Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

CASE STUDIES IN INSURGENCY 

AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE—

SRI LANKA (1976–2009)

United States Army Special Operations Command

Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

CASE STUDIES IN INSURGENCY 

AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE—

SRI LANKA (1976–2009)

Paul J. Tompkins Jr., USASOC Project Lead

Guillermo Pinczuk, Editor

Guillermo Pinczuk, Mike Deane, and Jesse Kirkpatrick, 

Contributing Authors

United States Army Special Operations Command

and

The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

National Security Analysis Department
This publication is a work of the United States Government in 

accordance with Title 17, United States Code, sections 101 and 105.

Published by:

The United States Army Special Operations Command

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the 

United States government. Nonmateriel research on special warfare is 

performed in support of the requirements stated by the United States 

Army Special Operations Command, Department of the Army. This 

research is accomplished at The Johns Hopkins University Applied 

Physics Laboratory by the National Security Analysis Department, 

a nongovernmental agency operating under the supervision of the 

USASOC Special Programs Division, Department of the Army.

The analysis and the opinions expressed within this document are 

solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions 

of the US Army or The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics 

Laboratory.

Comments correcting errors of fact and opinion, filling or 

indicating gaps of information, and suggesting other changes that may 

be appropriate should be addressed to:

United States Army Special Operations Command

G-3X, Special Programs Division

2929 Desert Storm Drive

Fort Bragg, NC 28310

All ARIS products are available from USASOC at www.soc.mil 

under the ARIS link.
ASSESSING REVOLUTIONARY AND 

INSURGENT STRATEGIES

The Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) series 

consists of a set of case studies and research conducted for the US Army 

Special Operations Command by the National Security Analysis Department of The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

The purpose of the ARIS series is to produce a collection of academically rigorous yet operationally relevant research materials to 

develop and illustrate a common understanding of insurgency and 

revolution. This research, intended to form a bedrock body of knowledge for members of the Special Forces, will allow users to distill vast 

amounts of material from a wide array of campaigns and extract relevant lessons, thereby enabling the development of future doctrine, 

professional education, and training.

From its inception, ARIS has been focused on exploring historical and current revolutions and insurgencies for the purpose of identifying emerging trends in operational designs and patterns. ARIS 

encompasses research and studies on the general characteristics of 

revolutionary movements and insurgencies and examines unique 

adaptations by specific organizations or groups to overcome various 

environmental and contextual challenges.

The ARIS series follows in the tradition of research conducted by 

the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of American University in the 1950s and 1960s, by adding new research to that body of 

work and in several instances releasing updated editions of original 

SORO studies.

VOLUMES IN THE ARIS SERIES

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume I: 1927–1962 (Rev. Ed.)

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009

Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (2nd Ed.)

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (2nd Ed.)

Irregular Warfare Annotated Bibliography

Legal Implications of the Status of Persons in Resistance

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia (1964–2009)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka (1976–2009)

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II (pub. 1961)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Cuba 1953–1959 (pub. 1963)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Guatemala 1944–1954 (pub. 1964)

SORO STUDIES

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Vietnam 1941–1954 (pub. 1964)

v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors acknowledge the following sources of illustrations 

included in this study:

Unless otherwise indicated below, map images were derived from 

Map Resources © 2014, Map Resources, Lambertville, NJ 08530, 

www.mapresources.com.

Figure  2-4. Wet and dry zones. Map image from Map Resources 

with modifications based on http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/sri_lanka/

lk02_01b.pdf, via Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Sri_

Lanka_Precipitation_and_Irrigation_map.png.

Figure 2-5. Sri Lankan ethnic distribution. Map image from Map 

Resources with modifications based on CIA, 1976, http://www.lib.

utexas.edu/maps/islands_oceans_poles/sri_lanka_charts_76.jpg.

Figure  3-1. Sri Lankan districts, with the boundaries for Tamil 

Eelam in red. Map image from Map Resources with modifications 

based on “Districts of Sri Lanka,” via Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.

org/wiki/Districts_of_Sri_Lanka.

Figure  3-3. Estimated fatalities from 1984 to 2009. Data from 

Uppsala Conflict Data Program, http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/

gpcountry.php?id=144®ionSelect=6-Central_and_Southern_Asia#.

Figure  4-1. Official population estimates, 1960–2011. Population 

data from the World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/

SP.POP.TOTL?page=6.

Figure 4-2. Percentage of population by ethnicity for Sri Lankan 

census years. Adapted from Table 3.2, Economic and Social Statistics 

of Sri Lanka 2010, Statistics Department, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 

www.cbsl.gov.1k.

Figure 4-3. Sri Lankan ethnic distribution. Map image from Map 

Resources with modifications based on CIA, 1976, http://www.lib.

utexas.edu/maps/islands_oceans_poles/sri_lanka_charts_76.jpg.

Figure 4-4. Distribution of Hinduism in Sri Lanka. Map image from 

Map Resources with modifications based on Sadalmelik, Wikipedia, 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hinduism_in_Sri_Lanka.

Figure 6-1. JVP organization. Based on information found in C. A. 

Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror, The JVP Insurrection 1987–

1989 (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Lake House Bookshop, 1991), 16–17.

Figure 6-1. JVP organization. Data from the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 

to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.
vi

Figure 6-4. JVP attack types. Data from the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 

to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

Figure 6-5. JVP incidents over time. Data from the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 

Responses to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

Figure 7-1. The flag of Tamil Eelam. By Mugilan (Own work) 

[CC0], via Wikimedia Commons, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/

File:Flag_of_Tamil_Eelam.svg.

Figure 7-4. LTTE attack types. Data from the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 

to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

Figure 7-6. LTTE target types. Data from the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 

to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

Figure  7-7. LTTE incidents over time. Data from the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 

Responses to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

Figure  7-8. A LTTE Sea Tiger fast attack fiberglass boat. Photo 

taken by Isak Berntsen, in Mullaitivu, Sri  Lanka, 2003, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:LTTE_Sea_Tigers_attack_vessel_by_

sunken_SL_freighter.JPG.

Figure 8-1. Greater Tamil Nadu. By Research Division, Tamil Nadu 

Liberation Front.
vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ....................................................................... v

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY ............................1

Background.........................................................................................3

Purpose of the Case Study .................................................................4

Organization of the Study..................................................................4

Summary of the Study ........................................................................5

Timeline ........................................................................................10

PART I. CONTEXT AND CATALYSTS OF THE INSURGENCY... 15

CHAPTER 2. PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT...................................... 17

The General Importance of Physical Environment........................25

The Importance of Physical Environment in Sri Lanka.................25

The Geography of Insurgency .........................................................33

CHAPTER 3. HISTORICAL CONTEXT...........................................39

Precolonial History ...........................................................................41

Colonial History................................................................................42

The Road to Independence, 1931–1948 ......................................46

Post-Independence History, 1948–1972...........................................50

1948–1956......................................................................................50

1956–1972......................................................................................54

Emergence of Violence, 1972–1983..............................................57

International Context.......................................................................63

Precolonial India...........................................................................64

China .............................................................................................67

European Colonialism..................................................................69

Ceylon During World War II........................................................71

Independence and Regional Politics ...........................................74

Indian Security Perceptions......................................................... 74

Russia/Soviet Union ..................................................................... 76

People’s Republic of China........................................................... 79

Ceylon/Sri Lankan Foreign Policy and Foreign Relations.........81

Phases of Conflict .............................................................................84

JVP: 1971 Insurrection .................................................................84

JVP: 1987–1989 Insurrection........................................................85

LTTE: First Eelam War, 1983–1987..............................................86

LTTE: Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, 1987–1990.............................88

LTTE: Second Eelam War, 1990–1995 ........................................90

LTTE: Third Eelam War, 1995–2002...........................................91

Norwegian Peace Initiative, 2002–2006.......................................95
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Table of Contents

Fourth Eelam War, 2006–2009 ....................................................97

Wartime Casualties.......................................................................98

CHAPTER 4. SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS ......................... 107

Demographics: Ethnicity ................................................................109

Demographics: Religion and Language........................................112

Theories of Violence in Sri Lanka ................................................. 115

Sinhalese Mytho-history .................................................................121

Tamil Mytho-history .......................................................................127

Caste Differences among Tamils and Sinhalese ...........................128

Tamil and Sinhalese Economic Concerns.....................................131

CHAPTER 5. GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS ............................ 143

CONCLUSION TO PART I............................................................... 163

PART II. STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS 

OF THE INSURGENCY.................................................... 167

CHAPTER 6. JANATHA VIMUKTHI PERAMUNA (JVP)............ 169

Timeline .......................................................................................... 171

Components of the Insurgency...................................................... 172

Underground .............................................................................. 172

Armed Component..................................................................... 176

Auxiliary ...................................................................................... 177

Public Component......................................................................180

Leadership....................................................................................... 181

Ideology ...........................................................................................182

Legitimacy .......................................................................................187

Motivation and Behavior ................................................................188

Operations.......................................................................................190

Paramilitary.................................................................................190

Administrative.............................................................................195

Psychological ...............................................................................197

Political........................................................................................202

External Actors and Transnational Influences.............................204

Finances and Armaments...............................................................205

Armaments..................................................................................205

Finances.......................................................................................206

CHAPTER 7. LIBERATION TIGERS 

OF TAMIL EELAM (LTTE) ............................................. 213

Timeline ..........................................................................................215

Origins of the LTTE and the Tamil Militant Movement.............. 216

Components of the Insurgency......................................................218

Command and Control ..............................................................218
Table of Contents

ix

Underground ..............................................................................220

Auxiliary ......................................................................................221

Armed Component.....................................................................222

LTTE Ground Forces: The Tigers..............................................222

LTTE Naval Forces: The Sea Tigers...........................................223

LTTE Air Forces: The Air Tigers ...............................................224

LTTE Special Forces: The Black Tigers.....................................224

LTTE Personnel Totals...............................................................225

Public Component......................................................................225

Leadership.......................................................................................225

Ideology ...........................................................................................228

Legitimacy .......................................................................................230

Motivation and Behavior ................................................................235

Cult of Martyrdom......................................................................238

Operations.......................................................................................239

Paramilitary.................................................................................239

Conventional Warfare................................................................. 241

Assassinations..............................................................................242

Suicide Missions..........................................................................243

Naval and Air Suicide Missions..................................................245

Administrative.............................................................................246

Training.......................................................................................246

Membership and Recruitment ................................................... 247

Women in the LTTE...................................................................248

Child Soldiers and Shields..........................................................249

Psychological ...............................................................................249

Political........................................................................................251

External Actors and Transnational Influences.............................253

Relations with India....................................................................253

Relations with Other Militant Groups.......................................257

Finances and Armaments...............................................................258

Overseas Tamil Support .............................................................259

Armaments..................................................................................260

CONCLUSION TO PART II..............................................................273

PART III. GOVERNMENT COUNTERMEASURES.......................277

CHAPTER 8. GOVERNMENT COUNTERMEASURES ...............279

Junius Richard Jayewardene Administration (1977–1989)...........287

Ranasinghe Premadasa Administration (1989–1993) ..................302

Chandrika Kumaratunga Administration (1994–2005) ..............304

Mahinda Rajapaksa Administration (2005–)................................ 311

CONCLUSION TO PART III............................................................ 319
x

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION ...........................................................323

APPENDICES.....................................................................................327

APPENDIX A. Major Sri Lankan Organizations..........................329

APPENDIX B. Tamil Terrorist Organizations..............................329

APPENDIX C. Acronyms................................................................331

APPENDIX D. Technical Appendix ..............................................333

Methodology of the Study ..........................................................333

Physical Environment .................................................................334

Historical Context.......................................................................335

Socioeconomic Conditions.........................................................336

Government and Politics ............................................................340

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...............................................................................345

INDEX ................................................................................................363
Table of Contents

xi

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 2-1. Map of South Asia. ............................................................ 19

Figure 2-2. Map of Sri Lanka...............................................................20

Figure 2-3. Sri Lankan terrain. ...........................................................22

Figure 2-4. Wet and dry zones.............................................................23

Figure 2-5. Sri Lankan ethnic distribution......................................... 24

Figure 2-6. LTTE areas of influence. ..................................................34

Figure 2-7. JVP areas of influence. ......................................................36

Figure 3-1. Sri Lankan districts, with the boundaries for

Tamil Eelam in red..............................................................60

Figure 3-2. Highway A9 from Vavuniya to Kilinochchi. ....................92

Figure 3-3. Estimated fatalities from 1984 to 2009. ...........................99

Figure 4-1. Official population estimates, 1960–2011...................... 111

Figure 4-2. Percentage of population by ethnicity for Sri Lankan 

census years........................................................................ 112

Figure 4-3. Sri Lankan ethnic distribution. ..................................... 113

Figure 4-4. Distribution of Hinduism in Sri Lanka. ........................ 115

Figure 5-1. Sri Lankan provinces. ..................................................... 158

Figure 6-1. JVP organization. ............................................................ 174

Figure 6-2. JVP influence map. ......................................................... 175

Figure 6-3. JVP target types............................................................... 190

Figure 6-4. JVP attack types. ............................................................. 191

Figure 6-5. JVP incidents over time. ................................................. 193

Figure 7-1. The flag of Tamil Eelam. ................................................ 216

Figure 7-2. LTTE organization.......................................................... 219

Figure 7-3. Velupillai Prabhakaran. ..................................................227

Figure 7-4. LTTE attack types...........................................................239

Figure 7-5. LTTE influence map.......................................................240

Figure 7-6. LTTE target types. .......................................................... 241

Figure 7-7. LTTE incidents over time................................................ 242

Figure 7-8. A LTTE Sea Tiger fast attack fiberglass boat.................246

Figure 8-1. Greater Tamil Nadu. ....................................................... 281
xii

Table of Contents

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2-1. Road distances in miles....................................................... 21

Table 3-1. 1952 election results............................................................52

Table 3-2. 1977 election results ........................................................... 61
CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Chapter 1. Introduction and Summary

3

BACKGROUND

The purpose of the Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) series is to produce academically rigorous yet operationally 

relevant research to expand on and update the body of knowledge on 

insurgency and revolution for members of the US Special Forces. We 

began this work with a rigorous assessment of all known insurgent or 

revolutionary activities from 1962 through the present day. To conduct 

this assessment, we agreed on a basic definition of revolution or insurgency.a

 For the purpose of this research, a revolution is defined as:

An attempt to modify the existing political system at 

least partially through unconstitutional or illegal use 

of force or protest.2

Next we developed a taxonomy to establish a standard structure for 

analysis and to facilitate discussion of similarities and differences. We 

classified events and activities according to the most evident cause of 

the revolt. The causes or bases of revolution were categorized as follows:

• Those motivated by a desire to greatly modify the type of 

government

• Those motivated by identity or ethnic issues

• Those motivated by a desire to drive out a foreign power

• Those motivated by religious fundamentalism

• Those motivated by issues of modernization or reform

After applying this taxonomy, we selected twenty-three cases, across 

the five categories above, to be researched for inclusion in the Casebook 

on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009.

3

 For each 

of the twenty-three revolutions or insurgencies, the casebook includes 

a summary case study that focuses on the organization and activities of 

the insurgent group.

Subsequently, we selected several of the cases for a more detailed 

treatment that would apply a broader and more holistic analytical perspective, considering factors such as the social, economic, historical, 

and political context. Within the ARIS research series, these studies are 

a The terms insurgency and revolution or revolutionary warfare are used interchangeably 

in the ARIS series. We adopted the term revolution to maintain consistency with the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) studies conducted during the 1960s, which also 

used the term. Many social scientists use an arbitrary threshold of battle deaths to delineate civil war from other acts of armed violence. Our definition relied on Charles Tilly 

and Sidney Tarrow’s definition of contentious politics, activity that “involves interactions 

in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests or programs, in which 

governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties.”1
4

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka

referred to as “ARIS Tier 1 Insurgency Case Studies.” This case study 

on Sri Lanka is one of these works.

PURPOSE OF THE CASE STUDY

This case study presents a detailed account of revolutionary and 

insurgent activities in Sri Lanka during the period from 1976 until 

2009. It is specifically intended to provide a foundation for Special 

Forces personnel to understand the circumstances, environment, and 

catalysts for revolution; the organization of resistance or insurgent 

organizations and their development, modes of operation, external 

support, and successes and failures; the counterinsurgents’ organization, modes of operation, and external support, as well as their effects 

on the resistance; and the outcomes and long-term ramifications of the 

revolutionary/insurgent activities. This foundation will allow readers 

to distill vast amounts of material from a wide array of campaigns and 

extract relevant lessons, thereby enabling the development of future 

doctrine, professional education, and training.

Like all products in the ARIS series, this study examines revolutions and insurgencies for the purpose of identifying emerging trends 

in operational designs and patterns, including elements that can serve 

as catalysts and indicators of success or failure. Building on an understanding of the general characteristics of revolutionary movements and 

insurgencies, this study examines ways that organizations or groups 

adapt to overcome various environmental and contextual challenges.

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

ARIS Tier 1 Insurgency Case Studies are organized in five major 

sections:

1. Introduction and Summary

2. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

3. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

4. Government Countermeasures

5. Conclusion

This Introduction and Summary presents an introduction to the ARIS 

series and a brief description of how the content in each particular case 

is presented and ends with a synopsis of the case study on Colombia.

Refer to the Technical Appendix for a discussion of the types of sources 

and methods that were used to gather and analyze the data, as well as 

any methodological limitations encountered in the research.
Chapter 1. Introduction and Summary

5

The section on Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency is divided into 

four chapters that address various aspects of the context within which 

the insurgency takes place. This section looks at the following elements:

• Physical environment

• Historical context

• Socioeconomic conditions

• Government and politics

The organization and inner workings of each of the primary insurgent groups are analyzed in the Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

section. Each insurgent group or organization is discussed separately 

in this section, providing details on the various aspects of each group. 

This analysis considers various characteristics including the following:

• Leadership and organization

• Ideology

• Legitimacy

• Motivation and behavior

• Operations

• External actors and transnational influences

• Finances, logistics, and sustainment

The Government Countermeasures chapter examines the political, 

military, informational, and/or economic actions taken by the government and by external forces in support of the government to counter 

the efforts of the insurgency. This chapter is presented chronologically, 

broken down by separate political administrations or by significant 

counterinsurgency campaigns or initiatives.

The final chapter, Conclusion, provides observations about the aftermath of the revolution, considering questions such as the following: 

Did any of the revolutionary or insurgent groups succeed in changing any political, economic, or social conditions as attempted? What 

changes took place over the time frame of the study—to the government itself as well as to the movement (e.g., did the insurgent group disappear, become the ruling government, become a legitimate political 

party, etc.)? This chapter includes a discussion about which objectives 

or goals of the opposing sides were met and which were not and what 

compromises or concessions, if any, were made by either side.

SUMMARY OF THE STUDY

During the late 1980s, Sri Lanka was bedeviled by two vicious insurgencies, one of which nearly succeeded in overthrowing the ruling 
6

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka

government and destroying the political system, the other threatening 

the territorial integrity of the unitary state. The first insurgency was 

orchestrated by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People’s Liberation 

Front, or JVP), a communist movement that first threatened the state 

with an uprising in 1971 and then in the late 1980s unleashed a campaign of terror that nearly toppled the central government. A cell-based 

movement, the group relied on hit-and-run tactics, assassinations of 

key political and security officials, and economic sabotage carried out 

by undercover operatives in key economic institutions to wreak havoc 

throughout the island. Yet in an act of desperation in August 1989, the 

group miscalculated by issuing death threats against the family members of personnel in the armed forces, as it anticipated that such a 

measure would undermine the only institution preventing the disintegration of the central government. The response was swift and deadly, 

as the government stepped up a preexisting unconventional campaign 

using paramilitary forces to decimate the leadership and the rank and 

file of the group within a few months.

The second insurgency was led by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 

Eelam (LTTE), one of the most deadly and fanatical insurgent movements in recent memory. The late 1980s was truly a testing time for the 

Sri Lankan government, as it had to contend with both the JVP and the 

LTTE, and it also had to manage the extreme unpopularity among the 

Sinhalese masses of the presence of foreign troops in the form of the 

Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), which was deployed to the island 

by virtue of a signed accord between Sri Lanka and India designed to 

end the ethnic conflict between Tamils and the central government. 

Yet the ethnic conflict had its origins in the early twentieth century as 

Ceylon (as the island was then known) was slowly shepherded toward 

self-rule by its British rulers. A series of pivotal decisions in 1956 and 

the early 1970s led to Tamil alienation over fears of economic disenfranchisement and fed the perception of a state-led campaign to obliterate Tamil culture. Path dependency eventually set in, as government 

concessions later in the conflict that may have earlier satisfied Tamil 

concerns (if fully implemented) failed to satisfy Tamil militants once 

the war for independence was under way and had acquired its own 

momentum. Twenty-six long years of conflict between the LTTE and 

the central government led to the deaths of thousands and the internal 

and external displacement of many more, and the final denouement 

in 2009 entailed a brutal and tragic military campaign that resulted in 

the death of the LTTE leader along with many noncombatants.

In the modern era, Sri Lanka’s physical environment did not play 

as determinative a role in affecting events on the island as it did during 

the colonial era. The first two colonial interlopers, the Portuguese and 
Chapter 1. Introduction and Summary

7

the Dutch, controlled the littoral areas of the island but were never able 

to subdue the mountainous Kandy region in the interior of the island. 

The Kandyans, adept at irregular warfare, used unconventional techniques to keep the forces of these two European powers at bay. It was 

the British in the early nineteenth century who conquered the entire 

island, yet initially the interior was won not through superior firepower 

and tactics but rather through guile and alliances with local notables 

who rebelled against an unpopular ruler.

Like the Kandyans, the LTTE also relied on irregular techniques 

to fight the forces of an outside power, this time in the form of Indian 

troops deployed to the island in the late 1980s. The latter embarked 

on a two-and-a-half-year counterinsurgency campaign that ultimately 

failed, despite the overwhelming number of Indian troops deployed, 

to subdue the much smaller and outgunned Tamil militant group. Yet 

terrain also played a more indirect role in the conflict. The port of 

Trincomalee on the east coast of the island features one of the finest 

natural harbors in all of Asia. During the British era, colonial planners 

in India feared that a hostile power would use the port to station naval 

forces to attack the Raj or disrupt sea-based communications between 

the east and west coasts of India. The strategic thinking of planners in 

independent India was similar, as they feared that the naval forces of 

an outside power (i.e., the United States) would be given access to the 

port, which in turn would limit India’s diplomatic and military room 

for maneuver in a region it considered its “backyard.”

Hence, in 1977, India became suspicious once a newly elected government in Colombo reoriented the country’s foreign policy toward 

the west, and one of India’s motives for supporting the LTTE and other 

militant Tamil groups during the 1980s was to punish Sri Lanka for its 

foreign policy reorientation, which, at a fundamental level, didn’t sufficiently recognize India’s heft in the region.

Given the path dependency exhibited by the ethnic conflict in 

Sri Lanka, any credible accounting of the conflict between Tamils and 

Sinhalese needs to account for the key historical precedents leading up 

to the outbreak of violence in the early 1980s. The political system that 

was ultimately bequeathed to Sri Lanka by the British did not feature 

an electoral system based on the principle of “communal representation,” under which Tamils and other minorities would be guaranteed 

a set number of seats within the legislature in excess of their percentage of the total population. Disenchanted with this oversight, Tamils 

looked on in horror in 1956 as a new populist government, swept into 

power by a Sinhalese-Buddhist majority population overcome with 

messianic fervor associated with the 2,500-year anniversary of the Buddha’s death, passed language legislation designating Sinhala as the sole 
8

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka

official language of the country. In the ensuing years, this legislation 

contributed to the de-Tamilization of the civil service, which had traditionally employed Tamils in percentages that had noticeably exceeded 

that group’s representation in the total population.

The final break with the central government occurred in the early 

1970s, as a new government adopted a new constitution that enshrined 

Sinhala as the sole official language and essentially elevated Buddhism 

to the status of a state religion. Additionally, the government revised 

entrance requirements into the science, engineering, and medical faculties of the nation’s universities to boost the representation of rural 

Sinhalese in these departments, which came at the expense of hopeful 

Tamils seeking places in departments that offered promising futures. 

This change was in response to the 1971 JVP insurrection, which was 

led by unemployed high school and college graduates of SinhaleseBuddhist descent, whose poor prospects were due in no small part to 

the lack of adequate facilities and teachers for imparting a science education in rural high schools. This policy led to the demoralization of 

Tamil youth who, in conjunction with language regulations that closed 

off opportunities for working in the civil service, began to view their 

situation within the unitary state as a hopeless one. This group formed 

the vanguard of the effort to detach the Tamil regions of the country 

to form a new state, and once the independence movement was invigorated in July 1983 after deadly anti-Tamil riots throughout the country, 

government concessions that would have granted some local autonomy 

to the Tamil regions did not satisfy the LTTE, who pressed ahead for 

full independence.

As suggested above, economic concerns played an important role 

in motivating the LTTE and JVP insurgencies (similar economic considerations also motivated the JVP insurgency in the late 1980s). Yet 

sociocultural factors also played an important role in motivating and 

shaping the insurgency waged by the LTTE and other Tamil groups. 

The constitutional enshrinement of Buddhism and the Sinhala language led Tamils to conclude that the state did not view Tamils as citizens of equal status to the Sinhalese, and in fact sought to obliterate 

Tamil culture throughout the island. Yet Tamils themselves are not 

culturally monolithic. Caste demarcations and regulations were more 

rigid and oppressive among Tamils than they were among the Sinhalese, and caste differences also overlapped with regional differences 

between northern and eastern Tamils in Sri Lanka. These differences 

were determinative, as they likely played an important role in the defection of a group of eastern Tamils from the LTTE in 2004, which paved 

the way for the downfall of the group in 2009.
Chapter 1. Introduction and Summary

9

The importance of sociocultural factors and their role in generating antagonistic Sinhalese and Tamil identities goes a long way toward 

answering a riddle that observers of Sri Lanka’s government and politics have sometimes raised: how is it that a country that, under gradual 

(and initially reluctant) British tutelage toward self-government, was 

endowed with the enlightened institutions necessary for representative 

government could descend into the horrors of ethnic conflict in the 

decades following its independence? The emergence of virulent sectarianism is certainly a necessary component to any answer to this question but by itself is not sufficient. Additionally, one must consider the 

nature of the electoral system in the country in the first few decades 

following independence. This system tended to reward Sinhalese 

politicians who promoted chauvinistic anti-Tamil policies to win the 

support of Sinhalese-Buddhist voters, who constituted an overwhelming majority of the electorate. Efforts by the government to reach an 

accommodation with the Tamils in the 1950s and 1960s failed as opposition politicians hypocritically played the ethnic card by claiming that 

government efforts to appease the Tamils represented a sellout and 

would ultimately lead to the partition of the country along ethnic lines. 

In 1978, a new electoral system was adopted that forced Sinhalese politicians to attach greater importance to the Tamil vote, which in turn 

held out the promise of promoting a more consociational political system. But these reforms were too little and too late, as the momentum 

had shifted in favor of independence.

Lastly, any accounting of the LTTE and JVP insurgencies needs to 

factor in the importance of India in directly (LTTE) and indirectly 

(JVP) fostering these two rebellions. Without India’s material assistance and intervention the LTTE would likely have been crushed by 

the Sri Lankan government in 1987. There are several reasons behind 

India’s support to Tamil militant groups and its decision to force the 

Indo-Lanka Accord, which entailed the deployment of Indian troops 

to Sri Lanka, on Colombo in July 1987. As previously noted, strategic 

considerations led to Indian concerns with Sri Lanka’s foreign policy 

reorientation in the late 1970s toward the West. Additionally, India has 

its own large Tamil population in the southern state of Tamil Nadu, 

which contained fifty to sixty million Tamils throughout most of the 

conflict, and this population sympathized with their ethnic brethren 

in Sri Lanka and demanded a response from New Delhi after atrocities against Sri Lankan Tamils or whenever Colombo appeared on the 

verge of defeating the Tamil separatist movement.

Hence, public pressure demanded Indian action in times of crisis 

during the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, yet India’s position was complicated by separatist tensions within India itself, including within Tamil 
10

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka

Nadu. Latent desires for a separate Tamil state on the subcontinent 

were a factor at this time despite a 1963 constitutional amendment that 

outlawed separatism. India also faced other separatist movements, specifically in Kashmir, Assam, and among Sikhs, who sought to establish 

the independent state of Khalistan. As a consequence, India could not 

support the LTTE’s goal of Tamil Eelam, or an independent Tamil state, 

as such a move would encourage the various separatist movements in 

India itself to declare independence.

India, therefore, had to tread carefully, and it ultimately came to 

support a solution that called for autonomy for the Tamil areas of 

Sri Lanka but stopped short of outright independence. Its stance was 

opposed by the LTTE, who would settle only for independence, and so 

it was inevitable that the group would wind up fighting the deployed 

Indian troops sent to enforce the July 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord. Tragically, the accord also had the effect of invigorating the JVP who, despite 

their communist orientation, could not resist the temptation to rely on 

the “false consciousness” of patriotic sentiment against the accord to 

mobilize the Sinhalese in an antigovernment campaign whose ultimate 

purpose was to institute a long-cherished social, political, and economic 

revolution throughout Sri Lanka. The result was an unmitigated disaster for the country, as thousands perished during the JVP uprising in 

the late 1980s. Yet unfortunately, this campaign was only the opening 

act, as thousands more would succumb over the next two decades in 

the fight between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE.

Timeline

1948 Ceylon independence from British rule is established by 

cooperation of Sinhalese and Tamil elites.

1956 Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) wins national election 

on the basis of “Sinhalese Only” platform.

Sinhala Only Act of 1956 sparked the first anti-Tamil riots.

1958 Riots and protests against proposals of Tamil self-rule.

1961 Sri Lankan army is stationed in northeast Sri Lanka to 

suppress peaceful Tamil protests against discrimination.

1965, 1967 Initial discussions are held on formation of the Janatha 

Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).

Mid-1969 JVP Central Committee is formed.

September 

1970

JVP politburo holds its first meeting.
Chapter 1. Introduction and Summary

11

March 1971 Rohana Wijeweera is imprisoned after months during 

which he and the group made threats of revolutionary 

violence.

April 1971 JVP mounts an insurrection against the Sri Lankan government. Although initially taken by surprise, the government eventually crushes the rebellion. Many top JVP 

leaders are imprisoned.

1972 Anti-Tamil policies are formally incorporated into the 

constitution.

The Tamil New Tigers (TNT) are established in 1972.

May 1972 The Criminal Justice Commission is established to try the 

perpetrators of the April 1971 uprising.

January 1974 Police attack the Fourth International Tamil Conference 

in Jaffna, killing eleven Tamils.

December 

1974

Wijeweera and thirty-one others are found guilty by the 

Criminal Justice Commission and are imprisoned.

1976 LTTE is formed from the TNT under Velupillai 

Prabhakaran.

November 

1977

Rohana Wijeweera is released from prison and embarks 

on reconstituting the JVP as an electoral organization.

1981 Burning of the Jaffna Library, which housed 90,000 Tamil 

books and manuscripts.

June 1981 JVP participates in District Development Council 

elections.

October 

1982

Rohana Wijeweera runs for president and places third.

July 1983 LTTE ambush a Sri Lankan army convoy, killing thirteen 

soldiers and sparking riots that kill 2,500 Tamils.

JVP is banned after anti-Tamil riots.

Late 1986/

early 1987

JVP decides to launch another uprising against the 

government.

1987 LTTE employs first noted suicide bombing of a 

Sri Lankan army camp followed by conventional tactics.

June 1987 The JVP successfully raids the General Sir John Kotalawala Defense Academy and the Katunayake air force base 

for weapons.

July 1987 India and the Sri Lankan government sign the IndoLanka Peace Accord; India deploys military forces to 

Sri Lanka.

August 1987 JVP launches a grenade attack on a meeting in parliament 

that featured the president and prime minister. Both survived, but one parliamentarian was killed.
12

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka

October 

1987

JVP attack the Counter Subversive Unit, killing the police 

commissioner.

December 

1987

JVP assassinates the chairman of the United National 

Party.

May 1988 JVP issues death threats against all parliamentarians, ministers, and officials of the United National Party.

JVP assassinates the general secretary of the United 

National Party.

November 

1988

JVP declares a national day of mourning on November 3 

after the deaths of a JVP student leader and politburo 

member. Streets are deserted, commercial establishments 

and government institutions are closed, and transport 

grinds to a halt.

To protest the holding of presidential elections in December, the JVP orchestrates a work stoppage throughout the 

country, paralyzing the economy.

Late 1988 JVP’s center of power shifts from the Southern Province 

to the Central Province.

April 1989 President Premadasa calls for both LTTE and JVP to 

enter the political mainstream and invites both for talks. 

LTTE agrees, but JVP refuses.

May 1989 Wijeweera issues an order calling on Sri Lankans to boycott Indian goods and cease all commercial activity with 

India.

June 1989 The JVP politburo decides to make a final push to overthrow the government in July.

Summer 

1989

To force the collapse of the government, the JVP orchestrates strikes by port and railway workers, as well as telecommunications and postal workers. Banks, markets, and 

stores close, and the navy is called on to run the Port of 

Colombo.

July 1989 Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange reserves dwindle and are 

able to cover only a few days of imports.

JVP organizes a hartal to commemorate the second anniversary of the Indo-Lanka Accord. Shops close and people 

are forced to hoist black flags in protest.

August 1989 JVP issues death threats against family members of armed 

forces personnel. In response, paramilitary groups go on 

a rampage and decimate JVP over the next few months.

November 

1989

Wijeweera is captured by government forces and subsequently killed.

March 1990 India withdraws forces from Sri Lanka.

May 1991 LTTE employs a suicide bomber to assassinate Indian 

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.
Chapter 1. Introduction and Summary

13

May 1993 LTTE employs a female Black Tiger to assassinate 

Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa.

October 

1997

LTTE is placed on the US State Department list of foreign 

terrorist organizations.

2002 Norway brokers cease-fire agreement between LTTE and 

the Sri Lankan government.

March 2004 Colonel Karuna splits LTTE Eastern command away from 

Prabhakaran-led Northern command.

December 

2004

A tsunami hits Sri Lanka and causes 40,000 deaths.

2005 The Sri Lankan government incorporates a national military draft system that substantially increases the size of 

the Sri Lankan army.

May 2005 LTTE assassinates Sri Lankan government Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar.

November 

2005

Anti-LTTE hard-liner Mahinda Rajapaksa wins national 

elections.

2006 Colonel Karuna founds the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal

(TMVP) in opposition to the LTTE.

The Sri Lankan government begins a military campaign 

against LTTE and the Tamil population with support of 

anti-LTTE Tamils.

2007 LTTE Air Tiger attack against the Colombo airport.

July 2007 The Sri Lankan army controls Eastern Sri Lanka.

December 

2007

The US government suspends military aid to Sri Lanka 

because of the Sri Lankan government’s human rights 

violations.

January 

2008

The Sri Lankan government formally withdraws from the 

cease-fire and Norwegian monitors depart Sri Lanka.

2009 250,000 civilians are displaced because of fighting in 

northern Sri Lanka.

May 2009 The Sri Lankan government claims victory over LTTE 

after a large military operation.

ENDNOTES

1 Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 

2007), 4.

2 Chuck Crossett, ed. Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009

(Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2012), xvi.

3 Ibid., xii–xiii.

PART I.

CONTEXT AND CATALYSTS OF 

THE INSURGENCY

CHAPTER 2.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

Chapter 2. Physical Environment

19

Sri Lanka is a pear-shaped island located in the Indian Ocean. The 

country sits a mere twenty miles from the southern tip of India and is 

separated from the subcontinental mainland by the Palk Strait (see 

Figure 2-1).

Andaman

Sea

Bay of Bengal

L a c c a d i v e 

S e a

Arabian S e a

Indian Ocean

Gulf of

Mannar

Gulf of

Khambhat

Andaman

Islands

Nicobar

Islands

Sumatra

China

Indonesia

Myanmar

( B u r m a )

India

Maldives

Bhutan

Bangladesh

Uzbekistan Kazakhstan

Turkmenistan

Tajikistan

Sri Lanka

P a k i s t a n

Iran

N e p a l

Kyrgyzstan

A f g h a n i s t a n

Lahore

Mumbai

(Bombay)

Chennai (Madras)

Kolkata

(Calcutta)

Karachi

Hyderabad

Delhi

Chittagong

Bangalore

Mashhad

Bhopal

Jaipur

Ludhiana

Patna

Lucknow

Ahmadabad

Faisalabad

Madurai Cochin

Coimbatore

Pune

Kalyan

Indore

Surat

Vadodara

Haora

Kanpur

Nagpur

Narayanganj

Yangon

Tashkent

Ashgabat

Dushanbe

Islamabad

Kathmandu

Bishkek

New Delhi

Colombo

Thimphu

Dhaka

Kabul

Southern Asia

National Capitals

Cities 3,000,000+

International

Boundaries

Highways

Primary Roads

Major Rivers

Lakes

0 110 220 Miles

0 110 220 KM

Figure 2-1. Map of South Asia.

The island is surrounded by the Bay of Bengal to its northeast and 

the Indian Ocean on its eastern, western, and southern shores. At its 

longest, Sri Lanka is approximately 273 miles, and its maximum width 

is about 137 miles. The island comprises just more than 25,000 square 

miles, making it slightly larger than the state of West Virginia (see 

Figure 2-2).1
20

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Bay of Bengal

Gulf of Mannar

Palk Strait

Indian Ocean

Puttalam

Talaimannar

Batticaloa

Negombo

Kalmunai

Jaffna

Kandy

Galle

Kurunegala

Anuradhapura

Trincomalee

Ratnapura

Badulla

Colombo

79° 80° 81° 82°

10°

9°

8°

7°

6°

0 10 20 Miles

0 10 20 KM

Sri Lanka and Surrounding Areas

National Capitals

Administrative Capitals

Cities 0-250,000

Administrative Boundaries

Highways

Primary Roads

Major Rivers

Intermediate Rivers

Lakes

Figure 2-2. Map of Sri Lanka.
Chapter 2. Physical Environment

21

Standard road distances between three key cities are listed in Table 2-1.

Table 2-1. Road distances in miles (kilometers)

From To Distance

Colombo Jaffna 225 (363)

Colombo Trincomalee 164 (264)

Jaffna Trincomalee 147 (237)

Sri Lanka has a tropical climate, but temperatures are moderated 

by ocean winds from the island’s 800 miles of coastline. The coastal 

region is notable not only for its marshes and lagoons but also for its 

“sandbars, dunes, coral reefs, and 113 islands.”2

 The country’s terrain 

is mostly flat, with jungle in the north-central region and mountains 

in the south-central region (see Figure 2-3). The central southwestern 

region of the island’s landmass is distinguished by highlands that are 

the result of a central massif.a

These highlands partly determine the amounts of rainfall different 

areas of the country receive from the region’s semiannual monsoons.b

The differing levels of rainfall result in the island’s division into two 

ecological halves. The wet zone covers the southwest third of the island, 

and the dry zone encompasses the remainder (see Figure  2-4). The 

single rainy season in the dry zone generally lasts from November to 

January and is followed by long droughts.

Regarding the human terrain, the Sinhalese are the largest ethnic 

group, constituting approximately seventy-five  percent of the population. They are located primarily in the coastal regions of the south and 

west as well as in the interior Kandyan region (see Figure 2-5). Sri Lankan 

Tamils constitute approximately eleven percent of the population, and 

they reside in the ethnically homogenous north of the country, as well 

as in the more ethnically mixed east of the island, where they share the 

territory with Sinhalese and with the island’s Muslim community. The 

center of the island also contains a sizeable population of Indian Tamils 

who are of more recent vintage then their Sri  Lankan counterparts. 

Indian Tamils were brought to the island by the British in the nineteenth century from the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu to work 

on agricultural plantations in the interior of the island.

a A massif is a large mountain mass or a group of compactly connected mountains 

that form an independent part of a range. It is notable for being bounded or demarcated 

by faults and flexures but remaining internally unchanged.

b The southwest monsoon period lasts from late May to late September and brings 

substantial rainfall to the southwestern region of the island. The northeastern monsoon 

period lasts from November to January and covers much of the island.3
22

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Trincomalee

0 10 20 Miles

0 10 20 KM

Colombo

Anuradhapura

Jaffna

Kurunegala

Kandy

Badulla

Ratnapura

Galle

Talaimannar

Negombo

Batticaloa

Kalmunai

Sri Lanka: Terrain

National Capitals

Cities 0-250,000

Province Capitals

Figure 2-3. Sri Lankan terrain.
Chapter 2. Physical Environment

23

Wet/Dry Zones of Sri Lanka

Trincomalee

0 10 20 Miles

0 10 20 KM

National Capitals

Province Capitals

Cities 0-250,000

Colombo

Anuradhapura

Jaffna

Kurunegala

Kandy

Badulla

Ratnapura

Galle

Puttalam

Talaimannar

Negombo

Batticaloa

Kalmunai

Wet Zone

Major Rivers

Intermediate Rivers

Lakes

WET ZONE

(250 centimeters

average per year)

DRY ZONE

(120–190 centimeters

per year)

Figure 2-4. Wet and dry zones.
24

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Ethnic Distribution of Sri Lanka

Trincomalee

0 10 20 Miles

0 10 20 KM

National Capitals Sinhalese

Tamil

Province Capitals

Cities 0-250,000

Colombo

Anuradhapura

Jaffna

Kurunegala

Kandy

Badulla

Ratnapura

Galle

Puttalam

Talaimannar

Negombo

Batticaloa

Kalmunai

Low country

Kandyan

Low country

Kandyan

Ceylon Moor

Figure 2-5. Sri Lankan ethnic distribution.
Chapter 2. Physical Environment

25

THE GENERAL IMPORTANCE OF PHYSICAL 

ENVIRONMENT

The tactical advantages or disadvantages that a physical environment can present for both insurgents and those practicing counterinsurgency have been recognized for millennia; Sun Tzu discusses the 

use of terrain (a part of the physical environment) in his Art of War, written more than 2,000 years ago. In a more recent example, in 2013, the 

Associated Press discovered a document left behind by Al Qaeda forces 

in Timbuktu, Mali. The document, a tip sheet on how to avoid drones, 

was full of suggestions, many of which involve the use and exploitation 

of the physical environment (for example, the use of trees for cover). 

The tactical and strategic importance of the physical environment is 

critical to an insurgency.

In the past few decades, scholars of social science have studied how 

the physical environment plays a more general role in the dynamics of 

conflict.c

 Specifically, these scholars have explored the role that the 

physical environment plays in the onset of conflict, as well as in the duration, intensity, and termination of conflict.4,5,6,7

 Much of this research 

has examined the contributing role that terrain plays in a conflict,d

and findings suggest that there is a relationship between mountainous terrain and civil war.8,9,10 Some scholars have examined foliage and 

jungle cover but have not located a statistically significant relationship 

between insurgency and forest.11 Much of this research indicates that 

certain terrain types are conducive to insurgent activity and that these 

physical characteristics have negative effects on a state’s capacity to 

counter insurgencies. These negative effects may include limitations 

on a state’s ability to exercise power and control, as well as a hindered 

ability to operate in certain types of terrain. While the findings and 

methods of this research remain matters of scholarly debate, physical 

environment undoubtedly plays a role in conflicts.

THE IMPORTANCE OF PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 

IN SRI LANKA

The physical environment specific to Sri  Lanka has shaped the 

conflict in important ways. To better understand this role, we briefly 

c See the Physical Environment section of Appendix D. Technical Appendix for an overview 

of some of this literature.

d In political science literature, “terrain” is typically used as an umbrella concept for 

various features of a physical environment. These features typically include slope elevation, the degree and amount of mountainous area, and size of rural countryside.
26

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

examine the relationship between Sri  Lanka’s physical environment 

and its key actors.

Like those of most places, Sri  Lanka’s early settlement patterns 

were influenced by topography, climate, and geographic location. The 

island’s close proximity to India ensured a degree of Indian influence, 

and findings from archeological excavations in the mid-twentieth century led scholars to infer that south Indian megalithic culture had a 

strong presence in Sri  Lanka.12 Yet there was an early north Indian 

presence on the island as well. Given that the dry zone constitutes twothirds of the island, early Indo-Aryan (i.e., north Indian) peoples settled in this zone, later spreading south. During Sri Lanka’s precolonial 

period through the thirteenth century, the island’s dry zone—made 

habitable by a vast and technologically sophisticated irrigation system 

that included tanks, channels, and canals—was one of the world’s leading hydraulic civilizations. The Sinhalese people’s ability to irrigate the 

dry zone was not only a marvel of technological achievement, but it also 

led to thriving kingdoms that experienced centuries of relative prosperity punctuated by periods of decline and recovery.

By the thirteenth century, the dry zone and the irrigation system 

supporting it were in decline. Under increasing attack by invaders from 

south India, the Sinhalese moved their kingdom’s capital farther and 

farther south.e

 As de Silva reports, the “Sinhalese power shifted to the 

central mountains” and, later, “further to the south, a region which 

had never in the past been well-developed or highly populated or a 

centre of civilization.”13 This frequent movement, coupled with bureaucratic over-centralization and the arrival of malaria (likely due to the 

hydraulic system the Sinhalese had constructed over the fifteen centuries prior), led to a collapse of the hydraulic society.f

 A Tamil kingdom 

emerged in the north of the island by the thirteenth century, around 

the time that the Sinhalese people began their exodus of the dry zone.17

Ultimately, at the end of the thirteenth century, Sri Lanka was characterized by significant political fragmentation.18 This fragmentation 

subdivided the island into distinct political entities, each within its own 

geographic region. During this period, Sri  Lanka comprised three 

kingdoms: a Tamil kingdom (in the Jaffna peninsula in the north), a 

Sinhalese kingdom (along the southwest coast in Kotte), and a second 

e This movement resulted in the concentration of Sinhalese in central and southern 

portions of the island. This historical fact would later prove important as the Sinhalese 

began to resettle in areas that had been predominantly inhabited by Tamils.

f This collapse, and the dry zone’s subsequent abandonment, would prove pivotal in 

the later ethnic tensions that contributed to the island’s insurgencies, as various political 

administrations would press policies of repopulation of the zone. For a discussion of these 

various resettlement schemes, see Amerasinghe.14 For a discussion of the tension these 

resettlement schemes produced, see Peebles.15 Also see Kearney.16
Chapter 2. Physical Environment

27

Sinhalese kingdom in the island’s central highlands at Kandy.g

 These 

divisions and locations were important for two reasons. First, they 

helped shape the geographic division of the Tamils and the Sinhalese, 

which would become critical as both groups would later appeal to geographic and ethnic divisions—an appeal that acted as a catalyst for 

the Tamil’s insurgency. Second, the island’s political fragmentation, 

and the geographic separation of the respective kingdoms, allowed the 

Kandyans to effectively resist outside rule for a period of time. In part 

because the other kingdoms lacked the topographical advantage of a 

mountain base, they would fall under European control.

Just as Sri Lanka’s physical environment played a key role in helping shape the early political geography of the island, it also played a key 

role during the colonial period beginning in the sixteenth century.h

The colonial activities of the Portuguese throughout Asia and Africa 

were typically not aimed at full territorial conquest.i

 Instead, the Portuguese were interested primarily in total control of commerce and 

industry, achieved through domination and submission of their colonial subjects.20 With respect to Sri Lanka, the Portuguese were particularly interested in the island’s cinnamon trade, littoral access, and 

control of maritime routes and commerce; it was these interests that 

drew the Portuguese into Sri  Lankan politics. This involvement was 

met with considerable resistance and hostility, partly spurred by the 

Portuguese’s imposition of Catholicism. In the mid-1600s, Sri Lankan 

powers negotiated with the Dutch, who agreed to help oust the Portuguese, a venture in which they were successful.

The Dutch’s interest resided in their desire for total control of 

Sri Lanka’s cinnamon, a lucrative export. But, like the Portuguese, the 

Dutch failed to extend their control to the entire island. This lack of 

complete geographic control provided the Kandyans with the opportunity to pursue outside powers that they hoped would provide them 

with more favorable terms of colonial rule. In a fashion similar to the 

Dutch strategy of exploiting the weaknesses of the Portuguese, the 

Kandyan king negotiated with the British, who successfully helped oust 

the Dutch in 1796.

g The southward movement of the Sinhalese, together with the concentration of 

Tamils in the Jaffna peninsula and the enduring collapse of the irrigation systems in the 

dry zone, contributed to what would later become the modern Sinhalese-Tamil ethnic and 

geographic divisions.

h Sri Lanka was subjected to the rule of three colonial powers: the Portuguese, 1505–

1658; the Dutch, 1658–1796; and the British, 1796–1948. For more information on colonial 

rule in Sri Lanka, see Chapter 3. Historical Context and Chapter 5. Government and Politics.

i On this point, see de Silva.19
28

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

It is important to note that, despite their best attempts, the early 

colonial powers were never able to fully conquer the mountainous 

regions. Given the central location of the island’s highlands, this meant 

that neither the Portuguese nor the Dutch were able to extend their 

authority to the whole island, and that their areas of rule and influence generally extended to only the island’s periphery—the coastal 

areas.21 The result of this limitation was that the common tool of colonial empires—brute force and subjugation through violence—was 

still routinely practiced but remained far less effective in the Kandyan 

kingdom. The early colonial actors were forced to engage in a brand 

of diplomacy where incentives were offered, but there was no effective 

means to ensure compliance and reduce defection from agreements. 

This situation permitted a relatively high degree of Kandyan autonomy, 

which contributed to the weakening of colonial control because it gave 

freedom to the Kandyan leaders to pursue policies that varied from 

those of the colonists.j

Like the Portuguese and the Dutch, the British were interested 

in the island’s natural resources. But perhaps more important to the 

British, at least in their early involvement, was Sri  Lanka’s favorable 

geographic location.k

 Of paramount importance was the deepwater 

port of Trincomalee (see Figure  2-2 for location), which the Dutch 

had been permitting the British to use to refit and shelter their vessels. 

Trincomalee provided shelter to the British boats during India’s rough 

monsoon season and facilitated communications between the west and 

east coasts of India. Additionally, once the British consolidated their 

rule in India, they developed an interest in ensuring that the port of 

Trincomalee would not be used by a hostile power to amass naval forces 

to attack the British Raj. Thus, the importance of Trincomalee made 

the port—and Sri Lanka more generally—of significant strategic interest to the British.

The mountains provided the Kandyans with the advantage of a 

strategic retreat in the heart of Sri Lanka that was defensible against 

the Portuguese and the Dutch. Specifically, the mountainous terrain 

enabled the Kandyans to use guerrilla warfare tactics to keep these two 

European powers at bay.22 However, the Kandyans would succumb to 

j Of course, Sri Lankans had little reason to negotiate in good faith with the colonizers. Colonial involvement in Sri Lanka was predicated on a desire to exploit the Sri Lankans and their natural resources while fulfilling geostrategic interests.

k This interest was partly driven by the British concern over the rise of France, which, 

under the Jacobins (the revolutionary regime), had occupied continental Dutch territory 

in 1795. This concern led to British fear that Dutch colonies may be inspired to launch 

similar insurrections spurred by France’s revolutionary ideology, thus jeopardizing British access to key land and sea routes that were essential to British economic and security 

interests.
Chapter 2. Physical Environment

29

colonial rule once the British arrived on the scene. As de Silva noted, 

“the traditional Kandyan policy of seeking foreign assistance to oust the 

European power established in the maritime regions had on this occasion led to the substitution of a very powerful neighbor [the British] for 

a weak one [the Dutch].” de Silva goes on to conclude that the British 

“had the resources . . . to subjugate that kingdom.”23 In 1818, after a long 

battle, the British defeated an uprising initiated by the Kandyans and 

controlled the whole island. For the first time since the fifteenth century, all of Sri Lanka was under the rule of a single unitary power. The 

British effectively ended the ability of Sri Lanka’s native population to 

exploit the island’s physical geography to resist colonial rule.

The implications of this development were significant. Perhaps most 

important was that the British could now use technology to overcome 

the physical environment. The British were able to develop a significant 

road system, granting military access to the interior Kandyan regions, 

thereby extending their military dominance. In addition, now that the 

interior of the island was under British control, communication lines 

extended throughout the highlands and outer reaches of the island.

These developments, in turn, helped the British consolidate their 

rule and create countrywide political administrations and institutions. This rule extended to the Tamil-dominated Jaffna peninsula. 

Because the British now controlled the Jaffna region, they consigned 

newly arrived US missionaries to the peninsula (particularly where 

agriculture was difficult).24 Both British and American missionaries 

established a number of well-regarded schools that imparted Englishlanguage education on the local populace. Tamils residing in the Jaffna 

peninsula became well trained in English. Given the high rate of internal migration from the area (due to the scarcity of economic opportunities), the Tamils came to hold numerous positions in the British 

colonial government, an outcome that led to considerable resentment 

among the Sinhalese.

With infrastructure and systems of political administration now 

extending through the once nearly impenetrable mountains, the 

British were able to more easily exploit Sri Lanka’s natural resources 

for economic gain.l

 This new capability resulted in the growth of the 

agriculture sector (coffee, tea, rubber, and coconuts were commonly 

grown) and the number of plantations.26 The rise of Sri Lanka’s plantation economy also signaled an attempt to revive the dry zone’s irrigation systems.27 This revival was born out of a desire to address the 

l It should be noted that, as de Silva points out, the centralization and island-wide 

expansion of communications and political administration were still incomplete in 

the early part of the nineteenth century, owing to “peculiarities of the island’s physical 

features.”25
30

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

concentrated population in the wet zone, as the dry zone remained 

inhospitable to agricultural development.m

Although British land policies had started shifting members of the 

Sinhalese population to the dry zone, by the time of independence, 

Sri  Lankan politicians accelerated these policies.28 “The principal 

stream of internal migration has involved the movement of settlers, 

mostly Sinhalese, from the heavily populated ‘Wet Zone’ of the southwest to the sparsely populated north-central, northeastern, and eastern 

‘Dry Zone’ regions.”29 This effort to “colonize” the dry zone was met 

with considerable resistance by the Tamils. Kearney insightfully notes 

how such colonization contributed to the Tamils’ resentment:

The lightly inhabited areas of the Dry Zone had once 

served as a broad belt of demarcation between the 

Sinhalese and the Sri Lanka Tamils. The progressive 

additions of population to the Dry Zone have served 

to blur the boundary between Sinhalese and Tamil 

settlements, bringing into stark relief the competition 

for territory. The movement of Sinhalese migrants 

into northern and eastern territories considered to be 

within the traditional Tamil homeland (in part with 

government sponsorship and facilitation) has been 

viewed by Tamil political leaders as a threat to the survival of their community. Among the Tamil grievances 

that contributed to the development of a Tamil separatist movement was the accusation that governmentsponsored Sinhalese colonization was deliberately 

encroaching on and undermining the distinctively 

Tamil territories, thus threatening the extinction of 

the traditional Tamil homeland.30

Kearney’s assessment demonstrates the hostility that the colonization programs produced among the Tamil populations. This sentiment 

was evident in many of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 

communiqués. For example, a 1983 statement asserted the group’s position on such settlement schemes:

The most vicious form of oppression calculated to 

destroy the national identity of the Tamils was the 

state aided aggressive colonisation which began soon 

after “independence” and now swallowed nearly three 

thousand square miles of Tamil Eelam (the Tamil 

m Most of the dry zone remained inhospitable to agricultural development, except 

the traditionally Tamil Jaffna peninsula, which had dependable water resources because 

of its limestone.
Chapter 2. Physical Environment

31

homeland). This planned occupation of Tamil lands 

by hundreds of thousands of Sinhala people aided and 

abetted by the state was aimed to annihilate the geographical entity of the Tamil nation.31

The colonization program became a source of grievance for the 

island’s Tamils, and later, the LTTE. This program contributed to the 

LTTE’s narrative of the Tamils as a population of ethnically distinct 

minority inhabitants who were beleaguered by the policies and practices of the majority Sinhalese and who had a historic homeland in 

need of protection.n The importance of physical environment on the 

island’s political composition was a theme that extended through the 

period of Sri Lanka’s colonial powers and continues to endure today.

Finally, the physical environment also had a significant impact on 

the tactics of both the government and the Tamils in the government’s 

war with the LTTE. The war took place in three distinct physical environments: the jungle, urban locations, and the sea. Because Sri Lanka 

is an island, the LTTE, unlike insurgencies that operate in regions with 

land borders, had limited ability to use artificial political boundaries 

to its advantage. However, the group was able to seek refuge and plan 

operations in Tamil Nadu, the Indian state immediately across the Palk 

Strait. Nevertheless, the inability to exploit foreign boundaries within 

Sri Lanka itself put a greater premium on relying on jungle, sea, and 

urban environments within the island for shelter and protection.

Sri Lanka’s physical environment led the LTTE to develop both 

land and sea forces. The LTTE’s maritime combat unit, the Sea Tigers, 

included some of the most effective fighting units in the conflict, “capable of operating in lagoons, territorial as well as international waters.”33

The LTTE placed emphasis on the development of its maritime attack 

capabilities, and it is reported that the LTTE’s sea forces constituted 

the most “formidable, nonstate ‘navy’ in the world.”34 The Sea Tigers 

n As discussed later in this study, Tamil politicians, and later militants, typically 

referred to the Northern and Eastern Provinces as the “traditional homeland” of the Tamils. Yet this claim is not without its critics. As Sri Lankan historian K. M. de Silva noted: “A 

Tamil kingdom did exist from the 13th century to the early part of the 17th, but except 

during the brief heyday of its power it seldom controlled anything more than the Jaffna 

peninsula, and some adjacent regions on the coast and some parts of the interior. Set 

against a history stretching over 2500 years the independent existence of this kingdom 

covered a very brief period, and even during that period its status and influence varied so 

dramatically; at times a very powerful kingdom; at others a satellite of expanding Dravidian states across the Palk Straits, and at times subjugated by the [Sinhalese] Kotte kingdom, and generally acknowledging its suzerainty. There is little or no evidence to support 

the claim made in the Vaddukoddai resolution [which called for a separate Tamil state 

in Sri Lanka] and the [Tamil United Liberation Front] manifesto of 1977 that there was 

either an unbroken ‘national’ consciousness or a continuing tradition of independent 

statehood.”32
32

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

exploited the jungle terrain bordering the littoral areas, permitting the 

insurgent forces to stay concealed until they were ready to attack the 

Sri Lankan naval forces. This, in turn, meant that the Sri Lankan navy 

had to “maintain 24-hour surveillance and remain prepared to intercept any movement.”35 In response, the LTTE dictated when and where 

the engagements would occur by innovatively using the various dimensions of Sri  Lanka’s physical environment to its advantage. The Sea 

Tigers used the sea to launch naval attacks and operations, and once 

these maritime operations were complete, the Sea Tigers retreated to 

the jungle, vessels and all. In such operations, the LTTE used trailers 

to carry their boats out of the jungle to be deployed. Once the operation concluded, they hauled the boats back into the cover of the jungle, 

concealing their location from the Sri Lankan air force.36

The Sri Lankan navy responded to this strategy by increasing its 

combat personnel training and updating its combat fleet to include 

faster, nimbler boats with upgraded firepower. This “small boats concept” “effectively copied the Sea Tigers’ asymmetric tactics, but on a 

much larger scale.”37 The small boats concept permitted the navy to 

more effectively combat the Sea Tigers by copying the Tiger’s tactics of 

significantly outnumbering and overwhelming the enemy with a swarm 

of numerous small boats.

Sri  Lanka’s island geography and lack of overland supply routes 

meant that the LTTE had to rely on maritime transportation for overseas supplies. This led the group to develop a merchant maritime wing 

that was separate from the Sea Tigers.38 While the navy’s small boats 

concept allowed them to effectively combat the Sea Tigers along the 

coastline, through their merchant vessels the LTTE was still able to supply its fighters for battle on the mainland.o

 When the Sri Lankan navy 

turned its attention to staunching the flow of supplies from overseas, 

the LTTE began to more fully develop its sea-based suicide cadres, the 

Black Sea Tigers. As Fair reports, the Black Sea Tigers were developed 

as a way to “counter the success of the Sri Lankan and Indian navies in 

denying sea-based supply routes to the LTTE.” Fair also noted that the 

Black Sea Tigers endeavored to use individuals who had been maimed 

in combat, in order to optimize their human resources.40

In addition to exploiting both the jungle and the sea, the LTTE was 

also adept at operating in urban environments, with what one analyst 

calls its “remarkable adaptability.”41 Particularly notable was the group’s 

o Part of this supply strategy included “floating warehouses,” an “ocean-going fleet of 

eight ships that were used as floating warehouses on the high seas. These ships were used 

to stow all types of illegally acquired items such as aircraft, artillery pieces and ammunition, diving equipment, electro-optical devices, night-vision equipment, radar, torpedoes 

and underwater vehicles.”39
Chapter 2. Physical Environment

33

ability to penetrate the capital Colombo, located in the southwest and 

outside the traditional area of Tamil support. Unlike in the north and 

northeast, in the southwest the LTTE could not face the Sri Lankan 

army’s conventional forces. Instead, the LTTE focused on asymmetric 

tactics, engaging in the exploitation of urban terrain and population.

Hallmarks of this asymmetric activity were suicide attacks by the 

Black Tigers (the LTTE’s suicide cadres). As Fair notes, “the LTTE can 

very easily slip Black Tiger cadres into the thickly populated city of 

Colombo and attack virtually at will.”42 By 2007, the group was able to 

infiltrate 150 suicide bombers thought to be “sleeping” in Colombo.43

Attacks by this group exploited not only the immediate tactical advantages of operating in Colombo’s urban environment but also the psychological significance of the capital. As Kulandaswamy notes, “life in the 

south . . . was largely unaffected by the northern casualties. There was 

a clear distancing from the battlefield, not only in geographical terms 

but also in mental terms.”44 Because the war was generally regarded as 

occurring in the north, once the LTTE proved that Colombo could be 

targeted, the stakes were raised.

In the end, the Sri Lankan military was able to capitalize on the 

Tamil’s concentration in the north. Once the LTTE’s naval capacity 

was degraded, leaving little option for escape by sea, government forces 

were able to push the LTTE’s fighters (and Tamil civilians) into a small 

geographic area that was initially set up as a no-fire zone for civilians. 

The area measured roughly eight square miles in the Mullaitivu District (in the far northeast) and was eventually reduced by about half. 

The Sri Lankan military was ultimately able to use the island’s physical 

environment to contribute to the defeat of the LTTE.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF INSURGENCY

This study provides a detailed analysis of two insurgent movements 

that wreaked havoc on Sri Lanka. The LTTE waged a twenty-six-year 

campaign against the government to establish an independent Tamil 

state in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of the country. At its peak 

in 2000, the amount of territory controlled by the group amounted 

to seventy-six percent of the combined area of these two provinces,45

which are populated by significant numbers of Sri  Lankan Tamils. 

Districts form subprovincial units of government in Sri  Lanka, and 

Figure  2-6 shows the districts where the LTTE exhibited strong and 

moderate influence.
34

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

0 10 20 Miles

0 10 20 KM

LTTE Influence

Strong Influence

Moderate Influence

Anuradhapura Trincomalee

Polonaruwa

Kurunegala Matale

Batticaloa

Ampara

Moneragala

Hambantota

Matara

Galle

Kalutara Ratnapura

Colombo

Gampaha Kegalle

Kandy

Nuwara

Eliya 

Badulla

Puttalam

Mannar

Vavuniya

Mullaitivu

Jaffna

Kilinochchi

Figure 2-6. LTTE areas of influence.
Chapter 2. Physical Environment

35

Until its final defeat in 2009, the LTTE maintained a strong presence in the north of Sri Lanka, and especially within the Jaffna peninsula, which is the northernmost area of the country and represents the 

cradle of Tamil civilization on the island. Owing to regional and caste 

differences between northern and eastern Tamils, the group had relatively less influence in the east, and in fact it was a defection of eastern 

cadres in 2004 that ultimately paved the way for the group’s downfall 

five years later.

The second insurgent group covered by this study is the Janatha 

Vimukthi Peramuna (People’s Liberation Front, or JVP), a Sinhalese 

Marxist group that led a failed insurrection in April 1971 as well as a 

broad-based antigovernment campaign that came perilously close to 

overthrowing the political system in the late 1980s. Unlike the LTTE, 

the JVP never developed conventional units that held territory, nor 

did it establish governing institutions that sought to administer to the 

needs of the population in the areas in which it was active. Yet as shown 

in Figure  2-7, the group’s underground cells were active throughout 

most of the country, in particular in areas that were not closed off to 

the group by the LTTE.

Gunaratna noted that the group established district committees in 

all districts except those in the north and east, and in late 1988 its center of power shifted from the Southern Province (which contains the 

districts of Galle, Matara, and Hambantota) to the Central Province 

(which contains the districts of Matale, Kandy, and Nuwara Eliya).46,p

The group largely operated underground, and on several occasions it 

orchestrated nationwide hartals, or general work stoppages, that paralyzed the country and brought the economy to a halt. It was also successful in bringing the fight to Colombo, the capital, and in August 1987 it 

nearly delivered a decapitating blow, as it launched a grenade attack on 

parliament that nearly killed the country’s top leadership.

p See also Chandraprema for a list of the group’s district leaders throughout 

Sri Lanka.47
36

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

0 10 20 Miles

0 10 20 KM

JVP Influence

Strong Influence

Moderate Influence

Anuradhapura Trincomalee

Polonaruwa

Kurunegala Matale

Batticaloa

Ampara

Moneragala

Hambantota

Matara

Galle

Kalutara Ratnapura

Colombo

Gampaha Kegalle

Kandy

Nuwara

Eliya 

Badulla

Puttalam

Mannar

Vavuniya

Mullaitivu

Kilinochchi

Jaffna

Ratnapura

Figure 2-7. JVP areas of influence.

ENDNOTES

1 Patrick Peebles, The History of Sri Lanka (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006), 2.

2 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and M. S. Swaminathan Research 

Foundation, “Sri Lanka: A General Description: Location, Land and Coastlines,” 

in Sri  Lankan Women and Men as Managers of Bioresources, 1999, http://www.fao.org/

docrep/005/ac791e/AC791E01.htm#ch1.
Chapter 2. Physical Environment

37

3 Ibid.

4 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American 

Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.

5 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic 

Papers 56, no. 4 (June 2004). doi: 10.1093/oep/gpf064.

6 H. Hegre and N. Sambanis, “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War 

Onset,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 4 (August 1, 2006): 508–535.

7 Bethany Lacina, “Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, 

no. 2 (April 2006): 276–289.

8 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.”

9 Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.”

10 Hegre and Sambanis, “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset.”

11 Siri Camilla Aas Rustad, Jan Ketil Rød, Wenche Larsen, and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Foliage and Fighting: Forest Resources and the Onset, Duration, and Location of Civil War,” 

Political Geography 27, no. 7 (September 2008): 761–782.

12 K. M. de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981), 

12–13.

13 Ibid., 82.

14 Nihal Amerasinghe, “An Overview of Settlement Schemes in Sri Lanka,” Asian Survey 16, 

no. 7 (July 1976): 620–636, esp. 621.

15 Patrick Peebles, “Colonization and Ethnic Conflict in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka,” The 

Journal of Asian Studies 49, no. 1 (February 1990).

16 Robert N. Kearney, “Territorial Elements of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka” Pacific Affairs

60, no. 4 (Winter, 1987–1988): 561–577, passim.

17 K. M. de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri  Lanka 1880–1985

(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), 14.

18 de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, chap. 7, passim.

19 Ibid., 100.

20 Ibid., 100.

21 Peebles, “Colonization and Ethnic Conflict in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka,” 34.

22 de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, 262.

23 Ibid., 187.

24 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of California 

Press, 1986), 156.

25 K. M. de Silva, “Regionalization and Decentralization of Power,” in Sri Lanka, Problems of 

Governance (Delhi, India: Konark Publishers, 1993), 100.

26 de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, chap. 21, passim.

27 Ibid., 298.

28 Peebles, “Colonization and Ethnic Conflict in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka,” 37.

29 Kearney, “Territorial Elements of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka,” 571.

30 Ibid., 571–572.

31 Satchi Ponnambalam, Sri Lanka: National Conflict and the Tamil Liberation Struggle (London: Tamil Information Center and Zed Books, Ltd., 1983), 260, as quoted in Kearney, 

“Territorial Elements of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka,” 572.

32 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 260–261.

33 C. Christine Fair, Urban Battle Fields of South Asia: Lessons Learned from Sri Lanka, India, and 

Pakistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004), http://www.rand.org/pubs/

monographs/MG210.html, 28.
38

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

34 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism 15 (2002), as quoted in Fair, Urban Battle Fields of South 

Asia: Lessons Learned from Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan, 28.

35 “Sri Lanka Learns to Counter Sea Tigers’ Swarm Tactics,” Jane’s Navy International, March 

2009, www.defence.lk/news/Sri_Lanka_Navy.pdf, 23.

36 Ibid., 23.

37 Ibid., 21.

38 Fair, Urban Battle Fields of South Asia: Lessons Learned from Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan, 28.

39 “Sri Lanka Learns to Counter Sea Tigers’ Swarm Tactics,” Jane’s Navy International, 24.

40 Fair, Urban Battle Fields of South Asia: Lessons Learned from Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan, 39.

41 Ibid., 11.

42 Ibid.

43 Chris Smith, “The Eelam Endgame?” International Affairs 83, no. 1 (2007), 78.

44 M. S. Kulandaswamy, Sri Lankan Crisis: Anatomy of Ethnicity, Peace, and Security (New Delhi: 

Authorspress, 2000), as quoted in Fair, Urban Battle Fields of South Asia: Lessons Learned 

from Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan, 48.

45 “Humanitarian Operation Timeline, 1981–2009,” Ministry of Defense and Urban Development (Sri Lanka), http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Humanitarian.

46 Rohan Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP (Kandy, Sri 

Lanka: Institute of Fundamental Studies, 1990), 44, 294.

47 C. A. Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89 (Colombo, 

Sri Lanka: Lake House Bookshop, 1991), 17.
CHAPTER 3.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Chapter 3. Historical Context

41

PRECOLONIAL HISTORY

In about the fifth or sixth century BCE, the first of the Sinhalese, an 

Indo-Aryan group from northern India, began to arrive in Sri Lanka, 

displacing the original inhabitants, the Veddahs. According to the 

Sinhalese historical chronicle the Mahavamsa, Vijaya, the son of the 

north Indian king Sinhabahu, and a group of 700 followers reached 

the island near Puttalam on the west coast after their exile for assault 

and robbery, and they settled in the interior near Anuradhapura.1, a By 

the fourth century BCE, the Sinhalese rulers had established the citystate kingdom of Anuradhapura, which controlled the adjacent coast 

and villages.

In the third century BCE, the Indian Emperor Ashoka sent missionaries led by his son Mahinda to the island, and they were able to convert 

the Anuradhapura King Devanampiya Tissa to Buddhism. By the second century BCE, most Sinhalese had adopted the Buddhist religion, 

which thereafter constituted the foundation of Sinhalese identity and 

unity. In 371 CE, the Buddhists acquired what was believed to be a tooth 

of the Buddha. Over time, this relic became not only a religious symbol 

for the Buddhists but also a symbol of sovereignty and legitimacy for 

the Sinhalese in general. Possession of the tooth conferred the right to 

rule. Consequently, protection of the relic, housed at the Temple of the 

Sacred Tooth Relic in Kandy, became a critical responsibility of political leaders, and this responsibility continues to the current day.

During the seventh century CE, conflicts between the Sri Lankan 

Sinhalese and the Southern Indian states of Chola, Pallava, and Pandya 

became fairly common. However, the Tamil presence on the island was 

generally limited to individual merchant groups and mercenary troops 

imported to assist one side or another in inter-Sinhalese squabbles.2

In 993, the Cholas sacked Anuradhapura and occupied and annexed 

the north-central area of Sri Lanka as a province of the Chola kingdom. This was followed by the Cholas’ conquest of the southern area of 

Ruhuna in 1017. In 1070, the Cholas were ousted and Sinhalese authority was restored to the island. However, from this point onward, the 

a The Mahavamsa was written in Pali verse by Buddhist Monks in the sixth century 

AD and subsequently updated, and it provides a history of Sri Lanka from the time of the 

Buddha in the fifth century BC to the fourth century AD. Together with the earlier chronicle, the Dipavamsa, and the later chronicle, the Culavamsa (which updated the Mahavamsa

to the unification of the island by the British in 1815), the Mahavamsa is central to the 

Sinhalese and Buddhist contention that they are the true historical claimants to Sri Lanka 

and that the Tamil are later interlopers. Indeed, it is very difficult to describe the island’s 

early history, especially prior to the sixteenth century, but even later, because the sources 

were more often written for myth-making or political purposes rather than for historical 

accuracy.
42

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Sinhalese lived in fear of losing their independence to foreign invaders 

from south India.

During their time in Ceylon the Cholas had established their capital 

in Polonnaruwa, which offered a more defensible location than Anuradhapura to hold off potential invaders from Ruhuna. Once Sinhalese 

ruler Vijayabahu I evicted the Chola from the island in 1070 he decided 

to rule from Polonnaruwa given its more militarily defensible location. 

However, because of mismanagement and regal extravagances, as well 

as a series of weak rulers, Polonnaruwa declined and was abandoned 

after about two centuries. The Sinhalese kingdom at Polonnaruwa and 

Sinhalese states throughout the island were frequently under attack by 

Malayans and southern Indians. Unable to defend themselves effectively, the Sinhalese rulers were continually on the move southward, 

establishing five different capitals between 1250 and 1400.

During this period of decline in the Sinhalese kingdom of Polonnaruwa, the Kalingas of southern India invaded and conquered the 

island, establishing a reign of terror that lasted until 1255. The Arya 

Chakaravartis, a southern Indian dynasty, seized control of the northern area of the island and by the beginning of the fourteenth century 

the dynasty established the first Tamil kingdom on the Jaffna peninsula. Although it was sometimes controlled by different south Indian 

powers, Jaffna usually had enough autonomy to become a thriving 

trade and cultural center in its own right.

Significant for future events, the Sinhalese move toward the south 

resulted in the creation of a jungle buffer zone below the Jaffna peninsula, known as the Vanni, between the Sinhalese to the south and the 

Tamils to the north, with some mixed Sinhalese-Tamil settlements in 

the middle.

COLONIAL HISTORY

Sri Lanka experienced three waves of colonial rule: the Portuguese, 

1505–1658; the Dutch, 1658–1796; and the British, 1796–1948. The first 

two can be described as incomplete, as Portuguese and Dutch authority was generally restricted to the coastal areas, while the kingdom of 

Kandy in the central highlands was usually independent. In the third 

period, the British established total control over the island only in 1815, 

but the Tamil kingdom in Jaffna retained a separate existence and a 

separate identity under British rule.

At the onset of the sixteenth  century, Sri  Lanka was generally 

divided among three kingdoms: the Tamil kingdom based in the Jaffna 

peninsula in the north, a Sinhalese kingdom along the southwest coast 

in Kotte, and another Sinhalese kingdom in the island interior at 
Chapter 3. Historical Context

43

Kandy. The Portuguese, the first of the European colonizers, established a foothold on the island through a treaty with the kingdom of 

Kotte. Despite this benign beginning, conflicts among the Sinhalese 

leadership factions enabled the Portuguese to take control and subjugate the surrounding areas. The Tamils, on the other hand, chose the 

course of resistance. Angered by Portuguese efforts to convert the Tamils to Catholicism, the Tamil king Sangily massacred the Portuguese 

missionaries and their converts. However, Tamil resistance proved ineffective, and in 1619, the Portuguese gained control of the kingdom of 

Jaffna along with the island’s entire coastline, leaving only Kandy as a 

Sinhalese stronghold and refuge in the central highlands.

To counter the Portuguese, the king of Kandy sought assistance 

and protection from the Netherlands through the Kandyan Treaty of 

1638. The Dutch were able to oust the Portuguese from their forts and 

take possession of the former Portuguese territories along the island’s 

coastal periphery. When the Kandyans then sought assistance from the 

French to offset Dutch expansionism, the Dutch ousted the French and 

further expanded their control to all of the island’s maritime provinces.

After a successful coup against the Kandyan king by the joint 

effort of Sinhalese and Tamil chieftains, the British seized control and 

annexed the island to the British Crown. The Kandyan Convention 

of 1815, signed by the Ceyloneseb

 and British, confirmed British rule 

and unified the island under one power (which last occurred 400 years 

prior under Parakramabahu VI, who was the king of the Sinhalese 

kingdom of Kotte). However, the tooth relic remained under the protection of Buddhist monks, and, as a consequence, the British were 

never accepted as legitimate sovereigns with a right to rule Sri Lanka 

and the Sinhalese. Further, the Sinhalese refused to work on Britishowned plantations, which the British began to establish within the central interior of the country in the 1830s and 1840s (especially for coffee, 

but later in 1870 for tea, rubber, and coconut once a leaf disease began 

to destroy the coffee crop3). During this time, the British abolished the 

rajakariya, the system of service tenure under which Sinhalese peasants 

had labored, but the Sinhalese looked unfavorably on wage employment,4

 forcing the British to import significant numbers of Tamils from 

southern India (these Tamils were subsequently referred to as “Indian 

Tamils”). Soon, the Kandyans launched the unsuccessful Uva Rebellion against the British.

The British attitude toward the traditional elite, especially in the 

Kandyan regions in the interior of the country, evolved during this 

period. The British had cooperated with the Kandyan aristocracy in 

b Prior to 1972 the island was known as Ceylon. With the introduction of a new constitution in that year, the name of the island changed to Sri Lanka.
44

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

deposing the last Kandyan king, Sri Vikrama Rajasimha, in 1815, and 

so when the region fell under English rule, the British decided not to 

disturb the existing institutions and social system of the region in order 

to maintain the support of the traditional elite. However, although the 

elite cooperated with the British to depose an unpopular local ruler, 

they did not expect the establishment of foreign rule over the region, 

and so the local elite supported the failed Uva Rebellion of 1817–1818 

against British authority.

Not surprisingly, after the suppression of the rebellion, the British 

became suspicious of the elite and sought to diminish their status and 

authority. Specifically, they sought to transform this group into a class 

of stipend earners subordinate to and under direct British supervision and charged with carrying out the orders of the government.5

 But 

beginning in the mid to late nineteenth century, the British pursued 

a policy of aristocratic resuscitation of the traditional elite, as both 

groups became suspicious of an emerging educated Sinhalese elite living in the maritime regions and seeking greater political authority.6, c

This relationship eventually flourished, as the British held durbars, or 

ceremonial gatherings, with local chiefs. In the early twentieth century, 

these gatherings were championed by Sir Henry MacCallum, the governor, who brought to Ceylon his experience with similar gatherings of 

local notables in Malaya, Nigeria, and Natal. The durbars held by MacCallum were patterned on the indabas held in Natal, where local chiefs 

discussed key issues with the governor and his officials.8

Because Sri Lanka was under full British control, arriving American missionaries were relegated to the agriculturally inhospitable area 

of Jaffna—the center of Sri  Lanka’s Tamil population. English and 

American missionaries proved adept at building and operating English-language schools, which created a reserve of well-trained, Englishspeaking Tamils. Because of their language skills and a high level of 

migration from Jaffna’s nonarable territory, Tamils were disproportionately represented in both the British colonial administration and 

commercial industry.9

 This unbalanced representation predictably led 

to perceptions, both real and imagined, of Tamil cooperation with the 

c Additionally, the demands of day-to-day governing necessitated a strong relationship with the traditional elite. The British simply did not have the personnel or the 

resources to pay them (if they could be found) to carry out administrative duties at the 

district level and below. Instead, many of these posts, which did not entail remuneration, 

were outsourced to local chiefs and were held on a hereditary basis.7
Chapter 3. Historical Context

45

British colonial government.d In a development common to many cases 

of ethnic rivalry, demands from the Sinhalese for equality with the 

Tamils eventually gave way to demands for preferential treatment.11

Aided by the introduction of the printing press and rising literacy 

rates, Sinhalese scholarship and social commentary on ancient Tamil 

invasions led to a climate wherein all Tamils, even those who could 

trace their Sri  Lankan heritage back for centuries, were considered 

kallathoni—illegal Indian immigrants.12 In the discourse of Sinhalese 

nationalism, Tamils were merely the first of many waves of invaders that 

included European colonists and other foreign capitalists. In addition, 

a particularly active and militant Buddhist clergy created myths and 

legends to explain away generations of mixing between Sinhalese and 

Tamils, further exacerbating religious tensions.e

Conversely, until the nineteenth century, the Tamils generally did 

not look south to the Sinhalese for their cultural heritage and identity 

but instead looked north to southern India, which contained a substantial Tamil population. This is not to say that the Tamils never interacted 

with the Sinhalese. Clearly, as inhabitants of the same small island, they 

did interact. Still, by geography and ethnicity, the Tamils were drawn 

to south India and, because of the almost impenetrable jungle in the 

north-central region, away from the Sinhalese south.14

Yet, the Tamils eventually began to see themselves politically as part 

of the island rather than as an adjunct of south India. The development 

of an island-based identity began gradually with the early eighteenthcentury publication of the chronicle Yalppana Vaipava Malai (The Garland 

of Jaffna Events), one of the first modern attempts to construct a Tamil 

history in Ceylon.f

 While The Garland, frequently known by its Tamil 

initials YVM, depicted the Sinhalese as the main foes of the Tamils, the 

d Gallege Punyawardana, secretary of the Federation of Buddhist Organizations, 

evidenced this common impression when he blamed the British for a Liberation Tigers of 

Tamil Eelam (LTTE) attack on a Buddhist shrine, commenting that the Tamils “fought 

along with their English masters against the Sri Lankans. They are the originators of our 

problem.” The kingdom of Kandy, the center of Sinhalese/Buddhist power and culture 

in Sri Lanka, was also the last province to fall to British tutelage, further contributing to 

this perception.10

e One such legend concerns the adoption of Tamil (Hindu) gods by Sinhalese (Buddhist) worshippers, a common occurrence in religiously diverse societies. In the Sinhalese 

narrative, the god Kandeswami abandons his Tamil worshippers in favor of the Sinhalese 

when the latter agree to carry him across a river after this responsibility is shirked by a 

passing band of Tamils.13

f Mayilvakana Pulavar was the author of The Garland of Jaffna Events. He was a native 

of Jaffna and was asked by the Dutch governor, Klaas Isaacsz, to write and translate 

a chronicle of history of Jaffna. The Garland of Jaffna Events was compiled from palm 

leaf manuscripts of unknown date, oral traditions, and “lost works” preserved only 

in memory.15
46

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Tamils were still more interested in intra-Tamil squabbles than Sinhalese-Tamil conflicts. This changed significantly in the 1920s, when the 

British introduced the Manning reforms. Between 1921 and 1924, Governor William Manning introduced a series of constitutional reforms 

that opened communal representation in the Legislative Council for 

those recognized as “legitimate interest groups” by the British.16,g To 

prevent their marginalization, it became necessary for the Tamils, especially Tamil politicians with national ambitions, to establish their standing as an important community worthy of representation.

Overall, the legacy of socioeconomic advantages established by 

the Tamils under the British colonial government led to decades of 

reactionary Sinhalese nationalist policies that effectively barred Tamil 

access to civil service employment and reduced their presence within 

the university system; recognized the Sinhala language and religion 

(Buddhism) as those of the state; and resettled Sinhalese peasants on 

Tamil land.

The Road to Independence, 1931–1948

During the first two decades of the twentieth century, the Sinhalese political leadership looked to join with their Tamil counterparts to 

campaign for independence. This inter-elite cooperation was enhanced 

with the 1911 election of Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan as the first 

“Educated Ceylonese” unofficial member to the Legislative Council.h

It reached its peak when Sinhalese and Tamil organizations united to 

form the Ceylon National Congress (CNC), with Sir Ponnambalam 

Arunachalam (brother of Ramanathan) as its first president, in 1919. By 

joint effort, the CNC members sought constitutional reforms that would 

shift political authority away from the British and in favor of the Ceylonese. One key reform proposal was the popular election of a majority 

of the seats to the Legislative Council. In 1919, the Legislative Council 

consisted of twenty-three members: eleven were “official members” who 

g For more information on the evolution of Sri Lanka’s political system under British 

rule, see Chapter 5. Government and Politics.

h In the early twentieth century, Sri Lanka was ruled by a governor who represented 

the Crown’s authority on the island. In 1833, a Legislative Council was established, consisting primarily of colonial officials. It also contained a few “unofficial” members representing the local European population, as well as representatives appointed by the governor 

from the Sinhalese, Tamil, and Burgher communities. In 1912, the British introduced the 

elective principle into the Council, and so the Council gained another Ceylonese member 

that was elected by the local population, albeit under a restricted franchise. This seat on 

the Council was known as the “Educated Ceylonese” seat, because electors had to meet 

certain professional, educational, or income qualifications. For more information on the 

evolution of Sri Lanka’s political system under British rule, see Chapter 5. Government and 

Politics.
Chapter 3. Historical Context

47

were predominantly English citizens nominated by the (British) governor, and the remaining twelve were “unofficial” members consisting 

primarily of Ceylonese and local Europeans and Burghers.i Of these 

twelve, only four were elected, with the rest nominated by the governor. 

Moreover, the Sinhalese and Tamil political leaders within the CNC 

agreed to a consociational arrangement in which the Tamils would be 

assured “a fair share” of legislative seats under any system of reform.17,j

In 1921, a new constitution was adopted, and in 1924, it was amended 

to provide for an elected legislative majority, an increase in territorially elected members, and the election of communal members.k

 Subsequently, the Sinhalese increased pressures for more extensive territorial 

representation and less communal representation, which favored the 

Sinhalese in any such election (because they constituted approximately 

three-quarters of the population), eroded the prospects for Tamil representation by election, and undermined the informal assurances of 

a fair share of seats by consociational agreement. As a general rule of 

thumb, it can be said that, from the 1920s, there was an inverse relationship between the Ceylonese movement toward independence and Sinhalese-Tamil political cooperation and ethnic friendship. Ultimately, 

the attainment of independence led to the initiation of violent conflict.

The Donoughmore Constitution, named for the special constitutional commission chaired by the British earl of Donoughmore, 

replaced the existing constitution in April 1931. The new constitution 

outlined a considerable devolution of power and responsibility from 

the British to the Ceylonese, with self-government as the ultimate goal. 

At the government apex were the British governor and the Ceylon 

State Council. The Ceylon State Council, which replaced the Legislative Council, was elected by territorial constituencies through universal 

adult suffrage and combined executive and legislative powers. However, 

in the hope of encouraging the development of national political parties and reducing racial divisions, the new constitution abolished communal elections and representation.18 Later that year, the Jaffna Youth 

i Burghers are mixed-race Ceylonese who can claim European ancestors on their 

father’s side.

j In a political context, a consociational arrangement is an agreement between two or 

more groups to share power in accordance with a mutually acceptable formula. In Ceylon, 

this was to be a fair share of seats in parliament. In other countries, such as Nigeria or precivil war Lebanon, the arrangement takes the form of alternating the office of president 

and vice president by the dominant political groups.

k Within a communal election, an election is held for an electorate that consists 

entirely of members from a particular community (e.g., Ceylonese Muslims), who will typically return a member from their community to represent them in the Legislative Council. 

Within a territorial election, all eligible voters within a given territory, regardless of which 

ethnic or racial group they belong to, can participate in electing a representative.
48

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Congress boycotted the first general election in Jaffna constituencies to 

protest limited Tamil self-representation. Their goal was purana swaraj

or complete self-government. Within two years, however, the Jaffa Youth 

Congress protest movement had exhausted itself, and the Tamils were 

left without direct representation in the government.19

In the 1930s, sensing the gradual evolution toward greater self-rule, 

the Tamils pressed for greater political representation for the Tamil 

community and the establishment of an equal political footing vis-àvis the Sinhalese. G. G. Ponnambalam, a Tamil member of the State 

Council, “spearheaded the demand for balanced representation of the 

minority communities” within a unified Ceylon. Specifically, he pushed 

for a “fifty-fifty solution,” namely, a communally based legislature with 

half of the seats allocated for all the minorities—Ceylon Tamils, Indian 

Tamils, Muslims, Malays, Burghers and Europeans—and the other half 

for the Sinhalese.20 Not all minority groups supported the initiative, 

and in 1938 Governor Sir Andrew Caldecott refused to endorse it. For 

S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, another prominent Tamil politician, the goal 

was as follows:

The unity of the Tamil people of the Northern and 

Eastern Provinces and of all the Tamil-speaking peoples in Ceylon, in particular the Tamil-speaking Muslims of the Eastern Province and the Indian Tamil 

plantation workers (whom he referred to as “hill country Tamils,” thus avoiding the designation “Indian”), 

but including also all the other Ceylon Tamils scattered throughout the seven Sinhala provinces.21

Several years later in 1944, during the midst of World War II, the 

British formed the Soulbury Commission on Constitutional Reform to 

explore the possibility of further devolution of authority to Ceylonese 

political institutions. That same year, G. G. Ponnambalam formed the 

All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), with Chelvanayakaml

 as its deputy 

leader, after realizing the need for a political organization capable of 

formulating and articulating the Tamils’ demands to the commission.23

Meanwhile, Ponnambalam was experiencing difficulties within the 

government. He found himself unable to produce acceptable resolutions to Tamil concerns relating to citizenship rights for Indian Tamil 

plantation workers or equal status for the Sinhala and Tamil languages. In addition, Ponnambalam was unable to end state-sanctioned 

l As recently described on TamilNet, “Mr. S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, founder of the Ilankai 

Tamil Arasu Katchchi (ITAK) and fondly called by Tamils as “Thanthai” (father) . . . Till 

his death on April 26th in 1977, Mr. Chelvanayakam was the acknowledged leader of the 

Tamil people. He was the only statesman to be returned in five general elections in a row 

and to remain a hero and a father figure to his people for thirty-three years.”22
Chapter 3. Historical Context

49

colonization of Tamil areas by Sinhalese colonists.24 Despite these difficulties, Ponnambalam continued to believe that Tamil concerns could 

be addressed through the government, a remnant of the cross-communal elitist ethos of the late nineteenth century. Many within the Tamil 

leadership at this juncture believed that the British presence would 

continue and that Ceylon would be granted restricted self-government 

rather than complete independence. The situation changed rapidly 

when Britain transferred power to India and Pakistan in 1947.

The Soulbury Commission Report, published in September 1945, 

recommended a significant revision of the governmental structure. The 

centerpiece of the new structure was a Cabinet of Ministers, with a prime 

minister appointed by the British governor-general and a bicameral legislature. The First Chamber would consist of ninety-five elected members and six governor-general nominees. The Second Chamber would 

consist of thirty members, half elected by the First Chamber and half 

chosen by the governor-general. The British governor-general would 

maintain control over external affairs, defense, and currency, as well 

as several major institutions, such as the Supreme Court. The report 

also proposed to retain universal suffrage.25 In October, the British government announced its intention to support constitutional reform in 

Ceylon on the basis of the Soulbury Report recommendations. Subsequently, the Ceylon State Council voted by fifty-three to three to accept 

the report’s proposals. G. G. Ponnambalam presented the case for balanced representation (i.e., the fifty-fifty solution) to the Soulbury Commission, but the proposal was not accepted by the commission. This left 

Ponnambalam disappointed with the passage of the reform proposals 

and upset at Tamil members in the State Council who had voted for the 

reform package. Chelvanayakam, one of the other top officials within 

the ACTC, preferred a more federalized political system that devolved 

greater authority to Sri Lanka’s regions than that entailed in the Soulbury Report, but in the end he voted for the Soulbury reforms.

In the political campaigns preceding the 1947 general election, the 

competing parties emphasized political differences rather than communal issues. The victorious United National Party (UNP) won fortytwo seats in the First Chamber, and Don Stephen Senanayake became 

the first prime minister of Ceylon. The main opposition groups were 

three Marxist parties: the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaj (ten seats), the 

Bolshevik-Leninist Party (five seats), and the Communist Party (Stalinist) (five seats). The Ceylon Tamil Congress secured seven seats, and 

the Ceylon Indian Congress had six  seats.26 In September, the UNP 

co-opted ACTC founder G. G. Ponnambalam, who joined the cabinet 

despite major objections within his own party.
50

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

In June 1947, the British government announced its intention to 

seek a further revision of the Ceylon Constitution, which would confer “full responsible status within the British Commonwealth.” On the 

basis of bilateral agreements, the Ceylonese were to assume authority over defense and external affairs, but the British governor-general 

would retain considerable authority over appointments to the government, including appointments to the office of the prime minister and 

the cabinet.27 The Ceylonese Independence Bill was approved by the 

British in December 1947.

However, the Ceylonese parties were divided. Whereas the UNP supported the bill, the three Marxist parties, the Tamil Congress, and the 

Indian Congress were all opposed. The Tamil and Indian Congresses 

countered that the Independence Bill did not provide sufficient safeguards for minorities.28 In the view of the Tamil Congress, put forth 

on several occasions since the end of World War II, the First Chamber should be divided on a communal basis in a so-called fifty-fifty 

arrangement, with the Sinhalese having half the seats and the remaining minorities the other half.

POST-INDEPENDENCE HISTORY, 1948–1972

1948–1956

In the mid-1940s, the prospects for an independent dominion of 

Ceylon seemed very high. The island was a relatively prosperous, peaceful, multiethnic state with a British-educated class poised to assume 

leadership. In the British view, an independent Ceylon was destined 

to become a model for other newly independent states.29 However, this 

British expectation proved elusive.

In February 1948, a new constitution went into effect. The governor-general still held considerable power. The legislature was divided 

into two houses: first a thirty-seat Senate with half elected by the 

lower house and half appointed by the governor-general and second 

a 101-seat House of Representatives with ninety-five members elected 

in several voting districts and up to six  members appointed by the

governor-general.30 Interestingly, the new constitution contained no 

statement of national principles in a preamble, nor, even more significant in light of future events, a bill of rights that might have protected 

the rights of minorities.31

Within a year, the government headed by the UNP, in conjunction 

with northern Tamil politicians and parties, took steps to deprive the 

Indian Tamils of their citizenship and right to vote. Subsequently, about 

half of the Indian Tamils were forcibly repatriated to the Indian state 
Chapter 3. Historical Context

51

of Tamil Nadu, primarily to give Sinhalese candidates in the tea-estate 

area of central Ceylon easier electoral victories.32

In the immediate post-independence period, Sri Lanka’s parliamentary system awarded seats on the basis of election by plurality in largely 

homogenous, ethnic regions of the country. This led to the election of 

candidates who appealed to the most extreme elements of their ethnic constituencies, as the candidates had no reason to accommodate 

appeals from other ethnic groups whose members were not present 

in any electorally meaningful numbers within their districts. Likewise, 

candidates running for national office had much more to gain from 

appealing to nationalist Sinhalese voters than to moderate Tamil voters because of the overall majority number of Sinhalese. As a result, 

the parliament was eventually dominated by two main Sinhalese parties (the UNP and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, or SLFP), although it 

also included some smaller third parties that represented other groups, 

including Sri Lankan Tamils, Muslims, and Indian Tamils.m

The sheer numerical superiority of the Sinhalese electorate meant 

that, even if a party aspired to gain ruling status, it need not appeal 

to any of the state’s ethnic minorities. This was clearly demonstrated 

on numerous occasions when Sinhalese-led governments attempted to 

implement policies to accommodate Tamil grievances but invariably 

mobilized such powerful opposition from Sinhalese nationalists that 

the issue of Tamil autonomy determined the political fortunes of the 

major Sinhalese parties. If one party supported the proposal, the opposition party would oppose it and leech supporters away from the more 

“accommodationist” politicians.33

Sri  Lanka’s post-independence governing environment has been 

characterized by cycles of accommodation and obstruction of Tamil 

rights, all within an atmosphere of increasing ethnic polarization. 

Upon gaining independence in 1948, the UNP portrayed itself as a 

multiethnic party, albeit one with Sinhalese leadership, and made electoral appeals to all ethnic groups. The UNP owed its early success to 

the relatively high level of integration between the Sinhalese and Tamil 

elite, with many attending the same schools and having struggled side 

by side in the independence movement.n However, as the memory of 

m Indian Tamils are also known as “up-country” Tamils because of their residence on 

the tea plantations of the central highlands where their ancestors were brought to work by 

the British.

n This partially explains the British failure to predict the coming tide of ethnic conflict. Because the very uppermost echelons of the elite were relatively well integrated, the 

British mistook this condition as representative of the entire population. Indeed, most of 

the attempts at accommodation have occurred under the UNP, whose leadership has been 

drawn primarily from among these colonial-era elites and their descendants.
52

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

British imperialism receded, so too did this brief experiment in nonidentity-based politics.

In the 1952 national election, the UNP and the Tamil Congress, 

though recent opponents, were closely allied. The central issues of 

the election were the domestic Marxist challenge to religion and the 

fear that the Marxists and the Ceylon Indian Congress, which largely 

represented the Indian Tamil community, would join forces to “flood 

the country with Indians.”34 As a result, the UNP was again victorious, 

increasing its seats in the House of Representatives from forty-two to 

fifty-four (see Table 3-1).

Table 3-1. 1952 election results

Group Before Election After Election

Government

UNP 42 54

Independents 10 15

Tamil Congress 6 4

Labor 1 1

Other

Sri Lanka Freedom Party 9 9

Three Marxist parties 20 13

Ceylon Indian Congress 7 0

Republican Party 2 1

Federalists 2 2

Independent 1 1

Adapted from W. Ivor Jennings, “Politics in Ceylon,” Far Eastern Survey 21, 

no. 17 (1952): 179.

The year 1956 was a time of great expectation among the Sinhalese 

Buddhists. It marked the 2,500-year anniversary of the death of the 

Buddha and the landing of Vijaya and his followers on the island.35 The 

year was also a watershed in Sri Lankan politics. On a tide of Sinhalese 

nationalism, which demanded that the Sinhalese-Buddhist majority 

should have its “rightful” share of economic and employment benefits,36 the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (People’s United Front) coalition—which included the radical socialist SLFP, under Solomon West 

Ridgeway Dias (S. W. R. D.) Bandaranaike, and the Viplavakari Lanka 

Samaja Party, under Philip Gunawardens—swept to victory. From this 

point forward, political success in Sri Lanka would rest largely on the 

commitment of leaders to the parochial interests of their co-ethnic 

constituents, amounting to a situation where interethnic clashes are 
Chapter 3. Historical Context

53

frequently precipitated by intraethnic political competition in which 

the most hard-line ethnic politicians garner the support of their 

constituents.37

In the 1956 electoral campaign, for example, Bandaranaike made 

strong appeals to Sinhalese chauvinism and Buddhist revivalism. As a 

key element of his campaign, Bandaranaike argued that the Sinhalese 

race, religion, and culture would “vanish” without a Sinhala-only language policy.

However, in the Sri Lankan context, a policy in favor of the Sinhala 

language not only had significant positive implications for the Sinhalese 

but also considerable negative consequences for all minorities. Since 

the era of British colonization, English was the official language of the 

state; therefore, English competency was the basis for political and economic advancement. Yet, in 1956, only about six to eight  percent of 

the population was proficient in English, and the majority of this percentage was Tamil.38 Rather than compete with the Tamils where the 

Tamils had the advantage, Bandaranaike and his followers proposed to 

replace English with Sinhala as the official language. In this way, they 

believed, the Sinhalese would acquire greater access to political influence and employment opportunities at the Tamil’s expense.

As prime minister, Bandaranaike quickly introduced the Official 

Language Act of 1956, otherwise known as the Sinhala-only Act, which 

designated Sinhala as “the one official language of Ceylon,”39,o

 replacing English in political and educational institutions. The draft bill contained several provisions to protect Tamil rights, but these provisions 

were generally limited to the northern areas in which the Tamils were 

the local majority. However, many Sinhalese- and Buddhist-dominated 

groups objected to these concessions and mounted organized protests, 

accusing the government of “placating” the Tamils.40 Under such pressures, the Bandaranaike government crumbled and eliminated the 

Tamil safeguards. It did, though, make an effort to conciliate Tamil 

opinion with the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act No. 28 of 

1958, which dealt with the use of the Tamil language for educational 

instruction, for administrative purposes in the Northern and Eastern 

Provinces, and for test-taking purposes for admittance into the civil service. However, subsequent legislation needed for the implementation of 

this act was not submitted for parliamentary approval until 1966, when a 

UNP government under Dudley Senanayake returned to power.41

o An Act to Prescribe the Sinhala Language of Ceylon and to Enable Certain Transitory Provisions to Be Made. The Act is often shortened to Official Language Act.
54

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

1956–1972

As the primary target of the Sinhala-only language policy, the 

Sri Lankan Tamils mounted large protests and riots, demanding not 

only language protection but also a constitutional modification instituting a federal system of government and granting a measure of 

autonomy for the Tamil regions.42 In addition, Chelvanayakam, the 

leader of the Tamil Federal Party, threatened a countrywide peaceful 

resistance campaign. The more extremist Tamils threatened to separate the northern territory from Sri Lankan government control and 

seek unity with kindred Tamil areas in south India.43

Under these tense conditions, the Sinhalese and Tamil leaders 

reached a compromise. In the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam (B-C) 

Pact of July 26, 1957, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike and Chelvanayakam 

agreed to a plan that would have granted language protections and a 

degree of administrative self-rule in the form of regional councils in 

the north and east.p Describing the discussions, the text of the pact 

stated the following:

Regarding the language issue, the [Tamil] Federal 

Party reiterated its stand for parity but in view of the 

position of the Prime Minister in this matter they came 

to an agreement by way of adjustment. They pointed 

out that it was important for them there would be a 

recognition of Tamil as a national language and that 

the administration of the Northern and the Eastern 

Provinces should be done in Tamil.

The Prime Minister stated that it was not possible for 

him to take any steps that would abrogate the Official 

Language Act.

After discussion it was agreed that the proposed legislation should contain recognition of Tamil as the 

language of the national minority of Ceylon and that 

the four points mentioned by Prime Minister should 

include provision that, without infringing on the position of the Official Language as such, the language of 

administration of the Northern and Eastern Provinces 

be Tamil, and that any necessary provision be made 

p A significant effect of such devolution would have been linguistic autonomy and the 

return of Tamil civil servants, company clerks, and traders to Tamil-dominated areas. This 

would have reversed the flow of migration of educated and wealthy Tamils back to Jaffna 

and away from the capital Colombo, a move that would have strengthened Sinhalese economic prospects.44
Chapter 3. Historical Context

55

for the non-Tamil speaking minorities in the Northern 

and Eastern Provinces.45

However, sustained opposition from the UNP (now in opposition), 

bhikkus (monks), and Sinhalese nationalists, exacerbated by the bus 

riots,q

 forced Bandaranaike to abrogate the pact in April 1958.

When communal tensions further intensified, the government was 

forced in May 1958 to request and receive a state of emergency proclamation from the governor-general. Members of the Tamil Federal Party 

and extremist groups on both sides were placed under house arrest from 

June to September. Subsequently, the government passed several halfhearted legislative measures on language rights for the Tamils, but it 

was too little and too late, especially because the new legislation did not 

enact the regional councils or the modicum of administrative autonomy 

originally envisioned in the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact.

In 1959, events culminated with the assassination of Prime Minister 

Bandaranaike, who was succeeded by his wife Sirimavo Bandaranaike 

as prime minister and SLFP leader. Under Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the 

SLFP instituted radical socialist economic policies such as nationalization and land reform, as well as blatantly pro-Sinhalese educational 

and employment policies.

By the early 1960s, the Ceylonese economy began to stagnate, as 

earnings from Ceylon’s major exports, tea and rubber, significantly 

decreased and led to the largest budget deficits in Ceylon’s history.46

As a consequence, the increasing cost of government social services 

and consumer subsidies produced a steady rise in the cost of living and 

unemployment.47 Combined with one of the highest rates of population growth in the world at the time, the economy stagnated.

In January  1962, the government was successful in forestalling a 

planned coup d’état by a group of military and police officers. Eventually, the government arrested twenty-four  people, mostly upper-class 

elites, including several members of prominent and wealthy Christian 

families in Colombo.48 These actions provoked a stern foreign response, 

including a discontinuation of US aid and an oil boycott, and led to an 

increasing economic crisis.

In 1965, the UNP under Dudley Shelton Senanayake returned to 

power with the support of the Tamil Federal Party. The new prime 

q Under its nationalized transport system, the Sri Lankan government allocated new 

buses to the Tamil areas. However, markings on the buses were in the Sinhala language. 

The Tamils took this as a major affront, and protests ensued. In response, Sinhalese rioters attacked Tamil shops and shopkeepers in Colombo, while the Sri Lankan police made 

little effort to intervene. More than 200 Buddhist monks carried out a sit-down protest in 

front of Bandaranaike’s residence. Many Tamils lost their homes in Sinhalese regions and 

were evacuated to Jaffna.
56

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

minister and Chelvanayakam reached agreement on a new effort to 

devolve authority to the Tamil areas in the form of the SenanayakeChelvanayakam (S-C) Pact, which was negotiated in an effort to accommodate Tamil grievances. According to the text of the agreement:

Mr. Senanayake agreed that action on the following lines would be taken by him to ensure a stable 

government:

(1) Action will be taken early under the Tamil Language Special Provisions Act to make provision of the 

Tamil Language of Administration and of Record in 

the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

Mr. Senanayake explained that it was the policy of his 

party that a Tamil-speaking person should be entitled 

to transact business in Tamil throughout the island.

(2) Mr. Senanayake stated that it was the policy of his 

party to amend the Languages of Courts Act to provide for legal proceedings in the Northern and Eastern Provinces to be conducted and recorded in Tamil.

(3) Action will be taken to establish district councils in 

Ceylon vested with powers over subjects to be mutually 

agreed upon between two leaders. It was agreed, however, that the government should have power under 

the law to give directions to such councils under the 

national interest.

(4) The Land Development Ordinance will be 

amended to provide that citizens of Ceylon be entitled 

to the allotment of land under the Ordinance.

Mr. Senanayake further agreed that in the granting 

of land under colonization schemes the following 

priorities be observed in the Northern and Eastern 

Provinces:

(a) Land in the Northern and Eastern Provinces 

should in the first instance be granted to landless persons in the district.

(b) Second, to Tamil-speaking persons resident in the 

Northern and Eastern Provinces.

(c) Third, to other citizens in Ceylon, preference being 

given to Tamil citizens in the rest of the island.49
Chapter 3. Historical Context

57

Tamil politicians were briefly included in a coalition government 

from 1965 to 1968, but the S-C agreement was again abrogated in the 

face of virulent Sinhalese opposition, this time led by the opposition 

SLFP despite their earlier stance supporting a devolution of authority 

through the B-C Pact.r

As a consequence of Sinhalese efforts and policies, Sinhala speakers 

became more and more numerically preponderant in the civil service. 

From 1956 to 1970, the proportions of Tamils employed by the state fell 

from sixty to ten percent in the professions, from thirty to five percent 

in the administrative service, from fifty to five percent in the clerical 

service, and from forty to one percent in the armed forces.”50 In the 

period from February 1962 to February 1963, for example, 1,157 Tamils recruited before 1956 were compelled to leave public service on the 

grounds that they were unable to work in Sinhalese.51

In May 1970, the United Front coalition, led by Sirimavo Bandaranaike of the SLFP and also consisting of the Trotskyite Lanka Sama 

Samaja Party (Ceylon Equal Society Party, or LSSP) and the Communist Party (Moscow Wing), swept into power. By securing a two-thirds 

majority in the legislature, the coalition did not need to rely on Tamil 

parties for support. Yet despite the presence of a leftist government, 

the Marxist JVP attempted to overthrow the Sirimavo Bandaranaike 

regime during an insurrection in April  1971. Despite being initially 

taken by surprise, the government was able to largely suppress the 

insurrection within a few weeks.

In 1972, Ceylon adopted a new constitution, and the name of the 

country was changed to Sri Lanka.52 The constitution’s preamble indicated that the state was to have a unitary form of government and was 

pledged to achieve a “socialist democracy,” including full employment 

of all working-age citizens, equal distribution of the social product, and 

collective forms of property.53,54

Emergence of Violence, 1972–1983

Although the two  decades after independence saw an oscillation 

of intercommunal violence and formal attempts at reconciliation, the 

events of the 1970s eventually set the two rival ethnic groups on a collision course. In 1971, legislation was passed that led to higher university 

r The Tamil Federal Party (FP) members of parliament supported Sinhalese leaders 

at various points when those leaders made pacts with Tamil leaders or agreed to implement certain legislation. However, at times there was a steep price to pay for reaching 

across the ethnic divide to reach an accommodation. One of the motivations for the assassination of Prime Minister Bandaranaike by an extremist Buddhist monk was unhappiness 

over Bandaranaike’s efforts to appease Tamils.
58

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

exam requirements for Tamil speakers, whose representation at the 

university level at that time exceeded their percentage of the total population. Moreover, the introduction of a district quota system meant 

that many well-educated Tamils from Jaffna and Colombo (the historic 

education centers of the country) could not gain entrance to university because spaces were reserved for lower-scoring students from less 

affluent rural districts. With almost no opportunities for employment 

in agriculture or industry, which were negligible in the north, and 

reduced opportunities in the public sector as a result of the Sinhalaonly legislation, this closing of the door to university access eliminated 

one of the few remaining avenues for upward mobility, wealth, and status for Tamil youths.55

The next year, in 1972, the government formalized a number of 

preexisting anti-Tamil policies by incorporating them into the constitution. Buddhism was accorded “the foremost place,” with the state 

directed “to protect and foster” it, and Sinhala was made the sole 

official language of the country, with Tamil permissible by statute.56

By this point, the Official Language Act of 1956 had led to the deTamilization of the civil service, and, as stated previously, policies in 

the early 1970s made it more difficult for Tamils to gain entrance into 

the country’s universities. These factors led to the radicalization of 

Tamil youth and prompted a proliferation of separatist organizations. 

Two  days after the new constitution’s adoption, three Tamil parties 

joined in forming the Tamil United Front (TUF). Soon, as many as 

thirty-six explicitly militant groups were in operation, including the 

Tamil New Tigers (TNT).57,s

 In January 1974, when Sri Lankan police 

attacked the Fourth International Tamil Conference in Jaffna, killing 

eleven Tamils, the mood among the Tamils, especially the youth, turned 

from alienation and protest to overt defiance and militant action.

Open advocacy of violent acts against the state led to the arrest of 

many Tamil leaders.58 As a consequence, even the less extremist organizations that were actively engaged in the political system began to 

change in nature and methods. For example, the TUF changed its name 

to the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) to emphasize a more 

radical approach,59 and the TNT would soon give rise to the LTTE.

The TULF included not only the Federal Party of the Sri Lankan 

Tamils but also the Ceylon Workers’ Congress (CWC) of the Indian 

Tamils, thus uniting the two major Tamil groups under one umbrella 

for the first time. At its first national convention in May 1976, the TULF 

adopted the Vaddukoddai Resolution, unambiguously advocating for 

the first time a separate Tamil Eelam (homeland),60 stating,

s For a list of such organizations, see Appendix B. Tamil Terrorist Organizations.
Chapter 3. Historical Context

59

Restoration and reconstitution of the Free, Sovereign, 

Secular, Socialist State of Tamil Eelam, based on the 

right of self-determination inherent to every nation, 

has become inevitable in order to safeguard the very 

existence of the Tamil Nation in this Country.

The Vaddukoddai Resolution further directed the TULF Action 

Committee to formulate an action plan to launch the “struggle for winning the sovereignty and freedom of the Tamil Nation.” The resolution 

also defined the proposed boundaries for Tamil Eelam (see Figure 3-1): 

the Northern Province (districts of Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, and Vavuniya) and the Eastern Province (districts of Ampara, 

Batticaloa, and Trincomalee).t

The LTTE, established by Velupillai Prabhakaran in May 1976, was 

small in number and limited in scope.62 Prabhakaran’s initial intention 

was to create an elite force, ruthlessly efficient and highly professional,63

with in-depth training and strict discipline. Initially, the primary targets were moderate Tamil politicians and police.64 Soon, the group 

sought more important targets, including the assassinations of Alfred 

Duraiappah, the SLFP mayor of Jaffna, in 1975 and M. Kanagaratnam, 

a Tamil member of the Sri  Lankan parliament, in 1977. Successful 

recruitment, especially among Tamil students, increased membership 

and allowed the LTTE to expand its targets to include local security 

forces. In addition, bank robberies were a major source of income.65,u

t Shortly thereafter, the TULF added the district of Puttalam. It is noteworthy that 

the proposed state of Tamil Eelam did not include the area of central Sri Lanka, where 

the Indian Tamils were concentrated.61

u However, recruitment was less successful among the rural poor, who were ambivalent to the LTTE cause.
60

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Bay of Bengal

Gulf of Mannar

Palk Strait

Indian Ocean

Trincomalee

0 10 20 Miles

0 10 20 KM

Colombo

Anuradhapura

Jaffna

Kurunegala

Kandy

Badulla

Ratnapura

Galle

Talaimannar

Negombo

Batticaloa

Kalmunai

Districts of Sri Lanka

National Capitals

Cities 0-250,000

Proposed Tamil Eelam State

Province Capitals

Anuradhapura Trincomalee

Polonaruwa

Kurunegala Matale

Baticaloa

Ampara

Moneragala

Hambantota

Matara

Galle

Kalutara Ratnapura

Colombo

Gampaha Kegalle

Kandy

Nuwara

Eliya 

Badulla

Puttalam

Mannar

Vavuniya

Mullaitivu

Kilinochchi

Jaffna

Figure 3-1. Sri Lankan districts, with the boundaries for Tamil Eelam in red.

Although Tamil politicians were elected to parliament through provincial elections in 1977, militant activity continued. In fact, the elections themselves became a major vehicle for political violence, with each 

round eliciting increasingly organized and systematic attacks by various 

parties.66 Still, in the 1977 general election, TULF members secured 

eighteen of the twenty-three seats they contested (see Table 3-2). In the 

Northern Province in particular, the TULF received a majority of votes 
Chapter 3. Historical Context

61

in Jaffna District (seventy-two  percent), Vavuniya (fifty-six  percent), 

and Mannar (fifty-two percent).67

Table 3-2. 1977 election results68

Party Seats

UNP 140

TULF 18

SLFP 8

CWC 1

Independent 1

Finally, in 1978, the electoral system was altered to include a separately elected executive and a party-list system that included proportional 

representation in multimember districts, and with these two electoral 

reforms, Sinhalese politicians could no longer safely ignore the Tamil 

vote.v By this time, however, most Tamil politicians had already boycotted parliament, and armed insurrection had taken hold.69 The strength 

of Sinhala nationalism and the failure of mainstream Tamil politicians 

to secure any noticeable gains therefore encouraged the eventual 

growth and sustainment of radical Tamil separatist movements.

The new constitution of 1978, which defined the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka as a unitary state (Article 2), reinforced the 

provisions of the 1972 constitution concerning the primacy of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. On one hand, the constitution granted all people 

the rights to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, speech, and 

assembly (Articles 10 and 14). On the other hand, it specified that Buddhism was to have “the foremost place” in the country (Article 9). It 

also mandated that it is the state’s duty “to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana.”70,w Although Buddhism did not become a state religion, 

all other religions and systems of thought were clearly deemed secondary under the constitution.72 The constitution further declared Sinhala 

to be the “official language” of Sri Lanka (Article 18) used for administrative purposes throughout the country, except for public records 

maintenance and public institution transactions in the Northern and 

Eastern Provinces (Article 22). Both Sinhala and Tamil were described 

v A multimember district is one that returns more than one member to the 

legislature.

w Obeyesekere noted that sasana can be loosely translated as the Buddhist “church” 

and that doctrinally it refers to the universal Buddhist community or church that transcends ethnic and other boundaries.71
62

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

as “National Languages” (Article 19) for specific purposes such as parliamentary activities and education.73

Communal violence continued to escalate in the 1970s and into 

the 1980s, marked by the burning of the Jaffna Library (which housed 

90,000 Tamil books and manuscripts) in 198174,75 and culminating in 

the anti-Tamil riots that killed an estimated 2,500 Tamils in 1983.76,x

Sparked by an LTTE attack on a Sri Lanka Army convoy that killed 

thirteen soldiers, the 1983 riots would prove to be a seminal event in 

modern Sri  Lankan history, as official hostilities between the LTTE 

and the government commenced thereafter. After the killing of the 

thirteen soldiers, certain enraged army elements displayed the mangled corpses in the cemetery of Kanatte in Colombo, after which commenced a wave of killings of Tamils by Sinhalese mobs, some of whom 

chanted “Victory to the Sinhalese Army.”77 Indications of possible preplanning include the use of voter lists and addresses of Tamil shops, 

homes, and businesses, as mobs sought to kill and drive out Tamils 

from Colombo.y

 Gangs associated with the Jathika Sevaka Samithiya 

(JSS), a government-run union organized by the highly sectarian Minister of Industry Cyril Mathew, went on a rampage. The JSS carried out 

intelligence activities, as it reportedly developed dossiers on Tamils that 

included information on where they lived and the property and businesses they owned.81

Most of Wellawatte, an area of Colombo where many Tamils 

resided, was burned down, and riots spread to other cities and also 

targeted Indian (especially south Indian) commercial interests. Much 

of Wellawatte was destroyed by men who were transported many miles 

x Official Sri Lankan government statistics claimed that only 350 Tamils were killed 

in the rioting.

y “False consciousness,” specifically the displacement of economic anxiety and 

class concerns onto a paradigm of ethnic conflict, may have played a role as well. Some 

have argued that the targeting of Tamil commercial establishments was a result of the 

frustrations felt by the Sinhalese after the liberalization of the economy that had been 

undertaken by the UNP government a few years earlier.78 According to this argument, the 

liberalization in foreign trade enacted by the government negatively impacted Sinhalese 

economic interests, because Sinhalese businesses with political connections had previously 

benefited from a permit-quota-license system that was dismantled by the reforms.79 Many 

of the businesses that were shuttered in the face of cheap foreign imports were owned by 

Sinhalese entrepreneurs that employed Sinhalese labor, who had to be discharged once 

their firms failed. Tamil entrepreneurs lacked the connections to avail themselves of this 

form of protection against international competition and so they were better prepared to 

compete under the new liberalized foreign trade regime. Thus, there emerged the perception that Tamils were benefiting under liberalization at the expense of the Sinhalese, 

given preexisting experience with international trade. This added to Sinhalese frustration, as they were already upset over perceptions that the Tamils controlled wholesale and 

retail trade in Colombo. Perhaps as a reflection of this argument, Neelan Thiruchelvam, a 

Tamil member of parliament, stated “This time the Tamil entrepreneurial class has been 

destroyed.”80
Chapter 3. Historical Context

63

in trucks belonging to the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, and attackers also used vehicles owned by the Sri Lanka Transport Board and 

other government departments.82 The armed forces also participated 

in these activities, as army personnel in Colombo actively encouraged 

arson and the looting of businesses and homes in Colombo (and in 

many cases participating in looting), and in Trincomalee, sailors 

from the Sri Lankan navy participated in killings, looting, and setting 

houses and businesses ablaze.83 Often described as a “pogrom,” these 

events reinforced the LTTE message that nothing short of a separate 

Tamil state would provide the community with security. No government response to the riots was forthcoming other than the issuance of 

an edict outlawing separatism. The anti-Tamil violence spurred mass 

migration, resulting in further geographic polarization along ethnic 

lines and a large supply of displaced people who were quickly absorbed 

by the recruitment arms of the militant groups.84

In addition to this escalation in ethnic violence, resettlement and 

state irrigation projects sponsored by the Sri Lankan government in 

the 1980s further exacerbated tensions by relocating tens of thousands 

of landless Sinhalese from the south and west into Tamil-majority 

lands in the east. These projects brought Sinhalese and Tamil farmers 

into direct conflict over water resources that were increasingly being 

diverted to support the sugarcane production practiced mostly by resettled Sinhalese. The projects were also framed as a return to the days 

of the ancient Sinhalese kingdoms that dominated the east, thus further enhancing both Tamil and Muslim fears of being overrun. These 

government-designed settlement programs exposed Sinhala settlers 

to acts of vengeance from Tamil groups who considered them legitimate military targets, resulting in an anti-Tamil mindset among settler 

families whose sons were increasingly recruited into either the regular 

army or paramilitary organizations.85 In a country where eight-five percent of the population is rural, the resettlement schemes had a major 

impact on the demographic composition in many provinces, shifting 

the majority-minority distribution between ethnic groups and further 

exacerbating ethnic tensions.z

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The discussions earlier in this chapter on Sri Lanka’s colonial experience and developments on the subcontinent indicate that global 

and regional developments had an impact on the island. This section 

z For data on the changing demographic composition of the Eastern Province during 

the twentieth and early twenty-first century, see International Crisis Group, Asia Report, 

no. 159.86
64

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

expands on this theme by attempting to more fully situate developments in Sri Lanka within a broader context. While the island (at least 

as seen by policymakers outside of India) is not a military or diplomatic appendage of India, clearly events on the subcontinent, such 

as the decline of Buddhism and the divide between north and south 

India, had an impact on Sri Lanka. Below these themes are explored 

more fully, and European colonialism in the Indian Ocean region is 

discussed more broadly, noting the impact of these regional developments on Sri Lanka.

Additionally, upon independence in 1948, Sri Lanka’s leaders found 

themselves with the responsibility to craft a foreign policy, which since 

1815 had been the obligation of the island’s imperial rulers. Suddenly 

the newly independent country’s elected leaders had to contend with 

an emerging bipolar world divided into communist and capitalist blocs. 

This section, therefore, includes a discussion of the impact of emerging 

post-war trends on Sri Lanka, with particular emphasis placed on Chinese and Soviet policies in the Indian Ocean region and with respect 

to Sri Lanka. The section concludes with a brief discussion of some of 

the key trends in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy before the emergence of 

conflict with the various Tamil militant groups.

Precolonial India

In the absence of reliable history texts of the period, events in the 

Indian subcontinent before the thirteenth century BC are difficult to 

detail and verify. Traditionally, the history of the subcontinent begins 

with the arrival of the Aryans in the northwest area at the “Land of 

the Seven Rivers” around present-day Punjab. Bringing with them the 

Sanskrit language and a socioeconomic caste system, the Aryans probably moved eastward into the Doab region of north-central India as 

depicted in the epics Mahabharata and Ramayana.

In the mid- to late fifth century BC emerged two philosophicaltheological schools: the Buddhist founded by Siddhartha Gautama (the 

Buddha or Enlightened One) and Jainism under Nataputta (Mahavira

or Great Hero). At the age of thirty-five, Gautama attained enlightenment and developed the concept of the Middle Way between indulgence and asceticism.

In the early part of the fourth century BC, India’s first large kingdom, the Mauryan Empire, emerged under Chandragupta. Described 

as “probably the most extensive ever forged by an Indian dynasty,”87

existing evidence suggests that Chandragupta’s empire reached from 

Afghanistan in the northwest and Gujarat in the west-central to Bengal on the east coast. Ashoka, Chandragupta’s grandson, further 
Chapter 3. Historical Context

65

extended the empire with the conquest of Kalinga (roughly presentday Orissa) on the east coast. It was this Ashoka who reportedly sent 

his son, Mahinda, on a Buddhist mission to the Ceylonese island. After 

Ashoka’s death in 231 BC until the empire’s last ruler in 180 BC, the 

Mauryan empire gradually declined and northern India experienced 

numerous ebbs and flows.

In the first century BC, peninsular India, that is, the region below 

the traditional north-south dividing line of the Narmada River, began 

to flourish politically and economically. Until this time, notes one 

observer, “the southern extremity of the subcontinent scarcely features 

in India’s history.”88 In contrast to the Aryan origins of the Sanskrit 

speakers in the north, the southern states were then (and are now) 

populated by four ethnic groups of Dravidian peoples, each with its 

own distinct Dravidian language: the Kannada speakers of Karnataka, 

the Telugu speakers of Andhra Pradesh, the Tamil speakers of Tamil 

Nadu, and the Malayalam speakers of Kerala. Moreover, in contrast to 

the north’s agrarian focus, the southern urbanized areas developed 

with the rapid expansion of trade, especially sea trade with Roman, 

Greek, and Egyptian merchants. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 

cultural as well as economic ties of southern India were drawn across 

the Palk Straits toward the Ceylonese island, rather than northward.

In the early fourth century AD, northern India began to recapture 

its political and military sway with the founding of the Gupta Dynasty 

under Chandragupta (not to be confused with the king of the previous Mauryan Empire). Over its course, the Gupta Dynasty absorbed 

most of the subcontinent, except for the extreme south. Whereas 

the Mauryan Empire had a centrally controlled administration, the 

Gupta Empire was more of a loose feudal system in which subordinate 

states—especially those at a greater distance—were left largely intact 

as they recognized the sovereignty of the Gupta Dynasty and paid the 

appropriate tribute.

By 510, the fierce attacks of the Huns on the Gupta Empire were 

taking their toll. The Huns seized Kashmir, Punjab, and fought their 

way into central India. Most noteworthy, the Hun assaults devastated 

the great centers of Buddhism in Taxila, Peshawar, and Swat and, therewith, largely eliminated not only Buddhism in northern India but also 

the religious “homeland” of Ceylonese/Sri Lankan Sinhalese.

In 375, the Pallavas of Kanchipuram, near Madras, began to establish 

the “first great southern India dynasty.”89 For almost three centuries, 

the Pallavas faced no major challenges and became one of the major 

forces in the sea trade throughout Southeast Asia. Locally, the situation 

changed with the rise of Chalukyas in the Deccan area north of the Pallavas. Then, the two empires continuously jousted directly or indirectly 
66

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

for more than a century. On occasion, the Chalukyas were distracted 

to the north to fend off Arab incursions into Gujarat. For their part, 

the Pallavas sometimes turned their forces south toward Madurai in an 

effort to suppress the Pandyas, allies of the Chalukyas, to support their 

own allies, the Cheras of Kerala, or to intervene in Ceylon in support 

of favored succession candidates.90 In comparison with the local situation, the Pallavas remained a major sea power in Southeast Asia until 

deposed by the emergence of the Srivijayas in the eighth century.

In the latter part of the ninth century, a new Dravidian dynasty, the 

Cholas, rose in the south. After decades of inconclusive combat with 

the Pandyas and Cheras to the south and the powerful Rashtrakutas to 

the north, the Cholas began a rapid expansion of territory under their 

control. First, attacking southward, the Cholas decisively defeated the 

Pandyas and the Cheras. From here, the Cholas successively attacked 

Ceylon, reaching and plundering as far as the ancient capital of Anuradhapura. Then, in defense of their allies, the Eastern Chalukyas, the 

Cholas became embroiled in the Deccan region against the Western 

Chalukyas, becoming “the first south Indian dynasty to intervene in 

the north.”91 In the early eleventh century, the Cholas entered another 

phase of expansion. In 1014, the Cholas again invaded and plundered 

Ceylon. Then, the Pandyas and Cheras were attacked with great success. Subsequently, the Cholas turned north against the Western Chalukyas, and then continued up the east coast reaching the territory of 

the Palas in Bengal.

By the thirteenth century, Muslim forces had successfully occupied 

the land across the north from Afghanistan to Bengal. Between 1296 

and 1312, several Muslim commanders mounted excursions south essentially in search of plunder, rather than territorial conquest. In 1311, one 

of these leaders, Malik Kafur, reached into the deep south with raids 

through the Tamil and Pandya areas. However, the Muslim hold on 

northern India proved vulnerable to invasions by Mongol forces under 

Timur the Lame (Tamerlane) and Afghan forces.

In the aftermath of Muslim disintegration, the subcontinent reverted 

to numerous “strong independent states based on ancient identities of 

lineage, language, dynastic tradition and economic interest.”92 Two of 

the more powerful new states were the Muslim kingdom of Bahmanid 

in the Deccan and its rival, the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar on the 

southern tip of the peninsula. Conflicts between Bahmanid and Vijayanagar, fundamentally border wars with religious overtones, continued 

until an agreement in the late 1440s put an end to hostilities. In the 

1490s, however, the Vijayanagar kingdom was able to take advantage 

of in-fighting among Bahmanid leaders to assert its influence in the 

Deccan region. While the Bahmanid kingdom broke up into four weak 
Chapter 3. Historical Context

67

sultanates, the Vijayanagar kingdom emerged as the most powerful 

kingdom in south India, with control over the present-day regions of 

Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala, and Andhra Pradesh. The Vijayanagar 

kingdom lasted but a short time. In 1565, the four Bahmanid sultanates 

united to crush the Vijayanagar forces in the Battle of Talikota. This 

defeat and the resultant collapse of the Vijayanagar kingdom would 

“spell the end of the south as a separate political arena.”93

While Vijayanagar was reaching its zenith during the reign of 

Krishna-deva-raya in the early sixteenth century, two history-changing 

events were occurring. In the north, Afghan forces under Zahir-ud-din 

Muhammad, also known popularly as Babur (The Tiger), began a series 

of incursions into northwest India. In short order, Babur—a descendant of Timur the Lame on his father’s side and Genghis Khan on his 

mother’s—pushed across northern India and established the Mughal 

Empire, which would ultimately rule over most of India until the nineteenth century. At nearly the same time in the south, but with much longer effect for all of South and Southeast Asia, European explorers were 

rounding the Cape of Good Hope and reaching India’s Kerala coast.

China

By the twelfth century, China had extended its territorial control in 

the north along a line from the Tian Shan Mountains of western Mongolia almost to the Pacific Ocean above present-day Korea and in the 

south along a line from the Pamir Mountains of Central Asia, across the 

Himalayan Mountains of northern India, to the South China Sea. Over 

the next century, it reached into Central Asia as far as Tashkent and 

Samarkand. The advance of the Mongols not only captured the throne 

of China but also spread into Persia and northern India. In addition, 

under the Mongol ruler Kublai Khan, China expanded its interests in 

Indian Ocean trade. After gaining influence in Vietnam, Burma, and 

Java, Kublai Khan established trading posts in Ceylon and southern 

peninsula India and made ten Indian kingdoms tributary to China.94

By the thirteenth century, the Chinese were building the best boats 

sailing in the Indian Ocean. As a result, Chinese traders were able to 

replace the Arabs as the primary commercial carriers in the Indian 

Ocean.95 Under Mongol ruler Kublai Khan, the Chinese regime sent diplomatic emissaries to Ceylon and southern India to establish and maintain diplomatic relations and regional influence in South Asia. Soon, 

Chinese merchants settled in Sumatra, Ceylon, and Calicut on India’s 

west coast. In effect, China’s Mongol dynasty held nearly complete domination of the eastern half of the Indian Ocean and came to control the 

lucrative spice trade across the eastern half of the Indian Ocean.96
68

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

At the beginning of the fifteenth century, under the Han ruler 

Emperor Zhu Di, the Ming Dynasty undertook a major effort to refurbish the Han-centered image of China’s international power and 

prestige in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. To this end, China 

needed to overcome its Confucian tradition as a self-isolated state and 

advance along two paths:97

• Enhance the mainland’s circle of influence over an expanding 

outer ring of subordinate and tributary states

• Broaden its foreign trade ties to secure new sources of commercial 

wealth

For these purposes, China constructed a new imperial fleet under the 

command of Admiral Zheng He. For a period of thirty years beginning 

in 1405, China’s massive fleet sailed the high seas from the mainland 

to Africa, conducting trade, extracting tribute, establishing diplomatic 

ties, and, where necessary, installing new leaders friendly to China.

During his first voyage in 1405, Zheng He landed in numerous 

ports across the Indian Ocean, including Ceylon. For more than a 

millennium, China and Ceylon had been closely linked by common 

ties to Buddhism, beginning with the visit of Fa Hien to India in 401 

and Ceylon in 413.aa However, Zheng He’s visit, at first friendly, ended 

in hostility. According to a Chinese source of the period, Zheng He 

had attempted to steal the Sacred Tooth Relic, which was not only a 

major religious object but also a symbol of sovereignty and legitimacy 

for Ceylonese monarchs.98 In 1408, Zheng He returned to Ceylon with 

a large military force, unseated the king, and took him as a prisoner 

back to China. To the throne, Emperor Zhu Di named a more friendly 

replacement. From then to 1438, Chinese forces occupied Ceylon.99 As 

a consequence, Ceylon fell under China’s influence and paid tribute to 

China until 1459, though Zheng He had to return to Ceylon on several 

“pacifying missions” to secure Ceylonese subordination.100,101 Indeed, 

as one author noted, Chinese authority in the coastal areas of South 

Asia was unchallenged.

At this moment Chinese influence abroad was at 

its peak, and all the important trading ports in the 

Indian Ocean basin and China seas—from Korea and 

Japan throughout the Malay Archipelago and India to 

the east Africa coast—were at least nominally under 

aa As early as the first century AD, Buddhist monks from northern India had begun 

religious missions to China over land routes by way of Central Asia. Fa Hien’s visit was the 

first major, well-documented trips in the opposite direction. After two years in Ceylon, Fa 

Hien returned to China, where he published his famous monograph The Travels of Fa Hien, 

which inspired numerous subsequent religious exchanges between Ceylon and China 

thereafter.
Chapter 3. Historical Context

69

Chinese authority and acknowledged the suzerainty of 

the dragon throne.102

However, at the height of its naval power,ab the course unexpectedly 

reversed. With the death of Zhu Di in 1424, his successor, Emperor Zhu 

Gaozhi, a traditionalist, was convinced by the conservative mandarin 

bureaucracy to curtail the imperial fleet, ban all sea-going ships, and 

again withdraw China into self-imposed isolation.ac Except for one final 

major voyage in 1431–1432, the imperial fleet soon ceased to exist.ad 

Therewith, China’s control and influence in the Indian Ocean rapidly 

waned at the very time that the Europeans, especially the Portuguese, 

were beginning to explore the sea routes through the Indian Ocean 

to China.

European Colonialism

By 1498, Vasco de Gama was successful in circumnavigating the 

Cape of Good Hope and reaching Calicut on the west coast of India. 

In contrast to the Chinese and earlier visitors, the Portuguese came to 

South Asia not simply to gain trade and profit, but more importantly to 

build forts and capture territory.

In 1500, a Portuguese expedition to India under Pedro Cabral bombarded the port of Calicut and forced the local ruler to grant the Portuguese use of a “warehouse” facility. Cabral returned to Portugal with 

considerable plunder and spurred another expedition by da Gama 

in 1502. After defeating an Egyptian fleet that had come to Calicut’s 

protection, da Gama likewise returned with valuable cargo and booty. 

Beginning in 1503, the Portuguese gradually displaced local Indian 

ab Reportedly, China’s navy possessed about 1,350 combat vessels, including 400 large 

floating fortresses and 250 long-range cruising ships that reached as far east as modernday Zanzibar. Based on the expertise of its sailors and the tonnage of its ships, naval 

experts suggest that China would probably have circumnavigated the Cape of Good Hope 

before the Europeans. See, for example, Kennedy.103

ac In the post-Zhu Di period, as during the next five centuries, the Chinese leadership had an ambiguous view of the military as a necessary evil. On the one hand, the military was a constant threat to the civilian leadership. On the other hand, the military was 

essential for internal security and peripheral defense from constant land invasions, especially the Mongols in the north. This is a principal reason why the Army again became the 

dominant service under close civilian scrutiny and the navy devolved into a riverine force.

ad In total, Admiral Zheng He commanded seven long-distance voyages between 

1405 and 1432. Each voyage consisted of about 100–300 ships and carried about 27,000 

men. In each voyage, there were generally about fifty colossal “treasure ships,” which were 

about five times the size and ten times the capacity of any wooden vessel then being built 

elsewhere in the world. In comparison, Europe’s pioneering long-distance voyages under 

Christopher Columbus and Vasco da Gama consisted of three to four ships, the largest of 

which had a capacity less than one-twentieth of a “treasure ship.”104
70

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

leaders in battle and took control of their lands, including the port 

of Goa. In 1505, the Portuguese appointed a Viceroy to administer its 

Indian possessions, now called the Estado da India (State of India).

Likewise, in 1505, the Portuguese established a foothold on the west 

coast of Ceylon and gradually extended its control along the coast. By 

1507, much of Ceylon had become a vassal state of Portugal. In 1517, 

the Portuguese solidified their control of the island with their occupation of Colombo. In a short time, the Portuguese were able to establish 

naval control over the major entry points into the Indian Ocean and 

channel most of the Indian Ocean trade to their main ports, Goa and 

Cochin.105 For four and a half centuries from this point to independence in 1948, India and Ceylon would find themselves under the occupation of Europeans who largely dictated regional and local events.

Spain’s absorption of Portugal in 1580 meant that the defeat of 

the Spanish Armada in 1588 severely curtailed Portuguese sway in the 

Indian Ocean and opened the region to British and Dutch merchants. 

The British East India Company, founded in 1600, and the Dutch East 

India Company, founded in 1602, were initially intended to challenge 

Portugal’s monopoly over the Indonesian spice trade. However, both 

companies—enticed by cheap Indian exports, especially cotton textiles—were lured to establish enclaves in the small states along the west 

coast, in the Tamil country at the southern tip, and eventually up the 

east coast of India. From here, the British and Dutch were able to fulfill 

their original goal and, by 1640, broke the Portuguese monopoly over 

the eastern sea routes of the Indian Ocean.

Although the Portuguese retained some of their footholds in India, 

the situation in Ceylon was quite different. In 1638, the Dutch East 

India Company entered into a treaty with the Kandyan kingdom and 

was able to oust the Portuguese from Ceylon. Subsequently, the Dutch 

took over the Portuguese coastal possessions, as well as the monopoly 

of Ceylon’s cinnamon exports.

In the mid-seventeenth century, the French presence in the Indian 

Ocean region increased significantly. The French navy confronted the 

British navy and challenged it for supremacy at sea. On land, the earlier 

Europeans were soon joined in India by the French Compagnie des 

Indes, founded in 1660. For almost the next century, conflicts in India 

with European involvement were generally limited commercial competitions and small skirmishes to secure strongholds against other Europeans and local Indian rulers. This changed drastically in the 1740s as a 

reflection of the increased British and French confrontation in Europe.

In the Indian Ocean region, the growing British and French naval 

clashes now spilled over into the Tamil region of India. In 1746, the 

French in Pondicherry attacked and captured the British stronghold in 
Chapter 3. Historical Context

71

nearby Madras. Both sides immediately began a buildup of professional 

forces and recruitment of increasingly more powerful Indian allies. In 

addition to proxy wars, the British and French forces launched major 

offensives against each other’s territory, including the British drive up 

the east coast to Bengal that is considered the initial move in Britain’s 

conquest of India. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the British were essentially in control of major portions of northeast India, as 

well as the two coastlines. However, the more that the British extended 

their hold in India, the more they felt vulnerable to external threats, 

especially from the French and the Russians.

In turn, the British moved to replace the Dutch in Ceylon at the 

beginning of the nineteenth century. As the British expanded colonization of India, Ceylon took on added importance as control over the Palk 

Strait became essential for the British line of communication between 

the west and east Indian coastlines. However, two factors hindered the 

British. First, the Bay of Bengal region lacked a potential harbor for 

developing a British naval base. Second, the annual October-to-March 

monsoons along the east India coastline forced the British fleet to seek 

safe harbor on the west Indian coast for major stretches of time. On the 

other hand, the Ceylonese port of Trincomalee, one of the best harbors 

in the entire Indian Ocean region, was an excellent solution.106

Thus, the British assessed Ceylon as not simply a commercial venture, but most importantly a vital strategic linchpin in the British position east of the Cape of Good Hope. Maintaining control of Ceylon 

remained a priority for Britain while they controlled their empire and 

India. In Europe’s never ending wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth 

centuries as in prior times, Ceylon was often perceived by the major 

seafaring states, such as Portugal and the Netherlands, as a prime jewel. 

Despite the many colonial concessions at the conclusion of these wars, 

Britain always made it a priority to hold onto Ceylon as long as there 

existed a British Empire and a British-controlled India. And indeed, 

the British would hold on to Ceylon until the mid-twentieth century, 

and the island would play a pivotal role in British plans during World 

War II for the destruction of Japanese power in the Pacific region.

Ceylon During World War II

By August 1942, the Japanese forces were rapidly advancing into the 

Indian Ocean. In December 1941, Japanese land-based naval bombers 

sank the British battleship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse. 

Two months later in the Battle of Java Sea, the Japanese soundly 

defeated a joint force of American, Australian, British, and Dutch warships. On land, the Japanese seized Malaya, Singapore, Sumatra, and 
72

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Burma. With the fall of Singapore, in particular, the image of the British Empire’s might and invincibility suffered a severe setback. This early 

in the war, Japanese victories and propaganda, which portrayed Japan 

as the “Liberator” of Asia under its “Asia for Asiatics” campaign, was 

still winning sympathizers and contributed to the Japanese advance, 

especially in Burma. Likewise, the Germans were successfully advancing through British colonies of North Africa, as well as toward the Caucasus regions of the southern Soviet Union.

In April 1942, the Japanese launched a major naval expedition of 

five carriers and 300 airplanes into the Indian Ocean. The main strike 

force headed south of Ceylon, raiding the port of Colombo, sinking a 

destroyer, and downing twenty-seven British aircraft, while losing only 

nine Japanese aircraft. Shortly thereafter, the British lost two heavy 

cruisers, the Devonshire and the Cornwall, in fighting to the southwest 

of Ceylon. Several days later, the Japanese strike force attacked the 

naval base at Trincomalee and sank the British small carrier Hermes

and the Australian destroyer Vampire.

107 Simultaneous with the naval 

operations around Ceylon, the Japanese sent another squadron from 

Burma to attack the ports of Cocanada and Vizagapatan on the east 

coast of India and commercial ships in the Bay of Bengal. The squadron sank twenty-three merchant ships, including twenty in one day. In 

subsequent raids on merchant ships along India’s west coast, Japanese 

submarines sank 32,000 tons of shipping.108 At this point, Ceylon and 

India were vulnerable to Japanese conquest. The capture of Ceylon 

would have provided a launching pad for an advance against an India 

that was politically divided and militarily weakened by having sent most 

of its forces to other war theaters despite the objections of the Indian 

National Congress. With the additional capture or neutralization of 

India, Japan may have been able to link up with Germany and Italy in 

the western Indian Ocean region, sever Allied oil supplies from the Persian Gulf, shut off sea lines of communication across the Indian Ocean 

that were essential for supplying the Soviet and Chinese war efforts, 

and break direct ties with Australia.

However, two factors intervened. First, South Asia was geographically a tremendous overextension for the Japanese navy. Lacking a 

major naval base in the region, the Japanese were forced to rely on distant Singapore. Second and more importantly, the US Navy took up the 

slack of the weakened British fleet. The Americans not only deterred 

Japanese advances in the Indian Ocean but also forced the Japanese to 

withdraw to the Pacific naval theater. As a result, there were no more 

major raids into the Indian Ocean by Japanese naval forces after May 

1942 and the British were able to concentrate their naval forces in the 

Mediterranean and the Atlantic.109 The political leaders and populace 
Chapter 3. Historical Context

73

of Ceylon opened their arms to the war effort. Indeed, Ceylon took up 

the role of a “surrogate Singapore.”110 The island became the home for 

many Allied wartime agencies, including headquarters for

• Supreme Allied Command South East Asia;

• the Eastern Fleet;

• the Royal Air Force’s reconnaissance operations in the Indian 

Ocean;

• the Dutch and Free French Forces in the east;

as well as main bases for

• allied special forces operating behind enemy lines;

• the Far East Combined Bureau; and

• allied secret services, such as the British MI6 and the American 

Office of Strategic Services.

During the war, many carriers and battleships sailed from Trincomalee to participate in attacks against Japanese-occupied territories. As the tide changed in Allied favor at the end of the war, Ceylon 

became a major assembly point for the British Pacific Fleet.

In contrast to India, the Ceylonese government and most of the 

island’s leading politicians united in positive support of the war effort. 

Traditionally oriented toward constitutionalism and gradualism, the 

political elites—with the exception of the Trotskyist Lanka Sama 

Samaja Party (LSSP)—were generally reluctant to employ confrontational behavior during the war. Indeed, they worked on the assumption 

that cooperation would augment their bargaining position for postwar 

dominion status and eventual independence. However, cooperation 

had its limits. As one leading member of the Ceylon National Congress party clearly stated in reference to the conflicting Roosevelt and 

Churchill interpretation of Point Threeae of the Atlantic Charter:

We believe that the War in which England is now 

engaged in was being waged for the freedom of small 

nations throughout the world. The recent declarations appear to restrict that freedom to such nations 

of Europe as have lost their independence. The Congress considers it anomalous that the people of Ceylon, a subject people, should be participating in a War 

effort to restore freedom to European nations, while 

ae The Atlantic Charter was an agreement between the United States and Great Britain signed in August 1941 and addressed the two countries’ vision for a post-World War 

II world. Point Three stated that all peoples had the right to self-determination, a norm 

whose universal application was not viewed favorably by Churchill, since Britain at that 

time controlled India.
74

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

they themselves are to continue indefinitely in a state 

of subjection within the Empire.111

Indeed, the more adamant Churchill became with respect to maintaining the Empire after the war, the more the Ceylonese political leaders became in their demands, first, for postwar dominion status within 

the Commonwealth and then, when that received no positive British 

response, for immediate dominion status. Yet Ceylon attained its independence in 1948, and in recognition of its inability to provide for its 

own external defense, prior to independence it placed itself under the 

British security umbrella by signing a defense agreement with Great 

Britain giving the British rights to naval and air bases on the island.

Independence and Regional Politics

Indian Security Perceptions

Despite the detachment of Pakistan in 1947 and the possibility of 

internal secessions at the time of independence, India under the Nehruled Indian National Congress party was viewed by all as the most likely 

successor to British authority in the Indian Ocean region in general 

and South Asia in particular. India’s huge size, vast economic and demographic potential, and strategic central location among the smaller and 

weaker states of South Asia seemed to ensure its premier status.

Moreover, Jawaharlal Nehru, independent India’s first prime minister and a key figure in its independence movement, came to adopt this 

view, as noted by de Silva:

In its commitment to the defense of this inheritance, 

Nehru’s India was assuming, tentatively at first, but 

with greater conviction with the passage of time, the 

strategic vision of the raj, especially the conception of 

the South Asian region as “a political unit knit together 

for defense.112

Of course, from India’s viewpoint, the strategic unity of the region 

would be buttressed by India’s self-arrogated role as security guarantor for the region, and just as British planners worried about sea-based 

threats from hostile forces based in Sri Lanka (in addition to Russian 

land-based threats in the north), Indian planners were also concerned 

about threats from the sea. As one Indian political analyst stated:

The events of the second World War, especially the 

Japanese sweep through archipelagic and mainland 

South-East Asia in a remarkably short time, had driven 

home the lesson to India’s nationalist elite that India’s 
Chapter 3. Historical Context

75

eastern flank and the seaward approaches to the subcontinent were as important for India’s defense as the 

land boundaries of the north-west and the north which 

had been traditional concerns of strategists during the 

days of the British Raj.

The events of the [second world] war also increased 

Indian awareness of, and concern with, its maritime 

strategy and the great importance of the Indian Ocean 

to the defense of the Indian peninsula. The lesson that 

India had lost its independence to European colonists 

because of the latter’s control of the sea was relearnt 

by the Indian nationalist elite as a result of the experience of the second world War.113

For another political analyst writing toward the end of World War 

II, given the impending declining role of the British the security needs 

of India demanded that she take on the task of securing the Indian 

Ocean region:

an exclusively land policy of defense for India will in 

future be nothing short of blindness. No other policy 

was required in the past, as the Indian Ocean was a 

protected sea—a British lake . . . But today the position is different. The freedom of India will hardly 

be worth a day’s purchase, if Indian interests in the 

Indian Ocean are not defended from India, especially, 

as in the changed circumstances . . . the British fleet 

will be in no position to maintain that unchallenged 

supremacy which it possessed for 150 years . . . As a free 

nation it is [India’s] sacred duty to organize herself in 

every way for the defense of her freedom. This . . . is 

primarily an Oceanic problem. Unless India is prepared to stand forth and shoulder the responsibility of 

peace and security in the Indian Ocean, her freedom 

will mean little. She will be at the mercy of any power 

which has command of the sea, as it will be impossible 

for us to require of Britain or any other country to 

defend the Indian Ocean for us.114

Given the reduced British presence in the region, during the 1960s 

Sri Lanka was to take shelter under the Indian defense umbrella, and 

by the 1970s Indira Gandhi came to the view that small south Asian 

nations like Sri Lanka must do so, since any alternative arrangement 

would have been regarded as unacceptable to India.115 These perceptions were likely influenced by a changed balance of power that shifted 
76

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

decidedly in India’s favor following India’s intervention in Pakistan’s 

civil war in 1971. Neither China nor the United States, which at that 

time had been allied with Pakistan, intervened to prevent the vivisection of that country caused by the establishment of Bangladesh. Sri 

Lanka and the other smaller south Asian states would have to accommodate themselves to the new strategic situation that featured a more 

powerful and self-confident India.116

For their part, the small states of South Asia, themselves newly independent from British control, developed a variable love-hate attitude 

toward India. On the one hand, the smaller states recognized their 

shared interests in regional peace and stability, their common heritage 

of Western democracy, and the benefits of close economic ties. On the 

other hand, smaller states feared that India’s immense ambitions and 

capabilities would eventually and inevitably create a threat to their own 

security and independent survival. Herein, the Hindu-Muslim struggles 

in the northern sector of the subcontinent and the Tamil cross-border 

affinities in the south were among the constant reminders that conflict 

with India might occur at any time.

Russia/Soviet Union

As far back as the eighteenth century, the Russians had superficial 

plans for land invasions of India, western China, and/or Tibet as elements of the “Great Game” to defeat British counter plans to acquire 

the northwest area of the subcontinent, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and 

Tibet. Immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, proposals for invading the Indian subcontinent were again floated,af but soon 

abandoned. When the “export of revolution” was discarded after the 

disaster of the Russo-Polish War of 1920–1921, the Soviets turned inward 

focusing predominantly on domestic security and economic growth.

Soviet foreign policy in the 1920s and 1930s concentrated essentially 

on the protection of the Soviet Union from “imperialist” attack. In relations with the West, the Soviets stressed international peace, cooperation, and disarmament. With respect to the colonies, particularly those 

af Alternative proposals were advanced for offensives through Persia, Afghanistan, or 

Tibet. Leon Trotsky, then Commissar of War, proposed an Afghan route and even ordered 

preparation of “the necessary military supplies.” Lenin approved a plan for sending troops 

though Mongolia and Tibet to India. Though the Trotsky and Lenin proposals were not 

implemented, the influential Indian communist M. N. Roy was able to convince the Bolshevik leadership to arm and fund a small training base in Tashkent for an assault via 

Afghanistan into northwest India. However, Roy’s plans and the training base were soon 

discarded not only because the Afghan King refused to cooperate, but also in response 

to vehement British demands that the Soviets desist from the plan and honor their commitment under the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of 1921 to refrain from military, diplomatic, and propaganda activity against the British Empire. On the Trotsky and Lenin 

proposals, see Volkogonov.117
Chapter 3. Historical Context

77

in Asia, Moscow and the Soviet-controlled Communist International 

sought to mobilize nationalist and communist leaders indirectly in support of Soviet defense, advocating messages of anti-imperialism and 

anti-colonialism, nationalist self-determination among the “oppressed” 

colonial peoples, and the formation of either bourgeois-communist 

“united fronts from above” or communist-leftist “united fronts from 

below” as dictated by circumstances and Soviet requirements.

In the immediate post-World War II period, the breakdown of the 

wartime alliance and the promulgation of the Stalinist two camps thesis did not allow any room for Nehru’s efforts to develop a “third way” 

between the communist and capitalist camps, and so at this time the 

newly independent nonaligned states found little sympathy in the Kremlin.118 Stalin himself held a dim view of Nehru, Gandhi, and Sukarno of 

Indonesia, viewing them as lackeys of imperialism.119

With regards to Sri Lanka itself, the Soviets were largely dismissive 

of its independence and essentially viewed it as a farce, and they didn’t 

establish diplomatic relations with the island until 1956. It also used its 

veto power in the United Nations Security Council to veto Sri Lanka’s 

admission into the world body. The Soviet delegate to the Security Council noted that a distinction had to be made between real and false independence, and the presence of British air and naval bases on the island 

indicated that Sri Lanka was not a sovereign state.120 These icy feelings 

were returned by Sri Lanka’s leadership. D. S. Senanayake, the prime 

minister at the time, once stated (of the Soviet Union) that “enslavement 

of the world is what we believe to be their attitude. Our view is quite the 

contrary. Since it is the freedom of this world that we are concerned 

with, we will never be with Russia until she gives up her policy.”121

With the death of Stalin in 1953, Soviet policy began to undergo 

a gradual reversal. Over staunch rightist objections, the Malenkov 

regime sought to promote economic development, including consumer 

production, to a higher priority relative to military construction. The 

Khrushchev regime attempted to go a step further in its post-1956 deStalinization, which was initiated at the Twentieth Congress of the 

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in February 1956. At 

the CPSU Congress the concept of “peaceful coexistence” was elaborated which recognized “various forms of transitions to socialism,” 

which therefore permitted collaboration with “national bourgeoisie” 

leadership from newly independent nonaligned countries.122 The Soviets viewed this leadership as progressive since they shared a common 

interest in resisting “imperialism,” and thus the nonaligned countries 

along with the Soviet bloc could form a “zone of peace.”123

However, the new Soviet approach regarding peaceful coexistence 

with the capitalist camp directly collided with the ideology, worldview, and 
78

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

national aspirations of the Maoist leadership in China. From the Maoist 

perspective, the Soviets had become right-wing “revisionists” and deserters of the world-wide communist revolution. Just as importantly, the Soviet 

relaxation of tensions with the West and attendant reduction in Soviet 

support for the Chinese economy and military threatened the Chinese 

leadership’s ambitions for consolidating its domestic hold over the legitimate territory of the Middle kingdom and extending its self-perceived 

rightful dominance over South and Southeast Asia. Thus, the Soviets and 

Chinese split along different paths and engaged in a hostile competition 

for hegemony within the communist camp and the third world.

Aside from the occasional small-scale Sino-Soviet border clashes 

that peaked with the 1969 conflict along the northern Amur River, 

the most concentrated area of direct Sino-Soviet confrontation was the 

Indian Ocean region, particularly South Asia. As part of their strategy 

to contain and encircle China, the Soviets (1) strengthened their forces 

in Central Asia, (2) enhanced relations with Afghanistan, (3) developed close security ties with the Indians, culminating in the SovietIndian Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation in 1971, and (4) 

significantly increased their naval presence in the Indian and Pacific 

Oceans. As elements of a counter-strategy, the Chinese (1) augmented 

their military forces in and access to Xinjiang Province, (2) improved 

their relations with Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and (3) intensified their 

commitment to a “one China” policy.

With respect to Sri Lanka, the new attitude adopted by the Soviets 

toward the nonaligned movement in 1956 likely facilitated the establishment of diplomatic relations with the island in that year, and additionally the Soviets were encouraged with the change in government 

in 1956, from the western-oriented United National Party to S. W. R. 

D. Bandaranaike’s People’s United Front government, which advocated 

a nonaligned foreign policy.124 Later, beginning in 1980, the Soviets 

(as well as the Indians) grew alarmed with the increased presence of 

US naval forces in the Indian Ocean region after the establishment of 

the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), which was formed following the 

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Specifically, there was concern that the 

United States was trying to secure additional bases for the RDF, either 

in the ports of Gwadar and Karachi in Pakistan, Chittagong in Bangladesh, or Trincomalee in Sri Lanka.125 However, for the most part Sri 

Lanka appeared to be mostly an afterthought in Soviet strategic thinking during the post-War period, as they perhaps reasoned that its ally 

India would handle any Chinese and American diplomatic or military 

incursions into the region.
Chapter 3. Historical Context

79

People’s Republic of China

In the years of the Chinese Civil War, Mao Zedong closely adhered 

to Soviet leadership of the communist camp as required by the Stalinist 

two camp thesis. As late as 1948, Mao reiterated his view that the Soviet 

Union was “the socialist fatherland of the working people of the world” 

and vehemently opposed the notion that states could pursue a neutral 

“third way,” as advocated by Nehru. Indeed, just three months before 

the proclamation of the communist government in Beijing, Mao stated 

in the Russian newspaper Pravda on July 6, 1949:

Sun Yat-sen’s forty years of experience have firmly convinced us that we must adhere to one side in order to 

achieve and consolidate victory. . . . [T]he Chinese people must, without exception, take either the side of imperialism or that of socialism. There is no third way. . . . 

Neutrality is a camouflage and a third way is a mirage.126

With the triumph of Mao Zedong’s communist forces, the new 

People’s Republic of China set out to recapture what Chinese leaders 

considered their rightful territory. In quick order, the Red Army swept 

north and south. By 1950, China had reconsolidated control over Xinjiang in the west and Tibet in the south. Despite China’s isolation by 

the international community, India signed an agreement in April 1954 

that recognized Chinese control over Tibet and incorporated the five 

Principles of Peaceful Coexistenceag as the basis for normalizing SinoIndian relations.

China’s initial views of Nehru were similar to those of Stalin, viewing 

him as a “running dog” of Anglo-American imperialism.127 However, it 

would soon change its view of India and the nonaligned countries as 

it sought to enlist this bloc in an effort to counter the US-led policy 

of containment of communism. For his part, Nehru dismissed China’s 

communist affiliation and nationalist ambitions as transitory factors. 

Nehru assumed that in time, China would be weaned away from communism and join the independent third way. To this end, the Indian 

Prime Minister became a strong supporter and sponsor of Chinese 

entrance into the newly emerging nonaligned movement, mostly composed of former colonies in Asia and Africa. This positive view of China 

was perhaps influenced by a more strategic analysis in which Nehru 

envisioned an Asia containing two spheres of influence, specifically an 

East Asia under Chinese influence, and a South Asia and South-East 

Asia (excluding Vietnam) under Indian influence.128

ag These principles included (1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity 

and sovereignty; (2) mutual nonaggression; (3) mutual noninterference in each other’s 

internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence.
80

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Despite Nehru’s best efforts, tensions between China and India 

erupted in 1958. Unbeknownst to India, China had covertly constructed an access road across the Aksai Cin Plateau from western Tibet 

to Xinjiang in area that India considered its territory. When discovered 

by India, Chinese leader Zhou Enlai proposed a solution that generally favored China and, therefore, was unacceptable to India. As SinoIndian tensions rose and the Tibetans rebelled, and small groups of 

Chinese and Indian troops clashed. With the Sino-Soviet split reaching 

a high level, the Soviets refused diplomatic and material aid to China 

against India and Tibet.

Instead of quelling tensions in South Asia, the realigning of relations among China, the Soviet Union, and India spurred them on, with 

1962 as a major turning point. In October 1962, the Chinese launched 

a surprise month-long offensive against Indian outposts and troop 

patrols in the disputed border areas. Despite China’s announcement of 

a unilateral ceasefire in November 1962, no permanent solutions were 

forged. Indeed, on October 16, 1964, despite the withdrawal of Soviet 

nuclear assistance and the signing of the atmospheric nuclear test ban 

by the United States and the Soviet Union, China conducted its first 

atmospheric nuclear test. In the process, Chinese and Indian relations 

were irreparably severed. All hopes for a cooperative Sino-Indian leadership at the head of a nonaligned movement, including a third way for 

the South Asian states, though always tenuous, were now dashed. The 

Cold War and the Sino-Soviet rift entered into South Asia affairs more 

strongly than ever:

• the Indians and the Afghanis strengthened their ties with the 

Soviets;

• the Chinese enhanced their ties with and arms sales to India’s 

primary foe, Pakistan;

• likewise, the United States improved its ties with Pakistan in 

response to closer Soviet relations with India and Afghanistan; 

and

• Sri Lanka entered into closer accord with China and the United 

States to balance the Soviet-Indian relationship.

Loyal to their European origins, the Indian and Ceylonese parties 

(along with the Outer Mongolian Communist Party) were the only Asian 

communist parties to remain essentially pro-Soviet and pro-nationalist 

during the Sino-Soviet conflict, though both had strong pro-Chinese 

minorities. Showing their displeasure in March 1963, the Chinese chastised the Indian Communist Party for having “embarked on the road of 

national chauvinism and class capitulationism” and having become “an 

appendage of India’s big bourgeoisie and big landlords and a lackey 

of the Nehru government.”129 Faced with similar criticisms and divisive 
Chapter 3. Historical Context

81

efforts to swing the party in favor of the Chinese, the Ceylonese Communist Party was forced to expel its own pro-Chinese faction, including 

two politburo members, in October 1963.

The 1962 border war came at an awkward moment for Sri Lanka, as 

at this time the country was on good terms with both India and China. 

Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike resisted pressure within her 

government to brand China as the aggressor, and she assumed a mediating role by organizing a conference in Colombo with six nonaligned 

nations to seek a peaceful resolution to the boundary dispute.130 This 

effort did not lead to a resolution of the conflict, but it was greatly 

appreciated by China, and Bandaranaike was warmly received in a January 1963 visit to the country. The two countries followed up the visit 

by signing a maritime agreement in July 1963 which gave most favored 

nation treatment to both countries with respect to commercial vessels 

engaged in cargo and passenger services between the two countries.131

Not surprisingly (given the nature of electoral competition at this time 

in Sri Lanka), during the 1965 election campaign Dudley Senanayake 

charged Bandaranaike with entering into a secret agreement to lease 

the port of Trincomalee to the Chinese, to be used as a stepping stone 

to invade India.132

These comments by Senanayake foreshadowed a deterioration in 

relations when he led the United National Party back into power in 

1965, but friendly relations were restored in May 1970 with Bandaranaike’s return to office. Concerns emerged in Colombo regarding 

potential Chinese assistance to the JVP during the April 1971 uprising, but in a late April broadcast to the nation Bandaranaike informed 

the populace that foreign powers were not involved in the insurgency. 

Following the uprising, Sri Lanka received a 265-million-rupee interest-free loan from China to finance agro-based industries, and China 

provided Sri Lanka with a gift of five high-speed naval boats.133 Additionally, in May 1973 Chinese workers completed the Bandaranaike 

International Conference Hall, which was used in 1976 to host the fifth 

summit of the nonaligned movement. Given Bandaranaike’s close ties 

with Indira Gandhi, these move by China did not negatively impact 

Sri Lanka’s relations with India.

Ceylon/Sri Lankan Foreign Policy and Foreign Relations

Under the three UNP Administrations from 1948 to 1956, Ceylon’s 

foreign policy highlighted a close security relationship with Great Britain and the Commonwealth system for security. In the Ceylonese threat 

perception, its northern neighbor, India, posed the most immediate 

danger. Historical fears plus perceived Indian aspirations to dominate 
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Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

the Indian Ocean region and incorporate Ceylon into an Indian sphere 

of interestah convinced the Ceylonese to maintain a close relationship 

with Britain as codified in the Anglo-Ceylonese agreements on external 

affairs and defense as well as Ceylonese membership in the Commonwealth. At the same time, UNP leaders acknowledged the advantages 

of developing economic relations with communist countries when possible. On the one hand, the Stalinist two camp policy ruled out closer 

ties. On the other hand, the Chinese were more than willing to exploit 

closer Sino-Ceylon economic relations. Thus, despite western objections, the UNP concluded the Sino-Ceylon Rubber-Rice Pact in 1952.

Ceylon’s foreign policy shifted to a more center-left orientation 

under the SLFP from 1956 to 1965. The upsurge of the nonaligned 

movement after the 1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia reduced 

Ceylon’s fears and threat perceptions of India. With the official policy 

of nonalignment as the basis of Ceylon’s foreign policy, the SLFP government moderated its security relations with Great Britain and “tilted” 

somewhat toward improved relations with the communist countries. As 

one of its first acts, the government successfully negotiated the British 

withdrawal from its Trincomalee naval base and Katunayake air base. 

At the same time, the government not only expanded economic ties 

with China and initiated new ties with the post-Stalin Soviet Union and 

other members of the East European bloc, but also began to establish diplomatic relations with its new economic partners. The British 

withdrawal significantly tempered Ceylon’s image as a British “puppet,” 

increased S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike’s personal image as a leader of 

the nonaligned movement, and opened up opportunities for trade and 

assistance from both the West and the East.

In 1960, the assassinated S. W. R. D. was replaced by his wife, Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Sirimavo became more personally involved in foreign affairs than previous government leaders, including her husband, 

and moved Ceylon’s foreign policy a bit further along a nonaligned and 

pro-East tilt. In many of the international crises during her period in 

office, such as the Cuban, Berlin, and Vietnam crises, Sirimavo took 

positions that directly or indirectly undermined the US stance. In a 

largely anti-US move since neither the Soviets nor the Chinese had the 

requisite long-range naval and air capabilities, she staunchly supported 

the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Indian Ocean region and 

ah On several occasions in the 1940s, Indian leaders suggested that Indian absorption of Ceylon was inevitable. In 1945, Nehru observed that shared ethnic, linguistic, and 

cultural affinities would draw Ceylon into unity with India “presumably as an autonomous 

unit of the Indian Federation.” In 1949, Nehru implied that India would not sit by and 

allow Ceylon to join in relations hostile to India interests. See Kodirkara.134
Chapter 3. Historical Context

83

closed Ceylon’s ports and airfields to all ships and planes equipped 

with nuclear warfare capabilities.

Domestically, Sirimavo’s administration enacted legislation in 1964 

to nationalize foreign oil companies and facilities in Ceylon. When 

compensation negotiations floundered, the United States, the United 

Kingdom, Germany, and the International Monetary Fund suspended 

all economic assistance and most diplomatic relations with Ceylon.

The government of Dudley Senanayake (1965–1970) took a much 

less active, less nonaligned, and less anti-Western role in foreign policy. 

Most importantly, Dudley negotiated a compensation settlement for 

the oil facilities nationalized by Sirimavo. In return, the Western states 

resumed their economic aid to Ceylon. On the domestic front, however, Dudley’s new course toward free enterprise and away from stateownership evoked strong hostility from Marxist and other organized 

opponents.

Sirimavo’s return to office in 1970 coincided with the intense 

buildup of rivalries among the major powers for dominance in the 

Indian Ocean region, especially South Asia. This development came 

after a period that saw a Sino-Indian border war (1962), a Chinese 

atomic bomb test (1964), and a war between India and Pakistan (1965). 

This latter event saw the United States suspend arms sales to both countries in the hope of quelling hostilities without taking sides. Unfortunately, this action opened the door wider for competitive Soviet and 

Chinese involvement. The Soviets used the opportunity to increase its 

arms sales to India and, therewith, solidify the Soviet-Indian partnership. The Chinese acted similarly with Pakistan. In sum, South Asia was 

now a key surrogate arena for contesting the Sino-Soviet rift.

During this time the close ties between Sirimavo and Indira, 

founded on the twin policies of democratic socialism at home and nonalignment abroad, ensured a close relationship between India and Sri 

Lanka. Bilateral relations became frosty, though, with the election of 

J. R. Jayewardene in 1977. The two leaders did not enjoy a close relationship, and India became alarmed as Jayewardene proceeded to liberalize the economy and dismantle the welfare state in an effort to 

attract western capital to spur economic growth. Foreign capital did 

indeed flood the country, and India reasoned that it was only a matter 

a time before Jayewardene would request western security assistance to 

combat the budding ethnic conflict with Tamil militant groups.135 This 

concern over Sri Lanka’s foreign policy reorientation was one of the 

factors that led India to support the LTTE and other militant groups 

during the 1980s.
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Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

PHASES OF CONFLICT

JVP: 1971 Insurrection

On April  5,  1971, the JVP, a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement, launched an armed uprising against the SLFP government headed 

by Sirimavo Bandaranaike. The group consisted primarily of educated 

rural Sinhalese-Buddhist youths in their late teens and early twenties who 

had dim future prospects within a political-economic system dominated 

by a Westernized urban elite. The main feature of their plan of operations consisted of an island-wide attack on police stations throughout the 

country as a first step in overthrowing the Bandaranaike government. 

Additionally, the plan also called for either apprehending or killing 

Prime Minister Bandaranaike, attacking the capital city of Colombo, 

freeing leader Rohana Wijeweera from his imprisonment on Jaffna peninsula, attacking various military installations, and assassinating various 

individuals deemed counter-revolutionaries. The JVP managed to capture thirty-five police stations (with a number of other stations attacked), 

and more than fifty towns fell into the hands of the group.136 This tally 

would have been higher had JVP cadres not tipped off the government 

by prematurely attacking the Wellawaya police station on the morning 

rather than the evening of April  5.137,ai Fighting between JVP cadres 

and government troops and police lasted until about June, but by that 

time the government had largely put down the revolt. Fifty-three security forces personnel died, and several hundred were injured; among the 

police, thirty-seven were killed and 193 injured.139 An estimated 4,000 to 

6,000 JVP members were killed during the uprising.140

An interesting fact of the uprising is that it occurred at a time when 

Sri Lanka was ruled by a coalition led by the left-wing SLFP. From the 

very start since its origins in the late 1960s, the JVP was skeptical of 

parliamentary democracy and believed that violence was necessary to 

establish a socialist society, regardless of whether Sri Lanka was ruled 

by the center-right UNP or the nonrevolutionary SLFP.141 Although the 

government was caught off-guard by the April 5th attack on police stations, by 1970 it had been keeping tabs on the JVP. In April, the Inspector General of the Police had established the “Che Guevara Bureau” to 

ai There are several theories regarding why the cadres in Wellawaya prematurely 

attacked the police station on April 5. One analyst138 noted that the premature attack was 

the result of miscommunication within the JVP, while another argued that JVP cadres in 

the Wellawaya-Moneragala region lost faith in the JVP leadership and grew so tired of the 

factionalism within the group that they launched a premature attack to alert the security 

forces of the impending insurrection and to precipitate a government crackdown, thereby 

preventing a greater loss of life and avoiding the catastrophe that would have befallen the 

country if the JVP had come to power.
Chapter 3. Historical Context

85

study the group, and the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) had a 

significant amount of information on the group.142 Additionally, after 

the group had made increasingly shrill threats of revolutionary violence for months,143 the police arrested Wijeweera on March 13, 1971, 

and the government declared a state of emergency several days later. 

Still, top military and police officials discounted reports that the group 

was preparing to take power by force, as they refused to believe that 

a group of village youths would be able to take on a force led by men 

trained at Scotland Yard and Sandhurst.144

JVP: 1987–1989 Insurrection

After the suppression of the 1971 uprising, many of the top leadership within the JVP were imprisoned, although in 1977 the new UNP 

government released Rohana Wijeweera and other JVP members. By 

that time, many of the top JVP leaders had turned against Wijeweera, 

who nonetheless went about rebuilding the party as an electoral organization despite the fact that the party still remained somewhat skeptical 

of bringing about socialism through elections.145 Despite harassment 

from the government in the form of disruptions of mass rallies, arrests 

of activists, and the raiding of offices, the party was able to win thirteen seats in District Development Council (DDC) elections in 1981, 

and in October  1982 Rohana was the JVP’s candidate for president, 

placing third behind the UNP and SLFP candidates, respectively. However, in July 1983, the party was proscribed by the government after 

false allegations that it was responsible for the anti-Tamil pogrom that 

swept the island that month after an LTTE attack that left thirteen government soldiers dead. The party then resumed an underground existence, and by late 1986 and early 1987 it had decided to wage an armed 

struggle against the government.146

Over the next few years the group proceeded to wage a terrifying 

campaign of assassinations, intimidation, and economic sabotage that 

on several occasions came close to collapsing the government. Beginning in September 1986, it carried out a series of robberies that brought 

it money and vehicles, and in 1987, it carried out raids for weapons 

against army facilities. It then proceeded to wage a campaign to collapse 

the government by liquidating the governing UNP through assassinating parliamentarians and other top officials as well as local government 

officials. It issued death threats against all UNP officials and those 

serving in government, and in addition to assassinating several parliamentarians, it nearly decapitated the government in August 1987 as it 

lobbed grenades at a parliamentary meeting that nearly killed the president, prime minister, and other top officials. Additionally, the signing 
86

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

of the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord in July 1987 proved a godsend to the 

group, as it was able to mobilize nationalist and patriotic sentiment 

against the accord among the Sinhalese to provide momentum to the 

social revolution it wished to bring about in Sri Lanka.

The group also established cells in a number of public and private 

organizations, which enabled it to bring the economy close to collapse 

on several occasions. In November 1988, a month before the presidential elections, the JVP succeeded in paralyzing transport throughout 

the island, and bank, telecommunication, and postal facilities ceased 

to function.147 Work stoppages also affected the petroleum sector, and 

food shortages emerged because shops were forced to close for several 

weeks.148 Additionally, the army was called in to run buses and distribute fuel, while the navy operated the port of Colombo.149 Various strikes 

also crippled the country in the summer of 1989 as the group made a 

final push to topple the government. By this time, though, the JVP had 

grown impatient, because attacks by government security forces were 

beginning to impact the group and its own actions were imposing real 

costs on society but had not yet led to the collapse of the government. 

It then proceeded to overplay its hand in August 1989 when it issued 

a death threat to the families of personnel in the armed forces, warning that they would be targeted for death unless their relatives in the 

security forces ceased their attacks on the group. This move proved to 

be the group’s undoing, as paramilitary groups with names such as the 

Black Cats, Shra, PRRA, Scorpion, Eagle, and Yellow Cats stepped up 

a preexisting unconventional campaign by assassinating many actual 

and suspected members of the group, wiping out most of the top leadership by January 1990. Wijeweera himself was apprehended in November 1989 and killed shortly thereafter.

LTTE: First Eelam War, 1983–1987

On July 23, 1983, the LTTE conducted its first major attack, ambushing a Sri Lankan army troop convoy in the northern region and killing 

thirteen soldiers.150 This led to the anti-Tamil “Black July” riots in which 

about 2,500 Tamils were killed and many other Tamils were assaulted. 

Early in the riots, the Sri Lankan military and police appeared to stand 

aside and even abet the attacks against the Tamils. Ultimately, tens of 

thousands of Tamils were left homeless throughout the country,151,152,153

numbering as many as 100,000 Tamils in Colombo and 175,000 elsewhere in the country.154 As a result, many Tamils were forced to flee the 

Sinhalese-majority areas and the country.

In April 1985, a number of Tamil militant groups formed the Eelam 

National Liberation Front (ENLF), providing an umbrella organization for antigovernment activities. The ENLF included the LTTE, the 
Chapter 3. Historical Context

87

Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front, the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students, and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization. On the basis of this and other Tamil efforts to join in common 

cause, the government throughout late 1984 and early 1985 increasingly raised the specter of a major war with the Tamil militants. In February 1985, for example, Sri Lankan President Jayewardene claimed to 

have information confirming that

the hit-and-run tactics of terrorists are to be changed 

soon. At least three of the terrorist groups have united 

and agreed on a common military strategy which will 

culminate in a “head-on battle” with the Sri  Lanka 

Army as soon as they have sufficient numbers of 

trained men and weapons.

Preparations are now being made for the final, and 

what is believed by them to be, decisive battle.155

Although the decisive battle did not occur, the violent action-reaction cycle continued with attacks on both military and civilian targets 

by both sides.

Under pressures from the Indian government, the Sri Lankan government and the ENLF coalition held brief and unsuccessful peace 

talks at Thimpu, Bhutan, in 1985. In response, in that July the ENLF 

issued a joint statement, called the Thimpu Declaration,156 asserting 

that any “meaningful” solution to the Tamil question had to be based 

on the following “four cardinal principles”:

1. Recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a nation

2. Recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for 

the Tamils in Sri Lanka

3. Recognition of the right of self-determination of the Tamil 

nation

4. Recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental 

rights of all Tamils who look upon the island as their country

However, the organization was unable to moderate intergroup 

rivalries or adjudicate policy differences. In 1986, the LTTE withdrew 

from the ENLF and initiated armed attacks on its former allies. After 

defeating its major rivals, the LTTE absorbed the remaining groups 

into a single organization and thus assumed complete control over the 

Tamil separatist movement.157

At the same time, the LTTE expanded its targets to include Sinhalese civilians, and the government responded in kind. The LTTE began 

with attacks on two farming villages in Mullaitivu District, called the 

Kent and Dollar Farms, in November 1984, killing twenty-nine men, 
88

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

women, and children in the former and thirty-three in the latter. Then, 

in 1985, the LTTE killed a reported 146 civilians in Anuradhapura. As 

a writer for Time magazine described the event:

The killings began when separatist guerrillas belonging to the country’s predominantly Hindu Tamil 

minority hijacked a bus and headed for Anuradhapura, a city largely inhabited by Buddhist Sinhalese. As 

the guerrillas drove into the city’s crowded main bus 

station, they opened fire with automatic weapons, killing about 100 men, women and children. Then they 

drove to the Sri Maha Bodhiya, a sacred Buddhist site, 

and fired indiscriminately into a crowd that included 

nuns and monks. The rebels continued on to Sri Lanka’s northwest coast, attacking a police station and a 

game sanctuary on the way, and may have escaped by 

boat to India, where the Tamil Nadu state is home to 

50 million Tamils. The macabre ride resulted in the 

massacre of 146 people.158

In retaliation, continued the Time writer, Sinhalese assailants 

“hacked 39 Tamils to death with axes, swords and knives” and police 

killed twenty guerrillas who were hiding in a cave.

In mid-1987 the Sri Lankan security forces mounted the major military offensive Operation Liberation to capture the Jaffna peninsula, 

especially the city of Vadamarachchi, the focal point for traffic between 

India and the Jaffna peninsula. At the same time, India made known 

through private sources and diplomatic channels that it would not stand 

by and allow Jaffna to be captured. Moreover, India dispatched a flotilla 

of boats flying the Red Cross colors to bring relief supplies to the Tamils in Jaffna. When turned away by the Sri Lankan navy, the Indians 

airdropped food and medicine to the LTTE-held areas in Jaffna.159 In 

response to the Sri Lankan military offensive, the LTTE conducted its 

first suicide attack. A LTTE insurgent detonated a truckload of explosives in an army camp, killing forty soldiers. The LTTE had created the 

Black Tigers, a group that was tasked with carrying out suicide attacks 

against political, economic, and military targets that year.

LTTE: Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, 1987–1990

On July  29,  1987, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the 

Sri  Lankan President Junius Richard Jayewardene signed the IndoLanka Peace Accord. In the accord, under Indian pressure, the Sri 

Lankan government agreed to the unification of the Northern and 
Chapter 3. Historical Context

89

Eastern Provinces into a single administrative unit with one elected 

Provincial Council, one governor, one chief minister, and one Board of 

Ministers. However, in a referendum to be held by December 31, 1988, 

the Eastern Province could elect to become separate from the Northern Province. The agreement also called for a cessation of hostilities, 

after which the Tamil militant groups were expected to disarm and Sri 

Lankan army and security personnel would be confined to barracks. 

The entire agreement was made conditional on Indian cooperation 

and military assistance, including the deployment of an Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka “to guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities.”

Aside from a temporary respite in the direct Sinhalese-Tamil conflict and a calming of Sri Lankan government fears of Indian unilateral 

military interference, it is difficult to believe that the government truly 

expected that the accord could provide a workable solution and achieve 

lasting peace. Any unification of the Northern and Eastern Provinces 

would certainly be viewed by Sinhalese nationalists as an unacceptable 

concession in the short term and a step toward Tamil Eelam in the long 

term. Therefore, an honest implementation of the accord would probably have provoked yet another inter-Sinhalese civil war comparable to 

the JVP insurrection of 1971.160,161

Interestingly, popular sentiments, among both the Sinhalese and 

the Tamils, opposed the presence of the IPKF on Sri  Lankan territory. From the Sinhalese perspective, the IPKF was the protector of 

the Tamils, preventing a military solution to the conflict. Sinhalese 

nationalists resented and distrusted the foreign troops whose government had armed, trained, and otherwise supported the LTTE for years 

in an effort to bolster its popularity among its own Tamil population.aj

Therefore, anti-IPKF protests erupted in the south. With IPKF transport support, the Sri Lankan government shifted forces from the north 

to the south to control the protestors. This only further provoked the 

protestors, and the JVP mounted a two-year uprising against the government in the south. From the LTTE perspective, on the other hand, 

the IPKF became the major obstacle to the ultimate goal of Tamil independence, as India had no interest in seeing a secessionist movement in 

Sri Lanka succeed because it would set a precedent that would encourage separatist groups within India itself.

Although most Tamil leaders and groups, including the LTTE, initially pledged to honor the agreement and accept disarmament, hostilities soon resumed. The catalyst occurred when the Sri Lankan Navy 

arrested seventeen LTTE cadres at sea and, after initially holding them 

aj See Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency for more information regarding 

Indian sponsorship of different Tamil insurgent groups.
90

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

at Palaly Base, attempted to transfer them to Colombo. The captured 

Tamils attempted to preempt their transfer to the capital by attempting suicide by biting into the cyanide capsules that all members of the 

LTTE wore around their necks. This led to the death of twelve of the 

cadres. The LTTE responded by killing 150 Sinhalese in the north and 

east regions.162 The inevitable result was conflict between the IPKF and 

the LTTE. By mid-1988, the initial IPKF contingent of 3,000 grew to 

50,000, as compared to an estimated 4,500 LTTE fighters.163 It was also 

becoming obvious to all that the official objective of a short-term peacekeeping mission was rapidly turning into a protracted and large-scale 

conflict between the IPKF and the LTTE. On October 10, 1987, the 

Indian forces launched a major offensive against the LTTE in the Jaffna 

peninsula, signaling that the IPKF had indeed transformed from an 

impartial party into an active participant.164 Soon, both the Sri Lankan 

government (now headed by President Ranasinghe Premadasa) and the 

LTTE were calling for the IPKF to leave, but the Gandhi government 

refused. Remarkably, then, the Sri Lankan government joined with the 

LTTE in an “alliance of convenience” against the IPKF,165 going so far 

as to supply arms to the LTTE for use against the IPKF.166 As a consequence, the IPKF suffered considerable combat losses, and LTTE confidence and resolve considerably intensified.167 With Gandhi’s defeat in 

the parliamentary elections of December 1989, however, the new Prime 

Minister V. P. Singh withdrew the IPKF from Sri Lanka. In May 1991, 

the LTTE carried out the assassination of then former Prime Minister 

Gandhi. The group feared the collapse of the Singh administration and 

the return of power to Gandhi, who had originally ordered the IPKF to 

take on the LTTE and who would likely proceed with the implementation of the accord if returned to power, which would entail the disarming of the LTTE and the derailment of the goal of Eelam.168,169

LTTE: Second Eelam War, 1990–1995

In March 1990, after two years of fighting, India withdrew the IPKF 

from Sri Lanka and left the LTTE in de facto control of Sri Lanka’s 

north and east, including Jaffna, where the LTTE established its political headquarters. For a while, negotiations between the government 

and the LTTE leaders concerning possible Tamil autonomy in the 

north and east produced a peaceful interlude. However, fighting soon 

resumed as the LTTE renounced the cease-fire and declared the initiation of Eelam War II. The government responded with equal determination and force. The Sri Lankan military sought to overwhelm 

the numerically weaker LTTE. Exemplary killings and officially sponsored paramilitary groups, counterterrorist tactics that had successfully 
Chapter 3. Historical Context

91

suppressed the JVP insurrection in the south, were widely employed 

against the LTTE. Scorched-earth methods in the countryside, as well 

as sea and air assaults, were also employed. However, government tactics 

were unproductive. Rather, they emboldened the LTTE and solidified 

its tight control of Jaffna and its periphery as far south as Trincomalee 

and Vavuniya.170

However, at this point, the LTTE adopted several decisions that 

were not only unsuccessful but also evoked a significant heightening 

of anti-LTTE sentiments at home and abroad. In November 1990, in 

an act of ethnic cleansing, the LTTE expelled 70,000 Muslim residents 

of Jaffna to lay the groundwork for an ethnically homogenous Tamil 

state.171 And as noted above, in May 1991, the LTTE employed a suicide 

bomber to assassinate Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. This act led 

to a significant drop in public support for the LTTE in Tamil Nadu and 

the proscription of the group by New Delhi in 1992, which signified the 

loss of Tamil Nadu as an operational and logistical base.172

In July 1991, the LTTE launched a major effort to capture Elephant 

Pass, the gateway between the Jaffna peninsula and the rest of the 

island. The LTTE was unsuccessful in its month-long siege, but combined losses numbered more than 2,000 combatants.173

LTTE: Third Eelam War, 1995–2002

In 1994, Chandrika Kumaratunga was elected Sri Lankan president 

on a platform of “peace and meaningful constitutional reform” and 

brought a new round of short-lived peace talks.174 Shortly after her inauguration, Kumaratunga declared a unilateral cease-fire, and talks were 

started.175 After three  months without progress, especially concerning the issue of local Tamil autonomy, the LTTE resumed fighting in 

April 1995.176 Each side accused the other of negotiating in bad faith. 

From the Sri Lankan government perspective, President Kumaratunga 

felt double-crossed, and her military commanders felt vindicated in 

their suspicion of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.177

In April 1995, the LTTE attacked and sank two navy gunboats, thus 

ending the cease-fire.ak Further, in an effort to carry the fight to its 

opponent’s territory to injure the national economy and scare foreign 

investors, LTTE suicide bombers detonated a truckload of explosives in 

Colombo’s financial and ministerial district, killing and wounding more 

than 1,000 people.179,180 However, this time, the military was successful 

in capturing Jaffna city in December 1995 and then the entire Jaffna 

peninsula in May 1996, which the militants had controlled since 1990.181

ak See Rotberg for a description of the LTTE’s naval capabilities.178
92

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Over the next three  years, the Sri Lankan government and the 

LTTE engaged in several major conventional battles, with fortunes on 

each side in a constant ebb and flow. In July 1996, the LTTE launched 

Operation Unceasing Waves, its largest offensive up to that point. The 

highlight of the offensive was the LTTE victory in the Battle of Mullaitivu in which the LTTE overran one of the military’s largest bases 

and killed a claimed 1,208 government troops.182 This was followed by 

an LTTE attack on an army garrison in which the LTTE, using a combination of conventional forces and suicide cadres, killed more than 

2,275 people by government estimates.183 Shortly thereafter, the military responded with its own offensive and, in September 1996, captured 

the town of Kilinochchi, the LTTE political headquarters established 

when the rebels were ousted from Jaffna. Though weakened, the LTTE 

was able to rebuff the military’s 20,000-man offensive of May  1997, 

named Operation Sure Victory, intended to capture the strategically 

important A9 Highway, which runs through thick jungle from Vavuniya 

to Kilinochchi (see Figure 3-2),184,185 and overall obstruct the military 

from resupplying Jaffna by land or sea.186

Trincomalee

Vavuniya

Mullaitivu

Kilinochchi

Omanthai

Puliyankulam

Nainamadu

Nedunkerni

Mankulam

Ottisuddan

Karyppadda

Olumadu murippu

Puthur

Katkidanku

Kanakarayan kulam

Highway A9

Figure 3-2. Highway A9 from Vavuniya to Kilinochchi.
Chapter 3. Historical Context

93

In late 1997 and the first quarter of 1998, the LTTE managed to 

attack government naval patrols, arrange three major bombings, and 

keep control, at least at night, of the thinly populated coastline north 

of Trincomalee and the northern interior either side of the main road 

from Vavuniya to Jaffna. In 1998, the LTTE reversed prior misfortunes 

and pushed the military out of Kilinochchi in its Operation Unceasing 

Waves II. Likewise, in January 1998, LTTE suicide bombers exploded a 

large truck bomb at the revered Buddhist Temple of the Sacred Tooth 

Relic in Kandy187, al and then at an area near Colombo railway station.

On October  8,  1997, the US government officially declared the 

LTTE a terrorist organization. In addition, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced that LTTE members would be denied visas 

for entry to the United States and LTTE profits from fund-raising activities in the United States would be frozen.188 Within the week, the LTTE 

responded with another suicide truck bombing within the Colombo 

commercial district, targeting the recently opened twin-tower World 

Trade Center located near the Hilton Hotel, where twelve American 

military officers were reportedly staying.189

After its victories, the LTTE sought to restart the peace negotiations that had been dormant since 1994. As a sign of its good will, the 

LTTE released soldiers and merchant sailors that had been held as hostages for up to five years. In November 1998, Prabhakaran reiterated 

his desire for peace talks to be moderated by a third party,190 noting,

The Tamils only wanted to live with dignity and peace 

in their homelands without any interference. We have 

every right to decide our own political destiny . . . On 

that basis we prefer to have a political agenda which 

could lead us to self-ruling.191

At the same time, Prabhakaran noted that unless there was a fundamental transformation in “the hawkish and racist attitude of Sinhal[ese] 

chauvinism,” which he admittedly did not anticipate, the government 

would bear responsibility for creating “the concrete historical conditions for the birth of the independent Tamil state.”192 However, the peace 

negotiations failed to gain any traction and the fighting continued.

In December, Sri Lanka’s minister of power and energy, the deputy defense minister, and the chiefs of the army, navy, and air force 

al Both the timing and symbolism of the attack on the Temple of the Sacred Tooth Relic 

were significant. First, Britain’s Prince Charles was scheduled to attend festivities related to 

the fiftieth anniversary of Sri Lankan independence the following week at the temple. Second, as noted earlier, the temple and the tooth are major symbols of not only the Buddhist 

religion but also Sinhalese political sovereignty and governmental legitimacy in Sri Lanka. 

Indeed, the attack on the Temple underscores the political importance, both domestic and 

foreign, that the LTTE considered in planning and executing its terrorist actions.
94

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

were ambushed in Oddusudan but were able to escape.193 Overall, the 

LTTE was able to maneuver with relative ease from its jungle encampments south of Jaffna, and it continued to harass government vessels off 

the northeast coast and remained capable of assassinating officials in 

Jaffna or detonating bombs in Colombo.194

In 1999, President Kumaratunga concluded that the LTTE insurgency could be ended by battlefield military victory. In March, the 

military launched Operation Rana Gasa from the south, aimed at dislodging the LTTE from the Vanni, but was only partially successful. The 

LTTE returned to the offensive with Operation Unceasing Waves III, 

which resulted in a reassertion of control over nearly the entire Vanni 

region. In addition, the LTTE made significant gains to the north and 

came close to assassinating President Kumaratunga.195

Estimates of the time placed the Sri Lankan military strength at 

143,000 personnel and the LTTE at 10,000 troops.196 However, the military had significant weaknesses. As one observer noted:

The official army is weak strategically, poorly led, 

poorly paid, demoralized by danger and sustained 

lack of success, and allegedly riddled with corruption. 

Strategically, its major handicap is a scarcity of intelligence about the enemy. It has few resources for gathering intelligence, few Tamils to do it, and very few 

trained analysts of the intelligence that is gathered. So 

the Sri Lankan army fights a committed, even fanatic 

cadre of guerillas with overwhelming numbers but with 

insufficient training, knowledge and motivation.197

In September 1999, the Sri Lankan air force conducted a bombing 

raid in northeast Sri Lanka that killed twenty-two Tamil civilians and 

wounded thirty-five others. In response, the LTTE Freedom Birds, a 

female unit, carried out a predawn attack on sleeping villagers in the 

east, in which twenty-three men, seventeen women, and eight children 

were reported to have been “systematically cut and chopped” to death. 

Similar attacks on smaller villages claimed six more victims.198 Reports 

by nongovernment sources, such as the University Teachers for Human 

Rights in Jaffna and United Nations officials, claimed that the LTTE was 

increasingly resorting to forcible conscription of male and female teenagers, as well as some as young as nine or ten years of age, to make up 

for depleting manpower. In the University Teachers estimate, the LTTE 

had lost as many as 1,500 of its core 7,000 fighters in recent months.199

The cycle of attempted cease-fires and returns to violence continued for the next several years. In part, a major obstacle to cease-fire 

negotiations at this time was an irreconcilable difference between the 
Chapter 3. Historical Context

95

government and the LTTE concerning the sequencing of events: the 

government insisted that war would continue until talks could reach a 

conclusion, while the LTTE insisted that a cease-fire precede settlement 

talks.200,201 A December 1999 cease-fire brokered by the Norwegian government broke when the LTTE launched an offensive aimed at taking 

the Elephant Pass in April 2000. However, unlike in the previous year, 

the government mounted a counterattack, Operation Agni Khiela, 

aimed at retaking control of the Jaffna peninsula.202 In July 2001, the 

LTTE conducted a major suicide attack against Bandaranaike International Airport. The attack not only destroyed eight military and four 

commercial planes but also significantly curtailed international travel 

and tourism, a key source of income for the government.

Norwegian Peace Initiative, 2002–2006

In late 2001, both sides were exhausted by events and put out feelers for a cease-fire. Again, the LTTE announced a unilateral cease-fire, 

and the government accepted. In March 2002, the government (now 

led by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe of the UNP) and the 

LTTE officially signed the Cease-fire Agreement (CFA) and accepted 

monitoring by the Norwegian-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. In a 

bilateral memorandum of understanding, the LTTE was unexpectedly 

granted access throughout the island. In addition, the all-important 

A9 Highway, linking Jaffna to the rest of the country, was reopened 

to allow displaced people to return and commercial activity to commence. In September, with great optimism both domestically and 

internationally, the sides commenced peace talks in Sattahip, Thailand. Talks lasted into 2003 and in the discussions the government proposed the establishment of a federal state arrangement. For its part, the 

LTTE announced that it would agree to a settlement that would give 

the Tamils “internal self-determination” within the north and east of 

the country. However, transforming these general ideas into concrete 

agreements proved impossible. Finally, after six rounds of talks without 

reaching a full peace agreement, the LTTE pulled out in 2003, and the 

talks were suspended.

The 2002 cease-fire commenced a negotiating process that had 

the potential to culminate in a federalized Sri Lankan state that was 

acceptable to both parties. During these peace negotiations, the LTTE 

declared that if substantial autonomy for the Tamil areas was not forthcoming, it would revert to its demand for an independent homeland. 

The scaling back of LTTE demands (from independence to autonomy) took many parties by surprise, but because an acceptable level 
96

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

autonomy (from the LTTE perspective) was never forthcoming from 

the government, the LTTE never had to make good on this promise.

Tragedy struck Sri Lanka in December 2004 when the Indian Ocean 

tsunami hit the island, causing 40,000 deaths and leaving many homeless. Although many countries pledged aid and assistance to the island, 

the conflict proved a major obstacle to relief efforts in LTTE-controlled 

areas. Before that catastrophic event, in March 2004, Vinayagamoorthy 

Muralithiran, also known as Colonel Karuna, then commander of the 

LTTE’s Batticaloa-Ampara District, announced his withdrawal from 

the LTTE and sought to split the LTTE Eastern command away from 

Prabhakaran’s Northern command. In a one-page note, Karuna listed 

his grievances with the LTTE leadership, noting that it had (1) generally neglected the district’s development by denying LTTE funds to the 

Batticaloa-Ampara District area, (2) excluded local Tamils from divisional commands and administrative positions in LTTE-held areas, (3) 

siphoned off fighters from the east for defense of the Jaffna area, and 

(4) conducted activities, including murders, without consulting Eastern LTTE leaders. Indeed, tensions between Prabhakaran and Karuna 

appeared to be on the rise for several years as the two increasingly 

came into conflict about leadership, direction, and priorities. The final 

straw seems to have been Karuna’s rejection of a Prabhakaran request 

in early March 2004 for an additional 1,000 eastern troops, probably 

the Jayanthan unit, to be transferred from the east to the north. It 

was speculated at the time that Prabhakaran’s request was the prelude 

to a purge of his rival, who was a brilliant battlefield commander but 

was not sufficiently deferential to the dictatorial Prabhakaran. This 

fractioning of the LTTE would prove catastrophic in the future as the 

LTTE lost valuable eastern manpower and territory that might have 

been crucial in the upcoming Fourth Eelam War.

In 2005, the Sri Lankan government initiated an island-wide recruitment campaign to substantially increase the size of the army, and in 

May  2005, an LTTE sniper assassinated Foreign Minister Lakshman 

Kadirgamar, a Tamil anti-LTTE hardliner. In June 2005, the government and the LTTE concluded the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS), it but was never implemented because of 

ongoing suspicions on both sides,203 as well as political and legal problems within the government.

In November  2005, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa won the 

national presidential election over former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe. Despite opposition from major Sinhalese and Buddhist 

political allies, Rajapaksa signed an order extending the merger of the 

Tamil-dominated Northern and Eastern Provinces, originally implemented as part of the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord of 1987. Moreover, the 
Chapter 3. Historical Context

97

government and the LTTE agreed to restart talks, which had been suspended when the LTTE withdrew in 2003, in Geneva, Switzerland, on 

April 19–21. However, the LTTE ultimately refused to attend the talks. 

Instead, on April 25, the LTTE carried out a suicide bombing against 

Army commander Sarath Fonseka, seriously wounding Fonseka and 

killing eight others.204 Sporadic fighting in the north and east resumed, 

after those events, in June 2005.

Fourth Eelam War, 2006–2009

With his victory in the 2005 election, Rajapaksa asserted his belief 

that only a military solution and the elimination of the LTTE could 

end the ethnic conflict. Additionally, by this point most Sinhalese as 

well as the government did not consider the Norwegians to be impartial monitors of the cease-fire. Although the CFA was not then officially abrogated and more sessions of the peace talks were scheduled to 

be held in June, the LTTE refused to attend. Subsequently, cease-fire 

violations, suicide attacks, and military clashes continued to occur. In 

2006, the government began a military campaign against the LTTE 

and Tamil population, with the support of the Tamil opposition. This 

latest military effort was prompted by the LTTE’s closure of the sluice 

gates of the Mavil Aru reservoir in July, which cut the water supply 

to thousands of farmers and villagers in government-controlled areas. 

This outbreak of hostilities unequivocally ended the CFA and marked 

the formal start of the Fourth Eelam War, even though hostilities had 

commenced roughly a year prior. In 2007, after weeks of Sri Lankan 

air force raids on Tamil targets in the north and east, the LTTE Air 

Tigers carried out their first confirmed attack on a military base near 

Colombo International Airport. At this time, estimates suggested that 

the LTTE had successfully smuggled four light aircraft onto the island 

and used one to drop explosives on the air base.205 In July 2007, the 

military captured Vakarai, a key LTTE foothold, and gained control 

over eastern Sri Lanka.

In late 2007, the government was faced with several dire situations. 

First, the economy was stagnating and faced an inflation rate of nearly 

twenty  percent. Second, the south was experiencing war fatigue in 

general and anger that the government could not defeat the Tamils. 

Third, in December 2007, the US government suspended military aid 

to Sri Lanka because of government human rights violations.206 In an 

effort to shore up wavering national and international support, the 

Sri Lankan government seemed to settle on the option of reopening 

hostilities in a major way. In January 2008, the government officially 
98

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

withdrew from the 2002 CFA, and the Norwegian monitors departed 

Sri Lanka.

Having pacified most non-LTTE Tamil militant groups with political deals and power-sharing agreements, the government launched a 

conventional ground offensive against the LTTE in April 2008. With 

a force of 160,000 well-equipped troops, the Sri Lankan military gradually steamrolled LTTE forces, now essentially restricted to Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu Districts.207 However, on several occasions, the 

outmanned LTTE was able to delay the march of a larger, but overconfident, Sri Lankan military force by superior tactics and surprise 

attacks. For example, feigning retreat, the LTTE was able to draw the 

initial wave of unsuspecting military units into a trap, surrounding the 

advancing soldiers, mowing down the onrushing troops, and capturing 

Sri Lankan military equipment to sustain the war effort.208 On other 

occasions, the LTTE was able to carry out air raids209,210 and underwater attacks,211,212 as well as suicide attacks outside of the battlefield.213

As the military continued to advance, LTTE operations came increasingly to rely on interconnected, lightly manned defensive strongpoints 

that the better equipped and more mobile military was able isolate and 

destroy.214 Never a large force, the LTTE had little ability to recruit and 

replace casualties. As the LTTE continued to retreat, it forced local 

civilians to go along with it in hope that (1) the Sri Lankan military 

would suspend its air and artillery attacks on the concentrated forces, 

and (2) the international community would pressure the government 

to halt its offensive.215 However, the Sri Lankan military pushed on.

On May  16,  2009, President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared victory 

for the government. On the following day, Selvarasa Pathmanathan, 

the LTTE chief of international relations, admitted defeat. On May 18, 

LTTE officials further acknowledged and Sri Lankan military leaders confirmed that Velupillai Prabhakaran, the LTTE leader; Charles 

Anthony, Prabhakaran’s heir; Colonel Soosai, the leader of the LTTE 

Sea Tigers; Pottu Amman, the Chief of Intelligence; B. Nadesan, 

the political chief; S. Puleedevan, head of the peace secretariat; and 

S. Ramesh, chief of the eastern military wing, had all been killed in 

combat.216 With this, the Fourth Eelam War came to an end.

Wartime Casualties

According to United Nations figures, approximately 80,000 to 

100,000 people were killed over the course of the four Eelam Wars.217

Of this total, about 23,000 were Sri Lankan soldiers and policemen, 

and about 27,000 were Tamil combatants. In the period from 2002 to 

2005, casualties were low but significantly increased in the period of the 
Chapter 3. Historical Context

99

Fourth Eelam War. According to the estimates of one source, depicted 

in Figure  3-3, estimated fatalities from 2006 to 2009 amounted to 

slightly more than 20,000.

Year

Fatalities

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

Figure 3-3. Estimated fatalities from 1984 to 2009.

ENDNOTES

1 Wilhelm Geiger, The Mahavamsa or the Great Chronicle of Ceylon, trans. (London: Oxford 

University Press, 1912).

2 P. A. T. Gunasinghe, The Tamils of Sri Lanka. Their History and Role (Colombo, Sri Lanka: 

H. W. Cave & Co., 1984), 31–38.

3 S. V. D. Gamini Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971–1987 (New Delhi: Gyan 

Publishing House, 2008), 89.

4 Ibid., 88.

5 K. M. de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981), 

261.

6 Ibid., 316–317.

7 Ibid., 322.

8 Ibid., 323.

9 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of California 

Press, 1986), 156.

10 “British Blamed for Tamil Attack,” Independent, January 27, 1998, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/british-blamed-for-tamil-attack-1141164.html.

11 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 197.

12 Ceylon Daily News (Colombo), May 15, 1970, cited in Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 

210.

13 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 141.

14 Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam, “The Politics of the Tamil Past,” in Sri Lanka: History 

and Roots of Conflict, ed. Jonathan Spencer (London: Routledge, 1990), 108.

15 Ibid.
100

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

16 Ibid., 111.

17 A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Sri Lankan Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the Nineteenth 

and Twentieth Centuries (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000), 2–3.

18 Charles Collins, “The Significance of the Donoughmore Constitution in the Political 

Development of Ceylon,” Parliamentary Affairs IV, no. 1 (January 1950): 109.

19 A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam and the Crisis of Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism 

1947–1977: A Political Biography (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 6.

20 Ibid., 12.

21 Ibid., 7.

22 “Thanthai Chelva’s 109th Anniversary Commemorated,” TamilNet, March 31, 2007, 

http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=21725.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Sydney D. Bailey, “Ceylon’s New Status,” Far Eastern Survey 17, no. 21 (November 1948): 

252.

26 Ibid.

27 E. Burk Inlow, “The Constitution of Ceylon,” Far Eastern Survey 18, no. 7 (April 1949): 81.

28 Bailey, “Ceylon’s New Status,” 253.

29 Wilson, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam and the Crisis of Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism 1947–1977, 133.

30 Inlow, “The Constitution of Ceylon,” 81.

31 Robert I. Rotberg, “Sri Lanka’s Civil War: From Mayhem Toward Diplomatic Resolution,” 

in Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 5–6.

32 Ibid.

33 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 133.

34 W. Ivor Jennings, “Politics in Ceylon,” Far Eastern Survey 21, no. 17 (December 1952): 179.

35 Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 42.

36 Jonathan Spencer, “Introduction: The Power of the Present,” in Sri Lanka: History and 

Roots of Conflict, ed. Jonathan Spencer (London: Routledge, 1990), 2.

37 Donald L. Horowitz, “Incentives and Behavior in the Ethnic Politics of Sri Lanka and 

Malaysia,” Third World Quarterly 11 (October 1989): 18–35.

38 W. Howard Wriggins, “Ceylon’s Times of Troubles, 1956–1958,” Far Eastern Survey 28, 

no. 3 (March 1959): 33.

39 “Official Language: An Act to Prescribe the Sinhala Language as the One Official Language of Ceylon and to Enable Certain Transitory Provisions to Be Made,” LawNet, http://

www.lawnet.lk/section.php?file=http://www.lawnet.lk/docs/statutes/stats_1956_2006/

indexs/Vol2/1956Y0V0C33A.html.

40 Wriggins, “Ceylon’s Times of Troubles, 1956–1958,” 35.

41 K. M. de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985

(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), 182.

42 Wriggins, “Ceylon’s Times of Troubles, 1956–1958,” 36.

43 Ibid., 34.

44 Robert N. Kearney, Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon (Durham, NC: 

Duke University, 1967), 117–118.

45 Wriggins, “Ceylon’s Times of Troubles, 1956–1958,” 34.

46 Robert N. Kearney, “Ceylon: The Continuing Crisis,” Asian Survey 3, no. 2 (February 

1963): 125.
Chapter 3. Historical Context

101

47 Robert N. Kearney, “The New Political Crises of Ceylon,” Asian Survey 2, no. 4 (June 

1996): 19.

48 Kearney, “Ceylon: The Continuing Crisis,” 123.

49 “Senanayake–Chelavanayakam Pact,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/

satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/actsandordinance/senanayake.htm.

50 Rotberg, “Sri Lanka’s Civil War,” 6.

51 Robert N. Kearney, “Ceylon: A Year of Consolidation,” Asian Survey 4, no. 2 (February 

1964): 730.

52 “Ceylon Becomes Socialist Republic,” Washington Post, May 23, 1972.

53 W. A. Wiswa Warnapala, “Sri Lanka in 1972: Tension and Change,” Asian Survey 13, no. 2 

(February 1973): 220.

54 W. A. Wiswa Warnapala, “The New Constitution of Sri Lanka,” Asian Survey 13, no. 12 

(December 1973): 1190–1191.

55 Sudha Ramachandran, “Selective Roots to Tamil Nationalism,” Asia Times, April 18, 

2002.

56 David Little, Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity (Washington, DC: United States Institute 

of Peace Press, 1994), 5.

57 Rohan Gunaratna, War and Peace in Sri Lanka (Kandy, Sri Lanka: Institute of Fundamental Studies, 1987), 27.

58 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Colombia University Press, 2006), 138.

59 Wilson, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam and the Crisis of Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism 1947–1977, 108.

60 Jon Lunn, Claire Taylor, and Ian Townsend, War and Peace in Sri Lanka (London: House 

of Commons Library, 2009), 8.

61 Kristian Stokke and Anne Kirsti Ryntveit, “The Struggle for Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka,” 

Growth and Change 31 (Spring 2000): 292.

62 Chris Smith, “South Asia’s Enduring War,” in Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, ed. Robert I. 

Rotberg (Arlington: World Peace Foundation, 1999), 17.

63 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 139.

64 Smith, “South Asia’s Enduring War,” 17.

65 Ibid.

66 S. V. D. Gamini Samaranayake, “Patterns of Political Violence and Responses of the Government of Sri Lanka,” Terrorism and Political Violence 11, no. 1 (1999), 113.

67 W. I. Siriweera, “Recent Developments in Sinhala-Tamil Relations,” Asian Survey 20, no. 9 

(September 1980): 904.

68 The Europa Year Book, 1979, Vol. II (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1980), 1429.

69 Horowitz, “Incentives and Behaviour in the Ethnic Politics of Sri Lanka and Malaysia,” 

18–35.

70 de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, 196.

71 Gananath Obeyesekere, “Buddhism, Ethnicity and Identity: A Problem of Buddhist History,” Journal of Buddhist Ethics 10 (2003), 192–242.

72 Steven Kemper, “J. R. Jayewardene, Righteousness and Real Politik,” in Sri Lanka: History 

and Roots of Conflict, ed. Jonathan Spenser (London, UK: Routledge, 1990), 208.

73 Policy Research & Information Unit of the Presidential Secretariat of Sri Lanka, The 

Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, last modified January 15, 

2013, http://www.priu.gov.lk/Cons/1978Constitution/Introduction.htm.

74 Stephen Hopgood, “Tamil Tigers, 1987–2002,” in Making Sense of Suicide Missions, ed. 

Diego Gambetta (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005), 57.

75 Stuart Auerbach, “Racial Clashes Leave Bitter Legacy Marring Peace of Sri Lanka,” Washington Post, October 7, 1981.
102

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

76 Jayshree Bajoria, “Backgrounder: The Sri Lankan Conflict,” Council on Foreign Relations, 

May 18, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/11407/.

77 S. J. Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy (Chicago and 

London: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 15, 21–33; Asoka Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy (New York and Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2009), 107.

78 Ronald J. Herring, “Making Ethnic Conflict: The Civil War in Sri Lanka,” in Carrots, 

Sticks, and Ethnic Conflict: Rethinking Development Assistance, eds. Milton J. Esman and Ronald J. Herring (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2001), 157–159.

79 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 80.

80 Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy, 32.

81 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 106.

82 Ibid.

83 Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy, 25.

84 Rohan Gunaratna, “Sri Lanka: Feeding the Tamil Tigers,” in The Political Economy of 

Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, eds. K. Ballentine and J. Sherman (Boulder, 

CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 199.

85 International Crisis Group, “Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province: Land, Development, Conflict,” Asia Report, no. 159, October 15, 2008, 5, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/

asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/159-sri-lankas-eastern-province-land-development-conflict.

aspx.

86 Ibid., Appendix C.

87 John Keay, India. A History: From the Earliest Civilizations to the Boom of the Twentieth Century

(New York: Grove Press, 2010): 83.

88 Ibid., 108.

89 Ibid., 156.

90 Ibid., 172.

91 Ibid., 214.

92 Ibid., 274.

93 Ibid., 308.

94 Milo Kearney, The Indian Ocean in World History (New York: Routledge, 2004), 91.

95 Louise Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas. The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 1405–

1433 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994): 43.

96 Ibid., 49.

97 K. M. M. Werake, “A Re-Examination of Chinese Relations with Sri Lanka During the 

15th Century A.D.,” Modern Sri Lanka Studies II, nos. 1–2 (1987): 89.

98 Ibid., 90.

99 Kearney, The Indian Ocean in World History, 96.

100Louise Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas. The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 112–118.

101 Werake, “A Re-Examination of Chinese Relations with Sri Lanka During the 15th Century A.D.,” 95.

102Louise Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas. The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 142.

103Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict 

from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), 6–7.

104 John Keay, China: A History (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 380.

105Kearney, The Indian Ocean in World History, 108–109.

106Alfred LeRoy Burt, The British Empire and Commonwealth from the American Revolution (Boston, MA: D.C. Heath, 1956), 159.
Chapter 3. Historical Context

103

107 Jeremy Black, “Midway and the Indian Ocean,” Naval War College Review 62, no. 4 

(Autumn 2009): 135.

108 Ibid., 135.

109 Ibid., 138.

110 Ashley Jackson, “‘Defend Lanka Your Home’: War on the Home Front in Ceylon, 1939–

1945,” War in History 16, no. 2 (April 2009): 215.

111 Quoted in Jackson, “‘Defend Lanka Your Home’: War on the Home Front in Ceylon, 

1939–1945,” 235.

112K. M. de Silva, “India and Sri Lanka, 1947–79,” in Regional Powers and Small State Security: India and Sri Lanka, 1977-90 (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 

1995), 20.

113 Quoted in de Silva, “India and Sri Lanka, 1947–79,” 19–20.

114 Quoted in de Silva, “India and Sri Lanka, 1947–79,” 20.

115 de Silva, “India and Sri Lanka, 1947–79,” 25.

116 Ibid., 24.

117 Dmitri Volkogonov, Lenin: A New Biography (New York: Free Press, 1994), 397–398.

118 Amal Jayawardena, “Soviet Involvement in South Asia: The Security Dilemma,” in Security Dilemma of a Small State: Sri Lanka in the South Asian Context, ed. P. V. J. Jayasekera (New 

Delhi: South Asian Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1992), 374.

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid., 373.

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid., 375.

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid., 380.

125 Ibid., 392–393.

126Quoted in Surendra K. Gupta, Stalin’s Policy Towards India, 1946-1953 (New Delhi: South 

Asian Publishers, 1988), 132–133.

127Mahinda Werake, “The China Factor in South Asia: Myths and Realities,” in Security 

Dilemma of a Small State: Sri Lanka in the South Asian Context, ed. P. V. J. Jayasekera (New 

Delhi: South Asian Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1992), 399.

128 Ibid.

129Quoted in William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1964), 

109.

130 Shelton U. Kodikara, Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka: A Third World Persepctive (New Delhi: 

Chanakya Publications, 1992), 90–91.

131 Ibid., 91.

132 Ibid., 135.

133 Ibid., 153–154.

134 Ibid., 22.

135Rohan Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies 

(Colombo, Sri Lanka: South Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1993), 2.

136Rohan Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP (Kandy, Sri 

Lanka: Institute of Fundamental Studies, 1990), 103–104.

137 Ibid., 92.

138C. A. Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89 (Colombo, 

Sri Lanka: Lake House Bookshop, 1991), 35–36.

139Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 105.
104

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

140 Ibid.

141A. C. Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989 (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Lake House Publishers, 1990), 

42–43.

142Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 7, 82.

143Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 48.

144Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 93.

145Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 52–53.

146Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 281.

147 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 293.

148 Ibid.

149Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 254.

150 S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe, “Sri Lanka in 1983,” Asian Survey 24, no. 2 (February 1984): 

252.

151 William Claiborne, “Unrest Spreads in Sri Lanka. Fires and Looting Mark Sri Lanka’s 

Racial Strife,” Washington Post, July 27, 1983.

152William Claiborne, “Sri Lanka’s Tamil Refugees Fear Massacre as Killing Continues,” 

Washington Post, July 30, 1983.

153 “Sri Lanka Torn,” Washington Post, August 5, 1983.

154Rotberg, “Sri Lanka’s Civil War,” 7.

155Robert N. Kearney, “Sri Lanka in 1985,” Asian Survey 26, no. 2 (February 1986): 220.

156Nadesan Satyendra, “The Thimpu Negotiations: The Basic Documents,” in The Tamil 

National Question and the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, ed. N. Seevaratnam (Delhi, Konark Publishers, 1989), 137.

157 Smith, “South Asia’s Enduring War,” 18.

158 “Sri Lanka Tamil Terror,” Time, May 27, 1985.

159 Steven R. Weisman, “India Airlifts Aid to Tamil Rebels,” New York Times, June 5, 1987.

160Ralph R. Premdas and S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe, “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: The 

Indo-Lanka Peace Accord,” Asian Survey 28, no. 6 (June 1988): 680.

161 Shantha K. Hennayake, “The Peace Accord and the Tamils in Sri Lanka,” Asian Survey

29, no. 4 (April 1989): 407–410.

162 Steven R. Weisman, “India Policy Shift: Tamil Conflict Poses New Risks,” New York Times, 

October 10, 1987.

163Allan Bullion, “The Indian Peace-Keeping Force in Sri Lanka,” International Peacekeeping 

1, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 151–152.

164 Ibid., 152.

165 Ibid., 153.

166Chris Smith, “Sri Lanka: The Continued Armed Struggle of the LTTE,” in From Soldiers 

to Politicians, Transforming Rebel Movements After Civil War, ed. Jeroen De Zeeuw (Boulder, 

CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), 207.

167 Smith, “South Asia’s Enduring War,” 19.

168Rohan Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies

(Colombo, Sri Lanka: South Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1993), 459.

169M. R. Narayan Swamy, Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerillas (Dehli: Konark Publishers 

Pvt. Ltd., 2002), 333.

170Rotberg, “Sri Lanka’s Civil War,” 9

171Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 153.

172 Ibid., 154.

173 Smith, “Sri Lanka: The Continued Armed Struggle of the LTTE,” 207.
Chapter 3. Historical Context

105

174 Rotberg, “Sri Lanka’s Civil War,” 9.

175 Ibid.

176 Ibid., 9–10

177 Ibid., 3.

178 Ibid., 39–40,

179 Ibid., 2.

180Chris Lefkow, “Government Vows To Escalate Military Campaign Against LTTE,” AFP, 

February 1, 1996.

181 Smith, “Sri Lanka: The Continued Armed Struggle of the LTTE,” 207.

182 “LTTE Claims 1,208 Army Troops Killed in Mullaitivu Assault,” AFP, July 22, 1996.

183 “Tigers Tie Down Troops; Government Admits Toll Over 2,275,” AFP, August 7, 1996.

184M. R. Narayan Swamy, “Officer: Offensive Against Rebels in Vavuniya Has Begun,” AFP, 

May 13, 1997.

185Amal Jayasinghe, “Death Toll Hits 400 as Troops, LTTE Battle in North,” AFP, December 

5, 1997.

186Rotberg, “Sri Lanka’s Civil War,” 2.

187 “Sri Lanka Outlaws Rebel LTTE Organization,” AFP, January 26, 1998.

188Amal Jayasinghe, “LTTE Expresses ‘Deep Dismay,’ ‘Displeasure’ Over US Moves,” AFP, 

October 11, 1997.

189 Jin Hui, “Colombo Bombing, Multi-Purpose Action,” Xinhua, October 16, 1997.

190 “LTTE Leader Backs Third-Party Mediation for Peace Talks,” AFP, November 27, 1998.

191Rotberg, “Sri Lanka’s Civil War,” 3.

192Quoted in “LTTE Leader Backs Third-Party Mediation for Peace Talks,” AFP, November 

27, 1998.

193Rotberg, “Sri Lanka’s Civil War, 2.

194 Ibid.

195 Smith, “Sri Lanka: The Continued Armed Struggle of the LTTE,” 207.

196Rotberg, “Sri Lanka’s Civil War,” 1.

197 Ibid., 2.

198 “Women Wing of LTTE Kills 54 Villagers in Retaliatory Raid,” AFP, September 18, 1999.

199Barbara Crossette, “Tamil Rebels Said to Recruit Children Soldiers,” New York Times, July 

17, 2000.

200“Sri Lanka Ready To Open Talks with Tigers,” AFP, December 12, 2000.

201 “Oslo Peace Bid Hits Snag as Sri Lanka Fighting Escalates,” AFP, December 17, 2000.

202Smith, “Sri Lanka: The Continued Armed Struggle of the LTTE,” 208.

203Melissa Tjota, “Sri Lanka and the Fight for Peace,” Harvard International Review, May 6, 

2006.

204Chandra Richard de Silva, “Sri Lanka in 2005: Continuing Political Turmoil.” Asian Survey 46, no. 1 (January–February 2006), 103.

205Simon Gardner and Ranga Sirilai, “Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers Bomb Base in First Air 

Raid,” Reuters, March 26, 2007.

206Lasantha Wickrematunge, “Sri Lanka’s Civil War: Not Over Yet,” Time, January 8, 2008.

207Nira Wickremasinghe, “Sri Lanka in 2008. Waging War for Peace,” Asian Survey 49, no. 1 

(January/February 2009), 60.

208B. Raman, “Over-Confident SL Army Again Walks into a Deadly Trap,” South Asia Analysis Group, paper no. 2681, April 25, 2008.

209Iqbal Athas, “LTTE Launches Air Raids,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 28, 2008.
106

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

210R. Hariharan, “LTTE’s Air Raid on Trincomalee and the Offensive Operations,” South 

Asian Analysis Group, Note no. 469, August 29, 2008.

211R. S. Vasan, “Sinking of A 520/MV Invincible in Trincomalee,” South Asian Analysis Group, 

Paper no. 2700, May 13, 2008.

212Tim Fish, “LTTE sinks Sri Lankan Logistics Ship,” Jane’s Navy International, May 21, 2008.

213R. Hariharan, “An Analysis of Military Operations,” South Asian Analysis Group, Note 

no. 447, May 29, 2008.

214 R. Hariharan, “Tactical Aspects of the Eelam War,” South Asian Analysis Group, Note 

no. 476, October 21, 2008.

215 Jayadeva Uyangoda, “Sri Lanka in 2009. From Civil War to Political Uncertainties,” Asian 

Survey, 50, no. 1 (January/February 2010): 104.

216 Ishara S. Kodikara, “Sri Lanka: The End of the Tigers,” STRATFOR Global Intelligence, 

May 18, 2009.

217 Smith, “Sri Lanka: The Continued Armed Struggle of the LTTE,” 205.
CHAPTER 4.

SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

109

Sri Lanka experienced numerous bouts of political violence after 

securing its independence from the United Kingdom in 1948. As 

described in the previous section, Sinhalese youth waged insurrections against the government in 1971 and over 1987–1989, and prior 

to the commencement of formal hostilities between the LTTE and the 

Sri Lankan state in 1983, intercommunal riots between Sinhalese and 

Tamils erupted in 1956, 1958, 1961, 1974, 1977, and 1983. The current section will delve into the economic and sociocultural factors that 

motivated these outbreaks of violence. To set the stage, we first provide some of the key basic demographic facts that constitute important structural underpinnings to these conflicts, and we also introduce 

some of the main theories that have been forwarded to explain the 

outbreaks of violence in post-independence Sri Lanka. Although there 

is not an accepted unifying theory that adequately accounts for all the 

myriad facets and factors of political violence in Sri  Lanka after its 

independence, these theories will provide a framework for placing into 

context some of the economic and sociocultural factors that are widely 

acknowledged as motivating the spasms of violence seen in the country 

since the mid-twentieth century.

We eventually turn to describing the main factors that motivated 

Tamils and Sinhalese to take up arms against the state and each other. 

Although some of these factors are economic in nature, a full accounting of the underpinnings of the conflict would be incomplete without 

an adequate description of the mytho-historical factors that played a 

fundamental role in providing content to and structuring Tamil and 

Sinhalese social identities. The clash of social identities added a virulence to the conflict, as defeat was perceived as not only entailing material consequences but also cultural extinction and the concomitant 

impairment and potential annihilation of social identities. Additionally, we also note how these two social identities are not undifferentiated wholes but rather display a significant amount of internal diversity, 

especially with respect to caste and region.

DEMOGRAPHICS: ETHNICITY

The island’s four primary ethnic groups are the Sinhalese, the 

Sri Lankan Tamils, the Indian Tamils, and the Moors. The Sinhalese 

are the majority ethnic group in the south, west, and central regions of 

the island. They trace their arrival on the island from northern India 

back to about the fifth or sixth century BC. They constitute approximately seventy-five  percent of the population, yet they have been 

described as a “majority with a minority complex”1

 because of fears 

that they would be overrun by hordes of Tamils. During most of the 
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Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

ethnic conflict about fifty to sixty million Tamils resided across the 

Palk Strait in Tamil Nadu, and the Sinhalese feared that these Tamils 

would someday link up with their Sri Lankan cousins and overrun the 

island. This has led to the Sinhalese perception that “we are carrying 

on a struggle for national existence against the Dravidian majority” 

and that “if the Tamils get hold of the country, the Sinhalese will have 

to jump into the sea.”2

During the colonial era, the Sinhalese were further divided into 

“up-country” and “low-country” categories. Although the Portuguese 

and Dutch controlled the coastal region of the island, neither was 

able to extend its authority to the (Sinhalese) kingdom of Kandy in 

the interior of the island. The result was the emergence of cultural 

and religious differences between Sinhalese in the southwest littoral 

(low-country Sinhalese) of the island and those of the Kandyan interior (up-country Sinhalese). Greater numbers of the former converted 

to Christianity, adopted a cosmopolitan outlook, and challenged caste 

hierarchies by obtaining substantial wealth in the colonial economy in 

the late nineteenth century, whereas the latter remained more culturally conservative (i.e., Sinhalese-Buddhist) and insular in outlook.

The arrival of Tamils from southern India, especially from the 

state of Tamil Nadu, and their settlement into the northern region of 

Ceylon is not as well documented but probably dates from about the 

tenth century AD. The Indian Tamils, also commonly referred to as 

the estate Tamils or up-county Tamils, are descendants of immigrants 

from India who were brought to the island by British colonists during 

the nineteenth century to labor on plantations established by the British. During the coffee boom from 1871 to 1881, 24,000 Indian Tamils 

were brought annually into Ceylon, and 34,000 arrived annually during 

the tea boom from 1891 to 1900. Additionally, 60,000 arrived annually from 1923 to 1928 when rubber production peaked, and by 1953 

the population of Indian Tamils (984,327) slightly outnumbered that 

of their Ceylonese cousins (908,705).3 Indian Tamils have historically 

been an isolated and poor population, working mostly on tea plantations in central Sri Lanka.4

 Strict caste and social divisions divide the 

Sri Lankan and Indian Tamils, and indeed both groups had pejorative 

nicknames for the other and criticized the dialect spoken by the other 

group.5

 Consequently, few Indian Tamils joined the LTTE; instead they 

maintained their own separate political and militant organizations.

The Moors, also known as the Sri  Lankan Muslims, trace their 

lineage to Arab traders and merchants of the eighth century AD who 

transited the Indian Ocean. They practice Islam and speak Tamil, and 

with Portuguese colonization of the west coast in the sixteenth century, the Moors were pushed further from the more heavily populated 
Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

111

southwest to the central and eastern regions of the island. In contrast 

to the Indian Tamils, the Moors and the Sri Lankan Tamils were able 

to gloss over their socioreligious differences and, at times, forge a tenuous working relationship. In addition, there are a comparatively small 

number of Anglo-Sri Lankans and Burghers, the latter being descendants of Dutch and Portuguese settlers. Population (Millions)

0

5

10

15

20

25

1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 

2012

Year

Figure 4-1. Official population estimates, 1960–2011.

As shown in Figure 4-1, the Sri Lankan population grew to exceed 

fifteen million in 1982 (from nearly ten million in 1960), and by the 

end of the conflict in 2009, the population had nearly reached 20.5 million. Additionally, according to official census data from 1946 to 2011, 

depicted in Figure 4-2, the Sinhalese were the largest ethnic group over 

this period, constituting approximately seventy to seventy-five percent 

of the total population, and the 2011 census records Sri Lankan Tamils 

as constituting approximately eleven percent of the population.6
112

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 

1946 

1953 

1963 

1971 

1981 

2001 

2011/12 

Buddhist Hindu Muslim Christian Other 

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 

1946 

1953 

1963 

1971 

1981 

2001 

2011/12 

Sinhalese Sri Lankan Tamils Moors Indian Tamils Burghers Malays Others 

Figure 4-2. Percentage of population by ethnicity for Sri Lankan census years.

The Sri Lankan Tamils have traditionally been concentrated in the 

north and east, making them the majority in some districts. However, 

in the east, the Sri Lankan Tamils are co-located with significant numbers of the island’s Muslim minority (see Figure 4-3).

Until the recent years of conflict, Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamil 

homesteads tended to intermix in the countryside. Although there 

were very few Tamils in the south and west, cities, especially Colombo, 

were often heterogeneous in numbers and settlement.7

DEMOGRAPHICS: RELIGION AND LANGUAGE

The Sinhalese are overwhelmingly members of the Theravada 

school of Buddhism. Although Buddhism originated in India, it was 

driven to the peripheries of the subcontinent by centuries of Muslim 

raiders from present-day Afghanistan and by the revival and spread of 

Hinduism in India. Sinhala, the language of the Sinhalese, is an IndoAryan language with classical Indian roots but today is indigenous only 

in Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese, therefore, view themselves and their island 

home as the last line of defense for a besieged and isolated group.
Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

113

Ethnic Distribution of Sri Lanka

Trincomalee

0 10 20 Miles

0 10 20 KM

National Capitals Sinhalese

Tamil

Province Capitals

Cities 0-250,000

Colombo

Anuradhapura

Jaffna

Kurunegala

Kandy

Badulla

Ratnapura

Galle

Puttalam

Talaimannar

Negombo

Batticaloa

Kalmunai

Low country

Kandyan

Low country

Kandyan

Ceylon Moor

Figure 4-3. Sri Lankan ethnic distribution.

The vast majority of Sri Lankan Tamils are members of the Saivite 

school of Hinduism, in common with the Tamils in the co-ethnic state 

of Tamil Nadu, just across the Palk Strait in southern India (see Figure 4-4 for the percentages of provincial populations that are Hindu). 

Tamil—the language of the Sri  Lankan Tamils, Indian Tamils, and 

Muslims—is a Dravidian language that is spoken not only in Sri Lanka 

but also in Tamil Nadu. During the nineteenth  century, these two 
114

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

characteristics—religion and language—vied within the Tamil community to become the foundation of “Tamilness.” By the end of the 

century, language proved the stronger of the two and became the dominant factor in determining what constitutes Tamilness.8, a

 This is why 

subsequent Sinhalese attempts to minimize or restrict the Tamil language were perceived as direct attempts at suppressing Tamil society, 

culture, and way of life as a whole.

In parallel with the growing importance of Tamil as a language, 

there emerged an unprecedented interest in developing a history of 

the Tamils on the island. Initially intended to awaken the Tamils to 

their heritage, these historical writings soon morphed into instruments 

of bitter conflict between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. In a spiraling 

action-response mode, each group increasingly depicted the other as 

its arch enemy and chief obstacle to its rightful and legitimate status 

on the island.

In summarizing the traditional divisions between the Sinhalese 

and the Tamils, one observer noted that the two are differentiated by 

language and script, religion, social organization, territorial concentration, and sense of collective history. Even when characteristics overlap, 

such as conversion to Christianity under colonial rule or facility in the 

English language, the result is superficial and does not produce a common bonding or shared identity.9

a Stokke and Ryntveit also point out that Christian missionaries and Tamil Christian 

converts were formidable forces behind the push for the supremacy of language over religion. This perception permitted Tamils to convert to Christianity without losing or compromising their sense of ethnic identity.
Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

115

Trincomalee

0 10 20 Miles

0 10 20 KM

Colombo

Anuradhapura

Jaffna

Kurunegala

Kandy

Badulla

Ratnapura

Galle

Talaimannar

Negombo

Batticaloa

Kalmunai

Distribution of Hinduism

National Capitals

Cities 0-250,000

Province Capitals

85.0

77.9

27.2 68.7

31.6 0.5

1.8

66.3

16.9

2.9

0.3

51.0 20.3

10.5 6.6

2.1

8.7

9.5

2.3

1.5

3.3

9.6

0.9

4.2

Figures are based on 2001 

census data except for 

those percentages in italic, 

which are from 1981 

census data.

Figure 4-4. Distribution of Hinduism in Sri Lanka.

THEORIES OF VIOLENCE IN SRI LANKA

A variety of theories have been advanced to understand the various 

conflicts in Sri Lanka.10,11 The approach known as primordialism notes 

that ethnic identity is largely inborn and immutable and is both socially 

acquired through language, culture, and religion and genetically 
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Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

determined through skin pigmentation and physiognomy.b Ethnicity is 

therefore seen as having a timeless and enduring sociobiological basis 

that is largely inherited at birth and promotes a commonality of interests among those within the same ethnic group, and which may remain 

latent but angrily emerge as a country experiences social and economic 

change in the effort to achieve modernity. Nissan and Stirrat noted that 

the history of Sri Lanka has largely been written in primordialist terms, 

and evidence for a primordialist basis to the modern iteration of the 

ethnic conflict is found in the Sinhalese historical chronicle the Mahavamsa, which was first written in sixth century AD (and subsequently 

updated) and uses the terms “Sinhala” and “Damila” to describe the 

antagonists, with the former as the followers and defenders of Buddhism and the latter depicted as non-Buddhist invaders.14,15

Proponents of primordialism may also point to the epic contest 

between Elara, the Tamil ruler of the kingdom of Anuradhapura, and 

Dutugemunu, a regal Sinhalese figure of symbolic importance to modern-day Sinhalese. Buddhism was established in Sri Lanka only after the 

Buddhist Indian emperor Ashoka (who ruled from 274 to 237 BC) sent 

a mission to the island that resulted in the conversion of Devanampiya 

Tissa, the King of Anuradhapura. In 177 BC, the kingdom fell under 

south Indian control, and Elara ascended the throne in 145 BC and 

ruled for forty-four years. Dutugemunu waged a fifteen-year campaign 

against Elara that was ultimately successful and is depicted in the Mahavamsa as an epic victory of the Sinhalese over the usurping Tamils in a 

holy war fought for Buddhism.16 Speaking of Dutugemunu, the Mahavamsa states, “his war cry was ‘Not for kingdom but for Buddhism.’ ”17

Additionally, after his victory, Dutugemunu was despondent over 

the scale of human carnage that resulted from his struggle with Elara, 

and in the Mahavamsa he is reported to have asked the sangha (the Buddhist order), “how shall there be comfort for me, O venerable sirs, since 

by me was caused the slaughter of a great host numbering millions?” 

The sangha responded by stating, “from this deed arises no hindrance 

in the way to heaven. Only one and a half human beings have been 

slain by thee, O lord of men . . . Unbelievers and men of evil life were 

the rest, not more to be esteemed than beasts.”18

While the Mahavamsa does locate a cosmic battle between the 

Sinhalese and Dravidian invaders from south India in antiquity, others have noted that the recent ethnic conflict is a product of twentieth century politics and nation building, and that it is misleading to 

apply modern-day notions of ethnic identity and nationalism to the 

states and peoples that inhabited Sri Lanka’s distant past. For instance, 

b For more information on primordialism, see Geertz12 and Imtiyaz and Stavis.13
Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

117

Spencer noted that ethnicity was not a politically relevant factor within 

the political systems of the precolonial kingdoms of Kotte, Kandy, and 

Jaffna;19 and Tambiah argued that ethnic solidarity was not prevalent 

among residents within those kingdoms, as they did not see themselves 

as “Sinhalese” or “Tamil” members of those political units.20,21

Additionally, conflicts during the colonial era between Sinhalese 

and Tamils were rare.22,23 The first modern-era conflict between the two 

occurred in 1956, when 300 Tamils organized a satyagraha (peaceful 

sit-down protest) outside parliament to protest the Official Language 

Act (No. 33) of 1956, which made Sinhala the only official language. 

Bhikkus and other supporters of the bill attacked the Tamil protesters 

and threw some of them into a nearby lake, and rioting and looting was 

directed against Tamil businesses and individuals. Before this event, in 

the colonial-era conflicts were often waged along caste lines within the 

respective communities or were religious struggles between Buddhists 

and Christians or between Buddhists, Catholics, or Hindus against 

Muslims.24 None of the clashes during the colonial era were between 

Buddhists and Hindus, and, interestingly, Tamils were not attacked by 

Sinhalese in 1915 when the Sinhalese rioted against Muslims.25,26

Additionally, there are a number of historical irregularities that suggest both cooperation and intermixing between Tamils and Sinhalese. 

For instance, some Tamil nobles supported Dutugemunu against Elara, 

the Tamil king, while some Sinhalese opposed him, thus suggesting 

that the battles between the two may not have represented a twilight 

struggle between Sinhalese and Tamils.27 And Nissan and Stirrat noted 

the following anomalies:28,29

• There is inscriptional evidence at Anuradhapura and 

Polonnaruwa, both historical centers of Sinhala-Buddhist 

civilization, of Tamil-speaking groups residing in these cities. 

Additionally, Tamil soldiers served in the armies of Sinhalese 

kings and even acted as guards for the Temple of the Sacred 

Tooth Relic in Kandy.

• In Jaffna, which is the heartland of Sri Lankan Tamils, there are 

place names that are of Sinhalese origin and Buddhist remains 

from the first millennium AD. The latter may be due to the 

fact that, at this time, there were significant Buddhist-Tamil 

communities in south India.

• A population of Sinhalese-Buddhists of the salagama, karava,

and durava castes reside in the coastal zones of southwestern 

Sri  Lanka. Members of these castes were among some of the 

more active participants of the Buddhist revival during the 

nineteenth century, yet evidence indicates that these groups are 

descendants of immigrants from Hindu south India, specifically 
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Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

from Kerala (Malayalam speakers) and Coromandel (Tamil 

speakers), who were subsequently “Sinhalized.”c

• Many Sinhalese of the karava caste along the coastal areas north 

of Colombo up to Puttalam were relatively recent migrants from 

south India who had converted to Catholicism under Portuguese 

rule and who were bilingual, using the Tamil language at 

home and Sinhala with outsiders and in markets. Additionally, 

Tamils and Sinhalese lived peacefully within the Panama and 

Akkaraipattu areas of the Eastern Province, sometimes in the 

same villages, and intermarried with one another.

• The independent Sinhalese kingdom of Kandy was the last to 

succumb to European colonialism, coming under British rule in 

1815.d Yet the last rulers of this kingdom were Tamil-speaking 

kings, the Nayakkars from Madurai in southern India. During the 

time of Dutch colonial rule, the Kandyan royalty actively sought 

military and dynastic/marital alliances with Nayakkar rulers 

and warrior elements from south India. The Nayakkar dynasty 

established itself in 1739, and these kings converted to Buddhism 

and revived the Buddhist monastic order (they also restored 

several major Hindu temples). Some of the Kandyan chiefs who 

signed the Kandyan convention with the British (which led to 

the surrender of authority to the imperial power) signed their 

names in Tamil script rather than Sinhala, and even today, within 

the Kandyan region there are Sinhalese with family names that 

betray a Tamil origin. One such name is “Hettiarachige,” which is 

translated as “chief of the Chettis,” a Tamil trading caste.

Hence, rather than representing unchanging identities that impose 

an inherited destiny on present-day actors, “Sinhalese” and “Tamil” 

may to some extent represent socially constructed categories that are 

the result of human actions and choices, specifically discourse and the 

ascription of specific meanings and emotive content to ideas and categories.30 Although differences and conflict existed in the past, pressures 

in the twentieth century related to state and nation building, electoral 

competition, and competition over limited economic opportunities 

may have led to “reading history backwards,” where “pre-existing differences were reinterpreted in a new fashion that emphasized antagonism and hostility instead of tolerance and exchange.”31, e

 Hence, social 

c See the section on Sinhalese Mytho-history for more information regarding the 

Buddhist revival during the nineteenth century.

d See Chapter 5. Government and Politics for more information regarding the era of British rule of the island.

e For a discussion of “reading history backwards,” see Pfaffenberger.32 For an interesting discussion of the Social Constructivist perspective, see Stokke.33
Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

119

constructivists would note that the recent and distant past was reinterpreted to emphasize eternal conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese. 

From this perspective, one may argue that the virulence and satanic 

quality of the conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese is due not simply to a disagreement over how to apportion economic and political 

resources and opportunities but rather to the fact that constructs such 

as Tamil and Sinhalese have been endowed with a significant emotive 

and symbolic quality, as they have come to represent exclusionary ethnically based symbols of immortality that both groups feared were at 

risk of obliteration in the current conflict.

Another approach, based on Huntington’s theory of modernization, 

argues that political instability and revolutions occur during periods 

of rapid social change and the mobilization of new groups into politics without concomitant advances in political development.34 Applied 

to Sri Lanka, modernization theorists would note that political development in the post-independence period did not match the impressive social modernization that was occurring through the broad-based 

expansion of education in local languages (instead of English), particularly among rural Sinhalese. This expansion in education and the 

increasing number of graduates led to new aspirations and an increase 

in expectations regarding suitable employment, which went unfulfilled 

as the economy was not able to keep pace with the large increases in 

the number of educated job seekers.35,36 The resultant frustration led 

to the political mobilization of this group in the late 1960s, and they 

flocked to the JVP because existing parties, including those on the 

left, did not adequately address their grievances.f Educated unemployment was a destabilizing factor in Sri Lanka during this period, as the 

JVP launched an insurrection to overthrow both the government and 

the political system and to restructure the latter along Marxist-Leninist lines. As Huntington noted, however, this effort was not unique to 

Sri Lanka:

In general, the higher the level of education of the 

unemployed, alienated or otherwise disaffected person, the more extreme the destabilizing behavior 

which results. Alienated university graduates prepare 

revolutions; alienated technical or secondary school 

graduates plan coups; alienated primary school leavers 

f Interestingly, the leaders of the left-wing parties, having been educated at Oxford, 

Cambridge, or the London School of Economics, had more in common with their colleagues within the center-right United National Party than with rural Sinhalese educated 

in the vernacular. Not surprisingly, one of the reasons Rohana Wijeweera, the founder of 

the JVP, started the organization was his belief that existing leftist parties had neglected 

the rural proletariat.37,38
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Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

engage in more frequent but less significant forms of 

political unrest.39

A related perspective is the theory of relative deprivation developed 

by Gurr, which argues that political violence flows from relative deprivation, which is a discrepancy between the goods and conditions of 

life that one can realistically achieve with what one believes he or she 

is legitimately entitled to.40 Political violence emerges as deprivation 

leads to anger and subsequently to aggression. This perspective is useful for understanding why Tamil and Sinhalese youths took up arms 

against the government in the 1970s. In the case of Tamil youth, the 

capability of achieving life aspirations was severely curtailed by the government through legislation that severely restricted access to university education and employment within the public sector. For Sinhalese, 

aspirations were raised after government policies increased access to 

education, but the capability to satisfy increased aspirations lagged as 

the economy failed to produce a sufficient number of jobs to absorb the 

increasing number of educated graduates. One theoretical difference 

with the approach offered by Huntington is that Gurr spends relatively 

less time theorizing the social, political, and economic causes of political instability and violence and instead focuses on the links between 

relative deprivation and violence.41

Lastly, another perspective that can be adopted is the argument that 

the island’s experience under colonialism, and especially British rule, 

set it on a path toward eventual ethnic conflict.42 Indeed, under the 

British, the island was administratively organized along linguistic lines, 

with Sinhalese areas administered in Sinhala and Tamil areas administered in Tamil, and the boundary separating the two areas bore a 

strong resemblance to the borders of the ancient Tamil Eelam invoked 

during the ethnic conflict in the twentieth century.43 And within the 

British colonial administration, Tamils were overrepresented, owing to 

their success in acquiring English-language skills, thereby leading to 

charges of British favoritism toward the Tamils at the expense of the 

Sinhalese. However, there are several counterarguments one can make 

in response to this perspective. First, as already mentioned, the categories of “Tamil” and “Sinhalese” representing distinct peoples preceded 

British rule, and one consistent pattern of Sri Lankan history is the persistence of fighting between Sinhalese kingdoms and Tamil-speaking 

invaders from southern India.g

 Additionally, Nissan and Stirrat noted 

that British policy was highly influenced by European racial theory that 

g See the Sinhalese Mytho-history section for examples of Tamil invasions of Ceylon 

from southern India.
Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

121

viewed language differences as markers of racial distinction,h and so 

the administrative division of the island along linguistic lines was based 

not on a “divide and rule” policy but on a misguided liberal desire to 

respect the customs and languages of different “races.”44

SINHALESE MYTHO-HISTORY

Any attempt to fully understand the ethnic conflict between Tamils 

and Sinhalese would be incomplete without an understanding of the 

mytho-history that animated both groups. In the case of the Sinhalese, the Mahavamsa and, to a lesser extent, the Dipavamsa and Culavamsa, are the main historical chronicles that imbued the Sinhalese 

with a belief in their own exceptionalism. This belief is rooted in the 

perception that they were designated by the Buddha himself as the 

stewards of Theraveda Buddhism, which led them to ascribe a Zion-like 

status to the island. The Mahavamsa notes that the island of Lanka was 

originally populated by demons called yakkhas and snake beings called 

nagas.

45 Around this time in the land of the Vangas (which modern-day 

Sinhalese believe to have been located near the Indian state of West 

Bengal and Bangladesh), the daughter of the king of the Vangas was 

abducted by a lion that subsequently impregnated her. She conceived 

a boy, Sinhabahu, and a girl, Sinhasivali. Sinhabahu eventually killed 

his lion father and married his sister, and they had two sons, the eldest 

of which was Vijaya. The chronicles assert that Vijaya was violent and 

demonic, and so he and his followers were banished to the island of 

Lanka.46 After his arrival, Vijaya and his followers married women from 

Madurai in south India (Vijaya himself married a princess from the 

royal family of that region), and their offspring emerged to constitute 

the Sinhalese people. Thus, Vijaya is regarded as the progenitor of the 

Sinhalese, yet ironically, the unions with south Indian women and the 

offspring they produced made the Tamils both kinfolk and cofounders 

of the Sinhalese people, a fact that adherents of the Vijaya myth do not 

emphasize.47

Before Vijaya’s arrival in Sri Lanka, the first chapter of the Mahavamsa notes three visits of the Buddha to the island. The first visit 

occurred when “at the ninth month of his Buddhahood . . . himself set 

forth to the isle of Lanka, to win Lanka for the faith. For Lanka was 

known to the Conqueror as a place where his doctrine should [thereafter] shine in glory.”48 During this first visit, the Buddha tamed the 

Yakkhas in the eastern part of the island, and on his second visit, he 

h See the Sinhalese Mytho-history section for a discussion of European racial theories 

that influence British policy in Ceylon.
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Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

subdued and converted the Nagas in the northern part. On his third 

visit, he went to Kelaniya, near Colombo, and to Anuradhapura, which 

would become the first capital of the Sinhalese kings. According to the 

Mahavamsa, Vijaya arrived in Sri Lanka on the day the Buddha died in 

543 BC.i Before his death, he is reported to have told Sakka, the king 

of the gods and the divine protector of the Universal Buddhist Church 

(sasana), the following statement:

Wijaya, son of King Sinhabahu, is come to Lanka from 

the country of Lala, together with seven hundred followers. In Lanka, O Lord of gods, will my religion be 

established, therefore carefully protect him and his 

followers and Lanka.50

Thus was born the notion that the Buddha had prepared the island 

and subsequently consecrated it as the repository of his religion, to be 

nurtured and advanced by the Sinhalese people.

Another theme ascribed to the chronicles is the notion that the 

Sinhalese are the defenders of the sasana against usurping Tamils 

opposed to Buddhism. The repeated invasions of Sri Lanka by invaders 

from south India who were generally Tamil speakers is a motif of the 

chronicles.51 Thus, a few centuries after the fall of the kingdom of Anuradhapura in 177 BC mentioned previously, in the fifth century AD Pandyan invaders from south India conquered Anuradhapura, which was 

retaken by Dhatusena twenty-five years later.52 More invasions occurred 

in the ninth and tenth centuries AD, and in 993 AD, the Chola Empire 

from south India annexed Anuradhapura and the surrounding region.

This glorious accounting of Sinhalese history was revitalized in the 

mid-nineteenth century after the encroachments of Christianity (rather 

than Hinduism) that accompanied British rule. Christianity had made 

some inroads on the island under both Portuguese and Dutch colonial rule. The Portuguese converted a number of Ceylonese in coastal 

regions to Catholicism, and once the Dutch took over the maritime 

regions controlled by the Portuguese, they welcomed missionaries from 

the Dutch Reformed Church to win converts to Calvinism.53 A number 

of missionary societies from Britain arrived in Sri Lanka once the British supplanted the Dutch, including the London Missionary Society 

(1805), the Baptists (1812), the Wesleyan Methodists (1814), and the 

Church Mission (1818).54 In 1813, the American Missionary Society 

established a presence in the Jaffna peninsula, and these organizations 

focused on providing an English-language education. During the nineteenth century, every village in the Jaffna peninsula hosted a mission 

i There is no consensus on the date of the Buddha’s death. In China, the date is identified as 947 BC, and in India, it is noted as 486 BC.49
Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

123

school,55 and the imparting of an English-language education on Jaffna 

Tamils was so successful that this group took a disproportionate number of posts within the colonial administration.

The establishment of English-language education also spurred 

the emergence of a new social class of Ceylonese, sometimes referred 

to as the “educated Ceylonese,” which spanned the Tamil-Sinhalese ethnic divide. This group never amounted to more than four to 

five percent of the population, but the Protestants within this group 

emerged as a bureaucratic and economic elite under British rule, and 

this class adopted a Western worldview, lifestyle, and mode of dress at 

the expense of knowledge of indigenous culture, literature, and history.56,57 In the mid-twentieth century, the British were to hand over 

power peacefully to this group (particularly to the Sinhalese component of this class), and it can be argued that Sri Lanka experienced a 

delayed ethnonational “revolution” in 1956, with the electoral victory of 

the SLFP, as over the next two decades, the government proceeded to 

align the state along a more explicit Sinhalese-Buddhist foundation. Yet 

the intellectual impetus for this movement can be located in the mid 

to late nineteenth century as Buddhists monks and an alienated nonpeasant and Sinhalese-educated intelligentsia consisting of ayurvedic 

physicians (who practiced traditional medicine), village schoolteachers, and government officials (headmen, coroners, registrars of marriages, etc.), alarmed at the political dominance of Protestantism and 

the emergence of an English-educated political and economic elite, led 

an assault on Christianity and Western influence.58,59 Thus, a number 

of Buddhist associations were formed, including the Sarvagna Sasanabhivruddhi Dayaka Dharma Samagama (Society for the Propagation of 

Buddhism), and a number of public debates between Christians and 

Buddhists were held. In one such debate in 1873, the monk Migettuwatte Gunananda, who had founded the Samagama, participated 

in a public debate with a Sinhalese Christian. Ten  thousand people 

attended and generally agreed that Gunananda had won.60 Another 

monk, Batuwantudawe, wrote Kristiani Prajnapti Khandanaya (The Tearing Asunder of the Evidence and Doctrine of Christianity) in response to the 

publication of a pro-Christian tract.61

During this time, one figure who played a prominent role in generating a Sinhalese-Buddhist national consciousness was Anagarika 
124

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Dharmapala (1864–1933),j,k whose discourse of resistance against Western imperialism was motivated by religious animosity toward Christianity and was informed by European racial theories that came to 

regard the Sinhalese as an Indo-European Aryan people. Dharmapala 

believed that the Sinhalese were of superior Aryan stock, as indicated 

by the following passage:

The Aryan race is the only race with noble customs 

handed down from tradition . . . [therefore] the Sinhalese (who are Aryans) should cultivate ancient codes 

of conduct, Aryan customs and Aryan dresses and 

ornaments . . . The Sinhalese first came to this country from Bengal and the Bengalis are superior in their 

intelligence to the other communities of India.64

Despite an alleged racial link with their British rulers, one of the 

themes that emerged from his writing was the notion that the arrival of 

Europeans ruined Sinhalese culture and dragged it and the Sinhalese 

people down to the level of inferior races, as demonstrated in the following passage:

From the day the white man set foot on this island, 

the arts and sciences and the Aryan customs of the 

Sinhalese have gradually disappeared and today the 

Sinhalese have to kiss the feet of the Moor [and] the 

dastardly Tamil.65

Another passage invokes the glory of King Dutugemunu and his 

supposed holy war for Buddhism while linking Buddhism to Ceylonese 

nationalism:

My message to the young men of Ceylon is . . . Believe 

not the alien who is giving you arrack whisky, toddy, 

sausages, who makes you buy his goods at clearance 

j Dharmapala was actually born Don David Hewavitarana and spent a considerable 

amount of his youth in Christian schools. He indigenized his name once his Buddhism 

became more fundamentalist in his late teens and early twenties. A big influence on his 

life were H. S. Olcott, an American colonel, and Madame Blavatsky, both of whom organized the Theosophical Society of New York in 1875 and traveled to Ceylon to organize 

the Buddhist Theosophical Society of Ceylon. After a three-month tour of Ceylon with 

Olcott and Blavatsky, Dharmapala became convinced of the decay of Buddhism and dedicated his life to its revival.62

k There was also a Saivite Hindu revivalist movement centered in the Jaffna peninsula 

that slightly preceded the Buddhist revivalism of the late nineteenth century. This movement was led by Arumuka Navalar (1822–1879), who was critical of Christian proselytizing activities and launched a Tamil Hindu school system to prevent Tamil children from 

potential conversion in Christian schools. Ironically, he helped translate the Bible into 

Tamil, although he also wrote textbooks for Hindu children and engaged in polemics 

against Christians.63
Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

125

rates . . . Enter into the realms of our King Dutugemunu in spirit and try to identify yourself with the 

thoughts of that great king who rescued Buddhism 

and our nationalism from oblivion.66

Additionally, although his main targets were Western imperialism 

and influence, his writing suggests the idea that Ceylon is not a multiethnic society but rather a homeland for the Sinhalese people:

The island of Lanka belongs to the Buddhist Sinhalese. For 2455 years this was the land of birth for the 

Sinhalese. Other races have come here to pursue their 

commercial activities. For the Europeans, apart from 

this land, there is Canada, Australia, South Africa, 

England and America to go to; for the Tamils there is 

South India; for the Moors . . . Egypt; the Dutch can 

go to Holland. But for the Sinhalese there [is] only this 

island.67

Eller noted that Dharmapala’s writings would help frame the discourse that energized Sri Lankan nationalism from the 1950s onward.68

The revival of Buddhism and the notion of Sinhalese exceptionalism were also invigorated in the late nineteenth century by European 

racial theories that identified the Sinhalese as an Indo-European Aryan 

people. Specifically, language and race were conflated so that different 

language groups were seen as constituting different racial groups, and 

beginning in the late eighteenth and into the nineteenth  centuries, 

philologists began to tie Sinhala to Sanskrit, an Indo-European language. Because language was seen as a marker of racial variation, it was 

only a short conceptual leap to subsequently place the Sinhalese people 

within the Aryan family. Thus, in 1788, William Jones’s lecture on the 

structural similarities between Sanskrit and European languages was 

published, and this relationship was viewed as reflecting the common 

ancestry of speakers of those languages.l In 1819, Friedrich Schlegel 

used the term Aryan to designate this group of people.70 The link to 

Sinhala was first made by B. C. Clough, who produced the first Sinhala-English dictionary between 1821 and 1830. Clough was the first to 

argue that Sinhala was derived from Sanskrit, and this was followed up 

in 1852 by the Sinhalese scholar James D’Alwis, who argued that Sinhala, while not a dialect of Sanskrit, shared a common origin with it.71

l The idea of the common origin of the non-Semitic peoples of Europe and India had 

a number of enthusiastic supporters at the time in Europe, including Hegel, the German 

philosopher. He referred to the idea of the similarity between European languages and 

Sanskrit as “the great discovery in history.”69
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Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Two subsequent works had an important influence on the development of Sinhalese consciousness.72 In his 1861 publication Lectures 

on the Science of Language, Max Müller argued that the languages spoken in Iceland and Ceylon were “cognate dialects of the Aryan family 

of languages.” And in 1856, after his study of the grammar of south 

Indian languages, Robert Caldwell used the term Dravidian to designate a family of languages consisting of six “cultivated dialects” (Tamil, 

Malayalam, Telugu, Canarese, Tulu, and Kadagu) and six “uncultivated 

dialects” (Tuda, Kota, Gond, Khond/Ku, Oraon, and Rajmahal), and 

he further argued that there was “no direct affinity” between Sinhala 

and Tamil. These works were cited by D’Alwis in an 1866 essay where he 

referred to “the Aryan invasions” of Ceylon, which was interpreted to 

signify that Vijaya, the progenitor of the Sinhalese people, was of Aryan 

stock.73 Thus, D’Alwis argued that the Sinhalese were essentially Aryans, which was a rather prestigious designation for a colonial people 

because it elevated them to the same status as their colonial rulers on 

the basis of a common descent.

The racial distinction between Sinhalese and Tamils was also 

grounded in biological anthropology during an 1879 lecture on Ceylon given by M. M. Kunte. He stated, “There are, properly speaking, 

representatives of only two races in Ceylon—Aryans and Tamilians, the 

former being divided into descendants of Indian and Western Aryans.” 

He also claimed that “the formation of the forehead, the cheek-bones, 

the chin, the mouth and the lips of the Tamilians are distinctly different from those of the Ceylonese Aryans.”74 By the 1920s, history books 

started to propagate the view that the Sinhalese were of Aryan origin, 

although the pureness of their Aryan blood may have been diluted 

through intermarriage. For instance, H. W. Codrington’s Short History 

of Ceylon stated the following:

Vijaya’s followers espoused Pandyan women and it 

seems probable that in course of time their descendants married with the people of the country on whom 

they imposed their language. Further dilution of the 

original Aryan blood has undoubtedly taken place in 

later ages, with the result that, though the Sinhalese 

language is of North Indian origin, the social system is 

that of the south.75

Thus, by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the linguistic differences between Sinhalese and Tamils was given a racial 

foundation rooted in alleged sociobiological differences between the 

two groups, with the Sinhalese endowed with higher status on the basis 

of supposed Aryan origins and the alleged superiority of this group 

over other races.
Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

127

TAMIL MYTHO-HISTORY

In contrast to the Sinhalese, the Tamils did not employ history instrumentally to inform ethnic identity, as ethnic identity for the Tamils was 

instead based more on religious, cultural, and social practices.76 But 

as noted by Wilson, Tamils began to increasingly use history to justify 

their claims as rightful inhabitants of the island.77 In doing so, Tamils 

attempted to counter Sinhalese claims of exceptionalism and paternity 

over the entire island, and one such effort was the argument that the 

Sinhalese were not really Aryans, “but Dravidians in disguise, and thus 

had nothing to be snooty about.”78 More specifically, they noted that 

the Sinhalese are the product of the intermixing of the indigenous 

people of Ceylon (the Veddahs) with subsequent Aryan and Dravidian 

settlers and invaders.79

There have also been some claims that Tamils have inhabited the 

island at least as long as the Sinhalese. Although only twenty  miles 

separate Sri Lanka from south India, there is no firm evidence of the 

date of the first Tamil settlements in Sri Lanka.80 However, findings 

at archeological sites at Pomparippu, Gurugalhinna, Katiraveli, Podiyogampola, and Walave Basin demonstrate a strong affinity with the 

Iron Age civilization in south India, suggesting that before the arrival 

of Buddhism in the third century BC, the local population cultivated 

rice through tank irrigation and was culturally closest to the Iron Age 

culture of middle and south India.81 Ponnambalam has claimed that 

Tamils were the original inhabitants of Sri Lanka and that the Sinhalese were originally Tamils that converted to Buddhism and adopted 

the Sinhala language, which is similar to Pali, the language of the 

Mahavamsa.

82,83 Tamils also emphasize that even if Sinhalese settlers 

preceded the arrival of Dravidians from south India, Tamils have lived 

on the island for at least 1,000 years and formed political units independent of Sinhalese control.84

Additionally, the Tamils can also point to historical documents 

(albeit of more recent vintage) that purport to show that Tamils have 

been on the island for at least as long as the Sinhalese. The Yalppana 

Vaipava Malai (The Garland of Jaffna Events [YVM]) was compiled in the 

early eighteenth century, and it depicts Rama (one of the protagonists 

of the Ramayana) as defeating the Yakkhas and the demon Ravana.85

Additionally, in the YVM, Vijaya is a Saivite Indian prince, and he and 

his followers marry Tamil wives. Vijaya builds Saivite temples before the 

arrival of Buddhism, and the YVM also discusses the relations between 

the Chola dynasty and Ceylon, as well as the establishment of the Tamil 

settlement in the Jaffna peninsula. There is also a vague reference to 

Elara, and on the basis of the YVM, in 1912 the historian Mututampipillai argued that Elara arrived in Ceylon long before Vijaya’s arrival.86
128

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

CASTE DIFFERENCES AMONG TAMILS 

AND SINHALESE

Caste differences were not as important as ethnic differences after 

independence in Sri Lanka, but they still played an important role in 

the JVP and Tamil insurgencies. The elite Sinhalese castes, including 

the govigama, but also the karava, salagama, and durava, largely withheld support to the JVP in 1987–1989. In general, during both of its 

insurrections, the group tended to draw support from the lower castes, 

including the wahumpura and batgam castes.87 For instance, the wahumpura villages of Ellewela and Ketanwila in the Matara District strongly 

supported the JVP, while the JVP received much less support in the 

neighboring govigama village of Lenama. Additionally, in 1987–1989, 

the group received very little support in Galle District, which may be 

due to the fact that nearly all of its population belonged to one of the 

four higher castes previously mentioned. And Chandraprema noted 

that the JVP played on caste resentment, as it typically attempted to 

recruit youth from oppressed castes when forming balakayas, or armed 

units that carried out violence.88

Caste differences were also a factor in the Tamil insurgency. The 

LTTE drew a lot of support from the karaiyar caste, whereas the People’s 

Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam drew support from the elite 

vellalar caste.89 Bandarage noted that most Tamil insurgents were from 

lower castes and that the Tamils they murdered were primarily vellalars. 

Additionally, she noted that the vellalar-dominated Tamil United Front 

succeeded in directing lower-caste Tamil anger at vellalar elites toward 

the Sinhalese.90 Caste (and regional) differences likely explain why 

Sri Lankan Tamils in the Eastern Province were less radicalized than 

Tamils in the Northern Province.91 The elite vellalar caste controlled 

economic and political affairs within the Jaffna peninsula, whereas 

the mukkuvar caste is at the top of the caste hierarchy in the Eastern 

Province, and neither they nor “Minority Tamils” from lower castes 

were eager to see an independent Tamil state controlled by vellalars.

92

Indeed, these factors undoubtedly played a role in the March  2004 

split of the LTTE into a northern wing headed by Prabhakaran and an 

eastern wing led by Vinayagamoorthy Muralithiran, who went by the 

nom de guerre of Colonel Karuna. This split proved disastrous for the 

group, as it played a fundamental role in their military defeat by the 

government. Following is a brief discussion of caste in Sri Lanka and its 

role in generating political tensions.

The term caste originated from the term casta, which was used by 

the Portuguese to identify groups that do not intermarry, are hierarchically organized in terms of social status, and whose interactions are 
Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

129

governed by a variety of ritualized behaviors.93 Indeed, with respect 

to ritualized behaviors, a number of social restrictions discriminated 

against low-caste Tamils. For instance, at one time “outcastes” were not 

permitted to attend school; sit on a bus; own a car or bicycle; wear 

shoes; cremate their dead; use laundries, cafes, or taxis; or to enter 

temples.94 Within the Sinhalese community, the govigama, the farmer 

caste, was the highest caste, and it constituted about sixty percent of 

the Sinhalese population.95 Secondary castes included the karava (fisherman caste), salagama (cinnamon peeler caste), and durava (toddy 

taper caste). Karavas and salagamas benefited economically under British rule and began to challenge the social and political supremacy of 

the govigamas, and in fact during this time caste differences were more 

important than ethnic differences. For instance, in 1911, the karavas 

presented their own candidate for the single elective seat open to Ceylonese on the Legislative Council, which actually led the govigamas to 

cross ethnic boundaries and support the Tamil vellalar candidate, Sir 

Ponnambalam Ramanathan, in an elite-caste alliance against the karavas.96 However, as the country moved inexorably toward independence, 

ethnic differences emerged as the main cleavage within society, and 

caste differences among the Sinhalese were further subsumed in the 

mid-twentieth century as rural-to-urban migration led recent migrants 

to drop identities based on village communities, kin groups, and locality-based castes in favor of the Sinhalese communal identity.97

Interestingly, having ancestors who arrived between the thirteenth 

and eighteenth  centuries, many of the members of the karava, salagama, and other lower castes likely have south Indian origins and were 

incorporated into Ceylonese society through a process of “differential incorporation” that was prevalent in other south Asian societies as 

well. Specifically, Eller noted that new groups were absorbed through 

a process of “inferiorization,” whereby waves of migrants who settled 

in southwest Ceylon were aggregated from disparate communities and 

integrated into an inferior position of Sinhalese society by being placed 

within a lower caste.98,99 These migrants had to learn Sinhalese and 

adopt Buddhism, and, perhaps as a result of identity-related insecurities bought about through comparisons with older inland Sinhalese 

communities, inhabitants of the southwest littoral emerged as some of 

the most eager participants in the Buddhist revival and defenders of 

Sinhalese-Buddhist religion and culture.100

The vellalar (cultivator) is the politically and economically dominant 

and most numerous caste within the Tamil society of Jaffna peninsula, 

where they form the landholding elite. There is no indigenous Brahmin caste within Sri Lanka. Instead, Brahmin priests were brought in 

from India (especially by wealthy vellalars) to perform ritual duties.101
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Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Other “clean castes” include the fisher castes of karaiyars and mukkuvars, 

while at the bottom are the “unclean castes,” or untouchables, such as 

the pallars and nalavars.

m Wilson noted that vellalars looked down on 

karaiyars and refused to marry them, but during the Tamil insurgency 

against the government, karaiyars acquired high status because of their 

active participation in the fighting.103 During the precolonial era, vellalars served as the highest revenue officers (with the title of mudaliyar) 

in the kingdom of Jaffna, and under Portuguese, Dutch, and English 

authority, members of this caste assisted European officials with various administrative duties.104 Additionally, under English rule, vellalars

consolidated their status by eagerly taking to English-language education, and most of the English-educated elite from the Tamil community 

came from the vellalar caste.105

Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth  centuries, there was 

a symbiotic relationship between Hindu Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu, 

characterized by cultural and economic links and by the role played 

by Indian sources in revitalizing Hinduism on the island, the practice 

of which had been severely curtailed under the Portuguese.n However, 

although strong links still remain between the two regions, beginning 

in the nineteenth century Sri Lankan Tamils began to develop an indigenous identity distinct from that of south India. The spread of Christianity, which was ultimately adopted by about ten to fifteen percent 

of the Tamil population, played a role in differentiating Sri Lankan 

Tamils from their Tamil Nadu counterparts.107 Caste-related practices, 

though, also played a role in convincing Sri  Lankan Tamils of the 

uniqueness of their culture and its representation of the essence of 

Tamil civilization, which added further motivation to the insurgency 

against the Sinhalese state, given fears that the government was trying 

to eradicate Tamil culture.108 Specifically, vellalar adherence to Brahminical Hinduism stood in stark contrast to a virulent anti-Brahmin 

movement that emerged among non-Brahmin castes in Tamil Nadu, 

which featured a rejection of Brahmin religious rituals and practices 

and challenged Brahmin social and political dominance.109 In contrast, 

for Sri Lankan Tamils the sponsorship of Brahmin-administered rituals was in accordance with ancient Tamil traditions and had the added 

benefit of according vellalars with a social status that they otherwise 

would be unable to attain under orthodox Hinduism.110 As a result, 

Pfaffenberger argued that Jaffna vellalars regarded themselves as the 

m Arasaratnam noted that untouchables fared relatively better in Jaffna than in south 

Indian villages because norms of purity and pollution were not strictly observed in Jaffna 

and pollution by sight was rarely practiced in the peninsula.102

n Arasaratnam noted that the Portuguese initiated widespread destruction of Hindu 

temples, with Felipe de Oliviera, the Captain General of Jaffna (1619–1627) having 

boasted of destroying 500 temples.106
Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

131

dominant group in Jaffna, with other castes residing there at their sufferance and for their convenience.111

In addition to differences with Tamil Nadu, regional differences 

also existed between Jaffna Tamils and those in the Eastern Province. The Jaffna peninsula has always been the center of gravity for 

Tamil society, yet the Eastern Province was never fully incorporated 

into the precolonial Tamil kingdom of Jaffna, and the integration 

between the two Tamil regions under European rule was tenuous at 

best, as colonial rule arrived in the eastern region only in the nineteenth century.112,113 Additionally, English-language instruction was not 

as prevalent in the eastern region as in the north, and conditions of 

overcrowding and economically inhospitable terrain were not factors 

in the east (as they were in the north) propelling Tamils in this region 

to migrate to Colombo in search of suitable economic opportunities.114

Religious differences also divided Tamils in two regions, as vellalars 

in Jaffna are largely Saivite Hindus (i.e., worshippers of the god Siva), 

whereas the numerically dominant mukkuvars in the Eastern Province 

are Vaishnavites (worshippers of Vishnu).115 Before the mid-twentieth 

century, these differences led to a social and political distance between 

the two Tamil communities, with the Tamils of the Eastern Province 

gravitating toward Sinhalese parties.116 Yet the two groups were drawn 

together after the Sinhala-only legislation of the mid-twentieth century, 

although concerns remained during the insurgency that an emergent 

Tamil state would be under vellalar domination.117,118

TAMIL AND SINHALESE ECONOMIC CONCERNS

The economic dimension of Tamil grievances fostering the LTTE 

insurgency centered on concerns over “internal colonialism” and policies 

that restricted the economic prospects of Tamils within a Sinhalese-dominated state. These sentiments are nicely captured by a 1976 statement 

issued by the Tamil United Liberation Front, which charged that the 

Sinhalese government aimed to make the Tamils into a

slave nation ruled by the new colonial master, the Sinhalese, who are using the power they have wrongly 

usurped to deprive the Tamil nation of its territory, 

language, citizenship, economic life, opportunities of 

employment and education thereby destroying all the 

attributes of nationhood of the Tamil people.119

Specifically, Tamil economic concerns centered on official language policy, university admissions and access to employment in the 

civil service in Colombo, and government resettlement schemes. With 
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Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

respect to language policy, under the British, the English language was 

the language of government, higher education, and the professions, 

yet by the mid-twentieth century eighty percent of the population did 

not have access to an English education and were therefore denied of 

opportunities for economic and social advancement.120 In response, 

the Swabasha movement emerged, which championed the use of the 

vernacular languages, both Sinhalese and Tamil, for everyday use. In 

1944, the State Council passed a resolution calling for Sinhalese and 

Tamil to replace English as the official languages within a reasonable 

amount of time. Yet Tamil was dropped in 1956 as the new SLFP-led 

government passed the Official Language Act No.  33 of 1956, also 

known as the Sinhala-only bill, which designated Sinhalese as the only 

official language of the country.

The year 1956 was an election year, and the SLFP swept into power 

on a wave of messianic fervor as that year also coincided with the Buddha Jayanthi, or the worldwide celebration of the 2,500th anniversary 

of the death of the Buddha. Before the election, the SLFP appealed 

to the newly mobilized political bhikkus and mass Sinhalese-Buddhist 

public by vowing to make Sinhalese the official language of the country 

(in twenty-four hours no less), and the legislation proved detrimental 

to Tamil economic interests, as Tamils now either had to pass Sinhala 

examinations to obtain employment in the government (which was 

the country’s largest employer) or compete for the limited number of 

regional Tamil-speaking positions.121 This legislation contributed to the 

de-Tamilization of the civil service. For example, Tamils held twentyfive percent of the positions within the Ceylon Civil Service in 1948, but 

by 1979 (by which time it was renamed as the Sri Lanka Administrative 

Services), the Tamil share dropped to thirteen percent.122 The drop was 

more pronounced in the numerically larger lower clerical grades, as 

the Tamil share of these positions dropped from forty-one to five percent over the same time period. And within the armed forces, Tamil 

representation dropped from forty to one percent from 1956 to 1970.123

Another factor that limited Tamil access to employment opportunities was the inability to fully participate in patronage networks, whereby 

increasingly scarce jobs were awarded to the well-connected by the 

politically powerful. Economic stagnation in the 1950s led to a curtailment of opportunities for public-sector employment, and around this 

time, patronage networks emerged through which the ruling parties 

recruited party faithful for state employment.124 By the 1970s, the state 

became heavily involved in the economy and patronage was actually formalized through a job bank scheme where each member of parliament 

could recommend up to 1,000 job seekers for employment in the lower 

grades of the public sector. The more limited Tamil representation in 
Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

133

Colombo meant that young Tamils had fewer opportunities to avail 

themselves of this pathway toward public-sector employment, and in the 

case of the job bank scheme, Tamil politicians also had less success in 

placing Tamils into the civil service. For instance, by May 1982 only 1,470 

of the 11,000 applicants nominated by parliamentarians from the Tamil 

United Liberation Front were awarded government jobs, which represented a success rate much lower than that achieved by other parties.125

Tamil grievances also centered on efforts by the government to 

resettle Sinhalese peasants and other settlers into lands in the north 

and east that were considered by Tamils to be part of their historic 

homeland. The establishment of plantations by the British in the midnineteenth century evicted many Sinhalese peasants from their land 

and generated landlessness among this class, as well as overcrowding in 

the southwest portion of the island.o

 Hence, the effort to relocate Sinhalese into the dry zone in the north and east represented an attempt 

to correct a historical wrong while also alleviating demographic pressures in the wet zone. Tamils, though, saw it as an effort to establish new 

“facts on the ground” and dilute Tamil representation in Colombo.

The resettlement effort commenced in 1928, with the Tabbowa 

Resettlement Scheme, and resettlement was given further impetus in 

1935, with the passage of the Land Development Ordinance.127,128 By 

the late 1960s, the government had allocated 300,000 acres of land to 

67,000 allottees through various colonization schemes, and the largest 

of these, Gal Oya in the Eastern Province, established an irrigation 

area of more than 120,000 acres between 1948 and 1952.129,p Many Sinhalese viewed the resettlement of the dry zone as an effort to restore 

what they considered the greatness of ancient Buddhist-Sinhalese civilization,131 and by the early 1980s, resettlement had led to a noticeable 

shift in the demographic makeup in areas that the Tamils considered 

part of their traditional homeland. For instance, the proportion of Sinhalese in Trincomalee District increased from 3.8 percent in 1911 to 

33.6 percent by 1981, and in Batticaloa/Ampara the increase was from 

3.7 to 21.8 percent over the same time period.132

Throughout this period, the Tamils saw the resettlement effort as 

a way to dilute their presence on the island, and it formed one of the 

chief reasons that led them to take up arms against the government. At 

o One of the means through which the British evicted Sinhalese peasants to make 

way for plantation agriculture was through the Crown Lands Encroachment Ordinance 

No. 12 of 1840, which declared that “all forest, chena, unoccupied of uncultivated lands to 

be Crown lands until the contrary was proved.” This ordinance placed the onus on peasants to prove ownership of their lands, which most were unable to do.126

p For more information on the different resettlement schemes, see Amerasinghe.130
134

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

the fourth annual convention in August 1956, the Tamil Federal Party 

passed a resolution that stated the following:

The colonization policy pursued by successive Governments since 1947 of planting Sinhalese population in 

the traditional homelands of the Tamil-speaking peoples is calculated to overwhelm and crush the Tamilspeaking people in their own national areas.133

And in the May 1976 Vaddukoddai Resolution issued by the Tamil 

United Liberation Front calling for independence, the resettlement of 

Sinhalese in the north and east was one of the nine justifications listed 

for the desire for an independent state.134

In the 1970s, the United Front government, led by the Sri Lanka 

Freedom Party, nationalized nearly one million acres, including large 

tea and rubber plantations and about one-fourth of the agricultural 

land on the island. The government intended to use the newly acquired 

land as an alternative to peasant colonization to relieve unemployment 

and landlessness in the wet zone, factors that it believed motivated the 

1971 JVP rebellion.135 However, in the late 1970s, the market-friendly 

United National Party government initiated a number of development 

projects, the most important of which was the Accelerated Mahaweli 

Program, which initially was planned in the late 1960s as a thirty-year 

endeavor but which the new government hoped to complete in only 

six years. This enormous project called for the building of fifteen reservoirs on the Mahaweli River and its tributaries to generate hydroelectric power and irrigate 390,000  acres of new land, primarily in 

the Eastern Province in the Mahaweli and Madura Oya basins, which 

would facilitate a new resettlement scheme that would dole out newly 

irrigated land to 140,000 families.136,137 Once completed, the project 

was expected to involve thirty-nine  percent of the island and fiftyfive percent of the dry zone.138

In 1981, Sri  Lankan Tamils constituted forty-two  percent of the 

population in the Eastern Province, with Sinhalese constituting twentyfive percent and Muslims, thirty-two percent.139 The demographic composition of the settlers would be determined by a “national ethnic ratio” 

rather than a local one, thereby ensuring that most of the settlers would 

be Sinhalese. Besides diminishing Tamil representation in Colombo, 

the use of a national ethnic ratio would have strategic implications 

for the Tamils, because if the demographic balance shifted away from 

them, they would have a harder time claiming that the Eastern Province belonged in an independent Tamil state. Peebles140 noted that both 

before and after it won the 1977 elections the UNP was sympathetic 
Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

135

toward Tamil concerns regarding colonizationq, r

 but turned a blind eye 

toward Sinhalese colonization under the Accelerated Mahaweli Program. There were accusations of leniency toward separatists, because 

at that time the government was considering concessions toward Tamils on language, education, employment, and local autonomy.141 The 

project absorbed forty-nine percent of all resources targeted for public 

investment between 1982 and 1984, with much of the financing coming 

from international lenders, which led Herring to argue that the international community was contributing to the sustainment of the ethnic 

conflict in Sri Lanka.142

Lastly, educational trends and government education policy played 

a fundamental role in both the Tamil and 1971 JVP insurgencies, with 

government policy enacted in response to the JVP insurgency tipping 

the scales in favor of violent insurgency later in the 1970s in the case 

of the Tamil insurgency. During the colonial era, Ceylon maintained 

a two-tiered educational system, which consisted of fee-based schools 

that were sponsored by missionaries and provided education in English and non-fee-levying schools that provided instruction in Tamil or 

Sinhalese.143 In the mid-1940s, the government significantly expanded 

access to education by establishing a number of new schools and changing the medium of instruction over to the local vernacular, resulting 

in an increase in enrollment at the primary and secondary level from 

867,000 to 2,716,000 students between 1945 and 1970.144 University 

enrollment also increased substantially, from 904 students in 1942 to 

19,723 in 1965, as in 1959 universities began to admit students who 

needed instruction in Sinhala or Tamil.145

These increasing numbers, though, mask noticeable differences 

between Sinhalese and Tamils regarding fields of study. Owing to superior facilities in the Jaffna peninsula for imparting a science-based education than those in the rural south where the Sinhalese predominate,s

Sri Lankan Tamil enrollment in the engineering, medicine, and science faculties at the university level far exceeded their proportion in 

the population. Hence, although Sri Lankan Tamils constituted about 

eleven  percent of the population in 1970, they secured more than 

q Clearly, the UNP’s sensitivity did not extend to Tamil concerns over the demographic viability of including the Eastern Province in an independent Tamil state, as no 

Sri Lankan government accepted the legitimacy of Tamil Eelam.

r In addition to complaints that the Accelerated Mahaweli Program facilitated Sinhalese colonization of Tamil areas, Tamils complained that it neglected Tamil areas and that 

it reflected a development program in which little development financing found its way to 

Tamil regions of the country.

s Efforts to develop a science-based education in the rural areas, particularly where 

the Sinhalese were numerous, suffered from a lack of qualified teachers and laboratory 

facilities.146,147
136

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

thirty-five percent of the admissions to science-based faculties, and in 

engineering and medicine it was as high as forty-five percent.148 In contrast, Sinhalese students were overrepresented in less practical subjects 

such as the social sciences and humanities, and therefore they had a 

much harder time in securing employment after graduation because 

job opportunities were scarce for graduates in these fields.

For instance, in 1964, eighty-five percent of the students enrolled in 

social sciences, law, and the humanities at the University of Ceylon were 

Sinhalese, whereas in science and engineering they constituted only 

fifty-nine percent of the students (Tamil students constituted 37.2 percent), and in medicine and dentistry Sinhalese students amounted to 

54.5 percent of total enrollment and Tamils, 40.5 percent.149 As a result 

of this imbalance, educated unemployment was a significant problem among young Sinhalese. In 1969–1970, the unemployment rate 

for those twenty-five to thirty-four years of age without schooling was 

1.4 percent; for those with a primary education, it was 3.9 percent; and 

for those with at least some secondary-level education, specifically at 

the General Certificate Examination (Ordinary Level) and above, it 

was 23.3 percent.150 With about three-quarters of the population being 

Sinhalese, these numbers indicate that, at the time of the JVP insurrection in 1971, there was a large population of educated Sinhalese youth 

with frustrated ambitions.

In the aftermath of the 1971 insurrection, the United Front government appeared to acknowledge the role of educated unemployment in 

fostering the rebellion, and so it proceeded to institute a number of 

highly controversial educational policies to correct for the inadequacy 

of the science-based curriculum at the secondary level in rural schools. 

These policies resulted in the increase of Sinhalese access to universitylevel science faculties, which, it turns out, came at the expense of Tamil 

enrollment in science-based university courses.t

 In the early 1970s, it 

instituted a district quota system to increase university enrollment from 

rural areas. Additionally, at this time, university entrance examinations were administered primarily in either Sinhalese or Tamil (a small 

number took exams in English), and so the government established a 

standardization scheme whereby the number qualifying from each language would be proportional to the number taking the exam in that 

language, which in effect signified that Tamils would have to attain a 

higher score to enter university.152 For instance, for Tamil students, the 

qualifying mark for admission into a medical faculty was 250 out of 

t Incidentally, the Sri Lankan governments appeared to recognize the political 

importance of higher-level education as avenues for social and economic advancement, 

and so decisions regarding the number of students to be admitted to universities were 

made at the cabinet level rather than by the universities themselves.151
Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

137

400, whereas for Sinhalese, it was only 229.153 Tamil representation in 

science-based faculties at the university level dropped noticeably after 

the enactment of these measures, particularly after the adoption of 

district-based quotas. Specifically, the percentage of university places 

in science-based faculties held by Tamil students fell from 35.3  percent in 1970 to nineteen percent in 1974.154 Tragically, the government 

response to the issue of educated unemployment, which had fostered 

the JVP insurrection, motivated a Tamil insurgency based on the same 

factor. In fact, de Silva noted that the educated unemployed were the 

most militant agitators for Tamil independence in the mid-1970s.155 Not 

surprisingly, in the late 1970s, the unemployment rate for young Tamil 

males with General Certificate Examination (advanced level) qualifications was forty-one percent.156

ENDNOTES

1 S. J. Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy (Chicago and 

London: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 92.

2 Neil DeVotta, “Control Democracy, Institutional Decay, and the Quest for Eelam: 

Explaining Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka,” Pacific Affairs 73, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 62.

3 Jack David Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), 99–100.

4 Sinnappah Arasaratnam, “Nationalism,” in India and Ceylon: Unity and Diversity, ed. Philip 

Mason (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 262.

5 Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, 100.

6 Department of Census and Statistics Sri Lanka, “Sri Lanka Census of Population and Housing, 2011,” http://www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/CPH2011/index.

php?fileName=Activities/TentativelistofPublications.

7 Robert I. Rotberg, “Sri Lanka’s Civil War: From Mayhem Toward Diplomatic Resolution,” 

in Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 4.

8 Kristian Stokke and Anne Kirsti Ryntveit, “The Struggle for Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka,” 

Growth and Change 31 (Spring 2000): 290.

9 Robert N. Kearney, “Language and the Rise of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka,” Asian 

Survey 18, no. 5 (May 1978): 526.

10 S. V. D. Gamini Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971–1987 (New Delhi: Gyan 

Publishing House, 2008), 43–83.

11 A. R. M. Imtiyaz and Ben Stavis, “Ethno-Political Conflict in Sri Lanka,” Journal of Third 

World Studies 25, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 135–152.

12 Clifford Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in 

the New States,” in Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, 

ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: Free Press, 1963), 105–157.

13 Imtiyaz and Stavis, “Ethno-Political Conflict in Sri Lanka.”

14 Elizabeth Nissan and R. L. Stirrat, “The Generation of Communal Identities,” in 

Sri Lanka: History and Roots of Conflict, ed. Jonathan Spencer (London and New York: 

Routledge, 1990), 40.

15 Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy, 6.
138

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

16 K. M. de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 

1981), 15.

17 Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, 106.

18 K. M. de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985

(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), 15.

19 Jonathan Spencer, “Introduction: The Power of the Present,” in Sri Lanka: History and 

Roots of Conflict, ed. Jonathan Spencer (London: Routledge, 1990), 5.

20 Ibid.

21 Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy, 7.

22 Spencer, “Introduction: The Power of the Present,” 5.

23 John D. Rogers, “Historical Images in the British Period,” in Sri Lanka: History and Roots 

of Conflict, ed. Jonathan Spencer (London, UK: Routledge, 1990), 101.

24 Spencer, “Introduction: The Power of the Present,” 5.

25 Nissan and Stirrat, “The Generation of Communal Identities,” 31.

26 Rogers, “Historical Images in the British Period,” 102.

27 Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, 140.

28 Nissan and Stirrat, “The Generation of Communal Identities,” 23–24.

29 Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy, 97, 99–100.

30 Imtiyaz and Stavis, “Ethno-Political Conflict in Sri Lanka,” 136.

31 Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam, “The Politics of the Tamil Past,” in Sri Lanka: History 

and Roots of Conflict, ed. Jonathan Spencer (London: Routledge, 1990), 119.

32 Bryan Pfaffenberger, “Introduction: The Sri Lankan Tamils,” in The Sri Lankan Tamils: 

Ethnicity and Identity, eds. Chelvadurai Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger (Boulder, 

CO: Westview Press, 1994), 20.

33 Kristian Stokke, “Sinhalese and Tamil Nationalism as Post-Colonial Political Projects 

From ‘Above’, 1948–1983,” Political Geography 17, no. 1 (1998): 83–113.

34 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale 

University Press, 2006), 4.

35 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 47.

36 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka: 1971–1987, 71.

37 A. C. Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989 (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Lake House Publishers, 1990), 11.

38 Michael Colin Cooke, Rebellion, Repression, and the Struggle for Justice in Sri Lanka: The Lionel Bopage Story (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Agahas Publishers, 2011), 76.

39 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 48.

40 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 24.

41 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka: 1971–1987, 69.

42 Imtiyaz and Stavis, “Ethno-Political Conflict in Sri Lanka,” 136–137.

43 Nissan and Stirrat, “The Generation of Communal Identities,” 29.

44 Ibid.

45 Neil DeVotta, Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalist Ideology: Implications for Politics and Conflict 

Resolution in Sri Lanka, Policy Studies 40 (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2007), 6.

46 Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, 105.

47 Gananath Obeyesekere, “Buddhism, Ethnicity and Identity: A Problem in Buddhist History,” in Buddhism, Conflict and Violence in Modern Sri Lanka, ed. Mahinda Deegalle (London, Routledge, 2006), 139.
Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

139

48 Gananath Obeyesekere, “Sinhalese-Buddhist Identity in Ceylon,” in Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities and Change, eds. George De Vos and Lola Romanucci-Ross (Chicago and 

London: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 233.

49 Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, 105, fn. 4.

50 Obeyesekere, “Sinhalese-Buddhist Identity in Ceylon,” 233.

51 Ibid., 234–235.

52 Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, 106.

53 Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, Sri Lanka: A Country Study, October 

1988, 101.

54 Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, 120.

55 Sinnappah Arasaratnam, “Sri Lanka’s Tamils: Under Colonial Rule,” in The Sri Lankan 

Tamils: Ethnicity and Identity, eds. Chelvadurai Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger

(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 47.

56 Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, 120.

57 Obeyesekere, “Sinhalese-Buddhist Identity in Ceylon,” 242.

58 Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, 109–114.

59 Obeyesekere, “Sinhalese-Buddhist Identity in Ceylon,” 244.

60 Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, 110.

61 Ibid.

62 Obeyesekere, “Sinhalese-Buddhist Identity in Ceylon,” 248–249.

63 A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Sri Lankan Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the Nineteenth 

and Twentieth Centuries (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000), 27–28.

64 Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, 113.

65 Ibid.

66 Obeyesekere, “Sinhalese-Buddhist Identity in Ceylon,” 251.

67 Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, 113.

68 Ibid., 112.

69 R. A. L. H. Gunawardana, “The People of the Lion: the Sinhala Identity and Ideology 

in History and Historiography,” in Sri Lanka: History and Roots of Conflict, ed. Jonathan 

Spencer (London, UK: Routledge, 1990), 70.

70 Ibid., 70.

71 Ibid., 71–72.

72 Ibid., 72.

73 Ibid., 73.

74 Ibid., 74.

75 Ibid., 75.

76 Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam, “Tamils and the Meaning of History,” in The Sri 

Lankan Tamils: Ethnicity and Identity, eds. Chelvadurai Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 55.

77 Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism, 13.

78 Hellmann-Rajanayagam, “The Politics of the Tamil Past,” 114.
140

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

79 Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, 117–118.

80 de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, 12.

81 Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy, 90.

82 Satchi Ponnambalam, Sri Lanka: The National Question and the Tamil Liberation Struggle

(London: Tamil Information Center and Zed Books, Ltd., 1983), 19.

83 Nissan and Stirrat, “The Generation of Communal Identities,” 20.

84 Ibid.

85 Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, 116.

86 Ibid.

87 Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 129–132, 198.

88 Ibid., 131.

89 Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, Sri Lanka: A Country Study, 204.

90 Asoka Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy

(New York and Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2009), 67.

91 Bruce Matthews, “Radical Conflict and the Rationalization of Violence in Sri Lanka,” 

Pacific Affairs 59, no. 1: 41.

92 Bryan Pfaffenberger, “The Cultural Dimension of Tamil Eelam,” Asian Survey 21, no. 11 

(November 1981): 1145–1157.

93 Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, Sri Lanka: A Country Study, October 

1988, 80.

94 Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, 102.

95 Ibid., 100.

96 Ibid., 101.

97 Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy, 84–85.

98 Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, 103.

99 Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy, 101.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid., 103.

102Arasaratnam, “Sri Lanka’s Tamils: Under Colonial Rule,” 39.

103Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism, 19.

104Arasaratnam, “Sri Lanka’s Tamils: Under Colonial Rule,” 30, 35, 45.

105 Ibid., 48, 50.

106 Ibid., 42.

107Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism, 44.

108Pfaffenberger, “The Cultural Dimension of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka,” 1147–1148.

109Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy, 110.

110 Pfaffenberger, “The Cultural Dimension of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka,” 1151.

111 Ibid.

112Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy, 102.

113Arasaratnam, “Sri Lanka’s Tamils: Under Colonial Rule,” 32, 41.

114 Ibid., 47.

115 Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism, 17.

116 Ibid., 16.

117 Ibid.
Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

141

118 Pfaffenberger, “The Cultural Dimension of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka,” 1146.

119 Ibid.

120 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971–1987, 148–149.

121Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, “Socio-Economic Inequality and Ethno-Political Conflict: 

Some Observations from Sri Lanka,” Contemporary South Asia 14, no. 3 (September 2005): 

344.

122 Sriskandarajah, “Socio-Economic Inequality and Ethno-Political Conflict: Some Observations from Sri Lanka,” 351.

123 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971–1987, 153.

124 Ibid.

125 Sriskandarajah, “Socio-Economic Inequality and Ethno-Political Conflict: Some Observations from Sri Lanka,” 345.

126 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971–1987, 87–88.

127 Ibid., 95.

128Patrick Peebles, “Colonization and Ethnic Conflict in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka,” The 

Journal of Asian Studies 49, no. 1 (February 1990): 37.

129 Ibid.

130Nihal Amerasinghe, “An Overview of Settlement Schemes in Sri Lanka,” Asian Survey 16, 

no. 7 (July 1976): 620–636.

131 Peebles, “Colonization and Ethnic Conflict in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka,” 41.

132 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971–1987, 147.

133Peebles, “Colonization and Ethnic Conflict in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka,” 38.

134 Ibid.

135 Ibid.

136Peebles, “Colonization and Ethnic Conflict in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka,” 41–43.

137Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 84.

138 Ibid.

139 Ibid., 85.

140Peebles, “Colonization and Ethnic Conflict in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka,” 46.

141 Ibid.

142Ronald J. Herring, “Making Ethnic Conflict: The Civil War in Sri Lanka,” in Carrots, 

Sticks, and Ethnic Conflict: Rethinking Development Assistance, eds. Milton J. Esman and Ronald J. Herring (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2001), 140–174.

143 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971–1987, 100.

144 Ibid., 100–101.

145 Ibid., 101, 154.

146 Ibid., 102.

147 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 262, 264.

148 Ibid., 263–264.

149 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971–1987, 156.

150 Ibid., 110.

151 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 263.

152 Ibid., 264–265.

153 Ibid., 82.

154 Ibid., 266.

155 Ibid., 261.

156Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 78.

CHAPTER 5.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Chapter 5. Government and Politics

145

The process toward self-governance in Sri  Lanka gradually commenced once the British took control of the island’s maritime regions 

in 1796 from the Vereenidge Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC), the 

Dutch East India Company. After the British takeover, the maritime 

regions were initially ruled by the imperial administration in India, 

specifically through British authorities in Madras. Ceylon (as the country was then known) was given a military commander-in-chief that had 

jurisdiction over civil and military affairs, and the civil administration 

was managed by the Madras Civil Service and led by Robert Andrews, 

the resident and superintendent of revenue.1

 The main responsibility of 

the civil administration was to raise revenue, although it also had judicial and administrative responsibilities, and it was assisted in its tasks 

by aumildars, who were natives of Madras. The aumildars were brought 

in to replace the mudaliyars, who were high-status Sinhalese landowners 

who assisted the previous Dutch administration with a number of tasks, 

including collecting revenues, carrying out the orders of Dutch officials, and keeping the administration informed of developments within 

the Sinhalese community.a

 The aumildars were unfamiliar with Sinhalese customs and language, and so they were incapable of forming a 

link between the population and British officials. Hence, they were 

unable to provide the British with sufficient warning of a Sinhalese 

revolt, which lasted from June 1797 to early 1798. Given their connection to the local populace, the mudaliyars were aware of the preparations for the revolt, but they did not inform the British, owing to their 

alienation over their displacement by the aumildars, which resulted in a 

loss of status, power, and salary.2

The British modified the colonial administration in November 1797 

by placing the maritime regions of Ceylon under the joint control of 

the Crown and the English East India Company. Given their unhappy 

experience with representative governance in the American colonies, 

in Ceylon (and in other colonies), the British decided to concentrate 

power in the office of the governor, which in Ceylon was established in 

1798 and vested with both legislative and executive authority. Both the 

governor and civil service officials were appointed by the Crown and 

received direction from the governor-general of India and the directors of the East India Company, although ultimately they answered to 

the president of the Board of Control, who was the British government 

official who oversaw the company.3

 Additionally, the East India Company controlled the revenues of Ceylon and in particular those from 

the important cinnamon monopoly.

a The British, though, did come to rely on the mudaliyars by the mid-nineteenth century, especially in the maritime provinces.
146

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Beginning in 1802, the colony was placed under the sole authority 

of the Crown, which meant that it was administered independently of 

India by the Colonial Office in London. This move was undertaken in 

part because it was recognized that Ceylon needed its own civil service. 

Previously, civil service officials were company employees brought in 

from Madras, but because of differences between Madras and Ceylon, 

they failed to develop an in-depth understanding of conditions on the 

island.4

 Hence, British officials established the Ceylon Civil Service, 

to be staffed by (British) officials who spent a significant portion of 

their careers in the colony. Additionally, an advisory council was established to advise the governor, who was under no obligation to follow its 

recommendations.

Although the British were in control of the maritime regions, by 

the first decade of the nineteenth century, they had not yet established 

control over the Kandyan kingdom in the interior of the country. Both 

the Portuguese and the Dutch had failed to subjugate this region, as 

the rugged terrain and lack of roads permitted the Kandyans to wage 

successful guerilla campaigns against encroaching European forces. 

The British tried to subject the region in 1803 but failed, although they 

succeeded in 1815 by conspiring with the Kandyan aristocracy against 

the king, who had lost the support of both the elites and the general 

populace. However, Kandyan elites did not expect their kingdom to 

come under foreign rule, which is what transpired with the signing 

of the Kandyan Convention of 1815, the terms of which were drafted 

largely by the British.5

 However, the British made concessions to local 

political and social sensitivities by preserving the laws, institutions, and 

customs of the region, as well as the power and status of local chiefs. 

Additionally, the fifth clause of the convention declared that “the Religion of Buddhoo, its rites, ministers and places of worship are to be 

maintained and protected.”6

 The Kandyans did not adhere to the separation of religion from politics, and so the British were obligated to 

insert the fifth clause into the convention if they were to legitimate 

their authority over the Kandyan region among the bhikkus and elites. 

Nonetheless, the Kandyans chaffed under British rule and organized a 

rebellion in 1817–1818, which the British were eventually able to quell. 

After the rebellion, the British reduced the privileges enjoyed by local 

chiefs but still maintained a separate administrative structure for the 

Kandyan region, which was not integrated politically with the maritime 

region until the early 1830s.

In 1833, the British commenced a gradual process that dispersed 

power in Ceylon away from the governor to other political bodies and 

began to consider Ceylonese opinion when formulating policy. As part 

of a series of reforms known as the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms, the 
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

147

advisory council was renamed the Executive Council. In addition to 

the governor, it consisted of the colonial or principal secretary, the 

treasurer, the Queen’s advocate, the senior officer commanding troops 

on the island, and the government agent (see below) of the Central 

Province. The governor was required to consult the Executive Council 

on all nontrivial matters regarding his executive duties that were not 

urgent, and although he was free to disregard their advice, if he did 

so he was required to submit a report to the Colonial Office detailing 

the circumstances of the issue in question.7

 Additionally, a Legislative 

Council was established primarily to serve as an alternative source of 

information on local conditions to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London. This council consisted of sixteen members, ten of 

whom were colonial officials, or “official” members, and the remaining six were “unofficial” members nominated by the governor.b

 The 

unofficial members consisted of three local Europeans as well as one 

each from among the respective Tamil, Sinhalese, and Burgher communities. Right from the start, unofficial members tended to view the 

Legislative Council as a local parliament, although colonial officials at 

that time had little sympathy with the liberal sentiment embodied in 

these reforms and at times evoked undisguised hostility toward greater 

self-rule.9 Indeed, in 1825, the governor remarked,

Whatever Utopian ideas Theorists may cherish of universal fraternity without regard to Colour, Religion or 

Civilization or whatever notions Levellers may wish 

to see adopted, I am decidedly of opinion that this 

people cannot nor ought to have under the existing 

circumstances any greater share in the Government.10

The Office of the Government Agent was established as part of 

the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms to extend the Crown’s authority 

throughout the island. The government agent was the principal representative of the government within a province, and his main duties 

included maintaining law and order, keeping the populace loyal to 

the government with the help of local elites, collecting revenues and 

disbursing payments, and implementing the laws of the government 

within the province.11 The British were suspicious of the Kandyan chiefs 

after the 1817–1818 rebellion, and they subsequently worked to undermine the authority of the indigenous elite throughout the country, but 

they continued to rely on this class for exercising provincial authority. 

Each province was divided into districts (there were twenty-one total 

b In addition to the governor, other members of the Legislative Council were the 

colonial secretary, the chief justice (who was replaced by the Queen’s Advocate in 1838), 

the auditor-general, the treasurer, the government agents for the Western and Central 

Provinces, the surveyor-general, and the collector of customs at Colombo.8
148

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

throughout the country) that were administered primarily by either 

the government agent or his assistant, and districts were divided into 

divisions led by a chief headman. These in turn were divided into subdivisions under a superior headmen, with approximately 4000 villages 

and subdivisions of villages under village headmen.12

By the late nineteenth century, an anglicized elite emerged primarily 

among low-country Sinhalese but also among Tamils and members 

from other minority groups.c

 Members of this elite had received an 

English education and earned their fortunes in commercial activities, 

and rather than ethnic tensions between Sinhalese and Tamils, the key 

element of discord during this period were caste differences between 

Sinhalese members of the elite. Members of non-govigama castes, and 

in particular those from the karava, began to earn substantial wealth 

in plantation agriculture, commerce, and trade and began to agitate 

for top status within the Sinhalese caste hierarchy.14 This agitation had 

a political component, as the karava community organized to promote 

candidates for gubernatorial nomination to the Legislative Council. 

Throughout the nineteenth century, appointees to the Sinhalese seat 

came from the elite govigama caste, specifically from a single family, 

and the Ceylon National Association, which had originally formed as 

an organization of wealthy karava entrepreneurs, began to promote 

karava candidates.15 However, it was not until 1912, under a reformed 

Legislative Council, that a non-govigama Sinhalese was nominated to 

the council.16 As for the Tamil seat, throughout the nineteenth century, 

it was primarily held by a single family from the elite vellalar caste, and 

it was not until 1898 that a non-vellalar was nominated to the seat.17

Additionally, during this period and into the early twentieth century, unlike in India, there did not emerge a vibrant nationalist movement that agitated for greater democratization and independence. In 

contrast to the energetic Buddhist revivalist movement in the second 

half of the nineteenth century that sought greater Ceylonese autonomy 

from Western religious and cultural influences, Ceylonese political and 

economic elites aimed for modest constitutional and political reforms 

that stopped well short of calls for independence or the mobilization 

of the broader public into political activity.18,19 For instance, although 

the Ceylon National Association promoted karava candidates to the 

Legislative Council, it was not interested in broader constitutional or 

political reform, despite the desire of some younger members to pattern the organization on the Indian National Congress, which was agitating for greater Indian autonomy on the subcontinent.20 One factor 

c The English-speaking Tamil elite tended to be concentrated in the professions and 

in the civil service, while the emerging Sinhalese elite, particularly those from the karava 

caste, earned their fortunes in commercial activities and plantation agriculture.13
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

149

behind this passivity was a convergence of economic interests between 

the Sinhalese elite and British commercial interests. These two groups 

were not in competition in plantation agriculture, nor did there exist 

wealthy and influential indigenous groups in banking and shipping.21

Additionally, Sinhalese entrepreneurs did not control large domestic 

industries, and when entrepreneurs did participate in the political system, they were largely grateful for the British connection.22

Another factor was that Ceylonese elites did not trust their compatriots with political power. At the urging of Ponnambalam Arunachalam 

(then a prominent Tamil official in the government), in the early twentieth century, John Ferguson, the owner-editor of The Ceylon Observer, 

attempted to organize a conference or public meeting that would call 

for constitutional reform in Ceylon, but he received scant support 

from Ceylonese public officials. “They would not trust power to their 

countrymen,” he indicated in a letter to Arunachalam.23 Nonetheless, 

reforms were gradually implemented during this period. In 1889, the 

Legislative Council was enlarged to include two unofficial members 

representing the Muslim community and the Kandyan Sinhalese, and 

more importantly, in 1912, the Legislative Council was expanded to 

include an elected seat (the “Educated Ceylonese” seat) chosen under 

a very restricted franchise that entailed professional, income-based, or 

educational qualifications.d

Although Ceylonese elites became frustrated with the heavy-handed 

British response to the outbreak of sectarian riots between Sinhalese 

and Muslims in 1915, overall they remained politically quiescent.26

They did establish the Ceylon National Congress (CNC) in 1919, but it 

was far more conservative and restrained than its Indian counterpart 

on the subcontinent, which at that time was leading a nationalist movement against the British. Still, after the First World War, the British 

began to seriously consider the possibility, and indeed the necessity, of 

transferring greater authority to the indigenous populations in its colonial outposts.27 The pace of devolution in Sri Lanka picked up in the 

1920s. In 1921, a new constitution was enacted in which the Legislative 

Council was expanded from twenty-one to thirty-seven  members, of 

which twenty-three were unofficial members. Of this latter figure, sixteen members were elected, three of whom were communally elected 

and eleven territorially elected (nine from Sinhalese areas and two 

from Ceylon Tamil areas).28 In total, thirteen of the unofficial members 

were Sinhalese, and the remaining ten were from minority groups. The 

British still held ultimate veto authority, as clause 52 of the constitution 

enabled the governor to declare any bill, clause, or amendment to be of 

d The electorate at this time did not exceed four percent of the total population.24,25
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Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

“paramount importance” and thereby take into consideration only the 

votes of the official members when determining whether the legislation 

in question passed the council. The constitution was modified again 

in 1924, with the Legislative Council expanded to forty-nine members, 

of whom thirty-four were elected (twenty-three from territorial elections, which returned sixteen Sinhalese members). The expansion of 

the Legislative Council to include a large majority of unofficial members meant that the governor now had to try to keep the unofficial 

members content lest they form a permanent opposition against the 

official members.29

The next major reform occurred in 1931 after recommendations 

made by the Donoughmore Commission, which was sent by the British 

to undertake a serious inquiry into the functioning of the 1924 constitution and to suggest changes. The result was a significant (and controversial) restructuring of the Sri Lankan political system. The commission 

maintained the office of the governor and recommended a unicameral 

legislature (the State Council) comprising sixty-one members, which 

divided itself into seven executive committees that addressed different 

domestic issues (agriculture and lands, local administration, health, 

etc.). Certain key issues, such as defense, external affairs, and finance, 

were the responsibility of three officers of state, who were British officials, and these officials, along with the heads of the executive committees, formed the Board of Ministers. Additionally, universal suffrage 

was adopted, and communal elections were abandoned in favor of territorial elections.e

 These last reforms generated significant concerns 

among the minorities, and tensions between the Sinhalese and Tamils 

began to emerge in the 1920s. Previously, Tamils regarded themselves 

as one of the founding majority groups of the island, even though they 

were greatly outnumbered by the Sinhalese. Yet as the devolution of 

power from the empire to the colony began to quicken in the 1920s, 

the Tamils began to fear that the combination of Sinhalese numerical 

superiority (the Sinhalese outnumber the Tamils, the largest minority 

group, by six to one), universal suffrage and territorial elections would 

result in their permanent political subordination to the Sinhalese.31

The reforms barely passed in the Legislative Council, with a vote of 

nineteen to seventeen (the vote was restricted to the unofficial members), and voting broke down along communal lines, with all minorities 

voting against the Donoughmore Constitution and all but two Sinhalese voting in favor. The two Sinhalese voted in opposition because they 

felt the reforms fell short of self-government.

e The commissioners also proposed extending the franchise to the Indian Tamils 

within Ceylon, but this measure was dropped to win Sinhalese approval of the reforms.30
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

151

Clearly, the issue of representation (territorial or communal), combined with universal suffrage, was highly controversial during this 

period. The Donoughmore commissioners rejected communal elections because, in their opinion, they would inhibit the emergence of 

an inclusive national identity that encompassed all communities on the 

island.32 Still, some measures were enacted to redress imbalances that 

did not rely on communal elections. Of the sixty-one members of the 

State Council, fifty were elected on the basis of territorial elections, and 

eight were nominated by the governor to represent inadequately represented populations (the remaining three were the officers of state). To 

implement this system, a delimitation commission was established in 

1930 to delineate fifty electoral districts on a basis of one per 100,000 

inhabitants. The Tamils complained of the “artificial uniformity” of 

this method, and in the late 1930s, G. G. Ponnambalam, a prominent 

Tamil leader, unveiled a “fifty-fifty” campaign that championed an electoral system in which minority votes would be overweighted to ensure 

that no single ethnic group could outvote a combination of the others.33 The British governor at the time, Sir Andrew Caldecott, did not 

support this endeavor, because he saw it as another form of communal 

representation that would only foster sectarianism.34 And, in 1944, the 

Soulbury Commission (see below) was also opposed to the fifty-fifty 

proposal.

Movement toward independence picked up pace again in the early 

1940s as initial Japanese victories in the Pacific theater of World War II 

led to imperial Japan’s acquisition of British, French, and Dutch colonial possessions in Southeast Asia, which highlighted the importance 

of Ceylon as a source of critical war supplies (particularly rubber) and 

as a base from which to mount the destruction of Japanese power in 

the Pacific. Indeed, in 1944, the headquarters of the South-East Asia 

command, under Lord Louis Mountbatten, was established in Kandy, 

and the island served as a crucial link in the supply line to the Soviet 

Union via the Persian Gulf.35 During this time, British officials believed 

that further concessions on self-governance were required to satisfy the 

desires for greater autonomy among Ceylonese political elites, who 

were largely supportive of the Allied cause. A commission headed by 

Lord Soulbury was established in 1944 to consult with local political 

elites on the development of a new constitution offering greater selfgovernment for the island. The Soulbury Constitution was approved by 

the State Council in November 1945 and became the foundational document when Ceylon was granted independence (as a dominion within 

the British Commonwealth) in 1948. The new constitution established 

a parliamentary system with a bicameral legislature featuring a Senate 

(with nominated and elected members) and a popularly elected House 

of Representatives that selected the prime minister. The head of state 
152

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

was the British monarch, represented by the governor-general, and 

although executive authority was formally vested in the monarch, it was 

actually exercised by the prime minster and the cabinet.36 The island 

was granted external sovereignty over its defense and foreign policy, 

although a defense agreement was signed with the United Kingdom, 

providing for British access to military facilities on the island.37

Don Stephen Senanayake, a prominent Sinhalese politician in the 

State Council and Board of Ministers, played a key role in drafting 

the constitution, and his sensitivity to minority concerns ensured that 

the new constitution contained some provisions that attempted to safeguard minority rights and representation. For instance, although the 

new constitution called for territorial elections, a weightage scheme 

was incorporated to increase minority representation in the legislative 

branch, and Article 29 (2) prevented the legislative branch from enacting legislation that discriminated against a particular religious or ethnic group (which proved to be insufficient in later years). Additionally, 

while he recognized that the government had a special obligation to 

foster Buddhism, he espoused a more inclusive nationalism that championed the secular state.38 In contrast, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, the 

founder of the nativist Sinhala Maha Sabha (Sinhalese Great Assembly), 

promoted a more exclusive form of nationalism in which the state more 

explicitly reflected the Sinhalese and Buddhist nature of the majority 

population. Nonetheless the Soulbury Constitution reflected the success of Senanayake’s effort at crafting a multiethnic state on the basis of 

a relatively stable equilibrium among the various ethnoreligious communities within the island.

During this time, several major political parties began to emerge. 

The United National Party was started by Senanayake in 1946, and it 

also included Bandaranaike and the Sinhala Maha Sabha. The UNP 

won the first general election in 1947 and shepherded the country 

through independence, although in 1951, Bandaranaike led the Sinhala Maha Sabha out of the UNP to form the Sri Lanka Freedom Party 

(SLFP). Both the UNP and the SLFP are predominantly Sinhalese parties, with the UNP adopting a center-right platform that favored economic liberalization, foreign investment, and close ties with the United 

States, while the SLFP took on a center-left orientation that championed nonrevolutionary socialism and the more explicit promotion of 

Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalism. Both parties alternated in power during the first few decades of the post-independence period, with the 

UNP ruling from 1947 to 1956, 1965 to 1970, and 1977 to 1994, and the 

SLFP ruling from 1956 to 1965 (save for a brief interlude in 1960 when 

the UNP ruled) and from 1970 to 1977.
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

153

One of the more pernicious aspects, though, of the two parties’ 

competition for Sinhalese votes was their engagement in a process 

described as “ethnic outbidding,” whereby each party tried to outdo 

the other in terms of favoring exclusivist policies to gain favor with the 

dominant Sinhalese-Buddhist community and often reversing previous policy positions in the process.39 Thus, in 1944, Bandaranaike had 

taken a softer line toward the possibility of Tamil being adopted as an 

official language, stating in the State Council,

It would be ungenerous on our part as Sinhalese not to 

give due recognition to the Tamil language . . . I have 

no personal objection to both these languages being 

considered official languages; nor do I see any particular harm or danger or real difficulty arising from it.40

Yet before the 1956 elections, he stated that the Sinhalese were in 

a “life and death struggle” and that language parity would result in 

“disaster to the Sinhalese race.”41 Bandaranaike won the elections, and 

the country was swept up in a wave of messianic religiosity as that year 

marked the 2,500th anniversary of the Buddha’s death. Once in power, 

Bandaranaike’s government passed the Official Language Act No. 33 

of 1956, otherwise known as the Sinhala-Only bill, which made Sinhala 

the only official language of the country, thereby promising to marginalize Tamils who were hoping to obtain employment in the civil sector.

UNP politicians were also guilty of ethnic outbidding. Sir John 

Kotelawala, the UNP prime minster at the time of the 1956 election, 

had been a supporter of linguistic parity, stating,

Those of you who [want to] start this communal racket 

do not know what it means. I have myself seen this 

communal racket work in India. I saw enough bloodshed there . . . I can assure . . . this House that . . . as 

long as I am head of the UNP the principle of [linguistic parity] we have adopted will be maintained to the 

very end.42

Yet he would later switch to a Sinhala-only policy, stating, “I want 

Sinhalese to be the official language of the country as long as the sun 

and moon shall last.”43

Ethnic outbidding also derailed several efforts to conciliate Tamils 

by elevating the status of the Tamil language and devolving authority 

to the Tamils. In an effort to defuse growing ethnic polarization, Prime 

Minister Bandaranaike (of the SLFP) and S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, the 

head of the Tamil Federal Party, negotiated what came to be known as 

the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam (B-C) Pact, which recognized Tamil 

as an official minority language permissible for administrative use in 
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Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

the Northern and Eastern Provinces and called for the establishment 

of regional councils to handle agriculture, education, and Sinhalese 

settlement in traditional Tamil areas. This effort was opposed by the 

bhikkus, Sinhalese nationalists, and the UNP, who saw this effort as the 

first step toward the partition of the island. The leader of the opposition UNP at the time, J. R. Jayewardene, led a protest march from 

Colombo to Kandy in an effort to pressure Bandaranaike to scuttle the 

B-C Pact. Yet a year earlier, as the SLFP government was going to introduce the Sinhala-only Act into parliament, he argued that

no Government should and could make Sinhalese the 

official language by trampling down on the language 

rights of over a million of the permanent residents of 

the country . . . Surely that was the way to sow the seeds 

of a civil war.44

In 1965 the roles reversed, with the ruling UNP attempting to 

negotiate a pact that would devolve authority to the Tamils and the 

opposition SLFP charging the UNP with risking the dismemberment 

of the country. By 1965, the UNP had won back control of the government and was led by Dudley Shelton Senanayake (son of Don Stephen), 

who proceeded to negotiate the Senanayake-Chelvanayakam (S-C) 

Pact, which also addressed language issues and Sinhalese settlement in 

Tamil areas. Yet this time it was left to the SLFP, in combination with 

bhikkus and Sinhalese nationalists, to charge the government with risking the territorial integrity of the country. Their efforts forced the UNP 

government to abandon this latest attempt to reach an accommodation 

with the Tamils.

During this time, several parties emerged to represent Tamil interests.f

 The All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) was organized in 1944 by 

G. G. Ponnambalam, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, and several other Tamil 

notables. It won a number of seats representing Tamil areas in the first 

elections under the Soulbury Constitution in 1947, with Ponnambalam 

and other Tamils joining the UNP government. However, a group of 

ACTC members led by Chelvanayakam opposed this move and broke 

away to form the Tamil Federal Party. Rather than join the government 

or sit in opposition, this group preferred to press for a federal union for 

Ceylon consisting of two sectors: a Tamil sector consisting of the Northern and Eastern Provinces and the other comprising the remaining 

seven Sinhalese provinces.45 In the early 1970s, these two Tamil parties 

and several other Tamil groups formed the Tamil United Front (TUF), 

f There were also parties that represented the other communities on the island. The 

Ceylon Workers’ Congress was an outgrowth of the Ceylon Indian Congress and represented Indian Tamils, while the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress represents the Muslim community on the island.
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

155

and in 1975, the group changed its name to the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) to emphasize that it was seeking an independent 

ethnocracy for Sri Lanka’s Tamils. A manifesto put out by the group 

stated,

The Tamil United Liberation Front regards the general election of 1977 as a means of proclaiming to the 

Sinhalese Government this resolve of the Tamil nation. 

Hence the TULF seeks the mandate of the Tamil 

nation to establish an independent, sovereign, secular, 

socialist state of Tamil Eelam that includes all the geographically contiguous areas that have been the traditional homeland of the Tamil-speaking people in the 

country . . . The Tamil-speaking representatives who 

get elected. . . while being members of the National 

State Assembly of Ceylon, will also form themselves 

into the National Assembly of Tamil Eelam and establish the independence of Tamil Eelam by bringing that 

constitution into operation either by peaceful means 

or by direct action or struggle.46

Interestingly, this manifesto was issued in the run-up to the 1977 

parliamentary election, which was won by the UNP but also resulted 

in the TULF securing enough votes to become the main opposition 

in parliament. Hence, the opposition was headed by an “anti-system” 

party that sought to dismember the state.

At its first national convention in 1976, the TULF issued the Vaddukoddai Resolution, which formally called for the establishment of an 

independent Tamil state. It charged the SLFP government, led by Sirimavo Bandaranaike (the widow of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, who was 

assassinated by a bhikku in 1959) with not taking advantage of the final 

attempt “to win constitutional recognition of the Tamil Nation without 

jeopardizing the unity of the country,” and the convention called upon

the Tamil Nation in general and the Tamil youth in 

particular to come forward to throw themselves fully 

in the sacred fight for freedom and to flinch not till 

the goal of a sovereign socialist state of Tamil Eelam 

is reached.47

What finally led the Tamils to seek independence rather than autonomy within a federated Sri  Lanka was the new constitution adopted 

in 1972 by the SLFP government. Rather than simply reform the 

existing constitution, the SLFP decided to rewrite a new constitution 

that did not incorporate Article 29 (2) of the Soulbury Constitution, 

which afforded protection to the minorities against any discriminatory 
156

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

legislation.48 The new constitution made Sinhalese the official languageg

 and, through Chapter  II, it elevated the status of Buddhism. 

Chapter II stated the following:

The Republic of Sri  Lanka shall give Buddhism the 

foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of 

the state to protect and foster Buddhism while assuring 

to all religions the rights granted by Section 18 (1) (d).

With this clause, Sri Lanka essentially ceased being a secular state, 

with Buddhism afforded greater status than Hinduism, Islam, and 

Christianity. Furthermore, although the 1972 constitution contained 

a new chapter on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, which specified the 

equality of all persons before the law, Section 18 (2) allowed the government to essentially override these guarantees in the interest of national 

security, territorial integrity, and public safety and order.h The lack of 

strong guarantees of minority rights combined with the elevation of 

Buddhism and the secondary status ascribed to the Tamil language 

convinced Tamils in the early to mid-1970s to agitate for a separate 

state on the island.

The 1972 constitution also abolished the Senate and established a 

unicameral National State Assembly. Furthermore, the official name of 

the country was changed from the Dominion of Ceylon to the Republic 

of Sri Lanka. With the adoption of a new (and current) constitution 

in 1978, the name of the country was changed again to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. Before the establishment of the 

1978 constitution, the government passed the second amendment to 

the 1972 constitution, which established the office of the executive 

president. The new constitution gave Sri  Lanka a political structure 

similar to that of France under the Fifth Republic, with the president 

as the head of state, chief executive, and commander-in-chief of the 

armed forces.50 The president appoints a prime minister with parliament’s approval, and in consultation with the prime minister selects 

g Within the Constituent Assembly that formulated the 1972 constitution, members 

from the Tamil Federal Party moved an amendment to recognize Tamil as an official 

language of Sri Lanka, along with Sinhala, but this motion failed, and the Federal Party 

members walked out of the Constituent Assembly and no longer participated in its 

deliberations.49

h Specifically, Section 18 (2) of the 1972 constitution stated, “The exercise and operation of the fundamental rights and freedoms provided in this chapter shall be subject 

to such restrictions as the law prescribes in the interests of national unity and integrity, 

national security, national economy, public safety, public order, the protection of public 

health or morals or the protection of rights and freedoms of others or giving effect to the 

Principles of State Policy set out in Section 16.”
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

157

the members of the cabinet. Additionally, the president presides over 

cabinet meetings and can assume any ministerial portfolio.i

With respect to language, Article 18 of the 1978 constitution recognizes Sinhala as the official language of the country, but Article 19 recognizes Tamil as a national language, which means it can be used for 

administrative purposes in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and 

during the examination process for government employment. The new 

constitution also permitted the use of Tamil for other purposes (e.g., 

for certified public documents, for use in the court system in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, etc.), and although many of these rights 

were already in existence through legislation and regulations passed 

in the 1950s and 1960s, the constitutional enshrinement of Tamil as a 

national language meant that subsequent legislation could not bar the 

use of Tamil for these purposes.52 Also, the designation of Tamil as a 

national language implicitly recognized for the first time the existence 

of the Tamil community on the island as a distinct nationality, separate from the Sinhalese community.53 Combined with more stringent 

safeguards for minority rights, the new constitution offered greater 

guarantees for minority interests. Nonetheless, by this stage, the Tamil 

community had embarked on the path toward independence, and in 

August 1983, after the outbreak of anti-Tamil riots in July, the TULF 

members of parliament forfeited their right to sit in the legislative body 

after refusing to take an oath renouncing separatism.

On a regional level, Sri Lanka is divided into nine provinces (see 

Figure  5-1), which are further subdivided into twenty-five districts. 

Colombo is the executive and judicial capital of the country, while Sri 

Jayawardenapura Kotte is the legislative capital.

i The new constitution’s concentration of authority in the Office of the President, 

combined with the five-sixth majority the UNP won in the 1977 elections, led to concerns 

that the presidency had acquired too much power. In fact, the first president under the 

new constitution, J. R. Jayewardene, reportedly required all UNP members of parliament 

to submit signed undated letters of resignation to him, which he could use to dismiss MPs 

as needed.51
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Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Bay of Bengal

Gulf of Mannar

Palk Strait

Indian Ocean

Puttalam

Talaimannar

Batticaloa

Negombo

Kalmunai

Jaffna

Kandy

Galle

Kurunegala

Anuradhapura

Trincomalee

Ratnapura

Badulla

Colombo

0 10 20 Miles

0 10 20 KM

Provinces of Sri Lanka

Southern

Uva

Eastern

North

Central

Central

North

North

Western

Sabaragmuwa

Western

National Capitals

Province Capitals

Cities 0-250,000

Administrative Boundaries

Highways

Major Rivers

Intermediate Rivers

Lakes

Figure 5-1. Sri Lankan provinces.

In the early 1980s, the district was the principal subnational unit of 

government, with each district maintaining administrative offices collectively known as kachcheri that represented most national-level ministries.54 Each district had a government agent and a district minister. 

The former was appointed by the central government and the position 

itself was a holdover from the British colonial era, and the latter was 

filled by a member of parliament whose influence exceeded that of the 
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

159

government agent, given the district minister’s access to central government funds, which enabled the formation of patronage networks. 

Below the kachcheri system was a subdistrict level of government consisting of village and town councils.

In 1981, the kachcheri system and the subordinate subdistrict administration were replaced by District Development Councils and subdistrict units known as pradeshiya mandalaya (divisional council) and 

gramodaya mandalaya (village council). These changes were introduced 

in an effort to satisfy minority demands for greater local self-government, particularly with respect to economic planning and development.55 In 1987, though, the province became the focal subnational 

unit, as the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord led to the establishment of provincial councils in Sri Lanka. These councils were formalized in domestic law with the thirteenth amendment to the 1978 constitution and by 

the Provincial Councils Act No. 42 of 1987. The 1987 accord also called 

for the merging of the Eastern and Northern Provinces. The accord 

itself drew the ire of bhikkus and Sinhalese nationalists, who bristled at 

the indignity of having an amendment to the constitution enacted as a 

result of the actions of a foreign power and who felt that the devolution 

of power entailed with the establishment of provincial councils would 

eventually led to the detachment of the Tamil regions of the country 

and their formation into an independent Tamil state.

Two final points need to be made regarding Sri Lanka’s political 

system. In an effort to deal with the ethnic conflict, the 1978 constitution modified the electoral system in a manner that assigned greater 

relevance to Tamil votes, which, it was hoped, would penalize Sinhalese 

politicians who ignored Tamil concerns. Previously, parliamentarians 

were elected on the basis of plurality from single-member constituencies, and so Sinhalese politicians had little incentive to appeal to Tamil 

and other minority voters, given the overwhelming number of Sinhalese in the electorate. So when the 1978 constitution established the 

office of the president, it was decided that the winner needed to obtain 

a majority of votes, rather than simply a plurality, and an alternative 

voting system was adopted in case no single candidate received more 

than fifty percent of the vote. Specifically, in this case, all but the top 

two contenders were eliminated, and the alternative preferences of voters whose first or second choices were eliminated but whose second 

or third choices were among the top two were reallocated to them to 

determine a majority.56 A Sinhalese presidential contender could no 

longer ignore or alienate Tamil voters for fear that they would not 

obtain their reallocated votes. Additionally, a proportional representative system in multimember constituencies was adopted for legislative elections, which, it was also hoped, would add greater relevance to 
160

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Tamil votes, but by this point, the Tamils were beginning to organize 

their insurgency, and within a few years, open warfare would break out 

between Tamil insurgents and the national government.

Lastly, observers have been sometimes surprised by Sri  Lanka’s 

tragic history of ethnic conflict, given its long tutelage under British 

colonial rule, which imparted on the country a democratic system of 

governance with all of the requisite political institutions. However, 

these governing institutions were overlaid on a society with ethnic fissures that grew in prominence as the country proceeded on the path 

toward independence and modernity. Having observed conditions 

of both endemic conflict and harmonious stability in various deeply 

divided democratic societies, political scientists have come to distinguish democracies in such societies between those that are “consociational” versus those that are “control” democracies. A consociational 

democracy is one in which elites from different social groups, as part of 

a conscious effort to maintain the stability of the political system, cooperate to develop policies that satisfy the interests of different groups, 

and politics within such a system often involves interethnic bargaining, 

compromise, the balancing of interests, and reciprocity. Additionally, 

state institutions within consociational democracies act as “umpires” by 

enforcing rules that do not discriminate against any particular group.

In contrast, within a control democracy, stability is maintained 

through the actions of a dominant group that successfully manipulates 

and imposes its will over a subordinate group.j

 Within control 

democracies, the former instrumentally uses state institutions to 

advance its interests at the expense of the latter. Both consociational and 

control democracies represent ideal types, and sometimes democracies 

with heterogeneous societies embody aspects of both types. DeVotta 

has argued that the post-independence Sinhalese-dominated political 

system of Sri  Lanka represented a control democracy in which 

Sinhalese elites eschewed ethnic compromise with the Tamils and 

instead opted for the establishment of a Sinhalese ethnocratic state.59

However, as is illustrated in Chapter 8. Government Countermeasures, there 

have been government efforts to reach an accommodation with the 

Tamils; unfortunately, these efforts were not successful in preventing 

the outbreak of hostilities.

j To learn more about consociational versus control democracies, see Andeweg57 and 

Lustick.58
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

161

ENDNOTES

1 Lennox A. Mills, Ceylon Under British Rule, 1795–1932 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 

1933), 16.

2 Ibid., 18.

3 Ibid., 27, 99.

4 Ibid., 27, 41.

5 K. M. de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981), 

230.

6 Ibid., 231.

7 Mills, Ceylon Under British Rule, 1795–1932, 27, 105

8 Ibid., 106.

9 de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, 263–264, 356–357.

10 Vijaya Samaraweera, “The Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms,” in The History of Ceylon, Volume 3, ed. K. M. de Silva (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Colombo University Press, 1973), 82.

11 K. M. de Silva, “The Development of the Administrative System” in The History of Ceylon, 

Volume 3, ed. K. M. de Silva (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Colombo University Press, 1973), 218.

12 Ibid., 219.

13 K. M. de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985

(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), 43.

14 Ibid.

15 K. M. de Silva, “The Legislative Council in the Nineteenth Century” in The History of Ceylon, Volume 3, ed. K. M. de Silva (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Colombo University Press, 1973), 

243.

16 Ibid., 245.

17 Ibid., 245.

18 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 4.

19 de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, 381.

20 Ibid., 364.

21 Ibid., 366.

22 Ibid.

23 de Silva, “The Legislative Council in the Nineteenth Century,” 246.

24 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 51.

25 A. J. Wilson, “The Development of the Constitution, 1910–1947” in The History of Ceylon, 

Volume 3, ed. K. M. de Silva (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Colombo University Press, 1973).

26 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 50.

27 Ibid., 51.

28 Wilson, “The Development of the Constitution, 1910–1947,” 364.

29 Ibid., 366.

30 de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, 424.

31 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 53, 59–60.

32 de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, 422.

33 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 100, 103.

34 Ibid., 104.

35 de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, 450.

36 Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, Sri Lanka: A Country Study, 184
162

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

37 “Defense Agreement between His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the 

Government of Ceylon, 4 February 1948,” Tamilnation.org, http://www.tamilnation.co/

srilankalaws/48defenceagreement.htm.

38 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 125, 154.

39 Neil DeVotta, “Illiberalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka,” Journal of Democracy 13, 

no. 1 (January 2002): 84–98.

40 Ibid., 86.

41 Ibid.

42 DeVotta, “Illiberalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka,” 87.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., 88.

45 A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism (London, UK: Hurst and Company 

Ltd., 2000), 82.

46 Swamy, Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerillas, 33.

47 Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism, 110.

48 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 252.

49 Ibid.

50 Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, Sri Lanka: A Country Study, 185.

51 Asoka Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy

(New York and Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2009), 96.

52 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 297–298.

53 Ibid., 297.

54 Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, Sri Lanka: A Country Study, 188–189.

55 Ibid.

56 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 639–640.

57 Rudy B. Andeweg, “Consociational Democracy,” Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000): 

509–536.

58 Ian Lustick, “Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control,” 

World Politics 31, no. 3 (April 1979): 325–344.

59 DeVotta, “Control Democracy, Institutional Decay, and the Quest for Eelam: Explaining 

Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka,” 57.
Conclusion

163

CONCLUSION TO PART I

This section highlights the economic, political, social, demographic, 

geographic, and diplomatic context of the JVP and LTTE insurgencies. 

What is important for the special operator to note is that in a given 

insurgency at any point in time, contextual factors will help determine 

group grievances and condition individual and group action and interests. For instance, in the case of the LTTE, Sri  Lankan government 

policy on language and university admissions contributed to an economic context characterized by the relative deprivation of Tamils, and 

the elevated status given to Buddhism and the Sinhalese language in 

the 1972 constitution helped generate a social context in which Tamils 

feared cultural annihilation.

Additionally, demographic, geographic, and diplomatic factors conditioned group interests and actions. The presence of millions of Tamils across the Palk Strait contributed to Sinhalese fears that concessions 

on federalism would lead to independence and perhaps the incorporation of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, and indeed the entire 

island, within India. Furthermore, as we will see in subsequent chapters, the presence of India offered strategic depth to the LTTE and 

other Tamil militant groups, and the location of Sri Lanka off the tip 

of the subcontinent conditioned India’s strategic calculations, because 

it was in its interest that no extraregional hostile power establish influence in Colombo.

The extended duration of both insurgencies, and in particular the 

LTTE, suggests another perspective through which to view an insurgency—one that highlights the impact of contextual factors. Various 

political scientists and sociologists have developed a number of concepts to understand the temporal factors that affect social and political phenomena. One such notion is that of path dependence, which 

captures the idea that past events and decisions condition the range of 

possible actions available today. For instance, Goldstone noted that the 

commencement of the Industrial Revolution in England was a pathdependent process, as the introduction of the first steam engine in 

1712 led to more efficient steam engines that significantly improved 

the extraction of coal.1,2

 As a result,

Cheap coal made possible cheaper iron and steel. 

Cheap coal plus cheap iron made possible the construction of railways and ships built of iron, fueled by 

coal, and powered by engines producing steam. Railways and ships made possible mass national and international distribution of metal tools, textiles, and other 
164

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

products that could be more cheaply made with steampowered metal-reinforced machinery.3

Path dependence may also characterize an insurgency, which itself 

can be viewed as a social and political phenomenon. For instance, with 

the passage of the Vaddukoddai Resolution in 1976 the goal of independence for the Tamil regions had finally moved from the fringe to 

the mainstream of public opinion and was followed up by the refusal 

of Tamil parliamentarians in August 1983 to take an oath renouncing 

separatism. Additionally, the conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE proceeded along a more violent trajectory after the 

July 1983 riots. 

One can take this analysis a step further and unpack the notion 

of path dependence to develop a better understanding of how history 

impacts the present. For instance, scholars interested in the temporal analysis of politics sometimes emphasize the importance of initial 

conditions, intermediate events, and what are known as “critical junctures.”4

 Clearly the initial conditions of an insurgency specify the starting social, political, and economic context as well as the grievances and 

interests of the various sides. One potential dating of the starting point 

of the Tamil conflict is the moment of Ceylonese independence, at 

which point the Tamils constituted a numerical minority whose representation in the professions and universities exceeded their proportion 

of the population. Additionally, they nursed political grievances owing 

to the adoption of territorial rather than communal elections in the 

Soulbury Constitution. 

Furthermore, events such as the failures of the B-C and S-C Pacts; 

the passage of the Official Language Act of 1956; the adoption of the 

1972 constitution; the communal riots of 1958, 1961, 1974 and 1977; 

and the Vaddukoddai Resolution could be considered intermediate 

events located between the initial conditions at the time of Ceylonese independence in 1948 and the final outcome (i.e., the start of the 

Tamil insurgency). The initial conditions, therefore, are likely to have 

at least some impact on the sequence of events that play out in a “run” 

of an insurgency, that is, on the events temporally located between its 

beginning and end, with intermediate events also having an impact on 

the trajectory and final outcome of the insurgency.

Lastly, Capoccia and Kelemen define a “critical juncture” as a 

“relatively short period of time during which there is a substantially 

heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of 

interest.”5

 More specifically, during this brief period the main actors 

confront a broader range of policy options and their choice of policy 

from these options is likely to have a significant impact on future outcomes. Of note is the high probability, relative to the probability before 
Conclusion

165

and after the juncture, that choices made during this brief period 

affect the outcome of interest and as a result critical junctures may trigger a new path-dependent process that constrains future choices.6

 One 

can argue that July 1983 constituted a critical juncture of the Tamil 

insurgency, as the LTTE killing of Sri Lankan government soldiers and 

the subsequent anti-Tamil riots constrained future policy options and 

commenced a new path-dependent sequence of violent events that culminated only recently in 2009.

Hence, important concepts useful in the temporal analysis of social 

and political phenomenon, such as initial conditions, intermediate 

events, and critical junctures, can perhaps also be fruitfully applied 

to develop a temporal analysis of insurgencies that highlights the 

impact of contextual factors. This form of analysis, though, does not 

take anything away from the potential role of human agency or the 

ability of leaders to shape the course of events and place history on a 

new trajectory.

Finally, special operators will also want be mindful of the role of contingency in insurgencies. By this we mean the impact of chance events 

on the evolution and final outcomes of an insurgency. For instance, the 

1994 massacre of twenty-nine praying Palestinians in Hebron by Baruch 

Goldstein, an Israeli doctor, severely impacted the Israeli–Palestinian 

peace process, as it contributed to a decision by Hamas to undertake 

suicide bus bombings in Israel.7

 These actions in turn eroded Israeli 

confidence in the peace process. The lesson to be taken away from 

this example is that, ideally, the overall social, political, and economic 

context that impacts an insurgency should be influenced in such a way 

such that contingent events do not negatively impact the desired outcome of a mission.

ENDNOTES

1 Jack A. Goldstone, “The Problem of the ‘Early Modern’ World,” Journal of Economic and 

Social History of the Orient 41, no. 3 (1998): 275.

2 James Mahoney and Daniel Schensul, “Historical Context and Path Dependence,” in The 

Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, eds. Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly 

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 454.

3 Goldstone, “The Problem of the ‘Early Modern’ World,” 275.

4 Mahoney and Schensul, “Historical Context and Path Dependence”, 456–460.

5 Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, 

Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59, no. 3 

(2007), 348.

6 Ibid.

7 Ehud Sprinzak, “Rational Fanatics,” Foreign Policy, no. 120 (September/October 2000).

PART II.

STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF 

THE INSURGENCY

CHAPTER 6.

JANATHA VIMUKTHI PERAMUNA (JVP)

Chapter 6. JVP

171

TIMELINE

1965, 1967 Initial discussions are held on formation of the Janatha 

Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).

Mid-1969 JVP Central Committee is formed.

September 1970 JVP politburo holds its first meeting.

March 1971 Rohana Wijeweera is imprisoned after months during 

which he and the group made threats of revolutionary 

violence.

April 1971 JVP mounts an insurrection against the Sri Lankan 

government. Although initially taken by surprise, the 

government eventually crushes the rebellion. Many top 

JVP leaders are imprisoned.

May 1972 The Criminal Justice Commission is established to try 

the perpetrators of the April 1971 uprising.

December 1974 Wijeweera and thirty-one others are found guilty by 

the Criminal Justice Commission and are imprisoned.

November 1977 Rohana Wijeweera is released from prison and embarks 

on reconstituting the JVP as an electoral organization.

June 1981 JVP participates in District Development Council 

elections.

October 1982 Rohana Wijeweera runs for president and places third.

July 1983 JVP is banned after anti-Tamil riots.

Late 1986/early 

1987

JVP decides to launch another uprising against the 

government.

June 1987 The JVP successfully raids the General Sir John Kotalawala Defense Academy and the Katunayake air force 

base for weapons.

July 1987 The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord is signed between India 

and Sri Lanka. The subsequent stationing of Indian 

troops in Sri Lanka is used by the JVP to mobilize the 

public against the government.

August 1987 JVP launches a grenade attack on a meeting in parliament that featured the president and prime minister. 

Both survived, but one parliamentarian was killed.

October 1987 JVP attack the Counter Subversive Unit, killing the 

police commissioner.

December 1987 JVP assassinates the chairman of the United National 

Party.

May 1988 JVP issues death threats against all parliamentarians, 

ministers, and officials of the United National Party.

JVP assassinates the general secretary of the United 

National Party.
172

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

November 1988 JVP declares a national day of mourning on November 3 after the deaths of a JVP student leader and 

politburo member. Streets are deserted, commercial 

establishments and government institutions are closed, 

and transport grinds to a halt.

To protest the holding of presidential elections in 

December, the JVP orchestrates a work stoppage 

throughout the country, paralyzing the economy.

Late 1988 JVP’s center of power shifts from the Southern Province to the Central Province.

April 1989 President Premadasa calls for both LTTE and JVP to 

enter the political mainstream and invites both for 

talks. LTTE agrees, but JVP refuses.

May 1989 Wijeweera issues an order calling on Sri Lankans to 

boycott Indian goods and cease all commercial activity 

with India.

June 1989 The JVP politburo decides to make a final push to 

overthrow the government in July.

Summer 1989 To force the collapse of the government, the JVP 

orchestrates strikes by port and railway workers, as well 

as telecommunications and postal workers. Banks, markets, and stores close, and the navy is called on to run 

the Port of Colombo.

July 1989 Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange reserves dwindle and are 

able to cover only a few days of imports.

JVP organizes a hartal to commemorate the second 

anniversary of the Indo-Lanka Accord. Shops close and 

people are forced to hoist black flags in protest.

August 1989 JVP issues death threats against family members of 

armed forces personnel. In response, paramilitary 

groups go on a rampage and decimate JVP over the 

next few months.

November 1989 Wijeweera is captured by government forces and subsequently killed.

COMPONENTS OF THE INSURGENCY

Underground

After their expulsion from the Communist Party (Peking Wing), 

Rohana Wijeweera and others held discussions in 1965 and 1967 that 

culminated in the formation of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna 
Chapter 6. JVP

173

(JVP).1

 Some of these discussions addressed organizational forms for 

the movement, and a debate ensued as to whether the revolution would 

even require the establishment of a revolutionary party.2

 This pathway 

toward revolution had previously been advocated by Che Guevara, who 

noted that a revolution could be successfully waged by a small group 

of committed revolutionaries without first establishing a revolutionary 

organization.3 Although this view was considered by Wijeweera and his 

colleagues, they instead decided to build a revolutionary organization, 

and so in the late 1960s and 1970, the JVP began to structure itself as 

an underground organization that aimed to seize power, through violence if necessary, to establish a socialist society in Sri Lanka.

By the middle of 1969, the JVP formed a Central Committee. By that 

time, the group already had district secretaries and it was decided that 

they should sit on the Central Committee.4

 A politburo of twelve influential members was also formed and had its first meeting in September 1970, although, interestingly, a party congress to elect this body 

was not held, for fear of repressive actions by the state.5

 The fundamental organizational unit was the local cell, which typically consisted of 

five members that were required to meet at least once per month and 

whose leader was appointed by a local JVP leader.6

 Cell leaders sat on 

village committees, whose purview was confined to their respective villages. Local committees, also known as police committees, represented 

the next layer up in the organizational hierarchy, and they were led 

by a secretary, who in 1971 was responsible for developing the plan to 

attack the local police station.7

 District committees came next in the 

hierarchy, above which were the Central Committee and the politburo, 

with district secretaries selected by the JVP leadership.8

 District committees were a critical component of the organization because they 

channeled communication between the secretaries of the police committees and the top leadership of the party. The party also formed four 

functional divisions corresponding to propaganda, education, organization, and arms.9

After the failure of the 1971 insurrection, many of the top JVP leaders were arrested, and it was not until November 1977, with the release 

of Wijeweera from prison, that the party was able to reconstitute itself, 

this time as an open electoral organization that contested elections. 

However, the party was proscribed in July 1983 on the (largely false) pretext that it helped instigate nationwide anti-Tamil riots that convulsed 

the country. Thus, the organization was forced to return underground, 

and because a decision was made in late 1986 and early 1987 to launch 

an armed uprising against the government,10 the group embarked on 

reestablishing its preexisting underground organization. In fact, by 
174

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

then, the group had already started to rebuild its former cell system to 

prepare for an armed conflict against the government.11

The organizational structure that emerged (see Figure  6-1) bore 

a resemblance to the preexisting structure from the early 1970s. At 

the apex stood the politburo, under which was the Central Committee.12,13,14,15 Members of the politburo headed national committees 

focused on education, finance, military organization, and propaganda, 

and some were responsible for front organizations centered around 

youth, students, workers, bhikkus, and women.

Politburo

Central

Committee

Department 2:

National Committees

Department 3:

Frontal Organizations 

Department 1:

Zonal Committees

Central

Rajarata

Southern

Western/

Sabaragamuwa

Uva/Eastern

Finance

Education

Propaganda

Military Organization

Youth

Bhikkus

Students

Women

Workers

Figure 6-1. JVP organization.

One new structure was the Zonal Committee, under which district 

committees were geographically grouped. Each zone had political and 

military secretaries, and the five zones were Western/Sabaragamuwa, 

Central, Rajarata, Uva/Eastern, and Southern. All districts except those 

in the north and east16 had their own committees led by a district secretary that reported to the Central Committee and that tended to all JVP 

activities within the district. And as shown in Figure 6-2, the group’s 

base was in the districts of the Southern Province, although in late 1988 

its center of power shifted to the districts in the Central Province.17

Additionally, within each district committee were both functional 

and geographic units, with the former addressing issues that fell under 

the purview of one of the national committees (e.g., education, finance, 

etc.) or frontal organizations. Geographically, district committees were 

also broken down into town committees, and, finally, village cells, which 

were present in most villages, and consisted of five to ten members.
Chapter 6. JVP

175

0 10 20 Miles

0 10 20 KM

JVP Influence

Strong Influence

Moderate Influence

Anuradhapura Trincomalee

Polonaruwa

Kurunegala Matale

Batticaloa

Ampara

Moneragala

Hambantota

Matara

Galle

Kalutara Ratnapura

Colombo

Gampaha Kegalle

Kandy

Nuwara

Eliya 

Badulla

Puttalam

Mannar

Vavuniya

Mullaitivu

Kilinochchi

Jaffna

Ratnapura

Figure 6-2. JVP influence map.

The reversion to a hierarchical cell-based structure in the mid1980s represented a logical adaptation for the organization, given its 

operating environment and the goals it ultimately set for itself. By 1984, 

the organization was proscribed and it would eventually settle on the 

policy goal of affecting the overthrow of the government and economic 

system by force. It therefore had to design an organizational form that 

would minimize the possibility of infiltration by the government’s 
176

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

security apparatus, and so to maximize secrecy, it settled on a compartmentalized and pyramidal cell-based structure in which cell members 

were aware of only the cell leader and a limited number of other members. Cadres were prohibited from requesting or divulging personal 

information,a

 and communication was managed through elaborate 

means involving leaving written notes within bottles at prearranged 

locations.19 This structure ensured that if relatively junior cadres were 

apprehended, they would not be in positions to divulge the identities 

or locations of other members throughout the organization, and it was 

only the top leadership that had insights into the overall organizational 

structure and identities of leaders throughout the organization.20,21

Additionally, another precaution taken by the organization when carrying out an armed action was to rely on cadres from a different area 

to carry out the action (after contacting the local informant), which 

mitigated the possibility of detection and identification.22

Armed Component

The JVP never developed a conventional military capability comparable to that of the LTTE. Direct confrontations with the Sri Lankan 

military were avoided, and most of the tactics consisted of hit-and-run 

actions that did not require a large number of personnel. Trained operatives could be mobilized to attack a particular target and then return 

to civilian life once the mission was completed (and be available for 

subsequent missions).23 The military wing was known as the Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya (People’s Patriotic Organization), or DJV, and 

it was represented at the district level by entities known as balakayas.

b

Whereas JVP cadres carried out hijackings of motor vehicles, robberies of arms and ammunition from police stations and security installations, and robberies of jewelry and cash from banks and government 

institutions, the DJV carried out (on instruction from JVP leaders) 

assassinations of political figures as well as government sympathizers 

among the police, Buddhist monks, and prominent citizens.26 Some 

of these assassinations involved entering homes in masks and killing 

both the designated targets and their families.27 The DJV consisted of 

full-time members who had received military training, but the group 

also relied on common criminals, contract killers, army deserters, and 

a JVP members addressed each other using the word Mahaththya (gentleman) rather 

than by their individual names, which were not shared.18

b Assigning a different name to the military wing proved useful for plausible deniability, especially because the JVP conducted discussions with the SLFP and UNP over the 

1987–1989 period, even though members of both of these two parties were attacked and 

killed by the JVP/DJV. The DJV was led by a member of the JVP politburo.24 For information on balakayas, see Chandraprema.25
Chapter 6. JVP

177

service personnel suspended for disciplinary reasons.28 The group was 

also able to infiltrate members into the security services with false 

papers so that their men could receive training, after which they would 

desert with their weapons.29

Auxiliary

One of the more remarkable aspects of the JVP campaigns against 

the state in 1971 and 1987–1989 was the extent to which students were 

mobilized into a children’s crusade to take both violent and nonviolent 

actions to overthrow the state. This phenomenon is perhaps most vividly encapsulated by the failed effort in late 1989 to assassinate Mr. Ranjan Wijeratne, the minister for foreign affairs and the state minister 

of defense. The leader of the team tasked to carry out this mission 

was a second-year engineering student at the University of Moratuwa.30

Other members included a veterinary science student at the University 

of Peradeniya and mostly secondary school students who had not yet 

matriculated into university.

Undoubtedly, many of the incidents of student involvement with 

the JVP occurred without the awareness of parental supervisors or 

other adults. For instance, in March  1987, students at the University 

of Ruhuna were arrested for holding secret discussions regarding the 

overthrow of the government.31 Also in 1987, army personnel arrested 

six tenth-grade students from a school in the Colonne area despite the 

protests of other students and teachers. Several days later, the students 

were brought back to the school, where they voluntarily admitted to 

having undertaken violent acts on behalf of the JVP.32 And in mid-1987, 

schoolgirls from a high school in Kandy were arrested after evidence 

emerged that they had attended JVP lectures and participated in manufacturing bombs.33

From its earliest beginnings, youths and students played a prominent role within the organization. Obeyesekere analyzed a survey 

of 10,192 suspected insurgents in the 1971  uprising and found that 

nearly seventy-two percent were within the fifteen to twenty-four age 

range, and twenty-two  percent were in the twenty-five to thirty-four 

range.34, c

 Additionally, the JVP had at its disposal 800 students within 

the Colombo District who were organized into groups of twenty-five 

for assignments ranging from attacking an army camp to arresting 

prominent individuals.36 The JVP’s student wing, the Socialist Student 

Union (SSU), was also active in various universities at that time, and by 

c For comparison, approximately 16,500 JVP suspects either surrendered or were 

arrested, and between 4,000 and 6,000 were killed in April 1971.35
178

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

the late 1980s, it was led by a nine-member Headquarters Committee 

that consisted primarily of current university students.37,38 Each university had a branch of the SSU represented in action committees, which 

were informal student bodies within universities where student activists 

came together.d By the mid-1980s, the JVP came to dominate student 

activism within the universities through the Inter-University Students 

Federation, which consisted of members from action committees in different universities.40,41

As part of an effort to keep antigovernment tensions high and to 

prepare the groundwork for a protracted guerilla campaign, the JVP 

was able to use this infrastructure to organize considerable agitation 

and violence within universities during 1987–1989. Thus, during the 

first week of April 1987, students at Galle Polytechnic held a demonstration calling for the release of eight soldiers held hostage by the LTTE.42

In June 1987, students at the University of Colombo boycotted classes 

in sympathy with demands for general elections made by a number of 

political parties.43 During this period at Kelaniya University, undergraduate students agitated against the proposed merger of the Northern 

and Eastern Provinces, as called for in the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord.44

Students at the Universities of Sri Jayawardenapura and Moratuwa 

went on a hunger strike, demanding the abrogation of the Indo-Lanka 

Peace Accord and the removal of Indian troops from the island.45 And 

in 1988, the JVP sent threatening letters warning academic staff in a 

number of universities not to administer examinations in May.46

The government estimated that there were between twenty and 

forty combat-trained JVP members in each university,47 and the group 

took actions that veered into intimidation and violence. In May 1987, JVP 

students took five senior lecturers at the University of Colombo as hostages, and two days later, fourteen members of the academic staff of the 

University of Sri Jayawardenapura were taken as hostages.48 Throughout most of the 1987–1989 period, the university system was paralyzed 

by the JVP, with many universities shut down for large stretches of time. 

In the spring of 1989, the government hoped to reopen the universities, but the JVP attempted to forestall this effort by assassinating the 

outgoing vice chancellor of the University of Colombo.49 The group 

also assassinated the vice chancellor of Moratuwa University as he was 

in his office.50

The JVP also put considerable effort into mobilizing schoolchildren 

in many schools, to considerable effect. For instance, in the second half 

of 1986, the government recorded actions in support of the JVP in 

more than 2000 schools.51 In mid-1988, the group established a front 

d In early 1983, formal student councils were abolished in Sri Lanka.39
Chapter 6. JVP

179

organization, the Jathika Sisya Madyasthanaya (National Students Center), led by a third-year arts student from the University of Ruhana, 

which mobilized protests among school children in 1987–1988.52 It 

was largely run through the SSU and was very successful in mobilizing schoolchildren throughout Sri Lanka. Thus, as part of the effort 

to disrupt the December 1988 presidential elections, in early October, 

2,000 children from elite schools in Galle, St. Aloysius, Mahinda, Richmond, Southlands Balika, Sangamitta Balika, and Ripon Balika demonstrated in Galle.53 Children left their homes that day on the pretext 

of attending schools but instead joined the demonstration. Additionally, 1,000 schoolchildren demonstrating in Kalutara were tear-gassed 

and chased away by the police, and schoolchildren in Ambalantota 

attacked an army detachment with stones.54 Some prominent secondary schools had covert Students’ Action Committees consisting of four 

or five students with ties to members of the JVP or DJV.55

The JVP also took efforts to infiltrate the labor movement in 

Sri Lanka. By early 1987, the group did control seventeen trade unions, 

but their total membership was only 8,400.56 For the purpose of comparison, in September 1983, the Ceylon Federation of Trade Unions 

had a membership of 55,000, and the Public Services Trade Union Federation had a membership of 65,000.57 However, the group was very 

effective in establishing covert cells within a number of public and 

private-sector establishments, which were used to bring the economy 

close to collapse on several occasions, such as in late 1988 before the 

December presidential elections. During this episode, buses were not 

running, banks were shut down, the Colombo harbor did not operate, 

and water, electricity, and food distribution were severely affected.58

And in July 1989, the JVP took over a strike waged by the Sri Lanka 

Transport Board (SLTB), which severely impacted transportation on 

the island.59,60

To coordinate the infiltration of economic organizations, the JVP 

established a front organization, the Jathika Kamkaru Satan Madyasthanaya (Center for National Worker’s Struggles).61 Its general secretary, 

propaganda secretary, and financial secretary were each members of 

the politburo, and it organized its activities both regionally (according 

to the five zones of the overall organization) and by industry sector. 

These sectors and their main components were as follows:

• State sector: ministries, departments, banks

• Private sector: private companies, free trade zone

• Transport: harbors, SLTB, government railways, private transport

• Public administration: urban/municipal councils

• Energy and public utilities: water, electricity, gas
180

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

• Communication: newspapers, radio

• Estate sector: workers

• Education: teachers and staff at universities and schools

By the late 1980s, most banks, corporations, and government institutions had JVP sympathizers who could potentially use their positions 

to sabotage the economy at critical junctures.62

Public Component

In 1970, the party pursued a dual strategy of secretly arming itself 

while holding a number of events for the public.63 Of the four functional divisions previously mentioned, the propaganda division was the 

only one that operated overtly.64 Its activities consisted of undertaking 

poster campaigns, publishing newspapers, and organizing public meetings and rallies. After the failure of the 1971 insurrection, the government set up a Criminal Justice Commission that indicted Wijeweera 

and most of the top JVP leadership. After his release in early November 1977, Wijeweera set about rebuilding the JVP along electoral lines 

to contest elections. In mid-November 1977, he held a meeting of the 

Central Committee and appointed district secretaries, and between 

1978 and 1980, he established JVP district and electoral offices.65 As 

part of this effort, the group established a political presence in Chunnakam and Kilinochchi in the Tamil-dominated north, where traditional leftist parties had some popular support.66 Additionally, a year 

later, it established a general fund that reached 220,000 rupees.67

The JVP’s participation in the District Development Council (DDC) 

elections in June  1981 proved beneficial for organizational development, because it allowed the party to establish district coordination 

committees throughout the island.68 However, its participation in the 

formal political process generated contradictions, given the party’s revolutionary aims. In fact, during its earlier incarnation, one of its main 

criticisms of leftist parties in Sri Lanka was that they had forsaken the 

revolutionary path in favor of democratic politics. Hence, the JVP managed these contradictory impulses during this period by maintaining a 

clandestine core of activists, and it reportedly maintained a secret politburo at this time that was known only to a select few within the party.69

Furthermore, it restarted its education camps in 1978, and the lecture 

on the path the revolution in Sri Lanka should take (see the Operations: 

Administrative section) still emphasized that it was not possible to effect 

a peaceful transition to socialism.70,71
Chapter 6. JVP

181

LEADERSHIP

Patabendi Don Nandasiri (Rohana) Wijeweera was born on Bastille 

Day in 1943 in Tangalle. His father was a member of the Communist 

Party, and in his youth Rohana read the Sinhalese version of Marx’s The 

Communist Manifesto as well as How to Be a Good Communist by Lui ShaoChi.72 In 1960, he read an article in the magazine Soviet Land announcing the establishment of the Patrice Lumumba People’s Friendship 

University in Moscow, which would cater to youth and activists from 

Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Wijeweera won a scholarship to study 

medicine at the university, and on September 25, 1960, he departed for 

Moscow. In July 1961, he spent time working in a village in the Soviet 

Moldavian Republic, and at the university he organized the Marxist 

Study Circle and took a keen interest in lectures given on materialism 

and political science.73,74 He gradually concluded that the Chinese form 

of Communism was closer to the original intent of Marx and Lenin 

than the Russian version, and he made his views known publicly in Moscow and Ceylon.75 In March 1964, he returned to Ceylon on academic 

leave, but once Soviet authorities became aware of his doctrinal preferences, he was denied a visa to return to Moscow to complete his studies.

In Ceylon, he became a member of the Communist Party (Peking 

Wing), but he grew disillusioned with the party and its leader, N. Sanmugathasan, whom Wijeweera did not think was a true Communist. For 

Wijeweera, Sanmugathasan was guilty of promoting false consciousness 

among the proletariat, as he emphasized national and racial themes over 

class-based concerns when he contested the Colombo municipal elections and the general election of 1965.76 Wijeweera developed ambitions 

to assume leadership of the party, which drew the suspicions of Sanmugathasan, and in mid-1966 Wijeweera was expelled from the party.

In the late 1960s, Wijeweera and his colleagues formed the JVP with 

the intention of establishing a doctrinally pure Marxist-Leninist revolutionary party that would mobilize and lead the proletariat toward social 

revolution. In party publications and public rallies held in 1970 and 

1971, the party made bold statements regarding the need for a social 

revolution in Sri  Lanka. These statements drew the attention of the 

government, and in March 1971 Wijeweera was arrested and imprisoned. The JVP launched an uprising on April 5, 1971, attacking police 

stations throughout the island and taking control of a number of them. 

However, after a few weeks, the government quelled the rebellion, and 

most of the top JVP leaders were apprehended and imprisoned.

After his release from prison, Wijeweera quickly started to rebuild 

the party to compete in elections. Additionally, in  1980, he married 

into an upper-middle class family, and in October 1982 he was the JVP 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

candidate for president, placing third in the election. In the aftermath 

of the July 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom that swept the island, the JVP was 

banned on false charges that it had a hand in the violence, and Wijeweera took the organization underground again and prepared it for 

an armed struggle against the government. That struggle took off in 

1987 and lasted until the end of 1989, and this campaign of hit-andrun attacks on political officials and widespread economic sabotage 

brought the government to the brink of collapse on several occasions. 

Beginning in August 1989, the government launched a vicious unconventional campaign against the JVP, wiping out many of its cadres, and 

Wijeweera himself was captured in November 1989 by the government 

and killed soon thereafter. “Yes, very soon you can rest permanently,” 

he was told, after a tired Wijeweera asked his government handlers for 

permission to rest.77 Wijeweera was clearly the mastermind and driving 

force behind the JVP, and he was described as charismatic and ruthless, with little tolerance for those who opposed his views or would challenge his power within the JVP.

IDEOLOGY

The JVP’s economic program called for a fully centralized economy 

in which private ownership of the means of production would be outlawed. Following are some of the key elements of a 1977 policy declaration issued by the program:78

• A fully planned socialist economic structure shall be established, 

and the existing capitalist mixed economy shall be completely 

abolished.

• Banks and credit institutions and all monopoly industries shall 

be nationalized without any payment of compensation.

• The payment of debts and interest due to imperialist banks and 

institutions shall be abolished.

• Foreign trade shall be carried on only by the state.

• Heavy industrialization shall be the monopoly of the state, while 

in the field of small industries, state industry shall be speedily 

developed.

• Systematic steps will be taken to abolish private ownership even 

in the field of small industries.

• Essential steps will be taken immediately for collectivization, 

mechanization, and modernization in the field of agriculture.

• A revolutionary land reform shall be immediately implemented, 

and landlessness shall be abolished.
Chapter 6. JVP

183

The group also regarded the tea plantations established by the 

British in the central highlands as a degenerate colonial inheritance 

imposed on the country as they were the cause of various ecological 

problems. Thus, once in power, they intended to dismantle the plantations and reforest the area to prevent soil erosion and ensure adequate 

rainfall.79 This policy was summed up by Wijeweera when he stated,

We should change the entire economy. The neoimperialist economy should be changed to a socialist 

economy. The basic aim is to do away with the plantation industry, the hill slopes should be reforested, 

reservoirs should be built, and rivers should be tapped 

to harness electricity and diverted to the Dry Zone.80

With respect to multiparty elections, although the 1977 policy declaration did indicate that the group would retain democratic elections 

and the multiparty system,81 there are reasons to doubt that the JVP 

would have upheld this commitment if they ever did rule the country. 

In the early 1970s, Wijeweera was skeptical of parliamentary democracy and, specifically, whether a capitalist class would permit a revolutionary socialist party to attain power through the ballot box.82 Hence, 

the group was skeptical of the possibility of building a socialist state 

through parliamentary means. Indeed, one of its main criticisms of 

existing leftist parties in Sri Lanka was that they eschewed the revolutionary path in favor of parliamentarianism, incrementalism, and compromise on socialist principles, which inevitably results if one is forced 

to make political agreements with capitalist parties.83 Thus, the group’s 

commitment to parliamentary democracy was debatable, particularly 

in the case where a party that wishes to undo a socialist economy is 

likely to capture power in Sri Lanka.

The group’s attitude toward India went through several revisions 

during the period under review. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 

JVP’s perception of India was highly influenced by Chinese perceptions 

that emerged after the 1962 border war between the two countries. The 

Chinese viewed India as an expansionist power that sought to incorporate smaller neighbors into its orbit, given India’s dependency on 

foreign investment and aid and its need to find outlets for the products 

of India’s merchant class.84 These ideas resonated with the JVP, who 

viewed India as a threat to Sri  Lanka’s economy and independence. 

Additionally, the group also feared India’s cultural influence within 

Sri Lanka. Films from Tamil Nadu were very popular among Tamils in 

Sri Lanka, and given the close ties between the independence-minded 

Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Association for Dravidian Progress, or 

DMK) in Tamil Nadu and the local film industry in that Indian state, 

DMK ideology tended to be reflected in these films.85 The JVP also 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

looked warily upon the popularity of Hindi films among the Sinhalese, 

where the latter enthusiastically consumed Hindi cultural products 

despite not being able to understand the language.86 This fascination 

was likely due to cultural similarities between the Sinhalese and North 

Indians, yet to the JVP, it represented a potential avenue for India to 

exert soft power to influence the hearts and minds of the Sinhalese.

By 1984, the JVP’s attitude toward India exhibited a subtle evolution. 

The JVP was opposed to the separatist struggle waged by various Tamil 

groups, and while it was aware that India was sponsoring several of these 

groups against the government, it viewed this policy as a logical response 

to the pro-American foreign policy of the UNP government in Sri Lanka. 

In his 1985 book Solutions to the Tamil Eelam Struggle, Wijeweera87 argued 

that the United States wanted to support separatist movements in India 

to balkanize the country and thereby incorporate the detached parts 

within the American orbit. As precedent, he cited the detachment of 

Pakistan from India and Bangladesh from Pakistan and noted that in 

each case, the resulting country was successfully incorporated into the 

American alliance network, and that the United States was trying to 

repeat this success by supporting the Sikhs in Punjab and the Gurkhas in 

Nagaland.88 Hence, the Indian government was supporting Tamil separatist groups in Sri Lanka to punish the country for the Jayewardene government’s pro-American foreign policy, despite the close links between 

the DMK and Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka. As stated by Wijeweera:

The pro-American stance of the Jayewardene government and the link it has built up with countries like 

Pakistan and China which are regarded as traditional 

enemies of India has given rise to very serious and 

unprecedented contradictions between India and 

Sri Lanka. Thus it appears that the Indians have formed 

a tactical alliance with the Tamil Eelam movement as a 

way of opposing the pro-Jayewardene regime . . . This 

manifests itself as a contradiction between India’s tactical interests and strategic interests . . . As long as the 

government’s pro-American and pro-Pakistan foreign 

policy is in existence, the Tamil Eelamist military 

camps in Tamil Nadu will not be removed. It is only 

with the removal of the pro-American and pro-Pakistani foreign policy that the Tamil Eelam camps in 

Tamil Nadu will be removed.

In order to fully solve the national question in 

Sri Lanka, to defeat the Tamil Eelam attempt, to continue the maintenance of Sri Lanka as a multinational 

unitary state, it is necessary to win the support of India. 
Chapter 6. JVP

185

However, by pursuing a regional policy detrimental to India’s interests, by consorting with forces that 

threaten India militarily, we are certainly not going to 

win this support.89

However, beginning in 1986 and 1987, JVP attitudes toward India 

became more hostile once they noticed that opposition to India could 

be a useful tool to mobilize the masses against the UNP government. 

During this time, India was putting pressure on Sri  Lanka to grant 

greater autonomy to the Tamils, which was opposed by most Sinhalese, 

and JVP literature began to emphasize that Indian foreign policy was 

under the control of India’s “monopoly capitalist class,” which sought 

to absorb Sri Lanka. A May 1988 statement issued by the JVP Central 

Committee noted,

Ever since the Indian capitalist class became the ruling 

class, their plans, strategies, tactics, and activities were 

directed at making India an imperialistic superpower. 

Their objective was first to become a regional power 

and later a superpower. The underlying strand which 

runs through all the economic, political, military and 

foreign policies of the Indian capitalist class was this.

India has turned Bhutan—a 18,000 square mile country with a Buddhist population into one of its colonies...Sikkim, a small nation of 23,000 square miles 

has been annexed as India’s 25th state. In both these 

instances, the Indian capitalist class has acted in a like 

manner as they are doing now in Sri Lanka. In both 

instances, Indian troops were sent in, Indian agents in 

the country were well utilized, the economy was swallowed up, unequal treaties were signed to the benefit 

of the Indian capitalist class. Thus gradually, these 

countries were annexed.90

And a document put out in September 1988 noted:

The Indian ruling class that took upon itself the task of 

building up Indian imperialism followed an aggressive 

policy from the time India gained independence from 

the British. This policy was to swallow up—annex—

the smaller states that were once under the control of 

the British. To implement this policy the Indian ruling 

class used as its fifth column the Indian immigrants 

brought to these regional countries by British imperialists as traders, racketeers, money-lenders, contractors and laborers.91
186

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Hence, a patriotic struggle was the vehicle through which to effect 

a social revolution. However, the JVP never actually fought against the 

Indian troops that were stationed on the island in the north and east 

after the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord of July 1987. One potential reason is 

that although the JVP viewed the harnessing of anti-Indian sentiment 

as a useful means to mobilize the public, in private it realized that an 

independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka would have disastrous implications for Indian unity, given separatist desires in Tamil Nadu.92 Thus, 

the group may have seen India as a useful ally in the struggle against 

Tamil separatism once the JVP assumed power.93

The JVP’s stance toward the Tamil separatist movement was also 

characterized by a divergence between public pronouncements and 

private attitudes. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Tamil separatist cause was a secondary issue for the JVP. During the 1982 presidential campaign, Wijeweera did not take a strong stance on the issue, and 

Lionel Bopage, the general secretary of the party at the time, opposed 

Tamil separatism, although he acknowledged that Tamils had legitimate 

demands concerning language and state employment.94 Bopage was in 

favor of establishing links with leftist elements among the Tamils to further the anti-capitalist struggle, yet the JVP never pursued this option, 

because its main concern at the time was building up the party as a 

major opposition force, and so it did not want to risk drawing the government’s ire by initiating an outreach effort toward Tamil militants.95

However, in the aftermath of the virulent anti-Tamil riots of 

July 1983, the JVP began to view the Tamil issue in a vein similar to 

how it would eventually view India—namely, that the party could use 

anti-Tamil sentiment to mobilize the Sinhalese masses to support an 

armed uprising against the government to bring about a social revolution.96 Hence, some of their public pronouncements during this time 

charged that the government would not be able to secure the unity of 

the nation, as indicated by statements made in a December 1984 leaflet:

They do not mind the loss of the Northern and Eastern Provinces as long as they were able to continue 

their luxurious and degenerate lifestyles, and they 

seek to cover up their impotence by victimizing the left 

movement. The JVP is resolutely opposed to the division of the country. The JVP policy declaration very 

clearly states that it is opposed to both the division of 

the country as well as to autocratic centralism.97

Nonetheless, in private, the JVP acknowledged that the Tamils had 

legitimate grievances that had to be addressed, a sentiment that was 

also expressed in Wijeweera’s book Solutions to the Tamil Eelam Struggle.98
Chapter 6. JVP

187

LEGITIMACY

After the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord in July 1987, the JVP was able 

to legitimate itself through appeals to Sinhalese-Buddhist patriotism 

and opposition to the presence of Indian troops in the country. The 

group’s propaganda during this time emphasized that the government 

had betrayed the country to the Indians and was overseeing the gradual partition of the country and the establishment of a separate Tamil 

Eelam (homeland). For instance, a communiqué calling for a strike in 

late October 1988 stated:

It is more than one year since the corrupt J. R. Jayewardene regime sacrificed our country secretly to the 

Indian imperialists. The Indian army has occupied the 

North and the East as a result of the so-called JR-Rajiv 

Peace Accord. Hundreds of thousands are destituted 

by the Indian invasion army. It will not be long before 

our country becomes an Indian colony. The Provincial Councils established under the so-called peace 

pact have become a weapon to make real the dream 

of Eelam.99

The September 1988 JVP document stated:

To escape the national calamity facing Sri Lanka it is 

necessary to drive away the illegal, treacherous, murderous, fascist Jayewardene-Thondamane

 government 

without delay, for it is the prime cause of this calamity. Without doing this, the Indian imperialist efforts 

cannot be defeated, national independence cannot 

be achieved, territorial integrity cannot be protected, 

democracy cannot be restored, human rights cannot be insured, national unity on a basis of equality 

cannot be established and the disaster brought about 

through the creation of Provincial Councils cannot 

be averted.100

In addition in its later incarnation, the group placed less emphasis 

on opposition to capitalism, and combined with its emphasis on patriotism, it was able to broaden its support base into the middle class, to 

include doctors, lawyers, engineers, and university lecturers.101,102

e Saumiyamoorthy Thondaman was the undisputed political leader of the Indian 

Tamil community in Sri Lanka. In 1950 he formed the Ceylon Workers Congress, which 

represented this population group, and beginning in 1978 he served in the Sri Lankan 

government for twenty-one years.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Unlike the LTTE, the JVP, during either of its incarnations, never 

established parallel state-like institutions to provide social services, 

such as in health or education, or carry out basic functions such as tax 

collection. In 1971, the group did not have a political program to consolidate its rule once it took over an area and hoisted a red flag over the 

building it designated as a headquarters.103 In the late 1980s, the group 

did take a number of actions to build legitimacy, such as punishing 

drug dealers and illegal liquor vendors, countering prostitution and 

corruption, repairing roads, and helping flood victims.104 But it never 

established parallel institutions to compete with corresponding government counterparts. Such a strategy would have required the group to 

develop a conventional capability, which it never set out to do, to conquer and hold large swaths of territory.f

MOTIVATION AND BEHAVIOR

The main motivating factor behind the 1971 uprising was the phenomena of educated unemployment among rural Sinhalese youth and 

corresponding grievances against an English-educated elite based out 

of Colombo. Between 1946 and 1970, Sri Lanka’s population grew by 

eighty-nine percent, and by 1971, sixty-eight percent of the population 

was under the age of thirty-five.106 Additionally, the expansion of education in the 1930s and 1940s was very successful; in the early 1970s, 

Sri Lanka had the second highest rate of literacy (eighty percent) in 

Asia, after only Japan.107 A fundamental problem, though, is that universities were producing an overabundance of graduates in the arts, 

humanities, and social sciences (in fields such as Sinhala language, 

Sinhala literature, and Buddhist civilization) rather than in science, 

medicine, and engineering, and for the former it was exceedingly difficult to find suitable white-collar employment.108 This phenomenon 

was particularly acute for graduates who came from rural secondary 

schools, because these schools lacked the funds to afford laboratory 

equipment and found it difficult to attract the few available teachers 

capable of teaching science in Sinhala.109 Hence, the majority of students studying science, medicine, and engineering within universities 

tended to come from wealthier urban schools, whereas students from 

rural schools tended to concentrate in the arts and humanities once 

f In 1988, the JVP did, however, manage to establish territorial control in the districts 

of Matara and Hambantota. Sri Lanka then (and now) had more than twenty districts.105
Chapter 6. JVP

189

at the postsecondary level.g These latter students had significant difficulties finding white collar-employment, yet they were not inclined to 

return to the paddy fields or the estates and plantations that employed 

their parents.

An additional barrier faced by rural students is that the public and 

private-sector job markets favored English-educated students, who were 

more likely to come from elite urban schools. One of the inheritances 

of the British era was an English-educated political, administrative, and 

commercial elite based out of Colombo that controlled the levers of 

political and economic power in Sri Lanka. This elite crossed political boundaries, as leaders of all the major parties on the left and right 

were educated at elite secondary schools and then at Oxford, Cambridge, or the London School of Economics.111 Privileged graduates 

from this class benefited enormously in the job market because they 

were in position to take advantage of connections that their parents 

maintained with politicians and other elites. Obeyesekere has argued 

that the 1971 insurrection could be viewed as an indigenous uprising 

against this class by a frustrated, rural Sinhalese-educated sector of 

the youth population with dim prospects.112 In the sample of 10,192 

suspected JVP insurgents that he analyzed, he found that 94.2 percent 

were Buddhist (and therefore Sinhalese); 71.9  percent were between 

the ages of fifteen and twenty-four, and 22.1 percent were between the 

ages of twenty-five and thirty-four; eight-five percent were educated at 

Maha Vidyalayas or Madya Maha Vidyalayas, rural secondary schools that 

taught in an indigenous language and lacked the facilities to provide 

an education in science and technology; and only 0.2 percent occupied 

elite occupational positions, while forty percent were underemployed, 

17.5 percent were unemployed, 12.5 percent were students, and twentyone percent occupied lower-level positions.113,114

The themes of elite resentment and the lack of job opportunities 

for Sinhalese-educated rural youth were also motivating factors in the 

1987–1989  uprising. Additionally, in the 1980s, elite resentment was 

a key feature of a Sinhalese intellectual movement known as Jathika 

Chintanaya (The National Ideology), which reaffirmed Sinhalese language and culture and drew adherents among middle-class Sinhalese 

professionals who were only one or two generations removed from the 

villages and held resentments against the entrenched English-educated 

g Data from 1967 show that 53.1 percent of the arts entrants at the university level 

came from labor or peasant backgrounds, whereas only 5.2 percent of the medicine and 

dental entrants, and only 11.3 percent of the engineering students, came from this socioeconomic class. At the same time, students of parents with professional backgrounds constituted 9.2 percent of the arts entrants, 32.9 percent of the science entrants, 33.6 percent 

of the engineering entrants, and 41.4 percent of the entering medicine and dentistry 

students.110
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

urban elite.115 Followers of this movement were also drawn to the JVP, 

which allowed the group in its second incarnation to establish a base of 

support among a segment of educated urban professionals.

OPERATIONS

Paramilitary

During the 1971 insurrection, the main tactics of the group consisted of attacks on a large number of police stations and security 

installations on a single day (to include the possibility of a prolonged 

guerilla campaign against the government from jungle areas), as well as 

the arrest of important political figures, including the prime minister 

(which was not successful).116 In contrast, in the late 1980s, the party 

envisioned a more protracted and comprehensive campaign against 

the state, one that would ultimately result in a terrifying campaign 

of killings and economic sabotage that would decimate the UNP and 

other political parties and bring the country close to economic and 

political collapse on several occasions. As detailed in Figure 6-3, the 

group’s wide-ranging campaign is reflected in the diversity of its targets, as the government, police, military, and various economic sectors 

were subjected to the group’s attacks in the late 1980s.

Government

(general) 

Police 

Business 

Military 

Transportation 

Private citizens

and property 

Violent political 

party 

Educational

institution 

Religious

gures/institutions 

Journalists

and media 

Other 

Telecommunication

Utilities

Government

(diplomatic)

NGO

Terrorists

Figure 6-3. JVP target types.

Its most spectacular attack was undoubtedly the one on parliament 

in August  1987, which nearly eliminated Sri  Lanka’s top leadership. 

Two grenades were lobbed into a parliamentary meeting in which President J. R. Jayewardene, Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa, and 

various other ministers were in attendance. One of the grenades rolled 
Chapter 6. JVP

191

under the chair of Minister of National Security Lalith Athulathmudali, and the prime minister had to pull the president behind a table to 

protect him from the attack.117,118 One parliamentarian was killed, and 

several ministers and other members of parliament were injured. The 

group followed up this attack by issuing a statement that read, “Traitors! These are the reasons why we threw bombs at you!” and it proceeded to list a number of accusations, the most prominent of which 

was the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord and the arrival of Indian troops on 

the island.119 This attack was indicative of the pattern of attacks the 

group unleashed. As shown in Figure 6-4, assassinations and bombings 

were two of the main attack types of the group, and the group also 

undertook a number of armed assaults.

Armed assault 

Assassination 

Bombing/explosion 

Facility/infrastructure attack 

Hostage taking (kidnapping) 

Unknown 

Figure 6-4. JVP attack types.

In addition to the August 1987 attack on parliament, the group also 

launched attacks against other prominent officials. Generally speaking, 

the group carried out raids and attacks by first commandeering private vehicles, giving them false license plates, and carrying out surprise 

attacks on targets, often with inside information (and making an escape 

along a carefully designed plan).120 For instance, in September 1987, 

the JVP planned to assassinate a member of parliament from Panadura 

using an army vehicle that transported a number of weapons.121 Fortunately, this attack was thwarted, but there were many other attacks 

against prominent officials that were successful. In December 1987, the 

UNP chairman and three others were shot and had a grenade thrown 

into their car, and in May 1988, two JVP activists on a motorcycle shot 

and killed the UNP general secretary.122 The group also managed in 

December 1987 to assassinate the director of the Counter Subversive 

Division, and in July  1988, militants set ablaze the residence of the 

deputy inspector general of police, Premadasa Udugampola, killing 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

his mother, brother, sister-in-law, and two children.h Various other 

members of parliament were attacked by the group, including G. V. S. 

de  Silva (member of parliament for Habaraduwa), Jinadasa Weerasinghe (member of parliament for Tangalle), and Dr. Neville Fernando 

(member of parliament for Panadura).124 The JVP also undertook a 

campaign to liquidate leftist rivals. One hundred members of the SLFP 

perished during 1987–1989, and both the Sri Lanka Mahajana Party, 

another left-of-center political party, and the Communist Party lost 

seventeen members each to JVP violence.125 Even former officials were 

attacked; the former deputy minister for cultural affairs was shot dead 

at his house in June 1989.126

However, the group did not just attempt to collapse the political 

system by initiating operations to decapitate the country’s top leadership. It also disrupted the political machinery of the state by threatening officials at the local level. A UNP branch meeting in Kotahena was 

attacked with grenades, and in January 1988, the deputy chairman of 

the Ukuwela District Development Council was shot and killed.127,128

The group issued death threats to lower-level UNP officials, and 

throughout 1988, it was a common occurrence to see posters, banners, 

and signs at various public places in which targeted individuals had 

resigned their posts and begged for forgiveness for past sins.129 The 

threat of death was also extended to everyone holding office in the 

government, and the DJV’s Vedihanda publication carried the constant 

refrain, “all traitors from the village level up to the ruling house will 

be exterminated.”130 Many UNP and government officials did indeed 

resign. For instance, the chairman of the Panadura Urban Council 

resigned without giving any reason.131 In addition, various attacks on 

local-level political institutions took place. In January 1988, the Matara 

Urban Council was attacked with grenades, and in June  1989, a car 

bomb exploded at Galle Town Hall while the Provincial Council was in 

session.132 Even candidates defeated in elections were targeted, as the 

JVP reasoned that they were inadequately protected.133 Overall, over 

a 2.5-year period, the JVP was estimated to have killed approximately 

17,000 people,134 and as shown in Figure 6-5, most of its operations were 

conducted during 1988 and 1989.

h This attack proved to be costly to the JVP. Udugampola subsequently tracked down 

and apprehended the fourteen men responsible for this attack, and he played a major role 

getting the government to adopt an unconventional strategy in its fight against the JVP.123
Chapter 6. JVP

193

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

1987 1988 1989 1990 

Year

Incidents

Figure 6-5. JVP incidents over time.

The JVP was also quite successful in its campaign of economic 

sabotage against the state. A senior academic worked with the group 

to develop a plan for the economic destruction of the country, which 

was based on the idea that hardships imposed on the general populace would lead to a revolt against the government.135 To implement 

this strategy, the group organized hartals (general strikes) that brought 

the country to the brink of economic collapse. As previously noted, in 

November 1988, the JVP brought the economy to a near standstill to 

protest the holding of presidential elections in December. Work stoppages paralyzed the transport and petroleum sectors, and shops were 

closed for weeks in certain areas of the country, leading to food shortages.136 Additionally, the banking and telecommunications industries 

were severely impacted. The army was called on to run buses and distribute fuel, while the navy operated the port of Colombo.137

This campaign of economic pressure was waged in support of a 

number of political demands leading up to the elections, including 

the removal of President Jayewardene and the assumption to office 

of a senior member of the supreme court in a caretaker role, as well 

as the dissolution of both the provincial councils and parliament, followed by the formation of a temporary government.138 Although elections were held, the campaign did succeed in convincing a number of 

important civil society actors and prominent individuals to place pressure on the government to accede to JVP demands. For instance, nineteen prominent trade unions called for the dissolution of parliament, 

a demand that was echoed by prominent Buddhist institutions, which 

also called for elections to be held under a caretaker government.139

Opposition leader Sirimavo Bandaranaike also called for the dissolution of parliament as well as the provincial councils, and she also called 
194

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

on the government to disband all paramilitary groups and to release 

all political detainees and students before holding elections.140 These 

public calls for accommodation to JVP demands ultimately swayed the 

president, who agreed to dissolve parliament and establish an interim 

government if the JVP renounced violence and participated in the elections.141 Sensing victory, the JVP refused, and the insistence on holding 

elections reportedly led close friends of President Jayewardene to pose 

the following question to him: “Your Excellency, is this a time to hold 

elections?”142

In a June 1989 meeting of the JVP politburo, the group decided to 

overthrow the government in July and assume power.143 They devised a 

detailed plan that called for attacks on key security installations, prominent politicians and bureaucrats, and media organizations. Additionally, various economic sabotage actions were undertaken in the critical 

summer months of 1989 to force the collapse of the government, 

including overtaking (and subsequently leading) an SLTB strike. This 

action was followed by strikes of port and railway workers, and eventually telecom and postal workers were also forced to go on strike. Banks, 

markets, and stores were also closed.144 The army again was asked to 

operate buses, and the navy took over the task of unloading ships carrying food and docked at the Port of Colombo.145 Despite the economic 

calamity inflicted on the country, the government was able to maintain 

power, because it had advance warning of this plan, and it responded 

by instituting a curfew that derailed the effort to topple it.146

Nonetheless, while the campaign of economic sabotage did put 

severe pressure on the government at this time, there is evidence to 

suggest that the group may have carefully calibrated its actions so as 

not to cause excessive hardship on the populace. By July 1989, Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange reserves covered only a few days’ imports, and 

exports of tea, the country’s main export, were delayed.147 An attack 

on the tea sector at this time would have caused enormous damage to 

the economy, yet the group refrained from attacking tea factories until 

September, after the government’s unconventional campaign began to 

cause significant losses within the group.148 A possible explanation for 

the delay is that the group initially held off on attacking the tea industry because of concern that such an action would severely impact livelihoods and result in less support for the group.

The JVP also undertook numerous actions to protest the presence 

of Indian troops on the island. The DJV threatened Indian High Commissioner J. N. Dixit with death, and in March 1989, it organized work 

stoppages to protest killings by the IPKF and LTTE in the north.149 DJV 

posters and leaflets requested the public not to leave their houses, to 

boycott places of work, and to refrain from driving and using televisions, 
Chapter 6. JVP

195

radios, and lights.150 The group also organized a hartal to commemorate the second anniversary of the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, and the 

public was instructed to hoist black flags and to demonstrate against 

the Indian presence on the island.151 The JVP also issued leaflets with 

highly charged slogans against Indian forces, including, “Drive away 

the Indian monkey army from our motherland!” and “Save our motherland from Indian imperialism.”152 The campaign against India also had 

an economic component. Sri Lankan women were barred from wearing Indian saris, and in May 1989, Wijeweera issued an order calling for 

Sri Lankans to boycott all goods produced in India, sever all relations 

with Indian insurance companies and banks, and cease all commercial 

activity with India.153,154

Administrative

As previously indicated, in the early 1970s, the JVP consisted primarily of lower-middle-class youth of Sinhalese-Buddhist background 

from the rural south, many of whom had attained at least some level of 

secondary education. By the 1980s, though, the appeal of the JVP had 

expanded into urban and quasi-urban areas, especially in the densely 

populated surroundings of Colombo.155 New members were recruited 

largely on the basis of personal relationships with existing members, 

and relationships were often originally established within an academic 

(secondary school or college) setting. Those potentially interested in 

membership would be approached and engaged in a discussion of the 

current political and socioeconomic situation in Sri Lanka and whether 

prevailing conditions had an impact on any economic difficulties the 

recruit was facing.156,157 On the basis of these discussions, existing members would decide whether to extend an invitation to the potential 

recruit to attend a set of lectures organized by the JVP (see below).

After a recruit attended the lectures, he or she was given a set of 

tasks. If the recruit performed well on the tasks and was rated highly 

by a JVP town or village committee, a JVP district or division secretary would recommend him or her for attendance at a JVP educational 

camp.i At these camps, attendees continued their education in Marxism by attending classes in subjects such as Marxist economics and 

Marxist philosophy.160 At one camp held in August 1969 at Bogahawewa, 

lectures were held between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., after which attendees 

i The first education camp was held at a house in Akmeemana in 1968, and camps 

were held in at least twelve other locations. These camps could accommodate twenty to 

thirty participants, and they would last seven days, with attendees participating in lectures 

and discussions for twelve to sixteen hours a day. Camps were also held in the mid to late 

1980s as well.158,159
196

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

were given military training.161 When curious villagers approached the 

camp, lecturers switched from the topics they were discussing to more 

benign topics, such as chicken farming.162

Once admitted, new members were expected to recruit at least five 

other friends or relatives.163 Additionally, loyalty played a prominent 

role in the sorting of individuals during the recruitment process. All 

individuals were classified into one of two lists, List  A and List  B.164

List A consisted of the most trustworthy members who had attended 

the five indoctrination lectures and had indicated a willingness to 

fight.165,166 They were assigned to combat units and tended to be more 

active within the party. List B consisted of the others who had attended 

the fifth lecture and who may not have been accepted yet into the organization. They were used primarily for propaganda activities, such as 

poster campaigns.167

In the late 1960s, the JVP developed a collection of lectures known 

as the five lectures, which served to introduce new members to the 

group’s ideology. The lectures were initially developed and presented 

by Wijeweera, and they would often last many hours spread over several 

days.168 The initial lectures were titled:169

• “The Economic Crisis of the Capitalist System”

• “Independence”

• “Indian Expansionism”

• “The Leftist Movement”

• “The Path the Sri Lankan Revolution Should Take”

The first lecture consisted of a Marxist interpretation of the ills 

of Sri Lanka’s economy, with emphasis placed on the unemployment 

of educated youth, poverty, a rising cost of living, inflation and the 

devaluation of the currency, Sri Lanka’s foreign debt, and the financial 

policies of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.170 This 

lecture also presented the JVP’s interpretation of how Sri Lanka fell 

under the control of colonial powers and how capitalism and the plantation economy were introduced into the country.

The second lecture addressed anticolonial movements in Asia, 

Africa, and Latin America and emphasized that “neocolonial” arrangements were instituted by Western powers to ensure that newly independent nations remained enslaved through economic, political, religious, 

ideological, and cultural dependence.171 The United States was seen 

as inheriting the mantle as the world’s predominant “imperial” power 

from Britain. Additionally, the lecture on Indian expansionism emphasized that India desired to absorb or subjugate its neighbors by employing expatriate communities of traders and workers in neighboring 

countries as fifth-columnists.172
Chapter 6. JVP

197

Once a recruit had attended his or her first four lectures, the party 

would determine whether the recruit was trustworthy and shared the 

views expressed during the lectures.173,174 If a positive determination 

was made, the recruit would attend the fifth lecture, which addressed 

the JVP’s strategy for revolution. The content of this class was both 

theoretical and practical. It examined different models of social revolution, including an analysis and comparison of the Cuban, Russian, 

and Chinese revolutions, and emphasized that, throughout history, 

the pathway of social revolution was contingent on existing conditions 

within a particular country at a point in time.175 More controversially, 

the class emphasized that it was not possible to effect a peaceful transition to socialism, and as evidence it pointed to the 1973 overthrow 

of Salvador Allende in Chile by Pinochet and the decimation of the 

Indonesian Communist Party in 1965 by the Indonesian army.176 From 

a practical perspective, it advocated a particular set of military tactics 

to seize power in Sri  Lanka, namely an island-wide attack on police 

stations and government institutions within a single day, rather than 

a protracted struggle.177 This was indeed the strategy followed by the 

group in April 1971.

The lecture topics were revised to take into account changing political and socioeconomic circumstances. Once the JVP entered mainstream politics in 1977, other lectures included “The Building Up of 

the Bolshevik Party” and “The Menshevik Movement of Sri Lanka,” and 

after the insertion of Indian troops in Sri Lanka after the Indo-Lanka 

Peace Accord in 1987, the JVP formulated another lecture titled, “Save 

the Motherland from Indian Imperialism.”178

Additionally, in the early 1970s, List A members received military 

training at camps located in jungle areas.179 Military training camps 

were also established in the mid-1980s once the JVP decided to wage a 

protracted campaign against the government. Training was imparted 

by army deserters to groups of twenty-five to thirty  cadres in camps 

located in the jungle areas of Wellawaya, Moneragala, Pottuvil, and 

Ampara, as well as areas surrounding the Sinharaja forest.180

Psychological

The JVP established a number of outlets and methods to communicate with and influence the broader Sri Lankan public. For instance, 

the party established a number of newspapers, including Janatha Vimukthi (People’s Liberation), which was distributed throughout the island, as 

well as Deshapremi (Patriot) and Rathu Balaya (Red Power).181 It was Deshapremi that praised Rohana de  Silva, the sailor who assaulted Indian 

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi with his rifle as Gandhi was to depart 
198

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

after signing the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord.182 Another JVP publication 

was Niyamuwa (The Vanguard), a Sinhalese weekly with a circulation of 

approximately 50,000 to 75,000, and in Angoda, the party maintained 

a printing press that in 1983 employed thirty full-time activists.183 Additionally, the party maintained a radio station, with posters in Colombo 

announcing its schedule and radio frequency.184 Incidentally, this station was used to issue the August 1989 threat against the families of 

armed forces personnel.185

The party was very effective in using psychological operations to 

attempt to undermine the political system. In August 1987, after the 

attack on parliament, the DJV issued a leaflet threatening parliamentarians that stated, “All those MPs and their lackeys who like to live, 

should resign their seats and confess their faults and rise up against 

Jayewardene.”186 The group followed this in May 1988 by sending letters to all parliamentarians, ministers, UNP officials, and senior government officers threatening them with death if they did not resign.187

Threats were also used to dissuade citizens from participating in the 

political process. Before April 1988 provincial council elections in six 

Sinhalese majority provinces, the JVP put up posters stating, “Death 

awaits those who vote” and “The first ten who vote and their families 

will be killed.”188 And in November 1988, it issued leaflets calling on 

Sri Lankans not to participate in presidential elections scheduled for 

the following month.189

The JVP also issued orders and sent threatening letters to coerce 

individuals into participating in curfews, demonstrations, and work 

stoppages. In October 1988, the JVP issued threatening letters to workers, calling on them to agitate for general elections. In response, thousands of workers in Galle, Matara, Kalutara, and Panadura left their 

workplaces.190 To protest the death of a prominent human rights lawyer (and alleged high-ranking member of the JVP) in the beginning 

of September 1988, the JVP issued a special order declaring September  12 a national day or mourning. It ordered all shops and offices 

closed and white flags hoisted in honor of the slain lawyer. Compliance 

was widespread; streets were deserted, most shops closed down, and 

public buses did not operate.191 Curfews subsequently became a common occurrence in villages, towns, districts, and provinces, and those 

who defied them were killed.192

In another example, after the deaths of a JVP student leader and a 

politburo member, the DJV declared November 3, 1988, a national day 

of mourning, and it issued a statement ordering all commercial establishments to close down, all state institutions and government industrial 

establishments to remain closed, all transport to stop and fuel stations 

to remain closed, and all private homes to switch off their lights until 
Chapter 6. JVP

199

midnight and hoist red and white flags to honor those killed.193 This 

action was highly successful; streets were deserted, and businesses and 

government institutions closed. Residents in Kandy were reportedly so 

fearful that those who turned on their lights for even a few minutes 

often found neighbors banging on their doors demanding that they 

turn off the lights.194

Personnel in the armed forces were some of the main targets of 

psychological operations, because the JVP realized that this institution 

functioned as the bulwark preventing the state’s collapse amidst the JVP 

onslaught against the central government. The JVP instituted various 

campaigns to sow dissension and undermine morale in the Sri Lankan 

Armed Forces. For instance, a leaflet issued sometime in the April to 

July 1987 time frame appealed to the frustration felt within the armed 

forces that they were not given free rein to destroy the LTTE. This 

leaflet was addressed to the “Patriots of the Armed Services, Police and 

Secret Police,” and it stated:

It is your responsibility to protect the legally-elected 

government, the people and the country. But what 

is Jayewardene trying to get you to do these days? To 

protect the country or the people? Definitely not! 

Jayewardene is consciously and deliberately betraying 

the nation and the country to the Rajiv Gandhi-MGRPrabhakaran-Amirthalingam gang. The lives of soldiers and ordinary people are being sacrificed to the 

Tigers.195,j

An April  1989 issue of Ranabima, a bulletin put out by the DJV, 

also emphasized the theme of the government’s betrayal of the nation 

through its foreign policy toward India and its handling of the Tamil 

issue (the bulletin also decried government attacks against JVP 

“patriots”):

Soldiers! Open your eyes! While some scoundrels continue to kill patriots by the thousands in the South, 

what is happening in the North and East? Indian 

imperialists who captured Jaffna yesterday are trying 

to capture Trincomalee today. Tomorrow it will be Polonnaruwa and Anuradhapura, and the day after it will 

be the plantation areas and the whole island. Are you 

going to be deceived by the treacherous Jayewardene 

and Premadasa and permit this crime? Are you going 

j M. G. R. are the initials of Marudhur Gopalan Ramachandran, the chief minister of 

Tamil Nadu. He was often referred to by his initials. Appapillai Amirthalingam was a leading Sri Lankan Tamil politician who was assassinated by the LTTE in July 1989.
200

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

to be a party to handing over the country to the Indian 

imperialists after murdering the patriots who love 

the people and the country? Soldiers! You need not 

be a party to this crime. You need not act against the 

people, country and nation in subservience to a salary 

of two or three thousand. Do not lift your weapons 

against the country. Realize that this amounts to lifting your gun against your children. Also realize that 

such an act would amount to getting the guns of the 

patriots turned against yourselves.196,k

The JVP also charged the government with wanting to eliminate 

left-leaning elements within the armed forces. It issued a leaflet alleging that the government had classified all personnel into one of three 

categories: “forward,” consisting of loyalists who would do anything to 

keep the “fascist clique” in power; “neutral,” consisting of personnel 

who maintained more moderate views; and “against,” consisting of leftleaning elements opposed to the government.197,198 The leaflet went on 

to claim that the task of eliminating members of the “against” group 

had been given to elements within the Rapid Deployment Force, the 

Special Task Force, and to personnel within the “forward” group.l

The JVP was also very successful in infiltrating the police and 

armed forces. Informants played an important role in JVP weapons 

raids on security installations, and there were also a number of egregious penetrations of various security institutions. For example, an 

accountant staffed at the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of 

the Sri Lanka Police was suspected of being a JVP sympathizer. Allegedly, this individual passed CID files to the JVP and also provided the 

group with information on the movements of the senior superintendent of the police before the latter was killed.200 Another example 

is that of the sub-inspector of police assigned to the Sapugaskanda 

police, who was a member of the JVP. He enabled an attack on this 

station by fifty  rebels by placing at the station a ten-kilogram bomb 

that killed several individuals, and he had previously taken an arrested 

JVP leader to the station to familiarize him with the premises and the 

guard points.201 Indeed, even a member of a military police team that 

was with Wijeweera shortly before his death was a JVP member.202 He 

did not attempt to stop the killing of Wijeweera, but he did provide to 

the JVP the names of the team that executed Wijeweera, and he had 

k Ranasinghe Premadasa was the president of Sri Lanka in April 1989.

l Chandraprema notes that the services never categorized its personnel in this 

manner.199
Chapter 6. JVP

201

previously provided the names and addresses of individuals engaged in 

operations against the group.

The JVP also relied on threats and violence to encourage desertions 

from the armed forces. More than one hundred homes of military personnel were set on fire in the Southern and Northwestern Provinces, 

and many members of the Special Task Force were killed when they 

went on sick or family leave.203 By late 1988, the number of army deserters exceeded 2,000, which is a considerable figure, given that at one 

time during the conflict, the number of army personnel fighting the 

JVP in the southern and western parts of the country was just 6,129.204

Some deserters did indeed join the JVP, and some key members of the 

JVP military wing consisted of deserters and personnel still in service.205

Nonetheless, in mid-1989, the JVP was confronted with a temporal dilemma.206 Its campaign of economic sabotage against the state 

was inflicting significant costs on the populace, but the government 

had not yet collapsed. Fearing that the populace would eventually turn 

against the group for the severe economic disruptions inflicted on the 

economy, the group initiated a desperate measure to force the collapse 

of the armed forces, which was seen as the only institution holding 

the state together. In April 1989, in response to government and paramilitary attacks on JVP cadres, the group issued a threat in the bulletin 

Ranabima to the families of service personnel:207

The blood relatives of the blood suckers in the Army 

and Police who are engaged in massacring patriots 

should take steps to stop this crime immediately. If 

they do not do so, the patriotic people’s armed troops 

will adopt merciless measures against them (the relatives) as well . . . Since there are a lot of innocent people in the armed forces, we have acted with care and 

responsibility, so as not to cause any harm to them. 

But now in the new situation, we have been forced to 

abandon this policy. The only response to massacre, is 

massacre. There is no other legitimate response.

The group followed this threat in the beginning of August 1989 by 

issuing a direct threat against the families of armed forces personnel: 

personnel had until the twentieth of the month to leave their posts, and 

if they refused, their families would be targeted for death.

The armed forces and sponsored paramilitary groups responded 

quickly and in a similar manner. Shortly after this threat was made, 

posters began to appear throughout the country stating, “Twelve of 

Yours for One of Ours!” One vigilante group, the Deshapremi Sinhala 
202

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Tharuna Peramuna (Patriotic Sinhala Youth Front) issued the following 

chilling announcement to the families of suspected JVP members:208

Dear Father/Mother/Sister,

We know that your son/brother/husband is engaged 

in brutal murder under the pretense of patriotism. 

Your son/brother/husband, the so-called patriot, has 

cruelly taken the lives of mothers like you, of sisters, 

of innocent little children. In addition, he has started 

killing the family members of the heroic Sinhalese soldiers who fought with the Tamil Tigers and sacrificed 

their lives in order to protect the motherland,

Is it not among us, ourselves, the Sinhala people that 

your son/brother/husband has launched the conflict 

in the name of patriotism? Is it then right that you who 

are the wife/mother/sister of this person who engages 

in inhuman murder or your children should be free 

to live? Is it not justified to put you to death? From 

this moment, you and all your family members must 

be ready to die!

May you attain Nirvana!

Patriotic Sinhala Youth Front

The response was ferocious. Beginning in August 1989, an estimated 

twenty-five to fifty bodies were found dumped on roadsides each day.209

The Mahaweli River had an average of seventy bodies floating down its 

pathway every day.210 Within a few months, Wijeweera and most of the 

top leadership were eliminated.

Political

Although the JVP called on Sri  Lankans to support the leftist 

United Front in the May 1970 general elections, it intended to launch 

an uprising to seize power regardless of which party was in power.m,n

It hosted a number of public rallies between August  1970 and February  1971, and a number of its public pronouncements suggested 

m The JVP expected the UNP to postpone elections on the pretext of a fabricated 

security incident that they would blame on radical left elements. Nonetheless, they called 

on voters to support the United Front to defeat the UNP.211

n According to Loku Athula, one of the key participants in the 1971 uprising, in 

statements presented before the Criminal Justice Commission, the objective of the JVP in 

1971 was to seize state power by force regardless of which government was in power.212
Chapter 6. JVP

203

revolutionary ambitions. For instance, the August 1, 1970, edition of 

Janatha Vimukthi stated:

The whited sepulchre of imperialism erected on the 

dead bodies of the people with the blood, tears and 

sweat of the people can be demolished not by kneeling 

and bowing before it, but by pitiless sledge hammer 

blows. The people drawn towards destruction by the 

curse of colonialism can be saved not by having roundtable conferences with imperialists, but by treading 

the fallen across their dead bodies. Only their blood 

can wash clean their motherland stained with black 

spots of infamous imperialism.213

An article from the September 5 edition of the same paper stated:

Yes we shall destroy the entire various revolutionary 

scourges which deny us our freedom and our civic 

rights. Until capitalist freedom and capitalist democracy are wiped away along with reactionary henchmen 

the real freedom and democracy we may inherit will 

be plainly false and illusory.214

Wijeweera was released from prison in 1977 with UNP blessing and 

the hope that he would mobilize the JVP to undermine the leftist SLFP, 

as both groups counted on rural Sinhalese for support. The UNP government provided the JVP with money, vehicles, and protection to 

launch an anti-SLFP campaign, and the JVP was able to stage meetings 

against Mrs. Bandaranaike and sabotage several meetings she held by 

attending them in SLFP uniforms.215

During this time, the party commenced with the electoral process 

in April 1979, when it submitted a list of nominations for the Colombo 

Municipal Council elections (despite the elections commissioner refusing to designate the group as a legitimate political party qualified to 

contest the elections).216 It was able to contest the District Development 

Council elections of June 1981, where it won thirteen seats, and during 

this period, it held various talks with other leftist parties. One such 

discussion involved the fielding of a common candidate to take on the 

UNP in the October 1982 presidential election, but an agreement was 

not reached because Wijeweera insisted that he should be the common 

candidate.217 In the end, Wijeweera ran as the JVP candidate, coming 

in third, with 4.2 percent of the vote (J. R. Jayewardene of the UNP 

won, with 52.9 percent of the vote).
204

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

EXTERNAL ACTORS AND TRANSNATIONAL 

INFLUENCES

The JVP had some contacts with foreign governments and groups, 

but overall these were minimal and did not result in assistance in the 

form of weapons or financial aid. In the early 1970s, the group did try 

to establish cells in the Maldives and in the Indian state of Kerala and 

to make contact with the vice president of Tanzania, who was a classmate of Wijeweera at Lumumba University.218 Contact was made with 

the government of South Yemen, who offered “revolutionary greetings” 

to the JVP, and Wijeweera and other JVP leaders traveled to Iraq (where 

they established contact with the Baath Party) and Cuba and also corresponded with Basque separatists in Spain and with the South West 

Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia.219 Additionally, the 

JVP did send a letter to Fidel Castro requesting the establishment of 

relations but received no response, and the group did not receive much 

assistance from the Chinese embassy when it tried to send a letter to 

Mao Zedong.220

There were, though, several notable transnational influences on 

the group. The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord in July 1987 proved a boon 

to the JVP. The agreement came at a time when government forces 

were on the verge of capturing the critical town of Jaffna, located in the 

north of the island in the Tamil heartland. The agreement led to protests and riots throughout the country, and Sinhalese revulsion toward 

the agreement provided the JVP with a pathway toward social revolution through patriotic struggle. Additionally, Wijeweera and other JVP 

leaders were highly influenced by the Cuban Revolution and by Che 

Guevara in particular.o

 Wijeweera sometimes reminded JVP cadres of a 

statement attributed to Guevara: “There are only three places for a true 

revolutionary in these times. He should either be among the dead, in a 

dark prison cell or in the battlefield.”222 Furthermore, after the death 

of Guevara in Bolivia, the Cuban embassy in Colombo made available 

a number of Castro’s and Guevara’s writings and speeches, which were 

read by Wijeweera and his colleagues. These writings included History 

Will Absolve Me, The Second Declaration of Havana, Those Who Are Not Militant Revolutionaries Are Not Communists, and From Moncada to Victory.

223

Wijeweera also read with interest the biographies of Guevara, Castro, 

Mao, Marx, Lenin, and Kim il-Sung.224

o Interestingly, in April 1970, the government established the Che Guevara Bureau 

within the inspector general of police to report the activities of the JVP to the prime 

minister.221
Chapter 6. JVP

205

FINANCES AND ARMAMENTS

Armaments

In 1970, the JVP armed itself by manufacturing crude bombs and 

by purchasing guns and ammunition from firearm dealers.225 Additionally, the group also purchased explosives, and on several occasions it 

acquired firearms through thefts from private citizens. It stored armaments and explosives in underground bunkers that it built and in Buddhist temples in remote parts of the country, where the monks were 

either members or sympathizers of the movement.226

In the mid-1980s, the group adopted the maxim that the enemy 

should supply it with weapons, and so it staged a number of raids and 

pilferages on military and police facilities to acquire arms. For instance, 

the group robbed 500 modern weapons and 50,000 rounds of ammunition from the Pannala army camp, and in a 1989 raid on the Tissamaharama police station, it was able to acquire the entire armory of 

the station, consisting of fifty weapons and large amounts of ammunition.227 Additionally, in 1987, the group conducted successful raids for 

weapons on the General Sir John Kotalawala Defense Academy and the 

Katunayake air force base.228

Deception and infiltration figured prominently in these operations. 

In the raid on the Tissamaharama police station, JVP cadres dressed 

in army uniforms arrived at the station with two “JVP rebels” who they 

wanted to turn over to the police, and they proceeded to steal the arms 

and ammunition in the facility.229 In the Katunayake attack, some of 

the assailants wore air force uniforms, and deserters participated in 

this attack and in the Pannala raid.230 The benefit of having deserters 

in the JVP ranks was that they would have inside information on the 

military facility, the location of the armory, and any military procedures that were followed.231 In the case of the Pannala attack, the JVP 

was able to obtain inside information from the camp cook regarding 

the number of personnel in the camp and information on the deployment and number of security vehicles on nearby roads from a petrol 

shed owner living near the camp.232

In addition, in late 1987 and 1988, the group is believed to have 

acquired land mine technology and training from the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), whose relations with the 

IPKF were always strained.233 Finally, in the late 1980s, the JVP also 

put effort into manufacturing an effective weapon known as a galkatas, 

which consisted of short pipes with a trigger device that could fire a 

cartridge over a short range.234
206

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Finances

There is no evidence that the JVP received foreign financial assistance.235 In its earlier incarnation, the group was able to raise funds 

during public meetings and rallies, and it also required every member 

to donate three to thirty percent of any earnings, depending on his or 

her level.236 Additionally, it carried out a number of bank robberies. For 

instance, in September 1970, it stole 65,000 rupees from a rural bank in 

Okkampitiya, and in February 1971, it was able to obtain 57,000 rupees 

through a bank clerk employed at the Bank of Ceylon.237 Similarly, to 

fund its second insurrection, the group collected money through membership fees and donations, as well as robberies staged by the DJV.238

ENDNOTES

1 A. C. Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989 (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Lake House Publishers, 1990), 13.

2 Ibid., 14.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., 25.

5 Ibid., 33.

6 S. V. D. Gamini Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971–1987 (New Delhi: Gyan 

Publishing House, 2008), 205–206.

7 Ibid., 206.

8 Ibid., 206–207

9 Ibid., 209

10 Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 281.

11 Ibid., 286.

12 Ibid., 283–285.

13 Rohan Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP (Kandy, Sri 

Lanka: Institute of Fundamental Studies, 1990), 44, 324.

14 C. A. Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89 (Colombo, 

Sri Lanka: Lake House Bookshop, 1991), 15–18.

15 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka: 1971–1987, 205–206.

16 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 44.

17 Ibid., 294.

18 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971–1987, 196.

19 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 58, 324.

20 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka: 1971–1987, 209.

21 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 324.

22 Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 308.

23 Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 306.

24 Mick Moore, “Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka,” Modern Asian 

Studies 27, no. 3 (1993): 622, fn. 81.

25 Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 17–19.
Chapter 6. JVP

207

26 Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 305.

27 Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 316.

28 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 221.

29 Ibid.

30 Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 145.

31 Ibid., 160.

32 Ibid., 194–195.

33 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 316.

34 Gananath Obeyesekere, “Some Comments on the Social Backgrounds of the April 1971 

Insurgency in Sri Lanka (Ceylon),” The Journal of Asian Studies 33, no. 3 (May 1974): 377.

35 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 11, 105.

36 Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 36

37 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 47.

38 Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 147.

39 Ibid.

40 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 46.

41 Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 159.

42 Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 160.

43 Ibid., 162.

44 Ibid., 163.

45 Ibid., 192.

46 Ibid., 212.

47 Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 46

48 Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 161.

49 Ibid., 265.

50 Ibid., 277.

51 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 48

52 Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 160.

53 Ibid., 227.

54 Ibid.

55 Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 322

56 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 55.

57 Ibid., 53.

58 Ibid., 56.

59 Ibid., 268.

60 Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 273–275.

61 Ibid., 236–237.

62 Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 312.

63 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 88.

64 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka: 1971–1987, 209

65 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 15, 141.

66 Michael Colin Cooke, Rebellion, Repression, and the Struggle for Justice in Sri Lanka: The Lionel Bopage Story (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Agahas Publishers, 2011), 229.

67 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 143.

68 Ibid., 152–155.

69 Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 28.
208

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

70 Ibid., 51–52.

71 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 143.

72 Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 2.

73 Ibid., 3–4.

74 S. V. D. Gamini Samaranayake, “Patterns of Political Violence and Responses of the Government of Sri Lanka,” Terrorism and Political Violence 11, no. 1 (1999), 188–189.

75 Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 4.

76 Ibid., 5.

77 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 345.

78 Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 71–72.

79 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka: 1971–1987, 272.

80 Ibid.

81 Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 75.

82 Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 42–43

83 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka: 1971–1987, 259.

84 Ibid., 257.

85 Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 84.

86 Ibid., 85.

87 Ibid., 88.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid., 89.

90 Ibid., 92.

91 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 260–261.

92 Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 93.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid., 96–97.

95 Ibid., 97.

96 Ibid., 103.

97 Ibid., 102.

98 Ibid., 103, 107.

99 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 291–292.

100 Ibid., 262.

101Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 307.

102Mick Moore, “Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka,” 629–630.

103Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 94.

104 Ibid., 268, 295.

105Moore, “Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka,” 631, fn. 101.

106Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 241–242.

107 Ibid., 242.

108 Ibid., 243–247.

109 Ibid., 243.

110 Ibid., 244.

111 Obeyesekere, “Some Comments on the Social Backgrounds of the April 1971 Insurgency 

in Sri Lanka (Ceylon),” 378–379.

112 Ibid., 378.

113 Ibid., 370–378.
Chapter 6. JVP

209

114 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka: 1971–1987, 198–204.

115 Moore, “Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka,” 627; Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 110–111.

116 Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 306.

117 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 61.

118Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 173.

119 Ibid., 172.

120Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 308.

121Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 175.

122Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 275, 283.

123 Ibid., 274, 285–286, 338.

124 Ibid., 270, 278, 281.

125Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 317.

126Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 275.

127 Ibid., 235.

128Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 276.

129Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 177–178.

130 Ibid., 177, 211.

131 Ibid., 211.

132 Ibid., 212, 275.

133Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 303.

134Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 312.

135Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 312.

136Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 293.

137Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 254.

138 Ibid., 251.

139 Ibid., 254–255.

140 Ibid., 255.

141 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 294.

142Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 256.

143Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 329.

144 Ibid., 334.

145Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 273.

146Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 329.

147 Moore, “Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka,” 637.

148 Ibid., 640.

149Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 273, 303.

150 Ibid.

151Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 278.

152 Ibid., 183.

153Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 269.

154Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 273.

155Moore, “Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka.”

156Cooke, Rebellion, Repression, and the Struggle for Justice in Sri Lanka: The Lionel Bopage Story, 

84.

157 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka: 1971–1987, 195.
210

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

158Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 57, 62–63, 214, 217.

159Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 19.

160 Ibid.

161 Ibid., 20.

162 Ibid.

163Cooke, Rebellion, Repression, and the Struggle for Justice in Sri Lanka: The Lionel Bopage Story, 

84.

164 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka: 1971–1987, 195–196.

165 Ibid.

166Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 32.

167 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka: 1971–1987, 196.

168Cooke, Rebellion, Repression, and the Struggle for Justice in Sri Lanka: The Lionel Bopage Story, 

86–87.

169Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 61.

170Cooke, Rebellion, Repression, and the Struggle for Justice in Sri Lanka: The Lionel Bopage Story, 

87.

171 Ibid., 90.

172Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 30.

173Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 32.

174 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971–1987, 195.

175Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 43–44.

176Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 52.

177Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 44.

178 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 62.

179Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 32–33.

180 Ibid., 286.

181Cooke, Rebellion, Repression, and the Struggle for Justice in Sri Lanka: The Lionel Bopage Story, 

127.

182Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 271.

183 Ibid., 192.

184 Ibid., 50.

185 Ibid.

186Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 176.

187Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 283.

188 Ibid.

189Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 254.

190 Ibid., 247.

191 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 288–289.

192 Ibid.

193Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 235.

194 Ibid., 236.

195 Ibid., 188.

196 Ibid., 285.

197Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 328.

198Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 285–286.

199 Ibid., 286.
Chapter 6. JVP

211

200Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 312.

201 Ibid., 311.

202Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 345–346.

203Ibid., 328.

204Ibid., 325.

205Ibid., 328.

206Moore, “Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka,” `640.

207Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 283–284.

208Ibid., 296.

209Ibid.

210 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 311.

211 Ibid., 82.

212Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 45.

213 Ibid., 50.

214 Ibid.

215Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 144.

216 Ibid., 143.

217 Ibid., 169.

218 Ibid., 8.

219 Ibid., 22.

220Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 82.

221Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 82.

222Ibid., 317.

223Ibid., 5.

224 Ibid., 112.

225Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 55–62.

226Ibid., 63.

227Ibid., 309.

228Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 270.

229Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 310.

230Ibid., 310–311.

231 Ibid., 311.

232Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 229.

233Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89, 141, 266.

234Alles, The JVP, 1969–1989, 309.

235Ibid., 39.

236Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka: 1971–1987, 212.

237 Ibid., 213.

238Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 350.

CHAPTER 7.

LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM 

(LTTE)

Chapter 7. LTTE

215

TIMELINE

1948 Ceylon independence from British rule is established by 

cooperation of Sinhalese and Tamil elites.

1956 Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) wins national election 

on the basis of “Sinhalese Only” platform.

Sinhala Only Act of 1956 sparked the first anti-Tamil riots.

1958 Riots and protests against proposals of Tamil self-rule.

1961 Sri Lankan army is stationed in northeast Sri Lanka to 

suppress peaceful Tamil protests against discrimination.

1972 Anti-Tamil policies are formally incorporated into the 

constitution.

The Tamil New Tigers (TNT) are established in 1972.

January 1974 Police attacked the Fourth International Tamil Conference in Jaffna, killing eleven Tamils.

1976 LTTE is formed from the TNT under Velupillai 

Prabhakaran.

1981 Burning of the Jaffna Library, which housed 90,000 Tamil 

books and manuscripts.

July 1983 LTTE ambush a Sri Lankan army convoy, killing thirteen 

soldiers and sparking riots that kill 2,500 Tamils.

1987 LTTE employs first noted suicide bombing of a 

Sri Lankan army camp followed by conventional tactics.

July 1987 India and the Sri Lankan government sign the IndoLanka Peace Accord; India deploys military forces to 

Sri Lanka.

March 1990 India withdraws forces from Sri Lanka.

May 1991 LTTE employs a suicide bomber to assassinate Indian 

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

May 1993 LTTE employs a female Black Tiger to assassinate 

Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa.

October 

1997

LTTE is placed on the US State Department list of foreign 

terrorist organizations.

2002 Norway brokers cease-fire agreement between LTTE and 

the Sri Lankan government.

2004 A tsunami hits Sri Lanka and causes 40,000 deaths.

March 2004 Colonel Karuna splits LTTE Eastern command away from 

Prabhakaran-led Northern command.

2005 The Sri Lankan government incorporates a national military draft system that substantially increases the size of 

the Sri Lankan army.

May 2005 LTTE assassinates Sri Lankan government Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar.
216

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

November 

2005

Anti-LTTE hard-liner Mahinda Rajapaksa wins national 

elections.

2006 Colonel Karuna founds the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal

(TMVP) in opposition to the LTTE.

The Sri Lankan government begins a military campaign 

against LTTE and the Tamil population with support of 

anti-LTTE Tamils (including the TMVP).

2007 LTTE Air Tiger attack against the Colombo airport.

July 2007 The Sri Lankan army controls Eastern Sri Lanka.

December 

2007

The US government suspends military aid to Sri Lanka 

because of the Sri Lankan government’s human rights 

violations.

January 

2008

The Sri Lankan government formally withdraws from the 

cease-fire and Norwegian monitors depart Sri Lanka.

2009 250,000 civilians are displaced because of fighting in 

northern Sri Lanka.

May 2009 The Sri Lankan government claims victory over LTTE 

after a large military operation.

Figure 7-1. The flag of Tamil Eelam.a

ORIGINS OF THE LTTE AND THE TAMIL MILITANT 

MOVEMENT

The first stirrings of ethnic mobilization of Tamil militants occurred 

in 1961 after the suppression of a nonviolent Gandhian civil disobedience movement led by the Tamil Federal Party. An underground group, 

a The only substantial difference between the LTTE emblem and the Tamil Eelam 

flag is that the latter omits the letters inscribing LTTE’s name.
Chapter 7. LTTE

217

Pulip Padai (the Army of the Tigers), formed in August 1961, and its 

members pledged to fight for a Tamil homeland.1

 By the mid-1960s, 

elements of the Tamil population, and in particular the youth, became 

frustrated with the parliamentarianism and nonviolent methods of the 

Federal Party and the Tamil Congress, and the idea of secession gained 

a wider audience during this period.2 Tamil youth began to mobilize 

within the Tamil IIainar Iyakkam (Tamil Youth Movement), the youth 

wing of the Federal Party and within the Tamil Manavar Peravai (Tamil 

Students’ Union).3

At the age of seventeen, Velupillai Prabhakaran joined the Tamil 

Manavar Peravai, and in 1975 he was one of the key members of a breakaway faction known as the Tamil New Tigers, which renamed itself the 

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in May 1976. Numerous other groups 

emerged around this time, and an important one that was founded in 

1975 was the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO). Up until 

1983, it was second to the LTTE in terms of membership and military 

strength.4 In the mid-1970s, Tamil militants drew inspiration from the 

demonstration effect of the 1971 JVP insurrection, which caught the 

government by surprise, and from the creation of Bangladesh in that 

same year.5

Several other important militant groups emerged at this time. The 

Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS) was formed in 

London in 1975 and was placed on a Marxist-Leninist foundation by 

A. R. Arudpragasam, an engineer who had earned a master’s degree 

from the Patrice Lumumba People’s Friendship University in Moscow.6

The group developed a strong presence in the districts of Batticaloa and 

Ampara.7

 The Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) 

was formed in 1981 as a breakaway faction of EROS. Its military wing was 

the People’s Liberation Army, and the group had six regional leaders in 

Jaffna, Vavuniya, Mullaitivu/Kilinochchi, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, and 

Mannar.8

 Lastly, the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam 

(PLOTE) was formed by Uma Maheswaran, a former chairman of the 

central committee of the LTTE. Many high-caste vellalars left the LTTE 

to join PLOTE.

These groups were divided by differences of opinion regarding military tactics and important political issues, including whether “liberation” necessarily required a separate state or whether autonomy within 

Sri Lanka was sufficient; whether negotiations should be held with the 

Sri  Lankan state and, if so, what compromises were acceptable, and 

what sort of relationship should be maintained with the Indian central 

government.9

Although the LTTE did form the Eelam National Liberation Front 

(ENLF) with TELO, EPRLF, and EROS in April 1985 to form a united 
218

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

front before the Thimpu talks that year, during and after Eelam War I, 

the LTTE undertook operations against the other groups to establish its leadership of the Tamil militant movement. In late April and 

early May of 1986, the LTTE killed 150 TELO members, including Sri 

Sabaratnam, the leader, and in December it killed seventy to eighty 

EPRLF members.10,11,12 And during a meeting of the EPRLF central 

committee in Madras in June 1990, the LTTE eliminated EPRLF leader 

K. Padmanabha and fourteen others.b

 Additionally, after the departure 

of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), the group decimated the 

Civilian Volunteer Force (CVF) and the Tamil National Army (TNA), 

two militias set up by departing Indian troops and led by experienced 

military personnel from TELO, EPRLF, and the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF).14

Thus, by the time of the Indo-Lanka Accord and certainly after 

Indian troops left, the LTTE had established itself as the predominant 

Tamil militant organization spearheading the drive for independence.

COMPONENTS OF THE INSURGENCY

Command and Control

The LTTE mirrored the organizational structure of many separatist and revolutionary groups in that it was composed of two primary 

wings, one military and one political, where the latter was subservient 

to the former and known as the People’s Front of Liberation Tigers 

(PFLT).15 The Central Committee, the supreme leadership group, oversaw both wings (see Figure 7-2), and was led by LTTE leader Velupillai 

Prabhakaran, who also led the military wing. The military structure 

consisted of conventional and special forces, including ground forces 

(the Tigers), naval forces (the Sea Tigers), air forces (the Air Tigers), an 

elite conventional unit (the Charles Anthony Regiment), a commando 

unit often tasked with suicide missions (the Black Tigers), and an intelligence unit.16 Each of these units was led by a special commander, and 

there were also special commanders responsible for ordinance, military intelligence, military planning, and the women’s wing.17 By 1986, 

the military wing had established twenty-five military bases and numerous sub-bases in the north.18

b The operation to eliminate the leadership of the EPRLF was initiated by a directive 

from LTTE Chief of Intelligence Pottu Amman and Prabhakaran in February 1990. Initial 

reconnaissance was carried out by an LTTE cadre who joined an engineering technology 

institute near the apartment where the EPRLF leaders lived. An LTTE hit team arrived 

in Tamil Nadu on June 10, 1990, and they eliminated the EPRLF leadership after being 

informed that the EPRLF leaders were holding a meeting in the apartment.13
Chapter 7. LTTE

219

Geographically, the LTTE assigned a regional commander accountable to Prabhakaran to each of the eight districts in the north and east, 

and personnel within these eight regional commands constituted the 

political and military wings of the organization.19, c While Prabhakaran 

held absolute authority within the LTTE, field commanders may have 

had a role in planning tactical operations and formulating strategy.21

Additionally, once operations were completed, regional commanders 

reported the outcome to a superior officerd or to Prabhakaran himself.23

The LTTE’s global network was overseen by an international secretariat, with responsibility for publicity and propaganda, arms procurement and shipping, and legal and illegal (e.g., via extortion) 

fundraising.24 Additionally, before the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 

1991, the group maintained fourteen divisions in India, including those 

focused on intelligence, communication, shipping, propaganda, arms 

production, purchase of explosives, and political work.25 The LTTE 

also established an extensive civil administration that managed a wide 

array of political, legal, economic, and social organizations, including 

a police force, law courts, postal services, banks, administrative offices, 

and a television and broadcasting station.26

LTTE Central Committee

Velupillai Prabhakaran

Military

Velupillai Prabhakaran

Conventional

Forces

Foreign

Cells

Tigers Sea

Tigers

Air

Tigers

Black

Tigers

Civil

Administration

Special

Forces

Peoples Front of

Liberation Tigers (PFLT)

International

Secretariat

Figure 7-2. LTTE organization.e

c In an analysis of the group up to the late 1980s (before the group developed conventional units), Samaranayake noted that below the regional commands were local councils and individual cells.20

d Sahadevan and DeVotta noted that although personnel who showed exemplary 

bravery in combat were rewarded with higher command responsibilities, they were not 

promoted to higher ranks. This policy was instituted in the interest of promoting an egalitarian military structure and culture.22

e Adapted from various sources.
220

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Underground

In the mid-1970s, the LTTE started out as a clandestine underground organization focused on urban guerrilla warfare in the north, 

with the key target being the state’s intelligence network deployed 

against the emerging Tamil militant movements.27 It had four full-time 

members in 1974, and its growth over the next few years was rather 

limited; by the July 1983 riots, its total membership was approximately 

thirty individuals.28,29 Although by Eelam War III the group had managed to develop conventional formations that inflicted notable defeats 

on government forces, it still maintained underground cells that caused 

significant concerns for Sri  Lankan defense planners. Urban terrorist operations such as the January  1996 attack on the Central Bank 

in Colombo, which killed ninety and injured 1,400, the October 1997 

attack on the World Trade Center in the capital, and attacks on prominent political and military leaders forced the government to withdraw 

troops from the frontline and station them in Colombo, thereby relieving pressure in the war zone.30,31

The underground had success in eliminating prominent military 

officials, often through suicide operations. In March 1991, an LTTE 

suicide bomber rammed a vehicle into the car that contained the Minster of State for Defense Ranjan Wijeratne. The minister, the architect 

of the unconventional campaign that decimated the JVP in the late 

1980s, was killed, along with eighteen others. Later in June, the group 

managed to destroy the headquarters of the Joint Operations Command, which functioned as the nerve center of the Sri Lankan security 

forces, killing eleven service personnel.32

Often the underground would perform dry runs or mount surveillance on targets before actual operations. For instance, before the 

assassination of Chief of the Navy Clancy Fernando, an LTTE team 

had spent more than a month monitoring Admiral Fernando’s movements.33 Additionally, before an October 1995 LTTE attack on oil storage facilities outside of Colombo, the LTTE had conducted extensive 

reconnaissance on the facilities and constructed models and rehearsed 

the attack. Additionally, a Black Tiger suicide squad, operating from 

a safe house in Colombo, had also conducted reconnaissance on the 

facility before the operation.34

At times the underground benefited from the assistance of sympathizers. For instance, in November  1997, two sympathizers used 

magnetic explosive devices to cause damage to two diesel tanks at the 

Kelanitissa power station in Orugodawatte.35 Sympathizers posed particularly difficult challenges to Sri Lankan security officials, as there 
Chapter 7. LTTE

221

were often no photographs of them or record of them having joined 

the LTTE. Only their LTTE handlers were aware of their identities.36

The government had some success in penetrating and dismantling 

underground LTTE cells in Colombo. Beginning in 1990, covert teams 

from the Special Task Force and the Directorate of Military Intelligence had targeted LTTE cells, and by 1995 sixty cells in Colombo were 

neutralized.37 Between 1995 and 1998, more than two dozen cells were 

neutralized, but the LTTE was still able to build operational, backup, 

and sleeper cells during this period, with operational cells managing 

accommodation, reconnaissance and transport and LTTE hit teams 

penetrating and attacking prominent political and military officials.38

By 2007, it was estimated that the underground maintained 150 Black 

Tiger suicide bombers in Colombo, and the extensiveness of the LTTE 

intelligence network in the capital was such that many members of 

Karuna’s faction, which defected in March  2004, preferred employment far afield in the construction sector in Qatar rather than risk 

their chances in Colombo.39

Auxiliary

The auxiliary component of the organization played a prominent 

role in weapons procurement. Before the mid-1980s, the LTTE had 

chartered vessels to ship arms into India and Sri Lanka.40 Around this 

time, though, it began to develop a merchant shipping network known 

as the “Sea Pigeons” with the help of a Bombay shipping magnate.41

This fleet eventually consisted of ten to twelve freighters with an average tonnage of 1,200 and equipped with advanced radar and communication technology.42 Although ninety-five percent of the time these 

vessels were used to transport legitimate commercial goods, including 

hardwood, tea, rice, cement, and fertilizer, on the rest of their voyages they carried explosives, arms, ammunition, and other war-related 

equipment.43 These ships often sailed under Panamanian, Honduran, 

and Liberian flags (colloquially known as “Pan-Ho-Lib”),44 and at times 

the legitimate commercial activities of these ships facilitated military 

objectives. For instance, after LTTE vessels were contracted to ship timber from Myanmar to Thailand, these contracts enabled the LTTE to 

build a relationship with the Myanmar military.45 By 1992, the LTTE 

had established a base in Twantay, a small town in the Irrawaddy delta 

south of Rangoon, which served as a trans-shipment point and communications facility before it was closed down in 1995.

This merchant shipping network was led by Tharmalingham 

Shanmugham (alias Kumaran Pathmanathan), who was known 

as “KP,” and his weapons procurement team was known as the 
222

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

“KP  Department.”46 These individuals received training in forgery, 

gun running, international freight and shipping, investing, and 

communication. Additionally, they were relatively easy to manage 

because most of them lacked a criminal record or were not involved in 

guerrilla or terrorist activity, and so overseas intelligence and security 

agencies typically did not have records of them.47

The LTTE also established front companies in Dhaka, Chittagong, 

Rangoon, and Kuala Lumpur to procure military equipment.48 The 

group also established communications hubs in Singapore and Hong 

Kong for its overseas weapons procurement and to manage cells in Thailand, Pakistan, and Myanmar.49,50 In addition, the group established a 

number of front organizations in South Africa, where there was a significant Tamil population.f

 Some of these organizations included the 

Tamil Federation of Gauteng, Dravidians for Peace and Justice (based 

in Gauteng), the Natal Tamil Federation, and the South African Tamil 

Federation.52 Hard-liners within the African National Congress viewed 

the LTTE as a liberation movement,53 yet Smith noted that there is no 

evidence that the LTTE exploited the market for illegal weapons in 

South Africa.54

Armed Component

LTTE Ground Forces: The Tigers

The LTTE evolved significantly over its lifetime. It largely waged 

a guerrilla campaign during Eelam Wars I and II,55 and it eventually 

became a regular uniformed army with conventional warfighting capabilities complemented by special forces with guerilla warfare capabilities.56 The army was composed of four brigades known as padaipirivu, 

which each consisted of 1,200 personnel.57 These were the Charles 

Anthony padaipirivu, the Jeyanthan padaipirivu, the Vithusha padaipirivu, and the Leopards padaipirivu. The Charles Anthony padaipirivu was the first conventional unit established by the LTTE, in the 

early 1990s.58 The Jeyanthan padaipirivu was established in 1993, and 

it undertook both conventional and guerilla attacks. The Vithusha 

padaipirivu was the women’s wing of the army, and it consisted of three 

sub-brigades, female members of the Sea Tigers, and members within 

the Black Tigers. Two of the sub-brigades were regular fighting units, 

and the other was the LTTE’s main artillery unit. The Leopards were 

regarded as the fiercest unit within the LTTE, and this unit was composed of experienced personnel from other units and orphaned youths 

provided with extensive military training.59

f Most of this population, however, consisted of Tamils from India.51
Chapter 7. LTTE

223

By the late 1990s, the LTTE was able to inflict conventional defeats 

on government forces. In July 1996, it killed more than 1,200 government troops when it overran the Mullaitivu army camp, and in September  1998 it killed 1,700 soldiers in an assault in Kilinochchi.60 It 

followed up these victories in November 1999 when it launched Operation Unceasing Waves III, during which it captured nine army camps 

in five days, as well as all of the territory the Sri Lankan army had won 

during the previous nineteen months.61 And in April 2000, it captured 

the strategic Elephant Pass military base, located in territory that connects the Jaffna peninsula to the rest of the island. Only the small size 

of its forces prevented the LTTE from taking the rest of the peninsula.62

LTTE Naval Forces: The Sea Tigers

Early in the First Eelam War, the LTTE recognized that its success 

depended on the creation of a naval capability to carry out and protect 

the flow of manpower and equipment to strongholds. The Sea Tigers 

were formed in 1984,63 and initially this unit used fast dinghies and fishing boats equipped with small arms and grenades, primarily to transport men and materiel between Tamil Nadu and the Jaffna peninsula.64

As the military moved its forces into the central and north-central 

regions, severing the LTTE’s freedom of ground movement between the 

north and east sectors, use and control of the seas became an essential 

lifeline of the LTTE. Sea Tiger equipment eventually included attack, 

high-speed, logistics, and suicide craft; mini-submarines, submersibles, 

and scuba-diving equipment; and GPS and satellite communications 

systems.65 Reportedly, some Sea Tiger members received glider, microlight, and speedboat training in Europe and Southeast Asia.g

 Sea Tiger 

tactics included not only ship-to-ship attacks using onboard arms but 

also suicide ramming attacks by fast boats laden with explosives.

The Sea Tigers were tactically important in several different ways. 

By 1991–1992, they posed a threat to Sri Lankan forces stationed in 

the north by disrupting their sea-based supply lines, and in important 

campaigns they served as a deterrent against the landing of Sri Lankan 

forces.67 They also transported LTTE forces between the north and east, 

which assumed greater importance whenever government troops occupied land between these two regions.68 Additionally, through 2006, the 

Sea Tigers were able to conduct operations off both the west and east 

coasts to deny the Sri Lankan navy the ability to supply High Security 

g Chalk reports that LTTE fighters have received glider, micro-light, and speedboat 

training in Europe and Southeast Asia.66
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Zonesh in the north of the Jaffna peninsula, which impacted the government’s ability to undertake operations in the peninsula.70

Gunaratna noted that the Sea Tigers maintained twelve divisions, 

including sea battle regiments, an underwater demolition team, the 

Sea Tiger strike group, a radar and telecommunications unit, a political, finance and propaganda section, and an intelligence section.71

Some of the major operations of the Sea Tigers included a successful 

May 1995 attack on the island of Mandathivu, off the Jaffna peninsula, 

and in 1996 they played an important role in attacking a coastal army 

base in Mullaitivu.72

LTTE Air Forces: The Air Tigers

The LTTE’s air capability was a relatively late addition to the group’s 

military arsenal. The Air Tigers unit was founded by Colonel Shankar, 

who worked as an aeronautical engineer with Air Canada.73 In 2002, 

the group acquired an airstrip south of its main base in Kilinochchi, 

and in January 2005, two light aircraft were spotted by a military drone 

at the airstrip.74 It is believed that LTTE pilots were trained at flying 

clubs in France and the United Kingdom.

The Air Tigers conducted their first bombing raid on the Sri Lankan 

air force’s main base, Katunayake Air Base, in March  2007, killing 

three personnel and damaging two helicopters. The next month they 

conducted their second air operation by bombing an army engineering 

unit in northern Sri Lanka, and in October 2007, the LTTE undertook 

a coordinated air and ground assault at the air force base in Anuradhapura, managing to destroy eight government aircraft. To counter the 

Air Tigers, the government purchased new MiG-29 combat aircraft and 

Mi-24 helicopter gunships from Russia.75

LTTE Special Forces: The Black Tigers

Especially gifted fighters were selected for membership in the Black 

Tigers, believed to date back to 1987. This special unit was tasked with 

the most difficult missions—including suicide bombings and assassinations.76 Reportedly, the members of the Black Tigers—who were 

handpicked by Prabhakaran—were held in almost mythical esteem by 

the other LTTE fighters.77 Although some analysts have theorized that 

groups are more likely to use suicide missions during periods when 

insurgent tactics were deemed to be less effective, the LTTE’s use of 

the Black Tigers did not appear to conform to this model.78 Instead, the 

h High Security Zones were set up around strategic military installations to afford 

them greater protection. There were eighteen High Security Zones in the Jaffna 

peninsula.69
Chapter 7. LTTE

225

Black Tigers were employed as part of the overall insurgency strategy 

once the LTTE became the dominant Tamil opposition force.79 Indeed, 

their first suicide attack with a truck bomb was used as a breaching 

action for a much larger operation, allowing LTTE regular forces to 

storm the target site (a Sri Lanka army camp) to halt an impending 

army offensive.80,i

LTTE Personnel Totals

The number of members within the LTTE fluctuated somewhat 

during the course of the conflict. Starting with less than five members 

in 1974, it had about thirty-three members just before the July 1983 

riots, after which it expanded rapidly, reaching 2,500 in 1986.81 It suffered combat losses in fighting with the IPKF, and in 1989 its strength 

was estimated at 1,500.82 By 1990, this figure had increased to 4,000, 

reaching 14,000 in 1997 and 20,000 in 2003.83,84

Public Component

As previously noted, the public component was known as the People’s 

Front of Liberation Tigers (PFLT). The PFLT appears to have emerged 

sometime after 1990,85 although in July 1992 it was abandoned for a 

time by Prabhakaran, who wanted to redeploy PFLT cadres for military 

actions.86 The leader of the PFLT was appointed by Prabhakaran, 

and this wing assumed a decidedly subordinate role to the military 

wing.87 Whereas the military wing oversaw policing, recruitment, 

finance, intelligence gathering, and special operations, the political 

wing was responsible for propaganda and oversaw the various aspects 

of the LTTE’s civil administration.88,89 As described more fully within 

the Legitimacy section, this civil administration took an active role in 

economic development, education, health care, and the judicial and 

legal system of the territory under LTTE supervision.

LEADERSHIP

The founder and only leader of the LTTE was Velupillai Prabhakaran 

(see Figure  7-3), an elusive personality about whom little accurate 

information is known. It is believed that Prabhakaran, born in 1954, 

was a member of the karaiyar caste from Valvettiturai. He is the son of 

i Hopgood provides evidence that this attack might not have been one of intentional 

suicide, and indeed that the incorporation of suicide attacks and the existence of the elite 

Black Tigers might have been constructed after the attack to enhance the LTTE’s reputation. Another LTTE fighter launched a similar attack shortly after this initial bombing but 

was able to flee the scene before the bomb exploded.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

a district land commissioner and he was the youngest of four children, 

although none of his siblings are known to have joined the LTTE. 

Although his family background suggests that he would have had more 

extensive opportunities for education than the average rural Tamil, 

Prabhakaran completed just seven  years of schooling. Prabhakaran 

is said to have joined the Tamil Manavar Peravai in 1972 during the 

standardization debate.j

 A faction broke away in 1975 to found the 

Tamil New Tigers, the precursor to the LTTE. He married in 1984 and 

had three children. In one description, Prabhakaran is characterized as

a traditional Tamil hero-ascetic: fiercely faithful, practicing and exacting strict discipline by shunning alcohol, tobacco, stimulants and forbidding his men to 

have extra- or pre-marital affairs, norms of conduct 

which are based on and justified with traditional and 

Hindu classics.90

In 1993, an interviewer further described Prabhakaran as follows:

He is 37, on the small side, and a bit overweight. With 

his black hair and moustache and large eyes, he looks 

a little like the hero that turns up regularly in Tamil 

films. He dresses in army fatigues, and carries a gun. 

Around his neck is a black cord at the end of which is 

a capsule, presumably containing the cyanide which 

Tigers are supposed to swallow rather than be taken 

prisoner.

His house—at least, the house where he gave his 

interview—is small and modern, and a bit of a drive 

from the town of Jaffna. There are maps on the walls, 

but no radio or television or books, although Mr. 

Prabhakaran appears well informed about affairs 

outside Sri  Lanka, especially wars, in Afghanistan, 

or in Indochina. Much of the talk was over dinner: 

noodles and a soft drink. Mr. Prabhakaran’s portliness 

does not seem to arise from over-eating. He appears to 

speak only Tamil.91

Still, Prabhakaran was not believed to be either strongly religious 

or staunchly ideological.k

 Yet, insofar as strong leadership was a critical 

j For more information regarding the policy of “standardization” with respect to university admission, see the section Tamil and Sinhalese Economic Concerns in Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions.

k Narayan characterized Prabhakaran as “quietly pious” and “disinterest[ed] in Marxist politics and ideology.”92
Chapter 7. LTTE

227

aspect of the Tamil struggle, he allowed a Stalin- or Mao-like personality cult to develop around him.

Figure 7-3. Velupillai Prabhakaran.

The only significant challenge to Prabhakaran’s leadership may 

have occurred in the latter half of the 1970s. Reportedly, in 1977, when 

Uma Maheswaran—a member of the vellalars caste and a universityeducated surveyor—joined the movement, Prabhakaran “turned the 

leadership over to him”93 or at least shared some aspects of authority. In 

1979–1980, Prabhakaran purportedly sought to regain sole authority 

but was denied. Unwilling to concede, the two contenders for power are 

said to have engaged in a shoot-out in the south Indian city of Madras, 

for which Prabhakaran was arrested by Indian police. Allegedly with 

the aid of Indian Premier Indira Gandhi, Prabhakaran was released 

and returned to Sri Lanka, where he reconsolidated his authority and 

secured the expulsion of Maheswaran “for disciplinary reasons.”94,l

Prabhakaran’s one-time second in command was Sathasivam Krishnakumar, also known as Kittu, a member of the vellalars caste from Valvettiturai. Kittu became involved in the Tamil movement as a volunteer 

helper engaged in Tamil relief efforts after the 1977 riots. In 1978, he 

joined the LTTE and worked on an LTTE farm for five years, but he 

also received military training in both Sri Lanka and India. He rose to 

second in command in Jaffna in 1983 and then to commander in Jaffna 

in 1984. After recovering from injuries suffered in 1987, Kittu became 

the LTTE spokesman in London.95

l Subsequently, Maheswaran went on to establish the rival PLOTE.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Mahathiya, a deputy leader of the LTTE after 1986, was, like the 

LTTE founder, a member of the karaiyar caste from Valvettiturai. 

Indeed, Mahathiya may have been a childhood acquaintance of Prabhakaran and was said to have been a classmate of Kittu. In 1977, Mahathiya left school and joined the Tamil movement.96 Yogaratnam Yogi, 

one-time commander of Jaffna, was reportedly a member of the karaiyar caste from Kondavil.97 Lawrence Thilakar, an LTTE spokesman in 

Paris, was member of the karaiyar caste from the city of Jaffna.98

IDEOLOGY

Tamil nationalism and socialism were the twin pillars underpinning 

the ideology of the LTTE, but the former assumed a clear precedence 

over the latter, as for the LTTE the primary contradiction in Sri Lanka 

was nationalism rather than capitalism.99 Furthermore, its conception 

of socialism also contained an important ethnocentric component that 

rejected Western culture and elevated traditional Tamil culture, as suggested by the following passage in an LTTE publication:

If a national race loves its history, filled with greatness 

and its language and culture, its traditions and ancient 

customs, that, we call patriotism. One who discards 

this progressive patriotism, this love of the nation and 

calls for cosmopolitanism, is not a true socialist. People like that are bourgeois cosmopolitans.100

In this regard, the notion of a traditional Tamil homeland was 

inextricably linked to the LTTE’s ideology, and the importance of this 

homeland to a resolution of the conflict was expressed by the following 

statement issued by an LTTE official to a representative of the Tamil 

Nadu state government:

This “homeland” is a clearly identifiable, contiguous, 

single region composed of the Northern and Eastern 

provinces. This region is the historically constituted 

homeland of the Tamil speaking people and therefore 

indivisible. The recognition of the territorial integrity 

of the region as the “homeland” of the Tamil is cardinal to any meaningful lasting solutions to the Tamil 

national question.101

The LTTE regarded the Jaffna kingdom that flourished in Jaffna 

before it was conquered by the Portuguese as a golden era in Tamil 
Chapter 7. LTTE

229

history,m and the ethnic conflict was in part the fault of the British, who 

conjoined Tamils with the Sinhalese when they unified the administrative system of the island in 1833. Additionally, the LTTE viewed Ceylonese independence as a farce, with the British transferring power to an 

anglicized Sinhalese national bourgeoisie.104 Furthermore, the group 

regarded itself as the true ideological heir of Tamil politician S. J. V. 

Chelvanayakam, whom they referred to as Tantai Selva, or “Father 

Selva.”105 Chelvanayakam spent much of his political career seeking to 

establish greater autonomy and rights for the Tamils (albeit nonviolently, and within a unified staten

).

Hellmann-Rajanayagam argued that the LTTE reserved its hostility primarily for the Sri Lankan government rather than the Sinhalese 

people, as the latter were viewed as having been duped by government 

propaganda into accepting racist and chauvinist ideology.106 Yet the 

LTTE seemed to believe that the Sinhalese since time immemorial 

have been brainwashed into hating Tamils, as indicated by the following passage in an LTTE publication:

Since 2500 years were the Sinhalese majority racists engaged in the destruction of the Tamil race in 

Ilankai. This hatred lies deep in their hearts till today. 

Every Sinhalese is fed hatred for the Tamil race with 

his mother’s milk.107

Hence, because the LTTE viewed the Sinhalese public as unwitting 

dupes conditioned to feel hatred for Tamils, the group saw no possibility for collaborating with left-wing Sinhalese groups such as the JVP, 

owing to the ingrained ethnic hatred of the Sinhalese.108

In contrast, the ideological predilections of some of the other Tamil 

groups did permit cross-ethnic cooperation with left-wing Sinhalese 

groups. The EPRLF emphasized Marxism-Leninism rather than ethnonationalism, and the relative unimportance of Tamil history and culture was captured by the following passage in one of their publications: 

“We do not deceive you with talk about our ancient greatness.”109 The 

EPRLF viewed its struggle as one in support of all suppressed peoples 

struggling against imperialism, neocolonialism, and fascism, and so 

members were open to cooperating with the Sinhalese working class, 

whom they viewed as equally oppressed and exploited as the Tamils.110

m Samaranayake102 notes that the LTTE also appropriated the notion of a glorious 

Chola kingdom, as there is compelling evidence that the Jaffna kingdom did not extend to 

the Eastern Province, and the territorial limits of the Chola Empire remained vague. The 

Cholas were a south Indian-based dynasty that invaded Ceylon on multiple occasions, and 

indeed the LTTE’s tiger emblem was inspired by the royal emblem of the Chola Empire.103

n However, by the early 1970s, a few years before his death, his outlook had changed 

and he supported an independent Tamil state.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Hence, the group advocated close links with the Communist Party and 

the Nava Sama Samaja Pakshaya (New Social Equality Party, or NSSP).111

Reportedly, the group also had links with the JVP, as Gunaratna noted 

that JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera had visited an EPRLF training camp 

in Madurai in south India.112 Wijeweera also had a strong relationship 

with Uma Maheswaran, one-time leader of PLOTE, and the relationship between the JVP and PLOTE involved the transfer of explosives, 

weapons, and land mine technology.113,114

Regarding the political and economic organization of Tamil society, Prabhakaran was opposed to a multiparty parliamentary system 

and seemed instead to support a benevolent dictatorship under his 

rule.115 In an interview in 1986, he stated:

The government of independent Eelam will be a socialist government; there will be only one party supported 

by the people; I do not want a multi-party democracy. Under a one-party government Tamil Eelam can 

develop and change faster. In a socialist constitution 

the needs of the people will have a priority.116

The LTTE was also suspicious of a free-market economic system. 

Uyangoda noted that during the Norwegian-led peace process beginning in 2002, the group appeared to view the spread of market forces in 

Tamil areas as a threat to its state-building project, with the potential to 

undermine the regional administration that the group established in 

the territory under its control.117 Hence, it favored a state-led economic 

development process in which the market was subject to strict regulation and control.

LEGITIMACY

The LTTE derived considerable legitimacy from its military achievements, its provision of social services to Tamil populations, and the 

merits of its appeals for Tamil autonomy. The LTTE’s string of successes against the numerically superior Sri Lankan army, as well as its 

consolidation of power after years of intra-Tamil violence, contributed 

significantly to its popularity locally and within expatriate populations.118 The group’s extensive networking with other revolutionary and 

secessionist movements not only provided the group with training in 

new techniques but also ensured that the Tamil struggle was included 

in popular transnational narratives of self-determination and minority rights.119 The perceived commitment of the group and the dedication of Tamils more generally and LTTE fighters specifically was highly 
Chapter 7. LTTE

231

coveted by Sinhalese commentators, who blamed their own continued 

military failure on a lack of Sinhalese cohesiveness.

The group’s state-building activities in the Tamil regions of 

Sri Lanka were a significant source of legitimacy. Very little state building occurred in rebel-held areas during Eelam War I. The central government still handled the administration of justice and the provision of 

security, and while the political wing did maintain a planning division 

before 1987, it accomplished very little.120

State-building efforts took on added importance after the withdrawal of Indian peacekeeping troops in 1990. One of the first components of the emerging civil administration was the Tamil Eelam 

Economic Development Organization (TEEDO), whose purpose was 

to assess damage to rebel areas and coordinate rebuilding efforts.121 In 

1994, TEEDO established several commissions that consisted of civil 

servants, civil society actors, and university personnel who provided 

assessments on reconstruction for different sectors. As these commissions began to focus on specific sectors, they became the precursors of 

various agencies within the LTTE civil administration, which eventually included ministries for health, education, finance, justice, protection (police), and economic development.122

The provision of justice began with the establishment of village 

mediation boards (inakka saphai) in the 1980s, and in the 1990s the 

group proceeded to establish a more extensive legal and judicial system in the territory under its control. It set up a law college capable of 

training 300 lawyers a year, and by 1992 a system of courts was established throughout rebel territory. The Tamil Eelam Penal Code was 

enacted in 1994, which incorporated elements of the British-inspired 

Sri Lankan Penal Code as well as LTTE interpretations of thesavalamai, 

or Tamil cultural norms (which were codified by the Dutch) that regulated marriage, inheritance, and other civil matters.123 Interestingly, 

the LTTE excluded elements of this code that went against its social 

agenda, such as regulations on caste and dowries.o

The LTTE made efforts to ensure that legal services were accessible 

to the population. It provided free legal advice to the poor, and it set 

a fee of twenty dollars to cover the cost of a court-appointed lawyer.125

In areas of the northeast controlled by the government, the rebel judicial system often had an uncertain relationship with the Sri Lankan 

legal system. In these border areas, residents could engage in legal 

arbitrage by choosing which legal system offered them the most advantages, and residents sometimes noted that LTTE supporters would use 

o Additionally, the LTTE interpreted the Thesavalamai Code as permitting land 

transfers only to relatives or members of the local community, which significantly 

restricted land transfers to Sinhalese and Muslims in Tamil-dominant areas.124
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

the group’s court system to overturn judgments made against them in 

official courts.126

The judicial system also featured land courts, which assessed 

property values in consultation with property owners.127 These courts 

thereby facilitated the imposition of property taxes, which provided an 

important revenue stream to the insurgent organization. The LTTE 

tax regime also included a number of other taxes, including taxes on 

manufacturers and service providers, who were taxed a percentage of 

their monthly income, as well as taxes on farmers and fishers, who paid 

in cash or in kind.128 The LTTE also collected taxes in the form of custom fees on goods brought into LTTE territory, as well as through taxes 

on vehicle registration and property transactions.129

The Tamil Eelam police force was formed in 1991 by a retired 

officer from the Sri Lankan police force, and its headquarters was in 

Kilinochchi, with local police stations scattered throughout LTTE territory.130 At one point, the force grew to approximately 3,000 officers, 

and it attained a high level of legitimacy among the Tamil population 

in LTTE territory, who viewed the force as lacking in corruption and as 

a stabilizing force in the region.131 The Tamil Eelam police reportedly 

had several wings, including those focused on traffic, crime prevention, crime detection, and administration, as well as an information 

bureau and a special force.132

In matters of health and education, the Sri  Lankan government 

still attempted to provide services to the Tamil population in LTTE 

territory, and so the relevant rebel ministries focused on regulating 

and supplementing government provision of health and educational 

services. In the case of health, the group played a largely advisory role, 

as it relied on international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 

such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and Médecins 

Sans Frontières, in addition to the Tamils Rehabilitation Organization 

(TRO), which provided a limited number of mobile health centers.133

The TRO was formed in 1985 to assist Tamil refugees in south India, 

and it mobilized resources among the diaspora to provide aid to waraffected populations in the north and east of Sri Lanka. The group has 

drawn concern regarding its autonomy from the LTTE.134

Given the traditional importance Tamil society placed on education, the LTTE worked with the central government to ensure the 

provision of education during the conflict. The LTTE established the 

Tamil Eelam Education Council (TEEC) to coordinate education in 

LTTE-controlled areas, and the TEEC encouraged the establishment 

of advisory committees composed of parents and educators to regulate 

and supplement the provision of education.135 This cooperation facilitated the continuity of the educational system even during wartime. 
Chapter 7. LTTE

233

For instance, before the 2002 cease-fire, 1,994 primary and secondary 

schools, with a total enrollment of 648,000, operated in the north and 

east.136 Yet this arrangement often led to unique challenges for teachers. In the east, teachers preferred to live in government-controlled 

Batticaloa and enter into rebel territory each day through a series 

of checkpoints.137

As has been described, both rebel and official agencies sought to 

provide public goods to the population residing in LTTE territory. 

Mampilly argued that both sides had little choice but to work with each 

other to provide such goods through a hybrid administrative system, 

given the history of strong state institutions that had penetrated deeply 

into Tamil society and had provided a substantial amount of public 

goods, such as food subsidies, health care, education, and subsidized 

transportation, to residents throughout the island.138 Rebel and government officials developed a working relationship under such circumstances. In LTTE territory, a district-level official called a porupalar

appointed by the LTTE worked with the government agentp (known as 

the district secretary beginning in 1997) to ensure that the government 

provision of public goods was in accordance with LTTE policy.139 Typically, government agents in rebel territories were ethnic Tamils who 

were acceptable to the LTTE and were sympathetic to the needs of the 

local population, and they usually had a positive working relationship 

with their LTTE counterparts.140

Effective provision of public goods suggests that the governing 

authority has a legitimate right to rule, so clearly each side would have 

preferred to have been the sole authority providing such goods to the 

Tamil population in the north and east. Nonetheless, each side benefited from this arrangement. The government continued to provide 

welfare services to residents in LTTE territory because it still wanted to 

maintain even a tenuous link to a population that it claimed to represent.q

 Its abdication of the provision of public goods may have led the 

LTTE to develop an even more extensive and capable civil administration, thereby bolstering its image as a Tamil government-in-waiting for 

the region.142 Additionally, beginning in 1977, the government became 

heavily reliant on external aid, and in the aftermath of the brutal 

p Recall that the appointment of a government agent to each district with responsibility for carrying out government policy was a holdover position that originated during the 

colonial era and was maintained in the post-independence period.

q It should be noted that some members of Kumaratunga’s government wanted to 

cut off all financial support to the regions under LTTE control. Also, while the government did continue to provide services to the north and east, it also imposed an economic 

embargo, covering more than sixty items, on the region once fighting resumed in 1990. 

The embargo had a significant impact on the provision of health care, and it continued 

until the cease-fire of 2002, only to be reintroduced once fighting restarted in 2006.141
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

repression of the JVP, donors did not want to be seen as financing a 

government tied to a significant humanitarian catastrophe.143 Hence, 

the government decided to continue to provide welfare benefits to the 

region to avoid this possibility, even while it engaged in a brutal campaign against the LTTE.

The LTTE also benefited from this arrangement, as it did not have 

to allocate a greater share of scarce resources to provide public goods, 

thus freeing up resources for combat activities. This arrangement also 

contributed to the tax base of the region under its control, as the government continued to pay the wages of government teachers, doctors, and 

other professionals in the health and education sectors in the region.144

The LTTE imposed a tax of twelve percent on government workers, so 

in effect, central government funds used to pay civil service personnel 

working in the north and east helped finance the organization.r

Mampilly argued that the LTTE sought to use the response to the 

December 2004 tsunami to upset this carefully crafted dependent relationship between the government and the insurgent organization, as the 

massive inflow of foreign aid to the afflicted Tamil region provided an 

opportunity for the group to wean itself off of a reliance on government 

funds to finance welfare spending in the north and east.146 Before the 

tsunami, in January 2004, the LTTE established a Planning and Development Secretariat (PDS) to coordinate the activities of NGOs that had 

increased their activities in the north and east after the 2002 cease-fire. 

The PDS sought to formulate an agenda for economic development for 

the north and east, and it required that NGOs register with them, submit plans for approval, and find a local partner, which the LTTE hoped 

would promote capacity building within the north and east.147

The PDS expanded after the disaster, opening district offices 

throughout LTTE territory to manage the influx of foreign aid agencies, and it was embraced by the World Bank, who sent representatives 

to meet with LTTE officials.148 Additionally, the LTTE insisted that all 

external aid destined for the north and east be remitted directly to 

the PDS, which the government adamantly opposed as it would have 

undermined the sovereign authority of the government to direct the 

reconstruction response.149 Additionally, direct control over external 

aid would have given the group access to a funding source that they 

could use to break their dependence on the state for the provision of 

public goods in the north and east.

r Mampilly noted that the government was aware that state funds were helping 

finance the LTTE through taxes on civil servants in the north and east, and it regarded 

this cost as a necessary price to pay to maintain a link to people living in insurgent 

territory.145
Chapter 7. LTTE

235

After the tsunami, the LTTE sought to ensure that it was viewed as 

the organization with the most effective aid response, and it appears as 

if the group was successful: evaluations of the post-2004 tsunami relief 

efforts were nearly universal in their praise for the LTTE-affiliated 

Tamils Rehabilitation Organization and almost as universal in their 

condemnation of the bungled government response to the disaster.150,s

This success had political ramifications, as it bolstered LTTE claims of 

being the sovereign political authority over the north and east, to the 

detriment of the Sri Lankan state.151

Finally, the organization’s use of female fighters also provided a 

source of legitimacy, especially considering the intensity with which 

patriarchal and caste-based structures restricted women’s freedom 

in Sri Lanka. Driven partly by demographic imperatives, notably the 

shortage of males eligible for recruitment, the LTTE’s employment of 

female fighters was also a tool in siphoning off support from rival Tamil 

groups that did not employ women and a direct response to women’s 

demands to be incorporated into the struggle.152

MOTIVATION AND BEHAVIOR

The motivation of the LTTE is summarized by the following open 

letter penned by Prabhakaran to then Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa after the enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act in 1979:

We wish to state clearly and emphatically that we are 

not a group of amateur armed adventurists roaming 

in the jungles with romantic illusions, nor are we a 

band of terrorists or vandals who kill and destroy at 

random for anarchic reasons...on the contrary, we are 

revolutionaries committed to revolutionary political 

practice . . . we are the armed vanguard of the struggling masses, the freedom fighters of the oppressed. 

We are not in any way isolated and alienated from the 

popular masses but immersed in and integrated with 

the popular will, the collective soul of our nation...in 

the deluded eyes of your government, our movement 

appears to be a spectre of terrorism and anarchy. In 

reality, who are the terrorists? We assert, and we hold 

that we are right in our assertion, that it is the State...

and those who poison the minds of the innocent 

s The cited report includes fifty-seven individual and group interviews with intergovernmental organization and NGO organizers, as well as indigenous civil and religious 

authorities.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Sinhala masses with racial fanaticism and chauvinism who are the real terrorists...we are fighting for 

a noble cause, the freedom of the oppressed nation. 

The revolutionary process towards national liberation 

and socialism will be long and arduous. Yet we are 

convinced that no force on earth, however repressive 

it may be, can stop the revolutionary struggle we are 

committed to. Long Live Tamil Eelam!153

With these words, Prabhakaran thereby sought to situate the movement within a broader context of a liberation movement similar to, say, 

the Palestinian Liberation Organization or the African National Congress, agitating for self-determination for an oppressed people.

Besides its overarching desire for Tamil Eelam, the LTTE also 

sought to upend Tamil society by seeking to orchestrate a social revolution that would abolish caste distinctions. One passage from the LTTE 

publication Socialist Tamil Eelam stated:

the nature and structure of economic organization 

underlying our social system is oppressive and based 

on social injustice . . . the LTTE is committed to the 

abolition of all forms of social oppression . . . the castesystem is another social evil that perpetuates inequality 

and inhumanity. It is an oppressive system inextricably 

linked to class-structure and based on exploitative economic practice...the LTTE is committed to the total 

eradication of the caste-system. The institution of an 

equalitarian socialist economy and the introduction of 

a revolutionary system of education will pave the way 

for the elimination of casteism.154

Although Samaranayake noted that the Tamil militant movement 

swept up all elements of Tamil society,155 there were some caste distinctions within the movement. Prabhakaran and many members of the 

LTTE came from the relatively lower-level karaiyar, or fisherman, caste, 

which may account for the virulent anti-caste orientation of the group,t

t Hellmann-Rajanayagam156 noted that while Prabhakaran had become a legend 

among Sri Lankan Tamils, many members of high castes maintained equivocal attitudes 

toward him, as they admired his military prowess but doubted his leadership qualities. 

Similarly, vellalars respect for the LTTE’s military capabilities mixed with doubts regarding 

the group’s fitness to rule, as demonstrated in the following passage: “The conservative 

Jaffna Tamils will not suffer mere teenagers with questionable political ideas and of questionable caste background lording it over them gladly: in Jaffna the high-caste, land-owning vellalars have dominated political life and intend to continue to do so. Yet the LTTE 

is the group with the widest-ranging caste mix. Thus, Jaffna Tamils might accept them as 

bodyguards, but not as their rulers. Their leaders will not willingly give up their dominant 

role to a youthful karaiyar, thought to be inferior to the vellalars.”157
Chapter 7. LTTE

237

while elite vellalars supported PLOTE. Bose noted that the LTTE placed 

importance on mobilizing youths from lower castes, those from rural 

backgrounds, and women.158

The social revolution that the LTTE sought to institute also had 

profound implications for women. Besides being forced by population 

pressures to incorporate women into fighting units, the LTTE regarded 

women as an oppressed segment of a very conservative Tamil society. 

One passage from the Socialist Tamil Eelam stated:

Tamil women . . . are subject to dual modes of oppression, national and social. Tamil women bore the brunt 

of national oppression and have suffered immensely 

at the hands of the State terrorists  .  .  .  at the same 

time, Tamil women are also victims of oppression 

emanating from their own social structure. The notorious dowry system and other forms of male-chauvinist 

domination that degrade women and deprive them of 

human dignity are typical features of our repressive 

social system...the LTTE assures that the dowry system 

will be legally proscribed, and that equality of status 

and opportunity for women will be constitutionally 

guaranteed . . . education will be made compulsory for 

all girls, and the practice of sexual division of labour 

will be abolished. Our organization will encourage the 

formation of a radical women’s movement to organize 

women on a national level and agitate for improvements in their condition.159

Although it was motivated by such strategic and ideological concerns, the LTTE was not averse to taking tactical actions to advance the 

material interests of the organization even if such actions did not promote the cause of Eelam in the near term. For instance, once Indian 

troops were deployed to Sri Lanka in July of 1987 as part of the IndoLanka Peace Accord, the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government both 

began to see IPKF troops rather than each other as greater threats to 

their immediate interests. This new perception of threat led the LTTE 

to form a temporary tactical alliance with the government and also 

led to the following curious statement by the LTTE deputy at the time, 

Mahattaya:

Sinhalese and we belong to this island  .  .  .  who are 

the Indians to come and dictate terms . . .? They are 

aggressors. After they finish with the Tamils, they will 

turn against the Sinhalese...public opinion  .  .  .  (in) 

Tamil Nadu, will demand this.160
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

As another example, Korf noted that the LTTE did not take action 

against Sinhalese settlers and farmers in the eastern town of Dehiwatte, 

who were encouraged to move into the area as part of a government 

settlement scheme. These Sinhalese farmers took action against an irrigation tank that negatively impacted local Tamil farmers, yet throughout the late 1990s the LTTE did not take any action against them since 

they were extracting taxes from both Sinhalese and Tamil farmers in 

the area.161 Although the desire for Eelam would have motivated the 

LTTE to clear the area of Sinhalese farmers and settlers, instead the 

group prioritized its immediate organizational and financial interests 

even though its inaction in this case did not further the goal for Eelam.

Lastly, Uyangoda noted that, as a result of a string of LTTE military victories over the Sri  Lankan government during 1999 to 2001, 

by the start of the 2002 peace process, the group had begun to see 

itself as a “regional state” of the “Tamil nation” or a “state in the making” rather than as a mere “non-state actor.”162 This new self-perception, 

which followed from a more equilibrated military balance of power, 

led the group to propose an expansive confederal solution to the conflict in the form of the proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA), which envisioned a coming together of two state entities 

within a confederation involving substantial self-rule, perhaps akin to 

the relationship between member countries of the European Union.163

In contrast, the Sri Lankan government envisioned a federalist solution whereby autonomy was granted by the state to the Tamil region, 

and with a dominant component of shared rule.164 After the inevitable 

breakdown of talks, some observers laid at least part of the blame on 

the Sri Lankan government and the international community for failing to recognize the LTTE’s bargaining position resulting from the 

new military balance of power.165

Cult of Martyrdom

Although by no means a religious movement, the LTTE actively 

propagated a “cult of martyrdom” to support recruitment.166 This 

incorporated the use of religious symbolism, but it was seldom of an 

explicitly Hindu variant. Much of the symbolism used Judeo-Christian 

terminology, including the idea of a “Zion” for the Tamil people and a 

sort of death and resurrection narrative that constructed the physical 

Eelam from the bodies of martyred fighters. Elements of mysticism and 

ceremony were present in the ritual dissemination of cyanide capsules 

to fighters, as well as in a “planting ceremony” that symbolically transferred a martyr’s impending death into an act of fertilizing the soil 

of the Eelam.167 LTTE leaders also substituted the word thadkodai (to 
Chapter 7. LTTE

239

give one’s self) for thadkolai (committing suicide) when discussing suicide missions and emphasized the role of such operations in hastening 

the establishment of a homeland that would spare Tamil civilians from 

the hardship of a more lengthy struggle.168 Some observers believe that 

the success of the Tiger’s suicide missions contributed to a culture that 

internalized this tactic as part and parcel of the Tamil nationalist movement, suggesting that suicide missions would have continued regardless of their efficacy or the environment of political accommodation.169

OPERATIONS

Paramilitary

LTTE operations can be roughly separated into four categories: 

conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, assassinations, and suicide 

bombings.170 As shown in Figure 7-4, overall the group overwhelmingly 

favored armed assaults and bombings.

Armed assault 

Bombing/explosion 

Assassination 

Unknown 

Hostage taking (kidnapping) 

Facility/infrastructure attack 

Hijacking 

Hostage taking (barricade incident) 

Unarmed assault 

Figure 7-4. LTTE attack types.

Geographically, as shown in Figure  7-5, the group had a strong 

presence in the north and east of the country, and at one point in 2000 

it controlled about seventy-six percent of the territory in the Northern 

and Eastern Provinces.171 However, its grip on the Eastern Province was 

weaker, and it effectively lost control of that area for good in 2004 with 

the defection of the forces of Colonel Karuna.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

0 10 20 Miles

0 10 20 KM

LTTE Influence

Strong Influence

Moderate Influence

Anuradhapura Trincomalee

Polonaruwa

Kurunegala Matale

Batticaloa

Ampara

Moneragala

Hambantota

Matara

Galle

Kalutara Ratnapura

Colombo

Gampaha Kegalle

Kandy

Nuwara

Eliya 

Badulla

Puttalam

Mannar

Vavuniya

Mullaitivu

Jaffna

Kilinochchi

Figure 7-5. LTTE influence map.

In general, LTTE conventional and guerrilla activities were focused 

on Tamil-dominant areas in the north and the east. LTTE assassinations and suicide bombings took place not only in the north and east 

but also in government-held areas in the south and west, especially 

the capital of Colombo. As shown in Figure 7-6, about half of the targets across all four attack categories were security personnel (military 
Chapter 7. LTTE

241

and police), and the group also heavily targeted private citizens and 

property.

Military 

Private citizens

and property 

Police 

Government

(general) 

Transportation 

Business 

Violent political

party 

Religious

gures/

institutions 

Utilities 

Maritime 

Terrorists 

Unknown 

Government

(diplomatic) 

Educational

institution 

Journalists

and media 

Other

Telecommunication

NGO

Food or water

supply

Airports

and airlines

Tourists

Figure 7-6. LTTE target types.

These assassinations and bombings were carefully selected and 

planned and were neither haphazard nor simply targets of opportunity. The overwhelming majority of LTTE assassinations targeted government officials; consequently, political officials and police became 

the group’s most predominant victims. Bomb attacks encompassed a 

wide array of targets with major political, economic, and psychological 

impact, such as army camps and naval bases, Colombo’s international 

airport, large oil depots, and popular religious structures.

Conventional Warfare

As noted in the Armed Component section discussing the LTTE 

ground forces, Eelam War I was largely waged as an irregular campaign 

by the group, as was the campaign against the IPKF, yet by the early 

1990s, the group began to develop a conventional capability, beginning with the Charles Anthony padaipirivu. As shown in Figure 7-7, it 

was around this time that the pace of operations picked up, with the 

number of incidents reaching full intensity during the peak years of the 

various Eelam Wars after 1990.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

0 

20 

40 

60 

80 

100 

120 

140 

160 

180 

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 

Year

Incidents

Figure 7-7. LTTE incidents over time.

During Eelam War II, the estimated number of LTTE cadres killed, 

6,220, exceeded the number of deaths of government security personnel, estimated at 4,988.172 However, during the first few years of Eelam 

War III, this trend reversed itself, as the number of deaths of government security personnel (5,441) exceeded LTTE losses (4,030) from 

April  19, 1995 to August  10, 1997.173 And as previously noted in the 

Armed Component section discussing the LTTE ground forces, by the 

late 1990s, the group was able to inflict notable conventional defeats 

on the Sri  Lankan military, including during Operation Unceasing 

Waves III, launched by the group in November 1999, and in the capture 

of the military base in Elephant Pass in April 2000.

Assassinations

Tactically, the LTTE relied heavily on assassinations of rival Tamil 

separatists and politicians, as well as police informants. In fact, twentyfour of the thirty-seven  high-ranking politicians assassinated by the 

LTTE were Tamils, and the rest were Sinhalese (nine), Muslim (three), 

and Indian (one).174 The first assassination for which Prabhakaran 

claimed responsibility was that of Alfred Duraiappah, the Tamil mayor 

of Jaffna and an SLFP member who was killed in 1975.u Few large operations were carried out by the LTTE between 1977 and 1983, during 

which time the Tigers killed eleven Tamil politicians, thirteen informants, and sixteen civilians.175 After the riots of 1983, however, operations and assassinations expanded. Many assassinations attributed to 

the LTTE were impossible to verify because its practice was to neither 

u This assassination probably took place when the LTTE was still operating as the 

Tamil New Tigers (TNT)—an organization that Prabhakaran took over after its founder 

Chetti Thanabalsingham was arrested. The TNT under Thanabalsingham primarily targeted Tamil collaborators—a characteristic that stuck with the LTTE in subsequent years.
Chapter 7. LTTE

243

claim nor deny involvement in specific activities, instead pointing to 

continued paramilitary and police violence against Tamil civilians as 

contributing to specific assassinations. Some of the suspected LTTE 

assassinations and attempted eliminations include the following:

• The death of TULF (Tamil United Liberation Front) Vice 

President Neelan Thiruchelvam

• The death of Appapillai Amirthalingam, leader of the Tamil 

United Liberation Front

• The attempt on then-President Kumaratunga in 1999

• The death of Rajiv Gandhi, whom it was feared would redeploy 

the highly unpopular IPKF if elected again as prime minister of 

India, and in whose death Prabhakaran took the unusual step of 

denying LTTE involvement (although they subsequently admitted 

responsibility for Gandhi’s assassination)

• The death of President Premadasa, who was killed by LTTE 

suicide bomber Kulaweerasingham Weerakumar, who went by 

the alias Babuv

• The death of Lalith Athulathmudali, the minister of education 

and one-time minister of defense

• The death of Ranjan Wijeratne, Minister of State for Defense

• The death of Lakshman Kadirgamar, a two-time foreign 

minister and ethnic Tamil. Kadirgamar was a harsh LTTE 

critic and central to the government’s successful efforts to have 

the LTTE listed as a terrorist organization in the United States 

and the United Kingdom, a legal step that severely hampered 

the organization’s ability to raise funds.177 LTTE leaders denied 

involvement in Kadirgamar’s death, as they often did in cases 

of high-level assassinations, and investigations produced little 

credible evidence.178

• The attempt on Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, secretary to the ministry 

of defense and urban development, in December 2006

Suicide Missions

Suicide missions were also a key component of LTTE tactics. How 

the organization assimilated the ideas and tactics associated with suicide bombing is of some dispute, but the first attack occurred in 1987, 

v The LTTE leadership, however, explicitly denied involvement in the murder of Premadasa, who was also very unpopular with right-wing Sinhalese parties.176
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

four years after the commencement of major hostilities.w Strategically, 

suicide operations appear to have been initiated in response to the government’s economic blockade that cut off the flow of raw materials to 

LTTE-controlled areas, rendering the group’s weapon caches insufficient to launch conventional attacks against the large concentrations of 

soldiers stationed in cities in the north and east as part of a stepped-up 

government offensive. The first suicide attack, on a former Tamil high 

school in Jaffna that had been turned into a makeshift army camp, 

involved a vehicle laden with explosives, similar to the attack by Hizbollah against the US Marine barracks in Lebanon four years earlier.x

However, unlike the attack in Lebanon, LTTE regulars were stationed 

nearby and rushed to the camp after the explosion. Some forty  soldiers were killed, and a planned Sri Lankan offensive was scrapped as a 

result of this preemptive LTTE strike.182 Analysts disagree as to whether 

this first mission was intended to be suicidal or the LTTE hierarchy 

constructed the story of a suicide mission after the operative failed to 

make it clear of the bomb.183 Regardless, the group’s commitment to 

self-immolation was made clear in 1991 when a female Black Tiger (or 

Freedom Bird, as they were often called) detonated the first concealed 

suicide vest to assassinate former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

In the LTTE case, the use of suicide missions appears to have 

depended more on their efficiency—they were estimated to have 

achieved their instrumental aim eighty  percent of the time—than 

on simple symbolism.184 Nonetheless, Prabhakaran portrayed suicide 

missions as a way of achieving a Tamil homeland more quickly and 

thereby reducing the suffering inflicted on the Tamil population in 

the long run.185

Some analysts also believed that in conventional LTTE battles, suicide bomb units would be deployed initially to take out enemy fortifications and breach the lines ahead of an assault by regular forces.186

Suicide missions against the Sri Lankan army were highly effective, but 

when India sent in peacekeepers in 1987, their superior numbers and 

weaponry forced the LTTE to adopt guerrilla-style tactics once more.187

Moreover, from the mid to late 1990s until the 2002 cease-fire, the 

Sri Lankan army became increasingly well equipped (benefiting from 

a market flush with excess Cold War weaponry) and elicited higher 

w Hopgood suggests that this time lapse indicates reservations about the efficacy 

and appropriateness of suicide bombing within the LTTE’s leadership.179 For a listing and 

description of LTTE suicide bombings between July 1987 and October 2000, see “Suicide 

Bomber Detonates Bomb in Colombo 19 Oct, 19 Wounded.”180

x Swamy claims that the LTTE sent sixteen fighters to be trained by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1983, implying that they certainly would have been familiar with the truck bombing in Lebanon.181
Chapter 7. LTTE

245

casualty rates from the LTTE, who themselves began to make more 

extensive use of Black Tiger suicide missions.188

Naval and Air Suicide Missions

The LTTE also incorporated suicide tactics into naval and air operations (see Figure 7-8). For increased speed and maneuverability, Sea 

Tigers often used fiberglass boats that were outfitted with penetration 

rods to puncture the outer hulls of target ships and amplify the shock 

waves caused by the explosion. Some forty such assaults were carried out 

between 1990 and 2004, frequently by injured Tiger fighters unable to 

carry out other operations. Their success dramatically reduced recruitment into the Sri Lankan navy. The government also reported the discovery of seven LTTE airstrips, two that were in frequent use and five 

that appeared to be emergency landing strips, in the months after the 

LTTE’s 2009 defeat. Interviews with recruits demonstrate that the narratives offered by the LTTE leadership regarding the principles of selfsacrifice were effectively internalized by members of the Black Tigers, 

who carried laminated cards during missions instructing those who 

would interfere (in English and Sinhala) that, “I am filled with explosives. If my journey is blocked I will explode it. Let me go.”189 Overall, 

the LTTE’s innovation of the suicide vest; use of female fighters; execution of suicide missions on land, sea, and air; and the use of cyanide 

pills by captured LTTE fighters contributed greatly to the “elite” image 

the group cultivated.y

y Cyanide capsules were carried in class vials around the neck of fighters, who would 

bite the glass, thereby lacerating the gums and allowing the poison to quickly enter the 

bloodstream. The distribution of the vials became a highly ritualized aspect of the recruitment process, and high-ranking members always displayed the vials prominently for photos. Interestingly, Roberts traces the first use of cyanide in the Sri Lankan conflict to the 

student leader of a small cell who swallowed the poison after a failed assassination attempt 

in 1974.190 Hoffman, on the other hand, traces this tactic to an announcement made by 

Prabhakaran much later in 1983.191
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Figure 7-8. A LTTE Sea Tiger fast attack fiberglass boat passing a Sri Lankan 

freighter sunken by the Sea Tigers just north of the village of Mullaitivu, Northeastern Sri Lanka.

Administrative

Training

Prospective members underwent a fairly grueling training process. 

Regular personnel first underwent an intensive three-month basic 

training program where they received instruction in guerrilla warfare, 

weapons handing, tactics, intelligence and counterintelligence, ambush 

and camouflage methods, and escape and evasion techniques.192 They 

then underwent three months of advanced training, and cadres were 

selected for more specialized divisions including commandos (special 

operations),z

 the Black Tigers, and the Tigers Organization of Security 

Intelligence Service (TOSIS). TOSIS personnel were instructed how to 

eat, act, talk, and think in numerous environments, thereby enabling 

them to infiltrate a range of institutions, such as a government bureaucracy or a church.194

Prospective suicide bombers within the Black Tigers were subjected 

to perhaps the most rigorous training, involving substantial physical 

endurance and indoctrination sessions.195 They were also instructed on 

avoiding detection and where to place themselves and their bombs to 

maximize destruction. Those who successfully completed this “death 

course” were subjected to intense security, with their identity known 

only to those at the highest levels of the LTTE leadership.196

z Chalk noted that Sri Lankan special forces personnel admitted that the LTTE’s 

advanced commando training was probably more mentally and physically demanding 

than their own.193
Chapter 7. LTTE

247

All prospective personnel were continually assessed and monitored 

during basic and advanced training, with performance assessments 

detailing their strengths and weaknesses stored within a central database known as “Zero-Zero Station.” After training, full-time personnel 

were assigned different tasks, such as political propaganda or social 

welfare, depending on their interests and capabilities.197 However, they 

were required to participate in military actions if called on by a regional 

commander.

Membership and Recruitment

LTTE membership (1) was made up of essentially ethnic Tamils; (2) 

was overwhelmingly Hindu, although there were some Christians; (3) 

was mostly very young, except for a number of long-surviving members; 

and (4) included primarily members of the karaiyar caste, although 

some were drawn from the vellalar caste. Geographically, members were 

drawn primarily from the Tamil population in the north, but also from 

the east.198 There are also indications that a small percentage of Muslims and Indian Tamils participated in LTTE activities.199 Moreover, 

the LTTE inner core was composed mainly of karaiyar caste members 

from the area around Valvettiturai.200 This corresponded to Prabhakaran’s reported vision of the LTTE in its early years as a very small, 

closely integrated group of professional and well-disciplined fighters.201

Many of the LTTE’s recruitment activities were essentially passive, 

with their ranks swelled by indiscriminate bombing campaigns.202 The 

island’s large number of well-educated yet unemployed or underemployed youth provided a reserve of radicalized opposition, as did the 

families who were targeted for persecution by local Sinhalese security 

forces, on whom the Tigers often focused their recruitment efforts.aa In 

addition to this latent source of fighters, the LTTE did engage in active 

recruitment, with varying degrees of voluntarism and conscription.ab

Human Rights Watch noted that the LTTE routinely visited Tamil 

homes to inform parents that they must provide a child to the organization,206 a policy probably linked to the group’s 1999 attempt to establish a Universal People’s Militia that would impose military training on 

anyone over the age of fifteen living in LTTE-controlled territory.207

aa Hoffman cites interviews with local NGO workers and militants, all of whom identify abuse by the Sinhalese security forces as the primary motivating factor behind joining 

the LTTE.203

ab Hellmann-Rajanayagam noted, however, that the LTTE did sometimes demand 

money from families who were keen to keep their children out of the movement.204 Additionally, she noted that many middle-class families attempted to first send their sons to 

Colombo and then overseas so that they did not wind up joining the LTTE.205
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Women in the LTTE

Historically, women in Tamil society were viewed as living within “a 

highly patriarchal and caste-ridden Hindu cultural ethos” and, thus, 

secondary in importance and status to men.208 Even during the early 

years of the Eelam Wars, women were popularly perceived as “victims” 

in the armed conflict, an image fueled by the brutal rapes of several 

Tamil women by government and IPKF soldiers in the late 1980s.209 By 

the mid-1980s, however, the position and role of Tamil women underwent rapid and significant change. Women began to achieve social, 

political, and military equality. As one observer reported on the basis 

of a first-hand conversation:

Women who suffer domestic violence and are physically abused by their spouses could complain to the 

LTTE cadres who take appropriate action. At the first 

complaint the abusive spouse is given a warning, on 

the second he is fined, and if there is a third complaint 

he might end up in the LTTE’s jail.210

The same observer went on to note that, even outside of marriage, 

women were gaining new prestige. For example, they could sit on LTTE 

local courts and arbitrate local disputes.

Likewise, the organization’s use of female fighters also provided 

a source of legitimacy, especially considering the intensity with which 

patriarchal and caste-based structures restricted women’s freedom 

in Sri Lanka. Driven partly by demographic imperatives, notably the 

shortage of males eligible for recruitment, the LTTE’s employment of 

female fighters was also a tool in siphoning off support from rival Tamil 

groups that did not employ women and a direct response to women’s 

demands to be incorporated into the struggle.211

Female Tigers (many of whom constituted the all-female fighting 

unit known as the Freedom Birds) proved to be as eager and as lethal 

as their male counterparts. Stack-O’Connnor noted that women constituted thirty-three percent of the ranks of the Black Tigers, and as 

mentioned in Chapter 3. Historical Context, during a morning raid in 

September 1999, the Freedom Birds “systematically cut and chopped 

to death” Sinhalese villagers and torched houses in revenge for a Sri 

Lankan air force bombing that killed twenty-two Tamils.212

Stack-O’Connor also surmised that demographic pressures in the 

mid-to-late 1980s led the LTTE to incorporate women into combat 

roles. Between 1982 and 1987, the LTTE was estimated to have lost 

about eight percent of its (male) fighters, while the Sri Lankan government had instituted a draft in 1985 and India deployed the IPKF in July 

1987.213 The LTTE also lagged behind other Tamil separatist groups 
Chapter 7. LTTE

249

that incorporated women into their operations much earlier, owing in 

part to the other groups’ explicit Marxist orientation and the tenets of 

gender equality within the Marxist dogma.ac

Child Soldiers and Shields

Like women members of the LTTE, children, referred to as Tiger 

Cubs, were brought into the LTTE during the First Eelam War. They 

received military training in India at the age of sixteen and were formed 

into their own brigade. However, after heavy troop losses in 1987, the 

child soldiers were integrated into the regular units with older soldiers.

The issue concerning the use of child soldiers by the LTTE is highly 

politicized, and it is unclear to what extent children were incorporated 

into LTTE operations. In the absence of other sources of data on child 

soldiers, most studies rely on assessments from the Directorate of Military Intelligence. These statistics report incredibly high numbers of 

child soldiers, with recruitment and fatality rates of fighters under eighteen years of age as high as sixty percent.215 Other sources identify child 

soldiers as an elite unit within the LTTE, citing a 1997 battle between 

the Leopard Brigade (LTTE orphans) and a commando unit from the 

army that ended with 200 army casualties.216

Psychological

The LTTE used newspapers, journals, magazines, books, pamphlets, 

songs, poems, and plays to spread its message.217 One of its magazines, 

Tamil Eelam, included accounts of IPKF atrocities, and some of the personal letters it published verged on worship of Prabhakaran as a hero.218

In the newspaper Viravenkai (Brave Tiger), questions from sympathizers 

in Sri Lanka and India were answered by the group. The LTTE also 

answered questions from sympathizers in the English-language paper 

Tamil Voice International, and Kittu, Prabhakaran’s one-time second in 

command, edited a question and answer column in Erimalai, in which 

he expanded on the aims of the LTTE.219

The group’s international secretariat played a prominent role in 

disseminating propaganda. The LTTE developed a sophisticated and 

extensive international operation whose messaging emphasized three 

key themes:220

• Tamils are the innocent victims of a government dominated by 

the Sinhalese.

ac Gender equality was much more a feature of Marxist-Leninist groups, such as the 

PLOTE and EPRLF, than it was of the LTTE, with its more ethno-national platform.214
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

• Sri Lankan Tamils are subjected to constant discrimination and 

military oppression.

• Tamils can never peacefully coexist with the Sinhalese within a 

unitary state.

These themes were distributed through an extensive global distribution channel. By mid-1998, the LTTE had established offices and 

cells in forty countries.221 It had an important presence in countries 

with large diasporas, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 

Switzerland, Canada, and Australia, and it also established a presence 

in more far-flung locales, including Botswana, Mozambique, and Liberia.222,223 The group’s main international front organization was the 

World Tamil Movement, which was established in 1983 and provided 

a number of services and programs, including newsletters in Tamil 

and English, cultural and religious programs, and news and music programs over the radio. Additionally, it had separate divisions for students and women, as well as an academy to promote Tamil art and 

technology.224 The LTTE’s foreign cells received daily faxes featuring 

selective battlefield reports to be disseminated to a foreign audience. 

The LTTE also put out videos, pamphlets, and calendars detailing the 

results of government strikes against LTTE strongholds,225 as well as 

footage of Black Sea Tiger suicide attacks against Sri  Lankan naval 

ships and dramatizations of successful operations.226 Most LTTE international propaganda was conducted through sympathetic pressure 

groups, including the Australasian Federation of Tamil Associations, 

the Swiss Federation of Tamil Associations, the French Federation of 

Tamil Associations, the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils, 

the Ilankai Tamil Sangam in the United States, the Tamil Coordinating Committee in Norway, and the International Federation of Tamils 

in the United Kingdom.227

Through its international propaganda campaign, the group was 

able to win the support of a number of prominent international NGOs, 

including the Canadian Relief Organization for Peace in Sri Lanka, 

the International Educational Development Inc., the World Council of 

Churches, the Australian Human Rights Foundation, the International 

Human Rights Group, the International Federation of Journalists, Pax 

Romana, the International Peace Bureau, the International Human 

Rights Law Group, and the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for 

Human Rights.228

The United Kingdom served as the nerve center of its international 

operations. The LTTE’s international secretariat was established in England in 1984,229 and Gunaratna estimated that the LTTE maintained 

forty to fifty front organizations in the United Kingdom.230 Some of 

these organizations, as well as pro-LTTE organizations, included the 
Chapter 7. LTTE

251

Tamil Information Center at Tamil House in London, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization in London, and the International Federation of 

Tamils (IFT) in Surrey.231 The IFT published several journals, including Network and Kalathil (in Tamil). Other United Kingdom-based 

LTTE publications included Viduthalai Puligal and Tamil Land. Also, an 

LTTE front organization in London published the journal Hot Spring, 

which had previously just been published in the Jaffna peninsula.232

Gunaratna estimated that throughout the North Atlantic region, there 

was at one time more than forty Sri Lankan newspapers, eighty percent 

of which were managed by either the LTTE or a front organization.233

The LTTE was successful in securing several notable public relations victories. For instance, the Tamil community in Boston succeeded 

in having the lower house of the Massachusetts state legislature pass a 

resolution on May 9, 1979, in support of Tamil Eelam. Michael Dukakis, the then-governor of the state, declared May 22, 1979, which was 

the anniversary of the Sri  Lankan government’s proscription of the 

LTTE, as “Eelam Tamils’ Day.”234 And in July 1996, the group managed 

to secure from Nelson Mandela a letter of congratulations to an LTTE 

front organization in Australia.235

Political

In late 1986, the LTTE established the Tamil Eelam People’s Organization (TEPO), a political party whose main task was to inform the 

Tamil public regarding political developments in Sri Lanka and elsewhere.236 It does not appear as if TEPO participated in any elections, 

although in late 1989 and early 1990 there emerged the possibility that 

the LTTE would participate in the political process.

Specifically, by the spring of 1989, both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan 

government shared a mutual interest in seeing Indian troops leave 

Sri Lanka. The disillusionment with the Indo-Lanka Accord and the 

introduction of Indian troops was used as a mobilizing tool by the JVP, 

and the LTTE saw the IPKF as an impediment to the goal of an independent state. This convergence of interests led to a series of meetings 

between the government (involving President Premadasa at times) and 

the LTTE beginning in May  1989, as well as a cease-fire and a rapprochement between the two parties.

During this juncture, the LTTE wanted to at least appear as if it was 

committed to the peace process, and so on the insistence of Premadasa, 

the PFLT, the group’s political wing, participated in an all-party conference, where it sought a repeal of the sixth amendment to the constitution (which prescribed severe penalties for those advocating a separate 

state) and the dissolution of the North-East Provincial Council, which 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

was ruled by the EPRLF (see below).237 The LTTE argued that the sixth 

amendment prevented the group from participating in elections, and 

while Premadasa understood the LTTE’s reasoning, he maintained 

suspicions regarding the group’s interest in seeing the repeal of the 

amendment.238 Premadasa insisted that the group surrender its arms 

before repealing the amendment, a demand that the group refused. 

The LTTE wound up not participating in any subsequent elections,ad

and in June 1990, both sides returned to the battlefield.

Although it did not participate in the political process, the group 

did undertake a number of politically motivated acts. For instance, 

it regarded Tamil moderates as a collection of sellouts and careerists 

who needed to be eliminated, because if their attempts at reaching 

a solution short of Eelam were successful, then LTTE members who 

had been killed in the fight for independence would have died in vain. 

Prominent Tamil politicians assassinated by the group include Appapillai Amirthalingam, the leader of the TULF, and Neelan Tiruchelvam, 

a TULF parliamentarian who was the architect of a government peace 

initiative in the mid-1990s.

The group also took efforts to disrupt elections in the areas it 

controlled. The Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987 called for the establishment of the North-East Provincial Council (NEPC), and by the 

time the election for the council was held in 1988, open combat had 

emerged between the LTTE and the IPKF. To counter the LTTE, India’s 

Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the country’s foreign intelligence 

agency, had established strong links with the EPRLF, TELO, and the 

Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF).ae These groups 

became known as the “three stars,” and RAW began to integrate these 

three groups into its military and political activities.241 Amidst allegations of electoral improprieties,242 the EPRLF and ENDLF won slightly 

more than fifty percent of the seats to the NEPC. To disrupt the elections, the LTTE issued death threats throughout the north and east, 

which may explain why none of the 22,000 election officials assigned 

to administer the poll showed up to work.243 In response, the IPKF was 

ad It should be noted, however, that in December 2001 the LTTE had something akin 

to political representation in parliament. Before the December 2001 parliamentary elections, the TULF, EPRLF, TELO, and the All Ceylon Tamil Congress formed the Tamil 

National Alliance (TNA), which supported the view that the LTTE should represent the 

Tamils in negotiations with the government. This led some to speculate that the TNA 

would invite suicide bombers to sit within parliament.239

ae After the signing of the accord, these three groups, along with PLOTE and EROS, 

had abandoned their support for secession and agreed to work within the framework 

of a unified state. As a result, their interests were more aligned with those of India, who 

favored Tamil autonomy within a unified state rather than an independent Tamil state in 

Sri Lanka.240
Chapter 7. LTTE

253

forced to fly in election officials from India and work at many of the 

election posts.244

The LTTE also “dissuaded” Tamil voters from participating in the 

November 2005 presidential election between Prime Minister Mahinda 

Rajapaksa and former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe. This 

action likely contributed to Rajapaksa’s slim victory over the more moderate Wickremasinghe, as the latter would have likely won the Tamil 

vote, given his prominent role in the February 2002 cease-fire agreement and the ensuing peace process. Smith noted that the LTTE may 

have preferred a more hard-line candidate less willing to offer concessions, as Wickremasinghe may have been more willing to offer a settlement short of independence that was acceptable to Sinhalese voters 

and the international community but unacceptable to the LTTE, Tamil 

nationalists, and members of the diaspora.245 If this was indeed the case, 

then the group badly miscalculated, as it was under Rajapaksa’s rule 

that the LTTE was finally defeated in a brutal military campaign that 

resulted in the death of thousands of LTTE cadres and Tamil civilians.

Additionally, as discussed in more detail in the Government Countermeasures chapter, the group engaged in a number of negotiations with 

both the Sri  Lankan and Indian governments. Sadly, none of these 

efforts led to a lasting peace between the group and the Sri Lankan 

government.

EXTERNAL ACTORS AND TRANSNATIONAL 

INFLUENCES

Relations with India

Without a doubt, the Indian government was the most influential 

external actor in the LTTE insurgency, and without Indian assistance 

and involvement in the 1980s, the Sri Lankan government would likely 

have militarily crushed the Tamil insurgent movement in the 1980s. 

There are several factors that led India to become actively involved 

in the conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. First and 

foremost, latent desire for Tamil independence within India itself in 

Tamil Nadu was still a factor despite the passage in 1963 of the sixteenth amendment to the Indian constitution, which banned secessionist parties and the promotion of secession. In 1982, Indian intelligence 

reported to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that the Chief Minister of 

Tamil Nadu, M. G. Ramachandran, and M. Karunanidhi, the leader 

of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), one of the main ethnically based political parties in Tamil Nadu, were overtly sympathizing 

and covertly supporting Tamil militants in Sri Lanka.246 India feared 
254

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

that a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka would lead Tamil Nadu and 

its fifty-five million inhabitants to secede from the India and create 

Dravida Desam, an ethnocratic state for Tamils, in conjunction with the 

detached Tamil areas of Sri Lanka.247

Electoral concerns also motivated Indira Gandhi. Even if secessionist impulses didn’t ultimately manifest themselves in Tamil Nadu, Gandhi was concerned about the popularity of her party, the Congress (I) 

Party, in south India. In the 1977 Indian general election, Congress (I) 

did poorly in north India but retained its support in southern India.248

Hence, Indira had to be sensitive to opinion in Tamil Nadu, which was 

sympathetic to the plight of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. This sensitivity 

even extended to entertaining pleas from Ramachandran after the 

July 1983 riots for an Indian intervention in Sri Lanka along the lines 

of the Indian intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, which led to the 

creation of Bangladesh.249

Concerns regarding Sri  Lanka’s foreign policy also motivated 

enhanced Indian interest in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict. Gandhi had 

a strong personal relationship with Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, as both favored nonalignment abroad and social democratic 

policies at home. Yet the election of J. R. Jayewardene in 1977 led to 

a souring of the bilateral relationship. Gandhi and Jayewardene did 

not enjoy a good personal relationship, and Gandhi was troubled by 

Jayewardene’s tilt toward the United States and the West, as India at 

this time was a Soviet ally. Jayewardene’s reorientation of Sri Lanka’s 

foreign policy revived long-standing Indian fears that an outside power 

(i.e., the United States) would be permitted to station naval forces in 

the highly coveted deepwater port of Trincomalee, which would thereby 

limit India’s diplomatic and military room for maneuver in a region it 

considered as its own “backyard.”250

These factors led Gandhi to decide in August 1983 to covertly 

support Tamil militant groups through India’s RAW agency, which is 

India’s foreign intelligence agency, while at the same time play a mediating role between Sri Lankan Tamils and the central government in 

Colombo.251 RAW training of LTTE members began in late 1983, with 

1,351 cadres trained by mid-1985, and an estimated 649 more members were trained over the next two years.252 Initial training occurred 

in Bangalore and Uttar Pradesh, and training occurred elsewhere in 

India as well.253 The LTTE was also able to establish training camps 

in Tamil Nadu, where LTTE members, including Prabhakaran, led 

the training as instructors.254 Additionally, as discussed below in the 

Finances and Armaments section, the LTTE established an underground 

procurement network in Tamil Nadu, and one armament factory in 
Chapter 7. LTTE

255

Coimbatore (in Tamil Nadu) produced 5,000 grenades a day for the 

group until it was shut down in August 1992.255

RAW also took an active role in training other Tamil militant 

groups. After RAW trained seventy PLOTE cadres (along with members of TELO, EROS, and EPRLF), PLOTE established its own camps 

throughout Tamil Nadu, including six in the Thanjuvar District, four 

in Madurai, and five in the Puthukottai District.256 RAW also trained 

350 TELO members, including leader Sri Sabaratnam, in two camps in 

north India and another near the airport in New Delhi.257 The group 

went on to establish its own camps in Tamil Nadu. Gunaratna estimated 

that within a year of Indira’s policy directive, thirty-two Sri  Lankan 

training camps were established in Tamil Nadu,258 and overall, by early 

1987, 2,000 LTTE cadres, 8,000 PLOTE members, 1,500 EPRLF cadres, 1,250 EROS cadres, and 1,500 TELO members were trained in 

north and south India.259

The LTTE also established strong links with political parties 

in Tamil Nadu. It had a strong relationship with the All India Anna 

Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) Party and its leader, M. G. 

Ramachandran.260 As chief minister of Tamil Nadu and in a personal 

capacity, Ramachandran contributed 200 million Indian rupees to the 

LTTE from 1983 to 1987.261 Once Ramachandran died in 1987, the 

relationship with AIADMK waned, and the LTTE began to develop a 

strong relationship with the DMK (the AIADMK was an offshoot of the 

DMK formed by Ramachandran in 1972) and its leader M. Karunanidhi.262 Karunanidhi was a supporter of Tamil Eelam but was not well 

disposed toward Prabhakaran.263 However, the LTTE appeared to have 

endeared itself to the DMK leader with a forty-million Indian rupee 

contribution toward Karunanidhi,af and Gunaratna asserted that the 

group financed one of Karunanidhi’s election campaigns.265

India escalated its role in the conflict in early June  1987 once it 

appeared that the Sri Lankan government was on the verge of defeating the LTTE. The government had launched Operation Liberation on 

May 26, 1987. By the 29th, it had captured Velvettiturai, Prabhakaran’s 

hometown, and the important city of Vadamarachchi, which curtailed 

the LTTE’s access to Tamil Nadu.266 At this point, it appeared as if the 

rest of the Jaffna peninsula would fall with the LTTE defeated. Facing 

af Gunaratna noted that the LTTE’s relationship with Karunanidhi provided the 

group, at times, with warning of Indian operations to be taken against the group. Specifically, after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, intelligence agencies in New Delhi reached 

a decision regarding anti-LTTE operations. This decision was relayed to the group within 

twenty-four hours by the Tamil Nadu Home Secretary at the instruction of Karunanidhi.264
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

pressure to intervene, Rajiv Gandhiag responded by sending a flotilla 

of twenty boats with relief supplies to the Jaffna peninsula, which was 

turned back by the Sri Lankan navy. In a show of force that hinted at 

a military intervention, on June 4, India air-dropped twenty-two tons 

of relief supplies on the Jaffna peninsula, and after a round of shuttle 

diplomacy, Sri Lanka was forced to agree to the Indo-Lanka Accord in 

July 1987.

The accord called for the following measures to occur:267

• A cease-fire was to come into effect, with all Tamil militant groups 

to surrender their arms within seventy-two hours of the signing 

of the accord and enter the political process.

• The Sri  Lankan government was to allow the Northern and 

Eastern Province to merge, with the residents of the latter to 

decide through a referendum whether this arrangement was 

permanent.

• The government would introduce legislation establishing a system 

of provincial councils to which power would be devolved.

• India would not allow its territory to be used by Tamil militants 

and would acknowledge the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.

The EPRLF, TELO, PLOTE, ENDLF, and EROS acknowledged 

the accord and dropped their demand for secession.268 The LTTE 

ultimately did not accept the accord because acceptance would have 

required giving up on its dream of Tamil Eelam. Yet while domestic 

pressures and irritation at Sri Lanka’s foreign policy motivated India to 

assist the Tamils, an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka was otherwise unacceptable, as it may have led to Dravida Dessam and potentially 

encouraged other secessionist movements in India, such as those being 

waged in Assam and Kashmir, and the movement by Sikh separatists to 

establish the independent state of Khalistan in the Indian Punjab.

The inevitable outbreak of hostilities between the LTTE and IPKF 

occurred in October 1987 with the suicide of thirteen LTTE cadres after 

they were captured at sea by the Sri Lankan navy. The IPKF launched 

Operation PAWAN (i.e., “Wind”), and for the next two and a half years 

the IPKF would wage a counterinsurgency campaign against the LTTE 

that saw the total number of Indian troops in Sri Lanka exceed 100,000. 

By 1989, there were a total of four Indian divisions in Sri Lanka, with 

the 54th air assault division in charge of the Jaffna peninsula, the 4th 

infantry division responsible for the Vavuniya sector, the 36th infantry 

division in charge of Trincomalee sector, and the 57th mountain division responsible for the Batticaloa sector.

ag Rajiv assumed office in 1984 once his mother Indira was assassinated by her Sikh 

bodyguards.
Chapter 7. LTTE

257

During this time, the LTTE lost control of the Jaffna peninsula, 

and as a result it waged a guerrilla campaign against the IPKF from 

bases in the jungles of Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, 

and Ampara Districts.269 The IPKF’s counterinsurgency campaign 

was assisted by the EPRLF, TELO, and the ENDLF, who assisted with 

tracing LTTE supporters and networks, identifying and interrogating 

LTTE supporters, and accompanying the IPKF on patrols in the jungles in search of LTTE members.270 For their part, the LTTE at every 

available opportunity attacked the IPKF from close proximity to Tamil 

civilians in order to provoke a counterattack that resulted in the death 

of Tamil noncombatants.271 For instance, one LTTE ambush of an IPKF 

patrol in August 1989 generated an Indian response that resulted in 

fifty-one deaths, seventy injuries, and extensive property damage.272

By early 1989, a stalemate emerged between the IPKF and the 

LTTE. Although the LTTE could not defeat the IPKF, the latter could 

not destroy the capacity of the LTTE to wage guerilla warfare. The 

IPKF would eventually leave Sri  Lanka in March  1990, but they left 

behind two militias, the CVF and the TNA, to protect the North-East 

Provincial Council against LTTE attacks. Both were destroyed by the 

LTTE, who returned to the battlefield in Eelam War II against the government later in 1990. The IPKF episode had a tragic denouement, as 

the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 over concerns that he 

would reintroduce Indian troops into Sri Lanka if he were reelected as 

prime minister.

Relations with Other Militant Groups

The LTTE made contact with a number of other terrorist and insurgent movements. Before leaving the LTTE and founding PLOTE, Uma 

Maheswaran, along with an EROS cadre, trained in Lebanon with Fatah, 

the military wing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.ah Interestingly, more than one hundred PLOTE and EPRLF cadres trained in 

Lebanon’s Bekka Valley from 1984 to 1986 with the Popular Front for 

the Liberation of Palestine, and during Operation Peace for Galilee, 

ah The training in Lebanon originated from EROS contacts with the PLO representative in London. Once he took up residence in London, the founder of EROS, Eliyathamby 

Ratnasabapathy, formed the General Union of Eelam Students (GUES), which was modeled after the General Union of Palestinian Students. GUES served as the student wing 

of EROS. Ratnasabapathy was a supporter of the Palestinians, and he developed a strong 

relationship with Sayed Hamami, the PLO representative in London. Before Hamami 

was assassinated by the Israelis, he helped Ratnasabapathy develop a link with Fatah, who 

offered training to EROS members. EROS sent one cadre to Lebanon for training and 

shared this offer with the LTTE, who sent Uma.273
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Israeli forces in southern Lebanon captured two Tamil insurgents who 

were fighting with their Palestinian trainers against the Israelis.274

Gunaratna notes that the LTTE established relationships with a 

number of insurgent groups, including Hezb-i-Islami, which formed 

one of the main Afghan groups that fought the Soviets.275 Allegedly, 

the LTTE established a link with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, and it has maintained links with a number of 

other groups, including the South West Africa People’s Organization 

(SWAPO) of Namibia, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and the 

Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front of Ethiopia, and the New People’s 

Army of the Philippines.276, 277 It also established links with the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). One senior-level LTTE official was invited to 

attend the inauguration of the Kurdish parliament-in-exile in Brussels, and both groups invited the other’s activists to attend political 

and cultural events.278 Additionally, as noted in the following section, 

this relation appears to have involved the LTTE acquisition of weapons 

from the PKK.

FINANCES AND ARMAMENTS

In its early years, similar to other Tamil groups, the LTTE raised 

funds through robberies, extortion, and donations,279 and over time 

the organization developed a sophisticated and diversified revenue 

stream. By the mid-1990s, the LTTE was able to raise approximately 

eighty million dollars per year, although this total declined after the 

group was listed as a terrorist organization by a number of countriesai

and after the increase in scrutiny of money transfers to terrorist organizations after the September 11 attacks.281

As discussed in the Legitimacy section, domestically the group was 

able to extract a variety of taxes from the Tamil population in the north 

and east, including property taxes, as well as taxes on manufacturers, 

service providers, farmers, and fishers. It also raised revenue through 

vehicle registration fees and taxes on property transactions, as well as 

through custom fees on goods brought into LTTE territory. Internationally, contributions from the Tamil diaspora (see the following section) also allowed the group to raise funds through investments in gas 

stations, restaurants, grocery stores, farms, real estate, stock and money 

ai Beginning with India in 1992, the LTTE would eventually be listed as a terrorist organization by a number of countries. These were mostly in the West, including the 

United States (1997), the United Kingdom (2000), and Canada (2006), as well as the European Union (2006). In the US action, LTTE members were denied visas to visit the United 

States and, more crippling, LTTE assets were frozen and further fund-raising activities 

were banned.280
Chapter 7. LTTE

259

markets, finance companies, phone card companies, the gold trade, 

and export-import businesses.282 Additionally, the revenue collected by 

the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization, the rehabilitation wing of the 

LTTE, was also used to procure weapons, a fact that was well known 

among its donors.283 There are also allegations that the group profited 

from narcotics trafficking.aj

Overseas Tamil Support

The LTTE was able to raise a substantial amount of revenue from 

overseas to finance its war budget. Gunaratna estimated that after the 

loss of the Jaffna peninsula in early 1996, sixty percent of the group’s 

war budget was generated abroad.286 Citing discussions with Sri Lankan 

intelligence and government officials, Chalk placed this figure at ninety 

to ninety-five percent.287

A significant amount of the group’s financing came from the large 

Tamil expatriate community, especially those contingents in Western 

countries (Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, 

and Scandinavia) but also those living in the Indian province of Tamil 

Nadu. Indeed, many analysts identify the overseas Tamil communities as the single most important actors enabling the insurgency.288 A 

2001 United Nations estimate put the Tamil expatriate community at 

817,000,289 while another source estimated that one-third (or about 

one million) of the population of Sri Lankan Tamils were living overseas as of 2002.290 The early waves of migration were dominated by 

more economically mobile, often English-speaking, Tamils fleeing the 

government’s discriminatory regime. The later waves, especially those 

that came after the 1983 riots, arrived in their new homelands having 

experienced much greater violence. This 1983 experience, as well as 

the difficulty they encountered in assimilating to their new countries, 

contributed to their willingness to support the separatist movement.

Chalk noted the following monthly totals were raised abroad: 

$800,000 per month from Canada, $500,000 per month from Scandinavia, $390,000 per month from the United Kingdom, $250,000 

per month from Australia, and $200,000 per month from the United 

States.291 Expatriate support included voluntary contributions from individuals and Tamil-owned businesses, as well as extortion.292 Collection 

methods evolved over time, from poorly coordinated, often violent, acts 

aj Gunaratna noted that it was believed that the LTTE ships transported heroin from 

Myanmar to Europe.284 Chalk noted that the Mackenzie Institute, a nonprofit research 

group based in Toronto, claimed that the LTTE profited significantly from heroin trafficking. However, Chalk also noted that definitive proof connecting the LTTE to an official policy of drug running had yet to materialize (as of 2003).285
260

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

of coercion to scheduled collections based on computerized databases 

that allowed overseas collectors to avoid paying visits to individuals who 

supported rival Tamil groups or who were already regular contributors.293 The collection schedule was similarly regimented on a monthly 

or annual basis; additional collections were made according to special 

dates commemorating specific battles or individual “martyrs.”294

Armaments

Before the Indo-Lanka Accord in July  1987, the LTTE obtained 

most of its weapons from four sources: (1) Afghanistan, through the 

Indo-Pakistani border, (2) India, (3) domestic production,ak and (4) 

munitions captured from the Sri Lankan military.297 Many of the weapons acquired from Afghanistan appear to have been provided by the 

United States to the Afghan Mujahideen, who were at that time fighting 

to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan.298 Additionally, the accord forced 

India to end its sponsorship of Tamil militant groups, who before that 

time had received weapons and training from India. However, the 

LTTE was able to set up an extensive procurement network in Tamil 

Nadu. A number of towns and villages served as focal points for procuring and transporting supplies, including Dharmapuri, which was the 

LTTE’s main center for procuring explosives; Coimbatore, which was 

the LTTE’s arms, ammunition, and explosives manufacturing center; 

the Vedaranyam coast, from which most of the supplies from India to 

Jaffna were shipped; Tuticorin, which served as a smuggling port for the 

LTTE; and Tiruch, where LTTE cadres went for medical treatment.299

Once the accord was signed, RAW halted its supplies to the LTTE, 

although the group was still able to procure arms and supplies on its 

own from India. After hostilities broke out between the LTTE and the 

IPKF, the former was able to secure supplies after victories over the 

CVF and the TNA, the two Indian proxies stood up by the NEPC and 

the IPKF to deal with the inevitable LTTE backlash once the IPKF left 

Sri Lanka.300 Although they were led by experienced military cadres 

from TELO, ENDLF, and EPRLF, both militias were overwhelmed by 

the LTTE, who captured truckloads of arms and ammunition that 

departing Indian troops had given to the TNA and CVF.301

As described in the Auxiliary section, the KP Department played 

an important role in procuring weapons from abroad. The LTTE 

ak Chalk noted that the LTTE developed a sophisticated short-range missile capability 

by 1990.295 Additionally, he noted that the group was believed to have the capacity to manufacture at least four types of maritime attack craft. The group also made extensive use of 

improvised explosive devices (often explosive-laden petrol cans equipped with tripwires) 

and was recognized internationally as experts in using these devices.296
Chapter 7. LTTE

261

searched far afield for arms and munitions, particularly after India and 

RAW began to crack down on the LTTE after the assassination of Rajiv 

Gandhi in May 1991.al For instance, in August 1994, an LTTE freighter 

left the Ukrainian port of Kikoleyev with sixty tons of RDX and TNT 

acquired from the Rubezone Chemicals plant.am It was also believed to 

have acquired Soviet-made SAM-7s from corrupt officials and insurgents in Cambodia, and intelligence sources in Colombo believed that 

the group acquired more sophisticated US Stinger-class missiles from 

the PKK in 1996.304 The LTTE also approached Rosboronoexport, 

the Russian state-owned defense export company, in Laos to acquire 

surface-to-air missiles, small arms and light weapons, and communications equipment.305

Thailand also played a pivotal role in the LTTE’s international 

procurement effort. Many weapons were acquired from Khmer Rouge 

members selling equipment in Thailand, with weapons shipped from 

the Andaman coast across the Bay of Bengal to Sri  Lanka, and the 

Thai town of Trans served as an important staging post.306 A number 

of prominent LTTE officials lived and worked in Bangkok (although 

Thailand cracked down on the LTTE in early 1999 as relations with 

Sri Lanka improved), and the LTTE maintained a submarine-building 

project in Phuket.307 Other key nodal points in Thailand included the 

ports of Sattahip and Rayong, and weapons were also shipped across 

the Gulf of Thailand to the southern Thai provinces of Chumporn 

and Songkhla, after which they were moved across the Kra Isthmus 

to the Andaman Sea coast. From that point, either the Sea Tigers or 

the Arkanese maritime mafia operating from Ranoug would transport 

them across the Bay of Bengal.308

The group also developed links with arms suppliers. In 1997, the 

Sri Lankan government had concluded a three-million-dollar deal with 

the Zimbabwe Defense Industries (ZDI) for the purchase of 32,000 

mortar bombs to be used in the army’s campaign to secure the strategic A9 highway.309 On May 23, 1997, the Sri Lankan government was 

informed that the munitions left the port of Beira, in Mozambique, en 

route to Sri Lanka. However, on July 11, the LTTE sent the following 

fax to the US embassy in Colombo:

We, the Tamil Tigers, inform you by the present that 

on 11 July 1997 we have hijacked a vessel carrying 

arms  .  .  .  destined for Colombo. We know that the 

al For more information regarding RAW activities against the LTTE after May 1991, 

see Gunaratna.302

am The transaction was arranged through Carlton Trading, an LTTE from company 

in Dhaka, which produced a forged user end certificate indicating the Bangladeshi military as the approved recipient.303
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

manufacturer and the supplier of the mortar bombs 

in ZDI from Harare  .  .  .  The cargo [has been] confiscated. We make known and warn that we will take 

action against all persons participating in the supply 

of military equipment used against the legitimate 

rights of Tamil people and we will severely punish 

those concerned.310

The LTTE was aware of the transaction because it had infiltrated 

the Sri  Lankan National Intelligence Bureau.311 It bribed the Israeli 

arms subcontractor who had arranged the original deal to let one of the 

group’s own freighters pick up the munitions from the Croatian port of 

Rijkei. The Israeli’s company, L.B.J. Military Supplies, persuaded ZDI 

to provide false information to the Sri Lankan government confirming 

that the shipment had been loaded, with L.B.J. Military Supplies then 

informing Colombo that the munitions were en route.312

Chalk noted that, overall, the LTTE’s international procurement 

efforts focused on five main geographic zones: northeast and southeast Asia, particularly China, North Korea, Cambodia, Thailand, Hong 

Kong, Vietnam, and Burma; southwest Asia, especially Afghanistan and 

Pakistan; the former Soviet Union, particularly Ukraine; southeastern 

Europe and the Middle East, including Lebanon, Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey; and Africa, in particular Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and 

South Africa.313

ENDNOTES

1 Syed Rifaat Hussain, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): Failed Quest for a 

‘Homeland,’ ” in Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics, ed. Klejda Mulaj (London: Hurst 

& Company, 2010), 395.

2 Jagath P. Senaratne, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1977–1990: Riots, Insurrections, Counterinsurgencies, Foreign Intervention (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1997), 57.

3 Ibid.

4 S. V. D. Gamini Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971–1987 (New Delhi: Gyan 

Publishing House, 2008), 219.

5 Senaratne, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1977–1990, 57.

6 Rohan Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies

(Colombo, Sri Lanka: South Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1993), 136.

7 Ibid., 137.

8 Ibid., 144.

9 Senaratne, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1977–1990, 83.

10 Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity (Stuttgart: 

Franz Steiner Verlag, 1994), 44.

11 Senaratne, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1977–1990, 84.
Chapter 7. LTTE

263

12 Asoka Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy

(New York and Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2009), 129.

13 Rohan Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis and National Security (Colombo, Sri Lanka: 

South Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1998), 339.

14 Senaratne, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1977–1990, 99–100.

15 Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity, 64.

16 Peter Chalk, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) International Organization 

and Operations–A Preliminary Analysis,” Canadian Security Intelligence Service Commentary, no. 77 (March 17, 2000), http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/com77e.htm.

17 P. Sahadevan and Neil DeVotta, Politics of Conflict and Peace in Sri Lanka (New Dehli: 

Manak Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2006), 320–321.

18 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971–1987, 228.

19 Sahadevan and DeVotta, Politics of Conflict and Peace in Sri Lanka, 321.

20 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971–1987, 228.

21 Sahadevan and DeVotta, Politics of Conflict and Peace in Sri Lanka, 321.

22 Ibid.

23 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971–1987, 227.

24 Chalk, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) International Organization and 

Operations.”

25 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis and National Security, 337–338.

26 Hussain, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): Failed Quest for a ‘Homeland,’ ” 384.

27 Anton Balasingham, War and Peace: Armed Struggle and Peace Efforts of Liberation Tigers

(Mitcham, UK: Fairmax Publishing Ltd., 2004), 26, 30.

28 Sumantra Bose, States, Nations, Sovereignty: Sri Lanka, India and the Tamil Eelam Movement

(Sage Publications, New Dehli, 1994), 87.

29 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis and National Security, 354–355.

30 Chris Smith, “The Military Dynamics of the Peace Process and its Aftermath,” in Conflict 

and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: Caught in the Peace Trap? eds. Jonathan Goodhand, Jonathan Spencer, and Benedikt Korf (New York: Routledge, 2011), 76.

31 Chris Smith, “The LTTE: A National Liberation and Oppression Movement,” in Armed 

Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists, eds. Laurent Gayer and 

Christophe Jaffrelot (London: Hurst & Company, 2009), 95.

32 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis and National Security, 321.

33 Ibid., 322.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid., 331–332.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid., 328.

38 Ibid., 328, 334.

39 Chris Smith, “The Eelam Endgame?” International Affairs 83, no. 1 (2007): 71, 78.

40 Smith, “The Military Dynamics of the Peace Process and its Aftermath,” 85.

41 Peter Chalk, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam insurgency in Sri Lanka,” in Ethnic 

Conflict and Secessionism in South and Southeast Asia: Causes, Dynamics, Solutions, eds. Rajat 

Ganguly and Ian Macduff (New Dehli: Sage Publications, 2003), 142.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., 142–143.

44 Ibid., 142.
264

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

45 Smith, “The Military Dynamics of the Peace Process and its Aftermath,” 85.

46 Chalk, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam insurgency in Sri Lanka,” 142.

47 Ibid.

48 Smith, “The Military Dynamics of the Peace Process and its Aftermath,” 85.

49 Ibid.

50 Chalk, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam insurgency in Sri Lanka,” 143.

51 Smith, “The Military Dynamics of the Peace Process and its Aftermath,” 91, fn. 21.

52 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis and National Security, 241.

53 Ibid., 240.

54 Smith, “The Military Dynamics of the Peace Process and its Aftermath,” 74.

55 Ibid.

56 R. Hariharan, “Sri Lanka: How Strong Are the Tigers,” South Asian Analysis Group, Note 

no. 297 (February 28, 2006).

57 Hussain, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): Failed Quest for a ‘Homeland,’ ” 398, fn. 53.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Neil DeVotta, Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay and Ethnic Conflict in 

Sri Lanka (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 182.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Hussain, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): Failed Quest for a ‘Homeland,’ ” 398.

64 Sudha Ramachandran, “The Sea Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” Asia Times Online, August 31, 

2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HH31Df01.html.

65 Ibid.

66 Chalk, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) International Organization and 

Operations.”

67 Hussain, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): Failed Quest for a ‘Homeland,’ ” 398–399.

68 Ramachandran, “The Sea Tigers of Tamil Eelam.”

69 N. Manoharan, “’High Security Zones’ in Sri Lanka,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, June 2007, http://ipcs.org/article/sri-lanka/high-security-zones-in-sri-lanka-2321.

html.

70 Smith, “The LTTE: A National Liberation and Oppression Movement,” 100.

71 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis and National Security, 257.

72 Hussain, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): Failed Quest for a ‘Homeland,’ ” 398.

73 Ibid., 399.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid., 400.

76 Stephen Hopgood, “Tamil Tigers, 1987–2002,” in Making Sense of Suicide Missions, ed. 

Diego Gambetta (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005), 43.

77 Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, “The Conflict in Sri Lanka: A Cornered Tiger is Still 

Deadly,” STRATFOR Global Intelligence, May 6, 2009.

78 Hopgood, “Tamil Tigers, 1987–2002,” 46.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid., 50.
Chapter 7. LTTE

265

81 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis and National Security, 355.

82 Ibid.

83 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis and National Security, 356.

84 DeVotta, Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay and Ethnic Conflict in Sri 

Lanka, 177.

85 Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity, 75.

86 Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 412.

87 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971–1987, 228.

88 DeVotta, Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay and Ethnic Conflict in Sri 

Lanka, 170.

89 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971–1987, 228.

90 Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity, 37.

91 “Sri Lanka: Top Tiger Talks about Talks,” Economist, 326, no. 7801 (March 6, 1993).

92 M. R. Narayan Swamy, Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerillas (Dehli: Konark Publishers 

Pvt. Ltd., 2002), 51, 68–69.

93 Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity, 38.

94 Sreeram Chaulia, “Enigma Decryption,” review of Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran, by 

M. Narayan Swamy, Asia Times, October 4, 2003.

95 Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity, 38.

96 Ibid., 39.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid.

99 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971–1987, 279.

100 Ibid., 281.

101 Ibid., 276.

102 Ibid., 282.

103 Ibid., 278.

104 Ibid., 277.

105 Ibid., 278.

106Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity, 95.

107 Ibid.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid., 76.

110 Ibid., 76, 98.

111 Ibid., 98.

112Rohan Gunaratna, War and Peace in Sri Lanka (Kandy, Sri Lanka: Institute of Fundamental Studies, 1987), 70.

113 Ibid.

114 Rohan Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP (Kandy, 

Sri Lanka: Institute of Fundamental Studies, 1990), 133.

115 Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity, 64.

116 Ibid., 65.

117 Jayadeva Uyangoda, “Government-LTTE Peace Negotiations in 2002–2005 and the 

Clash of State Formation Projects,” in Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: Caught in the 

Peace Trap? eds. Jonathan Goodhand, Jonathan Spencer, and Benedikt Korf (New York: 

Routledge, 2011), 33.
266

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

118 Alisa Stack-O’Connor, “Lions, Tigers, and Freedom Birds: How and Why the Liberation 

Tigers of Tamil Eelam Employs Women,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 1 (Spring 

2007): 45, 48.

119 Rohan Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict and National Security (Colombo, Sri Lanka: 

Southasian Network on Conflict Research, 1998), 3.

120Zachariah Cherian Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During 

War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 109.

121 Ibid., 110.

122 Ibid., 110–111.

123 Ibid., 117–118.

124 Ibid., 118.

125 Ibid.

126 Ibid., 119.

127 Ibid., 116–117.

128Kristian Stokke, “Building the Tamil Eelam State: Emerging State Institutions and Forms 

of Governance in LTTE-Controlled Areas in Sri Lanka,” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 6 

(September 2006): 1034.

129 Ibid.

130 Ibid., 1028.

131 Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War, 116.

132Hussain, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): Failed Quest for a ‘Homeland,’ ” 384.

133Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War, 119.

134 Stokke, “Building the Tamil Eelam State,” 1030.

135Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War, 121.

136 Ibid.

137 Ibid., 123.

138 Ibid., 94–95.

139 Ibid, 111.

140 Ibid., 112, 115.

141 Ibid., 110, 114.

142 Ibid., 114.

143 Ibid., 113–114.

144 Ibid., 115.

145 Ibid., 115–116, fn. 21.

146Zachariah Mampilly, “A Marriage of Inconvenience: Tsunami Aid and the Unraveling of 

the LTTE and the GoSL’s Complex Dependency,” Civil Wars 11, no. 3 (September 2009): 

302–320.

147 Ibid., 313.

148 Ibid., 314.

149 Ibid., 315.

150George Frerks and Bart Klem, “Tsunami Response in Sri Lanka: Report on a Field Visit 

from 6–20 February 2005,” Netherlands Institute of International Relations, March 14, 

2005, www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20050300_cru_other_frerks.pdf.

151 Mampilly, “A Marriage of Inconvenience: Tsunami Aid and the Unraveling of the LTTE 

and the GoSL’s Complex Dependency,” 315.

152 Stack-O’Connor, “Lions, Tigers, and Freedom Birds,” 43.

153Bose, States, Nations, Sovereignty: Sri Lanka, India and the Tamil Eelam Movement, 84.
Chapter 7. LTTE

267

154 Ibid., 105

155 Ibid., 226.

156Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity, 38

157 Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity, 140.

158Bose, States, Nations, Sovereignty: Sri Lanka, India and the Tamil Eelam Movement, 104

159 Ibid., 110.

160Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 152.

161Benedikt Korf, “Functions of Violence Revisited: Greed, Pride and Grievance in Sri Lanka’s Civil War,” Progress in Development Studies 6, no. 2 (2006): 117–118.

162Uyangoda, “Government-LTTE Peace Negotiations in 2002–2005, 30.

163Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity, 61.

164Uyangoda, “Government-LTTE Peace Negotiations in 2002–2005, 30.

165 Smith, “The Eelam Endgame?,” 70.

166Peter Schalk, “The Revival of Martyr Cults among Llavar Tamil Eelam,” Temenos no. 33 

(1997): 151–190.

167 Schalk, “The Revival of Martyr Cults among Llavar Tamil Eelam.”

168Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Colombia University Press, 2006), 141.

169Chalk, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) International Organization and 

Operations.”

170 Hopgood, “Tamil Tigers, 1987–2002,” 44.

171 Humanitarian Operation Timeline, 1981–2009,” Ministry of Defense and Urban Development (Sri Lanka),” http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Humanitarian.

172 Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis and National Security, 351.

173 Ibid., 352.

174 S. V. D. Gamini Samaranayake, “Political Terrorism of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 

Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka,” Journal of South Asian Studies 30, no. 1 (April 2007), 177.

175 W. I. Siriweera, “Recent Development in Sinhala-Tamil Relations,” Asian Survey 20, no. 9 

(September 1980): 903–913.

176 Hopgood, “Tamil Tigers, 1987–2002,” 56.

177 “Senior Sri Lankan Minister Killed,” BBC News, August 13, 2005, http://news.bbc.

co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4147196.stm.

178 “Senior Sri Lankan Minister Killed,” BBC News.

179 “Hopgood, “Tamil Tigers, 1987–2002,” 51.

180 “Suicide Bomber Detonates Bomb in Colombo 19 Oct, 19 Wounded,” AFP, October 19, 

2000.

181 Swamy, Tigers of Lanka, 97–101.

182Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 142.

183Hopgood, “Tamil Tigers, 1987–2002,” 50–51.

184Chalk, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) International Organization and 

Operations.”

185Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 141.

186Hopgood, “Tamil Tigers, 1987–2002,” 55.

187Hopgood, “Tamil Tigers, 1987–2002,” 52.

188Hopgood, “Tamil Tigers, 1987–2002,” 54.

189Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 142.

190Michael Roberts, “Suicidal Political Action II: Ponnudurai Sivakumaran,” The Sacrificial 

Devotion and Virulent Politics Research Network (blog), December 8, 2009, http://sacrificialdevotionnetwork.wordpress.com/2009/04/08/suicidal_political_action_2/.
268

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

191 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 141.

192Chalk, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam insurgency in Sri Lanka,” 141.

193 Ibid.

194 Ibid.

195 Ibid.

196 Ibid.

197Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity, 29.

198R. A. Hudson, Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why: The 1999 Government Report on Profiling 

Terrorists (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2000), 91.

199 Samaranayake, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971–1987, 224.

200Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity, 36.

201Gunaratna, War and Peace in Sri Lanka, 110.

202Hopgood, “Tamil Tigers, 1987–2002,” 45.

203Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 140.

204Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity, 74.

205Ibid., 139.

206“Living in Fear: Child Soldiers and the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka,” Human Rights Watch 

16, no. 13 (C) (November 2004), 2, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/srilanka1104.pdf.

207Hudson, Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why, 92.

208Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake, “Between Tamil and Muslim: Women Mediating Multiple Identities in a New War,” in Gender, Conflict and Migration, ed. Navnita Chadha Behera 

(Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2006), 187.

209Rajasingham-Senanayake, “Between Tamil and Muslim,” 185.

210 Ibid., 189.

211 Stack-O’Connor, “Lions, Tigers, and Freedom Birds,” 43.

212 Ibid., 53.

213 Ibid., 47.

214 Somasundaram Rajan, Daya K. Sritharan, and Rajani Thiranagama Hoole, The Broken 

Palmyra, the Tamil Crisis in Sri Lanka, An Inside Account (Claremont, CA: The Sri Lanka 

Studies Institute, 1988), 78.

215Cecile Van de Voorde, “Assessing and Responding to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 

Eelam (LTTE),” Police Practice and Research 6, no. 2 (May 2005): 186.

216 Peter Warren Singer, Children at War (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006), 

87.

217 Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity, 49.

218 Ibid.

219 Ibid., 50.

220Chalk, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) International Organization and 

Operations.”

221Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis and National Security, 372.

222Ibid.

223Chalk, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) International Organization and 

Operations.”

224Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis and National Security, 376.

225Chalk, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) International Organization and 

Operations.”

226Hopgood, “Tamil Tigers, 1987–2002,” fn. 40.
Chapter 7. LTTE

269

227Chalk, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) International Organization and 

Operations.”

228Ibid.

229Rohan Gunaratna, “Internationalization of the Tamil Conflict,” South Asia: Journal of 

South Asian Studies 20, Special Issue (1997): 125.

230Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis and National Security, 232.

231Gunaratna, “Internationalization of the Tamil Conflict,” 125.

232 Ibid.

233Ibid., 126.

234Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 98.

235Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict and National Security, 239.

236Ibid., 228.

237 Sahadevan and DeVotta, Politics of Conflict and Peace in Sri Lanka, 244.

238Ibid., 245.

239“A Vote for Peace?,” Economist, December 8, 2001, 39.

240 Senaratne, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1977–1990, 93.

241 Ibid., 94.

242Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 278.

243 Ibid.

244 Ibid.

245 Smith, “The Military Dynamics of the Peace Process and its Aftermath,” 80.

246Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 29.

247 Ibid.

248Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 30.

249Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 111.

250Gunaratna, “Internationalization of the Tamil Conflict,” 129.

251Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 112–113.

252Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 407.

253 Ibid., 406–407.

254Ibid., 407.

255Ibid., 421–422, 425.

256Ibid., 41.

257 Ibid., 40.

258Gunaratna, “Internationalization of the Tamil Conflict,” 130.

259Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 48.

260Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity, 106.

261Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 418.

262Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity, 106.

263Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 420.

264Gunaratna, “Internationalization of the Tamil Conflict,” 132.

265Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 420.

266Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 130.

267 Senaratne, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1977–1990, 90.

268Ibid., 93.

269Ibid., 95.

270 Ibid., 94.
270

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

271Ibid., 95.

272Ibid.

273Gunaratna, “Internationalization of the Tamil Conflict,” 122.

274Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis and National Security, 237

275Gunaratna, “Internationalization of the Tamil Conflict,” 140–141.

276 Ibid., 140.

277Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis and National Security, 189.

278 Ibid., 242.

279Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis and National Security, 136.

280Amal Jayasinghe, “LTTE Expresses ‘Deep Dismay,’ ‘Displeasure’ Over US Move,” AFP, 

October 11, 1997.

281DeVotta, Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay and Ethnic Conflict in Sri 

Lanka, 172.

282Ibid.

283Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis and National Security, 136.

284Ibid.

285Chalk, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam insurgency in Sri Lanka,” 164, fn. 75.

286Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis and National Security, 134.

287Chalk, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam insurgency in Sri Lanka,” 147, 164, fn. 77.

288C. Christine Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan 

and Tamil Eelam Movements,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 11, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 

125–156.

289“A World of Exiles,” Economist, no. 366 (January 2, 2003): 41.

290Gunaratna, “Sri Lanka: Feeding the Tamil Tigers,” 201.

291Chalk, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam insurgency in Sri Lanka,” 146.

292“Funding the ‘Final War’: LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora,” 

Human Rights Watch, March 14, 2006, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2006/03/14/

funding-final-war-2.

293Gunaratna, “Sri Lanka: Feeding the Tamil Tigers,” 212.

294Ibid., 213.

295Chalk, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) International Organization and 

Operations.”

296“Landmine Monitor Report 2007: Toward a Mine-Free World,” Mines Action Canada, 

2007, 534, http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2007/

sri_lanka.html.

297Chalk, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) International Organization and 

Operations.”

298Ibid., fn. 33.

299Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 420–421.

300Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis and National Security, 175.

301 Senaratne, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1977–1990, 99–100.

302Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis and National Security, 226–228.

303Chalk, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam insurgency in Sri Lanka,” 144.

304Chalk, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam insurgency in Sri Lanka,” 144.

305Smith, “The Military Dynamics of the Peace Process and its Aftermath,” 86.

306Ibid.

307Ibid.
Chapter 7. LTTE

271

308Ibid.

309Chalk, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam insurgency in Sri Lanka,” 144–145.

310 Ibid., 145.

311 Ibid.

312 Ibid.

313 Ibid., 143–144.

Conclusion

273

CONCLUSION TO PART II

This section has profiled two highly potent and virulent insurgent 

movements in Sri  Lanka, and their juxtaposition provides an interesting and useful comparison for the special operator. In particular, we draw the reader’s attention to the useful distinction raised by 

Kaufmann between ethnic civil wars and ideological wars. The latter 

represent competitions between the government and an insurgency for 

the loyalty of the people, and this type of war describes the conflict 

between the Sri Lankan government and the JVP. The key features of 

these conflicts are that ideological loyalties are changeable and difficult to assess, and the same population (i.e., the Sinhalese) serves 

as the shared mobilization base for both sides.1

 Winning the “hearts 

and minds” of the population is necessary for victory, and control over 

access to the population is important to facilitate recruitment and to 

undertake political, economic, and social reforms (and to prevent the 

other side from doing the same).2

In contrast, in ethnic wars individual loyalties are rigid and transparent, as they are based on ethnic identity, and each side’s mobilization base is limited to members of its own group in friendly territory.3

As a result, these conflicts are primarily military struggles in which 

victory depends on physical control over disputed territory and not 

on appeals to members of the other ethnic group (such as through a 

“hearts and minds” campaign). Clearly the LTTE was engaged in an 

ethnic war with the central government, although some of the other 

Tamil groups, such as the EPRLF, were engaged in an ideological war 

that happened to originate in the Tamil regions of the island. Additionally, whereas the LTTE saw no possibility of collaboration with the 

JVP, the latter did interact with PLOTE, and within the JVP’s Central 

Committee were two members with responsibility for outreach to and 

coordination with Tamil groups.a

Another feature of an ethnic wars, like that between the government and the LTTE, is that they generate intense security dilemmas.5

Originally developed within the context of relations between nationstates, political scientists use the term security dilemma to refer to a situation in which the actions taken by a group to enhance its security 

create insecurity for other groups.b Ethnic civil wars produce security 

dilemmas between opposing ethnic groups because they typically feature (perhaps defensive) ethnic mobilization by one side implemented 

a Within the JVP Central Committee, P. Thangarajah was responsible for organizing 

Indian Tamil workers in the plantation sector, and Ranjitham Gunaratnam, a Sinhalized 

Tamil, maintained links with Tamil militant movements in the north and east.4

b To learn more about security dilemmas, see John Herz.6
274

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

through nationalist rhetoric that other groups perceive as threatening.7

Additionally, the intermixing of different ethnic groups (as occurred 

in Sri Lanka) leads to conditions that facilitate the emergence of security dilemmas. This is the case because the military capability acquired 

for defense often can also be used for offense, and offensive operations 

tend to have advantages over defensive actions when populations are 

intermixed, because isolated ethnic pockets are harder to hold than 

to take.8

In the case of Sri Lanka, a sizeable portion of the Tamil population 

lived outside of the north and east, while many Sinhalese “settlers” lived 

in the Northern and Eastern provinces. These ethnic enclaves created 

defensive vulnerabilities and offensive opportunities, and in the case 

of the LTTE the group had incentives to use its military capability in 

an offensive manner to drive out enemy populations from the regions 

it controlled, both to create a homogenous enclave that was easier to 

defend and to prevent the other side from potentially using enemy territory to launch attacks. Hence, actions taken by the LTTE to enhance 

its security created insecurity for Sinhalese. From a practical perspective, what this means is that in the case of ethnic conflicts, undoing 

initial causes of a conflict (i.e., settlement schemes, language rights, 

lack of political representation, or lack of access to education or jobs, 

etc.) may not be enough to resolve the conflict, as any stable resolution 

may also require dealing with the unsettling dynamics of the conflict 

itself, whether the intense security dilemmas that fanned the flames of 

conflict or any negative outcomes or grievances associated with actual 

fighting, such as civilian atrocities.

Another interesting aspect for the special operator to consider is the 

important role of leadership and human agency in propelling an insurgency forward. Certainly legitimate grievances related to economic, 

social, and political marginalization fanned the flames of both the JVP 

and LTTE insurgencies, but arguably neither of these two insurgent 

movements could have inflicted such widespread damage throughout Sri Lanka and challenged the territorial and political integrity of 

the state absent the fundamental roles played by Rohana Wijeweera 

and Velupillai Prabhakaran, their respective leaders. One analysis of 

the JVP insurgency located the cause of the JVP insurgency primarily 

(although not entirely) in the leadership role played by Wijeweera. As 

Moore noted:

To a considerable extent, I interpret the JVP as an 

exercise in political entrepreneurship. An intelligent, 

creative and highly ambitious political leadership, dedicated to the achievement of state power but blocked 

from achieving it by electoral means, exploited both 
Conclusion

275

the reservoirs of political alienation found within 

Sri Lankan society and its own long experience of revolutionary endeavor to design political strategies and 

tactics that enabled the movement (temporarily) to 

achieve impressive results with relatively few resources 

and no external support. This emphasis on the creative role of the JVP leadership—and especially of 

the dominant individual leader, Rohana Wijeweera, 

who created the movement in the late 1960s and controlled it until he was captured and killed in November 1989—in seeking out and exploiting opportunities 

to make revolution as a means to achieve power will no 

doubt seem excessively “voluntaristic” to those observers who would emphasize the structural features of 

Sri  Lankan society which made revolution so attractive to many people. I adhere to my view because of 

what appears to me to be an abundance of evidence 

about the extent of opportunism displayed by Wijeweera during his long quest for power.9

The leadership variable was also highly salient in the case of the 

LTTE, and one observer indicated that Prabhakaran’s resistance to a 

deal was a significant obstacle to a resolution of the LTTE’s conflict 

with the Sri Lankan state:

Most informed sources within Sri Lanka agree there 

is simply no way that Prabhakaran will ever agree to 

come out of the jungle and live the life of a normal 

politician within the context of an autonomous Tamil 

region. Such a move would effectively destroy the 

omnipotent illusion and near mythical status that the 

LTTE supremo now enjoys as well as greatly increase 

his exposure to assassination. Prabhakaran has made 

many enemies over the years, with Indians, Sinhalese 

and other Tamil groups all openly vowing to kill him at 

the first available opportunity. Such dynamics ensure 

that Prabhakaran will never concede to peace unless it 

is established under his leadership and in accordance 

with his own exclusive and absolute terms. However, 

this is neither something that organizations such as 

PLOTE, EROS and TELO will accept; nor is it something that Colombo has the power, political mandate 

or willingness to grant.10
276

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

ENDNOTES

1 Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International 

Security, 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 139.

2 Ibid., 139–140.

3 Ibid., 140.

4 C. A. Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror. The JVP Insurrection 1987–89 (Colombo, 

Sri Lanka: Lake House Bookshop, 1991), 11, 14.

5 Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” 139.

6 John Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2, no. 2 

(1950): 171–201.

7 Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” 147.

8 Ibid., 148.

9 Mick Moore, “Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka,” Modern Asian 

Studies 27, no. 3 (1993): 596–597.

10 Peter Chalk, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam insurgency in Sri Lanka,” in Ethnic 

Conflict and Secessionism in South and Southeast Asia: Causes, Dynamics, Solutions, eds. Rajat 

Ganguly and Ian Macduff (New Dehli: Sage Publications, 2003), 139.
PART III.

GOVERNMENT COUNTERMEASURES

CHAPTER 8.

GOVERNMENT COUNTERMEASURES

Chapter 8. Government Countermeasures

281

A recurring dilemma in the government’s efforts to reach a political accommodation with the Tamils centered on determining the 

appropriate distribution of power and authority between the central 

government and Sri Lanka’s regional administrative units, particularly 

with the Tamil regions in the north and east of the country. In the 

1980s, with the emergence of the JVP the government also had to contend with negative feedback from its effort to reach an accommodation 

with the LTTE, as potential concessions to Tamils on devolution and 

autonomy fed antigovernment rhetoric used by the JVP in its campaign 

to overthrow the government.

Before the mid-1970s, the Tamils had challenged the unitary nature 

of the Sri Lankan state not by seeking outright independence but by 

seeking to remain within a reformed state featuring a federalized political structure that devolved substantial political authority to the Tamil 

regions of the country. These efforts, specifically the B-C and S-C pacts, 

faltered as a result of Sinhalese fears that federalist concessions would 

eventually give way to Tamil demands for independence, leading to the 

detachment of the Tamil areas from the country and their potential 

incorporation into a “greater Tamil Nadu” (see Figure 8-1).

Maledives

(Tamil Nadu)

Lakshadweep

(Tamil Nadu)

Trivandrum Kanniyakumari

Puttulum

Mullaittivu

Jaffna

Nagapattinum

Madurai

Alleppey

Cochin

Dindigul

Coimbatore Tiruchchiroppalli

Cuddalore

Puduchcheri

Aruva

Mal Nadu

Nadu

Erumai

Nadu Pool

Nadu

Kuddam

Nadu

Pandi Nadu

Panri Nadu

Punal Nadu

Ven Nadu

Eelam

Salem

Mysore

Mangalore

Bangalore

Kolar Chittoor

Chennai

Trincomalee

Batticaloa

Tirunelveli

Vishala Tamil Nadu

(Greater Tamil Nadu)

by Research Division, Tamil Nadu Liberation Front

Figure 8-1. Greater Tamil Nadu.
282

Part III. Government Countermeasures

Thus the B-C Pact negotiated by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike and 

S. J. V. Chelvanayakam in the mid-1950s was ultimately abrogated by 

the former in the face of pressure from Sinhalese nationalist elements 

in Ceylon. The pact represented an effort by Bandaranaike to mollify the Tamils after the passage of the “Sinhala-only” bill in 1956.a

 As 

part of this effort, Bandaranaike offered to modify an existing draft 

Regional Councils Bill to allow multiple regions to amalgamate across 

provinces.1

 Some amount of governing authority was to be devolved to 

regional councils, and the new revision that Bandaranaike proposed 

would allow both the Northern and Eastern Provinces, each of which 

would constitute a separate region, to combine into a larger political 

entity. Opponents of the bill viewed this proposition as the first step 

in an eventual division of the country. Another controversial provision 

involved the designation of the Tamil language as an official language 

for administrative use in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Language purists viewed this provision as diluting the Sinhala-only act.

One issue that was not addressed by the B-C Pact was the citizenship status of the Indian Tamil workers brought in by the British in the 

nineteenth and twentieth centuries to work on agricultural plantations 

in the interior of the island. As noted in Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions, by the mid-twentieth century, the population of Indian Tamils 

slightly outnumbered the Sri Lankan Tamil population. The Sinhalese 

were deeply suspicious of the Indian Tamils, so much so that shortly 

after independence the central government denied Indian Tamils Ceylonese citizenship through the passage of the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 

1948 and the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act of 1949. 

In addition to diluting the Kandyan Sinhalese vote in the interior of 

the island (had Indian Tamils been given the vote), Sinhalese concerns 

centered on fears that the Indian Tamils were potential fifth-columnists with greater loyalty to India than Ceylon.

For Bandaranaike, the effort to devolve authority to subnational 

political units in the 1950s was consistent with efforts earlier in his 

political career to enact a federal structure for the country. Thus, 

although he rode to power in 1956 on a wave of messianic SinhaleseBuddhist nationalism that would not countenance the devolution of 

central authority to the Tamil regions of the country, in the 1920s he 

espoused federalism for Ceylon as head of the Progressive Nationalist Party.2

 Also, as a minister of local government in the State Council 

a As noted in Chapter 3. Historical Context, another measure designed to mollify Tamil 

opinion was the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act No. 28 of 1958, which addressed 

the use of the Tamil language for educational instruction, for administrative purposes in 

the Northern and Eastern Provinces, and for test-taking purposes for admittance into the 

civil service. However, subsequent legislation needed for the implementation of this act 

was not submitted for parliamentary approval until 1966.
Chapter 8. Government Countermeasures

283

when Ceylon was still under British rule, he was the main advocate 

for a provincial council system (modeled on British County Councils) 

that devolved authority down to the provincial level.3

 Besides opposition from Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalists, opposition to the regional 

councils also came from cabinet ministers, as the councils would inevitably involve the dilution of the powers of central government ministries, and cabinet ministers were not eager to see a reduction in their 

political and administrative authority that would have resulted with the 

enactment of the Regional Councils Bill.4

In August 1958, pressure by bhikkus and SLFP extremists within 

his party, as well as communal riots in May, forced Bandaranaike to 

abandon the B-C Pact. The UNP returned to power in March 1960, 

but after a vote of noconfidence a new election was held a few months 

later in July. Before this subsequent election, the opposition SLFP won 

the support of the Tamil Federal Party by indicating its willingness to 

implement the B-C Pact. The ruling UNP made an issue of their collaboration and charged that the two parties had made a secret deal to 

partition the country.5

 Despite these exaggerated charges, the SLFP 

won the election; yet once in power, it reneged on its promise to implement the B-C Pact, owing to concerns over the potential reaction of 

Sinhalese extremists within and outside the party.

Efforts to reach an accommodation with the Tamils were revived 

in the mid-1960s with the S-C Pact, which called for the devolution of 

authority over colonization schemes and other issues to district councils. The pact noted that the proposed district councils would not be 

able to amalgamate and that employees of these bodies would be representatives of the central government. Additionally, Prime Minister 

Dudley Senanayake emphasized that the national government would 

have direct authority over the councils, as these regional bodies were to 

fall under the authority of the office of the prime minister.6

 Nonetheless, in mid-1969, Senanayake was forced to abandon a District Councils Bill that would have implemented the pact in the face of pressure 

from opposition parties and Buddhist activists animated by fears that 

the legislation was the first step along a slippery slope that culminated 

in the partition of the island.

As described in Chapter 5. Government and Politics, in 1972 the character of the Sri Lankan state was ethno-nationalized along SinhaleseBuddhist lines, as the new constitution enacted that year elevated the 

status of Buddhism and designated Sinhala as the sole official language 

of the country. These factors, along with revised university admission 

policies that made Tamil entry into higher education more difficult, 

led to the mobilization and radicalization of the Tamil population, 

especially among those Tamils residing in the Northern Province. At 
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Part III. Government Countermeasures

this time the TUF/TULF was formed, which brought together the two 

main Tamil political parties, the Tamil Congress and the Tamil Federal Party, as well as the Ceylon Workers’ Congress, which represented 

Indian plantation workers.

After the passage of the 1972 constitution in May, the TUF called 

for a hartal and a day of mourning, and on May 24 black flags were 

flown, schools were boycotted, and buses were stoned. Additionally, a 

TUF youth leader blatantly threatened Tamil members of parliament 

who voted for the new constitution, by stating that “the six Tamils who 

voted for the new constitution would not die by illness, by accident or 

by natural causes, but would meet their death by some other ways.”7

 In 

May 1972, the TUF also put together a program known as the Six-Point 

Plan, which consisted of a number of demands, including the equal 

parity of the Tamil and Sinhala languages, the extension of citizenship 

rights to all Indian plantation workers, the formal commitment to a 

secular state in which no single religion was given preference, and the 

establishment of a decentralized system of government.8

 However, by 

this stage, separatist sentiment had gained traction among Tamil youth, 

especially those within the lower middle class, who had the least to 

lose economically and politically in a struggle for independence.9

 They 

began to organize into militant groups that agitated for a separate state 

and placed pressure on TUF politicians to seek the same objective. For 

instance, the Tamil Youth League, started in 1970, later became the 

Tamil New Tigers, and the military wing of this organization, which 

was organized by Prabhakaran, became the LTTE in May 1976.

During this time, the security situation in the north rapidly deteriorated, as criminal groups engaged in thefts of cars and robberies of 

banks and government institutions to raise funds to carry out political 

killings.10 Assassination squads also emerged that targeted Sinhalese 

politicians and Tamil leaders sympathetic to the government. The first 

political murder in the north was carried out by Prabhakaran and two 

associates in July  1975 when they murdered Alfred Duraiappah, the 

progovernment Tamil mayor of Jaffna.11 Links between the militants 

and the TUF were reportedly very close at this time, as indicated by 

one activist:

[TUF leader Appapillai] Amirthalingam gave support 

to our activities. He gave us a political cover, a political 

justification for all that we did. He was the mass leader 

although Chelvanayakam was the figurehead . . . We 

did whatever the TUF asked us to do.12

However, the government at this time was not sure whether the 

TULF’s desire for a separate state was genuine or simply reflected pressure exerted by Tamil militants as well as the desire to consolidate its 
Chapter 8. Government Countermeasures

285

political position among the Tamil electorate.13 In any case, after the 

1977 elections in which he was made leader of the opposition, Amirthalingam reportedly wrote letters of reference on government stationary 

to raise funds for the LTTE and other Tamil insurgent groups.14

Additionally at this time, the police in the north contained fewer 

and fewer Tamils, and their absence aggravated ethnic tensions. Before 

the 1960s, given the onerousness of caste restrictions and rules of 

behavior in Tamil society, the Sinhalese officers that served in Jaffna 

were viewed as impartial arbiters of caste-based conflicts.15 However, as 

political violence erupted in the north during the 1970s, the government increasingly regarded Tamil officers as either unreliable or ineffective, and as a result the police eventually consisted almost entirely 

of Sinhalese.16,17 Very few of these officers spoke Tamil, and another 

difficulty they faced was the unwillingness of the local populace, for 

fear of retribution by Tamil militants, to act as informants and provide 

information regarding politically motivated crimes.18 These factors led 

to a breakdown in communication between the police and the local 

inhabitants, causing frustration among the police as they were unable 

to effectively apprehend the perpetrators of politically motivated acts 

of violence and robbery. The security forces were increasingly seen as 

an army of occupation by the inhabitants of Jaffna, and the frustration felt by these forces likely manifested in a number of police abuses 

that occurred at this time, from the mass arrests and torture of Tamil 

youths to the killing of nine people during the fourth International 

Conference of Tamil Research in Jaffna.19

The actions of the police in Jaffna, the government’s policy on 

university admissions and language, and the frustrations felt by the 

educated unemployed among Tamil youth led to the final break with 

the idea of federalism and led the Tamil political class to support outright independence, as communicated in the Vaddukoddai Resolution of May 1976. In addition to calling for a separate Tamil state in 

the Northern and Eastern Provinces, the resolution promised to offer 

Eelam citizenship to all Tamil-speaking citizens throughout the island 

and to Tamils of “Eelam origin” in the diaspora.20 From the Sinhalese 

perspective, in addition to its blasphemous nature, an independent 

Tamil state on the island would be an unmitigated socioeconomic and 

demographic disaster, as indicated by the following statement from an 

observer at that time:

Eelam will create an explosive socio-economic situation in the island. One third of the island would . . . be 

carved out for less than 1/6 of the population. The 

remaining 85  percent of the population will be 

cramped into the North-Central, South, Western and 
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Part III. Government Countermeasures

Central parts of the country. They would have less of 

the sea as an outlet. There is already acute landlessness 

in these areas. A good portion of the under-populated 

area that could be developed would be in “Eelam.” 

This is bound to cause much social tension inside the 

reduced Sri Lanka and the proposed Eelam . . . how 

fair is the Tamil leaders’ demand to reserve the colonization of the Northern and Eastern Provinces exclusively for the Tamils?21

Additionally, as previously noted, a more ominous concern centered on fears that the Tamils would not be content with simply independence. By 1981, nearly a third of the Sri Lankan Tamil population 

lived in predominantly Sinhalese areas,22 and combined with the large 

Indian Tamil population, these demographic realities likely helped 

motivate Sinhalese fears that the Sri Lankan Tamils sought to annex 

the island within a broader south Indian Dravidastan situated within 

the Indian federation.23

Prior to the 1977 elections, the TULF appealed to Tamil voters 

by running on a separatist platform, calling on Tamils to vote for the 

party to establish an independent Tamil state by peaceful means or 

other measures. In contrast, the UNP, then in opposition, took a conciliatory approach by calling for an all-party conference to develop constitutional reforms that would address minority grievances, and also 

called for the decentralization of governmental authority to district 

development councils. It also vowed to take actions to address Tamil 

grievances regarding education, language, colonization, and employment in the public sector. In the ensuing elections, the UNP won a fivesixth majority in the legislature, while the “antisystem” TULF secured 

eighteen parliamentary seats against the eight seats won by the SLFP, 

thereby making the TULF’s Amirthalingam the leader of the opposition. Support for Eelam was quite strong in the Northern Province, 

with 68.7 percent of the voters in that region voting for the TULF. In 

contrast, support for Eelam in the ethnically mixed Eastern Province 

was much more subdued, with the TULF garnering only 27.1 percent 

of the vote, but overall the Tamils in the north and east voted in support of the TULF’s separatist platform.24,25

Tamil militants took the results as vindication of the separatist 

agenda and therefore proceeded to wage a campaign to extricate the 

Sri Lankan state from the north and east of the country. In all likelihood, the young Tamil militants were influenced by the example of 

Sinhalese youth supporting the JVP insurgency in 1971, and indeed 

imprisoned Tamil militants reportedly met JVP insurgents in jail.26

Also, violence was widespread after the election. Commencing as 
Chapter 8. Government Countermeasures

287

violence between UNP and SLFP supporters, the violence subsequently 

took on a communal hue as Sinhalese mobs took out their frustrations 

against the Tamils. The riots were motivated in part by false rumors 

that Buddhist temples had been burned and Sinhalese murdered in 

the north, although observers also noted that inflammatory speeches 

made by Tamil leaders in support of Eelam also fanned the flames of 

violence against Tamils.27 As a result of this latest iteration of communal violence, the Sinhalese were ethnically cleansed from the Jaffna 

peninsula, while thousands of Tamils were forced to escape from the 

south. Radical Tamil youth groups encouraged the removal of Sinhalese from the north and the settlement of Indian Tamils in their place 

to reinforce the Tamil identity of the north and east and to create a buffer zone against prospective Sinhalese settlers moving into the region.28

To show solidarity with their Sri Lankan brethren, the DMK in Tamil 

Nadu organized a strike to protest the postelection treatment of Tamils.

With its victory in 1977, the UNP proceeded to amend the constitution and political structure of the country, adopting a presidential form 

of government that incorporated elements from the American, French, 

and British systems. With respect to national security, the president 

was made commander-in-chief of the armed forces as well as minister 

of defense.

Given the highly influential role the president would play in terms 

of directing government policy in meeting the challenges posed by the 

LTTE and JVP, the rest of this chapter concerning government countermeasures is organized by presidential administration.

JUNIUS RICHARD JAYEWARDENE 

ADMINISTRATION (1977–1989)

In February 1978, J. R. Jayewardene of the UNP became the president of Sri Lanka under the newly adopted constitution, and his government pursued a two-pronged strategy toward the Tamil issue that 

involved a conciliatory approach toward the TULF combined with a 

harsh crackdown on Tamil militants in the north.29 With respect to 

the former, the UNP’s election manifesto issued before the 1977 vote 

stated:

The United National Party accepts the position that 

there are numerous problems confronting the Tamilspeaking people. The lack of a solution to their problems has made the Tamil-speaking people even support 

a movement for the creation of a separate state. In the 

interests of national integration and unity so necessary 
288

Part III. Government Countermeasures

for the economic development of the whole country, 

the Party feels that such problems should be solved 

without loss of time. The Party, when it comes to power, 

will take all possible steps to remedy their grievances 

in such fields as:

1. Education

2. Colonization

3. The use of the Tamil Language

4. Employment in the public [sector] and semi-public 

corporations

We will summon an All-Party Conference as stated earlier and implement its decision.30

Indeed, one of the administration’s first acts once in power was to 

rescind the use of language-based ethnic quotas for university admissions, although it maintained a modified district quota system for 

admission to university science departments, whereby fifteen percent 

of all such slots were reserved for students from twelve rural and plantation districts. Additionally, the new constitution contained several 

provisions that addressed Tamil grievances. With respect to language, 

although Article 18 recognized Sinhala as the official language, Article 19 recognized Tamil as a national language that could be used, for 

example, for the purposes of education, receiving and transmitting 

communications with public officials, and conducting public administration and court proceedings in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

Although the prior 1972 constitution consolidated the “Sinhalaonly” policy of 1956, previously the use of the Tamil language had been 

permitted within the limits established by the Tamil Language (Special 

Provisions) Act of 1958. However, regulations drafted under the provisions of this act, specifically the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) 

Regulations Act of 1966, were regarded as “subordinate legislation.”31

So in theory subsequent legislation or even administrative decisions 

could override the language rights entailed in these provisions. However, the impact of the language provisions of the 1978 constitution was 

that this ability to override provisions was no longer possible, and that 

going forward the language rights enjoyed by Tamils could be modified only through constitutional amendments.

Additionally, as noted in Chapter 5. Government and Politics, a system 

of proportional representation was adopted, which dulled the extremist tendencies of the main Sinhalese parties (the UNP and SLFP) as 

they now had to work to build greater consensus with Tamil voters, as 

this group now played a more decisive role in determining electoral 

outcomes. The new constitution also extended to Indian Tamils the 
Chapter 8. Government Countermeasures

289

fundamental rights contained within the 1972 constitution,b

 and during the process of forming the new constitution, the government was 

able to withstand pressure by Sinhalese nationalists to elevate Buddhism to the status of a state religion and to restrict the presidency to 

a Sinhalese Buddhist.33

The new constitution did not offer any concessions regarding federalism, and in fact it asserted that Sri  Lanka was a unitary state.34

However, Jayewardene’s administration did initiate a new effort at 

devolving authority to subnational units, this time down to the district 

level with the establishment of District Development Councils (DDC) 

in 1980. The UNP had made reference to the DDCs in its election manifesto in 1977, but communal violence put these plans on hold. Yet in 

August 1979, a ten-member Presidential Commission including TULF 

representation was established to investigate the devolution of administration to DDCs. The TULF’s participation augured in a period of 

positive cooperation between the party and the UNP government, as 

the party began to temper its agitation for a separate state, and TULF 

ministers of parliament held regular meetings with President Jayewardene and his cabinet to discuss the management of ethnic issues.35 At 

this time, there was also a noticeable improvement in the security situation in the Jaffna peninsula, and so in the midst of this more positive 

atmosphere, the Development Councils Act was passed by parliament 

in August 1980.

The DDCs were led by a district minister and consisted of ministers 

of parliament from the district, elected leaders of local bodies, and 

government officials. Elections for the DDCs were held in June 1981, 

and although they had to be postponed in Jaffna because of terrorist 

violence, the DDCs did manage to dampen separatist agitation in the 

Jaffna peninsula, where in rescheduled elections the TULF took every 

seat on the council. Nevertheless, there were some complaints from 

Tamils that the DDCs did not have sufficient authority, such as with 

respect to initiating development projects on their own initiative. Additionally, they were not appropriately financed, and the operation of the 

DDCs was also hampered by bureaucratic, electoral, and financial considerations. Specifically, there was a delay in the delegation of authorities and administrative functions from cabinet to district ministers, as 

the former were unsure of their roles with respect to the delegated 

b In 1964, India and Ceylon reached an agreement regarding the status of Indian 

residents on the island. The agreement called for the repatriation of 525,000 Indian residents of Ceylon over a fifteen-year period and the absorption of 300,000 as citizens of the 

island nation. There was still a balance of 150,000 Indian residents that were not covered 

by the 1964 agreement, and in 1974, it was decided that half would be repatriated while 

the other half would become Sri Lankan citizens. However, even after this agreement, 

50,000 to 75,000 Indian residents were left over for further consideration.32
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Part III. Government Countermeasures

functions within the new administrative setup.36 And the implementation of the DDCs was slowed down as attention was turned to the September 1982 presidential elections and by budget cuts in 1982–1983.37

The UNP’s policy of conciliation toward the TULF, however, came 

to an abrupt end in July 1983 when anti-Tamil riots erupted throughout 

the country in response to an LTTE ambush that resulted in the deaths 

of thirteen soldiers in Jaffna.c The timing of the attack was not an accident. An all-party conference was scheduled to meet at the end of July 

to discuss remaining issues in the ethnic conflict, and at the time of the 

attack the TULF had organized a party convention to discuss whether 

to participate. Hence, the attack sent the very clear message that militant Tamil youth desired a separation from the state rather than a 

peaceful political resolution that entailed the Northern and Eastern 

Provinces remaining within a potentially federalized state. The attack 

achieved its objective, as afterward Jayewardene went on state television 

to state that the policy of conciliating the TULF and separatist forces 

was a mistake, and he promised firm steps to deal with the separatist 

threat.38 In early August 1983 parliament passed the sixth amendment 

to the constitution outlawing political parties that advocated separatism. Every TULF minister of parliament forfeited their seat by refusing 

to take an oath disavowing the advocacy of separatism, and in fact the 

TULF leadership left for Tamil Nadu and thus abdicated leadership of 

the Tamil cause to Tamil militant groups.39

Eelam War I commenced after the July 1983 riots, yet before the 

formal outbreak of hostilities the government had been taking aggressive actions against militant groups in the north. In May 1978 parliament passed a bill proscribing the LTTE and similar organizations 

for one year, which was extended one year later, and in July 1979 the 

government imposed emergency rule in Jaffna. President Jayewardene 

decided to launch a war on Tamil terrorism when he ordered Army 

Brigadier Tissa Weeratunga to “eliminate the menace of terrorism in 

all its forms from the island and more specially from Jaffna District” 

within six  months.40 In July, the government also enacted new legal 

instruments to deal with Tamil terrorism, specifically the Prevention of 

Terrorism Act (PTA), which had been modeled on legislation enacted 

by Britain to counter the violence perpetrated by the Irish Republican Army.41 The PTA allowed the government to hold suspects without 

trial for up to eighteen months, and suspects could be tried on charges 

on the basis of confessions that were inadmissible under existing laws. 

In March  1982 the PTA was made a permanent piece of legislation, 

and in December 1982 the government held and subsequently won a 

c See Chapter 3. Historical Context for more details surrounding this episode of communal violence.
Chapter 8. Government Countermeasures

291

referendum to extend the life of the parliament for another six years 

rather than hold elections in 1983. The government justified this move 

by arguing that the possibility of election violence, a “Naxalite”d threat 

from radical elements in the SLFP, and the need to deal with Tamil terrorism necessitated an extension of the current government.e

Although the security situation had improved somewhat in the 

Jaffna peninsula as the UNP government pursued a policy of conciliation toward the TULF, Tamil militants had not remained quiet during this time. In September 1978 an aircraft belonging to Air Ceylon 

was blown up on the runway of Ratmalana airport outside of Colombo 

during celebrations commemorating the new constitution. The aircraft 

was empty at the time, but the explosive device had been timed to go 

off when the aircraft was flying over Colombo.44 And President Jayewardene’s order to eliminate terrorism came after the police inspector for 

Jaffna was killed at the latter’s residence.45

By the end of 1979, the army had become a key component of the 

peacekeeping force in the Northern Province, and in August 1982 the 

Special Task Force (STF), a new police paramilitary force, opened a 

training camp and interrogation center in Elephant Pass, which connects the Jaffna peninsula with the rest of the island.46,47 The government also boosted military spending during this period. Expenditure 

on defense increased from forty million dollars (1.5 percent of gross 

national product) in 1978 to two hundred million (3.5 percent of te 

gross national product) by 1985.48 Additionally, the government established the Ministry of National Security in March 1984 to coordinate 

counterinsurgent activities, and it instituted a surveillance zone covering most of the north and northwestern coastal region to counter the 

increasing flow of men and arms between Jaffna and Tamil Nadu.49

Even before the outbreak of Eelam War I, India, and especially the 

Tamil Nadu state government, had become increasingly concerned over 

the budding ethnic conflict in Sri  Lanka. The first contact between 

Sri Lankan Tamil activists and Tamil Nadu officials occurred in 1972, 

when members from the Tamil Manavi Peravi, a Sri  Lankan Tamil 

youth group committed to armed struggle, met with E. V. R. Periya, 

d Naxalite is a generic term used to refer to militant communist movements operating 

in various parts of India.

e A key factor motivating the desire to extend the life of the government involved 

the legality of maintaining a state of emergency for an extended period of time. A simple 

parliamentary majority was needed to impose a state of emergency in response to outbreaks of communal violence, but a two-thirds majority was needed to extend the state of 

emergency beyond three months. The UNP had secured an overwhelming majority in the 

last parliamentary election in 1977, yet under the new proportional representation system, 

it was unsure whether it would be able to secure two-thirds of the seats in parliament in 

1983.42,43
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who was then the leader of Tamil Nadu.50 As indicated in Chapter 7. 

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a number of training camps were 

established in Tamil Nadu and elsewhere in India to train Tamil militants, and some of these camps were in operation before the anti-Tamil 

riots of July 1983.51 Additionally, the Tamil Nadu government provided 

offices, telephones, residences, and other facilities to assist Sri Lankan 

Tamil insurgents in their campaign of armed struggle.52

As previously noted, a variety of factors led India to take a substantial interest in the brewing ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Perhaps most 

importantly, electoral politics and fears of separatism within India led 

it to become heavily involved in Sri Lanka. Tamil Nadu (which translates as “Tamil Country”) was established in the mid-1950s as a concession to the powerful force of linguistic nationalism in India, and 

the key political actors within Tamil Nadu that championed linguistic nationalism at this time were the Dravida Kazhagam (DK) and the 

DMK, which was a breakaway faction of the DK. After the passage of 

the sixteenth  amendment to the Indian constitution, which banned 

secessionist parties and the promotion of secession, the DK had to temper its separatist impulses, and it ultimately reconciled itself to championing greater autonomy within India itself. K. M. de Silva noted that 

the group, barred from advocating the detachment of Tamil Nadu 

from India, took vicarious pleasure in encouraging and supporting the 

Tamil separatist movement in Sri Lanka.53

Still, as the ethnic conflict in Sri  Lanka accelerated in the late 

1970s, the ruling Indian National Congress led by Indira Gandhi had 

to pay attention to the plight of Sri Lanka’s Tamils to bolster its own 

support among the Tamil population in India. Stated bluntly, there 

were no Sinhalese votes in India, so when communal tensions broke 

out in Sri Lanka, the Indian government had to take measures to demonstrate that it was concerned about the welfare of Sri Lanka’s Tamils.54

Yet the fear of Tamil separatism in India itself remained a motivating 

factor in the minds of some Indian officials. Commenting on why India 

intervened in the conflict later in 1987, J. N. Dixit, the Indian ambassador to Sri Lanka in 1987, made a frank admission:

The first reason why we went to Sri Lanka was the interest to preserve our own unity . . . what the Tamils in 

Sri Lanka were being compelled to follow in terms of 

their life . . . would have affected our polity. Let us not 

forget that the first voice of secessionism in the Indian 

Republic was raised in Tamil Nadu in the mid-sixties. 

This was exactly the same principle of Tamil ethnicity. . . . So, in a manner, our interests in the Tamil issue 

in Sri Lanka, Tamil aspirations in Sri Lanka, was based 
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293

on maintaining our own unity, our own integrity, our 

own identity in the manner we have been trying to 

build our society.55

Such fears of separatism had been fanned by Tamil politicians in 

India. At a September 1984 public rally in Madras, the leader of the 

DMK indicated that unless the Indian government sent in troops to 

save the Sri Lankan Tamils, the DMK would have no other option but 

to revive its abandoned policy of working to promote a separate state 

for the Tamils of India.56 Additionally, an incident in August 1985 was 

also quite telling. After Tamil representatives walked out of Indianmediated talks with the Sri Lankan government in Thimpu, Bhutan 

(discussed below in this chapter), the Indian government ordered the 

expulsion from Tamil Nadu of LTTE spokesman Anton Balasingham, 

TELO spokesman N. Satyendra, and S .C. Chandrahasan, the son of 

the late prominent Tamil politician S.  J.  V. Chelvanayakam. Within 

forty-eight  hours, opposition parties in Tamil Nadu organized large 

street protests against the order, and the leader of the DK warned:

If the orders are not withdrawn, [Rajiv] Gandhi will 

face agitations like Punjab and Assam [i.e., ongoing 

secessionist struggles in those areas] and we will not 

allow any North Indian to set foot here.57

Tamil militants were quite aware of the electoral and separatist 

pressures motivating the Indian government to become involved in 

Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan government’s establishment of a surveillance 

zone in the north and northwestern coastal region in November 1984 to 

curtail the movement of arms and militants between Tamil Nadu and 

Jaffna began to impact the livelihood of residents in fishing communities, as a ban was placed on fishing in that area. Many residents decided 

to leave their homes and become refugees in Tamil Nadu, thereby demonstrating the porous nature of the surveillance zone. K. M. de Silva 

noted that the TULF leadership and Tamil militants took measures to 

increase this refugee flow into Tamil Nadu in order to force the Indian 

government to intervene militarily in Sri Lanka to carve out a separate state, as it did when it intervened in East Pakistan in 1971 (several 

months after nearly ten million Bangladeshis fled to the Indian state of 

West Bengal) to create Bangladesh.58

Interestingly, there are indications that the “Bangladesh model” 

was considered by Indira Gandhi. According to Gunaratna, when President Jayewardene refused to implement a devolution package known 

as Annexure  C (discussed later in this chapter), Gandhi told R.  N. 

Kao, her national security advisor (who was involved in the Bangladeshi operation), to “repeat the success of the Bangladesh operation in 
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Sri Lanka.”59 Gunaratna also noted that shortly before Gandhi’s death 

in October 1984, the Indian prime minister was under significant pressure by Tamil politicians and bureaucrats to invade Sri Lanka. Invasion 

plans were drawn up and mobilization had commenced, but the invasion never occurred once the prime minister was assassinated by her 

Sikh bodyguards.60

Additionally, as previously noted, international security concerns 

also led India to take an active interest in the ethnic conflict. In the 

early 1970s, India did not intervene in the emerging conflict as Gandhi 

had a close and personal relationship with Sri Lankan Prime Minister 

Sirimavo Bandaranaike.61 Yet India’s position changed when the center-right Jayewardene assumed power in 1977. As previously indicated, 

Gandhi and Jayewardene did not enjoy a good relationship, and suspicions were raised in New Delhi once the new Sri Lankan leader liberalized the economy. Suddenly, Sri Lanka was now answerable to external 

interests, especially the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, 

and with reliance on Western capital, the diplomats at India’s Ministry 

of External Affairs believed it was only a matter of time before Sri Lanka 

began receiving Western military aid to combat Tamil separatists.62

Additionally, as previously indicated in Chapter 3. Historical Context, 

India’s experience under colonial rule led Indian planners to conclude 

that the country had come under European domination because external powers—rather than India—controlled the Indian Ocean pathway 

to the subcontinent.63,64 As one Indian admiral stated, “Independent 

India’s wars might have been fought on the land borders of the north, 

but those outsiders who came here and ruled us came through the 

ocean.”65 Although a champion of the nonaligned movement, India 

had traditionally tilted toward the Soviet Union. Hence, once Jayewardene began to align Sri Lanka along a more pro-Western orientation, 

Indian officials began to develop a heightened fear that a hostile power 

would develop influence in Colombo and perhaps obtain permission 

to station naval vessels at the port of Trincomalee. Indian strategists 

remembered how, during the Indo-Pakistani war in 1971, Pakistani 

aircraft carrying reinforcements to East Pakistan were permitted to 

refuel in Colombo on their way to Dhaka, and so they were concerned 

that the port of Trincomalee would be used for a similar purpose in a 

future conflict.66

Hence, India grew alarmed in July 1983 when a well-placed source 

in the Sri  Lankan Army provided information regarding Americanf

and Israeli military assistance to Colombo, Sri Lanka’s relationship with 

Pakistan and China, and the assistance the Sri Lankan Army was getting 

f Gunaratna reports, however, that the United States ultimately did not provide military assistance to Jayewardene.67
Chapter 8. Government Countermeasures

295

from a private British security firm that included former Special Air 

Service officers.68 Shortly thereafter, as previously indicated, in August 

1983 Indira Gandhi made the decision to support the Tamil insurgencyg

 to pressure the Sri Lankan government to refrain from seeking 

a military solution to the ethnic conflict, and over concerns regarding 

Sri Lanka’s cooperation with outside powers. After this decision, India’s 

Research and Analysis Wing was given permission to provide training, 

financing and weapons to Sri Lankan Tamil insurgent groups.70

With respect to the United States, India was concerned that an 

expansion of the Voice of America’s relay station north of Colombo 

would be equipped with surveillance equipment to collect information 

on India,71 and it was also concerned that American warships would gain 

access to Trincomalee.h India was also worried over Pakistani training of 

senior Sri Lankan officers, and it also suspected that Pakistan’s premier 

intelligence agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, was 

assisting Colombo.73 Taken together, from India’s perspective, Jayewardene’s ultimate sin may have been his desire to conduct an independent foreign policy that did not pay sufficient homage to India’s place 

within the regional distribution of power. As noted by India’s Foreign 

Secretary in a 1986 communication to Gunaratna, Jayewardene “failed 

to acknowledge India as the leading regional power” and had “acted 

contrary to India’s geostrategic/political and security interests.”74

After the July 1983 riots, the chief minister of Tamil Nadu, M. G. 

Ramachandran, himself an Indian Tamil born in Sri  Lanka, urged 

Indira Gandhi to intervene in Sri Lanka to protect the Tamils, arguing that India’s intervention in East Pakistan and the secession of Bangladesh formed a precedent for intervention in Sri  Lanka.75 Gandhi 

instead adopted a diplomatic approach, telephoning Jayewardene to 

pressure him to control the ensuing violence and sending Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao to Colombo to assess the situation.i

 Rao’s trip commenced a period, lasting until the Indo-Sri  Lanka Treaty four  years 

later, during which India was to play a prominent role in mediating 

g Bandarage also reports that, after returning to power in 1980, Gandhi encouraged 

the chief minister of Tamil Nadu, M. G. Ramachandran, to provide covert support to Sri 

Lankan Tamil insurgents. As a consequence, the number of training camps in Tamil Nadu 

training Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents increased, as did the supply of weapons provided to 

the insurgents.69

h Interestingly, Sri Lankan officials believed that the United States desperately 

needed Trincomalee, yet Gunaratna reports that the US ambassador to Sri Lanka indicated that the United States was not interested in the port.72

i Gandhi’s principal advisors on Sri Lanka, Gopalaswami Parthasarathy and later 

P. Chidambaram, may not have been impartial observers of affairs on the island. Both 

were south Indian Tamils that were partial to Sri Lanka’s Tamils, and Chidambaram had 

once participated in pro-Tamil demonstrations in Tamil Nadu against the Sri Lankan 

government.76
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negotiations between the TULF and Tamil militants on the one hand 

and the Sri  Lankan government on the other. India, however, was 

hardly an honest broker—at the same time RAW was covertly aiding 

Sri Lankan Tamil militants as they waged their campaign against the 

Sri Lankan state during Eelam War I.

Toward the end of 1983, India helped bring together the Sri Lankan 

government and the TULF for talks, which did not produce any results. 

An all-party conference was later held in January  1984. After the 

July 1983 riots, the TULF had withdrawn its support for the DDCs, arguing that they did not meet the needs of the Tamils for greater autonomy 

after the riots.77 They decided to participate in the all-party conference 

to negotiate for a more comprehensive devolution of power along the 

contours set out in the 1957 B-C Pact, by supporting the creation of provincial councils and overarching regional councils that would permit 

the formation of a subnational political unit encompassing the Northern and Eastern Provinces.78 India also supported the TULF’s position. 

However, although India provided support to Sri  Lankan separatist 

groups, it had no interest in seeing an independent Tamil state on 

Sri Lanka, because its establishment would set a precedent that would 

encourage separatist movements within India itself. Hence, India supported the TULF’s position on the belief that the former’s support for a 

more comprehensive devolution of power would moderate the TULF’s 

inclination toward separatism.79

The outcome of the all-party conference was a list of proposals 

known as Annexure C. As called for in this document, DDCs within a 

province were permitted to combine into one or more regional councils, and so the DDCs within the Northern and Eastern Provinces 

were permitted to amalgamate within each province. Left unclear was 

whether the DDCs in the north and east were permitted to combine 

into an overarching regional council that would span the Northern 

and Eastern Provinces. The TULF believed that Annexure C did not go 

far enough in the direction of autonomy, whereas most non-Tamil opinion at the conference believed that Annexure C opened the gates to 

Tamil Eelam.80,81 The UNP government ultimately was also opposed to 

Annexure C, with President Jayewardene going back on his promise to 

Indira Gandhi that Annexure C would be implemented. In response, 

Gandhi placed more importance on the covert support provided by 

RAW to Tamil separatist groups.82

The next round of discussions occurred in Thimpu, Bhutan, in 

July 1985 after a cease-fire agreed to in June with Indian assistance. 

India had also managed to convince the Sri  Lankan government to 

meet with representatives of the various Tamil militant groups, something which, up until the end of 1984, it had refused to do.83 In Thimpu, 
Chapter 8. Government Countermeasures

297

representatives from the Sri Lankan government met with representatives from TULF and from TELO, PLOTE, LTTE, EROS, and EPRLF. 

The Tamil representatives indicated that the Sri Lankan government 

had to accept four nonnegotiable principles, which were subsequently 

regarded as the “Thimpu principles:”

1. Recognition of the Sri Lankan Tamils as a distinct nationality

2. Recognition of an independent Tamil homeland and the 

guarantee of its territorial integrity

3. Recognition of the unalienable right of self-determination 

of the Tamil nation

4. Recognition of the right to full citizenship and other 

fundamental democratic rights of all Tamils who look upon 

Sri Lanka as their country

The first three principles were reiterations of previous Tamil 

demands that were rejected by past Sri  Lankan governments,84 and 

so talks broke down as the Sri Lankan government again refused to 

accept them.

Violence picked up again after the failure of the Thimpu talks, and 

in February 1986, the government indicated that any agreement to end 

the conflict had to incorporate nine conditions, including the abandonment of the objective of an independent state, the ending of hostilities, the closure of insurgent training camps, and the surrender of arms 

by Tamil militants. These conditions were rejected by the Sri Lankan 

Tamil leadership.85 Subsequent efforts to reach an agreement were 

made by President Jayewardene and two Indian ministers of state, and 

their discussions led to a set of proposals known as the December 19 

proposals, which emerged at the end of 1986. These proposals called 

for removing Ampara, a Sinhalese-majority district, from the Eastern 

Province and merging the remaining two districts (Trincomalee and 

Batticaloa) with the Northern Province within a federal system.

This effort also found resistance among Tamils and Sinhalese. 

Tamils in the Eastern Province, who shared the province with sizeable Sinhalese and Muslim communities, were receptive to this latest 

effort. However, Prabhakaran was noncommittal because the proposal 

fell short of establishing a separate state.86 Among the Sinhalese, various groups mobilized against the proposals. Both the SLFP and the 

JVP came out against this latest attempt at devolution, and a Sinhalese 

nationalist organization called Maubima Surakeeme Viyaparaya (MSV, 

the Movement to Protect the Motherland) was organized by several 

prominent Buddhist monks to oppose the proposals.87 Although this 

latest effort failed at resolving the conflict, the proposals did form a 

basis for the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord of 1987.88
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Part III. Government Countermeasures

After the failure of these efforts, the combatants returned to the 

battlefield. Additionally, the LTTE began to consolidate its rule in the 

Jaffna peninsula. First, it took actions to decimate the other Tamil militant groups. For instance, as mentioned in Chapter 7. Liberation Tigers 

of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), it killed 150 members of TELO and seventy 

to eighty members of the EPRLF, and it wiped out nearly the entire 

EPRLF politburo in Madras.89 Additionally, as previously mentioned, 

it began to establish its own state institutions to supplant those of the 

Sri Lankan state, and in early 1987, once the LTTE announced that 

it would issue its own vehicle licenses and rationing measures, the 

Sri Lankan minister of national security placed an embargo on all fuel 

supplies and threatened to cut off food and electricity from the south.90

However, the government relaxed the fuel embargo in response to 

Indian pressure.

The LTTE also undertook a number of horrific terrorist attacks, 

which led the government to seek a military solution to the conflict. 

On April 17, 1987, the LTTE massacred 127 Sinhalese bus passengers 

traveling on the Trincomalee-Habarana Road, and several days later, a 

car bomb exploded in Colombo’s main market, killing 113 and injuring more than 200 people.91 In response, in May 1987 the government 

launched Operation Liberation to take back the Jaffna peninsula. It was 

able to capture Vadamarachchi, which curtailed the militants’ access to 

Tamil Nadu, and it very nearly captured Prabhakaran as Velvettiturai, 

the LTTE leader’s hometown, also fell to government forces.92

By this point, Jaffna was on the verge of falling and it appeared that 

the LTTE would be defeated with the entire peninsula falling under 

government control. With reports of swelling civilian deaths, Ramachandran, the chief minister of Tamil Nadu, rushed to New Delhi to 

urge Rajiv Gandhi to intervene “to save the Tamils.”93 India initially 

responded on June 3, 1987, by sending a convoy of twenty ships with 

relief supplies to the Jaffna peninsula. This flotilla was intercepted and 

turned back by the Sri Lankan navy, with the government stating that 

relief supplies had already been shipped to the north. With Pakistan 

and China also offering to send humanitarian aid, India decided to 

preempt them by airdropping twenty-two tons of relief supplies on the 

Jaffna peninsula on June 4, in violation of Sri Lanka’s airspace. Jayewardene subsequently described this violation as India’s seventeenth invasion of Sri Lanka over the last 2,500 years.94

A furious round of negotiations among the key participants took 

place behind the scenes to negotiate the settlement that came to be 

known as the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord. Dixit, the Indian high commissioner (i.e., ambassador) in Sri Lanka, met with twelve Sri Lankan 

cabinet ministers to argue that the merger of the Northern and Eastern 
Chapter 8. Government Countermeasures

299

Provinces (the key measure within the upcoming accord) should occur 

before, rather than after, a referendum ratifying it.95 On July 28 in New 

Delhi, Gandhi met with representatives of the TULF, TELO, EPRLF, 

ENDLF, EROS, and PLOTE, and later that day, he met with Prabhakaran to discuss the accord.96

Prabhakaran had previously indicated to an Indian official that 

the LTTE was not prepared to drop its demand for Tamil Eelam.97 For 

Gandhi, however, Eelam was unacceptable,j

 and he had a very difficult 

needle to thread. While he was obligated to intervene in Sri Lanka to 

ensure that separatist impulses in Tamil Nadu remained latent, RAW 

assessments from 1986 indicated that an independent Tamil state in 

Sri Lanka would invigorate the notion of Dravida Desam, or “greater 

Tamil Nadu.”99 Hence, at their meeting, Gandhi’s objective was to convince Prabhakaran to accept a deal that entailed the merger of the 

Northern and Eastern Provinces but fell short of Eelam. Pressed by 

Gandhi, Prabhakaran responded vaguely, indicating that he would support the accord provided that it was consistent with the interests of the 

Tamil people.100 As an inducement, India awarded the LTTE $300,000 

per month, which Prabhakaran planned to use for the financial rehabilitation of LTTE cadres.101

President Jayewardene and Gandhi signed the accord on July 29, 

1987, with Jayewardene under severe pressure both to support and 

to oppose the accord. India’s airdrop of supplies hinted at a military 

intervention,102 yet Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa 

strongly opposed the accord, and Jayewardene had to strong-arm the 

UNP into supporting the agreement by threatening to call for early 

parliamentary elections if the party did not support him.103

Jayewardene was also fearful that a coup was imminent if he did not 

prosecute the war against the Tamil militants until the end.104 Yet he 

felt he needed to agree to the accord because his national security advisor had indicated that the war was not winnable despite the impressive 

recent gains made by the armed forces.105 As he stated to Gunaratna:

[Critics] are now attacking the Accord. I can defend 

that. What was the alternative? Nobody answers. If I 

did not sign the Accord . . . I would have been strung 

by my legs like Mussolini. Who would have been in 

office? The JVP here and the LTTE in the northeast.106

j At this time India, was facing several separatist movements that threatened its unity. 

A separatist movement had been brewing in the Indian state of Assam, and Sikh separatists were pressing for the creation of the state of Khalistan in the Indian Punjab. And by 

1990, the separatist movement in Kashmir was beginning to escalate.98
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Part III. Government Countermeasures

As described in Chapter 6. Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the 

accord itself was highly controversial because it severely restricted the 

ability of Sri  Lanka to conduct an independent foreign policy, and 

it represented a severe intrusion into the domestic affairs of a small 

nation by a regional hegemon. The accord called for the joining of 

the Northern and Eastern Provinces into a single administrative unit 

with one elected provincial council and one chief minister, with a referendum held by the end of 1988 to allow the residents of the Eastern 

Province to decide whether they wanted to link up with the Northern 

Province. Additionally, the Tamil language, which up to that point had 

been a national language, was designated (along with English), as an 

official language, thus joining Sinhala in that category. The reversion to 

provincial councils and the new language provisions required a modification of the 1978 constitution in the form of the thirteenth amendment, which was approved in November 1987.107

A day after the accord was signed, Indian peacekeeping troops 

(the IPKF) began to arrive in Jaffna, and they were warmly received 

by the LTTE and its sympathizers.108 In the south, large street protests 

and antigovernment demonstrations erupted in Colombo. The accord 

required Tamil militant groups to surrender their arms within seventytwo  hours. India promised that its territory would not be used for 

activities harmful to Sri Lanka’s unity and security, and Sri Lanka was 

called on not to engage in activities that were “prejudicial” to India’s 

interests.109 Sri Lanka was required to consult with India regarding its 

reliance on foreign military and intelligence personnel, and it assured 

India that any foreign broadcasting facilities based in Sri Lanka would 

not be used for military or intelligence operations. Additionally, 

Sri Lanka promised to ensure that the port of Trincomalee would not 

be made available to foreign military forces in a manner that was inimical to India’s interests.

Critics charged that the accord turned Sri Lanka into a satellite of 

India, similar to Sikkim (before it was incorporated into India) and 

Bhutan, whose foreign policy is controlled by India.110 Yet the accord 

provided Jayewardene with some breathing room. Aware of the festering JVP rebellion in the south (which received greater support as a 

result of the accord), he knew that his armed forces could not combat 

two insurgent groups (the JVP and the LTTE) at the same time.111 With 

the introduction of Indian troops in the north, the accord allowed him 

to shift his forces to the south to deal with the JVP. In fact, the aircraft 

that were used to transport Indian troops to Sri Lanka were also used 

to transport Sri Lankan troops to the south.112 Yet this move bought 

Jayewardene some time, because it avoided the possibility of a coup 

brought about through a failure to defeat the LTTE.
Chapter 8. Government Countermeasures

301

It was perhaps inevitable, though, that the LTTE and the IPKF 

would come to blows, as the LTTE was fighting and dying not for the 

minimalist goal of greater autonomy within a Sri Lankan state but for 

outright independence, an intolerable outcome for the Indians. Even 

before their 1987 intervention in Sri  Lanka, the Indians had grown 

suspicious of the LTTE. The 1986 RAW assessment warning of the possibility of Dravida Desam also noted that the LTTE had become formidable and was getting difficult to control.113 Once the Indians arrived 

in Sri Lanka, the LTTE grew disenchanted as they alleged that India 

began arming rival militants and establishing bases for them in the 

north and east.114

The spark that set off their conflict occurred in early October 1987 as the Sri Lankan navy arrested seventeen LTTE cadres at 

sea. The Sri Lankan military wanted to bring the captured soldiers to 

Colombo, a moved opposed by the IPKF for fear that it would cause 

significant public unrest in the Jaffna peninsula, which the IPKF 

would be forced to control. The IPKF threatened to use force against 

the Sri Lankan forces to prevent the forcible transfer of the captured 

LTTE cadres to Colombo,115 but the cadres preempted such a possibility by swallowing their cyanide pills, with twelve of the captured LTTE 

members perishing.k

In response to the death of their cadres held by Sri Lankan troops, 

the LTTE executed eight Sri Lankan soldiers it held in custody and displayed their bodies at Jaffna’s main bus terminal.118 It also proceeded to 

massacre 260 Sinhalese men, women, and children in border villages, 

and it also publicly hanged five Indian soldiers. By this time, the IPKF 

had decided to wage war against the LTTE,119 and on October 10, 1987, 

the IPKF commenced a counterinsurgency campaign against the LTTE 

that would last about thirty months. Interestingly, the Tamil Nadu government continued to support the LTTE, providing the group with 

fifty million rupees, and the south Indian state continued to provide 

training and hospital facilities to the group.120 Ethnic solidarity also 

appeared to trump national identity when the Indian government 

was forced to withdraw the Tamil Madrasi Regiment of the IPKF on 

k Officials in Colombo were insistent that the captured LTTE members be sent to 

the capital. At one point, they told Brigadier Jayantha Jayaratne, who held the LTTE cadres in custody (and who was aware of the IPKF threat to use force to prevent the transfer 

of the LTTE members), that he would be relieved of his duties if he did not comply with 

the order to transfer the prisoners to Colombo. Colombo informed Jayaratne that “if 

you don’t send the prisoners to Colombo within the next two hours, you hand over your 

charge to your second-in-command and come to Colombo under house arrest.”116 The 

insistence with which the Sri Lankan government demanded the transfer of the seventeen 

LTTE cadres led Senaratne117 to speculate that the Sri Lankan government was interested 

in provoking a conflict between the LTTE and the IPKF.
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Part III. Government Countermeasures

October 11 because the unit refused to engage in the offensive against 

the LTTE.121

RANASINGHE PREMADASA ADMINISTRATION 

(1989–1993)

The period before the start of the Premadasa presidency was a 

highly turbulent one in Sri Lanka, as the government had to deal with 

the JVP in the south while the IPKF and LTTE battled in the north. 

As mentioned in Chapter 6. Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), during the 

height of the JVP insurgency the UNP government reached out to the 

group to invite it to participate in the political process, going so far as to 

offer to vacate seats in parliament for the group in return for an end to 

the insurgency. Sensing momentum on its side, the group turned down 

the offer and kept up the campaign to decapitate the government.

Ultimately the JVP was destroyed by government-sponsored paramilitary groups, who stepped up an existing campaign against the 

group after the latter’s disastrous decision in August 1989 to issue a 

death threat against the family members of armed forces personnel. 

Additionally, government efforts were supported by one  hundred 

intelligence analysts in five different agencies. These agencies were 

the National Intelligence Bureau, the Counter Subversive Unit, the 

Colombo Detective Bureau, Military Intelligence, and Operations 

Combine.122 Police units fought against the JVP, but when they were 

overwhelmed they were supported by the army. However, army units 

suffered from low morale because they preferred to fight against the 

Tamil Tigers rather than a pro-Sinhalese organization, and they lacked 

the training to fight against an unconventional enemy.123 However, special forces units within the army achieved greater success against the 

group because they had received training in unconventional warfare. 

These units largely concentrated their efforts in eliminating key JVP 

leaders.124

Before the final reckoning in August 1989, the government did consider psychological and political-military actions short of unrestricted 

combat to counter the group. Unfortunately none of these actions was 

pursued as vigorously as the paramilitary campaign. In September 1988 

the ministry of defense contemplated a strategy with two main components to counter the JVP.125 One aspect of this strategy called for the 

identification and elimination of members of the JVP politburo and 

central committee, to include turning a blind eye to extrajudicial killings. However, the second component of the strategy involved a psychological operations campaign targeting moderates and sympathizers of 

the group. Some of the key aspects of this proposed campaign included 
Chapter 8. Government Countermeasures

303

publicizing the awards available to informants providing information 

on the JVP; publicizing the atrocities committed by the group and the 

rationale for cumbersome actions taken by the security forces, such 

as instituting curfews and conducting searches; countering JVP propaganda; and encouraging the JVP to surrender by highlighting the 

lenient treatment and rehabilitation that defectors and cadres would 

receive.126 Yet Gunaratna noted that no military or civilian office, nor 

any high-level official, took responsibility for implementing this psychological operation campaign.127

This strategy also advocated tactics more in line with a counterinsurgency campaign than a kinetic counter-terrorist offensive. Specifically, it called on security forces to leave their bases to live and work 

with the local populace.128 It suggested the development of community 

relations officers selected from the security forces, with responsibility 

for winning the hearts and minds of the local populace. Key among 

their objectives would be convincing the public that a JVP government 

would be disastrous for the country.

To implement this approach the government launched the Winning 

Hearts and Minds Program (WHAM) in March 1989.129 The WHAM 

program called for troops to help provide medical facilities; distribute 

food, books, and clothes; assist with agricultural activities and organize the water supply; and help maintain other essential services. It also 

called for troops to have a continuous dialogue with local residents. 

The JVP was quite concerned with this program and attempted to disrupt its implementation, but they had little reason to worry because 

most troops stayed inside camps and left the villages to the JVP.130

With respect to the Tamil insurgency, President Jayewardene was 

initially supportive of an Indian crackdown on the LTTE.131 Yet quite 

quickly, the Sri  Lankan government changed its thinking, which 

resulted in a convergence of interests between the government and 

the LTTE in seeing the IPKF withdrawn from the island. Premadasa 

wanted the IPKF to leave to remove a rallying cry of the JVP,132 which 

had used the presence of the IPKF to great effect in drawing support to 

the group for its campaign to dislodge the government.

Additionally, Premadasa could not have been happy with the evolution of political and military affairs within the Northern and Eastern 

provinces under the IPKF. The NEPC was the centerpiece of the effort 

to devolve authority to the region. Given its war with the IPKF and its 

desire for an independent Eelam under its control, the LTTE boycotted 

the elections to this body, and India wound up administering the vote, 

flying in civil servants from the subcontinent to run the election.133 The 
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EPRLF, which was created by India, wound up winning the election,l

and the group, along with the ENDLF and TELO, came to comprise 

the Tamil National Army, which was also formed by the Indians and 

fought against the LTTE.

Given these politico-military developments, Premadasa was likely 

concerned that the north and east were growing increasingly under 

Indian control, and his government feared that that the IPKF would 

never leave if they managed to destroy the LTTE.135 In a controversial 

move, he began to reach out to the LTTE, going so far as to transfer 

weapons to them to use against the IPKF.m Premadasa also met with 

Anton Balasingham, the LTTE’s chief spokesman and ideologue. The 

result of this rapprochement between the government and the LTTE 

was a cease-fire declared by the government and an offer of a peace 

package, including amnesty and rehabilitation, to the LTTE, and 

the two parties formalized the cease-fire in June 1989. The IPKF left 

Sri Lanka in March 1990 after increasing pressure from Sri Lankan 

and Indian critics of the intervention.137 India’s role as a regional peacemaker had failed.

Not surprisingly, the LTTE had no interest in laying down its arms. 

It took over IPKF camps and arms left by the departing army, and after 

Premadasa’s refusal to dissolve the NEPC and repeal the sixth amendment to the constitution outlawing separatism, it broke off talks with 

the government, with Eelam War II commencing in June 1990.138 The 

LTTE proceeded to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991, as the group 

feared he would reintroduce Indian troops into Sri Lanka if reelected. 

It also assassinated President Premadasa in May 1993, as the group was 

able to place a suicide bomber near the president at an election rally.

CHANDRIKA KUMARATUNGA ADMINISTRATION 

(1994–2005)

Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga of the SLFP came to power 

after the August 1994 parliamentary elections. She headed the left-leaning People’s Alliance (PA) coalition, and several months after being 

elected prime minister, she was elected president in November 1994. 

Peace talks with the LTTE commenced in October 1994 shortly before 

she was elected president, and the LTTE and the government signed a 

cease-fire in early January 1995. This new effort at peace also saw the 

l Gunaratna reports that the elections were in all likelihood rigged by the IPKF, on 

instructions from the Indian High Commission in Colombo and RAW in New Delhi.134

m For more information regarding the weapons transferred to the LTTE, see 

Gunaratna.136
Chapter 8. Government Countermeasures

305

international community take a greater role in overseeing the process. 

Four peace-monitoring committees were established in February 1995, 

two of which were from Norway and one each from the Netherlands 

and Canada. Norway also assisted the Sri Lankan government with setting up a national integration and planning unit within the Ministry of 

Constitutional Affairs and Ethnic Integration.139

Negotiations lasted until mid-April 1995, at which time the LTTE 

abrogated the cease-fire by sinking two Sri  Lankan navy gunboats, 

killing twenty-two sailors. Eelam War III commenced, yet the Kumaratunga government continued to pursue a political resolution to the 

conflict by releasing a sweeping devolution package in August 1995 that 

promised to devolve significant authority to a Tamil-run administrative 

unit in the north and east.140 This new effort proposed to transform 

Sri Lanka into a “union of regions,” with each province constituting a 

region featuring a regional council and governor with authority over 

law and order, education, finance, and public service. Each region 

would have its own police force, educational and court systems, civil 

service, and administrative bodies for investment, taxation, and foreign 

aid. Additionally, a single North East Province would be created.n

This proposal generated substantial opposition from Sinhalese 

nationalists. One complaint was that under the new proposal, the government could not dissolve a regional council or assume its powers in 

case of war or rebellion.142 Article 2 of a legal draft on devolution issued 

in January  1996 noted that regional administrations were forbidden 

from advocating separatism, but it left unclear was how the government 

would respond if a regional unit desired to separate from Sri Lanka. 

The new proposal, however, did represent an effort to correct what 

some saw as deficiencies of the thirteenth amendment to the 1978 constitution.143 This amendment was passed as part of the Indo-Sri Lanka 

Accord, yet one criticism was that it failed to give to any provincial 

n Additionally, during the discussions over the Kumaratunga initiative, the leader of 

the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress negotiated a deal with the TULF and the Ceylon Workers 

Congress for the creation of a regional unit for Sri Lanka’s Muslims. This deal involved the 

removal of the largely Sinhalese Ampara District from the Eastern Province and its inclusion within a South East Council with the Potuvil, Samanthurai, and Kalmunai areas of 

the Eastern Province.141
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council complete control over any issue,o and the central government 

could easily reassert authority over a particular issue. For instance, on 

health and education matters, central government authority could be 

reasserted through a ministerial directive.145

The Kumaratunga government pursued this initiative while Eelam 

War III raged,p yet ultimately this latest peace effort also failed. The 

opposition UNP opposed the effort, and the PA government did not 

even put to vote a draft August 2000 bill to modify the constitution to 

provide the legal framework for devolution.146 The LTTE also rejected 

this effort. It was unhappy that the chief negotiator sent by the government lacked ministerial rank.147 Additionally, Teresita Schaffer, a former American ambassador to Sri Lanka, also believed that the LTTE 

leaders participated in the 1995 talks as an exploratory exercise.148 She 

noted that in talking to foreign audiences, they had previously indicated they would accept a settlement short of a separate state but had 

been vague as to what they would consider an acceptable solution. In 

her opinion, the LTTE’s participation in the negotiations gave them 

a glimpse of what a resolution short of a separate state would look 

like, and the leadership preferred a return to war, given their desire 

for Eelam.149

On the battlefield, in December 1995 the government managed to 

sweep the LTTE from the Jaffna peninsula, but the LTTE regrouped 

in the jungle area north of Vavuniya, from which it was able to prevent 

the government from resupplying Jaffna by overland, and it harassed 

sea traffic north of Trincomalee.150 It also brought the fight to Colombo 

in January 1996 by setting off a truck bomb right next to the Central 

Bank, which destroyed the entire financial district and killed eightysix people and wounded 1,400. In October 1997, it bombed Sri Lanka’s 

tallest building, the thirty-nine–story World Trade Centre in Colombo, 

shortly after the building opened. It also achieved several notable 

gains against the Sri Lankan army. In November–December 1999, the 

LTTE inflicted heavy casualties on the army and gained more than 

1,000  square miles of territory in the Vanni region in the north. In 

o More specifically, the thirteenth amendment specified three lists: List I detailed 

subjects devolved to provincial councils; List II, the reserved list, spelled out subjects 

retained by the central government; and List III, the concurrent list, specified subjects 

under the authority of both the central government and provincial councils, but in practice they fell under the authority of parliament. Additionally, the subjects listed in List I 

ultimately were under the authority of the central government as well, because the first 

phrase within the reserved list stated that “national policy on all subjects and functions,” 

including those on the provincial and concurrent lists, could be determined by the central 

parliament.144

p Kumaratunga pursued the peace effort even after an LTTE suicide bomber 

attempted to assassinate the president at a December 1999 election rally, which resulted in 

the loss of her right eye and injuries to several ministers.
Chapter 8. Government Countermeasures

307

April 2000, the group gained control over a key military base in the Elephant Pass, which connects the Jaffna peninsula with the mainland.151

Nearly 35,000 government troops were trapped on the Jaffna peninsula 

after this latest setback.

After these victories the LTTE instituted a unilateral cease-fire in 

December 2000, but once it ended in late April 2001 the Sri Lankan 

military launched an offensive to recapture the Elephant Pass, suffering heavy casualties. Additionally, the LTTE attacked the international 

airport outside of Colombo, destroying half the fleet of Air Lanka, 

the international carrier.152 As a result of these setbacks and frustration with a faltering economy, parliament passed a no-confidence vote 

against Kumaratunga’s government, forcing a new election. The elections brought to power Ranil Wickremasinghe of the UNP, who headed 

the United National Front (UNF) coalition. Wickremasinghe became 

the prime minister, with Kumaratunga remaining as president.

Initially, Wickremasinghe was more willing than Kumaratunga to 

negotiate directly with the LTTE.153 He was inclined to lift the ban that 

had been placed on the group after its attack on the Temple of the 

Sacred Tooth Relic in January 1998, and he favored the creation of an 

interim administration in the north and east that featured a prominent 

role for the LTTE. Reportedly, during the Norwegian-led negotiations 

that commenced in 2002 (see below), his government was willing to give 

the LTTE de facto control over the administration of the northeast for 

a period of two years.154 However, some observers argued that the LTTE 

and Prabhakaran had proceeded too far along the path of independence that they would never agree to any deal short of a separate state. 

For her part, Kumaratunga sought to sidestep the group and appeal 

directly to moderate Tamil parties through constitutional reforms that 

would pave the way toward greater autonomy for the north and east.155

After the election, in December  2001 the LTTE extended an 

existing month-long cease-fire to the new government, and in February 2002 the two parties, with the assistance of Norwegian facilitators, 

signed the cease-fire agreement (CFA), which ushered in an indefinite 

cease-fire and a period of negotiations to end the conflict. Building on 

the success it had achieved in overseeing a peace process during the 

1990s between Israelis and Palestinians, Norway proceeded to facilitate 

a spate of meetings between the LTTE and the Sri  Lankan government. Six rounds of talks were held over 2002–2003, in Norway, Thailand, Japan, and Germany.

This process started off promisingly, with a March  2002 visit by 

Wickremasinghe to the Jaffna peninsula, the first visit to the region by 

a government leader since 1982. The LTTE also attempted to repair its 

relationship with Sri Lanka’s Muslims. This community did not support 
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Part III. Government Countermeasures

the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces (given their fear of 

Tamil domination within the proposed administrative unit), nor did 

they approve of LTTE rule in the north and east of the country. In 

response, in 1990 the LTTE began expelling thousands of Muslims 

from the Jaffna peninsula, but in 2002 the LTTE apologized to the 

Muslim community for this action and agreed to set up a joint committee to facilitate the return of displaced Muslims. The Muslims, in turn, 

reached a deal with the LTTE in which they recognized the group as 

the de facto authority in the north and east.156

In April 2002, the LTTE sent out mixed signals regarding its willingness to consider a solution short of Eelam,q

 and in May Wickremasinghe expressed doubts regarding the advisability of establishing an 

interim administration in the north and east. In a May 2002 speech to 

the European Parliament, he indicated that the unity of Sri Lanka was 

nonnegotiable and that the establishment of an interim administration 

in the north and east should be linked to a political settlement.159

The first round of discussions between the LTTE and the government was held in Thailand in September 2002. Anton Balasingham, the 

chief negotiator for the LTTE, indicated that the group was willing to 

accept “autonomy and self-governance” in northeastern Sri Lanka once 

both parties agreed to a particular political system for the country, and 

the head of the government delegation noted that the LTTE’s political 

aspirations could be fulfilled “within one country.”160 In the follow-up 

meeting in Oslo in December  2002, both sides agreed to develop a 

federal political system in which the Tamils would enjoy “internal selfdetermination” within the north and east.

In July 2003, Wickremasinghe put forward a proposal based on 

the mutual understanding reached in Oslo, which entailed the establishment of a proposed Provincial Administrative Council (PAC) that 

would have authority over governmental functions except for matters of 

police, security, land, and revenue. The PAC would also have an LTTE 

majority. However, this proposal was rejected by the group, and in 

November 2003 the LTTE put forward its own proposal for an interim 

administration, known as the Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA). 

q In an April 2002 press conference held by Prabhakaran and LTTE chief negotiator 

and political strategist Anton Balasingham in Kilinochchi, Balasingham indicated that 

Prabhakaran was the president and prime minister of Tamil Eelam. Additionally, when 

asked if his long-standing request to his cadres to shoot him if he gave up his demand for 

Eelam still stands, Prabhakaran indicated that it does. However, during the same press 

conference, Prabhakaran thanked Wickremasinghe for his bold actions and indicated that 

if Tamil demands regarding a Tamil homeland, nationality, and the right of self-determination were met, they may agree to a political solution. He stated, “Once these fundamentals are accepted or a political solution is put forward by Sri Lanka recognizing these three 

fundamentals and if our people are satisfied with the framework of a solution that recognizes these core issues then we will consider giving up the demand for Eelam.”157,158
Chapter 8. Government Countermeasures

309

The ISGA would have an LTTE majority and authority over a wide 

range of subjects, including security, defense, and land; and separate 

institutions for finance and justice would be established, which would 

give the authority the ability to regulate internal and external trade, 

as well as to borrow and receive aid.161 With respect to maritime issues, 

Clause 18 would have given the ISGA control of nearly two-thirds of the 

Sri Lankan coastline.

Up to this point, the peace process on the government side had been 

handled by Prime Minister Wickremasinghe,r

 and by now President 

Kumaratunga had become alarmed by the evolution of the talks. She 

believed that the UNF government was making too many concessions 

to the LTTE and was concerned that the group was using the cease-fire 

to build up its military capabilities. Additionally, she was alarmed that 

the group had already set up a de facto independent state in the north 

and east.163 By this point, the conflict had evolved beyond a merely ethnic conflict to one that encompassed competing state-building projects, where “the Wickremasinghe’s government’s limited formulation 

of a unitary state with some regional decentralization” clashed with the 

“LTTE’s maximalist notion of a confederation of largely sovereign entities in one formal state.”164

Before the government considered the ISGA proposal, Kumaratunga invoked her authority as president by declaring a state of emergency in November 2003 and took control of the ministries of defense, 

interior, and media from the UNF government. Furthermore, in 2004 

she dissolved parliament four  years before the end of its term and 

announced new elections for April 2004. The election was won by the 

United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA), which was formed through 

an alliance between Kumaratunga’s SLFP and the JVP, which by this 

time had rehabilitated itself as a nonviolent Marxist-nationalist party. 

The election resulted in the exit of Wickremasinghe from the prime 

minister’s role, as this position was assumed by Mahinda Rajapaksa, 

who took a more skeptical view of LTTE intentions.165 The UPFA 

r The approach to the negotiations with the LTTE that the UNF government headed 

by Wickremasinghe adopted over 2002–2004 was fundamentally different from that 

adopted by Kumaratunga over 1996–2000. The UNF government envisioned a political 

solution as the culmination of a long drawn-out process of de-escalation, normalization, 

and rapid economic development in the north and east. This sequencing led to LTTE 

fears of a “peace trap,” whereby the north and east would become economically ensnared 

within the economy of Sri Lanka before an acceptable political settlement was reached. 

In contrast, the government headed by the People’s Alliance in the mid- and late 1990s 

favored reaching a political settlement up front, in conjunction with a military strategy 

designed to weaken the LTTE in order to impose a more favorable political settlement 

(albeit one entailing enhanced regional autonomy that may be acceptable to moderate 

Tamil groups).162
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Part III. Government Countermeasures

rejected federalism as a solution to the Tamil issue and instead favored 

decentralization and devolution within a unitary state.166

In November 2004, during his annual Heroes’ Day address honoring LTTE members who had given their lives in the battle for Eelam, 

Prabhakaran threatened a return to war.167 However, in December, the 

Indian Ocean tsunami struck Sri Lanka. Mullaitivu was badly hit, and 

LTTE infrastructure suffered significant damage. The LTTE organized humanitarian aid, which was regarded as exemplary, although 

the government would have preferred that the group not be seen providing human security in the affected areas, nor did it want to see the 

group directly receive foreign humanitarian assistance.168 Nonetheless, 

the government and the LTTE agreed to establish the Post-Tsunami 

Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) to coordinate the distribution of aid within LTTE areas. The Supreme Court, however, 

blocked implementation of P-TOMS by ruling it unconstitutional.

During this time, a development occurred that had far-reaching 

consequences for the LTTE and its struggle against the government. 

In March 2004 reports emerged of a split between Prabhakaran and 

Vinayagamoorthy Muralithiran, who was also known as Colonel 

Karuna and who headed the eastern wing of the LTTE based in the 

Batticaloa-Ampara region. Reportedly, the split was caused by Karuna’s refusal to send 1,000 of his combat troops up north, given fears 

that this redeployment of forces would weaken the LTTE in the eastern region. Yet this split was also the result of long-simmering tensions 

between northern and eastern Tamils within the LTTE. Eastern Tamils complained that most of the leadership positions within the group 

were held by northern Tamils, while the former did most of the fighting.169 Additionally, Karuna complained that very few funds collected 

from abroad were spent in the east, and the eastern leadership was not 

happy with the rapprochement with the Muslims in eastern Sri Lanka, 

because Tamils and Muslims were still clashing in the east, where Muslim youths were allegedly forming anti-LTTE “Osama suicide squads” 

to attack the group.170 This split led Karuna to claim that his forces, 

which totaled approximately 6,000 troops,s represented “South Eelam,” 

with the LTTE representing “North Eelam.”172

After this split, Karuna and his faction went over to the government side, and they undoubtedly provided government troops with 

tactical and strategic intelligence.173 Stung by the defection, the LTTE 

launched a swift counterattack against the group, which forced the latter to disband and disperse abroad. Many Karuna supporters wound 

up finding employment abroad in the construction industry in Qatar, 

s Chris Smith estimated that Karuna’s forces totaled 2,000.171
Chapter 8. Government Countermeasures

311

and they ruled out a move to Colombo, given the LTTE’s numerous 

and well-organized intelligence network in the capital.174

Presidential elections were held in November 2005, and frustrations 

with the CFA lead to the defeat of Wickremasinghe by SLFP leader 

Mahinda Rajapaksa. Rajapaksa brought his own ideas regarding how to 

confront the LTTE, and it was under his administration that Sri Lanka 

finally succeeded in defeating the Tamil Tigers.

MAHINDA RAJAPAKSA ADMINISTRATION (2005–)

As previously noted, Rajapaksa took a more jaundiced view of the 

LTTE’s motives, and he would countenance a political solution only 

as long as it validated the unitary nature of the Sri Lankan state and 

entailed only a minimal degree of devolution.175 Interestingly, there are 

reports that the Rajapaksa camp bribed the LTTE to dissuade Tamil 

voters in the north from voting.176 Tamil voters would likely have voted 

for Wickremasinghe, given his prominent role in the peace process, 

and their votes may have made a difference as Rajapaksa captured fiftyone percent of the vote against Wickremasinghe’s forty-nine percent.177

For the LTTE, they may have calculated that it was preferable to have 

a hard-line president with whom an agreement was impossible, so as 

to justify a return to the battlefield and thus avoid the possibility of 

being forced into making concessions in negotiations.178 If this indeed 

was their thinking, then the group miscalculated, as Rajapaksa proved 

to be willing to pursue a military solution in which the armed forces 

were given wide latitude to finally destroy the LTTE regardless of the 

humanitarian cost.

The last negotiation between the LTTE and the government 

occurred in February  2006 in Geneva, after which the two sides 

returned to the battlefield. In April, the LTTE nearly assassinated the 

army chief Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka, and in June it managed 

to kill Major-General Parami Kulatanga, the third most senior army 

officer. By this time the government appears to have been relying on 

tactics that successfully suppressed the JVP rebellion in the late 1980s. 

Paramilitary groups comprising members from groups that were decimated by the LTTE were operating in the north carrying out “white 

van” disappearances against suspected LTTE members and sympathizers.179 Some of those abducted were eventually located within the government’s Terrorist Investigation Division and Criminal Investigation 

Division.180 The government also collaborated with anti-LTTE Tamil 

political parties, including the Eelam People’s Democratic Party and 

the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (Tamil People’s Liberation Tigers, 

TMVP), which was the party created by Colonel Karuna.181
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Part III. Government Countermeasures

In July 2006 the LTTE raised the stakes by closing down a canal that 

ran from an “uncleared” area (i.e., one that still contained LTTE elements) into a “cleared” area in the Trincomalee District, which deprived 

water to more than 50,000 individuals.182 The government responded 

with air strikes in the Sampur District, along with the deployment of 

troops. It managed to liberate Sampur, which had been held by the 

LTTE for nine years and was used by the group to harass troop carriers 

and supply ships heading north.183

Sensing momentum swing to its side, the government took a number of actions to prepare for the final destruction of the LTTE. Internationally, it reoriented its foreign policy by establishing closer ties with 

China, Russia, and Pakistan. The Chinese provided the government 

with Jian-7 fighter jets, surveillance radars, ordnance, and substantial 

aid in return for a naval base in Hambantota, in the Southern Province.184 Additionally, both Russia and China shielded Sri Lanka from 

being targeted by the United Nations Security Council.185 Also, after his 

recovery from the LTTE suicide attack, Fonseka returned to his duties 

with great vigor and extra motivation. He invested more in training 

and jungle warfare and in long-range deep penetration units to attack 

the LTTE.186 On the home front, the government conducted an effective media campaign through state media and the newly established 

Media Center for National Security, via which LTTE battle deaths were 

inflated and military casualties underreported.187 Many members of 

the media reporting on the war were assaulted, murdered, kidnapped, 

and imprisoned on false charges.188

The defection of the Karuna faction essentially resulted in the loss 

of the east for the LTTE. The Sri Lankan military supported the remnants of Karuna’s forces with intelligence, safe houses, and weapons,189

and with their aid in July  2007 the government captured the entire 

Eastern Province. The vice was beginning to close in on the LTTE. By 

this late stage, the group had graduated from being a guerrilla force 

to a conventional one that ran a de facto state that controlled territory and had access to a population. These factors mitigated against a 

return to the jungle to wage a guerrilla campaign.190 Additionally, the 

population under its control tended to follow as the LTTE retreated, as 

they feared either the LTTE’s retribution or that of government forces.

The knockout blow occurred in May 2009, as the group and 100,000 

civilians found themselves trapped in a strip of land along the eastern 

coast.191 The military repeatedly bombed the area, which had previously been declared a no-fire zone, resulting in the death and maiming 

of thousands of Tamils civilians. Prabhakaran was shot and killed on 

May 19, and with his death, a tragic chapter in Sri Lanka’s history came 

to a close as the LTTE admitted defeat.
Chapter 8. Government Countermeasures

313

ENDNOTES

1 K. M. de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985

(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), 186–187.

2 Ibid., 183.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., 184.

5 Neil DeVotta, “Illiberalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka,” Journal of Democracy 13, 

no. 1 (January 2002): 88.

6 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 191, 193.

7 Asoka Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy

(New York and Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2009), 67.

8 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 257–258.

9 Amita Shastri, “The Material Basis for Separatism: The Tamil Eelam Movement in Sri 

Lanka,” The Journal of Asian Studies 49, no. 1 (1990): 74.

10 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 68.

11 Ibid., 70.

12 M. R. Narayan Swamy, Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerillas (Dehli: Konark Publishers 

Pvt. Ltd., 2002), 29.

13 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 324.

14 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 98.

15 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 269.

16 Ibid., 269.

17 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 69.

18 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 269–270.

19 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 69.

20 Ibid., 71.

21 Ibid., 75.

22 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 354.

23 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 71.

24 Ibid., 73–74.

25 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 327.

26 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 66.

27 Ibid., 73–74.

28 Ibid., 89.

29 Ibid., 97.

30 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 289.

31 Ibid., 296,298.

32 K. M. de Silva, “India and Sri Lanka, 1947–79” in Regional Powers and Small State Security: India and Sri Lanka, 1977–90 (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 

1995), 30.

33 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 92.

34 Ibid., 92, 94.

35 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 313–315, 

333.

36 Ibid., 317.

37 Ibid., 317–318.
314

Part III. Government Countermeasures

38 Ibid., 340.

39 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 110–111.

40 Ibid., 101.

41 Ibid.

42 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 335–336.

43 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 102.

44 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 328–329.

45 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 101–102.

46 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 331.

47 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 102.

48 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 356–357.

49 Ibid., 352.

50 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 99.

51 Ibid., 100.

52 Ibid., 114.

53 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 272.

54 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 111.

55 Ibid., 112.

56 Rohan Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies

(Colombo, Sri Lanka: South Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1993), 10–11.

57 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 126.

58 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 353.

59 Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 7.

60 Rohan Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP (Kandy, Sri 

Lanka: Institute of Fundamental Studies, 1990), 241–245.

61 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 99.

62 Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 2.

63 de Silva, “India and Sri Lanka, 1947–79,” 20.

64 Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 6.

65 Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 9.

66 de Silva, “India and Sri Lanka, 1947–79,” 26.

67 Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 18.

68 Ibid., 2, 11.

69 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 100.

70 Ibid., 113.

71 Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 2, 14.

72 Ibid., 9, 15.

73 Ibid., 11–12.

74 Ibid., 9.

75 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 111.

76 Ibid., 111–113.

77 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 345.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 101.

81 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 349.
Chapter 8. Government Countermeasures

315

82 Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 101.

83 de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985, 348.

84 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 126.

85 Ibid., 128.

86 Ibid., 127.

87 Ibid., 128.

88 Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 134.

89 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 129.

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid., 130.

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid., 131.

95 Ibid., 132.

96 Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 190–191.

97 Ibid., 188.

98 Chris Smith, “South Asia’s Enduring War,” in Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and 

Reconstruction, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 

1999), 18–20.

99 Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 18–19.

100 Ibid., 191.

101 Ibid., 192.

102Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 132.

103Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 187.

104 Ibid., 194.

105 Ibid., 195.

106 Ibid., 195.

107Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 133.

108Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 193–194.

109Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 134.

110 Ibid., 134.

111 Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 193.

112 Ibid., 193.

113 Ibid., 18.

114 Ibid., 230.

115 Ibid., 236.

116 Ibid., 240.

117 Jagath P. Senaratne, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1977–1990: Riots, Insurrections, Counterinsurgencies, Foreign Intervention (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1997), 92.

118 Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 236.

119 Ibid., 236, 240.

120Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 150.

121 Ibid., 150.

122Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, 326.

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.
316

Part III. Government Countermeasures

125 Ibid., 318–319.

126 Ibid., 319–320.

127 Ibid., 321.

128 Ibid., 320.

129 Ibid., 326.

130 Ibid., 327.

131 Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 240.

132Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 152.

133 Ibid., 151.

134Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 278.

135 Ibid., 294.

136 Ibid., 293–294, 300, 303–304.

137Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 153.

138 Ibid.

139 Ibid., 158.

140 Ibid., 156–157.

141 Ibid., 159–160.

142 Ibid., 159.

143Rohan Edrisinha, “Constitutionalism, Pluralism, and the Ethnic Conflict: The Need for 

a New Initiative,” in Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconstruction, ed. Robert I. 

Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 174.

144 Ibid.

145 Ibid.

146Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 161.

147Teresita C. Schaffer, “Peacemaking in Sri Lanka: The Kumaratunga Initiative,” in Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconstruction, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, 

DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 133.

148 Ibid., 138.

149 Ibid., 138–139.

150Robert I. Rotberg, “Sri Lanka’s Civil War: From Mayhem Toward Diplomatic Resolution,” 

in Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconstruction, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 2.

151Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 166–167.

152Rajat Ganguly, “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: At a Crossroads between War and Peace,” 

Third World Quarterly 25, no. 5 (2004): 904.

153 Ibid., 905.

154 Ibid., 909.

155Ganguly, “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: At a Crossroads between War and Peace,” 905.

156 Ibid., 908–909.

157Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 184.

158Ganguly, “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: At a Crossroads between War and Peace,” 908.

159 Ibid., 909.

160 Ibid., 910.

161Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 188.

162 Jayadeva Uyangoda, “Government-LTTE Peace Negotiations in 2002–2005 and the 

Clash of State Formation Projects,” in Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: Caught in the 
Chapter 8. Government Countermeasures

317

Peace Trap? eds. Jonathan Goodhand, Jonathan Spencer, and Benedikt Korf (New York: 

Routledge, 2011), 22–24.

163Ganguly, “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: At a Crossroads between War and Peace,” 911.

164 Jonathan Goodhand and Benedikt Korg, “On the Illiberal Consequences of Liberal 

Peace in Sri Lanka,” in Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: Caught in the Peace Trap?

eds. Jonathan Goodhand, Jonathan Spencer, and Benedikt Korf (New York: Routledge, 

2011), 9.

165Chris Smith, “The Eelam Endgame?” International Affairs 83, no. 1 (2007): 70.

166Ganguly, “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: At a Crossroads between War and Peace,” 912.

167 Smith, “The Eelam Endgame?” 71.

168 Ibid.

169Ganguly, “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: At a Crossroads between War and Peace,” 913.

170 Ibid., 914.

171 Smith, “The Eelam Endgame?” 70.

172 Ganguly, “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: At a Crossroads between War and Peace,” 914.

173 Smith, “The Eelam Endgame?” 70.

174 Ibid., 71.

175 Ibid., 76, 79.

176 Neil DeVotta, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism 

in Sri Lanka,” Asian Survey 49, no. 6 (2009): 1037.

177 Smith, “The Eelam Endgame?” 76

178 Ibid.

179 Smith, “The Eelam Endgame?” 72–73.

180DeVotta, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in 

Sri Lanka,” 1042.

181 Ibid., 1039–1040.

182 Ibid., 1038.

183Chris Smith, “The Eelam Endgame?” 75.

184DeVotta, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in 

Sri Lanka,” 1045.

185 Ibid.

186Chris Smith, “Military Dynamics of the Peace Process,” in Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri 

Lanka: Caught in the Peace Trap? eds. Jonathan Goodhand, Jonathan Spencer, and Benedikt Korf (New York: Routledge, 2011), 82.

187DeVotta, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in 

Sri Lanka,” 1043.

188 Ibid.

189Chris Smith, “The Eelam Endgame?” 78.

190DeVotta, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in 

Sri Lanka,” 1045.

191 Ibid., 1046.

Conclusion

319

CONCLUSION TO PART III

This section highlights how a conflict between an insurgency and 

a government sometimes plays out over many years and in fact may 

resemble a Kabuki dance—over this extended period of time both parties will likely have accumulated a substantial amount of information 

on the other side, becoming well familiar with its opponent’s potential 

strategies and interests. For the special operator, it is important to note 

that counterinsurgency efforts, such as the efforts against the JVP and 

LTTE, will often have both military and political components of varying intensities, and the latter may involve the government making various efforts to reach an accommodation with opposition forces. Indeed, 

the Sri Lankan government offered to vacate seats in parliament for 

the JVP, and in the 1950s and 1960s it explored various schemes to 

devolve political authority to the Tamil regions of the country.

However, governments often have their own “red lines,” or concessions beyond which they are hesitant to offer and unlikely or unable 

to implement. International relations theorists, particularly those of a 

realist persuasion, are fond of noting how distrust is endemic among 

countries, and indeed that the pervasiveness of distrust is a permanent 

operating condition inhibiting cooperation among nations.a

 The same 

as well may be said of the relationship between a government and an 

opposition movement, and this lack of trust may be instrumental in the 

establishment of limits on the concessions a government and is willing 

to offer and a society (or at least segments of it) is willing to tolerate. 

This was clearly evident in the Sri Lankan government’s inability to 

implement the B-C and S-C pacts in the 1950s and 1960s, as Sinhalese 

distrust of Tamil intentions fostered fears that these concessions would 

ultimately lead to the eventual independence of the Tamil regions of 

the country.

A useful conceptual tool for the special operator to potentially anticipate the types of countermeasures a government may adopt (or actions 

an insurgency may take) is the notion of a leader’s operational code, 

which was developed by Alexander George at the RAND Corporation 

in the 1960s.2

 Originally applied to understand the decision making of 

Bolshevik leaders, the operational code refers to a leader’s—whether 

government or insurgent—fundamental collection of beliefs about the 

nature of history and politics, and they serve as a frame through which 

historical and political events are interpreted. More specifically, this 

a For instance, the theory of offensive realism developed by John Mearsheimer is 

based on the notion that states that otherwise would prefer only to be secure have an 

incentive to act aggressively towards one another, in part due to the inability to never be 

certain about other states’ intentions.1
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Part III. Government Countermeasures

belief system can be deciphered through answers to a collection of philosophical and policy-oriented questions:

1. What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political 

universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the 

fundamental character of one’s political opponents?

2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s 

fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be 

optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in 

what respects the one and/or the other?

3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what 

extent?

4. How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical 

development? What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” 

history in the desired direction?

5. What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical 

development?

6. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for 

political action?

7. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?

8. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, 

and accepted?

9. What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interest?

10. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing 

one’s interests?

A full analysis of a government or insurgent leader’s operational 

code would require an exhaustive analysis of their spoken and written 

statements, as well as an analysis of the actions they undertook. While 

such an undertaking for the leaders of the Sri Lankan government, the 

LTTE, and the JVP is beyond the scope of this report, the information 

presented in this study does allow one to take an initial stab at deciphering the operational code of the main players in the two insurgencies in Sri Lanka addressed in this report. For instance, clearly Rohana 

Wijeweera believed in the power of human agency (especially his) to 

shape historical development in a desired direction, and this belief 

led him to agitate for a revolution whose ultimate goal was the radical transformation of the political and economic system of Sri Lanka. 

Additionally, given the different stances they took toward attempting 

to resolve the conflict with the LTTE, one can potentially argue that 

Mahindra Rajapaksa and Chandrika Kumaratunga had differing views 

about the relative utility of force and diplomacy in reaching a solution 

in the long-running conflict with the Tamil Tigers.
Conclusion

321

A focus on the operational code does not mean that other “structural” factors, such as economic, political, social, and diplomatic conditions, play a less important role in affecting the actions taken by 

governments and insurgencies. However, the questions that embody the 

belief system that underpins the operational code could serve as a useful conceptual tool for Special Operators as they attempt to understand 

the decision-making of government officials and insurgent leaders.

ENDNOTES

1 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 

2001).

2 Alexander L. George, The “Operational Code”: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making, Memorandum RM-5427-PR (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, September 1967), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/

RM5427.html.

CHAPTER 9.

CONCLUSION

Chapter 9. Conclusion

325

The insurgencies waged by the JVP and LTTE ended in the military 

defeats of both groups, with neither group achieving its original goals. 

For better or worse, the military defeat of one side or the other, as 

opposed to a negotiated settlement, is quite common in insurgencies. 

A 2010 RAND study noted that a stalemate or negotiated settlement 

was the outcome of only nineteen of eighty-nine insurgencies under 

review, whereas fifty-four resulted in a victory for either the insurgents 

(twenty-six) or the government (twenty-eight), with the remainder yet 

to conclude).1

The JVP re-emerged as a nonviolent Marxist-nationalist party, and 

it was one of the initial founders of the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA). The UPFA won more than forty-five percent of the vote in 

the 2004 legislative elections, thereby winning 105 of 225 seats in parliament. Somewhat ironically, as one of the key members of the UPFA 

the JVP became a part of the government (although it would leave the 

coalition in April 2005).

Although the LTTE was militarily crushed, the grievances that animated its struggle for independence are still relevant. A November 2012 

report by the International Crisis Group noted that the Rajapaksa 

government has not fully implemented the 13th amendment to the 

Sri Lankan constitution by devolving political authority down to the 

provincial level, and in particular to the Tamil regions of the country.2

Since the defeat of the LTTE the baton of Tamil nationalism has been 

taken up by the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), which was founded in 

2001 (with LTTE encouragement), and some of its constituent parties 

have included TELO, EPRLF, TULF, the ACTC, and the Illankai Tamil 

Arasu Katchi.

The TNA has taken a moderate path with respect to ethnic issues, 

indicating its willingness to accept a political settlement well short of 

a separate state.3

 Yet the tensions that motivated the thirty-year ethnic 

conflict remain. In the first-ever elections for the northern provincial 

council in September 2013, the TNA won seventy-eight percent of the 

vote and thirty of thirty-eight council seats, but it was obligated to run 

on a Tamil nationalist platform that tapped into continuing desire for 

a separate state.4

 Its election manifesto reiterated the claim that the 

Tamils are a distinct people with the right of “self-determination” and 

“self-rule” within a merged North-eastern Province in a federalized 

Sri Lanka.5

 Additionally, its candidate for chief minister, the retired 

Supreme Court Justice C. V. Wigneswaran, made campaign statements 

praising Prabhakaran as a hero.6

Sinhalese critics have taken such statements and actions by the TNA 

as evidence of the group’s separatist nature.7

 However, even if such 

actions were undertaken to gain electoral advantage, they attest to the 
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka

fact that even though the LTTE was militarily defeated, the sentiments 

that gave rise to its insurgency still resonate with members of the Tamil 

population in Sri Lanka.

ENDNOTES

1 Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, 2010), 163.

2 International Crisis Group, “Sri Lanka: Tamil Politics and the Quest for a Political 

Solution,” Asia Report, no. 239, November 2012, 1, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/

regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/239-sri-lanka-tamil-politics-and-the-quest-for-apolitical-solution.aspx.

3 Ibid., 8.

4 International Crisis Group, “Sri Lanka’s Potemkin Peace: Democracy Under Fire,” Asia 

Report, no. 253, November 2013, 8, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/

south-asia/sri-lanka/253-sri-lankas-potemkin-peace-democracy-under-fire.pdf.

5 Ibid., 9.

6 Ibid., 8.

7 Ibid., 9.
APPENDICES

Appendices

329

APPENDIX A. MAJOR SRI LANKAN ORGANIZATIONS

This appendix lists in alphabetical order the major nonterrorist 

organizations in Sri Lanka since independence in 1948.

ACTC All Ceylon Tamil Congress

CIC Ceylon Indian Congress

CPSL Communist Party of Sri Lanka

CWC Ceylon Workers’ Congress

FP Tamil Federal Party

JVP Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna

LSSP Lanka Sama Samaja Party

MEP Mahajana Eksath Peramuna

PLOTE People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam

SLFP Sri Lanka Freedom Party

SLPP Sri Lanka People’s Party

SMS Sinhala Maha Sabha

TNT Tamil New Tigers

TUF Tamil United Front

UNP United National Party

APPENDIX B. TAMIL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

This appendix presents an alphabetical listing of the Tamil groups 

that at some time since 1948 have advocated the establishment of an 

independent Eelam by violent means. These groups varied in size, 

importance, and impact. Some no longer exist. Others have evolved into 

mainstream organizations and have renounced separatism and violence.

ELDF Eelam Liberation Defense Front

ELT Eelam Liberation Tigers

EM Eagle Movement

ENDLF Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front

EPRLF Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front

ENLF Eelam National Liberation Front

EROS Tamil Revolutionary Organization of Students

GATE Guerrilla Army of Tamil Eelam

IFTA Ilankai Freedom Tamil Army

LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

NLFTE National Liberation Front of Tamil Eelam
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PLP People’s Liberation Party

RCG Red Crescent Guerrillas

RELO Revolutionary Eelam Liberation Organization

RFTE Red Front of Tamil Eelamists

SRSL Socialist Revolutionary Social Liberation

TEA Tamil Eelam Army

TEBM Tamil Eelam Blood Movement

TEC Tamil Eelam Commando

TEDF Tamil Eelam Defence Front

TEEF Tamil Eelam Eagles Front

TELA Tamil Eelam Liberation Army

TELC Tamil Eelam Liberation Cobras

TELE Tamil Eelam Liberation Extremists

TELF Tamil Eelam Liberation Front

TELG Tamil Eelam Liberation Guerrillas

TELO Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization

TENA Tamil Eelam National Army

TERO Tamil Eelam Revolutionary Organization

TERPLA Tamil Eelam Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army

TESS Tamil Eelam Security Service

TPCU Tamil People’s Command Unit

TPDF Tamil People’s Democratic Front

TPSF Tamil People’s Security Front

TPSO Tamil People’s Security Organization

TS Three Stars

Source: South Asia Intelligence Review, South Asia Terrorism Portal, accessed November 21, 2010, http://www.satp.org/.
Appendices

331

APPENDIX C. ACRONYMS

ACTC All Ceylon Tamil Congress

AIADMK All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam

ARIS Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

B-C Pact Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact

CFA Cease-fire Agreement

CID Criminal Investigation Division

CID Criminal Investigation Department

CNC Ceylon National Congress

CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CVF Civilian Volunteer Force

CWC Ceylon Workers’ Congress

DDC District Development Council

DJV Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya

DK Dravida Kazhagam

DMK Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Association for Dravidian Progress)

ENDLF Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front

ENLF Eelam National Liberation Front

EPRLF Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front

EROS Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students

ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna

FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

FP Federal Party

GCE General Certificate Examination

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GUES General Union of Eelam Students

IFT International Federation of Tamils

IPKF Indian Peacekeeping Force

ISGA Interim Self-Governing Authority

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence

ITAK Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchchi

JSS Jathika Sevaka Samithiya

JVP Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna

LSSP Lanka Sama Samaja Party

LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

MSV Maubima Surakeeme Viyaparaya

NEPC North-East Provincial Council

NGO Nongovernmental Organization
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NSSP Nava Sama Samaja Pakshaya

P-TOMS Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure

PA People’s Alliance

PAC Provincial Administrative Council

PDS Planning and Development Secretariat

PFLT People’s Front of Liberation Tigers

PKK Kurdish Workers Party

PLO Palestine Liberation Organization

PLOTE People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam

PTA Prevention of Terrorism Act

RAW Research and Analysis Wing

RDF Rapid Deployment Force

S-C Pact Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact

SLFP Sri Lanka Freedom Party

SLTB Sri Lanka Transport Board

SORO Special Operations Research Office

SSU Socialist Student Union

STF Special Task Force

SWAPO South West Africa People’s Organization

TEEC Tamil Eelam Education Council

TEEDO Tamil Eelam Economic Development Organization

TELO Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization

TEPO Tamil Eelam People’s Organization

TMVP Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal

TNA Tamil National Alliance

TNA Tamil National Army

TNT Tamil New Tigers

TOSIS Tigers Organization of Security Intelligence Service

TRO Tamils Rehabilitation Organization

TUF Tamil United Front

TULF Tamil United Liberation Front

UNF United National Front

UNP United National Party

UPFA United People’s Freedom Alliance

VOC Vereenidge Oost-Indische Compagnie

WHAM Winning Hearts and Minds Program

YVM Yalppana Vaipava Malai

ZDI Zimbabwe Defense Industries
Appendices

333

APPENDIX D. TECHNICAL APPENDIX

Methodology of the Study

All ARIS Tier 1 Insurgency Case Studies are presented using the 

same framework. While not a strict template, it is a method used by the 

team to ensure a common treatment of the cases, which will aid readers 

in comparing one case with another.

All of the sources used in preparation of these case studies are 

unclassified and for the most part are secondary rather than primary 

sources. Where we could, we used primary sources to describe the 

objectives of the revolution and to give a sense of the perspective of 

the revolutionary or another participant or observer. This limitation to 

unclassified sources allows a much wider distribution of the case studies while hindering the inclusion of revealing or perhaps more accurate information. We selected sources that provide the most reliable 

and accurate research we could obtain, endeavoring to use sources we 

believe to be authoritative and unbiased.

These case studies are intended to be strictly neutral in terms of 

bias toward the revolution or those to whom the revolution was or is 

directed. We sought to balance any interpretive bias in our sources and 

in the presentation of information so that the case may be studied without any indication by the author of moral, ethical, or other judgment.

While we used a multi-methodological approach in our analysis, 

the analytical method that underpins these case studies can most accurately be described as “contextual social/political analysis.” Research 

in the social sciences is often done from one of two opposing perspectives. The first is a positivist perspective, which looks for universal laws 

to describe actions in the human domain and considers context to be 

background noise. The second is a postmodernist or constructivist 

perspective, which denies the existence of general laws and attributes 

of social and political structures and processes, and as a consequence 

focuses almost entirely on local factors. Contextual analysis is “something in between,” in which context is used to facilitate the discovery 

of regularities in social and political processes and thereby promote 

systematic knowledge.1

 In practice, contextual social/political analysis 

balances these two perspectives, combining a comparative understanding of the actors, events, activities, relationships, and interactions associated with the case of interest with an appreciation for the significant 

role context played in how and why things transpired.

“Context” includes factors, settings, or circumstances that in some 

way may act on or interact with actors, organizations, or other entities within the country being studied, often enabling or constraining 
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actions. It is a construct or interpretation of the properties of a system, organization, or situation that are necessary to provide meaning 

beyond what is objectively observable.2

Although we have applied this methodology throughout these case 

studies, the section entitled Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency focuses 

heavily on contextual aspects. Examples of elements of context often 

used in this type of analysis include culture, history, place (location), 

population (demography), and technology. Within these studies, we 

present the primary discussion of context as follows:

Physical Environment

Social scientists often cite features of the physical environment as 

a risk factor for conflict—whether it is slope elevation, mountainous 

terrain, or rural countryside. Rough terraina

 is a typical topographical feature correlated with rebel activity, as it provides safe havens and 

resources for insurgents. Insurgent groups such as the Afghan Taliban 

have benefited from mountainous terrain, making pursuit and surveillance by countervailing forces difficult. Likewise, the Viet Cong in 

Vietnam benefited from dense forest cover despite American attempts 

at defoliation.3 Less clear are the reasons behind the correlation that 

researchers have found between rough terrain and conflict. Most theories for this relationship center on insurgent viability and a state’s capacity to govern. In short, rough terrain is correlated with conflict, but that 

does not mean it causes conflict or that rough terrain is necessary for a 

conflict to emerge.b

Other geographic features, such as location and distance, have an 

impact on conflict patterns and processes. Generally, regions farther 

from the capital are at higher risk for conflict, as are those closer to 

international borders. Another important consideration when analyzing the impact of geography on conflict patterns and processes is the 

expanse of the conflict. While it is common to speak of entire countries 

embroiled in conflict, actual conflicts generally occur only in a small 

percentage of a state’s territory, typically fifteen percent. Despite that 

a Most researchers use mountains (or slope elevation) and forests as a proxy for 

“rough terrain.” Little attention has been paid to other topographical features, such as 

swamps, that impede government access or surveillance.

b The relationship between terrain and conflict can be described as follows: “rebels 

who seek refuge in the mountains are better able to withstand a militarily superior opposition . . . that rebel groups will take advantage of such terrain, whenever available. We do 

not believe that terrain in and of itself is a cause of conflict, nor does the rough terrain 

proposition anticipate such a relationship.”4
Appendices

335

low figure, however, internal conflicts can sometimes encompass nearly 

half of the territory of the host country.5

Historical Context

Revolutions or insurgencies do not emerge from formless ether but, 

rather, take their shape from accumulated layers of historical experience. Not only are actors in insurgent movements important participants in history, but they are also its end users. That is, insurgent 

movements are not only shaped by historical experience, but they also 

actively seek to understand and manipulate the key components of 

those experiences—whether historical events, persons, or narratives—

to accomplish their objectives. Thus, sustained, organized political violence cannot be adequately explained without analyzing the historical 

context in which it developed. Some of the themes analyzed in this 

section are the legacies, whether organizational, political, or social, of 

conflict over time; the formation of group and organizational identity 

and its attendant narrative; the development of societal and political 

institutions; and the changing relationships, and perceptions thereof, 

that balance national, local, and/or group interests.6

Charles Tilly, a pioneering sociologist studying political conflict, 

made important observations about the relationship between social 

movements and historical context. Several of these are described below:

• Social movements incorporate locally available cultural materials 

such as language, social categories, and widely shared beliefs; 

they therefore vary as a function of historically determined local 

cultural accumulations.

• Path dependency prevails in social movements as in other political 

processes, such that events occurring at one stage in a sequence 

constrain the range of events that is possible at later stages.

• Once social movements have occurred and acquired names, both 

the name and competing representations of social movements 

became available as signals, models, threats, and/or aspirations 

for later actors.7

While Tilly’s observations address social movements, usually understood as nonviolent political movements, he and his collaborators 

argued that contentious political activity belonged on a continuum, 

not in separate categories.8 Violent and nonviolent groups belonged 

to the same genus but used different “repertoires of contention.” Thus, 

the same methodologies used to explain nonviolent political activity 

could also be useful in explaining violent political activity. Our extensive research on nearly thirty insurgencies supports this theory. The 
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insurgencies, but also the individual participants themselves, often 

began their careers by engaging in nonviolent political activity, transitioning to violence sometimes only after many years. To connect the 

observations described above more explicitly with revolutionary and 

insurgent activities, we examine each of these general observations of 

social movements and apply them to the specific activities associated 

with an insurgency or revolution. Revolutions and insurgencies typically begin as local or regional movements, and as such they include 

all of the aspects of local cultural material, which, as mentioned above, 

contributes to the ontology of a social movement.

Insurgent activities frequently cross borders and have an influence 

on the societies and movements in adjacent regions. Actions taken 

by an insurgent organization at one point in time can eliminate or 

enable possible future options for furthering the insurgency. Groups 

associated with revolutions and insurgencies usually seek recognition 

for their actions, so it is important for them to have names and symbols (emblems, flags, etc.) that can be easily associated with them and 

their causes. These representations then become the public branding 

of the organization and are used by supporters and detractors alike to 

further the narrative or counter-narrative of a movement. Given these 

factors, the historical context within which any insurgency, revolution, 

or other internal conflict takes place is a critical element in analyzing 

these events.

Socioeconomic Conditions

How do socioeconomic conditions affect insurgencies? One important socioeconomic variable to consider is per-capita gross domestic 

product (GDP), and the high correlation of this variable with political 

stability is among one of the most robust findings in the analysis of 

conflict dynamics. In general, some of the relevant socioeconomic factors that impact political violence include poverty, relative deprivation, 

opportunity costs, and ethnic nationalism.

With respect to poverty, some political scientists argue that countries with lower levels of economic development are more likely to witness political violence.9

 Poverty describes the poor material wealth of 

individuals or societies, but it also tells researchers that the country 

is likely suffering from a host of other ills. Rather than just a simple 

measure of wealth, a country’s low GDP per capita is also a proxy measure for poor state capacity. States with poor capacity feature a central 

government with a limited ability to project power across their territory 

to enforce laws, policies, and regulations.10 Often, the governments in 

these states have weak institutions, poor governance, and widespread 
Appendices

337

corruption, all factors that enable insurgents to more easily recruit 

and operate. For instance, in Colombia, a relatively wealthy developing 

country, limited resources made it difficult for the government to build 

road infrastructure in rural areas. As a result, the security forces found 

it difficult to access remote areas where insurgents found sanctuary. 

However, poverty by itself is not enough to predict an insurgency. It is 

best understood as a risk factor for political conflict.11

Researchers also look at additional factors that are closely related 

to poverty, such as the presence of a large landless population. In many 

countries, including Iran and Colombia, land reform was a prominent 

feature of the demands of resistance movements in the twentieth century.12 Poverty can also introduce “selective incentives” to participate in 

insurgencies. These incentives are the advantages that accrue to participants, whether economic gain or enhanced social status and political power, gained by participating in a successful rebellion.13 Other 

research has also indicated that countries with extensive patron–client 

networks, large agricultural sectors, and highly uneven patterns of land 

ownership are also at risk for political conflict.c

Another branch of research related to poverty looks at how a government’s efforts to modernize society and the economy can lead to 

increased tensions.15 More specifically, this perspective argues that 

the modernization process is inherently conflictual since in practice 

it is often uneven, as greater emphasis is usually placed on economic 

and social uplift of downtrodden groups without developing a political 

framework for adequately incorporating them in the political process. 

Elite members of the ancien régime may see their fortunes decline relative to newly empowered classes, yet the latter remain disenchanted as 

the former may still control the levers of political power. This dynamic 

was present in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in 

Sri Lanka, as rising members of the karavas caste in Sinhalese society 

attempted to challenge the political power of the govigama, the highest 

group within the Sinhalese constellation of castes.

Another proposed socioeconomic factor theorized to contribute to 

conflict is relative political, social, and economic grievances. In Why 

c In such an environment, patron–client relations may suppress the desire of the 

peasantry to offer support to reformist parties that seek to reduce extreme levels of economic and land inequality. Specifically, a small oligarchic land-holding elite may use its 

economic power over the peasantry to compel the latter to vote for parties that oppose 

land redistribution (which would involve the breakup and sell-off of large estates). Joshi 

and Mason14 found that Maoist insurgents in Nepal who supported land reform were more 

successful in mobilizing peasants to support an insurgency than to support their candidates for parliament. They found that patron–client relationships prevented the peasantry 

from offering their political support, and that the insurgents had greater support in 

areas where they were able to disrupt clientelist dependency between the landed elite and 

the peasantry.
338

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka

Men Rebel, Ted Gurr argued that political violence can be explained 

by relative deprivation, which occurs when individuals or groups feel 

deprived of resources or opportunities in comparison with others in 

society.16 If political allegiance is based on ethnicity and one ethnic 

minority group experiences deprivation relative to the ethnic majority 

group (as happened with the Tamils in Sri Lanka vis-à-vis the Sinhalese in the early 1970s), then the minority may give up hope for satisfying its aspirations within a unitary state and seek to detach itself from 

the nation.

Other related important indicators for grievance are political exclusion and economic inequality. In Colombia, for example, following the 

country’s mid-century civil war, La Violencia, political elites established 

a closed political system that disenfranchised several groups, especially 

communist and socialist ones. This reinforced Colombia’s historical 

inability to include all its citizens in a political process, leading to political exclusion and the economic space and motivation for insurgency by 

both political and criminal groups.

Social scientists also link poor economic development to reduced 

opportunity costs for potential rebels. People mired in poverty have 

few opportunities for economic gain. For these individuals, joining an 

insurgency is not a sacrifice of resources in other, more lucrative fields. 

Instead, joining an insurgency may offer economic benefits, making recruitment easier for insurgent groups.17 Lowered opportunity 

costs are magnified in areas with “lootable” resources such as drugs 

or diamonds that can be used to finance an insurgency and enrich 

its participants.

The analysis of the socioeconomic factors underlying political conflict also includes examining the dynamics between different ethnic 

groups in a state. After the Cold War, the incidence of wars motivated by 

identity grievances proliferated. Social scientists refer to these conflicts 

as ethnic wars. Ethnic wars may also be influenced by additional factors, 

such as relative deprivation and political exclusion, but the fulcrum of 

these conflicts is identity. The clash of ethnic identities and fears of cultural extinction can be the animus motivating these conflicts. Political 

scientist Benedict Anderson defined a nation as “an imagined political community” in which “members of even the smallest nation will 

never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of 

them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”18

Anderson’s seminal concept highlights how groups, whether nations 

or ethnicities, together construct a common identity through shared 

linguistic, regional, or religious attributes, among others.

These dynamics are also present in ethnic groups. In Sri Lanka, 

the ethnic Tamil Tigers battled the Sinhalese government for decades 
Appendices

339

to secure an independent state. The Tamils and Sinhalese communities constructed their identities based on both facts and distortions of 

the historical record. Thus, while separate south Indian and Sinhalese 

communities have resided on the island for several thousand years, during the recent conflict some participants may have “read history backwards.”19 The communities began to view past conflicts through the 

prism of an identity paradigm, irrespective of whether the participants 

of the conflicts in the distant past were motivated by ethnic grievances.

The social science research on ethnic identity and political conflict 

can be divided into three primary perspectives. Despite a burgeoning 

research program, social scientists do not agree on how ethnic identity 

impacts the dynamics of insurgency. Early research identified the extent 

of ethnic heterogeneity as a motivating factor for conflict. Ethnic heterogeneity refers to the diversity of different ethnic groups in a country. 

It was thought that the more ethnic groups resided in a country, the 

more likely it was to experience political conflict.20 Another school of 

thought argued that other risk factors, such as low levels of economic 

development and weak institutions, were more important contributors to political conflict than the ethnic makeup of a country.21 The 

third and final perspective developed more nuanced arguments. These 

scholars argued that ethnic groups which were excluded from political 

power were most likely to rebel. A widely used data set, the Minorities at Risk database, tracks disenfranchised ethnic groups all over the 

world.22 In the same vein, other research has added to arguments based 

on political exclusion. This research looks at how the distribution of 

power in the political system among competing groups affects conflict. 

Ethnic groups are more likely to rebel when the center of power in the 

country is segmented among competing groups and when a smaller 

ethnic majority rules over and excludes a larger ethnic majority.23

In addition to the long-running ethnic insurgency in Sri Lanka discussed above, numerous ARIS case studies were driven by ethnic politics. The decades-long conflict in Northern Ireland pitted Catholics and 

Protestants against one another. The conflict was fueled by the political 

exclusion of Catholics by the Protestant-dominated government. Protestants largely ruled the country even though the Catholic community 

comprised the majority of the population. Similarly, an ethnic Albanian 

insurgency erupted in Kosovo after Slobodan Milosevic gained control 

of the Serbian government in 1989. While in office, Milosevic dissolved 

the political autonomy of Kosovo, rendering it subordinate to the Serbian national government. Combined with his policies of exclusion targeted against ethnic Albanians, Kosovo declared its independence and 

mounted an armed insurgency against Milosevic’s government.
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka

Government and Politics

When considering government and politics in the contextual analysis of insurgency, it is helpful to begin by focusing on the impact of 

ideas and institutions on the decisions and actions of stakeholders in 

the conflict. An analysis of the impact of ideas requires understanding the political discourses within state and society and the dynamics 

between the state and challengers to its authority. When looking at how 

institutions influence decisions and actions, researchers consider the 

type of government and the capacity of the state to govern. Together, 

these factors help explain how insurgent groups are able to mobilize 

and operate in a state.

Civil society groups independent of the government contribute to 

the political context in which insurgencies emerge. Indeed, such groups 

may be among the main actors within a rebellion. More specifically, 

we have discussed insurgency or revolution as a specific instance of a 

social movement. Social movements have been defined as “networks 

of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups, or 

associations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of 

a shared collective identity.”24 Government and politics is one of the 

primary means through which ideas are enacted within society. Social 

movements (such as insurgencies) are another. The key difference 

between social movements and other means within society is that social 

movements (1) exhibit strong lines of conflict with political or social 

opponents, (2) involve dense interorganizational networks, and (3) are 

made up of individuals whose sense of collective identity exists beyond 

any specific campaign or engagement.25

Social scientists often look at how different regime types shape patterns of political violence in a country. Regime types are broad categories, such as democratic and autocratic, used to describe the political 

structure of a government. Currently, social scientists favor these institutional factors over the socioeconomic factors discussed above for 

their efficacy in explaining political violence in a country. Simply put, 

“most states have potential insurgents with grievances and resources, 

but almost always possess far greater military power than do insurgents.” With these advantages, competent regimes are usually capable 

of defeating armed challenges to their authority. Weak and divided 

regimes, however, are less capable of defending their authority.26

As a result, social scientists often look at a state’s regime type as 

a significant factor for explaining the emergence of political conflict. 

Many of the initial studies on this topic used a simple categorization 

of regimes as either democratic or autocratic, but researchers have 

also adopted a three-way categorization that includes democracy and 
Appendices

341

autocracy as categories, as well as a middle category of “anocracy,” 

which characterizes a government that has both democratic and autocratic elements. Although the findings have recently been challenged, 

anocracies are thought to be at higher risk for insurgencies than fully 

democratic or autocratic regimes.27

Most researchers agree that developed, mature democratic states are 

the least vulnerable to political conflict. Secure democracies provide 

pressure valves for the release of societal discontent through well-trod 

legal-institutional channels. In the United States, for instance, citizens 

are able to vote leaders out of office, contribute to groups lobbying for 

their interests, or engage in civil resistance to voice their discontent. If 

radicalized resistance movements were to opt to use violent or illegal 

means to achieve their political objectives in the United States, they 

would have difficulty raising support. For the average citizen, the costs 

are simply too high and the expected payoff too low.

In highly repressive regimes, the situation is nearly a mirror opposite of the situation facing open democratic societies. Highly repressive 

regimes provide no legal channels for political opposition or dissent. In 

these authoritarian states, it is difficult for political dissenters to form 

an organized political opposition to the regime. These regimes usually 

have highly refined secret police and other intelligence-gathering capabilities. Before the Syrian civil war and the Arab Spring, for instance, 

the Assad regime kept dissent in check through its secret police, the 

Mukhabarat. The police had an extensive intelligence apparatus supplemented by ordinary civilians encouraged to inform on family, friends, 

and colleagues. As a result, most Syrians were highly suspicious of voicing dissent against the Assad regime.28 In such regimes, any attempts 

at opposition are usually met with arbitrary arrests, interrogations, and 

detentions. Political opposition is usually stillborn, crushed by the overwhelming force of the state’s security apparatus. For the average citizen 

in these repressive regimes, such as North Korea, the costs of resistance 

are simply too high.

However, in today’s world, many states fall somewhere in between 

these two extremes. Social scientists call these states, which combine 

democratic and authoritarian features, hybrid regimes, or anocracies. These states might, for instance, have nominally democratic elections but might rig or otherwise corrupt election results. As a result, 

the ruling party or political leaders never face serious challenges to 

their authority.

Researchers find that political conflict is more likely to arise in 

these anocracies than in truly democratic or repressive states.29 This 

finding is referred to as the “inverted U-curve” because the concentration of political conflict on the authoritarian–democratic scale falls in 
342

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka

the middle. These states typically allow just enough political and civil 

liberties that political opposition is able to form. The inherent contradictions in these states, which claim to be democratic but engage in 

activities that do not support these claims, also fuel societal grievances. 

When the political opposition mounts a challenge to the state, security 

forces often violently suppress it, leading some resistance movements to 

adopt violence as a strategy to achieve their political objectives.30

In the preceding sections, we have already discussed how political exclusion fueled political conflict in Colombia. In many ways, the 

state resembled an anocracy. After its mid-century war, the government 

altered its constitution to rotate the presidency between the two major 

parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, in control of the government. 

The National Front government, as it was called, made it very difficult 

for the emerging middle and lower classes to be incorporated into the 

political process. Additionally, a small elite sector controlled both parties. In 1970, one outside contender for the Liberal presidential candidacy, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, ran for office but lost the election. Many 

believed that electoral fraud perpetrated by the political elite prevented 

Rojas’s victory.

This event was the trigger for the formation of an important insurgent group in Colombia, the M-19, which took its name from the date 

of the alleged fraudulent election, April 19. In its propaganda, the M-19 

disparaged the Colombian regime for failing to live up to its democratic 

ideals. The M-19 was instrumental in a 1991 constitutional reform process that eliminated some of these barriers to political participation.

Some researchers, however, consider these categorizations (democracy, anocracy, and autocracy) to be overly simplistic or ambiguous. 

Recent work has developed a more detailed set of parameters to determine what researchers call “the institutional character of the national 

political regime.” These parameters explain the degree to which elections for leaders of countries (i.e., presidents, prime ministers, etc.) are 

open, competitive, and institutionalized (i.e., rule based), and whether 

opposition and other political groups can compete for political power 

and influence. After considerable research, experts found these attributes to be the most significant indicators or predictors of conflict.31

ENDNOTES

1 Charles Tilly and Robert E. Gordon, “It Depends,” in The Oxford Handbook of Contextual 

Political Analysis, eds. Robert E. Gordon and Charles Tilly (Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 2006), 6, 9.
Appendices

343

2 W. B. Max Crownover, “Complex System Contextual Framework (CSCF): A GroundedTheory Construction for the Articulation of System Context in Addressing Complex Systems Problems” (PhD diss., Old Dominion University, 2005).

3 Nathan Bos, “Underlying Causes of Violence,” in Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, ed. Nathan Bos (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special 

Operations Command, 2013), 27.

4 Halvard Buhaug and Jan Ketil Rød, “Local Determinants of African Civil Wars, 1970–

2001,” Political Geography 25, no. 3 (2006): 316.

5 Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, “Introducing 

ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset: Special Data Feature,” Journal 

of Peace Research 47, no. 5 (2010): 652.

6 Charles Tilly, “Why and How History Matters,” in The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, ed. Robert E. Gordon and Charles Tilly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 

2006), 423.

7 Ibid., 425.

8 Doug McAdam, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, The Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

9 Bos, “Underlying Causes of Violence,” 15.

10 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American 

Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.

11 Bos, “Underlying Causes of Violence,” 15.

12 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic 

Papers 56, no. 4 (2004): 576-77.

13 Mark Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

14 Madhav Joshi and David Mason, “Between Democracy and Revolution: Peasant Support 

for Insurgency versus Democracy in Nepal,” Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 6 (2008): 

765–782.

15 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University 

Press), 1968.

16 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 571.

17 Jeffery Paige, Agrarian Revolution (New York: The Free Press, 1975).

18 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 2006), 6.

19 Bryan Pfaffenberger, “Introduction: The Sri Lankan Tamils,” in The Sri Lankan Tamils: 

Ethnicity and Identity, eds. Chelvadurai Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger (Boulder, 

CO: Westview Press, 1994), 20.

20 Tanja Ellingsen, “Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches’ Brew?: Multiethnicity and 

Domestic Conflict during and after the Cold War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 2 

(2000): 228–249.

21 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.”

22 Minorities at Risk Project, “Minorities at Risk Dataset,” Center for International Development and Conflict Management (2009), http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/.

23 Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min, “Ethnic Politics and Armed 

Conflict,” American Sociological Review 74, no. 2 (2009): 316–337.

24 Mario Diani, “The Concept of Social Movement,” Sociological Review 40, no. 1 (1992): 

1–25.

25 Mario Diani and Ivano Bison, “Organizations, Coalitions, and Movements,” Theory and 

Society 33, no. 3–4 (2004): 281–309.

26 Jack A. Goldstone, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael B. Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward, “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability,” American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 1 (2010): 190–208.
344

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka

27 Edward N. Muller and Erich Weede, “Cross-National Variation in Political Violence: A 

Rational Action Approach,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, no. 4 (1990): 624–651; 

James Vreeland, “The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy,” The 

Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 3 (2008): 401–425.

28 Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

29 Håvard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992,” American 

Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (2001): 33-48.

30 Ibid.

31 Goldstone et al., “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability,” 190–208.
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INDEX

Index

365

A

Abductions, 311

Accelerated Mahaweli Program, 134

Administrative operations

JVP, 195–197

LTTE, 246–249

Afghanistan, 76, 260

Agriculture, 29–30

Air Tigers, 224

Albright, Madeleine, 93

All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), 

48, 154

All India Anna Dravida Munnetra 

Kazhagam (AIADMK) Party, 

255

Al Qaeda, 25

American Missionary Society, 122–123

Amirthaligam, Appapillai, 243, 252, 

284

Amman, Pottu, 98

Andrews, Robert, 145

Annexure C, 293, 296

Anthony, Charles, 98

Anti-Tamil riots (1983), 62–63, 86, 157, 

173, 186, 290

Anuradhapura, 41, 116, 117, 122

ARIS Tier 1 Insurgency Case Studies, 

4, 333–342

Armaments

JVP, 205

LTTE, 221–222, 260–262

Armed component

JVP, 176–177

LTTE, 222–225

Armed forces (Sri Lanka)

Air Force, 94

Army, 62, 63, 96, 291, 294–295, 302, 

306

defeat of LTTE, 98, 312

JVP psychological operations 

against, 199–202, 302

and LTTE tactics, 33

LTTE weapons captured from, 260

Navy, 32, 89–90, 301

president as commander-in-chief, 

287

strength of, 94

Art of War (Sun Tzu), 25

Arudpragsam, A. R., 217

Arunachalam, Ponnambalam, 149

Arya Chakaravartis, 42

Aryans, 64, 124–127

Ashoka, Emperor of India, 41, 64–65, 

116

Assassinations

by JVP, 85, 176, 191–192

of JVP leaders/members, 86

by LTTE, 91, 96, 239–243, 252, 311

in the north, 284

Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent 

Strategies (ARIS) series, 3–5; See 

also ARIS Tier 1 Insurgency Case 

Studies

Asymmetric tactics (LTTE), 33

Athulathmudali, Lalith, 191, 243

Atlantic Charter, 73–74

Aumildars, 145

Auxiliary component

JVP, 177–180

LTTE, 221–222

B

Bahmanid, 66–67

Balasingham, Anton, 293, 304, 308

Bandaranaike, Sirimavo, 55–57, 81–84, 

155, 193–194, 254

Bandaranaike, Solomno West 

Ridgeway Dias (S. W. R. D.), 52–

55, 78, 82, 152–154, 282–283

Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam (B-C) 

Pact (July 26, 1957), 153–154, 

281–283

Bangladesh, 76

Batuwantudawe, 123

Black Sea Tigers, 32, 250

Black Tigers, 88, 220–222, 224–225, 

245, 246, 248
366

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka

Blavatsky, Madame, 124

Board of Ministers, 150

Bolshevik-Lenninist Party, 49

Bopage, Lionel, 186

Brahmin caste, 129

Brahminical Hinduism, 130

British

campaign for independence, 46–50

Ceylon’s foreign policy, 82

colonial rule, 27–30, 42–44, 70–71, 

120, 122, 130, 145–151

plantations established by, 133

and security needs of India, 74–76

during World War II, 71–74

The Buddha, 52, 64, 121–122, 132, 153

Buddhism, 64, 112

under constitutions, 58, 61

conversion of kings to, 118

establishment of, 116

and Hun attacks, 65

in India, 64

linking China and Ceylon, 68

and nationalism, 152

and Sinhalese identity, 41

Sinhalese mytho-history, 121–125

Soulbury Constitution, 156

as state religion, 46, 289

Buddhist clergy, 45

Buddhist Thesophical Society of 

Ceylon, 124

C

Cabinet of Ministers, 49

Cabral, Pedro, 69

Caldecott, Sir Andrew, 48, 151

Caldwell, Robert, 126

Canada, 304

Caste differences, 117, 128–131, 236–

237

Castes, Sinhalese, 117–118

Catholicism, 43

Cease-fire Agreement (CFA), 95, 97, 

98, 307

Cease-fires, 94–95

1989-1995, 304, 305

2000-2001, 95, 306

2001-2002, 307

2002, 95–96

by Kumaratunga, 91

Norwegian Peace Initiative, 95–96

Central Province, 35

Ceylon, 43

Chinese occupation of, 68

European colonialism, 70–71

foreign policy/foreign relations, 

81–83

Kandyan Convention of 1815, 43

nationalization of foreign oil 

companies/facilitìes, 83

during World War II, 71–74

Ceylon Citizenship Act (1948), 282

Ceylonese Communist Party, 81

Ceylonese Independence Bill, 50

Ceylon Indian Congress, 49, 51–52

Ceylon National Association, 148

Ceylon National Congress (CNC), 46, 

159

Ceylon State Council, 47, 49

Ceylon Tamil Congress, 49

Ceylon Workers’ Congress, 284

Chalukyas, 65–66

Chandragupta, 64, 65

Chandrahasan, S. C., 293

Chelvanayakam, S. J. V., 48, 49, 53–56, 

153, 154, 229, 282

Cheras, 66

Children and youth

JVP use of, 177–179

LTTE use of, 94, 249

China, 67–69, 312

economic ties with, 82

Pakistan partnership with, 83

regional politics, 79–81

Sino-Ceylon Rubber-Rice Pact, 81
Index

367

Sino-Soviet confrontations, 78

view of India in, 183

Cholas, 41–42, 66

Christianity, 122–124

Churchill, Winston, 73, 74

Church Mission, 122–123

Civilian Volunteer Force (CVF), 218, 

257, 260

Civil service, 46, 132, 145, 146

Climate, 21, 23

Clough, B. C., 125

Coalition government (1965-1968), 57

Codrington, H. W., 126

Colebrooke-Cameron reforms, 146–

148

Colombo, Sri Lanka, 157

1983 riots, 62

JVP fighting, 35

LTTE attacks, 33, 306

Colonial era

educational system, 135

European colonialism, 69–71

eventual ethnic conflict stemming 

from, 120–121

history, 42–50

physical environment and, 27–31

Sinhalese–Tamil conflicts during, 

117

Command and control

JVP, 173–176

LTTE, 218–219

Communist Party, 49, 80–82, 192, 230

Ceylonese, 81

Indian, 80–81

Moscow Wing, 57

Peking Wing, 172

Communist Party of the Soviet Union 

(CPSU), 77

Consociational democracies, 160

Constitutions

1921, 149–150

1924, 47, 150

1931, 47, 150

1945, 151–152, 164

1947, 49–50

1948, 50

1972, 57, 58, 155–157, 283, 284

1978, 61, 156–157, 159, 288–289

and Soulbury Commission on 

Constitutional Reform, 48

Control democracies, 160

Conventional warfare

and JVP, 176

LTTE, 92, 239–242

Criminal Justice Commission, 180

Critical junctures, 164–165

Crown Lands Encroachment 

Ordinance (1840), 133

Cuba, 204

Culavamsa, 121

Cult of martyrdom (LTTE), 238–239

Curfews, 198

D

D’Alwis, James, 125

December 19 proposals, 297

Defense spending, 291

De Gama, Vasco, 69

Democracies, consociational vs. 

control, 160

Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri 

Lanka, 156

Demographics

ethnic groups, 109–113, 134–135

population, 188

religion and language, 112–115

and women in LTTE, 248–249

Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya (DJV), 

176–177, 192, 194, 198, 206

Deshapremi Sinhala Tharuna 

Peramuna, 201–202

De Silva, G. V. S., 192

De Silva, Rohana, 197–198

Devanampiya Tissa, 41, 116

Dharmapala, Anagarika, 123–125
368

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka

“Differential incorporation” (castes), 

129

Dipavamsa, 121

District Development Councils (DDCs), 

85, 159, 180, 289–290, 296

Districts, 147–148, 157–159

Distrust, 319

Dixit, J. N., 194, 292–293

Donoughmore Commission, 150–151

Donoughmore Constitution (1931), 47

Dravida Kazhagam (DK), 292

Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), 

183, 253, 255, 287, 292, 293

Dravidians, 65, 126, 127

Dukakis, Michael, 251

Duraiappah, Alfred, 59, 242, 284

Durbars, 44

Dutch East India Company, 70, 145

Dutch rule, 27, 28, 42, 43, 70, 71, 122

Dutugemunu, 116, 117, 124–125

Dynamics of conflict, physical 

environment in, 25

E

Economic concerns

of LTTE, 230

of Tamils and Sinhalese, 131–137

Economic program

of JVP, 85, 86, 179–180, 182–183, 

193–194, 201

of LTTE, 231

Economy, in early 1960s, 55

“Educated Ceylonese,” 46, 123, 149

Educated unemployment, 136–137, 

188–189

Education

under LTTE, 232–233

missionary schools, 44, 122–123

role in insurgencies, 135–137

as Tamil concern, 131–132

university system, 46, 57–58

Education camps (JVP), 195–197

Eelam National Democratic Liberation 

Front (ENDLF), 252, 256, 257

Eelam National Liberation Front 

(ENLF), 86–87, 217–218

Eelam People’s Democratic Party, 311

Eelam People’s Revolutionary 

Liberation Front (EPRLF), 87, 

217, 218, 229, 252, 255–257, 297, 

303–304

Eelam Revolutionary Organization of 

Students (EROS), 87, 217, 255, 

256, 297

Eelam Wars; See individual wars, e.g.:

First Eelam War (Eelam War I, 

1983–1987)

Elara, 116, 117, 127

Elections

1947, 49

1952, 51–52

1956, 52–53, 123, 132

1965, 81

1970, 202

1977, 60–61, 155, 285, 286

1978 modification of electoral 

system, 61

1979, 203

1981, 85, 180

1982, 186, 203

1994, 91, 304

2005, 96, 310

2013, 325

immediately post-independence, 

50–51

JVP disruption of, 198

JVP policy, 183

LTTE disruption of, 252–253

to NEPC, 303

territorial, 150–152

Electoral districts, 151

Electoral system, 159–160

Elephant Pass, 95, 291, 306

Elites

under the British, 148–150

English-educated, 189
Index

369

post-independence integration of, 

51

traditional, 44

Employment

educated unemployment, 136–137, 

188–189

Tamil access to, 132–133

English East India Company, 145

English language, 53, 122–123

Ethnic groups, 21, 24, 109–113; See also

specific groups

anglicized elites, 148

education differences, 135–137

fifty-fifty solution for, 48–50, 151

in India, 65

shifting balance, 134–135

Ethnic outbidding, 153–154

Ethnic wars, ideological wars vs., 273

European colonialism, 69–71

European racial theory, 120–121, 

124, 125

Executive Council (under British), 147

External actors

JVP, 204

LTTE, 253–258

F

Fa Hien, 68

“False consciousness,” 62

Federalism, 282, 289, 309

Ferguson, John, 149

Fernando, Clancy, 220

Fernando, Neville, 192

Fifty-fifty solution, 48–50, 151

Finances

JVP, 206

LTTE, 258–260

First Eelam War (Eelam War I, 1983–

1987), 86–88, 218, 222, 223, 231, 

241, 249, 290

“Floating warehouses,” 32

Fonseka, Sarath, 97, 311, 312

Foreign policy and foreign relations, 

64, 81–83

of Jayewardene, 254, 295

of Rajapaksa government, 312

Soviet, 76–77

Fourth Eelam War (2006–2009), 97–98

Fourth International Tamil 

Conference (1974), 58

France, 18

Freedom Birds, 94, 248

French, in colonial period, 43, 70–71

G

Gandhi, Indira, 75, 83, 227, 253, 254, 

292–295

Gandhi, Rajiv, 88, 90, 91, 243, 244, 256, 

257, 298–299, 304

The Garland of Jaffna Events, 45–46

Gautama, Siddhartha, 64

Geography of insurgency, 33–36

Germany, 83

Government and politics, 143–160, 

340–342; See also Colonial era

campaign for independence, 46–50

Ceylonese elites under the British, 

148–150

civil service under the British, 146

Colebrooke-Cameron reforms, 

146–148

and consociational vs. control 

democracies, 160

constitution of 1972, 155–157

control of maritime regions, 145

Donoughmore Commission 

recommendations, 150–151

electoral system modification, 

159–160

emergence of political parties, 152, 

154–155

ethnic outbidding, 153–154

independence and regional politics, 

74–81

Kandyan Convention of 1815, 146

provinces and districts, 157–159
370

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka

Soulbury Constitution, 151

Government countermeasures, 279–

312

and central vs. regional distribution 

of power, 281–284

Jayewardene administration, 287–

301

Kumaratunga administration, 

304–310

leader’s operational code, 319–321

Premadasa administration, 302–304

Rajapaksa administration, 311–312

surveillance zone in north/

northwest, 293

Gramodaya mandalaya, 159

Guerrilla warfare (LTTE), 239–241

Guevara, Che, 173, 204

Gunananda, Migettuwatte, 123

Gunawardens, Philip, 52

Gupta Dynasty, 65

H

Hartals, 35, 193, 195

Health services, under LTTE, 232

Hewavitarana, Don David, 124

Hinduism, 112, 113, 115, 130

Historical context, 39–99, 335–336

1948-1956, 50–53

1956-1972, 53–57

1972-1983, 57–63

colonial history, 42–50

international, 63–83

JVP 1971 insurrection, 84–85

JVP 1987–1989 insurrection, 85–86

LTTE First Eelam War, 1983–1987, 

86–88

LTTE Fourth Eelam War, 2006–

2009, 97–98

LTTE Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, 

1987–1990, 88–90

LTTE Second Eelam War, 1990–

1995, 90–91

LTTE Third Eelam War, 1995–

2002, 91–95

Norwegian Peace Initiative, 2002–

2006, 95–97

phases of conflict, 84–99

post-independence, 50–63

precolonial history, 41–42

road to independence, 46–50

wartime casualties, 98–99

Huns, 65

Huntington’s theory of modernization, 

119–120

I

Ideology

JVP, 182–186

LTTE, 228–230

Indabas, 44

Independence, 151; See also

Government and politics

campaign for, 46–50

LTTE view of, 229, 301

and regional politics, 74–81

Tamil support for, 285

India; See also Indian Peacekeeping 

Force (IPKF); Indo-Lanka Peace 

Accord (1987)

and brewing ethnic conflict, 291–

293

and Ceylon/Sri Lankan foreign 

policy, 81–83

Chinese interests in, 67

European colonialism, 69–71

during Jayewardene’s presidency, 

294–301

JVP attitude toward, 183–186

JVP protests related to, 194–195

LTTE divisions in, 219

and LTTE insurgency, 253–257

LTTE weapons from, 260

post-World War II security needs, 

74–76

precolonial, 64–67
Index

371

regional politics, 74–76

repatriation of residents in Ceylon, 

289

Sino-Indian relations, 79–81

Soviet ties to, 78

during World War II, 72–73

Indian and Pakistani Residents 

(Citizenship) Act (1949), 282

Indian Communist Party, 80–81

Indian Congress, 50

Indian navy, 32

Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), 

6, 26, 89–90, 231, 237, 241, 244, 

251–253, 260, 300–301, 303–304

Indian Peak, 256–257

Indian Tamils (estate Tamils; upcountry Tamils), 21, 110–113

1978 constitution and rights for, 289

Ceylon Indian Congress, 52

citizenship status of, 282

in LTTE activities, 247

in the north, 287

and post-independence 

government, 50

religion and language, 113–115

in TULF, 58

Indo-Lanka Peace Accord (1987), 86, 

88–90, 159, 178, 187, 195, 204, 

251, 252, 256, 260, 298–300

“Inferiorization” (castes), 129

Insurgencies; See Revolutions

Intelligence agencies, 302

Interim Self-Governing Authority 

(ISGA), 238, 308

International Conference of Tamil 

Research, 285

International context, 63–83

Ceylon during World War II, 71–74

Ceylon/Sri Lankan foreign policy/

foreign relations, 81–83

China, 67–69

European colonialism, 69–71

independence and regional politics, 

74–81

precolonial India, 64–67

International Monetary Fund, 83

Inter-University Students Federation, 

178

Irrigation projects (1980s), 63

Isaacsz, Klaas, 45

Israeli–Palestinian peace process, 165

J

Jaffna, 117

anti-Tamil riots (1983), 290

British colonial control of, 29

LTTE expulsion of Muslims, 91

LTTE presence in, 35

military capture of, 91

Sinhalese police in, 285

Jaffna kingdom, 42–44, 117, 131, 

228–229

Jaffna Library burning, 62

Jaffna peninsula

DDC elections in, 289

ethnic cleansing of Sinhalese from, 

287

first Tamil kingdom, 42

LTTE swept from, 306

military capture of, 91

Muslims in, 307

Operation Liberation, 88, 255–256, 

298

Operation PAWAN, 256–257

Jaffna Tamils, 236

Jaffna Youth Congress, 47–48

Jainism, 64

Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People’s 

Liberation Front, JVP), 6, 169–

206, 325

1971 insurrection, 84–85, 173, 

188–190

1987–1989 insurrection, 85–86, 173, 

178, 182, 189–195

administrative operations, 195–197

areas of influence, 35–36

armaments, 205
372

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka

armed component, 176–177

attempted overthrow of 

Bandaranaike, 57

auxiliary component, 177–180

caste support for, 128

Chinese assistance to, 81

components of insurgency, 172–180

and December 19 proposals, 297

EPRLF links with, 230

external actors and transnational 

influences, 204

factors in insurgency, 163–165

finances, 206

and government accommodation 

with LTTE, 281

ideology, 182–186

and Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, 300

influence area, 174, 175

leadership, 181–182, 274–275

legitimacy, 187–188

motivation and behavior, 188–190

and nationalization of land, 134

operations, 190–203

organization of, 173–176

paramilitary operations, 190–195

physical environment and war with, 

35–36

political operations, 202–203

during Premadasa presidency, 

302–303

psychological operations, 197–202

public component, 180

and theory of modernization, 119

timeline, 171

training, 178, 195–197

underground component, 172–176

Japan, 71–73, 151

Jathika Chintanaya, 189–190

Jathika Kamkaru Satan Madyasthanya, 

179–180

Jathika Sevaka Samithiya (JSS), 62

Jathika Sisya Madyasthanya, 179

Jayaratne, Jayantha, 301

Jayewardene, J. R., 83, 87, 88, 154, 157, 

187, 190–191, 193, 194, 203, 254, 

287–301

Jones, William, 125

Judicial system (LTTE), 232

K

Kachcheri system, 158–159

Kadirgamar, Lakshman, 96, 243

Kafur, Malik, 66

Kalingas, 42

Kallathoni (illegal Indian immigrants), 

45

Kanagaratnam, M., 59

Kandyan Convention (1815), 43, 146

Kandyan rebellion (1817-1818), 146

Kandyans, 27–29, 43–44, 118, 146

Kandyan Treaty of 1638, 43

Kandy kingdom, 42, 43, 70, 117, 118, 

146, 151

Kao, R. N., 293–294

Karunanidhi, M., 253, 255

Kotelawala, Sir John, 153

Kotte kingdom, 42–43, 117

Krishnakumar, Sathasivam (Kittu), 227

Kublai Khan, 67

Kulatanga, Parami, 311

Kumaratunga, Chandrika 

Bandaranaike, 91, 94, 243, 

304–310

Kunte, M. M., 126

L

Labor movement, JVP infiltration of, 

179

Land Development Ordinance (1935), 

56, 133

Land policies (British), 30–31

Language, 112–114; See also Sinhala 

language; Tamil language

official, 53–54, 58, 61–62, 157, 282, 

288, 300

and Sinhalese consciousness, 

125–126
Index

373

Tamil economic concerns about, 

131–132

university ethnic quotas based on, 

288

Languages of Courts Act, 56

L.B.J. Military Supplies, 262

Leadership

JVP, 181–182

LTTE, 225–228

operational code of leaders, 319–

321

in propelling insurgencies forward, 

274–275

Legal system (LTTE), 231–232

Legislative Council (under British), 

147–150

Legislature

bicameral, 49

campaign for independence, 46–47

Donoughmore Commission 

recommendations, 150

“Educated Ceylonese” member, 46

minority representation in, 152

post-independence, 50

proportional representation, 159–

160

under Soulbury Constitution, 151

unicameral, 150, 156

Legitimacy

JVP, 187–188

LTTE, 230–235

Lenin, Vladimir, 76

Leopards, 222

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 

(LTTE), 6, 213–262, 325–326

1983 riots, 62, 63

administrative operations, 246–249

areas of influence, 239–240

armaments, 260–262

armed component, 222–225

attack on Sri Lanka Army, 62

auxiliary component, 221–222

caste support for, 128

and colonization programs, 30–31

command and control, 218–219

components of insurgency, 218–225

cult of martyrdom, 238–239

economic concerns fostering, 

131–132

establishment of, 59

external actors and transnational 

influences, 253–258

factors in insurgency, 163–165

finances, 258–260

First Eelam War, 1983–1987, 86–88

Fourth Eelam War, 2006–2009, 

97–98

government countermeasures, 

284–312

ideology, 228–230

Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, 88–90, 

299–301

in Jaffna peninsula, 298

during Kumaratunga presidency, 

304–310

leadership, 225–228, 274, 275

legitimacy, 230–235

membership and recruitment, 247

motivation and behavior, 235–239

operations, 239–253

origins of, 216–218

paramilitary operations, 239–246

physical environment and, 31–35

political operations, 251–253

during Premadasa presidency, 

302–304

psychological operations, 249–251

public component, 225

during Rajapaksa presidency, 

311–312

Second Eelam War, 1990–1995, 

90–91

territory controlled by, 33–35

Thimpu principles, 297

Third Eelam War, 1995–2002, 

91–95

timeline, 215–216
374

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka

training, 246–247, 254, 255, 257–

258

underground component, 220–221

London Missionary Society, 122–123

M

MacCallum, Sir Henry, 44

Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (People’s 

United Front), 52

Mahathiya, 228

Mahattaya (LTTE deputy), 237

Mahavamsa, 41, 116, 121–122

Maheswaran, Uma, 217, 227, 230, 257

Mahinda, 41, 65

Mandela, Nelson, 251

Manning reforms, 46

Mao Zedong, 78, 79

Maritime regions, British control of, 

145

Marxism, 195, 196

Marxist parties, 49, 50

Massachusetts, 251

Mathew, Cyril, 62

Maubima Surakeeme Viyaparaya 

(MSV), 297

Media

government use of, 312

JVP use of, 180, 197–198

LTTE use of, 249

Military training

JVP, 197

LTTE, 246

for Tiger Cubs, 249

Ming Dynasty, 68

Ministry of National Security, 291

Missionaries, 29, 43, 44, 122–123

Modernization theory, 119–120

Mongols, 67

Moors (Sri Lankan Muslims), 110–113

Motivation and behavior

JVP, 188–190

LTTE, 235–239

Mudaliyars, 145

Muhammad, Zahir-ud-din (The Tiger), 

67

Mükkerm Max, 126

Muralithiran, Vinayagamoorthy 

(Colonel Karuna), 96, 128, 310, 

312

Muslims, 21, 66, 91, 247, 305, 307, 310

Mytho-history

Sinhalese, 121–126

Tamils, 127

N

Nadesan, B., 98

Nataputta, 64

Nationalism, 152, 228, 282

National State Assembly, 156

Naval attacks and operations, 32

Nava Sama Samaja Pakshaya (NSSP), 

230

Nayakkars, 118

Nehru, Jawaharlal, 74, 77, 79, 80

Netherlands, 304

Norway, 95, 304–305, 307

Norwegian Peace Initiative, 2002–

2006, 95–98

O

Office of the Government Agent 

(under British), 147

Official Language Act of 1956 

(Sinhala-Only Act), 53–54, 58, 

117, 132, 153, 282

Olcott, H. S., 124

Operation Agni Khiela, 95

Operational code, 319–321

Operation Liberation, 88, 255–256, 

298

Operation PAWAN, 256–257

Operation Rana Gasa, 94

Operations

JVP, 190–203

LTTE, 239–253
Index

375

Operation Sure Victory, 92

Operation Unceasing Waves, 92

Operation Unceasing Waves II, 93

Operation Unceasing Waves III, 94, 

223, 242

P

Padmanabha, K., 218

Pakistan, 295

Pallavas, 65–66

Pandyas, 66

Parallel state-like institutions

and JVP, 188

of LTTE, 298

Paramilitary operations

by government, 90–91, 302, 311

JVP, 190–195

LTTE, 239–246

Parliament

dissolution of, 193–194

DJV threats to, 198

JVP attack on, 190–191

LTTE’s opposition to, 230

Pathmanathan, Selvarasa, 98

Patriotism, 187

Patronage networks, 132–133

People’s Alliance (PA) coalition, 304, 

306

People’s Front of Liberation Tigers 

(PFLT), 218, 225, 251–252

People’s Liberation Army, 217

People’s Liberation Organization of 

Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), 128, 205, 

217, 255, 256, 297

People’s United Front, 78

Periya, E. V. R., 291–292

Phases of conflict, 84–99

JVP 1971 insurrection, 84–85

JVP 1987–1989 insurrection, 85–86

LTTE First Eelam War, 1983–1987, 

86–88

LTTE Fourth Eelam War, 2006–

2009, 97–98

LTTE Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, 

1987–1990, 88–90

LTTE Second Eelam War, 1990–

1995, 90–91

LTTE Third Eelam War, 1995–

2002, 91–95

Norwegian Peace Initiative, 2002–

2006, 95–97

Physical environment, 17–36, 334–335

climate, 21, 23

ethnic groups, 21, 24

general importance of, 25

geography of insurgency, 33–36

importance in Sri Lanka, 25–33

South Asia (map), 19

Sri Lanka (map), 20

terrain, 21, 22

Planning and Development Secretariat 

(PDS), 234

Plantation economy, 29–30

Plantations, 133, 183

Police

1971 JVP insurrection, 84

fighting against JVP, 302

in Jaffna, 285

JVP infiltration of, 200–201

Tamil Eelam, 232

Political entities, geographic regions 

of, 26–27

Political operations

of JVP, 180, 190–192, 202–203

of Kumaratunga government, 

305–306

of LTTE, 251–253

of Premadasa government, 303–304

Political parties; See also individual 

parties

emergence of, 152, 154–155

in Tamil Nadu, LTTE links with, 

255

Politics; See Elections; Government and 

politics

Polonnaruwa, 42, 117

Ponnambalam, G. G., 48, 49, 151, 154
376

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka

Ponnambalam Arunachalam, Sir, 46

Ponnambalam Ramanathan, Sir, 46

Population, 188

Portuguese rule, 27, 28, 42, 43, 69–70, 

122, 130

Post-independence history, 50–63

Post-Tsunami Operational 

Management Structure 

(P-TOMS), 96, 310

Prabhakaran, Velupillai, 59, 93, 96, 98, 

219, 225–228, 235–236, 243, 244, 

274–275, 284, 297–299, 308

Pradeshiys mandalaya, 159

Precolonial era

castes, 130

history, 41–42

in India, 64–67

Precolonial India, 64–67

Premadasa, Ranasinghe, 190–191, 243, 

251, 252, 299, 302–304

President(s), 156, 287

Jayewardene administration, 287–

301

Kumaratunga administration, 

304–310

Premadasa administration, 302–304

Rajapaksa administration, 311–312

Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), 

235, 290–291

Prime minister, 49, 156–157

Primordialism, 115–116

Progressive Nationalist Party, 282

Provinces, 157–159

Provincial Administrative Council 

(PAC), 308

Provincial Councils Act (1987), 159

Psychological operations

of JVP, 197–202

of LTTE, 249–251

of Premadasa government, 302–303

Public component

of JVP, 180

of LTTE, 225

of Premadasa government 

operations, 303

Public goods, in LTTE territory, 233–

234

Pulavar, Mayilvakana, 45

Puleedevan, S., 98

Pulip Padai, 217

Punyawardana, Gallege, 45

Purana swaraj, 47

R

Racial theory, European, 120–121, 124, 

125

Rajakariya, 43

Rajapaksa, Gotabhaya, 97, 243, 311–

312, 325

Rajapaksa, Mahinda, 96, 98, 253, 309, 

310

Rama, 127

Ramachandran, M. G., 253, 255, 295, 

298

Ramanathan, Ponnambalam, 129

Ramesh, S., 98

Rao, Narasimha, 295

Ravana, 127

Regional Councils Bill, 282, 283

Regional politics, 74–81

China, 79–81

Indian security perceptions, 74–76

Russia/Soviet Union, 76–78

Relative deprivation theory, 120

Religion, 112–115, 117, 238–239; See 

also specific religions

Religious tensions, 45

Republic of Sri Lanka, 156

Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), 

252, 254, 255, 260, 295

Resettlement

in 1980s, 63

economic concerns of Tamils, 

133–134

Revolutions (insurgencies, 

revolutionary warfare)
Index

377

causes/bases of, 3

defined, 3

JVP strategy for, 197 (See also

Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna 

[People’s Liberation Front, 

JVP])

LTTE (See Liberation Tigers of 

Tamil Eelam [LTTE])

operational code of leaders, 319–

321

outcomes of, 325

summary of, 5–10

timeline, 10–13

Riots

anti-Tamil (1983), 62–63, 86, 157, 

173, 186, 290

prior to formal hostilities, 109

Roy, M. N., 76

Russia/Soviet Union, 76–78, 82, 84, 

312

S

Sabaratnam, Sri, 218, 255

Saivite Hindus, 131

Samagama, 123

Sangily, Tamil king, 43

Sanmugathasan, N., 181

Satyendra, N., 293

Schaffer, Teresita, 306

Schlegel, Friedrich, 125

Schools, missionary, 44, 122–123; See 

also University system

Sea Pigeons (LTTE), 221–222

Sea Tigers, 31–32, 222–224, 245–246

Second Eelam War (Eelam War II, 

1990–1995), 90–91, 222, 242, 

257, 304, 305

Security dilemmas, with ethnic wars, 

273–274

Senanayake, Don Stephen, 49, 77, 152

Senanayake, Dudley Shelton, 53, 55–

56, 81, 83, 154, 283

Senanayake-Chelvanayakam (S-C) 

Pact, 55–57, 281, 283

Separatism

India’s fear of, 292–293

Tamil separatist movement, 184, 

186, 284, 286, 290

Settlement patterns, physical 

environment and, 26–27

Shankar, Colonel, 224

Shanmugham, Tharmalingham 

(Kumaran Pathmanathan, KP), 

221–222

Singapore, 72

Singh, V. P., 90

Sinhabahu, 121

Sinhala language, 46, 53, 58, 61–62, 

112, 132, 153, 157, 288

Sinhala Maha Sabha, 152–153

Sinhala-only Act; See Official Language 

Act of 1956 (Sinhala-Only Act)

Sinhalese, 21

anglicized elite, 148–149

and campaign for independence, 

46–47

caste differences of Tamils and, 

128–131

and colonial British land policies, 

30

in colonial period, 29, 43–46

concerns about Indian Tamils, 282

and December 19 proposals, 297

in Dehiwatte, 238

economic concerns of, 131–137

during emergence of violence, 1972-

1983, 57–63

as ethnic group, 109–113

government and politics, 150, 152–

154, 156–160

and IPKF presence, 89

Jathika Chintanaya, 189–190

legislative representation for, 47

LTTE view of, 229

mytho-history, 121–126

physical environment and, 26

in the police, 285
378

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka

popularity of Hindi films among, 

184

post-independence history, 51–57

precolonial history, 41–42

religions and language, 112–114

revolt of 1797-1798, 145

socio-economic factors in violence, 

109

and Tamil Eelam, 285–286

and theories of violence, 115–121

traditional division between Tamils 

and, 114

up-country and low-country, 110

Sinhalese kingdoms, 26–27, 42–43

Sinhasivali, 121

Sino-Ceylon Rubber-Rice Pact (1952), 

81

Six-Point Plan, 284

“Small boats concept,” 32

Social constructivism, 118–119

Socialism, 77, 228

Socialist Student Union (SSU), 177–178

Socioeconomic conditions, 107–137, 

336–339

caste differences, 128–131

economic concerns of Tamils and 

Sinhalese, 131–137

ethnic groups, 109–113

religion and language, 112–115

Sinhalese mytho-history, 121–126

Tamil mytho-history, 127

theories of violence in Sri Lanka, 

115–121

Solutions to the Tamil Eelam Struggle

(Wijeweera), 184, 186

Soosai, Colonel, 98

Soulbury Commission on 

Constitutional Reform, 48, 151

Soulbury Commission Report, 49

Soulbury Constitution, 151–152, 164

South Asia (map), 19

Southern Province, 35

Soviet-Indian Treaty of Peace, 

Friendship, and Cooperation 

(1971), 78

Soviet Union; See Russia/Soviet Union

Spain, 70

Sri Jayawardenapura Kotte, 157

Sri Lanka

Ceylon changed to, 57

foreign policy and foreign relations, 

81–83

major nonterrorist organizations 

in, 329

map of, 20

names of, 156

Soviet attitude toward, 78

as unitary state, 61

Sri Lanka Army, 294–295, 302

1983 riots, 62, 63

LTTE gains against, 306

recruitment campaign, 96

Special Task Force, 291

Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), 52, 

55, 152

1956 election, 132

1960 election, 283

1971 JVP insurrection, 84

1977 elections, 286

2004 election, 309

and December 19 proposals, 297

and devolution of authority to 

Tamils, 154

foreign policy, 82

JVP liquidation of members, 192

nationalization of land by, 134

opposition to S-C agreement, 57

in post-independence government, 

51

violence between supporters of 

UNP and, 287

and Wijeweera’s release, 203

Sri Lanka Mahajana Party, 192

Sri Lankan Air Force, 94
Index

379

Sri Lankan military; See Armed forces 

(Sri Lanka)

Sri Lankan Navy, 32, 89–90, 301

Sri Lankan Tamils, 21, 110–113

caste differences, 128

expatriate, 130

indigenous identity of, 130

language and autonomy protests/

riots, 53–54

in LTTE territory, 33

religion and language, 113

in TULF, 58

Stalin, Joseph, 77

Stalinist two camps thesis, 77

State-building, in Tamil regions, 231

State Council, 150, 151

Student mobilization

by JVP, 177–179

by LTTE, 217

Suffrage, 150

Suicide operations (LTTE), 33, 91, 93, 

95, 97, 220, 221, 224–225, 238–

239, 239–246

Sun Tzu, 25

Supply routes, LTTE, 32

Swabasha movement, 132

T

Tabbowa Resettlement Scheme (1928), 

133

Tamil Congress, 50, 51, 284

Tamil Eelam, 58–59, 60, 187, 256, 

285–286, 299

Tamil Eelam Economic Development 

Organization (TEEDO), 231

Tamil Eelam Education Council 

(TEEC), 232–233

Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization 

(TELO), 87, 217, 218, 252, 255–

257, 297, 303–304

Tamil Eelam Penal Code (1994), 231

Tamil Eelam People’s Organization 

(TEPO), 251

Tamil Federal Party (FP), 54, 55, 57, 

134, 154, 216, 283

Tamil Ilainar Iyakkam, 217

Tamil kingdom, 26–27, 42–43

Tamil language, 61–62, 113–114, 132, 

153–154, 156, 157, 282, 288, 300

Tamil Language (Special Provisions) 

Act (1958), 53, 56, 288

Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal 

(TMVP), 311

Tamil Manavar Peravai, 217, 226

Tamil Manavi Peravi, 291

Tamil Nadu (India), 31, 50, 91, 130, 

183, 253–255, 260, 281, 287, 292, 

293, 301

Tamil National Alliance (TNA), 325–

326

Tamil National Army (TNA), 218, 257, 

260, 304

Tamil New Tigers (TNT), 58, 217, 226, 

242, 284

Tamil Rehabilitation Organization 

(TRO), 232, 235, 259

Tamils; See also Liberation Tigers of 

Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

anglicized elite, 148

and campaign for independence, 

46–47

caste differences of Sinhalese and, 

128–131

colonial British land policies, 30–31

in colonial period, 29, 43–46

and December 19 proposals, 297

economic concerns of, 131–137

emergence of violence, 1972-1983, 

57–63

ethnic groups, 110–113

expatriate, 259–260

government and politics, 150–151, 

153–160

government countermeasures, 

281–312

history of, 45–46

and IPKF presence, 89

legislative representation for, 47
380

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka

in Mullaitivu District civilian nofire zone, 33

mytho-history, 127

and official language, 53, 54

physical environment and, 26

post-independence history, 50–57

precolonial history, 41–42

and racial distinction, 126

regional influence of, 35

religion and language, 113–114

socio-economic factors in violence, 

109

terrorist organizations of, 329–330

and theories of violence, 115–121

traditional division between 

Sinhalese and, 114

“traditional homeland” of, 31

Tamil separatist movement, 184, 186, 

284, 286, 290

Tamil United Front (TUF), 58, 128, 

154, 284

Tamil United Liberation Front 

(TULF), 58–61, 131

1977 elections, 286

and all-party conference of 1984, 

296

and anti-Tamil riots, 157, 290

and District Development Councils, 

289

formation of, 284

government jobs for, 133

Jayewardene’s approach to, 287

origin of, 155

in parliament, 155

Thimpu principles, 297

Vaddukoddai Resolution, 134

Tamil Youth League, 284

Taxes (LTTE), 232, 234, 258

Terrain, 21, 22, 25

Thailand, 261

Theories of violence in Sri Lanka, 

115–121

Thesavalamai Code, 231

Thilakar, Lawrence, 228

Thimpu Declaration, 87, 297

Third Eelam War (Eelam War III, 

1995–2002), 91–95, 220, 242, 306

Thiruchelvam, Neelan, 62, 243, 252

Thondaman, Saumiyamoorthy, 187

Tibet, 79

Tiger Cubs, 249

Tigers Organization of Security 

Intelligence Service (TOSIS), 

246

Tilly, Charles, 335

Timeline

JVP, 171

LTTE, 215–216

Timur the Lame (Tamerlane), 66, 67

Training

JVP, 178, 195–197

LTTE, 223, 224, 246–247, 254, 255, 

257–258

by Research and Analysis Wing, 295

for Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents, 

292

Transnational influences

JVP, 204

LTTE, 253–258

Trincomalee, 28, 71, 72, 254, 295, 311

Trotsky, Leon, 76

Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaj Party 

(Ceylon Equal Society Party, 

LSSP), 49, 57, 73

Tsunami (December 2004), 96, 234–

235, 309–310

U

Udugampola, Premadasa, 191–192

Underground component

JVP, 172–176

LTTE, 220–221

Unemployment

educated, 136–137, 188–189

Tamils, in early 1970s, 58

United Front coalition, 57, 134
Index

381

United Kingdom, 83, 250–251

United National Front (UNF), 309

United National Party (UNP), 49, 50, 

78, 152–154

1960 election, 283

1965 election, 55

1977 election, 286

development projects, 134

and District Development Councils, 

289

election manifesto of, 287–288

foreign policy, 81–82

and Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, 299

JVP attacks on, 85, 191, 192

in post-independence government, 

50–52

Sino-Ceylon Rubber-Rice Pact, 81

violence between supporters of 

SFLP and, 287

and Wijeweera’s release, 203

United Nations, 77

United People’s Freedom Alliance 

(UPFA), 309, 325

United States

alliance network of, 184

in Cold War, 80

and foreign policy, 83

human rights violations and 

military aid, 97

in Indian Ocean in 1980s, 78

India’s concerns about, 295

as predominant “imperial” power, 

196

in World War II, 71–73

University system, 57–58

and educated unemployment, 

188–189

enrollment in, 135

JVP student mobilization in, 177–178

language-based ethnic quotas, 288

language of exams, 136–137

as Tamil concern, 131–132

Tamils in, 46

Urban environments, LTTE in, 32–33

Uva Rebellion (1817–1818), 43, 44

V

Vaddukoddai Resolution (1976), 58–

59, 134, 155, 164, 285

Vaishnavites, 131

Vangas, 121

Vanni, 42

Veddahs, 41

Vijaya, 41, 121, 122, 126, 127

Vijayabahu I, 42

Vijayanagar kingdom, 66–67

Vikrama Rajasimha, Sri, 44

Violence, theories of, 115–121

Viplavakari Lanka Samaja Party, 52

W

Wartime casualties, 98–99

Weapons; See Armaments

Weerakumar, Kulaweerasingham 

(Babu), 243

Weerasinghe, Jinadasa, 192

Weeratunga, Tissa, 290

Wickremasinghe, Ranil, 253, 306–311

Wigneswaran, C. V., 325

Wijeratne, Ranjan, 220, 243

Wijeweera, Patabendi Don Nandasiri 

(Rohana), 84, 86, 172, 173, 180–

184, 186, 195, 196, 200–203, 230, 

274–275

Winning Hearts and Minds Program 

(WHAM), 303

Women

in LTTE, 222, 235, 248–249

and LTTE social revolution, 237

in Tamil society, 248

Work stoppages, 86, 198–199

World Tamil Movement, 250

World Trade Centre (Colombo), 93, 

306

World War II, 71–74, 151
382

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka

Y

Yalppana Vaipava Malai (The Garland of 

Jaffna Events, YVM), 45–46, 127

Yogi, Yogaratnam, 228

Z

Zheng He, 68, 69

Zhu Di, Emperor, 68, 69

Zhu Gaozhi, Emperor, 69

Zimbabwe Defense Industries (ZDI), 

261–262