### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 09 -0 00 13 -C V

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IN T H E IN T E R E S T O F R

. A

. L. , A C H ILD

On Appea l from the 62nd Judi cial District Court

L amar County , Texas Trial Court No. 77294

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C

. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Opinion by

J ustice MoseleyTh e us e of ini tia ls i n li e u o f n a me s and a c ro ny ms f or the name s o f a g enci es in thi s c a se 1 makes for an alphabe t soup which is both confusing and difficult to f ollow. Acc ording ly , aliases a re e mpl oy e d f

or a ll o f t he ind ivi du a ls w ho are pa rt ie s. 2 O P I N I O N After a trial to a j u ry , the par ental rig hts betwee n J ohn and Mar y and their biolog ical son, Ab sa lom , we re termi nated . T he te rm inatio n a c tio n w a s n ot i ns tit ute d b y any State a g e nc y

bu t, 1

rathe r, by Mr s. Smith ( Mary ' s mo the r) and he r h us ba nd , M r. Smith ( Ma

ry ' s st e pf a the r) , a s a

pr e dic a te to an ac tion for adoption. J ohn and Mary eac h appea l from thi s order , alleg ing that the evidenc e wa s leg ally and fa ctually insufficient to suppor t te rmination and that they rec eived inef

fec tive assistance of c ouns e l in

thi s p ri vate te rm inatio n s uit . T he y fu rt he r ur g e that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in e rr on e ou sly admitting hea

rsay evidenc e and in f

ailing to submit a re quested jury char g e. We af

firm. I. F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound K e v i nJ e n k i n s , ani n v e s t i g a t o r w i t h t h e L a m ar C o u n t y S h e r i f

f ' s D e p art m e n t , f

o u n d t w e n t yfive g rams of me thamphetamine in the home of J ohn and Mary . At the time the drug s were found, Ab sa lom , w ho wa s a

pp ro xima te ly

thr e e mon ths old a t the tim e , wa s r e sid ingin t he ho me wi th t

he m. Th e De pa rtme nt of F a mil y and Pr ote c tiv e Se rv ic e s (D F PS) arr ang e d fo r the c hil d to sta y wi th Mr s. Smith. John and Mary did no t pa rt ic ipate in D F PS' s se rv ic e s and fa mil y pla n. As a re su lt, in 2006, Mr. and Mrs. Smith obtained sole custody of the c hild and neither J ohn nor Mar y wer e g rante d

c ourt -o rd e re d v isi ta tio n r ig hts

.J ohn testified that the fe dera l detainer sentenc e wa s to run concur rent l y wi th the other 2 se nte nc e s e nte re d o n Apr il 1 2, 20 07

. Howev e r, the langua g e of the de ta ine r c on fl ic ts w ithhis testimony

. 3 On May 20, 2008, Mr. and Mrs. Smit h filed a joint petition where in they soug ht termination of t he parental rig hts of J ohn and Mar y and, following that, the adoption of Absa lom. The soug ht-for termination was ba sed on Section 161.001(1) (Q) of the T exas Family

Code, which a llows for termination if the par ents have been c onvicted of a n offe nse and are unable to car e for a child due to imprisonment for at least t wo y ear s from the date that the petition is filed. T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 161.001(1)( Q) (V ernon 2008) . A jury hear d testimony

of both natura l pare nts' trouble d past. J ohn had bee n incar ce ra t ed twelve times duringhis lifetime, having had a la undry list of convictions: driving w hile intox icated, posse ssion of marihua na, burg lary , resisting arr est, theft of stolen proper

ty , and theft of chec k. He ha d also bee n using me thamphetamine whe n it was found in his home. After John and Mary wer e re lease d from jail on b o n d , they broke into Mr. a

nd Mr s. Smiths ' ho me (w he re Ab sa lom wa s th e n li vin g ), wh e re the y sto le ite ms f

ro m th e ho us e , s tol e the Smiths ' car , and fle d to Mex ico, wher e they wer e later a rre sted. On April 12, 2007, John entered pleas of guilty

to possession of methamphetamine ( rec eiving a ten- y ear sentenc e), to the bur g lary of the Smith hom e (r ece iving a n eig ht-y ear

sentenc e to run c oncurr ently with the possession conviction), a

nd to forg ery

(re ceiving a twelve- y ear sentenc e, also to r un concur rently ). Be cause he ha d a lso c ounte rf

e ite d mon e y , a

fe de ra l de ta ine r h a d b e e n is su e d, thi s f e de ra l de ta ine r r e qu ir inghim to serve a thirty -seve n-month sentence

. 2Th e a un t' s h ome burn e d d ow n the da y Ma ry burg lari zed

it, bu t Ma

ry de nie d invo lve me nt. 3 Th e re c or d is un c le ar w he the r t he se fi nd ing s of

g uil t w e re the re su lt o f guil ty ple a s o r t ri a ls. 4 4 Mary 's hi st ory was lik e wi se fa ir ly so rd id. She wa s f

or c e d to qu it a

pr e vio us job a t a pharma cy beca use she wa s discovere d takin g patients' presc ription medications. After rec eiving

c omm un ity su pe rv isi on fo r f

or g e ry and burg lary and wh ile liv ingwi th Joh n, sh e a tte mpt e d to pa ss count e r f e it mo n e y w h ic h s h e p r in te d

. A s w it h th e c ir c u ms ta

n c e o f Jo h n , M ar

y a ls o w a s a

b u s ing dr ug s at th e tim e me tha

mph e tamin e wa s f

ound in the ir ho me . As state d b e fo re , s he pa rt ic ipate d w ith Johnin t he burg lary

of the Smith hom e and the the ft of the ir a uto mob ile , th e re a ft e r f

le e ingto Mexi co; s he had stolen Mrs. Smit h' s chec kbook and was masquera ding as Mrs. Smith when she was

arr ested. In addition to the burg lary of the home of

the Smiths , without J ohn' s p articipation, she b ro k e i n t o h er

au n t 's h o m e, s t o l e e v ery t h i n g o f v al u e a n d

an y t h i n g wh i ch co u l d b e u s edt o fo rge chec ks. She then passed forg ed che cks in Texarkana and in Eag le Pass. I n 2007, Mary was found 3 g uilty of the followingcrimes whic h resulted in the foll owing concur rent sentences: 1) possession 4 of methamphe tamine with inten t t o d i stribute (re ceivinga sente nce of seven y ear s); 2) for g ery

(a twelve- month sentence ); 3) burg lary of the Smiths' home ( a five-y ear sentenc e); a nd 4) burg lary

of Mary ' s aunt' s home (a fi v e-y ear sentenc e). B eca

use she ha d also counter feited mone y , a fe dera l detainer had bee n issued, requiringher to ser ve a twe nty -seve n-month sentence

.5

II. Ana lys is 1. Legally and F actually Su ff icient Evidence Sup ported Term ination of Pare ntal Ri ght s

a. Se c ti on 1 61 .0 01 (1 ) R e quir e m e nt s "Ri ghts whi ch i nh ere i n the paren t- chi ld rel ati on sh ip are of con st it ut io nal di men si on ." In re J.J. , 911 S.W .2d 437, 439 (Tex. A pp.—Texarkana 1995, writ denied)

. Be cause of the involuntary nature of this termination proce eding , it must be strictly scrutinized. Id. A trial cour

t may order termination of the pa

rent-c hild relationship if it finds b y cl ear and convincingevidenc e that ter mination i s in the best interest of the child, and the pa rent ha s "know i n gl y en gage d in criminal conduc t that has resulted in the pa rent' s: (i) conviction of a n offe nse; and (ii) c onfinement or imprisonment and inability to car e for the child for not less than two y ears fro m t he d ate of f

il in g the p eti ti on ." T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 161.001(1)( Q), (2) (Ve rnon 2008). The statute' s two-y ear time period is to be applied pr ospectively

. In re A.V. , 113 S.W .3d 355, 356 (Tex. 2003). Although we recog nize the grave reality that the "' termination suit can result in a pa re nt' s lo ss o f h is o r h e r le g a l re la tio ns hip wi th the c hil d, ' the pr ima ry fo c us is p ro te c tin g the be st in ter est s o f t he ch il d. " Id. at 361. The requireme nt that evidenc e supporting a ter mination order be cle ar and con vi nci ng "is bo th con st it ut io nal ly as w ell as s tat ut ori ly

man dat ed. " J.J. , 911 S.W .2d at 439. Th e c le ar a

nd c on vin c ingsta

nd ard of pr oo f r e qu ir e d at th e tr ia l c ourt le ve l ne c e ssa

ri ly a ff e c ts our appe llate re view of the evidenc e. In re J .F .C. , 96 S.W .3d 256, 265 (Tex. 2002). I n revie wing6

le g a l su ff ic ie nc y , w e re

je c t th e tr a dit ion a l st and a

rd wh ic h o nly

re qu ir e s any

thi ngmor e tha

n a sc int ill a of evide nce. Id. I ns te a d, we loo k at al l the e vid e nc e in t he light m os t f

a vo ra ble to t he jud g me nt t o deter mine if the jury

could re asonably

have f ormed a firm belief

or convic tion that gr o u n ds for termination exist ed under the Texas Family

Code. Id. at 266. To g ive appr opriate de fer ence to the jury ' s conclusions wh en conducting a leg al suffic iency

revie w, we must assume that it resolved disputed fac ts in favor of its finding if a re asonable jury could do so. Id

. When we re v i ew termination finding s for fa ctual suff iciency , we must g ive due de fer ence to a jury ' s fac t-finding s, and must not supplant it s judgme nt with our own. In re H.R .M. , 209 S.W .3d 1 0 5 , 1 0 8 (T ex . 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g G o ld e n Ea g leA r c h e r

y , I n c . v . J a c kson , 1 1 6 S. W. 3 d

7 5 7 , 7 6 1 ( T e x. 20 03 ); In re C.H. , 8 9 S. W.3 d 1 7, 27 (T e x. 20 02 )) . We c on sid e r o nly e vid e nc e that th e jur

y c ou ld

re a so na bly have fo un d to be c le ar a

nd c on vin c ing

and inq uir e " wh e the r the e vid e nc e is suc h th a t a fac tfinder could rea sonably form a f irm belief or

conviction about the truth of the . . . alleg ations." H.R.M. , 20 9 S.W. 3d

a t 10 8; J .F .C. , 96 S.W .3d at 266. I n applying this standard in lig ht of the " clea r and convinc ing" lang uage required by Section 161.001, we must be c are ful not to "be so rig orous that th e on ly

fact find ing s th a t c ou ld w ith sta nd re vie w a re tho se e sta

bli sh e d b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. " H.R.M. , 209 S.W .3d at 108. Des p it e Jo h n ' s an d M ar

y ' s e xte n s iv e h is to r

y w it h th e c r im in a l ju s ti c e s y s te m, th ey are op tim ist ic of

the po ssi bil ity

of pa ro le , a nd the y qu est ion wh e the r t

he e vid e nc e is s uf

fi c ie nt t o establish that they will be inca rce rate d and unable to take ca re of Absalom until May

20, 2010. The7

jur y he ard that J oh n wa s eli g ibl e to be c on sid e re d for pa ro le fo r the thi rd

tim e in Jul y

20 09 . B e c a

us e he was not c onvicted of an ag g ravated crime and had not r ece ived any disciplinary

repr imand since incar cer ation, J ohn stated that he e x pecte d to be par oled, eve n though he had neve r been out on pa ro le duri ngany

of his tw e lve inc arc e ratio ns . Joh n e mph a size d tha t he co mpl e te d s e lf -h e lp c la sse s, Bible study

class, a fo rt y -day

Purpose Drive n L ife c ourse, a ten-we ek ang er solution course , a twelve- step substance abuse pr og ram, a Strateg ies and S ucce ss prog ram, wa s enrolled in a B asic L ife Principles prog ram a

nd a Celebr ate Rec overy

prog ram, e arne d his G ED, and had be come c ertified

a s a pe e r he a lth e du c a tor
. Simi larl y , Ma ry te sti fi e d that sh e wa s inv olv e d in a Ch ri st ian s agains t substance a

buse prog ram, B ible study , and par enting , cog nitive, and victim impact classes. W hen rele ased, Ma

ry hoped to re -establish an a micable r elationship with the Smi ths, attend colleg e, and g et a de g ree in substance a buse counse ling. Whil e John's sister and br other-in- law tes t i fi ed t h ey wer e pre pare d to help J ohn and Mar y up on the ir re sp e c tiv e re le a se s by pr ov idi ng the m with a pla c e to l ive and a job in t he fa mil y bu sin e ss, Mary testified, " I ' m asking , y ou know, at lea st give me a y ear , may be two y ear s, to ge t out and g et things tog ether ." Mr s. Smi th testified that she was not awa re if J ohn had ever be en employ ed in any job

. Mr

. Smith c la ime d that he and his wi fe ha d d on e e ve ry

thi ngto h e lp Joh n a

nd Ma ry , b ut t he ir eff orts had bee n to no avail. H.R.M. corr ectly

pointed out that in some cases, ne ither the leng th of the sentenc e nor the projec ted re lease date wa s disposit ive of the a ctual re lease date of the par ent due t o p o ssibili ty of8

parole . 209 S.W .3d at 108–09. Howeve r, the Te x as Supreme Court a lso stated that while evidenc e of availability of parole is r eleva nt, its mere introduction "doe s not prevent a fac tfinder f

rom forming

a fi rm c on vic tio n or be lie f that the pa re nt wi ll re ma in inc arc e rate d fo r a t le a st tw o y e ars ," be c a us e "[ p] arol e deci si on s ar e in here nt ly sp ecul ati ve. " Id. at 109. Thus, as "' the sole arbiter when a ssessing t h e c r e d i b i l i t y an d d e m e an o r o f w i t n e s s e s '

. . . [ a ] j u r y [ i s ] f r e e t o d i s r e g ar d [ p ar o l e ' s ] t e s t i m o n y, which [is] bare ly

more than c onjecture ," e specia lly when a rec ord shows multipl e convictions and sentenc es, and pr evious denials of pa role. Id. Since J ohn had alr ea d y b ee n t wi ce de nied par ole, and since Mary had also be en denie d parole , the jury was fre e to disre g ard the par ents' optimis tic testimony . Reviewing the evidenc e, we conclude the jury

could have formed a

clea r and c onvincing beli ef t h at b o th pare nts would be incar cer ated until May

20, 2010, and that they would be unable to support or ca re f or the c hild during that period. Thus, it ca

n be dete rmined that there was suff icient evidenc e for

the jury to have f ound that the re quirements of Sec tion 161.001(1)(Q) wer e met.

b. The Be stInt e r e stof t he Chi ld R e quir e m e nt A non e xha

us tiv e lis t of fa c tor s tha t can be us e d in det e rm ini ng the be st inte re st of the c hil d in a termination case include: 1) the emotional and phy sical needs of the child now and in the f

uture; 2) the pa re nta l a bil iti e s o f in di vi du als se e kin g c us tod y ; 3) the pla

ns fo r t he c hil d b y

ind ivi du a ls seekingcustody ; 4) the stability of the home or proposed plac ement; 5) the a cts or omissions of the pare nt which may

indicate that the e x isting par ent-c hild relationship is not a proper one; and 6) a ny9

excuse for the acts or omissions of the pare nt. In re S.B. , 207 S.W .3d 877, 886 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2006, no pet. ). Fu rt her, e vidence offe red to prove g rounds for te rmination, the deg ree of contac t be tween the natura l pa rent and child, deg ree of financ ial support, quality of car e r en d ered by a child's careg iver, and their wil lingne ss to adopt are all relevant to deter mining if the te rmination i s i n t h e best interest of the child. In re C.H. , 8 9 S. W.3 d 1 7, 28 (T e x. 20 02 ); In re J .W .M. , 153 S.W. 3d 54 1, 54 8–49 (T e x. Ap p. —A mari llo 20 04 , pe t. d e nie d) (" Whil e the pr os pe c t of a do pti on int o a stable home cannot a lone be sa id to be a dete rminative fa ctor, it clea rly is a mong the fa ctors the court prope rly

could consider

. . . .")

. Mr. and Mrs. S m i t h , J une Compost-Ty ler (a worke r with the DF PS), Gary Marlowe (who had bee n appointed by

the trial cour

t to conduct a soc ial study reg arding adoption place ment), and Mary ' s b iol og ic a l f

a the r a nd a un t all re c omm e nd e d tha t ter min a tio n of p are nta l r ig hts wa s in the be st interest of A

bsalom. J ohn, Mary , and John's sister and brother- in-law e ach oppose d the termination. Absalom had be en in custody of the Smiths si nce he was three or four months old. The jury hear d testimony that the S miths provided a stable home envir onment wher e Absa lom was well take n

car e of a nd was ha

ppy . Mary

testified that whil e J ohn had sired six children, he only had a relationship wit h three . J ohn had not see n Absalom since the Smi ths assumed custody in 2006, and none of John's other children had ever had conta ct with Absalom. Althoug h Mary testified that she d i d n o tv i s i t Ab s al o m o ft en , M rs . S m i t h cl ar i fi ed t h at M ary d i d n o t v i s i t t h e ch i l d at al l , ev en t h o u gh she wa s not incarc erated until four months after the Smiths assu m ed cu s t o dy of the c hild. Mary10

admitted that if she we re to mee t the child, the child would not rec og nize her. The Smith s and Mary ' s aunt all confirme d that Absalom would not rec og nize either of his biolog ical par ents and that he believe d the Smiths wer e his pare nts. There is no doubt that the emoti onal and phy sical nee ds of the thre e-year -old child wer e g reat and that those ne eds would g row throug h time. A plethora of evidenc e was develope d demonstrating that the Smiths could provide for Absalom' s pare ntal and fina ncial nee ds. I n contra st, there wa s no

e vid e nc e de mon str a tin g ho w Joh n a nd Mary c ou ld f ulf ill the c hil d' s n e e d fo r c ari ngpa re nts , e ve n if t h e r e w a s s o m e e v i d e n c e o f p o s s i b l e w ays t h a t t h e y c o u l d e v e n tu a l l y s u p p o rtt h e c h i l d

f i n an c i a l l y. The Smiths maintained a stable home w here Abs alom was ha ppy , while J ohn and Mar

y had open invitations from J ohn' s family that they could re side in th ei r h omes once their stay s in prison had been c ompleted. The a cts and omissions o f the biolog ical par ents (not only in their past cr iminal be havio r, bu t in

the ir la c k o f i nte rac tio n w iththe c hil d) ind ic a te d th a t th e e xistin g pa re nt- c hil d relationship was not a proper one for the child. I t was unconte sted that the child believe d Mr. and Mrs. Smit h to be his pare nts and that he simply did not know J ohn or Mar y . Giving a ppropriate defe renc e to the jury , we f ind it could have for m ed a f irm belief or

c on vic tio n th a t pr op e r T e xas F a mil y Cod e g ro un ds fo r t e rm inatio n ex is ted and that it w a s in Absalom' s best interest that the pa renta l rig hts be terminated, e ven if the juror s on l y considere d evidenc e that wa s clea

r and c onvincing in arriving at t h at deter mination. Thus, we conc lude the evidenc e wa s both leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt to support the trial court' s termination order

.Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 5 11 2. Effec ti ve As sis ta nc e of C ouns e l Next, J o h n an d M ary

argue that their tria l counsel provided ine ffe ctive assistanc e as g ua ra nte e d b y the Sixth Ame ndme nt. Whe n the Te xas Sup re me Court wa s f ir st p re se nte d w iththi s issue, they

declined to spe cifica lly

addre ss it and specifica lly opted to "le ave open" that question. J .F .C. , 9 6 S

. W

. 3 d

at 2 8 1

. I n s t ea d , t h e c o u rt d i s cu s s edt h e t wo -p ro n g Strickland t es t , s ay i n g: 5 A convicte d defe ndant' s claim that counsel' s assistance was so defe ctive as to require reve rsal of a conviction or death sentence has t wo components. F irst, the defe ndant must show that counsel' s perf ormanc e wa s deficie nt. Thi s require s showing that c ouns e l ma de e rr or s so se ri ou s th a t c ouns e l w a s not fu nc tio nin g a s th e " c ouns e l" g ua ra nte e d th e de fe nd ant b y

the Sixth A me ndme nt. S eco nd , th e de fe nd ant m us t show that the deficient perf ormanc e pre

judiced the de fense . This require s showing that counsel' s err ors wer e so serious as to de prive the def endant of a fa ir trial, a tria l whose re sult is reliable. Id. a t 280. Th e c ourt

the n w e nt s tr a ig ht t o a

ha rm ana ly sis and

c on c lud e d th a t e ve n if

ri g ht t o eff ective a ssistance wa s g uara nteed, the pare nts in that case whose pare ntal rig hts were terminated could not prove that a diffe rent re sult would ensue (i.e

. , that the cour t would not have ter

minated pare ntal rig hts). Id. at 281. More r ece ntly , in In re M

.S. , the Texas Supreme Court conc luded that Section 107.013 of the Texas Family

Co d e p r o v id e d

a s ta tu to ry rig ht to effe ctive counse l in parenta l-rig hts termination case s

w h e r e s u it

w a s f il e d b y a g o v e r n me n ta l e n ti ty

an d th e p ar e n t w a s in d ig e n t. 1 1 5 S. W. 3 d 5 3 4 ( T e x. 2003). Since M.S. , it has been r ei t er at ed t h at "[i ]t is well established that the rig ht to effe ctive

ass is tan ce of cou ns el do es no t ex ten d to pu rel y civ il case s. " Sanchez v . Sanchez , No. 04-06-00469-We n ote that M.S. only conclude d that Section 107.013 of t he Tex as Family Code provided 6 a s t a tu t o r y r i g h tt o e f

f e c t i v e c o u n s e l i np ar e n t a l

- r i g h t s t e r m i n a t i o nc a s e s w h e r e s u i tw a s f i l e d b y a g ov e rnme ntal ent ity

and the pa re nt w a s in dig e nt. 11 5 S. W.3 d 5 34 ; see T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 107.013 (Ve rnon 2008). 12 CV, 2007 WL 1888343, at *5 (Te x . App.—San Antonio J uly 3, 2007, pet. d en i ed ) (mem. op.) (dea ling with child custody ). Our sister

courts have expressly

held that no " rig ht exi sts to appointed

cou ns el i n a p ri vat e te rm in ati on su it ." In re J .C. , 2 50 S.W. 3d

48 6, 48 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 20 08 , p e t. d e nie d) ; see Br oth e rs v . W est , N o . 2

- 0 8

- 2 0 2

- C V , 2 0 0 9 W L 1 2 7 0 6 5 2 , a t * 3 ( T e x. Ap p. —F or

t Worth May 7, 20 09 , no pe t. h .) (m e m. o p. ); see also In reT.L.B. , No. 07-07-0349- CV, 2008 WL 5245905, at *1 (Te x . App.—Amar illo Dec. 17, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). 6 Ho we ve r, we ne e d n ot r e so lve the iss ue of wh e the r ef

fe c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e wa s c on sti tut ion a lly require d in this case since J ohn and Mar y do not meet the Strickland test for inef fec tive assistance claims as cited in J

.F .C. 9 6 S

. W

. 3 d

at 2 8 0 (c i t i n g Strickland , 466 U.S. 668). Fa ilure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland

test is fatal and we ne ed not examine both Strickland prong s if one ca nnot be met. Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 69 7; J au be rt v . S

tat e , 74 S.W .3d 1, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The second pr ong of Strickland would require J ohn and Mar y to demonstrate that c ounsel' s err ors had

some conc eivable e ffe ct on the outcome of the proc eedingsuch that its result woul d have be en differ ent. 466 U.S. at 693. B eca use, as discussed above, the unobjectionable e vidence was otherwise suf

ficient to support the judg ment, J ohn and Mar y would not be able to meet this standard to establish harm, eve n assuming its application.13

3. Adm ission of Feder al Detainer s Did Not Result in Rever sibl e Err or John and Mary argue that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in a dmi tti ngthe fe de ra l de ta ine rs a g a ins t th e m, sin c e the do c ume nts c on sti tut e d h e ars ay . T he a dmi ssi on or e xclu sio n of ev ide nc e is a ma tte r w ith in the sound discre tion of the trial cour t. Thus, we re view this issue under a n abus e o f di scre tion standard. Daniels v. Y

ancey , 175 S.W .3d 889, 895 (T ex . App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (c iting City of Browns ville v. Alv arado , 897 S.W .2d 750, 753 (Tex. 1995)). To reve rse a

judgme nt based upon e rror in the admission or exclusion of evidence , the appellant must show that the trial court c ommitt ed er ror a nd that the er

ror wa s rea sonably

calc ulated to cause and proba

bly did cause rendition of an imprope r judg ment. T EX . R. A PP . P. 44.1(a)( 1); Mc Cra w v . M

ar is , 828 S.W .2d 756, 757 (Tex. 1992) . I n making this determination, we must revie w the entire rec ord. When Mary

was be ing que stioned, the following exchang e occ urre d: Q. This is a detainer

that was g iven to L amar County that say s once you finish y our cha

rg es her e that y ou will rece i ve a 24 month sente nce in the F eder al P e n i t e n t i ar

y? A. Yes, sir. T h er e w as n o o b

j ec t i o nt o t h i s t es t i m o n y . W h en t h e d et ai n er wa s o ff er edi n t o e v i d e n ce , M ary 's counsel objec ted bec ause the detainer was " not cer

tified or ver ifi ed ; so theref ore, it would be hear say ." T he trial c ourt overr uled t he objection after it wa s pointed out that Mary had ver ified the detainer . During subsequent questioning , the contents of the d et ai n er was re ad by Mary without14

objection. Mary

stated, " Prior to the subject[']s r elea se from y our custody , please notify this office at once so that we may

assume custody

of the suspec t for [her] service of F eder al sent ence of i mp ri s o n m en t
. " Th i s s am e p at t erno f t es t i m o n y wa s d ev el o p edfo r J o h n 's fe d er al d et ai n er , al t h o u gh he (unlike Ma

ry ) did not rea d the contents of the detainer into the rec ord. We note that both John a

nd Mary admitted that the information in the fe dera l detainer was

corr ect. Neve rtheless, assuming arg uendo that admission of the fede ral de tainers wa s err oneous, any such er ror would not have been harmful since it was cumulative of unobje cted- to statements made by J ohn and Mar

y . Se e An de rso n v . S

tat e , 717 S.W .2d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Cunni ng ha m v . S

tat e , No. 06-03-00094- CR, 2004 W L2070816, at *7 (Te x . App.—Texarkana Sept. 17, 2004, pet. ref

' d) (not desig nated f

or publication). 4. Counsel Failed to Pr eser ve Alleged Error Regar din g Jury Charge Instruct ion J ohn and Mar

y next arg ue that the tria l court abuse d its discretion in fai ling to instruct the jury that incar cer ation alone is not sufficie nt to support termination of pare ntal rig hts. The re cord does not demonstrate that J ohn or Mary reque sted any such i nstruction. The c ourt' s char g e utiliz ed the exact statutory

wording for ter

mination cases a s require d by Section 161.001(1)( Q) of the Texas Family C o d e. During the cha rg e conf ere nce, John and Mary

objected by

mere ly stating that incar cer ation alone is insufficie nt to support termination, a fac t p o i n ted out by the statutory

c on jun c tiv e wo rd ing re qu ir ing " c on fi ne me nt or imp ri so nme nt and inability to c are for the c hild for not less than two y ear s from the date of filing the petition." ( Emphasis added.) "Areque st by either15

p ar t y fo r a n y qu es t i o n s , d ef

i n i t i o n s , o r i n s t ru ct i o n s s h al l b e ma d e se p ar at e an d ap ar tfr o m s u ch p ar t y 's ob jec ti on s t o t he co urt 's char ge." T EX . R. C IV . P. 273. We de cline to inter pret the above objection

as a r equest for

instruction. Even if we did decide this wa s an ora l reque st for an omitted instruction, no such er

ror would have bee n prese rved since counsel fa iled to submit a wr itten instruction to the trial court. Id. ; Gragson v. M.E.& E. W elding & F

a b r i ca t i o n , Inc. , No 06-00-00044- CV, 2001 WL 1190087, at *7 (Te x . App.—Texarkana Oct. 10, 2001, pet. de nied). 5. Trial Court Did Not Abuse Discre tion in Denying Contin uance Finally , J ohn argues t hat he was not able to prepa re a defe nse bec ause the trial court de nied his second motion for continuanc e, which w as filed on the day of trial. Specif

ically , J ohn complains that he did no t have c on ta c t w ithhis c ourt -a pp oin te d atto rn e y

un til Oc tob e r 1 7, 20 08 , a

nd wa s una ble t o co n t ac twi t n es s es wh o co u l d t es t i fy i n h i s f a v o r . W e r ev i ew t h e t ri al co u rt 's ru l i n g o nJ o h n 's motion for continuance for a n abuse of discretion

. R.M. Dudley Constr. Co. v. Dawson , 258 S.W .3d 6 9 4 , 7 0 1 (T ex . Ap p . —W ac o 2 0 0 8 , p et
. d en i ed ) ( ci t i n g Villegas v. Carter , 711 S.W .2d 624 , 626 (Tex. 1986)). An application for continuanc e may only be g rante d for suff

icient ca use supp o rted by aff idavit, consent of the pa

rties, or ope ration of law . T EX . R. C IV . P. 251. Since the g round for the motion was the want of te stimony , J ohn was re quired to file a n affi davit demonstrating that the testimony would be mater ial, that he " used due dili gen ce t o p ro cure such testimony , stating suc h di li gence, . . . th at s uch tes ti mo ny [ cou ld ] no t be pr ocu red f rom any ot her s ou rce. " T EX . R. C IV . P.16

252. I t was also nec essar y for J o h n t o "s t at e t h e name and re sidence of the witness, a nd what he expect[ed] to prove by

him; and also state that the continuance [was] not sought for delay only , but th at j us ti ce m ay

be d on e." T EX . R. C IV . P. 252. Th e re c or d c on fi rm s th a t John ha d k no wl e dg e a s of Ma

y 30 , 20 08 , th a t th e te rm inatio n s uit had bee n instit uted. The moti on for continuance (which is not supported by aff idavit) demonstrate s that J ohn knew by

October 17, 2008, of the a

ppointment of counsel and that he also knew that a final he ari ngha d b e e n s e t f

or De c e mbe r 1 , 2 00 8. Whil e the mot ion state s tha t J oh n ha d mai le d le tte rs to potential witnesses on Nove mber 20, 2008, it fails to list the names of any such potential witnesses nor does it indicate a

ny thing of the content of

their antici p ated testimony . Thus, the motion for continuance wholly

failed to comply

with Rules 251 and 252 of the Te x as Rules of Civil P roce dure; its ineffe c ti v e n e s s w a s f

u rth e r c o mp o u n d e d

b y th e f a c t t h a t i t w a s f

il e d o nth e d ay

o f tr ia l, a f ter conclusion of the c ourt' s p retrial confe renc e. Villegas , 711 S.W .2d at 626 (" Gene rally , when movants fail to comply with [Rule] 251' s require ment that the motion for continuanc e be ' supported by aff idavit,' w e pre sume that the trial cour t did not abuse it s d i s cr etion in denying the motion"); Go nz ale s v . S tat e , No. 07-07-00036- CR , 2 0 0 9 WL 498032, at *2 (Te x . App.—Amar illo Feb. 27, 2009, pet. filed) ( mem. op.) (trial court did not abuse discre tion in deny ing motion for c ontinuance fi l ed o n d ay

of trial); R.M. Dudley

Constr. Co. , 2 58 S.W. 3d a t 70 1 ( same ). B a se d o n th e se circ umstances, we ca n n o t s ay the trial cour

t abused its discretion in deny ing the motion for continuance . J ohn and Mar y ' s final point of err or is overr uled.17

III . Co nc lusi on We affir m the trial court' s judgme nt terminating the par ental rig hts of J ohn and Mar y .

Ba iley C. Moseley J ustice Date Submitted: J uly 2, 2009 Date D ecide d: J uly 9, 2009