49728 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 216, 223, 229, 231, 232,

and 238

[FRA Docket No. PCSS–1, Notice No. 2]

RIN 2130–AA95

Passenger Equipment Safety

Standards

AGENCY: Federal Railroad

Administration (FRA), Department of

Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: FRA is proposing a rule

establishing comprehensive Federal

safety standards for railroad passenger

equipment. The proposed rule contains

requirements concerning equipment

design and performance criteria related

to passenger and crew survivability in

the event of a passenger train accident;

the inspection, testing, and maintenance

of passenger equipment; and the safe

operation of passenger train service. The

proposed rule is designed to address the

safety of passenger train service in an

environment where technology is

advancing, and equipment is being

designed for operation at higher speeds.

The rule would amend existing

regulations concerning special notice for

repairs, safety glazing, locomotive

safety, safety appliances, and railroad

power brakes as applied to passenger

equipment.

The proposed rule does not apply to

tourist and historic railroad operations.

However, after consulting with the

excursion railroad associations to

determine appropriate applicability in

light of financial, operational, or other

factors unique to such operations, FRA

may prescribe requirements for these

operations that are different from those

affecting other types of passenger

operations.

DATES: (1) Written comments: Written

comments must be received on or before

November 24, 1997. Comments received

after that date will be considered by

FRA and the Passenger Equipment

Safety Standards Working Group to the

extent possible without incurring

substantial additional expense or delay.

The docket will remain open until the

Working Group proceedings are

concluded. Requests for formal

extension of the comment period must

be made by November 7, 1997.

(2) Public hearing: FRA intends to

hold a public hearing to allow interested

parties the opportunity to comment on

specific issues addressed in the NPRM.

The date and location of the hearing

will be set forth in a forthcoming notice

that will be published in the Federal

Register. Anyone who desires to make

an oral statement at the hearing must

notify the Docket Clerk by telephone

(202–632–3198), and must submit three

copies of the oral statement that he or

she intends to make at the hearing. The

notification should also provide the

Docket Clerk with the participant’s

mailing address. FRA reserves the right

to limit participation in the hearings of

persons who fail to provide such

notification. The date by which the

Docket Clerk must be notified about the

oral statement and receive copies of it

will be set forth in the notice

announcing the hearing.

ADDRESSES: Written comments should

identify the docket number and must be

submitted in triplicate to the Docket

Clerk, Office of Chief Counsel, Federal

Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh

Street, S.W., Mail Stop 10, Washington,

D.C. 20590. Persons desiring to be

notified that their comments have been

received by FRA should submit a

stamped, self-addressed postcard with

their comments. The Docket Clerk will

indicate on the postcard the date on

which the comments were received and

will return the card to the addressee.

Written comments will be available for

examination, both before and after the

closing date for written comments,

during regular business hours in Room

7051 of FRA headquarters at 1120

Vermont Avenue, N.W., in Washington,

D.C.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Edward Pritchard, Acting Staff Director,

Motive Power and Equipment Division,

Office of Safety Assurance and

Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh Street,

S.W., Mail Stop 25, Washington, D.C.

20590 (telephone: 202–632–3362);

Daniel Alpert, Trial Attorney, Office of

Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street,

S.W., Mail Stop 10, Washington, D.C.

(telephone: 202–632–3186); or Thomas

Herrmann, Trial Attorney, Office of

Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street,

S.W., Mail Stop 10, Washington, D.C.

20590 (telephone: 202–632–3167).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

To enhance rail safety, the Secretary

of Transportation convened a meeting of

representatives from all sectors of the

rail industry in September, 1994. As one

of the initiatives arising from this Rail

Safety Summit, the Secretary

announced that DOT would begin

developing safety standards for rail

passenger equipment over a five-year

period. In November, 1994, Congress

adopted the Secretary’s schedule for

implementing rail passenger equipment

regulations and included it in the

Federal Railroad Safety Authorization

Act of 1994 (the Act), Pub. L. No. 103–

440, 108 Stat. 4619, 4623–4624

(November 2, 1994). Section 215 of the

Act, as now codified at 49 U.S.C. 20133,

requires:

(a) MINIMUM STANDARDS.—The

Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe

regulations establishing minimum standards

for the safety of cars used by railroad carriers

to transport passengers. Before prescribing

such regulations, the Secretary shall

consider—

(1) The crashworthiness of the cars;

(2) Interior features (including luggage

restraints, seat belts, and exposed surfaces)

that may affect passenger safety;

(3) Maintenance and inspection of the cars;

(4) Emergency response procedures and

equipment; and

(5) Any operating rules and conditions that

directly affect safety not otherwise governed

by regulations.

The Secretary may make applicable some or

all of the standards established under this

subsection to cars existing at the time the

regulations are prescribed, as well as to new

cars, and the Secretary shall explain in the

rulemaking document the basis for making

such standards applicable to existing cars.

(b) INITIAL AND FINAL

REGULATIONS.—(1) The Secretary shall

prescribe initial regulations under subsection

(a) within 3 years after the date of enactment

of the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization

Act of 1994. The initial regulations may

exempt equipment used by tourist, historic,

scenic, and excursion railroad carriers to

transport passengers.

(2) The Secretary shall prescribe final

regulations under subsection (a) within 5

years after such date of enactment.

(c) PERSONNEL.—The Secretary may

establish within the Department of

Transportation 2 additional full-time

equivalent positions beyond the number

permitted under existing law to assist with

the drafting, prescribing, and implementation

of regulations under this section.

(d) CONSULTATION.—In prescribing

regulations, issuing orders, and making

amendments under this section, the Secretary

may consult with Amtrak, public authorities

operating railroad passenger service, other

railroad carriers transporting passengers,

organizations of passengers, and

organizations of employees. A consultation is

not subject to the Federal Advisory

Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.), but minutes

of the consultation shall be placed in the

public docket of the regulatory proceeding.

The Secretary of Transportation has

delegated these rulemaking

responsibilities to the Federal Railroad

Administrator. 49 CFR 1.49(m).

Consistent with the intent of Congress

that FRA consult with the railroad

industry in prescribing these

regulations, FRA invited various

organizations to participate in a working
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49729

1This date was incorrectly identified as June 6,

1995, in the Advance Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking (61 FR 30672, June 17, 1996).

group to focus on the issues related to

railroad passenger equipment safety and

assist FRA in developing Federal safety

standards. The Passenger Equipment

Safety Standards Working Group (or the

‘‘Working Group’’) first met on June 7,

1995, 1 and continues to meet in support

of this rulemaking. This proposed rule

was developed by FRA in consultation

with the Working Group, and FRA will

again convene the Working Group to

consider comments received in response

to this Notice and develop the final rule.

Notice of any Working Group meetings

will be available through the FRA

Docket Clerk.

The Working Group has evolved since

its initial meeting, and its membership

currently includes representatives from

the following organizations:

American Association of Private Railroad Car

Owners, Inc. (AAPRCO),

American Association of State Highway and

Transportation Officials (AASHTO),

American Public Transit Association (APTA),

Association of American Railroads (AAR),

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE),

Brotherhood Railway Carmen (BRC),

FRA,

Federal Transit Administration (FTA) of

DOT,

National Railroad Passenger Corporation

(Amtrak),

National Association of Railroad Passengers

(NARP),

Railway Progress Institute (RPI),

Safe Travel America (STA),

Transportation Workers Union of America

(TWU), and

United Transportation Union (UTU).

The Working Group is chaired by

FRA, and supported by FRA program,

legal, and research staff, including

technical personnel from the Volpe

National Transportation Systems Center

(Volpe Center) of the Research and

Special Programs Administration of

DOT. FRA has included vendor

representatives designated by RPI as

associate members of the Working

Group. FRA has also included the

AAPRCO as an associate Working Group

member. The National Transportation

Safety Board has designated staff

members to advise the Working Group.

In developing proposed safety

standards for passenger equipment

operating at speeds greater than 125

mph but not exceeding 150 mph, FRA

formed a subgroup (the ‘‘Tier II

Equipment Subgroup’’) of Working

Group members representing interests

associated with the provision of rail

passenger service at such high speeds.

FRA invited representatives from

organizations including Amtrak, the

BLE, BRC, RPI, and UTU to participate

in this effort.

In accordance with 49 U.S.C.

20133(d), the evolving positions of the

Working Group members—as reflected

in the minutes of the group’s meetings

and associated documentation, together

with data provided by the members

during their deliberations— have been

placed in the public docket of this

rulemaking.

On June 17, 1996, FRA published an

Advance Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking (ANPRM) concerning the

establishment of comprehensive safety

standards for railroad passenger

equipment (61 FR 30672). The ANPRM

provided background information on

the need for such standards, offered

preliminary ideas on approaching

passenger safety issues, and presented

questions on various topics including:

system safety programs and plans;

passenger equipment crashworthiness;

inspection, testing, and maintenance

requirements; training and qualification

requirements for mechanical personnel

and train crews; excursion, tourist, and

private equipment; commuter

equipment and operations; train makeup and operating speed; tiered safety

standards; fire safety; and operating

practices and procedures.

FRA’s commitment to developing

proposed regulations through the

Working Group necessarily influenced

the role and purpose of the ANPRM.

FRA specifically asked that members of

the Working Group not respond

formally to the ANPRM. The issues and

ideas presented in the ANPRM had

already been placed before the Working

Group, and the Working Group had

commented on drafts of the ANPRM. As

a result, FRA solicited the submission of

written comments that might be of

assistance in developing a proposed rule

from interested persons not involved in

the Working Group’s deliberations.

FRA received 12 comments in

response to the ANPRM, including a

request from a member of the Working

Group to extend the ANPRM’s comment

period. In addition, the United States

Small Business Administration (SBA)

commented that the length of the

comment period was inadequate for the

industry, especially small railways, to

prepare a thorough response to the

ANPRM. FRA had closed the comment

period on July 9, 1996, so that all

comments could be shared with the

Working Group before its meeting on

July 10, 1996.

Although FRA did not formally

extend the comment period, comments

received after the closing date of the

comment period have been shared with

the Working Group at subsequent

meetings. Such comments have been

considered (and identified in this

Notice) to the extent possible without

incurring additional delay in preparing

this Notice. Moreover, the Working

Group is broadly representative of

interests involved in the provision of

intercity and commuter rail service

nationwide, and its members had the

opportunity to comment on the issues

raised in the ANPRM before the

document’s publication, as noted above.

Need for Safety Standards

Effective Federal safety standards for

freight equipment have long been in

place, but equivalent Federal standards

for passenger equipment do not

currently exist. The AAR sets industry

standards for the design and

maintenance of freight equipment that

add materially to the safe operation of

this equipment. Industry standards for

the safety of railroad passenger

equipment have been in place since the

early part of this century, as noted by

the AAPRCO in comment on the

ANPRM. However, over the years, the

AAR has discontinued the development

and maintenance of passenger

equipment standards.

Passenger railroads do offer the

traveling public one of the safest forms

of transportation available. In the fiveyear period 1991–1995, there were 1.07

passenger fatalities for every billion

miles a passenger was transported by

rail. However, accidents continue to

occur, often as a result of factors beyond

the control of the passenger railroad.

Further, the rail passenger environment

is rapidly changing. Worldwide,

passenger equipment operating speeds

are increasing. Several passenger

trainsets designed to European

standards have been proposed for

operation at high speeds in the United

States. In general, these trainsets do not

meet the structural or operating

standards that are common practice for

current North American equipment.

FRA believes that adherence to such

standards by the nation’s passenger

railroads has in large measure

contributed to the high level of safety at

which rail passenger service is currently

operated. However, these standards do

not have the force of regulation.

In general, the North American

railroad operating environment requires

passenger equipment to operate

commingled with very heavy and long

freight trains, often over track with

frequent grade crossings used by heavy

highway equipment. European

passenger operations are intermingled

with freight equipment of lesser weight

than in North America. In many cases,

highway-rail grade crossings also pose
49730 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

lesser hazards to passenger trains in

Europe due to lower highway vehicle

weight. European passenger equipment

design standards may therefore not be

appropriate for the North American rail

environment.

FRA must become more active to

ensure that passenger trains continue to

be designed, built, and operated with a

high level of safety. A clear set of

Federal safety and design standards for

passenger equipment tailored to the

nation’s operating environment is

needed to provide for the safety of

future rail operations and to facilitate

sound planning for those operations.

Passenger Train Safety Hazards

Passenger trains are exposed to a

variety of safety hazards. Some of these

hazards are endemic to the nation’s rail

passenger operating environment, as

noted above, and result from the

operation of passenger trains

commingled with freight trains, often

over track with frequent grade crossings

used by heavy highway equipment.

Collisions with a wide range of

objects may occur at various speeds

under a number of different

circumstances. In addition to freight

trains and highway vehicles, these

objects include maintenance-of-way

equipment and other passenger trains.

Although most of these collisions occur

only in the normal running direction of

the train, impact into the side of the

train can occur, especially at the

junction of rail lines and at highway-rail

grade crossings.

A passenger train collision with

another train concerns FRA because of

the potential for significant harm

demonstrated in actual accidents.

• On February 16, 1996, a near-headon collision occurred between Maryland

Rail Commuter Service (MARC) train

286 and Amtrak train 29 on track owned

by CSX Transportation, Inc., (CSXT) at

Silver Spring, Maryland. The MARC

train was operating with a cab car (a car

which provides passenger seating, as

well as a location from which the train

is operated) as the lead car in the train,

followed by two passenger coaches and

a locomotive pushing the consist. The

collision separated the left front corner

of the cab car from the roof to its sill

plate, and tore off much of the forward

left side of the car body. Three

crewmembers and eight passengers were

fatally injured, and 13 other occupants

of the MARC train sustained injuries.

(FRA Accident Investigation Report

(Report) B–3–96.)

• On February 9, 1996, a near-headon collision occurred between New

Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc.,

trains 1254 and 1107 on the borderline

of Secaucus and Jersey City, New Jersey.

Two crewmembers and one passenger

were fatally injured, and 35 other

people sustained injuries. The passenger

fatality and most of the nonfatal injuries

to passengers occurred on train 1254,

which was operating with the cab car

forward, followed by four passenger

coaches and a locomotive pushing the

consist. (FRA Report B–2–96.)

• On January 18, 1993, Northern

Indiana Commuter Transportation

District (NICTD) trains 7 and 12 collided

corner-to-corner in Gary, Indiana. The

left front corners and adjacent car body

sidewall structures were destroyed on

both of the lead cars in each train. Seven

passengers died, and 95 people

sustained injuries. (NTSB/Railroad

Accident Report (RAR)–93/03.)

The exposure of passenger trains to

hazards associated with sharing

common rights-of-way with freight

trains has been demonstrated in recent

accidents, and a past disastrous

accident.

• On February 15, 1995, an Amtrak

train traveling at 58 mph struck a

shifted load of steel ‘‘I’’ beams

extending from a Union Pacific Railroad

Company freight train stopped in a

siding at Borah, Idaho. The Amtrak

train’s six passenger coaches were raked

with a steel beam which penetrated the

outer layer of the car bodies at various

points. Although no passengers were

injured, the Amtrak train’s two

locomotives were significantly

damaged, and two crewmembers were

injured. (FRA Report C–14–95.)

• On May 16, 1994, an Amtrak train

derailed after striking an intermodal

trailer which had fallen or was falling

from a CSXT freight train travelling

northbound on an adjacent track at

Selma, North Carolina. The lead

locomotive of the Amtrak train rolled

over, and the assistant engineer was

killed. The engineer sustained serious

injuries, and 120 other occupants of the

Amtrak train reported injuries. (NTSB/

RAR–95/02.)

• On January 4, 1987, an Amtrak train

collided with the rear of a Consolidated

Rail Corporation (Conrail) train near

Chase, Maryland, when it unexpectedly

entered the track ahead of the Amtrak

train, which had been travelling

between 120 and 125 mph only a few

seconds earlier. The Amtrak train’s two

locomotives and three front passenger

cars were destroyed in the collision. The

engineer and 15 passengers aboard the

Amtrak train were fatally injured, and

174 other persons aboard the train were

injured. (NTSB/RAR–88/01.)

The exposure of passenger trains to

hazards associated with operating over

frequent highway-rail grade crossings,

used by heavy highway vehicles, has

also been demonstrated in numerous

accidents.

• On January 16, 1996, a

Massachusetts Bay Transportation

Authority (MBTA) train being operated

by Amtrak struck a loaded tractor-trailer

which had become lodged in a grade

crossing in Wakefield, Massachusetts.

Twenty-two passengers were taken to

hospitals by ambulance or air. (FRA

Report C–4–96.)

• On October 3, 1995, a Metro-North

Commuter Railroad Company (MetroNorth) train with a cab car in the lead

struck a loaded tractor-trailer which had

become lodged in a grade crossing near

Milford, Connecticut. Two

crewmembers and 24 passengers were

injured. (FRA Report C–60–95.)

• On September 21, 1995, an Amtrak

train traveling at 81 mph struck a loaded

tractor-trailer at a highway-rail grade

crossing near Indiantown, Florida. The

assistant engineer was killed, and five

other persons onboard the train were

injured. (FRA Report C–56–95.)

• On November 30, 1993, an Amtrak

train derailed after striking an 82-ton

turbine being transported by a 184-foot

long vehicle which was fouling a grade

crossing near Intercession City, Florida.

Fifty-eight of the train’s passengers and

crewmembers were injured. (NTSB

Highway Accident Report 95/01.)

In addition to collisions involving

passenger trains striking highway

vehicles, highway vehicles may also

strike passenger trains. According to

FRA’s Rail-Highway Grade Crossing

Accident/Incident database, 13.8% of

all highway-rail grade crossing

collisions involving passenger trains

from 1986 through 1995 occurred when

the highway vehicle struck the

passenger train. This accounts for 388

such occurrences out of 2,820 highwayrail grade crossing collisions involving

passenger trains in this period. In

commenting on the ANPRM, the

Washington State Department of

Transportation (WSDOT) had asked that

FRA clarify the statement that 25

percent of all highway-rail grade

crossing accidents involve a highway

vehicle striking the side of a train. See

61 FR 30692. Though this higher figure

does include accidents involving both

freight and passenger trains, the

potential for a highway vehicle to strike

a passenger train is real.

The WSDOT also requested that FRA

document how many ‘‘heavy’’ highway

vehicles were involved in highway-rail

grade crossing accidents in which

highway vehicles struck passenger

trains. Over the same ten-year period

from 1986 through 1995, 52 of the 388

occurrences in which a highway vehicle
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49731

struck a passenger train involved a

heavy highway vehicle. For purposes of

this analysis, FRA considered the

number of heavy highway vehicles

which struck passenger trains to consist

of all those vehicles identified as a

‘‘Truck-Trailer’’ (12) and one-half the

number of those vehicles identified as a

‘‘Truck’’ (79), as specified according to

Form FRA F 6180.57—Rail-Highway

Grade Crossing Accident/Incident

Report.

Passenger trains are also vulnerable to

accidents caused by defective railroad

track structure and vehicle interaction

with the rail structure.

• On August 3, 1994, an Amtrak train

derailed while travelling at

approximately 79 mph on Conrail

trackage near Batavia, New York,

because of the dynamic interaction

between a material handling car and a

flattened rail head. Five of the derailed

passenger cars descended a railroad

embankment and came to rest on their

sides. One-hundred-and-eight

passengers and ten crewmembers were

injured. (NTSB/RAR–96/02.)

• On July 31, 1991, an Amtrak train

derailed while travelling at 80 mph over

CSXT trackage in Lugoff, South

Carolina, when a switch point leading to

a parallel auxiliary track unexpectedly

opened under the Amtrak train. The

derailed passenger cars collided with

the first of nine hopper cars stored on

the auxiliary track. The collision caused

the wheel set from the first hopper car

to penetrate the last passenger car. Eight

passengers were fatally injured, and 12

passengers sustained serious injuries.

(NTSB/RAR–93/02.)

Moreover, passenger trains are

vulnerable to accidents caused by

vandalism and sabotage.

• On October 9, 1995, an Amtrak

train derailed near Hyder, Arizona,

while operating at 50 mph on Southern

Pacific Transportation Company

trackage because the railroad track

structure had been sabotaged. The

derailment killed an Amtrak employee

who occupied a passenger car which

had rolled over onto its side. Seventyeight passengers were also injured. (FRA

Report C–62–95.)

• On May 21, 1993, an Amtrak train

traveling at approximately 45 mph

derailed after striking two pieces of steel

pipe which had been lodged between

the rails of a turnout near Opa-Locka,

Florida. Six of the train’s passengers and

crewmembers were injured. (FRA

Report C–34–93.)

• On August 12, 1992, an Amtrak

train traveling at 79 mph derailed at

Newport News, VA, after being

unexpectedly diverted into a railroad

siding because of a vandalized track

switch. Seventy of the train’s passengers

and crewmembers were injured. (FRA

Report C–52–92.)

Regardless of the cause of an accident,

the occupants of a passenger train may

risk harm caused by the crushing of the

occupant compartment, in which the

occupants themselves are crushed, and

local penetration into the occupant

compartment, where an object intrudes

into the occupant compartment and

directly strikes an occupant, as

demonstrated in the Amtrak accident in

Lugoff, South Carolina. Passenger train

occupants are also vulnerable to harm

from collisions within the train’s

interior, including loose objects inside

the train, such as baggage. For example,

the NTSB determined that at least two

passengers in a lounge car were injured

when they were struck by displaced

pedestal seats as a result of the

Intercession City, Florida, grade

crossing collision on November 30,

1993. The seat columns on four pedestal

seats had separated from their floor

attachments, allowing them to be

projected forward.

A variety of threats to passengers are

also posed by fire, broken glazing,

electrical shock, and submergence.

These dangers may arise following a

train derailment or collision, with

potentially catastrophic results.

• On September 22, 1993, an accident

occurred when an Amtrak train

travelling at approximately 72 mph

derailed after striking a girder that had

been displaced when a towboat,

pushing six barges, struck a railroad

bridge near Mobile, Alabama. The

train’s three locomotives, the baggage

and dormitory cars, and two of its six

passenger cars fell into the water. Fortytwo passengers and five crewmembers

were killed. All passengers died from

asphyxia due to drowning, and the

train’s three locomotive engineers died

from asphyxia and blunt force trauma

while inside the lead locomotive that

became filled with mud. Two other

employees died from smoke inhalation

inside the dormitory coach car which

had caught on fire. (NTSB RailroadMarine Accident Report 94/01.)

Further, in the 1996 Silver Spring,

Maryland, train collision between the

MARC and Amtrak trains, fire erupted

after the fuel tank of one of the Amtrak

locomotives was breached. Fuel oil

spilled into the MARC train’s cab car

through the openings in the torn car

body. The forward section of the cab car

was incinerated.

Some dangers to passenger train

occupants, such as fire and smoke, may

also arise independently without being

associated with a train collision or

derailment.

• On June 23, 1982, a fire started

onboard an Amtrak passenger train in a

sleeping car travelling en route to Los

Angeles, California. As a result of the

fire and smoke, two passengers died,

two passengers were seriously injured,

and 59 other occupants of the train were

treated for smoke inhalation. (NTSB/

RAR–83/03.)

Development of Passenger Train Safety

Program

This rulemaking is part of several

related and complementary efforts by

FRA that will contribute to rail

passenger safety. FRA has proposed

regulations governing emergency

preparedness and emergency response

procedures for rail passenger service in

a separate rulemaking proceeding,

designated as FRA No. PTEP–1. See 62

FR 8330, Feb. 24, 1997. In addition,

FRA has formed a separate working

group (the Passenger Train Emergency

Preparedness Working Group) to assist

FRA in the development of such

regulations. This related proceeding is

also addressing some of the issues FRA

identified in the ANPRM on passenger

equipment safety. Persons wishing to

receive more information regarding this

other rulemaking should contact Mr.

Edward R. English, Director, Office of

Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA,

400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington,

D.C. 20590 (telephone number: 202–

632–3349), or David H. Kasminoff, Esq.,

Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel,

FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone:

202–632–3191).

Further, in response to the New Jersey

Transit and MARC train accidents in

early 1996, FRA issued Emergency

Order No. 20 (Notice No. 1) on February

20, 1996, requiring prompt action to

immediately enhance passenger train

operating rules and emergency egress

and to develop an interim system safety

plan addressing the safety of operations

that permit passengers to occupy the

leading car in a train. 61 FR 6876, Feb.

22, 1996. Both the New Jersey Transit

and MARC train accidents involved

operations where a cab car occupied the

lead position in a passenger train. The

Emergency Order explained that in

collisions involving the front of a

passenger train, operating with a cab car

in the forward position or a multiple

unit (MU) locomotive, i.e., a selfpropelled locomotive with passenger

seating, presents an increased risk of

severe personal injury or death as

compared with locomotive-hauled

service when the locomotive occupies

the lead position in the train and

thereby acts as a buffer for the trailing

passenger cars. This risk is of particular
49732 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

concern where operations are conducted

at relatively higher speeds, where there

is a mix of various types of trains, and

where there are numerous highway-rail

crossings over which large motor

vehicles are operated. Accordingly, the

Emergency Order required in particular

that ‘‘railroads operating scheduled

intercity or commuter rail service * * *

conduct an analysis of their operations

and file with FRA an interim safety plan

indicating the manner in which risk of

a collision involving a cab car is

addressed.’’ 61 FR 6879.

The Emergency Order also noted that

there is a need to ensure that emergency

exits are clearly marked and in operable

condition on all passenger lines,

regardless of the equipment or train

control system used. Although FRA

Safety Glazing Standards, 49 CFR Part

223, require that passenger cars have a

minimum of four emergency window

exits ‘‘designed to permit rapid and easy

removal during a crisis situation,’’ the

Silver Spring accident raised concerns

that at least some of the occupants of the

MARC train attempted unsuccessfully to

exit through the windows. The

Emergency Order requires ‘‘that any

emergency windows that are not already

legibly marked as such on the inside

and outside be so marked, and that a

representative sample of all such

windows be examined to ensure

operability.’’ 61 FR 6880. On February

29, 1996, FRA issued Notice No. 2 to

Emergency Order No. 20 to refine three

aspects of the original order, including

providing more detailed guidance on

the emergency egress sampling

provision. 61 FR 8703, Mar. 5, 1996.

In addition, FRA submitted a report to

Congress on locomotive

crashworthiness and working

conditions on September 18, 1996, and

subsequently referred the issues raised

in the report to the Railroad Safety

Advisory Committee (RSAC). FRA

established RSAC in March of 1996, to

provide FRA with advice and

recommendations on railroad safety

matters. See 61 FR 9740, Mar. 11, 1996.

RSAC consists of 48 individual

representatives, drawn from 27

organizations representing various rail

industry perspectives, and two associate

nonvoting representatives from the

agencies with railroad safety regulatory

responsibility in Canada and Mexico.

RSAC will make recommendations as to

the best way to address the findings of

the report to Congress, including

voluntary initiatives, and regulatory

standards where appropriate. As a

result, FRA may initiate a separate

rulemaking proposing equipment safety

requirements for both conventional

freight and passenger locomotives.

In the context of improving railroad

communications, RSAC has established

a working group to specifically address

communication facilities and

procedures, with a strong emphasis on

passenger train emergency

requirements. FRA expects that group

will report recommendations to RSAC

early in 1997. FRA anticipates that those

recommendations will address the issue

of whether there should be redundant

communications capability on all

passenger trains.

Scope of the Proposed Rule

Through this Notice, FRA proposes to

establish a comprehensive set of

necessary safety regulations for railroad

passenger equipment. These safety

standards will improve the safety of rail

passenger service.

In commenting on the ANPRM, the

General Railway Signal Corporation

(GRS) expressed concern that FRA has

focused on equipment crashworthiness

without sufficiently addressing crash

avoidance. GRS noted that the

underlying systems which can provide

crash avoidance and the related systems

safety elements involving a vitally

integrated crash avoidance control

system include much more than the

elements onboard a train.

As explained in the ANPRM (61 FR

30683), and as is evident in Emergency

Order No. 20, FRA recognizes that rail

passenger safety does involve the safety

of the railroad system as a whole,

including the track structure, signal and

train control systems, operating

procedures, and station- and platformto-train interface design—in addition to

passenger equipment safety. To that

end, FRA has active rulemaking and

research projects in a variety of contexts

that address non-equipment aspects of

passenger railroad safety, including

signal and train control systems.

Nevertheless, this proposed rule is

designed to address the specific

statutory mandate that minimum safety

standards be prescribed for the safety of

cars used to transport railroad

passengers. Signal and train control

systems are not the focus of this

rulemaking.

FRA received comments from the

SBA and on behalf of the Minnesota

Transportation Museum, Inc., about this

rulemaking’s effect on tourist, scenic,

historic, and excursion railroads. The

proposed rule does not apply to these

railroads. Instead, the proposed rule

applies to railroads that provide

intercity passenger and commuter

service. A joint FRA/industry working

group formed under RSAC is currently

developing recommendations regarding

the applicability of FRA regulations,

including this one, to tourist, scenic,

historic, and excursion railroads. After

appropriate consultation with the

excursion railroad associations takes

place, passenger equipment safety

requirements for these operations may

be proposed by FRA that are different

from those affecting other types of

passenger train operations. Any such

requirements proposed by FRA will be

part of a separate rulemaking

proceeding.

Approach

The proposed regulations are

principally designed to apply to two

groups of equipment. The first group is

identified as Tier I equipment and

consists of railroad passenger

equipment operated at speeds not

exceeding 125 mph. The second group

is identified as Tier II equipment and

consists of railroad passenger

equipment operated at speeds greater

than 125 mph but not exceeding 150

mph. FRA is not proposing a rule of

general applicability for railroad

passenger equipment operated at speeds

exceeding 150 mph. FRA believes that

the safety of such passenger equipment

must be addressed in a rule of a

particular applicability for an individual

railroad.

The speed break points between Tier

I and Tier II equipment have been

chosen because most of the nation’s

intercity passenger and commuter rail

equipment has demonstrated an ability

to operate safely at speeds up to 125

mph. Nevertheless, FRA recognizes that

most of this same equipment is

currently operated only at speeds of 110

mph or less. As a result, the proposed

rule contains particular suspension

system safety requirements for

passenger equipment operating at

speeds above 110 mph but not

exceeding 125 mph, near the transition

range from Tier I to Tier II requirements.

Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20133(a), FRA

may apply some or all of the proposed

standards to passenger cars existing at

the time the regulations are published,

as well as to new cars, but FRA must

explain the basis for applying any such

standards to existing cars. FRA believes

that passenger railroad equipment

operating in permanent service in the

United States has established a good

safety record, proving its compatibility

with the operating environment.

Moreover, FRA seeks to maximize the

benefits resulting from the passenger

railroad industry’s investment in any

safety requirements which FRA may

impose through this rule. Accordingly,

to be cost effective, most of the

proposed requirements would apply

only to new or rebuilt equipment.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49733

However, certain features routinely

incorporated in existing designs would

be required at an earlier date than the

more innovative features proposed by

this rule. Further, where appropriate,

rebuilt equipment would be required to

comply with specific requirements.

FRA intends that the rules proposed

in this NPRM lead to the issuance of

initial passenger equipment safety

regulations, which are required by

statute to be issued by November 2,

1997. See 49 U.S.C. 20133(b)(1). FRA

will propose additional rules for

passenger equipment in a second NPRM

principally when the results of further

research are available. FRA intends that

the second NPRM lead to the issuance

of final regulations by November 2,

1999, thereby completing the

rulemaking within the five-year period

required by law. See 49 U.S.C.

20133(b)(2). To that end, FRA convened

a meeting of the Working Group on

December 10–11, 1996, at the Volpe

Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to

determine and set priorities for the

research necessary to address

unresolved safety issues identified in

prior Working Group meetings.

Moreover, FRA hopes that the

establishment of final regulations in

1999 will be furthered by APTA’s own

initiative to develop and maintain

recommended industry standards for

rail passenger equipment. APTA’s effort

is being carried out through the

Passenger Rail Equipment Safety

Standards (PRESS) Task Force, and

APTA has invited FRA, FTA, the NTSB,

equipment manufacturers, engineering

and consulting firms, rail labor, and

others with an interest in rail passenger

equipment to work with it in developing

and effectuating the recommended

standards. This represents a substantial

and continuing investment by member

commuter authorities in the safety of

rail passenger service.

System Safety

FRA believes that passenger railroads

should carefully evaluate their

operations with a view toward

enhancing the safety of those

operations. The importance of formal

safety planning has been recognized in

Emergency Order No. 20 and the

proposed rule on passenger train

emergency preparedness. As noted,

Emergency Order No. 20, Notice No. 1,

required that ‘‘railroads operating

scheduled intercity or commuter rail

service . . . conduct an analysis of their

operations and file with FRA an interim

safety plan indicating the manner in

which risk of a collision involving a cab

car is addressed.’’ 61 FR 6879.

In a letter to FRA dated June 24, 1996,

Mr. Donald N. Nelson, President of

Metro-North and Chairperson of APTA’s

Commuter Railroad Committee,

announced that commuter railroads are

committed to seeking additional

opportunities to ensure the safety of

their operations beyond efforts such as

those made to comply with the interim

system safety plan requirements of

Emergency Order No. 20. Mr. Nelson

explained in particular that commuter

railroads will examine and ensure the

safety of their operations by adopting a

comprehensive system safety plan that:

(a) Defines the overall safety effort,

how it is to be implemented and the

staff required to maintain it;

(b) Establishes the safety interface

within the railroad, as well as with its

key outside agencies;

(c) Clearly indicates Senior

Management support for implementing

the safety plan and the railroad’s overall

commitment to safety;

(d) Establishes the safety philosophy

of the organization and provides the

means for implementation;

(e) Defines the authority and

responsibilities of the safety

organization and delineates the safety

related authority and responsibilities of

other departments; and

(f) Incorporates safety goals and

objectives into the overall corporate

strategic plan.

(APTA’s Commuter Railroad Committee

letter at pages 1 and 2.) Further, the

system safety plan is intended to be

updated through periodic safety reviews

of all operations.

In a letter to FRA dated October 21,

1996, Mr. Donald N. Nelson submitted

for FRA’s review APTA’s ‘‘Manual for

the Development of a System Safety

Plan for Commuter Railroads’’ (APTA

Manual). The APTA Manual is intended

to assist commuter railroads in adopting

a comprehensive system safety plan by

September 1, 1997. In addition, Amtrak

recently began a corporate system safety

program initiative to make system safety

formally an integral part of Amtrak’s

operations. The value of the system

safety process is rapidly being

recognized and accepted by the

passenger railroad industry.

The System Safety Society (the

‘‘Society’’), which provided detailed

comments in response to the ANPRM,

observed that the use of the systems

approach to safety is very actively

followed in many other industries. The

Society noted that the implementation

of system safety plans has been

observed to improve safety by reducing

accidents and incidents. Further, the

Society explained that safety plans are

usually updated annually to maintain

their utility because of technological

improvements and other changed

circumstances, including changes in the

operating environment, rules and

regulations.

The proposed rule contains system

safety requirements to be applied to all

intercity passenger and commuter rail

equipment. Although FRA initially

considered addressing system safety

requirements for Tier I and Tier II

equipment separately, FRA decided to

propose system safety requirements

which can be applied generally to all

types of passenger equipment. Each

individual railroad would be required to

develop a system safety plan and a

system safety program tailored to its

specific operation, including train

speed. The plan required by this part

would be developed as part of a

comprehensive system safety process to

which commuter railroads are already

committed.

Through the system safety process,

each railroad would be required to

identify, evaluate, and seek to eliminate

or reduce the hazards associated with

the use of passenger equipment over the

railroad system. In particular, the

proposed rule would require that each

intercity passenger and commuter

railroad prepare a system safety plan

addressing, at a minimum:

• Fire protection;

• Software safety;

• Equipment inspection, testing, and

maintenance;

• Employee training and

qualifications; and

• Pre-revenue service acceptance

testing of equipment.

However, because FRA is also proposing

a comprehensive set of mandatory,

equipment safety standards in this rule,

FRA is generally not proposing to

enforce every element of a railroad’s

system safety plan. The section-bysection analysis identifies those

portions of the system safety plan that

will be enforced by FRA. Commenters

are requested to address whether FRA

should mandate the contents of system

safety plans, whether the areas

identified by FRA are appropriate,

whether additional areas should be

added, and whether FRA should enforce

other portions of the system safety plans

and, if so, which portions. Should the

proposed rule require that system safety

plans be comprehensive and address the

entire railroad system in which the

equipment operates? Should the

emergency preparedness planning

requirements contained in proposed 49

CFR part 239 (See the Passenger Train

Emergency Preparedness rulemaking,
49734 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

designated as FRA No. PTEP–1 (62 FR

8330, Feb. 24, 1997)) be expressly

integrated with the system safety

planning requirements contained in this

proposed part (49 CFR part 238)?

APTA, citing to the fact that the

commuter railroads have voluntarily

agreed to adopt system safety plans, has

objected to FRA issuing any regulations

governing such plans. Commenters are

requested to address APTA’s suggestion

that the commuter railroads be allowed

to regulate themselves in this area. FRA

understands that APTA’s system safety

approach will be more comprehensive

than what FRA is proposing and address

each commuter railroad’s system more

as an integrated whole, not focused

principally on rail equipment. FRA will

carefully consider the comments

received in deciding what approach to

take in the final rule with respect to

system safety plans.

Passenger railroads should seek to

employ all means necessary to reduce

the risks associated with the use of

passenger equipment over their systems

such as by improving the

crashworthiness of their equipment or

by imposing operational limitations on

its use. Further, because many

passenger railroads operate at least in

part as a tenant on the right-of-way of

another railroad and may not in

themselves be able to control some of

the major system hazards, as

demonstrated when an intermodal

trailer from a CSXT freight train struck

an Amtrak train operating on an

adjacent track in Selma, North Carolina,

all railroads are encouraged to exploit

ways to reduce the risks associated with

rail travel to their employees,

passengers, and the general public.

Emergency Egress and Access

During the NTSB’s investigation of

the February 16, 1996, collision between

the MARC and Amtrak trains in Silver

Spring, Maryland, that agency identified

unsafe conditions on MARC’s rail cars

that had been manufactured by

Sumitomo. Concerned that the unsafe

conditions identified on these rail cars

may exist on other commuter lines

subject to FRA oversight, on March 12,

1996, the NTSB recommended that

FRA:

Inspect all commuter rail equipment to

determine whether it has: (1) easily

accessible interior emergency quick-release

mechanisms adjacent to exterior passageway

doors; (2) removable windows or kick panels

in interior and exterior passageway doors;

and (3) prominently displayed retroreflective

signage marking all interior and exterior

emergency exits. If any commuter equipment

lacks one or more or these features, take

appropriate emergency measures to ensure

corrective action until these measures are

incorporated into minimum passenger car

safety standards. (Class I, Urgent Action) (R–

96–7)

(In a letter to FRA dated June 24, 1996,

the NTSB announced that it has added

‘‘Safety of Passengers in Railroad

Passenger Cars’’ to its list of ‘‘Most

Wanted’’ transportation safety

improvements.)

In the discussion accompanying the

safety recommendation, the NTSB

expressed concern that emergency

quick-release mechanisms for the

exterior side doors on MARC’s

Sumitomo rail cars are located in a

secured cabinet some distance from the

doors that they control, and the

emergency controls for each door are

not readily accessible and identifiable.

Each cabinet door was secured by two

fasteners, requiring a screwdriver or

coin to open. The NTSB believes that

the emergency quick-release

mechanisms for exterior doors on

MARC rail cars should be well marked

and relocated, so that they are

immediately adjacent to the door which

they control and readily accessible for

emergency escape.

Access to Emergency Door-Release for

Power-0perated Doors

In response to the NTSB’s

recommendation, FRA inspected a total

of 1,250 pieces of equipment in use on

16 commuter organizations. In addition

to MARC rail cars, FRA found that some

commuter railroads operate cars with

power doors equipped with emergency

door-release levers located inside

cabinets requiring special tools to enter.

In large part, these railroads have

committed to the voluntary elimination

of latches requiring tools or other

implements to access the emergencyrelease levers on power-operated doors.

FRA convened a joint meeting of the

Passenger Equipment Safety Standards

Working Group and the Passenger Train

Emergency Preparedness Working

Group on March 26, 1996, to discuss the

NTSB’s recommendations and

incorporate the Safety Board’s findings,

as appropriate, into each working

group’s rulemaking. In accordance with

the consensus of the working groups,

FRA is proposing in §§ 238.237 and

238.441 of the rule that train passengers

and crewmembers be able to access

door-release mechanisms without the

use of any tool or other implement.

Relocation of Emergency Door-Release

NTSB advisors to the Working Group

clarified that the recommendation to

relocate emergency door-release

mechanisms refers to exterior side doors

located in end vestibules partitioned

from the passenger compartment of the

rail vehicle. If emergency door-release

mechanisms are located inside the

passenger compartments of such

vehicles, exiting the vehicles in an

emergency through side doors in the

vestibules may be complicated as

passengers try to locate the mechanisms

and move between the vestibule and

passenger compartment areas.

In response to the NTSB’s safety

recommendation, passenger railroads

that operate rail equipment with end

vestibules have agreed to relocate

emergency door-release mechanisms so

that they are located adjacent to the

doors which they control. However,

agreement could not be reached on a

time-table for retrofitting existing

equipment. APTA has proposed that the

retrofit be required on all such

passenger equipment when it is

overhauled in the course of each

railroad’s equipment overhaul cycle.

APTA anticipates that under this

process retrofitting the entire fleet of

affected equipment will be

accomplished within 10 to 15 years.

FRA believes that the retrofit must be

accomplished sooner to ensure the

safety of passenger train occupants.

Consequently, FRA is proposing in

§ 238.237 that for equipment operated at

speeds not exceeding 125 mph (Tier I

equipment), within two years of the

effective date of the final rule each

powered, exterior side door in a

vestibule that is partitioned from the

passenger compartment of a passenger

car be equipped with a manual override

that is: (1) capable of opening the door

without power from inside the car; (2)

located adjacent to the door which it

controls; and (3) designed and

maintained so that a person may access

the override device from inside the car

without requiring the use of any tool or

other implement.

FRA expects that railroads will

expedite this retrofit program and

believes that this retrofit can be

completed well in advance of the 2-year

deadline. APTA maintains that the

supply industry cannot provide the

necessary materials to complete the

retrofit in such time without

unreasonable increases in costs, and

believes that a 3 to 5 year time frame is

needed. (Commenters are requested to

address whether a shorter or longer time

period should be established and, if so,

provide the rationale for the time period

that the commenter recommends.

Railroads are requested to identify the

number of cars that are not yet

retrofitted.) Further, before any

equipment may be introduced for

service at speeds exceeding 125 mph

but not exceeding 150 mph (Tier II
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49735

equipment), FRA is proposing in

§ 238.441 that each powered, exterior

side door on a passenger car be

equipped with a manual override

meeting the above and additional

requirements.

FRA believes that the cost of meeting

the retrofit requirement will be $3.7

million dollars, and recognizes that it is

not clear whether the occupants of the

MARC train in the Silver Spring,

Maryland, accident could have opened

the vestibule exterior side doors after

the collision, assuming that the

emergency-release had been employed.

The NTSB did note that the left and

right rear exterior side doors of the first

car and the front interior end door and

the right front exterior door of the

second car on the MARC train were

jammed. However, FRA believes it must

institute the retrofit requirement to

decrease the risk that passengers cannot

rapidly exit a train in a life-threatening

situation.

FRA recognizes that passenger

railroads have located door-release

mechanisms away from the doors which

they control to discourage passengers

from exiting trains in non-emergency

situations. When no emergency is

present, passengers exiting trains along

the railroad right-of-way unnecessarily

risk exposure to oncoming trains,

electrical hazards, and other dangerous

conditions. In consequence, the

proposed rule permits railroads to

protect emergency door-release

mechanisms from casual or inadvertent

use with a cover or a screen. However,

the cover or screen must be capable of

removal by a 5th-percentile female

without the use of any tool or other

implement. If the method of removing

the protective cover or screen entails

breaking or shattering it, the cover or

screen shall be scored, perforated, or

otherwise weakened so that a 5thpercentile female can penetrate the

cover or screen with a single blow of her

fist without injury to her hand.

Additional Egress Issues

The NTSB noted that none of the car

doors on the MARC train involved in

the Silver Spring, Maryland, accident

had removable windows or pop-out

emergency escape panels (‘‘kick

panels’’) for use in an emergency. In

addition, the NTSB stated that several

train passengers were unaware of the

locations of emergency exits, and none

knew how to operate them. The NTSB

found that the interior emergency

window decals were not prominently

displayed and that one car had no

interior emergency window decals.

Also, the exterior emergency decals

were often faded or obliterated, and the

information on them, when legible,

directed emergency responders to

another sign at the end of the car for

instructions on how to open emergency

exits.

Through the issuance of Emergency

Order No. 20, FRA has addressed on an

interim basis the inspection of required

emergency exits, and emergency exit

signage and marking. Further, FRA is

proposing requirements concerning the

marking of emergency exits, as well as

instructions for their use, in the related

rulemaking on passenger train

emergency preparedness. FRA shares

the NTSB’s concern about passenger

egress in an emergency; however, FRA

believes that the NTSB’s suggestion to

install kick panels is best limited to

interior doors to ensure passage through

a train in an emergency—and not

applied to exterior doors.

To the best of FRA’s knowledge, the

concept of kick panels has not been

utilized in North American rail

equipment. Installing kick panels below

the window levels in exterior doors was

evaluated by FRA, with concurrence

from the joint working groups, as

unacceptable for safety reasons. Because

passenger railroads have encountered

recurring situations in which passengers

have inappropriately exited moving

trains, leading to death or serious injury,

introducing kick panels in exterior

doors would create an unacceptable risk

of inadvertent use, particularly by

children. Penetration of occupied areas

by objects from the outside is also a

potential concern.

Use of kick panels to open

passageways through a train has merit.

If panels can be made sufficiently large

without decreasing the functionality of

doors in normal operation, such a

feature may facilitate evacuation

through the length of the train if exterior

side doors are jammed. Evacuation

throughout the length of the train is

often the safest route of egress in

situations such as fires, derailments in

multiple track territory, and incidents in

third-rail powered commuter service.

Accordingly, FRA is proposing in

§ 238.441 of the rule that Tier II

passenger car end doors be equipped

with a kick-out panel, pop-out window

or other similar means of egress in the

event the doors will not open.

Unlike a Tier II passenger train which

should operate as a fixed unit, the

interchangeable use of some cab cars

and MU locomotives as leading and

trailing units on a Tier I passenger train

will complicate analyzing the efficacy of

installing such panels on Tier I

equipment. It would be unacceptable to

have a removable panel at the point of

a train where objects or fluids might

enter the vehicle as a result of a

highway-rail grade crossing accident or

other collision. As a result, FRA will

further examine the concerns involving

the use of kick panels on Tier I

equipment in the second phase of this

rulemaking.

Additional emergency egress and

access topics addressed in this proposed

rule are discussed below in the

Emergency Systems section of this

preamble. Emergency egress and access

topics are also addressed in the related

rulemaking on passenger train

emergency preparedness. See 62 FR

8330, Feb. 24, 1997.

Power Brake Inspection and Testing

In 1992, Congress amended the

Federal rail safety laws by adding

certain statutory mandates related to

power brake safety. These amendments

specifically address the revision of the

power brake regulations and state in

pertinent part:

(r) POWER BRAKE SAFETY.—(1) The

Secretary shall conduct a review of the

Department of Transportation’s rules with

respect to railroad power brakes, and not

later than December 31, 1993, shall revise

such rules based on such safety data as may

be presented during that review.

* * * * *

Pub. L. No. 102–365, § 7; codified at 49

U.S.C. 20141, superseding 45 U.S.C.

431(r).

In response to the statutory mandate,

various recommendations to improve

power brake safety, and due to its own

determination that the power brake

regulations were in need of revision,

FRA published an ANPRM on December

31, 1992, concerning railroad power

brake safety. See 57 FR 62546. The

ANPRM provided background

information and presented questions on

various subjects related to intercity

passenger and commuter train

operations, including: training of testing

and inspection personnel; electronic

braking systems; cleaning, oiling,

testing, and stenciling (COT&S)

requirements; performance of brake

inspections; and high speed passenger

train brakes. Following publication of

the ANPRM, FRA conducted a series of

public workshops. The ANPRM and the

public workshops were intended as factfinding tools to elicit views of those

persons outside FRA charged with

ensuring compliance with the power

brake regulations on a day-to-day basis.

Furthermore, on July 26, 1993, the

NTSB made the following

recommendation to FRA: ‘‘Amend the

power brake regulations, 49 Code of

Federal Regulations 232.12, to provide

appropriate guidelines for inspecting

brake equipment on modern passenger
49736 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

cars.’’ (R–93–16). The recommendation

arose out of the NTSB’s investigation of

the December 17, 1991, derailment of an

Amtrak passenger train in Palatka,

Florida. The derailed equipment struck

two homes and blocked a street north of

the Palatka station. The derailment

resulted in eleven passengers sustaining

serious injuries and 41 others receiving

minor injuries. In addition, five

members of the operating crew and four

onboard service personnel received

minor injuries. By letter dated

September 16, 1993, FRA told the NTSB

that it was in the process of reviewing

and rewriting the power brake

regulations and would consider the

NTSB’s recommendation during the

process.

Based on comments and information

received, FRA published an NPRM in

1994 regarding revision of the power

brake regulations which contained

specific requirements related to intercity

passenger and commuter train

operations. These specific requirements

included: general design requirements;

movement of defective equipment;

employee qualifications; inspection and

testing requirements; single car testing

requirements and periodic maintenance;

operating requirements; and

requirements for the introduction of

new train brake system technology. See

59 FR 47722–47753, September, 16,

1994.

Following publication of the 1994

NPRM (59 FR 47676), FRA held a series

of public hearings in 1994 to allow

interested parties the opportunity to

comment on specific issues addressed

in the 1994 NPRM. Public hearings were

held in Chicago, Illinois, on November

1–2; in Newark, New Jersey, on

November 4; in Sacramento, California,

on November 9; and in Washington,

D.C. on December 13–14, 1994. These

hearings were attended by numerous

railroads; organizations representing

railroads; labor organizations; rail

shippers; and State governmental

agencies. Due to the strong objections

raised by a large number of commenters,

FRA announced by notice published on

January 17, 1995, that it would defer

action on the 1994 NPRM and permit

the submission of additional comments

prior to making a determination as to

how it would proceed in this matter.

See 60 FR 3375.

Based on these considerations and

after review of all the comments

submitted, FRA determined that in

order to limit the number of issues to be

examined and developed in any one

proceeding it would proceed with the

revision of the power brake regulations

via three separate processes. In light of

the testimony and comments received

on the 1994 NPRM, emphasizing the

differences between passenger and

freight operations and the brake

equipment utilized by the two, FRA

decided to separate passenger

equipment power brake standards from

freight equipment power brake

standards. As passenger equipment

power brake standards are a logical

subset of passenger equipment safety

standards, FRA requested the Passenger

Equipment Safety Standards Working

Group to assist FRA in developing

appropriate power brake standards for

passenger equipment and then decided

that they would be included in this

NPRM. See 49 U.S.C. 20133(c). In

addition, a second NPRM covering

freight equipment power brake

standards would be developed with the

assistance of FRA’s Railroad Safety

Advisory Committee. See 61 FR 29164,

June 7, 1996. Furthermore, in the

interest of public safety and due to

statutory as well as internal

commitments, FRA determined that it

would separate the issues related to

two-way end-of-train-telemetry devices

from both the passenger and freight

issues. FRA convened a public

regulatory conference and published a

final rule on the subject on January 2,

1997. See 62 FR 278.

Beginning in December of 1995, the

Passenger Equipment Safety Standards

Working Group adopted the additional

task of attempting to develop power

brake standards applicable to intercity

passenger and commuter train

operations and equipment. The Working

Group met on four separate occasions in

the last six months, which consisted of

ten days of meetings, with a good

portion of these meetings being devoted

to discussion of power brake issues.

From the outset, a majority of the

members, as well as FRA, believed that

any requirements developed by the

group regarding the inspection and

testing of the brake equipment should

not vary significantly from the current

requirements and should be consistent

with current industry practice.

FRA’s accident/incident data related

to intercity passenger and commuter

train operations support the assumption

that the current practices of these

operations in the area of power brake

inspection, testing, and maintenance are

for the most part sufficient to ensure the

safety of the public. Between January 1,

1990 and October 31, 1996, there were

only five brake related accidents

involving commuter and intercity

passenger railroad equipment. No

casualties resulted from any of these

accidents and the total damage to

railroad equipment totaled

approximately $650,000, or $96,000

annually. In addition, between January

1, 1995 and October 31, 1996, FRA

inspected approximately 13,000

commuter and intercity passenger rail

units for compliance with 49 CFR part

232. The defect ratio for these units

during this period was approximately

0.8 percent. Furthermore, during this

same period FRA inspected

approximately 6,300 locomotives for

compliance with 49 CFR part 229. The

brake defect ratio for these units was

approximately 4.65 percent.

Consequently, the defect ratio for brake

related defects on locomotives and other

passenger equipment during this period

was approximately 2.08 percent.

The existing regulations covering the

inspection and testing of the braking

systems on passenger trains are

contained in 49 CFR part 232. The

current regulations do provide some

requirements relevant to passenger train

operations, including: initial terminal

inspection and testing, intermediate

inspections, running tests, and general

maintenance requirements. See 49 CFR

232.12, 232.13(a), 232.16, and 232.17.

However, most of the existing

regulations are written to address freight

train operations and do not sufficiently

address the unique operating

environment of commuter and intercity

passenger train operations or the

equipment currently being used in those

operations. Therefore, it has been

necessary for FRA to provide

interpretations of some of the current

regulations in order to address these

unique concerns.

Currently, all non-MU (multiple unit)

commuter trains that do not remain

connected to a source of compressed air

overnight and all MU commuter trains

equipped with RT–5 or similar brake

systems must receive an initial terminal

inspection of the brake system pursuant

to § 232.12(c)–(j) prior to the train’s first

departure on any given calendar day.

All non-MU commuter trains that

remain connected to a source of

compressed air overnight are permitted

to receive an initial terminal inspection

of the brake system sometime during

each 24-hour period in which they are

used. Furthermore, all intercity

passenger trains must receive an initial

terminal inspection of the brake system

at the point where they are originally

made up and must receive an

intermediate inspection in accordance

with § 232.12(b) every 1,000 miles.

As noted previously, most of the

members of the Working Group believed

that any requirements developed by the

group regarding the inspection and

testing of the brake equipment should

not vary significantly from the current

requirements and should be consistent
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49737

with current industry practice.

However, the Working Group was

unable to reach consensus on power

brake standards, despite the positing of

multiple alternatives, use of a facilitator,

and the foundation provided by the

1994 NPRM. The Working Group

identified and discussed options with

which the agency and labor can agree,

and others with which FRA and the

railroads can agree. However, bridging

the gap between those various options

proved elusive. Consequently, as the

Working Group could not reach any

type of consensus on the inspection and

testing requirements, it was determined

that FRA would address these issues

unilaterally, based on the information

and discussions provided by the

Working Group and the information

gathered from the 1994 NPRM. FRA is

interested in receiving comments on the

brake tests that it has developed given

the differences in the positions of the

various parties.

The Working Group discussed various

options regarding the types of brake

inspections that should be required as

well as when and how these inspections

should be performed. Labor

representatives, particularly the BRC,

insisted that a comprehensive power

brake inspection (i.e., something similar

to the initial terminal brake inspections

currently required under § 232.12(c)–(j))

must be performed prior to a train’s first

run on a given calendar day. The BRC

expressed concern that, as equipment

lays over between the evening

commuter cycle and the first trip of the

morning, vandalism, weather changes,

or other factors could affect the integrity

of the air brake system. The BRC also

believes that it is necessary for the first

inspection of the day to determine

whether the brake shoes and the disc

pads actually apply as intended. The

BRC further contends that in order to

perform a comprehensive inspection

equivalent to an initial terminal

inspection the train must be walked or

otherwise inspected on a car-to-car

basis. In addition, the BRC contends

that these principal inspections should

be performed only by carmen or other

qualified mechanical personnel as they

are the only employees sufficiently

trained to perform these inspections.

Representatives of intercity passenger

and commuter railroads expressed the

desire to have the flexibility to conduct

a comprehensive in-depth inspection of

the train brake system sometime during

the day in which the equipment is

utilized. These parties argued that safety

would be better served by allowing the

railroads the flexibility to conduct these

inspections on a daily basis as it would

allow the railroads to conduct the

inspections at locations that are more

conducive to permitting a full

inspection of the equipment than many

of the outlying locations where trains

are stationed overnight and where the

ability to observe all the equipment may

be hampered. It is further contended

that, if trains are required to received

the equivalent of an initial terminal

inspection at these outlying points, then

many of these inspections may be

performed by individuals not as fully

qualified as a mechanical inspector.

Whereas, if the railroads are allowed

some flexibility in conducting these

type of inspections, then the equipment

can be moved to a location where a fully

qualified mechanical inspector can

perform a detailed brake inspection

under optimum conditions, perhaps in

conjunction with a daily mechanical

inspection.

Several parties also pointed out that,

with proper maintenance, ‘‘tread brake

units’’ and other friction brake

components, commonly used in

commuter train operations, are highly

reliable and that the non-functioning of

any individual unit would in no way

compromise the overall safety of the

train. Furthermore, permitting the

inspection of these types of brake

components in the middle of the day,

rather than at the beginning of the day,

involves no greater safety risk to

passengers because friction brake

systems and their components degrade

in performance based largely on use,

and nothing short of a continuous brake

inspection can guarantee 100-percent

performance at all times. Railroad

representatives suggested an inspection

scheme that would permit an in-depth,

comprehensive brake inspection to be

performed sometime during the day in

which the equipment is used with a

brake inspection being performed prior

to the first run of the day verifying the

continuity of the trainline by performing

a set and release on the rear car of the

train. In addition, one commuter

railroad also requested relief from

performing Class I inspections on trains

operated in weekend service due to the

shortage of mechanical inspectors

currently employed on those shifts.

Based on consideration of the

discussions held in the Working Group

meetings, outlined above, as well as

information obtained in relation to the

1994 NPRM, FRA proposes to abandon

the terminology related to the power

brake inspection and testing

requirements contained in the current

regulations, which is generally based on

the locations where the inspections and

tests are performed (i.e., initial terminal,

intermediate locations). In its stead,

FRA proposes to identify various classes

of inspections based on the duties and

type of inspection required, such as:

Class I; Class IA; and Class II. This is

similar to the approach taken by FRA in

the 1994 NPRM. See 59 FR 47736–40.

FRA believes that this type of

classification system will avoid

confusion with the power brake

inspection and testing requirements

applicable to freight operations and will

avoid the connotations historically

attached to the current terminology.

FRA also believes this approach is better

suited for providing operational

flexibility to commuter operations while

maintaining the safety provided by the

current inspection and testing

requirements. Although FRA proposes a

change in the terminology used to

describe the various power brake

inspections and tests, the requirements

of these inspections and tests will

closely track the current requirements

with some modifications made to

address the unique operating

environment of, and equipment

operated in, commuter and intercity

passenger train service. Members of the

Working Group appeared receptive to

this kind of classification system and

discussed various options using some of

this terminology. Consequently, FRA

proposes four different types of brake

inspections to be performed by

commuter and intercity passenger

railroads some time during the

operation of the equipment. FRA

proposes the terms ‘‘Class I,’’ ‘‘Class

IA,’’ ‘‘Class II,’’ and ‘‘running brake test’’

to identify the four types of brake

inspections required by this proposal.

FRA also proposes to divide

passenger train operations into two

distinct types for purposes of brake

inspections and testing. FRA recognizes

that there are major differences in the

operations of commuter or shortdistance intercity passenger trains, and

long-distance intercity passenger trains.

Commuter and short-distance intercity

passenger trains tend to operate for

fairly short distances between passenger

stations and generally operate in

relatively short turn-around service

between two terminals several times in

any given day. In contrast, long-distance

intercity passenger trains tend to

operate for long distances, with trips

between the beginning terminal and

ending terminal taking a day or more

and traversing multiple states with

relatively long distances between

passenger stations. Consequently, FRA

proposes to use and define the terms

‘‘commuter train,’’ ‘‘short-distance

intercity passenger train,’’ and ‘‘longdistance intercity passenger train’’ in

order to identify the inspection and
49738 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

testing requirements associated with

each. For the most part, commuter and

short-distance intercity passenger trains

are treated similarly, whereas, longdistance intercity passenger trains have

slightly different proposed inspection

and testing requirements. In addition,

FRA proposes slightly different

requirements with regard to the

movement of defective equipment in

long-distance intercity passenger trains

(see the discussion below on the

‘‘Movement of Equipment with

Defective Brakes’’).

APTA, in its comments on a draft of

the NPRM, expressed opposition to the

proposed Class IA brake test. APTA’s

position is that brake tests prior to a

train’s first departure in any day should

be limited to a pre-departure set and

release followed by a running test of the

brakes. APTA also expresses the belief

that the proposed NPRM Class I and

Class II requirements go well beyond

existing brake inspection processes and

that which is required for safety, and

that these requirements will increase

costs dramatically.

A. Commuter and Short-Distance

Intercity Passenger Trains Require a

Class I Brake Test Sometime During a

Day the Equipment Is Used

The proposed Class I brake test

basically requires an inspection similar

to an initial terminal inspection as

currently described at § 232.12(c)–(j),

but is somewhat more extensive and

specifically aimed at the types of

equipment being used in commuter and

intercity passenger train service. A Class

I brake test would require an inspection

of the application and release of the

friction brakes on each side of each car

as well as an inspection of the brake

shoes, pads, discs, rigging, angle cocks,

piston travel, and brake indicators if the

equipment is so equipped. The Class I

brake test would also require testing of

the communication signal system and

the emergency braking control devices.

In addition, all supplemental braking

systems would be required to be

inspected and be working. In

recognition of the advanced technology

and various designs used in many of

these operations, which make

observation of the piston travel virtually

impossible, FRA proposes to permit the

inspection of the piston travel to be

conducted either through direct

observation or by observation of a brake

actuator or the clearance between the

brake shoe and the wheel. Furthermore,

FRA proposes to require a brake pipe

leakage test only when leakage will

affect service performance.

Although FRA agrees with the

position advanced by many labor

representatives that some sort of car-tocar inspection must be made of the

brake equipment prior to the first run of

the day, FRA does not agree that it is

necessary to perform a full Class I brake

test before the first run in order to

ensure the proper functioning of the

brake equipment. As FRA proposes that

Class I brake tests be a comprehensive

inspection of the braking system,

including the proper operation of

supplemental braking systems, FRA

believes that commuter and shortdistance intercity passenger train

operations must be permitted some

flexibility in conducting these

inspections. Consequently, FRA

proposes to require that commuter and

short-distance intercity passenger train

operations perform a Class I brake test

sometime during the calendar day in

which the equipment is used. FRA

believes that the flexibility permitted by

this proposed requirement will allow

these railroads to move equipment to

locations that are most conducive to the

inspection of the brake equipment and

would allow these railroads to combine

the daily mechanical inspections with

this brake inspection for added

efficiency.

Furthermore, as FRA intends for these

Class I brake inspections to be in-depth

inspections of the entire braking system

which most likely will be performed

only one time in any given day in which

the equipment is used, FRA believes

that these inspections must be

performed by individuals possessing not

only the knowledge to identify and

detect a defective condition in all of the

brake equipment required to be

inspected but also the knowledge to

recognize the interrelational workings of

the equipment and the ability to

‘‘troubleshoot’’ and repair the

equipment. Therefore, FRA proposes

that only qualified mechanical

inspectors be permitted to perform Class

I brake tests.

Currently, initial terminal air brake

inspections are conducted prior to the

first run of the day on 554 commuter

train sets by mechanical inspectors and

on 168 commuter train sets by train

crews or other personnel who could not

be fully qualified as mechanical

inspectors. Typically, commuter and

short-distance intercity passenger trains

receive more than one initial terminal

test each day, even if this is not required

due to the equipment being left ‘‘off

air.’’ See 49 CFR 232.12(a). Often these

additional tests are conducted sometime

during the middle of the day by train

crews or mechanical employees.

Although most commuter and shortdistance intercity operations voluntarily

perform an initial terminal brake

inspection with mechanical employees

some time during the day, there is no

requirement to do so. In addition, there

is a certain percentage of equipment

where the principal brake inspections

are currently being performed strictly by

train crews rather than by mechanical

employees. Consequently, FRA believes

that the proposed requirement

incorporates the current best practices

of the industry and will, at a minimum,

ensure that the braking systems on all

commuter and short-distance intercity

equipment will be inspected at least

once each day by a fully qualified

mechanical inspector.

FRA has not proposed any special

provisions for weekend operations as

suggested by some members of the

Working Group. FRA recognizes this is

a difficult issue. Existing operations

generally involve using particular sets of

equipment on only one day during the

weekend to avoid the need to refuel. On

the one hand, there is no specific data

suggesting that existing weekend

operations involving inspections

exclusively by train crew members have

created a safety hazard. Yet, the

rationale for requiring daily attention by

mechanical forces, a proposition

generally accepted by Working Group

members, would appear to apply

equally to weekend periods. FRA

believes that adjustments might be made

to weekend operations that might avoid

significant new expense while

providing expert attention to inspection

of the equipment. Accordingly, FRA

seeks additional information on the

costs and benefits of requiring that Class

I brake inspections and daily

mechanical inspections be conducted by

qualified mechanical inspectors, as well

as any suggestions for alternative means

of addressing this issue.

B. Commuter and Short-Distance

Intercity Passenger Trains Require at

Least a Class IA Brake Test Prior to the

Train’s First Departure in Any Given

Day

Although FRA agrees with the

position advanced by many labor

representatives that some sort of car-tocar inspection must be made of the

brake equipment prior to the first run of

the day, FRA does not agree that it is

necessary to perform a full Class I brake

test in order to ensure the proper

functioning of the brake equipment in

all situations. However, contrary to the

position espoused by APTA, FRA

believes that something more than just

a determination that the brakes on the

rear car set and release is necessary.

Currently, the quality of initial

terminal tests performed by train crews

is likely adequate to determine that
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49739

brakes apply on each car. However,

most commuter equipment utilizes

‘‘tread brake units’’ in lieu of cylinders

and brake rigging of the kind prevalent

on freight and some intercity passenger

cars. It is undoubtedly the case that

train crew members do not verify

application of the brakes by tapping

brake shoes while the brakes are

applied, the only effective means of

determining that adequate force is being

applied. This is one reason why the

subject railroads typically conduct

redundant initial terminal tests at other

times during the day. Further, train

crews are not asked to inspect for wheel

defects and other unsafe conditions, nor

should they be asked to do so, given the

conditions under which they are asked

to inspect and the training they receive.

FRA proposes that, at a minimum, a

Class IA brake test be performed prior

to a commuter or short-distance

intercity passenger train’s first departure

on any given day. FRA believes that the

proposed Class IA brake is sufficiently

detailed to ensure the proper

functioning of the brake system yet not

so intensive that it requires individuals

to perform an inspection for which they

are not qualified.

The proposed Class IA brake test is

somewhat less comprehensive than a

Class I brake test but includes a detailed

inspection of the brake system to verify

the continuity of the brake system and

the proper functioning of the brake

valves on each car. A Class IA brake test

would be similar to the intermediate

brake inspection currently required for

freight trains prescribed at

§ 232.13(d)(1). A Class IA brake test

would generally require a walking

inspection of the set and release of the

brakes on each car; however, the

proposal would allow brake indicators

to be used to verify the set and release

if the railroad determines that operating

conditions pose a safety hazard to an

inspector walking along the train. The

Class IA brake test would also require a

leakage test if leakage affects service

performance, as well as an inspection

of: angle cocks; piston travel, if

determinable; brake indicators;

emergency brake control devices; and

communication of brake pipe pressure

changes at the rear of train to the

controlling locomotive. FRA believes

that a qualified mechanical inspector or

a properly trained and qualified train

crew member could perform a Class IA

brake test.

C. Long-distance Intercity Passenger

Trains Require a Class I Brake Test Prior

to Departure From an Originating

Terminal and Once Each Calendar Day

the Equipment Is Used or Every 1,500

Miles, Whichever Occurs First

As noted above, FRA recognizes the

differences between commuter or shortdistance intercity operations and longdistance intercity passenger train

operations. Long-distance intercity

passenger trains do not operate in

shorter turn around service over the

same sections of track on a daily basis

for the purpose of transporting

passengers from major centers of

employment. Instead, these trains tend

to operate for extended periods of time,

over long distances with greater

distances between passenger stations

and terminals. Further, these trains may

operate well over 1,000 miles in any 24

hour period. Thus, the opportunity for

conducting inspections on these trains

is somewhat diminished. Therefore,

FRA believes that a thorough inspection

of the braking system on these types of

operations must be conducted prior to

the train’s departure from an initial

starting terminal. Consequently, FRA

will not permit the use of Class IA brake

tests for these trains and proposes to

require that a Class I brake inspection be

performed on long-distance intercity

passenger trains prior to departure from

an initial terminal. FRA does not believe

there would be any significant burden

placed on these operations as the

current regulations require that an

initial terminal inspection be performed

at these locations. Furthermore,

virtually all of the initial terminal

inspections currently conducted on

these types of trains are performed by

individuals who would be considered

qualified mechanical employees under

this proposal.

FRA also recognizes that these longdistance intercity passenger trains could

conceivably travel over 3,000 miles if

Class I inspections were required only

once every 24 hours the equipment is in

service as proposed for commuter and

short-distance intercity passenger trains.

Thus, FRA believes that some outside

mileage limit must be placed on these

trains between brake inspections.

Currently, a passenger train is permitted

to travel no further than 1,000 miles

from its initial terminal, at which point

it must receive an intermediate

inspection of brakes that includes

application of the brakes and the

inspection of the brake rigging to ensure

it is properly secured. See 49 CFR

232.12(b). However, in recognition of

the improved technology used in

passenger train brake systems combined

with the comprehensive nature of the

proposed Class I brake tests and

mechanical safety inspections both

being performed by qualified

mechanical inspectors, FRA proposes to

permit long-distance passenger trains to

travel up to 1,500 miles between Class

I brake tests. Consequently, FRA

proposes to eliminate the 1,000-mile

inspection for these trains and proposes

to require that the proposed Class I

brake test be performed once every

calendar day that the equipment is used

or every 1,500 miles, which every

occurs first.

D. The Brake Inspection and Testing

Intervals for Long-distance Intercity

Passenger Trains Apply to All Tier II

Equipment Regardless of Whether the

Equipment is Used in Short- or Longdistance Intercity Trains

FRA also proposes to apply the brake

inspection and testing intervals

proposed for long-distance passenger

trains to all Tier II equipment (i.e.,

equipment operating at speeds greater

than 125 mph but not exceeding 150

mph) regardless of whether it is used in

short- or long-distance intercity trains.

As FRA proposes to permit operators of

Tier II equipment to develop inspection

and testing criteria and procedures,

these operations will be required to

develop a brake test that is equivalent to

a Class I brake test for Tier II equipment.

Due to the speeds at which this

equipment will be allowed to operate,

FRA believes it is a necessity that an

equivalent Class I brake test be

performed on Tier II equipment before

it departs from its initial terminal.

Likewise, FRA proposes to require that

the equivalent Class I brake test be

performed every calendar day in which

the equipment is used or every 1,500

miles, whichever comes first.

E. Class II Brake Test Required Where

Minor Changes to a Train Consist Occur

In addition to the proposed Class I

and Class IA brake tests, FRA also

proposes a Class II brake test. The

proposed Class II brake test is an

inspection intended to verify the

continuity of the train brake system and

is similar to the intermediate terminal

inspection currently prescribed at

§ 232.13(a). A Class II brake test would

basically require a set and release of the

brakes on the rear car. The proposed

Class II test would be required in those

circumstances where minor changes to

a train consist occur. These include the

change of a control stand, the removal

of cars from the consist, the addition of

previously tested cars, and the

situations in which an operator first

takes control of the train.
49740 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

F. Running Brake Tests

FRA also proposes to require a

running brake test as soon as conditions

safely permit it to be conducted after a

train receives a Class I, Class IA, or

Class II brake test. FRA believes that this

test should be conducted in accordance

with each railroad’s operating rules. The

‘‘running brake test’’ requirement is

similar to the ‘‘running test’’

requirements currently contained at

§ 232.16.

Movement of Equipment With Defective

Brakes

The current regulations do not

contain requirements pertaining to the

movement of equipment with defective

power brakes. The movement of

equipment with these types of defects is

currently controlled by a specific

statutory provision originally enacted in

1910, which states:

(a) GENERAL.—A vehicle that is equipped

in compliance with this chapter whose

equipment becomes defective or insecure

nevertheless may be moved when necessary

to make repairs, without a penalty being

imposed under section 21302 of this title,

from the place at which the defect or

insecurity was first discovered to the nearest

available place at which the repairs can be

made—

(1) On the railroad line on which the defect

or insecurity was discovered; or

(2) At the option of a connecting railroad

carrier, on the railroad line of the connecting

carrier, if not further than the place of repair

described in clause (1) of this subsection.

49 U.S.C. 20303(a) (emphasis added).

Although there is no limit contained

in 49 U.S.C. 20303 as to the number of

cars with defective equipment that may

be hauled in a train, FRA has a

longstanding interpretation which

requires that, at a minimum, 85 percent

of the cars in a train have operative

brakes. FRA bases this interpretation on

another statutory requirement which

permits a railroad to use a train only if

‘‘at least 50 percent of the vehicles in

the train are equipped with power or

train brakes and the engineer is using

the power or train brakes on those

vehicles and on all other vehicles

equipped with them that are associated

with those vehicles in a train.’’ 49

U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B). As originally

enacted in 1903, section 20302 also

granted the Interstate Commerce

Commission (ICC) the authority to

increase this percentage, and in 1910

the ICC issued an order increasing the

minimum percentage to 85 percent. See

49 CFR 232.1, which codified the ICC

order.

As virtually all freight cars are

presently equipped with power brakes

and are operated on an associated

trainline, the statutory requirement is in

essence a requirement that 100 percent

of the cars in a train have operative

power brakes, unless being hauled for

repairs pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20303.

Consequently, FRA currently requires

that equipment with defective or

inoperative air brakes makeup no more

than 15 percent of the train and that, if

it is necessary to move the equipment

from where the railroad first discovered

it to be defective, the defective

equipment be moved no further than the

nearest place on the railroad’s line

where the necessary repairs can be

made or, at the option of the receiving

carrier, to a repair point that is no

further than the repoint on the

delivering line.

The requirements regarding the

movement of equipment with defective

or insecure brakes noted above can and

do create safety hazards as well as

operational difficulties in the area of

commuter and intercity passenger

railroad operations. As the provisions

regarding the movement of defective

brake equipment were written almost a

century ago, they do not address the

realities of these types of operations in

today’s world. Strict application of the

requirements has the potential of

causing major disruptions of service

which result in the creation of serious

safety and security problems. For

example, requiring repairs to be made at

the nearest location where the necessary

repairs can be made could result in

passengers being discharged between

stations where adequate facilities for

their safety are not available or in the

overcrowding of station platforms and

trailing trains due to discharging

passengers from a defective train at a

location other than the passenger’s

destination. In addition, strict

application of the statutory

requirements could result in the moving

of trains with defective brake equipment

against the current of traffic during busy

commuting hours. Irregular movements

of this type increase the risk of

collisions on the railroad. Furthermore,

many of today’s commuter train

operations often utilize six cars or less

in trains and in many instances operate

just two-car trains. Consequently, the

necessity to cut out the brakes on one

car can easily result in noncompliance

with the 85-percent requirement for

hauling the car for repairs, thus

prohibiting the train’s movement and

resulting in the same type of safety

problems noted above.

FRA has attempted to recognize the

nature of commuter and intercity

passenger operations and the

importance of addressing the safety of

passengers, as well as avoiding

disruption of this service, when

applying the requirements regarding the

movement of equipment with defective

brakes on a day-to-day basis. In

addition, the representatives of

commuter and intercity passenger train

operations participating in this

proceeding have requested that the

regulations be brought up to date,

recognizing that brakes will have to be

cut out en route from time to time (e.g.,

because of damage from debris placed

on the track structure or because of

sticking brakes) and that contemporary

braking systems and established

stopping distances provide a very

considerable margin of safety.

Furthermore, speed restrictions can

readily be used to compensate for the

loss of brakes on a minority of cars. FRA

believes that affirmatively recognizing

appropriate movement restrictions

would actually enhance safety, since

compliance with the existing

restrictions is potentially unsafe.

Representatives from APTA proposed

a method of updating the current

requirements regarding the movement of

commuter passenger equipment with

defective brakes to bring them more in

line with the realities of today’s

operations. The Working Group

discussed the proposal at length,

making various revisions. Although the

Working Group did not reach consensus

on the issue, FRA believes that the

proposed requirements are within the

scope of options discussed by the group.

FRA believes that the proposed

restrictions are very conservative and

effectively ensure a high level of safety

in light of the reliability of braking

systems currently used in commuter

and intercity passenger train operations.

FRA recognizes that some of the

proposed restrictions are not in accord

with the requirement contained in 49

U.S.C. 20303(a) that cars with defective

or insecure brakes be moved to the

‘‘nearest’’ location where the necessary

repairs can be made. However, FRA

does have authority under 49 U.S.C.

20306, entitled ‘‘Exemption for

technological improvements,’’ to

establish the proposed restrictions.

Section 20306 provides:

[T]he Secretary of Transportation may

exempt from the requirements of this chapter

railroad equipment or equipment that will be

operated on rails, when those requirements

preclude the development or implementation

of more efficient railroad transportation

equipment or other transportation

innovations under existing law.

This provision was originally enacted as

a part of the Rock Island Railroad

Transition and Employee Assistance Act

to authorize the use of RoadRailer

trailers as freight cars. See Pub. L. 96–
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49741

254 (May 30, 1980). Although it could

be argued that the purpose of the

provision is too narrow to comprehend

the instant application, FRA believes

that the use of the provision as

contemplated in this proposal is

consistent with the authority granted

the Secretary of Transportation in 49

U.S.C. 20306. As noted previously, the

statutory requirements regarding the

movement of equipment with defective

brake equipment were written nearly a

century ago and, in FRA’s opinion, were

focused generally on the operation of

freight equipment and did not

contemplate the types of commuter and

intercity passenger train operations

currently prevalent throughout the

nation. Since the original enactment in

1910 of the provisions now codified at

49 U.S.C. 20303(a), there have been

substantial changes both in the nature of

the operations of passenger trains as

well as in the technology used in those

operations.

Contemporary passenger equipment

incorporates various types of advanced

braking systems; in some cases these

include electrical activation of brakes on

each car (with pneumatic application

through the train line available as a

backup). Dynamic brakes are also

typically employed to limit thermal

stresses on friction surfaces and to limit

the wear and tear on the brake

equipment. Furthermore, the brake

valves and brake components used

today are far more reliable than was the

case several decades ago. In addition to

these technological advances, the brake

equipment used in commuter and

intercity passenger train operations

incorporate advanced technologies not

found with any regularity in freight

operations. These include:

• The use of brake cylinder pressure

indicators which provide a reliable

indication of the application and release

of the brakes.

• The use of disc brakes which

provide shorter stopping distances and

decrease the risk of thermal damage to

wheels.

• The ability to effectuate a graduated

release of the brakes due to a design

feature of the brake equipment which

permits more flexibility and more

forgiving train control.

• The ability to cut out brakes on a

per-axle or per-truck basis rather than a

per car basis, thus permitting greater use

of those brakes that are operable.

• The use of a pressure-maintaining

feature on each car which continuously

maintains the air pressure in the brake

system, thereby compensating for any

leakage in the trainline and preventing

a total loss of air in the brake system.

• The use of a separate trainline from

the locomotive main reservoir to

continuously charge supply reservoirs

independent of the brake pipe train line.

• Brake ratios that are 21⁄2 times

greater than the brake ratios of loaded

freight cars.

Although some of the technologies

noted above have existed for several

decades, most of the technologies were

not in wide spread use until after 1980.

Furthermore, most of the noted

technological advances just started to be

integrated into one efficient and reliable

braking system within the last decade.

In addition to the technological

advances, commuter and intercity

passenger train operations have

experienced considerable growth in the

last 15 years necessitating the need to

provide more reliable and efficient

service to the riding public. Since 1980,

the number of commuter operations

providing rail service has almost

doubled and the number of daily

passengers serviced by passenger

operations has more than doubled over

the same time period. Furthermore,

commuter and intercity passenger train

operations conduct more frequent single

car tests, COT&S, and maintenance of

the braking systems than is generally the

practice in the freight industry.

Consequently, the technology

incorporated into the brake equipment

used in today’s commuter and intercity

passenger train operations has increased

the reliability of the braking system and

permits the safe operation of the

equipment for extended distances even

though a portion of the braking system

may be inoperative or defective.

In the face of these technological

advances, FRA believes it is appropriate

to utilize the authority granted by 49

U.S.C. 20306 and exempt commuter and

intercity passenger train operations from

the specific restriction contained in 49

U.S.C. 20303(a) requiring the movement

of equipment with defective or insecure

brakes to the nearest location where the

necessary repairs could be made and

proposes various restrictions on the

movement of this type of equipment

which FRA believes are more conducive

to safe operations.

In utilizing the authority granted

pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20306, the

Secretary is required to make ‘‘findings

based on evidence developed at a

hearing,’’ unless there is ‘‘an agreement

between national railroad labor

representatives and the developer of the

new equipment or technology.’’ FRA is

confident that, after notice and

opportunity for public comment, oral

and written, the record will support a

finding that the proposed provisions are

‘‘in the public interest and consistent

with railroad safety,’’ the basic test for

waiving safety requirements issued

under other, general provisions of the

code. See 49 U.S.C. 20103(d). It should

be noted that the exemption granted to

these operations does not include an

exemption from 49 U.S.C. 20303(c),

which contains the liability provisions

attendant with the movement

equipment with defective or insecure

safety appliances, including power

brakes. Consequently, the liability

provisions contained in 49 U.S.C.

20303(c) will be applicable to a railroad

when hauling equipment with defective

or insecure power brakes pursuant to

the requirements proposed by FRA in

this notice.

FRA also proposes to exempt

commuter and intercity passenger train

operations from its longstanding

interpretation, based on 49 U.S.C.

20302(a)(5)(B) and 49 CFR 232.1 noted

above, prohibiting the movement of a

train if more than 15 percent of the cars

in the train have defective, insecure, or

inoperative brakes. As discussed

previously, such a limitation is overly

burdensome and has the potential of

creating safety hazards due to the short

length of the trains commonly operated

in commuter and intercity passenger

service.

Based on the preceding discussions,

FRA proposes various restrictions on

the movement of vehicles with defective

brake equipment which allow commuter

and intercity passenger train operations

to take advantage of the efficiencies

created due to the advanced braking

systems these operations employ as well

as the improvements made in brake

equipment over the years, while

ensuring if not enhancing the safety of

the traveling public. FRA proposes to

permit trains to be operated with up to

50 percent inoperative brakes to the

next forward passenger station or

terminal based on the percentage of

operative brakes, which may result in

movements past locations where the

necessary repairs could be made.

However, to ensure the safety of these

trains with lower percentages of

operative brakes, FRA also proposes

various speed restrictions and other

operating restrictions, based on the

percentage of operative brakes. FRA

believes that the proposed speed

restrictions are very conservative and

ensure a high level of safety. In fact, test

data establish that with the proposed

speed restrictions the stopping distances

of those trains with lower percentages of

operative brakes are shorter than if the

trains were operating at normal speed

and had 100 percent operative brakes.

Consequently, FRA believes that the

proposed approach to the movement of
49742 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

equipment with defective brakes not

only enhances the overall safety of train

operations but benefits both the

railroads, by providing operational

flexibility, and the traveling public, by

permitting them to get to their

destinations in a more expedient and

safe fashion. (The proposed restrictions

on the movement of equipment with

defective brakes are discussed in detail

in the section-by-section analysis

below.)

Although FRA proposes to exempt all

commuter and passenger operations

from the specific statutory requirement

contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303(a), it

should be noted that in reality the

exemption being proposed is fairly

limited. In FRA’s view, many of the

proposed methods for moving defective

equipment are consistent, if not in

accordance, with the current statutory

requirement. For example, FRA

proposes to permit a passenger train

with 50–75 percent operative brakes to

be moved at reduced speed to the next

forward passenger station. Although the

percentage of operative brakes is lower

than currently permitted by FRA’s

longstanding agency interpretation

(which FRA believes is fully

compensated for by the proposed speed

restrictions), FRA believes that the

movement of the defective equipment to

the next passenger station is in

accordance with the statutory

requirement as the safety of the

passengers must be considered in

determining the nearest location where

necessary repairs can be made. In

addition, permitting passenger trains to

continue to the next forward location

where the necessary repairs can be

performed is also consistent with the

statutory requirement as such

movement is necessary to ensure the

safety of the traveling public by

protecting them from the hazards

incident to performing movements

against the current of traffic.

Furthermore, the proposed movement

provisions related to long-distance

intercity passenger trains and longdistance Tier II equipment are

consistent with the current statutory

requirements as the proposal permits

the movement of defective brake

equipment on these trains only to the

next passenger station or the next repair

location, with various speed restrictions

depending on the percentage of

operative brakes. Due to the unique

technologies used on the brake systems

of these operations and the unique

operating environments, the facilities

and personnel necessary to conduct

proper repairs on this equipment are

somewhat specialized and limited.

Thus, FRA proposes to require the

operators of these trains to designate the

locations where repairs will be made to

the equipment.

Some of the members of the Working

Group, particularly those representing

labor organizations, expressed concern

that any alteration of the movement for

repair provisions made in the context of

commuter and intercity passenger train

operations may have a spillover effect

into the freight industry. FRA wishes to

make clear that it has no intention, at

this time, of exempting freight

operations from the requirements

relating to the movement of defective

equipment contained in 49 U.S.C.

20303. As noted above, many of the

advanced brake system technologies

currently used in passenger service are

not used in the freight context.

Furthermore, even if freight operations

were to make similar advances in the

braking equipment they employ, this

development on the freight side may not

create the efficiencies created in the

passenger train context since the

operating environments of freight trains

and passenger trains differ significantly.

Finally, the special safety

considerations relative to passengers are

not present in freight operations.

Structural Standards

To help ensure the survivability of a

passenger train accident, FRA is

proposing comprehensive, minimum

safety standards for the structural design

of rail passenger equipment. Under

current regulations, MU locomotives

must comply with minimum structural

design requirements, see 49 CFR

229.141; however, no comparable set of

Federal structural design requirements

apply to other forms of passenger

equipment. Moreover, FRA believes that

existing structural design requirements

for MU locomotives should be revised,

particularly those concerning MU

locomotives operating in trains having a

total empty weight of less than 600,000

pounds, see § 229.141(b), because train

operation has significantly changed

since these requirements were first

promulgated.

The requirements contained in the

proposed rule for the structural design

of Tier I and Tier II equipment are

specified below in the section-bysection analysis. These requirements

include safety standards for the

following:

• Anti-climbers—to prevent vehicles

in a passenger train from overriding or

telescoping into one another;

• Collision posts—to protect against

the crushing of a passenger vehicle’s

occupied areas in the event of a

collision or derailment;

• Corner posts—to protect passenger

vehicles in corner-to-corner collisions

and impacts with objects intruding

upon the clearance envelope;

• Rollover strength—to prevent

significant deformation of the normally

occupied spaces of a vehicle in the

event it rolls onto its side or roof;

• Side impact strength—to resist

penetration of a passenger vehicle’s side

structure from a side collision with an

object such as a highway vehicle or a

freight car; and

• Truck to car body attachment—to

prevent separation of trucks from car

bodies during collisions or derailments.

Corner Posts

Requirements concerning corner posts

on rail passenger equipment have been

the subject of an NTSB safety

recommendation. Following the January

18, 1993, NICTD corner-to-corner train

collision in Gary, Indiana, the NTSB

expressed concern about the adequacy

of the corner post structure in selfpropelled passenger cars (MU

locomotives) that allows significant

inward car body intrusion and

subsequent serious injuries and

fatalities in a corner-to-corner collision.

The NTSB noted that, while MU

locomotives must comply with Federal

structural design requirements which

include providing for the protection of

vulnerable areas of the car body in a

head-on collision, Federal regulations

do not address structural requirements

for corner posts which protect the car

body in a corner-to-corner collision.

Based on its investigation, the NTSB

recommended that FRA:

In cooperation with the Federal Transit

Administration and the American Public

Transit Association, study the feasibility of

providing car body corner post structures on

all self-propelled passenger cars and control

cab locomotives to afford occupant

protection during corner collisions. If

feasible, amend the locomotive safety

standards accordingly. (Class II, Priority

Action) (R–93–24)

The Working Group has

recommended that minimum corner

post structural design requirements be

proposed for both locomotives and rail

cars designed to carry passengers,

regardless whether the rail cars are selfpropelled or have control

compartments. FRA is proposing such a

requirement in this rule and thereby

extending the scope of the NTSB’s

safety recommendation, which is

expressly limited to self-propelled rail

cars. This action recognizes passenger

exposure in accidents such as the one in

Lugoff, South Carolina, on July 31, 1991.

There, eight passengers were killed

following incursion of a freight car into
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49743

the side of two Amtrak coaches

beginning at the corner of each car.

For cab cars, material improvements

in actual end structure design with

respect to corner posts must await

completion of further research. Research

completed to date indicates that

improvements in strength alone will not

prevent casualties in accidents at higher

closing speeds such as those in the

Silver Spring, Maryland, and Secaucus,

New Jersey, accidents.

Fuel Tank Standards

Locomotive fuel tanks are vulnerable

to damage from collisions, derailments,

and debris on the roadbed due to their

location on the underframe and between

the trucks of locomotives. Damage to the

tank frequently results in spilled fuel,

creating the safety problem of an

increased risk of fire and the

environmental problem of cleanup and

restoration of the spill site. Although 49

CFR 229.71 does require a minimum

clearance of 2.5 inches between the top

of the rail and the lowest point on a part

or appliance of a locomotive, which

includes fuel tanks, FRA regulations do

not address the safety of fuel tanks in

particular.

In 1992, the NTSB issued a report

identifying concerns regarding safety

problems caused by diesel fuel spills

from ruptured or punctured locomotive

fuel tanks. Entitled ‘‘Locomotive Fuel

Tank Integrity Safety Study,’’ the NTSB

report cited in particular a collision

involving an Amtrak train and an MBTA

commuter train on December 12, 1990,

as both trains were entering a station in

Boston, Massachusetts. (NTSB Safety

Study-92/04.) Fuel spilled from a tank

which had separated from an Amtrak

locomotive during the collision. The

fuel ignited. Smoke and fumes from the

burning diesel fuel filled the tunnel,

increasing the hazard level in the postcrash phase of the accident, and

hindering emergency response activity.

As a result of the safety study, the NTSB

made several safety recommendations to

FRA, including in particular that FRA:

Conduct, in conjunction with the

Association of American Railroads, General

Electric, and the Electro-Motive Division of

General Motors, research to determine if the

locomotive fuel tank can be improved to

withstand forces encountered in the more

severe locomotive derailment accidents or if

fuel containment can be improved to reduce

the rate of fuel leakage and fuel ignition.

Consideration should be given to crash or

simulated testing and evaluation of recent

and proposed design modifications to the

locomotive fuel tank, including increasing

the structural strength of end and side wall

plates, raising the tank higher above the rail,

and using internal tank bladders and foam

inserts. (Class II, Priority Action) (R–92–10)

Establish, if warranted, minimum

performance standards for locomotive fuel

tanks based on the research called for in

recommendation R–92–10. (Class III, Longer

Term Action) (R–92–11)

The NTSB reiterated Safety

Recommendation R–92–10 in a letter to

FRA dated August 28, 1997, conveying

the NTSB’s final safety

recommendations arising from the

February 16, 1996, collision between a

MARC commuter train and an Amtrak

passenger train. During the collision, the

fuel tank on the lead Amtrak locomotive

ruptured catastrophically. The fuel

sprayed into the exposed interior of the

MARC cab control car and ignited,

engulfing the car. (Letter at 12.)

As explained in FRA’s report to

Congress on locomotive

crashworthiness and working

conditions, FRA believes that fuel tank

design has a direct impact on safety.

Minimum performance standards for

locomotive fuel tanks should be

included in Federal safety regulations.

Accordingly, FRA is proposing that

AAR Recommended Practice RP–506 be

incorporated into § 238.223 of the

proposed rule for external fuel tanks on

Tier I passenger locomotives. FRA

believes that RP–506 represents a good

interim safety standard for Tier I

passenger locomotives. Further, FRA is

proposing more demanding fuel tank

safety standards for Tier II passenger

equipment in § 238.423 of the proposed

rule. Additionally, it is anticipated that

RSAC will address the safety of

locomotive fuel tanks used on freight

equipment, thereby furthering the safety

of rail passenger trains which operate

commingled with freight trains.

FRA invites comments whether the

proposed rule should also require that

locomotive fuel tanks be

compartmentalized. The Working Group

specifically discussed requiring whether

the interior of fuel tanks be divided into

a minimum of four separate

compartments so that a penetration in

the exterior skin of any one

compartment results in loss of fuel only

from that compartment. The Working

Group recommended that such a

requirement be addressed in the second

phase of the rulemaking, to allow for

additional research to remedy fuel

feeding disruptions that may result from

the compartmentalization of fuel tanks.

Commenters are therefore requested to

provide the results of specific research

and operating experience showing how

compartmentalization can be practically

accomplished. Commenters are also

asked to explain why the issue of

compartmentalization should or should

not be addressed in the final rule of this

first phase of the rulemaking.

Rim-Stamped Straight-Plate Wheels

On January 13, 1994, a Ringling Bros.

and Barnum & Bailey Circus (Ringling

Bros.) train operating on CSXT trackage

derailed while passing through

Lakeland, Florida. Two circus

employees were killed, and 15 received

minor injuries. The NTSB determined

that the probable cause of the accident

was the fatigue failure of a thermally

damaged straight-plate wheel due to

fatigue cracking that initiated at a stress

raiser associated with a stamped

character on the wheel rim. (NTSB/

RAR–95/01.)

Noting that tread braking is a

significant source of wheel overheating

and thermal damage; straight-plate

wheels are vulnerable to thermal

damage; and rim stamping provides a

stress concentration for crack initiation,

the NTSB recommends as a result of its

investigation that FRA ‘‘[p]rohibit the

replacement of wheels on any treadbraked passenger railroad car with rimstamped straight-plate wheels.’’ (Class

II, Priority Action) (R–95–1).

FRA agrees that rim stamping of

straight-plate wheels can lead to wheel

failure when subjected to heat from

tread braking. Rim-stamping was

banned by the AAR in 1978, and FRA

does not believe that rim-stamped

straight-plate wheels are in use on

Amtrak or the nation’s commuter

railroads. Nevertheless, in the event

such wheels are in fact in use, FRA

proposes to prohibit the use of rimstamped straight-plate wheels on all

equipment, whether tread-braked or not,

used in intercity passenger or commuter

service as of January 1, 1998. In a letter

to the NTSB dated February 21, 1995,

Ringling Bros. itself announced that it

has removed all rim-stamped straightplate wheels on tread-braked passenger

cars from its circus trains. (Appendix D,

NTSB/RAR–95/01.)

At this time, FRA is not proposing to

prohibit the use of rim-stamped straightplate wheels on private passenger cars

hauled in intercity passenger or

commuter trains. Private passenger cars

are generally not highly utilized in

comparison to intercity passenger or

commuter equipment. According to a

comment received from the AAPRCO,

the average private car, qualified to

operate on Amtrak, probably operates

less than 4,000 miles per year, and a few

may exceed 50,000 miles per year.

Further, in a letter to the NTSB dated

December 2, 1994, Amtrak stated that it

only operates private cars that are

registered with Amtrak and are subject

to a regular inspection by Amtrakapproved inspectors. Amtrak observed

that it ‘‘has not experienced any
49744 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

2 ‘‘Fire Tests of Amtrak Passenger Rail Vehicle

Interiors.’’ (NBS Technical Note 1193, May 1984);

‘‘Fire Safety of Passenger Trains: A Review of U.S.

and Foreign Approaches.’’ (DOT/FRA/ORD–93/23–

DOT–VNTSC–FRA–93–26, December, 1993). The

1993 report is available to the public through the

National Technical Information Service,

Springfield, VA 22161. A copy of both reports have

been placed in the public docket for this

rulemaking.

problems on the private cars that

operate on Amtrak trains with wheels

that are rim-stamped.’’ (Appendix E,

NTSB/RAR–95/01.)

However, FRA is requiring that rimstamped straight-plate wheels not be

used as a replacement wheelset on a

private car. As part of this rulemaking,

FRA may further address the use of rimstamped straight-plate wheels on private

cars hauled in intercity passenger or

commuter trains.

Fire Safety

In 1984, FRA published guidelines

recommending testing methods and

performance criteria for the

flammability, smoke emission, and fire

endurance characteristics for categories

and functions of materials to be used in

the construction of new or rebuilt rail

passenger equipment. See 49 FR 33076,

Aug. 20, 1984; 49 FR 44582, Nov. 7,

1984. The guidelines mirrored fire

safety guidelines developed by the

Urban Mass Transit Administration

(UMTA) of DOT (now the Federal

Transit Administration).

The intent of the guidelines is to

prevent fire ignition and to maximize

the time available for passenger

evacuation if fire does occur. FRA later

reissued the guidelines in 1989 to

update the recommended testing

methods. See 54 FR 1837, Jan. 17, 1989.

Testing methods cited in the current

FRA guidelines include those of the

American Society of Testing and

Materials (ASTM) and the Federal

Aviation Administration (FAA). In

particular, the ASTM and FAA testing

methods provide a useful screening

device to identify materials that are

especially hazardous.

FRA sought comments in the ANPRM

on the need for more thorough

guidelines or Federal regulations

concerning fire safety (61 FR 30696).

FRA noted that fire resistance,

detection, and suppression technologies

have all advanced since the guidelines

were first published. In addition, FRA

explained that a trend toward a systems

approach to fire safety is evident in

most countries with modern rail

systems. In response, the National Fire

Protection Association (NFPA)

commented that perhaps more thorough

guidelines are needed, or at least should

be evaluated. A private citizen also

responded that, at a minimum,

guidelines which are more in depth and

‘‘well thought out’’—based on current

system safety procedures and available

fire safety engineering techniques—are

needed to address the fire safety

concerns FRA raised in the ANPRM.

The commenter noted in particular that

Federal maintenance standards related

to fire safety are necessary to ensure that

materials carefully qualified for use in

rail passenger vehicles because of their

fire safety characteristics are not

replaced with either substandard

materials or materials whose origin and

fire performance cannot be determined.

The proposed rule addresses fire

safety by making FRA’s fire safety

guidelines mandatory for the

construction of new passenger

equipment as well as the refurbishing of

existing equipment. In addition, the

proposed rule would require that fire

safety be furthered through a fire

protection plan and program carried out

by each operating railroad. This effort

would include conducting a fire safety

analysis of existing passenger

equipment and taking appropriate

action to reduce the risk of personal

injuries. In the second phase of this

rulemaking, FRA anticipates improving

upon the safety standards contained in

the existing fire safety guidelines

through ongoing research.

Currently, the National Institute of

Standards and Technology (NIST) is

conducting research under the direction

of FRA and the Volpe Center involving

the fire safety of rail passenger vehicles.

The NIST project, scheduled for

completion in 1998, will investigate the

use of alternative fire testing methods

and computer hazard assessment

models to identify and evaluate

approaches to passenger train fire safety.

The evaluation will examine the effects

and tradeoffs of passenger car and

system design (including materials), fire

detection and suppression systems, and

passenger egress time. A peer review

committee has been established to

provide project guidance and review

interim results and reports. The

committee includes representatives

from FRA, the Volpe Center, the NFPA,

builders of rail passenger vehicles,

producers of materials, Amtrak and

commuter railroads, and testing

laboratories.

In the first phase of the NIST project,

selected materials which satisfy the

testing methods referenced in FRA’s fire

safety guidelines will be evaluated using

a different testing instrument, the ASTM

1354 Cone Calorimeter. The Cone

Calorimeter provides a measurement of

heat release rate (the amount of energy

that a material produces while burning),

specimen mass loss, smoke production,

and combustion gases. For a given

confined space such as a rail car

interior, the air temperature and risk of

harm to passengers are increased as the

heat release rate increases. As a result,

even if passengers do not come in direct

contact with a fire, they may likely be

injured from the high temperatures,

high heat fluxes, and large amounts of

toxic gases emitted by materials

involved in the fire.

The NIST testing will help develop

performance criteria for materials using

the Cone Calorimeter in a context

similar to that provided in the FRA fire

safety guidelines. In addition, unlike

data derived from the testing methods

referenced in the current FRA

guidelines, heat release rate and other

measurements obtained from the Cone

Calorimeter can be used in a fire

modeling methodology to evaluate the

contribution of materials to the overall

fire safety of a passenger train. Data

gathered from the NIST testing will be

used in the second phase of the project

to perform a fire hazard analysis of

selected passenger train fire scenarios.

The analysis will employ computer

modeling to assess the impact on

passenger train fire safety for a range of

construction materials and system

design. In the final phase of the project,

selected real-scale proof testing of

assemblies representing rail passenger

equipment will be performed to verify

the bench-scale (small-scale) criteria

and hazard analysis studies in actual

end use configurations. This research

effort thus follows upon FRA-sponsored

studies by the National Bureau of

Standards in 1984 and the NIST in 1993

which noted among their findings that

the performance of individual

components of a rail passenger car in a

real-world fire environment may be

different from that experienced in

bench-scale tests due to vehicle

geometry and materials interaction.2

The NFPA publishes a standard

(NFPA 130) covering fire protection

requirements for fixed guideway transit

systems and for life safety from fire in

transit stations, trainways, vehicles, and

outdoor maintenance and storage areas.

(A copy of the 1995 edition of this

standard has been placed in the public

docket for this rulemaking.) However,

this standard does not apply to

passenger railroad systems including

those that provide commuter service

(NFPA 130 1–1.2). An APTA

representative on the Working Group

who is also an NFPA member has

initiated an NFPA-sponsored task force

to revise the scope of NFPA 130 to cover

all passenger rail transportation

systems, including intercity and
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49745

3Rail Safety/Equipment Crashworthiness,’’ M.J.

Reiley, R.H. Jines, & A.E. Tanner. (FRA/ORD–77/73,

Vol. I, July 1978).’’

commuter rail, and revise other

provisions as necessary. (Copies of the

correspondence concerning the

establishment of this task force have

also been placed in the public docket.)

FRA and the Working Group will

evaluate the results of this effort for

application to this rulemaking.

Safety Glazing Standards

Existing regulations found in 49 CFR

part 223 provide minimum

requirements for glazing materials in

order to protect railroad passengers and

employees from injury as a result of

objects striking the windows of

locomotives, cabooses, and passenger

cars. Noting some possible concerns

with these requirements, FRA sought

comment on whether these standards

should be revised and requested

information on any glazing-related

injuries to passenger train occupants (61

FR 30696).

The Sierracin/Sylmar Corporation

(Sierracin) commented that rail glazing

meeting much higher impact and

ballistic requirements is currently

available, economically viable, and in

fact in use by a few rail agencies (mass

transit and commuter rail) here in the

United States. Among its observations

in particular, Sierracin noted that the

strength of the glazing frame could quite

easily be tested. Further, it explained

that from its experience as a glazing

manufacturer it is aware of very few

ballistic attacks on trains, and such

attacks have been limited to the side

windows of locomotives or coach cars

or both—not to end-facing windows. In

addition, Sierracin pointed out that

since the impact energy of an object is

a function of velocity, an object’s

destructive capability increases as the

speed of the surface it impacts

increases.

FRA believes that existing safety

glazing requirements have largely

proven effective in passenger service at

speeds up to 125 mph. In fact, FRA is

concerned that less stringent

requirements would create vulnerability

to objects thrown at trains as well as the

risk of ejection of passengers during

train derailments. Because the safety

glazing standards do not address the

performance of the frame which

attaches the glazing to the car body,

FRA is proposing frame performance

requirements for all passenger

equipment. Moreover, FRA believes that

more stringent glazing requirements are

necessary or passenger equipment

operating at speeds greater than 125

mph because of the increased

destructive potential of an object

impacting equipment operating at such

speeds. Additionally, improved marking

and periodic inspection of emergency

windows are being addressed in FRA’s

emergency preparedness rulemaking.

Train Interior Safety Features

A review of the accident/incident

data, related to fatalities and injuries on

passenger trains for the period of 1972

to 1973, indicates that collapse of the

equipment structure and the loss of

sufficient space for the passengers to

ride out the collision is the principal

cause of fatality in train accidents,

resulting in approximately 63 percent of

the fatalities and 27 percent of the

serious injuries. Fire and post-collision

conditions result in 30 percent of the

fatalities and 16 percent of the serious

injuries. Thus, collapse of the

equipment structure, fire, and postcollision conditions account for 93

percent of the fatalities and 43 percent

of the serious injuries. To address these

major causes of fatalities and injuries,

FRA is proposing comprehensive

requirements related to structural

design, fire protection, and emergency

exits. As discussed above, FRA believes

these proposed requirements will aid in

reducing the number of fatalities and

injuries by minimizing the collapse of

equipment, reducing the likelihood of

fire, and ensuring accessible and

operable emergency exits.

Prior research also indicates,

however, that passengers striking

interior objects in trains, principally

during collisions and derailments,

accounts for 57 percent of the serious

injuries and 7 percent of the fatalities

occurring on passenger trains. 3

Therefore, as an initial measure to

reduce these numbers, FRA proposals

include requiring that:

• Passenger seats and other interior

fittings be securely attached to the car

body;

• Interior fittings in a passenger car

be recessed or flush-mounted;

• Overhead storage racks provide

restraint for stowed articles; and

• Sharp edges be padded or otherwise

avoided.

Overall, FRA’s proposed requirements

rely on ‘‘compartmentalization’’ or

‘‘passive restraints’’ (i.e., requiring no

action to be taken on the part of the

occupant) as a passenger protection

strategy. The proposed requirements are

based on the current available research,

discussed in detail below, which

indicates that during a collision the

interior environment of a passenger

coach is substantially less hostile than

the interiors of automobiles and aircraft.

In fact, current research indicates that

the interior of a typical intercity

passenger coach without active

restraints provides a level of protection

to the occupants that is at least as high

as that provided to automobile and

transport aircraft passengers with active

restraints.

Some research indicates that there

may be a potential for even a greater

level of passenger protection if lap belts

and shoulder harnesses are utilized on

passenger trains. In fact, FRA is

proposing that lap belts and shoulder

harnesses be required in the cab of a

Tier II train, as recommended by the

Tier II Equipment Subgroup. Due to the

high strength of the cab and its forward

location near the expected point of

impact in many different collision

scenarios, decelerations experienced by

crewmembers in the cab of Tier II trains

may be high. Accordingly, members of

the subgroup believed that restraints for

the crewmembers could provide a

significant benefit. FRA requests

information and comment from

interested parties as to whether there is

any existing research or experience

which would justify proposing active

seat restraints in the current stage of this

rulemaking. However, FRA believes

more research is necessary in this area

in order to determine the feasibility and

effectiveness of such active restraints as

well as the impact on seat design and

strength. Although FRA currently

proposes a passenger protection strategy

based on compartmentalization, FRA

will be undertaking an aggressive

research and testing program to

determine the feasibility and

effectiveness of active restraints such as

lap belts and shoulder harnesses. If this

research indicates that these types of

active restraints are a viable and feasible

means of providing additional

protection to the riding public, then

FRA will propose the use of such

restraints in the second NPRM on

passenger equipment scheduled for

development in 1998.

Discussion

The principal means of protecting

occupants during accidents include

‘‘friendly’’ (‘‘delethalized’’) interior

arrangements and occupant restraints,

such as lap belts, shoulder harnesses

and airbags. Occupant protection

devices which require some action on

the part of the occupant, such as

buckling a seatbelt, are termed ‘‘active

devices,’’ while protection devices

which require no action, such as

automobile door-mounted shoulder

harnesses and airbags, are termed

‘‘passive devices.’’ Both active and

passive occupant protection strategies
49746 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

4New Car Assessment Program Test #2312. DOT/

NHTSA, 1996. A copy of this test has been placed

in the public docket for this rulemaking.

5The Effect of Aircraft Size on Cabin Floor

Dynamic Pulses.’’ G. Wittlin, L. Neri. (DOT/FAA/

CT–88/15, March 1990). The report is available to

the public through the National Technical

Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161. A copy

of the report has also been placed in the public

docket for this rulemaking.

6 ‘‘Crashworthiness of Passenger Trains.’’ (DOT–

VNTSC–FRA–96–5, September 1996). The report

has not yet been published, but a copy of the report

has been placed in the public docket for this

rulemaking.

act to limit the decelerations and to

distribute the loads imparted to

occupants during an accident. Typical

passenger protection strategies in

automobiles include airbags, lap belts

and shoulder harnesses, and friendly

lower dashboard designs which limit

thigh loads imparted during a collision.

Typical passenger protection strategies

in transport category aircraft, intended

to protect passengers during accidents

occurring during takeoff or landing,

include seatbelts and friendly design of

the seatback or bulkhead ahead of the

occupant which limit the decelerations

of the occupant’s head.

The passenger protection devices

incorporated into a vehicle must allow

occupants to survive the deceleration of

the volume within which they are

contained. The decelerations of the

occupant volume of an automobile in a

collision can reach a peak of

approximately 30 g’s, while the

decelerations of transport-category

aircraft during a landing accident can

reach 18 g’s. In order to assure a high

likelihood of survival for such high

decelerations, the use of occupant

restraints are required in automobiles

and transport aircraft. The peak

deceleration of passenger rail coach

equipment is 8 g’s for a head on

collision. Figure 1 shows the time

histories of the occupant volume

decelerations for a Ford Taurus

colliding into a rigid barrier at 35 mph, 4

a transport category aircraft during a

landing accident, 5 and a rail passenger

coach during a train-to-train collision at

70 mph. 6 During a collision, the interior

of a passenger train is inherently a less

hostile environment than those of an

automobile or aircraft, owing to the

relatively low deceleration of the

occupant volume.

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49747

7 ‘‘Evaluation of Selected Crashwortiness

Strategies for Passenger Trains.’’ D. Tyrell, K.

Severson-Green, & B. Marquis. National Academy

Press, Transportation Research Record No. 1989,

July 1995; ‘‘Analysis of Occupant Protection

Strategies in Train Collisions.’’ D. Tyrell, K.

Severson, & B. Marquis. American Society of

Mechanical Engineers, AMD–Vol. 210/BED–Vol. 30,

pp. 539–557, 1995; ‘‘Crashworthiness Testing of

Amtrak’s Traditional Coach Seat.’’ D. Tyrell K.

Severson. (DOT/FRA/ORD–96/08—DOT–VNTSC–

FRA–96–11, October 1996); and ‘‘Crashworthiness

of Passenger Trains.’’ See note 6.

BILLING CODE 4910–06–C

Simulation studies of occupant

impacts with interiors have been

conducted in support of this rulemaking

effort, and have been placed in the

public docket for this rulemaking.7

Simulation results include detailed

time-histories of occupant motions and

the forces imparted to occupants during

a collision. These motions and forces

have been evaluated for the potential for

fatality using the criteria employed by

the National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration (NHTSA) and the FAA

in their regulatory requirements for

passenger protection in automobiles and

transport-category aircraft, respectively.

The principal criteria employed by

NHTSA and the FAA are the Head

Injury Criteria (HIC), which relate the

deceleration of the occupant’s head to

the potential for fatality, and the Chest

Deceleration, which relates the

deceleration of the occupant’s chest

(heart) with the potential for fatality.

The maximum limit prescribed by

NHSTA and the FAA for the HIC is

1000, and 60 g’s for Chest Deceleration.

Passenger rail equipment interior

configurations studied include rows of

forward-facing seats without passenger

restraints, with seat belts, and with

seatbelts and shoulder harnesses. The

seat design employed in these studies is

a typical intercity passenger coach seat,

for which the floor attachment is

sufficient not to fail during the

simulated collision. (The occupant

protection strategy in which occupant

motion during the collision is restricted

by fixed equipment such as seats and

bulkheads is termed

‘‘compartmentalization.’’) Table 1

summarizes the results for passengers

seated in the first coach of a locomotiveled consist, initially traveling at 70 mph,

which collides head-on with a

stationary locomotive-led consist. These

data indicate that without restraints, the

interior of a typical intercity passenger

coach provides a level of protection to

the occupants at least as high as that

provided to automobile and transport

aircraft passengers with restraints, while

lap and shoulder belts provide the

highest level of protection.

TABLE 1.—SELECTED RESULTS, INTERIOR SIMULATION STUDIES

No restraint

(compartmentalization)

Lap belt Lap and shoulder

belts

NHTSA and FAA

Max. permitted

values

HIC Chest g’s

HIC Chest g’s HIC Chest g’s HIC Chest g’s

50th percentile male, Seat ahead Upright ...... 241 20 141 23 21 9 1000 60

50th percentile male, Seat ahead Reclined .... 401 36 1428–2089 26 21 9 1000 60

The data in Table 1 indicate that lap belts alone result in a greater likelihood of fatal head injury for certain

occupants if the seat ahead of the occupant is reclined. This is owing to the lap-belted occupant striking the top

of the seatback ahead. Struck in this manner, the seat is stiff and the head deceleration is large, resulting in a high

likelihood of head injury. The head of an unrestrained occupant will strike the rear of the seatback ahead of the

occupant, along with the knees of the occupant. Struck in this manner, the seat is relatively soft, the impact forces

are distributed over the occupant’s body, and the decelerations experienced by the occupant are within survivable

levels. The head on an occupant restrained by a lap belt and a shoulder harness will not strike an interior surface,

and the deceleration of an occupant so restrained is relatively low. The motions of an unrestrained occupant, an occupant

restrained by a lap belt, and an occupant restrained by a lap belt and a shoulder harness are sketched in Figure

2.

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
49748 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

BILLING CODE 4910–06–C

The potential effectiveness of

occupant restraints in protecting

passengers has been inferred from

available information on what types of

injury occur during passenger train

accidents and the equipment involved

in causing these injuries. Available

criteria which relate these forces and

motions to the range of injuries resulting

from rail passenger accidents are limited

in number and reliability. For example,

there is only one accepted criterion for

evaluating back injury (an axial load

criterion employed by the FAA) while

there are many potential modes of back

injury, including twisting and excessive

flexion. The two principal

considerations in inferring the potential

effectiveness are the likelihood that the

occupant is in a seat and is able to use

the restraint, and the potential that the

type of injury is prone to prevention or

reduction in severity with an occupant

restraint.

Table 2 lists the types of injuries, their

frequency of occurrence from 1972 to

1973 (see note 3), and the potential

effectiveness of occupant restraints. The

likely causes of back injury are the seats

becoming unlocked and swiveling

during an accident and standing

passengers subject to falling. Leg, knee,

and thigh injuries are potentially caused

by leg entrapment beneath the seat

ahead of the occupant. Neck injuries are

likely the result of ‘‘whiplash’’ effects of

low seat backs during accidents. The

potential effectiveness of occupant

restraints can be inferred from the type

of injury. For example, seat belts may

reduce the occurrence and severity of

back injury owing to the longitudinal

decelerations from collisions, but may

not reduce the occurrence and severity

of back injury owing to the lateral

accelerations associated with derailment

or for a standing passenger falling.

TABLE 2.—INJURY TYPES, NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES, AND POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF OCCUPANT RESTRAINT

Injury type

Number

of Occurrences,

1972–73

Potential/effectiveness

No Restraints

(Compartmentalization)Lap Belts

Lap belts

and shoulder

harnesses

Back ................................................................................................................................. 195 Medium ....... Medium ....... High

Leg/Knee/Thigh ................................................................................................................ 140 Low ............. Medium ....... Medium

Neck ................................................................................................................................. 126 Medium ....... Low ............. Medium

Head ................................................................................................................................ 94 Medium ....... Low ............. High

Arm/Hand ......................................................................................................................... 89 Low ............. Low ............. Low

Chest ................................................................................................................................ 64 Medium ....... Medium ....... Medium

Shoulder ........................................................................................................................... 61 Medium ....... Medium ....... Medium

Hip/Pelvis ......................................................................................................................... 40 Medium ....... High ............. High

Face/Nose ........................................................................................................................ 38 Medium ....... Low ............. High

Foot/Ankle ........................................................................................................................ 27 Low ............. Medium ....... Medium

Abdomen .......................................................................................................................... 19 Medium ....... Medium ....... Medium

Side .................................................................................................................................. 15 Medium ....... Medium ....... High

Table 3 lists the equipment involved in injury over this same period (see note 3). The likelihood that an occupant

was in a seat immediately prior to the injury can be inferred from the type of equipment. For example, the potential

effectiveness of occupant restraints protecting occupants from injury with food service and lavatory equipment— the

most likely equipment to be involved with injury—is low because such equipment is not located near passenger coach

seats. Appropriate measures to assure that such equipment is ‘‘friendly’’ during a collision may potentially reduce

the severity of injuries associated with food service and lavatory equipment. In fact, since the time of the study,

Amtrak has taken significant steps to secure food service equipment and provides for better retention of luggage in

overhead storage racks. Further, lavatory design has also been improved in the newer generations of Amtrak equipment.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49749

8Crashworthiness of Passenger Trains.’’ (DOT–

VNTSC–FRA–96–5, September 1996). See Note 6.

TABLE 3.—EQUIPMENT INVOLVED IN INJURY, FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE, AND POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF

OCCUPANT RESTRAINT

Equipment involved in injury

Frequency

of occurrence (percent)

Potential effectiveness

No restraints

(compartmentalization) Lap belts

Lap belts

and shoulder

harnesses

Food Service and Lavatory Equipment .......................................................... 27.5 Medium ...................... Low ............. Low

Bulkheads, Doors, Window Frames ............................................................... 20 Medium ...................... Low ............. Low

Seats ............................................................................................................... 16 High ............................ High ............. High

Floor ................................................................................................................ 10.2 Medium ...................... Medium ....... Medium

Window Glass ................................................................................................. 10.2 Medium ...................... Medium ....... Medium

Tables Counters ............................................................................................. 7.2 Low ............................ Low ............. Low

Hand Rail ........................................................................................................ 2.9 Low ............................ Low ............. Low

Entrance Platform ........................................................................................... 2.9 Low ............................ Low ............. Low

Luggage .......................................................................................................... 1.5 Low ............................ Low ............. Low

Cabinets .......................................................................................................... 1.5 Low ............................ Low ............. Low

Conclusions from the research

conducted to date on passenger

protection in train collisions are that lap

belts alone may potentially increase

fatalities in train collisions;

compartmentalization can provide a

level of protection for rail passengers at

least as effective as that provided by

current regulations for automobile and

transport-category aircraft passengers;

and that lap belts and shoulder

restraints provide the highest level of

occupant protection of those protection

strategies studied.

Current FRA research plans include

efforts for developing the means of

implementing seat belts and shoulder

restraints in intercity and commuter

passenger rail equipment and efforts for

optimizing compartmentalization for a

wide range of occupant sizes, from

infants to large adults, and a wide range

of interior configurations, including

those of food service cars and lavatories

in addition to coach car seating

configurations. Issues to be addressed in

research on implementing seat belts and

shoulder restraints include:

• The development of a seat structure

design with sufficient integrity to

sustain the loads imparted by the

restraints during collisions;

• The potential for increased injury of

unrestrained occupants striking such

strengthened seatbacks and the hard

points necessary for lap and shoulder

belt securement;

• The potential for increased injury to

occupants who misuse the seat and

shoulder belts (e.g., placement of the

shoulder belt behind the occupant),

The development of mechanisms for

adjusting the height location of the

shoulder restraint to prevent

strangulation of occupants of small

stature, including children;

• The overall effectiveness in

reducing injury owing to occupant

impacts with the interior; and

• The manufacturing costs for a seat

which can support the loads imparted

by the restraints during collisions.

Although FRA’s research and

development budget is somewhat

limited, FRA is committed to

completing the following items within

approximately the next 12 months:

• Preliminary cost/benefit analysis on

lap belts and shoulder harnesses;

• Preliminary hazard analysis; and

• Preliminary qualitative engineering

feasibility work on new seat and belt

designs, including cost estimates.

The results of this research will be

followed by a final cost/benefit review

and will be available when FRA begins

the development of the second NPRM

on passenger equipment standards.

Based on current research results, the

proposed interior passenger protection

requirements for Tier I and II passenger

equipment rely on

compartmentalization as a passenger

protection strategy. Research results

indicate that during a collision the

interior environment of a passenger

coach is substantially less hostile than

the interiors of automobiles and aircraft.

Owing to this lower hostility of the

passenger collision environment, the

interior of a typical intercity passenger

coach can provide a level of protection

to passengers without restraints at least

as effective in preventing fatality as the

protection provided to automobile and

transport aircraft passengers with

restraints. Such a strategy has the

benefits of being passive, requiring no

action to be taken on the part of the

occupants, of being effective for a range

of occupant sizes, and potentially being

effective in a wide range of interior

configurations. If the results of ongoing

research indicate that lap belts and

shoulder restraints can provide a greater

level of protection for passengers than

compartmentalization, while being costeffective, then FRA will consider

requiring passenger restraints in the

second NPRM.

Crash Energy Management

FRA is proposing that Tier II

equipment be designed with a crash

energy management system. Crash

energy management is an equipment

design technique to provide a controlled

deformation and collapse of designated

sections of the unoccupied volumes of

a passenger train to absorb the energy

from a collision. This allows collision

energy to dissipate before any structural

damage occurs to the occupied volumes

of a passenger train and reduces the

decelerations experienced by passengers

and crewmembers in a collision, thereby

mitigating the force of any collisions

with objects in a train’s interior, such as

seats.

In a report prepared by the Volpe

Center, the crash energy management

approach was found to offer significant

safety benefits.8 For example, the Volpe

Center report found the crash energy

management approach significantly

more effective in preserving occupant

volume in a head-on collision at a

relative speed above 70 mph between

two trains propelled by power cars

(locomotives) than when the trains did

not employ such an approach.

Moreover, for the full range of collision

speeds, the crash energy management

design provided a significantly gentler

initial deceleration of the passenger

train occupants than when the trains

did not employ such an approach.

Further, the crash energy management

designed power car train is more

compatible with existing equipment. It

serves as a softer collision surface to a

conventionally designed train owing to

the collision energy absorbed as the
49750 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

unoccupied volumes of the power car

train intentionally crush.

Emergency Systems

In addition to the proposed

requirements concerning emergency

egress and access discussed above, FRA

is considering and proposing other

requirements to mitigate harm to

passenger train occupants in emergency

situations.

Emergency Lighting

In a passenger train emergency,

inadequate lighting may make it

difficult or impossible to read

emergency information, to locate doors

and emergency exits, and to move about

within the train’s interior. Rapid egress

from the passenger train may be

inhibited, and rescue efforts hampered.

Further, a private citizen commented in

response to the ANPRM that passengers

can be very frightened when a train’s

head-end power shuts down at night or

in a darkened station, and there is no

onboard emergency lighting for the

passengers’ security. Accordingly, the

proposed rule requires in § 238.123 that

all new or rebuilt passenger equipment

be equipped with an emergency lighting

system. FRA is also considering

requiring that auxiliary portable lighting

be available for assistance in a passenger

train emergency. FRA may prescribe

requirements for such lighting in either

the final rule of this rulemaking or in

the final rule of FRA’s complementary

rulemaking on passenger train

emergency preparedness.

Emergency Communication: To the

Train Control Center

FRA is considering requirements for

emergency communication equipment

on passenger trains. In Working Group

discussions, the UTU emphasized that

passenger trains should be equipped

with both a primary and a redundant

means to communicate with a railroad

control center. The UTU and BRC also

stressed that both means of

communication should be required to

operate properly before a passenger

train is dispatched.

The ability to communicate in an

emergency is important for all trains—

freight and passenger. For example,

because passenger trains operate

commingled with freight trains, the

ability of a freight train crew to notify

a railroad control center of an

emergency involving its train may

prevent a collision with an oncoming

passenger train. As noted above, FRA is

currently engaged in revising the Radio

Standards and Procedures in 49 CFR

part 220 through the Railroad

Communications Working Group

established under the RSAC. Although

FRA anticipates that this separate effort

will establish minimum safety

requirements with respect to

communications equipment for all train

service, it should be noted that intercity

passenger and commuter railroads

already make extensive provision for

ensuring communication capabilities

during emergencies.

Emergency Communication: Within the

Train

FRA is proposing in § 238.437 that

Tier II passenger trains be equipped

with a means of emergency

communication throughout the train.

This will enable crewmembers to

provide passengers with information

and instructions in an emergency.

FRA has decided to limit this

proposal to Tier II passenger trains,

however, because such trains are

intended to operate as a fixed unit,

unlike Tier I passenger trains. Whereas

an emergency system to communicate

throughout the train may be more easily

provided for a train which remains as a

fixed unit, the interchangeability of

passenger cars and locomotives raises

practical considerations about the

compatibility of communications

equipment in a Tier I passenger train.

FRA will seek to address these

considerations and further examine

requirements concerning emergency

communication within a Tier I train in

the second phase of the development of

passenger equipment safety standards.

Emergency Window Exits

As noted, under 49 CFR part 223

equipment designed to carry passengers

must be equipped with a minimum of

four emergency window exits which

permit rapid and easy removal during a

crisis. FRA is proposing in §§ 238.235

and 238.439 to strengthen this

requirement by making certain, for

example, that passenger cars be

equipped with four window exits on

each main level of each car. FRA is also

proposing that each compartment in a

sleeping car be equipped with at least

one emergency window exit. Above all,

the proposed rule requires that each

emergency window exit be easily

operable without requiring the use of

any tool or other implement to facilitate

passenger egress in an emergency.

FRA notes that Canadian passenger

equipment typically contain more than

four emergency window exits, and that

MARC is requiring that at least half of

all windows in each passenger car be

available for use during an emergency.

Commenters are requested to address

the issue of whether the final rule

should require additional emergency

window exits in a passenger car.

Commenters are also requested to

address what size requirements for

emergency window exits FRA should

impose in the final rule. FRA is

currently proposing that Tier I

equipment have a minimum,

unobstructed emergency window exit

opening of 24 inches horizontally by 18

inches vertically, and that Tier II

equipment have a minimum,

unobstructed emergency window exit

opening of 30 inches horizontally by 30

inches vertically. The Tier II Equipment

Subgroup, including Amtrak,

recommended the latter requirement for

application to Tier II equipment.

However, the full Working Group

advised against imposing such a

requirement on Tier I equipment.

Although FRA would prefer that all

emergency window exits afford the

larger opening, the Tier I equipment

proposal provides the minimum

opening needed for a fully-equipped

emergency response worker to gain

access to the interior of a train,

according to the NFPA.

Roof Hatches or Clearly Marked

Structural Weak Points

In an emergency, roof hatch exits on

railroad passenger equipment may

facilitate the rapid egress of passengers.

However, APTA and Amtrak have

raised concerns about requiring such

exits on passenger equipment. Allowing

access to the roof of a passenger train

can be particularly dangerous,

especially when the train operates in

electrified territory. As an alternative,

passenger equipment could be designed

with a clearly marked structural weak

point in the roof to provide quick access

for emergency personnel. Access to and

egress from passenger equipment would

be facilitated, without the risk of

allowing passengers immediate access

to the roof when no emergency is

present.

As recommended by the Tier II

Equipment Subgroup, the proposed rule

requires in § 238.439 that Tier II

equipment either be equipped with roof

hatches or be designed with clearly

marked structural weak points in the

roof to permit quick access for properly

equipped emergency personnel. The

proposed rule does not contain such

requirements for Tier I equipment,

however. There was no consensus

within the full Working Group to

recommend that such requirements be

included. FRA will consider such

requirements for Tier I equipment in the

second phase of the rulemaking, and the

Working Group agreed to do so as well.

FRA does believe that the safety of Tier
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49751

I passenger trains will still be

significantly advanced by the other

requirements for emergency egress and

access contained in this proposed rule.

Additional Passenger Train Safety

Issues

As detailed below in the section-bysection analysis, the proposed rule will

also address additional passenger train

safety issues including:

• Equipment (non-brake) inspection,

testing, and maintenance;

• Suspension system safety;

• Operating cab controls;

• Safety appliances;

• Electrical system safety;

• Software and hardware safety, and

• Introduction of new technology.

Further, in consultation with the

Working Group, FRA has identified

issues to address in the second phase of

this rulemaking which may lead FRA to

propose additional standards for Tier I

equipment in a future NPRM. Although

certain issues have already been noted

above, such as improvements in cab car

end structure design, other issues

include crash energy management

requirements and increased side impact

strength requirements for car bodies.

FRA intends that the Working Group

advise FRA as to which requirements

make sense for application to Tier I

equipment and which requirements

already proposed in this NPRM should

be strengthened. It is anticipated that

any operational experience gained from

the use of Tier II equipment will assist

the Working Group in this effort.

June 1997 NTSB Safety

Recommendations

On June 17, 1997, the NTSB

announced a series of safety

recommendations as a result of its

investigation of the collision between

MARC train 286 and Amtrak train 29 in

Silver Spring, Maryland, on February

16, 1996. While its investigation was

still ongoing, the NTSB issued an urgent

safety recommendation (R–96–7) to FRA

on March 12, 1996. As explained earlier

in the preamble, FRA convened a joint

meeting of the Passenger Equipment

Safety Standards Working Group and

the Passenger Train Emergency

Preparedness Working Group on March

26, 1996, to discuss this

recommendation and incorporate the

Safety Board’s initial findings into each

working group’s rulemaking, as

appropriate. This urgent

recommendation has been fully

considered and is reflected in this

NPRM as well as the NPRM on

Passenger Train Emergency

Preparedness that was published on

February 24, 1997 (see 62 FR 8330).

Though the Safety Board has

reiterated portions of its earlier, urgent

recommendation, FRA has not yet had

the opportunity to discuss with the

Passenger Equipment Safety Standards

Working Group the full array of June

1997 recommendations pertaining to

passenger equipment safety. However,

for the consideration of interested

parties, FRA has set forth below for

public comment the recent NTSB

recommendations relevant to this

rulemaking. In particular, the NTSB has

recommended that FRA:

• Require all passenger cars to have

easily accessible interior emergency

quick-release mechanisms adjacent to

exterior passageway doors and take

appropriate emergency action to ensure

corrective action until these measures

are incorporated into minimum

passenger car safety standards.

• Require all passenger cars to have

either removable windows, kick panels,

or other suitable means for emergency

exiting through the interior and exterior

passageway doors where the door could

impede passengers exiting in an

emergency and take appropriate

emergency measures to ensure

corrective action until these measures

are incorporated into minimum

passenger car safety standards.

• Issue interim standards for the use

of luminescent or retro-reflective

material or both to mark all interior and

exterior emergency exits in all passenger

cars as soon as possible and incorporate

the interim standards into minimum

passenger car safety standards.

• Require all passenger cars to

contain reliable emergency lighting

fixtures that are each fitted with a selfcontained independent power source

and incorporate the requirements into

minimum passenger car safety

standards.

• Provide promptly a prescribed

inspection and test cycle to ensure the

proper operation of all emergency exit

windows as well as provide that the

180-day inspection and maintenance

test cycle is prescribed in the final rule.

• Require that all exterior emergency

door release mechanisms on passenger

cars be functional before a passenger car

is placed in revenue service, that the

emergency door release mechanism be

placed in a readily accessible position

and marked for easy identification in

emergencies and derailments, and that

these requirements be incorporated into

minimum passenger car safety

standards.

• Require that a comprehensive

inspection of all commuter passenger

cars be performed to independently

verify that the interior materials of these

cars meet the expected performance

requirements for flammability and

smoke emissions characteristics.

FRA has specifically responded in

§ 238.105 (Fire protection program) of

this NPRM to the Board’s recent

recommendation concerning the

flammability and smoke emission

characteristics of interior materials in

existing passenger cars.

APTA Comments

As explained earlier in the preamble,

under the authority of 49 U.S.C.

20133(d) FRA developed the proposed

rule in consultation with a Working

Group that included Amtrak, individual

commuter railroads, and APTA, which

represents the interests of commuter

railroads in regulatory matters. On

March 19, 1997, following the last full

meeting of the Working Group, FRA

sent a draft of the NPRM to Working

Group members and advisors for their

review and comment as to whether the

rule inaccurately reflected the Working

Group’s recommendations in a

significant way. By letter dated April 28,

1997, APTA requested a meeting with

FRA to address its significant concerns

about a number of substantive items in

the NPRM, as well as the process used

to develop the NPRM. A meeting took

place on May 23, 1997, at which time

APTA provided FRA with extensive

written comments on the draft NPRM.

These comments have been placed in

the public docket for this rulemaking,

along with a summary of the meeting.

FRA has also included a number of

APTA’s comments in this NPRM for the

consideration of interested parties, and

FRA invites all interested parties to

address APTA’s comments while

commenting on the proposed rule.

Section-by-Section Analysis

Amendments to 49 CFR Part 216

Part 216 currently authorizes certain

FRA and participating State inspectors

to issue Special Notices for Repair,

under specified conditions, for freight

cars with defects under the part 215,

locomotives with defects under parts

229 or 230 or 49 U.S.C. chapter 207, and

track with defects under part 213. The

proposed revisions to part 216 would

create a fourth category of Special

Notices for Repair: for passenger

equipment with defects under part 238.

In summary, if the inspector determines

that the noncomplying passenger

equipment is ‘‘unsafe for further

service’’ and issues the proposed

Special Notice, it would require the

railroad to take the passenger equipment

out of service, to make repairs to bring

the equipment into compliance with

part 238, and to report the repairs to
49752 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

FRA. The revisions would also make

conforming changes to part 216

reflecting this new enforcement tool.

Finally, these proposed revisions

include various technical amendments

to update part 216 to reflect the

following: (1) internal organizational

changes within FRA; (2) the division of

former part 230, Locomotive Inspection

Regulations, into parts 229 and 230 and

the redesignation of those portions of

former part 230 related to non-steam

locomotives as part 229, Railroad

Locomotive Safety Standards; and (3)

the repeal, reenactment without

substantive change, and recodification

of the Federal railroad safety laws in

1994. See 45 FR 21092, Mar. 31, 1980;

Pub. L. 103–272, July 5, 1994.

Amendments to 49 CFR Parts 223, 229,

231, and 232

FRA proposes conforming changes to

the applicability sections of FRA’s

Safety Glazing Standards, Railroad

Locomotive Safety Standards, Railroad

Safety Appliance Standards, and

railroad power brakes and drawbars

regulations that were necessitated by

proposed provisions of new part 238. In

the final rule, FRA may adjust the

application of provisions in parts 215,

223, 229, 231, or 232, or possibly delete

provisions in those parts, to avoid

duplication of provisions in part 238.

FRA has not proposed deletion of

passenger train brake test and

maintenance requirements from part

232 because proposed part 238 would

not cover certain operations subject to

part 232, e.g., tourist, historic, scenic,

and excursion railroad operations on the

general system. If any provision in parts

215, 223, 229, 231, or 232 is deleted in

the final rule, FRA will revise the

schedule of civil penalties for the

affected part by removing the entry for

the provision deleted. Because such

penalty schedules are statements of

policy, notice and comment are not

required prior to their issuance. See 5

U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A).

49 CFR Part 238

(APTA is concerned that the proposed

record keeping and reporting

requirements in subparts A–D are

extensive and significantly exceed

current railroad practice, without any

corresponding safety benefit.

Commenters are requested to address

APTA’s concern.)

Subpart A—General

§ 238.1 Purpose and scope.

Paragraph (a) states the purpose of the

rule to be the prevention of accidents

involving railroad passenger equipment

and the mitigation of the consequences

of accidents involving railroad

passenger equipment, to the extent such

accidents cannot be prevented.

Paragraph (b) states that these

regulations provide minimum standards

for the subjects addressed. Railroads

and other persons subject to this part

may adopt more stringent requirements,

so long as they are not inconsistent with

this part.

§ 238.3 Application. As a general

matter, in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2),

FRA proposes that this rule apply to all

railroads that operate intercity

passenger train service on the general

railroad system of transportation or

provide commuter or other short-haul

passenger train service in a metropolitan

or suburban area; that is, the rule will

apply to commuter or other short-haul

service described in paragraph (a)(2)

regardless of whether that service is

connected to the general railroad

system. A public authority that

indirectly provides passenger train

service by contracting out the actual

operation to another railroad or

independent contractor would be

regulated by FRA as a railroad under the

provisions of the proposed rule.

Paragraph (a)(3), read in conjunction

with paragraph (c)(1), means that rapid

transit operations in an urban area that

are connected to the general railroad

system of transportation would also be

covered by this part. Paragraph (b)

makes explicit the liability imposed by

statute, 49 U.S.C. 20303, on a railroad

that owns track over which another

railroad hauls or uses equipment with a

power brake or safety appliance defect.

Under paragraph (b), a railroad that

permits operations over its trackage by

passenger equipment subject to this part

that does not comply with a power

brake provision of this part or a safety

appliance provision of this part is

subject to the power brake and safety

appliance provisions of this part with

respect to such operations that it

permits.

This section contains no explicit

reference to private cars. Rather than

addressing the scope of applicability of

part 238 to private cars in this section,

FRA has indicated in the particular

substantive sections of the rule whether

private cars are covered, according to

the terms of those sections. FRA

proposes to apply certain requirements

of the rule to private cars that operate

on railroads subject to this part. FRA

has taken into account the burden

imposed by requiring private car owners

and operators to conform to the

requirements of this part. Further, FRA

recognizes that private cars are often

hauled by railroads such as Amtrak and

commuter railroads which often impose

their own safety requirements on the

operation of the private cars.

Accordingly, FRA intends to limit the

application of the proposed rule only to

those requirements necessary to ensure

the safe operation of the passenger train

that is hauling the private car. For

instance, private cars will be subject to

brake inspection, testing, and

maintenance requirements.

The proposed rule is structured to

apply to intercity and commuter service,

but not to tourist, scenic, historic, and

excursion operations. The term ‘‘tourist,

scenic, historic, or excursion

operations’’ is defined in § 238.5 to

mean ‘‘railroad operations that carry

passengers, often using antiquated

equipment, with the conveyance of the

passengers to a particular destination

not being the principal purpose.’’ The

term refers to the particular physical

operation, not to the nature of the

railroad company as a whole that

conducts the operation. As a result, part

238 would exempt not only a

recreational train ride by a tourist

railroad company that employed five

people but also a recreational train ride

by the Union Pacific Railroad Company,

a Class I freight railroad. FRA has not

yet had the opportunity to fully consult

with tourist and historic railroad

operators and their associations to

determine the appropriate applicability

of the provisions contained in the

proposed rule to such railroad

operations. The Federal Railroad Safety

Authorization Act of 1994 directs FRA

to examine the unique circumstances of

tourist railroads when establishing

safety regulations. The Act, which

amended 49 U.S.C. 20103, states that:

In prescribing regulations that pertain to

railroad safety that affect tourist, historic,

scenic, or excursion railroad carriers, the

Secretary of Transportation shall take into

consideration any financial, operational, or

other factors that may be unique to such

railroad carriers. The Secretary shall submit

a report to Congress not later than September

30, 1995, on actions taken under this

subsection.

Pub. L. No. 103–440, § 217, 108 Stat.

4619, 4624, November 2, 1994. In its

1996 report to Congress entitled

‘‘Regulatory Actions Affecting Tourist

Railroads,’’ FRA responded to the

direction in the statutory provision and

also provided additional information

related to tourist railroad safety for

consideration of the Congress.

Section 215 of the 1994 Act

specifically permits FRA to exempt

equipment used by tourist, historic,

scenic, and excursion railroads to

transport passengers from the initial

regulations that must be prescribed by

November 2, 1997. 49 U.S.C.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49753

20133(b)(1). FRA is addressing the

passenger equipment safety concerns for

these unique types of operations

through the Tourist and Historic

Railroads Working Group formed under

RSAC. Any requirements proposed by

FRA for these operations will be part of

a separate rulemaking proceeding.

§ 238.5 Definitions. This section

contains a set of definitions to introduce

the regulations. FRA intends these

definitions to clarify the meaning of

important terms as they are used in the

text of the proposed rule. Several of the

definitions involve new or fundamental

concepts which require further

discussion.

‘‘Brake indicator’’ means a device,

actuated by brake cylinder pressure,

which indicates whether brakes are

applied or released on a car. The use of

brake indicators in the performance of

brake tests is a controversial subject.

Rail labor organizations correctly

maintain that brake indicators are not

fully reliable indicators of brake

application and release on each car in

the train. Further, railroads correctly

maintain that reliance on brake

indicators is necessary because

inspectors cannot always safely observe

brake application and release. FRA

believes that brake indicators serve an

important role in the performance of

brake tests. FRA has specified three

different types of brake tests—Class I,

Class IA, and Class II (described

below)—that must be performed on

passenger equipment. Railroads should

perform Class I brake tests so that the

inspector is able to actually observe

brake application and release. However,

FRA believes that during the

performance of a Class IA brake test,

railroads may rely on brake indicators if

they determine that the inspector cannot

safely make a direct observation of the

brake application or release.

‘‘Primary brake’’ and ‘‘secondary

brake’’ are complementary definitions.

‘‘Primary brake’’ refers to ‘‘those

components of the train brake system

necessary to stop the train within the

signal spacing distance without thermal

damage to friction braking surfaces,’’

while ‘‘secondary brake’’ refers to

‘‘those components of the train brake

system which develop supplemental

brake retarding force that is not needed

to stop the train within signal spacing

distances or to prevent thermal damage

to wheels.’’ FRA provides these

definitions to help draw the line

between safety and economics of brake

systems. Railroads have long held that

the dynamic portion of a blended brake

is not a safety system. Under the

provisions proposed in this rule,

railroads must demonstrate through

testing and analysis that the dynamic

brake fits the definition of a secondary

brake. Defective primary braking

systems are a serious safety problem

that railroads must address

immediately. Defective secondary

braking systems, as defined in § 238.5,

are not a serious safety concern,

because, by definition, their failure does

not result in unacceptable thermal

inputs into friction brake components.

Accordingly, FRA proposes to allow

railroads more flexibility in dealing

with defective secondary braking

systems.

Three brake tests are fundamental to

this proposed rule. A ‘‘Class I brake

test’’ means a complete passenger train

brake system test as further specified in

§ 238.313. The Class I test is the most

complete test. It must be done once a

day by qualified mechanical inspectors

as opposed to train crews. The Class I

test is intended to replace the current

initial terminal brake test. See 49 CFR

232.12 (c)–(j). The proposed Class I test

is much more tailored to the specific

designs of passenger equipment than the

initial terminal brake test that is

required now.

A ‘‘Class IA brake test’’ means a test

and inspection (as further specified in

§ 238.315) of the air brake system on

each car in a passenger train to ensure

the air brake system is 100 percent

effective. The Class IA test is a

somewhat less complete test than the

Class I test. However, the Class IA test

is equivalent to the current initial

terminal brake test. An important

difference between the Class I and Class

IA tests is that the Class IA test may be

performed by train crews as long as they

have been qualified by the railroad to do

so. The Class IA test allows commuter

railroads the flexibility to have trains

depart their first run of the day from an

outlying point without having to station

qualified mechanical inspectors at all

outlying points. If railroads take

advantage of the flexibility offered by

the Class IA test, they must follow up

with a Class I test sometime during the

day.

A ‘‘Class II train brake test’’ means a

test (as further specified in § 238.317) of

brake pipe integrity and continuity from

controlling locomotive to rear car. The

proposed Class II brake test is a simple

set-and-release test intended to replace

the passenger train intermediate

terminal air brake test. See 49 CFR

232.13(b). The Class II test is also

tailored to the special design of the

passenger equipment.

The concept of ‘‘ordered’’ or ‘‘date

ordered’’ is vital to the correct

application of this proposed rule. The

terms mean the date on which notice to

proceed is given by a procuring railroad

to a contractor or supplier for new

equipment. Many of the provisions of

the proposed rule, particularly

structural requirements, will apply only

to newly constructed equipment. When

FRA proposes to apply requirements

only to passenger equipment ordered on

or after January 1, 1999, or placed in

service for the first time on or after

January 1, 2001, FRA intends to

grandfather any piece of equipment that

is both ordered before January 1, 1999,

and placed in service for the first time

before January 1, 2001. FRA believes

this approach will allow railroads to

avoid any costs associated with changes

to existing orders and yet limit the delay

in realizing the safety benefits of the

requirements proposed in this rule.

FRA’s proposed definition of

‘‘passenger car’’ goes beyond its

traditional meaning. ‘‘Passenger car’’

means a unit of rolling equipment to

provide transportation for members of

the general public and includes a selfpropelled car designed to carry

passengers, baggage, mail, or express.

This term includes a cab car, an MU

locomotive, and a passenger coach. A

cab car and an MU locomotive are also

a ‘‘locomotive’’ under this rule.

‘‘Passenger coach’’ means a unit of

rolling equipment intended to provide

transportation for members of the

general public that is without propelling

motors and without a control stand;

therefore, passenger coaches are a subset

of passenger cars.

‘‘Control stand’’ is defined in The

Railroad Dictionary of Car and

Locomotive Terms (Simmons-Boardman

Publishing Corp. 1980), as ‘‘[t]he upright

column upon which the throttle control,

reverser handle, transition lever, and

dynamic braking control are mounted

within convenient reach of the engineer

on a locomotive. The air gauges and

some switches are also included on the

control stand.’’

‘‘Passenger equipment’’ is the most

inclusive definition. It means all

powered and unpowered passenger cars,

locomotives used to haul a passenger

car, and any other unit of rail rolling

equipment hauled in a train with one or

more passenger cars and includes a (1)

Passenger coach, (2) cab car, (3) MU

locomotive, (4) private car, (5)

locomotive not intended to provide

transportation for members of the

general public that is used to power a

passenger train, and (6) any non-selfpropelled vehicle hauled in a train with

one or more passenger cars, including a

freight car hauled in a train with one or

more passenger cars. The term therefore

covers a baggage car, mail car, or

express car.
49754 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

The terms ‘‘passenger station’’ and

‘‘terminal’’ are crucial to the

interpretation of the proposed rule for

movement of defective equipment.

‘‘Passenger station’’ means a location

designated in the railroad’s timetable

where passengers are regularly

scheduled to get on or off any train. By

contrast, ‘‘terminal’’ means a train’s

starting point or ending point of a single

scheduled trip, where passengers may

embark or disembark a train; normally,

a ‘‘terminal’’ is a point where the train

would reverse direction or change

destinations.

Under certain carefully controlled

conditions, FRA proposes to permit a

passenger train with defective

equipment to move to the next forward

passenger station or terminal. This

flexibility is allowed to prevent

railroads from discharging passengers in

potentially unsafe locations and to

minimize schedule impacts where this

can safely be done.

The concepts of ‘‘qualified person’’

and ‘‘qualified mechanical inspector’’

are vital to interpreting the proposed

inspection, testing, and maintenance

provisions of the rule. A ‘‘qualified

person’’ is a person determined by the

railroad to have the knowledge and

skills necessary to perform one or more

functions required under this part. With

the proper training, a train crewmember

could be a qualified person.

A ‘‘qualified mechanical inspector’’ is

a ‘‘qualified person’’ who as a part of the

training, qualification, and designation

program required under § 238.111 has

received instruction and training that

includes ‘‘hands-on’’ experience (under

appropriate supervision or

apprenticeship) in one or more of the

following functions: trouble-shooting,

inspection, testing, and maintenance or

repair of the specific train brake and

other components and systems for

which the inspector is assigned

responsibility. Further, the mechanical

inspector must be a person whose

primary responsibility includes work

generally consistent with those

functions and is designated to (1)

Conduct Class I brake tests under this

part; (2) inspect MU locomotives or

other passenger cars for compliance

with this part; or (3) determine whether

equipment not in compliance with this

part may be moved safely and, if so,

under what conditions. A train

crewmember would not be a qualified

mechanical inspector. (APTA believes

that the proposed definition of

‘‘qualified mechanical inspector’’ adds

nothing to safety, dictates work rules,

and creates unnecessary restricted jobs

with limited duties.)

FRA includes a clear definition of

‘‘qualified person’’ to allow railroads the

flexibility of having train crews perform

Class IA and Class II brake tests. A

qualified person must be trained and

designated as able to perform the types

of brake inspections and tests that the

railroad assigns to him or her. However,

a qualified person need not have the

extensive knowledge of brake systems or

components or be able to trouble-shoot

and repair them. The qualified person is

the ‘‘checker.’’ He or she must have the

knowledge and experience necessary to

be able to identify brake system

problems.

FRA provides a clear definition of

qualified mechanical inspector so that a

differentiation can be made between the

thorough brake test and inspection

performed by a professional mechanical

employee, and the less comprehensive

brake checks performed by train crews.

Under FRA’s proposal, only qualified

mechanical inspectors are permitted to

perform the required calendar day

inspections and Class I brake tests under

this part. This definition largely rules

out the possibility of train crewmembers

becoming a qualified mechanical

inspector. Part of the definition requires

the primary job of a qualified

mechanical inspector to be inspection,

testing, or maintenance of passenger

equipment. FRA intends the definition

to allow the members of the trades

associated with testing and maintenance

of equipment such as carmen,

machinists, and electricians to become

qualified mechanical inspectors.

However, membership in labor

organizations or completion of

apprenticeship programs associated

with these crafts is not required to be a

qualified mechanical inspector. The two

primary qualifications are possession of

the knowledge required to do the job

and a primary work assignment

inspecting, testing, or maintaining the

equipment.

Discussions conducted in the

Working Group meetings revealed that

railroad operators believe these

definitions are too restrictive and will

require training beyond the minimum

needed for many employees to do their

jobs. On the other hand, the

representatives of labor organizations

maintain that this approach will allow

unqualified train crewmembers to

conduct tests and inspections that

should be performed only by

mechanical employees.

FRA believes the proposed rule

strikes the correct balance between

these conflicting points of view. FRA

agrees with labor representatives that

mechanical employees generally

conduct a more thorough inspection

than train crewmembers. As a result, the

rule calls for a daily Class I brake test

and mechanical inspection performed

by qualified mechanical inspectors. At

the same time, FRA agrees with railroad

operators that properly trained train

crews are capable of performing brake

tests and have been doing so effectively

for years. As a result, the proposed rule

grants flexibility to railroads to use

properly trained train crewmembers to

perform certain brake tests.

‘‘System safety’’ is another concept

that forms a foundation for the proposed

rule. System safety means the

application of design, operating,

technical, and management techniques

and principles throughout the life cycle

of a system to reduce hazards and

unsafe conditions to the lowest level

possible through the most effective use

of the available resources. FRA proposes

that each railroad implement a system

safety program to identify and manage

safety risks. The system safety program

would generate data to be used to make

safety decisions. The risk identification

and analysis portion of the system safety

program would help demonstrate an

alternate means of achieving equivalent

safety when a proposed operation does

not fully comply with the Passenger

Equipment Safety Standards.

Definitions of the various types of

trains covered by the proposed

standards are extremely important to

understand how FRA proposes that the

rule be applied. The most general

definition is that of a ‘‘passenger train.’’

The proposed definition makes two

points very clear. First, the proposed

rule does not apply to tourist and

excursion railroads; and, second, the

provisions of the rule do apply to nonpassenger carrying units included in a

passenger train.

An important distinction highlighted

in these definitions is the difference

between a ‘‘long-distance intercity

passenger train’’ and a ‘‘short-distance

intercity passenger train.’’ ‘‘Longdistance intercity passenger train’’

means a passenger train that provides

service between large cities more than

125 miles apart and is not operated

exclusively in the National Railroad

Passenger Corporation’s (Amtrak)

Northeast Corridor. ‘‘Short-distance

intercity passenger train’’ means a

passenger train that provides service

exclusively on the Northeast Corridor or

between cities that are not more than

125 miles apart. This distinction

attempts to recognize the special set of

operating conditions on the Northeast

Corridor in light of the need to treat

long-distance trains differently than

short-distance trains. Additionally,

APTA has advised FRA that there are
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49755

commuter rail systems that operate

trains over 100 miles in distance on a

single run, and thus recommended the

use of the 125-mile distance in these

definitions.

The definition of the term ‘‘in

service’’ is modeled after the definition

of that term in the Railroad Freight Car

Safety Standards. See 49 CFR 215.5(e).

Passenger equipment that is in service

includes passenger equipment ‘‘in

passenger service,’’ meaning ‘‘carrying,

or available to carry, fare-paying

passengers,’’ as well as all other

passenger equipment unless it falls into

one of four categories; specifically,

unless the passenger equipment—

(a) Is being handled in accordance with

§§ 238.15, 238.17, 238.305(c)(5), or

238.503(f), as applicable;

(b) Is in a repair shop or on a repair track;

(c) Is on a storage track and is not carrying

passengers; or

(d) Has been delivered in interchange but

has not been accepted by the receiving

railroad.

The term ‘‘in service’’ is important

because if the train or passenger

equipment is not in service, it is not

subject to a part 238 civil penalty.

The last definition that warrants

discussion is ‘‘vestibule.’’ FRA proposes

‘‘vestibule’’ to mean an area of a

passenger car that normally does not

contain seating and that leads from the

seating area to the side exit doors. The

definition of ‘‘vestibule’’ is important to

determine the requirements for the

location of side door emergency-release

mechanisms.

§ 238.7 Waivers. This section sets

forth the procedures for seeking waivers

of compliance with the requirements of

this rule. Requests for such waivers may

be filed by any interested party. In

reviewing such requests, FRA conducts

investigations to determine if a

deviation from the general criteria can

be made without compromising or

diminishing rail safety.

FRA recognizes that circumstances

may arise when the operation of

passenger equipment that does not meet

the standards proposed in this rule is

appropriate and in the public interest.

FRA would entertain petitions for

waiver to allow operation of equipment

that does not fully comply with the

proposed standards, provided the

petitioner can demonstrate that the

equipment will operate at a level of

safety equivalent to that afforded by the

provision of this part that is sought to

be waived, i.e., demonstrate ‘‘equivalent

safety.’’ Equivalent safety may be

afforded by features that compensate for

equipment that does not meet these

standards. Equivalent safety is met

when railroad employees, passengers,

and the general public are no more at

risk from passenger equipment that does

not meet the requirements of this part,

but is protected by compensating

features, than when the equipment

meets the requirements of this part.

Some of the structural requirements

that FRA is proposing would prohibit

the operation of most light rail vehicles

if the operation is connected to the

general railroad system on or after

January 1, 1998; however, FRA does not

intend to completely foreclose the

possibility of the operation of such

equipment. FRA is aware of

arrangements by which light rail service

is conducted during the day, with

freight operations conducted at night.

FRA will entertain petitions for waiver

of the structural requirements from

operators of such ‘‘time-separated’’

service.

FRA proposes that the risk assessment

portion of the system safety program be

used to demonstrate equivalent safety.

The burden would be on the petitioning

railroad to perform a comparative risk

assessment and to prove equivalent

safety. FRA has experience with two

instances involving different passenger

equipment operations where a

comparative risk assessment has been

used successfully. Amtrak

commissioned a comparative risk

assessment between current Northeast

Corridor operations and proposed

operations involving the American Flyer

trainset at speeds up to 150 mph. The

risk assessment demonstrated that

proposed countermeasures such as

enhancements to the train control

system and the increased structural

strength and the crash energy

management design of the American

Flyer should compensate for the

increased operating speed. The

comparative risk assessment

quantitatively showed that passengers

were no more at risk travelling on the

American Flyer at 150 mph on the

Northeast Corridor than if they were

travelling on an existing Amtrak

passenger train at a lesser speed on the

same corridor.

The second instance is the proposed

Florida Overland Express (FOX)

operation of a French TGV high speed

rail system in Florida. FOX performed a

comparative risk assessment of three

operations: the American Flyer on the

Northeast Corridor, the TGV on high

speed lines in France, and the proposed

FOX operation in Florida. See FRA

Docket: RM Pet. 97–1. The analysis

showed the TGV operation in France to

pose less risk to passengers than the

American Flyer trainset on the

Northeast Corridor and the proposed

FOX operation to be even safer than the

TGV in France. The FOX risk

assessment suggested that collision

avoidance provided by a dedicated

right-of-way with no grade crossings

more than compensated for the

increased speed and decreased

structural strength of the proposed

equipment.

FRA cites these two instances as

examples of what is expected to

demonstrate equivalent safety for

proposed operations where the

equipment does not meet the Passenger

Equipment Safety Standards. FRA

would expect an analysis showing the

effectiveness of clearly compensating

features, such as closing grade crossings,

providing absolute separation of lighter

rail equipment from heavy rail

equipment, or using highly capable

signal and train control systems that

significantly reduce the probability of

accidents caused by human error. FRA

would provide advice and guidance to

organizations wishing to demonstrate

equivalent safety, but the burden of

performing a comparative risk

assessment and establishing that the

operation provides equivalent safety is

on the entity proposing to operate

equipment that does not comply with

this part.

§ 238.9 Responsibility for

compliance. General compliance

requirements are proposed in this

section. Paragraph (a). Paragraphs (a)(1)

and (a)(2) prohibit a railroad subject to

part 238 from committing a series of

specified acts with respect to a train or

a piece of passenger equipment while

the train or passenger equipment is in

service if it has a condition that does not

comply with part 238 or if it has not

been inspected and tested as required by

part 238. In particular, consistent with

49 U.S.C. chapter 203, under which the

provision is proposed, paragraph (a)(1)

imposes a strict liability standard with

respect to violations of the safety

appliance and power brake provisions

of part 238. In addition to the acts

prohibited by paragraph (a)(2) (that is,

the use, haul, offering in interchange, or

accepting in interchange of defective or

not properly inspected equipment),

paragraph (a)(1) prohibits a railroad

from merely permitting the use or haul

on its line of such equipment if it does

not conform with the safety appliance

and power brake provisions. See

§ 238.3(b). By contrast, paragraph (a)(2)

imposes a lower standard of liability for

using, hauling, delivering in

interchange, or accepting in interchange

a train or passenger equipment that is

defective or not properly inspected, in

violation of another provision of this

part; a railroad subject to this part is

liable only if it knew, had notice, or
49756 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

should have known of the existence of

either the defective condition of the

equipment or the failure to inspect and

test. Finally, paragraph (a)(3) establishes

a strict liability standard for

noncompliance with any other

provision of this part, for example, the

requirement to adopt a written system

safety plan under § 238.103.

Paragraph (b). In accordance with the

‘‘use’’ or ‘‘haul’’ language previously

contained in the Safety Appliance Acts

(49 U.S.C. chapter 203) and with FRA’s

general rulemaking authority under the

Federal railroad safety laws, FRA

proposes in paragraph (b) that passenger

equipment will be considered ‘‘in use’’

prior to departure but after it receives or

should have received the necessary tests

and inspections required for movement.

FRA will no longer wait for a piece of

equipment with a power brake defect to

be hauled before issuing a violation, a

practice frequently criticized by the

railroads. FRA believes that this

approach will increase FRA’s ability to

prevent the movement of defective

equipment that creates a potential safety

hazard to both the public and railroad

employees. FRA does not feel that this

approach increases the railroads’ burden

since equipment should not be operated

if it is found in defective condition in

the pre-departure tests and inspections,

unless permitted by the regulations.

Paragraph (c). This paragraph clarifies

FRA’s position that the requirements

contained in the proposed rules are

applicable not only to any ‘‘railroad’’

subject to this part but also to any

‘‘person,’’ as illustrated in § 238.11, that

performs any function required by the

proposed rules. Although various

sections of the proposed rule address

the duties of a railroad, FRA intends

that any person who performs any

action on behalf of a railroad or any

person who performs any action

covered by the proposed rule is required

to perform that action in the same

manner as required of a railroad or be

subject to FRA enforcement action. For

example, private car owner and contract

shippers that perform duties covered by

these proposed regulations would be

required to perform those duties in the

same manner as required of a railroad.

§ 238.11 Civil penalties. Section

238.11 identifies the civil penalties that

FRA may impose upon any person,

including a railroad or an independent

contractor providing goods or services

to a railroad, that violates any

requirement of this part. These penalties

are authorized by 49 U.S.C. 21301,

21302, and 21304. The penalty

provision parallels penalty provisions

included in numerous other safety

regulations issued by FRA. Essentially,

any person who violates any

requirement of this part or causes the

violation of any such requirement will

be subject to a civil penalty of at least

$500 and not more than $10,000 per

violation. Civil penalties may be

assessed against individuals only for

willful violations; where a grossly

negligent violation or a pattern of

repeated violations creates an imminent

hazard of death or injury to persons, or

causes death or injury, a penalty not to

exceed $20,000 per violation may be

assessed. In addition, each day a

violation continues will constitute a

separate offense. Finally, a person may

be subject to criminal penalties under

49 U.S.C. 21311 for knowingly and

willfully falsifying reports required by

these regulations. FRA believes that the

inclusion of penalty provisions for

failure to comply with the regulations is

important in ensuring that compliance

is achieved.

The final rule will include a schedule

of civil penalties as appendix A to this

part. Because such penalty schedules

are statements of policy, notice and

comment are not required prior to their

issuance. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A).

Nevertheless, commenters are invited to

submit suggestions to FRA describing

the types of actions or omissions under

each regulatory section that would

subject a person to the assessment of a

civil penalty. Commenters are also

invited to recommend what penalties

may be appropriate, based upon the

relative seriousness of each type of

violation.

§ 238.13 Preemptive effect. Proposed

§ 238.13 informs the public as to FRA’s

views regarding what will be the

preemptive effect of the final rule.

While the presence or absence of such

a section does not in itself affect the

preemptive effect of a final rule, it

informs the public concerning the

statutory provision which governs the

preemptive effect of the rule. Section

20106 of title 49 of the United States

Code provides that all regulations

prescribed by the Secretary relating to

railroad safety preempt any State law,

regulation, or order covering the same

subject matter, except a provision

necessary to eliminate or reduce an

essentially local safety hazard that is not

incompatible with a Federal law,

regulation, or order and that does not

unreasonably burden interstate

commerce. With the exception of a

provision directed at an essentially local

safety hazard, 49 U.S.C. 20106 will

preempt any State regulatory agency

rule covering the same subject matter as

the regulations proposed today when

issued as final rules.

§ 238.15 Movement of passenger

equipment with defective power brakes.

This section contains the proposed

requirements for movement of passenger

equipment with a power brake defect

without civil penalty liability under this

part. (Railroads remain liable, however,

‘‘in a proceeding to recover damages for

death or injury of a railroad employee

arising from the movement of’’ the

defective equipment. See 49 U.S.C.

20303(c).) A ‘‘power brake defect,’’ as

defined in paragraph (a), ‘‘is a condition

of a power brake component, or other

primary brake component, that does not

conform with this’’ rule. The term does

not include a failure to properly inspect

such a component.

The Passenger Equipment Safety

Standards Working Group did not reach

a consensus on the requirements

proposed in this section; however, the

Working Group did agree that passenger

operations needed some flexibility to get

passengers to their destination or, at a

minimum, to a location where

passengers can safely disembark. The

proposed requirements regarding the

movement of passenger equipment with

defective power brakes are based on the

extensive discussions and information

presented in the Working Group

meetings and in response to the

previous NPRM on power brakes.

As previously noted in the general

discussion, FRA proposes to utilize the

authority granted in 49 U.S.C. 20306 to

exempt passenger train operations

covered by this part from the statutory

requirements contained in 49 U.S.C.

20303(a) permitting the movement of

equipment with defective or insecure

brakes only if various requirements are

met, including the requirement that the

movement for repair be only to the

nearest location where the necessary

repairs can be made. FRA believes that

the granting of this exemption is

justified based on the technological

advances made in the brake systems and

equipment used in passenger

operations, and is necessary for these

operations to make efficient use of the

technological advances and protect the

safety of the riding public.

FRA also proposes to exempt

passenger train operations from a longstanding agency interpretation, based on

a 1910 Interstate Commerce

Commission order codified at 49 CFR

232.1, that prohibits the movement of a

train for repairs under 49 U.S.C. 20303

if less than 85 percent of the train’s

brakes are operative. As noted in the

previous discussion, many passenger

operations utilize a small number of

cars in their trains and the necessity to

cut out the brakes on just one car can

easily result in noncompliance. FRA
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49757

believes that speed restrictions can

readily be used to compensate for the

loss of brakes on a minority of cars.

Paragraph (b)(1). This paragraph

addresses the movement for repair of

equipment with a power brake defect

found during a Class I or IA brake test

or, for Tier II equipment, the equivalent

of a Class I or IA brake test. This

paragraph allows railroads the

flexibility to move passenger equipment

with a power brake defect found during

such a test if the following three

conditions are satisfied: (1) if the train

is moved for purposes of effecting repair

of the defect, without passengers; (2) the

applicable operating restrictions set

forth in paragraph (d) are complied

with; and (3) the information

concerning the defect is recorded on a

tag affixed to the equipment or in an

automated defect tracking system as

specified in paragraph (c)(2).

Paragraph (b)(2). This paragraph

permits railroads to move, for purposes

of scrapping or sale, passenger

equipment with a power brake defect

found during a Class I or IA brake test

(or the Tier II equivalent) if each of the

following conditions is satisfied: if the

movement is without passengers, if the

speed of the movement is 15 mph or

less, and if the railroad’s air brake or

power brake instructions are followed

when making the movement. This

provision allows railroads to move

surplus equipment without having to

request permission for one-time moves

from FRA, as is currently required. FRA

has not had any serious safety concerns

with the methods currently used by

railroads to move this equipment and

does not believe its limited resources

should be tied up in approving these

types of moves.

Paragraph (c), generally. This

paragraph addresses the use of

passenger equipment with a power

brake defect that develops en route from

a location where a Class I or IA brake

test (or the Tier II equivalent) was

performed on the equipment. The two

basic requirements are that at the

location where the railroad first finds

the defect, specified information (such

as the nature of the defect and the

destination where the defect will be

repaired) must be placed on tags

attached to the equipment or in a

computer tracking system and that the

railroad must observe the applicable

operating restrictions in paragraph (d).

A third requirement, found in paragraph

(c)(3) is a special, applying only if the

defect causes any brakes to be cut out.

Paragraph (c)(2) requires that

equipment being hauled for repairs be

adequately identified. Currently, there is

no requirement that equipment with

defective power brakes be tagged or

otherwise identified, although most

railroads voluntarily engage in such

activity. Furthermore, the current

regulations regarding freight cars and

locomotives contain tagging

requirements for the movement of

equipment not in compliance with those

parts. See 49 CFR 215.9 and 229.9.

Consequently, FRA proposes to require

the identification of equipment with

defective power brakes through either

the traditional tags which are placed in

established locations on the equipment

or by an automated tracking system

developed by the railroad. FRA

proposes certain information which

must be contained whichever method is

used by a railroad. FRA believes that the

proposed tagging or tracking

requirements add reliability,

accountability, and enforceability for

the timely and proper repair of

equipment with defective power brakes.

In addition, under paragraph (c)(3), if

the defect causes the brakes on the

equipment to be cut out, then the

railroad must first find out what

percentage of the power brakes in the

train are cut out or inoperative in some

other way, using the formula in

paragraph (d)(1). Next, the railroad must

notify the dispatcher of the percentage

of operative brakes and the movement

restrictions imposed by paragraph (d),

inform the railroad’s mechanical desk or

department about the brake defect, and

walk the train to confirm the percentage

of operative brakes at the next point

where it is safe to do so.

Paragraph (d)(1). This paragraph

explains the term ‘‘inoperative power

brakes’’ and proposes a new method for

calculating the percentage of operative

power brakes (operative primary brakes)

in a train. Regarding the term itself, a

cut-out power brake is an inoperative

power brake, but the failure or cutting

out of a secondary brake system (as

defined in § 238.5) does not result in

inoperative power brakes. For example,

failure of dynamic brakes does not

render a power brake inoperative unless

the dynamic brakes are in fact primary

brakes. Although the statute discusses

the percentage of operative brakes in

terms of a percentage of vehicles, the

statute was written nearly a century ago

and at that time the only way to cut out

the brakes on a car or locomotive was

to cut out the entire unit. See 49 U.S.C.

20302(a)(5)(B). Today, virtually every

piece of equipment used in passenger

service can have the brakes cut out on

a per-truck or per-axle basis.

Consequently, FRA merely proposes a

method of calculating the percentage of

operative brakes based on the design of

passenger equipment used today, and

thus, a means to more accurately reflect

the true braking ability of the train as a

whole. FRA believes that the proposed

method of calculation is consistent with

the intent of Congress when it drafted

the statutory requirement and simply

recognizes the technological

advancements made in braking systems

over the last century. Consequently,

FRA proposes to permit the percentage

of operative brakes to be determined by

dividing the number of axles in the train

with operative brakes by the total

number of axles in the train.

Furthermore, for equipment utilizing

tread brake units (TBU), FRA proposes

that the percentage of operative brakes

be determined by dividing the number

of operative TBUs by the total number

of TBUs.

Paragraphs (d)(2)–(d)(4), generally.

These paragraphs propose various speed

and other operating restrictions based

on the percentage of operative brakes in

order to permit passenger railroads the

flexibility to efficiently move passengers

without compromising safety. FRA

believes that the proposed movement

restrictions actually enhance the safety

of the riding public. The proposed

requirements retain the basic principle

that a train carrying passengers shall not

depart a location where a major brake

inspections or tests are performed on

that train unless the train has 100

percent operational brakes.

FRA recognizes that there are major

differences in the operations of

commuter or short-distance intercity

passenger trains, and long-distance

intercity passenger trains. Commuter

and short-distance intercity passenger

trains tend to operate fairly short

distances between passenger stations

and generally operate in relatively short

turn-around service between two

terminals several times in any given

day. On the other hand, long-distance

intercity passenger trains tend to

operate for long distances, with trips

between the beginning terminal and

ending terminal taking a day or more

and traversing multiple States with

relatively long distances between

passenger stations. Consequently, FRA

proposes slightly different requirements

with regard to the movement of

defective brake equipment in longdistance intercity passenger trains.

FRA believes that passenger railroads

can safely and efficiently operate trains

with en route brake failures under the

strict set of conditions proposed. FRA

has long held that the industry can

safely operate trains at normal track

speeds with as low as 85 percent

effective brakes as long as the

inoperative brakes were due to failures

which occurred en route or due to
49758 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

defective cars being picked up en route

and being moved for repairs. The only

change being proposed to current

practice is the additional flexibility for

certain passenger operations to move

the equipment past a location capable of

performing the repairs.

Paragraph (d)(2). This paragraph

proposes operating requirements for the

movement of any passenger train that

develops en route brake failures

resulting in 74 to 50 percent operative

brakes. In these circumstances, FRA

proposes to allow the trains to proceed

only to the next passenger station at a

reduced speed, not to exceed 20 mph,

to discharge passengers before

proceeding, without passengers, to the

nearest location where the necessary

repairs can be made. This provision

recognizes the dangers of unloading

passenger at locations other than

passenger stations by allowing railroads

to move the equipment to a location

with the facilities to handle the

discharge of passengers. Furthermore,

engineering evidence and test data

demonstrate that the reduced speed

more than compensates for the reduced

braking force. At the reduced speed,

even with only 50 percent effective

brakes, a train is able to stop in a much

shorter distance than the same train

traveling at the maximum operating

speed with 100 percent operative

brakes.

Paragraph (d)(3)(i). FRA also proposes

to permit commuter, short-distance

intercity, and short-distance Tier II

passenger trains experiencing en route

brake failures resulting in 84 to 75

percent operative brakes to continue in

service to the next terminal prior to

being moved without passengers to the

nearest location were repairs can be

made. However, in these circumstances,

FRA proposes that the speed of the train

must be reduced to 50 percent of the

train’s maximum operating speed or 40

mph, whichever is less. Engineering

evidence and test data demonstrate that

the reduced speed more than

compensates for the reduced braking

force. At the reduced speed, even with

only 75 percent effective brakes, a train

is able to stop in a much shorter

distance than the same train traveling at

the maximum operating speed with 100

percent operative brakes.

Paragraph (d)(3)(ii). FRA proposes to

permit commuter and short-distance

intercity passenger trains that develop

defective brake equipment en route

resulting in 99 to 85 percent operative

brakes, the flexibility to move the

defective equipment to the next

terminal where passengers can be

unloaded, prior to the defective

equipment being moved to the nearest

location were repairs can be made.

During Working Group meetings, APTA

presented engineering evidence and test

data that demonstrated that stopping

distances remained well within signal

spacing distances with a large margin of

safety even for trains with as low as 85

percent effective brakes.

Paragraph (d)(4). As noted above,

most long-distance intercity passenger

trains, both in Tier I and Tier II, have

considerable distances between their

starting terminal and their ending

terminal, thus FRA does not intend to

provide these operations the latitude to

move those large distance with defective

equipment entrained. This paragraph

permits the movement of defective

brake equipment in these trains only to

the nearest forward location designated

as a repair location for this equipment

by the operating railroad in the list

required by § 238.19(d). FRA also

proposes to permit long-distance

intercity passenger trains to continue in

service past a designated repair location

to the next forward passenger station

only if the designated repair location

does not have the facilities to safely

unload passengers. Although FRA

proposes to permit the continued

operation of long-distance intercity

passenger trains that develop en route

brake failures resulting in 99 to 85

percent operative brakes at normal

speeds, FRA proposes a speed

restriction of no greater than 40 mph

when the en route brake failures result

in 84 to 75 percent operative brakes.

Therefore, although long-distance

intercity passenger trains do not have

the flexibility to continue in service to

the next terminal, these trains do gain

flexibility in being permitted to move a

greater percentage of defective

equipment than currently allowed and

are able to move that equipment to the

next forward repair location rather than

the ‘‘nearest’’ repair location as

currently required. 49 U.S.C. 20303(a).

As noted previously, FRA believes that

the safety of the traveling public

mandates the flexibility of permitting

passenger trains to continue to the next

forward repair location or passenger

station because requiring trains to

reverse directions and perform back

hauls to the nearest repair location

increases the risk of collision on the

railroad.

APTA, in its comments on a draft of

the NPRM, agreed that many of the

defects need to be repaired but do not

require stopping the car or immediately

taking it out of service. Commenters are

requested to address APTA’s concern.

§ 238.17 Movement of passenger

equipment with other than power brake

defects. This section contains the

proposed requirements for the

movement of passenger equipment with

a condition not in compliance with part

238, excluding a power brake defect and

including a safety appliance defect,

without civil penalty liability under this

part. (Railroads remain liable, however,

under 49 U.S.C. 20303(c), as described

in the discussion of the previous

section.)

The Working Group was unable to

reach full consensus on the

requirements contained in this section.

There are currently no statutory or

regulatory restrictions on the movement

of passenger cars with defective

conditions that are not power brake or

safety appliance defects. The proposed

provisions contained in this section are

similar to the provisions for moving

defective locomotives and freight cars

currently contained in 49 CFR 229.9 and

215.9, respectively. As these provisions

have generally worked well with regard

to the movement of defective

locomotives and freight cars and in

order to maintain consistency, FRA has

modeled the proposed movement

requirements on those existing

requirements. FRA proposes to allow

passenger railroads the flexibility to

continue to use equipment with nonsafety-critical defects until the next

scheduled calendar day exterior

mechanical inspection. However, FRA

intends the calendar day mechanical

inspection to be the tool used by

railroads to repair all reported defects

and to prevent continued use of

defective equipment to carry passengers.

(Compare § 238.17(b) with § 238.17(c).)

FRA intends for 49 CFR 229.9 to

continue to govern the movement of

locomotives used in passenger service

which develop defective conditions, not

covered by part 238, that are not in

compliance with part 229. In the final

rule, FRA will make any necessary

conforming amendments to part 229 in

order to remove provisions that will

now be covered in this part or to make

inapplicable to locomotives subject to

part 238 provisions of part 229 that will

now be covered in part 238. Part 229

will continue to cover (non-steam)

locomotives that are used by the tourist

railroads until such railroads are

covered by part 238.

FRA also does not intend to alter the

current statutory requirements

contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303 regarding

the movement of passenger equipment

with defective or insecure safety

appliances. See proposed §§ 238.229,

238.429, 238.431. Consequently, in

paragraph (d), FRA proposes to require

that passenger equipment that develops

a defective or insecure safety appliance

continue to be subject to all the
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49759

statutory restrictions on its movement.

Under the current statutory language—

A vehicle that is equipped in compliance

with this chapter whose equipment becomes

defective or insecure nevertheless may be

moved when necessary to make repairs

* * * from the place at which the defect or

insecurity was first discovered to the nearest

available place at which the repairs can be

made-

(1) on the railroad line on which the defect

or insecurity was discovered; or

(2) at the option of a connecting railroad

carrier, on the railroad line of the connecting

carrier, if not farther than the place of repair

described in clause (1) of this subsection.

49 U.S.C. 20303(a). It should be noted

that the proposed requirement

applicable to Tier I equipment merely

references the Railroad Safety

Appliance Standards (49 CFR part 231);

however, FRA has proposed separate

safety appliance requirements for Tier II

passenger equipment. See proposed

§§ 238.429 and 238.431.

FRA proposes that passenger

equipment that is found with conditions

not in compliance with this part, other

than power brake defects, be moved

only after a qualified mechanical

inspector has determined that the

equipment is safe to move and

determined any restrictions necessary

for the equipment’s safe movement.

FRA also proposes to allow railroads to

move equipment based on an

assessment made by a qualified

mechanical inspector in communication

with on-site personnel. FRA proposes

this allowance based on the reality that

mechanical personnel are not readily

available at every location on a

railroad’s line of road. However, FRA

further proposes that if a qualified

mechanical inspector does not actually

inspect the equipment to determine that

it is safe to move, then, at the first

forward location where a qualified

mechanical inspector is on duty, an

inspector will perform a physical

inspection of the equipment to confirm

the initial assessment made while in

communication with on-site personnel

previously. Paragraph (c)(3) requires

tracking of the defect in either of two

ways. One option is to tag the

equipment in a manner similar to what

is currently required under § 215.9 for

freight cars. The second option is to

record the specified information in an

automated tracking system. The latter

alternative is offered to provide

railroads some flexibility and in

recognition of advances made in

electronic recordkeeping.

Under paragraph (c), FRA proposes

that after a mechanical inspector verifies

that a noncomplying piece of equipment

is safe to remain in passenger service,

that piece of equipment may remain in

passenger service until its next calendar

day mechanical inspection. However,

under paragraph (b), equipment

containing noncomplying conditions at

the time of the calendar day mechanical

inspection may be moved from that

location only if the noncomplying

conditions are repaired or if all of the

following conditions are satisfied: (1) if

the equipment is moved out of

passenger service and in a non-revenue

train for the purpose of effectuating the

repairs; (2) if the requirements of

paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) (regarding

tagging and notification) are satisfied;

and (3), in the case of a safety appliance

defect, if the special conditions of

paragraph (d) are met. As discussed

previously, FRA has intentionally

provided railroads wide flexibility in

where and when it will perform the

calendar day mechanical inspection in

order to permit railroads to get the

equipment to locations most conducive

to conducting the inspections. Thus,

FRA intends for calendar day

mechanical inspections of passenger

equipment to be conducted at locations

where qualified mechanical inspectors

are available and where virtually any

necessary repair can be made.

Consequently, FRA does not believe that

the proposed restrictions on the

movement of noncomplying equipment

will be overly burdensome to the

industry.

Paragraph (d) states the special

statutory restrictions on the movement

of passenger equipment with a safety

appliance defect.

APTA, in its comments on a draft of

the NPRM, agreed that many of the

defects need to be repaired but do not

require shopping the car or immediately

taking it out of service. APTA further

noted that this section does not take into

account the fact-based maintenance

cycles for equipment, subsystems, and

components as the introduction of

technology outpaces the regulatory

process. Commenters are requested to

address APTA’s concerns.

§ 238.19 Reporting and tracking

defective equipment. This section

contains the reporting and tracking

requirements that passenger railroads

must maintain regarding defective

passenger equipment. The Working

Group did not reach consensus on the

requirements proposed in this section.

FRA proposes to require that each

railroad develop and maintain a system

for reporting and tracking equipment

defects. FRA proposes that for each

equipment defect discovered by the

railroad on equipment used by the

railroad the system record: the number

by which the equipment is identified,

type of defect, when the defect

occurred, the determination made by a

qualified mechanical inspector on how

to handle the defect, and finally how

and when the defect was corrected. FRA

has not proposed any specific method or

means by which a railroad should

gather and maintain the required

information. FRA believes that each

railroad is in the best position to

determine the method of obtaining the

required information which is most

efficient and effective based on its

specific operation. Thus, railroads could

maintain this information electronically

in conjunction with their automated

tracking system, if so desired.

FRA believes that reporting and

tracking of defective equipment are

essential features of any effective system

safety program. Railroad managers are

able to utilize such systems to ensure

that the railroad complies with safety

regulations, does not use unsafe

equipment, makes needed repairs, and

has failure data to make reliability-based

decisions on maintenance intervals.

Furthermore, most passenger railroads

currently have some sort of reporting

and tracking system in place. FRA

recognizes that some railroads may have

to incur additional initial costs to

develop or improve defect reporting and

tracking systems; however, FRA

believes these costs can be recouped

through the increased operating

efficiency that an effective recording

and tracking system provides.

Paragraph (b) requires that railroads

maintain the required information for a

period equal to one periodic

maintenance interval for each specific

type of equipment as described in the

railroad’s system safety plan. FRA

believes that this minimum retention

period will ensure that the records

remain available when they are most

needed, but will not place a

burdensome record storage requirement

on railroads. However, FRA strongly

encourages railroads to keep these

records for longer periods of time

because they form the basis for future

reliability-driven decisions concerning

test and maintenance intervals.

Paragraph (d) requires railroads

operating long-distance passenger trains

to list the locations where repairs can be

made to the equipment. FRA believes

that the operators are in the best

position to determine which locations

have the necessary expertise to handle

the repairs of the somewhat advanced

braking systems utilized in passenger

trains. FRA also proposes a broad

performance-based requirement that

railroads operating this equipment

designate a sufficient number of repair

locations to ensure the safe and timely
49760 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

repair of the equipment. FRA intends to

fine a railroad for violating this

proposed requirement or take other

enforcement action if, based on its

expertise and experience, FRA believes

the railroad is failing to designate an

adequate number repair locations.

§ 238.21 Special approval

procedure. This section states the

procedures to be followed when seeking

to obtain FRA approval of a pre-revenue

service acceptance testing plan under

§§ 238.113 or 238.603 or an alternative

standard under §§ 238.115 (‘‘Fire

safety’’), 238.223 (‘‘Fuel tanks’’),

238.309 (‘‘Periodic brake equipment

maintenance’’), 238.311 (‘‘Single car

test’’), 238.405 (‘‘Longitudinal static

compressive strength’’), or 238.427

(‘‘Suspension system’’). Procedures for

obtaining FRA approval of inspection,

testing, and maintenance programs for

Tier II equipment under § 238.503 are

found at § 238.505.

Subpart B—System Safety and General

Requirements

§ 238.101 Scope. This subpart

contains the system safety program

requirements to be applied to all

passenger equipment subject to this

part. Although FRA initially considered

addressing system safety requirements

for Tier I and Tier II equipment

separately, FRA is proposing broad,

minimum requirements which can be

applied to all types of passenger railroad

systems. Therefore, separate

requirements are not needed.

The Working Group did not reach

consensus on the system safety

requirements as they apply to Tier I

equipment, but strong support exists

among Working Group members to

apply formal system safety planning to

Tier I equipment. The Tier II Subgroup

did reach full consensus on the system

safety program requirements as they

apply to Tier II equipment.

Tier I and Tier II passenger equipment

is used in a heavy rail environment that

includes a mixture of freight and rail

passenger traffic and highway-rail grade

crossings used by heavy highway

vehicles. Such an environment makes

reliance on collision avoidance risky. As

a result, crashworthiness must be

designed into the equipment.

However, situations may arise where

requiring strict adherence to either the

Tier I standards or the Tier II standards

may prevent rail passenger

transportation that is in the public

interest. As a result, FRA intends that

the system safety planning process

allow railroads to develop approaches to

providing rail passenger transportation

that do not meet all the Passenger

Equipment Safety Standards but

compensate by providing safety

equivalency to that provided by meeting

the full set of equipment safety

standards. For example, a rail passenger

operator would be allowed to seek relief

from some of the structural standards

based on a dedicated right-of-way or an

advanced signaling system. However,

the burden of demonstrating safety

equivalency based on a comprehensive

risk assessment falls squarely on the

organization proposing the rail

passenger operation that does not meet

all the equipment standards.

The system safety plan must be a

living document that evolves with the

passenger rail system, and the system

safety program detailed in the plan

should be enforced until the system is

decommissioned. Ideally, the system

safety program would be in place at the

inception of the system. This allows the

maximum benefit of the program to be

achieved. Tier II equipment and major

new purchases of Tier I equipment will

allow system safety planning to be used

in the design and development phase of

the new equipment. However, for the

most part, Tier I system safety programs

must be tailored to existing operations

and equipment.

The system safety approach can be

instituted at any point in the life cycle

of a passenger rail system. APTA

currently publishes a voluntary system

safety program guide. Several APTA

members, which operate existing Tier I

equipment, instituted this system safety

program on their existing rail systems.

APTA periodically audits these

programs and provides the operating

authority with feedback on how well the

system safety program has been

implemented. As previously noted,

APTA has suggested that commuter

railroads be allowed to regulate

themselves in this area, and that FRA

not issue any regulations governing

such plans. See preamble discussion; in

the preamble FRA asked a variety of

questions that commenters should

address regarding the need for system

safety plans, and if such plans should be

required what their contents should

contain and whether FRA should

enforce the various elements of the

plans.

In addition, Amtrak recently started a

corporate system safety program

initiative to make a formal system safety

program an integral part of the way

Amtrak conducts business. The value of

the formal system safety process is

rapidly being recognized by the

passenger railroad industry and is

becoming an accepted way of doing

business.

§ 238.103 General system safety

requirements. Paragraph (a) requires

each railroad operating equipment

subject to this part to adopt and

annually update a system safety plan

and implement a system safety program

using MIL–STD–882(C) as a guide. MIL–

STD–882(C) is a military standard

issued by the Department of Defense

that describes system safety planning

and system safety programs used by the

Unites States military for procuring and

operating weapon systems. See also the

discussion under § 238.5 of this sectionby-section analysis. FRA does not

attempt to dictate to railroads how to

apply this guidance. Railroads should

tailor their application of the guidance

to their unique safety needs and

operating scenarios.

Paragraphs (b)–(d) describe the

various elements required to be

included in the plan. In particular,

paragraph (e) requires the operating

railroad to document how the design

meets safety requirements and to track

how safety issues were raised and

resolved. This is a necessary step to

demonstrate that risks were identified

and eliminated or mitigated.

Paragraph (f) requires the system

safety plan to describe how operational

limitations are to be imposed if the

design cannot meet certain safety

requirements. Operational limits are the

least desirable and thus the last means

considered to reduce a safety risk.

Paragraph (g) establishes the dates by

which the operating railroad must adopt

a system safety plan for each of the three

categories of passenger equipment.

Paragraph (h) obliges the railroad to

allow FRA to inspect and copy its

system safety plan and the

documentation required by paragraph

(e).

§ 238.105 Fire protection program.

Paragraph (a) requires that the operating

railroad’s system safety program address

the fire safety of new equipment during

the design stage so as to reduce the risk

of harm due to fire on such equipment

to an acceptable level as defined in

MIL–STD–882(C). Paragraph (b) requires

that railroads make a written analysis of

the fire protection problem. These

paragraphs require the operating

railroad to ensure that good fire

protection practice is used during the

design and operation of the equipment.

Using this good practice will allow the

FRA fire safety regulations to be kept to

a minimum. Four elements of this

analysis correspond to required action

under § 238.115, ‘‘Fire safety’: the

installation of overheat detectors, a fire

or smoke detection system, and a fixed,

automatic, fire-suppression system

where the railroad’s written analysis

determines they are required and

compliance with the railroad’s written
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49761

procedures for the inspection, testing,

and maintenance of fire safety systems

and equipment that such procedures

designate as mandatory. See

§ 238.115(c)–(f).

Paragraph (c) requires the operating

railroad to exercise reasonable care to

assure that the system developer follows

the design criteria and performs the

tests required by the railroad’s fire

safety program during the design of new

equipment. To fulfill this obligation in

part, the operating railroad must include

fire safety requirements in each of its

contracts for the purchase of new

equipment.

Paragraph (d) requires that existing

passenger equipment and operations be

subjected to a fire safety analysis similar

to that proposed for new equipment in

paragraphs (a)–(c). A preliminary fire

safety analysis would be required

within the first year. This effort would

constitute an overview of the fleet and

service environments, together with

known elements of risk (e.g., tunnels).

For any category of equipment and

service identified as possibly presenting

unacceptable risk, a full analysis and

any necessary remedial action would be

required within the following year. A

full fire safety analysis, including

review of the extent to which interior

materials in all existing cars comply

with the test performance criteria for

flammability and smoke emission

characteristics contained in Appendix B

to this part or alternative standards

approved by FRA under this part, would

be required within 4 years. This overall

review would closely parallel and

reinforce the passenger train emergency

preparedness planning effort that will

be mandated under a separate docket

(see 62 FR 8330; February 24, 1997).

This paragraph responds to NTSB

concerns announced on June 17, 1997,

in adopting its report on the collision of

the MARC commuter train with

Amtrak’s Capitol Limited at Silver

Spring, Maryland, and approving

related recommendations. Among 13

recommendations to be addressed to

FRA was the following:

Require that a comprehensive inspection of

all commuter passenger cars be performed to

independently verify that the interior

materials in these cars meet the expected

performance requirements for flammability

and smoke emissions characteristics.

The Abstract of Final Report did not

include any express finding that

materials in the MARC cab car did not

meet FTA/FRA criteria for flammability

and smoke emission characteristics.

However, FRA understands that the full

report may point to the introduction of

some non-standard materials during

refurbishing and repair of the car. The

Board did find as follows:

19. Because other commuter passenger cars

may also have interior materials that may not

meet specified performance criteria for

flammability and smoke emission

characteristics, the safety of passengers in

those cars could be at risk.

20. The federal guidelines on the

flammability and smoke emission

characteristics and the testing of interior

materials do not provide for the integrated

use of passenger car interior materials and, as

a result, are not useful in predicting the

safety of the interior environment of a

passenger car in a fire.

FRA believes that existing fire safety

guidelines have continuing value for

their specific purpose. Those guidelines

are proposed for codification in

§ 238.115 as the best currently available

criteria for analysis of individual

materials, and NTSB representatives on

the working group have not suggested

alternative proposals. However, as

explained in the preamble, FRA is

conducting research through the

National Institute of Standards and

Technology to address the interaction of

materials and other aspects of fire safety

from a broader, systems approach. This

philosophy is embodied in proposed

§ 238.105(a)–(c) with respect to new

equipment. Based on this ongoing

research, FRA may propose new fire

safety performance criteria in the

second phase of this rulemaking.

FRA agrees with the Board that steps

must be taken to minimize fire safety

vulnerabilities in the existing rail

passenger equipment fleet. Present fire

safety guidelines are advisory and were

not introduced by FRA until 1984. Even

in recent years, passenger railroads have

been free to utilize non-compliant

materials (particularly during interior

refurbishment funded locally without

FTA support). It is appropriate for each

commuter authority and Amtrak to

evaluate the mix of materials, possible

sources of ignition, and potential fire

environments—including tunnels, cuts

and elevated structures where

evacuation to the outside of the vehicle

may be difficult or ineffectual in

reducing the risk of injury—relevant to

the risk of injury due to fire or smoke

exposure.

FRA is concerned in particular with

the risk arising from the operation of cab

cars forward and MU locomotives. Due

to their position in the lead of a

passenger train, these vehicles are more

greatly exposed to the risk of fire from

collisions with other rail vehicles as

well as highway vehicles at grade

crossings. In a collision, fire may erupt

from the fuel tanks of both the rail and

highway vehicles, and also from tanks

used by highway vehicles that transport

loads of flammable material. The level

of risk on each railroad corresponds to

the number of highway-rail grade

crossings, density of rail traffic, and

opportunities for collisions.

FRA requests comments on the costs

and benefits associated with the

approach contained in paragraph (d)

should railroads be successful in

establishing the categorical framework

assumed for the analysis. Is the period

of time allowed adequate to complete a

review of the existing fleet and differing

operating environments? To what extent

does available fire safety literature

adequately support this undertaking?

What difficulties will be faced in

identifying the source and current

characteristics of interior materials,

particularly in older cars and cars that

have been transferred from the initial

purchaser? In cars that have been

refurbished by the railroad’s own shop

or a contract shop?

§ 238.107 Software safety program.

This section provides requirements for

the software portion of the system safety

program and ties the system safety

program to § 238.121, which describes

the requirements for software that

controls safety features of Tier I or Tier

II equipment.

§ 238.109 Inspection, testing, and

maintenance program. This section

contains the general requirements for

the railroad’s program for inspecting,

testing, and maintaining Tier I

equipment. (The inspection, testing, and

maintenance program for Tier II

equipment is covered under § 238.503.)

FRA’s goal is a set of standards to

ensure that the equipment remains safe

as it wears and ages, to protect the

workers who perform the inspection,

testing, and maintenance tasks, and to

provide flexibility enough to allow

individual railroads to adapt the

maintenance standards to their own

unique operating environment. FRA

based the proposed requirements on the

extensive discussions and information

presented in the Working Group

meetings.

Paragraph (a) requires a railroad that

operates Tier I passenger equipment

subject to this part to provide to FRA,

if requested, particulars about its

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program for that equipment, including

the following:

• Safety inspection procedures,

intervals and criteria;Washington, DC

• Testing procedures and intervals;

• Scheduled preventive maintenance

intervals;

• Maintenance procedures; and

• Training of workers who perform

the tasks.
49762 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

Since FRA does not dictate the

contents of the program, individual

railroads retain much flexibility to tailor

the program to their individual needs

and experience. At the same time, FRA

believes this requirement is an

important component of the overall

system safety program and the approach

will cause railroads to re-examine their

inspection, testing, and maintenance

procedures to determine that they are

adequate to ensure that the safetyrelated components of their equipment

are not deteriorating over time. This

approach represents good business

practice and in most cases merely

formalizes what passenger railroads are

already doing. However, FRA believes

this section will provide valuable

guidance to regional governments or

coalitions attempting to establish new

commuter rail service.

Paragraph (b) defines broadly the

types of conditions that can endanger

the safety of the crew, passengers, or

equipment that the inspection, testing,

and maintenance program should be

designed to prevent or to detect and

correct. Beyond promulgating and

enforcing an extensive set of Federal

safety regulations on this subject, FRA

is not proposing to specify how a

railroad should prevent or detect these

conditions. Instead, the proposed

standards leave these details to be

developed by each individual railroad.

Paragraph (c) establishes a link

between scheduled maintenance

intervals and the system safety program.

Scheduled maintenance intervals

should be set so that worn parts are

replaced before they fail. Initial

intervals should be based on

manufacturer’s recommendations. As

operating experience is gained, FRA

believes that accumulated reliability

data should be used as the basis for

changing preventive maintenance

intervals on safety-critical components.

This standard will encourage railroads

to keep reliability records on safetycritical components that will provide

confidence that any safety or economic

trade-offs have a firm basis.

Paragraph (d) requires operating

railroads to adopt standard operating

procedures, in writing, on how to safely

perform all safety-critical inspection,

testing, and maintenance tasks. This

provision is intended to provide

protection to the workers who perform

these tasks. Inspecting, testing and

maintaining rail passenger equipment

involves many inherently dangerous

tasks. FRA does not intend to prescribe

to how to perform these tasks. The

proposed standard requires each

individual railroad to think through

how to safely perform these tasks and to

develop procedures that are safe under

its individual set of working conditions.

Standard operating procedures can be a

key component of a training program to

ensure new employees know how to do

their jobs safely.

§ 238.111 Training, qualification,

and designation program. This section

contains the proposed training,

qualification, and designation

requirements for workers (that is, both

railroad employees and contractors as

defined in the section) who perform

inspection, testing, and maintenance

tasks. FRA believes that worker training,

qualification, and designation are

central to a safe operation.

Labor organizations representing

mechanical employees believe that only

employees who receive a long-term

apprenticeship and on-the-job

training—typical of their membership—

are qualified to perform inspection,

testing, and maintenance tasks. Labor

organizations representing operating

employees (train crews) believe the

work of inspecting and testing is largely

outside the scope of work that should be

performed by their members, and that

railroads do not provide adequate

training to their members for them to

effectively inspect and test equipment.

Operating railroads believe a different

level of skills is needed for simple

inspections and tests (‘‘checkers’’) than

is required for trouble-shooting and

correction of problems (‘‘maintainers’’).

As a practical reality, operating

railroads make the point that they

cannot afford to train their entire

inspection, testing, and maintenance

work force to be highly-skilled

maintainers. Operating railroads claim

that operating employees can be easily

trained to perform the less complex

inspection and testing tasks and in fact

have been performing these tasks

effectively for years.

Mechanical employee labor

organizations counter this point with a

strong belief that operating employees—

lacking the experience and trained eye

of a mechanical employee—perform a

cursory inspection that misses defects or

problems that would be caught by a

mechanical employee.

As a result of these widely different

points of view, the Working Group

failed to reach overall consensus on the

requirements contained in this section.

FRA based the proposed requirements

on the extensive discussions and

information presented in the Working

Group meetings as the merits and

drawbacks of various approaches to

setting the safety standards covered in

this section were debated.

Paragraph (a) requires railroads to

establish and comply with a training,

qualification, and designation program

for employees and contractors who

perform safety-related inspection,

testing, or maintenance tasks under this

part. ‘‘Contractor,’’ in this context,

means ‘‘a person under contract with

the railroad or an employee of a person

under contract with the railroad.’’

Paragraph (b) lists the steps that must be

followed in developing a training,

qualification, and designation program.

FRA believes that the list of general

requirements enumerated in this section

informs railroads what their training,

qualification, and designation program

must do reasonably to ensure that

employees know how to keep the

equipment running safely. Most

passenger railroads have training

programs in place that meet or come

close to meeting these proposed

requirements. The list of actions that

FRA proposes would compel railroads

to evaluate their operation and focus

their training resources where the need

is greatest.

FRA recognizes that some passenger

railroads will be forced to place a

greater emphasis on training and

qualifications than they have in the

past, and this requirement will result in

additional costs for those railroads.

However, the proposed rule allows the

railroads the flexibility that they need to

provide only that training which an

employee needs for a specific job. The

proposed rule does not require the

‘‘checkers’’ to receive the intensive

training needed for the ‘‘maintainers.’’

The training can be tailored to the need.

Across the industry as a whole, this

proposal will not require extensive

changes in the way passenger railroads

currently operate. But it will prevent

railroads from using minimally trained

and unqualified people to perform

crucial safety tasks.

Benefits can be gained from this

increased investment in training. Better

inspections will be performed, resulting

in the running of less defective

equipment, which translates to a better

safety record. Equipment conditions

requiring maintenance attention are

more likely to be found while the

equipment is at a maintenance or yard

site where repairs can be more easily

done. Trouble-shooting will take less

time. More maintenance will be done

right the first time, resulting in cost

savings due to less rework.

APTA, in commenting on a draft of

the NPRM, believes that this section’s

requirements are overly detailed in

scope, content, and record keeping.

APTA maintains that broad

interpretation of the regulation could

lead to arbitrary enforcement resulting

in misdirection of training resources. In
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49763

addition, APTA contends that the

proposal adds costs without a

corresponding safety benefit—the cost

to develop and implement the training

programs and the cost to hire additional

work force to perform the duties of

those employees attending the required

training classes. Commenters are invited

to address APTA’s concerns.

§ 238.113 Pre-revenue service

acceptance testing plan. This section

provides requirements for pre-revenue

service testing of passenger equipment

and ties the system safety program to

subpart G, which describes the

requirements for the introduction of

new technology that could affect safety

systems of Tier II passenger equipment.

These tests are extremely important in

that they are the culmination of all the

safety analysis and component tests of

the system safety program. The prerevenue service tests are intended to

demonstrate the effectiveness of the

system safety program and prove that

the equipment can be operated safely in

its intended environment.

For equipment that has not previously

been used in revenue service in the

United States, paragraph (a) requires the

operating railroad to develop a prerevenue service acceptance testing plan

and obtain FRA approval of the plan

under the procedures stated in § 238.21

before beginning testing. Previous

testing of the equipment at the

Transportation Test Center, on another

railroad, or elsewhere will be

considered by FRA in approving the test

plan. Paragraph (b) requires the railroad

to fully execute the tests required by the

plan, to correct any safety deficiencies

identified by FRA, and to obtain FRA’s

approval to place the equipment in

revenue service prior to introducing the

equipment in revenue service.

Paragraph (c) requires the railroad to

comply with any operational limitations

imposed by FRA. Paragraph (d) requires

the railroad to make the plan available

to FRA for inspection and copying.

Paragraph (e) enumerates the elements

that must be included in the plan. FRA

believes this set of steps and the

documentation required by this section

are necessary to ensure that all safety

risks have been reduced to a level that

permits the equipment to be used in

revenue service.

In lieu of the requirements of

paragraphs (a) through (e), paragraph (f)

provides for an abbreviated testing

procedure for equipment that has

previously been used in revenue service

in the United States. The railroad need

not submit a test plan to FRA; however,

a description of the testing shall be kept

by the railroad and made available to

FRA for inspection and copying.

General Requirements

§ 238.115 Fire Safety

Paragraph (a) contains the fire safety

requirements for materials used in

constructing the interiors of passenger

cars and cabs of locomotive ordered on

or after January 1, 1999, or placed in

service for the first time on or after

January 1, 2001. Further, as of the

effective date of the final rule, fire safety

requirements also apply to materials

used in refurbishing the interiors of

passenger cars and locomotive cabs.

Currently, the rail industry follows

FRA’s fire safety guidelines as revised

on January 17, 1989. See 54 FR 1837.

Several Working Group members

believe that current fire safety practice

has worked well in addressing the

flammability of passenger car and

locomotive cab interiors. However,

since FRA’s guidelines were first

established, considerable fire safety and

fire resistance testing technology has

developed and some Working Group

members believe that new information

is available to improve fire safety.

As discussed earlier in the preamble,

FRA is proposing that the existing fire

safety guidelines be made mandatory for

the construction of new equipment as

well as the refurbishing of existing

equipment, and they are contained in

Appendix B. However, railroads can

request, under § 238.21, FRA approval

to utilize alternative standards issued or

recognized by an expert consensus

organization. As part of the second

phase of the rulemaking, the Working

Group will consider how to apply new

fire safety information to improve the

fire safety standards, including

information being gathered by the NIST

and the NFPA.

Paragraph (b) requires railroads to

obtain certification that combustible

materials to be used in constructing and

refurbishing passenger car and

locomotive cab interiors have been

tested and comply with the fire safety

standards as specified in paragraph (a)

and Appendix B to this part.

Paragraphs (c) through (e) contain

requirements for installing various

detection and suppression equipment

when shown to be necessary by analyses

conducted as part of the fire protection

program in § 238.105.

Paragraph (f) requires the railroad to

comply with those elements of its

written procedures, under § 238.105(12),

for the inspection, testing, and

maintenance of all fire safety systems

and equipment that is has designated as

mandatory as part of its fire protection

program.

Paragraph (g) requires the railroad,

after completing each fire safety analysis

required by § 238.105(d), to take action

to reduce the risk of personal injuries

due to fire and smoke exposure as

provided in § 238.105(d).

§ 238.117 Protection Against Personal

Injury

As recommended by the Working

Group, this section contains a general

requirement to protect passengers and

crewmembers from moving parts,

electrical shock and hot pipes. This

section extends to passenger equipment

not classified as locomotives the

protection against personal injury which

applies to locomotives under 49 CFR

229.41. The proposed requirements

represent common-sense safety practice;

reflect current industry practice; and

should result in no additional cost

burden to the industry. These

requirements apply to all passenger

equipment on or after January 1, 1998.

§ 238.119 Rim-Stamped Straight-Plate

Wheels

This section addresses the NTSB’s

safety recommendation concerning the

use of rim-stamped straight-plate wheels

on tread-braked rail passenger

equipment, as discussed earlier in the

preamble. Because a wheel having a

rim-stamped straight-plate character is a

sufficient safety concern in itself, FRA

is extending the NTSB’s safety

recommendation to apply to all such

wheels used on passenger equipment

regardless whether the equipment is

tread-braked or not.

§ 238.121 Train System Software and

Hardware

This section contains the proposed

requirements for the hardware and

software that controls train safety

functions that is ordered on or after

January 1, 1999, and such systems

implemented or materially modified for

new or existing equipment on or after

January 1, 2001. This section reflects the

growing role of automated systems to

control passenger train safety functions.

FRA had presented for consideration a

rather complex set of software safety

requirements in the ANPRM, but the

Working Group recommended

simplifying these requirements and

combining them with the requirements

for the hardware components of control

systems.

Paragraph (a) proposes a requirement

for a formal safety methodology that

includes a Failure Modes, Effects,

Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and full

verification tests for all components of

safety system controls. A formal safety

analysis that includes full verification is

now standard practice for safety systems

that contain software components.
49764 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

In paragraph (b), FRA proposes to

require a comprehensive hardware and

software integration testing program to

ensure that the hardware and the

software installed in the hardware

function together as intended. Again,

this is a practice that has become

common for critical control systems that

include both software and hardware.

Paragraph (c) contains a provision for

safety-related control systems driven by

computer software to have design

features that result in a safe condition in

the event of a computer hardware or

software failure. This is a design feature

that is used in aircraft and in weapon

control systems.

These requirements are not complex

and will not limit the flexibility of

equipment designers. Yet, they reflect

good design practices that have led to

reliable, safe computer hardware and

software control systems in other

industries. Computer hardware and

software systems designed to these

requirements may require a larger initial

investment to develop, but experience

in other industries has shown that this

investment is quickly recovered by

significantly reducing hardware and

software integration problems and

minimizing trouble-shooting and

debugging of equipment.

§ 238.123 Emergency Lighting

Experience gained during rescues

conducted after recent passenger train

accidents indicates that emergency

lighting systems either did not work or

failed after a short time, greatly

hindering rescue operations. This

section requires that passengers cars and

locomotives ordered or rebuilt on or

after January 1, 1999, or placed in

service for the first time on or after

January 1, 2001, be equipped with

emergency lighting providing a

minimum average illumination level of

5 foot-candles at floor level for all

potential evacuation routes and a backup power feature capable of operation

for a minimum of two hours after loss

of normal power. Although members of

the Working Group advised that the

lighting intensity requirement be 0.05

foot-candle, FRA does not believe that

0.05 foot-candle provides enough

illumination for passengers to locate

emergency exits, read instructions for

their operation, and operate the exits, as

demonstrated by Volpe Center staff at a

Working Group meeting in December,

1996. FRA requests comments whether

the lighting intensity requirement need

be 5 foot-candles at floor level for all

potential evacuation routes if the rail

vehicle has a combination of lower

intensity floor proximity lighting,

similar to that used on aircraft to mark

the exit path, and higher intensity

lighting at the vehicle’s exits.

FRA is considering requiring that

emergency lighting meeting the

requirements of this section be

implemented in existing passenger

equipment sooner than when the

equipment is rebuilt. Existing passenger

equipment may not be rebuilt for 20

years or more. FRA therefore invites

comments whether the proposed

requirements should be implemented in

existing passenger equipment within a

specified time such as 5 years.

The two-hour time duration for

availability of back-up power is based

on experience gained during rescue

operations for passenger train accidents

in remote locations. In such accidents,

fully-equipped emergency response

forces can take an hour or more to arrive

at the site, and additional time is

required to deploy and reach people

trapped or injured in the train. In

addition, the back-up power system

must be able to operate in all

orientations within 45 degrees of

vertical and after experiencing a shock

due to a longitudinal acceleration of 8g

and vertical and lateral accelerations of

4g. The shock requirement will ensure

that the back-up power system has a

reasonable chance of operating after the

initial shock caused by a collision or

derailment. FRA originally considered

that the back-up power system be

capable of operation within a vehicle in

any orientation. However, members of

the Working Group advised that some

battery technologies utilize a liquid

electrolyte which can leak when the

battery is tilted. FRA is further

considering whether the back-up power

system should be made capable of

operation within a vehicle in any

orientation, including allowing railroads

to continue using any existing batteries

through their permanent life before

implementing such a requirement on

replacement batteries. Commenters are

requested to address this issue.

FRA is further investigating

emergency lighting requirements as part

of a systems approach to effective

passenger train evacuation through a

research study to be performed by the

Volpe Center. FRA welcomes input from

knowledgeable persons as to what

emergency lighting requirements would

be appropriate for passenger trains to

assist in passenger evacuation.

Subpart C—Specific Requirements for

Tier I Passenger Equipment

§ 238.201 Scope

This subpart contains specific

requirements for railroad passenger

equipment operating at speeds not

exceeding 125 mph. Unless otherwise

specified in the discussion of this

subpart and with the following

qualifications, the proposed

requirements represent the consensus

recommendations of the Working

Group. FRA has proposed the specific

implementation dates for these

requirements. Additionally, in

structuring the rule FRA has specified

the type of equipment subject to each

requirement more finely than in the

Working Group’s recommendations,

while at the same time reflecting those

recommendations as closely as possible.

Further, FRA has made other changes to

the recommendations to make the

proposed requirements more clear,

enforceable, and compatible with other

rail safety laws.

Structural standards for new

equipment. Unless otherwise specified,

the requirements of this subpart apply

only to passenger equipment ordered on

or after January 1, 1999, or placed in

service for the first time on or after

January 1, 2001.

The proposed rule also provides that

passenger equipment placed in service

for the first time on or after January 1,

1998, unless otherwise provided in the

cited sections, must meet the minimum

structural requirements specified in:

§§ 238.203 (static end strength);

238.205(a) (anti-climbing mechanism);

238.207 (link between coupling

mechanism and car body); and

238.211(a) (collision posts). Together,

these four proposed requirements are

virtually identical to existing Federal

requirements, found in 49 CFR

229.141(a)(1)–(4), that apply to MU

locomotives built new after April 1,

1956, and operated in trains having a

total empty weight of 600,000 pounds or

more. These proposed requirements

reflect the current construction practice

for North American passenger

equipment, and FRA believes they are

minimum safety requirements for new

equipment.

In addition to the structural

requirements identified above, the

proposed rule also requires that

passenger equipment ordered on or after

January 1, 1999, or placed in service for

the first time on or after January 1, 2001,

unless otherwise provided in the cited

sections, comply with other structural

requirements specified in: §§ 238.205(b)

(anti-climbing mechanism for

locomotives); 238.209 (forward-facing

end structure of locomotives);

238.211(b) (collision posts for

locomotives); 238.213 (corner posts);

238.215 (rollover strength); 238.217

(side impact strength); 238.219 (truckto-car-body attachment); and 238.223

(fuel tanks).
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49765

Structural standards for existing

equipment. The proposed rule would

require that passenger equipment (other

than private cars, or vehicles of a special

design operating at the rear of a

passenger train and used solely to

transport freight) in use on or after

January 1, 1998, have a minimum static

end strength of 800,000 pounds

(§ 238.203). Static end strength is

critical in protecting passenger

equipment from crushing in a head-on

or rear-end collision, especially in the

North American railroad operating

environment that includes frequent

highway-rail grade crossings and the

mixed operation of freight and

passenger trains.

FRA is confident that existing North

American passenger cars have been

built to basic compressive strength

requirements. Beginning in 1939, the

AAR recommended that new passenger

cars operated in trains of over 600,000

pounds empty weight have a minimum

static end strength of 800,000 pounds,

and since 1956, Federal Regulations (49

CFR 229.141) require that new MU

locomotives operated in such trains

must meet this standard.

FRA is considering requiring that one

or more of the other structural

requirements for new passenger

equipment, discussed above, be made

applicable to existing equipment as

soon as one of the following events

occurs: the equipment is sold to another

railroad; the equipment is rebuilt; the

equipment reaches 40 years of age; or 10

years after the effective date of the rule.

FRA invites comments on: (1) what

equipment would be affected by each of

these structural requirements; (2) the

feasibility and costs of retrofitting such

equipment, with costs broken out for

each of the different structural

requirements, in the event such

triggering events were adopted in the

final rule; (3) whether these triggering

events are reasonable, or whether some

other fixed deadline should be

established for making one or more of

these structural requirements applicable

to existing passenger equipment; and (4)

the safety benefits that could accrue by

making these requirements applicable to

existing equipment.

FRA notes that older passenger

equipment may not meet the collision

post requirements in § 238.211(a)

because of a change in collision post

design following a collision between

two Illinois Central Gulf Railroad

commuter trains in Chicago, Illinois, on

October 30, 1972. Moreover, APTA is

opposed to making structural

requirements applicable to existing

equipment. In particular, APTA has

advised FRA that a significant number

of such equipment either may not meet

the structural requirements in

§§ 238.203, 238.205(a), 238.207, and

238.211(a), or the equipment must

undergo potentially costly testing to

determine whether the requirements are

met. FRA will discuss with the Working

Group alternatives that would avoid

unnecessary expense to document

design features of older equipment.

No new safety appliance

requirements. FRA is not proposing new

safety appliance requirements for

passenger equipment subject to this

subpart. The safety appliance

requirements referenced in § 238.229

continue to apply to such passenger

equipment and are noted in this rule for

clarity, on the advice of the Working

Group.

§ 238.203 Static End Strength

This section contains the

requirements for the overall

compressive strength of rail passenger

equipment. The proposed requirements

make mandatory the long-standing,

North American design practice of

specifying a minimum static end

strength of 800,000 pounds, and a

minimum static end strength of 800,000

pounds in the line of draft at the ends

of occupied volumes, without

permanent deformation of the car body

structure. This requirement has proven

effective in the North American railroad

operating environment that includes

frequent highway-rail grade crossings,

mixed operation of freight and

passenger trains, and less than fullycapable signal and train control systems.

The requirement is effective on or after

January 1, 1998. Although FRA would

prefer that every vehicle in a passenger

train have a minimum static end

strength as specified in this section,

FRA recognizes that imposing this

requirement universally may effectively

prohibit the use of some private cars

and all auto-carriers and RoadRailer

equipment.

To prevent sudden, brittle-type failure

of the main structure of passenger

equipment, the proposed rule requires

that the body structure be designed, to

the maximum extent possible, to fail by

buckling or crushing, or both, of

structural members rather than by

fracture of structural members or failure

of structural connections. To allow a

crash energy management design

approach to be employed, this

requirement applies only to the

occupied volume of the equipment.

Unoccupied volumes may have a lesser

static end yield strength.

§ 238.205 Anti-Climbing Mechanism

This section contains the vertical

strength requirements for anti-climbing

mechanisms on rail passenger

equipment. The purpose of the anticlimbing mechanism is to prevent

override or telescoping of one passenger

train unit into another in the event of

high compressive forces caused by a

derailment or collision.

FRA is proposing that all passenger

equipment placed in service for the first

time on or after January 1, 1998, shall

have an anti-climbing mechanism at

each end capable of resisting an upward

or downward vertical force of 100,000

pounds without permanent

deformation. When coupled together in

any combination to join two vehicles,

AAR Type H and Type F tight-lock

couplers satisfy this requirement. This

requirement incorporates a longstanding industry practice into the

proposed rule.

The proposed rule further requires

that the forward end of a locomotive

ordered on or after January 1, 1999, or

placed in service for the first time on or

after January 1, 2001, be equipped with

an anti-climbing mechanism capable of

resisting an upward or downward

vertical force of 200,000 pounds without

failure. This requirement applies to

locomotives or power cars of

permanently coupled trains. AAR

Standard S–580, which addresses the

crashworthiness of locomotives, has

included this requirement for all

locomotives built since August 1990.

FRA believes this industry practice

represents sound equipment design.

§ 238.207 Link Between Coupling

Mechanism and Car Body

This section contains the vertical

strength requirements for the structure

that links the coupling mechanism to

the car body on passenger equipment.

The purpose of this requirement is to

avoid a premature failure of the draft

system so that the anti-climbing

mechanism will have an opportunity to

engage.

FRA is proposing that all passenger

equipment placed in service for the first

time on or after January 1, 1998, be

provided with a coupler carrier or other

coupler-to-car-body linking structure

that is designed to resist a vertical

downward thrust from the coupler

shank of 100,000 pounds, without

permanent deformation for any normal

horizontal position of the coupler.

§ 238.209 Forward-Facing End

Structure of Locomotives

This section contains the requirement

for the covering or skin of the forward-
49766 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

facing end structure of each passenger

locomotive ordered on or after January

1, 1999, or placed in service for the first

time on or after January 1, 2001. The

purpose of this requirement is to protect

the occupied area of a locomotive cab,

which is especially vulnerable in a

highway-rail grade crossing collision if

a fuel tank that is part of or being

transported by a highway vehicle

ruptures.

FRA is proposing that the skin

covering the forward-facing end of each

passenger locomotive, e.g., a cab car and

an MU locomotive, be equivalent to a

1⁄2-inch steel plate with a 25,000

pounds-per-square-inch yield strength

and be designed to inhibit the entry of

fluids into the occupied area of the

equipment. Higher yield strength

material may be used to decrease the

required thickness of the material

provided an equivalent strength is

maintained. AAR Standard S–580 has

included this requirement for all

locomotives built since August 1990.

From observations of the improved

performance of locomotives during

collisions, FRA believes that this

industry standard should become part of

the proposed safety standards.

§ 238.211 Collision Posts

This section contains the structural

strength requirements for collision

posts. Collision posts provide protection

against the crushing of occupied areas of

passenger equipment in the event of a

collision or derailment. This section

does not apply to a vehicle of special

design that operates at the rear of a

passenger train and is used solely to

transport freight, such as an auto-carrier

or RoadRailer.

Paragraph (a) requires that all

passenger equipment placed in service

for the first time on or after January 1,

1998, shall have either two full-height

collision posts at each end where

coupling and uncoupling are expected,

each collision post having an ultimate

longitudinal strength of not less than

300,000 pounds; or an equivalent end

structure.

The proposed 300,000-pound strength

requirement makes mandatory the longstanding North American passenger

equipment design practice for collision

posts. This requirement has proven

effective in the North American railroad

operating environment. This

requirement is similar to that contained

in 49 CFR 229.141(a)(4), which applies

to MU locomotives operated in trains

having a total empty weight of 600,000

pounds or more, but also requires the

collision posts to be full-height. Fullheight collision posts provide additional

protection because they extend higher

than posts attached only at the

underframe. Little, if any, additional

cost is imposed on builders by requiring

full height posts. The spacing at

approximately the one-third points

laterally will allow both collision posts

to be engaged in many collision

scenarios. An equivalent single rear end

structure may be used in place of the

two collision posts provided it can

withstand the sum of the forces that

each collision post is required to

withstand.

Paragraph (b) requires that each

locomotive ordered on or after January

1, 1999, or placed in service for the first

time on or after January 1, 2001, have

two forward collision posts, located at

approximately the one-third points

laterally, each capable of withstanding a

500,000-pound longitudinal force

without exceeding the ultimate strength

of the joint. In addition, each post must

be capable of withstanding a 200,000-

pound longitudinal force exerted 30

inches above the joint of the post to the

underframe, without exceeding its

ultimate strength. AAR Standard S–580

has included this requirement for all

locomotives built since August 1990.

From observation of the improved

performance of these locomotives

during collisions, FRA believes this

industry practice should become part of

the proposed safety standards.

As an option, an equivalent end

structure may be used in place of the

two forward collision posts. The single

end structure shall withstand the sum of

the forces that each collision post is

required to withstand. This option is

proposed to allow for the design of

unitized or aircraft-type structures.

FRA is proposing that collision posts

be required at the ends of passenger

equipment where coupling and

uncoupling are expected or where

separation is likely in the event of a

violent derailment. Paragraph (c)

provides that if a train is made up of

vehicles with articulated units, collision

posts are required only at the ends of

the permanently joined assembly of

units, not at the ends of each unit of the

assembly. Articulated units are not

likely to experience impacts on other

than the outside ends of the assembly.

§ 238.213 Corner Posts

This section contains the

requirements for corner posts on

passenger cars, e.g., passenger coaches,

cab cars and MU locomotives.

A corner post is the vertical structural

member normally located at the

intersection of the end of a rail vehicle

with a side of that vehicle. However,

FRA intends for the proposed rule to

allow flexibility so that the corner post

may be located at positions other than

the extreme outside corner of a vehicle.

For example, on cars equipped with end

vestibules, the corner posts may be

located in the side structure inboard of

the side door opening.

The structural parameters proposed

for corner post strength represent the

current design practice for passenger

cars built for North American service.

They are being proposed as an interim

measure to prevent the introduction of

equipment not meeting such

requirements. FRA recognizes that

current design practice has proven

inadequate to protect the occupied

volume in several recent side-swipe

collisions involving passenger trains

with cab cars leading. Crash modeling

suggests that it is not feasible to protect

against collisions of the magnitude that

occurred at Secaucus, New Jersey, and

Silver Spring, Maryland, in February of

1996. Nevertheless, stronger corner

posts are necessary to address collisions

involving lower closing speeds, and

determining what may be feasible in

terms of cost and weight will be a

priority in the second phase of the

rulemaking.

§ 238.215 Rollover Strength

This section contains the structural

requirements intended to prevent

significant deformation of the normally

occupied spaces of a passenger car in

the event it rolls onto its side or roof.

The proposal essentially requires the

vehicle structure to be able to support

twice the dead weight of the vehicle

while the vehicle is resting on its side

or roof. Deformation of sheathing and

framing is allowed to the extent

necessary for the vehicle to be

supported directly by more substantial

structural members of the frame,

including the top chords and side

frames. Analysis has shown that current

passenger car design practice meets this

requirement. This requirement has

proven effective in preventing massive

structural deformation of cars that have

rolled during collisions or derailments.

For this reason, FRA believes this

requirement should be incorporated into

the proposed safety standards.

FRA invites comment on whether this

requirement should also apply to

locomotives. Representatives from RPI

advised that locomotives do not roll

over frequently enough to justify such

requirements for locomotives.

Nevertheless, even if a locomotive does

not roll over, this requirement should

help protect its roof from crushing if it

is forced to support the weight of

another vehicle thrown onto its roof in

an accident.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49767

§ 238.217 Side Impact Strength

This section contains the car body

strength requirements intended to resist

penetration of the side structure of a

passenger car by a highway or rail

vehicle.

FRA believes that a side impact

strength requirement is necessary

because approximately 14% of the grade

crossing accidents involving a passenger

train result from a highway vehicle

striking the side of the passenger train.

In addition, during a derailment or

train-to-train collision, trains frequently

buckle, exposing the sides of cars to

potential impacts during the collision.

The proposed requirement was an AAR

recommended design practice for

passenger cars, as last revised in 1984,

and represents current North American

design practice.

In designing a side impact strength

requirement for a passenger car, the

objective is to cause the side of the

passenger car to be strong enough so

that the car derails rather than collapses

when struck in the side by another rail

vehicle or a heavy highway vehicle.

FRA believes that current design

practice may not be adequate to meet

this goal. FRA also believes that cars

with low floors, such as bi-level

equipment, are particularly vulnerable

to penetration when struck in the side.

A more meaningful side impact strength

requirement is necessary and will be a

priority in the second phase of the

rulemaking, as research determines

what may be feasible in terms of cost

and weight. The proposed requirement

is therefore an interim measure to

prevent the introduction or use of

equipment not meeting this basic

strength requirement.

§ 238.219 Truck-to-Car-Body

Attachment

This section contains the truck-to-carbody attachment strength requirement

for passenger equipment. The

attachment is required to resist without

failure a 2g vertical force on the mass of

the truck and a force of 250,000 pounds

in any horizontal direction. The

requirement for the attachment to resist

a horizontal force is intended to allow

the truck to act as an anti-climbing

device during a collision. With the truck

attached to the car body, the truck of an

overriding rail vehicle is likely to be

caught by the underframe of the

overridden rail vehicle, thus arresting

the override. The parameter selected

represents the current design practice

that has proven effective in preventing

horizontal shear of trucks from car

bodies.

The requirement for the attachment to

resist a vertical force is intended to keep

the truck attached if the car body is

raised or rolls over. If the truck remains

attached to the car body, the truck is

less likely to be struck by other units of

the train. The attachment must resist,

without failure, a force equal to twice

the weight of the truck and all the

components attached to the truck. Many

types of keepers are used to keep trucks

attached to car bodies. FRA believes that

the majority of them are capable of

meeting this requirement.

§ 238.221 Glazing

FRA is proposing additional

requirements concerning the safety

glazing of passenger equipment subject

to the requirements of 49 CFR part 223.

Existing safety glazing requirements for

windows have largely proven effective

in passenger service at speeds up to 125

mph. However, part 223 does not

address the performance of the frame

which attaches the glazing to the car

body. This section requires the glazing

frame to be capable of holding the

glazing in place against all forces which

the glazing is required to resist under

part 223. In addition, the glazing frame

must hold the glazing in place against

the forces created by air pressure

differences caused when two trains pass

at their maximum authorized speeds in

opposite directions at the minimum

track separation for two adjacent tracks.

This requirement is intended to prevent

the glazing from being forced from the

window opening and potentially

injuring passengers and crewmembers.

FRA that believes most existing

passenger equipment subject to part 223

meets these requirements. However,

they should not be left to chance and

need to be required in the equipment

design.

§ 238.223 Fuel Tanks

This section contains the structural

requirements for external and integral

fuel tanks on locomotives ordered on or

after January 1, 1999, or placed in

service for the first time after January 1,

2001. A discussion of fuel tank safety

issues is provided above.

External fuel tanks must comply with

AAR Recommended Practice-506,

Performance Requirements for Diesel

Electric Locomotive Fuel tanks. FRA

believes that RP–506 represents an

improvement in fuel tank

crashworthiness and should be

incorporated into the proposed

standards. Labor representatives on the

Working Group object to a direct

incorporation of industry standards that

effectively allow an industry

organization to change a Federal safety

standard by changing the industry

standard. FRA agrees and is proposing

that the rule incorporate the industry

standard as adopted on July 1, 1995.

§ 238.225 Electrical System

This section contains the proposed

requirements for the design of electrical

systems on passenger equipment. The

Working Group advised that no single,

well-recognized electrical code or set of

standards applied directly to the design

of railroad passenger equipment. As a

result, the Working Group

recommended broad performance

requirements which reflect common

electrical safety practice and are widely

recognized as good electrical design

practice. FRA had offered for comment

more detailed electrical system design

requirements in the ANPRM, but as

advocated by the Working group the

proposed rule is more performanceoriented and provides wide latitude in

equipment design. FRA believes that

this approach helps to ensure good

electrical design practice without

imposing unnecessary costs on the

industry.

The electrical system requirements

include provisions for:

• Electrical conductor sizes and

properties to provide a margin of safety

for the intended application;

• Battery system design to prevent the

risk of overcharging or accumulation of

dangerous gases that can cause an

explosion;

• Design of resistor grids that

dissipate energy produced by dynamic

braking with sufficient electrical

isolation and ventilation to minimize

the risk of fires; and

• Electromagnetic compatibility

within the intended operating

environment to prevent electromagnetic

interference with safety-critical

equipment systems and to prevent

interference of the rolling stock with

other systems along the rail right-ofway.

§ 238.227 Suspension System

This section contains the proposed

requirements for suspension system

performance of all Tier I passenger

equipment on or after January 1, 1998,

and represents the minimum

requirements for a safe operation. In the

ANPRM, FRA presented for comment a

large set of fairly detailed suspension

system performance requirements very

similar to those now being proposed for

Tier II passenger equipment. The

Working Group advised that such an

extensive set of requirements was not

needed for Tier I passenger equipment.

Overall, FRA is proposing that all

passenger equipment shall exhibit
49768 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

freedom from hunting oscillations at all

speeds. Further, FRA is proposing

particular suspension system safety

requirements for passenger equipment

operating at speeds above 110 mph but

not exceeding 125 mph, near the

transition speed range from Tier I to

Tier II requirements. Although FRA

believes that for speeds not exceeding

110 mph existing equipment has not

demonstrated serious suspension

system stability problems, most of this

same equipment is only operated at

speeds that do not exceed 110 mph.

Accordingly, when new or existing

passenger equipment is intended for

operation above 110 mph, this

equipment must demonstrate stable

operation during pre-revenue service

qualification tests at all speeds up to 5

mph in excess of its maximum intended

operating speed under worst-case

conditions—including component

wear—as determined by the operating

railroad. The Working Group advised

FRA that a single definition of worstcase conditions could not be applied

generally to all railroads; and, as a

result, the definition of worst-case

conditions shall be determined by each

railroad based upon its particular

operating environment.

§ 239.229 Safety Appliances

This section references current safety

appliance requirements contained in 49

U.S.C. chapter 203 and 49 CFR part 231.

These existing requirements continue to

apply independently to all Tier I

passenger equipment, and FRA is

referencing them here for clarity on the

recommendation of the Working Group.

§ 238.231 Brake System

This section contains general brake

system performance requirements that

apply on or after January 1, 1998, to Tier

I passenger equipment except as

otherwise provided. Although the

Working Group did not reach consensus

on these proposed requirements due to

the inability of the group to resolve the

brake inspection, testing, and

maintenance issues, the proposed

provisions had widespread support

among many of the members of the

Working Group. Several of the proposed

requirements contained in this section

were included in written positions

provided by both rail labor and

management members of the Working

Group. Virtually all of the proposed

provisions were discussed in the 1994

NPRM on power brakes. See 59 FR

47676.

Paragraph (a) contains a requirement

that the primary braking system be

capable of stopping the train with a

service application of the brakes from its

maximum authorized operating speed

within the signal spacing existing on the

track. FRA believes that this proposed

requirement is the most fundamental

performance standard for any train

brake system. This section merely

codifies a requirement which is current

industry practice and is the basis for

safe train operation in the United States.

Paragraph (b) requires that passenger

equipment ordered on or after January 1,

1999, or placed in service for the first

time on or after January 1, 2001, be

designed not to require an inspector to

place himself or herself on, under, or

between components of the equipment

to observe brake actuation or release.

The proposal allows railroads the

flexibility of using a reliable indicator in

place of requiring direct observation of

the brake application or piston travel

because the current designs of many

passenger car brake systems make direct

observation extremely difficult without

the inspector placing himself or herself

underneath the equipment. Brake

system piston travel or piston cylinder

pressure indicators have been used with

satisfactory results for many years.

Although indicators do not provide 100

percent certainty that the brakes are

effective, FRA believes that they have

proven themselves effective enough to

be preferable to requiring an inspector

to assume a dangerous position.

Paragraph (c) proposes to require that

an emergency brake application feature

be available at any time and that it

produce an irretrievable stop. This

section merely codifies current industry

practice and ensures that passenger

equipment will continue to be designed

with an emergency brake application

feature. In the 1994 NPRM on power

brakes, FRA proposed a requirement

that all trains be equipped with an

emergency application feature capable

of increasing the train’s deceleration

rate a minimum of 15 percent. See 59

FR 47729. Comments received in

response to that proposal indicated that

passenger brake equipment should

provide a deceleration rate with a full

service application that is close to the

emergency brake rate and that the

proposed requirement would require the

lowering of full service brake rates,

thereby compromising safety and

lowering train speeds. Based on these

comments, FRA proposes the current

requirement which is in accordance

with suggestions made by several

passenger operations.

Paragraph (d) proposes to require that

the train brake system respond as

intended to brake control signals and

that the brake control system be

designed so that a loss of control signal

causes a redundant control to take over

or cause the brakes to apply. These

proposed provisions are fundamental

requirements necessary for effective

brake system performance, and a

codification of current industry practice.

FRA intends the requirement to apply to

all types of brake control signals,

including pneumatic, electric, and radio

signals.

Paragraph (e) proposes to prohibit the

introduction of alcohol or other

chemicals into the brake line. During

periods of extreme cold weather,

railroad employees at times resort to

adding alcohol or other freezing point

depressants to the brake line in an

attempt to prevent accumulated

moisture in the line from freezing.

Virtually every railroad has a policy

against this practice because alcohol

and other chemicals attack the o-rings

and gaskets that seal the brake system,

causing them to age or fail prematurely.

This practice can lead to dangerous air

leaks and it increases maintenance

costs. FRA proposed a similar

requirement in the 1994 NPRM on

power brakes and received numerous

comments supporting this provision.

See 59 FR 47728.

Paragraph (f) proposes to require that

the brake system be designed and

operated to prevent dangerous cracks in

wheels. Passenger equipment wheels are

normally heat treated so that the wheel

rim is in compression. This condition

forces small cracks that form in the rim

to be closed. Heavy tread braking can

heat wheels to the point that a stress

reversal occurs and the wheel rim is in

tension to a certain depth. Rim tension

is a dangerous condition because it

promotes surface crack growth. In the

1994 NPRM on power brakes, FRA

proposed a wheel surface temperature

limit to prevent this condition. See 59

FR 47729. Several brake manufacturers

and railroads objected to this approach,

claiming that the temperature limit was

too conservative and did not allow for

the development of new materials that

can withstand higher temperatures.

Based on these comments and concerns,

FRA is proposing a more flexible

performance requirement rather than a

wheel tread surface temperature limit.

This is an extremely important safety

requirement because a cracked wheel

that fails at high speed can have

catastrophic consequences. In addition,

the proposed requirement will lead to

longer wheel life, and thus should

provide maintenance savings to the

railroads.

Paragraph (g) proposes to require that

brake discs be designed and operated so

that the disc surface temperature does

not exceed manufacturer

recommendations. In the 1994 NPRM,
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49769

FRA proposed a disc surface

temperature limit. See 59 FR 47729. As

noted above, several brake

manufacturers and railroads objected to

this approach, claiming that the

temperature limit was too conservative

and did not allow for the development

of new materials that can withstand

higher temperatures. Based on these

comments and concerns, FRA proposes

a more flexible requirement rather than

a single disc surface temperature limit.

FRA believes this requirement will lead

to longer disc life, and thus will

produce maintenance savings to

railroads.

Paragraph (h) proposes to require that,

except for a locomotive that is ordered

before January 1, 1999, and placed in

service for the first time before January

1, 2001, and except for a private car, all

passenger equipment shall be equipped

with a hand or parking brake that can

be set and released manually and can

hold the equipment on the maximum

grade anticipated by the operating

railroad. A hand or parking brake is an

important safety feature that prevents

the rolling or runaway of parked

equipment. The proposed requirement

represents current industry practice. In

the 1994 NPRM on power brakes, FRA

proposed requiring that a hand brake be

equipped on cars and locomotives. See

59 FR 47729. FRA received several

comments to that proposal suggesting

that the term ‘‘parking brake’’ be added

to the requirement since that is what is

used in many passenger operations.

Based on those suggestions, FRA has

added the term in this proposal.

Paragraph (i) proposes to require that

passenger cars be equipped with a

means for the emergency brake to be

applied that is clearly identified and

accessible to passengers. This is a

longstanding industry practice and an

important safety feature because crucial

time may be lost requiring passengers

sensing danger to find a member of the

train crew to stop the train.

Paragraph (j) contains proposed

provisions to ensure that the dynamic

brake does not become a safety-critical

device. Railroads have consistently held

that dynamic brakes are not safety

devices because the friction brake alone

is capable of safely stopping a train if

the dynamic brake is not available. The

proposed provisions include requiring

that the blending of the friction and

dynamic brakes be automatic, that the

friction brakes alone be able to stop the

train in the allowable stopping distance,

and that a failure of the dynamic brake

does not cause thermal damage to

wheels or discs due to the greater

friction braking load. FRA believes that

without these requirements the dynamic

brake would most likely become a

safety-critical item and railroads would

not be permitted to dispatch trains

unless the dynamic brake were fully

operational.

Paragraph (k) proposes to require that

either computer modeling or

dynamometer tests be performed to

confirm that new brake designs not

result in thermal damage to wheels or

discs. Further, if the operating

parameters of the new braking system

change significantly, a new simulation

must be performed. This proposal

provides a means to ensure that the

requirements proposed in paragraphs (f)

and (g) are being complied with by new

brake designs.

Paragraph (l) proposes to require that

all locomotives ordered on or after

January 1, 1999, or placed in service for

the first time on or after January 1, 2001,

be equipped with effective air coolers or

air dryers on those locomotives that are

equipped with air compressors. The

coolers or dryers must be capable of

providing air to the main reservoir with

a dew point suppression at least 10

degrees F. below ambient temperature.

FRA and most members in the industry

agree that moisture is a major cause of

brake line contamination. Consequently,

reducing moisture leads to longer

component life and better brake system

performance. Currently, virtually all

passenger railroads purchase only

locomotives equipped with air dryers or

coolers. Therefore, FRA proposes to

require the continuation of what it

believes is good industry practice.

§ 238.233 Interior Fittings and

Surfaces

This section contains proposed

requirements concerning interior fittings

and surfaces that apply, as specified in

this section, to passenger cars and

locomotives ordered on or after January

1, 1999, or placed in service for the first

time on or after January 1, 2001. This

section should be read in connection

with an earlier discussion of train

interior safety features in the preamble.

FRA and NTSB investigations of

passenger train accidents have revealed

that luggage, seats, and other interior

objects breaking or coming loose is a

frequent cause of injury to passengers

and crewmembers. During a collision,

the greatest decelerations and thus the

greatest forces to cause potential failure

of interior fitting attachment points are

experienced in the longitudinal

direction, i.e., in the direction parallel to

the normal direction of train travel.

Current practice is to design seats and

other interior fittings to withstand the

forces due to accelerations of 6g in the

longitudinal direction, 3g in the vertical

direction, and 3g in the lateral direction.

Due to the injuries caused by broken

seats and other loose fixtures, FRA

believes that the current design practice

is inadequate.

Accordingly, paragraph (a) proposes

that each seat in a passenger car remain

firmly attached to the car body when

subjected to individually applied

accelerations of 4g in the vertical

direction and 4g in the lateral direction

acting on the deadweight of the seat or

seats, if a tandem unit. In addition, the

attachment must resist a longitudinal

inertial force of 8g acting on the mass

of the seat plus the impact force of the

mass of a 95th-percentile male

occupant(s) being decelerated from a

relative speed of 25 mph and striking

the seat from behind. By resisting the

force of an occupant striking the seat

from behind, a potential domino effect

of seats breaking away from their

attachments is avoided.

Paragraph (b) proposes that overhead

storage racks provide longitudinal and

lateral restraint for stowed articles to

minimize the potential for these objects

to come loose and injure train

occupants. Further, to prevent overhead

storage racks from breaking away from

their attachment points to the car body,

these racks shall have an ultimate

strength capable of resisting

individually applied accelerations of 8g

longitudinally, 4g vertically, and 4g

laterally acting on the mass of the

luggage stowed. This mass shall be

specified by each railroad. Paragraph (c)

requires that all other interior fittings in

a passenger car be attached to the car

body with sufficient strength to

withstand individually applied

accelerations of 8g longitudinally, 4g

vertically, and 4g laterally acting on the

mass of the fitting. FRA believes the

proposed attachment strength

requirements for seats, overhead storage

racks, and other interior fittings will

help reduce the number of injuries to

occupants in passenger cars.

Passenger car occupants may also be

injured by protruding objects, especially

if the occupants fall or are thrown

against such objects during a train

collision or derailment. As a result, FRA

is proposing in paragraph (d) that, to the

extent possible, all interior fittings in a

passenger car, except seats, shall be

recessed or flush-mounted. Such fittings

do not protrude above interior surfaces

and thereby help to minimize occupant

injuries.

Paragraph (e) is a general, common

sense prohibition against sharp edges

and corners in a locomotive cab and a

passenger car. Just as FRA is concerned

about protruding objects, these surfaces

could also injure passenger train
49770 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

occupants. If sharp edges and corners

cannot be avoided, they should be

padded to mitigate the consequences of

occupant impacts.

Paragraph (f) contains the

requirements for floor-mounted cab

seats provided solely for the

crewmembers in locomotive cabs. FRA

proposes to require the seat attachment

to have an ultimate strength capable of

resisting the loads due to individually

applied accelerations of 8g

longitudinally, 4g vertically, and 4g

laterally acting on the combined mass of

the seat and its occupant. This

requirement is more stringent than the

requirement for seats in passenger cars

in paragraph (a) because the mass of the

seat occupant is included in

determining the load that must be

resisted. Cab seats designed to this

requirement will allow the use of seat

belts and shoulder harnesses to restrain

crewmembers in a collision. Further,

when turned backwards during a

collision, seats designed to this

requirement can effectively restrain

crewmembers.

§ 238.235 Emergency Window Exits

This section should be read with the

earlier discussion of emergency window

exits in the preamble. With the

exception of paragraph (b), the

requirements in this section are

applicable to passenger cars on or after

January 1, 1998, thereby including

existing passenger cars. However, the

emergency window exit size

requirements in paragraph (b) are only

applicable to passenger cars placed in

service for the first time on or after

January 1, 1998. APTA has advised FRA

that not all emergency window exits on

existing passenger cars meet the size

requirements of paragraph (b), and FRA

invites comment on this point.

This section requires that a singlelevel passenger car, other than a

passenger car of special design, have a

minimum of four emergency window

exits, either in a staggered configuration

or with one located at each end of each

side of the car. A bi-level car shall have

a minimum of four emergency window

exits on each main level, configured as

above, so that the car has a minimum

total of eight emergency window exits.

Safety may be advanced by staggering

the configuration of emergency window

exits so that the window exits are

located diagonally across from each

other on opposite sides of a car, instead

of placing them directly across from

each other. Commenters are invited to

address this issue. In addition, concern

has been raised that the seat

arrangement of passenger cars may

block access to and the removal of

emergency window exits. Commenters

are also requested to address this issue.

FRA is proposing that each passenger

car of special design, such as a sleeper

car, have at least one emergency

window exit in each compartment.

Occupants of a sleeper car may have

difficulty reaching the car doors quickly

in an emergency from their

compartments, for example, if an

emergency window exit is not provided

in their individual sleeping

compartments. An emergency window

exit is necessary in each compartment to

enable occupants to quickly exit the car

when time is of the essence, especially

if the car is submerged.

Each emergency window exit must be

easily operable by a 5th-percentile

female without requiring the use of a

tool or other implement. FRA has added

to the Working Group’s

recommendation by specifying that a

5th-percentile female must be able to

easily operate the emergency exit,

thereby making clear the degree to

which the exit need be easily operable

by members of the general public. FRA

believes this is consistent with the

desire of the Working Group to promote

the safety of the travelling public.

Paragraph (f) is reserved for

emergency window exit marking and

operating instruction requirements.

These requirements are currently being

addressed in the proposed rule on

passenger train emergency

preparedness. See 62 FR 8330, Feb. 24,

1997.

§ 238.237 Doors

This section contains the

requirements for exterior side doors on

passenger cars. These doors are the

primary means of egress from a

passenger train. This section should be

read in connection with the preamble

discussion of NTSB safety

recommendation (R–96–7) arising from

the 1996 Silver Spring, Maryland

accident.

Paragraph (a) requires that within two

years of the effective date of the final

rule, each powered, exterior side door in

a vestibule that is partitioned from the

passenger compartment of a passenger

car shall be equipped with a manual

override that is: capable of opening the

door without power from inside the car;

located adjacent to the door which it

controls; and designed and maintained

so that a person may access the override

device from inside the car without

requiring the use of a tool or other

implement. Passenger cars subject to

this requirement that are not already

equipped with such manual override

devices must be retrofitted accordingly.

As noted above, FRA’s proposal is not

a consensus recommendation of the

Working Group.

FRA invites comment on whether the

location of the manual override device

should be specified in terms of distance

from the door it controls or some other

measure. FRA is proposing that the

manual override device be ‘‘adjacent’’ to

the door, as stated in the NTSB safety

recommendation. Railroad

representatives on the Working Group

have suggested a time performance

requirement that includes the time

necessary for locating and opening the

door.

Currently, there is no Federal

requirement that passenger cars be

equipped with side doors. Accordingly,

in paragraph (b) FRA is proposing that

passenger cars ordered on or after

January 1, 1999, or placed in service for

the first time on or after January 1, 2001,

shall have a minimum of four side

doors, or the functional equivalent, each

permitting at least one 95th-percentile

male to pass through at a single time.

Although the Working Group did not

discuss this proposal, FRA believes that

such a requirement is necessary, at least

as an interim measure, so that each

passenger car have sufficient doorway

openings to allow passengers to quickly

exit in a life-threatening situation.

Exiting a passenger car through a

window exit is slower.

FRA recognizes that existing designs

of passenger cars do not always provide

for four side doors, and the proposed

requirement does not specifically

require that passenger cars have four

side doors. For instance, the

requirement would be met if a passenger

car had two double-wide doors that

permit two 95th-percentile males to

pass through each door at the same

time—the functional equivalent of four

side doors having openings of the

specified size. FRA is interested in

comments concerning the extent to

which existing designs of passenger cars

cannot comply with the proposed

requirement, and FRA may modify the

proposal based on the information

supplied. As a longer term approach,

FRA is investigating an emergency

evacuation performance requirement

similar to that used in commercial

aviation where a sufficient number of

emergency exits must be provided to

evacuate the maximum passenger load

in a specified time for various types of

emergency situations.

Paragraph (b) also provides that each

powered, exterior side door be equipped

with a manual override feature the same

as that required in paragraph (a) for

existing equipment, except that the

manual override must also be capable of

opening the door from outside the car.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49771

This requirement is intended to provide

quick access to a passenger car by

emergency response personnel, and

represents the consensus

recommendation of the Working Group.

FRA is also considering, but has not

proposed in this rule, that for passenger

cars ordered on or after January 1, 1999,

or placed in service for the first time on

or after January 1, 2001, the status of

each powered, exterior side door shall

be displayed to the crew in the

operating cab of the train. Such a

proposal had support from Working

Group members and would enable a

crewmember in the operating cab to

determine whether train doors are

closed before departure, for example.

However, FRA is concerned that

railroads operating Tier I passenger

equipment would be unable to meet this

requirement. Because Tier I passenger

trains are not intended to operate as a

fixed unit and instead passenger cars are

freely switched into and out of such

trains, practical concerns exist about the

compatibility of door sensor equipment

in a Tier I passenger train. Commenters

are invited to address this issue.

To make sure that manual override

devices are easily accessible by

passengers, FRA is proposing

requirements in paragraph (c)

addressing covers and screens used to

protect such devices from casual or

inadvertent use. FRA desires to balance

the concern that passengers may

unnecessarily exit cars when no

emergency is present with the need for

passengers to easily access a doorrelease mechanism in an emergency.

Although this proposal reflects general

discussions within the Working Group,

it is not specifically a Working Group

recommendation.

Paragraph (d) is reserved for door

marking and operating instruction

requirements. These requirements are

currently being addressed in the

proposed rule on passenger train

emergency preparedness. See 62 FR

8330, Feb. 24, 1997.

§ 238.239 Automated Monitoring

This section requires on or after

January 1, 1998, an operational alerter

or a deadman control in the controlling

locomotive of each passenger train

operating in other than cab signal,

automatic train control, or automatic

train stop territory. This section further

requires that such locomotives ordered

on or after January 1, 1999, or placed in

service for the first time on or after

January 1, 2001, must be equipped with

a working alerter. As a result, the use of

a deadman control alone on these new

locomotives would be prohibited. The

Working Group recommended that new

locomotives be equipped with a

working alerter, and FRA is proposing

that existing locomotives also be

equipped with either a working alerter

or a deadman control as provided in

paragraph (a).

An alerter will initiate a penalty brake

application if it does not receive the

proper response from the engineer.

Likewise, a deadman control will

initiate a penalty brake application if

the engineer fails to maintain proper

contact with the device. The Working

Group discussed establishing specific

setting requirements for alerters or

deadman controls based on maximum

train speed and the capabilities of the

signal system. This discussion led to the

conclusion that settings should be left to

the discretion of individual railroads as

long as they document the basis for the

settings that they select. If the device

fails en route, the proposed rule requires

a second person qualified on the signal

system and brake application

procedures to be stationed in the cab or

the engineer must be in constant radio

communication with a second

crewmember until the train reaches the

next terminal. This is intended to allow

the train to complete its trip with the

device’s function of keeping the

operator alert taken over by another

member of the crew.

Alerters are safety devices intended to

verify that the engineer remains capable

and vigilant to accomplish the tasks that

he or she must perform. Equipping

passenger locomotives with an alerter is

current industry practice. These devices

have proven themselves in service, and

the requirement will not impose an

additional cost on the industry.

Subpart D—Inspection, Testing, and

Maintenance Requirements of Tier I

Passenger Equipment

§ 238.301 Scope

This subpart contains the proposed

requirements regarding the inspection,

testing, and maintenance of all types of

passenger equipment operating at

speeds of 125 mph or less. FRA

originally considered developing one set

of requirements for MU locomotives and

one set for push-pull equipment.

However, the Working Group

determined that this approach would be

redundant because nearly identical

requirements could be applied to both

types of equipment. Consequently, this

subpart includes the proposed

requirements for the inspection, testing,

and maintenance of Tier I passenger

equipment brake systems as well as the

other mechanical and electrical safety

components of Tier I passenger

equipment.

§ 238.303 Exterior Calendar Day

Mechanical Inspection of Passenger Cars

and Unpowered Vehicles Used in

Passenger Trains

This section contains the proposed

requirements for an exterior calendar

day mechanical inspection on passenger

cars and unpowered vehicles used in

passenger trains that is patterned after a

combination of the current calendar day

inspection required for locomotives

under the Railroad Locomotive Safety

Standards and the pre-departure

inspection for freight cars under the

Railroad Freight Car Safety Standards.

See 49 CFR 229.21 and 215.13,

respectively. FRA proposes that the

calendar day mechanical inspection

apply to all passenger cars and all

unpowered vehicles used in passenger

trains (which includes, e.g., not only

coaches, MU locomotives, and cab cars

but also any other unit of rail rolling

equipment used in a passenger train). A

mechanical safety inspection of freight

cars has been a longstanding Federal

safety requirement, and FRA believes

that the lack of a similar requirement for

passenger equipment creates a serious

void in the current Federal railroad

safety standards.

Paragraphs (a) and (b). Rail labor

representatives advocate a daily

inspection of all safety-related

mechanical components with pass/fail

criteria or limits written into the Federal

safety standards much like the

requirements contained in 49 CFR part

215, whereas, APTA and other

passenger railroad representatives

strongly maintain that specific

inspection criteria or limits are not

necessary. During the ongoing meeting

of the Working Group, FRA repeatedly

requested that railroad representatives

provide a recommended list of

mechanical components and criteria for

their inspection. These representatives

consistently responded with very broad

requirements basically limited to

inspections for obvious and visible

defects. Although passenger railroad

representatives do not object to the

safety principle of a mechanical

inspection, they do not want their

operations to be bound by a rigid list of

components and criteria for the

inspection.

FRA agrees with labor representatives

that a specific list of components to be

inspected with enforceable inspection

or pass/fail criteria needs to be included

as part of the proposed Passenger

Equipment Safety Standards. For several

years, Amtrak has been conducting

voluntary mechanical safety inspections

of passenger train components. Amtrak,

working in conjunction with FRA, has
49772 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

developed a list of components to be

inspected and ‘‘go’’ ‘‘no go’’ inspection

criteria for the various components.

Amtrak has trained mechanical

employees to conduct these inspections

and has issued pocket guides containing

the inspection criteria to all mechanical

employees. FRA commends Amtrak for

its progressive and voluntary efforts.

Furthermore, based upon investigations

conducted by FRA field inspectors, it

appears that virtually every passenger

railroad currently performs some type of

daily mechanical inspection on its

passenger equipment. Consequently,

FRA proposes to codify various

requirements and minimum standards

for conducting a calendar day

mechanical inspection.

Paragraph (a) requires that each

passenger car and each unpowered

vehicle used in a passenger train receive

an exterior mechanical safety inspection

at least once each calendar day that the

equipment is placed in service except

under the circumstances described in

paragraph (d). Paragraph (b) requires

that this inspection be performed by a

qualified mechanical inspector. FRA

believes the combination of a daily

Class I brake test and a mechanical

safety inspection performed by fully

qualified mechanical employees is a key

to safer passenger railroad operations.

Such a practice will most likely detect

and correct equipment problems before

they become the source of an accident

or incident resulting in personal injuries

or damage to property. FRA recognizes

that this requirement may create a

problem for some commuter railroads

that operate trains on weekends or other

days when qualified mechanical

inspectors are not scheduled to work.

Some railroads may be forced to

schedule qualified mechanical

inspectors to work on these days at

additional expense. However, based on

independent investigations performed

by FRA, it is believed that the impact of

this proposal will be much less than

several railroad representatives have

indicated. Nevertheless, FRA is willing

to consider whether to allow railroads

that have demonstrated an ability to

operate passenger trains safely over

weekends without a mechanical safety

inspection being performed by qualified

mechanical inspectors to continue that

practice. The problem, from FRA’s

position, is that it is difficult to allow

this flexibility without creating a

loophole that could be abused in certain

circumstances. Consequently, FRA

solicits detailed comments from

interested parties on whether the

granting of such flexibility is even

necessary and on possible methods for

providing such flexibility.

Paragraph (c) identifies the

components that FRA proposes to be

inspected as part of the exterior daily

mechanical safety inspection and

provides measurable inspection criteria

for the components. The railroad is

required to ascertain that each passenger

car, and each unpowered vehicle used

in a passenger train conforms with the

conditions enumerated in paragraph (c).

Deviation from any listed condition

makes the passenger car or unpowered

vehicle defective if it is in service. The

Working Group members generally

agreed that the components contained

in this section represent valid safetyrelated components that should be

frequently inspected by railroads.

However, members of the Working

Group had widely different opinions

regarding the criteria to be used to

inspect these components. Therefore, as

FRA was not provided any clear

guidance from the Working Group, FRA

selected inspection criteria based on the

locomotive calendar day inspection and

the freight car safety pre-departure

inspection required by 49 CFR parts 229

and 215, respectively. FRA believes

that, at a minimum, passenger cars

should receive an inspection which is at

least equivalent to that received by

locomotives and freight cars. FRA

solicits comments from interested

parties concerning other sets of

mechanical safety inspection criteria.

For example, a concern has been raised

by some parties regarding the

securement of doors on baggage cars.

Consequently, FRA seeks comments

from interested parties on the necessity

to inspect these doors as part of any

required daily mechanical inspection.

APTA believes that this section

contains exterior inspection

requirements that cannot be safely or

practically performed in the field. In

particular, APTA maintains that the

inspections concerning the draft gear,

truck attachment, suspension system,

and coupler knuckle can only be

properly performed by placing each car

individually over a repair pit.

FRA intends for the daily mechanical

inspection to serve as the time when the

railroad repairs defects that occurred en

route. Thus, this section proposes to

require that safety components not in

compliance with this part be repaired

before the equipment is permitted to

remain in or return to passenger service.

(See § 238.9 for a discussion of the

prohibitions against using passenger

equipment containing defects; and

§§ 238.15 and 238.17 for a discussion of

movement of defective equipment for

purposes of repair or sale). The purpose

of the defect reporting and tracking

system proposed in § 238.19 is to have

the mechanical forces make all

necessary safety repairs to the

equipment before it is cleared for

another day of operation. In other

words, FRA intends for the flexibility to

operate defective equipment in

passenger service to end at the calendar

day mechanical inspection.

The narrow exception in paragraph

(d) allows long-distance intercity

passenger trains that miss a scheduled

exterior calendar day mechanical

inspection due to a delay en route to

continue in passenger service to the

location where the inspection was

scheduled to be performed. At that

point, a calendar day mechanical

inspection must be performed prior to

returning the equipment to service of

any kind. This flexibility applies only to

the mechanical safety inspections of

coaches. FRA does not intend to relieve

the railroad of the responsibility to

perform a locomotive calendar day

inspection as required by 49 CFR part

229.

Paragraph (e) specifies an additional

contingent component of the calendar

day exterior mechanical inspection. If a

car requiring a single car test is moved

in a train carrying passengers or

available to carry such passengers to a

place where the test can be performed,

then the single car test must be

performed before or during the exterior

calendar day mechanical inspection.

§§ 238.305 and 238.307 Interior

Calendar Day Mechanical Inspection

and Periodic Mechanical Inspection of

Passenger Cars

Section 238.305 requires the

performance of an interior inspection of

passenger cars (which includes, e.g.,

passenger coaches, MU locomotives,

and cab cars) each calendar day that the

equipment is used in service except

under the circumstances described in

paragraph (d). Unlike the exterior

calendar day mechanical inspection,

FRA proposes in § 238.305(b) to permit

the interior inspections of passenger

cars to be performed by ‘‘qualified

persons,’’ individuals qualified by the

railroad to do so. Thus, these

individuals need not meet the definition

of a ‘‘qualified mechanical inspector.’’

FRA’s original position was to require

the interior inspections to be performed

by qualified mechanical inspectors.

However, after several discussions with

members of the Working Group and

several other representatives of

passenger railroads, FRA determined

that the training and experience typical

of qualified mechanical inspectors is not

necessary and often does not apply to
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49773

inspecting interior safety components of

passenger equipment. In addition, the

flexibility created by permitting

someone less qualified than a

mechanical inspector can reduce the

cost of performing the mechanical safety

inspection since the most economical

way to accomplish the mechanical

inspection is to combine the exterior

inspection with the Class I brake test

and then have a crewmember or train

coach cleaner combine the interior

coach inspection with coach cleaning.

Section 238.305(c) lists various

components that FRA proposes to be

inspected as part of the interior daily

mechanical safety inspection. As a

minimum, FRA proposes that the

following components be inspected:

trap doors; end and side doors; manual

door releases; safety covers, doors and

plates; vestibule step lighting; and

safety-related signs and instructions.

Consistent with the proposed exterior

inspection requirements, FRA proposes

that all en route defects and all

noncomplying conditions must be

repaired at the time of the daily interior

inspection in order for the equipment to

be placed or remain in passenger service

with the exception of a defect under

§ 238.305(c)(5). (See § 238.9 for a

discussion of the prohibitions against

using passenger equipment containing

defects, and § 238.17 for a discussion of

the movement of defective equipment

for purposes of repair.) Furthermore,

§ 238.305(d) allows long-distance

intercity passenger trains that miss a

scheduled calendar day mechanical

inspection due to a delay en route to

continue in passenger service to the

location where the inspection was

scheduled.

Initially, FRA considered requiring a

more extensive list of components to be

checked at each daily interior

inspection. However, based on

discussions conducted with the

Working Group, FRA determined that

the daily inspection and repair of some

interior items could be burdensome to

the railroads without producing an

offsetting safety benefit. As a result,

FRA in § 238.307 proposes a periodic

mechanical inspection for passenger

cars (which include, e.g., passenger

coaches, MU locomotives, and cab cars)

in order to reduce the frequency with

which certain components require

inspection and repair. FRA proposes to

require that the following components

be inspected for proper operation and

repaired, if necessary, as part of the

periodic maintenance of the equipment:

emergency lights; emergency exit

windows; seats and seat attachments;

overhead luggage racks and

attachments; floor and stair surfaces;

and hand-operated electrical switches.

Virtually all passenger railroads

currently have defined periodic

maintenance intervals for all of the

equipment they operate. These intervals

vary depending on the type of

equipment and the service in which it

is used, but typically range from 60 to

180 days. Although FRA does not

intend to limit the railroad’s flexibility

to set periodic maintenance intervals,

FRA believes that an outside limit must

be placed on the performance of the

periodic mechanical inspection. Thus,

FRA proposes that the periodic

mechanical inspection be performed at

least every 180 days, as that appears to

be the outside limit of currently

established maintenance cycles. As with

the daily inspection, any known defects

or conditions not in compliance with

this section which are uncovered by the

periodic inspection must be repaired in

order for the equipment to remain in or

return to passenger service.

APTA has advised FRA that most of

the daily interior inspection

requirements proposed in this section

are currently performed as part of a

railroad’s own periodic inspection.

Moreover, APTA maintains that the

daily interior inspection requirements

do not add to safety and will create

delays impacting on-time performance.

APTA believes that many cars with

defects found during both the daily

interior and exterior inspections can be

operated safely with appropriate

restrictions without first shopping the

cars. Commenters are asked to address

the various concerns raised by APTA.

§ 238.309 Periodic Brake Equipment

Maintenance

This section contains the proposed

requirements for the performance of

periodic brake maintenance for various

types of passenger equipment, referred

to in the industry as clean, oil, test, and

stencil (COT&S).

Paragraph (b) extends the periodic

maintenance interval for MU locomotive

fleets that are 100 percent equipped

with air dryers and modern brake

systems from 736 days to 1,104 days.

The requirement remains 736 days for

fleets that are not 100 percent equipped

with air dryers or that are equipped

with older brake systems. FRA bases

this proposed extension on tests

conducted by Metro-North and

monitored by FRA field inspectors.

These tests revealed that after three

years, brake valves on MU locomotives

equipped with air dryers were very

clean and showed little or no signs of

deterioration. Based on the results of

these tests, FRA is confident that these

valves can safely operate for three years

between periodic maintenance. FRA

believes this extension of the periodic

maintenance interval will result in a

cost savings to those railroads that

operate MU locomotives equipped with

air dryers.

Paragraph (c) extends the periodic

maintenance interval on conventional

locomotives equipped with 26–L or

equivalent types of brakes from the

current standard of 736 days to 1,104

days. The required periodic

maintenance interval remains at 736

days for locomotives equipped with

other types of brake systems. The

proposed requirement merely makes

universal a practice that has been

approved by waiver for several years.

See H–80–7. FRA believes that

locomotives equipped with 26–L brakes

have demonstrated an ability to operate

safely for three years between periodic

maintenance.

Paragraph (d) extends the periodic

maintenance interval on passenger

coaches and other unpowered vehicles

equipped with 26–C or equivalent brake

systems from 1,104 days to 1,476 days.

This extension is based on tests

performed by Amtrak. Based on these

tests, FRA granted Amtrak a waiver for

this extension on July 26, 1995. See FRA

Docket No. PB 94–3. Amtrak has

operated under the terms of this waiver

for several years with no problems.

Consequently, based on Amtrak’s

experience, FRA believes all passenger

cars with 26–C equipment can safely be

operated for four years between periodic

maintenance.

Paragraph (e) proposes that the same

extensions applicable to locomotives

and passenger coaches should be

applied to control cab cars that use

brake valves that are identical to the 26–

C valves used in passenger cars or the

26–L valves used on locomotives.

Consequently, based on the information

and tests conducted on those valves as

well as waivers currently existing, FRA

proposes to extend the periodic

maintenance interval for cab cars to

1,476 days or 1,104 days for those cab

cars that use brake systems identical to

the 26–C and 26–L, respectively. This

proposed extension is consistent with

recent requests for waivers received by

FRA.

A railroad may petition FRA, under

§ 238.21, to approve alternative

maintenance procedures providing

equivalent safety. Railroads could

propose using periodically scheduled

single car tests to extend the time

between required periodic maintenance

on passenger coaches. FRA believes that

the single car test provides a good

alternative to more frequent periodic
49774 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

maintenance. In fact, in the previous

NPRM on power brakes, FRA proposed

the elimination of time-based COT&S

and in its stead proposed time intervals

for conducting single car tests, ranging

from three to six months, depending on

the utilization rate of the passenger

equipment. See 59 FR 47690–47691,

47710–47711, and 47740–47741.

However, comments received and

discussions with members of the

Working Group revealed that many

passenger railroads would rather

perform periodic maintenance than

more frequent single car tests. One

reason for this is that some operators

would rather take equipment out of

service every few years and perform the

overhaul of the brake system rather than

having equipment out of service for

shorter periods every few months.

Therefore, FRA proposes to retain

periodic maintenance intervals but

provide the alternative to railroads to

propose single car testing intervals in

order to reduce the frequency with

which the periodic maintenance is

performed. Consequently, railroads are

afforded some flexibility to determine

the type of maintenance approach that

best suits their operations.

§ 238.311 Single Car Test

This section contains the proposed

requirements for single car tests of

passenger equipment. Although the

Working Group failed to reach

consensus on the requirements

contained in this section, the group did

agree that single car tests are a valuable

tool to demonstrate that a car’s brake

system performs correctly after repairs

have been made that could affect the

brakes. A major issue raised both in

comments to the previous NPRM on

power brakes and by various members

of the Working Group was the method

for specifying how the test is to be

performed. Labor representatives

objected to specifying the method of

testing by reference to an industry

standard that could be changed

unilaterally by the organization that

maintains the standard. These

representatives insisted that the

requirements specifying how to conduct

the test must be contained in the rule

text so that the only way that changes

can be made is through the

administrative procedures required by

the formal rulemaking process. FRA

agrees and proposes in paragraph (a) to

require that passenger railroads perform

the single car test of the brake system in

accordance with AAR Standard S–044

contained in AAR’s ‘‘Instruction

Pamphlet 5039–4, Supp. 3 (April

1991),’’ which is the most recent version

of the test description. FRA also

proposes that the special approval

process detailed in § 238.21 would be

employed to evaluate any proposed

changes in this highly technical

procedure.

The single car test proposed in this

section has proven effective in

uncovering brake system problems that

are the root cause of certain wheel

defects or that have been caused by

repairs made to the brake system. FRA

believes that this test has contributed to

the current trend of greater brake system

reliability and fewer brake-related

accidents/incidents of passenger

equipment. Currently, the regulations

require that a single car test be

performed on passenger cars whenever

they are on a shop or repair track. In the

previous NPRM on power brakes, FRA

discussed the potential loophole that

the current regulations permit. See 59

FR 47710. Basically, it has the potential

of allowing railroads to avoid the

performance of the tests by calling

repair tracks something other than a

repair track. Although this is an issue

that has arisen in the freight context, it

does appear prudent to base the

requirement to perform a single car test

on the type of defect involved rather

than the location where the defect is

repaired.

Paragraph (b) lists the wheel defects

that would trigger the requirement to

perform a single car test. FRA believes

that the proposed wheel defects indicate

some type of braking equipment

problem. FRA believes that merely

changing a wheel to correct a wheel

defect that is actually caused by a brake

system problem will only lead to a

continuation of the problem on the new

wheel and will increase repair costs to

the railroad. A test that checks for the

root cause of the defect is not only a

good safety practice, but is a good

business practice that will lead to

reduced operating costs.

Paragraph (c) requires a railroad to

conduct a single car test if one or more

of the identified brake system

components is removed, repaired, or

replaced. This paragraph also proposes

that a single car test be performed if a

passenger car or vehicle is placed in

service after having been out of service

for 30 or more days. FRA believes that

these requirements will ensure that

brake system repairs have been

performed correctly and that the car’s

brake system will operate as intended

after repairs are made or after the car

has been in storage for extended

periods. The proposed requirements are

consistent with the current practices of

most passenger railroads.

Paragraph (d) requires that all single

car tests be performed by qualified

mechanical inspectors. A single car test

is a comprehensive brake test that

requires the skills and knowledge of a

professional mechanical employee.

Railroads currently use the ‘‘qualified

mechanical inspector’’ as defined by

this part to perform single car tests, and

FRA believes that this practice should

continue.

Paragraph (e) provides that if a single

car test cannot be made at the point

where repairs are made, the car may be

moved in service to the next forward

location where the test can be made.

The single car test shall be completed

prior to, or as a part of, the car’s next

calendar day mechanical inspection.

APTA has advised FRA that the

proposed section on single car tests

contains an outdated standard and

requires a large number of tests which

do not serve to enhance safety. APTA

believes that actual operating

experience does not support a

requirement for this level of testing, and

the proposal will increase maintenance

costs and require additional spare

vehicles to maintain service.

Additionally, APTA maintains that the

proposed regulation provides a

disincentive to updating single car test

procedures as needed.

§ 238.313 Class I Brake Test

This section contains the proposed

requirements related to Class I brake

tests. FRA proposes that the

requirements in this section apply to all

passenger coaches, control cab cars, MU

locomotives, and all nonself-propelled

vehicles that are part of a passenger

train. The Working Group was unable to

reach consensus on the requirements

proposed in this section.

This section proposes to require that

a Class I brake test be performed at least

once each calendar day that a piece of

equipment is placed in service. As

discussed previously, the Working

Group discussed and debated when and

how a Class I brake test should be

performed. Labor representatives

stressed the need for a thorough brake

test performed by qualified mechanical

inspectors on every passenger train.

These representatives strongly

contended that this brake test must be

performed prior to the first daily

departure of each passenger train. On

the other hand, representatives of

passenger railroads expressed the desire

to have flexibility in conducting a

comprehensive brake inspection,

arguing that safety would be better

served if railroads were permitted to

conduct these inspections on a daily

basis.

Although FRA agrees with the

position advanced by many labor
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49775

representatives that some sort of car-tocar inspection must be made of the

brake equipment prior to the first run of

the day, FRA does not agree that it is

necessary to perform a full Class I brake

test in order to ensure the proper

functioning of the brake equipment. As

FRA proposes that a Class I brake test

consist of a comprehensive inspection

of the braking system, including the

proper operation of supplemental

braking systems, FRA believes that

commuter and short-distance intercity

passenger train operations must be

permitted some flexibility in conducting

these inspections. Consequently, FRA

proposes in paragraph (a) to require that

commuter and short-distance intercity

passenger train operations perform a

Class I brake test sometime during the

calendar day in which the equipment is

used.

However, FRA also recognizes the

differences between commuter or shortdistance intercity operations and longdistance intercity passenger train

operations. Long-distance intercity

passenger trains do not operate in

shorter turnaround service over the

same sections of track on a daily basis

for the purpose of transporting

passengers from major centers of

employment. Instead, these trains tend

to operate for extended periods of time,

over long distances with greater

distances between passenger stations

and terminals. Further, these trains may

operate well over 1,000 miles in any 24-

hour period, somewhat diminishing the

opportunity for conducting inspections

on these trains. Therefore, FRA believes

that a thorough inspection of the

braking system on these types of

operations must be conducted prior to

the trains’ departure from an initial

starting terminal. Consequently, FRA

proposes in paragraph (b) that a Class I

brake inspection be performed on longdistance intercity passenger trains prior

to departure from an initial terminal.

FRA does not believe there would be

any significant burden placed on these

operations as the current regulations

require that an initial terminal

inspection be performed at these

locations. Furthermore, virtually all of

the initial terminal inspections

currently conducted on these types of

trains are performed by individuals who

would be considered qualified

mechanical employees under this

proposal.

FRA also recognizes that these longdistance intercity passenger trains could

conceivably travel over 3,000 miles if

Class I inspections were required only

once every 24 hours that the equipment

is in service, as proposed for commuter

and short-distance intercity passenger

trains. Thus, FRA believes that some

outside mileage limit must be placed on

these trains between brake inspections.

Currently, a passenger train can lawfully

travel no further than 1,000 miles from

its initial terminal, at which point it

must receive an intermediate inspection

of brakes, which includes application of

the brakes to ensure brake pipe

continuity and the inspection of the

brake rigging to ensure it is properly

secured. See 49 CFR 232.12(b).

However, in recognition of the

improved technology used in passenger

train brake systems, combined with the

comprehensive nature of the proposed

Class I brake tests and mechanical safety

inspections both being performed by

qualified mechanical inspectors, FRA

proposes to require that the proposed

Class I brake test be performed once

every calendar day that the equipment

is used or every 1,500 miles, whichever

occurs first.

Paragraph (c) requires that the Class I

brake tests be performed by qualified

mechanical inspectors. As FRA intends

for these Class I brake inspections to be

in-depth inspections of the entire

braking system, which most likely will

be performed only one time in any given

day in which the equipment is used,

FRA believes that these inspections

must be performed by individuals

possessing the knowledge to not only

identify and detect a defective condition

in all of the brake equipment required

to be inspected but also the knowledge

to recognize the interrelational workings

of the equipment and the ability to

trouble-shoot and repair the equipment.

Furthermore, most passenger railroads

currently have a daily brake test

performed by mechanical employees so

this requirement is not really a

departure from current industry

practice.

FRA recognizes that these

requirements may create a problem for

some commuter railroads that operate

trains on weekends or other days when

qualified mechanical inspectors are not

scheduled to work. Some railroads may

be forced to schedule qualified

mechanical inspectors to work on these

days at additional expense. However,

based on independent investigations

performed by FRA, it is believed that

the impact of this proposal will be much

less than several railroad representatives

have indicated. However, FRA is willing

to consider whether to allow railroads

that have demonstrated an ability to

operate passenger trains safely over

weekends without a mechanical safety

inspection being performed by qualified

mechanical inspectors to continue that

practice. The problem, from FRA’s

position, is that it is difficult to allow

this flexibility without creating a

loophole that could be abused in certain

circumstances. Consequently, FRA

solicits detailed comments from

interested parties on whether the

granting of such flexibility is even

necessary and on possible methods of

providing such flexibility.

Paragraph (d) provides railroads with

the option to perform the Class I brake

test either separately or in conjunction

with the calendar day mechanical

inspections. FRA proposes this

provision simply to clarify that the two

inspections need not be done at the

same time or location as long as they are

both performed sometime during the

day.

Paragraph (e) prohibits a railroad from

using or hauling a passenger train in

passenger service from a location where

a Class I brake test has been performed,

or was required to have been performed,

with less than 100 percent operating

brakes. (See § 238.15 for a discussion of

movement of defective equipment for

purposes of repair or sale).

Paragraph (f) contains a proposed list

of the safety-related items that must be

inspected, tested, or demonstrated as

part of a Class I brake test. This list was

developed based on the experience and

knowledge of FRA’s motive power and

equipment field inspectors familiar with

the operations and inspection practices

of passenger operations. The Working

Group extensively discussed the items

contained in this proposal. Paragraph

(f)(1) requires that an inspection be

conducted on each side of each car to

verify the application and release of

each brake. This requirement is

consistent with FRA’s longstanding

interpretation of what the current

regulations require when conducting

initial terminal and 1,000 brake

inspections pursuant to § 232.12. For

clarity and consistency, FRA has

explicitly incorporated the requirement

into this proposal.

The requirements included in

paragraph (f) which FRA proposes to be

included in a Class I brake test contain

two items that would bar the use of a

train that current regulations allow to be

placed in service. These include the

requirement that the secondary brake

systems must be fully operational and

the requirement that brake indicators

must function as intended. These

requirements will require railroads to

make more frequent repairs than are

currently required. However, FRA

believes these added costs are

necessitated by and offset by the added

flexibility to move defective equipment

as well as the ability to use brake

indicators during the performance of
49776 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

certain brake tests in lieu of direct

observation of the brakes.

Paragraph (g) proposes to require the

qualified mechanical inspector that

performs a Class I brake test to record

the date, time and location of the test as

well as the number of the controlling

locomotive of the train. This minimal

information would be required to be

available in the cab of the controlling

locomotive to demonstrate to the train

crew and future inspectors that the train

is operating under a current Class I

brake test. Furthermore, the use of such

records or ‘‘brake slips’’ as they are

known in the industry is the current

practice of virtually all passenger

railroads. FRA believes that this

recordkeeping requirement adds

necessary reliability, accountability, and

enforceability to the inspection

requirements proposed in this section.

Paragraph (h) also proposes to allow

long distance, intercity passenger trains

that miss a scheduled Class I brake test

due to a delay en route to proceed to the

point where the scheduled brake test

was to be performed. This flexibility

prevents Amtrak or other operators of

long distance trains from having to

dispatch qualified mechanical

inspectors to the location of a delayed

train merely to meet the calendar day

Class I brake test requirement. This is a

common sense exception that will not

compromise safety.

§ 238.315 Class IA Brake Test

This section contains the proposed

requirements regarding Class IA brake

tests. As mentioned previously,

although FRA agrees with the position

advanced by many labor representatives

that some sort of car-to-car inspection

must be made of the brake equipment

prior to the first run of the day, FRA

does not agree that it is necessary to

perform a full Class I brake test in order

to ensure the proper functioning of the

brake equipment in all situations.

However, contrary to the position

espoused by several railroad

representatives, FRA believes that

something more than just a

determination that the brakes on the

rear car set and release is necessary.

Currently, the quality of initial

terminal tests performed by train crews

is likely adequate to determine that

brakes apply on each car. However,

most commuter equipment utilizes

‘‘tread brake units’’ in lieu of cylinders

and brake rigging of the kind prevalent

on freight and some intercity passenger

cars. It is undoubtedly the case that

train crewmembers do not verify

application of the brakes by tapping

brake shoes while the brakes are

applied, the only effective means of

determining that adequate force is being

applied. This is one reason why the

subject railroads typically conduct

redundant initial terminal tests at other

times during the day. Further, train

crews are not asked to inspect for wheel

defects and other unsafe conditions, nor

should they be asked to do so, given the

conditions under which they are asked

to inspect and the training they receive.

Consequently, paragraph (a) requires

that, at a minimum, a Class I or Class

IA brake test be performed prior to a

commuter or short-distance intercity

passenger train’s first departure on any

given day. FRA believes that the

proposed Class IA brake test is

sufficiently detailed to ensure the

proper functioning of the brake system,

yet not so intensive that it requires

individuals to perform an inspection for

which they are not qualified. FRA

proposes in paragraph (a) that a

qualified mechanical inspector or a

properly trained and qualified train

crewmember perform a Class IA brake

test.

As noted in the discussion of Class I

brake tests, FRA recognizes the

differences between commuter or shortdistance intercity operations and longdistance intercity passenger train

operations. FRA believes that a

thorough inspection of the braking

system on these types of operations

must be conducted prior to each train’s

departure from an initial starting

terminal. Consequently, FRA will not

permit the use of Class IA brake tests for

these trains, and requires that a Class I

brake inspection be performed on longdistance intercity passenger trains prior

to departure from an initial terminal.

Paragraph (a) also requires that a Class

IA brake test be performed prior to

placing a train in service if that train has

been off a source of compressed air for

more than four hours. This requirement

formalizes a long-standing agency

interpretation of the existing power

brake regulations but increases the time

limit from two hours to four hours.

Labor representatives maintain that any

number of brake system problems can

develop with equipment off air for only

a short time, while management

representatives contend that equipment

can be left off air for extended periods

of time with no problems. FRA believes

the proposed requirement is a fair

compromise that allows railroads some

operating flexibility, but does not allow

equipment to be off air without a new

brake test for extended periods of time.

As stated in the previous NPRM on

power brakes, FRA agrees that its

longstanding administrative

interpretation of allowing cars to be ‘‘off

air’’ for only two hours was established

prior to the development of new

equipment that has greatly reduced

leakage problems. However, contrary to

the contentions of some commenters,

FRA does not believe that cars should

be allowed to be ‘‘off air’’ for extended

periods without being retested. The

longer cars sit without a supply of

compressed air attached, the greater the

chances are that the integrity of the

system will be compromised, either by

weather conditions or vandalism.

Paragraph (b) allows a commuter or

short-distance intercity passenger train

that provides continuing late night

service that began prior to midnight to

complete its daily operating cycle after

midnight without performing another

Class I or Class IA brake test.

Paragraph (c) allows a Class IA brake

test to be performed at a shop or yard

site without needing the test repeated at

the first passenger terminal if the train

remains on air and in the custody of the

crew. This provision is an incentive for

railroads to conduct the tests at

locations where they can be performed

more safely and easily. FRA believes

that a shop or yard location is more

conducive for conducting a proper brake

test. Raised platforms and other

conditions frequently found at terminals

can make the performance of a brake

test difficult, if not hazardous.

Paragraph (d) permits the Class IA test

to be performed by either a qualified

person or a qualified mechanical

inspector. Paragraph (e) prohibits a

railroad from using or hauling a

passenger train from a location where a

Class IA brake test has been performed,

or was required to have been performed,

with less than 100 percent operative

brakes. (See §§ 238.15–238.17 for a

discussion of movement of defective

equipment for purposes of repair or

sale). Paragraph (f) establishes the

requirements for conducting a proper

Class IA brake test. It is proposed that

a Class IA brake test include: a check

that each brake sets and releases, a test

of the emergency brake application

feature, a check of the deadman or other

emergency control device, a check that

piston travel is in the nominal range for

the type of brake equipment, and an

observation that angle cocks and cutout

cocks are properly set and that brake

pipe pressure changes are

communicated to the rear of the train.

Paragraph (g) requires that the

inspection of the set and release of the

brakes be performed by walking the

train so the inspector actually observes

the set and release of each brake. Labor

representatives strongly contended that

this is the only way to do a proper brake

test. They believe that observation of

brake indicators does not give a reliable
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49777

indication of effective brakes because

the indicators sense brake cylinder

pressure rather than the force of the

brake shoe against the wheel or the pad

against the disc. However, this section

proposes to allow an exception when

railroads determine that direct

observation of the set and release can

place the inspector in danger. FRA

acknowledges the contention of rail

management representatives that

conditions at certain locations where

Class IA tests may be performed could

place the inspector in danger if he or

she is required to place himself or

herself in a position to actually observe

the set and release of each brake. Where

railroads determine this to be the case,

FRA will permit the use of brake

indicators for the set and release step of

the Class IA brake test as long as the

inspector takes a position where an

accurate observation of the indicators

can be made.

§ 238.317 Class II Brake Test

This section proposes the

requirements regarding how a Class II

brake test is to be performed and

contains the proposed conditions for

when a railroad is required to perform

the brake test. The Class II brake test

provides passenger railroads the

flexibility to continue to use train crew

personnel to perform the limited brake

tests required when minor changes to

the train occur. Both labor and

management representatives to the

Working Group recognized that train

crews are capable of performing the

relatively simple checks required by a

Class II brake test and that the

operations of most commuter and

passenger railroads require the

flexibility of having operating personnel

perform these tests.

Paragraph (c) requires that passenger

trains not depart from Class II brake

tests which are performed at a terminal

or a yard with any brakes known to be

cut-out, inoperative, or defective. This

requirement was agreed to by members

of the Working Group and is consistent

with the movement for repair provisions

contained in this proposal. See § 238.15.

Terminals and yards are generally the

best locations available to a railroad for

either conducting repairs or removing a

vehicle from a train. This requirement

only applies to brake equipment which

is known to be cut-out, inoperative, or

otherwise defective by the railroad prior

to the train’s departure from the yard or

terminal where the Class II brake test is

performed.

Paragraph (d) requires that a Class II

brake test consist of: a check that the

brakes on rear unit of the train apply

and release in response to brake control

signals, a test of the emergency brake

application, a test of the deadman pedal

or other emergency control device, and

a check that brake pipe pressure

changes are properly communicated at

the rear of the train. FRA believes that

if the equipment receives a full Class I

brake test and a calendar day

mechanical inspection at some time

during each operating day, then these

simple checks are adequate to confirm

brake system performance at

intermediate terminals or turning

points. This requirement basically

codifies current industry practice.

§ 238.319 Running Brake Tests

This section contains the proposed

requirements for conducting running

brake tests on the brakes of passenger

trains. A running brake test is merely a

brake application at the first safe

opportunity to confirm that the brake

system works as expected by the

engineer. FRA proposes that a running

brake test be performed in accordance

with the railroad’s established operating

rules after the train has received a Class

I, Class IA, or Class II brake test as safety

permits. FRA believes that railroads are

in the best position to determine when

and where running tests can be safely

performed. As most passenger railroads

routinely conduct running brake tests,

FRA believes that the proposal

requirement captures an important

safety check without changing current

operating practice to any great extent.

Tier II Passenger Equipment

Requirements

Most of the requirements proposed for

Tier II equipment are based on lengthy

discussions between Amtrak and FRA

over safety requirements for operation of

passenger train sets at speeds up to 150

mph in the Northeast Corridor (NEC).

Amtrak voluntarily included many of

the provisions proposed for Tier II

equipment in their procurement

specification for American Flyer

trainsets—the first Tier II equipment

which should be placed in regular

revenue service in the United States.

The process used by the Working

Group to discuss proposed Tier II

equipment standards differed from that

used for the Tier I standards. Many

members of the full Working Group

stated that they will never be involved

in the operation of such high-speed

equipment and participation in Tier II

standards was outside their area of

interest and expertise. As a result, the

full Working Group recommended the

formation of a smaller subgroup to

consider Tier II standards.

Consequently, a subgroup consisting of

representatives from Amtrak, equipment

builders, labor organizations, the NTSB

and FRA was formed to consider Tier II

equipment safety standards.

The Tier II Equipment Subgroup came

very close to reaching full consensus

recommendations on the proposed Tier

II safety standards. Only two exceptions

to a full consensus on recommendations

resulted from the process. The first

exception involves a disagreement

between Amtrak and labor organizations

over the proper use of brake indicator

technology.

The second exception results from a

joint meeting between the Tier II

equipment subgroup and the RSAC

High Speed Track Standards Working

Group. The purpose of this joint

meeting was to ensure that the two sets

of proposed standards not conflict at the

wheel-rail interface where the two sets

of standards overlap.

These two exceptions to full

consensus will be more fully discussed

under the appropriate section of this

section-by-section analysis. In all other

cases, the section-by-section analysis

assumes the full consensus of the

Subgroup without actually repeating it

as part of each of the discussions.

Subpart E—Specific Requirements for

Tier II Passenger Equipment

§ 238.401 Scope

This subpart contains the design and

performance requirements for Tier II

passenger equipment operating at

speeds exceeding 125 mph but not

exceeding 150 mph. Unless otherwise

specified, the proposed requirements

represent the consensus

recommendations of the Tier II

Equipment Subgroup with refinements

by FRA for clarity, enforceability, and

compatibility with other rail safety laws.

For the most part, compliance with the

requirements of this section will be

demonstrated by one-time analysis or

initial acceptance tests.

The requirements contained in this

subpart have their basis in discussions

between Amtrak and FRA involving

safety requirements for the operation of

passenger trainsets at speeds up to 150

mph on the Northeast Corridor (NEC).

Aware that FRA was considering the

development of safety standards for

high-speed passenger rail equipment,

Amtrak asked FRA for assistance in

developing a set of safety specifications

for the procurement of high-speed

trainsets which would address FRA’s

safety concerns. As a result, Amtrak’s

American Flyer trainsets, scheduled to

begin regular passenger service in 1999,

will very likely comply with all of the

proposed safety standards in this

subpart.
49778 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

Amtrak’s discussions with FRA led it

to sponsor a risk assessment of high

speed rail passenger systems on the

north end of the NEC—from New York

to Boston. The discussions also

prompted FRA to sponsor computer

modeling to predict the performance of

various equipment structural designs

and configurations in collisions. A copy

of the risk assessment performed by

Arthur D. Little, Inc., for Amtrak is

included in the docket of this

rulemaking. The risk assessment was

based on existing and predicted future

right-of-way configurations and traffic

density patterns. The risk assessment

concluded that a significant risk of

collisions at speeds below 20 mph and

a risk of collisions at speeds exceeding

100 mph exist over the 20-year

projected operational life of the

American Flyer trainsets—due to heavy

and increasing conventional commuter

rail traffic, freight rail traffic on the

NEC, highway-rail grade crossings,

moveable bridges, and a history of low

speed collisions in or near stations and

rail yards.

Based on the risk assessment and the

results of the computer modeling,

Amtrak and FRA determined that

reliance on collision avoidance

measures rather than crashworthiness,

though the hallmark of safe high-speed

rail operations in several parts of the

world, could not be implemented in

corridors like the north end of the NEC.

Existing traffic and right-of-way

configurations do not permit

implementation of the same collision

avoidance measures that have proven

successful in Europe and Japan. To

compensate for the increased risk of a

collision, a more crashworthy trainset

design is needed. As a result, the set of

structural design requirements proposed

for Tier II passenger equipment is more

stringent than current design practice

for North American passenger

equipment or for high-speed rail

equipment in other parts of the world.

§ 238.403 Crash Energy Management

Requirements

This section requires that each power

car and trailer car be designed with a

crash energy management system to

dissipate kinetic energy during a

collision. This section should be read

with the discussion of crash energy

management in the preamble.

During discussions with Amtrak over

the safety provisions for the American

Flyer trainsets, FRA proposed very

challenging crash energy management

requirements based on predictions using

computer modeling. Amtrak believed

that meeting these requirements would

be well beyond the current state of the

art for passenger equipment design, and

that an extensive and costly research

and testing program would be required.

As an alternative, Amtrak proposed a

crash energy management design based

on the demonstrated, commercially

viable design developed by France and

incorporated in the most recent design

of the TGV trainset. FRA believes that

Federal safety standards must be

capable of implementation in the design

of passenger equipment without driving

the cost of implementation to the point

that high speed rail systems are no

longer financially viable.

As a result, paragraph (c) proposes a

crash energy management system

capable of absorbing a minimum of 13

megajoules (MJ) of energy at each end of

the trainset. The ability to absorb this

energy must be partitioned as follows: a

minimum of 5 MJ by the front end of the

power car ahead of the operator’s

control compartment; a minimum of 3

MJ by the power car structure behind

the operator’s control compartment; and

a minimum of 5 MJ by the unoccupied

end of the first trailer car adjacent to the

power car. This requirement can be met

using existing technology. However, it

will effectively prevent a conventional

cab car from operating as the lead

vehicle in a Tier II passenger train

because such equipment cannot absorb

5 MJ of collision energy ahead of the

train operator’s position. Recent

accidents involving trains operating

with a cab car forward have

demonstrated the vulnerability of this

type of equipment in collisions. FRA

believes such equipment should not be

used in the forward position of a train

that travels at speeds greater than 125

mph. Further, FRA is specifically

proposing in paragraph (f) that

passenger seating be prohibited in the

leading unit of a Tier II train, though not

a specific recommendation of the

Subgroup.

Paragraph (e) proposes the analysis

process to demonstrate that equipment

meets the crash energy management

design performance requirements. The

process allows simplifying assumptions

to be made so computer modeling

techniques can be used to confirm

compliance.

§ 238.405 Longitudinal Static

Compressive Strength

This section contains the proposed

requirements for longitudinal

compressive strength of power cars and

trailer cars. Paragraph (a) requires the

ultimate compressive strength of the

underframe of the power car cab to be

a minimum of 2,100,000 pounds. To

form an effective crash refuge, this

strength is needed to take advantage of

the strength of the power car’s two end

frames. Alternate design approaches

that provide equivalent protection are

allowed, but the equivalent protection

must be demonstrated through analysis

and testing and approved by the FRA

Associate Administrator for Safety

under the provisions of § 238.21.

Paragraph (b) contains the

requirements for the static compressive

strength of the occupied volumes of

trailer cars. This proposal adopts the

traditional North American design

practice of a static strength of 800,000

pounds, without deformation of the

underframe. Paragraph (c) makes clear

that unoccupied or lightly occupied

volumes of power cars or trailer cars

may have a static end strength of less

than 800,000 pounds to accommodate

crash energy management designs.

The crash energy management design

requirement ensures that the stronger

end structures and the stronger static

compressive strength of the cab of a

power car will not make Tier II

passenger equipment incompatible with

existing passenger equipment should a

collision between the two different

types of equipment occur. The crash

energy management design makes a Tier

II passenger train appear as a softer

collision surface to a conventionally

designed train owing to the collision

energy absorbed by the Tier II train as

its unoccupied volumes intentionally

crush.

§ 238.407 Anti-Climbing Mechanism

This section contains the proposed

requirements for anti-climbing

mechanisms on power and trailer cars.

Paragraph (a) requires a power car to

have a forward anti-climbing

mechanism capable of resisting an

upward or downward static vertical

force of 200,000 pounds. This proposal

is identical to that required of

locomotives by AAR S-580. However,

designs are permitted that require the

crash energy management controlled

crushing to occur prior to the anticlimber fully engaging.

Paragraph (b) requires that interior

train coupling points between units,

including between units of articulated

cars or other permanently joined units

of cars, have an anti-climbing device

capable of resisting an upward or

downward vertical force of 100,000

pounds. This is consistent with current

design practice. Paragraph (c) requires

the forward coupler of a power car to

resist a vertical downward force of

100,000 pounds for any horizontal

position of the coupler without yielding,

and is virtually identical to that

provided in 49 CFR 229.141(a) for MU

locomotives built new after April 1,
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49779

1956, and operated in trains having a

total empty weight of 600,000 pounds or

more.

§ 238.409 Forward End Structures oF

Power Car Cabs

This section contains the proposed

requirements for forward end structures

of power car cabs. The forward end

structure of a power car cab plays a vital

role in a collision with another object.

This structure must resist override,

prevent the entry of fluids into occupied

spaces of the cab, and allow the crash

energy management system to function.

The proposed requirements in

paragraphs (a)-(c) are based on a specific

end structure design that consists of a

full-height center collision post, two

side collision posts located at

approximately the one-third points

laterally, and two full-height corner

posts. The proposal includes loading

requirements that each of these

structural members must withstand. In

addition, the proposal permits

flexibility for using other equipment

designs that provide equivalent

structural protection. End structures

meeting these requirements will provide

considerably greater protection to the

train operator than provided by existing

passenger equipment designs. For

example, much stronger corner posts are

proposed here than for Tier I passenger

equipment. FRA believes these end

structures help provide a degree of

crashworthiness to compensate for the

increased risk associated with operating

at higher speeds.

The front end structure design also

includes in paragraph (d) a skin

requirement equivalent to that required

by AAR S–580 and proposed in

§ 238.209 for Tier I locomotives.

§ 238.411 Rear End Structures of

Power Car Cabs

The rear end structure of a power car

cab provides protection to crewmembers

from intrusion of locomotive machinery

or trailing cars into the occupied

volume as a result of a collision or

derailment. The proposed requirements

are based on a specific end structure

design that consists of two full-height

corner posts (paragraph (a)) and two

full-height collision posts (paragraph

(b)). The proposal includes loading

requirements that each of these

structural members must withstand.

Further, the proposal permits flexibility

for using other equipment designs that

provide equivalent structural protection.

The proposed rear end structure will

provide considerably greater protection

to the train operator than that provided

by existing passenger equipment

designs. Together, the front and rear end

structures proposed in this rule for a

power car cab make the cab a highly

survivable crash refuge.

§ 238.413 End Structures of Trailer

Cars

The proposed requirements in

paragraph (a) are based on a specific end

structure design that consists of two

full-height corner posts and two fullheight collision posts. The proposal

includes loading requirements that each

of these structural members must

withstand. The proposal also allows

flexibility for other designs that provide

protection structurally equivalent to the

proposed design.

Paragraph (b) makes clear how the

requirements proposed in paragraph (a)

apply to a trailer car that consists of

multiple articulated units not designed

for uncoupling in other than at a

maintenance shop. The end structure

requirements apply only to the two ends

of the entire articulated assembly of

units. Paragraph (b) explains that the

interior ends of the individual units of

the articulated assembly need not be

equipped with an end structure that

meets the requirements proposed in

paragraph (a). Articulated assemblies

have a history of remaining in line

during derailments and collisions and if

not designed to be uncoupled, only the

exposed ends of the entire assembly will

be exposed to the risks of override.

However, interior units that are merely

semi-permanently coupled, but not

articulated, are subject to the proposed

end structure requirements in paragraph

(a).

Paragraph (c) contains an additional

requirement for trailer cars designed

with an end vestibule. Such designs

provide an opportunity for additional

corner post structures inboard of the

vestibule side doors. These corner posts

can be supported by the side sill and

therefore be structurally more

substantial than the corner posts

outboard of the side doors. The proposal

includes loading requirements that

these additional full-height corner posts

must withstand. Overall, the double

corner post design provides

significantly increased protection to

passengers in such trailer cars.

§ 238.415 Rollover Strength

This section contains the proposed

requirements for the rollover strength of

power cars and trailer cars. If the

occupied volumes of these vehicles

remain intact when they roll onto their

side or roof structures, occupant injury

from vehicle collapse will be avoided.

The proposal essentially requires the

vehicle structure to support twice the

deadweight of the vehicle as it rests on

its side or roof. Minor deformations of

the side and roof sheathing and smaller

structural members are allowed to the

extent necessary for the vehicle to be

supported directly by more substantial

structural members of the frame.

Passenger equipment constructed to

North American design practice

performs well in rollover situations.

FRA believes this proposal captures this

design practice.

§ 238.417 Side Loads

This section contains the proposed

requirements intended to resist

penetration of the side structure of a

passenger car by a highway or rail

vehicle. The objective is to make the

side of the passenger car strong enough

so that the car derails rather than

collapses when struck in the side by a

highway or rail vehicle. If the passenger

car moves sideways (derails), less

structural damage and potential to

injure train occupants will result.

§ 238.419 Truck-to-Car-Body and

Truck Component Attachment

Paragraph (a) requires the truck-tocar-body attachment on Tier II

passenger equipment to resist without

failure a vertical force equivalent to 2g

acting on the mass of the truck and a

force of 250,000 pounds acting in any

horizontal direction. The earlier

discussion of the proposed truck-to-carbody attachment strength requirement

in § 238.219 for Tier I passenger

equipment is also applicable here.

Paragraph (b) requires that each

component of the truck must remain

attached to the truck when a force

equivalent to 2g acting on the mass of

the component is exerted in any

direction on that component. Whereas

paragraph (a) is intended to keep the

truck attached to the car body,

paragraph (b) is intended to keep truck

components attached to the truck.

§ 238.421 Glazing

This section contains the proposed

glazing requirements for Tier II

passenger equipment. FRA believes that

the higher speed of Tier II passenger

equipment requires more stringent

glazing standards than currently

required by 49 CFR part 223.

Paragraph (a) requires each power car

and trailer car to be equipped with

glazing meeting the following

requirements. First, under paragraph

(a)(1), end-facing glazing shall resist the

impact of a 12-pound solid steel sphere

traveling at the maximum speed of the

vehicle in which the glazing will be

installed. The test must be conducted so

that the sphere strikes the glazing at the

same angle as an object would strike the
49780 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

glazing when installed in a train. To

successfully pass the test, the glazing

must neither spall nor be penetrated by

the sphere. This test is similar to the

requirements imposed under European

glazing standards for high-speed trains,

and should be much more repeatable

than the cinder block test specified in

49 CFR part 223.

Second, under paragraph (a)(2)(i),

side-facing glazing shall resist the

impact of a 12-pound solid steel sphere

traveling at 15 mph and impacting at an

angle of 90 degrees to the surface of the

glazing, with no penetration or spall.

This is a highly repeatable test that

demonstrates whether side-facing

glazing can protect occupants from a

relatively heavy object thrown against

the side of the train. This test is more

stringent than the large object impact

test required for side facing glazing

under 49 CFR part 223.

Third, under paragraph (a)(2)(ii), sidefacing exterior glazing shall resist the

impact of a granite ballast stone

weighing a minimum of 0.5 pounds,

traveling at 75 mph, and impacting at a

90-degree angle to the glazing surface,

with no penetration or spall. This is a

highly repeatable test to demonstrate

whether the glazing can protect

occupants against impact from a

common stone found along the railroad

thrown at a speed slightly faster than a

human could throw such an object.

Fourth, under paragraph (a)(3)(i), all

exterior glazing shall resist the single

impact of a 9-mm, 147-grain bullet

traveling at an impact velocity of 900

feet per second, with no bullet

penetration or spall. This bullet is a

much more common handgun round

than the 22-caliber bullet specified in 49

CFR part 223. The proposed

requirement does represent a balance

between the degree of bullet impact

protection and window weight,

however. Ballistic tests revealed that a

requirement to resist a round fired at

velocities typical of high-powered rifles

requires a glazing thickness that creates

a window weight that is impractical for

use as an emergency exit.

Fifth, under paragraph (a)(3)(ii), all

exterior glazing shall demonstrate antispalling performance by the use of a

0.001 aluminum witness plate, placed

12 inches from the glazing surface

during all impact tests. The witness

plate must not contain any marks from

spalled glazing particles after any

impact test. When impacted on the

exterior surface, glazing currently used

in railroad equipment tends to spall

from the inside surface. Several eye

injuries to crewmembers have resulted.

FRA believes that the witness plates

used in conducting the spalling tests to

qualify current glazing are too thick and

have allowed glazing that actually

spalled to pass the test. The witness

plate specified in this paragraph is

much thinner and therefore more

sensitive to detecting spall.

Paragraph (b) requires glazing

material to be marked to indicate that it

has passed the testing requirements

proposed in paragraph. This marking

requirement is similar to that provided

in 49 CFR part 223.

Paragraph (c) requires glazing frames

to hold the glazing in place against all

the forces which the glazing is required

to resist in paragraph (a). This proposal

is intended to prevent the glazing from

being knocked out of its frame by the

force of an object striking the glazing,

even though no penetration of the

glazing itself occurs. Since FRA is

proposing more stringent impact testing

requirements for glazing in Tier II

passenger equipment than for Tier I

passenger equipment, stronger glazing

frames will be required to keep the

glazing in place and achieve the

additional safety benefit provided by the

stronger glazing.

Paragraph (d) requires the glazing

securement components to resist the

forces due to air pressure differences

caused by trains passing with the

minimum separation for two adjacent

tracks while traveling in opposite

directions, each traveling at maximum

speed. The higher speed of Tier II

passenger equipment makes this a more

stringent requirement than proposed for

Tier I passenger equipment.

Paragraph (e) requires interior glazing

to meet the minimum requirements of

AS1 type laminated glass as defined in

American National Standard ‘‘Safety

Code for Glazing Materials for Glazing

Motor Vehicles Operating on Land

Highways,’’ ASA Standard Z26.1–1966.

This requirement alleviates the need for

interior glazing to meet the stringent

impact resistance requirements placed

on exterior glazing, while ensuring that

the glazing will shatter in a safe manner

like automotive glazing.

Paragraph (f) requires that each

vehicle be stencilled on an interior wall

to indicate that it meets the glazing

requirements contained in this section.

This requirement is already provided for

existing equipment in 49 CFR 223.17.

§ 238.423 Fuel Tanks

This section contains the proposed

requirements for fuel tanks for fossilfueled Tier II passenger equipment. FRA

is proposing separate requirements for

external fuel tanks, which are

traditional, under the car body fuel

tanks, and for internal tanks, which are

built into the structure of the car body.

Paragraph (a) requires the following of

external fuel tanks:

• A minimum height above the rail;

• A minimum penetration resistance

for end bulkheads;

• A minimum exterior skin strength;

• A temperature range to which

material properties must not degrade;

• A vent system that prevents spills

in any tank orientation;

• Skid surfaces on the bottom of the

tank; and

• An overall structural strength

adequate to support 11⁄2 times the dead

weight of the locomotive without

deformation of the tank.

This set of proposed requirements is

based on investigations of accidents

involving fuel tank rupture; analysis

and testing of improved fuel tank

designs; reports by railroads of

reductions in fuel spills on locomotives

built with more crashworthy fuel tanks;

and an analysis of the common methods

of damaging fuel tanks. FRA believes

the proposed requirements will result in

significantly fewer fuel spills and fewer

post-collision fires. Although the

proposed requirements reduce the range

of a train by adding weight and reducing

fuel carrying capacity, FRA does not

believe that this reduced range will

impact passenger train service because

food and other supplies will likely need

replenishing first before a train needs

refueling.

Paragraph (b) requires that internal

fuel tanks be a minimum height above

the rail, be equipped with a vent system

that prevents spills in any tank

orientation, and have a minimum

penetration resistance of the bulkheads

and skin. Amtrak has included internal

fuel tanks in the design of many new

locomotives. Experience with these

tanks has shown them to be much less

vulnerable than external fuel tanks due

to protection provided by the structure

of the car body. This reduced

vulnerability lessens the need for many

of the requirements proposed for

external fuel tanks.

§ 238.425 Electrical Systems

This section contains the proposed

requirements for electrical system

design. These requirements reflect

common electrical safety practice and

are widely recognized as good electrical

design practice. They include

provisions for:

• Circuit protection against surges,

overload and ground faults;

• Electrical conductor sizes and

properties to provide a margin of safety

for the intended application;

• Battery system design to prevent the

risk of overcharging or accumulation of
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49781

dangerous gases that can cause an

explosion;

• Design of resistor grids that

dissipate energy produced by dynamic

braking with sufficient electrical

isolation and ventilation to minimize

the risk of fires; and

• Electromagnetic compatibility

within the intended operating

environment to prevent electromagnetic

interference with safety-critical

equipment systems and to prevent

interference of the rolling stock with

other systems along the right-of-way.

§ 238.427 Suspension System

Suspension system performance

parameters are crucial to the safe

operation of high-speed rail passenger

equipment. The suspension system

requirements that FRA is proposing

served as safety limits for the successful

demonstrations of the X–2000 and the

ICE trainsets on the NEC at speeds up

to 135 mph. These proposed

requirements are also part of the

suspension system performance

requirements for Amtrak’s American

Flyer trainsets.

Safety requirements concerning the

wheel-rail interface have traditionally

been addressed as part of the track

safety standards. In parallel with the

Tier II Equipment Subgroup’s effort to

develop high-speed equipment safety

standards, the RSAC Track Working

Group developed an NPRM on track

safety standards which includes

proposed high-speed track standards.

See 62 FR 36138, Jul. 3, 1997. FRA

sponsored a joint meeting of the Tier II

Equipment Subgroup and members of

the Track Working Group focusing on

the development of high-speed track

standards to ensure that the two sets of

standards not conflict at the wheel-rail

interface, where they overlap. Overall,

the two groups proposed very similar

standards, but members of the Track

Working Group recommended some

modifications to Tier II passenger

equipment standards so that these

standards would dovetail with the highspeed track standards. FRA has revised

the proposed Tier II passenger

equipment standards accordingly, as

noted in discussions below of the

specific requirements of this section.

To ensure safe, stable performance

and ride quality, paragraph (a) requires

suspension systems to be designed to

reasonably prevent wheel climb, wheel

lift, rail rollover, rail shift, and a vehicle

from overturning. These requirements

must be met in all operating

environments, and under all track and

loading conditions as determined by the

operating railroad. In addition, these

requirements must be met under all

track speeds and track conditions

consistent with the Track Safety

Standards (49 CFR part 213), up to the

maximum operating speed and

maximum cant deficiency of the

equipment. These broad suspension

system performance requirements

address the operation of equipment at

both high speed over well maintained

track and at low speed over lower

classes of track. Suspension system

performance requirements are needed at

both high and low speeds as

exemplified by recent incidents where

stiff, high-speed suspension systems

caused passenger equipment to derail

while negotiating curves in yards at low

speeds.

Compliance with paragraph (a) must

be demonstrated during pre-revenue

service acceptance testing of the

equipment and by complying with the

safety performance standards for

suspension systems contained in

Appendix C to this part. Because better

ways to demonstrate suspension system

safety performance may be developed in

the future, the rule allows the use of

alternative standards to those contained

in Appendix C if they provide

equivalent safety and are approved by

the FRA Associate Administrator for

Safety under the provisions of § 238.21.

Paragraph (b) requires the steady-state

lateral acceleration of passenger cars to

be less than 0.1g, as measured parallel

to the car floor inside the passenger

compartment, under all operating

conditions. Passenger cars shall not

operate when the steady-state lateral

acceleration is 0.1g or greater. FRA

originally considered limiting the cant

deficiency, but Track Working Group

members recommended that the steadystate lateral acceleration requirement

alone is sufficient to ensure safe

operation. The Tier II Equipment

Subgroup concurred, and FRA is

proceeding according to these

recommendations.

Paragraph (c) requires each truck to be

equipped with a permanently installed

lateral accelerometer mounted on the

truck frame. If hunting oscillations are

detected, the train must be slowed. The

proposal contained in the paragraph did

not have the full support of the Tier II

Equipment Subgroup and the Track

Working Group members because of

disagreement over where the

accelerometer should be located.

Paragraph (d) provides ride vibration

(quality) limits for vertical accelerations,

lateral accelerations, and the

combination of lateral and vertical

accelerations. These limits must be met

while the equipment is traveling at the

maximum operating speed over its

intended route. The limiting parameters

and the means to measure them

represent the consensus

recommendations of both working

groups and have proven effective during

the demonstrations of the X–2000 and

ICE trainsets.

Paragraph (e) provides that

compliance with the ride quality

requirements contained in paragraph (d)

be demonstrated during the equipment

pre-revenue service qualification tests

required under § 238.113 and § 213.345

of the proposed federal track safety

standards. One of the most important

objectives of pre-revenue service

qualification testing is to demonstrate

that suspension system performance

requirements have been met.

Paragraph (f) requires bearing

overheat sensors to be provided either

on board the equipment or at reasonable

wayside intervals. FRA prefers sensors

to be on board the equipment to

eliminate the risk of a hotbox that

develops between wayside locations.

However, FRA does recognize that

onboard sensors have a history of falsely

detecting overheat conditions that have

caused significant operating difficulties

for some passenger railroads.

§ 238.429 Safety Appliances

This section contains the proposed

requirements for safety appliances for

Tier II passenger equipment. FRA has

attempted to simplify and clarify how

the Safety Appliance Standards

contained in 49 CFR part 231 and 49

U.S.C. 20302(a) will be applied to Tier

II passenger equipment. The proposed

requirements are basically a restatement

of existing requirements but tailored

specifically for application to this new

and somewhat unconventional

equipment. They represent the

consensus recommendation of the Tier

II Equipment Subgroup.

Paragraph (b) deserves special

mention; it proposes to require that Tier

II passenger trains be provided with a

parking or hand brake that can be set

and released manually and can hold the

equipment on a 3-percent grade. A hand

brake is an important safety feature that

prevents the rolling or runaway of

parked equipment.

§ 238.431 Brake System

This section contains proposed brake

system design and performance

requirements for Tier II passenger

equipment, and, except for one

provision, represents the consensus

recommendation of the Tier II

Equipment Subgroup. The main issue of

concern among Subgroup members

involved the capability of sensor

technology used to monitor the

application and release of brakes. Labor
49782 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

representatives maintained that a

technology that actually measures the

force of brake shoes and pads against

wheels and brake discs is required for

a reliable indication of brake application

and release. Railroad operators

contended that this technology is not

commercially available and that

monitoring pressure in brake cylinders

does provide a reliable indication of

brake application and release,

particularly when those cylinders are

directly adjacent to the point where

brake friction surfaces are forced

together.

Aside from this issue, the rest of the

proposed brake system design and

performance requirements received

widespread support. In fact, several of

the proposed requirements were

contained in written positions provided

by both rail labor and management

members of the Subgroup, and virtually

all of the proposed requirements were

discussed in the high-speed passenger

equipment section of the 1994 NPRM on

power brakes. See 59 FR 47693–47694,

47699–47700, and 47730. Many of the

requirements proposed in this section

are similar to the requirements proposed

for Tier I passenger equipment in

§ 238.231, thus the discussion related to

that section should be read in

conjunction with the following

discussion.

The proposal contained in paragraph

(a) is virtually identical to the proposal

related to the braking systems of Tier I

passenger equipment in § 238.231(a).

Paragraph (b) proposes a requirement

similar to that proposed in § 238.231(b)

and is intended to protect railroad

employees. FRA believes that inspectors

of equipment must be able to ascertain

if brakes are applied or released without

placing themselves in a vulnerable

position. The proposed rule allows

railroads the flexibility of using a

reliable indicator in place of requiring

direct observation of the brake

application or piston travel because the

designs of many of the brake systems

used on passenger equipment make

direct observation of the brakes

extremely difficult. Brake system piston

travel or piston cylinder pressure

indicators have been used with

satisfactory results for many years.

Although indicators do not provide 100

percent certainty that the brakes are

effective, they have proven effective

enough to be preferable to requiring an

inspector to assume a dangerous

position.

Paragraph (c) is virtually identical to

the requirement proposed in

§ 238.231(c), and is a fundamental brake

system performance requirement that an

emergency brake application feature be

available at any time and produce an

irretrievable stop. This paragraph

proposes an additional requirement that

a means to actuate the emergency brake

be provided at two locations in each

unit of the train. This additional

requirement ensures the availability of

the emergency brake feature and is in

accordance with the current available

design of high-speed passenger

equipment.

Paragraph (d) requires the brake

system to be designed to prevent

thermal damage to wheels and brake

discs.

Paragraph (e) proposes requirements

related to blended braking systems.

These requirements are similar to those

proposed in § 238.231(j). The only

additional requirement is that the

operational status of the electric portion

of the blended brake be displayed in the

operator’s cab. Operators use different

train handling procedures when the

electric portion of blended brake is not

available. A very dangerous situation

can arise when an operator expects the

electric portion of the blended brake to

be available and it is not. FRA believes

that when operations exceed 125 mph

either the train must not be used if the

electric portion of the blended brake is

not available, or the train operator must

know that the electric portion of the

blended brake is not available so he or

she can be prepared to use

compensating train handling

procedures. Further, FRA believes that

if the additional heat input to wheels or

discs caused by lack of the electric

portion of the blended brake causes

thermal damage to these braking

surfaces, then the electric portion of the

blended brake should be considered a

required safety feature and, unless it is

available, the equipment should not be

used.

Paragraph (f) requires the brake

system to allow a disabled train’s

pneumatic brakes to be controlled by a

conventional locomotive during rescue

operations.

Paragraph (g) requires that Tier II

passenger trains be equipped with an

independent brake failure detection

system that compares brake commands

to brake system outputs to determine if

a failure has occurred. This paragraph

also proposes that the brake failure

detection system report failures to the

automated monitoring system, which is

proposed in § 238.445, thus alerting the

train operator to potential brake system

degradation so that the operator can take

corrective action such as slowing the

train.

Paragraph (h) requires that all Tier II

passenger equipment be provided with

an adhesion control system designed to

automatically adjust the braking force

on each wheel to prevent sliding during

braking. FRA also proposes to require

that the train operator be alerted in the

event of a failure of this system with a

wheel slide alarm that is visual or

audible, or both. This proposed feature

ties the adhesion control system to the

automated monitoring system and

prevents dangerous wheel slide flat

conditions that can be caused when

wheels lock during braking.

§ 238.433 Draft System

FRA is proposing that leading and

trailing automatic couplers of Tier II

trains be compatible with standard AAR

couplers with no special adapters used.

FRA believes that compatibility with

standard couplers is necessary in order

that a conventional locomotive could

assist in the rescue of disabled Tier II

passenger equipment. In addition,

couplers must include an automatic

coupling feature as well as an

uncoupling device that complies with

49 U.S.C. chapter 203, 49 CFR part 231,

and 49 CFR 232.2. FRA believes that

automatic uncoupling devices are

necessary in order to comply with the

intent of the statute so that employees

will not have to place themselves

between equipment in order to perform

coupling or uncoupling operations.

§ 238.435 Interior Fittings and

Surfaces

This section contains proposed

requirements for interior fittings and

surfaces. Once survivable space is

ensured by basic vehicle structural

strength and crash energy management

requirements, the design of interior

features becomes an important factor in

preventing or mitigating injuries

resulting from collisions or derailments.

Loose seats, equipment, and luggage are

a significant cause of injuries in

passenger train collisions and

derailments.

Paragraphs (a) through (c) contain

requirements for the design of passenger

car seats and the strength of their

attachment to the car body. These

requirements are based on sled tests of

passenger coach seats, seat tests

conducted for other modes of

transportation, and computer modeling

to predict the results of passenger train

collisions. These provisions include a

requirement for shock absorbent

material on the backs of seats to cushion

the impact of passengers with the seats

ahead of them.

Paragraph (d) contains the

requirements for strength of attachment

of interior fittings and is similar to that

proposed in § 238.233(c).
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49783

Paragraph (e) contains a special

requirement for the ultimate strength of

seats and other fittings in the cab of a

power car. Due to the extra strength of

the cab, its structure is capable of

resisting forces caused by accelerations

that exceed 10g. As a result, benefit can

be gained from a greater longitudinal

strength requirement for seat and other

interior fitting attachments. FRA is

therefore proposing that seats and

equipment in the cab be attached to the

car body with sufficient strength to

resist longitudinal forces caused by an

acceleration of 12g. The lateral and

vertical requirements remain 4g. This

requirement does not apply to

equipment located outside the cab.

Paragraphs (f) and (g) contain

requirements representing good safety

design practice for any type of vehicle.

FRA believes the luggage restraint

requirement proposed in paragraph (h)

will prevent many of the injuries caused

by flying luggage that are typical of

passenger train collisions and

derailments.

§ 238.437 Emergency Communication

This section requires an emergency

communication system within the train

with back-up power, and is discussed

earlier in the preamble. This safety

feature will allow the train crew to

provide evacuation and other

instructions to passengers. Such a

system can help prevent panic that can

occur during emergency situations. FRA

is proposing that transmission locations

be located at both ends of each unit, that

the locations be marked with

luminescent material, and that clear

instructions be provided for the use of

the emergency communication system.

§ 238.439 Emergency Window Exits

and Roof Hatches

Paragraph (a) contains proposed

requirements that apply to emergency

window exits on passenger cars. This

paragraph is virtually identical to that

proposed for Tier I passenger equipment

in § 238.235, except for the required size

of the emergency window exits. A

discussion of emergency window exits

and the distinction between proposed

requirements for Tier I and Tier II

passenger equipment is provided earlier

in the preamble.

Paragraph (b) requires either a roof

hatch or a clearly marked structural

weak point in the roof to provide quick

access for properly equipped emergency

personnel. One roof hatch or structural

weak point is required for each power

car cab and two roof hatches or

structural weak points for each

passenger car. A discussion of roof

hatches and structural weak points is

also provided earlier in the preamble.

Such features should aid in removing

passengers and crewmembers from a

vehicle that is either on its side or

upright in water.

Paragraph (c) is reserved for marking

and operating instruction requirements.

§ 238.441 Doors

This section contains the proposed

requirements for exterior doors on Tier

II passenger cars. This section should be

read with the discussion of emergency

egress and access earlier in the

preamble. The requirements in

paragraph (a) are virtually identical to

those proposed in § 238.237(b), except

that paragraph (a)(2) requires that the

status of powered, exterior side doors be

displayed to the crew in the operating

cab and, if door interlocks are used, the

sensors to detect train motion must

nominally be set at 3 mph. Such

equipment is well within current

technology. Paragraph (b) requires that

powered, exterior side doors be

connected to an emergency back-up

power system. Paragraph (c) is identical

to that proposed for Tier I passenger

equipment in § 238.237(c). Paragraph (d)

requires passenger compartment end

doors to be equipped with a kick-out

panel, pop-out window, or other means

of egress in the event the door will not

open. As discussed above, FRA

considered this requirement for both

Tier I and Tier II equipment, but

believes such a feature may be

dangerous on side doors because

passengers could use the feature

inappropriately and possibly exit from a

moving train. However, this feature has

a strong safety benefit for end doors that

allow movement from car to car. These

doors are not used to exit the train, and

using end doors to exit to the next car

is the preferred mode of evacuating a

car.

Paragraph (e) is reserved for door

marking and operating instruction

requirements. These requirements are

currently being addressed in the

proposed rule on passenger train

emergency preparedness. See 62 FR

8330, Feb. 24, 1997.

§ 238.443 Headlights

Because of the high speeds at which

Tier II passenger equipment operates,

FRA is proposing that a headlight be

directed farther in front of the train to

illuminate a person than is currently

required for existing equipment under

49 CFR 229.125(a). A Tier II passenger

train will travel distances more quickly

than a Tier I passenger train, and the

train operator will have less time to

react thereby necessitating earlier

awareness of objects on the track.

§ 238.445 Automated Monitoring

This section contains the proposed

requirements for automated monitoring

of the status or performance of various

safety-related systems. Investigations of

past passenger train accidents reveal

that many of them were either fully or

partly caused by human error. The faster

operating speeds of Tier II passenger

equipment means that the train operator

will have less time to evaluate and react

to potentially dangerous situations. The

potential for accidents is increased.

Automated monitoring systems can

decrease the risk of accidents by alerting

the operator to abnormal conditions and

advising the operator as to necessary

corrective action. Such systems can

even be designed to take corrective

action automatically in certain

situations. As a result, FRA is proposing

that a Tier II passenger train be

equipped with an automated system to

monitor various train systems and

components.

Paragraph (a) requires the train to be

equipped to monitor the performance of

a minimum set of safety-related systems

and components. The monitoring

system can also be used to provide

information for trouble-shooting and

maintenance and to accumulate

reliability data to form the basis for

setting required periodic maintenance

intervals.

Paragraph (b) requires the operator to

be alerted when any of the monitored

parameters are out of predetermined

limits. FRA does not intend to remove

the decision from the operating railroad

for when automatic intervention is

necessary. However, the operating

railroad should have a valid basis for

either leaving response in the hands of

the train operator or making corrective

action automatic.

Paragraph (c) requires the monitoring

system to be designed with an automatic

self-test feature that notifies the operator

that the monitoring capability is

functioning correctly and alerts the

operator that a system failure has

occurred. Because operators can become

dependent on automated monitoring

systems, they need to know when their

vigilance must be heightened to

compensate for a malfunction in this

automated safety tool.

§ 238.447 Operator’s Controls and Cab

Layout

In the ANPRM, FRA offered for

comment a detailed set of requirements

concerning cab control systems and

interior safety features for consideration

by the industry. However, several

members of the Working Group believed

that a number of these requirements
49784 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

involved ergonomic issues which do not

directly affect safety. Nonetheless, FRA

is proposing in this section extensive

requirements for Tier II cab interior

features. The speeds at which Tier II

equipment will operate will press

human reaction time, and such features

will contribute to the ability of the crew

to operate the train as safely as possible.

Paragraph (g)(1) deserves special

mention; it requires that each seat

provided for a crewmember be equipped

with a single-acting, quick-release lap

belt and shoulder harness as defined in

§ 571.209 of this title. This proposed

requirement is mentioned earlier in the

preamble discussion of train interior

safety features.

Subpart F—Inspection, Testing, and

Maintenance Requirements for Tier II

Passenger Equipment

Currently, there is no operating

history with regard to Tier II equipment,

and thus there are no regulations or

industry standards establishing detailed

testing, inspection, or maintenance

procedures, criteria, and intervals for

the equipment. The railroads and the

rail labor organizations differ on the

approach that should be taken in

establishing inspection, testing, and

maintenance requirements. Railroads

have long appealed to FRA to move

away from detailed ‘‘command and

control’’ regulations and instead to

provide broad safety performance

requirements that afford railroads wide

latitude to develop the operational

details. Rail labor organizations, on the

other hand, believe that specific

inspection, testing, and maintenance

criteria that cannot be unilaterally

changed by railroads are the only way

that safe railroad operation can be

assured.

FRA believes that the introduction of

a new type of passenger train equipment

offers the opportunity for a fresh start,

where perhaps both of these seemingly

conflicting concerns can be resolved.

FRA proposes general guidelines on the

process to be used by the operating

railroad, together with the system

developer, to develop an inspection,

testing, and maintenance program. The

operating railroad and the system

developer together have the best

information, expertise, and resources

necessary to develop the details of an

effective inspection, testing, and

maintenance program. The operating

railroad is thereby granted some latitude

to develop the operational details of the

program, using the system safety

process to justify the safety decisions

that are made. However, FRA proposes

to exercise final approval of the

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program proposed by the operating

railroad; rail labor organizations will be

given an opportunity to discuss their

concerns with FRA during the approval

process set forth in § 238.505. Tier II

equipment must not be used prior to

FRA approval of an inspection, testing,

and maintenance program. Further, FRA

proposes to enforce the safety-critical

inspection, testing, and maintenance

procedures, criteria, and maintenance

intervals that result from the approval

process.

§ 238.501 Scope

This subpart contains inspection,

testing, and maintenance requirements

for passenger equipment that operates at

speeds exceeding 125 mph but not

exceeding 150 mph.

§ 238.503 Inspection, Testing, and

Maintenance Requirements

This section requires the

establishment by the railroad of an FRAapproved inspection, testing, and

maintenance program based on a daily

complete brake system test and

mechanical safety inspection of the

equipment performed by qualified

mechanical inspectors, coupled with a

periodic maintenance program based on

a system safety analysis. Although

paragraph (a) proposes some basic

requirements to be included in a

program, FRA does not intend to

prescribe every detail of what a program

must contain. FRA proposes to require

the operating railroad to develop and

justify the details of any program it

adopts based on the specific safety

needs and operating environment of the

high speed rail system being developed.

Paragraph (b) would make

enforceable, subject to civil penalties

and other enforcement action, the

safety-critical inspection, testing, and

maintenance requirements that are

identified in the railroad’s program and

approved by FRA. ‘‘Safety-critical’’

requirements are those that, if not

fulfilled, increase ‘‘the risk of damage to

equipment or personal injury to a

passenger, crewmember, or other

person.’’ See § 238.5. Under paragraph

(k), the railroad must identify which

items in its inspection, testing, and

maintenance program are safety-critical.

The railroad must submit the program to

FRA under the procedures of § 238.505.

Once these programs are approved by

FRA, this section proposes to make

those items identified as safety-critical

enforceable by FRA. FRA agrees with

labor representatives to the Working

Group that safety standards are stronger

when they contain specific provisions

that can be enforced.

Paragraph (c) requires that the

operating railroad develop an

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program to ensure that all systems and

components of Tier II passenger

equipment are free of general conditions

that endanger the safety of the crew,

passengers, or equipment. FRA has

identified the various conditions

enumerated in paragraph (c) that would

need to be addressed in the railroad’s

program. Consequently, FRA has

attempted to define what the inspection,

testing, and maintenance program must

accomplish, but not how to accomplish

it.

Paragraph (d) contains the more

specific requirements that any

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program must incorporate. In paragraph

(d)(1), FRA proposes that Tier II

equipment receive the equivalent of a

Class I brake test, as described in

§ 238.313, before its departure from an

originating terminal and every 1,500

miles after that or once each calendar

day the equipment remains in service.

The test must be performed by a

qualified mechanical inspector. For

example, a Tier II train must receive the

equivalent of a Class I brake test at its

originating terminal and must receive a

second Class I equivalent brake test after

traveling 1,500 miles from the time of

the original Class 1 brake test, whether

or not it is the same calendar day.

Furthermore, a Tier II train must receive

the equivalent of a Class I brake test

each calendar day it is used in service

even if it has not traveled 1,500 miles

since the last Class I equivalent brake

test. Due to the speeds at which this

equipment is permitted to operate, FRA

believes that a comprehensive brake test

must be performed prior to the

equipment being placed in service.

Paragraph (d)(2) proposes that a

complete exterior and interior

mechanical inspection be conducted by

qualified mechanical inspectors at least

once each calendar day that the

equipment is used. In order to perform

a quality mechanical inspection,

railroads must be provided some

flexibility in determining the locations

where these inspections can best be

performed. FRA believes that permitting

railroads to conduct these mechanical

inspections at any time during the

calendar day provides adequate

flexibility to move equipment to

appropriate locations. Trains that miss a

scheduled Class I brake test or

mechanical inspection due to a delay en

route may proceed to the location where

the Class I brake test or mechanical

inspection was scheduled to be

performed. FRA recognizes that, due to

the specialized nature of this
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49785

equipment, proper inspections can only

be conducted at a limited number of

locations. FRA also recognizes that

trains become delayed en route due to

problems which are not readily

foreseeable. Thus, FRA proposes to

permit the continued use of such

equipment to the location where the

required inspection was scheduled to be

performed.

Paragraph (e) restates § 238.15 and

provides a cross-reference to that

section. The paragraph provides that

trains developing en route defective,

inoperative, or insecure primary brake

equipment be moved in accordance

with the requirements of that section.

Paragraph (f) restates § 238.17 and

adds a narrow exception to that section.

The paragraph proposes that Tier II

equipment that develops a defective

condition not related to the primary

brake be moved and handled in

accordance with the requirements

contained in § 238.17, with one

exception. The exception to these

requirements applies to a failure of the

secondary portion of the brake that

occurs en route. In those circumstances,

FRA proposes that the train may

proceed to the next scheduled

equivalent Class I brake test at a speed

no greater than the maximum safe

operating speed demonstrated through

analysis and testing for braking with the

friction brake alone. At that location the

brake system shall be restored to 100

percent operation before the train

continues in service. This proposal

allows extensive flexibility for the

movement of equipment with defective

brakes, but also contains a hard

requirement that all brake components

be repaired and the brake system,

including secondary brakes, be restored

at the location of the train’s next major

brake test. FRA believes that this

proposal recognizes the secondary role

played by the electric portion of

blended brakes. If the railroad has

demonstrated that the friction brake

alone can stop the train within signal

spacing without thermal damage to

braking surfaces, then the train may be

used at normal maximum speed in the

event of an electric brake failure. This

proposal essentially limits the use of

trains without available secondary

braking systems to no more than 48

hours. FRA believes that § 238.17 strikes

the correct balance between the need of

railroads to transport passengers to their

destination and the need to have

equipment with defects that could lead

to more serious safety problems quickly

repaired. This proposed requirement

places a heavy responsibility on

qualified mechanical inspectors to

exercise their judgment on when and

how equipment is safe to move.

Paragraph (g) would require that

scheduled maintenance intervals be

based on the analysis conducted as part

of the system safety program and

approved by FRA under the procedures

of § 238.505. FRA proposes to allow the

maintenance intervals for safety-critical

components to be changed only when

justified by accumulated acceptable

operating data. Changes in maintenance

cycles of safety-critical components

must be based on verifiable data made

available to all interested parties and

shall be reviewed by FRA. This proposal

is another attempt to balance the needs

of the operating railroad to run

efficiently and the concern of rail labor

organizations that railroads have the

ability to unilaterally make safety

decisions. For a new system with no

operating history, a formal system safety

analysis is the only justifiable way to set

initial maintenance intervals. The

proposal recognizes that as time passes

and an operating history is developed,

a basis for changing maintenance

intervals can be established. However,

the decision to make these changes must

have the participation of all the affected

parties.

Paragraph (h) would require that the

operating railroad establish a training,

qualification, and designation program

as defined in the training program plan

under § 238.111 to qualify individuals

to perform safety inspections, tests, and

maintenance on the equipment. If the

railroad deems it safety-critical, then

only qualified individuals may perform

the safety inspection, test, or

maintenance of the equipment. FRA

does not prescribe a detailed training

program or qualification and

designation process. Those details are

left to the operating railroad, but FRA

must approve the program proposed by

the operating railroad under procedures

of § 238.505.

Under paragraph (i), the operating

railroad would be obliged to establish

standard procedures for performing all

safety-critical inspections, tests,

maintenance, or repair. This paragraph

proposes various broad requirements

relating to the content and

enforceability of the standard operating

procedures. FRA has drawn on the

experiences of other heavy industries

and in the military, where inherently

dangerous tasks are common, which

have proven that standard operating

procedures are an effective tool in

reducing work-related injuries. Further,

standard operating procedures can form

the basis for periodic safety refresher

training. FRA does not propose to

prescribe the detailed procedures to be

used. The proposed rule is designed to

have the detailed procedures developed

by those with most knowledge of how

to safely perform the tasks: the operators

and employees.

Paragraph (j) proposes to require that

the operating railroad establish an

inspection, testing, and maintenance

quality control program enforced by

railroad or contractor supervisors. In

essence, this creates the need for the

operating railroad to perform spot

checks of the work performed by its

employee and contract equipment

maintainers to ensure that the work is

performed in accordance with

established procedures and Federal

requirements. FRA believes this is an

important management function that

has a history of being neglected in the

railroad industry.

Paragraph (k) requires the operating

railroad to identify each inspection and

testing procedure and criterion and each

maintenance interval that the railroad

considers safety-critical.

§ 238.505 Program Approval

Procedure

This section contains the procedures

a railroad shall follow in securing FRA

approval of its program.

Subpart G—Introduction of New

Technology to Tier II Passenger

Equipment

§ 238.601 Scope

This subpart contains proposed

general requirements for introducing

new technology that affects safety

systems of ‘‘existing Tier II passenger

equipment,’’ which is defined as Tier II

passenger equipment that has been

approved for revenue service by FRA

under § 238.21. As part of the

development of the ANPRM in this

docket, FRA discussed extensive

requirements for the introduction of

new technology. During Working Group

meetings, various group members

pointed out that the requirements

presented by FRA were very similar to

the requirements of the system safety

program. These members suggested that

the proposed rule could be simplified

and made more concise if the system

safety process were used to introduce

new technology to existing Tier II

equipment. FRA agrees with this

suggestion. FRA may determine that it

is best to integrate subpart G with

§ 238.113. FRA invites comments from

interested parties on this possible

change.

§ 238.603 Process to Introduce New

Technology

Paragraph (a) requires a major

upgrade or introduction of new
49786 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

technology that affects the performance

of an existing Tier II passenger

equipment safety system to be designed

and implemented using the system

safety process prescribed in § 238.101.

This proposed requirement implements

the suggestions of Working Group

members.

Paragraph (b) requires railroads to

follow the procedures set forth in

§ 238.21 and obtain FRA’s special

approval of a pre-revenue service

acceptance testing plan for the existing

Tier II passenger equipment with the

upgrade or new technology containing

all the elements prescribed in § 238.113

prior to executing the plan.

Paragraph (c) requires railroads to

complete a pre-revenue service

demonstration of the existing equipment

with the upgrade or new technology in

accordance with the FRA approved

plan, to fulfill all other requirements of

§ 238.113, and obtain special approval

from FRA pursuant to § 238.21 prior to

using the Tier II equipment with the

upgrade or new technology in revenue

service. FRA considers these

requirements extremely important to

prevent unknown safety problems from

being introduced along with the new

technology.

Appendix A—Schedule of Civil

Penalties

This appendix is being reserved until

the final rule. At that time it will

include a schedule of civil penalties to

be used in connection with this part.

Because such penalty schedules are

statements of policy, notice and

comment are not required prior to their

issuance. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A).

Nevertheless, commenters are invited to

submit suggestions to FRA describing

the types of actions or omissions under

each regulatory section that would

subject a person to the assessment of a

civil penalty. Commenters are also

invited to recommend what penalties

may be appropriate, based upon the

relative seriousness of each type of

violation.

Regulatory Impact

Executive Order 12866 and DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures

This proposed rule has been

evaluated in accordance with existing

policies and procedures and is

considered to be significant under both

Executive Order 12866 and DOT

policies and procedures (44 FR 11034;

Feb. 26, 1979). FRA has prepared and

placed in the docket a regulatory

evaluation of the proposed rule. This

evaluation estimates the costs and

consequences of the proposed rule as

well as its anticipated economic and

safety benefits. It may be inspected and

photocopied during normal business

hours by visiting the FRA Docket Clerk

at the Office of Chief Counsel, FRA,

Seventh Floor, 1120 Vermont Avenue,

N.W., in Washington, D.C. Photocopies

may also be obtained by submitting a

written request by mail to the FRA

Docket Clerk at the Office of Chief

Counsel, Federal Railroad

Administration, 400 Seventh Street,

S.W., Mail Stop 10, Washington, D.C.

20590.

FRA expects that overall the proposed

rule will save the passenger rail

industry a Net Present Value (NPV) of

approximately $41 million over the next

20 years. The estimated NPV of the total

20-year costs associated with the

proposed rule is $41,064,095. The

estimated NPV of the total 20-year

savings (economic benefits) expected to

accrue to the industry from the

proposed rule is $81,612,874. For some

passenger rail operators, the total costs

incurred will exceed the total cost

savings. For others, the cost savings will

outweigh the costs.

The following table contains

estimated 20-year costs and savings

associated with the proposed

requirements.

Requirement category Cost

System Safety Program/Plan:

Initial Filing .................................................................................................................................................................................... $ 359,575

Modifications ................................................................................................................................................................................. 101,974

Auditability/Tracking ...................................................................................................................................................................... 159,611

Fire Protection:

New equipment ...................................................................................................................................................................... 497,509

Existing equipment (see discussion below) .......................................................................................................................... 622,486

Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Program ........................................................................................................................... 525,247

Training Course Development ...................................................................................................................................................... 163,844

Training ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 3,778,176

Pre-Revenue Service Testing ....................................................................................................................................................... 496,281

Total—System Safety ............................................................................................................................................................ 6,704,703

General Design Requirements—Tier I:

Anti-Climbing Mechanism & Link .................................................................................................................................................. 65,948

Forward Facing End Structure/Collision Posts ............................................................................................................................. 1,745,407

Rollover Strength .......................................................................................................................................................................... 60,927

Glazing .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 244,769

Brakes—ease of inspection .......................................................................................................................................................... 229,390

Interior Fittings .............................................................................................................................................................................. 466,449

Emergency Lighting ...................................................................................................................................................................... 1,483,162

Side Doors .................................................................................................................................................................................... 3,400,297

Total—Design Requirements ................................................................................................................................................ 7,696,349

Mechanical Inspections:

Daily Exterior Mechanical Inspections .......................................................................................................................................... 12,526,320

Daily Interior Mechanical Inspections ........................................................................................................................................... 1,567,829

Total—Inspections ................................................................................................................................................................. 22,666,895

Brake Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance:

Periodic MU Brake Maintenance .................................................................................................................................................. (20,052,750)

Periodic Coach Brake Maintenance ............................................................................................................................................. (5,468,750)

Periodic Cab Car Brake Maintenance .......................................................................................................................................... (6,158,448)

1,500-Mile Inspection .................................................................................................................................................................... (36,019,648)

Class IA Brake Tests .................................................................................................................................................................... (3,997,281)
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49787

Requirement category Cost

Class II Brake Tests ..................................................................................................................................................................... 3,996,147

Total—Brakes ........................................................................................................................................................................ (67,700,730)

Movement of Defective Equipment ...................................................................................................................................................... (9,915,997)

Total Net Impact ........................................................................................................................................................................... (40,548,780)

The costs of performing fire safety

analyses of existing equipment are

included in the calculations above.

However, the costs of modifying

equipment to reduce the risk of personal

injuries as required by the proposed rule

are not included in the above figures.

These costs could total between $8.75 to

$14 million. The costs depend on the

results of the proposed analyses, which

cannot be accurately predicted.

Consequently, the total net impact of the

proposed rule could be a savings of

$26,548,780.

In the last six years there have been

at least six passenger train accidents

which resulted in more than one train

occupant fatality. FRA does not know

the severity or number of commuter or

intercity passenger train accidents that

will occur in the future. Although

passenger railroads offer the travelling

public one of the safest forms of

transportation available—in the fiveyear period 1991–1995 there were 1.07

passenger fatalities per billion passenger

miles—the potential for injuries and

loss of life in certain situations is very

high. FRA believes that the proposed

rule represents a cost-effective approach

to providing a reasonable level of

protection against known threats to

human life. Accordingly, FRA believes

that it is reasonable to expect that the

measures called for in this proposal

would prevent or mitigate the severity

of casualties greater in value than the

costs of complying with the proposed

requirements.

FRA is allowing 60 days for

comments and invites public comment

on the issue of regulatory impact, and in

particular any impact the proposed rule

may have on small entities. FRA seeks

comments or data, or both, to help

identify or quantify other factors that

may affect the benefits or costs of the

proposal, including alternatives that

were not explored by the Working

Group and any costs or benefits

associated with such alternatives.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980

(5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires an

assessment of the impacts of proposed

rules on small entities. FRA has

conducted a regulatory flexibility

assessment of this rule’s impact on

small entities, and the assessment has

been placed in the public docket for this

rulemaking. This proposed rule affects

intercity passenger and commuter

railroads, and the proposed provisions

applicable to private cars may affect

other entities as well.

Entities impacted by the proposed

rule are principally governmental

jurisdictions or transit authorities,

which are not small for purposes of the

United States Small Business

Administration (i.e., no entity operates

in a locality with a population of under

50,000 people). Commuter railroads are

part of larger transit organizations that

receive Federal funds. FRA does not

expect that smaller commuter railroads

will be affected disproportionately. The

level of costs incurred by each

organization should vary in proportion

to the organization’s size. For instance,

railroads with fewer employees and

passenger equipment will have lower

costs associated with employee training

and the inspection, testing, and

maintenance of passenger equipment.

Tourist, scenic, historic, and

excursion railroad operations are

excepted from the proposed rule.

Entities devoted principally to such

operations are smaller railroads. A joint

FRA/industry working group formed

under RSAC is currently developing

recommendations regarding the

applicability of FRA regulations,

including this one, to tourist, scenic,

historic, and excursion railroads. After

appropriate consultation with the

excursion railroad associations takes

place, passenger equipment safety

requirements for these operations may

be proposed by FRA that are different

from those affecting other types of

passenger train operations.

A few provisions of the proposed rule

apply to private rail cars. These consist

of requirements concerning protection

against personal injury; rim-stamped

straight-plate wheels; suspension

system safety; safety appliances; brake

system safety; mechanical inspections;

and brake inspection, testing, and

maintenance. FRA has sought to

minimize the burden of the proposed

rule on private cars as much as possible,

while considering the safety concerns

associated with the use of private rail

cars in passenger trains operated by

railroads subject to the proposed rule.

FRA solicits comments or data, or both,

to identify the impacts of these

provisions to the extent that those

affected by such provisions are small

entities.

Paperwork Reduction Act

The proposed rule contains

information collection requirements.

FRA has submitted these information

collection requirements to the Office of

Management and Budget (OMB) for

review and approval in accordance with

the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995

(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). The sections

that contain the new information

collection requirements and the

estimated time to fulfill each

requirement are as follows:

CFR section Respondent universe Total annual responses Average time

per response

Total annual

burden hours

Total annual

burden cost

216.14—Special notice for repairs—

passenger equipment.

17 railroads ............... 12 letters ............................ 1 hour ............... 12 hours ........... $408

238.7—Waivers .................................. 17 railroads ............... 12 waivers .......................... 2 hours ............. 24 hours ........... 816

238.15—Movement of passenger

equipment with power brake defects, and 238.17—Movement of

passenger equipment with other

than power brake defects.

17 railroads ............... 408 cards/tags .................... 5 minutes .......... 34 hours ........... 1,020

Conditional requirement ..................... 17 railroads ............... 200 events .......................... 3 minutes .......... 10 hours ........... 300
49788 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

CFR section Respondent universe Total annual responses Average time

per response

Total annual

burden hours

Total annual

burden cost

238.19—Reporting and tracking defective passenger equipment.17 railroads ............... N/A ..................................... Usual and customary procedure.N/A ................... N/A

List of power brake repair points ....... 1 railroad ................... 1 list .................................... 2 hours ............. 2 hours ............. 68

Amendments to list ..................... 1 railroad ................... 1update .............................. 1 hour ............... 1 hour ............... 34

238.21/238.115/238.223(a)/

238.309(2)/238.3 11(a)/238.427(2)

Petitions for special approval of

alternative standard.

17 railroads ............... 1 petition ............................. 16 hours ........... 16 hours ........... 544

Petitions for special approval of

pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan.

17 railroads ............... 1 petition ............................. 24 hours ........... 24 hours ........... 816

Statement of interest in reviewing special approvals.Unknown ................... 2 statements ....................... 1 hour ............... 2 hours ............. 68

Comments on the petitions ......... Unknown ................... 2 comments ........................ 1 hour ............... 2 hours ............. 122

238.103—General system safety requirements.17 railroads ............... 17 plans .............................. 433 hours ......... 7,361 hours ...... 355,351

Amendments to System Safety

Plan.

17 railroads ............... 17 amendments ................. 11 hours ........... 187 hours ......... 97,801

Traceabillity and Auditability ....... 17 railroads ............... 17 documents ..................... 150 hours ......... 2,550 hours ...... 86,700

238.105—Fire protection program

238.115—Fire safety

Plan ............................................. 6 equipment manufacturers.4.8 (5 yr. average) ............. 224 hours ......... 1,075 hours ...... 75,725

Subsequent equipment orders ... 6 equipment manufacturers.4.8 (5 yr. average) ............. 60 hours ........... 288 hours ......... 28,800

Preliminary fire safety analysis ... 17 railroads ............... 17 documents ..................... 128 hours ......... 2,184 hours ...... 451,344

Final fire safety analysis ............. 16 railroads ............... 5.3 documents (3 yr. average).68 hours ........... 795 hours ......... 79,467

Fire safety analysis on equipment transfer.17 railroads ............... 1 document ........................ 8 hours ............. 8 hours ............. 800

Certification ................................. 6 equipment manufacturers.6 certifications .................... 120 hours ......... 720 hours ......... 72,000

238.107—Software safety plan .......... 17 railroads ............... N/A ..................................... Usual and customary procedure.N/A ................... N/A

238.109—Inspection, testing, and

maintenance program

Program ...................................... 17 railroads ............... N/A ..................................... Usual and customary procedure.N/A ................... N/A

Maintenance intervals ................. 17 railroads ............... 1 change ............................ 88 hours ........... 88 hours ........... 3,208

Standard procedures for safely

performing inspection, testing,

and maintenance or repairs.

17 railroads ............... 17 procedures .................... 96 hours ........... 1,632 ................ 62,832

Subsequent years—new railroads.1 railroad ................... 1 procedure ........................ 96 hours ........... 96 hours ........... 3,696

Subsequent years—railroad annual review and necessary

modifications.

17 railroads ............... 17 amendments ................. 19 hours ........... 323 hours ......... 12,359

New equipment purchases ......... 6 equipment manufacturers.4.8 designs (5 yr. average) 120 hours ......... 576 hours ......... 57,600

238.111 Training, qualification, and

designation program

Training employees to perform

brake-related inspections,

tests, or maintenance.

17 railroads ............... N/A ..................................... Usual and customary procedure.N/A ................... N/A

Training employees to perform

daily mechanical inspections.

17 railroads ............... 5,950 employees/235 instructors.2 hours ............. 12,376 hours .... 368,900

Development of Training Program.17 railroads ............... 17 programs ....................... 520 hours ......... 8,840 hours ...... 282,880

Record keeping ........................... 17 railroads ............... 5,950 records ..................... 3 minutes .......... 298 hours ......... 10,132

238.113—Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan.6 equipment manufacturers.4.8 plans (5 yr. average) .... 200 hours ......... 960 hours ......... 83,328

Subsequent equipment orders ... 6 equipment manufacturers.4.8 plans (5 yr. average) .... 60 hours ........... 288 hours ......... 22,464

Previously used equipment ........ 6 equipment manufacturers.4.8 plans (5 yr. average) .... 60 hours ........... 288 hours ......... 22,464

238.231—Brake System

Identify and mark emergency

brake.

N/A ............................ N/A ..................................... Usual and customary procedure.N/A ................... N/A

238.239—Automated monitoring ....... 17 railroads ............... 17 documents ..................... 2 hours ............. 34 hours ........... 1,156
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49789

CFR section Respondent universe Total annual responses Average time

per response

Total annual

burden hours

Total annual

burden cost

238.303—Exterior calendar day mechanical inspection of passenger

cars and unpowered vehicles used

in passenger trains.

N/A ............................ N/A ..................................... Usual and customary procedure.N/A ................... N/A

238.305—Interior calendar day mechanical inspection of passenger

cars

Stenciling or marking emergency

brake valve.

N/A ............................ N/A ..................................... Usual and customary procedure.N/A ................... N/A

Stenciling or marking high voltage equipment.N/A ............................ N/A ..................................... Usual and customary procedure.N/A ................... N/A

Tagging of defective doors ......... 9 railroads ................. 540 tags ............................. 1 minute ........... 9 hours ............. 306

238.307—Periodic mechanical inspection of passenger cars.N/A ............................ N/A ..................................... Usual and customary procedure.N/A ................... N/A

238.309—Records of periodic maintenance.N/A ............................ N/A ..................................... Usual and customary procedure.N/A ................... N/A

238.313—Class I Brake Test ............. N/A ............................ N/A ..................................... Usual and customary procedure.N/A ................... N/A

238.403—Crash energy management

requirements.

1 railroad ................... 1 analysis ........................... 120 hours ......... 120 hours ......... 12,000

238.405—Longitudinal static compressive strength.17 railroads ............... 1 design .............................. 20 hours ........... 20 hours ........... 680

238.421—Gazing

Marking of glazing material ........ N/A ............................ N/A ..................................... Usual and customary procedure.N/A ................... N/A

Stenciling requirement ................ N/A ............................ N/A ..................................... Usual and customary procedure.N/A ................... N/A

238.431—Brake System .................... 1 railroad ................... 1 analysis ........................... 40 hours ........... 40 hours ........... 1,360

238.437—Emergency communication 3 car manufacturers .. 3 instructions ...................... 1 hour ............... 3 hours ............. 90

238.439—Emergency window exits

and roof hatches—Marking.

3 car manufacturers .. 16 cars marked .................. 15 minutes ........ 4 hours ............. 120

238.503—Inspection, testing, and

maintenance requirements

238.505—Program approval procedures

Submission of program ............... 1 railroad ................... 1 program ........................... 80 hours ........... 80 hours ........... 2,720

Amendments to program ............ 1 railroad ................... 1 amendment ..................... 8 hours ............. 8 hours ............. 272

Comments ................................... 4 unions/individuals ... 4 comments ........................ 1 hour ............... 4 hours ............. 244

Approval ...................................... N/A ............................ N/A ..................................... No disapprovals

expected at

this time.

N/A ................... N/A

238.603—Process to introduce new

technology.

1 railroad ................... 1 plan ................................. 100 hours ......... 100 hours ......... 3,400

Appendix B to Part 238—Labeling requirement.5–6 seat manufacturers.N/A ..................................... Usual and customary procedure.N/A ................... N/A

All estimates include the time for

reviewing instructions; searching

existing data sources; gathering or

maintaining the needed data; and

reviewing the information. Pursuant to

44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(B), FRA solicits

comments concerning: whether these

information collection requirements are

necessary for the proper performance of

the functions of FRA, including whether

the information has practical utility; the

accuracy of FRA’s estimates of the

burden of the information collection

requirements; the quality, utility, and

clarity of the information to be

collected; and whether the burden of

collection of information on those who

are to respond, including through the

use of automated collection techniques

or other forms of information

technology, may be minimized. For

information or a copy of the paperwork

package submitted to OMB contact Ms.

Gloria Swanson Eutsler at 202–632–

3318.

Organizations and individuals

desiring to submit comments on the

collection of information requirements

should direct them to the Office of

Management and Budget, Attention:

Desk Officer for the Federal Railroad

Administration, Office of Information

and Regulatory Affairs, New Executive

Office Building, 726 Jackson Place,

N.W., Washington, D.C. 20503, and

should also send a copy of their

comments to Ms. Gloria Swanson

Eutsler, Federal Railroad

Administration, 400 Seventh Street,

S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

OMB is required to make a decision

concerning the collection of information

requirements contained in this NPRM

between 30 and 60 days after

publication of this document in the
49790 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

Federal Register. Therefore, a comment

to OMB is best assured of having its full

effect if OMB receives it within 30 days

of publication. The final rule will

respond to any OMB or public

comments on the information collection

requirements contained in this proposal.

FRA is not authorized to impose a

penalty on persons for violating

information collection requirements

which do not display a current OMB

control number, if required. FRA

intends to obtain current OMB control

numbers for any new information

collection requirements resulting from

this rulemaking action prior to the

effective date of a final rule. The OMB

control number, when assigned, will be

announced by separate notice in the

Federal Register.

Environmental Impact

FRA has evaluated these proposed

regulations in accordance with its

procedures for ensuring full

consideration of the environmental

impact of FRA actions, as required by

the National Environmental Policy Act

(42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), and related

directives. This notice meets the criteria

that establish this as a non-major action

for environmental purposes.

Federalism Implications

This proposed rule has been analyzed

in accordance with the principles and

criteria contained in Executive Order

12612, and it has been determined that

the proposed rule does not have

sufficient federalism implications to

warrant the preparation of a Federalism

Assessment. The fundamental policy

decision providing that Federal

regulations should govern aspects of

service provided by municipal and

public benefit corporations (or agencies)

of State governments is embodied in the

statute quoted above (49 U.S.C. 20133).

Further, FRA has consulted with

commuter authorities in developing this

proposed rule.

Request for Public Comments

FRA proposes to adopt a new part 238

and to amend parts 216, 223, 229, 231,

and 232 of title 49, Code of Federal

Regulations, as set forth below. FRA

solicits comments on all aspects of the

proposed rule whether through written

submissions, participation in the public

hearing, or both. FRA may make

changes in the final rule based on

comments received in response to this

proposed rule.

List of Subjects

49 CFR Part 216

Railroad safety, Special notice for

repairs.

49 CFR Part 223

Railroad safety, Glazing standards.

49 CFR Part 229

Railroad safety, Railroad locomotive

safety.

49 CFR Part 231

Railroad safety, Railroad safety

appliances.

49 CFR Part 232

Railroad safety, Railroad power

brakes.

49 CFR Part 238

Railroad safety, Railroad passenger

equipment.

The Proposed Rule

In consideration of the foregoing, FRA

proposes to amend chapter II, subtitle B

of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations

as follows:

PART 216—[AMENDED]

1. The authority citation for part 216

is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102–20104, 20133,

20137–20138, 20141, 20143, 20301–20302,

20701–20702, 21301–21302, 21304; 49 CFR

1.49(c), (m).

2. Section 216.1(a) is revised to read

as follows:

§ 216.1 Application.

(a) This part applies, according to its

terms, to each railroad that uses or

operates—

(1) A railroad freight car subject to

part 215 of this chapter;

(2) A locomotive subject to 49 U.S.C.

chapter 207 (49 U.S.C. 20701–20703); or

(3) Railroad passenger equipment

subject to part 238 of this chapter.

* * * * *

3. Section 216.3(b) is amended by

removing the phrase ‘‘section 206 of the

Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45

U.S.C. 435)’’ and adding in its place the

phrase ‘‘49 U.S.C. 20105’’.

4. Section 216.5(c) is amended by

adding after ‘‘216.13,’’: ‘‘216.14,’’.

5. The first sentence of § 216.13(a) is

amended by removing the phrase ‘‘the

FRA Locomotive Inspection Regulations

set forth in part 230’’ and by adding in

its place the phrase ‘‘the FRA Railroad

Locomotive Safety Standards set forth in

part 229 of this chapter or the FRA

Railroad Locomotive Inspection

Regulations set forth in part 230 of this

chapter’’. The third sentence of

§ 216.13(a) is amended by removing the

phrase ‘‘part 230’’ and adding in its

place the phrase ‘‘parts 229 and 230’’.

6. Section 216.14 is added to read as

follows:

§ 216.14 Special notice for repairs—

passenger equipment.

(a) When an FRA Motive Power and

Equipment Inspector or a State

Equipment Inspector determines that

railroad passenger equipment is not in

conformity with one or more of the

requirements of the FRA Passenger

Equipment Safety Standards set forth in

part 238 of this chapter and that it is

unsafe for further service, he or she

notifies the railroad in writing that the

equipment is not in serviceable

condition. The Special Notice sets out

and describes the defect or defects that

cause the equipment to be in

unserviceable condition. After receipt of

the Special Notice, the railroad shall

remove the equipment from service

until it is restored to serviceable

condition. The equipment may not be

deemed in serviceable condition until it

complies with all applicable

requirements of part 238 of this chapter. (b) The railroad shall notify in writing

the FRA Regional Administrator for the

FRA region in which the Special Notice

was issued when the equipment is

returned to service, specifying the

repairs completed. (c) Railroad passenger equipment

subject to a Special Notice may be

moved from the place where it was

found to be unsafe for further service to

the nearest available point where the

equipment can be repaired, if such

movement is necessary to make the

repairs. However, the movement is

subject to the further restrictions of

§§ 238.15 and 238.17 of this chapter.

§ 216.1 [Amended]

7. Section 216.17(a) is amended as

follows:

a. By adding, after ‘‘216.13’’,

‘‘216.14,’;

b. By adding, after the word

‘‘locomotive,’’ in the third sentence, the

phrase ‘‘railroad passenger equipment,’;

and

c. By revising the fifth sentence to

read as follows:

‘‘If upon reinspection, the railroad

freight car, locomotive, or passenger

equipment is found to be in serviceable

condition, or the track is found to

comply with the requirements for the

class at which it was previously

operated by the railroad, the FRA

Regional Administrator or his or her

agent immediately notifies the railroad,

whereupon the restrictions of the

Special Notice cease to be effective.’’ 8. In subpart B of part 216, the

phrases ‘‘the FRA Regional Director for

Railroad Safety’’, ‘‘the FRA Regional

Director of Railroad Safety’’, ‘‘a Regional

Director’’ and ‘‘the Regional Director’’

are removed, and the phrase ‘‘the FRA

Regional Administrator’’ is added in

their place.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49791

PART 223—[AMENDED]

9. The authority citation for part 223

is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102–20103, 20133,

20701–20702, 21301–21302, 21304; 49 CFR

1.49(c), (m).

10. Section 223.3 is amended by

adding paragraph (c) to read as follows:

§ 223.3 Application.

* * * * *

(c) Except for § 223.9(d), this part does

not apply to Tier II passenger equipment

as defined in § 238.5 of this chapter (i.e.,

passenger equipment operating at

speeds exceeding 125 mph but not

exceeding 150 mph).

PART 229—[AMENDED]

11. The authority citation for part 229

is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102–20103, 20133,

20137–20138, 20143, 20701–20703, 21301–

21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).

12 . Section 229.3 is amended by

revising paragraph (a) and adding new

paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) to read as

follows:

§ 229.3 Applicability.

(a) Except as provided in paragraphs

(b) through (e) of this section, this part

applies to all standard gage railroads.

(b) * * *

(c) Paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) through

(h) of § 229.125 do not apply to Tier II

passenger equipment as defined in

§ 238.5 of this chapter (i.e., passenger

equipment operating at speeds

exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding

150 mph).

(d) On or after January 1, 1998,

paragraphs (a)(1) and (b)(1) of § 229.141

do not apply to ‘‘passenger equipment’’

as defined in § 238.5 of this chapter that

is subject to part 238 of this chapter.

(e) Paragraphs (a)(2) through (a)(4),

and (b)(2) through (b)(4) of § 229.141 do

not apply to ‘‘passenger equipment’’ as

defined in § 238.5 of this chapter that is

subject to part 238 of this chapter and

placed in service for the first time on or

after January 1, 1998.

PART 231—[AMENDED]

13. The authority citation for part 231

is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102–20103, 20131,

20301–20303, 21301–21302, 21304; 49 CFR

1.49 (c), (m).

14. Section 231.0 is amended by

redesignating paragraphs (c) through (e)

as paragraphs (d) through (f),

respectively; by revising paragraph (a);

and by adding a new paragraph (c) to

read as follows:

§ 231.0 Applicability and penalties.

(a) Except as provided in paragraphs

(b) and (c) of this section, this part

applies to all standard gage railroads.

(b) * * *

(c) Except for the provisions

governing uncoupling devices, this part

does not apply to Tier II passenger

equipment as defined in § 238.5 of this

chapter (i.e., passenger equipment

operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph

but not exceeding 150 mph).

* * * * *

PART 232—[AMENDED]

15. The authority citation for part 232

is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102–20103, 20133,

20141, 20301–20303, 20306, 21301–21302,

21304; 49 CFR 1.49 (c), (m).

16. Section 232.0 is amended by

redesignating paragraphs (c) through (e)

as paragraphs (d) through (f),

respectively; by revising paragraph (a);

and by adding a new paragraph (c) to

read as follows:

§ 232.0 Applicability and penalties.

(a) Except as provided in paragraphs

(b) and (c) of this section, this part

applies to all standard gage railroads.

(b) * * *

(c) Except for §§ 232.2 and 232.21

through 232.25, this part does not apply

to a ‘‘passenger train’’ or ‘‘passenger

equipment’’ as defined in § 238.5 of this

chapter that is subject to part 238 of this

chapter.

* * * * *

17. Part 238 is added to read as

follows:

PART 238—PASSENGER EQUIPMENT

SAFETY STANDARDS

Subpart A—General

Sec.

238.1 Purpose and scope.

238.3 Application.

238.5 Definitions.

238.7 Waivers.

238.9 Responsibility for compliance.

238.11 Civil penalties.

238.13 Preemptive effect.

238.15 Movement of passenger equipment

with power brake defects.

238.17 Movement of passenger equipment

with other than power brake defects.

238.19 Reporting and tracking defective

passenger equipment.

238.21 Special approval procedure.

Subpart B—System Safety and General

Requirements

238.101 Scope.

System Safety

238.103 General system safety

requirements.

238.105 Fire protection program.

238.107 Software safety program.

238.109 Inspection, testing, and

maintenance program.

238.111 Training, qualification, and

designation program.

238.113 Pre-revenue service acceptance

testing plan.

General Requirements

238.115 Fire safety.

238.117 Protection against personal injury.

238.119 Rim-stamped straight-plate wheels.

238.121 Train system software and

hardware.

238.123 Emergency lighting.

Subpart C—Specific Requirements for Tier

I Passenger Equipment

238.201 Scope.

238.203 Static end strength.

238.205 Anti-climbing mechanism.

238.207 Link between coupling mechanism

and car body.

238.209 Forward-facing end structure of

locomotives.

238.211 Collision posts.

238.213 Corner posts.

238.215 Rollover strength.

238.217 Side impact strength.

238.219 Truck-to-car-body attachment.

238.221 Glazing.

238.223 Fuel tanks.

238.225 Electrical system.

238.227 Suspension system.

238.229 Safety appliances.

238.231 Brake system.

238.233 Interior fittings and surfaces.

238.235 Emergency window exits.

238.237 Doors.

238.239 Automated monitoring.

Subpart D—Inspection, Testing, and

Maintenance Requirements for Tier I

Passenger Equipment

238.301 Scope.

238.303 Exterior calendar day mechanical

inspection of passenger cars and

unpowered vehicles used in passenger

trains.

238.305 Interior calendar day mechanical

inspection of passenger cars.

238.307 Periodic mechanical inspection of

passenger cars.

238.309 Periodic brake equipment

maintenance.

238.311 Single car test.

238.313 Class I brake test.

238.315 Class IA brake test.

238.317 Class II brake test.

238.319 Running brake test.

Subpart E—Specific Requirements for Tier

II Passenger Equipment

238.401 Scope.

238.403 Crash energy management

requirements.

238.405 Longitudinal static compressive

strength.

238.407 Anti-climbing mechanism.

238.409 Forward end structures of power

car cabs.

238.411 Rear end structures of power car

cabs.

238.413 End structures of trailer cars.

238.415 Rollover strength.
49792 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

238.417 Side loads.

238.419 Truck-to-car-body and truck

component attachment.

238.421 Glazing.

238.423 Fuel tanks.

238.425 Electrical system.

238.427 Suspension system.

238.429 Safety appliances.

238.431 Brake system.

238.433 Draft system.

238.435 Interior fittings and surfaces.

238.437 Emergency communication.

238.439 Emergency window exits and roof

hatches.

238.441 Doors.

238.443 Headlights.

238.445 Automated monitoring.

238.447 Operator’s controls and cab layout.

Subpart F—Inspection, Testing, and

Maintenance Requirements for Tier II

Passenger Equipment

238.501 Scope.

238.503 Inspection, testing, and

maintenance requirements.

238.505 Program approval procedure.

Subpart G—Introduction of New

Technology to Tier II Passenger Equipment

238.601 Scope.

238.603 Process to introduce new

technology.

Appendix A to Part 238—Schedule of Civil

Penalties [Reserved]

Appendix B to Part 238—Test Performance

Criteria for the Flammability and Smoke

Emission Characteristics of Materials

Used in Constructing or Refurbishing

Locomotive Cab and Passenger Car

Interiors

Appendix C to Part 238—Suspension System

Safety Performance Standards

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102–20103, 20133,

20141, 20301–20303, 20306, 20701–20702,

21301–21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).

Subpart A—General

§ 238.1 Purpose and scope.

(a) The purpose of this part is to:

(1) Prevent accidents involving

railroad passenger equipment that cause

damage to property, or injury or death

to railroad employees, railroad

passengers, or the general public; and

(2) Mitigate the consequences of

accidents involving railroad passenger

equipment, to the extent such accidents

cannot be prevented.

(b) This part prescribes minimum

Federal safety standards for railroad

passenger equipment. This part does not

restrict a railroad from adopting and

enforcing additional or more stringent

requirements not inconsistent with this

part.

§ 238.3 Application.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph

(c) of this section, this part applies to

all:

(1) Railroads that operate intercity or

commuter passenger train service on

standard gage track which is part of the

general railroad system of

transportation;

(2) Railroads that provide commuter

or other short-haul rail passenger train

service in a metropolitan or suburban

area as described by 49 U.S.C. 20102(1),

including public authorities operating

passenger train service; and

(3) Rapid transit operations in an

urban area.

(b) Railroads that permit to be used or

hauled on their lines passenger

equipment subject to this part, in

violation of a power brake provision of

this part or a safety appliance provision

of this part, are subject to the power

brake and safety appliance provisions of

this part with respect to such

operations.

(c) This part does not apply to:

(1) Rapid transit operations in an

urban area that are not connected with

the general railroad system of

transportation;

(2) Circus trains; or

(3) Tourist, scenic, historic, or

excursion operations, whether on or off

the general railroad system of

transportation.

§ 238.5 Definitions.

As used in this part—

AAR means the Association of

American Railroads.

Alerter means a device or system

installed in the operator cab to promote

continuous, active operator

attentiveness by monitoring select

operator-induced control activities. If

fluctuation of a monitored operator

control is not detected within a

predetermined time, a sequence of

audible and visual alarms is activated so

as to progressively prompt a response by

the operator. Failure by the operator to

institute a change of state in a

monitored control, or acknowledge the

alerter alarm activity through a manual

reset provision, results in a penalty

brake application, bringing the

locomotive or train to a stop.

Anti-climbing mechanism means a

device at the ends of adjoining vehicles

in a train that is designed to engage

when subjected to large buff loads to

prevent the override of the vehicles.

Bind means restrict the intended

movement of one or more brake system

components by reduced clearance, by

obstruction, or by increased friction.

Block of cars means one car or

multiple cars in a solid unit coupled

together for the purpose of being added

to, or removed from, a train as a solid

unit.

Brake, air or power brake means a

combination of devices operated by

compressed air, arranged in a system,

and controlled manually, electrically, or

pneumatically, by means of which the

motion of a car or locomotive is retarded

or arrested.

Brake control system means the

components, including software, that

either automatically or under the

control of the engineer control the

retarding force applied to the train by

the brake system.

Brake, disc means a retardation

system used on some rail vehicles,

primarily passenger equipment, that

utilizes flat metal discs as the braking

surface instead of the wheel tread.

Brake, dynamic means a train braking

system whereby the kinetic energy of a

moving train is used to generate electric

current at the locomotive traction

motors, which is then dissipated

through banks of resistor grids or back

into the catenary or third rail system.

Brake, effective means a brake that is

capable of producing its required design

retarding force on the train.

Brake indicator means a device,

actuated by brake cylinder pressure,

which indicates whether brakes are

applied or released.

Brake, inoperative means a primary

brake that, for any reason, no longer

applies or releases as intended or is

otherwise ineffective.

Brake, on-tread friction means a

braking system that uses a brake shoe

that acts on the tread of the wheel to

retard the vehicle.

Brake, parking or hand brake means

a brake that can be applied and released

by hand to prevent movement of a

stationary car or locomotive.

Brake pipe means the system of

piping (including branch pipes, angle

cocks, cutout cocks, dirt collectors,

hose, and hose couplings) used for

connecting locomotives and all cars for

the passage of air to control the

locomotive and car brakes.

Brake, power means ‘‘air brake’’ as

that term is defined in this section.

Brake, primary means those

components of the train brake system

necessary to stop the train within the

signal spacing distance without thermal

damage to friction braking surfaces.

Brake, secondary means those

components of the train brake system

which develop supplemental brake

retarding force that is not needed to stop

the train within signal spacing distances

or to prevent thermal damage to wheels.

Brake shoes or pads aligned with

tread or disc means that the surface of

the brake shoe or pad, respectively,

engages the surface of the wheel tread

or disc, respectively, with no more than

a 1⁄4 inch overhang.

Braking system, blended means a

braking system where the primary brake

and one or more secondary brakes are
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49793

automatically combined to stop the

train. If the secondary brakes are

unavailable, the blended brake uses the

primary brake alone to stop the train.

Calendar day means a time period

starting at 12:01 am and ending at

midnight on a given date.

Class I brake test means a complete

passenger train brake system test (as

further specified in § 238.313)

performed by a qualified mechanical

inspector to ensure that the air brake

system is 100 percent effective.

Class IA brake test means a test and

inspection (as further specified in

§ 238.315) of the air brake system on

each car in a passenger train to ensure

the air brake system is 100 percent

effective.

Class II brake test means a test (as

further specified in § 238.317) of brake

pipe integrity and continuity from the

controlling locomotive to the rear unit

of a passenger train.

Collision posts means members of the

end structures of a vehicle that project

upward vertically from the underframe

to which they are securely attached, and

that provide protection of occupied

compartments from an object

penetrating the vehicle during a

collision.

Control valves means that part of the

air brake equipment on each car or

locomotive that controls the charging,

application, and release of the air

brakes, in response to train line

commands.

Corner posts means structural

members located at the intersection of

the front or rear surface with the side

surface of a vehicle and which extend

vertically from the floor support

structure to the roof support structure.

Corner posts may be combined with

collision posts to become part of the end

structure.

Crack means a fracture without

complete separation into parts, except

that, in a casting, a shrinkage crack or

hot tear that does not significantly

diminish the strength of the member is

not a crack.

Crash energy management means an

approach to the design of rail passenger

equipment which controls the

dissipation of energy during a collision

to protect the occupied volumes from

crushing and to limit the decelerations

on passengers and crewmembers in

those volumes. This may be

accomplished by designing energyabsorbing structures of low strength in

the unoccupied volumes of a rail

vehicle or passenger train to collapse in

a controlled fashion, while providing

higher structural strength in the

occupied volumes. Energy deflection

can also be part of a crash energy

management approach. Crash energy

management can be used to help

provide anti-climbing resistance and to

reduce the risk of train buckling during

a collision.

Crash refuge means a volume with

extreme structural strength designed to

maximize the survivability of

crewmembers stationed in the

locomotive cab during a collision.

Crewmember means a railroad

employee called to perform service

covered by 49 U.S.C. 21103 and subject

to the railroad’s operating rules and

program of operational tests and

inspections required in §§ 217.9 and

217.11 of this chapter.

Critical buckling stress means

minimum stress necessary to initiate

buckling of a structural member.

Emergency application means an

irretrievable brake application resulting

in the maximum retarding force

available from the train brake system.

End structure means the main support

structure projecting upward from the

floor or underframe of a locomotive,

passenger car, or other rail vehicle. The

end structure is securely attached to the

underframe at each end of a rail vehicle.

Foul means restrict the intended

movement of one or more brake system

components because the component is

snagged, entangled, or twisted.

Fuel tank, integral means a fuel

containment volume that is integral

with some other structural element of

the locomotive not designed solely as a

fuel container.

Full-height collision post, corner post,

or side frame post means any vertical

framing member in the car body

structure that spans the distance

between the underframe and the roof at

the car body section where the post is

located. For collision posts located at

the approximate third points of an end

frame, the term ‘‘full-height’’ applies to

posts that extend and connect to

supporting structural members in the

roof at the location of the posts, or to a

beam connected to the tops of the endframe and supported by the roof rails (or

anti-telescoping plate), or to both.

Full service application means a brake

application which results in a brake

cylinder pressure at the service limiting

valve setting or equivalent.

Glazing, end-facing means a glazing

panel located where a line

perpendicular to the exterior surface of

the panel makes an angle of 50 degrees

or less with the longitudinal center line

of the rail vehicle in which the panel is

installed. A glazing panel that curves so

as to meet the definition for both sidefacing and end-facing glazing is endfacing glazing.

Glazing, exterior means a glazing

panel that is an integral part of the

exterior skin of a rail vehicle with a

surface exposed to the outside

environment.

Glazing frame means the arrangement

used to install the glazing into the

structure of a rail vehicle.

Glazing, interior means a glazing

panel with no surface exposed to the

outside environment and which is

protected from projectiles by the

structure of a rail vehicle.

Glazing, side-facing means a glazing

panel located where a line

perpendicular to the exterior surface of

the panel makes an angle of more than

50 degrees with the longitudinal center

line of the rail vehicle in which the

panel is installed.

Handrails means safety appliances

installed on either side of a rail vehicle’s

exterior doors to assist passengers and

crew to safely board and depart the

vehicle.

Head end power means power

generated on board the locomotive of a

passenger train used for purposes other

than propelling the train, such as

cooking, heating, illumination,

ventilation and air conditioning.

Hunting oscillations means, for

purposes of Tier I equipment, lateral

oscillations of trucks that could lead to

a dangerous instability and, for

purposes of Tier II equipment, truck

frame lateral oscillations exceeding 0.8g

peak-to-peak for six or more consecutive

oscillations.

In passenger service, when used in

connection with passenger equipment,

means passenger equipment subject to

this part that is carrying, or available to

carry, fare-paying passengers.

In service, when used in connection

with passenger equipment, means:

(1) Passenger equipment subject to

this part that is in passenger service;

and

(2) All other passenger equipment

subject to this part, unless the passenger

equipment:

(i) Is being handled in accordance

with §§ 238.15, 238.17, 238.305(c)(5), or

238.503(f), as applicable;

(ii) Is in a repair shop or on a repair

track;

(iii) Is on a storage track and is not

carrying passengers; or

(iv) Has been delivered in interchange

but has not been accepted by the

receiving railroad.

Interior fitting means any auxiliary

component in the passenger

compartment which is mounted to the

floor, ceiling, sidewalls, or end walls

and projects into the passenger

compartment from the surface or

surfaces to which it is mounted. Interior
49794 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

fittings do not include side and end

walls, floors, door pockets, or ceiling

lining materials, for example.

Lateral means the horizontal direction

perpendicular to the direction of travel

of a rail vehicle.

Locomotive means a piece of on-track

equipment, other than hi-rail,

specialized maintenance, or other

similar equipment, which may consist

of one or more units operated from a

single control stand with one or more

propelling motors designed for moving

other equipment; with one or more

propelling motors designed to transport

freight or passenger traffic or both; or

without propelling motors but with one

or more control stands. This term does

not include a locomotive propelled by

steam power unless it is used to haul an

intercity or commuter passenger train.

Locomotive cab means a compartment

or space on board a locomotive where

the control stand is located and which

is normally occupied by the engineer

when the locomotive is being operated.

Locomotive, cab car means a unit of

rolling equipment intended to provide

transportation for members of the

general public that is without propelling

motors but with one or more control

stands.

Locomotive, controlling means the

locomotive from which the engineer

exercises control over the train.

Locomotive, MU means a unit of

rolling equipment self-propelled by any

power source, other than steam, and

intended to provide transportation for

members of the general public.

Longitudinal means in a direction

parallel to the normal direction of travel

of a rail vehicle.

Luminescent material means a

material that absorbs light energy when

ambient levels of light are high and

emits this stored energy when ambient

levels of light are low, making the

material appear to glow in the dark.

L/V ratio means the lateral force that

the flange of a vehicle’s wheel exerts on

the rail, divided by the vertical force

that the tread of the same wheel exerts

on the rail.

MIL–STD–882C means a military

standard issued by the United States

Department of Defense to provide

uniform requirements for developing

and implementing a system safety

program to identify and then eliminate

the hazards of a system or reduce the

associated risk to an acceptable level.

Occupied volume means the spaces of

a rail vehicle or passenger train where

passengers or crewmembers are

normally located during service

operation, such as the operating cab and

passenger seating and sleeping areas.

Vestibules are typically not considered

occupied, except when in use as a

control cab.

Ordered or date ordered means the

date on which notice to proceed is given

by a procuring railroad to a contractor

or supplier for new equipment.

Override means to climb over the

normal coupling or side buffers and

linking mechanism and impact the end

of the adjoining rail vehicle or unit

above the underframe.

Passenger car means a unit of rail

rolling equipment intended to provide

transportation for members of the

general public and includes a selfpropelled car designed to carry

passengers, baggage, mail, or express.

This term includes a passenger coach,

cab car, and an MU locomotive. This

term does not include a private car.

Passenger coach means a unit of rail

rolling equipment intended to provide

transportation for members of the

general public that is without propelling

motors and without a control stand.

Passenger equipment means all

powered and unpowered passenger cars,

locomotives used to haul a passenger

car, and any other unit of rail rolling

equipment hauled in a train with one or

more passenger cars. Passenger

equipment includes a—

(1) Passenger coach,

(2) Cab car,

(3) MU locomotive,

(4) Private car,

(5) Locomotive not intended to

provide transportation for a member of

the general public that is used to power

a passenger train, and

(6) Any non-self-propelled vehicle

hauled in a passenger train, including a

freight car.

Passenger station means a location

designated in a railroad’s timetable

where passengers are regularly

scheduled to get on or off any train.

Permanent deformation means the

undergoing of a permanent change in

shape of a structural member of a rail

vehicle.

Piston travel means the amount of

linear movement of the air brake hollow

rod (or equivalent) or piston rod when

forced outward by movement of the

piston in the brake cylinder or actuator

and limited by the brake shoes being

forced against the wheel or disc.

Power car means a rail vehicle that

propels a Tier II passenger train or is the

lead vehicle in a Tier II passenger train,

or both.

Pre-revenue service acceptance testing

plan means a document, as further

specified in § 238.113, prepared by a

railroad that explains in detail how prerevenue service tests of certain

passenger equipment demonstrate that

the equipment meets Federal safety

standards and the railroad’s own safety

design requirements.

Private car means historical or

antiquated rail rolling equipment that is

used only for excursion, recreational, or

private transportation businesses. A

private car is not a passenger car.

Qualified mechanical inspector

means a qualified person who has

received, as a part of the training,

qualification, and designation program

required under § 238.111, instruction

and training that includes ‘‘hands-on’’

experience (under appropriate

supervision or apprenticeship) in one or

more of the following functions:

troubleshooting, inspection, testing, and

maintenance or repair of the specific

train brake and other components and

systems for which the inspector is

assigned responsibility. Further, the

mechanical inspector shall be a person

whose primary responsibility includes

work generally consistent with the

above-referenced functions and is

designated to—

(1) Conduct Class I brake tests under

this part;

(2) Inspect MU locomotives or other

passenger cars for compliance with this

part; or

(3) Determine whether equipment not

in compliance with this part may be

moved safely and, if so, under what

conditions.

Qualified person means a person

determined by a railroad to have the

knowledge and skills necessary to

perform one or more functions required

under this part. The railroad determines

the qualifications and competencies for

employees designated to perform

various functions in the manner set

forth in this part.

Railroad means any form of nonhighway ground transportation that runs

on rails or electromagnetic guideways,

including:

(1) Commuter or short-haul rail

passenger service in a metropolitan or

suburban area and commuter railroad

service that was operated by the

Consolidated Rail Corporation on

January 1, 1979; and

(2) High speed ground transportation

systems that connect metropolitan areas,

without regard to whether those systems

use new technologies not associated

with traditional railroads. The term

‘‘railroad’’ is also intended to mean a

person that provides railroad

transportation, whether directly or by

contracting out operation of the railroad

to another person. The term does not

include rapid transit operations in an

urban area that are not connected to the

general railroad system of

transportation.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49795

Rebuilt means equipment undergoing

overhaul identified by the railroad as a

capital expense under the Surface

Transportation Board’s accounting

standards.

Refresher training means periodic

retraining required by a railroad for

employees or contractors to remain

qualified to perform specific equipment

inspection, testing, or maintenance

functions.

Repair point means a location

designated by a railroad where repairs

of the type necessary occur on a regular

basis. A repair point has, or should

have, the facilities, tools, and qualified

mechanical employees required to make

the necessary repairs. A repair point

need not be staffed continuously.

Respond as intended means to

produce the result that a device or

system is designed to produce.

Rollover strength means strength

needed to protect the structural integrity

of a rail vehicle in the event the vehicle

leaves the track and impacts the ground

on its side or roof.

Roof rail means the longitudinal

structural member at the intersection of

the side wall and the roof sheathing.

Running brake test means a test (as

further specified in § 238.319) of a train

system or component while the train is

in motion to verify that the system or

component functions as intended.

Safety appliance means an appliance

required under 49 U.S.C. chapter 203,

excluding power brakes. The term

includes automatic couplers, hand

brakes, sill steps, handholds, handrails,

or ladder treads made of steel or a

material of equal or greater mechanical

strength used by the traveling public or

railroad employees that provides a

means for safely coupling, uncoupling,

or ascending or descending passenger

equipment.

Safety-critical component or system

means a component or system that, if

not available, increases the risk of

damage to equipment or injury to a

passenger, crewmember, or other

person.

Safety-critical task means a task that,

if not performed correctly, increases the

risk of damage to equipment or injury to

a passenger, crewmember, or other

person.

Safety inspection criteria means a

measurement limit or observation

threshold used to trigger the duty under

this part to take corrective action to

prevent a serious safety problem from

developing. Measurements may be taken

manually or by reliable sensors.

Semi-permanently coupled means

coupled by means of a drawbar or other

coupling mechanism that requires tools

to perform the uncoupling operation.

Coupling and uncoupling of each such

unit in a train can be performed safely

only while at a maintenance or shop

location where personnel can safely get

under a unit or between units.

Shear strength means the ability of a

structural member to resist forces or

components of forces acting

perpendicular to compression or tension

forces, or both, in the member.

Shock absorbent material means

material designed to prevent or mitigate

injuries due to impact by yielding and

absorbing much of the energy of impact.

Side posts means main vertical

structural elements in the sides of a rail

vehicle.

Side sills means that portion of the

underframe or side at the bottom of the

rail vehicle side wall.

Single car test means a

comprehensive test (as further specified

in § 238.311) of the functioning of all

critical brake system components

installed on an individual passenger car

or unpowered vehicle, other than a

passenger car, hauled in a passenger

train.

Single car test device means a device

capable of controlling the application

and release of the brakes on an

individual passenger car or an

unpowered vehicle, other than a

passenger car, hauled in a passenger

train through pneumatic or electrical

means.

Skin means the outer covering on a

fuel tank or the front of a locomotive,

including a cab car and an MU

locomotive, excluding the windows and

forward-facing doors. The skin may be

covered with another coating of a

material such as fiberglass.

Spall, glazing means small pieces of

glazing that fly off the back surface of

glazing when an object strikes the front

surface.

Spot checks means random checks of

train inspections, tests, or maintenance

operations conducted by qualified

supervisors.

Standard procedures means a

description of the step-by-step process

to be used to safely accomplish a safetycritical or potentially hazardous task.

System means a composite of

equipment, computer programs, people,

facilities, procedures, and

documentation which are integrated to

perform a specific operational function

in a specific environment.

System developer means the entity

responsible for developing equipment or

a system so that it may be approved for

use in service.

System safety means the application

of design, operating, technical, and

management techniques and principles

throughout the system’s life cycle to

reduce hazards and unsafe conditions to

the lowest level possible through the

most effective use of the available

resources.

System safety plan means a document

that states in detail the techniques,

procedures, and tests to follow to reduce

hazards and unsafe conditions to the

lowest level possible through the most

effective use of available resources. The

system safety plan is used as part of the

design process for new equipment to

ensure that the equipment meets all

Federal safety standards and the

railroad’s own safety requirements.

System safety program means the

activities described in the system safety

plan to be performed to ensure that the

railroad’s passenger equipment meets

all Federal safety standards and the

railroad’s own safety design

requirements.

Telescope means override an

adjoining rail vehicle or unit and

penetrate into the interior of that

adjoining vehicle or unit because of

compressive forces.

Terminal means a starting point or

ending point of a single scheduled train

trip, where passengers may get on or off

a train. Normally the location is a point

where the train would reverse direction

or change destinations.

Tier I means operating at speeds not

exceeding 125 mph.

Tier II means operating at speeds

exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding

150 mph.

Tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion

operations are railroad operations that

carry passengers, often using antiquated

equipment, with the conveyance of the

passengers to a particular destination

not being the principal purpose.

Trailer car means a unit of rail rolling

equipment that neither propels a Tier II

passenger train nor is the leading unit

in a Tier II passenger train. A trailer car

is normally without a control stand and

is normally occupied by passengers.

Train means a locomotive unit or

locomotive units coupled, with or

without cars. For the purposes of the

provisions of this part related to power

brakes, the term ‘‘train’’ does not

include such equipment when being

used in switching movements (as

defined in § 231.30(b) of this chapter) of

less than one mile.

Train brake communication line

means the communication link between

the locomotive and cars in a train by

which the brake commands are

transmitted. This may be a pneumatic

pipe, electrical line, or radio signal.

Train, commuter means a passenger

train providing commuter service

within an urban, suburban, or

metropolitan area. The term includes a
49796 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

passenger train provided by an

instrumentality of a State or a political

subdivision of a State.

Train, long-distance intercity

passenger means a passenger train that

provides service between large cities

more than 125 miles apart and is not

operated exclusively in the National

Railroad Passenger Corporation’s

Northeast Corridor.

Train, passenger means a train that

transports or is available to transport

members of the general public. If a train

is composed of a mixture of passenger

and freight equipment, that train is a

passenger train for purposes of this part.

Train, short-distance intercity

passenger means a passenger train that

provides service exclusively on the

National Railroad Passenger

Corporation’s Northeast Corridor or

between cities that are not more than

125 miles apart.

Train, Tier II passenger means a shortdistance or long-distance intercity

passenger train providing service at

speeds that include exceeding 125 mph

but do not exceed 150 mph.

Trainset, passenger means a

passenger train including the

locomotive(s) or power car(s) and

passenger cars that are semipermanently coupled to operate as a

single unit. The individual components

are uncoupled only for emergencies or

maintenance.

Transverse means in a direction

perpendicular to the normal direction of

travel of a railroad vehicle.

Ultimate strength means the load at

which a structural member fractures or

ceases to resist any load.

Uncoupling mechanism means the

arrangement for operating the coupler

by any means.

Underframe means the lower

horizontal support structure of a car

body.

Unit means rail rolling equipment of

any type or, in the context of articulated

equipment, ‘‘unit’’ means a piece of

equipment located between two trucks.

Unit body (monocoque) design or

unistructure means a type of vehicle

construction where the shell or skin acts

as a single unit with the supporting

frame to resist and transmit the loads

acting on the vehicle.

Unoccupied volume means the spaces

of a rail vehicle or passenger train

which do not contain seating and are

not normally occupied by passengers or

crewmembers.

Vehicle, rail means a car, locomotive,

tender, or similar vehicle.

Vestibule means an area of a

passenger car that normally does not

contain seating, that leads from the

seating area to the side exit doors.

Witness plate means a thin foil placed

behind a piece of glazing undergoing an

impact test. Any material spalled or

broken from the back side of the glazing

will dent or mark the witness plate.

Yard means a system of tracks within

defined limits provided for the making

up of trains, storing of cars, and other

purposes.

Yard air test means a train brake

system test conducted using a source of

compressed air other than a locomotive.

Yield strength means the ability of a

structural member to resist a change in

length caused by a heavy load.

Exceeding the yield strength may cause

permanent deformation of the member.

§ 238.7 Waivers.

(a) Any person may petition the

Federal Railroad Administration for a

waiver of compliance with any

requirement prescribed in this part.

(b) Each petition for a waiver under

this section shall:

(1) Be filed in the manner required by

part 211 of this chapter;

(2) Contain the information required

by part 211 of this chapter; and

(3) Provide appropriate data or

analysis, or both, establishing that a

waiver is warranted under applicable

statutory criteria as well as a description

of the measures proposed to be taken to

provide a level of safety equivalent to

that afforded by the provision of this

part that is sought to be waived.

§ 238.9 Responsibility for compliance.

(a) A railroad subject to this part shall

not—

(1) Use, haul, permit to be used or

hauled on its line, offer in interchange,

or accept in interchange any train or

passenger equipment, while in service,

(i) That has one or more conditions

not in compliance with a safety

appliance or power brake provision of

this part; or

(ii) That has not been inspected and

tested as required by a safety appliance

or power brake provision of this part; or

(2) Use, haul, offer in interchange, or

accept in interchange any train or

passenger equipment, while in service,

(i) That has one or more conditions

not in compliance with a provision of

this part, other than the safety appliance

and power brake provisions of this part,

if the railroad has actual knowledge of

the facts giving rise to the violation, or

a reasonable person acting in the

circumstances and exercising reasonable

care would have that knowledge; or

(ii) That has not been inspected and

tested as required by a provision of this

part, other than the safety appliance and

power brake provisions of this part, if

the railroad has actual knowledge of the

facts giving rise to the violation, or a

reasonable person acting in the

circumstances and exercising reasonable

care would have that knowledge; or

(3) Violate any other provision of this

part.

(b) For purposes of this part,

passenger equipment will be considered

in use prior to departure but after it has

received, or should have received, the

inspection required under this part for

movement and is deemed ready for

service.

(c) Although many of the

requirements of this part are stated in

terms of the duties of a railroad, when

any person (including, but not limited

to, a contractor performing safetyrelated tasks under contract to a railroad

subject to this part) performs any

function required by this part, that

person (whether or not a railroad) is

required to perform that function in

accordance with this part.

§ 238.11 Civil penalties.

Any person (including but not limited

to a railroad; any manager, supervisor,

official, or other employee or agent of a

railroad; any owner, manufacturer,

lessor, or lessee of railroad equipment,

track, or facilities; any employee of such

owner, manufacturer, lessor, lessee, or

independent contractor) who violates

any requirement of this part or causes

the violation of any such requirement is

subject to a civil penalty of at least $500,

but not more than $10,000 per violation,

except that: Penalties may be assessed

against individuals only for willful

violations, and, where a grossly

negligent violation or a pattern of

repeated violations has created an

imminent hazard of death or injury to

persons, or has caused death or injury,

a penalty not to exceed $20,000 per

violation may be assessed. Each day a

violation continues shall constitute a

separate offense. Appendix A to this

part contains a schedule of civil penalty

amounts used in connection with this

part.

§ 238.13 Preemptive effect.

Under 49 U.S.C. 20106, issuance of

the regulations in this part preempts any

State law, rule, regulation, order, or

standard covering the same subject

matter, except for a provision directed at

an essentially local safety hazard if that

provision is consistent with this part

and does not impose an undue burden

on interstate commerce.

§ 238.15 Movement of passenger

equipment with power brake defects.

(a) General. This section contains the

requirements for moving passenger

equipment with a power brake defect
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49797

without liability for a civil penalty

under this part. Railroads remain liable

for the movement of passenger

equipment under 49 U.S.C. 20303(c).

For purposes of this section, § 238.17,

and § 238.503, a ‘‘power brake defect’’ is

a condition of a power brake

component, or other primary brake

component, that does not conform with

this part. (Passenger cars and other

passenger equipment classified as

locomotives under part 229 of this

chapter are also covered by the

movement restrictions contained in

§ 229.9 of this chapter for those

defective conditions covered by part 229

of this chapter.)

(b) Limitations on movement of

passenger equipment containing a

power brake defect found during a Class

I or IA brake test. Except as provided in

paragraph (c) of this section (dealing

with brakes that become defective en

route after a Class I or IA brake test was

performed), a commuter or passenger

train that has in its consist passenger

equipment containing a power brake

defect found during a Class I or IA brake

test (or, for Tier II trains, the equivalent)

may only be moved, without civil

penalty liability under this part—

(1) If all of the following conditions

are met:

(i) The train is moved for purposes of

repair, without passengers;

(ii) The applicable operating

restrictions in paragraph (d) of this

section are observed; and

(iii) The passenger equipment is

tagged, or information is recorded, as

prescribed in paragraph (c)(2) of this

section; or

(2) If the train is moved for purposes

of scrapping or sale of the passenger

equipment that has the power brake

defect, and without passengers; if the

movement is at a speed of 15 mph or

less; and if the movement conforms

with the railroad’s air brake or power

brake instructions.

(c) Limitations on movement of

passenger equipment in passenger

service that becomes defective en route

after a Class I or IA brake test. Passenger

equipment hauled or used in service in

a commuter or passenger train that

develops a power brake defect while en

route to another location after receiving

a Class I or IA brake test (or, for Tier II

trains, the equivalent) may be hauled or

used by a railroad for repair, without

civil penalty liability under this part, if

the applicable operating restrictions set

forth in paragraph (d) of this section are

complied with and all of the following

requisites are satisfied:

(1) En route defect. At the time of the

train’s Class I or IA brake test, the

passenger equipment in the train was

properly equipped with power brakes

that comply with this part. The power

brakes on the passenger equipment

become defective while it is en route to

another location.

(2) Record. At the place where the

railroad first discovers the defect, a tag

or card is placed on both sides of the

defective passenger equipment, or an

automated tracking system is provided,

with the following information about

the defective passenger equipment:

(i) The reporting mark and car or

locomotive number;

(ii) The name of the inspecting

railroad;

(iii) The name of the inspector;

(iv) The inspection location and date;

(v) The nature of each defect;

(vi) The destination of the equipment

where it will be repaired; and

(vii) The signature, if possible, and job

title of the person reporting the

defective condition.

(3) Conditional requirement. In

addition, if an en route failure causes

power brakes to be cut out on passenger

equipment, the railroad shall:

(i) Determine the percentage of

operative power brakes in the train

based on the number of brakes known

to be cut out or otherwise inoperative,

using the formula specified in paragraph

(d)(1) of this section;

(ii) Notify the dispatcher of the

percent of operative brakes and

movement restrictions on the train

imposed by paragraph (d) of this

section;

(iii) Notify the mechanical department

or desk of the failure; and

(iv) Confirm the percentage of

operative brakes by a walking

inspection at the next location where

the railroad reasonably judges that it is

safe to do so.

(d) Operating restrictions based on

percent operative power brakes in train.

(1) Computation of percent operative

power brakes.—(i) Except as specified in

paragraphs (d)(1) (ii) and (iii) of this

section, the percentage of operative

power brakes in a train shall be

determined by dividing the number of

axles in the train with operative power

brakes by the total number of axles in

the train.

(ii) For equipment with tread brake

units (TBUs), the percentage of

operative power brakes shall be

determined by dividing the number of

operative TBUs by the total number of

TBUs.

(iii) Each cut-out axle on a locomotive

that weighs more than 200,000 pounds

shall be counted as two cut-out axles for

the purposes of calculating the

percentage of operative brakes. Unless

otherwise specified by the railroad, the

friction braking effort over all other

axles shall be considered uniform.

(iv) The following brake conditions

not in compliance with this part are not

considered inoperative power brakes for

purposes of this section:

(A) Failure or cutting out of secondary

brake systems;

(B) Inoperative or otherwise defective

handbrakes or parking brakes;

(C) Excessive piston travel that does

not render the power brakes ineffective;

and

(D) Power brakes overdue for

inspection, testing, maintenance, or

stencilling under this part.

(2) All passenger trains developing

50–74 percent operative power brakes.

A passenger train that develops

inoperative power brake equipment

resulting in at least 50 percent but less

than 75 percent operative power brakes

may be used only as follows:

(i) The train may be moved in

passenger service only to the next

forward passenger station;

(ii) The speed of the train shall be

restricted to 20 mph or less;

(iii) After all passengers are

discharged, the defective equipment

shall be moved directly to the nearest

location where the necessary repairs can

be made; and

(iv) If the power brakes on the front

or rear unit in the train are inoperative,

a qualified person shall be stationed at

the handbrake on this unit.

(3) Commuter, short-distance

intercity, and short-distance Tier II

passenger trains developing 75–99

percent operative power brakes.

(i) 75–84 percent operative brakes.

Commuter, short-distance intercity, and

short-distance Tier II passenger trains

which develop inoperative power brake

equipment resulting in at least 75

percent but less than 85 percent

operative brakes may be used only as

follows:

(A) The train may be moved in

passenger service only to the next

forward terminal;

(B) The speed of the train shall be

restricted to 50 percent of the train’s

maximum allowable speed or 40 mph,

whichever is less;

(C) After discharging passengers, the

defective equipment shall be moved

directly to the nearest location where

the necessary repairs can be made; and

(D) If the brakes on the front or rear

unit in a train are inoperative, a

qualified person shall be stationed at the

handbrake on this unit.

(ii) 85–99 percent operative brakes.

Commuter, short-distance intercity, and

short-distance Tier II passenger trains

which develop inoperative power brake

equipment resulting in at least 85
49798 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

percent but less than 100 percent

operative brakes may only be used as

follows:

(A) The train may be moved in

passenger service only to the next

forward terminal;

(B) After all passengers are

discharged, the defective cars shall be

moved directly to the nearest location

where the necessary repairs can be

made; and

(C) If the brakes on the front or rear

unit in a train are inoperative, a

qualified person shall be stationed at the

handbrake on this unit.

(4) Long-distance intercity and longdistance Tier II passenger trains

developing 75–99 operative power

brakes.

(i) 75–84 percent operative brakes.

Long-distance intercity and longdistance Tier II passenger trains which

develop inoperative power brake

equipment resulting in at least 75

percent but less than 85 percent

operative brakes may be used only if all

of the following restrictions are

observed:

(A) The train may be moved in

passenger service only to the next

forward repair location identified for

repair of that equipment by the railroad

operating the equipment in the list

required by § 238.19(d); however, if the

next forward repair location does not

have the facilities to handle the safe

unloading of passengers, the train may

be moved past the designated repair

location in service only to the next

forward passenger station in order to

facilitate the unloading of passengers;

(B) The speed of the train shall be

restricted to 50 percent of the train’s

maximum allowable speed or 40 mph,

whichever is less;

(C) After discharging passengers, the

defective equipment shall be moved

directly to the nearest location where

the necessary repairs can be made; and

(D) If the brakes on the front or rear

unit in a train are inoperative, a

qualified person shall be stationed at the

handbrake on this unit.

(ii) 85–99 percent operative brakes.

Long-distance intercity and longdistance Tier II passenger trains which

develop inoperative power brake

equipment resulting in at least 85

percent but less than 100 percent

operative brakes may be used only if all

of the following restrictions are

observed:

(A) The train may be moved in

passenger service only to the next

forward repair location identified for

repair of that equipment by the railroad

operating the equipment in the list

required by § 238.19(d); however, if the

next forward repair location does not

have the facilities to handle the safe

unloading of passengers, the train may

be moved past the designated repair

location in service only to the next

forward passenger station in order to

facilitate the unloading of passengers;

(B) After passengers are discharged,

the defective cars shall be moved

directly to the nearest location where

the necessary repairs can be made; and

(C) If the brakes on the front or rear

unit in a train are inoperative, a

qualified person shall be stationed at the

handbrake on this unit.

(e) Special Notice for Repair. Nothing

in this section authorizes the movement

of passenger equipment subject to a

Special Notice for Repair under part 216

of this chapter unless the movement is

made in accordance with the

restrictions contained in the Special

Notice.

§ 238.17 Movement of passenger

equipment with other than power brake

defects.

(a) General. This section contains the

requirements for moving passenger

equipment with other than a power

brake defect. (Passenger cars and other

passenger equipment classified as

locomotives under part 229 of this

chapter are also covered by the

movement restrictions contained in

§ 229.9 of this chapter for those

defective conditions covered by part 229

of this chapter.)

(b) Limitations on movement of

passenger equipment containing defects

found at time of calendar day

inspection. Except as provided in

§ 238.305(c)(5), passenger equipment

containing a condition not in

conformance with this part at the time

of its calendar day mechanical

inspection may be moved from that

location for repair if all of the following

conditions are satisfied:

(1) When the defective equipment is

moved, it is not in passenger service and

is in a non-revenue train;

(2) The requirements of paragraphs

(c)(2) and (c)(3) of this section are met;

(3) The special requirements of

paragraph (d) of this section, if

applicable, are met.

(c) Usual limitations on movement of

passenger equipment that develops

defects en route. Except as provided in

§ 238.503(f), passenger equipment that

develops en route to its destination,

after its calendar day inspection was

performed and before its next calendar

day mechanical inspection was

performed, any defect not in compliance

with this part, other than a power brake

defect, may be moved only if the

railroad complies with all of the

following requirements and, if

applicable, the special requirements in

paragraph (d) of this section:

(1) Prior to movement of the defective

equipment, a qualified mechanical

inspector shall determine if it is safe

to move the equipment in passenger

service and, if so, the maximum speed

and other restrictions necessary for

safely conducting the movement. If

appropriate, these determinations may

be made based upon a description of the

defective condition provided by a

crewmember.

(2) Prior to movement of the defective

equipment, the qualified mechanical

inspector shall notify the crewmember

in charge of the movement of the

defective equipment, who in turn shall

inform all other crewmembers of the

presence of the defective condition(s)

and the maximum speed and other

restrictions determined under paragraph

(c)(1) of this section. The movement

shall be made in conformance with such

restrictions.

(3) The railroad shall maintain a

record of all defects reported and their

subsequent repair in the defect tracking

system required in § 238.19. In addition,

prior to movement of the defective

equipment, a tag or card placed on both

sides of the defective equipment, or an

automated tracking system, shall record

the following information about the

defective equipment:

(i) The reporting mark and car or

locomotive number;

(ii) The name of the inspecting

railroad;

(iii) The name of the inspector,

inspection location, and date;

(iv) The nature of each defect;

(v) Movement restrictions and safety

restrictions, if any;

(vi) The destination of the equipment

where it will be repaired; and

(vii) The signature, if possible, as well

as the job title and location of the

person making the determinations

required by this section.

(4) At the first location possible, a

qualified mechanical inspector shall

perform a physical inspection of the

defective equipment to verify the

description of the defect provided by

the crew. After a qualified mechanical

inspector verifies that the defective

equipment is safe to remain in service,

the defective equipment that develops a

condition not in compliance with this

part while en route may continue in

passenger service not later than the next

calendar day mechanical inspection, if

the requirements of this paragraph are

otherwise fully met.

(d) Special requisites for movement of

passenger equipment with safety

appliance defects. Consistent with 49

U.S.C. 20303, passenger equipment with
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49799

a safety appliance not in compliance

with this part or with part 231 of this

chapter, if applicable, may be moved—

(1) If necessary to effect repair of the

safety appliance;

(2) From the point where the safety

appliance defect was first discovered by

the railroad to the nearest available

location on the railroad where the

necessary repairs required to bring the

passenger equipment into compliance

can be made or, at the option of the

receiving railroad, the equipment may

be received and hauled for repair to a

point on the receiving railroad’s line no

farther than the point on the delivering

railroad’s line where the repair of the

defect could have been made; and

(3) If a tag placed on both sides of the

passenger equipment or an automated

tracking system contains the

information required under paragraph

(c)(3) of this section.

(e) Special Notice for Repair. Nothing

in this section authorizes the movement

of equipment subject to a Special Notice

for Repair under part 216 of this chapter

unless the movement is made in

accordance with the restrictions

contained in the Special Notice.

§ 238.19 Reporting and tracking defective

passenger equipment.

(a) General. Each railroad shall have

in place a reporting and tracking system

for passenger equipment with a defect

not in conformance with this part that:

(1) Records the identification number

of the defective equipment;

(2) Records the date the defect

occurred;

(3) Records the nature of the defect;

(4) Records the determination made

by a qualified mechanical inspector on

whether the equipment is safe to run;

(5) Records the name of the qualified

mechanical inspector making such a

determination;

(6) Records any operating restrictions

placed on the equipment; and

(7) Records repairs made and the date

that they were made.

(b) Retention of records. At a

minimum, each railroad shall keep the

records described in paragraph (a) of

this section for one periodic

maintenance interval for each specific

type of equipment as described in the

railroad’s system safety plan. FRA

strongly encourages railroads to keep

these records for longer periods of time

because they form the basis for future

reliability-driven decisions concerning

test and maintenance intervals.

(c) Availability of records. Railroads

shall make defect reporting and tracking

records available to FRA upon request.

(d) List of power brake repair points.

Railroads operating long-distance

intercity and long-distance Tier II

passenger equipment shall designate

locations, in writing, where repairs to

passenger equipment with a power

brake defect will be made and shall

provide the list to FRA’s Associate

Administrator for Safety and make it

available to FRA for inspection and

copying upon request. Railroads

operating these trains shall designate a

sufficient number of repair locations to

ensure the safe and timely repair of

passenger equipment. These

designations shall not be changed

without at least 30 days’ written notice

to FRA’s Associate Administrator for

Safety.

§ 238.21 Special approval procedure.

(a) General. The following procedures

govern consideration and action upon

requests for special approval of

alternative standards under §§ 238.115,

238.223, 238.309, 238.311, 238.405, or

238.427 and for special approval of prerevenue service acceptance testing plans

under § 238.113 or § 238.603. (Requests

for approval of programs for the

inspection, testing, and maintenance of

Tier II passenger equipment are

governed by § 238.505.)

(b) Petitions for special approval of

alternative standard. Each petition for

special approval of an alternative

standard shall contain—

(1) The name, title, address, and

telephone number of the primary person

to be contacted with regard to review of

the petition;

(2) The alternative proposed, in detail,

to be substituted for the particular

requirements of this part;

(3) Appropriate data or analysis, or

both, establishing that the alternative

will provide an equivalent level of

safety; and

(4) A statement affirming that the

railroad has served a copy of the

petition on designated representatives of

railroad employees, together with a list

of the names and addresses of the

persons served.

(c) Petitions for special approval of

pre-revenue service acceptance testing

plan. Each petition for special approval

of a pre-revenue service acceptance

testing plan shall contain—

(1) The name, title, address, and

telephone number of the primary person

to be contacted with regard to review of

the petition; and

(2) The elements prescribed in

§ 238.113.

(d) Service. (1) Each petition for

special approval under paragraph (b) or

(c) of this section shall be submitted in

triplicate to the Associate Administrator

for Safety, Federal Railroad

Administration, 400 7th Street, S.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20590.

(2)(i) Service of each petition for

special approval of an alternative

standard under paragraph (b) of this

section shall be made on the following:

(A) Designated employee

representatives responsible for the

equipment’s operation, inspection,

testing, and maintenance under this

part;

(B) Any organizations or bodies that

either issued the standard incorporated

in the section(s) of this part to which the

special approval pertains or issued the

alternative standard that is proposed in

the petition; and

(C) Any other person who has filed

with FRA a current statement of interest

in reviewing special approvals under

the particular requirement of this part at

least 30 days but not more than 5 years

prior to the filing of the petition.

(ii) If filed, a statement of interest

shall be filed with FRA’s Associate

Administrator for Safety and shall

reference the specific section(s) of this

part in which the person has an interest.

(e) Federal Register notice. FRA will

publish a notice in the Federal Register

concerning each petition under

paragraph (b) of this section.

(f) Comment. Not later than 30 days

from the date of publication of the

notice in the Federal Register

concerning a petition under paragraph

(b) of this section, any person may

comment on the petition.

(1) Each comment shall set forth

specifically the basis upon which it is

made, and contain a concise statement

of the interest of the commenter in the

proceeding.

(2) Three copies of each comment

shall be submitted to the Associate

Administrator for Safety, Federal

Railroad Administration, 400 7th Street,

S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

(3) The commenter shall certify that a

copy of the comment was served on

each petitioner.

(g) Disposition of petitions. (1) If FRA

finds that the petition complies with the

requirements of this section and that the

proposed plan is acceptable or changes

are justified, the petition will be

granted, normally within 90 days of its

receipt. If the petition is neither granted

nor denied within 90 days, the petition

remains pending for decision. FRA may

attach special conditions to the approval

of the petition. Following the approval

of a petition, FRA may reopen

consideration of the petition for cause

stated.

(2) If FRA finds that the petition does

not comply with the requirements of

this section and that the proposed plan

is not acceptable or that the proposed
49800 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

changes are not justified, the petition

will be denied, normally within 90 days

of its receipt.

(3) When FRA grants or denies a

petition, or reopens consideration of the

petition, written notice is sent to the

petitioner and other interested parties.

Subpart B—System Safety and General

Requirements

§ 238.101 Scope.

This subpart contains system safety

requirements for each railroad that

operates passenger equipment and

general requirements for the safety of all

railroad passenger equipment subject to

this part.

System Safety

§ 238.103 General system safety

requirements.

(a) By the dates specified in paragraph

(g) of this section, each railroad

operating passenger equipment subject

to this part shall adopt a written system

safety plan that describes the railroad’s

system safety program, using MIL–STD–

882(C) as a guide. The system safety

plan shall be updated annually.

(b) For the procurement of new

passenger equipment, the system safety

plan shall describe the system safety

program to be conducted as part of the

equipment design and development

process to ensure that all safety issues

and Federal safety requirements are

identified, addressed, and documented.

The documentation shall include

certification in writing by the

manufacturer that the passenger

equipment meets the design

requirements of this part. The system

safety plan shall also describe the

system safety program to be conducted

as part of the maintenance, overhaul,

and operation of all passenger

equipment by that railroad. The system

safety program should ensure that safety

issues are considered as important as

cost and performance issues in the

design, development, maintenance,

overhaul, and operation of the

equipment.

(c) The system safety plan shall be the

principal safety document. It shall be

used as guidance or, as applicable,

requirements for the development and

operation of equipment and subsystems.

At a minimum, the system safety plan

shall address:

(1) Fire protection;

(2) Software safety;

(3) Inspection, testing, and

maintenance;

(4) Training and qualifications; and

(5) Pre-revenue service acceptance

testing.

(d) The system safety plan shall

describe the approaches and processes

to be used to:

(1) Identify all safety requirements,

including Federal requirements

governing the design of passenger

equipment and its supporting systems;

(2) Evaluate the total system,

including hardware, software, testing,

and support activities, to identify

known or potential safety hazards over

the life cycle of the equipment;

(3) Identify safety issues during

design reviews;

(4) Eliminate or reduce the risk posed

by the hazards identified;

(5) Monitor and track the progress

made toward resolving safety issues,

reducing hazards, and meeting safety

requirements; and

(6) Develop a program of testing or

analysis, or both, to demonstrate that

safety requirements have been met.

(e) As part of the system safety

program, adequate documentation shall

be maintained to audit how the design

and operation of new equipment meets

safety requirements and to track how

safety issues are raised and resolved.

(f) The system safety plan shall

address how operational limitations

may be imposed on the use of

equipment if the equipment design

cannot meet certain safety requirements.

(g) Dates. (1) The portion of the

system safety plan applicable to existing

passenger equipment shall be adopted

no later than [one year after the effective

date of the final rule].

(2) The portion of the system safety

plan applicable to passenger equipment

to be procured by the railroad that is

already in the design and development

process before the effective date of the

final rule shall be adopted no later than

[one year after the effective date of the

final rule].

(3) The portion of the system safety

plan applicable to passenger equipment

to be procured by the railroad that is not

yet in the design and development

process on [the effective date of the final

rule] shall be adopted before

commencing the design and

development of new equipment.

(h) The railroad’s system safety plan

and documentation required by

paragraph (e) of this section shall be

available for inspection and copying by

FRA.

§ 238.105 Fire protection program.

(a) The operating railroad shall

include in its system safety program fire

safety considerations and features in the

design of new passenger equipment that

reduce the risk of equipment damage

and personal injuries due to fires to an

acceptable level as defined in MIL–

STD–882(C).

(b) As part of the system safety

program, each railroad operating

passenger equipment subject to this part

shall complete a thorough written

analysis of the fire protection problem.

In conducting this analysis, the railroad

shall—

(1) Ensure that good fire protection

practice is used as part of the equipment

design process.

(2) Take effective steps to design

equipment to be sufficiently fire

resistant to detect a fire and allow the

evacuation of equipment before fire,

smoke, or toxic fumes cause injury to a

passenger or crewmember.

(3) Identify, analyze, and prioritize

the fire hazards inherent in the design

of equipment.

(4) Document and explain how safety

issues were resolved in relation to cost

and performance issues in the design of

equipment to minimize the risk of each

fire hazard.

(5) Describe the analysis and tests

necessary to demonstrate how the fire

protection approach taken in the design

of equipment will enable a train to meet

the fire protection standards of this part

and of the railroad’s system safety plan.

(6) Describe the analysis and tests

necessary to select materials which

provide sufficient fire resistance to

reasonably ensure adequate time to

detect a fire and safely evacuate a train.

(7) Reasonably ensure that a

ventilation system does not contribute

to the lethality of a fire.

(8) Identify in writing which train

components are at risk of being a source

of fire and which require overheat

protection. As prescribed in

§ 238.115(c), overheat detectors shall be

installed in all components where the

analysis determines that such

equipment is necessary. If overheat

protection is not provided for a

component at risk of being a source of

fire, the written rationale and

justification for the decision shall be

included as part of the system safety

program documentation.

(9) Identify in writing all unoccupied

train compartments that contain

equipment or material posing a fire

hazard, and analyze the benefit

provided by including a fire or smoke

detection system in each compartment

identified. As prescribed in

§ 238.115(d), fire or smoke detectors

shall be installed in unoccupied

compartments where the analysis

determines that such equipment is

necessary to ensure sufficient time for

the safe evacuation of a train. The

written analysis shall explain why a fire

or smoke detector is not necessary, if the

decision is made not to install one in
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49801

any of the unoccupied compartments

identified as a potential source of fire.

(10) Perform an analysis of the

occupied and unoccupied spaces which

require portable fire extinguishers. The

analysis shall include the proper type

and size of fire extinguisher for each

location.

(11) Identify in writing all unoccupied

train compartments that contain

equipment or material which poses a

fire hazard. On a case-by-case basis, the

benefit provided by including a fixed,

automatic fire-suppression system in

each compartment identified shall be

analyzed. The type and size of the

automatic fire-suppression system for

each necessary application shall be

determined. As prescribed in

§ 238.115(e), a fixed, automatic fire

suppression system shall be installed in

unoccupied compartments where the

analysis determines it is necessary and

practical to ensure sufficient time for

the safe evacuation of the train. The

analysis shall provide the reasoning

why a fixed, automatic fire-suppression

system is not necessary or practical if

the decision is made not to install one

in any of the unoccupied compartments

identified in the plan.

(12) Develop and adopt written

procedures for the inspection, testing,

and maintenance of all fire safety

systems and equipment. As prescribed

in § 238.115(f), the railroad shall comply

with those procedures that it designates

as mandatory.

(c) The operating railroad shall

reasonably ensure in its contracts for the

purchase of new equipment that the

system developer follows the design

criteria and performs the tests required

by the fire protection part of the

railroad’s system safety plan and

program.

(d)(1) Not later than 365 days

following [the effective date of the final

rule] each passenger railroad shall

complete a preliminary fire safety

analysis for each category of existing rail

equipment and current rail service.

(2) Not later than 730 days following

[the effective date of the final] rule each

such railroad shall—

(i) Complete a final fire safety analysis

(equivalent to that required for new

equipment in this section) for any

category of existing equipment and

service evaluated during the

preliminary fire safety analysis as likely

presenting an unacceptable risk of

personal injury, including consideration

of the extent to which interior materials

comply with the test performance

criteria for flammability and smoke

emission characteristics contained in

Appendix B to this part or alternative

standards approved by FRA under this

part; and

(ii) Take remedial action to reduce the

risk of personal injuries to an acceptable

level in any such category.

(3) Within 1460 days following the

effective date of the final rule, the

railroad shall complete a fire safety

analysis for all categories of equipment

and service. In completing this analysis,

the railroad shall, to the extent

practicable, determine the extent to

which remaining interior materials

comply with the test performance

criteria for flammability and smoke

emission characteristics contained in

Appendix B to this part or alternative

standards approved by FRA under this

part and, based on the fire safety

analysis, take remedial action to reduce

the risk of personal injuries to an

acceptable level in any such category.

(4) Where possible prior to

transferring existing equipment to a new

category of service, but in no case more

than 90 days following such a transfer,

the passenger railroad shall complete a

new fire safety analysis taking into

consideration the change in railroad

operations and shall effect prompt

action to reduce any identified risk to an

acceptable level.

(5) As used in this paragraph,

‘‘category of rail equipment and current

rail service’’ shall be determined by the

railroad based on relevant fire safety

risks, including available ignition

sources, presence or absence of heat/

smoke detection systems, known

variations from required interior

material test performance criteria or

alternative standards approved by FRA,

and availability of rapid and safe egress

to the exterior of the vehicle under

conditions secure from fire, smoke, and

other hazards.

§ 238.107 Software safety program.

(a) The operating railroad shall

develop and maintain a software safety

program to guide the design,

development, testing, integration, and

verification of computer programs used

to control or monitor equipment safety

functions.

(b) The software safety program shall:

(1) Treat system software that controls

or monitors safety functions as safetycritical unless a completely redundant,

failsafe, non-software means to provide

the same function is provided; and

(2) Include a description of how the

following tasks will be accomplished, or

objectives achieved, to ensure safe,

reliable system software used to monitor

or perform safety functions:

(i) The software design process used;

(ii) The software design

documentation to be produced;

(iii) A software hazard analysis;

(iv) Software safety reviews;

(v) Software hazard monitoring and

tracking;

(vi) Hardware and software

integration safety tests; and

(vii) Demonstration of overall

software safety as part of the prerevenue service tests of equipment.

(c) The operating railroad shall ensure

that the system developer follows the

design criteria and performs the tests

required by the software safety part of

the system safety program. To fulfill this

obligation in part, the operating railroad

shall include software safety

requirements in each of its contracts for

the purchase of new equipment or new

components of existing equipment that

contain safety-critical software.

(d) The operating railroad shall follow

the software safety procedures required

by the software safety part of the system

safety program.

§ 238.109 Inspection, testing, and

maintenance program.

With respect to Tier II passenger

equipment operated by a railroad,

fulfillment of the requirements of

§ 238.503 to file an inspection, testing,

and maintenance program with FRA

satisfies the requirement of

§ 238.103(c)(3) to address the railroad’s

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program for such equipment in the

railroad’s system safety plan.

The following provisions of this

section apply only to Tier I equipment

operated by the railroad.

(a) General. Each railroad shall

provide to FRA, upon request, detailed

information, consistent with the

requirements of this part, on the

inspection, testing, and maintenance

procedures necessary for the railroad to

safely operate Tier I equipment. This

information shall include a detailed

description of:

(1) Safety inspection procedures,

intervals, and criteria;

(2) Test procedures and intervals;

(3) Scheduled preventive

maintenance intervals;

(4) Maintenance procedures; and

(5) Special testing equipment or

measuring devices required to perform

safety inspections and tests.

(b) General inspection, testing, and

maintenance procedures. The

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program shall contain procedures

reasonably to ensure that all systems

and components of the equipment are

free of all general conditions that

endanger the safety of the crew,

passengers, or equipment, including

procedures to ensure that all systems

and components of the equipment are
49802 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

free of the following conditions that

endanger the safety of the crew,

passengers, or equipment:

(1) A continuous accumulation of oil

or grease;

(2) Improper functioning of a

component;

(3) A crack, break, excessive wear,

structural defect, or weakness of a

component;

(4) A leak;

(5) Use of a component or system

under a condition that exceeds that for

which the component or system is

designed to operate; and

(6) Insecure attachment of a

component.

(c) Maintenance intervals. Initial

scheduled maintenance intervals should

be based on analysis completed as part

of the system safety program. The

intervals should be changed only when

justified by accumulated, verifiable

operating data.

(d) Standard procedures for safely

performing inspection, testing, and

maintenance, or repairs. Each railroad

shall establish written standard

procedures for performing all safetycritical or potentially hazardous

equipment inspection, test,

maintenance, or repair tasks. These

standard procedures shall be available

to FRA upon request and shall:

(1) Describe in detail each step

required to safely perform the task;

(2) Describe the knowledge necessary

to safely perform the task;

(3) Describe any precautions that shall

be taken to safely perform the task;

(4) Describe the use of any safety

equipment necessary to perform the

task;

(5) Be approved by the railroad’s chief

mechanical officer;

(6) Be approved by the railroad’s

official responsible for safety;

(7) Be enforced by supervisors with

responsibility for accomplishing the

tasks; and

(8) Be reviewed annually by the

railroad.

§ 238.111 Training, qualification, and

designation program.

(a) Each railroad shall adopt and

comply with a training, qualification,

and designation program for employees

and contractors that perform safetyrelated inspections, tests, or

maintenance of passenger equipment.

For purposes of this section, a

‘‘contractor’’ is defined as a person

under contract with the railroad or an

employee of a person under contract

with the railroad.

(b) As part of this program, the

railroad shall, at a minimum:

(1) Identify the safety-related tasks

that must be performed on each type of

equipment that the railroad operates;

(2) Develop written procedures for the

performance of the tasks identified;

(3) Identify the skills and knowledge

necessary to perform each task;

(4) Develop a training course that

includes classroom and ‘‘hands-on’’

lessons designed to impart the skills and

knowledge identified as necessary to

perform each task;

(5) Require all employees and

contractors to successfully complete the

training course that covers the

equipment and tasks for which they are

responsible;

(6) Require all employees and

contractors to pass a written

examination covering the equipment

and tasks for which they are

responsible;

(7) Require all employees and

contractors to demonstrate ‘‘hands-on’’

capability to perform their assigned

tasks on the type equipment to which

they are assigned;

(8) Require supervisors to complete

the program that covers the employees

that they supervise;

(9) Require supervisors to exercise

oversight to ensure that all the

identified tasks are performed in

accordance with the railroad’s written

procedures;

(10) Designate in writing that each

employee and contractor has the

knowledge and skills necessary to

perform the safety-related tasks that are

part of his or her job;

(11) Require periodic refresher

training at an interval not to exceed

three years that includes classroom and

‘‘hands-on’’ training, as well as testing;

(12) Add new equipment to the

qualification and designation program

prior to its introduction to revenue

service; and

(13) Maintain records adequate to

demonstrate that each employee and

contractor performing safety-related

tasks on passenger equipment is

currently qualified to do so. These

records shall be adequate to distinguish

the qualifications of the employee or

contractor as a qualified person or as a

qualified mechanical inspector.

§ 238.113 Pre-revenue service acceptance

testing plan.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph

(f), before using passenger equipment

for the first time on its system the

operating railroad shall submit a prerevenue service acceptance testing plan

containing the information required by

paragraph (e) of this section and obtain

the approval of the FRA Associate

Administrator for Safety, under the

procedures specified in § 238.21.

(b) After receiving FRA approval of

the pre-revenue service testing plan and

before introducing the passenger

equipment into revenue service, the

operating railroad shall:

(1) Adopt and comply with such FRAapproved plan, including fully

executing the tests required by the plan;

(2) Report to the FRA Associate

Administrator for Safety the results of

the pre-revenue service acceptance tests;

(3) Correct any safety deficiencies

identified by FRA in the design of the

equipment or in the inspection, testing,

and maintenance procedures or, if safety

deficiencies cannot be corrected by

design changes, agree to comply with

any operational limitations that may be

imposed by the Associate Administrator

for Safety on the revenue service

operation of the equipment; and

(4) Obtain FRA approval to place the

equipment in revenue service.

(c) The operating railroad shall

comply with any such operational

limitations imposed by the Associate

Administrator for Safety.

(d) The plan shall be made available

to FRA for inspection and copying upon

request.

(e) The plan shall include all of the

following elements:

(1) An identification of any waivers of

FRA or other Federal safety regulations

required for the tests or for revenue

service operation of the equipment.

(2) A clear statement of the test

objectives. One of the principal test

objectives shall be to demonstrate that

the equipment meets the safety design

and performance requirements specified

in this part when operated in the

environment in which it is to be used.

(3) A planned schedule for

conducting the tests.

(4) A description of the railroad

property or facilities to be used to

conduct the tests.

(5) A detailed description of how the

tests are to be conducted. This

description shall include:

(i) An identification of the equipment

to be tested;

(ii) The method by which the

equipment is to be tested;

(iii) The criteria to be used to evaluate

the equipment’s performance; and

(iv) The means by which the test

results are to be reported to FRA.

(6) A description of any special

instrumentation to be used during the

tests.

(7) A description of the information or

data to be obtained.

(8) A description of how the

information or data obtained is to be

analyzed or used.

(9) A clear description of any criteria

to be used as safety limits during the

testing.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49803

(10) A description of the criteria to be

used to measure or determine the

success or failure of the tests. If

acceptance is to be based on

extrapolation of less than full level

testing results, the analysis to be done

to justify the validity of the

extrapolation shall be described.

(11) A description of any special

safety precautions to be observed during

the testing.

(12) A written set of standard

operating procedures to be used to

ensure that the testing is done safely.

(13) Quality control procedures to

ensure that the inspection, testing, and

maintenance procedures are followed.

(14) Criteria to be used for the revenue

service operation of the equipment.

(15) A description of any testing of the

equipment that has previously been

performed.

(f) For passenger equipment that has

previously been used in revenue service

in the United States, the railroad shall

test the equipment on its system, prior

to placing it in revenue service, to

ensure the compatibility of the

equipment with the operating system

(track, signals, etc.) of the railroad. A

description of such testing shall be

retained by the railroad and made

available to FRA for inspection and

copying upon request.

General Requirements

§ 238.115 Fire safety.

(a)(1) All materials used in

constructing the interior of both a

passenger car and a cab of a locomotive

ordered on or after January 1, 1999, or

placed in service for the first time on or

after January 1, 2001, shall meet the test

performance criteria for flammability

and smoke emission characteristics

contained in Appendix B to this part or

alternative standards issued or

recognized by an expert consensus

organization after special approval of

FRA’s Associate Administrator for

Safety under § 238.21.

(2) On or after [the effective date of

the final rule], all materials used in

refurbishing the interior of a passenger

car and a locomotive cab shall meet the

test performance criteria for

flammability and smoke emission

characteristics contained in Appendix B

to this part or alternative standards

issued or recognized by an expert

consensus organization after special

approval of FRA’s Associate

Administrator for Safety under § 238.21.

Refurbishing includes replacing an

individual component such as a seat

cushion.

(3) For purposes of this section the

interior of a passenger car and a

locomotive cab includes walls, floors,

ceilings, seats, doors, windows,

electrical conduits, air ducts, and any

other internal equipment.

(b) A railroad shall require

certification that combustible materials

to be used in constructing or

refurbishing passenger car and

locomotive cab interiors have been

tested by a recognized independent

testing laboratory and that the results

comply with the requirements of

paragraph (a) of this section.

(c) Overheat detectors shall be

installed in all components of passenger

equipment where the written analysis

required by § 238.105(b)(8) determines

that such equipment is necessary.

(d) Fire or smoke detectors shall be

installed in unoccupied compartments

of a train if the analysis required by

§ 238.105(b)(9) determines that such

equipment is necessary to ensure

sufficient time for the safe evacuation of

the train.

(e) A fixed, automatic fire suppression

system shall be installed in unoccupied

compartments of a train if the analysis

required by § 238.105(b)(11) determines

that such a system is necessary and

practical to ensure sufficient time for

the safe evacuation of the train.

(f) The railroad shall comply with

those elements of its written procedures,

under § 238.105(b)(12), for the

inspection, testing, and maintenance of

all fire safety systems and equipment

that it has designated as mandatory.

(g) After completing each fire safety

analysis required by § 238.105(d), the

railroad shall take action to reduce the

risk of personal injuries as provided in

that paragraph.

§ 238.117 Protection against personal

injury.

On or after January 1, 1998, all

moving parts, high voltage equipment,

electrical conductors and switches, and

pipes carrying hot fluids or gases on all

passenger equipment shall be

appropriately equipped with interlocks

or guards to minimize the chance of

personal injury.

§ 238.119 Rim-stamped straight-plate

wheels.

(a) On or after January 1, 1998, no

railroad shall place or continue in

service any vehicle equipped with a

rim-stamped straight-plate wheel,

except for a private car.

(b) A rim-stamped straight-plate

wheel shall not be used as a

replacement wheel on a private car

operated in a passenger train.

§ 238.121 Train system software and

hardware.

Electrical and electronic systems,

including software components, used to

control safety functions of passenger

equipment shall be treated as safetycritical by the operating railroad. Safetycritical systems utilized in equipment

ordered on or after January 1, 1999, and

such systems implemented or materially

modified for new or existing equipment

on or after January 1, 2001, shall

conform with the following

requirements:

(a) A formal safety methodology shall

be used to develop electrical and

electronic control systems that control

safety functions for computer hardware

and software. The safety methodology

shall include a Failure Modes, Effects,

Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and

verification tests for all components of

the control system and its interfaces for

computer hardware and software.

(b) A comprehensive hardware and

software integration program for safetycritical systems shall be adopted and

complied with to ensure that the

software functions as intended when

installed in a hardware system identical

to that to be used in service.

(c) Safety-related control systems

driven by computer software shall

include hardware and software design

features that result in a safe condition in

the event of a computer hardware or

software failure.

§ 238.123 Emergency lighting.

(a) This section applies to each

locomotive and passenger car ordered or

rebuilt on or after January 1, 1999, or

placed in service for the first time on or

after January 1, 2001. This section

applies to each level of a bi-level unit.

(b) Emergency lighting shall be

provided and shall include the

following:

(1) An illumination level of a

minimum of 5 foot-candles at floor level

for all potential passenger and crew

evacuation routes from the equipment;

and

(2) A back-up power system capable

of:

(i) Operating in all equipment

orientations within 45 degrees of

vertical;

(ii) Operating after the initial shock of

a collision or derailment resulting in the

following individually applied

accelerations:

(A) Longitudinal: 8g;

(B) Lateral: 4g; and

(C) Vertical: 4g; and

(iii) Operating all emergency lighting

for a period of at least two hours.
49804 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

Subpart C—Specific Requirements for

Tier I Passenger Equipment

§ 238.201 Scope.

This subpart contains requirements

for railroad passenger equipment

operating at speeds not exceeding 125

miles per hour. As stated in § 238.229,

all such passenger equipment remains

subject to the safety appliance

requirements contained in Federal

statute at 49 U.S.C. chapter 203 and in

FRA regulations at part 231 and § 232.2

of this chapter. Unless otherwise

specified, these requirements only apply

to passenger equipment ordered on or

after January 1, 1999, or placed in

service for the first time on or after

January 1, 2001.

§ 238.203 Static end strength.

(a) Except as further specified in this

paragraph and paragraph (b) of this

section, on or after January 1, 1998, all

passenger equipment shall have a

minimum static end strength of 800,000

pounds without permanent deformation

of the car body structure. This

requirement does not apply to either—

(1) A private car or

(2) A vehicle of special design that

operates at the rear of a passenger train

and is used solely to transport freight,

such as an auto-carrier or a RoadRailer.

(b) On or after January 1, 1998, each

locomotive and passenger car shall have

a minimum static end strength of

800,000 pounds on the line of draft at

the ends of occupied volumes without

permanent deformation of the car body

structure. The static end strength of

unoccupied volumes may be less than

800,000 pounds if a crash energy

management design is used.

(c) When overloaded in compression,

the car body structure of passenger

equipment shall be designed, to the

maximum extent possible, to fail by

buckling or crushing, or both, of

structural members rather than by

fracture of structural members or failure

of structural connections.

§ 238.205 Anti-climbing mechanism.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph

(b) of this section, all passenger

equipment placed in service for the first

time on or after January 1, 1998, shall

have at both the forward and rear ends

an anti-climbing mechanism capable of

resisting an upward or downward

vertical force of 100,000 pounds without

failure. When coupled together in any

combination to join two vehicles, AAR

Type H and Type F tight-lock couplers

satisfy this requirement.

(b) Each locomotive ordered on or

after January 1, 1999, or placed in

service for the first time on or after

January 1, 2001, shall have an anticlimbing mechanism at its forward end

capable of resisting an upward or

downward vertical force of 200,000

pounds without failure, in lieu of the

forward end anti-climbing mechanism

requirements described in paragraph (a)

of this section.

§ 238.207 Link between coupling

mechanism and car body.

All passenger equipment placed in

service for the first time on or after

January 1, 1998, shall have a coupler

carrier designed to resist a vertical

downward thrust from the coupler

shank of 100,000 pounds for any normal

horizontal position of the coupler,

without permanent deformation.

§ 238.209 Forward-facing end structure of

locomotives.

The skin covering the forward-facing

end of each locomotive shall be:

(a) Equivalent to a 1⁄2-inch steel plate

with a 25,000 pounds-per-square-inch

yield strength—material of a higher

yield strength may be used to decrease

the required thickness of the material

provided an equivalent level of strength

is maintained;

(b) Designed to inhibit the entry of

fluids into the occupied cab area of the

equipment; and

(c) Be affixed to the collision posts or

other main vertical structural members

of the forward-facing end structure so as

to add to the strength of the end

structure.

§ 238.211 Collision posts.

(a) Except as further specified in this

paragraph and paragraphs (b) and (c) of

this section—

(1) All passenger equipment placed in

service for the first time on or after

January 1, 1998, shall have either:

(i) Two full-height collision posts,

located at approximately the one-third

points laterally, at each end where

coupling and uncoupling are expected.

Each collision post shall have an

ultimate longitudinal shear strength of

not less than 300,000 pounds at a point

even with the top of the underframe

member to which it is attached. If

reinforcement is used to provide the

shear value, the reinforcement shall

have full value for a distance of 18

inches up from the underframe

connection and then taper to a point

approximately 30 inches above the

underframe connection; or

(ii) An equivalent end structure that

can withstand the sum of forces that

each collision post is required to

withstand. For analysis purposes, the

required forces may be assumed to be

evenly distributed at the end structure

at the underframe joint.

(2) This paragraph does not apply to

a vehicle of special design that operates

at the rear of a passenger train and is

used solely to transport freight, such as

an auto-carrier or a RoadRailer.

(b) Each locomotive, including a cab

car and an MU locomotive, ordered on

or after January 1, 1999, or placed in

service for the first time on or after

January 1, 2001, shall have at its

forward end, in lieu of the structural

protection described in paragraph (a) of

this section, either:

(1) Two forward collision posts,

located at approximately the one-third

points laterally, each capable of

withstanding:

(i) A 500,000-pound longitudinal

force at the point even with the top of

the underframe, without exceeding the

ultimate strength of the joint; and

(ii) A 200,000-pound longitudinal

force exerted 30 inches above the joint

of the post to the underframe, without

exceeding the ultimate strength; or

(2) An equivalent end structure that

can withstand the sum of the forces that

each collision post is required to

withstand.

(c) If a vehicle consists of articulated

units, the end structural protection

requirements in paragraphs (a) and (b)

of this section apply only to the ends of

the permanently joined assembly of

units, not to each end of each unit so

joined.

§ 238.213 Corner posts.

(a) Each passenger car shall have at

each end of the vehicle two full-height

corner posts capable of resisting without

failure a horizontal load of 150,000

pounds at the point of attachment to the

underframe and a load of 20,000 pounds

at the point of attachment to the roof

structure. The orientation of the applied

horizontal loads shall range from

longitudinal inward to transverse

inward. The corner posts may be

positioned near the occupied volume of

the rail vehicle to provide protection or

structural strength to the occupied

volume.

(b) Each corner post shall resist a

horizontal load of 30,000 pounds

applied 18 inches above the top of the

floor without permanent deformation.

The orientation of the applied

horizontal loads shall range from

longitudinal inward to transverse

inward.

§ 238.215 Rollover strength.

(a) Each passenger car shall be

designed to rest on its side and be

uniformly supported at the top (‘‘roof

rail’’), the bottom (‘‘side sill’’) chords of

the side frame, and, if bi-level, the

intermediate floor rail. The allowable
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49805

stress for occupied volumes for this

condition shall be one-half yield or onehalf the critical buckling stress,

whichever is less.

(b) Each passenger car shall also be

designed to rest on its roof so that any

damage in occupied areas is limited to

roof sheathing and framing. Deformation

to the roof sheathing and framing is

allowed to the extent necessary to

permit the vehicle to be supported

directly on the top chords of the side

frames and end frames. Other than roof

sheathing and framing, the allowable

stress for occupied volumes for this

condition shall be one-half yield or onehalf the critical buckling stress,

whichever is less.

§ 238.217 Side impact strength.

Each passenger car shall comply with

the following:

(a) Side posts and corner braces. (1)

For ‘‘modified girder,’’ ‘‘semimonocoque,’’ or truss construction, the

sum of the section moduli—about a

longitudinal axis, taken at the weakest

horizontal section between the side sill

and side plate—of all posts and braces

on each side of the car located between

the body corner posts shall be not less

than 0.30 multiplied by the distance in

feet between the centers of end panels.

(2) For ‘‘modified girder’’ or ‘‘semimonocoque’’ construction only, the sum

of the section moduli—about a

transverse axis, taken at the weakest

horizontal section between side sill and

side plate—of all posts, braces and pier

panels, to the extent available, on each

side of the car located between body

corner posts shall be not less than 0.20

multiplied by the distance in feet

between the centers of end panels.

(3) The center of an end panel is the

point midway between the center of the

body corner post and the center of the

adjacent side post.

(b) Sheathing. (1) Outside sheathing

of mild, open-hearth steel when used

flat, without reinforcement (other than

side posts) in a side frame of ‘‘modified

girder’’ or ‘‘semi-monocoque’’ shall not

be less than 1⁄8 inch nominal thickness.

Other metals may be used of a thickness

in inverse proportion to their yield

strengths.

(2) Outside metal sheathing of less

than 1⁄8 inch thickness may be used only

if it is reinforced so as to produce at

least an equivalent sectional area at a

right angle to reinforcements as that of

the flat sheathing specified in paragraph

(b)(1) of this section.

(3) When the sheathing used for truss

construction serves no load-carrying

function, the minimum thickness of that

sheathing shall be not less than 40

percent of that specified in paragraph

(b)(1) of this section.

§ 238.219 Truck-to-car-body attachment.

Passenger equipment shall have a

truck-to-car-body attachment with an

ultimate strength sufficient to resist

without failure a force of 2g vertical on

the mass of the truck and a force of

250,000 pounds in any horizontal

direction. For purposes of this section,

the mass of the truck includes axles,

wheels, bearings, the truck-mounted

brake system, suspension system

components, and any other components

attached to the truck by design.

§ 238.221 Glazing.

(a) Passenger equipment shall comply

with the applicable Safety Glazing

Standards contained in part 223 of this

chapter, if required by that part.

(b) Glazing securement components

shall hold the glazing in place against

all forces described in part 223 of this

chapter. Securement components shall

remain held to the car body structure

against these same forces.

(c) Glazing securement components

shall be designed to resist the forces due

to air pressure differences caused when

two trains pass at the minimum

separation for two adjacent tracks, while

traveling in opposite directions, each

train traveling at the maximum

authorized speed.

§ 238.223 Fuel tanks.

(a) External fuel tanks. External

locomotive fuel tanks shall comply with

AAR Recommended Practice-506,

Performance Requirements for Diesel

Electric Locomotive Fuel Tanks (as

adopted July 1, 1995), or an industry

standard providing at least equivalent

safety if approved by FRA’s Associate

Administrator for Safety under § 238.21.

(b) Integral fuel tanks. Integral fuel

tanks shall be positioned in a manner to

reduce the likelihood of accidental

penetration from roadway debris or

collision.

(1) The vent system spill protection

systems of integral fuel tanks shall be

designed to prevent them from

becoming a path of fuel loss for any tank

orientation due to a locomotive

overturning.

(2) The bulkheads and skin of integral

fuel tanks shall at a minimum be made

of steel plate 3/8 of an inch thick with

a 25,000-lb yield strength, or made of

material with an equivalent strength.

Skid plates are not required. Higher

yield strength material may be used to

decrease the thickness of the material as

long as an equivalent strength is

maintained.

§ 238.225 Electrical system.

All passenger equipment shall comply

with the following:

(a) Conductors. Conductor sizes shall

be selected on the basis of currentcarrying capacity, mechanical strength,

temperature, flexibility requirements,

and maximum allowable voltage drop.

Current-carrying capacity shall be

derated for grouping and for operating

temperature.

(b) Main battery system. (1) The main

battery compartment shall be isolated

from the cab and passenger seating areas

by a non-combustible barrier.

(2) Battery chargers shall be designed

to protect against overcharging.

(3) If batteries are of the type to

potentially vent explosive gases, the

battery compartment shall be adequately

ventilated to prevent the accumulation

of explosive concentrations of these

gases.

(c) Power dissipation resistors. (1)

Power dissipating resistors shall be

adequately ventilated to prevent

overheating under worst-case operating

conditions as determined by each

railroad.

(2) Power dissipation grids shall be

designed and installed with sufficient

isolation to prevent combustion.

(3) Resistor elements shall be

electrically insulated from resistor

frames, and the frames shall be

electrically insulated from the supports

that hold them.

(d) Electromagnetic interference and

compatibility. (1) The operating railroad

shall ensure electromagnetic

compatibility of the safety-critical

equipment systems with their

environment. Electromagnetic

compatibility may be achieved through

equipment design or changes to the

operating environment.

(2) The electronic equipment shall not

produce electrical noise that affects the

safe performance of train line control

and communications or wayside

signaling systems.

(3) To contain electromagnetic

interference emissions, suppression of

transients shall be at the source

wherever possible.

(4) All electronic equipment shall be

self-protected from damage or improper

operation, or both, due to high voltage

transients and long-term over-voltage or

under-voltage conditions. This includes

protection from both power frequency

and harmonic effects as well as

protection from radio frequency signals

into the microwave frequency range.

§ 238.227 Suspension system.

On or after January 1, 1998—
49806 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

(a) All passenger equipment shall

exhibit freedom from hunting

oscillations at all speeds.

(b) All passenger equipment intended

for service above 110 mph shall

demonstrate stable operation during

pre-revenue service qualification tests at

all speeds up to 5 mph in excess of the

maximum intended operating speed

under worst-case conditions—including

component wear—as determined by the

operating railroad.

§ 238.229 Safety appliances.

All passenger equipment continues to

be subject to the safety appliance

requirements contained in Federal

statute at 49 U.S.C. chapter 203 and in

FRA regulations at part 231 and § 232.2

of this chapter.

§ 238.231 Brake system.

Except as otherwise provided in this

section, on or after January 1, 1998, the

following requirements apply to all

passenger equipment and passenger

trains.

(a) A passenger train’s primary brake

system shall be capable of stopping the

train with a service application from its

maximum authorized operating speed

within the signal spacing existing on the

track over which the train is operating.

(b) The brake system design of

passenger equipment ordered on or after

January 1, 1999, or placed in service for

the first time on or after January 1, 2001,

shall not require an inspector to place

himself or herself on, under, or between

components of the equipment to observe

brake actuation or release.

(c) Passenger equipment shall be

provided with an emergency application

feature that produces an irretrievable

stop, using a brake rate consistent with

prevailing adhesion, passenger safety,

and brake system thermal capacity. An

emergency application shall be available

at any time, and shall be initiated by an

unintentional parting of the train.

(d) A passenger train brake system

shall respond as intended to signals

from train brake control line or lines.

Control lines shall be designed so that

failure or breakage of a control line will

cause the brakes to apply or will result

in a default to control lines that meet

this requirement.

(e) Introduction of alcohol or other

chemicals into the air brake system of

passenger equipment is prohibited.

(f) The operating railroad shall require

that the design and operation of the

brake system results in wheels that are

free of condemnable cracks.

(g) Disc brakes shall be designed and

operated to produce a surface

temperature no greater than the safe

operating temperature recommended by

the disc manufacturer and verified by

testing or previous service.

(h) Except for a locomotive that is

ordered before January 1, 1999, and

placed in service for the first time before

January 1, 2001, and except for a private

car, all passenger equipment shall be

equipped with a hand or parking brake

that shall be:

(1) Capable of application or

activation by hand;

(2) Capable of release by hand; and

(3) Capable of holding the loaded unit

on the maximum grade anticipated by

the operating railroad.

(i) Passenger cars shall be equipped

with a means to apply the emergency

brake that is accessible to passengers

and located in the vestibule or

passenger compartment. The emergency

brake shall be clearly identified and

marked.

(j) Locomotives equipped with

blended brakes shall be designed so

that:

(1) The blending of friction and

dynamic brake to obtain the correct

retarding force is automatic;

(2) Loss of power or failure of the

dynamic brake does not result in

exceeding the allowable stop distance;

(3) The friction brake alone is

adequate to safely stop the train under

all operating conditions; and

(4) Operation of the friction brake

alone does not result in thermal damage

to wheels or disc rotor surface

temperatures exceeding the

manufacturer’s recommendation.

(k) For new designs of braking

systems, the design process shall

include computer modeling or

dynamometer simulation of train

braking that shows compliance with

paragraphs (f) and (g) of this section

over the range of equipment operating

speeds. Changes in operating parameters

shall require a new simulation prior to

implementing the changes.

(l) Locomotives ordered on or after

January 1, 1999, or placed in service for

the first time on or after January 1, 2001,

shall be equipped with effective air

coolers or dryers that provide air to the

main reservoir with a dew point at least

10 degrees F. below ambient

temperature.

§ 238.233 Interior fittings and surfaces.

(a) Each seat in a passenger car shall

be securely fastened to the car body so

as to withstand an individually applied

acceleration of 4g acting in the vertical

and in the lateral direction on the

deadweight of the seat or seats, if a

tandem unit. A seat attachment shall

have an ultimate strength capable of

resisting the longitudinal inertial force

of 8g acting on the mass of the seat plus

the impact force of the mass of a 95thpercentile male occupant(s) being

decelerated from a relative speed of 25

mph and striking the seat from behind.

(b) Overhead storage racks in a

passenger car shall provide longitudinal

and lateral restraint for stowed articles.

Overhead storage racks shall be attached

to the car body with sufficient strength

to resist loads due to the following

individually applied accelerations

acting on the mass of the luggage stowed

as determined by the railroad:

(1) Longitudinal: 8g;

(2) Vertical: 4g; and

(3) Lateral: 4g.

(c) Other interior fittings within a

passenger car shall be attached to the

car body with sufficient strength to

withstand the following individually

applied accelerations acting on the mass

of the fitting:

(1) Longitudinal: 8g;

(2) Vertical: 4g; and

(3) Lateral: 4g.

(d) To the extent possible, all interior

fittings in a passenger car, except seats,

shall be recessed or flush-mounted.

(e) Sharp edges and corners in a

locomotive cab and a passenger car shall

be either avoided or padded to mitigate

the consequences of an impact with

such surfaces.

(f) Each floor-mounted seat provided

exclusively for a crewmember assigned

to occupy the cab of a locomotive shall

be secured to the car body with an

attachment having an ultimate strength

capable of withstanding the loads due to

the following individually applied

accelerations acting on the mass of the

seat and the crewmember (ranging from

a 5th-percentile female to a 95thpercentile male) occupying it:

(1) Longitudinal: 8g;

(2) Lateral: 4g; and

(3) Vertical: 4g.

§ 238.235 Emergency window exits.

Except as provided in paragraph (b),

the following requirements apply to all

passenger cars on or after January 1,

1998—

(a) Except as provided in paragraphs

(d) and (e) of this section, each

passenger car shall have a minimum of

four emergency window exits, either in

a staggered configuration or with one

located at each end of each side of the

car.

(b) Each emergency window exit in a

passenger car placed in service for the

first time on or after January 1, 1998,

shall have a minimum unobstructed

opening with dimensions of 24 inches

horizontally by 18 inches vertically.

(c) Each emergency window exit shall

be easily operable by a 5th-percentile

female without requiring the use of a

tool or other implement.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49807

1The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

Accessibility Specifications for Transportation

Vehicles also contain requirements for doorway

clearance (See Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations

Part 38).

(d) If the car is bi-level, each main

level shall have a minimum of four

emergency window exits, either in a

staggered configuration or with one

located at each end of each side of the

car.

(e) Each passenger car of special

design, such as a sleeping car, shall

have at least one emergency window

exit in each compartment.

(f) Marking and instructions.

[Reserved]

§ 238.237 Doors.

(a) Within 2 years of the effective date

of the final rule, each powered, exterior

side door in a vestibule that is

partitioned from the passenger

compartment of a passenger car shall be

equipped with a manual override that

is:

(1) Capable of opening the door

without power from inside the car;

(2) Located adjacent to the door which

it controls; and

(3) Designed and maintained so that a

person may access the override device

from inside the car without requiring

the use of a tool or other implement.

(b) Each passenger car ordered on or

after January 1, 1999, or placed in

service for the first time on or after

January 1, 2001, shall have a minimum

of four side doors, or the functional

equivalent of four side doors, each

permitting at least one 95th-percentile

male to pass through at a single time.1

Each powered, exterior side door shall

be equipped with a manual override

that is:

(1) Capable of opening the door

without power from both inside and

outside the car;

(2) Located adjacent to the door which

it controls; and

(3) Designed and maintained so that a

person may access the override device

from both inside and outside the car

without requiring the use of a tool or

other implement.

(c) A railroad may protect a manual

override device used to open a powered,

exterior door with a cover or a screen

capable of removal by a 5th-percentile

female without requiring the use of a

tool or other implement. If the method

of removing the protective cover or

screen entails breaking or shattering it,

the cover or screen shall be scored,

perforated, or otherwise weakened so

that a 5th-percentile female can

penetrate the cover or screen with a

single blow of her fist without injury to

her hand.

(d) Marking and instructions.

[Reserved]

§ 238.239 Automated monitoring.

(a) Except as further specified in this

paragraph, on or after January 1, 1998,

a working alerter or deadman control

shall be provided in the controlling

locomotive of each passenger train

operating in other than cab signal,

automatic train control, or automatic

train stop territory. If the controlling

locomotive is ordered on or after

January 1, 1999, or placed into service

for the first time on or after January 1,

2001, a working alerter shall be

provided.

(b) Alerter or deadman control timing

shall be set by the operating railroad

taking into consideration maximum

train speed and capabilities of the signal

system. The railroad shall document the

basis for setting alerter or deadman

control timing and make this

documentation available to FRA upon

request.

(c) If the train operator does not

respond to the alerter or maintain

proper contact with the deadman

control, it shall initiate a penalty brake

application.

(d) The following procedures apply if

the alerter or deadman control fails en

route:

(1) A second person qualified on the

signal system and brake application

procedures shall be stationed in the cab;

or

(2) The engineer shall be in constant

communication with a second

crewmember until the train reaches the

next terminal.

Subpart D—Inspection, Testing, and

Maintenance Requirements for Tier I

Passenger Equipment

§ 238.301 Scope.

This subpart contains requirements

pertaining to the inspection, testing, and

maintenance of passenger equipment

operating at speeds not exceeding 125

miles per hour. The requirements in this

subpart address the inspection, testing,

and maintenance of the brake system as

well as other mechanical and electrical

components covered by this part.

§ 238.303 Exterior calendar day

mechanical inspection of passenger cars

and unpowered vehicles used in passenger

trains.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph

(d) of this section, each passenger car

and each unpowered vehicle used in a

passenger train shall receive an exterior

mechanical safety inspection at least

once each calendar day that the

equipment is placed in service. (Note:

The exterior inspection of a passenger

car classified as a locomotive under part

229 of this chapter shall be in

accordance with this part as well as part

229 of this chapter.)

(b) The exterior calendar day

mechanical safety inspection shall be

performed by a qualified mechanical

inspector as defined in § 238.5.

(c) As part of the exterior inspection,

the railroad shall verify conformity with

the following conditions, and

nonconformity with any such condition

renders the passenger car or unpowered

vehicle used in a passenger train

defective whenever discovered in

service:

(1) Products of combustion are

released entirely outside the cab and

other compartments.

(2) All battery containers are vented

and all batteries are kept from gassing

excessively.

(3) Each coupler is in the following

condition:

(i) The distance between the guard

arm and the knuckle nose is not more

than 51⁄8 inches on standard type

couplers (MCB contour 1904) or more

than 55⁄16 inches on D&E couplers;

(ii) Sidewall or pin bearing bosses and

the pulling face of the knuckles are not

broken or cracked;

(iii) The coupler assembly is equipped

with anti-creep protection;

(iv) The free slack in the coupler or

drawbar not absorbed by friction

devices or draft gears is not more than

1⁄2 inch;

(v) The coupler carrier is not broken

or cracked;

(vi) The yoke is not broken or cracked;

and

(vii) The draft gear is not broken.

(4) A device is provided under the

lower end of all drawbar pins and

articulated connection pins to prevent

the pin from falling out of place in case

of breakage.

(5) The suspension system, including

the spring rigging, is in the following

condition:

(i) Protective construction or safety

hangers are provided to prevent spring

planks, spring seats, or bolsters from

dropping to the track structure in event

of a hanger or spring failure;

(ii) The top (long) leaf or any of the

other three leaves of the elliptical spring

is not broken, except when a spring is

part of a nest of three or more springs

and none of the other springs in the nest

has its top leaf or any of the other three

leaves broken;

(iii) The outer coil spring or saddle is

not broken;

(iv) The equalizers, hangers, bolts,

gibs, or pins are not cracked or broken;

(v) The coil spring is not fully

compressed when the car is at rest;
49808 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

(vi) The shock absorber is not broken

or leaking clearly formed droplets of oil

or other fluid; and

(vii) Air bags or other pneumatic

suspension system components inflate

or deflate, as applicable, correctly and

otherwise operate as intended.

(6) All trucks are in the following

condition:

(i) Equipped with a device or securing

arrangement to prevent the truck and

car body from separating in case of

derailment;

(ii) All tie bars are not loose;

(iii) All center castings, motor

suspension lugs, equalizers, hangers,

gibs, or pins are not cracked or broken;

and

(iv) The truck frame is not broken and

is not cracked in a stress area that may

affect its structural integrity.

(7) All side bearings are in the

following condition:

(i) All friction side bearings with

springs designed to carry weight do not

have more than 25 percent of the

springs in any one nest broken;

(ii) All friction side bearings do not

run in contact unless designed to carry

weight; and

(iii) The maximum clearance of all

side bearings does not exceed the

manufacturer’s recommendation.

(8) All wheels do not have any of the

following conditions:

(i) A single flat spot that is 21⁄2 inches

or more in length, or two adjoining

spots that are each two or more inches

in length;

(ii) A gouge or chip in the flange that

is more than 11⁄2 inches in length and 1⁄2 inch in width;

(iii) A broken rim, if the tread,

measured from the flange at a point 5⁄8

of an inch above the tread, is less than

33⁄4 inches in width.

(iv) A shelled-out spot 21⁄2 inches or

more in length, or two adjoining spots

that are each two or more inches in

length;

(v) A seam running lengthwise that is

within 33⁄4 inches of the flange;

(vi) A flange worn to a 7⁄8 inch

thickness or less, gauged at a point 3⁄8

of an inch above the tread;

(vii) A tread worn hollow 5⁄16 inch or

more;

(viii) A flange height of 11⁄2 inches or

more measured from the tread to the top

of the flange;

(ix) A rim less than 1 inch thick;

(x) A crack or break in the flange,

tread, rim, plate, or hub;

(xi) A loose wheel; or

(xii) A weld.

(9) No part or appliance of a passenger

coach, except the wheels, is less than

21⁄2 inches above the top of the rail.

(10) All unguarded, noncurrentcarrying metal parts subject to becoming

charged are grounded or thoroughly

insulated.

(11) All jumpers and cable

connections are in the following

condition:

(i) All jumpers and cable connections

between coaches, between locomotives,

or between a locomotive and a coach are

located and guarded in a manner that

provides sufficient vertical clearance.

Jumpers and cable connections may not

hang with one end free;

(ii) The insulation is not broken or

badly chafed;

(iii) No plug, receptacle, or terminal is

broken; and

(iv) No strand of wire is broken or

protruding.

(12) All doors and cover plates

guarding high voltage equipment are

marked ‘‘Danger—High Voltage’’ or with

the word ‘‘Danger’’ and the normal

voltage carried by the parts so protected.

(13) All buffer plates are in place.

(14) If so equipped, all diaphragms are

in place and properly aligned.

(15) All secondary braking systems

are working.

(d) A long-distance intercity

passenger train that misses a scheduled

exterior calendar day mechanical

inspection due to a delay en route may

continue in service to the location

where the inspection was scheduled to

be performed. At that point, an exterior

calendar day mechanical inspection

shall be performed prior to returning the

equipment to service. This flexibility

applies only to the exterior mechanical

safety inspections required by this

section, and does not relieve the

railroad of the responsibility to perform

a calendar day inspection on a unit

classified as a ‘‘locomotive’’ under part

229 of this chapter as required by

§ 229.21 of this chapter.

(e) Cars requiring a single car test in

accordance with § 238.311 that are being

moved in service to a location where the

single car test can be performed shall

have the single car test completed prior

to, or as a part of, the calendar day

mechanical inspection.

§ 238.305 Interior calendar day mechanical

inspection of passenger cars.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph

(d) of this section, each passenger car

shall receive an interior mechanical

safety inspection at least once each

calendar day that it is placed in service.

(b) The interior daily mechanical

inspection shall be performed by a

qualified person or a qualified

mechanical inspector.

(c) As part of the daily interior

mechanical inspection, the railroad

shall verify conformity with the

following conditions, and

nonconformity with any such condition

renders the car defective whenever

discovered in service, except as

provided in paragraph (c)(5) of this

section:

(1) All fan openings, exposed gears

and pinions, exposed moving parts of

mechanisms, pipes carrying hot gases

and high-voltage equipment, switches,

circuit breakers, contactors, relays, grid

resistors, and fuses are in nonhazardous locations or equipped with

guards to prevent personal injury.

(2) The words ‘‘Emergency Brake

Valve’’ are legibly stenciled or marked

near each brake pipe valve or shown on

an adjacent badge plate.

(3) All doors and cover plates

guarding high voltage equipment are

marked ‘‘Danger—High Voltage’’ or with

the word ‘‘Danger’’ and the normal

voltage carried by the parts so protected.

(4) All trap doors safely operate and

securely latch in place in both the up

and down position.

(5) All end doors and side doors

operate safely and as intended. If all of

the following conditions are satisfied,

the car may remain in passenger service

until the next interior calendar day

mechanical inspection is due at which

time the appropriate repairs shall be

made:

(i) A qualified person or a qualified

mechanical inspector determines that

the repairs necessary to bring a door

into compliance cannot be performed at

the time the interior mechanical

inspection is conducted;

(ii) A qualified person or a qualified

mechanical inspector determines that it

is safe to move the equipment in

passenger service; and

(iii) A tag is prominently displayed on

the door indicating that the door is

defective.

(6) All safety-related signage is in

place and legible.

(7) All vestibule steps are illuminated.

(8) All manual door releases are in

place based on a visual inspection.

(d) A long-distance intercity

passenger train that misses a scheduled

calendar day interior mechanical

inspection due to a delay en route may

continue in service to the location

where the inspection was scheduled to

be performed. At that point, an interior

calendar day mechanical inspection

shall be performed prior to returning the

equipment to service.

§ 238.307 Periodic mechanical inspection

of passenger cars.

(a) Railroads shall conduct periodic

inspections of passenger cars as

required by this section and as

warranted by data developed under

§§ 238.103 and 238.109. A periodic
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49809

inspection conducted under part 229 of

this chapter satisfies the requirement of

this section with respect to the features

inspected.

(b) The periodic inspection program

shall specifically include the following

interior features, which shall be

inspected not less frequently than each

180 days. At a minimum, this

inspection shall determine that:

(1) Floors of passageways and

compartments are free from oil, water,

waste, or any obstruction that creates a

slipping, tripping, or fire hazard, and

floors are properly treated to provide

secure footing.

(2) Emergency lighting systems are

operational.

(3) With regard to switches:

(i) All hand-operated switches

carrying currents with a potential of

more than 150 volts that may be

operated while under load are covered

and are operative from the outside of the

cover;

(ii) A means is provided to display

whether the switches are open or

closed; and

(iii) Switches not designed to be

operated safely while under load are

legibly marked with the voltage carried

and the words ‘‘must not be operated

under load’’.

(4) Seats and seat attachments are not

broken or loose.

(5) Luggage racks are not broken or

loose.

(6) All beds and bunks are not broken

or loose, and all restraints or safety

latches and straps are in place and

function as intended.

(7) A representative sample of

emergency window exits on its cars

properly operate, in accordance with the

requirements of § 239.107 of this

chapter.

(8) All manual door releases operate

as intended.

(c) Nonconformity with any of the

conditions set forth in this section

renders the car defective whenever

discovered in service.

§ 238.309 Periodic brake equipment

maintenance.

(a) General. (1) This section contains

the minimum intervals at which the

brake equipment on various types of

passenger equipment shall be

periodically cleaned, repaired, and

tested. This maintenance procedure

requires that all of the equipment’s

brake system pneumatic components

that contain moving parts and are sealed

against air leaks be removed from the

equipment, disassembled, cleaned, and

lubricated and that the parts that can

deteriorate with age be replaced.

(2) A railroad may petition FRA’s

Associate Administrator for Safety to

approve alternative maintenance

procedures providing equivalent safety,

in lieu of the requirements of this

section. The petition shall be filed as

provided in § 238.21.

(b) MU locomotives. The brake

equipment of each MU locomotive shall

be cleaned, repaired, and tested at

intervals in accordance with the

following schedule:

(1) Every 736 days if the MU

locomotive is part of a fleet that is not

100 percent equipped with air dryers.

(2) Every 1,104 days if the MU

locomotive is part of a fleet that is 100

percent equipped with air dryers and is

equipped with PS–68, 26–C, 26–L, PS–

90, CS–1, RT–5A, GRB–1, CS–2, or 26–

R brake systems. (This listing of brake

system types is intended to subsume all

brake systems using 26 type, ABD, or

ABDW control valves and PS68, PS–90,

26B–1, 26C, 26CE, 26–Bl, 30CDW, or

30ECDW engineer’s brake valves.)

(3) Every 736 days for all other MU

locomotives.

(c) Conventional locomotives. The

brake equipment of each conventional

locomotive shall be cleaned, repaired,

and tested at intervals in accordance

with following schedule:

(1) Every 1,104 days for a locomotive

equipped with a 26–L or equivalent

brake system.

(2) Every 736 days for a locomotive

equipped with other than a 26–L or

equivalent brake system.

(d) Passenger coaches and other

unpowered vehicles. The brake

equipment on each passenger coach and

each other unpowered vehicle used in a

passenger train shall be cleaned,

repaired, and tested at intervals in

accordance with following schedule:

(1) Every 1,476 days for a coach or

vehicle equipped with a 26–C or

equivalent brake system.

(2) Every 1,104 days for a coach or

vehicle equipped with other than a 26–

C or equivalent brake system.

(e) Cab cars. The brake equipment of

each cab car shall be cleaned, repaired,

and tested in accordance with the

following schedule:

(1) Every 1,476 days for that portion

of the cab car brake system using brake

valves that are identical to the passenger

coach 26–C brake system;

(2) Every 1,104 days for that portion

of the cab car brake system using brake

valves that are identical to the

locomotive 26–L brake system; and

(3) Every 732 days for all other types

of cab car brake valves.

(f) Records of periodic maintenance.

The date and place of the cleaning,

repairing, and testing required by this

section shall be recorded on Form FRA

6180–49A or a similar form developed

by the railroad containing the same

information, and the person performing

the work and that person’s supervisor

shall sign the form. Alternatively, the

railroad may stencil the vehicle with the

date and place of the cleaning,

repairing, and testing and maintain an

electronic record of the person

performing the work and that person’s

supervisor. A record of the parts of the

air brake system that are cleaned,

repaired, and tested shall be kept in the

railroad’s files, the cab of the

locomotive, or a designated location in

the passenger car until the next such

periodic test is performed.

§ 238.311 Single car test.

(a) Single car tests of all passenger

cars and all unpowered vehicles used in

passenger trains shall be performed in

accordance with the AAR Standard S–

044 contained in AAR ‘‘Instruction

Pamphlet 5039–4, Supplement 3’’ (April

1991), or an alternative procedure

approved by FRA’s Associate

Administrator for Safety under § 238.21.

(b) A railroad shall perform a single

car test of the brake system of a car or

vehicle described in paragraph (a) of

this section when the car or vehicle is

found with one or more of the following

wheel defects:

(1) Built-up tread;

(2) Slid flat wheel;

(3) Thermal cracks;

(4) Overheated wheel; or

(5) Shelling.

(c) Except as provided in paragraph

(e) of this section, a railroad shall

perform a single car test of the brake

system of a car or vehicle described in

paragraph (a) of this section when:

(1) The car or vehicle is placed in

service after having been out of service

for 30 days or more;

(2) The trainline is repaired; or

(3) One or more of the following

conventional air brake equipment items

is removed, repaired, or replaced:

(i) Brake reservoir;

(ii) Brake cylinder;

(iii) Piston assembly;

(iv) Vent valve;

(v) Quick service valve;

(vi) Brake cylinder release valve;

(vii) Modulating valve or slack

adjuster;

(viii) Relay valve;

(ix) Angle cock or cutout cock;

(x) Service portion;

(xi) Emergency portion; or

(xii) Pipe bracket.

(d) Each single car test required by

this section shall be performed by a

qualified mechanical inspector.

(e) If the single car test cannot be

made at the point where repairs are

made, the car may be moved in
49810 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

passenger service to the next forward

location where the test can be made.

The single car test shall be completed

prior to, or as a part of, the car’s next

calendar day mechanical inspection.

§ 238.313 Class I brake test.

(a) Each commuter and short-distance

intercity passenger train shall receive a

Class I brake test once each calendar day

that the train is placed or remains in

passenger service.

(b) Except as provided in paragraph

(h) of this section, each long-distance

intercity passenger train shall receive a

Class I brake test:

(1) Prior to the train’s departure from

an originating terminal; and

(2) Every 1,500 miles or once each

additional calendar day, whichever

occurs first, that the train remains in

continuous passenger service.

(c) Each Class I brake test shall be

performed by a qualified mechanical

inspector.

(d) Each Class I brake test may be

performed either separately or in

conjunction with the calendar day

mechanical inspection required under

§ 238.303.

(e) Except as provided in § 238.15(b),

a railroad shall not use or haul a

passenger train in passenger service

from a location where a Class I brake

test has been performed, or was required

by this part to have been performed,

with less than 100 percent operative

brakes.

(f) A Class I brake test shall determine

and ensure that:

(1) The friction brakes apply and

remain applied on each car in the train

until a release of the brakes has been

initiated on each car in response to train

line electric, pneumatic, or other

signals. This test shall include a

verification that each side of each car’s

brake system responds properly to

application and release signals;

(2) The brake shoes or pads are firmly

seated against the wheel or disk with

the brakes applied;

(3) Piston travel is within prescribed

limits, either by direct observation,

observation of an actuator, or by

observation of the clearance between the

brake shoe and the wheel with the

brakes released;

(4) The communicating signal system

is tested and known to be operating as

intended;

(5) Each brake shoe is securely

fastened and aligned in relation to the

wheel;

(6) The engineer’s brake valve or

controller will cause the proper train

line commands for each position or

brake level setting;

(7) Brake pipe leakage does not

exceed 5 pounds-per-square-inch per

minute if leakage will affect service

performance;

(8) The emergency brake application

and deadman pedal or other emergency

control devices function as intended;

(9) Each brake shoe or pad is not

below the minimum thickness

established by the railroad. This

thickness shall not be less than the

minimum thickness necessary to safely

travel the maximum distance allowed

between Class I brake system tests;

(10) Each angle cock and cutout cock

is properly positioned;

(11) Brake rigging does not bind or

foul so as to impede the force delivered

to a brake shoe, impede the release of

a brake shoe, or otherwise adversely

affect the operation of brake system;

(12) If the train is equipped with

electropneumatic brakes, an

electropneumatic application of the

brakes is made and that the train is

walked to determine that the brakes on

each car in the train properly apply;

(13) Each brake disc is free of cracks;

(14) If the equipment is provided with

a brake indicator, the brake indicator

operates as intended; and

(15) The communication of brake pipe

pressure changes at the rear of the train

is verified.

(g) A qualified mechanical inspector

that performs a Class I brake test on a

train shall place in the cab of the

controlling locomotive of the train a

written statement, which shall be

retained in the cab until the next Class

I brake test is performed and which

shall contain the following information:

(1) Date and time the Class I brake test

was performed;

(2) Location where the test was

performed; and

(3) The number of the controlling

locomotive of the train.

(h) A long-distance, intercity

passenger train that misses a scheduled

calendar day Class I brake test due to a

delay en route may proceed to the point

where the Class I brake test was

scheduled to be performed. A Class I

brake test shall be completed at that

point prior to placing the train back in

service.

§ 238.315 Class IA brake test.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph

(b)(1) of this section, either a Class I or

Class IA brake test shall be performed:

(1) Prior to the first morning departure

of each commuter or short-distance

intercity passenger train; and

(2) Prior to placing a train in service

that has been off a source of compressed

air for more than four hours.

(b) A commuter or short-distance

intercity passenger train that provides

continuing late night service that began

prior to midnight may complete its daily

operating cycle after midnight without

performing another Class I or Class IA

brake test. A Class I or Class IA brake

test shall be performed on such a train

before it starts a new daily operating

cycle.

(c) A Class I or Class IA test may be

performed at a shop or yard site and

need not be repeated at the first

passenger terminal if the train remains

on a source of compressed air and in the

custody of the train crew.

(d) The Class IA test shall be

performed by either a qualified person

or a qualified mechanical inspector as

defined in § 238.5.

(e) Except as provided in § 238.15(b),

a railroad shall not use or haul a

passenger train in passenger service

from a location where a Class IA brake

test has been performed, or was required

by this part to have been performed,

with less than 100 percent operative

brakes.

(f) In performing a Class IA brake test,

it shall be determined that:

(1) Brake pipe leakage does not

exceed 5 pounds-per-square-inch per

minute if brake pipe leakage will affect

service performance;

(2) Each brake sets and releases by

inspecting in the manner described in

paragraph (g) of this section;

(3) The emergency brake application

and the deadman pedal or other

emergency control devices function as

intended;

(4) Each angle cock and cutout cock

is properly set;

(5) To the extent determinable, piston

travel is within the nominal range for

the type of brake equipment; and

(6) Brake pipe pressure changes at the

rear of the train are properly

communicated to the controlling

locomotive.

(g) In determining whether each brake

sets and releases—

(1) The inspection of the set and

release of the brakes shall be completed

by walking the train to directly observe

the set and release of each brake, if the

railroad determines that such a

procedure is safe.

(2) If the railroad determines that

operating conditions pose a safety

hazard to an inspector walking the

brakes, brake indicators may be used to

verify the set and release on cars so

equipped. However, the observation of

the brake indicators shall not be made

from the cab of the locomotive. The

inspector shall position himself or

herself to be able to accurately observe

the indicators.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49811

§ 238.317 Class II brake test.

(a) A Class II brake test shall be

performed on a passenger train when

any of the following events occur:

(1) Whenever the control stand used

to control the train is changed;

(2) When previously tested units are

added to or removed from the train; and

(3) When an operator first takes

charge of the train, except for face-toface relief.

(b) A Class II brake test shall be

performed by a qualified person or a

qualified mechanical inspector.

(c) A railroad shall not use or haul a

passenger train in passenger service

from a terminal or yard where a Class

II brake test has been performed, or was

required by this part to have been

performed, with any of the brakes

known to be cutout, inoperative, or

defective.

(d) In performing a Class II brake test

on a train, a railroad shall determine

that:

(1) The brakes on the rear unit of the

train apply and release in response to a

signal from the engineer’s brake valve or

controller of the leading or controlling

unit;

(2) The emergency brake application

and deadman pedal or other emergency

control devices function as intended;

and

(3) Brake pipe pressure changes are

properly communicated at the rear of

the train.

§ 238.319 Running brake test.

(a) As soon as conditions safely

permit, a running brake test shall be

performed on each passenger train after

the train has received, or was required

under this part to have received, either

a Class I, Class IA, or Class II brake test.

(b) The running brake test shall be

conducted in accordance with the

railroad’s established operating rules,

and shall be made by applying brakes in

a manner that allows the engineer to

ascertain whether the brakes are

operating properly.

(c) If the engineer determines that the

brakes are not operating properly, the

engineer shall stop the train and follow

the procedures provided in § 238.15.

Subpart E—Specific Requirements for

Tier II Passenger Equipment

§ 238.401 Scope.

This subpart contains specific

requirements for railroad passenger

equipment operating at speeds

exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding

150 mph. As stated in § 238.433(b), all

such passenger equipment remains

subject to the requirements concerning

couplers and uncoupling devices

contained in Federal statute at 49 U.S.C.

chapter 203 and in FRA regulations at

part 231 and § 232.2 of this chapter. The

requirements of this subpart are

effective on the effective date of the

final rule.

§ 238.403 Crash energy management

requirements.

(a) Each power car and trailer car

shall be designed with a crash energy

management system to dissipate kinetic

energy during a collision. The rash

energy management system shall

provide a controlled deformation and

collapse of designated sections within

the unoccupied volumes to absorb

collision energy and to reduce the

decelerations on passengers and

crewmembers resulting from dynamic

forces transmitted to occupied volumes.

(b) The design of each unit shall

consist of an occupied volume located

between two normally unoccupied

volumes. Where practical, sections

within the unoccupied volumes shall be

designed to be structurally weaker than

the occupied volume. During a

collision, the designated sections within

the unoccupied volumes shall start to

deform and eventually collapse in a

controlled fashion to dissipate energy

before any structural damage occurs to

the occupied volume.

(c) At a minimum, the train shall be

designed to meet the following

requirements:

(1) Thirteen megajoules (MJ) shall be

absorbed at each end of the train

through the controlled crushing of

unoccupied or occasionally occupied

spaces, and of this amount a minimum

of 5 MJ shall be absorbed outboard of

the operator’s cab in each power car;

(2) A minimum of an additional 3 MJ

shall be absorbed by the power car

structure between the operator’s cab and

the first trailer car; and

(3) The end of the first trailer car

adjacent to each power car shall absorb

a minimum of 5 MJ through controlled

crushing.

(d) For a 30-mph collision of a train

on tangent, level track with an identical

stationary train:

(1) The deceleration of the occupied

compartments of each trailer car shall

not exceed 10g; and

(2) When seated anywhere in the

train, the velocity at which a 50thpercentile male contacts the seat back

ahead of him shall not exceed 25 mph.

(e) Compliance with paragraphs (a)

through (d) of this section shall be

demonstrated by analysis using a

dynamic collision computer model. For

the purpose of demonstrating

compliance, the following assumptions

shall be made:

(1) The train remains upright, in-line,

and with all wheels on the track

throughout the collision; and

(2) Resistance to structural crushing

following the force-versus-distance

function determined during the

structural analysis required under

§ 238.103 as part of the design of the

train.

(f) Passenger searing shall not be

permitted in the leading unit of a Tier

II train.

§ 238.405 Longitudinal static compressive

strength.

(a) To form an effective crash refuge

for crewmembers occupying the cab of

a power car, the longitudinal ultimate

compressive strength of the underframe

of the cab of a power car shall be a

minimum of 2,100,000 pounds unless

equivalent protection to crewmembers

is provided under an alternate design

approach, validated through analysis

and testing, approved by the FRA

Associate Administrator for Safety

under the provisions of § 238.21.

(b) The longitudinal compressive

strength of the underframe of the

occupied volume of each trailer car

shall be a minimum of 800,000 pounds

without deformation. To demonstrate

compliance with this requirement, the

800,000-pound load shall be applied to

the underframe of the occupied volume

as it would be transmitted to the

underframe by the full structure of the

vehicle.

(c) Unoccupied or lightly occupied

volumes of a power car or a trailer car

designed to crush as part of the crash

energy management design are not

subject to the requirements of this

section.

§ 238.407 Anti-climbing mechanism.

(a) Each power car shall have an anticlimbing mechanism at its forward end

capable of resisting an upward or

downward static vertical force of

200,000 pounds. A power car

constructed with a crash energy

management design is permitted to

crush in a controlled manner before the

anti-climbing mechanism fully engages.

(b) Interior train coupling points

between units, including between units

of articulated cars or other permanently

joined units of cars, shall have an anticlimbing mechanism capable of

resisting an upward or downward

vertical force of 100,000 pounds.

(c) The forward coupler of a power car

shall be attached to the car body to

resist a vertical downward force of

100,000 pounds for any horizontal

position of the coupler without yielding.
49812 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

§ 238.409 Forward end structures of power

car cabs.

This section contains the design

requirements for the forward end

structure of the cab of a power car. (A

conceptual implementation of this end

structure is provided in Figure 1.)

(a) Center collision post. The forward

end structure shall have a full-height

center collision post, or its structural

equivalent, capable of withstanding the

following:

(1) A shear load of 500,000 pounds at

its joint with the underframe without

exceeding the ultimate strength of the

joint;

(2) A shear load of 150,000 pounds at

its joint with the roof without exceeding

the ultimate strength of the joint; and

(3) A horizontal, longitudinal force of

300,000 pounds applied at a point on

level with the bottom of the windshield

without exceeding the yield or the

critical buckling stress.

(b) Side collision posts. The forward

end structure shall have two side

collision posts, or their structural

equivalent, located at approximately the

one-third points laterally, each capable

of withstanding the following:

(1) A shear load of 500,000 pounds at

its joint with the underframe without

exceeding the ultimate strength of the

joint; and

(2) A horizontal, longitudinal force of

300,000 pounds, applied at a point on

level with the bottom of the windshield,

without exceeding the yield or the

critical buckling stress.

(c) Corner posts. The forward end

structure shall have two full-height

corner posts, or their structural

equivalent, each capable of

withstanding the following:

(1) A horizontal, longitudinal or

lateral shear load of 300,000 pounds at

its joint with the underframe, without

exceeding the ultimate strength of the

joint;

(2) A horizontal, lateral force of

100,000 pounds applied at a point 30

inches up from the underframe

attachment, without exceeding the yield

or the critical buckling stress; and

(3) A horizontal, longitudinal or

lateral shear load of 150,000 pounds at

its joint with the roof, without

exceeding the ultimate strength of the

joint.

(d) Skin. The skin covering the

forward-facing end of each power car

shall be:

(1) Equivalent to a 1⁄2-inch steel plate

with a 25,000 pounds-per-square-inch

yield strength—material of a higher

yield strength may be used to decrease

the required thickness of the material

provided an equivalent level of strength

is maintained.

(2) Securely attached to the end

structure.

(3) Sealed to prevent the entry of

fluids into the occupied cab area of the

equipment.

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49813

BILLING CODE 4910–06–C

§ 238.411 Rear end structures of power car

cabs.

This section contains design

requirements for the rear end structure

of the cab of a power car. (A conceptual

implementation of this end structure is

provided in Figure 2.)

(a) Corner posts. The rear end

structure shall have two full-height

corner posts, or their structural

equivalent, each capable of

withstanding the following:

(1) A horizontal, longitudinal or

lateral shear load of 300,000 pounds at

its joint with the underframe without

exceeding the ultimate strength of the

joint; and

(2) A horizontal, longitudinal or

lateral shear load of 80,000 pounds at its

joint with the roof without exceeding

the ultimate strength of the joint.

Collision posts. The rear end structure

shall have two full-height collision

posts, or their structural equivalent,

each capable of withstanding the

following:

(1) A horizontal, longitudinal shear

load of 750,000 pounds at its joint with

the underframe without exceeding the

ultimate strength of the joint; and

(2) A horizontal, longitudinal shear

lead of 75,000 pounds at its joint with

the roof without exceeding the ultimate

strength of the joint.
49814 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

BILLING CODE 4910–06–C

§ 238.413 End structures of trailer cars.

(a) Except as provided in paragraphs

(b) and (c) of this section, the end

structure of a trailer car shall be

designed to include the following

elements, or their structural equivalent.

(A conceptual implementation of this

end structure is provided in Figure 3.)

(1) Corner posts. Two full-height

corner posts, each capable of

withstanding the following:

(i) A horizontal, longitudinal shear

load of 150,000 pounds at its joint with

the underframe without exceeding the

ultimate strength of the joint;

(ii) A horizontal, longitudinal or

lateral force of 30,000 pounds applied at

a point 30 inches up from the

underframe attachment without

exceeding the yield or the critical

buckling stress; and

(iii) A horizontal, longitudinal or

lateral shear load of 20,000 pounds at its

joint with the roof without exceeding

the ultimate strength of the joint.

(2) Collision posts. Two full-height

collision posts each capable of

withstanding the following:

(i) A horizontal, longitudinal shear

load of 300,000 pounds at its joint with

the underframe without exceeding the

ultimate strength of the joint; and

(ii) A horizontal, longitudinal shear

load of 60,000 pounds at its joint with

the roof without exceeding the ultimate

strength of the joint.

(b) If the trailer car consists of

multiple articulated units not designed

for uncoupling other than in a

maintenance shop, the end structure

requirements of paragraph (a) of this

section apply only to the ends of the

entire car, not to the ends of each unit

comprising the multi-unit car.

(c) If the trailer car is designed with

a vestibule, the vestibule inboard end

structure shall be designed with two

full-height corner posts, or their

structural equivalent, each capable of

withstanding the following (A

conceptual implementation of this end

structure is provided in Figure 4.):

(1) A horizontal, longitudinal shear

load of 200,000 pounds at its joint with

the underframe without exceeding the

ultimate strength of the joint;
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49815

(2) A horizontal, lateral force of

30,000 pounds applied at a point 30

inches up from the underframe

attachment without exceeding the yield

or the critical buckling stress;

(3) A horizontal, longitudinal force of

50,000 pounds applied at a point 30

inches up from the underframe

attachment without exceeding the yield

or the critical buckling stress; and

(4) A horizontal, longitudinal or

lateral shear load of 20,000 pounds at its

joint with the roof without exceeding

the ultimate strength of the joint.
49816 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

BILLING CODE 4910–06–C

§ 238.415 Rollover strength.

(a) Each power car shall be designed

to rest on its side and be uniformly

supported at the top (‘‘roof rail’’) and

the bottom (‘‘side sill’’) chords of the

side frame. The allowable stress for

occupied volumes for this condition

shall be one-half yield or one-half the

critical buckling stress, whichever is

less.

(b) Each passenger car and power car

shall also be designed to rest on its roof

so that any damage in occupied areas is

limited to roof sheathing and framing.

Deformation to the roof sheathing and

framing is allowed to the extent

necessary to permit the vehicle to be

supported directly on the top chords of

the side frames and end frames. Other

than roof sheathing and framing, the

allowable stress for occupied volumes

for this condition shall be one-half yield

or one-half the critical buckling stress,

whichever is less.

§ 238.417 Side loads.

(a) The single-level passenger car

body structure shall be designed to

resist an inward transverse load of

80,000 pounds of force applied to the

side sill and 10,000 pounds of force

applied to the belt rail (horizontal

members at the bottom of the window

opening in the side frame).

(b) These loads shall be considered to

be applied separately over the full

vertical dimension of the specified

member for a distance of 8 feet in the

direction of the length of the car.

(c) The allowable stress shall be the

lesser of the yield stress or the critical

buckling stress with local yielding of the

side skin allowed.

(d) The connections of the side frame

to the roof and underframe shall support

these loads.

§ 238.419 Truck-to-car-body and truck

component attachment.

(a) The ultimate strength of the truckto-car-body attachment for each unit in

a train shall be sufficient to resist

without failure a vertical force

equivalent to 2g acting on the mass of

the truck and a force of 250,000 pounds

acting in any horizontal direction.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49817

(b) Each component of a truck (which

include axles, wheels, bearings, the

truck-mounted brake system,

suspension system components, and

any other components attached to the

truck by design) shall remain attached

to the truck when a force equivalent to

2g acting on the mass of the component

is exerted in any direction on that

component.

§ 238.421 Glazing.

(a) Each power car and trailer car

shall be equipped with certified glazing

meeting the following requirements:

(1) End-facing exterior glazing shall

resist the impact of a 12-pound solid

steel sphere at the maximum speed at

which the vehicle will operate, at an

angle equal to the angle between the

glazing surface as installed and the

direction of travel, with no penetration

or spall.

(2) Side-facing exterior glazing shall

resist the impact of a:

(i) 12-pound solid steel sphere at 15

mph, at an angle of 90 degrees to the

surface of the glazing, with no

penetration or spall; and

(ii) A granite ballast stone weighing a

minimum of 0.5 pounds, traveling at 75

mph and impacting at a 90-degree angle

to the glazing surface, with no

penetration or spall.

(3) All exterior glazing shall:

(i) Resist a single impact of a 9-mm,

147-grain bullet traveling at an impact

velocity of 900 feet per second, with no

bullet penetration or spall; and

(ii) Demonstrate anti-spalling

performance by the use of a .001

aluminum witness plate, placed 12

inches from the glazing surface during

all impact tests. The witness plate shall

contain no marks from spalled glazing

particles after any impact test.

(b) Each individual unit of glazing

material shall be permanently marked,

prior to installation, in such a manner

that the marking is clearly visible after

the material has been installed. The

marking shall include:

(1) The words ‘‘FRA TYPE IH’’ for

end-facing glazing or ‘‘FRA TYPE IIH’’

for side-facing glazing, to indicate that

the material has successfully passed the

testing requirements of paragraph (a) of

this section;

(2) The name of the manufacturer; and

(3) The type or brand identification of

the material.

(c) Glazing securement components

shall hold the glazing in place against

the forces described in paragraphs (a)(1)

through (a)(3) of this section.

(d) Glazing securement components

shall be designed to resist the forces due

to air pressure differences caused when

two trains pass at the minimum

separation for two adjacent tracks, while

traveling in opposite directions, each

train traveling at the maximum

authorized speed.

(e) Interior equipment glazing shall

meet the minimum requirements of AS1

type laminated glass as defined in

American National Standard ‘‘Safety

Code for Glazing Materials for Glazing

Motor Vehicles Operating on Land

Highways,’’ ASA Standard Z26.1–1966.

(f) Each vehicle that is fully equipped

with glazing materials that meet the

requirements of paragraphs (a) through

(e) of this section shall be stencilled on

an interior wall as follows: ‘‘Fully

Equipped with FRA Part 238 Glazing’’

or similar words conveying that

meaning, in letters at least 3⁄8 of an inch

high.

§ 238.423 Fuel tanks.

(a) External fuel tanks. (1) With all

locomotive wheels resting on the ties

beside the rail, the lowest point of an

external fuel tank shall clear an 81⁄2-inch

combined height of the tie plate and rail

by a minimum of 11⁄2 inches. (This

requirement results in a minimum 10-

inch vertical distance from the lowest

point on the wheel tread to the lowest

point on the external fuel tank.)

(2) The end bulkheads of external fuel

tanks shall at a minimum be equivalent

to a 1-inch thick steel plate with a

25,000 pounds-per-square-inch yield

strength—material of a higher yield

strength may be used to decrease the

required thickness of the material

provided an equivalent level of strength

is maintained.

(3) The skin of external fuel tanks

shall at a minimum be equivalent to a

1⁄2-inch thick steel plate with a 25,000

pounds-per-square-inch yield strength—

material of a higher yield strength may

be used to decrease the required

thickness of the material provided an

equivalent level of strength is

maintained.

(4) The material used for construction

of external fuel tank exterior surfaces

shall not exhibit a decrease in yield

strength or penetration resistance in the

temperature range of 0 to 160 degrees F.

(5) External fuel tank vent systems

shall be designed to prevent them from

becoming a path of fuel loss in the event

a tank is placed in any orientation due

to a locomotive overturning.

(6) The bottom surface of an external

fuel tank shall be equipped with skid

surfaces to prevent sliding contact with

the rail or the ground from easily

wearing through the tank.

(7) The structural strength of an

external fuel tank shall be adequate to

support 11⁄2 times the dead weight of the

locomotive without deformation of the

tank.

(b) Internal fuel tanks. (1) Internal fuel

tanks shall have their lowest point at

least 18 inches above the lowest point

on the locomotive wheel tread and shall

be enclosed by, or shall be part of, the

locomotive structure.

(2) Internal fuel tank vent systems

shall be designed to prevent them from

becoming a path of fuel loss in the event

a tank is placed in any orientation due

to a locomotive overturning.

(3) Internal fuel tank bulkheads and

skin shall at a minimum be equivalent

to a 3⁄8-inch thick steel plate with a

25,000-pound yield strength—material

of a higher yield strength may be used

to decrease the required thickness of the

material provided an equivalent level of

strength is maintained. Skid plates are

not required.

§ 238.425 Electrical system.

(a) Circuit protection. (1) The main

propulsion power line shall be

protected with a lightning arrestor,

automatic circuit breaker, and overload

relay. The lightning arrestor shall be run

by the most direct path possible to

ground with a connection to ground of

not less than No. 6 AWG. These

overload protection devices shall be

housed in an enclosure designed

specifically for that purpose with the arc

chute vented directly to outside air.

(2) Head end power, including

trainline power distribution, shall be

provided with both overload and

ground fault protection.

(3) Circuits used for purposes other

than propelling the equipment shall be

connected to their power source through

circuit breakers or equivalent currentlimiting devices.

(4) Each auxiliary circuit shall be

provided with a circuit breaker located

as near as practical to the point of

connection to the source of power for

that circuit; however, such protection

may be omitted from circuits controlling

safety-critical devices.

(b) Main battery system. (1) The main

batteries shall be isolated from the cab

and passenger seating areas by a noncombustible barrier.

(2) Battery chargers shall be designed

to protect against overcharging.

(3) Battery circuits shall include an

emergency battery cut-off switch to

completely disconnect the energy stored

in the batteries from the load.

(4) If batteries are of the type to

potentially vent explosive gases, the

batteries shall be adequately ventilated

to prevent accumulation of explosive

concentrations of these gases.

(c) Power dissipation resistors. (1)

Power dissipating resistors shall be
49818 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

adequately ventilated to prevent

overheating under worst-case operating

conditions.

(2) Power dissipation grids shall be

designed and installed with sufficient

isolation to prevent combustion

between resistor elements and

combustible material.

(3) Power dissipation resistor circuits

shall incorporate warning or protective

devices for low ventilation air flow,

over-temperature, and short circuit

failures.

(4) Resistor elements shall be

electrically insulated from resistor

frames, and the frames shall be

electrically insulated from the supports

that hold them.

(d) Electromagnetic interference and

compatibility. (1) The operating railroad

shall ensure electromagnetic

compatibility of the systems critical to

the safety of equipment with their

environment. Electromagnetic

compatibility can be achieved through

equipment design or changes to the

operating environment.

(2) The electronic equipment shall not

produce electrical noise that interferes

with trainline control and

communications or with wayside

signaling systems.

(3) To contain electromagnetic

interference emissions, suppression of

transients shall be at the source

wherever possible.

(4) Electrical and electronic systems

of equipment shall be capable of

operation in the presence of external

electromagnetic noise sources.

(5) All electronic equipment shall be

self-protected from damage or improper

operation, or both, due to high voltage

transients and long-term over-voltage or

under-voltage conditions.

§ 238.427 Suspension system.

(a) General requirements. (1)

Suspension systems shall be designed to

reasonably prevent wheel climb, wheel

lift, rail rollover, rail shift, and a vehicle

from overturning to ensure safe, stable

performance and ride quality. These

requirements shall be met in all

operating environments, and under all

track conditions and loading conditions

as determined by the operating railroad.

These requirements shall be met at all

track speeds and over all track qualities

of track consistent with the Track Safety

Standards in part 213 of this chapter, up

to the maximum operating speed and

maximum cant deficiency of the

equipment.

(2) Passenger equipment shall meet

the safety performance standards for

suspension systems contained in

Appendix C to this part or alternative

standards providing equivalent safety if

approved by the FRA Associate

Administrator for Safety under the

provisions of § 238.21.

(b) Lateral accelerations. Passenger

cars shall not operate under conditions

that result in a steady-state lateral

acceleration of 0.1g (measured parallel

to the car floor inside the passenger

compartment) or greater.

(c) Hunting oscillations. Each truck

shall be equipped with a permanently

installed lateral accelerometer mounted

on the truck frame. The accelerometer

output signals shall be calibrated and

filtered, and shall pass through signal

conditioning circuitry designed to

determine if hunting oscillations of the

truck are occurring. If hunting

oscillations are detected, the train

monitoring system shall provide an

alarm to the operator, and the train shall

be slowed to a speed 5 mph less than

the speed at which the hunting

oscillations stopped.

(d) Ride vibration (quality). While

traveling at the maximum operating

speed over the intended route, the train

suspension system shall be designed to:

(1) Limit the vertical acceleration, as

measured by a vertical accelerometer

mounted on the car floor, to no greater

than 0.55g single event, peak-to-peak;

(2) Limit the lateral acceleration, as

measured by a lateral accelerometer

mounted on the car floor, to no greater

than 0.3g single event, peak-to-peak;

and

(3) Limit the combination of lateral

acceleration (L) and vertical acceleration

(V) occurring within any time period of

2 consecutive seconds as expressed by

the square root of (V2∂L2) to no greater

than 0.604, where L may not exceed

0.3g and V may not exceed 0.55g.

(e) Compliance. Compliance with the

requirements contained in paragraph (d)

of this section shall be demonstrated

during the equipment pre-revenue

service acceptance tests required under

§ 238.113 and [proposed] § 213.345 of

this chapter.

(f) Overheat sensors. Overheat sensors

for each equipment bearing shall be

provided. The sensors may be on board

or placed at reasonable wayside

intervals.

§ 238.429 Safety appliances.

(a) Couplers. (1) The leading and the

trailing ends of semi-permanently

coupled trainsets shall be equipped

with an automatic coupler that couples

on impact and uncouples by either

activation of a traditional uncoupling

lever or some other type of uncoupling

mechanism that does not require a

person to go between the equipment

units.

(2) Automatic couplers and

uncoupling devices on the leading and

trailing ends of semi-permanently

coupled trainsets may be stored within

a removable shrouded housing.

(3) If the units in a train are not semipermanently coupled, both ends of each

unit shall be equipped with an

automatic coupler, that couples on

impact and uncouples by either

activation of a traditional uncoupling

lever or some other type of uncoupling

mechanism that does not require a

person to go between the equipment

units.

(b) Hand brakes. Except as provided

in paragraph (f) of this section, Tier II

trains shall be equipped with a parking

or hand brake that can be applied and

released manually that is capable of

holding the train on a 3-percent grade.

(c) Safety appliance mechanical

strength and fasteners.

(1) All handrails, handholds, and sill

steps shall be made of 1-inch diameter

steel pipe or 5⁄8-inch thickness steel or

a material of equal or greater mechanical

strength.

(2) All safety appliances shall be

securely fastened to the car body

structure with mechanical fasteners that

have mechanical strength greater than or

equal to that of a 1⁄2-inch diameter SAE

steel bolt mechanical fastener.

(i) Safety appliance mechanical

fasteners shall have mechanical strength

and fatigue resistance equal to or greater

than a 1⁄2-inch diameter SAE steel bolt.

(ii) Mechanical fasteners shall be

installed with a positive means to

prevent unauthorized removal. Selflocking threaded fasteners do not meet

this requirement.

(iii) Mechanical fasteners shall be

installed to facilitate inspection.

(d) Handrails and handholds. Except

as provided in paragraph (f) of this

section:

(1) Handrails shall be provided for

passengers on both sides of all steps

used to board or depart the train.

(2) Exits on a power vehicle shall be

equipped with handrails and handholds

so that crewmembers can get on and off

the vehicle safely.

(3) Throughout their entire length,

handrails and handholds shall be a

contrasting color to the surrounding

vehicle body.

(4) The maximum distance above the

top of the rail to the bottom of vertical

handrails and handholds shall be 51

inches and the minimum distance shall

be 21 inches.

(5) Vertical handrails and handholds

shall be installed to continue to a point

at least equal to the height of the top

edge of the control cab door.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49819

(6) The minimum hand clearance

distance between a vertical handrail or

handhold and the vehicle body shall be

21⁄2 inches for the entire length.

(7) All vertical handrails and

handholds shall be securely fastened to

the vehicle body.

(8) If the length of the handrail

exceeds 60 inches, it shall be securely

fastened to the power vehicle body with

two fasteners at each end.

(e) Sill steps. Except as provided in

paragraph (f) of this section:

(1) Each power vehicle shall be

equipped with a sill step below each

exterior door as follows:

(i) The sill step shall have a minimum

cross-sectional area of 1⁄2 by 3 inches.

(ii) The sill step shall be made of steel

or a material of equal or greater strength

and fatigue resistance.

(iii) The minimum tread length of the

sill step shall be 10 inches.

(iv) The minimum clear depth of the

sill step shall be 8 inches.

(v) The outside edge of the tread of

the sill step shall be flush with the side

of the car body structure.

(vi) Sill steps shall not have a vertical

rise between treads exceeding 18 inches.

(vii) The lowest sill step tread shall be

not more than 20 inches above the top

of the track rail.

(viii) Sill steps shall be a color which

contrasts with the surrounding power

vehicle body color.

(ix) Sill steps shall be securely

fastened.

(x) At least 50 percent of the tread

surface area of each sill step shall be

open space.

(xi) The portion of the tread surface

area of each sill step which is not open

space and is normally contacted by the

foot shall be treated with an anti-skid

material.

(f) Exceptions.

(1) If the units of the equipment are

semi-permanently coupled, with

uncoupling done only at maintenance

facilities, the equipment units that are

not required by paragraph (a) of this

section to be equipped with automatic

couplers need not be equipped with sill

steps or end or side handholds that

would normally be used to safely

perform coupling and uncoupling

operations.

(2) If the units of the equipment are

not semi-permanently coupled, the

units shall be equipped with hand

brakes, sill steps, end handholds, and

side handholds that meet the

requirements contained in § 231.14 of

this chapter.

(3) If two trainsets are coupled to form

a single train that is not semipermanently coupled (i.e., that is

coupled by an automatic coupler), the

automatically coupled ends shall be

equipped with hand brakes, sill steps,

end handholds, and side handholds that

meet the requirements contained in

§ 231.14 of this chapter. If the trainsets

are semi-permanently coupled, these

safety appliances are not required.

(g) Optional safety appliances. Safety

appliances installed at the option of the

railroad shall be firmly attached with

mechanical fasteners and shall meet the

design and installation requirements

provided in this section.

§ 238.431 Brake system.

(a) A passenger train’s brake system

shall be capable of stopping the train

from its maximum operating speed

within the signal spacing existing on the

track over which the train is operating

under worst-case adhesion conditions.

(b) The brake system shall be

designed to allow an inspector to

determine that the brake system is

functioning properly without having to

place himself or herself in a dangerous

position on, under, or between the

equipment.

(c) Passenger equipment shall be

provided with an emergency application

feature that produces an irretrievable

stop, using a brake rate consistent with

prevailing adhesion, passenger safety,

and brake system thermal capacity. An

emergency application shall be available

at any time, and shall be initiated by an

unintentional parting of the train. A

means to initiate an emergency brake

application shall be provided at two

locations in each unit of the train.

(d) The brake system shall be

designed to prevent thermal damage to

wheels and brake discs. The operating

railroad shall demonstrate through

analysis and test that no thermal

damage results to the wheels or brake

discs under conditions resulting in

maximum braking effort being exerted

on the wheels or discs.

(e) The following requirements apply

to blended braking systems:

(1) Loss of power or failure of the

dynamic brake does not result in

exceeding the allowable stop distance;

(2) The friction brake alone is

adequate to safely stop the train under

all operating conditions;

(3) The operational status of the

electric portion of the brake system shall

be displayed for the train operator in the

control cab; and

(4) The operating railroad shall

demonstrate through analysis and

testing the maximum operating speed

for safe operation of the train using only

the friction brake portion of the blended

brake with no thermal damage to wheels

or discs.

(f) The brake system design shall

allow a disabled train’s pneumatic

brakes to be controlled by a

conventional locomotive, during rescue

operation, through brake pipe control

alone.

(g) An independent failure-detection

system shall compare brake commands

with brake system output to determine

if a failure has occurred. The failure

detection system shall report brake

system failures to the automated train

monitoring system.

(h) Passenger equipment shall be

provided with an adhesion control

system designed to automatically adjust

the braking force on each wheel to

prevent sliding during braking. In the

event of a failure of this system to

prevent wheel slide within preset

parameters, a wheel slide alarm that is

visual or audible, or both, shall alert the

train operator in the cab of the

controlling power car to wheel-slide

conditions on any axle of the train.

§ 238.433 Draft system.

(a) Leading and trailing automatic

couplers of trains shall be compatible

with standard AAR couplers with no

special adapters used.

(b) All passenger equipment

continues to be subject to the

requirements concerning couplers and

uncoupling devices contained in

Federal Statute at 49 U.S.C. chapter 203

and in FRA regulations at part 231 and

§ 232.2 of this chapter.

§ 238.435 Interior fittings and surfaces.

(a) The seat back in a passenger car

shall be designed to withstand, with

deflection but without total failure, the

load of a seat occupant who is a 95thpercentile male accelerated at 8g

impacting the seat back.

(b) The seat back in a passenger car

shall include shock-absorbent material

to cushion the impact of occupants with

the seat ahead of them.

(c) The ultimate strength of a seat

attachment to a passenger car body shall

be of sufficient strength to withstand the

following individually applied

accelerations acting on the mass of the

seat plus the mass of a seat occupant

who is a 95th-percentile male:

(1) Longitudinal: 8g;

(2) Lateral: 4g; and

(3) Vertical: 4g.

(d) Other interior fittings shall be

attached to the passenger car body with

sufficient strength to withstand the

following individually applied

accelerations acting on the mass of the

fitting:

(1) Longitudinal: 8g;

(2) Lateral: 4g; and

(3) Vertical: 4g.
49820 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

2The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

Accessibility Specifications for Transportation

Vehicles also contain requirements for doorway

clearance (See Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations

Part 38).

Fittings that can be expected to be

impacted by a person during a collision,

such as tables between facing seats,

shall be designed for the mass of the

fitting plus the mass of the number of

occupants who are 95th-percentile

males that could be expected to strike

the fitting.

(e) The ultimate strength of the

interior fittings and equipment in power

car control cabs shall be sufficient to

resist without failure loads due to the

following individually applied

accelerations acting on the mass of the

fitting or equipment:

(1) Longitudinal: 12g;

(2) Lateral: 4g; and

(3) Vertical: 4g.

(f) To the extent possible, interior

fittings, except seats, shall be recessed

or flush-mounted. Corners and sharp

edges shall be avoided or otherwise

padded.

(g) Energy-absorbent material shall be

used to pad surfaces likely to be

impacted by occupants during collisions

or derailments.

(h) Luggage stowage compartments

shall be of the enclosed, aircraft type

with ultimate strength sufficient to

resist loads due to the following

individually applied accelerations

acting on the mass of the luggage that

the compartments are designed to

accommodate:

(1) Longitudinal: 8g;

(2) Lateral: 4g; and

(3) Vertical: 4g.

§ 238.437 Emergency communication.

A means of emergency

communication throughout a train shall

be provided and shall include the

following:

(a) Transmission locations that are

clearly marked with luminescent

material at each end of each unit

adjacent to the unit end doors;

(b) Clear and understandable

operating instructions at or near each

transmission location; and

(c) Back-up power for a minimum

time period of two hours.

§ 238.439 Emergency window exits and

roof hatches.

(a) Emergency window exits. Except as

provided in paragraphs (a)(3) and (a)(4)

of this section, each passenger car shall

have a minimum of four emergency

window exits, either in a staggered

configuration or with one located at

each end of each side of a passenger car.

(1) Each sealed emergency window

exit on a passenger coach shall have a

minimum free opening of 30 inches

horizontally by 30 inches vertically.

(2) Each emergency window exit shall

be easily operable by a 5th-percentile

female without requiring the use of a

tool or other implement.

(3) If the passenger car is bi-level,

each main level shall have a minimum

of four emergency window exits, either

in a staggered configuration or with one

located at each end of each side on each

level.

(4) Each passenger car of special

design, such as a sleeping car, shall

have at least one emergency window

exit in each compartment.

(b) Roof hatches. (1) Each power car

cab shall have a minimum of one roof

hatch emergency entrance location with

either a minimum opening of 18 inches

by 24 inches or a clearly marked

structural weak point in the roof to

provide a minimum opening of the same

dimensions to provide quick access for

properly equipped emergency

personnel.

(2) Each passenger car shall be

equipped with a minimum of two roof

hatch emergency entrance locations

with either a minimum opening of 18

inches by 24 inches or two clearly

marked structural weak points in the

roof to provide a minimum opening of

the same dimensions to provide quick

access for properly equipped emergency

personnel.

(c) Marking and instructions.

[Reserved]

§ 238.441 Doors.

(a) Each passenger car shall have a

minimum of four side doors, or the

functional equivalent of four side doors,

each permitting at least one 95thpercentile male to pass through at a

single time.2

(1) Each powered, exterior side door

shall be equipped with a manual

override that is:

(i) Capable of opening the door

without power from both inside and

outside the car;

(ii) Located adjacent to the door

which it controls; and

(iii) Designed and maintained so that

a person may access the override device

from both inside and outside the car

without the use of any tool or other

implement.

(2) The status of each powered,

exterior side door shall be displayed to

the crew in the operating cab. If door

interlocks are used, the sensors used to

detect train motion shall be nominally

set to operate at 3 mph.

(b) Each powered, exterior side door

shall be connected to an emergency

back-up power system.

(c) A railroad may protect a manual

override device used to open a powered,

exterior door with a cover or a screen

capable of removal by a 5th-percentile

female without requiring the use of a

tool or other implement. If the method

of removing the protective cover or

screen entails breaking or shattering it,

the cover or screen shall be scored,

perforated, or otherwise weakened so

that a 5th-percentile female can

penetrate the cover or screen with a

single blow of her fist without injury to

her hand.

(d) Passenger compartment end doors

shall be equipped with a kick-out panel,

pop-out window, or other similar means

of egress in the event the door will not

open.

(e) Marking and instructions.

[Reserved]

§ 238.443 Headlights.

Each power car shall be equipped

with at least two headlights. Each

headlight shall produce no less than

200,000 candela. One headlight shall be

focused to illuminate a person standing

between the rails at 800 feet under clear

weather conditions. The other headlight

shall be focused to illuminate a person

standing between the rails at 1500 feet

under clear weather conditions.

§ 238.445 Automated monitoring.

(a) Each passenger train shall be

equipped to monitor the performance of

the following systems or components:

(1) Reception of cab signals and train

control signals;

(2) Truck hunting;

(3) Dynamic brake status;

(4) Friction brake status;

(5) Fire detection systems;

(6) Head end power status;

(7) Alerter or deadman control;

(8) Horn and bell;

(9) Wheel slide;

(10) Tilt system, if so equipped; and

(11) On-board bearing-temperature

sensors, if so equipped.

(b) The operator shall be alerted when

any of the monitored parameters are out

of predetermined limits. In situations

where the system safety analysis

indicates that operator-reaction time is

crucial to safety, immediate automatic

corrective action such as limiting the

speed of the train shall be taken.

(c) The monitoring system shall be

designed with an automatic self-test

feature that notifies the operator that the

monitoring capability is functioning

correctly and alerts the operator that a

system failure has occurred.

§ 238.447 Operator’s controls and cab

layout.

(a) Operator controls in the power

vehicle or control cab shall be arranged
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49821

to be comfortably within view and

within easy reach when the operator is

seated in the normal train control

position.

(b) The control panels shall be laid

out to minimize the chance of human

error.

(c) Control panel buttons, switches,

levers, knobs, and the like shall be

distinguishable by sight and by touch.

(d) An alerter shall be provided. If not

acknowledged, the alerter shall cause a

brake application to stop the train.

(e) Cab information displays shall be

designed with the following

characteristics:

(1) Simplicity and standardization

shall be the driving criteria for design of

formats for the display of information in

the cab;

(2) Essential, safety-critical

information shall be displayed as a

default condition;

(3) Operator selection shall be

required to display other than default

information;

(4) Cab or train control signals shall

be displayed for the operator; and

(5) Displays shall be readable from the

operators’s normal position under all

lighting conditions.

(f) The cab layout shall be arranged to

meet the following requirements:

(1) The crew has an effective field of

view in the forward direction and to the

right and left of the direction of travel;

(2) Field-of-view obstructions due to

required structural members are

minimized; and

(3) The crew’s position in the cab is

located to permit the crew to be able to

directly observe traffic approaching the

train from either side of the train.

(g) Each seat provided for a

crewmember shall be:

(1) Equipped with a single acting,

quick-release lap belt and shoulder

harness as defined in § 571.209 of this

title;

(2) Secured to the car body with an

attachment having an ultimate strength

capable of withstanding the loads due to

the following individually applied

accelerations acting on the mass of the

seat and the crewmember occupying it:

(i) Longitudinal: 12g;

(ii) Lateral: 4g; and

(iii) Vertical: 4g;

(3) Designed so all adjustments have

the range necessary to accommodate a

5th-percentile female to a 95thpercentile male;

(4) Equipped with lumbar support

that is adjustable from the seated

position;

(5) Equipped with force-assisted,

vertical-height adjustment, operated

from the seated position;

(6) Equipped with a manually

reclining seat back, adjustable from the

seated position;

(7) Equipped with an adjustable

headrest; and

(8) Equipped with folding, padded

armrests.

(h) Sharp edges and corners shall be

eliminated from the interior of the cab,

and interior surfaces of the cab likely to

be impacted by a crewmember during a

collision or derailment shall be padded

with shock-absorbent material.

Subpart F—Inspection, Testing, and

Maintenance Requirements for Tier II

Passenger Equipment

§ 238.501 Scope.

This subpart contains inspection,

testing, and maintenance requirements

for railroad passenger equipment that

operates at speeds exceeding 125 mph

but not exceeding 150 mph.

§ 238.503 Inspection, testing, and

maintenance requirements.

(a) General. Under the procedures

provided in § 238.505, each railroad

shall obtain FRA approval of a written

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program for Tier II passenger equipment

prior to implementation of that program

and prior to commencing passenger

operations using that equipment. As

further specified in this section, the

program shall describe in detail the

procedures, equipment, and other

means necessary for the safe operation

of the passenger equipment, including:

(1) Safety inspection procedures,

intervals, and criteria;

(2) Testing procedures and intervals;

(3) Scheduled preventivemaintenance intervals;

(4) Maintenance procedures;

(5) Special testing equipment or

measuring devices required to perform

safety inspections and tests; and

(6) The training, qualification, and

designation of employees and

contractors to perform safety

inspections, tests, and maintenance.

(b) Compliance. After the railroad’s

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program is approved by FRA under

§ 238.505, the railroad shall adopt the

program and shall perform—

(1) The inspections and tests of power

brakes and other primary brakes as

described in the program;

(2) The other inspections and tests

described in the program in accordance

with the procedures and criteria that the

railroad identified as safety-critical; and

(3) The maintenance tasks described

in the program in accordance with the

procedures and intervals that the

railroad identified as safety-critical.

(c) General safety inspection, testing,

and maintenance procedures. The

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program under paragraph (a) of this

section shall contain the railroad’s

written procedures to ensure that all

systems and components of in service

equipment are free of any general

condition that endangers the safety of

the crew, passengers, or equipment.

These procedures shall protect against:

(1) A continuous accumulation of oil

or grease;

(2) Improper functioning of a

component;

(3) A crack, break, excessive wear,

structural defect, or weakness of a

component;

(4) A leak;

(5) Use of a component or system

under a condition that exceeds that for

which the component or system is

designed to operate; and

(6) Insecure attachment of a

component.

(d) Specific safety inspections. The

program under paragraph (a) of this

section shall specify that all Tier II

passenger equipment shall receive

thorough safety inspections in

accordance with the following

standards:

(1) Except as provided in paragraph

(d)(3) of this section, the equivalent of

a Class I brake test contained in

§ 238.313 shall be conducted prior to a

train’s departure from an originating

terminal and every 1,500 miles or once

each calendar day, whichever comes

first, that the train remains in

continuous service.

(i) Class I equivalent brake tests shall

be performed by qualified mechanical

inspectors.

(ii) Except as provided in § 238.15(b),

a railroad shall not use or haul a Tier

II passenger train in passenger service

from a location where a Class I

equivalent brake test has been

performed, or was required by this part

to have been performed, with less than

100 percent operative brakes.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph

(d)(3) of this section, a complete safety

exterior and interior mechanical

inspection, in accordance with the

railroad’s inspection program, shall be

conducted by qualified mechanical

inspectors at least once during each

calendar day the equipment is used in

service.

(3) Trains that miss a scheduled Class

I brake test or mechanical inspection

due to a delay en route may proceed to

the point where the Class I brake test or

mechanical inspection was scheduled to

be performed.

(e) Movement of trains with power

brake defects. Movement of trains with
49822 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

a power brake defect as defined in

§ 238.15 (any primary brake defect) shall

be governed by § 238.15.

(f) Movement of trains with other

defects. Movement of trains that with a

defect other than a power brake defect

shall be conducted in accordance with

§ 238.17, with the following exception.

When a failure of the secondary brake

on a Tier II passenger train occurs en

route, that train may remain in service

until its next scheduled calendar day

Class I brake test equivalent at a speed

no greater than the maximum safe

operating speed demonstrated through

analysis and testing for braking with the

friction brake alone. The brake system

shall be restored to 100 percent

operation before the train departs that

inspection location.

(g) Maintenance intervals. The

program under paragraph (a) of this

section shall include the railroad’s

initial scheduled maintenance intervals

for Tier II equipment based on an

analysis completed as part of the system

safety program. The maintenance

interval of a safety-critical component

shall be changed only when justified by

accumulated, verifiable operating data

and approved by FRA’s Associate

Administrator for Safety under

§ 238.505 before the change takes effect.

(h) Training, qualification, and

designation program. The program

under paragraph (a) of this section shall

describe the training, qualification, and

designation program, as defined in the

training program plan under § 238.111,

established by the railroad to qualify

individuals to inspect, test, and

maintain the equipment.

(1) If the railroad deems it safetycritical, then only qualified individuals

shall inspect, test, and maintain the

equipment.

(2) Knowledge of the standard

procedures described in paragraph (i) of

this section shall be required to qualify

an employee or contractor to perform an

inspection, testing, or maintenance task

under this part.

(i) Standard procedures for safely

performing inspection, testing,

maintenance, or repairs. The program

under paragraph (a) of this section shall

include the railroad’s written standard

procedures for performing all safetycritical equipment inspection, testing,

maintenance, or repair tasks. These

standard procedures shall:

(1) Describe in detail each step

required to safely perform the task;

(2) Describe the knowledge necessary

to safely perform the task;

(3) Describe any precautions that must

be taken to safely perform the task;

(4) Describe the use of any safety

equipment necessary to perform the

task;

(5) Be approved by the railroad’s chief

mechanical officer;

(6) Be approved by the railroad’s

official responsible for safety;

(7) Be enforced by supervisors with

responsibility for accomplishing the

tasks; and

(8) Be reviewed annually by the

railroad.

(j) Quality control program. Each

railroad shall establish an inspection,

testing, and maintenance quality control

program enforced by railroad or

contractor supervisors to reasonably

ensure that inspections, tests, and

maintenance are performed in

accordance with Federal safety

standards and the procedures

established by the railroad.

(k) Identification of safety-critical

items. In the program under paragraph

(a) of this section, the railroad shall

identify all inspection and testing

procedures and criteria as well as all

maintenance intervals that the railroad

deems to be safety-critical.

§ 238.505 Program approval procedure.

(a) Submission. Not less than 90 days

prior to commencing passenger

operations using Tier II passenger

equipment, each railroad to which this

subpart applies shall submit for

approval an inspection, testing, and

maintenance program for that

equipment meeting the requirements of

this subpart with the Associate

Administrator for Safety, Federal

Railroad Administration, 400 7th Street,

S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590. If a

railroad seeks to amend an approved

program, the railroad shall file with

FRA’s Associate Administrator for

Safety a petition for approval of such

amendment not less than 60 days prior

to the proposed effective date of the

amendment. A program responsive to

the requirements of this subpart or any

amendment to the program shall not be

implemented prior to FRA approval.

(1) Each program or amendment

under § 238.503 shall contain:

(i) The information prescribed in

§ 238.503 for such program or

amendment;

(ii) The name, title, address, and

telephone number of the primary person

to be contacted with regard to review of

the program or amendment; and

(iii) A statement affirming that the

railroad has served a copy of the

program or amendment on designated

representatives of railroad employees,

together with a list of the names and

addresses of persons served.

(2) Each railroad shall serve a copy of

each submission to FRA on designated

representatives of railroad employees

responsible for the equipment’s

operation, inspection, testing, and

maintenance under this subpart.

(b) Comment. Not later than 45 days

from the date of filing the program or

amendment, any person may comment

on the program or amendment.

(1) Each comment shall set forth

specifically the basis upon which it is

made, and contain a concise statement

of the interest of the commenter in the

proceeding.

(2) Three copies of each comment

shall be submitted to the Associate

Administrator for Safety, Federal

Railroad Administration, 400 7th Street,

S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

(3) The commenter shall certify that a

copy of the comment was served on the

railroad.

(c) Approval. (1) Within 60 days of

receipt of each initial inspection,

testing, and maintenance program, FRA

will conduct a formal review of the

program. FRA will then notify the

primary railroad contact person and the

designated employee representatives in

writing whether the inspection, testing,

and maintenance program is approved

and, if not approved, the specific points

in which the program is deficient. If a

program is not approved by FRA, the

railroad shall amend its program to

correct all deficiencies and resubmit its

program with the required revisions not

later than 45 days prior to commencing

passenger operations.

(2) FRA will review each proposed

amendment to the program within 45

days of receipt. FRA will then notify the

primary railroad contact person and the

designated employee representatives in

writing whether the proposed

amendment has been approved by FRA

and, if not approved, the specific points

in which the proposed amendment is

deficient. The railroad shall correct any

deficiencies and file the corrected

amendment prior to implementing the

amendment.

(3) Following initial approval of a

program or amendment, FRA may

reopen consideration of the program or

amendment for cause stated.

Subpart G—Introduction of New

Technology to Tier II Passenger

Equipment

§ 238.601 Scope.

This subpart contains general

requirements for introducing new

technology that affects a safety system of

existing Tier II passenger equipment.

For purposes of this subpart, ‘‘existing

Tier II passenger equipment’’ is Tier II
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules 49823

passenger equipment that has been

approved for revenue service by the

FRA Associate Administrator for Safety

under the procedures of § 238.21.

§ 238.603 Process to introduce new

technology.

(a) If a railroad plans a major upgrade

or introduction of new technology on

existing Tier II passenger equipment, as

defined in § 238.601, that affects the

performance of a safety system on such

equipment, such major upgrade or

introduction of new technology shall be

designed and implemented using the

system safety process prescribed in

§ 238.101.

(b) Under the procedures of § 238.21,

each railroad shall obtain special

approval from the FRA Associate

Administrator for Safety of a prerevenue service acceptance testing plan,

under § 238.113, for existing Tier II

passenger equipment with a major

upgrade or new technology that affects

the performance of a safety system on

such equipment, prior to implementing

the plan. ‘‘New passenger equipment,’’

for purposes of § 238.113, includes

existing Tier II passenger equipment

with such a major upgrade or new

technology.

(c) Each railroad shall complete a prerevenue service demonstration of such

passenger equipment described in

paragraph (b) of this section in

accordance with the approved plan,

shall fulfill all of the other requirements

prescribed in § 238.113, and shall obtain

special approval from the FRA

Associate Administrator for Safety

under the procedures of § 238.21 prior

to using such passenger equipment in

revenue service.

Appendix A to Part 238—Schedule of

Civil Penalties [Reserved]

Appendix B to Part 238—Test

Performance Criteria for the

Flammability and Smoke Emission

Characteristics of Materials Used in

Constructing or Refurbishing

Locomotive Cab and Passenger Car

Interiors

This appendix provides the performance

standards for testing the flammability and

smoke emission characteristics of materials

used in constructing or refurbishing

locomotive cab and passenger car interiors,

in accordance with the requirements of

§ 238.115.

(a) Definitions.

Critical radiant flux (CRF) means, as

defined in ASTM E–648, a measure of the

behavior of horizontally-mounted floor

covering systems exposed to a flaming

ignition source in a graded radiant heat

energy environment in a test chamber.

Flame spread index (Is) means, as defined

in ASTM E–162, a factor derived from the

rate of progress of the flame front (Fs) and the

rate of heat liberation by the material under

test (Q), such that Is = Fs × Q.

Specific optical density (Ds) means, as

defined in ASTM E–662, the optical density

measured over unit path length within a

chamber of unit volume, produced from a

specimen of unit surface area, that is

irradiated by a heat flux of 2.5 watts/cm2 for

a specified period of time.

Surface flammability means the rate at

which flames will travel along surfaces.

Flaming running means continuous

flaming material leaving the site of material

burning or material installation.

Flaming dripping means periodic dripping

of flaming material from the site of material

burning or material installation.

(b) Required test procedures and

performance criteria.

The materials used in locomotive cabs and

passenger cars shall be tested according to

the procedures and performance criteria set

forth in the following table. In all instances,

the most recent version of the test procedures

or the revision in effect at the time a vehicle

is ordered should be employed in the

evaluation of the materials specified.

Category Function of material Test procedure Performance criteria

Passenger seats, Sleeping and dining

car components.

Cushions, Mattresses 1, 2, 5, 9 ................ ASTM D–3675

ASTM E–662

IS ≤ 25

DS (1.5) ≤ 100; DS (4.0) ≤ 175

Seat and/or Mattress Frame 1, 5, 8 ......... ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

IS ≤ 35

DS (1.5) ≤ 100; DS (4.0) ≤ 200

Seat and Toilet Shroud, Food Trays 1, 5 ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

IS ≤ 35

DS (1.5) ≤ 100; DS (4.0) ≤ 200

Seat Upholstery, Mattress Ticking and

Covers, Curtains 1, 2, 3, 5.

FAR 25.853 (Vertical)

ASTM E–662

Flame Time ≤ 10 sec.; Burn length ≤ 6

inch

DS (4.0) ≤ 250 coated; DS (4.0) ≤ 100

uncoated

Panels ..................................................... Wall 1, 5, 10 .............................................. ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

IS ≤ 35

DS (1.5) ≤ 100; DS (4.0) ≤ 200

Ceiling 1, 5, 10 .......................................... ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

IS ≤ 35

DS (1.5) ≤ 100; DS (4.0) ≤ 200

Partition, Tables and Shelves 1, 5 .......... ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

IS ≤ 35

DS (1.5) ≤ 100; DS (4.0) ≤ 200

Windscreen 1, 5 ...................................... ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

IS ≤ 35

DS (1.5) ≤ 100; DS (4.0) ≤ 200

HVAC Ducting 1, 5 .................................. ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

IS ≤ 35

DS (1.5) ≤ 100

Window 4, 5 ............................................. ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

IS ≤ 100

DS (1.5) ≤ 100; DS (4.0) ≤ 200

Light Diffuser 5 ....................................... ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

IS ≤ 100

DS (1.5) ≤ 100; DS (4.0) ≤ 200

Flooring ................................................... Structural 6 ............................................. ASTM E–119 Pass

Covering 7, 10 .......................................... ASTM E–648

ASTM E–662

CRF ≤ 0.5 w/cm 2

DS (1.5 ) ≤ 100; DS (4.0) ≤ 200

Insulation ................................................ Thermal 1, 2, 5 ......................................... ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

IS ≤ 25

DS (1.5) ≤ 100

Acoustic 1, 2, 5 ........................................ ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

IS ≤ 25

DS (1.5) ≤ 100

Elastomers .............................................. Window Gaskets, Door Nosing, Diaphragms, Roof Mat. 1.ASTM C–542

ASTM E–662

Pass

DS (1.5) ≤ 100; DS (4.0) ≤ 200

Exterior Plastic Components .................. End Cap, Roof Housings 1, 5 ................. ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

IS ≤ 35

DS (1.5) ≤ 100; DS (4.0) ≤ 200
49824 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 184 / Tuesday, September 23, 1997 / Proposed Rules

Category Function of material Test procedure Performance criteria

Component Box Covers ......................... Interior, Exterior Boxes1, 3, 5 .................. ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

IS ≤ 35

DS (1.5) ≤ 100; DS (4.0) ≤ 200

1. Materials tested for surface flammability

must not exhibit any flaming running or

flaming dripping.

2. The surface flammability and smoke

emission characteristics must be

demonstrated to be permanent by washing, if

appropriate, according to FED–STD–191A

Textile Test Method 5830.

3. The surface flammability and smoke

emission characteristics must be

demonstrated to be permanent by drycleaning, if appropriate, according to ASTM

D-2724. Materials that cannot be washed or

dry cleaned must be so labeled and meet the

applicable performance criteria after being

cleaned as recommended by the

manufacturer.

4. For double window glazing, only the

interior glazing must meet the materials

requirements specified herein; the exterior

need not meet those requirements.

5. ASTM E–662 maximum test limits for

smoke emission (specified optical density)

must be measured in either the flaming or

non-flaming mode, depending on which

mode generates the most smoke.

6. Structural flooring assemblies must meet

the performance criteria during a nominal

test period determined by the railroad

property. The nominal test period must be

twice the maximum expected period of time,

under normal circumstances, for a vehicle to

come to a complete, safe stop from maximum

speed, plus the time necessary to evacuate all

passengers from a vehicle to a safe area. The

nominal test period must not be less than 15

minutes. Only one specimen need be tested.

A proportional reduction may be made in the

dimensions of the specimen provided that it

represents a true test of its ability to perform

as a barrier against under-car fires.

Penetrations (ducts, etc.) must be designed

against acting as passageways for fire and

smoke.

7. Floor covering must be tested in

accordance with ASTM E–648 with its

padding, if the padding is used in actual

installation.

8. Arm rests, if foamed plastic, are tested

as cushions and, if hard material, are tested

as a seat back shroud.

9. Testing is performed without upholstery.

10. Carpeting on walls and ceilings is to be

considered wall and ceiling panel materials,

respectively.

(c) The sources of test procedures specified

in the table are as follows:

(1) Leaching Resistance of Cloth, FED–

STD–191A–Textile Test Method 5830.

(Available from: General Services

Administration Specifications Division,

Building 197 Washington Navy Yard,

Washington, D.C. 20407.)

(2) Federal Aviation Administration

Vertical Burn Test, FAR–25.853.

(3) American Society for Testing Materials

(ASTM):

(i) Specification for Gaskets, ASTM C–542.

(ii) Surface Flammability of Flexible

Cellular Materials Using a Radiant Heat

Energy Source, ASTM D–3675.

(iii) Fire Tests of Building Construction

and Materials, ASTM E–119.

(iv) Surface Flammability of Materials

Using a Radiant Heat Energy Source, STM E–

162.

(v) Bonded and Laminated Apparel

Fabrics, ASTM D–2724.

(vi) Critical Radiant Flux of Floor Covering

Systems Using a Radiant Heat Energy Source,

ASTM E–648.

(vii) Specific Optical Density of Smoke

Generated by Solid Materials, STM E–662.

(Available from: American Society for

Testing Materials, 1916 Race Street,

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103.)

Appendix C to Part 238—Suspension

System Safety Performance Standards

This appendix contains the minimum

suspension system safety performance

standards for Tier II passenger equipment as

required by § 238.427. These requirements

shall be the basis for evaluating suspension

system safety performance until an industry

standard acceptable to FRA is developed and

approved under the procedures provided in

§ 238.21.

Passenger equipment suspension systems

shall be designed to limit the lateral and

vertical forces and lateral to vertical (L/V)

ratios, for the time duration required to travel

six feet at any operating speed or over any

class of track, under all operating conditions

as determined by the railroad, as follows:

1. The maximum single wheel lateral to

vertical force (L/V) ratio shall not exceed

Nadal’s limit as follows:

Wheel L for positi / V ve angle of attack) ≤ −

+

tan( )

tan( ) ( δ μ

1 μ δ

where: δ=flange angle (deg).

μ=coefficient of friction of 0.5.

2. The net axle lateral force shall not

exceed 0.5 times the static vertical axle load.

3. The vertical wheel/rail force shall be

greater than 10 percent of the static vertical

wheel load.

4. The sum of the vertical wheel loads on

one side of any truck shall be greater than 20

percent of the static vertical axle load. This

shall include the effect of a crosswind

allowance as specified by the railroad for the

intended service.

5. The maximum truck side L/V ratio shall

not exceed 0.5.

6. When stopped on track with a uniform

6-inch superelevation, vertical wheel loads,

at all wheels, shall be greater than 60 percent

of the nominal vertical wheel load on level

track.

Issued in Washington, D.C., on September

12, 1997.

Jolene M. Molitoris,

Federal Railroad Administrator.

[FR Doc. 97–24713 Filed 9–22–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P