# FILED
Novemb er 14, 1997 Cecil W. Crowson Ap pellate Cou rt Clerk RICK HOLLOWAY, ) ) Plaintiff/Appellee, ) Maury Cir cuit ) No. 7188 VS. ) ) Appeal No. JOHN R. COLLIER, JR., ) 01A01-9704-CV-00153 ) Defendant/Appellant. )

IN THE COURT OF AP PEALS OF

TENNESSEE MIDDLE SECT ION AT NASHV ILLE APPEA L FROM C IRCUIT COURT OF MA URY COUN TY

AT COLUMBI

A, TENNESSEE HONORABL E WILLIA M B. CAIN, JU DGE John S. Colley, II

I #12029 COLLE Y & COLL

EY P.O. Box 1476 Columbia, Tennessee 38402-1476 ATTORNEY FOR PLAI

NTIFF/APPEL

LEE Robert L. Trentham, #2257 Mark Tyler

Seitz, #11868 TRABUE STURDIVANT & DEWITT 2500 Nashville City Center 511 Union Street Nashville, Tennessee 37219 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT/APPEL LANT 

### REVERSED AND REMANDED.

HENRY F. TODD PRESIDING

JUDGE, MIDDL

E SECTION

CONCUR: BEN H. CANTRELL , JUDGE CONCUR IN SEPARATE OPINI ON: WILL IAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE-2-

RICK HOLLOWAY, ) ) Plaintiff/Appellee, ) Maury Cir cuit ) No. 7188 VS. ) ) Appeal No. JOHN R. COLLIER, JR., ) 01A01-9704-CV-00153 ) Defendant/Appellant. )



## O P I N I O N
The defendant, Joh n R. Co llier, Jr., has appealed from a jury verdict and judgment awarding the plaintiff, Rick Holloway, $17,000.00 compensa tory damag es for a tort described in the com

plaint as f ollows: 2. In June, 1995, Rick Holloway was an at-wil l em pl oye e o f C en te x- Ro ge rs Co ns tr uc ti on Co mp an y. 3. Ce ntex-Rogers Construction Company was providing materials and services to Maury Reg ional Hospital in the first

half of 1995 in

the form of a construction project at Maury Regiona l Hospital
. 4. Plaintiff

Rick Holloway worked at and on the Maury Regi onal Hospi tal c onstr uctio n pro

ject for C entexRogers Construction Company several months prior to June 1995. 5. In May

and/or June 1995, Defendant

John R. Collier, Jr. contacte d one or mor e ind ividu als a

t CentexRogers Construct

io n C ompany reg arding Plaintiff Rick Ho ll ow ay. 6. Defendant

John R. Collier, Jr. communicated to Centex-Rogers Construct ion Comp any in May and/or June, 1995 that Plaintiff Rick Holloway had improperly reroofed a Maury Regional Hospital employee’s home , and in doing so, h adviolated the trust of Maury Re gional Hospital manage ment. 7. The state

mentscommu

nica ted to CentexRogers Construction Company by Defendant

John R. Collier, Jr. as set forth in the preceding parag raph werenot true, and Defen dant J ohn R. Collier, Jr. either knew or should have known that said statements were untrue. 8. The statements communicated by De fendant John R. Collier, Jr. to Centex-Rogers Construction Company a s set forth

in the preceding

two para

graph s were ma

d e maliciously, and were

made inte

ntionally or reck lessly , with the intent to pro cure the termination of Plaintiff Rick-3- Hol lo way’semployment with Centex-Rogers Construction Co mp an y. 9. In communicat in g the aforementioned statemen ts to Centex-Roger s Co ns tr uc ti on Co mp an y, Defendant

John R. Collier, Jr. did, by inducem ent, persuas ion, misrepre sentatio n, and/or other means, wrongfully interfere withthe at-will employment betwee n C e ntex-Rogers Construction Co mp an y an d P la in ti ff Ri ck Ho ll ow ay. Defendant

John R. Collier, Jr. is there fore lia blefor Plaintiff’s lost wages since his termination on June 11, 1995.
The def endan t answ ered, d enying the mater ial po rtion s of th e comp laint and st ating:

14. The Compla

int fails to

state a c laim. 15. The Defendant is immune from suit under the provisions of Tennessee’s Governmental Tort L iability Act because at all times material to the Complaint, he was acting within the cour se and sc ope of hisemplo y ment as Assistant Administra

tor at Mau

ry Regiona l Hospital
. 16. The Plaintiff

’s Complaint is barred

by t he applic able statute of limitations
. 17. The Defendant’s communications to Centex-Rogers Construction Company concer ning the Plaintiff

are protected by a qualified pr

ivilege. WHEREFORE, havin g fully answered, the Defendant dema nds a jur y of

twelve ( 12) to try

the case agains t him; pr ays that the Complaintfiled ag ainst him be dismissed; and pr ays that he be

awarded his discr etionar y c osts incur

red in conjunction with the defense of this matter. The cause was tried to a jury with the result stated above.
Upon appeal t

o this Court , the defendant appellant presents a single issue as follow s: 1. Whether the plaintiff presented material eviden c e to support

the jury ’s verdi ct that the defenda nt is liable under the theoryof intentional interference with an employment relationship.
The verdict of a jury

may be set aside only if there is no material evidence to support the verdict. TRAP Rule 13d, Smith Count y v. Eathe rly , Tenn. App. 1991, 820 S.W.2d 366.-4- A verdict may be

reversed on appeal if, after taking the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of

the successful party , the appellate court finds that a reasonable mind could reach only

one conclusion and that conclusion is contrary to the verdict
. W

harton Transport v. Bridges , Tenn. A pp. 1980 , 606 S.W.2d 5 21; Holmes v. Wilson , Tenn. App. 1977, 551 S. W.2d 682; Flynn v. Shoney’s Inc. , Tenn. App. 1992, 850 S.W.2d 458.

In Forreste r v. Stock

still , Tenn. A

pp. 1994, 8 69 S.W.2d 328 , the empl o yee a t-will sued his corporate employ er and its directors who ma de the decis ion t o dis charge him. The Supreme Court held that the employee ha d no contractual right to continued employ ment and thus no claim

for procurement of breach of contract and that the directors were not liable f or intentiona

lly interfe ring wit h plaintif f’s employme

nt.

There is a statutory tort of inducement or procurement of breach of contract. T.C.A. § 47-50-109. The elements of the cause of action are, knowledge of the wrong doer of a legal contract, malicious intent of wrongdoer, and a resultant brea ch of the contract

with dama

ges. TSC Indus. I

nc. v. Tom lin , Tenn. App. 1987, 743 2d 169.

There i s evid ence fr om whi ch a reas onabl e jury migh t find the fo llow ing:

1. Centex-Rogers Construction Company was engaged as general contractor to construct a building

for Maur y Re gional H ospital. 2. John R. Collier, assistant administrator of the hospital had ove rsight of
secu rity of the hospital a

nd the cons truc tion b eing

perf orme d by Cente x.

3. In Septembe

r 1994, Mic

ky Je nkins, job s uperinte

ndent for Centex, hir

e d plain tiff tempo rari ly to wor k as a carp ente r on th e jobas an

“at w ill” e

mploy ee of Cente x.-5- 4. In Februa

ry 1995, whil e still e mp loy ed by Centex on the

same pro

ject, plaintiff agreed with Doug Johnston, a hos pital se curity g uard under the supervision of Collier, the assistant hospital administrator, to repair a roof for Johnston, the security guard.

5. This was “spare time” work, and did not interfere with plaintiff’s work on the hospi tal bu ildi ng.

6. Johnston became dissatisfied with the delay in completion of the roof job by plaintiff and, on severa

l occasi ons, Johnston complained about the delay to his supervisor, Charles Pe

rkins, ch ief of security

of the hos pital.

7. Both

plain tiff and Johnston had volatile personalities, and Johnston’s superiors were concerned about the possibility of an altercation between the two on hospital premises
.

8. Hospital authorities informed a Centex supervisor of their concern about the difficulty betwee

n plaintiff and Johnston, but did not suggest that any a ction be taken.

9. On June

9, 199 5, pla

intif f wasdisch arg ed by

Cente x.
Moreover, there isno evidence that defendant published any statement that there was danger of an alt ercation on the job

betwee n plaintif f and def endant. This was a

conclusion reached from rep orts rec eived fr

om othersby t

he hospita

l authorit ies wh o in turn reported their concerns to the pl ain tiff’s employer. T he report of their concerns by the hospital authorities was the obvious cause of plaintiff’s discharge, and none of the hospital authorities is a party to this action.-6- No evidenc e is found

in this rec ord to supp ort a ver dict for p laintiff

agains t defend ant. The verdict and

judgment of the Trial Court are therefore vacated and reversed and plaintiff’ s suit is dismissed. Costs of thi s appeal are taxe d again st the plaintiff app ellee. T he cause is remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.



### REVERSED AND REMANDED.

___________________________________ HENRY F. TODD PRESIDING

JUDGE, MIDDL

E SECTION

CONCURS:

____________________________ BEN H. CANTRELL , JUDGE
CONCUR IN SEPARATE OPINI ON: WILL IAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE