reports, I hold the opinion that 

a GVRO is necessary to protect the public and prevent harm to the 

respondent or others. There are no less restrictive means to ensure public 

safety.” 

The redacted police reports described several police contacts with 

Geoffrey between April 13 and 17 of 2020. On April 13, an “anonymous 

clinical psychologist” requested a welfare check on Geoffrey “due to him 

having ‘been posting angrily on Facebook about buying ammo and to “protect” 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Geoffrey’s first name and last initial are used in this opinion in 

accordance with California Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(3) and (b)(11).
3

himself.’ ” The police contacted Geoffrey and “determined he did not meet 

criteria at the time, but notated [sic] he ‘has very eccentric beliefs about the 

government and was dillusional [sic] and very paranoid.’ ” 

Just before midnight on April 14 or 15, police responded to a 

disturbance call at Geoffrey’s residence. They heard people arguing inside 

the house. When they knocked on the door, someone inside said, “ ‘Go 

away!’ ” The argument continued, then Geoffrey ran out the back door and 

reported to the police that someone inside had just threatened to kill him. 

Geoffrey explained to the police that for several weeks, he had been 

posting on social media about his belief that philanthropist Bill Gates had 

murdered millions of people. In response, a stranger called him to express 

his agreement. When Geoffrey asked the person how he got his phone 

number, the person said it was given to him by God. As a religious person, 

Geoffrey then invited the person over to his house to talk about their beliefs. 

The person came over and spent the night. The next day, they talked all day 

and read Bible verses. The man eventually proclaimed that he was God, got 

a kitchen knife, and demanded that Geoffrey “ ‘kneel before him.’ ” After 

Geoffrey complied, the man said, “ ‘I am going to kill you motherfucker.’ ” 

The man also told Geoffrey he was a “ ‘west coast gangster’ ” and had “been 

shot and stabbed before.” 

Geoffrey told the police he had “ ‘hunting shotguns’ ” inside his house, 

but no ammunition. He began talking about his “conspiracy theories” and 

“distrust of the government.” He explained “his eccentric beliefs about how 

he didn’t believe the Corona virus was real, how Bill Gates is a murderer and 

he is trying to vaccinate everyone with ‘nanotechnology’ so they can be 

tracked by 5G towers” and “claimed he even called the FBI San Diego field 

office to report what he knew about Bill Gates . . . .” 
4

The police confirmed that the other man was still inside Geoffrey’s 

house and his car was parked in the driveway. The man refused to come out 

of the house. The police decided to leave without entering or trying to take 

the man into custody. Geoffrey became “upset and unreasonable” and called 

them “ ‘cowards.’ ” 

On the afternoon of April 17, four officers and a clinician with the 

Psychiatric Emergency Response Team (PERT) were dispatched to Geoffrey’s 

house in response to more calls about him “posting bizarre threatening 

statements on social media and attempting to purchase firearm 

ammunition.” Before arriving at Geoffrey’s house, the police tried to contact 

the reporting parties and also reviewed his Facebook posts. The names of the 

reporting parties were redacted from the police reports attached to the GVRO 

petition. 

The first reporting party was anonymous and did not answer his phone. 

This anonymous person had reported that Geoffrey said, “ ‘I guess I’m just 

going to have to take things into my own hands.’ ” 

The police were able to contact the second reporting party. This person 

“expressed a strong concern for Geoffrey’s mental health” and said, “Geoffrey 

has reported signs of anxiety and paranoia for some time but has refused to 

seek treatment.” According to this person, “Geoffrey’s anxiety, delusional 

thoughts and paranoia ha[ve] rapidly escalated, putting him in a panic state.” 

Geoffrey had expressed to this person “a strong need to defend himself with 

his firearms against a government takeover.” Earlier that morning, Geoffrey 

had called “in rage, ranting about Walmart refusing to sell him firearm 

ammunition due to him coming up in their system as ‘denied.’ ” Geoffrey 

stated it was part of the “ ‘government[’]s plan.’ ” He told this person, 

“ ‘People are going to try and get me and I need to defend myself.’ ” Geoffrey 
5

said he had asked his father to fly to California from Ohio to purchase 

ammunition for him, but his father declined. 

The police discovered that Geoffrey had posted on Facebook multiple 

times per day over the previous month. None of these Facebooks posts were 

attached to the GVRO petition or submitted to the court. One of the police 

reports described them as follows: “The post[s] were essentially attempts to 

gather followers into defending themselves against a government takeover. 

Geoffrey believed that new 5G cell towers and vaccines were being 

implemented to control Americans. Geoffrey was outlining his attempts to 

stock up on ammunition and encouraging others to do the same.” 

When the police contacted Geoffrey, he refused to allow them to enter 

his home, but agreed to talk to them outside. He sat on a retaining wall next 

to his driveway. The police informed him that “his friends and family asked 

the police to check on him due to comments he had posted on social media 

regarding the purchase of ammunition.” 

According to the police reports, “Geoffrey was very animated, agitated 

and was rambling about a government takeover.” He “believed Bill Gates 

and the government were using the COVID-19 to scare Americans into 

receiving a vaccine to infuse trackers” and that “5G cell towers being 

installed would be used to track everyone with the vaccine.” “Geoffrey would 

not answer specific questions but would instead go into lengthy rants about 

various unrelated topics.” He “was exhibiting psychotic and delusional 

behavior.” “When asked specifically about his quest for ammunitions and his 

intentions, Geoffrey replied that it was none of our business and quoted his 

1st and 2nd amendment rights. Geoffrey became paranoid about where we 

had received our information and accused us of working with FBI to tap his 

phone lines. Geoffrey did confirm that he owns several shotguns.” “Geoffrey 
6

was aggressive in nature and very confrontational, answering most of our 

questions with questions and stating we were all stupid. At one point, 

Geoffrey stood up and began screaming at the top of his lungs, ‘I’m buying 

ammo and you should too!’ ” 

The police and PERT clinician believed that “Geoffrey was a potential 

danger to others” and decided to place him on a 72-hour psychiatric hold 

under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150. Geoffrey resisted being 

taken into custody and began yelling for neighbors to help him. He 

continuously yelled obscenities at the police while being transported to the 

hospital. 

B. GVRO Hearing and Defense Evidence

The trial court issued a temporary GVRO on April 22, 2020.3 The court 

held a GVRO hearing on July 21, 2020. Both sides were represented by 

counsel, but the hearing was unreported.4 Geoffrey and his counsel appeared 

3 We augment the record to include the temporary GVRO on our own 

motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)

4 The trial court later approved a lengthy settled statement that was 

prepared by Geoffrey in propria persona. The defense exhibits Geoffrey 

submitted at the hearing were attached to the settled statement. We will 

consider the attached Exhibits A-F as part of the record on appeal. But 

because the trial court heard no testimony at the GVRO hearing, and the 

record on appeal now includes all the documentary and video evidence 

submitted by the parties below, we will otherwise consider the settled 

statement only to the extent it describes what occurred at the unreported 

hearing. It would not be proper for us to consider the settled statement to 

supplement the documentary and video evidence submitted below. (Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 8.137(a) & (b)(1)(A) [permitting settled statement “as the 

record of the oral proceedings in the superior court, instead of a reporter’s 

transcript” when the proceedings “were not reported by a court reporter”].) 

We also disregard attachments 2a and 2b to the settled statement, which do 

not purport to summarize what occurred at the GVRO hearing; they instead 
7

remotely by video. No witnesses testified at the hearing, and the Department

submitted no additional evidence beyond the previously submitted 

declaration of Detective Garlow and police reports attached to the GVRO 

petition. However, Geoffrey submitted six defense exhibits (Exhibits A-F). 

At Geoffrey’s request, the court also reviewed police body-camera footage of 

the April 17 encounter outside his house. Geoffrey made hearsay objections 

to the witness statements and Facebook posts summarized in the police 

reports. 

The defense exhibits included a psychiatric admission evaluation of 

Geoffrey and medication noncompliance summary, both prepared by 

Dr. Samuel Etchie at Alvarado Parkway Institute (Alvarado). The 

psychiatric admission evaluation (signed April 22, 2020) described Geoffrey’s 

“delusional beliefs” and his admission to the hospital’s psychiatric intensive 

care unit after Geoffrey’s pastor and a friend had called 911 to express their 

concerns about his mental state and social media postings. Geoffrey repeated 

to Dr. Etchie his theories about Bill Gates and the COVID-19 vaccine. He 

said: “They have this vaccine and if they are going to force us to take this 

vaccine then I need to buy ammo and ammunitions to defend myself against 

the government and protect my family . . . .” Geoffrey also told Dr. Etchie

that his pastor, a friend, and his father all “told lies against [him].” 

Dr. Etchie stated: “Upon arrival at this facility . . . , the patient 

remained with significant risk of danger to others as a result of welldeveloped and well-organized delusional thought processes about the 

government and various governmental agencies . . . and the philanthropist, 

Bill Gates, and the current COVID-19 vaccine that is not even available at 

include 14 pages of argumentative responses to questions about the issues 

Geoffrey intended to raise on appeal.
8

this time.” “Inpatient psychiatric admission is imperative at this time due to 

the imminent risk of harm to others and the patient’s ability and 

wherewithal to purchase arms and ammunitions and to prevent harm to the 

patient and to others.” “The patient . . . remains with significant risk of harm 

to others, especially, ‘people from the government and people connected with 

the Bill Gates vaccine and the FBI.’ ” Dr. Etchie diagnosed Geoffrey with 

“[b]ipolar affective disorder, mania, severe with psychotic features.” 

In the medication noncompliance summary (signed May 4, 2020), 

Dr. Etchie quoted Geoffrey as follows: “Everybody’s against me - my deacon, 

my pastor, my father, my friend, the police, yourself, the nurses and staff in 

this hospital because of only one reason. I want to defend my Second 

Amendment rights to defend myself because of all the crazy things that have 

been started and have been sponsored by Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 

to infect millions of Americans with bad vaccine in the name of treating this 

viral pandemic.” Geoffrey denied any mental illness and refused to take any 

medication. 

Another defense exhibit was a one-page order of May 4, 2020 issued by 

a hearing officer after a certification review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 5256.1) held at Alvarado regarding Geoffrey’s involuntary psychiatric 

commitment.5 The order noted that Geoffrey had previously been certified on 

April 20, 2020 as “a danger to others.” However, the hearing officer 

concluded that Geoffrey did not have a mental disorder and explained: “No 

5 Under the Welfare and Institutions Code, a certification review hearing 

officer may be “either a state qualified administrative law hearing officer, a 

physician and surgeon, a licensed psychologist, a registered nurse, a lawyer, 

a certified law student, a licensed clinical social worker, a licensed marriage 

and family therapist, or a licensed professional clinical counselor.” (Welf. & 

Inst. Code, § 5256.1.)
9

known history of diagnosis or treatment. [Geoffrey] with belief virus is 

created by Bill Gates Foundation and others to place tracking device in 

others. [Geoffrey] has sought to obtain ammo to protect himself. No meds 

taken. No threats since admit. Strange beliefs insufficient to support 

psychiatric illness.” Accordingly, the hearing officer found that Geoffrey 

could no longer be detained. 

Geoffrey also submitted exhibits showing that he was a licensed 

attorney in Ohio and a licensed real estate broker in California. 

Geffrey’s father submitted a declaration stating: “On about April 17, 

2020 I received a telephone call from a female (I don’t recall her name) who 

represented that she was with the San Diego Police Department. She asked 

if my son, Geoffrey, had attempted to buy ammunition. I answered yes. She 

asked if he had said why he needed ammunition. I answered that I thought 

he wanted to be prepared to defend himself and his family against an 

intrusion.” 

The body-camera video from April 17, 2020 showed the interaction 

between Geoffrey and the police in front of his house. In addition to what 

was described in the police reports, Geoffrey said on the video that he did not 

intend to hurt himself or anyone else. When asked, he did not deny that he 

had been posting on Facebook about purchasing ammunition for his guns. 

He explained that he had been home alone for about 40 days and had been 

talking to a network of people through Facebook. He claimed that he had 

tried to buy ammunition for his guns because supply chains were breaking 

down in the pandemic and he feared he would have to hunt for food. 

According to Geoffrey, the “virus” (which he put in air quotes) was in fact a 

“bioweapon” that was released from Wuhan, China. Even though he was 

asked multiple times, Geoffrey repeatedly evaded answering the question 
10

whether he had talked to anyone or posted anything online about buying 

ammunition because he needed to defend himself. After three minutes of 

dodging the question, he finally told the police, “My simple answer is, ‘none of 

your business.’ ” When asked if he had a history of mental illness, Geoffrey 

said, “Absolutely not, I’m the smartest person you know.” 

Geoffrey also told the police about an “anti-Christ character” who 

appeared in the “end days” in the Book of Revelation and made everyone 

believe they could not leave home, travel, or buy or sell goods without the 

“mark of the beast.” He said Bill Gates’s plan was that people could not leave 

home or buy or sell goods unless they got “the mark” of the vaccine. He 

claimed that Bill Gates was developing the COVID-19 vaccine with 

“nanoparticle technology” that could track people and detect the balances in 

their bank accounts using 5G cell towers. According to Geoffrey, Nazi 

scientists had been brought to the United States from Germany to develop 

the atomic bomb in “Operation Paperclip,” and in 2018, the operation was 

moved to Wuhan, China to develop bioweapons with Bill Gates in charge. 

Geoffrey believed that Bill Gates “has the spirit of the anti-Christ in him.” 

C. GVRO After Hearing

After reviewing the documentary evidence and body-camera video 

footage, the trial court granted a GVRO prohibiting Geoffrey from owning or 

possessing firearms or ammunition for one year. The court issued the GVRO 

using Judicial Council Form GV-120 and found “by clear and convincing 

evidence” that Geoffrey posed “a significant danger of causing personal 

injury” by gun violence and that a GVRO was “necessary to prevent personal 

injury . . . .” 
11

Geoffrey appeals from the one-year GVRO.6

DISCUSSION

I

We first consider whether the appeal is moot. The GVRO expired in 

July 2021 and the Department did not seek to renew it. After the opening 

brief was filed in September 2021, the Department moved to dismiss the 

appeal on mootness grounds. We deferred ruling on the motion and now deny 

it.

Ordinarily, an appeal from an expired restraining order is moot 

because the appellate court cannot grant any effective relief from an expired 

order. (See Environmental Charter High School v. Centinela Valley Union 

High School Dist. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 139, 144.) But here, Geoffrey 

asserts that as a result of the restraining order, he faces an investigation by 

the Ohio State Bar where he is currently licensed and in good standing. He 

6 Geoffrey’s request for judicial notice is granted in part and denied in 

part. The court takes judicial notice of Exhibit A to his motion, a superior 

court order. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d) [court records].) The request for 

judicial notice of motion exhibits B (Rice University report); C (Mastercard 

document); D (journal article); and E (declaration) is denied because those 

documents are not properly subject to judicial notice under Evidence Code 

sections 451 and/or 452. The Department’s request for judicial notice of 

Exhibit A to its motion to dismiss the appeal is denied as moot because we 

have already augmented the record on our own motion to include the 

complete GVRO petition and exhibits. We also decline to consider the 

August 9, 2022 psychological evaluation attached as Exhibit A to Geoffrey’s 

supplemental letter brief filed October 14, 2022. We did not permit the 

parties to submit additional evidence in our orders allowing supplemental 

briefing, and this exhibit post-dates the trial court’s GVRO by over two years. 

“In reviewing the trial court’s ruling, we must consider the facts before the 

court at the time of its ruling, and not by reference to evidence produced at a 

later date.” (Sacramento Area Flood Control Agency v. Dhaliwal (2015) 236 

Cal.App.4th 1315, 1328, fn. 5.)
12

also contends that he will now be listed in a database alerting law 

enforcement he is a potential threat. 

An appeal from an expired restraining order is not moot if it could have 

collateral consequences in future proceedings. (See, e.g., In re Cassandra B.

(2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199, 209 [appeal not moot where expired restraining 

order “could have consequences . . . in this and future court proceedings”]; see 

also People v. Ellison (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1368–1369 [“[a] criminal 

case should not be considered moot where a defendant has completed a 

sentence where, as here, the sentence may have ‘disadvantageous collateral 

consequences’ ”].)

Moreover, as this case illustrates, a one-year GVRO may also evade 

appellate review by expiring before the appeal is decided. “That a 

controversy may be so short-lived as to evade normal appellate review is a 

strong reason to decide an issue although it is technically moot.” (In re 

Schuster (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 943, 952.) 

Finally, an appellate court may exercise its discretion to hear a moot 

case where it presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur. 

(See Golden Door Properties, LLC v. Superior Court of San Diego County 

(2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 733, 760.) We conclude that the general admissibility 

of hearsay evidence in a noticed hearing on a GVRO petition to prevent gun 

violence is such an issue.

Accordingly, for all these reasons, the Department’s motion to dismiss 

the appeal as moot is denied.7

7 On the mootness issue, we note that Geoffrey may be subject to a 

separate five-year prohibition against owning or possessing a firearm as a 

result of his involuntary psychiatric detention. Under the Welfare and 

Institutions Code, someone who was taken into custody for a section 5150 

hold, assessed within the meaning of section 5151, and admitted to a 
13

II

The only evidence the Department submitted in support of the GVRO 

petition was the attached declaration of Detective Garlow and hearsay police 

reports. The Department submitted no additional evidence at the GVRO 

hearing. On appeal, Geoffrey argues that hearsay evidence is inadmissible in 

a GVRO hearing under section 18175. This is an issue of statutory 

interpretation subject to de novo review. (See Walker v. Superior Court 

(2021) 12 Cal.5th 177, 194–195.)

A. The GVRO Statute

The GVRO statute provides for three different types of protective 

orders prohibiting a person from owning or possessing a firearm, 

ammunition, or magazine: (1) a 21-day temporary emergency GVRO issued 

ex parte on request of a law enforcement officer if the court finds “reasonable 

cause to believe” the subject “poses an immediate and present danger” of gun 

violence (§ 18125); (2) a 21-day ex parte GVRO issued on request of a family 

member, employer, coworker, teacher, or law enforcement officer if the court 

finds a “substantial likelihood” that the respondent “poses a significant 

danger, in the near future” of gun violence (§ 18150, 18155); and (3) a one to 

five year GVRO issued after notice and hearing if the court finds “by clear 

designated facility within the meaning of sections 5151 and 5152, is 

prohibited from owning or possessing any firearm for five years after release. 

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 8103, subd. (f)(1)(A).) A violation is punishable by 

imprisonment in state prison or county jail. (Id. at subd. (i).) On this record, 

however, we cannot determine definitively whether Geoffrey is subject to this 

prohibition.
14

and convincing evidence” that there is a “significant danger” of gun violence 

(§ 18175).8

For a temporary emergency GVRO, the law enforcement officer may 

request the order orally, but must later provide a sworn declaration reciting 

the oral statements made to the court. (§ 18140, subd. (a).) The court may 

issue a temporary emergency GVRO based on statements of the law 

enforcement officer. (§ 18145, subd. (a)(1).) If time and circumstances 

permit, a temporary emergency GVRO may be obtained in writing based on a 

sworn declaration. (Id. at subd. (a)(2).) A designated judge, commissioner, or 

referee must be reasonably available to issue temporary emergency GVROs 

even when the court is not in session. (Id. at subd. (b).)

For an ex parte GVRO, the court must either examine the petitioner 

and any witness under oath or require the petitioner and any witness to 

submit sworn affidavits. (§ 18155, subd. (a)(1)-(2).) The court may issue an 

ex parte GVRO if the sworn affidavits or testimony and “any additional 

information provided to the court” satisfy the “substantial likelihood” 

standard. (§ 18150, subd. (b).) The statute provides that the court “shall 

consider all evidence” of six factors listed in section 18155, subdivision (b)(1),9

8 At the time of the hearing in this case, a GVRO after hearing could 

have at most a one-year duration. (§ 18170, former subd. (a).) Effective 

September 1, 2020, the statute was amended to provide a duration of one to 

five years. (§ 18170, subd. (a)(1); Stats. 2019, ch. 725, § 4.5.) 

9 The subdivision (b)(1) factors are: “(A) A recent threat of violence or act 

of violence by the subject of the petition directed toward another. [¶] (B) A 

recent threat of violence or act of violence by the subject of the petition 

directed toward himself or herself. [¶] (C) A violation of an emergency 

protective order issued pursuant to [other specified provisions of law]. [¶] 

(D) A recent violation of an unexpired protective order issued pursuant to 

[other specified provisions of law]. [¶] (E) A conviction for any offense listed 
15

and “may consider any other evidence of an increased risk for violence, 

including, but not limited to” seven additional factors listed in section 18155, 

subdivision (b)(2).10 An ex parte GVRO must be issued or denied on the same 

day the petition is filed or the next day of judicial business. (§ 18150, subd. 

(d).)

For a GVRO after notice and hearing, the hearing must be held within 

21 days of issuance of the temporary emergency GVRO or ex parte GVRO.11 

in Section 29805 [illegal firearm possession]. [¶] (F) A pattern of violent acts 

or violent threats within the past 12 months, including, but not limited to, 

threats of violence or acts of violence by the subject of the petition directed 

toward himself, herself, or another.” (§ 18155, subd. (b)(1)(A)-(F).) “Recent” 

is defined to mean “within the six months prior to the date the petition was 

filed.” (§ 18155, subd. (b)(3).)

10 The subdivision (b)(2) factors are: “(A) The unlawful and reckless use, 

display, or brandishing of a firearm by the subject of the petition. [¶] (B) The 

history of use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force by the 

subject of the petition against another person. [¶] (C) A prior arrest of the 

subject of the petition for a felony offense. [¶] (D) A history of a violation by 

the subject of the petition of an emergency protective order issued pursuant 

to [specified provisions] of the Family Code. [¶] (E) A history of a violation of 

the petition of a protective order issued pursuant to [other specified 

provisions of law]. [¶] (F) Documentary evidence, including, but not limited 

to, police reports and records of convictions, of either recent criminal offenses 

by the subject of the petition that involve controlled substances or alcohol or 

ongoing abuse of controlled substances or alcohol . . . . [¶] (G) Evidence of 

recent acquisition of firearms, ammunition, or other deadly weapons.” 

(§ 18155, subd. (b)(2)(A)-(G).)

11 Rule 8 of the Judicial Council’s Emergency Rules Related to COVID-19 

provided that any temporary GVRO issued or set to expire during the 

COVID-19 state of emergency “must remain in effect for a period of time that 

the court determines is sufficient to allow for a hearing on the long-term 

order to occur, for up to 90 days.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Appen. I, rule 8.) In 

this case, the temporary GVRO was issued during the COVID-19 state of 
16

(§§ 18148, 18165.) The statutory provision for a GVRO after hearing refers 

back to the factors listed for an ex parte GVRO. Specifically, section 18175 

provides: “In determining whether to issue a gun violence restraining order 

[after notice and hearing], the court shall consider evidence of the facts 

identified in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 18155 and may 

consider any other evidence of an increased risk for violence, including, but 

not limited to, evidence of the facts identified in paragraph (2) of subdivision 

(b) of Section 18155.” (§ 18175, subd. (a), italics added.)

B. The Kaiser Decision

In Kaiser, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th 550, we ruled that hearsay evidence 

is admissible at a hearing on a WVRO. The WVRO statute allows an 

employer to seek on behalf of one of its employees (1) a temporary restraining 

order for up to 21 days (which may be extended to 25 days), and (2) an order 

after notice and hearing of not more than three years prohibiting unlawful 

violence or threats of violence against the employee. (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 527.8, subds. (a), (e)-(k).) 

The WVRO statute states that a temporary restraining order shall be 

issued based solely on the employer’s declaration providing “reasonable proof” 

that its employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of 

violence by the respondent, and that great or irreparable harm would result 

to the employee. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.8, subd. (e).) After granting or 

denying such a temporary restraining order, the court must hold a “hearing” 

before issuing a long-term WVRO. (Id. at subds. (h)-(i).) The hearing must 

be held within 21 days of the ruling on the temporary restraining order, or 

within 25 days if there is good cause. (Id. at subd. (h).) Subdivision (j) states: 

emergency for a 90-day period expiring on July 21, 2020, the date of the 

noticed GVRO hearing.
17

“At the hearing, the judge shall receive any testimony that is relevant and 

may make an independent inquiry.” If the court finds “by clear and 

convincing evidence” that the respondent engaged in unlawful violence or 

made a credible threat of violence, it must issue a WVRO of not more than 

three years. (Id. at subd. (j).)

As we noted in Kaiser, these provisions of the WVRO statute are 

similar to provisions of the statute governing CHROs. (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 527.6.) Section 527.6 allows a victim of harassment to seek (1) a temporary 

CHRO for up to 21 days (which may be extended to 25 days) based solely on 

the victim’s declaration showing “reasonable proof” of harassment (Code Civ. 

Proc., § 527.6, subds. (d), (f)), and (2) a long-term CHRO of up to five years 

issued based on “clear and convincing evidence” of harassment after a 

hearing at which “the judge shall receive any testimony that is relevant, and 

may make an independent inquiry.” (Id. at subd. (i).) Like Code of Civil 

Procedure section 527.8, section 527.6 requires a showing of “great or 

irreparable harm” for a temporary CHRO, but not for a CHRO after hearing. 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subds. (d), (i).) 

The appellant in Kaiser was appealing a three-year WVRO issued on 

behalf of two Kaiser employees after a hearing. He argued that the trial 

court had erred by admitting hearsay evidence of his threats at the WVRO 

hearing, including hearsay testimony from one of the employees that a police 

officer had told her that appellant’s wife had reported to the police that 

appellant was going to shoot the employee. (Kaiser, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 554–555.) We concluded that hearsay evidence is admissible at a 

WVRO hearing for several reasons. (Id. at pp. 555–558.)

First, we noted that Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8, subdivision 

(j) (then subdivision (f)) of the statute specifically states that the court “shall 
18

receive any testimony that is relevant” at the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 527.8, subd. (j), italics added.) We explained: “The plain language of this 

provision suggests that the Legislature intended to permit a trial court to 

consider all relevant evidence, including hearsay evidence, when deciding 

whether to issue an injunction to prevent workplace violence pursuant to 

[Code of Civil Procedure] section 527.8.” (Kaiser, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 557.) “Evidence Code section 1200, subdivision (b) provides that hearsay 

evidence is generally inadmissible, ‘[e]xcept as provided by law.’ Subdivision 

(f) [now subdivision (j)] of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 527.8 appears to 

be one of the exceptions to Evidence Code section 1200, subdivision (b), in 

that it mandates the court consider, without limitation, ‘any testimony that is 

relevant.’ ” (Ibid.)

Second, we observed: “The unique context of a hearing pertaining to a 

workplace violence injunction supports our conclusion. Specifically, 

injunctive proceedings under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 527.8 are 

intended to parallel those under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 527.6, 

which are procedurally truncated, expedited, and intended to provide quick 

relief to victims of civil harassment.” (Kaiser, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 557.)

Third, we explained: “In addition, a petition for an injunction under 

[Code of Civil Procedure] section 527.8 is heard by the court, not a jury, and 

is decided by the clear and convincing standard of proof. Trial judges are 

particularly aware of the potential unreliability of hearsay evidence, and are 

likely to keep this in mind when weighing all of the evidence presented.” 

(Kaiser, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 557.) 

We concluded: “Considering the fact that the purpose of the statute is 

to prevent violence in the workplace, the expedited nature of the proceeding 
19

contemplated by the statute, and the Legislature’s directive that the trial 

court shall receive all relevant testimony without qualification, we conclude 

that the testimony that a trial court may consider in making a ruling on a 

petition pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure] section 527.8 is not limited to 

nonhearsay testimony.” (Kaiser, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 558.)

Other courts have since cited Kaiser outside the WVRO context. For 

example, in Duronslet, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th 717, the court cited Kaiser in 

holding that hearsay evidence is admissible to prove a credible threat of 

violence for a three-year CHRO after hearing under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 527.6. (Id. at pp. 728–729.) The court thus found no error in the 

admission of a police report containing hearsay statements by a nontestifying nurse who told the police about threats she said she had heard the 

defendant make. (Id. at pp. 723, 728–729; accord Yost, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 521 [citing Kaiser and Duronslet for the proposition that “hearsay 

evidence, such as a declaration or police report, is admissible during hearings 

conducted pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure] section 527.6”].) Another 

court has cited Kaiser in stating that hearsay evidence is admissible in a 

noticed hearing on a petition for restraining order under Welfare & 

Institutions Code section 213.5 and rule 5.630(f)(1) of the California Rules of 

Court. (In re L.W. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 44, 48, fn. 3.) 

C. Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence at a GVRO Hearing

We now conclude that the rationale of Kaiser also applies to a GVRO 

hearing under section 18175. Based on the language, purpose, and 

legislative history of the GVRO statute, and its similarity to the WVRO and 

CHRO statutes, we hold that hearsay evidence is admissible at a GVRO 

hearing. 
20

We begin with the statutory language. By its terms, Penal Code 

section 18175, subdivision (a), states that the court “shall consider evidence” 

of the factors listed in section 18155, subdivision (b)(1), and “may consider 

any other evidence of an increased risk for violence,” including the factors 

listed in section 18155, subdivision (b)(2). (Pen. Code, § 18175, subd. (a), 

italics added.) The Evidence Code defines hearsay as a form of “evidence.” 

(Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a) [“ ‘Hearsay evidence’ is evidence of a statement 

that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and 

that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.”], italics added.) 

Moreover, the ordinary meaning of the word “any” is “without limit and no 

matter what kind.” (Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798.) 

“From the earliest days of statehood,” the Supreme Court has “interpreted 

‘any’ to be broad, general, and all embracing.” (California State Auto. Asso.

Inter-Insurance Bureau v. Warwick (1976) 17 Cal.3d 190, 195, citing 

Davidson v. Dallas (1857) 8 Cal. 227, 239 [construing “any” to mean “every”].) 

Thus, the statutory terms “evidence” and “any other evidence” as used in 

Penal Code section 18175, subdivision (a), logically include the form of 

“evidence” defined as “hearsay evidence.” (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).)

Just as the WVRO statute at issue in Kaiser permits “any testimony 

that is relevant” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.8, subd. (j), italics added), the GVRO 

statute permits a court to consider “any other evidence of an increased risk 

for violence” (§ 18175, subd. (a), italics added)—and does so “without 

limitation” and “without qualification.” (Kaiser, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 557, 558.) For purposes of resolving the hearsay issue, we perceive no 

meaningful distinction between the WVRO phrase “any testimony that is 

relevant” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.8, subd. (j)) and the GVRO phrase “any other 

evidence of an increased risk for violence.” (§ 18175, subd. (a).) The GVRO 
21

provision does not use the word “relevant,” but its plain meaning is that 

courts may consider “any” evidence that is relevant to show an increased risk 

for violence. (Ibid.) And testimony is just one form of evidence. (Evid. Code, 

§ 140 [defining “evidence” to include “testimony”]; Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 

2019) p. 1778, col. 2 [defining “testimony” as a form of “evidence”].) We 

therefore find that the broad, unqualified language of section 18175 similarly 

suggests that the evidence a trial court may consider at a GVRO hearing “is 

not limited to nonhearsay” evidence. (Kaiser, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 558.)

Beyond this similarity to the WVRO statute, however, the text of the 

GVRO statute contains another positive indication that the Legislature 

intended to allow the admission of hearsay evidence. As noted, section 

18175, subdivision (a) allows the court to consider “any other evidence of an 

increased risk for violence, including, but not limited to, evidence of the facts 

identified in paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) of Section 18155.” (§ 18175, 

subd. (a), italics added.) The referenced paragraph of section 18155 includes 

a provision allowing the court to consider “[d]ocumentary evidence, including, 

but not limited to, police reports and records of convictions, of either recent 

criminal offenses by the subject of the petition that involve controlled 

substances or alcohol or ongoing abuse of controlled substances or alcohol.” 

(§ 18155, subd. (b)(2)(F), italics added.) 

Documentary evidence and police reports offered for the truth of the 

matter asserted are classic forms of hearsay. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) Thus, the

inclusion of documentary evidence and police reports in section 18155, 

subdivision (b)(2)(F)—and its incorporation by reference in section 18175, 

subdivision (a)—signal that the Legislature intended the terms “evidence” 
22

and “any other evidence” as used in section 18175, subdivision (a) to include 

hearsay evidence.12 

In our view, it would make little sense to treat section 18155, 

subdivision (b)(2)(F) as a narrow exception only allowing hearsay evidence of 

alcohol or substance abuse or related convictions. In the first place, the 

statutory language does not frame it as an exception. Sections 18155 and 

18175 both treat the documentary evidence described in this subdivision as 

being “includ[ed]” within the broader category of “any other evidence of an 

increased risk for violence.” (§§ 18155, subd. (b)(2), 18175, subd. (a).) This 

affirmatively suggests that the Legislature intended the phrase “any other 

evidence” to include documentary evidence such as police reports. Moreover, 

we cannot conceive of any rational reason why the Legislature would create a 

narrow hearsay exception just for evidence of alcohol or substance abuse used 

to prove an increased risk for violence, but not for actual threats of harm or 

other evidence used to prove an increased risk for violence.13 To the extent 

the statute is ambiguous, we must construe it to avoid such a capricious

result. (California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Board (1994) 8 

Cal.4th 333, 340.)

12 The dissent quotes a statement made by the Department in its

respondent’s brief that “California’s GVRO law is silent as to the 

admissibility of hearsay in a GVRO hearing . . . .” But the Department later 

submitted a supplemental brief on the hearsay issue at our request. In that 

brief, the Department argued that hearsay evidence is admissible under “the 

plain language” of section 18175 and the reasoning of Kaiser. 

13 For example, why would the Legislature create a special hearsay 

exception for abuse of controlled substances or alcohol (§ 18155, subd. 

(b)(2)(F)), but not for a history of using physical force (id. at subd. (b)(2)(B)) or 

recent acquisition of firearms or ammunition (id. at subd. (b)(2)(G))?
23

Our conclusion that hearsay evidence is admissible in a GVRO hearing

is reinforced by the other factors we relied on in Kaiser. Like a WVRO or 

CHRO proceeding, a GVRO proceeding is “procedurally truncated, expedited, 

and intended to provide quick relief . . . .” (Kaiser, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 557.) These types of proceedings are all intended to prevent a threat of 

harm and designed to take less than a month to litigate from beginning to 

end. They all contemplate an initial ex parte or emergency order to be issued 

immediately for a limited duration of 21 days, followed by a noticed hearing

to be held within 21 days of the initial order for the court to determine 

whether to issue a long-term restraining order. And a GVRO proceeding is 

also “heard by the court, not a jury, and is decided by the clear and 

convincing evidence standard of proof” by judges who “are particularly aware 

of the potential unreliability of hearsay evidence” and “are likely to keep this 

in mind when weighing all of the evidence presented.” (Ibid.)

Not only are these statutory schemes similar in structure and purpose, 

but there is a substantial overlap of subject matter. Specifically, the WVRO 

and CHRO statutes both state that anyone who is subject to one of its 

protective orders “shall not own, possess, purchase, receive, or attempt to 

purchase or receive a firearm or ammunition while the protective order is in 

effect.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 527.6, subd. (u)(1), 527.8, subd. (s)(1).) It would 

be anomalous to conclude that hearsay evidence may be used to obtain such a 

firearm prohibition under the WVRO and CHRO statutes, but not under the 

GVRO statute, which more directly targets gun violence. To resolve any 

ambiguity, we must adopt “the construction which best serves to harmonize 

the statute internally and with related statutes.” (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 

Cal.4th 863, 871, italics added.)
24

Finally, we have reviewed the 2014 legislative history of the GVRO 

statute for guidance. We do not find it to be particularly helpful in deciding 

the question before us. The legislative committee reports shed no meaningful 

light on it.14 We do note, however, that the provision that ultimately became 

section 18175 went through several revisions in the legislative process. The 

language of an early version merely stated that “the court shall consider 

evidence of the facts identified” in what ultimately became section 18155, 

14 One legislative committee report suggests that the GVRO was modeled 

on the domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) statute (Fam. Code, 

§ 6200, et seq.), as well as gun seizure laws in Connecticut, Indiana, and 

Texas. (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Report on Assem. Bill No. 1014 (2013-

2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 11, 2014, pp. 13, 16-19.) However, this 

same report also states that the GVRO statute “differs from the domestic 

violence restraining order system in a variety of ways.” (Id. at p. 22.) In any 

event, neither the DVRO statute nor the case law applying it clearly 

establishes whether hearsay is generally admissible in a DVRO hearing. 

Family Code section 6300, subdivision (a) states that a DVRO may be issued 

“based solely on the affidavit or testimony of the person requesting the 

restraining order.” (Fam. Code, § 6300, subd. (a).) This provision applies to 

any order “issued under this part” (ibid.) (i.e., Part 4 of Division 10 of the 

Family Code), which includes both ex parte DVROs (Fam. Code, §§ 6320-

6327) and DVROs after notice and hearing (Fam. Code, §§ 6340-6347). Thus, 

at least one form of hearsay—affidavits—is admissible in a DVRO hearing. 

(See also Fam. Code, § 6305 subd. (a)(1) [allowing “written evidence of abuse 

or domestic violence” for issuance of mutual DVRO].) Two of the three DVRO 

cases cited by the dissent (all decided after the GVRO statute was enacted) 

merely noted in passing that the trial court had applied the hearsay rule. 

(In re Marriage of Everard (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 109, 115; M.S. v. A.S. (2022) 

76 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1142.) The third found no error in the admission of 

hearsay evidence for a non-hearsay purpose, but did not consider or discuss 

whether the hearsay rule generally applies in a DVRO hearing. (Molinaro v. 

Molinaro (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 824, 828, fn. 3.) We have also examined the 

Connecticut, Indiana, and Texas gun laws and found nothing to assist us in 

resolving the issue before us. (Conn. Gen. Stat., § 29-38c; Ind. Code, § 35-47-

14-1 et seq.; Tex. Health & Saf. Code, § 573.001(h); Tex. Code Crim. Proc., 

Art. 18.191.)
25

subdivision (b)(1) and “may consider evidence of any of the facts identified” in 

what ultimately became section 18155, subdivision (b)(2). (Sen. Amend. to 

Assem. Bill No. 1014 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) June 11, 2014, § 3, ch. 3 [Pen. 

Code, § 18107].) This provision was later amended to state that “the court 

shall consider evidence of the facts identified in” section 18155, subdivision 

(b)(1) and “may consider any other relevant evidence, including, but not 

limited to, evidence of the facts identified in” section 18155, subdivision 

(b)(2). (Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 1014 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) July 2, 

2014, § 3, ch. 4 [Pen. Code, § 18175].) Finally, it was amended again to state 

that “the court shall consider evidence of the facts identified in” section 

18155, subdivision (b)(1) and “may consider any other evidence of an increased 

risk for violence, including, but not limited to, evidence of the facts identified 

in” section 18155, subdivision (b)(2). (Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 1014 

(2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 4, 2014, § 3, ch. 4 [Pen. Code, § 18175].) 

This progression indicates that the Legislature deliberately expanded 

the language of the bill to permit courts to consider not only the specific 

factors listed in section 18155, subdivision (b), but also “any other evidence” 

relevant to show “an increased risk for violence.” (§ 18175, subd. (a).) To the 

extent this history is helpful at all, it bolsters our conclusion that the 

rationale of Kaiser applies here as well.

We recognize that a GVRO proceeding implicates the Second 

Amendment right to bear arms. But the Second Amendment has nothing to 

say about the admissibility of hearsay evidence. The Legislature has 

accounted for the importance of the right at stake by mandating a clear and 

convincing standard of proof. (§ 18175, subd. (b).) The clear and convincing 

evidence standard reduces the risk of error when particularly important 

individual interests are at stake, such as parental rights, involuntary 
26

commitment, and deportation. (Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 752-

766; Weiner v. Fleischman (1991) 54 Cal.3d 476, 487.) Once again, the GVRO 

statute is no different from the WVRO and CHRO statutes in this regard. As 

we have explained, those statutes also implicate the right to possess firearms; 

they also require proof by clear and convincing evidence; and they also allow 

the admission of hearsay evidence or testimony.15 

In sum, to paraphrase our holding in Kaiser: “Considering the fact that 

the purpose of the [GVRO] statute is to prevent [gun] violence . . . , the 

expedited nature of the proceeding contemplated by the statute, and the 

Legislature’s directive that the trial court shall receive [any evidence of an 

increased risk for violence] without qualification, we conclude that the 

[evidence] that a trial court may consider in making a ruling on a petition 

pursuant to [the GVRO statute] is not limited to nonhearsay [evidence].” 

(Kaiser, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 558.) Accordingly, we hold that hearsay 

evidence is admissible in a GVRO hearing under section 18175. At the same 

15 The dissent questions why the Legislature would have required a 

statement under oath for an emergency or ex parte GVRO, but not for a longterm GVRO after noticed hearing. The legislative history does not answer 

this question, but the Legislature may have believed that it was important to 

require a statement under oath for an emergency or ex parte GVRO precisely 

because it recognized that, in contrast to a GVRO after notice and hearing,

the respondent usually will not have sufficient notice and opportunity to

contest the petitioner’s evidence or produce evidence in defense. As noted, an 

emergency or ex parte GVRO may be issued without any evidentiary hearing 

(§§ 18140, 18145, 18155, subd. (a)(2)), and an ex parte GVRO must be issued 

or denied on the day it is filed or the next court day. (§ 18150, subd. (d).) In 

any event, requiring a sworn statement is not the same as forbidding 

hearsay, because an affidavit or declaration is itself hearsay and any sworn 

testimony may also contain additional hearsay. For example, the 

Department here submitted the sworn declaration of Detective Garlow to 

obtain both the temporary GVRO and long-term GVRO, but his declaration 

was based on the attached hearsay police reports.
27

time, we caution that courts must bear in mind “the potential unreliability of 

hearsay evidence, . . . when weighing all of the evidence presented.” (Id. at 

p. 557.)

III

Geoffrey also argues that by considering hearsay evidence, the trial 

court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against 

him. This claim is forfeited because Geoffrey’s hearsay objections in the trial 

court were insufficient to preserve a constitutional claim. (People v. Redd 

(2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 730.) Even if the claim were preserved, however, the 

Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause only applies to criminal proceedings. 

(People v. Sweeney (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 210, 221–222 [confrontation clause 

does not apply to civil commitment proceedings].) The GVRO statute 

“establishes a civil restraining order process” (§ 18100, subd. (a), italics 

added) and is not comparable to a criminal prosecution.

In a civil proceeding, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses 

derives from the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. 

(People v. Orey (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 529, 559.) Geoffrey has not raised any 

due process issue on appeal, nor does the record reflect that he did so in the 

trial court. Even if he had, however, we would also find no due process 

violation. 

When the petitioner calls live witnesses at a GVRO hearing, the 

respondent has a due process right to confront and cross-examine them. (See, 

e.g., CSV Hospitality Management LLC v. Lucas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 117, 

124–125 [right to cross-examine testifying witness at WVRO hearing].) 

Likewise, if the petitioner relies on hearsay evidence, the respondent has a 

due process right to call the hearsay declarants and cross-examine them on 

the stand. (See In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1244 [“in civil 
28

proceedings . . . parties generally have a due process right to cross-examine 

available hearsay declarants”]; see also In re Malinda S. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 

368, 382–385 [holding that when juvenile court relies on hearsay social study 

in dependency proceeding, due process requires that each party receive a copy 

of the report, have the right to subpoena and cross-examine the investigating 

officer and persons whose hearsay statements are contained in the report, 

and be allowed to introduce evidence in rebuttal]; In re Gary U. (1982) 136 

Cal.App.3d 494, 501 [holding that when juvenile court relies on hearsay 

probation report in proceeding to terminate parental rights, parent has right 

to cross-examine not only any law enforcement officer who authored the 

report, but also “the sources from which that person obtained the information 

inserted into the report”].)

Geoffrey is therefore correct that he had a right to cross-examine the 

hearsay declarants as witnesses at the GVRO hearing. (See also § 18121 [no 

fee for subpoena in GVRO proceedings].) But he elected not to assert or 

exercise this right. At the hearing (when Geoffrey was represented by 

counsel), he did not call either the police officers who authored the police 

reports or the reporting parties quoted in the police reports.16 Instead, 

Geoffrey elected to defend himself with his own hearsay exhibits. 

16 Although the names of the reporting parties are redacted from the 

copies of the police reports submitted for the GVRO hearing, Dr. Etchie’s 

report from two months earlier suggests that Geoffrey knew who several of 

them were. Dr. Etchie’s report identified the reporting parties as Geoffrey’s 

pastor and a friend. According to the same report, Geoffrey told Dr. Etchie, 

“My pastor, my friend and my father, they told lies against me.” He said: 

“ ‘Everybody’s against me – my deacon, my pastor, my father, my friend, the 

police . . . .’ ” And even if Geoffrey did not know the identities of all the 

reporting parties, he could have demanded that they be disclosed so that he 

could call them as witnesses and cross-examine them at the GVRO hearing. 

The record contains no suggestion that he did so.
29

Accordingly, we would find no due process violation even if Geoffrey had 

preserved the issue. 

IV

We next consider whether there is sufficient evidence to support the 

trial court’s issuance of the GVRO. A trial court’s factual findings on the 

elements necessary for a restraining order are reviewed for substantial 

evidence. (Technology Credit Union v. Rafat (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 314, 323

(Rafat).) In conducting our substantial evidence review, we must take into 

account the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof mandated by the 

GVRO statute. (§ 18175, subd. (b); Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 

989, 1011–1012 (O.B.); Rafat, at p. 323.)

Clear and convincing evidence requires a finding of high probability. 

(In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 919.) Under this standard, the 

evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt and sufficiently 

strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. (Ibid.)

“When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and 

convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the 

record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact 

finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (O.B., 

supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1011.) We must therefore determine whether the 

record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact

finder could have found it highly probable that Geoffrey posed a “significant 

danger” of gun violence.

17

 (§ 18175, subd. (b)(1).) We “review the record in 

the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate 

17 Geoffrey does not contest the trial court’s finding that “less restrictive 

alternatives [than a GVRO] either have been tried and found to be 

ineffective, or have been determined to be inadequate or inappropriate for the 

current circumstances.” (See § 18175, subd. (b)(2).) 
30

deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of 

witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable 

inferences from the evidence.” (O.B., at pp. 1011–1012.) 

The GVRO statute does not require a high probability that the subject 

will cause gun violence; it only requires a high probability that the subject 

poses a “significant danger” of committing gun violence. (§ 18175, subd. 

(b)(1); see also Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 1014 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) 

August 21, 2014, § 3, ch. 4 [amending final language of § 18175, subd. (b)(1) 

to substitute “significant danger” standard for “will cause” standard].) Both 

the statutory text and legislative history also make clear that the GVRO 

standard requires “a more attenuated showing” of danger than the DVRO 

standard because it does not require “a showing of abuse (physical, mental, or 

threatened) directed at the person seeking the order.” (Sen. Com. on Public 

Safety, Report on Assem. Bill No. 1014 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended 

June 11, 2014, p. 22.)

Applying these legal principles and viewing the entire record in the 

light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we conclude there is sufficient 

evidence to support its finding of a high probability that Geoffrey posed a 

significant danger of committing gun violence. In multiple Facebook posts, 

Geoffrey outlined his false beliefs about Bill Gates and the COVID-19 

vaccine, attempted to gather followers to defend themselves against a 

government takeover, discussed his attempts to stock up on ammunition, and 

encouraged others to do the same. Geoffrey admitted to the police that he 

had been posting on Facebook about Bill Gates killing millions of people and 

told the police that “Bill Gates is a murderer.” Geoffrey also admitted that he 

possessed shotguns and had unsuccessfully attempted to purchase 

ammunition for them at Walmart on the morning of his psychiatric detention. 
31

After his visit to Walmart, Geoffrey called an acquaintance in a “rage, 

ranting about Walmart refusing to sell him firearm ammunition due to him 

coming up in their system as ‘denied.’ ” Geoffrey told this person it was part 

of the “ ‘government[’]s plan’ ” and claimed that “ ‘[p]eople are going to try to 

get me and I need to defend myself.’ ” Geoffrey said he had asked his father 

to fly to California from Ohio to purchase ammunition for him, but his father 

declined. Geoffrey’s father submitted a declaration confirming that Geoffrey 

had called him about purchasing ammunition to defend himself. Geoffrey 

also told another acquaintance, “ ‘I guess I’m just going to have to take things 

into my own hands.’ ” 

In the days leading up to Geoffrey’s psychiatric detention, several 

individuals were so alarmed about his mental health and Facebook posts that 

they made reports to the authorities. These individuals included a clinical 

psychologist, Geoffrey’s pastor, and a friend. One of these individuals said 

“Geoffrey has reported signs of anxiety and paranoia for some time but has 

refused to seek treatment.” According to this person, “Geoffrey’s anxiety, 

delusional thoughts and paranoia ha[ve] rapidly escalated, putting him in a 

panic state.” Geoffrey had expressed to this person “a strong need to defend 

himself with his firearms against a government takeover.”

In his conversation with the police on April 17, 2020, Geoffrey admitted 

he believed Bill Gates “has the spirit of the anti-Christ in him” and compared 

him to the “anti-Christ character” in the “end days” of the Book of Revelation. 

According to Geoffrey, “the things that are being proposed to us are Biblical 

in proportion.” 

The trial court could reasonably infer from the evidence that Geoffrey 

was not forthright with the police about the reason he was trying to purchase 

ammunition. Even though he had posted on Facebook and told others that he 
32

wanted ammunition for his guns to defend himself against a government 

takeover, he told the police it was because supply chains were breaking down 

and he might have to hunt for food. Geoffrey repeatedly evaded the question

and tried to play word games when asked whether he had made statements 

about needing ammunition to defend himself—before finally telling the police 

it was none of their business. 

Geoffrey’s apparent effort to conceal from the police his true reason for 

purchasing ammunition supports a reasonable inference that he felt he had 

something to hide, and that he was not referring to a legally protected form of 

self-defense when he made statements about defending himself against a 

“government takeover.” Notably, there was evidence that Geoffrey believed 

various private parties were also part of the government plot or were out to 

get him, including Bill Gates, the people at Walmart, the staff at Alvarado, 

the police, and his own father, deacon, pastor, and friend.

The police and PERT clinician believed that “Geoffrey was a potential 

danger to others” and placed him on a psychiatric hold under Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 5150. When Geoffrey arrived at the psychiatric 

hospital, he “remained with significant risk of danger to others as a result of 

well-developed and well-organized delusional thought processes about the 

government and various governmental agencies . . . and the philanthropist, 

Bill Gates . . . .” Three days after his initial detention, Geoffrey was certified 

as “a danger to others.” After conducting a psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Etchie 

concluded: “Inpatient psychiatric admission is imperative at this time due to 

the imminent risk of harm to others and the patient’s ability and 

wherewithal to purchase arms and ammunitions and to prevent harm to the 

patient and to others.” In Dr. Etchie’s professional opinion, Geoffrey 

“remain[ed] with significant risk of harm to others, especially, ‘people from 
33

the government and people connected with the Bill Gates vaccine and the 

FBI.’ ”

We acknowledge that the Department’s evidence was hearsay, and we 

take heed of our own admonition that hearsay evidence is potentially

unreliable. But there were several different people who independently called 

authorities with the same concerns about Geoffrey’s mental state and 

attempts to purchase ammunition—none of whom had any evident reason to 

lie. These individuals included Geoffrey’s own pastor and a friend. Their 

concerns were corroborated by Geoffrey’s Facebook posts and his statements 

to the police, which were documented on the 22-minute body-camera video 

Geoffrey himself submitted to the court. Geoffrey also submitted his father’s 

declaration and Dr. Etchie’s psychiatric evaluation report, which further 

corroborated the hearsay evidence submitted by the Department.

18 Moreover, 

Geoffrey had an opportunity to call witnesses to challenge the Department’s 

hearsay evidence at the GVRO hearing. He could have testified himself or he 

could have called the police officers or the reporting parties to confront and 

cross-examine them about the information in the police reports. He could 

also have submitted copies of his own Facebook posts to dispute how they 

18 Geoffrey argues that Dr. Etchie’s psychiatric evaluation report 

contained inaccurate information, including a statement that Geoffrey had “a 

history of severe mental illness” and another that appeared to question 

whether Geoffrey was really an attorney and a real estate practitioner. We 

note that in a separate section of the report entitled “Past Psychiatric 

History,” Dr. Etchie mentioned nothing about Geoffrey having a history of 

mental illness and acknowledged that he denied having any such history. In 

any event, it was for the trial court to assess these alleged discrepancies and 

determine whether they undermined the rest of the report or the credibility 

of Dr. Etchie’s professional opinion that Geoffrey posed a risk of harm to 

others. On appeal, we must presume that the trial court resolved any such 

credibility issues in favor of the Department. (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 

Cal.4th 846, 882–883.) 
34

were described in the police reports. The trial court could fairly infer from 

Geoffrey’s failure to do so that the hearsay evidence in the police reports was 

accurate and reliable. (Evid. Code, § 413; Williamson v. Superior Court

(1978) 21 Cal.3d 829, 835, fn. 2.)

Considered in its totality, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to 

support the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that 

Geoffrey posed a “significant danger” of gun violence. (§ 18175, subd. (b)(1).) 

Because the Department’s hearsay evidence came from multiple sources that 

were consistent with one another, including Geoffrey’s pastor, his friend, his 

own Facebook posts, and Geoffrey himself, and it was corroborated by other 

evidence Geoffrey submitted at the hearing, and not otherwise refuted, we 

conclude that it was sufficiently reliable to support the GVRO.

V

Geoffrey contends that the trial court violated his First Amendment

free speech rights by retaliating against him for expressing “strange beliefs” 

and speaking publicly about buying ammunition. According to Geoffrey, the 

trial court erred “by granting the GVRO based on the content of [his] lawful 

speech.” 

Geoffrey has not preserved this issue for appeal. The trial court’s 

minute order from the GVRO hearing and the GVRO itself do not mention 

anything about a First Amendment issue having been raised by Geoffrey. 

Geoffrey’s settled statement also does not mention the First Amendment or 

state that he raised a First Amendment issue in the trial court. Because the 

record does not demonstrate that any First Amendment issue was raised 

below, we conclude that it was forfeited. In both criminal and civil cases, a 

constitutional claim is generally forfeited by the failure to assert it in the 

trial court. (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590; see also Hepner v. 
35

Franchise Tax Bd. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1486 (Hepner) [“In civil cases, 

constitutional questions not raised in the trial court are considered 

waived.”].)

Even if the issue were preserved, we would reject it on the merits. The 

First Amendment limits the government’s ability to regulate the content of 

speech, but it “does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the 

elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.” (Wisconsin v. Mitchell

(1993) 508 U.S. 476, 489 (Mitchell).) Although Mitchell involved a criminal 

case, the same principle logically applies in a civil proceeding. (Watson v. 

Perry (W.D. Wash. 1996) 918 F.Supp. 1403, 1418; Thomasson v. Perry (E.D. 

Va. 1995) 895 F.Supp. 820, 824.) Nothing in the record supports Geoffrey’s 

claim that the trial court issued the GVRO as retaliation against him for his 

speech or beliefs. Rather, the court made “evidentiary use of [his] speech” to 

determine whether Geoffrey posed a significant danger of gun violence, as 

required by the GVRO statute. (Mitchell, at p. 489.) This did not violate the 

First Amendment.

VI

Geoffrey next argues that the trial court violated his Second 

Amendment right to bear arms by ordering the seizure of his guns. He does 

not assert that the GVRO statute itself violates the Second Amendment, but 

he claims that the trial court erred by considering his lawful exercise of 

Second Amendment rights (i.e., possessing firearms and attempting to 

purchase ammunition) as a basis for issuing the GVRO. 

Once again, neither the minute order from the GVRO hearing nor the 

GVRO itself mentions anything about a Second Amendment issue having 

been raised by Geoffrey. Geoffrey’s settled statement also does not state that 

he raised a Second Amendment issue in the trial court. The settled 
36

statement refers to the Second Amendment only in describing the issues 

Geoffrey intended to raise on appeal. Thus, we conclude that Geoffrey 

forfeited the Second Amendment issue for appeal. (Hepner, supra, 52 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1486.)

Even if the issue were preserved, we would reject it on the merits for 

the same reason we have rejected his First Amendment claim. Even if 

Geoffrey’s conduct was protected by the Second Amendment, the trial court 

was entitled to make evidentiary use of his possession of firearms and his 

attempts to purchase ammunition—along with other relevant evidence—in 

deciding whether he posed a significant danger of gun violence under the 

GVRO statute. Like the First Amendment, the Second Amendment “does not 

prohibit the evidentiary use” of protected conduct as part of the proof to 

establish the required elements in a criminal or civil proceeding. (Mitchell, 

supra, 508 U.S. at p. 489.) Otherwise, the Second Amendment would prohibit 

the prosecution in a murder case from presenting evidence that the defendant 

lawfully possessed a firearm matching the murder weapon. Accordingly, we 

reject Geoffrey’s argument that the trial court violated the Second 

Amendment by considering his lawful possession of firearms and his attempt 

to purchase ammunition in deciding whether he posed a significant danger of 

gun violence.

VII

Finally, Geoffrey argues that he was wrongly entered into the state and 

federal firearms and ammunition background check databases. But the trial 

court made no such order in the GVRO proceeding. We only have jurisdiction 

to review the order Geoffrey is appealing; we do not have jurisdiction to 

address other wrongs allegedly committed against him by unknown parties. 

We therefore decline to decide this issue.
37

DISPOSITION

The one-year GVRO is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs on 

appeal.19

BUCHANAN, J.

I CONCUR:

AARON, Acting P. J.

19 We deny Geoffrey’s request for sanctions against the City Attorney 

made for the first time in his supplemental brief. 
Dato, J., Dissenting.

This case presents a classic question of statutory interpretation. When 

it enacted the gun violence restraining order (GVRO) statutes in 2014 (Stats. 

2014, ch. 872 (Assem. Bill No. 1014)), did the Legislature intend that all 

forms of hearsay evidence should be admissible without limitation in a 

noticed hearing seeking a GVRO? The Legislature’s intent with respect to 

the meaning of a statute is not always crystal clear, and in this instance it 

might be better characterized as opaque. It is therefore hardly surprising 

that reasonable judges might disagree.

There is, however, a more fundamental question that will have much to 

say about how we ultimately decide what the Legislature intended and what 

the statutes mean. That is because the Legislature itself has provided a 

framework within which we are to analyze questions about the admissibility 

of hearsay. Evidence Code section 1200, subdivision (b) succinctly states the 

generally applicable rule, “Except as provided by law, hearsay evidence is 

inadmissible.” The issue we must decide is whether, in the case of GVROs, 

the Legislature has otherwise “provided by law” for an exception. And to 

determine if the Legislature intended an exception, we must first understand 

the general rule.

 The rule against hearsay evidence exists for one overriding and crucial 

purpose: To make sure results in the courtroom are based on the truth. To 

expose innocent fibs, outright falsehoods, and all types of fabrications in 

between, witnesses are ordinarily required to personally appear in court, 

affirm to tell the truth, and be subject to cross-examination. (See California 

v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149, 158.) Courts have long recognized the 

importance of cross-examination and its crucial role in ferreting out the 
2

truth. (In re Brenda M. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 772, 777 [“ ‘Crossexamination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness 

and the truth of his testimony are tested.’ ”].) 

But it is impossible to cross-examine a witness who isn’t there. And in 

this case, the deputy city attorney who appeared at the hearing merely 

offered the court San Diego Police Department (Department) reports that 

memorialized several police contacts with Geoffrey S. at his home over the 

course of a week in April 2020, near the beginning of the COVID-19 

pandemic. In addition to the observations of officers, these reports included 

statements made by other, sometimes unidentified, persons. They also 

summarized Facebook posts allegedly made by Geoffrey but did not attach 

copies. At the same time, the Department’s presentation ignored—or at least 

significantly downplayed—the numerous factual errors in the psychiatric 

hospital’s intake report,1as well as the fact that the hearing officer who 

ultimately dismissed the Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 hold 

concluded that Geoffrey had “no known history of diagnosis or treatment” for 

mental illness and “does not have a mental disorder.”2

Critically, not a single witness testified at the hearing, not even the 

officers who authored the reports. The deputy city attorney merely argued 

that the reports proved by clear and convincing evidence that a one-year 

1 The report stated that Geoffrey “has a history of severe mental illness” 

and was “eventually apprehended by police officers,” neither of which was 

true. As evidence of his delusional mental state, the physician wrote, “The 

patient continues to insist that he is an attorney and a real estate 

practitioner,” which were both true.

2 Noting that “ ‘millions of Americans’ ” hold similar strange beliefs, the 

hearing officer rhetorically asked hospital staff, “ ‘Do you believe that 

everyone who has opinions similar to those held by [Geoffrey] should be 

incarcerated in mental institutions?’ ” 
3

GVRO should issue. The court’s minute order simply states, “The petitioner 

has proved the case by a Clear and Convincing Evidence per California Penal 

Code section 18157 (c)(d).”3

The inability to employ cross-examination to expose “the many possible 

deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and untrustworthiness” of hearsay 

evidence is the crux of the rule prohibiting it. (See Buchanan v. Nye (1954) 

128 Cal.App.2d 582, 585.) Indeed, although Geoffrey (who is selfrepresented) has not framed his appeal in due process terms, “in ‘almost 

every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process 

requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.’ ”

4

(Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. County of San Luis Obispo (2008) 

167 Cal.App.4th 705, 711.) In short, both the Legislature and the courts of 

this state have repeatedly recognized that the rule prohibiting the admission 

of hearsay evidence is of fundamental importance in assuring a fair hearing.5 

3 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 

Because there is no section 18157, I assume the statutory reference is a 

typographical error and the court in its minute order intended to cite section 

18175.

 

4 The majority dismisses any due process concerns by pointing out that a 

respondent can always subpoena hearsay declarants in order to crossexamine them. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 28.) Not only is this reasoning broad 

enough to swallow the entire hearsay rule, but it also would effectively shift

the burden to respondents to prove that their possession of firearms does not

create an unreasonable risk of injury to others. 

5 And this is not just a narrow California issue. The GVRO procedures 

(Pen. Code, § 18100 et seq.) are California’s version of what is known 

nationally as an Extreme Risk Protection Order (ERPO) or “Red Flag” law. 

In June 2022, Congress passed and the President signed the Bipartisan Safer 

Communities Act (Pub.L. No. 117-159). Among other things, this legislation 

provides grants to states to fund ERPO programs. As a condition of receiving 
4

To be sure, Evidence Code section 1200 itself recognizes that exceptions to 

the hearsay rule are sometimes appropriate and that the Legislature can 

“provide” for them. But given the importance of the rule, we should not 

lightly imply exceptions or assume the Legislature meant to create them, 

especially where they are based on ambiguous and diaphanous suggestions of 

legislative purpose. 

To decide if the Legislature wanted to create an exception to the 

hearsay rule in this case, we would normally begin by examining the words of 

the statute as the “ ‘the most reliable indications of the Legislature’s intent.’ ” 

(Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 83, quoting 

Cummins, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 478, 487.) We would 

construe those words in context, resolving uncertainties or ambiguities by 

reference to extrinsic aids such as legislative history and taking into 

consideration the Legislature’s purposes in enacting the legislation. (Ibid.; 

see also Walker v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 177, 194 (Walker).) 

In my view, the majority opinion starts down the wrong path in its first 

sentence by focusing on Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Wilson (2011) 201 

Cal.App.4th 550 (Kaiser)—a case that dealt with dissimilar language in an 

entirely different statute—instead of looking to the words of the GVRO 

statute, section 18175. Bypassing the relevant statutory language may be 

understandable. As the Department candidly concedes, “California’s GVRO 

funding, these state laws must meet certain due process requirements, 

including “heightened evidentiary standards and proof” that “prevent 

reliance upon evidence that is unsworn or unaffirmed, irrelevant, based on 

inadmissible hearsay, unreliable, vague, speculative, and lacking a 

foundation.” (34 U.S.C. § 10152(a)(1)(I)(iv)(III), italics added.) In other 

words, the majority opinion construes California law as allowing what federal 

law says must be excluded as a matter of due process—otherwise 

inadmissible hearsay—in order to qualify for federal funding.
5

law is silent as to the admissibility of hearsay in a GVRO hearing . . . .” 

Certainly “[n]othing in the language of the [statute] indicates the Legislature 

created an explicit hearsay exception to allow hearsay” in noticed hearings 

requesting a GVRO. (See Walker, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 195.) Indeed, the 

word “hearsay” never appears in section 18175. Neither is there any 

statement indicating that the usual “rules of evidence” do not apply. (Walker, 

at p. 200.) Had the Legislature intended a broad hearsay exception, it would 

have been a simple matter to say so. It did not. And this, in itself, should 

give us pause.

The majority opinion avoids grappling with these difficult issues by 

suggesting this case is just like Kaiser. But is it? Kaiser involved Code of 

Civil Procedure section 527.8, subdivision (j), which provides that at the 

hearing for a workplace violence restraining order, “the judge shall receive 

any testimony that is relevant . . . .” (Italics added.) Did the Legislature 

mean by this that relevance is the only criterion for admissibility, or simply 

that the court should consider any relevant testimony that is otherwise

admissible? Even the conditional language of the opinion suggests the 

answer is less than clear. (Kaiser, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 557 

[“Subdivision (f) of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 527.8 appears to be one of 

the exceptions to Evidence Code section 1200, subdivision (b)” (italics 

added)].) There is no mention of legislative history, and the opinion 

acknowledges that “we have found very little guidance in the case law.” 

(Kaiser, at pp. 556‒557.) Nonetheless, according to Kaiser, the “plain 

language of this provision” means that the Legislature “intended to permit a 

trial court to consider all relevant evidence, including hearsay, when deciding 

whether to issue an injunction to prevent workplace violence pursuant to 

section 527.8.” (Kaiser, at p. 557.) 
6

Even if we accept that proposition,6the language of the GVRO statute 

is quite different from that used in Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8, 

subdivision (j). As noted in Kaiser, a direction to the trial court to “receive

any testimony that is relevant” at least “suggests” a rule of admissibility 

where relevance is the only standard. (Kaiser, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 557, italics added.) In contrast, section 18175, which governs noticed 

hearings seeking a GVRO, merely says that the trial court “shall consider 

evidence” of certain factors listed in a different statute (§ 18155, subd. (b)(1)) 

and “may consider any other evidence of an increased risk for violence . . . .” 

(§ 18175, subd. (a).) There is no articulated standard for admissibility, 

relevance or otherwise. In my view, this is hardly language that manifests a 

clear legislative intent to abandon the hearsay rule and its crucial role in 

assuring a fair hearing. 

There are other critical differences in the two statutory schemes. Code 

of Civil Procedure section 527.8, the workplace violence restraining order 

statute, provides for issuance of a temporary restraining order if the 

petitioner submits a declaration “show[ing] reasonable proof that an 

employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence by 

6 There is one part of the Kaiser analysis that especially concerns me. 

The statutory language relied on to establish an exception to the hearsay rule 

tells the court to “receive any testimony that is relevant.” (Code of Civ. Proc.,

§ 527.8, subd. (j), italics added.) In reaching its conclusion, the opinion 

substitutes “evidence” for “testimony” so that it purports to hold that all 

relevant evidence is admissible. (Kaiser, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 557.) 

But while all testimony may be evidence, not all evidence is testimony and 

the Legislature is presumed to know the difference. (In re Jessica B. (1989) 

207 Cal.App.3d 504, 518.) At best, then, Code of Civil Procedure section 

527.8 should be read to permit in-court testimony that includes hearsay 

statements. And in-court testimony was precisely what was missing from the 

hearing in this case.
7

the respondent, and that great or irreparable harm would result to an 

employee.” (Id., subd. (e).) The GVRO statutes similarly provide for issuance 

of temporary orders of limited duration prior to a formal hearing, but they 

specify two different types of temporary orders—emergency and ex parte—

and identify in considerably greater detail what has to be submitted and how 

that submission will be evaluated. Different standards also apply to 

temporary orders as compared to orders issued after a noticed hearing. 

Because a request for a GVRO can arise in a variety of factual 

settings—from a crisis requiring an immediate response to a low level 

possible future threat and everything in between, there are different 

standards and evidentiary rules depending on the exigency and duration of 

the restraining order. For example, a 21-day “emergency” GVRO may (and 

as a practical matter almost always will) issue on nothing but the hearsay 

affidavit of the law enforcement officer who responded to the crisis. 

(§ 18125.) Slightly less urgent, a 21-day “ex parte” GVRO can issue at the 

request of someone other than a law enforcement officer. (§ 18150.) In-court 

testimony is generally required; however, the court has discretion to allow an 

affidavit instead. (§ 18155, subd. (a)(1)‒(2).) Finally, a long term restraining 

order lasting up to five years—the type we deal with in this case—can issue 

only after a noticed hearing. The table below summarizes these distinctions:
8

Standard 

for Issuing 

the GVRO

Emergency Ex Parte Noticed Hearing

Reasonable cause 

to believe the 

subject poses an 

immediate and 

present danger of 

gun violence. 

(§ 18125, subd. 

(a)(1).)

A substantial 

likelihood that the 

subject poses a 

significant 

danger, in the 

near future, of 

gun violence. 

(§ 18150, subd. 

(b)(1).)

The subject poses a 

significant danger

of gun violence. 

(§ 18175, subd. 

(b)(1).)

Scope of 

Admissible 

Evidence

Hearsay affidavit 

of law 

enforcement 

officer admissible. 

(§§ 18125, subd. 

(a), 18140, subd. 

(a).)

Oral testimony in 

court or affidavit 

under oath, plus 

“any additional 

information 

provided to the 

court . . . .” 

(§§ 18150, subds. 

(b), 18155, subd. 

(a)(2).)

The court “shall 

consider evidence 

of the facts 

identified” in 

section 18155, 

subdivision (b)(1) 

and “may consider 

any other evidence 

of an increased 

risk for 

violence . . . .” 

(§ 18175, subd. 

(a).)

 

In general, as the urgency decreases, the need to dispense with 

evidentiary rules and procedural protections should decrease as well. Both 

types of temporary orders provided for in the statute require, at a minimum, 

a statement under oath. In the case of the “emergency” order where the 

urgency is the greatest, a limited class of persons (a law enforcement officer) 

is permitted to submit an affidavit. The slightly-less-urgent “ex parte” order 

can be requested by a broader class of petitioners but, generally speaking, 

requires in-court testimony under oath before the judge. 
9

Yet the interpretation of section 18175 proffered by the majority turns 

this apparent logic on its head by applying the least restrictive evidentiary 

rule—all hearsay is admissible without the necessity of any testimony or 

affidavit under oath—to the proceeding with the least exigency, a request to 

issue a restraining order after a noticed hearing.7 Wouldn’t we expect just 

the opposite—more relaxed evidentiary rules to obtain a temporary 

emergency order, to be confirmed at a formal hearing with the usual and 

customary evidentiary protections? To put it another way, if the Legislature 

intended that nothing more than an unsworn police report would permit 

issuance of an order suspending for five years a citizen’s constitutionally 

protected property interest, why would it require substantially more—i.e., a 

sworn affidavit or in-court testimony—to issue a 21-day temporary order 

addressing a demonstrable exigency? 

It is true that as to one narrow category of hearsay evidence in GVRO 

proceedings, the Legislature did recognize an explicit exception to the 

hearsay rule. Subdivision (b)(2)(F) of section 18155 expressly permits the 

court to consider “[d]ocumentary evidence, including, but not limited to, 

police reports and records of convictions, of either recent criminal offenses by 

the subject of the petition that involve controlled substances or alcohol or 

ongoing abuse of controlled substances or alcohol by the subject of the 

petition.” The majority opinion construes this express hearsay exception as a 

7 By the time of the noticed hearing in this case, the Department was 

making no claim of any exigency or imminent risk of gun violence. Indeed, 

although the settled statement is not completely clear, at oral argument the 

parties specifically agreed that while Geoffrey was confined in the psychiatric 

hospital, his shotguns were seized by police. (See generally §§ 1524, subd. 

(a)(14), 1542.5.) Moreover, the Department offered no evidence that Geoffrey 

made any threats after his release from the psychiatric hospital following the 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 hold.
10

“signal” that the terms “evidence” and “any other evidence” in section 18175 

include hearsay evidence. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 21‒22.) I believe the more 

compelling inference is that the Legislature never intended hearsay to be 

fully admissible under section 18175, subdivision (a). If it had, there would 

be no need to carve out a specific hearsay exception for documentary 

evidence, and the exception under section 18155, subd. (b)(2)(F) would be 

superfluous. 

Anticipating this inference, the majority suggests there is no “rational 

reason” why the Legislature would create a narrow hearsay exception for 

evidence of alcohol or substance abuse, but not for threats of harm or other 

evidence of an increased risk for violence. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 22.) But the 

language of section 18155, subdivision (b)(2)(F)—creating a very narrow 

exception—is clear and unambiguous. As to why it is narrow, there is 

already a well-recognized hearsay exception in the Evidence Code for a party 

admission. (Evid. Code, § 1220.) Thus, so long as a percipient witness 

testifies at the hearing (e.g., “I heard the defendant threaten to harm X”), 

that testimony would not be made inadmissible by the hearsay rule. It is not 

that the Evidence Code makes it too difficult for the Department to prove its 

case. The problem here is that the Department—the party with the burden 

of proof by clear and convincing evidence—failed to offer a single witness to 

testify to any aspect of any supposed threat.

There is yet an additional reason why I find it difficult to interpret the 

language of section 18175 as demonstrating the Legislature’s intent to create 

a wholesale hearsay exception for GVROs issued after a noticed hearing. 

Kaiser was decided in 2011, nearly three years before the 2014 passage of 

Assembly Bill No. 1014 that created the GVRO procedures. Right or wrong, 

by 2014 Kaiser provided an established blueprint for creating a broad 
11

hearsay exception in the context of restraining orders. The statute need only 

provide that the court shall receive and consider “any testimony that is 

relevant.” 

In drafting Assembly Bill No. 1014, however, the Legislature did not 

adopt that language or otherwise use Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8 as 

a model. Indeed, the legislative history reflects that the authors modeled 

their bill not on the workplace violence legislation at issue in Kaiser, but 

rather on the Family Code’s domestic violence restraining order statutes 

enacted many years earlier. (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, conc. of Assem. Bill 

No. 1014 (2013‒2014 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 29, 2014, p. 7 com.) This is readily 

apparent in the common structure of the two statutory schemes. Like the 

GVRO process, the domestic violence statutes provide for (1) emergency 

restraining orders, (2) ex parte orders, and (3) orders issued after a noticed 

hearing. (See Fam. Code, § 6250 [compare with Pen. Code, § 18125]; Fam. 

Code, §§ 6300, subd. (a), 6320 [compare with Pen. Code, §§ 18150‒18165]; and 

Fam. Code, § 6340 [compare with Pen. Code, §§ 18170‒18197].) Significantly, 

courts have applied the hearsay rule, or assumed it applied, in noticed 

hearings for domestic violence restraining orders. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of 

Everard (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 109, 115 [noting that certain documentary 

evidence was received “under the business records exception to the hearsay 

rule” and its contents were admissible under the exception for party 

admissions]; Molinaro v. Molinaro (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 824, 828, fn. 3 [trial 

court applied hearsay rule in a domestic violence restraining order hearing]; 

M.S. v. A.S. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1142 [trial court sustained hearsay 

objections in domestic violence restraining order hearing].)
12

Where the Legislature has crafted a rule of general application, based 

on principles of due process, that it has expressly decreed should be applied 

except as provided otherwise, we should be certain the Legislature has in fact 

provided otherwise. Unlike the majority, I find the evidence of such a 

legislative intent in the GVRO statutes thin and unconvincing at best. And 

the Kaiser decision, interpreting a different statute addressing a different 

issue using different language, cannot supply what the Legislature has failed 

to provide. 

DATO, J.