IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI N O. 2015-KA-01667-COA DWAYNE BRYANT APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/09/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROBERT B. HELFRICH COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: FORREST COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: ERIN ELIZABETH BRIGGS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BILLY L. GORE DISTRICT ATTORNEY: PATRICIA A. THOMAS BURCHELL NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: CONVICTED OF SECOND-DEGREE MURDER AND SENTENCED TO FORTY YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 05/02/2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE LEE, C.J., ISHEE AND GREENLEE, JJ. LEE, C.J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Dway

ne Bry ant was f

ound guilty of second-degree m urde r b y a jury in the Circuit Court o f Forrest County and sentenced to f orty y ears in the c u stody of the Mississippi Departm ent of Corrections (MDOC). He appeals his conviction, arguing that (1) the evidence was insuf

f icient to support a conviction; ( 2) he was entitled to an a c quittal underW

eathersby ; 1 (3) the trial court erred w hen it allowed certain photos into evidence; and (4) his right to a f

u n d am entally f

a ir trial was violated by the prosecution’s closing a rgum ent. Finding no reversible error, we af f irm

. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. On August 1, 2013, Bry ant shot Adrian W alker m ultiple tim es, and W a lker later died

as a res u l t of the g unshot wounds. Bry ant was a resident of Bonhom ie Apartm ents in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Bry ant and W alker were considered to be neighborhood f riends. W a lker h ad previously lived with his girlf riend, Stacy Pollard, a Bonhom i e resident and one of Bry ant’s neighbors. Though W alker no l o n g e r lived with Pollard, he was regularly at Pollard’s apartm ent. Bry a nt would som etim e s cut W alker’s hair, as he did f or several residents of the apartm ent com plex. And W alker would of ten com e over when Bry ant was grilling, which was a regular occurrence. ¶3. On the evening that W alker was shot, Bry ant asked W a lker if h e could b orrow a grill
to cook s om e f

ood, and W alker agreed. W hen Bry ant went to Pollard’s apartm ent to get the grill, he f ou n d t h a t W alker h ad already started the c oals, and s o he decided to stay at Pollard’s apartm e nt to grill. The group at Pollard’s apartm ent included Bry ant, his brother Jerem y , W alker, W illie W ilson, and Slozella M cDonald. At trial, Wi l s o n t e stif ied that W a lker and Bry ant had been drinking bef ore she arrived there, and she believed they were drunk. Bry ant testif

ied that he only consum ed one alcoholic b everage during the tim e he was there. At som e point, a conversation between M c D o n a l d and Bry ant becam e intense, and

1 Wea th ersb

y v. S ta te , 1 6 5 M iss. 2 0 7 , 1 4 7 S o . 4 8 1 , 4 8 2 (1 9 3 3 ). 2W a lker joined in the heated conversation. Bry ant becam e irritated and decided to leave.

¶4. A t t r i a l , B r y a n t t estif ied that when he announced he w a s leaving, W alker bega n cursing at him

. B ry ant gathered his f ood o f f o f the grill and started walking back to his own apartm ent with his brother, Jerem y . W alker f o llowed Bry ant and Jerem y , though W ilson and Pollard told W alker not t o p u rsue them

. A ccording to B r y ant, he went inside his apartm ent and l ef t the door open f

or Jerem y to f

ollow. W h en Jerem y

and W alker m ade it to Bry ant’s doorway , Jerem y did not com e inside because h e reportedly did not want to get involved in the argum ent. Jerem y testif ied that W alker, who was standing in Bry ant’s doorway , was still cursing a nd “f

u ssing” at Bry ant. Jerem y also testif ied that W alker told Bry ant that he would phy sically harm him

. Bry ant walked back in a n d out of the house several tim es, a nd W alker did not l eave Bry ant’s doorway

. A t som e point, Bry ant w a l ked u pstairs in his apartm ent to get his gun, which he testif ied he kept f

or protection. Bry a n t testif ied that he then went back downstairs to take Jerem y hom e . Jerem y testif i ed that W alker s a i d “ I ’ m g oing to get y ou now,” and “started running up in the h ouse,” “try ing to f ight

. . . with his f

ist s balled.” Sim ilarly , Bry ant testif

ied that he heard W alker say , “F--- it. I’m f ixing to go ahead and get
y ou n ow.” A c c o r d i ng to B ry ant, W alker f linched, a n d Bry ant pulled out h is gun and shot him

. Both Bry ant and Jerem y t estif ied that W alker was in Bry ant’s doorway when W alker f linched and Bry ant shot him

. ¶5. B r y a n t t e s t i f

ied that he f

elt threatened by W alker and was f earf ul of him when h e

arm ed him self and when he s h ot W alker. He a lso testif ied that W alker was in his doorway when he i nitially shot him , and that W alker “ went backwards” and f e ll down “on the opposite

3side of the s idewalk.” Bry ant shot W alker eight tim es. He later turned him self in to the

Hattiesburg Police Departm ent. W alker was taken to the hospital w h e r e h e u nderwent several s u r g e r i e s and stay ed in the ICU. A m onth af ter the shooting, W alker died f rom

com plications due to the gunshot wounds. ¶6. At trial, Bry ant m oved f or a directed verdict at the close of the State’s case-in-chief and at the close of all the evidence—both m otions were d enied. The case was subm itted to the jury , and Bry ant w as convicted. Bry ant f iled a m otion f

or a judgm ent notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, a new trial, which was denied. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶7. “Motions f

o r a directed verdict and a judgm ent notwithstanding the verdict c hallenge the legal suf

f iciency of the evidence.” Mitchum v. State , 164 So. 3d 477, 481 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. A pp. 2014). W hen considering whether the evidence is suf f icient to sustain a conviction, “the critical inquiry is whether the evidence shows bey ond a reasonable d o u b t t hat the accused com m itted the act charged, and that he did so under such c ircum stances that every elem ent of the of

f ense e xisted.” Id

. at 480 ( ¶12) (internal quotation m arks om itted) (quoting Bush v. State , 8 9 5 So. 2 d 836, 843 (¶16) (Miss. 2005)). “[ W ]here the evidence f ails to m eet this test[ ,] it is insuf

f icient to support a c onviction.” Id

. An a ppellate “court will not reverse unless reasonable and f

air-m inded jurors could o nly f i nd the accused n ot guilty .” Id

. at 481 (¶12) (citing F

erguson v. State , 137 So. 3d 240, 243 (¶6) (Miss. 2014)).

DISCUSSION I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

4¶8. Bry ant argues that the evidence at trial was insuf f icient to support his conviction of second-degree m

urder. He contends that he was entitled to the castle-doctrine presum ption, and so the evidence o n ly established that his actions w ere justif i able hom icide. M ississippi’s jus t i f i a b l e - h om i cide statute, in relevant p art, provides that the killing of a nother person is justif i ed “[ w]hen com m itted in the lawf ul def ense of one’s own person . . . where there [ is] reasonable ground t o apprehend a design t o com m it a f elony o r t o d o som e great personal injury , and there [ is] im m inent danger of such design being accom p lished.” Miss. C ode Ann. § 97-3-15(1)(f

) (Rev. 2014). The castle doctrine, codif i ed i n section 97-3-15(3), states in part: A person w ho uses def ensive f o r c e shall be presum ed t o have reasonably f eared im m inent deat h o r great b odily harm , o r the com m ission of a f e lony upon him or another or upon his dwelling, or against a vehicle which he was o c c u p y i n g , or against his business or place of em ploy m ent or the im m ediat e prem ises of such business or place of e m ploy m ent, if the person a gainst whom the def ensive f orce was used, w as in the proces s o f unlawf ully and f orcibly entering, or h ad unlawf

ully and f orcibly entered, a d

welling, occupied vehicle, business, place of em

ploy m ent[ ,] or the im m ediate prem ises thereof [ ,] or if that person had u nlawf

ully rem oved or was attem pting to unlawf

ully rem ove another a gainst the other person’s will f rom that dwelling, occupied vehicle, business, place of em

p l oy m ent[ ,] or the i m m ediate prem ises thereof [ ,] a nd the p e r s o n who used d ef

ensive f orce knew or had reason to believe tha t t h e f orcible entry

or unlawf

ul and f orcible act was occurring or had occurred. ¶9. Bry ant s tates that a ll of the witnesses agreed that W alker f ollowed Bry a nt to his hom e, that W alker threatened Bry ant, and that W alker was in Bry ant’s doorway when B ry ant shot him

. As such, Bry ant argues that he was entitled to the castle-doctrine presum ption, and with the p resum

ption, his actions only am ounted to justif i able hom icide. Bry ant and Jerem y testif i ed that W alker was in B ry ant’s doorway w hen Bry ant shot him

. And that W alker went

5backwards and e ventually f ell d o wn outside on the opposite side of the sidewalk. But Pollard testif i ed that she saw B ry ant shoot W alker while W alker w as ly ing wounded on the ground, with Bry ant standing over h im with a gun in his hands. Of f icer Tam m y Hoadley , one of the f irst responders to the scene, testif ied that W alker was ly ing on the ground, s pecif ically on the sidewalk. As s uch, there was a f actual dispute as to w here Bry ant and W alker were when Bry ant shot W alker. ¶10. In a hom icide prosecution where the def e ndant asserts that the c astle doctrine applies, and there a re discrepancies in witness testim o ny , the issue is properly lef t to the jury

. Flynt

v. State , 183 So. 3d 1, 1 4 ( ¶40) (Miss. 2 0 1 5). Here, the j ury w as instructed on the castledoctrine presum

ption, justif

iable hom i ci d e , i mperf

e ct self def

ense, and heat-of

-passion

m anslaughter. Af

ter receiving instructio n s o n the applicable law, the jury deliberated and fo u n d B ry ant guilty of second-degree m urder, rejecting B r

y ant’s def en s e t h e o r i e s

— i n c l u d i n g the c astle doctrine. An appellate court “m ust p resum e that the j u r y c onsidered the jury instructions—includi n g the [ c]astle [ d]octrine instruction and the related evidence and testim o ny .” Id

. I n the instant case, the evidence presented supports the jury verdict, and thus the trial court did not err in deny ing Bry a nt’s m otion f o r JNOV. This issue is without m erit. II. Weathersby Rule ¶11. Bry ant a lso argues that he was entitled to a d irected v erdict under the W e a thersby rule, and that the trial court erred when i t d e n ied Bry a nt’s m otion. I n W eathersby , our suprem e court held: [ W ]here the def

endant or the def

endant’s witnesses are the only e y e witnesses to the hom icide, their version, if reasonable, m ust be a ccepted as true, u nless

6substantially c ontradicted i n m aterial particulars by a credible witness or

witnesses f

or the [ S]tate, or by phy sical f acts or b y t h e f

a cts o f com m on knowledge. W eathersby , 147 So. at 482. ¶12. Bry ant argues that he and Jerem y were the only ey ewitnesses t o the shooting. And he also s tates that their testim ony consistently m aintained that Bry ant s h ot W alker in necessary self -def e nse while W alker w as entering Bry ant’s house in a threatening m anner. As such, Bry ant a rgues that u n de r W eathersby , h is version of events is an absolute def ense to the hom icide, and he is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. ¶13. Bry ant’s recitation of the W ea t h e r s by rule is accurate. However, W e athersby only applies w here the def

endant’s witness are the only ey e witnesses. Here, Bry ant and Jerem y
t e stif ied that Bry a nt s hot W alker f rom inside h is apartm ent while W alker w as st a n d i n g i n Bry ant’s doorway

. Yet Bry ant adm itted there was conf licting t estim o ny a

b out where W alker

was standing w hen Bry ant shot him

. And there was another witness, Pollard, who testif ied she saw Bry a n t s h o ot W alker w hile W alker was ly ing on the ground outside of Bry ant’s apartm ent. ¶14. Additionally , W

e athersby does not apply w here the def endant’s version is “substantially c ontradicted in m aterial particulars b y a credible witness or w itnesses f or the [ S]tate, or by phy sical f

acts

. . . . ” Id

. I n the instant case, Bry ant testif i ed that he did not recall shooting W alker in the b a c k , o r W alker w alking or running away f rom Bry ant or Bry ant’ s a p a r t m e n t. H owever, the phy sical evidence showed that W alker had b een shot—not only i n the f

ront of his body

—but m ultiple tim es in t h e b a ck and buttocks. The f irst signs

7of blood were f ound ten to t w e l v e f

eet outside of B ry ant’s apartm ent. And there were

m ultiple shell casings f

ound outside of Bry ant’s apartm ent on the g rass next t o the s idewalk. There was also c onf

licting testim ony about who was t aun t i n g w h o, with Pollard testif y ing that Bry ant was “egging [ W a lker] on[ , ] initiating f or m ore conversatio n [ , ] ” a n d say ing, “[ C]om e one. I’ve got som ething f or y ou.” ¶15. Here, the W

eathersby rule does not apply

. Bry ant’s wit n e s s e s w e r e n o t t h e only
ey ewitnesses, and there were phy sical f acts and other e vidence presented by the State which substantially contradicted Bry ant’s version of the shooting. The suprem e c ourt “has warned repeatedly that w here circum stances are shown in the evidence which m aterially contradict the d ef e n d ant’s version of s elf

- def ense, the jury is n ot required to accept his version of self -def e nse along w ith the conf

licting evidence and any unf avorable inf

erences theref

rom .” Pritchett v. State , 560 So. 2d 1017, 1019 (Miss. 1990). Further, “[ i]t is a rare case that m eets all of the requirem ents o f the [ W eathersby ] rule.” Sartain v. State , 311 So. 2d 343, 345 (Miss. 1975) (citation om itted). ¶16. Bry ant correctly notes that it is the duty of the trial court and not the jury to determ ine the applicability of the W eathersby rule. I

d. at 344. Here, the t r i a l c o u r t f o und that there

were contradicting f

a cts, and t h at there were m ore ey ewitnesses than those testif y ing on Bry ant’s behalf

. “ [ W ]here the d ef

endant’s story is m aterially contradicted, the W e athersby rule has no application[ ,] and the m atter of conviction versus acquittal becom es a question f or the jury .” Green v. State , 631 S o. 2d 167, 174 (Miss. 1 994). Accordingly , the trial judge did not err when h e overruled Bry ant’s m otion f or a directed verdict under the W e athersby

8rule and properly lef t the issue to the jury . Theref o re, this issue is without m erit. III. Photographs Introduced into Evidence ¶17. Bry ant also c ontends that th e t r i a l c o urt erred in adm i tting certain photographs into evidence. At trial, the prosecution introduced three color autopsy photographs that depicted the open t orso, abdom en, and b u t t o c k s of W alker. Bry ant claim ed that the photographs lacked any probative value and were introduced o nly to aro u s e prejudice and inf lam e the jury . The State argued that the photographs were probative—specif ically , with a tendency
t o prove that W alker h ad b een shot m ultiple t im es i n the back, torso, extrem ities, a n d buttocks, dem o nstrating to the jury the num ber and location of those wounds. According to the S tate, the location and num ber of wounds depicted in the p hotographs negated the claim that Bry ant shot W alker in self -def ense. ¶18. “The decision of

whether or not to adm it photographs is lef t to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” Hoskins

v. S tate , 172 So. 3d 1242, 1 247 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Smith v. S tate , 792 So. 2d 343, 348 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001)). O ur suprem e court has noted that “[ p ]hotographs of the victim should not ordinarily be adm itted into evidence w here t h e killing is not contradicted or denied, and the corpus delicti and the id e n tity o f the deceased have been

e s t a b l ished.” Talbert v. State , 125 So. 3d 66, 74 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 2 013) (quoti n g Sudduth v. State , 562 So. 2 d 67, 70 (Miss. 1990)). However, “[ p ]hotographs of bodies m ay nevertheless be adm itted into evidence i n crim inal cases where they have probative value[ ,] and where they are not so gruesom e or used in such a way as to be over l y prejudicial or

9inf

lam m atory

. ” I

d

. “Som e p r o b a t i v e v a l ue is the only requirem ent needed in order to support a trial judge’s decision to adm it photographs i nto evidence.” Barfield v. State , 22 So. 3d 1 175, 1 1 8 1 (¶15) (Miss. 2009) (quoting Jones v. State , 920 S o. 2d 465, 476-77 (¶35) (Miss. 2006)). “Photographs o f a victim have evidentiary value when they aid in describing the circum stances o f the killing; describe the location of the body a nd cause o f d e a t h ; or supplem ent or clarif

y a w itness ’ s testim ony .” F ortenberry v. State , 1 95 So. 3d 890, 893 (¶11) ( Miss. Ct. App. 2016) ( quoting Keller v. State , 1 3 8 S o . 3d 817, 857 (¶101) (Miss. 2014)). ¶19. Here, the State presented the photographs at issue to d escribe the circum s tances of the killing, specif

ically the location and num

ber of wounds, and to c o ntradict Bry ant’s version of events that he s hot W alker out of f ear while W a lker was com ing t oward him

. A n d the State’s pathologist, Dr. Brent Davis, testif ied that the p hotographs h e l p e d t o clarif y the location of the injuries. U p on review, we do n ot f i nd that the photographs w ere overly
gruesom e, or that their potential f or prejudice outweighed their probative value. And “our

case law indicates that the d iscretion of the t r i a l [ c ourt] runs toward a lm ost unlim ited adm issibility r egardless of the gruesom eness, repetitiveness, and extenuation of probative value.” W

illiams v
. State , 544 So. 2d 782, 785 (Miss. 1987). Theref o re, we hold that the trial court judge did not abuse his discretion by adm itting the photographs into evidence. IV. Com m ents by the Prosecution ¶20. For the f

irst t i me o n a p p e a l , Bry ant argues that h e was unf airly prejudiced by

the prosecutor’s c o m m ents during the State’s closing argum ent, a nd that justice r equires this

1 0Court to reverse his conviction and rem and f or a new trial. ¶21. “ Wh i l e a t t o r

ney s are allowed wide latitude i n presenting t h e i r c a s e s t o a j u r y , p r o s e cutors are not perm itted to use tactics w hich are inf lam m atory , highly prejudicia l , o r reasonably c alculated to u nduly inf luence the jury .” Stevenson v
. State , 156 So. 3d 9 27, 929- 30 (¶ 1 1 ) ( M iss. Ct. App. 2015) (internal q uotation m arks om itted) (quoting Sheppard v. State , 7 77 S o. 2d 659, 661 (¶7) (Miss. 20 0 0 ) )

. “ T h e standard of review f or lawy er

m isconduct during opening statem ents or c losing argum e nts is whethe r t h e n atural and probable ef

f ect of the im

proper argum ent is to create unjust p rejudice against the accused so
as to r esult in a decision inf luenced by

the prejudice so created.” Id

. at 930 (¶11) (internal
q u o t a t i o n m arks o m itted) ( quoting Slaughter v. State, 815 So. 2d 1122, 1130 (¶45) (Miss

. 2002)). ¶22. Bef

ore this Court determ i nes whether the prosecutor’ s c l o s i n g rem arks were im proper such that they constitute r e v e rsible error, we m ust f irst “ d eterm ine i f d ef

ense counsel objected to the statem ent

. . . .” Id. at (¶13) (citation om itted). T he s uprem e c ourt has clearly stated, “ Failure t o raise an objection to a prosecutor’s statem ents m a d e at trial procedurally bars the statem ents f

rom appellate review.” Sandlin v. State , 156 S o. 3d 813, 820 (¶27) (Miss

. 2013). “If no contem poraneous objection is m ade, the error, i f any , is waived.” Stevenson , 156 So. 3d at 930 (¶13) (quoting Slaughter , 815 So. 2d at 1130-31 (¶47)). ¶23. Wh e n “ n o o b

j e c t i o n s w e re raised at trial, the def endant who f

a i l s t o ma k e a
contem poraneous objection m

ust r ely on plain error to raise the assignm ent on appeal.” Hurt

v. State , 34 So. 3d 1191, 1196 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting J a ckson v. S

tate , 924 So.

1 12d 5 31, 542 ( ¶ 3 6 ) ( M i s s . Ct. App. 2005)). “ A review under the plain-error doctrine is

necessary when a party ’s f u n dam e ntal rights are a f

f ected, and the error results in a m anif est

m iscarriage of justice.” I

d

. at 1 1 97 (¶17) (quoting McGee v. State , 953 So. 2d 2 11, 215 (¶8) (Miss. 2007)). ¶24. Bry ant argues that the prosecutor ’ s c o mme n t s ma d e d u r i n g c l o s i n g argum ents prejudiced his def

ense by leading the jury to b elieve Bry ant was a lazy person who had taken advantage of

the governm ent and cheated the sy stem

. The com m ents at issue included the prosecutor stating that B ry ant had “skirted the s y stem ,” “sat at hom e every day ,” and “[ was] having barbeques all d a y .” The State’s com m ents f urther included that Bry ant was “taking

an apartm ent that

. . . a single m other[ ] out there

. . . needs,” a n d “receiving alm ost f ree rent,
not pay ing a light bill, probably other f ood stam ps and stuf

f

. . . .” Bry ant also a rgues that the prosecutor m ade a n i m perm issible “send a m essage” argum ent with t h e f ollowing
statem ent: This is n o t s elf

-def ense. You’re drunk. You’re a drinking, irresponsible person who has to b e held accountable f or y our actions because if y ou don’t, then there is no responsibility , and there is no a ccountability , and people l ike him can continue on the sam e path and continue to take lives, continue to be irresponsible. W e’re going to stand f or those rights. I prom ise y ou. Stand up f or responsibility

. Our suprem e court h as “repeatedly condem ned the ‘send a m essage’ argum ent and warned prosecutors accordingly

. ” Payton v. State , 785 So. 2d 267, 270 (¶11) (Miss. 1999). ¶25. Here, the record shows that Bry an t d i d not m ake a contem poraneous objection—or

a n y o bjection a t a ll—to the prosecutor’s com m ents. However, “ despite the absen c e o f objection, [ an appellate court] will not procedurally bar the i ssue w h ere the s end-a-m essage
1 2argum ent is so inf lam m atory

that the trial judge should have objected on his own m otion.” Brown v. State , 9 86 So. 2d 2 70, 276 (¶13) (Miss. 2008) ( internal quotation m arks and citation

om itted). “[ T] h e ‘so inf

l am m atory ’ standard is the proper threshold inquiry f or appellate review of claim s o f prosecutorial m isconduct d uring closing argum ent.” O’Connor v. State , 120 So. 3d 390, 401 (¶29) (Miss. 2013). “If a def en d a n t c a n m eet this threshold test, then th e c o u rt s hould conduct the two-prong Spicer test. Under Spicer , we ask if ‘the rem arks

were im proper.’ And if so, w e ask if ‘the rem a rks prej u d i c i a l l y a f f ected the a ccused’s rights.’” Snyder v. State , 174 So. 3d 331, 336 ( ¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Spicer v. State , 921 So. 2d 292, 318 (¶55) (Miss. 2006)). ¶26. In the instant case, Bry a nt f ailed to object to the prosecutor’s com m ents d uring trial and h as thus waived the issue on appeal. And we do not f ind that the prosecutor’s com m ents

were “so inf

lam m atory ” as to overcom e the threshold f or plain-error r eview. Even where the “prosecutor’s c om m ents were im proper, [ but] they did not cause a m i scarriage of justice[ ,]

. . . a reversal b ased on plain error is not appropriate.” Stokes v
. State , 141 So. 3d 421, 424 (¶2) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). Though Bry ant urge s us to reverse and rem and his c ase f or a

new trial, “the power to grant a new trial should be invoked only in e x c e p t i o n a l cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdic t

. ” Id

. at 4 28 (¶30) (quoting
B u s h , 8 9 5 So. 2d at 844 (¶18)). Here, we do not f ind that the evidence weighed heavily against the jur y ’ s g u i l t y verdict of second-degree m u rder. R ather, there was suf f icient evidence to support Bry a nt’s conviction. Theref ore, this issue is without m erit. ¶27. T H E J U D G M E N T O F T H E F O R R E S T COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT O F CON V I C T ION OF SECOND-DEGREE MURDER AND S ENTENCE OF FORTY

1 3YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO FORREST COUNTY. IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P. J J . , B A R N E S , I S H E E , C A R L T O N , F A I R , W I L S ON, GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR.

1 4