Research Report 1203

REALTRAIN VALIDATiON FOR RIFLE SQUADS II:

TACTiCAL PERFORMANCE

Larry L. Meliza, Thomas D. Scott

ARI Field Unit at Presidio of Monterey o t

Kenneth L Epstein ¶2 ~ V1V’

~

~

J1

Engagement Simulation Technical Area

ENGAGEMENT SIMULATION TECHNICAL AREA

C-

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~~~ _

U. S. Army

Research Institute b r the Behavioral and Social Sciences

March 1979

Approv•d for public rilesis; distributio n unlimit id.
U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating A gency under the Jurisdiction of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

WILLIAM L. HAUSER

J OSEPH ZEIDNER Colonel , US Arm y

Technical Director Command er

NOTICES

DISTRIBUTION: Primsry distribution of this report has been vn ds by ARI. Pleas. eddveu correspondence

concerning diitribution of reports to: U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behiviorsl and Social Sciences, ATTN: PEAl-P. 5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333.

FINAL DI~~0SlTIOtd: This report ,pay be destroyed when it is no longer needed. Please do not return it to

the U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sclenoss.

~~~~ The findings in this report are not to be construed as en official Department of the Army position. unless so designated by other authorized documents .

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Unclassified SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (BSiw Dot. &,t.,.i ~

~~~~~~~~ ~~““E~~~~” DAr E READ INSTRUCTIONS

1% r UI% I I#’J’

.VM I~ I 

~~ I IUF~ U BEFORE COMPLETING FORM

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/ fPORT ~ILiM~~~ R 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO 3. RECIPIENT’S CATALOG NUMBER (j Research~j~

P

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TITLE (aid H•) 5. TYPE OF REPORT a PERIOD COVERED

REALPM~~ ~~ LIDATION FOR RIFLE SQUADS II: --

TAcTI~~~~~~!!

~

FORMANCE — — ( a. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

_______ _______ C. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(S)

~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

_71 

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S. PERFO~~~ING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS v tO. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT. TASK

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral,” ~

r—~~ and Social Sciences 

(!. 

j2Q763743A773~

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22333 L±Q763743A775

ii. CONTROLL ING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS

U.S. Army Training Support Center , TRADOC (71 Fort Eustis, VA 23604 ~~~~~~~~ c... 54. MONITORING AGENCY NAME 4 AOORE*S(II dtff.rsn I fton CanlroUhtg OWe.) IS. SECURITY CLASS. ~

of Nil. report)

~~~~~~~~~~ I

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SCHEDULE — — IS. OS$TRI•UTIOM STATEMENT (of Nil. R.p.rt)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited .

57. OI$tR$SUTION STATEMENT (of Co abs frog inb red In Sl.~k 30, II 

~~fbs’ael hint Rapist)

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IS. SUpoLEMENTARY NOTES

IC. KEY WORDS (Caithiuo on reverie .d~~ U nocooo y id SdsnlI~~’ by bl..k nocbsr)

Engagement simulation Training systems

Tactical training Infantry training

REALTRAIN Performance-oriented training

Simulation techniques

k A TRACT 4~~

— - ~ — ‘ceer.. -

~~ if . I

~~~~I4’ by bl..k n

~~ i.u~

A field experiment was carried out to determine the relative effectiveneó of REALTRAIN (which is an engagement simulation training system) and

conventional training. Rifle squads were given a tactical pretraining test ,

3 days of training uaing either REALTRAIN or conventional methods, a posttraining teat , and finally a series of tactical exercises in which REALTRAIN

and conventional squads opposed one another. Data collected on the behavior

of squads during engagements were shown to be related to end—product measures —

(continued )

DO ~~~~‘

~I W3 S.~

TON 0? I NOV SI IS O NOLETE Unclassified ssajm?y ce. PICATION o~ ThIS PASS (

~~ Dot. Lrter.uO

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I

,Q~g O i.O
Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAQE(Wbon Dot. &ib.red) —

Item 20 (continued)

~*of tactical performance. Resulting tactical performance data, as well as

mission accomplishment and casualty exchange data, indicate that REALTRAIN

is more effective than conventional field training in the training of rifle

s~uads~~

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Unclassified

SICURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(WP.on Dot. Rntor.N)
Research Report 1203

REALTRAIN VALIDATION FOR RIFLE SQUADS II:

TACTICAL PERFORMANCE

Larry L. Meliza , Thomas 0. Scott

ARI Field Unit at Presidio of Monterey

and

Kenneth I. Epstein

Engagement Simulation Technical Area

Submitted by: Frank J. Harris, Chief

ENGAGEMENT SIMULATION TECHNICAL AREA

Approved By:

Abraham BirnbaUm, Acting Director

ORGANIZATIONS AND SYSTEMS

RESEARCH LABORATORY

Joseph Zeidner,

TECHNICAL DIRECTOR

U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria , Virginia 22333

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Department of the Army

March 1979

Army Prolect Numbe, Tactical Team Performance

20763743A773

4 20763743A775

fr~prmed for pt~~ia release; dietñbution unlindted.
ARI Research Reports and Technical Papers are intended for sponsors of

R&D tasks and other research and military agencies. Any findings ready for

implementation at the time of publication are presented in the latter part of

the Brief. Upon completion of a major phase of the task, formal recommendations for official action normally are conveyed to appropriate military

agencies by briefing or Disposition Form.
FOREWORD

The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social

Sciences (ARI) has developed a broad program for more effective training of combat units in the Army . The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

Command (TRADOC) has identified small unit tactical engagement simulation training as one of its highest behavioral science research priorities. One product of API’s research program is a tactical engagement

simulation training method, known as REALTRAIN, which provides extremely

realistic and motivating training for small combat—arms units. ARI

Technical Report S-4 and API research Reports 1191 and 1192 describe

this method.

To validate REALTRAIN , ARI has projected a series of field tests

supported by personnel of the API Presidio of Monterey Field Unit, Jack

J. Sternberg , Chief. This report, one of a series, presents part of the

findings of an experiment conducted at Fort Ord, Calif., in May 1977.

The API core team, in addition to the authors, included James H. Banks

(Test Director) and Guthrie D. Hardy , Jr., of the API Field Unit at

Presidio of Monterey , and Robert H. Suizen , F. H. Steinheiser, Jr., and

MM Shelton E. Wood of the API Engagement Simulation Technical Area.

LTC Thomas J. Ritenour of the API Field Unit at Presidio of Monterey

organized and supervised the military support aspects of the field

tests. Without LTC Ritenour ’s outstanding contribution and the support

of the 7th Infantry Division , this research could not have been accomplished. Special thanks go to CPT Douglas L. Hawkins, 3/32 Infantry ;

~~L George J. Stapleton, TRADOC Systems Manager for Tactical Engagement

Simulation (TSM-TES) ; and LTC Larry Word and CPT Donald Loftis, Office

of TSM-TES , for their support and encouragement .

This research was conducted within the December 1976 Five Year

Test Program (FYTP) as approved by the Army Test Schedule and Review

Committee (TSARC) . The entire program is responsive to the requirements of Army Projects 2Q763743A773 and 2Q763743A780 and the TRADOC

TSM-TES of the U.S. Army Training Support Center, Fort Eustis , Va.

The research reported here was conducted as part of Army Project

2Q763743A775.

~JEPH ZEI R

Technical Director
REALTRAIN VALIDATION FOR RIFLE SQUADS II: TACTICAL PERFORMANCE

BRIEF

Requirement:

To compare and evaluate the tactical performance of rifle squads

trained with REALTRAIN engagement simulation methods and rifle squads

trained by conventional combat field training methods .

Procedure :

In Phase I , 18 rifle squads of nine men each from the 7th Infantry

Division at Fort Ord , Calif., engaged in a pretest field exercise to

establish pretraining performance levels . This pretest included a

movement—to—contact and attack against a four-man outpost, and a hasty

defense against a skilled squad—size opposition force.

Phase II provided 3 days of caref ully coordinated training by

REALTRAIN method s for nine squads and by conventional methods for nine

squads.

Phase III , the posttest , repeated the pretest on different terrain

to establish performance improvement after training .

In Phase IV , each squad conducted two attacks and two defenses

against squads of the other training group (shootoff exercise).

Findings :

Results were assessed in terms of mission accomplishment , casualties exchanged , and intermediate tactical performances.

All squads performed at similar Levels during pretraining tests.

In posttraining tests, conventionally trained squads showed little *

improvement over pretraining test performances . In contrast , REALTRAIN

squads showed large improvements on all three types of measures. More—

over , performance on intermediate tactical tasks was highly correlated

with casualty data.

— — —-~~~~~ -~~ - --- ~~---- --- ~~~~~~ —~~~~ -
Utilization of Findings :

Results from this portion of the field assessment of REALTRAIN

provide empirical evidence , gathered under a systematic and compre—

hensive field research program , of the greater effectiveness of

REALTRAIN over conventional combat unit training for infantry rifle

squads. The Army uses REALTRAIN methods now ; these methods will form

the core of a total engagement simulation system for training and

evaluation . Moreover , results of this study constitute a major step

toward the development of improved ARTEPs.
REALTRAIN VALIDATION FOR RIFLE SQUADS II: TACTICAL PERFORMANCE

CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION 1

METHOD 2 A

RESULTS 4

CONCLUSIONS 5

TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT 7

METHOD 7

Personnel 7

Test Personnel Training 8

Test Design 8

Experimentation Site 15

Communications 15

RESULTS 16

Section 1: Success in Engagements 16

Section 2 : Attack 22

S ~tion 3: Hasty Defense 48

Section 4: summary 59

APPENDIX A. SKETCH MAP FOR LANE 2 SHOWING LOCATIONS OF

KEY SCENARIO EVENTS 61

B. ATTACK ORDER AND MAP GIVEN TO SQUAD LEADERS IN

ASSEMBLY AREA (WITH FRAG ORDER FOR HASTY DEFENSE) 63

C. INFANTRY SQUAD REALTRAIN VALIDATION 79

D. DATA COLLECTION FORMS 89

E. TEST NARRATIVE 145

F. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY TABLES 153

DISTRIBUTI ON 155
CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Chronological sequence of events within a cycle . . . . 8

2. Mean number of casualties sustained by tested squads

in the attack on the OP 17

3. Mean number of casualties inflicted on OPFOR in

the attack on the OP 20

4. Mean number of casualties sustained by tested squads

in the hasty defense 20

5. Mean number of casualties inflicted in OPFOR in

the hasty defense 21

6. Mean number of casualties sustained by tested squads

in shootoff attacks and defenses 21

7. Number of casualties inflicted on OPFOR during the

attack, by weapon type 39

8. Number of tested units which had positive scores on “ n”

performance measures , where “n” is the number in the

left—most column——performance measures are identified

in the text 46

9. Percentage of total casualties inflicted by each

weapon type on OPFOR in the hasty defense 56

10. Number of tested units which had positive scores on

“n” performance measures in the hasty defense , where

“n” is the number in the left—most column— —performance

measures are identified in the text 58

11. Number of tested units which had positive scores on

“n” performance measures in the hasty defense and

in the attack on the OP, where “n” is the number in

the left—most column——performance measures are

identified in the text 60
CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Posttraining mission accomplishment for REALTRAIN

and conventional units: attack and hasty defense . . 18

2. Percentages of successful attacks and defenses by

REALTRAIN and conven tionally trained units durin g

shootoff trials 19

3. Duration of the engagement at the OP 23

4. Evaluation by OPFOR controllers of caution shown

by tested squads: attack on OP 24

5. Cumulative percentage of conventionally trained

squads declared casualties over time in attack on OP . 26

6. Cumulative percentage of REALTRAIN trained squads

declared casualties over time in attack on OP . . . . 27

7. Initial casualty rates during OP engagement

(posttest) 28

8. Percentage of squads who “stalled in place ,” at the

initiation of the engagement at the OP 29

9. OPFOR casualties as a function of time in the

posttest engagement at the OP 31

10. Evaluation by OPFOR controllers of squad use of

cover/concealment: attack on OP 32

11. Use of overwatch during the attack on the OP 34

12. Use of suppressive fire at the OP 35

13. Cumulative casualty exchange ratios (CERs) for

REALTRAIN squads during the posttraining tests . . . . 36

14. OPFOR casualties inflicted by REALTRAIN squads :

by weapon type and time 38

15. Organized flanking maneuvers at the OP 40
CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

Figure 16. Percentage of squads using M60 to form base of

fire concurrent with initial attempts to

maneuver against the OP 41

17. Percentage of squads whose attack was

controlled by a leader 43

18. Leading fire teams performing as an integrated unit . 44

19. Ratings of overall tactical performance of tested

units in the attack made by infantry officers . . . . 47

20. Percentage of squads with good coverage of

vulner~ble flank in the hasty defense 49

21. Percentage of claymores placed to cover tested

units ’ vulnerable flank 51

22 . Percentage of squads which employed an OP in

the hasty defense 52

23. Percentage of squads detecting OPFOR prior to

engagement in the hasty defense 53

24 . Percentage of squads firing first in the

hasty defense 54

25. Percentage of squads whose claymore mines were

well placed , well aimed , and fired during

the engagement 57
REALTRAIN VALIDATION FOR RIFLE SQUADS II:

TACTICAL PERFORMANCE

L INT~DDUCTION

Improvement of tactical training is one of the Army ’s highest

priorities . In recent years, the Army has sought to increase the effectiveness of unit training through the introduction of the Army

Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) . The major thrust of ARTEP

increases emphasis on development of performance—oriented training

and evaluation methods. The current ARTEP stresses that unit proficiency be judged on the basis àf performance of the appropriate missions, performed with as much tactical realism as possible . The ARTEP

also attempts to set forth training objectives and standards in explicit performance terms.

The ARTEP initially suffered from some critical weaknesses; one

was the inability to objectively determine terminal mission outcomes.

However, the introduction of tactical engagement simulation training

methods such as SCOPES,1 REALTRAIN ,2 and eventually , the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) has alleviated this problem.

Using these methods, commanders have the capability to conduct twosided, free-play tactical exercises with credible casualty assessment

and weapons signature effects, and a high degree of realism. A second

major weakness in the ARTEP is a general superficiality , which results

in inadequate guidance for Army trainers. For example, evaluation of

the engagement phase of the rifle squad movement to contact/meeting

engagement (ARTEP 7—15) , specifies only that “within a reasonable

time,. squad eliminates enemy resistance using fire . . . and maneuver

witho~

1t sustaining excessive casualties.” If a unit fails to accomplish its mission, this general guidance gives the trainer no help in

determining reasons for failure. In further ARTEP development, trainers should receive improved guidance in diagnoscng specific training

deficiencies, so that they can better design an effective, efficient

training program.

API and TRADOC are conducting a research program to improve Army

tactical training and evaluation. This program includes the development of tactical engagement simulation training methods, such as

REALTRAIN and MILES, and provides a basis for improving existing

ARTEPs. The use of improved ARTEPs and the employment of advanced

‘SCOPES: Squad Combat Operations Exercise (Simulation); ST 7-2—172,

U.S. Army Infantry School, 1973.

2

REALTRAIN: Tactical Training for Combined Arms Elements; Army Training Circular , TC 71—5 , January 1975.

1

—5-—-- - — — — — — —---5---- ——5- - . ____ _._&.- -- _- S
engagement simulation tactical training methods offer to greatly improve readiness of combat units. Not only will trainers be able to

determine objectively the terminal mission outcomes (e.g., mission

accomplishment and casualty exchange ratios), but they also will be

assisted in determining proficiency on critical intermediate tasks

(e.g., use of suppressive fire and use of overwatch3). Consistent

with the performance—oriented , criterion—referenced approach , critical intermediate tasks are defined as those that substantially increase the probability of mission accomplishment. The steps to

identify these tasks are (a) identification of candidate intermediate

tasks; (b) development of objective measures of proficiency for these

tasks; (c) determination of the test conditions necessary to gather

these data reliably; (d) correlation of intermediate task proficiency

with mission outcomes; and (e) identification of those tasks which

correlate most highly with mission outcomes. The payoff from this

research should be empirical identification and validation of criti—

cal intermediate tasks as well as determination of objective measures.

These measures of task proficiency and measurement procedures can be

incorporated into the ARTEP.

Two field experiments (one with rifle squads

4 and one with Arinor/

Anti—Armor teams5) have been conducted to compare the relative training effectiveness of REALTRAIN and conventional training methods not

employing engagement simulation. The tactical tests used to compare

the training methods were based on current ARTEPs but were greatly expanded to permit detailed analysis of tactical performance. The

present paper, one of the series of reports based on these experiments ,

examines a variety of measures of engagement—related tactical performance for rifle squads in the attack and in the defense. Other topics,

e.g., movement techniques, will be explored in subsequent papers.

METHOD

The field experiment consisted of four phases of tactical training and performance testing. Players consisted of 18 nine—man squads

from the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord , Calif. Phase I was a

tactically realistic pretraining test administered to establish

3

1n overwatch, either fire team is in a position to protect the other

fire team by firing on the enemy observation post.

4

Descri,ed in this report and in Banks, J. H., et al., REALTRAIN validation for rifle squads: Mission accomplishment. ARI Research Report 1192, October 1977.

5

Scott, P. D., Meliza, L. L., Hardy, G. D., Jr., Banks, J. H., &

Word, L. E. REALTRAIN validation for armor/anti-armor teams. API

Research Report 1204, March 1979.

2
- - . -- . - ---— - — —~~~~~~~

entry—level tactical proficiency and to establish the equivalence of

squads to be trained either by REALTRAIN or by conventional methods.

Phase II consisted of a 3—day training period during which squads

received either REALTRAIN or conventional training. Phase III was a

posttraining test, conducted to determine the performance increments

resulting from training. Finally, Phase IV consisted of two-sided ,

free-play engagements in which REALTRAIN and conventionally trained

squads opposed one another in a series of attack—defense missions.

Pretraining and posttraining tests (Phases I and III) consisted

of a movement—to—contact and a hasty attack against an outpost, fol—

lowed by a hasty defense against an opposition force. The scenario

for these tests was based on guidance provided in ARTEP 7-15 but was

greatly augmented to encompass the large number of performance measures

required for fine—grain performance analysis.

The test scenario included occupation of an assembly area, movement to contact, reaction to contact and attack, and a hasty defense.

Two test lanes were selected so that terrain was as similar as possible and so that tactical realism was maintained . Each squad was administered the pretraining test on one lane and the posttraining test

on the other. In addition, order of lane use in pretests and post—

tests was counterbalanced to minimize any possible lane effects.

Participants in the exercise were permitted to use M16A1 rifles,

M6O machineguns, practice handgrenades, smoke handgrenades, and practice claymore mines. No mortar or artillery was played. Tested

squads were initially given a movement to contact mission in which

they encountered and subsequently attacked an enemy observation post

(OP).

The OP consisted of an M60 machinegun team and two riflemen in

well-prepared , dug-in positions. Thus, the force ratio in this attack

was approximately 2:1. The terrain in front of the OP was relatively

open, thus providing excellent fields of fire and a decided advantage

to the defending opposition force (OPFOR).

In a subsequent portion of the scenario, the tested squads conducted a hasty defense against a 10-man OPFOR squad which included an

M60 machinegun team. The OPFOR attacked along a predetermined and

well—concealed avenue of approach on the flank of the tested squad.

Although the overall force ratio in the hasty defense was approximately

1:1, the brunt of the OPFOR attack was concentrated against one of the

tested fire teams, which more nearly resulted in a 2:1 attack defense

ratio. Because of the concealment along this selected avenue of approach, the terrain generally favored the attacking force (OPFOR).

3
Prior to the test , the OPFOR was given several days of collective

training using REALTRAIN to bring the force to a high level of tactical proficiency. They also were given experiment-specific training

to insure that their attacks and defenses during the pretraining and

posttraining tests presented a standardized threat. The test conditions presented extremely difficult objectives for the tested squads.

RESULTS

REALTRAIN squads showed a dramatic improvement across a variety

of performance measures following 3 days of tactical training. In

contrast, conventionally trained squads showed little improvement following training. The performances of REALTRAIN and conventional

squads were similar during pretraining tests. More specifically ,

during posttraining tests, REALTRAIN squads performed better than

conventionally trained squads during the attack in that they

• Accomplished more missions;

• Inflicted more casualties;

• Sustained fewer casualties;

• Used cover and concealment more effectively ;

• Were more likely to use overwatch;

• Were more likely to use suppressive fire;

• Were more likely to employ the M60 machinegun;

• Were more likely to use the M60 machinegun to cover the

maneuvering element;

• Used handgrenades more effectively;

• Were more likely to attack the more vulnerable approach

(flank) to the OP;

• Were more likely to be actively controlled by a leader; and

• Were more likely to perform as an integrated unit.

Similarly, REALTRAIN squads performed better than conventionally

trained units during the defense in that they

• Accomplished more missions;

• Inflicted more casualties;

4
• Sustained fewer casualties;

• We re more likely to use an 01’;

• Were more likely to deploy to cover their more vulnerable

flank;

• Were more likely to place claymore mines to cover the most

likely route of enemy advance;

• Made f ewer and less basic errors in employment of claymore

mines;

• Were more likely to make early detections of the OPFOR; and

• Were more likely to open fire before the OPFOR.

Thus, REALTRAIN units showed a dramatic improvement in tactical performance during posttraining tests and were far superior to conventional squads. In addition , performance on intermediate tasks was

highly correlated with terminal mission outcome.

CONCLUSIONS

The results have shown that REALTRAIN training can dramatically

increase the tactical proficiency of rifle squads. The quality of

tactical performance improved across a broad range of measures, and

performance on intermediate tasks was closely related to mission

outcomes.

Present rifle squad ARTEPs do not provide a substantial amount of

guidance for trainers to diagnose specific training deficiencies. The

data collection methods and measures, discussed in detail in the technical supplement, provide a basis for the development of an improved

generation of ARTEPs. Many of the measures discussed herein are relevant to the improvement of training and evaluation methods for rifle

squads and also may be generalized to larger units (platoons and companies). For example, use of overwatch , delivery of suppressive fire,

command and control are general intermediate processes which are not

solely linked to the tactical performance of rifle squads. Thus, the

information in this report not only indicates the substantial benefits

obtainable from REALTRAIN engagement simulation training, but also

leads to development of improved ARTEPs .

5

_______ _________________________________________________ — —‘

- -- -
TECHIJ ICAL SUPPLEMENT

METHOD

The research was conducted at Fort Ord, Calif., during March,

April, and May 1977, to validate REALTRAIN training methodology and

to identify critical measures of tactical performance for infantry

rifle squads. Player and support personnel were supplied by the 7th -

Infantry Division at Ford Ord.

Eighteen infantry squads underwent a program of tactical testing

and training for a period of 2 weeks each. Squad performance was

evaluated during ARTEP-based tactical tests against a standard opposition force before and after training. In addition, following posttraining tests, units trained by REALTRAIN and by conventional methods

opposed one another in a series of attack-defense missions (shootoffs).

REALTRAIN casualty assessment methods were used during testing and

shootoffs. Measures of tactical performance included both terminal

product and process types.

Personnel

Army test personnel were assigned duty positions based on their

individual qualifications. Participants included data collectors,

controllers, radiotelephone operators (RTO5), training officers and

noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and support personnel. The integrity

of player squads, assigned to the test by the 7th Infantry Division,

was maintained during the test. Scientific staff members monitored

all phases of testing and training to insure that test procedures and

scenarios were accurately replicated . The members also collected data

on some aspects of performance.

Players and OPFOR. Players were members of 18 rifle squads from

the 7th Infantry Division. Each nine-man squad was composed of a

squad leader, two fire team leaders, four riflemen, and a two—man M60

machinegun team. The OPFOR was similarly organized except that it

contained 1 additional rifleman , making a 10-man squad. In addition ,

two riflemen functioned as OPFOR along the tactical test lanes.

Controllers/Data Collectors. REALTRAIN controller staff consisted of four officers and two NCOs. During periods of the tactical

test when an engagement was not in progress, these controllers functioned as data collectors. Other data collectors were two civilian

scientists and seven enlisted men. The civilian scientists, officers,

and four enlisted men formed two controller/data collection teams

which allowed tactical tests to overlap in time and which permitted

two shootoff exercises (REALTRAIN vs. conventionally trained units)

to be executed concurrently.

7

— — —-— - ———- - S—.-.5----——~ =.-—— 
Test Personnel Training

Controller/Data Collectors. All controller/data collectors and

civilian scientists were trained in their duties and became familiar

with the tactical scenario and test lanes during the week before the

test. During this period , practice exercises on the test lanes were

carried out to verify the feasibility of executing the tactical scenario, to establish realistic test lane boundaries , and to insure that

all controller/data collectors were able to carry out their duties

accurately and reliably.

OPFOR. The OPFOR was given several days of tactical training

using REALTRAIN prior to the pretraining and p3sttraining tests to

bring the force to a high level of tactical proficiency. Much of

this training was experiment-specific and conducted on the test lanes

to insure that the OPFOR attacks and defenses during the pretraining

and posttraining tests were executed in a tactically proficient and

standardized manner.

Test Design

Schedule. The field experiment consisted of four phases of tactical training and performance testing, replicated in three cycles.

Each cycle consisted of the testing and training of six rifle squads

during a 2—week period (see Table 1).

Table 1

Chronological Sequence of Events Within a Cycle

Week 1 Week 2

Day Day Day Day

1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

Training in

REALTRAIN

procedures Training Posttest Shootoffs

Pretest

Phase I was an ARTEP-based pretraining test administered to establish entry-level tactical proficiency and to establish the equiva—

lence of squads to be trained by REALTRAIN and by conventional methods.

The test consisted of two missions : a movement to contact/attack on a

8
prepared position and a hasty defense . Test squads were opposed by

a trained and standardized opposition force . Three squads were tested

each day. Upon completion of Phase I , the six squads were ranked in

terms of their judged tactical proficiency and assigned to either

REALTRAIN or conventional training groups. Rankings were based upon

military judgment made by field grade (04) Infantry officers, and

supplemented by such readily determinable objective data as casualties sustained and inflicted. In each cycle, three squads were assigned to each training group in such a manner as to balance and

equalize, as much as possible, the entry—level proficiency of the

squads in the training groups. During the three cycles, nine squads

received REALTRAIN training and nine squads received conventional

training.

Phase II consisted of a 3-day training period during which

squads received either REALTRAIN or conventional training. Two highly

experienced and accomplished Infantry officers (both captains) trained

the squads: one with REALTRAIN , the other with conventional methods.

Both trainers were given the same training guidance (based on ARTEP

7-15), and both independently developed a 3-day program of instruction

(P01) for the attack and hasty defense missions. Each P01 was reviewed

and discussed with the trainer to insure that the two POIs were comparable and both trainers were training on the same missions, tasks,

and conditions. Conduct of training was monitored to insure that the

POIs were followed. However, as long as the trainers stayed within

the generally broad limits of the approved P01, they were allowed to

adjust their training to meet the particular needs of the squads that

they were training.

With the exception of REALTRAIN controllers, the same materiel

training resources, terrain, and personnel were available to both

trainers. Controllers are personnel required for casualty assessment

in a REALTRAIN exercise but not required in conventional exercises.

Phase III consisted of a posttraining tactical performance test--

the same as that administered during Phase I except that it was conducted on a different test lane.

Phase IV consisted of tactical exerc ises in which REALTRAIN and

conventionally trained units opposed one another. Each unit conducted

two attacks and two defenses against squads of the other training

group. The full tested squad (nine men) was employed in the attack.

Defenses, however, consisted of four riflemen (a fire team leader and

three riflemen) chosen by the squad leader. The fire team was as—

signed to defend predesignated , prepared (dug—in) defensive positions.

The force ratio for these exercises was approximately 2:1. The terrain on both shootoff lanes provided concealed avenues of approach

for the attacking force and somewhat restricted fields of fire for the

defenders.

9

— — ---— - -- — —
Pretests and Posttraining Tests. Phase I and II tactical performance tests consisted of a movement to contact/attack , followed by

a hasty defense . The scenario for these tests was based on the guidance provided by ARTEP 7-15 but was greatly expanded in order to accommodate the large number of performance measures required for detailed performance analysis.

Two test lanes were used, and each squad was administered the

pretraining test on one lane and the posttraining test on the other.

The order of lane use in pretests and posttests was counterbalanced

to minimize any possible lane effects. The two lanes covered similar

terrain, which was moderately wooded with designated routes of advance lying along clearly identifiable ridge lines. Lane boundaries

were placed so that squads had adequate freedom to maneuver yet were

constrained to move generally along the ridge lines.

Major events in the tactical scenario consisted of occupation of

an assembly area, movement, reaction to a potential threat, crossing a

danger area, reaction to an enemy observation post COP) and an attack

on that Op , and the setup and conduct of a hasty defense . Appendix A

includes a sketch map of one of the lanes (Lane 2).

1. Assembly Area. Upon arrival at a test lane, the squad leader

was informed that he was to occupy tactically a squad sector of a

platoon perimeter and was given the boundaries of his area of responsibility. After the squad had occupied its position , the squad leader

was given an operations order by the senior controller , who simulated

the platoon leader. The squad leader was given 15 minutes to brief

his men and prepare to cross the line of departure (LD). The orders

and maps given to the squad leaders are presented in Appendix B.

2. Potential Threat. Shortly after having crossed the LD, the

squad passed an abandoned position that showed signs of recent activity (i.e., fresh dirt and new sandbags placed around a foxhole).

In the position there was a map pouch containing a map of the local

area with “enemy” dispositions indicated . The squads’ reactions to

this potential threat were documented.

3. )anger Area. After passing the potential threat, squads

were required to cross a clearly hazardous “danger area” consisting

of a clearing bisected by an unimproved road. On the far side of the

danger area two riflemen occupied ‘concealed positions, located so

that they could observe the squad as it approached the danger area.

These “snipers” served two functions: first, they documented a squad ’s

use of cover and concealment as it approached the danger area; second,

they forced the squad to deploy, by firing 3- to 5-round bursts of

Ml6 rifle fire at 10— to 12-second intervals for 2 minutes, or until

each sniper had been declared a casualty. Fire was commenced once

the first squad member had crossed the danger area road. If the

snipers were not declared casualties after 2 minutes, they withdrew,

10
moving by bounds, along a predesignated path which ran obliquely to

their rear and off the test lane. No squad casualties were assessed

during this engagement. However, snipers did indicate the number of

squad members detected prior to anyone’s crossing the danger area.

4. The OP. Farther along the course, the tested squads encountered an enemy OP manned by an M60 machinegun team and two Ml6 riflemen. The force ratio for this encounter was thus approximately 2:1.

The OP consisted of well-prepared , dug—in , and camouflaged positions.

The relatively open terrain in front of the OP provided excellent

fields of fire and a decided advantage to the defending OPFOR. If

the squads did not take the OP under fire before crossing a point approximately 50 m from the OP, the squad was taken under fire by the

OPFOR defenders. The senior OPFOR controller was responsible for

insuring that this rule was followed.

The engagement continued until either (a) the tested squad had

only one survivor, (b) the OPFOR had all been declared casualties,

or (c) either side became sufficiently suppressed or disorganized

that continuation of their mission was not feasible. The civilian

scientist and the senior controller jointly determined the outcome(s).

After the engagement, an administrative break was called and

squads were reconstituted , resupplied , and issued new REALTRAIN helmet numbers. The squads then moved administratively to the site of

the hasty defense.

5. Hasty Defense. At the site of the hasty defense , squads

received a fragmentary (frag) order (see Appendix B) to set up a squad

section of a platoon defensive perimeter , to be completed within

15 minutes. Because of environmental constraints, squads were not

allowed to dig-in their positions or to damage local foliage to acquire material for camouflage . However, they were allowed to use

downed wood or other similar material they could find at the defensive site. Tested units were allowed to deploy for the defenses as

they thought best, as long as they remained within lane boundaries.

If squads chose to employ an 01’, the OP was not allowed to select a

position farther forward than 50 m from the designated defensive

site; this constraint prevented compromising of the OPFOR assembly

area. After 15 minutes, the 10—man OPFOR squad (including an M60

machinegun team) began to move against the defensive position. The

OPFOR attacked along a predetermined and well—concealed avenue of

approach on the flank of the tested squad. Despite the fact that the

overall force ratio in the hasty defense was approximately 1:1, the

main thrust of the OPFOR attack was concentrated against one of the

tested unit fire teams. The result was more nearly a 2:1 attack—

defense ratio. Moreover, because of the concealment afforded the

OPFOR along their routes of advance, the terrain favored the attacking unit.

11

- - - — -- —-- — —- -—- 5 — —- - ——-- 5——— - _—~~~~~ -•• — - -
The hasty defense exercise was terminated when. either (a) the

OPFOR had only one survivor; (b) the tested unit had only one survivor; or Cc) either unit was sufficiently disorganized , or suppressed ,

that continuation of their mission was not feasible. These determinations were made jointly by the civilian scientist and the senior

controller.

Materiel, Weapons, and Ammunition. All players arrived at the

test site with their weapons and a tactical radio (AN/PRC-77). Prior

to the tactical test movement to contact/attack , each tested unit

rifleman was issued 140 rounds of blank 5.56 ammunition and three

practice handgrenades , and each machinegun team was issued 400 rounds

of blank 7.62 ammunition and six practice handgrenades. Each squad

also received six smoke grenades. In addition , all players were issued REALTRAIN equipment, consisting of helmet covers bearing a

3—inch , 2—digit number, 6—power telescopes for M16 riflemen , and a

pair of 7x50 binoculars for each machinegun team.

Prior to the hasty defense , squad members were allowed to replenish their ammunition and pyrotechnic supplies up tc the limit

stated above. In addition , each squad was issued two Ml8Al practice

claymore mines and was allowed to draw , if desired , one TA312 field

telephone with field wire.

During training periods, training ammunition was issued daily .

Both training groups (REALTRAIN and conventional) received grenade

simulators, smoke grenades, 5.56 blank rounds, 7.62 blank rounds,

practice claymores, and practice grenades. Also, REALTRAIN units

received the REALTRAIN equipment listed above.

Squad Training. The tactical test employed REALTRAIN rules of

engagement. The ability to inflict casualties under REALTRAIN rules

of engagement partially depends on the ability to identify two-digit

helmet numbers using a 6x telescope mounted on the M16 rifle. Therefore, all player squads were given extensive training in the use of

telescopes and numbers for inflicting casualties prior to the administration of pretests. This training was necessary to permit meaningful casualty assessment in the pretest , as well as to insure that

subsequent differences in tactical proficiency between training groups

were not due to a difference in the ability to utilize the telescopes

and numbers themselves.

REALTRAIN and conventional squads received 3 days of tactical

training following the pretest. During this period , two training

areas were rotated between groups so that each had equal access to

the terrain. Training areas were separated from testing areas. All

training and testing areas had similar terrain.

12
On each training day , a civilian scientist or an Infantry officer was assigned to each training group to monitor the content and

method of training. These training monitors also insured that conventional squads were not trained using actual or approximations of

the REALTRAIN methods.

Rules of Engagement. The rules of engagement were generally

those contained in TC 71-5: REALTRAIN: Tactical Training for Combined Arms Elements, and in ST-7-2-l72: SCOPES: Squad Combat Operations Exercise (Simulation ).

All players were identified by 3-inch-high , 2-digit numbers on

helmet covers. When a controller declared a player a casualty , the

player was ordered to remove his helmet and lie down at his position.

Controllers insured that players who had been declared casualties

did not become reinvolved in the engagement .

Casualties could be inflicted by the simulated use of (a) the

Ml6 , (b) the M60 machinegun , Cc ) handgrenades , or Cd ) claymore mines.

No indirect fire was played during any portion of the test. Controllers used specific criteria to assess casualties , and the procedure

and criteria for assessing casualties differed as functions of the

types of weapons employed . Tb”se weapons are briefly described below.

1. M16 Rifle. In order to inflict a casualty with the M16 , a

rifleman must fire his Ml6 and call out the helmet number of the target. The firer must also be pointing his Ml6 toward the target when

he fires. The controller checks a list of numbers in the opposing

squad to insure that number called is valid. If no such number is in

the exercise , the controller tells the player that he “missed.” If

the number is valid , the controller transmits the numbers of the firer

and of the target over the control radio net , and the controller nearest the target player informs the player that he has been declared a

casualty . That player then removes his helmet and takes no further

part in the problem. Target and firer helmet numbers along with weapon

type and time of the casualty are recorded at the net control station

(NCS).

2. M60 Machinegun. The casualty assessment procedures and criteria used with the M60 machinegun are similar to those used with the

Ml6. The M60 must be fired in the dire’tion of the target when a

target helmet number is called out. Instead of using a 6x telescope

to identify target helmet numbers, the assistant machinegunner uses

binoculars. Casualties may thus be “inflicted” by the joint action

of the machinegunner and the assistant machinegunner. If the machinegunner becomes a casualty , he is prohibited from firing , carrying the

weapon or ammunition , or performing other combat functions , but he

may identify target helmet numbers when the assistant machinegunner

fires. The NCS logs all casualties.

13
The M60 machinegun may also be used to provide suppressive fire.

When the gun is firing, the nearest controller determin~~ its direction of fire and reports the information over the contrcl radio net.

For example , if the machinegun fire is oriented toward the lef t flank

of the opposing force position , the controller calls “Suppression ,

left flank” over the radio; if the fire is directed at the smoke cloud

from a smoke grenade , the controller calls “Suppression, smoke. ” The

controller on the opposite side determines whether any opposing force

personnel are in the area and informs them they are receiving fire ,

e.g., “Suppression , fire team bravo.” If any player in the area receiving fire then remains exposed or attempts to move without cover ,

he is assessed a casualty.

3. Handgrenade. Players within five paces of an exploding practice handgrenade and not in a covered position are declared casualties.

The controller on the receiving end of the grenade transmits the casualty report to the NCS.

4. Claymore Mine. The player sets up the practice claymore mine ,

and the controller determines the casualty-producing radius. The size

of the fan depends on the placement and aiming of the claymore . All

controllers in the exercise (in this case , both OPFOR and tested unit

controllers) are familiarized with the locations and aiming of emplaced claymores. The blast effect of the mine is simulated by a

blasting cap and a grenade simulator buried behind the mine and is

triggered by a player with a firing device. Exposed personnel within

the casualty-producing radius are declared casualties and are reported

to the NCS.

Data Collection. A wide range of data was collected during the

course of the experiment. During the tactical testing periods, four

test staff members collected data while accompanying the tested unit;

three collected data while stationed along the test lane; two collected

data while located with the OPFOR; and two staff members, remotely

located, collected data from radio traffic. The data collection procedures are documented in the test operations scenario (Appendix C).

1. Tested Unit Data Collection. Two officers, one civilian

scientist , and one enlisted man collected data while accompanying the

tested units. The senior controller (controller 1) traveled with the

lead fire team; the second controller (controller 2) traveled with

trailing fire team; and the civilian scientist (data collector) accompanied the squad leader. The enlisted man followed the squad ,

staying as far behind the squad as terrain and foliage density permitted, and was responsible for constructing maps of squad movements

and positions. All movements of data collectors and controllers were

tactical , and care was taken to insure that staff members did not

compromise either movements of or positions occupied by the tested

squads. Controllers 1 and 2 collected data only when an engagement

was not in progress ; during engagements, they functioned as controllers only. Data forms and maps appear in Appendix D.

14
2. Test Lane Data Collection. Three enlisted men collected

data on tested squads along the test lanes. One, positioned near

the assembly areas, collected data on the squads ’ use of cover and

concealment as they occupied the assembly area. The other two, the

“snipers” stationed at the danger area, collected data on the manner

in which the squad approached the danger area.

3. OPFOR Data Collection. Two NCOs collected data on tested

squads from the OPFOR point of view. These men (controllers 3 and 4)

were stationed at the OPFOR OP during the attack module and moved with

the OPFOR during their attack on the tested unit’s hasty defensive

position ; however , they did not collect data during the defense module.

4. Remote Data Collection. Two enlisted men , located at the

experimentation control center (ECC) , collected data from radio traffic. One of these operated the NCS and recorded all data regarding

casualties and data on scenario events (e.g., time of crossing con—

trol phase lines). The other monitored the tactical net and recorded

reports from the tested squad . Appendix D contains data forms.

5. Narrative Data. Upon completion of an exercise , the senior

controller debriefed the OPFOR controllers. After returning to the

ECC, the tested uni t controllers and ~he civilian scientist constructed

a narrative of the exercise. Narratives included a detailed descriptic’n of the events in the exercise , beginning with the occupation of

the assembly area and ending with the hasty defense. These narrative

sessions were tape-recorded and subsequently transcribed and edited ,

to be used to supplement and verify information provided by data forms

and maps. For a typical narrative , see Appendix E

Exper imentation Site

The experimentation site consisted of two tactical test lanes,

two shootoff test lanes, two training areas , and an ECC. The ECC,

located between the two tactical test lanes, provided a centralized

area for arrival and departure of troops; issue and turn-in of ammunition and materiel; issue and collection of data forms; and remote

data collection .

The experimentation site terrain was generally uniform and comprised of moderately wooded, small hills with some open depressions.

Communications

Communications among controllers and between controllers and the

NCS were made via AN/PRC-77 tactical radios. Communications between

tested squads and a simulated platoon headquarters located at the

ECC also employed AN/PRC-77s but used a separate frequency . Other

15
test staff data collectors used small , two-channel commercial

(“ walkie—talkie”) radios to communicate among themselves and with

the ECC.

RESULTS

Mission accomplishment and ca~

sualty data were presented in Banks

et al. (1977). Further analysis is presented herein , and the content

is primarily directed toward developing an understanding of the dynamics of rifle squad engagements. Several factors that contribute

to success in battle are examined . Results are presented in four

major sections. The first briefly reviews the casualty and mission

accomplishment data presented in Banks et al. (1977). The second

secticri discusses squad performance in the attack. The third examines

squad performance in the defense . The fourth summarizes and discusses

measures across both missions. -

Because of personnel problems , the data from two tested units

are not presented. Key squad members were missing from one conventional and one REALTRAIN squad during the scheduled posttest. Therefore , the results presented here are foi eight REALTRAIN and eight

conventionally trained squads.

Section 1: Success in Engagements

Two principal measures for success in battle are mission accomplishment and casualties inflicted and sustained. The performances

of the REALTRAIN and conventional training groups on these measures

are briefly described in this section. More detailed results are

contained in the previously cited report.

Mission Accomplishment. Mission accomplishment , the prime goal

of any combat unit, is defined here as the complete destruction or

neutralization of an opposing force. More specifically, for the attack on the 01’, the tested squad was considered to have accomplished

its mission when the OPFOR defenders were either (a) all declared as

casualties or (b) fully suppressed . The tested squad was considered

to have failed in the attack on the OP when only one man in the squad

was left “alive” or when the squad was so disorganized or suppressed

that it could not continue the attack. Rules for mission accomplishment in the Phase IV shootoff were the same.

For the hasty defense , the tested squad was considered to have

accomplished its mission when only one OPFOR attacker remained “alive”

or when the attackers were so disorganized or suppressed that they

could not continue the attack. The tested squad was conside~~ d to

have failed in its defense when only one defender remained “alive”

or when the defenders were so disorganized or suppressed that no effective defense was offered .

16
Because of the difficulty of the attack and the defense missions

in the tactical tests, none of the tested units accomplished either

of their missions during the pretraining tests. Following 3 days of

tactical training , however , some tested units showed a markedly improved capability for successfully executing their missions (see Figure 1). REALTRAIN units were successful in 50% of their attacks and

75% of their defenses. In contrast , conventionally trained squads

showed no great improvement , succeeding in only a single defense.

Units were compared with respect to the number of missions accomplished as a function of training group and test. The interaction between

training group and test was statistically significant at the p < 0.005

Level. REALTRAIN units demonstrated a significant (p < 0.05; Tukey ’s

HSD Test) improvement following training, and the number of missions

accomplished was greater for REALTRAIN units than for conventional

units (p < 0.05; Tukey’s HSD Test; see Appendix F). The effect of

training on mission accomplishment for conventional units was not significant. The data from shootoff exercises are consistent with these

results (Figure 2). In the shootoff exercises in which REALTRAIN and

conventional units directly opposed each other, EEALTRAIN units were

successful in 67% of their attacks and 82% of their defenses. Conventional units , on the other hand , were successful in 18% of their attacks and 33% of their defenses (p < .05; x2).

Casualties. Casualty data collected during these engagements are

consistent with the mission accomplishment data. In the attack ,

REALTRAIN squads showed greater improvement following training than

did conventional squads (see Tables 2 and 3). The mean number of

casualties sustained by the REALTRAIN squads decreased from 7.9 to

6.1 (p < 0.05; Tukey ’s HSD Test), and the casualties sustained by the

conventional squads (8.0 to 7.8 for pretest and posttest, respectively)

basically did not change. The mean numbe r of casualties inflicted on

the OPFOR increased from 0.4 to 2.4 (p < .05; Tukey ’s HSD Test) for

the REALTRAIN group but changed very little (.3 to .6) for the conventional group.

Table 2

Mean Number of Casualties Sustained by Tested

Squads in the Attack on the OP

Training method

RT CT

Pretest 7.9 8.0

Posttest 6.1 7.8

17
/

100%—

U)

w

U)

75%

-

50%

,-i 50%—

U)

U)

U

U

U)

~ 25%—

.lJ

w 12%

a)

_____ _____ 

0% _____ ____________

RT CT RT CT

Attack Defense

Figure 1. Posttraining mission accomplishment for REALTRAIN

and conventional units: attack and hasty defense.

18
100%—

U)

W

U)

82%

75%—

67% U)

U

50%-.

33%

U)

25%— .

18%

a,

U

RT CT RT CT

Attack Defense

Figure 2. Percentages of successful attacks and defenses by

REALTRAIN and conventionally trained units during

shootoff trials.

19

— -- — - - ——-
Table 3

Mean Number of Casualties Inflicted on

OPFOR in the Attack on the OP

___________________________________________________

Training method

RT CT

Pretest .4 .3

Posttest 2.4 .6

In the hasty defense, REALTRAIN squads were again superior (see

Tables 4 and 5). Following training, the mean number of casualties

sustained by REALTRAIN units decreased substantially from 8.0 to 5.3

(p < 0.05; Thkey ’s HSD Test) but basically did not change (7.9 to 7.6)

for conventional units. Casualties inflicted on the OPFOR increased

for REALTRAIN units from 4.4 to 8.5 (p < 0.05; Tukey ’s HSD Test) but

not for conventional units (4.3 to 4.0) .

Table 4

Mean Number of Casualties Sustained by Tested

Squads in the Hasty Defense

Training method

RT CT

Pretest 8.0 7.9

Posttest 5.3 7.6

20

--

~

-

~ 

--- -~~~~~~~~
Table 5

Mean Number of Casualties Inflicted on

OPFOR in the Hasty Defense

Training method

RT CT

Pretest 4.4 4.3

Posttest 8.5 4.0

These results are also supported by those from the shootoff exercises (Table 6). In the attack , REALTRAIN squads sustained fewer

casualties (-4.6) than did conventional squads (6.9) (p < .025; one

factor ANOVA). The results for the defense were similar : 1.7 versus

2 8 casualties sustained for REALTRAIN and conventional squads , respectively (p < .05; one factor ANOVA). As REALTRAIN and conventional

units opposed one another in these exercises, the casualties sustained

by one training group were inflicted by the other. For example, where

conventional units were in the defense , they sustained an average of

2.8 casualties and inflicted 4.6 casualties on the REALTRAIN units,

for a casualty exchange ratio of 1.64 attackers “killed” for every defender “killed.” However, when REALTRAIN units were in the defense,

the exchange ratio was 4.06 attackers “killed” for every defender

“killed.”

- Table 6

Mean Number of Casualties Sustained by Tested

Squads in Shootoff Attacks and Defenses

Training method

RT CT

Attack 4.6 6.9

Defense 1.7 2.8

21
In summary, following training, REALTRAIN squads accompLished

more of their missions while sustaining fewer casualties and inflicting more casualties than did conventional squads. Granted that the

performance of REALTRAIN squads was superior to that of conventionally

trained squads, the following analyses are directed toward identifying

the squad actions which produced that superior performance .

Section 2: Attack

For the attack , some factors which contributed to success will be

analyzed in terms of temporal characteristics of the engagement, mi —

tial response to contact, tactical development of the engagement, and

the assault.

Temporal Characteristics of the Engagement. Analysis of the

temporal characteristics of engagements may reveal important information about patterns of combat. In this research, the casualty distribution , over time, shows differences between REALTRAIN and conventional

units that suggest why REALTRAIN units were successful in their attacks ,

whereas conventionally trained units were unsuccessful.

The most apparent difference was the time that tested units took

to execute the attack; that is, difference in the time from first

inflicted casualty to last inflicted casualty, on either side (Figure 3). During pretests, attacks lasted an average of slightly over

15 minutes for both groups. In sharp contrast, following training,

REALTRAIN units took a mean time of 49 minutes to execute their attacks. Conventional units showed only a small increase (to 22 minutes

mean time) in the duration of their attacks following training. The

change from pretest to posttest was significant for the REALTRAIN

group (p < .05; Tukey ’s HSD Test) but not for the conventional group.

The posttest difference between the groups was also significant

(p < .05; Tukey ’s HSD Test).

These data on duration of the engagement suggest that, following

training, REALTRAIN squads may have been more cautious in their attacks than conventional squads. This interpretation is supported by

other evidence. During the attacks, controller/data collectors were

in the firing positions with the OPFOR riflemen and machinegun team

and were, therefore, in excellent positions to observe, from the “enemy”

point of view, how the tested squads conducted their attacks. They

evaluated the “cautiousness” of the squads on a 7—point scale from

“1: extremely cautious” to “7: extremely careless.” Figure 4 shows

that in the pretest both groups were about equal and tended to be

rated somewhat careless, with mean ratings of 4.8 for REALTRAIN and

4.6 for conventional squads. After training, REALTRAIN squads showed

a large increase in caution (rating of 2.7) and conventional squads

a smaller decrease in caution (rating of 5.6). The change from pretest to posttest was significant for the REALTRAIN group (p < .05;

Tukey’s HSD Test) but not for the conventional group.

22
60-

a,

4.)

50 -. .

~

2_

40-

I

30—

Z 22

20 — -

l0~~ 

17 1R 

—

REAL- Conven— REAL- Conven—

TRAIN tional TRAIN tional

Pretest Posttest

Figure 3. Duration of the engagement at the OP.

23

--- ---- --
1-

a, •.-I

14 4-)

4J~~~ 2 ...

r

~ c)

2.7

3 —

4—

4.6

4.8

5 —

5.6 >1

,-I U)

6 —

11W

4 )11

~

4u 7 — — ___ ___ __ ______

REAL— Conven— REAL— Conven—

TRAIN tional TRAIN tional

Pretest Posttest

Figure 4. Evaluation by OPFOR controllers of caution

shown by tested squads : attack on OP.

24

____ _______________________________________________ ___________ —k.----- -_
The longer duration of the engagements and the evidence of

greater cautiousness on the part of the REALTRAIN squads strongly

suggest that these squads were more deliberate in their attacks than

conventional squads. If so, the rate at which squads sustained casualties should show a marked decrease following training for REALTRAIN

squads but not for conventional squads.

Figures 5 and 6 present the cumulative percentage of tested squad

casualties over time for conventional and REALTRAIN units, respectively. There are no substantial differences among the REALTRAIN

pretest and the conventional pretest and posttest curves . The REALTRAIN

posttest curve , however , shows that af ter training this group sustained A

casualties at a substantially reduced rate.

Figure 7 shows an enlargement of the REALTRAIN and conventional

casualty rate curves for the first few minutes of the attack , during

posttraining tests. At the end of the first 5 minutes of the engagement, REALTRAIN squads had sustained approximately 18% casualties ,

and conventional squads had sustained more than twice that amount,

approximately 37% casualties. The casualties in the conventionally

trained group in the first 5 minutes were so high that the capability

for mounting a successful attack was much reduced . These results show

that the events occurring in the first few minutes of an engagement

may be major determinants of outcome .

Initial Response to Contact. Because the conventional squads

suffered such a debilitating level of casualties in the first few

minutes of the engagement, whereas the RF.ALTRAIN squads did not , it

is important to determine how the initial response to contact by these

groups differed. One possibility, suggested by the increased cautiousness of the REALTRAIN squads and supported by informal observations by

controllers and data collectors , is that upon contact REALTRAIN units

were more likely to pause and plan their attack than were conventionally

trained units. Narrative data and data forms were screened to determine the accuracy of these observations .

One item recorded during the attack asked whether , when contact

was initiated , the squad “stalled in place for several minutes.”

These data, presented in Figure 8, indicate that during posttraining

tests, 63% of REALTRAIN squads “stalled ,” compared with 25% of conventional units . This item was originally intended to measure lack of

aggressive squad performance; however , an interpretation indicating

a deliberate pause or halt by the tested units is not unwarranted .

Data derived from exercise narratives also support this interpretation . These data indicate that the initial response to contact of

88% of the conventional squads was to continue to move forward toward

the OP. None of the REALTRAIN squads responded in this manner upon

contact: 50% of the REALTRAIN squads paused so that leaders could

confer, and in another 38%, the squad leader ordered elements to set

25
100 —

Pretest

— 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ sttest

50-

~

4.1

0

.0S

a,

U

a)

a,

4-)

25—

I I I I I I I

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45

Minutes Since First Squad Casualty

Figure 5. Cumulative percentage of conventionally trained squads

declared casualties over time in attack on OP.

26

—

~

----- — -- - - -

~~~~~~~ -—--~~ -- --------
-o

I U-, U)

I co ‘1)

I ~~

1

I .0

L -l

— o I a:: S

I-’ U,

_ Lfl

-

~~~ U) .0

•.-4 z cL. H

- a,

o E~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~

s9t~~ vns~z~ P~ -

~~T~~ G p~nbg ~o ~~Ua3 LG d aAT~~~TnUmD

27 

.- —- - -—— - -- -
50- .

Conventional

U)

a,

I REALTRAIN

20—

~

1)

‘U4.)

S

a,

U

11

a,

l0

I I I I

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Minutes Since First OP Casualty

Figure 7. Initial casualty rates during OP

engagement (posttest).

28
100% —

75% —

- 

50% — 

63%

-

~~ 38% a)

0

11

a,

25% 25%

25% — _____

RT CT RT CT

Pretest Posttest

Figure 8. Percentage of squads who “stalled in place ,”

at the initiation of the engagement at the

OP.

29
up a base of fire and prepare to maneuver. In the remaining REALTRAIN

squad , the squad leader ordered a return of fire and then pulled his

squad back toward the rear . These data indicate that none of the

REALTRAIN units continued the movement forward toward the OP immediately upon initiation of contact, while seven of the eight conventional units did continue forward without benefit of a pause to assess the tactical situation and to organize for the attack .

These initial actions by the squads are very probably major determinants of their subsequent success or failure in the attack. If ,

during the initial stages of the attack , a unit attempts to minimize

its own casualties while assessing the situation , its probability of

success is apt to be higher than if the unit simply continues to press

the attack . Thus, the behavior of the REALTRAIN squads was consistent

with the sound tactical principle of delaying commitment of f riendly

forces until the disposition of the enemy is determined.

Tactical Development of the Engagement. Figures 5 and 7 showed

that , in the posttest, the conventional squad suffered more than 35%

casualties in the first 5 minutes and nearly 75% casualties in the

first 15 minutes. Thus , although the average duration of these engagements was 22 minutes , the conventional squads were largely ineffective after the first 15 minutes. This finding is conf irmed by the

casualties infl icted on the OPFOR . Figure 9 shows OPFOR casualties

during the posttest , as a function of time and training group . The

conventional squads ’ attacks resulted in only 16% OPFOR casualties--

all inflicted within the first 17 minutes of the engagement.

REALTRAIN squads continued to inflict casualties on the OPFOR

at a low but steady rate until about 33 minutes into the engagement

(Figure 9). At the end of this period, REALTRAIN squads had sustained

almost 50% casualties (see Figure 6) and had inflicted nearly 30%

casualties on the OPFOR. These data suggest that these squads, although they were not inflicting heavy casualties on the OPFOR during

this phase of the engagement , were taking more effective protective

measures than they had during the pretest , or than did conventional

units in either test.

1. Use of Cover and Concealment. One key protective measure

is a squad ’s use of cover and concealment . Proper use of cover and

concealment serves to protect squads from enemy observation and fire

while allowing squad members to advance on the defended position before becoming decisively engaged . Figure 10 presents the OPFOR

controller/data collectors ’ evaluations of the tested squads ’ use of

cover and concealment . Following training, REALTRAIN squads showed

a signif.~cant improvement (p < 0.05; Tukey ’s HSD Test) over their

performance in the pretraining test , and demonstrated superior per—

foriuance in comparison with conventional units (p < 0.05; Tukey ’s

HSD Test). The effect of training on performance of conventional

units was not significant .

30

___________________________________
-~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ — - --~~~ — -

0 - U)

4.)

(I)

a,

.0

4-’ 0 U)

L

L

jL

[

L

L

~~~

L

L

~~~

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~~~

t i:

~~~ll

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~~flS~~3 P~~~ T°~U ~

1OddO ~o aE~~ u93x~d 3Afl~ IflUIrtO

31
L.

~ 1 -

S

a,

-I

‘-I

2 — x 2.5

3 -

4- 

4.4

4.7 4.8

5 -

6 -

REAL- Conven- REAL- ConvenTRAIN tional TRAIN tional

Pretest Posttest

Figure 10. Evaluation by OPFOR controllers of squad use of

cover/concealment : attack on OP.

32
2. Use of Overwatch. Overwatch is defined here as having either

fire team in a position to protect the other fire team by delivering

fire on the OP. Data collectors/controllers accompanying the squad

evaluated , on a yes/no basis, the squads’ use of overwatch. Figure 11

presents the tested squads’ use of overwatch during the attack. During pretests, neither REALTRAIN nor conventional units employed overwatch to any substantial extent. During posttests, however , 50% of

the REALTRAIN units and none of the conventional units employed

overwatch.

3. Use of Suppressive Fire. Delivery of suppressive fire by

tested units serves a protective function as well as facilitating the

squads ’ ability to maneuver aggressively on the OP. (Rules of engagement for suppressive fire are contained in the Methods section, above.)

Data collectors/controllers accompanying the squads also collected

this information (Fi gure 12). During posttests, 100% of the REALTRAIN

units employed suppressive fire at the OP , compared with 38% of the

conventionally trained units.

Thus , while they developed the tactical situation, the REALTRAIN

squads took positive steps to protect themselves to a greater extent

than did conventionally trained squads. The REALTRAIN squads made

better use of cover and concealment , used overwatch more frequently,

and used suppressive fire more often . However , in order to overcome

the very well prepared OPFOR position , they would also have to attack

aggressively , using the resources they had available.

The Assault. During the engagement, REALTRAIN squads inflicted

casualties at a fairly steady rate until about 33 minutes into the attack, when there was a sharp rise in the casualties inflicted on the

OPFOR (see Figure 9). At about the same time , the REALTRAIN units

also began sustaining a somewhat accelerated casualty rate (see Figure 6). These data probably reflect the casualties exchanged during

the assault phase of the attack.

Figure 13 is the cumulative casualty exchange ratio (CER) over

time. The figure shows the relative losses by the tested units and

the OPFOR at any temporal point during the attack . The CER is equal

to the number of casualties in the tested unit divided by the number

of OPFOR casualties. Thus, positive-going portions of the curve

presented in Figure 13 indicate a CER shift in favor of the OPFOR

and negative-going portions indicate a CER shift in favor of the tested

unit. (The numbers of casualties in the early moments of engagements

by REALTRAIN units during posttests are small, and the CER tends to

be unstable . Therefore , the data in Figure 13 present the cumulative

CER starting at 15 minutes following the first casualty incurred by

either side.)

33
100% -

-4.)

S

a ,4 J E S Wa ) .-4 E

r4a,

-l

r

~

14 .) 75%

o

W E .5 .5 a,

04)

.

~4 0 ‘U .S s a~

•d O~~~i 50% 50%

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115

~

44 a) ...

~

O

4~ ~

a, ~~ 25% - 4 J ’~~ S —I

13% 13% p 

- i ri 0%

REAL- Conven- REAL- ConvenTRAIN tional TRAIN tional

Pretest Posttest

Figure 11. Use of overwatch during the attack on the OP.

34
.7

100%

lOO%-

p~ 75%....

-4

0 . 5

14 4.) ____

4.)

50%-. 50%

44.4 a,

38%

O~~U)

554

a , 5 4

25%— a,

54

REAL— Conven— REAL- ConvenTRAIN tiona]. TRAIN tional

Pretest Posttest

Figure 12. Use of suppressive fire at the OP.

35

- I - -
0

N

‘U’

U)

‘0

‘U

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

U)

U.)

(-4~~~~~~~ Lfl

‘US —

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(

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53) ot~~~ abu~qox~ A~T~nS

~ D wAT~~ Tnum3

36
As shown in Figure 13, the cumulative casualty exchange ratio

changes sharply and consistently in favor of the REALTRAIN units between 33 and 41 minutes. Also, during this interval the casualty

exchange ratio was 1:1. The REALTRAIN units obviously were performing extremely effectively during this portion of the engagement.

The data which follow show some of the critical actions that probably contributed heavily to the successful performance of these

squads.

1. Use of Weapons. Maximum squad effectiveness is related to

the proper employment of all weapons systems available to the squad.

Even with the limited number of weapons systems employed in the

test, units often did not effectively employ all the resources available to them.

a. Machineguns: During posttraining tests, eight REALTRAIN

squads and five conventional squads used the M60 machinegun at the

OP. The failure of three conventional squads to use the M60 at the

OP appeared to be due to a lack of activities coordination between

inachinegunners and assistant machinegunners. In two cases, the machinegunner was an early casualty and the assistant machinegunner was

unable to assume the role of the machinegunner. In the third case,

the assistant had all of the ammunition and became separated from the

inachinegunner .

b. Grenades: Handgrenades can be extremely effective against

a well-prepared , dug—in position. Table 7 presents the casualties inflicted on the OPFOR by weapon type and shows clearly that the

REALTRAIN units in the posttest made extensive use of grenades , accounting for half of the OPFOR casualties. As handgrenades are relatively short-range weapons, it is likely that they would not be employed until late in the attack, during the assault. Figure 14

presents the distribution of OPFOR casualties by weapon type during

posttests for the REALTRAIN squads. These data show that all grenade

casualties occurred after the first 15 minutes of the engagement and

that there is a sharp rise between 33 and 41 minutes after the first

casualty. As discussed earlier , this sharp rise probably represents

the assault phase of the attack . Thus, these results suggest that

REALTRAIN units employed handgrenades effectively during the assault.

Also, conventional units probably were unable to move within effective - 

handgrenade range and therefore were unable to employ these weapons.

2. Use of Tactics. The tactics employed may also be major deterininants of mission success. During pretests, controllers and data

collectors noted informally that most units attempted a direct frontal

assault on the OP. The result of these engagements was a high, sustained casualty rate among tested units - .~

e Figures 5 and 6). During posttraining tests, however, observers noted that many squads

tended to approach the OP from the flanks. This action might give a

squad two advantages. First, as the OPFOR OPs were composed of two

37
-0

U)

-

~~~~

Z

S

—4

U)

1 a,

.,.4

I 4’

I C~

-1

S a, I U)

S ___________ ______ - 

‘-4 14 0

0

‘-4

‘U’

-4

a)

11

1

I I 0 0 0 (.9 ‘-4

a6~~ UeOia~ ~At~~ TflU1fl3

38
side-by-side , dug-in positions, in a flank assault one of these positions would tend to be masked by the other, thus effectively shif ting

the force ratio more in favor of the attacking unit. Second , the

best fields of fire and observation lay along the major avenue of approach to the OP. By attacking the flank of the OP, the defenders ’

effective fields of fire and observation were substantially reduced .

Figure 15 presents the percentage of squads that employed an organized

flanking maneuver at the OP.

Table 7

Number of Casualties Inflicted on OPFOR During

the Attack , by Weapon Type

REALTRAIN Conventional

Grenades M60/Ml6 Grenades M60/Ml6

Pretest 2 1 1 1

Posttest 9 10 2 3

An organized flanking maneuver was defined as an attempt by three

or more squad members to flank the OP at the same time. Seven of the

eight REALTRAIN squads met the criterion for an organized flanking

maneuver during posttest, but only two conventional squads met these

criteria . In the pretest, three REALTRAIN squads and three conventional squads made an organized attempt to flank the OP position .

Although none of these differences is statistically significant, they

provide further understanding of the tactical actions of the REALTRAIN

and conventional units.

To be most effective , the maneuver element should be supported

by a base of fire. The REALTRAIN and conventional squads differed

with respect to the use of the M60 machinegun as a means of suppressing the OPFOR defenders during movement of the maneuver element (see

Figure 16). During the pretest phase of the experiment , one REALTRAIN

and one conventional squad used the M60 machinegun to provide a base

of fire prior to or concurrent with initial attempts to maneuver

against the OP. In the posttest, seven REALTRAIN squads and one conventional squad used the M60 to support the maneuver element in this

manner. The posttest improvement by the REALTRAIN squads was significant (p < .05, x2).

39
100% — -

88% N

S

‘U

4~~O ~~~

.4

S wa) 50% ‘OS ‘U

CI) O~ 38% 38% S ‘44 .,. 4

‘U 1&i 25% .... 4)

Sa,

0

Ii

a, -

Si

REAL- Conven- REAL- ConvenTRAIN tional TRAIN tional

Pretest Posttest

Figure 15. Organized flanking maneuvers at the 0?.

40

— —.--- — ——— I - —
100% -

88%

75%—

U)

‘0‘US

U’ U)

‘4-4

0

a, 50%

U’ ‘U.0S

a)

0

14

a,

Si

25% —

13% 13% 13%

I

_H __ _

REAL— Conven— REAL- ConvenTRAIN tional TRAIN tional

Pretest Posttest

Figure 16. Percentage of squads using M60 to form

base of fire concurrent with initial

attempts to maneuver against the OP.

41
These data suggest that the REALTRAIN training led to an increased tactical sophistication in use of weapons systems in conjunction with movement. Controllers and data collectors also informally

noted that the R~~-~ TRAIN units aopeared to be more sensitive to weak—

nesses of the opposing forces , and that they more re.Aily exploited

these weaknesses.

3. Control and Coordination. Sound tactics and proper weapons

system utilization undoubtedly contribute heavily to successful performance , and leader command and control constitute a critical element

that helps to weld the squad into a team . Figure 17 presents the

percentage of squads whose actions were controlled by a leader . To

be scored positively on this item , a leader had to be in continual

communication with the squad and take an active role in directing its

activities during the engagement. Also , if the designated leaders

were declared casualties, some other squad member was required to assume command of the unit.

These data show a substantial difference between REALTRAIN and

conventional units in the posttest: All of the REALTRAIN squads were

actively controlled by a leader compared to 38% of the conventional

units. The data for conventional squads also show decreased leader

control from pretest to posttest. Although this difference is not

statistically significant, it suggests that conventional training may

underemphasize leader control . These data indicate that generally

most leaders did attempt to control their units. However , since at

the outset most units were poorly trained in basic combat skills , attempts to control units during pretests were predisposed to failure .

Also , the extremely rapid rate at which tested units sustained casualties (see Figures 5 and 6) made effective control of units even more

difficult. Not only must leaders learn to effectively control units,

but also squad members must learn to be responsive to commands and to

execute these as a team. Fragmented responses to orders are unlikely

to result in mission accomplishment .

Another indicator of effective control is whether in the attack

the units performed as an integrated unit. Figure 18 presents the

percentage of squads in which the lead fire team performed as an integrated unit. To be scored positively on this item by the senior

control ler , the lead fire team had to be internally mutually supportive . For example , if some of the fire team members moved forward

toward the OP , other members of the team were required to support

them by fire or use smoke grenades to conceal their advance .

Internal fire-team communicat ion was also used in evaluating

the squads on this item. These data show a large increase for

REALTRAIN units from pretest to posttest and a slight, not significant, decrease for conventionally trained units. The results also

suggest that although in most cases in the pretest leaders attempted

to control their units (Figure 17) , these attempts did not result in

42
100%

100%—

88%

75%

75% —

U)

‘U

‘U

S

U’ U)

(4-I

0

50%—

‘U

38% a) ______

U

14

U

Si

25%—

REAL- Conven- REAL- ConvenTRAIN tional TRAIN tional

Pretest Posttest

Figure 17. Percentage of squads whose attack was

controlled by a leader.

43
100%

h 88%

ii __

38%

0~~~

V S

25% —

a)

13% 13%

I __ ___

REAL— Conven— REAL— Conven—

TRAIN tional TRAIN tional

Pretest Posttest

Figure 18. Leading fire teams performing as an

integrated unit.

44
b

fire teams performing as integrated units. During posttests , however, REALTRAIN unit leaders were more effective in controlling their

units so that they performed as a team.

The trailing fire teams could not be evaluated on a parallel

L item because often the squad leader elected to keep an RTO and the

M60 zr~tchinegun team under his direct control . This left the trailing

fire team leader and a single rifleman in what had been defined as

the “trailing element.”

Summary of the Attack. The preceding sections have described

the performance of tested units in terms of a number of measures of

tactical performance . Yet none of these alone is likely to lead to

mission accomplishment or a favorable casu3lty exchange ratio. Weapons

system employment , tactics, and command and control all play key roles

in sound unit tactical performance. It is therefore reasonable to expect tha t the REALTRAIN squads , who were superior to conventional squads

on terminal product measures , would be scored positively on more

process—type performance measures than would conventionally trained

squads. Table 8 presents the pooled data from the seven performance

measures discussed above. The left column of thc table indicates the

number of measures on which squads were scored positively. The center

and right columns indicate the number of REALTRAIN and conventional

squads that were scored positively on a given number of performances.

The performances included in the pooled data were (a) “stalled” in

place , (b) used overwatch, (c) used suppressive fire, (d) used M60

machinegun , (e) employed an organized flanking maneuver, (f) leader—

controlled squad , and (g) performed as an inte~~ ated unit.

As Table 8 shows , in the posttest, all REALTRAIN squads were

scored positively on at least five of the seven performances , with

75% being scored positively on at least six. In contrast , conventional ~quads were scored positively on at most four of the seven

measures , with 88% of conventional squads being scored positively on

two measures or fewer. The test data clearly indicate that REALTRAIN

squads not only performed better than conventional squads on individual tactical performance measures but also performed well consistently across a variety of measures.

Units were compared with respect to the number of squad actions

performed as a function of training group and test. The interaction

between training group and test was significant (p < 0.001; ANOVA

mixed design). The effect of training on performance was significant

for REALTRAIN units (p < 0.05; Tukey’s HSD Test) but not for conventional units. The posttest differences between training groups were

significant (p < 0.05; Thkey’s RSD Test), while the pretest differences were not significant.

45
Table 8

Number of Tested Uni ts Which Had Positive Scores on “n” Performance

Measures , Where “n” Is the Number in the Left—Most Column-—

Performance Measures Are Identified in the Text

Number

measures

with Number of units

positive Pretest — Posttest

scores REALTRAIN Conventional REALTRAIN Conventional

0 0 1 0 2

1 1 1 0 3

2 4 2 0 2

3 1 2 0 0

4 0 0 0 1

5 1 0 2 0

6 1 0 4 0

7 0 0 2 0

As pooled measures of performance at the OP are drawn from a broad

range of squad activities, they should be stable indicators of overall

performance and should also be closely related to the terminal product

measures, i.e., casualties sustained and inflicted. To determine the

degree of relationship between these two measures , a casualty exchange

index (CEI) was calculated and was correlated with the pooled measures.

The CEI is equal to the number of casualties inflicted minus the casualties sustained by the tested units during the attack . The productmoment correlation coefficient between the CEI and the pooled measures

was 0.60 (p < .02) for pretraining and posttraining tests, indicating

a close correspondence between product and process measures. Thus,

their pooled performance measures can be stable indicators of squad

tactical performance .

The data presented in this section indicate that the performance

of REALTRAIN squads was superior in terms of both product and process

measures to that of conventionally trained squads . Controllers were

asked to rate the tested squads’ overall tactical performance following each attack. These ratings (see Figure 19) show that REALTRAIN

squads were rated substantially higher than conventional squads during

the posttest (p < 0.05; Tukey’s HSD Test), but training groups did not

differ during the pretest.

46
L

4)

s 1—

a)

‘-4

‘-4

42)

C)

x 2— ri

~

U’ S

3.4

V

4-

4 

4.6 4.8

5—

Si

5.8

6..

>1

14

a,

> 7 .... ____ __ — __ ____ __ _______

REAL- Conven- REAL- ConvenTRAIN tional TRAIN tional

Pretest Posttest

Figure 19. Ratings of overall tactical performance of tested

units in the attack made by infantry officers.

47

_____________________ —
The data presented here are fully consistent. As had been previously shown, following training, REALTRAIN units accomplished more

missions while sustaining fewer and inflicting more casualties than

conventional units. Moreover , REALTRAIN units showed substantial

improvement on a variety of performance measures as well as on performance ratings by Infantry officers.

Section 3: Hasty Defense

The second mission in the tactical test was a hasty defense . Each

squad leader was given a fragmentary order and shown a position that

his squad was to occupy as part of a platoon defense. After the squad

had had 15 minu tes to prepare the defense , the OPFOR launched its attack , using a standardized tactical plan. As reported previously ,

after training, R.EALTRAIN squads conducted more successful defenses

while sustaining fewer casualties and inflicting more casualties than

did conventional squads. Some factors which contributed to this performance are presented and analyzed in four sections : Squad Tactical

Deployment; Early Detection and Engagement; Use of Weapons ; and Summary.

Squad Tactical Deployment. The manner in which a squad deploys

its men and weapons is a major determinant of mission accomplishment.

One aspect of tested units’ deployment for the hasty defense was their

coverage of the most likely route of OPFOR approach. On both test

lanes , tested squads had good fields of observation and fire to their

front. However, on both lanes, defensive locations had moderately

thick brush enveloping one flank and extending well forward of the

squad s’ positions. These locations were selected with those characteristics to provide a readily identifiable likely avenue of approach

(which was actually used by the maneuvering OPFOR). Thus the attack

of the OPFOR could be disrupted if the tested unit recognized its

vulnerability on one flank and took appropriate countermeasures. Even

though tested units generally attempted to cover this route, the coverage was often ineffective. Two central factors emerged from examination of the hasty defense narrative. First, in some cases the man

covering the flank had neither visual nor field telephone communication

with anyone in the r emainder of the squad . Second , although detection

of the OPFOR maneuver element was certain if a man were placed in the

brush on the flank, often the man covering the flank failed to report

detections or to engage OPFOR personnel.

Figure 20 presents the percentage of squads which had good coverage of the vulnerable flank . “Good coverage ” was defined as (a) a man

positioned to cover the vulnerable flank , with visual or field telephone communication with the rest of the squad ; and (b) report of a

detection prior to engagement . In the posttest, 75% of the REALTRAIN

units had good coverage of the likely avenue of approach , compared

with 38% of the conventional squads. Thus, following training,

REALTRAIN units provided good flank security more often than did

conventionally trained units.

48
100% —

75%— 75%

U)

‘0

‘US

U’ U)

0

a, 50%

U’

.4.) ‘U

38% 38%

C)

14

a,

Si

25%

25% — ____

REAL— Conven— REAL— Conven—

TRAIN tional TRAIN tional

Pretest Posttest

Figure 20. Percentage of squads with good coverage of

vulnerable flank in the hasty defense.

49
An additional method for covering a likely avenue of approach is

to employ claymore mines. While all, the tested units employed their

claymores, these were often poorly placed and did not cover the high—

threat route of approach to the defensive positions. Figure 21 presents the percentage of claymores that were placed in the high-threat

(and the actual OPFOR) route of advance . In the posttest , REALTRAIN

squads placed 69% of their claymores in this area, compared with 44%

for conventional squads. Thus, REALTRAIN squads brought more f irepower to bear on critical terrain than did conventional squads.

Yet another aspect of the tested units’ deployment was their use

of an observation post forward of the main defensive position . If

properly placed , an OP could provide the defending units with early

warning of the approach of the OPFOR , the direction of that approach ,

an opportunity to adjust positions to more effectively counter the

imminent attack , and an opportunity to engage the OPFOR at a greater

distance . Figure 22 presents the percentage of squads which employed

an OP. These data show that in the posttest 75% of the REALTRAIN

units employed an OP , compared with 50% of the conventional squads.

Thus , in deploying for the hasty defense , REALTRAIN squads secured three main advantages over the conventional squads : REALTRAIN

squads were more likely to (a) provide good coverage of their more

vulnerable flank, (b) employ claymores to cover the high-threat route

of advance , and (c) set out an OP forward of their main defensive

positions.

Early Detection and Engagement. Early detection of enemy activity

is vital to the conduct of a successful defense . It permits defenders

to engage and concentrate the defensive firepower for maximum effectiveness. In addition , early detection allows the defending unit some

flexibility in adjusting their positions to better counter the enemy

thrust. Figure 23 presents the percentage of squads which reported

(internally) detection of the OPFOR prior to engagement. In the posttest , 63% of the REALTRAIN squads reported detection of the OPFOR prior

to engagement , compared with 13% of the conventional squads. Thus ,

REALTRAIN squads more frequently secured a potential advantage over

the OPFOR in the very early stages of the exercise than did conventionally trained squads.

In order to capitalize on the potential advantages of early

detection , the tested units should also begin to deliver fire on the

OPFOR early in the exercise . Figure 24 presents the percentage of

tested squads which opened fire before the OPFOR. These data indicate that in the posttest , 100% of the REALTRAIN squads and 25% of

the conventional units opened fire before the OPFOR. Thus the

REALTRAIN squads , to a greater extent than conventional squads, tended

to gain tactical advantages in the early moments of the exercise by

early detection of and delivery of fire on the OPFOR .

50
l00%

75% —.

69%

I

50% — 44%

38% 38% U

U

‘-I

U

Si

25% —

REAL- Conven- REAL- ConvenTRAIN tional TRAIN tional

Pretest Posttest

Figure 21. Percentage of claymores placed to cover tested

units’ vulnerable flank .

51

-

~~~ --- -

~— - -
100%—

75%

75%—

U)

‘U‘US

U. U)

(4-I 50%

0 _____ 50%-

a,

U’

‘U

38% U

U

1.,

a,

Si

25%—

REAL— Conven— REAL— ConvenTRAIN tional TRAIN tional

Pretest Posttest

Figure 22. Percentage of squads which employed

an OP in the hasty defense .

52
100%

U)

‘U

~ 75%

U’ U)

I

~ 50%

‘4,4

0

38%

25%

~ 25% Si

13%

REAL,— ConvenTRAIN REAL— Conven- tiona], TRAj

~ tiona],

Pretest Posttest

Figure 23. 

engage

Percentage 

me

of squads detecting OPFOR prior to ~~ in the hasty defense .

53

V ‘- —
100%

100% —

75%—

U)

S

U’ U)

50% — 50% 50% 

25%

25% —

REAL- Conven- REAL- ConvenTRAIN tional TRAIN tional

Pretest Posttest

Figure 24. Percentage of squads firing first in

the hasty defe ’ise .

54
Use of Weapons. During the hasty defense , tested units had

four types of weapons available : M16 rifles, M60 machineguns , handgrenades, and claymore mines. This section analyzes the use of

weapons by the two training groups .

Table 9 shows the percentage of total casualties inflicted by

each weapon type on the OPFOR. Despite the large increase in total

casualties inflicted by the REALTRAIN group in the posttest (see

Table 5), the proportion of casualties caused by each type of weapon

did not differ for the two groups and did not change significantly

from pretest to posttest.

Surprisingly few casualties were inflicted with the claymore

mine , an important and lethal infantry weapon (although its effectiveness is highly dependent on its emplacement, aiming , and timing of

detonation). Since REALTRAIN squads were more likely to use claymores

to cover the OPFOR route of advance than were conventional squads, it

seems that these squads, at least, should have inflicted more casualties than they did . The narrative data were therefore interrogated

to determine why , even after training, the tested units did not employ

the claymores more effectively. The data, presented in Figure 25 ,

show tha t , during the posttraining tests, only 50% of the REALTRAIN

squads and 13% of the conventional squads emplaced , aimed , and fired

the claymore mines properly . The remaining squads all made mistakes

of various kinds. For all the four REALTRAIN squads which committed

errors, the claymores were properly set up but fired prematurely,

i.e., before OPFOR personnel entered the casualty fan. For the seven

conventionally trained squads that committed errors , in one case the

claymores were properly set up but fired prematurely; in two cases

they were properly set up but never fired; and in four cases errors

were made in the emplacement or aiming of the clayinores which made

them ineffective. Thus , while REALTRAIN units which committed errors

did so by poorly timed firing, conventional units tended more to make

errors in emplacement and setup.

Summary of the Hasty Defense. The data in this section indicate

that REALTRAIN squads performed better than conventional squads in

three respects. First , R.EALTRAIN squads tended to deploy their men

and weapons to minimize their vulnerability more frequently than did

conventional squads. This was done by employing an OP forward of the

main defensive position , by placing men and weapons to cover their

more vulnerable flank , and by placing claymore mines to cover the most

likely route of enemy advance . Second , REALTRAIN squads tended to

detect and engage the OPFOR early more often than did conventional

squads. Third , REALTRAIN squads tended to make fewer , less basic

errors in the employment of claymore mines during the course of the

engagement.
-4

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56
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nven- 

__ 

REALHConvenTRAIN tional TRAIN tional

Pretest Posttest

Figure 25. Percentage of squads whose claymore mines

were well placed , well aimed , and fired

during the engagement.

57
As was done for the attack , the principal measure s discussed in

this section were pooled and presented in Table 10. The measures included were (a) effectively covered vulnerable flank , (b) used an OP,

(c) properly aimed , placed , and fired claymore , (d) detected OPFOR

early, and (e) opened fire first. Table 10 shows that in the posttest, 75% of the REALTRAIN squads were scored positively on at least

four of the five items, and 63% were scored positively on all five.

In contrast, 88% of the conventional squads were scored positively on

two or fewer of the five measures, and 63% were scored positively on

only one single item. Thus, these process measures are fully consistent with the product data (casualties and mission accomplishment)

which were reviewed in the beginning of the Results section.

Table 10

Number of Tested Units Which Had Positive Scores on “n” Performance

Measures in the Hasty Defense , Where “n ” Is the Number in the

Left—Most Column-—Performance Measures Are Identified

in the Text

Number

measures

with Number of Un its

positive Pretest Posttest

scores BEALTRAI1~ Conventional REALTRAIN Conventional

0 2 1 0 0

1 2 1 0 5

2 3 3 2 2

3 0 3 0 1

4 1 0 1 0

5 0 0 5 0

Units were compared with respect to the number of squad actions

performed as a function of training group and test. The effect of

training on performance was significant for REALTRAIN units (p < 0.05;

Tukey’s HSD Test) but not for conventional units. The posttest differences between training groups were significant (p < 0.05; Thkey’s

HSD Test), but the pretest differences were not significant .

The pooled measures were correlated with the CEI (see Attack

Summary for fuller explanation) to determine the degree of relationship between these pooled measures and the casualty data. The product—

moment correlation coefficient was equal to 0.63 (p < .01), indicating

58
a substantial relation between the pooled measures and the casualties

inflicted and sustained during the hasty defense.

Section 4: Summary

Overall Tactical Performance. The preceding sections have analyzed the tactical performance of REALTRAIN and conventional squads

in the attack and in the defense . The casualty and mission accomplishment data (presented in Banks et al., 1977 , and reviewed in the beginning of the Results section) are clearly consistent with and supportive

of the results which have been presented here. REALTRAIN units demonstrated a dramatic improvement across a variety of performance measures following only 3 days of tactical training. Conventionally

trained units, however , showed no substantial improvement af ter the

3-day training period.

The previous sections presented data from the attack and defense

separately. By way of summary , Table 11 shows data from the pooled

measures (presented separately in the Attack and Defense Sections)

for both types of exercise . The performances measured during the

attack consisted of (a) “stalled” in place , (b) used overwatch ,

(c) used suppressive fire , (d) used M60 machinegun, (e) employed f lank—

ing maneuver , (f) leader controlled the squad , and (g) performed as

an integrated unit . Defense measures consisted of (a) effectively

covered vulnerable flank ; (b) used OP; (c) properly aimed , placed ,

and fired claymore ; (d) detected OPFOR early ; and (e) opened fire

before the OPFOR. The data show that the differences between groups

are strong and unequivocal. Seventy-five percent of the REALTRAIN

squads were scored positively on at least 10 of the 12 measures, and

50% were scored positively on at least 11. Conventionally trained

squads , on the other hand , were scored positively on at most 5 of the

12 measures, and 63% were scored positively on 3 or fewer of the items.

The training effect for the REALTRAIN squads and the posttest difference between REALTRAIN and conventional squads were both significant

at the p < .05 level (Tukey’s HSD Test). Other differences were not

statistically significant . Moreover , the pooled measures showed a

close relation to the casualty exchange index , with a product-moment

correlation of 0.72 (p < .01, df = 14).

Implications. Current rifle squad ARTEP5 focus the evaluation

process most heavily on movement to contact and on terminal products.

They do not provide substantial guidance to trainers on critical squad

performances during engagements themselves. Incorporation of new

measures of engagement—related tactical performances is essential for

the improvement of performance—oriented training and evaluation .

Product—oriented measures , such as casualties , are affected by a

large number of factors in addition to the training status of a unit.

These factors include mission and situation , weather , terrain , relative combat power, skill of the opposition force , and chance events.

59

- .
Consequently , such measures of performance are not , by themselves,

reliable or valid indexes of the capabilities of a unit. (Given

sufficient standardized replications , they can be useful for determining average tactical proficiency of a number of units.) Terminal

product measures must be supplemented by measures of critical tactical processes in order to permit more adequate evaluation , accurate

diagnosis of training deficiencies, and efficient conduct of remedial

training. Some of these critical tactical processes for rifle squads,

and possible measurement procedures , are identified by the analyses

presented in this report. Others will be identified in subsequent

reports. Moreover , the implications of this research for the training of larger units (e.g., platoon and company) are also significant ,

as most of the processes investigated are essential ingredients of

sound tactical performance (e.g., overwatch , suppression) by these

units as well. Thus, the data and analyses presented here not only

indicate the substantial training benefits to be derived from employment of REALTRAIN , but also , and perhaps more importantly, constitute

a major step toward development of improved ARTEPs.

Table 11

Number of Tested Units Which Had Positive Scores on

Performance Measures in the Hasty Defense and in

the Attack on the OP , Where “n” Is the Number

in the Left-Most Column--Performance

Measures Are Identified in the Text

Number

measures Number of Units

with positive Pretest Posttest

scores REALTRAIN Conventional RF.ALTRAIN Conventional

0 0 0 0 0

1 1 0 0 1

2 1 1 0 3

3 1 2 0 1

4 2 1 0 2

5 1 2 0 1

6 0 1 0 0

7 1 1 1 0

8 1 0 1 0

9 0 0 0 0

10 0 0 2 0

11 0 0 2 0

12 0 0 2 0

60
APPENDIX A

SKETCH MAP FOR L1~

NE 2 SHOWING LOCATION S OF KEY SCENARIO EVENTS

__________ — Assembly Area

Line of Departure

Phase Line Alfa

—Potential Threat

Danger Area

OFFOR Riflemen

OPFOR OP

Defensive Position

0 SOin lOOm 200in

1_ I

SCALE (Approx.)

61

— ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -—- . ~ -‘ . . —-.—
APPENDIX B

ATTACK ORDER AND MAP GIVEN TO SQUAD LEADERS IN ASSEMBLY AREA

(W ITH FRAG ORDER FOR HASTY DEFENSE)

(BOTH LANES)

AT DISMOUNT POINT

To Squad Leader: Your squad is to remain at this location.

Follow me to your first position.

AT ASSEMBLY AREA SITE:

Your squad is to occupy part of a platoon assembly area perimeter.

Your sector is from ______ to ______ (Designate on the ground).

Enemy stragglers have been seen in the area so, your reconnaissance

and subsequent occupation should be conducted tactically. Any activity

should be reported to me.

You are to conduct a hasty reconnaissance and sele~ t initial

positions. When you are ready to move your squad into position, report

to me.

Any Questions?

Note: Return squad leader to his squad. Form in squad column and move

1/2 the distance to assembly area. At that point turn control over to

squad leader and instruct him to “Occupy your assembly area.” You have

15 minutes to set up your defensive perimeter.

63
(LANE 1)

SQUAD ORDER - MOVEMENT

SITUATION

1

ENEMY: Combat action of the division over the last 3 days has left

the enemy confused and disorganized . Pockets of resistance and stragglers are being discovered all over the division area.

FRIENDLY: The division has been ordered to move forward to

establish contact with the enemy main force. Pockets of resistance are

to be eliminated. The battalion has been ordered to move to the east to

secure high ground above the Salinas valley and await further orders.

MISSION

A. Map Orientation. Squad Location.

B. The platoon , as the point element of the company , moves along

the ridge line to initially secure Hill 370 and await further orders.

64
Squad #1 — Point Squad — moves along ridge line to Hill 370.

Move as quickly as possible, but conduct a thorough reconnaissance along

route. Be watchful for enemy stragglers, report all intelligence items

found and signs of recent enemy presence.

Second and third squad leaders have already been briefed .

Squad #2 — Follow Squad #1 — protect platoon left flank.

Squad #3 — Follow Squad #1 — on line with the 2D Squad ,

protect platoon right flank.

SERVICE SUPPORT

1. Ammunition will be brought forward af ter any significant

contact.

2. Casualties are to remain in place until released by a controller.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

1. Make a communications check prior to leaving the assembly area.

65
2. Cross the line of departure (Indicate on map) at ______ 

hours.

3. Report crossing the line of departure , phase line alpha

(Indicate) and arrival at Hill 370.

4. Report all significant events. Enemy information is essential.

5. I will trail your squad .

6. The platoon sergeant will accompany the 3D Squad on the right

flank.

7. The company command element will trail this platoon .

8. Your call sign will be __________________________: Frequency is

9. The time is now _______• Do you have any questions?

66

- _...1. ._ _~
(LANE ~l)

MISSION

Our location is here (Point out) . We will move along the ridge

line to our Objective, Hill 370. (Point out arrow and Objective). Our

Objective is approximately 1000 meters from our location. Our LD is

located approximately 50 meters east of the AA ; the road runs perpendicular to the ridge. Report LD to me when you cross it. Phase Line

Alpha is located here. It Is also a road running perpendicular to the

ridge. Report Phase Line A when you cross it. Intelligence reports a

mi’nefield here (Po int out) . Stay clear of mine field. If you stay

along the ridge line you should have no problems with it.

(LANE 1 & LANE 2)

HASTY DEFENSE

SITUATION

ENEMY. Company commander has told the platoon to hold in place.

There is moderate enemy activity across the whole Bn front. ~~~~

waiting for orders from Battalion.

67
FRIENDLY. Situation is unsure — Information fragmented — we ’re to

be prepared for anything.

MISS ION

Platoon is to go into hasty defense on this hil — Immediately — A

I’ll designate squad positions on the ground . We are to wait for

further instructions.

EXECUTION

1. Position will be a triangle — make sure flanks are tied in

tight.

2. Use maximum camouflage and available cover — get into position

quickly. We’ll improve the positions later if we stay.

SERVI CE SUPPORT

1. Ammunition resupply has been completed — call for more if

required.

68
2. Casualties will remain in position until released by a controller.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

1. I will be located in the middle of the perimeter.

2. Report occupation of the position — also first contact if any

occurs.

3. Company command group is going into position 200 meters to the

rear.

Questions?

69
b

~ 4

~

th

~~

] I

~ 

r7

~ 

‘

~

\1

27/ J\ ill

~~~~(c~~ f~~~~ ( ~ j/J
(BOTH LANES)

AT DISMOUNT POIN T

To Squad Leader: Your squad is to remain at ~his location.

Follow me to your first position .

AT ASSEMBLY AREA SITE:

Your squad is to occupy part of a platoon assembly area perimeter.

Your sector is from ______ 

to ______ (Designate on the ground).

Enemy stragglers have been seen tn the area so, your reconnaissance

and subsequent occupation should be conducted tactically. Any activity

should be reported to me.

You are to conduct a hasty reconnaissance and select initial

positions. When you are ready to move your squad into position, report

to me.

Any Questions?

Note: Return squad leader to his squad. Form in squad column and meve

1/2 the distance to assembly area. At that point turn control over to

squad leader and instruct him to “Occupy your assembly area.” You have

15 minutes to set up your defensive perimeter.

71
(LANE 2)

SQUAD ORDER - MOVEMENT

SITUATION

ENEMY: Combat action of the division over the last 3 days has

left the enemy confused and disorganized. Pockets of resistance and

stragglers are being discovered all over the division area.

FRIENDLY: The division has been ordered to move forward to

establish contact with the enemy main force. Pockets of resistance

are to be eliminated . Your battalion has been ordered to move to the

west to secure high ground overlooking Monterey Bay and await further

orders.

MISSION

A. Mip Orientation. Squad Location.

B. The platoon , as the point element of the company , moves along

the ridge line to initially secure the ridge at coordinates 115558 and

await further orders.

72
Squad #1 - Point Squad - moves along ridge line to the Objective. 

Move as quickly as possible. but conduct a thorough reconnaissance along 

route. Be watchful for enemy stragglers. report all intelligence items 

found and signs of recent enemy presence. 

Second and third squad leaders have already been briefed. 

Squad #2 Follow Squad 11 - protect platoon left flank. 

Squad #3 - Follow Squad #1 - on line with the 2D Squad. protect 

platoon right flank. 

SERVICE SUPPORT 

1. Ammunition will be brought forward after any significant 

contact. 

2. Casualties are to remain in place until released by a controller. 

COMMAND AND SIGNAL 

1. Make a communications check prior to leaving the assembly area. 

2. Cross the line of departure {Indicate on map) at ______ hours. 

73 
3. Report crossing the line of departure, Phase Line Alpha 

(Indicate) and arrival at Hill 370. 

4. Report all significant events. Enemy information is essential. 

5. I will trail your squad. 

6. The platoon sergeant will accompany the 3D Squad on the right 

flank. 

7. The company command element will trail this platoon. 

8. Your call sign will be--------- Frequency is 

9. The time is now ---- Do you have any questions? 

(LANE 112) 

MISSION 

Our location is here (Point out). We will move along the ridge 

line to our Objective. The ranger station (located at grid 113558) 

74 
(Point out arrow and Obj ective) . Our Objective is approximately 1500

meters from our location. Our LD is here (Point out) . It is a road

L. located approximately 50 meters west of the AA; the road runs perpendicular to the ridge. Report LD to me when you cross it. Phase Line

Alpha is located here (Point out). It is also a road running perpendicular to the ridge. Report Phase Line A when you cross it. Stay

along the ridge line.

HASTY DEFENSE

SITUATION

ENEMY. Company commander has told the platoon to hold in place.

There is moderate enemy activity across the whole Bn front. He’s

waiting for orders from Battalion.

75 

—-~~ - - - - --- - -
FRIENDLY. Situation is unsure — Information fragmented — we ’re to

be prepared for anything.

MISSION

Platoon is to go into hasty defense on this hill — Immediately —

I’ll designate squad positions on the ground . We are to wait for

further instructions.

EXECUTION

1. Position will be a triangle — make sure flanks are tied in

tight.

2. Use maximum camouflage and available cover — get into position

quickly. We ’ll improve the positions later if we stay .

SERVICE SUPPORT

1. Ammunition resupply has been completed — call for more if

required.

76
2.. Casualties will remain in position until released by a controller.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

1. I will be located in the middle of the perimeter.

2. Report occupation of the position — also first contact if any

occurs.

3. Company command group Is going into position 200 meters to the

rear.

Questions?

77

—

~

-- ——-—--
p/} ~j?~~~ ( ES\ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

\

~

~(ki //~~;;

~
P

APPENDIX C

INFANTRY SQUAD REAIITRAIN VALIDATION

I-.

SCENARI O

Dramatis Personae

Controller No. 1 (C-i) Senior Controller

Controller No. 2 (C-2) Controller , Platoon Leader

Controller No. 3 (C-3) Controller of OPPFOR

Controller No. 4 (C-4) Controller of OPPFOR

Data Collector No. 1 (DC-l) Mobil Data Collector CARl)

Data Collector No. 2 (DC—2) Infiltrator

Data Collector No. 3 (DC-3) Danger Area OPPFOR

Map Maker (MM ) Mobil Map Maker

Platoon Leader RTO (RTO) Tactical Net Monitor at ECC

REALTRAIN Control Net (NCS) Net Control Station Operator

Operator at ECC

79
SCENARIO

Assembly Area

a. The Ops NCO will move the squad from the ECC to the lane report point. When the Ops NCO leaves with the squad , the NCS opera tor

will broadcast “Squad on the way ” over the control net.

At this time DC-i will alert DC-2 that the squad has left

the ECC. At this time Data Collector 1 (DC—i) will call DC-2 and inform him that the trial has begun (see d. below).

b. At the lane report point, the pla toon leader picks up the

squad leader and takes him to the assembly area. The remainder of

the squad waits at the report point for test firing weapons under the

direction of the Ops NCO. The platoon leader points out the right

and lef t limits of the squad sector of the platoon perimeter . The

platoon leader will then order the squad leader to bring his squad up

and set up his sector of the platoon perimeter . The platoon leader

will inform the NCS operator that the trial has begun . The platoon

leader will tell the squad leader to be ready to receive his order in

about 15 minutes.

c. The platoon leader will , after the allotted 15 minutes , take

the squad leader to a predesignated spot some distance from the assembly area toward the LD, and deliver the order to the squad leader.

As the platoon leader and squad leader depart the assembly area C-i

will determine whether the defensive perimeter has been set up. If

so , C-i will so inform NCS and DC-i will call DC-2 (see d. below). If

the perimeter set-up is still not completed , C-l and DC-i will wait

until it is completed and then complete the above coordinations.

d. Upon being informed by DC-i that the squad is moving into

the assembly area (see a. above) a remote Data Collector (DC—2) will

listen for breaches in squad noise discipline, but will not observe

the assembly area perimeter. Upon receiving a second call from DC—l

indicating that the assembly area perimeter is set up (see c. above),

DC-2 will locate himself in a predetermined position and observe the

perimeter noting cases of poor or inadequate use of cover/concealment

until instructed to begin his path. When the squad leader returns to

deliver the squad order , DC-i calls DC-2 to begin traversing a predesignated target path with numbered stakes. When a squad member reports detection of DC—2 , DC—l will call DC—2 and the latter will record

the nearest stake number. If the infiltrator detection is not made

by a squad member in the vicinity of Df~

-l, either C-i or C-2 will inform DC-i if a detection is made. When/if a squad member takes DC-2

under fire , DC-2 will record the nearest stake number when he hears

the shot. In order to insure that this data is taken, DC-i will attempt to determine whether the squad member(s) who fired had detected

DC-2 and then will call DC-2 who , if he had not already recorded a

“fire” stake number , wil l record the number of the last stake he passed

80
prior to the call. If DC-2 completes his target path without being

detected he will enter the number of the last stake on his target

path. Stakes will be set at 3 m intervals.

e. During the assembly area procedures, C-i, C-2, and MM will

collect the data indicated on their data coliection forms/maps.

f. At the conclusion of the platoon leader ’s briefing of the

squad leader , the platoon leader will use the squad leader ’s radio to

inform his “RTO,’ who is the tactical net monitor , that he has finished

delivering his order. The “RTO ” will enter the time of this communication in his log . The squad leader will then return to his squad ,

give his briefing, and begin preparations for departure from the assembly area so as to cross the line of departure at the appointed

time (15 minutes from the completion of the platoon leader ’s order) .

g. Following delivery of the order to the squad by the squad

leader , preparations for departure of the assembly area will be made ,

and C-i and C-2 will complete the subjective rating items on their

respective data forms . As the first squad member leaves the defensive

perimeter , C-2 will so inform NCS, and as the last man leaves, C-2

will again inform NCS .

h. After the squad has left the assembly area DC-2 moves to the

area , checks for equipment left behind . Upon completion of his form

(and af ter the tested squad has passed the danger area) , DC-2 will

move to the danger area and deliver his Data Collection Form to the

danger area rifleman (DC—3). The latter wili deliver this form to

DC—i at the hasty defense area upon conclusion of the exercise. DC—2

will pick up the potential threat map from DC-3 and return it to the

potential threat when he returns to the assembly area to prepare the

site for next squad.

Line of Departure (LD)

a. The squad leaves the assembly area and moves to the LD. As

the point of the squad crosses, C-i calls NCS and informs him. As per

the platoon leader ’s order , the squad leader calls the platoon leader ’s RTO on crossing the LD and the latter records the time of the

communication.

b. If the squad moves outside the test lane boundaries , DC-i

will instruct the squad leader to make the appropriate changes in

direction and make a note on his form for inclusion in the narrative .

c. C—l , C-2, DC-i, and MM will record data indicated on their

respective data forms.

81
Phase Line A

a. As the squad continues to move along its route of advance ,

it will approach and cross a phase line (Phase Line A). If the squad

leader reports his location to the piatoon leader RTO as required by

the platoon leader ’s order , the time of that report will be logged

by the RTO. C-i, C-2, DC-i, and MM will take data as indicated on

their forms/maps .

b. As the squad leader crosses Phase Line A , C-2 will call NCS

and the NCS will log the time of that communication.

Potential Threat

a. As the squad continues along its route of advance , it will

approach an abandoned prepared position which contains a map pouch

with a map of the local area and depioyment of enemy units indicated .

The location of these hypothetical units, however , is well away from

the test lane.

b. Detection/reaction to the potential threat position will be

noted as indicated on the appropriate data forms and map. Platoon

leader ’s RTO will log the time of any report made by the squad .

c. If the squad leader or squad member sees and recognizes the

intelligence value of the map , C— 2 will interface , qua platoon leader ,

with the squad leader , and receive the map. The map and map pouch

will be carried by C-2 to be handed off the DC-3 who will give it to

DC—2 to replace in the abandoned position immediately after the squad

departs the area.

d. Upon passing the potential threat, DC-i will call DC-3 and

inform him that the squad is approaching.

Danger Area

a. As the squad continues its movement along its route of advance , it will approach a highly dangerous area which it must cross.

The remote Data Collectors (DC-3a , DC-3b) will gather data on the

manner in which the squad approaches the area , as will C-i, C— 2 , DC-l ,

and MM. The platoon leader ’s RTO will log the time of any reports

made by the squad .

b. C—l will call NCS as the point reaches the edge of the danger

area and the NCS will log the time of that communication.

c. C—2 will call NCS as the last man crosses the danger area

and the NCS will log the time of that communication .

82
Contact With First OP 

a. When the point man has cro ssed the danger area (point marke d 

on course), the closest DC-3 will open fire on the squad followed immediately by the second DC-3. They will continue to fire 3 to 5 round 

bursts at approximately 10 to 15 second intervals for 2 minutes or until each is declared a casualty based on some squad action. If at the 

end of 2 minutes a DC-3 has not been assessed a casualty, he will ret reat from his position along a designated path . 

b. No squad casualties will be assessed. Only DC-3 may be assessed a casualty. When DC-3 helmet number i s corre ctly identified 

the appropriate controller will call NCS. The appropriate controller 

will assess the casualty by voice communicati on. No controller will 

be co-located with DC-3. DC-3 will carry a walkie-talkie for ~ornrnunication with the ECC and with DC-1. 

c. Upon being assessed a casualty, DC-3 will remove his helmet 

an<.l sit or lie on the ground until the squad has passed by. Once the 

squad has completely passed the danger/contact area, DC-3 will effect 

whatever repairs are required to the practice claymores and police up 

the area in order t o prepare for the next trial. Following contact, 

he will be joined by DC-2, will take DC-2's data form, and give DC-2 

the map pouch f or return to the potential threat (if necessary). At 

the end of t he exercise he will join the other data collectors/ 

controllers at the hasty defense position for preparation of the exercise narrativ~. 

d. All controllers and data collectors will r.ollect the data 

in1icated on their respective forms/maps. 

Ne ar Con trol Phase Line C 

a. As the squa~ continues to move toward its objective, it will 

approach an enemy OP. The OPPFORs located at the OP will only open 

fire on the squad (1) if some squad member has crossed Phase Line C, 

or (2) if the squad opens fire on the OPPFORs before anyone crosses 

Phase Line C. 

b. If the OPPFORs open fire first, according to the conditions 

specified in "a" above, they will open fire with several 3 to 5 round 

Ml6 bursts. The M60 will not open fire until several targets of opportunity are present at least 1 minute following the initiation of 

contact. C-3 will insure that OPPFORs follow the rules of initiation 

of contact. 

c. Once contact ~as been initiated, t he squad leader, as per the 

platoon leader's orders, is required to report the engagement to the 

platoon leader's RTO who will log the time of that communication. 

83 
d. If the squad fires for suppressive effect the OPP FORs will

be suppressed by that fire . C—3 will insure that all OPPFORs are

“down ” during any delivery of a heavy volume/rate of fire. C-3 will

call “ suppress ” each time , in his judgment , that the OPPFORs would

have been suppressed by incoming fire . OPPFORs will remain “down ’

for approximately 3 seconds following each suppress call by C-3. Any

OPPFOR not responding to a “suppress ’ call will be assessed a casualty.

The same rules and procedures will apply to the tested squad and Controllers 1 and 2 .

Attack on the OP

a. Following initiation of contact no direction or assistance

(e.g., indirect fire support) will be available to the squad. Questions from the squad leader concerning tactics , options , etc. will be

answered to the effect that the squad is to continue their mission

and to take the obj ective . No guidance on how to accomplish the squad ’s

mission will be offered by any test personnel. The engagement will

continue either until all the squad members are declared casualties ,

or until the squad eliminates resistance , establishes initial security

positions , and reorganizes. Should DC-i judge that the engagement

should be termi--~ated before this time , he wil l inform C-i or C-2 of

his decision and the controller will call NCS and inform him that the

attack has been terminated. In this case , NCS will insert that time

in the space titled “Start Break . ” If the engagement proceeds to its

conclusion , when the first man arrives at the OP , C-l will call NCS

and NCS will log the time of that communication . If the squad takes

the OP , the remaining squad members will remain tactical and hold the

security positions they have taken. Regardless of the outcome , squad

members who are declared casualties will remain in place until released by the senior controller (C-i) who will be advised by DC—i

when all necessary data collection efforts have been carried out.

b. At the OP, if there is any doubt , C-i or C-2 will remind the

squad members that they are to remain tactical.

c. If the squad attempts reorganization , DC-i will collect the

data specified in Form #3 and inform C-l when he has completed that

task . If the squad does not attempt reorganization , DC-l will allow

3 minutes to elapse and then inform C-i that he has completed collecting data. At that time C—I will call NCS and inform him that the attack on the OP has been terminated . The NCS will insert that time in

i- he space titled “Start Break .”

d. At the conclusion of the attack , MM , C-i , C—2 , C-3, and DC-i

will complete their data forms as required. DC-l is responsible for

assuring that all data collection efforts are completed before commencement of the next phase of the scenario .

84
e. After the data collection has been completed , the OPPFORs

will jo in the remaining OPPFORs in the ECC area under the control of

the OPPFOR NCOIC.

L Reconstitution of Squad

a. Following completion of the relevant data collection forms!

maps , the squad will be reconstituted .

b. At this time helmet numbers will be changed, the squad will

be resupplied with hand grenades and ammo as necessary . The senior

controller (C—l) will supervise these operations.

c. Also, the OPPFORs who had participated in the previous portion

of the exercise will change helmet numbers in the administrative area.

All helmet numbers will be checked against the NCS-OPPFOR roster . C-3

and the OPPFOR NCOIC will b’~ respons ible for insuring al l OPPFORs have

weapons , ammo and hand grenades , and the appropriate unobscured helmet

numb”rs.

d. After reconstitution and resupply, the squad will be given a

frag order by the platoon leader and move tactically to the site o~ their hasty defensive position .

Preparation of the Hasty Defense

a. As the squad enters the hasty defense site C— i will call NCS

and inform him. The NCS will log the time of this communication opposite the log entry entitled “end break.” NCS will , at this time , call

C-3/C-4 and inform them of the squad ’s arrival at the hasty defense

site . C—3/C-4 will allow 15 minutes to elapse and then begin to move

along their predesignated routes to hasty defensive site .

b. At the hasty defense site , the squad will set up a squad section of a platoon perimeter . The squad will be given about 15 minutes

from entry into the defensive site until the OPPFORs begin to move

against the position . OPPFORs begin to move against the position.

OPPFORs will move along predesignated routes of advance but will have

some individual latitude in the use of cover/ concealment, specific

routes, etc.

Conduct of the Def ense

a. Once contact has been initiated , no assistance or advice will

be available to the squad. DC—i , C—i , C-2 , and MM will collect data

specified on their respective forms. Casualties assessed during the

exercise will remove their helmets and remain in place until released

by the senior controller (C-l).

85
b, The OPPFORs will move toward the squad hasty defense position. The OPPFOR will only open fire on the squad if (1) at least one of the

OPPFQRs has crossed Phase Line D or (2) if the squad opens fire on the

OPPFORs before anyone has crossed Phase Line D.

c. If the squad fires for suppressive effect the OPPFORs will

be suppressed by that fire. C—3 and C-4 will insure that OPPFORS remain “down” during any delivery of a heavy volume/rate of fire. C—3

and C-4 will call “suppress” each time, in their judgment, that the

OPPFORs would have been suppressed by incoming fire. OPPFORs will remain “down” for approximately 3 seconds following each “suppress” call

by C-3 and/or C-4. Any OPPFOR not responding to a suppress call will

be assessed a casualty by the nearest controller. The same rules and

procedures apply to the tested squad and C-l/C-2.

End of Exercise

a. The engagement will continue until all OPPFORs or all squad

members are assessed casualties. C-i will call the NCS and inform him

that the exercise has been terminated and the NCS will log the time of

this coninunication. All squad and OPPFOR casualties will remain in

place until released to the assistant operations NCO by the senior

controller (C—l).

b. Upon termination of the exercise , DC-i, C-i, C—2 , and MM will

complete the ir respective data forms. DC-i will call DC-3 and inform

him that the exercise has ended , and DC—3 will join the other controllers and data collectors to complete the exercise narrative form. C—i

will call NCS, and the NCS will bring the NCS form to the defensive

site for error correction and for completion of the exercise narrative.

c. When NCS receives the message that the exercise has ended , he

will inform the OIC and assistant operations NCO. The assistant operations NCO will move to the defensive site to take charge of the tested

squad . When informed by DC-i that all data collection forms have been

completed to the extent requiring the presence of the squad, the assistant operations NCO will take charge of the squad and move them to

the administrative area for helmet cover, scope, and ammunition turn-in.

ci. The completion of the exercise narrative will be the responsibility of DC-i. C-l, C—2 , C—3 , C-4, DC-3, and MM and NCS will contribute to the completion of the form. While at the defensive site,

the parts of the narrative dealing with the Danger Area, OP, and Hasty

Defense will be completed in that order. When the Danger Area part

has been completed, DC-3 will turn in his data collection form to DC-i

and will be released to return to his station and complete preparations

for the next squad. When the OP and Hasty Defense parts have been

completed , C-3 and C—4 will be released and will supervise the preparation of the OP and Hasty Defense site for the next squad. C—3 will

turn in his data collection form to DC-i.

86
e. DC-i, C-i, C-2, MM , and NCS will then return to the adininis—

trative area, and will complete the exercise narrative forms, check

them for completeness, make sure all forms are present, and insert and

seal them in a data envelope. Forms/maps from C-i, C-2, MM, and NCS

will be collected from those individuals; forms from C-3, DC-2, and

DC—3 will have been turned in to DC—i at the hasty defense site.

87
APPENDIX D

DATA COLLECTION FORMS

CONTROLLER DATA COLLECTION FORM #1A

Date ___________________ 

Time ___________________

Trial _________________ 

Lane __________________

Name _________________ 

Test: Pre Post

(Circle one)

Squad ID ______________

89
ASSEMBLY AREA

Check Wher Completed

1. Call Net Control as squad enters Assembly Area. ___________________

2. Call Net Control when squad completes setting

up perimeter.

4. Was infiltrator reported to squad Yes No N/Obs.

or element leader? (2) (1) (0) ______

5. How was security maintained during delivery of

order to squad? Note any breaches in security of

perimeter.

6. Did the squad member accurately repea t Yes No NIObs.

specified elements of order? Element 1 (2) (1) (0) ______

Enemy Situation

Yes No N/Obs.

Element 2 (2) (1) (0) ______

Mission

Player Helmet Number

FTL A

Yes No N/Obs.

Element 3 (2) (1) (0) ______

Route

Yes No N/Ob..

Element 4 (2) (1) (0) ______

Call Sign

90
f

Listen to the Squad Leader deliver his order and describe:

a. Enemy/Friendly Situation.

b. Mission.

c. Leader Responsibilities — Fire Team “A”.

d. Leader Responsibilities — Fire Team “B”.

e. Point.

91
f. Flank Security.

g. Navigation/Route.

h. Movement Technique/Formation.

i. Chain of Command .

J. Signals/Cominunicat ions.

k. Other.

92
RATE THE SQUAD ON THE FOLLOWING FROM ARRIVAL IN

ASSEMBLY AREA TO DEPARTURE.

~

0

Command/Control/Communication:

7. In establishing their sector of the pla toon

perimeter the squad was

z z

Very Very

Organized Disorganized

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

Surveillance:

8. How well did squad positions permit observation of their assigned area to the front

Extremely

Excellent Poor

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) - _____

9. While manning the assembly area security

positions, the squad was alert and observing the

area ~o their front

All of None of

the time the time

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

yulnerability :

10. The concealment of fighting positions was

Extremely

Excellent Poor

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

93
AT THE LIN E OF DEPARTURE (LD)

11. From LD to Phase Line A , how many times did

the element 1ea~er communicate with the squad members?

(Tally: _________________________________ ) ______________________ ______

(Number) (xx)

12. Call Net Control as the point element crosses

LD. _____________________

(Check when completed)

13. How far is point ahead of squad?

(Enter “ x ” if you could not observe.) ____________________ _____

(Meters) (xxx)

14. Was the element leader part of the point? Yes No N/Ohs.

(2) (1) (0) ______

15. Is the point man covered by at least one Yes No N/Obs.

other man? (2) (1) (0) ______

16. From LD to Phase Line A , are three or more

men in your element within 10 meters of one

another? (Tally: __________________________) ____________________

(N umber) (x)

94
AT PHASE LI~

JE A ‘

I

17. Call NCS when point crosses Phase Line A. ______________________

(Check when completed)

18. From Phase Line A to Potential Threat, how many

t imes did the element leader communicate with the _______________________ ______

squad? (Tally: ____________________________________ ) (Number) (x)

19. Are 3 or more men in your element within 10 _____________________

meters of one another? (Tally: ________________) (Number) (x)

20. Number of men in your element with which your

element leader has visual contact. (Enter “x” if

you could not observe.) ___________________

(Number) (x)

21. How far is point ahead of squad? (Enter

“x” if you could not observe.) ___________________

(Meters) (xxx)

22. Was the element leader part of the point? Yes No N/Ohs .

(2) (1) (0) _______

23. Is point man covered by at least one man? Yes No N/Obs.

(2) (1) (0) ______

24. Number of men in your element moving in the

open. (Enter “x” if you could not observe.) ___________________ ______

(Tally: __________________________________ ) (Number) (x)

95
AT THE POTUITIAL THREAT

25. From the Potential ‘.reat to Danger Area , how

many times did the element leader communicate with

the squad members? (Tally: .

(Number) (xx)

26. Did the squad investigate the potential threat? Yes No N/Ohs.

(2 ) (1) (0)

27. Did your element provide overwatch for the Yes No N/Obs.

investigating element? (2) (1) (0)

96
AT THE DANGER A REA

28. Call Net Control w~en point element reaches

Danger Area . ____________________

(Check when completed)

29. From arrival at Danger Area to initiation of

contact, how many times did element leader communicate with squad members? (Tally: _______________) ______________________ ______

(Number) (xx )

30. Does the point element stop before entering Yes No N/Obs.

Danger Area? (2) (1) (0) ______

31. Were overwatch positions established before Yes No N/Obs.

anyone crossed the Danger Area? (2) (1) (0) ______

35. Did the point detect OPPFOR before contact? Yes No N/Ohs.

(2) (1) (0) _______

97
UPON COIITACT WITH FIRST OP

37. Did the element leader direct element members Yes No N/Obs.

throughout the engagement? (2) (1) (0)

38. When contact was initiated your element

a. Maneuvered as a team (3)

b. Formed base of fire (2)

c. Acted as individuals (1)

d. Could not observe (0)

39. During the engagement , did your element perform Yes No N/Ohs.

as an integrated team? (2) (1) (0) _______

40. Did your element provide covering fire for the Yes No N/Ohs.

point element? (2) (1) (0) ______

41. When contact was initiated , did your element

immediately

a. take cover Yes No N/Obs.

(2) (1) (0) _______

b. return fire Yes No N/Obs.

(2) (1) (0) _______

42. Does point element provide information about

OPPFOR to:

your element leader Yes No N/Ohs.

(2) (1) (0) _______

your squad leader Yes No N/Obs.

(2) (1) (0) _______

98
42a. From end of engagement at Danger Area to

contact near OP, how many times did the element

leader communicate with squad members? _____________________ _____

(Tally: _____________________________________ ) (Number) (xx )

AT CONTROL PHASE LINE C

43. Was OP detected:

a. Before anyone crossed Phase

Line C (3)

b. After crossing C but before

OP opened fire (2) ______

c. After OP opened fire (1)

d. Could not observe (0)

44. Approximate range of detection of OP. (Enter

“x” if you could not observe.) _____________________ ______

(Meters) (xxx)

45. When contact was initiated did your element Yes No N/Obs.

immediately take cover? (2) (1) (0) ______

46. When contact was initiated did element Yes No N/Ohs.

immediately return fire? (2) (1) (0) ______

AT THE OP

47. Call Net Control when first man reaches OP. ____________________

(Check when completed )

47a. Call NCS when attack is ended. _____________________

(Check when completed)

99
k

I.-

RATE THE SQUAD ON THE FOLLOWING FROM LEAVING TUE

ASSEMBLY AREA TO INITIATION OF ENGAGEMENT .

0I

Surveillance:

48. During this movement phase your element was

observing to its flanks

All of None of

the time the time

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 —

(0) (8) ______

Mobility :

49. The movement of your element given the terrain

and situation was

Too slow Too fast

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 —

(0) (8) ______

50. During this phase of the exercise, overwatch of

the point element was maintained

All of None of

the time the time

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

100
.u

Command/Control/Communication: $4 4$

4$

.0 5

51. Your element leader had control of the element 0

movement

All of None of

the time time

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) _____

52. Your element leader had control of his men

All of None of

the time the time

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 —

(0) (8) ______

53. Squad leader was immediately informed of all

tactically significant events

All of None of

the time the time

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 —

(0) (8)

54. When element leader gave a command , element

members responded

Immed iately Very much delay

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 

— — (0) (8) ______

101
RATE THE SQUAD ON THE FOLLOWING FROM INITIATION

OF CONTACT TO ARRIVAL AT OP.

4$ .

~~

Command/Control/Communication: .

~~~

55. Your element leader had control of the element ~ movement

All of None of

the time time

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 — (0) —(8) ______

56. Your element leader had control of his men

All of None of

the time the time

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

57. Squad leader was immediately informed of all

tactically significant events

All of None of

the time the time

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

58. When element leader gave a command , element

members responded

Immediately Very much delay

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 —

(0) (8) ______

59. The element ’s reaction to contact was

Extremely Extremely

Organized Disorganized

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8)

102
L

Firepower:

4$

I

60. During fire and movement , suppressive fire was .

Used Very

Effect— z z

ively No t used

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 —

(0) (8) _______

61. During fire and movement, the number of people

firing in your element was

All None of

Element the

Members Element

Members

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

62. During fire and movement the rate of fire was

Extremely

Continuous Intermittent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 — (0) —(8) _______

63. During fire and movement, fire was directed at

the enemy

Always Never

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

103
7

SQUAD HELMET NUMBERS (HASTY DEFENSE)

Team A Team B

SL __________ 

Leader __________ Leader __________

MG _____ _________ _________

AMG ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

OPFOR

PREPARATION OF THE HASTY DEFENSE

63a. Call NCS when squad arrives at Hasty Defense ____________________

site. (Check when completed)

64. Is there a covered/concealed route from OP Yea No N/Obs.

to defensive line? (2) (1) (0) _____

65. Communication between OP and defensive line was:

a. Visual Yes No N/Ob ..

(2) (1) (0) ______

b. Voice Yes No N/Obs.

(2) (1) (0) ______

c. Other Yes No N/Ob..

(2) (1) (0) ______

104
AT THE END OF THE EXERC ISE

RATE THE SQUAD ON THE FOLLOWING FROM ARRIVAL AT

THE OP THROUGH TUE END OF THE EXERCISE.

0

4$

$4 4$

Surveillance: .0 5

0

66. How well did squad positions permit observation of ~ the area to their front

Extremely

Excellent Poor

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 — (0) —(8) ______

67. While in their fighting positions squad members

were alert and observing the area to their front

All of None of

the time the time

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8)

Vulnerability :

68. The concealment of the squads fighting positions

was

Extremely

Excellent Poor

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 —

(0) (8) _______

105
(

4$

69. The organization and strengthening of the captured di

position was 0

Extremely ~ Excellent Poor Z Z

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

Conunand/Control/Coinniunication:

70. Adequacy of communication among fighting

positions was

Extremely

Excellent Poor

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 — — (0) (8) ______

71. Squad reaction to attack was

Very

Well Controlled Uncontrolled

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 —

(0) (8) ______

72. During the attack your element responded to

leader commands

Immediately Very much

delay

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

106

~ -- - _s.__ -
RATE TUE SQUAD ON THE FQLLOWING FOR THE ENTIRE

EXERCISE. I ~

0 14 di 4$ 00 4$

73. The overall control of the squad during this

exercise was

-Extremely

Excellent Poor

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

74. The overall motivation (enthusiasm) of this

squad was

Extremely Extremely

High Low

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

75. Overall, the squad’s performance was

Extremely Extremely

Aggressive Passive

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

76. In general, the squad was

Extremely Extremely • Caref ul Careless

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

• (0) (8)

77. The overall tactical performance of the squad

in this exercise was

Extremely

Excellent Poor

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8)

107

.—_ _ ~~~~~~p
CONTROLLER DATA COLLECTION FORM #2A

Da te __________________ 

Time __________________

Tr ial ________________ 

Lane _________________

Name _________________ 

Test: Pre Post

(Circle one)

Squad ID ______________

108
ASSEMBLY AREA

1. Was infiltrator reported to squad or element Yes No N/Ohs.

leader? (2) (1) (0) _______

2. How was security maintained during delivery

of order to squad? Note any breaches in perimeter

security.

3. Call Net Control when Platoon Leader has ______________________

finished briefing. (Check When Completed)

4. Did squad member accurately repeat Yes No N/Obs.

specified elements of order? Element 1 (2) (1) (0) _______

Enemy Situation

Yes No N/Obs.

Element 2 (2) (1) (0) ______

_______________________ 

Mission

Player Helmet Number

FTL B

Yes No N/Obs.

Element 3 (2) (1) (0) ______

Route

Yes No N/Obs.

Element 4 (2) (1) (0) ______

Call Sign

109

_______________ - —-- i. —--— —
RATE THE SQUAD ON THE FOLLOWING FROM ARRIVAL

IN ASSENBLY AREA TO DEPARTURE.

•0

U

Command/Control/Communication: di 00 0

.0

o

5. In establishing their sector of the platoon ,

the squad was

Very Very

Organized Disorganized

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

Surve illance:

6. How well did the squad positions permit observation of their assigned area to the front

Extremely

Excellent Poor

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

7. While manning the assembly area security

positions, the squad was alert and observing the

area to their front

All of None of

the time the time

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

Vulnerability :

8. The concealment of fighting positions was

Extremely

Excellent Poor

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

110
9. Call Net Control when first squad member

leaves the perimeter.

(Check when completed)

10. Call Net Control as last man leaves the

perimeter to move to LD. ______________________

(Check When Completed)

THE LINE OF DEPARTURE (ID)

11. From LD to Phase Line A , how many times did

the element leader communicate to squad members?

(Tally: ____________________________________________) —~~~~~~~~~

(Number) (xx )

12. Distance between principal squad elements.

(Enter “x” if you could not observe.)

(Meters) (xxx)

13. Distance between squad right and left ______________________

flank. (Enter “x” if you could not observe.) (Meters) (xxx)

14. Are 3 or more men in your element within 10

meters of one another? ______________________

(Tally: _____________________________________ ) (Number) (x)

111
I

AT PHASE LINE A

15. From Phase Line A to Potential Threat, how

many t imes did the element leader communicate

with squad members? (Tally: _________________) _______________________ _______

(Number) (xx )

16. Distance between principal elements? (Enter

“x” if you could not observe.) ___________________ _____

(Meters) (xxx )

17. Distance between right and left flanks.

(Enter “x” if you could not observe.) ____________________ ______

(Meters) (xxx)

18. Number of men in your element moving in the

open . (Enter “x” if you could not observe.) ___________________ ______

(Number) (x)

19. Number of men in your element with which your

element leader has visual contact. (Enter “x” if

you could not observe.) ___________________ ______

(Number) (x)

20. Are 3 or more men in your element within 10

meters of one another? _____________________ ______

(Tally: _________________________ ) (Number) (x)

112 

—- --- .- - - - .
AT THE POTENTIAL THREAT

21. From Potential Threat to Danger Area , how

many times did the element leader communicate

with squad members? (Tally: _________________) ______________________ ______

(Number) (xx)

22. If the squad investigated the potential Yes No N/Obs.

threat, did your element provide overwatch for (2) (1) (0) ______

the lead element?

113
L

AT THE DANGER AREA

22a. Did anyone investigate claymore? Yes No N/Obs.

(2) (1) (0) ______

23. From arrival at Danger Area to initiation of

contact , how many times did element leader communicate with squad members? (Tally: ________________) ______________________ ______

(Number) (xx )

24. Is M—60 positioned to provide coverage of Yes No N/Obs.

the area before point element crosses? (2) (1) (0) ______

25. Number of instances of 3 or more men within

10 meters of one another (in the entire squad).

(Enter “x” if you could not observe.) ____________________ ______

(Tally: _) (Number) (x)

26. Distance between flank elements as point

crosses danger area. _____________________ ______

(Meters) (xxx)

29. Did a squad member other than the point Yes No N/Ohs.

element investigate the claymore? (2) (1) (0) ______

114

-— —~~~‘
UPON CONTACT WITH FIRST OP

31. Did element leader direct element members Yes No N/Obs.

through the engagement? (2) (1) (0) ______

32. During contact, your element

a. maneuvered (3)

b. formed a base

of f ire (2) _______

c. acted as

ind ividuals (1)

d. could not

observe (0)

33. During the engagement , did your element Yes No N/Ohs.

perform as an integrated team? (2) (1) (0) ______

34. Did your element provide covering fire for Yes No N/Obs.

the lead element? (2) (1) (0) _______

35. When contact was initiated , did your element

immediately:

a. take cover Yes No N/Obs.

(2) (1) (0) _______

b. return fire Yes No N/Obs .

(2) (1) (0) _______

115
35a. From end of engagement at Danger Area to

contact at OP, how many times did the element

leader communicate with the squad members? __________________

(Number) (x)

AT CONTROL PHASE LINE-C

36. Was overwatch provided for lead element by Yes No N/Obs.

your element? (2) (1) (0) ______

37. When contact was initiated did your element Yes No N/Obe.

immediately take cover? (2) (1) (0) _______

116
AT THE OP

RATE THE SQUAD ON THE FOLLOWING FROM LEAVING THE

ASSEMBLY AREA TO INITIATION OF THE ENGAG EMENT AT THE OP.

Surveillance:

38. During this movement phase your element was

observing to its front and flanks 0

All of None of

the time the time

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 —

(0) (8) _______

Mobility :

39. The movement of your element given the terrain

and situation was

Too slow Too f ast

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

40. During this phase of the exercise, overwatch

of the lead element was maintained

All of None of

the time the time

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

Command/Control/Communication:

41. Your element leader had control of the element

movement

All of None of

the time the time

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

117
/

I 0 $4 4$ di 00 4$ •0

42. Your element leader had control of his men

‘I

All of None of ~ the time the time

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

43. Squad leader was immediately Informed of all

tactically significant events

All of None of

the time the time

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

44. When element leader gave a command , element

members responded

Very much

Immediately delay

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 

— — (0) (8) ______

118
/

RATE THE SQUAD ON THE FOLLOWING FROM INITIATION

OF CONTACT TO ARRIVAL AT OP. I

45. Your element leader had control of the element

movement ~

.,

All of None of

the time the time

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 — (0) —(8) ______

46. Your element leader had control of his men

All of None of

the time the time

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

47. Squad leader was immediately informed of all

tactically significant events

All of None of

the time the time

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 — (0) —(8) ______

48. When element leader gave a command, element

members responded

Very much

Immediately delay

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 — (0) —(8) ______

49. The element ’s reaction to contract was

Extremely Extremely

Organized Disorganized

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 —

(0) (8) ______

119
Firepower: 4$ .di Ii di

50. During fire and movement, suppressive fire was I

Used Very o

Effect— Z

ively No t used

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

51. During fire and movement, number of people firing your element was

All Element None of

Members the Element Members

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8)

52. During fire and movement the rate of fire was

Contin— Extremely

uOue Intermittent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) _____

53. During fire and movement, fire was directed at

the enemy

Always Never

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

120
SQUAD HELMET NUMBERS (HASTY DEFENSE)

Team A Team B

SL ___________ 

Leader ___________ 

Leader ___________

MG __________ _________________ ________________

ANG __________ ___________________ ___________________

OPFOR (HA STY DEFENSE)

PREPARATION FOR THE HASTY DEFENSE

54. Number of positions without visual contact

with either my adjacent position. (Enter “x” if you

could not observe.) (Tally: __________________

(Number) (x)

121
AT TIlE END OF THE EXERC ISE

RATE TUE SQUAD ON THE FOLLOWING FROM ARRIVAL AT OP

THROUGH THE END OP THE EXERCISE.

Surveillance: I •0 14 di

55. How well did squad positions permit observation .

~~~

of the area to their front 1.,

0 0 Extremely z z

Excellent Poor

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8)

56. While in their fighting positions squad members

were alert and observing the area to their front

All of None of

the time the time

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

Vulnerability~

57. The concealment of the squad’s fighting

position was

Extremely

Excellent Poor

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

58. The organization and strengthening of the

captured position was

Extremely

Excellent Poor

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

122
Conimand/Control/CommufllcatiOfl 0

di

‘di Ii 4$

59. Adequacy of communication among fighting

positions 4J

Extremely ~ Excellent Poor

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 — (0) —(8) ______

60. Squad reaction to attack was

Extremely Extremely

Well Con— Poorly

trolled Controlled

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) _____

61. During the attack your element responded to

leader commands

Very much

Immediately delay

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

123

— — —.-.—---—— .-—--— . — —a-— - - - B — — - —
RATE THE SQUAD ON THE FOLLOWING FOR THE ENTIRE EXERCISE. 1,

62. The overall tactical performance of the squad

in this exercise was I 0

Extremely ~ Excellent Poor

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 — (0) —(8) ______

63. The overall control of the squad during this

exercise was

Extremely

Excellent Poor

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 —

(0) (8) ______

64. The overall motivation (enthusiasm) of this

squad was

Extremely Extremely

High Low

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 -

(0) (8) ______

65. Overall, the squad’s performance was

Extremely Extremely

Aggr essive Passive

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

66. In general, the squad was

Extremely Extremely

Caref ul Careless

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(0) (8) ______

124
DATA COLLECTION FORM #3A

Da te __________________ Time __________________

Trial __________________ Lane __________________

Name _________________ Test: Pre Post

(Circle one)

Squad ID ______________

Squad Helmet Numbers

Squad Leader ____ Point ____ Squad Member ____

Element Leader ____ Squad Member ____ 

- 

Squad Member ____

Element Leader ____ Squad Member ____ Squad Member ____

Squad Member ____

4

125
/

ASSEMBLY AREA

1. Squad deployment was: a. directed by squad Yes No N/Ohs.

leader (2) (1) (0)

b. directed by element Yes No N/Ohs.

leader (2) (1) (0) ______

2. Sectors of fire were assigned by:

a. squad leader Yes No N/Ohs.

(2) (1) (0) _______

b. element leader Yes No N/Ohs.

(2) (1) (0) ______

3. Number of positions without visual contact with

either adjacent position. (Tally: ________________ .)

(Enter “x” if not observed.) ___________________

(Numbe r) (x)

4. Did element leader accurately report Yes No N/Ohs.

specified elements of order? Element 1 (2) (1) (0)

Enemy Situation

Yes No N/Ohs.

Element 2 (2) (1) (0) _______

____________________ Mission

Player Helmet Number

Machine Gunner

Yes No N/Obs.

Element 3 (2) (1) (0) _______

Route

Yes No N/Ohs.

Element 4 (2) (1) (0)

126 

Call Sign
From positions one through “11” indicate whether each could observe the

following locations. Enter a check where observation is possible.

Enter “0” wher e not possible.

LANE //l ______________ _____ _____ _____ 

Position _____ _____ ______

Location 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Hill Left

Hill Center

Hill Right _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ ______

Road to Front

Intersection

LANE #2 _____________ _____ _____ ____ Pn sj~ jon _____ ____ _____

Location 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Far Left

Brushline

Far Right _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ ______

127
AT THE LINE OF DEPARTURE (LD )

6. From LD to Phase Line A , how many times did

the squad leaders communicate with squad members?

(Tally: ___________________________________________) ______________________ _______

(Numbe r ) (x x )

7. Can squad leader see: a. lead element Yes No N/Ohs.

leader (2) (1) (0) ______

b. trailing element Yes No N/Ohs.

leader (2) (1) (0) ______

8. Is the squad leader controlling the squad:

a. directly Yes No N/Obs.

(2) (1) (0) _______

b. through element Yes No N/Ohs.

leader (2) (1) (0) ______

9. Can the squad l~

. ader see at least one member Yes No N/Ohs.

of lead element? (2) (1) (0) ______

128
/

L

AT PHASE LINE A

10. From Phase Line A to Potential Threat, how many times

did squad leader communicate with squad member?

(Tally: ____________________________________________) _______________________ _______

(Number) (xx )

11. Can squad leader see: a. leading element Yes No N/Obs.

leader (2) (1) (0) _______

b. trailing element Yes No N/Ohs.

leader (2) (1) (0) _______

12. Is the squad leader controlling his squad:

a. directly Yes No N/Ohs.

(2) (1) (0) _______

b. through element Yes No N/Ohs.

leaders (2) (1) (0) ______

13. The squad was employing

a. traveling formation (3)

b. traveling overwatch (2) ______

c. bounding overwatch _(l)

d. could not judge/

observe (0)

14. Can the squad leader see at least one Yes No N/Obs.

member of lead element? (2) (1) (0) _____

129

-- _ - __ __ - _ - - __--- —— — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -
AT TFIE POTENTIAL ThREAT

15. From Potential Threat to Danger Area, how

many times did the squad leader communicate with

squad members? _____________________

(Number) (xx)

16. Was intelligence item reported to the squad Yes No N/Obs .

leader? (2) (1) (0) ______

17. Number of instances of 3 or more men within

10 meters of one another? (Enter “x” if not

observed.) (Tally: _________________________ )

(Number) (x)

130
AT THE DANGER AREA

18. From arrival at Danger Area to initiation of

contact, how many times did the squad leader

communicate with the squad members?

(Tally: - ) ______________________ ______

(Number) (xx)

19. Was the squad leader informed of the Danger Area Yes No N/Obs.

before anyone crossed? (2) (1) (0) ______

20. Number of men covering Danger Area before

anyone crossed? (Enter “x” if not observed.) ___________________

(Number) (xx)

21. After investigation by point, is squad Yes No N/Obs.

leader informed that the area is clear (before (2) (1) (0) ______

main body of squad crosses)?

22. Did squad leader receive a report of the

claymore?

a. from Point Yes No N/Obs.

(2) (1) (0) ______

h. from other Yes No N/Ohs.

squad members (2) (1) (0) ______

23. Does squad cross the Danger Area:

a. singly or in a Yes No N/Obs.

dispersed group (2) (1) (0) ______

b. in a small bunch Yes No N/Ohs.

(2) (1) (0) ______

24. Did anyone detect OPPFOR before contact? Yes No N/Obs.

(2) (1) (0) _______

131
UPON CONTACT WITH FIRST OP

25. From beginning to end of engagement, how

many times did squad leader communicate with

squad members? (Tally: ___________________) _____________________ ______

(Number) (xx )

26. Number of smoke grenades used? _____________________ ______

(Tally: _________________________ ) (Number) (x)

27. Did squad employ hand grenades? Yes No N/Ohs.

(2) (1) (0) _______

28. When contact was initiated was the squad

leader with

a. point element (3)

b. lead element (2) ______

c. trailing element (1)

d. could not observe (0)

29. When contact was initiated the squad:

a. stalled in place - (3)

b. began fire and maneuver

as teams (2) _______

c. fired and moved as

individuals (1)

d. could not observe (0)

30. Did the squad leader direct one element to Yes No N/Obs.

form a base of fire? (2) (1) (0) ______

31. Did squad leader direct one element to Yes No N/Ohs.

maneuver against the OPPFOR? (2) (1) (0) ______

32. Did one fire team mask the fire of another Yes No N/Ohs.

f ire team? (2) (1) (0) _______

132

—a— - — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ —- ~~~~~~~ _- B --- -
33. Did the squad leader control the squad:

a. directly Yes No N/Ohs.

(2) (1) (0) _______

b. through fire Yes No N/Ohs.

team leaders (2) (1) (0) ______

34. Was the M—6O employed? Yes No N/Ohs.

(2) (1) (0) _______
NEAR CONTROL PHASE LINE C

35. If OP was detected before contact was Yes No N/Ohs.

initiated; was squad leader informed of OP? (2) (1) (0) ______

(If not applicable, indicate not observed.)

134
CONTACT WITH OPPFORS

36. From beginning to end of engagement, how many

times did the squad leader (or acting squad leader

if squad leader becomes a casualty) communicate

with squad members? (Tally: ___________________ ) ____________________ ______

(Number) (xx )

37. Number of smoke grenades used. _____________________ ______

(Tally:. ________________________ ) (Number) (xx)

38. When contact was initiated was the squad

leader with

a. point element ____________________

b. lead element ____________________ ______

c. trailing element_____________________

d. could not

observe ______________________

39. When contact was initiated , the squad

a. stalled in place for 4 several minutes

b. withdrew (3)

c. began fire and maneuver

as a team (2) ______

d. fired aM moved as

individuals (1)

e. could not observe (0)

40. Did squad leader direct one element to Yes No N/Obs.

maneuver against OPPFOR? (2) (1) (0) ______

41. Did squad leader direct one element to form Yes No N/Ohs.

a base of fire? (2) (1) (0) ______

42. When contact was initiated did elements

immediately take cover: 

a. lead element Yes No N/Ohs.

(2) (1) (0) _______

b. trailing elementYes No N/Ohs.

(2) (1) (0)

135
~

1

43. Rounds fired during first minute of engagement. _____________________ ______

(Tally: _________________________________________ ) (Number) (xx )

44. Is all returning fire directed at OP? Yes No N/Ohs.

(2) (1) (0) ______

45. Did the squad employ M—60? Yes No N/Ohs.

(2) (1) (0) _______

46. As the engagement progressed , did element Yes No N/Ohs.

mask the fire of another element at any time? (2) (1) (0) ______

47. Did the squad leader control the squad:

a. directly Yes No N/Oba.

(2) (1) (0) ______

b. through element Yes No N/Obs.

leaders (2) (1) (0) ______

48. If the squad leader was a casualty, did someone Yes No N/Ohs.

assume command immediately? (2) (1) (0) ______

49. When contact was initiated did point or other Yes No N/Ohs.

lead element member provide information about OPPFOR (2) (1) (0) ______

to the squad leader?

50. Did the lead fire team perform as an integrated Yes No N/Ohs.

team? (2) (1) (0) _______

51. Did the trailing fire team perform as am Yes No N/Obs.

integrated team? (2) (1) (0) ______

52. Did one element provide overwatch for another Yes No N/Ohs.

element throughout the attack? (2) (1) (0) ______

53. During the engagement did the squad employ Yes No N/Ohs.

suppressive fire? (2) (1) (0) ______

136
AT TIlE OP

54. Does squad move past the objective? Yes No N/Ohs.

(2) (1) (0) ______

55. Are initial security positions established? Yes No N/Obs.

(2) (1) (0) ______

56. Does squad leader get ammo count? Yes No N/Ohs.

(2) (1) (0) ______

57. Does squad leader get casualty count? Yes No N/Obs.

(2) (1) (0) _______

58. Does squad leader attempt retrieval of weapons? Yes No N/Ohs.

(2) (1) (0) ______

137
Squad Helmet Numbers

Squad Leader Point — Squad Member —

Element Leader Squad Member — 

Squad Member —

Element Leader — Squad Member — Squad Member —

Squad Member —

PREPARATION OF THE HASTY DEFENSE

59. Is an OP set out? Yes No N/Obs.

(2) (1) (0) _______

60. Squad deployment was directed by

a. squad leaders Yes No N/Ohs.

(2) (1) (0) _______

b. element leaders Yes No N/Obs.

(2) (1) (0)

61. Sectors of fire were assigned by

a. squad leader Yes No N/Obs.

(2) (1) (0) _______

b. element leader Yes No N/Obs .

(2) (1) (0) _______

138
CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE

62. If detection was made before contact was initiated ,

what was the range of detection? (Enter “x” if not

observed.) ______________________ ______

(Meters) (xxx)

63. What was the range of the OPFQRS when contact

was initiated? (Enter “x” if not observed.) ___________________ ______

(Meters) (xxx )

64. Was detection of OPPFORS reported to squad leader Yes No N/Obs.

before contact? (2) (1) (0) ______

65. Who opened fire first? (Enter “x” if not

observed.)

a. Squad (1)

b. OPFORS (0)

66. At contact , how many OPPFORS were visible? _____________________ ______

(Number) (xx)

67. Fire was opened with what weapon type? ____________________ ______

(x)

68. Did a leader coordinate fire of the squad? Yes No N/Ohs.

(2) (1) (0)

69. How many squad members could deliver fire on

the OPPFORS at initial contact? -(Enter “x” if you

could not observe.) ____________________ ______

(Number) (x)

• 70. Did a leader reassign positions during Yes No N/Ohs.

engagement? (2) (1) (0) ______

71. How many claymores did the squad expend?

(Enter “x” if you could not observe.) __________________ ______

(Number) (x)

72. How many grenades did the squad use? ___________________ ______

(Tally: _______________________________ ) (Number) (xx )

73. How many grenades did the OPPFORS use? ___________________ _____

(Number) (xx)

139

— - - -
NET CONTROL STATION FORM #9

Da te __________________ 

Name __________________ 

Test: Pre Post

(Circle one)

Trial __________________ 

Time ___________________ 

Squad ID ___________

SQUAD ROSTER (OP)

Position: SL TL TL MG AMG ____ ____ ____ ____ ____

Number: ____ _____ _____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____

OPPFOR ROSTER

Position: Inf 1 DgAr DgAr ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____

Number : ____ _____ _____ ____ _____ _____ _____ ____ ____ ____

TIME EVENT/COMMENT ECC REPORT POINT

X Comma check, Controller 1 ____________ ______________

X Commo check, Controller 2 ____________ ______________

X — Commo check, OPFOR 1 ________________________

X Commo check, OPFOR 2 ________________________

________ Squad enters Assembly Area (Controller 1)

________ 

Squad completes perimeter set up (Controller 1)

________ 

Platoon Leader Finish Briefing (Controller 2)

_________ 

Infiltrator casualty (Firer #

First man leaves perimeter (Controller 2)

-________ 

Last man leaves perimeter (Controller 2)

________ 

Point man crosses Line of Departure (Controller 1)

________ 

Point crosses Phase Line A (Controller 1)

________ 

Point reaches Danger Area (Controller 1)

________ 

Danger Area casualty (Firer # ) (Firer I )

140
SQUAD ROSTER (OP)

Positioiu - 

- SL TL TL MG ANG ____ ____ ____

- .

Number : - 

- 

OPPPOR ROSTER (OP)

Position; ~~~~~ flg.A±. — - 

— —

Number:

Weapons: R — M—16; M — M-60; C — Hand Grenade; C — Claymore

- TARGET FIRER TIME CONY WPN EVENT/COMMENT -

X X X X First man reaches OP 141

- ~~~~~~~~~~ .•. .

~~~~.. X Z End attack on OP (Controller X)
SQUAD ROSTER (HASTY DEFENSE)

Position: SL TL — TL j

~~~ AME - ____ ____ ____ ____

Number : ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____

OPPFOR ROSTER (HASTY DEFENSE)

Position: ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____

Number: ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____

Weapons: R — M—l6; N — M—60; C — Hand Grenade; C — Claymore

TARGET FIRER TIME CONY WPN EVENT/COMMENT

X X ______ X X Begin Hasty Defense (Controller 1)

___________ ________ _______ ______ ______ _____________________________________________ 142
SQUAD- ROSTER (HASTY DEFENSE)

Positions Si. TL - TL ~~~~~~~~ — — Number : ____ ____

OPPFOR ROSTER (HASTY DEFENSE)

Position: - - -

Number: -

Weapons: R 11—16; N — 14—60; C Rand Grenade; C — Claymore

TARGE~ ~~~~~~ TIME CONY WPN - EVENT/COMMENT

- - - .,

- 

- - - -——.-

~~ 143
PEST N A RKAI TYF

Del ivery of the rder to Squad: Th~ squad 1.- ider qave the order

to his two fire team leaders who tht- r lissem inited it to their respective

fire teams. He gave the order a second time to his RTO. He covered

the enemy situat ion adequately. He c’ave the division and battalion

mission . He did indicate that the platoon ’s mission was to reduce resistance and clear the ridge line . He covered the squad mission adequately. He indicated that the team ’s responsibilities in that A team

would lay down a base of fire . The squad leader wan ted everybody to

go down and return f ire while he assessed the situation and made the

decisions. He didn ’t cover any other team responsibilities . There

were no instructions to the point. Nothing about flank security . He

did indicate that they would move along the ridge line to the west.

he further indicated that A team would lead with the B team trailing.

He did not mention the chain of command . He did not cover any signal

or communications instructions. The machine gunner knew virtually

nothing except they were going to move west along the ridge line . The

B team leader knew generally what the mission was and the route to take.

But he knew nei ther the platoon call sign nor enemy situation .

ASSEMBLY AREA

Selection of Positions: The positions were adequate : Good fields

of observation , poor attempt to camouflage their positions, some non—

tactical moving around , lackadaisical attitude in terms of actually

maintaining observation to their front . At one point the infiltrator

called over and he mentioned that he could only see one of the positions from his view point.

Security: They covered their sector well . Both flanks were

covered and coverage in the middle was good. However , the squad was

not looking out to their front . The security was minimal. They were

in a good position and if anything happened , they could have reacted

to it. They had good fields of fire . It was supported on both sides * so if they did get attacked from a flank , etc. the machine gun would

have been protected . The machine gunner himself was not alert. A

few times they did get up and walk around. General alertness was very • poor. One man right next to the machine gunner detected the infiltrator , but nothing was done about it.

Departure From the Assembly Area: The A team was leading. They

were in a wedge formation . The team leader was the point. He was

moving 25 to 30 meters in front of the squad leader as they crossed

the line of departure . As they moved out he got disoriented a little.

145
The team leader did not have a compass and he went all the way from

his right boundary across to his left boundary. The squad leader got

him back. There was no attempt to cover the point man ’s movement.

The two people walking with him on the wedge could see less than he

could and they were not in a position to support him instantly if he

got into trouble. He was moving rapidly and didn ’t pause at all to

check the terrain. He moved fast until he was in the vicinity of

Phase Line A , where he started moving more carefully and looking

around. B team only had two members—-the team leader and one other

member. The machine gun crew was under the control of the squad

leader. The squad was composed of an A team, a two—member B team,

and the squad leader , RTO and machine gun crew. During movement, the

B team leader followed behind the squad leader. Later on he went out

in the left flank and ended up being out in front of the lead fire

team.

Use of Cover/Concealment: They attempted to stay on one side of

the ridge or the other. They also made an attempt to use the best

terrain. However, their movement was so rapid they were moving upright

and they did not take full advantage of it. There were a number of

times where the people could be observed moving in the open from tree

to tree. They did not use cover/concealment to the best advantage .

They stopped several times during movement to have conferences. They

did not have very much in the way of SOP as they had to stop and have

a quick frag order with squad leader, both team leaders , RTO , and machine gunner and assistant machine gunner together , with no security.

Overwatch: They moved very rapidly and it was probably difficult

to overwatch the forward elements . The only overwatch that was employed was at various danger areas when he would stop and physically

set somebody up. During the movement the point man moved without anyone covering him.

Control: The B team leader was able to control the other member

of his squad . They moved well as a team. He kept looking back to the

squad leader for further instructions . The squad leader never gave

him specifics. The “A” team leader was moving as the point. I assume

his two other members were supposed to follow his lead which they did

well. They moved and adjusted their pace with the fire team leader.

Communications: The communications from the squad leader to the

other squad members were very good . The squad leader was much more

directive about what he wanted to do. He also got a lot more feedback

from his team leaders . When they noticed something it was brought to

his attention and let him make a decision on it. Communication s were

kept throughout the entire exercise. Squad leader kept them informed

using hand and arm signals. The squad leader was effective in getting

his team to do what he wanted them to do. However , their execution

wasn ’t all that sharp. His fire team leaders responded to him when he

gave them a direction.

146
POTENTIAL THREAT

The potential threat wasn ’t really reacted to. One man turned

around and looked at it point blank and then turned around and continued to move. When we were in the area of the potential threat the

B team was on the left flank . Only members of A team could have seen

the potential threat. The “A” team did spot it; however , there was

no communication back to squad leader. They did not find the map.

DANGER AREA

Another conference was held. The point team saw the road and I

believe the squad leader was up so close that he spotted it at the

same time. He halted his entire squad . After a small conference the

A team moved over to the right flank and set up some overwatch positions. The A team was providing security on the near side of the

danger area. B team went over across the road. The first shot from

the danger area OPFOR5 came when they were on the near side. B team

at that time moved across the road and pursued the enemy . B team

fired one or two shots and the enemy tried to withdraw and they pursued them and they ended up killing one OPFOR in position . They kept

on going and did not notice the other one on the right flank. The A

team noticed him (the other OPFOR) when he came up. Even though A

team was providing security they were on the right flank and could

not secure the area where the fire team crossed. They could provide

security straight ahead. In effect, the B team actually crossed without having security . As soon as the firing started , the squad leader

was aggressive at moving his entire squad across the road . All we

heard was one long burst of M16 fire and a couple of shots. The squad

leader ’s decision was to push everyone as quickly as he could across

the road and they began fire and movement. The squad never saw the

right flank danger man until he began to withdraw . Once the B team

did get across the road and he saw the enemy OPFOR withdrawing, he

communicated that back to squad leader. The squad leader then told

him to check it out. The squad continued on and ended up killing the

2d OPFOR. No one on the left flank detected the claymore because they

were moving too fast. The mapper indicated that the squad leader

stepped right over the claymore. Later they reported the claymore .

From movement to line of departure on they had a few problems in staying in the boundaries as they were off to the right flank somewhat .

The squad leader did not have a compass and he was trying to guide

them on the ridge line and obviously he was not able to do it that well.

The squad leader ’s reaction to contact was a headlong rush into it.

The squad leader did not wait for fire support from the machine gun.

He comm itted people directly into the phase of the contact. Squad

leader also didn’t pay much attention to the machine gun and the extra

fire power that he had . The machine gunner employed the machine himself when he thought it was necessary. At the danger area the squad

leader told the machine gunner to set up suppressive fires. The location of the M60 was not a good one for employing it when it was desired to be employed . Only one smoke grenade was used.

147
Where was the point lead element about the time they were taken

under fire? There was confusion over whether the squad knew they were

L supposed to move or not. The A team did not move and the B team did

begin to move and in fact passed them up. At that point whether squad

leader intended to or not he had his B team leading as they walked up

into that OP. The B team moved out ahead of A team and kept on moving.

The first shot came from the OP. Instead of getting down immediately

they ran to a nearby tree and instead of staying there they continued

their rush trying to get as close as possible to the enemy as they

could . The B team ended up getting killed. The team leader was the

first one killed and the other man was pinned down and couldn ’t move .

He remained there until he was killed by a grenade . Just before the

team leader was killed he was trying to get the M60 closer and closer

to the OP. Actually where he was he could have delivered effective

fire had he not been masked by the rest of the squad . The squad leader

did indicate for A team to move up. They moved in on the right flank

by long rushes. There was one smoke grenade employed . The machine gun

had not opened up fire yet. The A t.eam was deployed on the right flank

and B team (left of center) was already hit and pinned down. Then the

A team came under suppressive fire from the OPFOR machine gun , and were

pinned down . They shifted to the right, again on their own. As they

shifted to the right they lost the team leader and then they lost the

second man crossing in the road on the right flank . At that point

they were completely separated from the squad leader . At that point

the machine gunner had a good field of fire and started to bring intermittent fire in on the OPFOR position and suppress them . The second

man killed was the squad leader that ’s why there was no direction .

The A team leader did understand the report that the squad leader was

dead . He moved from his position on the right flank into the center

to tty to get the machine gun. At that point they started taking a

lot of casualties. The “A” team leader then got separated from his

two remaining people on the right flank . The acting squad leader on

the left flank had a couple of people on the right flank completely

separated. The team leader instructed those two people on the right

flank to continue moving up and that’s where they eventually got

killed. The squad leader directed that the machine gun be brought

up and bring down a base of fire. It seemed like it took a long time

for the machine gunner to get set up and provide suppressive fires.

Most of the squad had been killed. Either the machine gunner or his

assistant (whichever one wasn’t killed) tried to organize the last

few people that were together. He yelled out for one man to pull back

to his position and maneuver - the left. This man was pinned down

in the middle and couldn ’t move and ended up getting killed by a

grenade. There was some attempt to try to organize the thing with

even just a few men alive. They were never within hand grenade distance except with that one last man. The team leader would have pulled

those two remaining people on the right flank back around and gotten

all those people together and had all those guns suppressing position

two. The squad had split up and then began to get picked off. The

148

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last man crossed the road and was moving in on the machine gun position. He had circled around it for about 15 minutes well within

grenade range but was either hesitant to either try to fire or pull

the grenades so we called the problem .

Cover/Concealment: It was very poor . Their idea of movement was

long rushes upright in front of the positions. Three people got killed

doing that. It was the same for B team. There was no attempt to use

cover and concealment. When one man got pinned down he used the cover

in front of him to good advantage but there was no way that he could

move. When they were taken under fire the B team was ahead of the A

team . The last man circled around on the extreme right hand side of

the flank and got up reasonably close to the positions. The machine

gunner himself was trying to move up into position most of the time .

The assistant never kept up with him.

HASTY DEFENSE

Selection of Positions: Squad leader deployed one fire team on

the left flank and the other fire team on the right flank. He positioned his machine gun on the far lef t flank covering the road and also

had a field of fire clear across the front of the sector. The positions themselves were selected by the individual members. The only

positions that the squad leader or team leaders selected were the two

flank points and OP. The positions the squad leader selected on the

right flank were reasonably good. It appeared that he realized that

that was his major threat. He had a claymore employed on the right

flank and another in the center . They were both aimed poorly but they

were employed in the right place in terms of the potential threat.

The people were alert and in a position to accept the attack . The OP

had no communication . They elected not to use the wire and the telephone. The OP was behind some brush trying to watch and listen for the

enemy . At one point he almost fell asleep. He heard the enemy coming

up on the position at which time he grabbed a hand grenade . He waited

a while then threw the smoke grenade and he did not wait for the smoke

to build up or any cover whatsoever . As soon as he threw it, he tried

to run back to the defensive position . He was immediately hit by the

OPFOR. The use of smoke grenades to alert the squad to the OPFORs was

his own idea.

Security: While they were watching to their front they detected

the movement at the same time the OP did at the right flank positions.

There were no instructions concerning the direction of attack . At

that point contact began . The right flank positions did not have

visual contact with the rest of the squad. There was one position on

the right that could relay messages by voice. The rest of the squad

didn ’t know what was going on on the right flank , but they could hear

some fires and grenades going off. The squad leader had to ask what

was going on over on the right flank . The man was hesitant to answer

him because he was afraid to give his position away. In fact, he did

149

—- - b
give away his position and was killed almost immediately . The people

on the right flank began to make contact and initially started throwing grenades. It was a good move. The squad heard the OPFOR in front

of them but they hadn’t spotted them. They threw a couple of grenades

that weren ’t effective . The right flank did shoot the point man of

that particular OPFOR element. The group between the two flank positions were a little hasty in throwing their grenades . They made no

attempt to find out exactly where the OPFOR was or even use suppressive fires in that direction . The squad leader had good control of

the members who were in the immediate area of his vicinity as he called

directions to his machine gunner to fire his final protective line

across the front of their sector. He also called to get a report so

he knew what was going on in the right flank . He could see the positions in the middle. Positions in the middle tried to keep the squad

leader informed by pointing out what direction the enemy were in , where

they were. The squad leader tried to use the M60 and he kept yelling

at them to suppress and to fire as their final protection . The machine

gunner himself fired only seldomly. The times the machine gunner did

fire were good and it did suppress. When he did fire the machine gun

the squad leader told him to fire the right flank . The machine gunner

had made no attempt to move the gun . It always pointed straight out

toward the center of the sector. There was only one man who was there.

The machi-ne gunner was reluctant to fire. He wanted to see targets.

Obviously he didn ’t understand the suppressive capability of his gun.

The right flank was wiped ou t before they had a chance to fire the

right hand claymore . No one made an attempt to get over there and

actually fire the claymore. The one in the middle was controlled by

the B team leader. He was supposed to fire it. But both members in

this position were killed and the squad leader himself came down

from his position to take over the claymore and did fire it. However ,

no one was in the killing radius of the claymore .

SUMMARY JUDGMENTS

The squad leader had a good idea of what he wanted to do. His

two fire team leaders , while they supported him, were less knowledgeable. Thus, the entire squad was dependent on the squad leader ’s

knowledge of what to do. In many cases at the danger area , and at

other times the squad leader had a good idea of what he wanted to do

yet he was usually unable to accomplish it because the people just

did not execute it very well. They were making attempts to do what

he wished . The squad leader ’s perception of what he should do in

contact was to close with that position as rapidly as he could with

all his people and that is what led to the casualties. None of the

squad members seemed to understand the necessity and the fire power

that the machine gun offered and it was not used the way it should

have been . Also when they were attacking the enemy position at the

OP they did not respect the machine gun fire, they just ran headlong

into it and tried to rush and get as close as possible without any

150
attempt to find out how many people were there , where the positions

were , or anything else. After a fiw people had been killed there was

an attempt by a few members who were left to pinpoint the positions

and try to maneuver and organize things, but too few were left to do

anything. Overall, the squad ’s tactical capabilities were good. They

just moved in the open and were upright too much . Once they did come

under fire they just went headlong right toward it and did not make

any attempt to coordinate or anything , find out where the OP was , use

their weapons , etc. This squad was sloppy in the execution of many

things although the squad leader seemed to exert a good deal of control over the squad . He seemed to be quite directive and seemed to

have good ideas of what to do but the squad was very slow responding

to orders. The movement techniques were generally poor, and their

employment of weapons , especially for suppression , was quite poor.

151

___ -- - -
APPENDIX F

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY TABLES

TABLE 1. Analysis of Variance for Number of Missions Accomplished

Source of Variation SS df MS F P

A (Training Group) 2.53 1 2.53 15.81 (0.005

B (Test) 3.78 1 3.78 23.63 (0.001

A x B 2.54 1 2.54 15.88 <0.005

Between Cells 2.19 14 0.16

Within Cells 2.18 14 0.16

TOTAL 13.22 31

TABLE 2. Analysis of Variance for Duration of OP Engagement

Source of Variation SS df MS F P

A (Training Group) 1417.78 1 1417.78 4.79 <0.05

B (Test) 2719 .53 1 2719.53 20.48 <0.001

Ax B 1471.54 1 1471.54 11.08 <0.005

Between Cells 4147.44 14 296.25

Within Cells 1859.43 14 132.82

TOTAL 11615.72 31

TABLE 3. Analysis of Variance for Evaluation by OPFOR Controllers of

Caution

Source of Variation SS df MS P P

A (Training Group) 15.13 1 15.13 9.06 <0.01

B (Test) 2.00 1 2.00 1.90 Not Significant

A x B 19.53 1 19.53 18.60 <0.001

Between Cells 23.34 14 1.67

Within Cells 14.72 14 1.05

TOTAL 74.72 31

TABLE 4. Analysis of Variance for Evaluation by OPFOR Controllers of

Use of Concealment

Source of Variation SS df MS F P

A (Training Group) 8.00 1 8.00 3.39 Not Significant

B (Test) 7.03 1 7.03 748 (0.025

A x B 12.50 1 12.50 13.30 <0.005

Between Cells 32.97 14 2.36

Within Cells 13.22 14 0.94

TOTAL 73.72 31

153
TABLE 5. Analysis of Variance for Pooled Measures of Performance at

the OP

Source of Variation SS df MS F P

A (Training Group) 50.0 1 50.0 20.92

B (Test) 10.13 1 10.13 10.34

A x B 36.12 1 36.12 36.86

Between Cells 33.50 14 2.39

Within Cells 13.75 14 0.98

TOTAL 143.50 31

TABLE 6. Analysis of Variance for Evaluation by OPFOR Controllers of

Tactical Performance

Source of Variation SS df MS F P

A (Training Group) 13.78 1 13.78 4.99 <0.05

B (Test) 0.13 1 0.13 0.07 Not Significant

A x B 10.12 1 10.12 5.44 (0.05

Between Cells 38.69 14 2.76

Within Cells 26.00 14 1.86

TOTAL 88.72 31

TABLE 7. Analysis of Variance for Pooled Measures of Performance in the

Hasty Defense

Source of Variation SS df MS F P

A (Training Group) 9.03 1 9.03 5.07 (0.05

B (Test) 9.03 1 9.03 10.62 <0.01

A x B 19.54 1 19.54 22.99 <0.001

Between Cells 24.94 14 1.78

Within Cells 11.93 14 0.85

TOTAL 74.47 31

TABLE 8. Analysis of Variance for Pooled Measures of Performance

(OP and Hasty Defense Combined)

Source of Variation SS df MS F P

A (Training Group) 101.53 1 101.53 22.31 <0.001

B (Test) 38.28 1 38.28 17.01 (0.005

A x B 108.79 1 108.79 48.35 (0.001

Between Cells 63.69 14 4.55

Within Cells 31.43 14 2.25

TOTAL 343.72 31

154

I--—- - - - - ---~~ _________
o STI I BUT ION

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155
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156