U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

30–927 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

S. HRG. 114–792 

REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2017 STATE 

DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 23, 2016 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: 

http://www.govinfo.gov 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

TODD WOMACK, Staff Director

JESSICA LEWIS, Democratic Staff Director

JOHN DUTTON, Chief Clerk

(II)


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee ................................................. 1 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland ................................... 3 

Kerry, John F., U.S. Secretary of State, Washington, DC ................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Nuclear Proliferation—Preliminary Observations on IAEA’s Role in Verifying 

the Iran Agreement, a Report to Members of Congress Prepared by the 

GAO ....................................................................................................................... 53 

Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to U.S. Secretary 

of State John F. Kerry by Members of the Committee 

Responses to Questions Submitted to Secretary Kerry by Senator Cardin . 81 

Responses to Questions Submitted to Secretary Kerry by Senator Rubio .. 100 

Responses to Questions Submitted to Secretary Kerry by Senator Boxer .. 114 

Responses to Questions Submitted to Secretary Kerry by Senator Flake ... 117 

Responses to Questions Submitted to Secretary Kerry by Senator Shaheen ................................................................................................................ 119 

Responses to Questions Submitted to Secretary Kerry by Senator Perdue 122 

Responses to Questions Submitted to Secretary Kerry by Senator Barrasso ............................................................................................................... 145 

(III)


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
(1) 

REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2017 STATE 

DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2016 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in Room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker, chairman of the committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Johnson, Flake, Gardner, 

Perdue, Paul, Barrasso, Cardin, Boxer, Menendez, Shaheen, Udall, 

Murphy, Kaine, and Markey. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee 

will come to order. 

We welcome everybody here. I know that many of us had a 

chance to talk to some of those in the audience in the hallway, and 

while we have had great discussions, we know that you will honor 

the committee by keeping comments to yourself while we are proceeding. 

I want to thank everybody here on the committee for being here 

today. And I want to thank our Secretary for his service. I do not 

know of many Secretaries of State that have put out as much effort 

in trying to solve the many problems that exist around the world. 

For that, I thank him. 

Thank you for coming today. And I thank you for, typically when 

we have a budget hearing, the testimony that is put forth is only 

about the budget. I think you know, having been chairman of the 

committee, you are probably not going to be asked many questions 

about the budget. Therefore, I think you gave a narrative of your 

view of the world, which I appreciate. 

I think all of us understand that the reason the State Department exists, really, and the reason that we fund it, is to do everything we can through diplomacy to solve the many problems that 

exist around the world and to do everything we can to keep our 

men and women in uniform from being utilized more than they are 

today because of our diplomacy. 

That is why you are here, and I think that is one of the reasons 

you went into the narrative in your written testimony about things 

happening around the world. So I just wanted to, again, thank you. 

I appreciate you being here. 


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2 

My opening comments are going to center around things happening around the world. We saw you in Munich last week. We had 

quite a candid conversation. I know you gave a talk there at the 

conference. 

My observation is, and I know that Senator Perdue was there 

and others, I do not think I have seen Europe so unsettled ever in 

my lifetime. I think their confidence level is at an all-time low. I 

think they are concerned about what Russia is doing to destabilize 

the area, using refugees as a weapon of war. Again, I do not think 

I have seen that at that level before. 

So they are looking for U.S. leadership, no question. 

In Syria, I know we had a very frank and off-the-record discussion regarding—you had just entered into the agreement relative 

to cessation in Syria. I know there were concerns at that time, relative to what Russia would actually do. And I think many people 

thought they would do what they have done, and that is to further 

solidify gains, kill more people, move into Aleppo, as they have. 

I know that you have negotiated another one, and I realize that, 

again, what you have at your disposal is negotiation. I think that 

many of us have been asking what happens if, in fact, the ceasefire 

does not hold. I do not think Russia believes that anything is going 

to happen. I think that is why they continue to make the gains. 

And at some point, they will have all the gains they need and be 

willing for a cessation. 

They are also right now selling or announced that they are going 

to sell to Iran Su-30s, which is in strict violation of the U.N. Security Council agreement that put the JCPOA into place. 

It is my understanding that they can, in fact, come to the U.N. 

Security Council and ask for permission. I would love to understand whether you expect that to happen. 

China today is beginning to militarize, if you will, the gains they 

have made in the South China Sea, building very sophisticated 

radar facilities. We understand through announcements—we do not 

have this verified—they are even developing missile systems on 

these ‘‘islands’’ that are basically underwater at high tide but are 

now being utilized in that regard. 

North Korea, we passed something here in the Senate and House 

last week. The President, thankfully, has signed it, to push back 

against them. I understand there were some peace overtures toward them prior to that occurring. I hope you will expand a little 

bit about what that was about and where you see that going. 

And then in Libya, we have 5,000 ISIS members there. I know 

we took some hits against them in the outskirts of Sirte last week. 

But I think many people had thought that maybe what the administration was going to do was going to assess a much greater 

effort there, so that instead of it being incremental, as it appears 

it might be, there would be something done on a far more shockand-awe basis to really set them back while we have the ability to 

do so. 

So I look forward to you talking about and sharing with us your 

thoughts on all of these issues. Again, I thank you for your narrative on the front end. I thank you for your service. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
3 

And I certainly thank Senator Cardin for his distinguished ranking member leadership on this committee and will now turn to 

him. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BEN CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening 

this hearing. It is always a pleasure to work with you. 

And, Secretary Kerry, it is really a pleasure to have you before 

your former committee. 

I first start by acknowledging this is the last budget that President Obama and his administration will be submitting to us, so I 

just really want to reflect for a moment on your extraordinary leadership in advancing America’s soft power through the effective use 

of diplomacy and development assistance. 

Secretary Kerry, you understand more than anyone else, as a 

former chair of this committee, the importance of diplomacy and 

development assistance to our national security. For that, I just 

congratulate you on an incredible record of accomplishment as Secretary of State. [Applause.] 

Senator CARDIN. You understand that military must be our last 

resort, and you have carried that out through developing partnerships with other countries and coalitions, so that we can be effective with our soft power. 

The most recent is the hope that we have in Syria through the 

ceasefire to stop the killings and to allow humanitarian access, 

which is a critically important first step to resolving the conflict 

within Syria, so that we can focus on ISIL without the fighting 

going on between the Assad regime and the opposition. And you 

did it in a way that does not compromise our position in regard to 

President Assad’s future and his accountability for war crimes that 

he has committed. 

I also want to thank your staff. They have been incredibly accessible to us in providing information that I think is vital to our 

needs. So to Julia Frifield and to the entire team, thank you for 

what you have been able to do. 

I generally support the President’s budget. I think it speaks to 

the right priorities, in regard to the State Department. It deals 

with the threat emanating from ISIL in the Middle East and North 

Africa, the $4 billion to counter violent extremism. It supports the 

rebalance to Asia and recognizes the challenges that we have in 

Asia, relative to China’s provocative actions in the South China 

Sea, and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. 

I was pleased to see that we have enacted, as the chairman 

pointed out, the North Korea sanctions bill. The President signed 

it into law. We are always stronger when the Congress and the administration work together to advance American foreign policy. 

The budget deals with challenges in our own hemisphere. I particularly mentioned Central America’s Northern Triangle. We still 

have the problems of unaccompanied children coming to our borders. 

I was in Honduras and El Salvador, saw firsthand the violence 

in the communities through the gang-controlled areas. We must do 

more in order to make that country safe. The President’s $1 billion 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
4 

request, I hope we will support that, dealing with good governance 

and protection of communities, as well as the security issues in 

Central America. 

The budget deals with Russia’s aggression in East and Central 

Europe. I particularly support the $953 million to improve democracy and good governance and anticorruption and promote European integration. I think that is critically important. 

It is the first anniversary of the Minsk II agreement. We know 

Russia has not complied with the military aspects, but it is incumbent upon Ukraine to comply with the good governance aspects, if 

there is going to be lasting peace in Ukraine. This budget allows 

us to advance to those challenges. 

The budget provides for the continued support of Israel, for its 

QME, $3.1 billion of security assistance, recognizing we are in the 

process of negotiating the next chapter in the memorandum of understanding. 

And it provides U.S. leadership on climate change. I was pleased 

to be part of 10 members who were in Paris for COP21. We saw 

firsthand America’s leadership, your leadership, and the international community coming together. This budget carries out our 

commitments. 

I am going to refer a couple times to a visit under CODEL flight. 

We were just in the southern part of Africa, and we saw firsthand 

the impact of continued drought on the survivability of those countries in the southern part of Africa. 

Their way of life is in jeopardy today, because we were there during the rainy season, and we saw no rain. This is the second year 

in a row that they have had this impact. 

The New York Times today points out that research teams report 

fastest sea rise in 28 centuries—28 centuries. The budget does deal 

with carrying out our commitments on climate change, so that we 

can continue to provide leadership needed globally to deal with this 

crisis of our times. 

The budget deals with Africa, carrying out Africa Leaders Summit commitments that were made there on Power Africa, Trade Africa, Young African Leaders. I think that is all very important. 

And it carries out our values, from providing international leadership on the refugees, humanitarian needs that are global, to maternal and child health, to Feed the Future. It deals with the Zika 

virus in Latin America. And it deals with AIDS-free generation. 

Mr. Secretary, when we were in Namibia, we had a chance to 

visit an AIDS site and see it firsthand. Senator Coons and I had 

a chance to interview with about 30 or 40 AIDS patients. One 

asked that we relay to the leaders of our country their thanks because, literally, they are alive today because of U.S. efforts. There 

is a whole generation alive today, working in their economies and 

on the future, as a result of U.S. leadership on PEPFAR. 

It makes a huge difference, what we do on development assistance around the world. We now have a stable country in Namibia 

that wants to work with the United States, and it is a direct result 

of our involvement. 

I want to also thank you for including $60 million for trafficking 

in humans. Senator Corker has been one of our great leaders on 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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the trafficking issue, to end modern-day slavery. And we appreciate 

the funds that are put in. 

So I am positive on the budget that has been submitted, but I 

want to conclude on two points that I am not as pleased about. 

First, there is not enough allocation in good governance and democracy in this budget. The small amount of monies that we put 

into democracy-building, we saw that in the four countries we visited—Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Botswana. The small 

dollars that are available are having incredible results. It is what 

America stands for, and we need to do a better job in providing resources to promote democracy globally. 

Then, secondly, I am very concerned about the OCO funding 

versus the baseline funding. I think we need to talk about that. 

The budget provides $50.1 billion in allocation for foreign assistance, but only $35.2 billion is in baseline funding, as this chart 

points out. That is a declining sum that is in the baseline. 

The reality of our world is that this budget provides our national 

security, and it needs to be grounded and sustainable and ongoing 

for the safety of our Nation. I am concerned, by not having the 

baseline high enough, we run a risk in the future. 

Now, I know the realities and the politics of the budget here. 

This is not the administration’s doing. But we need to make it clear 

that on national security, soft power, that we are committed not 

only to this year, but to the sustained growth of America’s presence 

globally. And I would hope that we would get a larger sum in the 

baseline. 

I look forward to your comments, and I thank you again for your 

leadership. 

The CHAIRMAN. If I could, prior to you starting, I could not agree 

more. It is the budget process, on both sides of the aisle. It is nothing but a political document. It serves no purpose. And our inability to focus on our fiscal issues will weaken our Nation while we 

are having this hearing. 

The fact that so much of it is funded through OCO, both, by the 

way, here and at DOD, just speaks to the fact that we are not willing to make the tough decisions that are necessary on a permanent 

basis to put our country on solid footing. I know, on this particular 

issue, that is not what the administration proposed, and I do appreciate you bringing that up. 

I would ask the audience, I know there was a degree of clapping 

and cheering. Again, we like the fact that everybody is here. I 

know you will all be very respectful, as the Secretary makes his 

comments. 

If you will, please begin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, SECRETARY OF STATE, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you. Senator 

Cardin, all my former colleagues and friends on the committee, I 

am really happy to be here. I think we have a chance to have a 

very important conversation, and I appreciate both of your opening 

comments very, very much, both in tone and tenor. 

And I want to begin just by thanking all of you. I know it has 

been very, very difficult. I know the committee has worked incredVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:15 Aug 10, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\02 23 2016\30-927.T

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ibly hard to fill our positions at the State Department and our 

overseas posts. And I also know this committee has a very special 

appreciation for the vital work of diplomacy. 

Both of your comments just now underscore how vital it is for 

America to have our senior diplomats, particularly our career diplomats, who just do not deserve to be waiting a year or 2 years or 

a year and a half to be put in position. 

And I know this committee believes that, and you worked extremely hard, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your diligence, and 

Senator Cardin, likewise, and all the members of the committee. 

This is the way we advance the objectives of U.S. policy, whether 

it is for our businesses that are trying to create jobs, or travelers, 

Americans abroad. So I thank you again for really pushing obviously complicated politics. 

And I ask your favorable and prompt effort on the other nominations. There are still some hanging out there, and particularly Roberta Jacobson, who is a professional civil servant, career, has done 

a diligent job. She does not make the choices about policy, and she 

should not be the prisoner of those choices. She does what she is 

instructed to do, and she does it very, very well. 

So, Mr. Chairman, you have my prepared statement. I am not 

going to give you all of that, but I do want to do just some initial 

comments in summary. First, you mentioned the number $50 billion, a little bit over. It 

is equal to about 1 percent of the entire budget of the United 

States. And that 1 percent, Mr. Chairman, I am just convinced 

more and more after these last years, even after serving on the 

committee, is the minimum price of the leadership role that the 

United States of America plays on a global basis, and particularly 

at a time when we are engaged diplomatically more deeply in more 

places simultaneously, on more significant issues simultaneously, 

than at any time in our history. 

And the scope of that engagement, I am also convinced, is absolutely essential to protect the interests of our Nation and to keep 

our citizens safe. And I think it is even growing more so with the 

numbers of failed and failing states, where the governance money 

that Senator Cardin just referred to is so critical. We can talk 

about that a little bit today. 

We are confronted today by perils that are as old as nationalist 

aggression and as new as cyber warfare, by dictators who run 

roughshod over global norms, and by violent extremists who combine modern media with medieval thinking to wage war on civilization itself. 

The last century was marked by state actors and states going to 

war with each other—World War I and II, Vietnam, Korea, so 

forth. This century is defined much more by nonstate actors taking 

actions against states and against, as I said, the broad norms of 

society. 

And I would emphasize today in coming here, despite the dangers, despite the turmoil, we Americans have many reasons for confidence. In recent years, our economy has added more jobs than the 

rest of the industrialized world combined. Our Armed Forces are 

second to none. It is not even close. Our alliances in Europe and 

Asia are vigilant and strong. And our citizens are unmatched in 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
7 

the generosity of their commitment to humanitarian causes and 

civil society. We are the largest donor in the world to the crisis of 

Syrian refugees, over $5.1 billion. 

I see, we see, all of us, and hear a lot of handwringing nowadays. 

But I, for one, with all my affection and respect for all my colleagues around the world that I work with, I would not switch 

places with the foreign minister of any country, and nor do I yearn 

to retreat to some illusionary golden age of the past. 

Here and now, we have enormous opportunities and we are trying to seize them. In the past year, we reached a historic multilateral accord with Iran that you all played a critical role in. And it 

has cut off that country’s pathways to a nuclear weapon, thereby 

making the world safer for us and our allies. 

And if you doubt that, read the speech by General Eizenkot, the 

head of the IDF forces of Israel, who recently, at a security conference in Israel, said that now, because of this agreement, there 

is no longer an existential threat to Israel from Iran with respect 

to the nuclear threat. That is from their security in Israel. 

In Paris, in December, we joined governments from more than 

190 nations in approving a comprehensive agreement to curb 

greenhouse gases, and you have mentioned the effects that we are 

seeing in the world today. We are trying to limit the most harmful 

consequences of climate change, and we are determined to implement that accord by meeting our targets here at home and helping 

friends abroad to reduce carbon pollution and move their economies 

forward at the same time. 

Just this month, we officially signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership to ensure a level playing field for American businesses and 

workers, to open up job opportunity and 40 percent of the global 

GDP, and also to strengthen America’s leadership within the entire 

Pacific. We are asking Congress to approve that pact this year, and 

we can accrue its benefits as quickly as possible when we do. 

In Europe, we are sharply upgrading our Security Reassurance 

Initiative with a fourfold increase in support and giving Russia a 

clear choice between continued sanctions or meeting its obligations 

to a sovereign and democratic Ukraine. 

In our hemisphere, we are helping Colombia to end the globe’s 

longest running civil conflict, and we are aiding our partners in 

Central America to implement reforms that will reduce the pressure for illegal migration. We are also seeking supplemental funds 

to minimize the danger to public health created by the Zika virus. 

In Asia, we are standing with our allies in opposition to threats 

posed by a belligerent North Korea. We are helping Afghanistan 

and Pakistan to counter violent extremism; deepening our strategic 

dialogue with India; supporting democratic gains in Sri Lanka and 

Burma; and encouraging the peaceful resolution of competing maritime claims in the South China Sea, a goal that is definitely not 

helped by the militarization of facilities in that region. 

So with friends in fast-growing Africa—and we are very grateful 

for the interest of this committee, Senator Coons, Senator Flake 

and others who have really been very focused on it—we have embarked on initiatives to combat hunger, increase connectivity, empower women, train future leaders, and fight back against such terrorist groups as al-Shabab and Boko Haram. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
8 

Now, of course, this administration recognizes that the threat 

posed by violent extremism extends far beyond any one region, and 

it is not going to be addressed solely, or even primarily, by military 

means. So the approach that we have adopted is comprehensive, 

and it is long-term. 

Diplomatically, we are striving to end conflicts that fuel extremism, such as those in Libya and Yemen. We also work with partners more broadly to share intelligence, tighten border security, improve governance, expand access to education, and promote job 

training and development. 

And I might add the coalition we have put together, 66 countries 

strong now, is gaining traction in many sectors where it has not 

previously worked on these kinds of things as jointly as we are 

now. 

As you all know, we have forged that coalition of 66 countries to 

defeat Daesh. Just a quick word on our strategy. We are combining 

our power with that of our partners to degrade Daesh’s command 

structure, shrink its territory, curb its financing, hammer its economic assets, discredit its lies, slow its recruitment, and block any 

attempt to expand its networks. Militarily, we are intensifying 

pressure through coalition airstrikes, more advisers, stepped-up 

training, improved targeting, and the systematic disruption of 

enemy supply lines. And we can go into greater detail, I am sure, 

in your questions. 

To consolidate territorial gains, we are stressing the importance 

of stabilizing communities freed from Daesh in Syria and Iraq. We 

are helping the government in Baghdad as it seeks to broaden and 

professionalize its security forces. And we continue to strengthen 

our regional partners, Lebanon and Jordan. 

And we are supporting a broad-based diplomatic effort, which I 

know we will talk about today, on the Syria war. 

Two weeks ago, we announced a plan to ensure access to humanitarian supplies for all Syrians in need. I am pleased to tell you 

that 114 trucks have gone in. At least 80,000 people who have not 

had supplies in years now have supplies for the next month, at 

least. And we have results in food and medicine reaching places 

that have been under siege for months. We will continue to work 

closely with the U.N. to see that future requests are honored and 

that humanitarian supplies are available throughout the country. 

The United States and Russia are co-chairing the International 

Syria Support Group Ceasefire Task Force. Yesterday, President 

Obama and President Putin agreed that the cessation of hostilities 

should begin on Saturday morning and include all groups willing 

to participate, with the exception of Daesh and al-Nusra, and any 

other terrorist groups designated by the U.N. Security Council. 

We are reminded each day in Syria that every attack, every casualty, every loss, every loved one that is bombed from the air by 

barrel bombs or otherwise, provides fresh grounds for the conflict. 

As long as the killing goes on, this devastating cycle will feed on 

itself. 

And that is why we have urged all parties to support the cessation of hostilities now, and it is why we have argued repeatedly 

there must be a diplomatic solution. As difficult as it is to get 

there, there must be a diplomatic solution to this war. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
9 

The only way forward that preserves a unified Syria is the path 

envisioned by the Syria Support Group, ratified by the U.N. Security Council and endorsed by the responsible opposition. And that 

requires a de-escalation of the conflict, a transition to a new system 

of governance, a new constitution, an election, and hopefully a 

Syria that could be committed to peace and stability with its neighbors and within itself. 

Mr. Chairman, the success of our leadership on terrorism and 

other security threats is linked to whether or not America is leading the fight to protect what we care about. And the truth is, we 

are in arena after arena. In all the years I sat on this committee, 

I never saw us having to deal with quite as many fronts, quite as 

many challenges as we are today. 

So this year, we seek your support to stay at the forefront of 

international humanitarian response, including the worldwide refugee crisis; to strike a blow for global health through PEPFAR— 

and you talked about it, Senator Cardin—and the President’s malaria initiative; and to carry out important programs on behalf of 

democracy, freedom of the press, human rights, and the rule of law; 

and to launch a new strategy focused on the equitable treatment 

of adolescent girls; and to adequately fund the people and the platforms that enable us to serve America effectively around the world. 

So my colleagues, as the chairman said, this is the last budget 

the Obama administration will submit on behalf of the foreign policy and national security of the United States. And I ask for its fair 

consideration, welcome your questions, appreciate your counsel, 

and I seek your backing. 

But above all, I want to say how privileged I feel to have had 

the chance to work with all of you in support of an agenda that 

reflects not only the most fundamental interests and values of the 

American people, but also carries with it, I am absolutely convinced, the hopes of the world. 

Thank you. 

[Secretary Kerry’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN KERRY

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee; I appreciate the chance to testify 

on behalf of the administration’s budget request for the State Department and related agencies for Fiscal Year 2017. 

Our request this year is roughly level with last year’s—right around fifty billion 

dollars. That amount, though substantial, is equal to only about one percent of the 

federal budget. We seek these resources to sustain America’s international engagement, which is deeper and more wide-ranging today than ever before in our history. 

The unprecedented scope of our leadership is warranted by the mix of opportunities and challenges we face. We are confronted by dangers as old as excessive nationalism and as new as cyber warfare, by dictators who run roughshod over international norms, by failing and fragile states, by infectious disease and by violent 

extremists who combine modern media with medieval thinking to murder, enslave, 

and wage war on civilization itself. 

In the face of such challenges, the United States and its citizens remain firmly 

committed to the pursuit of international peace, prosperity, and the rule of law. The 

administration’s Fiscal Year 2017 budget request embodies every aspect of that commitment. It is a reflection of our country’s wide-ranging interests, of what we are 

against—and most important—what we are for. 

There’s a reason why most people in most places still turn to the United States 

when important work needs to be done. It’s not because anyone expects or wants 

us to shoulder the full burden—but because we can be counted on to lead in the 

right direction and toward the right goals. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
10 

Make no mistake, we live at a moment filled with peril and complexity, but we 

Americans also have ample grounds for confidence. In recent years, our economy has 

added more jobs than the rest of the industrialized world combined. Our armed 

forces are by far the world’s strongest and best. Our alliances in Europe and Asia 

are energized. We have reached historic multilateral accords on Iran’s nuclear program, climate change, and trans-Pacific trade. We have witnessed important democratic gains in, among other places, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, and Burma. We helped facilitate what we hope will be a landmark peace agreement in Colombia. We have 

enhanced our position throughout the hemisphere by resuming diplomatic relations 

with Cuba. We marshalled a global campaign to save lives by containing the Ebola 

virus; and we are the leader in championing the empowerment of women and respect for the full range of internationally recognized human rights. We have also 

taken the lead in mobilizing international solidarity in the fight against such terrorist groups as Daesh, al-Qa’ida, Boko Haram, and al-Shabab—groups that have 

absolutely nothing to offer anyone except destruction and death. 

From the vantage point of America’s national security, we begin 2016 with a long 

agenda focused on key priorities but understanding the potential for emergencies to 

arise at any moment. We think it essential to make full use of every available foreign policy tool—from carrots to coercion—but with an emphasis on persuading governments overseas not just to do what we want, but to want what we want. We will 

act alone when we must, but with allies, partners and friends when possible on 

every continent and in every situation where our interests are at risk. We will respond to immediate needs, but with long term requirements in mind. And we will 

always be conscious that the State Department’s principal responsibility is not to 

interpret and justify foreign perspectives to the United States, but to defend and 

advance America’s well-being in a fast-changing world. 

I will turn now to the specifics of the administration’s budget request for the coming fiscal year. 

The funding we seek is in two parts; the first consists of a base amount of $35.2 

billion. These resources will deepen cooperation with our allies and regional partners and bolster American leadership at the U.N. and other multilateral organizations. They will protect U.S. diplomatic personnel, platforms, and information, while 

also helping us to mitigate the harmful consequences of climate change, promote 

human rights, combat trafficking in persons, and continue valuable educational exchanges. Worldwide, they will furnish life-saving humanitarian assistance, foster 

growth, reduce poverty, increase access to education, combat disease, and promote 

democratic governance and the rule of law. 

The Overseas Contingency Operations portion of our budget is $14.9 billion and 

will improve our ability to prevent, respond to, and recover from crises abroad; contribute to new and ongoing peacekeeping and U.N. special political missions; help 

allies and partners such as Afghanistan and Pakistan counter threats; step up our 

efforts to counter terrorist organizations; and sustain security programs and embassy construction at high risk posts. 

The number one goal of U.S. foreign policy is to keep Americans safe. To that end, 

this year’s budget seeks resources to enhance our nation’s leadership of the 65-member global coalition to degrade and destroy the terrorist group Daesh. Our strategy 

is to combine our power—and the power of our partners—to degrade Daesh’s command structure, shrink the territory under its control, curb its financing, hammer 

its economic assets, discredit its lies, slow its recruitment,and block any attempt to 

expand its networks. As President Obama has made clear, the murderous conduct 

that Daesh is trying to foment must be opposed with unity, strength, and a determination on our part to persist until we prevail. That determination has several dimensions: 

• Militarily, we are intensifying pressure through coalition air strikes backed by 

local partners on the ground, a stepped-up training and supply effort, the deployment of Special Forces advisers, improved targeting, the systematic disruption of enemy supply lines, and coordinated planning of future actions. 

• To consolidate the important territorial gains made thus far, we are stressing 

the importance of stabilizing communities freed from Daesh in Syria and Iraq. 

• We are helping the government in Baghdad as it seeks to broaden and professionalize its security forces and to liberate portions of the country still occupied 

by Daesh. 

• We continue to strengthen our regional partners, including Jordan and Lebanon, and to provide humanitarian assistance to people impacted by the conflict 

inside Syria, in neighboring countries, and beyond. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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• We are supporting a broad-based diplomatic initiative, chaired by U.N. Special 

Envoy Staffan de Mistura, and aimed at achieving a political solution to the 

Syrian civil war that will de-escalate the conflict, isolate the terrorists, provide 

for a transition in governance, and make possible the kind of peaceful, inclusive, 

pluralist, and fully sovereign country that most Syrians want. To that end, on 

February 11, we announced a plan to ensure access to humanitarian supplies 

for all Syrians in need, and to arrange a cessation of hostilities that we hope 

will evolve into a durable and nationwide ceasefire. The full and good faith implementation of these measures—to ensure humanitarian access and end violence against civilians in Syria—is a top foreign policy priority of the United 

States. 

• Finally, we believe it essential that America speak with a single voice in its resolve to defeat Daesh. Congressional approval of a new and more specific authorization to use military force against that terrorist organization would be 

welcomed by the administration and help to demonstrate our unity and commitment. 

In the seventeen months since the Counter-Daesh coalition was formed, its aircraft have launched more than 10,000 air strikes. The combination of air support 

and ground assaults by local partners has reversed Daesh’s momentum; driven the 

terrorists from such key cities as Kobani, Tikrit, and Ramadi; and weakened their 

position on the Syria-Turkish border. All told, Daesh has been forced to abandon 

almost a third of the populated territory it had previously controlled in these countries, and many of their fighters—faced by a deep cut in wages and no new towns 

to plunder—have either deserted or been executed trying to escape. 

The threat posed by violent extremism extends far beyond the Middle East and 

the particular dangers spawned by Daesh. Those threats cannot effectively be addressed solely—or even primarily—by military means. Our approach, therefore, is 

comprehensive, long term, and designed to enhance the capacity of countries and 

communities to defeat terrorist groups and prevent new ones from arising. To that 

end, our new Center for Global Engagement is helping partner nations to promote 

better governance, strengthen democratic institutions, expand access to a quality 

education, and foster development, especially in the most vulnerable parts of the 

world. On the diplomatic side, we are striving with the U.N. and our allies to solidify a new Government of National Accord in Libya, and to bring an end to the violence and political unrest that has plagued Yemen. 

Last year, with our P5+1 partners, we negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan 

of Action, cutting off each of Iran’s potential pathways to a nuclear weapons capability, requiring it to take thousands of centrifuges offline, pour concrete into the 

core of its heavy water reactor, and ship abroad 98 percent of its stockpile of enriched uranium. Because of these steps and the rigorous inspection and verification 

measures to which Tehran has also agreed, the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran has 

receded, our allies are safer, and so are we. In months to come, we will continue 

our close consultations with Congress as we monitor Iran’s compliance with the 

Joint Plan, and as we stand with our allies and friends against Iran’s destabilizing 

policies and actions in the region. 

In part because of the challenges posed by Iran and other threats, we continue 

to engage in a record level of military, intelligence, and security cooperation with 

Israel. We remain committed to helping our ally confront its complex security environment and to ensure its qualitative military edge. Each day, we work with Israel 

to enforce sanctions and prevent terrorist organizations such as Hamas and 

Hizballah from obtaining the financing and weapons they seek. Since 2009, we have 

provided more than $23 billion in foreign military financing to Israel, which constitutes the majority of what we have given to nations worldwide. Diplomatically, 

our support for Israel also remains rock solid as we continue to oppose efforts to 

delegitimize the Jewish state or to pass biased resolutions against it in international 

bodies.The Transatlantic partnership remains a cornerstone of American security 

and prosperity. We are in constant communication with our NATO and EU Allies 

and partners about a vast array of issues, including our steadfast backing for a 

democratic Ukraine, full implementation by every side of the Minsk protocols, and 

an increase in European Reassurance Initiative funding that will support the persistent presence of a brigade’s combat team for 12 months out of the year and allow 

us to preposition warfighting equipment for a division headquarters and other 

enablers in Europe. This year’s budget includes $953 million to enhance stability, 

prosperity, energy independence, and good governance in Ukraine and other partner 

countries facing direct pressure from Russia, in addition to fighting HIV/AIDS and 

countering violent extremism in the region. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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Closer to home, the Fiscal Year 2017 budget will continue our investment in Central America to fight corruption and crime and to attack the root economic causes 

of illegal migration to the United States, including by unaccompanied minors. Our 

Strategy for Engagement in Central America, with its whole-of-government approach, emphasis on building effective and accountable institutions and leveraging 

of private capital, will make it easier for our regional neighbors to live securely and 

with steadily increasing prosperity in their own countries. 

In addition, we are supporting Colombia as it seeks to finalize an agreement that 

will end the world’s longest ongoing civil conflict. During President Santos’s visit to 

Washington earlier this month, President Obama announced his intention to seek 

support for ‘‘Peace Colombia,’’ a successor to Plan Colombia that will spur recovery 

in communities ravaged by the many years of fighting. This project will highlight 

assistance to the victims of conflict, and aid in reinforcing security gains, clearing 

mines, demobilizing rebel fighters, and curbing trade in illegal narcotics. Our citizens may be proud that, in his remarks at the White House, President Santos attributed many of his country’s advances ‘‘to the fact that 15 years ago, when we 

were in serious straits, the Colombians received a friendly hand. That friendly hand 

came from here in Washington, from both sides of the aisle, Democrats and Republicans.’’ 

In Cuba, we have resumed diplomatic relations after 54 years. Although we continue to have sharp differences with the government in Havana regarding human 

rights, political prisoners, and other issues; we remain determined to support the 

aspirations of the Cuban people to plug into the global economy and live in greater 

freedom. We call on Cuban authorities to remove obstacles to participation by their 

citizens online and in commercial enterprises; and we urge Congress to lift the economic embargo, which has for decades been used as an excuse by the Castro regime 

to dodge blame for its own ill-advised policies. 

As evidenced by last week’s ASEAN Summit hosted by President Obama at 

Sunnylands in California, the United States is an indispensable contributor to stability, prosperity, and peace in the Asia Pacific. Dangers in that region include 

North Korea’s provocative nuclear and ballistic missile programs and tensions stemming from contested maritime claims in the South China Sea. United States policy 

is to encourage security cooperation and dialogue aimed at building confidence and 

ensuring that disputes are settled in keeping with international obligations and law. 

Our modernizing alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and the 

Philippines—in addition to our partnership with New Zealand and close ties with 

ASEAN—provide a firm foundation for our strategy, as does our multi-dimensional 

relationship with China. Our diplomatic priorities include support for human rights 

and the continued evolution of an open and democratic political process in Burma, 

where a freely-elected parliament has been seated for the first time, and where we 

have called for an end to discrimination and violence directed at the Rohingya Muslim minority. 

Our FY 2017 budget includes $1.25 billion in assistance to the national unity government of Afghanistan to strengthen its institutions, bolster its security capabilities, repel attacks by violent extremists, implement economic reforms, preserve 

gains made over the last decade (including for women and girls), and move forward 

with a wide range of social programs. We are requesting $742 million in aid to Pakistan to support its citizens as they seek security, build democracy and sustain economic growth and development—even as the country continues to suffer from terrorist attacks. Last October, I traveled to every state in Central Asia to reaffirm 

America’s friendship with the people in that part of the world and to discuss shared 

concerns in such areas as security, energy policy, development, and human rights. 

Also in 2015, we strongly endorsed democratic progress in Sri Lanka, while elevating our important strategic dialogue with India to include a commercial component, reflecting the five-fold increase in bilateral trade over the last decade. 

In Africa, our budget request reflects our emphasis on partnership—with civil society, with the private sector and with key allies. Our request of $7.1 billion will 

support democratic institutions, spur growth, promote gender equity, and protect 

human rights through such mechanisms as the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, 

the Feed the Future initiative, Power Africa, and the President’s ‘‘Stand with Civil 

Society Initiative.’’ Our assistance also undergirds regional stability through the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership, the Security Governance Initiative, 

and strategically important international peace operations in, among other countries, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, South 

Sudan, Sudan, and Somalia. Diplomatically, the United States continues to work 

closely with regional leaders to prevent crises—whether caused by outbreaks of disease, the threat of famine, or political controversy, as has recently been the cause 

of urgent concern in Burundi. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
13 

American leadership is on display and making a positive difference in every part 

of the world including the far north, where the United States last year assumed 

chairmanship of the Arctic Council, a platform we are using to forge united action 

on the environment, fisheries conservation, and economic opportunity for local populations. But in addition to bilateral and regional issues, the United States is at the 

forefront of a host of efforts that address global challenges and uphold universal 

ideals. 

For example, the administration’s FY 2017 budget request reaffirms our country’s 

premier role in the world economy. Each day, the men and women in our embassies 

and consulates work closely with representatives of the American private sector to 

identify new markets for our goods and services, ensure fair competition for foreign 

contracts, protect intellectual property, and advocate for U.S. interests under the 

law. This budget will advance U.S. engagement on global information and communications technology policy, encourage innovation, and protect the interests of our 

citizens in Internet freedom and digital privacy. Through our contributions to international financial institutions like the World Bank, we help to lift the economies of 

low-income countries and expand the global middle class. 

With the Trade Representative and others in the administration, the State Department works to conclude forward-looking agreements such as the recently signed 

Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to ensure a level playing field for American businesses and workers and raise labor and environmental standards. The TPP is a 

landmark twelve nation pact that will lower trade barriers and advance American 

leadership in the Asia Pacific region, ensuring that the rules of the road for trade 

in this critical region are written by the United States and our partners, rather 

than others who do not share our interests and values. In asking Congress to approve the agreement, President Obama has pointed out that the TPP will cut 18,000 

taxes on products that are made in America, boost U.S. exports, and support highpaying jobs, and he has expressed his interest in working closely with Congress to 

get the agreement approved as soon as possible. We are also working with USTR 

to pursue a similar high-standard approach to trade with Europe in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, which is still being negotiated. 

In Paris last December, the United States joined governments from more than 

190 nations in approving a comprehensive agreement to curb greenhouse gas emissions and limit the most harmful consequences of climate change. This historic pact 

represents the first time the world has declared that all countries have a responsibility to join in what must truly be a global commitment—through arrangements 

marked by transparency, a mandatory standard of review, and the flexibility a 

framework for successive and ambitious nationally determined climate targets. Our 

budget request of $983.9 million for the Global Climate Change Initiative and includes $500 million for the Green Climate Fund, which will help low income countries leverage public and private financing to reduce carbon pollution and bolster 

resilience to climate change. 

Our request for Fiscal Year 2017 allocates $4.7 billion for assessed dues and voluntary contributions to international organizations and peacekeeping efforts and to 

help other countries participate in such missions. The request includes contingency 

funding for new or expanded peace operations that may emerge outside the regular 

budget cycle. Tragically, the demand for peacekeeping assistance remains at an alltime high; and the United States neither can, nor should, take the lead in most 

cases. It serves both our interests and our values when U.N. agencies and regional 

organizations are able—with our encouragement and support—to quell violence, 

shield civilians from harm, promote reconciliation among rival groups, and ensure 

that women are fairly represented in all aspects of peacemaking and recovery 

projects. 

In FY 2017, we are requesting $8.6 billion for bilateral and multilateral health 

programs. These funds support the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 

(PEPFAR); the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, & Malaria; Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance and other critical maternal and child health programs; the Global Health Security Agenda; and an intensified campaign, launched by the White House, to end the 

scourge of malaria. We have also sought emergency funding to aid in an international effort to minimize the public health threat posed by the Zika virus. 

This year, we are asking for $6.2 billion to address humanitarian imperatives, including support for internally displaced persons, refugees, those affected by conflict 

or natural hazards and communities working to increase preparedness and resilience to disasters. 

To date, with backing from Congress, the United States has provided over $4.5 

billion in humanitarian assistance—more than any other country—to assist victims 

of the catastrophic civil war in Syria. In London, earlier this month, I announced 

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velopment funds that includes support for the education of 300,000 refugee youth 

in Jordan and Lebanon. In September, at the U.N., President Obama will host a 

summit on the global refugee crisis. This will be the culmination of a vigorous diplomatic effort to rally the world community to increase the global response to humanitarian funding appeals by at least 30 percent, and to add significantly to the number of countries that donate regularly to these appeals or that are willing to accept 

refugees for admission within their borders. Our budget request allocates $2.7 billion for Democracy, Human Rights and Governance—a modest amount compared to the steep costs of the civil strife and political extremism that often thrive in the absence of effective and democratic governing 

institutions. Programs carried out by the State Department and USAID can play a 

pivotal role in enabling countries to make governance more accountable, electoral 

systems more professional, and judicial systems more independent. By supporting 

civil society and the rule of law, these programs contribute to a range of important 

goals, among them freedom of speech, religion and the press; respect for the rights 

of persons with disabilities; equitable treatment for members of the LGBTQ community; and an end to human trafficking. 

In addition, I am pleased to announce that the administration, led by the Department of State and in cooperation with USAID, the Peace Corps, and the Millennium 

Challenge Corporation, will soon launch a strategy to advance the empowerment of 

adolescent girls. This strategy will be holistic in nature and address key issues facing adolescent girls today, including equal access to secondary education and cultural practices that deny girls a fair chance to participate in the economic and political life of their societies. Our budget also underscores the State Department’s decades-long commitment to scholarship programs and educational exchanges that help 

Americans to learn about the world and young leaders from around the world to 

learn about America. Meanwhile, our energetic and innovative activities in the field 

of public diplomacy are essential to convey the truth about U.S. policies and actions 

at a time when some—including terrorist organizations—lie continually about what 

Americans believe and do. 

To achieve our country’s international objectives, we must give State Department 

and USAID employees the tools and resources they need to do their jobs well. That’s 

why our request includes a $169 million net increase for Diplomatic and Consular 

Programs, reflecting heightened requirements in such areas as Freedom of Information Act processing, cyber security, counterterrorism, intelligence, and research. 

This proposal will support increased diversity through expanded recruitment and 

fellowship opportunities, and will provide more competitive wages for the locally employed personnel who make up the majority of our overseas workforce. I also ask 

you to support the restoration of full Overseas Comparability Pay for State Department personnel who are deployed abroad. This reform is essential to our effort to 

retain highly-skilled individuals in a competitive international jobs market, and to 

ensure fair treatment for those serving our country in relatively high-risk locations. 

The Budget also includes a $122 million increase for USAID’s Operating Expense 

account to maintain the Agency’s workforce and sustain on-going global operations 

to meet foreign policy objectives, implement Presidential initiatives, and expand 

global engagement. 

Finally, we are asking $3.7 billion to ensure the security of our diplomatic platforms, protect our IT network and infrastructure, meet special medical needs at select posts, and carry out emergency planning and preparedness. Our $2.4 billion request for diplomatic facility construction and maintenance will be used for repairs 

at our overseas assets, and to continue implementing the security recommendations 

of the Benghazi Accountability Review Board. 

My colleagues, a little more than a quarter century ago, when the Berlin Wall fell, 

there were those who suggested that we Americans could now relax because our 

core ideas had prevailed and our enemy had been defeated. But we have long since 

learned that although the particular demands on our leadership may vary from one 

decade to the next; our overall responsibilities neither vanish nor diminish. 

The challenge for today’s generation is to forge a new security framework that will 

keep our country strong and our people safe. We are under no illusions about how 

difficult that task is. We face determined adversaries and many governments whose 

priorities do not match our own. The old plagues of excessive nationalism and tribalism retain their grip in many regions. Technology is a two-edged sword, simultaneously bringing the world closer and driving it apart. Non-state actors have arisen, 

often for the best, but others are at war with all we have ever stood for—and with 

the modern world itself. 

In this complex environment, some setbacks are inevitable. Persistent and creative engagement will be required on all fronts. But we are guided by the same values and supported by the same democratic institutions that enabled our predeVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:15 Aug 10, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\02 23 2016\30-927.T

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cessors to succeed. We are bolstered by a citizenry that is earning respect for our 

country every day through its contributions to technological innovation and global 

prosperity; through its activism on behalf of humanitarian causes and civil society; 

through its brave service on the battlefield, in air and on sea; and through its commitment to a system of governance that will allow our country this year to elect a 

president—peacefully and fairly—for the 58th time. We are sustained, as well, by 

one of the true touchstones of America’s greatness—the willingness on the part of 

Congress and the Executive branch to work together for the common good. 

Thank you, and now I would be pleased to respond to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I could not agree more 

that the hopes of the world very much depend upon us. Again, I 

thank you for your testimony. 

Before we get into other longer discussions, you did not mention 

Afghanistan. I was there a couple months ago and witnessed that 

continued duplicity on Pakistan’s part, outright, blatant duplicity, 

where they continue to support the Taliban, the Haqqani network, 

and give safe haven to Al Qaeda. 

Most of us have been to the Waziristans and seen the tremendous amount of taxpayer money that has gone into changing the 

context of those areas. But they continue to give them safe haven. 

So recently, they have asked to be able to purchase F-16s. I 

would rather they purchase them from a U.S. company than some 

other company, but they also want U.S. taxpayers to subsidize 

more than half of that purchase over time. 

Do you agree with my position that that should not occur until 

they stop the duplicity that has continued now for 14 years while 

we have been in Afghanistan? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Mr. Chairman, we are evaluating all aspects of the counterterrorism efforts with respect to Pakistan’s impact on Afghanistan, obviously. 

I just met with Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister Sharif, a few 

weeks ago, and we discussed our concerns about the need to rein 

in particular terrorist groups that are either homegrown in Pakistan or are using Pakistan as a sanctuary. We have been very, very 

clear that they have to target all militant groups. 

The CHAIRMAN. If I could, we do know that they know exactly 

where these people are living, not in the FATA region, right in 

Pakistan in neighborhoods that they could interdict while we are 

having this hearing, and they are not. 

So I do not want to go into a long discussion about our relationship with Pakistan. I do hope that, ultimately, you will support the 

position that I have laid out in my capacity as chairman that zero 

U.S. taxpayer dollars will go to subsidize Pakistan’s purchase until 

such a time that they do the things that we know they could do 

to stop helping to destabilize Afghanistan, where men and women 

in U.S. uniforms have lost their limbs and lives, and huge amounts 

of taxpayer monies have gone to support a country as it evolves in 

democracy and anticorruption and other ways. 

Secretary KERRY. It is a very complicated mix, Mr. Chairman. I 

know you know this. The government itself, the military, has been 

very cooperative, very engaged in the fight against terrorism. They 

have lost tens of thousands of people themselves, and they have 

had 160,000 to 180,000 troops out in the western part of the country conducting a sweep, a major operation, in North Waziristan and 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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elsewhere. They drove the Haqqani network into new locations. 

And it is an ongoing process. 

But there are, obviously—and we should deal with this, I think, 

in a classified session—entities that complicate our efforts very significantly. We have had those conversations. I am happy to go into 

it in greater depth. 

I understand your reservations about it, but their military has 

been deeply engaged in the fight against terrorism. They have several groups there that are of concern. And we should talk in a classified session about what we are trying to do about it. 

The CHAIRMAN. They are partially helping. They are hedging 

their bets, and they are continuing a long line of duplicity, which 

is the greatest threat to U.S. soldiers right now in Afghanistan. I 

know you know that. I agree that the relationship is complex. 

How should we look at a relationship, speaking of complexity, 

with Russia? They have done more for a country that has very little economic resources to break Europe apart. In the modern era, 

it has never occurred, like it is right now with what they have done 

in Ukraine, what they continue to do in delaying the implementation of the Minsk III. I know part of that is on Ukraine’s side, too. 

What they have done to threaten the Baltics. What they have done 

to exacerbate the refugee issue and really use them now, in many 

ways, as weapons of war. And Syria, I do not think anyone can say 

that their role has been constructive as they continue—continue— 

to kill the folks that are our friends and allies. 

Now, in Iran, after this agreement has been negotiated, in strict 

violation of the U.N. resolution that put it in place, is now getting 

ready to sell Russian fighter jets to Iran in strict violation of that. 

So what is our relationship today with Russia? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, our relationship is one that is also complicated, because, obviously, we have different positions with respect to Ukraine, different positions with respect to Syria, at least 

as to the support of Assad. And the question remains to be tested 

whether or not they are at all serious about the political process. 

On the other hand, Russia cooperated quite significantly in the 

Iran negotiations. Russia joined with us in helping to remove the 

chemical weapons, the declared chemical weapons, under the 

Chemical Weapons treaty from Syria. Russia has cooperated with 

us in a U.N. resolution bringing to a head this effort diplomatically. 

Russia cooperated with us in the Vienna meetings that could not 

have happened without Russia’s input. In fact, without Russia’s cooperation, I am not sure we would have been able to have achieved 

the agreement we have now, or at least get the humanitarian assistance in. 

In the last days, Russia has sent its special envoy on the Syria 

issue to Syria to talk to the Assad regime and to make sure that 

they are in agreement to move forward in the diplomatic process, 

as well as to honor the humanitarian requirements. And they sent 

their defense minister to Iran to do the same. 

So it is step-by-step. There are no illusions. Eyes are open. And 

nobody on this committee should have any illusions. Russia made 

it clear years ago that they support Assad. This is not a surprise 

to us. It is not a surprise that they are following through on their 

support for Assad. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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And they are also threatened by terrorists. There are maybe 

2,000 to 2,500 to 3,000 Chechens who are fighting in Syria, and the 

Russians have a serious concern about the return of those 

Chechens to Russian soil or places of interest, and stirring up their 

Muslim population and/or other objectives they may have. 

So the bottom line, Mr. Chairman, is that we are proceeding on 

a step-by-step process by which the delivery of actions is what 

speaks. We will meet again in Geneva in the next few days to work 

on the modalities of the cooperation, so that it is Nusra that is attacked and not the moderate opposition, and so that we are both 

understanding how we are proceeding against ISIL. 

There could be a significant benefit in that we wind up having 

greater effort against ISIL and can speed up the destruction of 

Daesh. But the proof will be in the actions that come in the next 

days. 

May I say, I really appreciate your comments about Europe. I 

could not agree with you more. Europe is deeply threatened by 

what is happening. They are talking about different border measures that may be taken. I think it is imperative for the United 

States to be prepared to help Europe as much as necessary in every 

way possible in order to address what is happening and the pressures being put on them. But in the next days, we will know more. 

Now, when I met with President Putin, I said to him very directly that the test here is not a test that is going to be proven in 

6 months or 1.5 years, when the election is supposedly scheduled. 

We are going to know in a month or two whether or not this transition process is really serious—or three, whatever. We will have a 

sense of that. 

Assad himself is going to have to make some real decisions about 

the formation of a transitional governance process that is real. If 

there is not, as you have read in the newspapers and are probably 

hearing, there are, certainly, plan B options being considered. 

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think they think plan B is realistic, and 

I think that makes it very difficult for you in your efforts. 

I, again, want to thank you for your efforts on our behalf. I do 

think the breakthrough on the humanitarian side was a good thing, 

but I think you have a very tough hand of cards that you are dealing with. Again, we appreciate you being here today and for your 

service to our country. 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. With that, Ranking Member Cardin? 

Senator CARDIN. Once again, Secretary, thank you for your service to our country. Thank you for sharing with us today. 

Let me follow up a little bit on Syria. Obviously, the first challenge was to stop the shootings between the government and the 

opposition, supported by Russia and the government, and to allow 

humanitarian access, so that the humanitarian crisis can be eased. 

At least it will, hopefully, stop some of the flow of the refugees, and 

it will take some of the internal pressure, in order to be able to get 

a negotiation as to the future of Syria itself. That is the objective 

here. I strongly support that. 

You have alluded to this, but I hope you could be a little bit 

clearer as to what comes next. There seems to be a fundamental 

disagreement between the United States and Russia as to the fuVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:15 Aug 10, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\02 23 2016\30-927.T

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ture of President Assad. There has been silence as to the accountability of the Assad regime for its war crimes. And a lot of us are 

determined that when leaders commit war crimes, they must be 

held accountable for their actions. I understand there will be a 

process. 

At the end of the day, there needs to be a government in Syria 

has the confidence of all of its people, otherwise we will be back 

fighting again, and we are not going to be able to concentrate 

against ISIL forces, which is the objective here. 

Can you just share with us briefly how you see the next step unfolding, where we can get to a result where there is truly a government in Syria that has the confidence of all the population? 

Secretary KERRY. So let me try to lay this out as clearly as I can, 

and, certainly, how we see the options here. 

Russia, the United States, and Iran, and our allies, all say that 

we want a united Syria. The vast preponderance of the players say 

they want a nonsectarian, even secular, Syria, status quo ante, in 

which all minorities are protected, in which the people of Syria 

have the right to choose their leadership and their future. 

The Russians agree to that. The Iranians agree to that. All of our 

allies agree to that fundamental precept. So we are united on sort 

of this vision of where we want Syria to be. The question is getting 

there. 

We believe deeply, and we have argued this to the Russians and 

to the Iranians and others, that even if you wanted to, even if 

someone did strike an unholy alliance and suggested Assad could 

be part of that future, the war will not stop. 

As long as Assad is there, you cannot stop the war, because of 

the grievous events that have transpired over the course of the last 

years. People do not see how someone who has gassed his own people, driven so many of them into refugee status and displaced, tortured them, starved them, barrel-bombed them—how he somehow 

is going to be the glue that brings the place together is beyond anybody’s understanding. And there are forces out there that will 

never stop fighting him. 

So if you want peace, by definition, we believe it has to be without Assad. 

What the Russians and others have said is the Syrian people 

have to decide that. But this political process that we have created 

is what they say is the mechanism by which that decision could 

begin to be made. 

Senator CARDIN. What timing do you see? Are we talking 

months? Are we talking years? 

Secretary KERRY. No, we are talking months, because there is no 

way that people will be patient enough, obviously. First of all, there 

is a 6-month period that has been basically laid out for the political 

transition to try to be put in place. Now, if it is real and really happening, that could move. If it is not, as I said earlier, we will know. 

If they are stalling, if there is an absolute stonewall, if there is 

no progress, if nothing happens, it would be very hard to keep people at the table. I have no illusions about that. There are people 

who will say this is a farce, and they will walk away. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
19 

So I think we are going to see very quickly whether or not countries are serious about this transition and whether or not Assad is 

serious about it. 

Now, President Putin said and has said publicly, and Prime Minister Lavrov has said and said publicly, that they are committed to 

this process and that their support for Assad is an important component of his need to take part in it. 

Senator CARDIN. As far as holding President Assad accountable 

for the crimes that he has committed, has there been any understanding reached either for impunity or for actions? 

Secretary KERRY. No. No, there has been no discussion, no determination of it. I mean, I have said several times publicly, we have 

talked about the crimes that have been committed. Using gas 

against your own people is a war crime. Starvation as a tool of war 

is a war crime. So these are pretty clear things. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Let me turn to the area I said in my opening comments about 

democracy funding, anticorruption, et cetera, which, to me, is critically important. I do think that you have showcased the importance of anticorruption activities. We have talked about the 

Ukraine. 

If we get Russia to leave Ukraine alone, Ukraine’s survival depends upon the internal reforms in its own country, where the people have an honest government. That was one of the major reasons 

for the protests that occurred in Ukraine. 

When we look at countries we are dealing with in Asia, including 

in TPP, we fight countries that have serious corruption problems 

within their government, and we have tried to take steps in the 

TPP to deal with some of those issues. And we go through country 

after country—the impunity in Central America of people who commit crimes without any accountability. 

I would hope, this year, we could work together, this committee 

and your leadership, to develop a protocol where we make it clear 

that we will not tolerate a government that does not move to deal 

with the corruption problems. 

We are talking about developing an index similar to what we do 

in trafficking in persons for corruption. There has been transparency evaluations done of countries. 

Can you just share with us steps that you are taking to provide 

a more permanent structure within the State Department to deal 

with the problems of corruption and good governance? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Senator, I am glad you bring that up, because I gave a speech in Davos just a few weeks ago in which I 

talked about the challenge of global corruption. It is one of the 

most difficult challenges that we face in trying to deal with extremism, trying to deal with counternarcotics, with trafficking in persons. And the levels of corruption, I have to say, are greater in impact than I had perceived previously in my years on the committee 

and otherwise. 

It is having a profound impact. It steals the future from young 

people. 

In a sense, the Tunisian uprising and the Arab Spring was born 

not out of anything religious motivated. It came about as a result 

of corruption. A police officer was refusing to allow that Tunisian 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
20 

fruit vendor to sell his wares and wanted a bribe, and so forth. So 

when he got slapped around, it was one slap too many, and he selfimmolated. That is what ignited the revolution that saw change 

sweep through the region. 

I see that in other countries incipiently. In Nigeria, it was re- ported that former generals stole some $50 billion, some extraordinary amount of money taken out of the country. In Yemen, we 

know enormous amounts were taken out of the country. There are 

many other countries. We know this is happening. 

So we are very, very focused on this issue and the standard. In 

the State Department, this effort is led by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Enforcement Affairs, but it is really an alldepartment effort. And we promote standards in many, many different ways. We model our proposals to countries on our best practices. 

I might add, with respect to Ukraine, the IMF has put a very 

strong 10-point program in front of the government in Kiev that 

they need to address in full in order to get further support from 

the IMF. That has a very significant reform package in it. 

In the last weeks, the Vice President and I met with President 

Poroshenko. We have been very clear about steps that need to be 

taken. We are working very closely with them. 

That is really the best way to do this. I know there is an instinct 

people want to put hard lines in place legislatively, sort of a draconian ‘‘do this or else’’ kind of message. That often winds up in severing our capacity to have an impact. What I have found that we 

are able to do in working with countries is actually get them to 

move on things and make changes. We are working. We are cochair of the G–20 anticorruption working group, and we have advanced standards internationally on transparency, on integrity, on 

countering impunity. 

So this is an ongoing effort. It is not going to be resolved overnight, obviously. But the more we focus on it, the greater the prospects are that it is going to have an impact, and it will make a difference. And we are making a difference in a lot of places. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson? 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, thanks for coming here and testifying. Thanks for 

your service. 

I have to take this opportunity, though. I have to put on my 

chairman of Homeland Security and Government Affairs hat. As 

you are aware, my committee has jurisdiction over national security procedures and Federal records. I have joined in letters with 

Chairman Corker and Chairman Burr and Chairman Grassley. We 

have sent you a number of letters. You have been responsive, in 

part. I appreciate that. 

I want to go through a series of questions. I do not need real long 

answers, but I just want to establish that, so I can hopefully get 

to putting my Foreign Relations hat on as well. 

First of all, as Secretary of State, you send and receive classified 

material, correct? 

Secretary KERRY. Yes. I mean, I do not send it personally, directly. It is sent through the Executive Office. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
21 

Senator JOHNSON. Okay. So you never use your email system to 

actually create classified materials? 

Secretary KERRY. No, I do not. 

Senator JOHNSON. You never do that. 

Secretary KERRY. I have never actually opened my computer on 

my desk. [Laughter.] 

Senator JOHNSON. Okay. So, members of your staff do. I understand. I have white hair, too. 

Senator KERRY. It is not because I do not know how. I want it 

separated from me, and I do not do it. 

Senator JOHNSON. Good. So members of your staff do, correct? 

Secretary KERRY. Yes, of course. 

Senator JOHNSON. Okay. Then they use a system called 

ClassNet, correct? 

Secretary KERRY. Yes. 

Senator JOHNSON. Okay. You are fully aware of our enemies’ capabilities, in terms of hacking into—— 

Secretary KERRY. Indeed. 

Senator JOHNSON. Okay. Would you allow—so you do not use— 

you do not allow yourself to use a private server. Would you allow 

any members of your staff to use a nonofficial, nonsecure server for 

transmitting classified information? 

Secretary KERRY. Look—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Just yes or no. 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, I understand—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Just yes or no. 

Secretary KERRY. We have very specific procedures in place in 

the department. I brought in an Inspector General. I wrote a letter 

to the Inspector General, asking him to review our entire process. 

And so in today’s world, given all that we have learned and what 

we understand about the vulnerability of our system, we do not do 

that. 

Senator JOHNSON. So the answer is no. 

For every classified piece of information that is transmitted, 

there is a log kept at the State Department, correct? 

Secretary KERRY. Yes. There is a log kept on everything. Everything is kept, period, not just the log but the substance of the message is kept and filed. 

Senator JOHNSON. I would think that is a relatively condensed 

log though, I mean, pretty easily accessible. 

Secretary KERRY. I do not know the answer to that. 

Senator JOHNSON. There is a finite number of classified materials back and forth. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, we have 275 posts, and we are sending 

classified material every single day. I cannot tell you how many 

millions of—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Are the logs differentiated by individual, 

though? 

Secretary KERRY. I do not know precisely. 

Senator JOHNSON. We will find that out. 

Secretary KERRY. I do not believe so. 

Senator JOHNSON. In a September 21st letter of 2015, one of our 

questions was: Did Secretary Clinton have an official State Department email account assigned to her for accessing classified emails 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
22 

during her time in the State Department? We did receive, and I appreciate, this response from Julia Frifield. This states: To answer 

question five, Secretary Clinton did not use a classified email account at the State Department. An account was set up on ClassNet 

for her calendar, but it was not used. 

Another question we asked, which has not been responded to, is, 

I would like access—our committee would like access to those logs 

in the State Department of all the classified material that was 

transferred between the administration, other members of the administration, within the State Department, and Secretary Clinton. 

You have not responded to that yet. It has been about 5 months. 

Is there a reason why we have not had access to those logs? 

Secretary KERRY. I do not know the specific reason, because it 

has not been discussed with me. 

Senator JOHNSON. Is there any reason I cannot get access to 

those logs? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I do not know the answer to that, Senator. 

Senator JOHNSON. So I will put that for questions for the record. 

I will continue to want a response to that. 

Secretary KERRY. Right. But let me, so you understand, I appointed a transparency coordinator, an experienced ambassador, 

Janice Jacobs, to assist us to make sure we respond rapidly to all 

requests. 

We have more than 50 simultaneous investigations going on. And 

we have an unprecedented number of FOIA requests. I have had 

to cannibalize bureaus to get people to go spend their time responding to these requests. 

Senator JOHNSON. Which is my next question. Do you know how 

much money you have spent and what kind of manpower you put 

on, because you have been really evaluating these emails since 

March 2015? Do you know how much money the State Department 

has spent just reviewing—because, again, I think we have to assume that every piece of information that passed over Secretary 

Clinton’s nonofficial, nonsecure private server is in the hands of 

our enemy. We have to assume that. It is prudent to do so. 

So you have been reviewing that for almost a year. Do you know 

how much you have spent and the manpower associated with 

cleaning up that mess? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I would have to look. As I said to you, 

we have over 50 investigations, nine different committees, involving hundreds of specific requests for literally—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Well, I will—— 

Secretary KERRY [CONTINUING]. WAIT, WAIT—HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PAGES OF DOCUMENTS. 

Senator JOHNSON. Again, I am not concerned about the other investigations. I am asking a question on the one with Hillary Clinton’s emails. 

Secretary KERRY. I am concerned about it because this is—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Good. I am glad you are. 

Secretary KERRY [continuing]. Tying up professional diplomats. 

Senator JOHNSON. Are you aware, has the FBI recovered any of 

the 55,000 emails that were supposedly wiped from the server? 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
23 

Secretary KERRY. I have no knowledge of what the—you have to 

ask the FBI. We do not touch or know anything about—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Have you, in the emails—— 

Secretary KERRY. You allocated $2.4 million in years 2015 and 

2016 in order to help us respond to you, and we have been able to 

step up the level of our delivery as result of that. We are still 

greatly overburdened. 

Senator JOHNSON. So based on what you have reviewed, the classified material, because we are up to—what?—1,700 different 

emails that have some variation of some level of classified material 

in them. 

Secretary KERRY. I do not know. 

Senator JOHNSON. Is the State Department aware of anything 

that you have had to mitigate the damage from? Have you taken 

any actions in the State Department? Do you know if the intelligence community has taken any actions to mitigate the harm by 

the potential fact or the potential that our enemies might have access to that classified material on Secretary Clinton’s server? 

Secretary KERRY. I would not be able to discuss that in an open 

session, but I can tell you that the department, we have. I do not 

know what the other agencies have done or not done. 

By the way, that is one of the reasons why it has taken a while. 

If we have anything in an email, when one of our professional 

reads the email, that involves another agency, then every agency 

has to have a chance to read that to see if their interests are, in 

fact, at risk. So that takes a long time, and that is one of the reasons why—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Right. Secretary Clinton’s actions have cost 

the Federal Government an awful lot of money and caused you an 

awful lot of headache. 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, it remains to be seen whether or not 

it is the 50 investigations by nine different committees that have 

created more heartburn. 

Senator JOHNSON. So what I would like are answers to these 

questions. You said you cannot do it in an open committee. Would 

you commit to coming in a secure setting before my committee to 

answer some of these questions? 

Secretary KERRY. Would I what? 

Senator JOHNSON. Would you come before my committee in a secured setting, the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Committee, to answer some of these questions based on national 

security procedures and Federal records? 

Secretary KERRY. I am not the appropriate person to discuss 

those issues in that context. 

Senator JOHNSON. Would you send a representative, then? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I will evaluate with others in the administration through the appropriate interagency process who the appropriate person is to do that. Of course, someone appropriately responsible will always respond to any committee of the Congress. 

Senator JOHNSON. Again, it has been 5 months that we have 

been asking for the logs of the classified materials sent. So I would 

ask for those logs, as well. 

Secretary KERRY. Again, I am not sure whether that is even authorized or capable of being done, but we will take a look at it. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
24 

Senator JOHNSON. Okay. Appreciate it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary KERRY. It is the first I have heard of it. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer? 

Senator BOXER. I just want to say, before I welcome you, the 

Senator is injecting presidential politics into this. I resent it, and 

I would like to say for the record that we know that Secretaries 

Rice and Powell used their own private email. And I know of no 

Senator that has not sent emails about the work of this subject 

matter and other subject matters on their personal emails. So let 

us be clear. 

Now, I am really disappointed in this. I think we should be working together on the subject of today’s hearing. 

Senators Corker and Cardin, I thank you so much for this hearing, and I thank you both for your leadership. It is extraordinary, 

the way you work together. As a ranking member myself working 

with Senator Inhofe, it is so important that we do that to restore 

faith, frankly, in this government. 

Secretary Kerry, I just want to say how much I appreciate your 

accomplishments, especially in these very difficult times and, as 

you point out, so many hotspots all over the world. I want to be 

specific about what I am talking about when I compliment you. 

First of all, your work on the Iran nuclear agreement, I know it 

is controversial, but I also know how hard it was. While you are 

doing that, also your continued support for Israel in this budget, 

it is so important. And thirdly, your opening relations with Cuba. 

And fourth, the global climate change negotiations. And fifth, your 

efforts to bring Russia to an agreement regarding Syria. 

It was way back 3 or 4 years ago that Senator Dick Durbin called 

a bunch of us together to meet with the Russian Ambassador to 

say, can we work together so that there could be a peaceful transition in Syria? And there was the Russian Ambassador. 

That was the most brutal meeting I have ever been to. It was 

horrible. And all we said was, let us work together for the future 

of the world, for the future of the Syrian people. And he was impossible. 

So, frankly—I am not being diplomatic, you have to be, but I do 

not—I blame Russia and Iran for what is happening there, for the 

quarter of a million deaths since we had that meeting of innocent 

women and children. It is horrible. 

So I am going to ask you, if I have time, I have two subject matters I want to cover with you. One is Cuba, and one is Syria. So 

I will start off with Cuba. 

I am a strong supporter of the President’s decision to reestablish 

diplomatic relations with Cuba, another very difficult issue on this 

committee. I was proud to join you at the reopening of the U.S. 

Embassy in Havana last August. 

It was so emotional to see and speak with the same Marines, Mr. 

Secretary, who took down the flag 50 years ago who raised the flag 

again, and to see how excited they were to be there and to do that. 

To me, it is through engagement that we have the best chance 

to support the Cuban people. How do I know this? And I respect 

my friends on both sides of the aisle who disagree with me vehemently and disagree with you vehemently and disagree with the 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
25 

President vehemently. But really, we tried isolation for 50 years, 

and how did that go? 

So I think we have to move forward and get past it. People have 

a right to believe what they want to, and I have no animosity toward them. There are reasons they put forward that are deeply 

held. But I think those folks are living in the past. 

Walking through the Embassy last August, I did feel like I had 

traveled through time. The building, which has not been upgraded 

in over 30 years, was clearly in disrepair and understaffed. I see 

that the administration requested $3.8 million for upgrades to our 

Embassy in Cuba in its fiscal year 2017 budget. 

So whether or not one agrees with the new policy, could you tell 

us, because I know so many Americans are traveling to Cuba—and 

there are not enough hotel rooms. That is why Airbnb is doing so 

well there. That is where people are staying. 

Could you comment on why we really need these funds to rebuild 

the Embassy? 

Secondly, what are your priorities with respect to Cuba for the 

remainder of the administration? What does the President hope to 

achieve with his upcoming historic visit in March? 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer. 

The current staffing in Havana is inadequate to support our objectives of being able to do the diplomacy, the normal diplomacy. 

We were able to negotiate with the Cubans successfully a 50 percent increase in staffing, so we are very eager to reverse this shortfall, which will be helpful in terms of helping business, helping 

travelers, helping Americans. We have not increased any direct 

hire staff since 2014. 

Our Embassy there has hosted over 40 congressional and executive branch official delegations just in the year since the President 

announced the opening of diplomatic relations. So we also negotiated greater freedom for our diplomats to travel within Cuba and 

better monitor developments. And the ability to travel outside Havana and interact with Cubans outside the capital is obviously important to our relationship and security, and support of the Cuban 

people. 

We also were able to negotiate a number of containers going 

down there in order to help refurbish some of the Embassy, which, 

you are right, has not had any care in a long period of time. 

So we have concerns still. I am not going to pretend to anybody— 

I think the President said at the beginning that not everything is 

going to change overnight. There are still human rights issues. In 

fact, I may be down there in the next week or two to have a human 

rights dialogue specifically. 

Senator BOXER. Good. And what does the President hope to 

achieve? 

Secretary KERRY. The President hopes to press forward on the 

agenda of speaking to the people of Cuba about the future. Obviously, he is anxious to press on the rights of people to be able to 

demonstrate, to have democracy, to be free, to be able to speak and 

hang a sign in their window without being put in jail for several 

years. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
26 

Senator BOXER. So just to sum it up, because I have one more 

question for you, he is going to speak directly to the Cuban people, 

and that is really good. 

My last question is, as the person who has perhaps engaged the 

most with the Russians, and I talked about the frustration Senators felt when we met years ago with the Russians, do you believe 

they are truly willing to commit to a cessation of hostilities in the 

Syrian area and a peace process that allows for the eventual removal of Assad? What is your assessment? 

Secretary KERRY. My assessment is that we have an opportunity 

to put to test the proposition that they are committed to a political 

solution. If, indeed, the only outcome that anybody believes can 

occur is a political solution, we have no choice but to try to get the 

modalities in place to be able to get to the table and argue about 

it. 

So as Senator Corker has said, my tools are the tools of diplomacy, the tools of trying to reach an agreement, trying to use whatever leverage we have to get an outcome. The outcome we have gotten is to have everybody who is a stakeholder at the same table, 

all of them agreeing in this process to have Russia joining us with 

China and France and Britain, as the five permanent members of 

the Security Council, going to the Security Council with Germany 

and others, in order to get a U.N. Security Council resolution outlining a framework for a political settlement, and Russia voting for 

it. 

So if we are going to test whether the words mean anything, we 

have to put in place a process like we have here. 

Now, Senator Corker mentioned Aleppo and what they have been 

doing in the ensuing weeks. Yes, they have been bombing. Imagine 

what would happen if we did not even have an agreement to end 

in 2 weeks or 1 week? They would still be bombing. 

You have to begin a ceasefire sometime. But you cannot begin it 

on day 1 without working out modalities of it. You have to sit there 

and say, okay, what are the rules? Who is going to live by what? 

And in this case, that was particularly difficult because of the different players that you have involved in this. 

Senator BOXER. Well, if I could just reclaim my time because I 

have gone over, I just hope it is not a rope-a-dope deal. I just hope. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, it may be. I am not going to sit here—— 

Senator BOXER. Not that you have another option. I am not suggesting—— 

Secretary KERRY. If humanitarian assistance flows, if the guns 

do silence, with the exception of the effort against Daesh and 

Nusra, on Saturday—if they do—and lives are saved, then that is 

to the benefit—and it does not mean that is automatically going to 

have a positive outcome in the political process, folks. 

In fact, let me say this, because Senator Corker raised an important issue. He said Russia has sort of been accomplishing its ends 

in the meantime. Well, folks, even if Russia took Aleppo, even if 

Russia is sitting there, holding territory has always been difficult. 

If the war does not end, if the Turks and Qataris and Saudis and 

others continue to support the opposition, and we are supporting 

the opposition, and the opposition continues to fight, this can get 

a lot uglier. Russia has to be sitting there evaluating that, too. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
27 

So the question is, at some point in time, someday, someone is 

going to have to sit down at a table and arrive at an understanding 

about what Syria is going to be. 

But it may be too late to keep it as a whole Syria, if we wait 

much longer. So that is what is at issue here. 

I am not going to vouch for this. I am not going to say this process is sure to work, because I do not know. But I know that this 

is the best way to try to end the war, and it is the only alternative 

available to us, if, indeed, we are going to have a political settlement. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Flake? 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate the testimony so far. 

I share the concerns that Senator Cardin raised with regard to 

OCO, the shift. This is something all of us have been concerned 

with, the chairman and others, over the years, the shift from baseline funding to OCO funding. It is just not an honest way to budget. And I am not blaming the administration anymore than I am 

blaming Congress here, but we have to get away from it. 

Let me talk a little bit about the trip that Senator Cardin mentioned that he and I and Senator Coons from this committee and 

two other Members of Congress took to southern Africa, mostly to 

look at wildlife trafficking and poaching, and to provide some oversight for some of the programs that our government has with various governments there. 

It is a challenge. We have seen a decline in the elephant population in Africa over the past 10 years of about 40 to 50 percent. 

Rhinos are being poached in just one part, Kruger in South Africa, 

to the tune of about 1,200 just last year. 

When we were in Namibia, we went into a vault where they held 

illegal seizures of rhino horn and ivory. I held two horns from one 

white rhino that on the black market was worth about $600,000, 

one set of rhino horns. It goes for about $60,000 a k, more expensive than any precious metal or anything else, cocaine or drugs. 

Those countries are very worried that criminal networks will 

come in that will fund conflicts and instability like they have in 

Central Africa and elsewhere. So I would just say that the programs that we have going in those countries, to help these countries actually respond to this threat, are important and we ought 

to keep going with that. 

Also, Senator Cardin mentioned the issue of trafficking in people, 

TIP, the report that we have. Senator Cardin raised that just about 

everywhere we went. That is an important lever that we have to 

induce these governments to help more in this area. But it is concerning in some areas. 

In Namibia, when it was raised, the government responded, hey, 

we have tried to respond. After we left, there were newspaper articles expressing some confusion about where they were and where 

they are. It is not just the Namibian Government. Some of the 

other governments have expressed some confusion about how they 

respond. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
28 

When you look at what we are trying induce these governments 

to do, one of the things is the government of the country should 

make a serious and sustained effort to eliminate severe forms of 

trafficking in persons. 

Those items are maybe a little too subjective. And if we want to 

use this as an effective lever to push these countries to more where 

we want them to be, I would suggest that maybe we need to work 

on some of these measures to make them more concrete and precise. 

Do you have any thoughts on that? I know this is an area that 

is of concern to you, and you have been working with these governments. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, thank you, Senator. I know this is not on 

everybody’s mind, obviously, but I will tell you, it should be. I wish 

it were something that we were able to do more about, and we 

should be able to. 

The same criminal networks that engage in wildlife trafficking 

also, by the way, engage in trafficking in human persons and narcotics trafficking. It is a multi-billion-dollar criminal enterprise. 

And it is destroying the future for lots of countries that could rely 

on ecotourism or other things. But it is also eliminating species 

from the planet. 

I think there is one rhino, I saw the other day, I think there is 

one white rhino in one country left. That is all. 

When I was in Kenya recently, I visited the David Sheldrick preserve there, where there were a bunch of orphaned baby elephants, 

because the parents had been killed. And the poaching has been reduced significantly because they now have wardens out there 

armed, and there is a price you pay if you are caught. 

That is the only way—it has to be stopped by enforcement. You 

cannot have impunity in the system. 

When it is part of a criminal enterprise in what has become a 

klepto-country of one kind or another, it is extremely hard to do 

anything about this. 

So we need to galvanize countries together. Unfortunately, this 

also is one of those things that takes resources. You have to be able 

to provide the shelter, the refuge. You have to be able to provide 

the enforcement mechanism, train people, make sure that there is 

no impunity with respect to this. Until this moment, there has not 

been a significant enough effort. 

I know you and Senator Coons are contemplating legislation on 

this. We welcome talking to you about it. The one concern that we 

have goes back to what I was talking about earlier. We are cooperating now with a lot of countries, and they are cooperating with us. 

We are worried about the prospect that, if there is sort of a frontal 

assault on them, we may lose the cooperation rather than be able 

to make the progress we are making. It is something that we 

should talk about. So what is the best way to get the return on investment here? 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. I have one last question. 

I just want to commend the administration for what they have 

done on Cuba, as was mentioned before. I have said to the President and others that there are still, obviously, big concerns with 

the Cuban Government in the area of human rights, for example. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
29 

But it should not be lost on anyone, the improvement in the condition of the Cuban people, since many changes have been made. 

For example, few years ago, when the President lifted restrictions on Cuban-American travel and lifted caps on remittances, 

that in combination with some changes made in Cuba have meant 

that nearly 25 percent of the Cuban work force is now outside of 

government, whether they are running private hotels or Airbnb 

with a bed-and-breakfast, a private auto repair shop, or a beauty 

salon. 

These people, who have that ability now, are separate as much 

you can be in Cuba from government and are enjoying richer, 

fuller, more free lives than they would have otherwise. We still 

have a long way to go, but we are moving in the right direction. 

And I commend the administration for the steps that have been 

taken, and I wish the President well on his visit there. I think it 

is an important step. 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator. I appreciate it. 

We appreciate your support. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before moving to Senator Menendez, this is slavery and trafficking awareness week. We have a hearing tomorrow 

on this very topic. I very much appreciate you bringing it up. 

And I want to thank the State Department for working with us. 

This committee passed unanimously, under Senator Menendez’s 

leadership, the End Modern Slavery Act. We had a down payment 

on that, that we are working closely with the State Department to 

get to the right places. But this has to be a global effort, when 

there are 27 million people today enslaved. I know you know that. 

This committee knows that, and we look forward to continuing to 

work with you. 

Senator Menendez? 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your 

drive and leadership on that issue. 

Let me join the chair and the ranking member in saluting you, 

Secretary Kerry, for your service. While I may have disagreements 

at times on policy, I never doubt your commitment to America’s virtues and promoting those virtues abroad. 

And let me make a comment or two, which I did not intend in 

my preparation today. I guess it is the political hunting season, but 

if you keep shooting and you do not land anything, maybe there is 

nothing to shoot at. I think the global needs that we have, that we 

would be far better off if the State Department focused on that. 

And on Cuba, I would just say to my dear friend from California, 

I wish he was here, that human rights and democracy are never 

about the past. They are eternal, from my perspective. And yet, all 

I can say is that there is a difference between the President traveling to Cuba and when he traveled to Burma, for example. 

When he traveled to Burma, we had Aung San Suu Kyi released 

from house arrest. We had elections, however flawed. We had the 

11 commitments to release political prisoners. We got the Red 

Cross access to prisons and so forth. There were concrete and tangible progress on political reform and human rights. 

If anything, we are going backwards here. Some of the people 

who were released under the original deal have already been reVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:15 Aug 10, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\02 23 2016\30-927.T

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
30 

arrested and are serving long terms in prison. So much for good 

faith. 

We had 1,400 arrests this year alone in the first 2 months. That 

is progress? Fourteen hundred arrests. Not because I say it, but because the Cuban Commission on Human Rights, which is inside of 

Cuba, says it. 

When we do business with the Castro regime, which is what we 

are doing—we are not doing business with the Cuban people. We 

are dealing with Castro’s son and son-in-law, who head the two 

major entities, the only way you can do business inside of Cuba, 

both heads of the Cuban military. We are going to have a transitional and generational change from one set of Castros to another. 

So I am going to continue to speak out on that issue, because I 

think that human rights and democracy in Cuba is incredibly important, as I have viewed it elsewhere in the world. And I concerned that what we have done is neutered our programs there. 

But let me get to the heart of what I really wanted to talk about, 

and that is Iran. 

I want to ask you, Mr. Secretary, invoking sanctions against Iranian activities unrelated to its nuclear portfolio—let us say items 

of proliferation, of ballistic missile technology, or support for terrorism—they do not violate the terms of the JCPOA, correct? 

Secretary KERRY. They do not what? 

Senator MENENDEZ. That pursuing sanctions and other actions 

on proliferation of missile technology and support for terrorism, 

they do not violate the terms of the JCPOA? 

Secretary KERRY. That is accurate. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay. Now, I look at what has transpired 

since our agreement. We have seen two ballistic tests in violation 

of the U.N. Security Council. We have seen missiles tested in the 

vicinity of U.S. naval vessels. We have seen American sailors detained. We have seen the barter of four innocent Americans held 

hostage for the freedom of 21 Iranian criminals, including those 

convicted of conspiracy and material support to a state sponsor of 

terrorism, shipping sensitive dual-use technology, money, and other 

materials in violation of standing U.S. sanctions. We have seen 

clemency for another 14. We have awarded the Iranian Government $1.7 billion, admittedly, for some type of contractor service 

that we did not provide. 

But that was never, ever talked about, not when I was chairman, 

not when I was the ranking member, not as a member of this committee. I never heard about that at all. And it was done so quickly, 

and the payment was made so rapidly, that even the victims of terrorism who have judgments in the United States did not have the 

wherewithal to try to attach it. 

So I look at that, and then I see the challenges that we have 

with Iran outside of its nuclear portfolio, support to a Houthi insurgency that helped topple the internationally recognized Government of Yemen, support to Shia militias in Iraq that exercise profound control over the democratically elected Iraqi Government, 

support to the Syrian regime of Assad with the devastating war 

that we all know about, financing billions of dollars to Lebanese 

Hezbollah and Hamas. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
31 

And so I look at that and I just do not see where the counterweight is. And I look at that and say, I have a sense we are creating a permissive environment. 

Why do I say that? When we look at Iran’s ballistic missile 

launches, which violated U.N. Security Council resolutions, we 

waited an inordinate amount of time, knowing that the United Nations ultimately was not going to ask act, and did not. And when 

we finally did provide some sanctionable action, well after all the 

elements of implementation day took place, we have 11 entities 

that were sanctioned. 

But instead of sanctioning the banks that were financing those 

entities, so that we have a more far-reaching consequence, we are 

playing whack-a-mole. 

So we have the ability to be far more aggressive against the Iranians on those things that we care about. And I know there is this 

desire to try to create space for the moderates inside of Iran, even 

though they were just blocked by the Guardian Council in a way 

in which there are virtually no moderates who are being allowed 

to run in the legislative elections. 

So I look at that, and I say, why is it that we are not being far 

more aggressive with the tools that we have? 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record 

a GAO report that I had commissioned with Senator Kirk. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

[The information referred to above can be found in the ‘‘Additional Material Submitted for the Record’’ section of this transcript.] 

Senator MENENDEZ. It talks about the entity in which we are 

putting all the marbles, the International Atomic Energy Administration. Now, I think they do good work, but let me just say that 

some of the preliminary findings cause concern for me about what 

the IAEA is capable of. 

So let me read some of them. GAO’s preliminary observations 

point directly to future problems with monitoring, verifying, and 

meeting requirements of the JCPOA. It talks about its limitation, 

a limited budget from irregular funding sources, human resource 

shortfalls, important equipment operating at capacity already not 

being able to go beyond that. Limited analytical capabilities that 

will be tested by the new mandates of the JCPOA. A lack of authorities. Obviously, the IAEA activities will depend a significant 

degree on the cooperation of the Iranian state. Thirdly, while they 

have focused virtually all of their resources to pursue the JCPOA, 

they are going to have very little resources. They turn away from 

other proliferators and potential proliferators. And, finally, among 

other items, the IAEA’s own estimates identified the need for approximately $10 million per year, for 15 years, over and above its 

present budget. 

So it is an agency that is understaffed for its purposes, losing 

technical assistance—people are leaving; has now a singular focus, 

which I applaud the focus, but I want them to also pursue other 

proliferators; and a budget that does not have the wherewithal to 

sustain it just for the focus of the JCPOA. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
32 

So should Iran, who violated international norm and international law, ultimately be the entity to pay, since they are now 

flush with money that we have given them or returned to them? 

Should they be the ones to pay for the very essence of the 

verification and monitoring that they caused the need for in the 

first place? 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, you raise a lot, obviously. 

Let me just try to quickly say, on Cuba, first of all, I really appreciate your personal comments, and I am grateful for that. I also 

respect enormously your commitment. You are dedicated when it 

comes to the issue of human rights and freedom, and you have always been very clear about it, with respect to Cuba. We have a difference maybe in the tactics about how to get there, but we do not 

have a difference in the goal. 

It is our sense that we have already seen some improvement in 

empowerment of the Cuban people in the private sector now employing one in four Cubans. It has grown significantly and is growing. And as the flights come in, and more and more people are 

there, there is a transformation taking place. 

Anybody who has been down there and had been there previously has observed this change that is taking place. People in the 

United States can now send unlimited remittances in support of 

private business investment. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And 1,400 arrests. 

Secretary KERRY. I agree. It is not perfect. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I did not really ask you for comments on 

Cuba, which I appreciate. I just want to let you know, for the 

record, how I felt. 

I would like responses to the question of Iran, though. 

Secretary KERRY. Sure. 

With respect to Iran, we believe we are being more than vigilant, 

actually. On January 17, we designated three entities and eight individuals who had provided materials for Iran’s ballistic missile 

program. So we sanctioned people, and we cut them off from the 

U.S. financial system. 

We have continually been tracking the implementation with 

great impact. We had a couple questions about one thing or another. We raised them with the Iranians, and we resolved them in 

a way that kept faith with exactly what should happen. They were 

not malicious. They were just normal kinds of things that had arisen in the course of the process. We are happy to brief Congress. 

I am sure you will be fully briefed on every aspect of that. 

Yes, the IAEA does need more money. We know that. There are 

additional inspectors, however, under our agreement, who will be 

in there, 130 of them. 

And as you know, our Intelligence Community and our Energy 

Department remain absolutely clear that they have the ability to 

be able to verify and track this agreement. 

So the GAO is helpful. I think anybody’s scrutiny that adds some 

choices for what can be done to make sure we are doing this correctly can do so. 

But the bottom line is, we know that they took out—from 19,000 

centrifuges down to 5,060. We know that they took the calandria 

out of the plutonium reactor and destroyed it, filling it with ceVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:15 Aug 10, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\02 23 2016\30-927.T

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
33 

ment. It can never be used again. We know there is no enrichment 

taking place in Fordow, and so forth. 

Senator MENENDEZ. My time is over, well over, so I appreciate 

the chairman’s courtesy. 

My focus was not about the implementation of the JCPOA. It is 

about Iran’s malign activities within the region that—— 

Secretary KERRY. Let me come to that. We are also extremely focused on that. I had a meeting with the GCC a few weeks ago. We 

are meeting again somewhere in the next few weeks. I think we 

have plussed-up our assistance in the billions of dollars in terms 

of sales to them for their ability to be able to push back against 

Iranian activities. 

We have engaged with Iranians on their activities, specifically in 

Yemen. 

And we have high hopes that, over the course of the Syria process, we can begin to deal with the flow of weapons that have been 

coming out of Iran through Damascus into Lebanon and threatening Israel. We are very clear about that, and the threat of 

Hezbollah, and the IRGC’s engagement in various ways. Again, 

some of that should be taken up in a classified session. 

But we believe that the amount of money that has flowed to Iran 

thus far, not because we have interfered with it or something, but 

because it just has not materialized as significantly as a lot of people alleged, is not winding up in some great imbalance in support 

for activities that we object to. 

So there are things going on, obviously. That is why we left in 

place the sanctions on human rights, the sanctions on arms, the 

sanctions on missiles, the sanctions on state sponsors of terror. 

They are all still there, extant, and subject to enforcement. We 

have made that clear, which is why we did designate people because of the missile test that took place. 

So we are very focused on it, Senator, together with our allies 

and, I might add, with Israel. We are constantly sharing information, and I can assure you every country in the region will be as 

diligent as we are in tracking what they are doing. 

The CHAIRMAN. So I get an F on being a traffic cop. I am going 

to try to be better, for the remainder of the time here. I do appreciate the fulsome answers and questions. If we could, we will try 

to stay closer to our time frame. 

With that, Senator Perdue? 

Senator PERDUE. I will try to honor the time, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for your energy and effort. We may 

have disagreed on some of the details of some of the efforts, but 

I respect your effort to represent us diplomatically and solve some 

of these really tough problems around the world. It is a very dangerous world. 

With regard to the budget, which is primarily what I thought we 

were supposed to be talking about today, next week, Senator Kaine 

and I, I will chair and he is ranking member of the subcommittee 

where we will have some of your staff talk about a few more details 

of the State Department’s budget request. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
34 

But I want to note for the record today, the State Department, while it is up 25 percent since 2008, some $12 billion, I recognize 

it is still 1 percent of our total spending. 

I also recognize that the world is a lot more dangerous today. In 

fact, I think we see the world as having two real major crises. One 

is this global security crisis that continues to grow every day. But 

I think when we look at the State Department budget, as well as 

the defense budget, we would be well-positioned to consider it in 

its full perspective. I know you mentioned this in Munich last 

week, where you represented the United States very well, I 

thought. 

But it seems to me that we have interlocking two crises. One is 

the global security crisis on several levels. 

One is the rise of traditional states. China and Russia are ever 

more aggressive. We have these asymmetric threats and terrorists 

from Indonesia now to Algeria, and here at home. We also see nuclear proliferation threats, and honestly cooperation between North 

Korea and Iran, even that continues to date. On top of that, we 

have the cyber warfare dimension that our military is trying to 

adapt to, and I know you organization is trying to adapt to. And 

what we do not talk a lot about is the growing arms race in space. 

So, I mean, this is a very complicated world right now. 

Interlocked with that, though, is our own debt crisis, our own intransigence here threatens our ability to fund the needs that we 

have. I am coming to a specific question about Europe. 

Before I get to that, I would just like to ask you a quick question 

about Iran. 

Originally, we were told the number that they would be given over a period of time was somewhere between $100 billion and 

$150 billion. Then the administration came back and said, well, we 

think it is closer to $50 billion in terms of what they can get. There 

are some balance sheet issues that they have access to, but cash 

is about $50 billion. We have heard Iranian officials talk recently 

about it being an excess of $100 billion. 

Do we have an update on what that number is, quickly? 

Secretary KERRY. It is below the $50 billion. 

Senator PERDUE. Do we have any intelligence on how they are 

using it to date? 

Secretary KERRY. We can talk about that in a classified setting. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you. 

The next question is, General Breedlove in Munich just last week 

described the refugee situation, the migrant situation in Europe, as 

the refugees being weaponized. I know you were there, and I know 

you commented on that. I would love to get your comments, 

though, relative to defense spending in Europe as well under 2 percent. I think for a generation, Europe has looked to the United 

States to be the big brother. And now we see Putin seeing that 

underspending in the military. 

Our spending right now is about 3 percent of our GDP. It is 

about 100 basis points less than our 30-year average or, in today’s 

terms, about $200 billion. I am not suggesting that we need to 

spend $200 billion more. 

But I would like to know what the State Department and your 

strategy is, the administration strategy is, to deal with Putin, in 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
35 

light of these growing dangers from this immigration issue in Europe, particularly in the very susceptible states of Eastern Europe 

that used to be satellites of the Soviet Union all the way up 

through the Baltics. But starting in Greece and go up the refugee 

pipeline, these are very vulnerable states right now. 

What is our strategy to offset Putin and deal with the growing 

threat to these very fragile governments? 

Secretary KERRY. Our strategy is to support them to a much 

greater degree. We have the NATO assurance program that is in 

place. We have put very significant effort into larger numbers of rotating training and troops and equipment in the region. 

In addition, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I think our expenditure last year was about $700 million or something. We are 

taking it up to $3.4 billion or $3.5 billion in assistance to the frontline states, in order to make it very, very clear that we are there, 

and to support Ukraine, in addition to that. It is a very significant 

amount. It is about $1.6 billion, I think it is. 

So we are making it very clear that we are there to help. 

Now, the weaponization issue is a serious one. I think we have 

seen the dial get turned up and turned out, I might add, not only 

by Russia. So, again, in a classified session, I would be happy to 

talk about that a little bit. 

But I think it is imperative for us, as I said earlier, to be prepared to do more with respect to helping Europe be able to withstand this onslaught. You really cannot overstate the impact politically of the potential of another million refugees. 

Senator PERDUE. Do you think Europe can take another million? 

Secretary KERRY. No. I think it is not doable. I think that would 

have profoundly negative, dramatic—— 

Senator PERDUE. I know you also heard people in Munich just 

last week talk about the growing refugee crisis from the sub-Saharan area as well, and the crisis in Egypt right now. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, 50 percent of the people going in are not 

from Syria. They are coming from Bangladesh. They are coming 

from Pakistan, Afghanistan. They are coming from Africa. So it is 

a major challenge to the very nature of the European Union. 

Senator PERDUE. Some of us visited Serbia, and about 60 percent 

coming in through that pipeline are male, young male under 35, 

and only about 17 percent women, and the balance, 20 percent or 

so, were children. A good number of those were from Afghanistan, 

coming through the Greece and Macedonia pipeline. 

Secretary KERRY. Right. 

Senator PERDUE. Let me ask one other question. I am about out 

of time, but I would like to go back to North Korea. 

Director of National Intelligence Clapper just this year commented that, and I will quote this, ‘‘Pyongyang’s export of ballistic 

missiles and associated materials to several countries, including 

Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syrian construction of a nuclear reactor, illustrate North Korea’s willingness to proliferate 

dangerous technology.’’ 

We know that, in 2006, 2009, 2013, Iranian officials reportedly 

participated and were there during those nuclear tests. 

Do you have anything you can tell us about what the State Department is doing and the administration is doing to monitor that 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
36 

cooperation, and any potential violations of the JCPOA in terms of 

nuclear cooperation between those two countries? 

Secretary KERRY. Yes. At this point in time, we do not assess 

that there is a violation. But we have in place restrictions under 

the U.N. Security Council resolutions to be able to act, if there are. 

Director Clapper is on target, and he is accurate. We agree with 

that assessment, and we are working very closely to address that. 

I think we are on the verge of having an agreement, hopefully, 

with China. In fact, I am meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister this afternoon. We are very hopeful. We know we have made 

progress in the negotiations in New York in coming up with a substantial and improved U.N. Security Council resolution with respect to what we will do as a result of these activities. 

So we are taking both national steps and multilateral steps. We 

have entered conversations with South Korea on the THAAD missile deployment, THAAD defensive system deployment. And we obviously have other options available to us. 

But this does not interfere with the JCPOA. It is separate from 

it. But we are nevertheless going to take these actions. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Udall? 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Kerry, let me echo what others have said about your 

excellent service around the world, and all you are doing to try to 

bring peace to many of these difficult regions. 

I am glad you mentioned Roberta Jacobson in your opening. I 

think other Senators have mentioned her here. I have worked with 

her extensively. I think she is a very capable career State Department person. As you said, she does not make the policy about 

Cuba, so if you are objecting to the policy, it does not make any 

sense to hold up her nomination. I went down last week to the Senate floor to offer her name in consent, and it was objected to. 

I can just tell you, she is nominated for Mexico, to be Ambassador to Mexico. This has a real impact on my State. The State of 

New Mexico borders with Mexico. We have dramatic trade that is 

going on, in the last 15 years. It started at about $7.5 million. Now 

it is up to about $1.2 billion. We have all sorts of cooperative kinds 

of things we work with Mexico on at the State level. 

So I am just wondering, from your perspective, what is the impact of not having an ambassador to Mexico and recognizing that, 

Secretary Kerry, this has been vacant for 6 months. This is one of 

our very, very strong trading partners. Could you speak to that? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Senator, thank you. And thank you for 

your support of that effort. 

Look, everybody here knows you all interact with our ambassadors when you go over to these other countries. They spend a 

lifetime in service to our country, gaining skills over 20 and 30 

years, and there is a reason we send them to the countries we send 

them to. It is because they are particularly suited to helping us advance America’s interests, to build a relationship, to help to explain 

our values and choices. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
37 

But in this world right now, particularly, notwithstanding instant communication, and email, and the way in which we can 

communicate directly Foreign Minister to Foreign Minister, having 

an ambassador on the ground who builds relationships, who knows 

the people in the government, who understands their difficulties, 

who has a sense of the politics of that particular country, helps us 

to be able to get our policy implemented. 

Here we are. We just had a North American security dialogue in 

Canada the other day, with the Foreign Minister of Mexico, the 

Foreign Minister of Canada, and myself. We have a huge North 

American interest. We have energy challenges. We have border 

challenges. We have narcotics trafficking. We have violence. We 

have the challenge of Mexico’s help to help us prevent the flow of 

those children coming out of Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, 

coming up through Mexico into the United States last year, and so 

forth. I mean, you can run a long list. Counterterrorism. 

The need we have on a daily basis to have our Nation properly 

represented by an ambassador is absolutely critical. 

We are just hurting ourselves, and we make ourselves look silly, 

frankly. 

And we insult the country that does not get the person. They are 

sitting there saying, what is this? Punishment for something we 

did or did not do? And they do not sort of understand this process. 

So I spent years and years up here, as you all know. We usually 

got to the point where we could have a vote. Not one Senator or 

two Senators or rolling holds between three Senators preventing 

the country from doing what the country needs to do. 

I would hope that we just have a vote, and let democracy decide 

whether or not the Senate will say that Roberta Jacobson should 

go to Mexico and help us with all these issues. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

I would applaud Senator Corker. He has tried to move these 

nominees forward. What has ended up happening is they get 

bogged down on the floor. 

I would like to shift to another area that you just mentioned, because it is an area that we also work with Mexico on, and that is 

the vexing and problematic situation in Central America. 

This is having an impact on my State of New Mexico, because 

we have many unaccompanied minors who are staying at Holloman 

Air Force Base. The real central question here is, with these three 

countries in Central America—you have drug-fueled violence, you 

have corrupt governments, you have very weak governments—how 

are we going to move ourselves into a better situation so that migration does not happen? That is what I am very concerned about. 

We, in this budget deal, as you are very aware, helped significantly in terms of State Department funding for Central America 

and for these three countries. 

So I would like you to discuss any progress that has been made 

to date with respect to implementing the U.S. strategy for engagement in Central America. Has there been any change in migration 

patterns that could be attributed to this effort, which we are undertaking? Would the funding requested for 2017 be used differently 

from previously appropriated funds for the region? And how long 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
38 

do you think we are going to have to work on this to really make 

an impact? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, we are going to have to work for a fair 

number of years, Senator. As you recall, we just were able to celebrate 15 years of Plan Colombia. 

I remember in this room when we passed Plan Colombia, $1 billion, and a lot of people were wondering, for one country, over a 

10-year period, what that was going to do. I think it saved the 

country, together with the country’s commitment itself and its leaders to try to stand up to the narcotraffickers who back then were 

destroying the nation. 

Today, Colombia is one of the strongest countries in all of Latin 

America, and doing an amazing job, in many, many respects. 

So these investments are critical. That is what the administration has decided to do and is doing with respect to a number of 

countries, not just El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, but also 

Belize, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panama. We are working with all of 

them to try to address the causes of these folks sending their kids 

into danger and trying to come into the United States. 

It has to do violence, violence against young people. It has to do 

with narcotics trafficking. It has to do with lack of opportunity, 

education, health, and other ingredients. 

So we have found that what really does make a difference is to 

help these countries to be able to help themselves, and that helps 

us. So we are engaged in a major effort to try to professionalize the 

law enforcement, to reduce the illicit trafficking, to reduce the 

smuggling, the transnational organized crime, the gangs. 

I think we have $750 million we have asked for. It is a down 

payment on the full $1 billion-plus we want to put into this. And 

$359 million of that is for bilateral assistance, and $390 million is 

regional assistance for the things that I just talked about. 

I am convinced, if we follow through on that, this is going to reduce the numbers of people trying to come to the United States, 

cross the border. And it will significantly, in the long term, 

strengthen those countries and our relationships with them. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Paul? 

Senator PAUL. Thank you for your testimony. 

I continue to believe that one of the greatest threats our country 

faces is the accumulation of debt. We borrow about $1 million a 

minute. We have given away over $300 billion in foreign aid over 

the last 10 years. During those 10 years, we have accumulated over 

$10 trillion in debt. 

Now, some would say, well, it is only 1 percent of the budget. It 

is not a big deal. Actually, if you cut 1 percent of the budget each 

year over about a 5 year-period, you actually balance your budget 

within 5 years, so the savings does add up. 

The other thing I think in thinking about this is that most of us 

give privately to charities or to our church. And most of us would 

think it would be absurd to go to the bank and borrow money to 

give to your church. You give out of your surplus or out of your 

earnings, but you do not give out of borrowed money. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
39 

I think it is equally absurd for a country to borrow money from 

China to send to Pakistan. It sort of defies any common sense. 

The other argument, though, is whether or not it actually works, 

whether the money, if you say, ‘‘Gosh, it is so valuable. We borrowed this money and we are going further into debt, but it works.’’ 

But there is quite a bit of evidence that maybe it does not work. We plowed $1 trillion into Iraq, and Iraq has treated their liberation that we granted them with falling into the arms of Iran. You 

could make the argument they are closer allies with Iran than they 

are with us. They do not seem to do what we ask them to do with 

regard to making their army more national and less sectarian. 

They brought some of the Sunni uprising upon themselves, against 

our wishes. 

In Egypt over the last 10 years, we have given them $60 billion. 

Some estimate as much as half of that was stolen by the Mubarak 

family. Even liberal institutions such as the New York Times have 

reported as much as 50 percent to 70 percent of foreign aid is stolen. 

Chairman Corker has mentioned the duplicitous nature of Pakistan, who I think at best can be described as a frenemy, sometimes 

friend, sometimes enemy, but really ‘‘duplicitous’’ is probably the 

best way to put it. We have given them $15 billion over the last 

10 years. 

I do not think I will convince you, but I think the American people are convinced, that we do not have the money to be sending 

money all around the world when our infrastructure here is falling 

down, our country is struggling. We just simply do not have the 

money, and it makes no sense to borrow it. 

I do not think I will convince you on any of those points, so I 

would rather ask you a specific question about Syria. 

Do you think it would make any difference if, instead of demanding as a precondition Assad leaving, the demand were something 

more like an internationally monitored election within a certain period of time? Is that something that has already been offered up 

as a possibility? And what is your best guess as to whether Russia 

or Syria might treat that as more of a possibility of a starting 

point, if it were an election at some sort of predetermined date? 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, thanks for your comment on the general issue of aid. I would like to come back to it, just for a moment, 

but let me answer your specific question. 

Russia and Iran have accepted the idea of an internationally 

monitored, highest standard election in which even the diaspora 

can vote. So they are already there. That is, in fact, part of the 

laydown in the United Nations Security Council and in the agreement. 

The problem is that the opposition will not accept the idea of 

Assad running in an election, because they just do not have confidence it will—— 

Senator PAUL. Can I just make one quick interjection? 

The opposition is going to have to accept something. With Russia’s backing, Assad is not going anywhere. He has the upper hand 

now. 

So we are the ones supplying the opposition. We need to tell 

them they are going to have to accept something. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
40 

Secretary KERRY. Well, we will see. A negotiated settlement of a 

war requires compromise by everybody. The opposition has already 

compromised in significant ways to come to the table. 

But if you cannot end the war with Assad running, is it really 

worth destroying an entire country and region over one man who 

simply thinks his being there is more important than anything 

else? The question is whether or not, over the course of this process, people will come to their senses and understand—I mean, four 

words, could end this war. ‘‘I will not run.’’ You could immediately 

move to resolve all of the other issues in a very significant way. 

So I think the opposition and everybody believes Assad cannot 

unite the country. You cannot end the war. I said this earlier—— 

Senator PAUL. I know, but do you not think the opposition’s position has greatly weakened over the last year, and they really do 

not have the strength? They are one of 1,500 groups. The opposition we support will not exist without our support, basically. They 

are being overrun as we speak in the areas north of Aleppo. 

Secretary KERRY. The opposition has fought fiercely, and they 

continue to fight. And they continue to push back against the odds 

of aircraft bombing them, and so forth. 

I think that President Putin has to understand what everybody 

in the region understands, which is that this war cannot end if 

Russia wants to sit there and fight the jihadis. That can be, obviously, their choice. I do not think that is what they want to do. 

Senator PAUL. But I think, if you were to think about it, the 

whole disaster of this war and the mass migration and the killing 

and all that has gone on, if you could accept the end of the war 

with an election in a year and Assad might or might not run in 

the year, that to me is a victory to end the war. 

I mean, sure, he is a terrible guy, but the Middle East is full of 

them, you know? Half the countries over there have despots, you 

know? So the thing is that I do not have any love lost for him, but 

there are also 2 million Christians that would choose Assad over 

the opposition probably, you know? 

So the thing is that I think if you could negotiate something— 

negotiating is giving. If our position and the rest of the world’s position is that Assad has to go, you have seen where it is going. It 

is not going anywhere. 

Secretary KERRY. The United States cannot impose on people 

who have lived there under these bonds and starvation and torture. 

You cannot impose on them the notion that they have to live with 

the guy who did all these things to them. That is the fight. 

We do not have the ability, nor should we, to impose it on them. 

This has to be a Syrian-resolved process. 

Senator PAUL. But they only exist with our support. 

Secretary KERRY. I do not think so. I think that they would exist 

otherwise. They exist to greater degree, but we did not create them 

out of whole cloth. This revolution in Syria began when Assad attacked young kids who went out into the square to demonstrate for 

jobs and for a future. When their parents went out, he attacked 

them. That was the beginning of this, and everybody knows it. 

So we are where we are, and we have to try to find it. 

Let me come back just to the point you made. You know, we 

would not disagree on everything you said, because there are 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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places where money has been stolen. There are places where it has 

not been well-spent. Our job is, obviously, always to find out why 

that has happened and to prevent it from ever happening again. 

But all in all, if you look at the vast majority of countries that 

we are engaged with, and the nature of the world today, Senator, 

I just have to tell you that if we were not doing the development 

work we are doing, if we were not helping kids to get educated, if 

we were not providing some support for the development of health 

care capacity, apart from the humanitarian notion of that, there is 

enormous developmental return on that investment. 

For the United States, I am convinced more than ever—I have 

seen this now for the 3-years-plus I have been Secretary—it makes 

a difference, a huge difference to the standards of behavior, to the 

values that those people adopt, to the willingness of countries to 

join together to fight Ebola, to deal with AIDS, to fight—— 

Senator PAUL. I guess you could also make the argument that 

our support for someone like Mubarak leads to a reaction of antiAmericanism. When they see teargas shells made in Pennsylvania 

that we buy that he suppresses his crowds with, you can see that 

the reaction is not always a pleasant one for America. 

Secretary KERRY. That is correct, and there have always been 

imbalances and difficulties in some of the choices that we have 

made. I do not disagree with you about Iraq. There are a lot of 

problems in Iraq. 

But right now, we have a challenge, which is to try to save Iraq 

and help Iraq save itself from Daesh. And it is in everybody’s interest. Every country in the region wants to destroy Daesh. So we 

need to do that. 

I think there are a lot of ways. We are still the richest country 

in the world. We still have the strongest economy in the world, and 

we will for some years to come, hopefully forever, but, certainly, as 

we see a rising China, there is a time when automatically, by virtue of size and people, its economy will be larger. Whether it is 

stronger is a different question. 

But I would say to you that we have a huge imperative here to 

remain deeply engaged, because if we do not, there are too many 

young people out there, too many countries with a population 

under the age of 30 to 35 where you have 60 percent and 70 percent of the country under that age, and if they do not get educated 

and if they do not get job opportunities in this world in which everybody is connected and knows what everybody has and does not 

have, then I fear the evil that will fill their heads and the way in 

which they could get co-opted into enterprises and efforts that are 

very, very dangerous for all of us. 

So we all have a responsibility here to see that and try to do 

something about it, because that is a national security threat to the 

United States of America, as well as to all of our friends and allies. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murphy, is there a timer on your side? 

Senator MURPHY. I do not know. 

The CHAIRMAN. If the former chairman would help the current 

chairman, when it gets toward the end of the time, have less expansive answers. 

Secretary KERRY. I would be delighted, because I have another 

meeting. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murphy, thank you. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will 

try to do my part as well. 

Just quickly, one follow-up on this analogy that Senator Paul 

was making, regarding how a family may not borrow money in 

order to make a charitable contribution to their church. I think for 

a lot of us that is not what we view these investments in foreign 

aid. We view them as integral to our national security policy as the 

investments we are making in the submarines and jet engines and 

helicopters that we produce in Connecticut. So this is not something that we are doing out of goodwill. This is part and parcel of 

a broader national security strategy. 

Second, the overview that you began with, the U.S. and the State 

Department engaged in more places in the world than ever before, 

squares with the reality that a lot of people believe exists, which 

is a world that is more chaotic than ever before. The truth of the 

matter is, as you have pointed out, the number of people across the 

world who are dying from acts of violence, who are dying as a result of war, is actually declining and has been declining for a long 

time. 

It speaks to our ability to find ways out of conflicts other than 

war, something we have not been so good at in the past that we 

are much better at today. So I just say that as a means of congratulating you on a number of seminal diplomatic achievements 

that are important in and of themselves, the text in the agreements, whether it be the Iran nuclear agreement, the climate 

change agreement, or the ceasefire. But they also remind people all 

around the world of the gains that the been achieved, the lives that 

have been saved, because we figured out over time that, as important as it is to have a strong military, it is much more important 

to take chances, to take risks on diplomacy. More of them pan out 

than do not pan out, which brings me to a question. 

You have, in this budget, a near doubling of funding for CVE, for 

countering violent extremism. That is a smart investment. I know 

you would want to spend more, if you could, because we are cutting 

off the roots of extremism before it gets to the branches. A smart 

strategy. 

But here is my worry. My worry is that the impact of these funding increases are going to be blotted out by the advantage that accrues to extremist groups by virtue of this widening proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the region and, certainly, playing 

out, to an extent, in Syria. But I want to ask you about our policy 

in Yemen today. 

There is a BBC story today that says, ‘‘Yemen conflict: Al Qaeda 

joins coalition battle for Taiz.’’ The underlying analysis is that, increasingly, there is some pretty deep integration between elements 

of Al Qaeda and elements of the coalition, a coalition that does include the United States, not on the ground, but in terms of support 

that we have given for the Saudi air campaign. 

And as I read the conflict in Yemen, I have a hard time figuring 

out what the U.S. national security interests are, given the fact 

that the result of the coalition campaign has been to kill a lot of 

civilians, has been to sow the seeds of humanitarian crisis, and to 

create space for these groups, these very extremist groups that we 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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claim to be our priority in the region, to grow, whether it be ISIS 

or Al Qaeda in Yemen. 

So I just wanted to ask about the future of the U.S. involvement 

on the Saudi side of this conflict in Yemen, and just talk to us 

about why we should continue to fund munition requests from the 

Saudi Government that end up in that fight? 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, a good question. The answer is very 

straightforward. The Saudis are part of our coalition, part of our 

GCC link to pushing back against nefarious activities in the region. 

And the Saudis were threatened very, very directly by the combination of the Houthi and some Iranian input. As a result, they felt 

they had to defend themselves, and we supported their right to do 

that. 

Now, we are urging them very strongly to get to the table and 

to negotiate a resolution to this. We believe that there is a certain 

ripeness to that, and it would be better for everybody if we were 

able to achieve that. 

Now, there are some complications with it, obviously. You have 

former President Saleh, who has made life difficult in this whole 

process. We are working with the Omanis, the Saudis, and with the 

Emiratis, and other friends in the region, to try to see if we can 

now get back to the table. The U.N. is engaged, as you know. There 

are supposed to be talks that will take place shortly. Our hope is 

that this can end. 

A lot of civilians have, unfortunately, been impacted, as a consequence of what has been going on. 

I think the heart of the matter is that we are urging diplomacy 

at this moment to try to see if we can bring this to a close. I think 

it would be in everybody’s interest if that were to happen. It would 

also provide a capacity to be able to focus more on Daesh and get 

the forces that are there that have been distracted from the Daesh 

effort realigned and refocused. 

Senator MURPHY. I think at the root of your answer is that the 

alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia requires us 

to come to their aid when they feel threatened. I guess my pitch 

is that I hope that that would not be the default proposition, if this 

proxy war widens in the region. I think it, frankly, provides incentive and impotence for the proxy war to widen, if the Saudis know 

that wherever they go, the U.S. is very close behind. And the more 

this proxy war cedes, the more room there is for these groups to 

grow. 

Secretary KERRY. There is a distinction between a proxy war, as 

you describe it, and the threat that the Saudis faced as a consequence of what was happening right in their neighborhood, right 

on their border, and across their border. 

So we chose to support that. We would not be supporting a 

longer sort of proxy kind of effort. That is one of the reasons why 

I say to you we think it is important now to get to the table and 

negotiate. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Barrasso? 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, it is nice to see you again. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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The American people are facing significant issues here at home, a tight budgetary environment. And you are requesting $1.3 billion 

for the Global Climate Change Initiative. 

As legislators, we are constantly searching to find the resources 

to help many people around the country, communities who are 

dealing with unemployment, with aging water systems, with poor 

roads, substandard hospitals, failing schools. So how do we talk to 

people at home and say that the real priority of the administration 

is sending 1.3 billion taxpayer dollars overseas to international bureaucrats in the name of climate change, rather than dealing with 

these issues at home? 

Secretary KERRY. Very simple answer. The American people are 

extremely practical, enormous common sense about things that affect them. You pick up the newspaper today, and you read about 

the flooding that people are suffering directly as a result of climate 

change. That flooding costs those taxpayers money. We spent billions of dollars last year. It was $8 billion, I think, 

in reaction to storms in the United States, which are of greater intensity as a result, according to the scientists, of the impacts of climate change. We are actually—— 

Senator BARRASSO. So Barbara Boxer, a member of this committee, would agree with that. But I am saying, why are we not 

spending the money here? She says climate change is an issue related to wildfire and drought, storms. So it is $1.3 billion—— 

Secretary KERRY. We are spending some of it here. 

Senator BARRASSO. The question is, why are we not spending it 

here rather than sending it overseas to bureaucrats? 

Secretary KERRY. Because there are 20 major nations in the 

world that account for the vast majority—the majority, put it that 

way, because less-developed countries are now growing in their 

emissions as a result of their own developing practices. 

But the result is, if we do not help some of these countries that 

have no money, that are burning coal without any kind of restraint 

on how they burn it, we, regrettably, are also going to suffer. So 

it is in our self-interest to help these countries to make better 

choices about what they their energy future is going to be. 

It also, by the way, opens up jobs for Americans, because we are 

the most advanced, with respect to most of those energy technologies. So we could be actually creating more jobs for Americans, 

as a result of getting countries to invest more thoughtfully in their 

energy future. 

But they cannot afford to do it on their own. So what we are 

doing is actually helping people to make a transition to a clean-energy future, which is good for everybody. 

There will be $50 trillion, Senator, spent on the whole gamut of 

energy choices in the next 20 to 30 years. Those are jobs for people 

all over the world. This is going to be the single biggest market the 

world has ever seen. 

So I think this is an extremely smart investment in our security, 

as well as in our economy. And I think when Americans are presented that choice, Americans are—in fact, they already are—overwhelmingly in support of our doing something about climate 

change. 

Senator BARRASSO. I want to switch to Syria. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
45 

During your confirmation hearing in January 2013, you were 

asked about the situation in Syria. You stated, every day that goes 

by, it gets worse. 

I specifically asked you about Putin’s support of Assad in Syria. 

At the time of your confirmation hearing, there were more than 

60,000 individuals estimated to have been killed in the crisis in 

Syria. The estimate this past weekend is that it is now up to 

470,000 Syrians killed in the crisis in Syria. So that is since the 

day of your confirmation hearings to now. The numbers were in 

The Economist and international surveys on this. That is about 300 

more killed every day over the last 3 years. 

So Russia continues to support the Assad regime. It is now 

bombing civilians and opposition groups in Syria. Putin is attempting to change the battlefield dynamic to bolster the Assad regime, 

to weaken the opposition, in terms of anything related to peace. 

His support of the Assad regime includes bombing civilians, bombing opposition groups. 

The current edition of The Economist article is entitled, ‘‘Vladimir Putin’s war in Syria: Why would he stop now?’’ It says, both 

of Aleppo’s main hospitals were systematically destroyed by Russian airstrikes last year. Nobody should be surprised that, despite 

signing the agreement, Russia would continue its airstrikes against 

those it regards as terrorists, which they then point out is an elastic term for President Putin. 

Today’s New York Times editorial, ‘‘Relying Again on an Unreliable Mr. Putin.’’ It says with Putin, a ceasefire to him is a tactic, 

even a smokescreen, not a goal. The Economist says the only puzzle is what John Kerry, America’s Secretary of State, thought he 

could achieve through his agreement with Mr. Lavrov. 

So, I would say, after decimating opponents of the Assad regime 

with its bombing, Russia has now made a joint statement with the 

U.S. that it will agree to a cessation of hostilities February 27. 

To me, the only thing Russia has been consistent with is failing 

to keep its word. 

Specifically, what consequences do you support imposing upon 

Russia if it violates the ceasefire agreement and it is just a smokescreen or some kind of charade? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, in answer to the question, what does 

John Kerry think he could achieve? 

Senator BARRASSO. And the consequences for Russia, if they do 

violate. 

Secretary KERRY. Right. 

My job, the job of everybody in the State Department, is to try 

to—war is the absence or failure of diplomacy. And our job is to 

try to see if there is a way to bring this to an end. I am not sitting 

here naively vouching for the fact that this is going to work. But 

the alternative is that I sit in my office and I go visit a bunch of 

countries while the war rages on, and nobody makes an effort to 

stop it. That is the alternative. 

You would be criticizing me if I was doing that. You would be 

saying, why are you not doing something to end the war? Why is 

there not diplomacy to try to find a solution? 

Now, it is a well-known fact that I have also advocated for strong 

efforts to support the opposition, strong efforts to make sure we 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
46 

have the leverage that we need to be able to achieve something. 

And there is a significant discussion taking place now about plan 

B in the event that we do not succeed at the table. 

So, look, put yourself in President Putin’s shoes. Yes, he can drop 

bombs, and he can move the battlefield, and he has changed it for 

Assad. No question about it. He has had a better impact for Assad. 

But is that going to end the war? The answer is no. 

I think President Putin is smart enough to understand that if he 

just sits there over a period of time, those people who have supported the opposition will get different weapons, more weapons, 

and they will continue this fight. And you can wind up with a Syria 

that is utterly destroyed without a capacity to put it back together 

again, which we have today. 

That has happened before. The Roman historian Tacitus wrote 

about Carthage, ‘‘They make a desert and call it peace.’’ 

So you can make a desert in the desert and call it what you 

want. But I am telling you, this war will not end with Assad there. 

It just will not end as long as Assad is there. 

So President Putin can bring in more. He can start additional 

bombing. But I assure you that, because of the sectarian nature of 

this, if he thinks he is going to be better off fighting on behalf of 

a dictator who has driven most of his people out of the country or 

into refugee status, killed a bunch of them, if he thinks he is going 

to be better off supporting Hezbollah and the IRGC and Iran and 

Assad against an increasingly sectarian divide that is defined by 

Shia and Sunni, that is a very, very dangerous—— 

Senator BARRASSO. I am over my time, Mr. Secretary, but it does 

seem that there are no consequences for Putin’s violation of a 

ceasefire. I have not heard one from you with regard to this administration. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, there are a number of things being talked 

about right now. I do not think it is the moment to be throwing— 

I think it is out there, and people know what they are. But I think 

this is a moment to try to see whether or not we can make this 

work, not to find ways to preordain its failure and start talking 

about all the downsides of what we are going to do afterward. 

Senator BARRASSO. U.N. Ambassador Samantha Powers this past 

year talked about all of the failures of Russia to—all the violations 

of Russia with ceasefires in Ukraine. It just seems we are seeing 

this picture again. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, let us see if we do, and then let us see 

what plan B is or is not, if that is what it takes. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Before going to Senator Kaine, I have had terse words with the 

Secretary in public before, and it is not my job, certainly, today to 

defend him. I think ever since August, September 2013, when we 

did not take the actions that this committee authorized against 

Syria, Russia and others have known we are not going to do those 

things to cause there to be a price. 

I think that the Secretary is negotiating in a situation where 

there is no plan B. Russia knows there will be no plan B. 

So in spite of his energetic efforts, unless the other side knows 

that there will be consequences—we know there are not going to 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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be under this President. Secretary Kerry probably knows there are 

not going to be. And Russia knows that there are not going to be 

any consequences. And that is what makes it difficult, I think. 

Secretary KERRY. That would be, actually, Senator—I appreciate, 

honestly, I appreciate your comments. But it would be a mistake 

for anybody to calculate that President Obama is not going to decide that, if this does not work, there are not another set of options. 

I just do not buy that. 

I think anybody who presumes that is misjudging this President 

and his record of making tough decisions and doing what is necessary. The President’s first choice is to try to see if this can be 

resolved diplomatically. It is my first choice. It is the first choice 

of the security team. But there are plenty of people who are thinking about, okay, if it does not work, then what, including the President of the United States who has the responsibility to make that 

choice. 

But anybody who thinks that there is impunity for just violating 

this and going forward is making a grave mistake, in my judgment. 

The CHAIRMAN. We have been thinking about it for 2.5 years. 

Senator Kaine? 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. I am way late for a meeting I was 

supposed to be at. I am going to save my questions for the Budget 

Committee hearing that we are going to have in subcommittee next 

week. 

Let me just offer a statement to you, Mr. Secretary. 

As a member of this committee, but really just as a citizen, we 

owe you a huge debt of thanks. 

As a Senator, you have played a major part in unfreezing three 

frozen relationships the United States has had bilaterally. 

As a Senator, working with Senator McCain, you unfroze a very 

painful relationship between the United States and Vietnam. There 

was controversy associated with that, and it could have failed. 

There was no guarantee it would work, but you played a major 

leadership role in doing that. 

Now, as Secretary of State, you played a major leadership role 

in taking two other relationships the United States has had that 

have been frozen, with Iran and Cuba, and putting them into a 

new chapter. Again, there is no guarantee that diplomacy works, 

but I think our experience shows that there is a guarantee that the 

lack of engagement fails. 

It will be a long time before we will know the outcome of Cuba 

and Iran and the work that you have done diplomatically, just like 

it took a number of years for us to realize a path forward with 

Vietnam, where they are now begging us to be their security partner, begging us to be their trade partner. That was not obvious 

when you did what you did back in the early 1990s, yet that has 

been a path of progress, where even though we saw challenges with 

Vietnam, no one wants to go backward and go back to frozen relationship. 

I am not a historian, but if I think about what I know of American diplomacy, there have been achievements. Roosevelt brokering 

the end of the Russo-Japanese War, that was an achievement. Truman and Marshall and the Marshall Plan, that was an achieveVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:15 Aug 10, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\02 23 2016\30-927.T

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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ment. The Nixon opening to China, that was an achievement. The 

Northern Ireland Accords, that was an achievement. 

But I think the work that you have done on these three very 

tough, historically problematic and challenging relationships, working with Senator McCain and others, with the strong encouragement of President Obama, who cares about diplomacy, thanks 

goodness, I think it will rank in the very top ranks of American 

diplomatic achievements. 

Again, no guarantees of success, but the absence of diplomatic effort is almost a guarantee of failure. I just want to thank you for 

that. 

I will save my budget questions for next week. 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you. I do not have as broad of a perspective 

to provide thanks to you as Senator Kaine did, but I, certainly, appreciate your tireless efforts to promote American values around 

the world. 

I actually want to bring it back to a minute matter, as opposed 

to broad strategy. I think you have been very supportive of the special immigrant visa program, which has been designed to help 

those people who helped us on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

I think you may be aware that Senator McCain and Senator 

Reed from the Armed Services Committee and I sent you and Secretary Johnson a letter 2 weeks ago, asking you to reconsider the 

department’s initial interpretation of the language from last year’s 

defense authorization bill, because I believe the department’s initial reading of that language was inconsistent with what our intent 

was when we passed that bill, that we have disqualified many Afghans applicants who really worked to serve this country and 

should not be disqualified because they face serious threats if they 

are disqualified. 

So I do not know if you have any update on where the department is on this, but I would urge you to take a hard look and reconsider the initial interpretation. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, we could not agree with you more, Senator. And thank you for your ongoing concern about this. 

We share that concern. We do not want people who had already 

received chief of mission approval before September of last year to 

suddenly be caught up in this change inadvertently. That would be 

grossly unfair and dangerous, obviously. 

So two things. One, we are reviewing it in the legal department, 

and we are trying to see whether or not in fact the law can be interpreted in a way that we can just make it happen appropriately. 

If that did not work or does not work, then we are going to work 

with you very clearly to quickly legislate a change that remedies 

this inadvertent problem. 

But I agree with you. We just do not want people treated that 

way. And it would be a gross miscarriage of justice, if that happened. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

To stay on the subject of immigration, I think one of the most 

horrible outcomes of the civil war in Syria has been the refugee criVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:15 Aug 10, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\02 23 2016\30-927.T

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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sis that has been created by that, and the implications not just for 

Syria, for the Middle East, for so many of our allies, for Europe. 

And they have highlighted a growing refugee crisis around the 

world that is getting worse, not getting better. I was surprised to 

see that the budget reduces the migration and refugee assistance, 

and the international disaster assistance accounts, in the budget. 

Given the crisis that we are facing, it is hard for me to understand 

the rationale for that, so can you speak to that? 

Secretary KERRY. I think we feel as if we have, first of all, the 

money in the pipeline. But, secondly, I think we do not have a way 

of predicting exactly what the demand is going to be. We just committed another $925 million to deal directly with the refugee crisis. 

I think $600 million and some directly for aid, and then the difference would be for education and relocation, and so forth. 

But our sense is that, if we do not have enough, we are obviously 

going to have to come back and discuss that with you. But I think 

in the OCO, we have an ability to have some flexibility. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Since you mentioned it—— 

Secretary KERRY. That is one of the reasons it is a double-edged 

sword. We do not like OCO, because it got in the way of the budget 

baseline, and I agree with that. On the other hand, it gives us 

some flexibility to be able to respond to these kinds of crises. And 

there have been more of them, which is why OCO has sort of 

evolved the way it has. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And I appreciate that. But put me in the column with Senators Cardin and Corker that says that is not the 

way we ought to be solving our budget problems. 

Let me go to the EU because I mentioned the threat that has 

been posed by the Syrian refugees to the EU. It is obviously facing 

probably more threats than at any time since World War II, given 

Russian aggression in Ukraine, and other countries on the eastern 

border of the EU, given the threat from further terrorist attacks, 

the potential exit of the U.K. from the European Union. 

So can you talk a little bit about how we are trying to respond 

to some of those challenges, and how this budget strengthens our 

ability to do that, and what more we can do to support Europe? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, the first thing we have done most recently was agree to work with them on the NATO deployment, in 

order to try to prevent the flow of refugees coming across. We are 

talking with them now about what further extensions of the European border may or may not be needed in an effort to deal with 

this. I think the President is even having some discussions about 

that today. 

As I said earlier, we have plussed-up our budget to all of the 

frontline states. And in many ways, they are frontline with respect 

to this movement of refugees. 

In addition to that, we just pledged the $925 million I talked 

about in London for the refugees. 

But one of the things that has motivated our policy, Senator, has 

been this notion that we are the world’s largest donor. We are at 

$5.1 billion now, and this thing can keep on going, and we can keep 

writing a check. But we do not want to. What we would rather do 

is try to push forward on this other front to see if we cannot get 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
50 

an end to the flow of refugees by the cessation of hostilities and legitimate diplomatic process. 

While I have said again and again here I am not going to vouch 

for the fact that this will work, we have to put it to the test. We 

have no alternative but to test this. With all the cynicism and all 

the doubts that each of us will carry to the table, we have to test 

it. Then we will know. If people are not serious, then that gives you 

a whole different set of choices. 

But that will have the most profound effect of all on Europe, and 

it is the one way, really, to deal with the issue in a more lasting 

and effective way. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. My time is up, and you have been 

here long enough. But I just want to add, as a postscript, that I 

support the efforts to counter violent extremism that the State Department has undertaken. I think that is absolutely critical, as we 

think about how we are going to fight back against terrorism and 

ISIS and other terrorist groups. 

I would hope that we are coordinating with the Department of 

Homeland Security, which has undertaken a new initiative around 

countering violent extremism. So I just would hope that, as the 

State Department is working on this issue, that we are working 

with Homeland Security to make sure that it is a coordinated effort 

across government. 

Secretary KERRY. Yes. We are working very closely with them, 

hand in hand. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Cardin? 

Senator CARDIN. I just want to make a comment. I was listening 

to some of my colleagues comment about U.S. involvement internationally. 

When I first came to the Congress, we could not pass a foreign 

assistance bill. It was just not a popular thing to do. Today, I do 

not think we have any trouble at all, Mr. Secretary, getting the political support for a $50 billion foreign ops appropriation bill based 

upon U.S. involvement globally. That is a credit to involving leadership in our country to explain the importance of our power. 

We are the only country in the world that has the military 

might. And I agree with you. President Obama will use that military might when it is needed, but it should be a matter of last resort. 

We have universal values. These are not American values; these 

are universal values that we are willing to get engaged internationally in order to promote. And we have the ability to accomplish 

some really good things for the world, because we do get involved 

in those issues. 

So I just really wanted to underscore your record, and the 

Obama administration, and what you have been able to do to advance the national security of America. 

We are proud to be your partners here. I think we have had a 

good relationship, and we have been able to get some things done 

together. When we work together, we get more done. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
51 

Secretary KERRY. Let me just thank you. I thank you both. I 

mean, the committee has been just a terrific partner, and we really 

appreciate it. When we came up on the AUMF, you were there. You 

have taken the lead. I appreciate the chair and the ranking member’s relationship. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Listen, we appreciate your indulgence. You have 

been here 2.5 hours. 

On a bipartisan basis, people have extended their appreciation 

for your tremendous effort on behalf of our country. I know the details of the budget we will get more into with staff. But we appreciate your appearance today. We appreciate your work on behalf of 

our country, and I look forward to seeing you in the next setting. 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting is adjourned. If you would answer 

questions, we are going to leave the record open until the close of 

business Thursday. We would appreciate it. 

With that, this hearing is adjourned. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
(53) 

1Prepared for Congress by the GAO and submitted for the hearing record by Senator Robert 

Menendez. 

Additional Material Submitted for the Record 

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION—PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON

IAEA’S ROLE IN VERIFYING THE IRAN AGREEMENT1


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-1.eps
54 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-2.eps

GAO 

Highlights 

__ 

HIQHicJI"'I•OifGAO .__.. IC. .. 11 ••~to 

Why GAO Did This Study 

In July 2015, mullillteral talks wfth Iran 

culm•n•ted In an agreeme-nt called the 

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 

(JCPOA). lhrough whk:lltran 

committed 10 l m.ts on Its nude1r 

prCJV~m on exehlnge for ,.lief 11om .-put In place by 11\o liMed 

Stain end-ne-. -

.._ 

---- (IAEA). en-inlemotoonol ... t_ Energyl>qenq 

... _.,.,. dHigMd"' doted end 

- lhe--ol nuclear material tor nor.-p~aceful putpOH$, was 

reqUHIId 10 mon<tot and venty lran·s 

- .. -. ....... -u.s. Oepenmtnl of State c:oordtnates rhe 

UnKed SlOtH' finonclol and policy 

r~ltJonshlp W11h IAEA 

GAO wu asked to revkow the 

autMrltltl and resources IAEA has to 

carry out tt. activities reg:archng the 

JCPOA On tllo basis of preliminary 

res!Jts of ongoing work that GAO is 

conducting, "'" report PfO"CCe• oi>MMt>Onlon(l)lheJCPOA 

commltflenttlhatiAEA has been 

Hl<ed to venly end "' oulhonl>os ID do 

so. (2) IN ,...,..ceo IAEA hH 

ldol'~l~Md 01 -ISO'Y ID vedy 11\o JCPOA. end (3) _. .. dlaknges 

end~ loCIIOMIAEAendOihers how ldonl<f\ed-,_., ID wnfylng 

lhe JCPOA GAO onolynd the JCPOA 

end key IAEA documents ond 

ln1eiViewed current end fctmefiAEA off-. us govemment o!fiCIIIs, nationll ~tof)' rept&Senlatlves, 

and expens from resean:il~nstrtullons. 

GAO ft nol making recommendabons 

at this time end expects 10 issue a final 

report on lhlt wotl< lltef this year. 

.... GA014>.,.11 fCifMCt•ltlfOtmabOI'I. 

COI'IIildOIWJC rm.tte•~)5t2-384tcw 

II rlt' "QQIIIOOV 

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION 

Preliminary Observations on IAEA's Role in Verifying the Iran Agreement 

What GAO Found 

M outlined In the JCPOA. IAEA was asked to ve-nfy Iran's imptementatlon or 1 

ranoe of nuc,.aNtlated commitmet~ . and IAEA use-s its authorttioes and 

cooclucts additional ventleatlon activities to do $0, according to IAEA. lran't 

commitments tncNde llmttl on uranium en~nt levels and enriched uranium 

Wlventories GAO's pte'lltfllnary obMt'VItions indieilte ~~ IAEA plans to verity 

an slmplementollon of !heM ccmmKments llllough a·-olactivlbls 

conducted by .. Sol<gulfdS ~ronent. ""eh <OS inspeel>ng lror1'1 nu<Mar 

bc:ilibes iiiOCI ~ enYif'OfN'Nntal Qmples, To verify ~n s lmpMmentatiOn of 

.. _,.., .. ,.undo< tho JCPOA.IAEA oll!cials- GAO lhol lhe-usu ib outhonbc_. and ~ .od.-on.l ve-nfi,wt.on ~s -weed 10 by ken 

undo< tho JCPOA. well os ""'""'>r'ng nn·s urarwm,..,.. ond "'*· In 

-...on, unde< tho JCPOA.Iron agreed to~ apply tho- Protocol an agrHmenllhalwllll expand lAEA's accHS, ~ng to toc.Uons 

wt\efe undeclared materials and actMties-4:hose that an IAEA member S&alt ts 

required to, but has not dKlared 4..1'\der it$ i9reements with lAEA-tnly be 

S<1$pe<:ted. Tllo JCPOA oliO Includes a meehanlsm In 'NI>Ieh palllelponto to tho 

agreement commit to retotve en ltceS$ request from the agency wi1Nn 24 deys 

afte-r the request ts made. 

GAO's prellmiMry obtetvatlons lndk:ate lhat tAEA hasldentttled the resources 

necessary to verify the nucletr-relilted commitments in tile JCPOA. IAEA hat 

e.Umated that it needs approximately S 10 mlhfon per year for 15 years In 

add1tional tund.ng above its current safeguards budget for JCPOA v&rifleaOon In 

addition. IAEA plant to transfer 18 exper~nced inspeetort to Its Iran Telk Fotce 

from otMr safeguards divisions and to hite and train addltional inspectors. 

According to tA.EA otfleials. exbtJng nfeguards techntcal resources are aufflc;lent 

1D implement the JCPOA Aecordlng to IAEA documents, ol of IAEA's JCPOA 

wort< through 2016 will be fvndo<flht<MJ9h extra-budgetary conlrib<lbOnS IAEA 

olficlals said that tho agency Intends"'-lholol the SIO milion, 

•PI>"'onattfy SS 7 mollon for al Addobanal Protoeol ac-and Inspector -'1 

a-IDihe JCPOA be fvndo<flhlough IAEA's r09U1M budslet oltM 2016 

GAO's prolominoly -•liOnS indw::ote 11\atiAEA may taee potenbal chohnges 

In rnonitomg end ventytng Iron's implementation olcertoin -.-.ototed commrt:ments ~ 1M JCPOA. Accord~ng 10 currenl and eormti IAEA and U S 

olficiols ond experts, 111 ... potentlal ehailenQes include (I) lntevrotJng JCPOA· 

r&tatM funding ~to ita regular budget and manag~t~g hu-man resource• 1'1 the 

s.afeguards progrem. (2) accesa challenges depending on tran't cooperation and 

the untested JCPOA mechanism to resotve aoeeu requests, and (3) tM Inherent 

challenge of detecting undeclared nuclear materials a.nd acttvlt)et-tuc.h 11 

potential weapcM'It devetopment activities that may not involve nuclear materill 

Aeeordlng to knowle<lgeeble current and fom'ler U.S. government otflclalt. 

detection of undeC&I!'ed material and activities in Iran and wortcfwldelslAEA't 

greatest chatlenge. According to IAEA documents, Iran has pofevioully filled to 

dectare activity to IAEA However. accocdll'lg to a fOC'met IAEA official It wei 11 

eu«ent IAEA and U S govemment otfteials GAO terviewed. IAEA hu Improved 

Its capabilities tn detec1ang undeclared acb'Vrty, such as by ad.aptang Its inspector 

training pcogr am 

____________ uftbdsc.s .. Goo~ef'ftl'l'lotMAc:c•~Oftlc• 
55 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-3.eps

Contents 

Letter 

Appendix I 

Appendix II 

Table 

Background 4 

IAEA Uses Its Authorities to Carry outlls Verification Activities 

under the JCPOA 6 

IAEA Has Identified the Finanaal, Human, and Technical 

Resources Necessary to Venly lhe Nuclear-Related 

Commilments in the JCPOA 10 

Verifying the JCPOA's Nuclear-Related Commitments May 

Present Potential Challenges to tAEA's Safeguards Efforts 12 

Agency Comments 17 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 

Table 1: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Estimates for 

Its Annual Funding Requirements for Joint 

19 

22 

Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Activities 11 

GA0·16-t17 Nucl•at Nonprotiftrltlon 
56 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-4.eps

Abbreviations 

CSA 

DOE 

IAEA 

INFCIRC 

JCPOA 

NNSA 

NPT 

PMD 

TC 

TCF 

UN 

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement 

Department of Energy 

International Atomic Energy Agency 

lnfonnation circular 

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 

National Nuclear Security Administration 

Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons 

Possible Military Dimensions 

Technical Cooperation 

Technical Cooperation Fund 

United Nations 

This is a wotk of the U.S. government and Is not subject to copyright protection In the United State$. The published product may be reproctuoed and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

oopyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

neussary if you wish to reproduce this material sepafatety. 

Page 11 CA0·1&-417 Nuclear NonproU1eratlon 
57 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-5.eps

GAO u.s. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

441 G St. N.W. Washington, DC 20548 

February 12, 2016 

The Honorable Mark Kirk 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on National Security and International Trade and Finance 

Commtttee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Nita Lowey 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Robert Menendez 

United States Senate 

Iran's efforts to develop a nuclear program have threatened regional and 

global security and presented significant challenges to the United States. 

The United States and other nations imposed sanctions on Iran that have 

adversely affected the Iranian economy.' In July 2015, multilateral talks 

with Iran culminated in an agreement-the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 

Action (JCPOA}-in Which the United States, France, Germany, the 

United Kingdom, Russia, and China, with the High Representative of the 

European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, agreed to 

reciprocal commitments with lran.

2 These commitments include providing 

sanctions relief If Iran addressed those countries' concerns about its 

nuclear program. The JCPOA details, among other things, Iran's 

commitments related to its nuclear facilities, equipment, matertals, and 

' For a description of th-e effedS or sanccions on Iran, see GAO. Iran: U.S. and lntemational Sanction$ Have Adv~rse/y Affected the lflJ,;an Economy, GA0..13-326 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2013). 

21n November 2013. these mutblateral talks resulted in the interim Joint Plan of Action. an Initial understanding with Iran to explicitly btodc near.term Iranian pathways to a nuclear 

weapon and allow further catks 'o reach a long-term comprehensive solution. The participants to the agreement in addition to Iran are eolle<:eivety referred co as the E3+3 (i.e .• france. Germany, and the United Kingdom plus China, Russia, and the United States). 

Page1 
58 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-6.eps

activities. The Untted Nations Security Council endorsed the JCPOA and 

requested that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitor 

and verify these commitments. 3 IAEA-an independent international 

organization based in Vienna, Austria, and affiliated with the United 

Nations-has the dual mission of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear 

energy and verifying that nuclear technologies and materials intended for 

peaceful purposes are not diverted to weapons development efforts. 

The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which 

came into force in 1970, requires non-nuclear weapon states that are 

party to the treaty-eountries, such as Iran, that had not manufactured 

and detonated a nuclear device before January 1, 1967-to agree not to 

acquire nuclear weapons and to subject all nuclear material used in 

peaceful activities to IAEA safeguards. • IAEA has found Iran to be in noncompliance with its safeguards obligations within the last 15 years. 

You asked us to review the authorities and resources IAEA has to carry 

out its activities to monitor and verify certain nuclear-related commitments 

under the JCPOA. In response to that request, we have work ongoing on 

IAEA's authorities, resources, and potential challenges faced in 

supporting implementation of the JCPOA. In January 2016, we briefed 

your staff on the preliminary results of our work, and this report transmits 

information from that briefing. Specifically, this report provides our 

preliminary observations on (1) the JCPOA commitments that IAEA has 

been asked to verify and its authorities to do so; (2) the resources IAEA 

has identified as necessary to verify the JCPOA; and (3) potential 

challenges and mitigating actions, if any, IAEA and others have identified 

with regard to verifying the JCPOA. We will issue a separate report with 

the final results of our work later this year. 

>s.c. Res. 2231. U.N. Doc. S/RES/2231 (July 2<1. 2015). 

•unde~ Article II ol the NPT. each non-nuclear weapon state party agrees. among other 

things, not to receive any transfer whatsoever o f nuclear weapons or other nuclear 

explosive devices; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons 01 other 

nuclear explosive devices: and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture 

of nueleat weapons Of other nuctear e)(J)Ios,ive devices. Under Article Ill of the NPT. each 

non-nuclear weapon state party agrees. among other things. to accept IAEA safeguards 

on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities 'hithin the 

territory of such state. under its jurisdiction. or carried out under its control anywhere. 

Page 2 GA0·16-417 Nuelear Nonproliferation 
59 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-7.eps

To identify the nuclear-related oommitments in the JCPOA that IAEA has 

been asked to verify and IAEA's authorities for verifying these 

oommitments, we analyzed the JCPOA, and IAEA documentation 

oonceming the safeguards legal framework, including the Statute of the 

IAEA (the Statute),s information circular (INFCIRC)/153, Which provides 

the basis for a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) that most 

oountries have concluded with IAEA and that oovers all of the oountries' 

civilian nuclear activities, and INFCIRC/540, Which provides the basis for 

an Additional Protocol that most countries with a CSA have concluded 

wi1h IAEA to provide additional information about countries' nuclear and 

nuclear-related activities. To examine the resources IAEA has identified 

as necessary to verify the JCPOA, we reviewed IAEA planning and 

budget documents, such as •The Agency's Programme and Budget 

2016-2017," and statements by the IAEA Director General. In addition, to 

further understand IAEA authorities and resource needs, and to examine 

potential challenges and mitigating actions IAEA and others have 

identified with regard to verifying the JCPOA, we interviewed officials of 

IAEA, the Department of State, and the Department of Energy's (DOE) 

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA);• as well as 

representatives of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Los Alamos National 

Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Uvermore National 

Laboratory, and Brookhaven National Laboratory. We also interviewed 8 

former IAEA and 10 former U.S. government and national laboratory 

officials, and representatives of 10 expert organizations-research 

institutions and nongovernmental organizations with knowledge in the 

5n.e Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. done Oct. 26. 1956.8 U.S.T. 

1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Juty 29, 1957). 

NSA is a separate, semi-autonomous agency v.ithin the Department of Energy, with 

responsibility for the United States' nuclear weapons and nonproliferation programs. 

among other things. NNSA cond\Jets its activities at headquarters and at research and development laboratories, production plants, and other facilities. NNSA aJso provides 

technical assistance to IAEA's safeguards and nuclear security programs. 

Page 3 GA0·16417 Nuclear NonproliferatiOn 
60 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-8.eps

Background 

areas of nuclear verification, monitoring, and safeguards. 

7 Appendix I 

provides a more detailed discussion of our objectives, scope, and 

methodology. 

Our preliminary observations are based on our ongoing 'INOrk, which is 

being conducted in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

IAEA safeguards are a set of technical measures and activities by which 

IAEA seeks to verify that nuclear material subject to safeguards is not 

diverted to nuclear weapons or other proscribed purposes. To carry out 

its safeguards activities, inspectors and analysts in IAEA's Safeguards 

Department collaborate to verify that the quantities of nuclear material 

that non-nuclear weapon states have formally declared to the agency are 

corred and complete. All NPT non-nuclear weapon states are required to 

have a CSA that covers all of their civilian nuclear activities and serves as 

the basis for the agency's safeguards activities. Iran's CSA entered into 

force in May 19748 Most countries with a CSA have also brought into 

force an Additional Protocol to their CSAs. IAEA developed the Additional 

Protocol to provide additional information about countries' nuclear and 

nuclear-related activities as part of its response to the 1991 discovery of a 

clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq. The Additional Protocol, 

when ratified or otherwise brought into force by a country, requires that 

7we selected these experts by first identifying (l(ganizations that had previousty served as 

sources of IAEA subject matter experts for GAO. To ensure a 'Mde range of viewpoints. 

we supplemented our initial selection with individuals and organizations identified through 

a literature search and by recommendations frOtn our initial set of expert organizations. 

We requested interviews from all the identified experts and suggested contacts and 

interviewed all who agreed to participate (two experts pro-Med written responses in lieu of 

in.person interviews). When referring to former U.S. and IAEA officials and expert 

organizations throughout the report. we use •some'" to refer to three members of a group. 

several· to refer to four or five members of a group, and "many'" to refer to more than five 

members of a group. 

81AEA. '"The Text of the Agreement between fran and the N}ency for the Application of 

Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.'" 

INFCIRC/214 (Dec. 13, 1974.) 

Page4 OA0-1&-417 Nuc:le.ar Nonproliferation 
61 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-9.eps

country to provide IAEA with a broader range of information on the 

country's nuclear and nuclear-related activities. It also gives the agency's 

inspectors access to an expanded range of declared activities and 

locations, including buildings at nuclear sites, as well as locations where 

undeclared activities may be suspected. Undeclared nuclear material and 

activities are those a state has not declared and placed under safeguards 

but is required to do so pursuant to its CSA.9 

In addition to its safeguards program, IAEA's other programs include 

nuclear safety and security, nuclear energy, nuclear sciences, and 

technical cooperation. For example, IAEA's technical cooperation 

program helps member states achieve their sustainable development 

priorities by furnishing them with relevant nuclear technologies and 

expertise. IAEA funds its programs primarily through (1) its regular 

budget, for which all member countries are assessed, ' 0 and (2) voluntary 

extra-budgetary cash contributions from certain member countries and 

other donors to meet critical needs." In 2015, IAEA reported that its 

regular budget was $375.8 million, of which the nuclear verification 

program (i.e., safeguards) budget comprised $144.2 million. IAEA has a 

Board of Governors that provides overall policy direction and oversight for 

the agency. A Secretariat. headed by the Director General. is responsible 

for implementing the policies and programs of the IAEA General 

Conference and the Board of Governors. 12 The U.S. Department of State 

coordinates the United States' financial and policy relationship with IAEA. 

9Additionally. fOl a state that has an Additional Protoool in force. undedaJed nuclear 

material also covers nuclear material which that state has not declared but i:s required to 

do so under the Additional Protoool. 

10Assessed contributions are payments made as part of the obligations that countries 

I.Kidertake as members of the United Nations. The current payment structure for assessed 

contributions to IAEA is based on the United Nations scale of assessment, adjusted for 

membership. with a maximum rate (25 percent) and a mirimum rate (J)01 percent). The 

scale fof IAEA also includes a slight premium to cover the costs of the nuclear safeguards 

p.-og.ram. 

111n addition, financing of Technical Cooperation (TC) projects is generally supported 

through the amual voluntary contributions of member states to IAEA's Technical 

Cooperation Fund (TCF). 

12nle General Conference is composed of representatives of 167 COI.Kitries (member 

states) thai contribute to IAEA's budget 

GA0-1$-411 Nuc:lnr onproflfe~ n 
62 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-10.eps

IAEA Uses Its 

Authorities to Carry 

out Its Verification 

Activities under the 

JCPOA 

Under the JCPOA, IAEA verification of Iran's implementation of its 

nuclear-related commitments was a condition to the lifting of specified 

U.S., European Union, and United Nations nuclear-related sanctions on 

Iran. These sanctions were l~ted on the JCPOA's "Implementation Day· 

(January 16, 2016), when IAEA verified and reported that Iran had fully 

implemented its commitments defined in Annex V, paragraph 15, of the 

JCPOA. 13 1n addition. the JCPOA provides for a "Transition Day." when 

the Un~ed States and European Union will take further steps to eliminate 

nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. e~her on October 18. 2023, or before if 

IAEA reaches what it calls a "broader conclusion." A broader conclusion 

refers to the agency's determination that for a given year, a country has 

demonstrated that all declared nuclear material within its borders 

remained in peaceful activities and that there are no indications of 

diversion of declared nudear material or of undedared nudear activities. 

IAEA has been requested to verify Iran's implementation of a range of 

nuclear-related commitments. and our preliminary observations indicate 

thatiAEA is using existing authorities to do so. Iran's commitments 

include limits on, among other things, Iran's enrichment facilities, 

including numbers of centrifuges (for example. no more than 5,060 of 

specifred centrifuges fOf 10 years), uranium enrichment levels of no more 

than 3.67 percent for 15 years. and stocks of enriched uranium of no 

more than 300 kilograms for 15 years." In addition, Iran agreed to (1) 

limits on its heavy water inventories;" (2) limits on centr~uge 

13-rhese commitments are specified in Sections 15.1·15.11 of AnnexV of the JCPOA. Th.e 

JCPOA a1so contains provisions describing the circumstance-s under whkh a participant 

may cease perf«mance of its oommi1ments. These commitments include the provis.ion of 

sanctions rebef. Furthermore, the United Nations Security Council Resolution endorsing 

the JCPOA details the cifeumscan<:es t.r~def which United Nations Security Council 

sanctions might be re-imposed. 

14TM JCPOA speclfies that Iran will maintain a Iota! enriched uranium stockpile of no 

more than 300 kilograms of up to 3.67 peftenl enriched uranium hel@tlvoride (UF&) {or the equivalent in ditfetent ch~m caJ rorms) for 15 yeats. H&wever, the agteem.ent also 

details cases when eenain enriched uranium wll not count against the limit. FOt example, 

Ru~n.Oesigned, fabricated iind licensed fuel assemblies for use in Russian·$Uppied 

reactors in Iran do not count against the 300 kilograms UF6 stockpile limit, 

15tieavy water, which contains deuterium (heavy hydrogen), is used in heavy water 

reactOfs as a moderator. Heavy water reactors can be efficient at producing plutonium 

under certain conditions. 
63 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-11.eps

manufacturing; and (3) conditions on uranium ore concentrate. 16 Iran also 

agreed not to engage in spent fuel reprocessing, uranium or plutonium 

metallurgy, or activities that could contribute to the design and 

development of a nuclear explosive device. The duration of certain 

commitments is from 8 (for certain centrifuge restrictions) to 25 years (for 

monitoring of lran•s uranium ore concentrate). Iran also agreed to fully 

implement the "Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present 

Outstanding Issues" agreed to with IAEA. The Road map sets out a 

process for IAEA to address issues relating to the •possible military 

dimensions" (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program." IAEA issued a report on 

the results of its PMD investigation in December 2015, '

8 and the Board of 

Governors subsequently issued a resolution closing its consideration of 

PMD. State officials noted that the Board, in its resolution, stated that it 

will be watching closely to verify that Iran fully implements its 

commitments under the JCPOA and will remain focused going forward on 

the full implementation of the JCPOA in order to ensure the exclusively 

peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. 

According to officials in IAEA's Office of the Legal Affairs, the agency will 

draw on existing authorities to verify lran•s implementation of these 

commitments. For example, using its safeguards authorities, including the 

CSA, IAEA will verify implementation of most of Iran's nuclear-related 

commitments largely through a range of traditional safeguards 

approaches and techniques that it has used in the past, such as 

inspecting nuclear facilities and conducting nuclear material accountancy 

to verify quantities of nuclear material declared to the agency and any 

changes in the quantities over time. For example, to verify non-diversion 

of nuclear material, IAEA inspectors count items (e.g., containers of 

1

&rhe JCPOA states that Iran will permit IAEA to monitor. through agreed measures that 

will include containment and surveillance measures. for 25 years. that an uranium ore 

concentrate pcoduced in Iran or obtained from any other source. is transfened to a 

uranium conversion facility in Iran. Uranium ore is the product of uranium mining. and 

uranium ore concentrate is the product of uranium milling. The two steps in the uranium 

nudear fuel cycle prior to conversion are mining and milling. IAEA discusses its activities 

related to uranium ore concentrate as monitoring mines and mills. 

171n 2002. 1AEA became increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of 

undisclosed nuclear-related activities involving military-related organizations. Information 

indicated that Iran had carried out activities relevant to the development of a nudear 

explosive de\lice. 

181AEA "Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran's 

Nuclear Programme," GOV/2015168 (Dec. 2 , 2015). 

Page7 GA0-16-417 Nuc:lnr Nonproliferation 
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FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-12.eps

uranium or plutonium), measure attributes of these items (e.g., isotopic 

composition), and compare their findings with records and declared 

amounts. Other IAEA safeguards activities include environmental 

sampling, 19 remote monitoring, analysis of commercial satellite imagery, 

and analysis of open source documents. 

Under lhe JCPOA, IAEA also conducts certain activities agreed to by 

Iran, such as monitoring of Iran's uranium mines and mills, according to 

IAEA officials. Such activities include containment and surveillance 

measures. Containment and surveillance measures include using video 

cameras to detect movement of nuclear material and tampering with 

agency equipment as well as seals that indicate Whether the state has 

tampered with installed IAEA safeguards systems. Further, under lhe 

JCPOA, Iran agreed to provisionally apply, and seek ratification of the 

Additional Protocol, which gives the agency's inspectors access to an 

expanded range of declared activities and locations, including buildings at 

nuclear sites, and locations where undeclared activities may be 

suspected. 20 Under lhe JCPOA, Iran also agreed to fully implement 

"Modified Code 3.1" of the subsidiary arrangement to its CSA2 ' 

According to IAEA, the text of the Modified Code 3.1 in Iran's subsidiary 

arrangement is based on model language under Which a country is 

generally required to provide preliminary design information for new 

19tAEA inspectors collect environmental samples from nudear facilities and othef 

locations. and IAEA's Netwon<. of Analytical Laboratories anatyzes these safl1)1es to detect 

traces, if any, of undeclared nudear material. 

20tran signed an Additional Protocol in December 2003 but has not brought it into force, 

and ceased implementing it in February 2006. Aocolding to IAEA offiCials. since 

Implementation Day (January 16. 2016). Iran has been provisionally apptying its Additional 

Protocol. IAEA regards this as if the Additional Protocol were "in force: 

21 Aooording to reports from the IAEA Director General to the Board of Governors, IAEA 

agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 beginning in 2003 and ceased to implement it in 

2007. In March 2007, Iran notified IAEA that il had suspended the implementation of 

Modified Code 3.1. and that it would revert to the previous version of the code. which only 

required submission of design information fcx a new facility 180 days before introducing 

nudear material into it The Director General disagreed and asserted that Iran remained 

bound by the revised Code 3. 1. See IAEA. ·Implementation of the NPT Safeguards 

Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic 

Repul>lic of Iran." GOV/2007122 (May 23. 2007). and IAEA. "Implementation of the NPT 

Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 

12006). 1747 (2007). 180312008) and 1835 (200S) in the Islamic ReJ)<Iblic oflran." GOVI20091741Nov. 16, 2009). 

GA0-1$-411 Nuc:lnr Nonproflfe~don 
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FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-13.eps

nuclear facilities "as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize 

construction, of such a facility has been taken, whichever is earlier.•22 

In addition, Iran made commitments under the JCPOA to cooperate with 

IAEA and facilitate its safeguards activities. For example, Iran agreed to 

make arrangements to allow for the long-term presence of IAEA 

inspectors by issuing long-term visas, among other things. Iran also 

agreed to permit the use of modern technologies such as online 

enrichment monitors to increase the efficiency of monitoring activities. 

The JCPOA includes a mechanism in which its participants commit to 

resolve an access request from the agency within 24 days after the 

request is made. The JCPOA also describes a dispute resolution 

mechanism through Which a participant in the agreement can bring a 

complaint if it feels that commitments are not being met and that allows 

the participant to cease performance of its commitments in certain cases 

if dispute resolution fails to resolve the participant's concerns. 

Iran has also agreed to import enumerated nuclear-related and nuclearrelated dual-use materials and equipment exclusively through a new 

"procurement channel" established under the JCPOA. 23 The JCPOA 

details the establishment of a Joint Commission comprised of 

representatives of participants in the agreement, whose "procurement 

working group" will provide information to IAEA on these proposed 

imports. 2' Under the JCPOA, IAEA may access the locations of intended 

use of such nuclear-related imports. 

25 IAEA officials told us that they 

:nAocording to tAEA. the text of Irati's r.Aodified Code 3.1 is based on language contained 

in the Model Subsidiary Arrangements General Part (Fifth Revision) dated Juty 3, 1992. 

2:3rhe items to be imported tlvough the procurement chat~nel include certain nuclear 

material, equipment, and technology as well as certain nuclear-related dual-use 

equipment. materials. softv.!are and related technology listed in two IAEA documents: 

INFCIRCI254/Rev.121Part 1 and INFCIRCJ254/Rev.9/Part 2. 

Z

4The JCPOA details the establisl\ment of a Joint Commission cofl"C)rising representatives 

of participants in the agreement (i.e., Iran and the E3+3) and provides that the Joint 

Commission may establish WCKt<ing Groups in particular areas. as appropriate. The 

JCPOA states that the Joint Commission is to establish a Procurement Working Group to 

review and make recornrnendations on proposals by states seeking to engage in nuclear 

commerce with Iran. 

Z5 The JCPOA states that, •1rat1 will provide to the IAEA access to the lo<:ations of 

intended use of all items. materials. equipment, goods and technology set out in 

INFCIRCI254/Rev.121Part 1 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated 

by !he Se<:urity Council) ... • 

GA0-1$-411 Nuc:lnr Nonproflfe~don 
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FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-14.eps

IAEA Has Identified 

the Financial, Human, 

and Technical 

Resources Necessary 

to Verify the NuclearRelated 

Commitments in the 

JCPOA 

expect the infonnation provided through the procurement channel to 

support the agency's efforts to deJect undeclared activity. 

Our preliminary observations Indicate thatiAEA has estimated the 

financial, human, and technical resources necessary to verify Iran's 

implementation of nuclear-related commitments In the JCPOA. lAEA has 

estimated that it needs approximately $10 million per year for 15 years in 

add~ionallund ng above its current safeguards budget to fund addrtional 

inspections, among other things." Of thrs amount, IAEA estomates that ~ 

will need about $3.3 million for costs associated with Implementing the 

Additional Protocol, about $2.4 milhon for other rnspector and dorect staff 

costs, and about S4.4 miRoon ., other costs, such as travel, equrpment 

and support services beyond those aSSOCiated with Addrbonal Protocol 

implementation (see table 1 ). 

26aAEA. ·v~ifleation arwt MoniiOtlng lin eM lll~lc Rtpubtlc of Iran In light of Uniltd Nations SecurhyCouncll ResolubOn 2231 (Aug, 14, 2015).· a report by the Director 

GenerJI to the Board of Governors. This report providtt this estimate baHd on ~ctWities 

foreseen as being applable for 15 yeart. IAEA offidatt told us that after tO years. they 

will consider incoming lnfotmatlon 10 refine the estlmltt going forward. TM prehmlnlt)' 

estimate for the safeguard' budget foe- 2015 and 2017 tt appro.ximatety S 148.9 milion pet" 

year. according to "The Agency's Programme lnd Budgtt 2018 -2017: 

... ,0 
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FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-15.eps

Table 1: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Estimates for Its Annual 

Funding Requirements for Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Activities 

Ool1ars in millions 

Human Other 

Funding requirements by category resources costs Total 

Additional Protocol: inspector and dired staff costs 1.6 NJA 1.6 

Additional Protocol: travel, equipment. support staff from 1.0 0 .7 1.6 

other safeguards divisions. and other 

Subtotal: Additional Protocol 2.6 0.7 3.3 

Other nudear·retated commitments: inspector and direct 2.4 NJA 2.4 

staff costs 

Other nucleaNelated commitments: travel. equipment, 2.5 1.8 4.4 

support staff from other safeguards dMsions, and other 

Subtotal: Other nuclear..-elated commitments 4.9 1.8 6.1 

TotaiJCPOA 7.5 2.5 10 

Sourot 0A0Wf)11:S"IAE-\dllt'<l I QAO.~t7 

Notes: C05t5 wele c.lculated at the a'l8i~e e.xchange rate U$ecl by the Oepartm&nt ot Treas.ury ot 

S 1 to E.919. Nwnbel5 may not add to totals because of rou~. 

IAEA officials said that, pursuant to the Statute, the agency intends to 

propose to the Board of Governors that the approximately $5.7 million for 

all Additional Protocol activities and inspector costs attributable to the 

JCPOA be funded through IAEA's regular budget after 2016. These 

officials said that the remaining $4.4 million in estimated funding needs 

for the following 15 years will remain unfunded in the regular budget and 

will therefore be supported through extra-budgetary funding. Under the 

Statute of the IAEA, IAEA is to apportion the costs of implementing 

safeguards., which would include inspector salaries and the cost of 

implementing the Additional Protocol, through assessments on member 

countries. 27 As previously noted, such assessments form IAEA's regular 

budget. The Statute also states that any voluntary contributions may be 

used as the Board of Governors, with the approval of the General 

Conference, may determine. 28 The JCPOA was not finalized in time for 

the agency to include these costs for 2016 in its assessments. 

Consequently, according to a 2015 1AEA report, all of IAEA's JCPOA 

?? Miele XIV(B) 1.(b) and Miele XIV.O of the Statute of the IAEA. respe<:tively. 

28 Article Xrv.F of the Statute of the lAEA. 

Page11 GA0·1$411 Nuc:lear Nonproflfe~don 
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FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-16.eps

Verifying the JCPOA's 

Nuclear-Related 

Commitments May 

Present Potential 

Challenges to IAEA's 

Safeguards Efforts 

work through 2016 will be funded through extra-budgetary contributions.:19 

According to IAEA officials. how quickly the SS. 7 million in JCPOA costs 

are incorporated into the regular b<Jdget depends on member state 

support. These officials told us that IAEA hopes to resolve the questions 

about funding the JCPOA through the regular budget by the June 2016 

Board of Governors meeting. 

IAEA's annual $10 million funding estimate Includes approximately $7.5 

million in funding to cover estimated human resource costs associated 

with additional inspectors and support services under the JCPOA. IAEA 

officials told us that the agency plans to transfe.- 18 experienced 

inspectors and nearly twice that number of other staff to 1ts Iran Task 

Force from other divisions Within 1ts Safeguards Department that cover 

countries and regions beyond Iran."' Aocord1ng to IAEA official.s, the other 

Safeguards diviSIOOS would backfln the vacancies created by the transfer 

of inspectors to the Iran Task Foree by hinng and tra1rung new Inspectors. 

In addition, acoording to IAEA olf!CI8ls, exlsbng safeguards technocal 

resources are sufficienllo Implement IAEA's actMbes under the JCPOA. 

Our pretrninary observations indocate that IAEA may face some potential 

ehalenges in monrtoring and wnfylng Iran's omplementabon of certalll 

nuclear-related commrunents 1n the JCPOA. acoord1ng to current U.S. and IAEA officials as well as some fo<mer U S offiCials, several former 

IAEA offiaals, and many expert organaatoos we onteMeWed These 

potenbal challenges onclude (1) the lllherent challenge of detecbng 

undeclared nuclear materials and acbVI!Jes, (2) potenbal access 

challenges to sites in Iran, and (3) safeguards resource management 

challenges. 

29tAEA. R~pon by the Olteelor General 10 the 8ottd or Governott, "Ver•ficatlon and 

Monitoring In the Islamic Repoblic ot Iran In llghl of United Nations Security Counc.l 

Resolution 2231 (2015).' 

30A.ccording to the Olrectof General's opening 1t1tement to lhe January 2018 Board of 

GovemotS meetitlg, the Dlreceot Generll p&lns to establlth 1.n Otfioe in the Oepatttnent of Safeguards to take eharge of the agency's Nfeguards, and vtrifieaton and monitomg 

activities in Iran. This wi11 repl10e lhoe existing Iran TaM. Foroe . 

... ,2 
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FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-17.eps

IAEA Faces an Inherent 

Challenge in Detecting 

Undeclared Nuclear 

Materials and Activities 

Our preliminary observations indicate that detection of undeclared nuclear 

materia.ls and activities is an inherent challenge for IAEA particularly with 

regard to activities that do not involve nuclear material, such as some 

weapons development activities and centrifuge manufacturing, according 

to current U.S. officials, a former U.S. official, several former IAEA 

officials, and several e~pert organizations we interviewed. According to 

U.S. government officials, as well as a former U.S. official, detection of 

undeclared material and activities in Iran and wortdwide is IAEA's 

greatest challenge. Iran has previously failed to declare activity to IAEA. 

For example, according to IAEA documents, prior to 2003, Iran failed to 

provide IAEA information on a number of nuclear-fuel-cycle-related 

activities and nuclear material.31 In addition. according to IAEA 

documents and officials, Iran failed to notify the agency before 2009 that ~ 

had constructed the Fordow enrichment facility, as required under 

Modified Code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangement to Iran's CSA 

To detect undeclared materials and activities, 32 IAEA looks for indicators 

of such activities, including equipment, nuclear and non-nuclear material, 

infrastructure support, and traces in the environment, according to an 

IAEA document. However, some activities may not be visible through 

satellite imagery or do not involve nuclear material, and may not leave 

traces in the environment, such as some weapons development activities. 

According to a former U.S. government official, some former IAEA 

officials. and several expert organization interviews. this creates a 

challenge for IAEA in detecting undeclared activity. 

Furthermore, according to one e~pert organization we int.erviewed, the 

Board of Governors' vote to close its consideration of the PMO issue 

without a complete accounting of Iran's past nuclear program could 

reduce the indicators at IAEA's disposal to detect potential undeclared 

activity. However, DOE offl(;ials noted that under the JCPOA, IAEA will 

have the authorities of the Additional Protocol and enhanced 

transparency measures of the JCPOA with which to investigate any 

indication of undeclared activities. In addition, IAEA officials told us that 

31

The nuclear fuel cycle refers to the series of processes used to ma.ke fuel for nuclear 

ruetors that may also be used to produce material for nuclear weapons. 

32For aJI states wi1tl a CSA and an Additional Protocol in force, the IAEA looks for 

incfJcations of (1) the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities, and 

(2) undeclared nuclear material or activities. 

GA0-16-417 Nueltar HonproUftr1Uon 
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FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-18.eps

IAEA Access Depends on 

Iran's Cooperation and the 

JCPOA Mechanism to 

Resolve Access Requests 

Is Untested 

any uncertainties regarding the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program 

that may arise during the course of the agency's verification and 

monitoring under the JCPOA would have to be resolved for the agency to 

reach a broader conclusion that a ll nuclear material in Iran rema ins in 

peaceful activities. IAEA officials told us that the agency does not draw a 

broader conclusion lightly, for any state, and that it has traditionally taken 

3 to 5 years for most member states. 

According to a former IAEA official as well as current IAEA and U.S. 

government officials we interviewed, IAEA has improved its capabilities in 

detecting undeclared activity. For example, according to U.S. government 

officials and national laboratory representatives, IAEA has adapted its 

inspector training program to focus on potential indicators of undeclared 

activity, beyond the agencfs traditional safeguards focus on nuclear 

materials accountancy. IAEA also has analytical tools at its disposal, 

some of Which IAEA officials demonsltated to us, to detect undeclared 

activity worldwide. Furthermore, IAEA receives member-state support in 

detecting undeclared activity. For example, member states provided 

some of the information that formed the basis of IAEA's PMD 

investigation. State officials agreed that the detection of undeclared 

nuclear material and activities in Iran, and all states, is a serious 

challenge for IAEA, but added that the JCPOA puts IAEA in a better 

position to detect such activities in Iran. 

The procurement channel estabHshed under the JCPOA may also serve 

as an additional source of indicators for IAEA on potential undeclared 

activities in Iran, according to current and two former U.S. government 

officials as well as representatives from two organizations we interviewed. 

IAEA officials told us that there is add~ onal work to be done in informing 

exporting countries of their obligations and standardizing the data that the 

countries would report to IAEA so that they are usable to the agency. 

Officials noted that ensuring that countries report the data as required is 

particularly a challenge for countries that do not have a robust export 

control system. 

Our preliminary observations indicate that IAEA could face potential 

challenges in gaining access to Iranian sites, according to two former 

U.S. government officials, a former IAEA official, and one expert 

organization. IAEA•s safeguards activities in Iran. as in every state. 

depend on the cooperation of the member state, and those officials noted 

that Iran has a history of denying access to IAEA inspectors. For 

example, IAEA requested access in February 2012 to the Iranian military 

OA0-16_.17 Nucl..a.r NonproUferatlon 
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FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-19.eps

complex at Parch in- where high-explosive experiments were believed to 

have been conducted-and Iran did not allow access until the fall of 2015 

as part of IAEA's PMD investigation. 

One expert organization we interviewed said that Iran's limited 

cooperation during the PMD investigation may have set a precedent for 

limiting IAEA access going forward. However, IAEA officials told us that 

the closure of the PMD investigation would not preclude future IAEA 

access requests to the sites that were part of the investigation, should 

IAEA determine that such access is warranted. These officials added that 

IAEA's PMD investigation was conducted without the Additional Protocol 

and that any future investigations into potential undeclared activity would 

be conducted under the expanded legal authority of the Additional 

Protocol. According to IAEA officials we interviewed, Iran's agreement to 

provisionally apply the Additional Protocol will facilitate the agency's 

access to sites in Iran. Specifically, they told us that under the Additional 

Protocol, the agency can access any part of a site that it is inspecting 

within 2 hours' notice and any other site within 24 hours. DOE officials 

noted that the JCPOA's provisions for the reinstatement of sanctions will 

encourage Iranian cooperation with and access for IAEA. Additionally, 

State officials noted that refusal by Iran to comply with the access 

provisions of the Additional Protocol or JCPOA could lead to the 

reinstatement of sanctions. 

If Iran were to deny access, IAEA officials said that they could report the 

state's noncompliance to the Board of Governors, though there is no 

deadline in the CSA or Additional Protocol that compels a state to 

cooperate, and according to a former IAEA official, the Board of 

Governors cannot impose a deadline for the state's cooperation. 

However, as we noted earlier, the JCPOA includes a mechanism that 

limits the time for resolution of differences between the participants to 24 

days for matters related to JCPOA implementation. According to some 

former U .S. government officials., the mechanism is an advantage for 

IAEA in that it imposes a time frame for Iran's cooperation with access 

requests. 33 However, a former IAEA official and one expert organization 

33Aocording to a former government official. the other parties to the agreement may 

reinstate sanctions if fran does not cooperate with IAEA access requests in accordance with this mechanism. and eontrlued noncooperation may result in the termination of the 

agreement and an expansion of sanctions in the future. 

Page 1S GA0-1$-411 Nuc:ln r Nonproliferation 
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FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-20.eps

IAEA Faces Potential 

Budgetary and Human 

Resource Management 

Challenges Stemming 

from JCPOA-Related 

Workload 

Integrating JCPOA-Related 

Funding Needs into IAEA's 

Regular Budget 

noted that the mechanism is untested, and that it is too soon to tell 

whether it will improve a~ss. 

Our preliminary observations indicate that IAEA faces potential resource 

management challenges stemming from the monitoring and ver~ication 

workload in Iran, including integrating the additional JCPOA-relaled 

funding needs that IAEA has identified into the agency's regular budget 

and managing human resources within the safeguards program that could 

affect IAEA's safeguards efforts internationally. 

State and NNSA officials told us that they are confident that tAEA would 

obtain any funding it would need in the form of extra-budgetary 

contributions from the Un~ed States and other member states to support 

its JCPOA activities. However, IAEA officials expressed concerns about 

the reliability of sustained extra-budgetary contributions for IAEA JCPOA 

activities due to possible donor fatigue in the tong run, as IAEA will be 

conducting certain JCPOA verification activities for 10 or more years. 

IAEA and State officials, as well as a former IAEA official and one expert 

organization, also stated that funding the JCPOA !rom the IAEA regular 

budget would give the safeguards program a more stable and predictable 

funding base for its monitoring and verification activities. We have 

previously concluded that IAEA cannot necessarily assume that donors 

will continue to make extra-budgetary contributions at the same levels as 

in the past.34 

However, our preliminary observations indicate that IAEA may face 

challenges in incorporating some of its JCPOA activities under its regular 

budget, which requires support from the General Conference. IAEA 

officials, as well as a former IAEA official, two former U.S. government 

officials, and one expert organization we interviewed stated that the 

proposal to move funding for monitoring and verification efforts under the 

JCPOA into the IAEA safeguards' regular budget could faoe resistance 

from some member states without corresponding budget increases for 

other IAEA programs, such as the Technical Cooperation program, which 

supports nuclear power development and other civilian nuclear 

applications. State officials noted that delay or failure to incorporate costs 

34GAO, Nuclear Nonprolifsrab·on: IAEA Has Made Progress in Implementing Critical 

Programs bur ConUnws to Face Ch•ll•~·· GA0.13-139 (Washington. D.C.: May 16. 2()13~ 

GA0-16-417 Nueltar NonproUftriUon 
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FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-21.eps

Managing Human Resources 

in the Safeguards Program 

Agency Comments 

into the regular budget would increase the reliance of IAEA on extrabudgetary contributions, but would not prevent IAEA from carrying out 

JCPOA-related activities as long as those contributions are forthcoming. 

These officials added that they recognize that long-term reliance on extrabudgetary contributions risks donor fatigue, and that they will plan for 

providing support with a view toward filling any future funding gaps that 

arise. 

Our preliminary observations indicate that IAEA faces a potential human 

resource management challenge in its safeguards program as it 

implements actions to monitor and verify the JCPOA, which could affect 

its broader international safeguards mission. Specifically, our preliminary 

observations indicate that IAEA's strategy of transferring inspectors to its 

Iran Task Force from other safeguards divisions may pose a challenge to 

IAEA and its safeguards work in other countries because of the extensive 

time taken to hire and train new inspectors for those divisions. 

According to current IAEA and U.S. government officials, as well as two 

former IAEA officials and two expert organizations, hiring and training 

qualified inspectors can take years. A former IAEA official and current 

officials noted that inspector skills are highly specialized-typically 

requiring a combination of nuclear engineering knowledge with analytical 

abilities-making recruitment difficult. These officials also noted that 

IAEA's hiring process is lengthy, requiring multiple interviews and 

examinations. Furthermore, current IAEA officials and two former IAEA 

officials, as well as one expert organization noted that training new 

inspectors to be proficient in executing their safeguards responsibilities 

can be a time-consuming process. As a result, IAEA faces a potential 

challenge as it prioritizes the JCPOA in meeting the need for additional 

experienced inspectors to work on Iran-related safeguards, while 

ensuring that other safeguards efforts in other countries are not 

understaffed. IAEA officials have said that its work in Iran is its priority. 

However, a former IAEA official, as well as some former U.S. government 

officials and several ex,pert organizations told us that IAEA could mitigate 

human resources challenges in the short term through remote monitoring 

and the use of cost-free experts in its headquarters. 

We are not making any recommendations in this report. We provided the 

Departments of State and Energy and IAEA a draft of this report to for 

their review and comment. State, DOE, and IAEA provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

Page 17 GA0-16-417 Nuclear Nonpronreratlon 
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FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-22.eps

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report ea~ier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to appropriate 

congressional committees, the Secretaries of State and Energy, and 

other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no 

charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff members who made key contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix II. 

David C. Trimble 

Director, Natural Resources and Environment 

OA0-18-417 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
75 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-23.eps

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

This report provides our preliminary observations on (1) the Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) commitments that the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (tAEA) has been asked to verify ancf 

its authorities to do so, (2) the resources IAEA has identified as 

necessary to verify the JCPOA, ancf (3) potential challenges and 

mttigating actions, ~any, IAEA and others have Identified wtth regard to 

verifying the JCPOA. We wtll issue a separate report wtth the final results 

of our work tater this year. 

To identify the nuclear-related commitments in the JCPOA that IAEA has 

been asked to verify ancf IAEA's authorities for verifying these 

commitments, we analyzed the JCPOA. in close coordination with IAEA 

and lhe Oepar1ment of State. We also analyzed IAEA documentation 

concerning the safeguards legal framework, including the Statute of the 

IAEA,' whiclh authorizes the Agency to apply safeguards, at the request 

of parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement; "The Structure ancf 

content of Agreements Between the Agency ancf States Required in 

connection wtth the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons· 

(information circular (INFCIRC)/153). whiclh provides the basis for the 

comprehensive safeguards agreement that most countries have 

concluded wtth IAEA and that covers all of the countries' civilian nuclear 

activ~ies; Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/214); 

the Model Additlonal Protocol (INFCIRC/540), which provides the basis 

for an Additional Protocol that most countries wtth a CSA have concluded 

With IAEA to provide additional information about countries' nudear and 

nuclear-related activities; ancf the November 2011 IAEA Safeguards 

Report,' which details nems concerning •possible military dimensions· of 

Iran's nuclear program; IAEA's report on its Investigation or the possible 

mil~ry dimensions; ancf the related Board of Governor's resolution. We 

also analyzed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 

(NPT) and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, whiclh 

requests IAEA to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of 

Iran's commnments. 

1The SlaMe of the International Alomle Ene<gy Ageney, done Oct. 26, 1956, 8 V.S.T. 

1093, 278 V.N.T.S. 3 (entered Into le<ce July 29. 1957~ 

l tAfA, •Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and retevan1 ptOvlsions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iron,' GOVI20t l /65 (Nov. 8, 201 t). 

Page 19 OA0·16-417 Nuc:tu~ Nonprour~atlon 
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FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-24.eps

App4tndi.x 1: Objectivn, Scop4t, and 

Methodology 

To examine the resources IAEA has identified as necessary to verify the 

JCPOA, we reviewed IAEA planning and budget documents, such as 

"The Agency's Programme and Budget 2016 -2017," lhe Director 

General's report titled ·verification and Monitoring in lhe Islamic Republic 

of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 

(2015)," and pertinent Director General's statements to the Board of 

Governors. 

In addition, to further understand IAEA authorities and resource needs, 

and to examine potential challenges and mitigating actions IAEA and 

olhers have identified with regard to verifying the JCPOA, we interviewed 

officials of IAEA, the Department of State, and the Department of 

Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA);

3 as 

well as representatives of Oak Ridge National laboratory, los Alamos 

National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and Brookhaven 

National Laboratory. We also held classified interviews with officials in the 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence and representatives of 

Lawrence livermore National Laboratory. The information from these 

interviews is not reflected in this report. 

We also interviewed 8 former IAEA, and 10 former U.S. government and 

national laboratory officials, and representatives of 10 expert 

organizations-research institutions and nongovernmental organizations 

with knowledge in the areas of nuclear verification, monitoring, and 

safeguards. We selected these experts by first identifying organizations 

lhat had previously served as sources of IAEA subject matter experts for 

GAO. To ensure a wide range of viewpoints, we supplemented our initial 

selection with individuals and organizations identified through a literature 

search and by recommendations from our initial set of expert 

organizations. We requested interviews from all the identified experts and 

suggested contacts and interviewed all who agreed to participate (two 

experts provided written responses in lieu of in-person interviews). We 

analyzed their responses and grouped them into overall themes related to 

different elements of the objective. When referring to lhese categories of 

interviewees throughout the report, we use •some" to refer to three 

NSA is a separate. semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy. with 

responsibility for the United States' nuclear weapons and nonproliferation programs. 

among olher things. NNSA conducts its activities at headquarters and at research and 

devek>pment laboratories. production pJants. and other facilities. NNSA also provides 

technical assistance to IAEA's safeguards and nuclear security programs. 

GA0-1$-411 Nuclnr onproflfe~don 
77 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-25.eps

Appendix 1: Ob}tdlws, Scope, and 

MtthO<JOtogy 

members of a group, "several" to refer to four or five members of a group, 

and "many" to refer to more than five members of a group. 

Our preliminary observalions are based on our ongoing work, which is 

being conducted in accordance with generally accepted government 

audiling standards. Those standards require that we plan and perfonm the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Page 21 GA0-1&-417 Nudear Nonproliferation 
78 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-26.eps

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

11006$3) 

David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov 

In add~ion to the contact named above, William Hoehn (Assistant 

Director), Alisa Beyninson, Antoinette Capaccio, R. Scott Fletcher, 

Bridget Grimes, Joseph Kirschbaum, Grace Lui, Thomas Melito, Alison 

O'Neill, Sophia Payind, Timothy M. Persons, Steven Putansu, Vasiliki 

Theodoropoulos, and Pierre Toureille made key contributions to this 

report. 

'~ 22 OA0·11S-411 Nucle.., Honpt'OflfereUon 
79 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERMenendez-27.eps

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FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
(81) 

Responses to Additional Questions for the Record 

Submitted to U.S. Secretary of State John F. 

Kerry by Members of the Committee 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO

SECRETARY KERRY BY SENATOR CARDIN

Question 1. With the lifting of sanctions, European and Asian businesses are 

flocking to Iran in order to take advantage of investment opportunities. However, 

Iran is still a major state sponsor of terrorism and perpetrates a variety of human 

rights abuses. 

• What mechanisms do we have in place to ensure that other nations and corporations continue to adhere to the variety of international and U.S. sanctions 

that remain in place? Has our leverage over international companies been 

weakened by the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions and the implementation of 

the JCPOA? 

Answer. We have been very clear in highlighting to the international community 

that the JCPOA was negotiated to address Iran’s nuclear program only. All of our 

other sanctions programs not related to Iran’s nuclear program, whether for its destabilizing activities within the region, human rights abuses, or ballistic missile programs, remain in place and continue to be enforced. The most recent example of our 

continued enforcement is the January 16 designation of three entities and eight individuals involved in a procurement network for Iran’s ballistic missiles program. 

This designation was in response to Iran’s October missile launch and cut these persons off entirely from the U.S. financial system. Additionally, any non-U.S. person 

who engages with these designees will also be subject to U.S. sanctions. 

Under the JCPOA, if there is a significant violation by Iran, the United States 

has the ability to quickly re-impose the multilateral sanctions that were lifted. 

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231 establishes an unprecedented mechanism under which we have the ability to re-impose U.N. sanctions on 

Iran—the sanctions that were the hardest to secure given the veto held by other 

permanent members of the Security Council. This new mechanism is not vulnerable 

to being blocked by any of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. 

Furthermore, the United States maintains the ability to unilaterally reinstate the 

sanctions lifted under the JCPOA following significant Iranian non-compliance. 

These are the sanctions that were the most powerful in driving Iran back to the 

negotiating table. 

Question 2. February 3 you said in a statement: ‘‘The continued assault by Syrian 

regime forces—enabled by Russian airstrikes—against opposition-held areas, as well 

as regime and allied militias’ continued besiegement of hundreds of thousands of civilians, have clearly signaled the intention to seek a military solution rather than 

enable a political one.’’ This statement was made well after the passage of the U.N. 

Security Council Resolution in December that established a timeline for a political 

transition in Syria and called for end to the bombardment of opposition-held areas. 

Now, the deadline for a ‘‘cessation of hostilities’ has passed and we are still not any 

closer to establishing conditions that could bring the parties back to the negotiating 

table. 

• Mr. Secretary, is it still your view that Russia and the Assad regime intend to 

seek a military solution rather than enable a political one that can end the 

Syria civil war? 

Answer. While Russia wants to keep its only strategic ally in the region in power, 

it knows that its military support to the regime will not bring an end to the conflict. 

Knowing this, in November 2015, Russia signed onto the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) Statement reaffirming key Geneva Communique principles, most 

importantly, a commitment to a political transition, including agreeing to free and 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
82 

fair elections administered under U.N. supervision within 18 months. In December, 

Russia also voted in favor of UNSCR 2254, which explicitly requested that the U.N. 

convene formal negotiations on a political transition process between the regime and 

the opposition. Per UNSCR 2254, the Syrian parties are supposed to reach agreement on the shape of a transition within six months. 

The United States is committed to seeing this process through to a political transition away from Bashar al-Asad. Discussions over the last several weeks have not 

been easy. Intensified military operations by Russia and the Asad regime have 

worsened an already-dire humanitarian crisis in Syria, but we are hopeful that the 

cessation of hostilities will reduce violence and allow for the freer movement of humanitarian goods and greater access throughout Syria. 

This is a moment for action. The world can see in writing what has been agreed. 

This will be a difficult deal to implement, and we know that obstacles abound. Setbacks will be inevitable. But it is in all of our interests, and especially the interests 

of the Syrian people, to give this process a chance. This is a real opportunity to reduce the violence the Syrian people have endured for far too long. 

We have been clear with all parties that the transition timeline in UNSCR 2254 

must be adhered to, and we expect the U.N. Special Envoy to reconvene talks soon. 

Question 3. I am pleased by the President’s request for robust funding for 

Ukraine. This body passed two pieces of legislation to support the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian civil society, and I believe we must continue to show our support for the reformers in the government who are desperately working to institutionalize rule of law, democracy, and good governance in the country. That said, the 

Ukrainian government must do more to tackle endemic corruption. Recent political 

turmoil in Kiev has raised concerns about the government’s commitment to reform. 

• What is the State Department doing specifically to bolster Ukrainian reformers 

in the government during this challenging period? 

Answer. Ukraine is working to resolve the current political impasse. We regularly 

underscore to Ukrainian officials at all levels that they must unite behind reforms 

that meet IMF preconditions, accelerate the implementation of reforms, and move 

forward on Minsk implementation.The wave of activism that emerged during the 

EuroMaidan protests is the engine that will propel the government towards reform. 

The Department of State and USAID have therefore continued to prioritize support 

for civic organizations that hold government accountable, protect citizens’ rights, 

provide fact-based information and promote democratic reforms. Since the crisis 

began, we have provided over $760 million in assistance to Ukraine, as well as two 

$1 billion sovereign loan guarantees. While some of our crisis-related assistance was 

targeted at meeting Ukraine’s urgent humanitarian and security needs, the majority 

of U.S. assistance to Ukraine is helping to advance reforms and strengthen democratic institutions. We appreciate Congress’s support for Ukraine’s reform efforts. 

The Government of Ukraine’s commitment to reform and European integration 

has renewed our ability to engage with government institutions, and U.S. assistance 

to Ukraine prioritizes fighting corruption and promoting the rule of law. U.S. programs have supported, and will continue to support new anti-corruption bodies; public administration, procurement, and justice sector reforms; transparency measures; 

civil society and independent media engagement; and the recovery of assets stolen 

by the previous government. 

Question 4. How much of this assistance will support human right defenders operating inside Russia? What is our strategy for helping HRDs improve the human 

rights situation inside the country? 

Answer. The United States is concerned about the Russian government’s disregard for human rights and the increased restrictions the government has imposed 

on civil society, which impede the fundamental freedoms of those active in civil society and their ability to receive international support. We raise these concerns regularly in our dialogue with the Russian government. 

Our commitment to engage Russian civil society remains firm. The United States 

will continue to seek ways to foster links between the Russian and American people, 

as we do across the rest of the region and around the world. Although the traditional routes for support have been challenged, Russian human rights and civil society organizations continue to express a desire to engage with the United States.We 

no longer have a dedicated line item in the budget for bilateral assistance for Russia. However, to the extent we can productively use resources in support of Russian 

human rights and civil society and in support of multilateral settings to address 

shared global priorities, we will use funds from the Europe and Eurasia Regional 

budget and from global accounts. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
83 

Question 5. When we add funds provided through the 150 and 050 accounts, funding for security assistance in Africa has nearly doubled from FY 2013 to FY 2015, 

while resources for democracy assistance from over the same period have decreased 

by approximately 46 percent. Levels for FY 2016 have yet to be determined. 

• How are you working with the interagency to ensure we are balancing our security assistance with appropriate levels of DG funding for key allies in the region? 

Answer. There is a critical link between democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) programs and security sector assistance within Africa. Many of our security assistance accounts also fund activities that touch on rule of law and human 

rights concerns. This does not replace the need for core DRG funding, but it is important to note that some of our security assistance contributes to DRG objectives. 

The Departments of State and Defense work closely to formulate, plan and implement security assistance in Africa. The Presidential Policy Directive on Security 

Sector Assistance (PPD-23), released by the Administration in 2013, guides this 

process. The directive mandates an inclusive, deliberate, whole-of-government approach to U.S. security sector assistance, which aligns activities and resources with 

our national security priorities. The directive calls for transparency and coordination 

across the U.S. government to develop long-term strategies for security sector assistance, which build the capacity of our partners in a way that is strategic and sustainable. 

The Departments of State and Defense recognize that human rights-sensitive security assistance is important to efforts to strengthen democracy and governance in 

Africa. In response to the increasing linkages between governance and security, the 

President’s FY 2017 Budget Request includes funds for the Sahel Development Initiative (SDI) and the Security Governance Initiative (SGI). SDI seeks to better link 

development and security efforts to effectively counter the increasing threat of violent extremism in the region. SGI is a collective approach to strengthen African 

partners’ security institutions’ capacity to protect civilians and confront challenges 

with integrity and accountability. 

The Department of State and USAID support democracy and governance programming in the region. Democracy, human rights, and good governance are fundamental objectives in and of themselves: a lack of democratic governance creates an 

enabling environment for instability, violent extremism, and humanitarian crises, 

which often are a result of corruption, poor governance, and weak or nonexistent 

democratic institutions. The U.S. government also recognizes the importance of 

DRG programing to achieving and sustaining global development goals, as well as 

key U.S. foreign policy objectives. 

While the President’s request in recent years has included increasing support for 

DRG programs in Africa, in the past, annual appropriations bills have reduced funding for the key foreign assistance accounts that support DRG programs, which has 

made it difficult to fully fund DRG programs included within the President’s request, including DRG programs in Africa. 

The FY 2017 request includes approximately $343.2 million for DRG programs in 

Africa—an increase over previous years—that will support programs focusing on 

transitions of power, reform, and civil society engagement. For many countries, the 

FY 2017 request reflects an increased level over the FY 2015 allocation and will 

offer a substantial boost to DRG work in those countries. 

Question 6. Secretary, at the release of the 2014 Trafficking in Persons Report, 

you noted that as the Chairman of the Human Trafficking Task Force, you would 

‘‘sit down on this, every single Cabinet officer who has a responsibility, whether it’s 

DHS, Department of Justice, they’re all there, all coordinating. And [you], as the 

chair, instructed this year that none of [them] should travel anywhere in the world 

and fail to raise this issue with our interlocutors, no matter what meetings, no matter where we are. This has to be on the agenda.’’ 

• To what extent have you personally been able to raise human trafficking in 

your meetings with representatives from India, Uzbekistan, Malaysia, Thailand, 

Cuba, and Mexico? What efforts have resulted from your efforts to address 

human trafficking with your counterparts? 

Answer. The Department of State has engaged numerous governments on this 

issue directly, using bilateral meetings, multilateral venues, and media platforms to 

make clear that combating human trafficking is a priority for this Administration— 

and for me—and is a responsibility for all members of the international community. 

The governments of Cuba, India, Malaysia, Mexico, and Uzbekistan are among 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
84 

those I have engaged directly, and I will continue to directly engage with foreign 

governments regarding their efforts to combat human trafficking. 

I, and other senior Administration officials, continue to press the Government of 

Cuba to expand its anti-trafficking efforts to prohibit and combat labor trafficking, 

including indicators of forced labor within its overseas medical mission program. 

Cuba acceded to the Palermo Protocol in 2013 and is working to amend its criminal 

code to bring it into conformity. We are watching closely to see if Cuba lives up to 

those commitments. The government has reported efforts to address sex trafficking—including the conviction of traffickers and the provision of services to sex 

trafficking victims involved in the cases. 

I directly communicated the Department’s top recommendations from the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report to the Indian government. Our Ambassador-at-Large 

to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Susan Coppedge, is currently working with the Indian government to plan a visit, in support of greater anti-trafficking 

cooperation. 

I, and many others in the Administration, have had robust engagement with Malaysia on human trafficking. As the result of this engagement, the Malaysian government should be very clear on what it needs to do, both in the context of the TIP 

Report and its commitments under the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This consistent 

attention has led the government to consult international experts and NGOs in the 

process of developing implementing regulations for legal amendments to its antitrafficking law. Malaysia still has a long way to go, and the Administration is working to maintain pressure and help ensure improved anti-trafficking efforts and protection of victims. 

In Mexico, we continue to highlight the government’s commitments under the Palermo Protocol and have encouraged a victim-centered approach to human trafficking. Mexico has several challenges, such as a broad definition of trafficking at 

the federal level, inconsistent anti-trafficking laws among the federal and state governments, as well as a lack of funding for victim services. However, we have a great 

relationship with the Mexican government and regularly seek opportunities for collaboration, such as sharing best practices on prevention efforts, including across all 

of North America. 

We maintain high-level, consistent, and robust engagement with the Government 

of Thailand on human trafficking. The message has been clear: the government 

must improve its anti-trafficking efforts, especially in holding complicit officials accountable and significantly increasing its efforts to address labor trafficking. The 

concerns in Thailand are vast, but the government’s level of attention to this problem is high. Thailand must ensure its efforts are effective and sustained. 

Finally, I directly discussed the trafficking problem in Uzbekistan, including 

state-sponsored forced labor. The government has made commitments to prohibit 

the mobilization of children for its cotton harvest and has allowed international 

monitors into the country. Unfortunately, forced labor of adults persists and we are 

very clear that forced labor should be prohibited completely. 

These engagements complement those undertaken across the globe every day by 

many Department officials. Ambassador Coppedge recently visited Cuba, Mexico, 

Botswana, and South Africa, and the staff in the Office to Monitor and Combat 

Trafficking in Persons has traveled to five continents and over 50 countries in the 

last six months alone. U.S. missions around the world have sustained and expert 

engagement that occurs every day in some of the most challenging environments in 

the world.In each of these cases, the Department has been unequivocal that human 

trafficking is a priority for which each of these governments must make appreciable 

progress. 

The annual TIP Report not only assesses these efforts, but provides the road map 

for progress through the country-specific recommendations, which the Department 

uses to guide year-round engagement and spur continual improvement in combating 

this crime. Each country is clear on these recommendations and that future tier 

rankings will be assessed objectively against them by our experts. 

Question 7. Senators Coons, Flake and I just returned from Southern Africa where 

we visited Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia to learn more about 

their efforts to conserve threatened species. We also saw the startling effects of the 

extreme and prolonged drought that have caused a water crisis in those countries. 

This drought is fueled by climate change. 

• What are the concerns the State Department has with climate change’s impacts 

on agricultural production, natural disasters, or water resource scarcity and the 

potential destabilizing effects that these emergencies can have on a country and 

how does the State Department’s budget specifically address these potential security risks? 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
85 

Answer. The Department of State supports sustainable, climate-resilient development projects in vulnerable nations through the Global Climate Change Initiative 

(GCCI). By building resilience to the effects of increasingly harsh or unpredictable 

climatic conditions and extreme weather events, our programs reduce the risk of 

damage and prevent broader instability that can be exacerbated by lack of preparedness. Helping developing countries manage climate and weather-related risks protects decades of progress in reducing poverty and economic growth in vulnerable 

countries. 

For example, USAID Kenya supports the efforts of the Northern Rangelands 

Trust in developing community resilience strategies, mainstreaming climate adaptation, and increasing access to climate information and decision-making tools. The 

project has helped more than 30 conservancies in northern Kenya include climate 

adaptation in conservation, management and planning, particularly under drought 

conditions. These interventions have led to better management and conservation of 

natural resources, which, in turn, has significantly reduced poaching and conflicts 

over land and water. The resulting peace dividend has had wide, positive repercussions in this historically volatile region. In addition, the President has also pledged $3 billion to the Green Climate Fund 

(GCF), which will speed low-cost financing and grants for low-carbon and climateresilient work in threatened regions around the globe. Our GCF pledge has already 

leveraged over $7 billion in additional funding commitments from other donors 

which will support mitigation and adaptation projects. To ensure that especially vulnerable states are prioritized by the GCF, the GCF Board decided to allocate half 

of the adaptation support to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small Island 

Developing States (SIDS), and African States. 

Finally, the 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) emphasizes strengthening climate diplomacy and development, integrating climate 

change into all of our diplomatic and development efforts, and expanding climate 

engagement internationally. The Department is also implementing Executive Order 

13677, which focuses on integrating climate resilience considerations into all of our 

international development efforts. As a result of E.O. 13677, the Department will 

begin in the coming year to take climate risks into consideration when developing 

relevant programs. 

Question 8. What is your confidence level that Sunni communities will receive the 

necessary resources and support to rebuild and recover? Given the fiscal constraints 

on the Prime Minister Abadi’s government, are there other donors that could help 

in Iraq? 

Answer. The economic crisis in Iraq, caused by volatility in the oil market, the 

significant costs of the counter-Da’esh fight, and the displacement of 3.3 million 

Iraqis severely restricts the ability of the Government of Iraq to finance the recovery 

and reconstruction of communities devastated by Da’esh. Oil price volatility also 

negatively affected the ability of Iraq’s neighbors to provide assistance, while the 

unprecedented demands caused by other humanitarian crises on traditional donor 

countries has reduced their capacity to support Iraq. Our partners are making significant contributions to help Iraq, but we are concerned about the lack of resources 

available for immediate recovery and long-term reconstruction in Iraq, as well as 

the government’s immediate cash-flow constraints, which could delay payments to 

security forces. We will continue our efforts to generate contributions from the international community to support Iraq as it recovers from destruction caused by 

Da’esh. 

The stabilization of liberated areas is the first step toward recovery. Seventeen 

international donors have contributed or pledged nearly $100 million to the U.N. 

Development Program (UNDP) Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization (FFIS), 

which funds rapid projects to rehabilitate light infrastructure, provides grants to 

small business to help jump-start the local economy, provides technical support to 

local government, and supports community reconciliation. FFIS addresses immediate concerns in the first six months after liberation. FFIS was instrumental in the 

initial recovery of Tikrit, to which 95 percent of the residents have returned. FFIS 

money has also been approved for a number of liberated areas, including majority 

Sunni al-Dour, Baiji, and Ramadi. 

Stabilization is not possible without trusted local security. Italy is leading a Coalition police training program to build the capability of local police forces; several 

other partners are planning to join the program to double the training output. The 

U.N. has estimated that $15 million will be needed to clear the recently liberated 

city of Ramadi of unexploded ordinance (UXO) and improvised explosive devices 

(IEDs). The United States is planning to contribute to this effort and several Coalition partners are prepared to do so as well. The United States is working with U.N. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
86 

and the Coalition to develop a more comprehensive approach to funding the estimated $200 million needed for UXO/IED clearance across Iraq. 

Volatility in the oil market has severely cut Iraqi government revenues, resulting 

in significant challenges for the Government of Iraq to meet its budget obligations. 

The austere budget adopted by the Government of Iraq includes allocations for assistance for displaced Iraqis and reconstruction, which are in jeopardy due to lower 

than anticipated revenues. The United States is negotiating a $2.7 billion FMF loan 

with the Iraqi government, which will help ensure that Iraq has the necessary ammunition, equipment, and training it needs to combat Da’esh and free up Iraqi resources for other Iraqi domestic priorities. The United States is also leading an effort in the G7 and among other partners to generate immediate budgetary support. 

Kuwait has provided significant financial assistance to Iraq by suspending Iraq’s obligation to pay 5 percent of Iraqi oil revenues as reparations due to Kuwait as a 

result of Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait for 2015 and 2016, freeing up billions for 

Iraq to spend on domestic priorities. 

The IMF will play an integral role in to helping keep Iraq solvent during the economic crisis. Iraq has entered into an IMF Staff-Monitored Program (SMP), which 

requires the Iraqis to implement a series of fiscal reforms. If Iraq meets their obligations under the SMP, they can begin negotiations with the IMF to enter a Standby Arrangement, which could unlock billions of dollars to help finance its budget. 

The World Bank provided a $1.2 billion Development Policy Loan in late 2015, 

which the Government of Iraq intends to use for energy-sector improvements, improving expenditure management, reforming state-owned enterprises, and repairing 

Mosul Dam. The World Bank’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has provided a $350 million loan for reconstruction; a significant portion of 

these funds will be directed toward re-establishing electricity and transportation infrastructure, housing, and health services in the Sunni areas of Tikrit, Dour, alDalooeyya, and al-Alam, and portions of the loan could also be directed toward 

Anbar reconstruction. The European Investment Bank and the Islamic Investment 

Bank are also potential sources of funds. The Government of Iraq intends to host 

a reconstruction donor conference in April, and Germany has already announced a 

500 million euro loan for reconstruction. 

Question 9. The administration’s long-term plan to support Afghanistan’s economic sustainability appears to be the New Silk Road initiative, which was announced in 2011 and would promote the country’s economic integration into the region. Since then, China has announced plans to invest significantly across the region. 

• Is the U.S. coordinating with China on these efforts? Are there any challenges 

associated with coordination with China on economic development in the region? 

Answer. The Administration continues to work closely with the Government of Afghanistan and its international partners to promote long-term Afghan economic development. Our approach has been to support Afghanistan’s own reform agenda, the 

development of strong Afghan institutions, and the growth of Afghan revenue so as 

to promote sustainability. A critical component of that long-term sustainability will 

be Afghanistan’s continued integration into the regional economy. 

China’s engagement with the Central Asian states, Afghanistan, and Pakistan has 

the potential to contribute significantly to regional prosperity. By addressing major 

infrastructure needs in the region, China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative 

could contribute to peace and stability in Afghanistan, stimulate economic growth 

in Pakistan and Central Asia, and complement the New Silk Road vision. At the 

same time, the United States continues to encourage China to adhere to international standards on governance, environment, debt sustainability, and social safeguards as it becomes more deeply engaged in development finance activities in third 

countries. 

In Afghanistan, we have three joint training projects for young Afghan diplomats, 

Afghan agricultural professionals, and Afghan health workers that emerged through 

trilateral U.S.-China-Afghanistan diplomatic engagement. More broadly, the United 

States and China are in the initial stages of coordinating overseas economic development activities as we build on a development MOU signed during President Xi 

Jinping’s September 2015 state visit. We are also exploring with the Chinese government possible further development cooperation in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 

Central Asia. The security situation in some parts of the region hampers both U.S. 

and Chinese economic development efforts. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
87 

Question 10. Can you walk us through—very specifically—a case study of, say, Tunisia or Mali, of exactly what variety of civilian tools that are being used to prevent 

violent extremism and how we are measuring the results? 

Answer. The United States National Security Strategy (2015) calls for a sustainable approach to combat the persistent threat of terrorism. The United States will 

continue to take measures and engage in collective action with responsible partners 

to disrupt threats against the United States and our allies. At the same time, effectively addressing these threats requires simultaneous and complementary efforts to 

counter and prevent the spread of violent extremism. The Department of State leads 

the U.S. government’s international efforts to counter violent extremism (CVE)—in 

close partnership with USAID—and is elevating CVE as a top priority, as Deputy 

Secretary of State Blinken laid out in a February 16 speech at the Brookings Institution. 

Broadly speaking, our CVE effort aims to identify and address the specific societal 

dynamics and drivers of radicalization to violence and counter the ideology, messaging, and recruitment methods that extremist groups and propagandists employ 

to attract new recruits and foment violence. 

CVE also requires proactive efforts to engage key stakeholders and prevent support for violent extremism in areas where the threat is more nascent. We are focusing our CVE efforts in a few key areas, including analyzing drivers of violent extremism, assisting national governments in developing national CVE strategies, expanding engagement with sub-national and local government authorities, and 

strengthening the roles of key non-governmental actors who can play important 

roles on the CVE front. 

ASSISTING GOVERNMENTS

National CVE Action Plans: 

We are expanding technical support and assistance to governments as they design 

and implement national CVE action plans, with the involvement of civil society— 

in line with the U.N. Secretary-General’s new Plan on Action on Preventing Violent 

Extremism and Hedayah’s Guidelines and Good Practices for Developing National 

CVE Strategies. 

For example, we deployed a team of interagency advisors (e.g., State, DHS, and 

NCTC) last year to assist the Government of Albania in developing its national CVE 

strategy targeting the radicalization and recruitment to violence of foreign terrorist 

fighters. We are now developing a broader regional initiative for the Western Balkans to promote a range of CVE programs and activities involving governments and 

civil society. The process of developing a national CVE strategy can help governments to refine their understanding of the problem and commit to a holistic approach to addressing the problem, including committing new resources to at-risk 

communities and populations. 

Strategic Communications: 

Working closely with the new Global Engagement Center, we are increasing our 

technical support and assistance to governments, as well as grassroots partners, as 

they undertake new efforts to counter violent extremist messaging and promote alternative narratives. For example, the United States has worked closely with the 

United Arab Emirates on the development of the Sawab Center. 

We have also funded Hedayah, the CVE center of excellence in Abu Dhabi, to provide training for governments and civil society on messaging strategies, including 

how to promote the narratives of disillusioned ‘‘formers.’’ We are providing specific 

technical assistance for national governments and law enforcement agencies as they 

develop their strategic communications capabilities. 

Law Enforcement Community-Oriented CVE Strategies: 

We provide extensive training and advisory support for law enforcement officials 

on strategies to partner with communities on CVE initiatives and build trust between police and communities vulnerable to violent extremism. For example, in Indonesia we are implementing a program to institutionalize the role of Community 

Action Officers within the Indonesian National Police (INP). These officers work to 

promote positive police-community interactions and higher levels of trust between 

police and communities, with a goal of marginalizing the influence of extremists. In 

North Africa, we are providing support to a non-governmental organization to help 

national police in North African countries better understand and address local drivers of radicalization to violence. 


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Countering Prison Radicalization: 

We are also assisting governments in reducing the threat of prison radicalization, 

by helping corrections officials recognize and effectively manage violent extremists 

in their facilities. For example, we have funded Department of Justice advisors to 

help the Philippines develop new policies for assessing and managing terrorist inmates to impede recruitment of other prisoners. We are also working with governments on developing diversion and juvenile justice programs for low-risk offenders 

that can help promote rehabilitation and reintegration. 

EXPANDING ENGAGEMENT WITH SUB-NATIONAL, LOCAL AND CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS

Strong Cities Network: 

We are working closely with the new Strong Cities Network, an effort to assist 

mayors and sub-national authorities to share expertise and build capacity to develop 

localized CVE strategies. The Network already includes more than 25 cities from 

around the world and continues to grow. As a result of the Network, European cities 

are pairing with cities like Amman, Jordan, and Tunis, Tunisia, to help with CVE 

capacity-building. 

Youth and Women Engagement: 

We will continue our efforts to engage and empower youth who may be susceptible 

to violent extremist radicalization and recruitment. We will also deepen our ongoing 

support for women as family and community actors in recognizing and preventing 

radicalization into violent extremism. Youth can also play a critical role in mobilizing public support against violent extremism, including in countering violent extremist messaging. In the past, we have funded non-governmental organizations in 

East Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia that are mobilizing youth-led media 

campaigns against violent extremism in their communities. 

Civil Society Rehabilitation/Reintegration Network: 

We are working with non-governmental organizations that have a critical role to 

play in the rehabilitation and reintegration of former violent extremists—both inside and outside of prison settings. For example, we are funding an effort to build 

the capacity of civil society organizations in East Africa, the Sahel-Maghreb, and 

Southeast Asia that are involved in rehabilitation and reintegration work, with a 

focus on returning foreign terrorist fighters. We are also funding a new training 

course for government and non-governmental actors on designing strategies to handle returning foreign terrorist fighters. 

Researching Solutions to Violent Extremism (RESOLVE): 

We will expand our knowledge base by working with researchers around the 

world to better understand the local drivers of violent extremism and how communities can build resiliencies against it. Launched by the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and USAID and guided by a steering committee composed of 

research institutions around the world, the RESOLVE Network will leverage local 

research to promote exchanges between researchers, practitioners, and policymakers 

to build effective and sustainable responses to the drivers of violent extremism. In 

the next few months, the network will launch an online platform and develop a 

shared research agenda to focus efforts and resources on the top CVE research questions. 

Question 11. The 2015 National Security Strategy, 2015 Quadrennial Development & Diplomacy Review, and the U.N. Secretary General’s new report that came 

out last week on the forthcoming World Humanitarian Summit all make clear, stark 

calls for greater political leadership, investment and innovations to prevent and reduce violent conflict. However, the numbers aren’t adding up. State and USAID’s 

Democracy and Governance accounts have been cut roughly 23 percent in the last 

four years to make up for Presidential Initiatives and earmarks. A 2015 USAID OIG 

audit found that Washington is not meeting USAID Mission Directors’ requests for 

governance and conflict mitigation funding, and USAID’s Office of Conflict Mitigation and Management has lost nearly all of its core funding despite being one of 

the most regularly endorsed offices by our civil society partners. 

• Secretary Kerry, can you please explain to the Committee how your FY17 budget improves US capacities to prevent and reduce violent conflict? 

• What are State and USAID tactically doing right now to rejigger our foreign 

policy investments towards prevention? 

Answer. On May 18, 2016, the President signed Executive Order 13729 and in 

so doing enshrined a comprehensive approach to atrocity prevention and response, 


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including through the creation of the Atrocity Prevention Board (APB). As outlined 

in that E.O., the APB is an interagency body that seeks to ensure mass atrocities 

and the risk thereof are effectively considered and appropriately addressed by the 

U. S. government. The APB meets on a regular basis and coordinates the development and execution of policies and tools to prevent and respond to mass atrocities. 

The Department of State and USAID’s FY 2017 Budget Request provides $5 million toward atrocity prevention programming. These funds will be used to support 

programming in places identified by the APB for the prevention and mitigation of 

atrocities, as well as post-atrocity activities. 

Alongside the establishment of the APB, State and USAID are also making great 

strides in creating the policy infrastructure necessary to make conflict prevention 

a clear priority. Unlike crisis response where the needs are great but the challenges 

are more self-evident, conflict prevention requires stronger analytical, planning, and 

learning capabilities to discern where conflicts will crop up, how they will impact 

U.S. interests, and what amount of U.S. and international intervention is required. 

The Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights (J) has 

tasked the bureaus in the ‘‘J-family’’ of bureaus and offices to focus on conflict prevention. The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) has moved conflict prevention to the heart of its mission and work, with the bureau’s top three 

priorities comprising of: (1) preventing violent extremism; (2) preventing mass atrocities; and (3) preventing destabilizing violence around transitions like elections, 

ceasefires and peace agreements. To support this critical conflict prevention capacity 

in FY 2017, the President requested $39.5 million for CSO, including the $5 million 

for atrocity prevention mentioned above. 

The Department of State and UAID also recognize that countries with precarious 

justice institutions, poor governance, corruption, and human rights violations, create 

an environment in which instability, violent extremism, and humanitarian crises 

can flourish. Robust democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) programming 

that supports the development of government institutions, the inclusion of citizen 

voices in the political process, and the promotion and protection of human rights is 

critical to strengthening and expanding our efforts to prevent—rather than react 

to—the next political crisis, violent episode, human rights violation or mass atrocity. 

As such, Department of State and USAID’s FY 2017 Budget Request includes a robust $2.7 billion for DRG programs, which is $411.8 million (18 percent) above the 

FY 2016 earmark level for democracy programs. 

Question 12. With the current length of displacement averaging 17 years, refugees 

and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are increasingly in need of longer term assistance in addition in short-term emergency aid. Given the protracted nature of 

many of the current crises (for example—Syria, Yemen, and South Sudan), it is apparent that these refugees and IDPs will not be returning home any time soon. 86 

percent of the world’s refugees are hosted by developing countries, placing additional strain on countries that were already in need of development assistance. Appropriations for 2016 recognized the need to break down the silos between humanitarian assistance and development assistance by providing new transfer authorities 

from traditional development accounts to support countries affected by significant 

refugee flows. 

• How are these new authorities being implemented to supporting host communities, for example, in the Syria context? 

Answer. The administration appreciates Congress’ recognition and support of the 

tremendous refugee need and the substantial strain placed on host communities. In 

the context of the Syrian refugee crisis, the Department of State and USAID provide 

significant development and economic assistance to support refugee-hosting countries and communities, primarily in Jordan and Lebanon, in responding to the refugee crisis by supporting essential services and infrastructure in host communities. 

In both Lebanon and Jordan, we have re-oriented development assistance to meet 

the increased needs in geographic areas and sectors where refugees are having the 

greatest impact on host communities. The United States also provides humanitarian 

assistance to non-governmental organizations and U.N. organizations delivering assistance to Syrians in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. 

In Lebanon, U.S. development assistance primarily focuses on education, water, 

economic growth, and community resilience to support communities hosting large 

numbers of refugees from Syria. In education, our assistance has rehabilitated 183 

school buildings, including 55 schools in areas with large populations of displaced 

refugees. We have equipped classrooms, paid school fees for vulnerable children, and 

worked to enhance teaching methods and create quality learning opportunities. U.S. 

assistance has improved the availability of water services by increasing the effiVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:15 Aug 10, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\02 23 2016\30-927.T

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ciency of water management, improving water infrastructure and strengthening 

water governance. These efforts helped build financial management, planning and 

operations capacity; procure equipment and funding infrastructure for water; and 

develop customer service and outreach programs. More than 120,000 Syrian refugees are impacted by these interventions. 

In Jordan, U.S. development assistance focuses on the education, water, health 

and economic growth sectors to address the greater strains imposed by the refugee 

influx. The crisis is having a profound impact on the education sector, particularly 

public schools. To help meet this challenge, we are investing $231 million to expand 

120 schools, renovate 150 schools and build 25 new schools in areas with large numbers of Syrian refugees. In addition, USAID fast-tracked the expansion of 20 schools 

in overcrowded areas due to the refugee population. Workforce development programs are being reformulated to include Syrians as a result of the Government of 

Jordan’s agreement to issue work permits to Syrians. Assistance will include vocational training and job placement. In the water sector, our assistance is supporting 

the construction of a new pipeline, pump station and waste water treatment plant 

that will increase water supply and waste treatment for 1.7 million people in northern Jordan, where a large number of refugees reside. Additionally, U.S. government 

assistance to the Jordanian health sector includes health facility expansions and 

renovations, particularly near the Syrian border in areas with large numbers of refugees; this assistance has improved Jordan’s ability to deliver high quality reproductive, maternal, and newborn care in communities hosting refugees. 

The Department of State’s Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) and Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), USAID and other appropriate parties closely 

coordinate both overseas and in Washington to ensure humanitarian and development assistance programs are complimentary. The Department has also been exploring options along with the World Bank and other donors to provide multi-donor 

mechanisms that can provide leveraged assistance to Syria’s neighbors. 

Regarding the FY 2016 Appropriations bill, Section 7063 makes funds available 

to: expand and improve host government social services and basic infrastructure to 

accommodate the needs of such populations and persons; alleviate the social and 

economic strains placed on host communities; improve coordination of such assistance in a more effective and sustainable manner; and, leverage increased assistance 

from donors other than the United States government for central governments and 

local communities in such countries. This section does not, however, provide transfer 

authority between accounts. 

Question 13. Having traveled to Central America in recent months, I am deeply 

concerned about the situation in the region. As past strategy showed the limitations 

of solely focusing on security assistance, I support the Administration’s new push 

for a comprehensive approach. However, I am concerned that we are over funding 

economic programs, without making necessary and critical investments in strengthening the rule of law, building democratic institutions, and combating corruption. 

These programs were the smallest part of the FY 2016 request, and it appears the 

same in the FY 2017 request. 

• Are we spending too little on strengthening democratic governance? Can security take root or economic growth flourish without a strong presence of the rule 

of law? 

Answer. Strengthening governance and democracy are critical priorities for the 

U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America. The Administration’s FY 2017 

Budget Request seeks $203 million to support governance in the region, an increase 

of $57 million from the allocation for governance support in FY 2015 ($146 million). 

Improving governance in Central America requires similar efforts to improve prosperity and security. The request therefore calls for increased commitment to all 

three of the Strategy’s lines of action—security, prosperity, and governance—because advances in one line of action depend on advances in the others. 

Our efforts to strengthen democracy by implementing the Strategy have yielded 

successes, such as anti-corruption efforts that strengthen the rule of law, which will 

serve as the foundation for new governance programs supported by the request. The 

U.N. International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), to which 

the U.S. government has contributed $37 million to date, pursued customs fraud investigations that led to the arrest of former-President Perez Molina, former-Vice 

President Baldetti, and 35 others, including current and former directors of the tax 

authority. Honduras signed an agreement with the Organization of American States 

(OAS) on January 19 to create the OAS Mission Against Corruption and Impunity 

in Honduras (MACCIH), which will also address high-level corruption. El Salvador’s 


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new attorney general, Douglas Melendez, is establishing a public integrity task 

force, supported by U.S. assistance and training, to investigate corruption cases. 

The request seeks to capitalize on and sustain these successes through new prosperity and governance programs, building upon the strong political will in the region 

to engage as active partners and commit to substantial reform. U.S. efforts will support improved tax administration and revenue collection and encourage the use of 

internal control systems and internal checks and balances. We will support professionalizing civil services and judiciaries and strengthen municipal governments. The 

request will also support civil society organizations and help build regional networks 

to promote civic engagement, the protection of human rights, and increased transparency. 

Question 14. During my travel to Honduras, I had the chance meet with at-risk 

youth and hear first-hand the threats of crime, violence, drugs and the lack of opportunity the faced in their communities. Mr. Secretary, I was pleased to hear you 

announcement in mid-January that the U.S.—in close cooperation with UNHCR— 

would expand refugee processing in the region. 

• Given the urgent humanitarian situation in the region, what concrete steps are 

we taking to launch this program and ensure that eligible individuals have access to asylum screening? When will it start? 

Answer. The new Central American Minors program will complement our existing 

initiatives designed to protect Central American minors from the dangers of unaccompanied migration. Unlike our existing Central American Minors program, individuals and families without relatives in the United States will be eligible. We have 

spoken to a number of partners in the region, including nongovernmental entities, 

about different aspects of this program. These discussions are ongoing. We hope to 

begin accepting referrals in the coming months. 

Question 15. The prospects of a peace deal in Colombia not only hold the potential 

to end 50 years of conflict, but also highlight the strategic contribution of U.S. foreign assistance. In the final weeks of negotiations, as some concerns remain over 

accountability and appropriate punishment for human rights violations. What can 

we do to support conditions for a sustainable and lasting peace in Colombia? How 

can the U.S. best use funding requested for the President’s new initiative—Peace 

Colombia—to support implementation of a potential peace accord? 

Answer. During President Santos’ February 2016 visit, President Obama announced a new framework for our bilateral cooperation known as Peace Colombia. 

U.S. assistance in support of Peace Colombia is an important expression of our commitment to supporting one of our closest allies as it builds a more secure and prosperous future. We will focus ongoing and future U.S. assistance under three pillars: 

consolidating and expanding Colombia’s progress on security and counternarcotics, 

while reintegrating demobilized FARC combatants into society; expanding the Colombian state’s presence and institutions to strengthen the rule of law and rural 

economies, especially in former conflict areas; and promoting justice and addressing 

rights and interests of conflict victims. The administration requested $391 million in FY 2017 bilateral foreign assistance for the Department of State and USAID, an increase from the FY 2015 level of $307 

million for those accounts. The increased funding supports Colombia’s efforts to implement a peace accord with the FARC. In addition to the $391 million, the Administration requested FY 2017 funds for other agencies; contributions to Peace Colombia goals, including $44.6 million in Department of Defense counternarcotics programs, for a total interagency peace implementation request of $450 million. 

Economic Support Funds (ESF) address rural development, support to victims, reintegration of ex-combatants, and land reform. Increased funding will support Colombia’s efforts to bring public services, including justice, dispute resolution, and 

critical infrastructure, to the populations of former conflict areas. Increasing our 

support to rural road maintenance and construction is an important priority for the 

Colombian government; the United States has some ability to provide technical assistance in this area. 

In addition, funds will support integrating victims’ needs and rights into peace accord implementation. Specifically, funds will support the search for missing persons 

and strengthen national reconciliation efforts by promoting truth, criminal accountability, reparations (including land restitution), and guarantees of non-recurrence 

for conflict victims. ESF will also support human rights and judicial training programs. 

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance will 

support Colombia’s effort to implement its new counternarcotics strategy, which 

places greater emphasis on riverine, maritime, aerial, and land-based interdiction; 


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manual eradication; seizing assets through anti-money laundering operations; and 

dismantling organized crime groups through complex criminal investigations. 

INCLE funds will help the Colombian authorities develop the intelligence to make 

manual eradication efficient and safe; enhance interdiction; and improve Colombia’s 

ability to conduct complex investigations against criminal organizations. INCLE 

funding will also support extension of justice services to former conflict areas, a 

peace implementation priority. 

Requested Foreign Military Financing (FMF) will increase the Colombian military’s ability to project the state’s presence and provide security in former conflict 

areas. Support will focus on engineering units, counternarcotics battalions, aviation 

support, and other units that will extend the reach of the Colombian military to new 

areas. FMF will also support institutional reforms that will enhance the efficiency 

and flexibility of Colombia’s armed forces. 

Requested Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and related program funding will support U.S. participation in the Global Demining Initiative for Colombia, 

co-led with Norway, which the President announced on February 4. The initiative 

seeks to marshal international resources and technical assistance for Colombia’s 

pursuit of the goal to be landmine free by 2021. Landmines and improvised explosive devises kill or maim thousands of Colombians every year. Supporting Colombia’s demining efforts will help the Colombian government deliver a concrete ‘‘peace 

dividend’’ to the Colombian people; reinforce support for a peace accord; and provide 

a foundation for rural economic development by facilitating licit agriculture, investments in infrastructure, and access to markets. 

FISCAL YEARS 2015–2017 REQUESTS—STATE/USAID ONLY 

$ in thousands for all items 

FY 2015 

Actual 

FY 2016 

Request* 

FY 2017 

Request 

Columbia—State/USAID ............................................ 307,776 288,726 391,253 

Economic Support Fund ........................................ 133,000 141,326 167,328 

Food for Peace Title II ........................................... 6,835 — — 

Foreign Military Financing .................................... 27,000 25,000 38,525 

International Military Education & Training ......... 1,446 1,400 1,400 

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement .................................................................. 135,195 117,000 143,000 

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and 

Related Programs ............................................. 4,300 4,000 21,000 

of which, Antiterrorism ..................................... 800 500 — 

of which, Conventional Weapons Destruction 

(Demining) .................................................... 3,500 3,500 21,000 

*FY 2016 levels are pending allocation by the Department and USAID 

Question 16. How does your budget request fund health worker training and 

health system strengthening priorities worldwide? What are the U.S. goals for the 

multilateral Global Health Security Agenda for improving the capacity of countries 

worldwide to detect, prevent, and respond to diseases with pandemic potential? 

Given the extraordinary challenges we’ve seen with global health security over the 

last couple of years; please explain your flat funding request. 

Answer. The Department advances our global health mission through diplomacy 

and robust foreign assistance programs. Healthy people make for stronger, more 

prosperous, and more stable nations; enhance international security and trade; and 

ensure a safer, more resilient America. The U.S.-launched Global Health Security 

Agenda (GHSA) is a multilateral, multi-sectoral initiative to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats, regardless of source. Advancing the GHSA is a 

key U.S. government priority, and the United States is committed to assist at least 

30 countries to achieve GHSA targets over the next five years. 

The Department’s extensive collaborations with partner governments, international organizations, other U.S. government agencies, and civil society contribute 


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to implementation of these and other health system strengthening activities. Specifically the Department: 

• Ensures successful country-level implementation of U.S. programmatic activities; drives GHSA forward by assessing progress, determining where more work 

is needed, and helps U.S. technical agencies identify the partner(s) best placed 

to improve performance. 

• Leads diplomatic outreach at senior levels to build international support for 

GHSA with current members, other countries, and regional and multilateral 

bodies, including the G7, the G20, and the World Health Organization. 

• Manages relationships and builds partnerships with major non-governmental 

and philanthropic partners, especially internationally. 

Through our interagency partners including USAID and the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention (CDC), GHSA promotes a strategic approach that fosters developing multi-sectoral collaboration with partners across public health/medicine, 

science, agriculture/veterinary, interior (security), border and trade, and defense 

agencies to prevent, detect, and respond to threats posed by the natural emergence 

of new diseases, as well as the intentional or accidental release of dangerous pathogens that have the potential to jump from animals to humans. A core component 

within GHSA is expanding the capacity of health care workers to identify and respond to infectious disease threats, expand the capacity of veterinarians and others 

within the animal health community to prevent, detect and respond to infectious 

disease outbreaks that could spread to humans. 

The U.S. government—including PEPFAR, the President’s Malaria Initiative, and 

the rest of the broad global health portfolio—puts a high priority on health worker 

training and health systems strengthening. Funding for these critically important 

activities are core components of our programs and, while not requested separately, 

are incorporated into each component of health programming. For example, since its 

founding, PEPFAR has worked to build health infrastructure and strengthen health 

systems capacity. 

To support PEPFAR’s human resources for health (HRH) strategy, PEPFAR has 

committed significant resources to strengthen the capacity of health workers to address HIV/AIDS across Africa with a particular focus on some of the world’s most 

fragile states. As of the end of FY 2015, PEPFAR has trained more than 190,000 

health care workers to deliver HIV and other health services. These efforts not only 

support patients living with HIV/AIDS but also provide essential health systems 

that are leveraged for malaria, immunizations, and other health needs. 

Additionally, PEPFAR’s investments in health systems strengthening (HSS), including building laboratory capacity and creating and supporting strategic information systems, enabled countries with PEPFAR investments to respond to and contain Ebola outbreaks (e.g., Nigeria, Uganda, etc.). PEPFAR’s health systems investments cover a wide range of structural and operational elements of a functioning 

health delivery system. 

All PEPFAR country programs include core systems investments in areas of laboratory strengthening, strategic information, HIV and other essential drug and supply chain procurement and management, the production and training of human resources for health (i.e., professional and community health care workers), expanding 

health financing opportunities through increasing domestic investments, developing 

and implementing essential policies and practices at the national and subnational 

and clinical levels, promoting capable and functioning governance structures, and 

numerous other elements of an effective health service program. For example, HRH 

investments ensure that health workers with the right skills are in the right places 

to scale up HIV services to achieve UNAIDS 90-90-90 targets. 

Our achievements within HRH include: rapid scale-up of highly trained providers 

to deliver services in health facilities and communities most affected by HIV/AIDS, 

major investments in future physicians and nurses, with HRH training and production capacities strengthened in 40 medical schools and 20 nursing schools across 14 

sub-Saharan African countries; and strengthened HRH data systems to drive decision making, improved HRH policies and regulations to support both HIV services 

scale up and quality of services provided, and support for increased HRH retention. 

The FY 2017 budget includes funding for continued implementation of GHSA activities in Asia and some African countries. This request complements FY 2016 

Ebola emergency funding, which expanded the coverage of USAID’s GHSA and 

emerging pandemic threats portfolio into West Africa, where activities had not been 

implemented. 

Over the last 15 months, USAID has initiated work in 15 of the GHSA designated 

countries in Africa using the Ebola emergency funding. Technical assistance has 

been provided in key areas, including risk communications, infection prevention conVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:15 Aug 10, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00097 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\02 23 2016\30-927.T

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trol, and targeted surveillance. Building health system capacity to sustainably 

achieve GHSA objectives is core to the USG’s approach. 

Question 17. Despite the threat that infectious diseases like TB pose to the world, 

the FY2017 budget request cuts funding for all USAID infectious disease programs, 

except malaria. How do you justify these substantial cuts in programs targeting 

such deadly diseases as TB? 

Answer. USAID takes its responsibility to combat infectious diseases extremely 

seriously even in a difficult budget environment. In the example of tuberculosis (TB) 

that you have highlighted, the FY 2017 Budget Request for TB of $191 million is 

a reduction of $45 million from the FY 2016 appropriated level. Over the last five 

fiscal years (FY 2012-16), through USAID-Global Health Programs account funds, 

USAID’s funding for TB reached $1.17 billion. However, these figures do not represent the totality of the U.S. government’s response to TB. USAID collaborates 

with other programs including PEPFAR on TB/HIV co-infection interventions, and 

the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund) to integrate 

and expand TB health services and strengthen delivery platforms. 

The Global Fund is a major donor for international TB control, and the U.S. government remains the largest donor to the Global Fund. In fact, the U.S. government 

is the world’s leading donor to TB, and USAID is the lead agency for international 

TB. Furthermore, middle-income countries, which have higher burdens of TB and 

multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB), have a greater ability to pay for their 

programs and are increasingly stepping up to this responsibility by bearing a larger 

share of the costs. To further increase their share of resources, USAID is continuing 

its work with these countries on domestic resource mobilization. 

USAID will lead the international component of the National Action Plan for 

Combating Multidrug-Resistant Tuberculosis (National Action Plan) by introducing 

new point-of-care diagnostics, new MDR-TB drugs and regimens, and new approaches to improve adherence. USAID is already leveraging additional resources 

and creating efficiencies through innovative partnerships with two American companies and a global partnership to achieve more with existing resources, which include: 

• Janssen Pharmaceuticals will provide $50 million for the National Action Plan, 

through the donation of new drugs, strengthening of surveillance systems, and 

improving adherence to MDR-TB treatment; 

• Through a partnership among Cepheid (the producer of the Xpert TB and MDRTB diagnostic), USAID, PEPFAR, UNITAID and the Bill & Melinda Gates 

Foundation, Cepheid agreed to reduce the price of the Xpert diagnostic cartridge 

from almost $17 to less than $10. 

• The Cepheid diagnostic test price reduction has already increased our ability to 

accurately and quickly diagnose TB and MDR-TB, and saved over $50 million 

in two years, including for countries like South Africa’s purchasing of tests with 

domestic resources; and 

• USAID has partnered with the Stop TB Partnership’s Global Drug Facility to 

achieve a 50 percent price reduction for MDR-TB drugs, thereby stretching resources for the U.S. government, Global Fund and country partners. 

Question 18. Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 

(NADR) support a broad range of U.S. national interests through critical, security 

related programs that reduce threats posed by international terrorist activities; 

landmines, and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD). It appears funding for these programs in the 2017 budget was reduced by 

$217m almost 25 percent of their total funding. 

• Can you explain why funding for these vital programs was reduced in the 2017 

budget? 

Answer. The Department’s total FY 2017 Request for the Nonproliferation, AntiTerrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) account, including Overseas 

Contingency Operations (OCO) funds, is $668.5 million, which is a reduction of 

$217.0 million (25 percent) below the level that Congress appropriated in FY 2016. 

The primary driver of the decrease in this account is the reduction of the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) level. The FY 2017 Request for CTPF is $80 

million, which is $95 million below the FY 2016 appropriated CTPF level of $175 

million. 

The Department’s FY 2017 Request for CTPF is $80 million, comprised of $21 million in NADR OCO and $59 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF)—OCO for 

CTPF, which will build on the NADR funds Congress provided for CTPF in FY 


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2016. We expect that some FY 2016 CTPF-funded programs will be implemented 

over several years and therefore believe a smaller amount of NADR funding ($21 

million requested) will suffice in FY 2017 to sustain and build on our FY 2016 investments, when combined with the request for ESF funding to support activities 

that will work to counter violent extremism. 

Question 19a. The FY17 Congressional Budget Justification for the Diplomatic 

Policy and Support category included a $1.4 million increase to support cyber security policy coordination. Can you provide for us a detailed summary of what the increase in funds will be used for? 

Answer. The Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues (S/CCI) FY 2017 Request 

is $5.4 million in Diplomatic Engagement resources, which is $1.4 million and one 

additional Foreign Service domestic position, above the FY 2016 level of $4 million. 

These funds support contract personnel salaries and benefits, official travel, and 

professional services. 

Question 19b. Please provide a breakdown of the various specific programs under 

S/CCI and describe how they are connected to our larger strategic goals and objectives, especially as they pertain to the President’s International Strategy for Cyberspace (‘‘Strategy’’). Please provide a historical breakdown of S/CCI’s budget and programs since its creation in 2011. 

Answer. The Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues (S/CCI) coordinates with 

the many offices within the Department of State including functional bureaus (e.g. 

Economic and Business Affairs; Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Counter Terrorism; International Organizations Affairs; International Narcotics and Law Enforcement), geographic bureaus and across the U.S. government to advance an open, 

interoperable, secure and reliable Internet and information security policies and to 

implement the President’s International Strategy for Cyberspace (‘‘Strategy’’). Priorities for the office include promoting norms of responsible state behavior, advancing 

cybersecurity, fighting cybercrime, promoting multi-stakeholder Internet governance, and advancing Internet freedom. 

Separately, S/CCI executes its own capacity building and training programs. 

Below is a breakdown of S/CCI’s budget since its creation in 2011: 

S/CCI’S BUDGET SINCE 2011 

(in millions of dollars) 

Fiscal Year 

S/CCI 

Budget Total 

2011 .400 

2012 2 

2013 4 

2014 5 

2015 7 

2016 4 

2017 5 

Question 19c. How would the State Department evaluate its efforts to implement 

the President’s International Strategy for Cyberspace? 

Answer. The Department of State leads the U.S. government’s diplomatic and development engagement on cyberspace, and is a leading participant in the whole-ofgovernment approach to achieve foreign policy and national security objectives. The 

Department has devoted significant effort and resources to mainstreaming cyberspace issues within the Department, into building robust foreign diplomatic engagements on cyber issues, as well as building the necessary internal capacity to formulate, coordinate, and implement cyber policy and execute U.S. cyber diplomacy. 

Developing and augmenting relationships with other countries using diplomatic 

and foreign assistance tools is our best means to implement the President’s International Strategy for Cyberspace (‘‘Strategy’’). One metric to evaluate the Department’s efforts is the number of countries we engage diplomatically on cyber policy 

and/or provide with technical assistance. The Department has steadily increased its 


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diplomatic and development assistance reach and is on track to meet the goal of 50 

countries on or before September 2017. 

At the same time, we have been successfully integrating cyber into State-USAID 

strategic plans and all of the core Department of State core strategic planning documents, targeting new resources, and increasing the capacity of our diplomatic corps. 

We have trained over 150 officers, from more than 120 embassies and posts, on 

cyberspace policy via Department-led interagency regional workshops in 2014 and 

2015, and will train an additional 100 officers from embassies and posts in April 

2016. Additionally, since 2011, we have trained over 200 officers from more than 

70 embassies and posts on Internet and telecommunications policy through an annual course at the Foreign Service Institute and through regional training in 2014 

and 2015. These trainings ensure officers at posts are fluent in cyber issues and can 

persuasively engage and influence our international interlocutors. 

With consistent and expanded efforts, the number of like-minded countries will 

continue to grow, and the number of countries engaged with us in dialogues on 

cyber issues will increase. 

Question 19d. How has the State Department leveraged bilateral and multilateral 

partnerships; international and multi-stakeholder organizations; and private sector 

collaboration to advance the seven policy priorities enumerated in the Strategy? 

Answer. The Department of State, in partnership with other Federal departments 

and agencies, works bilaterally and multilaterally to lead and shape the international debate around achieving an open, secure, interoperable, and reliable Internet. The Department has leveraged the advent of cyberspace policy as a foreign policy imperative to create a broad range of new, cross-cutting bilateral and multilateral diplomatic engagements, and integrated cyber issues into numerous existing 

diplomatic processes and fora. 

We also leverage cyber policy to work closely on cross-cutting issues such as countering violent extremism online. Cyber issues have gained significant traction in virtually every regional and global venue, including the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe, the Organization of American States, the ASEAN Regional 

Forum, and the United Nations. The Department also plays a leading role in fostering collaboration between the public and private sector. 

Since early 2011, the Department has made significant strides in implementing 

the President’s strategic goals across all of the priorities. 

Some specific accomplishments are: 

• launching whole-of-government cyber policy dialogues with the European 

Union, Germany, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea, among others; 

• launching a whole-of-government information and communication technology 

(ICT) and Internet Working Group with Brazil, and new digital economy policy 

dialogues with Colombia and Taiwan as well as a dialogue partnership with 

ASEAN; 

• negotiating the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 

(OECD) Principles for Internet Policymaking (2011), as well as updates to the 

‘‘privacy guidelines’’ (2013) and ‘‘security guidelines’’ (2014) that advance strategies aimed at promoting sound Internet policy practices and managing privacy 

and digital security risk toward economic and social prosperity; 

• working with the Department of Commerce and other interagency partners to 

facilitate the successful negotiation of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework 

with the European Commission (to replace the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework); 

• collaborating with the United Kingdom to launch the Global Conference on 

Cyberspace series in 2011, to expand the Strategy vision among a like-minded 

community of governments, civil society groups, and private sector entities;partnering with the governments of Hungary, the Republic of Korea, and 

the Netherlands to ensure additional successful Global Conferences on Cyberspace in 2012, 2013, and 2015; 

• achieving ministerial commitments, advance polices to increase broadband access and facilitate the free flow of information across borders, and developing 

global ICT standards through engagements in international organizations, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the International 

Telecommunication Union (ITU); 

• securing several key commitments from China on cyberspace issues after several years of high-level bilateral engagements; 

• advancing and preserving the multi-stakeholder approach to Internet governance at key international negotiations including the U.N. General Assembly’s 


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High Level Meeting on the Overall Review of the World Summit on the Information Society and numerous other global conferences and events; 

• enlarging the Group of 7 (G7) 24/7 Network in partnership with the Department of Justice, to 70 countries; 

• launched the Freedom Online Coalition as one of 15 founding countries in December 2011, and helped it expand to 29 countries; 

• initiating two regional cyber consultations in Europe focusing on cooperation in 

the Baltic countries and coordination in the Nordic-Baltic countries; 

• integrating cyber policy into existing mechanisms such as the North American 

Leaders Summit and the Gulf Cooperation Council; and 

• convening successful U.S.- GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) Cyber Working 

Group meetings in Riyadh in August 2015, which explored the cyber security 

readiness of Gulf countries and possible areas of cooperation in developing cyber 

policies. 

Taking into consideration the rapidly expanding environment of global cyber 

threats and the reality that many developing nations are still in the early stages 

of their cyber maturity, the Department of State anticipates continued expansion of 

our cyber-focused diplomatic efforts for the foreseeable future, which will require additional resources for diplomatic engagement. 

Question 19e. How has the State Department facilitated cybersecurity capacitybuilding abroad through building technical capacity, cybersecurity capacity, and policy relationships to advance the Strategy’s development objectives? 

Answer. The Department of State, in partnership with the interagency, utilizes 

an active, ongoing, and longstanding series of capacity building programs and consultations to expand Internet access and build the capacity of foreign governments 

across a range of interconnected cyberspace policy issues to combat cybercrime, 

counter violent extremism online, improve cooperation with global partners to address shared threats, promote a culture of cybersecurity, develop cyber confidence 

building measures, promote freedom online, and help developing countries improve 

domestic market and regulatory conditions to catalyze private sector investment. 

The Department actively works to advance U.S. strategic interests, in coordination with like-minded partners. Many other foreign countries have followed our lead 

by drafting national cyber strategies, establishing cyber policy offices in their foreign 

ministries, and elevating cyber policy to a top diplomatic priority. Since early 2011, 

the Department has conducted a number of capacity building projects to support cybersecurity. Some specific accomplishments are: 

• providing, in partnership with the interagency, cybercrime and cybersecurity 

training to officials from 35 sub-Saharan African nations; 

• conducting cybercrime training for ASEAN countries and the Pacific Islands; 

• joining the Netherlands in founding the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise as 

a global platform for countries, international; organizations, and the private sector to exchange best practices and expertise on cyber capacity building; 

• partnering with Japan, Australia, Canada, the African Union Commission, and 

Symantec on four cybersecurity and cybercrime capacity building initiatives; 

• helping launch the Alliance for Affordable Internet, a public-private partnership 

that works to catalyze policy change to drive down the cost of broadband and 

unlock rapid gains in Internet penetration rates around the world; 

• investing $145 million in tools and technologies to promote freedom online; 

• launching the Global Connect initiative that seeks to help bring 1.5 billion people without Internet access online by 2020; 

• launching global computer security incident response teams (CSIRT) capacity 

building efforts via a Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute program; and 

• promoting the development of comprehensive national cyber policies and strategies globally, in close partnership with regional multilateral bodies such as the 

Organization of American States (OAS) and the African Union Commission 

(AUC) through a MITRE Corporation initiative for the State Department. 

Cyber is a relatively new policy area. As the number of countries connected to the 

Internet continues to grow rapidly, we expect cyber issues to expand at a steep rate, 

with an increase in areas of focus, and the State Department will continue to use 

resources made available to address emergent concerns. 


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Question 19f. How has the State Department advanced the five ‘‘principles’’ (upholding fundamental freedoms, respect for property, valuing privacy, protection from 

crime, right of self-defense) and the five ‘‘emerging norms’’ (global interoperability, 

network stability, reliable access, multi-stakeholder governance, cybersecurity due 

diligence) that the Strategy enumerates? 

Answer. As cyber issues have dramatically grown in global importance over the 

last five years, the Department has prioritized efforts to advance the principles and 

values described in the President’s International Strategy for Cyberspace (‘‘Strategy’’). A key aspect of the Strategy is promoting stability in cyberspace through the 

identification and promotion of certain voluntary norms of state behavior in peacetime. Proceeding from the principles and ‘‘emerging norms’’ enumerated in the 

Strategy, significant progress has been made to develop international consensus 

around the concept of norms of state conduct in cyberspace. Specific accomplishments include: 

• adoption of U.S.-championed framework of international cyber stability through 

pivotal negotiations in the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on 

Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security in 2013 and 2015 that resulted, inter alia, in the 

affirmation of the applicability of existing international law, including the 

United Nations Charter, to state conduct in cyberspace and the articulation of 

voluntary peacetime norms of state behavior; 

• reaching consensus at the 2014 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

Wales Summit on a statement affirming that international law applies to state 

behavior in cyberspace, and cyber defense is part of NATO’s collective defense 

mission; and 

• achieving 2015 Group of 20 (G20) Leaders’ commitments to affirm the applicability of international law to state behavior in cyberspace, refrain from conducting or supporting cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property with the intent of providing competitive advantage to companies or commercial sectors, 

and endorse the view that all states should abide by norms of responsible behavior. 

Additionally, the Department advances these principles, outside the framework of 

identifying voluntary peacetime norms of responsible state behavior, as part of our 

broader bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts to promote an open, secure, reliable and interoperable cyberspace. Noteworthy accomplishments include: 

• helping to expand Budapest Convention membership by 17 countries since 2011, 

and to recruit another 10 countries that are actively working to become parties 

to the Convention. Promoted the Convention as a framework for numerous 

other countries; 

• working with partners to secure passage of the 2012 U.N. Human Rights Council resolution affirming that people have the same rights online as offline, and 

a 2014 resolution reaffirming the same principle; and 

• launching global computer security incident response team capacity building efforts, partnering with the Department of Homeland Security and the Forum of 

Incident Response and Security Teams. 

Despite this progress, substantial work remains to realize the vision articulated 

in the Strategy. Thus, the Department anticipates continued acceleration of our 

cyber-focused diplomatic efforts for the foreseeable future, which will require additional resources for diplomatic engagement. 

Question 20. Diversity Initiatives—I was pleased to see that the State Department 

Congressional Budget Justification included a request to pursue diversity initiatives 

that focus on recruitment and retention programs. In particular, it is great to see 

that many of the diversity reforms included in the ‘‘Department of State Operations 

Authorization and Embassy Security Act, Fiscal Year 2016’’ which passed unanimously by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were specifically called for in 

the request. 

• Can you provide for us a specific breakdown of how the $5.4 million requested 

will be used for the new diversity initiatives? This breakdown should include 

other diversity programs and initiatives the State Department is currently pursuing. In particular, will there be an increase in the Donald Payne Fellowship 

for USAID? What other new initiatives is the State Department considering implementing to boost its objectives in having a diverse workforce? 


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Answer. The $5.4 million requested would be spent as follows: Pickering and Rangel Fellowship Programs: $4.5 million, including one Civil Service USDH position; 

Paid Internships: $400,000; International Career Advancement Program (ICAP): 

$100,000; Diversity Outreach: $375,000. 

The Pickering and Rangel Fellowship programs are the Department’s most significant tool for increasing diversity within the Foreign Service. These programs bolster 

the Department’s ability to attract highly qualified and diverse candidates, at the 

graduate and undergraduate levels, who are interested in a career in the Foreign 

Service. The Department will expand partnerships with community based organizations such as Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities (HACU) and Washington Internships for Native Students (WINS) to facilitate the provision of more 

internships to students from underrepresented groups. 

ICAP is a professional development and leadership program for mid-career professionals in the U.S. international affairs sector. The program’s tradition of assisting 

mid-career professionals advance to more senior positions in international affairs 

aligns well with the Department’s goals to strengthen leadership and to retain and 

sustain its diverse talent pool. Our Diversity Outreach funding will enable Human 

Resources (HR) to recruit more effectively for diversity by enhancing the Department’s advertising contract and recruitment travel. HR’s advertising and marketing 

strategies contribute directly to identifying, attracting, and engaging with the most 

competitive and diverse prospects possible to Department of State Foreign Service 

and Civil Service careers. 

USAID’s FY 2017 request for their Operating Expense (OE) account includes 

$850,000 for the Payne Fellowship program to support a total of seven students. 

This is consistent with their FY 2016 request, an increase of one to two fellows over 

their FY 2015 levels. The increase of $5.4 million in diversity funding came in 

State’s Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) account. To further expand the 

Payne Fellowships, an increase would be needed in USAID’s OE account. 

Question 21. During a recent CoDel to southern Africa, local government and nongovernmental leaders in several countries identified poor primary education systems 

as the number one constraint to governance and economic growth. According to the 

USAID FY17 budget request, FY17 basic education programming is estimated at 

$561.8 million, $238.2 million (29.8 percent) below the FY15 directive of $800 million, and $38.7 million (6.4 percent) below the FY16 request level of $600.5 million. 

• Why the reduction in funds for FY17? How does FY17 programming for basic 

education address key issues such as teacher training and credentialing and 

curriculum development? 

Answer. At $562 million, the President’s FY 2017 basic education request is a 6.4 

percent decrease from the FY 2016 request, but an increase from the FY 2014 and 

FY 2015 requests. The request at this level is a result of a desire to strike a balance 

between support of basic education key priorities, such as democracy and human 

rights, food security, and assistance for sectors like health, water, and economic 

growth. 

We recognize that investments in inclusive, quality education play a critical role 

in promoting long-term economic growth, promoting participatory democracies, and 

in turn reducing poverty and inequality. To address profound global education challenges, USAID has focused its Education Strategy on ensuring that all children 

learn to read and that children in crisis situations have access to a quality education, in spite of their circumstances. As a result of focusing efforts, USAID successfully has reached 38 million students with reading programs and improved the 

quality of education of nearly 12 million children in conflict environments. 

FY 2017 programming, in line with USAID’s Education Strategy, will continue to 

address key issues such as teacher training, credentialing and curriculum development. For example, in Malawi, through a partnership with Lakeland College in Wisconsin, USAID supports a teacher education program that emphasizes early grade 

reading. Teachers in Jordan will be trained on how to provide psycho-social support 

and use non-traditional learning techniques to better assist students who have been 

adversely impacted by the Syrian crisis. Mother tongue curriculum development will 

continue in Ethiopia, ensuring that a generation of students will have access to 

quality instruction. 

In addition to direct assistance for education, USAID prioritizes partnerships to 

leverage technical knowledge and financial resources, extending the influence of appropriated funds. For example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, USAID leveraged ÷36 million committed by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) to jointly support increased access to primary school 

for out-of-school children; increased retention of children in schools; strengthening 


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capacities of the parents committees and school management committees; and 

strengthening the Ministry for Primary, Secondary, and Vocational Education. 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO

SECRETARY KERRY BY SENATOR RUBIO

Question 1. It has been 48 days since North Korea’s nuclear test and 16 days 

since its missile test, but the UN Security Council has not acted except for statements saying it would ‘‘take further significant measures’’ and ‘‘adopt [a new Security Council resolution] expeditiously.’’ Why has the UN Security Council not acted 

and what signal does that send to North Korea on the consequences (or lack thereof) 

for its provocations? 

Answer. In response to the North Korean’s fourth nuclear test on January 6, 

2016, and its launch using ballistic missile technology on February 7, 2016, the 

United States will propose to impose additional binding sanctions on North Korea 

(DPRK) as these actions are in clear violation of its U.N. obligations. We will push 

for the resolution to contain the toughest set of sanctions imposed by the Security 

Council in more than two decades. They will have broader scope and impact by targeting key economic activities that generate funds for the regime as well as further 

restricting DPRK access to commodities and technologies that support proscribed activities. The UNSCR will also incorporate unprecedented inspection and financial 

provisions, including mandatory inspections of cargo to and from the DPRK and a 

requirement to terminate banking relationships with DPRK financial institutions. 

For these new, as well as existing, U.N. sanctions to be effective, international 

cooperation is essential. We will continue to work closely with the Security Council’s 

DPRK sanctions committee and its Panel of Experts, like-minded partners, and others around the globe to ensure the full and transparent implementation of new and 

all previous U.N. resolutions. We will also continue our outreach to countries that 

have diplomatic or trade relations with North Korea to prevent activities proscribed 

by U.N. resolutions or targeted by U.S. sanctions. We maintain regular contact and 

consultations with our allies and partners to counter—whether through persuasion 

or pressure—the threat to global security posed by the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic 

missile programs. 

Question 2. Following the President signing the North Korea Sanctions and Policy 

Enhancement Act of 2016 into law, 

• What steps has the State Department taken encourage other countries to adopt 

similar measures? 

• Has the State Department warned countries on the types of activities that could 

be sanctioned? 

Answer. The United States is actively engaged with our regional partners to coordinate bilateral sanctions aimed at encouraging North Korea to alter their strategic calculus in regards to the development of nuclear weapons. We work closely 

with our partners in the region to ensure that bilateral sanctions send a strong message to North Korea in the wake of recent violations of previous United Nations Security Council resolutions. 

The act requires sanctions on those who knowingly transfer significant amounts 

of certain metals, minerals, or software to or from North Korea for use by or in processes directly related to certain entities and activities, and we have added into our 

discussions with other countries guidance as to the types of activities that are sanctioned under the new law. Following the enactment of the act and the adoption of 

UNSCR 2270, the United States is engaging countries around the world to underscore the importance of vigorous sanctions enforcement. 

Question 3. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is an integral component of Iran’s economy, terrorist activities and human rights violations, and remains 

sanctioned under the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. What steps 

have been taken to warn foreign governments, companies, and financial institutions 

of continuing engagement with IRGC or IRGC-affiliated companies? 

Answer. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) remains firmly under 

U.S. sanctions for its support for terrorism and other activities. We have no intention of removing these sanctions until the IRGC ceases such activity. Executive 

Order (E.O.) 13224, which allows us to target terrorists of any stripe across the 

globe, is employed forcefully against Iran. The IRGC-Qods Force, the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security, Iran’s Mahan Air, Hizballah, and over 100 other 


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Iran-related individuals and entities remain subject to sanctions under this E.O. 

Further, under Iran sanctions statutes, foreign financial institutions may be subject 

to secondary sanctions for knowingly facilitating a significant financial transaction 

or providing significant financial services for any person on the Specially Designated 

National (SDN) List, which includes the IRGC and IRGC-related officials, agents, 

and affiliates. These and other authorities allow us to continue to target the IRGC 

for any activities which threaten us or our allies. 

Question 4. The Wall Street Journal reported that the Obama administration 

agreed to talks with North Korea on a peace treaty just before North Korea’s January nuclear test and asked that the discussions also address the nuclear program. 

• Did the Obama administration agree to talks on a peace treaty without any concessions on North Korea’s nuclear program? 

• If so, were South Korea and Japan on board with proceeding with discussions 

on a peace treaty without any nuclear concessions? 

Answer. It was the North Koreans who proposed discussing a peace treaty. The 

United States carefully considered their proposal and made clear that 

denuclearization had to be part of any such discussion. North Korea rejected our response. Our response to North Korea’s proposal was consistent with our longstanding focus on denuclearization. 

Question 5. Mahan Air, an Iranian airline that was sanctioned in October 2011 

for its activities with designated terrorist groups the IRGC Qods Force and 

Hizballah, continues to fly to Europe. 

• What has the Obama administration done to prevent a U.S. designated, terrorism-linked airline from continuing to fly to Europe? Has the Obama administration considered using secondary sanctions authorities against companies that 

provide services to Mahan Air? 

Answer. We share your concerns about the activities of Mahan Air. The Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and State have a long history of working to thwart 

Mahan Air’s activities. We share your commitment to enforcement of measures 

against denied persons and designated entities and will continue to vigorously employ our authorities as part of our broader efforts to counter Iran’s support for terrorism and destabilizing regional activities. We have numerous domestic authorities—including sanctions—to counter Iran’s support for terrorism or other destabilizing activities. The State Department, Treasury, Commerce and our partners in 

the Intelligence Community are constantly looking for solid evidence of such activity. When we see evidence, we will build a case, and we will take action. 

For years, Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has investigated 

and targeted Mahan Air procurement activities using its unique administrative authorities. BIS maintains a Temporary Denial Order (TDO) against Mahan, and its 

procurement agents, that has been in place since 2008. This TDO is renewed every 

180 days pursuant to renewed findings that Mahan Air continues to present an imminent threat of violating U.S. export control laws. BIS has added a number of 

Mahan front companies and procurement agents to the TDO, as well as to its Entity 

List, thus prohibiting engagement in transactions involving items subject to the Export Administration Regulations. 

Treasury’s ongoing efforts to disrupt Mahan Air’s ability to operate include numerous designations against the airline and its support networks since Mahan Air’s 

designation in 2011. Treasury continues to vigorously enforce sanctions against this 

type of activity, designating 16 persons for their involvement with Mahan Air and 

identifying more than 50 Mahan Air planes as blocked property. Treasury also uses 

its authorities to disrupt Mahan Air’s financial relationships. 

The State Department also plays a vital role in the administration’s efforts to 

counter Mahan Air and its networks by engaging with foreign governments to seek 

their cooperation in disrupting or limiting the activities of Mahan Air abroad. Working together with its interagency colleagues, State’s efforts have been successful in 

disrupting Mahan Air’s activities on several occasions. 

The Departments will continue working together to actively investigate and aggressively enforce violations of sanctions on Iran to work together to counter Iran’s 

and Mahan Air’s malign activities. This effort includes ongoing exploration of options—including by working with friendly countries—to deprive Mahan Air of the 

use of its aircraft and its ability to engage in further illicit conduct. 

Question 6. The politically driven manipulation of the State Department’s 2015 

Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report is a major setback to U.S. efforts against human 

trafficking around the world. According to whistleblowers within the State DepartVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:15 Aug 10, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\02 23 2016\30-927.T

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ment, the administration has announced to the world that it will allow political considerations to trump real reform. The most glaring example is the politically driven 

improvement of Cuba from the ‘‘Tier 3’’ category to the ‘‘Tier 2 Watch List.’’ 

• Given the widely held perception that several countries were undeservedly upgraded in this year’s report for political reasons, what will be done to rebuild 

the credibility of the report? 

• In regards to Cuba, will you be willing to place Cuba back on Tier 3 for its failure to combat human trafficking? 

Answer. Over the past 15 years, the Trafficking in Persons Report has consistently drawn public attention to the problem of modern slavery and foreign government efforts to address it. The report is widely regarded as the gold standard for 

anti-trafficking information. The Department strives to make the report as objective 

and accurate as possible, documenting the successes and shortcomings of government anti-trafficking efforts measured against the minimum standards established 

under U.S. law. The attention that the report generates demonstrates the impact 

and importance of addressing this crime and protecting trafficking victims. The Department will continue to use the report to elevate the issue on the global stage, 

to guide its anti-trafficking programming around the world, and to encourage foreign governments to implement recommended improvements in their efforts. 

In the report, the Department evaluates government efforts to combat trafficking 

based on criteria established under U.S. law. I have made combating human trafficking a priority for the Department, and demonstrated this through consistent 

high-level outreach and dedication of resources. 

As of the writing of the 2015 Trafficking in Persons Report, Cuba did not fully 

comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it 

was making significant efforts to do so. A Tier 2 Watch List ranking indicates there 

is much room for improvement in the government’s anti-trafficking efforts; an upgrade to the Watch List does not mean the government is doing enough to address 

human trafficking. Cuba was upgraded to Tier 2 Watch List in 2015 because it 

made significant efforts to comply with the minimum standards for the elimination 

of trafficking, but did not yet fully comply. In the same manner, the 2016 TIP Report will evaluate the government’s efforts and assign Cuba a Tier ranking based 

on those efforts during the reporting period, regardless of where it was ranked the 

previous year. 

Question 7. In the 2008 reauthorization of the TVPRA, the State Department was 

authorized to suspend certain categories of U.S. visas (A-3/G-5) used for guest workers at specific diplomatic missions or international organizations that have abused 

or exploited such workers in the past. Despite several cases, the State Department 

has yet to suspend any countries A-3/G-5 visa programs for abuse. Will you pledge 

to ensure that this portion of the TVPRA is enforced? 

Answer. The Department is committed to implementing all applicable provisions 

of the TVPA as reauthorized, including those relating to A-3 and G-5 visas. Although there has not yet been a case of visa suspension under the William Wilberforce Act, the Department has seen that the law has been a factor in persuading 

foreign governments and their diplomats to address allegations of abuse made by 

domestic workers, and in some cases, to settle civil cases brought by former domestic workers. In addition, the suspension provision appears to have made foreign missions more attentive to the issue generally and more willing to cooperate with the 

Department when allegations of abuse are brought to their attention. 

Question 8. During the 2013 Annual Meeting of the President’s Interagency Task 

Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking In Persons, you announced the launch of 

a new in-person registration process for foreign domestic workers to prevent trafficking by diplomats. What is the status of this program? Is every A-3 or G-5 visaholder being served by this program? 

Answer. The In-person Registration Program for foreign domestic workers employed by foreign mission and international organization personnel launched in October 2015. The program currently covers foreign domestic workers employed by foreign mission and international organization personnel in the Washington, DC area. 

The program will continue to be expanded to cover foreign domestic workers employed by foreign mission and international organization personnel throughout the 

United States. 

Question 9. As you know, Christians, Yezidis, and other religious minorities in 

Iraq and Syria have been deliberately and ruthlessly targeted by the Islamic State. 

This genocidal campaign threatens to wipe out these communities from the lands 

they’ve inhabited since Antiquity. The Omnibus bill required the Department, withVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:15 Aug 10, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\02 23 2016\30-927.T

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in 90 days of passage, to submit to the appropriate congressional committees and 

evaluation of the persecution endured by these groups and a determination of 

whether such attacks constitute genocide. 

• Is the Department on track to make that determination in a timely fashion? 

• Apart from seeking input from outside groups has the Department undertaken 

its own fact-finding assessment akin to what Secretary Powell commissioned 

during the Darfur genocide? 

Answer. We are appalled by the horrific acts being committed by Da’esh and will 

seek accountability for those responsible. The United States is leading a coalition 

of 66 partners to degrade and ultimately defeat Da’esh. 

The Department of State is currently conducting an assessment of whether 

Da’esh’s actions meet legal definitions of internationally recognized atrocity crimes. 

This effort includes collecting and evaluating available information regarding Da’esh 

atrocities from all sources. We are working on our response to the report tasked to 

us in Section 7033(d) of the FY 2016 Appropriations Law. 

Regardless of whether Da’esh’s conduct satisfies certain legal definitions, including genocide and crimes against humanity, the U.S. government will continue to 

work to help prevent mass atrocities, particularly against vulnerable communities, 

and to support those victimized by Da’esh. This is why we have provided nearly 

$624 million since FY 2014 in humanitarian assistance for vulnerable Iraqis in Iraq 

and the region. As new areas are liberated from Da’esh’s grasp, there will be a great 

deal more for us to do. 

Question 10. As of Thursday, Chinese lawyer Zhang Kai has been in detention for 

six months. As you know he was detained the day before he was supposed to meet 

with U.S. Ambassador for International Religious Freedom, David Saperstein. After 

a flurry of public advocacy on his behalf last fall, things seem to have quieted down. 

When was the last time the Department raised it with the Chinese government? Do 

you have any update on his case? 

Answer. The Department has been closely following developments in Zhang Kai’s 

case since his detention last August just prior to a meeting with Ambassador-atLarge for International Religious Freedom David Saperstein. Ambassador 

Saperstein publicly called for Zhang’s release immediately following his detention. 

In October 2015, Secretary of State John Kerry and Ambassador Saperstein again 

called for Zhang’s release in their public remarks during the rollout of the 2014 

International Religious Freedom Report. In the February 26, 2016, daily press briefing, the Department spokesperson expressed concern about the airing of Zhang 

Kai’s purported confession on state media prior to any indictment or judicial process. 

The Department will continue to press China, in public and private, to release 

Zhang Kai and to uphold its international human rights commitments and release 

all those seeking to peacefully uphold the freedom of religion. 

Question 11. Also in the realm of religious freedom, Pastor Gu Yuese, also known 

as Joseph Gu, was detained in China. He is the highest ranking Christian leader 

detained since the Cultural Revolution. Gu, who headed Hangzhou’s prominent 

Chongyi Church, was reportedly removed from his post by China’s Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM), 10 days prior to his detention. He had been vocal in his opposition to the government’s cross-removal and destruction campaign in the eastern 

province of Zhejiang. 

• Do you have any update on this case? Has the Department raised it? What do 

you think it represents in terms of the trajectory for religious freedom? 

Answer. The Department has followed Pastor Gu Yuese’s case since his detention 

by Chinese authorities earlier in this year. On February 4, 2016, a State Department spokesperson in a statement to the press called on Chinese authorities to immediately release Pastor Gu and other detained religious leaders and activists, and 

to cease the apparent cross removal and church demolition campaign in Zhejiang 

province. In our high level engagements with China, including the 2015 Human 

Rights Dialogue, we have called on China to release all prisoners of conscience, including those detained for peacefully expressing their religious beliefs. In that same 

dialogue, we also expressed concern about the ongoing and systematic religious freedom violations in China. 

Question 12. The Department was slow to register any sort of concern regarding 

the recent disappearances of the Hong Kong booksellers. Apart from urging China 

to ‘‘clarify the current status’’ of the individuals in questions, how else has the Department engaged? Department Spokesman John Kirby, in a daily press briefing, 


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indicated that these cases ‘‘raise serious questions about China’s commitment to 

Hong Kong’s autonomy under the ‘one country, two systems framework’ ’’ 

• Have these concerns been raised with Beijing directly and if so how have they 

responded? 

Answer. The State Department and our Consulate General in Hong Kong have 

been closely following the bookseller disappearances, even before publisher Lee Bo 

went missing in December, and have made our concerns known, both publicly and 

in private exchanges with Hong Kong and mainland Chinese officials. In addition 

to our multiple public comments, the Department has repeatedly raised these cases, 

including at senior levels, in Washington, in Beijing, and in Hong Kong. Most recently, Deputy Secretary Blinken raised the issue before the Human Rights Council 

in Geneva on March 2. We do not accept Beijing’s assertion that these cases are 

an internal matter, and we will continue to voice our concerns, shared by many in 

Hong Kong and the international community, that Beijing’s actions contravene its 

commitment to Hong Kong’s autonomy. 

Question 13. U.S. law requires that foreign assistance may not be sent to Haiti 

unless the Secretary of State certifies and reports that the Government of Haiti has 

taken the steps to hold free and fair parliamentary elections and seat a new Haitian 

Parliament; strengthen the rule of law in Haiti, including by selecting judges in a 

transparent manner; respect the independence of the judiciary; and improve governance by implementing reforms to increase transparency and account ability. 

• Can you please provide an update on the current political structure, the process 

for the transitional government and the plan to elect a new President? 

Answer. Elections in 2015 resulted in the seating of a new Haitian Parliament. 

The parliamentarians were sworn in January 12 and the first National Assembly 

took place in February. Due to the cancellation of a few of the first round races, 

there remain six (out of 30) Senate seats and 27 (out of 136) seats in the Chamber 

of Deputies for which a run-off round of voting must take place. Under an agreement signed by outgoing President Michel Martelly and the presidents of both 

chambers of Parliament, the final round of presidential elections, as well as the final 

round for remaining parliamentary seats, is scheduled for April 24. The publication 

of final results is scheduled for May 6, and the installation of the newly elected 

president for May 14. 

On February 14, Haiti’s National Assembly elected President of the Senate 

Jocelerme Privert to serve as interim president and to advance the February 5 political accord toward completion of the electoral process in Haiti. The interim president 

is charged with nominating a consensus prime minister and cabinet and replacing 

the nine-member Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), the body that will organize 

the final round of elections. Provisional President Jocelerme Privert issued a presidential decree February 25 appointing Fritz-Alphonse Jean as interim prime minister following meetings throughout the week with both houses of Parliament. Interim Prime Minister Jean will form a Cabinet and submit his government and 

statement of policies for review and approval/disapproval by the Parliament. 

The CEP has not yet been re-established. Although all nine social sectors were 

to nominate representatives to a newly configured CEP by February 24, several sectors are still working on their nominations. CEP members represent the media, 

unions, human rights, universities and educators, the religious community, business, and vodou sectors. Reconstituting the CEP is of utmost importance to keep 

with the schedule for the April 24 elections. 

The United States supports all efforts aimed at finding consensual and constructive solutions that will see the political accord implemented and the electoral process concluded April 24. The Haitian people deserve to have their voices heard and 

needs met through a democratically elected government. This ongoing effort is a 

Haitian-led process that must ultimately reflect the will and intent of the Haitian 

people. 

Question 14. President Obama’s FY 2017 request provides funds for the promotion 

of a stable and economically viable Haiti by continuing post-earthquake reconstruction and sustainable development programs. Please provide details of those programs. 

Answer. The FY 2017 request supports the Post-Earthquake U.S. Government 

Haiti Strategy, extended until 2018, with continued focus on four strategic pillars: 

Infrastructure and Energy; Food and Economic Security; Health and Other Basic 

Services; and Governance and Rule of Law in three geographic corridors, including 

the greater Port-au-Prince area, the St. Marc Corridor, and the Cap Haı ̈tien Corridor. U.S. assistance supports ongoing efforts for Haiti’s reconstruction through a 


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Haitian-led response in coordination with the international community. U.S. funding assists the Government of Haiti develop transparent and accountable institutions; make better informed strategic public investments; enforce security and the 

rule of law; provide energy, shelter, and other productive infrastructure especially 

for vulnerable groups; increase access to and quality of public services in health and 

education; improve potable water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) services; drive 

economic growth through increased labor income and workforce development; stabilize and secure natural resource management; and implement a country-led, comprehensive food security strategy. U.S. assistance programs emphasize country ownership as well as strengthening local institutions to help Haiti further chart its own 

development and promote sustainability. 

The United States is firmly committed to long-term support for the Haitian people. Working closely with other donors and the Government of Haiti, FY 2017 assistance will continue to foster credible and transparent electoral processes. A top priority is supporting the creation of a permanent electoral council responsible for 

building public trust in the integrity of the electoral process. U.S. assistance will 

support local capacity building by helping improve laws and policies in support of 

decentralization and de-concentration of central government services toward local 

governments in target communities. 

Stability in Haiti will undergird progress across all sectors, and the importance 

of improving the capacity of the Haitian National Police (HNP) to provide nationwide security will grow as the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) 

considers a possible further drawdown. FY 2017 assistance will continue to bolster 

HNP’s administrative and operational capabilities through training, the embedding 

of subject matter experts in key HNP leadership offices, and continued support for 

incoming cadets. Activities will also support capacity building for the Haitian Coast 

Guard (HCG) unit, enabling it to enhance control of territorial waters, reduce illegal 

immigration, combat illicit trafficking, and build the leadership and maritime skills 

of the HCG through professional military education and technical training to support maritime security operations in Haiti. 

Assistance will also help strengthen local government capacity to sustainably increase local revenues and improve the service delivery of Haitian civil society and 

government institutions. Activities will assist the Government of Haiti to promote 

an efficient and fair judicial system by addressing pre-trial detention, promoting judicial independence, advancing penal code reform, training community leaders in alternative dispute resolution, and providing free legal aid to low-income communities. 

U.S.-sponsored economic growth programs will help Haitian financial institutions 

create and improve financial products and will facilitate greater access to basic financial services and credit through the use of digital finance solutions that expand 

reach to underserved markets, thereby increasing financial inclusion and economic 

opportunity. U.S. assistance will continue to support private-sector capacity building 

to enhance job creation and improve the competitiveness of micro, small, and medium enterprises. Programs will engage the Haitian diaspora to unlock liquidity and 

spur private investment, provide technical assistance that expands enterprises and 

fosters innovation, and build and strengthen the Haitian workforce through targeted 

skills training for workers in select value chains, such as in agriculture, construction, and the garment industries. 

In terms of improving access to economic opportunity through education, U.S. assistance will address barriers to quality education with a new focus on out-of-school 

children and youth, including those with disabilities, and will continue to improve 

early grade reading outcomes. Activities will design and implement evidence-based 

reading programs for first through fourth grades and support the Ministry of National Education’s development of strategies to build community support for improved literacy outcomes and increased access to education. U.S. assistance will also 

build the capacity of the Ministry of National Education at the national, departmental, and district levels. 

As part of the President’s Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative, Feed the 

Future, we will support the efforts of the Government of Haiti to refine and implement a country-led comprehensive food security strategy to reduce hunger and increase economic growth through market-led agricultural development. These strategies aim to reduce hunger, improve nutrition, and promote broad-based economic 

growth through agricultural development. The program will train local enterprises, 

farmers, water-users associations, and other organizations and community groups to 

provide extension services at key points throughout targeted value chains. Moreover, the program will integrate WASH activities to reduce water-borne diseases 

and improve livelihoods. 

U.S. assistance will continue to support the provision of health services, including 

infectious disease prevention and integrated HIV/AIDS services for approximately 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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45 percent of Haitians, as well as nutritional support for vulnerable populations. 

The U.S. government will continue to strengthen referral networks within the development corridors and rebuild and reform the management of essential health institutions affected by the 2010 earthquake. U.S. assistance will support the goals and 

principles of the Global Health Initiative to achieve major improvements in health 

outcomes in three globally shared goals: ending preventable child and maternal 

deaths, creating an AIDS-free generation, and protecting communities from other infectious diseases. 

Question 15. President Obama’s FY 2017 budget request supports Central American governments for their progress on addressing the migration of unaccompanied, 

undocumented minors, including improving border security, combating human 

smuggling and trafficking, and supporting repatriation for migrants returning from 

the U.S. 

• What progress been made on addressing these issues with prior year funds? 

• Please explain how have you been able to measure the success of such progress. 

Answer. The U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America is addressing the 

underlying conditions driving migration from the region. FY 2015 funds are supporting efforts of the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to reverse endemic violence and poverty, promote economic prosperity, crack down on 

criminal networks, and strengthen good governance and the rule of law. 

With State Department funding, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is 

deploying nine advisors to the region to provide the governments with technical assistance, mentoring, and training on border security issues. 

DHS has helped the Governments of El Salvador and Guatemala to establish 

Transnational Crime Investigative Units to combat transnational organized crime, 

including human smuggling and trafficking. In Honduras, U.S. sponsored and vetted Honduran units are conducting border enforcement operations to disrupt 

human, narcotics, currency, and weapons smuggling. 

With the financial support from USAID, the International Organization of Migration is helping the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to improve their repatriation facilities, enhance their capacity to receive and assist their 

citizens, and to develop a data management tracking system on migration, child protection, and security related authorities. 

Our strategy is designed for long-term success, and recognizes that we must assist 

the Central American governments as they make systemic reforms. Part of our approach includes continuous monitoring and evaluation of our assistance in the shortand medium-term. Our ultimate vision for success is a safe and prosperous Central 

America with transparent, accountable, and capable governments. 

Question 16. The administration included $3.8 million within their FY 2017 budget request from the Diplomatic and Consular Programs account (D&CP) for infrastructure improvements to convert the U.S. Interests Section to a U.S. Embassy in 

Havana. 

• How does the State Department plan to spend that $3.8 million? 

• What facility upgrades are required at the Embassy? 

• Is the Castro regime placing any limits on the type of construction or modifications that can be made? 

• Will any foreign contractors be involved in any construction efforts? 

• What counterintelligence mitigation efforts have been made for any construction 

activities at the Embassy? 

• Has the USG been limited in the types of equipment and materials that can 

be brought into Cuba to support the Embassy? 

• What future plans, if any, are included in this budget in support of the administration’s new policy on Cuba? 

• How will this budget request be used for democracy promotion and efforts to 

reach the Cuban people including beyond the geographic limits of Havana? 

• How many locally employed staff are at the Embassy? 

• What is the status of the State Department in implementation of the reforms 

in the FY 2016 Intelligence Authorization Act to ensure all supervisory positions are held by U.S. persons? 

• Does the State Department believe it’s consistent with the purpose and intent 

of U.S. law, and in the foreign policy interests of the United States, to allow 

U.S. companies to invest in military owned companies that played a role in 

smuggling weapons to North Korea? 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
107 

Answer. The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) has been unable to 

correct long standing building deficiencies effectively and perform regular, routine 

maintenance and repairs on our facilities in Havana over the last 50 years, spanning the time when the United States had no formal diplomatic relations with Cuba. 

The Government of Cuba’s restrictive import policies and limit on the number and 

availability of temporary duty (TDY) visas severely hampered OBO’s access to Post 

and necessary materials for projects. The aging facilities thus need major rehabilitation, which would include upgrades to the Chancery’s internal systems, security 

modifications, and other repairs and improvements. Major rehabilitation projects 

are planned, funded, and managed by the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations. 

The re-establishment of diplomatic relations has provided an easing of the Cuban 

government’s strict import policies and an increase in the number of maintenance 

visas available. Funding caps or shortfalls would only complicate efforts to address 

years of neglect. Our $3.8 million FY 2017 Diplomatic and Consular Program (D&CP) funding request is for a mixture of communication and office infrastructure improvements and 

increases in staff, including improvements to our aging cabling and internet infrastructure in the Chancery and replacement of 20-year-old office furniture. 

The Government of Cuba does not place limits on the type of construction modifications the Department can make to our Embassy. Foreign contractors would not 

be involved in infrastructure improvements funded by the FY 2017 D&CP funding 

request. We welcome the opportunity to discuss the counterintelligence mitigation 

efforts taken for construction activities in a classified setting. 

Embassy Havana requires additional U.S. Direct Hire personnel to support an already overburdened platform. A mixture of reporting, public diplomacy, and support 

positions are required to deepen U.S. understanding of Cuba’s political, social, and 

economic environment, oversee maintenance upgrades, conduct human rights monitoring and advocacy, and deepen law enforcement cooperation on issues such as fugitives and counternarcotics. Given the growing number of authorized American 

visitors to Cuba and the demand for visa services, we have also requested additional 

consular staffing. Additional staff will free up resources to conduct more trips outside of Havana to connect with average Cubans on a wide range of issues. 

The specific number of Cubans working at the U.S. Embassy in Havana varies 

from time to time. Currently, we have fewer than 300 Cuban nationals working in 

various administrative and support roles. 

We are preparing the report requested in the FY 2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Division M, Section 512, regarding the use of locally employed staff serving at a United States Diplomatic Facility in Cuba. This report will be submitted 

to Congress by the due date. 

The State Department does not believe it is in our foreign policy interest for U.S. 

firms to invest in any entity, Cuban or any other nationality, that would smuggle 

weapons to North Korea. The comprehensive embargo severely limits U.S. firms’ 

commercial engagement in Cuba. We refer you to the Department of the Treasury’s 

Office of Foreign Assets Control, which administers and enforces the Cuban Assets 

Control Regulations, for specific questions on U.S. financial transactions with Cuban 

entities. 

Question 17. As part of the administration’s changes to Cuba policy regarding the 

opening of the U.S. Embassy, Cuba agreed to allow U.S. diplomats to travel 

throughout the island, albeit with prior notice. 

• Has the Cuban regime upheld its commitment to allow travel? 

• Please detail trips, including purpose, by U.S. diplomats outside Havana since 

the Embassy opening. 

Answer. We were able to negotiate greater flexibility for our diplomats to travel 

outside of Havana during the negotiations to re-establish diplomatic relations with 

the Cuban government. The previous policy required all U.S. diplomats to seek permission from Cuban officials ten days in advance of any travel outside of Havana. 

Now, four diplomats and their family members are permitted to travel freely without providing prior notification to the Cuban government. All others are required 

to notify the Cuban government four business days before travel. The new requirement is for notification, not approval of travel. Reciprocal restrictions apply to 

Cuban diplomats at the Cuban embassy in Washington, DC. 

U.S. officials at Embassy Havana have reported no difficulties regarding Cuban 

government interactions concerning travel outside of Havana or the notification 

process for this purpose. 

Embassy officials have traveled outside of Havana for a variety of purposes when 

schedules permit. For example, one embassy official traveled to Cuba’s second and 


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third largest cities—Santiago de Cuba and Camaguey—in a week-long over-land trip 

that facilitated contact with average Cubans. The official spoke with small business 

owners, church leaders, and municipal government officials, in addition to average 

Cubans he encountered in the streets and plazas. Another official accompanied a 

congressional staff delegation to Pinar del Rio to meet with local government officials, church representatives, and members of the Cuban private sector. There has 

also been some travel outside of Havana for personal travel, something previously 

not regularly permitted. 

Question 18. President Obama had originally said that he will visit Cuba when 

‘‘the conditions are right, if in fact we’ve seen progress in the liberty and freedoms 

of the ordinary Cubans.’’ ‘‘He wasn’t interested in validating the status quo.’’ 

• What are the conditions the President was referring to? And do you believe 

those conditions have been met? 

Answer. President Obama announced plans to travel to Cuba March 21-22. In 

Cuba, the President will work to build on the progress we have made toward normalization of relations—advancing commercial and people-to-people ties that can 

improve the well-being of the Cuban people. The trip also provides an opportunity 

to engage the Cuban government directly on human rights. 

In addition to holding a bilateral meeting with Cuban President Raul Castro, 

President Obama will talk with members of civil society, entrepreneurs, and Cubans 

from different walks of life. 

Our policy of engagement has further empowered a Cuban private sector that now 

employs at least one in four Cuban workers. For example, people in the United 

States can send unlimited remittances in support of private businesses, provide 

microfinance and entrepreneurial training activities, and export a broad range of 

materials and supplies to Cuban entrepreneurs. The number of self-employed Cubans has grown remarkably, from 145,000 in 2009 to approximately 500,000 in 

2015. Just as we are doing our part to remove impediments that have been holding 

Cuban citizens back, we are urging the Cuban government to make it less difficult 

for its citizens to start businesses, to engage in trade, and to access information online. 

The U.S. government has serious concerns about the human rights situation in 

Cuba and we regularly convey them to the Cuban government. We also consult with 

our allies in the region, and raise the human rights situation in Cuba at international fora. 

Our policy change has brought greater focus and more public discourse on human 

rights, both in Cuba and the United States. We speak to democracy and human 

rights activists on the island and with those who travel to Washington, DC, who 

regularly tell us that since the policy change they feel more emboldened to express 

their views, and they are doing so. We continue to see demonstrations on the island; 

many march peacefully—some on a weekly basis—to advocate for fundamental freedoms. We commend those who defend freedom of expression, assembly, and democratic values. We have not and will not defend the Cuban government’s human 

rights record, nor its response to these demonstrations. 

Question 19. The FY 2017 budget request includes support for the implementation 

of the pending peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC. 

• What programs will be supported under this request? 

Answer. During President Santos’ February 2016 visit, President Obama announced a new framework for our bilateral cooperation: Peace Colombia. 

U.S. assistance in support of Peace Colombia will focus ongoing and future U.S. 

assistance under three pillars: consolidating and expanding Colombia’s progress on 

security and counternarcotics, while reintegrating demobilized FARC combatants 

into society; expanding the Colombian state’s presence and institutions to strengthen the rule of law and rural economies, especially in former conflict areas; and promoting justice and addressing rights and interests of conflict victims. 

The administration requested $391 million in FY 2017 bilateral foreign assistance 

for the State Department and USAID, an increase from the FY 2015 level of $307 

million for those accounts. The increased funding will support Colombia’s efforts to 

implement a peace accord with the FARC. In addition to the $391 million, the administration requested FY 2017 funds for other agencies’ contributions to Peace Colombia goals, including $44.6 million in Department of Defense counternarcotics 

programs, for a total interagency peace implementation request of $450 million. 

Economic Support Funds (ESF) address rural development, support to victims, reintegration of ex-combatants, and land reform. Increased funding will support Colombia’s efforts to bring public services, including justice, dispute resolution, and 


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critical infrastructure, to the populations of former conflict areas. Increasing our 

support to rural road maintenance and construction is an important priority for the 

Colombian government; the United States has some ability to provide technical assistance in this area. In addition, funds will support integrating victims’ needs and 

rights into peace accord implementation. Specifically, funds will support the search 

for missing persons and strengthen national reconciliation efforts by promoting 

truth, criminal accountability, reparations (including land restitution), and guarantees of non-recurrence for conflict victims. ESF will also support human rights and 

judicial training programs. 

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance will 

support Colombia’s effort to implement its new counternarcotics strategy, which 

places greater emphasis on riverine, maritime, aerial, and land-based interdiction; 

manual eradication; seizing assets through anti-money laundering operations; and 

dismantling organized crime groups through complex criminal investigations. 

INCLE funds will help the Colombian authorities develop the intelligence to make 

manual eradication efficient and safe; enhance interdiction; and improve Colombia’s 

ability to conduct complex investigations against criminal organizations. INCLE 

funding will also support extension of justice services to former conflict areas, a 

peace implementation priority. 

Requested Foreign Military Financing (FMF) will increase the Colombian military’s ability to project the state’s presence and provide security in former conflict 

areas. Support will focus on engineering units, counternarcotics battalions, aviation 

support, and other units that will extend the reach of the Colombian military to new 

areas. FMF will also support institutional reforms that will enhance the efficiency 

and flexibility of Colombia’s armed forces. 

Requested Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and related program funding will support U.S. participation in the Global Demining Initiative for Colombia, 

co-led with Norway, which the President announced February 4. The initiative seeks 

to marshal international resources and technical assistance for Colombia’s pursuit 

of the goal to be landmine free by 2021. Landmines and improvised explosive devises kill or maim thousands of Colombians every year. Supporting Colombia’s 

demining efforts will help the Colombian government deliver a concrete ‘‘peace dividend’’ to the Colombian people; reinforce support for a peace accord; and provide a 

foundation for rural economic development by facilitating licit agriculture, investments in infrastructure, and access to markets. 

FISCAL YEARS 2015–2017 REQUESTS—STATE/USAID ONLY 

$ in thousands for all items 

FY 2015 

Actual 

FY 2016 

Request* 

FY 2017 

Request 

Columbia—State/USAID ............................................ 307,776 288,726 391,253 

Economic Support Fund ........................................ 133,000 141,326 167,328 

Food for Peace Title II ........................................... 6,835 — — 

Foreign Military Financing .................................... 27,000 25,000 38,525 

International Military Education & Training ......... 1,446 1,400 1,400 

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement .................................................................. 135,195 117,000 143,000 

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and 

Related Programs ............................................. 4,300 4,000 21,000 

of which, Antiterrorism ..................................... 800 500 — 

of which, Conventional Weapons Destruction 

(Demining) .................................................... 3,500 3,500 21,000 

*FY 2016 levels are pending allocation by the Department and USAID 

Question 20. In the FY 2017 budget request, institutions funded by the State Department that support freedom and democracy around the world, including the National Endowment for Democracy, the Asia Foundation and other are getting cuts. 

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) enjoys broad bipartisan and bicameral support in the U.S. Congress yet the administration’s budget request calls 

for a cut of almost 40 percent in the NED’s budget—from $170m to $103.5m. 


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• Can you explain why the administration would want to drastically cut this critically important program at a time when democracy is under attack around the 

world? 

• In addition, the budget submission ‘‘encourages NED to compete for specific 

U.S. Government programs’’ in order to make up for the large cut in funding. 

Is the administration not aware that the Congress, in the National Endowment 

for Democracy Act that President Ronald Reagan signed into law in 1983, expressly stipulated that the NED is an independent institution that should be 

free of direction or interference from the executive branch, which is why it is 

a separate line item in the budget. 

• Does the administration not accept the status of NED as contained in the NED 

Act? 

Answer. The Department of State strongly supports the work and mission of the 

National Endowment for Democracy (NED). While the FY 2017 request of $103.45 

million for NED is a reduction from the level appropriated by Congress in FY 2016, 

the request reflects a straight-line of funding requested by the administration for 

NED in the FY 2016 President’s Budget. 

The Department of State does affirm that NED is an independent institution; 

however, the Department recommends that external organizations it supports, such 

as NED, compete for grants and seek additional funding to leverage program funds 

if they so desire. 

Question 21. According to the FY 2017 Budget Request, public diplomacy (PD) 

spending, including exchange programs, has an increase of 5.4 percent under the 

FY 2017 request, to a total of $1.21 billion. How do you measure the success of these 

strategies? What are the taxpayers getting in exchange for this? Is the U.S. image 

in the world better as a result of this expenditure? 

Answer. Public diplomacy is essential to creating and sustaining support for U.S. 

foreign policy goals among key international audiences, including civil society leaders, journalists, youth, and religious leaders. These non-governmental actors, empowered by new digital technologies, play an increasingly important role in shaping 

the international system. With a backsliding in press freedoms around the world 

and countries spending billions of dollars to restrict information, our public diplomacy efforts are increasingly important to reach these audiences. 

PD funding enables the Department to regularly engage a vast and growing social 

media following, currently numbering close to 60 million people, on priority issues. 

The foreign media hubs successfully amplify U.S. foreign policy messages to upwards of 650 unique media outlets worldwide, ensuring accurate coverage of U.S. 

policy messages in influential foreign news coverage. Our global network of 700+ 

American Spaces hosts nearly 37 million visits annually, building and strengthening 

relationships with foreign audiences by showcasing American culture and values 

and providing accurate information about the United States. And our exchange programs annually bring more than 55,000 promising future foreign leaders to the 

United States, and send more than 10,000 U.S. citizens abroad, to create enduring 

networks of personal relationships that promote U.S. values and national security 

interests. 

These programs have an immediate impact, but they also have a generational impact, because they create connections—with our country, with the American people—that last far into the future. For instance, 395 alumni of our exchange programs are current or former heads of foreign governments, 77 are Nobel Prize winners, and thousands more are leaders of industry, academia, business, science, and 

the arts—the vast majority of whom have indicated they came away from their program with a greater understanding of the United States. 

Informing, engaging, and influencing foreign publics requires a long-term commitment and strategic investment of limited resources. Toward this end, the Department is making increased public diplomacy investments in analytics and evaluations to help us better identify key audiences, measure the impact of our engagement, and stay in front of an ever-changing world. 

Question 22. We understand that the administration and the Government of 

Israel are in the final stages of discussions on a new 10-year Memorandum of Understanding agreement on aid. Can you update us on where talks with Israel stand 

on a new MOU that will meet Israel’s growing threats? 

Answer. Our commitment to Israel’s security is steadfast, and our close cooperation with the Israeli government on military and security issues continues. As Prime 

Minister Netanyahu recognized during his 2015 speech to the U.N. General AssemVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:15 Aug 10, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00114 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\02 23 2016\30-927.T

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bly, ‘‘we never forget that the most important partner that Israel has always been, 

and will always be, the United States of America.’’ 

Israel remains the leading recipient worldwide of U.S. Foreign Military Financing 

(FMF). The current ten-year $30 billion Memorandum of Understanding between 

the U.S. and Israel, under which Israel currently receives $3.1 billion per year, is 

just one example of our strong, enduring partnership and the U.S. commitment to 

Israel’s security. 

During their meeting on November 9, the President and Prime Minister 

Netanyahu agreed to resume formal talks on a new MOU to succeed the current 

one, which expires at the end of 2018. Several rounds of talks with the Israelis have 

been held since then. We hope to reach a new MOU that will build on the United 

States’ historic and enduring commitment to Israel’s security, provide maximum 

benefit to both Israel and the United States and serve as the foundation for the bilateral security relationship well through the next decade. Even as we grapple with 

a particularly challenging budget environment, this administration’s commitment to 

Israel’s security is such that we are prepared to sign an MOU with Israel that 

would constitute the largest single pledge of military assistance to any country in 

U.S. history. 

Question 23. The administration has estimated that Iran’s sanctions relief windfall would be about $50 billion, while Iran has claimed that the figure is closer to 

$100 billion. 

• Now that Implementation Day has passed, do you have a better estimate of how 

much money Iran was able to gain access to? 

• Do we have an indication of how Iran is using its windfall thus far? Do we see 

evidence that they are paying down their debts, or using some of the money to 

further increase support for terrorism? 

• Do you have figures for how much Iran provides Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian 

Islamic Jihad, and Shi’a militias in Iraq? And for how these figures are likely 

to increase as a result of sanctions relief? 

Answer. On January 16, following the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA)’s verification that Iran had implemented key nuclear-related commitments 

as specified in the JCPOA, the United States lifted nuclear-related sanctions on 

Iran. As part of the lifting of these sanctions, foreign financial institutions holding 

funds owed to Iran in accounts outside of the United States can release such funds 

to the Central Bank of Iran without being subject to U.S. secondary sanctions. As 

a result, we estimate that Iran now has access to approximately $50 billion of its 

own funds. 

Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region are a threat to us and our allies, and 

they are a top concern of the administration. We work intensively with our partners 

in the region, including the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Israel, to deter and 

disrupt Iranian threats. Iran’s ongoing economic difficulties make it harder to divert 

large portions of its financial gains from sanctions relief away from its domestic 

economy and toward its regional activities. For example, we estimate that Iran 

needs about half a trillion dollars to meet pressing investment needs and government obligations. 

We have numerous domestic authorities—including sanctions—to counter Iran’s 

support for terrorism and other destabilizing activities. We will continue to enforce 

aggressively our sanctions, including those related to Iran’s support for terrorism, 

ballistic missile activities, destabilizing activities in the region, and human rights 

abuses. On March 24, the Treasury Department sanctioned two entities participating in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ ballistic missile program and six 

entities tied to Iranian airline Mahan Air, a Specially Designated Global Terrorist 

that provides significant support to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

The United States will also continue its efforts to disrupt Hizballah’s financial 

and procurement networks, as it did in two separate actions in January when the 

Treasury Department designated five entities for providing material support to 

Hizballah. In addition to its longstanding efforts to combat Hizballah’s facilitation 

network, the administration will utilize authority under the Hizballah International 

Financing Protection Act to target financial institutions that knowingly facilitate 

significant transactions or engage in money laundering activities on behalf of 

Hizballah. We have made significant progress and will continue to disrupt 

Hizballah’s terrorist capabilities by targeting the group’s financial support infrastructure. Treasury and State have consistently used and will continue to use our 

authorities to expose and target Hizballah’s financial, commercial, and terrorist activities around the world. 


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Question 24. During the IAEA’s investigation of the possible military dimensions 

of Iran’s nuclear program, the agency received environmental samples taken by Iran 

from the Parchin military facility. According to the IAEA, the samples Iran gathered 

revealed two uranium particles that appeared to be chemically man-modified. However, this small number precluded the IAEA from determining whether they were 

tied to a nuclear program. 

• If the IAEA needs to return to Parchin for further inspections, will it be able 

to? 

• Would Iran be in violation of the JCPOA if it denied the IAEA access to 

Parchin? 

• Was a precedent set by allowing Iran to self-inspect Parchin? Or will IAEA inspectors be granted full unfettered access to suspect nuclear sites should the 

need arise, regardless of their location on a military base? 

Answer. We are confident that the JCPOA gives the IAEA the tools it needs to 

effectively monitor Iran’s nuclear commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan 

of Action (JCPOA). In accordance with its JCPOA commitments, Iran has taken on 

a legal obligation to apply the IAEA Additional Protocol, which provides the IAEA 

with a clear basis for access to investigate any indications of possible undeclared 

material and activities in Iran. In addition, should the IAEA receive credible information indicating that Iran is using Parchin or any other undeclared location for 

nuclear weapons-related work in the future, the JCPOA provides strengthened tools 

for the IAEA to demand timely access within a predetermined time period. In accordance with its JCPOA commitments, Iran has also taken on a legal obligation 

to apply the IAEA Additional Protocol which encompasses all sites in Iran, including 

military sites like Parchin. 

We retain a wide range of options to deal with any failure by Iran to fulfill its 

nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, including failure to provide the 

IAEA access. If there is a significant violation by Iran of its JCPOA commitments 

and the JCPOA processes do not lead to a resolution of the concerns, we can unilaterally snap back sanctions. The United States has the ability to re-impose at any 

time all of the unilateral and multilateral sanctions that have been lifted in response to a violation of the JCPOA. 

IAEA access to Parchin was conducted according to the IAEA-Iran Roadmap process, separate from the JCPOA. The IAEA confirmed that both the Director General 

himself as well as his head of Safeguards visited Parchin in September 2015. This 

was the first time that the IAEA had visited the location of interest. Before this 

visit, IAEA safeguards activities were carried out at the Parchin site, including the 

taking of environmental samples. Verification activities at the Parchin site were 

conducted in a manner consistent with the IAEA’s safeguards practices, and we 

have full confidence in the IAEA to pursue only procedures that meet its independent verification requirements. We are confident that the IAEA will not depart 

from its longstanding approach of independent verification in Iran or anywhere else 

it implements safeguards. 

Question 25. Mr. Secretary, what is the U.S. position on using international sanctions and boycotts to pressure our democratic ally Israel, on issues that need to be 

decided at the negotiating table? 

Answer. We have been very clear that boycotts of Israel are unhelpful, and we 

oppose them. 

The United States has worked in the three decades since signing the U.S.-Israel 

Free Trade Agreement—our first such agreement with any country—to grow trade 

and investment ties exponentially with Israel. As we advance our trade agenda, we 

will continue to strengthen these important economic ties. 

We will also continue to pursue policies aimed at preserving the prospect of a twostate solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We continue to believe that the preferred path to the resolution of this conflict is for the parties to reach an agreement 

on final status issues directly, and we will continue to work to advance the interest 

we all share in bringing about a lasting peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. 

Question 26. It has long been a congressional priority to see a U.S. consulate established in Lhasa. 

• When was the last time this was raised with the Chinese government? 

• Is the Chinese government presently pursuing any additional consulates in the 

United States? 

• Has the USG made it clear that any future expansion of their consular presence 

would be contingent upon a U.S. consulate in Lhasa? 


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Answer. The Department continues to explore options to expand consular facilities 

in China. We have proposed a consulate general in Lhasa, Tibet, as well as in other 

cities in the People’s Republic of China, in accordance with relevant statutes and 

reciprocity requirements. The Chinese have not responded to the Department’s request. 

Question 27. As you know Congress passed bipartisan legislation which created 

a Special Envoy for Religious Minorities in the Middle East position at the Department and the president signed the bill into law. After an extended delay the position 

was finally filled, albeit at a more junior level than was originally envisioned by 

Congress. The authorizing legislation provided $1 million for the envoy and support 

staff to accomplish its mandate. 

• Has the Special Advisor for Religious Minorities been provided with separate 

funding or is his budget being carved out of the already limited budget of the 

International Religious Freedom Office? 

Answer. The Department of State is complying with the earmarks contained in 

the FY 2016 Appropriations Law related to the Office of International Religious 

Freedom and the Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Middle East and 

South and Central Asia. 

In his first six months, Knox Thames, the Special Advisor for Religious Minorities 

in the Middle East and South and Central Asia has undertaken a robust agenda, 

including travel to Beirut, Baghdad, Erbil, Doha, Islamabad, Karachi, and elsewhere to advocate for the rights of religious minorities in these difficult regions. In 

addition to working with foreign governments in support of religious freedom, Mr. 

Thames has met with a broad spectrum of civil society groups representing the minority groups under threat. He has also launched an interagency initiative to protect religious and cultural heritage in the Middle East and South and Central Asia. 

Planning is underway for a series of multilateral conferences to address the plight 

of religious minorities under threat. 

Question 28. As Venezuela is facing food shortages and opposition lawmakers 

have recently declared a ‘‘food emergency’’, please provide details of the U.S. government assistance and involvement to respond to the current ?economic conditions in 

Venezuela. 

Answer. Venezuela faces serious economic challenges, including significant economic contraction, triple-digit inflation, widespread shortages of food and medicine, 

and depleted reserves. We remain in close communication with the contacts in Venezuela, international nongovernmental organizations, and multilateral organizations 

about the availability of food, medicines, and other essentials. 

We have expressed our concerns to governments in the region about the worsening political, economic, and social situation in Venezuela. We know that many 

others share these concerns and have communicated them to the Maduro government. 

We believe the only solution to these shortages and other economic issues in Venezuela is a meaningful dialogue among Venezuelans on sustainable policies that reverse years of economic mismanagement. We continue to call for dialogue in Venezuela. 

The United States frequently provides humanitarian assistance to countries 

around the world at the request of the executive branch of a receiving country. In 

addition, there are appropriate mechanisms by which the international community 

and multilateral institutions could consider support to Venezuela. The Maduro administration has made no such request. 

Question 29. Could you please provide an assessment of the Bahrain government’s 

implementation of the Bahrain Independent Committee of Inquiry Report? Within 

the assessment please include a determination if each of the 26 recommendations 

has been fully implemented. 

Answer. Bahrain has implemented some important reforms, including key recommendations made by the Bahraini Independent Commission of Inquiry such as 

the establishment of the Ombudsman’s Office, the Special Investigative Unit, and 

human rights training for police. The Government has investigated claims of torture, which have led to convictions in several cases; rebuilt demolished religious 

structures; reinstated employees who were wrongfully dismissed in 2011; and compensated families of victims of state violence. 

However, more work remains to be done. We remain concerned by the government’s criminalization of freedom of expression, selective application of the law, denial of due process guarantees, and other issues relating to the detention process 

and prison conditions as specified in the BICI recommendations. 


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We will continue to press the government on all of these issues of concern and 

urge it to work with opposition groups and civil society to continue pursuing full 

implementation of the BICI recommendations in a manner that meets international 

standards. Beyond just the BICI recommendations, additional progress is needed to 

build trust across Bahraini society. 

The Department’s forthcoming report, ‘‘Steps Taken by the Government of Bahrain to Implement the Recommendations in the 2011 Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI)’’ was requested by Congress and will provide 

a detailed analysis including an assessment of Bahrain’s progress on each of the 

BICI report’s 26 recommendations. 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO

SECRETARY KERRY BY SENATOR BOXER

Question 1. With this legislation in mind, how is the U.S. government ensuring 

the Kurds have the support and supplies they need in the fight against ISIL? 

Answer. The FY 2015 Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) budget of $1.6 billion 

is supporting training and equipment for two Peshmerga brigades, and additional 

FY 2016 ITEF programming totaling $715 million includes additional support for 

Iraqi Kurdish fighters. Nearly 10,000 Peshmerga have already received basic and 

specialized training at the Build Partner Capacity (BPC) sites, and the first of two 

Peshmerga brigades selected for training with U.S. Special Operations Forces will 

begin training next month. 

These efforts have already shown success as U.S. and Coalition-trained 

Peshmerga troops stationed on the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT) in northern Iraq 

have proved critical in maintaining the FLOT in Ninewa and elsewhere as these 

areas came under assault from Da’esh. The United States is committed to assisting 

all Iraqis in their mission to defeat Da’esh. As of February 7, 2016, the U.S. and 

the Coalition have provided the Peshmerga with more than 60 million rounds of 

rifle ammunition; more than 100,000 mortar rounds; tens of thousands of grenades 

and anti-tank rounds; tens of thousands of other weapons such as rifles and heavy 

caliber machine guns; counter-IED equipment; and vehicles, including ambulances 

and mine resistant vehicles. The Coalition is doing everything it can to provide the 

necessary weapons, munitions, and advisors to support the Peshmerga in the 

counter-Da’esh effort. 

Question 2. Specifically, are there any delays in the shipments of weapons and 

supplies from Baghdad to Erbil? If so, how is the State Department addressing 

these delays? 

Answer. There are no delays. The shipment of weapons and supplies provided by 

the Coalition through the Government of Iraq to the Kurdistan Regional Government is running smoothly and efficiently. Equipment transferred through Baghdad 

never leaves U.S. or Coalition custody, and we have assurances from U.S. personnel 

in Baghdad that the equipment destined for the Kurds is processed in the most expedient manner possible. KRG officials have confirmed to senior U.S. officials that 

they receive the equipment in full and without delay. 

Question 3. How is the State Department working with Afghanistan to preserve 

the gains that have been made in women’s rights, specifically with respect to economic and political advancement? 

Answer. The United States has prioritized the promotion of gender equality and 

rights of women in all of our activities in Afghanistan. As a result, Afghanistan has 

adopted some of the most expansive protections of women’s rights anywhere in the 

region, and the Afghan government has taken steps to ensure that women are represented at all levels of government. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul consults closely 

with government leaders, parliamentarians, and provincial officials as they work to 

increase women’s participation in all levels of the government. We are also advocating for the full implementation of the Law on Elimination of Violence Against 

Women. 

In addition to our political engagement, our development and assistance programs 

complement and underpin our advocacy for the rights of women and girls in Afghanistan. The Afghan Women’s Leadership in the Economy (AWLE) project, which is 

part of USAID’s Promote program for Afghanistan, will provide thousands of women 

with the skills, and resources to contribute to Afghanistan’s economic development 

and poverty reduction goals as well as to influence service delivery, education, and 

workplace policies. AWLE also supports educated women between the ages of 18 


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and 30 in finding new or better jobs by providing them with knowledge, skills, networks, and support. In April 2016, the USAID Financial Access for Investing in the 

Development of Afghanistan (FAIDA) project and the Afghanistan Institute of Banking and Finance recognized 100 professional women who successfully completed a 

six-month ‘‘Women in the Financial Sector’’ Internship Program. The internship program provided participants with the knowledge and networking opportunities needed to succeed in Afghanistan’s private financial sector. Fifty percent of the participants have already secured employment in various financial institutions. Employment negotiations are underway for the rest of the graduates. 

Question 4. What is the State Department doing to help Afghan women assume 

leadership roles in the political and security sectors? 

Answer. In addition to broad support provided by the United States to support 

opportunities for women in the private and public sectors, we also have specific programs targeted on the justice and security sectors. We have also continually advocated for Afghan women to be represented at all levels of government. 

For example, USAID is working to close the gender gap in the ministries by training 3,000 young women interested in joining the Afghan civil service. This past February, the Afghan government, in coordination with USAID, placed 17 female interns in government ministries after they completed a six-month classroom-based 

training at the Afghanistan Civil Service Institute (ACSI). The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), in order to decrease the gender disparities within the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics (MCN), supports an annual 

fellowship and internship program at the MCN for female Afghan students. In FY 

2015, there were six undergraduates with summer internships and three graduates 

with one-year paid fellowships. In late August 2015, another 13 recent graduates 

began fellowships with the Ministry. In addition, our Bureau of Democracy, Human 

Rights, and Labor (DRL) provides tuition and fees for 20 young women to attain 

an undergraduate education coupled with human rights-focused training and skillbuilding through specific coursework, internships, and post-graduate fellowships. 

Through coursework, leadership positions in extracurricular activities, and internships with civil society organizations, these women are gaining the skills to become 

Afghanistan’s next generation of women leaders and human rights advocates. 

Since 2012, INL’s Justice Training Transition Program (JTTP), implemented by 

the International Development Law Organization (IDLO) has built the capacity of 

women working in the Afghan justice sector through training and coaching. Over 

the life of the program, JTTP has transitioned from an externally provided training 

service into an Afghan government-owned continuing legal education program. In 

April 2016, IDLO and INL launched a follow-on program which will assist the ministries to further operationalize the training units and ensure the success of continuing legal education efforts. In FY 2015, women comprised 10 percent of all Advanced Continuing Legal Education for Afghanistan (ACLEA) participants and 12 

percent of all Continuing Legal Education (CLE) participants. Additionally, 118 

women legal professionals were provided 765 hours of one-on-one coaching on legal 

substance. 

The Resolute Support (RS) Gender Advisor’s office reports a significant increase 

in the recruitment of women into the Afghan National Army (ANA) as a result of 

offering scholarships as a recruitment incentive. According to the RS Gender Advisor, as of late April the ANA had recruited 193 women since mid-February, a figure 

that surpasses ANA recruitment of women over the past three years. There are now 

also 69 female members of the ANA’s officer corps. Additionally, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) recently recruited 250 women to begin police training in Turkey starting this summer. While increased recruitment is a definite sign of progress, the Afghan government, with the support of the State Department and other international 

partners, is taking steps to ensure the successful integration of women into the security sector. For example, the Women, Peace, and Security Working Group, cochaired by the United Nations and the Finnish Embassy in Kabul, reports that the 

Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) is spearheading an initiative to establish an Ombudsman Office, which will be a joint agreement between 

the Ministry of Defense (MoD), MoI, and the Directorate of Security (NDS), giving 

the AIHRC access and opportunity to monitor and address gender based violence 

and other forms of harassment and violence committed against women in the security institutions. 

Department and USAID programs enjoy the strong support of the Ghani administration, which is strongly committed to gender equality in Afghanistan. In addition 

to increased numbers of women in the security sector, we have seen the appointment of two women to senior leadership positions within the High Peace Council. 

Notably, Afghan women’s rights civil society groups were reportedly invited to meet 


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informally with representatives of the Gulbuddin Hekmatyar-led Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan (HIA), which is currently engaged in peace negotiations with the Afghan 

government. Such interactions, even informal, are vital to ensuring women have a 

voice in the peace process and to guard against any erosion of the rights they have 

gained since 2001. 

Question 5. Based on the results of the comprehensive review of the National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace, and Security in 2015, what impact has the NAP 

had on our efforts to promote women’s participation in peace and security processes 

worldwide? 

Answer. In accordance with E.O. 13595, ‘‘Instituting a National Action Plan on 

Women, Peace, and Security,’’ the U.S. Departments and Agencies—in particular 

the Department of State, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID), in coordination with the National Security 

Council staff—conducted a review of policy, programming, challenges, and lessons 

learned in the first three years of implementing the NAP. In 2015, during the 

course of the review, the State Department, USAID, and DoD conducted consultations with partner governments, multilateral organizations, and civil society. These 

efforts were undertaken with a view toward updating the NAP based on findings 

from the first three years of implementation. 

The Department of State’s review identified several key findings related to the impact of the NAP on the Department and its operations. In brief, these successes include appreciable impact in several areas. 

First, the NAP and its implementation plan have provided a coherent framework, 

and common language, for pursuing the many gender issues that cut across policy, 

public diplomacy, and foreign assistance. 

Second, as a framework for accelerating progress, the NAP gave life to several 

new initiatives. Catalytic outcomes include the Africa—Women, Peace, and Security 

Initiative and the Global Women, Peace, and Security Initiative, both of which are 

small grant programs that enhance security through the political and economic empowerment of women. In the realm of public diplomacy, the NAP inspired an ongoing series of exchanges through the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs’ 

(ECA) flagship Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) program, ‘‘Women Leaders: Promoting Peace and Security.’’ In a select set of specific contexts, the NAP implementation process sparked policy commitments, reinforced by parallel foreign assistance 

allocations, for women-led civil society. A survey of key NAP stakeholders revealed 

that 95 percent of respondents indicated that the NAP has at least incrementally 

influenced U.S. policy in conflict-affected areas. 

Lastly, in addition to spurring new action, the NAP expanded ongoing efforts. 

Where existing work was already underway on WPS-related topics prior to the 

NAP’s 2011 release—such as in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, and 

Sierra Leone—the NAP has offered a high-level policy mandate for further elevating 

issues affecting women in war, conflict, violence, and insecurity. In Afghanistan, for 

instance, women’s empowerment was a United States government policy priority for 

over a decade, but the emergence of the U.S. NAP has helped provide an overall 

framework for action and a common language to discuss women, peace, and security 

with Afghan government and civil society leaders, including women’s inclusion in 

peace and reconciliation processes and development of laws that protect women’s 

rights. Within the U.S. mission, the U.S. NAP helped to cement the rationale for 

establishing internal coordination processes and an embassy-specific gender strategy. The NAP also helped to inform key indicators to measure progress on the rights 

of Afghan women and girls through multilateral agreements within the international donor community and Afghan government. In the embassy’s work with donors and international organizations, the NAP has appreciably strengthened U.S. 

credibility and leverage, especially in efforts to promote better cooperation. 

In summary, we have seen impressive short-term successes, and while transformative change takes time, we have found that progress is often a function of 

leadership, political will, and resources. As we look to the future, it will be important to bear in mind that regardless of an update, the NAP remains one tool among 

many (e.g. leadership, political will, and resources) necessary to bring women into 

decision making about peace and security issues. 

Question 6. What have been the biggest challenges to the NAP’s implementation? 

Answer. Challenges associated with the implementation of the NAP stem from 

both external and internal factors. Often, the most important areas for promoting 

Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) are those characterized by the insecurity that 

limits the scope of United States government efforts. These insecure local backdrops 

for NAP implementation can be exacerbated by additional barriers, including culVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:15 Aug 10, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00120 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\02 23 2016\30-927.T

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tural perspectives that limit the full participation of women across political, economic, and societal spheres. In addition, limited capacity among government counterparts can undercut the political will necessary to convert international commitments into action and continues to preclude the development of budgets and institutional capabilities that drive local implementation and enforcement. At the civil society level, partners’ limited capacity can at times pose challenges to sustainability. 

Internally, resource and staffing limitations, limited training opportunities on 

gender-sensitive policy and programming, insufficient funding for WPS-oriented initiatives, uneven political will, and differentiated monitoring practices can limit the 

Department of State’s ability to more fully integrate WPS goals. 

Question 7. As we move forward, how will the United States update the NAP to 

meet emerging security threats, such as violent extremism? 

Answer. The NAP review reflects agencies’ commitment to relevant implementation and rigorous learning of how to best optimize women’s participation, and protection, in the prevention and resolution of conflict. During the review process, agencies identified successes, opportunities, and challenges associated with NAP implementation and recommended several changes to the NAP to accelerate implementation. Any update to the NAP should lay a foundation for long-term NAP implementation, meet emerging security threats, and reflect shifting policy priorities. This includes strong interest in devoting increased attention to the intersection of the WPS 

agenda and transnational challenges, including countering violent extremism, displacement and migration, natural disaster response, atrocity prevention, and climate change. 

Question 8. In November, 2015, I wrote to President Obama urging him to draft 

and implement a new Foreign Military Financing Memorandum of Understanding 

(MOU) with Israel to help address the serious and ongoing threats to Israel’s security. In its response to my letter, the State Department mentioned that formal talks 

between the U.S. and Israel would begin in December. What is the current status 

of those negotiations? 

Answer. The administration is engaged in discussions with Israel regarding a 

new, ten-year memorandum of understanding (MOU) on security assistance that 

would replace the current MOU when it expires at the end of fiscal year 2018. An 

interagency delegation traveled to Israel to begin discussions on the MOU in early 

December 2015. In the ensuing months, we have held additional rounds of talks in 

Israel and Washington. 

We hope to conclude a new MOU that will build on the United States’ historic 

and enduring commitment to Israel’s security, provide maximum benefit to both 

Israel and the United States and serve as the foundation for the bilateral security 

relationship well through the next decade. Even as we grapple with a particularly 

challenging budget environment, this administration’s commitment to Israel’s security is such that we are prepared to sign an MOU with Israel that would constitute 

the largest single pledge of military assistance to any country in U.S. history. 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO

SECRETARY BY SENATOR FLAKE

Question 1. The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report is an important tool that can provide us with leverage to push other countries that have real 

problems with human trafficking into taking action against it. But in order for that 

leverage to be effective, it is important for our reports, their recommendations, and 

the criteria against which a country’s progress in combatting trafficking is measured, all be very precise. 

The TIP report’s authorizing statute includes four minimum standards a country 

should meet for the elimination of trafficking, and progress toward meeting these 

standards serves as the basis for determining a country’s ranking. One of these minimum standards is whether a government has made ‘‘serious and sustained efforts 

to eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons.’’ A list of very broad criteria are 

then listed in the authorizing language as factors that should be taken into account 

when determining a country’s ‘‘serious and sustained efforts’’ to eliminate trafficking. 

• How do you ensure that the same metrics to weigh a country’s ‘‘serious and sustained efforts’’ to eliminate trafficking, or lack thereof, are applied evenly and 

precisely? Who makes the final determination as to whether a country has 

made ‘‘serious and sustained efforts’’ to eliminate trafficking? 


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Answer. The annual TIP Report reflects the State Department’s assessment of foreign government efforts in 188 countries and territories during the reporting period 

to comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons 

established under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA). The TVPA spells 

out four minimum standards, and breaks the fourth standard down into 12 indicia 

that guide our assessment on whether or not a government has undertaken ‘‘serious 

and sustained efforts’’ to eliminate human trafficking during the reporting period. 

Department staff consider whether a government’s efforts satisfy each of the relevant indicia. That judgment is then factored into our overall assessment of the 

country’s efforts against all four minimum standards across the ‘‘3Ps’’—prosecution, 

protection, and prevention. This final assessment is the basis of all tier ranking recommendations made to me. I assign the final tier rankings. 

The country narratives in the Report include facts collected by the Department 

throughout the year and an analysis of how a country has or has not taken action 

with respect to the relevant TVPA minimum standards. Collecting and verifying 

these facts is a whole-of-Department effort involving experts in Washington and 

U.S. missions overseas. The Department strives to make the report as accurate and 

objective as possible, documenting the successes and shortcomings of government 

anti-trafficking efforts. The report applies the criteria and requirements as statutorily required. These criteria and requirements are comprehensive and therefore 

the Department’s process to produce the annual Report is both extensive and rigorous. The assessments contained in the TIP Report reflect each government’s efforts in addressing human trafficking problems during the current reporting period, 

compared to that government’s own efforts in the prior year. 

Question 2. How does the J/TIP office work with the governments of countries on 

the margins to help them understand what our metrics are and how we define various terms of significance in this process? 

Answer. The Department works year-round to encourage progress by foreign governments to combat modern slavery, as well as to explain the TVPA’s minimum 

standards and international legal standards. This occurs at all levels, both in Washington and overseas. I have engaged numerous governments on this issue directly 

in many forums, using bilateral meetings, multilateral venues, and media platforms 

to make clear that combating human trafficking is a priority for this Administration 

and is a responsibility for all members of the international community. My efforts 

are supported by robust engagements by many Department officials, such as Ambassador Coppedge’s recent trips to Cuba, Mexico, Botswana and South Africa. In addition, working-level travel by the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons has covered five continents and more than 50 countries in the last six months. 

These efforts complement the sustained and expert engagement that occurs every 

day through our missions abroad. 

Although this engagement is not always easy, our professional staff and their ability to encourage countries to pursue recommendations in the TIP Report have contributed to the Report’s 15-year legacy of progress and to the United States’ leadership on this issue. We have Congress to thank for its vision in the passage of the 

TVPA and its continued interest in making sure all governments, including our own, 

are working to eliminate the scourge of modern slavery. 

Question 3. The Bipartisan Budget Act from last year sets ‘‘targets’’ on OCO funding of $14.9 billion for each fiscal year 2016 and 2017 for the international affairs 

budget function. These targets are not caps, and there is nothing that would prevent 

Congress from appropriating additional OCO funds beyond these targets. The Administration’s OCO request for international affairs for FY 2017 is $14,894,989,000. 

• Do you see any reason why OCO funding for State and Foreign Operations accounts should be increased beyond what you’ve requested in this fiscal year? 

Answer. The FY 2017 Request is in line with the OCO levels set in the Bipartisan 

Budget Agreement (BBA) of 2015. This agreement provided a higher percentage of 

the Department’s resources in OCO than has been the case in recent years. Consequently, the Department shifted a number of programs into OCO that were traditionally supported with enduring funds. In the FY 2017 Request, OCO funds support programs that will allow the Department of State and USAID to prevent, address, and recover from man-made crises and natural disasters and secure State 

and USAID global operations. While the Department acknowledges the current challenging fiscal climate which necessitated this shift from base to OCO, an appropriation that increases OCO above the FY 2017 request would prove challenging to accommodate, given the limited number of programs remaining in the Enduring request that could not fit an OCO definition. 


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Question 4. What challenges does it present to the State Department from a budgeting perspective when Congress appropriates more in OCO funds than the Administration requested? 

Answer. The BBA level of OCO funding also complicates budget execution because 

OCO funding must be managed separately from enduring funds. OCO and enduring 

funds must be kept separate and therefore accounting procedures must be employed 

to avoid comingling of funds. Additionally, OCO funding is intended for use in specific situations. This reduces the resources available to the Department of State and 

USAID when unexpected contingencies arise in programs and regions that do not 

generally program OCO funds. 

Base funds are critically important to ensuring long term support for critical Department of State and USAID programs. We look forward to working with Congress 

to re-establish the Department’s enduring base funding as we move toward the FY 

2018 budget. 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO

SECRETARY KERRY BY SENATOR SHAHEEN

Question 1. The JCPOA has resulted in Iran slashing its stockpile of enriched uranium by at least 97 percent and surrendering most of its uranium enrichment capacity, disabling more than 13,000 uranium enrichment centrifuges and ceasing all 

uranium enrichment activities at its underground Fordow facility. Iran also modified its Arak heavy water reactor to prevent the production of weapons-grade plutonium. 

• Does the administration’s budget request ensure the IAEA has the funding necessary to fulfill its role and hold Iran accountable? 

Answer. Yes. Resources requested in the administration’s FY2017 budget, together with international extrabudgetary support already pledged, will fully cover 

IAEA costs in fiscal year 2017. 

The IAEA’s monitoring role is essential to the success of the JCPOA. Costs associated with the IAEA’s role in the years to come will need to be met through a combination of assessed dues toward the IAEA’s regular budget (paid through the Contributions to International Organizations account) and extra-budgetary contributions (paid through the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related programs account). The FY2017 budget request includes resources for U.S. contributions through both of these mechanisms. 

Thanks to sustained and strong Congressional support for the U.S. voluntary contribution to the IAEA, we have maintained the ability every year to support urgent, 

high-priority projects like IAEA monitoring of the JCPOA. 

We will continue to work with international partners and with Congress to ensure 

that necessary resources are made available to the IAEA throughout the duration 

of the JCPOA. 

Question 2. What are we doing to push back against Iran’s continued destabilizing 

activities, including its support to Hezbollah? How is the Administration using the 

new authorities in the Hezbollah Sanctions Act passed by this Congress last year? 

Answer. Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region threaten our interests and our 

allies. They are a top concern of the Administration, and we are working intensively 

with our partners in the region to deter and disrupt Iranian threats. The September 

25, 2015 seizure of a dhow carrying Iranian weapons that were likely bound for the 

Houthis in Yemen is a recent example.μ 

Additionally, we have expanded our security engagement with Gulf partners following the President’s summit at Camp David last May through the establishment 

of six U.S.-GCC working groups on ballistic missile defense, military preparedness, 

counterterrorism, arms transfers, cybersecurity, and intelligence sharing. 

While Iran received relief from nuclear-related sanctions under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, our sanctions to counter Iran’s destabilizing activities, 

support for terrorism, ballistic missile development, and human rights abuses remain in place and we will continue to enforce them. 

The administration fully supports the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015 (HIFPA) as a valuable tool in our overall strategy to dismantle 

Hizballah’s global financial network. Before the passage of this legislation, we targeted the nodes of Hizballah’s international financing by designating 99 Hizballahaffiliated individuals and entities, and we sanctioned five more individuals and entities in January 2016 alone. 


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We will use our authority under HIFPA to target financial institutions knowingly 

facilitating significant transactions or engaged in money-laundering activities on behalf of Hizballah. The State Department, Treasury, and our partners in the Intelligence Community are constantly looking for solid evidence of such activity. When 

we see evidence, we will build a case, and we will take action. 

We have made significant progress and will continue to further disrupt 

Hizballah’s terrorist capabilities by targeting the group’s financial support infrastructure. Treasury and State have consistently used and will continue to use our 

authorities to expose and target Hizballah’s financial, commercial, and terrorist activities around the world. 

Question 3. Secretary Kerry, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration’s 

most recent National Drug Threat Assessment Report, Mexico and Colombia continue to supply almost all of the heroin that reaches U.S. markets. As you know, 

the number of heroin-related overdose deaths in the U.S. have more than doubled 

in the past five years. The President’s request for International Narcotics Control 

and Law Enforcement assistance to Mexico is reduced when compared to the current budget by more than 25%. 

• Given that the DEA Threat Assessment report concluded that ‘‘Mexican traffickers are making a concerted effort to increase heroin availability in the U.S. 

market,’’ shouldn’t the State Department be looking for ways to deepen our joint 

efforts with Mexico to combat drug trafficking? 

Answer. Our bilateral dialogue with the Government of Mexico on counternarcotics, and specifically on heroin, has led to enhanced collaboration on this critically important issue. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

(INL), under the Merida Initiative, is working with the Government of Mexico to 

help build the capacity of Mexico’s law enforcement and rule of law institutions to 

disrupt drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and to stop the flow of heroin and 

other drugs from Mexico to the United States. Beyond financial support, we are providing training and capacity building for police, enhancing Mexico’s interdiction capabilities through the donation of non-intrusive inspection equipment (NIIE) and 

support for canine units, and assisting Mexico’s transition to an accusatory justice 

system. We are also augmenting Mexico’s capacity to identify and dismantle clandestine heroin and methamphetamine labs. 

The United States and Mexico are working to increase communication and information sharing on the topic of heroin and methamphetamine. In the last year, we 

funded bilateral heroin and methamphetamine seminars, which brought together 

leading experts from both countries to share information and strategies. We will 

provide additional programming as needs are identified through our partnership 

with the Government of Mexico. 

Question 4. This budget would increase assistance to Colombia by $100 million. 

What portion of that funding will go towards counter-drug efforts? 

Answer. Of the total FY 2017 budget requested by the Department of State for 

assistance in Colombia, $95 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds and $90.46 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) will 

support counter-drug efforts. Compared to the FY 2016 budget request, this represents an overall increase of $23.115 million; a decrease of $350,000 to INCLE and 

an increase of $23.465 million to ESF, which correlates to the Government of Colombia’s increased emphasis on alternative development as a counter-drug tactic. 

INCLE funds will support the Government of Colombia’s effort to implement its 

new counternarcotics strategy. In October 2015, the Government of Colombia issued 

regulations halting all aerial eradication. Going forward, Colombian efforts will 

place a greater emphasis on interdiction operations, manual eradication, seizing assets through anti-money laundering efforts, and complex criminal investigations to 

dismantle organized crime groups. Sustained levels of assistance will be required to 

support Colombia’s continued commitment to our shared counter-drug objectives. 

ESF funds will help Colombian authorities improve the quality and volume of licit 

crops; strengthen the competitiveness of rural producers to respond to new and expanding market opportunities; leverage private investment to generate business opportunities; promote the provision of market-based rural financial services for micro- 

, small- and medium-sized producers and businesses; address the challenges of illegal and informal mining; and provide support to Colombia’s rapid response programming for peace accord implementation. 

Question 5. The President’s budget has requested that Congress restore two-year 

appropriations for Diplomatic & Consular Programs funding. Could you outline how 

this change would improve Departmental function and efficiency? 


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Answer. The Department seeks two-year authority for the Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) appropriation to facilitate implementation of interagency 

funding agreements and enable efficiencies in executing annual appropriations. The 

Department would capitalize on the following benefits: 

• Make better use of GSA Reimbursable Work Authorizations (RWA) for construction projects that extend beyond one year. GSA recently prohibited the use of 

‘‘incremental funding’’ for most multi-year projects, meaning that State can no 

longer fund a GSA-managed project by applying appropriations from a current 

year and a subsequent year. State will have to break projects into phases with 

a single-year RWA for each phase, which will increase costs. Each RWA will 

incur a GSA project management fee of up to $30,000, and savings achieved 

during any phase on an RWA can no longer be spread to related activities, resulting in lost opportunities to utilize savings. With two-year funding, State 

could avoid the extra costs and inefficiencies associated with creating multiple 

one-year RWAs, and could apply savings before they expire. 

• Facilitate financial arrangements with foreign governments and international 

organizations that do not operate on the U.S. fiscal calendar. Some bureaus use 

D&CP funds to pay for expenses of U.S. participation in international organizations, which implemented through agreements that may cross over into the next 

fiscal year. Two-year authority would prevent D&CP funding from expiring at 

the end of the first fiscal year, and thus being unavailable to meet U.S. commitments. 

For example, State regularly enters into memorandums of understanding 

(MOU) with the Community of Democracies (CD)—a coalition of democratic nations promoting representative government—under which D&CP funds are used 

to pay the U.S. costs of participating in the CD. CD bases its financial planning 

on calendar years, but State’s obligations are based on the fiscal year. As a result, the Department cannot obligate expired funding for expenses incurred by 

the CD between the end of the fiscal year and the calendar year, even when 

such expenses were budgeted for. 

In 2015 CD incurred significant expenses related to U.S. participation from 

October to December, a period the 2015 MOU with State was meant to cover. 

CD could not access the funding provided by that MOU after the U.S. fiscal 

year ended on September 30th. Securing FY 2016 funds to fulfill State’s 2015 

agreement with CD required revisions to the MOU, and a lengthy funds recovery and reallocation process. This disrupted CD’s work. Absent a last-minute 

year-end contribution from Poland, CD may not have been able to continue operating while waiting to receive the full funding promised by the United States. 

• Eliminating the requirement for two Treasury accounts for each period of 

D&CP availability. The current process for carrying over a percentage of D&CP 

funds into the two-year appropriation is highly complex, involving numerous 

time-consuming steps that require OMB and Treasury approval. In FY 2015, up 

to $650 million were made available for two fiscal years. The following steps 

were required to extend those FY 2015 D&CP funds into FY 2016. 

1. Unobligated balances were identified as the end of FY 2015 was drawing 

to a close; 

2. Balances were withdrawn from the FY 2015 account and prepared for 

transfer; 

3. New FY 2015/2016 accounts were created for the transfer; 

4. New apportionment document submitted to OMB for approval; 

5. New transfer document submitted to Treasury for approval; 

6. Upon receipt of approval from OMB and Treasury funds are available for 

obligation; 

7. New allotments documents were created to allocate funding to various bureaus/programs 

• As expired FY 2015 D&CP balances become available, all of these steps (except 

#3) are being repeated to transfer expired FY 2015 balances into the FY 2015/ 

2016 account during FY 2016. 


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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO

SECRETARY KERRY BY SENATOR PERDUE

Question 1. Looking at your overall budget request for the International Affairs 

budget for FY 2017, it represents a 25 percent increase since FY 2008 in constant 

dollars. 

• Can you help me understand what accounts for this increase in the budget since 

FY 2008? The rest of the accounts that make up our budget certainly haven’t 

increased by this amount. 

Answer. Increases in spending by the Department of State and USAID since 2008 

are primarily due to greater investments in humanitarian aid and the rising costs 

of maintaining the safety of our employees stationed overseas. 

The Department and USAID have expanded foreign assistance programs in recent 

years to address increasing global challenges, including addressing conflict and insecurity in Syria, Iraq, South Sudan, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and elsewhere. As part of this effort, humanitarian assistance 

needs have greatly increased, and we have responded robustly. In recent years, we 

have also expanded resources to address global health needs and the underlying 

causes of the migration crisis in Central America, and to invest in Asia’s part of 

the Administration’s Asia Rebalance effort. 

Question 2. Overall, this budget request appears to have some shifting priorities 

since FY 2016. The overall request has gone down by about 1 percent. The request 

for diplomatic engagement, however, has gone up 4 percent (background: diplomatic 

engagement includes worldwide security protection, embassy construction and maintenance, staffing and HR, the regional bureaus in DC, contributions to international 

organizations, public diplomacy and exchanges). However, the overall foreign assistance request has decreased by 3 percent. 

• Is that the right direction we should be going in? How do you account for spending more here in DC and less on foreign assistance? 

Answer. The increase in the Diplomatic Engagement portion of the State Department budget from FY 2008 to the FY 2017 request is largely attributable to an increase in funding for security projects over this timeframe. Authority for non-security spending has remained essentially flat, while security related spending has 

more than doubled. 

There are three major factors which have contributed to the increase in security 

related authority: 

First, the Department’s priority on maintaining a presence in conflict areas has 

required funding to protect our persons and assets in those areas. The Department 

sees great value in having Americans observing at the ground level in conflict areas 

worldwide. This is true of our missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. America 

needs a diplomatic presence in conflict areas to counter terrorism, sectarian violence, and the spread of conflicts beyond borders. 

Second, the military draw-down in Iraq and Afghanistan has required that security of American persons and assets be provided by State resources. As the military 

presence has been reduced in these two vital missions, the State Department has 

taken on the role of maintaining a secure environment from which United States 

government personnel can operate. The security situation in these two countries is 

not only very different now than it was in 2008, but the number of military personnel is far smaller than in 2008. 

Third, internal reorganizations have moved security-related spending to a handful 

of accounts, increasing these security accounts and reducing the administrative accounts from which the funds were moved. In FY 2008, much of the funding for Diplomatic Security was in the Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) ongoing operations account. Over time this funding has been moved to the Worldwide Security 

Protection (WSP) account. Similarly, security-related funds in the Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) account have moved into the Worldwide Security Upgrades (WSU) account. 


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The table below groups Diplomatic Engagement budget authority into four categories: 

D&CP Ongoing Operations The non-security portions of the D&CP (19-0113) account 

Other Diplomatic Engagement All other non-fee, non-security appropriated accounts except 

International Organizations (IO) 

Security Programs WSP, WSU, Protection of Foreign Missions and Officials 

International Organizations Contributions to International Organizations (CIO), Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) 

COMPARISON OF APPROPRIATED BUDGET AUTHORITY FOR DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT 

(FY 2008 Actual Versus FY 2017 Request) 

Non-Adjusted Dollars in Millions 

FY 2008 

Actual 

FY 2017 

Request 

Percent 

Change (NonAdjusted) 

Percent 

Change 

(Constant 

Dollars) * 

Diplomatic and Consular Programs ............. 5,639 4,957 -12 -21 

Other Non-Security Diplomatic Engagement 1,439 1,852 29 16 

Security Related Programs ........................... 1,949 5,332 174 146 

Worldwide Security Protection .................. 1,179 3,715 215 183 

Worldwide Security Upgrades ................... 747 1,587 112 91 

Protection of Foreign Missions and Officials ..................................................... 23 30 30 17 

International Organizations .......................... 3,473 3,932 13 2 

Contributions to International Organizations ..................................................... 1,409 1,387 -2 -12 

Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities ................................ 2,064 2,545 23 11 

Total Administration of Foreign Affairs ........ 12,500 16,073 29 15 

* Dollars adjusted using CPI-U BLS full year average for CY 2008 and OMB President’s Budget FY 2017 

Assumptions for FY 2017. 

Question 3. The two-year budget deal reached late last year increased the International Affairs Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget by approximately 

60 percent compared to FY 2015. The growth in OCO has also made the International Affairs Budget dangerously dependent on a funding mechanism that was 

originally intended only to cover temporary, generally war-related programs. The 

use of OCO for the State Department Budget has shifted from being exclusively for 

‘‘frontline’’ states, like Afghanistan and Iraq, and is now to be used to quote ‘‘respond to, recover from, or prevent, including armed conflict as well as humancaused and natural disasters,’’ according to your FY 2017 Congressional Budget Justification. 

• Can you explain the expansion of the use of OCO beyond ‘‘frontline’’ states? 

(frontline being Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan traditionally) 

• Isn’t responding to and recovering from international crises a normal part of 

State department and USAID operations? 


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• What are the short-and long-term implications of this growing dependence on 

OCO, and how does the Administration propose to strengthen the ‘‘base’’ or 

long-term international Affairs funding in the future? 

Answer. The OCO portion of the FY 2017 request for the Department and USAID 

is $14.9 billion, consistent with the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015. The OCO request 

will support Department of State and USAID efforts to prevent, address, and recover from man-made crises and natural disasters and secure State and USAID 

global operations. The United States is currently simultaneously engaged in more 

places with more issues of consequence than in recent history. 

In support of this increased engagement and assistance, the FY 2017 request includes OCO increases for several major programs. For Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance, we will be relying more heavily on OCO to construct more 

safe and secure diplomatic facilities in India, Kenya, Uganda, and Afghanistan. It 

will also enable us to contribute to peacekeeping mission, shield allies and partners 

from potential threats, aid Afghanistan and Pakistan, step up our efforts to destroy 

Da’esh, and confront and recover from other crises in the Middle East and Africa. 

While we appreciate that the OCO increase was instrumental to securing an overall increase in funding for FY 2016 and FY 2017 above levels included in the Budget 

Control Act, the Department is concerned about the shift in balance between base 

and OCO funding. Programs supported with base funding serve as the foundation 

of core, ongoing Department operations and assistance programs. Base funds support vital development and diplomacy programs, including health, democracy, and 

diplomatic security. 

The Department looks forward to working with Congress to restore the Department’s enduring funding levels for long-term programs as we move toward the FY 

2018 budget. The President’s Budget anticipates this by planning for the restoration 

of $8.7 billion to the International Affairs base budget in FY 2018. 

Question 4. The growing dependence on OCO to fund America’s development and 

diplomacy programs means that a broad range of programs and accounts that are 

designed to meet long-term commitments, and historically were funded in the base 

budget, now receive a significant share of their funding through a temporary funding mechanism. Given the strain on discretionary resources, this flexibility is important in the short-term but has led to a significant shift in funding from base to OCO 

for certain programs. For example, nearly 100 percent of U.S. assistance to Jordan 

is funded through the OCO account in this year’s budget request. In another example, the line item for ‘‘Contributions for International Peacekeeping’’ went from 

being fully base-budget funded in FY15 to now 66 percent of the amount has been 

shifted to OCO in FY 2017. Could you expand on the Administration’s thinking behind these major shifts in funding for long-term programs specifically? 

Answer. The OCO portion of the FY 2017 request for the Department and USAID 

is $14.9 billion, consistent with the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015. The Department 

is also concerned about the shift in balance between base and OCO funding, particularly the substantial increase in OCO funds as compared to base. The Department 

looks forward to working with Congress to restoring enduring funding levels as we 

move toward the FY 2018 budget. The President’s Budget actually anticipates this 

by planning for the restoration of $8.7 billion to the International Affairs base budget in FY 2018. 

Question 5. The world is facing unprecedented humanitarian crises—conflict and 

disaster have displaced millions of people. In June 2015, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that worldwide, nearly 60 million persons 

were forcibly displaced—the highest number on record. Despite these record highs, 

the total U.S. humanitarian assistance request is $6.156 billion—that’s 20 percent 

less than FY 2016. Further, the amount in the Migration and Refugee Assistance 

account in this year’s request decreased by $267 million. 

• What accounts for this significant decrease? Particularly when the causes of 

this mass migration have yet to be solved? 

Answer. Humanitarian assistance remains a top priority for the Administration. 

The United States continues to be the largest bilateral contributor of humanitarian 

assistance funding. 

The FY 2017 request includes $6.2 billion in humanitarian assistance, which is 

over $500 million above the FY 2016 Request of $5.7 billion. 

In concert with the significant resources provided by Congress in FY 2016, the 

funding included in the FY 2017 request will help to meet humanitarian assistance 

needs globally over the next two years. 


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Question 6. Can you describe State’s strategies for delivering assistance to these 

areas? Approximately, in what percentage of the country have State and USAID 

been able to operate? 

Answer. There are 13.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance inside 

Syria; 6.4 million are IDPs, 1.3 million people are hosting IDPs, and nearly 4.5 million people are living in hard-to-reach locations, including 360,000 people in besieged areas. Priority humanitarian needs for 2016 include emergency food assistance, health care, shelter, and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) assistance. 

We cannot provide a percentage of the country in which State and USAID have 

been able to operate in delivering humanitarian assistance. However, we work closely with countries in the region—mainly Turkey and Jordan—as well as with the 

United Nations and our NGO partners to get assistance into Syria through all possible means. Approximately half of the more than $5.1 billion of humanitarian assistance that we have provided has gone to humanitarian needs inside Syria. Our 

international organization and NGO partners hope that the cessation of hostilities 

in Syria will allow for more systematic access to the besieged areas and hard-toreach locations. As the cessation of hostilities holds we continue to work with the 

U.N. and members of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), particularly 

Russia, to expand access and assistance to more priority areas inside the country. 

Since the cessation of hostilities in Syria came into effect on February 27, humanitarian access has significantly improved for many of the hard-to-reach and besieged 

locations prioritized by the ISSG. As of March 8, 10 interagency convoys comprised 

of nearly 300 trucks have provided emergency relief assistance to more than 225,000 

people, or approximately 46 percent of the estimated 486,700 people living in U.N.- 

identified besieged areas. 

Approximately 500 U.N. interagency trucks crossed into northern Syria via the 

Bab al Salaam and Bab al Hawa border crossings, providing emergency relief supplies to people in Afrin, Azaz, and Mar’a sub-districts in Aleppo, as well as Harim 

and Idlib sub-districts, Idlib Governorate. The Turkish Red Crescent, which facilitates NGO utilization of the humanitarian lanes at the borders, also reported an 

uptick in NGO cross-border deliveries, noting that an estimated 800 trucks passed 

through the Atmeh, Bab al Hawa, Bab al Salaam, Kobane, and Yamadiah border 

crossings in February. 

Question 7. Due to restrictions in place, aid is often delivered using networks of 

volunteers in Syria 

• What requirements or specific policies does State and USAID have in place to 

vet volunteers or networks that assist in the delivery of this humanitarian aid? 

• What types of monitoring activities do State and USAID implement to ensure 

accountability of assistance delivery? 

• What percentage of deliveries in Syria has been affected by fraud or diversion? 

How does the U.S. track this? 

Answer. The State Department and USAID vet beneficiaries of Syria assistance 

as part of our strategy to mitigate the risk that U.S. government non-lethal assistance could benefit groups or individuals associated with terrorism. Further, the vetting process is intended to ensure that U.S. government assistance is not provided 

to individuals or entities that are human rights violators: 

• Vetting coordinators from each implementing office coordinate with the Intelligence Community to identify derogatory or potentially derogatory information. 

• In addition to vetting, we closely monitor and evaluate our assistance through 

a network of Syrian in-country monitors who interface directly with beneficiaries to ensure assistance is delivered, hand receipts, photographs, and 

tracking devices. 

State Department: 

• There are unique challenges to working in Syria, given the ongoing conflict, the 

range of actors on the ground including designated terrorist organizations, and 

the lack of U.S. presence on the ground. However, we have a range of monitoring procedures in place to help mitigate the risk that assistance falls into the 

wrong hands and ensure that the assistance is used appropriately by recipients. 

These efforts include: 

• Meetings with the recipients of State Department assistance in Turkey or Jordan to ensure they know the responsibilities of accepting U.S. assistance. 

• Having recipients sign a letter of assurance before receiving support that details 

the responsibilities of accepting U.S. assistance and declare that they will not 


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use the assistance for any other than its intended purpose or divert equipment 

to designated terrorist organizations. 

• Follow up meeting with beneficiaries to assess the usefulness of the assistance 

to further refine their needs assessments and target the appropriate assistance 

• Survey reports from recipients via email/phone to report on the use of the assistance. 

• Syrian field monitors are contracted to observe and survey beneficiaries for the 

provision of heavy equipment. When security allows, photographs are taken of 

in-kind assistance. When the security situation cannot allow monitors, phone 

calls are used to query the recipients on the current location and status of 

equipment. 

USAID 

USAID works closely with partners to ensure that its assistance is reaching the 

intended beneficiaries. USAID exercises considerable oversight over our programs, 

and our partners have developed a variety of multi-layered monitoring and tracking 

mechanisms to make sure that our assistance gets to those it is intended to reach. 

• Partners are required to provide prompt, regular updates on the progress of 

their activities and any security concerns. USAID staff closely and systematically track the reports, are in regular direct communication with partners, and 

immediately follow up on any reported issues. 

• USAID works closely with all its partners to collect performance and situational 

data to monitor activities and gather enough information from different sources 

to verify assistance is reaching targeted areas and beneficiaries, including 

through geo-tagged photos and videos of distributions, independent field monitors, and feedback hotlines for beneficiaries. Partners are required to provide 

regular program updates on the progress of their activities and any security 

concerns, and we require them to report any diversions, seizures, or losses immediately, without exception, for immediate follow-up and investigation. 

• The USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) in Jordan and Turkey 

meets regularly with partners to discuss programming, issues that impede humanitarian activities, and partners’ risk mitigation mechanisms. The DART 

also meets with the broader humanitarian community, and communicates directly and indirectly with Syrian organizations that provide added layers of 

ground-truth to partner reporting. The DART also attends cluster and donor coordination meetings, which provide an opportunity to triangulate information 

about partners’ performance. 

• In addition, USAID utilizes a third-party monitoring system to verify and provide independent confirmation of a number of USAID programs. By providing 

independent, field-based monitoring of activities and verification of outputs, as 

well as monthly progress reporting, third party mechanisms supply USAID with 

the level of assurance that comes from field visits that are the basis of USAID 

monitoring in more stable environments, but also contribute to program learning. 

• USAID staff in Washington also maintains regular contact with all humanitarian partners, including U.N. agencies, other international organizations, and 

NGOs, concerning their assistance activities in Syria. The U.S. government humanitarian response inside Syria is coordinated by the Middle East Crisis Response (MECHR) Management Team, which is inclusive of both USAID’s Office 

of Food for Peace and USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. 

USAID leadership also regularly engages with U.N. agency emergency directors 

and other senior U.N. staff in a variety of forums, including Emergency Directors Group meetings, Syria Top Donor Group meetings, and other events. 

• As part of its mandate, the OIG writes a quarterly Operation Inherent Resolve 

(OIR) report detailing events of the quarter. The investigators explore a variety 

of issues to help understand and review USAID/OFDA and USAID/FFP operating principles, methods for ensuring accountability of funding, and efficacy of 

programming. 

Known losses comprise less than 4 percent of State Department non-humanitarian assistance provided through the START and SSAP platforms. To date, less 

than 0.05 percent of USAID program funds for the Syria humanitarian crisis response has been lost to fraud or diversion. Approximately 0.04 percent of total Office 

of Transition Initiatives funded non-humanitarian assistance is known to be lost or 

diverted. 


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We take all battlefield losses of U.S.-provided equipment very seriously and have 

a range of risk mitigation steps in place to limit these losses. However, given that 

Syria is an active war zone, some losses are unavoidable. It is important that we 

maintain our commitment to supporting the moderate opposition in Syria as they 

seek to counter extremists and defend against the regime, with the goal of ultimately creating the conditions for a negotiated political solution. Losses accounting 

is a joint effort between START and SSAP, USAID and State Department, implementing partners, and grantees. As losses come to light, START and SSAP staff 

work closely with implementing partners and grantees to confirm all relevant details, which are then tracked in Washington. 

Question 8. ISIS’s branch in Libya is expanding its reach across a broadening area 

of Africa. They are taking advantage of the chaos and security vacuum in Libya to 

expand territory, and grow. CIA Director John Brennan told the Senate earlier this 

month that quote, ‘‘Libya has become a magnet for individuals not only inside 

Libya, but from the African continent as well as from outside,’’ in terms of terrorist 

recruitment. This year’s budget request focuses most of its counter-ISIS measures 

at Iraq and Syria, as well as immediately neighboring countries like Jordan and 

Lebanon. While ISIS in Iraq and Syria is certainly the more immediate threat, we 

should work to prevent this emerging threat in Libya from getting out of hand. 

• Could you outline for me what State plans to do to counter this developing 

threat in Libya? 

Answer. The United States remains committed to supporting the Libyan people 

in their fight against Da’esh. We are actively supporting the U.N.-facilitated Libyan 

political process to form the Government of National Accord, putting Libya on the 

path to regaining control of the country’s ungoverned space. We and our international partners will work together with the Government of National Accord to 

counter the growing threat from violent extremists and Da’esh-aligned groups and 

rebuild a national security force to restore stability in Libya. 

To that end, we are committed to providing the Government of National Accord 

technical, economic, humanitarian, security, and counter-terrorism assistance, as requested. We are pursuing our counterterrorism and governance efforts so that they 

proceed in parallel and are mutually reinforcing. A unified, capable national government is our best hope for a sustainable effort to counter Da’esh and other extremists. 

At the same time, we will not ignore immediate threats from Da’esh or other extremists. As President Obama has made clear, we will not hesitate when it comes 

to defending U.S. national security interests and to taking direct action when necessary. Actions like the U.S. strike on a Da’esh facility in Sabratha, Libya, which 

we announced on February 19, are part of our comprehensive approach to degrading 

and ultimately destroying Da’esh. Last November, the United States conducted an 

airstrike against Abu Nabil, an Iraqi, who was at the time the leader of Da’esh in 

Libya. These actions show our commitment to dislodging Da’esh from Libya. 

Question 9. I, and many of my colleagues, disagree with the U.S. peacekeeping 

assessment level set by the U.N. General Assembly. Since FY1992, with few exceptions, Congress has enacted a cap on U.S. payments to U.N. peacekeeping at levels 

below the established U.N. assessment. Your budget request this year is based on 

the U.N. peacekeeping assessment for the U.S. of 28.56 percent, rather than the 

amount recognized by U.S. law, which is 27.14 percent. 

• What is the Administration’s position on this issue? 

• How has the cap impacted recent budget requests and appropriations? 

• More broadly, what impact, if any, has this issue had on U.N. peacekeeping operations? 

Answer. The U.S. role as a global leader demands that we continue to pay our 

U.N. peacekeeping assessments in full, at the rate assessed, so U.N. peacekeeping 

missions have appropriate resources available to carry out their life-saving mandates. While Congress passed legislation in 1994 (P.L. 103–236) capping our use of 

appropriated funds for peacekeeping assessments at a rate of 25 percent, Congress 

also raised the cap for calendar years 2001 through 2012 to authorize the use of 

appropriated funds to pay U.S. assessed peacekeeping expenses in full. 

The current U.S. peacekeeping assessment rate for calendar year 2016 is 28.57 

percent. However, the Department only has the authority for fiscal year 2016 to 

make payments from appropriated funds at the calendar year 2012 assessed rate 

of 27.14 percent. Because of the Administration’s commitment to paying U.S. treaty 

obligations in full and on-time, the President’s request is based on the current U.N. 


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peacekeeping assessment rate, and accordingly requests raising the statutory cap so 

that the United States can pay our assessments in full. 

If the funds are appropriated without an associated cap lift, the United Nations 

may apply U.N. peacekeeping credits to pay the difference, to the extent such credits are available. If there are not adequate credits to address the difference, the cap 

will cause the United States to accrue new arrears. The reliance on credits is not 

a sustainable practice as there may not be sufficient peacekeeping credits to address 

future shortfalls caused by the statutory cap. 

The gap between the actual U.S. assessment rate and the amount of the U.S. payment will deprive the United Nations of the full amount of funding that the General 

Assembly appropriated for peacekeeping missions. Reductions in U.S. payments can 

strain important U.N. peacekeeping operations or cause delays in reimbursements 

to troop contributing countries, which can affect future troop rotations. Timely and 

full U.S. payment has helped to solidify the U.N.’s ability to attract and retain 

peacekeeping forces, strengthened U.S. leverage with troop contributing countries, 

and allowed us to more effectively shape and reform peacekeeping operations to deliver maximum impact. For example, in September 2015, President Obama convened the Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping, which resulted in new and significant 

pledges of troops, police, and enabling capabilities to U.N. peacekeeping from over 

50 countries and regional organizations. Paying late and accruing arrears undermines U.S. credibility and influence at the U.N., particularly on matters dealing 

with budget, finance, and management reform. In the past, this has affected world 

opinion regarding U.S. commitment to multilateral engagement and respect for the 

role of multilateral organizations, and has diminished our own U.S. influence even 

with our closest allies. 

Question 10. The State Department, as requested, has been provided by the Congress with a substantial influx of additional resources since FY 2013 to address 

global diplomatic security needs. 

• How are these resources contributing to the security of our diplomats abroad? 

• To what extent are the requests for higher levels of spending likely to persist 

into future years? 

• How are you balancing funding for and attention to securing high threat posts 

against the possibility that less threatened posts will be targeted—bearing in 

mind that Kenya and Tanzania were not considered high threat when they were 

bombed in 1998? 

Answer. Diplomatic Security programs protect thousands of Chief of Mission 

(COM) personnel, and the facilities and data systems on which these personnel rely, 

at 275 overseas posts and 125 domestic offices. The Department’s budget request 

reflects the Administration’s commitment to: 

• Prepare U.S. government personnel posted overseas under COM authority for 

assignments to critical and high threat posts. Manage a full spectrum of 

counterterrorism, criminal, and special investigations to include violations of 

laws regarding U.S. passports and visas, defensive counterintelligence programs, and interagency liaison functions. Investigations include analysis involving terrorist threats, incidents, and hostile activities directed against U.S. government personnel, facilities, and interests around the world: 

1. Provide robust and nimble information security protection that keeps pace with 

changing technology. 

2. Leverage the latest physical and technical countermeasures for use worldwide. 

3. Conduct initial and periodic vetting of all employees and contractors in positions 

that require security clearances, access to sensitive intelligence, or public trust 

certifications. 

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security conducts regular, integrated budget and performance reviews over the course of the fiscal year. These reviews inform resource 

requirements, and provide for the informed and accountable development of future 

budgets. Resources are finite. Therefore, the Department carefully manages its resources to ensure that emergent priorities are addressed as quickly as possible in 

order to keep our people safe at all of our posts worldwide. We apply the lessons 

learned from previous attacks to all of our facilities. 

Although the unique conditions at each post dictate a specific approach to providing security for facilities and personnel, such as a post-specific travel policy, 

there are a number of programmatic commonalities that apply worldwide, regardless of threat levels and local security environments, including: 


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• The need for construction of hardened, secure facilities with setback where older 

facilities fall short. 

• The use of appropriate technical and physical security technologies and countermeasures. 

• The development and maintenance of a well-trained, well-equipped and flexible 

cadre of security professionals across a variety of disciplines. 

• Training to deal with enhanced-risk environments: the Foreign Affairs Counter 

Threat (FACT) course will be required for all Chief of Mission employees serving overseas by January 1, 2019. 

• The deployment of a wide range of technical security equipment needed to protect our facilities and people. 

• Close cooperation with interagency partners and host country security agencies 

to detect, deter and disrupt threats directed against U.S. interests abroad. 

• Soft target funding for physical and technical security improvements at international schools. 

While risk can never be completely eliminated from our diplomatic duties, we 

work to constantly mitigate it, regardless of the threat level. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security is also fortunate to retain no-year availability authority on Worldwide Security Protection funding. Continuation of this authority provides the Department essential flexibility to sustain complex, global security programs, and to 

adjust mitigation responses as security threats evolve, not only at high threat posts, 

but at all diplomatic locations. 

Additionally, the Department prioritizes the construction of safe and secure embassy and consulate facilities to replace those that are most vulnerable. Under the 

direction of the Bureau of Overseas Building Operations, 129 projects have been 

completed since the 1999 enactment of the Secure Embassy Construction and 

Counterterrorism Act—moving more than 35,000 people into safer and more secure 

facilities. Funding in Fiscal Years 2013-2015 has allowed us to move forward with 

the following projects: 

• FY 2013—New Embassy Compounds (NEC) in N’Djamena, Chad; Nouakchott, 

Muaritania; Paramaribo, Suriname; and The Hague, Netherlands; as well a new 

office annex in Amman, Jordan and new housing in Karachi, Pakistan. 

• FY 2014—NECs in Ankara, Turkey; Ashgabat, Turkmenistan; Harare, 

Zimbabwe; Maputo, Mozambique; and Pristina, Kosovo; as well as New Consulate Compounds (NCC) in Erbil, Iraq and Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. In addition, 

Marine Security Guard Residences were funded in Belmopan, Belize; 

Guayaquil, Ecuador; and Tijuana, Mexico. 

Question 11. Operations in the challenging environments of the three countries 

termed ‘‘frontline states’’—Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq—continue to rightly be 

a focus of attention by the Department. Together, these three countries (at a total 

of $2.62 billion) make up roughly 22 percent of the State Department’s overall request for operational funding. NEA and SRAP: 

• Please describe your long-term plans for presence in the frontline states. 

• Does the significant investment of resources necessary to maintain a full presence in these challenging conditions come at an opportunity cost elsewhere? 

• What lessons from the Iraq transition (from military to civilian lead) are being 

applied to our presence in Afghanistan? 

Answer. First, as laid out in the U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement and the Bilateral Security Agreement, the United States maintains a longterm commitment to support Afghanistan’s social and economic development, security, and institutions so that Afghanistan may never again serve as a safe haven 

for terrorists who would attack the United States and its allies. The Department 

is continuing the consolidation of security, development, and diplomatic activities in 

Kabul to allow the U.S. to ensure that as few people as necessary remain in harm’s 

way, and that remaining staff have the security and resources they require to do 

their jobs. 

From more than 1,200 U.S. direct-hire staff at the peak of the surge, the Department is working toward a steady state of roughly 500 direct hires (supported by 

about 4,000 contractors providing life support and security). This number will provide sufficient U.S. staff to enable core diplomatic activities and ensure proper implementation and oversight of approximately $1 billion in annual civilian assistance. 

The current presence in Iraq consists of Embassy Baghdad, Consulate General 

Erbil, Consulate General Basrah, and the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center at 


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the Baghdad International Airport. The current policy priority in Iraq is degrading 

and defeating Da’esh. As the Iraqis, with Coalition support, continue to liberate territory from Da’esh, the Department will maintain a significant presence there in 

order to prevent the spread of violent extremism and help the Iraqis rebuild their 

country. 

As set forth by the Strategic Framework Agreement, the United States has an enduring partnership with the Government of Iraq to support its democratic institutions, enhance its regional and international status, promote cultural and social exchanges, facilitate growth of education and scientific institutions, promote human 

rights, support economic growth, and strengthen its defense and security forces. Toward that end, the Department expects to maintain the current presence for the 

foreseeable future, with construction of a New Consulate Compound (NCC) in Erbil 

slated to begin the end of this year, and a site search for a Basrah NCC in progress. 

As demonstrated by U.S. engagement under the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, 

the United States will stay engaged with Pakistan to advance shared interests in 

regional stability and security, to include countering terrorism and violent extremism; strategic stability and non-proliferation; defense and military-to-military cooperation; economics and finance; education; and energy. The completion of the new 

chancery in Islamabad in 2015 and the scheduled completion of the entire New Embassy Compound project in FY 2018 will ensure that the Department has safe and 

secure facilities to support these shared interests. 

Second, FY 2017 priorities, such as the normalization of Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

Pakistan ongoing operations into the base budget, have necessitated constraints to 

other program and management priorities in order for the FY 2017 request to fit 

within the spending caps set by the Bipartisan Budget Act. The annual State Department budget is spread across missions and programs worldwide, requiring 

trade-offs during the budgeting process. 

FY 2017 Diplomatic Engagement trade-off assumptions include: 

• Reduced operational spending by embassies and Washington bureaus to ensure 

payroll obligations are met for hiring to attrition; 

• Holding funding for independent commissions and foundations to levels previously requested by the Administration; 

• Increased reliance on a projected surge in consular fee collections to fund IT investments; 

• Budgeting for reduced peacekeeping assessments based on the anticipated 

drawdown of selected missions. 

Third, while the Iraq transition experience has been instructive in our planning 

for our diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, sustaining an enduring presence in Afghanistan will present a number of challenges distinct from those encountered in 

Iraq relating to security, geography, and overall development levels. The U.S. military and NATO partners also will maintain a presence in Afghanistan through the 

end of 2016, which will require continuing coordination. 

The Department has, however, benefitted from political and practical lessons 

learned in Iraq, to include: 

• Planning based on expectations of the bilateral relationship, not the military 

model. 

• Recognition of the political capital and trade-offs required in negotiating an enduring platform. 

• Holding realistic assumptions about host country’s capacity to complete new 

tasks. 

Question 12. As this administration contemplates the way forward in Afghanistan, 

I hope that we have learned the lessons of Iraq, and don’t find ourselves with another power vacuum. The intelligence community testified earlier this month that, 

quote, ‘‘Afghanistan is at serious risk of a political breakdown in 2016.’’ 

• To what extent does the aid request (of $1.25 billion) for FY 2017 seek to prevent or mitigate the effects of such a potential breakdown? 

• What criteria will the administration use to determine whether the Afghan government is meeting the conditions to receive the total amount of the aid? 

• With the U.S. presence in Afghanistan diminishing, how is the use of U.S. economic assistance monitored? 

• What programs have been most successful in promoting governance reform and 

economic growth? 


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• How flexible are U.S. programs to augment those that are working and phasing 

out those that are not? 

Answer. The FY 2017 foreign assistance request and already-appropriated resources at work in Afghanistan are essential to the success of our strategy to help 

Afghanistan build sustainable stability. A main focus of our assistance programs is 

to improve the functioning of the Afghan government. It is in our interest that the 

Afghan government be able to meet the needs of the people who elected it. Our programming enhances the effectiveness of Afghan governance in many ways. For example, we are implementing programs focused on improving the delivery of education and health services, which has an immediate impact on all Afghans and impacts local perceptions of the credibility of the government. We are working in a 

similar fashion to improve the functioning of the Afghan justice and correctional 

systems. 

In 2017, we expect to continue the innovative New Development Partnership 

(NDP) that was initiated during the visit of President Ghani and Chief Executive 

Abdullah in 2015. The NDP will provide up to $800 million to the Afghan government through 2019 if it meets specific, pre-determined reforms and development results. The NDP conditions the provision of full U.S. assistance on Afghan government progress in addressing corruption, improving the government’s fiscal sustainability and management, reducing poverty, and empowering women. Incentive funds 

are released only after the government has demonstrated that they have met predetermined benchmarks established at the outset of the partnership. In 2015, the 

government achieved most of the NDP result targets agreed upon for the calendar 

year and qualified for $180 million of the $200 million that was available. 

Since 2001, U.S. assistance to Afghanistan has had a significant and positive impact: 

• The average number of years that Afghan children attend school has risen from 

2.5 years to 9.3 years since 2000, and 67 percent of Afghans are satisfied with 

the education that their children receive. In 2002, roughly 900,000 boys and 

zero girls were enrolled in school; by 2014, nearly eight million children attended school, with girls comprising one-third of the student population. 

• With help from USAID and other donors, the government provides basic health 

services to 2.3 million Afghan citizens a month. Since 2002, infant mortality has 

decreased 53 percent; child mortality rate has decreased 62 percent; and maternal mortality has decreased 77 percent. Furthermore, the Government of Afghanistan—in conjunction with the Department of State—reaches approximately 28,000 patients per year in more than 100 drug treatment centers. 

• Women hold 27 percent of seats in Parliament, three cabinet positions, and 165 

judicial positions. 

• We have also helped the Afghan government and private sector spur a communications revolution with nearly 90 percent of Afghan households owning a cell 

phone, and fostered the birth of a vibrant, free media. 

While there is still much to work to be done, particularly with regard to sustainability, we continue to achieve significant gains. For instance, in 2015, after years 

of targeted assistance from USAID, the Afghan government successfully acceded to 

the World Trade Organization, and the Parliament is on track to ratify the accession agreement by summer 2016. WTO membership will anchor Afghanistan in a 

rules-based trading system, and foster regional trade. Also in 2015, USAID completed the last segment of paved highway in eastern Afghanistan from Gardez to 

Khost. This road will link to another road under construction to the Pakistan border 

and open another strategic trade route for Afghan and transit goods. 

In addition, the Department continues to support the Counter Narcotics Justice 

Center (CNJC), which tries all high-level and government official narcotics cases. 

With support from specialized enforcement units mentored by the Drug Enforcement Administration, and operations and maintenance support from the Department of State and the Government of Britain, the Afghan government has arrested 

and the CNJC has successfully prosecuted a U.S-designated drug king pin and provincial officials implicated in the drug trade. 

We have established an innovative multi-tiered monitoring approach for all of our 

programs in Afghanistan that draws on information from multiple sources and allows us to assess in real-time how our programs are functioning and whether they 

are achieving the intended results. This monitoring information allows the United 

States to expand programs that are working well and terminate programs that are 

not achieving results. We have learned, to date, that most of our programs are 

working well. 


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On rare occasions, we have changed course to refocus our resources on more productive programs that have greater impact on Afghanistan’s development. For example, referring to the aforementioned Gardez-Khost road, USAID originally contracted with an external firm on the project; however, after monitoring efforts revealed the contractor was struggling to build community support for the project, 

which was causing delays, USAID turned project implementation over to a local 

firm. As a result, the project proceeded much faster and was recently completed. 

As we fine tune our development activities, we also recognize that progress on 

many issues takes many years and sustained effort, and we employ multi-year, national-scale projects to maximize impact. The key is to monitor these programs 

closely to ensure results are being achieved and refinements are made to address 

identified issues. 

Question 13. We’re seeing some troubling developments in Ukraine—earlier this 

month, Ukraine’s economic minister and his full team, resigned citing ingrained corruption as their reason for stepping down. A major focus of our assistance to 

Ukraine has been centered around countering this rampant corruption. 

• Is Ukraine making sufficient efforts to fight corruption and enhance the rule 

of law? If so, how? 

Answer. The Ukrainian government is implementing an ambitious anti-corruption 

and rule of law reform agenda. Although Kyiv has made tremendous progress, much 

more must be done. Our highest priorities for rule of law reforms are focused on 

improving the effectiveness of the operations of the new anti-corruption institutions; 

reform of the prosecutorial and judicial system; and police reform. 

Regarding the new anti-corruption institutions, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) has been established with a special anti-corruption prosecutor, and is 

currently conducting investigations. The PGO’s new Inspector General Unit is also 

now functioning, and we are hopeful that the prosecutorial reform process will be 

rejuvenated now that the Prosecutor General, Victor Shokin, has resigned. 

In 2015, the Rada passed legislation to reform judicial self-governance, change the 

processes for appointments, discipline, qualifications, and training for judiciary 

members. Constitutional amendments required to bolster judicial independence are 

moving through the Rada now. 

The most visible and celebrated reform has been the establishment of the new patrol police that replaced the notoriously corrupt traffic police. In 2016, the new patrol police will be expanded to all oblast capitals. Government transparency will be 

enhanced by new laws on e-procurement, public official’s asset disclosures, and 

openness on media companies’ ownership. 

These reforms will be critical to Ukraine’s future and have been valiantly fought 

for by ordinary Ukrainians. The United States will continue to encourage further 

reforms during this critical time in Ukraine’s history. 

Question 14. Ukraine is still facing Russian aggression—both militarily and via 

propaganda. 

• Is U.S. aid helping Ukraine’s armed forces enhance its capabilities? 

• Is non-lethal aid sufficient to help deter Russian aggression, or is some level 

of lethal aid needed? 

Answer. In response to the crisis, we have committed over $266 million in training and equipment to help Ukraine’s forces better monitor and secure their borders, 

operate more safely and effectively, and preserve Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Our security assistance has saved lives while helping to build 

Ukraine’s long-term defense capacity. We have delivered non-lethal defensive equipment, including counter-battery radars, secure communications, Humvees, and medical equipment to help Ukraine protect its forces while defending against Russian 

aggression. 

We have stood up a multinational joint commission to better understand 

Ukraine’s defense requirements, and have embedded advisors to promote long-term 

defense reform. In November 2015, we completed a $19 million train and equip program for Ukraine’s National Guard utilizing the Global Security Contingency Fund 

(GSCF). In addition, we are providing training and equipment to the Ministry of Defense. 

We have not ruled out sending lethal weapons to Ukraine. We continue to believe 

that there is no military resolution to this crisis, but Ukraine has the right to defend itself. 


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Question 15. What is the U.S. doing to help Georgia to hold free and fair elections 

later this year? Are there concerns about Georgia’s democracy and adherence to the 

rule of law? 

Answer. In FY 2015, the U.S. government allocated more than $20 million to promote democracy in Georgia. These programs work to advance democratic political 

processes, strengthen civic participation, bolster independent media, and support 

the rule of law. The October 2016 parliamentary elections will represent another 

key moment in the consolidation of Georgia’s democracy, which has made significant 

progress since independence. Moving toward the elections, it will be important for 

Georgia to maintain media freedom, promote political pluralism, and ensure independence of the judiciary. 

We are currently assessing the electoral environment to identify any unmet needs 

in advance of the elections. We will fund observation missions by international and 

local NGOs and plan to contribute observers to the OSCE observation mission. Electoral reform and safeguarding media freedom, civil society and political pluralism 

during the election season will be a key focus of the upcoming U.S.-Georgia Democracy Working Group. 

Question 16. President Obama’s budget is set to provide additional assistance to 

Georgia to combat Russian aggression, but beyond military concerns, there are also 

opportunities to further link Georgia and the United States through trade. In fact, 

a U.S. company, Conti, is now leading efforts to develop a new multi-billion deep 

water port in Georgia. Will you support intensifying discussion related to a U.S.- 

Georgia Free Trade Agreement? 

Answer. The United States is committed to maximizing economic cooperation with 

Georgia, including by strengthening our bilateral trade relationship and encouraging reforms that create a welcoming investment environment for American businesses. We also advocate vigorously for U.S. businesses at every opportunity. The 

deep water port that you cite is a good example of recent progress on this front. 

We will continue to engage with Georgia and discuss ways to strengthen trade and 

investment between our countries, including the possibility of a free trade agreement. A successful U.S.-Georgia High-Level Dialogue on Trade and Investment was 

held in Washington in October 2015, and the Strategic Partnership Commission’s 

Economic Working Group will convene in Tbilisi in April this year. 

Question 17. In June 2015, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 

reported that, worldwide, nearly 60 million persons were forcibly displaced, the 

highest number on record. As violent conflict continues, humanitarian needs of 

those affected by natural disasters have also increased. In addition to responding 

to conflict in Iraq, Syria, South Sudan, and Yemen, the U.S. and the humanitarian 

community is responding to other conflicts and natural disasters such as the earthquake in Nepal, floods in Burma, and the typhoon in Micronesia. The total U.S. humanitarian assistance request is for $6.156 billion, which is about 20 percent less 

than the FY 2016 estimate (a decline that may be attributed to relatively high funding levels in FY 2016 and to high-level responses to crises in Yemen and South 

Sudan, which are expected to be scaled back in FY 2017). State Department officials 

have also suggested that the proposed funding reduction assumes an increased 

share of the humanitarian assistance burden will be taken on by other donors. 

• Is responding to humanitarian needs brought on by political crisis, such as in 

Syria and Iraq, different from those brought on by a natural disaster, such as 

the earthquake in Nepal or typhoon in Micronesia? 

• Does the cause of the suffering come into play when the United States 

prioritizes recipients of humanitarian assistance? 

• How do you respond to critics who argue that humanitarian assistance may actually prolong political crisis? 

Answer. While there are some similarities in the response to natural disasters 

and complex emergencies—including addressing immediate humanitarian needs 

such as access to temporary shelter, food, clean water and sanitation—there are important differences in response. For example, the Government of Nepal generously 

welcomed international assistance after the 2015 earthquake. But the politics of humanitarian aid are starkly different in a case like Syria, where the government is 

a party to ongoing conflict that is displacing large numbers of people and is the primary cause of growing humanitarian needs. 

Despite differences in response, the United States prioritizes humanitarian assistance based on need, whether that need arises from a man-made or natural disaster. 

While natural disasters often lead to quick responses, complex disasters caused by 

conflict may continue for years. Long-term, unceasing violence or oppression may 


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mean that uprooted people are not able to return home. For example, some 45 percent of refugees today have been displaced for five years or more. A child born in 

a refugee camp at the start of a crisis will often spend his or her entire childhood 

away from home. 

In addition to the United States, other traditional humanitarian donors include 

Western European governments, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and, more 

recently, Korea. At critical junctures in the past few years, the Saudis, Kuwaitis and 

Emiratis also have given hundreds of millions of dollars to help cope with the emergencies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. We are working to expand cooperation with India 

in this area and to encourage China to become more engaged on humanitarian 

issues. 

Our efforts to increase engagement on humanitarian issues include diplomacy in 

addition to assistance programs. The United States is a leader in diplomatic efforts 

to resolve the conflicts at the root of humanitarian suffering, and we pursue political 

solutions both bilaterally and multilaterally. Humanitarian assistance does not prolong conflict, although it can sometimes distract leaders from focusing on political 

engagement. 

Humanitarian programs save lives, reduce suffering, and work toward durable solutions for those displaced by conflict and natural disaster. U.S. humanitarian assistance strives to advance America’s humanitarian values, maximizing diplomatic 

and programmatic efforts to provide effective protection and assistance worldwide. 

The FY 2017 humanitarian assistance budget request seeks to balance rising humanitarian requirements and a difficult budget reality in order to meet basic needs 

and sustain ongoing programs. 

Question 18. Do you anticipate that the outbreak of the Zika virus in Latin America, which came to international attention after this budget request was formulated, 

will impact plans for global health assistance allocations in FY2017? 

Answer. At this time, there are no changes to the FY 2017 Global Health request. 

The response to Zika requires immediate action. The FY2016 emergency supplemental appropriations request would be our primary response to Zika. We are also 

exploring additional authorities to use available funds, including remaining funds 

in the Ebola supplemental appropriations. 

We should not divert funding from other important Global Health challenges for 

Zika. This would undermine our ability to achieve important global goals—such as 

ending child and maternal deaths and protecting communities from infectious diseases, including completing the response to Ebola, building global health security 

capacity, and addressing tuberculosis. These issues currently claim millions of lives 

each year—and most of these deaths are preventable, and doing so has been a priority of the U.S. government for many years. The experience over the last several 

years with outbreaks of Ebola, SARS, MERS-CoV, avian influenza and Zika has underscored the point that infectious disease outbreaks will happen and they can have 

devastating impacts locally and globally if they are not prevented and mitigated. 

Ensuring effective prevention, detection and response of such outbreaks is at the 

heart of global health security. If Zika continues to spread around the world, and 

response needs exceed the emergency funding capacity we have requested, we will 

have to explore and review the options available to address the changing epidemic. 

Question 19. Budget documents suggest that the proposed boost in malaria program funding would come in part from unobligated emergency funds to counter 

Ebola, if authorized by Congress. 

• What is the status of emergency Ebola funds? 

• Why are the funds no longer needed to address Ebola? 

• If not necessary for Ebola programs, why did the Department choose not to 

apply them to addressing the Zika virus instead of seeking an emergency supplemental? 

Answer. The Department of State and USAID were appropriated $2.5 billion in 

Ebola emergency funds. As of December 1, $1.2 billion in foreign assistance and 

$34.3 million in Diplomatic Engagement funding has been obligated for the StateUSAID Ebola emergency response and recovery efforts. There is nearly $1.3 billion 

in unobligated foreign assistance and $2.1 million in unobligated Diplomatic Engagement balances. The bulk of the unobligated funding is planned for our ongoing 

Ebola response and recovery efforts in West Africa; for activities to support the 

Global Health Security Agenda; and to ensure our ability to rapidly and effectively 

respond in the event of a new Ebola outbreak and tackle the effects of Ebola. 

While the height of the Ebola epidemic is over, we are continuing to support Ebola 

recovery efforts and survivor issues in the affected countries and stand ready to reVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:15 Aug 10, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00138 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\02 23 2016\30-927.T

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spond to flare-ups as they occur. While we do plan to maintain some resources to 

ensure we can meet ongoing Ebola needs, we anticipate some flexibility with remaining Ebola funds. 

Malaria remains a major cause of morbidity and mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa, 

with a number of high burden countries in West and Central Africa. Malaria globally infects over 200 million people and kills over 400,000 people annually. As such, 

the FY 2017 Budget proposes to allocate approximately $129 million from remaining 

USAID Ebola funds to fight malaria. The Administration believes that this is an appropriate use of remaining Ebola emergency funds because malaria is a dangerous 

infectious disease that continues to kill many, particularly children under five. 

While we anticipate some flexibility with remaining Ebola funds, a majority of the 

funds are still needed to sustain our ability to support Ebola recovery efforts and 

maintain our readiness to respond to flare-ups as they occur. The FY 2016 Zika supplemental request of $376 million reflects our best estimate, given current information, of potential State and USAID needs for the Zika response at this time; however, there remains significant uncertainty around the scope of the Zika challenges 

we will face. 

As such, the President’s FY 2017 Budget and the FY 2016 Zika supplemental request authority to use unobligated Ebola funds for other infectious diseases, such 

as Zika, in addition to Ebola. This authority would allow us to consider the use of 

Ebola funds to address Zika and other future infectious disease outbreaks, if needed, 

beyond the currently identified needs. We should not short-change our ability to address either of these important health challenges. 

Question 20. How does the current allocation of foreign assistance, both regionally 

and by sector, reflect larger U.S. foreign policy priorities? 

Answer. The President’s FY 2017 request for the Department and USAID includes $34 billion for foreign assistance programs. This request supports key national security, foreign policy, and development mission objectives. Regionally, the request includes $4 billion to counter Da’esh, respond to the crisis in Syria, and support humanitarian needs in the region. It requests $750.6 million to bolster the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America and $873 million to support economic development and security efforts as part of the Asia Rebalance effort. It also requests 

$7.1 billion to support our goals in Africa, including advancing democracy, health, 

education, economic growth and security throughout the region. 

As part of these regional efforts, the Department and USAID are also requesting 

funds to support important investments in critical sectors across the globe. The request includes $2.7 billion for democracy, human rights and governance programming, one of the core strategic goals of this Administration. It also includes $983.9 

million to support the Global Climate Change Initiative and $561.8 million for basic 

education. These are just examples of the important cross-cutting programs requested as part of the FY 2017 Request. All of these investments, plus many others, 

are critical to ensuring the success of our broader foreign policy and development 

goals. 

Question 21. How could aid, as a tool for foreign policy, be allocated to more effectively address strategic priorities? 

Answer. The Department of State and USAID always work to ensure the funds 

are allocated to address strategic priorities. The development of the President’s annual budget request for the Department of State and USAID begins at embassies 

and USAID missions around the world. These requests are based on country-specific 

priorities and strategies and are organized by mission objectives when they are submitted to the Department of State and USAID in Washington, DC. 

Department and USAID leadership then review the submissions from the embassies and missions overseas, and make tough decisions to ensure the request supports the most critical regional and global strategic priorities. In coordination with 

the Office of Management and Budget, this results in a final budget request that 

advances the U.S. government’s most important foreign policy, national security, 

and development objectives. The President’s request reflects these priorities when 

it is submitted to Congress each year. 

Once an appropriation bill is passed, the allocation of funds must abide by funding directives included in the bill as well as the Statement of Managers, as required. 

Within these guidelines, the Department and USAID work to ensure the best allocation of resources in support of strategic foreign policy priorities. 

Question 22. How will you manage foreign assistance programs differently, if at 

all, in the absence of congressional directives? 

Answer. The Department of State and USAID have many shared priorities with 

Congress. While many congressional funding directives support these shared goals, 


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including advancing democracy or education across the globe, we must be able to 

respond to changing circumstances and adapt as needed. Often, the world looks different between the time we submit our request and the time we receive our final 

appropriation. We need to remain nimble. 

In the absence of congressional directives, we would allocate funding according to 

the President’s request, which sustains projects, programs, and activities supported 

by Congress, taking into account changing circumstances, prior year funding availability, and any new needs that have emerged since the request was submitted. This 

would reduce our dependence on transfer authorities, which, while incredibly valuable, can be time consuming to execute and thus hinder our ability to move funds 

and respond quickly. 

Question 23. The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) is one 

of the most effective initiatives of its kind. But I am concerned about how long the 

United States is going to have to keep serving as the world’s number-one source of 

finance for HIV care and prevention. 

• What is the United States doing to help developing countries take on more of 

a leadership role in serving their own citizens, to make sure that the countries 

we are trying to help have all the tools they need to manage their way to an 

AIDS-free generation? 

Answer. PEPFAR is committed to the end goal of country-led sustainable responses, where partner countries will lead, manage, coordinate, and increasingly finance the efforts needed to achieve an AIDS-free generation and an effective, efficient, and durable response. First and foremost, PEPFAR is focused on supporting 

countries to ensure viral load suppression within their populations to stop transmission of the AIDS virus, which is key to the ability of countries to reach sustained 

epidemic control and reduce the costs of the epidemic. 

As part of this process, PEPFAR has prioritized helping governments understand 

the use of program and epidemiological data to inform where to invest resources to 

have the greatest programmatic impact. It is essential that governments be able to 

evaluate cost data and evolve their service delivery models to become more efficient 

in the implementation of HIV/AIDS programs. 

New game changing guidelines from the World Health Organization (WHO) in the 

fall of 2015 provide tremendous opportunities to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS immediately. Policy changes are essential to the elimination of HIV as a public health 

threat and we have worked with countries to encourage them to exhibit leadership 

on changing their policies and adopting WHO guidelines when they are released 

within weeks and months instead of years. 

The new guidelines related to ‘‘Test and Start’’ treatment, service delivery guidelines that will reduce the number of clinical interventions needed, and guidelines 

related to pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) can change the course of the epidemic. 

Nearly two-thirds of the cost of treatment is service delivery, not the cost of drugs. 

Additionally, a change in policy to having stable patients switching to having medical appointments every 6 months and facilities tendering 3-6 month supply of drugs 

will allow each treatment site to add 75 percent more clients on treatment with the 

same facility personnel and cost. 

One of the five pillars of PEPFAR 3.0 is the Sustainability Action Agenda, whereby the U.S. government aims to engage both partner governments and civil society 

in service and systems strengthening. PEPFAR’s Sustainability Agenda focuses on: 

• The policy, administrative, and legal environment that would ensure access to 

services and social protection for vulnerable populations. 

• Rapid adoption of the 2015 World Health Organization guidelines that will substantially increase the effectiveness of PEPFAR investments. 

• The financing and delivery of necessary HIV/AIDS services and what can be 

done to support increased domestic investment in these areas. 

• The systems and capabilities to facilitate the strategic use of data. 

• The accountability of partner country governments to be responsive to stakeholders for achieving results and to be good stewards of HIV/AIDS funding. 

A key component of the Sustainability Action Agenda is the development and use 

of the Sustainability Index and Dashboard (SID), a measurement tool that provides 

a periodic snapshot of the elements central to a sustained and controlled epidemic. 

The implementation of the SID, in collaboration with country stakeholders, allows 

PEPFAR and its partners to objectively track progress toward sustainability goals. 

These goals are ‘‘owned’’ by the country and have been supported by PEPFAR. The 

Index targets 15 elements organized under four overarching domains: 


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• Governance, Leadership, and Accountability; 

• National Health System and Service Delivery; 

• Strategic Investments, Efficiency, and Sustainable Financing; and 

• Strategic Information 

The SID was implemented for the first time in 33 countries in 2015 and has been 

revised and refined for implementation during COP 2016 (‘‘SID 2.0’’), the results 

from which are intended to serve as the baseline going forward. The findings from 

periodic implementation of the SID will contribute to a shared understanding of 

each country’s sustainability landscape, help identify strengths, gaps, and weaknesses within the national HIV response, and inform the annual planning of 

PEPFAR investments. 

Recognizing the importance of full participation by non-governmental partners, including the private sector to the success and sustainability of efforts to combat HIV, 

the revised SID more explicitly reflects and assesses the role these groups play in 

national HIV responses. In addition, to further ensure increased participation and 

integration of civil society in HIV/AIDS planning and implementation, all PEPFAR 

countries were directed to actively involve civil society throughout the development 

of their annual Country/Regional Operational Plans. 

During the COP 2015 in-person reviews, each country was empowered to invite 

members of civil society, host country governments, multilaterals and other stakeholders to participate in high-level discussions with Ambassador Birx around the 

annual PEPFAR planning process. 

Question 24. I certainly appreciate the steps this administration has taken to 

make U.S. foreign assistance more transparent. One of these steps was the creation 

of the foreign aid dashboard, managed by the State Department, where American 

taxpayers can review how and where the U.S. is spending foreign aid dollars. Every 

federal agency that provides foreign assistance funding is required to share its information on this website 

• What is the agency participation rate for the site? 

• What agencies lag behind in sharing their data, and what is the reason for the 

delay in sharing this information with U.S. taxpayers? 

• What is the status of the State Department’s own data on this site? 

Answer. ForeignAssistance.gov contains data from 10 agencies representing 98 

percent of the U.S. foreign assistance portfolio. These 10 agencies are: the Department of State; USAID; the Millennium Challenge Corporation; the Departments of 

Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human Services, and the Treasury; the African 

Development Foundation; the Inter-American Foundation; and the Peace Corps. 

The Department is engaged with non-reporting agencies and working to improve 

the quantity and quality of data reported by agencies. Progress is being made incrementally; however, there are a number of challenges to reporting including that 

agencies are often compiling and reconciling data from multiple systems that were 

not designed to collect or report on the detailed level of reporting currently requested. 

The Department of State chartered a Foreign Assistance Data Review (FADR) 

working group to understand and document issues related to managing and tracking foreign assistance within the Department and recommend a path forward. The 

first phase of the FADR produced a report that examines the current foreign assistance data environment and recommends improvements. The full report is available 

online at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/250931.pdf. 

Question 25. I was disappointed that the State Department did not meet its international commitment to post its own foreign assistance data online by December 

2015. 

• Do you have a plan for the State Department to comply with this commitment? 

And would you please share it with the Committee? 

Answer. The Department of State has been reporting core data fields to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) standard since 2012. While we are not 

reporting every one of the IATI fields, the Department has made great progress in 

opening up and publishing its foreign assistance financial records, performance 

data, evaluations, and budget planning data over the last few years. 

To improve its IATI data reporting, the Department chartered a Foreign Assistance Data Review (FADR) working group to understand and document issues related to managing and tracking foreign assistance within the Department and recommend a path forward. The first phase of the FADR produced a report that examVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:15 Aug 10, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00141 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\02 23 2016\30-927.T

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ines the current foreign assistance data environment and recommends improvements. The full report is available online at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/250931.pdf. The FADR group is continuing its work to carry out these recommendations. 

Question 26. U.S. development assistance should foster long-term self-sufficiency 

and ultimately support partner countries transition from foreign aid. The FY 2016 

Omnibus Appropriations bill included an important provision requiring all future 

country development strategies to include a plan for transitioning over time away 

from foreign assistance. 

• How are you approaching these transition plans? 

• Have you considered developing clear, measurable, and realistic benchmarks for 

country transition, such as benchmarks for social and economic progress across 

social groups, public sector capacity, or the enabling environment for civil society and the private sector? 

Answer. Transition planning is already being incorporated into USAID’s Country 

Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCS). Decisions about the necessary scope of 

transition planning for a particular mission are made during the early stages of 

strategy development, including the type of transition a mission is planning and 

over what timeframe. For example, transition could include phasing out of a particular sector, planning to transition assistance from programmatic to advisory, or 

phasing out of a country entirely. Development strategies, including any transition 

planning, are cornerstones of our whole-of-government Integrated Country Strategies (ICS) and we will be requiring all of our missions to consider foreign assistance 

transition planning more broadly in ICS development going forward. 

As part of its efforts to transition away from historic levels of assistance, USAID 

recently has reduced its Full Mission presence to either a non-presence status or 

a smaller office in the following countries: Mongolia, Namibia, Benin, Albania, and 

Macedonia. 

Setting end goals for foreign assistance and benchmarks toward achievement of 

those goals are integral to our approach to transition planning for development. 

These goals and benchmarks will be dependent on particular country contexts, rather than set at a corporate level. Given the variety of contexts in which we work, 

and the range of U.S. government interests in those countries, our approach is to 

develop broad guidelines while preserving adaptability so that it may be responsive 

to local and U.S. government realities. 

Question 27. In order to support implementation of its new Cuba policy, $3.8 million is requested within the Diplomatic and Consular Programs account for infrastructure improvements to the U.S. embassy in Havana (converted from an interests 

section last year), and additional funds are requested for additional staffing at the 

embassy. 

• Could you describe what impact, if any, that the conversion of the Interests 

Section to an Embassy has had on our bilateral relationship? 

• What further steps, if any, are contemplated in the context of this budget in 

support of the new Administration’s Cuba policy? 

Answer. U.S. Embassy officials are able to travel more freely in Cuba since the 

re-establishment of diplomatic relations. For the first time in decades, some Embassy staff can travel throughout the island without providing advance notification 

to Cuban government officials. Free travel allows us to make contact with average 

Cubans. 

U.S. officials at the U.S. Embassy in Havana are also able to more effectively engage with a broad range of Cuban government counterparts since the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. As a result, U.S. and Cuban officials, with participation from U.S. Embassy officials, were able to negotiate an arrangement to restore 

scheduled air service between the United States and Cuba, sign a joint statement 

on environmental protection cooperation, and agree on a pilot program for the direct 

transportation of mail between the United States and Cuba. These instruments, as 

well as others we are negotiating related to counternarcotics cooperation, law enforcement cooperation, and oil spill prevention and response, put in place the mechanisms for bilateral cooperation on these issues going forward. 

Additionally, re-establishing diplomatic relations has facilitated bilateral dialogues with Cuban government officials in important areas in which we had not previously engaged, such as U.S. claims against the Cuban government. 

The FY 2017 budget request for Diplomatic and Consular Programs would allow 

U.S. Embassy Havana to increase staff and improve the embassy’s unsafe and aging 


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facilities. At present, our diplomats work in poor and deteriorating conditions, and 

the budget request would support basic repairs. The U.S. Embassy requires additional American personnel to support an already overburdened platform. A mixture 

of reporting and support positions are required to deepen U.S. understanding of 

Cuba’s political, social, and economic environment, oversee maintenance upgrades, 

conduct human rights monitoring and advocacy, and deepen law enforcement cooperation on issues such as fugitives and counternarcotics. Adding these positions 

is vital to U.S. national security. 

Question 28. Could you describe the department’s public diplomacy strategies in 

countering Russian propaganda efforts in Europe? How do you measure the success 

or failure of these strategies? To what extent do the BBG’s broadcasting efforts contribute to their success? Is the budget request adequate to ensure the strategy’s success? 

Answer. The Kremlin is rapidly disseminating disinformation, part of a concerted 

effort to undermine trust in Western institutions and erode freedom of the press. 

Research shows that despite Moscow’s efforts and resources devoted to this objective, they have limited effectiveness abroad: less than one third of Europeans polled 

outside of Russia are confident that Putin will do the right thing in world affairs 

or see Russia favorably. In these same European countries, views of the United 

States are much more positive; 69 percent viewed the U.S. favorably. 

Capitalizing on this public goodwill, the State Department is leading a coordinated effort to support the free flow of information, expand independent media, root 

out corruption, and refute Russian government disinformation. Our efforts extend 

across a range of diplomatic tools as we proactively amplify key U.S. government 

messages, correct disinformation, engage opinion leaders, encourage independent 

voices, and forge and maintain people-to-people ties. 

The Department employs a combination of short-term messaging strategies with 

medium- and long-term programs to boost resilience and build capacity to recognize 

and reject Russian government disinformation. The State Department supports our 

overseas posts in times of heightened Kremlin messaging. Armed with the facts, our 

missions abroad are able to adapt the content and materials we supply to their own 

audiences and rapidly amplify the truth. We have also increased our capacity to 

proactively deliver our messages in Russian by forming a cadre of Russian-speaking 

officers to engage with the media and introducing a Russian-language, policy-oriented Twitter handle. We augment this messaging activity by providing foreign audiences with opportunities to engage directly with experts, opinion leaders, and 

third party groups. 

The State Department is implementing programs that support independent media 

and investigative journalists in countries throughout the region, including Azerbaijan, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Ukraine, and the Baltics. We have developed exchanges to encourage independent media voices, including workshops on 

digital skills and investigative journalism, and support for a Digital Communicators 

Network of more than 1,000 members who bring accurate, objective information to 

regional audiences. 

At the same time, we are supporting efforts to engage ethnic Russian populations 

by expanding our English language training programs and professional exchanges. 

These cost-effective programs create lasting educational and professional linkages 

and increase English proficiency of students and educators, helping remove language as a barrier for thought leaders to understand U.S. policy and culture. 

U.S. public diplomacy also includes NATO and U.S. military outreach and media 

engagement. These high visibility engagements help dispel the Russian government’s anti-NATO messages and serve as opportunities to explain our security partnerships. Last year the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 

provided a new fund to support embassy public affairs teams in developing new, innovative public outreach projects pegged to U.S. military exercises in Europe. These 

interactions between people are the cornerstone of our strategy and absolutely essential in refuting disinformation. 

We continue to use our public diplomacy tools to deepen people-to-people ties in 

an admittedly challenging political environment. In the past year, the State Department has designed and implemented a range of programs in the region that build 

relationships based on common interests and perceptions. Based on participant feedback, we know these programs are having a positive net effect. In addition to anecdotal evidence, we also conduct evaluations of our programs to ensure impact. 

The Broadcasting Board of Governors receives steady input from the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, who serves on the BBG to 

ensure its strategic planning is aligned with broader U.S. foreign policy goals. The 

BBG is an active participant in an ongoing working group at State, through which 


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it apprises the Department of its efforts and provides analysis of current media 

trends. In its own work, the BBG maintains a robust response to Russian 

disinformation through the combined work of Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, which employ flexible, innovative, and cross-platform programming around the world to counter the Kremlin’s strident anti-American messaging 

with fact-based journalism. 

The bureaus undertaking this important work ensure that our limited resources 

are directed, in the most effective way, toward implementing priority programs focused on countering Russian government disinformation. 

Question 29. As Iran is receiving billions in sanctions relief and oil funds in the 

wake of the nuclear deal, I’m concerned that they are seeking to expand their aggressive behavior. The press has reported that Russia is planning to sell fighter jets, 

comparable to American F-15E fighter bombers, to Iran. As you know, the sale of 

combat aircraft to Iran would violate the U.N. arms embargo, but the U.N. Security 

Council could approve the sale in advance. 

• Do you plan to raise the issue of this proposed sale with Russia? 

• How can this sale be stopped? 

• What would the U.S. do in reaction, should Russia go ahead with the sale? 

• Since Russia is a member of the U.N. Security Council, would any repercussions 

from the U.N. be blocked? 

Answer. We have seen the reports of a possible sale of Russian combat aircraft 

to Iran but have no confirmation of such an intention. If we saw indications that 

such a sale was moving forward, we would, of course, raise it. 

The United States would be able to block U.N. Security Council approval of any 

such sale while the restrictions under UNSCR 2231 remain in force. We do not see 

a circumstance in which we would consider allowing the Council to approve such 

a transfer. 

Whenever the United States has information about any country taking actions 

prohibited by UNSCRs, we treat it as a very serious matter. Such a violation would 

become a serious issue in our bilateral relationship and affect our cooperation on 

a range of issues, including Iran. As we have in the past, we would raise any reported violation directly in the U.N. Security Council to emphasize the degree to 

which such actions are unacceptable. 

As a permanent member of the Security Council, Russia can block the Council 

from taking any substantive decision in response to such a violation. However, Russia could not prevent us from reporting the matter to the Council, and could not 

prevent the Council from discussing it. By shining an unwelcome spotlight on such 

actions in the Security Council, we can expose the irresponsibility of any country 

that violates U.N. Security Council resolutions, especially a permanent member of 

that Council. Russia would also be unable to prevent us from taking appropriate domestic measures, unilaterally or in coordination with multilateral partners. 

Question 30. I’m also very concerned by Russia’s delivery of advanced S-300 air 

defense missile systems to Iran. 

• Can you confirm if this transfer has taken place? 

• What impact might this defense system have on Iran’s behavior? 

Answer. We do not have information indicating the transfer of an S-300 missile 

system from Russia to Iran has taken place. On numerous occasions, we have 

strongly urged Russia not to proceed with the sale of an S-300 system to Iran as 

the transfer of advanced surface-to-air weapons systems to Iran would add to instability in the region and be clearly inconsistent with our common nonproliferation 

goals. 

We remain concerned that introduction of any advanced defensive weapons system such as the S-300 into Iran’s inventory would further raise tensions in the region. We will continue to work intensively with our partners in the region to deter 

and counter any Iranian destabilizing activities. 

Question 31. Mr. Secretary, there is a long history of nuclear and missile cooperation between Iran and North Korea. North Korea has already demonstrated its capability to explode a nuclear device. Iranian officials reportedly traveled to North 

Korea to witness each of its three nuclear tests—in October 2006, May 2009, and 

February 2013. Just before North Korea’s third test, a senior American official said 

that, quote, ‘‘it’s very possible that the North Koreans are testing for two countries.’’ 

And, Director of National Intelligence Clapper’s 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment 

stated that Pyongyang’s ‘‘export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to sevVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:15 Aug 10, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00144 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\02 23 2016\30-927.T

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eral countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria’s construction 

of a nuclear reactor . . . illustrate its willingness to proliferate dangerous technologies.’’ This is truly alarming. 

• How confident are you that if Iran were to use North Korean nuclear facilities, 

we would know about it? 

• If we did, would that lead to a full snapback of sanctions? 

• Can you inform me of the State Department’s current efforts to halt this sharing of nuclear technology between North Korea and Iran? What more can be 

done? 

Answer. The United States closely monitors and reviews all available information 

on the DPRK’s dealings related to its WMD programs and its proliferation activities 

worldwide, as well as any efforts by Iran to acquire proliferation-sensitive materials 

or technologies. We continue to take concerted efforts, both nationally and multilaterally, to impede the DPRK’s proliferation activities, including through the full suite 

of relevant U.S. unilateral sanctions measures and by urging all countries to implement relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions concerning the DPRK. 

We also continue to do the same with respect to Iran, both unilaterally and multilaterally, in accordance with UNSCR 2231 (2015) and the provisions of the Joint 

Comprehensive Plans of Action (JCPOA). We are committed to ensuring that Iran 

fulfills all of its nuclear-related commitments in a verifiable and complete manner. 

Because there is comprehensive IAEA monitoring of the entire fuel cycle within 

Iran, we are confident we will know if Iran attempts to cheat, including through 

the introduction of foreign technology or material into Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle that 

is contrary to the JCPOA. 

Should Iran violate its commitments under the JCPOA, we retain a wide range 

of options to respond, whether in the case of significant non-performance by Iran 

or more minor instances of noncompliance, including the ability to snapback both 

national and multilateral nuclear-related sanctions. This provides us with significant leverage to deter Iranian noncompliance and allows us to respond appropriately 

and proportionately to any Iranian violations. 

Question 32. Today in Syria, we have a humanitarian crisis of epic proportions. 

Millions have been displaced from their homes and tens of thousands are dead from 

violence—not only from violent extremists, but also at the hands of President Asad. 

Russia’s support for President Asad has truly served as a game-changer in international negotiations on Syria. While I applaud your efforts, Secretary Kerry, for 

coming to an agreement on a ‘‘cessation of hostilities’’ to begin later this week, I 

have some concerns. Russia is the key player in this ceasefire, and yet their recent 

track record is marred. Multiple ceasefires have been negotiated for Ukraine, which 

Russia continues to violate on a, quote, ‘‘daily’’ basis, according to U.S. Ambassador 

to the U.N., Samantha Power. 

• I’d like to ask you, Secretary Kerry, what are the consequences for Russia, 

should they violate this ceasefire, as they have violated over and over the 

ceasefires in Ukraine? 

• How does this cessation of hostilities take into account non-state actors, such 

as ISIS or Jabhat al Nusra? 

Answer. We are committed to seeing this process through and are pressing hard 

to keep the Cessation of Hostilities on track. We have no illusions about activities 

by Russia and the regime to date in Syria and will judge their commitment to the 

Cessation of Hostilities by their actions. The discussions over the last several weeks 

have not been easy, and this will continue to be a challenging process. Thus far the 

cessation of hostilities has reduced the violence while allowing for the freer movement of humanitarian goods and greater access to besieged communities throughout 

Syria. 

In the initial days of the cessation of hostilities, the emphasis has been on getting 

the cessation to take hold and defusing tensions as we see reports of violations. 

Given the intensity of fighting and the number of actors involved, putting this cessation fully into effect is going to take time. 

If the COH should break down due to Russian actions, the U.S. will consider a 

range of options to advance our objectives of countering Da’esh and ending the conflict in Syria through a process that includes a political transition from Asad. 

As announced in Munich, this cessation of hostilities applies to all parties in Syria 

except for Da’esh, al-Nusrah, and other terrorist groups designated by the U.N. Security Council. 


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Question 33. According to the State Department, Iran continues to be the world’s 

leading state sponsor of terrorism. In its quest to dominate the Middle East and 

expel American influence, Iran has exploited terrorism as a tool of statecraft to oppose U.S. interests and objectives in Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. All restrictions preventing Iran from repatriating its foreign held 

oil revenues have now been lifted since Implementation Day. 

• How have Iran’s terrorist activities been affected by the JCPOA and the subsequent lifting of sanctions? 

• Has Iranian support for terrorism increased or decreased? 

• Does the U.S. have an estimate of the amount of funding Iran provides to 

Hezbollah? 

• How are these funds being transferred? 

• If we see an Iranian bank transfer funds for the benefit of Hezbollah, will the 

U.S. immediately sanction that bank? 

Answer. Over the past three decades, Iran has used some of its resources to support terrorism. For that reason, Iran is and remains a designated State Sponsor of 

Terror. This is also why our non-nuclear related sanctions on Iran remain in place, 

and why we will continue to work with our partners in the region to counter Iran’s 

malign activities, regardless of the source of funds for those activities. 

After the IAEA verified that Iran had met key nuclear-related commitments as 

specified in the JCPOA, the United States lifted nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. 

As part of the lifting of these sanctions, foreign financial institutions holding funds 

owed to Iran in accounts outside of the United States can release such funds to the 

Central Bank of Iran without being subject to U.S. secondary sanctions. We estimate that, as a result, Iran now has access to approximately $50 billion of its own 

funds. 

Iran’s ongoing economic difficulties make it harder to divert large portions of its 

financial gains from sanctions relief away from its domestic economy and toward its 

regional activities. For example, we estimate that Iran needs about half a trillion 

dollars to meet pressing investment needs and government obligations. 

We have numerous domestic authorities—including sanctions—to counter Iran’s 

support for terrorism and other destabilizing activities. We will continue to enforce 

aggressively our sanctions related to Iran’s support for terrorism, ballistic missile 

activities, regional destabilization, and human rights abuses. 

We will use our authority under the Hizballah International Financing Protection 

Act to target financial institutions that knowingly facilitate significant transactions 

or engage in money laundering activities on behalf of Hizballah. The State Department, Treasury, and our partners in the Intelligence Community are constantly 

looking for solid evidence of such activity. When we see evidence, we will build a 

case, and we will take action. 

We have made significant progress and will continue to further disrupt 

Hizballah’s terrorist capabilities by targeting the group’s financial support infrastructure. The U.S. government has consistently used and will continue to use our 

authorities to expose and target Hizballah’s financial, commercial, and terrorist activities around the world. 

I would be happy to discuss more details regarding Iran’s funding Hizballah in 

a classified setting. 

Question 34. Since implementation day of the JCPOA went into effect, any hope 

that Iran would somehow moderate its malign behavior has been dashed. If anything, Iran has become more aggressive in preserving the regime of Syrian dictator 

Bashar al-Assad, has become more confrontational against America’s presence in the 

Persian Gulf, and has escalated its threatening rhetoric against the U.S. and Israel. 

The administration repeatedly promised during the Congressional review of the 

JCPOA that the U.S. would continue to confront Iran in the region. In response to 

Iranian illegal ballistic missile tests, the U.S. imposed sanctions on 11 entities and 

individuals for the provision of missile related technology to Iran. The Iranians paid 

for that technology, but no financial institution was sanctioned for the transaction. 

The technology arrived in Iran by boat or plane, yet no shipping line or airline was 

sanctioned. 

• Mr. Secretary shouldn’t we be going after the infrastructure that allows Iran 

to continue its missile program? Do you have any plans to do so? 

• Beyond the 11 entities sanctioned for supporting Iran’s missile program, has the 

administration imposed any sanctions targeting Iran non-nuclear activities 

since the JCPOA was reached? Any sanctions for supporting terrorism? Any 


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sanctions for supporting the Assad regime? Any sanctions for human rights violations? Any sanctions for supporting Shiite militias in Iraq? 

• What is the U.S. doing to prevent Iran from transferring advanced weaponry 

to non-state actors in the region who might use those weapons against our allies? 

Answer. We continue to deploy a wide range of multilateral and unilateral tools 

to address Iran’s ballistic missile development efforts. Iran’s efforts to develop increasingly capable ballistic missile systems are a significant nonproliferation challenge and a very real threat to regional and international security. 

In response to Iran’s ballistic missile launches, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control on January 17 designated three individuals 

and eight entities, including five Iranian officials, involved in the procurement of 

materials and equipment for Iran’s ballistic missile network. 

Additionally, the United States is constantly working with partners to interdict 

missile-related transfers to Iran and target Iranian missile proliferation activities 

in third countries, including Iran’s procurement of equipment related to building a 

domestic infrastructure for missile development. 

Finally, in addition to enforcing measures on Iran’s ballistic missile activities, we 

will continue to enforce our sanctions related to Iran’s support for terrorism, destabilizing activities in the region, and human rights abuses. We will continue to act 

on any information of sanctionable activity. 

Regarding Iran’s transfer of weapons to groups in the region, we continue to work 

intensively with our partners, especially Israel and the Gulf states, to deter and disrupt Iranian threats and proliferation. Examples of such cooperation include diplomatic and sanctions pressure on Mahan Air, ongoing security cooperation with the 

GCC following the Camp David summit, sanctions on a range of Iranian entities for 

actions in Syria, Israel’s seizure of the Klos C vessel carrying weapons bound for 

Gaza in 2014, military and diplomatic efforts to prevent an Islamic Revolutionary 

Guard Corps (IRGC) naval flotilla from docking in Yemen in April 2015, and the 

September 25, 2015, seizure of the Nasir dhow carrying weapons from Iran that we 

assess were bound for Yemen. 

Question 35. Since the JCPOA went into effect, Iran’s hard-liners have taken 

pains to consolidate their economic and political power and to sideline would-be 

reformists who are more amenable to a rapprochement with the West. It was hoped 

that the openings created by the JCPOA would engender Iranian moderation, but 

instead, extremists have reaped the benefits while tightening their grip and escalating their malign behavior. 

• Does the U.S. have a strategy to combat the retrenchment we see on the part 

of Khamenei, his allies, and the IRGC? 

• What will the long-term repercussions be as the JCPOA progresses, particularly 

with regard to Iran’s foreign policy, if extremist elements continue to dominate 

Iran’s economic and political scene? 

Answer. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) remains firmly under 

U.S. sanctions, which we have no intention of removing until the IRGC ceases the 

activities for which it has been sanctioned, including its support for terrorism. Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, which allows us to target terrorists and those who support 

them across the globe, is employed forcefully against Iranian entities that provide 

support to terrorism. The IRGC-Qods Force, the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and 

Security, Iran’s Mahan Air, Hizballah, and over 100 other Iran-related individuals 

and entities remain subject to sanctions under this E.O. Further, under Iran sanctions statutes, foreign financial institutions may be subject to secondary sanctions 

for knowingly facilitating a significant financial transaction or providing significant 

financial services for any person on the SDN List, which includes the IRGC and 

IRGC-related officials, agents, and affiliates. These and other authorities allow us 

to continue to target the IRGC for any activities which threaten us or our allies. 

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was never intended to resolve 

all our issues with Iran. It is about eliminating the biggest and most imminent 

threat—a nuclear-armed Iran. Our governments have significant disagreements, but 

our experience on the nuclear deal demonstrates that engaging directly with the Iranian government on a sustained basis created a window to try to resolve important 

issues. This engagement is clearly in our interest. Iran has a choice about how it 

moves forward. If Iran chooses to build on the constructive outcomes of the nuclear 

deal reached with the international community, it would lead to a better future for 

the Iranian people. 


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Question 36. The administration has estimated that Iran’s sanctions relief windfall would be about $50 billion, while Iran has claimed that the figure is closer to 

$100 billion. 

• Now that Implementation Day has passed, do you have a better estimate of how 

much money Iran was able to gain access to? 

• Do we have an indication of how Iran is using its windfall thus far? Do we see 

evidence that they are paying down their debts, or using some of the money to 

further increase support for terrorism? You indicated during the hearing that 

you would get back to me in a classified setting on this issue. I would like to 

request a follow-on briefing in a classified setting. 

• Do you have figures for how much Iran provides Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian 

Islamic Jihad, and Shi’a militias in Iraq? And for how these figures are likely 

to increase as a result of sanctions relief? 

Answer. After the IAEA verified that Iran had met key nuclear-related commitments as specified in the JCPOA, the United States lifted nuclear-related sanctions 

on Iran. As part of the lifting of these sanctions, foreign financial institutions holding funds owed to Iran in accounts outside the United States can release such funds 

to the Central Bank of Iran. We estimate that, as a result, Iran now has access to 

approximately $50 billion of its own funds. 

Iran’s ongoing economic difficulties make it harder to divert large portions of its 

financial gains from sanctions relief away from its domestic economy and toward its 

regional activities. For example, we estimate that Iran needs about half a trillion 

dollars to meet pressing investment needs and government obligations. 

I would be happy to discuss your question of Iran’s funding of groups in the region 

and our assessment of Iran’s use of released assets in a classified setting. 

Question 37. As you know, the State Department went ahead with the purchase 

of land last summer at Ft. Pickett and awarded a contract while there was a great 

deal of questions and opposition coming from Congress. In fact, we did not have an 

independent cost benefit of analysis on the project until December of last year. The 

State Department then halted the contract, upon reviewing language in the State 

Authorization Act passed out of SFRC and the SFOPs appropriations bill calling for 

the independent cost-benefit analysis. As a result of halting the contract, we were 

told that State paid a $10,000 per day penalty. I’m concerned about the lack of disregard for Congressional intent shown by this process. Why did State not wait to 

move ahead until the known Congressional requirements were satisfied? How much 

did the penalties on the contract at Ft. Pickett cost the taxpayer to date? 

Answer. Beginning in 2009, the Department and U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) conducted an extensive site selection process, reviewing over 70 sites 

before selecting Fort Pickett as the preferred site for FASTC. The Department and 

the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), working with the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB), also extensively reviewed the FLETC site in 

Glynco, GA. The Administration ultimately relied on the Department’s unique understanding of diplomatic missions abroad and its training needs, which led to the 

selection of Fort Pickett in April 2014. 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO), the principal investigative arm of 

Congress, unofficially advised in May 2015 that the Fort Pickett alternative was the 

only site that fully supported the FASTC functional requirements and was fiscally 

the best course of action. Based on the cumulative results of these multiple reviews 

and to avoid further delays, particularly in light of the increased security training 

implemented following the Benghazi Accountability Review Board, the Department 

determined that moving forward with construction at Fort Pickett was a logical 

course of action. 

However, in response to additional Congressional concerns about the project, the 

Department halted construction in July 2015 in order to conduct additional due diligence. GSA contracted with Deloitte to conduct an independent ‘‘apples to apples’’ 

Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) of Fort Pickett, FLETC, and the Bill Scott Raceway in 

Summit Point, WV. In December 2015, the CBA confirmed that Fort Pickett would 

be less expensive, could be completed sooner and presented less risk than any other 

option. The finalized GAO report also agreed with this finding. The Department and 

GSA have since discussed the CBA results with Congress. On February 25, 2016, 

the Department restarted construction activities for FASTC at the Fort Pickett site. 


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The CBA cost $527,000 and supported previous results in the Department’s, 

OMB’s and GAO’s separate analyses. Prior to the restart date of February 25, GSA 

estimated that delay costs would accrue at the rate of $620,000 per month when 

the construction hold was issued in August 2015. Now that all project phases are 

proceeding, GSA will continue coordinating with contractors to determine actual 

delay costs. GSA estimates it will be at least several more weeks before a final delay 

cost is known. 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO

SECRETARY KERRY BY SENATOR BARRASSO

Question 1. Does your budget eliminate any program? Please provide a complete 

list of programs eliminated in the administration’s FY 2017 budget for State and 

USAID? 

Answer. The Department does not propose the elimination of any Diplomatic Engagement programs in the Fiscal Year 2017 Request. 

In the five-year period between FY 2012 and FY 2016 the non-OCO portion of the 

non-security D&CP operations account has been reduced by 19 percent. The Department’s FY 2017 Request includes a recommendation to increase funding in this account for the first time in five years. This request would still remain 11 percent 

below the FY 2012 level. 

The D&CP account is the primary source of funding for all of the administrative 

functions, excluding buildings and security, performed by State. The Department 

considers all of these functions to be essential to the security and diplomatic presence of the United States. At the same time the Department looks for every opportunity to reduce the cost to the taxpayer through rightsizing, identifying greater 

operational efficiencies, and having no tolerance for waste. 

Question 2. In November 2014, President Obama unilaterally pledged $3 billion 

for the U.N. Green Climate Fund. Congress has not authorized or appropriated any 

money for it. According to the Congressional Research Service, Congress did not appropriate any funding for fiscal year 2016. A few media reports indicate that you 

plan to divert funds from other line items in order to pay for the United Nations 

Green Climate Fund. 

• Does the Fiscal Year 2016 appropriation bill specifically provide funding for the 

U.N. Green Climate Fund? If yes, what appropriations were funded specifically 

to the U.N. Green Climate Fund and to what accounts? If no, what accounts 

are you planning to divert and reprogram funds from in order to meet this unilateral commitment? 

Answer. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is an independent institution and not 

part of the United Nations. The GCF is governed by an independent Board that has 

full authority over funding decisions. The United States has a seat on the Board. 

The Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2016 (Div. K, P.L. 114-113) did not earmark funds specifically for the 

GCF, but it also did not contain any restrictions on the use of FY 2016 funds for 

the GCF. The administration plans to provide funding to the GCF from the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account that is available for this purpose. 

Question 3. What is the process through which the administration determines appropriate commitments to multilateral funds such as the Green Climate Fund? 

What consultation with Congress is involved when commitments to multilateral 

funds are being considered? 

Answer. The administration undertook an interagency discussion to determine the 

amount of the first U.S. funding to the GCF in light of the U.S. pledge to provide 

up to $3 billion to the GCF not to exceed 30 percent of total confirmed pledges during the initial resource mobilization period of the GCF. The administration consulted with Congress before the GCF pledge was announced and discussed the FY 

2016 request for the GCF in the course of conference negotiations regarding the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 

2016. 


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Question 4. President Putin is attempting to change the battlefield dynamics to 

bolster the Assad regime and weaken the opposition in any negotiations for a peace 

deal. Russia continues to support the Assad regime but is now bombing civilians 

and opposition groups in Syria. The most recent example is the Russian bombings 

in Aleppo. 

• What leverage does the international community have to pressure Assad to 

leave when he is currently winning the civil war on the battlefield with the assistance of Russia? 

Answer. Bashar al-Asad continues to be the President of Syria because he is being 

propped up by Iran and Russia. While Russia wants to keep its only strategic ally 

in the region in power, it knows that its military support to the regime will not 

bring an end to the conflict. In November 2015, Russia signed onto the International 

Syria Support Group (ISSG) Statement reaffirming key Geneva Communique principles, most importantly, a commitment to a political transition, including agreeing 

to free and fair elections administered under U.N. supervision within 18 months. 

In December, Russia also voted in favor of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254, 

which explicitly requested that the U.N. convene formal negotiations on a political 

transition process between the regime and the opposition. 

The United States is committed to seeing this process through to a political transition away from Asad; that is what the upcoming negotiations in Geneva under the 

auspices of the U.N. are supposed to do, and UNSCR 2254 provides a timetable for 

it. We are pressing hard to support implementation of the cessation of hostilities 

and get greater humanitarian access throughout Syria which will help to support 

negotiations between the Syrian opposition and Regime. 

The ISSG is made up of over 20 other countries and entities. As a result of our 

ongoing diplomatic exchange with Russia, Russia has pressured the regime to agree 

to the cessation of hostilities, as well as allowing more humanitarian aid into besieged areas of Syria, but more needs to be done. 

Question 5. How will the ceasefire affect the rules of engagement for our special 

operations forces that currently operate in Syria? 

Answer. The cessation of hostilities will not affect the rules of engagement for 

U.S. special operations forces in Syria. I direct you to the Department of Defense 

for a more detailed response about the rules of engagement for U.S. special operations forces in Syria. 

Question 6. Is Russia in violation of the political agreements and ceasefire commitment in Ukraine? 

Answer. Russia continues to arm, train, direct, and fight alongside separatist 

forces in eastern Ukraine. The number of ceasefire violations in eastern Ukraine is 

at the highest level since September 2015, and according to reporting from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Special Monitoring Mission 

(OSCE SMM) a majority of ceasefire violations originate from separatist-controlled 

territory. Attacks by combined Russian-separatist forces have often involved prohibited heavy artillery, mortars, and multiple-rocker launchers, including a confirmed 

March 3 use of 40 Grad rockets fired on Ukrainian positions. The SMM reports also 

make clear that Russia-backed separatists continue to obstruct its mission by delaying or blocking monitors, jamming OSCE unmanned aerial vehicles, and, in some 

cases, directly intimidating and even firing at monitors to threaten their safety. 

Russia is a party to but has not implemented the Minsk agreements, which it 

signed in February 2015 and in September 2014. Under the Minsk agreements, Russia and the separatists it backs have committed to a series of steps including: abide 

by the ceasefire; permanently withdraw heavy weapons from the line of contact; 

allow OSCE monitors full access throughout areas under separatist control, including up to the international border; hold local elections in areas of Donetsk and 

Luhansk oblasts in keeping with Ukrainian law and OSCE standards and observed 

by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights; withdraw foreign forces and equipment from eastern Ukraine; and return control of Ukraine’s 

international border to the Ukrainian government. Russia has not fulfilled these 

commitments. 

As President Obama stressed to President Putin in their conversations, the 

United States expects Russia to fully implement the Minsk agreements, and until 

it does, sanctions will remain in place. Separate Crimea-related sanctions will remain in place as long as Russia occupies that piece of Ukrainian land. 

Question 7. What does Russia’s repeated violations of its ceasefire commitments 

in Ukraine say about the prospects of Russia abiding by and the international community enforcing a ceasefire in Syria that was just announced? 


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Answer. Our diplomacy in both Ukraine and Syria is focused on supporting 

ceasefires in order to advance political negotiations to end the conflicts. In Syria, 

we are committed to implementing the cessation of hostilities (COH) in Syria announced on February 22 because it represents the best chance for stability, humanitarian access, and a resumption of negotiations in pursuit of a political solution to 

end the Syrian civil war. The COH offers a visible international platform so that 

the international community can see what Russia has agreed to do. 

Our emphasis is on getting the cessation to take hold and defusing tensions as 

reports of violations inevitably surface. Given the intensity of fighting and the number of actors involved, putting this cessation fully into effect is going to take time. 

Nevertheless, as of March 11 we have seen a marked reduction in violence, corroborated by local reporting from within Syria. 

Once the cessation of hostilities is on solid footing, the focus will shift to monitoring and reporting on compliance. As co-chairs of the COH Task Force, we are in 

contact with the Russians to report and de-escalate COH violations. We are also in 

touch daily with the U.N. Office of the Special Envoy (OSE), based in Geneva, which 

maintains a small in-country presence in Syria. The OSE will serve as secretariat 

of the Task Force and a conduit and hub of information for all. 

In Ukraine, our clear message to Russia is the importance of implementation of 

the ceasefire. As President Obama told President Putin in their February 22 phone 

conversation, we expect Russia to implement the Minsk agreements fully, including 

the ceasefire and heavy weapons withdrawal, and sanctions will remain until place 

until Moscow does so. 

Question 8. What is your plan to ensure Russia keeps its word and is held accountable for any ceasefire violations in Syria? What consequences and sanctions 

should Russia face for targeting Syrian civilians and members of the opposition? 

Answer. We are committed to implementing the cessation of hostilities (COH) in 

Syria announced on February 22 because it represents the best chance for stability, 

humanitarian access, and a resumption of negotiations in pursuit of a political solution to end the Syrian civil war. The world can see what Russia has agreed to and 

is watching very closely for any sign that Russia will try to manipulate the situation 

further or renege on its commitments under the COH. 

As we have said from the beginning of this process, challenges are to be expected. 

We are closely monitoring reports of COH violations by all parties. We are treating 

such allegations seriously and continue to urge all parties to practice restraint. We 

anticipate obstacles, but as of March we have seen a marked reduction in violence, 

corroborated by local reporting from within Syria. Dedicated teams in Washington, 

Geneva, and the region have been and will continue coordinating closely with the 

U.N., Russia, and other International Syria Support Group partners to defuse violence where it arises and prevent any violations to the COH. It is in Russia’s interest and indeed the interest of all who seek an end to the violence—especially the 

Syrian people—to ensure this process succeeds. 

Should the Syrian regime and Russian forces precipitate the failure of the COH, 

the United States will consider all available options to advance our goals of a political process in Syria away from Asad and defeating ISIL. 

Question 9. What consequences and sanctions do you support in order to pressure 

Russia to meet its international commitments in Ukraine? 

Answer. Our sanctions related to Russian aggression in Ukraine are strong and 

strategic. They are carefully calibrated to impose maximum pressure on the Russian 

government, while safeguarding, to the extent possible, global financial markets and 

the global economy. 

We will continue to coordinate our sanctions with the EU, the G7, and other international partners to maintain pressure on the Russian government for its destabilizing activities in Ukraine, including its occupation and attempted annexation of 

Crimea. 

Sanctions will remain in place until Russia fully implements its commitments 

under the Minsk Agreements, and we are prepared to impose additional costs if 

Russia escalates its destabilizing activities in eastern Ukraine. Our Crimea sanctions will remain as long as Russia continues its occupation of that piece of Ukraine. 

Question 10. Do you agree with Admiral Haney’s assessment? Are you aware of 

support from the Department of Defense for this treaty? 

Answer. The administration, including the Department of Defense, supports the 

full implementation of the Open Skies Treaty. The images taken by Treaty sensors 

are similar in quality to images available through other sources, such as commercial 

satellite imagery, and are available to all Treaty parties. The Treaty is designed to 

enhance confidence and transparency by allowing its 34 member states to obtain inVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:15 Aug 10, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00151 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\02 23 2016\30-927.T

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formation on the military forces and activities of other Treaty partners through aerial observation flights. 

The Treaty contributes to European security by providing images and information 

on military forces and activities, and by permitting observation flights to verify compliance with arms control agreements. The Treaty establishes procedures for certifying sensors to confirm that they are compliant with Treaty limits on resolution 

for image quality and data processing. Moreover, the Treaty permits inspections 

prior to each flight as well as on-board observers during each observation mission 

to verify that requirements are being met. 

Question 11. Do you believe that this treaty has out lived its original intention 

and the United States should withdraw? 

Answer. No. The purpose of the Open Skies Treaty is to promote transparency 

and confidence-building among the 34 parties. The observation flights conducted 

under the Treaty are as important now as they were when the Treaty was signed 

in 1992. The Treaty continues to play an important role in European security and 

the administration believes we should continue to be an active party to the Treaty. 

Question 12. How would an Iraq government without Prime Minister Abadi affect 

the U.S. led coalition against ISIS? 

Answer. Abadi and his government have proven to be key partners in the fight 

against Da’esh, and we continue to support his efforts to promote reform and a more 

inclusive society. We believe Prime Minister Abadi retains the support of a sufficiently broad coalition to continue to govern. The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad maintains relationships with nearly every political party and constituent group involved 

in Iraqi national politics. Iraqi leaders are aware of the benefits and the importance 

of a relationship with the United States. 

If there were a new Prime Minister, which we would not expect before the next 

parliamentary elections in 2018, it would in all likelihood be someone we already 

have a relationship with and would be able to work with to defeat Da’esh. A sustainable military victory is not possible without the support of the Government of 

Iraq. 

Question 13. Do you believe that Prime Minister Abadi will be inevitably forced 

out of office? If so, what do we believe Iran will do in reaction if Prime Minister 

Abadi is forced out? 

Answer. Prime Minister Abadi was selected as a consensus candidate after the 

2014 elections, and we believe he retains the support of a sufficiently broad coalition 

to continue to govern. We do not expect a new Prime Minister before the next parliamentary elections in 2018. 

Iran has a great deal of influence in Iraq, but does not control its neighbor. Since 

the collapse of the Saddam regime, Iran has worked assiduously to increase its influence in Iraq through political and military support, first to former Shia resistance 

forces against Saddam, and later to Shia militia groups countering the U.S. military 

presence in the last decade. We expect Iran will continue to use its considerable influence to empower Iraqi politicians whose agenda aligns with Iran. 

Question 14. What does the United States government know about those responsible for kidnapping the Americans? Was Iran involved in the kidnapping? 

Answer. The United States worked closely with the Government of Iraq to secure 

the safe release of the kidnapped individuals, including information sharing about 

the perpetrators. There is no indication that Iran was involved in the kidnapping. 

The State Department is happy to provide more information in a classified setting. 

Question 15. As part of the administration’s Iran nuclear deal, Iran was granted 

over $100 billion in frozen assets. You have previously acknowledged that some of 

the money received through sanction relief will go to terrorist groups. In January, 

you stated, ‘‘I think that some of it will end up in the hands of the IRGC or other 

entities, some of which are labeled terrorists.’’ How much of the windfall in cash 

is being used by Iran to pay down their debts, modernize their military, increase 

support for terrorist groups and fund destabilizing activities in the region? 

Answer. Iran has, over the past three decades, used some of its resources to support terrorism. That is why Iran is and remains a designated State Sponsor of Terror. And that is why our non-nuclear related sanctions on Iran remain, and why 

we will continue to work with our partners in the region to counter Iran’s malign 

activities, regardless of the source of funds for those activities. 

After the IAEA verified that Iran had met key nuclear-related commitments as 

specified in the JCPOA, the United States lifted nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. 

As part of the lifting of these sanctions, foreign financial institutions holding funds 


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owned by Iran in accounts outside of the United States can release such funds to 

the Central Bank of Iran. We estimate that, as a result, Iran now has access to approximately $50 billion of its own funds. 

Iran’s ongoing economic difficulties make it harder to divert large portions of its 

financial gains from sanctions relief away from its domestic economy and toward its 

regional activities. For example, we estimate that Iran needs about half a trillion 

dollars to meet pressing investment needs and government obligations. 

I would also note that we have numerous domestic authorities—including sanctions—to counter Iran’s support for terrorism and other destabilizing activities. We 

will continue to aggressively enforce our sanctions, including those related to Iran’s 

support for terrorism, destabilizing activity in the region, ballistic missile development, and human rights abuses. 

Question 16. What additional sanctions do you suggest imposing on Iran due to 

its support of terrorist groups and destabilizing activities in the region including in 

Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and the Palestinians territories? 

Answer. We are deeply concerned about Iran’s support for terrorism, destabilizing 

activities in the region, ballistic missile development, and human rights abuses. 

Powerful non-nuclear sanctions, including those targeting Iran’s support for terrorism, destabilizing activities in the region, ballistic missile development, and 

human rights abuses remain in effect, and we will not hesitate to use these sanctions when called for. 

The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control on January 17 designated three individuals and eight entities, including five Iranian officials, involved in the procurement of materials and equipment for Iran’s ballistic 

missile network. These designations effectively cut these entities off from the U.S. 

financial system, and any non-U.S. person who engages with these designees may 

also be subject to U.S. secondary sanctions. 

Anyone worldwide who transacts with or supports individuals or entities sanctioned in connection with Iran’s support for terrorism or development of WMD and 

their means of delivery, including missiles—or who does the same with any Iranian 

individual or entity who remains on Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals and 

Blocked Persons List—may put themselves at risk of being sanctioned. 

Question 17. What is the administration doing to prevent Iran from transferring 

advanced weaponry to non-state actors in the region who might use those weapons 

against our allies? 

Answer. Regarding Iran’s transfer of weapons to groups in the region, we continue 

to work intensively with our partners, especially Israel and the Gulf states, to deter 

and disrupt Iranian threats and proliferation. Examples of such cooperation include 

diplomatic and sanctions pressure on Mahan Air, ongoing security cooperation with 

the GCC following the Camp David summit, sanctions on a range of Iranian entities 

for actions in Syria, Israel’s seizure of the Klos C vessel carrying weapons bound 

for Gaza in 2014, military and diplomatic efforts to prevent an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) naval flotilla from docking in Yemen in April 2015, and 

the September 25, 2015, seizure of the Nasir dhow carrying weapons from Iran that 

we assess were bound for Yemen. 

Question 18. Following the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa, Congress provided 

$5.4 billion in emergency appropriations to combat the outbreak, of which roughly 

$2.5 billion was directed to the Department of State and USAID. The administration 

recently requested an additional $1.8 billion in emergency appropriations for efforts 

related to the Zika virus. The request included $335 million for USAID and $41 million for the Department of State. The White House’s funding fact sheet also requested flexibility in the use of the remaining USAID Ebola funds. 

• How much did USAID and the Department of State spend on Ebola and from 

what accounts? How much money remains unobligated? 

Answer. As of January 1, $1.2 billion in foreign assistance and $34.3 million in 

diplomatic engagement funding has been obligated for State-USAID Ebola emergency response and recovery efforts. There is approximately $2.1 million in unobligated diplomatic engagement Ebola funding and nearly $1.3 billion in unobligated 

foreign assistance. The bulk of this unobligated funding is, however, planned for 

critical ongoing Ebola response and recovery efforts in West Africa, including ensuring our ability to rapidly and effectively respond to new Ebola cases as well as addressing the needs of the survivor population, and activities to support the Global 

Health Security Agenda over the next five years. 


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Question 19. How much of the unobligated money would the Department of State 

and USAID recommend repurposing to help with the international Zika efforts? 

Would giving USAID and the Department of State the flexibility to use these funds 

for Zika reduce the administration’s emergency funding request? 

Answer. The FY 2016 Zika supplemental request of $376 million reflects our best 

estimate, given current information, of potential State and USAID needs for the 

Zika response at this time; however, there remains significant uncertainty around 

the scope of the Zika challenges we will face. As such, the President’s FY 2017 

Budget and the FY 2016 Zika supplemental request authority to use unobligated 

Ebola funds for other infectious diseases, such as Zika. This authority would allow 

us to consider the use of Ebola funds to address Zika and other future infectious 

disease outbreaks, if needed, beyond the currently identified needs. This request for 

additional authority for Ebola funds does not change the funding requested in the 

Zika supplemental. 

While we anticipate some flexibility with remaining Ebola funds, a majority of the 

funds are still needed to sustain our ability to support Ebola recovery efforts and 

maintain our readiness to respond to flare-ups as they occur. We should not shortchange our ability to address either of these important health challenges. 

Question 20. What efforts has the Department of State taken to protect embassy 

staff, employees, and Americans living in impacted areas? Does the Department of 

State currently have a policy in place for employees to defer travel or leave countries with the virus? 

Answer. The State Department’s Office of Medical Services works with U.S. government employees in areas with active Zika transmission to inform them of the 

risks and to help them determine appropriate action given their individual situations. The Department is working with U.S. missions in the region to ensure that 

mosquito control measures are in place and that effective mosquito repellants are 

available to mission employees. Our medical personnel at embassies are identifying 

and counseling pregnant U.S. Government employees or their pregnant spouses who 

are covered under the Department of State Medical Program and currently posted 

in a country with a CDC travel alert for Zika. Pregnant women in this group are 

offered the option of voluntary medical evacuation or curtailment (reassignment). 

The health and safety of U.S. citizens living and traveling abroad is a top priority 

for the State Department. Through a variety of outreach tools, the Bureau of Consular Affairs ensures that U.S. citizens have access to the information they need 

about the Zika virus, as well as information about steps they can take to protect 

themselves, based on the latest public health guidance from the CDC. We send messages to U.S. citizens in countries listed in the CDC travel alerts, provide information on our travel information website, Travel.State.Gov and post links to CDC information from U.S. Embassy websites and through social media. 

Question 21. The Ebola outbreak certainly highlighted the need for a robust international response to global disease outbreaks. According to the Department of State 

spokesperson, the Department of State created a Zika coordination team to help 

lead the U.S. international response to Zika. 

• Please provide details on the teams’ leadership structure and personnel, their 

mission and authorities, and current funding sources. 

Answer. Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources Heather Higginbottom 

established a Zika Coordination Team under the leadership of the Acting Assistant 

Secretary for the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific 

Affairs (OES) to ensure a robust and coordinated State Department response and 

rapid engagement with our interagency partners. In our response to Ebola last year, 

we learned important lessons about how best to establish a robust coordination 

mechanism, and we are putting those lessons into practice. 

The Zika Coordination Team leverages existing staff and expertise within OES’ 

Office of International Health and Biodefense (OES/IHB) and is led by the director 

of that office. OES/IHB also manages Department engagement on other priority 

health issues, including Ebola response and the Global Health Security Agenda. The 

Zika Coordination Team’s funding and authorities are derived from those of OES/ 

IHB. 

The Team’s mission is to 1) ensure Department activities are fully coordinated; 

2) serve as the main point of contact for external coordination, including with the 

interagency, foreign countries, and non-governmental entities; and 3) provide strategic advice and direction to senior Department leadership. As the central node for 

Department activities on Zika, the Team works in close coordination with bureaus 

across the Department, including the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, the 


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Bureau of International Organizations Affairs, the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the 

Office of Medical Services, and the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, 

among others. 

Question 22. What is the Department of State doing to prepare for the massive 

influx of passport renewals in order to prevent long delays and massive backlogs? 

Answer. Since 2007, the Department has improved significantly its physical capacity to meet the expected increased passport demand. We added 11 new passport 

facilities, increasing the number nationwide to 29. These additions serve key population centers and border-crossing areas. The Department also now has four ‘‘megaadjudication centers’’ capable and prepared to adjudicate high volumes of applications. In this same time frame, the Department increased its passport staff by more 

than 34 percent and continues to increase its adjudication staff by another 20 percent beyond current levels. 

The Department continues to proactively reach out to U.S. citizens to encourage 

them to apply for passports well in advance of travel. We expect this to help disperse seasonal application spikes. Additionally, we recently increased the number 

of contractors at our national call center and expanded its hours to better accommodate anticipated increases in call volume. We also worked with the Department of 

Treasury and its lockbox contractor to expand capacity and create redundancy in 

our application intake. 

All of these improvements support our tiered, trigger system designed to prevent, 

identify, and address backlogs through a variety of methods. These include increased overtime, dedicated passport application adjudication task forces, and transferring work to less-burdened passport agencies. 

Our continued goals are to manage our workload proactively, to retain as little 

work on hand as possible, and to ensure applicants receive their travel documents 

in a timely manner. 

Question 23. What funding resources do you intend to shift around to ensure that 

staff at the Department of State is equipped to effectively process the high volume 

of passport requests? 

Answer. In FY 2016, we project to receive 17.4 million applications and in FY 

2017, we expect to receive approximately 20 million applications. Our budget requests are tied to forecasted passport demand and increases in high-volume years. 

The FY 2017 President’s Budget Request includes $991.7 million to address passport requirements; this is $459.3 million (86 percent) above the actual spending 

level for FY 2015. Because consular services, including passport adjudication, are 

funded fully by consular fees, the portion of the passport fee retained by the Department will help fund the increased workload associated with the passport surge. 

The FY 2017 President’s Budget Request supports the Department’s plans to increase staff by 283 positions over FY 2015 staffing levels to meet growing demand. 

These employees are dedicated to adjudicating passport applications and providing 

essential and reliable service to the U.S. traveling public. This funding level also 

supports the purchase of supplies and inventory for the production of U.S. travel 

documents. We also are developing contingencies within our fee-based operations to 

assign consular staff to adjudicate applications on a temporary basis, should the 

need occur. 

Question 24. What outreach to travel groups, schools, tourist organizations, national media outlets, and local officials, including postmasters, is the Department 

of State doing to get the word out to the American people about this looming problem? 

Answer. Since the end of the passport application busy season in fall 2015, the 

Department has conducted intensive outreach to inform the U.S. traveling public of 

expected high demand for passports. In all outreach, we promote key messaging 

that encourages U.S. citizens to apply early in order to avoid delays and receive 

their passports in time for travel. 

The Department’s efforts include concerted engagement with the press, conducting interviews with, and providing information to, national and local media outlets. For example, coverage during the last week of January 2016 resulted in more 

than 250 news articles and sizeable television coverage promoting Department messaging. During this period we reached more than 39.5 million people. 

The Department also utilizes social media and our website to inform U.S. citizens 

of current processing times and to apply early. We have more than 500,000 Twitter 

followers, allowing us to connect and inform daily. 

We have presented information about the upcoming surge to external stakeholders including A4A (Airlines for America), ASTA (American Society of Travel 

Agents), ACTE (Association of Corporate Travel Executives), AARP (American AssoVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:15 Aug 10, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00155 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\02 23 2016\30-927.T

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ciation of Retired Persons), and AAA (The American Automobile Association). These 

stakeholders have in turn relayed our messages to their members. 

The United States Postal Service (USPS) is a valuable partner and the Department has engaged USPS through various means. We notified USPS senior management of the expected increased demand, and communicated the same messages to 

local post office acceptance facilities through information notices, newsletters, and 

an online question-and-answer session. 

The Department also reaches out to colleges and universities throughout the year 

regarding travel safety and passport messages. For example, during 2015 International Education Week, 23 passport agencies and centers interacted with 6,000 

students at 57 passport fairs at colleges and universities across the nation. 

Finally, passport agencies and centers conduct local outreach to inform local officials and U.S. citizens of the upcoming surge. Local outreach includes participation 

in travel shows, naturalization ceremonies, and community organization meetings. 

Question 25. Why hasn’t the United Nations been able to solve the terrible problem of sexual exploitation and abuse of U.N. peacekeepers? Which countries have 

been objecting to reforms? What steps are you taking to counter the objections and 

resolve the problem? 

Answer. We share your profound concern about the persistent, appalling reports, 

particularly from the Central African Republic (CAR), of sexual exploitation and 

abuse (SEA) of vulnerable people by both U.N. and non-UN forces. While the United 

Nations has taken a number of steps over the past decade to enforce its policy of 

zero tolerance for SEA by U.N. personnel serving around the world, that effort has 

clearly fallen short. 

The United States has taken every opportunity to express its concern about these 

recurring allegations with U.N. leadership, including the Secretary-General, and has 

pushed for urgent action. We anticipate the release in the coming days of the Secretary-General’s annual report on SEA in U.N. peacekeeping, and expect that report 

to include identification of stronger and more effective mechanisms to reduce the 

risk of SEA, and recommendations to better protect vulnerable populations and hold 

perpetrators accountable for their actions. For the first time, the report will also 

identify the nationalities of U.N. uniformed peacekeeping personnel against whom 

there were allegations of SEA during 2015. 

This report follows measures launched by the Secretary-General last year to 

strengthen enforcement of the U.N.’s policy of zero tolerance for SEA, including the 

establishment of immediate response teams in peacekeeping missions to gather and 

preserve evidence for use in investigations within 72 hours of an allegation. He is 

also holding troop- and police-contributing countries more accountable by withholding payments to governments for their personnel against whom there were credible allegations of SEA. Just last month, with encouragement from the United 

States and like-minded countries, the Secretary-General ordered the repatriation of 

the entire Democratic Republic of the Congo contingent from CAR, largely because 

of a pattern of such allegations. Earlier, in August 2015, he demanded the resignation of the head of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in CAR, during whose leadership 

many of these egregious offenses were committed. 

The United States applauds such steps, and will push for their assertive, consistent application. We will also expand our outreach to troop- and police-contributing countries to take immediate, necessary actions to enforce good discipline and 

to complement the U.N.’s efforts, particularly regarding ensuring appropriate justice 

and accountability measures. 

Question 26. What specific proposals is the administration suggesting the United 

Nations implement in order to end this abuse and misconduct by U.N. peacekeepers 

as well as preventing further situations in the future? What measures should the 

U.S. government take to pressure the United Nations to take the needed reforms? 

Answer. The United States is actively engaged with the U.N. leadership to underscore our profound concern about the appalling pattern of sexual exploitation and 

abuse (SEA) by some U.N. peacekeepers in the Central African Republic and elsewhere, who tarnish the reputation and undermine the work of U.N. peacekeepers 

everywhere. By their very definition, peacekeeping missions are intended to protect 

populations at risk, communities under threat, and families in peril. Exploiting or 

abusing these same vulnerable people is inexcusable. 

For its part, the United States will redouble its diplomatic engagement with 

troop- and police-contributing countries to urge them to enforce good discipline on 

their peacekeeping personnel, and to take appropriate action, particularly on justice 

and accountability. That effort will benefit from the Secretary-General’s decision to 

identify alleged perpetrators by nationality—information that was previously unVerDate Mar 15 2010 09:15 Aug 10, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00156 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\02 23 2016\30-927.T

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available but that we will now employ in our outreach to track cases, press for full 

investigations, and insist on prosecution when crimes have been committed. We intend to use a range of diplomatic tools in Washington and abroad to pressure countries to do the right thing. 

Last year the U.N. Secretary General launched an effort to strengthen enforcement of the U.N.’s zero tolerance policy for SEA. The United States asked for and 

welcomes the following actions by the U.N.: 

• steps to speed and improve investigations; 

• improved systems for victims and communities to report allegations against 

U.N. personnel; 

• suspending reimbursement to troop- and police-contributing countries for uniformed personnel against whom there are credible allegations; 

• repatriating individuals and contingents where there is a pattern of allegations; 

• identification by nationality of those alleged to have committed SEA; and 

• establishment of SEA taskforces in all missions to provide operational and strategic advice to the head of the mission. 

The United States applauds these efforts but will continue to press the U.N. and 

troop- and police-contributing countries to do more to end SEA. 

Question 27. Is the Department of State considering or willing to withhold funds 

until it is satisfied that effective safeguards have been implemented to prevent similar conduct in the future? 

Answer. While we share your concerns about the shocking allegations of sexual 

exploitation and abuse by both U.N. and non-UN forces in the Central African Republic, we have found that withholding funds is counterproductive to our efforts to 

promote U.N. reform. What we have seen again and again is that U.N. reforms are 

more effectively achieved when the United States is in good standing, has a seat 

at the table, and pursues robust, long-term, sustained engagement, not by withholding funds in contradiction of our treaty obligations. 

For example, the withholding of funds to the U.N. in the 1990s almost led to the 

United States losing its vote in the U.N. General Assembly. When we were in arrears, even our closest allies were less willing to work with us, including on reform 

issues. 

While we do not support withholding funds we have obligations to pay, in 2011 

we proposed and the General Assembly approved a historic, first-ever prohibition on 

payments for troops sent home for disciplinary reasons, including SEA, and 

strengthened the U.N.’s ‘‘zero tolerance’’ policy for SEA. The U.N. began withholding 

payments in 2015 to countries whose personnel had been credibly alleged to have 

engaged in SEA or repatriated for this misconduct. 

Question 28. What is the rationale for absolving UNESCO and the Palestinians 

of the consequences of undermining the peace process? If we do not attach consequences to the Palestinians bypassing the peace process, doesn’t that fundamentally undermine the peace process? 

Answer. The administration continues to oppose unilateral actions in intergovernmental bodies that circumvent outcomes that can only be negotiated between Israel 

and the Palestinians, including Palestinian statehood. However, it does not serve 

the U.S. national interest to respond to Palestinian efforts or those of their allies 

by withholding our contributions to U.N. specialized agencies. 

Withholding of U.S. contributions could hinder the U.N. specialized agencies from 

carrying out work we value highly, limit U.S. influence in these organizations, and 

undermine our ability to pursue important U.S. objectives—such as working against 

anti-Israeli resolutions and initiatives. 

U.S. leadership in the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is critical in combatting anti-Israel bias, promoting freedom of 

expression, countering and preventing violent extremism, and supporting implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including in the areas of 

education, gender equality, promoting the health of our oceans and improving 

weather forecasting, leveraging traditional donor resources by driving innovation 

and science and technology, and protecting fundamental freedoms and promoting 

the rule of law. 

Because of specific benefits of full participation in UNESCO, the Department 

seeks Congressional support for legislation that would provide the administration 

with the authority to waive restrictions that currently prohibit paying U.S. contributions to UNESCO. 


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Over our objections, the member states of UNESCO voted to admit the Palestinians as a member state in 2011. The United States has not paid any part of the 

U.S. assessments to UNESCO for calendar years 2011 through 2016 as required by 

current law. As a result of our arrears, the United States lost its vote in the 

UNESCO General Conference in 2013. The FY 2017 request includes transfer authority to pay up to $160 million (approximately two-year’s worth) of outstanding 

assessments to UNESCO, should such a waiver be enacted. 

Question 29. At a July 28, 2015 hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, you testified that it is a ‘‘prerequisite’’ for sanctions relief under the Iran 

nuclear agreement that Iran resolve issues related to the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program. More clearly and forcefully, you said on July 24, 2015: 

‘‘PMD has to be resolved before they get one ounce of sanctions relief.’’ Wendy Sherman as the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs testified to this Committee 

on February 4, 2014 that Iran will have to ‘‘come clean on its past actions as part 

of any comprehensive agreement. We will work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern. And that is a formula used by the IAEA 

in addressing possible military dimensions, including Parchin.’’ 

In its report on Iranian compliance with the initial requirements of the nuclear 

agreement, the IAEA described how Iran had in the past installed a large cylinder/ 

chamber at Parchin in which to conduct high explosives testing. When the IAEA 

went to inspect the facility on September 20, 2015, the chamber was gone. The 

IAEA went on to say it could not conclude exactly what had happened at Parchin, 

but it knew that Iran’s explanation was false. It further concluded that Iran’s sanitization behavior at Parchin ‘‘seriously undermined the Agency’s ability to conduct effective verification.’’ 

• Did we know the explosives testing chamber would not be there when the IAEA 

inspectors visited Parchin on September 20, 2015? If not, what does that have 

to say about our capabilities to monitor Iranian compliance with the Iran nuclear agreement? 

Answer. When IAEA Director General Amano visited Parchin as a part of the 

Road Map between the IAEA and Iran, he noted that there was no longer an explosives chamber at Parchin. As to how the chamber was removed and what we knew 

or assessed when, I would have to direct you to my colleagues in the intelligence 

community for further information. 

What I can say is that, as confirmed in the IAEA’s December report, we know 

the chamber is no longer at Parchin. If the IAEA receives credible information indicating that Iran is using this or any chamber for any nuclear weapons related work 

in the future, the JCPOA provides strengthened tools for the IAEA to demand timely access to any such site. 

Question 30. What does this matter have to say about the IAEA’s ability to conduct effective verification of the Iran nuclear agreement? 

Answer. We are confident that the JCPOA gives the IAEA the tools that it needs 

to effectively monitor Iran’s nuclear commitments under the Joint Comprehensive 

Plan of Action with Iran (JCPOA). In particular, the IAEA has the tools necessary 

to investigate any indications of possible undeclared material and activities, and, 

with the cooperation of other States, to uncover any future Iranian attempt to establish a covert nuclear program. 

The IAEA concluded that the information available to it, including the results of 

the visit, does not support Iran’s statements on the purpose of the Parchin facility. 

This information is consistent with what we have long said: that Iran was covering 

up its past nuclear weapons work at Parchin. This is not new information for us, 

but it was important to have the IAEA confirm it. 

Significantly, the IAEA received access to the particular area of interest at the 

Parchin facility—access it had been trying to get for years. That access helped lead 

to the IAEA’s assessment as to the past nature of the Parchin site, which did not 

support Iran’s claims about the facility. 

Question 31. Where is the explosives testing chamber today and when will the 

IAEA get access to it? 

Answer. I cannot comment on what is known specifically about the location of the 

chamber and would direct you to my colleagues in the intelligence community for 

additional information. 

What I can say is that, as confirmed in the IAEA Director General’s December 

report, we know the chamber is not at Parchin. If the IAEA receives any credible 

information indicating that Iran is using such a chamber at this or any other site 


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for any nuclear weapons related work in the future, the JCPOA provides strengthened tools for the IAEA to demand timely access to any such site. 

Question 32. Why did you give sanctions relief to Iran when the PMD issue was 

not resolved? 

Answer. From the start, we have consistently said that we know that Iran had 

pursued an illicit nuclear program and that we know that it was engaged in activities prior to 2003 and subsequently on occasion. 

The JCPOA is a forward-looking arrangement, but addressing questions about 

what Iran did in the past has always been an important part of this process for the 

international community. For this reason, we and our P5+1 partners insisted Iran 

work with the IAEA to address the issue of possible military dimensions to Iran’s 

nuclear program (PMD). 

The IAEA and Iran together developed and agreed on a time-limited process for 

Iran to address the IAEA’s outstanding questions, and this process laid out a path 

for closure of the PMD issue at the IAEA. The IAEA Director General’s December 

report—which was an independent assessment based on nothing but the facts— 

echoes our longstanding assessment about Iran’s pre-2003 weaponization work and 

its halt in 2003. 

The timing of Implementation Day, and the associated lifting of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions, was dependent on Iran completing its key nuclear-related commitments, and the IAEA verifying that Iran had completed each and every one of those 

requirements as detailed in the JCPOA text. 

The key issue here is to make certain that those past activities do not take place 

again as we go forward into the future. And that is why the implementation of the 

JCPOA is so critical. Our primary goal has been and continues to be ensuring that 

Iran’s nuclear program is and will remain peaceful. 

Æ 


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