FOR PUBLICATION 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: 

IAN W. THOMPSON V. SAMUEL LAURIN, III 

Greenwood, Indiana BRYAN H. BABB

JOEL T. NAGLE

Bose McKinney & Evans LLP 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

LORA HOAGLAND, ) 

) 

Appellant/Plaintiff, ) 

) 

vs. ) No. 49A02-1301-PL-44 

) 

FRANKLIN TOWNSHIP COMMUNITY ) 

SCHOOL CORPORATION, ) 

) 

Appellee/Defendant. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT 

The Honorable Theodore M. Sosin, Judge 

Cause No. 49D02-1111-PL-42082 

June 10, 2014 

OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION 

VAIDIK, Chief Judge 
2

Case Summary

Indiana’s public schools lost hundreds of millions of dollars when new propertytax caps went into effect in 2010. Franklin Township Community School Corporation

(“Franklin Township”)—one of a number of school corporations hit hardest by the new 

property-tax caps—responded by eliminating student transportation for the 2011-2012 

school year. Franklin Township later contracted with an educational service center to 

provide student transportation for an annual fee. In November 2011 township parents 

filed a class-action lawsuit against the school corporation, challenging the 

constitutionality of its actions. 

Though this case raises a number of legal questions, one is of primary importance: 

did Franklin Township act unconstitutionally with respect to student transportation?

Applying our Supreme Court’s reasoning in Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School 

Corp., 844 N.E.2d 481 (Ind. 2006), we conclude that it did. We affirm in part and

reverse in part. 

Facts and Procedural History

In 2010 the Franklin Township School Board voted to eliminate student 

transportation for the 2011-2012 school year. Franklin Township then transferred its 

transportation equipment, including its buses, to Central Indiana Educational Service 

Center (“CIESC”).1 CIESC, in turn, offered transportation services to Franklin Township

parents. Parents who signed a transportation contract with CIESC received a year of 

transportation to and from school for one child for $475 and a $20 non-refundable 

 

1 Franklin Township sold its equipment to CIESC for one dollar. Appellants’ App. p. 64. 
3

deposit. A year of transportation for each additional child cost $405. Franklin Township 

did not receive any of the money paid to CIESC. Signing a contract with CIESC was 

optional; some parents chose to utilize CIESC for student transportation while other 

parents made alternate arrangements. 

In July 2010, in response to an inquiry from the State Examiner, the Attorney 

General of Indiana issued an official opinion advising that Indiana’s public-school 

corporations were “not authorized to assess and collect a bus[-]rider fee from a student in 

order for that student to receive transportation to and from the student’s school to receive 

a public education. Such a fee is unconstitutional.” Appellants’ App. p. 23. The 

Attorney General cited our Supreme Court’s opinion in Nagy, 844 N.E.2d at 481, 

explaining that Nagy “provides the following analytical framework [] for examining a fee 

or charge for services by a public[-]school corporation”:

Is the program, activity, project, service[,] or curricula mandated by the 

legislature or permitted by the legislature? If so, then “the legislature has 

made a policy decision regarding exactly what qualifies for funding at 

public expense.” 

Although the legislature has the authority to place appropriate condition[s] 

or limitations on funding for such programs, “absent statutory authority, 

fees or charges for what are otherwise public education cost items cannot 

be levied directly or indirectly against students or their parents.” 

Id. at 26-27 (citations omitted, formatting altered). Citing several sections of the Indiana 

Code, the Attorney General concluded that the Indiana General Assembly “has identified 

transportation of school children as a part of what would constitute a uniform system of 

public education in Indiana,” and pursuant to Nagy, a “school[-]bus rider fee is 

unconstitutional” under Article 8, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution. Id. at 30-31. 
4

Despite this, Franklin Township proceeded with its plan to discontinue student 

transportation, and township parents were faced with a choice: pay the transportation fee 

or make alternate transportation arrangements for their children. Lora Hoagland, whose

two sons qualified for the federal free-and-reduced-lunch program, opted to drive her 

children to and from school. 

On November 10, 2011, the Attorney General issued a second official opinion 

addressing Franklin Township’s actions directly. Again citing Nagy, the Attorney 

General advised that:

An [Educational Service Center] is the agent of the school corporation and 

may not charge parents for transporting students to and from school. Such 

a fee is unconstitutional. 

Franklin Township Community School Corporation’s transportation 

arrangement does not comply with state law as the school is attempting to 

do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly.

* * * * *

Schools may utilize private parties for provision of student[-]transportation 

services, but neither the school nor the private party may charge fees to the 

parents for the provision of such services.

Schools may utilize [Educational Service Centers] for provision of student 

transportation services, but neither the school nor the [Educational Service 

Center] may charge fees to parents for the provision of such services.

Id. at 33 (emphasis added, formatting altered). 

The next day Hoagland and Donna Chapman—a Franklin Township parent who 

had entered into a transportation contract with CIESC—filed a class-action lawsuit 

against Franklin Township and CIESC, alleging that Franklin Township had “unlawfully 

fail[ed] to provide transportation,” and seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary 
5

relief. Id. at 10-11. After the lawsuit was filed, the Franklin Township School Board 

voted to resume busing its students to and from school at no charge.

 The trial court granted Hoagland’s request for class certification and created two 

classes: “the paying class”—those individuals who entered into a contract with CIESC

and paid the transportation fee—and “the non-paying class”—those individuals who 

made alternate transportation arrangements for their children. Hoagland is the named 

plaintiff for the non-paying class and Chapman is the named plaintiff for the paying class. 

CIESC filed a motion to dismiss the claims against it. Appellee’s App. p. 10-25. 

The trial court granted CIESC’s motion. Appellants’ App. p. 92. Chapman appealed, 

and another panel of this Court affirmed.2 Chapman v. Cent. Ind. Educ. Ctr., 49A05-

1209-PL-478 (Ind. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2013), trans. denied.

Only Hoagland’s and Chapman’s claims against Franklin Township remained. In 

August 2012, all three parties filed summary-judgment motions. After oral argument, the 

trial court granted summary judgment for Franklin Township. Appellants’ App. p. 49-61. 

In relevant part, the court concluded that: (1) the Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) 

barred Hoagland’s and Chapman’s claims; (2) Hoagland and Chapman were not entitled 

 

2

In affirming the trial court, this Court wrote:

[C]hapman alleged in her complaint that “the CIESC contract is an unenforceable 

adhesion contract, that it is illegal, that it unlawfully purports to limit parents’ remedy 

and is void as against public policy.” Chapman does not further allege why the CIESC 

contract is an adhesion contract, why it is illegal, why it unlawfully limited parents’

remedy, or how it is void against public policy. Chapman entered into a contract with 

CIESC, under which CIESC, a private vendor, was to transport her child to school in 

exchange for a fee paid by Chapman. Chapman paid the fee and received bus services 

from CIESC for the 2011-2012 school year, and that contract between the parties is now 

completed.

Chapman v. Cent. Ind. Educ. Ctr., 49A05-1209-PL-478 (Ind. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2013) (references 

omitted), trans. denied. 
6

to monetary damages; and (3) Franklin Township did not violate the Indiana Constitution 

by discontinuing student transportation to and from school. Id. at 50. 

Hoagland—but not Chapman—appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

On appeal, Hoagland contends that Franklin Township, through CIESC, violated 

the Indiana Constitution by charging a transportation fee. She argues that student 

transportation to and from school is an integral part of public education, so Franklin 

Township may not charge for it—or discontinue it. In response, Franklin Township 

argues that Hoagland’s claim is barred by the ITCA and the Indiana Constitution does not

authorize the monetary relief that Hoagland seeks. Franklin Township also contends that 

it has no constitutional duty to bus its students to and from school under the Education 

Clause or any other Indiana law.3 

I. Standard of Review

Hoagland appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Franklin 

Township. “In reviewing an appeal of a motion for summary judgment ruling, we apply 

the same standard applicable to the trial court.” Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 

1218 (Ind. 2013) (citations omitted). Our review is limited to the facts that were 

designated to the trial court, Ind. Trial Rule 56(H), and summary judgment shall be 

granted where the designated evidence “shows that there is no genuine issue as to any 

 

3 Franklin Township also argues that Hoagland lacks standing to assert the paying class’s claims,

and we agree. In December 2012 the trial court granted summary judgment for Franklin Township on 

Hoagland’s and Chapman’s constitutional claims. While Chapman, on behalf of the paying class, had 

appealed the grant of summary judgment for CIESC, she did not appeal the grant of summary judgment 

for Franklin Township—only Hoagland did. Moreover, Hoagland is not in a position to raise the paying 

class’s legal challenges: she never entered into a transportation contract with CIESC, which forms the 

basis of the paying class’s claims. 
7

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” T.

R. 56(C). “All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in 

favor of the non-moving party.” Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1218 (citation omitted). “When 

faced with competing motions for summary judgment, our analysis is unchanged and we 

consider each motion separately construing the facts most favorably to the non-moving 

party in each instance.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Where, as here, the facts are not 

disputed, our review is de novo. Justice v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 4 N.E.3d 1171, 

1174-75 (Ind. 2014).

II. Hoagland’s State Constitutional Claim is not Subject to the ITCA

Whether the ITCA applies to state constitutional claims appears to be an issue of 

first impression. This Court has previously held that claims against school corporations 

are subject to the ITCA. See Simpson v. OP Prop. Mgmt., LLC, 939 N.E.2d 1098, 1102 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied; Meury v. Eagle-Union Cmty. Sch. Corp., 714 N.E.2d 

233, 241 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. Hoagland acknowledges that she is suing a 

school corporation. However, she argues that she is asserting a state constitutional claim, 

not a tort claim, and asks us to declare that the ITCA does not apply to her state 

constitutional claim. 

This issue has been raised in federal district court. In 2000, in an opinion on 

summary judgment, Judge John Tinder wrote:
8

The Defendants first argue that the Plaintiff has waived his [Indiana]

constitutional claims for failure to file a timely tort claim notice. They have 

not cited to any case which holds that a state constitutional claim is 

governed by [the ITCA], and the court’s own research has located none. It 

is unclear whether the Indiana courts would require a tort claim notice to be 

filed with respect to state constitutional claims.

Baker v. Washington Bd. of Works, 2000 WL 33252101 at *7 (S.D. Ind. June 8, 2000), 

recons. granted in part on other grounds, 2000 WL 964934. “In the absence of any [] 

authority” holding that the ITCA applies to non-tort claims, Judge Tinder “decline[d] to 

impose such a requirement . . . .” Id. Three years later, in Schreiber v. Lawrence, 2003 

WL 1562563 *6 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 4, 2003), Judge David Hamilton noted that it was still 

unclear whether Indiana courts would apply the ITCA to state constitutional claims.

When interpreting a statute, we independently review a statute’s meaning and then 

apply it to the facts of the case being reviewed. Jones v. Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 926 

N.E.2d 116, 121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). First, we determine whether the legislature has 

spoken clearly and unambiguously in the statute. Id. If a statute is unambiguous—

meaning it is not susceptible to more than one interpretation—we will apply its clear 

and plain meaning. Id.

By its express language, the ITCA “applies only to a claim or suit in tort.” Ind. 

Code § 34-13-3-1. A tort is defined as “a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for 

which a remedy may be obtained, usually in the form of damages; a breach of duty that 

the law imposes on persons who stand in a particular relation to one another.” Black’s 

Law Dictionary 1526 (8th ed. 2004). Hoagland’s claim sounds in Indiana’s Education 

Clause, not tort law, and for reasons explained below, she may not seek monetary 
9

damages.4 Moreover, this case does not involve the type of loss contemplated by the 

ITCA: in general, the ITCA requires a plaintiff to give notice of a claim soon after a loss 

occurs, and the ITCA defines “loss” as “injury to or death of a person or damages to 

property.” Ind. Code § 34-6-2-75. Therefore, in light of the ITCA’s express language, 

we conclude that the ITCA does not govern Hoagland’s state constitutional claim.5

III. Hoagland May Not Seek Monetary Damages

Hoagland seeks monetary damages from Franklin Township. See Appellants’

App. p. 10-11. In granting summary judgment for the township, the trial court held that 

“the Education Clause does not afford the Plaintiff a private cause of action for monetary

damages . . . .” Id. at 57. We agree. 

There is no express or implied right of action for monetary damages under the 

Indiana Constitution. In Smith v. Indiana Department of Correction, 871 N.E.2d 975, 

985-86 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied, this Court held that:

[N]o Indiana court has explicitly recognized a private right of action for 

monetary damages under the Indiana Constitution. With respect to Article 

1 Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution, the Indiana Supreme Court has 

“never held that the Open Courts Clause provides a substantive ‘right’ of 

access to the courts or to bring a particular cause of action to remedy an 

asserted wrong.” Blanck v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 829 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Ind. 

2005). With one exception, the federal district courts that have addressed 

the issue have found it unlikely that Indiana Courts would recognize an 

implied right of action for damages under the Indiana Constitution. See,

e.g., Fidler v. City of Indpls., 428 F. Supp. 2d 857, 865 (S.D. Ind. 2006). In 

making this determination, the district courts reasoned that Indiana’s courts 

have been hesitant to recognize implied rights of action under Indiana 

statutory law, and it is unlikely that the framers of the Indiana Constitution 

intended such an action because they would have understood sovereign

 

4

In Cantrell v. Morris, 849 N.E.2d 488, 605 (Ind. 2006), our Supreme Court recognized that the 

ITCA does not apply to federal constitutional claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

5 For this reason we need not consider whether Hoagland complied with the ITCA’s provisions. 
10

immunity to bar such an action. Baker, 2000 WL 33252101 at *8. Since 

there is no express or implied right of action for monetary damages under 

the Indiana Constitution, Smith cannot succeed on such a claim.

(Formatting altered, emphasis added).6 Because there is no right of action for monetary 

damages under the Indiana Constitution, Hoagland cannot succeed on her damages claim. 

IV. Public-School Transportation in Indiana

Hoagland also seeks a declaratory judgment that Franklin Township acted 

unconstitutionally by discontinuing student transportation and contracting with CIESC 

to provide student transportation for a yearly fee.

7 She argues that this studenttransportation fee violates the Education Clause, Article 8, Section 1 of the Indiana 

Constitution. In essence, her argument is that student transportation is an integral part 

of public education, so Franklin Township may not charge for it—or discontinue it. In 

response, Franklin Township argues that it has no constitutional duty to transport its 

students to and from school. The trial court determined that Franklin Township acted 

constitutionally with respect to student transportation and denied Hoagland’s request for 

a declaratory judgment. For reasons explained below, we find that this was error. 

 

6 See also Cantrell, 849 N.E.2d at 499 (“There is no explicit language in the Indiana Constitution 

providing any specific remedy for violations of constitutional rights.”). Federal district courts have also

held that there is no right of action for monetary damages under the Indiana Constitution. See, e.g.,

Greater Indianapolis Chapter of N.A.A.C.P. v. Ballard, 741 F. Supp. 2d 925, 934 (S.D. Ind. 2010)

(“Going back to at least 2000, and after Cantrell, the judges of this District have refused to recognize 

implied rights of action under the Indiana Constitution.”). 

7 Declaratory relief is appropriate in this case. “The test to determine the propriety of declaratory 

relief is whether the issuance of a declaratory judgment will effectively solve the problem involved, 

whether it will serve a useful purpose, and whether [] another remedy is more effective or efficient.” 

Hood’s Gardens, Inc. v. Young, 976 N.E.2d 80, 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Boone Cnty. Area Plan 

Comm’n v. Kennedy, 560 N.E.2d 692, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), trans. denied). “The determinative factor 

of this test is whether the declaratory action will result in a just and more expeditious and economical 

determination of the entire controversy.” Id. (citing Ferrell v. Dunescape Beach Club Condo. Phase I, 

Inc., 751 N.E.2d 702, 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)). As school corporations across the state are grappling

with budget and transportation issues, declaratory judgment in this case will be a useful step toward 

resolving the controversy. 
11

A. The Education Clause and the Education Code 

The Education Clause, Article 8, Section 1, of the Indiana Constitution, states:

Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a community, being 

essential to the preservation of a free government; it shall be the duty of the 

General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable means, moral, intellectual, 

scientific, and agricultural improvement; and to provide, by law, for a 

general and uniform system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall be 

without charge, and equally open to all.

The Education Clause expresses two duties of the General Assembly: (1) the duty to 

encourage moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement and (2) the duty to 

provide for a general and uniform system of open common schools without tuition.

Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1220-21. 

Our legislature has enacted a detailed and comprehensive body of law aimed at 

providing a general and uniform system of public schools. See Titles 20 and 21 of the 

Indiana Code (“the Education Code”). The Education Code makes numerous provisions 

for public-school transportation in Indiana. One provision, Indiana Code section 20-27-

5-2, is particularly relevant to our analysis. 

Section 20-27-5-2 authorizes school corporations to transport their students to and 

from school. Critically, after suit was filed against Franklin Township, our legislature 

amended Section 20-27-5-2 to prohibit school corporations from charging a 

transportation fee:

(a) The governing body of a school corporation may provide transportation 

for students to and from school.[8]

(b) If the governing body of a school corporation:

 

8 This first sentence was present in the original statute enacted in 2005. The remaining text was 

added by the 2012 amendment. See P.L. 140-2012 (eff. July 1, 2012). 
12

(1) provides transportation; or

(2) contracts with an educational service center (as defined by IC 20- 

20-1-2) to provide transportation;

no fee may be charged to a parent or student for transportation to and from 

school. However, a fee may be charged for transportation to and from an 

athletic, a social, or another school sponsored function.

(Emphasis added). The Education Code contains other provisions that pertain to school 

corporations’ transportation of students, see Ind. Code § 20-26-5-4(10), as well as 

parents’ rights to arrange transportation for their children, see Ind. Code ch. 20-27-6. 

Notably, however, Indiana law also requires that some students be transported to 

and from school. School corporations must transport students with disabilities,9 511 Ind. 

Admin. Code 7-36-8, homeless students, Ind. Code § 20-27-12-4, students in foster care, 

Ind. Code § 20-50-3-5, and in certain circumstances, private-school students, Ind. Code § 

20-27-11-1.10

B. Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corporation

Nagy provides the analytical framework for examining a fee or charge for services 

by a school corporation. 

 

9 See also Ind. Code § 20-35-8-1(a)(1) (except as otherwise provided, if a student with legal 

settlement in a school corporation is transferred to another school corporation because of a disability, the 

transferor corporation must either provide transportation or pay transportation costs). 

10 Section 20-27-11-1 provides:

Sec. 1. (a) If a student who attends a nonpublic school in a school corporation resides on 

or along the highway constituting the regular route of a public school bus, the governing 

body of the school corporation shall provide transportation for the nonpublic school 

student on the school bus.

(b) The transportation provided under this section must be from the home of the 

nonpublic school student or from a point on the regular route nearest or most easily 

accessible to the home of the nonpublic school student to and from the nonpublic school 

or to and from the point on the regular route that is nearest or most easily accessible to 

the nonpublic school from which the student can walk to and from the nonpublic school.
13

In Nagy, the Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corporation (“EVSC”) imposed a 

$20 fee on all students from kindergarten through twelfth grade. 844 N.E.2d at 483. The 

“student-services fee” was used to fund, among other things, a student-services 

coordinator, nurses, media specialists, alternative education, elementary-school 

counselors, a police-liaison program, and activities such as athletics, drama, and music. 

Id. The fee was charged to every student, even those students who qualified for the 

federal free-and-reduced-lunch program. Id. If the student-services fee was not paid, 

EVSC would send a notice to the student’s parents threatening to refer the matter to a law 

firm for collection. Id. 

Parents of children who qualified for the federal free-and-reduced-lunch program 

filed a class-action lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. In relevant part, the 

complaint alleged that the student-services fee violated Article 8, Section 1 of the Indiana 

Constitution. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of EVSC.

This Court reversed, and our Supreme Court granted transfer. On transfer, our 

Supreme Court found EVSC’s student-services fee unconstitutional based on our 

legislature’s actions:

Where the legislature . . . has identified programs, activities, projects, 

services or curricula that it either mandates or permits school corporations 

to undertake, the legislature has made a policy decision regarding exactly 

what qualifies as a part of a uniform system of public education 

commanded by Article 8, Section 1 and thus what qualifies for funding at 

public expense. And of course the legislature has the authority to place 

appropriate conditions or limitations on any such funding. However, absent 

specific statutory authority, fees or charges for what are otherwise public 

education cost items cannot be levied directly or indirectly against students 

or their parents. Only programs, activities, projects, services or curricula 

that are outside of or expand upon those identified by the legislature—what 

we understand to be “extracurricular”—may be considered as not a part of a 
14

publicly-funded education. And thus a reasonable fee may be assessed, but 

only against those students who participate in or take advantage of them.

Id. at 492 (emphases added). Because the student-services fee was used to fund things 

such as a student-services coordinator, nurses, media specialists, alternative education, 

elementary-school counselors, a police-liaison program, and activities such as athletics, 

drama, and music, and the legislature had “already determined that all such items are part 

and parcel of a public school education and by extension qualify for public funding,” the 

Court ruled that the fee was unconstitutional. Id. at 493.

C. Franklin Township Acted Unconstitutionally 

Applying Nagy to the facts of this case, we conclude that Franklin Township acted 

unconstitutionally. Our legislature has determined that school corporations “may” 

transport their students to and from school. See Ind. Code § 20-27-5-2. Thus, pursuant to

Nagy, the legislature has determined that transportation to and from school qualifies as a 

part of a uniform system of public education. 844 N.E.2d at 492 (“Where the legislature . 

. . has identified . . . services . . . that it either mandates or permits school corporations to 

undertake, the legislature has made a policy decision regarding exactly what qualifies as a 

part of a uniform system of public education . . . .”). Franklin Township’s arrangement 

with CIESC—which is, by definition, Franklin Township’s agent11—to transport its 

students to and from school for an annual fee violated the Education Clause. See id.

(“[F]ees or charges for what are otherwise public education cost items cannot be levied 

directly or indirectly against students or their parents.”). This conclusion is consistent 

 

11 See Ind. Code § 20-21-1-2(a) (defining an “educational service center” as “an extended agency 

of school corporations . . . .”). 
15

with the 2012 amendment to Section 20-27-5-2, which now prevents school corporations 

from charging a fee for transporting students to and from school. 

If Indiana’s school corporations may not charge a fee for transporting students to 

and from school, may they stop transporting students to and from school? Franklin 

Township says yes; it argues that it may discontinue student transportation because the

Education Code has only authorized—not mandated—student transportation.12 But that 

is not entirely accurate: Indiana’s school corporations must transport homeless students, 

foster-care students, special-needs students, and even private-school students who live on

or near a school bus route. It is hard to image that the legislature meant to require our 

school corporations to transport these students but exclude all others.

13 It is similarly 

 

12 Interestingly, neither party cites Chapter 20-27-13, which went into effect March 19, 2012, and 

discusses the termination of school transportation. The Chapter applies to any “school corporation that 

carried out a general program in at least one (1) school year beginning after June 30, 2010, to provide 

transportation to and from school for eligible students.” Ind. Code § 20-27-13-2. Of particular 

significance is Section 20-27-13-3, which authorizes school corporations to stop transporting “eligible 

students” to and from school: 

Except as provided in section 7 of this chapter, a school corporation described in section 

2 of this chapter shall carry out a program to provide transportation to and from school 

for all eligible students in any part of a school year beginning after June 30, 2012, unless 

the governing body of the school corporation:

(1) approves the termination of the transportation program; and

(2) provides public notice of the date after which the transportation will no longer 

be provided under the transportation program;

at least three (3) years before the date after which the transportation will no longer be 

provided under the transportation program.

An “eligible student” is defined as an individual who is enrolled in a school corporation, has legal 

settlement in the school corporation, attended school in the school corporation’s taxing district, and is not 

required by federal or state law to receive transportation services to and from school. Ind. Code § 20-27-

13-1. Because neither party cites Chapter 20-27-13, we do not raise it sua sponte.

13 Responding to concerns about budget shortfalls and student transportation, the legislature 

recently enacted Indiana Code section 6-1.1-20.6-9.9, which works in conjunction with Indiana Code 

section 5-1-5-2.5. Section 5-1-5-2.5 diverts money from school corporations’ transportation funds to pay 
16

difficult to comprehend, returning to Nagy, that if transportation to and from school is 

“part and parcel of a public[-]school education,” school corporations could simply 

discontinue it without running afoul of the Indiana Constitution.

14

Franklin Township’s statutory argument is not a persuasive one, and the township

offers no justification for departing from the logic found in Nagy. For this reason, we 

conclude that Franklin Township also acted unconstitutionally when it discontinued 

student transportation to and from school. 

In summary, we affirm in part and reverse in part. We affirm the trial court’s 

conclusion that Hoagland is not entitled to legal relief, as there is no right of action for 

monetary damages under the Indiana Constitution. However, we conclude that the ITCA 

does not apply to Hoagland’s state constitutional claim, and we reverse the trial court on 

that ground. We also conclude that Franklin Township acted unconstitutionally by 

discontinuing student transportation to and from school and by later contracting with 

CIESC to provide that transportation for a yearly fee, and Hoagland is entitled to 

declaratory judgment to that effect. We therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of 

declaratory judgment and remand to the trial court with instructions to enter a declaratory 

judgment consistent with this opinion. 

Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 

RILEY, J., and MAY, J., concur.

 

their debts. Section 6-1.1-20.6-9.9 offers school corporations that lost at least ten percent of their 

property-tax funds a three-year reprieve from the fund-diversion requirement. 

14 Neither party provides any independent constitutional analysis; Franklin Township relies 

wholly on the Education Code and Hoagland cites Nagy to support her claims.