1

Filed 6/10/13 (second of two modifications; opinion filed 4/26/13 and mod./pub. order filed 5/15/13 follow)

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL LEWIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

E055569

(Super.Ct.No. FVI900076)

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION 

AND DENYING PETITION FOR 

REHEARING

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT

The petition for rehearing filed on May 30, 2013, is denied. The opinion filed in 

this matter on April 26, 2013, and modified on May 15, 2013, is modified as follows:

On page 8, remove footnote 5, and modify the first sentence of the last paragraph.

The first two sentences of the last paragraph on page 8 should read as follows:

Neither defendant‟s current offenses nor his strike priors disqualify him for

resentencing pursuant to section 667(e)(2)(C). Defendant contends, therefore, that upon 
2

remand for resentencing, the trial court must sentence him pursuant to section 

667(e)(2)(C).

These modifications do not change the judgment.

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION

McKINSTER

J.

We concur:

HOLLENHORST

Acting P. J.

CODRINGTON

J.
1

Filed 4/26/13 Certified for partial publication as modified 5/15/13 (mod. and pub. order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL LEWIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

E055569

(Super.Ct.No. FVI900076)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Eric M. Nakata, 

Judge. Affirmed as modified; remanded for resentencing.

Jean Ballantine, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steven T. Oetting, Tami 

Falkenstein Hennick, and Ifeolu E. Hassan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

This is an appeal from the sentence imposed on remand for resentencing following 

our opinion in People v. Lewis (Aug. 23, 2011, E051058) (nonpub. opn.) (Lewis I). 

During the pendency of this appeal, the California Supreme Court issued its 

opinion in People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350 (Jones). Pursuant to that opinion, we 

conclude that Penal Code section 6541 bars imposition of unstayed sentences on both 

count 1 and count 4, for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and for receiving 

stolen property, consisting solely of the same firearm.

Also during the pendency of this appeal, the electorate amended the three strikes 

law by passing Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, effective 

November 7, 2012. Defendant contends that the amendment to sections 667 and 

1170.12, which would reduce his sentence from 25 years to life to a far lesser determinate 

term, applies to him under the doctrine of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), 

i.e., that an amendatory statute which reduces punishment applies in all cases not yet final 

on appeal, unless there is a clear indication that the enacting body did not so intend. As 

we discuss below, we agree.

 

1

 All statutory citations refer to the Penal Code unless another code is specified.
3

BACKGROUND

In Lewis I, we reversed the conviction on count 3, possession of ammunition by a 

convicted felon (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1)), and remanded for further proceedings on count 3 

and for resentencing on counts 1 and 4. In count 1, defendant was convicted of being a 

convicted felon in possession of a firearm (former § 12021, subd. (a)); in count 4, 

defendant was convicted of receiving or possessing stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)). 

(Lewis I, supra, E051058 [at p. 2].) The trial court had sentenced defendant, under the 

three strikes law (§§ 667, subd. (c)(6), 1170.12, subd. (a)(6)), to consecutive terms of 

25 years to life on counts 1 and 4, believing that it had no discretion to do otherwise. We 

held that the court did have the discretion to impose either concurrent or consecutive 

terms. (Lewis I, supra, E051058 [at pp. 22-23].)

Our remand order directed the district attorney to determine, within 30 days after 

the opinion became final, whether to retry defendant on that count. The remand order 

further stated, “If the district attorney elects not to retry defendant on count 3, the court 

shall dismiss count 3 and hold a new sentencing hearing within 30 days following the 

district attorney‟s election, to determine whether to impose consecutive or concurrent 

sentences on counts 1 and 4.” (Lewis I, supra, E051058 [at p. 26].)

The district attorney elected not to retry defendant, and the court dismissed 

count 3. At the resentencing hearing, the court again imposed consecutive sentences 

of 25 years to life on counts 1 and 4.

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
4

DISCUSSION

1.

SECTION 654 BARS IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE ON BOTH COUNT 1 AND 

COUNT 4

Section 654, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part that “[a]n act or omission 

that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under 

the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case 

shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” At its simplest, 

“section 654 proscribes double punishment for multiple violations of the Penal Code 

based on the „same act or omission.‟” (People v. Siko (1988) 45 Cal.3d 820, 822.)

In this case, the same firearm was the subject of both count 1 and count 4—that is, 

defendant was convicted of illegally possessing the firearm both because of his status as a 

convicted felon and because he knew that the firearm was stolen. In Lewis I, supra, 

E051058, we rejected defendant‟s claim that section 654 bars imposition of sentence on 

both count 1 and count 4. We based our opinion primarily on In re Hayes (1969) 70 

Cal.2d 604. (Lewis I, supra, [at pp. 19-21].) We noted that a similar issue was then 

under review in Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th 350, review granted Mar. 24, 2010, S179552. 

(Lewis I, supra, [at p. 21, fn. 11].)

On June 21, 2012, after the parties had filed their briefs in this case, the Supreme 

Court issued its opinion in Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th 350. Jones involved a convicted 

felon who was found with a loaded firearm concealed in the door panel of the car he was 
5

driving. The firearm was not registered to him. (Id. at p. 352.) The court held that the 

defendant could be punished only once for the three crimes of which he was convicted 

based on the single physical act of possessing a single firearm: possession of a firearm 

by a felon, carrying a readily accessible concealed and unregistered firearm, and carrying 

an unregistered loaded firearm in public. (Id. at pp. 352, 360.) The court confirmed that 

“[s]ection 654 prohibits multiple punishment for a single physical act that violates 

different provisions of law.” (Jones, at p. 358.) It overruled In re Hayes, supra, 70 

Cal.2d 604, and held that “a single possession or carrying of a single firearm on a single 

occasion may be punished only once under section 654.” (Jones, at pp. 357-358, 360.)

We directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing as to the effect, if any, of 

Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th 350, on this case. The parties agree that Jones and section 654 

preclude imposition of sentence on both count 1 and count 4, and we concur. We will 

remand the cause for resentencing, with directions to stay the sentence imposed on either 

count 1 or count 4.2

 

2

 Our determination that defendant‟s sentence must be modified to stay the sentence 

imposed on count 1 or count 4 obviates the need to address the contention raised in 

defendant‟s opening brief, i.e., that despite our holding in Lewis I, the trial court continued to 

believe that it had no discretion to impose concurrent rather than consecutive terms on counts 

1 and 4. It similarly renders defendant‟s petition for writ of habeas corpus (In re Lewis, 

E056109) moot. We will address the petition by separate order.
6

2.

DEFENDANT MUST BE SENTENCED UNDER SECTION 667(e)(2)(C) 

1. Proposition 36

While this appeal was pending, voters passed Proposition 36, the Three Strikes 

Reform Act of 2012 (hereafter the Reform Act or the act). The Reform Act became 

effective on November 7, 2012. (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C), 

1170.126.)3 We granted defendant‟s request for supplemental briefing on the effect of 

the Reform Act.

Under the three strikes law as it existed before the passage of the Reform Act, a 

defendant with two or more strike priors who is convicted of any new felony would 

receive a sentence of 25 years to life. (Former § 667(e)(2)(A).) As amended, section 667 

provides that a defendant who has two or more strike priors is to be sentenced pursuant to 

paragraph 1 of section 667(e)—i.e., as though the defendant had only one strike prior—if 

the current offense is not a serious or violent felony as defined in 

 

3

 For convenience, we will dispense with the use of “subdivision” in referring to 

statutes. We will also refer solely to section 667(e) in discussing the Reform Act, omitting 

reference to the substantially identical section 1170.12(c). However, the analysis applies to 

both section 667 and section 1170.12.
7

section 667.5(c) or section 1192.7(c), unless certain disqualifying factors are pleaded and 

proven.4 (§§ 667(d)(1), (e)(2)(C).)

 

4

 Section 667(e)(2)(C) provides that second-strike sentencing does not apply if the 

prosecution pleads and proves any of the following:

“(i) The current offense is a controlled substance charge, in which an allegation under 

Section 11370.4 or 11379.8 of the Health and Safety Code was admitted or found true.

“(ii) The current offense is a felony sex offense, defined in subdivision (d) of Section 

261.5 or Section 262, or any felony offense that results in mandatory registration as a sex 

offender pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290 except for violations of Sections 266 and 

285, paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) and subdivision (e) of Section 286, paragraph (1) of 

subdivision (b) and subdivision (e) of Section 288a, Section 311.11, and Section 314.

“(iii) During the commission of the current offense, the defendant used a firearm, was 

armed with a firearm or deadly weapon, or intended to cause great bodily injury to another 

person.

“(iv) The defendant suffered a prior serious and/or violent felony conviction, as 

defined in subdivision (d) of this section, for any of the following felonies:

“(I) A „sexually violent offense‟ as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the 

Welfare and Institutions Code.

“(II) Oral copulation with a child who is under 14 years of age, and who is more than 

10 years younger than he or she as defined by Section 288a, sodomy with another person 

who is under 14 years of age and more than 10 years younger than he or she as defined by 

Section 286, or sexual penetration with another person who is under 14 years of age, and 

who is more than 10 years younger than he or she, as defined by Section 289.

“(III) A lewd or lascivious act involving a child under 14 years of age, in violation of 

Section 288.

“(IV) Any homicide offense, including any attempted homicide offense, defined in 

Sections 187 to 191.5, inclusive.

“(V) Solicitation to commit murder as defined in Section 653f.

“(VI) Assault with a machine gun on a peace officer or firefighter, as defined in 

paragraph (3) of subdivision (d) of Section 245.

“(VII) Possession of a weapon of mass destruction, as defined in paragraph (1) of 

subdivision (a) of Section 11418.

“(VIII) Any serious and/or violent felony offense punishable in California by life 

imprisonment or death.”
8

The Reform Act also provides a procedure which allows a person who is 

“presently serving” an indeterminate life sentence imposed pursuant to the three strikes 

law to petition to have his or her sentence recalled and to be sentenced as a second-strike 

offender, if the current offense is not a serious or violent felony and the person is not 

otherwise disqualified. The trial court may deny the petition even if those criteria are 

met, if the court determines that resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger 

to public safety. (§ 1170.126(a)-(g).) Accordingly, under section 1170.126, resentencing 

is discretionary even if the defendant meets the objective criteria (§ 1170.126(f), (g)), 

while sentencing under section 667(e)(2)(C) is mandatory, if the defendant meets the 

objective criteria. 

The parties agree that neither defendant‟s current offenses—possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon and receiving stolen property—nor his two robbery-strike 

priors, disqualify him for resentencing pursuant to section 667(e)(2)(C).5 Defendant 

contends, therefore, that upon remand for resentencing, the trial court must sentence him 

pursuant to section 667(e)(2)(C). He contends that section 667(e)(2)(C) is an 

ameliorative sentencing statute which presumptively applies to all criminal judgments 

which were not yet final as of its effective date, and that there is nothing in the language 

of the Reform Act which overcomes the presumption. The Attorney General contends 

 

5

 Defendant‟s strike prior in San Bernardino County case No. SCR51536 is for 

robbery with no enhancements. (§ 211.) His second strike prior in Los Angeles County case 

No. NA00841, is for robbery with an enhancement for personal use of a firearm. (§§ 211, 

12022.5.) Neither such offense disqualifies him for sentencing pursuant to section 

667(e)(2)(C).
9

that section 667(e)(2)(C) applies, prospectively only, to defendants who are first 

sentenced on or after November 7, 2012. She contends that it does not apply to defendant 

because he is “presently serving a third-strike sentence” within the meaning of section 

1170.126(a), and that his only remedy is to petition for relief under that statute. 

2. Section 667(e)(2)(C) Applies to Defendants Whose Judgments Were Not Yet 

Final on the Effective Date of the Reform Act.

There is a general rule of statutory construction, embodied in section 3 of the 

Penal Code, that “„when there is nothing to indicate a contrary intent in a statute it will be 

presumed that the Legislature intended the statute to operate prospectively and not 

retroactively.‟ [Citation.]” (People v. Floyd (2003) 31 Cal.4th 179, 184 (Floyd).) In 

Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, the California Supreme Court created a limited exception 

to that presumption. In that case, the court held that where a statute has been amended to 

lessen the punishment for an offense and there is no clear indication of an intent to apply 

the amendment prospectively only, it must be presumed that the Legislature intended the 

mitigated punishment to apply to all judgments not yet final as of the effective date of the 

amended statute. (Id. at pp. 744-747.) The court held, „“A legislative mitigation of the 

penalty for a particular crime represents a legislative judgment that the lesser penalty or 

the different treatment is sufficient to meet the legitimate ends of the criminal law.”‟ 

(Id. at 745.) From this, “[i]t is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have 

intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to be 
10

sufficient should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply,” including 

those which are not yet final. (Ibid.)

The Legislature has never abrogated the Estrada rule. (See People v. Nasalga 

(1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 792, fn. 7 (Nasalga).) The rule and its continued vitality were 

most recently discussed by the California Supreme Court in People v. Brown (2012) 54 

Cal.4th 314 (Brown).) In Brown, the court reiterated that Estrada “is today properly 

understood, not as weakening or modifying the default rule of prospective operation 

codified in section 3, but rather as informing the rule‟s application in a specific context 

by articulating the reasonable presumption that a legislative act mitigating the 

punishment for a particular criminal offense is intended to apply to all nonfinal 

judgments.” (Id. at p. 324, italics added.)

Despite the Estrada presumption, however, a court interpreting a statute which 

ameliorates punishment must nevertheless determine the intent of the Legislature or of 

the electorate in enacting the statute. (Floyd, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 184.) To determine 

intent, courts look first to the language of the provision, giving its words their ordinary 

meaning. If that language is clear in relation to the problem at hand, there is no need to 

go further. (Ibid.) If the language is not clear, the tools of statutory construction must be 

applied, including but not limited to the Estrada rule. If necessary, the court must also 

look to other extrinsic indicators of intention. (Nasalga, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 794.)
11

There is no question that section 667(e)(2)(C) is an amendment which ameliorates 

punishment under the three strikes law for those defendants who meet its criteria. 

However, the Reform Act does not contain any explicit provision for retroactive or 

prospective application, and it does not explicitly state what remedy—i.e., section 

667(e)(2)(C) or section 1170.126—applies to a person in defendant‟s position. 

Consequently, we must “look for any other indications” to determine and give effect to 

the intent of the electorate. (Nasalga, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 794.)

In enacting new laws, both the Legislature and the electorate are “presumed to be 

aware of existing laws and judicial construction thereof.” (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 

Cal.3d 873, 890, fn. 11.) Accordingly, we presume that in enacting the Reform Act, the 

electorate was aware of the Estrada presumption that a law ameliorating punishment 

applies to all judgments not yet final on appeal on the effective date of the new statute. 

We also presume that the electorate was aware that a saving clause may be employed to 

make it explicit that the amendment is to apply prospectively only, and that in the 

absence of a saving clause or another clear signal of intent to apply the amendment 

prospectively, the statute is presumed to apply to all nonfinal judgments. (Nasalga,

supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 793; Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 747.) Previous ballot 

initiatives have employed explicit language making an ameliorative statute prospective. 

For example, the California Supreme Court held that the previous Proposition 36, 

approved by voters on November 7, 2000, applied prospectively only, despite its

ameliorative effect, because it expressly stated, “Except as otherwise provided, the 
12

provisions of this act shall become effective July 1, 2001, and its provisions shall be 

applied prospectively.” (Floyd, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 183-185.) The court in Floyd

held that the plain language of this saving clause trumped any other possible 

interpretation of the proposition. (Id. at pp. 185-187.) In the Reform Act, in contrast, the 

absence of such language is persuasive evidence that the electorate did intend to apply 

section 667(e)(2)(C) to nonfinal judgments.

This construction, moreover, is fully consistent with the expressed purposes of the 

Reform Act. In Floyd, the court found further support in the ballot arguments in support 

of the proposition, which stated that “[i]f Proposition 36 passes, non-violent drug 

offenders convicted for the first or second time after 7/1/2000, will get mandatory, courtsupervised treatment instead of jail.” (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2000) argument 

in favor of Prop. 36, p. 26, cited in Floyd, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 187-188, italics 

added.) The ballot arguments in support of the Reform Act stated that its purpose was to 

ensure that “[p]recious financial and law enforcement resources” were not diverted to 

impose life sentences for some non-violent offenses, while assuring that violent repeat 

offenders are effectively punished and not released early. The proponents stated that the 

act would “help stop clogging overcrowded prisons with non-violent offenders, so we 

have room to keep violent felons off the streets” and “help[] ensure that prisons can keep 

dangerous criminals behind bars for life.” An additional purpose was to save taxpayers 

“$100 million every year” by ending wasteful spending on housing and health care costs 

for “non-violent Three Strikes inmates.” Moreover, the act would ensure adequate 
13

punishment of non-violent repeat offenders by doubling their state prison sentences. The 

proponents pointed out that dangerous criminals were being released early because “jails 

are overcrowded with non-violent offenders who pose no risk to the public.” And, the 

proponents stated that by passing Proposition 36, “California will retain the toughest 

recidivist Three Strikes law in the country but will be fairer by emphasizing 

proportionality in sentencing and will provide for more evenhanded application of this 

important law.” The proponents pointed out that “[p]eople convicted of shoplifting a pair 

of socks, stealing bread or baby formula [sic] don‟t deserve life sentences.” (Voter 

Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012) argument in favor of Prop. 36 and rebuttal 

to argument against Prop. 36, <http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/propositions/36/argumentsrebuttals.htm>.)

Applying section 667(e)(2)(C) to nonfinal judgments is wholly consistent with 

these objectives, in that doing so would enhance the monetary savings projected by the 

proponents and would further serve the purposes of reducing the number of non-violent 

offenders in prison populations and of reserving the harshest punishment for recidivists 

with current convictions for serious or violent felonies, while still assuring public safety 

by imposing doubled prison terms on less serious repeat offenders.

For both of these reasons—the absence of any expressed intent to apply the act 

prospectively only and the stated intent underlying the proposition—we conclude that 

section 667(e)(2)(C) applies to judgments which were not final as of its effective date.
14

The sole published appellate decision to date which addresses this issue is People 

v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161.6 In Yearwood, as in this case, the defendant 

would have been entitled to second-strike sentencing under the Reform Act if he had 

been sentenced initially after the effective date of the Reform Act. He had already been 

sentenced and his appeal was pending on the date the act became effective. The court 

held that even though the judgment was not yet final, Yearwood‟s only remedy was to 

petition for recall of his sentence and for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.126. 

(Id. at pp. 167, 168, 169.)

The court held, as we have, that the Reform Act does not contain a saving clause 

or refer to retroactive or prospective application or refer explicitly to persons in 

Yearwood‟s position. Nevertheless, the court held, section 1170.126 unambiguously 

applies to prisoners whose judgments were not final on the Reform Act‟s effective date, 

because those prisoners were “presently serving” an indeterminate life term under the 

three strikes law. (See § 1170.126(a).) The court held that section 1170.126 therefore 

effectively operates as the functional equivalent of a saving clause and, if section 

667(e)(2)(C) is read not in isolation but in the context of the entire statutory scheme, it is 

clear that the mandatory sentencing provision of section 667(e)(2)(C) is intended to 

operate prospectively only. (Yearwood, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 175.)

 

6

 As of this date, a petition for review is pending. (Yearwood, supra, 213 

Cal.App.4th 161 (petn. for review filed Mar. 6, 2013, S209069). )
15

Yearwood is correct that even in the absence of an express saving clause there may 

be other reasons to determine that the enacting body intended the statute to apply 

prospectively only. Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th 314, provides an example. In that case, the 

court held that an amendment to section 4019 which increased the rate at which prisoners 

may earn credits for good behavior applied prospectively only, despite the absence of 

express language to that effect, because the purpose of section 4019 is to provide an 

incentive for good behavior during incarceration. Accordingly, rather than reflecting a 

determination that a reduced penalty for past criminal conduct satisfies the legitimate 

ends of criminal law, section 4019 addresses “future conduct in a custodial setting by 

providing increased incentives for good behavior.” (Brown, at p. 325.) Awarding the 

credit retroactively, for time spent in custody before the effective date of the amendment, 

would not further that purpose. Consequently, the court held, there is no logical basis for 

inferring that the Legislature intended the amended statute to apply retroactively, and the 

Estrada rule does not apply. (Id. at p. 325 & fn. 15.) The same is not true of the Reform 

Act, however. As we discussed above, retroactive application of section 667(e)(2)(C) is 

consistent with the proponents‟ stated objectives of reducing prison overcrowding, 

reducing the resources expended on third-strike offenders whose current and prior 

offenses are non-violent and less serious, and enhancing public safety by ensuring that 

the truly dangerous repeat offenders serve indeterminate life terms less. (More about this 

below.) Accordingly, there is a logical basis for inferring that the electorate intended the 

amendment to apply to nonfinal judgments.
16

Moreover, we do not agree with Yearwood that section 1170.126 unambiguously 

applies to defendants who were serving nonfinal third-strike sentences on the effective 

date of the Reform Act. In light of the Estrada presumption and the absence of a saving 

clause in section 667(e)(2)(C), the provision that section 1170.126(a) applies “exclusively 

to persons presently serving” a third-strike sentence is ambiguous—does it refer only to 

prisoners serving sentences which are final, or does it include those whose judgments are 

not final? It is certainly not so clear as to qualify as the functional equivalent of a saving 

clause. In Nasalga, supra, 12 Cal.4th 784, the California Supreme Court held that the 

rule of Estrada is “not implicated where the Legislature clearly signals its intent” to 

make an amendment prospective, “by the inclusion of either an express saving clause or 

its equivalent.” (Nasalga, at p. 793, italics added.) The court did not describe what 

constitutes an “equivalent” to an express saving clause. However, the court stated that in 

the absence of an express saving clause, the “„quest for legislative intent‟” requires that 

“„the Legislature demonstrate its intention with sufficient clarity that a reviewing court 

can discern and effectuate it.‟ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) In our opinion, the statutory language 

that Yearwood relies on does not meet that requirement because it is ambiguous. We 

note, too, that Yearwood does not cite a single case in which similarly ambiguous 

language was deemed to be the equivalent of a saving clause.

Yearwood finds support for its position in the ballot arguments in favor of the 

Reform Act. It points out that enhancing public safety was a key purpose of the act. 

(Yearwood, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 175.) The court states that giving section 
17

667(e)(2)(C) prospective-only application furthers that purpose by reducing the 

likelihood that prisoners who are currently dangerous will be released from prison under 

the Reform Act. In contrast with section 1170.126, section 667(e)(2)(C) does not provide 

the court with discretion to impose a third-strike sentence if it finds that the defendant 

poses an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (§ 1170.126(f).) Yearwood 

points out that several years may elapse between sentencing and finality, and a defendant 

who might objectively qualify for second-strike sentencing under section 667(e)(2)(C) 

may have shown him- or herself to pose such a risk by misconduct during postsentencing incarceration. (Yearwood, at pp. 175-176.)

This is arguably a valid concern. However, it is not reflected in the ballot 

arguments in support of the Reform Act. We cannot say that a concern not expressed in a 

ballot argument is a clear indication of voter intent, no matter how valid the concern may 

be. Moreover, a defendant may also be incarcerated for many months before being 

convicted and sentenced for a third-strike offense. Such a defendant may also display a 

propensity for violence or other conduct while incarcerated which indicates that he or she 

poses a risk to public safety. Nevertheless, any qualifying defendant convicted and 

sentenced after the effective date of the Reform Act is entitled to sentencing under 

section 667(e)(2)(C), and the trial court has no discretion to impose a third-strike 

sentence even if the court has concerns about the defendant‟s future dangerousness for 

any reason, including the defendant‟s conduct while in custody. For this reason as well, 

we do not find Yearwood‟s analysis persuasive.
18

3. Conclusion

We conclude that in passing the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, the electorate 

intended the mandatory sentencing provision of sections 667(e)(2)(C) and 

117012(c)(2)(C) to apply to qualifying defendants whose judgments were not yet final on 

the effective date of the act. Accordingly, we do not need to address defendant‟s other 

arguments as to why the act should apply to him.

DISPOSITION

The cause is remanded. The superior court is directed to hold a resentencing 

hearing within 30 days after finality of this opinion. The superior court is directed to 

impose sentence pursuant to Penal Code sections 667(e)(2)(C) and 1170.12(c)(2)(C) and 

to stay imposition of sentence on either count 1 or count 4 pursuant to Penal Code section 

654. The superior court is directed to issue an amended abstract of judgment reflecting 

the sentence as modified and to provide a copy of the amended abstract to the parties and 

to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation within 30 days after resentencing. 

The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

McKINSTER

J.

We concur:

HOLLENHORST

Acting P. J.

CODRINGTON

J.
1

Filed 5/15/13

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL LEWIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 E055569

(Super.Ct.No. FVI900076)

 ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION

 FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION

 AND MODIFYING OPINION

 [NO CHANGE IN JUDGEMENT]

THE COURT

On the court‟s own motion, the above-entitled unpublished opinion filed April 26, 

2013, meets the standards for partial publication as specified in California Rules of Court, 

rule 8.1105(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6).

Therefore, the opinion is certified for partial publication, with the exception of 

“section I.” of the opinion (located on pages 4-5).

Additionally, the opinion filed in this matter is modified as follows:

On page 4, under discussion, replace heading “1.” with “I.”

On page 6, replace heading “2.” with “II.”

On page 14, delete footnote 6, and replace the first sentence on page 14 to read:
2

The first published appellate decision which addresses this issue is People v. 

Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161 (review den. May 1, 2013, S209069).

On pages 17-18, add the following paragraph as the last paragraph in section II.2., 

to read as follows:

A second published opinion on this issue, People v. Conley (May 2, 2013, 

C070272) ___ Cal.App.4th ___ [2013 WL 1833251], also holds that section 1170.126 

applies to all defendants serving indeterminate three strikes sentences, regardless of the 

finality of the judgment, and thus “defeats the presumption of retroactivity set forth in 

Estrada.” (Id. at pp. 4-6.) Conley‟s reasoning is similar to Yearwood‟s, and we find it 

unpersuasive as well.

These modifications do not effect a change in the judgment.

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION

McKINSTER

J.

We concur:

HOLLENHORST

Acting P. J.

CODRINGTON

J.