1

Filed 8/29/22 In re M.P. CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re M. P. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

MARIN COUNTY HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.Y.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A163678

 (Marin County Super. Ct.

 Nos. JV26498A & JV26499A)

M.Y. appeals from juvenile court orders terminating her parental rights 

to two of her children and selecting adoption as the children’s permanent 

plan. She contends the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the beneficial 

relationship or sibling relationship exceptions to termination of parental 

rights, and in failing to order a bonding study before selecting the permanent 

plan. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The Prior Dependency Case

M.Y. (mother) is the mother of M.P. and J.P. (the minors) and their 

older half sisters E.E. and N.E.; the minors’ father (father) is the stepfather 
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of E.E. and N.E.1 M.P. and J.P were six years old and three years old, 

respectively, when they were initially taken into protective custody by the 

Marin County Social Services Agency (Agency) due to their father’s sexual 

abuse of E.E. and mother’s failure to protect E.E. and her other children. A 

juvenile dependency petition was filed in July 2017, after then 14-year-old 

E.E. disclosed that father sexually abused her repeatedly when she was 

“between third and seventh grade,” including violent, forcible vaginal and 

anal penetration. When E.E. told mother about the abuse, mother blamed 

her, said she did not believe her, and continued to allow father to be with 

E.E. unsupervised. N.E., then 10 years old, disclosed an incident in which 

the father touched her groin area and she slapped his hand away, and later

reported two incidents of molestation. N.E. also claimed that father 

repeatedly attempted to bribe her to allow him to touch or kiss her in a 

sexual manner, and said that she informed mother, but mother took no 

protective actions. Both E.E. and N.E. reported that mother continued to 

leave all the children alone with father. 

Father was arrested on multiple charges of sexually assaulting E.E.,

but the criminal case was subsequently dismissed. Mother divorced father in 

2017.

2

Mother received reunification services and in July 2018, M.P., J.P., and 

N.E. (who at some point had recanted her abuse allegations) were returned to 

mother with family maintenance services.3 In April 2019, the juvenile court 

1 Mother told the Agency that E.E. and N.E.’s father returned to Mexico 

when N.E. was a baby and E.E. about five years old; mother married M.P. 

and J.P.’s father when N.E. was about 18 months old. 

2 Mother married her current husband in 2019. 

3 Reunification services were not offered to father. 
3

awarded mother sole custody of M.P. and J.P., with professionally supervised 

visitation for father, and terminated jurisdiction. The court issued a 

protective order preventing father from having any contact with E.E. and 

N.E. Mother did not reunify with E.E., who was placed under a legal 

guardianship with her caregivers. 

The Present Dependency Petition and Jurisdiction

M.P. and J.P. were again taken into protective custody in January 

2020, after N.E. reported that father forcibly raped and sexually abused her

when she was five years old to 11 years old and said she had recanted her 

previous allegations because mother told her to lie and say father did not 

abuse her. N.E. said mother was “present/sleeping” during at least one 

sexual assault, and that others occurred while M.P. and J.P. were in the room 

or in the back of the car. She also reported that M.P. and J.P. had been

visiting with father at least twice a week. 

Father was arrested for sexually abusing N.E., charged with oral 

copulation with a child under 14, sodomy with a person under 14 or with 

force, and penetration with a foreign object of a child under 14. He remained 

in custody throughout these proceedings.4 

The petition filed on January 15, 2020, alleged, in essence, that there 

was a substantial risk M.P. and J.P. would be sexually abused by father 

based on N.E.’s disclosures and the prior case involving father’s abuse of 

E.E., and that although mother knew or should have known of the danger, 

she failed to protect the minors by allowing visitation with father without the 

4 As of the contested 12-month review hearing in April 2021, father had 

not yet gone to trial. The record contains no subsequent information about 

the status of his criminal case. 

Father was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings and is 

not a party to this appeal.
4

professional supervision required by the 2017 exit orders, and allowed father 

to have contact with N.E. in violation of no-contact orders.5 

J.P. told the social worker that she saw father twice a week and that

father babysat her and M.P. the week before because mother had to work. 

She said that mother took her, M.P., and N.E. to father’s job one day and 

when father said hello to N.E., N.E. swore at him and told him not to talk to 

her again. In a subsequent forensic interview, J.P. said that father would 

babysit her and M.P. at his apartment while mother was at work, and her 

uncles were “ ‘sometimes’ ” there. 

M.P. told the social worker she did not have visits with father and 

could not remember the last time she saw him, then said that she saw him at 

his house in 2017, and that she and J.P. had visits with him that ended in 

2018 or 2019. M.P. was sullen and quiet during the interview, became “teary

eyed,” and said she wished she saw father more often. In her forensic 

interview, M.P. said she had not had contact with father since the 2017 case 

closed, and the last time she saw him a social worker was present. She said 

she felt safe with mother and was sad she was not with her, and denied that 

anyone “hurt her body” or told her to keep secrets. M.P. seemed “guarded 

and cautious” throughout her interview and cried at various points. 

Mother admitted the children had visits with father that were not 

professionally supervised, saying she thought they could be supervised by 

anyone. She initially told the social worker she was always present at visits 

5 The petition contained allegations under Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), (d) (sexual abuse), and 

(j) (abuse of sibling). Pursuant to an agreement among the parties, an 

amended petition filed on April 15, 2020, alleged the same factual 

background under subdivisions (b) and (j) of section 300, and omitted 

allegations under subdivision (d). 
5

and subsequently said she always made sure the visits were supervised by 

one of the minors’ uncles. She said neither she nor father could afford to pay 

for professional supervision and she “felt bad” because the minors asked to 

see their father. Mother said that when she took M.P., J.P., and N.E. to 

father’s workplace, N.E. stayed in the car “with the window up and a hat on 

and father ‘didn’t even know she was there’ until N.E. started crying and 

yelling at him.” 

Father initially told the social worker he saw M.P. and J.P. weekly or 

biweekly at the mall when mother would leave the children with him and his 

brother while mother shopped. Later, father said he had seen the minors one 

or two times when he ran into them at the mall by chance and stopped to talk 

and eat pizza, with mother present. He denied that M.P. and J.P. ever came 

to his house when he was there. Father said that on the day mother brought 

the three girls to his workplace, he did not know N.E. was there and did not 

approach or say anything to her. He denied the sexual abuse allegations as 

he had before; he believed N.E. was accusing him because she did not receive 

Christmas gifts from him in 2019, and was jealous of gifts he gave M.P. and 

J.P.

E.E. told the social worker she believed mother knew father had 

sexually abused N.E. because N.E. had told her that she and the minors had 

seen father and that prior to the visit, mother had been telling N.E. to forgive 

father for what he did to her and E.E. E.E. said mother brought N.E. to the 

visit with the minors so N.E. could see father and forgive him. 

Mother told the social worker she would only believe N.E.’s abuse 

allegations when N.E. “tells her to her face what happened to her.” She said 

she now believed what E.E. had disclosed in the prior case but only after 

having talked to E.E. about it directly. Mother’s main goal was to reunify 
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with M.P. and J.P.; she agreed to N.E. remaining in the care of her resource 

family (E.E.’s legal guardians) if N.E. felt better living with them. A legal 

guardianship was subsequently established for N.E. with E.E.’s legal 

guardians. 

The court sustained the petition at an uncontested jurisdiction hearing 

on April 21, 2020, ordered supervised visitation for mother, and prohibited 

any contact between father and the minors. 

Disposition and Reunification Services

The Agency’s disposition report stated that the main problem requiring 

intervention was that mother failed to protect E.E. and N.E. from sexual 

abuse by father that occurred over many years and, despite the previous 

dependency case, mother continued to minimize the disclosures of abuse by 

the older daughters and disregarded court orders “put in place to protect the 

girls from potential harm.” The Agency stated that the causes of mother’s 

failure to protect her children from sexual abuse needed further exploration, 

suggested she might be impeded by past trauma and/or mental health 

condition, and noted that mother had participated in therapy for over two 

years but had been reluctant to discuss her “mental and emotional health” 

with the Agency. The social worker observed that when mother was 

experiencing high levels of emotional stress, she was “unable to emotionally 

regulate herself” and became “so overwhelmed and distressed that she [could 

not] act in ways that prioritize the emotional wellbeing of her children.” The 

social worker commented that mother’s inability or unwillingness to discuss 

the past sexual abuse made it difficult to assess how she would recognize 

possible signs of abuse in the future and act protectively. 

Mother reported feeling sad and depressed with the current 

circumstances and had made suicidal statements to the social worker and 
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others, but she was continuing to see the therapist she began to see during 

the prior case and reported that therapy was helpful. Mother felt the minors 

needed to return to her care because the separation from her was difficult for 

them. She was meeting with the social worker and participating in “Child 

and Family Team” meetings, and had social support from friends and family. 

The social worker noted that mother had “little trust” in the Agency. 

The minors were reported to have a close and supportive relationship 

with each other. The second removal from mother’s care had been traumatic 

for M.P. and she was experiencing “a lot of sadness and anxiety”; J.P. was 

also experiencing sadness due to the separation from mother. Both minors 

were actively engaged in therapy. They had been placed in a long term 

resource home at the end of January 30, 2020, appeared to be content and at 

ease there, and were able to maintain connection with their older sisters, who 

lived nearby. 

Mother had weekly supervised visitation with the minors, which had 

been conducted by video conference since implementation of shelter in place 

orders due to the pandemic. Mother attended visits consistently, the visits 

were “appropriate and positive” and the minors looked forward to them and 

expressed wanting more time with mother. 

At the disposition hearing on May 5, 2020, the juvenile court adjudged 

M.P. and J.P. dependents of the court, found out-of-home placement 

necessary and the minors’ current placement appropriate, ordered 

reunification services for mother, and denied reunification services for father. 

The Agency Requests Termination of Reunification Services

In October 2020, about three weeks ahead of the scheduled six-month 

review hearing, the Agency filed a “Request to Change Court Order” asking

the juvenile court to terminate mother’s reunification services due to her
8

failure to make behavioral changes and inability to focus on the need to act 

protectively toward the minors. The Agency reported that mother continued 

to “maintain[] the narrative that she has done nothing wrong and that she is 

being victimized” by the Agency and “routinely denies the sexual abuse that 

her eldest daughters experienced and continues to maintain that she does not 

believe their allegations, no matter how credible they may seem.” The 

Agency saw “little to no behavioral change” despite mother having received 

extensive services, noted that between the two dependency cases the minors 

had been in out-of-home care for 22 of the past 40 months, and believed it 

would be in the minors’ best interests for the Agency to shift its focus toward 

an alternative placement plan. 

On the same day it filed its request to change the court order, the

Agency filed its status report for the six-month review hearing. Mother had 

begun a support class for parents of sexually abused children, but the 

providers were concerned that her defensiveness would interfere with her 

ability to learn from the class, and that “because of [mother’s] denial, she 

may never be fully capable of acting protectively toward her younger 

daughters.” Mother’s therapist attended the second session for support and 

mother was “more open” but “continuously ask[ed] why her children were 

removed,” repeatedly said she was the one being punished by having her 

children taken away, and did not express either blaming father or being 

concerned about the minors. Mother told the social worker she felt the 

sessions were “forced” and it was difficult to discuss sexual abuse because she 

wanted to “ ‘leave it all behind’ and focus on positive things.” Mother felt her 

daughters could come to her about anything and said she had always listened 

to them and would do whatever she could to protect them if they told her 

something had happened. She said she understood she had to be aware of 
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other warning signs because children do not always report abuse and felt the 

class was not providing information she had not already discussed in therapy.

Mother’s denial was also reflected in an evaluation performed in 

connection with her mental health services,6 during which mother “denied 

any current or historical depression or suicidal ideation,” and explained that 

she did not believe her older daughters’ reports that they had been sexually 

abused by her ex-husband. When the social worker asked mother about this, 

she acknowledged having read the police reports and being told about the 

allegations, but said she did not believe it because her daughters never told 

her about it. Mother said, “ ‘I don’t know if it happened or didn’t happen.’ ” 

6 The evaluation by the Marin County Access Team (Access) related to 

a component of mother’s case plan requiring her to undergo a psychiatric 

medication evaluation, which mother was to arrange through Access. Mother 

told the social worker the Access evaluation concluded she did not need to see 

a psychiatrist, but the evaluation in fact stated that mother had a diagnosis 

of “Major Depressive Disorder Mild Recurrent” and declined a medication 

evaluation or other referral. After about two months of efforts to help mother 

obtain a referral, mother told the social worker she had been taking 

medication for anxiety/depression daily since the beginning of the 2017 

dependency case but had not disclosed this earlier because “she felt 

oppositional to the [Agency] ‘telling’ her that she needed a medication 

evaluation. She also had not told her therapist about the medication. 

Mother’s primary care physician told the social worker she had first 

prescribed the anxiety/depression medication in July 2019 and, although 

mother said in September 2020 that she had been taking it daily, the 

physician said this was not possible based on the number of refills. The 

physician also said she had referred mother for therapy because mother said 

she did not have an individual therapist. Mother met with a psychiatric 

nurse practitioner in October 2020 but had missed follow-up appointments. 

Based on the above, the Agency reported that mother had “actively worked 

against current case plan goals” by failing to engage with providers 

attempting to arrange services, misleading providers about her current 

emotional health needs, and being dishonest with the Agency and providers 

about medication. 
10

Mother’s therapist reported that mother was angry, depressed, and 

more resistant to treatment than she had been during the prior dependency 

case. After Mother’s mother (grandmother) died in August 2020, mother 

“was unable to discuss other issues or moving forward with family sessions,” 

she “appeared to only be able to focus on grieving.” Mother told the social 

worker that “she was too consumed with grief from the loss of her mother to 

do family therapy.”

When family therapy with M.P. began in mid-September, mother was 

resistant to bringing up topics she thought would hurt M.P. Nevertheless, 

the therapist felt there was a breakthrough in the second session, when 

mother told M.P. that the girls had been removed from home because father 

had “ ‘not respected’ ” N.E., and N.E. would not be returning home because 

she did not feel safe there. 

During a visit with the minors on October 1, 2020, mother told M.P. 

that grandmother had passed away. Afterward, M.P. told her resource 

parent and her therapist that mother had said she “ ‘no longer had a 

mother’ ” and instructed M.P. not to tell J.P. because it would be too 

upsetting. The burden of the secret caused M.P. “a lot of anxiety,” including 

several incidents of bed-wetting. This incident raised concern because 

“keeping secrets is often the foundation of sexual abuse dynamics” and the 

issue had been discussed with mother “as a part of her work learning about 

child sexual abuse.” Mother denied telling M.P. to keep grandmother’s death 

a secret and said she had not told J.P. because J.P. was busy playing on her 

phone. When told about the emotional impact of the experience on M.P., 

mother asked no follow-up questions about M.P., said she would not do any 

harm to her children, and asked how the social worker thought telling M.P. 

about the recommendation to terminate reunification services would go if this 
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incident had had such an impact on her. Mother’s therapist was concerned 

about the incident but also felt mother was more stable than she had been in 

previous weeks and had been able to put feedback into practice. 

Mother consistently attended visits with the minors, which the minors 

continued to look forward to and enjoy. The supervised visits transitioned 

from fully supervised to “check-in” visits but then back to supervised due to 

concerns about the secrecy incident with M.P. and the Agency’s 

recommendation to terminate reunification services. 

The Agency reported that the minors had a “strong connection” with 

the resource parents and were doing well in their placement and in school. 

They saw their older sisters often and enjoyed spending time with them. The 

minors frequently expressed missing mother. M.P. was having episodes of

enuresis and encopresis, the frequency of which increased after family 

therapy sessions began in September 2020. M.P.’s therapist felt this was 

likely due to the “stress of the conversations and interactions,” but potential 

medical causes were also being investigated.7 M.P. was willing to discuss

“big feelings” in therapy, which for her included “a sense of loss of family, 

worries about her siblings, and feeling unseen and/or uncared for by her 

mother.” J.P.’s therapist reported that J.P. was often more willing to discuss 

“difficult topics” with the resource mother present. After learning that N.E. 

would not be returning home, both minors “routinely” expressed concern 

about not seeing her or returning home without her.

Referencing the egregious nature of the sexual abuse suffered by E.E. 

and N.E., their descriptions of mother blaming E.E. and telling N.E. to lie 

7 The therapist cautioned that although there was no evidence M.P. 

had been sexually abused, it should be kept in mind that both conditions 

have a correlation with sexual abuse. 
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about the abuse, mother allowing father to see the minors in violation of 

court orders, and mother’s continued denial despite “almost three years of 

services to address these concerns,” the Agency saw “little recourse as to its 

recommendation” to terminate services. 

A contested hearing on the Agency’s recommendation to terminate 

reunification services was held in December 2020. The court concluded the 

Agency had established mother’s lack of substantial progress. Although it

questioned the likelihood that reunification would occur, the court was 

reluctant to terminate services early in light of the “extraordinary stress on 

everyone” attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic. The court denied the 

request to terminate reunification services despite not finding there was a 

substantial probability the minors could be returned, making clear it would 

have granted the Agency’s request absent the pandemic. 

Twelve-month Review and Termination of Reunification Services

In its report prepared in February 2021, the Agency related that the 

minors frequently expressed missing mother and anxiety about the 

impending court decisions. J.P. expressed sadness about not being able to 

live with her mother or older sisters, but these feelings did not impede her 

day-to-day functioning. The majority of the “big feelings” J.P. discussed in 

therapy involved missing mother or feeling sad about not being at home. 

M.P. continued to experience bowel and bladder dysfunction and digestive 

issues which were being investigated and treated. The resource parents 

observed that enuresis incidents were frequently coupled with other periods 

of emotional dysregulation (extreme sadness, anger, yelling, and crying). In 

November 2020, M.P. started to have episodes of screaming “for hours on 

end,” hitting her head against the wall or pulling out her hair. These 

behaviors decreased after “Seneca Wraparound” services were put in place,
13

but M.P. still experienced significant worries and anxiety, especially at night. 

She described feeling scared about “people removing her from the house,” and 

on one occasion answered, “yes” when the resource parent asked if she had 

ever been “hurt at nighttime.” M.P. related memories about “her family 

yelling and screaming at night”; she described E.E. wielding a knife during 

an argument with mother, and seeing mother throw N.E.’s cell phone and 

break it because N.E. had failed to check in with mother. M.P. said “she is 

nice to her mother so her mother does not yell at her.” The Agency’s April 

2021 addendum reported that “there have been no recent reports of extreme 

behaviors (screaming, pulling hair out)” and that M.P.’s enuresis/encopresis 

had improved. 

The Agency reported that although mother engaged with the 

wraparound services for M.P., the clinician was concerned that mother “can 

become so caught up in her emotions that she doesn’t think about the impact 

of her words on [M.P.].” When the team attempted to discuss the causes of

M.P.’s anxiety and fear of the dark, mother denied that M.P. suffered from 

anxiety and claimed that she was “always happy” when she was with mother.

Mother consistently attended in-person and virtual visits and the visits 

were appropriate and positive. The visit supervisor related that mother 

appeared “really happy, engaged, attentive and inquisitive about her 

daughter[s’] lives,” the minors appeared “very excited” to see mother and 

“they were affectionate and had good communication throughout the visits.” 

The Agency continued to have concerns, however, based on mother’s inability 

or unwillingness to acknowledge the minors’ difficult emotions during visits.

Although mother “would check in with her daughters and ask them if they 

were ok or if there was anything they wanted to talk about” during several 

visits in November and December 2020, she soon reverted to “not wanting to 
14

acknowledge acting unhappy during visits in an effort to make the visits a 

positive experience.” The Agency was also concerned about the visit which 

occurred on April 1, 2021, wherein the minors excitedly told mother about a 

planned trip with the resource family. Mother responded that she was sad 

that the minors were going without her. After this visit, the resource family 

observed that the minors’ excitement waned and they were very sad about 

taking the trip.

After mother met with a new family therapist in a first step toward 

sessions with the minors, the therapist expressed concern that despite her 

willingness to learn, mother “consistently blam[ed] the system for everything 

that has happened” and is “missing the piece that acknowledges how hard 

this is for her children.” M.P. told the resource parents that during the first 

family therapy session, mother had talked about cutting her hair short 

because it had been falling out in the shower due to stress; mother was 

crying, which made M.P. sad, but M.P. did not want to cry because she did 

not want to make mother “more sad.” M.P. also related that mother referred 

to father as “[J.P.’s] father,” which made M.P. so upset that she walked off 

camera and cried quietly, feeling like people only care about J.P. The family 

therapist “noted that [mother] doesn’t seem to see or understand how things 

impact her daughters.” He told the social worker that mother is not able to 

understand the information he shares with her, likely due to her own 

“trauma history,” depression, loss of her older daughters, and fear of losing 

the minors. In another session, mother had an “over the top” positive 

reaction to M.P. saying she was going to court for the contested hearing. 

When mother pressed M.P. to tell her what she was going to say to the judge, 

the therapist intervened. The therapist felt “that [M.P.] really wants to say 

what [mother] wants but that it is too much pressure.”
15

In January 2021, mother told the social worker for the first time that 

she was “ ‘starting to accept the truth’ ” that father had sexually abused E.E. 

and N.E., explaining that previously she had wanted to move on from painful 

topics but that now she was breaking down the barriers so she could learn 

how to better protect her children. Mother continued to insist she was not to 

blame for what happened to her children. She continued to “express feelings

of victimization by the [Agency],” claiming that the Agency made her divorce 

father. 

Mother’s therapist related that mother was starting to reflect on the 

information provided to her and relate it to incidents in her life. By the end 

of the reporting period, the therapist found mother more emotionally stable 

and “in a great place to do the therapeutic work.” Despite having admitted 

the sexual abuse occurred, however, mother maintained that she does not 

remember E.E. or N.E. telling her about it and was unable to acknowledge 

her responsibility to protect her daughters. 

The Agency continued to recommend termination of reunification 

services. The minors’ court-appointed special advocate (CASA) reported that 

the minors were thriving in their current placement and recommended that 

the case be reviewed again in six months. Mother asked the court to appoint 

an expert to conduct a bonding study. 

At a contested hearing on April 14 and 15, 2021, the minors’ attorney 

read a letter from M.P. to the court saying that she wanted to return to 

mother and felt mother should be given more time to work on the tools she 

needed to make sure it was safe for M.P. and J.P. to return home. 

Mother testified that at first it was difficult for her to talk about the 

concerns that led to the minors being removed from her home because she 

was hurt by what happened and it was “not easy to assimilate” something so 
16

painful, but she had learned through therapy to look for signs of abuse even if 

the children did not report it and to call the police or the Agency if something 

happened. She said that she had learned to listen to the children, to respond 

to their positive and negative emotions, and to involve herself more in their 

lives. Mother felt family therapy had been helpful and would be useful to 

continue; it had taught her to go at the minors’ pace rather than expect them 

to go at hers. She felt her medication helped her to manage her emotions and 

be calmer, which allowed her to listen to the minors and be open to what they 

wanted to talk about. Mother testified that she believed E.E. and N.E. when 

they disclosed sexual abuse and denied ever saying she did not believe them. 

Asked if she understood why M.P and J.P. were removed from her care, 

mother said she made a mistake having N.E. in the car at father’s workplace; 

she did not understand the order prevented all contact between N.E. and 

father, and, because father sexually abused N.E., mother “put them in danger 

with [N.E.] in the car.” Asked if there was any reason N.E. was removed 

from her care, other than that mother allowed her to be around father, 

mother said she did not think so. 

The juvenile court found return of the children would create a 

substantial risk of detriment, reasonable services had been offered, and there 

was not a substantial probability the children could be returned within six 

months. The court’s explanation of its detriment finding emphasized (1) the 

mother’s failure to abide by the protections put in place when the children 

were returned to her at the conclusion of the 2017 case; (2) her failure to gain 

insight into the minors’ pain and need for protection; and (3) mother’s false 

testimony, in particular, her statement that she had never denied that her 

older daughters had been sexually abused. The court terminated 

reunification services and set a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 
17

hearing for August 10, 2021.8 The court denied mother’s request for a 

bonding study, explaining that there was no question that mother and the 

girls love each other, the court had information about their bond, and the 

court was concerned about the pressure a bonding study would put on the 

minors, especially M.P. 

The Section 366.26 Reports

In its July 23, 2021 report for the section 366.26 hearing, the Agency 

recommended that the court terminate the parents’ parental rights and make 

adoption the permanent plan. The minors’ CASA “strongly” supported this 

recommendation. Mother opposed the recommendation based on the 

beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption. (§ 366.26, 

subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)

The Agency reported that the resource parents wanted to adopt the 

minors but were willing to accept legal guardianship if that was what the 

court ordered. Both minors told the social worker they felt loved by the 

resource parents and safe in their home, and could see it as their “forever 

home.” When M.P. was directly asked whether she would choose adoption or 

legal guardianship, she said she did not know; the social worker did not ask 

J.P. this question because she was too young to understand the difference. 

The minor’s prospective adoptive parents and the older sisters’ legal 

guardians had arranged for all four siblings to see each other frequently at 

sleepovers, meals, and celebrations while the case was pending, and were 

committed to doing so in the future. The minors had a trusting relationship 

with their sisters’ legal guardians, whom the resource parents considered 

extended family. The social worker reported that the minors were sad that 

8 Further undesignated code references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
18

they would not be returning home, yet they “demonstrated a wellness that 

they have not gained in the care of their mother” and “expressed excitement 

at the prospect of being adopted.” An addendum report filed in September

2021, described various “bonding moments” between the minors and each of 

the resource parents and their extended families that reflected the girls’ 

attachment and comfort. 

After mother’s reunification services were terminated, J.P.’s “behavior

escalated” and she became more “combative” with M.P. The social worker 

viewed this as a stress reaction to the court process; with extra support the

behaviors decreased “rather quickly.” J.P.’s therapist reported that J.P. had 

demonstrated increasing comfort with the topic of adoption and was more 

open in discussing her feelings. M.P. was no longer showing the “intense 

behaviors” previously reported. She had asked for tools to help her manage 

difficult emotional moments and was working on this with her therapist, 

other providers, and the resource parents. She had shown “anticipation and 

excitement” at the possibility of being adopted. 

Mother consistently attended visits with the minors. They would 

generally spend about half the visit watching short videos or movies and the 

other half chatting, looking at pictures, and playing. The minors laughed and 

had a good time visiting with mother, they exchanged affectionate greetings, 

and the visits typically ended “without any emotional disruption.” However, 

the visit on July 8, 2021, was disrupted when mother found a tick in J.P.’s 

ear and the resource parents arrived to take J.P. to see a doctor. M.P. told 

the resource mother that she heard mother say, “and they say I’m a bad 

parent.” M.P. was upset about mother saying “ ‘mean’ ” things about the 

resource parents and appeared to be conflicted about who to “side with.” 

M.P. said that when J.P. asked what the tick looked like, mother showed the 
19

girls pictures of ticks that were “huge, engorged, and attached to a person’s 

skin” and a picture of a cat with “ticks all over its eyes”; M.P. wished mother 

had not shown them the pictures because they scared both minors. 

M.P. said she could not show how she was feeling because “ ‘mommy 

was so upset.’ ” When the resource mother said she could always tell adults

when they were making her feel uncomfortable, M.P. said she could never tell 

her mother that: “ ‘I can’t talk about big feelings at home like I can here. 

That is something I am not going to miss about home.” M.P. said that when 

she has “big feelings” at home, mother gives her a quick hug but does not 

know how to help her, and that mother “ ‘has anger problems.’ ” M.P. asked 

the resource mother to help her “ ‘learn how not to have to be strong for 

mommy or [J.P.].” 

The Agency provided letters from the minors’ therapists in an

addendum report. M.P.’s therapist, after noting that she was not an

evaluator, offered her professional opinion as a trauma specialist that 

adoption would be better for M.P. than legal guardianship. The therapist 

related that M.P. had rarely commented on visits with mother except to say 

they make her sad. M.P. had been disappointed by mother paying more 

attention to J.P. but had feelings of loyalty and missed mother. She appeared 

to fear hurting her mother’s feelings or being rejected by mother if she talked 

about anything good happening in the resource family, felt burdened by 

having to keep herself, her mother, and J.P. in good spirits during visits, and 

wanted to protect mother from feeling bad. The therapist stated, “It is 

notable that this is in sharp contrast to the emotional turmoil she has 

expressed to me and to her resource parents.” Explaining that a child who 

senses a parent will react unfavorably to conflict or distress learns to be 

cheerful and compliant so as not to upset the parent, and to express “big 
20

feelings” with adults the child senses can handle them, the therapist saw 

M.P.’s “episodes of emotional dysregulation” before and after visits with 

mother as indicating “frustration that she could not have the emotional 

support she craves and the answers she desires.” M.P. “now sees her mom as 

someone who is not able to provide the safety that is required for her 

wellbeing” and knows that her resource parents will provide her with more 

emotional support. According to the therapist, M.P. “conveys a peaceful 

resignation that this will be best for her in the long run.” The therapist 

stated that the “tension of waiting, wondering, and worrying” over an 

extended period had been a “tremendous strain” for M.P. and believed legal 

guardianship would “become an untenable state of uncertainty” for her, while 

adoption would remove the uncertainty and allow her to “relax into her 

natural developmental tasks and focus entirely on being a smart, happy kid.” 

J.P.’s therapist stated that J.P. had slowly and steadily developed a 

secure attachment to her resource parents, who, despite tantrums and 

meltdowns, had consistently demonstrated “care, encouragement, and a 

fundamental high regard for [J.P.] (and [M.P.]).” On occasions when J.P. 

brought up the topic of mother two to three times a month, “she is unable to 

talk about any feeling other than sadness.” The therapist opined that “once 

uncertainty about placement was removed—i.e., adoption is finalized—this 

secure attachment and fundamental global trust would only deepen. 

Guardianship would prolong and exacerbate a dormant insecurity about a 

clear and reliable future,” which would be a “certain detriment to [J.P.’s] 

accomplishment of developmental tasks.” 
21

The Section 366.26 Hearing

At the contested hearing, mother asked the court to reconsider its 

ruling on her request for a bonding study, and the court again denied the 

request. 

The parties stipulated that the minors would testify that if they cannot 

live with mother, they want to live with their resource parents; they like the 

idea of adoption because they would not have to “deal with all the foster care 

rules,” but they like the idea of guardianship because “it would be what their 

sisters had”; they would prefer guardianship if it meant they could have more 

time with mother; the visits with mother were good; and, according to M.P.,

the only thing bad about the visits “is when they have to leave.” 

The visitation supervisor testified that at the 24 or 25 visits since 

January 1, the minors and mother were excited to see each other; the girls 

would run to mother, hug her, and say “hey, mommy,” and mother would hug 

them. Mother often told the minors at the beginning of a visit that she loved 

them, and they reciprocated; the minors spontaneously displayed affection, 

such as M.P. randomly holding mother’s hand or J.P. sitting on mother’s lap; 

and the minors snuggled with mother at almost every visit. Mother paid 

close attention to the minors, asked about school and praised the minors 

when they said they were doing well, and was supportive when they told her 

about something fun they had done. They talked about extended family 

members and looked at photographs from their life together. At the end of 

the last visit on September 2, after mother hugged and said “I love you” to 
22

each of the minors, she looked teary-eyed as she walked away but remained 

composed.9

On cross-examination, the visitation supervisor acknowledged he had 

heard some concerns about mother speaking to the minors when they were in 

the bathroom. After the visit when mother found the tick, the resource 

parent told the supervisor that M.P. had a “safe word” to use if she felt 

uncomfortable during visits; the supervisor told M.P. they could do this and 

she told him the word, but she never used it during a visit. 

The social worker testified that even after M.P. began working with the 

wraparound support team she continued to say she missed mother and was 

frustrated with the ambiguity of the situation. In March 2021, the resource 

parent texted the social worker to say M.P. was feeling sad about being away 

from her sisters and mother. In early April 2021, the resource parent 

conveyed concerns that mother told the minors, while in the bathroom during 

a visit, that E.E. was a liar. 

The social worker told the children about the termination of mother’s 

reunification services the day after the hearing, a Friday. On Monday, the 

resource mother called saying M.P. had been yelling at her over the weekend 

and both minors had a hard time going to school that day. The next day, the 

resource parent called again to say J.P. had had a “big breakdown,” crying for 

almost an hour, repeatedly apologizing, and saying “this was all her fault.”

J.P. had previously reported feeling that if she had not talked to the social 

worker who came to her school, she would not be in foster care. J.P.’s 

behaviors escalated, including hitting M.P., and wraparound services were 

9 The visitation notes from January 1, 2021, to September 9, 2021, 

which mother introduced into evidence, are consistent with the supervisor’s 

description. 
23

put in place for her. Subsequently, after a family therapy session with 

mother, the resource parent called the supervisor to say that when the 

minors got home, M.P was sobbing and saying she missed mother and 

wanted to go home. 

The social worker expressed the view, formed in consultation with the 

minors’ therapists, that although the minors said they missed mother and 

wanted to go home, the stress caused by the lack of certainty about the future 

was driving their behaviors. Noting that it was common for children to miss 

their parents and want to go home even in cases of severe neglect and abuse, 

the social worker testified that the minors’ initial upset when reunification 

services were terminated was normal. It was followed by a period of “calm 

and stability,” and the minors were “doing incredibly well now that they have 

some certainty about what their future holds.” 

In closing arguments, the Agency argued against application of the 

beneficial relationship exception to adoption. Mother urged the court to 

apply both that exception and an exception based on sibling bonds. (§ 366.26, 

subd. (c)(1)(b)(v).) Counsel for the minors argued the evidence did not 

support finding that either exception applied, making clear that her position

was contrary to the minors’ preference for a legal guardianship.10

The Court’s Ruling

The court announced its ruling on September 28, 2021. Since the 

parties agreed mother had regularly visited the minors, the court discussed 

the second and third requirements for the beneficial relationship exception, 

expressly taking guidance from the California Supreme Court’s decision in In 

10 Counsel told the court she was “heartbroken” to be arguing against 

the minors’ wishes. Counsel explained that when she told the minors she did 

not think any of the exceptions to adoption apply in this case, “they were both 

sad,” and M.P. said she “would like to speak to the President about that.” 
24

re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.). The court noted that the 

minors, then 10 and 7 years old, had been removed from mother’s care twice 

since 2017, a total of two and a half years that constituted a quarter of M.P.’s 

life and almost half of J.P.’s.11 The court described mother’s visits with the 

minors as “generally positive” and overall demonstrating love and affection. 

It further noted that “[m]other has made some statements and taken some 

actions at visits which do not reflect positively on her parenting ability,” and 

that the minors’ therapists attributed the minors’ “dysregulation” before and 

after visits to their “inability to be themselves with mother, her inability to 

handle big emotions, and the girls feeling responsible for mother’s sadness.” 

The court relied heavily on the therapists’ opinions that the girls’ greatest 

need was permanence and stability. It concluded that mother’s lack of 

insight and inability to accept responsibility for the girls being in foster care, 

despite all the services she had received in the course of the two dependency 

proceedings, had defined her relationship with M.P. and J.P. 

The court also found the sibling exception did not apply, explaining 

that the exception applies only if there is a “demonstrated interference” with 

such relationships and here there was a “strong track record” of the resource 

parents facilitating visits and communication between the minors and their 

older sisters.

The juvenile court terminated both mother and father’s parental rights

and ordered adoption as the permanent plan. 

Mother’s appeal followed.

11 The court’s calculations are not precise. The minors were outside of 

mother’s care for a total of two years and eight months between the two 

dependency cases, which amounted to just under a quarter of M.P.’s life (.25) 

and between a quarter and half of J.P.’s life (.35). 
25

DISCUSSION

I.

The Juvenile Court’s Determination That Mother Failed to

Establish the Beneficial Relationship Exception is Supported

by Substantial Evidence 

As we explained in In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 851–

852 (J.D.), “[t]he sole purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is to select and 

implement a permanent plan for the child after reunification efforts have 

failed. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 304; see also § 366.26, 

subd. (b).) At that stage, ‘the welfare agency’s focus shifts from monitoring 

the parents’ progress toward reunification to determining the appropriate 

placement plan for the child.’ (In re Marilyn H., at p. 305.) The dependency 

statutes embody a presumptive rule that, after reunification efforts have 

failed, parental rights must be terminated in order to free a child for 

adoption. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 630–631.)” The statutes, 

however, provide an exception where “ ‘[t]he court finds a compelling reason 

for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one 

or more of the following circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained 

regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from 

continuing the relationship.’ (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)” (Caden C., at 

p. 631.) “[I]n assessing whether termination would be detrimental, the trial 

court must decide whether the harm from severing the child’s relationship 

with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of placement in a new 

adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 632.) Throughout the analysis, “the focus is on the 

best interests of the child.” (Ibid.)

“As summarized in Caden C., ‘the parent asserting the parental benefit 

exception must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, three things. The 

parent must show regular visitation and contact with the child, taking into 
26

account the extent of visitation permitted. Moreover, the parent must show 

that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the 

parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from 

continuing the relationship. And the parent must show that terminating 

that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced 

against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home. When the parent 

has met that burden, the parental-benefit exception applies such that it 

would not be in the best interest of the child to terminate parental rights, and 

the court should select a permanent plan other than adoption.’ ” (J.D., 

supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 852, quoting Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

pp. 636–637.)

On appeal, we review the juvenile court’s decision on the first two 

elements—whether the parent “has visited and maintained contact with the 

child consistently” and whether “the relationship is such that the child would 

benefit from continuing it”—for substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra,

11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) In so doing, we follow the guiding principle that 

“a reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility 

of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ (In re Dakota H. (2005) 

132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) The determinations should ‘be upheld if . . .

supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the 

contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a different result 

had it believed other evidence.’ (Ibid.; see also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th 

ed. 2020) Appeal, § 365.)” (Caden C., at p. 640.)

On the third element, we review the determination whether 

termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child for abuse of 

discretion. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) “A court abuses its 

discretion only when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal 
27

discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd 

determination.’ ” ’ ([In re] Stephanie M. [(1994)] 7 Cal.4th [295,] 318.) But 

‘ “ ‘[w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, 

the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the 

trial court.’ ” ’ (Id. at p. 319; see also [In re] Robert L. [(1993)] 21 Cal.App.4th 

[1057,] 1067 [‘The reviewing court should interfere only “ ‘if . . . under all the 

evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court’s action, no judge 

could reasonably have made the order that he [or she] did’ ” ’].)” (Caden C., at 

p. 641.)

There is no dispute in the present case that mother satisfied the first of 

the three elements by virtue of her consistent visitation. Mother argues that 

it is unclear whether the juvenile court found she established the second 

element (that the minors had a substantial, positive emotional attachment to 

her). She maintains that reversal is required because the court considered 

improper factors in analyzing that question, which then affected the court’s 

consideration of the third element (whether termination of her parental 

rights would be detrimental to the minors). The Agency views the court’s 

conclusion that minors’ relationship with mother was “loving and 

affectionate” as an implicit determination that mother satisfied the second 

element of the exception and argues the court did not abuse its discretion in 

finding termination of parental rights would be detrimental. 

The Court’s Reference to “Parenting Ability” Did Not Undermine

its Analysis

Mother argues the court juvenile court erred by improperly relying on 

evidence that she did not act as a “parent” to the minors. She points to the

court’s comment that she made statements and took actions that reflected 

negatively on her “parenting ability,” as well as county counsel’s argument 

that mother did not have a “parent-child” relationship with the minors 
28

because the minors could not express all their emotions to her, and minors’ 

counsel’s argument that mother had an opportunity to “parent these 

children,” “do the good parent thing” and “be a parent to these kids” but fell 

short.12

Caden C. made clear that a parent’s ability to provide day-to-day care 

for her children is not required for application of the beneficial relationship 

analysis, nor is the focus of the exception on “some narrow view of what a 

parent-child relationship should look like.” (In re D.M. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 

261, 270.) The exception “can apply even when a child has bonded to an 

alternative caretaker,” and the parent seeking to establish the exception is 

“not required to prove that [the child’s] attachment to her was [the child’s]

primary bond.” (J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 859.) 

A juvenile court’s reference to concepts such as “parental role” or 

“parenting ability,” however, is not improper where the context or court’s 

explanation demonstrates the court was not basing its decision on factors 

Caden C. found inappropriate. (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 

12 Minors’ counsel’s comments were in reference to the incident when 

mother found the tick on J.P. Counsel argued that this incident “highlighted 

the fact that this is not the case of the parent-child bond,” as mother “had the 

opportunity to parent these children. She had the opportunity to show an 

emotional connection to them and do the good parent thing and make her 

kids feel better in a scary situation and instead she did the opposite” by 

showing them pictures of engorged ticks. Acknowledging that this was “one

visit,” counsel continued, “but it was the exact opportunity to be the parent to 

these kids and she fell short.” Counsel believed the children could not trust 

mother to handle their emotions or physical safety, and argued, “I wish this 

was the type of bond that the law describes because I know these girls want 

to have a relationship with their mom and I know that they love her so much; 

but I thought the statements from the girls in the [section 366.]26 report 

were incredibly insightful about their own emotional needs and who they look 

[to] for comfort, and I don’t think the court can make the findings necessary 

under the parent-child bond.” 
29

319 (Katherine J.).) In Katherine J., the juvenile court concluded the father 

had “ ‘not occupied a significant parental role’ ” because his “unresolved 

issues with substance abuse and violence had consistently destabilized 

Katherine’s life for years, fatally compromising father’s attempts to maintain 

a strong, positive emotional attachment with her.” (Katherine J., at pp. 319–

320.) Despite pleasant visits with the child, the father’s conduct on certain 

occasions demonstrated not only that he could not regain custody but that his 

conduct “traumatized” the child and “significantly impact[ed] the quality of 

the relationship with her father.” (Id. at pp. 320–321.)

As we observed in J.D., “Caden C. did not address whether, to satisfy 

the second element, the nature of a parent’s relationship must be ‘parental,’ a 

descriptor the Supreme Court did not use and that, standing alone, is vague 

and unhelpful in this context. Caden C. said only that the child must have a 

‘substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of 

attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing the 

relationship.’ ” (J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 864, quoting Caden 

C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) “ ‘[T]he words “parental role,” standing 

alone, can have several different meanings,’ ranging from ‘the person whom 

the child regards as his or her parent,’ the person who demonstrates the 

‘nurturing, supportive, and guiding’ characteristics traditionally associated 

with ‘good’ parenting, or ‘giving parental care’ through such activities as 

‘changing diapers, providing toys and food, and helping with homework.’ ” 

(Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 319, quoting In re L.A.-O. (2021)

73 Cal.App.5th 197, 210.) Katherine J. pointed out that “problems arise 

when juvenile courts use the phrase ‘parental role’ without explaining which 

meaning(s) they impart to it” because “each of these definitions may be useful 
30

as factors to determine the strength of a parent’s relationship with their child

[but] none is dispositive on its own.” (Katherine J., at p. 319.)

Mother relies heavily on our opinion in J.D., arguing that we found 

problematic the same language and analysis she challenges here. Unlike this 

case, however, the juvenile court’s decision in J.D. preceded Caden C. The

attorneys’ arguments “alluded to factors deemed irrelevant in Caden C.” and 

the court’s comments indicated it was “swayed, at least in part, by such 

considerations.” (J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 863–864.) We reversed 

because the juvenile court’s finding on the second element of the beneficial 

relationship exception—that the mother’s relationship with J.D. “did not 

‘amount to a parental bond’ ”—was conclusory, leaving us unable to “be 

certain the juvenile court did not rely on improper factors in assessing this 

element.” (Id. at p. 863.) Similarly, in In re L.A.-O., the juvenile court’s 

“terse” ruling stated that the parents “ ‘ha[d] not acted in a parental role in a 

long time’ and the prospective adoptive parents ‘ha[d] been acting in a 

parental role.’ ” (In re L.A.-O., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 211.) The 

reviewing court could not determine whether the juvenile court used 

“parental role” to mean the child “had a substantial, positive, emotional 

attachment to the prospective adoptive parents but not to the parents,” which 

“would be legally correct” under Caden C., or to mean the parents “were not 

capable of taking custody, or had not been good parents, or had not been 

providing necessary parental care,” which would be erroneous under Caden 

C. (In re L.A.-O., at pp. 202, 211–212.) In D.M., another pre-Caden case 

mother cites, the juvenile court’s remarks demonstrated its error: The court 

found that the father had not “risen to the level of a parent” because he did 

not know his children’s medical needs and had not attended, or asked to 

attend, medical or dental appointments, without any reference to attachment 
31

between the father and children. (D.M., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 268, 

270.) 

Here, the juvenile court explained its reasoning at length, beginning 

with its understanding that Caden C. required the focus of the analysis to be 

on the child and reference to the factors Caden C. noted might shape the 

parent-child relationship, including age of the child, portion of the child’s life 

spent in parental custody, positive or negative effect of parent-child 

interaction, particular needs of the child, and “how children feel about, 

interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.” (Caden C., supra,

11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The court found that visits between mother and the 

minors were mostly positive, but the girls showed dysregulation before and 

after visits which their therapists attributed to the girls’ “inability to be 

themselves with mother, her inability to handle big emotions, and the girls 

feeling responsible for mother’s sadness.” The court then stated, “[m]other 

has made some statements and taken some actions at visits which do not 

reflect positively on her parenting ability, but overall, there is love and 

affection.” 

Read in context, the court’s brief reference to “parenting ability” 

appears to be no more than an acknowledgment that the visits, while largely 

positive and affectionate, were not perfect. The court’s subsequent remarks 

make clear that it considered mother’s inability to address the impact of her 

own statements and conduct on the children as critical to the determination 

whether the children had a “substantial, positive, emotional attachment” to 

mother that benefitted the children. The court discussed M.P.’s conflicted 

relationship with mother, noting that she yearned for emotional support from 

mother but did not receive it. The court stated that M.P. was “unable to be 

herself or express herself with mother” because “[s]he feels responsible for 
32

mother’s emotional health,” noting that although “[J.P.] has been less 

expressive . . . the information is consistent.” The court’s passing reference to 

mother’s “parenting ability” did not obviate its otherwise proper analysis.

The Court Did Not Improperly Rely on Mother’s Failure to Address

Case Issues

After finding that mother “has little to no insight into the reasons 

behind the case” and had “done little to accept responsibility,” the court 

stated: 

“The lack of insight helps define the relationship and although not

controlling is relevant to the issue of detriment. The case was opened in

2017, more than four years ago. Given that mother has a lack of insight into 

why the girls were removed from her care despite all of the effort and services 

and contested hearings, she is unlikely to ever accept responsibility or accept 

the need for removal. Creating a guardianship only provides the vehicle for 

mother to continue fostering these feelings, to believe she was wronged, that 

the older girls lied, and to keep the girls in a state of perpetual tug of war, 

which both therapists have warned is untenable for the girls.” 

Mother argues that the court’s remarks demonstrate that it improperly

relied on her failure to address a case issue as a bar to application of the 

beneficial relationship exception in contravention of Caden C., which held 

that “[a] parent’s continued struggles with the issues leading to dependency 

are not a categorical bar to applying the exception” and “may not be used as a 

basis for determining the fate of the parental relationship by assigning 

blame, making moral judgments about the fitness of the parent, or rewarding 

or punishing a parent.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 637–638.) But 

Caden C. also explained that “[i]ssues such as those that led to the 

dependency often prove relevant to the application of the exception”: “A

parent’s struggles may mean that interaction between parent and child at 
33

least sometimes has a ‘ “negative” effect’ on the child,” ’ ” while “a parent who 

gains greater understanding of herself and her children’s needs through 

treatment may be in a better position to ensure that her interactions with the 

children have a ‘ “positive” . . . effect’ on them.” (Ibid.) Caden C. did not 

preclude consideration of a parent’s failure to overcome case issues; it 

cautioned that “the parent’s struggles with issues such as those that led to 

dependency are relevant only to the extent they inform the specific questions 

before the court: would the child benefit from continuing the relationship 

and be harmed, on balance, by losing it?” (Ibid.)

The juvenile court’s reasoning was consistent with Caden C. The court 

explained that mother’s failure to accept responsibility for placing the minors 

at risk of sexual abuse and her inability to recognize and prioritize her 

children’s needs negatively affected her bond with the minors, resulting in 

the minors being unable to reveal their true emotions to mother and “feel[ing] 

responsible for mother’s sadness and for the breakup of the family.” 

Mother argues that the court did not find that her failure to address 

these issues affected the quality of her visits with the minors, which she 

acknowledges would have been a proper consideration. (Caden C., supra,

11 Cal.5th at p. 642.) She emphasizes that mother’s visits with the children 

were loving and affectionate but ignores “other evidence the juvenile court 

was entitled to credit that paint a much more complex picture.” (In re Eli B. 

(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1073.) Here, the juvenile court’s concerns about 

mother’s lack of insight and failure to take responsibility are reflected in 

incidents which occurred during visitation. For example, after finding a tick 

on J.P. during a visit, mother said “and they say I’m not a good mother” in 

front of the children. Mother’s inability to consider the effect of her 

comments on the children caused M.P. to experience anxiety and a feeling of 
34

divided loyalty when she perceived mother to be saying “mean” things about 

the resource parents. At another visit, mother told the minors that E.E. lied 

about the sexual abuse, her lack of insight and denial serving to undermine

the minors’ relationship with their sister. 

In short, we understand the court’s remarks as identifying why 

mother’s lack of insight and failure to accept responsibility had been 

detrimental to the minors during the dependency and would continue, facts 

that are important to determine the nature of the parent-child bond.

The Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion

Mother argues that the juvenile court disregarded the minors’ 

expressed wishes, concluding the minors did not really mean or understand 

what they were saying. She points out that M.P. was only one year short of 

the age at which she could legally object to adoption (§ 366.26, 

subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii) [exception to termination of parental rights where 

termination would be detrimental because “child 12 years of age or older 

objects to termination of parental rights”]) and the court was obligated to 

consider J.P.’s wishes as well (§ 366.26, subd. (h)(1) [“[a]t all proceedings 

under this section, the court shall consider the wishes of the child and shall 

act in the best interests of the child”]). 

The record demonstrates that the juvenile court did not ignore or 

minimize the minors’ expressed wishes: It expressly acknowledged them but 

found them outweighed by the minors’ need for permanency. The record also 

reflects that notwithstanding the minors’ statements that they wanted to be 

with mother and would prefer a guardianship if it allowed them more time 

with her, their feelings were ambivalent. As documented in the Agency’s 

reports, the minors were sad about not being with mother but also excited at 

the prospect of adoption. For example, the Agency’s September 2021 
35

addendum report describes M.P., at a gathering of the resource parents’ 

extended family, telling one family member after another that the resource 

parents might adopt her and J.P., “smiling from ear to ear” and happily 

receiving hugs and positive reactions to the news. The therapists’ opinions 

that the minors needed the permanency of adoption, which were supported by 

the minors’ CASA and their attorney, supported the court’s conclusion. The 

court was required to consider not just the minors’ wishes but their best 

interests. (§ 366.26, subd. (h).)

Mother stresses that because the resource parents were willing to 

accept a legal guardianship, an order of legal guardianship would not have 

jeopardized the minors’ placement. To the extent she is suggesting this 

willingness—which was expressed as a fallback to the resource parents 

clearly stated preference for adoption—should have caused the court to order 

legal guardianship, she is mistaken. As we have said, when reunification 

efforts fail, “adoption is the first choice” and the “exceptions to the general 

rule that the court must choose adoption where possible” must be considered 

in light of this legislative preference. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45,

53, italics omitted.) 

Where, as here, “a relationship involves tangled benefits and burdens.”

“[T]he court faces the complex task of disentangling the consequences of 

removing those burdens along with the benefits of the relationship.” (Caden 

C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) Ultimately, the juvenile court concluded that 

even though mother and the minors deeply loved each other, it could not find 

that the harm of terminating mother’s parental rights outweighed “the 

security and sense of belonging a new family would confer.” (In re Autumn H. 

(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 577 [“court balances the strength and quality of 

the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the 
36

security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer”].) The 

juvenile court understood that its task was to balance the benefit of the 

parent-child relationship to the minors, and detriment to them from losing it, 

against the benefit of an adoptive home. The court recognized its decision 

would cause pain but citing M.P.’s comment related by her therapist, 

concluded adoption would be for the best in the long run. 

The beneficial relationship exception, like the other circumstances 

specified in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B), “ ‘merely permit the court, in 

exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm, 

which remains adoption.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631, quoting 

In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.) It is the parent’s burden to 

establish the exception. (Caden C., at p. 631; J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 861.) Mother’s argument that the court erred is built on her assertion that 

it considered improper factors in evaluating the nature of her parental 

relationship with the children. It did not, and we have no basis to conclude it 

abused its discretion.

II.

The Court Did Not Err in Denying Mother’s Request 

for a Bonding Study

Mother next contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in 

denying her request for a bonding study at the section 366.26 hearing. As 

mother acknowledges, a trial court’s decision whether to order a bonding 

study is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 

Cal.App.4th 1330, 1341.) “The applicable standard of review is whether, 

under all the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the juvenile court’s 

action, the juvenile court could have reasonably refrained from ordering a

bonding study.” (Ibid.) It is appellant’s burden to demonstrate that the 

juvenile court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently 
37

absurd manner that resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (In re M.V. (2014) 

225 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1506.)

As earlier noted, mother’s initial request for a bonding study was 

denied at the 12-month review hearing, when the court terminated 

reunification services. Explaining its denial of the request, the court stated, 

“I don’t think there’s any question that mother desperately loves her girls 

and that the girls really love their mother, that is just not the issue here. As 

I’ve articulated [in terminating services], it’s just that the risk to the girls is 

too great and the progress by mother too little to have that take precedence 

over their safety and permanency.” The court felt it had sufficient 

information about the bond between mother and the girls and it was 

concerned about the pressure a bonding study would put on the minors, 

especially M.P. 

Mother’s brief for the contested section 366.26 hearing argued that the 

record was replete with evidence of the minors’ bond with mother and desire 

to be with her, and that the Agency’s report did not properly present the 

minors’ point of view because it lacked any expert or professional opinion 

about the importance of the relationship to the children or analysis of 

whether they would be harmed by severing it. Mother pointed to the footnote 

in Caden C., which was decided a month after the 12-month hearing, 

recommending consideration of bonding studies on the question of potential 

harm to a child in severing the parental relationship, and argued such 

information was lacking here due to the denial of the request for a bonding 

study. 

A week before the section 366.26 hearing, the Agency filed its response 

to mother’s brief and an addendum report that included letters from the 

minors’ therapists. 
38

At the section 366.26 hearing, mother asked the court to reconsider her 

request for a bonding study. The court declined, explaining that it had 

letters from both minors’ therapists, who had explored with the minors the 

nature and extent of their relationship with mother, and felt it had a “good 

understanding” of the nature of the bond and effect the court’s ruling would 

have on the minors. The court further stated, “I have also heard very loudly 

from the therapists that these girls are in need of some finality and that 

ongoing hearings, et cetera, create anxiety and that it would be detrimental 

to them to initiate yet further proceedings.” 

Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her 

request for a bonding study for several reasons: (1) Caden C.’s emphasis on 

the importance of bonding studies; (2) the minors’ therapists were not 

bonding experts, and had not meaningfully observed mother with the 

children; and (3) the Agency’s late filing of the Addendum report containing

the therapists’ letters “in essence ambushed [mother] and her counsel, 

providing no recourse for [mother] to counter this evidence submitted by the 

Agency.” 

Mother’s suggestion that she was “ambushed” by the late submission of 

the therapists’ letters to the court is belied by the record. The Agency’s 

report was filed seven days before the section 366.26 hearing. At the hearing, 

mother’s counsel told the court she was entitled to have the Agency’s filing 10 

days before a trial and stated, “I know that I do have the right to ask to delay 

today’s hearing, but because I have had a chance to investigate and consider 

what has been presented, I am not going to do that.” Mother thus waived her 

objection to the timeliness of the report.

Turning to the merits, a bonding study is not required as a condition 

precedent to terminating parental rights. (In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 
39

Cal.App.4th at p. 1339.) Caden C. observed that such studies can provide

important information about the psychological importance of the parent-child 

relationship for the child but did not require them: “Trial courts should 

seriously consider, where requested and appropriate, allowing for a bonding

study or other relevant expert testimony.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 633, fn. 4, italics added.) In J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at page 862, which 

mother also cites as emphasizing the importance of bonding studies, we 

observed that “a bonding study or other expert opinion” is “ ‘an important 

source of information’ (Caden C., at p. 633)” but “not required as a matter of 

law,” and that other evidence in the record can be sufficient to provide the 

necessary information “even in the absence of professional opinion.” In the 

present case, the trial court concluded it had sufficient information, including 

relevant expert opinion, and ordering a bonding study was not appropriate 

because of the delay it would require and pressure it would put on the 

minors. 

The court here had the opinions of therapists who, although not 

bonding experts, had been working with the minors in therapy for 

approximately 18 months and were able to provide professional insight into 

the minors’ feelings about their relationships with mother. As the same 

judge had presided over this case from the inception of the first dependency, 

the court also had deep familiarity with and extensive information about the 

family from the Agency’s reports, hearings, and the input of the minors’ 

counsel and CASA. The court’s reluctance to delay the permanent plan 

hearing to obtain a bonding study was supported by the therapists’ strong

emphasis on the emotional toll prolonged uncertainty about the future was 

taking on the minors. The court’s concern about the pressure a bonding 

study would put on the minors was supported by evidence that the minors 
40

felt responsible for mother’s sadness and for the dependency itself; the court 

was entitled to infer that the minors would feel mother’s wellbeing depended 

on them proving their love for her.

13 The court expressly recognized that the 

minors and mother loved each other deeply and termination of parental 

rights would be painful for the minors as well as for mother. Based on the 

totality of the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court’s 

denial of mother’s request for a bonding study an abuse of discretion.

III.

The Juvenile Court’s Determination that Mother Failed to

Establish the Sibling Relationship Exception is Supported 

by Substantial Evidence 

Mother also contends the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the 

sibling relationship exception to adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) 

Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v) provides that the court shall not 

terminate parental rights if it finds that termination would be detrimental to 

the child because “[t]here would be substantial interference with a child’s 

sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the 

relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with 

a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common 

experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and 

whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s 

13 When mother first requested a bonding study at the 12-month review 

in April 2021, minors’ counsel expressed concern that if the court terminated 

reunification services and ordered a bonding study, “for [the minors] it will 

feel like a four-month period of trying to prove to everybody how much they 

love their mother. . . . I can’t say it would be torture, but I think it would be 

close to it.” Counsel felt it would be different if the minors were younger and 

did not understand the purpose of having another person observe them, but 

the minors were old enough to understand “what this would be about.” 
41

long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of permanence 

through adoption.”

“Under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v), the juvenile court ‘is 

directed first to determine whether terminating parental rights would 

substantially interfere with the sibling relationship. . . .’ [Citations.] ‘If the 

court determines terminating parental rights would substantially interfere 

with the sibling relationship, the court is then directed to weigh the child’s 

best interest in continuing that sibling relationship against the benefit the 

child would receive by the permanency of adoption.’ ” (In re D.O. (2016) 247 

Cal.App.4th 166, 173–174 (D.O.), quoting In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 

942, 951–952.) “ ‘[U]nlike the parent-child relationship, sibling relationships 

enjoy legal recognition after termination of parental rights.’ (In re S.B.

[(2008)] 164 Cal.App.4th [289,] 300.) Thus, it is not a foregone conclusion 

that terminating parental rights will substantially interfere with a sibling 

relationship, and the juvenile court must make this factual determination.” 

(D.O., at p. 175, fn. omitted.)

In finding the sibling relationship exception inapplicable, the juvenile 

court here cited the “strong track record” of facilitating visitation between the 

minors and their older sisters. The court noted that the older sisters’ 

guardians had known the minors “almost the girls’ whole lives” and had a 

“long standing relationship with them,” and that the siblings lived in close 

proximity to the minors, the girls saw each other “frequently and regularly,” 

and “[t]hat has not changed over the years of this dependency.” 

In D.O., the juvenile court found the sibling relationship exception did 

not apply because there was a “proven track record of facilitating visits” and 

no evidence there would be any interference with the sibling bond. (D.O.,

supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 169, 172, 176.) D.O. affirmed, noting that the 
42

juvenile court did not rely solely on “unsupported assurances from the 

caregivers that they would allow future visits” but also on the “proven track 

record” and the caregiver’s commitment to also take in D.O.’s mother’s new 

baby. 

Mother concedes the minors’ resource parents had ensured sibling 

contact in the past and would likely continue to do so in the future. She 

contends, however, that if the court had considered the “other factors” set 

forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v), it would have found the 

sibling relationship “was indeed facing interference.” Specifically, mother

addresses the statutory directive to consider “the child’s long-term emotional 

interest,” arguing that it will be devastating to the minors if their older 

sisters reestablish relationships with mother and are “still a family” from 

which minors would be excluded if they are adopted rather than placed in a 

guardianship.14

This argument, to a great extent, inappropriately focuses on the 

potential for the minors to have contact with mother in the future. The basis 

of the sibling relationship exception to adoption is interference with the bond 

between the minor to be adopted and his siblings. (In re Celine R., supra, 31 

Cal.4th at p. 54.)

14 Mother mentions but does not discuss the other factors enumerated 

in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v)—whether the child was raised in 

the same home, shared significant common experiences, or has existing close 

and strong bonds with the sibling. These factors pertain to the nature and 

extent of the sibling relationship, which in the present case was indisputably 

strong. While the juvenile court did not specifically address these factors, it 

is apparent that its analysis was premised on the existence of a strong bond 

that was important to continue and appropriately focused on whether 

termination of mother’s parental rights would interfere with that bond.
43

This argument is also highly speculative. There is no evidence in the

record to support mother’s suggestion that her older daughters will 

“inevitably” rekindle their relationship with her and discuss their visits and 

contact with the minors. Mother notes that “at least one of the older minors 

was open to visitation with [her] during the case,” but her citation to the 

record is to a September 2018 status review report in the first dependency 

case, after the minors and N.E. had been returned to mother’s care. The 

report, which recommends termination of reunification services regarding 

E.E., mentions that “despite having had more contact with her daughter in 

recent weeks, including an in-person visit together with [E.E.] and her 

sisters,” mother had been unable to address the harm father caused and 

provide E.E. emotional support. This reference to a visit several years ago, 

during the first dependency case, offers little basis for an assumption that 

mother, E.E. and N.E. in the future will “still be a family” from which M.P. 

and J.P. will be excluded.15 The future events mother anticipates may come 

to pass; they may not. Meanwhile, the record resoundingly demonstrates the 

minors’ need for certainty and permanence. 

It was mother’s burden to establish termination of her parental rights 

would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, not the Agency’s 

burden to prove it would not. (D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 176.) The 

evidence demonstrated the sibling relationship would not be disrupted: The 

resource parents had consistently facilitated frequent visits and other contact 

15 As far as we are aware, the only other evidence of contact between 

mother and her older daughters was mother’s testimony at the 12-month 

review hearing, when asked how she thought the sexual abuse had affected 

them, that she spoke or texted with E.E. and “sometimes she tells me how 

she feels, but we never talk about that subject.” Mother said she knew 

“absolutely nothing” about N.E. “since they took her away” because they do 

not speak. Mother said she did not see either of the older girls. 
44

between the sisters and expressed commitment to continuing to do so; the 

older sisters’ guardians lived nearby, had known M.P. and J.P. most of their 

lives and had close relationships with them; and the resource parents 

considered the older sisters’ guardians “extended family” and a consistent 

support. (See In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 254 [evidence that 

social worker identified adoptive homes that would allow sibling contact and 

wanted to place child in such a home demonstrated relationship with sibling 

would not be disrupted].) Conversely, “selection of a lesser preferred 

permanency plan would not further the children’s interests in maintaining 

their relationships with [their siblings], nor would it provide them with the 

security and sense of belonging conferred by adoption.” (In re Valerie A.

(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014.) Indeed, “the only manner in which the 

court could serve both of [the minors’] interests was to free [them] for 

adoption, because [they] would gain the stability of a permanent home and 

maintain [their] relationship with [E.E. and N.E.].” (In re Megan S., at 

p. 254.)

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed. 
45

_________________________

Mayfield, J.*

We concur:

_________________________

Stewart, Acting P.J.

_________________________

Miller, J.

In re M.P. (A163678)

* Judge of the Mendocino Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice 

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.