### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-17-00482- CV

River C ity Drywall, LL C, Appellant

v. Eric Hanlon and Nali nh H anlon , Appellees

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 98TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -GN-1 5-0 0208 9, H ONO RAB LE AMY CLARK MEACH UM, J UDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

River City Dry

wall, L L C, (River City ) appea ls the t ri al co urt’s final judgme nt rende red afte r a jury found in favor of appellee s Eric and Nalinh Hanlon on their construction-de fec t claims. The Ha

nlons hired River City

to install dry

wall and dry

wall text ure in the ne w home they

wer e building and ultimately su ed R i v er City as well as their painter and, later, the manufa cture r of the text ure product due to problems with paint peeling off the walls i n t h ei r h ome. River City contends that the evidenc e is leg ally and fac tually insufficient t o s u p port the jury ’s answe rs to questions about proxi mate cau s at i o n, brea ch of war ranty , damag es, and attorney ’s fee s. For the following rea sons, we will reve rse the trial court’s judgme nt and rende r judgme nt that the Hanlons take nothing on their cla ims.BACK GR OUND 1
The Hanlons serve d in the role of g ener al contra ctor in the co n struction of their

new home (the Residence ) in Austin. They enter ed into a contra ct with River City to install t h e Residence ’s dry

wall and to apply decor ative text ure to the dry wall. They hired another contra ctor, Nicolas Guer

rer o, to paint the interior walls afte r River City finished its dry wall and text ure work.
At some point afte r t he wa lls were pa inted, the Hanlons discove red tha t when blue painter’ s tape is ap p lied to some of t he walls and then remove d, some of t he paint peels off along with the tape. The Hanlons filed a lawsuit ag ainst River C ity and Guer err o and later added the manufa cture r of the text ure product, Murco W al l P roducts, I nc. (Murc o), as a defe ndant for the damag es t hey alleg edly suffe red in the form of t he peeling paint. The Hanlon s as s er t ed cause s of action ag ainst the defe ndants for brea ch of contra ct, brea ch of war ranty , violations of the Dec eptive Trade Practice s Act (DT PA), neg lige nce, a nd fra ud. The case was tried t o a jury , afte r which the j ury re t u rned a verdict in favor of t he 2 Hanlons, finding that River City brea ched its con t ra ct with them; knowing ly eng ag ed in a false, misleading , or dece ptive act or prac tice on wh i ch the Hanlons relied to their detriment; failed to comply with a war

ranty ; and committed a neg li gen t act or omission. The jury additionally found that River City ’s conduct, under eac h of the Hanlons ’ t heorie s, was the proxi mate cause of the

Be cause the parties are familiar with the fac ts of the case and its proce dural his t o ry , we 1 include only a brief summary of the rele vant and undisputed fac ts here and will ref ere nce the evidenc e adduce d at trial in the discussion section of this opinion only to the ext ent nece ssary to advise the parties of the Court’s decision and the basic rea sons for it. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1, 47.4. Shortly befor e trial, Gue rre ro and Mur co ea ch settled with the Ha nlons. 2 2Hanlons’ damag es, in the amount of $ 2 6 7 , 1 6 0

. The jury also found that the Hanlons incurre d 3 $222,079 in r easona

ble attorney ’s fee s. The trial court r ender ed judg ment in favor of the Hanlons

on their brea ch-of

-wa rra nty cl ai m , awa

rding them actua l damag es and attorney ’s fee s in the
amounts found by the jury

. The judgme nt also awa rded River City a settlement cre dit in the amount of $100,000, which “is the s ettlement amount rec eived by Plai n t i ff s l es s the amount of attorney s’ fee s that were seg reg ated by Plaintiff at trial for the settling pa rty .”

DISCUSSIO N River City raises four issues on appea l, contending that the evidenc e is (a) leg ally and fac tually insufficient to suppor t the jury ’s answe rs to questions about (1) proxi mate causa tion, (2) brea ch of war

ranty , and (3) damag es and (b) fac tually insufficient to support the jury ’s answe rs to que stions about attorney ’s fee s. Specifica lly with respe ct to c ausation, River City contends that

none of the Hanlons’ expert witnesses wer e qualified to testify about the dry wall or dry

wall text ure and their purported defe ctive installation as the proxi mate cause of the “pe el i n g-paint problem” and that their testimony was, there fore , unreliable

. See Broders v. Heise , 924 S.W .2d 148, 152 (Tex. 1996) (noting that proponent of expert testimony has burden to show that expert possesses “spec ial knowledg e as to the very matter on which he proposes to g ive an opinion” (citation omitted)). River City makes simil ar arg uments with respe ct to its issue conce rning brea ch of war ranty , asser

ting that the Hanlons’ experts wer e “inca pable of judging River City ’s installation of the dry wall text ure”

The Hanlons’ damag es ex pert, David B. Kettler, supported his $222,344 repa ir estimate 3 by explaining that all of the dry wall would need to be remove d and repla ced, rete x tured, and repa inted and that mere ly rete x turing the “proble m a rea s” would not a ddress the painted are as that are likely to peel off

in the future. 3and did not testify that River City “in any way failed to install or apply dry wall text ure in a g ood and workmanlike manner .” River City continues with its asser tions o f u nreliable expert-witness testimony in raising its third issue about t he evidentiary sufficie ncy to support the j ury ’s award of damag es. Wit h respe ct to its complaint about attorney ’s fee s, River City contends that the Hanlons’ attorney who testified on the issue did not proper ly seg reg ate his firm’s fee s for work on the case as it relate d to pursuing the Hanlons’ c laims ag ainst eac h of the de fenda nts.

Stan dards of revie w

The evidenc e is legal l y insufficient if: (1) there is a complete absenc e of evidenc e of a vital fac t; (2) the law prec ludes consideration of the only evidenc e offe red to prove a vital fac t; (3) the evidenc e offe red to prove a vital fac t is no more than a scintill a; o r (4 ) t h e ev idence conclusively establishes the opposite o f a v ital fac t. City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802,
810–11 (Tex. 2005). More than a scintilla of evidenc e exis ts if rea sonable and fair- minded people

can differ in their conclusions about its meaning

. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway , 135 S.W .3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004). I n deter

mining whether a finding is supported by leg ally sufficie nt evidenc e, we view the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the finding , cre diting favor able evidenc e if a rea sonable fac tfinder could, and d i s re gar d ing contra ry evidenc e unless a rea sonable fac tfinder could not. City of Keller , 168 S.W .3d at 807. We indulge ever y rea sonable inferenc e that would support the finding

. Id. at 822.

When revie wing a verdic t for fac tual s u ff i ci ency , we consider and weig h all of the evidenc e, not just the evi d en ce that supports the verdic t. Maritime Ove rseas Corp. v. Ellis , 971 S.W .2d 402, 406–07 (Tex. 1998). When a party challeng es the fac tu al s u ff i ci en cy of the

4ev i dence supporting a findi ng for which it did not have the burden of proof, we m ay set as i d e t h e

verdic t only

if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weig ht of t he evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. See id. at 407. We may not substitut e our o wn j u d gm en t for that of the fac tfinder or pass upon the cr edibility

of witnesses. Id

.

P roxim ate c ausation

I n its first issue, River City challeng es the evidentiar y s u ff i ciency to support the jury ’s finding s, under eac h of the Hanlons’ asser ted theories, that River City ’s acts or omissions wer e the cause in fac t of the Hanlons’ injury (i.e., the peeling -paint problem). See Del Lago Partners v. Smith , 307 S.W .3d 762, 774 (Tex

. 2 0 1 0) (explaining proxi mate cause as having two elements—

cause in fac t and fore seea

bility —and noting that test for cause in fac t is whether act or omission was “a substantial fac tor in causing the injury without which the harm would not have o cc u rr ed ”)

. A fi n d i n g of cause in fac t may be based on either direc t or circ umstantial evidenc e, but it cannot be supported by mere conjec ture, g uess, or specula tion. Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner , 106 S.W .3d 724, 727 (Tex. 2003).

Specifica lly , River City contends that the Hanlons “attempted to prove [prox imate]

causa tion solely throug h the testimony of witnesses who admittedly l ac k ed ex pertise in dry wall, dry wall text ure, dry

wall-texture application, or any thing rela ted with dry

wall or dry

wall text ure, and whose opinions wer e unreliable beca use they wer e not the product of objective scientific methods.”
I n other words, River City contends that beca use there was no competent exper t t es t imony about whether any act or omission of River City was the proxi mate cause of the peeling -paint problem, we
must reve rse the judgme nt beca use the jury ’s causa tion finding s could only , there fore , be based on

5mere specula tion. See id. at 727–28 (“[A]s we have fre quently said, some suspicion linked to other

suspicion produce s only more suspicion, which is not the same as s o me evidenc e.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)).

“Proof other than e x pert testimony will constitut e some evidenc e of causa tion only when a lay

person’ s g ener al ex perie nce and common under standing would enable the lay person to deter mine from the evidenc e, with rea sonable probability , the causa l rela tionship betwee n the event and the condition.” Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez , 206 S.W .3d 572, 583 (Tex. 2006). Whether expert
t es t i m o n y is nece ssary to prove a matter or theory is a question of law. Id. (citing FFE T r a n s p
. Servs., Inc. v. Fulgham , 154 S.W .3d 84, 89–90 (Tex. 2004)). We conclude that wh ether dry wall
t ex t u re has been proper ly applied and whether its alleg ed improper application here cause d t h e peeling -paint problem are issues that are not w ithin a lay person’ s g ener al experience and common understand i n g; there fore , the Hanlons wer e require d to prove those issues with expert testimony

. After revie wing all of the evidenc e, we ag ree with River City that it is leg ally insufficient to support the jury ’s verdic t that River City was the proxi mate cause of the Hanlons’ damag es. The evidentiar y problems ar e two-f

old: (1) none of

the experts relied upon by the Hanlons were qualified t o opine about whether River City did any thing wrong in a

pply ing the dry

wall text ure (and wer e not able to identify any wrong ful act or omission), and (2) neither the experts’ testimony nor any other evidenc e

cre ated any

thing more than a mere suspicion of a causa l link betwee n any act or omission of River City and the pe eling -paint problem.

The Hanlons r e li e d o n th e te s ti mo ny o f three experts to support their causa tion claims: Dwig ht G. Weldon, an expert in “paint and coating failure analy sis” and author of the book, Failure

6Analysis of Paints and Coatings ; David B. Kettler, a “re sidential remode ling” expert who testified

a s to h is r e c o mm e n d e d r e p a ir p r o c e d u r e s a n d c o s ts th e r e o f

; a n d T h a n e K a tz , a p a in t “ p r o d u c t q u a li ty ” employ ee of Sherwin Wil liams—the manufa cture r of the pain t u s e d in the Residence —who has been analy zing paint and doing “quality repor ting” for the company for six teen y ear s. Significa ntly , the Hanlons did not call any dry wall or dry

wall-texture experts to testify about proper text ure application

or the eff ects of improper text ure application, and al l t h re e of the Hanlons’ experts admitted that they are not experts on dry wall text ure or its application. Fur thermore , eac h of the thr ee experts additionally testified about their lack of qualifica tions to testif y an d o p i n e about the issue of why
text ure might fail or why it alleg edly did fail i n this case —the “very matter” on which the e x perts purported to g ive ultimate opinions. See B roders , 924 S.W .2d at 152.

Specifica lly , Weldon testified that:

• He does not have the expertise to testify or opine about why dry wall text ure would “fa il,” except that he “ca n tell y ou in broad terms that if it fails, i t ’s either be cause it was applied wr ong or it was def ective pr oduct.”

• He i s not an expert in the manufa cturing of dry wall text ure or its chem i ca l composition.

• He is not an e x pert in prope r applica tion of dry wall texture to walls.

• He has never befor e been called as an expert to opine in a lawsuit that text ure is defec tive beca

use it pulled awa

y from the wa ll with painter’s tape

.

• He is not an expert on adhesion proper ties of dry wall text ure and cannot point to any industry standard or peer -re viewed scientific journal that has measure d the adhesive nature of dry wall text ure and deter

mined what forc es it should be able to withstand before it “fails.”

• He is not familiar w ith the Dry wall Finishing Council, a trade g roup.

7Kettler similarly testified that:

• He does not hold himself out as an expert on whether dry wall text ure is or is not defe ctive.

• The last time he himself did any work involving dry wall text ure or paint was in the ear ly

1970’s.

• He has never befor e g iven expert opinion testimony on the adhesive or bonding quality or char acte ristics of dry wall text ure and h as never been rec og nized by a court as an exp er t conce rning the char acte r, quality , or char acte ristics of dry

wall texture or its application.
Finally , Katz testified that:

• He does not hold himself out as an expert reg arding dry wall-t ex t u re manufa cture , composition, or formulas.

• He ha s no experience in apply ing dr y wall texture.

• He has never been reta ined by any one in litigation to g i v e opinions on whether or not dry

wall text ure has been applied to dry wall in a workmanlike manner .

• He cannot identify any industry standard conce rning cohesive ness of dry wall text ure, is not a chemist, and is not an expert reg arding the “bre aking point” of dry wall texture.

I t is evident from the rec ord that all three of the Hanlons’ experts admittedly lacke d
any specia l knowledg e, tra ining, or education reg arding dry

wall or dry

wall texture, both ge nera lly and specific ally about its proper application and the eff ects of its improper application. Fur thermore ,

none of the witnesse s were able to identify any particula r act or omission on the part of River City that they considere d improper, neg lige nt, or substandard. The experts’ ultimate concl u s i ons on

8causa tion also demonstrate thei r l ack of qualifica tions to opine on that issue, as i ndicated by their explanations of the foundations on which their opinions were ba sed. Specifica lly , Weldon testified t h at h e analy zed some peele d-paint samples that the Hanlons sent to him ; h e did not visit the R esidenc e or collect any samples hi mself. He ex plained that when he analy

zes paint to deter

m i n e h o w it has failed to perf orm as it should, he attempts to deter mine in which “plane ”—which lay er of paint, p ri m er , o r other materia l—the “fa ilure” has

occur red. He conclude d that the paint’s failure to adher e to the wall in this case occur red within the
text ure “plane ” rathe r than within one of the paint “plane s,” based on the fac t that he found a small
amount of text ure materia l on the back of the peele d paint, which he confirme d b y v i ew i n g the samples under a microscope and using “infra red spectrosc opy .” He explained his conclusion thus: 4 “Well, here [t he failure i] s occur ring in the text ure coat, beca use there ’s text ure coat on the back of the primer.” Weldon explained that he did not measure the thickness of the text ure materia l on the back of the peeled-pa int samples because the text ure m at eria l and the primer applied by Guer rer o

wer e both white in c olor and he could not se e the “line of demar cation” betwee n them; instea d, he used an “ X-Ac to knife” to “ shave of f th[e] powder

y text ure c oat” a

nd estimated, based on his “35
y ear s of doing this,” that there “wa s a couple of mils of text ure coat on the back” of the peele d-paint sample. He explained that a “mil” is “one one-thousandths of an inch” or “25 microns”—e ssentially , “the thickne ss of a piec e of pa per.”

We ld o n e xp la in e d to th e ju r y th a t in f r a r e d s p e c tr o s c o p y is “ b a s ic a ll y a n a n a ly ti c a l te c h n iq

u e 4 wher e y ou shine a beam of infrar ed light either throug h a sample or bounce it off of the sample. And a sample will ab s orb infrar ed light at differ ent fre quencie s, and that depends on the chemica l compositio n o f t h e s am p l e. So y ou g et—y ou can g et quite a bit of information on the chemica l composition of the samples. Some people c all them fing erpr ints, infrare d fing erpr ints.” 9Howeve r, Weldon’s testimony about the “fa ilure plane” and, espec ially , his ulti mate

conclusion that the text ure “fa i l ed ” d o n o t ex plain for the jury how or why the text ure alleg edly failed—tha t is, whether its “fa ilure” was due to its being a defe ctive product, improper application 5
of the product, improper application of p rimer or paint by Guer rer o, improperly clea

ned walls 6 prior to painting, or something else altog ether

. The fac t that some small amount of text ure product 7
has come off the wall along with the paint t h at h as peele d off simply does not prove—e ven circ umstantially

—that the texture was applied ne g lige ntly or improper ly

. 8 Essentially , Weldon’s testimony about the text ure’ s “fa ilure” ca n be reduc ed thus:

a small amount of the text ure product came off the wall attache d to the back of the paint that peele d off when painter’ s tape was pulled off the walls. But that fac t doe s not a mount to any more than a scintilla of evidenc e demonstrating proxi mate causa tion—i.e., that any act or omission of River City

There was no evidenc e admitted re lating to a ny analy sis of the text ure pr oduct itself and 5 whether its manufa cture and desig n com p l i ed with industry standards, even though Katz testified that “low-qua lity text ure” is one of the three “main rea sons” he has seen for why text ure is “poorly cohesive .” Simi larly , Weldon testi fi ed t h at, “in broad terms,” there are two cause s for dry wall text ure “ failure ”: improper a pplication and a “ defe ctive produc t.” There was eviden ce t h at Guer rer o primed and painted the text ured walls under humid 6 conditions, which—ac cording to some of the witnesses—incre ases th e r e quired dry ing time betwee n primer and paint, and there wer e conflicts betwee n Guer rer o’s deposition and trial testimony about how soon afte r priming the walls he be g an apply ing c oats of paint. There was a lso testimony that hand-trow eled text ure, due to its thickness, needs to be “bac k-rolled” with primer afte r being primed with a spray er and that Guer rer o mere ly spray ed the primer on the walls without back- rolling them. There was evidenc e that, except for the cra cked are as that River City repa ired, the text ured 7 walls rema ined unpainted for about five months while construction continued, and Guer rer o did not clea n the walls bef

ore pa inting them except for the bottom portion of the walls nea r the trim. Katz testified that he has never seen a peeling -paint situation wher e th e p aint “pee led 8 rig ht off the top of the text ure a nd none of the text ure c ame with it.”

10was a substantial fac tor in causing the peeling -paint problem. Weldon’s conclusion that the text ure

product “fa iled” solely beca use a small amount of it was on the back of the peele d-paint samples is simply too g rea t an infere ntial leap to withstand leg al-suff iciency revie w. See Coastal Transp. Co.

v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. , 136 S.W .3d 227, 232 (Tex. 20 04) (“O pinion testimony that is conclusory or speculative i s not relev an t evidenc e, because it does not tend t o make the exis tence of a materia l fac t ‘more probable or less probable .’” (citing Tex. R. Evid. 401)). I t is the basis of an expert witness’s opinion—not the witness’s qualifica tions or his bare o pinions alone—that can settle an issue, beca

use a claim will not stand or fall on the mere ipse dixit of a cre dentialed witness. Id. (citing Burrows v. Arce , 997 S.W .2d 229, 235 (Tex. 1999)). Weldon did not ex plain the basis of his conclusion that the text ure “fa iled” except to say that it “fa iled” beca use some small a

mount of text ure came off the wall along with the paint. Such a conclusory observa tion does not make the exis tence of any improper act or omission on the part of River City any more or less probable , and Weldon’s testimony

about ca usation, theref

ore, a mounts to not hing mor e than mer e spec ulation.
Fur thermore , t h e jury would have had to make too g rea t an infere ntial leap when concluding that the alleg ed text ure “fa ilure” was cause d by any act or omission of River City , based on the evidenc e cited by

the Hanlons:

• Testimony that River City applied primer to the bare dry wall in the place s wher e it applied an “ora

ng e peel” tex ture finish but did not apply primer to the bar e dry

wall when a

pply ing a “hand tr owel” te x ture finish.

• Testimony that the paint peels only in the “hand trowel” are as and not in the “ora ng e pee l” ar eas.

11• Testimony that R i v er C i ty made repa irs to cer tain portions of the “hand trowel” are as to fix cra cks in the text ure shortly befor e Guer rer o painted the walls and that pa int does not peel off of the re paire d hand-trow el ar eas.

• Weldon’s te stimony that he ana ly zed a peele d-paint sample from an are a of the hand-trow el wall that the Hanlons said had been repa ired and found that the text ure materia l in the repa ired-sa mple contains g y

psum and poly

viny l ac etate resin (PVA), which the samples from the unrepa ired hand-trow el are as did not contain. Weldon explained that g y psum and PVA “ca

n be used in a wi de rang e of materia l” and are often used in primers. Weldon conclude d that there wer e only two possibil i t i es to explain the differ ence betwee n the repa ired and non-re paire d samples: either “the dry waller added something to the tex ture material t hat he applied in the repair area ” or use d a diffe rent texture produc t for the r epair ed ar eas.

• Testimony

that cer tain hand-trow el ar eas that were never painted ar e “sof

t” and “powde ry ” to the touch and the testimony of River City ’s principal that hand-trow el texture “should be har d to the touch once dry .”

For an issue that is outside t h e g ener al experience and common understanding of

a lay person, the above-ci t ed ci rc umstantial evidenc e is leg ally insufficient to support the jury ’s proxi mate-c ausation finding s, espec ially in light of evidenc e in the rec ord indicating other possible

cause s of t he peeling paint and the failure of t he Hanlons’ experts t o rule those out. For instance,
Ka t z t est ified that there wer e at least three possible rea sons for the peeling -paint problem at t h e Residence : (1) over-thinning of t he dry wall t exture, (2) painting over the dry wall texture befor e it adequately dried, and (3) low-quality t ex t u re t hat has a “low binder content.” He was unable to confirm that any of the three possibili ties actua lly occur red here o r ru l e an y of them out. Thus,
Katz’s testimony about causa tion is leg ally insufficient to support the jury ’s verdic t. See Me r r ell
Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havne r , 953 S.W .2d 706, 720 (Tex. 1997) (“[I ]f th er e ar e other plausible

cause s of the injury or condition tha t c ould be neg ated, the plaintiff must off er evidenc e excluding

12those cause s with rea sonable cer tainty .”); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. R o b i n son , 923 S.W .2d 549, 558–59 (Tex. 1995) (finding that failure of expert to rule out other ca u s es of damag e re ndere d his opinion l ittle more than spec ulation).

Finally , Kettler testified t h at h e fo rm ed his opinion that the text ure is “def ective” and nee ds to be repla ced ba sed mere ly on his revie w of the reports prepa red by Weldon and Katz.
He testified that he did not conduct any independe nt analy sis of the text ure or paint except to apply and remove p ai n t er ’s t ape from the walls to confirm that the paint in fac t peels off under such circ umstances. Acc ording ly , Kettler’ s opinions about causa tion are not leg ally sufficie nt to support the jury ’s ver dict either.

I n sum, the evidenc e of proxi mate causa tion here —that is, the evidenc e showing that
any act or omission of River City was a substantial fac tor in ca u s i n g t he peeling -paint problem, without which the har

m would not have occ urre d—consists of nothing more than s pecula tion and infere nces that require too g rea t a leap for rea sonable minds to make. “[A]n infere nce stacke d only

on other infere nces is not leg ally sufficie nt evidenc e.” Marathon Corp. , 106 S.W .3d at 728. “[I ]n

case s wi t h o n l y s l ight circ umstantial evidenc e, something else must be found in the rec ord to

corr oborate the probability of the fac t’s exis tence or non-existence.” Lozano v. Lozano , 52 S.W .3d 141, 148 (Tex. 2001). That “some thing e lse” is abse nt here

. See M arathon Corp. , 106 S.W .3d at
728 (holding that evidenc e of proxi mate causation was lega lly insufficient be cause circ umstances could g ive rise to any

number of inf

ere nces, none more proba ble than anothe r).
We sustain River City ’s first issue in which it as s er ts that the evidenc e is leg ally insufficient to support the jury ’s answe rs to question s ab o u t proxi mate causa tion. Additionally ,

13beca

use proxi mate causa tion was an element of eac h o f the Hanlons’ theories of liability , our deter mination of that issue requi re s u s t o render judgme nt in favor of River City

. See Southwest Key Program, Inc. v. Gil-Pere z , 81 S.W .3d 269, 270 (Tex. 2002) (re versing and rende ring judgme nt that plaintiff take nothing on his c laim a fter holding that evidenc e is le g ally insufficient to suppor t proxi mate-c ause e lement of e ach of plaintiff’s theor ies of liability ). We thus do not need to re ach River C i t y ’s additional issues about the evidentiar y sufficie ncy supporting the jury ’s answe rs to questions about brea ch of w arr anty , damag es, and a ttorney ’s fe es.

CONCLUSION
We reve rse the trial court’s judgme nt and rende r jud g me n t th a t appellee s take nothing on their cla ims.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice
Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Pemberton, and B ourland
Reverse d and Rende red Filed: Aug ust 28, 2018

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