Asia and the Trump Administration:

Challenges, Opportunities, and a Road Ahead

by James J. Przystup and Phillip C. Saunders

STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 26

Center for Strategic Research

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University
Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National 

Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes 

the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, 

Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, and Center for 

Technology and National Security Policy. The military and civilian 

analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute 

their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and 

participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach.

The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the 

Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 

unified combatant commands in support of the academic programs at 

NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and 

the broader national security community. 

Cover: Clockwise from left, Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India, Shinzo 

Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, Malcolm Turnbull, Prime Minister of 

Australia, Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, and 

President Donald J. Trump

(Cover by DOD/Jack J. Church)
Asia and the Trump Administration

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Strategic Perspectives, No. 26

Series Editor: Denise Natali

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

June 2017

By James J. Przystup and Phillip C. Saunders

Asia and the Trump Administration:

Challenges, Opportunities, and a Road Ahead
For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, please visit inss.ndu.edu/Publications.aspx.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those 

of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any 

other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a 

standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints 

or reviews.

First printing, June 2017

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Contents

Executive Summary ........................................................................................... 1

Introduction........................................................................................................ 5

U.S. National Interests in the Asia-Pacific Region ......................................... 6

Defining Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region.................................................... 7

Asia-Pacific Security Challenges....................................................................12

Sustaining U.S. Presence..................................................................................20

Conclusion ........................................................................................................30

Notes ..................................................................................................................32

About the Authors............................................................................................35

1

Asia and the Trump Administration

Executive Summary

The Asia-Pacific region is of exponentially increasing importance to the United States. 

Developments there affect vital U.S. economic, security, and political interests. Unfettered access to the region is a strategic imperative to allow the United States to protect and advance its 

wide-ranging national interests.

The Donald Trump administration, in the face of a rapidly evolving strategic environment, 

will need to develop policies to sustain the U.S. presence and safeguard American interests in 

the Asia-Pacific region.

Defining trends in the Asia-Pacific region include:

■ Rapid economic growth that has increased the region’s weight in world affairs and importance to U.S. interests. Asia-Pacific economies make up more than one-quarter of the 

global economy and account for about one-third of all U.S. trade.

■ Rising Chinese economic and military power that has reshaped global and regional 

trade and investment patterns and challenged U.S. regional dominance. Countries in the 

region value their economic ties with China and do not want to be forced to make a strategic choice between Washington and Beijing.

■ Increasing U.S. economic, military, and diplomatic engagement with the region since 

the end of the Cold War.

Although countries in the Asia-Pacific region are primarily focused on economic development, a number of security challenges could threaten regional stability and damage U.S. interests. These include:

■ Sino-Japanese rivalry and conflicting claims over maritime boundaries in the East China Sea and over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands

■ North Korea’s increasing nuclear and missile capabilities, which challenge nonproliferation norms, threaten U.S. regional allies, and will eventually include the ability to strike 

the U.S. homeland with a nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 26

■ China’s desire to resolve the Chinese civil war by achieving unification with Taiwan, 

and Beijing’s increasing efforts to develop the military capabilities and economic leverage 

necessary to coerce Taipei into accepting a political relationship with the mainland.

■ Increasing tensions over conflicting maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea, 

with all claimants engaging in a range of tactics to strengthen their positions and China 

making greater use of its military and paramilitary forces to try to expand its effective 

control of disputed waters.

We advocate a regional strategy focused on working with U.S. allies, partners, and multilateral organizations to build a rules-based regional order that includes China and advances 

U.S. economic, security, and political interests.

■ A rules-based regional order will help the United States to maintain economic, security, and political access to the Asia-Pacific region and advance its interests in the face of 

regional trends and security challenges.

■ This approach requires sustaining the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region and intensifying cooperation with other regional allies and partners to shape China’s choices 

and make it pay a price for aggressive actions that violate international rules and norms.

■ If the United States is not actively engaged in shaping the regional economic order, that 

order is likely to evolve in ways that do not reflect U.S. interests.

The starting point for a strategic approach to the Asia-Pacific region is to reinforce existing bilateral alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, the Philippines, and 

Thailand to deal with specific security threats. The alliances also provide a good foundation for 

expanding regional security cooperation. The United States should:

■ encourage increased cooperation among U.S. allies

■ develop strategic partnerships with key states in the region such as Indonesia, Malaysia, 

Singapore, and Vietnam 
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Asia and the Trump Administration

■ support trilateral and quadrilateral cooperation mechanisms with Australia, Japan, India, and South Korea

■ shape the evolution of regional norms through active U.S. participation in regional organizations and dialogue mechanisms.

If the United States emphasizes its alliances, expands security cooperation with other partners, and actively engages in regional multilateral institutions and dialogues, it will be able to 

deal with China from a position of strength.

The mixture of cooperation and competition in the U.S.-China relationship will present 

the new administration with a defining challenge given China’s increasing ability to affect the 

broad range of U.S. global, regional, and domestic interests. The policy challenge will be to 

maximize cooperation while competing successfully in areas where U.S. and Chinese interests 

are opposed.

■ President Trump will need to engage directly with his Chinese counterpart to keep both 

governments focused on a cooperative agenda and to manage the more competitive aspects of the relationship. Domestic economic and political problems are likely to produce 

more restrained Chinese external behavior and give U.S. policymakers more leverage.

■ China does not aspire to challenge the United States for global leadership. In most regions, its focus on maintaining stability and securing access to resources and markets is 

relatively compatible with U.S. interests.

■ U.S. and Chinese interests are less aligned in the Asia-Pacific, where China seeks increased influence and increasingly views the United States as a constraint. Heightened 

U.S.-China strategic competition and the potential for military incidents or crises makes 

it imperative to improve bilateral communications and crisis management mechanisms.

■ U.S. policymakers should resist Beijing’s efforts to create a U.S.-China condominium 

or “G-2”-like arrangement, which would require accepting Chinese territorial claims (including to Taiwan) at the expense of U.S. allies and partners.

The United States will have to deal with the rapidly evolving nuclear and missile threat 

posed by North Korea, the most destabilizing element in the Asia-Pacific security environment.
4 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 26

■ Military options are unattractive given the vulnerability of U.S. allies to attack by North 

Korean long-range artillery and missiles armed with nuclear warheads.

■ North Korea has no interest in trading its nuclear program for economic assistance; it 

seeks recognition as a nuclear weapons state.

■ Given North Korea’s history of cheating, a negotiated freeze on nuclear and missile testing that does not include intrusive verification measures is unlikely to permanently constrain the North Korean ICBM program and would likely require concessions that would 

reduce U.S. ability to deter and defend its allies against a North Korean attack.

■ Given the bad options, the most effective policy may be to strengthen deterrence and 

defense of the ROK and Japan, maintain the external pressure of economic sanctions, and 

keep the door open to dialogue and diplomacy, aimed at the denuclearization of North 

Korea as agreed to by Pyongyang in the September 2005 Six Party statement.

■ To deal with the possibility of instability or regime collapse, the Trump administration should work to closely coordinate U.S. and ROK objectives, endstates, and policy 

responses and try to engage China in discussions of responses to various contingencies. 

Over the next 4 years, the United States will be challenged to maintain its leadership of a 

rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific region. Sustained U.S. involvement and close coordination 

with regional allies and partners will allow the Trump administration not only to meet the challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, but also to grasp the opportunities.

■ U.S. diplomacy must play a leading role in strengthening our alliances, partnerships, 

and regional institutions that widely share the U.S. commitment to a rules-based order as 

the foundation of regional peace and stability.

■ Consistent engagement with the region by the highest levels of U.S. leadership will be 

critical for success. 

■ Allies, partners, and potential challengers will judge the regular presence of the President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense in the region as a key indicator of U.S. 

commitment.
5

Asia and the Trump Administration

Introduction

America’s engagement with Asia began before the United States existed. In February 1784, 

the ship Empress of China departed New York harbor, arriving in Macau in August of that year. 

The ship returned the following year with a cargo of Chinese goods that netted a $30,000 profit. 

In Federalist Paper No. 4, John Jay referred to American commerce with China and India.

In 1835, before the United States touched the shores of the Pacific Ocean, the U.S. Navy 

East India Squadron was established. In 1844, China, in the Treaty of Wanghia, granted trading 

rights to the United States. Two years later, the United States attempted to negotiate a commercial treaty with Japan. The talks ended in failure, but a decade later Commodore Matthew 

C. Perry concluded the Treaty of Kanagawa, opening Japan to American goods and providing 

protection for shipwrecked American Sailors engaged in the China trade.

In the last half of the 19th century, U.S. commercial interests expanded rapidly. At the end 

of the century, U.S. interests expanded beyond trade. In the Treaty of Paris ending the SpanishAmerican War, Spain ceded the Philippines and Guam to the United States. Expansion across 

the Pacific brought the United States into contact with the geopolitics of Asia, focused then on 

China and the efforts of the imperial powers (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and 

Russia) to carve out spheres of influence and commercial privileges in the weakening Qing 

empire.

Over the past century, the United States has adopted multiple policy frameworks to protect 

and advance its national interests in the Asia-Pacific region. The Open Door policy toward China represented a unilateral U.S. initiative aimed at rejecting imperial spheres of influence and 

special privilege and advancing the principle of equality of commercial opportunity. The Open 

Door evolved into a multilateral framework for managing commercial competition in China. 

A second Open Door note, issued at the time of the Boxer Rebellion, appealed to the imperial 

powers to preserve China’s territorial and administrative integrity.

President Theodore Roosevelt, playing balance-of-power politics, aligned the United 

States with Japan to check Russia’s efforts to develop an exclusive sphere of influence in Northern China and Korea. Roosevelt’s diplomatic intervention in the Treaty of Portsmouth brought 

the Russo-Japanese war to a close.

In 1920, at the Washington Conference, the United States worked to fashion a multilateral 

cooperative framework to preserve China’s territorial integrity and the postwar status quo in the 

Asia-Pacific region. Lacking any enforcement mechanism, the Washington Conference system 
6 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 26

failed to meet the challenges of rising Chinese nationalism, the great depression, and Japanese 

unilateralism.

From 1945 through the end of the Cold War and the Barack Obama administration’s rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, the United States has relied primarily on bilateral security treaties 

with Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand to protect 

and advance its security interests.1

 This bilateral “hub and spokes” framework has served as the 

region’s informal security structure, underpinning its remarkable postwar reconstruction and 

present-day prosperity. Today, the hub-and-spokes framework is evolving to encompass trilateral cooperation among alliance partners and multilateral cooperation involving U.S. allies and 

strategic partners.

The common principle underlying these various policy approaches is the concept of “access”: economic access to the markets of the region to pursue U.S. commercial interests; strategic and physical access to our allies to ensure confidence in U.S. security commitments; and 

political access to allow for the promotion of democracy and human rights.

At the same time, the United States has championed the evolution of a postwar liberal, 

open, rules-based international order allowing for the free flow of commerce and capital supported by the Bretton Woods institutions of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and its successor the World Trade Organization. The 

United States has also promoted efforts to support international stability and the peaceful resolution of disputes. This principled U.S. commitment has contributed significantly to the stability 

and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region today.

U.S. National Interests in the Asia-Pacific Region

The United States has a range of important national interests either located in the AsiaPacific region or strongly influenced by developments there. These interests include:

■ defense of the homeland, U.S. territories, and U.S. citizens

■ maintenance of an open, rules-based international order that enables U.S. access to regional markets and encourages resolution of disputes through peaceful means rather than 

coercion or the use of force

■ access to the region and freedom of navigation in the maritime and air domains
7

Asia and the Trump Administration

■ maintenance of a stable balance of power that supports regional stability and economic 

prosperity joined with opposition to any power or group of powers that would deny U.S. 

access to the region or threaten U.S. interests

■ strengthening U.S. alliance relationships and reinforcing U.S. commitment to security 

of its allies

■ prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery 

systems

■ promotion of global norms and values, such as human rights, democracy, and good 

governance.

Defining Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region

The Asia-Pacific region is marked by important opportunities and challenges that require 

high-level attention. Economic dynamism is increasing the region’s weight in world affairs and 

its importance to U.S. interests. China’s rise is part of this positive story, but Beijing is also converting its astonishing economic growth into military power and diplomatic influence that are 

challenging the regional balance of power and threatening the stability of the existing order. The 

Obama administration responded to regional opportunities and challenges via its rebalance to 

the Asia-Pacific, which sought to increase U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic engagement 

there. U.S. interests merit increased strategic attention and resources, but the Donald Trump 

administration will need to decide how to sustain the U.S. presence in Asia and what adjustments are necessary given the changing global and regional strategic environment and the U.S. 

domestic political context.

Asia’s Economic Dynamism

In 2013, the Asia-Pacific region generated close to $21 trillion in economic activity, over 

a quarter of the global economy. China and Japan stand as the world’s second and third largest 

economies, while the 10 countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have 

a combined economic output of over $2.3 trillion.2

 East Asia remains one of the fastest growing 

regions in the world, with an annual growth rate of 6.8 percent in 2014, accounting for about 40 

percent of global growth.3

 This economic dynamism is increasing the region’s overall strategic 

weight and importance to the U.S. economy.
8 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 26

In 2015, U.S. trade with Asia totaled more than $1.5 trillion, growing from $397 billion 

at the end of the Cold War and $503 billion at the turn of the century.4

 In 2014, U.S. exports to 

the Asia-Pacific region represented 27.8 percent of total exports, while imports accounted for 

37 percent of total imports. Capital goods, excluding automotive, led U.S. exports to the region, 

amounting to 26.3 percent, while consumer goods, excluding food and automotive, accounted 

for 32.2 percent of U.S. imports from the region. Meanwhile the U.S. direct investment position in the region amounted to $738.8 billion, an increase of 6.1 percent over 2013.5

 The United 

States remains the single largest investor in the Asia-Pacific region.

In 2012, 32 percent of export-related jobs in the United States were tied to the Asia-Pacific 

region, representing 1.2 million American jobs, an increase of more than 52 percent over 2002. 

In 2011, 68 percent of all congressional districts exported more than $500 million to the region, 

with 39 states sending approximately 25 percent of their exports to the Asia-Pacific region.6

Governor-led trade missions target the region’s booming economies. Top U.S. trading partners 

include China (the second largest), Japan (fourth), and South Korea (sixth); if taken as a whole, 

ASEAN would be the fourth largest U.S. trading partner.7

The Rise of China

China’s rise is altering the strategic landscape of the region and challenging the existing 

regional order. In 1980, as Deng Xiaoping began to open China to the market, China had a $200 

billion economy; by 2014, its economy topped $10 trillion. This remarkable transformation 

was achieved by adopting market-oriented economic reforms and opening China to foreign 

trade, investment, technology, and ideas. The result is a China that is firmly integrated into the 

regional and global economy. China is now more exposed to external economic developments; 

the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis and 2008 Great Recession both caused significant slowdowns 

in Chinese growth.8

 Conversely, China’s economy is now big enough and integrated enough 

into the global economy that its economic problems can move global trade and investment patterns, exchange rates, and U.S. stock markets. As China’s economy has become larger, its annual 

growth rate has declined substantially (currently 6 to 7 percent) and is unlikely to return to the 

previous rapid growth rates.

Like other Asian countries, China’s economic rise was enabled by an open international 

trading order and stability in the Asia-Pacific region underpinned by U.S. military power and 

the U.S. alliance system. A reasonably good working relationship with the United States remains 

critical for Chinese goals such as sustaining economic growth and maintaining regional stability, but the relationship has become more competitive and many Chinese elites believe that the 
9

Asia and the Trump Administration

United States seeks to subvert the Chinese political system and contain China’s economic and 

military potential. As China has become more powerful, and has converted some of its economic gains into military power, it has become less comfortable with the U.S. alliance system and 

has begun to seek more influence within the region and in the international system as a whole.

China’s economic growth has reshaped regional trade and investment patterns and greatly 

increased Beijing’s influence. China is now the number one export market for almost all countries within the region and has dramatically expanded its foreign investment across Asia. China 

has a free-trade agreement (FTA) with ASEAN and is currently pursuing both a China–Japan–South Korea FTA and a broader Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 

agreement. Chinese foreign aid and infrastructure projects within Asia, some of which are now 

under the umbrella of Xi Jinping’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative, are another source of influence. Beijing has mostly used its economic power as assurance measures and inducements to 

cooperate with China, but in recent years has become more willing to use more coercive economic measures to punish countries that displease it.9

Rapid economic growth has also supported modernization and expansion of the Chinese 

military, which has enjoyed double-digit budget increases for most of the last 20 years and now 

has the largest defense budget in the Asia-Pacific region ($154 billion for 2016).10 The People’s 

Liberation Army has been modernizing its forces and developing the joint doctrine, training, 

and capabilities necessary to win “local wars under conditions of informationization.”11 This 

modernization effort gives priority to naval, air, and missile forces capable of projecting power 

beyond China’s borders and places increasing emphasis on the maritime, space, and cyber domains. As part of its efforts to deter potential U.S. intervention in a Taiwan contingency, the 

People’s Liberation Army has emphasized the development of antiaccess/area-denial capabilities that would raise the costs and risks for U.S. forces operating near China.12 These capabilities 

threaten to put at risk the U.S. ability to access its allies, extend deterrence, and meet its regional 

security commitments. Expanded naval and coast guard capabilities have also supported more 

assertive Chinese efforts with respect to maritime territorial disputes in the East and South 

China seas.

Countries in Asia have been carefully monitoring China’s rise and the potential for a strong 

China to dominate the region. Aggressive Chinese behavior toward Taiwan and in the South 

China Sea from 1994 to 1996 created regional alarm about a “China threat,” but more restrained 

Chinese behavior and assurance measures adopted from 1997 to 2008 helped ease regional 

concerns. During this period, Asian views largely shifted from regarding China as a potential 

threat to regarding China as an opportunity; this shift was widely interpreted as an indicator of 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 26

the success of China’s Asia policy.13 Beginning in 2009, however, more assertive Chinese behavior on maritime territorial disputes and other issues dissipated much of the goodwill built by 

China’s charm offensive and revived regional concerns about how a strong China might behave 

in the future.14 These concerns are most acute for countries with maritime or land territorial 

disputes with China, such as India, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Chinese 

policymakers talk about the need to maintain the proper balance between the competing goals 

of defending Chinese sovereignty (weiquan) and maintaining regional stability (weiwen); under 

President Xi Jinping there has been more emphasis on pursuing territorial claims and less concern about the negative impact on relations with China’s neighbors.

In interviews conducted as part of the Institute for National Strategic Studies research 

project “The Rebalance Beyond 2016,” analysts across the region described China’s rise as “inexorable.” Despite the significant economic and political challenges facing China, they were 

confident that China will, at worst, muddle through. Looking ahead, interviewees defined a 

best-case China scenario as one in which the pace of change would slow, allowing countries of 

the region to adapt and, over time, engage and socialize China toward acceptance and support 

of the existing regional order. This will require sustained U.S. involvement and coordination 

with regional allies and partners. For the United States and the Asia-Pacific region, China’s rise 

(and international reactions to that rise) will shape the contours of the international order in 

the century ahead.

While participating in the postwar Bretton Woods system and benefiting from a stable 

regional order underpinned by U.S. alliances, China has moved to advance a parallel set of 

institutions that mostly exclude the United States. These include the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; the initial proposal for an East Asian Summit that would have excluded the United 

States; and under President Xi, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; the One Belt, One 

Road Eurasian trade initiative; the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership; and the 

“Asia for Asians” security concept, widely viewed as aimed at U.S. alliances and the U.S. security 

role in the region. Taken as a whole, China’s growing power and willingness to use that power to 

try to alter regional security arrangements and support new institutions that advance Chinese 

interests and exclude the United States pose a significant challenge to U.S. interests in the AsiaPacific region.

The U.S. Rebalance to Asia

Upon taking office in January 2009, Obama administration officials proclaimed a U.S. “return to Asia.” This pronouncement was backed with more frequent travel to the region by senior 
11

Asia and the Trump Administration

officials and increased U.S. participation in regional multilateral meetings, culminating in the 

decision to sign the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and to participate in the East Asia 

Summit at the head-of-state level.

The strategic rebalance to Asia built on these actions to deepen and institutionalize U.S. 

commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. In announcing the rebalance in a November 17, 2011, 

address to the Australian Parliament, President Obama argued that “Our new focus on this 

region reflects a fundamental truth—the United States has been, and always will be a Pacific 

nation. . . . Here we see the future.” The President noted that Asia is “the world’s fastest growing region,” “home to more than half of the global economy,” and critical to “creating jobs and 

opportunity for the American people.” He described the rebalance as “a deliberate and strategic 

decision” to increase the priority placed on Asia in U.S. policy.15

Then–Secretary of State Hillary Clinton elaborated on the rationale for the rebalance, 

arguing that “harnessing Asia’s growth and dynamism is central to American economic and 

strategic interests” and that the United States had an opportunity to help build “a more mature 

security and economic architecture to promote stability and prosperity.” Given the importance 

of the Asia-Pacific region, she argued that “a strategic turn to the region fits logically into our 

overall global effort to secure and sustain America’s global leadership.”16

While the main objective of the rebalance was to bring U.S. foreign policy commitments in 

line with U.S. interests, it also responded to China’s increasingly assertive regional policies, especially on maritime territorial disputes. Countries across the Asia-Pacific region urged Washington to play a more active role in regional economic, diplomatic, and security affairs in order 

to demonstrate U.S. commitment and help maintain regional stability in the face of a more 

powerful and more active China.

Obama administration officials stressed that the rebalance includes diplomatic, economic, 

and military elements, all of which must be applied in a coordinated manner for maximum 

effect.17 The diplomatic element involved enhanced high-level diplomatic engagement, including frequent travel to the region by the President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. 

President Obama participated regularly in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and 

East Asia Summit meetings; had periodic meetings with the leaders of U.S. allies Japan, South 

Korea, and Australia; and launched a new U.S.-ASEAN dialogue mechanism that included a 

summit with Southeast Asian leaders at Sunnylands, California, in February 2016.

American allies and partners in the region have stressed U.S. economic engagement with 

Asia as a key means of demonstrating U.S. staying power. The Obama administration faced a 

number of practical and political obstacles in increasing U.S. trade and investment ties with 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 26

the Asia-Pacific, especially in the context of the global financial crisis. The centerpiece of the 

administration’s efforts was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), as “an ambitious, next-generation Asia-Pacific trade agreement” including Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, 

Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam.18 The 

TPP agreement was signed on February 4, 2016, but will not take effect until all member countries have ratified the agreement. Facing strong political headwinds in both the Republican and 

Democratic parties, the Obama administration did not submit the agreement to Congress for 

approval. On January 23, 2017, President Trump, by executive order, withdrew the United States 

from participation in TPP.

The military element of the rebalance aimed to increase commitments of U.S. military 

forces to the Asia-Pacific region and enhance military and security cooperation with a range 

of allies and partners. The Navy and Air Force both announced plans to devote 60 percent of 

overseas-based forces to the Asia-Pacific region, including deployments of advanced systems 

such as the Littoral Combat Ship and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The Army announced plans to 

align 70,000 troops to Asia missions, while the Marines announced plans for rotational deployments of 2,500 Marines to Australia. Then–Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter described a 

three-part Department of Defense approach to the “next phase” of the rebalance that included 

investing in future capabilities relevant to the Asia-Pacific security environment, fielding key 

capabilities in quantity, and adapting the U.S. defense posture to be “geographically distributed, 

operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.”19 A significant part of the rebalance involved 

efforts to expand military cooperation with traditional allies such as Australia, Japan, and South 

Korea, while using exercises and dialogues to reach out to nontraditional partners such as India, 

Malaysia, and Vietnam.20

While President Obama’s remarks set out a comprehensive strategy toward the region, the 

initial public diplomacy rollout focused on the military aspects, unfortunately playing into the 

Chinese conceit that U.S. policy is aimed at containing China. Beijing has subsequently gone 

a step further, blaming the rebalance for increasing tensions in the region even though it was 

partly a response to regional concerns about increasing Chinese assertiveness.

Asia-Pacific Security Challenges

Asia’s economic dynamism, China’s rising power, and the U.S. rebalance are broad trends 

that are having a major impact on the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. These trends co-exist with 

a number of specific security challenges in Northeast Asia, the Korean Peninsula, the ChinaTaiwan relationship, and the South China Sea, including unresolved territorial disputes, com-
13

Asia and the Trump Administration

petition to secure natural resources, and freedom of navigation issues that present complex 

challenges to regional stability and security.

Northeast Asia

Even 75 years after the end of World War II, tensions over the history of Japanese colonialism and aggression continue to complicate Tokyo’s relations with Beijing and Seoul. The 

Japan-China relationship is also marked by conflicting territorial claims in the East China Sea, 

including disputes over possession of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, an unresolved maritime 

boundary, and resource competition for fish, oil, and natural gas. Both China and Japan claim 

the islands (as does Taiwan), and tensions over them have flared periodically since the late 

1970s.21 The United States does not take a position on the sovereignty dispute but recognizes 

Japanese administrative control and has stated that the unpopulated islands are covered under 

the U.S-Japan Security Treaty.

In September 2010, a Chinese fishing trawler operating within Japan’s exclusive economic 

zone north of the Senkaku Islands collided with two Japanese coast guard ships. The ships pursued and boarded the trawler, taking into custody the captain and crew. Tokyo took the position 

that the coast guard’s actions were correct, taking place in Japanese waters and based on Japanese 

law. Beijing’s response was to call on Japan to refrain from taking “so-called law enforcement activities” in Chinese waters. To have accepted the legality of the coast guard’s action would have 

been to compromise China’s claim to sovereignty over the islands. The rapid deterioration of 

relations that followed, China’s suspension of rare-earth metal exports to pressure the Japanese 

business community, widespread anti-Japanese demonstrations across China, and small-scale 

anti-Chinese protests in Japan all underscored the sensitive nature of the territorial issue.

Two years later, in September 2012, the Japanese government purchased (“nationalized”) 

three of the five Senkaku islands from their private-sector owner. Widespread anti-Japanese 

demonstrations spread across China, and Beijing suspended all high-level political and diplomatic contacts. To assert its claims to the islands, China stepped up patrols of white-hulled 

paramilitary ships (now consolidated into the Chinese coast guard) into the contiguous zone 

around the islands, establishing an almost daily presence in the area. Chinese ships also entered 

the 12 nautical miles’ territorial waters limit in the Senkakus. By the end of 2013, Chinese coast 

guard ships had entered territorial waters in the Senkakus 256 times. Of the incursions, 68 took 

place in the period September‒December 2012 and 188 in 2013.22 In November 2013, China 

declared an Air Defense Identification Zone that extended over the Senkaku Islands. The fol-
14 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 26

lowing month the government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, in its national security strategy, 

defined Japan’s security environment as “ever more severe.”23

Japan and China also hold conflicting claims over the maritime boundary in the East China Sea. Japan claims a mid-line boundary in the East China Sea, while Beijing’s claim is based 

on the continental shelf and extends beyond the mid-line to the Okinawa trough. In the context 

of this unresolved boundary, exploration for oil and natural gas has also served as a flashpoint. 

In June 2008, Japanese and Chinese diplomats reached agreement on the joint development of 

resources in the East China Sea; implementing details were left to follow-on talks, which have 

failed to resolve outstanding issues. In June 2013, China began the construction of large exploration platforms on the Chinese side of the mid-line boundary. Tokyo considered the Chinese 

action to be at odds with the 2008 agreement and an “attempt to change the status quo unilaterally.” Beijing’s response was to make clear that exploration was taking place within China’s 

sovereign waters, that China and Japan have yet to reach agreement on the maritime boundary, 

and that China does not recognize Japan’s unilateral boundary demarcation. The Japanese press 

reported that Prime Minister Abe raised the issue twice with President Xi in November 2014 

and April 2015 meetings.

North Korea

North Korea, as it has for decades, remains the most destabilizing element in the AsiaPacific security environment. Pyongyang’s growing nuclear and missile arsenal poses a direct 

threat to U.S. national security interests. Senior U.S. defense officials have stated that North Korea, within a decade, will be able to deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching 

U.S. territory in the Pacific and the homeland itself.24

North Korea’s estimated 1.2 million-man conventional army also continues to pose a direct threat to the Republic of Korea, a treaty ally of the United States. North Korean provocations, such as the sinking of the ROK navy’s warship Cheonan in March 2010, the shelling of 

Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010, and the August 2015 incident at the demilitarized zone 

(DMZ), risk escalation into a wider conflict. Pyongyang remains committed to the unification 

of the Korean Peninsula on its terms.

Diplomatic efforts to address North Korea’s nuclear program have a long history. Beginning in 1991, then–Under Secretary of State Arnold Kanter met with North Korean diplomats 

in New York and proposed the basic tradeoff that has marked diplomatic efforts since: abandonment of North Korea’s plutonium-based nuclear program in exchange for an array of security 

guarantees and economic benefits. The initiative eventually played out into the 1994 Agreed 
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Asia and the Trump Administration

Framework, which offered Pyongyang two light water reactors, a security guarantee, and moves 

toward normalized relations. Profound distrust on both sides gradually unraveled the accord, 

which collapsed in 2002 when the George W. Bush administration discovered that Pyongyang 

was secretly pursuing uranium enrichment as an alternative path to the bomb.

In August 2003, China launched the Six Party Talks to reduce the risk of unilateral U.S. 

military action and to keep denuclearization of North Korea on the security agenda. The talks 

produced the September 19, 2005, agreement, yet another attempt at a grand bargain. The Six 

Party Talks collapsed in December 2008 when North Korea failed to produce details of its nuclear activities that would verify compliance with the agreement. Efforts to revive the Six Party 

Talks have proved unavailing.

In 2009, the Obama administration attempted to break the diplomatic deadlock, offering to extend an open hand to North Korea. North Korea answered with ballistic missile and 

nuclear weapon tests. Nevertheless, the administration continued to pursue a diplomatic opening to Pyongyang, which resulted in the February 29, 2012, Leap Day agreement, a mini-grand 

bargain in which the United States would provide food in return for North Korea’s freezing of 

its missile and enrichment programs. Pyongyang responded with another ballistic missile test.

In 2012, the nuclear and missile programs were enshrined in North Korea’s revised constitution. Today, under the leadership of 30-something Kim Jong-un, North Korea is pursuing 

byungjin, a two-track policy aimed at sustaining its nuclear weapons and missile programs and 

simultaneously promoting economic growth—in short, guns and butter. Pyongyang has made 

very clear that it has no interest in surrendering its nuclear program, even for an economic 

windfall. Instead it seeks international recognition as a nuclear weapons state.

Uncertainties about the long-term life expectancy of the regime under Kim Jong-un, including the prospect of instability or regime collapse, raise daunting security challenges.25 China 

might intervene to prop up a failing regime, to prevent a refugee crisis from spilling over its borders, or to secure North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction. Similar conditions could prompt 

the ROK to cross the 38th parallel in an effort to unify the peninsula or the United States to intervene to secure North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction. The prospects for strategic miscalculation in a fast-moving, dynamic environment are extremely high, especially given the absence of 

substantive dialogue between the United States and China about contingency responses.

China-Taiwan

The political dispute between Mainland China and Taiwan remains an unresolved legacy 

of the Chinese civil war. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) claims Taiwan as an inherent 
16 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 26

part of Chinese territory. While pursuing a policy of unification through peaceful development, 

Beijing has refused to renounce the use of force if Taiwan should pursue de jure independence. 

Even as economic integration has deepened to the point where Mainland China is now Taiwan’s 

number one export market and the main destination for Taiwan investment, political trends 

have continued to diverge.

On the mainland, the narrative of a “century of humiliation” at the hands of foreign powers 

makes Taiwan reunification a benchmark goal for Chinese nationalism and a domestic political 

third rail where top leaders have little room to compromise. Conversely, democratization and 

social changes on Taiwan have reduced the political dominance of the mainlanders who fled the 

Communist takeover in 1949 and produced a population with less sense of a Chinese identity 

and little desire for closer political relations with Mainland China, much less unification with 

a country led by a communist government. Despite an increasing sense of an identity separate 

from the Mainland, the pragmatic population on Taiwan prefers to maintain the political status 

quo and avoid pro-independence actions that might provoke hostile PRC responses.

U.S. policy is based on three communiques signed with the People’s Republic of China 

and the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. U.S. policy recognizes the PRC government as the sole legal 

government of China, acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and that 

Taiwan is part of China, and maintains cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with 

the people on Taiwan. At the same time, U.S. policymakers have clearly and consistently stated 

that the United States does not support Taiwan independence. The Taiwan Relations Act provides the legal basis for U.S. unofficial relations with Taiwan and enshrines a U.S. commitment 

to assist Taiwan in maintaining its defensive capability. It also states that peace and stability 

in the Western Pacific area “are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United 

States, and are matters of international concern” and that U.S. policy is to “maintain the capacity 

of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize 

the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”

U.S. policy is focused on maintaining a framework within which the two sides of the strait 

can work out their political differences rather than on achieving specific outcomes. Accordingly, 

the United States insists on peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences, opposes unilateral 

changes to the status quo by either side, and encourages cross-strait dialogue to help advance 

a peaceful resolution. This approach has helped the United States cooperate with the PRC on 

a range of global, regional, and bilateral economic and security issues while maintaining robust unofficial ties with the people on Taiwan. However, the growing imbalance in economic 

and military power between China and Taiwan poses challenges for the viability of this policy 
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Asia and the Trump Administration

framework, especially as Chinese military modernization expands the coercive tools available 

to PRC leaders.

Contentious cross-strait relations improved considerably from 2008 to 2016 under Taiwan 

President Ma Ying-jeou, whose willingness to endorse the so-called “1992 consensus” (which 

he interpreted as “one China, separate interpretations”) reduced tensions and permitted a major 

expansion of cross-strait economic ties, establishment of direct air and sea links, and the signing of 23 cross-strait agreements. Ma resisted pressure from Mainland China to engage in talks 

on political issues or to define Taiwan’s status more precisely. Although this period saw stability 

and a significant expansion in cross-strait contacts, many on Taiwan claimed that the economic 

benefits went largely to politically connected big businesses and that the Ma administration did 

not stand up enough for Taiwan’s interests.

Opposition Democratic Progressive Party candidate Tsai Ing-wen won a decisive victory 

in January 2016 elections; her party won control of the legislature for the first time and she took 

office as president on May 20, 2016. Mainland China is suspicious of Tsai because of her party’s 

pro-Taiwan independence stance and her service in former president Chen Shui-bian’s government, although she has pledged not to challenge the status quo and has made subtle policy adjustments to reassure Beijing that she will not take pro-independence actions that might disrupt 

stability.26

Nevertheless, Mainland China officials have insisted that Tsai explicitly acknowledge that 

Taiwan is part of China and endorse the 1992 consensus, a concession she is unwilling (and perhaps unable) to make. A March 2016 Center for Strategic and International Studies delegation 

to China and Taiwan concluded that China is deliberately setting the bar high because it wants 

Tsai’s term in office to be considered a failure. To that end Beijing has severed semi-official 

cross-strait dialogue mechanisms, reduced the flow of tourists to Taiwan, and taken actions to 

curtail Taiwan’s international space, including by inducing some of Taiwan’s 21 diplomatic allies 

to shift recognition to the PRC.27 Beijing’s strategy appears to be to blame Tsai for a downturn 

in cross-strait relations that damages Taiwan’s economy, and to hope that Taiwan voters choose 

a candidate committed to improving cross-strait relations in the 2020 election.

This all suggests that cross-strait relations will enter a period of greater turbulence with 

Beijing seeking to depict Tsai as challenging the status quo by refusing to endorse the 1992 consensus and Tsai and her government looking to Washington for support in the face of increasing 

Chinese pressure. At the same time, Beijing knows that any attempt to resolve the Taiwan issue 

with force would have extremely high costs and risks (including the likelihood of U.S. military 

intervention) and would severely damage China’s relations with the United States and other 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 26

major countries in the region. President-elect Trump’s decision to accept a phone call from 

President Tsai and subsequent suggestions that the Trump administration might reevaluate the 

longstanding U.S. “One China” policy created uncertainty about the administration’s policy. 

This may have been a tactical maneveur to seek leverage in dealing with Beijing. President 

Trump subsequently reaffirmed U.S. commitment to its “One China” policy.28

South China Sea

In contrast to the East China Sea, competing territorial claims and maritime boundaries 

in the South China Sea involve multiple parties. The disputes center on three sets of overlapping claims. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam all claim the Paracel Islands, which China occupied 

in 1974 during the last days of the Republic of Vietnam. China, the Philippines, and Taiwan 

claim Scarborough Shoal, site of a 2012 dispute between Beijing and Manila. China, Taiwan, 

and Vietnam claim all the land features in the Spratly Islands, while Brunei, Malaysia, and the 

Philippines each claim a number of specific features. China has not clarified the exact nature 

or legal basis of its claim to land features and adjacent waters inside the “nine-dash line” that 

it inherited from the Republic of China. The nine-dash line overlaps with part of Indonesia’s 

exclusive economic zone claim, including part of the Natuna natural gas field.

In 2002, the member states of ASEAN and China adopted the “Declaration on the Conduct 

of Parties in the South China Sea” to address conflicting claims. In the document, the parties:

■ reaffirmed “their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles 

of international law, including the 1982 UN [United Nations] Convention on the Law of 

the Sea”

■ undertook “to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, 

without resorting to the threat of or use of force”

■ undertook “to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining 

from . . . inhabiting . . . the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other 

features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.”29
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Asia and the Trump Administration

Finally, the parties reaffirmed that “the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China 

Sea would further promote peace and stability” and agreed “to work, on the basis of consensus, 

toward the eventual attainment of this objective.”

A binding code of conduct today stands as a distant vision, and much has transpired that 

is at odds with the spirit of the Declaration of Conduct. Claimants have used a variety of tactics 

to reinforce their claims, with a significant increase in activity since 2009.30 Tactics to assert 

sovereignty include patrols by coast guard and naval forces, occupying land features, enforcing 

fishing regulations in disputed waters, oil and natural gas exploration, harassment of military 

ships and aircraft operating in disputed areas, and using legal means (such as the case the Philippines brought against China in the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea). None of the 

claimants has clean hands, but China has been the most active in using military and paramilitary means to assert its claims, including by coercion of other claimants.31 Since 2009, China has 

become more assertive in enforcing its claims, including harassment of U.S. military ships and 

aircraft operating legally in international waters or within China’s exclusive economic zone. In 

May 2014, China deployed an oil rig into waters in the Paracels claimed by Beijing and Hanoi, 

raising tensions and setting off collisions between Chinese and Vietnamese coast guard ships 

and virulent anti-Chinese demonstrations in Vietnam.

In 2013, China began land reclamation projects in the South China Sea on several low-tide 

elevations, geologic features that do not extend above water at high tide. China’s efforts at land 

reclamation were not unprecedented: Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam have also 

engaged in such projects since the 1980s. The U.S. Department of Defense Maritime Security 

Strategy notes that, in the period from 2009 to 2014, Vietnam “was the most active claimant in 

terms of both outpost upgrades and land reclamation,” adding “approximately 60 acres of land 

at 7 of its outposts and [building] at least 4 new structures as part of its expansion efforts.”32

However, China’s land reclamation activities dwarf those of other claimants. By June 2015, 

China’s land reclamation projects totaled “more than 2,900 acres, or 17 times more land in 20 

months than the other claimants combined over the past 40 years, accounting for approximately 

95 percent of all reclaimed land in the Spratly Islands.” In comparison Vietnam had reclaimed 

“a total of approximately 80 acres, Malaysia, 70 acres; the Philippines, 14 acres; and Taiwan, 8 

acres.”33 In October 2015, President Xi pledged that China would not “militarize” the islands 

that it had constructed, but the exact nature of this commitment is vague and most observers expect China to use the airfields and port facilities that it is building for both military and 

civilian purposes. Beijing’s position remains that “China has indisputable sovereignty over the 

Nansha islands and their adjacent waters,” with “sovereignty and relevant rights . . . formed over 
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the long course of history and upheld by successive Chinese governments.”34 However on July 

12, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in a case brought by the Philippines contesting 

Chinese claims in the South China Sea, ruled in favor of Manila and rejected most of Beijing’s 

claims.

U.S. policy has been to avoid taking sides in the sovereignty disputes, but to stress the importance of respect for international law and peaceful resolution of disputes without coercion. 

China’s successful use of incremental salami tactics to expand its effective control of disputed 

maritime territory in the South China Sea has brought this approach into question, as Beijing 

has been able to “work around” the United States to gradually expand its naval and coast guard 

presence and power projection capabilities while avoiding the use of lethal force. More recently, 

the United States has adjusted its policies to increase security assistance to help improve maritime domain awareness of U.S. allies and partners and has also reinvigorated its Freedom of 

Navigation program, which challenges excessive or illegitimate maritime claims.35

Sustaining U.S. Presence

U.S. policies must take the broad trends of Asia’s economic dynamism, China’s rising 

power, and the U.S. rebalance into account even as they grapple with specific regional security 

challenges. We believe the correct strategy is to work with U.S. allies, partners, and multilateral 

organizations to build a rules-based regional order that includes China and advances U.S. economic, security, and political interests. This requires sustaining the U.S. presence in the AsiaPacific and intensifying cooperation with other regional actors to shape China’s choices and 

make it pay a price for aggressive actions that violate international rules and norms.

For over a half century, the U.S. system of bilateral security alliances (with Australia, Japan, 

the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand) has served as the informal security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region, underpinning stability and enhancing economic prosperity. 

Although most countries in the region share concerns about how China is using its power (and 

especially about its aggressive pursuit of its maritime territorial claims), they are reluctant to 

choose between China (a critical economic partner) and the United States or to participate in 

security cooperation aimed against China. Given the diversity of the region in terms of political 

culture and security interests, a formal alliance system such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been widely recognized as impractical.

The best approach is to build on the existing bilateral alliance system by encouraging increased cooperation between U.S. allies, engaging other regional security partners, and shaping the evolution of regional organizations through active U.S. participation. U.S. policymakers 
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Asia and the Trump Administration

must recognize China is a powerful country that is also attempting to reshape the regional order 

in directions favorable to its interests. Not all Chinese interests run counter to U.S. goals. For 

instance, the two governments share an interest in combatting piracy and illegal trafficking. But 

China’s reluctance to accept multilateral rules that restrict its ability to exercise power or to address sovereignty disputes in a multilateral setting will limit the appeal of most Chinese proposals. An open, rules-based regional order that includes the United States will be more attractive 

to Asia-Pacific countries than Chinese-backed alternatives.

Strengthening Alliances

To address the security challenges in 2017‒2021 and beyond, a critical first step for the 

Trump administration is to focus on strengthening the bilateral alliance structure. This starts 

with the U.S.-Japan Alliance.

Japan. For over half a century, the alliance with Japan has served as the foundation of U.S. 

strategy toward the Asia-Pacific region and an integral element of U.S. global strategy. Elements 

of the Seventh Fleet based in Yokosuka, Japan, were among the first U.S. units to support coalition efforts in the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001.

Under the government of Prime Minister Abe, Japan has taken steps to enhance security 

cooperation with the United States. In December 2013, the Abe government released Japan’s 

first-ever national security strategy, which defined Japan as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” 

in support of international stability and security. The document set out three objectives for 

Japan’s security policy: to strengthen deterrence, to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and to 

strengthen the rules-based international order. In July 2014, a decision by the Japanese government cabinet reinterpreted Japan’s constitution to allow for the exercise of the right of collective 

self-defense.

In April 2015, the Obama administration and the Abe government released the Revised 

Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. The new guidelines aim to enhance U.S.-Japan Alliance 

cooperation by providing for an Alliance Coordination Mechanism; closer operational coordination; a whole-of-government, upgraded bilateral planning mechanism; seamless coordination of efforts “to ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies”; and defense equipment and technology cooperation as well as cooperation in space and 

cyberspace. The limiting geographic reference to “Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan” in 

the 1997 guidelines was omitted, theoretically expanding the scope of alliance-based security 

cooperation.
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Of increasing concern to Japan is the potential for “gray zone” activities, attempts to change 

the status quo by limited use of force or coercion such as China’s frequent incursions into Japan’s sovereign waters and air space that could cause “unexpected situations” and challenge the 

alliance in response. In April 2014, President Obama made clear that Article V of the alliance 

extends to the Senkaku Islands given Japan’s administrative control. To strengthen deterrence, 

it is critical for the Trump administration to be seen actively planning and exercising with Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to deal “seamlessly” with gray zone situations that could arise in the 

Senkaku Islands.

With respect to North Korea’s growing missile threat, Japanese strategists are concerned 

with the potential for “decoupling,” the result of a North Korea inclined to engage in provocations, confident that its nuclear arsenal would preclude a U.S. response. Japanese strategists are 

also concerned with the deterrence challenge posed by China at both the regional and strategic 

levels.

Implementation of the new defense guidelines, in particular the U.S. commitment “to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces” 

and to continue forward deployment in the Asia-Pacific region will be critical to sustaining 

Japanese confidence in the alliance. Implementation of the guidelines will be a critical test both 

of the Trump administration’s commitment to the alliance and to the rebalance.

Across the region, the strength of the U.S.-Japan Alliance as well as the U.S. commitment 

to the defense of the Republic of Korea are widely perceived as a barometer of the U.S. security 

commitment to the Asia-Pacific region.

The Republic of Korea. For over 60 years, the U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea 

has succeeded in deterring North Korea from again attempting to unify the Korean Peninsula 

by force of arms. The resulting armed peace has allowed for a political evolution to take place 

in which the Korean people have transformed an authoritarian political system into a vibrant 

democracy, while allowing the native energies of the Korean people to flourish and develop a 

dynamic market economy with an international presence.

At the same time, the threat posed by North Korea to the security of the ROK and the 

broader international community remains. The sinking of the ROK navy corvette Cheonan in 

March 2010, the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010, and the August 2015 landmine incident at the DMZ underscore North Korea’s continuing hostility.

While North Korea’s conventional capabilities have continued to degrade, the threat posed 

by its nuclear weapons and missiles is increasing at an accelerating pace. Since the September 19, 

2005, Six Party Talks agreement on denuclearization, North Korea has conducted five nuclear 
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Asia and the Trump Administration

tests (in October 2006, May 2009, February 2013, January 2016, and September 2016); each test 

was followed by UN Security Council–imposed sanctions. Meanwhile North Korea continues 

to develop and test a ballistic missile arsenal. In October 2014, U.S. Forces Korea commander 

General Curtis Scaparrotti, USA, cautioned that North Korea may have developed a miniaturized nuclear warhead and mated the warhead to missiles capable of striking U.S. territory.

North Korea’s evolving nuclear and missile capabilities raise issues related to deterrence 

and defense, affecting both the ROK and Japan.36 Defense planners are concerned that “newly 

nuclear states often are more assertive at the conventional level because of their confidence in 

being able to deter a strong adversary response with their nuclear means.”37 To address this 

potential risk, the ROK and the United States reached agreement on a Counter-Provocation 

Plan in March 2013. The plan was employed during the August 2015 DMZ landmine incident. 

Updating the Counter-Provocation Plan to deal with the evolving threats posed by North Korea 

will be an important alliance management instrument for the Trump administration.

Enhancing missile defense will also be a critical alliance issue for the new administration. In July 2016, the United States and the ROK agreed to deploy the Terminal High Altitude 

Area Defense (THAAD) system to the ROK. The deployment will defend against North Korean 

missile attacks, and open the door to the development of an interoperable U.S.-ROK-Japan 

multilayered missile defense system that would enhance defense and deterrence in Northeast 

Asia. China, however, has expressed concerns that the U.S. deployment of the THAAD system 

in South Korea could put China’s nuclear deterrent at risk and aggravate tensions on the peninsula. In July 2014, President Xi Jinping reportedly told President Park Geun-hye that THAAD 

deployment on the peninsula “went against China’s security interests.”38 After the deployment 

decision, China expressed “firm opposition” and has applied economic and diplomatic pressure 

on the ROK to reconsider. U.S. and ROK policymakers will need to stand firm in the face of 

Chinese pressure.

Meanwhile, efforts to implement the September 19, 2005, Six Party agreement on the denuclearization of North Korea remain on diplomatic life support. In April 2009, North Korea 

announced its withdrawal from the Six Party Talks and subsequently made clear that its nuclear 

arsenal will not be used as a bargaining chip to secure economic benefits.

The Trump administration should take the long view with respect to North Korea—not all 

problems will be solvable within its term in office. Available military options are unattractive 

given the vulnerability of U.S. allies to attack by North Korean long-range artillery and missiles 

armed with nuclear warheads. Given North Korea’s history of cheating, a negotiated freeze on 

nuclear and missile testing that does not include intrusive verification measures is unlikely to 
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permanently constrain the North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile program and would 

likely require concessions that would reduce U.S. ability to deter and defend its allies against a 

North Korean attack.

The most effective policy may be to strengthen deterrence and defense of the ROK and 

Japan, maintain the external pressure of economic sanctions, and keep the door open to dialogue and diplomacy aimed at the denuclearization of North Korea as agreed to by Pyongyang 

in the September 2005 Six Party statement. To deal with the possibility of instability or regime 

collapse, the Trump administration should work to closely coordinate U.S. and ROK objectives, 

endstates, and policy responses and try to engage China in discussions of responses to various 

contingencies. To date China has considered such official-level discussion to be premature.

The Philippines. In 1992, after the Philippine senate rejected an extension of the basing 

agreement, the United States closed Clark Air Base and the Subic Bay Naval Base and withdrew 

its military forces from the Philippines. U.S. military assistance resumed after 9/11, directed to 

support Manila’s counterterrorism efforts in Mindanao and the southernmost islands.

As Philippine concerns about China have increased, Manila has become more willing to 

expand security cooperation. In 2011, the United States agreed to support programs aimed at 

enhancing its maritime security capabilities. In 2012, the Balikatan joint exercise took place off 

Palawan Island, near the contested Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The United States 

also transferred two former Coast Guard ships to the Philippines. In 2014, Washington and 

Manila signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, aimed at “addressing short-term 

capability gaps, promoting long-term modernization, and helping maintain and develop additional maritime security, maritime domain awareness, and humanitarian assistance and disaster 

relief capabilities.”39 During his visit to the Philippines in 2014, President Obama made clear 

that the U.S. commitment “to defend the Philippines is ironclad and the United States will keep 

that commitment because allies never stand alone.” Obama reiterated the “ironclad commitment” formulation during his 2015 visit to the Philippines. Despite new Philippine President 

Rodrigo Duterte’s recent remarks questioning the value of security cooperation with the United 

States, U.S. policymakers should exercise patience and remain focused on the long-term interests of both countries.

Moving Beyond the Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System

Since the turn of the century, the U.S. alliance structure has been evolving from the 

Cold War bilateral hub-and-spokes construct toward a more open architecture that includes 

increased cooperation between U.S. allies and active efforts to engage other regional security 
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partners. The United States has supported increased bilateral security cooperation between U.S. 

allies, most notably between Australia and Japan and Japan and the Philippines; trilateral cooperation among Australia, Japan, and the United States and among Japan, the ROK, and the 

United States; and quadrilateral engagement involving Australia, India, Japan, and the United 

States. Exercises that began in the context of U.S. bilateral alliances have expanded to include a 

wide range of regional participants, including China (which participated in the 2014 and 2016 

Rim of the Pacific exercises).

At the same time, the United States has developed Comprehensive Partnerships with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam and a Strategic Partnership with Singapore. Japan and Australia, both U.S. allies, have developed similar partnerships with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 

and Vietnam. U.S. security cooperation with India has deepened to the point where the two 

countries have become “major defense partners,” and the United States has encouraged India to 

expand its diplomatic and security role in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. These nonalliance partnerships help to enhance broad-based regional security cooperation and contribute 

to stability.

Maritime territorial disputes are among the most difficult regional security challenges. 

These disputes are sensitive domestic political issues (but not existential interests) for all the 

claimants. China’s efforts to use military and paramilitary means to expand its effective control 

of disputed territories and waters pose a challenge to key U.S. interests and principles such as 

peaceful resolution of disputes, respect for international law, and freedom of navigation.

Australia, Japan, and the United States have all increased their focus on maritime issues 

in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, including maritime capacity-building, maritime 

domain awareness, joint training and exercising, and port calls. In 2013, the United States committed $156 million (2014‒2015) to support maritime capacity-building in Southeast Asia, including $18 million to Vietnam.40 In November 2015, the White House announced its intention 

to enhance capacity-building efforts by committing more than $250 million over the 2015‒2016 

period, focused on Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.41

In November 2015, Japanese and Vietnamese ministers of defense agreed to strengthen 

defense cooperation, including joint maritime exercise and a 2016 port call at Cam Ranh Bay by 

Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force. Earlier, in 2006, Japan, making strategic use of its Official 

Development Assistance program, sent three patrol boats to Indonesia and in 2012 transferred 

10 Japanese Coast Guard ships to the Philippines. Similarly Australia has used the Pacific Patrol 

Boat Program to donate aging Australian ships to South Pacific and Southeast Asian neighbors.
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The United States should continue to resist pressure to take sides in sovereignty disputes 

and maintain an even-handed approach. However, when countries, including China, take actions that we view as inconsistent with international law, the United States should impose costs, 

including via official statements, diplomatic efforts to organize opposition to illegal or destabilizing actions, and enhancing security cooperation with regional allies and partners. The United 

States must maintain its military capabilities and be willing to act to assert its own interest in 

freedom of navigation, including by military activities that challenge excessive maritime claims. 

If carried out on a routine basis, there will be less need to publicize each freedom of navigation operation. Ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which the U.S. 

signed in 1982 and regards as customary international law, would strengthen the legitimacy of 

U.S. diplomatic efforts to defend freedom of navigation.

Enhancing maritime capacity-building efforts in Southeast Asia will be an important 

benchmark of the Trump administration’s commitment to regional stability and security. At the 

same time, given the diversity and complexity of the Asia-Pacific region, alliances and partnerships should not be viewed as being exclusively threat-centric. They can also play an important 

role in building regional order by strengthening cooperation in dealing with nontraditional 

security issues, thereby enhancing confidence among states. Efforts to work with allies and partners in enhancing regional security cooperation will strengthen U.S. political and diplomatic 

leadership in the region.

Shaping the Asia-Pacific Order

Scholars have long argued that the Asia-Pacific region lacks the web of multilateral organizations that have facilitated European integration. Explanations for Asia’s under-institutionalization include the region’s economic and cultural diversity, mutual suspicions between countries, and the impact of Cold War political divisions. In 1967, the governments of Indonesia, 

Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand came together to create ASEAN. For over 

two decades, ASEAN stood as the lone multilateral institution in the region. However, recent 

decades have seen the creation of new regional organizations and meetings that may become 

building blocks for a new regional order.

As the Cold War was ending in 1988, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mohammed Mahathir advanced the concept of an East Asia Economic Caucus that would exclude the United States. U.S. 

opposition doomed the caucus, but in 1989 Australia, with strong U.S. support, established the 

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum to advance regional trade liberalization. With the 

establishment of APEC, Asian multilateralism gathered momentum. In 1993, ASEAN created 
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the ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan, South Korea) format, followed by the ASEAN Regional Forum 

in 1994, the East Asian Summit in 2005, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus in 

2010—ASEAN plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the ROK, Russia, and the United States. In addition, the annual Shangri-la Dialogue sponsored by the International Institute 

for Strategic Studies in Singapore has served as a high-level multilateral forum for the discussion 

of political and security issues.

In 2008, the Bush administration appointed the first U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN, a clear 

recognition of the growing importance of ASEAN and of the region’s expanding multilateral, 

diplomatic, economic, and security forums. One explicit goal of the rebalance was to increase 

the U.S. ability to help shape the emerging multilateral architecture in the Asia-Pacific region. 

The Obama administration paid particular attention to high-level participation in the region’s 

multilateral institutions and dialogues, with the President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of 

Defense regularly attending meetings in Asia. Countries across the region welcomed the Obama 

administration’s sustained high-level attention, but are concerned whether the Trump administration will place an equally high priority there. U.S. interests would be best served by continued 

high-level U.S. participation and active U.S. engagement in efforts to shape the regional order.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership and U.S. Trade with Asia

The priority that almost all Asia-Pacific governments place on economic growth means 

that trade and investment agreements are a critical aspect of international relations in Asia 

and important building blocks for the emerging regional order. If the United States is not actively engaged, other countries will be allowed to shape regional economic rules, norms, and 

standards in ways that may work against U.S. interests. The centerpiece of the Obama regional 

economic agenda was the Trans-Pacific Partnership, described as a “gold-standard” free trade 

agreement involving 10 countries.

President Trump’s decision to withdraw from TPP and pursue a trade policy based on 

bilateral negotiations will reduce the U.S. ability to shape evolving regional economic rules. 

In interviews across the region over the past 2 years, political leaders, diplomats, and military 

officials all underscored the strategic importance of TPP as a benchmark of long-term U.S. 

commitment to the region. As the new administration attempts to to address U.S. trade deficits 

via bilateral negotiations, it should keep in mind the importance of maintaining U.S. economic 

access to the Asia-Pacific region and sustaining an open trading order based on World Trade 

Organization rules.
28 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 26

China Policy: Managing a Mixed Relationship

One of the most difficult policy challenges will be dealing with China, which has the ability 

to affect a range of U.S. global, regional, and domestic interests. The U.S.-China relationship is 

marked by a mix of cooperation and competition; the policy challenge is to maximize cooperation in areas where common interests exist, while competing successfully in areas where 

U.S. and Chinese interests are opposed. Both countries have a strong interest in maintaining 

an effective bilateral working relationship in order to pursue important global, regional, and 

domestic goals. High-level leadership will be needed on both sides to keep the competitive and 

cooperative aspects of the relationship in balance.42

Cooperation is important for the United States because China has become an important 

global actor, with the ability to influence the effectiveness of global institutions such as the UN 

Security Council and World Trade Organization. On some issues, such as climate change and 

dealing with North Korea’s nuclear and missile ambitions, progress is impossible without cooperation with China. While Chinese leaders view some aspects of global institutions as unfair 

and are not interested in shoring up U.S. hegemony, they support a rules-based global economic 

system and view the United Nations as the most legitimate institution of global governance.43

China has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of the open global trade system established by 

the United States after World War II, which facilitated its economic rise. Beijing seeks to wield 

greater influence within global institutions, and where possible to work with other countries to 

adjust international rules and norms to better reflect its own interests and perspectives. Nevertheless, China remains reluctant to take on the costs, risks, and commitments necessary to play 

a global leadership role; its actions are usually focused on defending narrow Chinese interests 

rather than aspiring for global leadership. Given that China’s main interest in most parts of the 

world is to maintain stability and secure access to resources and markets, its interests will often 

be relatively compatible with those of the United States.44

U.S. and Chinese interests are less aligned at the regional level, where there is increasing 

competition for influence. Over the last decade, Beijing has become more critical of the U.S. alliance system, arguing that it reflects Cold War thinking and emboldens U.S. allies to challenge 

Chinese interests. The U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and increased U.S. regional security 

cooperation have stoked Chinese fears of U.S. encirclement or containment. Beijing’s proposed 

alternatives emphasize nontraditional security cooperation and the importance of resolving 

disputes through peaceful dialogue. Beijing has resisted making any binding commitments that 

might restrict its military capabilities or ability to employ military power to defend its core in-
29

Asia and the Trump Administration

terests. Its increasing military capabilities and more assertive approach to maritime territorial 

disputes have heightened regional concerns about how a strong China will behave, leading most 

countries to improve their security ties with the United States. If the United States emphasizes 

its alliances, expanding security cooperation with other partners, and active engagement with 

regional multilateral institutions, it will be able to deal with Chinese regional security initiatives 

and actions from a position of strength and successfully resist Chinese efforts to erode the U.S. 

alliance system. Conversely, if Washington appears disengaged, it will become less relevant and 

less able to shape the evolving regional security environment.

Cooperation for regional influence will also have important military dimensions. China’s investment in indigenous and Russian conventional submarines, warships armed with advanced anti-ship cruise missiles, improved aircraft, and a formidable array of increasingly accurate ballistic missiles will make it more difficult and costly for the U.S. military to project power 

near and into Chinese territory. Some Chinese systems, such as the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic 

missile, are specifically designed to target U.S. aircraft carriers. The United States is responding 

with innovative systems such as a new strategic bomber, technologies (under the Third Offset 

strategy), and operational concepts (such as AirSea Battle, now labeled the Joint Concept for 

Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons) that Chinese military analysts will regard as 

highly threatening.

As the U.S. military increases its presence in the Asia-Pacific region and the People’s Liberation Army extends its operations farther from the Chinese coast, the frequency of potentially 

dangerous interactions between U.S. and Chinese military aircraft and vessels will increase. 

Moreover, competition extends into space and cyber domains, which both militaries regard 

as critical to their ability to fight and win wars. Military-to-military relations are unlikely to 

overcome these competitive dynamics, but they can have considerable value in enhancing deterrence, increasing transparency, and dispelling unfounded suspicions. They can also develop 

communication mechanisms and understandings about how military ships and aircraft will 

behave when they encounter each other, which will help avoid incidents and provide more effective crisis management tools.

U.S. policymakers should be careful to resist Beijing’s efforts to create a U.S.-China condominium or “G-2”-like arrangement. Such an arrangement would be unlikely to last and would 

probably require unacceptable compromises to accommodate China’s so-called core interests 

(including accepting China’s territorial claims to Taiwan and in the South China Sea and East 

China Sea). Accepting a Chinese sphere of influence or giving the appearance of siding with 
30 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 26

Beijing against U.S. allies would damage U.S. credibility and compromise the U.S. position in 

the Asia-Pacific region.

The Trump administration will have the opportunity to develop a new label for the U.S.-

China relationship to replace Beijing’s preferred formulation of a “new type of major country 

relationship.” It will be important to adopt a label that reflects the importance of the U.S.-China 

relationship, but does not suggest that the United States values its relationship with China above 

its relationships with its treaty allies.

China’s more assertive regional behavior is partly the product of misreading global power 

trends (including the mistaken assessment that the 2008 global financial crisis marked a fundamental shift in the relative balance of power between the United States and China). Current 

Chinese Communist Party efforts to tighten political control over the Chinese population and 

restrict the flow of information into China reflect increasing concerns about domestic stability 

in the face of slowing economic growth. China’s successful economic model needs to be adapted 

to place more weight on markets and domestic demand, but there are widespread concerns that 

the political system may not be able to push through the necessary reforms. Moreover, past efforts to stimulate the economy in the wake of the financial crisis have created debt burdens at 

various levels of the Chinese financial system that increase the risk of a major financial crisis.

Although an economic collapse that brings down the Chinese regime is unlikely, President 

Trump will likely face a Chinese leadership more focused on maintaining domestic stability and 

less inclined to engage in provocative international behavior. This will heighten the importance 

of a cooperative working relationship with the United States to give China the space to deal with 

its internal problems and should give U.S. policymakers more leverage. China will continue its 

military modernization and regional infrastructure investments through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the One Belt, One Road, initiative but may have fewer resources 

to devote to these efforts. Chinese leaders are unlikely to engage in provocative international 

behavior to divert attention from domestic problems but will be concerned that other countries 

may seek to exploit a distracted Chinese leadership.45 The result may be an increased interest in 

stabilizing maritime territorial disputes and avoiding challenges to Chinese sovereignty claims. 

This approach might also spill over into more interest in engaging with the Democratic Progressive Party on Taiwan to work out an acceptable formulation for cross-strait relations.

Conclusion

Over the next 4 years, the United States will be challenged to maintain its leadership 

of a rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific region. U.S. diplomacy must play a leading role in 
31

Asia and the Trump Administration

strengthening our alliances, partnerships, and regional institutions that widely share the U.S. 

commitment to a rules-based order as the foundation of regional peace and stability.

The U.S. bilateral alliances with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, 

and Thailand remain the foundation of our strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific region and 

need appropriate high-level attention. At the same time, the alliance structure is evolving toward a more open system, with new security partnerships forming across the region. This has 

been most noticeable in Southeast Asia, where Australia, Japan, and the United States are all engaged in maritime capacity-building with states bordering on the South China Sea. The United 

States should expand bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with its allies and partners 

and support their efforts to promote regional security cooperation. Given U.S.-China regional 

competition, initiatives from other countries may sometimes be the best means of moving forward.

The United States is best positioned to deal with China if it has devoted sufficient attention to its regional alliances, partnerships, and participation in multilateral organizations. The 

President will need to engage directly with his Chinese counterpart in order to keep both governments focused on a cooperative agenda and to manage the more competitive aspects of the 

relationship. The relationship with Beijing will be challenging, but Chinese internal economic 

and political problems are likely to give U.S. policymakers more leverage. Chinese leaders will 

remain suspicious about U.S. intentions to contain China. U.S. policymakers should stress that 

the United States supports open, rules-based regional and global organizations, which will require China’s active participation and support if they are to achieve their goals and, at the same 

time, can help generate international pressure on China to be a constructive participant.

Consistent engagement with the region by the highest levels of U.S. leadership will be 

critical for success. Allies, partners, and potential challengers will judge the regular presence 

of the President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense in the region as a key indicator of 

U.S. commitment. Sustained U.S. involvement and close coordination with regional allies and 

partners will allow the Trump administration not only to meet the challenges in the Asia-Pacific 

region, but also to grasp the opportunities.
32 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 26

Notes 1 The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a multilateral treaty established in 1954 to 

resist the expansion of communism in Southeast Asia, is a partial exception. SEATO was dissolved in 

1977.

2The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is made up of Brunei Darussalam, 

Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 

Vietnam.

3The World Bank, “East Asia Pacific Economic Update, October 2015: Staying the Course,” 

available at <www.worldbank.org/en/region/eap/publication/east-asia-pacific-economic-update>.

4U.S. Census Bureau, “Trade in Goods with Asia,” available at <www.census.gov/foreign-trade/

balance/c0016.html>.

5U.S. Census Bureau, “U.S. Direct Investment Abroad for 2012–2014,” September 2015, available at <http://bea.gov/scb/pdf/2015/09%20September/0915_outward_direct_investment_detailed_historical_cost_positions.pdf>.

6East-West Center, “Asia Matters for America,” available at <http://www.asiamattersforamerica.

org/overview>. Note that the Asia Matters for America project includes 40 countries as comprising the 

Asia-Pacific region.

7Walter Lohman, Olivia Enos, and John Fleming, 2014 Asia Update: What’s at Stake for America, Special Report No. 158 (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, October 8, 2014), available at 

<www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/10/asia-update-whats-at-stake-for-america-2014>.

8China’s official growth statistics for 1998 and 2008 do not fully reflect this slowdown, which 

was partly offset by large economic stimulus packages.

9Bonnie S. Glaser, “China’s Coercive Economic Diplomacy—A New and Worrying Trend,” 

PacNet 46 (Honolulu, HI: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 23, 2012).

10Christopher Bodeen, “China’s Military Spending Increase to Be Smallest in 6 Years,” Associated Press, March 4, 2016.

11 State Council Information Office, “China’s Military Strategy,” May 2015, available at <http://

eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/>.

12 See Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 

Republic of China 2015 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2015).

13David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of 

California Press, 2006); Evelyn Goh and Sheldon W. Simon, eds., China, the United States, and Southeast 

Asia: Contending Perspectives on Politics, Security, and Economics (New York: Routledge, 2008).

14 See David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 2013); Phillip C. Saunders, “China’s Role in Asia: Attractive or Assertive?” in International Relations of Asia, ed. David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 

2014), 147‒172.

15 “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” Canberra, Australia, November 

17, 2011, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obamaaustralian-parliament>.
33

Asia and the Trump Administration

16Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy 189 (November–December 2011), 

56–63.

17 For an analysis of the origins of the rebalance, see Phillip C. Saunders, “China’s Rising Power, 

the U.S. Rebalance to Asia, and Implications for U.S.-China Relations,” Issues and Studies 50, no. 3 (September 2014), 19–55.

18 See the fact sheets from the U.S. Trade Representative’s Office, available at <http://www.ustr.

gov/tpp>; Jeffrey Schott, Barbara Kotschwar, and Julia Muir, Understanding the Trans-Pacific Partnership

(Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2013).

19Ashton Carter, “Remarks on the Next Phase of the U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific,” McCain Institute, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, April 6, 2015, available at <www.defense.gov/

News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606660>.

20 For a recent overview of these activities, see Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., commander, U.S. 

Pacific Command, statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on U.S. Pacific 

Command Posture, February 23, 2016, available at <www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/

Harris_02-23-16.pdf>.

21 For the Japanese position, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Fact Sheet on the 

Senkaku Islands,” November 2012, available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/

fact_sheet.html>; for the Chinese position see State Council Information Office, “Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China,” September 2012, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-

09/25/c_131872152.htm>

22 Japan Ministry of Defense, available at <www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2014/

DOJ2014_3-1-1web_1031.pdf>.

23National Security Strategy (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, December 17, 2013), 1, available at 

<www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf>.

24 See Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic 

People’s Republic of Korea 2015 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2015).

25 For an analysis of future scenarios, see Phillip C. Saunders, James J. Przystup, and David F. 

Helvey, “North Korea 2025: Alternate Futures and Policy Challenges,” CSCMA Event Report, February 

2, 2016, available at < http://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/82/Documents/conference-reports/2015-Korea-Symposium-Event-Report.pdf>.

26Alan D. Romberg, “The ‘1992 Consensus’—Adapting to the Future?” China Leadership Monitor, no. 49 (Winter 2016), available at <www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/clm49ar.pdf>.

27 In late December 2016, Sao Tome and Principe shifted diplomatic recognition from Taiwan 

to the People’s Republic of China. See “China Resumes Ties with Sao Tome, Which Turned Away from 

Taiwan,” Associated Press, December 26, 2016.

28 Mark Landler and Michael Forsythe, “Trump Tells Xi Jinping U.S. Will Honor ‘One China’ 

Policy,” New York Times, February 9, 2017.

29ASEAN, “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” November 4, 2002, 

available at <www.asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea>.

30 See Christopher D. Yung and Patrick McNulty, An Empirical Analysis of Claimant Tactics in 

the South China Sea, INSS Strategic Forum 289 (Washington, DC NDU Press, August 2015).
34 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 26

31 Ibid.

32Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, August 

21, 2015), available at <www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF>.

33 Ibid.

34 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Regular Press Conference on October 27, 2015,” 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, October 27, 2015, available at <www.

fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1309625.shtml>.

35Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy.

36 In Japan, North Korea’s growing missile arsenal raises similar questions regarding missile 

defense and deterrence.

37Brad Roberts, Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia, NIDS Visiting 

Scholar Paper Series, No. 1 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, August 9, 2013 ), available at 

<www.nids.go.jp/english/publicationvisiting/pdf.01.pdf>.

38Chang Se-jeong and Ser Myo-ja, “Xi Pressed Park on Thaad System,” Korea JoongAng 

Daily, February 6, 2015, available at <http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.

aspx?aid=3000595>. 

39Available at <www.gov.ph/2014/04/29/document-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement>. 

40 “Resourcing the Pivot to East Asia and the Pacific FY 2015 Budget Priorities,” May 20, 2014, 

House of Representatives Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 4.

41 “Fact Sheet: U.S. Building Maritime Capacity in Southeast Asia,” available at <www.whitehouuse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/17>.

42 See Phillip C. Saunders, Managing Strategic Competition with China, INSS Strategic Forum 

242 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, July 2009).

43Thomas Fingar, “China’s Vision of World Order,” in Strategic Asia 2012–2013: China’s Military 

Challenge, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 

2012), 342‒373.

44Phillip C. Saunders, “Implications: China in the International System,” in The Chinese People’s 

Liberation Army in 2025, ed. Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, 2015), 301‒333.

45 John Speed Meyers and Phillip C. Saunders, “Will China Start a Diversionary War?” unpublished manuscript, April 2015.
35

Asia and the Trump Administration

About the Authors

Dr. James J. Przystup has worked on Asia-related issues for over 30 years: on the staff of 

the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs; in the 

private sector with Itochu Corporation and IBM World Trade Americas/Far East Corporation; 

in the United States Government, on the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff under Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Under Secretary of State James A. Baker III, as Senior Member 

responsible for East Asia and the Pacific; and in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy, as Director for Regional Security Strategies on the Policy Planning Staff. During the 

administration of President Ronald Reagan, Dr. Przystup served as the Deputy Director of the 

Presidential Advisory Commission on U.S.-Japan Relations. He also served on the State Department delegation to the Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia. Before accepting his current 

position, he was Director of the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation. Dr. Przystup 

was presented with the State Department’s Meritorious Honor award in 1989 and 1991; the 

Defense Department’s Outstanding Achievement Award in 1992; and cited for his Exceptional 

Performance by the National Defense University on three separate occasions.

Dr. Przystup graduated summa cum laude from the University of Detroit and holds an M.A. 

in International Relations from the University of Chicago and a Ph.D. in Diplomatic History also 

from the University of Chicago. He studied Japanese at Columbia University and Keio University 

in Tokyo and was a Visiting Fellow on the Law Faculty of Keio University.

Dr. Phillip C. Saunders is Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs 

and a Distinguished Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National 

Defense University. Dr. Saunders previously worked at the Monterey Institute of International 

Studies, where he was Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program from 1999–2003, and 

served as an officer in the U.S. Air Force from 1989–1994. Dr. Saunders is co-author, with David 

Gompert, of The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Era of Vulnerability

(NDU Press, 2011) and co-editor of five books on Chinese military and security issues. Dr. 

Saunders attended Harvard College and received his MPA and Ph.D. in International Relations 

from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University.



Center for Strategic Research Senior Fellows

COL KRIS A. BAUMAN, USAF, PH.D.

Senior Military Fellow

COL SUSAN BRYANT, USA, PH.D.

Senior Military Fellow

DR. G. ALEXANDER CROWTHER

Senior Research Fellow

DR. T.X. HAMMES

Distinguished Research Fellow

DR. FRANK G. HOFFMAN

Distinguished Research Fellow

DR. CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB

Distinguished Research Fellow

DR. ANDRE LE SAGE

Senior Research Fellow

DR. THOMAS F. LYNCH III

Distinguished Research Fellow

DR. DENISE NATALI

Director

DR. JAMES J. PRZYSTUP

Senior Research Fellow

DR. PHILLIP C. SAUNDERS

Distinguished Research Fellow

BRIGADIER GENERAL PETER B. ZWACK, USA (RET.)

Senior Research Fellow

For a complete list of INSS researchers and staff, please visit inss.ndu.edu.
ISBN 978-0-16-093962-4

9 780160 939624

90000