### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs D ec em be r 7, 200 4

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. MA CK T. TRA NS OU

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Madison Cou nty

No. 02-360 Roy B. Mor gan, Jud ge

No. W2003-02966-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled May 13, 2005

Following a jury

trial, Def endant Ma ck Transou was convic ted of ag g ravated burg lary and ra pe. He was sente nced to c oncurr ent sentenc es of f ifteen y ear s for a g g ravated burg lary and six teen y ear s for rape . On appe al, Def

endant a rg ues that the e vidence prese nted at tri al was insuffic ient to support the jury ' s verdict, that the trial court e rre d in admitting DNA e vidence , and that his s en t en ce w as improper in light of Blakely v. W ashington . We conclude that the evidenc e wa s sufficient to support the De fe nd a nt' s c on vic tio ns , th e DN A e vid e nc e wa s pro pe rl y a dmi tte d, a nd that th e tr ia l c ou rt did not err in its application of one enhance ment fac tor when sentencing Def endant. Accor dingly , we aff irm Defe ndant’s convic tions and sentence s.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3, Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of t h e co u rt , i n which D AVI D H. W ELLES and R OB E R T E. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

Richard L . Finney , Attorney , J ackson, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, Mac k T. Tra nsou

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tt orne y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; B re nt C . Ch e rry , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, Cr imi n al Ju s ti c eD i v i sio n; Ja me s G . ( Jer ry ) Wo od a ll, Di stric t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; a ndJody

S. Pi c ke ns , Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, the State of Tenne ssee

OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

I n t h e e ar l y

h o u rs o f t h e m o rn i n g o n De ce m b er2 3 , 2 0 0 1 , t h e v i ct i m , S h i r l e y A n n Ki n g, awoke to the sound of Def endant c rashing throug h her be droom door. De fendant gr abbed he r and though the victim f

oug ht to push him a way , he succe eded in r aping her. When the police arrived, they found the victim visiblyupset and e x tremely fright en ed. Although the victim identified Def endant at trial, on the morning of the a ssault she was only able t o gi ve investig ators a g ener al description of her ass ail ant, including his ge nera l ag e, heig ht, weig ht, rac e, and c lothing. Police-2-

determined that Def

endant had broken in a nd fled throug h the victim's ba ck door, a s evidenc ed by the broke n g lass, cut s cre en, and damag e to the door itself. Investig ators we re not a ble to collect a ny usable fing erprints from th e v i cti m's home . The victim was take n to the emer g ency room, wher e ph y sic ia ns pe rf

orme d a n e xami natio n a ndse xua l a ssa ult kit . An exa min a tio n o f the se xua l a ssa ult kit revea led the prese nce of semen. DNA from semen collecte d as part of the sexual assault kit was compar e d w ith D N A f

r o m a s a mp le o f D e f

e n d a n t' s b lo o d
, a n d th e y matc h e d

. A c c o r d in g to the crime la b technicia n who testified at tria l
, t he proba bilitythat another

person be sides Def

endant

wo uldha ve the e xac t D NApr of ile is o ne ou t of

a nu mbe r so larg e tha

t it e xce e ds the c ur

re nt w or ld pop u lati o n

. Sp e c if

ic a ll y , th e c r im e la

b te c h n ic ian te s ti f

ie d th a t, b a s e d o n th e s tati s ti c s , n o person other than D efe nd an t co u ld have be en the sourc e of thesemen c ollected during the phy sical examination of the victim.

Def end an t was c onvicted of one count of a g g ravated burg lary and one c ount of rape

. Following a sente ncing hearing, D efe ndant was se ntence d to concur rent sentenc es of fifte en y ear s for a g g ravated burg lary

as a Rang e I I I

car eer offe nder and six teen y ear s for rape as a Rang e I I violent of fe nd e r. De fe nd a nt f

ile d a mot ion fo r jud g me nt of a c qu itt a l or ne w t ri a l, w hic h w a s su bs e qu e ntl y denied.

II. Ana lys is
A. Sup pression of

DNA Evidence

First, De fendant arg ues that the trial court should have gr anted his motion to suppress DNA

ev i d en ce

. Be fo re d en y i n g t h e mo t i o n , t h e tr i al co u rt h el d an ev i d en t i ar y h ea ri n g. At t h i s h ea ri n g, the following evidenc e wa s introduced:

De fe nd a nt s ub mit te d a

blo odsa mpl e fo r D NAte sti ng on thr e e dif fe re nt o c c a sio ns . T he fi rs t blo odsa mpl e wa s su bmi tte d in19 99 du ri ng De fe nd a nt’ s in take int o th e W est Te nn e sse e Sta te Pe nit e nti ary , w he re he wa s in c us tod y for a fel on y convic tio n f or a n o ff e ns e that he c omm itt e d in 1997. During intake, the Te nnessee Depa rtment of Corre ction soug ht to obtain a blood specimen from inmates for purposes of providing D NA samples. During the proce dure, nur ses explained the proce dure to a

g roup of inmates. I nmates we re told they wer e re quired to submit a blood sample,

a lth ou g h they may refu se to d o s o if the y so c ho os e . T he y

we re g ive n a n o pp ortun ity to a sk questions and also we re g iven a consent form to r ead and sign. After an inmate c onsented to having his or her blood dra wn, a nur se would dra w a blood sample which would then be sent to the Tenne ssee B ureau of I nvestig ation. Def endant initially went throug h this intake proce dure in 1999, signe d the consent form, and submitt ed a blood sample. This blood sample was turne d over to the Tenne ssee B ureau of I

n v e s ti g ati o n , an d

D efe ndant’s DNAprofile wa s entere d into a Combined DNA I ndex S y stem (CODI S). CODI S is a local, state, and national database of DNA prof iles collecte d from crime scene evidenc e as w ell as convic ted offe nders.

De f e n d a n t s u b m i t t e d a s e c o n d b l o o d s a m p l e i n 2 0 0 0 , a l s o a t t h e W e s t T e n n e sse e Sta te Penitentiary

under the same procedur e as in 1999. The sample submit ted in 2000, howeve r, wa s not-3-

enter ed into the CODI S sy stem beca use Def endant’ s DNA profile was alre ady in the databa se at that time.

Def

endant f irst became a suspec t of the ra pe and burg lary in the present case when a match was made on CODI S between D efe ndant' s DNA index profile and the DNA index profile of semen collecte d from the victim's sexual a ssault kit. Police took D efe ndant into c ustody in May of 2002 in order to inter view him and o b t ain an additional blood sample which could be use d to compare with the DNA pr ofile in the victim’s se x ual assault kit. Accor ding to the of fice r’s testimony , during police questioning , Def

endant told the off

icer he wa s “we lcome to take his blood and DNA” and signe d a conse nt of sear ch form, giving written permission for the taking of a blood sample for D NA

a na ly sis . D e fe nd a nt c la ime d d uring his te sti mon y that th e sig natur e on the c on se nt f orm w a s n ot h is, but rather was for g ed by

the offic er. N evertheless, Def endant submitted a blood sample to off icer s and wa s relea sed fr om custody

.
Def endant a rg ued in his motion t o suppress that the blood sample collec ted in 1999 was a n ill e g a l s e ar c h
, a n d a s k e d th e c o u r t to s u p p r e s s a n y a n d a ll e v id e n c e s e iz e d a s a r e s u lt o f th e 1999

s ea rc h
, i n cl u d i n g th e s u b s eq u en t b l o o d s am p l e s u b m i t t ed i n 2 0 0 2 d u ri n g p o l i ce q u es t i o n i n g. De fe nd a nt b a se d h is a

rg ume nt o n th e c on te nti on that th e 19 99 bl oo d sample wa s su bmi tte d in violation of Tennesse e Code Annotated § 40-35-321 be cause Def endant’ s offe nse wa s committed in 1997. The statute require s courts to order any person c onvicted of a

felony offe nse committed

on or afte r J uly 1, 1998, to pr ovide a biologica l spe cimen for the purpose of

DNA a naly sis. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 321(d)( 1) (2004)

. Def endant arg ued that bec ause the statute did not apply , the

c oll e c tio n o f the DN A sa mpl e wa s ill e g a l, a nd a ll of the DN A e vid e nc e c oll e c te d b y the Sta te in this

c a se wa s a dir e c t re su lt of thi s ille g a l sea rc h an d sho uld ha ve be e n s up pr e sse d. Th e tr ia l c ou rt he ld that even thoug h the law r equiring biologica l spe cimens for DNA a naly sis from convicted of fende rs did not apply

to Defe ndant, he “ fre ely , voluntarily and intellige ntly ” conse nted to g iv i n g a blood

sam p l e o n eac h of the thre e occ asions in 1999, 2000, and 2002. The c ourt emphasized that Def endant’ s consent to g ive a blood sample to of fice rs in 2002 during questioning “ was suff icient even if the ot hers [ in 1999 and 2000] were not upheld under the se circ umstances.” Acc ording ly , the tr ia l c ou rt de nie d D e fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to su pp re ss.

On app e a l, D e fe nd a nt a

rg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt

sh ou ld h a ve g rante d his mot ion to s up pr e ss be c aus e the statut e re qu ir ing su bmi ssi on of a bio log ic a l sp e c ime n fo r DN A te sti ng did no t app ly to h i m , an d b ec au s e h e di d n o t gi v e ef fe ct i v e co n s en t fo r th e ex tra ct i o n o f hi s b l o o d fo r D NA t es t i n g. Fu rt h er m o re, D efe ndant ar g ues that the CODI S database used by the State for pur

poses of conducting DNA matc hes is unconstitutional. The fi n dings of fac t made by

the trial court at the hearing on a m o tion to suppress are binding upon this court unless the e vidence contained in the

rec ord preponde rate s ag ainst them. Sta te v . R os s , 49 S.W.3 d 833 , 839 (T e nn . 200 1)

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt , as the trier of fac t, is able to a ssess the cre dibilit y of the witnesse s, determine the weig ht and value to be afforde d the evidenc e and r esolve a ny conflicts in the evide nce. State v. Odom , 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996) . The prevailing party is entitled to the s trong est leg itimate view of the e vidence and all reasonable infere nces drawn f rom that evidenc e. State v. Hick s , 55 S.W .3d 515, 521 (Tenn. 2001). Howe ver, this court is not bound by the trial court’s c onclusions of law. State v. Simpson ,-4-

968 S.W .2d 776, 779 (Tenn. 1998). The application of the law to the fac ts found by the trial court
are qu e sti on s o f l a w that th is c ou rt re vie ws de novo

. S t a t e v

. Daniel , 12 S.W .3d 420, 423 (Tenn. 2000). The de fendant has t h e b u rd en of establishing that the e vidence contained in the r ecor d preponde rate s ag ainst the finding s of fa ct made by the trial court. Br

az ie l v . S tat e , 529 S.W .2d 501, 506 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975)

Def endant first arg ues that the trial court err ed by retroa ctively

apply ing to De fendant’s 1997

c on vic tio n a

19 98 statut ory

pr ov isi on re qu ir ing blood and DN A s a mpl e s to be take n f ro m a ll convicted f

elons. Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-35-321(d) (1) r equire s that, “[w] hen a c ourt sentenc es a pe rson convicted of any felony offe nse commi tted on or after J uly 1, 1998, it shall order the per son to provide a biolog ical spec imen for the pur po s e o f DN A analy sis[ .]” Defe ndant was convicted in 1999 of

driving afte r having been de clar ed a ha bitual motor vehicle off ender

. Howeve r, the off

ense w as committed in 1997. The trial court specific ally held that “at the time he g a ve the fi rs t sampl e in T DO C, o f c ou rs e , th e la w d idn ’t app ly to [D e fe nd a nt] u nd e r that st a tut e
re qu ir ing the DN A o f the de fe nd a nt. ” We a g re e

. De fe nd a nt wa s no t re qu ir e d un de r a ny statut e to submit a blood sample for DNA analy sis whe n he did so in 1999. Def endant arg ues that beca

use the DN A t e sti ng wa s no t re qu ir e d by statut e , a ll e vid e nc e re su lti ng fr om the 19 99 blo odsa mpl e sh ou ld ha ve be e n s up pr e sse d. Th e Sta te arg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y de nie d D e fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to suppress bec ause, e ven thoug h the s t at u t e did not require D efe ndant to g ive a DN A spec imen for

a na ly sis , h e vo lun tari ly

c on se nte d to the dr awi ng of his bl oo d. I n d e nying De fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to
su pp re ss, the t

ri al c ou rt a g re e d w iththe Sta te ’s re a so nin g a ndhe ld that D e fe nd a nt “ fr e e ly , v olu nta ri ly and intellige ntly

knew what he was doing at the time he sig ned the fo rm gi v i n g consent for that specimen [in 1999 and 2000], af ter be ing g iven the opportunity to refuse .” On a

ppeal, De fendant arg ues that he ne ver, at any time, ga ve ef

fec tive consent for

the withdraw al of his blood.

Th e wi thdra wa l of blo od fr om a su bje c t fo r pu rp os e s of se ro log ic a l ty pin g a ndDN A ana ly sis constitutes a sea

rch w ithin the constraints of t he Fourth Amendment a nd, there fore , a sea rch w arr ant is ge nera lly

require d. Se e Sc hm e rb e r v . Ca lif or nia , 3 84 U. S. 7 57
, 76 7-72 ( 19 66 ); State v. John Chapman , 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXI S 950, at *50 (T en n

. Crim. App., at Nashville, Sept. 30, 1997), perm. app. de nied (T e nn . 1 99 8) ; see also State v. J ackson
, 8 8 9 S.W .2d 219, 221 (Tenn. Crim

. A p p

. 1993), perm. to appeal de nied (Tenn. 1994) . The F ourth Amendment of the United S t at es C o n s t i t u t i o n s t at es t h e f o l l o wi n g:

Th e ri g ht o f the pe op le to b e se c ur e in their per so ns , h ou se s, pa pe rs , a nde ff

e c ts,
a g a ins t un re a so na

blese arc he s a ndse izur e s, sh a ll n ot b e vio la te d, a ndno wa rr a nts shall issue, but upon pro b ab l e ca use, supported by

oath or a ffirmation, and particula rly describing the pla ce to be sear ched, and the per sons or things to be seized.

Further, Article I , Section 7 of the Te nnessee Constit ution provides
[t]ha t th e pe op le sh a ll b e se c ur e in the ir pe rs on s, ho us e s, pa

pe rs a ndpo sses sio ns , f r o m u n r e a s o n ab le s e ar c h e s a n d s e iz u r e s ; an d th a t g e n e r a l w arr a n ts , w h e r e b y an-5-

office r may

be commande d to searc h suspected pla ces, w ithout evidence of the fa ct committed, or to se ize a ny person or persons not named, whose offe nces are n ot particula rly described and supporte d by evidenc e, are dang erous to liberty and oug ht not to be g rante d.

Th e pu rp os e a ndint e nt o f A rt ic le I , Sec tio n 7 is ide nti c a l with that of the F ou rth A me nd me nt, which is to “saf

eg uard the privac y

and sec urity

of individuals aga i n s t t h e ar bitrary invasions of g overnme nt officials.” Simpson , 9 6 8 S

. W

. 2 d at 7 7 9 (q u o t i n g Cam ar a v . M un ic ipa l Co ur t , 3 87 U. S. 52 3, 52 8 ( 19 67 )) ; State v. Gonzalez , 52 S.W .3d 90, 95 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). The lang uag e of both t he fe dera l and state c onstitut ions mandate that “ a wa rra ntless searc h or seizure is pre sumed

unrea sonable, a nd the evid ence discovere d as a r esult thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the sear ch or se izure was conduc ted pursuant to one of the narr owly define d exceptions to the war

rant re quirement.” Sta te v . G arc ia , 123 S.W .3d 335, 343 (Tenn. 2003) (quoting State v. Y eargan , 9 58 S.W. 2d62 6, 62 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) ); se e als o Co oli dge v . Ne w H am ps hire , 403 U.S . 443, 454-55 (1971) . “One of the spec ifically established exceptions to both a war rant a nd probable cause is a sear ch that is conduc ted pursuant to a voluntarily g iven conse nt.” Sc hn e c k lot h

v . B us tam on te , 412 U. S. 2 18 , 2 19 (1 97 3) (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; Sta te v . Tr ox e ll , 78 S.W .3d 866, 871 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 2) ; s ee also State v . Bartram , 925 S.W .2d 227, 230 (Tenn. 1996) . The burde n of proof

re sts up on the State to sh ow , by a pr e po nd e ranc e of the e vid e nc e , th a t th e c on se nt t o a wa rr a ntl e ss
sear ch wa s g iven fre ely

and voluntarily

. Sc hn e c k lot h , 4 12 a t 21 9; Bumper v. North Carolina , 391 U.S

. 54 3, 548 ( 19 68 ); Bartram , 925 S.W .2d at 230. The que stion of whether the appe llant voluntarily

consente d to the s ear ch is a que stion of fac t which foc uses upon the totality of the circ umstances. Sc hn e c k lot h , 4 12 U. S. at 24 8- 24 9. In o rd e r t o p a ss c on sti tution a l mu ste r, c on se nt t o
sear ch must be unequivoca l, spe cific, intelligently g iven, and unc ontaminated by duress or c oerc ion. Trox e ll , 7 8 S. W.3 d at 87 1; Sta te v . B ro wn , 836 S.W .2d 530, 547 (Tenn. 1992)

.
I n Sta te v . B ro wn , police obtained the defe ndant’s verbal permission t o sear ch his home, and he signe d a conse nt form that explicitl y made r efe renc e to the def endant’ s rig ht to refuse to consent to the sear ch. Id. The c ourt in Br own held that without further evidenc e which w ould undermine the vol untariness of the consent, it would not suppress the evidenc e that was seized by police during the sea rch. Id. Alternatively , in Bumper v . North Carolina , th e Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Cou rt he ld that the def

endant’ s consent to a se arc h was invalid. Bumper , 391 U.S. at 550. I n that case , a 66- y ear -old widow, who lived at the end o f an isolated dirt road in a r ural a rea , allowed f

our law enfor ceme nt officials to sea rch he r home, but only

afte r th ey claimed to have a wa rra nt for the

sear ch. Id. Th e Cou rt he ld the c on se nt wa s c oe rc e d be c a us e “ wh e n a la w e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e r c la ims

auth ority to s e arc h .

. . un de r a wa

rr a nt, he a nn ou nc e s in e ff

e c t th a t th e oc c up a nt h a s n o rig ht t o r e sis t the sea rch.” Id.

I n the ca se s u b ju dice
, t h e t rial court, following the suppression hea ring , conclude d that Def endant’ s consent to having his blood drawn and analy zed in 1999 and 2000 was voluntary . The court rule d:-6-

As to the iss ue de a lin g wi th the bio log ic a l sp eci men th at wa s ta ke n w hil e thi s Def endant wa s in the Tenne ssee State Penitentiary
, I note two or three things. It was very cl ea r that the individuals, as Mr. Tr ansou also testified to, ar e broug ht in a g roup. It might be 10, it might be 20 or somewher e in betwee n, and they are advised of the pr oc e du re . T he pr oc e du re un de r w hic h M r. Tr a ns ou wa s tak e n inde a lt w ith this statute requiring DNA a n al y s is, but it ’s very clea r fr om the consent forms, 2A

a nd2B , le t’ s ta lk a

bo ut 2 A f ir st, that it wa s a con se nt fo r DN A an a ly sis

. I t do e s st a te – set forth the statute and the conse quence s of not g iving it and the re q u irement of the la w t o g ive it, bu t it a lso c le arl y ha s th e pr ov isi on fo r the de fe nd a nt t o r e fu se to participate in the testing proce ss, even thoug h there may be conse quence s, as the Def endant testified to. B ut the prior witnesses te stified that this i s explained, inc lud ing the ri g ht t o r e fu se a ndthis D e fe nd a nt d id- -a s h e ’s te sti fi e d, thi s is his signature. He did sig n the form on September the 7th of ‘99 g iving consent to take the biologic al spec imen. He had a chance to refuse . The only thing that c oncerns the

c ou rt is i t’ s b e ing take n und e r the c ir c ums ta nc e s as if that sta tut e re qu ir e d it. I no te that as a similar situation on this Aug ust the 9t h of 2000 [si c]. Ag ain, t he same type form, conse nt for DNAanaly sis, same type [si c] c ircumstance s, ag ain the Def endant g iven an opportunityto refuse i t but didn’t. He has his own explanation as to why he didn’t re fuse it and that’ s that he would suffe r conse quence s if he didn’t, but he is well experience d in the TDOC s y stem, in the way it operates. He e ven testified he kn e w w he n the la w [re qu ir ing a bio log ic a l sp e c ime n f or DN A ana ly sis ] too k e ff

e c t. I fi nd that he fr e e ly , volu nta ri ly a nd int e lli g e ntl y

kn e w w hat he wa s d oin g a t th e tim e he sig ned t h e form g iving c onsent for that specimen on both those occ asions, afte r being g iven the opportunity to refuse

.
The e vidence does not preponde rate ag ainst this finding. De fendant arg ues that his consent was not voluntary

beca use he g ave his consent under the threat of discipline if he re fused to sig n the consent form and s ubmit a blood sample. Furthermore
, Def endant arg ues that the fa ct that sec tion 40-35-321 did not ac tually apply to him further unde rmines the voluntarine ss of his consent, since that st a tut e wa s th e ba sis of the DN A s a mpl e c oll e c tio n. Ho we ve r, the se fa c ts d o n ot p re po nd e rate aga i n s tt h e t ri al co u rt ’s fi n d i n g t h atDe fe n d an t ’s c o n s en twa s n ev er t h el es s v al i d

. Al t h o u gh Def endant wa s told he was “r equire d” to g ive a biolog ical spec ime n fo r DN A an aly sis during the intake proc edure , he also ha d the benef it of the consent form itself, which explained the basis of the testing, a s well as som eone w ho explained the proce dure and was a vailable to answ er que stions. The consent form itself consists of one half of one pag e, and c lear ly

states that the re quirement of providing a biolog ical spec imen for DN A ana ly sis applied to “any person c onvicted of any felony offe nse committed on or af ter July1, 1998,” and g ave D efe ndant an optio n to refuse to provide a sample by

signing next t o the words, “ I am re fusing to p articipate in the DNA te sting proc ess.” These fac ts are distinguishable f rom the fa cts in Bumper , wher e the Court held that the def endant’ s
c on se nt t o se arc h wa s c oe rc e d wh e re of fi c e rs pu rp orte d to h a ve auth ority to s e arc h u nd e r a

wa rr a nt, though the y

did not. Bumper v . North Carolina , 391 U.S. 543 (1968). Her e, it cannot be said that Def endant’ s consent wa s co er ced. Whatever thre at of discipline De fendant believed he might be subject to for r efusing to submit to the DNA testing proce ss in a ccor dance with the statute did not-7-

eff ectively tell D efe ndant that he had “ no rig ht to resist the sear ch.” See B umper, 391 U.S. at 550. L ike the def

endant in Br

own , this Defendant intelligently and voluntarily

consente d to a sea

rch, e ven though he was a war e of his rig ht to refuse

. Se e Br own , 836 S.W .2d at 547.

Def endant a lso a

rg ues that the blood sample he submitt ed in 2002 while in police c ustody for investig ation, was c oerc ed. During the suppression hea ring , Def endant c laimed that t he off icer who was intervie wing him forg ed De fendant’s signature on the f orm g iving police consent to sea rch “his body ” by

taking a blood sample for DNA analy sis. The trial court, howeve r, found the of fice r’s te sti mon y to b e c re dib le , a ndDe fe nd a nt’ s te sti mon y no t c re dib le . T he c ou rt

he ld that it

wa s, in f a c t, Def endant’ s signature on the c onsent form a nd that, under allth ec irc u ms ta

n c es, De fendant’s consent

wa s f re e ly , v olu nta

ri ly , an d in te lli g e ntl y

g ive n. Th e e vid e nc e do e s n ot p re po nd e rate a g a ins t th is finding

. Wit hout further

evidenc e that would indicate Def endant’ s consent wa s invalid, we will not disturb the trial court’ s decision.

De fe nd a nt n e xt ar g ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt sh ou ld h a ve g rante d h is m oti on to s up pr e ss b e c aus e the State’s collec tion of DNA s ampl es pursua nt to Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-321 (h e re ina ft e r “ the DN A s ta tut e ” ) andus e of the CO DI S data

ba se a s a n i nve sti g a tory too l is unconstitutional. He contends that the D NA statute violates the F ourth Amendment’s pr ohibition

a g a ins t un re a so na

ble se arc he s a nd se izur e s be c a us e it c omp e ls e xtra c tio n of blo od fo r a DN A s a mpl e in the abs e nc e of ind ivi du a lize d susp ic ion or pr ob able c a us e of a ny c ri min a l w ro ng do ing . T he Sta te arg ues that the c ollection of De fendant’s blo o d wa s n o t a sea rch at all because it was done f or purposes of ide ntification only . Furthermore , the State ar g ues that if the c ollection of DNApursuant to the DN A statut e is c on sid e re d a “ se arc h” fo r pu rp os e s of the F ou rth Am e nd me nt, it i s n e ve rthe le ss
rea sonable be cause it falls wit hin the “spec ial needs” exception to the Fourth Ame ndment’s war rant require ment. A lt e r n a ti v e ly
, th e St a te ar g u e s th a t th e c o ll e c ti o n o f D N A s a mp le s p u r s u a n t t o the DNA statute is rea sonable under the totality of the c ircumstance s, when the inter ests of the State a re weig hed ag ainst the expectations of privac y of the off ender s involved.

Con tr ary to t he State ’s arg ume nt, the e xtra c tio n of blo od fo r D NApr of ili ng do e s c on sti tut e a “se arc h” within the mean i n g o f the F ourth Amendment. Se e Sk inn e r v . R y . La bo r E

x e c uti v e s’ Ass’n 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (“w e have long rec og nized that a compelled intrusion into the body for blood to be analy zed f

or alcohol conte nt must be deemed a Fourth Amendment sea

rch.” ) (c itation omi tte d) ; see also W

inston v. Lee , 4 70 U. S. 7 53 , 7 60 (1 98 5) ; Sc hm e rb e r v . Ca lif or nia , 384 U.S. 757 (1 96 6) ; State v. John Chapman
, 1997 Tenn. Crim

. App. L EXI S 950, at *50 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Sept. 30, 1997), perm. app. de nied (T e nn . 1 99 8) ; see also State v. Jac kson , 889 S.W .2d 219, 221 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)
, perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 1994) . Of c ourse, the f act that such an e x trac tion constitut es a se arc h is not dispos itive, since “the Fo u rt h Am endment does not proscribe all sea

rche s and seizures . . . .” Skinner , 4 89 U. S. at 61 9. “ Th e tou c hs ton e of ou r ana ly sis under the Fourth Amendment i s alway s ‘the reasona bleness in all the circ umstances of the particular g overnme ntal invasion of a c itiz en’s pe rsonal sec urity .’” Pennsylv ania v. Mimms , 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1 9 7 7 ) ( q u o t i n g Te rryv . O hio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).-8-

Tenne ssee’ s challeng ed DNA statute, codified in Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35- 321, require s a per son convicted of a fe lony to provide a biolog ical s p ec i m en for the purpose of DNA a naly sis. Accor ding to the statute, “DNAanaly s i s ” m ea n s the proce ss throug h which deoxyribonucleic acid ( DNA) in a human biologica l specimen is analy zed and compa red w ith DNA from another bi ologic al spec imen for identific ation purposes. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-321( a). For those that are convicted of offe nses that fa ll within t he statute, the c ourt must mak e t he providing of the biolog ical specimen a condition of t heir probation or communitycorr ection if e ither is g rante d. Id. § 40-35-321( b), (d) (1). Onc e collecte d, the spec imen is then forwa rded to the Te nnessee Bur eau of I nvestig ation, who must maintain the specimen a s provided in s ection 38-6-113. Tenne ssee Code An no ta te d s e c tio n 3 8- 6- 11 3 p ro vid e s:
( c ) T h e b u r e au s h a ll a d o p t u n if o r m p r o c e d u r e s to main tain
, p r e s e rve and a n a ly ze human bi o logic al spec imens for DN A. The bur eau sha ll establish a centr alized sy ste m to c ro ss- re fe re nc e data ob ta ine d f

ro m D NAa na ly sis

. (d) The bureau shall perf

orm DNA analy sis and make data obtained a vailable to law enforceme nt officia l s i n co n n ec t i o n wi t h ap p ro p ri at e c ri m i n al i n v es t i gat i o n s i n wh ich human biologic al s p ec imens have be en re cover ed. The bureau shall also make the data a vailable to the district attorne y g ener al, and the subje ct of t h e d at a i n any
su bs e qu e nt c ri min a l pr os e c uti on of the su bje c t.
All fifty states have enac ted similar DNA database leg islation, requiring the collec tio n of blood

sa mpl e s f ro m c on vic te d o ff

e nd e rs a ndsto ra g e a nda na ly sis of su c h s a mpl e s in stat e DN A d a ta ba se s. I n order to comply with the require ments of sec tion 38-6-113(c ), Tenne ssee, ( along with forty -nine other states, the U.S. A rmy , the FB I , and Puerto Rico,) participates in the FB IL aboratory ’s Combined D NA I ndexing Sy stem (CODI S). Fe d. Bur eau of I nvestig ation, CODI S - Participating S t at es , av ailab le at h tt

p :/ /w w w

. f b i. g o v/h q /l a b /c o d is /p a

r ts ta te s

. h tm

. CO D I S e n a

bles law e nforc ement officia ls to match evidenc e obtained at the scene of a c rime to a pa rticular of fende r’s prof

ile, which

ca n s erve as a tool for

monitoring the c riminal activity of known off

ender s. U

n it e d S tates v. Kincade , 3 79 F .S. W.3 d 8 13 , 8 20 (9 th C ir . 2 00 4) . A s of J anu ary , 20 05 , th e CO DI S data ba se
c on ta ine d 2 ,0 72 ,5 13 c on vic te d o ff e nd e r D NApr of

ile s. F e d. B ur e a u o f Inv e sti g a tio n, CO DI S - Statist ical C l i ck able Ma

p, av ail ab le at htt

p:/ /w ww .f bi. g ov /hq /la b/c od is/natio na l.h tm. Of tho se profiles, 54,789 orig inated in the state of Tenne ssee. I d.
Although ne ither our Supre me Court, nor the United States Supre me Court has addr essed the iss ue of wh e the r the se DN A statut e s con sti tut e a n u nr e a so na ble se arc h a ndse izur e un de r the F ou rth Am en d m en t , o t h ers t at e a n d fe d er al co u rt s h av e u p h el d DN A s t at u t es s i m i l art o T en n es s ee ’s , t h o u gh throug h divided analytical appr oache s. A majority of these courts have upheld DNA statutes under a tra ditional assessment of re asonable ness, considering the totalityof the c ircumstance s. See e .g. United States v. Kincade , 3 79 F .S. W.3 d 8 13 (9 th C ir . 2 00 4) ; Groce man v

. Un i t ed States Dep’t of Justice , 354 F .S. W.3 d 411 , 413 -1 4 (5th Cir. 20 04 ) (p e r c uria m) ; Velasquez v . W oods , 329 F.S.W.3d 42 0, 42 1 (5th Cir. 20 03 ) ( pe r c uria m) ; Jones v . Murray , 962 F.S.W.2d 302, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1992); Nic ho las v . G oo rd , 2004 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 11708, No. 01Civ.7 8 9 1 , 2004 WL 1432533, *2-*6-9-

( S

. D

. N

. Y

. Ju n e 2 4 , 2 00 4) ; Un i t ed States v. Stegman , 295 F. Supp. S.W.2d 542, 548-50 (D. Md. 20 03 ); Pa dg e tt v . F

e rre ro , 2 94 F . Su pp . S. W.2 d 1 33 8, 13 43 -4 4 ( N. D. Ga . 2 00 3) ; United States v. Meie r , N o. CR9 7- 72 HA , 2 00 2 U .S. Di st. LEX I S 25 75 5 ( D. Or . 2 00 2) ; United States v. Lujan , No. CR9 8- 48 0- 02 HA , 2 00 2 U .S. Di st. LEX I S 25 75 4 ( D. Or . 2 00 2) ; Shelton v. Gudmanson , 934 F. Supp. 10 48 (W. D. Wis. 19 96 ); Kruger v. Erick son , 8 75 F . Su pp . 5 83 (D . M inn . 1 99 5) ; Vanderlinden v. Kansas , 8 74 F . Su pp . 1 21 0 ( D. Kan. 19 95 ); Sanders v. Coman , 864 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N .C. 1994); Ry nc ar z v . E ike nb e rry , 8 24 F

. Sup p. 14 93 (E .D . Wa sh . 1 99 3) ; Polston v. S t a t e , 2 0 0 5 A rk

. LE X IS 36 (A rk . 2 00 5) ; Landry v. Attorney G eneral , 429 Mass. 336, 343-48, 709 N.E.2d 1085 ( 1999); Ga ine s v . S tate , 998 P.S.W .2d 166, 171-73 (Ne v. 2000); J o h n s o n v . Co mm on we alt

h , 529 S.E.2d 769, 77 9 ( Va . 2 00 0) ; Do le s v . S tate , 9 94 P.S. W.2 d 3 15 , 3 17 -2 0 ( Wy o. 19 99 ); In re Ma ric op a Coun ty Juve nile Action
, 9 3 0 P

. S

. W

. 2 d 4 9 6 , 5 0 0

- 0 1 ( A r i z

. C t

. A p p . 1 99 6) ; P eo ple v. Adam s , 9 Cal.Rptr. S.W. 3d17 0, 18 0- 84 (C a l. C t. A pp . 2 00 4) ; L.S . v . S tat e , 8 05 So. S.W. 2d10 04 , 1 00 6- 07 (F l. D ist . Ct

. Ap p. 20 01 ); People v. Calahan , 649 N. E. 2d 58 8, 59 1- 92 (Ill. Ap p. Ct. 19 95 ); Cooper v. Gamm on , 943 S.W .2d 699, 704-05 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). This bala ncing test weig hs the g overnme ntal need for the a ction ag ainst the privac y conce rn of the individual a ffe cted. Pe op le v . G ar v in , 812 N.E.2d 773, 782 (I ll. App. Ct. 2004). I n contra st, a minority of courts have determined that the collec tion of DNA samp le s f

r o m o f f e n d e r s f a ll s w ith in th e “ s p e c ia l n e e d s ” e xc e p ti o n to th e w arr a n t a nd probable -cause re quirement of the Fourth Amendment. See G reen v . Berge , 354 F.S.W.3d 675, 679 (7t h Cir. 2 00 4) ; United States v. Kimler , 3 35 F .S. W.3 d 1 13 2, 11 46 (1 0thCir . 2 00 3) ; R o e v. Ma rc otte , 1 93 F .S. W.3 d 7 2, 79 -8 2 ( S.W. 2dCir . 1 99 9) ; Vore v. United St ates Dep’ t of Justice , 281 F . Su pp . S.W.2 d 1 12 9, 11 33 -3 5 ( D. Ariz. 2 00 3) ; Miller v. U.S. Parole Comm ’n , 259 F. Supp. S.W. 2d11 66 , 1 17 5- 78 (D . K a n. 20 03 ); United St ates v. Sczubelek , 255 F. Supp. S.W.2d 315, 319-23 (D . D e l. 2 00 3) ; Un ite d S tate s v . R ey na rd , 220 F. Supp. S.W.2d 1142, 1165-69 (S

. D. C al. 2002); State v. Martinez , 2 76 Kan. 52 7, 78 P.S. W.3 d 7 69 , 77 1-7 5 (Kan . 200 3) ; State v. Olivas , 856 P.S. W.2 d 1 07 6, 10 85 -8 6 ( Was h. 19 93 ); State v. Surge , 94 P.S.W .3d 345, 453 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004); Sta te v . S te e le , 802 N. E. 2d11 27 , 1 13 2- 37 (O hio Ct. Ap p. 20 03 ); In re D. L.C. , 124 S.W .3d 354, 370-73 (Te x . App. 2003).

We a g re e wi th tho se c ou rt s th a t ha ve a do pte d th e “ re a so na ble ne ss tes t” when a sk e d to de te rm ine wh e the r a DN A statut e c on sti tut e s an unr e a so na ble se arc h an d sei zur e

. Un de r this te st, we must determine whether the State’s interest in collecting DNA sa mples and maintaining a DNA databa se out weig hs the blood test’s intrusion on a qualified f elon’s priva cy

interest. See B rown v. Texas , 4 43 U. S. 4 7, 50 -5 1 ( 19 79 ); se e als o S tat e v . P utt , 955 S.W .2d 640, 645 (Tenn. Ct. Crim . App. 1997). I n Sta te v . P utt , this Cou rt app lie d the re a so na ble ne ss te st wh e n an a ly zing the su sp ic ion le ss
sear ch of a

vehicle be longing to a visitor at a corr ectional fac ility

. 955 S.W .2d at 645. I n that case
, the def endant entere d the grounds of a prison facility in order to visit her husba nd. Upon ar riving at the fa cility , her c ar w as sea rche d and marijuana and drug para pherna lia wer e found. The Court held that the g overnme nt’s interest in keeping contra band out of penal instit utions outwe ighe d the intrusion into t he defenda nt’s privac y cause d by the sea rch of her ve hicle bec ause thefac t that the d e f e n d a n th a d e n t e r e d t h e g r o u n d s o f t h e p r i s o n f a c i l i t y d i m i n i s h e d h e r

u s u a l e x p e c t a t i o n o f

p r i v a c y. Id. at 646.-10-

Collecting DNA samples from certain convicted offe nders and maintaining them in a data ba se pu rs ua nt t o T e nn e sse e ’s DN A s ta tut e pr omo te s impo rt a nt g ov e rn me nt i nte re sts . F ir st, it is be y ond dispute that the State has a strong interest in deter ring and prose cuting rec idivist criminal acts. See, e .g., State v. Robinson , 29 S.W.3 d 476 , 478 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; see als o P e op le v . G ar v in , 812 N.E.2d 773, 782 (I ll. App. 2004). I n addition, because it is possibl e to identify a p er s o n “t o the prac tical exclusion of all others” throug h DNA an al y s i s , t he use of the CODI S database as an inv e sti g a tory too l pr omo te s the State ’s ov e rw he lmi ng int e re st i n p ro se c uti ng c ri me s ac c ur ate ly

. See T h o m as M

. Fl em m i n g, An n o t at i o n , A d m is s ibilit y of DNA Ide ntification Evidence , 84 A.L .R. 4th 313 at § 2[b] (1991).

Be cause tho s e s u b

j ec t to the DNA statute ha ve alr eady been c onvicted of a

felony and ar e ei t h eri n ca rc er at ed o r o n p ar o l e o r p ro b at i o n , t h ey h av e a re d u ce d ex p ec t at i o n o f p ri v ac y

. Al t h o u gh prisoners do not fa ll completely outside of t he sweep of constitutional protections, “imprisonment

car ries with it the circ umscription or loss of many signific ant rig hts.” Hudson v. Palme r , 4 68 U. S. 51 7, 52 4- 25 (1 98 4) ; B e l lv

. W o l f ish
, 4 4 1 U. S

. 520, 545-46 (1979) . Prisoners have a diminished expectation of privac y

while they

are incar cer ated. See Hu dson , 468 U.S. at 526-27 (holding that priso ne rs ha ve no e xpe c ta tio n o f p ri va c y in their jail c e lls ); Be ll , 441 U.S. at 560 (holding that pr e tr ia l de ta ine e s c a n b e su bje c t to bo dy c a vit y sear c he s w ith ou t a wa rr a nt o r p ro ba

ble c aus e fo llo wi ng c on ta c t vi sit s) ; se e als o S tate v . D uls wor th , 781 S.W .2d 277, 284 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) (n oti ng that a pris on e r ha s no leg iti ma te e xpe c ta tio n of p ri va c y in h is o r h e r j a il c e ll) . Like wi se , it is a we ll- e sta bli sh e d p ri nc ipl e that pr ob a tio ne rs a lso ha ve lim ite d p ri va c y ri g hts un de r the F ou rth Amendment. Se e Gr iff

in v . W isc on sin , 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987). Specif ically
, courts have he ld that

once a person ha s been c onvicted, his or her identity has bec ome a matter

of state interest and he or sh e ha s lost a ny le g iti ma te e xpe c ta tio n o f p ri va c y in the ide nti fying inf

orma tio n d e ri ve d f

ro m bo dil y sampling. Ga ine s v . S tate , 9 98 P.S. W.2 d 1 66 (N e v. 20 00 ); Rise v. Ore gon , 59 F.S.W.3d 1556, 1560 (9 Cir. 1995). th

Wit h reg ard to the intrusive nature of the sear ch, it is widely acc epted that the w ithdrawa l of b l o o d i s not an “unduly

extensive imposi tion” ( W inston v. Lee , 4 7 0 U

. S. 7 5 3 , 7 6 2 ( 1 9 8 5 ) ) a nd “would not be c onsidered offensive by even the most delicate.” Breithaupt v. Abram , 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957). The collection of a blood sample is a minimal intrusion and has become routine. Sc hm e rb e r v . Ca lif

or nia , 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966). I n addition, the DNA pr ofile derived from a n
o f f e n d e r ’ s b l o o d s a mp l e p r o d u c e s o n l y m i n i m a l l y i n v a s i v e i n f o r m a t i o n , a s i t e s t ab l i s h e s o n l y a
r e c o r d o f t h e o f f e n d e r ’ s i d e n t i t y.

I n light of the substantial interests of the State, the diminis hed privac y interests of convic ted felons, and the minimal int rusion cause d by the taking of blood samples, we hold that the collection and maintena nce of

DNA sa mples pursuant to Tenne ssee’ s DNA statute is re asonable . As such, the tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y de nie d D e fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to su pp re ss. De fe nd a nt i s n ot e nti tle d to re lie f o n th is issue.-11-

B. Su ff iciency of Evid ence

De fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at trial wa s in su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

his

co n v i ct i o n. When an appe llant challeng es the suff iciency of the e vidence , the standar d of re view is whether, a fter viewing the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the state , any rational trier

of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond a re asonable doubt. Jack son v. Vi rg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 , 3 19 , 9 9 S. Ct. 27 81 , 27 89 , 6 1 L . E d. S.W. 2d56 0 ( 19 79 ); State v. Ev ans , 838 S.W .2 d 1 8 5
, 1 9 0

- 9 1 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 2 ) ; T e n n

. R. A p p

. P. 1 3 ( e )

. O n ap p e a l, th e s tate is e ntitled to the strong est leg itimate view of the evidence and all rea sonable or leg itimate infere nces which may be draw n there from. State v. Cabbage
, 5 7 1 S

. W

. 2 d 8 3 2 , 8 3 5 (T en n

. 1 9 7 8 ). T h i s co u rt wi l l n o tre we i gh the evidenc e, re evaluate the evide nce, or substitut e its evidentiary inference s for those r eac hed by the jury

. State v. Carey , 914 S.W .2d 93, 95 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) . Furthermore , in a criminal trial, g reat w eig ht is g iven to the result rea ched by the jury

. State v. Johnson , 910 S.W .2d 897, 899 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

.
De fe nd a nt d oe s n ot d isp ute that th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at trial est ablish e d th a t th e vic tim was, in fa ct, the victim of a r ape and ag g ravated burglary

. Howeve r, he arg ues that the e vidence was i n s u ff i cient to identify

him as the assailant. At trial, the vic tim identified the Defe ndant as he r attacke r af

ter de scribing the sex, race , complexion, we i gh t , cl o t hing, he ight, build and a g e of the person who attacke d her. One of the offic ers who inve stigated the burg lary and ra pe testified that the victim ga ve him a desc ription of the assailant’ s sex, race, he ight, we ight, and ag e on the morning of the attack. The DNA profile from the vi ctim’s rape kit matched Defe ndant’s DNA profile. The DNA a naly sis ex pert who te stified at trial stated that “ the proba bili ty of an unr elated individual having the s ame DNA profile from either the African- Americ an, Cauc asian, Southeastern Hispanic, or Southwestern H ispanic population exceeds t h e cu rr ent world population.” I n other wor ds, the expert witness conclude d that no other person could have been the source of the seme n left inside the victi m. This evidence prese nted at trial wa s sufficient to support the jury ’s finding bey ond a

rea sonable doubt that De fendant was the pe rson who committed these cr i m es

. Def endant is not entitled to relief on this issue.
C. Validity of

Defendan t’s Sentence

Def endant a rg ues that t he length of his sentenc e for the ra pe convic tion should be reduce d in light of Blakely v. W

ashington , 542 U.S. ___, 159 L . Ed. S.W .2d 403, 124 S.Ct . 2531 (2004).

A def endant who c halleng es his or her sentenc e has the burden of provi n g t h e sentence imposed by

the trial court is im proper . Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401, Sentenc ing Com m i s sion Com me nts ; State v. Ashby , 8 23 S.W. 2d16 6, 16 9 ( Te nn

. 19 91 ). I t is thi s c ou rt ’s du ty to c on du c t a de novo revie w of the r ecor d with a pre sumption t he trial court’s de terminations are corr ect whe n a def endant a ppeals the le ng th, rang e, or ma nner of service of his or her

sentenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d). The pr esumption of corr ectne ss is conditioned upon theaff irmative showing in the

rec ord that the trial c ourt considered t h e s entenc ing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances. State v. Pe ttus , 986 S.W .2d 540, 543-44 (Te nn. 1999).-12-

Following a sentencing hearing, Defe ndant was sentenc ed to concurre nt sentence s of fiftee n y ear s for a g g ravated burg lary as a c are er of

fende r and sixteen y ear s for ra pe as a Rang e I I offe nder. Def endant’ s fiftee n-y ear

sentenc e for

ag g ravated burg lary

is the sentence mandated by statute for a

car eer offe nder w ho commits a class C felony . Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-108(c ), -112( c)( 3). Acc ording to statute, the presumptive sentence for Defenda nt’s rape conviction i s twelve y ear s, but may be enhanced up to a

maxi mum sente n ce o f twenty y ear s. Id. § 40-35-112( b)(2) . After considering the evidenc e introduce d at the sente ncing hearing, the trial court he ld t hat the two enhanc ement fa ctors applied to De fendant: the defe n d an t h as a pre vious historyof criminal convictions or criminal behavior in addition to those nece ssar y t o establish the appr opriate r ang e; and the de fendant has a pre vious historyof unwillingne ss t o comply with the conditions of a sentenc e involving r elea se in the community

. See id. § 4 0- 35 -1 14 (2 ), (9 ). I n a dd iti on , th e c ou rt he ld that one mitigating f

actor wa s ap p l i ca ble bec ause D efe ndant’s criminal conduct did not cause or threaten serious bodily

injury

. Id. § 40-25-113( 1). After weig hing the se two enhanceme nt fac tors and one mitig ating fac tor, the trial court sentence d Def endant to ser ve six teen y ear s for his ra pe conviction, four y ear s above the presumptive sente nce of twelve y ear s.

De fe nd a nt did no t in iti a lly raise a ny iss ue s in his mot ionfo r n e w t ri a l c on c e rn ing the le ng th of his sentenc e. Howe ver, on appea l, D efe ndant asks this c ourt to c onsider the impact of the ruling in Blakely v. W

ashington , 542 U.S. ___, 159 L . Ed. S.W .2d 403, 124 S.Ct . 2531 (2004), on the trial

cour t ’s sentenc ing de terminations. The State a rg ues that De fendant has waive d any sentenc ing issues under Blakely by

the fa i l u re to raise his issues in the trial court under Rule 36(a ) of the T en n es s ee R ules of Appe llate Proce dure. Indeed, a ccor ding to the T ennesse e Supreme Court’s

rec ent dec ision, State v. Gome z , b oththe Un ite d St a te s Supr e me Cou rt a nd the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court do not reg ard Bl ake ly a s h a v in g a n n o u n c e d a n e w rule of law. State v. Edwin Gomez and Jonathan S. L o n d o no , ___ S.W .3d ___, No. M2002-01209-SC-R11-CD, 2005 Tenn. L EXI S 350 (T e nn ., a t K noxvill e , A pril 1 5, 20 05 ). As su c h, De fe nd a nt d id n ot p ro pe rl y pr e se rv e a

Sixth Am e nd me nt c ha lle ng e to h is s e nte nc e , a nd Defen dan t is lim ite d to se e kin g re lie f o n h is Si xth Amendment cla im via plain error revie w. See G omez , 2005 Tenn. L EXI S 350. I n G o mez , our Sup re me Cou rt

c on c lud e d th at Te nn e sse e ’s se nte nc ing str uc tur e do e s n ot v iol a te the Sixth Am e nd me nt andthat Blakely there fore d o es n ot apply to Tennesse e’s se ntencing scheme

. Id. Be cause Def

endant’ s sentence s were not imposed in viol ation of t he S ix th Amendment, Def endant is not entitl ed to re lief bec ause the rec ord re flec ts no error

.
The trial c ourt properly

g ave gre at weig ht to Defe ndant’s pre vious historyof criminal convictions, and prope rly considere d the enha nceme nt fac tor that Def endant ha s a pre vious history of un wi lli ng ne ss t o c omp ly wi th the c on dit ion s o f h is r e le a se . T he tr ia l c ou rt app ro pria te ly

e xce rc ise d ju di c ia l di sc re tio n inimp os ing De fe nd a nt’ s se nte nc e a ft e r c are fu lly c on sid e ri ng the se enhanc ement fa ctors and one mitigating fac tor. The evidenc e does not pr eponder ate ag ainst the trial court’s de cision.-13- CO NC LU SION

For the fore g oing rea sons, we af firm Def endant’ s convictions and sente nces f or ag g ravated burg lary and ra pe.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL

L , J UDGE