alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Otis McCALL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2348.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.

June 30, 1969.

*371Otis McCall, in pro. per.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and J. Terrell Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

McCall, appellant, appeals from an order denying a Rule 1.850, 33 F.S.A., motion to vacate a conviction and sentence.

McCall alleges that his plea of guilty on an information of robbery was not free and voluntary. He charges misrepresentation by the trial judge, and promises by police officials were made to induce and coerce his plea of guilty. No hearing was granted McCall by the trial court nor were the allegations made by McCall refuted.

Fact questions raised by petitioner on a Rule 1.850 motion or unrefuted claims of a coerced plea of guilty entitle petitioner to a hearing by the trial court. Jones v. State, Fla.App.1964, 165 So.2d 191; Bennett v. State, Fla.App.1967, 203 So.2d 211.

McCall also claims that he is entitled to be appointed counsel on his Rule 1.850 motion. There is no absolute organic right to counsel in Rule 1.850 motions and only when complicated circumstances are present and potentially due process may be denied may a trial judge, in his discretion, appoint counsel in a post conviction proceeding. State v. Weeks, Fla.1964, 166 So.2d 892; Harper v. State, Fla.1967, 201 So.2d 65.

We reverse and remand to the trial court so that a complete and prompt hearing be granted on petitioner’s claims and leave to the trial judge the discretion to appoint counsel if he deems it necessary under the circumstances.

WALDEN, C. J., and CROSS and Mc-CAIN, JJ., concur.
# Euroopa Liidu C 83I/2021

| | ISSN 1977-0898 |
| --- | --- |
| Euroopa Liidu
  Teataja | C 083I |
| | |
| Eestikeelne väljaanne | Teave ja teatised | 64. aastakäik12. märts 2021 |

ISSN 1977-0898

Euroopa Liidu

Teataja

C 083I

Eestikeelne väljaanne

Teave ja teatised

64. aastakäik12. märts 2021

---

| Sisukord | Lehekülg |
| --- | --- |
| | IV   Teave |
| | TEAVE LIIKMESRIIKIDELT |
| 2021/C 83 I/01 | Liikmesriikide edastatud teave püügikeelu kehtestamise kohta | 1 |

Sisukord

Lehekülg

IV   Teave

TEAVE LIIKMESRIIKIDELT

2021/C 83 I/01

Liikmesriikide edastatud teave püügikeelu kehtestamise kohta

1

---

| ET | |
| --- | --- |

ET

---

IV Teave

TEAVE LIIKMESRIIKIDELT

| 12.3.2021 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | CI 83/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.3.2021

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

CI 83/1

---

Liikmesriikide edastatud teave püügikeelu kehtestamise kohta

(2021/C 83 I/01)

Kooskõlas nõukogu 20. novembri 2009. aasta määruse (EÜ) nr 1224/2009 (millega luuakse liidu kontrollisüsteem ühise kalanduspoliitika eeskirjade järgimise tagamiseks) (1) artikli 35 lõikega 3 on vastu võetud otsus kehtestada püügikeeld vastavalt järgmisele tabelile:

| Püügikeelu kehtestamise kuupäev ja kellaaeg | 24.12.2020 |
| --- | --- |
| Kestus | 24.12.2020–31.12.2020 |
| Liikmesriik | Portugal |
| Kalavaru või kalavarude rühm | ALB/AN05N |
| Liik | Põhjapoolne pikkuim-tuun (Thunnus alalunga) |
| Püügipiirkond | Atlandi ookean, põhja pool 5° põhjalaiust |
| Kalalaevade tüüp/tüübid | --- |
| Viitenumber | 40/TQ123 |

Püügikeelu kehtestamise kuupäev ja kellaaeg

24.12.2020

Kestus

24.12.2020–31.12.2020

Liikmesriik

Portugal

Kalavaru või kalavarude rühm

ALB/AN05N

Liik

Põhjapoolne pikkuim-tuun (Thunnus alalunga)

Püügipiirkond

Atlandi ookean, põhja pool 5° põhjalaiust

Kalalaevade tüüp/tüübid

---

Viitenumber

40/TQ123

---

(1)  ELT L 343, 22.12.2009, lk 1.

---
254 La. 914

#### In the Interest of Henry Bart PALMISANO, Jr.

No. 50238.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 2, 1969.

In re: Henry Bart Palmisano, Jr., applying for writs of prohibition, certiorari and mandamus.

Application denied. The ruling complained of is correct.
#### Willard Lee BURNS, Petitioner, v. CITY OF MIAMI, Department of Water and Sewers, et al., Respondents.

No. 40889.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 21, 1971.

Certiorari denied.

ERVIN, Acting C. J., and CARLTON, ADKINS, BOYD and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
1

The Honorable Patrick J. Schiltz, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-1966

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Isaac Vuittonet, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: December 5, 2007

Filed: December 12, 2007

___________

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Isaac Vuittonet appeals the 210-month prison term that the district court1

imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 846. He argues that his sentence is

unreasonable because the district court overvalued the seriousness of his criminal

history, the theoretical deterrent effect of imposing a lengthy sentence, and the

generalized need to avoid sentence disparities. 
-2-

When the applicable Guidelines range is undisputed, as it is here, we consider

whether the sentence is unreasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. See

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261-62 (2005); United States v. Haack, 403

F.3d 997, 1003 (8th. Cir. 2005). We conclude that Vuittonet’s sentence at the bottom

of the advisory Guidelines range is not unreasonable. The record shows that the

district court considered only relevant factors--including Vuittonet’s prior convictions

and probationary sentences for possessing large amounts of marijuana, his

commission of this even more serious offense while on probation, and the need to

deter such activity--and we see no clear error of judgment in the court’s weighing of

those factors. See United States v. Harris, 493 F.3d 928, 932 (8th Cir. 2007) (sentence

within advisory Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable); Haack, 403 F.3d at

1003-04 (describing how court may abuse its discretion in its consideration of

sentencing factors); see also United States v. Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007)

(approving appellate presumption of reasonableness).

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________
EXHIBIT 32.2


                           SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION


     In connection with the Quarterly Report of Sierra Resource Group, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ending September 30, 2007 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, Paul W. Andre, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

     (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.


Date: October 17, 2007



                                        By: /s/ PAUL W. ANDRE
                                            ___________________________
                                                Paul W. Andre
                                                Treasurer and
                                                Chief Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<CIK>                         0000943906
<NAME>                        WNC HOUSING TAX CREDIT FUND V, L.P., SERIES4
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     US DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              MAR-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                           3,460,935
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                            0
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 3,460,935
<PP&E>                                                   0
<DEPRECIATION>                                           0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  18,871,377
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                    0
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                                 0
<OTHER-SE>                                      17,507,376
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    18,871,377
<SALES>                                                  0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                    39,963
<CGS>                                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                       39,377
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   249,437
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                       0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (248,851)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (248,851)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (248,851)
<EPS-BASIC>                                       (11.20)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                            0




</TABLE>
#### Jimmie Lee JACKSON, et ux., and Abraham Logan, et ux., Appellants, v. Ernest O. HODGE, Sr., Appellee.

No. 69-190.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District.

Oct. 2, 1969.

Appeal dismissed.
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission

LOG OF MEETING

SUBJECT: ASTM F15.21 Soft Infant and Toddler Carriers

DATE OF MEETING: September 26, 2013

LOG ENTRY SOURCE: vja

DATE OF LOG ENTRY: 1/16/13

LOCATION: ASTM HQ, West Conshohocken, PA

CPSC ATTENDEE(S): Patty Edwards, Vince Amodeo, Jonathan Midgett, Suad 

Wanna-Nakamura, Hope Nestaruk

NON-CPSC ATTENDEE(S): Various

SUMMARY OF MEETING: The meeting was called to order.

The meeting agenda was approved.

The previous meeting minutes were approved.

Results of recent F15 (13-07) ballot items were reviewed.

Ballot closed 9/22/13.

Balloted items proposed clarifications to:

1. Instructional information text height.

2. Fastener load testing strap slip requirements.

3. Fastener load testing exempted fasteners.

No negatives were received.
Ballot was approved.

New revision to be published as ASTM F2236-13a.

No new hazard patterns were observed in review of new incidents.

A task group was formed to review the need to further delineate between 

products that could be considered soft carriers or sling type products.

A discussion ensued as to whether certain fasteners that are used to adjust head 

support are considered exempt from fastener load testing. The subcommittee 

determined that they are not load bearing and should be exempt.

As a result of discussion, the subcommittee chair agreed to prepare a new ballot 

to add the term "head adjustment fasteners" to the list of fasteners exempt from 

load testing. The proposed change would be sent to ballot asap.

Future meeting schedule for week of April 2014.

Meeting was adjourned.
#### FLORIDA GLASS & MIRROR COMPANY OF ORLANDO, INC., Appellant, v. ECONOMY KING EQUIPMENT COMPANY et al., Appellees.

No. 76-2586.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Dec. 13, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 17, 1978.

*597Robert B. Worman of Waterhouse & Worman, Orlando, for appellant.

Robert G. Murrell of Sam E. Murrell & Sons, Orlando, for Appellee-Economy King Equipment Co.

ALDERMAN, Chief Judge.

We have considered the issues raised by the appellant and cross-appellant in this mechanic’s lien foreclosure case and find no reversible error. We also grant appellee’s motion for attorney’s fees.

The award of attorney’s fees merits discussion. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975), provides for recovery of attorney’s fees by the prevailing party in any action brought to enforce a mechanic’s lien. The Supreme Court in *Sunbeam Enterprises, Inc. v. Upthegrove,*316 So.2d 34 (Fla.1975), held that Section 713.29 referred only to attorney’s fees at the trial level and did not provide for the allowance of such fees on appeal. Since that time the Legislature has enacted an amended version of Section 59.-46, Florida Statutes, which took effect on October 1, 1977. (Chapter 77-76, Laws of Florida.)

> In the absence of an expressed contrary intent, any provision of statute or contract entered into after October 1, 1977, providing for the payment of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party, shall be construed to include the payment of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party on appeal. Section 59.46(1), Florida Statutes (1977)

We conclude that the phrase, “entered into after October 1, 1977,” refers only to contracts and has no bearing on the time of enactment of statutes. We therefore hold that Section 713.29 when construed in the light of Section 59.46 now permits recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees by the prevailing party on appeal.

Because the amended version of Section 59.46 took effect on October 1,1977, and this court’s determination of this appeal occurred after that date, the appellee, as the prevailing party, is entitled to the payment of reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal. The law in effect at the time of appellate disposition is to be applied. *Guth*v. *Guth,*346 So.2d 81 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).

Affirmed and remanded to the trial court for the determination and award of reasonable attorney’s fees to appellee as the prevailing party on appeal.

AFFIRMED and REMANDED.

DOWNEY and LETTS, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1

<S>                         <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>               YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                  JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                    DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                              525,356
<SECURITIES>                                              0
<RECEIVABLES>                                     1,125,791
<ALLOWANCES>                                         38,306
<INVENTORY>                                          70,157
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                  1,711,415
<PP&E>                                            1,422,746
<DEPRECIATION>                                      785,754
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                    3,873,219
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             3,731,091
<BONDS>                                                   0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                     0
<PREFERRED>                                       2,250,000
<COMMON>                                         16,910,544
<OTHER-SE>                                     (19,072,304)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                      3,873,219
<SALES>                                           2,958,160
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                  2,958,160
<CGS>                                             2,885,255
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                     8,466,869
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                          0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                          0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  227,567
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (5,678,215)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (5,678,215)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (5,678,215)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        (1.06)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        (1.06)



</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32


   Certification of Chief Executive Officer and Acting Chief Financial Officer
            pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to
                 Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.


                                  CERTIFICATION
                                  -------------

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Bancorp International Group, Inc. a
Nevada corporation (the "Company"), on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended
September 30, 2000 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, the Chief Executive Officer and
Chief Financial Officer, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350 as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to my
knowledge and upon a review of the Report that:

(1) the Report of the Company filed today pursuant to Section 13(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

This certification is based upon, among other things, my responsibilities as
Chief Executive Officer, my own due diligence and representations made by
certain members of the Company's senior management.


Dated: December 23, 2005                          /s/ Tom Megas
                                                  ---------------------------
                                                  Tom Megas
                                                  Chief Executive Officer and
                                                  Acting Chief Financial Officer
Case 4:06-cv-00427-JEJ Document 10 Filed 07/17/06 Page 1 of 7
Case 4:06-cv-00427-JEJ Document 10 Filed 07/17/06 Page 2 of 7
Case 4:06-cv-00427-JEJ Document 10 Filed 07/17/06 Page 3 of 7
Case 4:06-cv-00427-JEJ Document 10 Filed 07/17/06 Page 4 of 7
Case 4:06-cv-00427-JEJ Document 10 Filed 07/17/06 Page 5 of 7
Case 4:06-cv-00427-JEJ Document 10 Filed 07/17/06 Page 6 of 7
Case 4:06-cv-00427-JEJ Document 10 Filed 07/17/06 Page 7 of 7
#### Willie May SMITH, Petitioner, v. LUCILLE’S MARKET et al., Respondents.

No. 40426.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 25, 1971.

Certiorari denied.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
1 The Honorable Patrick J. Schiltz, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 07-1966

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Minnesota. Isaac Vuittonet, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: December 5, 2007 Filed: December 12, 2007

___________ Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Isaac Vuittonet appeals the 210-month prison term that the district court 1 imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 846. He argues that his sentence is unreasonable because the district court overvalued the seriousness of his criminal history, the theoretical deterrent effect of imposing a lengthy sentence, and the generalized need to avoid sentence disparities.-2- When the applicable Guide lines range is undisputed, as it is here, we consider whether the sentence is unreasonable in lightof the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 261-62 (2005); United States v. Haack , 403 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th. Cir. 2005). We conclude that Vuittonet’s sentence at the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range is not unreasonable. The record shows that the district court considered only relevant f actors--including Vuittonet’s prior convictions and probationary sentences for possessing large amounts of marijuana, his commission of this even more serious offense while on probation, and the need to deter such activity--and we see no clear erro r of judgment in the court’s weighing of those factors. See United States v. Harris , 493 F.3d 928, 932 (8th Cir. 2007) (sentence within advisory Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable); Haack , 403 F.3d at 1003-04 (describing how court may abuse it s discretion in its consideration of sentencing factors); see also United States v. Rita , 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007) (approving appellate presumption of reasonableness).
The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________
#### Ivory SIMMONS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-995.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

June 2, 1970.

Pollack & Barone and Neale J. Poller, Miami Beach, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Melvin Grossman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant was convicted of the crimes of robbery and assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree by the trial court.

The defendant was charged by information with robbery and assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree. He pleaded not guilty and waived jury trial. The trial judge found the defendant guilty on both counts and sentenced him to terms of twenty and ten years in the State penitentiary, to run concurrently. Defendant’s motion for new trial was denied and this appeal followed.

Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction on the ground that the state failed to present legally sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the perpetrator of the crimes for which he was convicted.

The judgment of conviction arrives in this court with a presumption of correctness. Crum v. State, Fla.App.1965, 172 So.2d 24; Bruton v. State, Fla.App.1969, 220 So.2d 669. It is our duty to examine the record to see if there is substantial competent evidence to support the findings of the trier of the facts.

*148We have carefully considered appellant’s point on appeal, in the light of the record, briefs and argument of counsel and have concluded that the record contains evidence sufficient to support the findings of the trier of the facts. State v. Sebastian, Fla.1965, 171 So.2d 893.

Affirmed.
#### ALTER SALES CO., Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. DETROIT ALUMINUM & BRASS CORPORATION, a corporation, Appellee.

No. 69-853.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 28, 1970.

Rehearing Denied May 22, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.