This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 4 ). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A14
- 1864 State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs. Theo Barry Putt, Appellant. Filed September 8 , 2015 Affirmed Peterson , Judge Winona County District Court File No. 85

- CR

- 14

- 744 Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Karin L. Sonneman, Winona County Attorney, Christina M. Davenport, Erin C. Stephens, Assistant County Attorneys, Winona, Minnesota (for respondent) Melissa V. Sheridan, Assistant State Public Defender, Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Johnson , Presiding Judge; Peterson , Judge; and Ross , Judge

. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N PETERSON , Judge In this appeal from his conviction of failure to register as a predatory offender, appellant argu es that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he moved from his properly registered primary address . We affirm.2 FACTS Appellant Theo Barry Putt was convicted of two separate incidents of indecent assault in Pennsylvania in 2002. Because of these convictions, appellant was required to register as a predatory offender under Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (2012) when he moved to Minnesota. T he predatory

- offender registration form that appellant signed and submitted

on January 6, 2014, listed 6 Tahoe Lane, Winona , 1 as his current resident address; he listed no alternate residence. The January 6 predatory

- offender registration form includes a list of appellant’s registration requirements, and appellant was required to individually initial each of the requirements. Appellant initialed the following requirement :

I understand that I must register all changes to my primary address, including moving to another state, at least five days prior to moving . I understand that i f I do not have five days advance notice of a change to my primary address, I must report the change immediately . I understand that I must make these notifications by completing the Minnesota Predatory Offender Change of Information Form with my correctio ns agent, or if I do not have a corrections agent, I will complete the form at the law enforcement authority with jurisdiction in the address I am leaving. This provision is consistent with Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3(b), which states that

a t least fiv e days before the person [who must register as a

predatory offender] starts living at a new primary address . . . the person shall give written notice of the new primary address to the assigned corrections agent or to the law enforcement authority with whi ch the person currently is registered.

1 Although the address states Winona, t his address is in the city of Goodview, Minnesota.3

Appellant was residing at 6 Tahoe Lane with E.M.’s mother when E.M. moved
into the residence with her children. Winona County Sheriff investigator Robin Averbeck received information on March 27, 2014, that appellan t had moved out of 6 Tahoe Lane. For two weeks, Averbeck did not receive notice from appellant that he had changed his primary address. On April 11, Averbeck went to 6 Tahoe Lane at 7:30 a.m. Appellant was not there. At 8:20 a.m., Averbeck went to 278 Orrin Street in Winona. Appellant came to the door and spoke with Averbeck , who recorded t he conversation.
A ppellant told Averbeck that he had been living at the Orrin Street address for “a little over a week.” Appellant denied being aware of the five

- da y notice requirement and said that Goodview police officers had told him that he had ten days to register his new address. A verbeck arrested appellant for violatin g the predatory

- offender registration statute, which states that “[a] person required to reg ister [as a predatory offender] . . . who knowingly violates any of its provisions . . . is guilty of a felony.” Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a). At appellant’s bench trial, a family

- resource worker who was assigned to a child

protection matter that in volved E.M.’s children testified that she made multiple visits to 6 Tahoe Lane and that during a visit on April 7, 2014, appellant told her that “ he was staying at Don’s house on Orrin Street. ” E.M. testified that appellant moved out of the
Tahoe Lane res idence about two weeks before his arrest

. Nicole Norman, a Goodview police officer who patrolled the area around the Tahoe Lane address a few times daily, testified that she did not se e appellant’s vehicle at that address during the two

- week period before his arrest.4

T he district court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to a 26

- month executed sentence. D E C I S I O N Appellant argues that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he moved from his primary address.

When evaluating whether the evidence is sufficient, [an appellate court] carefully examine[s] the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted. We view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the verdict, and assume that the fact

- finder disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the verdict. The verdict will no t be overturned if the fact

- finder, upon application of the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proving an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.
State v. Fox ,
___ N.W.2 d ___ , ___, 2015 WL 1810482, at *12 (Minn. Apr. 22, 2015) (citations omitted) . This court will not reverse a conviction if the fact

- finder, “acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a r easonable doubt, c ould reasonably conclude that a defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.” State v. Alton , 432 N.W.2d 754, 756 (Minn. 1998). “The State does not have the burden of removing all doubt, but of removing all reasonable doubt.” St

ate v. Al

- Naseer , 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). It is the factfinder’s task to “determine credibility and weigh the evidence.” Id. at 473. We defer to the factfinder’s credibility determinations. State v. Kramer , 668 N.W.2d 32, 37 (Minn. App. 2003 ), review denied (Minn. Nov. 18, 2003).5

Appellant a rgue s that “[t]he only person who testified that [he] moved from his registered primary address was [E.M.], a witness with significant credibility issues.” But although appellant contend s that E.M. had a motive to lie about whether he moved from the Tahoe Lane address, the district court was in the best position to evaluate E.M.’s credibility and specifically found that E.M. testified credibly that appellant moved out of 6 Tahoe Lane at the end of March 2 014. Also, E.M.’s testimony was consistent with the testimony of other witnesses. E.M.’s family

- resource worker testified that appellant told her on April 7 that he was staying at a house on Orrin Street. Averbeck testified that when he went to the Orrin Street address , appellant came to the door

. And i n a recording of Averbeck’s conversation with appellant, appellant said that he had been living there a little over a week

. A ppellant cites contrary evidence presented at trial that demonstrated that some of his belongings and his dog were at the Tahoe Lane residence after he had alleg edly moved out. He argues that E.M.’s testimony about when he left the Tahoe Lane residence was equivocal. He also argues that he was only temporaril y absent from the Tahoe Lane residence and did not intend to move fro m his primary residence there.
But other evidence, including appellant’s own recorded statements, demonstra ted that appellant had moved. It was the district court’s responsibili ty as fac tfinder to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. State v. Gomez , 721 N.W.2d 871, 883 (Minn. 2006) (“It is not the province of this court to reconcile conflicting evidence. On appeal, a trial court’s findings of fact are given great deference, and shall not be set aside unless clearly6

erroneous.”) (quotation omitted) )

. Viewed in the light most favorable to the district court’s verdict, the evidence is sufficient to support the court’s finding that appellant “moved out of 6 Tahoe Lane sometime between Mar ch 27, 2014 and April 4, 2014 without completing the require d change of information form.”
T he district court specifically rejected as not credible appellant’s c ontention that he thought he had ten days to update his registration . The district court exp lained that

this contention flies in the face of [appellant’s] initialing on multiple prior occasions that he understood he must register all changes to his primary address at least five days prior to moving or immediately if he does not have five days adv ance notice of moving . . . . Even if this C ourt was persuaded that [appellant] was confused about timing, which it is not, it is incredible to believe that [appellant] did not know he had to register his change of address. [Appellant] had properly changed his address and vehicle registration on prior occasions which shows that he knew and understood his registration obligation

. We defer to this credibility determination

. See Kramer , 668 N.W.2d at 37. Consequently, we conclude that t he evidence was suffi cient to permit the district court to conclude that appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of failing to register as a predatory offender. Affirmed

.