Present: All the Justices 

VICTOR H. SALZI, ET AL. 

OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 

v. Record No. 010438 January 11, 2002 

VIRGINIA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL 

INSURANCE COMPANY 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHARLOTTE COUNTY 

Charles L. McCormick, III, Judge 

 In this appeal, we consider whether a provision in an 

insurance contract is ambiguous and, therefore, unenforceable. 

 Victor H. and Lorraine Salzi filed their amended motion 

for judgment against Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance 

Company (Virginia Farm Bureau). They alleged that Virginia 

Farm Bureau breached its insurance contract by failing to 

indemnify them for damages sustained to a barn as a result of 

a hurricane. The parties entered into a stipulation of facts, 

and the litigants submitted the matter to the circuit court 

for summary judgment on the issue whether a business use 

exclusion in the contract absolved Virginia Farm Bureau of any 

obligation to pay the stipulated damages. The circuit court 

held that the exclusion was clear and unambiguous and that 

Virginia Farm Bureau had no duty to indemnify the Salzis for 

their loss. The circuit court entered a final judgment, and 

the Salzis appeal. 
 Victor H. and Lorraine Salzi were the named insureds 

under a homeowners insurance policy issued by Virginia Farm 

Bureau. The property insured included a barn that had an 

actual cash value in excess of $16,120. 

 On September 15, 1996, the barn collapsed. "At the time 

of the [l]oss, the barn contained between 1,500 and 3,000 

bales of hay, which measured approximately 2' x 4' each." 

James Renneth Marston owned the hay that was stored in the 

barn. Marston operates a tobacco farm "with a profit motive 

in Charlotte County." Marston raised tobacco "over more than 

115 acres in Charlotte, Appomattox and Campbell Counties." He 

raised the hay stored in the Salzis' barn "as part of his 

normal crop rotation in his tobacco farming operation." 

Marston did not have sufficient space on his own farm to store 

the hay, and he "asked for and received permission from Victor 

Salzi to store hay in the barn." Marston had "free access to 

the barn." Marston did not need permission from the Salzis 

when he wanted access to the barn. 

 Marston had not used the Salzis' barn in the past. 

Marston did not rent the barn from the Salzis, nor had he 

discussed rental terms with them. "Marston thanked Salzi for 

allowing him to use the barn, and gave Salzi $100 as a 

neighborly gesture." Marston had intended to sell the hay 

stored in the barn to a buyer, but the buyer no longer desired 

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to purchase the hay after it was damaged in the hurricane that 

caused the barn to collapse. The Salzis filed a claim with 

Virginia Farm Bureau for damages to the barn. 

 Virginia Farm Bureau denied the claim on the basis that 

the barn was used "for business" at the time of the loss. 

Virginia Farm Bureau's insurance contract that had been issued 

to the Salzis contained the following pertinent provisions: 

"The following definitions apply to this policy. 

. . . . 

 "Business means a trade, profession, or other 

occupation including farming, all whether full 

or part time, or the rental of any property to 

others. (However, business does not include 

the occasional rental, for residential 

purposes, of the portion of the insured

premises normally occupied exclusively by your

household.) 

. . . . 

"PRINCIPAL PROPERTY COVERAGES 

. . . . 

"Coverage B – Related Private Structures on the 

Premises – This policy covers related private 

structures on the insured premises which are not 

attached to your residence. (Structures connected 

to the residence by only a fence, utility line or 

similar connection are considered to be related 

private structures.) . . . . 

"Coverage B does not cover: 

"1. structures used for business." 

 The Salzis argue that the definition of the word 

"business" in the insurance contract is vague, ambiguous, and 

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susceptible to two reasonable interpretations. The Salzis 

contend that the language in the policy "speaks in specific 

terms of the insured's activity, use or ownership, not that of 

a third party. The business use exclusion applies . . . to 

Salzi's business, not Marston's temporary, one time use of the 

barn to store hay." Continuing, the Salzis argue that even 

though Virginia Farm Bureau "is clearly attempting to limit 

its liability by excluding coverage for the commercial use of 

the barn . . . the limitation applies to the insured's

business use of the structure, for the insured's trade, or the 

insured's profession, or the insured's other occupation or the 

insured's rental to others. The use of the word 'others' in 

the sentence limits the applicability of the exclusion to the 

insureds." The Salzis contend that the policy's definition of 

business could mean one of two things: (i) the business 

exclusion only applies if the Salzis use the barn in their 

trade, profession, or occupation, or (ii) the exclusion 

applies if the Salzis and Marston used the barn in their 

trades, professions, or occupations. We disagree with the 

Salzis. 

 The principles of contract interpretation that guide our 

resolution of this appeal are well established. "Reasonable 

policy exclusions not in conflict with statute[s] will be 

enforced; to be effective, the exclusionary language must 

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clearly and unambiguously bring the particular act or omission 

within its scope." Floyd v. Northern Neck Ins. Co., 245 Va. 

153, 158, 427 S.E.2d 193, 196 (1993). Additionally, " '[a]n 

insurance policy is a contract, and, as in the case of any 

other contract, the words used are given their ordinary and 

customary meaning when they are susceptible of such 

construction.' " Graphic Arts Mutual Ins. v. C.W. Warthen 

Co., 240 Va. 457, 459, 397 S.E.2d 876, 877 (1990) (quoting 

Hill v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., 237 Va. 148, 152, 375 

S.E.2d 727, 729 (1989)). 

 We have also stated that "an ambiguity, if one exists, 

must be found on the face of the policy." Nationwide Mutual 

Ins. v. Wenger, 222 Va. 263, 268, 278 S.E.2d 874, 877 (1981); 

accord S.F. (Jane Doe) v. West American Ins. Co., 250 Va. 461, 

464, 463 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1995). Language is ambiguous when 

it may be understood in more than one way or when such 

language refers to two or more things at the same time. 

Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Corrugated 

Container Corp., 229 Va. 132, 136-37, 327 S.E.2d 98, 101 

(1985). 

 The insurance contract at issue in this appeal plainly 

states that the coverage does not include "structures used for 

business." As we have already stated, the word "business" is 

defined in the insurance contract as "a trade, profession, or 

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other occupation including farming, all whether full or part 

time, or the rental of any property to others." The phrase 

"structures used for business" is unambiguous. And, the 

insurance contract's definition of business is unambiguous. 

 We find no language in the insurance contract that 

permits us to conclude that the definition of business is 

limited to the Salzis' business activities as opposed to the 

business activities of others, in this instance, Marston's 

business activities. The Salzis' barn is a structure within 

the plain meaning of the insurance contract. Their barn was 

"used for business" within the plain meaning of the insurance 

contract because the Salzis permitted a farmer to store in 

their barn between 1,500 and 3,000 bales of hay related to the 

farmer's tobacco business. 

 Finding no merit in the Salzis' remaining contentions, we 

will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 

Affirmed. 

JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE KEENAN and JUSTICE LEMONS 

join, dissenting. 

 I do not agree with the statement in the majority opinion 

that the barn belonging to the appellants, Victor H. and 

Lorraine Salzi, “was ‘used for business’ . . . because the 

Salzis permitted a farmer to store in their barn between 1,500 

and 3,000 bales of hay related to the farmer’s tobacco 

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business.” In my opinion, a one-time, gratuitous use of a 

barn to store a neighbor’s hay does not turn that barn into a 

“structure[] used for business.” 

 The storing of hay in this barn on one occasion lacks the 

continuity necessary to constitute a business use. See

Virginia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hagy, 232 Va. 472, 475, 352 S.E.2d 

316, 318 (1987) (defining, as the law of the case, the term 

“business pursuit” as requiring both continuity and profit 

motive). “[T]he term business . . . mean[s] more than a 

single act.” Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Hill, 307 F. Supp. 801, 

804 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff’d, Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Aetna 

Casualty & Surety Co., 426 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1970). 

 The appellee, Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance 

Company, argues that the Salzis did not assign error to the 

trial court’s factual finding that the Salzis permitted their 

neighbor “to use their barn to store hay in his farming 

business.” I do not agree. The question whether the barn was 

a “structure[] used for business” is a mixed question of law 

and fact, and resolution of the question depends upon the 

construction placed on that phrase in the policy. The Salzis 

objected to the final order, in part, on the basis that the 

trial court misconstrued the policy’s language, and, on 

appeal, they challenged the trial court’s construction of the 

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phrase “structures used for business.” Thus, I conclude that 

this question is properly before this Court. 

 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would 

reverse the judgment of the circuit court. 

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