1

Stanko’s involuntary transfer out of this district does not defeat this court’s

jurisdiction over his habeas petition. See Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 477 (3d

Cir. 1990) (retaining jurisdiction over the habeas petitioner who had been

involuntarily transferred to another federal prison outside the court’s jurisdiction).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RUDOLPH GEORGE STANKO, :

:

Petitioner :

: CIVIL NO. 4:09-CV-2180

:

v. : (Judge McClure)

:

DAVID EBBERT, :

:

Respondent :

MEMORANDUM

 May 5, 2010

Petitioner Rudolph George Stanko, an inmate presently confined at the Terre

Haute Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI Terre Haute”) in Terre Haute, Indiana,

initiated the above action pro se by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus

(“petition”) under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Rec. Doc. No. 1.) At the time

of filing, Stanko was confined at the Allenwood Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI

Allenwood”) in White Deer, Pennsylvania.1

 The petition originally was filed on

September 16, 2009 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 

(See Rec. Doc. No. 1.) Pursuant to a transfer order dated September 18, 2009, the

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case was transferred to this Court and opened on November 6, 2009. (See Rec. Doc.

Nos. 3, 4.) 

In an Order dated December 8, 2009, FCI Allenwood Warden David Ebbert

was deemed to be the only proper respondent to this action; Stanko’s first, third, and

fourth grounds were dismissed without prejudice to his ability to pursue those claims

in a properly filed civil rights action; and Respondent was directed within twenty-one

(21) days to file a response solely as to Stanko’s ground asserting that he is entitled to

a twelve month placement in a Residential Reentry Center (“RRC”) and that he was

not properly considered for RRC placement by the Federal Bureau of Prisons

(“BOP”). (See Rec. Doc. No. 6.) 

On December 24, 2009, Respondent filed a response (Rec. Doc. No. 10),

supporting exhibits (Rec. Doc. No. 10-2), and supporting authority (Rec. Doc. No. 10-

3). On January 12, 2010, Stanko filed a reply (Rec. Doc. No. 14) and exhibits (Rec.

Doc. Nos. 14-2 through 14-9). On January 14, 2010, Stanko filed a second copy of

his exhibits. (Rec. Doc. No. 16.) Because one of the documents in Stanko’s list of

exhibits, Declaration of Facts, was not included with the reply, by Order dated January

13, 2010, he was given an opportunity to file the exhibit within fourteen (14) days. 

(See Rec. Doc. No. 15.) Stanko filed his Declaration of Facts on January 20, 2010. 

(Rec. Doc. No. 17.) On January 26, 2010, Stanko filed a motion requesting leave to

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Citations to page numbers refer to the page number on the CM/ECF electronic

record.

3

file a copy of the opinion in Strong v. Schultz, 599 F. Supp. 2d 556 (D.N.J. 2009) as

an addendum to his reply. (Rec. Doc. No. 18.) By Order dated January 29, 2010, his

motion was granted, and the Court accepted a copy of the opinion as an addendum to

Stanko’s reply brief. (Rec. Doc. No. 19.) Accordingly, the petition is fully briefed

and ripe for review. For the reasons set forth below, the petition will be dismissed.

I. Factual Background

On August 3, 2006, Stanko was sentenced in the United States District Court 

for the District of Nebraska to a seventy-two (72) month term of imprisonment for the

offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm. (Rec. Doc. No. 10-2 at 4,

McCluskey Decl., ¶ 4.)2

 His projected release date is August 29, 2011 via good

conduct time release. (Id.) At the time of filing, Stanko was confined at FCI

Allenwood, where he had been an inmate since July 27, 2009. (Id.) 

Recommendations for RRC placements ordinarily are reviewed with the inmate

and the Unit Team seventeen (17) to nineteen (19) months before an inmate’s

probable release date. (Id. ¶ 5; Rec. Doc. No. 10-2 at 19, 4/14/08 BOP Memorandum

for Chief Executive Officers.) RRC referrals should be forwarded to the Community

Corrections Manager (“CCM”) at least sixty (60) days prior to the maximum

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recommended range or date. (Rec. Doc. No. 10-2 at 4, McCluskey Decl., ¶ 6; Rec.

Doc. No. 10-2 at 30-31, BOP Program Statement (“P.S.”) 7310.04, Community

Corrections Center Utilization and Transfer Procedures.) These recommendations and

referrals are based on assessments of inmate needs for services, public safety, and the

necessity of the Bureau to manage its inmate population responsibly. (Rec. Doc. No.

10-2 at 5, McCluskey Decl., ¶ 7; Rec. Doc. No. 10-2 at 34-37, P.S. 7310.04.) When

assessing an inmate for recommendation, the Unit Team reviews the resources of the

placement facility, the resources available to the inmate in that area, the nature and

circumstances of the inmate’s offense, the history and characteristics of the inmate,

and any other pertinent information or documents that will assist with the inmate’s

placement at an RRC. (Rec. Doc. No. 10-2 at 5, McCluskey Decl., ¶ 7.)

As of the date of filing the response on December 24, 2009, Stanko’s most

recent program review had been held by his Unit Team in August 2009. (Id. ¶ 8.) At

that program review, Stanko was advised that his eligibility and appropriateness for

RRC placement would be reviewed at his next program review scheduled for February

2010. (Id.) As of February 2010, Stanko was to be within seventeen (17) to nineteen

(19) months of his projected release date. (Id.) 

II. Discussion

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Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a 

federal prisoner who is challenging not the validity but the execution of his sentence.” 

Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a)

and (c)(3)). In Woodall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that § 2241 is the appropriate means for

challenging a decision to exclude an inmate from release to an RRC. 432 F.3d 235,

242 (3d Cir. 2005).

Article III of the Constitution requires the existence of an active case or 

controversy before a matter may be presented to a federal court. See Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Presbytery of N.J. of Orthodox

Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir. 1994); see also U.S.

CONST. art. III § 2; Danvers Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 291

(3d Cir. 2005) (“By ensuring that litigants present actual cases and controversies,

[Article III] keeps the judicial branch from encroaching on legislative prerogatives,

thereby preserving the separation of powers.”). Standing and ripeness are components

of the case or controversy requirement. Presbytery of N.J., 40 F.3d at 1462;

Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006); Joint Stock

Soc'y v. UDV N. Am., Inc., 266 F.3d 164, 174 (3d Cir. 2001); In re GI Holdings, Inc.,

122 Fed. Appx. 554, 556 (3d Cir. 2004). “[Ripeness] tells us when a proper party may

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bring an action and . . . standing tells us who may bring the action.” Presbytery of

N.J., 40 F.3d at 1462. 

The Supreme Court has identified three elements that comprise the 

“irreducable constitutional minimum of standing.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. A plaintiff

first must “have suffered an ‘injury in fact’-an invasion of a legally protected interest

which is (a) concrete and particularized [citations omitted] and (b) ‘actual or

imminent, not ‘conjectural or hypothetical.’’” Id. (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461

U.S. 95, 102 (1983)). Next, the injury suffered by the plaintiff must be causally

connected to the conduct of which the plaintiff complains: “the injury has to be ‘fairly

... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . [t]he result [of] the

independent action of some third party not before the court.’” Id. (quoting Simon v.

Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42). Finally, “it must be

‘likely’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a

favorable decision.’” Id. (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).

 In his petition, Stanko alleges that the policies implemented by the BOP to

consider inmates for RRC placement are inconsistent with the Second Chance Act and

that the BOP has refused to use the base score for classifying minimum security

prisoners in determining his eligibility for RRC placement such that he would be

eligible for the maximum allowable time in an RRC. (See Rec. Doc. No. 1 at 7.) As

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relief, he requests that the Court direct the BOP to follow the intent of Congress in

enacting the Second Chance Act and to rule that the BOP policies are inconsistent

with that Act. (See id. at 14 ¶ 2.) He also requests to be scored as a minimum security

prisoner in the determination of his RRC placement. (See id. ¶ 3.) 

 Stanko does not have standing to obtain the relief he requests because he has 

not suffered an injury in fact. At the time he filed the petition on September 16, 2009,

Stanko was more than nineteen (19) months from his projected release date of August

28, 2011, and therefore, the Unit Team had not yet reviewed his eligibility for RRC

placement and was not required to do so under its current policies. (See Rec. Doc. No.

10-2 at 4, McCluskey Decl, ¶ 5; Rec. Doc. No. 10-2 at 19, 4/14/08 BOP

Memorandum.) Because the BOP had not yet made a decision about Stanko’s

eligibility that he could challenge at the time of filing the instant action, there is no

case or controversy for this Court to adjudicate. Stanko’s assertion that he has

suffered an injury is speculative in that it is based on his assumption that the BOP will

either deny him RRC placement or not properly consider him for such placement at

the time it evaluates his eligibility. Because Stanko has not suffered an injury, and

indeed, may never suffer the injury about which he speculates, he lacks standing to

seek the relief he requests in the instant petition, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to

entertain it. See Griffin v. Holt, Civil No. 3:08-CV-1028, 2008 WL 5348138, at *3

(M.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2008) (Munley, J.) (finding inmate lacked standing to challenge

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BOP RRC policy where he was not yet eligible for consideration for RRC placement

at time of filing petition). Consequently, we will dismiss Stanko’s petition for writ of

habeas corpus. 

III. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus (Rec. Doc. No.

1) will be dismissed. An appropriate Order will issue.

 

 s/ James F. McClure, Jr. 

JAMES F. McCLURE, JR.

United States District Judge 

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