In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-1177

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Alejos Cardenas,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Indiana,

Indianapolis Division.

No. IP 99-76-CR T/F--John D. Tinder, Judge.

Argued May 8, 2000--Decided June 23, 2000

 Before Posner, Chief Judge, and Bauer and

Diane P. Wood, Circuit Judges.

 Bauer, Circuit Judge. On January 7,

2000, Alejos Cardenas pled guilty to two

counts of possessing a handgun in

violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(g). The

district court sentenced him to a term of

imprisonment of 180 months and 5 years of

supervised release. In computing

Cardenas’ sentence, the district court

found that Cardenas qualified for an

enhancement under the Armed Career

Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(e)(1).

The ACCA mandates a minimum sentence of

fifteen years for a defendant with three

prior serious drug convictions, who is

subsequently convicted for unlawful

possession of a firearm. Cardenas had

three prior convictions for selling crack

cocaine. The convictions included two

sales of crack cocaine to confidential

informants on March 27, 1995, one at 8:00

p.m. and the other at 8:45 p.m. and a

third the following day at 9:00 p.m. The

district court concluded that each sale

constituted a separate and distinct

criminal episode. Cardenas disagrees,

arguing that the sales on March 27

constituted a single predicate offense

under the ACCA.
 We review whether the district court

violated the statute in its sentencing

determination de novo. United States v.

Williams, 68 F.3d 168, 169 (7th Cir.

1995).

 Title 18, United States Code, Section

924(e)(1) provides that:

In the case of a person who violates

section 922(g) of this title and has

three previous convictions by any court

referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this

title for a violent felony or a serious

drug offense, or both, committed on

occasions different from one another,

such person shall be fined not more than

$25,000 and imprisoned not less than

fifteen years. . .

In United States v. Hudspeth, 42 F.3d

1015, 1019 (7th Cir. 1995) (en banc), the

court examined the "committed on

occasions different from one another"

language of sec. 924(e)(1). The court

concluded that it is necessary "to look

to the nature of the crimes, the

identities of the victims, and the

locations." Id. Additionally, we must ask

whether the defendant had sufficient time

to cease and desist or withdraw from the

criminal activity. Id.; Williams, at 171.

 In Hudspeth, the defendants, in a span

of thirty-five minutes, burglarized three

separate businesses at the Laketown

Shopping Center. Id. at 1022. The

burglars first entered the cleaners. Next

they used a sledge hammer to break the

adjoining wall to gain entrance into the

doughnut shop. Finally, they forced the

door of the adjacent insurance company

open. Id. The court found that each

unlawful entry was a separate and

distinct episode. Before entry into the

second and third businesses, the

defendants had the chance to stop the

criminal activity but instead chose to

continue. Id. Each entry was a "clear and

deliberate" choice. Id.

 In this case, the two sales of crack

cocaine on March 27 were two separate and

distinct episodes. While Cardenas sold

the crack cocaine to the same people, the

sales were separated by forty-five

minutes and a half a block. Cardenas had

plenty of time to change his mind, to

cease and desist, and to refuse to sell
to the informants. The price of the

cocaine at the first sale was not

contingent on there being a second sale.

The informants were not afforded any

deals if they purchased more. In fact,

the informants paid the same price at

each sale, $60 for three pieces. Further,

Cardenas did not know if the informants

would even return to buy more. The

understanding after the first sale was

that they would return if the drugs were

acceptable. This was not a single

agreement as Cardenas would like us

tobelieve, but two separate transactions.

 The district court correctly applied

sec. 924(e) to Cardenas. As we found in

Hudspeth, "a defendant who has the oppor

tunity to cease and desist or withdraw

from his criminal activity at any time,

but who chooses to commit additional

crimes, deserves harsher punishment. . ."

 Affirmed.