SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4443-17T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

FRANK L. AIGOTTI, a/k/a 

FRANK L. AIGOTTI, JR., 

JAMES WILKE, MOORE 

JAMES, JAMES MOORE,

and FRANK L. AIGOTT, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________

Argued telephonically March 24, 2020 –

Decided April 27, 2020

Before Judges Yannotti, Hoffman and Currier.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Sussex County, Indictment No. 15-06-0258.

Ahmed J. Kassim, Designated Counsel, argued the 

cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, attorney; Ahmed J. Kassim, of counsel and 

on the briefs).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Shaina Brenner, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause 

for respondent (Francis A. Koch, Sussex County 

Prosecutor, attorney; Shaina Brenner, of counsel and on 

the brief).

Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.

PER CURIAM

Defendant was tried before a jury and found guilty of first-degree robbery 

and second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery. Defendant appeals from the 

judgment of conviction (JOC) dated March 13, 2018. We affirm.

I.

On or about May 19, 2015, a Sussex County Grand Jury returned 

Indictment No. 15-06-0258 charging defendant with first-degree robbery of 

Lakeland Bank, by placing teller Donna O'Neill in fear of immediate bodily 

injury, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (count one); second-degree conspiracy to commit 

robbery and theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, 2C:15-1, 2C:20-3 (count three); third-degree 

theft by unlawful taking, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3 and 2C:2-6 (count four); and thirddegree credit card fraud, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-6(h) (counts six and seven).

Co-defendant Jacinda Moore was charged with defendant in counts three, 

four, six, and seven. Moore was also charged with first-degree aiding defendant 

in the commission of the robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 and 2C:2-6 (count two); 

third-degree hindering the apprehension of defendant, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a) 
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(count five); third-degree unlawful possession of a controlled dangerous 

substance (CDS) (heroin), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a) (count eight); third-degree 

unlawful possession of a CDS (cocaine), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count nine); 

and third-degree theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a) (count ten). 

On November 15, 2016, the trial judge entered an order which, among 

other things, denied without prejudice defendant's pro se motion to dismiss the 

indictment based on an alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial. On that 

date, the judge also entered an order granting defendant's motion to dismiss 

counts one, two, three, five, and six. 

The State thereafter moved to vacate the order of November 15, 2016 and 

reinstate the dismissed counts. The State also moved to amend the charges in 

count one and the related charges to state that, during the robbery, defendant had 

placed one or more persons in fear of immediate bodily injury. The judge 

granted the motions. 

At a proceeding on March 1, 2017, the judge decided that the charges 

against defendant and Moore would be severed. The State thereafter advised 

the court that it would proceed only on counts one and three, and any reference 

to theft in count three should be deleted. 
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II.

At the trial, testimony was presented which established that on the 

morning of January 13, 2015, at approximately 11:35 a.m., O'Neill, Dawn 

Keener, and Martina Styles were working at the Lakeland Bank on Route 23 in

Wantage. Two customers, Lynne Dyer and Benjamin Simmons, entered the 

bank. After Simmons completed a transaction, he and Dyer were speaking with 

the bank's employees when a person entered the bank and said, "Give me the 

money." Dyer and Styles testified that the person was motioning in a way that 

made it appear he might have a weapon in his pocket. 

Simmons stated, "You've got to be kidding. This doesn't happen." The 

person stepped closer and repeated, "Give me the money." Dyer and Simmons 

backed away. Simmons raised his hands and put them flat on the counter 

because he believed the man was armed. 

O'Neill opened her teller drawer and handed the person money. He said, 

"Give me more." She then provided the person with additional money. The 

bank's employees estimated that the entire incident took less than one minute. 

They locked the doors and called the police. They determined that the teller had 

given defendant $1477. 
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Trooper Brad Cosh of the New Jersey State Police (NJSP) arrived on the 

scene promptly and other law enforcement officers arrived later. Witnesses said 

the perpetrator was wearing dark clothing with white sneakers and gloves. They 

said he had his face covered except for his eyes, and appeared to have long, dark, 

curly hair that could have been fake. 

The bank's surveillance cameras recorded the incident. Surveillance video 

footage from neighboring businesses depicted the individual fleeing the area of 

the bank, crossing Route 23 to the southbound side, walking through a wooded 

area near an abandoned house, heading south to Pond School Road, and entering 

the trunk of a vehicle near a diner on Route 23. 

Detective Steven Deckert of the NJSP identified the vehicle in the 

surveillance footage as a silver Dodge Dart SE bearing a temporary New Jersey 

registration. On January 19, 2015, Deckert went to Franklin Sussex Auto Mall 

(FSAM) on Route 23 and obtained sales records for all Dodge Darts sold at that 

location since 2013. Later, while stopped at a traffic light, Deckert observed a 

white male driving a silver Dodge Dart. He pulled behind the vehicle and noted 

the vehicle's temporary New Jersey vehicle registration number. 

Deckert identified the registered owner of the car and found his name on 

the list of purchasers that he had obtained from FSAM. Members of the NJSP
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met with a sales representative at FSAM, and she provided sales information, 

which indicated that on December 18, 2014, the registered owner had purchased 

the Dodge Dart. The sales representative said Moore co-signed the loan for the 

purchase of the car. She said she is Moore's sister and Moore was in a 

relationship with defendant. 

On January 20, 2015, defendant was arrested at the Sussex County 

courthouse for an unrelated matter. Thereafter, he was processed at the Sussex 

County Correctional Facility and a corrections officer inventoried his property, 

which included a cellphone and the keys to a Dodge vehicle. 

Detective Thomas Laird of the Sussex County Prosecutor's Office (SCPO) 

was informed of defendant's arrest. Laird obtained a search warrant and 

retrieved defendant's phone. Laird thereafter conducted a forensic examination 

of the calls and text messages on the phone. Laird's examination revealed that 

on January 13, 2015, defendant sent a text message to a person stating he had 

money to pay what he owed. The examination also revealed that Moore called 

defendant at 11:21 a.m. on January 13, 2015. 

Laird obtained a communications data warrant for defendant's and 

Moore's phones, as well as their call-detail records. The records indicated that 

defendant made several calls to Moore on January 13, 2015, including a call at 
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11:38 a.m. that lasted more than fifteen minutes, and a call at 11:55 a.m. that 

lasted more than five minutes. Laird also determined that Moore used her phone 

for certain internet searches, including searches regarding the robbery at 

Lakeland Bank. 

On January 21, 2015, Laird conducted surveillance at a residence in 

Wantage where defendant and Moore were living. He observed a 2015 Dodge 

Dart parked in the driveway. Thereafter, a judge issued a warrant to search the 

residence, and on January 29, 2015, Laird and other law enforcement officers 

executed the warrant. Defendant and Moore were present at the time. 

Detective Jared Cramer of the NJSP conducted a walkthrough of the 

property. He observed a grey Dodge Dart parked in the driveway, with a 

temporary registration tag from FSAM. The car was seized and taken to NJSP

headquarters in Totowa for processing. In the garage, Cramer recovered a black 

work glove with yellow markings on the top with the letters "FG." Cramer then

searched the home. In the master bedroom, he found several items, including a 

"Mossy Oak"-brand sweater, cellphones, and red sneakers.

Moore was transported to the NJSP barracks in Sussex County and 

charged in connection with her role in the robbery. She was informed of and 
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waived her Miranda rights.1 Laird then interviewed Moore and the interview 

was recorded. 

Moore stated that she and defendant had been dating since December 10, 

2005, and that they had two children together. She received a phone call from 

defendant shortly before 11:00 a.m. on January 13, 2015. During the phone call, 

defendant stated he had several bills to pay including one to his attorney. On 

the same day, at 11:39 a.m., defendant called and requested that she pick him up 

near the diner on Route 23 because "people were after him." Defendant told her 

he had robbed a bank. 

Moore said she arrived at the location. Defendant was still on the phone 

and told her to open the trunk of her vehicle. Moore observed defendant exit a 

wooded area. She said defendant was wearing a wig, a blue and gray jogging 

suit, and white sneakers. He was covering his face. He entered her vehicle’s 

trunk. 

Moore drove southbound on Route 23 and proceeded to Paterson, where 

she stopped on a dead-end road that she knew did not have surveillance cameras. 

Defendant exited the trunk and gave Moore between $400 and $600 to

purchase drugs. 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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According to Moore, defendant changed his clothes and threw the clothes 

he had been wearing into a garbage can. After Moore bought the drugs, she 

rejoined defendant and they purchased red shoes so that he could dispose of his 

white sneakers. They went to a Walmart in Riverdale and then returned to their 

home in Wantage. 

After he took Moore's statement, Laird obtained additional surveillance 

footage from traffic cameras in Paterson, which showed the 2015 Dodge Dart 

driving around the city on the date of the robbery. Laird also went to a shoe 

store in Paterson and obtained video camera footage, which showed defendant 

entering the store. He was wearing a dark-colored jacket and white sneakers. 

Laird entered a nearby store and took a photo of a pair of red sneakers that 

were sold in the store. The sneakers matched the sneakers that were recovered 

from defendant's residence on January 29, 2015. Surveillance footage obtained 

from the Walmart in Riverdale depicted the 2015 Dodge Dart driving through 

the parking lot, and defendant and Moore entering the store from the main 

entrance. 

According to Laird, defendant was wearing a dark colored jacket and 

bright red shoes. On the video footage from within the store, defendant is seen 

purchasing various items, including a "Mossy Oak"-brand sweater. The store's 
10 A-4443-17T4

surveillance footage also shows that defendant was wearing the same brand of 

sweater when he exited the store. 

The jury found defendant guilty of robbery and conspiracy to commit 

robbery. Thereafter, the judge granted the State's motion to sentence defendant 

to an extended term pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) as a persistent offender. 

For the robbery, the judge sentenced defendant to a forty-year term of 

incarceration, with an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility and five 

years of parole supervision, pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), 

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The judge also sentenced defendant to a concurrent tenyear prison term for the conspiracy to commit robbery. The judge entered a JOC 

dated March 13, 2018. This appeal followed. 

Defendant's counsel has filed a brief in which he argues:

POINT I

DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL WAS 

VIOLATED BY THE NEARLY THREE-YEAR 

DELAY IN BRINGING HIM TO TRIAL.

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REINSTATING 

COUNTS ONE, TWO, THREE, AND FIVE OF THE 

INDICTMENT WITHOUT HAVING THE STATE 

SEEK A SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT. 

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE 

STATE TO REOPEN ITS CASE AND TO PLAY 
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RECORDED CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN 

[DEFENDANT] AND MOORE FOR THE JURY 

BECAUSE THE CONVERSATIONS WERE 

PREJUDICIAL AND THEIR ADMISSION 

DEPRIVED [DEFENDANT] OF A FAIR TRIAL.

POINT IV

REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE 

STATE'S CASE WAS BOLSTERED BY 

INADMISSIBLE OPINION TESTIMONY.

POINT V

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 

WHEN IT SENTENCED [DEFENDANT] AS A 

PERSISTENT OFFENDER BASED ON FOURTHDEGREE CRIMES AND IMPOSED AN EXCESSIVE 

SENTENCE.

Defendant has filed a pro se supplemental brief. He argues: 

[POINT I]

THE STATE DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO FILE 

A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AS THE 

COURT RULE DOE[S] NOT ALLOW FOR 

RECONSIDERATION IN CRIMINAL COURTS AND 

THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DECLINED TO HEAR 

SUCH A MOTION. ADDITIONALLY[,] THE 

COURT'S ORIGINAL DECISION WAS THE 

CORRECT ONE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN LEFT 

ALONE BECAUSE THE AMENDING OF THE 

INDICTMENT IN THIS INSTANCE WAS 

UNCONSTITUTIONAL. (Not Raised Below).

[POINT II]

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AT [THE] 

GRAND JURY, FAILURE TO CALL WITNESSES 

OF THE CRIME, INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 

SUPPORT THE FIRST-DEGREE ROBBERY 
12 A-4443-17T4

INDICTMENT AND CONVICTION, PERJURY BY 

DETECTIVE LAIRD WHICH WAS CLEARLY 

SUBORNED BY THE PROSECUTOR, AND 

INADEQUATE JURY CHARGE FOR FIRSTDEGREE ROBBERY. (Not Raised Below). 

[POINT III]

INSOFAR AS THERE WAS AN IDENTIFIABLE 

FACE ON THE VIDEO, THE JURY WAS JUST AS 

WELL POSITIONED AS DETECTIVE LAIRD AND 

[TROOPER C]OSH WERE TO DETERMINE (A) IF 

IT WAS THE DEFENDANT IN THE SHOE STORE 

VIDEO AND (B) IF THE ATM VIDEO SHOWED 

THE GLOVE THAT THE STATE PRESENTED AS 

EVIDENCE. (Not Raised Below).

[POINT IV]

DEFENDANT WAS THE VICTIM OF JUDICIAL 

AND PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS AS A 

RESULT OF HI[S] HAVING SUCCESSFULLY 

EXERCISED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND 

PROCEDURAL RIGHTS IN THE 2010 

PROSECUTION. THE COURT IGNORED 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION SEEKING DISMISSAL 

FOR SAME. (Not Raised Below).

[POINT V]

THE STATE NEEDLESSLY ELICITED 

TESTIMONY FROM [THE] STATE'S MAIN 

WITNESS JACINDA MOORE ABOUT DRUG USE 

AND OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE. (Not Raised 

Below).

[POINT VI]

[DEFENDANT] FILED MANY PRO SE MOTIONS 

WHICH WERE DENIED BY THE COURT. THEY 

SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN SERIOUSLY AND 

GIVEN DUE WEIGHT, ESPECIALLY THE 
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INTERPRETATION OF THE N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) 

MOTION. (Not Raised Below). 

 III.

We turn first to defendant's argument that his right to a speedy trial was 

violated by the delay in bringing this matter to trial. Defendant argues that this

court should reverse his convictions and remand the matter with instructions to 

dismiss the indictment. Alternatively, defendant argues that we should remand 

the matter to the trial court for a full hearing and further consideration of his 

speedy-trial claim. 

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a 

defendant's right to a speedy trial and that right is applied to the states by the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Cahill, 213 N.J. 

253, 264 (2013) (citing Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967)). 

In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1972), the Court established a 

balancing test to evaluate claims of violations of the right to a speedy trial. 

In Barker, the Court identified four non-exclusive factors a court should 

consider when evaluating a speedy-trial claim: length of the delay, reasons for 

the delay, assertion of the right to a speedy trial by the defendant, and prejudice 

to the defendant. 407 U.S. at 530-33. All four factors are not necessary or 

sufficient "to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, 
14 A-4443-17T4

they are related factors and must be considered together with such other 

circumstances as may be relevant." Id. at 533.

Applying these factors, we are not convinced defendant was denied his 

right to a speedy trial in this matter. The record shows that defendant was 

arrested on January 29, 2015, and his trial did not begin until November 28, 

2017. According to defendant, completion of discovery was delayed. The 

record shows that this case involves an array of evidentiary materials that the 

detectives gathered from various witnesses and sources. The evidence includes

surveillance videos, forensic examinations of phones, motor vehicle records, and 

physical evidence. It also includes various witness statements. Defendant has 

not shown that discovery was delayed unnecessarily, or that the delay was 

entirely the State's fault.

Moreover, the parties devoted considerable time to motions, including 

defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, the State's motion to reinstate the 

dismissed counts, the State's motion to disqualify counsel, and the State's motion 

for leave to appeal the denial of its disqualification motion. Defendant contends 

the State's motion to disqualify defense counsel was meritless and merely a 

delaying tactic; however, the State appeared to have a legitimate concern that 

counsel might be a witness at trial. 
15 A-4443-17T4

As noted, there was evidence that defendant owed his attorney money and 

one of defendant's reasons for robbing the bank was to pay his attorney. It 

appears that counsel had confirmed that defendant owed him money. At trial, 

however, the assistant prosecutor informed the judge that the issue had been 

resolved because counsel had "changed his position and said that money was not 

owed." Defendant's contention that the State's motion to disqualify counsel was 

merely a delay tactic is not supported by the record. 

In addition, at the time these charges were pending, defendant faced

charges under at least four other indictments, and the State chose to try the oldest 

case first. Other delays were attributable to the defense, the State, and the court. 

The record does not support defendant's contention that the State deliberately 

attempted to delay the trial in this matter. 

We note that defendant did assert his right to a speedy trial when he filed 

his pro se motions in May 2016. It appears that defendant's attorney did not 

thereafter file a formal motion to assert defendant's right to a speedy trial

because the trial had been scheduled for June 6, 2017. 

In any event, defendant has not shown he was prejudiced by the delays in 

bringing this case to trial. He has not shown that the delays prejudiced his 

defense. He also has not shown he was subjected to oppressive pretrial 
16 A-4443-17T4

incarceration or suffered anxiety greater than the anxiety any defendant 

experiences while incarcerated awaiting trial. 

IV. 

We next consider defendant's contention that the trial judge erred by 

reinstating and amending counts one, two, three, five, and six of the indictment. 

Defendant contends that by allowing the State to amend the indictment, the 

judge violated his constitutional rights to indictment by a grand jury and notice 

of the charges against him. We disagree. We are convinced that the trial judge

did not err by vacating the November 15, 2016 order, reinstating the dismissed 

counts and allowing the State to amend the indictment. 

Rule 3:7-4 provides that the court "may amend the indictment . . . to 

correct an error in form or the description of the crime intended to be charged

. . . provided that the amendment does not charge another or different offense 

from that alleged and the defendant will not be prejudiced thereby in his . . .

defense on the merits." Therefore, "[a]n error relating to the substance or 

'essence' of an offense cannot be amended by operation of that rule." State v. 

Dorn, 233 N.J. 81, 94 (2018). "[T]he analysis as to whether an indictment was 

sufficient and whether an amendment under Rule 3:7-4 was appropriate hinges 

upon whether the defendant was provided with adequate notice of the charges 
17 A-4443-17T4

and whether an amendment would prejudice defendant in the formulation of a 

defense." Id. at 96. 

Here, the judge initially dismissed counts one, two, three, five, and six of 

the indictment because the State had not presented evidence to the grand jury 

showing that O'Neill observed defendant simulating the possession of, or 

intended use of, a deadly weapon. The judge also found that the State had not 

presented the grand jury with any evidence that could support the conclusion

that O'Neill "was in fear of immediate bodily injury as a result of such 

simulation." 

The State thereafter moved for reinstatement of the dismissed counts and 

leave to amend the indictment to indicate that other persons who were in the 

bank at the time of the robbery had been placed in fear of immediate bodily 

injury by defendant's simulation. The judge granted the State's motion. 

Therefore, count one was amended to charge defendant with committing 

the theft at Lakeland Bank, and in the course thereof, "put[ting] one (1) or more 

persons in fear of immediate bodily injury in the course of committing a theft 

specifically by acting in a manner consistent with having a deadly weapon in his 

pocket while demanding money . . . ." The related charges were amended 

accordingly, including count three, in which defendant was charged with 
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conspiring with Moore to commit the robbery. As noted previously, the State 

later chose to proceed only on counts one and three. 

We are convinced the amendments to the indictment were permitted by 

Rule 3:7-4. The amendments merely corrected an error in the description of the 

offense and did not charge a new offense. Furthermore, defendant had adequate 

notice of the charges. He was charged with committing the robbery by placing 

persons in fear of immediate bodily injury, through his simulated use of a 

weapon. Defendant has not shown that the amendments prejudiced his defense. 

V.

Defendant argues that after the State rested its case, the trial judge erred 

by allowing the State to reopen its case and play recordings of certain 

conversations he had with Moore during his incarceration. He contends the 

evidence was prejudicial and deprived him of a fair trial. We disagree. 

"The conduct of a trial, civil or criminal, is in the hands of the judge." 

State v. Menke, 25 N.J. 66, 70 (1957). The "[d]ecision as to whether to permit 

the State to reopen after resting . . . must be allowed to rest in [the judge's] 

discretion." Id. at 70-71. 

When deciding whether to allow the State to reopen its case, the court 

considers certain factors, including: (1) "whether the defendant had excused his 
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witnesses who would have been used to rebut the new evidence offered, and had 

called to the attention of the court the disadvantageous position in which the 

State had placed him;" (2) "whether the prosecutor had deliberately withheld the 

so-called additional evidence until that late stage of the trial;" (3) “the extent, if 

any, to which the defendant suffered greater damage than would have been 

imposed if the evidence had been offered at the proper time." Id. at 71. We 

review the court's decision for abuse of discretion. Ibid.

Here, the record shows that the State moved to reopen its case before 

defendant began to present his case. The State sought to present evidence that,

while he was incarcerated, defendant had been calling Moore utilizing other 

inmates’ personal identification numbers. On November 29, 2017, the day 

before she was scheduled to testify at trial, defendant called Moore to discuss 

her upcoming testimony. 

The judge permitted the State to reopen its case, relying on N.J.R.E. 608. 

The judge found that the State did not deliberately withhold the evidence to 

surprise defendant. The judge also found that if there was any prejudice to 

defendant, it was "very, very” minor. The judge therefore allowed the State to 

play recordings of defendant's conversations with Moore. 
20 A-4443-17T4

We are convinced that the judge's decision was not a mistaken exercise of 

discretion. Since defendant had not begun presenting his defense, he had not 

excused any witnesses who could have rebutted this evidence. The record also 

does not support defendant's contention that the State deliberately withheld this 

evidence. Moreover, since the State apparently became aware of defendant’s 

conversations with Moore after it rested its case, the State could not have offered 

this evidence “at [a] proper time.” Menke, 25 N.J. at 71.

VI.

Defendant further argues that the trial judge erred by allowing the State to 

present what he claims was inadmissible opinion testimony. He asserts the 

surveillance video evidence was inconclusive and Moore lacked credibility as a 

witness. He contends the State attempted to make up for those deficiencies by 

allowing Cosh, Laird, and Deckert to narrate the surveillance-video footage, 

despite a lack of personal knowledge by these witnesses. He argues that this 

testimony improperly bolstered the State's case. Again, we disagree. 

We note that defendant did not object to the testimony at trial. Therefore, 

we must determine whether the judge erred by permitting the testimony and, if 

so, whether the error is "of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of 

producing an unjust result . . . ." R. 2:10-2. To warrant reversal of a conviction, 
21 A-4443-17T4

the error must be "sufficient to ‘raise a reasonable doubt . . . as to whether the 

error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.’" State v. 

Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016) (quoting State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 361 

(2004)).

Evidence Rule 701 states "[i]f a witness is not testifying as an expert, the 

witness'[s] testimony in the form of opinions or inferences may be admitted if it 

(a) is rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) will assist in 

understanding the witness'[s] testimony or in determining a fact in issue." 

N.J.R.E. 701. "The central purpose of [Rule] 701 is to ensure that lay opinion 

is based on a sufficient foundation, and not inadmissible hearsay." Rice v. 

Miller, 455 N.J. Super. 90, 104 (App. Div. 2018). "[L]ay opinion testimony is 

limited to what was directly perceived by the witness and may not rest on 

otherwise inadmissible hearsay." State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 460 (2011).

The courts "have established the boundary line that separates factual 

testimony by police officers from permissible expert opinion testimony." Ibid. 

"On one side of that line is fact testimony, through which an officer is permitted 

to set forth what he or she perceived through one or more of the senses." Ibid. 

Such fact testimony consists of "a description of what the officer did and saw," 

and is an "ordinary fact-based recitation by a witness with first-hand 
22 A-4443-17T4

knowledge." Ibid. "On the other side of the line . . . , experts, with appropriate 

qualifications, [can] explain the implications of observed behaviors that would 

otherwise fall outside the understanding of ordinary people on the jury." Ibid. 

At trial, Cosh was shown surveillance footage and still photographs from 

inside Lakeland Bank taken before and after the robbery. Cosh identified the 

bank’s front entrance, the side of the bank facing Route 23 southbound, the 

bank's drive-through lane, an aerial photo of the Route 23 area near the bank, 

and the suspect fleeing the bank wearing certain clothing. He did not testify that 

defendant was the suspect seen in the surveillance footage. 

Deckert was shown surveillance footage from a camera at the diner on 

Route 23. He identified a "lone subject" who entered the picture from a nearby 

wooded area, walked towards the Pond School Road area, and then retraced his

or her steps. Deckert testified that the individual was seen approaching a vehicle 

near Pond School Road and entering the trunk of the vehicle. The vehicle then

proceeded southbound on Route 23. Using a still photograph, Deckert identified 

that vehicle as a Dodge Dart. 

In his testimony, Laird stated that defendant was the person depicted in 

the footage obtained from the shoe store in Paterson and the Walmart in 

Riverdale. Laird testified that he had personal knowledge of defendant after 
23 A-4443-17T4

having observed defendant in the Sussex County courthouse following his arrest. 

Laird did not, however, state that defendant was the person seen in the bank 

security footage. Laird said still photos depicted a "male departing from the 

bank right after the bank robbery . . . ." He added that the male had "the same 

clothing, [and] the same glove with a wad of cash in his hand." 

We are convinced that the testimony of these three witnesses was 

admissible under N.J.R.E. 701. Each witness provided factual observations 

based on his personal review and observation of the surveillance videos or 

photographs. Furthermore, based on their respective knowledge and experience, 

each witness was able to assist the jury perform its fact-finding role. They were 

able to explain the locations depicted and "the implications of observed 

behaviors that would otherwise fall outside the understanding of ordinary people

on the jury." McLean, 205 N.J. at 460. 

In arguing that the judge erred by allowing the testimony, defendant relies 

on State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9 (2012). In that case, the Court concluded that it was 

improper for a detective to opine that the defendant’s arrest photo closely 

resembled a composite sketch of the suspect. Id. at 24. The Court stated that 

"[t]he detective had not witnessed the crime and did not know the defendant; the 

officer’s opinion stemmed entirely from the victim’s description.” Ibid.
24 A-4443-17T4

Defendant's reliance upon Lazo is misplaced. As noted, Cosh and Deckert 

did not identify defendant as the person seen in the surveillance videos or still 

photos. Laird stated that defendant was the person seen in the video surveillance 

obtained from the shoe store in Paterson and the Walmart in Riverdale, but Laird 

had personal knowledge of defendant's appearance, having seen him in the 

Sussex County courthouse after his arrest. Moreover, Laird did not identify 

defendant as the person seen in the bank's surveillance footage, and he never

opined that defendant was the person who committed the robbery. 

VII. 

Defendant contends the judge erred by sentencing him to an extended term 

as a "persistent offender," pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a). The statute provides 

that the court may impose an extended term of imprisonment if "[t]he defendant 

has been convicted of a crime of the first, second or third degree and is a 

persistent offender." Ibid. A "persistent offender" is defined as:

a person who at the time of the commission of the crime 

is [twenty-one] years of age or over, who has been 

previously convicted on at least two separate occasions 

of two crimes, committed at different times, when he 

was at least [eighteen] years of age, if the latest in time 

of these crimes or the date of the defendant's last release 

from confinement, whichever is later, is within [ten] 

years of the date of the crime for which the defendant 

is being sentenced.
25 A-4443-17T4

[Ibid.]

As noted, the jury found defendant guilty of robbery and conspiracy to 

commit robbery, which occurred on January 13, 2015. Defendant contends the 

judge erred by considering crimes he committed in 2004 and 2005, which he 

claims were outside the ten-year window established in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a). 

Those offenses were third-degree resisting arrest and third-degree witness 

tampering, respectively. 

Defendant was sentenced in June 2006 to an eighteen-month prison term. 

Moreover, defendant was released from confinement within ten years of the date 

of the offense for which he was being sentenced. Therefore, the judge did not 

err by considering the offenses defendant committed in 2004 and 2005 in 

determining if he was a persistent offender under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a). 

Defendant also argues that the judge erred by considering his convictions

of three fourth-degree offenses, which were committed within the ten-year 

window under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a). Defendant asserts it would be contrary to 

the Legislature's intent to consider fourth-degree offenses in determining 

whether he is a "persistent offender." Again, we disagree. 

When interpreting a statute, we must "give effect to the intent of the 

Legislature." State v. Harper, 229 N.J. 228, 237 (2017) (quoting State v. 
26 A-4443-17T4

Morrison, 227 N.J. 295, 308 (2016)). In doing so, we begin our analysis with 

the plain language of the statute and "[i]f it clearly reveals the Legislature's 

intent, the inquiry is over." Ibid. (citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 

(2005)). We may not, under the guise of interpretation, "rewrite a statute or add 

language that the Legislature omitted." State v. Munafo, 222 N.J. 480, 488

(2015) (citing DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492). 

The pertinent language of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) is clear and unambiguous. 

It states that a defendant may be sentenced to an extended term if the defendant 

"has been previously convicted on at least two separate occasions of two crimes, 

committed at different times . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) (emphasis added). The 

statute therefore allows the court to consider any "crimes" and does not exclude 

fourth-degree offenses. 

Defendant argues, however, that fourth-degree offenses should not be 

considered for purposes of determining whether an extended term may be 

imposed under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) because fourth-degree offenses are not 

considered in sentencing under the Persistent Offenders Accountability Act,

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1, which is commonly known as the "Three Strikes" law. 

The "Three Strikes" law provides, in part, that an extended term under 

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7 may be imposed when a person is convicted of at least three 
27 A-4443-17T4

specified second- or third-degree offenses. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(b)(1). However, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) and the "Three Strikes" law are separate and distinct 

sentencing schemes. 

The "Three Strikes" law does not allow for the consideration of fourthdegree offenses, whereas N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) does not preclude consideration 

of such crimes in determining if a defendant is a "persistent offender." 

Therefore, the judge did not err by considering the fourth-degree offenses in 

determining whether defendant was a "persistent offender" under N.J.S.A. 

2C:44-3(a). 

VIII.

In addition, defendant challenges his sentence. He contends the judge 

erred by finding aggravating factor twelve. He also contends his sentence is 

excessive when compared to the sentence imposed on Moore and another person 

who testified at trial.

"An appellate court's review of a sentencing court's imposition of sentence 

is guided by an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308, 318 

(2018). In reviewing a sentence, the court must determine whether: "(1) the 

sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the findings of aggravating and 

mitigating factors were . . . 'based upon competent credible evidence in the 
28 A-4443-17T4

record;' [and] (3) 'the application of the guidelines to the facts' of the case 

'shock[s] the judicial conscience.'" State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014) 

(third alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).

"An appellate court is bound to affirm a sentence, even if it would have 

arrived at a different result, as long as the trial court properly identifies and 

balances aggravating and mitigating factors that are supported by competent 

credible evidence in the record." State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215 (1989) 

(citing State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 400-01 (1989); Roth, 95 N.J. at 364-65).

Here, the judge found aggravating factors three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) 

(risk defendant will commit another offense); six, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6) 

(extent of defendant's prior criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses 

of which he has been convicted); nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) (need to deter 

defendant and others from violating the law); and twelve, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(a)(12) (offense was committed against a person defendant knew or should 

have known was sixty years of age or older, or disabled). The judge also found 

mitigating factor six, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(6) (defendant will compensate the 

victim). 

As stated previously, for the robbery, the judge sentenced defendant to 

forty years in State prison, with an eighty-five percent period of parole 
29 A-4443-17T4

ineligibility and five years of parole supervision, pursuant to NERA. For the 

conspiracy to commit robbery, the judge sentenced defendant to a concurrent 

ten-year term of incarceration. The judge ordered defendant to pay restitution 

to the bank in the amount of $1477. The judge also imposed fines, fees, and 

penalties. 

Defendant argues that the judge erred by finding aggravating factor 

twelve. He contends there was no specific evidence that any of the victims were

over the age of sixty years. However, Dyer testified that she was in the bank 

when the robbery was committed. She said a person entered the bank, demanded 

money, and "intimated he had a weapon." Dyer said she had been living in 

Wantage for sixty years. Thus, there was a sufficient factual basis for the finding 

of aggravating factor twelve. 

Defendant further argues that his sentence is excessive when compared to 

the sentence that Moore received. "[U]niformity [i]s one of the major sentencing 

goals in the administration of criminal justice." State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 

231 (1996). A sentencing "[d]isparity may invalidate an otherwise sound and 

lawful sentence." Id. at 232. 

However, a defendant's sentence "is not erroneous merely because a codefendant's sentence is lighter." Ibid. (quoting State v. Hicks, 54 N.J. 390, 391 
30 A-4443-17T4

(1969)). The court "must determine whether the co-defendant is identical or 

substantially similar to the defendant regarding all relevant sentencing criteria.” 

Id. at 233. The court must determine "whether the disparity is justifiable or 

unjustifiable." Ibid.

Here, Moore faced charges related to the bank robbery and was charged 

with other offenses. She pled guilty to second-degree robbery as an accomplice

and agreed to testify against defendant. She received a five-year Drug Court 

sentence. 

On the other hand, defendant was tried and found guilty of first-degree 

robbery and second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery. He has an extensive 

criminal record and was eligible for an extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

3(a). Defendant and Moore are not similarly situated with respect to the relevant 

sentencing criteria, and the disparity between the sentences is justifiable. 

Defendant also contends his sentence is excessive when compared to a 

sentence imposed on Keven Puza, who testified for the State. Puza stated that 

he robbed Lakeland Bank in 2014, pled guilty, and was sentenced to a five-year 

term of incarceration, subject to NERA. However, Puza was not convicted of a 

first-degree offense. Defendant and Puza are not similarly situated with respect

to the sentencing criteria. The different sentences are justifiable. 
31 A-4443-17T4

We therefore conclude that the record supports the judge's findings of 

aggravating and mitigating factors and the sentence imposed is not an abuse of 

discretion. We reject defendant's claim that his sentence is excessive or 

disproportionate to the sentences imposed on Moore and Puza. 

IX.

As noted, defendant has raised several additional arguments in his pro se 

supplemental brief. These arguments are raised for the first time on appeal. 

Defendant contends the trial court did not have authority under the court 

rules to entertain the State's motion to reconsider the order of November 15, 

2015, which dismissed certain counts of the indictment. Defendant argues that 

the rules governing criminal proceedings do not permit motions for 

reconsideration. This argument is patently without merit. See State v. 

Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 554 (1999) (noting that the Court "has never 

questioned the appropriateness of interlocutory motions to reconsider in 

criminal matters."). 

Defendant also argues that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct 

by only calling Laird before the grand jury, and by charging defendant with firstdegree robbery. He contends the State did not present sufficient evidence to the 

grand jury to support the first-degree robbery charge. It is well-established, 
32 A-4443-17T4

however, that a grand jury may return an indictment even if based primarily on 

hearsay. State v. Vasky, 218 N.J. Super. 487, 491 (App. Div. 1987). The State 

was not required to present the grand jury with testimony from persons who 

witnessed the robbery. Moreover, there was sufficient evidence to support the 

first-degree robbery charge. 

Defendant further argues that the trial judge improperly admitted evidence 

of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, specifically testimony by Moore regarding his 

drug use. He also argues that the judge did not properly instruct the jury on the 

limits to its use of this evidence. Again, we disagree. 

Evidence of a person's "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" may not be admitted 

"to prove the disposition of a person in order to show that such person acted in 

conformity therewith." N.J.R.E. 404(b). However, the rule permits such 

evidence to be admitted as "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 

plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when such matters 

are relevant to a material issue in dispute." Ibid.

The evidence of defendant's drug use was properly admitted since it was

relevant to defendant's motive for committing the robbery. In addition, the judge 

properly instructed the jury on its use of this evidence. The judge stated:

In this case, evidence has been presented with regard to 

drug use by the defendant. This may be used for the 
33 A-4443-17T4

limited purpose of motive. Whether this evidence in 

fact demonstrates motive is for you to decide. You may 

decide that the evidence does not demonstrate motive 

and is not helpful to you at all. In that case, you must 

disregard the evidence. On the other hand, you may 

decide that the evidence does demonstrate motive and 

you may only use it for that specific limited purpose. 

However, you may not use this evidence to decide that 

the defendant has a tendency to commit crimes or that 

he is a bad person.

Defendant further argues that he was a victim of judicial and prosecutorial 

"vindictiveness" because he successfully exercised his constitutional rights in a 

2010 prosecution and the trial court ignored his motion to dismiss the indictment 

on this basis. The argument is meritless. 

"The essence of the concept of prosecutorial vindictiveness is a violation 

of due process by retaliating against a defendant for exercising a legal right." 

State v. Gomez, 341 N.J. Super. 560, 571 (App. Div. 2001) (citing Blackledge 

v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-28 (1974)). There is nothing in the record to support 

defendant's claim that he was prosecuted for exercising a legal right. 

Defendant also contends that: the prosecutor improperly permitted Laird 

to present false testimony before the grand jury; the jury charge for the firstdegree robbery charge was inadequate; Laird and Cosh should not have been 

permitted to testify as to what they observed in video recordings; and the trial 
34 A-4443-17T4

court failed to take his pro se motions seriously. These arguments lack sufficient 

merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). 

Affirmed.