Opinion filed May 3, 2012

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

__________

No. 11-10-00330-CR

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STANLEY ANTHONY SHOOTES, Appellant

V.

STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 350th District Court

Taylor County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 09311-D

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Stanley Anthony Shootes appeals his conviction by the court of the offense of aggravated 

sexual assault, following his plea of not guilty. The trial court assessed his punishment at eleven 

years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. Shootes contends in a 

sole point of error that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to make a bill of exception and 

offer of proof in response to the trial court’s sustaining an objection by the State to a question his 

trial counsel asked the complaining witness. We modify and affirm.

In order to prevail on this claim, Shootes must first establish that his counsel’s 

performance was deficient by showing that his counsel’s representation fell below the objective 
2

standard of professional norms. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Bone v. 

State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Second, he must show that this deficient 

performance prejudiced his defense by showing that the error was so serious as to deprive him of 

a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This means that Shootes 

must show a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different. Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 833. A reasonable probability is 

one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

Appellate review of defense counsel’s representation is highly deferential and presumes 

that counsel’s actions fell within the wide range of reasonable and professional assistance. Bone, 

77 S.W.3d at 833. Under normal circumstances, the record on direct appeal will not be sufficient 

to show that counsel’s representation was so deficient and so lacking in tactical or strategic 

decision making as to overcome the presumption that counsel’s conduct was reasonable and 

professional. Id. In the case at bar, there is no evidence as to counsel’s strategy with respect to 

not making a bill of exception and offer of proof in order to preserve what the complaining 

witness’s testimony would have been. Consequently, we conclude that the record in this appeal 

is inadequate to support Shootes’s contention. We are unwilling to assume, as we are urged to 

do by Shootes, that there could have been no reasonable trial strategy. We overrule Shootes’s 

sole point of error.

The judgment entered by the trial court reflects that Shootes entered a plea of guilty to the 

charged offense. However, the reporter’s record shows that he entered a plea of not guilty to the 

charged offense. We modify the judgment of the trial court to reflect that Shootes entered a plea 

of not guilty to the charged offense. As modified, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM

May 3, 2012

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Hill, J.1

 

1

John G. Hill, Former Justice, Court of Appeals, 2nd District of Texas at Fort Worth, sitting by assignment.