# FILED September 18, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr . App ellate C ou rt Clerk IN THE COURT OF AP PEALS OF

TENNESSEE WESTERN SECTION AT JACKSON

CHARLES THOMAS JOYNER, ) ) Plaintiff/Appellee ) Shelby Circuit No. 28647-9 T.D. ) vs. ) ) DEPUTY SHERIFF B. TAYLOR, et al., ) Appeal No. 02A01-9508-CV-00188 ) Defend ants/Appe

llants. )

APPEAL FROM THE CI RCUIT COURT OF SHEL BY COUNTY AT MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE ROB ERT L. CHI LDERS, JUDGE For the Plaintiff/Appellee : For the D efenda nts/Appellants : Connie Westbrook Brian L. Kuhn Thomas E. Vornberger Memphis, Tennessee Memphis, Tennessee

REVERSED

HOL LY KI RBY LI LL ARD , J.

CONCUR:
W. FRANK CR

AWFORD, P. J., W.S.
DAV ID R. F ARM ER, J.OPINION

This is a civil rights case. Appellants, Shelby County and Shelby Count y Sheriff A.C. Gilless, Jr., appeal a

jury verdict finding them liable for violating the civil rights of Appellee Charles Thomas Joyner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because the alleged civil rights violationwas caused by simple negligence, and not by a County policy, procedure, custom, or usage, we reverse. On June 15, 1976, Charles E. Joyner received a citation for a DWI violation and for driving without tail lights. He failed to appear for his scheduled court appearance. Consequently, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. Char les T. Joyner, the Appellee in this case, received a speeding ticket on December 17 , 1982. He also fa il ed to appear for his court date, scheduled on Ja nuary 27, 1983, and a bench warrant was issued for

his arrest. Charles T. Joyner subsequently appeared in c ourt on February 4, 1983, and pled guilty to the charge of speeding. Consequently, an order wa s entered recalling the bench warrant for Charles T. Joyner. In 1981, the Shelby County Sheriff’s Department acquired a new computer system, known

as S.C.A.T.S. In 1982 or 1983, the criminal justic e informa tion in the City of Memphis’ computer system was tran sferre d to S.C.A.T.S. This was a huge un dertaki ng, involving thousands of entr ies. Much of the infor mation wa s transfe

rred thr ough the c omputers . Some of it was manu ally entered into the S.C.A.T.S. database. Somehow, in the course of the transfer of da ta, information on Charles T. and Charles E. Joyner was intermingled, resulting in Charles T. Joyner b eing id entified as the person w anted on t

he warr ant for Ch arles E. Joyner’ s arres t. On November 14, 1988, Charles T. Joyner (hereinaf ter “Joyner”) went to the

Social Sec

urity Office in Memphis to obtain a copy of his lost social security card. While he was there, two officers of the Shelby County Sheri ff ’s Depa rtment, de

puty sher iffs Bobby

Taylor ( “Taylor

”) and G erald Marcum (“Marcum”), consulted their book of outstanding warra nts and found Joyner

listed. They arrested Joyner on

the outsta

nding ben ch warr

ant. The y confir med over the radi o that the

first and last name, address, and date of birth for the Charles Joyne r in their records back at hea dq uarters matchedthose of the person they had arrested. Apparently, the office rs were concerned that

Joyner’s height might not match the description given them over the radio, because Marc um attempted to verify Joyner’ s height by

compari ng it with hi s. Joyner protested his innocence and told the officers that he was the wrong person, and that he had to repor t to work. Because Joyner had protested repeatedly that the office rs hadthe wrong man, they requested2

that Joyner go through expedited processing. Joyner used one phone c all to call his mother. He did notask his moth

er to ca ll his employer because he “didn’t think about it then.” He was given the chance to make a

second phone ca

ll and sign ed a for

m stating hi s right to ma

ke a long- distance

call. However, Joyner

made no second call; he testified that he did not read the form. Af ter having spent approximately nin e and a h alf hours in jail, Joyner posted bond that night. The next day, Joyner’s

case was dismis sed at his court appearance. The same day, he also discovered that he had been fired from his job. Joyner filed suit against officers Taylor a nd Marcu m in their individual and official capaci ties, against Sh

eriff G illess in his offic ial capa

city, and against Sh

elby Count

y Government for alleged ly violatin g his civil r

ights u nder 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. He also sued the two deputies for fals e arre st

and false imprisonment. The Sect ion 1985 c laim was la

ter dismis sed as to all defe ndants. At trial, all of the defendants moved for a directed

verdict. These motions were denied by the trial cou

rt. The ju ry initial ly deliver

ed a ver dict in fa vor of the office rs and She

riff Gill ess but against Shelby County in the amount of $50,000. The trial court instructed the jury that the verdict

was inconsistent because Shelby Cou nty could no t be found liable if none of the individual defenda nts were found

liable. After redeliberation, the jury returned a verdict for the two officers butagainst Sheriff Gilless and Shelby County, once a gain fi nding damages in the amount of $50,000. Sheriff Gilless and Shelby County (hereinafter “the County Defenda nts”) moved for a new trial or remittitur, which was denied. Joyner moved for an award of attorney’s fees, and this was granted. Joyner a

lso moved for the trial court to reconsider the amount of attorney’s fees aw arded and to provide findings of fact supporting its award. The trial court did not award the amount sought by Joyner, but altered the award and set forth its findings of fa ct in support of the award. The County Def

endants a ppeal the trial cou rt’s dec isions to deny both motions for directed verdict and its refusa

l to vaca te and se t aside the jury ver dict. The y maintain

that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires that the deprivation of constitutional rights be caused by an established policy, procedure, custom, or usage. They argue that Joyner’s arr est was the result of a simp le mistake , not a policy,3

procedure, custom, or usage. Joyner files a counter-appeal, contending that the trial court er red in the amoun

t of its aw ard of a

ttorney’ s fees. In considering an appeal from a jury verdict , this Court does not “reweigh the evidence or reeval uate witnesses' c re dibility.” Witter v. N esbit , 878 S.W.2d 116, 121 (Tenn. App. 1993). Rather, this Court must “take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence favoring the prevailing party, discardall contr

ary evid ence, [ and] all ow all re asonable inferences to uphold the jury's verdict and set aside the jury verdict only when there is no material evidenc e to support it.” Id. at 121; see also Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Joyner a lleges a depriva tion of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 198 3, which p

rovides: Ever y person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, r egulation, custom, or usage, or any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other pr oper pro ceeding

for red ress. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Supp . 1997). I t is well es tablished

that a municipality can only be guilty of a Section 1983 violation when a person’s cons titutional rights are deprived as the result of a governmental policy, procedure, custom or usage. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). There must be a direct causal connection between the policy and the alleged violation. See Strauss v. City of Chicago , 760 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 1985). A mun icipality cann ot be held liable under the common law theory of respondeat superior

. Monell , 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S. Ct. at 2036. Mere negligence is not enough for a Section 19 83 violatio n; either gross negligence or deliberate indifferenc e is required. Owens

v. City of A tlanta , 780 F.2d 1564, 1566-67 (11th Cir. 1986). Indeed, some cases hold that even gross negligence is not s ufficie nt. Lewellen v. Metropolitan Gov’t , 34 F.3d 345, 351 (6th Cir. 1994) (rely ing on Collins v. Cit y of Harke

r Heights , 503 U.S. 115, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 117 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1992)). Joyner asserts t wo alleged policie s to support the jury’s finding of a Section 1983 violation. First, he alleges that

the Sheri ff had no

procedu re in pla ce to check the warrant information in the S.C.A.T.S. system, a

nd that the

failure to do so was a “policy” that resulted in Joyner’s erroneous arrest. Second, Joyner asserts that the Sheriff’s Department had a written policy for investigating

an arrestee’s claim of

mistaken identity. The written policy included an investigation by the Records4

and Ide n tification Division (“R&I”), which Joyner maintains would have uncovered the mistake which lead to hi s arrest. Instead, the officers followed the Sheriff’s Depar tment’s “unwritten policy” of utilizing e

xpedited process ing for pr

isoners w hose iden tity is in questio n. Under

this procedure, Joyner alleges he may have been processed more quickly, but there was no real investiga tion of his claims of mistake

n identity. Thus, he a

rgues, th is “proc edure”resulted

in the dep rivation o f his constitutional rights. W

e willfirst address the alleged “policy” of having no proce dure for checking warrant information. T he County Defendants rely on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in B aker v . McCollan , 443 U.S. 137, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 61 L. Ed. 2d 433 (1979). In Baker , a faci ally valid ar rest

w arrant was issued for McCollan, who had committed no crime. Previously, McCollan’s brot he r had been arrested. The b rothe r procured a duplicate of McCollan’s driver’ s license and put the brother’s photograph on it. Consequently, when the brot her was arre sted, McCollan’s name and identifying details w ere ent ered int o the computer. When

the brother, the real offender, skipped out

on bail, McCollan was later picked up on an outstanding bench warran t. McColla

n was hel d in jail for eight days before the mistake was discovered, despite h is repe ated protestations that he was innocent

. He filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court concluded that therehad been no constitutional deprivation of his due process rights. Baker , 443 U.S. at 146, 99 S. Ct. at 2695-96. In its opinion, the Court found the following: Given the requ

irementsthat arr

est be ma de only on probable cause and that one detainedbe accorded

a speedy t rial, we

do not think

a sherif f execu ting an ar rest warrant is required

by the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence, whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such

as lack of requisite intent. No

r is the of

fic ial cha rged with maintaining custody of the accused named in the warrant

required by the Constitution to perform an error-free investigation of such a

claim. Th

e ultimate

dete rm ination of such claims of innocence is placed in the hands of the judge and the jury. Id. at 145-46 , 99 S. Ct. at 2695. The

Court also

made the following

point: The Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested. If it did, § 1983 would provide a cause of action for ever y defendant acquitted--indeed, for every suspect released. Id. at 145, 99 S. Ct. at 2695 . The Coun ty Defendants argue that, under Baker , since the offic ers in the instant ca se acte d pursuan t to a fac ially vali d arres twarran t and took a

ction to de

termine i f they had the right man, the fa ct that their investigation was flawed does not give rise to a claim under Section 1983.5

The County Defendants also cited Howard v. Re gional Trans it

Authority , 667 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Ohio 1987), in which an arrest was based on mistaken information from a c omputer system much like the S. C.A.T.S. system in the instant case. T he Court c oncluded

that the p laintiff

’s arre st did not amount to a civil rights violation:

This Court concl udes that if a law enforcement office r acts reasonably and consiste nt with t he information obtained from the computer system, then a person who is mistakenly arrested because of

such information cannot maintain a cause of action under § 1983. Id. at 546. The County De fendant s argue that

the officers in this case acted in a rea sonable manner, consistent with the information available to them. The name, date of birth, and address all matched. There was appa

rently so me conce

rn that Jo yner’s h

eight did n ot match th

e informa tion fr om headqua rters, but the dif

ferenc e was insufficien

t to cause r

easonab le officers to conclude that they were arresting the wrong man. Joyner cites sev eral ca ses purpo

rtedly e stablishin g that a police department’s failure to upd ate and correct information in a computer system is a policy or procedure sufficient

to support a Section 1983 violation. See United States v. Mackey , 387 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Nev. 1975 ); People v. Ramirez , 668 P.2d 761 (Ca

l. 1983) ( in banc) ; Albo v. State , 477 So. 2d 1 071 (Fla. D ist. Ct. Ap p. 1985); People v. Lawson , 456 N.E. 2d 170 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); People v. Jones , 443 N.Y.S.2d 298 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1981). However, none of these case s involve civil actions for alleged Section 1983 violations

. Rather, t

hey dea l w ith the s uppression of evidence collected in a sear ch based on inaccur ate information from police computers or records. In these c a ses, i naccurate information was relayed because of negligence, not delibe rate indifference. See Mackey , 387 F. Supp. at 1125; Ramirez , 668 P.2d at 766; and Albo , 477 So. 2d at 1076. As noted above, a Section 1983 violation cannot be based on a finding of mere negligence; either gross negligence or

deliberate indifference is required. Owens v. Ci

ty of Atlant

a , 780 F.2d at 1566-67. Joyner cites no case in which a Section 1983 claim is upheld on the basis of inaccurate record keeping. From the rec ord in this c ase, it is apparent that the mixup in information on Joyner was the result of a clerical error. Under these circumstances, based on Bakerand Howard , t he failu re to detect the mixup prior to Joyner’s arrest was insufficient to supporta jury verdict finding a Section 1983 violation.6

Joy ner also argues that the Sheriff’s Department failed to follow its written policy fo r investigating a n arrestee’ s claim of mistaken identity. Instead, the officers followed the Department’s “unwritt

en policy ” of utiliz

ing exped ite d p rocessing for Joyner. Joyner asserts that the mistaken identity would have been discovered earlier ha d the official written p olic y been followed, which would have entailed an investigation by R&I. In Section 1983 cases, the plaintiff must produ ce evide

nce that the polic y at issue

caused h is injury. See Strauss , 760 F.2d at 767 (“A successful [§ 1983] suit require s the plain

tiff to es tablish that he was in

jured, a nd that som

e municip al policy , custom or practice proximately caused the injury.”). Even if this were deemed a governmental policy, proce dure or custom, Joyner failed to introduce evidenc e that it c aused hisinjury. There was no evidence that an investigation by R&I in Joyner’ s case w ould

have uncovered

the clerical error and ended in Joyner ’s being released earlier. Absent evidenc e of cau sation, the evidence on thistheory w as insuff icient to support th e jury’s finding of a Section 1983 violation. In sum, the Sheriff’s Department’s failure to detect the mixup in information on Joyner prior to his arrest cannot be deemed a governmenta l policy, procedure or custom to supporta Section 1983 violation. Joyner failed to introduce evidence that the offic er’s decision to utilize expedited process ing instead of referring Joyner’s matter to R&I for investigation ca used Joyner’s injury

. Absent evidence of causation, the evidenc e was insuff icient to support a Section 1983 violation. Therefore, the trial court’s failure to grant th

e County De

fendant s’ motion f

or direc ted verd

ict must be revers ed. The a

ward of attorne y’s fee s to Joyner

must also be reve

rsed. Joyner’s iss ue on app eal, regarding the amount of attorney’s fees aw arded, is pretermitted by this holding. T he decision of the trial court is reversed. Costs are taxed to the Appe llee, fo r whic h execution may issue if necessary.

HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, J. CONCUR:

W. FRAN K CRAWF ORD, P.J., W.S.

DAVID R. FARMER, J.