1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GEORGE ESTRADA, :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : CIVIL NO. 4:CV-06-245

:

TROY WILLIAMSON, :

: (Judge McClure) 

:

Respondent :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

June 13, 2006

Background

George Estrada (“Petitioner”), an inmate presently confined at the Allenwood

United States Penitentiary, White Deer, Pennsylvania (“USP-Allenwood”), initiated this

pro se habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Named as sole

Respondent is USP-Allenwood Warden Troy Williamson. Service of the petition was

previously ordered. 

Estrada states that while incarcerated at the Allenwood Federal Correctional

Institution, White Deer, Pennsylvania (“FCI-Allenwood”) on March 22, 2005, he was

issued an incident report. Specifically, the Petitioner was charged with insolence

towards a staff member and threatening another with bodily injury or any other

offense. Petitioner states that on the above date he approached Unit Manager Levi in

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the prison’s dining hall during the noon meal and asked why his prison job had been

changed. Estrada admits that during the ensuing conversation, his tone of voice

became “loud and boisterous” and that each time he yelled he stepped towards Levi. 

See Record document no. 1, p. 3. According to the petition, other staff members

intervened and when Estrada failed to comply with orders to settle down, he was

escorted from the dining hall and taken to the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”).

Levi then prepared an incident report setting forth the above described charges. 

Later that same day, Lieutenant Farmer initiated an investigation into the incident which

included interviews with Estrada and an eyewitness, Lieutenant Litchard. Upon

conclusion of the investigation, Farmer prepared a written report which concluded that

Petitioner’s actions could have been interpreted as a threat. A Unit Disciplinary

Committee (“UDC”) hearing was convened on March 30, 2005. The UDC referred

the charges to the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) for further proceedings.

A disciplinary hearing before DHO K. Bittenbender was convened on April 7,

2005. DHO Bittenbender determined that upon consideration of Petitioner’s size,

mannerisms, movements, and tone of voice during the incident, it was proper to

interpret prisoner’s actions as constituting a threat. As a result, he found Estrada

guilty of both charges and sanctioned him to a thirty (30) day term of disciplinary

segregation, a one (1) year loss of telephone and visiting privileges, a twenty-one (21) 

day loss of good conduct time and a sixty (60) day loss of non-vested good conduct

time.

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Petitioner’s present action asserts that Bureau of Prison (“BOP”) regulations fail

to specify what type of conduct constitutes threatening another with bodily harm or

any other offense. Second, Estrada contends that the underlying facts do not support

DHO Bittenbender’s arbitrary determination that he threatened Unit Manager Levi

because there was no communicated intent to injure. The Petitioner also maintains that

his due process rights were violated because a UDC hearing was not held within the

time period authorized under BOP regulations.

Discussion

It is well-settled that a habeas corpus petition may be brought by a prisoner who

seeks to challenge either the fact or duration of his confinement in prison. Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), Telford v. Hepting, 980 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir.), cert.

denied, 510 U.S. 920 (1993). Federal habeas corpus review is available only “where

the deprivation of rights is such that it necessarily impacts the fact or length of

detention.” Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 540 (3d Cir. 2002). 

The alleged unconstitutional actions taken by federal prison officials occurred

with regards to institutional disciplinary proceedings. Since those proceedings

resulted in the forfeiture of good time credits which extended the length of Estrada’s

incarceration, his present claims are properly raised before this Court.

Disciplinary Hearing

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in

pertinent part: "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

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without due process of law . . . ." The Supreme Court has mandated a two-part

analysis of a procedural due process claim: first, "whether the asserted individual

interests are encompassed within the . . . protection of 'life, liberty or property[,]'" and

second, "if protected interests are implicated, we then must decide what procedures

constitute 'due process of law.'" Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977). If

there is no protected liberty or property interest, it is obviously unnecessary to analyze

what procedures were followed when an alleged deprivation of an interest occurred. 

Liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may arise either from the

Due Process Clause itself or from state law. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-26

(1976). 

 In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-73 (1974), where the plaintiffs were

deprived of good time credits as a severe sanction for serious misconduct, the

Supreme Court held that such inmates have various procedural due process

protections in a prison disciplinary proceeding. The Supreme Court recognized in

Wolff that "prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution and

the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Id. at

556. Nonetheless, the Court held that a prisoner facing serious institutional sanctions

such as a loss of good time credits is entitled to some procedural protection before

penalties can be imposed. Id. at 563-71. 

Wolff set forth five requirements of due process in a prison disciplinary

proceeding: (1) the right to appear before an impartial decision-making body; (2)

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twenty-four hour advance written notice of the charges; (3) an opportunity to call

witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided the presentation of such does

not threaten institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) assistance from an inmate

representative, if the charged inmate is illiterate or if complex issues are involved; (5) a

written decision by the fact finders as to the evidence relied upon and the rationale

behind their disciplinary action. Id. An additional procedural requirement was set

forth in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Inst. at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S.

445, 453-56 (1985). In that case, the Court held that there must be some evidence

which supports the conclusion of the disciplinary tribunal. The Court of Appeals for

the Third Circuit in Griffin v. Spratt, 969 F.2d 16, 19 (3d Cir. 1992), thereafter

recognized that the above due process requirements must be satisfied in a prison

disciplinary hearing.

In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480-84 (1995), the United States Supreme

Court reiterated that the Wolff due process safeguards must be provided when, as in

the instant case, the challenged disciplinary proceeding results in a loss of good time

credits. See also Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1399 (3d Cir. 1991) (a federal

prisoner has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in good time credit); Von Kahl,

855 F. Supp. at 1417. In conclusion, since Estrada was sanctioned to a loss of good

time credits, his allegations relating to his underlying disciplinary proceeding will be

reviewed under the Wolff and Hill standards.

Petitioner claims that the DHO Bittenbender’s decision that he made a threat

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staff representation, he later changed his mind and declined representation.

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constituted a due process violation because there was no communicated threat to

injure Unit Manager Levi. Wolff requires in part that an inmate accused of a

disciplinary infraction be provided with twenty four (24) hour advance written notice

of the charges against him. Estrada raises no claim that the advance notice mandate of

Wolff was violated. This Court’s independent review of the record also confirms that

Petitioner received proper advance written notice of the charges against him. There is

also no contention or basis in the record establishing that the fact finder, DHO

Bittenbender, failed to issue a written decision. On the contrary, a copy of

Bittenbender’s decision has been submitted by the Respondent. See Record

document no. 6, Exhibit 1, Attachment E, p. 18. Consequently, both of those Wolff

procedural safeguards were satisfied.

Petitioner also does not contend that he requested but was denied assistance

from an inmate representative.1 He also makes no claim that he was denied the

opportunity to present witnesses or documentary evidence. Accordingly, a discussion

as to whether those Wolff procedural prongs were satisfied is also not warranted.

The remaining Wolff safeguards require the factfinder to issue a written decision

outlining the evidence relied upon and the rationale behind the disciplinary action. 

Wolff also requires that an inmate must be afforded the opportunity to appear before

an impartial decision maker. Petitioner does not claim that DHO Bittenbender was

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 The Court notes that Petitioner was charged with threatening another with

bodily harm. Clearly, as noted by Respondent, threats may either be verbal, nonverbal, or a combination of both.

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biased. His present due process claim is best described as a challenge to the DHO’s

determination that a threat was made.2

It is undisputed that Estrada initiated a verbal confrontation in a loud and

boisterous tone with Unit Manager Levi. Petitioner also admits that each time he yelled

he stepped towards Levi. DHO Bittenbender concluded that the Petitioner’s physical

size, loud tone of voicing his displeasure, mannerisms, and his continuous approach

towards Levi posed a threat to her safety.

A federal court has no duty to independently assess the witnesses’ credibility

or weigh the evidence, but only to see that there was some evidence or basis in fact to

support the finding of guilt. Hensley v. Wilson, 850 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1988). The

court in Hensley added that a disciplinary tribunal's failure to explain why alibi

testimony was not found credible did not constitute a due process violation. See id. at

278. The findings in a disciplinary hearing are not arbitrary or capricious if there exists

a basis in fact to support a disciplinary hearing officer's findings. Edwards v. White,

501 F. Supp. 8 (M.D. Pa. 1979). Certainly, in light of the Petitioner’s admitted

conduct of loud boisterous yelling accompanied by a continuous approach towards

Levi, the totality of Estrada’s conduct provided a sufficient factual basis for the DHO

Bittenbender’s determination that Estrada engaged in threatening behavior directed

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towards the Unit Manager. Based on the foregoing discussion, this Court is satisfied

that the proceedings before the DHO satisfied Estrada's federal due process rights. 

UDC Hearing

Under BOP regulations, prison staff shall provide an inmate with a written copy

of the charges levied against him “ordinarily within 24 hours of the time staff became

aware of the inmate’s involvement in the incident.” See 28 C.F.R. Section 541.15. 

Following the issuance of the incident report, a prompt investigation must be

undertaken. 541.14(b). Section 541.14 also directs that the investigating officer should

“thoroughly investigate the incident.” 

Once the investigation is concluded, the incident report is referred to the UDC

for an initial hearing “ordinarily held within three work days from the time staff became

aware of the inmate’s involvement in the incident. This three day work day period

excludes the day staff became aware of the inmate’s involvement in the incident,

weekends, and holidays.” Id. at § 541.15(b). Furthermore, the UDC “may extend

time limits imposed in this section for a good cause shown by the inmate or staff and

documented in the record of the hearing.” Id. at (k).

Petitioner argues that he was denied due process because he was not afforded a

UDC hearing until six (6) days after the incident report was written. He adds that there

was no indication that the Warden approved an extension of time in which to convene

the UDC hearing.

It is initially noted that absent a showing of prejudice, a technical violation of

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Bureau of Prison (“BOP”) regulations does not automatically require that a disciplinary

sanction must be vacated and remanded. Von Kahl v. Brennan, 855 F. Supp. 1413,

1421 (M.D. Pa. 1994)(in a federal inmate disciplinary proceeding “where the minimal

requirements of due process have been met, an inmate must show prejudice to the

rights sought to be protected by the regulation claimed to be violated” in order to

obtain habeas relief). 

As previously noted, the underlying incident occurred on Tuesday, March 22,

2005, the incident report was issued that same day and the UDC hearing was held on

Wednesday, March 30, 2005. Under §541.15(b), the UDC hearing should have been

held by Friday, March 25, 2005. Thus, the issue is whether the three (3) day delay

(excluding the weekend of March 26-27, 2005) in convening the UDC hearing

constituted a due process violation which would entitle Estrada to federal habeas

corpus relief.

§541.15(b) states only that a UDC hearing should “ordinarily” be held withing

three (3) working days. The statute adds that this time period may be extended by the

UDC for good cause. In Rashid v. Yates, 2005 WL 1277825 *3 (M.D. Pa. May 26,

2005), Judge Rambo of this Court noted that the time limitation of § 542.15(b) is not

imposed by Wolff. Recently, Judge Caldwell of this Court in Thibodeau v. Watts,

2006 WL 89213 *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2006), stated that a four (4) day delay in

conducting a UDC hearing “[e]ven if the UDC had not obtained an enlargement of time

from the Warden to conduct the hearing ... does not automatically equate to a violation

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of Thibodeau’s Due Process rights.” Id. 

It is undisputed that the issuance of Lieutenant Farmer’s investigation report was

delayed, thus delaying the UDC hearing. See Record document no. 1, p. 4. The

Respondent has also presented evidence that the Warden did in fact approve a request

for an enlargement of time in which to conduct the UDC hearing. See Record

document no. 6, Exhibit 1, Attachment C, p. 13. An application of § 541.15(b),

Rashid, Thibodeau and Von Kahl, especially in light of Estrada’s failure to establish

any resulting prejudice, establishes that there is no basis for the finding of a due

process violation based on the short term delay in conducting the UDC hearing.

Consequently,

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case.

3. Based on the court's decision herein, there is no basis 

for the issuance of a certificate of appealability.

 

 

s/James F. McClure, Jr. 

 JAMES F. McCLURE, JR.

United States District Judge

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