alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S DECEMBER 31, 1997 CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE PERIOD
DECEMBER 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                           5,204
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    5,731
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (1,158)
<INVENTORY>                                        183
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                12,558
<PP&E>                                           7,842
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (5,426)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  19,254
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            4,652
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           143
<OTHER-SE>                                      25,344
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    19,254
<SALES>                                         22,381
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                22,381
<CGS>                                            2,793
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   25,817
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (5,919)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,012
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (3,907)
<DISCONTINUED>                                     217
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (3,690)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.33)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.33)


</TABLE>
The Honorable William A. Knox, United States Magistrate Judge for the

1

Western District of Missouri, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by

consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 96-2400

___________

Padraic Angelo Cook, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the 

Michael Groose; Dave Dormire; Lt. * Western District of Missouri.

Ross; Donald Cline; Walter Richter; *

Robert M. Malone, II, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellees. *

___________

 Submitted: February 27, 1998

 Filed: March 2, 1998

___________

Before BOWMAN, WOLLMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit

Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Padraic Angelo Cook appeals from the final judgment of the district court1

entered upon a jury verdict in favor of defendant prison officials in this 42 U.S.C.
-2-

§ 1983 action claiming Muslims were denied equal protection at the Jefferson City

Correctional Center (JCCC). We affirm.

After a two-day jury trial, the jury concluded in its verdict interrogatory that

Cook had a sincerely-held religious belief in the Muslim faith, but that he was not

denied a reasonable opportunity to practice his faith comparable to the opportunities

afforded other prisoners of different faiths. Cook moved for a new trial, arguing, inter

alia, the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The district court denied the

motion. On appeal, Cook argues the court erred in denying the new-trial motion, that

counsel did not present all the evidence, and that he was prejudiced by the admission

of evidence regarding his witnesses& criminal convictions.

We review for abuse of discretion the district court&s denial of a motion for a

new trial. See Keenan v. Computer Assoc. Int&l, Inc., 13 F.3d 1266, 1269 (8th Cir.

1994). Where, as here, “the basis of the motion for a new trial is that the jury&s verdict

is against the weight of the evidence, the district court&s denial of the motion #is

virtually unassailable on appeal.&” Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d 1309, 1314 (8th Cir.

1997) (quoted cases omitted). Upon our review of the record, including the trial

transcript, we conclude that the jury&s conclusions were amply supported and that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the new-trial motion. 

Cook&s complaints regarding his counsel&s representation are not grounds for

reversal. See Glick v. Henderson, 855 F.2d 536, 541 (8th Cir. 1988) (no constitutional

right to effective assistance of counsel during civil trial). As Cook failed to object to

the admission of the evidence he now challenges, we review for plain error. See

McAlinney v. Maron Merrell Dow, Inc., 992 F.2d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 1993). Because

the jury knew the witnesses were inmates at the JCCC, we find no plain error in the

limited admission of the types of their felony convictions. 

Accordingly, we affirm.
-3-

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### L. P. ANTONACCI, Petitioner, v. CITY OF SOUTH MIAMI, Respondent.

No. 69-931.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 2, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Certiorari denied.
#### ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD CO. v. TURPAK (two cases).

No. 38951.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 1969.

Certiorari denied without opinion.
#### Eugene BUFORD, Jr. v. STATE of Mississippi.

Misc. No. 836.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Feb. 22, 1978.

LeRoy Pitts, Meridian, for appellant.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by Henry T. Wingate, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

WALKER, Justice, for the Court.

Petition for appeal granted.

PATTERSON, C. J., INZER and SMITH, P. JJ., and ROBERTSON, SUGG, BROOM, LEE and BOWLING, JJ., concur.
254 La. 808

#### Fred B. KING et ux. v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 50043.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 23, 1969.

In re: Fred B. King and Merle N. King applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge. 224 So.2d 42.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal we find no error of law in its judgment.
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.2

I, Lawrence D. Ellis, certify that:

     1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of The Med-Design
Corporation;

     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were
made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

     4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

        a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

        b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

        c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most
recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
and

     5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

        a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize, and report financial information; and

        b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.


Date: March 10, 2004                  Lawrence D. Ellis
                                      ------------------------------------------
                                      Lawrence D. Ellis, Chief Financial Officer
#### BURDA METALS, INC., etc., Petitioner, v. HEAVY EQUIPMENT RENTAL COMPANY, Inc., etc., Respondent.

No. 40883.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 19, 1971.

Certiorari denied. 243 So.2d 163.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, CARLTON, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. James JOHNSON, Thomas Lee Cardwell, Jerry J. Trent, Roger Goff, Joseph A. Fitch, Danny Ryan, Earl Spencer, Stacy J. Boudreaux, Kenneth J. Vandervort, Billie Dean Spradlin, Stephen A. Anderson, Junior J. Barrett, and Jack Nichols.

No. 62505.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 22, 1978.

In re: James Johnson, et al., applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

Bond reduced.

IT IS ORDERED that the amount of bail be reduced in the following cases to the amounts indicated:

> James Johnson $40,000.

> Thos. Lee Caldwell 75,000.

> Jerry J. Trent 75,000.

> Roger Goff 75,000.

> Joseph A. Fitch 25,000.

> Danny Ryan 40,000.

> Earl Spencer 50,000.

> Stacy J. Boudreaux 25,000.

> Kenneth F. Vandervort 40,000.

> Billie Dean Spradlin 40,000.

> Stephen A. Anderson 75,000.

> Junior L. Barrett 50,000.

> Jack Nichols 75,000.

SUMMERS, J.,

is of the opinion that the bond should not be reduced because the trial judge did not abuse his discretion.
# L_2023109EN.01000601.xml

| 24.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 109/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 109/6

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2023/843

of 17 April 2023

entering a name in the register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications (‘Rökt Vättersik’ (PDO))

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (1), and in particular Article 52(2) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, Sweden’s application to register the name ‘Rökt Vättersik’ was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, Sweden’s application to register the name ‘Rökt Vättersik’ was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2).

| (2) | As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the name ‘Rökt Vättersik’ should therefore be entered in the register, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the name ‘Rökt Vättersik’ should therefore be entered in the register,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The name ‘Rökt Vättersik’ (PDO) is hereby entered in the register.

The name specified in the first paragraph denotes a product in Class 1.7. – Fresh fish, molluscs and crustaceans and products derived therefrom, as listed in Annex XI to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 668/2014 (3).

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 17 April 2023.

For the Commission,

On behalf of the President,

Janusz WOJCIECHOWSKI

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  
  OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

1

(2)  
  OJ C 481, 19.12.2022, p. 8.

2

(3)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 668/2014 of 13 June 2014 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (OJ L 179, 19.6.2014, p. 36).

3

---
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Gary C. HEATLEY.

No. 61069.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 19, 1978.

Alton T. Moran, Director, Allen J. Ber-geron, Jr., Appellate Counsel, John R. Sheppard, E. Michael Harrison, John B. Cornish, Trial Counsel, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie B. Brown, Dist. Atty., Marilyn C. Castle, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Rosario R. RIZZUTO, Appellant, v. Philip E. DiPAOLO, III, Appellee.

No. 77-1499.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 19, 1978.

Frank H. Bass, Jr., of Martin J. Jones, P. A., St. Petersburg, for appellant.

Dennis E. Dabroski and William D. Slicker, of Lyle, Skipper, Wood & Anderson, St. Petersburg, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff/appellant seeks to appeal an order which reads “that defendant’s motion for summary judgment is hereby granted.” This is not a final decision, order, judgment, or decree within the contemplation of Fla.R.App.P. 3.2(b). Likewise, the case is not one which formerly would have been cognizable in equity so the order is not subject to *491an interlocutory appeal. Fla.R.App.P. 4.2(a). Since we have no jurisdiction, the appeal, sua sponte, is dismissed. *Arnold v. Brady,*178 So.2d 732 (Fla.2d DCA 1965); *Renard v. Kirkeby Hotels,*99 So.2d 719 (Fla.3d DCA 1958).

GRIMES, A. C. J., and OTT and DAN-AHY, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-6025

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff – Appellee, 

v. 

JOSEPH ROGER PEARSON, 

Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior 

District Judge. (7:08-cr-00818-HMH-1) 

Submitted: February 28, 2011 Decided: March 9, 2011

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and KING and DIAZ, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Joseph Roger Pearson, Appellant Pro Se. William Jacob Watkins, 

Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South 

Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2

PER CURIAM: 

Joseph Roger Pearson appeals the district court’s 

order denying his motion for resentencing under the 

Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 

2372. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. 

The Fair Sentencing Act, which increased the amounts of cocaine 

base that trigger the statutory minimum sentences at 21 U.S.C.A. 

§ 841(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010), is not retroactive and is 

therefore inapplicable to Pearson’s sentence. See United States 

v. Diaz, 627 F.3d 930, 931 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); 

United States v. Brewer, 624 F.3d 900, 909 n.7 (8th Cir. 2010); 

United States v. Bell, 624 F.3d 803, 814 (7th Cir. 2010); 

United States v. Gomes, 621 F.3d 1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 2010)

(per curiam); United States v. Carradine, 621 F.3d 575, 580 

(6th Cir. 2010). 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. 

United States v. Pearson, No. 7:08-cr-00818-HMH-1 (D.S.C. 

Dec. 23, 2010). We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED
<PAGE>   1


                                                                   EXHIBIT 21.1

                          SUBSIDIARIES OF THE COMPANY


1.   Dave & Buster's of Illinois, Inc., a Illinois corporation

2.   Dave & Buster's of Georgia, Inc., a Georgia corporation

3.   Dave & Buster's of Pennsylvania, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation

4.   DANB Texas, Inc., a Texas corporation

5.   Dave & Buster's of Maryland, Inc., a Maryland corporation

6.   Dave & Buster's of California, Inc., a California corporation

7.   Dave & Buster's of Colorado, Inc., a Colorado corporation

8.   Dave & Buster's of New York, Inc., a New York corporation
# EUR-Lex - 51998IP0595 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 51998IP0595

**Resolution on the question of the death penalty and the establishment of a universal moratorium on executions **

*
Official Journal C 210 , 06/07/1998 P. 0207 *

B4-0595, 0615, 0621, 0642, 0658 and 0665/98

Resolution on the question of the death penalty and the establishment of a universal moratorium on executions

The European Parliament,

- having regard to its previous resolutions on the death penalty,

A. whereas in 1994 the United Nations General Assembly rejected by only 8 votes a resolution on the establishment of a universal moratorium on the death penalty,

B. recalling the 1997 resolution of the UN Commission on Human Rights (E/CN.4/1997/L.20) which maintains that 'abolition of the death penalty contributes to the enhancement of human dignity and to the progressive development of human rights ̈,

C. recalling the resolution of the UN Commission on Human Rights of 3 April 1998, (E/CN.4/1998/L.12) which calls for the establishment of a universal moratorium on executions;

D. welcoming the latest report of the UN Secretary-General which contains information on changes and positive developments in law and practice concerning the death penalty world-wide (E/CN.4/1998/82),

E. welcoming the fact that several countries, while still keeping the death penalty in their legislation, are applying a de facto moratorium on executions,

1. Calls on the Member States to undertake all necessary steps to ensure that the question of the death penalty is included on the agenda of the next session of the UN General Assembly;

2. Requests the Council to give a mandate to the Austrian Presidency to coordinate the initiatives of the EU Member States concerning the inclusion of a universal moratorium on executions on the agenda of the next session of the UN General Assembly;

3. Calls on the Council, the Member States and the Commission, acting within their respective remits, to table at the next UN General Assembly a resolution for the introduction of a universal moratorium on executions;

4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the governments of the Member States, the UN Secretary-General and the President of the UN General Assembly.

10
#### James MYRON, Appellant, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida, Appellee.

No. L-369.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District.

July 22, 1969.

James Myron, in pro. per.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Horace A. Knowlton, III, Asst. A tty. Gen., for appel-lee.

ON MOTION TO QUASH

PER CURIAM.

The appellee has filed a motion to quash the appeal herein on the grounds that it is frivolous. Appellant has filed a response in opposition to said motion to quash.

This appeal is from an order entered below denying appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus for the reason that same is without merit. By his petition, appellant, who is serving a ten year sentence imposed upon a plea of guilty to the charge of forgery, sought a ruling from the court below that being confined in punitive segregation together with the consequential limitations upon his movements — being limited to a three-minute shower on alternate days, not receiving any sunlight, limited reading material, limited medical and dental care, and the imposition of mental duress because of the foregoing conditions as a result of which appellant has slashed his wrist in order to gain release — all constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of constitutional provisions, both state and federal.

We know of no reason why such custodial treatment is violative of the constitution when same is imposed because of a prisoner’s violation of prison rules. In his petition, appellant admitted that he was confined in the manner complained of because he had in his possession a hypodermic syringe and needle without authorization.

The appellee’s motion to quash on grounds of frivolity is well founded. There is no merit to this appeal. Nor was there merit in the petition filed in the lower court.

Dismissed.

CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C. J., and WIGGINTON and SPECTOR, JJ., concur.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Larry Joe PHILLIPS.

No. 60455.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Aug. 16, 1977.

In re: Larry Joe Phillips, applying for appeal bond.

Writ denied. The showing made does not warrant the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction. No abuse of discretion is shown in the ruling of the trial judge.