alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT
32.1




CERTIFICATION





Certification
Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Subsections (a) and
(b) of


Section
1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code)




Pursuant
to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of
section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each of the
undersigned officers of Innocom Technology Holdings, Inc., a Nevada corporation
(the "Company"), does hereby certify, to such officer's knowledge,
that:




The
Annual Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2009 (the "Form 10-Q")
of the Company fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in the Form 10-Q
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company.




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Innocom Technology Holdings, Inc. and will be retained by Innocom Technology
Holdings, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.





Date:
      May 20, 2009
              
              
              /s/
      William Yan Sui HuiWilliam
      Yan Sui Hui,
                  Chief
      Executive Officer
#### Eli HOLLIE, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. J-160, L-281.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 1, 1971.

Don Dansby, Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The briefs and the record on appeal having been read and given full consideration, and the appellant having failed to demonstrate reversible error, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

JOHNSON, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD K., and RAWLS, JJ., concur.
#### Vincent Anthony BUSCH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. GG-445.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Feb. 27, 1978.

Michael J. Minerva, Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

McCORD, Chief Judge.

Appellant contends first that the trial judge should have suppressed his confession *489because it was the result of an arrest of appellant in his home without a warrant and with no showing by the state of exigent circumstances that would have excused the absence of an arrest warrant. The trial court was correct in denying appellant’s motion to suppress. See *State v. Perez,*277 So.2d 778 (Fla.1973). Appellant next contends that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that he could be found guilty of robbery committed while carrying a firearm when the evidence conclusively established that the firearm was in the possession of appellant’s accomplice and that the judgment and sentence for armed robbery are, therefore, not supported by the evidence. Appellant cites *Earnest*v. *State,*351 So.2d 957, Fla., opinion filed August 31, 1977, rehearing denied December 6, 1977. There, the Supreme Court construed § 775.-087(2), Florida Statutes (1975), which provides that any person who is convicted of robbery and who had in his possession a firearm shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of three years. The court held that the three-year minimum term under the statute applied only to physical possession of a firearm by a defendant rather than constructive possession. Here, as in *Earnest,*the appellant, who did not have a firearm, was convicted as an aider and abettor of the crime in which he participated — robbery in which the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon [§ 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Florida Statutes (1975)], rather than robbery in which the offender carried no firearm, deadly weapon, or other weapon [§ 812.13(1) and (2)(c), Florida Statutes (1975)]. Here, unlike in *Earnest,*appellant was not sentenced to minimum three-year term of imprisonment; thus, we are not concerned with § 775.-087(2).

The Supreme Court in *Earnest*did not in any way abrogate § 777.011, Florida Statutes (1975), dealing with principals in the first degree. That statute provides that whoever aids, abets, counsels, hires or otherwise procures an offense to be committed and such offense is committed is a principal in the first degree and may be charged, convicted and punished as such whether he is or is not actually or constructively present at the commission of such offense. That statute makes an aider and abettor a principal in the first degree to the crime he aids and abets. Here, the evidence clearly shows that appellant was present aiding and abetting his accomplice in the accomplice’s commission of the crime of robbery with a firearm. Thus, appellant is guilty as a principal in the first degree of that crime rather than the crime of robbery in which the offender carried no firearm, deadly weapon, or other weapon.

AFFIRMED.

BOYER, J., and McLANE, RALPH M., Associate Judge, concur.
#### Curt O. LECHLER et al. v. CITY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION for the Parish of Orleans and their agents and superintendent of police, Clarence B. Giarrusso and his agents.

No. 62210.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 2, 1978.

In re: Curt O. Lechler, et al., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, 8580. Parish of Orleans. 357 So.2d 41.

Denied.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
financial statements of USANi LLC for the quarter ended March 31, 1998.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         0
<SALES>                                        415,358
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               415,358
<CGS>                                          242,418
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  242,418
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               142,084
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              18,206
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  7,955
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,645
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              5,310
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     5,310
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### Frederick GARMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-395.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Oct. 21, 1969.

Frederick Garman, in pro. per.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and BARKDULL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This court, proceeding in the manner outlined and recommended by the Supreme Court of the United States in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, having deferred ruling on a motion of the public defender to withdraw as counsel for the indigent defendant-appellant, and having furnished appellant with a copy of the public defenders’ memorandum brief, and having allowed the appellant a reasonable specified time within which to raise any points that he chose in support of his appeal and the appellant having failed to respond thereto on consideration thereof upon full examination of the proceedings we conclude that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Whereupon, the public defender’s said motion to withdraw is granted, and the order or judgment appealed is hereby affirmed.
EXHIBIT 23.1



|     |  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
|---- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|LOGO |  | Thigpen, Jones, Seaton & Co., P.C. C E R T I F I E D  P U B L
I C  A C C O U N T A N T S B U S I N E S S  C O N S U L T A N T S 1004
Hillcrest Parkway  P.O. Box 400 Dublin, Georgia 31040-0400 Tel 478-272-2030
 Fax 478-272-3318 E-mail tjs@tjscpa.com

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We have issued our report dated March 14, 2008, accompanying the consolidated financial statements included in the Annual Report of CCF Holding Company on Form 10-KSB
for the year ended December 31, 2007. We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference of said report in the Registration Statement of CCF Holding Company on Form S-8 (File No. 333-35108).

LOGO

Dublin, Georgia

March 26, 2008
#### Norma Jean HUTCHINSON and Lee C. Hutchinson, Appellants, v. Roy ALBERTI and Anthony A. Alberti, Appellees.

No. 69-671.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 17, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 10.50


                                 AMENDMENT NO. 1

                                       to

                            ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT

                                   DATED AS OF

                                  JUNE 18, 2001

                                 BY AND BETWEEN

                        IMPRES TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS, INC.

                                       AND

                             WAREFORCE INCORPORATED

Effective as of June 19, 2001, the Asset Purchase Agreement dated as of June 18,
2001 by and between IMPRES Technology Solutions, Inc. and Wareforce Incorporated
is hereby amended as follows:

Strike Section (1)(g)(ii) which reads as follows:

"Seller has several service contracts commonly known as DPSS, DCFS and CATS,
which are paid monthly. Seller will continue these contracts through June 30,
2001 and assign these contracts to Buyer as of July 1, 2001, and"

and replace it with: "Seller has several service contracts commonly known as
DPSS, DCFS and CATS, which are paid monthly. Seller will continue these
contracts through June 30, 2001 and assign these contracts to Buyer or Buyer's
designee(s) as of July 1, 2001; specifically Seller and Buyer both agree that
the DCFS / CATS contract shall be directly assigned by Seller to Richard Fu, an
individual, upon the approval of Los Angeles County, and".

Agreed and accepted this 19th day of June, 2001.

WAREFORCE INCORPORATED                  IMPRES TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS, INC.



/s/ Dan Ricketts                        /s/ Richard Fu
----------------------------            --------------------------------
Dan Ricketts                            Richard Fu
General Counsel                         President
**EXHIBIT 23.1**

 

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-2202) pertaining to the AMXCorp. 1996 Employee Stock Purchase Plan, the AMX Corp. 1995 Director Stock Option Plan, the AMX Corp. 1995 Stock Option Plan, and the AMX Corp. 1993 Stock Option Plan, and in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-83061) pertaining to the AMXCorp. 1999 Equity Incentive Plan of our report dated April 23, 2004 with respect to the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedule of AMX Corporation included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended March 31,2004. 

 

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP 

 

Dallas, Texas 

June 18, 2004
At a Glance, Issuing EDSP Second List Test Orders

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Office of Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention

March 28, 2013

EPA issues orders using

FIFRA/FFDCA

policies and procedures

SDWA

§1457?

Orphan

Chemical

Evaluate Data

Pesticide

Chemical?

EDSP

2nd List

Recipients?

1st ‐ CDR

2nd ‐ Other

EPA issues orders using

SDWA §1457/FFDCA

policies and procedures

Data?

Data?

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes
#### Lester WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2129.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.

Jan. 12, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Larry Joe PHILLIPS.

No. 60305.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 6, 1977.

In re: Larry Joe Phillips, applying for remedial writs.

Writ denied. Return from district court reveals that defendant’s appeal is presently pending. Habeas Corpus petition will not be granted pending an appeal. La.Code Criminal Procedure, Art. 363.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1


                        REPORT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS


TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND STOCKHOLDERS OF USDATA CORPORATION

In our opinion, the consolidated balance sheets and the related consolidated
statements of operations and comprehensive income, of stockholders' equity and
of cash flows listed in the index appearing under Item 14 (a) (1) and (2) on
page 15 present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of
USDATA Corporation and its subsidiaries (the "Company") at December 31, 1998
and 1997, and the results of their operations and their cash flows for each of
the three years in the period ended December 31, 1998, in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles. These financial statements are the
responsibility of the Company's management; our responsibility is to express an
opinion on these financial statements based on our audits. We conducted our
audits of these statements in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards which require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material
misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting
the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements, assessing the
accounting principles used and significant estimates made by management, and
evaluating the overall financial statement presentation. We believe that our
audits provide a reasonable basis for the opinion expressed above.



Dallas, Texas
February 12, 1999
CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO

                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of The Cyber Group Network Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ending December 31, 2002, as filed with
the  Securities  and  Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned,  Chief  Executive Officer, certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350,  as  adopted  pursuant  to  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 3(a) or 15(d) of
the  Securities  and  Exchange  Act  of  1934;  and

(2)  The  information  contained  in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects,  the  financial  condition  and  results of operations of the Company.

A  signed  original  of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears  in  typed  form within the electronic version of this written statement
required  by  Section  906,  has  been  provided to [name of issuer] and will be
retained  by  [name  of  issuer]  and  furnished  to the Securities and Exchange
Commission  or  its  staff  upon  request.



By: /s/ R. Scott Cramer

    --------------------



    R. Scott Cramer

 Chief Executive Officer

Dated: September 22, 2004


                                       16
<PAGE>
Exhibit
23.1




CONSENT
OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM




The
      Board of Directors


GSE
      Systems, Inc.




We
consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements No.
333-138702 and No. 333-150249 on Form S-8 and registration statements No.
333-147537, No. 333-144623, No. 333-143199, No. 333-134569  and No.
333-126472 on Form S-3 of GSE Systems, Inc. of our reports dated March 16,
2009, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of GSE Systems, Inc. and
subsidiaries as of December 31, 2008 and 2007, and the related consolidated
statements of operations, comprehensive income (loss), changes in stockholders’
equity and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended
December 31, 2008,  and the effectiveness of internal control over
financial reporting as of December 31, 2008, which reports appear in the
December 31, 2008 Annual Report on Form 10-K of GSE Systems,
Inc.





As
discussed in Note 10, the Company adopted FASB Interpretation No. 48,Accounting for Uncertainty in
Income Taxes – An Interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109, on
January 1, 2007.




/s/ KPMG
LLP




Baltimore,
Maryland


March 16,
2009
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1811 

To authorize the Secretary of the Interior to study the feasibility of enlarging 

the Arthur V. Watkins Dam Weber Basin Project, Utah, to provide 

additional water for the Weber Basin Project to fulfill the purposes 

for which that project was authorized. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 3, 2005 

Mr. HATCH (for himself and Mr. BENNETT) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To authorize the Secretary of the Interior to study the feasibility of enlarging the Arthur V. Watkins Dam Weber 

Basin Project, Utah, to provide additional water for the 

Weber Basin Project to fulfill the purposes for which 

that project was authorized. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Arthur V. Watkins 

5 Dam Enlargement Act of 2005’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress finds the following: 
2 

•S 1811 IS

1 (1) Arthur V. Watkins Dam is a feature of the 

2 Weber Basin Project, which was authorized by law 

3 on August 29, 1949. 

4 (2) Increasing the height of Arthur V. Watkins 

5 Dam and construction of pertinent facilities may 

6 provide additional storage capacity for the develop7 ment of additional water supply for the Weber Basin 

8 Project for uses of municipal and industrial water 

9 supply and flood control. 

10 SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION OF FEASIBILITY STUDY. 

11 The Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Bu12 reau of Reclamation, is authorized to conduct a feasibility 

13 study on raising the height of Arthur V. Watkins Dam 

14 for the development of additional storage to meet water 

15 supply needs within the Weber Basin Project area and the 

16 Wasatch Front. The feasibility study shall include such 

17 environmental evaluation as required under the National 

18 Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et 

19 seq.) and a cost allocation as required under the Reclama20 tion Project Act of 1939 (43 U.S.C. 485 et seq.). 

Æ
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2033 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2033

 To amend the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act to designate segments of the 
 Taunton River in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as a component of 
              the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           November 17, 2005

Mr. Kennedy (for himself and Mr. Kerry) introduced the following bill; 
   which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and 
                           Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act to designate segments of the 
 Taunton River in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as a component of 
              the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TAUNTON RIVER, MASSACHUSETTS.

    Section 3(a) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C. 1274(a)) 
is amended--
            (1) by designating the undesignated paragraph relating to 
        the White Salmon River as paragraph (167); and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(168) Taunton river, massachusetts.--The segment 
        downstream from the headwaters of the Taunton River, from the 
        confluence of the Town River and the Matfield River in 
        Bridgewater to the Mount Hope Bay in the city of Fall River, 
        Massachusetts.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### Janice L. GRAY, Appellant, v. Ronald E. GRAY, Appellee.

No. 78-149.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

June 28, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 30, 1978.

*295Walt D. Logan, St. Petersburg, for appellant.

Martin Errol Rice, of Harris, Green, Piper, Davenport, Nelson & Rice, St. Peters-burg, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The only point meriting discussion in this post-decretal interlocutory appeal of an order denying appellee/husband’s motion for modification of final judgment of dissolution is the trial court’s denial of appellant/wife’s motion for attorney’s fees.

Despite the fact that the record contains certain relevant information as to the financial resources of appellant and appellee in the form of their financial affidavits, the record is devoid of any affirmative showing that the trial court considered these affidavits as the basis for its order denying the wife’s attorney’s fees. Indeed, the order expressly based denial of attorney’s fees on the sole ground that “there existed a legitimate question for Court determination on the part of the husband in bringing his Motion for Modification of Final Judgment.”

Whether or not a legitimate question for court determination existed is not the appropriate standard for determining entitlement to attorney’s fees in dissolution and modification cases. The proper criterion is the relative financial resources of the parties. *See*Section 61.16, Florida Statutes (1977).

Accordingly, the order appealed from is reversed only insofar as it denies appellant/wife’s motion for attorney’s fees and the cause is remanded for appropriate consideration and determination of this issue. In all other respects, the order appealed from is affirmed.

GRIMES, Acting C. J., and OTT and RYDER, JJ., concur.