From Wolf Pack to Lone Wolf:

The Retreating Islamic State’s Radicalized

Strategy to Exist beyond Territoriality

by Joseph Tyler Gruber 

Analysis of the self-identified Islamic State’s (IS) prolific and

complex propaganda machine combined with increasing incidents

of homegrown terrorism paint the group as a pervasive national

security threat with a global reach. At the same time, reports from

the front lines of its self-proclaimed “caliphate” in Iraq and Syria

boast sequential defeats and massive territorial losses for IS.

These conflicting depictions of IS’s capacity are reflective of the

jihadist group’s broad strategy to reshape its identity. By promoting

and producing so-called “lone wolf” terrorist attacks internationally,

IS is seeking a new source of legitimacy which can survive the

military and territorial losses of the caliphate. 

Explosive Origins

The chaos and instability caused by the Syrian civil war was the ladder with which IS climbed to

power. Within the omnipresent carnage of conflict, the Salafi jihadist group found legitimacy among

disenfranchised Sunni Muslims who were unsympathetic to regime loyalist and other rebel groups. The

group distinguished itself from its regional competitors in both its ideological aspirations and its

ultraviolent tactics. Early military clashes were characterized by the jihadists’ indiscriminate killing of

opponents and civilians. The group also found an audience that was ripe for radicalization within the

marginalized Sunni population in Iraq. Harnessing this fresh support, IS launched a series of sweeping

offensives in Iraq and Syria that filled international headlines in early 2014.The relatively small extremist

group captured the major urban centers of Raqqa, Fallujah, and Ramadi with an unforeseen level of

ferocity and success. In June of the same year, IS achieved a monumental victory the capture of Iraq’s

second largest city, Mosul. By the end of the month IS declared the establishment of a caliphate that

transcended the internationally recognized borders of Iraq and Syria. 

Implications of the Caliphate

In declaring the establishment of the Islamic State, Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi proclaimed himself the

caliph and “Commander of the Faithful” of what he believed to be the first ideologically legitimate Islamic

caliphate the world has seen in a millennium. This territorial aspect of a caliphate provided a boost in

credibility and legitimacy for IS. At the same time, this very territoriality confined IS to new criteria for

legitimacy, and opened IS up to more observable measures of success, and failure, to which it had not

been subject to prior to its territorial caliphate. With the establishment of the caliphate, IS was now

theologically bound to possess “ardh al-tamkeen”, or “land to rule”, and strictly enforce its Salafi ideology

throughout this land.1 Furthermore, IS’s identity became tied to the belief that its caliphate was destined

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Middle East Studies

at the Marine Corps University

MES Insights • Volume 8, Issue 4 August 2017

MES Notes

Information about MES events and

publications is available on the MES

website at: www.usmcu.edu/mes, or

you can contact Adam Seitz at (703)

432-5260 or adam.seitz@usmcu.edu.

MES at MCU Disclaimer

The opinions and conclusions

expressed herein are those of the

individual author and do not

necessarily represent the views of

either the Marine Corps University

or any other governmental agency.

Any references to this newsletter

should include the foregoing

statement.
to defeat the army of “Rome” (Christianity) in Dabiq, Syria, which would in turn incite the apocalyptic Day

of Judgement by God that is foretold in the Quran.2 This purpose, coupled with the Salafi/Wahhabi ideology that violence is the justified mechanism to purify the faith of all “kufir”, or “unbelievers”, obligates the

caliphate to engage in what Islamic Law refers to as “offensive jihad”, or the constant war against all who

do not practice their ultra-conservative brand of Sunni Islam.3

Following the establishment of the caliphate, IS demonstrated its understanding of what constituted,

and was necessary to maintain, its legitimacy, as well as the measures required to do so. Securing and

expanding the caliphate became IS’s paramount goal, but its commitment to the offensive jihad meant it

faced a plethora of domestic enemies, including the governments of Iraq and Syria, Shi’ite and Kurdish

fighters, and rival Sunni militants, on a circumambient war-front. The high cost to maintain legitimacy left

IS hungry for increased manpower. In response to this demand IS directed a bulk of its burgeoning

propaganda machine towards recruitment of a steady influx of foreign fighters to the build an army of the

caliphate.

Legitimizing the Caliphate

A robust propaganda apparatus was part of the complex bureaucracies emblematic of the state

established by IS. Under the presumed leadership of the caliph’s chief spokesperson, Abu Muhammad

al-Adnani, IS’s propaganda network was funded and managed using the same level of diligence given to

the military. As a result, IS developed perhaps the most advanced propaganda apparatus ever seen from

a terrorist organization. Social media operatives managed the development and distribution of thousands

of videos, pictures, audio recordings, and messages on highly trafficked social media sites every month,

as well as the publication and distribution of periodical online propaganda magazines; including the

English language Dabiq, French Dar al-Islam, Turkish Konstantiniyye, and Russian Istok.

4

The output of IS’s vast propaganda apparatus demonstrated a high level of forethought and

guidance, exemplifying the strict control IS leadership had over its content. As such, IS’s propaganda

provides a useful tool for understanding the caliphate’s broader strategy. Propaganda output prior to

late-2015 focused on recruitment to the caliphate, as IS and the newly established caliphate needed new

recruits to fuel its offensive jihad and build an army. This propaganda strategy was uniquely different from

that of most other terrorist organizations, particularly that of al-Qaeda. After the 11 September 2001

terrorist attacks, and the subsequent loss of its Afghan safe haven, al-Qaeda’s propaganda prioritized

radicalizing unaffiliated individuals, including those often described as lone wolfs, to conduct attacks

against the far enemy in the West. While IS required the manpower to build a standing military and

defeat the enemy at its gates, al-Qaeda’s lack of dependence on territorial legitimacy allowed it the space

to focus on the far enemy in the West. 

To acquire new recruits to the caliphate, IS employed two seemingly incompatible propaganda

styles that attempted to bolster the caliphate’s legitimacy while tailoring its messaging with different

rationalities for joining. The first theme exaggerated the stability of the caliphate by portraying IS as a

champion of peace and inclusivity for all Sunni Muslims, boasting about the benefits and stability brought

by its religiously righteous government, as well as the peaceful coexistence between its multi-ethnic

people.5 The message repeatedly painted the caliphate as a pathway to prosperity by nostalgically

romanticizing the power and prestige of previous Muslim caliphates, a message designed to strongly

resonate with Muslims disenfranchised by repressive and secular regimes. In stark contrast, the second

style of propaganda depicted IS as a military power, slaughtering unbelievers and expanding its territory

with an unprecedented level of success. The latter theme was most notably present throughout IS’s

social media efforts, with frontline photographs of IS soldiers standing over deceased enemies,

portraying victory and showing potential jihadists that IS had the resources and momentum to achieve

victory over the enemies of Islam. With every military victory IS was able to better portray itself as the

legitimate caliphate, and as a result its territorial control quickly became its greatest recruitment tool. 

The caliphate’s demand for fresh recruits was being accomplished with surprising vigor, and by the

end of 2015 worldwide recruitment was estimated at upwards of 30,000 foreign fighters.6 The capacity to

achieve unprecedented military victory provided IS with an observable measure of success for recruitment

purposes. As a former CIA analyst summarized “the overriding point is that success breeds success ... the

perception of quick victories and territory and weapons and bases means they don’t need to try hard to

recruit.”7 

This self-serving cycle initially played out in IS’s favor, as it expanded to a size of over 35,000 square

Gray Research Center, 2040 Broadway Street, Quantico, VA 22134 • 703.432.5260 • www.usmcu.edu/mes
Gray Research Center, 2040 Broadway Street, Quantico, VA 22134 • 703.432.5260 • www.usmcu.edu/mes

miles by January 2015.8 The group demonstrated an unusual efficacy for survival and expansion even in

the face of mounting opposition from intervening states and non-state armed opposition. Yet this

symbiotic relationship between its legitimacy (particularly territoriality) and recruitment created a reliance

on ambitious military objectives. While the cycle might have appeared self-sufficient, IS’s pool of recruits,

while substantial, was certainly not boundless, and sectarian as well as intra-sectarian violence further

alienated the caliphate within the broader Muslim community. IS also became faced with a more unified

international opposition, as additional states realized that IS’s offensive jihad would not stop with Iraq and

Syria. The military involvement of Turkey and Russia, among others, illustrates the growing opposition to

IS. By March 2016, for example, the US-led coalition alone had conducted 10,809 airstrikes on IS targets,

killing an estimated 20,000 fighters.9 This increase in internal and foreign opposition left IS confronting

enemies on multiple fronts, and IS territorial legitimacy was increasingly under pressure with each loss it

incurred. 

A Turning Tide

By mid-2017 the caliphate, which once boasted 35,000 square miles, had been reduced to only

14,000 square miles.10 From early 2015 through early 2016, IS lost 40 percent of its territory in Iraq,

including the cities of Ramadi and Tikrit, the Sinjar region, and the Baiji oil refineries. Through the same

period IS lost over 10 percent of its territory in Syria.11 These substantial defeats shattered the image of

IS as an unstoppable force, which IS had become dependent upon for recruitment, and undercut its

territorial legitimacy. By early 2016, the flow of foreign fighters to the caliphate had largely stopped,

leaving IS with a dwindling force that continued to endure massive battlefield casualties. In the same way

that IS’s military victories had bred success off success, military failures now breed failure and loss of

legitimacy, resulting in a decline in recruitment, making it all the more difficult to hold territory, let alone

achieve military victory and territorial gains. What was once their greatest recruitment tool now stood as

an indication of their failures, leaving IS to address the fact that they are increasingly becoming a caliphate

with no land to rule. Faced with this cataclysmic chain of failure, and understanding its future

consequences, IS shifted its propaganda and broader strategy towards achieving an alternative source

of legitimacy.

The Homegrown Solution: Legitimizing the Idea not the Caliphate

In mid-2015 as IS began to see its territorial caliphate shrink, it shifted its strategy to one more

comparable to al-Qaeda: the promotion of homegrown terrorism abroad. IS’s calls for homegrown

terrorism is reflective of the anxious group’s leadership turning towards the niche of other terrorist

organizations for solutions to its compounding problems. Demonstrably incapable of defeating the near

enemy at its gates, IS transitioned towards targeting the far enemy, with the United States, United

Kingdom, and France as the new front lines to wage its mandated offensive jihad. Highly symbolic of this

transition and the circumstances which prompted it is IS’s abandonment of its two-year-old propaganda

periodical Dabiq, and the creation of Rumiyah in its place. Dabiq, which was named in reference to the

Syrian city IS believed would be the site of their victory over the armies of “Rome”, was abandoned

following the publication of its 15th issue, after IS lost the city to Turkish backed forces. In response, IS

began the publication of a new magazine, Rumiyah (Rome), and focused its content on alternative fronts

in which IS was fighting around the world. Rather than romanticizing traveling to caliphate, IS began to

romanticize fighting to defend the caliphate with attacks abroad. 

IS began to advertise itself as a global idea that jihadists could support with attacks abroad, with

an increasing emphasis on inspiring attacks by lone wolves. Lone wolves can be described as selfradicalized single-actors detached from terrorist hierarchies who are willing to conduct independent attacks

within their home territory in the name of established causes with which they possess a self-proclaimed

affiliation with. To radicalize these lone wolves, IS’s propaganda apparatus targeted a demographic

frequently labelled as “in-betweeners”, described as young men, typically the sons of immigrants, who

feel marginalized within Western societies and have yet to develop a real identity for themselves, making

them more easily radicalized and manipulated into turning their loyalties away from their places of birth

or domicile.12 Both direct and indirect styles of propaganda are utilized to instigate homegrown terrorism

from these in-betweeners, as well as other potential lone wolves. For its indirect style, IS highlights the

anti- Muslim behaviors of Western states and the greatness of Islam in an effort to steer loyalties towards

its own ideology. This style typically discredits Western states for their participation in the coalition against
Middle East Studies at Marine Corps University

Dr. Amin Tarzi • Director, MES • amin.tarzi@usmcu.edu

Mr. Adam C. Seitz • Senior Research Associate, MES • adam.seitz@usmcu.edu

IS, labeling them as “crusader-states” fundamentally against Islam and Muslims.13 The alternative style is

much more direct in clearly and explicitly calling upon its followers to conduct lone wolf attacks. Calls for

lone wolf terrorism were, unfortunately, answered swiftly with several major attacks. Al-Adnani’s May 2015

call for Muslims around the world to attack during Ramadan serves as the turning point of IS’s broader

strategy to retain relevance and legitimacy. It took only three days for a sympathizer to answer al-Adnani’s

call with an IS-inspired beheading in Lyon, France. Following the attack in Lyon, there was a substantial

uptick in IS-inspired lone wolf attacks against the far enemy in Europe, North America, and elsewhere. 

The promotion of lone wolf terrorism provides several distinct benefits for the retreating caliphate.

First and foremost, it is a low-cost and simple strategy that requires minimal planning. Lone wolf

terrorism is a decentralized tactic that is difficult to deter and detect because their attacks require little to

no communication, and they typically have minimal, if any, traceable affiliation with known terrorists.

Lacking the organizational constraints of group terrorism, lone wolves are more adept at conducting

especially lethal attacks in countries with an advanced and pervasive counterterrorism capacity. Despite

the meager resources necessary to produce lone wolf terrorism, such attacks induce fear and alarmism

in host countries. By finding one-in-a-million sympathizers in a given country, IS can manage to portray

itself as a growing global movement rather than a dwindling state.

Conclusion

The transition from a focus on the near enemy to the far enemy demonstrates a decreasing

confidence in the future of IS’s territorial caliphate. As exemplified by their propaganda, IS no longer places

priority on recruiting potential jihadists to travel to the caliphate and has shifted to a new strategy to

retain its relevance and legitimacy. By inspiring people from around the world to carry out attacks abroad,

IS can continue to appear as a viable figurehead within the Salafi jihadist movement and a champion of

the offensive jihad. The internet provides the perfect pathway for IS to survive as an idea, giving it the

mechanism to spread its ideology and inspire enough lone wolfs to survive, even as the wolf pack is

cornered and its den is crumbling around them. 

Joseph Tyler Gruber is a summer research intern for Middle East Studies at Marine Corps University (JuneAugust 2017). He is a Cadet at the Virginia Military Institute, class of 2018. 

Notes:

1 Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants”, The Atlantic, March 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-reallywants/384980/.

2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Greg Miller and Souad Mekhennet, “Inside the surreal world of the Islamic State’s propaganda machine”, The Washington Post, November

20, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/inside-the-islamic-states-propaganda-machine/2015/11/20/051e997a-8ce6-

11e5-acff-673ae92ddd2b_story.html?utm_term=.7db064511e68.

5 See Dabiq issues 1-10. 6 The Soufan Group, FOREIGN FIGHTERS: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq, December 2015,

http://soufan group.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf. 

7 Scott Shane and Ben Hubbard, “ISIS Displaying a Deft Command of Varied Media”, The New York Times, August 30, 2014,

https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/31/world/middleeast/isis-displaying-a-deft-command-of-varied-media.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%221%22.

8 Jack Moore, “End of ISIS Approaching as Caliphate Loses Money and Land”, Newsweek, June 29, 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/islamicstate-wont-survive-fourth-year-after-territory-and-revenue-collapse-630018.

9 Cameron Glenn, ISIS Losses By the Numbers, March 25, 2016, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/isis-losses-the-numbers.

10 Moore, “End of ISIS Approaching”. 11 Ibid. 12 Scott Shane, Richard Pérez-Peña and Aurelien Breeden, “‘In-Betweeners’ Are Part of a Rich Recruiting Pool for Jihadists”, The New York

Times, September 22, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/23/us/isis-al-qaeda-recruits-anwar-al-awlaki.html. 13 See Dabiq issues 10-15, and Rumiyah issues 1-12.