Foreword

From the moment o f his departure fro m the Philippines in 1942, General

MacArthur was determined t o return t o the islands and restor e th e freedom

of th e Philippin e people. Capture o f th e mai n island of Luzon i n 194 5 sub -

stantially realized this goal. How his armies accomplished it forms th e bod y

of the story unfolded in this volume.

In some respects th e Luzon Campaig n repeate d th e patter n o f Japanese

conquest three years earlier, although with action on a much larger scal e and

for a much longe r period . Unlike the Japanes e conquest, the operation s o f

1945 involve d a fierc e month-lon g battl e fo r Manila , th e onl y suc h pro -

tracted actio n b y U.S . force s i n a bi g cit y durin g Worl d Wa r II . I t als o

involved a complicate d an d costl y reductio n o f thre e mountai n position s

into which the Japanese withdrew, in one of which there was still a substantial

core of resistance when Japan surrendered.

Within the broad scop e of this work, covering the intensive operations o f

two armie s for seve n months , th e autho r ha s necessaril y concentrate d o n

what is most instructive and significan t to the outcome. The clarity , thorough

scholarship, an d carefu l mappin g o f this volume should mak e i t especiall y

useful fo r the military student, and al l who read it will benefit by the author's

forthright presentatio n o f thi s dramati c an d climacti c story o f U.S . Army

operations i n the Pacifi c war.

Washington, D.C. 15 March 1961

JAMES A. NORELL

Brigadier General, US A

Chief of Military History

vii
The Author

Robert Ross Smit h receive d a B.A . an d M.A . i n America n Histor y fro m

Duke University . A graduat e o f th e Infantr y Office r Candidat e Schoo l a t

Fort Benning , Georgia , i n 1943 , h e serve d o n th e staf f an d facult y o f th e

Special Services School at Washington and Le e University and then, for two

years, wa s a membe r o f th e G- 3 Historica l Divisio n a t Genera l Dougla s

MacArthur's Genera l Headquarters , Southwes t Pacifi c Area . H e presentl y

holds a reserve commission a s a lieutenant colonel of Infantry .

Mr. Smit h ha s bee n wit h th e Offic e o f th e Chie f o f Militar y History ,

either a s an office r o n activ e dut y o r a s a civilian, sinc e January 1947 . Hi s

first boo k i n th e serie s TH E UNITE D STATE S ARM Y I N WORL D

WAR II , The Approach to the Philippines, wa s published i n 1953 . H e i s

currently workin g o n hi s thir d volum e fo r th e series , Th e Rivier a t o th e

Rhine. Mr . Smith's othe r work s includ e a n essa y i n Command Decisions

(New York : Harcour t Brac e an d Company , 1959 , an d Washington : Offic e

of th e Chie f o f Militar y History , 1960) ; a n articl e o n tactica l supply prob -

lems in Military Review; the articl e o n th e Pacifi c phas e o f World Wa r I I

in th e Encyclopædia Britannica; an d a n accoun t o f th e Battl e o f O x Hil l

(1 September 1862 ) i n Fairfax County and the War Between the States, a

publication of the Fairfax Count y (Va. ) Civi l War Centennia l Commission.

viii
Preface

Triumph in the Philippines i s the story of the largest joint campaign of

the Pacifi c phas e of World Wa r II . Devote d principall y t o th e accomplish -

ments of U.S . Army ground comba t force s an d t o th e operation s o f major

organized Philippin e guerrilla units tha t contributed notabl y t o th e success

of th e campaign , th e volum e describe s th e reconques t o f th e Philippin e

archipelago exclusive of Leyt e and Samar . Th e narrativ e include s coverage

of air , naval, and logistica l activity necessar y t o broa d understandin g of th e

ground combat operations. Th e strategi c planning and th e strategic debates

leading t o th e decision t o seiz e Luzo n an d bypas s Formos a ar e als o treate d

so a s to enabl e th e reade r t o fi t the Luzo n an d Souther n Philippine s Cam -

paigns into their prope r perspectiv e of the wa r against Japan.

For th e force s o f Genera l Dougla s MacArthur' s Southwes t Pacifi c Are a

the reconquest of Luzon and th e Southern Philippine s was the climax of the

Pacific war , althoug h n o on e anticipate d thi s outcome when , o n 9 January

1945, Lt. Gen . Walter Krueger's Sixth Army poured ashore over the beaches

of Lingaye n Gulf . Viewe d fro m th e aspec t o f commitmen t o f U.S . Arm y

ground forces , th e Luzo n Campaig n (whic h strategicall y an d tacticall y in -

cludes the seizur e of Mindor o Island an d th e securing of th e shipping lanes

through th e centra l Visaya n Islands ) wa s exceede d i n siz e durin g Worl d

War I I onl y b y th e driv e acros s norther n France . Th e Luzo n Campaig n

differed fro m others of the Pacifi c wa r in tha t it alon e provided opportunity

for th e employment of mass and maneuve r on a scale even approaching tha t

common t o th e Europea n an d Mediterranea n theaters . Th e operation s o f

Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger's Eighth Army , both o n Luzo n and durin g

the Souther n Philippine s Campaign , wer e mor e aki n t o previou s action s

throughout th e Pacific , bu t th e souther n campaign , too , presente d feature s

peculiar t o th e reconquest o f the Philippin e archipelago .

Triumph in the Philippines bega n a s th e join t effor t o f tw o authors ,

myself an d a former colleague , Dr. M . Hamlin Cannon. Befor e completio n

of th e manuscript's first draft , Dr. Canno n accepted another position and th e

task o f completio n an d revisio n fel l upo n m y shoulders . I ha d acces s t o

Dr. Cannon's draf t chapters , which prove d valuabl e guide s t o researc h an d

which helpe d m e avoi d man y pitfalls . A detaile d discussio n o f al l sourc e

material is to be found a t the end o f the volume in The Sources : A Critical

Note. Fo r thi s prefac e i t i s sufficien t t o stat e tha t th e onl y limitatio n o n

access t o or us e of records concerned question s tha t could b e shown t o have

ix
an obviously and directly adverse effec t upo n national security and national

policy.

In 195 7 th e Offic e o f th e Chie f o f Militar y Histor y made i t possibl e fo r

me t o revisit th e battlefield s o f Luzon . Thi s permitte d m e t o mak e man y

important revision s base d upo n a n invaluabl e firsthan d examinatio n o f

much o f th e terrai n involve d i n th e Luzo n Campaig n an d enable d m e t o

complete substantive work on th e volume early in 1958 .

It i s impossibl e t o lis t al l wh o mad e significan t contribution s t o th e

preparation of Triumph in the Philippines, bu t it is incumbent upon me to

single out thos e who provided help and guidance above and beyon d th e call

of duty . Headin g the list are th e nearly eighty officers o r forme r officer s o f

the Army, Navy, and Air Force whose time and patience in reviewin g all or

parts o f the manuscript produced valuabl e informatio n an d man y provoca -

tive ideas. I t wa s especially gratifyin g t o fin d bus y me n i n importan t posts

taking pain s t o submi t comments—fo r example , th e Honorabl e Hug h M .

Milton II, forme r Unde r Secretary of the Army and during the Luzon Campaign th e Chie f o f Staff, XI V Corps. Similarly , Genera l Georg e H. Decker ,

Chief o f Staff, U.S . Army, and formerl y Chie f of Staff, Sixt h Army, on Luzon,

provided a collection of papers tha t prove d especiall y valuable i n analyzin g

the problems of XI Corp s during the return t o Bataan .

Within th e Offic e o f th e Chie f o f Militar y Histor y gratefu l acknowledg -

ment goes to Dr. Stanle y L. Falk , whos e skill a s research assistant , especiall y

in th e fiel d o f enemy materials, ease d my burden an d save d countless hours

of digging . Thank s are als o owing Dr. Louis Morton, formerly Chie f o f the

Pacific Section and Deput y Chief of the World War II Branch , and Dr. Kent

Roberts Greenfield , formerl y Chie f Historian , Departmen t o f th e Army ,

both o f whom gav e valuable guidance an d advice . I als o acknowledg e my

debts t o th e Genera l Referenc e Branch , Offic e o f th e Chie f o f Militar y

History, and to the World War II Record s Division, National Archives and

Records Service , fo r thei r ai d i n locatin g an d obtainin g sourc e material .

Miss Mary Ann Bacon undertook the editing of the manuscript; Mrs. Marion

P. Grimes was the copy editor. Th e tas k of preparing the maps that so admirably supplement the text was in the capable hands of Mr. Billy C. Mossman,

who also prepared a research draft fo r part of Chapter XXVIII. Mrs . Norma

Heacock Sherris made the excellent selection o f photographs. Mr . Nichola s

J. Anthony compiled the Index.

Acknowledgment o f assistanc e b y no mean s implie s tha t th e individuals

or organizations concerned eithe r approve or disapprov e th e interpretations

set forth i n th e volume, nor shoul d th e contents of th e volume be construed

as representing the officia l view s of the Department of the Army. I alone am

responsible fo r interpretation s mad e an d conclusion s draw n an d fo r an y

errors of omission o r commission .

Washington, D.C. 15 March 196 1

ROBERT ROS S SMIT H

x
Contents

PART ON E

Plans an d Preparation s

Chapter Page

I. TH E DEBAT E OVER LUZO N ........... . 3

T h e Strategic Background ............... . 3

Luzon Versus Formosa ................ . 8

I. THE PLAN FOR INVASION 18 .....

The Concept ..................... 18

Changing the Target Dates ............... 22

Tactical Plans .................... . 2 6

The Logistical Plan ......... 38

III. PRELIMINAR Y OPERATION S AN D THE

APPROACH .............. 43

Airfields o n Mindoro ................. . 4 3

Diversionary Activities ................ . 5 3

The Approach to Luzon ................ 54

PART TW O

Invasion

IV. ESTABLISHIN G TH E BEACHHEA D ......... . 7 3

The Assault: S-day–S Plus 2 .............. . 7 3

The Beachhead Through S Plus 2 ............ . 8 5

V. THE ENEMY ........... 88

Japanese Strategy in the Philippines .......... . 8 8

T h e Japanese o n Luzon ................ . 9 0

Dispositions in Northern Luzon ............ . 9 7

xi
Chapter Page

VI. EXPANDING THE HOLD ............... 104

I Co rps Meets the Enemy ................ 104

X IV Corps Probes South ............... . 11 5

VII. TH E LOGISTIC S O F TH E INVASIO N ...... . 11 8

Unloading the Assault Convoys ............. 118

Inland Supply and Construction ............. 128

PART THRE E

The Centra l Plain s

VIII. REDEPLOYMEN T AN D TACTICAL PLAN S ... . 13 9

N e w American Plans ................. . 13 9

Japanese Redispositions ................ . 14 3

IX. SECURIN G TH E SIXT H ARMY' S BAS E ARE A .. . 14 7

The Fight for the Routes 3-11 Junction ........ . 14 7

Binalonan and San Manuel: The I Corps Center ..... . 15 5

Advancing the I Corps Right ........... . 16 0

T h e Achievements Analyzed .............. . 16 5

X. TH E CAPTUR E O F CLAR K FIEL D ......... . 16 7

Into Contact With the Kembu Group ........... 167

The First Attacks .................... 171

A Planning Interlude ................. . 17 9

Closing With the Kembu Group's MLR ........ . .18 3

The Attack Through the End of January . ........ . 18 6

XI. PROTECTIN G XI V CORPS ' REA R AN D FLANK S . . .18 7

T he Problem and the Plan .............. . 18 7

T h e Capture o f Sa n Jose ............... . 19 0

San Jose to the East Coast ................ 201

The Destruction of the Kembu Group ......... . 20 2

Epilogue ...................... . 20 6

PART FOU R

Securing th e Manil a Ba y Area

XII. MANILA : TH E APPROAC H MARC H ......... . 21 1

XIV Corps' Drive South ................ 211

The Approach From the South .............. 221

Support Operations During the Approach March ...... 232

xii
Chapter Page

XIII. MANILA : THE DEFENDER S AND THE DEFENSE S . . .23 7

The City ....................... 237

The Japanese Defenses ................. 240

XIV. ISOLATIN G TH E BATTLEFIEL D ..... . 24 9

The Concept of the Attack ............... 249

Operations North of the Pasig ............. 251

Across the River and Into the Buildings .......... 258

Encircling the City ................... 265

XV. TH E DRIV E TOWAR D INTRAMURO S ...... . . . 27 1

Iwabuchi Entrapped ................. . 27 1

The Battles at the Strongpoints .............. 275

XVI. MANILA : TH E LAS T RESISTANCE ......... . 29 1

Intramuros ..................... . 29 1

The Government Buildings ............... 301

Conclusions ..................... . 30 6

XVII. BAC K T O BATAA N ............... . . . 30 9

The Plans for Opening Manila Bay ......... . . 30 9

Sealing Off Bataan: A Study i n Command ...... . ..31 3

Clearing Bataan Peninsula ............ . . 33 1

XVIII. CORREGIDOR .... 335

The Plan of Assault .................. 335

Securing "The Rock" ................. . 34 0

XIX. MANIL A BAY-MINO R OPERATION S ....... . 35 1

The So uth Shore .................... 351

The S mall Islands .................. 352

PART FIV E

The Shimbu Group an d th e Visaya n Passage s

XX. AMERICA N PLAN S FO R POST-MANIL A

OPERATIONS .................. . 36 1

xiii
Chapter Page

XXI. TH E REDUCTIO N OF THE SHIMBU GROUP—

PHASE I: TURNIN G TH E SHIMBU LEF T ..... . 36 7

Plans ........................ . 36 7

T h e XIV Corps Offensive .............. . . 37 1

The Collapse of the Shimbu Left ............ . 38 4

Conclusions ..................... . 3 8 8

XXII. TH E REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP —

PHASE II : TH E SEIZUR E O F WAW A AN D

IPO DAMS ................ . . 391

Protecting the Right Rear ................ 391

Breakthrough in the Center ............... 392

The Seizure of Ipo Dam ................. 403

The Destruction of the Kogure Detachment ........ 415

The End of the Shimbu Group .............. 418

XXIII. SECURIN G TH E VISAYA N PASSAGE S ....... . . . 42 3

Southern Luzon ................... . 42 3

Clearing the Smaller Islands ............... 435

The Bicol Peninsula Operation ............. 439

PART SI X

The Conquest o f Northern Luzo n

XXIV. NORTHER

THE

N LUZON : TH E SITUATIO N AN D

 PLANS 449 .......

The Terrain and the Defenses in Northern Luzon ..... . 44 9

The S ixth Army's Plan ................. 457

XXV. TH E COLLAPS E OF TH E BAGUI O FRON T ...... . 46 8

The 33d Division's Holding Mission .......... . 46 8

The Drive to Baguio .................. 479

The Baguio Front to the End of May ........... 488

XXVI. TH E BAMBAN G FRONT—I: TH E VILL A VERD E

TRAIL ................... 491

The Situation and the Plans ............... 491

Prologue to Stalemate .................. 492

The Battle for Salacsac Pass No. 2 ............ . 49 8

Salacsac Pass No. 1 to Imugan ............. . 50 5

xiv
Chapter Page

XXVII. TH E BAMBAN G FRONT—II : TH E 25T H DIVISIO N

O N ROUT E 5 .................. . 51 2

T h e 25th Division's Drive Begins ............ . 51 2

Objective: Balete Pass ............. . 51 6

T h e Envelopment o f Balete Pass ............ . 53 0

Sante Fe and the Villa Verde Trail ........... . 53 5

Conclusions ..................... . 53 7

XXVIII. ACTIO N AT THE NORTHER N APE X ......... . 54 1

Northwestern Luzon ................. . 54 1

Laoag, Vigan, and the Araki Force ........... . 54 6

T h e Fight fo r Bessang Pass .............. . 54 7

Results of USAFIP (NL) Operations .......... . 55 5

XXIX. PURSUI T I N NORTHER N LUZO N ........ . . . 55 8

The Shobu Group Withdrawal Plans .......... . 55 8

Sixth Army-I Corps Pursuit Plans ............ . 56 1

Compressing the Shobu Group .............. 562

The End in Northern Luzon ............... 572

PART SEVE N

The Southern Philippine s

XXX. TH E CAMPAIG N BEGIN S ............ . 58 3

The Plans and the Forces ................ 583

Airfields on Palawan .................. 589

Zamboanga ..................... . 59 1

The Sulu Archipelago ................. 597

Zamboanga-Sulu Airfield Development ......... . 59 9

XXXI. TH E CENTRA L VISAYAN ISLAND S ...... . ... . 60 1

Panay an d Guimaras .............. . . . 60 1

Northern Negros ................... . 61 7

Cebu ...................... . . . 60 4

Bohol and Southern Negros ............ . . . 60 8

Conclusions ..................... . 61 8

XXXII. TH E CONQUES T O F EASTER N MINDANA O ... . 620

Plans, Preparations, an d Penetration .......... . 62 0

The Destruction of the 100th Division .......... . 62 7

The Collapse of 30th Division Resistance ......... . 63 6

Mop-up and Pursuit in Eastern Mindanao ........ . 64 2

The End of the War in Eastern Mindanao ........ . 64 7

xv
PART EIGH T

Conclusion

CONCLUSION ........................ . . 65 1

Appendixes

Page

A. ORGANIZATIO N FO R TH E INVASIO N O F LUZO N ... . 65 9

1. Generalized Organization of the Southwest Pacific Area,

December 1944 ................... . 66 0

2. Organization of Ground Combat Forces in the Southwest Pacific

Area, 9 January 1945 .................. . 66 1

3. Organization of the Sixth Army for the Invasion of Luzon ... . 66 2

4. Organization of the Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific

Area, for the Lingayen Gulf Operation ......... . 66 3

5. Organization of the Amphibious Forces for the Lingayen Gulf

Operation ...................... . 66 4

6. Operational Organization of Allied Air Commands in the

Pacific, 9 January 1945 .............. . facin g 66 4

B. COMPOSITIO N O F TH E LANDIN G WAVES , LINGAYE N

ASSAULT, 9 JANUARY 1945 666 ....

C. JAPANES E COMMAND STRUCTURE IN TH E PHILIPPINE S . . 66 9

1 . Simplified Organization, November 1944 ........... . 67 1

2. Organization as of 9 January 1945 ............. . 67 2

D. ORGANIZATIO N O F JAPANES E FORCE S A T MANIL A . . . 67 3

E. SHIMBU GROUP ORDE R O F BATTL E .......... . 67 4

F. STRENGT H AN D DEPLOYMEN T O F JAPANES E I N TH E

SOUTHERN PHILIPPINE S ............. . 68 2

G. JAPANES E ORDER OF BATTLE I N EASTER N MINDANA O 68 4

1. 100th Division, 17 April 1945 ...... 684

2. 100th Division Reorganization of Mid-May ......... . 68 7

3. 30th Division, 17 April 1945 ...... 688

4. Order of Battle of Japanese Forces Along the Northwestern

Section of the Kibawe-Talomo Trail ........... . 69 1

xvi
Page

H. TH E COS T O F TH E CAMPAIGN S ............ . . 69 2

1. Battle Casualties of the U.S. Army Ground Combat Forces,

Luzon and the Southern Philippines, 1945 ........ . 69 2

2. Japanese Casualties, Luzon and the Southern Philippines, 1945 . . 69 4

THE SOURCES : A CRITICAL NOT E ............ . 69 5

GLOSSARY ......................... 714

BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS 720 .......

INDEX ............................. 725

Tables

No.

1. Result s o f Japanes e Kamikaz e Operations , 1 3 Decembe r 1944 -

1 3 Januar y 194 5 .................... 6 6

2. Compositio n o f 6t h Divisio n Shor e Part y ............ . 12 3

3. Artiller y i n Suppor t o f Assaul t o n Intramuro s .......... . 29 6

4. Artiller y Expende d i n Support o f th e Assaul t on Intramuro s .... . 29 7

5. Casualties in Battle for Manila .................. 307

6. Japanes e Equipmen t Capture d i n Manil a Are a ......... . 30 8

7. Casualties in Corregidor Operations to March 1945 ........ 350

8. U.S . Infantr y Casualtie s i n Attac k Towar d Santa Fe , 2 1 February3 1 Ma y 194 5 .................... . 5 3 9

9. U.S . Army Casualties , Easter n Mindanao , Throug h 1 5 Augus t

1945 ............................ 648

Maps

1. Situatio n i n th e Pacific , 1 5 Decembe r 194 4 .......... . 5

2. Invasio n o f Mindoro , 1 5 December 1944-3 1 January 194 5 ..... . 4 4

3. Th e Enem y on Luzon , 1 1 January 194 5 ............. . 9 5

4. Sixt h Army Advance , 12-1 7 January 194 5 ........... . 11 6

5. Th e Captur e of San Jose, 1- 8 Februar y 194 5 ........... . 19 1

xvii
No. Page

6. Th e Captur e o f Manila : Th e Driv e Towar d Intramuros , 13-2 2

February 194 5 ................ . 27 6

7. Th e Captur e o f Manila : Eliminatin g the Las t Resistance , 2 3 February-3 Marc h 194 5 ..................... 29 8

8 . ZigZa g Pass , 1 February 194 5 ................ . 31 7

9 . ZigZa g Pass , 2 Februar y 1945 ................. . 31 8

1 0 . ZigZa g Pass , 3 Februar y 194 5 ............ . 32 0

1 1 . ZigZa g Pass , 4 Februar y 194 5 ................ . 32 1

12. ZigZa g Pass, 5 Februar y 194 5 .................. 32 3

1 3 . ZigZa g Pass, 6 Februar y 194 5 ............... . 32 8

14. Clearin g ZigZa g Pass: 38t h Division , 7-14 Februar y 194 5 33 1

1 5 . Clearin g Bataan , 12-2 1 February 194 5 .............. 33 3

16. Th e Seizur e o f Waw a Dam , 27 March-2 8 Ma y 194 5 ..... 39 3

17. Th e Seizur e o f Ip o Dam , 6-17 May 194 5 ............ . 40 9

18. To Infanta and Santa Inez, 31 March-18 June 1945 ..... 417

19. Troo p Dispositions, Northern Luzon, 2 1 Februar y 194 5 ....... 45 1

20. Th e Captur e of Baguio , I Corps, 21 February-26 April 194 5 . . . .47 3

21. The Irisan Gorge Area .............. 483

22. T o Balet e Pass an d Sant a Fe, 25t h Division, 12 March-31 Ma y 194 5 . . 52 1

23. Th e Figh t fo r Bessan g Pass, U.S . Army Force s i n th e Philippines ,

North Luzon , 2 9 March-2 2 Ma y 194 5 ..... . 55 0

24. Throug h Bessan g Pas s t o Cervantes , U.S . Arm y Force s i n th e

Philippines, Nort h Luzon , 1-15 Jun e 194 5 ........... 55 5

25. Pursui t i n Norther n Luzon, I Corps , 3 1 May-3 0 Jun e 194 5 .. . 565

26. Fina l Operations in Norther n Luzon, XIV Corps, 1 July-15 August

27. Clearin

194

g Puert

5 ............................

o Princes a Harbor , Palawa n Island , 2 8 February

 575

-

1 Marc h 194 5 .......... . 59 0

28. Th e Seizur e o f Zamboanga , 41s t Infantry Division , 10-3 1 March

1945 ....... . . .................. 59 4

2 9 . Th e Sul u Archipelag o ................. . . . 59 8

30. Clearin g th e Centra l Visayan Islands, 40t h an d America l Divisions,

1 8 March-2 8 Apri l 194 5 ............ 60 3

31. Clearin g the Cebu City Area, Americal Division, 26 March-18 April

1945 .................... 611

32. Clearin g Eastern Mindanao , X Corps, 1 7 April-30 Jun e 1945 . . . 62 4

33. Clearin g the Dava o Area, 24th Infantr y Division , 3 0 April-26 June

1945 .......................... . . 631

Maps I-XII Are in Accompanying Map Envelope

I. Th e Lingaye n Assault, 9-11 January 1945

II. Seizin g th e Route s 3-11 Junction , 43 d Infantr y Division , 12-31

January 1945

xviii
III. Sixt h Army's Advance, 18-31 Januar y 194 5

IV. Th e Captur e of Clar k Field , XIV Corps, 24 January-20 Februar y 194 5

V. Th e Approac h to Manila, 1-4 Februar y 194 5

VI. Th e Captur e of Manila: the Encirclement, 3-12 February 1945

VII. Corregido r Island

VIII. Turnin g the SHIMBU Left , 20 February-26 March 1945

IX. Clearin g Southern Luzon, XIV Corps, 4 March-11 April 194 5

X. Securin g the Visaya n Passages, 19 February-2 May 1945

XI. Advanc e Toward Santa Fe , I Corps, 2 1 February-10 March 194 5

XII. Clearin g the Salacsa c Passes, 32d Infantr y Division , 7 March-28 Ma y 194 5

Illustrations

Page

Relief Map of the Philippine Islands .............. 20

Landing Unoppose d o n Whit e Beach , Mindor o ........... . 5 0

Southern Landing Beach at Lingayen .............. 74

Looking Inland, Eastern Shore of Lingaye n Gulf ......... . 7 5

Dusk, 9 Januar y ................... . . . 8 2

Damortis ............................ . 1 0 6

Troops o n Hil l Overlookin g Damortis-Rosari o Roa d ........ . . 11 0

Manaoag and Hill 200 Complex .................. .113

LST's With Causeways ........... . . 120

Congestion at Blue Beach ............... 125

First Standard Locomotive in Operation ..........131

Medium Tanks Suppor t 158t h RC T .............. . . . 15 3

Watching and Waiting .................... 163

Bamban .......................... 170

Kembu Defens e Are a .................. . 17 2

Cave-Pocked Hill ....................... . . 178

Wrecke

Muño

d Japanes e Tank-Artiller y Colum n ........... . 18 9

z ............................. 194

The Bridges at Calumpit ................. 213

Plaridel Bridge s ......................... . 2 1 4

Tuliahan Bridg e ....................... . .21 9

Airdrop on Tagaytay Ridge ................... 228

Parañaque ........................... . 2 3 1

Central Manil a ................... . 23 8

Japanese Barricad e ................ . 24 7

Liberated Internees at Santo Tomas ................. 251

Northern Manil a ...................... . 25 3

Provisor Island .......................... 262

Rizal Baseball Stadium ...................... . 27 8

xix
Page

Manila Hotel in Ruins .......... . . 281

N e w Polic e Statio n ....................... . 28 4

Rizal Hall ............................ 289

Objective—The Walled Cit y ........... . . . 29 9

Intramuros After th e Battl e .................. . . . 30 1

Legislative Building—Befor e ................... . 30 4

Legislative Building—Afte r .................... . 30 5

XI Corp s Landin g Area , Wester n Luzo n ...............31 4

Visibility Zero , ZigZa g Pass .....................31 6

Airdrop, Topsid e ...................... . . . 34 2

Amphibious Assault, Bottomsid e ............... . . . 34 3

Raising th e Flag , Corregido r ................. . . . 34 9

Caballo Island .......................... 354

Fort Drum .......................... . . 355

Boarding Fort Drum From LSM ................ . . . 35 6

Carabao Under Fire ........... . . 357

Northern Section of Marikina Valley ................. 370

Mts. Pacawagan and Mataba .................... 374

Benchmark 7 ............................ 383

Terrain Defende d b y Kobayashi Force ............... . 39 5

6 t h Divisio n Approac h t o Waw a Da m ............... . 40 1

Approaches to Ipo Dam ................. 406

Ipo Dam ............................. 412

7th Cavalry at Kapatalan Sawmill .............. 419

Lipa After Bombardmen t ................... . . . 43 1

Landing at Port Legaspi ...................... 442

Bontoc ............................. 452

Baguio ............ ................. 455

Villa Verd e Trail Nea r Sa n Nicola s .............. . . . 46 2

Bagabag ............................. 464

Route 1 1 Winding South From Bagui o ............... . 46 9

Galiano Valley Approac h t o Bagui o .............. . . . 47 0

Route 9 Nea r Burgo s ...................... . 47 1

Irisan Gorg e .......................... . 4 8 2

Salacsac Pass No. 2 ........................ 496

Hill 50 4 ............................ . 5 0 0

Villa Verd e Approac h t o Imuga n ............... . . . 51 0

Route 5 Through Balet e Pass ................ . . . 51 9

Neutralizing the Enemy, Norton's Knob ............. 523

Route 5 South o f Sant a F e .................. . 53 7

Upper an d Lowe r Cads u Ridge s ................ . . 55 1

105-mm. Howitze r Firin g a t Extrem e Elevatio n ......... . 55 2

Attackin Bessan g Through Oriun gg Pass Pass ................ ......................... . . 554 . . . 56 4

xx
Page

Kiangan Valley .......................... 576

Terrain in the Last-Stand Area , Asin Valley ................. . 578

Yamashita Comes Out of the Valley ................. 579

Dipolog Airstrip ....................... . . 592

Amphibious Landin g Area , Zamboang a Peninsul a ......... . 59 5

Panay Coasta l Plai n ....................... . 60 4

90-mm. Antiaircraft Gu n Firin g Ground Support ........... . 60 6

Landing at Cebu ....................... 612

Cebu City ........................... 613

LCM Carrying Troops, Mindanao River ............... 625

Route 1 ............................ . 6 2 8

Clearing Enemy From Sayre Highway................ 639

Transporting Howitzer by Cable................. 640

Philippine Guerrilla Scout ................. 657

All pictures in this volume are fro m Departmen t of Defense files .

xxi
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xxii
PART ON E

PLANS AN D PREPARATION S

CHAPTER I

The Debate Over Luzon

The Strategic Background

Pacific Strategy

In January 1945, after mor e than three

years o f war , United State s force s re -

turned t o th e islan d o f Luzo n i n th e

Philippines, wher e i n 194 2 American

troops had suffered a historic defeat. The

loss o f th e Philippine s i n Ma y o f tha t

year, followin g th e disaste r tha t befel l

the U.S . Pacifi c Flee t a t Pear l Harbor ,

had rendere d obsolet e an d inoperabl e

American prewa r plans for action in th e

Pacific i n th e even t o f wa r wit h Japan. 1

By th e lat e spring of 194 3 th e U.S. Joint

Chiefs of Staff (who , by agreement of the

U.S.-British Combine d Chief s o f Staff ,

were responsible for th e conduc t o f th e

war i n th e Pacific ) ha d developed a new

strategic pla n fo r th e defea t o f Japan .

The pla n was neither sacrosanct nor im -

mutable—it wa s no t intende d t o be .

Nevertheless, it s underlyin g concept s

governed th e plannin g and executio n of

operations i n th e Pacifi c durin g a yea r

and a hal f o f debat e ove r th e relativ e

priority o f Luzo n an d Formos a a s primary objective s o f a n Allie d driv e int o

the western Pacific. 2

The pla n wa s premised upo n th e concept tha t th e Allies might very wel l fin d

it necessar y t o invad e Japan i n orde r t o

end th e wa r i n th e Pacific . Th e Join t

Chiefs o f Staf f foresa w tha t intensiv e

aerial bombardmen t o f th e Japanes e

home island s woul d b e prerequisit e t o

invasion, an d tha t suc h bombardmen t

would hav e to be co-ordinated with combined air, surface, an d submarin e operations aimed a t cuttin g Japan's overwater

lines o f communicatio n t o th e ric h territories she had seized in the Netherlands

East Indie s an d southeaster n Asia . Th e

joint Chief s believe d tha t th e Allie s

could best undertake the necessary bombardment of Japan from airfield s i n eastern China , an d the y decide d tha t t o

secure and develop adequate air base s in

China, Allied force s woul d hav e t o seiz e

at leas t on e majo r por t o n th e sout h

China coast . Th e Allie s woul d requir e

such a port t o replace the poor overland

and ai r route s from Indi a and Burm a a s 1

 See Loui s Morton , The Fall of the Philippines

(Washington, 1953), a volume in th e serie s UNITED

STATES ARM Y I N WORL D WA R II , fo r th e

opening phase s of Japan's attac k i n th e Pacifi c an d

a descriptio n of prewar plans with especia l reference

to th e Philippines. Morton' s genera l volum e i n th e

same serie s o n th e Pacifi c theaters , Strategy and

Command: The First Two Years (Washington ,

1962), covers th e prewar plan s in mor e detail.

2

 See JCS 287/1 , 8 Ma y 43 , and JP S 67/4 , 2 9 Apr

43, bot h entitle d Strategi c Pla n fo r th e Defea t o f

Japan, an d associate d paper s i n OP D AB C 38 1

Japan (8-27-42 ) Secs . 1 an d 2 . Se e als o Morton ,

Strategy and Command, passim.
4 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

the principa l means of moving men an d

matériel int o China .

To secur e a port o n th e Chin a coast ,

and simultaneousl y t o cu t Japan's line s

of communication to the south, the Allies

would hav e t o gain contro l of th e Sout h

China Sea . Gainin g thi s control , th e

Joint Chief s realized , woul d i n tur n in -

volve th e seizur e an d developmen t o f

large air , naval, an d logistica l base s i n

the strategic triangle formed by the south

China coast , Formosa , an d Luzon . Bu t

before the y coul d safel y mov e int o thi s

triangle, th e Join t Chief s decided , th e

Allies woul d hav e t o secur e air base s i n

the southern or central Philippines from

which t o neutraliz e Japanes e ai r powe r

on Luzon . Th e Allie s woul d als o nee d

staging bases in th e southern and centra l

Philippines fro m whic h t o moun t am -

phibious attacks against Luzon, Formosa,

and th e Chin a coast .

In accordanc e wit h thes e 194 3 plans.

Allied force s i n th e Pacifi c ha d struc k

westward towar d th e strategi c triangl e

along two axes of advance. Air , ground,

and nava l force s o f th e Southwest Pacifi c

Area, unde r Genera l Dougla s MacAr -

thur, ha d drive n u p th e nort h coas t o f

New Guine a t o Morota i Island , lyin g

between th e northwester n ti p o f Ne w

Guinea an d Mindanao , southernmos t

large islan d o f th e Philippin e archipel -

ago. Simultaneously , Admira l Cheste r

W. Nimitz , commande r o f th e Pacifi c

Ocean Areas , ha d directe d th e force s o f

the Centra l Pacifi c Are a i n a driv e

through th e Gilberts , Marshalls , an d

Marianas to th e Pala u Islands , some 500

miles east o f Mindanao. 3 (Map 1)

The Importance of Formosa

Studying various plans for Allied entry

into th e strategi c triangle , th e Join t

Chiefs an d thei r subordinat e advisor y

committees concluded that Formos a constituted th e mos t importan t singl e ob -

jective i n th e targe t area. 4 Th e islan d

possessed s o man y obviou s advantage s

and wa s locate d i n suc h a strategicall y

important positio n tha t mos t planner s

in Washington believed th e Allies would

have t o seiz e i t n o matte r wha t othe r

operations they conducted in the western

Pacific. Unti l the y seize d Formosa , th e

Allies woul d b e unabl e t o establis h an d

secure a n overwate r suppl y rout e t o

China. Formosa , therefore , seeme d a

necessary steppingston e t o th e Chin a

coast. Moreover , Allie d ai r an d nava l

forces coul d seve r th e Japanes e line s o f

communication t o th e south much more

effectively fro m Formos a tha n fro m

either Luzo n o r th e sout h Chin a coas t

alone. Furthermore , fro m field s i n

northern Formosa , the Army Air Forces'

new B-29 's coul d carr y heavie r bom b

loads against Japan tha n fro m mor e distant Luzon. 5

Many planner s considere d Formos a

such a valuabl e strategi c priz e tha t the y

devoted considerabl e attentio n t o th e

possibility o f bypassin g al l th e Philip -

pines i n favo r o f a direc t assaul t upo n

Formosa. Discussio n o f thi s proposa l

waxed and waned in Washington during

much o f 194 3 an d 194 4 despit e th e fac t

3

 Nimitz' Pacifi c Ocea n Area s include d th e North ,

Central, an d Sout h Pacifi c Areas , o f whic h onl y th e

Central Pacifi c Are a wa s activ e afte r th e sprin g o f

1944.

4

 See th e source s cite d i n not e 1 , above , an d als o

JCS 713, 16 Feb 44, Strategy in th e Pacific ; JCS 713/1,

10 Mar 44, Future Opns in th e Pacific; an d associate d

sources i n OP D AB C 38 4 Pacifi c (1-17-43) . 5

 Northern Formosa , affordin g som e goo d airfiel d

sites, lies 300-odd nautical miles closer to Tokyo than

the bes t airfiel d area s o f norther n Luzon .
Map 1
6 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

that the strategic outline plan for the defeat o f Japa n calle d fo r th e seizur e o f

bases i n th e souther n o r centra l Philip -

pines befor e goin g o n int o th e Luzon -

Formosa-China coas t triangle . Suc h

discussions foun d th e Wa r an d Nav y departments internall y divided . Admira l

Ernest J . King , Commande r i n Chief ,

U.S. Fleet , Chie f o f Nava l Operations ,

and Nav y member of th e Joint Chiefs o f

Staff, wa s a leadin g advocat e o f plan s t o

bypass th e Philippines . O n th e othe r

hand, Admiral Nimitz and othe r ranking

naval commanders in th e Pacifi c favore d

at least reoccupying the southern or cen -

tral Philippine s befor e strikin g o n to -

ward Formosa . Thes e officers believe d it

would be impossible to secure the Allied

line of communications to Formosa until

Allied land-base d aircraft fro m souther n

Philippine base s ha d neutralize d

Japanese air powe r on Luzon. 6

General Georg e C. Marshall , Chie f o f

Staff o f the U.S. Army and Army member

of th e Joint Chiefs, played a relatively inactive part in th e debate until late 1944 ,

but a t one time at least seemed incline d

toward bypassin g bot h th e Philippine s

and Formos a in favor o f a direct invasion

of Kyush u i n souther n Japan. Som e offi -

cers high in Army counsels, including Lt.

Gen. Josep h T . McNarney , th e Deput y

Chief o f Staff , strongl y advocate d bypas -

sing th e Philippine s o n th e wa y to For -

mosa. Genera l Henry H . Arnold , Arm y

Air Force s membe r o f th e Joint Chiefs ,

also appears to have maintained through

much o f 194 3 and 194 4 that i t migh t

prove desirabl e t o bypas s th e Philip -

pines.7 Othe r Arm y planners, including

those o f th e chie f logistician , Lt . Gen .

Brehon B. Somervell, commander o f th e

Army Servic e Forces, favore d takin g th e

entire Philippin e archipelag o befor e

making any move toward Formos a or th e

China coast . I n th e field , Genera l Mac -

Arthur stoo d adaman t against bypassin g

any par t o f th e Philippines , a stan d i n

which h e ha d th e support o f most othe r

ranking Arm y officer s i n th e Pacific. 8

In Marc h 194 4 the Join t Chief s ha d

directed MacArthu r to be ready t o move

into th e southern Philippine s before th e

end o f the yea r and t o mak e plan s to in -

vade Luzo n durin g Februar y 1945 . Simultaneously, the y ha d ordere d Nimit z

to prepar e plan s fo r a n assaul t agains t

Formosa i n Februar y 1945. 9 Thes e di -

rectives, whic h lef t i n abeyanc e th e rela -

tive priorit y o f Luzo n an d Formosa ,

6

 Memo, Kin g fo r Marshall , 8 Fe b 44 , sub :

CINCSWPA Despatc h ( sic) C-121702 Fe b 44 , an d

other documents in OPD ABC 384 Pacific (2 8 Jun 43) ;

JCS Mem o for Info 200 , 7 Mar 44 , sub: Sequence and

Timing o f Opn s CenPa c Campaig n ( a rp t b y Nimitz), an d associate d source s i n OP D AB C 38 4 Pacifi c

(1-17-43) Secs. 3-A an d 4 ; Supplementar y Min , JC S

145th an d 150t h Mtgs , 8 Feb and 7 Mar 44; Min, JCS

151st Mtg , 1 1 Mar 44 ; Min , JP S 125t h Mtg, 2 Feb 44 ;

Rad, Nimitz , to Kin g and MacArthur , 4 Jul 44 , CMIN 2926 .

7

 Memo, Marshal l fo r King , 1 0 Fe b 44 , OP D

ABC 38 4 Pacifi c (2 8 Jun 43) ; Memo, Co l Charle s K ,

Gailey, Jr. (Exec O OPD) , fo r Ma j Gen Thoma s T .

Handy (ACof S OPD), 2 2 Feb 4 4 (reportin g McNarney remarks), an d associate d materials i n OP D AB C

384 Pacifi c (1-17-43 ) Sec . 3-A ; JPS 418/1 , 2 3 Ma r 44, Basi c Decisio n Whic h Wil l Giv e Strategi c Guid -

ance fo r .. . th e Wa r i n th e Pacific , OP D AB C 384

Pacific ( 8 Ma r 44) ; Rad, Marshall t o MacArthur , 23

Jun 44 , CM-OUT 55718 ; Supplementar y Min , JC S

150th Mtg , 7 Mar 44 . 8

 Memo, Somervel l fo r Handy , 1 5 Jul 44 , sub: JCS

924, an d associate d paper s i n OP D AB C 38 4 Pacifi c

(1-17-43) Sec . 3-A ; Rad, MacArthu r t o Marshall ,

C-3302, 2 0 Ju n 43 , CM-I N 13149 ; GH Q SWPA ,

Estimate o f th e Situatio n an d Roug h Draf t REN O

Plan (REN O I), 2 5 Feb 43 , photostat cop y i n OCM H

files; Min , JP S 134th , 157th , an d 159t h Mtgs, 8 Mar,

28 Jun, and 2 6 Jul 44. 9

 JCS 713/ 4 1 2 Mar 44, Future Opns in th e Pacific ,

OPD AB C 384 Pacifi c (1-17-43 ) Sec. 3-A. Se e als o

Robert Ross Smith, The Approach to the Philippines,

UNITED STATE S ARM Y I N WORL D WA R I I

(Washington, 1953), ch. I.
THE DEBAT E OVE R LUZO N 7

ostensibly settled the question of re-entry

into the Philippines, but in mid-June the

Joint Chief s themselve s reopene d th e

question o f bypassin g th e archipelago .

Developments in th e Pacific , Asia , and

Europe betwee n mid-Marc h an d mid -

June 194 4 tende d t o support thos e plan -

ners who wanted to bypass the Philippines.

The U.S . Arm y ha d acquire d ne w

intelligence indicating tha t th e Japanese

were rapidl y reinforcin g thei r bastion s

throughout th e wester n Pacific , includ -

ing Formosa. Thus , the longer the Allies

delayed a n attac k o n Formosa , th e mor e

the operatio n woul d ultimatel y cost .

Army planners suggeste d tha t th e Allie s

might b e abl e t o reac h Formos a durin g

November 194 4 i f th e Join t Chief s im -

mediately decide d t o bypas s th e Philip -

pines. Moreover , th e Join t Chief s wer e

beginning t o fea r a n imminen t collaps e

of Chines e resistance—som e planner s

felt tha t th e onl y wa y t o aver t suc h a n

eventuality would be th e earl y seizure of

Formosa and a port o n th e Chin a coas t

without undertaking intermediary operations i n th e Philippines. 10

 Th e Join t

Chiefs wer e probabl y als o stimulate d b y

the success of th e invasio n o f Normand y

in earl y Jun e an d b y th e impendin g in -

vasion o f th e Mariana s i n th e Centra l

Pacific, se t fo r 1 5 June. A t an y rate , o n

13 June , seekin g way s an d mean s t o

accelerate th e pac e o f operation s i n th e

Pacific, an d feelin g tha t th e tim e migh t

be ripe for acceleration , the Joint Chiefs

asked Admira l Nimit z and Genera l MacArthur t o conside r th e possibilitie s o f

bypassing al l objective s alread y selecte d

in th e wester n Pacific , includin g bot h

the Philippines and Formosa. 11

Neither Nimit z no r MacArthu r gav e

the Join t Chief s an y encouragement .

Both declare d tha t th e nex t majo r ste p

in th e Pacifi c afte r th e advanc e t o th e

Palaus-Morotai line would have to be the

seizure o f ai r base s i n th e souther n o r

central Philippines . Th e Join t Chiefs '

subordinate committees , examinin g th e

theater commanders' replie s an d under -

taking ne w studie s o f thei r own , reaffirmed th e concept tha t th e Allie s would

have to move into the central or southern

Philippines befor e advancin g t o eithe r

Formosa or Luzon. Lik e MacArthur and

Nimitz, th e advisor y bodie s sa w no possibility o f a direc t jum p t o Japan . Th e

Joint Chief s o f Staff , apparentl y wit h

some reluctance, agreed.12

Meeting wit h Presiden t Frankli n D .

Roosevelt a t Pear l Harbo r i n lat e Jul y

1944, bot h MacArthu r and Nimit z again

emphasized tha t MacArthur 's force s

would hav e t o b e firml y establishe d i n

the souther n o r centra l Philippine s be -

fore an y advanc e t o eithe r Formos a o r

Luzon coul d tak e place—o n thi s poin t

almost everyon e was agreed. MacArthu r

then argued persuasivel y that it was both

necessary an d prope r t o tak e Luzon be -

10

 JCS 713/8, 1 3 Jun 44 , Future Opns in th e Pacific ,

OPD AB C 38 4 Formos a (8 Se p 43 ) Sec. 1-C; Rad,

JCS t o MacArthu r an d Nimitz , 1 3 Jun 44 , CM-OUT

50007; Rad, Marshall t o MacArthur, 23 Jun 44 , CMOUT 55718 .

11

 Rad, JCS t o MacArthu r an d Nimitz , 1 3 Jun 44 ,

CM-OUT 50007 . See also Mauric e Matloff , Strategic

Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1944, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington ,

1959), ch.XXI. 12

 Rad, MacArthu r t o Marshall , CX-13891, 1 8 Jun

44, CM-IN 15058 ; Rad, Nimit z t o Kin g an d MacAr -

thur, 4 Jul 44 , CM-IN 2926; Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 2 3 Jun 44 , CM-OUT 55718 ; Min , JPS 157th ,

158th, and 159t h Mtgs , 28 Jun an d 1 2 and 2 1 Jul 44 ;

JPS 404/5 , 2 3 Ju n 44 , Future Opn s i n th e Pacific ,

and relate d papers in OP D AB C 384 Formosa ( 8 Sep

43) Sec . 1- C an d OP D AB C 38 4 Pacifi c (1-17-43 )

Sec. 4 ; se e als o Smith , Approach to the Philippines,

pp. 451-52.
8 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

fore goin g on t o Formosa , whil e Nimit z

expounded a pla n fo r strikin g straigh t

across the western Pacific to Formosa, bypassing Luzon. Apparently , no decisions

on strateg y wer e reache d a t th e Pear l

Harbor conference. 13 Th e Formos a versus Luzon debate continued without letup at the highest planning levels for over

two months , an d eve n th e questio n o f

bypassing th e Philippine s entirel y i n

favor o f a direct mov e on Formos a came

up fo r seriou s discussio n withi n Wash -

ington planning circles again.14 Th e ne t

result o f th e debat e throug h Jul y 194 4

was th e reaffirmatio n o f th e decisio n t o

strike int o th e southern o r centra l Phil -

ippines befor e advancin g t o eithe r For -

mosa o r Luzon . Th e Join t Chief s stil l

had t o decide whether t o seiz e Luzon o r

Formosa, o r both , befor e executin g an y

other majo r attack s against Japan .

Luzon Versus Formosa

The Views Presented

General MacArthu r wa s a most vigorous adheren t o f th e view tha t th e Allie s

would have t o secure Luzon befor e moving an y farthe r towar d Japan . Contrar y

to the views the Joint Chiefs of Staff held,

MacArthur believe d tha t Luzo n wa s a

more valuabl e strategi c priz e tha n For -

mosa. H e declare d tha t th e Allies would

need t o reoccup y th e entir e Philippin e

archipelago before the y could completely

sever Japan's line s o f communication t o

the south. MacArthu r als o believed tha t

an invasio n of Formos a would prove unduly hazardou s unles s h e provide d ai r

and logistica l suppor t fro m Luzon . Fi -

nally, h e suggested , i f th e Allie s too k

Luzon firs t the y coul d the n bypas s Formosa and strike for targets farther north ,

thus hastenin g th e end o f th e war. The

Luzon-first cours e o f action , h e averred ,

would b e th e cheape r i n term s o f time ,

men, an d money. 15

In addition , MacArthu r considere d

that bypassin g par t o f th e Philippine s

would hav e th e "siniste r implication "

of imposin g a foo d blockad e upo n un -

occupied portion s o f th e archipelago .

(MacArthur's argumen t her e would not

have stood u p to o well unde r clos e scrutiny, fo r his own curren t plans called fo r

seizing a foothol d i n southeaster n Min -

danao, jumpin g thenc e t o Leyt e i n th e

east-central Philippines , an d the n goin g

on t o Luzon , initiall y bypassin g most o f

13

 No evidence that strategic decisions were reached

at Pear l Harbo r i s t o b e foun d i n contemporary

sources. Se e Rad , MacArthu r t o Marshall , C-15589 ,

1 Aug 44, CM-IN 496; Memo, King for Marshall and

Arnold, 9 Au g 44 (quotin g parts o f a lette r o n th e

Pearl Harbor Conferenc e fro m Nimit z to King, dated

31 Ju l 44) , OPD AB C 38 4 Pacifi c (1-17-43 ) Sec . 4;

Ltr, L t Ge n Rober t C . Richardson , COMGENPOA ,

to Marshall , 1 Aug 44 , OP D Persona l Fil e o n Ge n

Marshall. Se e Fleet Admira l Willia m D . Leahy ,

I Was There (Ne w York: Whittlese y House , 1950) ,

pp. 247-52 . Leah y participate d i n th e conference ;

Richardson wa s MacArthur' s hos t i n Hawaii .

Some writers stat e tha t a basi c decisio n not t o by -

pass th e Philippine s wa s reached a t Pear l Harbor .

See, fo r example : Lt . Gen . Robert L . Eichelberge r

and Milto n MacKaye . Our Jungle Road to Tokyo

(New York : Th e Vikin g Press , 1950) , pp . 165-66 ;

John Gunther , The Riddle of MacArthur (Ne w

York: Harpe r & Brothers, 1951) , pp. 9-10; Robert E .

Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History (rev . ed.; New York : Harpe r & Brothers, 1950 ),

pp. 809-10. Other s say that a decision t o tak e Luzon

was made by the Presiden t a t Pearl Harbor. See , for

instance, Clar k Le e an d Richar d Henschel , Douglas

MacArthur (Henr y Hol t an d Co ., Inc., 1952) , pp .

170-71. Non e o f th e foregoin g author s participate d

in the conference. 14

 See, fo r example , Min, JPS 160t h Mtg , 2 Aug 44 .

15

 Rad, MacArthur t o Marshall, C-3302, 20 Jun 43 ,

CM-IN 13139 ; Rad , MacArthur t o Marshall , CX -

13891, 1 8 Jun 44 , CM-IN 15058 ; Rad, MacArthur t o

Marshall, (C-15689, 3 Aug 44, CM-IN 2479 ; REN O I,

25 Fe b 43 ; GH Q SWPA , Basi c Outlin e Pla n fo r

MUSKETEER (Philippine ) Opn s (MUSKETEE R I) , 1 0

Jul 44.
THE DEBAT E OVE R LUZO N 9

the larg e island s o f th e Visaya n group ,

the bul k o f Mindanao , an d th e Sul u

Archipelago.16 O f course , the bypassin g

under MacArthur's plans would not have

lasted a s lon g a s woul d hav e bee n th e

case ha d Formosa , rathe r tha n Luzo n

been the target.) MacArthu r had a more

cogent argument , an d on e tha t wa s

bound t o hav e som e influenc e upo n

planning i n Washington . Th e reoccu -

pation of the entire Philippine archipelago as quickly and earl y as possible was,

MacArthur said , a nationa l obligatio n

and political necessity. T o bypas s any or

all the islands, he declared, would destroy

American honor and prestige throughout

the Fa r East , i f no t i n th e res t o f th e

world as well.

Just a s Genera l MacArthu r wa s th e

most vigorou s proponen t o f Luzon , s o

Admiral Kin g wa s th e mos t persisten t

advocate o f th e Formosa-firs t strategy .

King believe d tha t th e seizur e of Luzo n

before Formos a coul d onl y dela y th e

execution o f mor e decisiv e operation s

to th e north . H e als o argue d tha t th e

capture o f Formos a firs t woul d greatl y

facilitate th e subsequen t occupatio n o f

Luzon. Moreover , King pointed out, the

Allies coul d no t secur e an d maintai n a

foothold o n th e Chin a coas t unti l the y

had seize d Formosa . Finally , h e sug -

gested, i f th e Allie s should bypas s Formosa, then the principal objective in the

western Pacifi c shoul d b e Japa n itself ,

not Luzon. 17

MacArthur believe d tha t th e plan s

to bypass Luzon were purely Navyinspired.18

 Actually , th e Wa r an d Nav y

Departments were as internally split during th e Luzo n versu s Formos a debat e a s

they ha d bee n earlie r ove r the questio n

of bypassin g al l th e Philippines . Fo r

example, a t leas t unti l mid-Septembe r

1944 Genera l Marshal l leane d towar d

the Formosa-firs t strateg y an d lik e Ad -

miral Kin g ha d expresse d th e opinio n

that Japa n itself , rathe r tha n Luzon ,

should b e considere d th e substitut e fo r

Formosa. Mos t Arm y member s o f th e

Joint Chiefs ' subordinat e committee s

held simila r views, an d unti l Septembe r

consistently presse d for an earl y decision

in favo r o f Formosa . Arm y Ai r Force s

planners, meanwhile , expresse d thei r

interest i n Formos a a s a sit e fo r B-29

bases.19

Admiral Nimitz , th e rankin g nava l

officer i n the Pacific, went on record until

late September as favoring Formos a first .

However, ther e ar e indication s tha t hi s

staff di d no t enthusiasticall y shar e hi s

views, an d ther e ar e ground s t o believ e

that Nimit z gre w steadil y mor e luke -

warm toward the idea of seizing Formosa.

Nimitz ha d bee n a t varianc e wit h Ad -

miral Kin g on th e question of bypassing

the entire Philippine archipelago, and it

is possibl e tha t hi s suppor t o f th e For -

mosa-first strateg y stemme d a t leas t i n

part from deferenc e t o King 's judgment.

A hint of Nimitz' attitud e is apparent i n

the fac t tha t his staff wa s preparing plans

to seiz e Okinawa , a s a substitut e fo r

16

 MUSKETEER I, 1 0 Jul 44 ; MUSKETEER II, 2 9 Aug 44 ;

MUSKETEER III, 26 Sep 44. 17

 See th e source s cite d i n not e 6 , above , an d als o

JCS 713/10, 4 Sep 44 (mem o from Kin g for th e JCS),

and associate d papers i n OP D ABC 384 Pacifi c (1 -

Se17-43 p 44) Sec . . 5 ; Min , JCS 171st and 172 d Mtg, 1 and 5

18

 Rad, MacArthu r to Marshall, C-15689, 3 Aug 44,

CM-IN 2479. 19

 JPS 414/10 , 2 9 Ju n 44 , Futur e Opn s i n th e

Pacific, an d associate d sources in OPD ABC 384 Formosa ( 8 Sep 43) Sec. 1-C; JCS 713/14, 7 Sep 44, Proposed Directive , an d connecte d material s i n OP D

ABC 38 4 Pacifi c (1-17-43 ) Sec. 5 ; Min , JCS 171st -

173d Mtgs, 1 , 5, and 8 Sep 44; Min, JPS 160th , 162d,

163d, 165th , an d 167t h Mtgs , 2 , 10 , 16 , and 2 8 Aug

and 2 Sep 44.
10 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Formosa, wel l befor e suc h a n operatio n

gained seriou s consideratio n amon g

high-level planners i n Washington. 20

The nex t ranking naval office r i n th e

Pacific, Admira l Willia m F . Halsey ,

commander o f th e Thir d Flee t (an d

until 1 5 June 194 4 commander o f th e

South Pacifi c Are a a s well) , steadfastl y

opposed th e Formosa-firs t plan . H e

wanted t o go t o Luzo n an d bypas s Formosa i n favo r o f seizin g Okinawa . I n

this connectio n Halse y relate s a classi c

story concernin g a discussio n betwee n

his chie f o f staff , Vic e Adm . Robert B .

Carney, an d Admira l King . King , propounding hi s Formos a pla n t o Carney ,

who wa s arguin g i n favo r o f Luzon ,

asked, "D o yo u want t o make a London

out o f Manila? " Carney' s repl y was :

"No, sir, I wan t t o mak e a n Englan d

out o f Luzon." 21

Most o f th e othe r senio r Arm y an d

Navy officer s o n dut y i n th e Pacifi c als o

favored th e Luzon-firs t strateg y an d ad -

vocated bypassin g Formosa . Lt . Gen .

Robert C . Richardson , commandin g

U.S. Arm y Forces , Pacifi c Ocea n Areas ,

strongly advise d agains t Formosa . So ,

too, di d MacArthur' s ai r commander ,

Lt. Gen . Georg e C . Kenney , an d th e

Southwest Pacifi c Area' s nava l com -

mander, Vice Adm. Thomas G, Kinkaid.

But among the Joint Chiefs o f Staf f dur -

ing th e summe r an d earl y fal l o f 194 4

only Admira l Willia m D . Leahy , th e

President's Chie f o f Staff , favore d goin g

to Luzo n instea d o f Formosa , an d thi s

stand represente d a reversa l o f Leahy' s

earlier thinkin g o n th e subject. 22

It is noteworthy that, with the possible

exception o f Nimitz , th e rankin g Army

and Nav y commanders i n th e Pacific —

the me n responsibl e fo r executin g o r

supporting the operation—were opposed

to th e seizur e of Formosa . I n general ,

they favore d a progra m callin g fo r th e

capture of Luzon and a subsequent jump

to Okinawa or Japan. I n th e face of this

opinion o f th e commanders on th e spot,

the consensu s o f mos t high-rankin g

Army an d Nav y planner s i n Washing -

ton—with Leah y and Genera l Somervell

as outstandin g exceptions—wa s tha t th e

Formosa-first cours e of action wa s strategically th e sounde r and , therefore, th e

most desirabl e cours e fo r th e Allie s t o

follow i n th e wester n Pacific .

The Washingto n planners , however ,

had t o giv e carefu l consideratio n t o

many factor s othe r tha n idea l strategy .

Study of these factors brought th e Luzo n

versus Formos a debat e t o a clima x i n

late Septembe r 1944 .

Tactical and Logistical Problems

Perhaps th e mos t influentia l even t

helping t o precipitat e th e clima x wa s

a drasti c chang e i n th e targe t dat e fo r

the initia l invasio n o f th e Philippines .

Until mid-September 1944, General MacArthur's plan s ha d calle d fo r th e firs t

20

 Rads, Nimit z t o King , 1 8 and 2 4 Aug 44, CM-IN

16755 an d CM-I N 22182 ; Rad , Nimit z t o Arnold , 5

Sep 44, CM-IN 4996; Memo , unsigned bu t prepare d

by Co l Willia m L . Ritchi e o f OPD , wh o ha d jus t

returned t o Washingto n afte r talkin g wit h mos t o f

the rankin g Army an d Nav y commanders in th e Pa -

cific, circa 1 5 Aug 44 , sub: Notes for Discussio n With

General Marshall (hereinafte r cite d a s Ritchie Notes

for Marshall) , an d relate d source s i n OP D 38 4 Pa -

cific (1-17-43 ) Sec . 5 ; Flee t Admira l Willia m F .

Halsey and Lt. Comdr J. Bryan, III, Admiral Halsey's

Story (Ne w York: Whittlese y House , McGraw-Hil l

Book Co., 1947), p. 195. 21

 Halsey an d Bryan , Halsey's Story, p. 195 .

22

 Ritchie Note s fo r Marshall ; Georg e C. Kenney ,

General Kenney Reports, A Personal History of the

Pacific War (Ne w York: Duell , Sloa n an d Pearce ,

1949), p . 371 ; Leahy , I Was There, p . 259 ; Rad,

Richardson to Marshall, R-28617, 22 Aug 44, CM-IN

19958.
THE DEBAT E OVE R LUZO N 11

entry int o th e Philippine s t o tak e plac e

in southeastern Mindanao on 1 5 November, whil e th e majo r assaul t int o th e

archipelago woul d occu r a t Leyt e o n

20 December . O n 1 5 September , wit h

the approva l o f th e Joint Chiefs o f Staff ,

MacArthur cancele d preliminar y Min -

danao operation s i n favo r o f a direc t

jump fro m th e Palaus-Morota i lin e t o

Leyte o n 2 0 October. 23

Soon afte r thi s chang e o f schedule ,

MacArthur informe d th e Join t Chief s

that h e coul d pus h o n fro m Leyt e t o

Luzon o n 2 0 December , tw o month s

earlier tha n th e dat e currentl y unde r

consideration fo r a n invasio n o f eithe r

Luzon o r Formosa . Thi s ne w plan ,

MacArthur suggested , woul d permi t th e

Allies t o execut e the Formos a operatio n

on th e dat e alread y selected , but , he

reiterated, th e prio r seizur e o f Luzo n

would render unnecessary the occupation

of Formosa. 24

MacArthur's ne w schedul e containe d

much t o recommen d i t t o th e Join t

Chiefs of Staff. Hi s proposed sequence of

operations—Leyte on 2 0 October, Luzon

on 2 0 December, and Formosa , possibly ,

on 2 0 February 1945—woul d permit the

Allies to maintain steady pressure against

the Japanese. O n th e other hand, should

the Allie s dro p Luzo n ou t o f th e se -

quence, th e Japanes e would hav e ampl e

time t o realig n thei r defense s durin g

the interva l betwee n th e Leyt e an d Formosa operations. Moreover , eliminatin g

Luzon coul d i n n o wa y accelerat e th e

advance t o Formos a — logistical prob -

lems woul d mak e i t impossibl e fo r th e

Allies t o moun t a n assaul t agains t For -

mosa unde r an y circumstance s befor e

late Februar y 1945 .

While MacArthur' s proposal s wer e

gaining some favor i n Washington , espe -

cially amon g Arm y planners , Nimitz '

proposals fo r advancin g t o Formos a an d

the sout h Chin a coas t wer e losin g

ground.25 Plan s develope d i n Washing -

ton ha d lon g called fo r th e seizur e of all

Formosa, afte r whic h amphibiou s force s

would strik e o n westwar d t o secur e a

port on th e mainland. Bu t Nimitz' latest

plans provided fo r simultaneous assaults

in souther n Formos a an d i n th e Amo y

area o f th e Chin a coast . Nimit z pro -

posed t o occup y th e bul k o f Formos a

only i f such a ste p prove d necessar y an d

feasible afte r h e ha d establishe d a fir m

bridgehead a t Amoy .

Army planner s quickl y decide d tha t

Nimitz' ne w plan s possessed major draw -

backs. Th e Japanes e woul d hardl y al -

low Allie d force s t o si t unmoleste d i n

southern Formosa . Instead , th e Japa -

nese would mount strong counterattacks

from norther n Formos a wit h troop s al -

ready o n th e islan d an d wit h reinforce -

ments staged i n fro m China . Occupyin g

and defendin g on e beachhea d o n south -

ern Formos a and another at Amoy would

involve problems far differen t from thos e

the Allie s ha d encountere d previousl y

in th e Pacific . S o fa r durin g th e war ,

the Japanes e ha d usuall y bee n har d pu t

to mov e ai r an d groun d reinforcement s

23

 For th e events leading up t o this change in plans,

see M . Hamli n Cannon , Leyte: The Return to the

Philippines, UNITE D STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR I I (Washington , 1954) , ch . I. 24

 Rad, MacArthur t o Marshall, C-18103, 21 Sep 44,

CM-IN 19803 .

25

 The discussio n of tactical and logistical problems

in th e remainder of this subsection is based generally

upon: Min , JPS 162d , 165th, and 167t h Mtgs, 10 and

28 Au g an d 2 Sep 44 ; OPD , Draf t Appreciatio n o f a

Plan o f Campaign , circ a 1 Se p 44 , an d associate d

sources i n OP D 38 1 Strateg y Se c Papers ( 4 Se p 44);

Memo, Hand y fo r Marshall , circ a 5 Se p 44 , sub:

Opns in th e Wester n Pacific , an d relate d documents

in OP D AB C 384 Pacifi c (1-17-43 ) Sec. 5; Min, JCS

171st an d 172 d Mtgs, 1 and 5 Se p 44 .
12 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

against th e islan d perimeters Allied am -

phibious tas k force s ha d seized . I n th e

southern Formosa-Amo y area , o n th e

other hand , th e Allie s woul d no t hav e

the protectio n o f distanc e fro m majo r

Japanese base s the y ha d enjoye d i n earlier campaigns. Th e Allie s did not hav e

sufficient aircraf t i n th e Pacifi c t o continually neutraliz e al l existin g Japanes e

airfields withi n rang e o f souther n For -

mosa an d Amoy . I n addition , experi -

ence i n th e Pacifi c ha d demonstrate d

that Allie d ai r an d nava l force s coul d

not b e expecte d t o forestal l al l Japanese

efforts t o mov e stron g reinforcement s

across th e narro w strai t betwee n Chin a

and Formosa .

Having considered these factors, Army

planners swun g t o th e opinio n tha t

a souther n Formosa-Amo y operatio n

would b e impracticable . The y believe d

that i t woul d inevitabl y lea d t o pro -

tracted, costl y campaign s t o secur e al l

Formosa an d larg e area s o f th e adjacen t

China mainlan d a s well . Majo r groun d

campaigns of such scope could only delay

progress toward Japa n an d woul d prov e

an unacceptabl e drai n upo n Allie d

manpower resources .

Further study of the manpower needed

for th e souther n Formosa-Amo y oper -

ation reveale d additiona l difficulties .

Army intelligenc e estimate s o f Japanes e

strength i n th e Formosa-Amo y region ,

for example , wer e fa r highe r tha n thos e

Nimitz' staf f ha d produced . Arm y plan -

ners therefore believe d that the southern

Formosa-Amoy campaign would require

many mor e comba t unit s tha n Nimit z

was plannin g t o employ . Furthermore ,

according to various estimates made during September, Nimit z would lac k fro m

77,000 t o 200,00 0 o f th e servic e troop s

needed fo r th e campaig n h e proposed .

Planners studie d a numbe r o f suggestions fo r securin g th e necessar y servic e

forces. On e thought , originatin g wit h

the Navy , whic h wa s seekin g way s t o

accelerate th e Formos a targe t date , proposed takin g servic e unit s fro m th e

Southwest Pacific Area. Bu t MacArthur's

command wa s alread y shor t o f servic e

troops. T o remov e an y fro m hi s are a

might jeopardize the success of the Leyte

operation an d woul d certainl y immobi -

lize his force s i n th e centra l Philippine s

until lon g afte r Nimit z ha d secure d th e

southern Formosa-Amo y region . Al -

though the southern Formosa—Amoy and

Luzon operation s woul d eac h requir e

about th e sam e numbe r o f U.S . combat

troops i n th e assaul t phase , MacArthu r

could coun t upo n hundred s o f thou -

sands of loya l Filipinos t o augment bot h

his servic e an d hi s comba t strength .

No simila r sourc e of friendly manpowe r

would b e available on Formosa .

By mid-September 194 4 s o fe w service

units were available in th e United States

that th e onl y wa y Army planners coul d

see t o solv e th e servic e troo p shortag e

for Nimitz ' propose d operatio n wa s t o

await redeployment from Europe . Arm y

planners an d th e Join t Logisti c Com -

mittee both estimate d tha t Nimitz could

launch th e souther n Formosa-Amo y

campaign eve n a s earl y as 1 March 194 5

only i f th e wa r i n Europ e ende d b y

1 Novembe r 1944 , thereby permittin g

timely redeploymen t o f servic e unit s t o

the Pacific . An d eve n if th e Allie s could

effect suc h a n earl y redeploymen t fro m

Europe, logistica l planners still fel t tha t

Nimitz would be unable to move against

Formosa b y 1 Marc h 194 5 unles s th e

Joint Chiefs of Staff immediatel y decided

to cancel th e Luzo n operation , thus providing for an expeditiou s and unbroke n
THE DEBAT E OVE R LUZO N 13

build-up o f th e resource s require d t o

execute Nimitz' campaign. O n the other

hand, th e logistica l expert s wer e con -

vinced, MacArthur could move to Luzon

before th e en d o f 194 4 regardless o f de -

velopments i n Europe . Arm y planners ,

not a s optimistic a s they ha d bee n a few

months earlie r abou t a n earl y en d t o

the wa r i n Europe , pointe d ou t tha t i t

would be illogica l to schedule the southern Formosa-Amoy operation on the presumption o f a Germa n collaps e b y 1

November 1944 . Event s wer e t o prov e

this argumen t sound .

Army planner s sa w othe r combine d

logistical-tactical disadvantage s i n Nim -

itz' plan . The y believed , fo r instance ,

that th e campaig n woul d ti e dow n s o

many troops , ships , landin g craft , an d

planes that an invasio n of Luzon, assuming Formos a cam e first , coul d no t tak e

place until November 1945 . By the same

token an y othe r majo r ste p towar d

Japan, suc h a s th e seizur e o f Okinawa ,

would b e equall y delayed . A hiatu s of

this lengt h woul d b e unacceptabl e fo r

tactical reason s alone . I n addition , th e

Luzon-first course , i t appeared , woul d

be fa r safer logisticall y than the southern

Formosa-Amoy undertaking . A s Army

Service Force s planners pointed out, the

Allied line s of communication t o Luzo n

would b e shorte r an d easie r t o protec t

than thos e t o Formosa. Th e logisticians

predicted tha t th e Allie s woul d fin d i t

especially difficul t t o safeguar d th e line s

of communicatio n t o Formos a i f Luzo n

remained i n Japanes e hands.

Other aspects of the logistical problems

attained disturbin g overtones . Admira l

Leahy, fo r example , believe d tha t al -

though th e Formosa-first cours e of action

might ultimatel y haste n th e en d o f th e

war in th e Pacific , th e captur e of Luzon

and th e bypassin g o f Formos a woul d

prove fa r cheape r i n term s o f live s an d

other resources . B y mid-Septembe r he ,

as wel l a s mos t Arm y planners , wer e

favoring wha t promise d t o b e the longer

course a t th e lesse r cost . Genera l Mac -

Arthur, meanwhile , expresse d th e opin -

ion tha t the Formosa-first strategy would

cost no t onl y mor e live s bu t als o mor e

time. H e wa s prepared t o guarante e t o

the Join t Chief s tha t h e coul d secur e

the most strategically important area s of

Luzon—the Centra l Plains-Manil a Ba y

region—within fou r t o si x week s afte r

initial landings on the island .

General Marshal l als o bega n t o sho w

misgivings about the cost of the southern

Formosa-Amoy operatio n vis-à-vi s

Luzon, although h e remained convinced

that the Formosa-first course was strategically the more desirable. Admira l Nimitz

expressed no strong opinion o n the relative cost of the two campaigns, but, "backing" int o th e problem , state d tha t th e

occupation of Luzon afte r Formos a need

not dela y th e pac e o f th e wa r i n th e

Pacific. I f Formos a cam e first , Nimit z

pointed out, MacArthur's task on Luzo n

would b e considerabl y ease d and , pre -

sumably, les s costly . Admira l King , o n

the othe r hand , declare d himsel f con -

vinced tha t th e Formosa-firs t cours e

would sav e tim e and , therefore , reduc e

casualties ove r th e lon g run . B y lat e

September 194 4 King alon e amon g th e

high-level planner s seem s t o hav e

retained a strong conviction alon g thes e

lines.

While the discussions over tactical and

logistical problem s continue d i n Wash -

ington, the Allied positio n in China had

been steadil y deteriorating . I n mid -

September Lt . Gen . Josep h W . Stilwell,

commanding U.S. Army force s in China,
14 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Burma, an d Indi a an d Allie d Chie f o f

Staff t o Generalissim o Chian g Kai-shek ,

reported t o th e Join t Chief s tha t Japa -

nese offensive s i n easter n an d southeast -

ern Chin a wer e overrunning the last air

bases fro m whic h th e China-base d U.S .

Fourteenth Ai r Forc e coul d effectivel y

support invasion s o f eithe r Luzo n o r

Formosa. Chiang 's armies were unable to

either hold o r recaptur e th e ai r bases. 26

This news had an obvious impact upon

the thinking of both th e ground and th e

air planners i n Washington . Th e Arm y

Air Forces had intended t o expand their

airfields i n easter n Chin a a s stagin g

bases fo r B-29's flyin g agains t targets i n

Japan, Korea , Manchuria , and Formosa ,

and t o bas e o n thes e field s muc h o f th e

tactical bombardmen t precedin g th e ac -

tual invasio n o f Japan. Th e eas t Chin a

fields no w appeare d irretrievabl y lost ,

and th e Allies could not affor d t o expend

the manpowe r necessar y t o retak e an d

hold them. Th e nee d for the seizure and

development o f a por t o n th e Chin a

coast was therefore deprive d of muc h of

its urgenc y sinc e th e Allie s ha d neede d

such a por t primaril y t o ope n a goo d

supply route into China for the development o f ai r bases . B y th e sam e token ,

one o f th e principa l reason s fo r seizin g

Formosa—to secur e a steppingston e t o

the Chin a coast—becam e muc h les s

compelling.

This lin e o f thinkin g force d nava l

planners t o reconside r th e souther n

Formosa-Amoy plan . T o mos t Nav y

planners a mov e t o Formos a withou t

the concomitan t seizur e o f a mainlan d

port woul d prov e unsound , becaus e

Formosa lacked the anchorages and ports

required for the large fleet an d logistica l

bases th e Allie s neede d i n th e wester n

Pacific. Inevitabl y th e questio n arose :

If i t were no longer feasible o r desirable

to seize and develo p a port on th e south

China coast , wa s it feasibl e o r desirabl e

to occup y an y par t o f Formosa ? Sinc e

early Septembe r 194 4 Arm y planner s

had bee n answerin g tha t questio n wit h

an emphati c "No." 27

The los s of existin g and potentia l ai r

base sites in eastern China, together with

the limitations inherent in Nimitz ' plan s

to occup y onl y souther n Formosa ,

weighed heavil y wit h Arm y Ai r Force s

planners. Ther e wa s n o questio n bu t

that B-29' s coul d operat e mor e effec -

tively against Japan fro m norther n For -

mosa tha n the y coul d fro m norther n

Luzon, th e Marian a Islands , o r wester n

China, but the big bombers could accomplish littl e more from souther n Formos a

than the y coul d fro m th e othe r bas e

areas. Indeed , Saipa n an d Tinia n i n

the Mariana s la y close r t o Toky o tha n

Nimitz' propose d bas e are a i n souther n

Formosa, an d th e tw o island s o f th e

Marianas would be far more secure from

Japanese ai r attacks . Eve n norther n

Luzon, som e 20 0 mile s furthe r fro m

Tokyo than southern Formosa, had some

advantages ove r souther n Formos a — it

had mor e roo m fo r B-2 9 field s an d

would b e safe r fro m ai r attack . Finally ,

assuming tha t Nimit z coul d mee t th e

most optimisti c targe t dat e fo r the inva -

sion o f souther n Formos a — 1 Marc h

26

 Rad, Stilwel l t o Marshal l an d MacArthur ,

CFBX-22674, 1 6 Se p 44 , CM-I N 15768 . Se e also ,

Charles F. Romanus and Rile y Sunderland, Stilwell's

Command Problems, UNITED STATES ARM Y I N

WORLD WA R I I (Washington , 1955) .

27

 Memo, Hul l fo r Handy , 2 Se p 44 , sub : Pacifi c

Strategy, an d OPD , Draf t Appreciatio n o f a Pla n o f

Campaign, circ a 1 Se p 44 , both , wit h associate d

sources, i n OP D AB C 384 Pacifi c (1-17-43 ) Sec . 5 ;

Min, JC S 172 d Mtg , 5 Sep 44.
THE DEBAT E OVE R LUZO N 15

1945—B-29's could not begin operations

from tha t islan d until the late spring or

early summer. Th e Arm y Air Forces was

already plannin g to initiate B-2 9 opera -

tions from th e Mariana s before th e en d

of 1944 . In brief , b y mid-September the

Army Ai r Force s ha d los t interes t i n

Formosa and had begun to see eye to eye

with othe r Army elements on th e disad -

vantages and drawback s of th e southern

Formosa-Amoy scheme .

An obviou s politica l consideratio n

may have had a bearing on th e ultimat e

decision i n th e Luzo n versu s Formos a

debate. Genera l MacArthur's argument

that i t woul d b e disastrou s t o Unite d

States prestig e t o bypass any part o f the

Philippines could not be dismissed. Per -

haps mor e important , Admira l Leah y

took th e same point o f view. B y virtue

of hi s intimat e contac t wit h Presiden t

Roosevelt, i t mus t b e presume d tha t

his colleague s o f th e Join t Chief s o f

Staff gav e Leahy 's opinio n carefu l

consideration.

Decision

Whatever th e politica l implication s

involved, th e Join t Chief s decide d th e

Formosa versu s Luzo n questio n primar -

ily upon its military merits. B y the en d

of Septembe r 194 4 almost al l th e mili -

tary consideration s — especially th e

closely interrelate d logistica l problem s

concerning troop s an d timing—ha d

weighted th e scale s heavil y i n favo r o f

seizing Luzon , bypassin g Formosa , for -

getting about a port on th e China coast,

and jumpin g o n t o Okinawa . Admira l

King wa s the onl y membe r o f th e Joint

Chiefs of Staff, i f not th e onl y prominent

military figur e a s well , wh o stil l main -

tained a strong stand i n favo r o f bypassing Luzo n an d executin g th e souther n

Formosa-Amoy operation .

Realizing that the military and political factors had undermined his position,

King too k a new, negative tac k i n th e

debate by raising objections to the Luzon

operation pe r se . H e argue d tha t th e

Luzon campaig n a s MacArthu r ha d

planned i t woul d ti e u p al l th e Pacifi c

Fleet's fast carrier task force s for at least

six week s fo r th e purpose s o f protecting

the Luzo n beachhea d an d Luzon-boun d

convoys an d neutralizin g Japanes e

air powe r o n bot h Luzo n an d Formosa .

To pi n dow n th e carrier s fo r s o lon g

would b e unsound , Kin g averred , an d

he therefor e declare d MacArthur' s pla n

unacceptable to the U.S. Navy.28

Alerted b y hi s deput y chie f o f staf f

(Maj. Gen . Richar d J . Marshall , the n

in Washingto n o n officia l business) ,

General MacArthu r wa s able to provid e

Army planner s wit h ammunitio n t o

counter King' s last-ditc h arguments. 29

MacArthur informe d th e Join t Chief s

that hi s onl y requiremen t fo r carriers

after th e initia l assault o n Luzo n would

be fo r a small group of escort carriers to

remain of f th e islan d fo r a fe w day s t o

provide suppor t fo r groun d operation s

until hi s engineer s coul d read y a fiel d

for land-base d plane s a t th e invasio n

beaches. MacArthu r continued by pointing out that only the first assaul t convoys

28

 Memo, Kin g fo r Marshall , 2 3 Sep 44 , OPD AB C

384 Pacifi c (1-17-43 ) Sec. 5 . 29

 Rads, R . J. Marshal l t o MacArthur , 2 6 Se p 44 ,

CM-OUT's 3700 0 an d 37001 . Th e firs t radi o in -

formed MacArthu r o f th e natur e o f King' s argu -

ments, told MacArthu r wha t Arm y planners neede d

to counte r King' s objections , an d cautione d Mac -

Arthur t o mak e n o referenc e t o th e firs t radi o i n

replying t o th e second . Th e secon d radio , signed b y

R. J . Marshall , wa s actuall y a forma l reques t fo r

information sen t b y th e Joint Chiefs o f Staff t o Mac -

Arthur.
16 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

would b e route d throug h dangerou s

waters north o f Luzo n and consequentl y

require protectio n fro m th e fas t carrie r

task forces. Resuppl y and reinforcemen t

convoys would come through the central

Philippines under a n umbrell a o f land -

based aircraf t fro m th e islan d o f Min -

doro, sout h o f Luzon , an d woul d nee d

no carrier-base d ai r cover . Thus , MacArthur declared, he would have no longterm requiremen t fo r th e fas t carrie r

task forces , whic h h e coul d quickl y re -

lease so tha t Nimit z coul d emplo y the m

elsewhere. MacArthu r conclude d wit h

the counterargumen t tha t th e fas t car -

riers woul d b e tie d dow n t o a specifi c

area muc h longe r durin g th e propose d

southern Formosa-Amo y operation ,

especially i f Luzo n remaine d i n Japa -

nese hands , tha n woul d b e th e cas e fo r

the Luzo n invasion. 30

This exchange took muc h o f the wind

out of King's sails. Next , Admiral Nimitz

withdrew whateve r suppor t h e wa s still

giving the Formosa plan, for he had concluded tha t sufficien t troop s coul d no t

be mad e availabl e fo r hi m t o execut e

the souther n Formosa-Amo y campaig n

within th e foreseeabl e future . Accord -

ingly, at th e end o f September, he threw

the weigh t o f hi s opinio n behin d th e

Luzon operation , proposin g tha t plan s

to seiz e Formos a b e a t least temporaril y

dropped. Simultaneously , Nimit z pre -

sented for King's consideration a planned

series of operations designed t o maintain

steady pressur e against the Japanese and

carry Allie d force s speedil y o n towar d

Japan: MacArthur' s force s woul d initi -

ate the Luzon campaign on 20 December

1944; Centra l Pacifi c force s woul d mov e

against Iwo Jima, in th e Volcano Islands

some 65 0 mile s sout h o f Tokyo , lat e i n

January 1945 ; and th e Centra l Pacifi c

would nex t attac k Okinawa , 85 0 mile s

southwest o f Tokyo , an d othe r target s

in th e Ryuky u Islands , beginnin g o n

1 Marc h 1945. 31

King accepte d Nimitz ' recommenda -

tions, wit h on e las t reservation . Kin g

felt tha t th e hazard s involved i n routin g

the Luzon assault convoys into the waters

between Luzo n an d Formos a wer e s o

great that approval for such action should

come directl y fro m th e Join t Chief s o f

Staff. H e raise d simila r objection s t o

plans fo r havin g th e Pacifi c Fleet' s fas t

carrier tas k force s operat e i n th e sam e

restricted waters. Th e othe r thre e mem -

bers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however,

agreed t o leav e th e decisio n o n thes e

problems u p t o Nimit z an d MacArthur ,

a settlement tha t Kin g finally accepted. 32

After King' s eleventh-hou r chang e o f

position, th e Join t Chief s wer e abl e t o

attain th e unanimit y tha t thei r majo r

strategic decisions required. O n 3 October 194 4 they directe d Genera l MacArthur t o launc h th e invasio n o f Luzo n

on o r about 20 December and instructe d

Admiral Nimit z to execute the Iwo Jima

and Okinaw a operations on th e dates he

had proposed . Nimit z woul d provid e

naval cove r an d support , includin g fas t

and escor t carriers , fo r th e invasio n o f

Luzon; MacArthu r woul d provid e

Nimitz wit h a s muc h ai r suppor t a s h e

30

 Rad, MacArthu r to Marshall, C-18496, 28 Sep 44,

CM-IN 26358.

31

 Conf Notes , Rea r Ad m Forres t P . Sherma n

(Nimitz' plannin g chief) an d Rea r Ad m Charle s M .

Cooke (King' s deputy chie f o f staff) , 2 7 Sep 44 , OPD

Exec Files 17 , Binder 3 ; JCS 713/18 , 2 Oct 44 , Future

Opns i n th e Pacifi c ( a mem o b y Kin g t o th e JCS) ,

OPD 38 4 Pacifi c (1-17-43 ) Sec. 5. Nimit z personall y

presented hi s views t o Kin g a t a secre t conferenc e i n

San Francisc o ove r th e weeken d o f 2 9 September1 Octobe r 1944 . 32

 JCS 713/18 , 2 Oc t 44 ; Rad, JCS t o MacArthur ,

Nimitz, and Stilwell , 3 Oct 44 , CM-OUT 40782.
THE DEBAT E OVE R LUZO N 17

could fro m Luzo n fo r th e attac k o n

Okinawa. Th e tw o commanders woul d

co-ordinate thei r plan s wit h thos e o f

B-29 units in th e Pacifi c an d Indi a an d

with th e plan s o f Genera l Stilwel l an d

the Fourteent h Air Forc e in China. 33

The Join t Chief s o f Staf f di d no t

formally cance l th e Formos a operation .

Instead, the y lef t i n abeyanc e a fina l

decision o n th e seizur e o f tha t island ,

but thereafte r th e occupation of Formosa

as an operatio n o f World Wa r I I neve r

came up fo r serious consideration a t th e

higher level s o f Washingto n plannin g

councils.

The Join t Chief s ha d no t reache d

their decisio n t o tak e Luzon , bypas s

Formosa, and , i n effect , substitut e Oki -

nawa fo r Formosa , eithe r lightl y o r

easily. Fro m the beginning of the Luzon

versus Formos a debat e the y ha d be -

lieved the seizure of Formos a and a port

on th e sout h Chin a coast , bypassin g

Luzon, t o be th e best strateg y th e Allies

could follo w i n th e wester n Pacific . I n

the end , however, th e Join t Chief s ha d

had t o face th e facts tha t the Allies could

not assembl e th e resource s require d t o

execute tha t strategy , a t least unti l afte r

the en d o f th e wa r i n Europe , an d the y

could not seriously consider delaying the

progress o f th e wa r i n th e Pacifi c unti l

Germany collapsed . I n th e las t analysi s

then, logistica l consideration s alon e

would have forced th e Joint Chiefs to the

decision the y reached i n favo r o f Luzon ,

although othe r militar y realities , an d

possibly political factors as well, had some

influence upo n th e outcom e o f strategi c

planning fo r operation s i n th e wester n

Pacific.

For th e Allie d force s o f th e Pacifi c

theaters, th e Join t Chiefs ' directiv e o f

3 Octobe r 194 4 ended month s o f uncertainty. Th e di e wa s cast. Luzo n woul d

be taken ; Formos a woul d b e bypassed .

United States forces would recapture the

entire Philippin e archipelag o i n a con -

secutive serie s o f advances , just a s Gen -

eral MacArthu r had been plannin g ever

since h e ha d lef t Corregido r i n Marc h

1942.

33

 Ibid. Th e B-29's operated unde r th e direct control o f th e JCS , with Genera l Arnol d actin g a s th e

executive agen t o f th e JCS.
CHAPTER I I

The Pla n for Invasion

The Concept

Until Septembe r 194 4 General Mac -

Arthur's plan s fo r th e reconquest o f th e

Philippines, thoug h change d ofte n i n

detail durin g th e wear y month s sinc e

March 1942 , all calle d fo r a campaig n

divided int o fou r phases . Firs t woul d

come seizur e o f a foothol d i n th e south -

ern Philippines , o n southeaster n Min -

danao, i n orde r t o establis h air base s for

the suppor t o f th e secon d phase . (See

map, p. 20.) This would b e a move into

the centra l Philippine s a t Leyte , wher e

MacArthur would develop major air and

supply base s fro m whic h t o stag e an d

support the advance to Luzon. Afte r th e

third-phase operation s o n Luzo n ha d

proceeded t o th e poin t a t whic h neces -

sary planes , ships , troops , an d supplie s

could b e released , fourth-phas e attack s

would begi n fo r th e recaptur e o f thos e

islands i n th e souther n Philippine s tha t

had bee n bypassed during the firs t thre e

phases.1

MacArthur eliminate d th e first-phas e

operations when, in mid-September 1944,

the changin g situatio n i n th e wester n

Pacific mad e it possibl e for him t o mov e

directly t o Leyte , bypassin g Mindanao .

The ne w three-phas e campaig n bega n

with landing s o n smal l island s i n Leyt e

Gulf o n 1 7 October. 2 (S ee Map 1.)

Three day s late r th e U.S . Sixth Army ,

Lt. Gen . Walte r Kruege r i n command ,

sent th e X an d XXI V Corp s ashor e o n

the mainland . Th e res t o f MacArthur's

plan remaine d essentiall y unchanged .

Luzon would come next, to be followed,

when th e mean s becam e available , b y

the occupation o f th e bypasse d southern

islands. Som e o f th e operation s i n th e

southern island s were designed no t onl y

to liberat e Filipino s bu t als o t o secur e

base site s fro m whic h t o launc h attack s

on Britis h Borne o and th e Netherland s

East Indies. 3

From th e first , Genera l MacArthur 's

plans fo r th e invasio n o f Luzo n calle d

for th e mai n effor t t o b e mad e a t Lin -

gayen Gulf , o n th e west-centra l shor e of

the island . Th e choic e wa s practicall y

inevitable, for Lingayen Gulf, wher e the

Japanese had made their major landing s

in 1941, 4 provide s direc t acces s t o th e 1

 The concep t of the four-phase plan fo r the reconquest o f th e Philippines , togethe r wit h th e timin g

and selectio n o f targets , is t o b e foun d i n a serie s o f

plans covering th e conduc t o f th e wa r i n th e South -

west Pacifi c produce d a t MacArthur' s headquarter s

from REN O I of 2 5 February 194 3 throug h MUSKETEE R

II o f 2 9 August 1944 , copie s to b e foun d i n OP D file s

and préci s i n collectio n o f GH Q SWP A Historica l

Record Inde x Cards, in OCM H files .

2

 For details of th e change in pla n an d o f the Leyte

landings, see Cannon , Leyte, chs. I and IV. 3

 MUSKETEE R III , 2 6 Se p 44 . Fo r th e plannin g o f

specific operation s i n th e souther n Philippine s an d

the Indies , se e below , ch . XXX. 4

 Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, page s 51-61,

123-38, describes the Japanese landing s of 1941 .
THE PLA N FO R INVASIO N 19

most importan t militar y objectiv e o n

Luzon, th e Centra l Plains-Manil a Ba y

region, and boast s the best and most ex -

tensive stretches of good landing beaches

on th e island . Althoug h Lingaye n Gul f

itself i s something o f a defile , bein g less

than twent y miles across at its narrowest

point, al l othe r approache s t o th e vita l

Central Plains-Manil a Ba y are a lea d

through stil l wors e defiles—easil y defen -

sible isthmuse s an d tortuou s mountai n

passes, coasta l strip s flanke d b y th e se a

on one side and mountains on the other,

and narrowe r wate r approache s suc h a s

the 12-mile-wid e entrance to Manila Bay.

Lingayen Gul f give s direc t acces s t o

Luzon's bes t railroa d an d highwa y network, runnin g sout h throug h th e Cen -

tral Plain s 12 0 miles to Manila . Finally ,

the regio n inlan d fro m th e gulfs south -

ern shores—althoug h not th e immediate

beach area—provide s ampl e maneuve r

room fo r larg e militar y forces . Simila r

space canno t b e foun d elsewher e o n

Luzon except at Aparri, 17 5 miles northeast of Lingaye n Gul f o n Luzon' s northern shor e a t th e en d o f th e Cagaya n

Valley. Th e souther n end of the Cagayan

Valley is separated from th e northeastern

corner o f th e Centra l Plain s b y fift y

miles o f rugged , mountainou s terrain .

General MacArthu r directe d Genera l

Krueger's Sixth Army , supported b y the

Allied Ai r Force s an d Allie d Nava l

Forces, Southwes t Pacifi c Area , t o seiz e

and secur e a beachhea d o n Lingaye n

Gulf an d the n driv e sout h throug h th e

Central Plain s i n orde r t o tak e Manil a

and ope n Manil a Bay . Operations t o

complete the occupation of Luzon would

follow th e execution of the Sixth Army's

initial missions , bu t plan s fo r th e late r

maneuvers MacArthu r lef t fo r futur e

determination. Ai r an d logistica l base s

for th e support of subsequent operations

against Japa n woul d b e constructe d o n

Luzon, an d th e lawfu l governmen t o f

the Philippine Commonwealth would be

re-established i n its capital city, Manila.5

The politica l implication s o f th e las t

section o f MacArthur 's directiv e coul d

hardly hav e bee n los t o n th e planners ,

who realize d tha t th e Luzo n Campaig n

was no t t o b e undertake n fo r purel y

military reasons . Th e politica l objec -

tives o f th e campaign , a s wel l a s th e

American appetenc y t o aveng e o n th e

ground th e defea t o f 1941-4 2 undoubt -

edly influenced plannin g and woul d just

as surel y influenc e th e conduc t o f

operations.

General MacArthu r mad e tentativ e

plans fo r a numbe r o f subsidiar y opera -

tions along Luzon's extensiv e coast line ,

many o f the m schedule d fo r executio n

at points where the Japanese had lande d

in 1941 . MacArthur's planners designed

the secondar y attack s bot h t o provid e

support fo r th e mai n effor t a t Lingaye n

Gulf an d t o kee p th e Japanes e of f balance. Th e operation s would tak e plac e

either before or after th e Lingayen assault

as th e occasio n demande d an d i f thei r

execution proved necessary and feasible. 6

All o f them , i n compariso n wit h th e

assault a t Lingaye n Gulf , woul d presen t

knotty problems—terrain , ai r an d nava l

5

 GHQ, SWP A O I 73 , 1 2 Oc t 44 , Sixth Arm y G- 3

Jnl Fil e Luzon , 14-3 1 Oc t 44 . 6

 MUSKET EER III, 26 Sep 44; GHQ SWPA OI 73, 12

Oct 44 ; GH Q SWP A Staf f Studies : MIK E I (Lingaye n

Gulf), Editio n No . 2 , 7 Oc t 44 ; MIK E I I (Dingala n

Bay), 4 Oct 44 ; MIK E III (Vigan) , 23 Nov 44 ; MIK E IV

(Nasugbu an d Balaya n Bays) , 7 No v 44 ; MIK E V I

(Batangas an d Tayaba s Bays) , 2 Ja n 45 ; an d MIK E

VII (Zambale s coast), Editio n No . 2 , 1 4 Jan 45 . Al l

in OP D AB C 384 Pacifi c (1-17-43) , variou s sections.

GHQ SWPA OI 74, 13 Oct 44, G-3 GH Q Jnl File , 1 3

Oct 44; GHQ SWP A OI 80 , 20 Nov 44, G-3 GH Q Jn l

File, 20 No v 44 .

THE PLA N FO R INVASIO N 21

support, and logistics; all of them would

be carefull y examine d b y MacArthur' s

planners befor e the y wer e undertaken. 7

MacArthur originall y intende d t o

send his Lingayen-bound assault convoys

north alon g th e easter n coast o f Luzon ,

west aroun d th e norther n ti p o f th e

island, throug h Luzo n Strait , an d the n

south dow n th e wes t coast t o th e gulf. 8

This scheme required ai r cove r b y landbased plane s operating from som e northern Luzo n fiel d tha t woul d hav e t o b e

captured wel l befor e th e Lingaye n

assault convoys sortied from Leyt e Gulf.

General MacArthur' s planners , le d b y

Maj. Gen . Stephen J . Chamberlin, the Assistant Chief of Staff G- 3 a t GHQ SWPA ,

accordingly had t o give serious consideration t o th e seizur e o f a n ai r bas e sit e

at Aparri . Fo r a time , Chamberli n als o

thought it might prove necessary to establish land-base d ai r strengt h a t Legaspi ,

on th e eastern tip of the Bicol Peninsula,

Luzon's southeasternmos t extension .

Legaspi-based plane s coul d supplemen t

convoy cove r t o b e provide d b y escor t

carriers (CVE 's) an d coul d als o hel p

support th e groun d force s a t Lingaye n

Gulf unti l land-base d aircraf t coul d b e

sent forwar d t o field s alon g th e gulf' s

shores.

MacArthur, o n Chamberlin' s advice ,

soon dismisse d th e Legasp i pla n fro m

consideration. Th e operatio n pose d

such logisti c problems that its execution

might dela y th e Lingaye n Gul f assaul t

for a month. Furthermore , Chamberli n

had decided , th e additiona l ai r suppor t

that coul d b e provide d fro m Legasp i

probably woul d no t b e needed. 9 Th e

Aparri operatio n likewis e create d grav e

logistical problems , sinc e i t calle d fo r

the effort s o f a corp s containin g tw o

reinforced divisions . Th e corp s woul d

have t o hol d a n isolate d perimete r 60 0

miles fro m th e neares t Allie d ai r base s

(at Leyte ) bu t onl y 30 0 mile s fro m

major Japanes e ai r concentration s o n

southern Formosa , an d muc h close r t o

Japanese fields on Luzon , for a month or

more befor e th e Lingaye n assault. 10

Yet MacArthur had to give continuing

consideration t o th e Aparr i operation .

Admiral King , fo r one , believe d tha t

until Japanes e ai r strengt h o n Luzo n

could be completely neutralized it would

be unsafe to route assault convoys around

the island unless land-based fighters were

operating fro m Aparri. 11 Admira l Kin -

kaid, MacArthur' s nava l commander ,

agreed wit h King , an d wen t o n t o

raise othe r objection s t o th e propose d

northern route . Kinkai d wa s especiall y

worried abou t weathe r condition s of f

northern Luzon , wher e sever e typhoon s

were know n t o occu r aroun d 2 0 De -

cember, th e dat e MacArthu r ha d se t

for th e Lingaye n assault . Althoug h h e

had previousl y oppose d sendin g th e

Lingayen-bound convoy s throug h th e

confined water s aroun d th e Visaya n

Islands, reconsideratio n prompte d Kin -

kaid t o recommen d tha t th e assaul t

shipping emplo y th e Visaya n route ,

where th e sea s wer e more protecte d an d

7

 See, fo r example , th e examinatio n o f proposal s

for operation s i n souther n Luzo n i n ch . XII, below . 8

 MUSKETEE R III, 26 Sep 44 , and othe r plan s cite d

previously i n thi s section .

9

 Rad, MacArthu r t o Marshall , C-14608 , 8 Jul 44 ,

CM-IN 6202 ; WD Telecon , Hand y (i n Washington)

and Ma j Gen John E. Hull (Chief , Theater Gp OPD,

in Brisbane , Australia) , 7 Au g 44 , CM-OUT WD -

TC-797. 10

 Rad, MacArthur t o Marshall, C-51429, 2 Nov 44,

CM-IN 1749 ; MUSKETEER III, 2 6 Sep 44 . 11

 Rad, Marshal l t o MacArthur , 3 1 Oc t 44 , CM -

OUT 55075 .
22 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

where ai r cove r coul d b e provide d b y

Allied Ai r Force s plane s operating from

Mindoro Island. 12

General Chamberli n ha d alread y

made a thoroug h stud y o f th e Visaya n

route an d ha d recommende d sendin g

resupply an d reinforcemen t convoy s t o

Lingayen Gulf throug h the Visayans and

up th e west coast o f Luzon , MacArthur ,

approving thi s recommendation , de -

cided t o establis h land-base d aircraf t a t

the southwester n corne r o f Mindoro ,

150 mile s sout h o f Manila , befor e th e

assault at Lingaye n Gulf i n order to provide air cove r fo r th e follow-up shippin g

and t o increase the scale of air operations

against Luzon .

Admiral Nimitz , responsibl e fo r sup -

porting th e invasio n o f Luzo n wit h

carriers, surfac e comba t vessels, an d am -

phibious shipping, was also interested i n

the Visaya n route . Accordingly , whe n

representatives o f MacArthu r an d

Nimitz conferre d o n plan s earl y i n No -

vember the y quickl y agree d tha t th e

assault convoys would be routed throug h

the Visayans and that only the fast carrier

striking force s o f Admira l Halsey 's

Third Fleet , whic h wa s t o provid e stra -

tegic cover an d suppor t fo r th e invasio n

of Luzon , nee d operat e of f norther n

Luzon. Aparri , unde r this new concept,

would no t b e take n unless a completely

adverse air and naval situation developed

between th e tim e of th e Mindor o attack

and th e invasio n a t Lingaye n Gulf. 13

Changing the Target Dates

MacArthur decided early in November

that Mindor o woul d b e th e onl y majo r

operation t o preced e th e assaul t a t Lin -

gayen Gulf . I t wa s not, however, unti l

the las t da y o f th e mont h tha t GH Q

SWPA finall y settle d th e date s fo r th e

two operations.

In conformit y wit h th e Join t Chiefs '

directive, MacArthu r ha d schedule d th e

Mindoro attack fo r 5 December an d th e

Lingayen Gul f operatio n fo r 2 0 December. A numbe r o f developments withi n

the Southwes t Pacifi c Are a force d th e

theater commander, with manifest reluc -

tance, t o conside r changin g th e dates .

First, operations on Leyt e wer e consuming mor e tim e an d effor t tha n antici -

pated. Th e Japanes e ha d sen t suc h

strong reinforcement s t o Leyt e tha t o n

10 Novembe r Genera l MacArthu r ha d

to ask Admiral Nimit z to make available

another infantr y divisio n fro m Centra l

Pacific resource s t o execut e a n amphibi -

ous flankin g attac k o n Leyte' s west coast

during th e firs t wee k o f December. 14

Lt. Gen. Richard K . Sutherland, MacArthur's chief o f staff, advise d the theater

commander tha t th e movemen t o f th e

new divisio n t o Leyt e and th e execution

of th e flankin g operatio n woul d ti e u p

so muc h shippin g an d s o man y escor t

vessels that the Lingaye n invasion would

have t o b e postpone d a t least a week be -

yond the scheduled date of 20 December.

This delay , Sutherlan d pointe d out ,

would mea n tha t th e assaul t convoy s

heading fo r Lingaye n Gul f woul d hav e 12

 Interview, author with Kinkaid , 25 Jun 51 , notes

in OCM H files ; Comment s o f Lt . Gen . Stephen J .

Chamberlin (Ret.) , 20 Jan 57 ; Comments of Admiral

Thomas C. Kinkai d (Ret.) , 1 5 Jan 57 . 13

 Rad, MacArthu r to Marshall, C-18496, 28 Sep 44,

CM-IN 26358 ; Rad , MacArthur t o Marshall , C -

51429, 2 No v 44 , CM-IN 1749 ; Rad, MacArthur t o

Marshall, C-51706 , 7 No v 44, CM-IN 6425 .

14

 This wa s th e 77t h Infantr y Division , which ha d

originally bee n par t o f Sixt h Arm y Reserv e fo r th e

Leyte operatio n bu t whic h ha d bee n release d t o

Nimitz' control , withou t havin g bee n committe d

on Leyte , o n 2 9 October . Se e Cannon , Leyte, pp .

276-77.
THE PLA N FO R INVASIO N 23

to sai l throug h Visaya n water s unde r a

full moon , a meteorologica l considera -

tion tha t woul d forc e Admira l Kinkai d

to request stil l furthe r postponemen t o f

the Luzo n invasion. 15 Moreover , Kin -

kaid's Allied Nava l Force s did no t hav e

enough assaul t shippin g an d escor t ves -

sels to execute both the Mindoro landing

and th e amphibiou s flankin g operatio n

at Leyt e during the firs t wee k o f December.16

 Fo r thes e reasons alone , i t woul d

probably b e necessar y t o reschedul e th e

Lingayen Gulf an d Mindor o operations.

Next, heav y rain s an d Japanes e ai r

attacks ha d s o slowe d airfiel d construc -

tion a t Leyt e tha t i t wa s impossibl e t o

find roo m o n th e islan d fo r th e plane s

required fo r ai r defens e an d suppor t o f

ground actio n there , le t alon e thos e

needed t o support advance s t o Mindor o

and Luzon . Genera l Kenney, the Southwest Pacific' s ai r commander , i n mid -

November informe d MacArthu r tha t i t

would b e 1 Decembe r a t leas t befor e

enough plane s could b e base d o n Leyt e

to cover th e jump to Mindoro, and tha t

it would be the 15t h befor e those aircraft

could neutraliz e all Japanes e field s within fighte r an d medium bomber range o f

the Mindoro beaches.17

Kenney's estimates, coming as they did

on to p o f Sutherland' s an d Kinkaid' s

discouraging reports about th e shippin g

situation, prove d a rea l blo w t o Mac -

Arthur, fo r th e 5 Decembe r dat e fo r

Mindoro had been predicate d o n th e assumption tha t th e Allie d Ai r Force s

would hav e contro l o f th e ai r ove r th e

central Visayan s b y tha t time . Despit e

the increasingl y advers e outlook , Mac -

Arthur wa s not ye t ready t o chang e th e

Mindoro and Lingaye n dates, but he was

soon subjecte d t o additiona l pressur e

from Admira l Kinkaid .

Kinkaid coul d no t sen d assaul t ship -

ping and escort vessels into the restricted

Visayan water s unles s ai r contro l wa s

assured, fo r t o d o so , h e felt , woul d in -

vite disastrou s an d unjustifiabl e nava l

losses. Halsey' s Thir d Flee t carrie r

groups ha d lef t Philippin e water s an d

could not, in any case, provide close sup -

port fo r a n advanc e t o Mindoro , an d

Kinkaid wa s reluctant to send any of his

Seventh Fleet escort carriers into the confined water s o f th e Visayans . S o con -

cerned wa s Kinkai d wit h th e potentia l

strength o f Japanes e air reactio n t o th e

Mindoro an d Lingaye n operation s tha t

he proposed t o MacArthu r tha t th e tw o

be canceled as currently planned in favo r

of a step-by-ste p advanc e throug h th e

many island s o f th e centra l Visayans ,

moving forward land-base d aircraft wit h

each step . Kinkai d wa s b y n o mean s

wholeheartedly i n favo r o f thi s slo w

method of advance, but h e fel t tha t only

by proposing such a sweeping change in

plans coul d h e persuad e MacArthu r t o

reconsider the scheduled dates.18

Kinkaid, like Kenney, thought that the

Mindoro operatio n ough t t o b e post -

poned a t least until 1 5 December, but i t

15

 Rad, Sutherlan d t o MacArthu r an d Krueger ,

C-52192, 1 5 Nov 44, Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon,

25 Nov- 1 De c 44 . 16

 Cannon, Leyte, p. 276 . 17

 ACofS G- 3 Sixt h Army , Note s o n LOV E II I

(Mindoro) Con f a t H q Sixt h Army, 1 6 Nov 44, Sixth

Army G-3 Jn l Fil e Mindoro, 28 Sep-20 Nov 44; Rad,

MacArthur t o Nimit z an d Marshall , CAX-11669 ,

16 No v 44 , CM-IN 16704 ; Sixt h Army Rp t Mindoro ,

pp. 10-11 . Se e Cannon , Leyte, pp . 185-88 , 306-07 ,

for furthe r informatio n o n airfiel d constructio n a t

Leyte.

18

 Memo, Kinkai d fo r MacArthur, 3 0 Nov 44 , CofS

GHQ SWP A File , AN F 116 , préci s i n collectio n o f

GHQ SWP A His t Re d Inde x Card s i n OCM H files ;

Interview, author wit h Kinkaid , 2 5 Jun 51 ; Kinkai d

Comments, 1 5 Ja n 57 ; Chamberli n Comments , 2 0

Jan 57.
24 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

soon becam e apparen t t o Kinkai d tha t

even tha t dat e coul d no t b e me t unles s

CVE suppor t wer e mad e availabl e t o

cover the assault. Fo r on e thing , airfield

construction o n Leyt e continue d t o fal l

behind schedule . Fo r another , airfiel d

facilities a t Leyt e wer e such , an d man y

of Kenney' s pilots so inexperienced, tha t

land-based plane s fro m Leyt e coul d no t

risk constant night take-offs an d landing s

during the period of the Mindoro assault.

Therefore, land-base d plane s woul d b e

unable t o cove r th e assaul t convoy s o r

the Mindoro beaches during the first and

last hours of daylight, the two most critical time s of th e day . Weighin g all thes e

factors Kinkaid , wh o ha d alread y bee n

under considerabl e pressur e fro m Gen -

eral Chamberli n t o provid e CVE' s fo r

the Mindor o operation, finall y an d wit h

misgivings decided t o send a small forc e

of CVE' s t o Mindor o wit h th e assaul t

convoys. H e organize d a coverin g forc e

of 6 CVE's (replacin g most o f thei r tor -

pedo an d div e bomber s wit h fighte r

planes) and , for escor t an d antiaircraf t

roles, added 3 old battleships, 3 cruisers,

and 1 8 destroyers. 19

Other nava l and air support problems

also forced MacArthu r to give consideration t o changin g th e dates. MacArthu r

wanted th e Thir d Fleet 's fas t carrie r

groups t o conduc t a n extensiv e serie s o f

strategic ai r strike s t o suppor t bot h th e

Mindoro an d th e Lingaye n landings .

Halsey was willing to provide the desired

support t o enabl e MacArthu r t o mee t

the 5 December target date for Mindoro,

but recommende d a mor e tha n 15-da y

interval between Mindoro and Lingayen.

The inadequacie s o f land-base d air sup -

port a t Leyte , th e Thir d Flee t com -

mander pointe d out , ha d mad e i t

necessary fo r th e carrier s t o remai n i n

Philippine water s a n unconscionabl y

long period—the flee t wa s in grea t nee d

of repairs , rest , replenishment , pilo t re -

placement and recuperation, and general

servicing.20

Admiral Nimitz likewise felt tha t Mac -

Arthur's schedul e di d no t tak e flee t re -

quirements sufficientl y int o account -

Knowing that the Third Fleet's need for

rest would be even greater after th e invasion o f Luzon , especiall y if MacArthur's

Mindoro an d Lingaye n date s wer e no t

postponed, Nimit z ha d alread y sough t

approval from th e Joint Chiefs of Staff t o

change the target dates for Iwo Jima and

Okinawa, originall y se t fo r 2 0 Januar y

and 1 March, respectively, t o 3 February

and 1 5 March. Th e Join t Chiefs , recog -

nizing the close interdependence of operations i n th e Southwes t an d Centra l

Pacific Areas , agree d t o Nimitz '

recommendations.21

Nimitz pointe d ou t t o MacArthu r

that with an adequat e rest period befor e

Mindoro th e Thir d Flee t coul d retur n

to Philippin e waters t o neutraliz e Japa -

nese air powe r o n Luzo n fo r a considerable period . Withou t suc h rest , th e

fleet's operation s would b e s o limite d i n

scope tha t it simply could no t mee t Mac -

Arthur's requirement s fo r carrier-base d

air support . Nimitz , accordingly , als o

recommended tha t th e Mindor o an d

19

 Rad , Kinkai d t o King , 023 5 2 7 Nov 44 , CM-IN

26547; Kinkai d Comments , 1 5 Ja n 57 ; Chamberli n

Comments, 20 Jan 57 .

20

 Rad , MacArthu r t o Nimit z an d Marshall , CAX -

11669 , 1 5 Nov 44 , CM-IN 16704 ; Rad , MacArthu r t o

Kinkaid, Halsey , an d Nimitz , CX-54038, 2 7 No v 44 ,

CM-IN 7958; Rad , Halse y t o Nimitz , 0400 29 Nov 44,

CM-IN 29593 . 21

 Rad , Nimit z t o King , 204 0 1 7 No v 44 , CM-I N

16705; Rad , Nimitz t o MacArthur , 020 0 1 7 No v 44 ,

CM-IN 16045 ; Rad , Nimit z t o MacArthur , 050 2 2 5

Nov 44 , CM-IN 25078 ; Rad , Nimitz t o Halse y an d

King, 0324 29 Nov 44, CM-IN 29579.
THE PLA N FO R INVASIO N 25

Lingayen target dates be postponed until

adequate land - an d carrier-base d ai r

power coul d b e mad e availabl e fo r th e

proper suppor t o f both operations. 22

In th e fac e o f th e recommendation s

and estimate s from Sutherland , Kenney ,

Kinkaid, Halsey , an d Nimitz , Genera l

MacArthur, wit h fa r mor e reluctanc e

than enthusiasm , decide d t o postpon e

the Mindor o and Lingaye n targe t dates.

On 3 0 Novembe r h e se t th e Mindor o

date forward te n days, to 1 5 December.23

Postponements wer e no t ove r insofa r

as the Lingaye n Gulf operatio n wa s concerned. MacArthu r wante d t o follo w

the formul a o f a 15-da y interval between

Mindoro an d Lingaye n Gulf , bu t h e

found thi s impossible . First , h e ha d t o

consider th e fac t tha t Admira l Kinkai d

would object to sailing the Luzon assault

convoys through th e Visayans under th e

full moo n o f lat e December, an d woul d

undoubtedly as k postponemen t o f th e

Lingayen attack well into January. Naval

planners also pointed out that moon and

tide condition s a t Lingaye n Gul f itsel f

would b y n o mean s b e a s favorabl e fo r

amphibious operation s o n 3 0 Decem -

ber a s they would b e a wee k t o te n day s

later. An d fro m Kinkaid' s point of view

an additiona l dela y i n th e invasio n o f

Luzon woul d probabl y b e necessar y t o

give hi s Allie d Nava l Force s adequat e

time fo r rest , replenishment , loading ,

and rehearsals between th e Mindoro and

Lingayen assaults.

Air suppor t problem s agai n ha d a

major influenc e on the decision. Kenne y

informed MacArthu r tha t the continued

slow pac e o f airfiel d constructio n a t

Leyte woul d mak e i t impossibl e fo r th e

Allied Ai r Force s t o mee t a Lingaye n

Gulf targe t dat e o f 3 0 December. Seek -

ing a method t o help overcome th e construction difficultie s a t Leyte , Kenne y

recommended tha t a muc h large r ai r

base tha n originall y planne d b e estab -

lished in southwestern Mindoro, and the

additional construction tha t he proposed

could not be completed by 30 December.

The Southwes t Pacific's ai r commander,

and othe r planners a s well, als o pointed

out that a longer interval than fifteen day s

between th e Mindor o and Lingaye n op -

erations would probabl y b e required t o

assure the complete neutralization of Japanese land-base d ai r powe r o n Luzon. 24

In th e end, MacArthur selecte d 9 January as the date for the Lingaye n assault,

a fina l postponemen t tha t provide s an -

other illustration of the interdependence

of MacArthur's and Nimitz ' operations.25

Many o f th e comba t vessels an d mos t o f

the amphibiou s shippin g th e Southwes t

Pacific neede d fo r th e Luzo n invasio n

would hav e t o b e borrowe d fro m re -

sources unde r Admira l Nimitz ' control .

The ship s could no t b e returned t o th e

Central Pacifi c i n tim e fo r Nimit z t o

meet a n Iw o Jima targe t dat e o f 3 February, and again the necessary period for

repair an d replenishmen t o f th e carrie r

striking force s woul d als o hav e t o b e

moved forward . Therefore , th e Centra l

Pacific commander had to reset Iwo Jima

22

 Rads, Nimit z t o MacArthur , 0502 2 5 Nov 44 and

2349 2 9 No v 44 , CM-IN's 2507 8 an d 29598 . 23

 Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, C-54164 and CA54167, 3 0 No v 44 , CM-I N 30 6 (Dec ) an d CM-I N

29666 (Nov) .

24

 Rad, MacArthur t o Marshall , C-54164 , 3 0 No v

44; Kenney , General Kenney Reports, pp . 478-79 ;

Comdr Luzo n Attac k Forc e (Kinkaid ) Actio n Rp t

Luzon, pp. 2- 4 (thi s document is simultaneously th e

report o f th e AN F SWPA , th e Sevent h Fleet , Tas k

Force 77 , an d th e Luzo n Attac k Forc e an d i s here -

inafter cite d a s Luzo n Attac k Forc e Actio n Rpt) ;

Kinkaid Comments, 15 Jan 57 . 25

 Rad, MacArthu r to Marshall, C-54164, 30 Nov 44.
26 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

for 1 9 February, a chang e tha t simulta -

neously force d hi m t o postpon e th e

invasion o f Okinawa t o 1 April.26

These wer e th e las t change s Nimit z

had t o mak e i n hi s schedule , an d Mac -

Arthur, whe n h e se t Mindor o fo r 1 5

December and Lingaye n Gul f fo r 9 January, ha d mad e wha t h e expecte d t o b e

his final changes. Th e date s were as firm

as Allie d planner s coul d mak e them —

only th e Japanes e coul d forc e furthe r

changes.

Tactical Plans

The Intelligence Basis

When, in mid-October , Genera l Mac -

Arthur directe d th e majo r subordinat e

commands withi n th e Southwes t Pacifi c

to begin preparation s for the Luzo n op -

eration, he assigned th e bulk o f his U.S.

Army groun d comba t an d servic e force s

to th e undertaking. 27 Likewise , most o f

Kenney's Allie d Ai r Force s an d practi -

cally ever y shi p an d landin g craf t o f

Kinkaid's Allie d Nava l Force s woul d

participate.28 N o one expecte d th e Mindoro operatio n t o tur n int o a majo r

battle. Th e islan d wa s known to have a

weak Japanese garrison, and ther e didn't

seem t o b e muc h likelihoo d tha t th e

enemy woul d attemp t majo r counterat -

tacks once Allied forces were ashore. O n

the othe r hand , intelligenc e indicate d

that th e Luzo n operatio n promise d t o

be th e biggest an d toughes t ye t t o tak e

place within th e Pacific . Ever y scra p o f

information tha t Maj . Gen. Charles A .

Willoughby, MacArthur 's intelligenc e

chief, wa s able to gather during the waning month s o f 194 4 served t o confir m

that view .

The Southwes t Pacific's intelligenc e

estimates concerning Japanes e strengths,

dispositions, capabilities, and intention s

on Luzo n were reasonably accurate from

the start of planning. Th e abundanc e of

information mus t be attributed i n larg e

measure t o th e effort s o f guerrilla s o n

Luzon, a n islan d tha t wa s becomin g a

veritable hotbe d o f guerrill a resistance ,

both American-led and Filipino-led, even

before Lt . Gen . Jonathan M . Wain -

wright's surrender at Corregidor in Ma y

1942. Carefull y nurtured by MacArthur's

headquarters, especiall y afte r mid-1943 ,

the guerrill a organization s ha d grow n

steadily in strength and effectivenes s no t

only a s sabotag e unit s bu t als o a s valu -

able source s o f information . Th e Leyt e

invasion i n Octobe r 194 4 gave great en -

couragement t o th e guerrillas , wh o re -

doubled thei r effort s i n preparatio n fo r

the invasio n o f Luzon , whic h the y realized coul d no t b e to o fa r off. Through -

out 194 4 supplies o f al l type s ha d bee n

sent t o the guerrillas, first b y submarine

and late r b y airdrop and clandestin e in -

terisland transportation. Afte r th e establishment of the Allied base on Leyte, the

flow o f supplie s increase d b y leap s an d

bounds. Th e guerrilla s themselves estab26

 Rad, Nimit z t o King , 021 5 3 De c 44 , CM-I N

2908. Fo r furthe r informatio n o n settin g th e targe t

date of the Okinawa operation, see Roy E. Appleman,

James M . Burns, Russel l A . Gugeler, an d Joh n Ste -

vens, Okinawa: The Last Battle, UNITE D STATE S

ARMY I N WORL D WA R I I (Washington , 1948) ,

pp. 19 , 28. 27

 This subsection is based primaril y upon th e fol -

lowing genera l sources : G- 2 GH Q SWPA , DSEI's ,

12 Oc t 44-9 Jan 45 , file d i n th e G- 3 GH Q Jn l File s

for th e correspondin g dates ; G- 2 GH Q SWPA ,

Monthly Summarie s o f Enem y Dispositions , Oct ,

Nov, an d De c 44, filed i n th e G-3 GH Q Jn l File s for

31 Oct , 30 Nov , and 3 1 De c 44 , respectively ; G- 2

GHQ FEC , Th e Guerrill a Resistanc e Movemen t i n

the Philippines , passim, cop y i n OCM H files ; G- 2

Sixth Army , Summar y o f Inf o Affectin g MIK E I , 3 0

Oct 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 14-31 Oct 44. 28

 See app . A- 1 fo r organizatio n o f th e Southwes t

Pacific Area .
THE PLA N FO R INVASIO N 27

lished a networ k o f radi o communica -

tions that soon came to be sustained and,

to som e extent , controlle d b y Mac -

Arthur's headquarters , whic h als o sen t

into Luzon special intelligence parties to

develop new sources o f information an d

provide guerrill a effort s wit h mor e

effective direction ,

In th e end , on e o f th e majo r difficul -

ties Southwes t Pacifi c intelligenc e agen -

cies ha d wa s not obtainin g informatio n

from Luzo n bu t rathe r siftin g th e ple -

thora of guerrilla reports, which attained

every conceivable degree of accuracy and

detail. Onc e sifted, th e informatio n ha d

to be evaluated and correlate d with tha t

received from othe r sources such as radio

intercepts, capture d documents , an d

prisoner interrogations .

When detaile d plannin g fo r th e ad -

vance o f Luzo n began , Genera l Will -

oughby could not know that the Japanese

would choos e t o mak e a stan d a t Leyt e

—nor, a s a matte r o f fact , di d th e Japa -

nese. Thus , Willoughb y expecte d th e

Japanese t o mak e thei r principa l defen -

sive effort o n Luzon . I n mid-October he

estimated tha t a tota l Japanes e garriso n

of nearl y 121,00 0 men , includin g fou r

infantry divisions and three independent

mixed brigades (eac h about half th e siz e

of a standard Japanese infantry division),

was o n Luzon , an d h e anticipate d tha t

the Japanes e woul d strongl y reinforc e

the islan d befor e th e Allie s could reac h

it. H e als o assume d tha t Sixt h Arm y

would encounte r th e mai n Japanes e de -

fenses i n th e militaril y importan t Lin -

gayen Gulf , Centra l Plains , an d Manil a

Bay areas. H e expecte d th e Japanese t o

deploy stron g force s alon g th e Lingaye n

shores an d i n successiv e delayin g

positions dow n th e Central Plains.

When th e Japanes e bega n sendin g

strong reinforcement s t o Leyte , Will -

oughby ha d t o mak e man y revision s i n

his Luzon estimates. H e note d th e shifting o f units o n Luzo n t o tak e ove r th e

areas vacated b y the forces sen t t o Leyte ,

and h e kep t trac k o f new unit s arrivin g

on Luzon . I n mid-Decembe r h e esti -

mated tha t the Japanese had on Luzo n a

tank division, 5 infantry divisions, 6 independent mixe d brigades, an d 2 separate

infantry regiments , thereb y identifyin g

all the major Japanese ground force units

already there or soon to reach th e island.

He ha d als o foun d ou t tha t larg e num -

bers of naval troop s and Japanes e Army

Air Forc e units wer e o n th e island , an d

he ha d identifie d th e commander s o f

most of the major units.

Willoughby estimate d tha t a larg e

and potentiall y dangerous concentration

of Japanes e forces held th e region immediately east , northeast , an d southeas t o f

Lingayen Gulf , a concentratio n tha t

could seriously threaten the Allied beachhead o r th e lef t flan k o f Allie d force s

moving sout h dow n th e Centra l Plain s

toward Manila , H e furthe r estimate d

that th e Japanes e woul d deplo y stron g

forces t o defen d th e Clar k Fiel d area , a

well-developed ai r cente r lyin g sevent y

miles south o f Lingaye n Gul f an d abou t

fifty mile s nort h o f Manila . Genera l

Willoughby wa s als o concerne d abou t

Japanese strengt h i n souther n Luzon ,

below Manila , an d deduce d tha t th e

Japanese expecte d a majo r Allie d effor t

along the island's southern coast. Finally,

he devote d considerabl e attentio n t o

Bataan Peninsula "as possibly the site of a

historically repetitive delaying action."29

In detail , Willoughb y estimate d tha t

the Japanes e woul d hav e a t leas t tw o

29

 G-2 GH Q SWPA , DSE I 1017 , 7-8 Ja n 45 , G- 3

GHQ Jn l File , 8 Jan 45 .
28 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

infantry division s i n positio n t o defen d

Lingayen Gul f an d environs, and, until

the first wee k in January, he anticipated

that th e Japanes e woul d defen d al l th e

gulf's beaches strongly. H e insiste d tha t

the Japanes e coul d moun t stron g an d

rapid counterattack s agains t th e Allie d

beachhead, possibl y employin g a s a

spearhead th e tan k division , which , h e

thought, th e Japanes e woul d hol d mo -

bile i n th e Centra l Plains. H e furthe r

estimated tha t the Japanese might build

up a stron g centra l reserv e o f infantr y

units no t committe d t o specifi c defens e

roles bu t rathe r hel d read y t o counter -

attack a t an y poin t durin g th e earl y

stages of th e operation.

As tim e passe d an d mor e informatio n

concerning th e Japanes e becam e avail -

able from Luzon , Willoughby raised his

October estimate s o f Japanes e strength .

As of late December, in his fina l estimat e

before th e assault , he reckoned tha t th e

Japanese garriso n numbere d abou t

152,500 troop s o f all categories.

The estimate s concernin g Japanes e

ground force s presente d only one important aspec t o f th e Southwes t Pacific' s

intelligence problem—the tas k o f determining Japanese air an d nava l strength s

and capabilitie s wa s equall y importan t

and, probably , muc h mor e difficult .

Southwest Pacifi c intelligenc e agencie s

believed tha t th e Japanes e woul d commit al l thei r availabl e ai r strengt h i n

counterattacks against Allied forces while

they wer e movin g towar d Luzo n an d

while th e groun d force s wer e establish -

ing the beachhead. Willoughb y assumed

that th e Japanese would maintai n thei r

Philippine air strength at 400-500 planes,

the bul k o f them base d o n Luzon . Fur -

thermore, h e expecte d tha t despit e th e

best effort s o f Allie d land-base d an d

carrier-based aircraft, th e Japanes e could

have 300-40 0 plane s o n Luzo n a s o f 9

January.

The Japanes e coul d easil y reinforc e

their air garriso n on Luzo n fro m For -

mosa, China , th e Indies , an d th e

Ryukyus; the y could also stage in plane s

from th e homeland . Fo r instance , th e

Japanese could move 400-500 plane s to

Formosa fro m th e hom e island s withi n

a wee k afte r th e Allie d assaul t a t Lin -

gayen Gul f and , with plane s base d a t

such nearb y base s an d o n Luzon , could

mount daily attack s with 15 0 plane s fo r

a period of at least ten days. 30

Estimates o f Japanes e nava l capabili -

ties an d intention s change d drastically ,

of course , after th e Battl e of Leyt e Gulf.

Although th e Allie s ha d anticipate d

strong naval counterattack against Luzon,

they now kne w tha t th e Japanes e Nav y

was incapabl e o f a major , sustaine d ac -

tion. Th e Japanes e could bring together

a respectabl e bu t unbalance d forc e i f

they chos e t o concentrat e th e scattere d

elements o f thei r fleet , bu t th e forc e

would be no match for the one the Allies

could assemble . Nevertheless , Allied in -

telligence agencie s considere d i t likel y

that th e Japanese might risk some ships

in hit-and-ru n raids , an d i t wa s known

that th e Japanese ha d larg e comba t vessels base d i n Indochin a waters , withi n

easy sailing distance of Luzo n an d Min -

doro. Th e onl y othe r nava l threa t

seemed to be that pose d by small suicide

30

 In additio n t o the sources cited i n note 27, above,

information o n ai r intelligenc e estimate s is derive d

from: AA F SWPA, Inte l Summar y 252 , 3 0 De c 44 ,

G-3 GH Q Jnl File , 30 Dec 44; CINCPAC-CINCPOA,

Opns in PO A Durin g Jan 45 , 31 Ju l 45, pp 5 , 10-12 ,

copy i n OCM H files ; AA F SWP A O I 73 , 1 7 Oc t 44 ,

and amendments thereto, G-3 GH Q Jnl File , 1 7 Oct

44; AN F SWP A Op n Pla n No . 17-44 , Sixt h Arm y

G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 1- 2 De c 44; Sixt h Arm y Rp t

Luzon, II, 27 , 30.
THE PLA N FO R INVASIO N 29

craft, covey s of whic h th e Japanes e were

known t o b e hidin g alon g Luzon' s

southern and western coasts. 31

Ground Force Plans

The tas k confrontin g th e Southwes t

Pacific planner s was clear. The y had t o

allot sufficient force s t o the Luzon operation t o overcome a strong Japanese gar -

rison tha t the y believe d woul d b e

reinforced befor e 9 January ; secur e a

beachhead agains t possibl e determine d

opposition a t th e beaches ; driv e sout h

through the Central Plains against anticipated strong defenses; protect the beachhead against expected counterattack; and

secure th e Centra l Plains-Manil a Ba y

area i n fou r t o si x weeks , th e period

within whic h Genera l MacArthu r ha d

promised th e Join t Chief s h e coul d se -

cure tha t strategicall y important region.

In addition , sufficien t nava l an d ai r

strength, bot h land - an d carrier-based ,

had to be assembled to counter whatever

air an d nava l threa t th e Japanese could

pose.

Changes i n th e intelligenc e estimate s

were reflecte d b y corresponding change s

in th e siz e o f th e forc e Genera l Mac -

Arthur assigned t o the Luzon operation.

In October , i n accordanc e wit h Will -

oughby's estimate s a t tha t time , Mac -

Arthur allocate d t o Genera l Krueger' s

Sixth Army, responsible for the Lingayen

invasion, th e I Corps , consistin g o f th e

6th an d 43 d Infantr y Divisions , an d th e

XIV Corps , containin g th e 37t h an d

40th Infantry Divisions . Als o assigne d

to the Sixth Army for reserve and followup roles were the 25th Infantry Division,

the 11t h Airborn e Division , th e 158th

Regimental Comba t Tea m ( a separat e

organization no t par t o f an y division) ,

the 13t h Armore d Grou p (initiall y con -

sisting o f a tan k destroyer , a n engineer ,

and tw o tan k battalions) , an d th e sepa -

rate 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion. Sup -

porting element s fo r al l thes e unit s

included 1 3 nonorgani c fiel d artiller y

battalions of various calibers, 2 chemical

mortar battalions , 2 othe r tan k battal -

ions, th e bul k o f 5 enginee r boa t an d

shore regiments , 4 amphibiou s tracto r

battalions, an d 1 6 enginee r aviatio n

battalions. Th e tota l assaul t forc e num -

bered approximatel y 191,00 0 men , o f

whom 131,00 0 wer e classifie d a s combat

troops. Bas e servic e troop s t o com e for -

ward wit h th e initia l echelon s brough t

the total to 203,000. 32

Simultaneously, MacArthu r assigne d

Lt. Gen. Rober t L. Eichelberger's Eighth

Army th e tas k o f executin g a subsidiar y

landing on Luzon , th e troops ultimately

to pas s t o Sixt h Arm y control . Th e

forces thu s allocated include d X I Corp s

headquarters, the 32 d Infantr y Division ,

and th e separate 112t h Cavalr y and 503 d

Parachute Regimenta l Comba t Team s

(RCT's) togethe r with supporting units.

For Genera l Headquarters Reserv e Mac -

Arthur se t asid e th e 33 d an d 41s t

Infantry Divisions. 33

With th e new estimates in han d i t became evident that th e Sixt h Arm y woul d

need additional forces. Therefore , GH Q

SWPA laid plans to ship to Luzon within

two month s afte r th e assaul t th e 33d ,

38th, 41st , an d 77t h Infantr y Division s

and th e 1st Cavalry Division, in addition

to the units already allocated to the Sixth

and Eight h Armies. Th e 77t h Divisio n 31

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Opn s i n PO A Durin g

Jan 45 , pp. 5, 48-49; Luzon Attack Force Action Rpt ,

pp. 4 , 7 , 48; Sixt h Arm y Rp t Luzon , III, 28-30.

32

 GHQ SWP A O I 73 , 1 2 Oct 44 . 33

 Ibid.; GH Q SWP A Staf f Stud y MIK E II, 4 Oct 44 .
30 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

was use d o n Leyte , an d th e 41s t neve r

reached Luzon . Th e res t o f th e fore -

going units were employed on Luzon , as

was the bul k o f the 19t h an d 34t h Regimental Comba t Team s o f th e 24t h

Infantry Division. 34

Thus, th e groun d forc e commitmen t

to Luzon grew larger than Genera l Mac -

Arthur ha d contemplate d i n October .

At on e tim e o r anothe r h e committe d

to Luzo n 2 army headquarters, 3 corp s

headquarters, 1 0 divisions , an d 5 regimental comba t teams. 35

 Armore d unit s

assigned to the Sixt h Arm y aggregate d

more tank s tha n a n armore d division .

One well-organize d guerrill a uni t ap -

proximated th e siz e an d effectivenes s o f

a U.S . infantr y division , less supporting

arms, whil e a t leas t tw o others attaine d

something near th e strength an d useful -

ness o f infantr y regiments. 36 I n all , in -

cluding effectiv e guerrill a forces , MacArthur employe d th e equivalen t o f

nearly fiftee n division s in th e reconquest

of Luzon .

For operations in the Southern Philippines Campaign—th e responsibilit y o f

the Eight h Army—U.S . Arm y groun d

forces remainin g available afte r th e ini -

tial assignment s t o Luzo n wer e th e X

Corps headquarters, th e America l Divi -

sion, th e 24t h Divisio n les s tw o regi -

mental comba t teams, an d th e 31s t an d

93d Infantr y Divisions—o f whic h th e

93d wa s deemed suitabl e onl y fo r garrison duties . Ultimately , th e 24t h Divi -

sion's two RCT's were reassigned t o th e

Eighth Arm y fro m Luzon , a s wer e th e

40th an d 41s t Divisions , th e 503 d Para -

chute RCT , and variou s supportin g

units. Som e larg e guerrill a unit s wer e

also availabl e i n th e souther n Philip -

pines, especiall y o n Panay , Cebu , an d

Mindanao.37

The principa l combat-read y Austra -

lian unit s availabl e t o Genera l Mac -

Arthur a t thi s tim e comprise d a n arm y

headquarters, tw o corp s headquarters ,

the equivalen t o f si x infantr y divisions ,

and a n armore d brigade . MacArthu r

had onc e planne d t o us e a two-divisio n

Australian corp s in th e Philippines, but

ultimately most o f th e Australia n unit s

replaced U.S. Arm y units in eastern New

Guinea, th e Solomo n Islands , an d th e

Bismarck Archipelago. Australia n forces

also undertook the recapture of Borneo.38

While it did no t equal the strength of

U.S. Arm y groun d force s committe d i n

central Europe , th e Luzo n Campaig n

was by fa r th e largest o f th e Pacifi c war .

It entaile d th e us e o f mor e U.S . Arm y

ground comba t an d servic e force s tha n

did operation s i n Nort h Africa , Italy ,

or souther n Franc e and was larger tha n

the entire Allied commitment to Sicily.39

It fa r outclasse d th e Japanes e effor t o f

1941-42, whic h ha d totale d littl e mor e

than th e equivalen t o f fou r divisions. 40

34

 Rad, MacArthu r t o Krueger , CX-52617, 2 1 Nov

44, Sixt h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 15-2 5 No v 44;

GHQ SWP A O I 84/1 9 De c 44, G-3 GH Q Jnl File , 19

Dec 44; Eighth Army FO 13 , 8 Jan 45 , G-3 GH Q Jnl

File, 1 2 Ja n 45 , Fo r th e employmen t o f th e 77t h

Division, se e Cannon , Leyte. Fo r th e assignmen t o f

the 19t h an d 34t h RCT' s t o Luzon , se e below , chs .

XII an d XVII. Th e employmen t of the 41s t Division

is describe d below , chs. XXX-XXXII . 35

 Subsequent information o n th e commitment and

deployment o f majo r groun d unit s availabl e i n

SWPA i s base d upo n G- 3 GH Q SWPA , Monthl y

Summaries o f Opns , Jan-Ju n 45 , copie s i n OCM H

files. 36

 Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , III , 3 . Se e als o below ,

chs. XX , XXIII , XXVIII .

37

 See below, chs. XXX-XXXII . 38

 See apps. A-2 an d A-3 . 39

 The U.S . commitmen t i n Nort h Afric a staye d

below 7 divisions; i n Sicily , th e Allie s used approxi -

mately 1 2 divisions; an d th e U.S . Arm y commitmen t

to Ital y remaine d belo w 9 divisions. 40

 See Morton, Fall of the Philippines, passim.
THE PLA N FO R INVASIO N 31

The Sixt h Army 's pla n fo r th e Lin -

gayen assaul t calle d fo r th e amphibiou s

attack t o b e launche d acros s th e gulf' s

southern beaches , a significan t decisio n

in tha t thes e beache s wer e no t th e best

along th e gulf' s shore. 41 Th e souther n

beaches hav e littl e protectio n fro m th e

weather an d ar e backe d b y fis h ponds ,

rice paddies, an d man y tida l streams of

varied width s an d depths. Thes e obsta -

cles severel y limi t maneuve r i n th e

immediate beach area and channel movement alon g a relatively fe w narrow corridors o f egres s fro m th e shor e lin e t o

the Centra l Plains . B y fa r th e bes t

beaches a t Lingaye n ar e thos e o n th e

eastern shore , wher e th e Japanes e ha d

landed in December 1941 . Bu t information availabl e t o Genera l Kruege r indi -

cated tha t th e Japanes e maintaine d

strong defenses along the east side of the

gulf, takin g advantag e o f hig h groun d

overlooking that shore. Insofa r a s could

be ascertained from guerrill a sources, the

southern beache s were weakly defended.

Moreover, the southern shore boasted an

airstrip tha t th e Sixt h Arm y migh t b e

able t o rehabilitat e rapidly . Finally ,

since the southern beaches were relatively

poor, especially in regard to exits, a landing ther e migh t wel l achiev e a con -

siderable degre e o f tactica l surprise .

Taking int o consideratio n th e exi t

problem, ye t desirin g t o ge t ashor e

quickly a s stron g a forc e a s possible ,

Krueger decide d t o lan d o n a broa d

front. Thus , h e woul d sen d ashor e th e

maximum numbe r o f troop s th e south -

ern beache s coul d hol d an d th e maxi -

mum strengt h tha t coul d pus h inlan d

without creatin g unmanageabl e bottle -

necks alon g th e fe w exits. H e directe d

his tw o corps t o lan d abreast , wit h th e

I Corps on the left, o r east, and th e XIV

Corps o n th e right . Eac h corp s woul d

put tw o divisions, eac h les s on e RCT ,

ashore abreast. On e RCT (o r its equivalent) o f eac h divisio n woul d remai n

afloat i n reserv e until 1 0 January.42

The tw o corps' initia l mission s wer e

identical: t o seiz e th e beachhea d are a

within their respectiv e zones; t o protec t

the Sixth Army's flanks; an d to maintain

contact wit h eac h other . Bot h corp s

would b e prepare d t o pus h rapidl y in -

land t o secur e a crossing ove r th e Agn o

River, which , originatin g i n mountain s

far northeas t o f th e landin g beaches ,

swept i n a broa d ar c twent y t o twenty -

five miles inland across the Central Plains

and emptie d int o th e southwester n corner o f Lingaye n Gulf . Kruege r figure d

that onc e th e Sixt h Arm y wa s o n th e

Agno and its flanks wer e secure, it would

be read y t o driv e o n sout h t o secur e

Manila an d Manil a Bay.

Expecting som e congestio n o n th e

beaches, Kruege r decide d t o hol d hi s

army reserve—th e 25t h Infantr y Divi -

sion, th e 158t h RCT, an d th e 13th Armored Group—afloa t unti l 1 1 January.

Since the greatest threat would probably

develop o n th e army 's left , Kruege r di -

rected th e 158t h RC T t o g o ashor e o n

the 11t h alon g the I Corps' extrem e left

and b e read y t o bloc k th e coasta l corridor o n th e gulf' s easter n shor e s o a s t o

hold bac k an y Japanes e counterattac k

from th e north. Sixt h Arm y prepare d a

number o f alternativ e plans for th e em -

41

 The remainde r of this subsection is based generally upon: Sixth Army Rpt Luzon , I, 6-9; Sixth Army

FO 34 , 20 Nov 44, ibid., I, 117-39 ; I Corp s F O 1 , 2 5

Nov 44 , Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 9 De c 44;

XIV Corp s F O 1 , 3 0 No v 44 , Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l

File Luzon, 2-5 De c 44, 42

 See app. A-3.
32 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

ployment of the 25t h Division , most of

them anticipating that the division would

probably be committe d in the I Corps'

zone, wher e th e 13t h Armore d Grou p

was als o t o lan d an d prepar e fo r bot h

defensive an d offensiv e action .

To Genera l Krueger , th e tas k o f seiz -

ing an d securin g a beachhea d entaile d

gaining contro l o f al l th e terrai n en -

closed withi n th e limit s o f a n "Arm y

Beachhead Line, " a semicircl e wit h a

radius o f roughl y fiftee n mile s fro m th e

center o f th e landin g area . Th e factor s

determining th e locatio n o f th e Arm y

Beachhead Lin e ar e perhap s bes t de -

scribed by the Sixth Army's own report:

Sufficient dept h was essential to secure the

landing beache s agains t fir e fro m hostil e

long range artillery. I n additio n t o providing space for initial air installations, dispersion o f suppl y dumps , an d deploymen t o f

large forces, i t was highly desirable that the

Army Beachhea d includ e th e mai n acces s

roads leadin g t o th e sout h across th e Agn o

River a s wel l a s a n adequat e latera l roa d

net t o facilitate ready shifting of forces when

the tim e cam e t o brea k ou t o f th e beach - head. I t wa s important tha t thi s are a als o

include the road ne t emanating from Pozor -

rubio an d Binalona n [roughly , seventee n

miles east ] t o permi t th e concentratio n o f

our ow n armo r i n tha t area , whil e a t th e

same tim e denyin g th e are a t o ou r enemy .

As th e fina l consideration , th e Sixt h Arm y

flanks [ha d to] b e anchore d o n th e hig h

ground along the coastal defile s a t Port Sual

[to th e west ] an d i n th e Rosario-Damorti s

area [t o the northeast].43

The Naval and Amphibious Plan

Admiral Kinkaid's Allied Naval Forces

was responsibl e fo r transportin g th e

Sixth Army to Lingayen Gulf an d estab -

lishing it ashore. Thi s mission include d

the protection of the assault convoys, the

transport an d cove r o f reinforcemen t

and resuppl y echelons , preparatio n fo r

possible surfac e engagement s wit h ele -

ments o f th e Japanes e Navy , an d min e

sweeping and preliminar y bombardment

at Lingaye n Gul f befor e th e arriva l o f

the assaul t convoy s bearin g th e Sixt h

Army.44

These task s wer e beyon d th e capability o f th e Allie d Nava l Force s a s con -

stituted.45 Kinkai d ha d barel y enoug h

amphibious means under his permanent

control t o moun t a one-division assault ;

he ha d n o battleship s fo r preliminar y

bombardments; h e ha d n o CVE' s fo r

escort an d groun d suppor t missions ; h e

lacked destroyer s an d destroye r escort s

for th e proper protection of large assault

convoys; an d h e ha d insufficien t min e

sweepers t o undertak e th e extensiv e

sweeping at Lingayen Gulf tha t available

information indicate d migh t b e neces -

sary. Adequat e mean s woul d hav e t o

come fro m resource s unde r Admira l

Nimitz' control, and , i n accordanc e with

the Joint Chiefs' instruction s t o support

the Luzo n invasion , Nimit z furnishe d

the necessar y comba t vessel s an d

amphibious attac k ships .

Once th e mean s wer e assembled , th e

naval an d amphibiou s organizatio n fo r

Luzon followe d a patter n lon g sinc e established i n th e Southwes t Pacific . A t

the to p wa s Admira l Kinkaid , simulta -

43

 Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I, 8 .

44

 GHQ SWP A O I 73 , 1 2 Oct 44 . 45

 The genera l source s fo r th e remainde r o f thi s

subsection are : Luzo n Attac k Forc e Action Rpt, pp . 3,

7-13, 18-20 , 48-51 , an d an . A , Organization , pp .

1-14; Comd r II I Amphi b Forc e (Vic e Ad m Theo -

dore S . Wilkinson ) Lingaye n Gul f Op n Rpt , pp .

1-7, 15-18 ; Comd r VI I Amphi b Forc e (Vic e Ad m

Daniel E . Barbey ) Lingaye n Rpt , pp. 5-6 , 26-27;

Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I, 14-15 ; CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Opn s i n PO A During Jan 45 , pp. 4 , 48-49.
THE PLA N FO R INVASIO N 33

neously th e commande r o f th e Allie d

Naval Forces, the U.S. Seventh Fleet, and

the Luzo n Attac k Force . Th e Allie d

Naval Force s wa s the Sevent h Flee t plus

the fe w Australia n an d Dutc h vessel s

assigned to MacArthur, whil e the Luzon

Attack Force was the Allied Naval Forces

augmented b y th e ship s borrowe d fro m

Admiral Nimitz. 46 Kinkai d divide d

Luzon Attack Forc e into various combat

components, ove r som e o f whic h h e re -

tained direc t control. 47 Th e res t h e

assigned t o two subordinate amphibious

forces commande d b y Vice Adm. Danie l

E. Barbe y an d Vic e Adm . Theodore S .

Wilkinson.

Barbey (know n a s "Uncl e Dan , the

Amphibious Man, " i n th e Southwes t

Pacific Area) ha d lon g experience as the

commander o f th e Sevent h Fleet' s VI I

Amphibious Force. Fo r Luzo n his command was designated Task Force 78 (the

San Fabia n Attac k Force ) an d wa s re -

sponsible for putting the I Corps ashore.

Admiral Wilkinson , whos e norma l command wa s the II I Amphibiou s Forc e o f

Halsey's Thir d Fleet , commande d Tas k

Force 7 9 (th e Lingayen Attac k Force )

and wa s responsible for putting the XIV

Corps ashore . Each tas k forc e wa s further subdivide d int o amphibiou s tas k

groups, eac h o f whic h wa s t o lan d on e

infantry division. 48

The amphibiou s landin g pla n pre -

sented few unusual features. The landin g

hour was set for 0930 on 9 January, a bit

later i n th e da y tha n normal , an d ther e

were variation s i n th e compositio n an d

timing o f th e assaul t wave s o f each am -

phibious group, or, perhap s better, each

assault infantry division . Kinkaid set th e

hour for 0930 both to provide greater visibility in the landing area and to make allowances for tidal conditions. A n earlier

landing would se t forces o n shore in th e

face o f a strong ebb tide , low tide being

approximately 1050 ; a late r hou r might

redound t o th e advantag e o f th e Japa -

nese. Assaul t wave s wer e mad e u p o f

LVT's (Landin g Vehicles, Tracked ) o r

LVT (A)'s (Landin g Vehicles, Tracked,

Armored) an d th e timin g o f succeed -

ing waves varied from on e division beach

to another. 49

While the amphibious command structure wa s th e sam e a s tha t previousl y

employed i n th e Southwes t Pacific , i t

differed fro m tha t normally employed i n

the Sout h an d Centra l Pacifi c Areas .

Control o f al l air, land, an d se a force s

of th e Southwes t Pacifi c wa s veste d i n

General MacArthur . Directl y unde r

him, commandin g th e invasio n unti l

ground forc e commanders could assume

control ashore , wa s Admira l Kinkaid .

The transfe r o f contro l fro m nava l t o

ground commander s passe d fro m th e

bottom up . Thus , whe n a n infantr y di -

vision commande r assume d contro l

ashore he passe d from th e control of the

task grou p commande r t o tha t o f th e

next highe r nava l echelon , th e tas k

force. Whe n the corps commander went

ashore, he passed from th e control of the

amphibious tas k forc e commande r t o

that o f Admira l Kinkaid . Kinkai d re -

tained comman d o f bot h nava l an d

46

 Eleven Australia n vessels , includin g tw o heav y

cruisers an d tw o destroyers , participate d i n th e

Luzon invasion . A t th e tim e o f th e assault , th e

Netherlands contributio n t o th e Allie d Nava l Force s

was represente d onl y b y a fe w submarines , whic h

played n o direc t part . 47

 See app. A-4. 48

 See app. A-5. 49

 See app. B .
34 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

ground element s unti l Kruege r wen t

ashore, reportin g onl y t o MacArthu r

until Sixth Army headquarters was functioning o n land . A s a practica l matter,

Kinkaid issue d n o orders t o th e ground

forces withou t prio r consultatio n wit h

General Krueger.

Admiral Wilkinson , mor e familia r

with another system of amphibious com -

mand, suggeste d tha t h e comman d th e

"joint expedition, " tha t is , th e landin g

operation proper, while Kinkaid retained

"over-all" command not onl y o f the amphibious operatio n bu t als o o f all othe r

Allied Nava l Force s activities—thos e o f

submarines and detached surface groups,

for example—no t directl y involve d i n

the invasion. Wilkinson's proposals called

for th e creatio n o f a separat e comman d

and staff , tha t o f th e "commander , joint

expeditionary force. " Thi s syste m ha d

worked wel l i n th e Sout h an d Centra l

Pacific Areas , wher e carrie r an d battle -

ship forces no t directl y associated with a

landing ha d operate d unde r th e sam e

fleet commande r a s had th e amphibiou s

attack forces. 50 Admira l Kinkai d saw no

necessity fo r an extr a headquarters dur -

ing th e Luzo n invasion . Halsey 's Third

Fleet, whil e i t wa s t o provid e genera l

cover an d support , wa s not unde r Kin -

kaid's control. Therefore, Kinkaid turned

down Wilkinson 's suggestio n wit h th e

observation tha t sinc e s o muc h o f th e

Allied Nava l Force s woul d b e a n inte -

gral part o f th e propose d "join t expedi -

tionary force, " Kinkai d coul d retai n

tighter contro l ove r th e amphibiou s op -

eration wit h a singl e headquarters tha n

would b e possibl e unde r Wilkinson' s

system.

Operating essentiall y a s a fas t carrie r

task forc e unde r Halsey , and comprisin g

the bulk of the U.S . Navy' s most modern

battleships, carriers , cruisers , an d de -

stroyers, th e Thir d Fleet' s mission s i n

support o f th e Lingaye n invasio n prin -

cipally concerne d strategi c ai r suppor t

operations. However , i n th e unlikel y

event th e Japanes e shoul d assembl e suf -

ficient surfac e element s t o precipitat e a

major flee t action, Admiral Halsey would

reorganize his vessel s fo r surfac e action .

In thi s connection , i t i s interestin g t o

note tha t despit e th e nea r shamble s a t

Leyte Gul f i n October , necessar y nava l

co-ordination at the time of the Lingayen

assault coul d b e accomplishe d onl y b y

co-operation betwee n MacArthu r an d

Nimitz, Agai n n o provisio n wa s mad e

for unifie d comman d i n cas e o f a n

emergency.

The Air Cover and Support Plan

Unlike Admira l Kinkaid , Genera l

Kenney ha d sufficien t resource s i n th e

Southwest Pacifi c t o undertak e th e bul k

of th e air missions necessary fo r th e sup -

port o f th e Lingaye n invasion , bu t h e

could not bring those resources to bear.51

The fac t wa s that th e Allie d Ai r Force s

50

 See, inter alia, Philip A. Crowl an d Edmun d G .

Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington ,

1955).

51

 This subsectio n is based principall y upon : GH Q

SWPA O I 73 , 1 2 Oc t 44 ; AA F SWP A O I 73 , 1 7 Oc t

44; AN F SWPA , an . G , Ai r Plan , t o Op n Pla n No .

17-44, 2 0 No v 44 , Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon ,

1-2 De c 44 ; Fift h Ai r Forc e O I 7 , 2 6 Oc t 44 , G-3

GHQ Jn l File , 3 1 Oc t 44 ; Lt r o f Agreemen t G- 3

GHQ SWP A an d Plan s Of f Pacifi c Flee t (Sherman )

for MacArthur , Nimitz , Arnold, et al., sub : Co-ordi -

nation o f Opn s (FIVESOM E Agreement) , Sixt h Arm y

G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 1-15 Nov 44; CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Opn s i n PO A During Jan 45 , pp. 3-8, 11-12,

24-31, 48-51 .
THE PLA N FO R INVASIO N 35

could no t deploy enough land-based aircraft a t field s withi n range of Luzon, the

southern Philippines, Formosa, and other

Japanese ai r bas e area s t o furnis h th e

required minimu m essentia l suppor t o f

various types . Fo r thi s reaso n Mac -

Arthur ha d t o borro w CVE' s fro m th e

Central Pacific, make arrangements with

Nimitz fo r Thir d Flee t cove r an d sup -

port an d th e hel p o f land-base d aircraf t

of th e Centra l Pacifi c Area , arrange with

the Joint Chiefs o f Staff s fo r support b y

B-29 unit s i n th e Pacifi c an d China ,

and co-ordinat e hi s plan s wit h th e

China-based Fourteent h Ai r Force .

Kinkaid's CVE-based planes had varied

missions i n connectio n wit h th e Lin -

gayen assault, many of which they would

execute i n co-operatio n wit h th e land -

based plane s o f th e Allie d Ai r Forces .

The CVE' s would provid e cove r fo r the

assault an d reinforcemen t convoys , un -

dertake air strike s a t th e objectiv e are a

in conjunction wit h th e preassault mine

sweeping an d bombardment , hel p th e

Allied Air Forces forestall Japanese overland an d overwate r movement s towar d

Lingayen Gulf , an d provid e clos e ai r

support fo r groun d operation s ashor e

until relieve d o f tha t responsibilit y b y

Kenney's land-based planes.

In turn , the Allied Air Forces' principal mission s include d strikin g souther n

Luzon befor e th e assault i n conjunctio n

with Thir d Flee t carrie r operation s t o

the north, helpin g th e CVE's t o protec t

assault convoys , augmentin g CVE-base d

aircraft effort s t o sto p an y Japanes e at -

tempts t o move troops towar d Lingaye n

Gulf b y land o r sea , bombing Japanese

air base s an d othe r installation s i n th e

southern Philippine s an d th e Indies ,

helping guerrilla saboteurs disrupt Japanese communication s o n Luzon , and ,

finally, makin g reconnaissanc e an d pho -

tographic missions. 52 Withi n a wee k

after th e Lingaye n assault , Kenney' s

land-based aircraf t wer e t o reliev e th e

CVE-based plane s of further responsibility for the support o f ground operation s

on Luzon , a missio n tha t require d th e

rapid constructio n o f airstrip s i n th e

Lingayen Gulf area .

Kenney delegate d responsibilit y fo r

the executio n o f th e bul k o f thes e missions t o th e U.S . Fifth Ai r Force , com -

manded b y Maj . Gen . Enni s C .

Whitehead. Th e othe r majo r compo -

nents o f th e Allie d Ai r Forces—th e

Thirteenth Ai r Forc e unde r Maj . Gen .

St. Clai r Streett , an d th e Roya l Austra -

lian Air Force Command under Air Vice

Marshall Willia m D . Bostock—wer e t o

help insofa r a s thei r deploymen t an d

other assignment s permitted . Th e las t

two would be more intimately concerned

with th e reconques t o f th e souther n

Philippines and Borneo.

Many o f th e Allie d Ai r Force s searc h

and reconnaissanc e mission s woul d b e

flown b y land-based aircraft o f the Allied

Naval Forces, operating under Kenney's

control. Als o under the operational control o f th e Allie d Ai r Force s wer e U.S .

Marine Corp s ai r unit s — then i n th e

process of moving forward from th e Solomon Island s an d Bismarc k Archipelag o

— which Kenne y ha d place d unde r

Whitehead's command . Palau-base d

bombers of the Seventh Air Force, under

Nimitz' control , wer e als o to hi t target s

on Luzon at times and place s determined

by Kenney . Th e Fourteent h Ai r Forc e

52

 In additio n t o th e source s liste d i n not e 51 ,

information o n Allie d Air Force s mission s is derived

from: AA F SWPA, OI's 73/3, 21 Nov, and 73/8 , 2 7

Dec 44, G-3 GH Q Jnl File , 17 Oct 44; Thirteenth Air

Force OI 15 , 8 Nov 44, G-3 GH Q Jnl File , 13 Nov 44.
36 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

would conduc t searche s ove r Formos a

and th e South Chin a Sea and bomb Japanese air and port installation s along the

China coast . Land-base d plane s i n th e

rear area s o f th e Pacifi c woul d continue

to neutraliz e Japanes e airfield s o n

bypassed islands .

There wa s som e difficult y selectin g

profitable target s fo r th e supportin g

B-29's o f th e Twentieth Air Force—the

XX Bombe r Comman d i n Chin a an d

India an d th e XX I Bombe r Comman d

on the Mariana Islands. MacArthu r and

Nimitz wante d th e bi g bombers t o pa y

special attentio n t o Japanes e por t an d

air installation s o n Formos a and i n th e

Ryukyus, but Genera l Arnold , th e com -

mander o f th e Army Air Forces , did no t

consider airfield s suitabl e B-29 targets.

As i t worke d out, th e B-29 plan calle d

for strike s agains t aircraf t depot s an d

factories i n Japa n immediatel y befor e

and afte r th e Lingaye n assault , together

with attack s against port installation s i n

northern Formosa . Th e firs t serie s wa s

designed t o forestal l th e Japanes e send -

ing any planes southward from th e home

islands an d th e secon d t o preven t th e

Japanese from assemblin g reinforcement

convoys a t Formosa . Finally , th e X X

and XX I Bombe r Command s wer e t o

undertake a n extensiv e reconnaissanc e

program ove r th e wester n Pacifi c an d

Japan, th e progra m t o b e accompanie d

by light , harassin g bombing.53

The principa l mission s o f th e fas t

carrier tas k group s o f Halsey' s Thir d

Fleet wer e t o destro y Japanes e ai r an d

naval force s i n th e Ryukyus , Formosa ,

south Chin a coast , an d norther n Luzo n

areas before th e Lingaye n assault, and t o

prevent Japanes e ai r an d nava l inter -

ference with th e assault. Specifically , th e

carrier-based aircraf t wer e schedule d t o

strike Formosa , th e Ryukyus , an d th e

Pescadores (betwee n Formos a an d th e

south Chin a coast ) o n 3 and 4 January,

then refue l an d mov e t o ne w position s

on th e 5th i n orde r t o blanke t Japanes e

airfields i n norther n Luzo n o n 6 Janu -

ary, and strik e Formosa and th e Ryukyus

again o n 7 and 9 January.54

One important , albei t tentative ,

change wa s propose d fo r thi s schedul e

before 9 January. 55 Fearin g tha t Japa -

nese surfac e force s migh t sorti e fro m

bases a t Singapor e an d i n Indochin a

after th e CVE' s an d othe r surfac e com -

bat vessel s borrowe d fro m Nimit z ha d

returned t o th e Centra l Pacific , Genera l

MacArthur suggeste d tha t afte r th e Lin -

gayen assaul t the Third Flee t move into

the Sout h Chin a Se a t o strik e Japanes e

naval an d ai r concentration s alon g th e

coast o f th e mainland . I f suc h a mov e

could no t be undertaken , the Southwest

Pacific commande r pointed out, it might

be necessar y t o hol d th e borrowe d re -

sources a t Luzo n longer, thu s agai n de -

laying Nimitz' invasions of Iwo Jima and

Okinawa.

53

 Rad, MacArthu r t o Arnold , CX-51561 , 5 No v

44, CM-I N 4769 ; Rad , MacArthu r t o Nimit z an d

Arnold, CX-52470 , 1 9 No v 44 , CM-IN 18735 ; Rad ,

Nimitz t o MacArthur , Halsey , an d Arnold , 225 5 2 0

Nov 44, CM-IN 21078 ; Rads, Arnol d t o MacArthur ,

Nimitz, Wedemeyer, et al., 1 7 Nov, 26 Nov, 1 9 Dec,

and 22 Dec 44, CM-OUT's 6457 9 and 6882 9 Nov, 79536 and 8099 8 Dec.

54

 An. C t o Thir d Flee t Op n Pla n No . 24-44 , 2 8

Dec 44, and 2d Carrier TF (T F 38, the Third Fleet's

fast carriers ) Op n Orde r No . 5-44 , 2 7 Dec 44 , both

in Sixt h Army G-3 Jn l File Luzon, 1-3 Ja n 45 . 55

 The stor y o f thi s chang e i s base d principall y

upon: Memo , ACof S G- 3 GH Q SWP A fo r Mac -

Arthur, 2 5 De c 44 , sub: Protectio n o f Amphibiou s

Assault . . . Movemen t to Lingayen Gulf, G-3 GHQ

Jnl File , 2 5 Dec 44; Rad, MacArthur t o Halsey , CX54435, 6 Dec 44, CM-IN 7977 ; CINCPAC-CINCPOA

Opns i n PO A Durin g Ja n 45 , pp. 4 , 11-12; Halse y

and Bryan , Admiral Halsey's Story, pp . 241-42 .
THE PLA N FO R INVASIO N 37

The water s int o whic h MacArthu r

suggested th e Third Flee t sai l ha d bee n

unchallenged b y Allie d nava l force s

other tha n submarine s sinc e th e los s o f

H.M.S. Prince of Wales an d H.M.S .

Repulse t o Japanes e aircraf t i n Decem -

ber 1941 . Moreover , th e Sout h Chin a

Sea wa s ringe d b y Japanes e field s esti -

mated t o hol d wel l ove r 1,00 0 planes,

the operations of whic h woul d no t b e a s

severely handicapped by the bad weathe r

to be expecte d durin g January a s would

those o f carrier-base d aircraft .

Nevertheless, Nimit z an d Halse y fel l

in quit e happil y wit h th e idea . Halse y

had bee n anxious to press th e war closer

to th e Japanes e fo r som e time , an d

Nimitz, too , fel t tha t successfu l opera -

tions i n th e Sout h Chin a Se a might wel l

have grav e advers e psychologica l effect s

on th e Japanese , simultaneousl y boost -

ing Chines e morale . Furthermore , th e

Japanese comba t vessel s know n t o b e

based i n Indochina , togethe r wit h con -

centrations o f carg o an d transpor t ship s

along th e wester n shore s o f th e Sout h

China Sea , promised lucrativ e target s

for carrier-base d air attacks. Finally , th e

sortie migh t hel p mislea d th e Japanes e

as t o th e directio n o f th e mai n attack .

Accordingly, Nimit z directe d Admira l

Halsey t o b e read y t o mov e th e fas t car -

riers int o th e Sout h Chin a Se a afte r

Southwest Pacifi c force s ha d mad e a

successful assaul t a t Lingaye n Gulf .

As was the case for naval elements, th e

invasion o f Luzo n involve d n o provi -

sions fo r centralize d ai r command , ex -

cept i n th e immediat e Lingaye n Gul f

area.56 Again , fo r force s o f th e South -

west Pacific , th e joint control wa s vested

in Genera l MacArthur, who by virtue of

his positio n woul d contro l bot h CVE -

based an d land-base d aircraf t throug h

Kinkaid and Kenney , respectively. How -

ever, al l land-base d an d CVE-base d

planes operatin g i n th e Lingaye n Gul f

area befor e th e assaul t woul d b e con -

trolled b y th e Advanc e Commande r

Support Aircraft , reportin g t o Kinkai d

through th e nava l office r i n contro l o f

the preliminary bombardment and min e

sweeping groups . Upo n th e arriva l o f

the Luzo n Attac k Force , contro l ove r

these plane s woul d pas s t o th e Com -

mander Support Aircraft Luzon , another

naval office r reportin g directl y t o Kin -

kaid, wh o would remai n i n genera l control o f ai r operation s i n th e are a unti l

the Allie d Ai r Force s too k over. 57

For th e rest , th e CV-base d an d land -

based plane s fro m Admira l Nimitz '

command ha d t o b e controlle d b y co -

operation betwee n Nimit z an d Mac -

Arthur, just a s MacArthur ha d t o mak e

arrangements wit h th e Join t Chief s fo r

B-29 support and could exercis e control

over Fourteenth Ai r Force activities only

by co-operation . Th e executio n o f th e

air plan , as it was finally evolved, entailed

the effort s o f nearl y fiftee n majo r ai r

commands, both Army and Navy , directing th e activitie s o f bot h carrier-base d

and land-base d aircraft , operatin g i n

separate theater s an d acros s theate r

boundaries, an d reportin g t o highe r

headquarters throug h widel y differin g

channels. Th e tas k facin g th e planner s

was difficult , t o b e sure , bu t afte r thre e

years o f experienc e wit h suc h a compli -

cated air organizatio n th e planners wer e

well awar e o f wha t wa s required an d o f

56

 See app. A-6.

57

 An. G, Ai r Plan , t o AN F SWPA Op n Pla n No .

17-44, 20 Nov 44; Comdr Air Support Control Units,

Seventh Fleet, Rpt o f Support Aircraft Opn s MIK E I,

20 Jan 45, G-3 Jn l File , 1 7 Jan 45.
38 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

what each air echelon was capable. Thus,

in th e end , a n ai r pla n wa s developed

with remarkabl y littl e fuss , considerin g

the problems involved. Ther e can, how -

ever, be no evading the fac t tha t the task

of co-ordinatin g air , ground , an d nava l

plans an d operation s woul d hav e bee n

considerably simplifie d ha d a differen t

command arrangemen t existe d i n th e

Pacific.

The Logistical Plan

Organization and Responsibility

The Unite d State s Arm y Service s o f

Supply, Southwes t Pacifi c Area , wa s t o

provide th e necessar y supplie s fo r th e

ground force s an d mos t o f th e ai r eche -

lons that General MacArthur committed

to th e Luzo n operation. 58 Th e Allie d

Naval Forces was responsible for its own

logistics—although i n cas e of emergenc y

it coul d dra w upo n Service s o f Suppl y

stocks—while th e Allie d Ai r Force s

would provid e its elements with special -

ized item s o f air forc e equipment . Th e

Allied Ai r Force s wa s als o responsibl e

for emergenc y air suppl y operations, fo r

which i t woul d dra w stock s fro m th e

Services o f Supply . Th e supportin g

forces unde r Admira l Nimitz ' contro l

would dra w thei r ow n supplie s an d

equipment throug h variou s Arm y an d

Navy channel s i n th e Centra l Pacifi c

Area. Fro m S-day—a s MacArthu r designated th e invasio n targe t date—on , th e

Sixth Army was responsible for all othe r

logistical operation s o n Luzo n unti l i t

was relieved o f thos e duties b y th e Serv -

ices o f Supply , o n o r abou t S plu s 35 .

On th e same date, the Services of Supply

was t o reliev e th e Allie d Nava l Force s

of th e responsibilit y fo r transportin g

men an d equipmen t t o Luzon .

In general , th e logistica l progra m fo r

the Luzo n Campaig n presente d fe w unusual feature s excep t a n extrem e decen -

tralization o f logistica l responsibilitie s

during th e stagin g an d assaul t phases ,

when th e corp s and , t o a lesse r extent ,

the divisions had abnormally heavy logistic duties. I n th e plan , logistica l opera -

tions ashore on Luzo n woul d be divided

into thre e phases . First , unde r Sixt h

Army's genera l direction , th e corp s an d

divisions wer e t o b e responsibl e fo r al l

aspects o f suppl y an d constructio n ex -

cept for the duties assigned t o th e Allied

Air an d Nava l Forces. Second , wit h th e

Allied Nava l Force s continuin g t o hol d

overwater transportation responsibilities,

an Arm y Servic e Comman d woul d re -

lieve th e corp s an d division s o f man y

logistical burdens . Th e linea l descend -

ant o f a simila r organizatio n employe d

by th e Sixt h Arm y a t Leyte , th e Arm y

Service Command , operatin g unde r th e

control o f Headquarters , Sixt h Army ,

would assume logistica l responsibility in

the Lingaye n Gul f are a o n S plus 6 . A t

that time it woul d tak e ove r th e control

of most of th e logistica l support agencies

already ashore , suc h a s the shor e partie s

built aroun d enginee r boa t an d shor e

regiments previousl y assigne d t o divi -

sions. Th e thir d an d fina l phas e woul d

begin o n o r abou t S plus 35 , whe n th e

Services of Supply was to assume responsibility fo r al l logistica l operation s (ex -

cept comba t suppl y activity) , takin g

over th e contro l o f th e Arm y Servic e

Command an d it s subordinate echelons.

58

 This and th e next subsection are base d generally

upon: GH Q SWP A O I 73 , 1 2 Oct 44 ; USASO S L I

73/SOS, 4 Nov 44, and L I 73/21/SOS , 21 Jan 45 , both

in G- 3 GH Q Jn l File , 4 Nov 44. Sixth Arm y Admi n

Order 16 , 23 No v 44 , an d amendment s thereto , i n

Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 136-39 ; Sixt h Arm y Rp t

Luzon, III , 51-58 , 113 .
THE PLA N FO R INVASIO N 39

The suppl y pla n calle d fo r assaul t

units t o reac h Lingaye n Gul f wit h suffi -

cient supplies and equipmen t of all types

to las t te n days . A t th e same tim e combat echelon s woul d brin g wit h the m

two unit s o f fir e fo r al l weapons . B y

S plus 1 2 a month's supply of most items

of equipmen t an d fiv e unit s o f fir e fo r

combat organization s woul d hav e bee n

built u p i n th e Lingaye n Gul f area .

Within tw o month s afte r th e invasion ,

the Service s o f Suppl y woul d shi p for -

ward t o Luzo n a three-mont h suppl y o f

matériel for some 203,000 troops, including fiftee n unit s o f fir e fo r artiller y an d

mortars and te n unit s of fir e fo r all other

weapons.59

General Problems

The bi g proble m i n stagin g an d sup -

porting the Luzon invasion was the same

one encountere d i n mos t othe r opera -

tions i n ever y theate r throughou t th e

war—insufficient shipping. 60 Fo r Luzon ,

specifically, th e lac k o f ship s cause d tw o

significant shortage s in th e forward area .

First, th e assaul t units, findin g i t neces -

sary t o allot most of their availabl e cargo

space t o troop s an d genera l supplies ,

had t o leav e behin d i n th e stagin g area s

many of their assigned vehicles. 61 A general shortag e o f engineer s woul d als o

develop durin g th e initia l stages o f th e

operation, since it was impossible to send

forward wit h th e assaul t convoy s al l th e

required engineers and equipment. This

shortage wa s overcom e relativel y earl y

in th e campaig n a s resuppl y convoys ,

often involvin g a retur n tri p b y ship s

of th e assault echelons, brough t forwar d

more Enginee r unit s an d equipment .

The shippin g tha t reache d Lingaye n

Gulf i n th e firs t tw o convoys—on e o n

S-day an d on e o n S plus 2—consiste d o f

three principa l categories : th e nava l as -

sault shippin g functionin g mainl y a s

troop carriers but having secondary cargocarrying capacities; nava l assaul t vessels,

whose primary function wa s transporting

bulk carg o an d vehicle s bu t whic h als o

carried som e troops; an d merchant-typ e

cargo ship s involve d mainl y i n resuppl y

operations. O f th e first group , 8 4 vessels

arrived a t Lingayen Gulf throug h S plus

2. Ther e wer e als o 21 6 naval an d mer -

chant-type cargo ships. Twenty-fiv e more

of thes e type s wer e schedule d t o arriv e

on S plus 4, and a n aggregat e of 7 1 merchant ship s woul d reac h th e gul f b y S

plus 60 .

In settin g up a timetabl e for dispatching ships t o Luzon , th e Sixt h Arm y an d

the Allied Nava l Force s ha d t o pla n fo r

a discharg e rat e o f abou t 5,00 0 dead -

weight ton s pe r da y durin g th e firs t

month, and ha d t o take into account th e

potential demand s o f th e tactica l situa -

tion ashor e a s well a s th e availabilit y o f

59

 The Worl d Wa r I I uni t o f fir e wa s the amoun t

of ammunitio n on e weapo n o r on e organizatio n

would normall y us e i n on e day , and wa s figure d i n

terms of rounds or ton s pe r weapo n o r organization .

At thi s writin g th e wartim e ter m "uni t o f fire " ha s

no exac t equivalen t i n U .S. Army usage , an d thre e

different term s ar e presentl y employe d fo r ammuni -

tion requirements and expenditures. Th e Southwes t

Pacific's uni t of fir e a t th e tim e of th e Lingaye n Gulf

assault included ; M 1 rifle , 10 0 rounds; 81-mm. mortar, 240 rounds; 105-mm , fiel d artiller y howitzer , 300

rounds; 155-mm . howitzer , 15 0 rounds. 60

 In additio n t o th e source s liste d i n not e 46, general sources used in the preparation of this subsection

include: Luzo n Attac k Forc e Actio n Rpt , pp. 16-19 ,

77-79, and an . A, Org, pp . 4-12; Sixth Arm y Rpt o n

Luzon Campaign , IV , 3 , 7-8, 11, 18, 22; III Amphi b

Force Lingayen Gul f Rpt , Encl G, Logistics, pp. 1-3;

4th ESB Rpt Luzon, pp. i-iii, 1-2.

61

 The 40t h Division, fo r example , lef t abou t one -

third o f it s vehicle s o n Ne w Britain . Comment s o f

Maj Gen Rap p Brush (Ret .) (formerl y CG 40th Div),

28 De c 56 .
40 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

escorts. Eac h headquarters , basin g it s

arguments o n experienc e a t Leyte , came

up wit h a n entirel y different tim e schedule fo r th e arriva l o f resuppl y convoys ,

and th e area o f disagreement became s o

wide that at one time early in Novembe r

all plannin g cam e t o a nea r standstill .

The principa l poin t a t issu e wa s

whether t o schedule a convoy fo r S plus

1. Kruege r argue d tha t congestio n a t

Leyte had bee n caused b y dividing ships

of a once-schedule d A plu s 1 convo y

between A-da y an d A plu s 2 echelons ,

but Admira l Kinkai d replie d tha t i f a n

A plu s 1 convoy ha d bee n sen t t o Leyt e

the confusio n alread y existin g ther e

would hav e becom e complet e chaos ,

since muc h o f th e shippin g schedule d

to b e unloade d o n A-da y wa s no t dis -

charged a s planned. Moreover , Kinkai d

pointed out , he di d no t hav e sufficien t

escort vessels to execute the Sixth Army's

plan. Th e solutio n finall y agree d upo n

called fo r a combined S-day and S plus 1

convoy t o reach Lingaye n Gul f o n S-da y

but wit h n o effor t t o b e mad e t o star t

discharging th e S plu s 1 convo y unti l

10 January . Othe r echelon s wer e t o

arrive o n S plu s 2 , S plu s 4 , S plu s 8 ,

S plu s 12 , and s o on. 62

Except fo r artiller y ammunitio n an d

light, portabl e bridgin g equipment , th e

Services o f Suppl y ha d littl e difficult y

meeting suppl y quotas . A theaterwid e

artillery ammunition shortag e prompted

General Kruege r t o direct artiller y com -

manders t o contro l expenditure s care -

fully. He enjoined them to make accurate

calculation o f fir e dat a an d t o hol d un -

observed fir e t o th e minimum. 63 Th e

shortage wa s graduall y overcome , espe -

cially after resuppl y began to arrive from

the Unite d State s and afte r th e cumula -

tive effec t o f th e progra m o f carefu l

expenditure bega n t o mak e itsel f felt .

The shortag e o f ligh t bridgin g equip -

ment wa s not alleviate d unti l ver y lat e

in th e campaign. A t first , a slow rat e o f

discharge create d a shortag e o f heav y

bridging equipmen t inlan d fro m th e

beachhead, bu t a s th e equipmen t wa s

unloaded th e proble m diminished .

One othe r suppl y proble m deserve s

special mention , tha t concernin g civi l

administration and relief. Wit h the Japanese takin g everythin g the y coul d possibly carry with them as they moved into

defensive positions , th e civilia n popula -

tion o f Luzo n bega n t o run dangerousl y

low o n foo d an d medica l supplies. Gov -

ernment a t th e local and nationa l levels,

completely reorganize d sinc e 1941 , wa s

approaching a state of chaos. Th e prob -

lem wa s vast, ye t coul d no t b e allowe d

to interfer e wit h tactica l operations.

To hel p the Sixt h Arm y an d its components wit h a civi l affair s an d relie f

program, MacArthu r activate d an d

attached thirteen Philippine Civil Affairs

Units (PCAU's ) t o the various echelons

of th e command . Bearin g som e resem -

blance t o militar y governmen t unit s

being employed i n Europe , many o f th e

PCAU's wer e partiall y staffe d b y expa -

triate Filipino s fro m th e Unite d States ,

Their responsibilitie s include d super -

62

 The stor y of the solutio n o f th e convoy-scheduling proble m i s t o b e foun d i n a serie s o f radio s

among Sixt h Arm y headquarter s a t Leyte , a Sixt h

Army plannin g group i n GH Q SWP A a t Hollandia ,

and AN F SWPA. Thes e messages, most o f the m ex -

changed durin g th e firs t wee k o f November , ar e

located i n Sixt h Army G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 1-15 Nov

44, o r i n Sixt h Arm y Rea r Echelo n G- 3 Jn l Fil e

Luzon, 1-11 No v 44.

63

 Ltr, Kruege r (t o subordinat e units) , 4 De c 44 ,

sub: S p Instruction s t o F A Comdr s i n M- 1 Opn ,

Sixth Arm y G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 6-8 De c 44.
THE PLA N FO R INVASIO N 41

vising th e distributio n o f relie f supplies ,

setting pric e ceiling s an d directin g th e

retailing o f consume r goods , re-estab -

lishing school s an d medica l facilities ,

and reconstitutin g loca l governments .

Since th e vas t majorit y o f th e Luzo n

Filipinos wer e loyal , th e PCAU' s coul d

expect co-operation .

Each PCA U boarde d shi p wit h th e

maximum quantit y o f relie f supplie s i t

could squeez e int o th e carg o spac e

allotted it . GH Q SWP A provide d fo r a

bulk shipmen t o f 4,00 0 ton s o f relie f

supplies t o reac h Lingaye n Gul f o n S

plus 18 , an d withi n anothe r mont h an d

a hal f som e 16,00 0 mor e ton s woul d

arrive on Luzon . Suitabl e captured Jap -

anese supplie s woul d b e distribute d t o

the needy , an d i n a n emergenc y th e

PCAU's could call upon th e Sixth Army

or th e Service s of Supply to provide food

and medica l supplies.

For th e combat forces, th e most pressing assaul t logistica l requiremen t woul d

be th e unloading, stockpiling, an d deliv -

ery o f essentia l supplie s and equipment .

No provisio n wa s mad e fo r centralize d

control o f thes e operation s durin g th e

assault phas e — such woul d no t com e

until th e Arm y Servic e Comman d as -

sumed logistica l responsibilitie s i n th e

Lingayen Gul f area . Instead , th e

responsibilities were decentralized at the

division level , th e actua l wor k t o b e

undertaken by shore parties built around

engineer boa t an d shor e regiment s at -

tached t o eac h division . Shor e part y

operations woul d b e supplemente d b y

the activitie s o f Nav y beach parties, control ove r whic h wa s eve n mor e decen -

tralized. I n general , th e beac h partie s

would direc t unloadin g traffi c and , in

co-operation wit h th e shor e parties ,

select beache s for suppl y discharge.

The nex t major logistica l requirement

involved construction . A grea t dea l o f

road an d bridg e constructio n woul d b e

necessary i n th e beachhead area , and airfields woul d hav e t o b e buil t quickl y i n

the region s o that th e supportin g CVE's

could b e released o n schedule . Th e firs t

airfield constructio n projec t wa s t o pro -

vide a fiel d b y S plus 6 t o accommodat e

two fighte r group s an d a nigh t fighte r

squadron. B y S plu s 1 5 a secon d fiel d

was to be ready, triplin g or quadrupling

the capacity of th e first . Th e I an d XI V

Corps wer e responsibl e fo r beginnin g

work o n al l constructio n projects ; th e

Army Service Command would take over

on S plus 6 .

Other majo r constructio n project s t o

be undertake n b y th e Arm y Servic e

Command include d petroleu m storag e

and distributio n facilities , warehouses ,

hospitals, dock s and jetties , and, i n gen -

eral, al l th e bas e facilitie s necessar y t o

the suppor t o f th e 203,000 troop s fo r

whom supplie s wer e t o b e brough t forward. A Nava l Servic e Command, operating initially under Sixth Army control,

would prepar e a PT (Moto r Torpedo )

boat base , some naval shor e installations

including repair facilities, and a seaplane

base.

Evacuation o f sic k an d wounde d fro m

the fron t line s t o th e beachhea d wa s at

first th e responsibilit y o f th e tw o corps.

The Allie d Nava l Forces , durin g th e

early phase s o f th e operation , woul d

send casualtie s t o rea r area s o n assaul t

shipping, an d th e Allie d Ai r Force s

would undertak e ai r evacuatio n a s airfields becam e available . Unti l adequat e

fixed hospitalizatio n could be established

on Luzon , mos t casualtie s woul d b e

moved t o hospital s ru n b y th e Service s

of Suppl y o n Leyte .
42 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Thus, th e logistica l pla n calle d fo r

extreme decentralizatio n o f operationa l

responsibilities during the assault phase ,

decentralization tha t woul d b e followe d

by a n orderl y passag e o f responsibilit y

to centralize d directio n firs t unde r th e

Army Service Command and the n under

the Service s o f Supply .
Map 2
CHAPTER II I

Preliminary Operations an d th e Approach

Airfields on Mindoro

Getting to the Objective

The firs t ste p of th e Luzo n Campaign

involved th e seizur e an d developmen t

of air bas e sites in southwestern Mindoro

in orde r t o provid e land-base d ai r cove r

for convoy s movin g towar d Lingaye n

Gulf an d t o permit th e Allied Air Force s

to broade n th e bas e o f its attac k agains t

Japanese air powe r o n Luzon . Mindor o

is non e to o pleasan t a place . A n ovoi d

about hal f th e siz e o f Ne w Jersey , th e

island is very mountainous though i t ha s

some coastal plain s along the east , northeast, and southwes t shores. Throughou t

much o f Mindor o rai n i s a dail y occur -

rence eve n i n th e "dry" season . Humid -

ity i s high , th e climat e enervating , an d

malaria an d othe r tropica l disease s prev -

alent. Third-rankin g i n siz e amon g th e

Philippines, Mindor o i s fo r th e mos t

part undevelope d an d ha s fewe r natura l

resources and les s favorabl e terrai n tha n

many o f th e othe r islands.

The bes t airfiel d sites , MacArthur' s

planners knew , wer e locate d i n th e

northeast, bu t tha t sectio n o f th e islan d

has poo r flyin g weathe r an d wa s dan -

gerously clos e t o Japanese air concentra -

tions on Luzon . Therefore , th e planners

elected t o secur e a beachhea d an d air -

field site s near San Jose, in th e southwest

corner. (Map 2) Mangari n Bay ,

Mindoro's bes t anchorage , la y nearby. 1

The Allie s accuratel y estimate d tha t

the Japanes e garrison o n Mindor o num -

bered some 1,00 0 troops . Th e me n were

under th e contro l o f th e Japanes e 8th

Division o n Luzon , bu t th e comba t

troops — two provisiona l infantr y com -

panies—came fro m th e 105th Division,

likewise o n Luzon . Als o presen t wer e

about 20 0 survivor s o f ship s sun k of f

Mindoro o n th e wa y t o Leyte , som e

Japanese Arm y Ai r Forc e engineers ,

ground crew s o f a coupl e o f Japanes e

Naval Ai r Servic e units , an d a handfu l

of othe r servic e troops . Th e 8th Division organize d a Marauding Unit o f 110

troops and sen t i t fro m Luzo n t o north -

ern Mindor o shortly afte r 1 5 December,

or U-da y as the Mindor o target dat e was

known. Th e reinforcements did nothing

to put th e Japanese on Mindoro in posi -

tion t o defen d th e islan d agains t th e

force MacArthu r ha d sent. 2

MacArthur assigne d responsibilit y fo r

the operation to General Krueger's Sixth

Army, supporte d b y th e Allie d Ai r an d

Naval Forces . Krueger , i n turn , dele -

gated th e jo b t o a n especiall y create d

headquarters designate d th e Wester n

1

 GHQ SWPA 0 1 74 , 13 Oct 44, G-3 CH Q SWPA

Jnl File , 1 3 Oct 44 . 2

 Sixth Arm y F O 33 , 2 0 No v 44 , Sixth Arm y G- 3

Jnl Fil e Mindoro, 21-30 Nov 44; Japanese Studie s i n

World Wa r II , No . 12 , Operation s o n Mindoro ,

passim; WVTF Hist Rcd , 1 5 Dec 44-3 1 Ja n 45 , an. 2,

Intel Rpt, pp . 7-9, 12.
PRELIMINARY OPERATION S AN D TH E APPROAC H 45

Visayan Task Force, and placed this unit

under Brig . Gen . Willia m C , Dunckel .

The principa l comba t component s o f

the forc e wer e th e 19t h Regimental

Combat Team o f th e 24t h Divisio n an d

the separat e 503 d Parachut e RCT .

Scheduled to jump at Mindoro, the 503d

was reassigned t o th e tas k o f makin g a n

amphibious landin g abreast o f th e 19th

RCT whe n planner s foun d tha t no t

enough spac e wa s available o n Leyt e t o

accommodate th e troop-carryin g aircraft

necessary t o lif t th e parachutists .

Other comba t component s o f th e

Western Visaya n Tas k Forc e include d

the 3 d Battalio n o f th e 21st Infantry o f

the 24t h Division , whic h wa s to execut e

feinting operation s against southern Lu -

zon fro m Mindoro ; a n antiaircraf t artil -

lery group ; an d a n enginee r boa t an d

shore regiment . Sinc e rapi d construc -

tion o f airfield s wa s a primar y mission ,

the tas k forc e include d a larg e propor -

tion o f airfiel d engineers—fou r U.S .

Army battalion s and a Royal Australian

Air Forc e work s squadro n — and othe r

service troops . T o hel p unloa d assaul t

shipping a t Mindoro , Kruege r detaile d

1,200 me n fro m variou s X an d XXI V

Corps unit s o n Leyt e a s stevedores .

These men were to return to Leyte once

their tas k wa s finished.3

Air suppor t plan s wer e simila r t o

those for Luzon, albeit on a smaller scale,

and include d operations by Allied Nava l

Forces CVE's, th e Allied Air Forces, th e

Seventh Air Force, Halsey's Third Fleet,

and th e B-29's . Land-base d plane s o f

the Fift h an d Sevent h Ai r Force s would

neutralize Japanes e field s fro m Manil a

south on Luzon; the Third Fleet's planes

would cove r th e field s nort h o f Manila .

To accomplis h its share in this program,

the Thir d Flee t planne d tw o serie s o f

strikes o n Luzon , on e fro m U minu s 1

through U plu s 1 an d th e othe r fro m

U plu s 4 throug h U plu s 6. 4

Admiral Kinkai d delegate d comman d

of th e amphibious phase of the operation

to Rea r Adm . Arthur D . Struble , th e

commander o f Tas k Grou p 78.3 , the

Mindoro Attac k Group . Cruiser s an d

destroyers of Task Group 77.3 (the Mindoro Clos e Coverin g Group ) togethe r

with CVE's, old battleships, cruisers, and

destroyers o f Tas k Grou p 77.1 2 (the

Mindoro Heav y Coverin g an d Carrie r

Group) woul d b e i n support. 5

The suppl y pla n wa s simila r t o tha t

for th e Lingaye n invasion . Th e tota l

force to be supplied at Mindoro included

12,000 groun d comba t troops , almos t

6,000 ground service units, and approximately 9,50 0 Allie d Ai r Force s troops .

Aircraft woul d a t firs t operat e unde r

contro Bombardmen l o f th et Win Fift hg Ai headquarters r Force' s 300t h 6 an d

planes wer e t o b e flyin g fro m Mindor o

by U plus 5, when a strip was to be ready

to accommodat e on e fighte r group .

Before th e assaul t a t Lingaye n Gulf ,

engineers woul d expan d th e Mindor o

3

 Sixth Arm y F O 33 , 20 Nov 44 ; Sixt h Arm y Rp t

Mindoro, pp. 8-14; Sixth Arm y Admi n Orde r 15 , 23

Nov 44 , Sixt h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Mindoro , 21-3 0

Nov 44 . Mos t o f th e stevedorin g troop s cam e fro m

the 306t h Infantry , 77t h Division , whic h ha d jus t

reached Leyte . Se e Cannon, Leyte, p. 277 .

4

 AAF SWPA OI 74, 30 Oct 44, G-3 GHQ Jnl File ,

7 Nov 44; Halsey and Bryan , Halsey's Story, pp. 235-

41; Sixt h Arm y Rp t Mindoro , pp . 18-20 ; Rads ,

Arnold t o MacArthu r an d Nimitz , 2 6 No v an d 1 3

Dec 44, CM-OUT's 68838 and 76699 ; 2 d Carrie r T F

Opn Orde r No . 4-44, 7 Dec 44, Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l

File Luzon , 17-22 De c 44. 5

 TG 78.3 Mindoro Rpt, pp. 1-5; TG 77.3 Mindoro

Rpt, p . 1 . 6

 Not desirin g t o mov e it s ow n headquarter s for -

ward no r t o se t u p a special headquarters , th e Fift h

Air Forc e used th e bombardmen t wing headquarters

to contro l al l ai r activitie s a t Mindor o durin g th e

early phases o f th e operation .
46 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

facilities t o accommodate another fighte r

group, a ligh t bombe r group , a tactica l

reconnaissance squadron , an d tw o commando fighte r squadrons . Allie d Nava l

Forces PT boats were to begin operations

from Mindor o on U plus 1. 7

The Wester n Visaya n Tas k Forc e

staged o n th e eas t coas t o f Leyt e an d

departed Leyt e Gul f o n 1 2 Decembe r

aboard th e ship s o f Tas k Grou p 78.3. 8

(See map, p. 20.) During th e nigh t o f

12-13 Decembe r th e convoy s transite d

Surigao Strait , betwee n Leyt e an d Min -

danao, an d heade d westwar d int o th e

Mindanao Sea , Task Grou p 77.12—th e

escort carriers—movin g t o th e van. Admiral Halsey 's Thir d Flee t carriers ha d

left Ulithi , i n th e western Carolines, o n

the 11t h and ha d starte d hittin g targets

in norther n Luzo n o n th e mornin g o f

the 14th.

Struble's force s steame d o n throug h

the Mindana o Se a unmolested unti l th e

afternoon o f 1 3 December . Japanes e

Army and Nav y planes had had the three

groups unde r surveillanc e sinc e 0900 ,

but ha d no t attacke d pending receipt o f

information o n th e force' s destination .

In midafternoo n te n Japanes e Nav y

planes, includin g thre e designate d a s

suicide bomber s — the drea d kamikaze s

—flew u p fro m a fiel d o n Ceb u an d

found th e Allie d forc e of f th e

southeastern corne r o f Negro s Island .

Unobserved b y lookout s an d unde -

tected b y radar , whic h nearb y lan d

masses blanketed , on e kamikaz e fle w i n

low ove r th e wate r an d crashe d wit h a

mighty roa r o n th e ligh t cruise r Nashville, Admira l Struble 's flagship . Com -

bined explosion s from th e plane's bomb

and ship 's ammunition wrecke d th e fla g

bridge, th e communication s office , an d

the comba t informatio n center . Ove r

130 men wer e killed outright , includin g

General Dunckel 's chie f o f staff , th e

310th Bombardment Wing's commander,

Admiral Struble's chief o f staff, and Tas k

Group 78.3's communications and medical officers . Th e wounded , numberin g

about 190 , include d Dunckel , wh o wa s

painfully bu t no t seriousl y injure d an d

burned.

Struble an d Duncke l quickl y trans -

ferred t o th e destroye r Dashiell, whic h

also too k aboar d som e o f th e member s

of bot h officers ' staffs . Th e res t o f th e

staffs an d th e wounde d saile d bac k t o

Leyte on th e Nashville, protecte d by the

destroyer Stanley. Late r in the afternoon

another kamikaz e s o damage d th e de -

stroyer Haraden tha t it , too , had t o re -

turn t o Leyte . Casualtie s aboar d th e

Haraden wer e approximatel y 1 5 kille d

and 2 5 wounded.

7

 Sixth Arm y Admin Order 15 , 23 Nov 44; USASO S

LI 74/SOS , 1 Nov 44 , G-3 GH Q Jn l File , 4 No v 44 :

Sixth Arm y Rp t Mindoro , pp. 13-16 . 8

 The res t of this subsection is based primaril y on:

Sixth Army Rpt Mindoro, pp. 13 , 18-21; TG 78. 3 Rpt

Mindoro, pp . 5ff. ; T G 77.1 2 Rpt Mindoro , passim;

Japanese Studies in W W II , No . 101 , Battle of Mindoro, pp. 1-9; Halse y an d Bryan , Halsey's Story, pp .

235-37; Wesle y Fran k Crave n an d Jame s Le a Cate ,

eds., "Th e Army Ai r Forces i n Worl d Wa r II," vol.

V, The Pacific: MATTERHORN to Nagasaki, June

1944 to August 1945 (Chicago: Th e Universit y o f

Chicago Press, 1953) (hereinafte r cite d as Craven an d

Cate, AAF V), pp . 396-97 . Additiona l informatio n

on kamikaz e operations in this subsection an d i n th e

rest o f thi s chapte r i s derive d from : Samue l Elio t

Morison, "History of Unite d State s Nava l Operation s

in Worl d Wa r II," vol. XIII, The Liberation of the

Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas: 1944-

1945 (Boston : Little , Brow n an d Company , 1959 )

(hereinafter cite d a s Morison , The Liberation), pp .

23-26, 29-31 , 33-36 , 43-48 , 98-119 , 125-26 , 133 ,

138-140. Originally, it was anticipated tha t Triumph

would b e publishe d befor e The Liberation. A s

events turne d out, The Liberation wa s in prin t first ,

permitting th e presen t autho r t o tak e advantag e a t

the las t momen t o f deepe r researc h int o U.S . Nav y

materials an d Japanes e source s tha n h e coul d o r

needed t o undertak e fo r Triumph.
PRELIMINARY OPERATION S AN D THE APPROAC H 47

The Japanese , havin g decide d tha t

Panay, Cebu , o r Negro s woul d b e th e

target o f th e Allie d invasio n force , ha d

ambitious plan s for renewing air attack s

on th e 14th , bu t fe w materialized. Th e

Japanese waste d to o muc h tim e lookin g

for th e convo y of f Pana y an d Negros ,

and wer e diverte d b y Allie d Nava l

Forces movements of f th e wes t coas t o f

Leyte, movements that concerned resup -

ply of Sixth Army units on Leyte . Mean -

while, Halsey' s Third Flee t plane s kep t

the Japanes e air garrison on Luzo n occupied, and durin g the da y Struble's CVE -

based plane s knocked down about thirt y

Japanese aircraft befor e the y could clos e

with th e Mindoro-boun d force .

On th e mornin g o f th e 15th, as th e

Allied group s starte d movin g i n t o th e

Mindoro beaches, 2 5 Japanes e plane s

from th e Clar k Fiel d cente r o n Luzo n

and 1 2 t o 1 5 fro m th e Dava o are a o f

southeastern Mindana o attempted t o re -

sume th e attack . Struc k b y Third Flee t

aircraft eve n befor e the y go t of f th e

ground, many of th e Luzon-based plane s

never reached th e Mindor o area. Allie d

Air Force s P-38' s (whic h arrive d ove r

Mindoro fro m Leyt e abou t 080 0 t o as -

sume the air cove r dutie s of the CVE's),

and CVE-base d plane s stil l operatin g a t

Mindoro shot down eight of fifteen kami -

kazes tha t attacke d shippin g of f th e

island o n th e 15th . Nonetheless , Japa -

nese ai r operation s durin g th e da y met

with som e success . Kamikaze s s o dam -

aged tw o LST's (Landin g Ships, Tank)

that th e Allie d Nava l Force s late r ha d

to sin k them . Ammunitio n explodin g

aboard th e LST's damaged th e destroyer

Moale a s it trie d t o rescue survivors and

fight fires . A n LS M (Landin g Ship ,

Medium), th e destroye r Howerth, an d

the CV E Marcus Island receive d lesse r

damage fro m kamikazes , bu t continue d

operations.9 Casualtie s totale d 7 kille d

and abou t 2 0 wounded.

In accordanc e wit h plans , th e CVE' s

had started t o withdraw upon th e arrival

of Allie d Ai r Force s land-base d planes ,

but i n midafternoo n wor d cam e tha t

weather condition s ove r easter n Leyt e

would preven t land-base d aircraf t fro m

providing ai r cove r th e res t o f th e day.

Task Grou p 77.1 2 thereupo n slowe d it s

speed and, lat e in the afternoon, returned

to a suppor t positio n of f Mindor o i n

order t o provid e air cove r o n U plu s 1 .

Meanwhile, th e 19th and 503 d RCT's

landed, and, despit e a few harassing raids

by Japanes e aircraft , unloadin g pro -

ceeded fa r ahea d o f schedule . Admira l

Struble was able to depart with th e bulk

of th e ships of Task Grou p 78. 3 a t 1900 ,

leaving Rea r Adm . Russel l S . Berke y o f

Task Grou p 77. 3 i n charge off Mindoro.

The nex t morning , 1 6 December , a

slow tow convoy of small tankers, barges,

and LCT's (Landin g Craft, Tank), with

accompanying destroyers , hov e t o of f

Mindoro, havin g suffered th e loss of one

small Army tanke r sun k an d a destroyer

damaged b y kamikaze s o n th e way. 10

Berkey's forc e lef t abou t 0700 , an d th e

CVE's resume d thei r withdrawa l abou t

1100, whe n Allie d Ai r Force s plane s

showed u p fro m Leyte . Poo r weathe r

conditions agai n force d a n earl y retire -

ment o f land-base d aircraft , an d CV E

planes ha d t o maintai n som e cove r ove r

Mindoro all day. The thre e echelon s o f

Admiral Struble's forc e finall y go t bac k

9

 Morison, The Liberation, page 29, states tha t th e

destroyer damaged was the Ralph Talbot. In describing th e day' s attacks , page s 29-31 , h e doe s no t

mention th e damag e t o th e LSM . 10

 Morison, i n The Liberation, pag e 31 , does no t

mention damag e t o th e destroyer , an d implie s tha t

the Arm y tanke r wa s only damaged .
48 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

to Leyt e o n th e 17t h wit h n o furthe r

damage.

To th e north , Halsey' s plane s ha d

again struc k Luzo n o n 1 6 December ,

and th e carriers had started retiring eastward t o refue l i n preparatio n fo r th e

second series of attacks beginning on th e

19th. Lat e o n th e mornin g o f th e 17t h

a viciou s typhoo n bega n lashin g th e

Third Flee t an d di d no t blo w itsel f ou t

until evenin g o f th e 18th . Continue d

bad weathe r force d Admira l Halse y t o

cancel th e strike s schedule d fo r 19-2 1

December, an d o n th e 21s t th e flee t

retired to Ulith i to repair storm damage

and star t preparation s fo r its operation s

in support of the Lingayen Gulf landings.

Through the 16th, Japanes e air attacks

had cos t force s o f th e Southwes t Pacifi c

Area 2 LST's an d 1 small Arm y tanke r

sunk; 1 ligh t cruise r an d 1 destroye r

severely damaged; and 1 CVE, 3 destroyers, an d 1 LSM slightl y damaged . Th e

Japanese ha d als o inflicte d almos t 39 0

casualties—about 15 5 me n kille d an d

235 wounde d — the majorit y o f the m

Allied Nava l Force s personnel . Th e

CVE's ha d los t 9 plane s an d Halsey' s

carriers had lost 27 to the Japanese. Th e

typhoon throug h whic h th e Third Flee t

had saile d resulte d i n th e los s o f abou t

790 men . I t als o san k 3 destroyers ,

wrecked 20 0 planes , an d damage d 2 8

ships, 9 s o severel y tha t the y wer e ou t

of actio n fo r weeks .

On th e othe r hand , accordin g t o th e

claims of the Allied Air Forces, the Allied

Naval Forces, and the Third Fleet, about

450 Japanese plane s ha d bee n destroye d

in th e air o r o n th e ground i n th e Philippines sinc e th e 1s t o f December. Th e

Third Flee t claimed about 27 0 Japanese

aircraft, Struble' s CVE's got another 70 ,

Allied Air Force s planes at least 80, shipbased an d shore-base d antiaircraft weap -

ons 15 , and approximatel y 1 5 more were

destroyed durin g kamikaze attacks. Jap -

anese ai r powe r i n th e Philippine s ha d

been literall y decimated , an d reinforce -

ments had t o be flown i n fro m th e home

islands an d Formosa . Finally , Admira l

Halsey's plane s ha d sun k 3 3 Japanes e

ships of various sizes and type s in Luzo n

waters, whil e th e Allie d Nava l Force s

had destroye d a smal l freighte r of f

Mindoro.

For the Allied Naval Forces, the Third

Fleet, an d th e Japanese , th e invasio n o f

Mindoro had indeed been costly. Ashor e

on tha t islan d th e stor y was far different.

The landin g was unopposed and through

16 December th e Western Visaya n Tas k

Force suffere d n o casualtie s i n groun d

operations.

The Air Build-up at Mindoro

The 19t h and 503d RCT's began landing at 073 0 on 1 5 December an d b y late

afternoon ha d outposte d a fina l beach -

head lin e lyin g seve n mile s inland .

Troops secure d th e Sa n Jos e airstrip , a

prewar emergenc y landin g fiel d roughl y

five miles inland, against no opposition.11

Beach condition s wer e almost ideal, and

an observe r fro m th e 2 d Enginee r Spe -

cial Brigade , watchin g th e unloading ,

was prompted t o report tha t th e "operation wa s reall y jus t a maneuver " fo r

shore part y units. 12

Since expansio n o f th e Sa n Jos e stri p

was not feasible , engineers quickly began

surveys fo r a bette r sit e and soo n foun d

11

 WVTF Hist Rcd, Opn s Rpt, pp. 1-2 ; Sixt h Army

Rpt Mindoro, pp. 16-18; 19t h In f Rpt Mindoro, p. 1. 12

 Ltr, Asst ACofS 8-2 2 d ESB to CG 2d ESB, 19 Dec

44, Sub: Obsn s of Landing on Mindor o Island , Sixth

Army G- 3 Jn l Fil e Mindoro , 21 Dec 44-1 Ja n 45 .
PRELIMINARY OPERATION S AN D THE APPROAC H 49

one abou t thre e miles south o f the field .

By midafternoo n th e 1874t h Enginee r

Aviation Battalio n an d No . 3 Airdrome

Construction Squadro n (RAAF ) had begun work o n th e ne w site , ultimatel y

called Hil l Drome . Th e fiel d wa s ready

as scheduled o n so December, o n whic h

day Fift h Ai r Forc e P-38' s an d P-6 1

night fighters began arriving; P-47's

reached th e fiel d fro m Leyt e thre e day s

later. Meanwhile , engineers began work

on anothe r stri p calle d Ellmor e Field ,

about tw o mile s northwes t o f Hil l

Drome. Thi s second fiel d wa s ready fo r

limited us e o n 2 3 Decembe r an d fo r

continuous dry-weathe r operation s o n

the 28th , a wee k ahea d o f schedule. 13

The firs t runwa y wa s barel y opera -

tional i n tim e t o b e o f us e i n helpin g

to tur n bac k ne w Japanes e counter -

attacks.14 O n o r abou t 2 0 December the

Japanese Nava l Air Servic e i n th e Phil -

ippines, whic h ha d execute d th e bul k

of th e attack s agains t Mindor o s o far,

was reinforced b y some fifty plane s flown

in fro m Formosa , bringin g it s opera -

tional strengt h t o abou t seventy-fiv e

planes a t base s withi n eas y rang e o f

Mindoro. Wit h thi s force—augmente d

by a few Japanese Army Air Force planes

—the Japanes e renewe d ai r attack s o n

21 December, 15 th e da y befor e ship s o f

an Allie d resuppl y convo y wer e sched -

uled t o reac h Mindoro . Abou t twent y

kamikazes attacke d th e convoy , s o damaging tw o LST's tha t the y late r ha d t o

be abandoned, and inflictin g lesse r damage o n tw o destroyer s an d a Libert y

ship.16 Th e 3 d Battalion , 21st Infantry,

en rout e t o Mindor o in this convoy lost

6 me n kille d an d 3 2 wounded ; U.S .

Navy losse s wer e abou t 7 0 me n kille d

or wounded ; th e Japanese lost 7 plane s

in kamikaz e attack s an d 3 other s t o

shipboard antiaircraft fire .

In th e meantime th e Japanese Southwestern Area Fleet, wit h headquarter s

at Manila , had organize d a small surfac e

striking forc e o f tw o cruiser s an d si x

destroyers an d ha d ordere d i t t o Min -

doro t o bombar d th e Allie d beachhea d

and sin k whateve r Allie d shippin g i t

could fin d unprotecte d i n th e area. 17

The Japanes e had n o intentio n o f making a majo r actio n ou t o f thi s raid; th e

best the y coul d hop e fo r wa s t o dela y

for a littl e Allie d developmen t o f th e

Mindoro ai r base .

The strikin g forc e sortie d fro m Cam -

ranh Bay , Indochina, abou t 130 0 on 2 4

December an d wa s discovered earl y th e

next day by Allied submarines operating

in th e Sout h Chin a Sea . Forewarned

13

 Sixth Army Rpt Mindoro, pp. 17-20; Craven and

Cate, AAF V, pp. 397-98 . 14

 The stor y o f Japanes e ai r an d nava l counter -

attacks i s base d primaril y on : Sixt h Arm y Rp t

Mindoro, pp . 21-23 ; WVT F His t Rcd , an . 2 , Intel

Rpt, passim; T G 78. 3 Rpt Mindoro , passim;

Craven an d Cate , AAF V, pp . 398-401 ; Japa -

nese Studie s i n W W II , No . 101 , Battle of Mindoro ,

pp. 8-13 ; No. 5 , 4th Air Army Operations , 1944 -

1945, pp. 61-65, 73-74; The Join t Army-Navy Assessment Committe e (JANAC) , Japanese Naval and

Merchant Shipping Losses During World War II By

All Causes (Washington : Nav y Department , 1947 )

(hereinafter cite d a s JANA C Japanese Shipping

Losses), pp . 20 , 78; a n exchang e of radi o msgs dated

27 an d 2 8 Dec 4 4 among Sixt h Army , WVTF, Fift h

Air Force, and Sevent h Fleet, all to be found i n Sixth

Army G-3 Jn l Fil e Mindoro, 21 Dec 44-1 Jan 45 .

15

 There wer e som e isolate d attack s betwee n th e

15th and 21st . O n th e 18th , for instance , a kamikaz e

destroyed on e PT , an d i n a conventiona l bombin g run a Japanes e plan e lightl y damage d anothe r PT .

Morison, The Liberation, p. 34. 16

 Morison, The Liberation, pag e 35 , accounts fo r

only on e destroye r damage d i n thi s action . 17

 The carrie r Unryu wa s apparently schedule d t o

participate, bu t wa s sun k of f Formosa o n 1 9 December b y a U.S. Nav y submarine . Tw o mor e Japanese

cruisers wer e originall y assigne d t o th e actio n bu t

were left behin d a s being too slow. Additiona l information o n th e Japanes e nava l actio n come s fro m

Morison, The Liberation, pages 37-43.
50 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

LANDING UNOPPOSE D O N WHITE BEACH , MINDOR O

by th e submarines, Allie d Nava l Force s

reconnaissance seaplane s bega n trackin g

the Japanes e force , an d abou t 193 0 on

the 26t h reporte d tha t th e vessel s wer e

within eas y rang e o f th e Allie d Ai r

Forces' bas e at Mindoro. I n preparation

for th e impendin g action , Genera l

Kenney ha d hurriedl y reinforce d th e

Mindoro ai r garrison , an d 10 5 plane s

were read y t o fl y against th e Japanes e

naval force—1 3 B-25's , 4 4 P-38's , 2 8

P-47's, an d 2 0 P-40's.

Except fo r a fe w P-61's, whic h wer e

searching fo r Japanes e aircraft , non e o f

the Mindoro-base d plane s was equipped

for nigh t operations . The y therefor e

had t o us e runnin g an d landin g light s

to guid e eac h othe r an d t o locat e th e

Japanese ship s sailin g o n towar d Min -

doro unde r cove r o f ba d weather . De -

spite ai r opposition , abou t 230 0 o n th e

26th th e Japanes e flee t unit s bega n t o

bombard th e beachhea d an d airfiel d

areas, wher e the y cause d littl e damage .

After som e fort y minute s o f suc h shell -

ing, th e Japanese vessels withdrew northwestward a t hig h speed , stil l unde r

attack b y Allied Ai r Force s planes.

Offshore, th e Japanes e ha d sun k a

Liberty ship and an Allied Nava l Forces

PT boat. 18 Th e Allie d Ai r Force s ha d

lost 2 6 planes : 3 B-25's , 7 P-38's , 1 0

P-47's, and 6 P-40's, Man y of these aircraft wer e not lost to Japanese action but

crashed as they tried to find some place to

land. The bombardmen t prevented landings a t th e Mindor o strip s an d man y

pilots, findin g thei r plane s running lo w

18

 Morison, The Liberation, page s 40-41 , state s

that th e PT's damage came from bombin g by a U.S.

Army plane , an d tha t Arm y aircraf t als o adde d t o

the damag e inflicte d upo n th e Libert y ship.
PRELIMINARY OPERATION S AN D THE APPROAC H 51

on fuel, headed through the darkness and

heavy weathe r towar d Leyt e field s onl y

to cras h o n th e way . Th e Allie d Ai r

Forces—at firs t makin g somewhat large r

claims19—had helpe d t o sin k on e de -

stroyer t o which a n Allie d Nava l Force s

PT boa t gav e th e coup de grâce. Th e

Mindoro-based plane s also severely damaged th e weathe r deck s and gun s o f th e

two cruisers an d ha d no t permitte d an y

of th e othe r Japanes e ship s t o escap e

unscathed.

On 2 8 Decembe r Japanes e aircraf t

resumed kamikaz e an d conventiona l at -

tacks against Allied shipping at Mindoro

and agains t shippin g o n th e wa y to an d

from tha t island. Fro m that date through

the 4t h o f January 1945 , the plane s suc -

ceeded i n sinkin g 3 Libert y ships ,

including one carrying air force ammunition; a tanker carrying aviation gasoline;

two LST's, a destroyer, and tw o LCM's.

Three other Liberty ships were so badly

damaged that they had to be run aground

to preven t sinking . Fo r a tim e th e los s

of carg o o f th e Liberty s an d th e tanke r

inhibited airfiel d constructio n an d ai r

operations a t Mindoro . I n additio n t o

these sinkings or beachings, the Japanese

also inflicte d sever e damage upon a Liberty ship , a destroyer, a P T tender , and

two PT boats, while another destroyer, an

LCI, a mine sweeper, and an oiler suffered

lighter damag e a s direc t o r indirec t re -

sults o f kamikaz e operations. Attackin g

the Mindor o airfield s durin g th e nigh t

of 2-3 January , Japanese planes destroyed

15 P-38's and 7 A-20's. Durin g the period 2 8 December through 4 January, the

Japanese los t som e 5 0 aircraf t i n th e

Mindoro area . Thereafter , Japanes e air

strikes in the region virtually ceased; th e

Japanese wer e occupie d wit h Allie d

convoys moving toward Luzon .

Ashore a t Mindor o th e Wester n Vi -

sayan Tas k Force , beginnin g o n 1 9 December, institute d a serie s o f patro l

actions along th e southern, western , and

northwestern shore s of Mindoro t o hun t

down Japanes e stragglers , secur e area s

where the Japanes e might land reinforcements fro m Luzon , an d se t u p an d pro -

tect rada r station s an d groun d forc e

observation posts , som e o f whic h wer e

established o n smal l offshor e islands. 20

Mindoro guerrillas guided and gav e support t o mos t o f th e Allie d patrol s an d

also playe d a larg e part i n variou s mopping-up operation s al l ove r th e island .

While th e 19t h and 503 d RCT' s wer e

thus spreadin g out , th e res t o f th e 21st

Infantry reache d Mindor o t o reinforc e

the beachhead. Genera l Krueger, fearing

possible Japanes e reinforcemen t move s

from Luzon , ha d dispatche d th e 21st to

Mindoro jus t afte r th e Japanes e nava l

raid.

On 1 Januar y control o f th e Wester n

Visayan Tas k Forc e passe d fro m th e

Sixth Arm y t o Eichelberger' s Eight h

Army, whic h continue d t o mo p u p an d

patrol. B y th e en d o f Januar y Wester n

Visayan Tas k Forc e groun d operation s

associated wit h th e seizur e an d securin g

of th e ai r bas e ha d cos t 1 6 me n killed ,

71 wounded, an d 4 missing, exclusiv e o f

the casualties resulting from Japanes e air

attacks. Tota l casualtie s fo r th e Allie d

land, sea, and ai r force s of the Southwest

19

 The Fift h Ai r Forc e originall y claime d t o hav e

sunk o r se t afir e a t leas t fou r Japanes e troo p

transports.

20

 The remainin g materia l o n Mindor o groun d

operations is based principall y on: WVT F Hist Rcd,

Opns Rpt , pp. 2-7; ibid., Inte l Rpt , pp. 4-9; 19th

Inf Rp t Mindoro , pp . 1-2 ; 503d Prcht In f S- 3 Pe r

Rpts Mindoro. Th e casualt y figure s ar e derived fro m

a stud y o f al l pertinen t sources , whic h provid e

contradictory an d irreconciliabl e figures .
52 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Pacific directl y concerned with establishment o f th e southwester n Mindor o ai r

base, includin g thos e fro m kamikaz e

operations, numbere d abou t 47 5 me n

killed an d 38 5 wounded. O n Mindoro ,

the Japanes e lost abou t 17 0 men kille d

and 1 5 taken prisoner . Japanes e casualties i n th e ai r an d nava l counterattac k

operations are unknown .

Work continued apace at the Mindoro

airfields throughou t th e perio d o f th e

Japanese raids , an d th e facilitie s wer e

greatly expanded. 21 Genera l MacArthu r

decided t o ad d mor e mediu m bomber s

and fighter s t o th e Mindoro air garriso n

for bette r suppor t o f operation s o n

Luzon, an d temporaril y cancele d plan s

to establis h a bas e for troop carrie r an d

cargo plane s o n Mindoro . A t th e sam e

time, he directed the Allied Air Forces to

construct heav y bombe r field s o n Min -

doro fro m whic h t o launc h strike s

against th e souther n Philippines , For -

mosa, an d th e norther n Indies . Wor k

began o n th e firs t o f tw o bombe r field s

on 2 January, bu t neithe r wa s read y i n

time t o provide support for the move t o

Luzon,

Nevertheless, a sizable air garriso n ex -

isted o n Mindor o b y 9 January. Majo r

Allied Air Forces units included 3 fighter

groups, 2 mediu m bombe r groups , 2

night fighte r squadrons, 3 tactical reconnaissance squadrons , a photographi c

squadron, an d a n air-se a rescu e squad -

ron. Whil e none of the units was up t o

strength i n eithe r plane s o r pilots , th e

total wa s stronge r tha n th e minimu m

General Kenne y ha d deeme d necessar y

for prope r suppor t o f th e Lingaye n

invasion.

Insofar a s th e invasio n o f Luzo n wa s

concerned, th e principa l valu e o f th e

Mindoro operatio n wa s th e establish -

ment o f th e ai r bases . I n addition , th e

island was used t o good purpos e to stage

diversionary activitie s designe d t o focu s

Japanese attentio n o n souther n Luzon .

Later i n th e campaign fo r the recaptur e

of th e Philippines , Mindor o becam e a

staging base from whic h t o mount many

operations against smalle r island s t o th e

north, northeast , an d eas t i n orde r t o

make th e wate r passage s throug h th e

central Visaya n Island s saf e fo r smal l

ships movin g t o Luzon . Large r opera -

tions fo r th e recaptur e o f majo r island s

during th e Souther n Philippine s Cam -

paign wer e also staged fro m Mindoro .

By the time the Sixth Army was ashore

on Luzon , i t ha d becom e obviou s that ,

whatever th e cost , th e establishmen t o f

an air base at southwestern Mindoro had

been well worth the effort . Th e valu e of

the fields was proved time and time again

as Mindoro-based planes interdicted Japanese communication s o n Luzon , struck

Japanese shipping i n Philippin e waters,

provided cove r fo r convoy s movin g t o

Luzon, an d fle w direc t support mission s

for groun d force s o n th e latte r island .

The suppor t value of the base would b e

enhanced durin g operation s i n th e

Southern Philippine s Campaig n and ,

once the heavy bomber strips were ready,

by man y indirec t strategi c suppor t

missions.

It seem s saf e t o assum e tha t withou t

the Mindoro airfields, MacArthu r would

not hav e bee n abl e t o mov e t o Luzo n

when h e did . Certainly , withou t thos e

fields hi s force s woul d hav e foun d th e

21

 The remainde r of this subsection is based upon :

Rad, MacArthu r t o Krueger and Kenney , CX-55211,

21 De c 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jn l Fil e Mindoro, 21 Dec

44-1 Ja n 45 ; GH Q SWP A O I 74/15 , 1 Jan 45 , G-3

GHQ Jn l File , 1 3 Oct 44 ; Sixth Arm y Mindor o Rpt,

pp. 21-23; WVTF Hist Rcd, an. 5, Engr Rpt, passim;

Craven an d Cate , AAF V, p. 401.
PRELIMINARY OPERATION S AN D TH E APPROAC H 53

invasion o f Luzon , and postassaul t operations a s well , considerabl y mor e

hazardous an d difficult .

Diversionary Activities

The Southwes t Pacific' s diversionar y

operations wer e divide d int o thre e

phases. First , Dunckel' s Wester n Vi -

sayan Tas k Forc e would seiz e northeastern Mindor o an d Marinduqu e Island ,

thirty miles to the east, i n a n attempt t o

make th e Japanes e believ e tha t th e tw o

areas would be developed as staging bases

for a n invasio n o f souther n Luzon .

Second, a serie s o f mino r nava l demon -

strations, simulate d landings , dumm y

parachute drops , an d radi o an d rada r

deception measure s woul d b e execute d

at variou s point s alon g th e sout h coas t

of Luzon . Third , south Luzon guerrillas

would co-operat e wit h th e Allie d Ai r

Forces an d th e Palau-base d Sevent h Ai r

Force i n destroyin g railroads , bridges ,

highways, wire communications, and Jap -

anese suppl y installation s throughou t

southern Luzon. 22 Th e Allie s als o carried ou t a Pacific-wid e deceptio n pro -

gram t o mak e th e Japanes e believ e tha t

the Formosa-Amo y area , rathe r tha n

Luzon, woul d b e th e nex t majo r Allie d

target afte r Leyte. 23

The Wester n Visaya n Tas k Force' s

share i n th e progra m go t unde r wa y on

1 January whe n th e 21s t Infantry , fro m

its base in southwestern Mindoro , began

clearing ou t northeaster n Mindoro , a

job tha t th e regiment di d no t complet e

until almos t th e en d o f th e month . B y

that tim e th e Japanes e o n th e islan d

were no longer a threat. Som e 13 5 Japanese wer e kille d i n northeaster n Min -

doro—at leas t 5 0 o f the m b y guerrilla s

under Genera l Dunckel' s control—an d

the res t o f th e garriso n o f som e 30 0

Japanese originall y stationed i n th e are a

fled t o th e mountainou s interior . Th e

21st Infantr y los t bu t 1 man kille d an d

7 wounded . A compan y o f th e 21s t

Infantry secure d Marinduqu e Islan d

during th e wee k endin g 1 1 January ,

guerrillas havin g previousl y cleaned ou t

all bu t on e smal l pocke t o f Japanese o n

the island. 24

Little informatio n i s availabl e con -

cerning guerrill a sabotag e operation s i n

southern Luzon , an d i t i s impossibl e t o

allocate credit for destruction as between

the guerrilla s an d th e ai r commands .

Suffice i t t o sa y that sinc e ther e wa s con -

siderable difficult y gettin g demolitio n

supplies int o guerrill a hands , th e sabo -

tage wa s probabl y no t a s extensiv e a s

hoped. Ver y few of the minor naval and

aerial demonstration s were execute d be -

fore th e Lingaye n invasio n becaus e th e

necessary plane s an d smal l nava l vessel s

could no t b e diverte d t o th e tas k i n th e

face o f th e Japanes e aeria l counterat -

tacks at Mindor o and Luzon. 25 I n brief.

22

 GHQ SWP A O I 80 , 2 0 No v 44 , G- 3 GH Q Jn l

File, 20 Nov 44. 23

 Rad, MacArthu r t o JCS an d Nimitz , CX-52283 ,

16 No v 44 , CM-IN 15326 ; Rad , MacArthur t o JC S

and Nimitz , CX-52782 , 2 3 No v 44 , CM-I N 22748 ;

Rad, Nimit z to MacArthur and JCS , 1 9 Nov 44, CMIN 21934 ; Rad , JC S t o MacArthu r an d Nimitz , 3 0

Nov 44 , CM-OUT 70546 .

24

 WVTF Hist Rcd, Opn s Rpt, pp. 2-4; ibid., Intel

Rpt, pp . 7-9 ; Japanese Studie s i n W W II , No . 12 ,

Opns o n Mindoro , pp. 7-9; WVTF G- 3 Opn s Rpts

Mindoro. 25

 Miscellaneous memos an d msg s in WVTF Guerrilla Jn l Fil e an d WVT F PD Q Guerrill a Ne t File ;

Rad, T G 77.1 1 (Diversionar y Attac k Gp ) t o AN F

SWPA et al., 4 Ja n 45 , Sixt h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e

Luzon, 3-4 Ja n 45 ; Rad, MacArthu r to Kinkaid , TG

77.11, e t al., 7 Ja n 45 , WVTF G- 2 Ms g File ; Rad ,

Kinkaid t o MacArthur , 0644 5 Jan 45 ; Rad , Kenne y

to Whitehea d an d T G 77 .11, AX-30585 , 8 Ja n 45 ;

Rad, Kinkai d t o T G 77 .11, 8 Jan 45 . Las t thre e i n Sixth Arm y G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 5-11 Jan 45 .
54 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

none o f th e Southwes t Pacific' s loca l

diversions too k plac e a s originall y

planned. O n th e othe r hand , th e north -

eastern Mindor o an d Marinduqu e Is -

land operation s succeede d i n liberatin g

more Filipinos , helpe d t o clea r th e Vi -

sayan Passages , an d secure d th e nort h

coast o f Mindor o against Japanes e rein -

forcement movements . Th e effect s o f

the Pacific-wid e progra m ar e unknown .

By the time th e deception valu e o f th e

Southwest Pacific's diversion s could hav e

been realized , th e Japanes e o n Luzo n

well kne w wher e th e mai n landing s o n

that islan d ha d take n place . Th e Japa -

nese wer e n o longe r concerne d wit h

southern Luzon—the y ha d othe r fis h t o

fry.

The Approach to Luzon

Allied aircraft , whic h ha d no t concen -

trated thei r effort s agains t souther n

Luzon, ha d bee n flyin g mission s ove r

widespread area s o f Luzo n fo r months .

Carrier-based aircraft o f th e Third Flee t

had struc k target s o n Luzo n i n Septem -

ber whil e providing strategic support for

the invasion s o f th e Pala u Island s an d

Morotai; the y ha d hi t Japanes e installa -

tions o n Luzo n agai n durin g Octobe r

and Novembe r i n suppor t o f th e inva -

sion o f Leyte ; an d the y ha d returne d t o

Luzon i n mid-Decembe r i n suppor t o f

the Mindor o landing. 26 B y thi s time ,

Leyte-based plane s o f th e Allie d Ai r

Forces an d Sevent h Ai r Forc e bomber s

from th e Palau s had also initiated strike s

against Luzon in a program of air attacks

that double d i n intensit y durin g lat e

December. O n th e 30th , Halsey' s car -

riers lef t th e wester n Caroline s o n thei r

way t o Formosa n an d Philippin e waters.

Meanwhile, Kinkaid's surfac e force s ha d

completed thei r preparations ; th e am -

phibious attac k convoy s ha d finishe d

loading an d ha d se t sai l fo r Lingaye n

Gulf.

Assembling the Attack Forces

The majo r proble m amphibiou s an d

ground force s commander s face d i n

mounting th e assaul t forces—onc e ship -

ping limitation s ha d bee n established —

was tha t o f co-ordinatin g stagin g activi -

ties a t widel y separate d points . Fo r

example, XIV Corps headquarters, corps

troops, an d th e 37t h Infantr y Divisio n

staged and loade d at Bougainville , in th e

Solomon Island s nearl y 3,00 0 mile s

southeast o f Lingaye n Gulf. 27 Th e XI V

Corps' 40t h Division mounte d a t Ne w

Britain, 37 5 mile s west o f Bougainville .

I Corp s headquarters wa s at Hollandia ,

Dutch Ne w Guinea , almos t 2,00 0 mile s

from Lingaye n Gulf; its 43d Division was

125 miles to the east at Aitape in Britis h

New Guinea; and its 6th Division staged

at Sansapor , o n th e Vogelko p Peninsul a

of wester n Dutc h Ne w Guine a some 625

miles northwest o f Hollandia . Th e 25t h

Infantry Division of Sixth Army Reserve

had th e longest distanc e t o travel , bein g

located o n Ne w Caledonia , abou t 1,30 0

miles south-southeas t o f Bougainville .

The 158t h RC T loade d a t Noemfoo r

Island, 440 miles northwest of Hollandia.

Sixth Arm y headquarters , th e 6t h

Ranger Battalion , an d variou s othe r

Sixth Arm y units wer e o n Leyte , abou t

500 mile s southeas t o f Lingaye n Gulf . 26

 G-3 GH Q SWPA , Monthl y Summarie s of Opns ,

Sep 4 4 and No v 44, copies in OCM H files . Th e firs t

strikes agains t Luzo n wer e execute d o n 2 1 an d 2 2

September. Se e Cannon , Leyte, ch . IV.

27

 All distance s i n thi s paragrap h ar e straight-lin e

statute miles.
PRELIMINARY OPERATION S AN D THE APPROAC H 55

Service unit s wer e loade d a t al l thes e

places an d a t variou s Service s of Suppl y

bases fro m Australi a t o Morotai . Th e

staff wor k involve d i n co-ordinatin g th e

movement of such widely dispersed units,

and i n schedulin g the arrival an d departure of shipping from eac h staging point,

would stagge r th e imagination of anyone

not well versed in th e peculiar problems

of wagin g wa r ove r th e vas t reache s o f

the Pacific . Th e wonde r is not tha t some

problems aros e durin g th e loadin g an d

staging, bu t rathe r tha t th e problem s

were s o fe w an d relativel y mino r i n

nature.

The XI V Corp s wa s responsibl e fo r

obtaining th e supplie s fo r its ow n units

and fo r Sixt h Arm y force s statione d i n

the Solomon s an d a t Ne w Caledonia .

XIV Corps units staging at New Britain,

New Guinea , Morotai , an d Leyt e base s

obtained thei r supplie s fro m th e South -

west Pacific' s Service s o f Suppl y through

channels established by the Eighth Army,

to whic h thes e XIV Corp s organization s

were attached fo r logistica l support during the staging period. A n initial survey

indicated that all XIV Corps units lacked

25-30 percen t o f th e supplie s tha t

Lt. Gen . Osca r W . Griswold , th e corp s

commander, deemed essential for combat

efficiency. Bu t befor e loadin g began ,

those units stagin g i n th e Sout h Pacifi c

area had obtained 98 percent of their required supplie s whil e thos e mounting at

New Britai n an d point s west got 9 5 percent o f thei r requirements . Th e majo r

lasting shortage wa s tha t o f wheele d ve -

hicles, a shortage general shipping limitations imposed . Th e I Corps ' suppl y

situation wa s quite similar. 28

The principa l troubl e bot h corp s ha d

in loadin g stemme d fro m delay s i n

receiving ful l informatio n concernin g

characteristics an d carg o capacitie s o f

ships assigned to them, the limitation s of

tonnage fo r eac h typ e o f vessel , an d

changes i n shi p assignments. 29 T o som e

extent thes e problem s see m t o hav e re -

sulted fro m insufficien t liaiso n betwee n

the Arm y an d Nav y headquarter s con -

cerned. Fo r example , when ship s o f th e

III Amphibiou s Forc e arrive d a t Bou -

gainville t o loa d corp s troop s an d th e

37th Division , the XIV Corps discovered

that th e tonnag e allotment s prescribe d

for each type of ship by Sixth Army loading instruction s wer e greate r tha n th e

limitations Allie d Nava l Force s ha d im -

posed upo n Admira l Wilkinson' s ves -

sels.30 Again , Arm y loadin g planner s

often foun d tha t th e informatio n the y

had concernin g a given ship's characteristics wa s based upo n th e characteristic s

of th e ship as originally constructed, not

as i t ha d bee n modifie d b y th e Nav y

during a year or more of combat service.

28

 XIV Corps Rp t Luzon , pt . I, Opns, pp. 1 , 8-12;

ibid., pt . II , Administration , pp . 5-10 , 27; I Corp s

Rpt Luzon , pp. 1 , 13 , 162-63.

29

 In additio n t o th e sources liste d i n th e previou s

note, descriptio n o f thes e problem s fro m th e Arm y

point o f vie w is foun d in : 37t h In f Di v Rp t Luzon ,

pp. 11-13 , 191-92, 285-86, 297-301; 40th Inf Div Rpt

Luzon, p . 6 ; 6t h In f Div , G-4 Rp t Luzon , pp . 3-8;

43d In f Di v Rpt Luzon , p. 57; 43d In f Div , G-4 Rp t

Luzon, p. 1 . 30

 The matte r wa s finally straightene d out afte r a n

extensive exchang e o f radio s amon g XI V Corps ,

Sixth Army , Allied Nava l Forces, and th e III Amphi -

bious Forc e durin g th e perio d 16-2 8 November ,

copies o f whic h ar e t o b e foun d i n XI V Corp s G- 3

Jnl Fil e Luzon, 13-18 an d 19-2 4 Nov 44, and in Sixth

Army G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 15-2 5 Nov 44. A t leas t

partially, th e difficultie s stemme d fro m th e fac t tha t

XIV Corp s ha d a t firs t bee n instructe d t o emplo y

long ton s in plannin g its loading, but foun d tha t its

figures had t o be revamped on th e basis of short tons.

Comments o f Hon . Hug h M . Milto n II , Ass t Secre -

tary o f th e Arm y (Cof S XI V Corp s durin g Luzo n

assault), 6 Dec 56, in OCM H files.
56 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Such problems frustrated an d irritated

Army loading officers bu t seemed to have

been ignore d by th e nava l echelons con -

cerned.31 I n th e en d thes e unfortunat e

—and perhap s avoidable—problems di d

not preven t the assault force s fro m load -

ing o n tim e wit h sufficien t supplie s an d

equipment t o undertak e th e task s as -

signed. I t i s enoug h t o sa y tha t th e

two corps and th e two amphibious forces

overcame the problems, just as they overcame other s presente d b y advers e sur f

and beac h condition s a t som e stagin g

areas, th e lat e arriva l o f some ship s an d

ground servic e unit s a t stagin g points ,

and th e necessit y fo r transshippin g men

and material s amon g variou s base s fo r

more orderly loading. Th e job was done.

XIV Corp s element s stagin g a t Ne w

Britain completed loading on 1 0 December; thos e mounting at Bougainvill e fin -

ished tw o day s later. 32 O n th e 17t h al l

groups of the III Amphibiou s Force rendezvoused a t Huo n Gulf , easter n Ne w

Guinea, to rehearse the Lingayen assault.

General Griswold felt tha t the 37th Division's rehearsa l wa s satisfactor y bu t ha d

much faul t t o fin d wit h th e 40t h Divi -

sion, remarkin g upon a "genera l failur e

to observ e th e spirit o f th e rehearsal." 33

As a result , furthe r trainin g wa s con -

ducted a t Manu s Islan d i n th e Admir -

alties, wher e th e convo y reassemble d o n

22 December. 34 O n th e 27t h LST's an d

LSM's, wit h escorts, made u p a separat e

convoy an d departe d fo r Leyt e Gulf .

The res t o f th e forc e lef t o n th e 31st , al l

sections sailin g towar d a rendezvou s

with othe r component s o f th e Luzo n

Attack Force , includin g th e VI I

Amphibious Forc e wit h th e I Corp s

aboard.

The I Corp s unit s stagin g a t Aitap e

finished loadin g o n 2 5 Decembe r an d

conducted a limite d rehearsa l o n th e

27th, when they were joined by the headquarters of the I Corps and th e VII Amphibious Force aboard the command ship

Blue Ridge.

35 Thi s combine d convo y

left Aitap e on th e 28th . Th e res t o f th e

I Corp s units finishe d loadin g a t Sansa -

por o n 2 9 December and , havin g ha d a

limited rehearsa l o n th e 23d , sortie d

during th e afternoo n o f th e 30th .

While th e variou s amphibiou s attac k

groups were starting toward the objective

area, th e comba t echelon s o f th e Luzo n

Attack Forc e wer e also movin g forward ,

all t o rendezvou s a t Leyt e Gul f durin g

31

 To reac h thi s conclusio n th e autho r consulte d

the reports o f th e Luzo n Attac k Force , II I Amphi -

bious Force, VII Amphibious Force, and their various

echelons, including many reports of individua l ships.

Of som e fort y nava l reports consulted, only one , tha t

of th e A P President Polk, reflect s an y awarenes s o f

the problem s tha t s o harrie d Arm y planners . See :

Extract Fro m Repor t o f President Polk, i n COM -

INCH, Amphibiou s Operations , Invasio n o f th e

Philippines, Octobe r 1944-Januar y 1945 , 3 0 Ap r 45 ,

ch. VII, p . 5. 32

 Information o n stagin g an d rehearsa l i s base d

principally upon : XI V Corps Rp t Luzon , pt . I, pp .

13-15, 24-25 ; 37t h In f Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 15-17 ;

I Corp s Rp t Luzon , pp. 13 , 19; 6th In f Div , G- 4 Rp t

Luzon, pp . 4-7 ; 43 d In f Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 3-5;

43d In f Div , G- 4 Rp t Luzon , pp . 2-3; III Amphi b

Force Rp t Luzon , pp . 7-9; ibid., Enc l G , Logistics,

p. 2; VII Amphib Forc e Rp t Luzon , pp. 9-12 .

33

 Memo, Griswol d fo r Brus h (C G 40th Div), 2 1

Dec 44 , XIV Corp s G-3 Jn l File , 1 2 Dec 44- 9 Ja n 45 . 34

 Ltr , Cof S XI V Corp s t o Ma j Ge n Rober t S .

Beightler an d Ge n Brush , 2 0 De c 44 , sub : Tn g o f

Unloading Detail s an d Shor e Part y Personnel , XI V

Corps G- 3 Jn l File , 1 2 Dec 44- 9 Ja n 45 ; XIV Corps

Rpt Luzon , pt. I, p. 25. 35

 The I Corp s report , pag e 13 , states: "realisti c

rehearsals wer e feasibl e an d carrie d ou t t o th e las t

detail." Thi s statement is flatl y contradicte d b y all

other Arm y an d Nav y report s tha t mentio n th e

I Corps-VI I Amphibiou s Forc e rehearsals.
PRELIMINARY OPERATION S AN D TH E APPROAC H 57

the period 1- 5 January. 36 There , on the

4th, Genera l MacArthu r an d member s

of hi s staf f boarde d th e ligh t cruise r

Boise, sailing with tw o escorting destroyers a s Tas k Uni t 77.1.2 . Admira l Kin -

kaid an d Genera l Kruege r wen t aboar d

the command ship Wasatch, which, with

another tw o destroyers , forme d Tas k

Unit 77.1.1 .

The firs t portio n o f th e Luzo n Attac k

Force t o leav e Leyt e Gul f consiste d o f

the Minesweepin g an d Hydrographi c

Group (Task Grou p 77.6 ) togethe r wit h

a fe w oilers , ammunitio n ships , tugs ,

LCI(G)'s (Landing Craft, Infantry , Gun -

boats), an d screenin g vessels, al l depart -

ing about noon on 2 January. Late r that

day th e bombardmen t an d fir e suppor t

vessels, Tas k Grou p 77.2 , accompanie d

by twelv e CVE's an d escort s fro m Tas k

Group 77,4 , move d out of the gulf. Com -

mand o f thes e va n echelon s wa s veste d

in Vic e Adm . Jess e B . Oldendorf , wh o

was also th e commander o f Task Grou p

77.2.

During th e nigh t o f 4- 5 Januar y an -

other larg e element o f th e Luzo n Attac k

Force move d ou t o f Leyt e Gul f int o

Surigao Strait . I n th e lea d wa s Tas k

Group 77.3 , a close covering group con -

sisting o f thre e ligh t cruiser s an d si x

destroyers, accompanie d b y Tas k Uni t

77.1.2, General MacArthur aboard. Next

came th e entir e VI I Amphibiou s

Force-I Corp s convo y wit h tw o CVE' s

providing cover, followed b y the III Amphibious Force-XI V Corp s LST-LS M

groupment. Th e whol e formed a singl e

convoy ove r fort y mile s long. Th e mai n

body of th e III Amphibiou s Force-XIV

Corps convo y lef t Leyt e Gul f o n th e

morning of 6 January, and , makin g more

knots than th e preceding elements, soon

began t o close th e distance.

Air Attack and Counterattack

Meanwhile, the Pacific-wide aerial sup -

port pla n wa s i n operation . Mindoro -

based aircraf t greatl y steppe d u p th e

intensity o f their attack s during th e las t

week o f December. Seekin g to stop Jap -

anese overwate r reinforcements , thes e

planes san k thre e larg e carg o ship s o r

transports an d a n escortin g frigat e a t

Vigan, 10 0 miles north o f th e Lingaye n

Gulf beaches, on 30 December, and thre e

days late r a t Sa n Fernando , L a Union ,

fifty-odd mile s sout h o f Vigan , go t fou r

cargo ship s an d anothe r escort . Strike s

against Japanes e transpor t o n Luzo n

were also profitable , and , th e Allied Air

Forces claimed , Leyte-base d an d Palau -

based heavy bombers (B-24's ) destroye d

140 Japanes e plane s o n th e groun d a t

various Centra l Plain s field s durin g th e

period 20-2 5 Decembe r alone. 37

36

 The remainde r o f thi s subsectio n i s base d prin -

cipally upon : Luzo n Attac k Forc e Rpt , pp . 10-13 ,

21-26; II I Amphi b Forc e Rp t Luzon , pp . 9-10 ; VI I

Amphib Forc e Rp t Luzon , pp . 11-13 ; ibid., Encl D ,

Chron Rpt , pp . 2-8 ; T G 77. 2 (Bombardmen t an d

Fire Suppor t Gp—Vic e Ad m Jess e B . Oldendorf )

Rpt Lingaye n Gulf , pp . 5 , 8.

37

 During air operation s in support o f th e invasio n

of Luzon , two members of th e Arm y Ai r Forces won

Medals o f Honor . Fo r a combinatio n o f heroi c

actions while flying fighte r cover for bombers striking

Clark Field o n 2 5 and 2 6 December and fo r a fighte r

sweep over Negros Island on 7 January. Maj . Thoma s

B. McGuire of the Thirteenth Air Force was awarded

the Meda l o f Honor . Tragically , th e awar d ha d t o

be mad e posthumousl y sinc e th e major' s plan e

crashed on 7 January as he tried t o save a fellow flye r

from Japanes e attack. Whil e leading a photographic

and strafin g missio n agains t airfield s i n th e Aparr i

and Laoa g area s o n 1 1 January , Maj . Willia m A .

Shomo of th e 82d Tactical Reconnaissanc e Squadron

met a fligh t o f thirtee n Japanes e aircraft , shootin g

down si x Japanes e fighter s an d a twin-engin e

bomber. Fo r thi s action , Major Shom o wa s awarded

the Meda l of Honor.
58 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

The Thir d Fleet' s fast carriers sortied

from Ulith i on 30 December and arrive d

at their first launchin g point—about 14 0

miles southeast of Formosa and 22 5 miles

north o f Luzo n — during th e predaw n

hours o f 3 January . Ther e th e carrie r

force bega n t o run int o bad weathe r conditions that were to hamper its operations

for weeks .

Admiral Halsey's missions for 3 and 4

January wer e t o destro y Japanes e ai r

power o n Formosa , hi t shippin g i n th e

same area, and conduc t secondary strike s

against th e Ryukyu s an d Pescadores .

Poor weathe r condition s curtaile d th e

morning strike s an d force d cancellatio n

of al l flight s i n th e afternoo n o f th e 3d .

Weather th e next da y also limited fligh t

operations, but Halse y reporte d tha t his

planes ha d destroye d 10 0 Japanes e aircraft an d sun k 1 2 ships an d damage d 1 8

others during the two-day period . There

were t o b e n o strike s o n 5 January , S

minus 4 , sinc e th e Thir d Flee t wa s t o

move t o a ne w positio n fro m whic h t o

hit Luzo n o n S minus 3 . O n tha t day ,

the fas t carriers wer e t o cove r all Luzo n

north o f Clar k Fiel d except fo r th e Lingayen Gul f Area , th e Allie d Ai r Force s

were to blanket Clar k Fiel d and the area

to th e south , an d Admira l Kinkaid' s

CVE plane s were scheduled to fly against

Japanese airfields in the Lingayen region.

These plan s wer e destine d t o b e

changed.38

As of the 1st o f December the Japanese

Army and Nav y had probabl y had a combined air strength o f some 500 plane s in

the Philippines , th e bul k o f the m base d

on Luzon. 39 Thi s strengt h ha d bee n

largely destroye d b y Allied air strike s i n

support o f th e Mindor o operatio n an d

during Japanese air attack s against Mindoro-bound convoy s an d th e Mindor o

beachhead area . B y the 20th of Decem -

ber, th e Japanes e Nava l Ai r Servic e i n

the Philippine s ha d n o mor e tha n 3 0

planes, and th e Japanese Army Air Forc e

was down t o approximately 10 0 first-line

combat aircraft . Abou t tha t date , som e

50 nava l plane s fle w t o Luzo n fro m

Formosa t o rene w attack s agains t Min -

doro, an d shortl y thereafter , i t appears ,

a few Army aircraft als o came down from

Formosa or th e home islands to reinforce

Luzon. Man y o f thes e plane s wer e los t

during continue d attack s agains t Min -

doro until , b y 3 1 December , th e Japa -

nese ha d probabl y n o mor e tha n 15 0

operational aircraf t lef t o n Luzon , an d

about a thir d tha t man y o n othe r field s

in th e Philippine archipelago, for a tota l

of abou t 200. 40

The Japanes e ha d n o intentio n o f

making a large-scal e ai r effor t a t Luzo n

and planne d t o sen d n o stron g air rein -

forcements t o th e Philippines. Instead ,

they wer e devotin g their mai n effort s t o

strengthening th e ai r defense s o f th e

homeland, th e Ryukyus , an d Formosa .

Nevertheless, 20 0 comba t plane s wa s a

respectable force . I t coul d als o b e a n

38

 Craven an d Cate , AAF V, pp . 406-11 ; JANAC ,

Japanese Shipping Losses, p . 78 ; G- 3 GH Q SWPA ,

Monthly Summarie s o f Opns , De c 4 4 an d Ja n 45 ,

copies i n OCM H files ; CINCPAC-CINCPOA , Opn s

in PO A Durin g Jan 45 , pp. 3 , 23-32 , 61-62 ; Halse y

and Bryan , Halsey's Story, p . 242 .

39

 Information fro m th e Japanes e sid e i n thi s an d

the next subsection is derived mainl y from: Japanes e

Studies i n W W II , No , 72 , History o f Army Section

Imperial GHQ, pp. 156-61 ; No . 5 , 4th Air Army

Opns, 1944-45, p. 64-73, 77; Statements of Col Misoo

Matsumac (Staf f 4th Air Army), i n G- 2 GH Q FEC,

Statements o f Japanes e Official s o n Worl d Wa r I I

(hereinafter cite d a s States) ( 4 vols.), II, 434 , 443 . 40

 The tota l o f abou t 20 0 is far less tha n th e tota l

aircraft th e Seventh Fleet's CVE's alone later claimed

to hav e destroye d i n th e Luzo n area . Th e wid e discrepancy betwee n Allie d estimate s o f damag e an d

the Japanes e figure s i s inexplicable.
PRELIMINARY OPERATION S AN D THE APPROAC H 59

extremely effectiv e an d poten t forc e i f

the Japanes e electe d t o us e th e aircraf t

in kamikaz e attacks.

On th e evenin g o f 2 January th e va n

group o f th e Luzo n Attac k Force—th e

mine sweeping and hydrographi c group,

with attachments—wa s enterin g th e

Mindanao Sea , where thre e Japanes e

planes ineffectuall y bombe d it. 41 Earl y

the nex t mornin g fiv e o r si x kamikaze s

jumped th e forc e an d succeede d i n in -

flicting mino r damage on a n oile r and a

mine sweeper . B y thi s tim e th e mai n

body o f Admira l Oldendorf' s force —

battleships, cruisers , destroyers , an d

CVE's o f Tas k Group s 77. 2 and 77.4 —

was als o well int o Visayan waters. Lat e

in th e evenin g a lon e kamikaz e slippe d

through air cover and antiaircraft fir e and

crashed aboar d a heav y cruise r o f thi s

second echelon , inflictin g considerabl e

damage.

Before noo n th e nex t day, 4 January,

CVE-based plane s shot down two wouldbe kamikazes , an d Allie d Ai r Force s

planes, helping to cover the convoys, got

another. Beginnin g at 170 0 th e Japanese

ineffectually attacke d th e mine sweeping

group, the n off Mindoro, but no t fa r t o

the rear a kamikaze caused suc h damag e

aboard a CV E tha t th e shi p ha d t o b e

sunk afte r th e los s o f abou t 9 5 me n

killed and 65 wounded. Th e for m Japa -

nese ai r operation s woul d tak e wa s

becoming clear.

MacArthur a t this time reasoned tha t

the attacks ha d bee n stage d fro m Luzo n

airfields, wher e Allie d Ai r Force s landbased planes had met considerable opposition sinc e th e 2d . Lat e o n th e 4t h th e

Southwest Pacifi c commander , havin g

decided tha t land-base d ai r operation s

against Luzon had not bee n as successful

as anticipated, requested Halse y to commit th e Third Fleet' s plane s against al l

Luzon at least as far south at Clark Field

on 6 January. 42 Admira l Halse y agreed

and, makin g ever y possibl e effor t t o co -

operate with the Southwest Pacific forces,

directed his pilots t o hi t ai r facilitie s a t

Manila as well as those at the Clark Field

air center.

On 5 January, while th e Third Flee t

was makin g preparation s fo r th e ne w

strikes, Oldendorf's forward group s were

having a ba d time . I n a serie s o f kamikaze attack s lat e i n th e afternoon—th e

time the Japanese most frequently chose ,

the Allie d Nava l Force s ha d learned —

the Japanes e ha d inflicte d considerabl e

damage o n a CVE, a heav y cruiser, an d

a destroye r escort , while als o hitting another CVE, a secon d heav y cruiser , tw o

destroyers, a destroyer transport, a mine

sweeper, a fleet tug, and an LCI(G). Th e

first CV E wa s s o badl y damage d tha t i t

could no t conduc t fligh t operation s o n

the 6th, S minus 3, and onl y limited op -

erations thereafter . Personne l losse s fo r

the da y wer e abou t 6 5 me n kille d an d

195 wounded , practicall y al l o f the m o f

the Allied Nava l Forces, O f some forty -

41

 The genera l source s fo r th e remainde r o f thi s

subsection an d al l o f th e nex t arc : Luzo n Attac k

Force Rpt, pp. 10-18 , 22-47 , 52-75, 80-83; II I Am -

phib Forc e Rp t Luzon , pp . 9-11, 17 ; ibid., Encl D ,

Air, pp . 2-5, 15, and Enc l H, Battle Damage, pp. 1-4;

VII Amphi b Forc e Rp t Luzon , pp . 13-14 , an d Enc l

D, Chron Rpt, pp. 5-19; TG 77. 2 Rpt Lingaye n Gulf,

pp. 7-32, 35-42, 48-56; TG 79. 1 (part of Wilkinson's

command) Rpt Lingaye n Gulf, pp. 9-11, and Enc l A,

Chron Log , pp. 9-25 ; T G 79. 2 Rpt Lingaye n Gulf ,

pp. 6-14, 42-43; T G 77. 9 (Reinforcement Gp ) Rp t

Luzon, pp . 4-6, and Enc l A , Chron Log , pp. 10-23 ;

TU 77.4. 2 (CVE's ) Rpt Lingayen Gulf, pp. 1-3, 6-13,

16-18; T U 77.4. 4 (CVE's ) Rp t Lingaye n Gulf , pp .

9-18, 21-28 , 30-35 , 38-41 ; CINCPAC-CINCPOA ,

Opns i n PO A Durin g Jan 45 , pp. 4-11, 47-56; Halsey an d Bryan , Halsey's Story, pp . 243-46 ; Crave n

and Cate , AAF V, pp. 409-13 .

42

 Rad, MacArthur t o Halsey , CX-55815, 4 Jan 45 ,

in Sixt h Army G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 5-11 Jan 45 .
60 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

five Japanese planes attacking during the

day, almos t all wer e destroyed.

Nor wer e the kamikazes the only Japa -

nese force s th e advanc e group s encoun -

tered. I n midafternoo n tw o Japanes e

destroyers wer e discovere d movin g to -

ward th e mine sweepers, now of f Manila

Bay. A n America n destroye r an d tw o

Australian frigate s trie d t o intercep t th e

Japanese vessels but were unable to close

within effectiv e range . Oldendor f the n

ordered th e CVE 's t o launc h strike s

against th e Japanes e ships . Th e CVE -

based plane s severel y damage d bot h de -

stroyers, which put back into Manila Bay

sometime durin g the night.

Far to the rear, the amphibious assault

convoys ha d n o troubl e fro m Japanes e

planes on th e 5th, but develope d a number of contacts with Japanese submarines.

During th e midafternoo n a midge t sub -

marine fire d tw o torpedoe s towar d th e

portion o f the convo y tha t include d th e

Boise, MacArthur's command post afloat.

Both torpedoe s misse d an d th e subma -

rine was later sunk by combined se a and

air action . Anothe r submarine , whic h

could no t b e found , fire d a torped o o r

two a t a grou p of LST's wit h n o effect .

On th e mornin g o f th e 6th , Third

Fleet carrier s launche d attack s fro m a

position about 12 0 miles off northeastern

Luzon. Weathe r conditions , togethe r

with Japanes e dispersa l an d camouflag e

measures, reduced the effectiveness of the

strikes, an d Halsey' s plane s claime d th e

destruction o f onl y thirty-tw o Japanes e

aircraft.

The Kamikaze Threat

It wa s smal l wonde r tha t th e Thir d

Fleet ha d foun d s o few planes, fo r mos t

of th e operationa l aircraf t th e Japanes e

still had on Luzon were engaged in attacks

against Admira l Oldendorf' s groups ,

now operating in or near Lingayen Gulf.

At daw n o n th e 6th , CVE's an d escort s

took u p air support position s just northwest of the gulf, Task Grou p 77.6 moved

into th e gul f t o begi n sweepin g opera -

tions, and th e fire support vessels of Task

Group 77. 2 steame d int o positio n t o

bombard shor e installations . Min e

sweeping starte d a t 0700 , almos t coin -

cidentally wit h a serie s o f Japanes e ai r

attacks tha t laste d fo r th e nex t twelv e

hours.

Between 070 0 an d 080 0 Japanes e

planes undertoo k som e orthodo x air at -

tacks, bombing an d strafin g tw o destroyers, a destroyer transport, and three mine

sweepers, bu t causin g littl e damage .

Kamikaze attacks began about 1130 , an d

by noon th e Japanese had severel y damaged a battleship and tw o destroyers and

had inflicte d lesse r damage on tw o other

destroyers. I n th e afternoo n kamikaze s

sank 1 mine sweeper ; severel y damage d

another battleship , 2 heav y cruisers , 1

light cruiser , an d 1 destroyer transport ;

and cause d light damage aboard a heavy

cruiser, 3 destroyers, a mine sweeper, and

a seaplan e tender . Th e heav y cruise r

Louisville, hi t fo r th e secon d tim e i n

two days, had to retire from th e gulf an d

join th e CV E grou p outside , an d a de -

stroyer transport , also hit fo r th e second

time, likewise had t o give up active operations. Th e Japanes e attack s kille d

nearly 17 0 men and wounde d 500 more;

misdirected friendl y antiaircraf t fir e

caused a few additional casualties.

From thei r results , th e Japanes e ai r

operations sinc e 2 Januar y ca n bes t b e

characterized b y th e ter m "limite d suc -

cess." S o far, they ha d sun k tw o ship s

and caused damage of varying degrees to
PRELIMINARY OPERATION S AN D THE APPROAC H 61

some thirt y others , an d kille d approxi -

mately 33 0 me n an d wounde d abou t

760. Bu t th e Japanes e ha d no t force d

the forwar d element s o f th e Luzo n At -

tack Forc e t o retire—o n th e contrary ,

mine sweepin g an d bombardmen t ha d

progressed prett y muc h a s planned .

Nevertheless, Oldendorf and othe r Army

and Nav y commanders i n th e Southwest

Pacific Are a wer e worried .

Admiral Oldendor f wa s worried wit h

good reason. Previously , kamikaze operations against his ships and thos e of other

naval commands, though dangerous, had

generally bee n execute d b y relativel y

untrained pilots who had take n few precautions t o avoi d detectio n an d antiair -

craft fir e an d wh o ofte n appeare d t o b e

flying partially damaged, lightly armored

planes carryin g littl e ordnance . I n Jan -

uary th e kamikaze s ha d bee n operatin g

in a far different manner.

There was now a definite progra m o f

kamikaze operations, fo r th e vast majority of the perhaps one hundred Japanese

aircraft tha t ha d attacke d th e force s

under Admira l Oldendorf' s comman d

since 2 Januar y ha d a t leas t attempte d

kamikaze crashes. I n addition , the pilots

seemed t o b e mor e skilled . The y too k

every advantag e o f radar-blanketin g terrain, especiall y i n th e Lingaye n Gul f

area, and fle w towar d targe t ship s a t ex -

tremely lo w altitudes , thu s helpin g t o

avoid bot h rada r an d visua l detection .

Flight tactics included radical maneuvering designe d no t onl y t o avoi d antiair -

craft fir e an d Allie d plane s bu t als o t o

confuse observer s a s t o whic h shi p wa s

the actua l target . Finally , man y o f th e

kamikaze plane s wer e heavil y armore d

and armed .

The Allie s had expected grea t results

from th e relativel y ne w proximit y fuz e

for shipboar d 5-inc h antiaircraf t weap -

ons, bu t th e Japanes e plane s usually appeared so suddenly and too k such violent

evasive action that 5-inch batteries could

seldom track properly. Th e employmen t

of the expensive special ammunition was,

therefore, generall y useless , an d wa s

sometimes eve n dangerou s t o friendl y

ships. Havin g missed approaching kamikazes b y suc h distance s tha t fuze s wer e

not activated , shells sometime s saile d o n

to explod e on or nea r Allie d vessels ,

thereby causing some damage and man y

casualties. Th e heav y cruise r H.M.A.S .

Shropshire, whic h use d it s 8-inc h bat -

teries i n antiaircraf t barrage s wit h pro -

jectiles se t t o explod e a t eithe r 2,50 0 o r

5,000 yards, evidentl y foun d he r answe r

to th e suicide planes. Ho w effectiv e th e

method wa s cannot b e accuratel y ascer -

tained, but it appeared t o observers that

a numbe r o f th e kamikaze s turned awa y

from th e Shropshire towar d othe r ships.

At an y rate , kamikaze s neve r hi t th e

Shropshire.

Other Australia n ship s an d th e U.S .

Navy vessels, findin g thei r 4.7-inc h o r 5 -

inch ammunitio n ineffective , fel l bac k

on thei r automati c weapon s batteries —

40-mm.'s an d 20-mm.'s . However , Ad -

miral Oldendor f reporte d tha t th e pro -

jectiles o f thes e gun s di d no t hav e

sufficient explosiv e powe r o r impac t t o

knock ou t heavil y armore d kamikazes ,

even thoug h thos e planes were hit man y

times a s the y drov e throug h a veritabl e

hail o f antiaircraf t fire .

CVE-based plane s had als o proved unable t o sto p th e kamikaz e attacks . Th e

CVE's had maintained local air superiority i n th e Lingaye n are a an d ove r othe r

convoys o n thei r wa y t o th e gulf , bu t

kamikazes continuall y slippe d throug h

the air cover, and th e CVE-base d plane s
62 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

had knocke d dow n les s tha n hal f o f al l

Japanese aircraf t destroye d fro m 2

through 6 January . Interception , a s a

result o f th e Japanes e fligh t tactic s an d

the rada r problems , becam e largel y a

matter of luck in the Lingayen Gulf area.

By evenin g o f 6 Januar y Admira l

Oldendorf ha d concluded tha t th e terms

"local air superiority" and "adequat e air

cover" a s understoo d befor e th e Luzo n

operation ha d littl e meaning i n th e fac e

of determine d kamikaz e attacks . Wha t

was required, h e said , wa s a progra m o f

offensive ai r operation s designe d t o keep

all Japanes e airfield s withi n rang e neu -

tralized unti l al l Japanes e plane s wer e

found an d destroyed . Hi s CVE's , h e

pointed out , could no t undertak e suc h

a task. Fo r one thing, the y had too many

other mission s and fo r another the y were

too few in number eve n to undertake all

their clos e suppor t missions . Finally ,

Admiral Oldendor f wen t on , th e plane s

with whic h th e CVE' s wer e equippe d

were simpl y no t goo d enoug h t o cop e

with th e typ e o f aircraf t th e Japanes e

were employing for the kamikaze attacks.

Some though t o f takin g his ship s ou t

of Lingaye n Gul f undoubtedl y passe d

through Admira l Oldendorf' s min d o n

the mornin g o f 6 January, bu t h e wel l

realized the implication s of such a retirement. H e decided , instead , tha t i f th e

kamikazes coul d no t b e physicall y de -

feated, the y might be beate n psychologi -

cally. Therefore , h e sa w t o i t tha t th e

mine sweeper s continue d thei r opera -

tions despit e damage . Then , i n mid -

afternoon o n th e 6th , h e sen t i n th e

bombardment battleships , cruisers , an d

destroyers, not only to undertake assigned

missions bu t als o t o mak e th e Japanes e

think tha t thei r suicid e operation s wer e

ineffective. Despit e th e damag e the y

incurred tha t day, the bombardment an d

mine sweepin g group s di d no t begi n

retiring fro m th e gulf' s confine d water s

to tak e u p nigh t disposition s unti l al -

most 1930 , about a n hou r afte r th e las t

kamikaze raids.

As darknes s cam e o n 6 January ,

Admiral Oldendor f Wa s worried abou t

what th e morrow might bring, and agai n

with goo d cause . Whe n hi s force s ha d

sortied fro m Leyt e Gul f o n 2 January ,

intelligence estimate s ha d le d hi m t o

expect tha t th e Japanes e woul d hav e

300 t o 400 operational planes on Luzon ,

with th e capabilit y o f bringin g i n rein -

forcements i n sufficien t number s t o

mount dail y ai r attack s wit h 15 0 plane s

for a perio d o f te n day s o r more. 43 S o

far a s th e Admira l coul d ascertai n b y

the 6th—fro m th e reports o f th e Thir d

Fleet, th e Allie d Ai r Forces , an d th e

air an d surfac e element s unde r hi s command—the Japanes e could hav e lost less

than 12 5 aircraft s o far, giving the m a t

least 22 5 operationa l plane s o n Luzo n

alone wit h whic h t o continu e thei r

kamikaze program .

Oldendorf's estimat e seeme d clos e t o

reality th e next morning , when Admira l

Halsey reporte d tha t photograph s take n

by Third Flee t plane s o n th e afternoon

of 6 Januar y indicate d tha t 23 7 appar -

ently operationa l Japanes e aircraf t wer e

on Luzon , most o f the m base d a t Clar k

Field.44 Ho w th e Thir d Fleet' s intelli -

gence officer s arrive d a t thi s estimat e i s

unknown, fo r b y dus k o n 6 January th e

Japanese actuall y ha d les s tha n fift y op -

erational aircraf t lef t o n th e island .

But Oldendorf coul d no t kno w this, nor

could h e know tha t the Japanese had no

43

 See above , ch . II. 44

 Rad, Halse y t o Nimit z an d MacArthur , 002 0 7

Jan 45 , G-3 GH Q Jnl File , 6 Jan 45.
PRELIMINARY OPERATION S AN D THE APPROAC H 63

intention o f exercisin g thei r capabilit y

of flyin g i n stron g reinforcements fro m

Formosa and the home islands. H e knew

that th e Japanes e ha d no t ye t mounted

attacks with their 150-plan e daily poten -

tial, an d h e als o knew tha t th e numbe r

of attacking planes had mounted steadily

every da y sinc e 2 January .

Oldendorf believe d tha t the kamikaz e

attacks woul d continue , a n opinio n

shared by General Willoughby, who now

thought i t possibl e tha t th e kamikaz e

operations constitute d on e phas e o f a

co-ordinated counterattac k pla n tha t

would als o involv e operation s o f nava l

surface elements. 45 Th e worrie s tha t

such estimate s must hav e raised i n Mac -

Arthur's an d Kinkaid' s mind s wer e certainly no t pu t t o rest when , lat e o n th e

6th, Oldendor f reporte d tha t ther e wa s

a vita l an d urgen t nee d fo r additiona l

air support at Lingayen Gulf.

Recommending tha t th e Allie d Ai r

Forces redouble its efforts against Luzon

and tha t th e Thir d Flee t mov e t o th e

Lingayen area , Admira l Oldendor f

pointed ou t tha t muc h mor e damag e t o

the force s unde r hi s comman d woul d

invite th e Japanes e Nav y t o sorti e i n

some strength , precipitatin g a n actio n

with whic h hi s own force s wer e becoming progressivel y les s prepare d t o cope .

He wen t o n t o sa y tha t i f kamikaze s

went t o wor k o n th e amphibiou s con -

voys—now wel l withi n Visaya n water s

—the result s migh t b e disastrous . H e

concluded wit h th e ominou s suggestio n

that th e situatio n warrante d immediat e

reconsideration o f al l current plans. 46

On the basis of information previously

available, Admira l Kinkai d ha d alread y

taken step s t o increas e th e weigh t o f

Allied ai r effor t agains t Luzon . First ,

he ha d recommende d t o Genera l Mac -

Arthur tha t n o mor e ai r element s b e

diverted t o deceptio n operation s alon g

the south coast of Luzon, but tha t planes

assigned to these activities be reallocated

to mission s agains t Japanes e field s o n

Luzon. Genera l Kenne y immediatel y

issued order s reducin g th e scal e o f th e

diversionary efforts . Second , Kinkai d

had requeste d Halse y t o strik e Luzo n

again o n S minu s 2 . T o thi s reques t

the Third Flee t commande r had agree d

reluctantly, sinc e he ha d planne d t o hit

Formosa o n th e 7th. Halse y fel t tha t

further operation s i n th e Luzo n are a

would simpl y ti e dow n hi s fas t carrie r

groups to a passiv e role, and h e thought

it a better idea to bomb Formosa, whence

he erroneously believed most of the Japanese air strike s were originating. Nevertheless, h e reverse d th e Thir d Fleet' s

course, tha t forc e havin g already started

toward Formosa. 47

When h e receive d Admira l Olden -

dorf's lat e evening message, Kinkaid further requested th e Third Fleet to attack

all Japanese fields i n th e Lingaye n Gulf

area, heretofor e reserve d fo r CVE-base d

planes. Kinkai d hope d tha t th e Thir d

Fleet, i n co-operatio n wit h th e CVE' s

and the Allied Air Forces, would be able

45

 G-2 GH Q SWPA DSEI 1016 , 7 Jan 45, G-3 GH Q

Jnl File , 7 Jan 45 . 46

 Rad, Oldendor f t o Kinkaid , 0614 6 Jan 45 , VII

Amphib Force Rpt Luzon, Encl D, Chron Rpt, p. 12 ;

Rad, Kinkai d t o Halsey , 183 4 6 Ja n 45 , an d Rad ,

Oldendorf t o Kinkaid, 21106 Jan 45, last two in Sixth

Army G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 5-11 Jan 45 . 47

 Rad, Kinkai d t o MacArthur, 0644 5 Jan 45 ; Rad,

Kinkaid to Halsey, 1834 6 Jan 45; Rad, Halsey to Kin- kaid, 2054 6 Jan 45 . Al l in Sixt h Army G-3 Jn l Fil e

Luzon, 5-11 Jan 45 . Admira l Halsey , in Halse y and

Bryan, Halsey's Story, page 243, states he received the

request to repeat the Luzon strike s from MacArthur ,

but n o suc h messag e from MacArthu r can b e found .

For cancellatio n o f deceptio n operations, se e above ,

page 53 and not e 25.
64 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

to plac e a day-long neutralizing blanket

over al l Japanes e field s o n Luzon .

Admiral Halse y agreed . Th e Allied

Naval Force s commande r als o wante d

the fas t carrie r group s t o mov e t o ne w

positions west o f Luzon i n orde r t o provide additiona l support fo r all echelon s

of th e Luzo n Attac k Forc e an d t o

interpose itsel f betwee n Luzo n an d an y

Japanese surfac e element s tha t migh t

approach under cover of the bad weather

then blanketin g th e Sout h Chin a Sea .

Kenney seconde d Kinkaid' s recommen -

dations, bu t decisio n wa s deferred. 48

MacArthur propose d furthe r changes .

Also believin g no w tha t th e kamikaze s

were comin g fro m Formosa , h e re -

quested, throug h th e Join t Chief s o f

Staff, tha t o n 8 Januar y B-29' s strik e

Formosa airfield s instea d o f thei r sched -

uled targets, th e port facilitie s i n north -

ern Formosa . Later , thinkin g tha t th e

Japanese migh t b e stagin g kamikaze s t o

Formosa throug h th e Ryukyus , Genera l

MacArthur aske d tha t i n additio n th e

B-29's attac k Okinaw a airfields . Th e

Joint Chief s agree d t o thes e requests ,

but ba d weathe r condition s prevente d

the B-29' s fro m carryin g ou t th e ne w

assignments as planned. Successfu l B-29

strikes agains t th e Formos a field s wer e

undertaken too late to do any good, even

if the Japanese had been flying kamikazes

from th e Formosa area. 49

Halsey's planes, still hampered by poor

weather conditions , struc k Luzo n field s

as schedule d o n 7 January, claimin g t o

have destroye d abou t 80 Japanes e air -

craft durin g the day. The effor t di d no t

halt Japanes e ai r attacks . O f th e 4 0 t o

50 operationa l aircraft th e Japanese had

left—it appear s tha t th e bul k o f th e

planes th e Thir d Fleet' s aircraf t de -

stroyed o n 7 Januar y wer e no t opera -

tional t o begi n with—20 or 2 5 attacked

the various echelons of the Luzon Attack

Force.

At Lingayen Gulf th e Japanese attacks

of 7 January wer e o n a greatly reduce d

scale, an d mos t o f the m wer e o f th e

orthodox type . However , thes e plane s

did succeed in sinking two of Oldendorf's

mine sweepers . Fa r t o th e south , Japa -

nese plane s attacke d th e amphibiou s

convoys intermittentl y throughou t th e

day, but succeeded only in damaging one

VII Amphibiou s Forc e LST . Durin g

the followin g nigh t VI I Amphibiou s

Force destroyer s san k a Japanes e de -

stroyer off Manila Bay , on e tha t had pu t

back int o the bay on th e 5th.

The nex t day , 8 January , th e Thir d

Fleet bega n movin g towar d Formosa , refueling o n th e way . MacArthur an d

Halsey ha d bot h recommende d agains t

Admiral Kinkaid' s proposa l tha t th e

Third Flee t tak e up a covering position

off Luzon , an d Admira l Nimit z ha d ac -

cordingly instructe d Halse y t o procee d

against Formos a a s originall y planned .

MacArthur, wh o stil l believe d tha t th e

kamikazes wer e comin g fro m Formosa ,

also suggeste d tha t th e Thir d Flee t at -

tack Formos a o n S-day , 9 January, espe -

cially if the flee t wer e not i n positio n t o

launch majo r strike s agains t th e islan d

on th e 8th.

Nimitz, MacArthur , an d Halse y wer e

48

 Rad, Kinkai d t o Halsey , 032 4 7 Ja n 45 , Sixt h

Army G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 5-11 Ja n 45 ; Chamberlin

Comments, 2 0 Jan 57 . 49

 In additio n t o sources noted previously, information o n B-29 operation s i n suppor t o f th e Luzo n

assault i s from : Rads , MacArthu r t o Arnold , CX -

56001, 7 Jan, and CX-56140 , 9 Jan 45, CM-IN' s

5768 an d 8096 ; Rads , Arnol d t o MacArthur , [Ma j

Gen Curti s E. ] LeMay , Wedemeyer , et al., 7 Jan, 9

Jan, 9 Jan, and 1 0 Jan 45 , CM-OUT's 88424, 89316 ,

89317, an d 89580 ; CINCPAC-CINCPOA , Opn s i n

POA Durin g Jan 45 , pp. 23-26 , 66.
PRELIMINARY OPERATION S AN D THE APPROAC H 65

looking upo n th e Third Fleet 's fast car -

rier group s a s a strategi c weapo n o f

opportunity tha t shoul d no t b e tie d

down t o clos e suppor t o f a landin g ex -

cept i n a n extrem e emergency . The y

realized tha t Oldendor f an d Kinkai d

were justifiabl y influence d b y th e dam -

age the kamikazes had inflicted upo n the

Luzon Attac k Force , but howeve r reluc -

tant t o act against th e recommendations

of th e subordinat e commanders , th e

three senio r officer s fel t tha t th e bes t

employment fo r th e Thir d Flee t wa s at

Formosa, fro m whic h th e Japanes e ai r

was apparentl y operating. 50

Poor weathe r condition s agai n cur -

tailed th e Thir d Fleet 's operation s o n

9 January and the strike against Formosa

that day—none was launched on th e 8th

—did no t prov e a s successfu l a s hoped .

Third Flee t plane s destroye d 4 7 Japa -

nese aircraft , 5 of the m i n th e air , san k

9 Japanese ships, and damage d 19 other

surface vessels .

Meanwhile, th e situatio n a t Lingaye n

Gulf ha d take n a tur n fo r th e better .

On th e 8th , kamikaze s struc k th e heav y

cruiser H.M.A.S . Australia for the thir d

and fourt h times , inflictin g suc h damag e

that Oldendor f ha d t o reliev e th e shi p

of it s bombardmen t assignments. That ,

however, wa s th e onl y importan t dam -

age Oldendorf 's group s suffere d o n th e

8th. Fo r th e amphibiou s convoys , o n

the othe r hand , things proved a bit hot -

ter tha n previously. Kamikaze s seriously

damaged tw o escortin g CVE 's an d in -

flicted mino r damag e o n a n LSI , an

LST, an d a n attac k transpor t (APA) .

In all , th e Japanes e employe d n o mor e

than fiftee n plane s durin g th e day , bu t

had damage d si x ships , kille d abou t 5 0

men, an d wounde d aroun d 6 5 more.

Throughout S-day , a s assaul t opera -

tions go t unde r wa y a t Lingaye n Gulf ,

about fiftee n mor e Japanes e plane s con -

ducted scattere d attacks . Kamikaze s in -

flicted sever e damag e o n a battleship ,

hit th e ligh t cruise r Columbia fo r th e

third tim e an d H.M.A.S . Australia fo r

the fift h time , and damage d one destroyer

escort. Friendl y antiaircraft fire , fo r th e

second time , inflicte d man y casualtie s

aboard th e battleshi p Colorado.

The Japanes e were not quite through.

On 10 January eight kamikazes attempted

attacks, succeeding in damagin g an AP A

and a destroye r escort . O n th e 12th ,

striking wit h fiv e planes , th e Japanes e

severely damage d a destroye r transpor t

and inflicte d lesse r damag e o n anothe r

destroyer escor t an d a destroye r trans -

port. Wes t o f Luzo n kamikazes , o n th e

same day , hi t convoy s o n thei r wa y t o

and fro m Lingaye n Gul f heavil y dam -

aging 3 Liberty s an d lightl y damagin g

another and 2 LST's. Th e 13t h o f January brough t wit h i t th e las t significan t

air attack s o n element s o f th e Luzo n

Attack Force . A t Lingaye n Gul f tha t

day Japanes e plane s severel y damage d

another CVE , a n APA , an d a n LST ,

while lightly damaging a destroyer transport. O n th e sam e da y anothe r AP A

suffered a bi t fro m friendl y antiaircraf t

fire.

That wa s th e end . For th e Allie d

Naval Forces, Southwest Pacifi c Area , i t

was mor e tha n enough . I n th e mont h

following 1 3 December, whe n th e Japa -

nese firs t launche d ai r attack s agains t

the Mindoro-boun d convoys , Japanes e

planes ha d succeede d i n sinkin g 2 4 vessels and damagin g 67 others. (Table 1)

Shipboard casualties from th e air attack s

50

 Rad, MacArthu r to Nimit z and Halsey , 8 Jan 45 ,

cited in VII Amphib Force Rpt Luzon , Encl D, Chron

Rpt, p . 16 ; Chamberlin Comments, 20 Jan 57 .
66 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

TABLE 1—RESULT S O F JAPANESE KAMIKAZ E OPERATION S

13 DECEMBE R 1944-1 3 JANUARY 1945

a

 Includes three Liberty ships beached and abandoned a t Mindoro.

Source: Th e source s fo r this tabl e ar e primaril y th e nava l document s cite d previousl y i n this chapte r an d Morison , The Liberation, pages

cited i n not e 8 , p . 46, above. The total s in the table will not necessarily agree with the text, because the tabl e make s allowance s for "repeats."

The tabl e als o includes one FT destroye d an d a Libert y shi p severely damage d a s a resul t o f th e nava l actio n off Mindoro. Finally , the tabl e

includes vessels damage d indirectl y a s a result of kamikaz e operations, such a s the destroye r Moale bein g damage d b y ammunitio n explodin g

on anothe r vessel .

numbered approximatel y 1,23 0 men

killed an d 1,80 0 wounded. O f these , the

vast majorit y wer e me n o f th e Unite d

States and Australian naval forces. Losse s

among merchant seamen were about 275

killed an d 10 0 wounde d o r injured ,

while U.S . Arm y shipboar d casualtie s

numbered aroun d 15 0 kille d an d 20 0

wounded.51

In th e sam e period , 1 3 December-13

January, th e Japanes e ha d los t perhap s

600 aircraf t o n o r ove r Luzo n an d th e

Visayas t o Allie d ai r attack s o r i n kami -

kaze operations. O f th e total , probabl y

at leas t a thir d ha d bee n destroye d i n

attempted or successful kamikaz e attacks.

With thes e losses, Japanese air powe r on

Luzon cease d t o exist . Althoug h th e

Allies coul d no t ye t kno w it , the y ha d

nothing more t o fea r fro m Japanes e ai r

strength i n th e Philippines.

When th e kamikaz e attack s tapere d

off, Allie d force s ha d ye t t o develo p a n

51

 Casualty figure s ar e base d upo n th e source s previously cited; upon Morison, The Liberation, passim;

and upo n telephon e conversation , 2 8 Ma y 1952 ,

author wit h Mrs . Kathorne A . Daly , Divisio n o f

Insurance, U.S. Maritime Administration .
PRELIMINARY OPERATION S AN D TH E APPROAC H 67

effective defense . Th e onl y answe r

seemed t o b e Admira l Oldendorf' s pro -

posals fo r complet e neutralizatio n o f al l

Japanese field s withi n range . Th e im -

possibility o f accomplishin g thi s wit h

the means available in th e Pacific during

early 194 5 was firs t demonstrate d a t

Luzon i n Januar y an d agai n a t Oki -

nawa i n April , whe n damag e t o nava l

forces fa r surpasse d tha t a t Luzon. 52 I n

both campaign s kamikaz e attack s ceased

at Japanese initiative—at Luzon because

the Japanes e refuse d t o sen d i n stron g

air reinforcements ; a t Okinaw a becaus e

they wer e unwillin g t o continu e th e

heavy attrition of aircraft attendant upon

such operations, preferring to save planes

and pilot s fo r th e defens e o f th e home -

land. Wha t woul d hav e happene d a t

Luzon, wher e Allie d ai r strengt h wa s

weaker tha n a t Okinawa , ha d th e Japa -

nese electe d t o exercis e thei r capabilit y

of mountin g attack s an d reinforcement s

from Formos a i s amon g th e imponder -

ables o f Worl d Wa r II .

Mine Sweeping and Preliminary

Bombardment

At Admira l Oldendorf' s direction ,

mine sweeping , hydrographi c surveys ,

shore bombardment , an d suppor t air -

craft attack s ha d continue d throughou t

the period o f th e worst kamikaz e opera -

tions a t Lingaye n Gulf. 53 Whe n min e

sweeping bega n abou t 070 0 o n 6 January, th e da y tha t th e kamikaz e attack s

were at their height, Oldendorf expecte d

reports o f heav y min e field s an d stron g

beach obstacles. Muc h to everyone's surprise, explorator y sweep s durin g th e

morning turne d u p onl y tw o floatin g

mines an d non e o f th e moore d type. 54

When sweepin g wa s completed o n th e

8th, onl y fou r mine s had bee n found .

On th e 7t h underwate r demolitio n

teams had slipped into the gulf t o begin

their hazardous tas k o f destroying beach

obstacles, an d hydrographi c ship s began

marking shoal s an d takin g soundings .

Again contrary to expectations, no beach

obstacles wer e found . Th e "fro g men "

encountered onl y a littl e rifl e an d ma -

chine gu n fire , an d th e fe w beac h

defenses the y observe d appeare d t o b e

unoccupied. Thei r task s an d thos e o f

hydrographic ship s wer e complete d o n

the 8th.

While thi s wor k wa s under way , the

CVE-based aircraf t wer e bombin g an d

strafing target s alon g th e gulf' s beache s

and a t inlan d points , flyin g 25 0 t o 30 0

sorties during the period from 6 through

8 January . Meanwhile , thos e oft-for -

gotten bu t highl y importan t nava l air -

craft—battleship-based an d cruiser-base d

seaplanes—were helpin g t o direc t th e

preliminary beach bombardment, which

also began on the morning of 6 January.55

First target s wer e Japanes e installa -

tions i n th e Sa n Fernand o area , o n th e 52

 See Appleman et al., Okinawa, pp. 96-102 , 489.

During the Okinawa operation kamikaze s alone sank

26 ship s an d damage d 16 4 others. Ther e th e Japa -

nese use d abou t 1,90 0 aircraft i n kamikaz e attacks ,

while durin g th e Mindoro-Luzo n invasio n perio d

they employe d abou t 20 0 i n suc h operations . Th e

percentage retur n wa s thu s muc h greate r fo r th e

Mindoro-Luzon operation. 53

 This subsection is based principally upon: Luzon

Attack Forc e Rpt , pp. 13-14 , 26-33, 48-52 ; T G 77 .2

Rpt Lingaye n Gulf , pp . 1 , 6 , 18-20 ; T U 77.4. 2 Rp t

Lingayen Gulf , p . 4; CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Opns in

POA Durin g Jan 45 , pp. 52-54 . 54

 Col. Russell W. Volckmann, commanding a guerrilla forc e know n a s th e U.S . Arm y Force s i n th e

Philippines (Norther n Luzon) , USAFI P (NL),

claimed tha t his men ha d remove d many mines from

Lingayen Gul f durin g lat e 1944 . Volckmann Com -

ments, 1 0 Jan 57 . 55

 See, for example , extrac t o f report o f US S Colorado, in Luzon Attack Force Rpt, p. 60.
68 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

east sid e o f th e gulf , an d o n Santiag o

Island an d th e nearb y mainlan d a t th e

northwest corne r o f th e gulf . Spottin g

planes coul d locat e n o suitabl e militar y

targets i n th e Santiag o Islan d area , an d

the bombardmen t vessel s fire d onl y a

few round s of ammunition in tha t direction. Bombardmen t of the San Fernando

area, answere d b y severa l ineffectua l

rounds fro m Japanes e shor e batteries ,

had laste d abou t tw o an d a hal f hour s

when Admira l Oldendor f stoppe d i t i n

order to send his battleships and cruisers

further int o Lingaye n Gul f t o suppor t

his beleaguere d min e sweeper s an d t o

make th e Japanes e thin k th e kamikaz e

operations wer e havin g n o effect . Th e

vessels wer e i n positio n t o fir e a t th e

southern beache s abou t 1715 , one sec -

tion hittin g th e tow n o f Lingaye n an d

its airstri p an d th e othe r concentratin g

on th e Sa n Fabia n area , a t th e gulf' s

southeast corner . Th e firin g wa s continually interrupte d b y kamikazes , an d

when i t cease d a t 191 5 not mor e tha n

half a n hou r o f actua l bombardmen t

had take n place . Th e Japanes e did no t

return fire .

Oldendorf's ship s agai n covere d th e

southern beache s on th e 7th , once more

with n o answer from th e Japanese. Th e

day's firin g ende d abou t 1730 , when th e

bombardment vessels , a s was their prac -

tice, bega n retirin g fro m th e gulf's con -

fined water s t o tak e u p nigh t position s

outside. Returnin g o n th e mornin g o f

the 8t h t o resum e bombardmen t abou t

0800, on e sectio n agai n hi t th e Lin -

gayen area . Abou t te n minute s late r a

destroyer standin g clos e inshor e an d a

spotting plane from a battleship reported

that Filipino s wer e formin g a parade ,

complete with Unite d State s and Philip -

pine flags, i n th e town of Lingayen. Th e

fire wa s shifted t o mor e westerl y targets

while leaflet s wer e quickl y prepared in -

structing th e Filipino s to clea r th e area .

A spottin g plan e droppe d th e leaflet s

and th e parader s dispersed . Bombard -

ment starte d agai n a s soo n a s th e are a

seemed vacated .

The reason s fo r resumin g th e bom -

bardment o f Lingaye n an d it s environ s

in th e fac e o f thi s friendl y demonstra -

tion ashor e ar e unknown , especiall y

since neithe r underwate r demolitio n

teams nor spottin g planes had discovered

any signs of Japanese activity in th e area.

The town , a t least , seeme d safel y i n th e

hands o f th e Filipinos. Th e mos t obvious explanation is that erroneous intelligence, havin g indicate d tha t stron g

defenses woul d b e encountere d i n th e

area, mad e i t incumben t upo n Admira l

Oldendorf t o continu e th e bombard -

ment whether he wanted to or not. To o

much wa s a t stak e t o tak e a chance .

Actually h e coul d hav e pu t a forc e o f

seamen ashore on Lingaye n Gulf's southern beache s o n 8 Januar y withou t fea r

— indeed, th e entir e beachhea d are a

could probabl y hav e bee n occupie d b y

men fro m th e bombardmen t vessel s

without muc h ris k anytim e after Olden -

dorf's vessel s reache d Lingaye n Gul f o n

6 January . On e ca n but ponde r o n th e

amusing (an d undoubtedl y confusing )

results had the I and XIV Corps arrived

at Lingaye n Gul f t o fin d th e beache s

already occupie d b y me n o f th e Allie d

Naval Forces .

The Filipino s i n th e Lingaye n are a

could hardl y hav e bee n please d a s the y

saw thei r home s an d publi c building s

damaged o r destroye d b y wha t t o the m

must hav e seeme d a n unnecessar y bom -

bardment. I t seems a tribute both to the

Filipinos an d t o th e prewa r administra -
PRELIMINARY OPERATION S AN D THE APPROAC H 69

tion of the United States in the islands—

as wel l a s a sever e an d obviou s indict -

ment o f Japanes e occupatio n policies —

that th e peopl e o f th e Philippine s too k

such adversitie s i n thei r stride , no t permitting personal resentments to overcome

judgment an d loyalty .

Throughout th e res t o f 8 January ,

bombardment of the landing beach areas

continued withou t incident . Practicall y

no militar y installation s o r targets wer e

found i n th e Lingaye n tow n an d air -

strip area , an d relativel y fe w wer e discovered i n th e Sa n Fabia n region . Th e

San Fabia n bombardmen t vessel s ra n

out o f target s b y 153 0 and move d bac k

up th e gul f t o strik e th e Sa n Fernand o

area fo r another forty-fiv e minutes , completing the tas k tha t th e Japanes e kamikazes ha d interrupte d o n th e 6th, The

Lingayen are a ship s ha d lon g sinc e

ceased thei r firin g fo r th e day . Thus

ended preliminar y bombardmen t

operations.

That th e bombardment , min e sweep -

ing, an d ai r operation s i n th e Lingaye n

Gulf are a had been successful a s a preparation fo r a n amphibiou s assaul t ther e

can b e n o doubt . Ashore , considerin g

the absenc e o f Japanes e defenses , ai r

and nava l bombardmen t target s ha d

been mor e tha n adequatel y covered ,

while i n th e gul f th e min e sweeper s

found onl y fou r mines . Judgin g th e

effectiveness o f th e bombardmen t i s an -

other matter . Sinc e th e groun d force s

suffered ver y fe w casualtie s durin g th e

landing, th e shellin g and strafin g would

appear to have been completely effective,

but a s Admiral Oldendor f pointe d out,

the "Japanese tactics of withdrawal from

[the] beac h area s probabl y mad e muc h

of th e bombardment unnecessary." 56 I n

the fac e o f th e kamikaz e attacks , th e

situation migh t hav e bee n fa r differen t

had the Luzon Attack Force encountered

expected min e field s an d shor e defenses.

During th e nigh t o f 8- 9 Januar y

Oldendorf's force s cruise d jus t withi n

Lingayen Gul f an d acros s it s entrance .

The amphibiou s attack convoy s reached

the entranc e abou t 040 0 o n th e 9th,

S-day, and , the bombardmen t vessel s

leading, immediatel y bega n movin g

southward t o assigne d anchorages . A s

the amphibiou s shippin g deploye d t o

begin landin g operations , th e fir e sup -

port vessel s (contro l no w veste d i n

Admirals Barbe y an d Wilkinson ) too k

up position s fo r last-minut e preassaul t

shelling. Unde r cover o f this fire , trans -

ports began lowerin g boats an d loadin g

them with troops; LST's disgorged LVT's

and LV T (A)'s of the assault waves. Al l

was i n readines s fo r wha t man y o f th e

participating officer s an d me n o f th e

Luzon Attack Forc e and th e Sixth Army

firmly expecte d to be a bloody shambles.

56

 TG 77. 2 Rpt Lingaye n Gulf , p . 36 .

PART TW O

INVASION

CHAPTER I V

Establishing th e Beachhead

Considered a s one even t i n th e Allied

campaign agains t Japan , th e assaul t o n

Luzon contained withi n itsel f grea t stra -

tegic significance . Bu t t o th e Sixt h

Army, th e attac k acros s th e Lingaye n

Gulf beache s wa s a tactica l introductio n

to th e Southwest Pacifi c Area' s strategi c

goal — the recaptur e o f th e Centra l

Plains-Manila Ba y region. Th e landin g

would serv e Genera l Krueger' s force s a s

the mean s t o secur e a bas e are a int o

which t o pou r supplie s an d reinforce -

ments, on whic h t o establis h ai r support

units, an d fro m whic h t o launc h subse -

quent offensive s agains t th e mai n bod y

of th e Japanes e 14th Area Army. Ac -

cordingly, Sixt h Arm y ha d limite d initial objectives . I t woul d secur e th e

terrain withi n th e confine s o f th e Arm y

Beachhead Lin e an d simultaneousl y de -

ploy t o safeguard it s flank s against Japa -

nese counterattack . Detaile d plannin g

did no t exten d beyon d thi s preliminar y

stage. Sixt h Arm y ha d onl y th e bares t

outline o f a pla n fo r operation s inlan d

from th e beachhea d lin e — an outlin e

based upon a concept developed at GHQ

SWPA. Thi s concep t calle d fo r Sixt h

Army t o pus h generall y southward fro m

the Lingaye n assaul t beache s and secur e

crossings ove r th e Agn o River , th e firs t

major natura l defensiv e barrie r o n th e

way t o Manila . Onc e poise d alon g th e

south ban k o f th e Agno , Sixt h Arm y

would prepar e t o strik e o n southwar d

toward Manil a an d Manil a Bay . The

manner i n whic h th e driv e beyon d th e

Agno woul d b e conducte d wa s lef t fo r

future determinatio n dependin g upo n

the developin g tactica l situatio n o n th e

rest o f Luzon .

The Assault: S-day–S Plus 2

First ligh t o n S-day , 9 Januar y 1945 ,

revealed a n impressiv e armada o f Allied

vessels i n Lingaye n Gulf . Th e da y

dawned with a light but broke n overcast.

Visibility wa s excellent. Regular , gentle

swells len t a n aspec t o f serenit y t o th e

gulf's waters, and the surf breaking along

the gulf' s shore s wa s neithe r hig h no r

rough. A s the su n ros e higher, a touc h

of hea t i n th e tropica l daw n becam e

more marked— a ma n coul d easil y fee l

that o n shor e th e da y migh t wa x a s hot

as th e hinge s o f hel l befor e evenin g

brought relief . Weathe r conditions , i f

anyone aboar d th e ship s o f th e assaul t

convoys though t t o mak e th e compari -

son, wer e fa r differen t fro m thos e th e

Japanese ha d encountere d a t Lingaye n

Gulf i n Decembe r 1941 . The Japanes e

had gon e ashor e durin g dark , predaw n

hours through heavy , rough surf . Blac k

skies an d intermitten t rai n squall s ha d

reduced visibilit y almos t t o th e vanish -

ing point , an d th e gulf' s chopp y water s
74 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

SOUTHERN LANDIN G BEAC H A T LINGAYEN. Note provincial capital building, lower right.

had thoroughl y doused the invaders with

chill spray. 1

On 9 Januar y 194 5 th e America n

assault troops awaiting debarkation from

their transport s coul d observ e t o thei r

front (south ) a generally flat vista broken

only by the taller buildings of the town s

of Lingaye n an d Sa n Fabian . I t wa s

impossible eve n t o gues s wha t thi s fea -

tureless terrai n migh t hol d i n th e wa y

of Japanese ; th e imaginatio n coul d ru n

riot a s smoke , dust , an d fire s fro m pre -

assault ai r an d nava l bombardmen t rose

to obscur e th e shor e line . T o th e left ,

ominously brooding , lay the grassy, open

foothills o f th e gulf' s easter n shore . Be -

yond thes e hills ros e terracelik e tiers o f

towering mountain s tha t appeare d a t a

distance t o b e heavil y forested . I t wa s

only to o eas y fo r troop s o f th e I Corps,

coming i n o n th e Sixt h Army' s left , t o

imagine wha t thos e dar k mountain s

would contain . O n th e righ t th e me n

of th e XI V Corp s ha d a vie w o f th e 1

 Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp . 128-29 .
ESTABLISHING TH E BEACHHEA D 75

LOOKING INLAND , EASTER N SHOR E O F LINGAYE N GUL F

lower, more wooded hills of th e Bolina o

Peninsula, formin g th e wester n sid e o f

Lingayen Gulf. N o need to worry much

about th e peninsul a yet—n o assaul t wa s

scheduled fo r tha t sid e o f th e gul f an d

available intelligence indicated that few ,

if any, Japanese were located there. Yet ,

all in all, a man with a good pair of fiel d

glasses could decide for himself tha t this

assault could be a sticky affair. Hill s and

mountains dominate d bot h th e easter n

and th e wester n flank s o f th e landin g

beaches, an d th e mountain s stretche d

off southwar d (o n th e west ) an d south -

eastward a s fa r a s th e ey e coul d reach .

Would th e Japanes e hol d th e fla t lan d

to th e front ? Woul d the y defen d th e

hills an d mountains ? O r woul d the y

launch counterattacks from ye t invisible

mountain valleys?

Ignoring the speculations of the assault

infantry, th e gun s o f nava l fir e suppor t

vessels bega n thei r S-da y bombardmen t

on schedul e a t 0700 . A t first th e battle -

ships, cruisers , destroyers , LC I (G)'s,

LCI (R)'s (Landin g Craft , Infantry ,
76 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Rocket), and LC I (M)'s (Landin g Craft ,

Infantry, Mortar) , directe d thei r fire s

upon selecte d landin g beaches. Admira l

Kinkaid wa s especially well pleased wit h

the performanc e o f th e LC I (M)'s, th e

main batterie s o f whic h wer e Army -

manned 4.2-inc h chemica l mortars. Th e

high-explosive morta r fire , Kinkai d

thought in retrospect, seemed more effective fo r beac h neutralizatio n tha n th e

strafing undertake n b y hi s CVE-base d

aircraft. Bu t a s th e bombardmen t lifte d

from th e landin g beache s t o th e flank s

of th e assault area , troops of th e leadin g

waves wer e no t concerne d wit h suc h

comparisons — their onl y concer n wa s

whether th e beac h bombardment , how -

ever executed, would indeed be effective .

The Right Flank

The ship s o f Admiral Wilkinson's III

Amphibious Force began debarking XIV

Corps assault troop s about 0730. 2 Short -

ly thereafter , LVT' s an d LV T (A)' s dis -

gorged fro m LST' s t o for m th e leadin g

waves. A t 090 0 th e firs t amphibian s

started shorewar d fro m a lin e o f departure approximately 4,500 yards offshore .

The landin g beache s o f th e XI V

Corps, o n th e Sixt h Army' s right , wer e

located acros s th e middl e o f Lingaye n

Gulf's souther n shore s an d centere d o n

Lingayen airstrip and the nearby grounds

of th e capito l o f Pangasina n Province .

(Map 1)* I n peacetim e one woul d hav e

considered th e shor e lin e a beautifu l

swimming beach, 3 a magnificient stran d

of fir m san d stretchin g eastwar d almos t

nine mile s fro m th e mout h o f th e Calmay River to the mouth of the Dagupan,

The eas t ban k o f th e Dagupan , whic h

enters the gulf midwa y between Lingayen

and Sa n Fabian , delineate d th e bound -

ary betwee n th e XI V an d th e I Corps ,

and bridge s ove r th e Dagupa n wer e ex -

pected t o provid e th e firs t eas y mean s

of contac t betwee n th e two corps. Sinc e

there was a gap of over six miles between

the I Corps ' westernmos t beache s an d

the XI V Corps ' easternmost , i t wa s imperative tha t th e Dagupa n crossing s b e

seized withou t delay . Planner s antici -

pated tha t inasmuc h a s I Corp s troop s

would b e a mile or so closer t o the river

at th e moment of landing they would b e

the firs t t o reac h th e bridges, but i t wa s

XIV Corps ' responsibilit y t o reliev e I

Corps at the crossings as soon as possible.

The 37t h Infantr y Division , landin g

on th e XI V Corps ' left , wa s t o driv e

toward th e Dagupan , whil e th e 40t h

Infantry Divisio n goin g ashor e o n th e

corps (an d army) righ t flank , woul d

make a quick thrust west and northwest

to Por t Sua l an d Alaminos . Por t Sual ,

located a t th e southwester n corne r o f

Lingayen Gulf , an d a t th e wester n ex -

tremity o f th e Arm y Beachhea d Line ,

possessed some importance as the sit e o f

minor por t facilities . Alaminos , abou t

twelve mile s northwest o f Port Sual , la y

inland o n th e Bolina o Peninsula . Earl y

capture o f roa d junction s a t Alamino s

would hel p forestal l Japanes e attempt s

to organiz e counterattack s agains t th e

Sixth Army's right flank .

2

 Information o n plan s an d organizatio n i n thi s

subsection is from: XI V Corps Rp t Luzon , pt. I , pp .

1-7; XI V Corps FO 1 , 3 0 Nov 44; III Amphi b Forc e

(TF 79 ) Attack Pla n No . A-305-44, 27 Nov 44, Sixth

Army G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 2-5 De c 44; 37th In f Di v

FO 19 , 1 2 Dec 44 .

*Maps numbere d i n Roma n ar e place d i n invers e

order insid e th e bac k cover .

3

 Such, indeed , wa s th e author' s reactio n whe n

he examine d thes e beache s i n Apri l 1957 .
ESTABLISHING TH E BEACHHEA D 77

The XI V Corps ' assaul t forc e wa s

composed o f eight o f the corps' eightee n

available battalio n landin g teams. Th e

reserve infantr y battalio n o f eac h o f th e

four assaul t regimenta l comba t team s

was t o follo w th e firs t tw o battalion s

ashore rapidly , bu t eac h divisio n woul d

retain on e RC T afloa t i n reserv e unti l

S plu s 1 unles s th e RCT' s presenc e

ashore wa s require d earlier. 4 Eac h o f

the fou r assaul t RCT' s 105-mm . how -

itzer battalion s would revert t o division

artillery control o n S plus 1 or S plus 2 ,

when al l divisio n an d corp s artiller y

would b e ashor e an d a n adequat e artil -

lery communication s ne t woul d b e

functioning.

The XI V Corps' assaul t wave s had no

trouble forming , an d the y heade d to -

ward shor e i n goo d order. 5 Probabl y

because the leading amphibians and LCI

guide boat s move d mor e slowl y tha n

anticipated—an eb b tid e wa s still run -

ning—no landings were made exactly on

schedule a t 0930 , bu t al l XI V Corp s

assault waves were on th e beach b y 0940.

Then cam e LCVP' s (Landin g Craft ,

Vehicle an d Personnel) , LCM's, LCT's ,

and LST's , al l o n schedule s varyin g i n

detail from on e beach to another.6 Shor e

and beach parties soon started landward,

and befor e 110 0 genera l unloadin g wa s

under wa y acros s al l II I Amphibiou s

Force-XIV Corp s beaches . Ther e ha d

been n o opposition . Indeed , a s soon a s

the nava l bombardmen t had lifte d fro m

the assaul t beaches, Filipino s bega n ap -

pearing alon g th e shor e line , read y t o

aid th e invading forces.

The 1s t Battalio n o f 185t h Infantry ,

40th Division, landed o n the corps' an d

army's extrem e right . B y noon , unop -

posed, th e battalio n ha d marche d si x

miles westward to the mouth of the Agno

River. Befor e dus k LV T (A)' s carrie d

elements o f th e 40t h Reconnaissance

Troop across th e river t o set up a roadblock alon g th e mai n roa d jus t thre e

miles east of Port Sual. Meanwhile , th e

2d Battalion, 185th Infantry, had pushed

directly inland through the town of Lingayen and had crossed the Calmay River

and an east-west stretch of the Agno, two

of th e larges t wate r course s tha t slice d

the terrai n behin d th e Sixt h Army's assault beaches. Nightfal l foun d th e regiment's lef t ove r fou r mile s inlan d along

Route 13 . Th e 185t h ha d encountere d

no Japanes e durin g th e da y an d ha d

suffered n o casualties. 7

On th e 40th Division's lef t th e 160t h

Infantry ha d als o gon e ashor e withou t

trouble an d b y dusk , havin g ferrie d

across th e Calmay , wa s assemblin g al -

most fou r mile s inland . Th e regimen t

had foun d fe w signs of Japanese activity

and ha d suffere d n o casualties. Th e 2 d

Battalion, 108t h Infantry, th e 40t h Division's assault reserve , came ashore about

1700 an d assemble d a t Lingayen. 8

4

 See app. A-3. 5

 The res t o f thi s subsectio n i s base d mainl y on :

Luzon Attac k Forc e Rpt , pp . 16 , 32-35, 51-52 ; II I

Amphib Forc e Rp t Luzon , p . 12 , and Enc l C, Nava l

Gunfire, pp . 1-4 ; T G 77 .2 Rp t Lingaye n Gulf , pp .

28-30; T G 79 .1 Rp t Lingaye n Gulf , Enc l A , Chron

Log, pp . 15-17 ; T G 79 .2 Rp t Lingaye n Gulf , pp .

7-10; Sixt h Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 17-18 ; XI V Corp s

Rpt Luzon, pt. I, pp. 35-53; 37th Inf Div Rpt Luzon ,

pp. 19-21 ; 37th Div G-3 Pe r Rpts, 9-12 Ja n 45; 37th

Div G- 3 Jn l Files, 9-11 and 11-1 5 Ja n 45; 40th In f

Div Rp t Luzon , pp . 9-12 ; 40th Di v G- 3 Jn l Files ,

9-12 Ja n 45 . 6

 See app. B . 7 Additional informatio n i n thi s chapte r o n 185t h

Infantry operation s is from: 185t h In f S- 3 Pe r Rpts

and Overlays , 9-12 Jan 45 ; 185t h Inf S- 3 Jn l Files ,

9-12 Ja n 45; 185th In f S-2/S-3 Jnl, 9-12 Jan 45. 8

 No records of the 108th an d 160th Infantry Regi -

ments fo r th e perio d 9 throug h 1 1 January ca n b e

located.
78 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Immediately eas t o f th e 40t h Division, th e 37t h Division' s 148t h Infantr y

poured ashor e agains t n o resistance. 9

The regimen t foun d a bridg e ove r th e

Calmay Rive r i n it s secto r destroyed ,

but LVT' s ferrie d troop s acros s durin g

the afternoon. Th e 129t h Infantr y land -

ed o n th e XI V Corps' left . Whil e par t

of th e regiment went straight inland and

across th e Calmay , othe r unit s swun g

east alon g th e beac h towar d th e mout h

of th e Dagupa n River . A fe w Japanese

hidden behin d a lo w san d dun e an d i n

houses behin d th e dun e pu t u p a sho w

of resistance , bu t wer e quickl y silence d

by fir e fro m LV T (A)' s o r LC I (G)'s. 10

During th e afternoo n me n o f th e

129th moved int o Dagupan. Findin g no

signs o f I Corp s unit s i n th e area , th e

regiment crossed the Pantal Rive r at th e

east edg e of th e city by LVT—the highway bridg e wa s out—an d onc e o n th e

east ban k quickl y mad e contac t wit h

troops of the I Corps' 6t h Infantr y Divi -

sion. Late r in th e day the 129t h probed

south thre e mile s fro m Dagupa n t o

Calasiao, where it foun d nearb y bridge s

over th e Panta l an d Mayrus o River s

either destroye d o r unsaf e fo r heav y

vehicles. A t dusk the regiment extended

its right westward along secondary roads

to gai n contac t with th e 148t h Infantry .

Movement i n bot h regiments ' sector s

during the day had been strictly confined

to road s an d t o th e relativel y narro w

beach area . Numerou s fis h pond s and,

beyond th e Calma y River , man y dr y

rice paddies had prevente d cross-country

operations.

By dusk o n S-da y the XI V Corps held

a beachhea d extendin g fro m Calasia o

northwestward almos t twent y mile s t o

the outpost nea r Port Sual , a beachhead

that penetrate d inlan d fo r a n averag e

depth o f som e fou r miles . Practicall y

unopposed—the corps' unit s ha d foun d

only tw o ver y smal l group s o f Japanes e

—the advanc e durin g th e da y "fa r exceeded th e wildest dreams o f thos e wh o

had planne d th e operation." 11 I n fact ,

everything ha d gon e s o easil y tha t divi -

sion an d corp s intelligenc e an d opera -

tions officers ha d some forebodings about

what th e morrow migh t bring .

S plus 1 , 10 January, proved littl e dif -

ferent fro m S-da y i n th e XI V Corps '

zone, and th e advanc e inland continue d

to resembl e chessboard tactics . Probin g

westward towar d Por t Sual , elements o f

the 185t h Infantry , o n th e corps ' right ,

encountered a littl e resistance , bu t no t

enough t o constitut e a real threat. Th e

160th Infantry pushe d sout h o n Rout e

13, takin g ove r alon g thi s rout e o f ad -

vance southward from th e 185th , and by

nightfall wa s nearly eigh t mile s inland .

A platoo n o f Japanes e infantry , rein -

forced b y four armored cars, had delayed

the 160th . Th e regimen t los t approxi -

mately 5 men kille d an d 1 0 wounded—

the heavies t casualtie s suffere d b y an y

regiment o f th e XI V Corp s durin g th e

first thre e days o f th e Luzo n Campaign .

The 160th Infantr y kille d 2 5 t o 3 0

Japanese in scattered contacts.

On 1 1 Januar y th e 185t h Infantr y

patrolled an d consolidate d it s position s

on th e west flank , suffere d n o casualties,

killed 5 Japanese, and captured another.

9

 Additional informatio n o n th e 148t h Infantr y i s

from: 148t h In f Rp t Luzon , 1 Nov 44-4 Mar 45 , p. 2 ;

148th In f S- 3 Pe r Rpts , 9-12 Jan 45 ; 145t h In f S- 3

Jnl, 9-1 2 Jan 45 . 10

 Additional information o n 129t h Infantr y opera -

tions is from : 129t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 2-3 ; 129th

Inf S- 3 Pe r Rpts, 9-12 Jan 45 ; 129t h In f Regt l Jnl,

9-12 Ja n 45 . 11

 XIV Corps Rpt Luzon, pt. I, p. 53.
ESTABLISHING TH E BEACHHEA D 79

Early i n th e mornin g a Chevrole t seda n

of 194 0 o r 194 1 vintage , occupie d b y

two Japanese , cam e calml y dow n th e

coast roa d fro m th e directio n o f Por t

Sual. Obviousl y unaware that Compan y

C, 185t h Infantry , maintaine d a road -

block on th e highway, the Japanese practically ra n int o th e America n outpos t

before the y realized thei r situation . Be -

fore the y coul d recove r fro m thei r surprise an d consternation , bot h Japanes e

were dead, and Company C had acquired

some luxurious transportation.

With th e 185t h Infantr y displacin g

generally westwar d an d th e 160th moving south, a gap began t o develop along

the 40th Division's front . Accordingly ,

General Griswold, the corps commander,

released th e 108th Infantr y (les s 2 d Battalion) from corp s reserve and lat e on th e

10th Maj. Gen . Rap p Brush , command -

ing the 40th Division, starte d th e 108th

south afte r th e 160th Infantry . Th e

160th reached Aguilar , a roa d junctio n

town te n mile s inland , abou t noo n o n

the 11th , finding th e town already in th e

hands o f Filipin o guerrillas.

Progress in the 37th Division's area on

10 and 1 1 January was even faster. Push -

ing generall y southeast fro m it s bridge -

head acros s th e Calmay , th e 148t h

Infantry, agains t n o resistance , reache d

the Arm y Beachhea d Lin e i n it s zon e

during th e afternoo n o f th e 10th. The

next da y th e regimen t outposte d th e

Army Beachhea d Lin e fro m Dumpa y

west fou r mile s t o Bacnar , o n th e 37th -

40th Divisio n boundar y i n thi s area .

Patrols then probed five miles south from

Bacnar to the Agno River at Urbiztondo,

which guerrillas held. Bu t when a patrol

of th e 37t h Reconnaissanc e Troop spe d

south ou t o f Dumpa y towar d th e Agn o

River a t Bayambang , i t foun d indica -

tions tha t th e Japanes e wer e goin g t o

defend th e Bayambang crossing.

On th e divisio n lef t th e 129t h Infan -

try, o n 1 0 January, marched sout h eigh t

miles fro m Calasia o t o b e greete d b y

guerrillas at Malasiqui . A skirmish with

a Japanese forc e sout h o f Malasiqu i lat e

in th e da y halte d th e advanc e an d th e

bulk o f th e regimen t hel d a t Malasiqu i

during th e 11th, maintaining contac t

with I Corps units to the north and wit h

the 148t h Infantr y to the west. Th e 37t h

Division's remaining regiment, the 145t h

Infantry, remained in reserve to the rear.

By evenin g o n S plu s 2 th e XI V

Corps had eithe r physicall y occupie d o r

outposted practicall y all th e are a withi n

the Arm y Beachhea d Lin e i n it s zone .

Only o n th e corps ' extrem e right , o n

high groun d southeast o f Port Sual , ha d

no units reached the beachhead line, but

the corp s ha d foun d n o evidenc e tha t

organized group s o f Japanes e hel d an y

portion o f tha t rough , largel y trackless ,

hill country . Th e XI V Corp s had pene -

trated approximatel y te n mile s south -

ward o n it s righ t t o Aguila r an d ove r

eighteen miles on the left along the corps

boundary. I n th e absenc e o f significan t

Japanese opposition, the corps' units had

advanced i n a somewha t mechanica l

manner. Ther e ha d existe d n o chanc e

for th e spectacula r o r th e heroic—fo r

the most part th e corps had secure d un -

defended terrai n methodically , slowe d

primarily b y requirement s o f cautio n

and th e dange r o f outrunnin g it s sup -

plies. Th e corp s had a fir m hol d o n th e

ground i t ha d traversed , bu t on e weak -

ness in th e corps' situation became steadily more apparent. Th e corps ' lef t flan k

was exposed fo r a distance of some three

miles, since the I Corps had been unable

to keep pac e i n th e advanc e southward .
80 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

The Left Flank

Unlike thos e i n th e XI V Corps' area ,

the I Corps ' beache s wer e widel y sepa -

rated.12 Th e 6t h Division, going ashore

on th e I Corps ' right , lande d o n Blu e

Beaches 1 and 2 , whic h centere d o n a

sandy coas t abou t midwa y betwee n th e

mouth o f th e Dagupa n an d tha t o f th e

Bued River , fiv e mile s t o th e northeast .

The wes t ban k o f th e Bue d marke d th e

boundary between the 6th and 43 d Divisions. Jus t eas t o f th e river's mout h a t

San Fabian the 103d RCT, 43d Division,

landed o n Whit e Beac h 3 . Almos t tw o

miles t o th e northeast la y Whit e Beac h

2, th e 169t h RCT' s landin g site . A t

White Beac h 1 , adjoinin g Whit e 2 an d

opposite th e barri o (smal l town ) o f

Mabilao, th e 2 d Battalio n o f th e 172 d

Infantry wa s th e assaul t unit—th e divi -

sion's, corps' , an d army' s leftmos t

element.

I Corp s hel d ou t a s reserv e th e 6t h

Division's 63 d RCT . Th e 1s t an d 3 d

Battalions, 172 d Infantry , prepare d t o

land o n cal l a t an y Whit e Beach, comprised th e 43 d Division' s reserve , whil e

a battalio n o f the 20th Infantry wa s the

principal reserve for the 6th Division.

As i n th e XI V Corps ' zone , an d fo r

similar reasons, non e o f th e I Corps' assault landin g too k plac e exactl y o n

schedule. O n th e corps' right , th e 20t h

Infantry lande d unopposed , ove r Blu e

Beach 2 shortly after 0930. Almos t simultaneously, th e 1s t Infantr y wen t ashor e

at Blue 1.13 Moving northeast along the

beach t o th e Bued' s mout h an d the n

south abou t a mile and a half alon g the

west ban k o f th e river, troop s of th e 1s t

Infantry secure d damage d rail an d high -

way bridge s acros s th e strea m i n mid -

afternoon, an d establishe d contac t wit h

the 43d Division. Then the 1st Infantry's

right pushe d rapidl y sout h t o Mangal -

dan, thre e miles inland. A t dusk patrols

reached out t o the Patalan River, a mile

east of Mangaldan, and hurried westward

to make contac t wit h th e 20th Infantry.

The 20th had meanwhile established contact wit h th e 37t h Divisio n a t bot h

Dagupan an d Calasiao . Onl y on e smal l

group o f Japanese , whic h th e 1s t Infan -

try encountered, disputed 6t h Division's

advance during the day. By nightfall the

6th Division' s penetration—averagin g

about thre e an d a hal f miles—wa s no t

as deep as that achieved by the 37th Division o n S-day , bu t th e 6th Divisio n ha d

more tha n kep t pac e wit h th e 43 d

Division, on th e I Corps' left .

The 43 d Divisio n ha d th e mos t haz -

ardous an d difficul t S-da y tasks. O n th e

division's left lo w hills lay scarcely threequarters o f a mil e inlan d fro m Whit e

Beaches 1 and 2 . Stretchin g northward,

and coming still closer to Lingayen Gulfs

eastern shore , a firs t lin e o f low , grasscovered hills formed a somewhat broken

ridge line , th e seawar d slope s o f whic h

grew steeper as the hills proceeded north

along the coast . Beyon d thi s first range ,

which average d les s tha n 25 0 fee t i n

height, lay another, more irregular northsouth ridg e tha t ros e t o 35 0 feet . Stil l 12

 General source s fo r thi s informatio n are : Sixth

Army Rp t Luzon , I, 17-18 ; VII Amphi b Forc e Rp t

Luzon, pp. 15-19 , and Encl D, Chron Rpt, pp. 16-18;

I Corp s Rp t Luzon , pp . 6-11 , 22-28; 6t h In f Di v

Rpt Luzon , pp . 3-6; 6t h In f Di v G-3 Jn l an d G- 3

Jnl Files , 9-12 Jan 45 ; 43d In f Di v Rp t Luzon , pp .

1-8; 43d Inf Div G-3 Pe r Rpts, 10-1 2 Ja n 4 5 ( 9 Jan

missing); 43 d Inf Di v G-3 Jnl , 9-12 Jan 45 .

13

 Additional informatio n o n th e 1s t Infantr y i s

from: 1s t In f Rpt Luzon , pp . 2-8; 1st In f S- 3 Opn s

Rpts, 9-12 Jan 45 ; 1st In f S- 3 Jnl , 9-12 Jan 45 ; 1st

Inf Msg , Order, an d Lt r File , 9-12 Jan 4 5 (actuall y

a sort of S-3 Jn l File).
ESTABLISHING TH E BEACHHEA D 81

further east— a littl e ove r thre e mile s

inland—was yet a third steep-sided, grasscovered ridg e line , thi s on e averagin g

around 60 0 fee t high .

The thre e tier s o f ridge s overlooke d

the 43 d Division' s beache s fro m th e

north, northeast , an d east . The y pro -

vided th e Japanes e wit h natura l defen -

sive terrain , excellen t observation , goo d

positions fro m whic h t o delive r direc t

fire o n th e beaches , an d cove r behin d

which ther e wa s protection fro m th e essentially fla t trajector y o f nava l suppor t

fires. Moreover , the ridges were close to

assembly areas further inlan d tha t could

provide large Japanes e forces wit h cover

and concealment. I n a singl e nigh t th e

Japanese coul d mov e considerabl e

strength from thes e assembly points into

the tier s o f hill s t o launc h a counter -

attack agains t th e Sixt h Army 's left .

Accordingly, th e I Corp s directed th e

43d Divisio n t o seiz e th e most dominat -

ing of the nearby hills as quickly as possible. Whil e th e 103 d Infantry , o n th e

division right, struck generally south and

southeast towar d th e Arm y Beachhea d

Line i n it s sector , th e 169t h Infantr y

was t o driv e due eas t fro m it s beac h t o

clear Hill 470 . Lyin g three miles inland,

Hill 47 0 wa s th e highes t poin t a t th e

southern end o f the third ridge line east

from Whit e Beache s 1 an d 2 . Th e a d

Battalion, 172 d Infantry, wa s t o strik e

inland t o secur e Hil l 247 , a t th e south -

ern en d o f th e firs t ridge , an d Hil l 385 ,

on th e secon d ridge . Thes e objective s

lay respectivel y on e an d on e an d a hal f

miles inlan d an d slightl y northeas t o f

the beaches. Othe r elements of the 172d

Infantry wer e t o pus h nort h alon g th e

gravel-surfaced beac h roa d t o se t u p

roadblocks an d t o prob e u p th e coasta l

ridge line i n th e area north o f Mabilao .

The 169t h Infantry , landin g i n col -

umn o f battalions, rapidly fanned ou t t o

the east and southeast. Japanes e artillery

and mortar s emplace d i n th e risin g

ground northeas t o f th e beac h harasse d

the regiment most of th e day, an d a few

small group s o f Japanes e infantr y op -

posed the regiment's march. A t dusk, the

169th wa s a t Binday , nea r th e Bue d

River abou t fou r mile s southeas t o f

White Beach 2. Lef t flank units extended

the line s northwar d alon g gentle , ope n

slopes leadin g t o Hil l 470 . The regi -

ment ha d no t ye t take n thi s objective ,

and patrols reported that strong Japanese

forces held th e hill.14

As th e 2 d Battalion , 172 d Infantry,

landed acros s Whit e Beac h 1 , Japanes e

mortar and artiller y fire fel l sporadicall y

among landing craft and along the shore.

Nevertheless, th e battalio n quickl y se -

cured th e littl e tha t wa s lef t o f barri o

Mabilao, an d patrol s thrus t rapidl y u p

the beach road abou t half a mile to barrio Alacan . Th e res t o f th e battalio n

struck fo r Hil l 24 7 an d b y 123 0 seize d

that grassy-slope d terrai n featur e against

scattered resistance . I n th e fac e o f in -

creasingly heav y smal l arms an d morta r

fire, comba t patrols , unde r constan t ob -

servation b y th e Japanes e o n th e ope n

ground o f th e 172d' s sector , move d o n

toward Hil l 385 , the cres t an d easter n

slopes o f whic h wer e stil l i n Japanes e

hands at dark. Meanwhile , beach conditions bein g suitable and ther e bein g no

requirement to commit it elsewhere, the

division reserve—th e bul k o f th e 172 d

RCT—started ashor e a t Whit e Beac h 1

about 1000 . Some o f th e ne w arrival s

14

 Sources fo r 169t h Infantr y operation s i n thi s

chapter include : 169t h In f Rpt Luzon , 9 Jan-30 Jun

45, pp . 4-5; 169t h In f Uni t Jn l an d Jn l Files , 9-12

Jan 45 .
82 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

DUSK, 9 JANUAR Y

set up roadblock s along the coastal highway nort h o f Alacan ; on e battalio n

remained in reserve near Mabilao. 15

On 9 January th e 103 d Infantry' s op -

erations soon tended to become tactically

distinct fro m thos e o f th e 169t h an d

172d Infantr y Regiments on th e 43d Division's left , a conditio n tha t obtaine d

for severa l days . Th e 103d' s initia l ob -

jective wa s Hil l 200 , th e hig h poin t o f

a two-mile-squar e grou p o f low , gentl y

sloping, grass y hill s tha t la y almos t te n

miles southeast o f th e regiment's assault

beach. Whit e Beac h 3 . Fro m point s o f

vantage o n th e Hil l 20 0 complex, Japa -

nese observer s coul d watc h deploymen t

of America n force s ove r a larg e are a

south an d southeas t fro m th e Sixt h

Army's assaul t beaches . Moreover , th e

hills dominated th e easiest an d shortes t

approaches fro m th e I Corps ' landin g

area t o Rout e 3 , the mai n highwa y running down th e wes t sid e o f th e Centra l

Plains t o Manila .

Making a n eas y landing , th e 103d

Infantry wa s throug h shattere d Sa n Fa -

bian b y 1030 , havin g encountere d n o

opposition. Smal l group s o f Japanes e

delayed further advance s toward the Hill

200 area , bu t b y dus k leadin g elements

of th e 103d ha d penetrate d almos t fou r

miles inland. Th e regimen t held for the

night just north of San Jacinto, two miles

east of the 1s t Infantry's concentration at

Mangaldan.16

15

 Additional informatio n o n th e 172 d Infantr y i s

from: 172 d In f Rpt Luzon , 9 Jan-13 Feb 45 , pp 1-4 ;

172d In f S- 3 Rpts , 9-1 2 Ja n 45 ; 172 d In f Ms g Fil e

and Jnl , 9-1 2 Ja n 45 .

16

 Additional informatio n o n th e 103d Infantr y is

from: 103 d In f Rp t Luzon , 1 Jan-31 Ma y 45 , pp .

4-10; 103 d RC T S-3 Per Rpts, 9-12 Ja n 45; 103d In f

Opns Jnl, 9-1 2 Ja n 45.
ESTABLISHING TH E BEACHHEA D 83

Although th e I Corps ' assaul t unit s

were ashore by dusk o n S-day , there were

important difference s betwee n th e situa -

tion i n it s zon e an d tha t i n th e XI V

Corps area . Th e I Corps ' penetratio n

had not been as deep. Th e risin g terrain

in th e secto r o f th e 169t h an d 172 d Infantry Regiments , harassin g fir e fro m

Japanese mortar s an d artillery , an d de -

laying action s b y smal l group s o f Japa -

nese across muc h o f th e corp s fron t ha d

combined t o slo w progress . Moreover ,

I Corp s ha d n o soli d front . Th e 103 d

Infantry, on th e 43d Division's right, had

no physical contact with the 6th Division,

and withi n th e 43 d Divisio n are a gap s

existed betwee n th e flank s o f th e 103d,

169th, and 172 d Infantry Regiments. I n

the open , heavil y populate d are a ove r

which th e I Corp s wa s operating s o far,

such gap s attaine d littl e significance—i t

would b e extremel y difficult , i f no t im -

possible, fo r th e Japanese t o launc h surprise counterattacks ove r th e terrai n th e

I Corps had secure d on S-day . Bu t if the

gaps continue d t o exist , o r i f the y wid -

ened a s th e corps' lef t flan k unit s moved

further int o th e hill s o n a n axi s o f ad -

vance divergen t fro m th e cente r an d

right flan k forces , the n troubl e migh t

very well arise .

On 1 0 January th e 6t h Division—less

the 63 d RCT , stil l i n corp s reserve —

displaced generall y sout h an d south -

southeast about four mile s ove r flat , dry,

open, and hot farm land , and a t nightfall

held a front o f roughly seven miles, west

to east. Th e divisio n had ha d difficultie s

getting supplie s forward durin g the day,

a proble m that , combine d wit h a fe w

minor skirmishes , ha d slowe d progress .

The 1s t and 20th Infantry Regiment s

lost 2 men kille d an d 1 0 wounded on 1 0

January, an d kille d 15-2 0 Japanese .

Again th e advanc e o f th e divisio n ha d

not kep t pac e with th e 37t h Divisio n o n

the XI V Corps ' left , an d b y dar k o n th e

10th there wa s a 9-mil e discrepanc y o f

penetration alon g th e corp s boundary .

To th e lef t o f th e 6t h Division , th e

103d Infantr y o f the 43d Division moved

forward o n 1 0 Januar y o n a n ever -

expanding front , th e axe s o f advanc e o f

its flank s formin g a n angl e o f nearl y 9 0

degrees. Th e 2 d Battalion engage d i n a

game o f ta g wit h a Japanes e tractor -

drawn '75-mm , artiller y piece , whic h de -

layed th e America n unit fro m successiv e

positions down th e graveled road toward

Manaoag a t th e southwester n corne r o f

the Hill 200 group. Th e 103d' s supporting artillery destroyed th e Japanese trac -

tor during the afternoon, bu t the Japanese

manhandled thei r gu n int o Manaoa g a s

the American battalion halted west of the

town for the night. Th e regiment' s other

two battalion s hel d wes t an d northwes t

of th e Hil l 20 0 area . Again , a s dar k

came th e 103 d Infantry wa s out o f contact wit h th e 6t h Division , t o th e right ,

and th e 169t h Infantry , t o the left.

On th e 11th the 103d Infantr y starte d

up the open, grassy, western slopes of the

Hill 20 0 comple x an d soo n discovere d

that i t face d stif f fightin g before i t could

secure th e area . T o th e right , th e 6t h

Division's 1s t Infantry , whic h mad e pa -

trol contact with the 103d near Manaoag

during th e day , consolidated position s

held th e previou s night . Th e 20t h Infantry, agains t n o opposition , agai n ad -

vanced ove r open farm lan d and secure d

about fiv e mile s o f groun d i n a south -

southeasterly directio n acros s a fron t o f

nearly six miles. A t dark the 20th Infantry was still about three miles behind the

main bod y o f th e 129t h Infantry , 37t h

Division, along the corps boundar y
84 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

The situatio n ha d develope d fa r dif -

ferently o n 1 0 an d 1 1 Januar y i n th e

zones o f th e 169t h an d 172 d Infantr y

Regiments, o n th e I Corps' left . Troop s

of bot h regiment s bega n lookin g dee p

into th e fac e o f deat h o n 1 0 January ,

gaining a foretast e o f th e typ e o f resist -

ance tha t woul d hol d u p th e 43 d Divi -

sion fo r th e nex t month . Th e divisio n

had had ample combat experience in the

steaming jungles of the South Pacifi c and

New Guinea , bu t th e enervatin g heat ,

the steep-sided bar e hills, and th e fanatical oppositio n i n th e risin g groun d eas t

and northeas t o f Lingaye n Gul f wa s

something else again. Th e wors t o f pre -

assault imaginings about the Japanese in

that sun-bake d ye t depressin g hil l

country woul d come true all to o soon .

Encountering resistanc e describe d a s

"heavy,"17 th e 1s t Battalion , 169t h In -

fantry, behin d clos e artillery and morta r

support, fough t throughou t 1 0 January

along the steep, grass y slope s of Hill 470

and finall y seize d th e cres t abou t 1730 .

The res t o f th e regiment , meanwhile ,

struck across the Bued River toward Hills

355 an d 318 , respectivel y tw o mile s

southeast and tw o and a half mile s south

of Hil l 470 . Treeles s like the other hills

in this portion of the 43d Division's area,

Hills 318 and 355 provided the Japanese

with excellent observation of the I Corps

beaches, controlle d th e approache s t o

Route 3 in the country north of the 103 d

Infantry's sector, and als o dominated th e

southern approach to grassy Mt. Alava, a

520-foot-high hil l mas s lyin g les s tha n

two miles east of Hil l 470 .

The 169th' s driv e towar d Hill s 31 8

and 35 5 o n 1 0 January halte d nea r th e

Bued i n th e fac e o f intensiv e artillery ,

mortar, an d machin e gu n fire . O n th e

11th th e regimen t virtuall y surrounde d

Hill 31 8 but, despit e th e closest possibl e

support fro m CVE-base d aircraft , nava l

gunfire, an d divisio n artillery , wa s un -

able t o dislodg e th e Japanese , wh o ha d

tunneled themselve s into the sides of th e

dirt and roc k hill . Th e cav e and tunne l

defenses a t Hil l 31 8 typifie d thos e being

found b y all elements of the 43d Division

on 1 0 and 1 1 January, an d th e Japanes e

employed thei r hole s not onl y for infan -

try protectio n bu t als o fo r morta r an d

artillery emplacements . A t Hil l 318 ,

specifically, th e Japanese garrison consisted o f a n infantr y compan y reinforce d

by mortars and a few pieces of artillery .

To th e nort h o n 1 0 and 1 1 January,

the 172 d Infantr y encountere d simila r

defensive installations . Th e regimen t

cleared Hil l 38 5 on th e 10t h an d the n

struck towar d Hill s 35 1 an d 580 , alon g

the southern part of th e thir d ridge lin e

inland fro m th e beaches . Mopping-u p

operations at Hil l 385 , Japanes e mortar

and artiller y fire , an d dange r fro m

friendly artiller y supportin g th e 169t h

Infantry a t th e souther n en d o f th e

ridge, combine d t o slo w th e driv e o n

Hill 351 . O n th e 11t h Japanes e morta r

and artiller y fir e al l across th e 172 d In -

fantry's eastward-facin g fron t waxe d s o

intense that Maj . Gen . Leonar d F. Wing

decided t o chang e th e regiment 's direc -

tion o f attac k fro m eas t t o north . H e

ordered th e uni t t o strik e towar d Hill s

351 and 580 from Hil l 470, i n the 169th 's

zone, an d fro m othe r point s o f vantag e

along the southern end of the third ridge

line. Redeploymen t consume d muc h o f

the 11th , an d th e 172d' s righ t flan k

therefore gained little ground during the

day. 17

 169th In f Rpt Luzon , p. 5.
ESTABLISHING TH E BEACHHEA D 85

On th e division , corps , an d arm y ex -

treme lef t o n 1 0 Januar y th e 1s t Battal -

ion, 172 d Infantry , advance d tw o mile s

up th e graveled coast road an d patrolle d

along the crest of the coastal ridge. Little

opposition fro m Japanes e infantr y greet -

ed this advance, but Japanese mortar and

artillery fir e harasse d th e battalio n fro m

the nort h an d east . O n th e mornin g o f

the 11th the uni t hel d it s forwar d posi -

tions unti l relieve d b y th e 158t h RC T

of Sixt h Arm y Reserve .

The Beachhead Through S Plus 2

Committing the Sixth Army Reserve

As earl y a s evenin g o f 1 0 January ,

Sixth Arm y operation s an d intelligenc e

officers ha d decide d tha t th e Sixt h Arm y

Reserve shoul d b e committe d t o th e I

Corps zone , a s contemplated i n th e preassault plans. Th e situatio n a t Lingaye n

Gulf wa s sufficientl y disturbin g t o giv e

pause t o intelligenc e officer s fro m infan -

try battalion s o n u p throug h Genera l

MacArthur's headquarters. All units had

anticipated stron g opposition, bu t a s yet

only th e 169t h an d 172 d Infantry Regi -

ments, o n th e fa r left , ha d encountere d

significant resistance , an d i t ha d begu n

to appea r tha t thes e tw o unit s ha d un -

covered a formal defens e line. Th e Japa -

nese ha d obviousl y withdraw n whateve r

strength the y may once have deployed in

the immediat e assaul t area , bu t i t wa s

the consensus of intelligenc e officers tha t

this withdrawal was a ruse. Th e Japanes e

were probabl y invitin g th e Sixt h Arm y

to overexten d it s line s unti l it s flank s

became vulnerable to counterattack.

Attention focuse d o n th e lef t a s th e

probable poin t o f Japanes e attack . Al -

lied air reconnaissance had substantiate d

guerrilla reports of Japanese troop movements an d stron g defense s t o th e north ,

northeast, and east of the I Corps beaches,

and th e opposition th e 43d Divisio n had

encountered provide d additiona l confir -

mation. Indeed , a s resistanc e increase d

along th e 43 d Divisio n fron t o n 1 0 and

11 January , man y intelligenc e officer s

began t o fee l tha t a Japanes e counter -

attack migh t b e imminen t an d tha t th e

Japanese were delaying the 43d Division

primarily t o gain tim e to assemble forces

for a large-scale counteroffensive.18

Other factor s prompte d commitmen t

of th e reserv e i n th e I Corp s zone , possibly the most important being Krueger's

desire for I Corps to advanc e toward th e

Army Beachhea d Lin e a t a pac e mor e

commensurate wit h tha t o f XI V Corps .

There wer e man y reason s wh y I Corp s

had bee n unabl e t o keep up. Th e corp s

had t o cover fa r more ground t o gain its

objectives tha n di d XIV —fully three -

quarters o f th e terrai n enclose d withi n

the Arm y Beachhea d Lin e initiall y la y

within th e I Corps ' zone . I n addition ,

I Corp s ha d t o advanc e halfwa y aroun d

the compass —from nort h u p Lingaye n

Gulf's eas t shor e aroun d t o th e sout h

along the corps boundary. I n the smaller

XIV Corp s zon e th e advance s ha d t o

cover onl y a quarte r o f th e compass ,

from wes t t o south , and, wit h n o resist -

ance on th e west, XIV Corps could place

emphasis o n it s advanc e sout h acros s a

front approximatel y fiftee n mile s wide .

The I Corps, b y evening on 1 1 January,

held a n overextende d fron t stretchin g

18

 G-2 Sixt h Army, G-2 Estimat e of the Enemy Situation a s o f 180 0 10 Jan 45 , an d G- 2 Sixt h Army ,

G-2 Pe r Rp t 371 , 9 Jan 45 , both i n Sixt h Arm y G- 3

Jnl Fil e Luzon, 5-11 Jan 45; G-2 GH Q SWPA, DSEI's

1019 an d 1020 , 1 0 and 1 1 Jan 45 , G-3 GH Q Jn l Files,

10 and 1 1 Jan 45 . See also above, ch. II.
86 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

along a n ar c o f som e twenty-fiv e mile s

from th e gulf' s coas t nort h o f Alaca n t o

Balingueo o n th e corp s boundary .

The divergen t advances of the I Corps

divisions tended t o create gaps along the

front, gap s tha t woul d wide n unles s th e

corps receive d reinforcements . Th e ex -

istence o f suc h gap s slowe d progress, fo r

all units had t o patrol fa r to thei r flank s

to maintai n physica l contac t wit h

friendly force s an d t o mak e sure tha t no

concentrations of Japanese were bypassed.

In thi s situation, th e tas k o f divisio n re -

connaissance troop s an d regimenta l in -

telligence an d reconnaissanc e platoon s

was of special importance and significance.

The I Corps ' relativel y slo w progres s

southward bega n t o hold up XIV Corps,

for th e latter' s left flank , expose d fo r al -

most nine miles during th e nigh t o f 10 -

11 January , wa s stil l expose d fo r abou t

three miles at dusk on the 11th . Although

the entir e XI V Corp s coul d apparentl y

move sout h fro m it s position s o n th e

Army Beachhea d Lin e an d cros s th e

Agno Rive r without meetin g serious opposition, th e advance would increas e th e

gap along the corps boundary. I t woul d

avail nothin g fo r th e 6t h Divisio n t o

proceed southwar d abreas t o f th e XI V

Corps' left—suc h a mov e woul d creat e

an expose d flan k withi n I Corps. Eithe r

I Corp s woul d hav e t o b e strengthene d

or XI V Corp s woul d hav e t o halt . Fo r

obvious reasons the latter solution could

not b e considere d favorabl y b y eithe r

General MacArthur or General Krueger.

On 1 1 Januar y Maj . Gen . Inni s P .

Swift, th e I Corp s commander, had con -

cluded tha t he would soo n hav e t o commit mos t o f hi s corp s reserve , th e 63 d

RCT, i n th e 43 d Division 's zone . Th e

corps thereupo n prepare d t o continu e

operations with bu t on e battalio n of th e

63d Infantr y a s a reserve. Th e 43 d Divi -

sion ha d alread y committe d it s entir e

strength an d th e 6t h Division 's remain -

ing reserv e wa s a battalio n o f th e 20t h

Infantry.19 Th e margi n o f safety wa s too

small, especiall y i n vie w o f a possibl e

Japanese counterattack .

Accordingly, o n th e mornin g o f 1 1

January, General Kruege r sent the 158t h

RCT o f th e Sixt h Arm y Reserv e ashor e

on th e I Corps ' left . Unloadin g jus t

north o f Whit e Beac h 1 , th e RC T dis -

patched tw o infantr y battalion s u p th e

coast road . On e battalio n relieve d 172 d

Infantry elements along the road and th e

other pushe d nort h t o withi n a mil e o f

Rabon, thre e mile s beyon d Alacan , an d

dug i n t o bloc k an y Japanes e attac k

down th e coasta l highway. 20

The commitmen t o f th e 158t h an d

63d RCT's o n I Corp s lef t seeme d ade -

quate t o thwar t immediat e Japanes e

threats from th e north or northeast. Th e

6th Divisio n and th e XIV Corps had not

encountered sufficien t oppositio n t o warrant thei r immediat e reinforcement .

Therefore Genera l Kruege r decide d t o

hold hi s othe r majo r reserv e unit , th e

25th Infantr y Division , i n reserv e in th e

I Corp s sector . Th e divisio n bega n un -

loading o n th e 11t h an d starte d movin g

inland t o a n assembl y are a betwee n th e

Agoi and Patala n Rivers behind th e 43d

Division's right flank. 21

19

 Rad, Swif t t o Krueger , RM-79 , 1 2 Jan 45 , Sixt h

Army G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 11-1 3 Ja n 45; I Corps Rpt

Luzon, p . 36 ; 43 d Di v G- 3 Jnl , 1 1 Ja n 45 ; 63 d In f

Rpt Luzon , 9 Jan-3 0 Ju n 45 , p . 1 ; 20t h In f Rp t

Luzon, p . 5 . 20

 Sixth Arm y F O 34 , 2 0 No v 44 ; 158t h In f Rp t

Damortis-Rosario, 1 1 Jan-13 Feb 45, p. 1 ; 158t h RCT

S-3 Jn l an d Jnl Files , 11-1 2 Ja n 45 . 21

 Sixth Arm y FO 34 ; Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I, 20 ;

Rad, Kruege r t o Swift , 1915/ I 1 0 Jan 45 , Sixth Army

G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 5-1 1 Ja n 45 ; 25t h In f Di v Rpt

Luzon, 1 7 Jan-30 Jun 45 , pp. 7-9, 12-14 .
ESTABLISHING TH E BEACHHEA D 87

The remainin g element s o f Sixt h

Army Reserve—th e 6th Range r Infantr y

Battalion an d th e 13t h Armore d Grou p

—also cam e ashore . Th e 6t h Range r

Battalion, landin g over Blu e Beache s o n

10 January , move d o n th e 11t h t o th e

Dagupan area , wher e it began preparing

a perimete r defens e a t a sit e selecte d fo r

Sixth Arm y headquarters . Th e 13t h

Armored Grou p unloade d o n th e 11t h

and, les s it s 775t h Tan k Battalion , as -

sembled a t Sai l Fabian . Th e 775t h

moved up the coast road to Alacan.22

The Situation: Evening S Plus 2

As viewe d fro m th e vantag e points o f

MacArthur's an d Krueger' s headquar -

ters, thre e strikingly significan t fact s ha d

emerged b y th e tim e th e Sixt h Army' s

reserve ha d begu n t o land . First , resist -

ance to the initia l penetrations had been

surprisingly weak . Second , a s expected ,

significant oppositio n wa s developin g

along th e I Corp s fron t fro m th e nort h

around t o th e southeast , and a threa t o f

counterattack ha d arise n from th e north

and east . Third , furthe r rapi d advance s

would evidentl y overexten d th e Sixt h

Army's lines, exposing flanks beyon d th e

limits of calculated risk.

So far , casualties ha d bee n fa r lowe r

than anticipated . Operation s ashor e t o

dusk on th e 11t h had cost the Sixth Army

55 me n kille d an d abou t 18 5 wounded,

the 43 d Divisio n havin g los t th e mos t

men an d th e 37t h Divisio n th e least .

Most o f th e casualtie s had resulte d fro m

Japanese mortar an d artiller y fir e rathe r

than from close-i n infantr y action . Japa -

nese casualties in ground operation s had

also been quit e low; indication s are tha t

Sixth Army infantry had killed only 150-

200 Japanese to evening on 1 1 January.23

At th e en d o f th e firs t thre e day s o f

the campaign, then , the Sixt h Arm y had

seized a beachhea d and , fro m a tactica l

point o f view , ha d firml y establishe d

itself ashore . Plan s for th e next few days

called fo r th e XI V Corp s t o continu e

southward an d secur e crossings ove r th e

Agno River ; th e I Corp s t o continue t o

advance int o wha t promise d t o b e th e

center o f Japanese resistanc e withi n th e

limits of the Army Beachhead Line. The

major proble m racin g Sixt h Arm y a t

dusk o n 1 1 Januar y wa s tha t o f deter -

mining th e nature , location , an d exten t

of th e oppositio n developin g on th e left .

Where were the Japanese and wha t were

they plannin g t o do ?

22

 6th Ranger In f B n Rpt , 2 Jan-1 Jul 45 , p . 2 ;

13th Armd G p Rp t Luzon , pp . 3-5, 10-12.

23

 Casualty reportin g durin g th e firs t thre e day s o f

the Luzo n Campaig n wa s extremely spotty . Th e fig -

ures give n abov e ar e derive d fro m a mass o f contra -

dictory an d incomplet e U.S . Arm y sources .
CHAPTER V

The Enemy

The Sixt h Army's landing at Lingayen

Gulf o n 9 January ha d com e a s no stra -

tegic surpris e t o Genera l Tomoyuk i

Yamashita, commande r o f th e Japanes e

14th Area Army in the Philippines.1 The

landing had achieved tactical surprise, for

Yamashita had not expected the invasion

for a t least another two weeks, an d 14th

Area Army planner s ha d no t seriousl y

considered th e possibilit y tha t th e Sixt h

Army woul d lan d it s mai n strengt h

across Lingaye n Gulf s souther n shores .

But Yamashit a kne w a n invasio n wa s

coming, expecte d i t throug h Lingaye n

Gulf, and , ever sinc e th e invasio n o f

Mindoro, had been redoubling his efforts

to prepar e fo r the inevitable .

Japanese Strategy in the Philippines

Originally, Japanese plan s fo r th e de -

fense o f th e Philippine s ha d envisage d

that th e decisive battle would b e fough t

on Luzon. 2 Ai r an d nava l force s migh t

seek their Armageddon i n th e central o r

southern Philippines , bu t th e 14th Area

Army woul d undertak e onl y delayin g

actions there .

The Allie d invasio n o f th e centra l

Philippines a t Leyt e i n Octobe r precipitated a switch, and th e Japanes e decided

to figh t i t ou t o n th e groun d a t Leyte .

Leyte turned into a graveyard of Japanese

hopes. Thei r Nav y suffered a shattering

defeat; the y los t hundred s o f land-base d

and carrier-base d aircraft , losse s the y

could il l afford ; the y threw away ground

1

 The genera l source s for most of this chapter are:

Japanese Operation s i n th e Southwes t Pacifi c Are a

(vol. I I o f th e 3-volum e SWPA His t Series, prepared

by G- 2 GH Q FEC ) (hereinafte r cite d a s SWPA His t

Series, II) , pp. 281-86 , 295-302 , 310-11 , 337-43 ,

404-37; Japanes e Studie s i n W W II , No . 5 , 4th Air

Army Opns , 1944-45 , pp . 64-77 ; No. 6 , 14th Area

Army Plans , 1944 , pp . 12-25 , 28-37 , 44-45 ; No . 8 ,

14th Area Army Operation s on Luzon, pp. 2-3, 6-40;

No. 11 , 35th Army Operations , 19-14-45 , pp . 23-34 ,

114, 119 , 127 ; No . 21 , History o f Southern Army, pp.

61-70, 73-80, 83-84; No . 72, History of Army Section

Imperial GHQ, pp . 123-27 , 131-48 , 153-61 ; Memoirs

of L t Ge n Akir a Mut o (Cof S 14th Area Army), i n

G-2 GH Q FEC , Translations o f Japanes e Docu -

ments ( 4 vols., hereinafte r cite d a s Trans, copie s i n

OCMH files) , II , Ite m 2 0 (hereinafte r cite d a s Mut o

Memoirs), pp . 7-17, 22-24, 31 . 2

 In additio n t o th e source s cite d i n not e 1 , thi s

section i s based on : Unite d State s Strategi c Bombing

Survey (Pacific) , Nava l Analysi s Division , Interrogations of Japanese Officials ( 2 vols., Washington, 1946),

II, 500-30, Interrog of Vic e Adm Shiger u Fukudom e

(Comdr 2d Air Fleet); Interro g o f Ge n Yosbijir o

Umezu (Cof S Japanes e Army) , USSB S (Pacific) ,

Interrog No . 488 , copy i n OCM H files ; Ma j Ge n

Yoshiharu Tomochik a (Cof S 35th Army), Th e Tru e

Facts of th e Leyte Operation, passim, originally pub -

lished i n Japa n i n 1946 , translate d M S cop y i n

OCMH files ; Statement s o f Ma j Ge n Toshi o Nishi -

mura (a n ACof S 14th Area Army), States , II , 677 ,

687; Statemen t o f Lt Ge n J o Iimur a (Cof S Southern

Army), States , I , 540-41 ; Rp t o f Join t Researc h b y

Gen Iimura , L t Ge n Shuich i Miyazak i (Chie f Opns

Dept Army Sec Imperial GHQ), Co l Takushiro Hat -

tori, Col Kazutsug u Sugit a (bot h on Miyazaki' s staff),

States, II , 498-502 ; Befor e th e Militar y Commissio n

Convened b y the Unite d State s Army Force s Western

Pacific, Unite d State s o f Americ a versus Tomoyuk i

Yamashita, Publi c Tria l (hereinafte r cite d a s US A

vs. Yamashita), pp. 3623-3665 (Yamashit a testimony),

p. 300 7 (Mut o testimony) .
THE ENEM Y 89

reinforcements draine d fro m Chin a an d

Luzon; thei r los s o f carg o ship s an d

transports wa s irreplaceable. 3

Yamashita ha d steadfastl y oppose d

making Leyt e a decisive battle area and ,

able tactician tha t he was, ha d concluded

as earl y a s th e firs t wee k o f Novembe r

that Leyt e was lost. A t tha t time he ha d

proposed t o hi s immediat e superior ,

Field Marsha l Coun t Hisaich i Terauch i

of Southern Army, tha t th e Leyt e figh t

be halte d an d effort s b e concentrate d

upon preparin g th e defense s o f Luzon .

Terauchi turne d dea f ear s t o thi s pro -

posal a s h e di d t o a simila r Yamashit a

plan i n earl y Decembe r afte r a n Allie d

force ha d lande d o n th e wes t coas t o f

Leyte, closin g th e 14th Area Army's

principal por t o f entr y o n tha t island .

Next, Yamashit a viewe d th e Allie d

invasion of Mindoro as an event that provided hi m wit h a welcom e opportunit y

to ceas e his all bu t impossibl e effort s t o

reinforce Leyte . Callin g off—apparently

on hi s ow n initiative— a las t reinforce -

ment attempt , Yamashit a agai n recom -

mended to Count Terauchi that attention

be turne d t o Luzon . Th e latter , havin g

already forestalle d Yamashita 's earlie r

attempts t o hal t th e fightin g o n Leyte ,

now directe d th e 14th Area Army t o

prepare a counterattack against Mindoro.

This Yamashit a ha d n o intentio n o f

doing. I t was therefore with some uneasiness that he greeted Lt . Gen . J o Iimura ,

the Chie f o f Staf f o f Southern Army,

when th e latte r arrive d a t Manil a fro m

Saigon—site o f Terauchi 's headquarters

—on 1 7 December . Bu t Iimura , afte r

talking t o Yamashita , advise d Terauch i

that th e 14th Area Army commander 's

recommendations ough t t o b e followed .

On th e 19th , Terauch i finall y ordere d

Yamashita t o prepar e th e defense s o f

Luzon. Th e ide a of sending strong reinforcements t o Mindor o wa s quietl y

dropped, an d th e Japanes e 35th Army

on Leyt e wa s informed tha t i t coul d ex -

pect n o mor e help . O n 2 5 Decembe r

Yamashita directe d Lt . Gen . Sosak u

Suzuki, 35th Army commander , t o evac -

uate hi s force s fro m Leyt e a s bes t h e

could an d mak e preparation s t o defen d

the res t o f th e souther n an d centra l

Philippines.4

Yamashita's plannin g problem s wer e

still no t solved . O n 2 1 Decembe r

Lt. Gen . Shuich i Miyazaki , Chie f o f

Operations, Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters, reache d Manil a pre -

pared t o direc t Yamashit a t o continu e

defensive effort s i n th e centra l Philip -

pines an d simultaneousl y read y th e de -

fenses o f Luzon , Afte r tw o day s o f con -

ferences wit h Iimura , Yamashita , an d

the latter' s chie f o f staff , Lt . Gen . Akir a

Muto, Miyazak i als o decide d tha t

Yamashita's plan s ha d t o b e followed .

Miyazaki concluded that no one in Tokyo

had enoug h knowledg e o f th e situatio n

in th e Philippine s t o overrul e Yamash -

ita, an d h e promise d Yamashit a t o d o

his bes t t o preven t an y furthe r inter -

ference b y Imperial General Headquarters wit h th e conduc t o f operation s o n

Luzon. Yamashita , belatedly , ha d hi s

way.5

3

 See Cannon , Leyte.

4

 For subsequen t operation s o f th e 35th Army, se e

below, chs . XXX-XXXII . 5

 Iimura returne d t o Saigo n o n 2 4 December an d

Miyazaki t o Tokyo on th e 25th. Apparently , Iimura's

original missio n ha d bee n t o see to it tha t Yamashit a

followed Terauchi' s instruction s t o th e letter . I f so ,

the missio n mus t hav e bee n considere d a failur e b y

Terauchi. Perhap s onl y coincidentally , Iimur a im -

mediately foun d himsel f wit h a ne w assignment —

on 2 6 December he was given command of the almost

defunct 2d Area Army i n th e Indies.
90 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

The Japanese on Luzon

During th e firs t hal f o f Novembe r

Yamashita, whil e tryin g t o convinc e

Southern Army o f th e foll y o f continu -

ing th e figh t o n Leyte , ha d prepare d a

draft pla n fo r th e defens e o f Luzon . A

realist, Yamashit a kne w tha t i f i t ha d

not alread y don e so , Imperial General

Headquarters woul d soo n writ e Luzo n

off a s a strategic loss. H e believed , therefore, tha t operation s o n Luzo n woul d

have to be primarily defensive i n charac -

ter, an d h e kne w tha t h e coul d expec t

no reinforcement s onc e a n Allie d inva -

sion forc e reache d th e island . Neverthe -

less, hi s Novembe r plan s include d

provisions fo r a stron g counterattac k

against an Allie d landin g force—a counterattack tha t woul d b e execute d onl y if

expected supplies and equipmen t reached

Luzon, i f h e coul d kee p o n th e islan d

three infantr y division s schedule d fo r

shipment t o Leyte , if h e coul d obtai n a

modicum o f air support , and i f he coul d

maintain th e mobilit y o f a n armore d

division alread y o n Luzon .

The thre e infantr y division s reache d

Luzon, but tw o lost fully a third o f their

troops an d equipmen t t o Allie d ai r o r

submarine action on th e way; one RCT

of th e thir d divisio n ha d t o b e lef t o n

Formosa fo r lac k o f shipping . Wors e

still, schedule d shipment s o f supplie s

and equipment never arrived, and stock s

available o n Luzo n wer e inadequat e for

the force s alread y there . N o ai r rein -

forcements, Yamashit a learne d b y mid -

December, woul d b e forthcoming . Th e

Allies woul d b e abl e t o dominat e th e

skies over Luzon and render the armored

division immobile .

By mid-December Yamashit a had con -

cluded tha t th e only course open t o him

was a stati c defense . H e intende d t o

delay th e conques t o f Luzo n a s lon g a s

possible i n orde r t o pi n dow n a s man y

U.S. division s a s h e coul d i n th e hop e

of slowing Allied advances toward Japan,

He prepare d t o undertak e his task wit h

understrength, underfed , an d under -

equipped groun d comba t forces , th e

leadership and organizatio n of which left

much t o b e desired. 6

Japanese Logistics

Logistically, Yamashit a face d th e pro -

verbial insolubl e problem s an d insur -

mountable obstacles. 7 First , supplie s o n

6

 Japanese Studie s i n W W II , No , 6 , 14th Area

Army Plans , pp . 33-34 , 50 ; No . 8 , 14th Area Army

Opns o n Luzon , pp . 2-3 , 24; Statemen t o f Genera l

Tomoyuki Yamashita, States, IV, 500; Muto Memoirs,

pp. 12-13 ; Nishimur a Statement , States , II , 677-78 ;

Shobu Gp (14 Area Army) Opns Dept, Outlin e o f

Operational Polic y fo r Luzon , 1 9 De c 44 , an d apps .

I an d I I thereto , 2 0 Dec 44, Trans, III, pt . I , pp . 16 -

28. Colone l Volckmann , guerrilla leade r i n norther n

Luzon, believe d o n th e basi s o f document s hi s me n

had capture d fro m th e Japanes e tha t Yamashit a ha d

reached hi s decisio n fo r a stati c defens e befor e th e

end o f November . Th e Novembe r plan s ha d calle d

for operation s primaril y defensiv e i n character ,

hedged b y "if" provisions fo r a counterattack . Th e

December plan s lef t ou t eve n th e "if" provisions fo r

a counterattack . 7

 Additional source s use d fo r thi s subsectio n in -

clude: Japanes e Studie s i n W W II , No . 9 , Luzo n

Operations o f th e Shimbu Group, pp . 4-5; No . 10 ,

Operations of th e Kembu Group, pp . 2 , 5-6; Nishimura Statements , i n States , 690-94 ; US A vs. Yama -

shita, pp. 2999 , 3014, 3027-28 (Muto) ; ibid., pp. 3540,

3566 (Yamashita) ; ibid., pp . 3013-14 , 321 9 (Lt Co l

Kikuo Ishikawa , Suppl y an d T O 14th Area Army);

ibid., p. 3190 (Ma j Gen Goich i Kira , Intendance Off,

14th Area Army); 10t h Info an d Hist Serv Hq Eight h

Army, Staf f Stud y o f Japanes e Operation s o n Luzon ,

Narrative of Col Ryoichir o Aoshima (Chie f LofC Sec,

14th Area Army), pp . 5-8, 12-13; 10th I&H Staf f

Study, Japanes e Opn s o n Luzon , Narrativ e o f Co l

Shujiro Kohayash i (Opn s Of f 14th Area Army an d

Shimbu Gp), pp. 1-2 ; ibid., Narrativ e o f Co l Yasuj i

Okada (Cof S Kembu Gp), p. 16 ; ibid., Narrative o f

Col Shigeo Kawai (Staf f 2d Tank Div), pp. 4-5; ibid.,

Aoshima Interrog, p. 7.
THE ENEM Y 91

Luzon were insufficient t o provide properly fo r the 14th Area Army, and a t th e

end o f Decembe r Genera l Muto , Yama -

shita's chie f o f staff , reporte d tha t "sup -

ply shortage s ha d reache d unexpecte d

proportions."

 8 Second , th e Japanes e

transportation syste m wa s completel y

inadequate fo r th e tas k a t hand—mov -

ing supplie s fro m depot s t o defensiv e

positions. Third , th e syste m o f suppl y

control and distribution was chaotic until

late December.

Chief shortage s wer e ammunition ,

demolitions, construction equipmen t o f

all sorts , medica l supplies , communica -

tions equipment and food . I n brief , th e

14 Area Army wa s il l equippe d fo r a

long campaign. Th e foo d situation alone

would soon bring that fact home sharply.

Even befor e th e en d o f 194 4 food stock s

in th e Philippine s ha d bee n inadequat e

to satisf y bot h Japanes e an d Filipin o

requirements. Ric e had t o be importe d

from Thailan d an d Frenc h Indochina ,

and much of the rice harvested on Luzo n

had bee n sen t t o Leyte . Wit h increase d

Allied air an d submarin e activit y i n th e

South China Sea, imports were drastically

reduced until, in December, not a single

shipload o f foo d reache d Luzon . A s

early a s mid-Novembe r th e foo d short -

age o n Luzo n had reache d suc h propor -

tions tha t th e 14th Area Army ha d cu t

its ratio n fro m a dail y thre e pound s t o

about nine-tenth s o f a pound . Befor e

mid-January me n i n som e unit s woul d

be luck y t o ge t a s muc h a s a hal f a

pound a day.

Many o f Yamashita's supply problems

stemmed directly from his transportation

problems, fo r he foun d i t impossibl e to

move th e supplie s an d equipmen t tha t

were available , a conditio n resultin g

from man y causes . Fo r on e thing , a

Japanese infantr y divisio n ha d onl y 50 0

organic vehicles—a s compare d wit h th e

2,125 i n a U.S . Arm y division 9—and

none o f th e Japanes e unit s o n Luzo n

had it s authorize d numbe r o f vehicles .

This shortag e wa s compounde d b y a

lack o f fue l an d lubricants . Moreover ,

the railroad s on Luzon , neve r adequat e

for th e scal e o f militar y operation s en -

visaged b y th e Allie s an d Japanese , ha d

been allowe d t o fal l int o " a shockin g

state o f disrepair " durin g th e Japanes e

occupation.10

Allied land-base d an d carrier-base d

air attacks , combine d wit h guerrill a

sabotage operations , multiplie d trans -

portation problems a hundredfold. Bridges wer e destroyed , highway s cratered ,

railroad beds and marshaling yards damaged, railroad rolling stoc k an d engine s

knocked out, and truck s destroyed . B y

9 Januar y th e highway s an d railroad s

on Luzon , once th e fines t transportatio n

network i n th e Pacifi c an d Fa r Eas t outside Japan , wer e i n suc h condition tha t

the 14th Area Army coul d mov e onl y a

trickle o f essentia l supplie s t o defensiv e

positions.

Manila ha d lon g bee n th e mai n sup -

ply depot for Japanese forces i n th e Philippines, th e Ne w Guine a area , an d th e

Indies, an d i n Jun e 194 4 had als o be -

come th e principa l distributio n an d

transshipment poin t for Southern Army

supplies movin g t o Indochin a an d Ma -

laya. A s the mai n por t o f entr y i n th e

Philippines and th e hub o f Luzon's rail8

 Muto Memoirs, p. 13 .

9

 TM-E 30-480 , Handboo k o n Japanes e Militar y

Forces, p. 23; FM 101-10 , Staff Officer s Fiel d Manual:

Organization, Technical , an d Logistica l Data , 1945 ,

par. 121 . 10

 Muto Memoirs, p. 13 .
92 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

road an d highwa y network , Manil a ha d

also bee n th e 14th Area Army's mai n

supply point . Japanes e nava l force s op -

erating i n th e Philippine s and at points

south ha d likewis e stockpile d supplie s

and equipment there.

No centralize d logistica l authorit y

existed a t Manila , an d man y o f th e supplies di d no t com e unde r Yamashita 's

control unti l afte r 1 January 1945 . A s

a depot , Manil a mus t hav e presente d a

chaotic picture, so much so that Genera l

Muto, rememberin g th e mes s afte r th e

war, wa s prompted t o state tha t th e supplies an d equipmen t ther e "wer e pile d

in a n unsystemati c . . . helter-skelte r

way" an d tha t there was "a lack of articles

. . . require d i n the Philippines accompanied b y plent y . . . fo r whic h ther e

was no use."11

Yamashita had n o intentio n of defending Manila . Th e efficac y o f hi s defens e

of Luzo n woul d therefor e depen d i n

large measur e o n ho w muc h o f th e

65,000 t o 70,00 0 metri c ton s o f Arm y

supplies stockpiled ther e h e could mov e

out o f the city to defensive position s elsewhere befor e th e American s arrived .

Early i n Decembe r h e ha d foun d t o hi s

dismay tha t wit h existin g transportatio n

it woul d tak e si x month s t o mov e th e

entire stockpile . Bu t he had t o do wha t

he could , an d issue d order s t o remov e

approximately 13,00 0 metri c ton s of th e

most vita l supplie s t o norther n Luzo n

by mid-January. Becaus e of the transportation proble m an d Yamashita' s lac k o f

control ove r man y commander s an d

units a t Manila , onl y a littl e over 4,00 0

metric ton s of th e Manil a stockpile s ha d

been redispose d t o norther n Luzo n b y

9 January .

Command and Organization

As i f hi s logisti c problem s wer e no t

enough, Yamashita' s god s ha d als o pre -

sented him with equally serious problems

of command , organization , administra -

tion, and morale. 12 Manila , for example,

had lon g bee n cluttere d wit h variou s

headquarters, over many of which Yamashita had no control. Indeed , until midNovember a t least , les s tha n hal f th e

troops on Luzon were under Yamashita's

command.13

The senio r headquarter s i n Manil a

until 1 7 Novembe r wa s tha t o f Terau -

chi's Southern Army. Directl y unde r it,

and al l o n th e sam e leve l o f command ,

were Yamashita' s 14th Area Army; th e

4th Air Army unde r Lt . Gen . Kyoji

Tominaga; and a logistical headquarters,

the 3d Maritime Transport Command,

under Maj . Gen . Masazumi Inada . Als o

in Manil a wer e thre e importan t nava l

headquarters. Th e firs t tw o wer e th e

Southwest Area Fleet an d it s subordi -

nate echelon , th e 3d Southern Expeditionary Fleet, bot h commande d b y Vic e

Adm. Denshich i Okochi, who controlled

all Japanes e nava l force s i n th e Philip -

pines an d wh o wa s responsible onl y t o

naval headquarters in Tokyo. Th e thir d

naval headquarter s wa s th e 31st Naval

Special Base Force unde r Rea r Adm .

Sanji Iwabuchi , who reported to Okochi.

In additio n abou t 30,00 0 Arm y re -

placements, wh o ha d bee n strande d o n

Luzon fo r lac k o f shipping , wer e sta -

11

 USA vs. Yamashita, p . 299 9 (Mut o testimony) .

12

 Additional sources used in the preparation of this subsection are: USA vs. Yamashita, pp. 3524-26 , 3655

(Yamashita); ibid., pp . 3001-02 , 3008 -09 (Muto);

ibid., pp. 2533-3 6 (testimon y of Vic e Adm Denhichi

Okoochi, more commonly Denshichi Okochi, Comdr

Southwest Area Fleet); ibid., Defense Exhibi t J, Or g

Chart prepare d b y Muto. 13

 See app. C-1.
THE ENEM Y 93

tioned a t Manila . Th e cit y ha d als o

become a collection poin t for Army an d

Navy me n discharge d fro m hospital s o r

rescued fro m vessel s sun k i n nearb y

waters. Contro l ove r th e heterogeneou s

collection wa s divided amon g Southern

Army, Southwest Area Fleet, an d

Imperial General Headquarters.

After mid-Novembe r step s were taken

to brin g orde r int o thi s confusio n o f

commands. Headquarters, Southern

Army, move d t o Saigo n o n 1 7 Novem -

ber, takin g wit h i t Inada' s 3d Maritime

Transport Command headquarters. 14

Early i n Decembe r Arm y replacement s

and convalescent s passe d t o Yamashita 's

control, an d th e 4th Air Army wa s

placed under him o n 1 January. O n th e

6th Yamashit a gaine d operationa l con -

trol o f shore-base d nava l troops , bu t i t

was not unti l mid-Januar y tha t th e serv -

ice troops of th e 3d Maritime Transport

Command passe d t o his command. 15

His late assumption of control created

many problem s fo r Yamashita , whos e

opinion was:

The sourc e o f comman d an d co-ordina -

tion within a command lie s in trustin g your

subordinate commanders . Unde r th e cir -

cumstances, I wa s forced [t o defen d Luzon ]

with subordinate s who m I di d no t kno w

and wit h whos e characte r and abilit y I was

unfamiliar.16

For example , Yamashit a ha d troubl e

with Genera l Tominaga and the 4th Air

Army fro m th e first. Befor e th e air uni t

passed to Yamashita's control, Tominaga

had provide d n o hel p i n preparin g de -

fenses outsid e Manila . Instead , Tomin -

aga worke d o n readyin g defense s o f th e

city an d environs , fo r h e fel t tha t th e

defense o f Luzo n woul d b e meaningles s

if Manil a wer e abandone d withou t a

fight. I t wa s no t unti l h e passe d t o

Yamashita's contro l tha t Tominag a

moved hi s headquarter s an d thousand s

of hi s troops ou t o f th e city .

The bul k o f the units Yamashita commanded o n Luzo n coul d b y n o mean s

be fitte d int o th e categor y o f first-clas s

combat organizations. Division s recently

formed fro m forme r garriso n units were

badly organized , il l equipped , poorl y

officered, an d miserabl y trained. I n eve n

worse stat e wer e th e multitude of provisional infantr y an d artiller y unit s tha t

the Japanes e organize d o n Luzo n fro m

the Manil a replacements, ship survivors,

convalescents, and, in som e cases , Japa -

nese civilian s strande d i n th e Philip -

pines. Eve n th e regula r unit s wer e i n

poor shape, many having suffered morale -

shattering losse s o f me n an d equipmen t

on thei r wa y to Luzon . Th e 23d Division, fo r instance , ha d los t it s chie f o f

staff, mos t o f th e othe r officer s o f divi -

sion headquarters, and full y a third of its

men. Th e 10th Division ha d suffere d

similarly, whil e onl y two-third s o f th e

19th Division reache d Luzo n fro m For -

mosa befor e th e Allie d invasio n pu t a n

end t o furthe r shipments .

Yet Yamashita had a respectable force,

and on e tha t was far stronge r tha n General Willoughby , MacArthur 's intelli -

gence chief, had estimated. Instea d of the

152,500 troops of Willoughby's estimate,

14

 By thi s tim e Inad a wa s a n "evacuatio n expert. "

He ha d arrive d i n wester n Ne w Guine a i n lat e 194 3

to assum e command o f a suppl y organizatio n there ;

went t o Hollandi a t o tak e comman d o f th e 6th Air

Division i n Apri l 1944 ; made his way westward overland t o th e Wakde-Sarmi are a afte r th e Allie d inva -

sion o f Hollandia , arrivin g shortl y afte r th e Allie d

landings near Sarmi on 1 7 May; again escaping , went

to th e Philippines ; move d t o Saigo n i n November ;

and woun d u p t o surviv e th e wa r a s a ground com -

mander i n Japan proper. 15

 See app. C-2. 16

 USA vs. Yamashita , p . 365 5 (Yamashita) .
94 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Yamashita actuall y ha d nearl y 275,00 0

men.17 Willoughby , of course, could not

know exactl y wha t Yamashit a planne d

to d o wit h thes e troops ; h e di d no t

anticipate a n essentiall y stati c defense .

The General Defense Plan

Yamashita knew that within the framework o f his pla n fo r a protracte d delay -

ing action o n Luzo n h e ha d n o hop e o f

defending al l th e island. 18 H e ha d

neither th e troop s no r th e equipmen t

to do so, and th e terrain i n man y place s

would no t provid e hi m wit h desire d

natural defensiv e position s o r acces s t o

significant food-producin g areas . Thus ,

he fel t h e coul d no t defen d th e vita l

Central Plains-Manila Bay region against

the superiority he knew MacArthur could

and woul d brin g t o bear . Yamashita ,

therefore, di d no t inten d t o cop y MacArthur's exampl e o f 1941-4 2 an d with -

draw int o Bataan , whic h th e 14th Area

Army commande r considere d a cul-de -

sac. O n tha t relatively smal l peninsula ,

scarcely twent y b y thirt y mile s i n area ,

Yamashita's 275,00 0 troop s coul d no t

hope t o fin d food , and , concentrated i n

such a limite d area , woul d quickl y b e

cut t o piece s b y the superio r air, naval,

and artiller y fir e powe r availabl e t o

MacArthur. B y th e sam e token , Yama -

shita ha d decide d t o leav e undefende d

the souther n shore s o f Lingaye n Gulf ,

for h e ha d conclude d tha t th e terrai n

there woul d mak e futil e an y attempt t o

hold tha t ground.

Having decided t o abando n th e Cen -

tral Plains-Manila Bay region, Yamashita

concentrated hi s force s i n thre e moun -

tainous stronghold s that , h e felt , th e

Allies coul d overru n onl y a t th e cost o f

many live s and muc h time . Onl y minor

delaying actions , b y isolate d garrisons ,

would b e undertake n a t other points on

Luzon.

The stronges t an d mos t importan t o f

the defens e sector s covere d al l Luzo n

northeast an d eas t o f Lingaye n Gulf .

(Map 3) Include d withi n thi s secto r

was th e mountainou s regio n eas t an d

northeast of the gulf a s well a s the fertil e

Cagayan Valley , rankin g onl y secon d t o

the Centra l Plain s a s a food-producin g

area o f the Philippines. T o defen d thi s

northern stronghol d Yamashit a forme d

the Shobu Group, a forc e h e retaine d

under hi s direc t command . Headquar -

ters of the Shobu Group—identical wit h

Headquarters, 14th Area Army—was

located at Baguio, the cool and beautifu l

Philippine summe r resort city, which lay

about 5,00 0 fee t u p i n th e mountain s

and abou t twenty-fiv e mile s northeast o f

San Fabia n o n Lingaye n Gulf. 19

The Shobu Group numbere d aroun d

152,000 troops. Its major units were four

infantry division s (th e 10th, 19th, 23d,

17

 General Willoughb y di d no t chang e his estimate

of Japanes e strength significantl y unti l th e campaig n

was nearly over. 18

 In addition to relevant documents cited in note 1,

this subsectio n i s base d on : 14th Area Army Opn s

Orders, Trans, III, pt. III, Ite m 3, pp. 8-18; Nishi -

mura Statement , States, II, 691-92; Yamashit a State -

ment, States , II , 497 ; Statemen t o f Co l Kenichir o

Asano (Cof S 8th Division an d ACof S Shimbu Gp),

States, I, 90-92; USA vs. Yamashita, pp. 2536-38 (Oko -

chi testimony) ; ibid., pp. 3527-28 (Yamashita) ; Japa -

nese Studie s i n W W II , No . 9 , Luzo n Opn s o f th e

Shimbu Gp, pp. 1-5; No . 10, Opns of the Kembu Gp,

pp. 1-6; 14th Area Army Home Organization Board

(a sor t o f veteran s group) , 14th Area Army T r Or g

List (prepare d i n Japan , De c 46), trans i n OCM H

files.

19

 SHOBU wa s th e cod e nam e fo r th e 14th Area

Army a s wel l a s th e nam e o f th e norther n defens e

group. I n Japanes e plans , orders , an d reports , th e

distinction betwee n th e group and th e army is sometimes elusive , bu t i n thi s narrativ e th e ter m Shobu

Group is reserved fo r th e northern defens e sector.
Map 3
96 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

and 103d), th e 2d Tank Division (les s

most o f th e 2d Mobile Infantry an d

other elements), and th e 58th Independent Mixed Brigade (abou t hal f th e siz e

of a Japanese infantr y division). 20 Th e

rest o f th e grou p include d variou s 4th

Air Army units , miscellaneou s smal l

combat an d servic e organizations , an d

many provisional units of all types. Th e

Shobu Group's principa l mission s wer e

to preven t a n Allie d landin g o n th e

west coas t o f Luzo n nort h o f Lingaye n

Gulf, threate n th e lef t flan k o f Sixt h

Army force s movin g sout h throug h th e

Central Plains , den y th e American s ac -

cess t o th e Cagaya n Valle y fro m th e

south, and, finally , conduc t a protracte d

defense o f th e rugged , mountainou s

terrain i t held.

The secon d defensiv e groupmen t

Yamashita locate d i n mountai n countr y

on th e wes t sid e o f th e Centra l Plain s

overlooking th e Clar k Fiel d area . Thi s

force, designate d Kembu Group, wa s to

deny t o th e Allie s th e us e o f th e Clar k

Field ai r cente r a s lon g a s possible ,

threaten th e righ t flan k o f Allie d unit s

moving dow n th e Centra l Plains , and ,

when force d bac k fro m Clar k Field , execute delaying operations in the Zambale s

Mountains, t o th e wes t o f th e ai r base .

Until lat e Decembe r th e Kembu are a

was unde r th e comman d o f Lt . Gen .

Yoshiharu Iwanaka , 2d Tank Division

commander, wh o supervise d th e effort s

of nava l troop s an d par t o f hi s divisio n

to mak e defensiv e preparations . Whe n

on 1 January 4th Air Army passe d t o

Yamashita's control, he ordered Genera l

Tominaga t o se t troop s t o wor k i n th e

Kembu region , bu t lef t th e grou p tem -

porarily under Iwanaka's command, having som e ide a o f movin g th e entir e 2d

Tank Division t o th e Clar k Fiel d area .

The Allie s reache d Luzo n befor e th e

2d Tank Division coul d concentrat e i n

the Kembu area , an d Yamashit a the n

placed th e group under th e command o f

Maj. Gen . Rikich i Tsukada , wh o als o

commanded th e 1st Raiding Group, a n

airborne infantr y uni t previousl y con -

trolled b y 4th Air Army. Tominaga' s

4th Air Army headquarter s move d dur -

ing th e firs t wee k o f Januar y fro m Ma -

nila t o Echague , i n th e north-centra l

part o f th e Cagaya n Valley .

Of th e 30,00 0 men o f Kembu Group,

about hal f wer e nava l airfiel d engineers ,

ground crews , antiaircraf t units , an d

some groun d comba t organizations , al l

under Rea r Adm . Ushi e Sugimoto , th e

commander o f th e planeles s 26th Air

Flotilla. I n addition t o thes e troops and

Tsukada's 1st Raiding Group, Kembu

Group containe d the 2d Mobile Infantry

(less on e battalion) , a tan k company ,

and othe r detachment s fro m th e 2d

Tank Division; som e fiel d an d antiair -

craft artiller y organizations ; an d a het -

erogeneous collectio n o f servic e unit s

from 4th Air Army.

The thir d majo r Japanes e forc e wa s

the Shimbu Group, unde r Lt . Gen .

Shizuo Yokoyama, who also commanded

the 8th Division.

21 Whil e responsibl e

20

 The 61st IMB, statione d on th e Batan and Babu -

yan Island s of f northern Luzon , wa s nominall y par t

of th e Shobu Group bu t i s not include d i n th e fore -

going totals . Th e uni t remaine d unmoleste d o n it s

islands unti l th e en d o f th e war , playin g n o par t i n

the Luzo n Campaign . O f th e tota l o f som e 150,00 0

in th e Shobu Group, abou t 140,00 0 wer e in unifor m

as of 9 January. Th e remainde r consisted o f civilia n

government and militar y employees, man y o f who m

were drafte d int o th e servic e befor e th e campaig n was over.

21

 The staff s o f Shimbu Group an d 8th Division

headquarters wer e somewha t different , althoug h

many officers serve d on both .
THE ENEM Y 97

for defendin g al l souther n Luzon , General Yokoyam a wa s t o concentrat e hi s

main strength in th e mountains east and

northeast of Manila . Yamashit a ordered

him no t t o defen d th e capital , bu t t o

keep troop s ther e onl y lon g enoug h t o

cover th e evacuatio n o f supplie s an d

delay the Allies by destroying important

bridges. I n th e mountain s eas t o f th e

city, Yokoyama woul d contro l th e dam s

and reservoir s tha t supplie d Manila' s

water. Hi s 80,00 0 me n include d th e

8th Division (les s th e 5 th Infantry, o n

Leyte), the 105th Division, various Army

service an d mino r comba t units , an d

some 20,000 naval troops under Admiral

Iwabuchi o f th e 31st Naval Special Base

Force.

In southwester n Luzon , Yokoyam a

stationed a reinforced infantr y regimen t

from th e 8th Division. A nava l guar d

unit an d miscellaneou s 4th Air Army

service organization s arme d a s auxiliar y

infantry hel d th e Bico l Peninsul a o f

southeastern Luzon , whic h wa s als o i n

Yokoyama's sector . Man y Japanes e

Army suicid e boa t units , whos e mem -

bers were ultimatel y t o figh t a s infantry

under Shimbu Group control , wer e stationed a t variou s point s alon g Luzon' s

southwestern an d souther n coasts. 22

Dispositions in Northern Luzon

The Shobu Group

The firs t Japanese to establish contact

with th e Sixt h Arm y wer e member s o f

the Shobu Group.

23 I n lat e Decembe r

1944 tha t grou p ha d bee n disposin g it -

self i n what Yamashita intended to make

his principa l forwar d defense s i n north -

ern Luzon . Th e fina l defensiv e area ,

into which the Shobu Group woul d ultimately withdraw, formed a near-isosceles

triangle in high , rugge d mountain s o f

that sectio n o f norther n Luzo n lyin g

west o f th e Cagaya n Valley. Th e south -

western ancho r o f th e triangl e wa s

Baguio, whence the base line ran almost

due eas t thirty-fiv e mile s t o Bambang ,

located on Rout e 5 north o f th e exits of

the mountai n passe s leadin g fro m th e

Cagayan Valle y t o th e northeaster n corner o f th e Centra l Plains. Th e ape x o f

the triangle was Bontoc, a t th e junction

of Route s 4 an d 1 1 som e fift y mile s

northeast of Baguio.

A basi c tene t o f Yamashita's pla n fo r

the defens e o f norther n Luzo n wa s t o

hold the approaches to the Cagayan Valley until that region could be stripped of

foodstuffs an d militar y supplie s fo r th e

triangular redoubt. Yamashit a expecte d

that onc e th e Sixt h Arm y ha d secure d

the Centra l Plains-Manil a Ba y are a i t

would strik e his defensiv e triangl e fro m

the south , possibl y makin g its mai n ef -

fort a n attac k int o th e Cagaya n Valle y

via th e Bamban g approach . Yamashit a

had t o hold th e souther n approache s t o

the triangle to keep open his supply lines

from Manil a and t o maintain his line of

communications t o th e Shimbu Group,

22

 Further informatio n o n disposition s in souther n

Luzon i s t o b e foun d i n Chapter s XI I an d XXIII ,

while material on th e deployment of th e main bod y

of th e Shimbu Group i s se t fort h i n Chapter s XX I

and XXII .

23

 The genera l source s fo r thi s sectio n are: SWPA

Hist Series, II, Japanes e Opns in th e SWPA , 418-25,

430-37; Japanese Studies in WW II, No . 8, 14th Area

Army Opn s on Luzo n (hereafte r cite d a s 14th Area

Army Opn s on Luzon), 6-15, 26-28, 36-40; 10th I&H

Staff Study , Japanese Opn s on Luzon , Aoshima Narrative, pp . 3-4, 7-10, and atch d Map s Nos. 1 and 2 ;

Statement o f Ma j Ge n Haru o Konum a (Vic e Cof S

14th Area Army), States, II, 300-302, 305-09, 327-30;

14th Area Army T r Or g List.
98 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

much o f which h e migh t transfe r t o th e

Shobu Group secto r i f tim e permitted .

The foca l poin t fo r th e defens e o f th e

southern approaches to the Cagayan Valley wa s Sa n Jose , forty-fiv e mile s south -

east o f Sa n Fabia n an d nearl y th e sam e

distance sout h o f Bambang . Situate d a t

the end of one branch of the Manila Railroad, Sa n Jos e wa s als o th e sit e o f th e

junction o f Route s 5 , 8 , an d 96 . Rout e

5 led north t o Bamban g throug h Balet e

Pass an d sout h fro m Sa n Jos e towar d

Manila along the eastern side of the Central Plains. Rout e 8 led northwest fro m

San Jos e towar d Lingaye n Gulf . Rout e

96 wen t southeas t towar d th e eas t coast

of Luzon .

San Jos e wa s th e mai n transshipmen t

point fo r supplie s goin g nort h fro m

Manila o r bein g move d ou t o f Centra l

Plains depots to the Shobu Group. Som e

supplies fro m Decembe r sailing s t o west

coast port s suc h a s Sa n Fernando , L a

Union, wer e als o reassemble d a t Sa n

Jose. Durin g lat e Decembe r a n averag e

of 60 0 metric tons of all type s of supplies

and equipment , includin g mos t o f th e

matériel fro m Manila , cam e int o Sa n

Jose each day, much of it by rail. There ,

supplies wer e transferre d t o truck s o r

hand-carrying partie s fo r furthe r move -

ment nort h alon g Rout e 5 . S o lon g a s

Yamashita coul d hol d Sa n Jose and control Rout e 5 , he coul d continu e t o shi p

supplies nort h int o th e Shobu defensiv e

triangle. Withou t Sa n Jose , th e grou p

would b e cu t of f fro m it s principa l

sources o f militar y supplie s an d equip -

ment, an d woul d hav e t o rel y o n foo d

and othe r supplie s it coul d mov e ou t o f

the Cagaya n Valley . Bagui o becam e

Shobu Group's mos t importan t second -

ary suppl y point . Yamashit a planne d t o

assemble there the many tons of supplies

stockpiled a t variou s wes t coas t point s

during Novembe r an d December .

From th e firs t Yamashit a realize d tha t

a glarin g weaknes s i n al l hi s plan s fo r

the defens e o f norther n Luzo n wa s th e

absence of a good overland link betwee n

Baguio an d Bambang . H e urgentl y

needed a roa d betwee n th e tw o town s

not onl y to move troops rapidly between

the two fronts bu t als o to transport supplies to Bagui o from th e Cagayan Valle y

and from th e stockpiles being established

along Rout e 5 nort h o f Sa n Jose . Ac -

cordingly, Yamashita began construction

late i n Decembe r o r earl y i n January .

The suppl y roa d swun g eas t of f Rout e

11 a t a poin t abou t te n mile s northeast

of Baguio , an d followe d a narro w pre -

war minin g an d loggin g road—unti l

then suitabl e onl y fo r ligh t traffic—fo r

the firs t te n o r fiftee n mile s eastward .

Then i t swun g east-southeas t throug h

the Caraballo Range, following a graded

horse trail that American force s had constructed befor e th e war, to Rout e 5 a t

Aritao, te n mile s south o f Bambang . B y

early February , th e Shobu Group, usin g

hand-carrying parties along much o f th e

route, wa s abl e t o mov e abou t a to n o f

supplies wes t alon g th e improve d roa d

each day . It wa s mid-Apri l befor e th e

whole road wa s open t o trucks.

While Yamashit a deploye d a consid -

erable portio n o f hi s strengt h i n posi -

tions t o defen d th e approache s t o Sa n

Jose an d th e Bamban g ancho r o f th e

defensive triangle , h e di d no t neglec t

the othe r approache s t o th e triangula r

redoubt and th e Cagayan Valley. H e assigned responsibilit y fo r holdin g th e

Cagayan Valley and th e north and northwestern coast s o f Luzo n t o th e 103d

Division, to which he attached an understrength regimen t o f th e 10th Division.
THE ENEM Y 99

The 23d Division, wit h th e 58th Independent Mixed Brigade (IMB) attached ,

held th e wes t coas t fro m Alaca n nort h

sixty-five miles , an d wa s also responsible

for defendin g th e approache s t o Bagui o

from th e sout h an d west. 24 Th e 58th

IMB ha d some troops as far north as San

Fernando, but its main strength was concentrated alon g th e coasta l hill s fro m

Alacan nort h twent y mile s t o Aringay .

Yamashita intende d t o deplo y th e 23d

Division alon g a n ar c o f hig h groun d

defenses runnin g generall y southeas t

from Alaca n acros s Hil l 20 0 and o n an -

other te n mile s t o th e Cabarua n Hills ,

which controlle d th e Rout e 3 crossin g

over th e Agn o River. I f the y coul d no t

hold their assigned sectors, the 23d Division an d th e 58th IMB woul d fal l bac k

on Baguio , delayin g alon g successiv e

defensive lines.

The 23d Division had stationed an in -

fantry battalio n alon g th e southwester n

shore of Lingayen Gulf an d ha d directed

the battalion to delay an American drive

clown th e west side of the Central Plains.

A reconnaissanc e uni t fro m th e sam e

division, wit h order s t o withdra w with -

out offerin g an y resistance, was deployed

along the gulf's southern shores, but ha d

sped southwar d afte r th e infantr y bat -

talion whe n ship s o f th e Allie d Nava l

Forces ha d begu n preassaul t bombard -

ment. I t had been principall y stragglers

from thes e tw o 23d Division organiza -

tions tha t th e XI V Corp s an d th e 6t h

Division o f I Corps ha d encountere d o n

9, 10 , and 1 1 January.

In earl y January , th e 10th Division,

less th e bul k o f tw o infantr y regiments ,

was responsibl e fo r th e defens e o f Sa n

Jose. On e regiment, less a battalion, was

in the Bambang area attached to the 103d

Division, and another , als o minus a bat -

talion, wa s fa r t o th e southwes t o n

Bataan Peninsula . Th e divisio n was ,

however, reinforce d b y th e Tsuda Detachment, a n understrengt h regimenta l

combat tea m o f th e 26th Division.

25

Stationed at Dingalen and Bale r Bay s on

Luzon's eas t coast , Tsuda Detachment

was to make a fighting withdrawa l t o th e

Central Plains in th e even t of an Ameri -

can landing on the east coast. Ultimately,

both the 10th Division and the Tsuda Detachment would defend Rout e 5 through

Balete Pass and secur e th e Bamban g anchor of Yamashita's final defense triangle.

When th e Sixt h Arm y lande d a t Lin -

gayen Gul f th e 19th Division wa s a t

Naguilian, o n Rout e 9 between Bagui o

and th e west coast town of Bauang, seven

miles sout h o f Sa n Fernando. 26 Yam -

ashita planned to move the 19th Division

to a reserv e positio n a t Sa n Leon , o n

Route 8 twent y mile s northwes t o f Sa n

Jose. Th e 2d Tank Division (les s most

of it s 2d Mobile Infantry) wa s i n th e

southern par t o f th e Centra l Plains ,

strung ou t alon g Rout e 5 sout h o f Sa n

Jose.27 I t wa s t o defen d agains t Ameri -

24

 Additional informatio n o n th e 23d D ivision and

the 58th IMB i s from: Statement s of Ma j Gen Bunz o

Sato (C G 58th IMB), States , II, 253-54, 259-62; Statement o f Co l Masaich i Takahash i (Staf f 23d Div),

States, IV , 42-43 .

25

 The Tsuda Detachment contained the 11th Independent Infantry Regiment (les s 2d Battalion) of the

26th Division, a batter y o f mediu m artillery , an d

miscellaneous servic e troops, all unde r Col . Tsukad a

Tsuda. Th e res t o f th e 26th Division wa s on Leyte . 26

 Additional informatio n o n th e 19th Division

comes from : Statemen t o f L t Ge n Yoshihar u Ozak i

(CG 19th Div), i n States , III, 177; Nishimur a State -

ment, States, II, 677-80 . 27

 Additional informatio n o n th e 2d Tank Division

is fro m Statemen t o f Co l Shige o Kawa i (Staf f 2d

Tank Div), States , II, 145-49 .
100 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

can parachut e landing s i n th e Centra l

Plains, hol d itsel f mobil e fo r a possibl e

counterattack, prepar e t o withdra w u p

Route 5 into the Cagaya n Valley, and be

ready t o mov e wes t acros s th e Centra l

Plains to th e Kembu area .

The Effect of the Invasion

When o n 6 Januar y Allie d Nava l

Forces' vessel s starte d bombardin g Sa n

Fernando and environs, Yamashita began

to fea r a n imminen t assaul t a t th e por t

city. Suc h a n invasion , coming north o f

the 58th IMB's concentration , would en -

danger the security of Route 9 to Baguio,

especially i f th e 19th Division wer e t o

deploy southwar d a s planned . Quickly ,

Yamashita changed his plans for the 19th

Division an d directe d th e divisio n com -

mander, Lt . Gen . Yoshiharu Ozaki , t o

hold the coastal sector from Bauan g north

forty miles—a n are a previousl y assigne d

to th e 58th IMB—and t o maintai n con -

siderable strength at Naguilian to defend

Route 9 . Th e chang e i n plan s wa s not

drastic. A s a result o f Allie d ai r attack s

and guerrill a operations, and becaus e of

the prevailing opinion within 14th Area

Army tha t no American landing s would

occur before mid-January, the 19th Division ha d hardl y starte d redeployin g

toward Sa n Leo n whe n it s ne w order s

arrived. Th e divisio n ha d onl y t o sta y

where i t wa s t o execut e Yamashita' s

directive.

But th e chang e upse t Yamashita' s

plans fo r strengthenin g Shobu Group's

southern flan k an d th e approache s t o

San Jos e an d Bambang . H e accordingl y

decided t o organize four defens e lines in

front o f San Jose and Bambang , employing th e 2d Tank Division in a new role.

The firs t line , the 23d Division's AlacanCabaruan Hill s arc, presumably alread y

in existence , woul d no w b e considere d

an outpos t lin e o f resistanc e behin d

which thre e ne w line s woul d b e estab -

lished. Yamashit a decide d tha t t o gai n

time fo r th e constructio n o f th e thre e

new lines, h e woul d hav e t o strengthe n

the outer arc . Therefor e h e ordered th e

2d Tank Division's Shigemi Detachment,

roughly comparabl e t o a comba t com -

mand o f a n America n armore d division ,

to move from it s concentration poin t on

Route 5 south o f Sa n Jose and tak e sta -

tion a t th e roa d junctio n tow n o f Ur -

daneta, on Route 3 north of the Cabaruan

Hills.28 Par t o f th e detachmen t wa s t o

move o n t o reinforc e 23d Division out -

posts at Binalonan, five miles north along

Route 3 from Urdaneta .

Since man y o f th e bridge s alon g th e

main road s t o Urdanet a ha d bee n de -

stroyed, an d sinc e guerrill a an d Allie d

air operation s impede d movemen t ove r

these roads, the Shigemi Detachment had

to displac e b y nigh t marche s ove r sec -

ondary roads, approaching Urdaneta and

Binalonan from th e northeast. Daw n on

9 Januar y foun d th e detachmen t a t Sa n

Manuel, fiv e mile s east o f Binalonan .

Having decide d tha t th e roa d an d

bridge destruction woul d make it impossible fo r th e 2d Tank Division t o mov e

across th e Centra l Plain s t o th e Kembu

area, Yamashit a no w planne d t o mov e

the rest o f th e division northeast behind

28

 The Shigemi Detachment wa s named afte r Maj .

Gen. Isa o Shigemi , als o th e commande r o f th e 3d

Tank Brigade, 2d Tank Division. I t consiste d o f th e

7th Tank Regiment, a battalio n (les s elements ) o f

the 2d Mobile Infantry, an d miscellaneou s reinforc -

ing elements . Th e 7th Tank Regiment ha d take n

part i n th e Philippin e Islands Campaig n o f 1941-42 ,

but ha d apparentl y bee n completel y reconstitute d

since then .
THE ENEM Y 101

the Shigemi Detachment.

29 Th e divisio n

(less th e Shigemi Detachment an d th e

2d Mobile Infantry) woul d concentrat e

on the Agno near Tayug, six miles southeast o f Sa n Manuel . Here , th e armore d

unit wa s to make ready t o counterattack

or, conversely , t o defen d a mea n trac k

known a s th e Vill a Verd e Trail , whic h

wound north and east over rough mountains fro m th e vicinit y o f Tayug t o join

Route 5 north o f Balet e Pass.

During th e firs t day s followin g Sixt h

Army's landings , man y Shobu Group

staff officers , dismaye d b y th e America n

progress inland a s well a s by the increasingly advers e effec t o f Allie d ai r an d

guerrilla operation s o n Shobu Group

supply movements, implore d Yamashit a

to moun t a n all-ou t counterattack , em -

ploying th e 2d Tank Division a s a

spearhead. Suc h a n attack , Yamashita 's

subordinates suggested , woul d gai n valuable tim e t o mov e supplie s int o th e

triangular redoubt . Eve n i f onl y tem -

porarily successful, th e attac k migh t provide Shobu Group wit h a n opportunit y

to captur e America n supplie s and mov e

them int o th e mountains . Bu t

Yamashita conclude d tha t Sixt h Arm y

was deployin g grea t strengt h s o slowl y

and cautiousl y tha t n o situatio n favora -

ble fo r a Japanes e counterattac k coul d

arise i n th e nea r future . Furthermore ,

other staff officers advise d him tha t th e 2d

Tank Division's fue l situation , combined

with th e condition o f road s an d bridge s

in th e Centra l Plains , woul d mak e i t

impossible fo r th e divisio n t o moun t

a cohesiv e counterattack. Yamashit a fel t

that th e only resul t woul d b e th e quic k

decimation o f his armored strengt h and,

envisaging a n essentiall y defensiv e rol e

for th e entir e Shobu Group, refuse d t o

risk any important elements of the group

in a counterattack.

As on e consequenc e o f thi s decision ,

Yamashita committed th e 2d Tank Division, still minus the Shigemi Detachment

and mos t o f th e 2d Mobile Infantry, t o

the first of the three new defense line s in

front o f Sa n Jos e and Bambang . O n 1 1

January h e directe d th e divisio n t o concentrate at Lupao, on Route 8 nine miles

northwest o f Sa n Jose, an d t o exten d its

left southeas t t o Muñoz , o n Rout e 5

south o f Sa n Jose . Here , th e divisio n

ancoul d 23 d bette d Divisions' r plug a ga existin p betwee g line n thse tha 10thn

would b e possibl e i f th e uni t wer e t o

move t o Tayug , a s Yamashit a ha d di -

rected onl y tw o days earlier. Moreover ,

the new deployment would bring strong

defensive force s close r t o Sa n Jos e an d

thus hel p forestal l envelopmen t o f tha t

town fro m th e west o r south.

The responsibilit y for holding the second o f th e thre e ne w line s Yamashit a

assigned t o th e 10th Division which ,

with th e arrival of the 2d Tank Division

from th e south , coul d redeploy some o f

its strength awa y from Sa n Jose. O n th e

northwest th e secon d lin e wa s virtually

an extensio n o f th e first , an d stretche d

from Lupa o t o Tayug an d th e entranc e

to th e Vill a Verd e Trail . Th e south -

eastern sectio n o f th e secon d lin e

stretched from Sa n Jose southeast twentyfive mile s t o Bongabon , junctio n o f th e

roads to Bale r and Dingalen Bay s on th e

east coast. Th e Tsuda Detachment, now

directed t o withdra w inlan d fro m th e

bays, woul d defen d thi s sectio n o f th e

29

 Actually, th e destructio n wa s grea t enoug h t o

forestall th e division' s mov e westwar d b y abou t 2 5

December, whil e Yamashit a di d no t cance l plan s t o

move th e uni t t o th e Kembu are a unti l 9 January .

The dela y i n issuin g the cancellation order probably

provides a blea k commentar y o n th e stat e o f Japa -

nese communication s o n Luzon .
102 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

second lin e t o hel p preven t th e out -

flanking o f Sa n Jos e fro m th e sout h an d

southeast.

Yamashita realize d tha t hi s force s

would be unable to hold out indefinitel y

in th e relativel y flat , ope n lan d i n fron t

of Sa n Jos e an d that , accordingly , h e

would requir e a lin e in bette r defensiv e

terrain along the approaches to the Bambang ancho r o f hi s triangle . Thus , th e

third new lin e o f defense s h e establishe d

in earl y Januar y la y across Rout e 5 i n

the mountain s som e twent y mile s nort h

of Sa n Jose an d abou t seven mile s south

of Balet e Pass . Responsibilit y fo r hold -

ing this third lin e wa s initially veste d i n

the 10th Division, but Yamashit a kne w

that, wit h th e mission s h e ha d alread y

assigned it , th e uni t woul d no t hav e

enough strengt h t o defen d th e line .

Therefore, o n 8 January, he directed the

105th Division of Shimbu Group t o start

north fro m it s position s eas t o f Manil a

to deplo y alon g th e new Rout e 5 defensive line . Th e division 's firs t echelo n

was compose d o f divisio n headquarters ,

five infantr y battalions , an d a n understrength artiller y battalion . Indication s

are tha t Yamashit a expecte d t o hav e

plenty o f tim e t o mov e th e res t o f th e

105th Division northward , an d tha t h e

may als o hav e planne d t o brin g nort h

much of the 8th Division, leaving Shimbu

Group onl y provisiona l Arm y units an d

the nava l forces. 30

As o f 1 1 Januar y th e 105th Division's

advance elements had barely started their

trek northward. Th e 2d Tank Division's

Shigemi Detachment wa s at Sa n Manue l

and ha d passe d t o th e control o f th e 23d

Division. Anothe r comba t comman d o f

the 2d Tank Division, th e Ida Detachment, wa s still strun g ou t alon g Rout e

5 twenty-fiv e t o thirty miles south o f Sa n

Jose. Th e res t of the division, which was

composed o f division headquarters, division troops , th e 10th Tank Regiment,

and a battalion eac h from th e 2d Mobile

Infantry an d th e 2d Mobile Artillery

Regiments, wa s movin g int o positio n

along Rout e 8 northwest o f Sa n Jose. 31

On 1 1 Januar y th e 23d Division an d

the 58th IMB hel d excellen t defensiv e

positions i n th e are a eas t an d nort h o f

Alacan o n Lingaye n Gulf , bu t th e 23d

Division's oute r ar c o f defense s fro m

Alacan to the Cabaruan Hills was weakly

garrisoned. O n it s ow n initiativ e th e

division ha d decide d tha t th e Alacan -

Cabaruan line would prov e indefensibl e

if America n force s lande d substantia l

strength ove r Lingaye n Gulf' s souther n

shores and swun g thence generally southeastward. Therefore , th e divisio n ha d

prepared its principal defense s i n highe r

30

 At least initially , th e redeploymen t o f th e 105th

Division was apparently partially intended a s a means

of permittin g th e 2d Tank Division t o mov e t o th e

Kembu area . Bu t plan s t o mov e th e tan k divisio n

west wer e cancele d th e da y afte r Yamashit a issue d

the movement orders t o th e 105th Division, without

a concomitan t cancellatio n o f 105th Division orders.

Therefore, i t appear s tha t Yamashit a intende d t o

move the 105th Division nort h t o the Shobu are a n o

matter wher e th e 2d Tank Division wa s ultimatel y

deployed. Hint s tha t Yamashit a planne d t o brin g

the 8th Division nort h ar e mor e elusive , althoug h

the mov e woul d hav e bee n logica l i n th e contex t o f

his pla n t o mak e hi s principa l stan d i n norther n

Luzon. A thesi s tha t Yamashit a ma y hav e intende d

to denud e th e Shimbu Group o f it s regula r Arm y

combat unit s is supporte d b y th e fac t tha t jus t on e

tank regiment of the 2d Tank Division held defensive

positions i n th e Shimbu are a unti l th e en d o f th e

first wee k o f January . 31

 The Ida Detachment was named afte r Col. Kumpei Ida , the commande r o f th e 6th Tank Regiment,

around whic h th e detachmen t wa s built . Th e de -

tachment ha d previousl y hel d defense s a t Ip o Dam ,

in th e Manila watershe d area , unde r Shimbu Group

control. Th e 10th Tank Regiment wa s commanded

by Col. Kazuo Harada .
THE ENEM Y 103

terrain east of the Alacan-Cabaruan line,

disposing most o f it s strengt h i n risin g

ground east of Route 3 from Sison , about

seven mile s inlan d fro m Alacan , sout h

and southeast ten miles to Binalonan and

San Manuel.

General Muto , Yamashita' s chie f o f

staff, ha d discovere d thi s unauthorize d

redeployment during an inspection tou r

on 5 January. Mut o agreed that th e 23d

Division could not hold back a concerted

American drive southeast from Lingaye n

Gulf, but he was alarmed at the prospect

that th e Sixt h Army , encounterin g n o

substantial defenses in the region west of

Route 3 , woul d b e abl e t o initiat e a

drive towar d Sa n Jos e fa r soone r tha n

anticipated, thereb y upsettin g al l

Yamashita's plans . Mut o therefor e di -

rected th e 23d Division t o reinforc e it s

Alacan-Cabaruan Hill s lin e forthwith .

Obviously i n n o hurr y t o compl y wit h

these orders, the 23d Division, by 1 1 January, ha d sen t forwar d fro m it s Sison -

Binalonan-San Manue l position s onl y

one infantr y compan y and hal f a battery

of artillery . A s the divisio n woul d soo n

learn, further opportunities to strengthen

the Alacan-Cabarua n Hill s ar c ha d

passed.
CHAPTER V I

Expanding the Hold

I Corps Meets the Enemy

By evenin g o f 1 1 January , I Corps '

center an d righ t flan k unit s wer e wel l

into th e 23d Division's weakl y hel d ar c

of forwar d defenses. 1 Simultaneously ,

the corps ' lef t wa s preparin g t o driv e

north toward the Damortis-Rosario road,

in th e 58th IMB's sector .

The Attack on the Left

The Damortis-Rosari o road , a two -

lane, concrete-pave d sectio n o f Rout e 3 ,

led eas t fro m th e junctio n o f Rout e 3

and th e coas t roa d a t Damortis , abou t

eight mile s north o f Sa n Fabian , t o th e

junction o f Routes 3 and 11 , eight miles

inland and a mile east of Rosario. (Map

II) Seizur e o f th e Damortis-Rosari o

stretch of Route 3 would present I Corps

with an eas y means of access to Rout e 11 ,

in tur n providin g a two-lan e asphalt -

paved axi s o f advanc e towar d Bagui o

along the deep valley of the Bued River.

Equally important , if the I Corp s could

quickly gain contro l ove r th e DamortisRosario road an d th e Routes 3-11 junction, th e corp s coul d largel y overcom e

the threa t o f counterattac k agains t th e

Sixth Army's beachhead fro m th e nort h

and northeast . Wit h th e securit y o f it s

left rea r thu s assured , th e XI V Corp s

could spee d it s driv e towar d th e Sixt h

Army's principa l objectiv e area , th e

Central Plains-Manila Bay region.

The Damorti s - Rosario roa d ra n

sometimes acros s woode d ravine s an d

sometimes ove r ridg e top s fo r three -

quarters of the way to Rosario , and the n

continued acros s ope n far m lan d an d

through Rosario to a junction with Route

11. Th e roa d wa s dominated by broken

ridges an d steep-side d hill s t o bot h th e

north an d th e sout h fo r th e firs t fiv e

miles inland. Sout h of the road the hills

and ridge s wer e grass-covered ; t o th e

north man y o f th e draw s an d ravine s

contained thic k scru b growth . Bare ,

steep height s north , northeast , an d eas t

of Rosari o controlle d th e Route s 3-1 1

junction. Th e 58th IMB, defending

the Damortis-Rosari o road , ha d al l th e

advantages of observation, while the relatively sof t roc k an d dir t mixtur e o f th e

hills an d ridge s gav e th e brigad e ampl e

opportunity to indulg e in wha t was soon

to appea r t o the I Corp s a s the Japanese

Army's favorit e occupatio n — digging

caves and tunnels.

Numbering about 6,900 men, the 58th

IMB wa s compose d o f fiv e independen t

infantry battalions of some 900 men each ,

a battalio n o f fiftee n 75-mm . mountai n

1

 The genera l America n source s fo r thi s sectio n

and it s subsection s are : Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I ,

19-23; I Corp s Rp t Luzon , pp . 28-34 ; 43 d Di v Rpt

Luzon, pp . 8-12 ; 43d Div G-3 Pe r Rpts , 12-1 8 Jan

45; 43d Div G-3 Jn l Luzon , 12-1 8 Jan 45 .
EXPANDING TH E HOL D 105

guns, an d brigad e servic e troops. 2 At -

tachments included thre e heavy artillery

units totalin g nearl y 2,15 0 me n wit h

twelve artillery piece s ranging in caliber

from 150-mm . t o 300-mm . B y coinci -

dence, one o f th e firs t I Corp s unit s t o

gain fir m contac t with the 58th IMB wa s

a correspondingly separate nondivisional

organization, the 158t h RCT. This unit,

with abou t 4,50 0 men , was organize d

into thre e infantr y battalions , a 12 -

weapon battalio n o f 105-mm . howitzers ,

and regimental troops. Th e RCT woul d

have additiona l fir e suppor t fro m CVE -

based plane s an d fro m th e battleships ,

cruisers, an d destroyer s o f th e Luzo n

Attack Force .

On 1 2 January the 158t h RCT, whic h

had replace d element s o f th e 172 d Infantry, 43d Division, along the coast road

on th e 11th, sen t patrol s int o Damorti s

and foun d th e tow n virtuall y deserted. 3

Late th e sam e da y Genera l Krueger , i n

order t o unif y comman d o n th e arm y

left, release d th e RC T fro m arm y con -

trol an d attache d i t t o I Corps . Fo r

similar reason s Genera l Swift , th e corp s

commander, further attache d the combat

team t o th e 43 d Division. 4 Swif t als o

attached hi s corps reserve , th e 6t h Divi -

sion's 63d RCT, to the 43d Division and

directed th e divisio n commander , Gen -

eral Wing, t o commit th e 63d t o clos e a

growing ga p betwee n th e 158t h RC T

and th e 172 d Infantry, whic h ha d bee n

advancing eastward a s the 158t h pushe d

north.5

On th e mornin g o f 1 2 Januar y th e

172d Infantry , aide d b y lef t flan k ele -

ments of th e 169t h Infantry , undertoo k

an abortive attack against Hill 580 , nea r

the souther n en d o f th e third , bare -

crested ridg e lin e inlan d fro m th e

Mabilao landin g beaches. 6 Fro m Hil l

580 th e ridg e lin e stretche d northwar d

about fou r an d a hal f mile s t o th e

Damortis-Rosario road near barrio Cataguintingan, at the edge of the open farm

land wes t o f Rosario . O n th e eas t th e

ridge overlooke d open , gentl y slopin g

terrain that fell awa y to the valle y of th e

Bued River, leading northeastward from

the vicinit y o f Hil l 58 0 an d pas t th e

Routes 3-11 junction. A tin y tributar y

of th e Bued, the Apanga t River, lay just

under th e easter n sid e o f th e ridge line .

Once Hil l 58 0 wa s cleared, th e 172 d

Infantry coul d procee d nort h alon g th e

ridge and th e Apanga t Rive r abreast o f

the 63 d Infantry , which , as 43d Divisio n

plans evolved o n 1 2 and 1 3 January, was

to attac k nort h alon g th e nex t ridg e t o

the west while the 158t h Infantr y struc k

east alon g th e Damortis-Rosari o road .

If thi s three-regimen t attac k succeede d

quickly, the units could drive rapidly on

to overru n artiller y position s nort h o f

the roa d fro m whic h th e Japanes e wer e

still shellin g I Corp s beache s an d the n

2

 Japanese informatio n i n thi s subsectio n i s from :

Sato Statement , States , III, 253-55; 172 d In f Rp t

Luzon, 9 Jan-13 Fe b 45 , O/B an. , pp. 1-2 ; 43d Di v

FO 2 , 1 3 Jan 45 . 3

 Additional information o n 158t h RCT operation s

is from: 158t h RC T Rp t Luzon , pp. 12-13 ; 158t h Inf

Rpt Damortis-Rosario , pp . 1-2; 158th RC T S- 3 Jn l

and Jn l File , 11-1 7 Ja n 45 ; 158t h In f Uni t Jn l an d

Jnl File , 11-1 8 Ja n 45 . 4

 Rad, Sixt h Army to I Corps and 158t h RCT, 2048

12 Jan 45 , Sixth Arm y G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 11-13 Jan

45; Rad , I Corps to 158t h RCT , 003 4 1 3 Jan 45 , 158th

RCT S-3 Jnl File, 11-1 7 Ja n 45.

5

 Rad , I Corp s t o Sixt h Army , RM-79, 1 2 Jan 45 ,

Sixth Arm y G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 11-1 2 Ja n 45 ; Entry

56, 11-1 2 Jan , and Entrie s 44 and 76 , 12-1 3 Jan , 43 d

Div G- 3 Jnls , 11-1 2 an d 12-1 3 Ja n 45 . 6

 See above , Chapte r IV , fo r a generalize d descrip -

tion of th e thre e ridge lines. Additiona l informatio n

on 172 d Infantr y operation s i s from : 172 d In f Rp t

Luzon, 9 Jan-13 Feb 45, pp. 3-6; 172d In f S-3 Rpts ,

11-18 Jan 45 ; 172d Inf Jn l an d Ms g File , 11-18

Jan 45 .
106 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

JUNCTION O F COASTA L AN D DAMORTIS-ROSARIO ROADS A T DAMORTI S

push o n to secure the Routes 3-11 junction, thereb y helping to safeguar d Sixt h

Army's extreme left and permitting General Kruege r t o devot e mor e attentio n

to the XIV Corps' drive toward Manila .

Making fina l pre p ration s for th e three -

regiment advance , th e 43 d Divisio n es -

timated tha t som e 5,00 0 troop s o f th e

58th IMB hel d defenses in th e DamortisRosario sector , a n estimat e tha t wa s a t

least 1,00 0 men to o low.7

On the morning of 1 3 January, behind

close morta r support , th e 172d Infantr y

again struc k u p th e grassy , stee p slope s

of Hil l 580 , meeting a witherin g fir e

from Japanes e mortars , machin e guns ,

and rifles . Befor e securin g most o f th e

hill a t 1730 , the tw o assaul t companie s

lost about 15 men killed and 2 5 wounded.

The nex t da y th e regimen t continue d

north alon g th e thir d ridge , supporte d

now b y th e 43 d Division' s 103 d Field

Artillery Battalion (105-mm . howitzers)

from position s nea r Whit e Beac h 1 .

Against scattere d resistance , th e 172 d

captured Hil l 565 , a mil e and a quarte r

north o f Hil l 580. This gai n ha d bee n

so easy that General Wing, the 43d Division's commander, directed the regiment

7

 Of th e 9,000 men originally i n o r attache d t o th e

58th IMB, over 6,000 were probably available to hold

the approache s t o Rosario . Abou t 1,00 0 more wer e

at Aringay , o n th e coas t nort h o f Damortis . Th e

remaining 2,00 0 wer e sick , ha d bee n kille d o r wounded b y th e air, naval, an d artiller y bombard -

ments, or wer e scattered i n smal l detachments north

and eas t o f Rosario .
EXPANDING TH E HOL D 107

to pus h o n durin g the 15th to tak e Hill

665, anothe r mil e an d a quarte r nort h

and th e highes t poin t alon g th e thir d

ridge line.

Meanwhile, the attacks of the 63d an d

158th Infantr y Regiments had no t gon e

so well . O n th e 13t h the 63 d attacke d

north fro m Hil l 24 7 (capture d b y th e

172d o n S-day) and seized Hill 363, about

a mile and a half u p th e middl e ridge. 8

Artillery support wa s to hav e been provided b y th e 43 d Division' s 155-mm .

howitzer battalion, the 192d Field Artillery, since the 63d RCT's own 105-mm .

battalion ha d bee n sen t sout h wit h th e

rest of the 6th Division.

Unfortunately, th e 192 d Fiel d Artil -

lery did no t lear n i t wa s to support th e

63d Infantr y unti l afte r dar k o n 1 2 January, and could not start moving to good

close suppor t position s unti l dayligh t

on th e 13th, after th e 63d had started its

attack. Unlik e a 105-mm . battalion, the

192d di d no t normall y operat e in direc t

support roles and lacke d the forward ob -

servers an d communication s th e lighte r

battalions possessed . Th e 192 d migh t

therefore hav e bee n expecte d t o tak e

some tim e t o prepar e for its direc t sup -

port mission , but th e battalion reported

it coul d hav e provide d som e support —

with a t leas t on e battery—b y noo n o n

the 13th had not Col. Ralph C. Holliday,

commanding th e 63d Infantry , insiste d

that wir e b e lai d fo r artiller y liaiso n of -

ficers an d forwar d observers , a jo b tha t

was no t complete d fo r th e 192 d Fiel d

Artillery fo r almos t thirty-si x hours .

Colonel Hollida y ma y hav e bee n influ -

enced i n his decision by the fac t tha t th e

artillery's SCR-61 0 radi o di d no t wor k

efficiently i n th e broke n terrai n o f th e

middle ridg e lin e wher e th e 63d Infan -

try wa s attacking . I t wa s not, indeed,

until th e 43d Divisio n ha d supplie d th e

192d Fiel d Artiller y with infantr y SCR300 set s tha t th e battalio n wa s abl e t o

establish satisfactor y radi o communica -

tions. Then , o n 1 4 January , th e firs t

radio brought u p t o th e battalion 's forward observer s wa s promptl y destroye d

by Japanese artillery, which also cut wire

that had already been laid. Suppor t wa s

again delayed .

During the 14th, the 192d brought one

battery still furthe r forwar d t o excellent

direct suppor t positions, bu t th e com -

munications problem s mad e i t impossi -

ble for this battery to deliver any support

fires tha t day . I t was , finally, midafter -

noon o n 1 5 Januar y whe n th e entir e

battalion wa s in position—abou t a mile

inland an d approximatel y thre e mile s

south of Hill 363—and ready to give the

63d Infantr y th e support i t needed. 9

Without artiller y support , an d con -

tinually force d t o see k cove r fro m ob -

served Japanese artillery an d morta r fir e

against whic h i t coul d cal l dow n n o

counterbattery fire , th e 63 d Infantry 's

progress wa s slow. Hea t helpe d t o slo w

advances. Though scarcely a mile inland,

the regimen t wa s cut of f from Lingaye n

Gulf's coolin g breeze s an d reape d th e

dividends o f th e broilin g su n o n th e

browning, steep hills. Water was another

problem—none wa s readily availabl e i n

the regiment's area , an d th e absenc e o f

8

 Additional informatio n o n th e 63 d Infantr y i s

from: 63 d In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 1-2 ; 63d Inf S-2/S-3

Jnl, 13-1 8 Jan 45; 63d Inf S-3 Pe r Rpts, 13-1 8 Ja n 45.

9

 Ltr, L t Co l Don n R . Pepk e (C O 2 d B n 63 d Inf)

to author , 7 Jan 53 , OCMH files ; 192d F A Bn Rp t

Luzon, pp. 2-3; 192d F A Bn Jnl, 12-16 Jan 45. The

192d's record s indicat e tha t som e suppor t mission s

were fire d lat e o n th e afternoo n o f th e 14th , but

Colonel Pepke, commanding the 63d Infantry's leading battalion , state d tha t h e receive d n o artiller y

support unti l noo n o n th e 15th at th e earliest.
108 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

roads mad e i t necessar y t o hand-carr y

all drinking water forward. Bu t General

Wing was dissatisfied with the regiment's

accomplishments. Lat e o n th e 14t h h e

relieved Colone l Hollida y an d place d

Lt. Col . Harol d G . Maison , th e regi -

mental executiv e officer , i n command .

Under Maison' s direction, th e 63 d pre -

pared t o driv e o n northwar d t o gai n

contact wit h th e 158t h Infantr y alon g

the Damortis-Rosari o road.10

The 158t h Infantry had spent 1 3 January patrollin g i n th e Damortis are a an d

preparing to attack eastwar d on th e 14t h

in a drive tha t wa s expected t o tak e th e

regiment a t least halfwa y t o Rosari o i n

one day . Th e attac k o n th e 14t h pro -

ceeded smoothl y fo r approximatel y fiv e

minutes. Then , a s th e 158th' s leading -

elements started through a shallow defil e

about half a mil e east of th e Damortis—

coastal roa d junction , Japanes e morta r

and artiller y fir e bega n chewin g u p th e

highway, and Japanes e machine gun fir e

pinned dow n th e America n troop s a s

they sought cover along the slopes north

and sout h o f th e road . Th e troop s o f

the 58th IMB, wh o ha d take n a heav y

pounding from Allie d aircraft, nava l fir e

support vessels, and I Corp s artillery for

some days , ha d abandone d thei r coasta l

defenses an d ha d move d int o defilad e

positions alon g th e easter n slope s an d

folds o f th e coasta l ridg e line . Thei r

cave an d tunne l defense s ha d bee n in -

visible from th e west, and the y had bee n

able t o se t u p wha t amounte d t o a n

ambush tha t 158t h Infantr y patrol s ha d

not discovere d o n 1 3 January. Durin g

the afternoo n o f th e 14t h th e 158t h

Infantry's forward troop s painfully with -

drew fro m thei r expose d position s o n

the ope n slope s jus t eas t o f Damortis .

The day' s abortiv e effor t cos t th e regi -

ment 2 0 me n kille d an d 6 5 wounded .

The nex t da y th e 158t h Infantry ,

supported b y th e 147t h Fiel d Artiller y

Battalion (105-mm . howitzers) , nava l

gunfire, an d CVE-base d planes , gaine d

about 1,00 0 yards o f ground i n a n east -

erly directio n bot h nort h an d sout h o f

Route 3 , advancin g o n a fron t abou t

800 yard s wid e astrid e th e highway .

South o f th e road , troop s reache d th e

crest o f th e firs t ridg e line , whic h di d

not exten d nort h o f th e road . There ,

the seawar d slope s ros e eastwar d t o a

ridge that , lyin g approximatel y a mil e

and a quarte r inland , forme d a north -

ward extension of the middle ridge south

of Rout e 3. Unit s of the 158t h operating

north o f th e roa d o n 1 5 Januar y wer e

able t o pres s onl y halfwa y u p th e bar e

slopes o f th e norther n ridge .

Meanwhile, south o f Rout e 3, the 63 d

Infantry ha d advance d ove r a mil e an d

a half nort h from Hil l 36 3 in an attemp t

to reac h barri o Amlang , a t th e easter n

exit o f th e defil e throug h whic h th e

158th Infantr y wa s driving . Th e 63 d

was no w operatin g alon g th e easter n

slopes o f th e firs t ridg e lin e an d acros s

the second ridge , which becam e progressively mor e broken an d ill-define d a s the

regiment proceede d northward . Japa -

nese artiller y an d morta r fire , whic h

showed n o sign s o f decreasin g i n inten -

sity a s th e da y wor e on , lambaste d th e

63d's forwar d element s al l day .

Both th e 63 d an d th e 158t h Infantr y

Regiments ha d encountere d stronge r

resistance than anticipated , and Genera l

Wing no w realize d tha t neithe r wa s

10

 Intervs, autho r wit h Co l Georg e G . O'Conno r

(CO 53 d F A B n 6t h Div) , 15 Dec 5 2 an d 2 Feb 53 ;

Ltr, Pepk e t o author, 7 Jan 53 ; 63d Inf S-2/S-3 Jnl ,

13-15 Ja n 45; 43d Div G-3 Jnl , 13-1 5 Ja n 45 .
EXPANDING TH E HOL D 109

going t o brea k throug h towar d Rosari o

as soo n a s hoped . Accordingly , h e di -

rected th e 172 d Infantry t o spee d it s

advance toward Rout e 3 . H e simultane -

ously directe d th e regimen t t o seiz e

Rosario and clea n ou t Japanes e artillery

emplacements nort h o f Rout e 3 fro m

which muc h o f th e fir e ha d bee n fallin g

on th e 63 d an d 158th. 11

Speed o n th e righ t appeare d essentia l

for anothe r reason . Lat e o n 1 4 January

both air an d ground observers had spot -

ted a Japanes e motorize d colum n mov -

ing south along Route 3 below the Routes

3-11 junction . If , a s feared , thi s mov e

presaged a build-up for a Japanese counterattack agains t th e Sixt h Army' s left ,

the 172 d Infantry ha d t o gai n contro l

over th e highwa y junctio n befor e an y

more Japanes e troops could come south.

The regimen t bega n operation s o n th e

morning o f 1 5 Januar y t o secur e th e

junction. Tha t day , a t th e cost o f 5 men

killed an d 2 0 wounded, th e 172 d Infan -

try establishe d on e battalio n a t th e edg e

of Rout e 3 about a mil e and a half wes t

of Rosario .

The 43 d Divisio n wa s now tryin g t o

accomplish thre e relate d tasks : secur e

the Route s 3-1 1 junction; overru n al l

Japanese artiller y emplacement s i n th e

Damortis-Rosario region; an d secur e all

the groun d o n it s lef t t o th e Arm y

Beachhead Line, which la y roughly three

miles nort h o f th e Damortis-Rosari o

road. Sinc e it appeared to General Wing

that hi s thre e lef t flan k regiment s di d

not hav e enoug h strengt h t o accomplis h

all thes e missions, h e directed th e 169t h

Infantry, whic h ha d bee n operatin g t o

the southeast for three days, to push some

troops nort h alon g Rout e 3 towar d th e

Routes 3-11 junction . The 172 d Infan -

try wa s t o seiz e Rosario , hig h groun d

immediately north o f th e town , an d th e

highway junction. Th e 63 d woul d clea r

the Damortis-Rosari o roa d fro m th e

172d's westernmos t position s wes t t o

barrio Amlang . Th e 158t h Infantry' s

primary tas k wa s t o eliminat e th e Japa -

nese fro m th e ridg e nort h o f th e defil e

where th e regimen t ha d bee n stopped .

The 158t h ha d alread y probe d u p th e

western slope s o f this ridge , an d patrol s

had discovere d tha t th e Japanes e ha d

many morta r an d machin e gu n posi -

tions, an d a fe w artillery emplacement s

as well , alon g th e ridg e line , whic h ex -

tended fo r som e tw o mile s nort h o f th e

road.

Advances mad e o n 1 6 Januar y i n

accordance wit h thes e plan s wer e disappointing. Non e of the three regiments

on th e lef t mad e significan t progress ,

but all took mor e casualties. Th e 158t h

Infantry, fo r example , suffere d 1 3 me n

killed, 3 4 wounded , an d 4 9 evacuate d

because o f hea t exhaustion . Almos t al l

the casualtie s were incurre d b y one bat -

talion an d constitute d a rat e tha t n o

battalion could stand for long. Th e sup -

ply problems of th e 63d an d 172 d Infan -

try Regiment s were becoming more an d

more vexing. Unti l engineers could con -

struct roads northward alon g th e ridges,

food an d ammunitio n ha d t o b e eithe r

airdropped o r move d u p b y Filipin o

hand-carrying parties . A t thi s stag e o f

operations on Luzon , i t wa s not ye t pos -

sible t o organiz e suc h a resuppl y pro -

gram o n th e scal e require d fo r rapi d

advances. Th e thre e regiment s o n th e

left—the 169t h ha d been unabl e to start

any troop s nort h alon g Rout e 3 o n 1 6

January — had apparentl y bee n stale -

mated, eac h unabl e t o mak e significan t 11

 43d Div FO 3 , 1 5 Jan 45 .
TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

TROOPS ON HILL OVERLOOKIN G DAMORTIS-ROSARI O ROA D

progress until th e others began breaking

through. Genera l Win g woul d hav e t o

discover som e wa y t o brea k th e stale -

mate quickly , fo r i n larg e measur e th e

entire developmen t o f th e Sixt h Army 's

campaign wa s coming t o depen d upo n

the progress of the 63d, 158th, and 172 d

Infantry Regiments .

The 43d Division's Right Flank

While operation s o n th e 43 d Divi -

sion's lef t ha d bee n developin g int o a

stalemate, th e 103 d and 169t h Infantr y

Regiments, o n th e divisio n right , ha d

been preoccupie d wit h a drive eastward

toward th e Arm y Beachhea d Line , a

drive tha t too k th e regiment s int o th e

23d Division's oute r defensiv e arc . O n

13 January , afte r havin g cleared , wit h

the 172 d Infantry, th e souther n en d o f

the thir d ridg e lin e inlan d fro m th e

landing beaches, th e 169t h Infantr y be -

gan directin g it s majo r effort s towar d

securing Hil l 318 , on th e eas t ban k o f

the Bue d Rive r fou r an d a hal f mile s

due eas t o f Sa n Fabian , an d Hil l 355 ,

two miles northeast of Hill 318. 12

The 169t h Infantr y wa s u p agains t

the 23d Division's 64th Infantry, whic h

was responsibl e fo r holdin g th e wester n

approaches to Route 3 from a point near

12

 Additional informatio n o n 169t h Infantr y oper -

ations is fro m 169t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 4-5; 169th

Inf Uni t Jn l an d Jn l Files , 12-1 8 Jan 45 .

During preliminar y attack s agains t Hil l 31 8 o n

12 January , S . Sgt. Rober t E . Law s o f Compan y G ,

169th Infantry , earne d th e Meda l o f Hono r when ,

leading th e company' s assaul t squad , h e personall y

knocked ou t a Japanes e pillbo x and , although

wounded, continue d t o fight , killin g thre e Japanes e

before bein g evacuated.
EXPANDING TH E HOL D 111

the Route s 3-1 1 junctio n south-south -

east almost eighteen miles to Urdaneta, 13

The Japanes e regiment numbered about

2,500 troops, at least half o f whom wer e

ill-trained replacement s picke d u p o n

Luzon. Th e 1st Battalion, les s a rein -

forced rifl e compan y a t Hil l 318, wa s on

Hill 355 . Th e 3d Battalion hel d Mt .

Alava, a mil e an d a hal f nort h o f Hil l

355, an d th e groun d slopin g dow n t o

Route 3 at th e tow n o f Sison , tw o an d a

half mile s northeast o f Mt . Alava 's crest.

Supporting artillery, about tw o medium

battalions, wa s emplace d i n th e Mt .

Alava-Sison are a an d a t Hil l 355 . Th e

64th Infantry wa s well du g i n alon g the

bare slope s o f Hill s 31 8 an d 35 5 an d

Mt. Alava , havin g constructe d man y

tunnels an d cave s an d enlarge d natura l

fissures and holes. Th e regiment , having

all th e advantage s o f observation , coul d

watch ever y movemen t o f 169t h Infan -

try troops across the open approache s to

the hil l defenses.

The 169t h Infantry , i n a fronta l

assault tha t cos t 7 0 me n kille d o r

wounded, cleare d Hil l 31 8 b y evenin g

on 1 4 January and th e nex t da y started

a two-pronge d attac k agains t Hil l 355. 14

The effor t o f th e 15th , a t th e expens e

of 1 5 men kille d an d 3 0 wounded , onl y

demonstrated tha t continue d fronta l as -

sault fro m th e sout h an d wes t hel d ou t

little chanc e fo r th e quic k succes s an d

breakthrough t o Rout e 3 tha t Genera l

Wing, unde r pressur e fro m Genera l

Swift a t I Corp s headquarters , wa s de -

manding. Win g accordingl y directe d

the 169t h Infantr y t o ceas e it s fronta l

attacks, bypas s Hil l 35 5 t o th e south ,

and displac e overlan d t o Rout e 3 a t

barrio Palacpalac , fou r mile s sout h o f

Sison.15

To escap e detectio n i n th e ope n

ground south of Hill 355 and Mt . Alava,

the 169t h Infantry , whic h lef t a one -

battalion containin g forc e a t Hil l 355 ,

started it s overlan d marc h a t 203 0 o n

the 15th. Forced to ford two small rivers

and threa d its way through dry rice paddies with their separating embankments,

the regimen t di d no t clos e at Palacpala c

until 170 0 on th e 16th . Th e troop s had

been encumbered by supplies during the

march becaus e suppl y line s wer e aban -

doned unti l th e 103d Infantry, o n th e

right, coul d secur e goo d grave l road s

running fro m Rout e 3 a t Pozorrubio ,

a mil e south o f Palacpalac , southwest t o

Manaoag an d wes t t o Sa n Jacinto.

For som e day s th e 103 d Infantry ha d

been striving to reach and clea r Rout e 3

from Pozorrubi o south t o Urdaneta , but

had foun d it s wa y blocked b y th e rein -

forced 2d Battalion, 64th Infantry, o n

the Hil l 20 0 complex . Th e Japanes e

battalion ha d about 60 0 me n o n th e six

square mile s o f complicate d bu t gentl y

rolling and ope n hills, in which they had

dug man y caves , tunnels , an d machin e

gun emplacements . Th e Japanes e ha d

ten t o fiftee n artiller y pieces in support ,

some o f the m hel d mobil e alon g th e

road t o Pozorrubio . Othe r troop s an d 13

 Japanese informatio n i n thi s subsection is from:

SWPA Hist Series, II, 463, n. 9, and Plate III; 43d Div

G-2 Rp t Luzon , Sec. II , Enem y O/B , pp . 1-2 ; 103d

Inf O/ B Rp t Luzon , p. 1 . 14

 Additional information on operations at Hill 355

comes from: 716t h Tan k B n Rp t Luzon , p. 3 ; 169t h

Inf Verba l FO , 1 4 Jan 45 , résum é i n 169t h In f Jn l

File, 1 4 Jan 45 ; 43d Div G-3 Jnl , 13-15 Jan 45 .

15

 43d Div FO 3 , 1 5 Jan 45 ; Entries 27, 100, and 101 ,

43d Di v G- 3 Jnl , 13-14 Ja n 45 ; Entrie s 2 1 an d 32 , 43d Div G-3 Jnl, 14-15 Jan 45; Entry 84, 43d Div G-3

Jnl, 15-1 6 Jan 45 ; 43d Div G-3 Rpts , 1 5 and 1 6 Jan

45; 43 d Div Rpt Luzon , pp . 10-11.
112 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

additional artiller y wer e i n Pozorrubi o

and a t Binalonan , midwa y betwee n

Pozorrubio and Urdaneta .

The 103 d Infantry' s figh t t o clear Hill

200 wa s marked fro m star t t o finis h b y

heat an d dust , an d b y extremel y clos e

support o f 105-mm . howitzers , th e 105 -

mm. self-propelle d howitzers of th e regimental Canno n Company , 4.2-inc h

mortars, an d a compan y o f th e 716t h

Tank Battalion. 16 Th e battl e was joined

in earnest on th e morning of 1 2 January,

and b y dar k o n th e 16t h only mino r

mopping up remained. Som e 25 0 of th e

Japanese defender s escape d towar d

Pozorrubio, whic h element s of th e 103d

Infantry entere d lat e o n th e 16th . The

next da y the 103 d cleare d th e town , th e

remaining troop s o f th e 2d Battalion,

64th Infantry, havin g withdrawn north -

ward durin g th e night. Meanwhile , fur -

ther south , tw o reinforced companie s o f

the 3 d Battalion , 103 d Infantry, ha d

reached barri o Potpot, a mile or s o west

of Binalona n on th e Binalonan-Manaoag

road. Th e companie s scarcel y ha d tim e

to se t u p defense s a t dus k o n th e 16t h

before the y wer e attacke d fro m th e east

by a forc e o f Japanes e tanks.

Counterattack

Although Genera l Yamashit a neve r

had an y intention o f launchin g a majo r

counteroffensive agains t the Sixth Army ,

he di d decide , probabl y t o assuag e th e

oft-expressed desire s o f man y member s

of hi s staff , t o undertak e som e minor ,

local counterattacks on th e Sixth Army's

left.17 Hi s intentio n wa s to retai n som e

initiative fo r 14th Area Army an d t o

gain a bit more time to continue moving

supplies nort h int o th e Shobu Group's

redoubt. Th e 23d Division wa s to exe -

cute the local counterattacks, moving on

the nigh t o f 16-1 7 January .

The divisio n directe d th e attache d

58th IMB t o strike south along the coast

road t o disrupt th e 158t h RCT's suppl y

line. Th e division' s ow n 71st Infantry,

from position s i n hill s eas t an d north -

east of Sison , was to send tw o companies

southwest dow n th e Bue d Rive r valley ,

threatening th e rea r an d th e suppl y

routes o f th e 172 d and 169t h Infantr y

Regiments. Th e 72d Infantry, als o employing two companies, was to move into

Pozorrubio and operat e against th e rea r

of th e 169t h an d 103 d Infantry Regi -

ments. Th e armore d Shigemi Detachment, attached t o the 23d Division sinc e

10 o r 1 1 January , wa s t o sen d a smal l

tank-infantry tas k forc e wes t fro m Sa n

Manuel, throug h Binalonan , an d o n t o

Manaoag t o disrupt th e 103d Infantry' s

attack.

"From th e first , however , th e pla n

went awry." 18 O n th e north , th e onl y

noteworthy actio n seem s t o hav e bee n

a rai d agains t a 158t h RC T artiller y

emplacement. Fo r th e rest, the units on

the 43 d Division' s lef t reacte d t o th e

58th IMB's shar e i n th e counterattac k

with laconi c reports o f "norma l infiltra -

tion." Conflictin g informatio n make s it

impossible t o separat e th e part s playe d

by th e 71st an d 72d Infantry Regiments,

16

 Additional informatio n o n th e 103 d Infantr y i s

from: 103d In f Rp t Luzon , 1 Jan-31 Ma y 45, pp.

7-13; 103 d RC T 3- 3 Pe r Rpt , 12-1 8 Ja n 45 ; 103d

Inf Opn s Jnl , 12-1 8 Ja n 45 .

17

 Japanese informatio n i n thi s subsection i s from:

SWPA Hist Series, II, 437-38; 14th Area Army Opn s

on Luzon , pp . 44-45 ; Takahash i Statement , States ,

IV, 43 ; Sato Statement , States, III, 254; Kawa i State -

ment, in States , I , 321-24 ; 43 d Div G-2 Rp t Luzon ,

Sec. II , Enem y O/B , p . 3. 18

 SWPA His t Series, II, 438.
EXPANDING TH E HOL D 113

MANAOAG. HIL L 20 0 COMPLE X I S I N BACKGROUND.

but i n thei r sector s ther e wa s mor e

action. On e smal l part y o f Japanes e

reached rea r installation s o f th e 172 d

Infantry, se t afir e a gasoline dump, damaged a coupl e o f trucks, kille d 2 American soldiers, and wounded 8 others. This

group of Japanes e disperse d afte r losin g

about 1 0 men killed , bu t continue d t o

create infiltratio n scare s along the Bue d

River valle y fo r th e nex t tw o o r thre e

days.

At barri o Palacpala c som e 20 0 Japa -

nese hi t th e perimete r o f th e 1s t Battal -

ion, 169t h Infantry , shortl y afte r dar k

on 1 6 January, Confuse d fighting—th e

Japanese group had not expecte d to fin d

the American s o n Rout e 3—continue d

until afte r dayligh t o n th e 17th , when

the Japanes e withdre w leavin g nearly a

hundred dead o n th e field . Th e 169th 's

battalion los t 4 me n kille d an d 2 6

wounded. Th e actio n ma y not, indeed,

have been part o f the counterattack, bu t

may well have been precipitated by remnants of th e 2d Battalion, 64th Infantry,

withdrawing fro m Hil l 200.

The stronges t rai d wa s that execute d

by th e Shigemi Detachment agains t th e

outpost o f the 3d Battalion , 103d Infan -

try, a t barri o Potpot . Shortl y befor e

midnight on 1 6 January, Japanese tank s

suddenly loome d u p throug h th e dark -
114 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

ness o n th e eas t sid e o f th e outpost .

American antitank gunners were so taken

by surpris e tha t tw o tank s wer e abl e t o

drive throug h th e perimete r sprayin g

machine gun fir e i n al l directions before

disappearing dow n th e roa d towar d

Manaoag. A thir d Japanes e tan k wa s

knocked ou t eas t o f th e perimeter , bu t

others, accompanie d b y infantry , con -

tinued t o attack. Th e Japanes e infantr y

withdrew afte r a sharp , two-hou r fir e

fight, an d th e tank s als o disappeared .

But a t daw n o n th e 17t h the tw o tank s

that ha d broke n throug h earlie r cam e

roaring bac k dow n th e roa d fro m

Manaoag. This time they were destroyed.

When a coun t coul d b e taken , th e

103d Infantry 's groupmen t a t Potpo t

found i t ha d los t 2 me n kille d an d 1 0

wounded; a 37-mm. antitank gun, a jeep,

and a n M 8 scou t ca r destroyed ; an d a

tank, anothe r jeep , an d a secon d M 8

damaged. Th e Japanes e los t 1 1 tank s

and a t least 5 0 men killed .

At daw n o n th e 17th , as the Japanes e

counterattacks a t Palacpala c an d Potpo t

ended, element s o f th e 25t h Divisio n

began movin g u p t o reliev e th e 169t h

and 103d Infantr y Regiments . Takin g

stock a t th e end o f the day, the 43d Division (an d its attache d 158t h an d 63 d

RCT's) coul d look bac k o n its performance sinc e th e landin g wit h mixe d feel -

ings. Nowhere had the division projected

any strengt h t o th e Arm y Beachhea d

Line,19 and a t least temporarily the units

on th e division left ha d become involved

in a stalemat e tha t threatene d t o hav e a

serious, i f no t disruptive , effec t upo n

Sixth Army' s progress . O n th e othe r

hand, th e 43 d Division's troops had me t

and partiall y overcom e th e strongest re -

sistance th e Japanes e o n Luzo n ha d ye t

offered an y elements o f th e Sixt h Army .

The divisio n ha d overru n som e impor -

tant position s alon g th e 23d Division's

outer line of defenses, an d i t ha d uncov -

ered additional Japanese concentrations.

Holding a front o f approximately twentyfive mile s a s o f daybrea k o n 1 7 January ,

the fiv e regiment s unde r 43 d Divisio n

control ha d attaine d position s tha t a t

least partiall y nullifie d chance s that 14th

Area Army coul d launc h a large-scal e

surprise counteroffensive tha t might seriously threate n Sixt h Army 's beachhead .

The division' s mai n proble m wa s t o

overcome the last majo r vestige s o f suc h

a threa t b y securin g contro l ove r th e

Routes 3-11 junction and gainin g a firm

hold o n Rout e 3 south o f th e junction .

Their accomplishment s t o 1 7 Januar y

had cost the forces under General Wing's

command approximatel y 77 0 casualtie s

—roughly 20 0 me n kille d o r missin g

and abou t 57 0 wounded .

The 6th Division's Zone

While th e 43 d Divisio n ha d bee n

moving agains t th e stronges t Japanes e

defenses s o fa r encountere d o n Luzon ,

I Corps' righ t flan k unit , th e 6t h Divi -

sion, had been holdin g along a generally

static line. 20 B y evening o n 1 1 January ,

it ha d appeare d tha t th e 6t h Divisio n

could pus h o n i n it s sector t o th e Arm y

Beachhead Lin e an d a s fa r a s th e Agn o

River wit h littl e trouble , bu t Genera l

Swift, th e I Corp s commander, hel d th e

19

 Actually , a coupl e of patrols of th e 158t h Infan -

try had readied th e Army Beachhea d Lin e along th e

coast nort h o f Damortis .

20

 The principa l source s fo r thi s subsectio n are :

I Corp s Rp t Luzon , pp . 28-32 ; 6t h Di v Rp t Luzon ,

pp. 5-10; 6th Di v Arty Rp t Luzon , pp. 3-6; 6t h Ca v

Rcn T r Rp t Luzon , pp . 5-9; 6th Di v G-3 Jnl s an d

Jnl Files , 12-1 7 Jan 45 ; 1st Inf Rp t Luzon , pp . 8-9.
EXPANDING TH E HOL D 115

division bac k becaus e it s furthe r ad -

vance woul d creat e a potentiall y dan -

gerous ga p alon g th e I Corps ' front .

(Map 4) Swif t directe d th e divisio n t o

consolidate along a line stretchin g fro m

Malasiqui, about twelv e miles inland o n

the I-XI V Corp s boundary , northeas t

across ope n far m lan d almos t te n mile s

to th e 6th-43d Divisio n boundar y nea r

Manaoag. Th e divisio n displace d t o its

new lin e agains t negligibl e oppositio n

on 1 2 and 1 3 January, an d immediatel y

began sendin g reconnaissanc e element s

eastward an d southward . Patrol s o f th e

6th Reconnaissanc e Troop, base d i n th e

vicinity o f Manaoag , reporte d tha t Ur -

daneta wa s hel d b y a stron g forc e o f

Japanese an d tha t Villasis , anothe r fiv e

miles sout h alon g Rout e 3 an d o n th e

Agno, als o containe d a Japanes e garri -

son. Patrol s movin g ou t o f Malasiqu i

found a good-size d Japanes e grou p du g

in o n th e Cabarua n Hills , centerin g

some si x mile s eas t o f Malasiqui .

The 6t h Divisio n coul d no t mov e

against thes e Japanes e concentration s

until release d fro m it s holdin g mission ,

and, les t a grea t ga p develo p betwee n

the 6t h an d 43 d Divisions, release could

not com e unti l th e situatio n acros s th e

Sixth Army 's fron t wa s sufficientl y clari -

fied t o permi t Genera l Kruege r t o de -

cide ho w an d wher e t o commi t hi s las t

reserve, th e 25t h Division— a decisio n

he di d no t reac h unti l lat e o n th e 16th .

When th e 25t h Divisio n starte d takin g

over fro m 43 d Divisio n righ t flan k unit s

on th e morning of the 17th , the 6th Division wa s abl e t o resum e it s advance ,

heading no w towar d Urdanet a an d th e

Cabaruan Hills . Unti l th e 17t h the 6t h

Division ha d encountere d n o stron g re -

sistance, an d it s casualties , excludin g

those o f th e 63 d RCT , numbered

no mor e tha n 2 0 me n kille d an d 9 0

wounded.21

XIV Corps Probes South

The XI V Corp s ha d no t bee n idl e

while th e I Corp s ha d bee n developin g

the situatio n o n Sixt h Army' s left. 22 A s

of evenin g o n 1 1 January, XI V Corps '

37th Divisio n wa s outposting th e Arm y

Beachhead Lin e fro m th e corp s bound -

ary south o f Malasiqu i west nearl y eigh t

miles t o Bacna r o n th e 37th-40t h Division boundary. Th e 40th Division's most

southerly unit wa s at Aguilar, o n Rout e

13 and th e Army Beachhea d Line about

six mile s west o f Bacnar . T o th e north -

west, alon g Lingaye n Gulf s southwest -

ern shore , th e 40th Division ha d control

of Rout e 7 almos t a s fa r a s Por t

Sual, th e wester n terminu s o f th e Arm y

Beachhead Line .

During th e period 12-1 4 January th e

185th Infantry , 40t h Division, wit h th e

40th Reconnaissanc e Troo p attached ,

secured Por t Sua l an d move d o n t o tak e

the roa d junctio n tow n o f Alamino s o n

the Bolina o Peninsula . Th e regimen t

also advance d nort h fou r mile s fro m

Port Sua l alon g th e wester n sid e o f

Lingayen Gul f t o Cabalita n Bay , where

it foun d tha t me n o f th e Allie d Nava l

Forces, unopposed , ha d alread y lande d

to establish a seaplane base. Patrol s then

drove wes t an d reache d Daso l Bay , on

Luzon's west coast , o n 1 5 January. No -

21

 For furthe r informatio n o n th e commitmen t o f

the 25t h Division , se e below , Chapte r VIII . Oper -

ations o f th e 6t h an d 25t h Division s o n 1 7 January

are describe d i n Chapte r IX . 22

 The genera l source s fo r thi s sectio n are : XIV

Corps Rp t Luzon , pt . I , pp . 54-62 ; 40t h Div Rp t

Luzon, pp . 11-13 ; 40t h Di v G-3 Opn s Rpts , 12-1 7

Jan 45 ; 37th Div Rpt Luzon, pp. 21-25; 37th Div G-3

Jnls an d Jn l Files , 12-1 8 Jan 45 ; Sixt h Arm y Rp t

Luzon, I , 20 .
Map 4
EXPANDING TH E HOL D 117

where di d an y significan t contact s wit h

Japanese force s develop.

Further south , th e 160t h Infantry o f

the 40th Division ha d a fe w skirmishes

with element s o f th e Kubota Detachment, whic h wa s compose d o f th e 23d

Reconnaissance Regiment, 23d Division,

and a larg e part o f th e 1st Battalion o f

the 72d Infantry, 23d Division. A fe w

stragglers o f th e Kubota Detachment

were cu t of f on th e Bolina o Peninsula ,

but th e detachmen t dissipate d mos t o f

its strengt h i n a serie s o f mino r clashe s

south alon g Rout e 1 3 wit h th e 160t h

Infantry.23

To th e 40t h Division's left , o n 1 2

January, patrol s o f th e 37t h Divisio n

found Filipin o guerrilla s holdin g Bay -

ambang, o n th e Agn o Rive r eigh t mile s

south o f Malasiqui , an d secure d Urbiz -

tondo, o n th e Agn o fiv e mile s sout h o f

Bacnar. Th e next day patrols moved into

Wawa, betwee n Bayamban g an d Urbiz -

tondo. O n 1 5 Januar y a battalio n o f

the 129t h Infantry, 37th Division , crossed

the Agn o a t Waw a an d marche d o n

south alon g a dust y grave l roa d t o

Camiling, where Route 1 3 comes in from

the northwest . A battalion o f th e 160t h

Infantry, 40th Division, came down from

Aguilar t o Camilin g the same day .

General Kruege r no w instructe d

General Griswold , th e XI V Corp s com -

mander, t o sen d mor e troop s sout h o f

the Agno . O n th e evenin g o f 1 5 Janu -

ary Griswol d accordingl y directe d hi s

engineers t o construct crossings over th e

Agno s o tha t heav y equipmen t coul d

move on toward Manil a and large r force s

could b e supplie d sout h o f th e river .

Generally, th e corp s wa s t o brin g it s

main strength u p to the line BayambangWawa-Camiling, an d wa s t o se t u p a n

outpost lin e furthe r south. 24

 Unit s re -

deployed withou t inciden t durin g th e

next tw o days . B y th e 17t h the corp s

had outpost s a t Moncada , o n Rout e 3

over te n mile s sout h o f th e Agn o a t

Villasis i n th e I Corp s sector ; a t Nam -

picuan an d Anao , on th e corps boundar y

four mile s eas t o f Moncada ; an d a t

Paniqui, o n Rout e 3 six mile s sout h o f

Moncada. A s o f 1 7 Januar y XI V Corp s

had los t abou t 3 0 me n kille d an d 9 0

wounded, compare d t o I Corp s losse s o f

220 kille d an d 66 0 wounded .

Whatever th e strengt h o f th e opposi -

tion th e XIV Corp s ha d encountere d i n

the open, fla t farm land through which it

was moving, th e corp s ha d accomplishe d

its initia l missions. I t ha d secure d Sixt h

Army's right; i t ha d reache d an d passe d

the Arm y Beachhea d Lin e i n it s sector;

it ha d secure d crossing s ove r th e Agn o

River. Fro m th e nature o f the resistance

encountered s o far and fro m informatio n

supplied b y guerrilla s an d reconnais -

sance patrol s abou t th e are a sout h o f

the Agno , i t appeare d tha t XI V Corp s

could driv e o n towar d Manil a jus t a s

soon a s I Corp s coul d assur e th e safet y

of th e XIV's left rea r and th e supporting

echelons coul d mov e sufficien t supplie s

and heav y equipmen t acros s th e Agno ,

over whic h th e Japanes e ha d lef t scarcel y

a singl e bridge standing.

23

 Japanese informatio n i n thi s sectio n i s from :

14th Area Army Opn s on Luzon, pp. 45, 73-74; SWPA

Hist Series , II , Plat e II I (afte r p . 437) ; Kubota Detachment Opn l Orde r 1 , 5 Jan 45 , trans i n 40t h Di v

G-3 Jn l File , 1 4 Jan 45. Th e detachmen t wa s named

after Lt . Col . Shohe i Kubota , als o th e commande r

of th e 23d Reconnaissance Regiment.

24

 XIV Corp s Opn s Memo s 6 , 1 5 Jan 45 , and 6/1,

17 Ja n 45 , bot h i n XI V Corp s Opn s Memo s File ;

37th Di v Opn s Mem o 3 , 1 6 Ja n 45 , 37t h Di v G- 3

Jnl File , 15-1 8 Ja n 45 ; 40th Di v Opn s Mem o 1 , 1 6

Jan 45 , XIV Corps G- 3 Jn l File , 16-1 7 Ja n 45; Sixt h

Army F O 42 , 1 6 Ja n 45 , Sixt h Arm y Rp t Luzon ,

I, 147.
CHAPTER VI I

The Logistic s o f th e Invasion

The dange r o f overextensio n i n th e

face o f th e continue d threa t o f Japanese

counterattack agains t Sixt h Army 's lef t

was th e principa l facto r s o fa r prevent -

ing XIV Corps from drivin g further an d

more rapidl y southward . A t th e sam e

time, however, logistical problems threatened no t onl y seriousl y t o dela y XI V

Corps progress bu t als o t o slo w I Corp s

operations t o secur e th e arm y left .

Largely a s th e resul t o f circumstance s

beyond th e contro l o f Sixt h Arm y an d

of th e Allie d Nava l Forces, th e problem

of supplyin g the advancing troops of th e

two corp s ha d becom e extremel y vexin g

during th e firs t wee k ashor e o n Luzon .

Indeed, a s earl y a s evenin g o f S plus 1 ,

10 January, all suppl y operations at Lin -

gayen Gul f ha d almos t halted . More -

over, Sixt h Arm y engineer s ha d quickl y

found tha t unanticipate d difficultie s

would dela y bridg e an d airfiel d con -

struction i n th e Lingaye n Gul f are a an d

that othe r constructio n project s alon g

the gulf's shore s woul d hav e t o b e aban -

doned a s impracticable . Suc h logistica l

problems tended t o create the proverbial

vicious circle—o n th e on e han d the y

would dela y th e XI V Corps ' progres s

southward; o n th e othe r han d the y de -

manded tha t XIV Corps push southward

as rapidly a s possible to secure the Clar k

Field ai r cente r an d th e Manil a por t

facilities.

Unloading the Assault Convoys

Beach Operations on S-day

Early landing s o n 9 Januar y gav e n o

hint o f problem s t o arise. 1 Th e long ,

shallow gradien t alon g th e XI V Corps '

beaches wa s ideal fo r LVT's, LVT(A)'s,

and Dukws , all of which mad e their way

to dry lan d without difficulty . However ,

most LCVP's grounded in shallo w water

some 20 to 30 yards offshore. Next , engineer specia l brigad e LCM' s (Landin g

Craft, Mechanized ) grounde d abou t 5 0

yards of f th e beaches , Nav y LCT' s

stopped 7 5 t o 8 0 yard s out , an d LST' s

grounded b y th e ster n 5 0 t o 10 0 yard s

seaward o f th e LCT's .

Most of the LST's had stuck on a shoal

or san d ba r that , frontin g muc h o f th e

1

 The principa l source s use d fo r this sectio n an d

its subsections are: III Amphi b Force Rpt Luzon , pp.

12-14; ibid., Enc l A , Intel , pp . 1-2 ; ibid., Enc l C ,

Logistics, p . 3 ; TG 79. 1 Lingayen Gul f Rpt , pp. 12 -

13, 16-17 ; T G 79. 2 Lingayen Gul f Rpt , pp . 10-15 ,

31-33, 38-40 ; T G 79. 3 Lingayen Gul f Rpt , pp . 1 ,

6-7, 11 ; TG 79. 4 Lingayen Gul f Rpt , pp . 6-12 , 19-

28; TG 79.6 Lingayen Gulf Rpt, pp. 6-9; VI I Amphib

Force Rp t Luzon , pp . 4-5, 17, 27-30; T G 78. 5 Lingayen Gul f Rpt , pp. 6-7; 4t h ES B Rp t Luzon , pp .

6-8, 11-22 ; I Corps Amphib Off , Lingaye n Gul f Rpt ,

atchd t o 3 d ES B Rpt , Jan 45 , pp . 3 , 8 , 10-12 ; 37t h

Inf Di v Rpt Luzon , pp . 19-21 , 192-95 ; 544th EB&S R

Hist, 1 Feb 43- 1 Fe b 46 , I, 21-24 ; 594th EB&S R Rp t

Lingayen Gulf , 2 4 Nov 44-13 Feb 45 , pp . 4-9; 533d

EB&SR Rp t Lingaye n Gulf , pp . 6-9 ; 543d EB&SR

Rpt M- I Opn , pp. 7-22 ; 543 d EB&S R Rp t o n M- I

Opn Throug h S Plus 3 , pp. 1-7 .
THE LOGISTIC S O F TH E INVASIO N 119

length o f th e XI V Corps ' beaches , ha d

not bee n detecte d durin g th e stud y o f

preinvasion aeria l photograph y o r b y

hydrographic survey operations on 7 and

8 January. 2 Afte r th e landing s starte d

on 9 Januar y i t wa s to o lat e t o diver t

LST's t o bette r beachin g sites, an d th e

price o f th e failur e t o locat e th e san d

bar earlie r quickl y becam e apparent .

Attempts t o sen d truck s ashor e throug h

water tha t deepene d o n th e landwar d

side o f th e shoa l prove d futile , sinc e

most of the vehicles were not—and could

not hav e been—sufficiently waterproofe d

to mak e thei r wa y throug h sal t wate r

that a t leas t i n a fe w spots reache d wel l

over their hoods. A t many points, there -

fore, direc t unloadin g fro m LST' s wa s

halted, an d effort s wer e mad e t o ri g

ponton causeway s t o bridg e th e wate r

gap — a solutio n tha t le d t o anothe r

problem.3 A t som e o f th e XI V Corps '

beaches LST's ha d grounde d s o fa r out

that crew s ha d t o us e thre e causewa y

sections t o reach dr y land and eve n the n

bulldozers ha d t o pus h san d ramp s ou t

from shor e a t som e point s t o reac h th e

inland en d o f th e thir d sections . Build -

ing suc h ramp s wa s no mea n fea t sinc e

most o f th e enginee r shor e part y bull -

dozers require d fo r th e tas k wer e stil l

aboard th e ver y LST' s awaitin g dis -

charge. Arm y planners , wh o ha d n o

more informatio n abou t shoal s tha n

Navy planners, ha d assume d tha t LST's

would b e abl e t o ge t clos e inshor e at al l

points acros s Lingaye n Gulf . Workin g

from thi s assumption , th e Arm y ha d

loaded th e bulk o f shor e part y me n an d

equipment aboar d LST's . Th e effec t

of thi s emphasi s wa s tha t th e entir e

unloading schedule began to break down.

There ar e some indication s tha t LS T

unloading was also slowed at two or three

points becaus e nava l personnel , force d

to alte r tentativ e plans to construc t twosection ponto n causeways , too k a lon g

time t o ri g th e require d three-sectio n

causeways. Man y LST's, unloading bulk

cargo directl y o n t o th e causeways, rendered th e bridge s useles s fo r th e dis -

charge o f wheele d o r tracke d vehicles .

At som e point s alon g th e beache s LS T

commanders, reluctan t t o follo w beach -

ing direction s fro m Nav y beachmaster s

ashore, use d thei r ow n discretio n a s t o

how t o avoi d th e shoal . A t thi s tim e

Navy doctrin e wa s no t entirel y clea r

on th e degre e o f contro l beachmaster s

could exercise . Moreover , doctrin e o n

LST beachin g varie d betwee n th e II I

and the VII Amphibious Force, a circumstance tha t undoubtedl y create d prob -

lems for commanders of LST's operating

in th e Southwes t Pacifi c Are a fo r th e

first time. 4 I n the case of the III Amphibious Forc e (XI V Corps) beaches , mos t

of th e beachmasters, sadl y outranked b y

LST skippers , di d no t hav e a rank commensurate wit h thei r responsibilities .

Moreover, man y LS T commander s re -

ported tha t discharg e slowe d dow n eve n

more becaus e Arm y unloadin g detail s

assigned t o thei r ship s wer e to o smal l

to begi n wit h an d becaus e th e members

of th e details ha d a marke d tendenc y t o

disappear one b y one. Discharge of bulk

cargo fro m som e LST's therefor e virtu -

2

 Admiral Barbey , commandin g th e VI I Amphib -

ious Force , believe d tha t sufficien t information ,

properly interpreted , ha d bee n availabl e t o disclos e

the shoa l wel l befor e th e landings . Barbe y Com -

ments, 1 4 Apr 57 . 3

 By nava l designation , th e prope r spellin g fo r

ponton i n ponton cubes is pontoon. Fo r th e sak e of

consistency, th e Arm y spellin g ponton i s employe d

in this volume. 4

 Barbey Comments, 1 4 Apr 57 .
120 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

LST's WITH CAUSEWAY S AT XIV CORP S BEAC H

ally halted until ship commanders could

round u p member s o f thei r ow n crew s

to d o th e job.

Also servin g t o retar d th e discharg e

rate o f LST's an d smalle r craf t wa s the

terrain alon g man y beaches . A lin e o f

sand dunes, lyin g about 1 0 yards inland

and varyin g from 5 to 1 5 feet i n height ,

extended along the beaches.5 Th e dune s

proved n o obstacl e t o foo t troop s but,

steep o n th e seawar d side , wer e impas -

sable fo r wheele d vehicles . Unti l bull -

dozers—apparently n o on e though t o f

putting crews of men t o work with shovels—could cu t exi t road s throug h th e

barriers, vehicle s ha d t o dispers e later -

ally along the beaches. Luckily , the sand

on th e Wate r side of th e dune s was fairly

firm; nonetheless the unloading area rapidly becam e congested , an d bul k carg o

piled u p along the water's edge. O n th e

west, at the 40th Division's beaches, there

was les s troubl e wit h dunes , bu t som e

congestion resulte d becaus e i t wa s necessary to keep the Lingayen airstrip clear

of supplie s and equipment .

If shor e part y troop s an d equipmen t

had no t bee n s o concentrated o n LST's

and had been able to get ashore as scheduled, much of the early beach congestion

could have been avoided, and the landing

schedules coul d hav e bee n maintained .

5

 As reporte d i n 1945 . Th e autho r examine d th e

beaches i n Apri l 195 7 an d foun d n o dune s a s muc h

as ten fee t high , while in many places the dunes were

scarcely thre e fee t high .
THE LOGISTIC S O F TH E INVASIO N 121

But shor e partie s wer e s o involve d i n

getting themselve s ashore that the y were

delayed i n turning to their normal tasks.

In addition , throughou t th e da y man y

troops tha t shoul d hav e bee n handlin g

bulk supplie s o n th e beac h ha d t o hel p

unload carg o fro m th e smalle r landin g

craft. Normally , wit h smal l craf t beach -

ing a t th e water 's edge , n o mor e tha n

ten me n woul d b e detaile d t o hel p un -

load carg o fro m a n LC M o r a n LCVP ,

but a t th e XI V Corps ' beache s i t wa s

necessary t o for m huma n chain s o f fift y

to a hundred me n t o reach ou t int o th e

surf fo r th e cargo . Shor e partie s coul d

not meet this abnormal demand for manpower, an d a numbe r o f on-the-spo t

improvisations ha d t o b e employed . Seamen cam e ashor e fro m transport s an d

cargo ships , comba t troop s o f reserv e

units len t a hand , straggler s wer e

rounded u p o n th e beaches, and a s soon

as possible local Filipinos were organized

into labor parties.

Beach condition s alone did no t creat e

all th e manpowe r problem s o n S-day .

Some o f th e difficultie s reflec t a lac k o f

detailed co-ordination during planning. 6

For example , on e Nav y beachmaste r ex -

pected an Army working party of 91 men

to show u p t o help unloa d a transport's

small craft . Instea d 7 5 arrived , le d b y

an Arm y lieutenan t wh o wa s sur e tha t

75 wa s the correc t number. Th e differ -

ence o f jus t 1 5 me n coul d an d di d

make a disproportionat e differenc e i n

the spee d o f small-boa t discharge .

All acros s th e Sixt h Army' s beaches ,

shore part y officer s ha d troubl e estab -

lishing an d maintainin g contro l ove r

units attache d t o th e nucleu s enginee r

boat an d shor e regiments. A t on e XI V

Corps beach, for instance, the shore party

commander an d a Navy beachmaste r de -

cided to move one RCT's cargo discharge

point abou t hal f a mile . Th e move , in -

volving th e transfe r o f markers, communications equipment, bulldozers, tractors,

and trucks , alon e halte d unloadin g fo r

about forty-fiv e minutes . Then , whe n

all wa s in readines s t o resum e discharg e

operations a t th e ne w site , th e shor e

party commande r foun d tha t man y o f

his troop s ha d disappeare d durin g th e

transfer. I t too k anothe r hal f a n hou r

or s o t o round u p th e me n an d resum e

unloading a t th e forme r pace .

A shortag e o f trucks , althoug h antici -

pated, becam e mor e seriou s tha n ex -

pected. Mos t o f th e truck s schedule d t o

go ashor e o n th e mornin g o f S-da y carried supplie s consigned t o infantry units.

The vehicle s wer e firs t t o mov e t o tem -

porary unit dump s behind th e dune line

and then , unloaded , repor t bac k t o th e

beaches for shore party assignments. Th e

plan was one thing, its execution another.

Since there was no Japanese opposition

at th e beaches, infantr y unit s ha d pene -

trated inlan d muc h faste r an d furthe r

than expected . Truck s ha d t o mak e

longer roun d trip s tha n anticipated , de -

laying their return t o th e beaches. Som e

infantry units , landin g well befor e thei r

supply trucks , faile d t o leav e adequat e

guides o r direction s a t th e beaches . A s

a result , truck s coul d no t fin d th e unit s

to whic h the y wer e t o delive r cargoes .

Late i n th e afternoon, whe n shor e party

6

 Additional informatio n o n XI V Corp s beac h

operations i s from : T U 79.4. 1 Rp t Lingaye n Gulf ,

pp. 2-3 ; ibid., Enc l K , Transportatio n Di v 1 0

Beachmaster Rpt, pp. 1-3 ; T U 79.4. 3 Rp t Lingaye n

Gulf, p . 8 ; ibid., Enc l B , Transportatio n Di v 3 0

Beachmaster Rpt , pp. 3-4; T U 79.6. 1 Rp t Lingaye n

Gulf, Encl A, Transportation Div 8 Beachmaster Rpt,

pp. 2-3 ; T U 79.3. 2 Rp t Lingaye n Gulf , p . 2 ; T U

79.3.3 Rpt Lingaye n Gulf , pp . 17 , 21-22.
122 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

men starte d lookin g for vehicles t o help

alleviate th e beac h congestion , the y

found man y truck s parke d alon g road s

just inland , still loade d an d stil l search -

ing fo r their units. Finally , come infan -

try units ha d no t bee n properl y briefe d

or ha d shirke d thei r responsibilit y t o

return th e trucks to the beaches and had

instead retaine d th e vehicle s inland .

Whatever the causes, a critical shortage

of truck s existe d a t XI V Corp s beache s

during S-day. I n addition, few bulldozers,

tractors, or cranes were available. Thes e

latter shortage s ha d resulte d i n larg e

measure from shippin g shortages and th e

expectation o f heav y resistanc e a t th e

beaches. Planner s ha d ha d n o choic e

but to load available shipping with combat unit s an d equipment , skimpin g o n

shore part y matériel . Thus , th e engi -

neer boa t an d shor e regiment s an d at -

tached servic e units arrivin g o n S-day —

and th e S plu s 2 convo y also—reache d

Luzon fa r underequipped . Eve n wit h

the bes t possibl e beac h an d sur f condi -

tions th e shor e partie s would hav e bee n

operating on a shoestring. The y had no

margin o f safety—n o slac k o r reserves —

to deal wit h unforesee n contingencies .

As th e resul t o f matérie l an d man -

power shortage s o n th e beaches, offshor e

discharge—from transport s to small craft

—steadily fel l behin d schedule . Havin g

to wai t a t th e beache s a n inordinatel y

long time t o unload , landin g craf t wer e

slow t o retur n t o carg o vessels. Comba t

units als o delaye d discharg e operation s

when the y requisitione d enginee r boa t

and shore regiment LCM's to serve as ferries across th e man y stream s just inlan d

from th e beaches.

Discharge problems along the I Corps'

beaches wer e simila r t o thos e i n th e

XIV Corps' secto r excep t tha t a t Whit e

Beaches 1 and 2 , where the 43 d Divisio n

went ashore , al l landin g craft an d land -

ing ship s coul d beac h wit h dr y ramp s

at an y stag e o f th e tide. 7 A t th e othe r

I Corp s beaches, shore parties were even

slower gettin g ashor e tha n i n th e XI V

Corps area, and control problems loomed

at least as large. A single example suffices

to illustrat e th e contro l problem—th e

6th Division 's shor e party , whic h oper -

ated unde r th e comman d o f Headquar -

ters, 543 d Enginee r Boa t an d Shor e

Regiment, 3 d Enginee r Specia l Brigade .

(Table 2)

The situatio n wa s littl e differen t a t

other beache s acros s Lingaye n Gulf .

Because planner s ha d wante d t o ge t

forward echelon s o f technica l servic e

units se t u p o n Luzo n a s earl y a s possible, man y underequippe d an d under -

manned organizations , attache d t o th e

shore parties , arrive d o n S-da y an d S

plus 2 t o complicat e th e contro l prob -

lem. I n retrospect , many officers fel t tha t

it woul d hav e bee n bette r t o sen d for -

ward fewe r technica l servic e unit s i n

favor o f makin g certai n tha t thos e tha t

came wer e full y u p t o strengt h i n me n

and equipment . Man y o f th e servic e

units sa w limite d us e durin g th e firs t

week o r s o of operations on Luzo n and,

when loade d a t th e stagin g areas , too k

up spac e tha t th e shor e partie s sorel y

needed. Th e shor e part y commanders ,

faced wit h th e tas k o f co-ordinatin g th e

operations o f s o man y miscellaneou s

units, accomplishe d a remarkabl y goo d

control job. Th e wonde r is not so much

7

 Additional informatio n o n th e I Corps-VII Am -

phibious Forc e beac h operation s is from : T U 78.1. 2

Rpt Lingaye n Gulf , pt. I, pp. 3-4, 24-26 ; TU 78.1.2 1

Rpt Lingaye n Gulf , pp . 15-16 ; TU 78.1.2 3 Rpt Lin -

gayen Gulf , pp . 3-7; TU 78.5. 3 Rp t Lingaye n Gulf ,

pp. 1-4 ; TU 78.5. 4 Rp t Lingaye n Gulf , pp . 10-11 ;

ibid., Encl F , Rpt o f Transport Di v 32 Beachmaster.
THE LOGISTIC S O F TH E INVASIO N 123

TABLE 2—COMPOSITIO N O F 6T H DIVISIO N SHOR E PART Y

543d Enginee r Boa t an d Shor e Regiment (les s Compan y C , two platoons of Compan y A, Boa t Battalio n head -

quarters)

3d Battalion , 20th Infantr y (availabl e for general labor details unless required fo r combat b y th e 6t h Division )

6th Quartermaster Company, 6th Divisio n

466th Quartermaster Amphibiou s Truck Compan y (Dukws)

558th Quartermaster Railhead Compan y (less elements)

2448th Quartermaster Truck Company (21⁄2-to n 6x6 trucks)

4188th Quartermaster Servic e Company

244th Transportation Corp s Port Compan y (less one platoon)

294th Transportation Corps Port Company

48th Ordnance Medium Maintenanc e Company

622d Ordnance Ammunition Company

706th Ordnance Light Maintenanc e Company, 6th Divisio n

108th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad

1st Platoon, 36th Military Polic e Company

Company C, 263d Medica l Battalion, 3d Enginee r Special Brigade

Provisional Truck Company , 6th Divisio n (21⁄2-to n 6x6)

Detachment, 198t h Quartermaster Gas Suppl y Compan y

Detachment, 163d Ordnance Maintenance Company, 3d Enginee r Special Brigade

Detachment, 3608th Ordnance Heavy Maintenanc e Company (tanks)

Detachment, 293d Joint Assaul t Signa l Compan y

Detachment, 1462d Enginee r Boat Maintenance Company, 3d Enginee r Special Brigade

Source: 4t h ESP Rp t Luzon, pp. 1-2; 543 d EB&S R M- I Op n Rpt, an. 6, Org Chart; 543d EB&S R Rp t o n M-I Op n Through S Plus 3,

p. 1 ; 6th In f Div Rpt Luzon , p. 4.

that control at the beaches was sometimes

loose, bu t rathe r tha t contro l wa s established an d maintaine d a s well a s it was.

Harassing fir e fro m Japanes e mortars

and artiller y emplace d o n th e hig h

ground t o th e eas t an d northeas t o f

the I Corp s beache s wa s a delayin g fac -

tor wit h whic h XI V Corps di d no t hav e

to contend . Th e fir e waxe d s o intens e

late i n th e afternoo n o f 9 Januar y tha t

LST's ha d t o hal t operation s a t al l

White Beaches . Nigh t unloadin g a t

these beache s was impossible .

One or two other problems were peculiar t o th e I Corp s beaches. Inadequat e

ship-to-shore communication s plagued

most beachmasters an d shor e party commanders throughou t th e day , and som e

aspects o f unloadin g wer e poorl y co -

ordinated. Fo r example , th e VI I Am -

phibious Force's beachmaster announced

at on e poin t tha t bul k carg o coul d no t

be handled a t White Beac h 3 . Actually ,

under th e directio n o f on e transpor t

division beachmaste r and th e local shore

party commander , bul k carg o ha d bee n

coming ashor e a t Whit e Beac h 3 slowly

but efficientl y fo r tw o hours befor e th e

announcement an d continue d t o d o s o

thereafter. A t anothe r beac h th e shor e

party commande r an d th e beachmaste r

decided t o mov e a small-craf t discharg e

point, but three cargo ships continued to

send supplie s to the abandone d are a despite th e best effort s o f th e beachmaste r

to redirec t traffic .

Some troubl e aros e ove r contro l o f

landing craf t acros s I Corp s beaches .

Engineer specia l brigad e LCM' s wer e

scheduled t o hel p unloa d firs t th e ves-
124 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

sels tha t ha d carrie d the m t o Lingaye n

Gulf, the n othe r ships of th e same naval

transport division , nex t othe r ship s a s

directed b y Nav y contro l officers , and ,

when al l nava l vessel s wer e discharged ,

were t o report t o shore part y command -

ers for directions to start unloading merchant ships . Man y o f th e LC M cox -

swains ha d bee n improperl y briefe d o n

the sequenc e o f unloading , an d som e

had inexplicabl e difficult y locatin g th e

ships the y wer e t o unload . To o ofte n

Navy beachmasters could no t hel p solve

the locatio n problem , fo r the y ha d to o

little informatio n concernin g individ -

ual shi p anchorage s t o giv e th e LCM' s

proper directions .

Many LC M coxswains , contrar y t o

plan, reporte d t o shor e part y command -

ers afte r thei r firs t ru n t o shore . Th e

shore part y usuall y directe d th e LCM' s

back int o Nav y comman d channels, but

some shor e part y officer s assigne d th e

LCM's t o specia l Arm y mission s suc h

as the river crossing operations that took

lighterage craf t awa y fro m unloadin g

jobs i n th e XI V Corps ' area . Offshore ,

some enginee r LCM' s makin g turn -

around trip s t o nava l carg o ship s wer e

directed b y ships ' captain s t o differen t

vessels. O n occasio n Nav y contro l offi -

cers did no t lear n of the changes, and i n

one cas e a I Corp s shore party lost trac k

of fiv e LCM' s fo r tw o days , th e craf t

having move d t o anothe r beac h a t th e

order o f a Nav y transpor t captain .

Despite th e difficulties , bot h norma l

and abnormal , th e AP's and APA' s o f

the II I an d VI I Amphibiou s Force s

slated fo r S-day discharge were unloaded

and read y t o leav e Lingaye n Gul f b y

1800 a s planned . O n th e othe r hand ,

only tw o or thre e LST's, th e majority o f

which wer e also schedule d fo r S-da y discharge, were unloaded; some LSM's had

not complete d discharge ; and , finally,

only a bare start ha d bee n mad e towar d

the unloadin g o f AK' s (Cargo Ships ,

Auxiliary) an d AKA' s (Carg o Ships ,

Attack). A t th e en d o f th e day , it wa s

obvious tha t th e morrow would hav e to

bring with it ideal conditions of weather,

tide, organization , co-ordination , an d

communications if all vessels of th e S-da y

convoy wer e t o b e unloade d b y evenin g

of S plus 2 in accordanc e with plans.

Discharge Operations,

10 and 11 January

Weather conditions were to prove anything bu t ideal . Fa r t o th e nort h o f

Lingayen Gul f stron g tropica l disturb -

ances, includin g th e typhoo n tha t ha d

hampered th e operation s o f Admira l

Halsey's fas t carrie r tas k forces , wer e

whipping u p th e water s o f th e Sout h

China Sea . Durin g th e nigh t o f 9-1 0

January th e pressure s buil t u p b y thes e

storms bega n t o creat e correspondin g

pressures within Lingayen Gulf. B y midmorning o n 1 0 January th e sur f wa s so

high an d rough all along the XIV Corps

beaches tha t unloading , havin g gotte n

off t o an excellen t start earl y i n th e day,

slowed drasticall y an d rapidly . Befor e

noon Dukw s halte d lighterag e opera -

tions, offshor e sea s bein g s o roug h tha t

the amphibian s coul d no t clim b bac k

on LC T an d LS M ramp s t o reload .

About 1330 , LCVP lighterag e als o

ceased. B y tha t tim e many LCVP's ha d

broached t o o r swamped , an d on e ha d

tossed en d ove r en d ont o th e beach .

About a n hou r late r causewa y dis -

charge als o stopped . B y 150 0 tw o pon -

ton causeway s ha d swun g broadsid e t o

the beach , tw o were awash , an d mos t o f
THE LOGISTIC S O F TH E INVASIO N 125

CONGESTION A T BLUE BEAC H

the others ha d t o b e secure d t o preven t

damage. Self-propelle d ponto n barge s

could n o longe r run ; thre e LST' s ha d

stuck fas t o n th e beache s an d a fourth ,

broaching t o ster n first , ha d damage d

a fifth . B y 153 0 enginee r LCM' s wer e

the only craf t stil l able t o come through

the sur f a t XI V Corp s beaches , bu t off -

shore th e wave s were s o high tha t i t wa s

next t o impossibl e t o kee p th e LCM' s

sufficiently clos e aboard discharging ships

to permi t unloading . Finally , shortl y

after 1600 , al l discharg e operation s

ceased alon g th e XI V Corp s beaches .

In I Corp s area th e two Blue Beaches

and Whit e Beac h 3 als o close d dow n

during the afternoon. A t White Beaches

1 an d 2 , on th e easter n shore of th e gulf ,

the surf wa s not s o rough an d discharg e

operations continue d unti l dusk , whe n

Japanese artiller y an d morta r fir e agai n

forced a halt. B y nightfall th e discharg e

of carg o vessel s ha d falle n hopelessl y

behind schedul e al l acros s th e gulf .

Ashore, o n th e othe r hand , shor e

parties wer e abl e t o mak e considerabl e

progress i n relievin g beac h congestion ,

although stil l hampere d b y a shortag e

of tracke d an d wheele d vehicles . A s

beaches close d dow n on e b y one , th e

shore partie s turne d t o clearin g opera -

tions. Mainl y b y din t o f manhandlin g

—employing ever y man , America n an d

Filipino, wh o coul d b e foun d i n th e

beach area —most bul k carg o wa s sorted

and pile d i n dumps . Bu t a deart h o f

vehicles, combined with bridg e construction problems , stil l mad e i t impossibl e

to mov e muc h carg o inland .

On S plu s 2 , 1 1 January , th e sur f

remained hig h an d rough , bu t abate d

sufficiently i n th e afternoo n fo r LCM' s

to resume lightering at the Blue Beaches.

LSM's complete d discharg e durin g th e

day, bu t thi s accomplishmen t brough t

mixed blessings. Previously , some of the

unloaded LSM's, larger an d mor e stable

than LCM's , ha d mad e goo d lighters ,

but no w all had t o assemble for th e trip

back t o Leyte. Lighterag e also decreased

as more and more engineer LCM's broke

down—at Blu e Beac h 2 , fo r example ,

only eightee n o f twenty-eigh t assigne d

were stil l operationa l a t dar k o n 1 1

January. LC M maintenanc e becam e a

major problem , primaril y becaus e a

theaterwide spar e part s shortag e ha d

made it impossibl e for the engineer boat

and shor e regiments t o bring with the m

sufficient part s t o assur e continued operations, especially during the beating that

LCM's too k fro m th e roug h sur f o n 1 0

and 1 1 January . Th e fe w Navy LCM 's

present ha d th e sam e problem.

Actually, th e enginee r LCM 's pro -

vided th e bes t lighterag e durin g th e

assault. Arm y an d Nav y LCVP 's wer e

too smal l an d ligh t fo r th e sur f tha t
126 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

arose o n S plu s 1 , whil e LCT 's an d

LSM's drew to o much water t o get close

inshore excep t a t Whit e Beache s 1 and

2. Th e LCT' s als o prove d quit e har d

to handl e i n th e roug h surf . Th e engi -

neer LCM' s wer e th e LCM(6 ) model ,

six fee t longe r an d a bi t heavie r tha n

Navy LCM(3)' s use d a t Lingaye n Gulf .

Although possessin g essentially th e same

draft an d capacit y a s th e smalle r Nav y

craft, th e enginee r LCM' s wer e mor e

seaworthy i n th e high , roug h surf .

Along th e beache s o n S plu s 2 truc k

shortages remained acute, and in I Corps'

area only 2 5 percent of scheduled truck -

ing wa s availabl e b y dusk . Additiona l

Filipino labo r partiall y alleviate d th e

shortage, but congestion remained severe

at Whit e Beache s 1 and 2 , especially a s

more and more ships were diverted there

to tak e advantag e o f easie r sur f

conditions.

At White Beach 3 congestion increased

on 1 1 Januar y a s th e convo y carryin g

the 25t h Infantr y Divisio n o f th e Sixt h

Army Reserv e hov e t o an d bega n dis -

charging.8 Th e divisio n ha d hoped tha t

I Corp s coul d furnis h shor e part y help ,

but i n co-operatio n wit h Tas k Forc e

77.9, th e Reinforcement Group, had pre -

pared for its own unloading . Havin g no

assigned enginee r specia l brigad e shor e

party, th e divisio n ha d organize d regi -

mental shor e partie s aroun d a nucleu s

of on e infantr y battalio n fro m eac h regiment, augmente d b y a composit e grou p

from divisio n headquarters an d divisio n

troops. Th e divisio n ha d "scrounged "

two ligh t crane s a t it s staging area , an d

Task Grou p 77. 9 had borrowe d eigh t

5-ton cranes , complet e wit h nava l C B

(construction battalion ) operators , fro m

the nava l bas e in th e Admiralty Islands.

There, th e tas k grou p ha d als o secure d

100 length s o f conveyo r belt , employe d

for handlin g bul k cargo , t o ad d t o 5 0

lengths th e 25t h Divisio n ha d brough t

with i t an d 7 5 mor e length s tha t th e

ships o f th e convo y contributed .

As anticipated, I Corp s could provid e

little help , althoug h th e shor e part y a t

White Beac h 3 did suppl y a few LCM's

and th e loca l beachmaste r diverte d a

couple o f LCT' s t o hel p Tas k Grou p

77.9. However , Tas k Grou p 77.9' s ow n

boats unloade d mos t o f th e 25t h Division's matériel , and th e me n an d equip -

ment th e tas k grou p an d th e divisio n

brought alon g handle d al l cargo o n th e

beaches. Unloadin g wa s slo w an d no t

a singl e transport , al l schedule d fo r S

plus 2 discharge, wa s ready t o leav e tha t

night. Th e 158t h RCT , which ha d a n

engineer specia l brigad e shor e part y at -

tached t o it , unloade d wit h les s troubl e

on Re d Beach , immediatel y nort h o f

White Beac h 1 .

All acros s Lingaye n Gulf , LS T dis -

charge conditions improve d o n 1 1 January, an d b y 180 0 most LST' s tha t ha d

arrived o n S-da y wer e read y t o retur n

to Leyte , tw o day s behin d schedule . A

few AKA' s wer e als o read y t o leav e b y

dusk. Ashore , muc h o f th e congestio n

at th e XIV Corps' beache s an d a t th e I

Corps' Blu e Beache s decrease d rapidly ,

though the arrival of the Sixth Army Reserve renewe d congestio n a t al l I Corp s

landing points. Clearin g the beaches had

demanded almost superhuma n effor t o n

the par t o f al l personne l involved , an d

by evenin g o n 1 1 January man y officer s

8

 Additional informatio n o n unloadin g th e Sixt h

Army Reserv e i s from : VI I Amphi b Forc e Rp t

Luzon, p . 17 ; 534th EB&S R Rpt , 11 Jan-13 Fe b 45 ,

pp. 2-4; 25th Inf Div Rpt Luzon , pp. 13-14 ; TG 77. 9

Rpt Lingaye n Gulf , Enc l F , Comments o n Loading ,

pp. 1-3.
THE LOGISTIC S O F TH E INVASIO N 127

and me n o f th e shor e partie s an d th e

beachmaster group s ha d ha d bu t tw o

or thre e hour s slee p sinc e the y ha d

awakened o n th e mornin g o f th e 9th .

On S plu s 2 a n innovatio n solve d

many o f th e lighterag e problem s tha t

the high, rough surf ha d caused . LCM 's,

LCVP's, an d amphibia n tractor s an d

trucks bega n t o discharg e i n protecte d

waters jus t insid e th e mouth s o f th e

many stream s tha t cu t int o Lingaye n

Gulfs southern shore. Give n the weather

conditions an d th e tactica l situation , i t

would see m tha t us e migh t hav e bee n

made o f th e rive r bank s befor e th e

afternoon o f S plu s 2 , bu t a s event s

turned ou t i t wa s S plus 4 , 1 3 January,

before th e protecte d anchorage s wer e

extensively employed .

Cleaning Up

As nigh t fel l o n S plu s 2 , orde r ha d

begun t o emerg e fro m wha t mus t hav e

appeared t o man y beachmaster s an d

shore part y commander s t o b e th e un -

conscionable confusio n o f th e precedin g

two days . I f th e weathe r di d no t tak e

another turn for the worse, those responsible fo r discharge and beac h operation s

could forese e th e ultimat e unloadin g o f

all S-da y and S plus 2 shipping. Thi s was

a predictio n tha t man y Arm y an d Nav y

officers a t Lingaye n Gul f migh t wel l

have been unwilling to make twenty-four

hours earlier.

Unfortunately, durin g th e nex t tw o

days ther e wa s littl e abatemen t i n th e

surf, an d unloadin g proceeded generally

under th e sam e handicap s tha t ha d pre -

vailed o n 1 0 and 1 1 January. LS T dis -

charge continue d t o ru n fa r behin d

schedule, especiall y a s ponton causeway s

were buffeted ont o the beache s time and

time again. Lat e on 1 4 January on e II I

Amphibious Forc e LST , as a n experi -

ment, beache d quit e fa r i n a t hig h tid e

and unloade d throug h th e shallow s a t

low water . Th e metho d prove d successful an d wa s often use d thereafter, reduc -

ing the role of the causeways to secondary

importance. However , wit h mor e an d

more LST's of resupply convoys arriving

from rea r bases , a considerabl e backlo g

of unloade d LST's developed by 1 5 January, a backlo g tha t persiste d unti l th e

end o f th e month .

For th e AP's , APA's, AK's , AKA's ,

and merchan t vessels , lighterag e contin -

ued to be a major problem as operational

accidents an d mechanica l failure s dead -

lined more and more landing craft. Th e

only compensatin g facto r wa s tha t a s

more us e wa s mad e o f th e protecte d

river mouth discharg e points all unloading accelerated. Nonetheless , most of the

AK's an d AKA' s o f th e S-da y convo y

were tw o day s lat e leavin g Lingaye n

Gulf, as were those of the S plus 2 group.

AP's an d APA' s o f th e latte r convo y

were als o tw o day s lat e departing .

On S plu s 3 , 1 2 January , th e Nav y

established more centralized control over

lighterage tha n ha d been possibl e in th e

initial assaul t phases , whe n comman d

channels had bee n necessarily much sub -

divided. Beachmaster s an d shor e part y

commanders wer e no w abl e t o kee p

better trac k o f lighterin g craf t an d s o

could emplo y the m mor e efficiently .

Ashore, truc k shortage s continue d t o b e

critical. Fo r example , the I Corps' shore

parties ha d expecte d th e 6t h an d 43 d

Divisions t o retur n approximatel y 22 0

trucks to th e beaches b y th e morning of

10 January , bu t a s o f th e mornin g o f

the 14t h only 15 9 trucks were available.

In brief, discharge operations were not
128 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

an unqualifie d succes s durin g th e firs t

week. Whil e th e shelvin g beache s an d

adverse weather and surf conditions were

in larg e measur e directl y o r indirectl y

responsible for many difficulties, it would

be incorrec t t o assum e tha t ther e wer e

no mistake s i n plannin g an d execution .

However, despit e th e difficultie s o n th e

beaches, Admira l Barbey , th e VI I Am -

phibious Forc e commander , wa s suffi -

ciently impresse d wit h th e shor e part y

operations t o report :

It i s believe d tha t th e Enginee r Specia l

Brigade a s organize d i n th e Southwes t

Pacific Area is the most efficient Shor e Party

organization no w functionin g i n amphib - ious warfare and tha t th e permanent organ- ization o f thes e [brigade s has] contributed

in larg e measur e t o th e succes s o f amphib -

ious operations i n this theater. 9

It i s perhap s sufficien t tribut e t o al l

echelons t o stat e tha t i n th e fac e o f un -

anticipated an d unavoidabl e problem s

the Arm y an d Nav y unit s concerne d

with discharg e operation s a t Lingaye n

Gulf ultimatel y accomplishe d thei r missions. Certainl y Genera l Krueger , th e

commander wit h s o muc h a t stake , fel t

that al l hand s "di d a s wel l a s coul d

have bee n expecte d unde r existin g

conditions."

 10

Inland Supply and Construction

Moving the Supplies From the Beaches

For most of the first week of the Luzo n

Campaign, difficultie s involve d i n mov -

ing supplie s fro m th e beache s t o thei r

proper destinatio n inlan d wer e almos t

as great as those encountered during discharge operations.11

 Bridg e construction

was th e main proble m i n th e stream-cut

area alon g th e souther n shore s o f Lin -

gayen Gulf . Th e assaul t force s foun d

that mos t o f th e bridge s fro m th e gul f

south acros s th e Agn o Rive r ha d bee n

at leas t partiall y destroye d b y Allied air

action, naval bombardment, or Japanese

and guerrill a demolitions . Moreover ,

many o f th e bridge s foun d intac t wer e

too weak t o bear th e weight of the Sixth

Army's heav y equipment. Som e bridges

had bee n destroye d b y MacArthur 's

withdrawing force s i n 1941-42 , and th e

Japanese ha d replace d the m wit h struc -

tures capable o f bearin g onl y te n t o

twelve tons. The Sixt h Army now needed

bridges o f a t leas t 35-to n capacity .

Without bridges, the advancing infantry depended largely on LV T ferrie s fo r

supplies durin g th e firs t fe w day s afte r

the assault—eve n th e ubiquitou s jeep s

moved ove r rivers aboard LVT 's. Initi -

ally, artiller y an d tank s wer e move d

south b y a variet y o f expedients . Th e

6th Division , fo r example , go t tw o 105 -

mm. artiller y battalion s acros s th e Bin -

loc River , behin d th e Blu e Beaches ,

using a temporar y fill , whil e th e 37t h

Division move d tw o o f its fiel d artiller y

battalions acros s th e Calma y Rive r o n

engineer LC M ferries . Th e 40t h Divi -

sion use d Filipin o rafts , ponto n floa t

ferries, an d enginee r LCM 's fo r bot h

9

 VII Amphib Forc e Rpt Luzon , p. 30. 10

 Comments of General Walter Krueger, 1 8 Dec 56.

11

 The genera l source s fo r this section an d its subsections are: Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I, 139-42 , 152 ;

ibid., III, 56-58, 113-14 , 169 , 243 ; ibid., IV, 8, 28-29,

34, 43 , 80 ; Arm y Servic e Comman d (ASCOM ) Rp t

Luzon, 2 6 De c 44-13 Feb 45 , pp . 11-18 , 22-23 , 39 ;

5202d Eng r Const r Bri g Rp t Luzon , pp . 23-29 , 54 -

56; I Corp s Rp t Luzon , pp . 168 , 195; 37th Di v Rpt

Luzon, pp . 19 , 25, 193-96 , 209-10, 303; 6th Di v Rp t

Luzon, p. 6; 6th Div G-4 Rp t Luzon , p. 15 ; 6th Eng r

Bn Rp t Luzon , p . 15 ; 43d Di v G-4 Rp t Luzon , pp .

3-7, 18; 117th Engr Bn Rpt, 8 Jan-4 Feb 45, pp. 1-2 .
THE LOGISTIC S O F TH E INVASIO N 129

troops and equipment. I n th e 43d Division area there were not as many streams,

and th e divisio n foun d th e bridge s o f

the Manila Railroad intact—all that had

to be done to make the bridges passable

for wheele d vehicles was to lay planking

across th e rails. Wher e no bridge s wer e

found, fords sufficed fo r the 43d Division.

Conversely, road s wer e n o proble m

except on th e I Corps' left , especiall y i n

the zone s o f th e 63 d an d 172 d Infantry

Regiments. There , bulldozer s ha d t o

construct road s wher e non e existed .

Elsewhere, only occasional smoothing or

filling of shell holes was necessary. Pend -

ing th e developmen t o f roads i n par t o f

its area , th e 43 d Divisio n employe d a s

many a s 50 0 Filipino s a da y i n hand -

carrying operation s and , as soo n a s airfields wer e constructed , use d airdrop s

extensively.

Unloading delay s mad e i t impossibl e

to begin bridg e construction an d repai r

as soo n a s hoped . Baile y bridg e span s

had bee n divide d amon g severa l ship s

for safety' s sak e an d cam e ashor e piece -

meal, making it difficul t fo r engineers to

find an d assembl e th e necessar y spans .

Nevertheless, th e 37t h Division' s 117t h

Engineers had a Bailey across th e Pantal

at Dagupa n b y th e morning of 1 3 Janu -

ary, thu s permitting the division's heavy

equipment to move on south. 12 Th e 6t h

Division's 6t h Engineer s buil t a Baile y

across the Binloc River by the afternoon

of 1 1 January , whil e element s o f th e

5202d Enginee r Constructio n Brigade ,

operating directl y unde r Sixt h Arm y

control, had placed heavy ponton bridges

across the Binloc and th e Calmay by the

15th, providin g simila r crossing s i n th e

40th Division's area.

Further inland, various Engineer units

repaired existin g structure s t o carr y 35 -

ton load s o r constructe d ne w crossings.

The 5202 d buil t tw o ponto n bridge s

across th e Agno , on e a t Waw a an d th e

other at Bayambang , by 20 January, and

all availabl e engineers constructe d ne w

timber bridge s acros s smalle r streams .

Generally, bridge construction could not

keep pac e wit h th e advancin g infantry .

LVT's and Dukws , not designe d fo r the

job, accordingl y ha d t o b e presse d int o

service for operation s far inland—a fiel d

expedient tha t hardl y me t wit h th e ap -

proval o f many experienced officer s an d

drivers.

As event s turne d out , bridge repai r

rather tha n ne w constructio n too k u p

most o f th e engineers ' time . Thus , al -

though the bridging problem i n the area

south t o th e Agn o wa s formidable , i t

. . . did no t develop to the proportions orig -

inally expected. Thi s wa s attributable primarily to the failur e of the enemy t o oppose

the landin g an d hi s failur e completel y t o

demolish existin g bridge s . . . bridg e replacement wa s only 25 % o f th e anticipate d

figure.13

Beyond th e Agno , bridg e destructio n

was muc h mor e thorough , a fac t that ,

coupled wit h th e slow rat e o f discharge,

threatened t o caus e a seriou s shortag e

of heav y bridgin g equipmen t i n addi -

tion t o a n expecte d shortag e o f ligh t

bridging. Genera l Kruege r therefor e

requested tha t th e Allie d Ai r Force s

cease its program o f bridg e destruction ,

and afte r 2 0 January the air arm limited

its antibridg e strike s t o span s th e Sixt h

12

 To bypass other destroyed bridge s in its zone, the

37th Divisio n sen t its artillery an d tank s sout h ove r

roads in th e I Corps area, routing them vi a Calasiao,

Santa Barbara , Balingueo , an d the n bac k int o th e

XIV Corps zone at San Carlos and Malasiqui . 13

 Sixth Army Rpt Luzon , IV, 29. (Italic s supplied.)
130 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Army specifically wante d knocke d out. 14

Inland, th e genera l shortag e o f truck s

was eve r mor e keenl y fel t a s th e arm y

advanced southward . Fe w troop s coul d

move b y moto r an d th e infantry' s rat e

of marc h therefor e governe d th e spee d

of th e advance . Eve n a t thi s relativel y

slow pace , transportatio n facilitie s wer e

strained t o th e utmost t o kee p supplie s

going forward , an d suppl y level s some -

times become dangerously low at inlan d

dumps.

So critical wa s the truck shortage tha t

Sixth Arm y quickl y bega n t o devot e

considerable energy to repairing railroad

facilities. Th e 37t h Divisio n wa s th e

first uni t to get a section of railroad into

operation. Castin g aroun d for som e

means o f employin g th e Manil a Rail -

road, th e divisio n foun d th e roadbe d

north an d sout h o f th e Agn o Rive r i n

fairly goo d conditio n an d locate d a fe w

sound flatcars , bu t coul d discove r n o

usable engines . Thereupon , th e divi -

sion's 737t h Ordnanc e Compan y rigge d

a jee p wit h flange d railroa d wheel s t o

make a n improvise d engin e capabl e o f

hauling fou r loade d 16-to n flatcars . O n

19 Januar y th e 37t h Division' s firs t

"train" ra n dow n th e twelv e mile s o f

track fro m Sa n Carlo s — the division 's

truck hea d — to Bayambang. Tw o day s

later the unit acquired two small donkey

engines from a sugar refinery an d added

another ten miles of track to its railroad.

Meanwhile, the Engineer, Sixth Army,

and th e Army Servic e Comman d bega n

rounding u p experience d Filipin o rail -

road men and started to repair roadbeds,

rolling stock , an d locomotives . O n 2 2

January th e firs t trai n move d b y on e o f

the railroad' s standar d engine s pulle d

out o f Dagupa n fo r Bayambang . Simul -

taneously th e roa d wa s opene d fro m

Dagupan northeast t o Sa n Fabian. Th e

initial capacity o f th e line s between Sa n

Fabian an d Bayamban g wa s 20 0 dead -

weight ton s pe r trip , a smal l tonnag e

but s o importan t tha t Genera l Kruege r

arranged fo r th e Allie d Ai r Force s t o

limit it s attack s o n rollin g stoc k solel y

to train s actuall y movin g withi n Japa -

nese-controlled territory. 15 A s unit s

moved on southward, additional sections

of th e railroa d wer e opene d a s fas t a s

rolling stock could be found an d bridges

repaired. Th e jo b becam e mor e an d

more pressing, for it was not until March

that th e comba t an d servic e unit s o n

Luzon obtaine d al l thei r organi c trans -

portation fro m rea r bases . Eve n the n

the length o f the supply line s continued

to strain highway facilities t o the utmost

until por t operation s bega n a t Manila .

"The earl y rehabilitatio n o f th e rail -

road," Sixth Army reported, "prevented

collapse o f th e suppl y syste m [during ]

the advanc e o n Manila." 16 Certainly ,

the rapi d repai r o f th e railroads , th e

employment o f suc h fiel d expedient s a s

jeep engines , th e us e o f LVT' s an d

Dukws for extended overlan d hauls and

as river-crossin g ferries , an d th e man y

hours engineers devoted to bridge repair

combined t o overcom e truc k shortage s

and t o permi t unit s t o operat e alon g

combat suppl y line s thre e t o fou r time s

normal length . Althoug h supplie s wer e

sometimes slo w gettin g forwar d t o th e 14

 Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , IV, 43; Rad, Kruege r t o

MacArthur, WL-235 , 1 9 Jan 45 , Sixt h Arm y G- 3

Jnl Fil e Luzon , 18-2 0 Jan 45 ; Rad , MacArthur t o

Kenney, Krueger , an d Kinkaid , CAX-50069 , 2 0 Jan

45, Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 20-22 Ja n 45 .

15

 See, inter alia, Rad, Sixth Army , GH Q SWPA ,

WL-670, 25 Jan 45 , Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon,

25-26 Jan 45 . 16

 Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , III, 58 .
THE LOGISTIC S O F TH E INVASIO N 131

FIRST STANDAR D LOCOMOTIV E I N OPERATION hauls ammunition to front, 22 January.

combat units , n o seriou s shortage s de -

veloped.17 Again , ingenuit y an d har d

work kep t th e operation s goin g an d

solved difficult , unexpecte d problems .

Construction

Work t o satisf y th e pressin g require -

ment fo r airfield s a t Lingaye n Gul f

began almos t as soon as the firs t assaul t

waves hi t th e beaches. 18 O n S-da y a n

engineer surve y part y determine d tha t

the Lingaye n airstri p coul d b e rehabilitated by the time the CVE's of the Allied

Naval Force s ha d t o leave , bu t unload -

ing delay s retarded wor k unti l S plus 2 .

Even then , mos t o f th e repair s wer e

made by some 400 Filipino laborers who,

working almost entirel y b y hand, began

filling bomb craters with beach sand and

started clearin g debris. Wit h th e ai d o f

only three or fou r piece s of heavy equip

ment, th e Filipino s ha d th e stri p i n

shape b y th e afternoo n o f S plus 3 for a

CVE-based fighte r t o mak e a successfu l

emergency landing . I t wa s 1 3 Januar y

before "formal " enginee r work bega n a t

the site , an d no t unti l th e 15th were all

three engineer battalions assigned t o the

project ashor e and working .

17

 Col Ingomar M. Oseth, Hq AGF , Observer's Rpt

on Op n o f th e Sixt h Army , SWPA , 2 6 No v 44-2 7

Feb 45, 1 0 Apr 45 , p. 3 . 18

 In additio n t o th e source s cite d i n not e 8 , this

subsection i s als o base d on : 308t h Bombardmen t

Wing (H ) Rpt Luzon , 1 Jan-28 May 45, pp. 4-9; Maj.

Charles W . Boggs , Jr., USMC, Marine Aviation in

the Philippines (Washington : Historica l Division ,

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1951 ) (th e USMC's

official history) , pp. 66-67, and n . 160 , p. 105 ; Craven

and Cate , AAF V, pp. 416-18.
132 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Other delays occurred when some lac k

of co-ordinatio n o r misunderstandin g of

unloading plan s mad e i t difficul t t o ge t

discharged steel matting for surfacing the

strip. First , th e XIV Corps, responsibl e

for getting the matting to the strip, could

obtain n o informatio n throug h eithe r

Army o r Nav y channels concernin g th e

whereabouts o f th e mat-lade n carg o

ships. Then , shortly afte r ma t discharge

had starte d lat e o n th e afternoo n o f

S plu s 3 , th e tw o ship s carryin g most o f

the mattin g move d of f t o a n oute r

anchorage fo r th e night , contrar y t o

plans. Th e nex t day high surf hampere d

discharge, and b y evening only 20 0 tons

of mattin g was ashore. Th e cos t of even

this smal l amoun t wa s tw o Dukw s an d

one LV T sun k an d thre e me n seriousl y

injured. Risk s wer e even greater during

the nigh t unloading , bu t ha d t o b e

accepted sinc e i t wa s necessar y t o discharge a dail y averag e o f 70 0 ton s o f

matting t o mee t th e constructio n targe t

date.19

By din t o f almos t incredibl y har d

work o n th e par t o f shor e parties, engi -

neers at the airfield, and Filipino civilian

labor, th e Lingaye n strip , steel-matte d

to a 5,000-foo t length , wa s read y fo r

sustained us e abou t midnigh t o n 1 5

January. C-47' s bega n operation s fro m

the fiel d th e next day, when some P-61's

of th e 547t h Nigh t Fighte r Squadro n

also arrived. O n 1 7 January P-40's an d

P-51's o f th e 82 d Tactica l Reconnais -

sance Squadro n fle w in , a s di d th e 18th

Fighter Group' s P-38's . Headquarters ,

308th Bombardmen t Win g (Heavy) ,

responsible fo r th e initia l conduc t o f

land-based ai r operation s i n th e area ,

was alread y se t up . O n th e 17th, a da y

behind schedule , th e win g relieve d th e

CVE's o f ai r cove r an d suppor t duties .

In origina l plan s th e Lingaye n stri p

and anothe r fiel d i n th e area wer e to b e

developed into all-weather air bases, but

since Japanes e oppositio n wa s less tha n

anticipated an d sinc e goo d weathe r wa s

in prospec t fo r th e nex t thre e months ,

the Allie d Ai r Forces , Sixt h Army , an d

General Headquarter s determine d tha t

two dry-weathe r strip s woul d b e suffi -

cient. Constructio n o f necessar y all -

weather field s coul d wait until th e Clark

Field ai r cente r wa s secured . I n th e

meantime, i t wa s still imperativ e t o provide a second fiel d i n th e Lingaye n area

to mov e sufficien t plane s forwar d fo r

proper ai r suppor t operations.

On S-da y engineers o f th e Army Serv -

ice Command had selected a site at Blu e

Beach fo r th e secon d field , an d Filipin o

laborers began work there on 1 3 January,

followed thre e days later by one engineer

battalion.20 Fro m th e beginnin g of construction som e engineer s an d airme n

expressed reservation s abou t th e desira -

bility of the Blu e Beach site, for the area

was narro w an d ha d a high wate r table .

On th e 16t h engineers als o discovere d

that the subsoil was extremely difficult t o

compact.

Already, anothe r likel y sit e ha d bee n

examined in dry rice paddies about midway betwee n Dagupa n an d Mangaldan ,

five mile s to th e east. Som e work started

19

 The stor y of the mat unloading difficulty is to be

found i n a n exchang e of radio s amon g Sixt h Army ,

XIV Corps, I Corps, an d th e Luzo n Attac k Forc e in

the Sixth Arm y G-3 Journa l File s Luzon , 11-13 and

13-15 January 45.

20

 Further informatio n o n th e selectio n o f th e

second sit e is derived fro m Rads , I Corp s t o Sixt h

Army, RM-69 and 2150 , 11 Jan 45 , Sixth Arm y G-3

Jnl Fil e Luzon , 11-1 3 Jan 45 .
THE LOGISTIC S O F TH E INVASIO N 133

at this site on 1 7 January, and during the

next tw o day s al l th e troop s an d equip -

ment fro m th e Blu e Beac h stri p move d

to th e ne w location. 21 Th e Mangalda n

strip, compacted earth without steel matting, was ready for fighters on 22 January,

and withi n a week wa s expanded t o th e

length necessar y fo r mediu m bombers .

Fifth Ai r Forc e fighter s an d A-20 's,

together wit h Marin e Ai r Group s 2 4

and 32 , equippe d wit h th e obsolescen t

Douglas Dauntless div e bomber , move d

up t o Mangalda n b y th e en d o f th e

month, al l passin g t o th e contro l o f th e

308th Bombardmen t Wing. 22

While work on th e airfields was under

way, other construction had begun. Th e

Naval Servic e Comman d prepare d a n

advance PT-boa t base , readie d a sea -

plane base at Cabalitan Bay on Lingayen

Gulf's west shore, and se t up shore installations fo r shippin g contro l an d mino r

repairs. Mor e extensive construction fo r

naval purpose s awaite d th e seizur e o f

base site s a t Manil a an d Subi c Bay s i n

southern Luzon .

The Arm y Servic e Comman d soo n

discovered tha t th e shore s o f Lingaye n

Gulf ha d n o suitabl e site s a t whic h t o

construct dock s tha t woul d hav e th e

capacity t o discharg e larg e cargo vessels,

and therefor e abandone d plan s t o con -

struct suc h facilities . Advers e sur f an d

beach condition s als o le d t o th e cancel -

lation o f projects fo r constructin g man y

smaller docks , lighterin g jetties, an d a n

extensive fue l jett y system . A t firs t fue l

barges anchored inside the mouth of the

Dagupan River . Ultimatel y ASCO M

built a smal l permanen t fue l jett y a t

Alacan o n th e eas t shor e o f th e gulf ,

whence pipeline s stretche d t o th e tw o

airstrips. Engineer s als o constructe d a

small jetty for unloading railroad equipment at San Fabian. LS T beachin g sites

were improved , bu t mos t large r vessel s

discharged ove r wharve s buil t alon g th e

river a t Dagupan . Th e res t o f th e

planned por t constructio n woul d hav e

to await the recapture of Manila.

Logistical Command and Control

The schedul e for centralizing logistical

responsibilities in the hands of the Army

Service Command , vic e th e I an d XI V

Corps, coul d no t b e met , the discharg e

delays an d co-ordinatio n problem s making i t desirabl e fo r th e tw o corp s t o

retain responsibilit y unti l 1 9 January ,

four day s longe r tha n planned . O n th e

date the transfe r becam e effective , Arm y

Service Comman d assume d mos t o f th e

logistical suppor t responsibilit y withi n

a regio n designate d a s th e Arm y Bas e

Area, enclosed withi n a n ar c lyin g generally thre e an d a hal f mile s inlan d

from th e gulf 's shores . Late r move d

forward wit h th e advance , thi s lin e

also marke d th e rea r boundarie s o f th e

two corps ' area s o f continue d logistica l

responsibility.

Within th e Arm y Bas e Area , Arm y

Service Comman d wa s responsibl e fo r

traffic control , discharge and beac h operations, roa d an d bridg e maintenance ,

airfield construction , an d al l othe r con -

struction excep t tha t assigne d t o th e

5202d Enginee r Constructio n Brigade ,

which continue d t o operat e directl y

under Sixt h Arm y control. Establishin g

21

 According t o Boggs, op. cit., p. 67 and n . 160 , p.

105, Col . Clayto n C . Jerome , USMC , commandin g

Marine aviation on Luzon , had a large if not decisive

share in locating the Mangaldan strip. 22

 In additio n t o his other duties, Colone l Jerome

became th e 308th's bas e commander a t th e Mangal -

dan strip .
134 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

its headquarter s a t Mangaldan , Arm y

Service Comman d too k ove r th e control

of all other service units in th e base area.

Most of its operational functions, excep t

for airfiel d construction , i t delegate d t o

Base M , whic h se t u p headquarter s a t

San Fabian , wit h subbase s a t Dagupa n

and Por t Sual . Shor e part y operation s

now centralize d a t Headquarters , 4t h

Engineer Specia l Brigade . O n 2 9 January, meetin g its target date, Army Service

Command assumed responsibility for dispersal, issue , storage , an d deliver y o f al l

Sixth Army supplies, responsibilities thus

far restin g with th e tw o corps and othe r

units.

Until 1 3 February logistical operations

remained unde r th e contro l o f Sixt h

Army, functionin g throug h Arm y Serv -

ice Command. O n tha t date, as planned,

the Service s of Supply , Southwest Pacifi c

Area, too k over. Somewha t reorganized,

Army Servic e Command' s headquarter s

was redesignate d Headquarters , Luzo n

Base Section , i n whic h capacit y i t con -

tinued in contro l of logistical operations

on Luzon . Bas e M wa s transferre d t o

the contro l o f th e Luzo n Bas e Section ,

which als o controlle d othe r base s late r

established o n Luzon . Stil l later, Luzo n

Base Sectio n wa s redesignate d Philip -

pine Bas e Section , i n whic h rol e i t

co-ordinated most Service s of Suppl y ac -

tivities throughou t th e archipelago .

The Sixt h Army 's G-4 , Col . Willia m

N. Leaf , ha d viewe d th e decentralize d

logistical contro l tha t existe d befor e

Army Servic e Comman d too k ove r o n

19 Januar y wit h som e misgivings . H e

realized tha t completely centralized con -

trol neithe r coul d no r shoul d b e estab -

lished durin g th e initia l phase s o f a n

amphibious operation , bu t h e wa s

pleased whe n th e servic e comman d

organized centralize d carg o discharg e

and reported:

Centralized operatio n o f carg o discharg e

should be effected a t the earliest practicable

time. Thi s permits Army, the best judge of

. . . requirements, to put the weight of effort

where i t belongs. . . . tonnage s will b e in - creased under early centralized control, and

tactical units, thus released, will be enabled

to devot e themselve s t o th e tactica l

situation.23

By coincidence , an d apparentl y onl y

by coincidence , th e discharg e rat e a t

Lingayen Gul f jumpe d a s soon a s Army

Service Comman d too k ove r unloadin g

control. Slowe d b y advers e sur f con -

ditions an d th e othe r difficultie s tha t

hampered unloading , discharg e a t th e

Lingayen beache s totale d som e 20,00 0

dead-weight ton s o f bul k carg o b y eve -

ning o n 1 8 Januar y a s oppose d t o a

scheduled tota l o f 26,00 0 tons . Th e

actual rat e caugh t u p wit h an d sur -

passed th e planne d rat e withi n th e next

week an d continue d t o exceed estimate s

thereafter.

Colonel Leaf likewis e welcomed Army

Service Command 's assumptio n o f additional logistica l burden s o n 2 9 January:

. . . th e issu e o f supplie s .shoul d [also ] b e

centralized a t th e earlies t practicabl e date . The earl y groupin g o f suppl y responsibil -

ities wil l d o muc h t o preven t wast e o f

rations an d unnecessar y dispersio n o f

ammunition.24

In thi s connection, of course, it is necessary t o not e tha t Lea f wa s thinkin g i n

terms o f th e Allie d ai r superiorit y tha t

existed a t Lingaye n Gul f o n an d afte r

9 January . Thi s superiorit y permitte d

an earl y centralizatio n o f suppl y dump s

23

 Sixth Army Rpt Luzon , III , 58 . 24

 Ibid., III , 169 .
THE LOGISTIC S O F TH E INVASIO N 135

that, unde r othe r circumstances , migh t

have proved extremely dangerous.

In regar d t o th e logistica l comman d

established a t Lingaye n Gulf , Colone l

Leaf stated that Army Service Command

. . . was an unnecessary link in the chain of

command and tha t Base M could hav e sup -

plied the same logistic support. Sinc e there

was onl y on e bas e [durin g th e driv e t o

Manila], th e us e o f [Arm y Servic e Com -

mand] interposed another headquarters between th e unit s t o b e serve d an d Sixt h

Army.25

While Leaf 's view s o n th e existenc e o f

two suppl y headquarter s a t Lingaye n

Gulf see m logical , i t i s possible that th e

Sixth Arm y G- 4 di d no t kno w al l th e

circumstances tha t le d t o their creation .

For example , i t wa s th e consensu s a t

GHQ SWP A and Headquarters, Services

of Supply , tha t th e Service s o f Suppl y

could not spare any officers o f the caliber

required fo r th e logistica l comman d i n

the large-scal e operatio n a t Lingaye n

Gulf. Accordingly , Maj . Gen . Hug h J.

Casey, formerl y Chie f Engineer , GH Q

SWPA, wa s selected fo r tha t command .

Since it was not desired to restrict Casey's

activities an d talent s t o th e relativel y

limited role of a base commander, he had

been appointe d t o th e highe r leve l o f

Army Servic e Command. 26 I n an y case ,

the Service s o f Suppl y woul d hav e ha d

to creat e som e co-ordinatin g headquar -

ters such as the Army Service Command

when base s i n additio n t o Bas e M wer e

established o n Luzon . Nevertheless ,

activation o f Headquarters , Arm y Serv -

ice Command , probabl y coul d hav e

waited.

Sixth Arm y itsel f promote d som e de -

centralization, keepin g th e 5202 d Engi -

neer Constructio n Brigad e unde r th e

control o f th e Engineer , Sixt h Army ,

rather tha n passin g i t t o th e contro l o f

Army Servic e Command . Th e Engi -

neer's reaso n wa s tha t th e brigade' s

operations—primarily roa d an d bridg e

construction an d maintenance—ha d t o

be s o closel y tie d i n wit h thos e o f th e

combat unit s tha t i t wa s necessar y fo r

the Sixt h Arm y t o contro l th e brigad e

directly.27

Colonel Leaf' s criticism s o f decentralization an d o f th e logistica l comman d

system a t Lingaye n Gul f wer e almos t

identical wit h remark s h e ha d mad e o n

the sam e subjects afte r th e Leyt e oper -

ation.28 A t Leyt e decentralizatio n ha d

lasted eve n longe r tha n a t Lingaye n

Gulf, an d a n Arm y Servic e Command -

Base K organization tha t had functione d

at Leyt e wa s a n exac t paralle l o f th e

Army Servic e Command-Bas e M estab -

lished a t Lingaye n Gulf . Yet , whateve r

the defect s o f th e syste m a t bot h Leyt e

and Luzon , the system worked. I t might

well hav e bee n accomplishe d wit h les s

"red tape " unde r anothe r system , bu t

that th e organizatio n wa s considered t o

have considerabl e merit , a t leas t b y

GHQ SWP A and th e Service s of Supply,

is illustrate d b y th e fac t tha t i t wa s

also slate d t o b e employe d durin g th e

invasion o f Japan .

25

 Ibid., III , 58 . 26

 Chamberlin Comments, 2 0 Jan 57 .

27

 Interv, autho r wit h L t Ge n Samue l D . Sturgis ,

USA, Ret. , formerl y Engineer , Sixth Army, 8 Feb 57 . 28

 Sixth Arm y Rp t Leyte , pp . 206 , 220 , 243 .

PART THRE E

THE CENTRA L PLAIN S

CHAPTER VIII

Redeployment and Tactical Plans

The perio d 16-1 8 January was one of

transition for both Sixth Army and 14th

Area Army. Fo r the American s it wa s a

period o f plannin g an d redeployin g t o

fulfill Genera l Krueger' s urgen t desir e

to spee d th e pac e o f operation s o n th e

army left an d t o comply with new orders

that General MacArthur issued directing

Sixth Arm y t o pus h XI V Corp s o n to -

ward Manil a mor e rapidly . Fo r th e

Japanese, the same period found General

Yamashita franticall y tryin g t o realig n

his force s fo r th e bette r defens e o f th e

approaches t o th e Cagaya n Valle y an d

the Shobu redoubt.

New American Plans

Plans for Left Flank Operations

Growing dissatisfaction wit h th e progress o f operation s i n th e I Corp s zone ,

especially i n th e Damortis-Rosari o area ,

played a large part in prompting General

Krueger t o formulat e som e o f hi s ne w

plans.1 A catalys t ma y wel l hav e bee n

the failur e o f th e 172 d Infantry, 43 d

Division, t o secur e Rosari o an d th e

Routes 3-11 junction o n 1 6 January, as

planned.2 Th e Japanes e ha d evacuate d

both locations, probably as the resul t of

air an d nava l bombardmen t an d long -

range artiller y fire , bu t o n surroundin g

high ground they had plenty of artillery,

mortars, an d machin e guns tha t covered

all approaches . Col . Georg e E . Bush ,

commanding th e 172 d Infantry , knew ,

therefore, tha t h e coul d hol d neithe r

Rosario no r th e road junctio n unti l his

troops had cleared the nearby dominating

terrain.3 Wing , th e 43 d Division's commander, agreed , bu t whil e makin g provision fo r a ne w effor t i n th e Rosari o

area als o planne d t o destroy stron g Japanese forces , includin g mor e artillery ,

along th e Rosario-Damorti s roa d be -

tween th e 172 d an d 158t h Infantr y

Regiments, sinc e th e road coul d no t b e

used unti l th e Japanes e pocke t wa s

cleaned out. Genera l Wing directed th e

158th RCT an d th e 63d Infantry (t o be

attached to the 158th ) t o devote all their

energies t o th e necessar y clearin g operations. Meanwhile , h e limited th e 172 d

Infantry t o holdin g actio n wit h it s lef t

1

 This subsectio n i s base d generall y upon : Sixt h

Army Rpt Luzon, I, 20-21; I Corps Rpt Luzon, p. 32;

43d Div Rpt Luzon , p. 12; 6th Div Rpt Luzon , p. 9;

20th In f Rp t Luzon , p. 9; Sixth Army FO 42, 16 Jan

45, Sixth Army Rp t Luzon , 1 , 147; I Corps FO a , 16

Jan 45 ; 43 d Di v FO 4 , 1 7 Jan 45 ; 6t h Di v F O 6 , 1 6

Jan 45 ; Rpt, Sixth Army G-3 Liaiso n Off with 158t h

and 63 d RCT's t o G- 3 Sixt h Army , 1 6 Jan 45 , and

Memo, Asst ACof S G- 3 Sixt h Arm y t o ACof S G- 3

Sixth Army, 1 6 Jan 45 , both in Sixt h Army G-3 Jn l

File Luzon, 15-1 7 Jan 45 .

2

 See above, ch. VI, p. 109. 3

 Further informatio n o n th e developmen t o f th e

43d Division' s ne w pla n i s derive d from : Entrie s

timed 1030 , 1130, 1140 , and 1150 16 Jan 45 , and 125 0

17 Jan 45 , 172d Inf Jnl Luzon ; Entries 45, 77, and 88 ,

16-17 Jan 45, 43d Div G-3 Jnl, 16-17 Jan 45.
140 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

and to securing the high ground immediately nort h an d northwes t o f Rosari o

with it s right .

This pla n lef t ope n t o th e Japanes e

both th e Route s 3-1 1 junction an d

Route 3 south t o Palacpalac , wher e th e

169th Infantr y wa s concentrating. Wit h

the prevailing fear of counterattack from

the northeast—a fear certainly not abated

after th e event s o f th e nigh t o f 16-1 7

January—it wa s imperative tha t th e 43d

Division secur e th e road junction imme -

diately. The division could accomplish

this tas k withi n th e foreseeabl e futur e

only i f th e 103d an d 169t h Infantr y

Regiments were to drive north up Route

3, simultaneousl y clearin g dominatin g

terrain eas t an d wes t o f th e road .

Wheeling lef t alon g Rout e 3 , th e tw o

regiments woul d leav e behin d the m a

huge ga p betwee n th e 43 d Division 's

right rear—to be anchored at Pozorrubio

—and th e 6t h Division' s left , whic h wa s

approaching Urdaneta . T o fil l thi s ga p

and t o assur e continue d progres s east -

ward towar d th e Army Beachhea d Line ,

General Krueger, on 1 6 January, decided

to commi t anothe r majo r portio n o f

Sixth Arm y Reserve . H e release d t o

I Corps the 25th Division, less one RCT,

to tak e ove r a wedge-shape d zon e o f at -

tack betwee n th e 6t h an d 43 d Divisions.

The 25th' s lef t woul d b e based on roads

running eas t an d northeas t t o Pozor -

rubio; its right on roads leading southeast

to Urdaneta. The division would first

seize Binalonan and the n secure Route 3

between Pozorrubi o an d Urdaneta .

The commitmen t of the 25th Division

permitted Genera l Swift , th e I Corp s

commander, to lift his restrictions on th e

6th Division' s advanc e towar d Rout e 3 ,

the Army Beachhead Line, and the Agno

River. Th e division now directe d it s

20th Infantr y t o eliminat e th e Japanes e

known to be holding the Cabaruan Hills

and ordere d th e 1s t Infantr y t o strik e

east t o seiz e Urdaneta , maintainin g con -

tact o n th e lef t wit h th e 25t h Division ,

To provid e adde d protectio n t o XIV

Corps' lef t rea r an d t o gathe r informa -

tion o n whic h t o pla n futur e advances ,

Krueger directe d I Corp s t o reconnoiter

south an d eas t acros s th e Agn o i n it s

zone. H e issue d n o ne w orders t o XI V

Corps, which woul d continue t o consolidate alon g th e Agno , brin g forwar d it s

supplies, and maintai n its outposts south

of th e river.

New Plans for the Drive to Manila

Krueger intende d t o hol d XI V Corp s

generally alon g th e lin e o f th e Agn o

until Swift's I Corps could overcome the

resistance fro m Damorti s t o Urdanet a

and, havin g thu s eliminate d th e mos t

immediate threat t o th e army's left flan k

and bas e area, could begi n maneuvering

some o f it s force s sout h abreast o f Gris -

wold's corps . I t woul d b e impossible ,

Krueger reasoned , t o completel y over -

come th e danger of counterattack on th e

left unti l h e coul d commi t th e 32 d In -

fantry Division , the 1st Cavalry Division,

and th e separate 112t h Cavalry RCT, al l

scheduled t o reac h Luzo n towar d th e

end o f January . Then , bu t no t unti l

then, woul d i t b e saf e i n his opinion t o

mount a n all-ou t driv e towar d Manila. 4

General MacArthur , havin g assure d

the Join t Chief s o f Staf f tha t h e coul d

secure th e entire Centra l Plains-Manil a

Bay region within fou r t o six weeks after

4

 General Walte r Krueger , From Down Under to

Nippon: The Story of Sixth Army in World War II

(Washington: Comba t Force s Press, 1953) , pp . 227 - 28; Sixth Army Rpt Luzon, I, 8-9, 20-23.
REDEPLOYMENT AN D TACTICAL PLAN S 141

the assaul t a t Lingaye n Gulf, 5 wa s un -

willing t o accep t th e two - or three-wee k

delay i n th e driv e towar d Manil a tha t

Krueger's plan foretokened . MacArthu r

was b y n o mean s a s worried a s Kruege r

that th e Japanes e woul d counterattac k

the extende d lef t o f th e Sixt h Arm y a s

its force s drov e towar d Manila , and ,

unlike Krueger , MacArthu r di d no t

think tha t th e Japanes e woul d defen d

Manila.6

It i s readily apparen t th e MacArthu r

and Kruege r wer e basin g their plan s o n

different intelligenc e estimates. Genera l

Willoughby, MacArthur's chie f o f intelligence, ha d estimate d tha t ther e wer e

about 152,50 0 Japanes e o n Luzo n an d

that thes e troop s were scattered i n thre e

defensive areas—on e nort h an d north -

east o f Lingaye n Gulf , anothe r i n th e

Clark Fiel d region , an d th e third cover -

ing al l souther n Luzon , probabl y ex -

cluding Manila. Willoughby had furthe r

estimated tha t ove r hal f o f th e Japanes e

were locate d i n th e norther n defensiv e

area.7 B y 1 7 January, as Sixth Army was

redeploying i n accordanc e wit h Krue -

ger's order s o f th e 16th , th e arm y ha d

over 175,00 0 troop s ashore , a t leas t

110,000 o f the m classe d a s comba t per -

sonnel.8 Give n Willoughby' s estimates ,

it i s smal l wonde r tha t MacArthu r wa s

unworried abou t th e Sixt h Army' s lef t

and fel t tha t Kruege r woul d hav e littl e

difficulty occupyin g Manila .

Krueger wa s basing his plans on quit e

different figures . Hi s G-2 , Col . Horto n

V. White , place d 234,50 0 Japanes e o n

Luzon, a n estimat e approximatin g th e

actual Japanes e strength of some 250,000

far mor e closel y tha n Willoughby's .

White did no t believ e tha t th e Japanese

had a s much strength on Luzo n south o f

Manila a s di d Willoughby , an d Whit e

felt tha t Manil a woul d b e strongl y de -

fended. Lik e Willoughby , th e Sixt h

Army G- 2 estimate d tha t abou t half th e

Japanese o n Luzo n wer e i n positio n t o

threaten th e army' s left , bu t Whit e

placed some 50,000 more Japanese on the

left tha n did Willoughby. 9

In additio n t o his desir e t o seiz e Ma -

nila a s early a s possible, MacArthu r ha d

other reason s t o pus h Sixt h Arm y sout h

more rapidly than Krueger's plans would

permit. Requirement s o f Pacifi c strat -

egy, th e theate r commande r radioe d t o

Krueger on 1 7 January, made imperative

the earl y seizur e an d rehabilitatio n o f

the Clar k Fiel d ai r center. 10 Kenney' s

Allied Ai r Force s manifestl y neede d ai r

base facilitie s o n Luzo n fa r beyon d th e

capacity of the fields tha t engineers could

hurriedly prepar e i n th e Lingaye n Gul f

area. Strategi c air support requirements

for Nimitz ' invasion s o f Iw o Jim a an d

Okinawa alon e mad e i t necessar y t o de -

velop heav y bombe r field s o n Luzo n a t

an earl y date . Th e Allie d Ai r Force s

also neede d t o expan d it s bas e facilitie s

in order to carry out its part in blocking

the Japanes e shipping lanes to the Indies

and t o provid e adequat e suppor t fo r

ground operation s o n Luzon . Finally ,

the Lingaye n strips , no t bein g all -

weather fields, woul d probabl y wash out

once Luzon' s rain y seaso n bega n i n lat e 5

 See above, chs. I and II. 6

 Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon, p . 228 ;

Krueger Comments, 1 8 Dec 56. 7

 See also above , ch. II. 8

 An. 3, Tr List , an. 6, Assignment of Shipping, and

an. 7, Loading and Landin g Schedule, to Sixth Army

FO 34 , 20 Nov 44, Sixth Arm y Rpt Luzon , I, 121-36 .

9

 G-2 Sixt h Army , G-2 Estimat e of the Enemy Situation Wit h Respec t t o MIK E ON E Opn, 5 De c 44 ,

Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , III, 27-31; Kruege r Com -

ments, 18 Dec 56; White Comments, 23 Jan 57 . 10

 Rad, MacArthu r t o Krueger , CAX-50027 , 1 7

Jan 45 , Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I, 112-13 .
142 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

April. Th e seizur e of the Clark Field air

center, wit h it s prewa r pave d runways ,

its ne w pave d strip s th e Japanes e ha d

constructed, its proximity t o presumably

reparable rail and highwa y facilities, and

its location relatively clos e to the port of

Manila, would go far toward meeting the

air bas e requirements o n Luzon. 11

MacArthur ha d al l thes e reason s fo r

believing tha t XI V Corp s bot h shoul d

and coul d move faster . H e suggeste d t o

Krueger that the threatening dispositions

of th e Japanes e on th e Sixt h Army's lef t

actually permitte d a rapi d advanc e a t

least a s fa r as Clark Fiel d o n th e par t o f

XIV Corps . Th e theate r commande r

right southwar d behin d XI V Corps ' lef t

proposed tha t Kruege r echelo n I Corps'

rear, thereb y protectin g XI V Corp s

while simultaneousl y containing—no t

necessarily attacking , i t i s t o b e note d

—the Japanes e force s o n th e arm y left .

With suc h a pla n i n execution , MacArthur continued, it would not be necessary t o hol d XI V Corp s bac k unti l I

Corps coul d pus h stron g force s sout h

abreast. Eve n determine d resistanc e b y

Japanese i n th e Clar k Fiel d area , Mac -

Arthur claimed , nee d no t lon g dela y

XIV Corps, since such oppositio n would

be "completel y dislocated " by XI Corps,

soon t o lan d o n th e west coast o f Luzo n

just nort h o f Bataa n Peninsula . Mac -

Arthur conclude d wit h a n orde r t o

Krueger t o "direc t . . . operations wit h

a view t o the earliest possible" seizure of

the Clar k Fiel d ai r center. 12

At thi s junctur e Colone l White , re -

vising his earlier estimates, began t o fee l

that th e proposed advanc e of XIV Corps

might no t b e a s risk y a s previousl y

thought. B y this time , th e tru e patter n

of th e Japanes e pla n fo r th e defens e o f

Luzon ha d begu n t o crystalliz e for Colonel White , an d o n 1 7 January , abou t a

week befor e Willoughb y reache d th e

same conclusion, White decided tha t the

Japanese wer e no t goin g t o defen d th e

Central Plains . H e no w estimate d tha t

XIV Corp s woul d probabl y encounte r

no significant oppositio n until it reached

Bamban, o n Rout e 3 thirty-fiv e mile s

south o f th e Agn o Rive r an d jus t nort h

of Clar k Field. H e guesse d tha t the only

strong Japanese forc e lef t i n th e Centra l

Plains wa s the 2d Tank Division, which

he correctl y suspecte d wa s displacin g

northward. An d eve n i f tha t Japanes e

division wer e stil l concentrate d nea r

Cabanatuan, twenty-fiv e mile s east across

the Centra l Plain s fro m Rout e 3 a t

Bamban, White did no t fee l tha t it could

pose to o muc h o f a threa t t o XIV Corp s

—the destruction o f intervenin g bridges

and Allie d ai r superiority woul d se e too

that.13

Despite thes e encouragin g estimate s

from hi s G-2 , Genera l Kruege r stil l

felt tha t considerable risks were involved

in an y pla n t o spee d XI V Corp s to -

ward Manila . H e kne w tha t behin d

MacArthur's pressur e wa s th e theate r

commander's desir e t o appea r i n th e

Philippine capital at the earliest possible

date, an d fel t sur e tha t MacArthu r ha d

in min d his birthday, 2 6 January, which

was als o Krueger's, 14 Kruege r wa s no t

so confiden t tha t X I Corps ' landin g

north o f Bataa n woul d i n an y way upset

11

 Ibid,; Craven an d Cate , AAF V, pp. 392 , 402, 418 ,

421, 443-45 , 448, 470-71; see also above, chs. I and II. 12

 Rad, MacArthu r t o Krueger , CAX-50027 , 1 7

Jan 45 .

13

 G-2 Sixt h Army , G- 2 Estimat e o f th e Enem y

Situation Wit h Referenc e t o Propose d Seizur e o f

Clark Field , 1 7 Jan 45 , Sixt h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e

Luzon, 17-18 Jan 45 ; White Comments, 23 Jan 57 . 14

 Krueger Comments, 1 8 Dec 56.
REDEPLOYMENT AN D TACTICA L PLAN S 143

Japanese defensiv e plan s i n th e Clar k

Field region. 15 Moreover , i n close r

contact wit h XI V Corps' situatio n tha n

MacArthur, Kruege r fel t tha t th e XI V

Corps' suppl y problem s alon e woul d

slow progress . Finally , I Corp s wa s de -

veloping s o muc h oppositio n al l acros s

its fron t tha t Krueger believed th e corps

would b e unable , a s MacArthu r sug -

gested, to echelon enough strength southward o n it s right t o protec t XI V Corps'

left rear . Rather , Kruege r foresa w tha t

it woul d b e necessar y fo r XI V Corp s t o

provide its own protection by echeloning

its left t o the rear, to this degree weakening it s strikin g powe r fo r th e advanc e

southward.16

Nevertheless, Kruege r had t o alter his

plans i n accordanc e wit h MacArthur' s

wishes, and o n 1 8 January he issued new

orders that provided for the execution o f

MacArthur's directiv e b y stages. 17 XI V

Corps, Krueger' s order s read , woul d

move its main strengt h u p t o its forme r

outpost lin e sout h o f th e Agn o b y 2 0

January. O n th e 21st , Griswold woul d

push hi s righ t sout h alon g Rout e 3 t o

Tarlac, twent y mile s beyon d th e Agno ,

and hi s lef t t o Victoria , eleve n mile s

northeast of Tarlac. Onc e on the TarlacVictoria line , th e corp s woul d mak e

ready t o move o n towar d Clar k Field ,

leaving troop s echelone d alon g it s lef t

rear t o maintai n contac t wit h I Corp s

and cove r a XIV Corp s zon e tha t Krue -

ger now enlarged b y pushing the I-XIV

Corps boundar y te n t o fiftee n mile s

eastward.

Krueger directe d I Corp s t o secur e

Route 3 fro m Pozorrubi o nort h t o th e

Routes 3-1 1 junctio n a s wel l a s th e

stretch o f Rout e 3 wes t t o Damortis .

Simultaneously, t o hel p protec t XI V

Corps' lef t rear , I Corp s woul d advanc e

its right east and southeast t o a new line

lying generally thre e miles east of Route

3 and extending southward to the eastern

anchor o f XI V Corps ' forme r outpos t

line. Th e I Corp s woul d als o sen d it s

reconnaissance forwar d t o establis h con -

tact wit h XI V Corp s troop s a t Victoria ,

and woul d the n establis h a n outpos t

line runnin g northeastwar d fro m Vic -

toria approximatel y eigh t mile s t o

the highway-railroa d junctio n tow n o f

Guimba.

The I Corps' tas k would obviously b e

the most difficult , bu t t o accomplis h it s

mission th e corp s ha d unde r it s control

the 43 d Division , th e 6t h Division , th e

25th Division less the 35th RCT i n Army

Reserve, an d th e separat e 158t h RCT .

The XI V Corp s woul d advanc e south -

ward through the Central Plains with the

37th an d 40t h Divisions.

Japanese Redispositions

Until XIV Corps reached the outposts

of th e Kembu Group i n th e Clar k Fiel d

region, it would meet no Japanes e other

than scattere d remnant s o f th e Kubota

Detachment.

18 Yamashit a knew tha t th e

western sid e o f th e Centra l Plain s wa s

wide ope n sout h t o Bamban , bu t ther e

15

 Kruege r Comments , 1 8 De c 56 . Se e als o below ,

ch. XVII , fo r X I Corp s operation s o n Bataan . A s

events turned out, XI Corp s was still fightin g its way

across Bataan wel l afte r XI V Corp s ha d take n Clar k

Field. 16

 Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 23 ; Krueger , From

Down Under to Nippon, p . 229 ; Krueger Comments,

18 De c 56 . 17

 The remainde r of this subsection is based mainly

on Sixt h Arm y F O 43 , 1 8 Jan 45 , Sixt h Arm y Rp t

Luzon, I, 147 .

18

 This section is based on Japanese sources, on fil e

in th e OCMH , tha t wer e used i n th e preparation o f

and ar e cite d i n Southwes t Pacifi c Are a Historica l

Series, II, page s 438-43.
144 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

was nothin g h e eithe r coul d o r wante d

to d o abou t it . Lik e Krueger , h e wa s

much mor e concerned wit h th e situation

east an d northeas t o f Lingaye n Gulf ,

although fo r differen t reasons .

By 1 6 January , I Corp s ha d largel y

overrun th e 23d Division-58th IMB

outer lin e of defense s excep t i n th e Mt .

Alava-Hill 35 5 are a an d o n th e Caba -

ruan Hills . Yamashit a ha d no t expecte d

to hol d thes e defense s ver y lon g i n an y

case. Moreover , th e 23d Division an d

the 58th IMB controlle d suc h excellen t

defensive terrain in the Rosario area tha t

Yamashita does not seem to have worried

that Sixt h Arm y coul d o r woul d soo n

mount a strong drive toward th e Baguio

anchor o f th e Shobu Group's triangula r

redoubt. However , t o guar d agains t a

sudden an d unexpecte d breakthroug h

on hi s southwestern flan k Yamashita , o n

or abou t 1 5 January, did strengthe n th e

road junction are a b y dispatching sout h

for attachmen t t o th e 23d Division tw o

infantry battalion s o f th e 19th Division.

For th e rest , th e 58th IMB an d th e 23d

Division wer e to hold the position s the y

then ha d alon g an d o n bot h side s o f

Route 3 from Palacpala c t o Rosario and

Damortis unti l force d bac k o n Baguio .

The defens e o f th e approache s t o Sa n

Jose worrie d Yamashit a fa r more . Th e

direction o f th e I Corps' advance s see m

to hi m t o pos e a direc t an d immediat e

threat t o tha t gatewa y t o th e Cagaya n

Valley. H e als o feare d tha t America n

forces wer e abou t t o driv e o n Sa n Nico -

las at the southern end of the Villa Verde

Trail, th e bes t alternat e rout e towar d

the valle y fro m th e south . Stil l tryin g

to move supplie s and troop s up Rout e 5

through Sa n Jose , h e coul d a t bes t tak e

a very anxious view of the 43d Division's

breakthrough alon g th e 23d Division's

outer line in th e Manoag-Hill 200 area,

for th e defense s o f th e approache s t o

San Jos e fro m thi s directio n wer e stil l

woefully weak . Som e unit s o f th e 2d

Tank Division, concentratin g i n th e

Lupao are a northwes t o f Sa n Jose , ha d

not ye t passe d throug h th e latte r town .

Worse still , th e advanc e echelon s o f th e

105th Division, comin g nort h fro m th e

Shimbu are a wit h fiv e battalion s o f in -

fantry, wer e stil l twenty-fiv e t o thirt y

miles south o f Sa n Jos e a s of 1 5 January.

Something ha d t o b e don e an d don e

quickly i f th e approache s t o Sa n Nico -

las an d Sa n Jos e wer e t o b e hel d muc h

longer.

On 1 5 January, returnin g t o a once -

discarded plan , Yamashit a directe d th e

2d Tank Division t o concentrat e i n th e

Tayug area , southwes t o f Sa n Nicolas .

The divisio n would hold the Villa Verde

Trail and the Ambayabang River valley,

which, lyin g betwee n th e trai l o n th e

east and th e Agno on th e west, provided

an approac h t o Bagui o fro m th e sout h

and southeast . Th e 2d Tank Division

would als o assum e contro l ove r 10th

Division elements—principall y th e 10th

Reconnaissance Regiment—already i n

the Tayug-Sa n Nicola s area . Th e

Shigemi Detachment, still at San Manuel

across th e Agn o wes t o f Tayug , wa s t o

move u p t o Binalona n t o cove r th e displacement o f th e res t o f th e 2d Tank

Division. Ultimately , the 2d Tank Division woul d withdraw up th e Villa Verde

Trail t o Rout e 5 , reconcentrating along

Route 5 t o defen d th e souther n ap -

proaches t o th e Bamban g ancho r o f th e

Shobu defens e triangle . Th e 10th Division, meanwhile , woul d defen d th e im -

mediate approache s to Sa n Jose, holding

that town until the 105th Division passed

through o n it s wa y up Rout e 5 . The n
REDEPLOYMENT AN D TACTICA L PLAN S 145

the 10th Division woul d itsel f withdra w

up Rout e 5 .

Yamashita coul d no t execut e thes e

plans, for the 2d Tank Division reported

that i t coul d no t carr y ou t th e rol e

assigned it . Th e terrai n i n th e TayugSan Nicola s area , th e divisio n reported ,

was il l suite d t o armore d operations .

Moreover, th e division' s terrai n recon -

naissance parties ha d concluded tha t the

Villa Verd e Trail, th e shortest rout e o f

withdrawal fro m th e Tayug-Sa n Nico -

las region, wa s impassable fo r tank s an d

trucks.

Another even t forcin g Yamashit a t o

alter hi s plan s provide s a sa d commen -

tary o n th e stat e o f Japanes e communi -

cations. O n 1 7 January th e 14th Area

Army commande r belatedly learned tha t

the 10th Division had never concentrated

at Sa n Jos e an d tha t i t ha d mad e n o

real effor t t o dispos e itsel f alon g th e

entire Tayug-Umingan-Lupao-San Jos e

defense line for which it was responsible.

Lt. Gen . Yasuyuki Okamoto , th e divi -

sion commander , ha d decide d tha t h e

did no t hav e sufficien t strengt h t o hol d

the relativel y ope n groun d assigne d t o

him. Mos t o f his 39th Infantry wa s with

the Kembu Group, th e bulk o f th e 10th

Infantry, greatl y understrength , wa s at -

tached t o th e 103d Division fo r th e de -

fense o f norther n Luzon , and , at leas t

as lat e a s 1 5 January , h e ha d received

no word a s to when h e might expect the

attached Tsuda Detachment t o arrive in

the Sa n Jos e are a fro m th e eas t coast .

He ha d therefor e withdraw n most o f his

troops u p Rout e 5 fro m Sa n Jos e an d

had started disposing them along the line

Yamashita ha d intende d th e 105th Division t o hold ; leavin g behin d onl y a

reinforced infantr y compan y an d tw o

artillery battalion s t o secur e th e all -

important railhead . Okamot o ha d di -

rected the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment

to remai n i n th e Sa n Nicola s area , an d

he statione d thre e o r fou r rifl e compa -

nies of his 63d Infantry alon g the TayugLupao lin e an d i n risin g groun d t o th e

southwest.

Faced wit h thes e unexpecte d prob -

lems, Yamashit a agai n ha d t o mak e

sweeping change s i n hi s plans . H e de -

cided tha t th e bes t thin g t o d o wa s t o

accept th e 10th Division's redeploymen t

as a fait accompli. H e thereupo n di -

rected th e 2d Tank Division, which ha d

already starte d movin g towar d Tayug ,

to hol d it s mai n strengt h southeas t o f

Tayug t o protec t th e immediat e

approaches t o Sa n Jose . Leavin g th e

Shigemi Detachment i n th e San Manue l

area, th e divisio n woul d concentrat e a t

Lupao an d establis h its Ida Detachment

—a comba t comman d buil t upo n th e

6th Tank Regiment — at Muñoz , o n

Route 5 abou t nin e mile s southwes t o f

San Jose . Thus , bot h mai n approache s

to the latter town—vi a Route 8 from th e

northwest an d Rout e 5 fro m th e south -

west—could b e held , an d force s coul d

be shifte d betwee n th e tw o concentra -

tions alon g a secondar y roa d connectin g

Lupao an d Muñoz .

Yamashita directe d th e 10th Division

to complet e defensiv e preparation s i n

the are a wher e i t wa s alread y disposin g

itself; th e 105th Division, instructe d t o

speed it s northwar d movement , woul d

drop tw o o f its fiv e first-echelo n infantr y

battalions a t Sa n Jose . Ther e th e tw o

battalions, a s wel l a s th e 10th Division

detachments at San Jose an d i n th e area

to the west, would pass to 2d Tank Division control . Th e res t o f th e 105th

Division's firs t echelo n woul d continu e

north u p Rout e 5 .
146 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

To th e northwest , ther e wa s one further change . A s th e Shigemi Detachment prepare d t o mov e wes t fro m Sa n

Manuel to Binalonan in accordance with

the earlie r plans , i t foun d Sixt h Arm y

troops alread y i n th e outskirt s o f th e

latter Rout e 3 town . Therefor e th e

combat command decided t o figh t i t ou t

at Sa n Manuel , wher e i t coul d hol d a t

least on e approac h t o th e Vill a Verd e

Trail.

None o f th e rapi d change s i n plan s

for th e defens e o f th e Sa n Jos e are a

affected Yamashita 's progra m fo r th e

employment of the 23d Division and th e

58th IMB. Thes e units were alread y i n

excellent position to hold the approaches

to Baguio , a fac t tha t becam e increas -

ingly clea r t o I Corp s a s i t continue d

to attac k towar d th e Route s 3-1 1 junc -

tion i n accordanc e wit h Sixt h Army' s

new plans .
CHAPTER I X

Securing th e Sixth Army's Base Area

The Fight for the Routes 3-11

Junction

The 43 d Division , a s i t resume d it s

attack o n 1 7 January t o secur e th e junc -

tion o f Route s 3 and 11 , was well awar e

that stron g Japanes e force s remaine d

within it s zon e o f responsibility . (See

Map II.) Th e divisio n an d it s attache d

158th an d 63 d RCT's ha d goo d reaso n

to believe that hard fightin g wa s in stor e

before the y reache d th e junctio n an d

cleared th e terrai n t o th e Arm y Beach -

head Lin e o n Sixt h Army' s norther n

flank.

The Situation

On 1 7 January , th e 58th IMB, wit h

its ampl e supportin g artillery , wa s stil l

responsible fo r holdin g th e Damortis -

Rosario roa d an d th e Route s 3-11 junc -

tion.1 Th e 23d Division, commande d

by Lt . Gen . Fukutar o Nishiyama , hel d

the terrai n alon g bot h side s o f Rout e 3

south fro m th e road junctio n t o Pozor -

rubio. Th e division' s 1st Battalion, 64th

Infantry, wa s on Hil l 355 , whil e th e 3d

Battalion stil l hel d Mt . Alava. 2 Th e

23d Division's 71st an d 72d Infantry

Regiments defende d th e risin g groun d

east o f Rout e 3 betwee n th e junctio n

and Pozorrubio . Her e th e terrai n ros e

sharply t o a ridg e tha t begin s a t Hil l

600, tw o mile s nort h o f Pozorrubio , an d

stretches northwar d si x mile s t o Hil l

1500, overlookin g th e junction . Hil l

1500 seem s to have been th e responsibility of one o f the 58th IMB's independen t

infantry battalions ; th e rest o f th e ridg e

was defende d b y th e 2d an d 3d Battalions, 72d Infantry,3

 an d th e 3d Battalion,

71st Infantry, Th e 72d Infantry als o had

some strengt h s o emplace d a s t o guar d

the entranc e t o th e Arodoga t Rive r

valley, east o f th e Hill s 600-150 0 ridge ,

in orde r t o block tha t outflankin g valle y

route.

The 2d Battalion, 71st Infantry, hold -

ing defense s i n th e 6t h Division' s zone ,

was cut off from th e res t of th e 23d Division, which ha d a s a reserv e th e 1st Battalion, 71st Infantry, locate d nea r th e

Routes 3-1 1 junction . Tw o battalion s

of th e 19th Division wer e o n thei r wa y

south fro m Bagni o t o reinforc e th e 23d

Division, and th e total strength availabl e

to Genera l Nishiyam a wa s probabl y 1

 Japanese informatio n throughou t thi s sectio n i s

from: 43 d Di v G-2 Pe r Rpts , 2 0 Jan-10 Feb 45 ; 43 d

Div G- 2 Rp t Luzon , Sec . II , Enem y O/B , pp . 2-3;

103d Inf OB/ Rp t Luzon , p. 1 , and atch d maps; 172 d

Inf Rp t Luzon , 9 Jan-13 Fe b 45 , O/B an. , pp . 1-2 ;

33d In f Di v Rp t Luzon , pt . II , Intel , Sec . 2 , Enem y

O/B, pp . 2-6; 14th Area Army T r Or g List. Se e also

above, chs. V I an d VIII .

2

 The 2d Battalion, 64th Infantry, ha d bee n wipe d

out a t Hil l 20 0 by th e 103 d Infantry , 43 d Division . 3

 The 1st Battalion, 72d Infantry, par t o f th e

Kubota Detachment, was cut of f on th e west sid e o f

the Centra l Plains. Se e above , ch. VI.
148 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

close t o 13,00 0 men. Genera l Wing , th e

43d Division's commander, ha d well over

twice tha t numbe r a t hi s disposal . H e

would nee d al l thi s strength , fo r th e

advantages o f terrai n wer e stil l o n th e

side o f th e Japanese .

The terrai n in th e 23d Division's zon e

was varied, withi n th e framewor k o f a n

area comprising generally rising ground.

The groun d i n th e vicinit y o f th e

Damortis-Rosario road ha s already bee n

described; west of Route 3 in th e region

between th e junctio n an d Pozorrubi o

the slope s wer e bare , bu t fairl y gentle ;

east o f th e highwa y th e approache s t o

the crest of the Hills 600-1500 ridge line

were bar e and quit e steep. Deep , shar p

draws separate d individua l knob s

throughout th e area , som e thic k wit h

scrub growth including bamboo thickets,

others gras s banke d an d offerin g littl e

concealment. Throughou t th e are a th e

Japanese had well-established, sometimes

elaborate defenses . The y ha d enlarge d

natural caves , du g ne w ones , an d con -

structed tunnels t o connec t caves. Som e

artillery piece s wer e mounte d o n rail s

for eas y withdrawa l int o caves ; other s

were hidde n i n speciall y constructe d

nipa huts . Well-conceive d camouflag e

and tacticall y soun d emplacemen t o f al l

weapons wer e hallmark s o f th e defense .

General Wing' s pla n fo r securin g th e

Routes 3-11 junction calle d for two converging attacks, bot h essentiall y fronta l

in nature . H e di d no t fee l h e ha d th e

time, th e strength , o r th e necessar y

knowledge o f Japanes e disposition s an d

the terrai n t o mount envelopments . H e

directed th e 63d, 158th, and 172 d Infantry Regiment s t o attac k fro m th e wes t

along the Damortis-Rosario road an d the

103d and 169t h Infantr y Regiment s t o

drive north astrid e Rout e 3 from Pozor -

rubio.4 Th e executio n o f thi s pla n

would involv e th e seizur e o f fou r sepa -

rate objectives : th e Damortis-Rosari o

road an d th e dominatin g terrai n imme -

diately north an d sout h of that section of

Route 3; the Hill 355-Mt. Alava complex

south o f Rosari o and south-southwes t o f

the Routes 3-11 junction; the Hills 600-

1500 ridg e lin e eas t o f Rout e 3 fro m

Pozorrubio nort h t o th e junction ; and ,

finally, the junction and nearb y dominating heights.

Mt. Alava and Hill 355

The 169t h Infantry , 43 d Division, had

moved t o barrio Palacpalac , o n Rout e 3

just north of Pozorrubio, for the purpose

of seeking new routes of approach to Hill

355 an d Mt . Alava. 5 Th e regimen t lef t

one battalio n o n th e sout h sid e o f Hil l

355 t o contain th e Japanes e o n tha t ter -

rain feature . Th e res t o f th e unit spen t

much o f 1 7 an d 1 8 Januar y preparin g

to launc h a n attac k agains t Mt . Alav a

from th e east an d southeast , an d o n th e

18th th e 2 d Battalio n move d nort h o n

Route 3 toward Sison , almost four mile s

beyond Palacpalac . Abou t tw o mile s

south o f Siso n th e uni t branche d of f on

a ne w sectio n o f Rout e 3 tha t bypasse d

Sison t o th e eas t an d rejoine d th e ol d

road hal f a mil e northeast o f th e town .

The Japanese , who ha d perfec t observa -

tion all alon g th e road, made no seriou s

attempt t o oppose the advance until lat e

afternoon, when , as the American battalion secure d th e junctio n northeas t o f

Sison, the y bega n firin g machin e guns ,

4

 43d Di v FO 4 , 17 Jan 45 . 5

 The genera l source s for this subsection are : Sixt h

Army Rp t Luzon , I, 21-33; 43 d Di v Rpt Luzon , pp .

12-23, 81-83, 43 d Div G-3 Pe r Rpts , 17-3 1 Jan 45 ;

169th In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 5-6; 169th In f Uni t Jnl s

and Jn l Files , 17-2 5 Jan 45 .
SECURING TH E SIXT H ARMY 'S BAS E ARE A 149

mortars, and artiller y against th e 169th 's

unit. A t dusk eight accompanying tanks

of th e 716t h Tan k Battalio n wer e sen t

back t o th e Rout e 3 branching betwee n

Sison an d Palacpala c becaus e the y

seemed t o b e drawin g th e Japanese fire .

Beginning about 050 0 o n 1 9 January,

a Japanese force composed of 64th Infantry unit s withdrawin g fro m Mt . Alav a

(and possibl y som e 72d Infantry troop s

cut of f at Sison ) struc k th e 2 d Battalion,

169th Infantry , fro m th e southwest . B y

noon constant Japanese pressure, increasingly heav y Japanes e artiller y fir e fro m

which th e America n troop s coul d fin d

no protection , an d a concomitant threa t

that th e Japanes e migh t cu t Rout e 3

south o f Sison , force d th e battalio n t o

withdraw alon g th e flat , ope n lan d t o

the Rout e 3 for k wher e th e tank s ha d

bivouacked. A s reassembled on 2 0 January, th e 2 d Battalio n ha d onl y 65 0 effec -

tives lef t fro m a landin g strengt h o f

over 1,00 0 men. It s comba t casualtie s

on 1 8 an d 1 9 January ha d totale d ap -

proximately 3 5 me n kille d an d 16 5

wounded; th e broilin g su n ha d take n

an additiona l toll . However , th e fight -

ing on th e 18th and 19t h had no t bee n

wasted. Th e 64th Infantry, i n orde r t o

keep ope n it s lin e o f communications ,

had practicall y denude d it s Mt . Alav a

defenses an d ha d los t nearl y 40 0 me n

killed.

Mt. Alav a wa s no w wid e ope n t o

attack b y th e 169t h Infantry , an d tha t

regiment launche d a n assaul t o n th e

20th. B y evening , th e attackin g force s

had secure d th e bare crest o f th e moun -

tain an d th e nex t da y finishe d moppin g

up. Th e regimen t turne d it s attentio n

to bypasse d Hil l 35 5 and , employin g

two battalions , mad e slo w an d costl y

gains o n th e bare-slope d hil l durin g 2 2

and 2 3 January . B y lat e afternoo n o f

the 24t h th e 169t h ha d cleare d mos t o f

the hill , an d i n th e proces s ha d kille d

nearly 50 0 me n o f th e 1st Battalion,

64th Infantry, an d attache d units. Th e

3d Battalion , 103d Infantry, the n undertook th e reductio n o f th e las t resistanc e

at Hil l 35 5 an d Mt . Alava , an d soo n

developed a quit e sou r vie w o f it s

assignment:

According t o man y infantrymen , a cam - paign for a ridg e syste m is "strategicall y

closed" whe n th e enem y thereon , havin g

lost hi s las t "battleship " an d possessin g

only isolate d group s o f thre e o r fou r thou -

sand men and a dozen or s o artillery pieces,

may n o longe r b e expecte d t o invad e suc - cessfully th e wester n hal f o f th e Unite d

States. Onc e th e enem y i s beate n t o hi s

knees t o this extent , ther e remain s onl y t o

"mop up." 6

At any rate, from 2 5 through 2 8 Janu -

ary th e 103d's battalio n kille d nearl y

150 mor e Japanes e an d capture d o r de -

stroyed fou r 47-mm . antitan k gun s an d

seven 75-mm. and 105-mm . field artiller y

weapons a t Hil l 355 . Three day s later ,

having flushe d a fe w hidde n Japanes e

from Hil l 355 and Mt . Alava , the battalion marche d bac k t o Pozorrubi o t o re -

join its parent unit . Th e firs t o f th e 43 d

Division's four separat e battles was over.

The High Ground East of Route 3

The 103 d Infantry had secured Pozor -

rubio o n 1 7 Januar y agains t scattere d

resistance, thu s openin g a suppl y rout e

to th e 169t h Infantry. 7 O n th e 19th, it s

6

 103d In f Rpt Luzon , p . 36. 7

 Additional informatio n fo r thi s subsectio n i s

from: 103 d Inf Rpt Luzon , pp. 13 , 18-24; 103 d RC T

S-3 Pe r Rpts , 1 6 Jan-15 Feb 45 ; 103d Inf Opn s Jnl,

16 Jan-15 Feb 45; 169t h In f Unit Jnls and Jn l Files ,

24 Jan-15 Feb 45 .
150 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

elements furthe r sout h havin g bee n re -

lieved b y th e 25t h Division , th e 103 d

began t o attac k Hil l 600 , th e souther n

end o f the ridge line lying east o f Route

3 i n th e are a betwee n Pozorrubi o an d

the Route s 3-1 1 junction . Afte r fronta l

assaults tha t cost almost 10 0 me n kille d

or wounded , th e regimen t secure d a

precarious foothol d o n th e hot , grassy ,

open souther n slope s o f Hil l 60 0 abou t

dusk o n 2 0 January, bu t wa s unabl e t o

gain mor e groun d th e nex t da y o n th e

bare terrain , whic h afforde d n o protec -

tion from Japanes e fire . Tha t continued

frontal attac k fro m th e south , a t least ,

would prov e costl y wa s made clea r i n a

shocking manne r o n th e mornin g o f 2 2

January. A n incautiou s grouping of offi -

cers an d enliste d me n i n th e ope n a t a

forward comman d pos t o n Hil l 600 's

southern slope s brough t dow n fiftee n

well-placed round s o f Japanes e 75-mm .

artillery fire . Withi n minute s 4 com -

pany commander s wer e kille d an d 2

others officer s wer e wounded; 7 enlisted

men wer e kille d an d 3 3 mor e wer e

wounded, man y o f the m ke y NCO 's.

The 3 d Battalion , 103 d Infantry , ha d t o

withdraw fro m th e hil l t o reorganize ,

and th e 43 d Divisio n revampe d its plan

of attac k agains t th e Hill s 600-150 0

ridge line .

General Win g now directed th e 103d

Infantry t o establis h a lin e o f departur e

along Route 3 and strike eastward against

the northwester n slope s o f Hil l 600 ,

simultaneously drivin g u p th e south -

western slope s of bare Hill 700 , cresting

nearly 2,00 0 yard s nort h o f th e to p o f

Hill 600 . Th e regimen t wa s als o t o

secure Hil l 800 , lying about 1,20 0 yards

across a n ope n saddl e northwest o f Hil l

700. Th e 169t h Infantry , movin g u p t o

the 103d's left (north) , would seiz e Question Mar k Hill , a little ove r 2,00 0 yards

north o f Hill 800 , and th e 3 d Battalion .

63d Infantry, previousl y I Corps Reserve.

was t o clea r Benchmar k Hill , abou t

1,800 yards northwest of Question Mark.

Once al l thes e bare , steep-slope d hill s

were i n America n hands , th e attackin g

forces woul d drive on t o tak e Hill 1500 ,

the souther n cres t o f whic h la y 2,00 0

yards northwes t o f Benchmar k Hil l

across th e scrubwoo d dra w o f th e

Cauringan River. 8

The ne w attack—essentiall y a fronta l

assault up th e bare, western slopes of the

Hills 600-150 0 ridg e line—starte d o n

the ho t morning of 2 5 January. O n th e

far lef t th e 3 d Battalion , 63 d Infantry ,

secured th e west side of Benchmar k Hil l

at th e cos t o f 8 me n kille d an d 2 8

wounded. The n th e battalio n turne d

north acros s th e Cauringa n Rive r t o

help th e rest o f th e 63 d Infantry , whic h

had just moved ove r from th e DamortisRosario roa d sector , t o clea r Hil l 1500 .

Meanwhile, th e 169t h Infantr y ha d cap -

tured th e ope n cres t o f Questio n Mar k

Hill, but lef t th e eastern slope s i n Japa -

nese hands . O n 2 7 Januar y th e 169t h

relieved element s o f th e 63 d Infantr y

still holdin g th e wester n sid e o f Bench -

mark Hil l an d the n settle d dow n t o a

8

 43d Div FO 5, 24 Jan 45 ; 169th In f FO 2, 24 Jan 45 .

The 33 d Division , late r fightin g ove r th e sam e

ground, kne w Questio n Mar k Hil l a s Hil l 1500 , a

name als o employe d initiall y b y th e 169t h Infantry .

The 33 d Divisio n applie d th e nam e Questio n Mar k

Hill t o anothe r heigh t 1,50 0 yard s nort h o f th e 43 d

Division's Questio n Mar k an d abou t 80 0 yard s eas t

of Benchmar k Hill . Th e 43 d Divisio n kne w th e 33 d

Division's Questio n Mar k a s Hil l 1800 . Th e prob -

lem o f nomenclatur e is furthe r confuse d b y th e fac t

that element s o f th e 33 d Divisio n als o applie d th e

name Questio n Mar k t o a heigh t som e 1,50 0 yard s

north-northeast o f Hil l 1800 . Se e als o below , ch .

XXV.
SECURING TH E SIXT H ARMY' S BAS E ARE A 151

period o f patrollin g to hunt down Japanese straggler s an d pinpoin t defensiv e

installations fo r air an d artiller y strikes.

To th e sout h th e 103 d Infantry (les s

the 3 d Battalion) , o n 2 5 January , ha d

reached th e ope n cres t o f Hil l 60 0 but,

finding it s expose d positio n untenabl e

until heights further nort h wer e cleared

of Japanese , ha d ha d t o withdraw . O n

the regiment' s lef t 8 2 me n wer e kille d

or wounde d i n a n abortiv e attemp t t o

seize Hil l 70 0 an d Hil l 600' s grass y

northwestern slopes . Lat e i n th e after -

noon patrol s discovere d tha t th e Japa -

nese had lef t undefende d th e saddle connecting Hill s 70 0 an d 800 . That nigh t

one battalio n o f th e 103 d employe d th e

saddle as a route of approach t o Hill 800,

which th e uni t secure d agains t a small ,

surprised grou p o f Japanese.

About 150 0 on 2 7 January Compan y

E, 103 d Infantry, manage d t o reac h th e

bare cres t o f Hil l 700 . Half a n hou r

later al l hel l brok e loose , t o th e accom -

paniment o f a violen t tropica l cloud -

burst. Compan y F, 103 d Infantry , whic h

had secure d a foothol d o n th e north -

western slope s o f Hil l 600 , wa s hi t b y a

strong Japanes e counterattack; Japanes e

artillery lambaste d th e 2 d Battalion' s

command post , disruptin g communica -

tions, firin g a n ammunitio n dump , an d

inflicting 1 9 casualties; Japanes e infan -

try struck Company E, which lost 1 5 men

killed o r wounde d an d ha d t o abando n

Hill 700 . Throughout th e followin g

night smal l group s o f Japanes e struc k

intermittently at 103 d Infantr y position s

from Hil l 600 to Hill 800. Th e nex t day

the 103d , lik e th e 169t h Infantry , settle d

down t o a period o f patrollin g and con -

solidating. Th e regimen t mad e on e o r

two furthe r effort s t o tak e Hil l 700 , but

neither i t no r th e Japanes e o f th e 23d

Division wer e abl e t o hol d th e hill' s

narrow, exposed crest. I n effect , th e 43 d

Division an d th e 23d Division compro -

mised o n denyin g th e hillto p t o eac h

other.

The 103 d and 169t h Infantr y Regi -

ments ha d no t accomplishe d thei r origi -

nal missio n o f clearin g th e ridg e fro m

Hill 60 0 nort h t o Questio n Mar k Hill .

On th e othe r hand , the y ha d secure d

much o f th e terrai n immediatel y adja -

cent t o Rout e 3 in their sectors and ha d

largely succeeded in denying to the Japanese the southern two-thirds of the Hills

600-1500 ridg e line , thereb y protectin g

Route 3 from Pozorrubi o nort h agains t

direct an d observe d machin e gun , mor -

tar, and artiller y fire . Th e tas k o f eliminating morta r an d artiller y fir e fro m

more distan t emplacement s woul d de -

volve upo n artiller y an d Arm y an d

Marine Corp s aircraft . Th e tw o 43 d

Division regiment s woul d patro l t o lo -

cate target s fo r thes e supportin g arms ,

simultaneously guardin g thei r ow n portions o f th e 43 d Division' s zon e agains t

Japanese surprise counterattack from th e

east.

The operation s eas t o f Rout e 3 ha d

cost th e 103 d an d 169t h Infantr y Regi -

ments dearly . Heat , fanati c Japanes e

resistance, an d th e necessit y fo r attack -

ing u p open, stee p slope s ha d take n a

heavy tol l until , b y th e en d o f January ,

each o f th e regiments ' infantr y battal -

ions wa s down t o littl e mor e tha n one -

half o f effectiv e strength . Casualtie s had

not been exceptionall y heavy on any one

day—except, perhaps, fo r th e 20 0 killed

and wounde d suffere d b y th e 2 d Battal -

ion, 169t h Infantry , o n 1 8 and 1 9 Janu -

ary—but th e cumulativ e tota l wa s suc h

that th e tw o regiment s wer e badl y i n

need o f rest an d rehabilitation .
152 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

The Damortis-Rosario Road

Since on e win g o f th e 43 d Division' s

converging attac k towar d th e Route s

3-11 junctio n faile d t o accomplis h it s

mission, i t fel l t o th e 63d , 158th , an d

172d Infantr y Regiment s t o seiz e th e

junction, bu t befor e th e thre e unit s

could d o so, it wa s necessary fo r them t o

secure th e Damortis-Rosari o road. 9 B y

17 January the 158t h Infantr y had driven

approximately a mile and a quarter east

along th e roa d bu t the n ha d bee n

stopped a t a defil e throug h whic h th e

road passe d a t a poin t abou t 75 0 yard s

west o f barri o Amlang . Nort h o f th e

defile a reinforce d compan y o f th e 58th

IMB defende d a n open, grassy ridge that

stretched northward from th e vicinit y of

Amlang two miles t o th e Cupang River.

South o f th e road, o n th e middl e o f th e

three ridge s tha t ros e i n step s inlan d

from Lingaye n Gulf' s easter n shore , a

battalion o f th e 58th IMB ha d halte d

both th e right flan k o f th e 158th Infan -

try an d th e forwar d element s o f th e 63 d

Infantry, whic h ha d bee n drivin g north

athwart the middle ridge toward Amlang.

The 58th IMB als o had stron g force s o n

high ground along both side s of Route 3

from Amlan g southeas t tw o mile s t o

barrio Cataguintingan , nea r whic h th e

172d Infantr y ha d reache d th e highway .

The Japanes e unit likewise held partially

wooded high ground tha t lyin g north of

the highway , dominate d th e tow n o f

Rosario an d th e flat , ope n far m lan d

between Rosari o an d Cataguintingan .

All three American regiments were more

or les s stalemated , an d furthe r progres s

by an y on e demande d a breakthroug h

by a t leas t on e other .

During th e perio d 17-1 9 January th e

158th Infantry 's leftmos t units , gather -

ing momentu m behin d clos e ai r an d

artillery support , cleare d th e ridg e lin e

north o f Amlan g agains t scattere d bu t

determined resistance. Sout h of the road,

on th e middle ridge, both th e 158t h an d

the 63d Infantr y Regiment s made negligible gains . Finally , lat e o n th e 18th,

the 158t h an d 63 d mad e patro l contac t

about a mil e sout h o f Amlan g and , coordinating plans , launche d a concerte d

attack o n th e mornin g o f 1 9 Januar y

against 58th IMB defense s alon g th e

northern sectio n o f th e middl e ridge .

The las t Japanes e defense s collapse d o n

the 21st , an d th e 158t h Infantr y wa s

then abl e t o advanc e alon g Rout e 3 ,

securing th e roa d a s fa r a s a roadbloc k

the 63d Infantr y ha d se t up abou t 1,00 0

yards eas t o f Amlang . Th e operation s

from 1 7 through 2 3 January (whe n th e

158th reache d th e 63d's roadblock) cos t

the two regiments roughly 50 men kille d

and 30 0 wounded . Th e 58th IMB los t

nearly 65 0 me n kille d durin g th e sam e

period.

Route 3 continue d southeastwar d

from th e 63d' s roadblock , an d a poo r

road, hardl y mor e tha n a trail , loope d

south fro m th e roadbloc k t o rejoi n th e

main highwa y just wes t o f Cataguintin -

gan. O n 2 3 January, pressed b y General

Wing t o driv e alon g Rout e 3 t o th e

172d Infantry' s positions , th e 158t h In -

fantry dispatche d troop s an d tank s east -

ward alon g bot h th e highwa y an d th e

loop road, but gaine d scarcel y 50 0 yards.

For th e nex t tw o day s th e 158th' s prog -

ress demande d laborious , foot-by-foo t

advances ove r an d u p ope n hill s an d

9

 The principa l source s fo r thi s subsectio n are :

43d Div Rpt Luzon , pp. 12-29 ; 158t h Inf Rpt Damortis-Rosario, pp . 2-4 ; 158th RC T Rp t Luzon , pp .

13-15; 158t h RCT S- 3 Jnl s and Jnl Files , 17-3 1 Jan

45; 172 d Inf Rp t Luzon , 9 Jan-13 Fe b 45 , pp. 6-9 ;

172d In f Jnl, 17-28 Jan 45 . See also above , ch. VI.
SECURING TH E SIXT H ARMY 'S BAS E ARE A 153

MEDIUM TANK S SUPPORT 158T H RCT NEA R DAMORTI S

ridges i n th e fac e o f machine gun, mortar, an d artiller y fire , an d i t wa s no t

until 2 6 Januar y tha t th e regimen t

broke throug h t o Cataguintingan. No w

all tha t remaine d t o clea r th e res t o f

the Damortis-Rosario road was to secure

the flat , ope n two-mil e stretc h betwee n

Cataguintingan an d Rosario , a tas k th e

172d Infantr y ha d bee n abou t sinc e 1 7

January.

In a n expose d positio n o n th e ope n

farm lan d nea r Cataguintingan , it s sup -

plies runnin g low, the 172 d had spen t

17 January patrollin g and consolidatin g

its positions. Th e followin g night a Japanese 155-mm . howitze r battalio n tha t

had bee n supportin g th e 58th IMB at -

tempted to withdraw to Rosario through

the 172 d Infantry's roadblock. Th e Jap -

anese uni t los t fiv e howitzer s destroye d

and ove r 10 0 me n killed . However , a

single roun d fro m a howitze r th e Japa -

nese had managed t o get into action hi t

the command post and ai d statio n of the

2d Battalion , 172 d Infantry, killin g th e

battalion commander , 2 othe r officers ,

and 1 4 enlisted men , and woundin g 1 5

more officers an d men.

On 1 8 January a company of the 172 d

crossed Rout e 3 and seize d position s o n

the southwester n slope s o f Hil l 600 ,

two mile s northeas t o f Cataguintinga n

and a mile northwest o f Rosario. Usin g

the fairl y gentl e souther n slope s o f th e

hill, which was partially covered by scrub

growth, element s o f th e 172 d Infantry
154 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

then occupied a bare hill, also about 600

feet high , approximatel y 1,00 0 yard s

north o f Rosario . Fro m thi s hil l th e

infantry, i n co-operatio n wit h support -

ing artiller y an d aircraft , coul d contro l

much o f th e Rosari o area a s well a s th e

southern reache s o f th e Pug o Valley .

This valle y ra n nort h int o th e moun -

tains t o connect wit h mountai n trail s

leading t o Baguio , an d coul d b e em -

ployed b y th e Japanes e a s a secondar y

avenue o f retrea t o r reinforcement .

The 172 d Infantry marche d o n fro m

the hil l nort h o f Rosari o t o Hil l 606, a

scrub-grown height half a mile northeast

of th e tow n an d overlookin g the stretc h

of Rout e 3 betwee n Rosari o an d th e

Routes 3-1 1 junction. Fro m a bas e o f

operations at Hill 606, patrols went into

Rosario, findin g th e tow n mined , liber -

ally booby-trapped , an d defende d b y

machine gunner s an d rifleme n hidde n

in shattere d buildings. Th e 172 d finall y

cleared Rosari o o n 2 8 January . No w

the regiment could abandon its exposed,

tortuous supply route that wound up the

ridge to Cataguintingan and emplo y the

two-lane, concrete-paved Rout e 3 inland

from Damortis . Th e 43 d Divisio n ha d

completed th e thir d o f it s fou r tasks .

The Routes 3-11 Junction

The fina l mission—securin g the junc -

tion of Route s 3 and 11 a mil e and a

quarter eas t o f Rosario—feature d tw o

regiments in a converging attack.10 Th e

172d Infantr y struc k from th e north and

northwest; th e 63 d Infantr y drove i n

from th e sout h an d southeast . Th e ke y

terrain featur e i n th e 172 d Infantry's

zone was Hill 900, th e scrub-grow n pea k

of th e hill mass of which Hill 606 formed

a southwester n nose. Hil l 900 lay about

a mil e and a half nort h o f th e junction ,

while th e bar e norther n cres t o f Hil l

1500, th e 63 d Infantry 's ke y objective ,

was almost th e sam e distanc e east o f th e

junction an d droppe d steepl y awa y o n

its wester n slope s t o th e Bue d River .

An ol d stretc h o f Rout e 3 , lyin g abou t

half a mile east of the main road, hugged

the botto m o f th e Hil l 150 0 hill mass ,

the souther n crest o f whic h la y approximately half a mile south of th e northern

peak.

Hills 90 0 an d 150 0 were s o locate d

and their defenses wer e so arranged tha t

they ha d t o be attacke d simultaneously ;

neither coul d b e hel d unti l th e othe r

was also largely cleared of Japanese. Ac -

cordingly, th e 63 d an d 172 d Infantry

Regiments launched a dual attack on the

morning of 25 January. T o avoi d costl y

frontal assault , th e 172 d sent its maneuver forc e northeas t betwee n Hill s 60 0

and 60 6 an d acros s th e Pug o Valle y t o

fall upon the Japanese rear on the northwestern shoulde r o f Hil l 900 . Achieving tactical surprise, the regiment cleared

the norther n an d wester n slope s o f th e

hill in time to dig in for the night before

the Japanes e struc k bac k wit h tw o o r

three unsuccessfu l counterattacks . Dur -

ing th e nex t thre e days, drivin g mainl y

against th e rea r o f strong Japanese positions, th e 172 d Infantry banged , clawed,

bayonetted, an d sho t it s wa y sout h

through th e scru b growt h o f Hil l 90 0

against fanatically determined resistance.

The las t defense s fel l o n 2 9 January.

Meanwhile, th e 63 d Infantry , attack -

ing generally t o th e northeast , ha d sen t

10

 This subsection is based on: 43d Div Rpt Luzon ,

pp. 16-23 , 78-80; 172 d Inf Rpt Luzon , 9 Jan-13 Feb

45, pp. 7-10; 172d Inf Jnl, 24 Jan-13 Feb 45; 63d Inf

Rpt Luzon , pp . 4-6; 63d In f S- 3 Pe r Rpts , 24-3 0

Jan 45 .
SECURING TH E SIXT H ARMY 'S BAS E ARE A 155

its 1s t Battalio n acros s th e Bue d Rive r

on 2 5 January t o star t a fronta l assaul t

up th e open western slopes of Hill 1500 .

During the nex t tw o day s th e 2 d Battalion cam e u p o n th e 1st's right, an d th e

3d Battalio n (relieve d a t Benchmar k

Hill b y the 169t h Infantry ) struc k nort h

across th e Cauringan Rive r an d u p Hil l

1500's bar e souther n slopes . Th e 63 d

took th e souther n cres t o f th e hil l mass

on 3 8 January , bu t lef t th e norther n

crest an d th e eastern slope s i n Japanes e

hands. O n th e 30t h th e 172 d Infantry

took ove r th e attac k a t Hil l 1500 , subsequently extendin g th e hol d t o th e

northern peak .

By th e 30th , then , America n troop s

had cleare d th e Japanes e from mos t im -

portant terrai n dominatin g th e Route s

3-11 junction . Patrol s o f th e 172 d Infantry ha d reache d th e junctio n a s early

as 2 8 Januar y but , since th e are a wa s

devoid o f cover , mad e n o attemp t t o

occupy i t permanently . Fo r th e tim e

being, i t wa s enoug h tha t th e hig h

ground overlookin g th e junctio n wa s

secure—the Japanes e coul d n o longe r

send force s dow n Rout e 1 1 from Bagui o

to execut e a surpris e attac k agains t th e

Sixth Army' s left rear .

The fina l operation s t o gai n contro l

over th e junction—fro m 2 5 throug h 3 0

January — had cos t th e 172 d Infantr y

about 3 0 men kille d an d 15 0 wounded,

while th e 63 d Infantr y ha d los t abou t

40 me n kille d an d 27 0 wounded. Per -

haps a s man y a s 1,00 0 Japanese, th e

majority o f the m member s o f th e 58th

IMB, gav e up their live s in the junction

area during the same period. The rough ,

tedious, three-wee k battl e fo r th e junc -

tion wa s over—th e Sixt h Army' s beachhead wa s secure against attac k fro m th e

north an d northeast.

Binalonan and San Manuel:

The I Corps Center

While th e figh t fo r th e Route s 3-1 1

junction had been raging, I Corps center

and righ t flan k division s ha d pushe d

steadily eas t an d southeas t t o secur e

Sixth Army' s easter n flan k an d t o pro -

vide protectio n t o XI V Corps' lef t rear .

(Map III) Th e firs t jo b facin g I Corps'

center division , th e 25th , wa s t o secur e

Route 3 from Pozorrubi o south throug h

Binalonan t o Urdaneta , a tota l road distance of some ten miles. Thi s done, th e

division woul d driv e o n eastwar d t o a

second objectiv e lin e extendin g fro m

San Felipe , tw o an d a half mile s east o f

Binalonan, t o Bactad , thre e an d a hal f

miles east of Urdaneta, anchoring its left

on th e bar e foothill s o f th e Caraball o

Range.11

The terrai n ove r which the 25t h Division wa s t o advanc e wa s fla t an d open ,

characterized b y dr y an d dryin g ric e

paddies, field s fo r othe r crops, and som e

carabao pastur e land , non e o f whic h

provided an y cove r o r concealmen t ex -

cept alon g strea m beds . Th e strea m

beds an d a fe w irrigatio n ditche s con -

stituted the only obstacles to free maneu -

ver, bu t a t thi s season o f th e yea r man y

of th e smalle r stream s wer e dry , and

easy ford s wer e availabl e acros s thos e

that still carried water. A good network

of all-weathe r road s existe d i n th e divi -

sion's sector . Rout e 3 wa s a two-lane ,

macadam highway , whil e th e east-wes t

roads wer e tw o lane s wid e an d grave l

surfaced. Th e onl y rea l transportatio n

problem wa s whethe r th e grave l road s

11

 Sixth Arm y FO's 4 2 and 43, 16 and 1 8 Jan 45 ; I

Corps FO's 2 and 3 , 1 6 and 1 8 Jan 45 .
156 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

could stan d u p unde r th e constan t

pounding o f heav y militar y traffic .

The division' s firs t majo r objectiv e

was the road junction town of Binalonan,

about midwa y betwee n Pozorrubi o an d

Urdaneta. Th e tow n wa s held b y remnants o f th e Shigemi Detachment ar -

mored forc e tha t ha d made the abortive

counterattack agains t element s o f th e

103d Infantry, 43 d Division , during th e

night o f 16-1 7 January.12 Unde r orders

to mov e u p t o Binalona n fro m Sa n

Manuel, si x mile s t o th e east , th e Shigemi Detachment ha d evidentl y starte d

its displacemen t o n 1 6 o r 1 7 January ,

but th e movemen t cease d o n th e 17t h

when Genera l Shigem i learne d tha t

American troop s wer e withi n a mil e o f

Binalonan. Thus , as o f 1 7 January, th e

Japanese garrison at Binalona n was composed o f a compan y o f th e 2d Mobile

Infantry, 2d Tank Division; eight or ten

tanks o f th e 7th Tank Regiment; a fe w

artillerymen mannin g tw o o r thre e 75 -

mm. weapons ; an d som e straggler s o f

the 2d Battalion, 64th Infantry, fro m th e

Hill 20 0 are a wes t o f Binalonan . Th e

total forc e probabl y numbered less tha n

350 troops. 13

The defense s withi n Binalona n wer e

of a hast y natur e — trenches an d dir t

bunkers fo r th e infantry , sandbagge d

emplacements unde r buildings , an d

earthern revetment s behin d whic h me -

dium tank s wer e hidde n hul l dow n a s

pillboxes. Wit h insufficien t force s t o

man a perimeter all around, the garrison

concentrated a t th e souther n an d east -

ern side s of Binalona n i n orde r t o hol d

the approaches to three bridges ove r th e

Tagumising River, whic h flowe d south -

ward pas t th e easter n borde r o f th e

town.14

On th e mornin g o f 1 7 Januar y th e

161st Infantry , o n th e 25t h Division' s

left, relieve d troops of the 103d Infantr y

holding a perimeter a mile west of Binalonan an d immediatel y bega n patrollin g

toward th e town. 15 Th e 27t h Infantry ,

on th e division 's right , move d forwar d

the same day from th e vicinit y of Mana -

oag an d secure d Rout e 3 fro m a poin t

about a mile sout h o f Binalona n t o th e

6th Division' s lef t a t Urdaneta .

The regimenta l commander , Col .

James L . Dalto n II , delaye d th e 161st

Infantry's advance toward Binalona n for

a coupl e o f hours whil e h e determine d

that a raid against his rear elements near

Manaoag had n o significance . Then , i n

the afternoon , hi s 3 d Battalio n pushe d

into the northern hal f o f Binalonan and

cleared tha t sectio n o f th e tow n befor e

dark. Meanwhile , Japanes e rifl e an d

machine gu n fir e ha d stoppe d th e 1s t

Battalion a bloc k shor t o f th e Tagumising Rive r i n th e souther n hal f o f town .

About 173 0 a lon e Japanes e tan k ra n

across th e battalion's front , sprayin g the

area wit h 47-mm . an d machin e gu n fir e

before i t wa s destroyed . Shortl y there -

after, fiv e mor e tank s bega n whippin g

through th e streets i n th e southern an d

central section s o f th e tow n i n a com -

pletely disorganize d counterattac k

marked b y wild firin g i n ever y direction

by bot h side s i n th e affray . Th e 161s t

12

 See above, ch. VI. 13

 25th Di v Rpt Luzon , pp. 21-22; 161st Inf, Battle

of Binalonan , p . 2 . (Th e 161st Infantry's report fo r

Luzon is divided int o a serie s of separate narratives, one fo r eac h engagement. )

14

 161st Inf , Battle of Binalonan , p . 2 . 15

 The battl e fo r Binalonan is reconstructed from :

25th Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 20-22 ; 161s t Inf, Battle o f

Binalonan, pp . 2-5 ; 161st Inf S- 3 Pe r Rpts , 17-1 8

Jan 45 .
SECURING TH E SIXT H ARMY' S BAS E ARE A 157

Infantry finall y destroye d th e fiv e tanks ,

and th e nigh t settle d dow n t o a "stati c

fire fight " betwee n th e infantr y

elements.18

With th e help of thre e mediums from

the 716th Tank Battalion, the 161st completely cleared Binalona n b y 130 0 o n 1 8

January. I n an d aroun d th e tow n th e

regiment ha d kille d som e 25 0 Japanese

and ha d destroye d o r capture d 9 tanks ,

2 75-mm. artiller y weapons , 5 trucks ,

an artiller y tractor , and larg e quantitie s

of ammunition . Th e 161s t lost 1 9 men

killed, 6 6 wounded , an d 3 truck s de -

stroyed. Fo r th e 25t h Divisio n th e cos t

had bee n relativel y lo w considerin g th e

degree o f contro l i t ha d gaine d ove r

roads leadin g t o th e east, southeast , an d

south. Certainl y th e cos t woul d hav e

been fa r greate r ha d th e mai n bod y o f

the Shigemi Detachment bee n i n it s

proper positio n a t Binalona n instea d o f

six mile s awa y a t Sa n Manuel .

After th e captur e o f Binalona n Gen -

eral Swift , th e I Corp s commander ,

directed th e 25t h Divisio n t o mov e u p

to th e Sa n Felipe-Bacta d lin e b y even -

ing on 2 0 January; secur e crossings ove r

the Agn o River, whic h flowe d generall y

southward i n th e division' s sector ; an d

then reconnoite r eastwar d acros s th e

Agno u p t o te n mile s beyon d th e Sa n

Felipe-Bactad line. 17 Th e jo b was a big

one, fo r th e division' s fron t woul d ex -

tend i n a n ar c nearl y thirt y mile s lon g

from Pozorrubi o around t o the 6t h Divi -

sion's left an d woul d hav e t o be covered

without hel p o f th e 35t h RCT , whic h

was still i n arm y reserve. Bu t Maj . Gen.

Charles L . Mullins , Jr., the 25th' s commander, wa s not to o worried . H e ha d

enough informatio n t o kno w tha t th e

27th Infantr y woul d encounte r fe w Japanese, an d h e als o kne w tha t th e onl y

significant Japanes e forc e stil l lef t wes t

of th e Agn o Rive r wa s the Shigemi Detachment a t Sa n Manuel . H e ha d rea -

sonably accurat e informatio n abou t th e

combat command 's strengt h an d arma -

ment, but h e did no t know tha t Genera l

Shigemi ha d electe d t o stan d t o th e las t

man a t Sa n Manuel. 18

Dug i n a t Sa n Manuel , th e Shigemi

Detachment wa s hardl y a n asse t t o

Yamashita's Shobu Group. I t guarde d

but on e approac h t o th e Vill a Verd e

Trail rout e int o th e group' s fina l re -

doubt—a poo r roa d runnin g eas t fro m

San Manue l t o Sa n Nicola s an d crossin g

the Agn o Rive r vi a a long , rock y for d

that wa s nearl y impassabl e t o wheele d

vehicles. A goo d grave l roa d ra n sout h

from Sa n Manue l an d connecte d wit h

other road s leading toward th e entrance

to the Villa Verde Trail and towar d San

Jose a s well . Thes e road s sout h o f Sa n

Manuel wer e wel l connecte d wit h Ur -

daneta an d othe r town s i n th e 6t h an d

25th Divisions ' sectors . Th e Shigemi

Detachment could not withdraw east, for

it had already decided tha t the long ford

and th e Vill a Verd e Trai l wer e impas -

sable fo r its armor, artillery , an d trucks ;

there wer e n o road s t o th e north ; with -

drawal t o th e wes t wa s already impossi -

ble; an d th e escap e rout e t o th e sout h

was cu t o n 1 9 Januar y whe n th e 27t h

Infantry, 25t h Division , move d int o

Asingan, four miles south of San Manuel.

Not knowin g tha t Genera l Shigem i

had mad e u p hi s min d t o figh t t o th e

death a t Sa n Manuel , Genera l Mullin s

16

 161st Inf, Battle of Binalonan , pp. 3-4. 17

 I Corps FO 3 , 18 Jan 45 .

18

 25th Di v Rp t Luzon , p . 22 . Se e als o above , ch .

VIII.
158 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

considered th e Shigemi Detachment a

strong threa t t o hi s lef t tha t h e woul d

have t o eliminat e befor e th e 25t h Divi -

sion coul d thrus t acros s th e Agno . Ac -

cordingly, he directed th e 161st Infantr y

to destroy the Shigemi Detachment. The

ensuing engagement , give n Genera l

Shigemi's plan t o hold fast , ha d little significance in th e broad scope of the Luzon

Campaign. However , i t foreshadowe d

subsequent encounter s wit h Japanes e

armor an d provide s a nea t pictur e o f

25th Divisio n tactica l maneuve r agains t

armor employe d a s a purel y stationar y

defensive weapon .

San Manue l lie s just off the southeast -

ern nos e of a bare, steep-sided ridge that,

rising to a height o f 85 0 fee t less tha n a

mile north of town, leads northward into

the Caraball o Mountains. 19 Alon g th e

west sid e o f th e ridg e lie s th e Abored o

River an d it s steep-banke d valley ,

stretching nort h t o connec t wit h roug h

mountain trail s leadin g towar d Baguio .

East o f th e ridge is a lesse r strea m an d a

dirt road that heads northward fiv e mile s

to the Agno River nea r th e point wher e

that strea m debouche s fro m it s moun -

tain gorge s t o begi n it s majesti c swee p

across th e Centra l Plains .

The strea m eas t o f th e ridg e run s o n

south throug h a steep draw o n th e east -

ern sid e of Sa n Manuel . A small drainage ditc h run s aroun d th e nos e o f th e

ridge o n th e nort h sid e o f town , th e

southern an d wester n side s o f whic h ar e

lined wit h deep , broa d drainag e an d

irrigation ditches. Dens e bamboo thick -

ets, som e o f whic h include d larg e trees ,

grow alon g th e outskirt s o f th e town .

The onl y fairl y ope n approac h is on th e

southwest, wher e th e mai n roa d fro m

Binalonan comes in past a small cemetery.

The Japanes e garrison numbered over

a thousan d men , with th e rifl e element s

concentrated i n th e understrengt h 1st

Battalion, 2d Mobile Infantry. Ther e

were 40 medium an d 5 light tank s of the

7th Tank Regiment, abou t 1 5 75-mm .

and 105-mm . artiller y piece s fro m th e

2d Mobile Artillery, a few 47-mm. antitank guns, at least 2 5 machine guns, and

15 o r mor e ligh t mortars . Th e defens e

was centere d o n tank s i n earthe n revet -

ments. Ther e were 75 revetted emplace -

ments i n Sa n Manuel , eac h ringe d wit h

rifle pit s an d a t leas t on e machin e gu n

position. Initially , tank s occupie d 2 5 to

30 of the revetments, while Shigemi held

out 1 0 t o 1 5 tank s a s a mobil e reserve .

Tanks an d infantr y coul d mov e rapidl y

from on e revette d strongpoin t t o an -

other. Th e Japanes e oriented th e defenses principall y agains t attac k fro m th e

west, southwest, and south , but the y di d

not neglect the other approaches entirely

and dispose d their weapons in depth for

all-around defense .

Considering the tactical importance of

the ridge north o f town t o both attacker

and defender, it is almost incredible that

the Shigemi Detachment statione d onl y

a platoo n o f infantr y there . Th e 161s t

Infantry mad e n o suc h mistake . Th e

regiment had to seize the ridge to secure

its northern flank , t o block th e Aboredo

19

 The stor y of the fight a t San Manuel is based on:

161st Inf , Engagement fo r th e Abored o River-San

Manuel Hil l Mass , pp . 1-4, an d atch d opn s sketch ;

Brig Gen James L. Dalton II, Commentary on Reduction o f Stron g Point , Sa n Manuel , Luzon , pp . 1- 7

(this is the 161st Infantry's onl y report for th e mai n

battle); 161st Inf S-3 Opn s Rpts, 19-2 9 Jan 45 ; 25th

Div Rp t Luzon , pp . 22-35 ; 716t h Tan k B n Rp t

Luzon, p . 67 .

For heroi c action—succoring wounded while under

heavy Japanes e fir e a t Binalona n an d Sa n Manue l

during th e perio d 18-2 4 January—T/ 4 Lavern e

Parrish o f th e Medica l Detachment , 161s t Infantry ,

was posthumousl y awarde d th e Meda l o f Honor .
SECURING TH E SIXT H ARMY 'S BAS E ARE A 159

Valley a s a rout e o f Japanes e reinforce -

ment o r withdrawal , an d t o gai n a n

excellent jump-of f poin t fo r th e attack .

For th e rest , Colone l Dalton 's pla n fo r

the reductio n o f Sa n Manue l calle d fo r

a convergin g attack . Th e 2 d Battalio n

was t o mak e th e mai n effort , strikin g

from th e north; the 1st Battalion, in support, woul d move i n fro m th e west an d

southwest from th e south side of the road

to Binalonan . Th e 3 d Battalio n wa s at

this time i n corp s reserve , bu t th e 161s t

Infantry wa s strengthene d b y a rein -

forced compan y o f th e 716t h Tan k Bat -

talion an d Compan y D , 98t h Chemica l

Battalion, with its 4.2-inc h mortars.

By evening on 2 3 January, a t th e cost

of 3 me n kille d an d 5 wounded , th e

161st ha d secured th e southern slope s o f

the bare ridge north o f San Manue l an d

had se t u p trai l block s i n th e Abored o

Valley. Th e entir e 2 d Battalio n the n

deployed along a line of departure northwest o f th e tow n i n preparatio n fo r a

dawn attac k o n th e 24th . Th e 1s t Bat -

talion, comin g forwar d alon g th e roa d

from Binalonan , halted a t th e last cove r

west of San Manuel .

On 2 4 Januar y th e 1s t Battalion' s

secondary attac k starte d first , behin d a

fifteen-minute artiller y and mortar preparation. Th e effor t failed . Supportin g

tanks could no t cros s a tree-line d drain -

age ditch o n th e southwest side of town ,

and Japanes e 47-mm. fir e destroye d on e

tank an d temporaril y disable d fou r

others. A sixt h tan k wa s immobilize d

when i t attempte d t o hurdl e th e ditch .

Pinned down, partiall y in th e open, hot

fields, th e 1s t Battalion lost 6 men kille d

and 5 5 wounde d durin g th e day ; the

supporting tan k compan y lost anothe r 2

men killed an d 8 wounded. Lat e in th e

afternoon bot h th e infantr y an d th e

tanks withdre w westwar d t o covere d

positions.

The firs t attack s b y th e 2 d Battalio n

met wit h n o greate r success . Compan y

F, striking down the ridge, advanced fift y

yards int o Sa n Manuel , bu t a Japanes e

counterattack, spearheade d b y thre e

tanks, drove the company out o f town at

midmorning. The 2 d Battalion launched

another attac k shortl y afte r 1730 , with

Cannon Compan y M7' s and Antitan k

Company 37-mm. guns i n clos e support.

At dar k th e battalio n ha d a tenuou s

hold o n th e norther n par t o f Sa n Man -

uel, an d it s supportin g weapon s ha d

knocked ou t fiv e Japanes e tank s an d re -

duced th e volum e o f machin e gu n an d

rifle fir e that had been slowing the attack.

During 25 and 2 6 January the 2 d Battalion, supporte d b y tank s transferre d

from th e 1s t Battalion' s secto r an d b y

elements of both th e 1s t an d th e 3 d Bat -

talion, inched its way southward through

the town , gainin g tw o o r thre e block s

across a front si x blocks wide. Compan y

B, attached , move d aroun d t o th e 2 d

Battalion's lef t (east ) flan k an d blocke d

the bridge over the draw on th e east side

of Sa n Manuel , thereb y cuttin g th e las t

route by which th e Japanes e could evac -

uate thei r tanks . Earl y o n th e mornin g

of th e 27t h all of the 1s t Battalio n swung

around t o the 2d's left , an d at mid-morning th e tw o battalion s launche d a co -

ordinated attac k southward behind close

support fro m tw o battalion s o f 105-mm .

howitzers. B y dusk, afte r a blood y day's

fighting a t clos e quarters , th e tw o battalions were abreast along the north side

of th e main road through town .

About 010 0 o n th e 28t h th e Japanes e

launched a counterattac k agains t th e

regimental cente r wit h 1 3 tank s i n

waves o f 3 o r 4 each , Japanes e infantr y
160 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

following. Th e 161s t knocked ou t 1 0

tanks; th e other 3 and infantr y survivors

then withdre w int o th e southeaster n

corner of th e town . Befor e dawn most of

the Japanes e lef t i n Sa n Manue l scram -

bled acros s th e dra w o n th e east sid e o f

town an d fled , bu t no t befor e launchin g

a fina l counterattac k t o cove r thei r es -

cape. A t 093 0 th e 161s t Infantry's tw o

battalions resume d th e driv e southwar d

through th e town , an d b y 133 0 San

Manuel wa s clear.

In a heroic but tacticall y unimportant

stand th e Shigemi Detachment ha d virtually fulfille d it s self-impose d desir e fo r

annihilation i n place . Th e detachmen t

had los t 75 0 me n killed ; al l it s tanks ,

artillery, trucks, machine guns, an d mortars ha d bee n eithe r capture d o r de -

stroyed. Probabl y n o mor e tha n 250

troops escaped , an d man y o f the m wer e

unarmed an d wounded . Th e 161st Infantry an d attache d unit s ha d los t ap -

proximately 6 0 me n kille d an d 20 0

wounded; th e 716th Tank Battalio n los t

3 tanks.

The necessit y fo r th e blood y assaul t

on Sa n Manuel is, perhaps, open t o question. Colone l Dalto n stated :

The tow n coul d a t an y time hav e bee n

by-passed t o th e south an d blocke d off. . . . no noticeabl e effor t wa s made [by the Japa -

nese] t o hol d th e easter n exi t o f town , s o

that afte r thre e days ' fightin g [American ]

traffic could have passed unimpeded through

the nort h sid e o f tow n an d o n t o Sa n

Nicolas. Tw o mor e day s wer e require d t o

clear th e souther n hal f o f town. 20

Yet common sense lent ample support to

General Mullins ' decisio n t o eliminat e

the Shigemi Detachment befor e sendin g

his divisio n o n t o execut e al l th e mis -

sions assigned it by I Corps. Mullin s did

not kno w tha t th e Shigemi Detachment

intended t o hol d i n place—t o hi m th e

combat comman d clearl y possesse d a

counterattack capabilit y an d therefor e

constituted a threa t t o his left . A s matters stoo d a t 133 0 on 2 8 January , th e

25th Divisio n coul d advanc e eastward t o

cross th e Agn o Rive r i n it s secto r with -

out havin g t o worr y abou t th e securit y

of it s left flank .

Advancing the I Corps Right

The chie f responsibility fo r protecting

XIV Corps ' lef t rea r durin g th e earl y

stages o f th e corp s driv e sout h throug h

the Centra l Plain s o f Luzo n devolve d

upon th e 6th Infantr y Division , I Corps'

rightmost unit . Th e division' s mission s

were t o clea r th e remainin g terrai n t o

the Arm y Beachhea d Lin e i n it s sector;

drive south an d east t o an objectiv e lin e

stretching from Bactad , on th e 25th Division's right, south almos t fiftee n mile s to

Cuyapo; seiz e an d secur e crossing s ove r

the Agn o Rive r i n it s zone ; an d recon -

noiter sout h an d southwes t towar d

Guimba an d Victori a t o establis h con -

tact wit h th e 37t h Division' s left . Th e

6th Divisio n woul d star t t o execut e th e

missions understrength, for its 63d RC T

remained unde r 43d Division contro l for

the duratio n o f th e figh t fo r th e Route s

3-11 junction. 21

By 1 7 January, when th e 6t h Divisio n

started forwar d fro m th e Malasiqui -

Manaoag line it had held sinc e the 14th,

division patrol s ha d discovere d a pocke t

20

 Dalton, Commentar y o n Reductio n o f Sa n Manuel, p. 4.

21

 The 105-mm . howitze r battalio n tha t normall y

supported th e 63d Infantr y wa s with the 6th Division,

but th e rest o f th e RC T attachment s remained wit h

the regiment.
SECURING TH E SIXT H ARMY 'S BAS E ARE A 161

of Japanes e in th e Cabaruan Hills , lying

athwart a secondary gravel-surfaced roa d

connecting Malasiqu i wit h Villasis , o n

the Agno River si x mile s south of Urda -

neta. Th e divisio n als o ha d reaso n t o

believe tha t th e Japanese held Urdanet a

and controlle d th e grave l roa d tha t le d

from Urdanet a three and a half miles east

to Bactad . Indication s wer e tha t stron g

Japanese force s migh t likewis e b e en -

countered at Villasis, holding the Route

3 bridge across the Agno, and at Carmen

and Resales , jus t acros s th e rive r fro m

Villasis.

The Cabaruan Hills

Crossed by the Army Beachhead Line,

the Cabaruan Hills formed a low barrier

approximately fou r mile s squar e tha t

dominated th e approache s t o Rout e 3

and the Agno River east and south of the

6th Division . Wit h few heights over 20 0

feet, th e hills were covered with bamboo

thickets, scattere d palms , a fe w patche s

of scru b growth , an d ope n fields . Shal -

low valleys , eithe r grass y o r cultivated ,

separated individua l knolls and afforde d

little opportunit y fo r covere d o r con -

cealed approac h t o Japanes e defenses. 22

Originally, th e Cabarua n Hill s ha d

been th e souther n ancho r o f th e 23d

Division's oute r defens e line . Th e gar -

rison, known a s the Omori Detachment,

was built aroun d th e 2d Battalion, 71st

Infantry, an d numbere d abou t 1,50 0

troops. Reinforcin g unit s include d a

battery of 75-mm. artillery, two or thre e

medium tanks, various service units, and

the Gun Company, 71st Infantry. De -

fenses, unde r preparation for some time,

were concentrate d i n th e northwester n

section o f th e hill s i n a n are a immedi -

ately wes t o f th e tow n o f Cabarua n

which la y a t th e north-centra l edg e o f

the hills. 23

As had been the case with th e Shigemi

Detachment, it might have been possible

to bypas s th e Omori Detachment an d

contain i t wit h minimu m forces . Maj .

Gen. Edwi n D, Patrick, the 6t h Division

commander, seem s t o hav e ha d suc h a

plan i n mind. 24 H e apparentl y hope d

that a har d attac k b y th e 20t h Infantry ,

on hi s division's right , coul d overcom e

most o f th e Japanes e resistanc e i n tw o

or thre e days . The n h e coul d leav e a

single battalion behind to mop up while

the rest o f the division pushed on t o the

Bactad-Cuyapo objectiv e line. 25

In preparatio n fo r its attack, th e 20t h

Infantry ha d slowl y move d troop s int o

the hills until, at dawn o n th e 17th , th e

1st Battalio n wa s i n th e cente r o f th e

hills, wher e a north-sout h trai l crosse d

the roa d t o Villasis ; th e 2 d Battalion ,

which wa s t o mak e th e mai n effort , wa s

at barri o Lunec , a t th e hills' northwestern corner ; th e 3 d Battalio n wa s i n

reserve of f th e west-centra l edg e o f th e

terrain complex . B y evenin g o n th e

18th, th e 2d Battalion had reached a low

ridge line about 2,50 0 yards west of th e

town o f Cabarua n an d ha d determine d

that th e cente r o f resistanc e la y i n a

U-shaped grou p o f knoll s an d ridge s

1,000 t o 1,50 0 yard s t o its front. Whil e

the 20t h Infantr y clearl y ha d no t ye t

22

 6th Di v Rpt Luzon , p . 8 .

23

 SWPA Hist Series, II, 436 , n . 9; 6th Div , S p Rpt ,

The Battl e of the Cabaruan Hills, p. 11 . The Omori

Detachment wa s name d afte r th e infantr y battalio n

commander. 24

 The res t o f thi s subsectio n i s mainl y base d on : 6th Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 8-16 ; 6th Div , Battl e o f

Cabaruan Hills , pp . 1-13; 20t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp .

9-16; 1s t In f Rpt Luzon , pp. 12-18 . 25

 See, fo r thi s idea , 6t h Di v FO's 5 , 6 , 7 , an d 8 ,

respectively date d 15 , 16 , 18 , an d 1 9 Jan 45 .
162 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

reached th e mai n defenses , th e attac k

had s o fa r gon e easie r tha n anticipated ,

and Genera l Patric k expecte d tha t th e

regiment could complete its task by dark

on th e 19th. 26 I t had better, for I Corp s

had directe d th e 6t h Divisio n t o ge t t o

the Bactad-Cuyap o lin e b y dus k o n th e

20th.27

Despite a setbac k durin g th e after -

noon, operation s o n 1 9 January seeme d

to meet with success. B y evening of tha t

day ove r 50 0 Japanes e ha d bee n kille d

throughout the hills, and th e 20t h Infan -

try estimate d tha t no t mor e tha n 30 0

were left i n th e northwest pocket . Sinc e

it appeare d tha t littl e furthe r effor t

would b e require d t o overcome th e last

opposition, General Patric k directe d th e

20th Infantr y t o pull two of its battalions

out o f th e hills . Th e remainde r o f th e

regiment, reinforce d b y a compan y o f

4.2-inch mortar s an d on e o f mediu m

tanks fro m th e 44t h Tan k Battalion ,

would finis h moppin g up.

Probing slowl y throug h th e roughes t

ground in the Cabaruan Hills on 2 0 and

21 January , th e 20t h Infantry' s rein -

forced battalio n jumped off in th e morning o f th e 22 d in wha t wa s expected t o

be th e las t attack , it s wa y pave d b y a n

especially heav y artiller y an d ai r bom -

bardment. Bu t from th e start, operations

on 2 2 January di d no t g o a s planned .

The ai r strike , conducte d b y Fift h Ai r

Force A-20's wa s fou r hour s late , sub -

jecting th e infantr y t o " a nerv e rackin g

wait,"28 an d di d no t includ e requeste d

napalm. Ai r an d artiller y concentra -

tions were, however, wel l placed , an d i t

seemed improbable to the waiting infantry tha t man y Japanes e could hav e lived

through them . A combine d tank-infan -

try assaul t bega n abou t 123 0 and pro -

ceeded slowly but steadil y for almost two

hours. The n th e attackers were stoppe d

cold b y a tremendou s burs t o f rifle ,

machine gun , an d ligh t artiller y fir e

from th e ver y hillsides that had receive d

the weight o f th e bombardments. Com -

pany E, in th e lead, fel l back ; Compan y

G's officer s wer e al l eithe r kille d o r

wounded, an d th e compan y wa s temporarily scattered ; Compan y F wa s pinned

in place ; tw o supportin g tank s wer e

knocked out; casualties mounted quickly

to 1 0 men kille d an d 3 5 wounded.

As early as 20 January th e 20t h Infan -

try ha d estimate d tha t on e reinforce d

battalion wa s to o wea k fo r th e tas k a t

hand and ha d aske d tha t another battalion b e committed . Col . Washington M .

Ives, Jr. , the regimenta l commander, re -

quested that he be given at least an additional rifl e compan y an d followe d hi s

request wit h a report tha t 60 0 Japanese

remained i n th e Cabarua n Hills. 29

Greatly perturbe d b y th e implie d dela y

to a general advanc e south an d east tha t

the 20t h Infantry's request and estimat e

brought up, General Patrick directed the

1st Infantry to send one battalion to reinforce Colonel Ives, a redeployment made

possible because the 1s t Infantr y had en -

countered onl y scattered resistanc e in its

sector.30

On 2 4 Januar y th e reorganize d 2 d

Battalion o f th e 20t h Infantr y hel d i n

place a s th e newl y arrive d battalio n o f

the 1st Infantr y too k up the attack. Th e

26

 6t h Di v F O 7 , 1 8 Jan 45 . 27

 I Corps FO 3, 18 Jan 45. 28

 6th Div Rpt Luzon , p. 12 .

29

 Entry 20, 20th In f Uni t Jnl, 20-21 Jan 45 ; Entry

34, 20t h In f Uni t Jnl , 21-2 2 Jan 45 ; Entr y 10 , 20t h

Inf Uni t Jnl, 22-2 3 Jan 45 ; Entr y 41 , 6th Di v G- 3

Jnl, 2 2 Jan 45 ; 20th Inf S-3 Pe r Rp t 15 , 22-23 Jan 45. 30

 Entries 4 8 an d 49 , 6th Di v G- 3 Jnl , 2 2 Jan 45 .
SECURING TH E SIXT H ARMY' S BAS E ARE A 163

WATCHING AN D WAITING I N CABARUA N HILL S

1st Infantry' s battalio n mad e limite d

gains, bu t ha d closed with th e main de -

fenses b y dark . Prospect s for quic k suc -

cess seeme d s o muc h brighte r tha t th e

20th Infantry's elements were withdrawn

from th e hills .

General Kruege r ha d b y now take n a

direct interes t i n th e figh t an d o n th e

24th directe d Genera l Swift , I Corp s

commander, "to promptly eliminate" the

remaining oppositio n i n th e Cabarua n

Hills lest the 6th Division and, concomitantly, XI V Corps , b e furthe r delayed. 31

General Swif t relaye d th e messag e t o

General Patrick , wh o reporte d t o th e

corps commande r tha t th e 1s t Infantr y

could probabl y clea r u p th e las t resis -

tance i n anothe r day . There wer e onl y

a hundred Japanese left aliv e in th e last

pocket, Patric k estimated , an d ther e

seemed no necessity to commit additional

troops.32

The 1s t Infantry' s battalio n attacke d

again o n th e 25t h bu t b y nightfal l ha d

gained onl y 30 0 yard s o f ne w groun d

against determined resistance, Neverthe -

31

 Rad, Krueger t o Swift , WL-558, 24 Jan 45 , Sixth

Army G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 22-24 Jan 45.

32

 Telecon, CG I Corp s an d ACof S Sixt h Army , 2 5

Jan 45 , Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 24-2 5 Ja n

45; Telecon, G-3 6t h Di v and G-3 I Corps, 194 0 24

Jan 45 , 6th Di v G- 3 Jn l File , 2 4 Jan 45 ; Entr y 46 ,

6th Di v G-3 Jnl , 25 Jan 45 .
164 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

less, about 1830 General Patrick reported

to General Swift that organized resistance

in th e Cabaruan Hills was over, an esti -

mate wit h whic h th e 1s t Infantr y di d

not agree . Instead , th e regimen t be -

lieved that 15 0 to 200 Japanese still held

strong position s an d requeste d tha t be -

fore resumin g th e attac k it s assaul t battalion b e reinforce d wit h te n t o twelv e

flame throwe r teams. 33 Actio n o n 2 6

January prove d th e 1s t Infantr y right .

During the morning the battalion gained

only 15 0 yard s a t th e cos t o f 1 2 men

killed, 12 wounded, and a tank destroyed.

General Patric k thereupo n directe d th e

regiment to move another battalion into

the hills for a co-ordinated attack on th e

27th.34

The two-battalio n attac k wa s successful an d b y 160 0 on 2 8 January th e 1s t

Infantry ha d overcom e al l resistanc e i n

the Cabaruan Hills. I n the last two days,

the 1s t Infantry' s battalio n lost approximately 2 0 me n kille d an d 5 0 wounde d

while killing an additional 225 Japanese.

A fina l summatio n disclose d tha t ove r

1,400 Japanes e ha d bee n kille d i n th e

hills betwee n 1 7 an d 2 8 January. Th e

6th Division' s unit s engage d ther e ha d

lost about 8 0 men kille d an d nearl y 20 0

wounded. Th e Omori Detachment ha d

indeed fough t t o the death, but whil e i t

had done so the bulk of the 6th Divisio n

had swept around and beyond it.

Urdaneta to Cuyapo

On 1 7 January , whil e th e 20t h Infan -

try starte d closin g i n o n th e Omori Detachment, th e 1s t Infantr y bega n t o

advance toward Urdanet a from th e west

and northwest.35 At Urdaneta a small outpost o f the Shigemi Detachment pu t u p

a figh t strikingl y similar to that in which

the 161s t Infantry, 25t h Division , ha d

engaged at Binalonan . Th e 1s t Infantr y

lost about 5 men killed and 1 5 wounded

at Urdaneta ; th e Shigemi Detachment

lost ove r 10 0 men kille d an d anothe r 9

tanks destroyed.

Relieved a t Urdanet a b y elements o f

the 25t h Divisio n on 1 9 January, the 1s t

Infantry spe d southwar d alon g Rout e 3

toward Villasis an d th e Agno River, si x

miles distant. Tha t day the regiment occupied Villasis against no resistance and

moved across the river to secure Carmen.

It als o too k Resales , o n Rout e 8 about

three miles east of Carmen, again against

no opposition. O n th e 20th, a battalion

of th e 1s t Infantr y continue d eastwar d

along gravel-surface d Rout e 8 anothe r

three miles to Balungao, which guerrillas

already occupied. Balunga o was located

on th e Bactad-Cuyap o objectiv e lin e

about midwa y betwee n th e latte r tw o

towns. Les s element s sen t bac k t o th e

Cabaruan Hills, the 1st Infantr y held the

Rosales-Villasis-Balungao are a unti l 2 8

January.

Meanwhile, the battalions o f the 20t h

Infantry, a s the y were released from th e

Cabaruan Hills, moved south and south -

east throug h Villasi s t o Cuyapo , takin g

the latter town on 2 0 January. Th e 6t h

Division ha d thu s secured its portion o f

the I Corps ' objectiv e lin e an d wa s

ready t o g o o n t o th e corp s reconnaissance line, which extended from Victoria,

on th e I-XI V boundar y fourtee n mile s

south o f Cuyapo , northeast abou t eigh t

miles to Guimba, in turn some ten miles

33

 Entries 93 and 111, 6th Di v G-3 Jnl , 25 Jan 45 . 34

 Entry 41, 6th Di v G-3 Jnl , 2 6 Jan 45 .

35 This subsection is based on: 6th Div Rpt Luzon ,

pp. 6-18; 1st In f Rpt Luzon , pp. 9-12; 20th Inf Rpt

Luzon, p. 18 ; 6th Ca v Rcn Tr Rp t Luzon , pp. 9-20.
SECURING TH E SIXT H ARMY' S BAS E ARE A 165

southeast o f Cuyapo . Th e 6t h Recon -

naissance Troop had reached Guimba on

20 Januar y an d ha d mad e contac t wit h

XIV Corp s patrols a t Victori a th e sam e

day, bu t unti l th e resistanc e i n th e

Cabaruan Hill s wa s cleaned up , th e 6t h

Division wa s unabl e t o mov e stronge r

forces south and southeast from Cuyapo .

The Achievements Analyzed

For th e Japanes e force s holdin g positions alon g th e Sixt h Army' s lef t flank ,

the defense as conducted since 9 January

had no t bee n withou t it s brigh t spots .

The 23d Division an d 58th IMB ha d

held th e Route s 3-1 1 junction agains t

heavy odds for almost two weeks, and i n

so doin g ha d inflicte d man y casualtie s

upon I Corps. Despit e the loss of the entrance t o Rout e 11 , Baguio—the south -

western ancho r o f th e Shobu Group's

final redoubt—seeme d secur e fo r som e

time t o come , an d Sixt h Arm y ha d no t

yet gaine d contac t wit h th e stronges t

defense force s holdin g i n fron t o f Sa n

Jose—gateway t o th e approache s t o th e

group's southeastern anchor.

On th e othe r hand, Japanese losse s i n

man an d matérie l ha d bee n staggering .

The 23d Division wa s littl e mor e tha n

half it s origina l strength ; nearl y two -

thirds o f th e 58th IMB an d attache d

artillery wer e casualties. Th e regiment s

of th e 23d Division woul d figh t again ,

but thei r rank s woul d b e fille d b y ill -

trained replacement s o r woul d b e

brought partiall y u p t o strengt h b y th e

attachment o f third-clas s provisiona l

units. O f eve n greate r significanc e wa s

the loss of most o f th e 23d Division an d

58th IMB artillery , together with numerous truck s an d larg e store s o f ammuni -

tion an d othe r supplies . I n fac t th e

units' losses had force d Yamashit a t o the

conclusion tha t a protracte d attemp t t o

hold th e Route s 3-1 1 junction woul d

have bee n futile . O n o r abou t 2 3 January h e had , accordingly, instructe d th e

23d Division t o mak e preparation s t o

withdraw further up Route 11. The with -

drawal wa s no t wel l unde r wa y b y 2 8

January, bu t th e beginning s o f th e re -

treat ha d probabl y rendere d easie r th e

tasks o f th e reinforce d 43 d Divisio n o n

the I Corps left. 36

To th e sout h th e pictur e wa s not s o

bright for the Japanese. B y their fight t o

the deat h i n place , th e Omori an d

Shigemi Detachments ha d deprive d th e

Shobu Group o f a reinforce d infantr y

battalion an d a n armore d comba t com -

mand. Th e sligh t dela y th e tw o unit s

imposed upo n I Corp s wa s hardly commensurate wit h th e los s o f first-lin e

troops an d valuabl e comba t equipmen t

that coul d hav e bee n use d t o bette r ad -

vantage elsewhere . Th e fantasti c stand s

of bot h detachment s ar e illustrativ e o f

a sort of tour de force t o which the Japanese Arm y seeme d peculiarl y addicte d

during World War II, but neithe r stand

had muc h significance .

It is true that during the time the 6th

and 25t h Division s were fightin g against

the Omori an d Shigemi Detachments,

the Shobu Group wa s able t o redeplo y

forces furthe r eas t fo r th e mor e effectiv e

defense o f Sa n Jose, 37 bu t th e oppor -

tunity for the redeploymen t was only an

incidental an d accidenta l resul t o f th e

Omori an d Shigemi Detachment stands .

Theoretically, th e 6t h an d 25t h Divi -

36

 43d Div G-2 Rp t Luzon , Sec. II, Enemy O/B, pp.

2-3; 43 d Div G-2 Pe r Rpt, 10 Feb 45 ; 103d Inf O/B

Rpt Luzon , p . 1 ; 14th Area Army Opn s o n Luzon ,

p. 81; SWPA His t Series, II, 439 . 37

 See below, ch. XI.
166 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

sions could have bypassed and contained

the tw o Japanes e units , bu t th e Japa -

nese had hel d positions from whic h the y

could threate n th e easter n crossing s o f

the Agno , an d Sixt h Arm y coul d no t

know tha t th e fightin g a t Sa n Manue l

and i n th e Cabarua n Hill s ha d bee n

undertaken t o overcom e danger s mor e

imaginary tha n real. Actually , elements

of bot h U.S . divisions ha d bypasse d th e

Japanese units , bu t neithe r divisio n

could mov e fa r beyon d th e Agn o les t

its rea r becom e expose d t o counterat -

tack from th e north. First , the 43d Division ha d t o gai n contro l o f th e Route s

3-11 junction , an d i t actuall y ha d bee n

the defens e offere d b y th e 23d Division

and th e 58th IMB tha t ha d permitte d

Shobu Group t o realig n force s i n fron t

of Sa n Jose.

Convinced earlie r tha t Yamashit a

could endange r th e Sixt h Army' s bas e

area, th e safet y o f whic h wa s essentia l

until the Manila Bay region fell, Krueger

had ample reason to believe that the 43d

Division's success had secured the army's

left an d rear against the Japanese threat.

The army's base area was safe. Th e gain s

achieved b y th e 6t h an d 25t h Division s

had adde d t o this security, but th e most

decisive action had bee n tha t o f the 43d

Division and its two attached RCT's.
CHAPTER X

The Captur e of Clark Field

To 2 8 January I Corps had been abl e

to accomplis h littl e mor e tha n long -

range reconnaissanc e towar d th e fulfill -

ment o f it s secon d mission , tha t o f

protecting XI V Corps' lef t rear . Thus ,

beyond th e protectio n i t coul d provid e

for itself , XI V Corp s ha d bee n movin g

southward throug h th e Centra l Plain s

since 1 8 Januar y wit h a n expose d lef t

flank. Tha t day the main strength of the

37th an d 40t h Infantr y Division s wa s

deployed along the Agno River from th e

corps boundar y a t Bayamban g west te n

miles t o Urbiztondo . Tw o battalion s

were acros s th e rive r fro m Camiling ,

nine mile s sout h o f Bayambang , east almost fiftee n mile s t o Anao . (See Map

III.) Th e XI V Corp s wa s i n hig h

spirits. It s casualtie s ha d bee n light , i t

was rapidl y assemblin g supplie s alon g

the Agno t o support it s advances south -

ward, and i t di d no t anticipat e any serious oppositio n a t leas t unti l i t reache d

Clark Field , fort y mile s sout h o f th e

Agno and the first major objective on the

road t o Manila.

General Griswold , th e XI V Corp s

commander, was to push his troops south

in successiv e bounds, th e lengt h o f eac h

bound t o depen d o n I Corp s progres s

and o n ho w rapidl y XI V Corp s coul d

keep its supplies moving. First , Genera l

Krueger directe d Griswold , XI V Corp s

would move in strength u p to its outpost

line b y 2 0 January . O n th e 21s t th e

corps woul d star t advancin g t o a lin e

extending fro m Tarlac , o n Rout e 3

nearly twent y mile s southeast o f Camil -

ing, northeas t almos t te n mile s t o Vic -

toria. Ther e th e corp s woul d hal t

pending further orders from Sixth Army.1

Into Contact With the Kembu Group

Twenty-four hour s befor e th e dead -

line set by General Krueger, XIV Corps,

encountering n o opposition , move d u p

to th e Camiling-Ana o line , an d ad -

vanced well beyond the line on the right,

or west. 2 Th e 160t h Infantry , 40t h Division, which ha d reached Camiling on 1 8

January, marched seven miles south along

Route 1 3 on th e 19th . O n th e corps left

the 129t h Infantry, 37th Division, moved

into Carmen, occupied Anao in strength,

and establishe d contac t wit h othe r 37t h

Division outpost s a t Paniqui , o n Rout e

3 fiv e mile s southwes t o f Anao. 3 Th e

regiment als o cleare d Rout e 3 fro m

Carmen sout h eleve n mile s t o th e junc -

1

 Sixth Arm y F O 43, 1 8 Jan 45 ; see also above , ch.

VIII. 2

 The genera l source s fo r thi s sectio n are : Sixt h

Army Rp t Luzon , I , 23-25 ; XI V Corp s Rp t Luzon ,

pt. I, pp. 59-66; XIV Corps G-3 Jn l Files, 19-2 3 Ja n

45; 37t h Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 25-29 ; 37t h Di v G- 3

Jnl and Jnl Files, 19-2 3 Ja n 45; 40th Div Rpt Luzon,

pp. 14-15; 40th Div G-3 Jn l Files, 19-2 4 Ja n 45. 3

 Additional materia l fo r th e 129t h Infantr y i s

from: 129t h In f Rp t Luzon , p . 4 ; 129t h In f S- 3 Pe r

Rpts, 19-2 3 Ja n 45 ; Beightler Comments, 1 8 Mar 57 .
168 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

tion o f th e highwa y wit h th e mai n lin e

of th e Manil a Railroa d a t Moncada .

Here, i n a midmorning clash, th e 129t h

Infantry too k th e firs t sizabl e number o f

prisoners t o b e capture d o n Luzon—al -

most 200—an d als o kille d abou t 5 5

Japanese.

Advances o n 2 0 January were equall y

rapid. Wit h th e 129t h Infantr y holdin g

on th e corp s left , th e 37t h Division' s

148th Infantry advanced south four miles

along Rout e 3 from Paniqu i t o Gerona ,

and the n marche d east abou t fou r mile s

along a grave l roa d t o Pura , fou r mile s

north o f Victoria. Th e 37t h Reconnais -

sance Troop , findin g th e tow n alread y

in th e hands of guerrillas, rode into Victoria a t dus k o n th e 20th . Meanwhile ,

left flan k unit s of th e 40t h Divisio n had

marched int o Gerona from th e west and

had struc k o n sout h alon g Rout e 3 to a

point jus t fou r mile s shor t o f Tarlac. 4

The 40t h Division's right ha d advance d

to withi n fou r mile s o f Tarla c alon g

Route 13. Nowhere in the flat, open farming countr y throug h whic h the y wer e

passing ha d troop s o f th e XI V Corp s

encountered any significant opposition .

The advanc e continue d o n 2 1 Janu -

ary as the corps moved forwar d t o establish itsel f alon g a line sout h o f Victori a

and Tarlac . Element s o f th e 160t h In -

fantry, 40t h Division , cleare d Tarla c

against scattere d rifl e fir e shortl y afte r

0900. Sit e o f th e junctio n o f th e mai n

line o f th e Manil a Railroa d wit h th e

branch runnin g northeast throug h Vic -

toria t o Sa n Jose, and o f th e junctio n of

Routes 3 and 13 , Tarlac had bee n an important Japanes e suppl y bas e an d ha d

therefore received considerable attention

from Allie d Air Force s bombers and carrier-based plane s o f th e Thir d Fleet ,

Before i t withdrew southward o n 1 9 and

20 January , th e smal l Japanes e garriso n

had destroye d th e militar y supplie s an d

equipment tha t th e Allied aircraf t ha d

missed. Tarla c wa s practically i n ruin s

and virtuall y deserte d a s o f 2 1 January,

but, a s wa s th e cas e elsewher e through -

out th e Centra l Plains , Filipino s bega n

flocking bac k t o th e cit y upo n th e

arrival of American troops.

After cleanin g ou t Tarla c th e 160t h

Infantry sen t on e battalio n sout h alon g

Route 3 about four mile s to San Miguel.

To th e east, th e 145t h an d 148t h Infan -

try Regiments , 37t h Division , marche d

unopposed sout h an d southwes t fro m

Victoria and , establishing contac t wit h

the 160t h near Sa n Miguel, se t up a defensive outpos t lin e extendin g eastward

to a roa d junctio n jus t wes t o f L a Pa z

and thenc e back north to Victoria.

Since XI V Corp s ha d advance d wel l

beyond th e Tarlac-Victoria lin e without

encountering significan t opposition ,

Krueger, lat e on th e 21st, directed Griswold t o strike on southwar d t o seiz e th e

Clark Fiel d ai r center . Kruege r kne w

that risks were involved . Fo r on e thing ,

XIV Corp s suppl y units wer e havin g a

hard tim e moving a s fast a s th e comba t

troops. Fo r another , I Corp s wa s still

unable t o advanc e it s righ t beyon d

Cuyapo, an d XI V Corps ' lef t woul d

therefore remai n exposed . However ,

since I Corps reconnaissance patrols had

reached Victori a an d Guimb a withou t

developing significant contacts, th e risk s

did no t appear as great as they had three

days earlier when XIV Corps had started

south. Also , o f course , Kruege r ha d t o

4

 Additional informatio n o n 40t h Divisio n opera -

tions is from: 160t h In f Uni t Jnls an d Jn l Files , 19 -

23 Ja n 45 ; 108th RC T Jnl s an d Jn l Files , 19-2 3

Jan 45 .
THE CAPTUR E O F CLAR K FIEL D 169

consider MacArthur' s order s t o ge t t o

Clark Fiel d rapidly. 5

The Sixt h Army's orde r gave Genera l

Griswold pause . Th e spee d of his corps'

advance ha d stretche d hi s suppl y line s

abnormally an d ha d expose d hi s lef t

from Cuyap o t o L a Paz , a distanc e o f

nearly twenty-fiv e miles . H e ha d n o

definite informatio n abou t suspecte d

Japanese concentration s i n th e vicinit y

of Cabanatuan , o n Rout e 5 just fiftee n

miles east o f L a Paz . Hi s worrie s about

the security of his flan k wer e hardly put

to rest b y reports o f ne w contacts wit h

Japanese force s a t Moncada, now twenty

miles behin d th e front , an d a t L a Paz .

Elements o f th e 129t h an d 145t h Infan -

try Regiment s easil y too k car e o f th e

Japanese i n th e Moncada area, but during the night of 21-22 January a pitched

battle develope d a t L a Pa z when a platoon o f Japanese infantry , supporte d b y

one tank , attacked a 148t h Infantr y perimeter a t a road junction a mile west of

town. Th e Japanes e withdrew afte r de -

stroying a bridge that carried a secondary

road across a river a mile east of La Paz.

Griswold reported to General Krueger

that i t woul d b e impossibl e t o exten d

XIV Corps' lef t an y furthe r sout h unti l

he ha d mor e informatio n abou t Japa -

nese force s east o f L a Paz . Accordingly ,

Griswold intende d t o keep th e 37t h Di -

vision echelone d t o hi s lef t rea r whil e

the 40th continued south along Route 3

to Bamban , fiftee n mile s below Tarlac .

The 40t h woul d the n hol d whil e th e

37th Divisio n sen t patrol s int o th e I

Corps zone as far as Cabanatuan, an "invasion" to which Swift , th e I Corps commander, prove d agreeable . Th e pla n

admitted o f som e dela y i n reachin g

Clark Field , bu t wa s approved b y General Krueger , wh o wa s becomin g in -

creasingly afrai d tha t XI V Corp s migh t

be overextendin g itself. 6

By evenin g o n 2 2 Januar y forwar d

elements o f th e 160t h Infantr y an d th e

40th Reconnaissanc e Troop had reached

Capas, o n Rout e 3 fiv e mile s shor t o f

Bamban. Th e reconnaissanc e troop then

probed westwar d te n mile s t o Cam p

O'Donnell, terminu s o f th e infamou s

Death Marc h fro m Bataa n i n Apri l

1942. Th e prisoners had long since been

evacuated, but marked graves gave ample

mute testimony to O'Donnell's past. The

Japanese wer e als o gone , bu t the y ha d

just left—withou t a chanc e t o ea t th e

food tha t ha d bee n cookin g o n thei r

camp stoves. 7

Operations earl y o n 2 3 January gav e

promise of smooth sailing . O n th e 40th

Division's left the 108th Infantry cleaned

a few Japanese stragglers out of towns up

to seve n mile s eas t an d southeas t o f

Capas. O n the right the 160t h Infantry ,

against n o opposition , secure d Bamba n

Airfield, tw o mile s sout h o f Capa s an d

on th e east sid e o f Rout e 3 . Th e tow n

of Bamban , however , wa s infeste d wit h

small group s o f Japanese , an d on e battalion o f th e 160t h Infantr y too k mos t

of th e afternoon t o root them out. Then

the battalion swung west off the highway

5

 Sixth Army Rp t Luzon , I, 24 ; Sixth Arm y FO 44,

21 Ja n 45 .

6

 Sixth Army Rp t Luzon , I, 24 ; Telecon, C G XIV

Corps and DCof S Sixth Army, 21 Jan 45 , Sixth Army

G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 20-22 Jan 45; Memo ACofS G-3

XIV Corp s fo r CofS XIV Corps, sub: Proposed Pla n

for Captur e of Clark Field, 20 Jan 45 , XIV Corps G-3

Jnl Fil e Luzon , 20-2 1 Ja n 45 ; XI V Corp s F O 3 , 2 2

Jan 45 . 7

 For a detaile d accoun t o f th e Deat h March , se e

Stanley L. Falk , Bataan: The March of Death (Ne w

York: W. W. Norto n & Co., 1962).
170 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

BAMBAN AN D HIGH GROUN D TO WEST

toward sharpl y rising ridges, greete d b y

increasingly heav y smal l arm s fire . An -

other battalio n secure d a for d ove r th e

Bamban Rive r sout h o f town , an d wa s

fired o n b y Japanes e mortar s fro m th e

high ground to the west. Th e 40t h Division, i t bega n t o appear , ha d reache d

some strong, organize d defenses, defens -

es tha t al l intelligenc e officer s fro m

MacArthur's headquarter s o n dow n ha d

anticipated would be found i n the Clark

Field area.

General Griswold decided to spend 2 4

January consolidating , regroupin g fo r

further advance s southward , an d prob -

ing into the defenses th e 160t h Infantr y

had uncovered . H e directe d th e 40t h

Division t o fee l ou t Japanes e strengt h

and disposition s west an d southwes t o f

Bamban, and ordered the 37th Division ,

less it s 129t h RCT , t o assembl e north -

east o f Bamba n t o awai t furthe r orders .

The 129t h woul d continu e t o protec t

the XIV Corps' elongate d left flank . I n

effect, Griswol d wa s preparing t o swin g

half his strength—the 40th Division—90

degrees west into the high groun d dom -

inating Clar k Fiel d whil e holdin g th e

37th Division, less the 129t h RCT , read y

to resume th e march towar d Manil a o n

short notice. H e fel t he needed only the

129th RC T alon g hi s expose d lef t be -

cause his reconnaissance into the I Corps

sector ha d foun d n o concentration s o f

Japanese in the Cabanatuan region. 8

8

 XIV Corp s F O 3 , 2 2 Ja n 45 ; XI V Corp s Opn s

Memo 9, 23 Jan 45 , Sixth Arm y G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon,

22-24 Ja n 45 ; Griswol d Comments , 1 1 Jan 57 .
THE CAPTUR E O F CLAR K FIEL D 171

The First Attacks

Terrain and Defenses at Clark Field

A vas t comple x o f prewa r an d Japa -

nese-constructed pave d an d unpave d

runways, taxiways , dispersa l areas , air -

craft revetments , an d associate d installa -

tions comprise d th e Clar k Fiel d ai r

center—the whol e extending from Barn -

ban Airfiel d sout h alon g bot h side s o f

Route 3 fo r almos t fiftee n miles . (Map

IV) Ther e wer e fiftee n separat e landin g

strips, wit h bu t thre e exception s al l lo -

cated wes t o f th e highway . Clar k Fiel d

proper, wit h si x separat e strips , la y o n

the west side of Route 3 in a n ope n are a

about fou r mile s wide , east t o west, an d

extending fro m Mabalacat , fou r mile s

south o f Bamban , sout h anothe r si x

miles. I n th e western sectio n o f this airfield regio n la y Fort Stotsenburg, prewar

home of variou s Philippin e Scou t units ,

including th e 26t h Cavalry. 9

East o f Rout e 3 the flat , ho t terrai n i s

given ove r t o rice paddies—dr y in Janu -

ary—and far m land s tha t ar e cu t b y

many irrigatio n ditche s an d small , tree -

lined streams. Her e th e onl y prominen t

terrain featur e i s woode d Mt . Arayat ,

rising i n majesti c isolatio n abov e th e

floor o f th e Centra l Plain s t o a heigh t of

some 3,350 feet. Wes t of Clark Fiel d th e

bare foothills of the Zambales Mountains

rise sharply , formin g a serie s o f paralle l

ridges, oriente d northeas t t o southwest ,

and separate d b y the Bamban Rive r and

many lesse r wet-weathe r streams . It s

source dee p i n th e mountain s behin d

Fort Stotsenburg, the Bamban, called the

Sacobia alon g it s wester n reaches , flow s

generally northeastwar d pas t th e north -

ern sid e of the Clark Field strips. Abou t

a mil e and a half wes t o f Mabalacat, th e

stream turn s northwar d fo r thre e miles,

its wester n ban k forme d b y th e stee p

noses o f paralle l ridge s risin g southwestward int o th e Zambale s Mountains . A

mile sout h o f Bamban , a n unname d

stream comes in from th e west to join the

Bamban River. Here , under the clifflik e

southern side of another sharp ridge, the

Bamban make s a right angl e turn t o the

east, ultimatel y feedin g int o th e Ri o

Chico de l a Pampang a off the northeastern slope s of Mt. Arayat. Jus t east of the

river bend south o f Bamban, the Manil a

Railroad crosse s th e river and, some 20 0

yards further east , Route 3 also goes over

the Bamban. Th e bridge s here had been

destroyed b y MacArthur 's retreatin g

forces i n 1942 , rebuilt i n woo d b y th e

Japanese, an d knocke d ou t agai n b y th e

Allied Ai r Force s o r guerrill a sabotag e

in Januar y 1945 . Th e for d th e 160t h

Infantry ha d foun d an d secure d o n 2 3

January prove d a goo d dry-weathe r re -

placement, but both bridge s would have

to b e reconstructe d befor e th e rain y

season began i n May.

The ridge s at th e river ben d sout h o f

Bamban an d alon g th e north-sout h

stretch o f th e Bamba n Rive r ris e steepl y

to a heigh t o f som e 60 0 fee t withi n 25 0

yards o f th e river's banks. Wes t o f Fort

Stotsenburg bare, dominating hills shoot

quickly an d sharpl y u p t o a heigh t o f

over 1,00 0 feet scarcel y hal f a mil e be -

yond th e camp's western gate . Fro m al l

this risin g groun d Japanes e artillery ,

mortars, an d machin e gun s coul d la y

easily observe d fir e alon g Rout e 3 an d

the Manil a Railroad , an d coul d jus t a s

easily prevent the Allied Air Force s from

using th e Clar k Fiel d ai r center . Th e 9

 Morton, Fall of the Philippines, p . 22 .
Kembu Defense Area. Fort Stotsenburg is at lower left.
THE CAPTUR E O F CLAR K FIEL D 173

40th Division , probing into this terrain ,

knew al l to o wel l that , a s usual, th e in -

fantry's objectiv e woul d b e th e hig h

ground.

While ther e wa s genera l agreemen t

that the Japanese maintained defense s i n

the Clar k Fiel d area , n o intelligenc e

agency o f th e Southwes t Pacifi c Are a

had muc h informatio n concernin g th e

strength an d exten t o f th e defenses, no r

of th e capabilitie s and intention s o f th e

Japanese i n th e region . Whe n XI V

Corps' advanc e element s reache d Barn -

ban o n 2 3 January , variou s estimate s

placed fro m 4,00 0 t o 8,00 0 Japanes e o n

or nea r Clar k Field . Intelligenc e officers

believed that most of these Japanese were

service personnel—Arm y Ai r Forc e

ground units—wit h perhap s a leavening

of comba t troop s fro m th e 2d Tank Division. A s o f 2 3 Januar y XI V Corps '

G-2 Sectio n felt tha t the Japanese might

offer onl y mino r delayin g actio n a t

Clark Field , an d wa s willin g t o stat e

nothing mor e definit e tha n tha t som e

Japanese defense s existe d i n th e hill s

immediately wes t an d southwes t o f

Bamban.10

These estimate s wer e fa r wid e o f th e

mark. Genera l Tsukada's Kembu Group

numbered som e 30,00 0 troops , whos e

orders were to

. . . check an anticipate d penetration o f the

Clark Fiel d sector, facilitat e th e operation s

of th e ai r force s a s fa r as possible , an d a s a

last resort hinde r utilization o f th e airfield s

by operatin g fro m th e strongpoin t wes t o f

Clark Field. 11

Tsukada divide d hi s heterogeneou s

collection of Army and Nav y combat and

service unit s int o nin e separat e detach -

ments; for a headquarters he used that of

the 1st Airborne Raiding Group, his previous command . Hi s Arm y personnel ,

about 15,00 0 me n i n all, he assigne d t o

four comba t an d fou r servic e detach -

ments. Th e nint h detachment , comprising nava l comba t an d servic e troops ,

numbered anothe r 15,00 0 men . The

total traine d comba t strengt h availabl e

to th e Kembu Group wa s about 8,50 0

troops, of whom no more than half wer e

first-class, well-seasone d men .

The larges t Army combat detachment

was th e Eguchi, wit h 3,90 0 me n unde r

Lt. Col. Seizuke Eguchi. Eguchi' s troops

included fiv e airfiel d constructio n bat -

talions arme d a s ligh t infantry , a provi -

sional infantr y battalio n forme d fro m

replacements an d casual s fro m Manila ,

and a heav y (120-mm. ) antiaircraf t gu n

battalion set up for ground support operations.12

 Nex t i n size , wit h abou t 2,80 0

men, wa s th e Takayama Detachment

under Lt . Col. Koshi n Takayama , wh o

was als o th e commandin g office r o f th e

2d Mobile Infantry, 2d Tank Division.

10

 G-2 GH Q SWPA , G- 2 Pe r Summar y o f Enem y

Trends, No. 26, 21 Jan 45 , G-3 GH Q Jn l File , 21 Jan

45; Sixt h Arm y G-2 Weekl y Rp t 71 , 1 7 Jan 45 , copy

in G- 2 D A Files; XI V Corps G- 2 Pe r Rpt s 11-14 ,

21-24 Ja n 45, Sixth Arm y G-3 Jn l File s Luzon, 20-22

through 24-25 Jan 45; Teletype Msg , G- 2 XI V Corps

to G-2 Sixt h Army , 0025 23 Jan 45 , Sixth Arm y G- 3

Jnl Fil e Luzon , 22-2 4 Jan 45 .

11

 14th Area Army Opn l Orde r No . A-384, 1 1 Jan

45, Trans, III, Item 3 , p. 19 . Th e remainde r o f this

subsection is based principally on: SWP A Hist Series,

II, 447-49 ; Japanes e Studie s i n W W II , No . 10 ,

Luzon Opn s o f th e Kembu Gp, pp . 4-11 , and atch d

map; No . 125 , Philippin e Area Nava l Operations, pt.

IV, pp . 20-21 ; 14th Area Army T r Or g List ; 10t h

I&H Staf f Study , Japanes e Opn s o n Luzon , Interro g

of Co l Yasuj i Okad a (Cof S Kembu Gp), pp . 1-2 ;

ibid., Okad a Narrative , p . 16 ; 38t h In f Di v Rp t

Luzon, pp. 128-30 . 12

 The antiaircraf t battalio n wa s probably a nava l

unit. Eguch i wa s als o th e commande r o f th e 10th

Air Sector Unit, a n enginee r an d defens e organiza -

tion, th e headquarter s o f whic h h e use d a s detach -

ment headquarters .
174 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Takayama's force included the 2d Mobile

Infantry les s tw o battalions , tw o airfiel d

construction battalion s reorganize d a s

auxiliary infantry, an understrength antitank gun battalion, and a 75-mm. battery

from 2d Tank Division artillery . Th e

third comba t force , th e Takaya Detachment, numbere d 75 0 me n unde r Maj .

Saburo Takaya. I t wa s composed o f th e

understrength 2d Glider Infantry (for -

merly par t o f Tsukada' s 1st Airborne

Raiding Group) an d miscellaneou s at -

tachments. Th e las t Army combat group

with th e Yanagimoto Detachment, about

650 me n unde r a Captai n Yanagimoto ,

whose comman d include d th e 3d Battalion, less elements , o f th e 2d Mobile

Infantry, an d a n independen t ligh t tan k

company. Th e fou r servic e detachments

were apparently at first i n direct support

of th e fou r comba t detachments , bu t

most o f th e me n o f th e servic e unit s

later fought a s infantry.

The nava l troops were under the command o f Rea r Adm . Ushie Sugimoto ,

whose headquarters was tha t o f th e no w

planeless 26th Air Flotilla, Th e admira l

subdivided his detachment into five combat sector s an d tw o servic e commands .

His principa l comba t forc e wa s th e

small 37th Naval Guard Unit, whic h

formed th e nucleus of one o f the comba t

sectors. Th e res t o f the nava l troop s in -

cluded th e groun d echelon s o f variou s

naval ai r groups , a fe w strande d pilots ,

some antiaircraf t units , an d servic e

personnel o f all categories.

Considering it s tota l strength , th e

Kembu Group wa s lightl y armed . I t

possessed less than a battalion o f 47-mm.

antitank guns; tw o or thre e batteries, i n

all, o f 70-mm. an d 75-mm . fiel d artiller y

weapons; abou t a battalio n o f mediu m

artillery—100-mm. t o 150-mm.—eithe r

emplaced i n cave s o r o n self-propelle d

mounts; an d th e equivalen t o f tw o battalions o f nava l 120-mm . antiaircraf t

guns, al l emplace d a s groun d suppor t

weapons. Th e auxiliar y and provisiona l

infantry unit s ha d fe w heav y machin e

guns and fewe r mortars. Bu t the Kembu

Group ha d man y othe r type s o f fairl y

heavy automati c weapons. I t ha d modi -

fied a variety and multitud e of automatic

antiaircraft gun s fo r groun d suppor t

roles, and i t ha d strippe d machin e gun s

and machin e canno n fro m damage d aircraft i n th e Clark Field area, moving the

weapons int o th e hill s an d mountain s

to provid e added fir e power .

Tsukada disposed his forces along three

eastward-facing defens e lines , whic h

stretched north to south almost ten miles.

The firs t line , th e Kembu Group's out -

post lin e o f resistanc e (OPLR) , ha d it s

northern ancho r o n a bare , stee p ridg e

nose abou t tw o mile s northwes t o f

Bamban, an d followe d successiv e nose s

south t o th e Bamba n River . Sout h o f

the stream, th e OPLR continue d t o th e

Abucayan River , o n th e sout h sid e o f

Fort Stotsenburg , takin g advantag e o f

knolls an d ridgelet s i n th e wester n portion o f th e Clar k Fiel d area . Element s

of th e Takayama Detachment hel d th e

northern sectio n o f th e OPLR ; par t o f

the Eguchi Detachment defende d th e

southern half .

General Tsukad a di d no t pla n pro -

tracted operation s alon g th e OPLR , fo r

he coul d no t hol d th e souther n par t o f

the line , whic h ra n ove r relativel y fla t

ground, agains t th e ai r an d armore d

superiority h e kne w Sixt h Arm y coul d

bring t o bear . Instead , h e intende d t o

control th e Clar k Fiel d area , Rout e 3 ,

and th e Manil a Railroad by fir e fro m hi s

main lin e o f resistanc e (MLR) , whic h
THE CAPTUR E O F CLAR K FIEL D 175

lay generall y tw o an d a hal f mile s wes t

into th e mountain s fro m th e OPLR .

He locate d th e norther n ancho r o f th e

MLR o n th e bar e to p o f a 1,000-foot -

high ridg e about fiv e mile s west o f Barn -

ban; and here the Kembu Group refuse d

its lef t flan k wit h a westwar d extensio n

of th e MLR . Th e Takayama Detachment hel d th e lef t thir d o f th e MLR ;

the Takaya Detachment th e center ,

south t o th e Bamba n River ; an d th e

Eguchi Detachment th e ground sout h o f

that strea m t o a poin t tw o mile s south -

west o f For t Stotsenburg , wher e th e

right flan k wa s als o refused .

In rugged, still higher terrain a couple

of mile s wes t o f th e MLR , Admira l

Sugimoto's nava l force s wer e movin g

into a n are a th e Kembu Group viewe d

as it s "last-stand " position . Fa r t o th e

east, forwar d o f th e OPLR , wa s th e mo -

bile Yanagimoto Detachment. Wit h n o

fixed position , thi s coverin g forc e wa s

ready t o defen d agains t paratroo p land -

ings, hel p hol d th e sout h flan k o f th e

OPLR, and undertak e reconnaissance as

required. A s o f 2 3 January Yanagimoto

Detachment headquarter s wa s a t Ange -

les, o n Rout e 3 and th e Manila Railroa d

about te n mile s sout h o f Bamban .

The Kembu Group's strengt h la y i n

the terrain it held, in th e depth o f its defenses, an d i n th e great numbe r o f automatic weapons (aircraft an d antiaircraft )

it possessed . It s majo r weaknesse s wer e

its immobility ; th e inadequat e trainin g

and armamen t o f th e bul k o f it s troops;

shortages of food, ammunition , and fiel d

artillery; an d th e rudimentar y stat e o f

many defensiv e installations , a stat e de -

riving from th e lat e start i n establishin g

the positions a t an d wes t o f Clar k Field .

The healt h o f th e comman d wa s poo r

from th e start , an d medica l supplie s

were short. Moral e wa s not o f th e high -

est order , an d man y o f th e troop s wer e

easily disaffecte d Formosan , Okinawan ,

and Korea n labo r personnel . I n brief ,

the Kembu Group wa s th e poores t

armed, prepared , an d supplie d o f Yamashita's thre e defens e commands. O n th e

other hand , a s th e 40t h Divisio n wa s

soon t o learn , eve n poo r servic e troops ,

whatever their stat e of training and arm -

ament, can pu t u p stif f resistanc e in good

defensive terrain . Befor e a wee k ha d

passed th e 40t h Divisio n an d th e XI V

Corps woul d b e willin g t o conced e tha t

General Tsukad a an d hi s troop s ha d

missed n o opportunitie s t o exploi t t o

the utmost every defensive advantage the

terrain the y hel d offere d them .

Penetrating the OPLR

Directed b y Genera l Griswol d t o

probe int o th e Kembu Group's defense s

west and southwest o f Bamban, the 40th

Division ordere d it s 160t h Infantr y t o

press on against the Japanese with whom

it had established contact on 2 3 January.

The regimen t woul d strik e westwar d

from a lin e o f departur e alon g th e Ma -

nila Railroa d bot h nort h an d sout h o f

the Bamba n River . It s lef t woul d driv e

up Laf e Hill , a 600-foot-hig h ridg e nos e

lying half a mile south o f th e confluenc e

of th e Bamban and th e unnamed stream

coming i n fro m th e west . Th e righ t

flank objectiv e wa s anothe r ridg e nose ,

Hill 500 , immediately nort h o f th e

stream junction. 13

The tw o objectives marke d th e northernmost majo r strongpoint s alon g th e

Takayama Detachment's portio n o f th e

OPLR. Tw o airfiel d enginee r battal -

13

 40th Di v FO 7 , 22 Jan 45 , 160th In f Jn l File , 2 3

Jan 45 ; XIV Corps Opns Memo 9, 2 3 Jan 45 .
176 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

ions, supporte d b y provisiona l morta r

and machin e gu n units , hel d th e tw o

ridge nose s an d th e ridge s risin g fro m

the nose s t o th e southwest . Th e Japa -

nese ha d emplace d dismounte d aircraf t

machine cannon and a few light artillery

pieces t o cove r th e hill s an d thei r

approaches. Cave s of variou s size s pock -

marked th e stee p slope s o f bot h objec -

tives, som e o f th e cave s a t th e botto m

of th e ridges having been converted from

storage dumps t o defensiv e installations .

There were no easy approaches to either

ridge nose . Th e visibl e side s o f bar e

Hill 50 0 wer e virtua l cliff s where , fo r

the Japanese , a bi g roc k wa s nearl y a s

good a defensiv e weapo n a s a rifl e o r

machine gun . Th e slope s o f knife -

crested Laf e Hil l wer e almos t a s stee p

and, bar e lik e thos e o f Hil l 500 , possessed som e roc k outcroppings . Thi s

was handhold terrai n where the problem

involved i n closin g wit h th e Japanes e

defenses woul d b e equale d onl y b y th e

problems o f suppl y an d evacuation .

Two battalion s o f th e 160t h Infantr y

launched th e attac k abou t noo n o n 2 4

January.14 Despit e the terrain difficulties

and heav y fir e fro m Japanes e automati c

weapons, mortars, an d 75-mm . artillery ,

the southern win g o f th e attack , behin d

close artiller y support , worke d it s wa y

up Laf e Hil l an d secure d th e cres t b y

1800. Th e unit s on th e right, however ,

were scarcel y able t o gain a foothold o n

the scrub-grow n norther n slop e o f Hil l

500.

Although th e 160t h Infantr y ha d

encountered well-organize d resistanc e

and ha d faile d t o tak e on e o f it s objec -

tives, XI V Corps ' G- 2 Sectio n wa s still

reluctant t o believ e tha t th e Japanes e

had significan t defense s west of Bamban.

Rather, th e sectio n estimated , th e 160t h

had uncovere d a smal l delayin g forc e

bent upo n self-destructio n i n place. 15

General Griswold , therefore , expecte d

that th e 40t h Divisio n coul d overcom e

the resistanc e i n th e Bamba n vicinit y

on 2 5 Januar y and , he hope d i t coul d

clear al l th e Clar k Field-For t Stotsen -

burg region within another day or two. 16

The 40t h Divisio n di d no t shar e th e

corps' optimism . O n 2 5 Januar y th e

division wa s abl e onl y t o broade n it s

front t o bot h th e nort h an d th e south ,

and t o accomplish eve n thi s ha d t o commit element s o f th e 108th Infantr y o n

its right . Majo r ne w objective s wer e

Hill E , a bar e ridg e nos e wit h fairl y

gentle slope s a mile and a quarter north

of Hil l 500 , and steep-sided , bar e Hil l

636, a mil e an d a quarte r southwes t o f

Lafe Hill and over a mile up (southwest)

the nex t ridg e sout h o f Laf e Hill .

Fighting ove r ope n groun d agains t a

company o f Japanese tha t ha d excellen t

heavy weapons support, the 160th Infan -

try, o n 2 5 January, faile d t o reac h Hil l

636, but , overrunning on e OPL R posi -

tion alon g th e easter n nos e o f th e Hil l

636 ridg e line , di d progres s almos t a

mile up th e ridge. Furthe r north, othe r

elements o f th e 160t h cleare d Hil l 50 0

during th e day, and a n attache d battal -

ion of the 108th Infantr y secure d Hil l E

and the n wen t o n t o clea r a fe w Japanese fro m Hil l G , anothe r bar e knol l a

little ove r a mil e north-northwes t o f

Hill E .

14

 This subsectio n i s base d generall y upon : 40t h

Div Rpt Luzon, pp. 15-18 ; 40th Div G-3 Jnls and Jnl

Files, 24-28 Jan 45; 160th In f Unit Jnls and Jnl Files,

24-28 Ja n 45 ; 108t h RC T Jnl s an d Jnl Files , 24-2 8

Jan 45 ; XI V Corp s G- 3 Jnl s an d Jn l Files , 24-2 9

Jan 45 .

15

 XIV Corps G-2 Pe r Rp t 14 , 24 Jan 45 . 16

 XIV Corps Opn s Memo 10 , 24 Jan 45 .
THE CAPTUR E O F CLAR K FIEL D 177

The 40t h Divisio n di d no t ye t know

it, bu t th e attac k ha d carrie d throug h

some o f th e Takayama Detachment's

strongest OPL R defense s and , o n th e

right, ha d take n th e assaul t troop s t o

positions fro m whic h the y coul d out -

flank th e lef t o f th e OPLR . Th e de -

fenses, whic h Tsukad a ha d expecte d

would hol d a t leas t a week , ha d falle n

rapidly unde r th e combine d weigh t o f

American infantry , artillery , an d ai r at -

tack. Th e achievement s ha d cos t th e

40th Divisio n 1 5 me n kille d an d 4 5

wounded; th e Takayama Detachment

had lost over 30 0 men killed of an original OPL R forc e o f nearl y 1,10 0 troops .

The 40t h Divisio n nex t planne d t o

swing the 160th and 108th Infantry Regiments south . Th e 160th' s initia l objec -

tives included Hill 636 and another bare

knob 80 0 yard s furthe r wes t alon g th e

same ridg e line . Onc e i t ha d secure d

these tw o terrai n features , th e 160t h

would whee l southwes t across th e Barn -

ban Rive r t o clea r Clar k Fiel d prope r

and th e eastern hal f o f the Fort Stotsenburg camp area. Th e 108th Infantry, ini -

tially undertakin g a wid e developmen t

westward beyon d Hill s E an d G , wa s

to strik e south t o seiz e Hil l 350 , a mil e

and a hal f wes t o f Laf e Hill , an d the n

continue south-southwest on th e 160th 's

right t o clea r th e wester n hal f o f For t

Stotsenburg. Th e 108th wa s als o t o

secure high groun d immediatel y west of

and overlookin g th e fort area. 17

By th e tim e th e attac k o n th e 26t h

was wel l unde r way , a distinc t patter n

had emerge d fro m th e operation s wes t

and southwest of Bamban, a pattern tha t

would remai n i n effec t a s lon g a s th e

Kembu Group wa s able to put up a sem -

blance o f organize d resistance . An y

movement by American troops along the

generally ope n ridge s wes t o f Rout e 3

inevitably brough t dow n Japanes e ma -

chine gu n an d morta r fire , ofte n aug -

mented b y fir e fro m th e dismounte d

aircraft automati c weapons, antiaircraf t

guns, an d ligh t artillery. Seekin g cove r

and usuall y pinned in place , the American infantr y woul d call for close-in mor -

tar an d artiller y support , wai t fo r th e

concentrations to be fired, and then drive

forward a fe w yards, whe n th e proces s

had to be repeated. Each time, the Americans managed to overrun a few Japanese

machine gu n o r rifl e strongpoints.

There wa s littl e choic e o f route s o f

advance. Draws , providin g som e con -

cealment i n scru b growt h o r bambo o

thickets, wer e usuall y covere d b y well -

emplaced Japanese weapons both within

the draws and o n the ridges to each side.

Possession o f th e hig h ground , a s ever ,

was essential. Ye t the troops had t o employ draw s wheneve r possibl e t o out -

flank Japanes e ridg e lin e strongpoints ,

and ofte n draw s an d ravine s prove d t o

be th e onl y routes by which tanks, tank

destroyers, an d canno n compan y self -

propelled mounts could ge t to the fron t

to fir e agains t Japanes e cav e position s

along the sides of the ridges.

The captur e o f on e Japanese-hel d

cave served only to disclose another, and

one machin e gu n positio n wa s overrun

only t o provid e access t o th e next. Dis -

lodging th e Kembu Group fro m suc h

defenses i n dept h wa s t o prov e a slow ,

laborious, and costly process, demanding

the closest teamwor k betwee n th e infan -

try an d it s supporting arms. Casualties ,

as a rule, would not b e heavy on any one

day—progress woul d b e to o slo w an d

the troop s woul d spen d to o muc h o f

17

 40th Di v FO 9 , 2 5 Jan 45 , 108t h RC T Jn l File ,

25 Jan 45 .
178 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

CAVE-POCKED HILL, typical of Japanese defenses in Clark Field area.

their tim e pinne d dow n awaitin g fir e

from supportin g weapons. Bu t a dail y

attrition rat e of about 5 men kille d an d

15 wounde d fo r eac h battalio n engage d

would soo n begi n t o have its effect .

When i t prove d impossibl e fo r tank s

and othe r supportin g artiller y t o reac h

the front lines, or when it was impossible

for an y reason t o la y fire int o a Japanese

position, th e infantr y ha d t o fal l bac k

on assaul t tea m techniques . A n eight -

man assaul t squa d woul d b e equippe d

with submachin e guns , flam e throwers ,

demolitions, an d smok e an d thermit e

grenades. A six-ma n coverin g squad ,

armed wit h rifle s an d ligh t automati c

weapons, woul d provid e clos e support .

The two-squa d tea m woul d operat e forward of and unde r the cover of fires from

other infantr y unit s an d heavie r sup -

port weapons, al l set u p o n dominatin g

ground.18

On 2 6 Januar y th e 160t h Infantry' s

left mad e th e greates t progres s a s th e

Takayama Detachment's righ t flan k

OPLR defense s bega n t o disintegrate .

The 160t h secure d Hil l 63 6 wit h littl e

trouble an d als o cleared th e grass y crest

of Hil l 600 , a ho t three-quarter s o f a

mile southwes t o f Laf e Hil l alon g th e

Lafe Hil l ridge. Nort h o f th e unnamed

18

 Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 29 ; G- 3 40t h Div ,

Summary o f Opn l Lesson s Learned, MIK E ONE Opn,

p. 3 , attached t o 40th Di v Rp t Luzon .
THE CAPTUR E O F CLAR K FIEL D 179

stream th e 160th's right flan k drove west

against negligibl e resistanc e an d bega n

wheeling southwar d t o prepar e t o cros s

the strea m an d rejoi n th e res t o f th e

regiment.

In the 108th Infantry's sector advances

were mor e painful . Th e regimen t ha d

to give up its hold a t Hil l G in th e fac e

of heav y concentration o f Japanes e artillery an d morta r fire , an d coul d mak e

very littl e progres s i n th e Hil l E area .

In th e afternoon , attempt s t o star t th e

scheduled envelopin g maneuve r suc -

ceeded onl y in extending the regimental

right int o risin g groun d 1,00 0 yard s

northwest o f Hil l G .

The 40t h Divisio n ha d no t mad e

anticipated progress , bu t th e operation s

on 2 6 January had provided th e division

and th e XI V Corp s wit h a cleare r pic -

ture o f th e opposition . B y th e en d o f

the da y th e division 's G- 2 Sectio n wa s

able to delimit th e Japanese OPLR, had

recognized i t a s a n OPLR , an d ha d

identified th e majo r component s o f th e

Takayama Detachment. The corps' G- 2

Section readil y admitte d tha t th e 40t h

Division ha d uncovere d a stron g defen -

sive lin e an d tha t th e Japanes e seeme d

determined t o maintai n contro l o f th e

Clark Fiel d area. 19 Genera l Griswol d

had t o accep t the fac t tha t operations in

the Clar k Fiel d regio n wer e goin g t o

take longer than he had hoped and might

require th e commitmen t o f additiona l

forces.

The 40t h Division 's operations o n 2 7

January, again meeting with limited success, confirme d Griswold 's reasoning .

The 160t h Infantr y gaine d onl y 50 0 t o

800 yard s i n westerl y an d southwesterl y

directions during the day and was unable

to brin g it s righ t flan k element s sout h

of th e unname d stream . Furthe r nort h

the 108th Infantr y advance d about 1,000

yards southwest from Hill s E and G but

failed t o reach the day's objective, Hill 5,

a roug h bar e heigh t three-quarter s o f a

mile southwest o f Hil l G . Nevertheless ,

by th e en d o f th e da y the 40t h Divisio n

had virtuall y demolished th e Takayama

Detachment OPLR , reducin g th e onc e

well-organized lin e t o a numbe r o f iso -

lated strongpoint s manne d b y troop s

who preferred to die in place rather than

withdraw t o th e detachment' s MLR .

These isolate d group s presente d n o rea l

threat, an d i t wa s only a matter o f tim e

before th e 40t h Divisio n woul d elimi -

nate them . Finally , th e 40t h Division' s

progress through 2 7 January had secured

the Manil a Railroa d an d Rout e 3 fro m

Bamban sout h t o Mabalacat. Th e gain s

of th e firs t fou r days ' actio n against th e

Kembu Group ha d cos t th e 40t h Divi -

sion approximatel y 3 5 me n kille d an d

115 wounded ; th e Takayama Detachment ha d lost a t least 1,00 0 men kille d

alone.

A Planning Interlude

While th e 40t h Divisio n ha d bee n

engaged agains t th e Takayama Detachment, the 37th Divisio n had safeguarde d

XIV Corps' easter n flank , ha d continued

to reconnoiter eastward into the I Corps

zone, and, on 2 5 January, ha d begu n t o

extend it s righ t (west ) flan k southwar d

from th e vicinity o f Bamban i n th e are a

immediately eas t o f Rout e 3 . O n th e

26th, the 145t h Infantr y secured Mabala -

cat an d Mabalaca t Eas t Airfield , fou r

miles sout h o f Bamban , agains t ligh t

19

 40th Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 16-18 ; 40t h Di v G- 2

Rpts, 25-2 7 Ja n 45 , 40th Di v G- 3 Jn l Files , 25-2 7

Jan 45 ; XI V Corp s G- 2 Pe r Rpt , 26 Jan 45 , Sixt h

Army G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 26-27 Ja n 45 .
180 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

opposition. Th e nex t da y the 145t h In -

fantry advance d sout h alon g Rout e 3

another thre e mile s t o Culayo and Dau ,

while 148t h Infantr y secure d Magalang ,

five mile s east o f Dau .

The Culayo-Da u are a assume d som e

importance a s th e junctio n o f Rout e 3

with a road running west throug h Clark

Field to Fort Stotsenburg and with a spur

of th e Manil a Railroa d runnin g fro m

the for t t o Magalang . I n it s advanc e

to Da u th e 145t h Infantr y encoun -

tered tank s o f th e Yanagimoto Detachment, operatin g sout h o f th e town , an d

had bee n fire d o n b y Japanes e artiller y

emplaced i n hig h groun d wes t o f For t

Stotsenburg. Scattere d group s o f Japa -

nese hel d ou t i n Culay o an d Da u unti l

the mornin g o f 2 7 January.

On th e 26th, the 145t h Infantry swung

west across Rout e 3 and wit h littl e diffi -

culty overran Clark Field Runway No. 1 ,

a mile northwest of Culayo. I t ha d been

almost thirty-seve n month s sinc e American groun d force s ha d se t foo t o n Clar k

Field.20

On 2 7 January , th e 145t h Infantr y

marched another three miles south along

Route 3 t o th e cit y o f Angeles , whic h

the Yanagimoto Detachment had already

left to Filipino guerrillas. Fro m Angeles,

good grave l road s le d southwes t towar d

Bataan Peninsul a an d northeas t t o Ma -

galang, whil e Rout e 3 an d th e Manil a

Railroad swun g of f t o th e southeas t o n

their wa y to Manila . Th e 148t h Infan -

try o n 2 7 Januar y patrolle d eas t an d

south fro m Magalan g findin g n o signifi -

cant trace s of th e Japanese . A t th e close

of th e day , th e 37t h Division' s tw o regiments were prepared to leave Clark Field

to thei r righ t rea r an d continu e th e

advance towar d Manila. 21

How t o emplo y th e 37t h Divisio n i n

the immediate future wa s a knotty problem for both General Griswold and Gen -

eral Krueger. 22 Th e obviou s choice s

presented obviou s disadvantages. I f th e

division wer e t o continu e towar d Ma -

nila, it s righ t rea r migh t b e ope n t o a

Kembu Group counterattac k tha t th e

40th Division might not be able to repel;

if th e divisio n wer e committe d t o figh t

against th e Kembu Group, th e advanc e

on Manil a would b e delayed; if the division lef t stron g force s echelone d alon g

XIV Corps' lef t rear to protect the corps'

exposed lef t flank , bot h th e advanc e t o

Manila an d th e destructio n o f Kembu

Group woul d b e delayed . Genera l Mac -

Arthur's constant pressure upon Genera l

Krueger to get the XIV Corps on toward

Manila further complicated the problem.

The ke y t o spee d i n th e advanc e

toward Manil a wa s th e tim e element —

the time take n b y I Corp s t o exten d it s

right flan k sout h an d southeast i n orde r

to affor d bette r protectio n t o th e XI V

Corps lef t rear , an d th e tim e take n b y

XIV Corp s t o assur e th e safet y o f it s

right rea r b y overrunnin g th e principa l

Kembu Group defense s i n th e Clar k

Field area . On e facto r mitigate d th e

problems attendan t upo n securin g XIV

Corps' righ t rear . O n 2 9 January , th e

XI Corp s wa s t o lan d o n Luzon' s wes t

coast nort h o f Bataa n i n a n attac k tha t

20

 MacArthur's forces , retreatin g int o Bataan , ha d

evacuated th e Clar k Fiel d are a durin g th e nigh t o f

1-2 Januar y 1942 . Se e Morton , Fall of the Philippines, p . 213 .

21

 XIV Corp s an d 37t h Di v G- 3 Pe r Rpts , 25-2 8

Jan 45 . 22

 The genera l source s fo r th e remainde r o f thi s

section are : Sixt h Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 24-27 ; Sixt h

Army FO 45, 26 Jan 45, in ibid., I, 147-48 ; XIV Corps

Rpt Luzon , pt . I , p . 69 ; XIV Corps Opn s Mem o 11 ,

27 Jan 45 ; I Corps FO 7, 27 Jan 45 .
THE CAPTUR E O F CLAR K FIEL D 181

bid fai r t o diver t Kembu Group atten -

tion an d tak e som e o f th e pressur e of f

XIV Corps .

23

 O n th e othe r hand , th e

problems involve d i n providin g protec -

tion t o XI V Corps' lef t flan k wer e no t

so easil y solved . Genera l Kruege r fel t

that I Corp s coul d no t advance sout h

from th e San Felipe-Cuyapo line, which

the corp s ha d secure d b y 2 7 January ,

until reinforcements reached Luzon. T o

spread I Corps any thinner would create

an entirel y ne w danger—a weakl y hel d

I Corp s flan k expose d t o counterattac k

from a Japanese concentration th e Sixt h

Army believe d t o b e locate d nea r Sa n

Jose o n Rout e 5 . I t wa s bad enoug h t o

have XI V Corps ' lef t exposed , bu t a t

least tha t corp s ha d th e protectio n o f

distance an d unbridge d stream s agains t

a Japanes e thrust fro m Sa n Jose , protec -

tion I Corps' right would not hav e onc e

it starte d southward .

The 32 d Infantr y Division , th e 1s t

Cavalry Division, and th e separate 112t h

Cavalry RCT al l reached Lingaye n Gulf

on 2 7 January. Onc e the units were unloaded, Kruege r coul d retur n th e 25t h

Division's 35t h RCT , still i n Arm y re -

serve, t o I Corps. H e als o intende d t o

give the 32 d Division, less on e regimen t

in Army reserve, to I Corps for insertion

between th e 25t h an d 43 d Divisions .

Then th e 25t h an d 6t h Division s coul d

narrow thei r front s an d continu e sout h

and southeast with less danger of leaving

the I Corp s flan k expose d beyon d th e

limits of a calculated risk ,

Krueger reasone d tha t th e 32 d Divi -

sion and the 35th RCT coul d move into

position i n tim e fo r I Corp s t o star t

advancing beyond its San Felipe-Cuyapo

line o n 2 8 January, strikin g forwar d t o

a ne w objective line twent y miles to th e

south an d southeast . O n th e righ t th e

6th Divisio n woul d mov e u p t o a lin e

extending fro m Lica b t o Muñoz , o n

Route 5 eigh t mile s southwes t o f Sa n

Jose. Th e 25t h Divisio n woul d tak e

over nea r Muño z t o exten d th e ne w

objective lin e northwar d t o Rout e 8 at

Lupao, roughly nine miles northwest o f

San Jose. Reconnaissanc e would be pro -

jected t o Sa n Jose , Cabanatuan , an d

Rizal, th e last lyin g te n mile s southeast

of Sa n Jose .

Feeling tha t fo r th e tim e bein g th e

I Corps ' advanc e woul d provid e ade -

quate securit y alon g XI V Corps ' lef t

rear, Kruege r directe d XI V Corp s t o

resume it s driv e towar d Manila , firs t

securing crossing s ove r th e Pampang a

River, twenty-fiv e mile s south o f Clar k

Field. Griswol d hesitate d t o commit his

"free" unit—th e 37t h Divisio n les s th e

129th RCT—t o an advanc e to the Pam -

panga s o hurriedly , fo r h e feare d th e

division migh t be cu t of f south o f Clar k

Field i f i t move d to o soon . H e wante d

another tw o o r thre e days , a t least , o f

concerted attack s agains t th e Kembu

Group s o tha t h e could pus h tha t forc e

far enoug h bac k int o th e mountain s t o

permit th e uninterrupted flo w o f troop s

and supplie s dow n Rout e 3 an d recon -

structed portion s o f th e Manil a Rail -

road. H e als o fel t tha t h e woul d hav e

to drive th e Kembu Group furthe r int o

the Zambale s Mountain s t o allo w th e

Allied Ai r Force s t o carr y ou t pressin g

construction task s a t Clar k Fiel d

unmolested.

Accordingly, Griswol d directe d th e

37th Divisio n t o mov e t o th e attac k o n

the 40t h Division' s left , clearin g thos e

portions o f Clar k Fiel d stil l controlle d

by th e Japanese an d the n securin g Fort 23

 See below, ch. XVII.
182 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Stotsenburg and th e high ground imme -

diately wes t an d southwes t o f th e for t

area. While not complyin g entirely with

Krueger's orders to get to the Pampanga,

Griswold did direc t th e 37th Division t o

send reconnaissanc e south along Route 3

to Sa n Fernando , Pampang a Province ,

fifteen mile s beyon d Clar k Field . Fro m

San Fernand o Rout e 7 stretched south -

westward int o Bataan. Onc e it ha d captured Sa n Fernando , Griswold 's order s

read, th e 37t h Divisio n woul d recon -

noiter southwes t alon g Rout e 7 to gai n

contact with XI Corp s and woul d patro l

southeastward alon g Rout e 3 t o th e

Pampanga crossings.

The mission s Griswol d assigne d hi m

forced a wholesal e reshufflin g o f unit s

upon Maj. Gen. Robert S. Beightler, the

37th Division' s commander. First , wit h

I Corps resuming its advance southward,

Beightler neede d onl y one battalio n of

his 129t h Infantr y t o protec t th e XI V

Corps' lef t rear , an d h e decide d t o em -

ploy th e res t o f th e regimen t i n th e

attack o n For t Stotsenburg . T o brin g

the regiment up to strength for this task,

he attached to it a battalion of the 145t h

Infantry. Th e res t o f th e 145t h woul d

strike wes t fro m Angele s t o clea r th e

high groun d sout h an d southwes t o f

Fort Stotsenburg. T o th e 148th Infantr y

and th e 37t h Reconnaissanc e Troop fell

the 37t h Division 's othe r missions.

As the 37th Division swung into action

against the Kembu Group, the 40th Division woul d continue its drive southwestward i n th e are a nort h o f th e Bamba n

River, it s objectiv e groun d risin g t o

over 1,50 0 feet thre e t o fou r mile s be -

yond th e 160t h Infantry 's deepes t pene -

tration. The 160t h Infantr y wa s to make

the mai n effor t i n th e 40t h Division' s

sector, its axis of advance to be th e steepsided Hil l 63 6 ridg e lin e runnin g i n

a southwesterly direction along the north

bank o f the Bamba n River . Th e 108th

Infantry woul d continu e it s driv e o n

the 160th 's righ t an d woul d eliminat e

the las t pocket s o f resistanc e alon g th e

Takayama Detachment's sectio n o f

the OPLR. Th e 185t h Infantr y an d th e

40th Reconnaissanc e Troop would con -

tinue t o protec t th e XI V Corp s lin e o f

communications back t o Lingayen Gulf ,

patrol int o th e norther n portio n o f th e

Zambales Mountains , an d secur e th e

Sixth Army 's right rear. 24

XIV Corps ' ne w attack , schedule d t o

start a t 070 0 o n 2 8 January , woul d b e

launched agains t a Japanes e forc e tha t

still held many positions along its OPLR,

that wa s still unde r centralize d control ,

that ha d los t fe w o f th e weapon s wit h

which i t ha d begu n t o fight , an d tha t

still hel d excellen t defensiv e terrai n

from whic h i t could observe every movement made by the assaultin g Americans.

The 108th Infantr y ha d yet to overru n

some Takayama Detachment OPLR de -

fenses; th e 160t h Infantry , havin g de -

stroyed th e OPL R i n it s sector , woul d

drive directly into the Takaya—not th e

Takayama—Detachment's secto r i n th e

center o f th e Kembu Group MLR ;

the 129t h and 145t h Infantr y Regiments

would slam into the Eguchi Detachment

OPLR, undisturbed s o far except by air

and artillery bombardments. O n 2 7 January th e Yanagimoto Detachment with -

drew its tank s an d infantr y t o th e For t

Stotsenburg area , i n effec t settin g u p

another defensiv e lin e betwee n th e

Eguchi Detachment OPL R an d MLR. 25

The 129t h Infantr y woul d hea d directly

24

 37th Di v F O 25 , 27 Jan 45 ; 40th Di v F O 10 , 27

Jan 45 . 25

 SWPA Hist Series, II, 449.
THE CAPTUR E O F CLAR K FIEL D 183

into th e strengthene d Eguchi Detachment sector .

Closing With the Kembu Group's MLR

Leading off the ne w attack , th e 129t h

Infantry struc k westwar d fro m th e vicin -

ity o f Culay o about 0715 o n 2 8 January

and withi n tw o and a half hour s gaine d

firm contac t al l acros s th e Eguchi Detachment OPLR. 26

 Fir e coming fro m a

block o f destroye d hangar s an d min e

fields a t th e wester n en d o f Runway No .

2, two mile s west o f Culayo , stoppe d th e

regiment's right, whic h medium s o f th e

754th Tan k Battalio n supported . Th e

129th's lef t reache d th e outskirt s o f barrio Tacondo, off the southeastern corner

of Fort Stotsenburg, but halte d when hit

by Japanese small arms and machine gu n

fire an d b y a misplace d Fift h Ai r Forc e

strike. Th e supportin g tank s stoppe d a t

another min e field . Th e Japanes e ha d

strewn mine s liberall y i n th e 129t h In -

fantry's sector, the extent of their mining

operations indicated by the fac t tha t during th e perio d 28-3 1 Januar y th e 37t h

Division remove d almos t 1,35 0 mine s

from Clar k Fiel d an d For t Stotsenburg .

Meanwhile, nort h o f th e Bamba n

River, th e 160t h Infantr y encountere d

surprisingly ligh t oppositio n a s i t swep t

on alon g it s ridg e lin e t o seiz e open -

crested Hill 620, a mile beyond Hill 636.

But Japanes e automati c weapons , mortars, and artiller y pinne d down th e regiment as, during th e afternoon , i t drov e

1,200 yard s west o f Hil l 62 0 on a n ever -

broadening front. A t 190 0 Japanese in -

fantry counterattacked , an d th e 160t h

had t o withdra w it s forwar d companie s

some 70 0 yard s i n orde r t o refus e it s

right (north ) flank , whic h wa s bearin g

the brun t o f th e attack . Th e nex t day,

still operatin g on open ground, th e regiment pulle d i n it s righ t an d narrowe d

its front t o a width closel y corresponding

to that of the Takaya Detachment MLR.

By this time th e American units were

dividing th e groun d amon g themselve s

much a s th e Japanes e ha d divide d it .

The 108t h Infantry , o n th e 40t h Divi -

sion's right, was now fighting only against

the Takayama Detachment; th e 160t h

Infantry's adversar y wa s th e Takaya

Detachment; th e 129t h Infantr y face d

the Eguchi Detachment. Th e similarit y

in deployment , base d upo n th e terrai n

compartments o f th e area , illustrate s

the fac t tha t th e principle s o f terrai n

appreciation ofte n diffe r littl e fro m on e

army t o another.27

On 2 9 Januar y th e 160t h Infantr y

gained almost tw o miles i n a southwesterly directio n acros s a fron t nearl y a

mile wide , breakin g throug h a strong -

point a t th e ver y cente r o f th e Takaya

Detachment MLR . The Japanes e re -

acted wit h severa l small-scal e counter -

attacks durin g th e night , bu t achieve d

nothing. I n thi s succes s th e 160t h In -

fantry los t 1 0 me n killed , abou t 7 0

wounded, an d nearl y 5 0 evacuate d be -

cause o f hea t exhaustio n an d comba t

fatigue.

26

 This subsectio n i s base d generall y on : 37t h Di v

Rpt Luzon , pp . 31-35 ; 37t h Di v G-3 Jn l an d Jn l

Files, 28 Jan-1 Feb 45; 129th In f Rpt Luzon, pp. 4-5;

129th Inf , Hist o f 129t h Inf , 1810-1945, pp . 51-59 ;

129th In f Jnl, 28 Jan-2 Fe b 45 ; 129t h In f S- 3 Pe r

Rpts, 28 Jan-2 Feb 45; 145t h In f Rpt Luzon , pp. 13 -

15; 145t h Inf S- 3 Jnl , 28-31 Jan 45; 145t h Inf S-3 Pe r

Rpts, 28-3 1 Ja n 45 ; 40th Di v G-3 Jn l Files , 28-3 1

Jan 45 ; 160t h In f Unit Jnls an d Jnl Files , 27-31 Jan

45; 108th RC T Jnls and Jnl Files, 28 Jan-1 Feb 45.

27

 The Eguchi Detachment OPL R la y entirel y

within th e 129t h Infantry' s zone . It s southernmos t

MLR strongpoin t wa s withi n th e 145t h Infantry' s

zone, bu t th e Eguchi Detachment abandone d thi s

position befor e th e 145t h reache d it .
184 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

For th e 129t h Infantry , actio n bega n

on 2 9 Januar y wit h a n unsuccessfu l

Eguchi Detachment counterattack . Th e

American regiment' s advanc e starte d

about 0915 , after a n artiller y an d 4.2 -

inch mortar preparation and afte r await -

ing a Fifth Air Forc e strike that failed t o

materialize. Agains t increasingl y heav y

fire fro m al l type s o f Japanes e weapons,

the 129t h Infantr y overra n th e righ t o f

the Eguchi Detachment OPL R b y 163 0

and starte d int o th e ruin s o f th e For t

Stotsenburg camp area. Fiftee n minute s

later si x Yanagimoto Detachment tank s

counterattacked a t barri o Tacondo, hitting th e 3 d Battalion , 129t h Infantry ,

on it s right . Sinc e th e battalion' s sup -

porting tank s ha d jus t withdraw n t o

replenish fue l an d ammunition, 28 onl y

infantry machin e gun s an d a lon e Can -

non Compan y self-propelle d mount —

which wa s promptly knocke d ou t alon g

with mos t o f it s crew—a t firs t oppose d

the Japanes e tanks. Othe r self-propelled

mounts, a s wel l a s vehicle s fro m th e

637th Tank Destroye r Battalion quickl y

came up , an d th e Japanes e tank s bega n

to withdraw . Fou r Yanagimoto Detachment tanks were ultimately knocked out,

as were two vehicles of th e 637th .

The tw o Japanese counterattack s o n

the 29t h ha d bee n launche d wit h th e

hope tha t th e OPLR migh t b e restore d

and hel d a t leas t anothe r da y o r two .

With thei r failur e Genera l Tsukada , th e

Kembu Group commander , ordered th e

Eguchi Detachment t o withdra w t o it s

MLR positions . Fo r th e Yanagimoto

Detachment th e losses , coupled wit h at -

trition i n other, lesse r contacts and wit h

losses fro m America n artiller y fir e dur -

ing th e precedin g fe w days, marke d th e

end o f a n armore d unit . Th e detach -

ment's survivor s pulle d bac k int o th e

Eguchi Detachment MLR. 29

These Kembu Group order s mus t

have bee n issue d abou t th e sam e tim e

that Genera l Beightle r gav e th e 129t h

Infantry ne w instruction s deriving fro m

a chain of events over which the regiment

had n o control . Takin g stoc k o f th e

situation i n th e Clar k Fiel d are a o n 2 9

January, Genera l Kruege r wa s no t to o

well pleased . Passin g o n th e pressur e

earlier place d upo n hi m b y Genera l

MacArthur, Krueger reminded Griswold

that strategi c considerations made it im -

perative t o seiz e th e entir e Clar k Fiel d

air cente r promptly , an d directe d th e

XIV Corp s commande r t o pres s th e

attack wit h th e "utmost vigor." 30

Griswold passed on the pressure to the

37th an d 40t h Divisions , orderin g th e

37th t o secur e For t Stotsenbur g an d

the hig h groun d t o th e immediat e west

by dar k o n 3 0 January , simultaneousl y

broadening its front t o the right.31 Thu s

far a gap of tw o miles had separated th e

129th Infantry's righ t and th e left o f the

160th Infantry , o n th e nort h ban k o f

the Bamban . Fro m a positio n o n hig h

28

 Hist o f 129t h Inf, 1810-1945 , p . 56 . Accordin g

to an exchang e of messages summarized i n th e 129t h

Infantry Regimenta l Journa l fo r th e perio d 1805 -

1848, 2 9 January, th e regimenta l an d battalio n com -

manders fel t tha t th e tank s ha d withdraw n t o avoi d

Japanese artiller y fire ; tha t the y refuse d t o return t o

the fron t a t th e tim e o f th e Japanes e tan k attack ;

and tha t the y di d no t provid e prope r suppor t fo r

Cannon Compan y self-propelle d mount s an d 637t h

Tank Destroye r Battalio n weapons. Th e regimenta l

commander reporte d tha t h e finall y go t thre e tank s

turned aroun d an d bac k t o th e front , bu t no t unti l

the Japanese tank s ha d withdrawn . Th e record s o f

the other units involved contai n no furthe r informa -

tion o n th e action .

29

 SWPA Hist Series, II, 451 . 30

 Rad , Kruege r t o Griswold , WL-827 , 2 9 Jan 45 ,

Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 28-2 9 Jan 45 . 31

 Tele Msg , XI V Corp s t o 37t h Div , 170 1 2 9 Jan ,

Entry 1709 , 37t h Di v G-3 Jnl , Jan-Feb 45.
THE CAPTUR E O F CLAR K FIEL D 185

ground nea r barri o Dolores, situate d o n

the sout h ban k o f th e river , Japanes e

automatic weapons and mortars from a n

Eguchi Detachment OPL R strongpoin t

had bee n harassin g th e 160t h Infantry .

This strongpoint, an d tw o other OPL R

positions between Dolore s and th e 129t h

Infantry's right , ha d t o b e eliminate d

before the 160th Infantry could continue

southwestward and befor e th e security of

all th e Clar k Fiel d runway s coul d b e

assured.

The las t unit t o receive th e impac t o f

the pressur e fro m highe r headquarter s

was th e unit in contact, th e 129t h Infan -

try, whic h Genera l Beightle r directed t o

extend it s righ t a s fa r a s th e Bamba n

River and secure the Dolores area.32 The

regiment cleare d th e hills nea r Dolore s

with littl e difficult y o n 3 0 January, most

of th e defender s havin g alread y with -

drawn i n accordanc e wit h th e Kembu

Group's order s o f th e 29th . Sinc e th e

Eguchi Detachment had abandoned practically it s las t forwar d position s durin g

the nigh t and sinc e the Yanagimoto Detachment ha d als o withdraw n t o th e

MLR, th e 129t h Infantr y encountere d

only ligh t oppositio n a s i t continue d

westward, securin g th e rubbl e o f For t

Stotsenburg b y dus k o n th e 30th . Be -

fore dark , right flan k units , driving into

rising groun d wes t o f th e cam p area ,

gained contac t wit h a n Eguchi Detachment. ML R strongpoint . S o easil y ha d

the advanc e bee n mad e durin g th e da y

that i t appeare d tha t al l th e dominatin g

high groun d clos e t o For t Stotsenbur g

could b e cleared withou t muc h trouble .

Meanwhile, north o f the Bamban , the

160th Infantr y battle d o n agains t th e

Takaya Detachment MLR . Resistance

was stiffe r tha n an y th e 160t h ha d ye t

encountered, and th e regiment, losing 11

men killed and 8 6 wounded, gained onl y

500 yards of new ground during the day.

The 108th Infantr y continue d t o mak e

local advance s in its area and b y evening

on th e 30t h ha d finall y secure d Hil l 5 .

The 108th als o cleare d Thral l Hill , a

height 1,00 0 yard s sout h o f Hil l 5 tha t

remnants o f Takaya Detachment OPLR

units defended fiercely . Wit h the seizure

of Thral l Hil l th e 40t h Divisio n ha d

overrun almos t th e las t o f th e isolate d

OPLR pockets.

On 3 1 January th e 108t h Infantr y in -

stituted long-rang e patrollin g westward ,

making no contac t wit h organize d Japa -

nese forces . Th e 160t h Infantry , t o th e

south, again could mak e very little prog -

ress i n th e fac e o f fanati c opposition, although th e regimen t ha d th e closes t

possible artiller y suppor t an d wa s als o

supported by tanks brought up along flat

ground on the north bank of the Bamban.

As ha d bee n th e cas e o f th e 30th , th e

key actio n o n 3 1 Januar y too k plac e

along th e 129t h Infantry' s front . Th e

regiment's objectiv e fo r th e da y wa s a

large, bare-sloped commanding hill mass

known as Top o f the World, lying about

1,200 yard s beyon d For t Stotsenbur g

and markin g th e wester n limit s o f th e

XIV Corps ' objectiv e are a a s the n de -

fined. Th e Eguchi Detachment ha d th e

open approache s t o th e 1,000-foot-hig h

hill mas s covere d wit h 20-mm. , 25-mm. ,

and 40-mm. automatic weapons, the fire s

of whic h wer e reinforce d b y a fe w mortars and light artillery pieces. Onc e Top

of th e Worl d an d nearb y knob s wer e

taken, th e securit y o f For t Stotsenbur g

and Clar k Field could be assured against

fire fro m anythin g excep t long-rang e

artillery. 32

 37th Di v FO 36 , 29 Jan 45 .
186 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

The 1s t Battalion , 129t h Infantry ,

launched th e attac k agains t To p o f th e

World a t 090 0 o n 3 1 January . Delaye d

and sometime s pinned i n plac e by Japa -

nese fir e durin g the morning, th e battalion secure d th e steep , grassy , souther n

and southeaster n slope s o f th e hil l b y

midafternoon, an d befor e dar k som e

troops were halfway u p thos e slopes. O n

the morning of the next day, 1 February,

there wa s considerable maneuverin g b y

small unit s al l acros s th e hill 's ope n

slopes, an d fro m tim e t o tim e th e de -

fenders and th e attackers almost reached

the poin t o f engagin g i n game s o f catc h

with hand grenades. Despit e determined

resistance o n th e par t o f th e Japanese ,

the 129t h Infantr y battalio n gaine d th e

crest o f th e hil l mas s a t 1330 . Clark

Field wa s secure.

The Attack Through the End of January

With th e seizur e o f Top o f the World

and th e 160t h Infantry' s concomitan t

penetration o f th e Takaya Detachment

MLR, th e critica l phas e o f XI V Corps'

battle against the Kembu Group came to

a successfu l end . The 37t h an d 40th Divisons ha d overru n th e group's OPLR ,

they ha d pierce d th e ML R i n bot h th e

Takaya an d th e Eguchi Detachment sec -

tors, and the y had destroye d th e Yanagimoto Detachment a s an armore d force .

They ha d inflicte d ove r 2,50 0 casualtie s

on th e Japanese , whos e fanaticis m an d

tenacity i s illustrated i n part , a t least , b y

the fac t tha t th e America n force s ha d

taken les s than 1 0 prisoners in th e Clar k

Field are a sinc e th e attac k bega n o n 2 4

January. Throug h 3 1 January th e 37t h

and 40t h Divisions , togethe r wit h rein -

forcing units , ha d los t roughl y 15 0 men

killed an d 60 0 wounded . A s usual , th e

infantry bore the brunt of the losses. The

casualties o f th e fou r regiment s partici -

pating i n th e attac k wes t fro m Rout e 3

approximated:33

Regiment

129th

145th

108th

160th

Total

Killed

50

5

30

45

130

Wounded

230

10

125

215

580

Total

280

15

155

260

710

Probably a n equa l numbe r o f me n ha d

had t o be evacuated from th e front line s

as th e resul t o f injuries , sickness , hea t

exhaustion, an d comba t fatigue .

Of greate r significanc e tha n th e casu -

alties wer e th e tactica l result s o f th e

battle against the Kembu Group through

31 January. XI V Corps had secure d th e

Clark Fiel d air center for the Allied Air

Forces—construction work ha d alread y

begun an d th e Fift h Ai r Forc e plane s

would soo n b e flyin g fro m repaire d

strips. Next , th e corps , pushin g th e

Kembu Group westward, had assured for

itself th e uninterrupte d flo w o f supplie s

down Rout e 3 and th e Manila Railroad ,

securing a line of communications along

which futur e advance s towar d Manil a

could b e supported .

The figh t agains t th e Kembu Group

was not ye t over. Manifestly , th e res t o f

General Tsukada' s force s coul d no t b e

left a t large—his strength was still potentially to o great—but th e XIV Corp s had

made sufficien t progres s b y 3 1 Januar y

that plan s could b e mad e t o releas e one

division fro m th e Kembu Group t o

continue th e driv e toward Manila .

33

 The tabl e is base d upo n incomplete , contradic -

tory, an d mutuall y irreconcilabl e figure s containe d

in th e source s cite d previousl y i n thi s chapter.
CHAPTER X I

Protecting XIV Corps' Rear an d Flanks

The Problem and the Plan

At th e en d o f Januar y th e spee d o f

XIV Corps' progress toward Manil a continued t o depen d largel y upo n th e pac e

of I Corps' advance to the east and south.

(See Map III.) O n 3 1 Januar y XI V

Corps wa s preparin g t o sen d th e 37t h

Division o n towar d Manil a along Route

3, whil e th e 1s t Cavalr y Division , re -

cently attache d t o th e corps, wa s assembled a t Guimb a an d makin g read y t o

mount a complementar y driv e towar d

the capita l dow n th e eas t sid e o f th e

Central Plain s vi a Rout e 5 .

1

XIV Corp s ha d mad e provisio n t o se -

cure it s righ t rea r an d it s lin e o f com -

munications against th e threa t pose d b y

the remainin g troop s o f th e Kembu

Group b y directing the 40th Divisio n t o

resume th e westwar d offensiv e i n th e

Clark Fiel d are a an d driv e th e Kembu

Group deepe r int o the Zambale s Moun -

tains. Som e additiona l measur e o f pro -

tection ha d been give n XIV Corps' right

by X I Corps , whic h ha d lande d o n th e

west coast o f Luzo n north o f Bataa n an d

was wel l inlan d towar d th e bas e o f

Bataan Peninsul a b y the end o f January.

Although X I Corp s ha d not , a s MacArthur ha d hoped , "completel y dislo -

cated" th e resistance th e Kembu Group

offered, th e corp s ha d pinne d dow n a

first-class Japanes e infantr y regimen t

that might otherwise have been deployed

to good advantag e a t Clar k Field. 2 Fur -

thermore, MacArthu r an d Kruege r

hoped tha t oppositio n i n fron t o f XI V

Corps, a s tha t corp s drov e o n towar d

Manila, migh t b e a t leas t partiall y dislocated b y th e 11t h Airborne Division ,

which, unde r Eight h Arm y direction ,

had landed on 3 1 January along Luzon's

west coast sout h o f Manila. 3 Th e prin -

cipal problem, then, was still the security

of th e XIV Corps' left rear, security that

I Corp s ha d to provide .

Directed b y General Krueger t o move

up i n strength t o th e Licab-Lupa o line,

I Corp s ha d se t it s 6t h Divisio n i n mo -

tion towar d th e southern sectio n of tha t

objective lin e o n 2 8 January. 4 Tha t

afternoon th e 6th Division had troops in

Victoria an d Guimba , which previousl y

marked th e unit' s limit s o f reconnais -

sance, an d o n th e nex t da y relieve d a

37th Division outpost at Licab, five miles

east o f Victoria. 5 Encounterin g n o op -

position, th e 6t h Divisio n lef t spe d east1

 XIV Corp s Rp t Luzon , pt . I , p . 75 ; Sixt h Arm y

FO 46 , 30 Jan 45 , Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I, 148-49 .

See als o below , ch . XII.

2

 Rad, MacArthu r t o Krueger , CAX-50027, 1 7 Jan 45 Sixt h Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 112-13 . Se e als o chs.

VIII, above , an d XVII , below. 3

 See below, ch. XII. 4

 For selectio n o f this line , see above , ch. X. 5

 Operational materia l i n thi s section i s from ; 6t h

Div Rp t Luzon , pp . 14 , 23; 6t h Ca v Rc n T r Rp t

Luzon, pp. 19-23 ; 1st Inf Rpt Luzon , pp. 19-21 ; 20th

Inf Rp t Luzon , pp . 18-20 ; 25t h Di v Rpt Luzon , pp .

25-28; 25t h Ca v Rcn Tr Rp t Luzon , pp . 3-4 ; 35th

Inf Rp t Luzon , pp . 12-13 ; 27t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp .

9-11.
188 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

ward o n 2 9 January along a good grave l

road that , led throug h hot, dry, fla t far m

land an d cu t Rout e 5 i n th e vicinit y o f

Talavera, almos t twelv e mile s eas t o f

Licab. O n 3 0 January , afte r a skirmis h

with a smal l Japanese force , th e division

secured th e roa d junctio n barri o o f

Baloc, on Rout e 5 about fiv e mile s north

of Talavera . Fa r mor e easil y tha n ex -

pected, th e 6t h Divisio n ha d severe d th e

main lin e o f communication s betwee n

the Shobu an d Shimbu Groups, two -

lane, pave d Rout e 5 .

Muñoz, markin g th e norther n en d o f

the 6t h Division' s sectio n o f th e Licab -

Lupao line , la y on Rout e 5 and th e Sa n

Jose branc h o f th e Manil a Railroa d

some fiv e mile s nort h o f Baloc . O n 2 7

January th e 6t h Reconnaissanc e Troo p

reported th e town unoccupied, but upon

reinvestigation th e nex t da y discovere d

a stron g Japanes e forc e i n an d aroun d

the town. O n th e 30th one rifl e company

of th e 20t h Infantry , 6t h Division , un -

successfully attempte d t o clea r th e town ,

and th e 6t h Divisio n learne d tha t th e

objective wa s not t o b e take n withou t a

stiff fight .

Meanwhile, th e 6t h Reconnaissanc e

Troop ha d range d fa r t o th e sout h o f

Muñoz and Talavera . O n th e 28th , elements o f th e troo p reache d th e vicinit y

of Cabanatuan , abou t seve n mile s sout h

of Talaver a an d nearl y fiftee n eas t o f

Licab. Unlik e XI V Corp s patrol s a few

days earlier, the 6th Division's reconnaissance units reported tha t a strong force of

Japanese hel d Cabanatuan , bu t th e 6t h

Reconnaissance Troo p foun d n o othe r

signs o f Japanese sout h o f Talaver a an d

Licab. Other 6th Division patrols learned

that the Japanese had establishe d a counterreconnaissance scree n wes t o f Muño z

and Sa n Jose .

The 25t h Division , o n th e 6th' s left ,

had no t bee n successfu l i n movin g up t o

its portio n o f th e Licab-Lupa o line .

Coming out o f army reserve on 2 8 January, th e 25t h Division' s 35t h Infantr y

marched east along Route 8 from Resale s

and b y evening the next day, unopposed

on it s advanc e throug h hot , dry, ricepaddy country , ha d reache d barri o Gonzales, on gravel-pave d Rout e 8 nearly ten

miles west-northwes t o f Lupao . I n th e

meantime th e 27t h Infantry , movin g

overland vi a narrow , dusty , dir t road s

south o f Rout e 8 , ha d drive n a Japanes e

outpost from barri o Pemienta, on Rout e

8 thre e mile s east o f Gonzales.

Unknown to the 25t h Division, a small

tank-artillery forc e o f th e 2d Tank Division had been trappe d along the highway

between Gonzale s an d Pemienta . Fro m

2000 o n th e 29t h unti l 043 0 th e nex t

morning the force tried unsuccessfull y t o

break throug h a perimete r th e 27t h In -

fantry ha d establishe d a t Pemienta . B y

the time the action ha d ended th e American regimen t ha d kille d 12 5 Japanes e

and ha d destroye d 8 tanks , 8 artiller y

prime movers , 4 tractors , 8 105-mm .

howitzers, 5 trucks , an d miscellaneou s

other equipment . Th e 27t h Infantry' s

own losse s were about 1 5 men kille d and

45 wounded.

Meanwhile, 25t h Divisio n patrols ha d

learned tha t the Japanes e held Umingan ,

on Rout e 8 fiv e mile s northwes t o f

Lupao, in some strength. O n 3 0 January

the 27t h Infantr y starte d movin g int o

position t o strik e th e tow n fro m th e

north an d northwest , whil e th e 35t h In -

fantry bega n preparin g a holdin g attack

from th e wes t an d southwest . T o cove r

these preparations , th e 25t h Reconnais -

sance Troo p patrolle d towar d Lupa o

and othe r town s along Route 8 between
PROTECTING XI V CORP S REA R AN D FLANK S 189

WRECKED JAPANES E TANK-ARTILLER Y COLUMN , NEA R PEMIENT A

Umigan an d Sa n Jose . Th e troo p made

scattered contact s wit h man y smal l

groups of Japanese in th e region west o f

the highwa y an d sout h o f Umingan , in -

dicating that the Japanese had a counterreconnaissance scree n i n th e 25t h

Division's secto r a s wel l a s i n th e 6t h

Division's area.

Although th e 25t h Divisio n ha d no t

reached Lupao , th e advance s mad e b y I

Corps' tw o right flan k division s throug h

30 January wer e o f considerabl e impor -

tance t o futur e Sixt h Arm y planning .

First, b y severing Route 5 , the 6t h Divi -

sion ha d force d th e Shobu-Shimbu

Group lin e of communication s eastwar d

to poo r road s i n th e foothill s o f th e

Sierra Madr e beyond th e main highway .

Even thes e route s woul d b e denie d th e

Japanese onc e I Corp s coul d secur e

Cabanatuan an d San Jose. Then , by the

end o f January , I Corp s ha d gathere d

sufficient informatio n fro m patrols , captured documents , Filipin o guerrillas ,

prisoners o f war , and aeria l reconnais -

sance fo r Sixt h Arm y t o conclud e tha t

strong elements of the 2d Tank Division

were concentrated in the triangle formed

by Sa n Jose , Muñoz , an d Lupao . Gen -

eral Kruege r als o ha d reaso n t o believ e

that th e 10th Division ha d considerabl e

strength a t o r nea r Sa n Jose . Th e 6t h

Division's unopposed advances to 30 January, an d it s discover y tha t ther e wer e

no Japanes e wes t o f Rout e 5 i n th e re -

gion sout h o f Lica b an d Talavera , indi -

cated t o Kruege r tha t th e dangers to th e

XIV Corps' left rea r were not a s great a s

he ha d previousl y feared . O n th e othe r

hand, h e wa s unwillin g t o discoun t en -

tirely th e threa t presente d b y th e 2d

Tank Division an d 10th Division con -

centrations i n th e Sa n Jose-Muñoz -

Lupao area. Hi s interpretatio n o f avail-
190 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

able intelligence did no t lea d him to believe that the Japanese forces in th e area

had onl y defensiv e intentions , an d h e

therefore felt th e two Japanese units had

an offensiv e potentia l h e coul d no t

ignore. I Corps, Krueger decided, would

have t o mak e lon g stride s towar d over -

coming th e threa t fro m th e Sa n Jose -

Muñoz-Lupao triangl e befor e th e XI V

Corps' advanc e to Manila could procee d

unchecked.6

Accordingly, o n 3 0 January , Genera l

Krueger directe d I Corp s t o driv e east -

ward i n orde r t o seiz e Sa n Jos e an d

secure a lin e extendin g fro m tha t tow n

to Cabanatua n an d Rizal , respectivel y

twenty mile s south an d te n mile s southeast o f Sa n Jose . (Map 5) Onc e o n thi s

line, I Corp s woul d reconnoite r t o

Luzon's east coast at Bale r and Dingale n

Bays. Kruege r als o change d th e I-XI V

Corps boundar y fro m th e earlie r north -

south lin e throug h th e Centra l Plains ,

turned th e lin e eas t o f Licab , passe d i t

north o f Cabanatuan , an d swun g i t

thence southeas t t o Dingale n Bay. 7

The Capture of San Jose

Japanese and American

Tactical Plans

General Yamashit a wa s vitall y inter -

ested i n th e defens e o f Sa n Jos e fo r

reasons that , a s o f 3 0 January , wer e o f

secondary importanc e t o Genera l

Krueger. Kruege r kne w tha t wit h th e

successful accomplishmen t o f its missio n

I Corps would have cut the last overland

links betwee n th e Shimbu and Shobu

Groups an d woul d hav e gaine d a goo d

base o f attac k agains t th e Shobu Group

concentration i n norther n Luzon , bu t

Krueger's mai n interes t wa s th e protec -

tion o f XIV Corps' left rear . Yamashita ,

on th e other hand, intended t o hold San

Jose an d it s approache s unti l h e coul d

move al l th e supplie s stockpile d ther e

north int o the mountains along Route 5

and unti l th e 105th Division coul d pas s

through th e town o n it s way north fro m

the Shimbu Group t o joi n th e Shobu

Group. Yamashit a estimate d tha t hi s

troops coul d mov e th e bul k o f th e sup -

plies—mainly ammunition—stil l a t Sa n

Jose ou t o f tow n b y th e en d o f th e firs t

week in February, and he hoped tha t the

last elements of the 105th Division would

have cleared San Jose by the same time. 8

Thus Yamashita viewed the defense o f

San Jos e a s a holdin g actio n o f limite d

duration. Ye t the cours e of futur e oper -

ations i n norther n Luzo n woul d b e de -

termined i n large measure by the nature

of th e defensiv e stan d o f th e 2d Tank

Division an d attache d element s o f th e

10th and 105th Divisions. Upo n that defense depende d th e quantit y o f supplie s

the Japanese could move out o f San Jos e

and environ s before losing that railhead,

the strength the 2d Tank Division would

have left , an d th e siz e an d compositio n

of th e force s th e 105th Division coul d

move throug h th e tow n befor e i t fell .

Manifestly, i f I Corp s could captur e San

Jose quickly, Sixt h Army 's ultimate tas k

in norther n Luzo n woul d b e muc h

easier.

6

 Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I, 32 . 7 Sixth Arm y F O 46 , 3 0 Ja n 45 , Sixt h Arm y Rp t

Luzon, I, 148-49 .

8

 Japanese informatio n i n thi s section an d it s subsections is from : SWP A His t Series, II , 444-46 ; 14th

Area Army T r Or g List ; Kawa i Statement , States ,

II, 145-49 ; Konum a Statement , States , II , 300-40 ;

Kawai Narrativ e an d atch d maps , 10t h I& H Staf f

Study, Japanese Opns on Luzon ; 6th Div Rpt Luzon ,

p. 31 ; 25th Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 29 , 31-33.
Map 5
192 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

The Japanes e forces at and i n fron t o f

San Jos e wer e deployed i n scattere d de -

tachments i n a n attemp t t o provid e a

defense i n depth . Yamashit a ha d in -

tended tha t defense s woul d b e concen -

trated a t Lupao and Muñoz , but instea d

the 2d Tank Division had spli t its available forces—includin g th e attachment s

from th e 10th an d 105th Divisions—

among eigh t separat e strongpoints . A t

Umingan, for example , th e garriso n wa s

built aroun d th e 3d Battalion, 26th Independent Mixed Regiment, one o f th e

five infantr y battalion s tha t th e 105th

Division ha d starte d nort h fro m th e

Shimbu area. 9 Th e battalio n wa s reinforced b y a rifl e compan y tha t th e 10th

Division ha d lef t behin d a s it withdre w

up Rout e 5.

Lupao wa s hel d b y a tan k compan y

each o f th e 7th an d 10th Tank Regiments, two companie s o f th e 2d Mobile

Infantry, a three-gu n (75-mm. ) artiller y

platoon, and 2d Tank Division engineer

and ordnanc e troops . Sa n Isidro , o n

Route 8 midway between Lupao and San

Jose, wa s garrisoned b y th e 10th Tank

Regiment, les s on e company . Th e 2d

Tank Division's headquarters , alon g

with mino r enginee r an d infantr y units,

was located o n Rout e 5 two miles north

of Sa n Jose . A bi t furthe r north , i n

sharply risin g groun d eas t o f th e high -

way, ther e wa s another groupmen t com -

posed o f tw o 75-mm . batteries , tw o

infantry companies, and a tank company.

The Ida Detachment defended Muñoz,

Numbering nearly 2,00 0 men , thi s combat comman d include d th e 6th Tank

Regiment, les s on e company ; th e bul k

of th e 356th Independent Infantry Battalion, 103d Division;

10

 a battery of 105 -

mm. howitzer s fro m th e 2d Mobile Artillery; an d element s o f th e 2 d Tank

Division's Antitank Unit, whic h wer e

armed wit h 47-mm . guns . A t a n agri -

cultural school o n Rout e 5 about a mile

and a hal f northeas t o f Muño z wa s a

small force of infantry and antitank guns;

a simila r groupmen t hel d barrio s Caan -

awan an d Aba r No . 2 , on Rout e 5 tw o

miles southwes t o f Sa n Jose . Riza l wa s

garrisoned b y a compan y eac h o f tanks ,

infantry, an d antitan k guns , reinforce d

by two or thre e 75-mm. weapons. Ther e

was n o permanen t garriso n i n Sa n Jos e

itself, whic h ha d lon g bee n a prim e

target fo r Allied Ai r Forc e planes.

The Japanes e made little provision to

defend, the fairl y ope n groun d adjacen t

to Route s 5 an d 8 o n th e wa y t o Sa n

Jose. The y mad e no attempt , either , t o

block Rout e 99 , a third-clas s roa d tha t

connected Lupao and Muñoz. They had ,

in brief , n o pla n t o forestal l America n

flanking maneuver s agains t th e isolate d

individual strongpoints.

All defense s wer e fixed . Most o f th e

available tanks were dug i n a s pillboxes,

and th e Japanes e ha d n o plan s for their

withdrawal. Afte r th e war , 14th Area

Army an d 2d Tank Division officer s of -

9

 Insofar a s can b e ascertaine d fro m contradictor y

Japanese an d America n sources , th e compositio n o f

the forc e th e 105th Division move d nort h was :

Headquarters, 105th Division, less elements

105th Division Artillery, less 1 1⁄2 batterie s

105th Division Engineers, less 7 companies

3d Battalion, 26th Independent Mixed Regiment

(attached)

184th Independent Infantry Battalion

183d Independent Infantry Battalion, les s 21⁄2

companies

359th Independent Infantry Battalion, les s 2 1⁄2

companies

3d Company, 182d Independent Infantry Battalion

Inoue Provisional Infantry Battalion

10

 This battalio n ha d formerl y bee n attache d t o the 10th Division.
PROTECTING XI V CORP S REA R AN D FLANK S 193

fered man y explanation s fo r th e unor -

thodox, stati c us e o f th e armor , citin g

fuel shortages , Allie d ai r superiority ,

terrain difficulties , an d th e ligh t arma -

ment an d armo r o f th e Japanes e tank s

as compared to the American. N o doubt

all thes e explanations have some validity,

but the y als o reveal tha t Yamashit a wa s

willing to sacrifice the 2d Tank Division,

which h e woul d hav e foun d difficul t t o

employ i n a mor e norma l role , i n th e

static defens e o f th e approache s t o Sa n

Jose. H e ha d obviousl y determined tha t

the approache s would b e held , whateve r

the cost, until the 105th Division and the

ammunition stockpile d a t Sa n Jos e ha d

moved north up Rout e 5.

I Corp s pla n fo r th e attac k o n Sa n

Jose was simplicity itself, as is the natur e

of mos t goo d plans . Genera l Swift , th e

corps commander , decide d upo n a pin -

cers movement . Th e 6t h Division , t o

make th e mai n effort , woul d attac k

northeast u p Rout e 5 throug h Muñoz ;

the 25t h Divisio n woul d support wit h a

drive southeas t alon g Rout e 8 throug h

Umingan an d Lupao . Genera l Swif t re -

inforced eac h division for the attack. T o

the 25th Divisio n h e attached a 155-mm .

gun battalion , an 8-inc h howitze r battalion, a 4.2-inc h morta r company , an d a

company o f mediu m tanks . Th e 6t h

Division's reinforcement s include d a

155-mm. howitzer battalion, two 105-mm.

howitzer battalions , a 4.2-inc h morta r

company, a compan y o f mediu m tanks ,

and tw o platoons of light tanks. Th e 6t h

Division woul d provid e it s ow n protec -

tion on its right and righ t rear; th e 25t h

Division's lef t rea r woul d b e protecte d

by the 32d Division, which ha d started to

move into the line between th e 25t h and

43d Divisions . Th e 43 d Divisio n an d

the 158t h RC T woul d hol d th e groun d

they had secured in the Damortis-Rosario

sector.11

The Attack Begins

The driv e towar d Sa n Jos e bega n o n

the mornin g o f 1 February a s th e 20t h

Infantry, 6t h Division , gathere d fo r a n

assault on Muño z and th e 27t h Infantry ,

25th Division , struck toward Umingan. 12

The groun d aroun d Muñoz , fla t an d

open, provide d neithe r cove r no r con -

cealment fo r th e attackers , an d wa s

broken only by a few drainage o r irriga -

tion ditche s withi n th e tow n an d b y a

gentle draw openin g westward fro m th e

town's center . A few , small , scattere d

trees afforded th e only shade in the vicinity—heat from th e broiling tropica l su n

would becom e a proble m fo r th e 20t h

Infantry. Fe w house s withi n th e tow n

were stil l intact , fo r America n ai r an d

artillery bombardment had already made

a shamble s of most buildings.

Japanese medium tanks, mounting 47-

mm. weapons and machin e guns, formed

the backbone of the defense . Mos t of the

tanks wer e du g i n wit h turret s barel y

showing abov e ground . Artiller y an d

47-mm. antitan k gun s wer e i n sand -

bagged o r earthen-walle d emplacement s

that onl y a direc t hi t b y American mor -

tars o r high-angl e artiller y fir e coul d

knock out . Japanese infantr y an d ma -

chine gunners held strongpoints throughout th e Muño z debris , whic h als o

provided camouflag e fo r man y artiller y

and tan k positions .

11

 I Corp s F O 8 , 3 1 Jan 45 ; 25t h Di v F O 7 , 3 1 Jan

45, 35t h In f Jn l File , 3 1 Ja n 45 ; 6t h Di v F O 12 , 31

Jan 45 . 12

 Information o n 6t h Divisio n operation s i n thi s

section i s generall y from ; 6t h Di v Rp t Luzon , pp .

23-27; 20t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 17-21 ; 20t h In f S- 3

Per Rpts , 3 1 Jan-3 Fe b 45 .
194 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

MUÑOZ

On 1 February th e 3 d Battalion , 20t h

Infantry, le d th e attack wit h a n attemp t

to gain control o f a 2,000-yar d stretch o f

Route 9 9 alon g th e wester n edg e o f

Muñoz. Afte r fiftee n minutes ' prepara -

tion by a battalion of 105-mm . howitzers

and tw o platoon s o f 4.2-inc h mortars ,

the infantr y struc k fro m th e southwes t

at 0800 . Abou t 1130 , whe n th e leadin g

troops wer e stil l 50 0 yard s shor t o f

Route 99 , Japanes e tan k an d artiller y

fire fro m th e souther n en d o f Muño z

stalled the attack. Th e 1s t Battalion then

came u p o n th e right, but wa s able only

to clear a fe w Japanese fro m a cemeter y

stretching along Route 5 and the Manila

Railroad a t th e southeaster n corne r o f

town.

The 2 d o f Februar y wa s essentially a

repetition of th e 1st , an d agai n th e 20t h

Infantry mad e onl y sligh t gains . Gen -

eral Patrick , th e 6t h Division' s com -

mander, began t o lose patience. H e wa s

already dissatisfie d wit h th e 20t h Infan -

try's earlie r performanc e i n th e Cabar -

uan Hills and wa s increasingly disturbed

by wha t h e fel t wa s inordinatel y slo w

progress a t Muñoz . H e thereupo n re -

lieved th e 20th' s commander , Colone l

Ives, a n actio n h e late r cam e t o regret ,
PROTECTING XI V CORP S REA R AN D FLANK S 195

and replace d Ive s wit h Lt . Col. Harol d

G. Maison.13

On 3 February th e 2 d Battalion , 20t h

Infantry, move d i n o n th e northwest ,

but coul d no t reac h Rout e 99 i n it s sector. Th e 3 d Battalion pushe d across that

road a t th e southwest corne r o f Muñoz ,

but gaine d onl y hal f a bloc k int o th e

main sectio n o f th e town . Th e 1s t Bat -

talion, on the south side of Muñoz, made

negligible progress . B y dusk , th e 20t h

Infantry ha d overru n a fe w Japanes e

strongpoints, bu t i n orde r t o hol d it s

gains had had t o destroy completely and

physically occup y ever y positio n i t ha d

reached s o far. Muñoz , Genera l Patric k

had begu n t o realize , wa s going t o b e a

costly, hard , an d time-consumin g nu t t o

crack. Th e 20t h Infantr y ha d no t ye t

closed wit h th e mai n Japanes e defenses,

but ha d spent most o f the last thre e days

pinned down by Japanes e artillery, tank,

and machin e gun fire . Onl y by huggin g

the groun d an d takin g advantage o f th e

little cover even shattered tree stumps afforded ha d th e regimen t kep t it s casu -

alties dow n t o 1 5 me n kille d an d 9 0

wounded.

The 6t h Division , bogge d dow n a t

Muñoz, could tak e some wry consolation

from th e fac t tha t th e 25t h Divisio n ha d

made n o bette r progres s a t Umingan ,

where th e cove r an d concealmen t prob -

lems were much th e same as at Muñoz. 14

On 1 February th e 25th' s 27t h Infantr y

attacked from th e north and west. Under

cover o f artillery and air support, troops

operating alon g Rout e 8 advance d t o

within 25 0 yard s o f Umingan' s wester n

edge, bu t Japanes e machin e gu n an d

rifle fir e the n pinne d the m down . Japa -

nese antitank weapon s drov e of f American tank s tha t cam e u p Rout e 8 t o

support th e infantry , whil e irrigatio n

ditches o n bot h side s o f th e roa d pre -

vented th e tank s fro m executin g cross -

country maneuvers. Th e infantr y sought

what cove r i t coul d fin d i n thes e an d

other irrigation ditches, and, sinc e many

of th e ditches were charged with noisome

excrement that flowed sluggishly through

dry ric e paddies, spent a thoroughl y un -

pleasant afternoon . Meanwhile , ele -

ments o f th e 27t h Infantr y attackin g

from th e nort h ha d als o spen t mos t o f

the day seeking cover from Japanes e fire.

Toward dus k thes e troops had advance d

only a s fa r a s a n almost-dr y cree k be d

500 yard s nort h o f Umingan . A s nigh t

fell on e compan y employe d anothe r

creek be d t o pus h int o the northwestern

corner o f th e town , bu t afte r tha t th e

attack stalle d completely.

During th e cours e o f th e da y General

Mullins, the 25t h Division's commander,

13

 Entries 33 and 34 , 20th In f Uni t Jnl, 1-2 Fe b 45;

6th Di v G- 1 Jnl , 2 Fe b 45 ; Interv , Stanle y L . Falk ,

Pacific Sec , OCMH , wit h Co l O'Connor , formerl y

CO 53 d F A Bn , 6th Div, 1 Sep 53 , copy of interv notes

in OCM H files . Accordin g t o Colone l O'Connor ,

Maj. Gen . Charle s E . Hurdis , wh o becam e com -

mander o f th e 6t h Divisio n whe n Patric k wa s killed

later i n th e campaign , fel t tha t Patric k cam e t o be -

lieve afte r th e battl e fo r Muño z tha t i n th e ligh t

of th e Japanese strengt h ultimatel y discovere d ther e

Colonel Ives's relief wa s regrettable and unjustifiable .

Ives late r commande d a regimen t o f th e 38t h Divi -

sion o n Luzon , reflectin g th e fac t tha t Genera l Krue -

ger stil l ha d confidenc e i n him . Maiso n ha d

temporarily commande d th e 63 d Infantr y durin g

the figh t fo r th e Route s 3-1 1 junction, bu t ha d

reverted t o th e pos t o f regimenta l executiv e office r

upon th e arriva l o f Col . Everett M . Yo n t o tak e

over th e 63d . Yon, in turn , ha d previousl y com -

manded a regimen t o f th e 93 d Division , whic h wa s

being scattere d aroun d th e Southwes t Pacifi c Are a

in variou s smal l garrisons .

14

 Information o n 25t h Divisio n operation s i n thi s

subsection i s from : 25t h Di v Rpt Luzon , pp . 27-30 ;

25th Di v G- 3 Jn l File , 1- 3 Fe b 45 ; 25t h Di v G- 3

Opns Rpts, 1 - Fe b 45 ; 27th In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 12 -

15; 27t h Inf S-3 Opn s Rpts, 1- 3 Fe b 45; 35th Inf Rpt

Luzon, pp. 13-16 ; 35th In f Jnl Files, 1- 3 Fe b 45.
196 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

had decide d t o emplo y part o f th e 35t h

Infantry t o bypas s Uminga n t o th e

south. Movin g cross-country alon g one -

lane dirt roads, a battalio n o f th e 35th ,

encountering n o opposition , occupie d

San Roqu e barrio , o n Rout e 8 nearl y

four mile s southeast o f Uminga n an d a

little ove r a mil e nort h o f Lupao . An -

other battalion o f th e 35t h Infantr y ha d

held durin g th e da y i n ope n groun d

south o f Umingan , but earl y o n th e 2 d

drove u p a third-clas s roa d agains t th e

southeastern corner of the town . Mullins

had already directed the 35th Infantr y t o

use its remaining battalion i n a n attac k

west int o Uminga n alon g Rout e 8. 15

The 35th's two battalions did not meet

expected resistanc e o n 2 February , fo r

during th e nigh t mos t o f th e Japanes e

infantry ha d withdraw n northeas t fro m

Umingan into the grass y foothills o f th e

Caraballo Mountains . B y 130 0 on th e

2d, the 35th Infantry had cleared most of

Umingan, leavin g tw o fina l pocket s fo r

the 27th Infantr y to reduce the next day.

When a summation was made at dusk on

the 3d , th e 35t h Infantry' s casualtie s i n

the reductio n o f Uminga n wer e 3 men

killed an d 1 3 wounded, whil e th e 27t h

Infantry ha d los t nearl y 4 0 me n kille d

and 13 0 wounded. Th e Japanese , wh o

lost abou t 15 0 killed, lef t behin d eigh t

47-mm. antitan k gun s alon g wit h larg e

quantities o f 47-mm . an d 75-mm .

ammunition.

The captur e of Uminga n ha d take n a

day longe r tha n Genera l Mullin s ha d

anticipated, casualtie s ha d bee n hig h

compared t o thos e of the Japanese, and

the mai n bod y o f th e Japanes e ha d es -

caped t o figh t again . Hopin g t o mak e

up th e tim e lost , Mullin s pushe d th e

35th Infantr y o n towar d Lupa o durin g

the afternoo n o f 2 February, hardly giving th e regimen t tim e t o regrou p afte r

its operation s a t Umingan. 16 Th e regi -

ment estimate d tha t a company o f Japanese infantry , reinforce d b y fiftee n t o

twenty mediu m tanks , hel d Lupao . I f

so, the regiment felt, i t would need only

one reinforce d battalio n t o captur e th e

town, an d i t expecte d t o clea r th e

objective b y 180 0 on th e 2d. 17

The 1s t Battalion , 35th Infantry , lead -

ing th e advanc e o n Lupao , me t n o

resistance during the afternoon o f 2 February until its lead company wa s within

750 yard s o f town . Then , Japanes e ar -

tillery, mortar , an d machin e gu n fir e

stopped th e attac k cold . Attempt s t o

outflank th e defense s acros s th e ope n

ground of dry ric e paddie s tha t sur -

rounded th e tow n prove d unavailing ,

and a t dus k th e battalio n withdre w 50 0

yards westward to allow supporting artillery an d mortar s t o la y concentration s

into the town. Resumin g frontal attack s

the nex t morning, th e 35t h Infantry ,

still trying to advance across open ground,

again made no significant progress. Lik e

the 20th Infantr y i n fron t o f Muñoz, the

35th Infantry had been stopped at Lupao.

Outflanking Maneuvers

By late afternoon o f 3 February, General Patric k an d Genera l Mullin s face d

nearly identica l situations . Stalled i n

front o f intermediate objectives, th e tw o

division commanders had to devise some

means o f bypassin g an d containin g th e

Japanese strongpoints a t Lupa o an d

15

 25th Di v FO 8, 1 Feb 45.

16

 Change No . 1 , 2 Fe b 45 , t o 25t h Di v F O 8 , 1

Feb 45 . 17

 35th In f Rp t Luzon , p. 15 ; 35th Inf F O 2 , 2 Feb

45, 35th In f Jn l File , 2 Feb 45 .
PROTECTING XI V CORP S REA R AN D FLANK S 197

Muñoz whil e pressin g the attack towar d

San Jose . Genera l Patrick , althoug h h e

had no t expecte d th e dela y a t Muñoz ,

had forehandedl y directe d the 1s t Infan -

try to reconnoiter six miles east of Muñoz

to th e Talaver a Rive r wit h a vie w to -

ward locatin g a n overlan d approac h t o

the Sa n Jose-Riza l roa d a t th e poin t

where tha t roa d crosse d th e Talaver a

three miles southeast of San Jose . Here ,

he ha d reasoned , th e 1s t Infantr y migh t

assemble fo r a n attac k towar d Sa n Jose ,

if necessary , t o suppor t th e 20t h Infan -

try's drive up Route 5. Order s to the 1st

Infantry t o mov e t o th e Talavera crossing wen t ou t durin g th e lat e afternoo n

of 1 February. Simultaneously , Patric k

directed hi s 63 d Infantr y t o bypas s

Muñoz t o th e east an d com e bac k ont o

Route 5 nort h o f th e town , read y t o

drive o n Sa n Jos e i n concer t wit h th e

1st Infantry. 18

General Mullins made somewhat similar arrangements to bypass Lupao. Temporarily leavin g th e 27t h Infantr y a t

Umingan and assigning the tas k of clearing Lupao to the 35th Infantry , Mullin s

directed th e 161s t Infantry t o mov e

cross-country t o position s o n Rout e 9 9

south o f Lupa o an d the n pus h o n t o

Route 8 between Sa n Isidro , fou r mile s

southeast o f Lupao , an d Sa n Jose . Th e

regiment woul d patro l towar d Sa n Jose

in preparation , i f th e nee d arose , fo r

helping th e 6t h Divisio n secur e tha t

town. Th e 35t h Infantry , i n additio n t o

capturing Lupao, would cut Route 8 between Lupao and Sa n Isidro with a force

of sufficien t strengt h to preven t Japanese

movements between the two towns, both

now known to be held in some strength.19

The 3 d Battalion , 35th Infantry , mov -

ing ove r risin g groun d northeas t o f

Lupao, establishe d itsel f o n Rout e 8

about 1,50 0 yard s southeast o f th e tow n

during the afternoon o f 3 February. Th e

next day the battalion forced its way into

the souther n edg e o f Lupa o agains t

heavy opposition , bu t 35t h Infantr y

troops north an d west of the tow n made

no progress . Meanwhile , th e 161st Infantry ha d starte d movin g an d b y mid -

afternoon o n 4 Februar y ha d se t u p

roadblocks o n Rout e 8 southeast o f Sa n

Isidro. Th e regimen t wa s read y t o at -

tack toward either San Isidro or San Jose,

but progress made by the 35t h Infantry ,

to th e northwest , an d th e 6t h Division ,

to th e southeast, mad e furthe r advance s

unnecessary fo r th e tim e being. 20

The 6t h Division's flanking operations

began shortl y afte r 1700 on 1 February

when elements of the 1st Infantr y started

north alon g th e wes t ban k o f th e Tala -

vera River . Th e regimen t secure d th e

Talavera crossin g on th e San Jose-Rizal

road during the lat e afternoon o f 2 February after a sharp skirmish with a small

Japanese infantry-tan k force . Mean -

while, othe r troop s o f th e 1s t Infantr y

18

 6th Div F O 12 , 31 Jan 45 ; 6t h Di v F O 13 , 2 Fe b

45; Msgs , C G 6t h Di v t o C O 1s t Inf , 1530 and 170 0

1 Fe b 45 , 1s t In f S- 3 Jnls , 3 1 Jan-1 Feb an d 1- 2

Feb 45 , respectively ; Entrie s time d 094 5 an d 130 0

2 Fe b 45 , 63d In f S-2/S-3 Jnl, 2 Feb 45 . Th e 63 d

Infantry returne d t o 6t h Divisio n contro l o n 1 February upo n releas e fro m -attachmen t t o th e 43 d

Division.

19

 25th Di v F O 8 , 1 Fe b 45 , an d Chang e No . 1

thereto, 2 Feb 45 ; Rad, CG 25t h Di v to CO 161st Inf,

0915 3 Fe b 45 , 2 .5th Di v G-3 Jn l File , 2- 3 Fe b 45 ;

Rad, C G 25t h Di v t o C O 35t h Inf , 0900 3 Fe b 45 ,

35th In f Jn l File , 3 Feb 45 ; Entr y 1 , 161s t Inf Jnl,

3 Feb 45 ; Entry 2, 161st Inf Jnl, 4 Feb 45. Th e 161s t

infantry, previousl y holdin g a t Sa n Manuel , wa s

relieved ther e b y element s o f th e 32 d Divisio n o n

2 February .

20

 25th Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 29-31 ; 35t h In f Rp t Luzon, pp. 10-17 ; 161st Inf, The Battl e of San Isidro,

p. 2.
198 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

came u p from th e southeast and, bypassing Riza l t o th e west , turne d northwest

along th e Sa n Jose-Rizal road . Thes e

troops encountere d onl y scattered opposition. B y late afternoo n o n 3 February

most o f th e 1s t Infantr y ha d assemble d

at tw o position s 1,00 0 yards sout h an d

1,500 yard s east o f Sa n Jose. 21

The 63 d Infantry , als o bypassin g

Muñoz t o th e east , reache d th e agricul -

tural schoo l o n Rout e 5 a mil e an d a

half northeas t o f Muño z o n th e after -

noon o f 2 February . Leavin g a rein -

forced company to clean out the Japanese

tank-infantry groupmen t a t th e school ,

the bul k o f th e regimen t presse d o n u p

Route 5 during th e nex t afternoo n an d

by dusk, having encountered little opposition, was within sight of barrios Caanawan an d Aba r No . 2 , two mile s short o f

San Jose. 22 Th e situatio n seeme d t o

favor a two-regimen t attac k agains t Sa n

Jose on the 4th , and at 200 0 on the 3d

General Patric k ordere d th e executio n

of suc h a n attack. 23

The Seizure of San Jose

The prospec t o f a n all-ou t battl e a t

San Jos e turne d ou t t o b e a chimera .

Indeed, after th e costly fighting at Lupao

and Muñoz and exhaustin g night marches entailed in the 6th and 25t h Divisions'

flanking maneuvers , th e actua l captur e

of th e objectiv e came as a pleasan t anti -

climax. Hel d u p b y th e Japanes e tank -

infantry groupmen t i n th e vicinit y o f

Abar No . 2 , th e 63 d Infantr y too k n o

part i n th e seizur e o f Sa n Jose , bu t tw o

companies o f th e 1s t Infantr y walke d

into Sa n Jos e virtuall y unoppose d during the morning of 4 February. B y 1330

the regimen t ha d secure d th e objectiv e

at a cos t t o th e 1s t Infantr y o f 2 me n

killed an d 2 5 wounded , includin g 1

killed an d 7 wounde d whe n Fift h Ai r

Force B-25' s mad e a n unschedule d

strafing run across the regimental front.24

The seizur e of San Jose turned ou t t o

be anticlimactica l fo r a t least tw o othe r

reasons. Tw o day s before th e tow n fell ,

I Corps ' progres s a s fa r a s Lupa o an d

Muñoz, disclosing that the Japanese had

committed thei r force s t o a piecemeal ,

passive defens e o f th e approache s t o Sa n

Jose, ha d dispelle d Genera l Krueger' s

remaining anxieties about counterattack

from th e east and th e security of the XIV

Corps' lef t rear . Th e Japanese , havin g

failed t o organiz e a strong, mobile striking forc e fro m thei r availabl e armor ,

had themselve s removed th e last vestige s

of threa t fro m th e east an d northeas t t o

Sixth Arm y and XI V Corps.

Accordingly, on th e evenin g of 2 February, Kruege r ha d directe d XI V Corp s

to resum e it s driv e t o Manil a wit h al l

speed. I Corp s woul d procee d wit h it s

mission t o secur e th e Cabanatuan-Rizal

line an d reconnoite r t o Luzon 's eas t

coast, but henceforth , howeve r heavy the

actual fightin g i n th e Sa n Jos e region ,

I Corp s operation s woul d evolv e int o

mopping-up action s an d woul d b e partially aime d a t securin g line s o f depar -

ture from whic h futur e attack s could b e

launched agains t th e Shobu Group i n

northern Luzon. 25

21

 1st Inf Rpt Luzon pp. 21-23; 1st Inf S-3 Jnl, 1-3

Feb 45. 22

 63d In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 7-8; 6th Di v G-3 Jnl ,

1-3 Fe b 45. 23

 6th Div FO 14 , 3 Feb 45 .

24

 6th Di v Jnl an d Jn l File , 4 Feb 45 ; 1st In f Rp t

Luzon, pp. 23-24. 25

 Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 32 , 45 ; Sixt h Arm y

FO 47, 2 Feb 45, in ibid., I, 149.
PROTECTING XI V CORP S REA R AN D FLANK S 199

From on e poin t o f view , th e Japanese

themselves ha d produce d th e fina l anti -

climax for th e I Corp s a t Sa n Jose. By 4

February the bulk of the forces the 105th

Division tha t ha d s o fa r bee n abl e t o

start northwar d fro m th e Shimbu are a

had slippe d throug h Sa n Jos e an d wer e

well o n thei r wa y up Rout e 5 north o f

the town . Th e Tsuda Detachment, at -

tached t o th e 10th Division, had b y th e

same date evacuated its now unimportant

defensive positions at Baler and Dingalen

Bays and had withdrawn to Rizal. O n o r

about th e 4th , th e detachmen t ha d

started ou t o f Riza l alon g a third-clas s

road tha t le d nort h int o the mountains.

Finally, th e las t o f th e supplie s o f th e

Shobu Group neede d th e mos t fo r it s

planned protracte d stan d i n norther n

Luzon ha d bee n remove d fro m Sa n Jose

during th e night o f 3-4 February . Sinc e

there wa s no longe r an y reaso n fo r hi m

to hol d th e tow n Genera l Yamashita ,

sometime o n th e 4th , directed th e ele -

ments o f th e 2d Tank Division (an d its

attachments) stil l holdin g defense s for -

ward o f Sa n Jos e t o brea k contac t an d

retreat up Rout e 5.

That I Corps had been unabl e to prevent th e evacuatio n of supplies from Sa n

Jose, th e displacemen t o f th e 105th Division's troops, o r th e withdrawa l o f th e

Tsuda Detachment wa s unfortunate, but

these task s ha d no t bee n amon g thos e

Krueger ha d assigne d th e corps . A s i t

was, I Corps ha d probabl y accomplished

more than ha d been expected of it when

it cu t of f the mai n bod y o f th e 2d Tank

Division in front o f San Jose. Th e corp s

could no w reduce th e division's isolate d

strongpoints at its leisure, could pus h its

troops rapidl y to th e east coast t o brea k

the las t overlan d connection s betwee n

the Shimbu an d Shobu Groups, an d

could secur e position s fro m whic h t o

launch attack s against th e Shobu Group

when s o directed.

Mop-up on the Approaches to

San Jose

Such wa s th e stat e o f Japanes e com -

munications i n th e Sa n Jos e are a tha t

Yamashita's order s fo r a genera l with -

drawal did no t reac h 2d Tank Division's

units south an d west of San Jose until 6

February.26 I n the meantime, the Lupao

and Muño z garrison s continue d t o hol d

out, thwartin g th e best efforts o f th e 6t h

and 25t h Division s t o dislodge them .

By 4 February the 20th Infantr y attack

against Muñoz had evolved into a siege.27

During that day and o n throug h th e 6th,

the regiment's pressur e produced mino r

gains, bu t th e mor e th e Japanes e forc e

was compresse d th e mor e difficul t be -

came th e 20t h Infantry' s task . B y eve -

ning on the 6th, the 20th Infantr y and its

supporting force s ha d knocke d ou t

nearly thirty-fiv e tank s a t Muñoz , alon g

with a few antitank gun s and a number

of machin e guns. Th e Japanes e still had

twenty t o twenty-fiv e tanks , the y stil l

held hal f th e town , an d the y stil l ha d

over half o f their origina l garrison. Th e

20th Infantr y ha d s o fa r los t 4 0 me n

killed an d 17 5 wounded , whil e man y

26

 SWPA Hist Series, II, 446. 27

 The remainde r o f thi s subsectio n i s base d on : 6th Di v Rpt Luzon , pp. 27-32 ; 20t h In f Rp t Luzon ,

pp. 22-25; 20th Inf S-3 Pe r Rpts, 4-8 Fe b 45; 63d Inf

Rpt Luzon, pp. 7-10; 25t h Div Rpt Luzon, pp. 29-34;

161st Inf , Battle of Sa n Isidro, passim; 35th In f Rp t

Luzon, pp . 16-19 .

On 5 February T. Sgt. Donald E. Rudolph of Company E , 20t h Infantry , reduce d o r helpe d reduc e

eight Japanese pillboxes and destroye d one Japanese

tank during the 20th Infantry's attacks. For thes e and

associated actions . Sergean t Rudolp h receive d th e

Medal of Honor and a battlefield promotion to second

lieutenant.
200 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

others ha d droppe d o f hea t exhaustio n

and comba t fatigue. I t was clear to General Patric k tha t somethin g beyon d th e

direct assaul t method s employe d s o fa r

would hav e t o b e trie d i f th e 6t h Divi -

sion wa s to clear Muño z within a reasonable time and wit h reasonable casualties.

A larg e par t o f 7 February , Patric k

planned, woul d b e spen t poundin g

Muñoz wit h ai r an d artillery . First ,

about fift y plane s o f th e Fift h Ai r Forc e

were to bomb and strafe, climaxing their

effort wit h a napal m saturation . The n

division artiller y an d reinforcin g corp s

artillery battalion s woul d thoroughl y

plaster th e town . Finally , th e groun d

troops woul d resum e th e assaul t abou t

midafternoon behin d a rollin g barrag e

laid dow n b y th e 6t h Division' s thre e

105-mm. howitze r battalions . Th e 63 d

Infantry, relieve d b y th e 1s t Infantr y

just south of San Jose , would redeploy to

the sout h sid e o f Muño z t o joi n th e

final attac k o f th e 20t h Infantry .

The Japanes e di d no t co-operate .

Under cove r o f a minor diversionary attack against the 20th Infantry 's lines, the

main bod y o f th e Ida Detachment at -

tempted to escape up Route 5 during the

predawn hours of 7 February, apparently

not realizin g tha t th e road fro m Muño z

north t o Sa n Jos e wa s i n America n

hands. Runnin g a gauntle t o f road -

blocks held by the 63d Infantry , th e 53d

and 80t h Fiel d Artiller y Battalions, an d

the 2 d Battalion , 161st Infantry (whic h

had move d dow n t o th e agricultura l

school from th e San Isidro area prepared

to reinforce th e 6t h Divisio n for th e attack o n Muñoz) , th e Japanes e escap e

column was destroyed. Afte r daylight on

the 7t h th e 20th Infantr y move d int o

Muñoz almos t unopposed , clearin g th e

last resistance b y noon.

The defens e o f Muño z an d Rout e 5

north to San Jose cost the 2d Tank Division 52 tanks, 41 trucks, 1 6 47-mm. guns,

and 4 105-mm . howitzer s destroye d an d

1,500 me n killed . I n securin g th e sam e

area, the 6th Division lost 90 men kille d

and nearl y 250 wounded , exclusiv e of

the casualtie s incurre d b y th e 1s t

Infantry i n and around San Jose.

At Lupao , meanwhile , th e battl e ha d

developed alon g lines similar to thos e at

Muñoz. Fro m 4 through 7 February the

35th Infantry , placin g th e emphasi s o f

its attack against the south side of Lupao,

continued t o compress th e garrison int o

a smalle r an d smalle r space . Th e Japa -

nese made a breakout attemp t the nigh t

after th e Ida Detachment's fligh t fro m

Muñoz. Te n o r eleven tank s started out

of Lupao ; fiv e of them managed to break

through th e 35t h Infantry' s cordo n an d

disappeared int o th e foothill s eas t o f

town, wher e thei r crew s abandone d

them. Th e dismounte d Japanes e i n th e

town melte d away , an d b y noon o n th e

8th the 35th Infantry had secured Lupao

against negligibl e opposition . Th e 2d

Tank Division's losse s ther e include d

over 90 0 troop s kille d an d 3 3 tanks, 2 6

trucks, an d 3 75-mm. gun s destroyed o r

abandoned. Th e 35t h Infantr y an d at -

tached unit s los t abou t 9 5 me n kille d

and 27 0 wounded.28

The Japanes e garriso n a t Sa n Isidr o

fled befor e th e 161s t Infantry coul d

mount an attack , taking to the hills during th e nigh t o f 5- 6 February . Th e

161st occupie d the town against scattered

28

 Although wounded , M. Sgt. Charles L . McGah a

of Compan y G , 35th Infantry , assume d comman d o f

his platoo n o n 7 Februar y whe n hi s platoo n com -

mander wa s wounded , an d als o extricate d som e

wounded men under Japanese fire. For a combination

of hi s action s durin g th e day , Sergeant McGah a

received th e Meda l of Honor.
PROTECTING XI V CORP S REA R AN D FLANK S 201

rifle fir e o n th e 6th, and fo r th e next few

days sough t ou t Japanes e straggler s i n

rising groun d t o th e northwest , north ,

and northeast . Th e regimen t destroye d

or foun d abandone d 2 3 tanks, 1 8 trucks,

2 75-mm . artiller y pieces , an d a miscel -

lany o f othe r equipmen t an d supplies .

A hundre d o r mor e Japanese died a t or

near San Isidro, while the 161st Infantry

lost abou t 1 5 me n kille d an d a lik e

number wounde d i n th e vicinity .

The 2d Tank Division was finished a s

an armore d unit . I n th e defens e o f th e

approaches t o San Jose th e division ha d

lost 18 0 o f th e 22 0 tanks wit h whic h i t

had entere d comba t o n Luzon . Th e di -

vision's troo p losse s — exclusive o f th e

losses o f attache d units—numbere d

nearly 2,25 0 men kille d o f th e 6,50 0 th e

unit ha d committe d t o th e defens e o f

San Jose . Th e survivor s wer e eithe r al -

ready on their way up Rout e 5, or slowl y

filtered throug h I Corps line s and mad e

their way northward. Reorganize d a s an

understrength infantr y division , th e 2d

Tank Division woul d figh t again , bu t

Japanese armo r woul d n o longe r b e a

factor wit h whic h Sixt h Arm y woul d

have t o recko n o n Luzon. 29

San Jose to the East Coast

After th e seizur e o f Sa n Jos e an d th e

destruction o f th e 2d T ank Division a s

an armore d force , I Corps, t o finis h th e

tasks assigne d i t b y Genera l Krueger ,

still ha d t o mov e i n strengt h u p t o th e

Cabanatuan-Rizal lin e an d reconnoite r

to Bale r an d Dingale n Bay s o n th e eas t

coast. Th e corp s assigne d thes e task s t o

the 6t h Division , whic h waste d n o tim e

undertaking the m afte r th e fal l o f

Muñoz.30

The 63 d Infantry , o n 7 February, captured Riza l against scattere d oppositio n

from Tsuda Detachment stragglers.31 The

next day the 20th Infantry , encountering

few Japanese , secure d Bongabon , si x

miles sout h o f Rizal , an d cleare d th e

road fro m Riza l throug h Bongabo n t o

Cabanatuan. A combined 20t h Infantry6th Reconnaissanc e Troo p patro l nex t

pushed ove r th e hills fro m Bongabo n t o

Dingalen Ba y alon g a poo r grave l roa d

and reache d th e ba y o n 1 1 February .

The followin g da y a 63 d Infantry-6t h

Reconnaissance Troop patrol, followin g

another roa d ou t o f Bongabon , reache d

Baler Bay . The patrol s foun d onl y

abandoned defense s a t eac h objectiv e

and lef t th e securit y o f th e bay' s shore s

and th e road s bac k t o Bongabo n t o

Filipino guerrillas.

In th e meantime , th e 25t h Divisio n

had take n ove r from th e 6th Divisio n a t

San Jose and ha d begun patrollin g both

northward u p Rout e 5 an d southeast -

ward alon g th e road t o Rizal . Th e tw o

divisions continue d patrollin g i n th e

areas the y hel d until , o n 1 0 February, I

Corps bega n realignin g forces fo r opera -

tions against th e Shobu Group i n north -

29

 Kawai Statement, States, II, 148 ; G- 2 GH Q FEC,

Interrogations of Japanese Officials o n World War I I

(2 vols. ) (hereinafte r cite d a s Interrogs), i n OCM H

files, Interrogatio n o f Co l Shige o Kawai , I , 321-23 .

I Corp s (an d subordinate unit) records indicate that

the corp s ha d destroye d 19 3 tank s o f th e 2d Tank

Division from 9 January throug h 7 February. Counting 5 or 6 more destroye d b y XIV Corps units, it is

doubtful tha t a s man y a s 2 0 tank s organi c t o th e

2d Tank Division wer e stil l intac t an d i n Japanes e

hands a s o f 7 February . Othe r tank s lef t t o th e

Japanese o n Luzo n wer e fro m independen t tan k

companies. 30

 Sixth Army FO 46, 30 Jan 45 ; I Corps FO's 8 and

9, 3 1 Jan an d 6 Feb 45 . 31

 The res t o f thi s sectio n derive s from : 6t h Ca v Rcn T r Rp t Luzon , pp . 24-28; 20t h In f Rp t Luzon ,

pp. 26-28; 63d Inf Rpt Luzon , p. 13 ; 63d Inf S-3 Pe r

Rpts, 6-14 Feb 45 .
202 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

ern Luzon . Befor e such operations could

start, mor e urgen t battle s t o th e sout h

had t o b e brough t t o successfu l conclu -

sions, and th e I Corps' right flan k units ,

for th e time being, would hold th e positions the y ha d alread y attaine d whil e

preparing for stif f fight s the y knew wer e

in th e offing .

The Destruction of the Kembu Group

Sixty mile s southwest acros s th e Cen -

tral Plain s from Sa n Jos e th e 40th Divi -

sion, fighting against the Kembu Group,

took about a week longer to secure Sixth

Army's righ t an d XI V Corps' righ t rea r

to Krueger' s an d Griswold' s satisfactio n

than I Corp s ha d take n o n th e left . I n

the Kembu area, the terrain did not permit the relatively fre e maneuve r I Corps

had employe d t o captur e Sa n Jose .

Rather, the fight a t the Kembu positions

continued t o b e a slu g tes t agains t a

well-entrenched Japanes e forc e holdin g

rugged, dominatin g ground . Progres s

each day was often measure d in term s of

feet.

The Situation at Clark Field

By 1 February, whe n th e XI V Corp s

started th e 37t h Divisio n sout h towar d

Manila, the 37th and 40t h Division s had

overrun th e Kembu Group OPL R bot h

north an d sout h o f th e Bamba n River .

(See Map IV.) Sout h o f th e strea m th e

129th Infantry , 37t h Division , ha d

breached th e Japanes e ML R a t To p o f

the World Hill, just west of Fort Stotsenburg. Wes t an d southwes t To p o f th e

World remnants of the Eguchi and Yanagimoto Detachments, combine d int o a

single force , hel d ou t i n roug h groun d

in fron t o f th e "last-stand " position s occupied b y th e Kembu Group's nava l

units.

North o f the Bamban the 160t h Infan -

try, 40t h Division , ha d pushe d int o th e

Takaya Detachment MLR positions. The

regiment's left wa s on hig h ground overlooking the river, its right and cente r on

a 1,000-foot-high , ill-define d hil l mas s

known a s Stor m Kin g Mountain . Ele -

ments o f th e Takaya Detachment stil l

maintained ML R defense s o n th e wes t

side o f Stor m King . Although , furthe r

north, th e 108th Infantr y ha d no t ye t

closed wit h th e Takayama Detachment

MLR, th e breach the 160t h Infantry ha d

effected alon g th e MLR 's cente r an d

right ha d mad e untenabl e th e Japanes e

unit's hold. Th e Takayama Detachment

was face d wit h th e choic e o f fightin g t o

death i n plac e o r makin g a n orderl y

withdrawal int o th e nava l last-stan d

positions.

The nava l defense s wer e composed o f

five combat sectors, numbered 1 3 through

17. Th e 16th Combat Sector centere d

on high ground two miles west-northwest

of To p o f th e Worl d an d athwar t th e

upper reaches of the Bamba n River; th e

17th lay another mil e or s o to th e west .

The 15th Combat Sector was north across

a branc h o f th e Bamba n fro m th e 16th

and nearl y tw o mile s beyon d th e 160t h

Infantry's penetratio n a t Stor m Kin g

Mountain, Th e 14th and 13th Combat

Sectors, reading east t o west, were northwest o f th e 15th. Eac h comba t secto r

held dominating ground protected on a t

least tw o side s b y shar p ravines ; eac h

varied a s to are a an d strength .

General Tsukada , commandin g th e

Kembu Group, stil l ha d som e 25,00 0

men under his control. H e was prepared

to offe r protracte d resistance , althoug h

his communications were poor and, with
PROTECTING XI V CORP S REA R AN D FLANK S 203

all chanc e o f resuppl y lon g gone , hi s

food an d ammunitio n could not las t for -

ever. Bu t h e wa s firml y ensconce d i n

easily defensible terrain, his defense plan

was wel l conceived , an d th e bul k o f his

positions were mutually supporting. T o

overrun an y strongpoin t th e 40t h Divi -

sion woul d hav e t o mak e carefu l plan s

for th e closest co-ordination o f air, artillery, an d armor . Onc e th e approache s

to a n objectiv e wer e cleared , th e Japa -

nese defenders woul d hav e to be flushe d

out o f hidden foxholes, caves, and bunk -

ers. T o tak e an y piec e o f dominatin g

terrain th e Americans would hav e to destroy a serie s o f mutuall y supportin g

strongpoints. Th e whol e process woul d

be difficult , costly , time consuming , an d

repetitive but , i n Genera l Krueger 's

opinion, woul d b e necessar y i n orde r t o

secure th e right rea r o f XI V Corp s an d

push th e Kembu Group s o far back int o

the Zambale s Mountain s tha t i t woul d

be incapabl e of threatenin g Clark Field .

The 40t h Division spent the first wee k

of Februar y realignin g it s forces , mop -

ping u p area s alread y secured , an d pa -

trolling to fin d goo d route s o f approac h

to strongpoint s locate d b y groun d an d

aerial observation . Th e 185t h Infantr y

rejoine 108t d th e divisio n an d replace d th he i n th e north; t

took ove r th e 129t h Infantry 's position s

on Top o f the World on 2 February.32

It is not know n whe n Genera l Brush ,

the divisio n commander , intende d t o

start a general offensiv e westward , but i f

he ha d an y ide a o f waitin g beyon d th e

first wee k i n Februar y h e wa s undoubtedly brought u p short on th e 6th. That

day Genera l Kruege r instructe d XI V

Corps t o hav e th e 40t h Divisio n "pro -

ceed mor e expeditiousl y wit h th e de -

struction" o f th e Kembu Group, no t

only fo r th e reason s o f whic h th e corp s

was already well awar e but als o becaus e

the divisio n woul d soo n hav e t o b e

relieved for operations elsewhere.33 Griswold relaye d thes e instructions to Brus h

without delay.

Brush's pla n fo r attac k calle d fo r th e

185th an d 160t h Infantr y Regiment s t o

drive agains t th e Japanes e cente r whil e

the 108t h Infantr y continue d th e ad -

vance agains t th e Japanes e righ t wher e

the 129t h Infantr y had lef t off . Th e divi -

sion's objectiv e wa s hig h groun d lyin g

about seve n mile s west o f Rout e 3 an d

extending almos t a n equa l distanc e

north t o south. 34 Onc e this terrai n ha d

been cleared , th e 40t h Divisio n woul d

have overru n th e entir e Kembu ML R

and would be poised in front o f the naval

last-stand positions.

Turning the Kembu Flanks

Before th e divisional attack began, the

160th Infantry , moppin g u p a t Stor m

King Mountain , becam e involve d i n a

fight tha t turne d int o preparatio n fo r

the regiment' s par t i n th e mai n offen -

sive.35 Th e figh t focuse d a t McSevne y

Point, a ridg e 30 0 yard s lon g an d 7 5

yards wid e formin g a wester n nos e o f

32

 40th Div G-3 Pe r Rpts, 1-7 Fe b 45, 40th Div G-3

Jnl Files, 2-8 Fe b 45.

33

 Rad, Sixt h Army to XIV Corps, WG-85, 6 Feb 45,

Sixth Army G-3 Jnl File Luzon, 4-6 Fe b 45. 34

 40th Di v F O 11 , 6 Fe b 45 , 108th In f Jn l File ,

6 Feb 45. 35

 This subsectio n i s based on : 40t h Di v G-3 Pe r

Rpts, 6-19 Feb 45; 40th Di v G-3 Jn l Files, 6-19 Feb

45; 160th Inf S-3 Jnl and Jnl Files, 6-11 Feb 45; 185th

Inf Uni t Jnl , 6-15 Fe b 45 ; 185t h In f S-2/S- 3 Jnl,

6-10 Fe b 45 ; 185t h In f S- 3 Pe r Rpts, 7-15 Feb 45 ;

108th In f S-3 Pe r Rpts, 7-19 Feb 45; 108t h In f S- 3

Jnl Files, 7-1 9 Fe b 45; 108th Inf 3-2 Pe r Rpts, 10-19

Feb 45 ; Anonymous , 40th Infantry Division (Bato n

Rouge: Arm y an d Nav y Publishin g Co. , 1947), pp .

113-16.
204 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Storm King . Her e a n infantr y compan y

of th e Takaya Detachment, reinforce d

by on e 70-mm . howitzer , thre e 90-mm .

mortars, ten 50-mm. grenade dischargers,

and 2 7 machine guns of various calibers,

blocked the 160th Infantry 's path. 36 Th e

Japanese forc e wa s holded u p i n caves ,

bunkers, and foxholes, all well concealed

by natural camouflage.

The 160t h Infantry' s firs t attac k

against McSevne y Point too k plac e on 6

February, an d behin d th e clos e support

of tanks , tan k destroyers , an d Fift h Ai r

Force planes, the regiment cleare d most

of th e point by dusk o n th e 8th. During

the ensuing night the Japanese launched

a serie s o f banzai-typ e counterattacks ,

and it was nearly noon on the 9th before

the 160th Infantr y ha d repulsed the final

Japanese assault. Th e nex t morning, 1 0

February, th e regimen t discovere d tha t

the last Japanese ha d withdrawn during

the night. Th e affra y cos t th e 160t h In -

fantry abou t 2 0 me n kille d an d 12 5

wounded, while the Japanese lost around

225 men killed .

Although th e figh t a t McSevne y Point

at firs t appeare d t o hav e delaye d th e

160th Infantry' s participatio n i n th e division attack—scheduled t o begin on the

8th—the actio n turne d ou t quit e wel l

for th e 40th Division . First , th e capture

of McSevne y Point removed a major ob -

stacle a t th e division' s center . Second ,

the los s o f th e poin t prompte d Genera l

Tsukada t o direc t th e Takaya Detachment to abandon its portion of the MLR

and fal l bac k t o th e last-stan d positions .

The withdrawa l split th e Kembu MLR ,

and th e 40t h Divisio n coul d pres s o n

into a ga p betwee n th e Takayama Detachment, o n th e north , an d th e combined Eguchi-Yanagimoto Detachment

force o n th e south. Th e existenc e of the

gap also permitte d th e 185t h an d 108th

Infantry Regiments to deal in detail with

the Kembu G roup's lef t an d right .

On 7 February the 185t h Infantr y had

started a n attac k agains t th e Takayama

MLR, o n th e Japanes e left , it s ultimat e

objective Snak e Hil l North , a heigh t

from whic h Japanes e fir e ha d harasse d

the 160t h Infantry 's righ t flan k unit s

2,000 yard s t o th e southeast . I n thre e

days of stiff fightin g through thick undergrowth an d ove r rough , steepl y risin g

terrain, th e 185t h Infantr y gaine d hal f

the groun d t o Snak e Hil l North . Th e

regiment ha d no t ye t close d wit h th e

Japanese ML R i n it s zone , an d opposi -

tion had come principally from mortars ,

light artillery , an d a ver y fe w machin e

guns. Th e mos t th e 185t h Infantr y

could sho w fo r it s operation s t o th e

morning of 10 February was that it had

brought it s fron t lin e abreas t o f th e

160th's right.

On th e 40t h Divisio n lef t (th e Japanese right) , th e 108th Infantr y starte d

westward fro m To p o f th e World o n 8

February, its first objective a north-south

line o f knob s lyin g 1,50 0 to 2,00 0 yard s

west an d southwes t o f th e lin e of departure. Th e hill s were honeycombed wit h

small bunker s an d foxholes ; rifleme n

were supported by and in turn protected

machine gu n emplacements ; defensiv e

weapons include d many 20-mm . and 25 -

mm. machin e cannon strippe d fro m air -

craft at Clark Field; and, at least initially,

the defenders boasted a plentiful suppl y

of mortars and morta r ammunition.

36

 Additional information o n th e Japanese is from:

Japanese Studie s i n WW II , No . 10 , Luzon Opn s o f

the Kembu Gp, pp. 11-12; 40th Di v G-2 Pe r Rpts, 7-9 Fe b 45 , 160t h In f S- 3 Jn l Files , 9-11 Fe b 45 ;

SWPA Hist Series, II, 451.
PROTECTING XI V CORP S REA R AN D FLANK S 205

From 8 through 1 2 February the 108th

Infantry fought solely to clear approaches

to th e Japanes e hil l strongpoints . Th e

advance wa s daily marked b y temporar y

gains o f terrai n tha t th e Japanes e ren -

dered untenabl e b y heav y weapon s fir e

or b y gains along approache s wher e th e

American troop s spen t mos t o f thei r

time pinned down by Japanese fire. Th e

108th Infantr y bega n t o mak e apprecia -

ble progres s onl y afte r divisio n artiller y

started t o la y suppor t fire s dangerousl y

close to the fron t line s and afte r Canno n

Company SPM's, 640t h Tan k Destroye r

Battalion TD's, an d 754t h Tan k Battal -

ion medium s laboriousl y rumble d for -

ward ove r roug h groun d t o plac e direc t

fire o n Japanes e emplacements.

By evenin g o n 1 2 Februar y th e

Eguchi-Yanagimoto Detachment, having

lost ove r 50 0 me n kille d sinc e th e 8th ,

was finishe d a s an effectiv e fightin g uni t

and hel d onl y on e positio n alon g th e

Kembu Group's righ t flank . Hil l 7 , a s

the positio n wa s designated , la y three -

quarters of a mile westward o f the group

of knob s tha t th e 108th Infantr y ha d

cleared b y th e 12th. It too k th e 108t h

Infantry unti l afternoo n o f th e 16t h to

clear thi s las t hill . Th e regimen t ha d

now turne d th e righ t o f th e Kembu

MLR, an d th e shattere d remnant s o f

the Eguchi-Yanagimoto Detachment

retreated int o th e last-stan d positions .

By th e tim e th e 108th Infantr y ha d

turned th e righ t flank , th e 185t h Infan -

try ha d alread y pushe d i n th e Japanes e

left, an d i n th e cente r th e 160t h Infan -

try ha d advance d int o th e nava l last -

stand area . Betwee n 1 0 and 1 2 February

the 185t h Infantr y ha d secure d Snak e

Hill North against negligible opposition,

simultaneously takin g Hil l 810 , a littl e

over tw o mile s t o th e northeast , an d

Hill 1000 , a mile west of Hill 810. With

these gains , almos t th e las t position s

along th e lef t o f th e Kembu ML R ha d

fallen. Continuin g forward , th e 185t h

Infantry struc k towar d Hil l 1500 , lo -

cated a t th e northwester n corne r o f th e

14th Combat Sector area and ove r a mile

southwest o f Snak e Hil l North . Th e

185th capture d Hil l 150 0 on th e 15th ,

an even t that , wit h th e 108t h Infantry' s

seizure o f Hil l 7 th e nex t day , marke d

the en d o f th e Kembu Group MLR .

The tw o Americans regiment s engage d

on th e flank s ha d los t approximatel y

75 me n kille d an d 29 0 wounded ; th e

infantry alon e accounte d fo r 68 0 Japa -

nese kille d durin g th e flan k attacks .

The Fight in the Center

While th e 108t h an d 185t h Infantr y

Regiments ha d bee n turnin g th e flank s

of th e Kembu MLR, the 160t h Infantr y

had drive n forwar d i n th e center, start -

ing its attack on 1 0 February from a line

of departur e a t McSevne y Point. 37 Th e

160th's initial objectives were Snake Hill

West, Scattered Trees Ridge, and Object

Hill. Th e first , gras s covered an d abou t

1,500 fee t high , la y a littl e shor t o f a

mile west-southwes t o f McSevne y Poin t

and a t th e northern ape x of the triangularly shaped 15th Combat Sector defense

area. Scattere d Trees Ridg e formed th e

base o f th e triangl e an d ra n alon g th e

north bank of a Bamban River tributary.

Object Hill , marking the western limits

of th e 15th Combat Sector area , la y

37

 This subsectio n is based primaril y on : 40t h Di v

G-3 Pe r Rpts, 10-2 0 Fe b 45; 40th Div G-3 Jn l Files,

10-20 Fe b 45; 40th Di v G-2 Pe r Rpts, 14-1 7 Feb 45;

160th In f S- 3 Jn l an d Jn l Files , 10-2 0 Feb 45 ;

108th Inf S-3 Jn l Files, 10-20 Feb 45. Copies of many

of th e sources used ar e to be found onl y in th e 108th

Infantry's Journa l Files.
206 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

about 1,50 0 yards southwes t o f Snak e

Hill West, Sout h o f th e Bamba n tribu -

tary, an d betwee n th e branc h strea m

and th e mai n cours e o f th e river , la y

Sacobia Ridge , alon g whic h th e 16th

Combat Sector wa s dug in .

By dus k on 10 Februar y the 160t h

Infantry's tw o forwar d battalion s wer e

well u p th e easter n slope s of Snak e Hill

West an d Scattere d Tree s Ridg e bu t

were separated b y nearly a mile of Japa -

nese-controlled terrain . Eve n wit h th e

close support o f tanks, TD's, and SPM' s

the regiment did not clear all Snake Hill

West unti l 1 5 February , althoug h th e

open cres t o f th e hil l fel l o n th e 12th.

The battalio n o n Snak e Hil l Wes t the n

turned southwes t towar d Objec t Hill ,

and, Scattere d Tree s Ridg e havin g

proved an unprofitable route of advance,

troops o n tha t ridg e struc k northwest -

ward toward Object Hill in a converging

attack. Element s o f th e 160t h Infantr y

reached th e cres t o f Objec t Hil l o n 1 6

February, bu t th e regimen t too k unti l

the 20th to clear the last Japanese strongpoints fro m th e hil l an d it s approaches.

By tha t tim e th e 15th Combat Sector's

right, alon g Scattered Tree s Ridge , ha d

also collapsed , an d America n infantr y

had gaine d a foothold o n Sacobi a Ridge

in th e 16th Combat Sector area .

The 160t h Infantry' s driv e int o th e

center o f th e nava l last-stan d position s

at Objec t Hil l complete d anothe r phas e

of th e figh t wit h th e Kembu Group. A s

of 2 0 February , th e group' s ML R n o

longer existed ; position s o n th e lef t o f

the last-stand defenses, th e 14th Combat

Sector area , ha d falle n t o th e 185t h In -

fantry; th e 160th Infantry , attacking into

the 15th an d 16th Combat Sectors de -

fenses, wa s well across th e cente r o f th e

last-stand positions . Th e 160t h Infan -

try's gain s i n th e center , includin g th e

earlier fight a t McSevne y Point, had cost

the regiment roughly 75 men kille d and

330 wounded, while heat exhaustion and

combat fatigu e too k a n increasingl y

heavy toll. Th e regiment' s 1st Battalion

had les s tha n 40 0 effective s an d th e 2 d

and 3 d Battalion s wer e bot h som e 30 0

men understrength .

Whatever the costs, the 40th Division's

advances to the 20t h of February marked

the end o f the Kembu Group a s a threat

to Sixt h Arm y an d XI V Corps . Clar k

Field, Rout e 3 , and th e army and corp s

right were now secure beyond all shadow

of doubt . Th e Kembu Group ha d de -

fended it s ground well since 24 January ,

when XI V Corp s ha d firs t gaine d con -

tact, an d ha d inflicte d nearl y 1,50 0 casualties upo n XI V Corp s units—roughl y

285 men kille d and 1,18 0 wounded—but

had itsel f lost around 10,00 0 men killed .

The 20,00 0 troops General Tsukada still

commanded wer e hardl y i n goo d shape .

Supplies o f al l kind s wer e dwindlin g

rapidly, morale was cracking, centralized

control wa s breakin g down . Th e onl y

defenses stil l intac t wer e thos e hel d b y

the naval 13th and 17th Combat Sectors,

and thos e ha d bee n heavil y damaged b y

air and artillery bombardments. Troop s

of th e Sixt h Arm y woul d continu e t o

fight th e Kembu Group, bu t afte r 2 0

February operation s in th e Kembu are a

were essentiall y mop-ups.

Epilogue

XI Corps, not XIV, would be in charge

of th e fina l mop-u p operation s i n th e

Kembu area. B y 20 February XIV Corps

had its hands full i n an d around Manila ,

and th e supervisio n o f th e separat e battle against th e Kembu Group place d a n
PROTECTING XI V CORP S REA R AN D FLANK S 207

intolerable administrativ e an d opera -

tional burden on the corps headquarters.

The X I Corps , o n th e othe r hand , ha d

nearly complete d it s initia l mission s o n

Luzon and , commanding onl y on e an d

one-third division s whe n i t landed , wa s

able to take on th e additional burden o f

controlling 40t h Divisio n operations. 38

Under X I Corp s directio n th e 40t h

Division resume d th e offensiv e o n 2 3

February bu t wa s relieved b y element s

of th e 43d Divisio n between 28 February

and 2 March . I n it s fina l attacks , th e

40th Divisio n overra n th e last organize d

resistance i n th e 13th, 14th, and 16th

Combat Sectors, losin g anothe r 3 5 me n

killed an d 15 0 wounded . B y th e tim e

the 43 d ha d relieve d th e 40t h Division ,

just on e organize d Japanes e positio n

remained, tha t o f th e 17th Combat

Sector.39

The 43 d Divisio n fough t th e Kembu

Group fo r onl y te n days , an d b y th e

time i t wa s relieved b y element s o f th e

38th Division , beginnin g 1 0 March , i t

had overru n th e 17th Combat Sector

and ha d drive n th e Japanes e bac k an -

other thre e t o fou r mile s beyon d th e

point a t whic h th e 40t h Divisio n lef t

off. Th e 43 d Division lost 70 men kille d

and 19 5 wounded in the area, eliminating

perhaps 2,00 0 Japanese. 40

The 38t h Divisio n — to whic h th e

169th Infantry , 43 d Division , remaine d

attached unti l 2 2 March 41—pushed o n

into th e untracked , ill-explored , an d

worse-mapped wildernes s o f th e centra l

Zambales Range , it s progres s slowe d

more by supply problems than Japanes e

resistance. I n earl y Apri l th e divisio n

noted tha t th e las t vestige s o f an y con -

trolled defensiv e effor t ha d disappeared .

Unknown to XI Corps General Tsukada,

on 6 April , ha d give n u p an d ha d

ordered his remaining force s t o dispers e

and continu e operations , i f possible , a s

guerrillas.42 Fo r th e Japanese remnants,

it wa s a cas e o f sauve qui peut. Som e

tried t o escap e t o Luzon' s wes t coast ,

whence 38t h Divisio n troop s wer e al -

ready patrollin g inland ; other s trie d t o

make their way north through the mountains, onl y t o b e cu t dow n b y American

patrols workin g southwar d fro m Cam p

O'Donnell, Th e 38t h Division had killed

about 8,00 0 o f th e scatterin g Japanes e

by th e tim e i t wa s relieve d b y unit s o f

the 6t h Divisio n o n 3 May. The losse s

of th e 38t h totale d approximatel y 10 0

men kille d an d 50 0 wounded. 43

The 6t h Division , element s o f whic h

remained i n th e Kembu are a unti l 2 5

June, limited its operations to patrolling

38

 Sixth Arm y F O 53 , 1 9 Feb 45 , Sixth Arm y Rp t

Luzon, I, 155 ; XI V Corps Rpt Luzon , pt. I, p. 77. Se e

also below, ch. XVII. Th e effectiv e date of transfer of

corps control wa s 2 1 February. 39

 XI Corps G-3 Jn l Files, 21 Feb-1 Mar 45; 108t h

Inf S- 3 Jn l Files , 23-2 8 Fe b 45 ; 160t h In f S- 3 Jn l

Files, 23-25 Feb 45; 185t h Inf S-3 Jnl Files, 22-25 Feb

45; 185t h In f Uni t an d S-2/S- 3 Jnls, 2 3 Feb-1 Mar

45; 43d Div G-2 an d G-3 Pe r Rpts, 23 Feb-1 Mar 45. 40

 43d Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 26-30 ; 169t h In f Rp t

Luzon, p. 9; 172d Inf Rp t Luzon , 26 Feb-10 Mar 45 ,

pp. 1-3.

41

 During th e perio d 10-2 2 March th e 169t h In -

fantry an d attachment s los t a n additiona l 4 0 me n

killed an d 17 5 wounded , whil e killin g 80 0 mor e

Japanese. Th e 43 d Division' s shar e i n th e figh t

against th e Kembu force s thu s cos t th e divisio n a

total o f 11 0 me n kille d an d 36 0 wounded , whil e i t

had kille d perhaps 3,000 Japanese. 42

 SWPA Hist Series II, n. 57, p. 451. 43

 38th Di v Rpt Luzon , pp. 47-49, 65-92; 169t h In f

Rpt Luzon , p. 9; 149t h Inf Rp t Luzon , 7 Mar-20 Apr

45, pp. 1 , 4-20; 152 d In f Rp t Luzon , 3 Mar-30 Jun 45,

pp. 1-2.

On 2 2 April, durin g th e cours e o f th e 38t h Divi -

sion's mopping-u p operations , Pfc . Willia m H ,

Thomas o f Compan y B , 149t h Infantry , althoug h

mortally wounded , magnificentl y helpe d his platoon seize a stron g Japanes e position . Fo r thi s action ,

Private Thoma s wa s posthumousl y awarde d th e

Medal of Honor.
208 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

and settin g u p trai l block s alon g Japa -

nese route s o f escape . Troop s o f th e

38th Divisio n ultimately returned to the

region and remained there until the end

of th e war. 44

Insofar a s U.S. forces were concerned,

the mop-up period unde r XI Corp s control was even more costly tha n had been

the XIV Corps' offensiv e period . Fro m

21 Februar y t o th e en d o f Jun e th e

various elements of XI Corp s committed

to action against th e Kembu Group lost

approximately 550 men kille d and 2,20 0

wounded. Th e Kembu Group, durin g

the sam e period , los t 12,50 0 kille d o r

dead fro m starvatio n an d disease . B y

the en d o f th e wa r th e origina l 30,00 0

troops o f th e Kembu Group wer e

reduced t o approximatel y 1,50 0 sorr y

survivors, abou t 1,00 0 o f the m Arm y

personnel. Anothe r 50 0 ha d alread y

been take n prisoner. 45 44

 6th Div Rpt Luzon , pp . 78-79; 1s t In f S-3 Opn s

Rpt, 2 5 Jun 45 ; 10t h I&H Opn l Monograph , Th e

Luzon Mop-U p Operation , p . 52 . Th e 6t h Divisio n

lost onl y on e ma n kille d an d tw o wounde d i n th e

Kembu area between 3 May and 25 June.

45

 Japanese Studie s i n WW II, No . 125, Philippin e

Area Nava l Opns, pt. IV , p. 23 ; No. 10 , Luzon Opn s

of th e Kembu Gp, pp. 28-30.
PART FOU R

SECURING TH E

MANILA BA Y AREA

CHAPTER XI I

Manila: Th e Approach Marc h

By th e las t wee k o f January , Sixt h

Army ha d complete d th e firs t phas e o f

the Luzon Campaign. I Corps controlled

the Route s 3-1 1 junction an d position s

from whic h t o attac k towar d Sa n Jose ;

XIV Corp s wa s pushin g th e Kembu

Group bac k from Clark Field . (See Map

III.) Th e arm y ha d secure d it s bas e

area, carefull y provide d agains t th e

threat o f counterattac k fro m th e nort h

and east , an d projecte d strengt h int o

position t o protec t XI V Corps' rea r an d

lines o f communication . Genera l

Krueger thu s fel t fre e t o devot e mor e

attention t o th e captur e o f th e Manila -

Manila Ba y area , th e mos t importan t

single strategi c objectiv e o f th e cam -

paign. O n 2 6 Januar y h e ha d tackle d

the ver y practica l proble m o f actuall y

getting troop s int o th e cit y o f Manila .

On tha t date he had directed XI V Corps

to sen d force s sout h a s fa r a s th e Pam -

panga River , twenty-fiv e mile s belo w

Clark Fiel d and abou t a n equa l distanc e

north o f Manila. 1

XIV Corps' Drive South

Moving Out

XIV Corps' objectiv e alon g th e Pam -

panga River was the Route 3 and Manila

Railroad crossin g a t Calumpit , a fla t

land defil e throug h whic h passe d th e

only highwa y and rai l connection s pro -

viding direc t acces s to Manil a fro m th e

western sid e o f th e Centra l Plains . T o

the northeas t o f Calumpi t lie s th e for -

midable Candab a Swamp , passabl e onl y

to light vehicles even in dr y weather; t o

the south and west are virtually impassable swamplands, fish ponds , and marsh y

river delta s formin g the norther n shor e

of Manil a Bay . Althoug h th e Japanes e

had destroye d th e bridge s a t Calumpit, 2

XIV Corp s ha d t o secur e th e crossin g

sites before the Japanese too k advantag e

of th e natura l defens e opportunitie s

afforded b y th e deep , unfordabl e Pam -

panga t o block th e western approac h t o

Manila. XI V Corp s intelligenc e o n 2 6

January estimated that the Japanese ha d

few i f an y defense s alon g Rout e 3 a t

least a s fa r sout h a s Calumpit . I f thi s

were so , th e corp s migh t b e abl e t o

secure th e defil e befor e th e Japanes e

1

 Sixth Arm y F O 45 , 26 Jan 45 , Sixth Arm y Rp t

Luzon, I, 147-48 .

2

 The souther n group o f MacArthur's forces, with -

drawing nort h acros s th e Pampang a o n 1 January

1942, ble w th e tw o Calumpi t bridges . Se e Morton ,

Fall of the Philippines, pp . 209-10 . Th e Japanes e

replaced th e bridge s i n 1943 , employin g i n par t

bridging materia l lef t i n Manila . Th e bridge s wer e

intact as lat e as 27 December 1944 , but th e Japanes e

blew the m lat e i n January , leavin g tw o set s o f

bridges in th e water, one on to p of th e other. Com -

ments by Mr. James J. Halsema, an American civilian

who wa s interned b y th e Japanes e durin g th e war .

Hereinafter cite d as Halsem a Comments , thes e remarks wer e forwarde d t o th e autho r durin g March

1957.
212 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

could chang e thei r mind s abou t it s

defense.

On 2 7 Januar y th e 37t h Reconnais -

sance Troo p an d th e 148t h Infantry ,

37th Division , starte d sout h fro m Clar k

Field towar d Calumpit, their first objec -

tive th e Rout e 3 an d railroa d bridge s

over th e Sa n Fernand o Rive r a t Sa n

Fernando, thirtee n mile s belo w Clar k

Field a t th e junctio n o f Rout e 3 wit h

Route 7 to Bataan. Wit h Filipin o guerrillas' aid , th e 37t h Division' s unit s se -

cured bot h bridge s intac t o n 2 8 January.3

 B y afternoon o n th e 30th , afte r a

minor skirmish or two with small groups

of Japanes e alon g Rout e 3 sout h fro m

San Fernando , 37t h Divisio n patrol s

were within a mile o f Calumpit an d th e

Pampanga River. 4

When on th e afternoo n o f 3 0 January

General MacArthu r made a persona l reconnaissance sout h alon g Rout e 3 from

San Fernando , th e pac e o f th e advanc e

impressed hi m a s bein g muc h to o lei -

surely, an d upo n hi s retur n northwar d

he informe d Genera l Kruege r tha t th e

37th Division units moving on Calumpit

had demonstrate d " a noticeabl e lac k o f

drive an d aggressiv e initiative . . . ." 5

There was no question tha t th e advanc e

south fro m Sa n Fernand o wa s slow, de -

liberate, an d cautious , bu t thi s wa s b y

design on th e part of Generals Griswol d

and Beightler . Wit h onl y th e 148t h

Infantry an d th e 37t h Reconnaissanc e

Troop availabl e fo r th e advanc e sout h

from Clar k Field , the corps and division

commanders wer e unwillin g t o g o to o

far to o fast , fo r the y ha d littl e informa -

tion o n Japanes e deploymen t sout h o f

the Pampanga . Moreover , the y kne w

that th e Calumpit bridge s were out an d

that n o ne w crossing coul d b e con -

structed o n th e 30th . Griswold , accord -

ingly, had directed Beightler not to push

his infantr y fa r sout h o f th e Pampang a

until supportin g tank s an d artiller y

could als o cross. 6

Be tha t a s it may , the impac t o f Mac -

Arthur's impressions went to XIV Corps,

whence Griswold passe d it o n to Beightler, and so on down to the 148th Infantry,

which immediatel y bega n preparation s

to mov e acros s th e Pampanga. 7 Mac -

Arthur's reactions also undoubtedly had

considerable influenc e i n promptin g

Krueger, late on the 30th, to direct XIV

Corps t o speed it s drive toward Manila ,

orders issue d simultaneousl y wit h thos e

directing I Corp s t o seiz e Sa n Jose. 8

After securin g crossing s ove r th e Pam -

panga, Krueger's orders read, XIV Corps

would hurr y its right southeast anothe r

six miles from Calumpi t to Malolos. O n

the lef t th e 1s t Cavalr y Division , no w

attached t o XI V Corp s an d assemblin g

west o f Cabanatuan , woul d star t sout h

along Rout e 5 i n concert wit h th e 37t h

Division's renewed drive down Route 3.9

Krueger expecte d th e tw o division s t o

establish contac t a t Plaridel , where ,

3

 These bridge s ha d als o bee n knocke d ou t b y

MacArthur's force s i n 1942 , bu t ha d bee n repaire d

by th e Japanese.

4

 The foregoin g operationa l material is from: 37t h

Div Rp t Luzon , pp . 31-33 ; 148t h In f Rp t Luzon , p. 4 ; 37t h Rc n T r Rp t Luzon , 8 Jan- 3 Fe b 45 ,

pp. 5-6.

5

 Rad, Kruege r t o Griswold (quotin g MacArthur),

WL-944, 30 Jan 45 , Sixth Army G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 29-31 Ja n 45 .

6

 Beightler Comments , 1 8 Mar 57 .

7

 Rad, Kruege r t o Griswold , WL-944 , 3 0 Jan 45 ;

Entries 1 , 5, and 23 , XIV Corps G-3 Jnl , 31 Jan 45 ;

Telecons, G- 3 XI V Corps an d G- 3 37t h Div , 014 0

and 085 5 31 Jan 45 , in XI V Corp s G- 3 Jn l File , 3 1

Jan 45 .

8

 Sixth Arm y F O 46 , 3 0 Ja n 45 ; se e als o above ,

ch. XI. 9

 Sixth Army FO 46, 30 Jan 45 .
MANILA: TH E APPROAC H MARC H 213

THE BRIDGE S A T CALUMPIT. (Prewar photograph)

seven mile s eas t o f Calumpit , Rout e 5

crossed th e Anga t River . (Map V)

Krueger's new orders limited the XIV

Corps advanc e t o th e Malolos-Plaride l

line. Althoug h h e anticipate d tha t th e

I Corps attack against San Jose would be

well alon g b y 1 February—the da y th e

1st Cavalr y Divisio n wa s t o star t sout h

from Cabanatuan—Kruege r wa s a s ye t

unwilling t o discoun t th e possibilit y o f

Japanese counterattac k fro m th e Sa n

Jose area. H e also had reaso n t o believe

that element s o f th e 2d Tank Division

had not yet moved north through Cabanatuan an d migh t b e i n positio n t o fal l

upon th e flan k o f th e 1s t Cavalr y Divi -

sion. Moreover , as the 1s t Cavalr y Division approache d Plaridel , its lef t woul d

become expose d t o counterattac k fro m

elements of the Shimbu Group, a danger

that Kruege r believe d woul d increas e a s

the cavalry division moved south beyond

Plaridel. I n brief , Kruege r wa s unwilling to launch an all-ou t drive to Manil a

until h e ha d mor e informatio n o n th e

nature an d exten t o f th e potentia l

threats to the XIV Corps left.10 Tha t no

threats actuall y existe d mad e n o differ -

ence—Krueger was basing his plans upon

his estimate s o f Japanes e capabilities .

On 3 1 January, a s th e 148t h Infantr y

crossed the Pampanga, Beightler relieved

the 145t h Infantr y a t Clar k Fiel d an d

started it south along Route 3. Withou t

waiting fo r th e 145t h t o catc h up , th e

148th spe d rapidl y dow n Rout e 3

10

 Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 31-32 ; Sixt h Arm y

FO 46 , 30 Jan 45 .
214 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

PLARIDEL BRIDGE S (PREWAR )

through a n are a becomin g mor e an d

more densel y populated . Th e regimen t

secured Malolo s agains t mino r opposi -

tion o n 1 Februar y an d o n th e nex t

day sen t patrol s sout h anothe r eleve n

miles t o Marilao , foun d voi d o f Japa -

nese. O n th e sam e da y on e battalio n

worked east from Calumpi t toward Plaridel alon g the south bank of the Quingua

and Anga t Rivers . A t Plaride l on e o f

Shimbu Group's man y provisiona l in -

fantry battalions , about 500 men strong ,

in a short bu t bitte r stan d hel d u p th e

148th's battalio n unti l noon . The n th e

American uni t marche d o n throug h

Plaridel and abou t 170 0 established contact wit h element s o f th e 1s t Cavalr y

Division near destroyed bridges that had

once take n Rout e 5 an d th e Manil a

Railroad acros s th e unfordabl e Angat. 11

The 1s t Cavalr y Division' s driv e to -

ward Manil a ha d begu n jus t afte r 190 0

on 3 1 January, whe n a small forc e fro m

the divisio n starte d towar d Cabanatua n

from th e assembl y are a wes t o f tha t

town. I n th e lea d wer e elements o f th e

1st Cavalr y Brigade .

The World War II brigaded structure

11

 37th Di v Rpt Luzon , pp . 34-36 ; 148t h In f Rp t

Luzon, pp . 4-5 ; 145t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 15-16 ;

148th Inf S-3 Pe r Rpts, 31 Jan-3 Feb 45. The record s

indicate tha t th e Shimbu Group battalio n ma y have

been caugh t b y surprise, or a t least in th e process of

trying to withdraw southeast, but Genera l Beightler,

in Beightle r Comments , 1 8 Marc h 57 , state s tha t

the uni t wa s i n well-prepare d defensiv e positions .

The Anga t and Quingu a ar e tw o names for different

sections o f th e sam e stream that , flowin g westward ,

joins th e delt a o f th e Pampang a jus t sout h o f

Calumpit.
MANILA: TH E APPROAC H MARC H 215

of Maj . Gen . Vern e D . Mudge' s dis -

mounted 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n differe d

greatly fro m tha t o f th e triangula r in -

fantry divisio n o f th e period. 12 Instea d

of thre e infantr y regiment s th e 1s t Cav -

alry Division ha d fou r cavalr y regiments

—the 5t h an d 12t h i n th e 1s t Cavalr y

Brigade, th e 7t h an d 8t h i n th e 2 d Cav -

alry Brigade . Eac h regimen t ha d tw o

cavalry squadrons, eac h smalle r tha n a n

infantry battalion , a s oppose d t o th e

three battalions of an infantr y regiment .

Each cavalry regiment contained a weapons troo p arme d wit h 81-mm . mortars ,

.30-caliber and .50-calibe r machine guns,

and bazookas , bu t ther e wa s n o heav y

weapons troo p withi n eac h squadron .

The cavalr y regiment s lacke d th e anti -

tank an d canno n companies of an infan -

try regiment . 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n

Artillery wa s compose d o f on e 75-mm .

howitzer battalion , thre e 105-mm . how -

itzer battalions, and, for obvious reasons,

an attache d 155-mm . howitze r battalion .

Reinforcing comba t an d servic e attach -

ments brought the division's strength u p

to nearly 15,00 0 men, somewhat less than

the strengt h o f th e reinforce d 37t h Divi -

sion a t th e sam e time . O n paper , eac h

of th e fou r cavalr y regiments numbere d

1,750 men—i n contrast t o th e 3,000-odd

of a n infantr y regiment—bu t non e o f

the 1s t Cavalr y Division's regiments wa s

up t o strength . Th e divisio n ha d re -

ceived fe w replacements sinc e enterin g

combat o n Leyt e in October , an d i t ha d

come to Luzon afte r ver y littl e rest from

its arduou s campaig n throug h Leyte' s

mountains.

For th e driv e t o Manila , Genera l

Mudge organize d tw o reinforce d motor -

ized squadron s tha t soon became known

as Flyin g Columns . Eac h include d a

cavalry squadron , a mediu m tan k com -

pany, a 105-mm . howitze r battery , othe r

supporting elements, an d sufficien t vehi -

cles t o lif t al l troops. Mudg e place d th e

two Flyin g Column s unde r Brig . Gen .

William C . Chase , commande r o f th e

1st Cavalr y Brigade . Chase' s groupment

also included th e Provisional Reconnaissance Squadron , whic h containe d th e

division's ow n 302 d Reconnaissanc e

Troop an d th e headquarter s an d ligh t

tank companie s o f th e attache d 44t h

Tank Battalion. 13

On th e morning o f 1 February th e 2 d

Squadron, 5t h Cavalry , nucleu s o f on e

of th e Flying Columns, forded th e broad

Pampanga nort h o f Cabanatua n an d b y

1300 ha d establishe d fir m contac t wit h

a forc e o f som e 25 0 Japanes e infantry -

men supporte d b y tw o o r thre e 75-mm .

artillery pieces. 14 Th e Japanes e grou p

held u p th e 2 d Squadron , 5t h Cavalry ,

until th e 1s t Squadron, 8th Cavalr y (no t

part o f a Flyin g Column) , forde d th e

Pampanga sout h o f Cabanatua n an d

fought it s wa y int o tow n agains t th e

Japanese rear. (See Map 5.) B y dusk th e

two unit s ha d cleare d mos t o f Cabana -

tuan, an d othe r element s o f th e 5t h

Cavalry finishe d moppin g u p th e nex t

12

 After World Wa r II th e 1st Cavalr y Divisio n wa s

triangularized an d reorganize d a s a n infantr y divi -

sion, bu t kep t it s name .

13

 1st Ca v Di v FO' s 2 2 an d 23 , 8 an d 3 1 Ja n 45 ;

1st Ca v Div Rp t Luzon , Org , pp . 1-2 ; Ltr , C G 1s t

Cav Di v to Comdrs of Units an d Separat e Orgs, sub:

Org o f Reinforce d Motorize d Squadron , 3 1 Ja n 45 ,

1st Ca v Div FO File . 14

 The genera l sources for the rest of this subsection

are: 1s t Ca v Di v Rp t Luzon , Narrative , pp . 1-3 ;

Maj. Bertra m C . Wright , The 1st Cavalry Division

in World War II (Tokyo : Toppa n Printin g Co. ,

Ltd., 1947) , pp. 126-28 ; 1st Cav Div G-3 Per Rpts ,

1-3 Fe b 45 ; 1st Cav Brig S- 3 Pe r Rpts , 1- 3 Fe b 45 ;

5th Ca v Rpt Luzon , pp. 2-5 ; 5t h Ca v S-3 Pe r Rpts ,

1-3 Fe b 45 ; 8th Ca v Rpt Luzon , Manila Phase , p . 1 ;

302d Rc n T r Rp t Luzon , pp . 8-12; 44t h Tan k B n

Rpt Luzon , pp . 5-7.
216 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

day. O n 3 Februar y th e 12t h Cavalry ,

responsible fo r protectin g th e division's

long lin e o f communication s dow n

Route 5 , too k ove r i n th e Cabanatua n

region a s al l troop s o f th e 5t h an d 8t h

Cavalry Regiments moved sout h behin d

the Flyin g Columns.

About th e sam e tim e tha t 2 d Squad -

ron, 5th Cavalry, started into Cabanatuan

from th e north , th e Provisiona l Recon -

naissance Squadron forded the Pampanga

about fiv e mile s sout h o f tow n an d b y

1330 on 1 February was at Gapan, where,

thirteen miles below Cabanatuan, Route

5 crosse s th e Peñarand a River . S o far ,

the provisiona l uni t ha d encountere d

no opposition as it sped south across hot,

baked far m land , bu t Japanes e rifl e fir e

from th e sout h ban k o f th e Peñarand a

killed Lt. Col. Tom H . Ross, commander

of the Provisional Reconnaissance Squadron an d th e 44t h Tan k Battalion , a s he

led a patro l ont o th e Rout e 5 bridge a t

Gapan. Capt . Do n H . Walton , com -

manding th e 302 d Reconnaissanc e

Troop, immediatel y assume d contro l o f

the me n a t th e Gapa n bridg e and , lead -

ing a das h acros s th e span , probabl y

forestalled it s destruction . Walton' s

force, togethe r wit h Troo p G , 8t h Cav -

alry, whic h arrive d fro m th e vicinit y o f

Cabanatuan before dark, set up defensive

perimeters t o hold th e Gapa n bridge for

the Flyin g Columns.

The mai n bod y o f th e leadin g Flyin g

Column, built aroun d th e 2 d Squadron,

8th Cavalry , passe d throug h Gapa n during th e nigh t o f 1- 2 Februar y an d b y

0900 on th e 2d was moving into Sabang,

on th e Anga t Rive r thirty-fiv e mile s

south o f Gapa n an d seve n mile s north -

east o f Plaridel. 15 Th e column , afte r

establishing contac t wit h th e 37t h Divi -

sion, made no attempt to cross the Angat

at Plaridel—th e bridge s were down an d

the area sout h o f the Angat in th e Plaridel regio n wa s i n th e 37t h Division' s

zone. Accordingly , th e Flyin g Colum n

forded th e Anga t abou t fiv e mile s north

of Plaride l i n th e vicinit y o f Baliuag ,

where, thre e year s earlier , element s o f

MacArthur's withdrawing forces ha d de -

layed Japanes e force s attemptin g t o

reach th e Calumpi t bridge s alon g th e

Angat Rive r ban k road s throug h Plari -

del.16 Th e Flyin g Column' s somewha t

ticklish fordin g job—the river wa s wide,

although no t to o dee p a t Baliuag—wa s

accomplished as crowd s of Filipino s

cheered th e cavalrymen on . T o neithe r

the 37t h no r 1s t Cavalr y Division s ha d

the Japanes e offere d seriou s resistanc e

along th e natura l defens e lin e o f th e

unbridged Angat .

While th e 2 d Squadron , 8t h Cavalry ,

was bus y near Baliuag , th e othe r Flyin g

Column ha d reache d Saban g and , ford -

ing th e Angat there , struck eas t throug h

gently risin g far m lan d alon g Rout e 6 5

toward Norzagaray , thirtee n mile s dis -

tant. Th e ai m o f this maneuve r wa s to

ascertain i f Shimbu Group unit s be -

lieved t o b e holdin g hig h groun d eas t

and southeas t o f Norzagara y ha d an y

intentions of sallying forth t o fall o n th e

15

 According to th e 1st Cavalr y Divisio n G- 3 Peri -

odic Report fo r 1 February, a s well a s th e 8t h Cav -

alry Regiment , 2 d Cavalr y Brigade , an d divisio n

journals fo r th e day , Troop G ha d reache d Saban g

on 1 February. Fro m th e tim e an d distanc e factor s

involved—especially wit h a retur n t o Gapa n fo r th e

night—this seem s impossible . Fro m interna l evi -

dence in th e journals i t is obvious tha t a s the resul t

of garble d radi o message s Gapa n an d Saban g wer e

confused i n mor e tha n on e instanc e o n bot h 1 and

2 February. 16

 See Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp . 206-08 .

Both Cabanatua n an d Gapa n ha d als o bee n scene s

of mino r delayin g actions during MacArthur's with -

drawal; se e Morton , o p. cit., p . 183 .
MANILA: TH E APPROAC H MARC H 217

left flan k o f th e 1s t Cavalr y Division ,

If th e Flying Column met stron g opposition, o r i f th e Japanes e attacke d it , th e

1st Cavalr y Divisio n migh t hav e t o hal t

its advance toward Manil a until it could

bring up additional strength . I f no serious threa t developed , th e 5t h Cavalry' s

group woul d swin g bac k southeast fro m

Norzagaray and follo w th e 8t h Cavalry' s

Flying Colum n acros s th e Sant a Mari a

River at Santa Maria, ten mile s southeast

of Baliuag . A t dus k o n 2 Februar y

patrols of the 8th Cavalry were approaching Sant a Maria , havin g followe d cir -

cuitous, third-class roads from Baliua g in

order t o kee p out o f the 37t h Division's

zone,

The Dash Into Manila

By evening of 2 February, XI V Corp s

had progressed well beyond the MalolosPlaridel lin e tha t Genera l Krueger , o n

30 January , ha d name d a s th e corp s

objective. Th e 1s t Cavalr y Division , o n

the left , ha d foun d n o mor e signs o f sig -

nificant resistanc e tha n ha d th e 37t h

Infantry Divisio n o n th e right , an d th e

corps ha d foun d n o indication s tha t

Shimbu Group intende d t o moun t a

counterattack. Oppositio n had been tac -

tically unimportant , an d fo r th e mos t

part th e fe w organize d group s o f Japa -

nese XIV Corps had found ha d appeared

surprised an d unprepared .

This favorabl e situatio n alon g th e

XIV Corp s fron t an d left , togethe r wit h

the progres s mad e b y I Corp s throug h

2 February an d th e success o f X I Corp s

and 11t h Airborn e Divisio n landing s o n

Luzon's west coast on 2 9 and 3 1 January,

respectively, prompte d Krueger , lat e o n

the 2d , to direct Griswol d t o drive on t o

Manila wit h all possibl e speed. I n addition t o securin g th e capita l city , XI V

Corps wa s t o advanc e beyon d th e cit y

to a lin e extendin g fro m th e Cavit e

naval bas e area , o n Manil a Ba y sout h

of th e city , northeas t som e twenty-fiv e

miles an d the n nort h anothe r te n miles.

This lin e wa s draw n s o a s t o includ e

almost th e entir e Manil a metropolita n

region withi n XI V Corps ' zon e o f

responsibility.17

On th e basis of Krueger 's new orders,

Griswold establishe d a n intermediat e

corps objective line along the north bank

of th e Pasi g River , whic h flow s eas t t o

west throug h th e cente r o f Manila . A t

this tim e th e XI V Corp s commande r

expected th e 37t h Divisio n t o reac h th e

city firs t an d mak e th e mai n effor t t o

clear it . H e s o dre w th e boundar y be -

tween the 37th Infantr y an d th e 1st Cav -

alry Divisions tha t al l Manil a proper, a s

well a s its most direc t approache s fro m

the north , la y wel l withi n th e 37th' s

zone. Th e cavalr y divisio n woul d hav e

to mov e o n th e cit y vi a secondary road s

coming i n fro m th e northeast and, theoretically a t least , woul d b e barre d fro m

entering Manil a eve n shoul d it s Flyin g

Columns reac h th e cit y first. 18

17

 Sixth Arm y F O 47 , 2 Fe b 45 , Sixt h Arm y Rp t

Luzon, I, 149 . 18

 XIV Corps FO 5 , 3 Feb 45 , Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l

File Luzon , 3 1 Jan- 2 Fe b 45 . Althoug h date d 3

February, thi s fiel d orde r actuall y starte d goin g ou t

to subordinat e units b y radi o an d telephon e befor e

midnight on th e 2d . Genera l Beightler, i n Beightle r

Comments, 1 8 Marc h 57 , too k exceptio n t o th e rea -

soning i n th e las t sentenc e of thi s paragraph , pointing ou t tha t th e ne w boundar y lef t th e onl y intac t

bridge on th e northern an d northeaster n approache s

to Manila in th e 1st Cavalr y Division's zone, and tha t

the 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n therefor e coul d hardl y hel p

entering Manil a first . O n th e othe r hand , Genera l

Griswold coul d no t hav e know n tha t th e Japanes e

would leav e th e bridg e intac t fo r th e 1s t Cavalr y

Division.
218 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

On 3 February the 37th Division's van

unit, th e 2 d Battalio n o f th e 148t h In -

fantry, wa s delayed a t a numbe r o f un -

bridged, unfordable , tida l streams , an d

also had t o deploy three or four time s to

disperse smal l group s o f Japanese . A t

1930 o n 3 Februar y th e mai n bod y o f

the battalio n wa s les s tha n tw o mile s

south o f Marilao , whic h it s patrols ha d

reached the previous day.19 I n a race for

Manila, th e 148t h wa s a t a decide d dis -

advantage. Wit h mos t o f th e bridge s

over unfordabl e stream s alon g Rout e 3

down o r severel y damaged, the regiment

had t o ferr y it s supporting artiller y an d

tanks across stream s o r wai t unti l engi -

neers coul d construc t bridge s across th e

rivers.20 Eithe r cours e involve d consid -

erably more delay than tha t encountered

by th e 1s t Cavalr y Division , whic h ha d

been abl e to seiz e intac t some important

bridges an d ha d foun d relativel y eas y

fords ove r unbridged streams.

Well aware that the 37th Divisio n was

moving on Manila , th e 1s t Cavalr y Division's Flyin g Columns , determine d t o

beat th e infantr y int o th e cit y "wasted "

little tim e sleepin g durin g th e nigh t o f

2-3 February. 21 A small Japanes e defense

force hel d u p th e 5t h Cavalry' s Flyin g

Column alon g th e Sabang-Norzagara y

road befor e midnigh t o n 2 February ,

but th e colum n wa s unde r wa y agai n

at 043 0 o n th e 3 d when , a s th e moo n

rose, vehicl e driver s coul d a t leas t

locate th e shoulders o f th e grave l road .

By daw n th e Flyin g Column ha d foun d

Norzagaray in the hands of Filipino guerrillas, an d ha d the n swun g bac k south -

west towar d Sant a Maria , almos t te n

miles away . Slowe d a s i t forde d bridge -

less streams, th e 5t h Cavalry' s motorized

column wa s not acros s th e Sant a Mari a

River unti l 1500 . Once acros s tha t

stream, th e colum n race d eas t alon g

rough, gravel-paved Rout e 64 and quick -

ly reache d th e Route s 64-5 2 junction ,

eight mile s fro m Sant a Maria. 22 The n

the motorize d squadro n turne d sout h

along Rout e 5 2 and, movin g a t speed s

up t o fift y mile s a n hour, 23 endeavore d

to catch up with the 8th Cavalry's Flying

Column, a n hou r ahea d an d throug h

Talipapa, te n mile s south o f th e Route s

64-52 junction .

At a minor road junction on flat , open

ground nea r Talipapa , fou r Japanes e

trucks loade d wit h troop s an d supplie s

nosed ou t int o Rout e 5 2 fro m th e eas t

just a s th e 2 d Squadron , 5t h Cavalry ,

arrived fro m th e north . Troop s aboar d

the cavalry' s leadin g vehicle s wave d th e

Japanese t o a hal t and , momentarily

stupefied, th e Japanese drivers complied.

As eac h o f th e 5t h Cavalry' s vehicle s

19

 148t h In f Rpt Luzon , pp. 4-5; 148th Inf S-3 Pe r

Rpts, 3- 4 Fe b 45 . 20

 Beightler Comments, 18 Mar 57. Genera l Beightler

stated tha t Griswold still did no t want the 37th Division's infantr y t o ge t ver y fa r beyond it s supporting

arms. 21

 Information o n 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n operation s

in thi s subsectio n i s base d primaril y upo n th e rele -

vant portion s o f th e narrativ e source s cite d i n not e

14 above . Th e followin g wer e als o consulted : 1s t

Cav Bri g Jnl, 3- 4 Fe b 45; 1st Ca v Div G-3 Jnl , 3-4

Feb 45 ; 5t h Ca v S-2/S- 3 Jnl, 3 Fe b 45 ; 8t h Ca v S-2/S-3 Jnl, 3-4 Fe b 45.

22

 The 5t h Cavalry could have reached this junction

by comin g southeas t an d sout h ou t o f Norzagara y

along a third-class road. However , suc h a route ha d

been considered to o risk y becaus e i t wa s believe d

that stron g Japanes e force s hel d anothe r junctio n

some fiv e mile s nort h o f th e Route s 64-52 junction . 23

 The author , who went ove r th e stretch o f Route

52 i n Apri l 1957 , whe n par t o f i t ha d bee n paved ,

could onl y conclud e tha t anyon e wh o drov e fift y

miles a n hou r alon g th e roa d i n 1945 , whe n i t wa s

almost al l grave l a t leas t t o Novaliches , mus t hav e

taken leav e o f his sense s o r els e ha d abandone d hi s

life t o th e hand s of St . Christopher.
MANILA: TH E APPROAC H MARC H 219

TULIAHAN BRIDG E (1953 )

came within range of the Japanes e group,

the cavalryme n fire d wit h al l th e weap -

ons the y coul d brin g t o bear , an d con -

tinued shootin g unti l the y ha d passe d

on southwar d ou t o f range. Withi n sec -

onds th e Flyin g Column's me n ha d se t

afire fou r Japanes e trucks and ha d kille d

at leas t 2 5 Japanese . Th e remainin g

Japanese, recoverin g thei r wit s suffi -

ciently to flee, scattere d in all directions.

Five mile s fro m th e nearest wate r tha t

would floa t eve n a PT , th e 5t h Cavalr y

had execute d th e classic naval maneuver

of crossin g th e T.

A few moments later, the 5th Cavalry's

force caugh t u p wit h Genera l Chase' s

command group . Th e 5t h wa s now less

than hal f a n hou r behin d th e 8t h

Cavalry's Flyin g Column.

Delayed a t ford s an d slowe d a s i t

deployed t o dispers e a few small group s

of Japanese , th e 8t h Cavalry' s group -

ment ha d no t crosse d th e Sant a Mari a

River until noon o n the 3d . Eas t o f the

river, two Japanese outposts, attempting

to bloc k Rout e 64, again slowed th e column. Th e colum n the n brok e throug h

light oppositio n a t th e Route s 64-5 2
220 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

junction an d starte d int o Novaliches ,

seven mile s t o th e south , abou t 1630 .

Just sout h o f Novaliche s th e Japanes e

had prepare d demolition s t o blo w a

stone-arch bridg e ove r th e Tuliaha n

River, an d the y defende d th e bridg e b y

fire fro m th e sout h bank . Despit e thi s

fire, Lt . (jg ) James P . Sutto n (USNR) ,

from a Seventh Fleet bomb disposal unit

attached t o th e 1s t Cavalr y Division ,

dashed ont o the bridge to cut a burning

fuze leadin g t o a larg e charg e o f dyna -

mite. Sutto n the n proceede d t o heav e

some mine s ove r th e sid e o f th e bridg e

into th e gorg e throug h whic h ra n th e

Tuliahan.24

Without Lieutenan t Sutton' s quic k

action, th e 1s t Cavalr y Division's Flyin g

Columns woul d hav e bee n delaye d a t

least twenty-fou r hour s unti l engineer s

could have brought forward heav y equipment t o buil d a for d acros s th e steep .

banked, deep Tuliahan gorge. A s it was,

the 8th Cavalry's motorized force pushed

on agains t ver y ligh t oppositio n an d

secured Talipap a about 1800 . Hal f a n

hour late r th e Flyin g Colum n reache d

Grace Park , a suburba n developmen t

about a mil e nort h o f th e Manil a cit y

limits.

Now twelve hours ahead of the nearest

37th Divisio n units , th e 8t h Cavalry' s

group ha d reache d th e wester n limits o f

the 1s t Cavalr y Division' s zone . Gris -

wold ha d know n sinc e noo n tha t th e

cavalrymen wer e going to arriv e a t Ma -

nila befor e th e infantry, an d h e gave the

1st Cavalr y Division permissio n t o enter

the city . Late r i n th e day , anticipating

that i f h e di d no t tak e some furthe r ac -

tion th e tw o division s migh t inadvert -

ently star t shootin g a t eac h other , th e

corps commande r move d th e divisio n

boundary westward . Th e 37t h Divisio n

got a narrow, thickly populated, partially

industrialized stri p along th e bay front ;

the rest of Manila went to the 1st Cavalry

Division.25

The 8t h Cavalry's Flying Column met

scattered resistanc e i n th e Grac e Par k

area, bu t wit h tank s i n th e va n firin g

on al l position s suspecte d o f harborin g

Japanese, the column continued forward

and crossed th e city limits about 1900. 26

General Chase , i n contac t b y radio , directed th e Flyin g Colum n t o spee d o n

into Manila . Guide d b y guerrillas, th e

force followed city streets and swep t past

hidden Japanes e rifleme n wh o snipe d

away a t th e colum n and , about 1930 ,

drew u p a t th e gate s o f Sant o Tomas

University. Withi n th e wall s an d hel d

under close guard by the Japanes e Army,

24

 For a combinatio n o f thi s actio n an d a late r

mine-clearing exploit in Manila , Sutton wa s awarded

the Army' s Distinguishe d Servic e Cross . Althoug h

a naval officer, Sutto n spent almost his entire overseas

tour attached t o Army units and his wartime decorations—the DSC, a Silver Star, and tw o Purple Hearts

—were al l awarde d b y th e Army . Afte r th e war ,

Sutton serve d i n th e U.S . House o f Representative s

as a Congressman from Tennessee . Interview, author

with Sutton , 24 June 1953, cop y of interview notes in

OCMH files.

25

 Rads, XIV Corps to 1st Ca v Div and 37th Inf Div,

1225 an d 210 0 3 Fe b 45 , XIV Corp s 6- 3 Jn l Fil e

Luzon, 3-4 Feb 45; Amended Version, 2000 3 Feb 45,

XIV Corp s FO 5, 3 Feb 45 , Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e

Luzon, 31 Jan-2 Feb 45.

26

 The exac t tim e th e squadro n crosse d th e cit y

limits is highl y debatable , fo r th e division's record s

give time s running fro m 173 0 to 1945 . Most journa l

entries agreed tha t it was about 183 0 when the squadron reache d Grac e Par k an d betwee n 193 0 and 194 5

when th e va n units reached Sant o Tomas University ,

well within th e city . The questio n is further compli -

cated b y th e difficult y o f determinin g the exac t loca -

tions of th e city limits, for th e 8t h Cavalr y foun d n o

defining signs and th e Japanese, during th e war, had

moved th e cit y boundarie s t o includ e som e o f th e

prewar suburbs. Thus the 8th Cavalr y may well have

crossed th e cit y limit s a s define d b y th e Japanes e

when it reached Grac e Park.
MANILA: TH E APPROAC H MARC H 221

were almost 4,00 0 America n an d Allie d

civilian internee s wh o wer e runnin g

dangerously lo w o n foo d an d medica l

supplies.

The Approach From the South

By evenin g o n 3 Februar y th e Japa -

nese defender s o f Manila—an d a s ye t

the Sixt h Arm y ha d littl e informatio n

concerning th e natur e o f th e city' s de -

fenses—were abou t t o b e squeeze d be -

tween th e two arms of a pincers. A s the

37th Infantr y an d 1s t Cavalr y Division s

of Sixt h Arm y wer e closin g i n fro m th e

north, th e 11t h Airborn e Divisio n o f

General Eichelberger's Eighth Army was

approaching the capita l fro m th e south .

The Planning Background

Plans fo r th e employmen t o f th e 11t h

Airborne Divisio n o n Luzo n ha d under -

gone man y changes . A t on e tim e th e

division, commande d b y Maj . Gen.

Joseph M . Swing , ha d bee n prepare d t o

drop i n th e Centra l Plain s i n fron t o f

Sixth Arm y force s drivin g sout h fro m

Lingayen Gulf . GH Q SWP A ha d aban -

doned thi s pla n when , a s th e Lingaye n

target dat e approached , th e Allie d Ai r

Forces reporte d i t woul d hav e neithe r

sufficient airfield s no r transpor t planes to

lift th e entir e divisio n a t th e tim e it s

employment woul d b e mos t meaning -

ful.27 Next , MacArthur' s headquarter s

made plans to use the division in a series

of minor , diversionar y operation s alon g

the souther n an d southwester n coast s o f

Luzon, ultimatel y narrowin g th e serie s

to tw o RCT-sized landing s o n th e sout h

coast. Bu t th e employmen t o f highl y

specialized troop s fo r mino r operation s

seemed wastefu l an d woul d ten d t o cre -

ate almost insolubl e problems of supply,

command, and administration . Even two

landings, on e a t Nasugb u o n th e south -

west coast 45 miles from Manil a and th e

other a t Tayaba s Bay , 75 mile s eas t o f

Nasugbu, produced on e majo r problem .

To achiev e desired results an d t o assur e

that th e Japanese would no t destro y th e

two RCT' s i n sequence , th e landing s

would hav e t o tak e plac e simultaneous -

ly.28 Th e Allie d Nava l Forces, however,

could no t provid e sufficien t escort s an d

fire suppor t vessels fo r tw o simultaneou s

landings. If , on th e other hand, the 11t h

Airborne Divisio n mad e a singl e assaul t

at Nasugbu , th e Allie d Nava l Force s

could mak e bot h fir e suppor t ship s an d

escorts available . Th e Nav y coul d solv e

the suppor t problem s eve n mor e easil y

if th e airborn e units lande d a t Nasugb u

shortly afte r X I Corp s wen t ashor e o n

Luzon's wes t coas t nort h o f Bataan , fo r

27

 Sixth Army Rp t Luzon , I, 7 , 10 .

28

 GHQ SWPA , MUSKETEE R I , 1 0 Ju l 44 ; GH Q

SWPA Staf f Stud y MIK E I V (Nasugbu-Balayan) , 7

Nov 44 , OP D Fil e AB C 38 4 Pacifi c (1-17-43) , Sec .

8-G; GH Q SWP A Staf f Stud y MIK E V I (Batangas -

Tayabas Provinces), Ed . No. 1 , 2 Jan 45 ; GHQ SWP A

OI 86, 11 Jan 45 , G-3 GH Q Jnl File , 11 Jan 45 ; GHQ

SWPA OI 87, 14 Jan 45, G-3 GH Q Jnl File , 14 Jan 45 ;

Memo, Chie f Strateg y Se c OP D fo r Chie f Strateg y

and Polic y G p OPD , sub: Opn MIK E Six, 13 Jan 45 ,

atchd t o OPD cop y o f GH Q SWP A Staf f Stud y MIK E

VI, During the course of planning for two RCT land -

ings, Eight h Arm y suggeste d substitutin g Balaya n

Bay, fiftee n mile s southeast o f Nasugbu , fo r Tayaba s

Bay, returnin g t o th e GH Q SWP A concep t o f MIK E

IV, 7 November 1944 . The planner s foun d tha t th e

Balayan Ba y landing would make little tactica l sens e

when the y learne d tha t th e onl y practica l rout e

inland fro m tha t ba y le d directl y t o th e Nasugb u

area, where a landing was to be mad e anyway . Gen -

eral Eichelberge r stated tha t he had bee n opposed t o

the tw o separat e landing s ide a fro m th e beginnin g

because he fel t tha t th e two small RCT's of th e 11t h

Airborne Divisio n woul d b e chewe d u p i n shor t

order. Eichelberge r Comments , 2 1 Jan 57 .
222 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

many o f th e sam e suppor t vessel s coul d

participate in bot h operations. 29

A single landing at Nasugbu promised

to produc e othe r desirabl e results . Fo r

one, it would tend to pin Japanese forces

in souther n Luzon , preventin g the m

from redeployin g northwar d t o oppos e

Sixth Army 's driv e t o Manila . Fo r an -

other, fro m presumabl y goo d beache s a t

Nasugbu th e 11t h Airborne Divisio n

could driv e towar d Manila , fifty-fiv e

miles distant , alon g a n excellen t road .

Upon reachin g th e shore s o f Lagun a d e

Bay, a larg e fresh-wate r lak e lyin g south -

east o f Manil a an d separate d fro m

Manila Ba y b y th e narro w Hagono y

Isthmus, the division could cut th e main

southern route s o f reinforcemen t an d

withdrawal t o an d fro m th e capital .

Again, the Nasugbu beaches might prove

an excellen t plac e t o lan d th e 41st Infantry Division, a GHQ Reserv e unit that

was scheduled t o move to Luzo n t o rein -

force Sixt h Army . Finally , th e 11th Airborne Divisio n coul d easil y secur e th e

Nasugbu beachhea d agains t Japanes e

counterattack, sinc e al l th e approache s

to i t ra n throug h narro w passe s i n rug -

ged hil l country . N o othe r landin g

points i n souther n Luzo n combine d th e

obvious advantage s o f Nasugb u Bay .

On 2 0 January , havin g weighe d al l

the pros and cons, Genera l Eichelberge r

recommended t o Genera l MacArthu r

that the 11th Airborne Divisio n mak e a

single landin g a t Nasugb u Bay . The

Eighth Army' s commande r intende d t o

send th e division' s tw o glider-infantr y

RCT's ashor e i n a n amphibiou s assaul t

and the n push them inland about twenty

miles along Route 1 7 to Tagaytay Ridg e

where th e highway , havin g com e eas t

across steadily rising ground, turns sharply nort h an d run s graduall y dow n hil l

to Manil a Bay . Two o r thre e day s afte r

the landin g a t Nasugbu , th e 11t h Airborne Division' s 511t h Parachute In -

fantry woul d drop on Tagayta y Ridg e to

secure i t fo r th e foo t troop s an d t o seiz e

nearby stretche s o f Rout e 1 7 befor e th e

Japanese coul d assembl e t o defen d th e

highway. Onc e th e entir e divisio n ha d

assembled alon g Tagayta y Ridge , i t

would mak e read y t o driv e northwar d

to Manila. 30

While approvin g Eichelberger's plan s

for a singl e assaul t a t Nasugbu , Mac -

Arthur's concep t o f th e 11t h Airborne

Division's employment wa s by n o mean s

as ambitious, at leas t initially , a s Eight h

Army's, Instead , MacArthu r directe d

Eichelberger to land one RCT a t Nasugbu Ba y i n a reconnaissance-in-forc e t o

ascertain Japanese strength, deployment,

and intention s i n th e Nasugbu-Tagaytay

region. I f it appeare d tha t th e Japanese

had relativel y wea k force s a t Tagayta y

Ridge, then Eichelberge r could assembl e

the entire division ther e and reconnoite r

to th e north and eas t t o determine Japanese dispositions and t o contain Japanese

forces throughou t southwestern Luzon—

rather a fa r cr y fro m mountin g a driv e

29

 GHQ SWP A O I 86 , 1 1 Jan 45 ; Rad, CT F 7 7 t o

CTF 78 , 022 5 1 8 Jan 45 , Sixt h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e

Luzon, 17-1 8 Jan 45 ; Memo, ACofS G-3 Eight h Army

for Cof S Eight h Army , 1 9 Jan 45 ; Memo , Asst ACof S

G-3 Eight h Army fo r ACofS G-3 Eight h Army, sub:

Plan fo r MIK E VI Opn, 2 1 Jan 45 ; Memo , Asst ACof S

G-3 Eight h Army fo r ACofS G- 3 Eighth Army , sub:

Topics Discussed at Conferenc e . . . , 22 Jan 45. Last

three i n Eight h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e MIK E V I Opn ,

4-25 Jan 45.

30

 Rad, Eichelberger t o MacArthur, FB—769, 20 Jan

45, Eighth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e MIK E VI, 4-25 Ja n 45 ;

Eighth Army FO 17 , 22 Jan 45 , G-3 GH Q Jnl File , 24

Jan 45 .
MANILA: TH E APPROAC H MARC H 223

to Manila . MacArthu r se t th e dat e fo r

the Nasugb u assaul t fo r 3 1 January, tw o

days afte r X I Corp s wa s t o lan d nort h

of Bataan. 31

The organizatio n an d mission s o f th e

forces involve d i n th e small-scal e Nasug -

bu landin g wer e simila r t o thos e o f

previous amphibiou s operation s under -

taken within th e Southwest Pacifi c Area .

Task Group 78.2, under Rear Adm. William M . Fechteler , loade d an d lande d

the assault troops. Th e tas k grou p numbered abou t 12 0 ships an d landin g craft

of al l types , it s larges t vessel s bein g

APD's an d LST's . Fir e suppor t wa s

provided b y Tas k Uni t 77.3.1 , whic h

consisted o f a ligh t cruise r an d tw o de -

stroyers. Plane s o f th e 310t h Bombard -

ment Wing, based on Mindoro, provided

air support. 32

The 11t h Airborne Division , whic h

had bee n seasone d durin g th e Leyt e

Campaign, numbere d approximatel y

8,200 men. Its tw o glider-infantr y regi -

ments, th e 187t h an d 188th , ha d abou t

1,500 me n apiec e (hal f th e strengt h o f

a standar d infantr y regiment ) an d eac h

contained tw o battalion s o f thre e rifl e

companies each . Th e regiment s ha d n o

heavy weapons, cannon, or antitank companies. Th e 511t h Parachute Infantr y

totaled abou t 2,00 0 me n distribute d

among thre e battalions , eac h o f whic h

contained onl y thre e rifl e companies .

Artillery consiste d o f tw o 75-mm . pac k

howitzer battalions, a 105-mm . howitze r

battalion arme d wit h a shor t barre l

howitzer tha t lacke d th e rang e o f th e

105's of a standar d infantr y division ,

and a n airborn e antiaircraf t artiller y

battalion arme d wit h 40-mm . an d .50 -

caliber guns . Reinforcement s include d

the Canno n Compan y o f th e 24t h Divi -

sion's 21st Infantry; Compan y C o f th e

532d Enginee r Boa t an d Shor e Regi -

ment, th e 2 d Enginee r Specia l Brigade ;

two antiaircraf t automati c weapon s batteries; an d variou s servic e units . A

Mindoro-based battalio n o f th e 24t h

Division's 19t h Infantry wa s availabl e

on call. 33

The 11t h Airborne Divisio n expecte d

to mee t 7,00 0 Japanese i n th e Nasugbu -

Tagaytay area , th e bul k o f the m fro m

the 17th and 31st Infantry Regiments,

8th Division. Th e airborn e uni t be -

lieved tha t about 500 Japanese defended

the shore s o f Nasugb u Ba y and tha t th e

main Japanes e force , som e 5,00 0 strong ,

held Rout e 1 7 at Tagayta y Ridg e an d a

defile a few miles west of th e ridge where

the highwa y passe d betwee n th e peak s

of tw o extinc t volcanoes. 34

The estimate s wer e correc t i n genera l

but wrong in detail. Shimbu Group, responsible fo r th e conduc t o f operation s

in souther n Luzon , ha d entruste d th e

defense o f th e regio n sout h o f Manil a

to th e Fuji Force, a composit e uni t un -

der Col . Masatoshi Fujishige , wh o als o

commanded th e 8th Division's 17th In31

 Rads, MacArthu r t o Eichelberger , C-5680 6 an d

CX-56903, 22 Jan 45, Eighth Army G-3 Jn l Fil e MIKE

VI, 4-35 Jan 45 .

32

 TG 78. 2 Op n Pla n No . 1-45, 2 3 Jan 45 , Eighth

Army G-3 Jn l Fil e MIKE VI, 4-25 Jan 45; AAF SWPA

OI 86, 15 Jan 45, G-3 GH Q Jnl File , 18 Jan 45.

33

 11th A/B Di v FO 10 , 24 Jan 45 ; 11th A/B Di v

Rpt Luzon , p . 57 ; Maj . Edward M . Flanagan , Jr.,

The Angels: A History of the 11th Airborne Division,

1943-1946 (Washington : Infantr y Journa l Press ,

1948), pp . 1-2 ; Eight h Arm y F O 17 , 2 2 Jan 45 , an d

Amendment No. 1 , 26 Jan 45 , both i n G- 3 GHQ Jnl

File, 2 4 Jan 45 ; Rad, GH Q SWP A t o Eight h Army ,

CX-57942, 1 Feb 45, Eighth Army G-3 Jn l Fil e MIKE

VI, 26 Jan-2 Feb 45.

34

 11th A/B Di v FO 10 , 24 Jan 45 .
224 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

fantry.35 Numberin g som e 8,50 0 men ,

the Fuji Force was composed of th e 17th

Infantry, les s 3d Battalion; th e 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry; a battalio n o f

mixed artillery ; an d comba t engineer s

and servic e troop s o f th e 8th Division.

Co-operating wit h Colone l Fujishig e

(and soo n t o pas s t o hi s direc t com -

mand) wer e abou t 5,00 0 troop s o f th e

2d Surface Raiding Base Force, a Japa -

nese Army organizatio n mad e u p o f suicide boa t units , calle d Surface Raiding

Squadrons, and thei r base support units,

designated Surface Raiding Base Battalions.36 The Raiding Squadrons, on

paper, eac h containe d 10 0 suicide boats

and a lik e numbe r o f men ; each Base

Battalion numbere d abou t 90 0 troops ,

most o f them servic e personnel. Fiv e o r

six of the Raiding Squadrons, which had

lost most of their boats t o Allied air an d

naval actio n befor e o r shortl y afte r th e

11th Airborn e Division' s landing , ulti -

mately became available to Colonel Fujishige, a s di d a n equa l numbe r o f th e

Base Battalions. Normally , th e squad -

rons wer e amalgamate d wit h thei r sup -

port battalion s t o for m a singl e entit y

for groun d comba t operations.

With a larg e are a an d a n extensiv e

coast lin e t o hold , Fujishig e originall y

deployed th e bul k o f hi s troop s fo r de -

fense agains t a n Allie d attac k fro m th e

south rathe r tha n th e west . I n th e are a

of immediat e interes t t o th e 11t h Airborne Divisio n h e statione d hi s West

Sector Unit, a n organizatio n o f 2,25 0

troops buil t o n a nucleu s of th e 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry. Th e West Sector

Unit's larges t concentration—60 0 infan -

try wit h artiller y support—hel d th e de -

file jus t wes t o f Tagayta y Ridge , whil e

another 40 0 infantryme n defende d a

southwestern nos e o f th e ridge . Th e

West Sector Unit ha d onl y 10 0 troops a t

or nea r Nasugbu ; th e remainin g me n

were scattere d i n smal l garrison s

throughout southwester n Luzon .

The Seizure of Tagaytay Ridge

The 11t h Airborne Division , les s th e

511th Parachut e Infantry , stage d o n th e

shores o f Leyt e Gulf , whenc e th e Tas k

Group 78.2 convoy departe d fo r Nasug -

bu Ba y during the afternoon o f 2 7 January.37

 Th e voyag e t o th e objectiv e are a

was uneventful . Afte r destroyer s con -

ducted a shor t preliminar y bombard -

ment, assault troops of th e 1s t Battalion,

188th Glider Infantry, aboard LCP (R) 's

(Landing Craft , Personnel , Ramp) ,

launched fro m APD's , beache d abou t

0815. Whil e som e troop s move d of f t o

secure th e flank s o f th e beachhead , th e

main bod y o f th e 188t h Infantr y drov e

inland throug h th e tow n o f Nasugb u

and starte d southeastwar d alon g grave l

roads towar d th e Palic o Rive r an d th e

entrance t o th e sectio n o f Rout e 1 7 that

led t o Tagayta y Ridge . Th e Japanes e

35

 Japanese informatio n i n thi s an d th e followin g

two subsection s is mainl y from : 11t h A/B Di v Rp t

Luzon, pp. 13-16, 27-28; Japanese Studies in WW II,

No. 9 , Luzo n Opn s o f th e Shimbu Gp, pp . 2-3 , 8;

Sixth Army G-2 Wkl y Rpts 76 and 77 , 21 and 2 8 Feb

45, copies in G-2 D A Files; Statement of Lt Col Norio Tsutsumi (C O 2d Surface Raiding Base Force), States,

IV, 426-28 ; Statemen t o f L t Co l Tsugunor i Kuriy a

(Staff 14th Area Army), States, II, 371-73 ; 10th I&H,

Staff Stud y o f Japanes e Operation s i n th e Batanga s

Area (Nasugb u Operation) , passim. 36

 Many differen t translation s fro m th e Japanes e

are t o b e foun d fo r thes e forces , squadrons , an d

battalions.

37

 The genera l source s fo r thi s an d th e nex t sub -

section are : Eight h Arm y Rp t Nasugb u an d Bataa n

Opns, pp . 14-20 ; Flanagan , The Angels, pp. 67-77 ;

11th A/ B Di v Rpt Luzon , pp . 3-4, 16, 27-28; 11t h

A/B Di v His t Narrativ e MIK E SIX , pp. 1-3 ; 11th

A/B Div G-3 Pe r Rpts, 1- 5 Fe b 45; TG 78.2 Action Rpt Nasugbu , pp. 4-6.
MANILA: TH E APPROAC H MARC H 225

had oppose d th e landin g lightl y an d in -

effectively wit h rifle , machin e gun, and

mortar fir e fro m position s on hills north

and sout h o f th e beach. 38

By 111 5 General Eichelberge r wa s

satisfied tha t th e initia l landing , con -

ducted a s a reconnaissance-in-force , ha d

been successfu l beyon d expectation . H e

thereupon directe d th e res t o f th e 11t h

Airborne Division—stil l les s th e para -

chute regiment—t o land. 39 Al l comba t

troops o f th e firs t day' s convo y wer e

ashore b y 1230 , by whic h tim e artiller y

had starte d inlan d an d th e 187t h In -

fantry, sendin g it s 2 d Battalio n towar d

the Palic o River , ha d relieve d rea r

elements of the 188th .

The 188t h Infantry' s firs t importan t

objective wa s a Palic o Rive r bridg e carrying th e shortes t an d bes t rout e t o

Tagaytay Ridg e ove r a gorg e 25 0 fee t

wide and 8 5 fee t deep . Lyin g fiv e mile s

inland, the Palico bridge could hol d th e

11th Airborn e Division' s heavies t loads .

If th e division could not seiz e the bridge

intact, i t woul d hav e t o for d a rive r

south of Nasugbu and wor k its way along

poor roads to Route 1 7 east of the Palic o

crossing, a time-consumin g proces s tha t

would requir e considerabl e enginee r

effort an d slo w supply movements.

But th e actio n wen t wel l wit h th e

188th Infantr y o n 3 1 January. 40 Th e

1st Battalion ran down an open hill west

of th e bridge , dashe d acros s th e span ,

and surprise d a small group of Japanese

on th e eas t bank . Apparentl y stunne d

by th e sudden , unexpecte d appearanc e

of America n forces , th e Japanes e faile d

to explod e prepare d demolitions . B y

1500 th e entir e 188t h Infantr y an d th e

attached 2 d Battalion , 187t h Infantry ,

were acros s th e Palic o an d a t th e junc -

tion o f Rout e 1 7 wit h th e mai n roa d

from Nasugbu , no w fiv e mile s t o th e

west.

Hoping to continue achieving tactica l

surprise and plannin g t o hav e troops on

Tagaytay Ridg e befor e dar k o n 1 February, Eichelberge r directe d th e 11t h

Airborne Divisio n t o advanc e inlan d

with all possible speed. H e thought that

the entir e division , includin g th e 511th

Infantry, coul d assembl e o n Tagayta y

Ridge o n th e 2d , an d i n anticipatio n

asked th e Fift h Ai r Forc e t o dro p th e

parachutists o n th e 2 d instead o f th e 3 d

as originally planned. H e als o requested

GHQ SWP A t o shi p th e entir e 19t h

Infantry, 24t h Division , t o Nasugb u

from Mindor o t o protec t th e 11t h Airborne Division's line of communications

to Tagayta y Ridg e an d releas e al l th e

airborne uni t fo r th e advanc e towar d

Manila. Th e Fift h Ai r Forc e replie d

affirmatively, bu t Genera l MacArthu r

agreed onl y t o mak e anothe r battalio n

of th e 19t h Infantry availabl e i n addi -

tion t o th e on e tha t wa s alread y unde r

Eichelberger's contro l an d loadin g fo r

Luzon.41

38

 Swing Comments, 1 0 Jan 57 . 39 Rad, Eichelberger to MacArthur (via Navy channels), 024 5 3 1 Jan 45 , in Eight h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e

MIKE VI, 2 6 Jan-2 Fe b 45 . 40

 Additional information on regimental operations

is from : 188t h Gl i In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 1-4 ; 188th

Para-Gli Inf, Draf t His t Luzo n Campaign , 3 1 Jan- 31 Ma r 45 , passim; 188t h In f S- 3 Pe r Rpt s Luzon ;

187th In f S-3 Pe r Rpts Luzon; 187t h Inf Chron Narrative MIK E VI ; 1s t B n 187t h In f Chro n Narrativ e

MIKE VI, 26 Jan-24 Feb 45 . Las t four documents are in 11t h Airborne Divisio n Cam p Campbel l (Ky. )

collection.

41

 Rad, Eichelberger to MacArthur, 0245 31 Jan 45;

Rad, MacArthur to Eichelberger, CX—57342, 1 Feb 45, Eighth Army G-3 Jn l Fil e MIKE VI, 26 Jan-2 Feb 45;

TG 78 .2 Action Rp t Nasugbu , Chro n Orde r o f

Events, p. 4.
226 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

At 180 0 on 3 1 January th e 188t h In -

fantry's advanc e element s halte d fou r

miles along Rout e 1 7 beyond th e Palic o

bridge. Th e regimen t resume d th e ad -

vance a t 010 0 o n 1 February , headin g

for th e defil e wes t o f Tagayta y Ridge .

As th e lea d troop s approached th e defil e

at firs t light , Japanes e machine gun an d

rifle fir e stoppe d them ; whe n daw n

broke, Japanes e artiller y emplace d o n

high groun d t o th e lef t fron t o f th e

188th Infantr y force d th e regiment' s

point t o withdra w slightly .

Ground an d ai r reconnaissanc e dis -

closed tha t th e Japanes e defense s wer e

centered on the bare, steep, southern and

eastern slope s o f Mt . Cariliao , nort h o f

the highway , an d alon g th e ope n an d

more rugge d norther n slope s o f Mt .

Batulao, sout h o f th e road . Raisin g it s

broken, scrub-grow n cres t ove r 2,10 0

feet abov e sea leve l and 1,30 0 feet abov e

the Rout e 1 7 defile , Mt . Carilia o pro -

vided th e Japanes e wit h excellen t de -

fensive terrain , whil e th e roug h slope s

of Mt . Batulao , almos t 2,70 0 fee t high ,

afforded almos t innumerabl e hideaways.

To th e 11t h Airborne Division , ap -

proaching alon g groun d tha t gav e littl e

concealment i n patche s of scru b growth ,

the ke y t o th e Japanes e defense s ap -

peared t o b e Mt . Aiming , a sharp , bar e

height o f som e 1,18 0 feet of f th e south -

eastern slope s o f Mt . Cariliao . Pickin g

its way through wha t cove r an d conceal -

ment i t coul d find , includin g a shar p

gorge o n th e nort h sid e o f Rout e 17 ,

Company A o f th e 188t h Infantr y se -

cured a foothol d o n th e souther n slope s

of Mt . Aiming about noo n o n 1 February. Th e remainde r o f the 1s t Battalio n

followed quickly , an d i n th e fac e o f

Japanese machin e gu n an d morta r fire ,

rapidly cleare d al l Mt . Aiming . Thi s

achievement spli t th e Japanes e defense s

at th e defil e an d helpe d reduc e th e volume o f point-blan k machin e gu n an d

rifle fir e tha t ha d hel d u p th e division ,

which no w mad e preparation s t o con -

tinue th e advanc e o n 2 Februar y wit h

one battalio n alon g Rout e 1 7 an d an -

other overrunnin g Japanese defense s o n

the norther n slope s o f Mt . Batulao .

The dela y occasione d b y th e figh t a t

the defil e o n 1 February dashe d Genera l

Eichelberger's hope s fo r assemblin g th e

entire divisio n o n Tagayta y Ridg e b y

dusk on 2 February. General MacArthu r

had instructe d Eichelberge r no t t o cal l

the 511t h Parachute Infantr y forwar d

until h e wa s certain tha t th e paratroop -

ers coul d mak e contac t wit h th e res t o f

the 11t h Airborne Division withi n twen -

ty-four hour s o f thei r drop . Sinc e i t

appeared b y evening on 1 February tha t

the divisio n migh t wel l hav e t o spen d

all da y o n 2 Februar y fightin g it s wa y

through th e defile , Eichelberge r re -

luctantly change d th e parachut e dro p

back t o 3 February. 42

Despite stron g clos e suppor t b y Fift h

Air Forc e plane s an d divisio n artillery ,

the 188t h Infantr y coul d mak e littl e

progress o n th e mornin g o f 2 February .

However, momentum picke d u p shortl y

after 120 0 whe n troop s brok e throug h

to barri o Aga , a mil e an d a hal f eas t

of Mt . Aiming . Th e Japanes e ha d hurriedly abandone d Aga , the sit e o f th e

West Sector Unit's comman d post , an d

had lef t behin d larg e store s o f ammuni -

tion, enginee r equipment , an d othe r

supplies o f al l sorts , includin g man y

42

 Rad, MacArthu r t o Eichelberger , C-56806 , 2 2

Jan 45 , Eighth Army G-3 Jn l Fil e MIK E VI, 4-25 Jan

45; Rad, Eight h Arm y t o Fift h Ai r Force, FB-839, 1

Feb 45, Eighth Army G-3 Jn l Fil e MIKE VI, 26 Jan-2

Feb 45.
MANILA: TH E APPROAC H MARC H 227

weapons. B y 180 0 on th e 2 d th e 1s t

Battalion, 187t h Infantry , no w leadin g

the attac k alon g Rout e 17 , wa s thre e

miles beyon d Ag a an d onl y tw o mile s

short of th e west end o f Tagaytay Ridge .

The advanc e halte d fo r th e nigh t an d

the battalio n prepare d t o resum e it s

drive a t 0830 on th e 3 d t o mak e contac t

with th e 511th Parachut e Infantry ,

scheduled t o start dropping on Tagayta y

Ridge a t 0815 .

On th e mornin g o f 3 Februar y th e

188th Infantr y me t n o resistanc e unti l

after 1000 , when i t bega n roundin g a

bare ridg e nos e o n th e nort h sid e o f a

sharp ben d o n Rout e 1 7 at th e wester n

end o f Tagaytay Ridge . Japanes e troop s

holding anothe r steep , bar e ridg e nos e

south o f th e ben d the n opene d u p wit h

rifle, machin e gun, and morta r fir e tha t

was augmented by artillery fir e fro m em -

placements north o f th e highway . Leav -

ing one battalio n t o dea l wit h thi s ne w

opposition, th e res t o f th e reinforce d

regiment presse d o n u p Tagaytay Ridg e

along Rout e 1 7 and , about 1300 , at a

point nearly two miles beyond th e bend,

made contac t wit h me n o f th e 511t h

Parachute Infantry .

Unopposed, abou t 1,75 0 troops of th e

511th ha d begun droppin g along Tagaytay Ridg e jus t abou t o n schedule. 43

 I t

was wel l tha t ther e wa s n o opposition ,

for th e 'troopers ha d lande d i n a n inor -

dinately scattere d fashion . Th e dro p

zone selected fo r the 511th Infantry centered a mil e an d a hal f north-northeas t

of th e Rout e 1 7 bend an d wa s situate d

along th e fairl y gentle , grass y norther n

slopes o f Tagayta y Ridge . Les s tha n a

third o f th e parachutist s lande d i n th e

selected area .

The firs t echelo n o f th e 511th Infantry, abou t 91 5 officer s an d me n i n all ,

had com e t o Tagaytay Ridg e aboar d 4 8

C-47 aircraft o f the 317th Troop Carrier

Group. Th e plane s ha d flow n nort h

from Mindor o t o approac h Tagayta y

Ridge fro m th e northeas t i n orde r t o

avoid fir e fro m Japanes e antiaircraf t

weapons west of the drop zone. Th e firs t

18 planes , carryin g abou t 34 5 troops ,

dropped ove r th e assigne d area . A t thi s

juncture, plane s fro m succeedin g flight s

were nearly si x miles and thre e minute s

behind th e lea d aircraft . Abou t 082 0

one o f thes e late r plane s dumpe d ou t a

couple o f bundle s o f supplies . Takin g

this a s a signa l tha t the y wer e ove r th e

proper dro p zone , 'trooper s o f th e suc -

ceeding 3 0 plane s bega n jumping . Air -

craft pilots , realizin g the y ha d no t ye t

reached th e prope r point , attempte d t o

halt th e jumping , but th e 511th's jump.

masters continue d sendin g th e para -

troopers out . Most o f the m lande d

almost fiv e mile s east-northeas t o f th e

assigned dro p zone .

A secon d grou p o f fifty-on e C-47' s

began approachin g th e drop are a abou t

1210. Som e 8 0 me n fro m th e firs t 5

aircraft o f thi s grou p lande d i n th e

proper place . Th e res t starte d ou t o f

their plane s whe n the y sa w o n th e

ground th e collapse d chute s o f th e firs t

misplaced jump. I n th e end, of th e men

jumping o n 3 February onl y 42 5 landed

on th e assigne d dro p zone ; th e others ,

about 1,32 5 i n all, mad e scattere d land -

43

 Additional source s fo r 511th Infantr y operation s

are: 511t h Inf S-1 , S-2, and S- 3 Jnl s (incomplete )

Luzon, 11t h A/B Di v Cam p Campbel l (Ky. ) collection; Ltr, CG Fift h Ai r Force to CG Eight h Army ,

4 Fe b 45 , Eighth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e MIK E VI , 2-19

Feb 45 , with atch d Missio n Rpts , 317t h T r Carrie r

Gp; 511t h Inf S- 1 Casualt y an d Inspectio n Rpt s

Luzon.
228 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

AIRDROP O N TAGAYTAY RIDG E

ings four an d one-half t o six miles to the

east an d northeast .

The 11t h Airborne Division, blaming

the 317t h Troo p Carrie r Grou p fo r the

premature dropping , reporte d tha t th e

"true reaso n wa s th e refusa l o f th e Ai r

Force to co-operate in a combined train -

ing program for Airborne and Air Forc e

troops . . . ."44 Whil e i t i s tru e tha t

many of the 317th's pilots had no experience i n parachut e operations , th e divi -

sion's records indicat e tha t th e division

had participate d in a significant amoun t

of combine d trainin g i n th e Unite d

States and again i n New Guinea. I n an y

event, it appears that some lack o f jump

discipline within the 511th Infantry con- tributed t o th e scattered , prematur e

jumping.

Whether th e jum p wa s necessary i s a

question tha t canno t b e answere d cate -

gorically. Certainly , th e dro p wa s no t 44

 11th A/B Div Rpt Luzon, p. 4.
MANILA: TH E APPROAC H MARC H 229

required t o secur e Tagayta y Ridge —

there wer e n o Japanes e ther e an d ele -

ments of the 188t h Infantry wer e already

on th e west en d o f th e ridg e befor e th e

first paratrooper s wer e ou t o f thei r

planes. O n th e othe r hand , wit h th e

Allied Nava l Force s short of amphibious

lift an d escorts to move th e regiment any

sooner, th e 511th Infantry, comin g fro m

Mindoro by sea and the n overlan d from

Nasugbu, coul d not have reached Tagaytay Ridg e unti l lat e o n 4 Februar y a t

the earliest . I n suc h a n even t th e 11th

Airborne Division , wit h insufficien t

strength t o continu e towar d Manila ,

might hav e bee n force d t o wai t alon g

the ridg e anothe r day , givin g th e Japa -

nese ampl e tim e t o redeplo y force s t o

defend Rout e 1 7 nort h o f th e ridge .

Eichelberger hope d tha t th e divisio n

could mov e i n strengt h o n Manil a dur -

ing 3 February and catc h of f balance the

defenders sout h o f th e city . Whateve r

the case , th e da y o r tw o save d b y th e

511th Infantry' s jum p woul d prov e t o

make n o difference , fo r th e Japanes e

had alread y full y manne d stron g de -

fenses a t th e souther n outskirt s o f Ma -

nila, thoug h Eight h Arm y an d th e 11th

Airborne Divisio n coul d no t kno w thi s

on th e basi s o f availabl e information ,

To the Outskirts of Manila

Luckily fo r th e 511t h Infantry, th e

area wher e th e bul k o f it s me n hi t th e

ground was not to o impossible , although

many o f th e 'troopers ha d lande d i n o r

among banana trees . Th e regimen t suffered abou t 5 0 jum p casualties— a lo w

rate of less tha n 3 percent—of who m al l

but tw o were liste d as "slightly injured."

One ma n wa s kille d an d anothe r wa s

carried o n th e casualt y list s a s seriousl y

injured.45 Despit e th e organizationa l

problems th e scattere d jum p created ,

Col. Ori n D . Haugen , commandin g th e

511th Infantry , ha d all his troops unde r

his contro l b y 1400 . H e dispatche d pa -

trols westwar d t o establis h contac t wit h

the 188t h Infantry , an d his men, encountering no opposition, secured th e eastern

end o f Tagayta y Ridg e wher e Rout e 1 7

turned sharpl y nort h an d downhil l to -

ward Manila . Hauge n als o sen t patrol s

out alon g roads and trail s leading north

and sout h fro m th e ridg e cres t an d a t

evening reporte d t o divisio n headquar -

ters tha t h e ha d foun d n o sign s o f

Japanese.

Generals Eichelberge r and Swin g now

intended t o hav e th e reinforce d 188t h

Infantry hol d Tagayta y Ridg e an d re -

duce the Japanes e pocke t on the western

nose whil e th e 511t h Infantr y pushe d

north towar d Manil a wit h al l possibl e

speed. Swin g sen t al l o f hi s availabl e

motor transportatio n forwar d t o Tagay -

tay Ridg e t o mov e th e 511t h Infantr y

northward i n battalion-size d shuttle s

and directed th e 188th Infantry t o follow

when ready .

This plan constituted a change in mission fo r th e 11t h Airborne Division .

MacArthur's origina l instruction s t o

Eichelberger ha d envisaged tha t th e division's primar y dutie s woul d b e t o con -

tain Japanes e force s i n souther n Luzo n

and patro l t o ascertain Japanes e dispositions and intention s in its area of respon45

 General Swing , commentin g o n thi s passage ,

stated tha t h e coul d no t recal l an y fatalitie s (Swin g

Comments, 1 0 Januar y 1957) , bu t th e division' s

records indicat e tha t on e ma n wa s eithe r kille d o r

later die d o f injuries . Th e divisio n record s bein g

incomplete an d confusin g o n thi s point , i t ma y b e

that th e tw o men liste d i n th e subjec t sentenc e wer e

one an d th e same .
230 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

sibility. Manifestly, the division could not

carry ou t thes e dutie s i f i t drov e nort h

to Manila . Eichelberger' s authorit y t o

change th e missio n apparentl y derive d

from persona l contac t wit h MacArthur ,

who ha d give n th e Eight h Arm y com -

mander considerabl e discretio n o n th e

handling of the 11t h Airborne Division.46

Eichelberger's hope s tha t th e 11t h

Airborne Divisio n coul d star t it s das h

to Manil a o n 3 Februar y di d no t com e

to fruition . I t wa s after dayligh t o n th e

4th befor e th e 2 d Battalion , 511t h Infantry, alread y over twelv e hours behind

Sixth Army elements coming into the city

from th e north , se t ou t fro m Tagayta y

Ridge. Movin g as fast a s the elementar y

requirements o f cautio n permitted , th e

battalion spe d rapidl y northwar d alon g

two-lane, concrete-pave d Rout e 17 . A t

every town and barri o through th e open

country crowd s o f cheerin g Filipino s

greeted th e colum n and , once o r twice ,

practically halted th e movement in their

enthusiasm.

About 113 0 forward element s

detrucked a t Imus , a smal l tow n almos t

twenty-five mile s nort h o f Tagayta y

Ridge. Th e Rout e 1 7 bridg e ove r th e

Imus Rive r jus t sout h o f th e tow n wa s

out, an d abou t fift y Japanese , hole d u p

in a n ol d ston e buildin g datin g bac k t o

the early days of the Spanis h occupation,

blocked an alternate bridge within Imus.

Most o f th e infantr y walke d acros s th e

river along the to p o f a small dam sout h

of town , while Company D, 511th Infantry, supported by some 75-mm. howitzers

of th e 674th Field Artillery, undertook to

reduce th e Japanes e strongpoin t s o tha t

the truck s coul d continu e u p Rout e 17 .

The 5-foot-thic k wall s o f th e ol d build -

ing proved imperviou s t o th e light artillery shells , s o T . Sgt . Rober t C . Steel e

climbed t o th e building's roof , knocke d

a hol e throug h th e roofing , poure d i n

gasoline, an d starte d a fin e flas h fir e

inside wit h a whit e phosphoru s han d

grenade. A s th e Japanes e cam e dashin g

out, the y wer e summaril y cu t dow n b y

the me n o f Compan y D . Steel e person -

ally dispatche d tw o Japanes e wh o

remained insid e th e building. 47

With the Imus bridge secure, the parachute battalio n drov e o n anothe r thre e

miles t o Zapote . Here , Rout e 1 7 ended

at a junction wit h Rout e 25 , which le d

another hal f mil e northeas t acros s th e

Zapote Rive r t o a junctio n wit h Rout e

1 a mil e south o f a bridg e ove r th e La s

Piñas Rive r a t La s Piñas. Th e Japanes e

had prepare d th e La s Piña s bridg e fo r

demolitions an d wer e t o defen d i t fro m

positions on the north bank, but the men

46

 Eighth Army Rpt Nasugbu-Bataan , p. 22; Eichelberger an d MacKaye , Our Jungle Road to Tokyo,

p. 189 . Both Maj. Gen. Clovis E . Byer s (contempo -

rary Chie f o f Staff , Eight h Army ) an d Brig. Gen.

Frank S . Bowe n (Eichelberger' s G-3 ) stated tha t

Eichelberger receive d supplementar y verba l instruc -

tions fro m MacArthur . (Se e Ltr, Byers t o author , 3 0

Jun 53 , in OCM H files .) Eichelberger , reviewing th e

draft manuscrip t o f thi s volume , state d tha t befor e

the 11t h Airborne Divisio n departe d Leyte , Genera l

Sutherland (MacArthur' s chie f o f staff ) cam e t o

Eighth Arm y headquarter s o n Leyt e an d state d tha t

MacArthur wante d Eichelberge r t o captur e Manila .

(See Eichelberge r Comments , 2 1 Jan 57. ) No docu -

ments relevan t t o th e chang e ca n b e foun d i n avail -

able GH Q SWPA , Eight h Army , o r 11t h Airborne

Division files . Whateve r th e case , ther e ca n b e n o

doubt tha t Genera l Eichelberge r woul d hav e like d

a shar e i n th e hono r o f seizin g Manil a an d tha t h e

would dearl y hav e loved t o bea t Sixt h Arm y int o th e

capital city .

47

 Steele wa s awarde d th e Distinguishe d Servic e

Cross fo r thi s exploit . Tragically , th e awar d ha d t o

be mad e posthumously , fo r th e sergean t wa s kille d

a fe w days later i n Manila .
MANILA: TH E APPROAC H MARC H 231

PARAÑAQUE, four miles south of Manila, where on 4 February the Japanese stopped the 511th

Infantry.

of th e 511th Infantr y caugh t th e Japa -

nese b y surpris e an d secure d th e spa n

intact afte r a short, sharp fir e fight . Th e

2d Battalio n held a t La s Piña s while th e

1st Battalion , coming north o n a second

truck shuttl e fro m Tagayta y Ridge ,

passed throug h an d continue d towar d

Manila.

Driving throug h a densel y populate d

area and followin g Rout e 1 up th e shor e

of Manil a Bay , th e 1s t Battalio n lef t La s

Piñas behind at 1800 . Th e battalio n ran

into increasingl y heav y harassin g fir e

from Japanes e rifleme n an d machin e

gunners. A t Parañaque , tw o mile s be -

yond La s Piñas, th e unit foun d a bridge

across th e Parañaqu e Rive r badl y dam -

aged, defended b y Japanes e on th e north

bank, an d covere d b y Japanes e morta r

and artillery fire originating from Nichols

Field, a mile and a half t o th e northeast.

Here, onl y fou r mile s sout h o f th e

Manila city limits,48 the Japanese stopped

the 511th Infantry .

On 4 February th e 511th Infantry , i n

various clashes, lost 8 men kille d an d 1 9

wounded. Th e entir e 11t h Airborn e

Division, sinc e it s landing , ha d los t ap -

proximately 3 5 me n kille d an d 15 0

wounded, plu s 5 0 injure d i n th e Tagaytay Ridge jump. Th e divisio n now faced

the principa l Japanes e defense s sout h o f

Manila.

48

 The sam e questions a s to th e locatio n o f th e cit y

limits aris e her e a s i n th e cas e o f th e 1s t Cavalr y

Division. Se e above , n . 26 .
232 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Support Operations During the

Approach March

Logistical Problems

One o f th e majo r problem s th e XI V

Corps an d th e 11t h Airborne Divisio n

faced durin g their drive s t o Manil a wa s

logistical i n nature , derivin g fro m th e

speed o f th e advances, the distance s covered, th e chroni c shortage s o f moto r

transportation, an d th e destructio n o f

bridges.49 Genera l Krueger' s request o f

20 Januar y tha t th e Allie d Ai r Force s

cease knockin g ou t bridge s o n Luzo n

proved o f littl e hel p t o XI V Corps . B y

that tim e mos t o f th e bridge s tha t th e

Allied Ai r Forces , th e Japanese , o r th e

Filipino guerrilla s eve r intende d t o de -

stroy in the XIV Corps zone were already

down.

It i s well-nig h impossibl e t o ascertai n

to who m th e credi t fo r bridg e destruc -

tion on Luzo n should go, for th e cycl e of

demolitions, repairs , an d redestructio n

was ofte n quit e involved . Fo r example ,

in 1941-4 2 Genera l MacArthur' s with -

drawing force s ha d destroye d fiftee n

major highwa y bridge s an d fou r majo r

railroad bridges between th e Agno River

and Manila. 5 0 Par t o f thi s destructio n

had not bee n too successful , an d th e Japanese ha d ha d littl e troubl e repairin g

some spans, such a s those at Cabanatua n

and Gapan . I n 194 5 th e 1s t Cavalr y

Division wa s abl e t o sen d it s heavies t

loads across both bridge s afte r engineer s

made relativel y mino r repairs . Whil e

the Japanes e ha d repaire d man y span s

for heav y loads, they ha d replace d others

with light , wooden structure s tha t coul d

not bea r Sixt h Arm y loads . I n 194 5 the

Japanese no t onl y demolishe d bridge s

they ha d onc e repaired bu t als o knocked

out man y span s tha t MacArthur' s force s

had no t neede d t o destro y i n 1941-42 .

While th e Allie d Ai r Force s bombe d

many of the bridges in th e Central Plain s

(and i n souther n Luzo n a s well) , i t

appears tha t th e Japanese executed most

of th e bridg e destruction sout h fro m th e

Agno t o Manil a durin g Januar y an d

February 1945 , a conclusio n born e ou t

by guerrill a report s an d becaus e th e

type of destruction accomplishe d usuall y

resulted fro m carefull y place d demoli -

tion charges rather tha n aeria l bombard -

ment. Th e exten t o f Japanes e plan s fo r

bridge destructio n i s indicate d b y th e

fact tha t almost al l th e bridge s th e XI V

Corps an d th e 11t h Airborne Divisio n

captured intac t ha d bee n prepare d fo r

demolition. Th e Allie d Air Forces, an d

carrier-based plane s too , did destro y o r

damage som e bridges , whil e th e guer -

rillas als o ha d a han d i n som e o f th e

destruction, o r a t leas t prevente d th e

Japanese fro m effectin g permanen t

repairs afte r 9 January.

To spa n th e many streams on th e way

to Manila , Sixt h Arm y engineer s leap -

frogged bridgin g equipmen t southward ,

sending ponto n an d heav y treadwa y

bridging forwar d a s Bailey s an d othe r

semipermanent crossing s wer e erecte d

over th e Agn o Rive r an d othe r stream s

back t o Lingaye n Gulf . Fo r example , at

the Sulipa n Canal , a mil e nort h o f

Calumpit, the first bridge was a light pon49

 The genera l sources for this subsection are: Sixth

Army Rp t Luzon , III, 55, 115 ; ibid., IV , 86-89, 108,

118, 134, 143-44 ; Eighth Arm y Rp t Nasughu-Bataan ,

pp. 22 , 50-54, 57 , 71 ; 37t h Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 37 ,

197-99, 210-11 ; 117th Engr B n Rpt, 8 Jan-4 Fe b 45,

p. 11 ; Craven an d Cate , AAF V, p. 408.

50

 Ltr, Co l Harr y A . Skerry (Ret.) , in 194 2 the En -

gineer North Luzo n Force and I Philippin e Corps, to

author, 2 6 Ju n 53 , cop y i n OCM H files . Se e als o

Morton, Fall of the Philippines, passim.
MANILA: TH E APPROAC H MARC H 233

ton affai r tha t th e 530t h Enginee r Ligh t

Ponton Compan y se t u p o n 1 February.

On th e nex t da y heav y ponto n equip -

ment arrive d fro m a dismantle d bridg e

over th e Bue d Rive r a t Lingaye n Gulf ,

and b y 103 0 on th e 2 d th e 556t h Engi -

neer Heav y Ponto n Battalion , havin g

worked at a feverish pace , had completed

a ne w bridg e tha t coul d carr y 16-to n

loads acros s th e canal . A s soo n a s th e

larger Sulipan bridge was in place, trucks

laden wit h heav y treadwa y bridgin g dismantled from th e Agno River crossing at

Bayambang came over the canal on thei r

way to the Pampanga River at Calumpit.

The heav y treadway that the Sixth Army

engineers had trucked south proved sixty

feet to o short to span the Pampanga but,

improvising with all sorts of equipment ,

the 37t h Division' s 117t h Engineer Bat -

talion wa s able to complet e th e crossing.

According to General Beightler, this contretemps a t th e Pampang a hel d u p th e

37th Divisio n fo r a ful l da y o n it s wa y

to Manil a whil e th e divisio n waite d fo r

its supporting tanks and artiller y t o cross

the river.51

As soo n a s th e Pampang a bridg e wa s

ready, the 530th Light Ponton Company

dismantled th e bridg e the y ha d erecte d

across th e Sulipa n Cana l an d move d i t

south t o th e Biga a River . Stil l furthe r

south, a t Meycauyan , engineer s assem -

bled anothe r ponto n bridge , usin g sec -

tions remove d fro m th e Agn o Rive r a t

Villasis i n I Corps ' zone , wher e othe r

engineers had completed a Bailey bridge.

By a complex continuatio n o f suc h processes, th e engineer s assure d a constan t

flow o f supplie s an d heav y equipmen t

down Route 3 behind th e 37t h Division .

In th e 1st Cavalr y Division's zone th e

first major, unbridged water obstacle was

the Angat River. Afte r most of the division ha d crossed tha t stream via fords i n

the vicinit y o f Baliua g an d Sabang , en -

gineers began constructing a heavy treadway bridge , usin g equipmen t originall y

earmarked fo r th e Pampang a Rive r a t

Cabanatuan bu t not needed there . Th e

cavalry seize d th e Tuliahan bridg e nea r

Novaliches o n 3 February, bu t th e nex t

night a Japanese raiding party destroyed

it—the division's securit y wa s not goo d

enough. Sinc e the Tuliahan was unfordable, a n acut e suppl y proble m immedi -

ately aros e and , worse still , th e mai n

body o f th e 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n coul d

not get into Manila for two days, leaving

General Chase' s Flyin g Column s virtu -

ally isolate d a t Sant o Tomas University .

On 4 an d 5 Februar y th e divisio n sen t

supplies t o Genera l Chase' s forc e ove r

roads and bridge s in th e 37t h Division's

zone, bu t o n th e 6t h engineer s buil t a

ford nea r Novaliche s and supplie s again

started crossin g th e Tuliahan.

Japanese infiltration partie s continued

to harass the 1st Cavalry Division's rather

exposed, easterl y suppl y route . There -

fore, whe n XI V Corp s engineer s com -

pleted a bridg e ove r th e Anga t a t

Plaridel, th e divisio n abandone d th e

Novaliches route and sen t its traffic sout h

along Route 5 three mile s from Plaride l

to th e Route s 3- 5 junctio n a t Taban g

and thenc e int o th e city . Needles s t o

say, bridg e congestio n becam e chroni c

between Tabang and Manila , a situation

that obtained fo r many crossings in XI V

Corps' area . Engineer s at firs t ha d bee n

able to erect only one-lane spans at eac h

stream. A s a result , o n on e sid e o f a

river Manila-boun d traffi c soo n jamme d

up, whil e o n th e othe r empt y vehicle s

returning northwar d fo r anothe r loa d 51

 Beightle r Comments, 1 8 Mar 57.
234 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

created a secon d traffi c jam . Only constant, carefull y co-ordinate d effort s o f

traffic control officers prevente d complete

chaos.

Having captured mos t o f th e bridge s

along its route of advance, th e 11th Airborne Divisio n encountere d n o seriou s

crossing problem s unti l i t reache d th e

Parañaque River. Initially , the divisio n

employed smal l rafts mad e fro m rubbe r

assault boat s t o mov e it s supplie s an d

equipment acros s th e Parañaque , bu t

within a few days division engineers had

completed temporar y timbe r repair s a t

the damaged Parañaque span and vehicles

began crossing.

Even with adequate bridging installed,

the XI V Corp s an d th e 11t h Airborne

Division continue d t o fac e knott y transportation problems. Th e spee d an d distances involve d i n th e advance s towar d

Manila mean t tha t al l truck s were in al -

most constan t use . All othe r availabl e

motor transport also had to be employed.

Dukws, no t designe d fo r th e job, mad e

long overland hauls ; jeep s and enginee r

flat-bed trailers , ofte n overloaded , car -

ried genera l supplies ; LVT 's, employe d

as ferrie s a t man y rivers, als o sometimes

carried cargo for long distances overland.

The demand s o n maintenanc e person -

nel an d equipmen t becam e abnormall y

heavy, eve n thoug h vehicle s wer e i n

such constan t us e tha t i t wa s nearly im -

possible t o pul l the m of f dut y fo r th e

most pressin g repairs . I f maintenanc e

officers an d me n verge d o n nervou s

breakdowns, the y can hardl y be blamed.

Trucks consume d tire s a t a n alarmin g

rate, especiall y ove r grave l road s i n th e

1st Cavalr y Division' s secto r an d alon g

a particularl y viciou s stretc h o f shar p

gravel along Route 1 7 between Nasugbu

and Tagayta y Ridge .

Another proble m aros e i n th e 11t h

Airborne Division' s zone . Th e beache s

at Nasugbu , contrar y t o expectations ,

proved unsatisfactor y fo r dischargin g

LST's. Fro m tim e t o tim e i t becam e

relatively difficul t t o suppl y eve n th e

small 11t h Airborne Divisio n ove r thes e

beaches, and the adverse conditions there

convinced planners that i t woul d be impracticable to unload and supply the 41st

Infantry Divisio n throug h Nasugbu .

Plans t o emplo y th e 41st Division o n

Luzon wer e thereupo n dropped. 52

None o f th e problem s prove d insolu -

ble, an d troop s a t th e fron t wer e neve r

without a t leas t th e bar e minimu m o f

essential supplies . Fo r a tim e th e 11th

Airborne Divisio n face d a seriou s gaso -

line shortage , bu t thi s wa s eliminate d

when, on 5 February, C-47's began flying

drums o f gasolin e t o a hastil y prepare d

airstrip at Nasugbu . Later , cargo planes

dropped general supplies along Tagaytay

Ridge, thereb y overcomin g th e inade -

quacies of the Nasugbu beaches, shortening th e division' s suppl y line , an d

reducing the problem o f tire wear. Nevertheless, th e 11t h Airborne Divisio n

was unable t o eliminate all o f its supply

problems unti l i t bega n receivin g sup -

plies fro m th e north , throug h Manila .

In th e 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n Genera l

Chase's Flying Columns, reduced to two

K-ration meals pe r day, wen t a bit hun -

gry on 4 and 5 February afte r th e Japa -

nese destroye d th e Novaliche s bridge .

Practically th e onl y othe r suppl y prob -

lem i n th e 37t h Infantr y Divisio n an d

1st Cavalr y Division sectors evolved from

52

 Rad, Eichelberger to MacArthur (vi a Navy channels), 0955 31 Jan 45 , and Rad, MacArthur t o Eichelberger, CX-57342 , 1 Feb 45 , bot h i n Eight h Arm y

G-3 Jn l Fil e MIK E VI , 2 6 Jan-2 Fe b 45 . Se e als o

above, p . 222 , an d below , ch . XXIV .
MANILA: TH E APPROAC H MARC H 235

delays inciden t t o th e installatio n o f

heavy bridgin g tha t trucks , tanks , an d

artillery coul d cross . A s th e resul t o f

such delays, supporting units sometime s

did no t ge t forwar d a s rapidl y a s th e

infantry an d cavalr y uni t commander s

desired.

Thus, it is obvious tha t th e success o f

the das h t o Manil a depende d i n larg e

measure upo n th e succes s o f Engineer ,

Transportation, an d Quartermaste r

units. Tha t th e das h wa s successfu l i s

ample testimony to the effectiveness wit h

which thes e supportin g unit s operated .

Air Support Operations

While th e XI V Corp s an d th e 11t h

Airborne Divisio n require d fe w clos e

air support mission s durin g their drive s

toward Manila , ai r powe r assume d a n

important role in th e operations.53 Th e

511th Parachut e Infantr y dro p i s on e

case i n point . O n XI V Corps' left , ai r

operations attained perhaps more significance. Wit h it s lef t exposed , th e 1s t

Cavalry Divisio n depende d i n larg e

measure upon air for its flank protection .

Beginning o n 1 Februar y Marin e Ai r

Groups 2 4 an d 32 , flyin g fro m th e re -

cently complete d Mangalda n stri p nea r

Lingayen Gulf , kept nine SBD's (Doug -

las dive bombers) ove r the cavalry's leading elements. Other SBD's and Fift h Air

Force P-40's, all under 308t h Bombard -

ment Win g control , undertoo k recon -

naissance mission s alon g th e cavalry' s

left flan k an d lef t front . Durin g the last

stages o f th e das h t o Manil a a squadron

of Fift h Air Forc e A-20's—mediu m

bombers—maintained a constant ground

alert at th e Lingaye n field s awaitin g call

by eithe r o f XI V Corps ' leadin g

divisions.

The SBD' s flew onl y one close support

mission—if i t can be so designated. Near

the Santa Mari a Rive r ford, o n 3 February, th e 1st Cavalr y Division called upon

the Marin e plane s t o dispers e a smal l

group o f Japanes e holdin g a piec e o f

high groun d dominatin g th e crossin g

point. Unabl e to fire because the cavalrymen wer e to o clos e t o th e target , th e

planes mad e severa l simulate d strafin g

attacks ove r th e Japanes e positions .

These "dr y runs" s o unnerve d th e

Japanese tha t most of them soon fled. 54

Mindoro-based plane s o f th e 310t h

Bombardment Win g provide d th e sup -

port fo r th e 11t h Airborne Division .

P-47's o r P-38' s maintaine d a constan t

four-plane umbrell a ove r th e leadin g

troops, an d o n 1 an d 2 Februar y th e

310th Win g execute d clos e suppor t

bombardment an d strafin g mission s a t

the defil e west o f Tagaytay Ridge.

Not al l th e air support mission s wen t

off withou t a hitch . I t migh t hav e been

expected tha t afte r thre e years ' experi -

ence air-groun d co-operatio n woul d b e

such as to preclude bombing and strafin g

friendly troops , bu t th e contemporar y

records o f Sixt h Arm y an d it s compo -

nents reveal tha t ther e wer e man y suc h

incidents, mos t o f the m apparentl y at - 53

 The genera l sources for this subsection are: Sixth

Army Rpt Luzon , I, 99-103, 108; His t of 308th Bom -

bardment Wing, ch. IV, 1 January-28 May 45, pp. 8 ,

13-14, 17; Boggs, Marine Aviation in the Philippines,

pp. 74-79 ; Craven an d Cate , AAF V, pp. 420, 425-28 , 442; 11t h A/B Div Rpt Luzon , pp. 3-4.

54

 Boggs, Marine Aviation in the Philippines, p . 78;

Wright, 1st Cavalry Division in WW II, p . 128 . Bot h

sources state tha t th e inciden t occurre d o n 2 February, bu t accordin g t o th e 1s t Cavalr y Division's con -

temporary record s non e o f its troop s wer e nea r th e

target area unti l the morning of th e 3d.
236 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

tributable t o pilo t error s i n targe t

identification.55

Late in January General Krueger had

informed Genera l Kenney , th e com -

mander o f th e Allie d Ai r Forces , tha t

since the Fifth Ai r Force had take n over

air support responsibility on Luzon from

the Allie d Nava l Forces ' CVE-base d

planes ther e ha d bee n "numerou s inci -

dents" o f Fift h Ai r Forc e plane s attacking I an d XI V Corp s troops . Kruege r

went on to point out that, as a result, his

ground force s wer e rapidly losing confidence i n th e supportin g ai r arm. 56

 Fi -

nally, after anothe r mistake by Fifth Ai r

Force planes on 4 February caused more

casualties,57 Kruege r sen t Kenne y a

blistering radio:

I must insist that you take effective meas- ures t o sto p th e bombin g an d strafin g o f

our groun d force s b y friendly planes . . . . These repeate d occurrence s ar e causin g

ground troops to lose confidence i n air support an d ar e adversel y affectin g morale. 58

General Kenne y and his subordinates,

having received steadily increasin g criticism fro m Sixt h Arm y troops, wer e taking many steps to prevent errors. I t can

be suppose d tha t the y no w redouble d

their efforts. 59

The vas t majority o f air strikes, whatever servic e execute d them , wer e bot h

accurate an d helpful . A s th e campaig n

on Luzo n progressed , th e incidenc e o f

mistakes rapidly diminished as Fifth Ai r

Force pilots became mor e familia r wit h

the ground situatio n an d th e Allied Air

Forces and the Sixth Army modified an d

improved air-ground liaiso n and control

systems. Althoug h som e o f th e Arm y

divisions o n Luzo n preferre d t o hav e

Marine Corp s aircraf t suppor t them ,

Fifth Ai r Forc e pilots , wh o ha d previ -

ously ha d rathe r limite d experienc e i n

close air support operations, became well

versed i n suc h activity , and som e o f th e

Fifth's squadron s came to provide as excellent clos e ai r suppor t a s wa s t o b e

executed anywher e durin g Worl d Wa r

II. I n th e end, the Fift h Ai r Forc e di d

its job and did i t well.

55

 The Ai r Force s officia l histor y say s of ai r opera -

tions durin g th e Luzo n Campaig n that : "Ai r mistakes resultin g i n casualtie s t o Sixt h Arm y troop s

were few and limite d almost entirely to th e firs t tw o months o f th e campaign. " An d agai n tha t "Reac -

tions o f th e ai r commander s t o thes e accident s wa s

somewhat less philosophical than those of the ground

generals, one o f whom spok e o f havin g experienced

short rounds from hi s own artillery."

The Ai r Forces' volume lists but thre e air support

mistakes durin g th e perio d o f th e driv e t o Manila ,

two involvin g Fift h Ai r Forc e plane s strafin g Sixt h

Army troop s and th e thir d a n accidenta l jettisoning

of a bomb on a Nav y LS M by a Marin e Corps SBD. (Craven an d Cate , AAF V, p. 442.) Bu t a s indicated

in this text, ground commanders were anything but

"philosophical" abou t th e errors, whil e th e record s of th e groun d unit s clearl y demonstrat e tha t ther e

were man y mor e errors tha n th e Ai r Force s histor y

would lea d on e t o believe .

56

 Rad, Kruege r t o Kenney , WL-907 , 3 0 Ja n 45 , Sixth Army G-3 Jnl Fil e Luzon, 29-3 1 Ja n 45 . 57 The strafin g o f troop s o f th e 1s t Infantry , 6t h

Division, a t Sa n Jose. Se e above, ch. XI.

58

 Rad, Kruege r to Kenney, WG-32, 4 Feb 45, Sixth

Army G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 2-4 Fe b 45. 59

 Rad, Kenney t o Krueger , AX-34890 , 3 1 Jan 45 ,

Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 3 1 Jan-2 Fe b 45 .

No reply to Krueger's 4 February radio can be found

in availabl e files.
CHAPTER XII I

Manila: The Defenders an d th e Defense s

The City

Manila i s a city— a statemen t that ,

having been made , leave s fa r to o muc h

unsaid.1 I t i s a cit y o f contrasts—con -

trasts deriving from unbroke n centuries

of existenc e an d a polyglo t population .

It i s a city o f parts, capable o f bein g all

things t o al l men . Ther e ar e section s

that canno t b e calle d moder n i n an y

sense o f th e word . Ther e ar e section s

that ar e ultramodern . I t boast s movi e

houses, filling stations, night clubs, slums,

dark alleys, and broad , tree-line d boule -

vards. Ther e ar e hospital s an d univer -

sities; shippin g office s an d departmen t

stores; privat e club s an d publi c parks ;

race track s an d cockpits ; a n Olympi c

Games stadiu m an d yach t clubs ; street -

car track s an d bu s lines ; pony-draw n

taxis an d railroa d stations . A touc h o f

medieval Spain rubs harshly against modern port facilities; centuries-old churches

and monasteries face gaswork s and brew -

eries. Nipa-thatche d hut s hous e part o f

the teeming population, while for others

home i s a moder n air-conditione d

apartment. Manil a is a city.

Established a t th e sit e o f a n ancien t

Tagalog village, Manila, whose existence

antedates that of any urban center of the

United State s except St . Augustine, was

founded i n 157 1 b y Spanis h colonize r

Miguel Lope z d e Legaspi. Independen t

—that is, not unde r th e administratio n

of an y province—th e city , i n 1945 , cov -

ered an area of nearly 14. 5 square miles.

It stretche d abou t 5. 5 mile s nort h t o

south alon g th e easter n shor e of Manil a

Bay and extende d inlan d approximatel y

4 miles. Wit h th e surroundin g suburbs

and smal l town s o f Riza l Province , th e

city formed a public utilities service area

known a s Greate r Manila . A n are a o f

almost 110 square miles, Greater Manila

extended fro m th e Parañaqu e Rive r

north som e te n mile s t o includ e Grac e

Park and inland, with irregular boundaries, abou t eigh t mile s t o th e Marikin a

River.

The city' s populatio n ha d increase d

greatly since the outbreak of war, mainly

as the result of a job-seeking influx from

the provinces . I n Decembe r 194 1 Ma -

nila's population was about 625,000 and

the tota l fo r Greate r Manil a wa s nearly

850,000. The pea k of growth was reached

in th e earl y fal l o f 1944—peopl e bega n

to move out again after Allied air attacks

started in September. Just before the air

attacks began, the population of the city

1

 This sectio n i s base d principall y upon : AG S

SWPA Terrai n Stud y No . 94, Central Luzon , vol. I,

Text an d Maps , 1 8 Oc t 44 ; AG S SWP A Terrai n

Handbook No . 41 , Manila , 2 1 No v 44 ; AG S SWP A

Terrain Handboo k No. 41-A, Manila City, 6 Dec 44;

Encyclopædia Britannica, 1952 , XIV , 806-08 ,

Throughout this and subsequent chapters on Manila,

descriptive materia l ha s been supplemente d b y th e

author's own observations, since he was stationed i n

Manila for almost nine months in 194 5 and revisite d

it in April 1957.
Central Manila
MANILA: TH E DEFENDER S AN D THE DEFENSE S 239

proper wa s ove r 800,000 , an d tha t o f

Greater Manil a wa s some 1,100,000 .

The busines s distric t la y i n th e west -

central part of Manila north of the Pasig

River, which flows westward into Manila

Bay through the center of the city. (Map

VI) Likewise , most o f th e retai l stores ,

movie houses , restaurants , an d othe r

service an d amusemen t outlets , a s wel l

as man y manufacturin g plants , wer e

north o f th e Pasig . Tond o District , o n

the ba y front , wa s th e mos t populou s

residential area, housing laborers, fishermen, an d other s i n th e lowe r incom e

brackets, often i n substandard dwellings.

To th e east of the business area lay better

residential districts , which , antedatin g

World Wa r I for the most part , housed

the olde r Europea n familie s an d man y

of th e middl e and uppe r class Filipinos.

On the north bank of the Pasig, near the

center o f th e city , wa s located th e Filipino Whit e House, Malacaña n Palace ,

once th e sea t o f Spanis h an d America n

governors-general.

South o f th e Pasig , nea r th e river' s

mouth, la y the ol d Spanis h walle d city ,

Intramuros, bordere d o n thre e side s b y

a fille d moa t tha t ha d bee n converte d

into a publi c park . Originall y locate d

on th e ba y front—constructio n o f th e

interior stone citadel, Fort Santiago, was

begun i n 1590—Intramuros , i n 1945 ,

was hal f a mil e inland . Alon g it s wes t

wall the bay front wa s reclaimed for th e

construction o f moder n por t facilities ,

including piers , warehousing , fue l stor -

age, and machin e shops. Th e adven t o f

war interrupte d developmen t o f a similar port area north of the Pasig's mouth.

Beyond Intramuros and the port area,

much o f Manil a sout h o f th e Pasi g wa s

composed of modern residential districts,

hospitals, government buildings, schools,

apartment houses , an d parks . I n addi -

tion, ther e wa s considerabl e industria l

development alon g th e sout h ban k i n

the easter n par t o f th e city . Souther n

Manila wa s develope d almos t entirel y

after th e America n occupation , most o f

it durin g th e perio d betwee n th e tw o

World Wars . Th e residentia l suburb s

of Greate r Manil a spran g u p largel y i n

the '20's and '30's , thei r mushroomin g

growth cu t short in Decembe r 1941 .

Most o f Manila' s street s wer e pave d

before th e war, bu t man y of them could

not stan d u p unde r constan t militar y

traffic, an d maintenanc e ha d falle n fa r

behind during the Japanese occupation .

North o f th e Pasi g man y street s wer e

narrow, littl e bette r tha n alleys . Ther e

they radiated i n al l directions from cen -

tral plazas, crossed eac h othe r a t various

angles, an d ende d abruptl y t o creat e

streets alon g whic h field s o f fir e wer e

limited to one or two blocks. Withi n the

city limits on e railroa d an d fiv e vehicu -

lar bridge s crosse d th e Pasig , bu t th e

Japanese destroyed al l o f the m i n 1945 .

South o f th e rive r th e cit y streets wer e

generally broade r and , even i n Intra -

muros, mos t wer e se t a t righ t angles. 2

Types of construction withi n th e cit y

varied considerably . Th e flims y house s

of Tondo District were highly flammable,

while th e othe r residence s north o f th e

Pasig wer e eithe r fram e o r a combina -

tion o f fram e an d ston e o r brick . Th e

buildings o f th e busines s distric t wer e

of reinforce d concrete ; th e governmen t

buildings sout h o f th e rive r wer e con -

structed t o withstan d earthquake s and ,

in appearance , were not unlik e many of

the governmen t building s i n Washing -

2

 Like the rivers throughou t Luzon , th e streets i n

Manila ar e subjec t t o sudden nam e changes, apparently on th e basis of long usage.
240 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

ton, D.C . Th e oute r wall s o f Intra -

muros, up t o fort y fee t thic k a t th e bottom an d i n place s reachin g a heigh t o f

twenty-five feet , wer e constructe d o f

great ston e blocks , an d th e building s

within th e walls were constructed al l o r

partially o f stone . Man y o f th e home s

south o f th e rive r combine d woo d wit h

brick, stucco, o r cinde r block , whil e th e

apartment house s wer e o f reinforce d

concrete.

Much o f Manil a remaine d relativel y

untouched b y wa r unti l Februar y 1945 ,

although Japanese air raids in December

1941 ha d wrough t som e damag e i n th e

port area and Intramuros . A s they evac -

uated the city, MacArthur's Fil-American

troops undertook demolitions within the

port are a an d fire d fue l installation s i n

the Paco , Pandacan , an d Sant a An a in -

dustrial district s lyin g alon g bot h side s

of th e rive r i n th e east-centra l par t o f

the city. 3 Th e por t are a an d railroa d

facilities were struck i n late 194 4 an d i n

January 194 5 b y land-based planes of the

Allied Ai r Force s an d b y carrier-base d

aircraft o f Halsey' s Thir d Fleet . Bu t

destruction cause d b y thes e ai r attack s

was minor compare d wit h tha t wrought

during th e fightin g withi n Manil a i n

February and March 1945 .

The Japanese Defenses

The Background

It wa s not Yamashita's intentio n t o preside ove r th e destructio n o f Manila. 4

Since h e ha d decide d t o le t th e vita l

Central Plains—Manil a Ba y are a g o b y

default, th e defens e o f Manil a t o hi m

would b e meaningless. H e reasoned :

First th e populatio n of Manila is approx- imately on e million ; therefore , i t i s impos- sible t o fee d them . Th e secon d reaso n i s

that th e building s ar e ver y inflammable . The thir d reaso n i s tha t becaus e [Manila ]

is o n fla t lan d i t require s tremendou s . . . strength t o defend it . Fo r thes e reasons my

policy o r pla n wa s to leav e Manil a outsid e

the combat zone. 5

When, i n December , Yamashita decide d

to evacuate troops and supplies from th e

city, he planned t o leave behind a small

Army forc e t o maintai n order , protec t

supply movements , and , ultimately, t o

blow bridge s ove r th e Pasi g an d Mari -

kina River s i n orde r t o dela y Allied oc -

cupation of the entire metropolitan area

and slow development of an Allied drive

against th e Shimbu Group, eas t o f th e

city. Th e Japanes e would hold the Pasig

bridges onl y s o lon g a s th e span s re -

mained usefu l fo r suppl y movements —

they had no plan for a last-ditch stan d at

the bridges.

Yet, a s the XI V Corp s an d 11t h Airborne Divisio n approache d th e cit y i t

became obvious that Manila was strongly

defended. Ther e ha d bee n a change i n

Japanese plans.

The chang e reflecte d n o reversa l o f

Yamashita's policy . Rather , i t mirrore d

a pictur e of disagreement and confusio n

existing among the lower-level headquar3

 See Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp . 234-35 . 4

 The genera l source s fo r th e remainde r o f thi s

chapter are: SWPA His t Series , II, 452-63 , an d th e

sources cited therein , copies available in OCMH files;

USA vs. Yamashita , Yamashit a testimony , pp . 3522 -

23, 3527-28, 3532-33; ibid., Lt Ge n Shizuo Yokoyama

(CG Shimbu Gp) testimony , pp . 2672-73 , 2681-86 ,

2693; ibid., Muto testimony , pp. 3015-18 , 3062; ibid.,

Col Hirosh i Hashimot o (Cof S Manila Defense Force)

testimony, pp. 3113-17 ; 14th Area Army Opn s Orders

and Plan s containe d i n Trans , III, Items 1 and 3 ;

Japanese Studies in WW II , No. 125 , Philippine Area

Naval Opns, pt. IV, pp. 5-8; Asano Statement, States,

I, 87-95; Hashimot o Statement, State s I, 278-81 .

5

 USA vs. Yamashita, Yamashita testimony , p. 3527 .
MANILA: TH E DEFENDER S AN D TH E DEFENSE S 241

ters unde r Yamashita's nomina l control,

and especiall y betwee n th e Arm y an d

Navy echelon s o f hi s command . Con -

trary t o Yamashita' s expresse d desires ,

these conflict s le d t o a decisio n t o giv e

battle withi n th e city— a developmen t

that was a cancerous growth on th e 14th

Area Army's pla n fo r th e defens e o f

Luzon an d tha t stemme d fro m a serie s

of compromise s amon g Japanes e Arm y

and Nav y commander s i n th e Manil a

area.

Until lat e Decembe r 194 4 th e protec -

tion o f Manil a had bee n charged t o Maj .

Gen. Takash i Kobayashi' s Manila Defense Force, roughl y equivalen t t o tw o

RCT's in strength and armament. When,

on 2 7 December , Yamashit a organize d

the Shimbu Group fo r a fina l defensiv e

stand i n th e mountai n countr y east an d

northeast o f Manila , h e place d th e cit y

and th e Manila Defense Force unde r

General Yokoyama , Shimbu Group an d

8th Division commander . Sinc e Yama -

shita contemplated no defens e of Manila,

one o f Yokoyama' s principa l mission s

was to oversee the evacuation of th e city,

and h e directe d Genera l Kobayash i t o

speed th e movement , whic h wa s already

under way . Two Arm y units , responsi -

ble fo r carryin g ou t th e evacuatio n an d

assigned demolitions, wer e t o remai n i n

and aroun d th e city for th e nonce. Th e

first wa s th e Noguchi Detachment, tw o

provisional infantr y battalion s an d sup -

porting troop s unde r Col . Katsuzo

Noguchi. Statione d within the northern

part o f th e cit y an d i n th e norther n suburbs, th e detachmen t wa s t o withdra w

eastward onc e i t ha d knocke d ou t th e

Pasig bridges . Anothe r reinforce d pro -

visional infantr y battalio n unde r Capt .

Saburo Ab e wa s statione d sout h o f th e

city an d wa s responsibl e fo r blockin g

the souther n approache s alon g th e narrow Hagonoy Isthmus, separating Manila

Bay and Lagun a de Bay .

Throughout Decembe r an d January ,

however, while Army units were pulling

out o f the city and environs, naval troops

were moving in. A s it had for Yamashita,

the Allie d mov e t o Mindor o i n Decem -

ber ha d prompte d a flurr y o f change s in

plans b y Vic e Adm. Denshich i Okochi ,

the commander of the Southwestern Area

Fleet and th e ranking Japanese naval officer i n th e Philippines. 6

 Okochi , appar -

ently o n hi s ow n initiative , decide d t o

strengthen th e Navy 's defenses o f Manila

and h e assigne d som e 4,00 0 me n t o a

new organizatio n tha t h e designate d th e

Manila Naval Defense Force—not t o b e

confused wit h Genera l Kobayashi' s Manila Defense Force. T o hea d th e ne w

force, Okoch i calle d upo n Admira l

Iwabuchi, als o th e commande r o f th e

31st Naval Special Base Force, which al -

ready had troop s i n an d aroun d Manila .

Okochi planned to send the remainder

of th e larg e numbe r o f nava l troop s i n

and aroun d Manil a u p t o th e Kembu

area, but supply and transportation problems forestalled completio n of this movement. Thus , whe n h e departe d fo r

Baguio with Yamashita early in January ,

Okochi lef t Admira l Iwabuch i i n com -

mand o f a Manila Naval Defense Force

that, wit h subsequen t mino r accretions ,

6 deposition Additiona s isl from materia : USl oAn vs Japanes . Yamashita e nava, Okoch l plani

s testi andmony, pp . 2546-47 ; Statemen t o f Cap t Masayosh i

Koma, IJ N (Staf f Southwest Area Fleet), States , II ,

293; Statemen t o f Comd r Shigeich i Yamamot o (Staf f

Southwest Area Fleet), States , IV , 488; Statemen t o f

Lt Comd r Koich i Kayashim a (Staf f Manila Naval

Defense Force an d 31st Naval Special Base Force),

States, II , 157-70 ; Statemen t o f Co l Shujir o Kobay -

ashi (Staf f Shimbu Group, no t t o b e confuse d wit h

General Kobayashi), States, II, 241 .
242 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

numbered nearl y 16,00 0 nava l troops .

Iwabuchi's missions were to hold Nichols

Field an d th e Cavit e nava l bas e area ,

mine Manil a Bay , direc t Nav y suicid e

boat operation s i n th e bay , arrange fo r

the evacuatio n o f ship s an d smal l craf t

of th e 31st Naval Special Base Force, and,

ultimately, assur e th e destructio n o f al l

Japanese naval installation s and supplie s

in th e Manil a an d Cavit e areas . Th e

program o f demolitions Okochi directed

Iwabuchi t o undertak e wa s far more extensive tha n tha t assigne d t o th e Arm y

troops.

When h e lef t fo r Baguio , Admira l

Okochi transferre d th e operationa l control o f th e Manila Naval Defense Force

to Genera l Yokoyam a an d th e Shimbu

Group. Bu t operationa l contro l unde r

the principle s o f unit y o f comman d di d

not mea n th e sam e thin g withi n th e

Japanese armed force s tha t i t di d i n th e

Allied service s during World War II—i t

also did no t mean th e same thing to th e

Japanese Nav y tha t i t di d t o th e Japa -

nese Army. Thus , th e control authorit y

Okochi actuall y transferre d wa s s o limited a s to contain th e seed s o f man y disagreements betwee n Genera l Yokoyam a

and Admira l Iwabuchi . Whe n i t cam e

down to cases, the Shimbu Group woul d

have complete operational control of the

Manila Naval Defense Force only within

an are a plainl y of primary Army interest

and eve n then only after Iwabuchi's command ha d successfull y complete d al l th e

missions Okoch i ha d assigne d it .

Manifestly, som e o f thes e missions in -

volved operations on land—theoretically,

on Luzon , the exclusiv e responsibility of

the Japanese Army. Bu t to the Japanese

Navy, th e assignmen t o f troop s t o th e

Army for operational control meant control onl y fo r groun d comba t operation s

actually conducte d unde r Arm y com -

mand i n a n Arm y area . Th e fac t tha t

Admiral Iwabuch i coul d carr y ou t hi s

naval assignment s whil e conductin g

ground combat operations as directed by

the Shimbu Group di d no t alte r th e situation. H e woul d no t withdra w hi s

forces fro m Manil a unti l h e fel t h e ha d

executed hi s nava l missions , and, what -

ever operations he might conduc t unde r

Shimbu Group directives, his prior naval

orders would continue to take precedence

over an y directive s Genera l Yokoyam a

might issue. 7

It wa s no t unti l 6 Januar y tha t th e

Shimbu Group commande r learne d tha t

his operationa l contro l ove r th e Manila

Naval Defense Force woul d b e limite d

to th e degre e implici t i n th e peculiarl y

naval mission s assigne d t o Admira l

Iwabuchi. An d at the same time General

Yokoyama wa s informed , t o hi s eviden t

surprise, tha t Iwabuch i ha d 16,000-od d

naval troop s i n an d aroun d Manila .

Yokoyama ha d base d his plans for delay -

ing action, bridge destruction, and supply

evacuation o n th e assumption tha t ther e

were no more than 4,00 0 naval troops in

the area in addition to the approximately

3,750 Arm y troop s o f th e Noguchi Detachment an d th e Abe Battalion. H e

considered thes e forces sufficien t t o carry

out assigne d missions and h e could evac -

uate tha t numbe r fro m th e cit y without

undue trouble once Allied forces arrived,

an even t h e estimate d woul d occu r n o

earlier tha n 2 0 February.

General Yokoyam a calle d a serie s of

Manila Naval Defense Force-Shimbu

7

 For furthe r analysi s o f thi s peculia r comman d

situation, se c A . Fran k Reel , The Case of General

Yamashita (Chicago : Universit y o f Chicag o Press ,

1949).
MANILA: TH E DEFENDER S AN D TH E DEFENSE S 243

Group staf f conference s t o discus s th e

obvious complication s arisin g from Iwa -

buchi's divide d responsibilitie s an d th e

size o f th e nava l commitment . I n th e

course o f th e discussions , whic h too k

place betwee n 8 an d 1 3 January , nava l

officers made it clear that, no matter what

Shimbu Group's plans , i t wa s th e con -

sensus o f th e nava l staf f tha t Manil a

should b e defende d t o th e bitte r end .

Any withdrawal fro m th e city, naval representatives pointe d out , woul d preven t

the Manila Naval Defense Force fro m

executing th e mission s Admira l Okoch i

had assigne d it . Moreover , mos t o f th e

naval staf f officer s fel t tha t Manil a wa s a

natural fortres s tha t coul d easil y b e de -

fended a t grea t cos t t o Allie d forces .

Therefore, the naval staff wa s not anxious

to abando n th e cit y meekl y withou t a

struggle. I n addition , many members o f

Iwabuchi's staf f wer e dissatisfie d wit h the

positions i n th e mountain s east of Manil a

that Yokoyama ha d assigne d t o th e Manila Naval Defense Force for a last stand.

Admiral Iwabuch i jus t abou t settled al l

arguments when h e pointed ou t tha t his

force ha d "n o alternativ e bu t t o carr y

out it s primar y dut y o f defendin g nava l

facilities."

 8

Faced wit h th e fait accompli o f prio r

naval order s tha t h e coul d no t counter -

mand, Yokoyama had littl e choice but t o

assent t o Iwabuchi' s general concep t for

the defens e o f Manila , howeve r unwis e

he might feel tha t concept to be. And , in

accordance wit h th e practic e i n th e

Japanese an d Allie d services , h e pro -

vided fo r unifie d comman d withi n th e

city, placin g th e Arm y troop s stil l sta -

tioned ther e under Admiral Iwabuch i a s

the senio r office r o n th e spot—thereb y

making th e bes t ou t o f a ba d situation .

Extracting suc h concession s fro m th e

Manila Naval Defense Force a s his limited operationa l contro l power s permit -

ted, th e Shimbu Group commande r

persuaded Iwabuch i to organize a special

naval forc e t o defen d th e Sa n Jua n de l

Monte area , lyin g betwee n th e cit y an d

the Shimbu Group's mai n position s t o

the east . H e furthe r convince d Iwa -

buchi o f th e necessit y fo r strengthenin g

the defense s a t Fort McKinley , southeast

of Manila , an d o f th e wisdo m o f settin g

up a n alternat e headquarters there , presumably i n anticipatio n o f ultimat e

withdrawal fro m th e city . Expectin g existing communication s betwee n Manil a

and th e Shimbu Group comman d pos t

in th e mountain s t o b e severe d onc e the

Allies reache d th e city , Yokoyam a als o

saw t o i t tha t a secondar y wir e commu -

nications ne t wa s establishe d betwee n

his mountai n headquarter s an d For t

McKinley.

Not losin g sigh t o f hi s principa l

mission—protracted defensive operations

in th e mountainou s terrai n eas t an d

northeast of Manila—General Yokoyama,

late in January , issue d somewha t ambig -

uous order s concernin g th e defens e o f

the city and its immediate environs. Th e

Shimbu Group, whil e concentratin g it s

main forc e i n it s mountain strongholds,

was t o "firml y defen d Manil a an d For t

McKinley an d chec k thei r us e b y th e

enemy, a t th e sam e tim e destroyin g th e

enemy's fightin g strengt h an d preparin g

to counterattack the enemy rear from th e

main position s whe n a favorabl e situa -

tion arises. " Th e Manila Naval Defense

Force, i n turn , wa s directe d t o "defen d

8

 The word s ar e Colone l Asano's , repeatin g Iwa -

buchi, and appear in Asan o Statement, Statements, I,

93. Yokoyama , i n hi s testimon y cite d previously ,

makes essentially th e same point.
244 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

its already-establishe d position s an d

crush th e enemy' s fightin g strength. "

 9

Despite the seemingly definitive word -

ing o f thes e orders, a n ambiguit y arise s

from th e fac t tha t Yokoyam a use d th e

term koshu, usuall y rendere d a s "fir m

defense," i n regard to the plans for holding Manila . Quit e weak a s the wordin g

of Japanese orders go, koshu by no means

implied a figh t t o th e death . Moreover ,

since Japanese Army orders did not lea n

toward understatemen t i n suc h matters ,

the ter m seem s indicativ e o f a desir e

to conduc t a rathe r limite d holdin g ac -

tion followe d b y a n earl y withdrawal .

Even Admira l Iwabuchi' s operations officer interprete d th e us e o f koshu a s

meaning tha t Yokoyam a woul d order a

general withdrawal once battle had been

joined withi n th e city.10 Apparentl y th e

fact tha t n o specifi c mentio n o f with -

drawal wa s containe d i n th e Shimbu

Group order s merel y reflecte d a reluc -

tance on th e part of Yokoyama to impair

the moral e o f th e troop s i n Manila— a

regard fo r th e sensibilitie s t o whic h th e

Japanese forces were singularly addicted.

Defensive Dispositions and Plans

Iwabuchi's mainland are a o f responsibility extende d inlan d fro m a poin t o n

Manila Ba y about tw o and a half mile s

north of the city northeast to Novaliches,

east t o th e Marikin a River , sout h t o

Laguna de Bay's western shores, and then

west across the Hagono y Isthmu s t o th e

base o f Cavit e Peninsula. 11 Th e whol e

area covere d a n are a o f approximatel y

250 squar e miles. T o defen d thi s zon e

Iwabuchi had under his command nearly

17,000 troops—abou t 12,50 0 Nav y per -

sonnel an d 4,50 0 Army troops. Th e re -

maining 3,50 0 nava l troop s include d i n

Iwabuchi's total of 16,000-od d naval personnel th e admira l ha d eithe r lef t o n

islands i n Manil a Ba y or ha d sen t int o

the mountains east of Manil a to join the

main bod y o f th e Shimbu Group. Iwa -

buchi assigned some 14,00 0 of th e troops

he controlle d i n an d aroun d Manil a t o

three combat organization s for defensiv e

operations. A fourt h comman d con -

tained force s nominall y afloa t bu t ac -

tually base d eithe r o n th e city' s water -

front o r o n th e ba y islands ; a fift h

command wa s compose d o f engineers ,

supply troops , medica l units , an d s o

forth. Iwabuch i gave this fift h grou p the

blanket titl e "attache d units. "

 12

Iwabuchi retaine d approximatel y

10,000 troop s withi n th e Manil a cit y

limits, 8,00 0 o f the m member s o f th e

three combat commands. Th e northern -

most combat command, labeled Northern Force, wa s commanded b y Colone l

Noguchi, whom Iwabuch i made responsible fo r th e defens e o f th e entir e cit y

north o f th e Pasig , Intramuro s sout h o f

the river, and th e suburbs north , northeast, and east of Manila to the boundaries

of th e Manila Naval Defense Force. I n

addition to the 2d and 3d Provisional Infantry Battalions an d supportin g Arm y

troop 9 s of his own Noguchi Detachment, The quotation s ar e fro m SWP A His t Series , II ,

458.

10

 Kayashima Statement , States, II, 170 . 11

 Additional informatio n o n Japanes e strength s

and dispositions presented in this subsection is from:

ATIS SWPA, Enem y Publicatio n No . 389, Organization Chart of Manila Naval Defense Force, 19 Sep 45 ,

copy in OCMH files; XIV Corps. Japanese Defense o f

Cities as Exemplified b y The Battl e for Manila, p. 3 ;

ibid., an. 2 , Disposition Chart , an d an . 4, Org Char t

Kobayashi Gp; Entr y 2 , 0100 10 Feb 44 , G-2 Jn l 1s t

Cav Div, givin g information fro m a Japanes e POW;

11th A/ B Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 13-14 , 16 , 29 ; ibid.,

Maps 1, 2, and C.

12

12 See App. D.
MANILA: TH E DEFENDER S AN D TH E DEFENSE S 245

Noguchi had under his command th e 1st

Independent Naval Battalion. Hi s forc e

totaled about 4,500 men i n all.

Posting small Army detachments along

the norther n approache s t o Manila ,

Noguchi statione d th e 1st Independent

Naval Battalion i n th e Sa n Jua n de l

Monte suburb , eas t o f th e city . On e o f

his Army battalions held th e Pasig River

bridges; th e other , wit h miscellaneou s

service units attached, se t up defense s i n

Intramuros. Genera l Yokoyam a trans -

ferred variou s Army shipping units, pre -

viously formin g part of th e 3d Maritime

Transport Command, to Noguchi's con -

trol; th e colone l lef t thes e troop s i n th e

port area s north an d sout h o f the Pasig's

mouth.

The Central Force, commande d di -

rectly b y Admira l Iwabuch i an d com -

prising abou t 5,00 0 nava l troops , hel d

the remainder of Manila. Central Force's

1st an d 2d Naval Battalions wer e i n de -

fensive position s throughou t th e south -

ern part of the city. Headquarters Sector

Unit13 an d th e 5th Naval Battalion (th e

latter withdrew from Cavit e on 2 February afte r completin g demolition s there )

concentrated i n th e governmen t build -

ing, park , and private club area of Ermita

District, eas t an d sout h o f Intramuros .

Here Iwabuch i ha d hi s headquarters ,

protected b y a Headquarters Battalion

of 75 0 men. Th e Central Force wa s also

responsible fo r holdin g Nielso n Fiel d

and Makati , a subur b jus t southeas t o f

the city , bu t ha d fe w troops statione d a t

those places.

The Southern Force, ove r 5,00 0 me n

under Capt . Takusu e Furuse , IJN , de -

fended Nichol s Field , Fort McKinle y t o

the northeas t o f th e airfield , an d th e

Hagonoy Isthmus . Furus e statione d th e

3d an d 4th Naval Battalions a t Nichol s

Field an d For t McKinle y an d mad e th e

Army's Abe Battalion responsibl e fo r

holding th e Hagono y Isthmus . Captai n

Abe's mission was to defend along Route

1 an d Rout e 59 , th e latte r lyin g alon g

the wester n shor e o f Lagun a d e Bay .

With mino r detachment s t o th e sout h

and a compan y a t Parañaque , th e bul k

of th e Abe Battalion wa s dug i n a t an d

near Mabat o Point , o n th e Lagun a d e

Bay shor e across th e isthmu s fro m Para -

ñaque. S o disposed, the uni t wa s hardly

in positio n t o execut e all o f its missions.

Generally, th e defense s o n th e sout h

were stronge r tha n thos e o n th e north ,

for tw o reasons . Whe n Genera l Koba -

yashi's Manila Defense Force withdre w

from th e norther n are a i t ha d lef t be -

hind onl y th e Noguchi Detachment t o

fill th e voi d create d b y th e evacuation .

True, Kobayashi , hi s command no w re -

designated the Kobayashi Force, retained

control o f th e 3d Surface Raiding Base

Force—another group of boat squadrons

and bas e battalion s lik e thos e statione d

in th e 11t h Airborn e Division' s area —

but th e 3,000-odd me n o f this unit wer e

disposed abou t fiv e mile s northwes t o f

Manila and ha d been cut off by the 37t h

Division.

Second, Japanes e nava l headquarter s

on Luzon had believed that the principal

Allied invasion s woul d com e fro m th e

south and ha d therefor e lon g devoted its

energies t o preparin g defense s o n tha t

side of Manila. I t was, indeed, not unti l

the las t wee k i n Januar y tha t Iwabuch i

seems t o hav e learne d o f XI V Corps '

13

 By th e time h e ha d complete d hi s organizatio n

Iwabuchi wa s wearin g fou r hats : 31st Naval Special

Base Force, Manila Naval Defense Force, Central

Force, an d Headquarters Sector Unit, Apparentl y

the staff s fo r al l excep t th e las t wer e virtuall y

identical.
246 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

progress, o r a t leas t unti l h e attache d

any significance to that corps' drive down

the Centra l Plains . B y then , o f course ,

it wa s to o lat e fo r hi m t o redeplo y hi s

forces.

For th e rest , Iwabuchi 's pla n fo r th e

defense o f Manil a wa s rathe r vague ,

promising onl y a suicida l figh t t o th e

death i n place . B y suc h a stati c defens e

he hoped t o inflic t heav y casualties upon

Sixth Arm y an d den y t o th e Allie s fo r

some tim e th e facilitie s o f Manil a an d

Manila Bay . To hel p realiz e th e latte r

objective, h e planne d extensiv e demo -

litions tha t ostensibl y calle d fo r th e de -

struction o f purel y militar y installation s

and whateve r supplie s wer e lef t i n th e

city. "Militar y installations " o r "mili -

tary facilities " ar e loos e term s a t best ,

and fo r Iwabuch i the y included th e port

area, bridges , transportatio n facilities ,

the wate r suppl y system , an d electri c

power installations.

While th e admiral apparentl y did no t

plan wholesale, wanton demolitions, even

the destructio n o f th e purel y militar y

installations woul d hav e it s effec t upo n

the civi l population . Onc e starte d b y a

body o f half-traine d troop s hastil y or -

ganized into provisional units and whos e

only futur e i s death i n combat , demolitions are impossible t o control. Leavin g

aside thi s problem , i t i s obviou s tha t a

fire resultin g from demolition s set off in

a supply dump will not necessaril y obe y

"orders" t o confin e itsel f t o th e dump .

Intent i s on e thing—th e result s o f th e

performance another .

The Means of Defense

Tactically, Iwabuchi 's defensiv e prep -

arations lef t muc h t o b e desired . On e

line of defensive positions, while usually

(but no t always ) containin g mutuall y

supporting strongpoints , di d no t neces -

sarily giv e wa y t o a secon d lin e o f pre -

pared positions ; seldo m wer e an y tw o

lines mutuall y supporting . Littl e provision seem s t o hav e been made for route s

of withdrawa l fro m on e lin e t o another.

The cor e o f th e defenses , i f any existed ,

was Intramuros, the approaches to which

were protecte d b y a semicircl e o f forti -

fied governmen t building s an d school s

extending from th e Genera l Post Office ,

on th e sout h ban k o f th e Pasi g abou t

three block s of f th e northeas t corne r o f

Intramuros, aroun d t o th e Army-Nav y

Club, o n th e ba y fron t a fe w hundre d

yards south of th e walled city ,

A prime characteristi c o f th e defense s

within th e cit y wa s improvisation base d

upon th e ready , man-mad e defense s o f

heavily reinforce d concret e buildings .

The Japanese fortified building entrances

with sandbags ; the y se t u p barricade s

along corridor s an d stairways ; the y

chopped firin g slit s fo r rifle s an d ma -

chine gun s throug h outsid e walls ; the y

dug tunnel s tha t connecte d th e base -

ments of various buildings or le d t o outside pillboxe s an d bunkers . Whil e th e

defenders constructed many bunkers and

pillboxes throughou t th e city , the y de -

pended principall y on the buildings, and

most o f th e standar d militar y defensiv e

installations were located in the Southern

Force's are a o f responsibility .

The Manila Naval Defense Force barricaded streets and intersection s throughout th e cit y wit h al l type s o f obstacles :

barbed-wire entanglements ; oi l drum s

filled wit h dirt o r cement ; rails se t int o

the pavement ; hastil y du g ditches ; trol -

ley cars , trucks , an d automobiles ; eve n

heavy factor y machiner y wrenched fro m

interior mountings . Th e defender s em -
MANILA: TH E DEFENDER S AN D TH E DEFENSE S 247

JAPANESE BARRICAD E O N PADRE BURGO S

ployed mine s o f ever y conceivabl e typ e

and improvisation , includin g Japanes e

Navy beac h mine s an d dept h charges ,

artillery shells , aeria l bombs , morta r

shells, an d standar d Japanes e Arm y

antipersonnel an d antitan k mines . Mos t

mine fields wer e poorly camouflaged an d

although th e Japanes e covere d som e

with fir e fro m prepare d positions , the y

had establishe d n o patter n tha t tie d on e

mine fiel d int o another o r relate d a fiel d

to major defenses .

Another outstandin g characteristi c o f

the Japanes e defens e preparation s wa s

the grea t numbe r o f automati c weapons,

a numbe r al l ou t o f proportio n t o th e

troop strength . Th e basi c infantr y wea -

pon, th e rifle , playe d a ver y secondar y

role, bein g use d mainl y fo r th e protec -

tion o f th e automati c weapon s an d fo r

last-ditch personne l defense . Th e muc h

publicized—but seldo m encountered —

Japanese snipe r playe d n o significan t

part. Indeed , after th e battle XIV Corp s

reported:

Despite frequen t mentio n b y ou r troop s

of "snipers, " the snipe r a s a carefully place d

individual riflema n specializin g i n long -

range selectiv e firin g seldo m mad e a n ap -

pearance (hardl y an y telescopi c rifl e sight s

were foun d i n Manila). 1 4

On th e othe r hand , th e Japanes e use d

various type s o f grenade s wit h grea t

abandon, especiall y i n th e defens e o f

buildings.

In preparin g fo r extensiv e employ -

ment o f automati c weapons, th e Manila

Naval Defense Force ha d remove d many

such arm s fro m ship s sun k i n th e ba y

and fro m aircraf t lyin g destroye d o r

damaged o n th e numerou s outlyin g airfields.15

 Ordnanc e troop s adapte d thes e

for groun d use , and als o se t u p fo r em -

ployment against ground targets many of

the antiaircraf t weapon s wit h whic h

Manila an d environ s bristled befor e th e

Allies entere d th e city . Th e principa l

automatic weapon s upo n whic h th e de -

fenders se t grea t stor e wer e th e aircraf t

and antiaircraf t 20-mm . and 25-mm . machine cannon . The y ha d als o a fe w 40-

mm. antiaircraf t weapons , a s wel l a s

innumerable infantr y an d antiaircraf t

machine gun s o f lesse r caliber . Mortar s

14

 XIV Corps, Japanese Defens e o f Cities, p . 10 . 15

 Subsequent descriptio n o f Japanes e weapon s i s

based largel y upon : XI V Corps, Japanese Defens e o f

Cities, pp . 10-13 ; 11t h A/ B Di v Luzo n Rpt , p. 29 ;

WD Tec h Manual , TM-E-30-480 , Handboo k o n

Japanese Militar y Forces , 1 5 Se p 44 , an d change s

thereto date d 1 Jan an d 1 Jun 45 . Th e XI V Corp s

and manua l description s o f caliber s an d mode l

numbers o f th e arm s encountere d ar e no t alway s i n

agreement.
248 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

played a larg e part i n th e defense ; liter -

ally hundred s o f thes e weapons, varyin g

from 50-mm . to 150-m m i n caliber, wer e

available to Iwabuchi's men.

The basi c heav y artiller y weapo n wa s

the Japanes e Navy' s dual-purpos e 120 -

mm. gun . Th e Manila Naval Defense

Force emplace d ove r fift y o f thes e wea -

pons i n an d aroun d th e city , mos t o f

them in the Nichols Field-Fort McKinley

area. I n addition , th e Japanes e ha d

some 76.2-mm. dual-purpos e guns, a few

Army 75-mm . antiaircraf t weapon s

adapted fo r groun d fire , a scatterin g o f

75-mm. Arm y fiel d artiller y pieces , an d

some Arm y 47-mm . antitan k guns .

Finally, for the first tim e during the wa r

in th e Pacific , th e Japanes e employe d

rockets t o a n appreciabl e extent . Mos t

of thos e availabl e t o th e Manila Naval

Defensive Force wer e 200-mm . Nav y

rockets, but th e force also possessed some

200-mm. Arm y rockets an d a fe w Nav y

450-mm. giants.

Practically non e of Iwabuchi' s troop s

had an y unit training in ground comba t

operations and many had very little individual infantry training . The proficienc y

of me n assigne d t o crew-serve d weapon s

usually left muc h to be desired. Perhap s

the best units were the Army provisional

infantry battalions , man y member s o f

which wer e infantr y o r othe r groun d

force replacement s strande d i n Manila .

But few of these men wer e first line , and

the vast majorit y o f eve n th e Arm y personnel wer e member s o f th e servic e

branches.

Naval units wer e i n eve n wors e state .

The onl y troops among them having any

semblance o f groun d comba t trainin g

were the few members of the ground defense section s o f th e 31st Naval Special

Base Force. For th e rest, the naval troops

were aircraf t maintenanc e men, airfield

engineers, crew s fro m ship s sun k i n th e

bay, casuals , othe r servic e personne l o f

all types , an d eve n som e Japanes e

civilians pressed int o uniform.

Admiral Iwabuchi had time neither to

train his troops nor to complete defensive

preparations. Eve n so, his defenses wer e

strong and , althoug h hel d b y inferio r

troops, coul d prov e formidabl e whe n

manned b y me n wit h littl e though t o f

escape. H e defende d Manil a wit h wha t

he had, and wha t he had was sufficient t o

cause XIV Corp s great trouble .
CHAPTER XI V

Isolating the Battlefield

The Concept of the Attack

When XI V Corp s reache d Manil a o n

3 February , n o definit e Allie d pla n

existed fo r operations i n th e metropoli -

tan are a othe r tha n th e divisio n o f th e

northern par t o f th e cit y int o offensiv e

zones. Ever y comman d i n th e theater ,

from MacArthur' s headquarter s o n

down, hope d — if i t di d no t actuall y

anticipate—that the city could be cleared

quickly an d withou t muc h damage .

GHQ SWP A ha d eve n lai d plan s fo r a

great victory parade, à la Champs Elysées,

that th e theate r commande r i n perso n

was to lead throug h th e city. 1

Intelligence concernin g Manil a an d

its environs had been pretty meager, and

it was not unti l the las t wee k or so of

January tha t GH Q SWP A an d Sixt h

Army bega n t o receiv e definit e report s

that th e Japanes e planne d t o hol d th e

city, althoug h Genera l Kruege r ha d fel t

as early as the middle of th e month tha t

the capital woul d be strongly defended.2

The lat e Januar y reports , ofte n contra -

dicting previou s informatio n tha t ha d

been supplie d principall y b y guerrillas,

were usuall y s o contradictor y withi n

themselves as to b e useless a s a basis fo r

tactical planning . Thus , muc h o f th e

initial fightin g wa s shadowboxing, wit h

American troops expecting to come upon

the mai n bod y o f th e Japanes e aroun d

each street corner. Onl y when the troops

actually closed with the principal strongpoints did the y discover where the main

defenses were . Whe n XI V Corp s bega n

to lear n o f th e exten t an d natur e o f th e

defenses, th e plan s fo r a bi g victor y

parade wer e quietl y lai d aside—th e pa -

rade neve r cam e off . Th e corp s an d it s

divisions thereupo n bega n developin g

tactical plans on th e spot as the situation

dictated.

In a n effor t t o protec t th e city an d it s

civilians, GH Q SWP A an d Sixt h Arm y

at first place d stringent restrictions upon

artillery suppor t fire s an d eve n tighte r

restrictions upon air support operations.

The Allie d Ai r Force s fle w onl y a ver y

few strike s against targets within the city

1

 A host o f documents concernin g th e parad e ar e

to b e foun d i n th e file s o f al l levels of th e command .

See, inter alia: Memo , Asst ACof S G- 3 Sixt h Arm y

for ACof S G- 3 Sixt h Army , 1 Fe b 45 , Sixt h Arm y

G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 31 Jan-2 Fe b 45; Memo , ACof S

G-3 XI V Corps fo r Cof S XI V Corps, 4 Fe b 45 , sub:

Notes Take n a t Con f a t GH Q 4 Fe b 45 , XI V Corp s

G-3 Jn l File , 2- 4 Fe b 45; Rad, Sixt h Arm y t o I, XI,

and XI V Corps, WG-53 , 5 Feb 45 , Sixth Arm y G- 3

Jnl Fil e Luzon , 4- 6 Fe b 45 ; 40t h In f Div , Mem o fo r

Components, 6 Fe b 45 , sub: Manil a Victor y Parade ,

108th In f S-3 Jn l File , 6-9 Fe b 45.

2

 Subsequent materia l o n Manil a plannin g prob -

lems is based on : XI V Corps Rp t Luzon , pt . I , pp .

86-87; XIV Corps, Japanese Defense of Cities, pp. 13 ,

19-22, 26.
250 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

limits befor e Genera l MacArthu r for -

bade suc h attacks , whil e artiller y sup -

port wa s confined t o observe d fir e upo n

pinpointed target s suc h a s Japanese gu n

emplacements.

These tw o limitation s wer e th e onl y

departures from orthodo x tactic s o f cit y

fighting. N o ne w doctrine s wer e use d

or developed—i n th e sens e o f "lesson s

learned," th e troop s agai n illustrate d

that establishe d U.S. Army doctrine wa s

sound. Mos t troop s engage d ha d ha d

some trainin g i n cit y fighting , an d fo r

combat i n Manil a the main problem was

to adapt th e mind accustome d t o jungl e

warfare t o th e specia l condition s o f cit y

operations. Th e adjustmen t wa s made

rapidly an d completel y a t th e soun d o f

the first shot fired from a building within

the city. The necessit y for quickly securing the

city's wate r suppl y facilitie s an d electri -

cal powe r installation s ha d considerabl e

influence o n tactica l planning. 3 Consid -

ering th e sanitatio n problem s pose d b y

the presenc e of nearly a million civilian s

in th e metropolita n area , Genera l

Krueger had good reason to be especially

concerned abou t Manila 's wate r supply .

Some eight y artesia n o r dee p well s i n

the cit y an d it s suburb s coul d provid e

some water , but , even assumin g tha t

these well s wer e no t contaminate d an d

that pumpin g equipmen t woul d b e

found intact , the y coul d mee t require -

ments fo r onl y tw o weeks . Therefore ,

Krueger directe d Genera l Griswol d t o

seize th e principa l close-i n feature s o f

the city' s moder n pressur e syste m a s

rapidly a s possible .

Establishing prioritie s fo r th e captur e

of individua l installations , Sixt h Arm y

ordered XI V Corp s t o secur e firs t Nova -

liches Dam , a t th e souther n en d o f a

large, man-mad e lak e i n rising , ope n

ground abou t tw o an d a hal f mile s east .

of th e tow n o f Novaliches. (See Map V.)

Second cam e th e Balar a Wate r Filters ,

about fiv e mile s northeas t o f Manila' s

easternmost limits and almost seven miles

east of Grac e Park. (See Map VI.) Third

was th e Sa n Jua n Reservoir , o n hig h

ground nearly two miles northeast of the

city limits . Fourt h wer e th e pipeline s

connecting thes e installation s an d lead -

ing from the m int o Manila . Ultimately ,

Sixth Arm y woul d secur e othe r wate r

supply facilitie s suc h a s a da m o n th e

Marikina River northeast of Manila, but

not until it could release men for the job

from Manil a o r othe r battleground s o n

Luzon.

XIV Corp s woul d secur e portion s o f

the electrica l powe r syste m a t th e sam e

time its troops wer e capturing th e wate r

supply facilities . Durin g th e Japanes e

occupation muc h o f th e powe r fo r Ma -

nila's lights and transportation had come

from hydroelectri c plants far to the south

and southeas t i n Lagun a Province , fo r

the Japanese had been unabl e to import

sufficient coa l t o kee p runnin g a stea m

generator plan t locate d withi n th e cit y

limits. I t appeare d tha t Lagun a Prov -

ince migh t b e unde r Japanes e contro l

for som e tim e t o come , an d i t coul d b e

assumed tha t th e hydroelectri c plant s

and th e transmissio n line s woul d b e

damaged. Therefore , Sixt h Arm y di -

3

 The remainde r of this section is based principally

upon: Sixt h Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 36 ; Memo , Eng r Sixth Arm y fo r Cof S Sixt h Army , 4 Fe b 45 , Sixt h

Army G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 2- 4 Fe b 45 ; Rad, Sixth

Army t o XIV Corps, WC-40, 5 Feb 45, and Teletyp e

Msg, Sixt h Arm y t o XI V Corps , 6 Fe b 45 , bot h i n

Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 4- 6 Fe b 45 ; XI V

Corps FO 6, 7 Feb 45, Sixth Army G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon,

8-10 Fe b 45 .
ISOLATING TH E BATTLEFIEL D 251

LIBERATED INTERNEE S A T SANT O

TOMAS, 6 FEBRUAR Y

rected XI V Corp s t o secur e th e stea m

power plant , whic h wa s situate d nea r

the center o f the city o n Proviso r Islan d

in th e Pasig ,

XIV Corp s wa s also t o take two transmission substation s a s soo n a s possible .

One wa s located i n Makat i suburb , o n

the south bank o f the Pasi g about a mile

southeast o f th e cit y limits ; th e othe r

was presume d t o b e o n th e north ban k

of th e rive r i n th e extrem e easter n sec -

tion o f th e city . I t i s interestin g com -

mentary o n th e stat e o f mapping ,

considering th e numbe r o f year s tha t

the Unite d State s ha d bee n i n th e Phil -

ippines, that the second substation turned

out t o b e a bil l collectin g offic e o f th e

Manila Electri c Company ,

Operations North of the Pasig

Clearing the City North of the River

Plans for securin g th e wate r an d elec -

tric installations were far from th e minds

of th e me n o f the 2 d Squadron, 8t h Cav -

alry, as the y move d int o Manil a o n th e

evening o f 3 February. 4 Thei r imme -

diate missio n wa s t o fre e th e civilia n

internees a t Sant o Toma s University ;

further plannin g woul d hav e t o wai t

until th e cavalryme n coul d ascertai n

what the morrow would bring.

Upon thei r arriva l a t Sant o Tomas ,

the advanc e element s o f th e 8t h Cav -

alry,5 a mediu m o f th e 44t h Tan k Bat -

talion servin g a s a battering ram, broke

through th e gate s o f th e campu s wall .

Inside, the Japanese Army guards—most

of the m Formosans—pu t u p littl e figh t

and withi n a fe w minute s som e 3,50 0

internees wer e liberate d ami d scene s o f

pathos and joy none of the participatin g

American troop s wil l eve r forget . Bu t

in anothe r buildin g awa y fro m th e in -

ternees' mai n quarters som e sixt y Japa -

4

 The genera l sources for 1st Cavalr y Division operations covere d i n thi s chapter are : 1st Ca v Div Rpt

Luzon, Narrative, pp. 4-14; Wright, 1st Cavalry Division in World War II, pp . 130-33 ; 1s t Ca v Div G-3

Jnl, 3-12 Feb 45; 1st Ca v Div G-3 Opn s Rpts, 3-12

Feb 45 ; 1s t Ca v Bri g Rp t Luzon , pt . I , Narrative ,

pp. 1-4 ; 1st Ca v Brig Unit Jnl, 3-12 Feb 45; 1st Ca v

Brig S- 3 Pe r Rpts , 3-1 2 Feb 45 ; 2 d Ca v Bri g Rp t

Luzon, pp. 4-7; 2d Cav Brig S-3 Opn s Rpts, 3-12 Feb

45; 2d Cav Brig Jnl File , 3-12 Feb 45 ; 44th Tank Bn,

Rpt Luzon , pp . 7-11 ; 44th Tan k B n S- 3 Pe r Rpts ,

3-12 Feb 45; 44th Tank Bn S-2/S-3 Jnl, 3-12 Feb 45.

5

 Additional information o n the 8th Cavalr y operations i s from : 8t h Ca v Rp t Luzon , Manil a Phase ,

pp. 1-2; ibid., Novaliches Water Shed Phase , pp. 1-2;

8th Ca v S-2/S-3 Jnl, 3-20 Feb 45; 8th Cav Unit Pe r

Opns Rpts, 3-20 Feb 45.
252 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

nese under Lt. Col. Toshio Hayashi, the

camp commander , hel d a s hostage s an -

other 27 5 internees, mostl y wome n an d

children. Hayash i demande d a guaran -

tee fo r safe conduct from th e groun d fo r

himself an d hi s me n befor e h e woul d

release th e internees . Genera l Chase ,

who ha d com e int o th e universit y campus about a n hou r afte r th e 8t h Cavalr y

entered, ha d t o accep t th e Japanes e

conditions.6

While th e release o f the internee s was

in progress, elements o f th e 8t h Cavalr y

had receive d a bitte r introductio n t o

city fighting . Troo p G ha d continue d

southward fro m Sant o Toma s towar d

the Pasig River and, afte r a n uneventfu l

advance o f abou t si x blocks, came upo n

the intersectio n o f Quezo n Boulevard —

its rout e o f advanc e — and Azcarrag a

Street, running east and west. Th e grea t

stone bulk of Old Bilibi d Prison loomed

up o n th e right ; o n th e lef t ros e th e

modern, three-stor y concret e building s

of Far Easter n University . The priso n

seemed deserted , bu t a s th e trooper s

came o n dow n Quezo n the y wer e sub -

jected to a veritable hail of machine gun

and rifl e fir e fro m th e universit y build -

ings and a few rounds of 47-mm. gun fir e

from a n emplacemen t a t th e northeas t

corner o f th e intersection .

When driver s trie d t o tur n vehicle s

around t o bea t a hast y retreat , othe r

groups o f th e regimen t bega n jammin g

Quezon Boulevar d t o th e rear . Chao s

was narrowly averte d bu t th e entire column, agai n guide d b y guerrillas , go t

safely bac k t o Sant o Toma s where , b y

2330, th e squadro n (les s Troop F ) an d

the 2 d Squadron , 5t h Cavalry , ha d as -

sembled. Troo p F , 8t h Cavalry , ha d

moved alon g sid e street s an d secure d

Malacañan Palace , o n th e Pasi g a mil e

southeast o f th e university .

The nex t mornin g Genera l Chas e

learned tha t th e Japanes e ha d knocke d

out th e Novaliche s bridge , cuttin g hi s

line of communications and delaying the

arrival of reinforcements fo r som e twen -

ty-four hours . Th e forc e h e ha d unde r

his contro l wa s to o smal l t o attemp t

much mor e tha n loca l patrolling , fo r he

had, a s yet , no definit e informatio n

about Japanese defenses and none about

the progres s o f th e 37t h Division . Hi s

situation wa s rather precariou s fo r thes e

twenty-four hours . Ha d Colone l Nogu -

chi's Northern Force counterattacked ,

Chase woul d hav e ha d t o withstan d a

siege a t Sant o Toma s o r abando n th e

internees i n orde r t o figh t hi s wa y ou t

of a n encirclement. Eithe r course would

probably hav e le d t o heav y losses . Bu t

Noguchi, no t expectin g th e American s

to arriv e fo r anothe r tw o weeks , wa s

unprepared. H e foun d i t impossibl e t o

carry ou t al l hi s assigne d mission s an d

he was unable to withdraw al l his force s

in accordanc e wit h plans , le t alon e

mount an y strong counterattacks.

Late o n th e afternoo n o f 4 Februar y

General Mudg e directed Genera l Chas e

to seiz e Quezo n Bridge , locate d a t th e

foot o f Quezo n Boulevar d a mil e sout h

of Santo Tomas. Accordin g to the spotty

information the n available , this wa s the

only crossin g ove r th e Pasi g tha t th e

Japanese ha d no t ye t destroyed . Chas e

assigned the tas k to part of the 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry. Th e Japanes e oppose d

the squadron wit h fir e fro m Fa r Easter n

University again and stopped the Ameri6

 Negotiations between Chase and Hayash i actually

took plac e on th e 4th, and it wa s not unti l morning

of th e 5t h tha t Hayash i an d hi s me n left , releasin g

their hostages.
ISOLATING TH E BATTLEFIEL D 253

NORTHERN MANILA , BILIBI D PRISO N A T LOWE R LEFT . Note roadblock on Quezon Boulevard, left center.

can colum n a t a formidabl e roadbloc k

on Quezo n Boulevar d jus t sout h o f

Azcarraga Street. Her e the Japanese had

laid a small min e fiel d i n th e pavemen t

and ha d drive n row s o f stee l rail s int o

the roadbed . A lin e o f truc k bodies ,

wired together, also blocked passage. The

roadblock containe d fou r machin e gu n

positions, an d othe r machin e gun s cov -

ered i t fro m emplacement s o n th e

grounds o f Fa r Easter n Universit y an d

from anothe r intersection a block t o the

east. Th e 5t h Cavalry 's group , lik e th e

force fro m th e 8t h Cavalr y th e nigh t

before, had to withdraw under fire . Th e

cavalrymen wer e unabl e t o seiz e thei r

objective and , during th e attempt ,

Noguchi's troops blew th e bridge. 7

By the time the 5th Cavalr y squadron

had returned t o Santo Tomas, the situa -

tion withi n Manil a ha d begu n t o loo k

brighter, fo r th e 37t h Division' s va n

units ha d entere d th e cit y an d estab -

lished contac t wit h th e cavalryme n a t

7

 Additional informatio n o n th e 5t h Cavalry' s

participation in this and other actions covered in this

chapter is from: 5t h Ca v Rpt Luzon , pp. 5-27; ibid.,

an. 4, Casualties; 5th Cav S-3 Pe r Rpts, 3-12 Feb 45;

5th Cav S-2/S-3 Jnl, 3-12 Fe b 45.
254 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

the university. 8 Marchin g int o Manila ,

the 148t h Infantr y advance d southwar d

through th e Tondo and Sant a Cru z Districts, wes t o f Sant o Tomas. 9

 Abou t

2000 on th e 4th the 2 d Battalion reached

the northwes t corne r o f Ol d Bilibi d

Prison, onl y thre e short block s fro m th e

5th Cavalry , whic h wa s jus t beginnin g

its figh t nea r th e Quezon-Azcarrag a in -

tersection of f th e prison' s southeaster n

corner. Bus y wit h thei r fight s a t Fa r

Eastern University, neither the 2d Squadron, 5t h Cavalry , no r th e 2 d Squadron ,

8th Cavalry , ha d attempte d t o ge t int o

the prison , bu t th e 2 d Battalion , 148t h

Infantry, brok e i n an d discovere d ap -

proximately 80 0 Allie d an d America n

prisoners o f wa r an d 53 0 civilian internees inside . Sinc e ther e wa s n o bette r

place fo r the m t o g o a t th e tim e bot h

prisoners and internee s remained i n th e

prison, happ y enoug h fo r th e momen t

that the y wer e i n America n hand s onc e

again.10 Fightin g rage d aroun d Bilibi d

through muc h o f th e night , bu t th e 2 d

Battalion, 148t h Infantry , an d th e 2 d

Squadron, 5t h Cavalry , di d no t estab -

lish contac t wit h eac h other . A t leas t

the infantr y kne w th e cavalr y wa s i n

the vicinity—fo r th e rest , th e dange r o f

shooting friendl y troop s kept bot h units

channeled along single routes of advance

during the night .

On 5 February , a s th e remainde r o f

the 37t h Divisio n bega n movin g rapidly

into Manila , Genera l Griswol d mor e

equitably divide d th e norther n par t o f

the city , givin g th e wester n hal f t o th e

37th Divisio n an d th e easter n t o th e

1st Cavalr y Division. 11 Tha t mornin g

the 145t h Infantry , 37t h Division , began

clearing th e densel y populate d Tond o

District alon g th e ba y front. 12 B y th e

afternoon o f 6 Februar y th e battalio n

assigned t o thi s tas k ha d reduce d Japa -

nese resistanc e t o a pocke t o f som e 20 0

men (an d at leas t on e 75-mm . artiller y

piece) hole d u p i n th e extrem e north -

western corne r o f th e district . Th e

145th's uni t launche d a fina l assaul t

against th e pocke t o n 8 February , a n

assault tha t cost th e lif e o f th e battalio n

commander. Lt . Col . George T . Cole -

man. B y th e tim e th e America n battal -

ion had finishe d moppin g up on th e 9th,

it ha d suffere d mor e casualties, and 37t h

Division artiller y an d th e M7's of Can -

8

 General source s for 37th Divisio n operation s covered i n thi s chapte r are : 37t h Di v Rp t Luzon , pp .

37-77; 37t h Div G-3 Pe r Rpts, 4-12 Feb 45; 37th Div

G-3 Jnl s an d Jn l Files , 4-1 2 Feb 45 . 9

 Additional informatio n o n 148t h Infantr y actio n

is from: 148t h Inf Rpt Luzon , pt. I, pp. 5-9; 148th Inf

S-1 an d S-3 Pe r Rpts, 4-12 Feb 45; 148t h Inf S-3 Jnl,

4-12 Fe b 45 . 10

 Chase Comments, 3 Dec 56; Beightler Comments, 18 Ma r 57 ; Halsem a Comments , Ma r 57 . Accordin g

to Genera l Chas e th e probabl e reaso n tha t non e o f

his troop s ha d discovere d th e prisoner s wa s tha t n o

one had th e slightest inkling they were in Old Bilibid.

On 5 February th e 37th Divisio n ha d t o remove both

prisoners and internees from th e prison t o temporary

quarters at Grace Par k whe n fir e threatene d th e are a

and i t appeare d tha t th e Japanese might b e formin g

a counterattack . Th e prisoner s an d civilian s de -

parted s o hurriedl y tha t the y ha d t o leav e their few

pitiful belonging s behind—whe n the y returne d a

few day s late r looter s ha d stole n almos t everything .

11

 XIV Corps changed the boundary within th e city

three times between 182 0 4 February and 231 0 5 February; i t i s th e las t chang e tha t i s describe d above .

Entry timed 182 0 4 Feb 45 , XIV Corps G-3 Jnl , 4 Feb

45; Rads , XI V Corp s t o 37t h Di v an d 1s t Ca v Div,

0215 an d 231 0 5 Fe b 45 , XI V Corp s G- 3 Jn l File ,

5 Fe b 45 . Additiona l informatio n o n Griswold' s

command decision s durin g th e battl e i s from : XI V

Corps Rp t Luzon , pt . I , pp . 89-113 ; XI V Corps ,

Japanese Defens e o f Cities , pp . 2 , 10 , 13-14 , 19-23 . 12

 Additional source s for 145t h Infantr y actio n are:

145th In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 16-19 ; 145t h In f S- 3 Pe r

Rpts, 4-12 Feb 45; 145th In f S-1 an d S-3 Jnls , 5-12

Feb 45.
ISOLATING TH E BATTLEFIEL D 255

non Company , 145t h Infantry , ha d

wrought considerabl e destructio n t o th e

lower clas s residentia l distric t an d t o

some industria l building s an d stores. 13

Further sout h othe r element s o f th e

145th Infantry , passin g throug h Tond o

District, reache d Sa n Nicola s an d Bi -

nondo District s alon g th e wester n

stretches of the Pasig River's north ban k

by evenin g o n 5 February . T o th e lef t

(east) th e 148t h Infantr y ha d likewis e

continued toward th e river, cleaning out

machine gu n nest s an d a fe w rifleme n

from busines s building s i n th e easter n

section o f Binond o Distric t an d o n east -

ward int o Sant a Cru z District. 14 Th e

regiment hoped t o seize the two westernmost vehicula r bridge s ove r th e Pasig —

Jones an d Sant a Cru z Bridges—an d b y

1600 o n th e 5t h wa s within 20 0 yards o f

them. Then , as forward patrols reported

that th e bridge s ha d jus t bee n blown , a

general conflagratio n bega n t o driv e al l

troops o f bot h th e 145t h an d th e 148t h

Infantry Regiments back fro m th e river.

Throughout th e 5t h th e 37t h Divi -

sion's men had heard and observed Japanese demolition s i n th e are a alon g an d

just nort h o f th e Pasi g i n th e Binond o

and Sa n Nicola s District s a s wel l a s i n

the North Port Area, on the 145th's right

front. Th e Northern Force wa s firin g

and blowin g u p militar y store s an d in -

stallations al l throug h th e are a and , a s

these task s wer e completed , wa s with -

drawing sout h acros s th e river . Insofa r

as XI V Corp s observers coul d ascertain ,

there was no wanton destruction , and i n

all probabilit y th e fire s resultin g fro m

the demolition s woul d hav e bee n con -

fined t o th e Nort h Por t Are a an d th e

river bank s ha d no t a n unseasonabl e

change i n th e win d abou t 203 0 drive n

the flame s nort h an d west. 15 Th e 37t h

Division, fearin g tha t th e flame s woul d

spread into residential districts, gathered

all availabl e demolition s and starte d de -

stroying fram e building s i n th e pat h o f

the fire . Th e exten t of these demolitions

cannot b e ascertaine d — although i t i s

known tha t th e work o f destruction continued fo r nearl y twenty-fou r hours —

and i s a n academi c poin t a t bes t sinc e

the demolition s prove d largel y ineffec -

tual in stopping the spread o f the flames.

The conflagratio n ra n nort h fro m th e

river t o Azcarraga Stree t an d across tha t

thoroughfare int o th e Nort h Por t Are a

and Tond o District . Th e flame s wer e

finally brough t unde r contro l lat e o n

6 Februar y alon g th e genera l lin e o f

Azcarraga Street, but only after th e wind

again change d direction .

While th e 37t h Divisio n wa s fightin g

the fire s an d clearin g it s secto r o f th e

city nort h o f th e river , additiona l ele -

ments o f th e 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n ha d

been coming into the metropolitan area.

From 5 through 7 February th e 5t h and

13

 While most o f th e informatio n concernin g artillery suppor t o f 37t h Divisio n operation s i n Manil a

(in bot h thi s and th e nex t chapter) comes fro m th e

infantry regimenta l sources cited previously or subsequently, the followin g wer e also employed: 37t h Div

Arty Rpt Luzon , pp. 9-10; ibid., an. 5, Manila Overlays; 135t h F A B n Rp t Luzon , pp . 14-15 ; 135t h F A

Bn Unit Jnl, 5-23 Feb 45; 140th FA Bn Unit Jnl, 5-23

Feb 45 ; 6th F A Bn Rp t Luzon , 4 Feb-3 Mar 45 , pp.

2-3; Dail y S-3 Pe r Rpts of the 6th, 135th, 136th , and

140th F A Bns and th e 637t h T D Bn , 4-23 Fe b 45 ,

copies in 37t h Di v G-3 Jn l Files , 4-2 4 Fe b 45. 14

 2d Lt. Robert M. Viale, a platoon leader of Company K , 148t h Infantry , wa s posthumousl y awarde d

the Meda l o f Hono r fo r heroi c actio n durin g th e

regiment's advance southward throug h Manila . Viale

was th e firs t o f fou r me n o f th e 37t h Division , al l

from th e 148th , t o wi n Medals of Hono r i n Manila .

15

 See, for example, Msg, Asst ACofS G-3 XI V Corps

to ACofS G-3 Sixt h Army, 1500 6 Feb 45, Sixth Army

G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 4-6 Fe b 45.
256 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

8th Cavalr y Regiments, their provisional

task forc e organization s no w dissolved ,

cleaned ou t th e easter n sectio n o f th e

city north of the Pasi g against very weak

opposition. O n th e 7t h th e 37t h Divi -

sion too k ove r thi s easter n portio n o f

the cit y proper, 16 whil e th e cavalryme n

continued across th e cit y limits to clea r

the suburbs east t o the Sa n Juan River,

which, flowin g generall y south , joine d

the Pasig at the eastern corner of Manila.

The cavalryme n encountere d littl e op -

position i n th e are a a s fa r a s th e Sa n

Juan, an d ha d cleane d ou t th e suburb s

by evenin g o n th e 7th.

Capturing the Water

Supply Facilities

Meanwhile, fa r t o th e north , th e 7t h

Cavalry capture d on e o f th e importan t

water suppl y installations , Novaliche s

Dam.17 O n 5 February , whe n trooper s

first reache d th e dam , they foun d n o

prepared demolitions, but they did intercept thre e Japanes e wh o wer e carryin g

explosives towar d th e installation . Th e

next day , agains t littl e resistance , th e

regiment secure d th e Balar a Wate r Filters, whic h wer e foun d undamage d bu t

wired fo r demolitions.

On 7 an d 8 Februar y th e trooper s

patrolled southwest along the main water

pipeline fro m th e filter s fou r mile s t o

San Juan Reservoir, which they captured

intact about 153 0 on th e 8th. Forty-five

minutes late r a Japanes e artiller y shel l

fired fro m hig h groun d across th e Mari -

kina Rive r hi t th e reservoir's main out -

let valve . Fortunately , damag e wa s not

so sever e tha t th e valv e coul d no t b e

worked b y hand . Fo r mos t o f th e res t

of th e perio d tha t i t remaine d i n th e

Manila area , th e 7t h Cavalr y (th e only

major elemen t o f th e 1s t Cavalr y Divi -

sion no t t o figh t withi n th e cit y limits )

continued t o protec t Novaliche s Dam ,

the Balar a Filters , an d th e pipeline s

connecting th e tw o installations.

The 8t h Cavalr y secured a water facility still close r t o Manila , but no t befor e

the regimen t fough t a pitche d battl e

against the strongest resistance any troops

of th e 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n encountere d

in th e are a nort h o f th e Pasig . Movin g

east across the Sa n Juan Rive r on 7 February, th e 8th Cavalr y pushed u p t o the

northwest corner o f Ne w Manil a Subdi -

vision, where fire from th e 1st Independent Naval Battalion an d a supportin g

heavy weapon s detachmen t stoppe d th e

advance. Th e subdivisio n extende d

northeast t o southwes t thre e block s

(about 85 0 yards ) an d twelv e block s

(roughly 1,50 0 yards) southeas t t o th e

northern edg e o f Sa n Jua n de l Mont e

Subdivision. Th e Japanes e ha d heavil y

mined th e street s withi n Ne w Manila ;

pierced rock walls along the streets with

slits through which 20-mm. machine cannon coul d fire ; turne d many homes into

machine gun nests; and, at th e souther n

edge o f th e subdivision , emplace d thre e

dual-purpose nava l gun s s o a s t o cove r

much o f th e subur b wit h point-blank ,

flat-trajectory fire .

On 8 Februar y th e 8t h Cavalr y at -

tacked again , supporte d b y a compan y

of medium s from th e 44t h Tank Battal -

ion and b y the 61st (105-mm . howitzers)

and 947t h (155-mm . howitzers ) Fiel d

Artillery Battalions . Th e 105 's fired

16

 As directed b y XIV Corps Opns Memo 15 , 6 Feb

45, Sixth Arm y G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 8-10 Feb 45 . 17

 Additional informatio n on th e 7th Cavalry operations is from : 7t h Ca v Rpt Luzon , pp . 11-14 ; 7t h

Cav S-3 Pe r Rpts, 4-20 Feb 45; 7th Cav S-2/S-3 Jnl,

4-20 Fe b 45 .
ISOLATING TH E BATTLEFIEL D 257

1,360 round s of high explosiv e into New

Manila and San Jua n del Mont e suburbs

and th e 155' s adde d anothe r 35 0 rounds

of th e same typ e of ammunition. Whil e

this suppor t succeede d i n knockin g ou t

many Japanes e strongpoint s — and de -

stroying many homes—it was inadequate

to overcom e al l th e opposition . Th e

mine field s limite d th e effectivenes s o f

tank support . Th e 8t h Cavalr y ha d t o

make shor t infantr y rushe s fro m on e

strongpoint t o anothe r t o gai n ground ,

but b y th e en d o f th e da y ha d substan -

tially complete d th e reductio n o f th e

area. Th e tas k cos t th e 8t h Cavalr y 4 1

men wounded ; th e 44th Tank Battalio n

11 me n kille d an d 1 2 wounded. Thre e

tanks wer e knocke d out ; on e o f the m

was completel y demolishe d b y a hug e

Japanese land mine. The 8t h Cavalry and

division artiller y each claime d credit for

all Japanes e losse s of men and matériel :

the cavalr y regimen t averre d i t kille d

350 Japanese an d capture d o r destroye d

22 20-mm . machin e cannon , 3 6-inc h

naval guns , an d 5 13.2-mm . machin e

guns; the artillery's claims were the same

350 Japanese killed , an d 2 3 20-mm. ma -

chine cannon , a 105-mm . howitzer , an d

a 6-inc h nava l gu n destroyed. 18 B e tha t

as i t may , th e cavalr y cleare d th e res t

of th e suburba n are a northeast an d eas t

of th e cit y durin g th e nex t fe w day s

with littl e trouble . Th e 1st Independent Naval Battalion, apparently deciding

that discretio n wa s th e bette r par t o f

valor, started withdrawing eastward with

its 800 remaining troops on 1 0 February.

The uni t left behind about 500 dead and

all its heavy weapons. 19

On 9 February the 8th Cavalr y moved

on fro m Ne w Manil a t o Sa n Jua n de l

Monte an d secure d E l Deposito , a n

underground reservoi r fe d b y artesia n

wells and locate d about a mile southwest

of Sa n Jua n Reservoir . Followin g th e

seizure o f E l Deposito , th e las t o f th e

close-in wate r installations , th e 8t h Cav -

alry continue d sout h unti l i t reache d

the nort h ban k o f th e Pasi g Rive r a t a

point jus t eas t o f th e cit y limits . Th e

5th Cavalry , which ha d bee n relieve d i n

the cente r o f th e cit y b y th e 37t h Divi -

sion o n 7 February , wen t sout h o n th e

8th's lef t and , encounterin g onl y scat -

tered opposition , reache d th e Pasi g a

mile eas t o f th e 8t h Cavalr y o n th e

morning o f 1 0 February.

The 37t h Division and th e 1s t Cavalry

Division ha d accomplished much during

the week endin g 1 0 February. The y had

cleared al l Manil a and its suburbs north

of th e Pasig ; pushe d Colone l Noguchi' s

Northern Force eithe r sout h acros s th e

Pasig o r eas t acros s th e Marikina ; cap -

tured o r destroye d almost all the Northern Force's heav y support weapons; an d

secured intac t th e close-i n wate r suppl y

installations. Th e Northern Force, a s a

matter o f fact , ha d mad e n o concerte d

effort t o hol d norther n Manila . Nogu -

chi ha d execute d hi s assigne d demoli -

tions an d the n withdraw n mos t o f hi s

troops sout h ove r th e Pasig , destroyin g

the bridge s behin d him . Hi s 1st Independent Naval Battalion ha d escape d t o

18

 Additional materia l o n th e operation s o f 1s t

Cavalry Division artillery in this and the next chapter

is from : 1s t Ca v Div Arty Rp t Luzon , pt . II , Chro n

Red, pp . 5-15 ; ibid., pt. III , Uni t Jnl , 4-2 3 Fe b 45;

947th F A Bn Rp t Luzon , pt . II, Uni t Jnl , 5-2 3 Fe b

45; ibid., pt. V, S-3 Wor k Sheets , 5-2 3 Fe b 45.

19

 The Japanes e battalio n ha d starte d evacuatin g

the San Juan de l Monte-Ne w Manil a are a o n 6 February bu t ha d bee n ordere d bac k int o it s defenses .

It seems probable that the bulk of the unit was never

engaged a t New Manila and tha t before th e battalion

had reoccupie d al l o f it s position s i t ha d begu n it s

final withdrawal .
258 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

the east . Th e tw o America n division s

had kille d perhap s 1,50 0 Japanes e i n

the regio n nort h o f th e Pasig , bu t i t

appears tha t les s tha n hal f o f thes e wer e

members o f Noguchi' s comba t units —

the majority were ill-armed service troops

and stragglers . Despit e th e limitation s

placed o n it , artiller y fire , supplemente d

by tan k an d morta r fire , cause d th e vas t

bulk o f th e Japanes e casualtie s nort h o f

the river . Tha t infantr y assaul t opera -

tions accounte d fo r relativel y fe w Japa -

nese i s a t leas t partiall y atteste d t o b y

the fac t tha t America n casualtie s wer e

not mor e tha n 5 0 me n kille d an d 15 0

wounded.

Except fo r th e fire s tha t had rage d ou t

of contro l alon g th e nort h ban k o f th e

Pasig, burnin g dow n o r guttin g man y

buildings, damag e t o th e cit y ha d s o fa r

been limite d largel y t o Japanes e bridg e

destruction an d t o destructio n resultin g

from America n artiller y and tan k fir e i n

the Tondo District and th e Ne w Manila

and Sa n Juan suburbs . Th e American s

had discovere d fe w evidence s o f atroci -

ties agains t th e Filipin o populatio n

north o f the Pasig . I t appeare d tha t th e

rest o f th e battl e migh t b e fough t ac -

cording t o th e rule s an d tha t th e cit y

might ye t escap e wit h onl y superficia l

damage.

To dat e operation s ha d serve d prin -

cipally a s a "ge t acquainte d session " fo r

both th e Japanes e an d Americans . Ad -

miral Iwabuch i ha d learne d tha t XI V

Corps wa s i n Manil a t o stay ; Genera l

Griswold ha d learne d tha t th e tas k o f

securing th e cit y an d environ s wa s no t

going to b e a s easy as anticipated. Final -

ly, i n clearin g th e norther n portio n o f

the metropolita n area , th e troop s o f th e

37th Divisio n an d th e 1s t Cavalr y Divi -

sion ha d gaine d invaluabl e experienc e

in cit y fightin g tha t woul d serv e the m

in goo d stea d i n operation s south o f th e

Pasig. Eve n a s th e 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n

was securin g th e wate r suppl y system ,

the 37t h Divisio n wa s puttin g thi s

experience t o th e test .

Across the River and

Into the Buildings

By th e mornin g o f 7 Februar y tw o

factors were prompting Griswold to head

his troop s acros s th e Pasig . First , th e

1st Cavalr y Divisio n an d th e 37t h Divi -

sion ha d cleare d th e cit y prope r nort h

of th e rive r excep t fo r th e pocke t i n

Tondo District , an d Griswol d foresa w

that th e cavalryme n wer e going t o hav e

little difficult y clearin g th e easter n sub -

urbs an d securin g th e wate r facilities .

Second, lat e o n th e 6th , Kruege r ha d

directed XIV Corp s to seiz e the Provisor

Island generatin g plan t forthwith . Ac -

cordingly, o n th e mornin g o f th e 7th ,

Griswold ordere d th e 37t h Divisio n

across th e Pasi g an d assigne d i t mos t o f

the cit y prope r sout h o f th e river. Th e

1st Cavalr y Division , whe n i t finishe d

its jo b i n th e norther n suburbs , woul d

also cross th e river and the n swin g westward towar d Manil a Ba y o n th e 37t h

Division's left. 20

The 37th Division Crosses

General Beightler , th e 37t h Divisio n

commander, ordere d th e 148t h Infantr y

to make the assault across the Pasig. Th e

20

 XIV Corps Rp t Luzon , pt . I , pp . 89-90 , 96-97 ;

Teletype Msg , Sixt h Arm y t o XI V Corps, 6 Fe b 45 ,

Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 4- 6 Fe b 45 ; XI V

Corps F O 6 , 7 Feb 45 ; Msg , G- 3 XI V Corp s t o 37t h

Inf Di v an d 1s t Ca v Div , 120 5 7 Fe b 45 , XIV Corp s

G-3 Jn l File , 6- 7 Fe b 45 ; Beightle r Comments , 1 8

Mar 57 .
ISOLATING TH E BATTLEFIEL D 259

129th Infantr y woul d follo w th e 148t h

and b e followe d i n tur n b y th e 1s t Bat -

talion, 145t h Infantry , divisio n reserve .

The remainde r o f th e 145t h wa s to protect th e division' s lin e o f communica -

tions north o f Manila . Beightle r turne d

the norther n sectio n o f th e cit y ove r t o

a provisiona l organizatio n designate d

the Specia l Securit y Force , whic h con -

tained th e 637t h Tan k Destroye r Bat -

talion, th e 37t h Cavalr y Reconnaissanc e

Troop, an d Compan y A o f th e 754t h

Tank Battalion. 21

Beightler directe d th e 148t h Infantr y

to cros s jus t eas t o f Malacaña n Palac e

and land on the south shore at Malacañan

Gardens, a partially developed botanica l

park opposit e th e residency . Excep t a t

the gardens and a t th e mouth s of esteros

(small, canallik e streams) , se a walls —

impassable t o LVT 's an d unscalabl e

from th e assaul t boat s i n whic h th e

crossing wa s t o b e made—edge d bot h

river banks . Th e 37t h Divisio n ha d

sufficient informatio n t o indicat e tha t

the gardens lay east of the principa l Japanese concentrations in souther n Manil a

and tha t most of th e industrial Paco and

Pandacan Districts in th e eastern sectio n

of th e city , sout h o f th e Pasig , might b e

lightly defended . Th e 148t h Infantr y

would firs t clea r th e Pac o and Pandaca n

Districts an d the n whee l southwes t an d

west toward Intramuros and Manil a Bay .

The 129t h Infantry , onc e o n th e sout h

bank, woul d immediatel y swin g wes t

along the river t o secure Provisor Islan d

and th e steam powe r plant. 22

The 37t h Divisio n wa s to strik e int o

a secto r hel d b y th e Central Force's 1st

Naval Battalion, some 80 0 rifleme n an d

machine gunner s supporte d b y variou s

provisional heav y weapon s units . Th e

battalion wa s concentrated i n th e west -

ern sectio n o f Pac o Distric t sout h fro m

Provisor Islan d — half a mil e wes t o f

Malacañan Garden s — generally alon g

the lin e o f th e Ester o d e Paco , whic h

extended south-southeas t a littl e ove r a

mile. On e group from th e battalion held

a strongpoin t east o f th e Ester o de Pac o

at Pac o Railroa d Station , almost a mil e

south o f th e 148t h Infantry 's landin g

point an d o n th e 37th-1st Cavalr y Division boundary , her e marke d b y th e

tracks o f th e Manil a Railroad .

In preparatio n for the assault the 672d

Amphibian Tracto r Battalion , whic h

had accompanie d th e 37t h Divisio n

south fro m Lingaye n Gulf , assemble d

its LVT 's behin d th e protectio n o f a n

indentation i n th e nort h ban k nea r th e

palace. Th e 117t h Engineers, wh o had

scrounged al l th e enginee r assaul t boats

they coul d fro m Manil a bac k t o Sa n

Fernando, gathere d its craft a t th e sam e

point, read y t o co-operat e wit h th e

LVT's i n shuttlin g th e 37t h Divisio n

across th e river.

Behind a 105-mm . artiller y barrag e

the 3 d Battalion , 148t h Infantry , bega n

crossing i n assaul t boat s a t 151 5 on 7

February. Th e firs t wav e encountere d

no opposition, but, as the second crossed,

intense machin e gun , mortar, an d artil -

lery fir e bega n t o hit th e river, the land -

ing site, and th e Malacaña n Palac e area.

However, the 148t h Infantr y foun d onl y

a fe w Japanes e a t th e Malacaña n Gar -

dens and establishe d its bridgehead wit h 21

 37th Div FO 28, 7 Feb 45, 37th Div G-3 Jn l File ,

6-8 Fe b 45. 22

 37th Di v F O 28 , 7 Fe b 45 ; 37t h Di v Rp t Luzon ,

pp. 43-48; Verbal Orders, CG 37t h Di v t o C O 148t h

Inf, 110 0 7 Fe b 45 , an d 148t h In f Opn s Mem o 16 ,

2100 7 Feb 45, both in 37th Div G-3 Jn l File , 6-8 Fe b

45; 129t h In f Unnumbere d Opn s Order , 7 Fe b 45 ,

129th In f Opns Orders File.
260 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

little difficulty . B y 200 0 tw o battalion s

were acros s th e Pasig , holdin g a n are a

stretching sout h fro m th e rive r abou t

300 yard s alon g Cristoba l Stree t t o a

bridge ove r th e Ester o d e Concordia ,

northeast approximately 1,00 0 yards , and

then bac k t o th e rive r alon g th e wes t

bank o f a n inlet . Th e crossin g ha d cos t

the regimen t abou t 1 5 me n kille d an d

100 wounded, almost al l a s the resul t o f

machine gu n an d morta r fire . Man y o f

the casualtie s ha d actuall y occurre d o n

the palac e grounds, wher e th e 148t h In -

fantry ha d it s command post an d wher e

General Beightle r ha d se t u p a n ad -

vanced headquarters. 23

Between 8 and 1 0 February th e 148t h

Infantry cleare d Pandaca n Distric t wit h

little trouble , bu t i n th e easter n sectio n

of Pac o Distric t ha d ver y grea t troubl e

reducing th e Japanes e strongpoin t a t

Paco Railroa d Statio n an d th e nearb y

buildings of Concordia College and Pac o

School, Suppor t fire s o f th e 136t h an d

140th Fiel d Artiller y Battalion s nearl y

demolished th e statio n an d th e school ,

but a s o f evenin g o n 9 Februar y th e

Japanese, originall y ove r 25 0 strong ,

were still holding out, and th e 148t h In -

fantry mad e plan s fo r a fina l assaul t o n

the 10th . Happily , most of the surviving

Japanese withdrew from th e thre e buildings durin g th e nigh t o f 9-1 0 February ,

and th e fina l attac k wa s less blood y tha n

had bee n anticipated. 24

By lat e afternoo n o n 1 0 February th e

148th Infantry' s lef t ha d move d a hal f

mile beyon d Pac o Railroa d Statio n an d

had gaine d th e eas t ban k o f th e Ester o

de Paco . Th e righ t flan k element s ha d

initially bee n hel d u p b y Japanes e fir e

from Proviso r Island , whil e i n th e cen -

ter troop s ha d ha d t o figh t thei r wa y

through a lesse r Japanes e strongpoin t

at th e Manil a Ga s Works, about a quarter o f a mil e sout h o f th e Pasi g River, 25

but b y afternoo n o n th e 10t h the righ t

and cente r were also up t o the Estero de

Paco. Th e las t troop s o f th e 1st Naval

Battalion eas t o f th e estero ha d eithe r

been killed o r ha d withdrawn across th e

stream. A s the 148t h dre w u p alon g the

estero, the volum e o f Japanes e fir e fro m

the wes t increase d sharply . Har d fight -

ing seeme d certai n befor e th e regimen t

could cros s th e wate r obstacle , an d th e

regiment's operation s sout h o f th e Pasi g

had alread y .cost nearl y 5 0 me n kille d

and 45 0 wounded .

Provisor Island

As planned, the 129t h Infantry crossed

the Pasig on th e afternoon o f 8 February

and swung west toward Provisor Island. 26

One company attempted t o cross the un -

bridged Ester o d e Tonqu e t o th e eas t

end o f the island tha t evening, but Japa -

nese rifle , machin e gun, and morta r fir e

pinned th e troop s i n place . Th e effor t

was calle d of f i n favo r o f a n assaul t be -

hind artillery support the next morning. 23

 Beightler Comments , 1 8 Ma r 57 , Accordin g t o

General Beightler , Genera l MacArthu r ha d mad e a

personal tou r o f th e Malacana n Palac e ground s

during th e mornin g o f th e 7t h an d ha d observe d

that it was so quiet in th e area tha t XIV Corps could

cross th e rive r an d clea r al l souther n Manil a wit h a

platoon. 24

 T. Sgt . Clet o Rodriguez and Pfc . John N .

Reese, Jr., both o f Compan y B , 148t h Infantry , wer e

awarded the Medal of Honor for heroic action during

this fight , Reese' s awar d bein g mad e posthumously .

25

 Pfc. Josep h J . Cicchett i wa s awarded , posthum -

ously, th e Meda l o f Hono r fo r heroi c actio n a t th e

Gas Work s on 9 February . Cicchett i wa s a membe r

of Compan y A , 148t h Infantry . 26

 Additional informatio n o n 129t h Infantr y actio n

comes from : 129t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 6-7 ; 129t h

Inf Hist 1810-1945, pp. 62-66; 129t h Inf S-3 Pe r Rpts,

6-12 Fe b 45; 129t h Inf Regtl Jnl, 8-1 2 Fe b 45.
ISOLATING TH E BATTLEFIEL D 261

Provisor Island , abou t 40 0 yard s eas t

to wes t an d 12 5 yards nort h t o south ,

was bordered o n th e nort h b y th e Pasi g

River, o n th e eas t b y th e Ester o d e

Tonque, an d o n th e sout h an d wes t

by the Estero Provisor. Fiv e large build -

ings an d man y smalle r shedlik e struc -

tures covere d almos t ever y foo t o f th e

island's surface . Thre e o f th e larg e

buildings were of concrete, the rest were

frame structure s side d an d roofe d wit h

sheet metal . Th e Japanes e garrison ,

probably members of th e 1st Naval Battalion, fluctuated i n strength, being reinforced a s th e nee d aros e b y mean s o f a

bridge across th e Ester o Proviso r o n th e

west sid e o f th e island . Japanes e fortifi -

cations wer e o f a hast y nature , mos t o f

them sandbagged machin e gu n emplace -

ments withi n building s o r a t entrances .

From position s t o th e west , southwest ,

and sout h othe r Japanes e force s coul d

blanket th e islan d wit h al l type s o f sup -

port fire .

Following th e schedule d artiller y

preparation, Compan y G , 129t h Infan -

try, move d u p t o th e mout h o f th e

Estero d e Tonqu e a t 080 0 o n 9 Febru -

ary. Th e compan y planne d t o shuttl e

across th e estero i n tw o engineer assaul t

boats t o seiz e firs t a boile r plan t a t th e

northeast corne r o f th e island. Th e firs t

boat, eight men aboard, got across safely,

but th e secon d wa s hi t an d tw o me n

were killed ; th e survivor s swa m an d

waded t o th e island . B y 083 0 fiftee n

men o f Compan y G ha d entere d th e

boiler plant , onl y t o b e throw n ou t al -

most immediatel y b y a Japanes e coun -

terattack. The y then took refuge behin d

a coa l pil e lyin g betwee n th e boile r

house an d th e wes t ban k o f Ester o d e

Tonque.

Rifle an d machin e gu n fir e fro m th e

boiler plan t an d fro m th e mai n power -

house just t o th e sout h pinne d th e fif -

teen down . Th e 129t h Infantr y wa s

unable t o reinforc e them , fo r th e Japa -

nese ha d th e Estero s Proviso r an d d e

Tonque covered with rifle, machine gun ,

and morta r fire . Immediat e withdrawa l

proved equall y impossibl e — two othe r

men ha d alread y bee n kille d i n a n at -

tempt t o swi m bac k acros s th e Ester o

de Tonque .

With clos e support—s o clos e tha t th e

fifteen survivor s ha d t o kee p prone —

from th e 2 d Battalion' s mortars , Com -

pany G's isolate d grou p hun g on fo r th e

rest o f th e da y whil e th e battalio n mad e

plans t o evacuat e the m s o tha t artiller y

could again strike the island. Afte r dar k

Company G's commander, Capt, Georg e

West, swam across the Estero de Tonque

dragging an engineer assault boat behind

him. Althoug h wounded , h e shuttle d

his troop s bac k t o th e eas t ban k i n th e

dim ligh t o f flame s fro m burnin g buildings o n an d sout h o f th e island . Whe n

a count was taken about midnight, Com -

pany G totale d 1 7 casualtie s — 6 me n

killed, 5 wounded , an d 6 missin g —

among th e 1 8 men, includin g Captai n

West, wh o ha d reache d Proviso r Islan d

during th e previou s eightee n hours .

For th e next hou r or s o the 37t h Division's artillery and morta r fir e blankete d

the islan d a s Compan y E prepare d t o

send ninet y me n ove r th e Ester o d e

Tonque i n si x enginee r assaul t boats .

The fire s ha d died down by the time th e

craft starte d acros s th e strea m a t 0230 ,

but th e moo n chos e t o com e ou t fro m

behind a cloud just a s the firs t tw o boats

reached shore safely . A hail o f Japanes e

machine canno n an d morta r fir e sun k

the nex t thre e boats whil e o n th e islan d

a small fue l tan k flare d u p t o expos e th e
Provisor Island, lower left center.
ISOLATING TH E BATTLEFIEL D 263

men alread y ashore . Huggin g th e coa l

pile, Compan y E' s troop s remaine d

pinned dow n unti l almos t 0500 , whe n

the moo n disappeare d an d th e fue l fir e

burnt itsel f out .

Quickly, th e me n dashe d int o th e

boiler plant . A macabr e gam e o f hid e

and see k wen t on aroun d th e machinery

inside unti l dawn , b y whic h tim e Com -

pany E had gaine d possessio n o f th e eastern hal f o f th e building . Th e Japanes e

still hel d th e wester n half .

On th e 10th , Compan y E slowl y

cleaned ou t th e rest o f th e boile r house ,

but ever y attemp t t o mov e outsid e

brought dow n th e fir e o f ever y Japanes e

weapon withi n rang e o f Proviso r Islan d

—or s o i t seeme d t o th e troop s isolate d

in thei r industria l fortress . Therefore ,

Company E held wha t i t had whil e division artiller y an d mortar s pounde d th e

western par t o f th e island , a s di d tank s

and tan k destroyer s fro m position s o n

the north bank of the Pasig . In th e afternoon T D fir e accidentall y kille d 2 me n

and wounde d 5 other s o f Compan y E ,

which, throug h th e day , als o suffere d

7 me n wounde d fro m Japanes e fire .

During th e nigh t Compan y E sen t an -

other 10-ma n squa d acros s th e Ester o

de Tonqu e t o reinforc e th e troop s al -

ready o n th e island . Artillery , tanks ,

tank destroyers , an d 81-mm . mortar s

kept u p a stead y fir e i n preparatio n fo r

still anothe r attac k th e nex t morning -

After daw n o n th e 11th, Company E

found tha t resistanc e ha d largel y col -

lapsed o n th e island an d tha t a s division

artillery continue d t o poun d know n o r

suspected Japanes e morta r an d artiller y

positions t o th e south an d west , th e vol -

ume o f Japanes e fir e previousl y sen t

against th e islan d ha d greatl y dimin -

ished. Searchin g cautiousl y an d thor -

oughly throug h th e rubbl e o f th e no w

nearly demolishe d building s o f th e

power plant , Compan y E cleare d al l

Provisor Islan d b y midafternoon an d se -

cured a foothol d o n th e mainland , wes t

across Ester o Provisor .

The tas k o f securin g th e islan d ha d

cost th e 2 d Battalion , 129t h Infantry ,

approximately 2 5 me n kille d an d 7 5

wounded. Fro m on e poin t o f vie w th e

losses had bee n i n vain . Th e American s

had hope d t o secur e th e powe r plan t

intact, bu t eve n befor e troop s ha d

reached th e islan d th e Japanes e ha d

damaged som e equipment , an d wha t

was left th e Japanese and America n artillery an d mortar s ruined . Ther e wa s no

chance that the plant would soo n delive r

electric power t o Manila .

The 1s t Battalion , 129t h Infantry , o n

the 2 d Battalion's left , ha d bee n stalle d

until th e 10th both b y th e Japanes e fir e

supporting th e Proviso r Islan d garriso n

and b y lesse r Japanes e strongpoint s i n

an industria l are a wes t o f Cristoba l

Street. Bu t by evening on th e 10th, th e

1st Battalio n ha d move d it s lef t u p t o

the Ester o d e Paco , abreast o f th e 148t h

Infantry, whil e it s right ha d pushe d o n

to th e Ester o d e Tonque . Thes e gain s

cost th e 129t h Infantr y anothe r 5 me n

killed an d nearl y 2 0 wounded.

Lifting the Restrictions on

Artillery Fire

The artillery , mortar , tank , an d tan k

destroyer fir e tha t ha d destroye d th e

Provisor Islan d powe r plan t an d turne d

Paco Station , Pac o School , an d Con -

cordia Colleg e int o a shamble s repre -

sented a strikin g departur e fro m th e

limitations place d upo n suppor t fire s

during th e clearin g o f norther n Manil a
264 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

and th e easter n suburbs . Fo r th e 37t h

Division, a t least , cancellatio n o f th e

earlier limitation s ha d becom e a neces -

sity. Fo r on e thing , sufficien t informa -

tion ha d no w becom e availabl e fro m

aerial observation , patrolling , an d re -

ports fro m civilian s an d guerrilla s fo r

XIV Corps' s G- 2 Sectio n t o conclud e

that th e Japanes e ha d turne d almos t

every larg e buildin g fro m Ester o d e

Paco west to Manil a Ba y into a veritable

fortress, fa r stronge r eve n tha n th e de -

fenses alread y encountere d sout h o f th e

Pasig.

In addition , th e operation s sout h o f

the river ha d force d th e XIV Corps an d

the 37t h Divisio n t o th e reluctan t deci -

sion tha t al l pretens e a t savin g Manila's

buildings woul d hav e t o b e give n up —

casualties wer e mounting a t a much to o

alarming rat e amon g th e infantr y units .

The 148t h Infantr y ha d suffered 500-od d

casualties (abou t 20 0 di d no t requir e

hospitalization) fro m 7 throug h 1 0 February. Th e regimen t wa s no w nearl y

600 me n understrength , an d it s rifl e

companies averaged about 50 men understrength. Throug h th e seizur e o f Pro -

visor Islan d th e 129t h Infantr y ha d

incurred about 285 casualties—35 killed,

240 wounded, an d 1 0 missing—and wa s

nearly 70 0 me n understrength . Com -

pany G had onl y 90 effectives; Compan y

E was little better off. Th e 148t h Infan -

try ha d apparentl y receive d onl y fiv e

replacements since 9 January; th e 129t h

Infantry, none. 27

The losse s ha d manifestil y bee n to o

heavy for th e gain s achieved. I f th e cit y

were t o b e secure d withou t th e destruc -

tion o f th e 37t h an d th e 1s t Cavalr y

Divisions, n o furthe r effor t coul d b e

made t o sav e th e buildings ; everythin g

holding u p progress would b e pounded ,

although artiller y fir e woul d no t b e di -

rected against structures such as churches

and hospital s tha t wer e know n t o con -

tain civilians. Eve n thi s last restrictio n

would no t alway s b e effective , fo r ofte n

it coul d no t b e learne d unti l to o lat e

that a specifi c buildin g hel d civilians. 28

The liftin g o f the restrictions on support

fires woul d resul t i n turnin g muc h o f

southern Manil a int o a shambles ; bu t

there wa s n o hel p fo r tha t i f th e cit y

were to be secured in a reasonable length

of tim e an d wit h reasonabl e losses. Re -

strictions on aerial bombardment, on th e

other hand , woul d remai n i n effect .

The 1st Cavalry Division Crosses

While th e 37t h Divisio n wa s fightin g

its costl y battl e t o clea r Proviso r Islan d

and advanc e t o th e eas t ban k o f th e

Estero de Paco , th e 1st Cavalr y Division

started across the Pasi g and cam e u p o n

the infantry's left . On e troo p of th e 8t h

Cavalry crossed near the Philippine Racing Club , jus t eas t o f th e cit y limits ,

during th e evenin g o f 9 February ; th e

rest o f th e regimen t wa s across th e river

at th e same poin t b y 095 0 o n th e 10th.

The cavalr y encountere d practicall y n o

opposition i n th e crossin g area , bu t

progressed slowl y becaus e th e Japanes e

had thoroughl y mine d man y o f th e

streets sout h an d wes t o f th e club . B y

dusk o n th e 10t h th e 8t h Cavalr y ha d

secured a bridgehea d abou t a thousan d

yards deep . It s righ t flan k crosse d th e

city limit s int o Sant a An a Distric t an d

patrols established contact with 37t h Di- 27

 This conclusion is based upon a thorough examination o f al l relevan t 37t h Division , 129t h Infantry ,

and 148t h Infantr y records.

28

 XIV Corp s Luzo n Rpt , pt. I , p . 93 ; 37t h Di v

Luzon Rpt, pp. 51-53 .
ISOLATING TH E BATTLEFIEL D 265

vision troop s alon g th e divisio n bound -

ary nea r Pac o Station ; o n it s lef t (east )

other patrols met men of the 5th Cavalry.

Shuttling troop s acros s th e Pasi g a t

the suburb o f Makati , a mile east o f th e

8th Cavalry' s crossin g site , th e 5t h Cav -

alry got on e squadron t o the south ban k

of th e river b y 150 0 on 1 0 February and

secured th e Makati electrica l power substation. Th e troop s me t no groun d op -

position, bu t considerabl e machin e gu n

and morta r fire , originatin g fro m th e

Fort McKinle y are a t o th e southeast ,

harassed the m a t th e crossin g are a

throughout th e day.

Dusk o n 1 0 Februar y foun d XI V

Corps firmly established—wit h two sepa -

rate bridgeheads—sout h o f th e Pasig .

The 37t h Division , i n it s driv e t o th e

Estero d e Paco , ha d secure d a quarte r

of th e cit y prope r sout h o f th e river ;

the 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n ha d cleare d

some o f th e souther n suburba n area s

and wa s ready t o mov e o n int o th e cit y

on th e 37th' s left . Enoug h ha d bee n

learned abou t th e Japanes e defense s

for th e corps ' G- 2 Sectio n t o conclud e

that th e hardes t fightin g wa s still ahea d

—and not al l o f it necessarily withi n th e

city itself , fo r XI V Corp s wa s abou t t o

become involve d i n th e fightin g sout h

of th e cit y previousl y conducte d b y th e

11th Airborn e Divisio n unde r Eight h

Army control .

XIV Corps' are a o f responsibility wa s

enlarged o n th e 10t h of Februar y whe n

the 11th Airborn e Divisio n passe d t o its

control, solvin g som e problem s an d

creating others . Bu t th e mos t immedi -

ately significan t featur e o f th e passag e

of comman d wa s that—i n concer t wit h

the 1s t Cavalr y Division's crossing of the

Pasig—XIV Corp s ha d a n opportunit y

to cut th e last route s of withdrawa l an d

reinforcement availabl e t o th e Manila

Naval Defense Force in the metropolitan

area. Th e corp s planne d tha t whil e th e

37th Divisio n pushe d o n acros s th e Es -

tero d e Paco , th e 5t h an d 8t h Cavalr y

Regiments woul d driv e generall y south -

west towar d Manil a Ba y an d gai n con -

tact wit h th e 11t h Airborne Division ,

thus effectin g a n encirclemen t o f th e

city.

Encircling the City

The 11th Airborne Division's

Situation

When th e 11th Airborne Division had

halted o n 4 Februar y a t th e Rout e 1

bridge ove r th e Parañaqu e River , thre e

miles sout h o f th e Manil a cit y limits ,

the majo r forc e opposin g i t wa s th e

Southern Force's 3d Naval Battalion,

reinforced b y a compan y o f th e 1st

Naval Battalion an d artiller y unit s o f

varying armament. 29 I n man y way s th e

3d Naval Battalion position s wer e th e

strongest i n th e Manil a area, having the

virtue o f bein g lon g established . Rein -

forced concret e pillboxe s abounde d a t

street intersection s in th e suburban are a

south o f th e cit y limits , man y o f the m

covered wit h dir t lon g enoug h t o hav e

natural camouflage ; other s wer e care -

fully conceale d i n clump s o f trees .

Northeast o f Parañaque , Nichol s Fiel d

—used b y th e Japanes e Nava l Air Serv -

ice an d defende d b y par t o f th e 3d

Naval Battalion—literally bristle d wit h

antiaircraft defenses . Mos t o f th e gu n

positions wer e a s wel l camouflage d a s

the generall y fla t terrai n permitted , an d

29

 Japanese informatio n i n thi s sectio n i s base d

primarily upon 11th A/B Div Rpt Luzon , pp. 16 , 29;

see also above , ch. XIII.
266 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

the emplacements , usefu l i n themselve s

as fortifications , wer e supplemente d b y

scattered bunkers and pillboxe s housin g

machine gunner s an d supportin g

riflemen.

As o f 4 Februar y th e Japanes e ha d

few troop s a t Nielso n Field , tw o mile s

north-northeast o f Nichol s Field , bu t

the 4th Naval Battalion an d heav y weap -

ons attachment s hel d For t McKinley ,

two miles east of Nielson. Other Japanes e

troops manne d a grou p o f antiaircraf t

gun position s abou t midwa y betwee n

the Arm y pos t an d Nichol s Field , gun s

that could an d di d suppor t th e 3d Naval

Battalion.

On th e mornin g o f 5 Februar y th e

11th Airborn e Division' s 511t h Para -

chute Infantr y force d a crossin g o f th e

Parañaque an d starte d nort h alon g

Route 1 ove r a quarter-mile-wid e stri p

of lan d lyin g betwee n th e river , o n th e

east, an d Manil a Bay , on th e west. 30

During th e nex t tw o day s th e regimen t

fought, it s wa y 2,00 0 yard s northwar d

house b y hous e an d pillbo x b y pillbox .

Supported onl y b y ligh t artillery—an d

not muc h o f that—th e 511t h depended

heavily upo n flam e throwers , demoli -

tions, an d 60-mm . mortar s i n it s ad -

vance. I n th e tw o day s i t los t 6 me n

killed and 3 5 wounded, and killed about

200 Japanese. 31

On th e 6t h th e 511t h Infantry halte d

to wait fo r th e 188t h Infantr y (wit h th e

1st Battalion , 187t h Infantry , attached )

to come north from Tagayta y Ridge and

launch a n attac k towar d Nichol s Field ,

whence Japanes e artiller y fir e ha d bee n

falling o n th e 511th' s right . Th e divi -

sion planne d t o sen d th e 188t h Infantr y

against th e airfiel d fro m th e sout h an d

southeast, whil e on e battalio n o f th e

511th woul d attac k fro m th e west across

the Parañaqu e River . I n preparatio n

for th e effort , th e reinforce d 188t h In -

fantry move d u p t o a lin e o f departur e

about a mil e an d a hal f southeas t o f

Nichols Fiel d unde r cove r o f darknes s

during th e nigh t o f 6- 7 February .

The Attack on Nichols Field

The 188t h Infantr y attac k o n 7 February wa s almost completel y abortiv e i n

the fac e o f concentrate d artillery , mor -

tar, an d machin e gun fir e fro m th e Japa -

nese defense s o n an d aroun d th e ai r

field.32 O n th e wes t th e 511t h Infantry

managed to get its right across the northsouth stretc h o f th e Parañaqu e t o posi -

tions near the southwest corner of Nichols

Field, bu t ther e i t stopped. Durin g th e

next two days the 511th Infantry secured

a narro w stri p o f lan d betwee n th e

Parañaque Rive r an d th e airfield's west -

ern runwa y an d overra n som e defense s

30

 The genera l source s o f informatio n concernin g

11th Airborn e Division operation s arc: Eighth Arm y

Rpt Nasugbu-Bataan, pp. 22-28 ; Sixt h Arm y Rp t

Luzon, I, 38; XIV Corps Rpt Luzon , pt. I, pp. 91- 94;

11th A/ B Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 4-6; Flanagan, The

Angels, pp. 81-88; 11th A/B Div G-3 Pe r Rpts, 4-23

Feb 45; 11th A/B Div Arty, Unit Hist, 31 Jan-9 Feb

45, pp. 4-6; ibid., 10 Feb-4 May 45, pp. 1-5. 31

 Additional informatio n o n 511t h Infantry opera -

tions is from; 511t h Inf S-1, S-2 , and S- 3 Jnls , 4-23

Feb 45 ; 511th Inf S-1 Casualt y and Ins p Rpts Luzon.

32

 Most of the 11th Airborne Division's records were

lost whe n th e divisio n move d t o Japan a t th e en d o f

the wa r o r wer e destroye d i n a fir e a t th e division's

headquarters building during the occupation. Therefore, i t is impossibl e t o reconstruc t th e details of th e

fighting fo r th e Nichol s Fiel d are a o n an d afte r 7

February. Fragmentar y informatio n i s availabl e in :

188th In f Draft His t Luzon , pp . 4-10; 188th In f Rp t

Luzon, pp . 4-8 ; 1st B n 187t h In f Chro n Narrative ,

26 Jan-2 4 Fe b 45 , pp . 4-7 , 11th A/ B Di v Cam p

Campbell Ky . collection ; 187t h In f S- 3 Pe r Rpts ,

8-23 Fe b 45 ; 187t h In f Chro n Narrativ e MIK E V I

Opn, pp . 2-4 ; 2d B n 187t h In f Chro n Narrativ e

MIKE V I Opn, pp. 3-5.
ISOLATING TH E BATTLEFIEL D 267

at the northwest corner of the field. Th e

188th Infantr y mad e contac t wit h th e

511th a t th e southwest corne r bu t coul d

gain littl e groun d o n th e sout h an d

southeast. O n th e 10th , it s last da y un -

der Eight h Arm y control , th e divisio n

consolidated it s gain s an d establishe d a

solid lin e fro m th e northwes t corne r

around t o th e southwes t corne r o f th e

field, eliminatin g th e las t Japanes e re -

sistance o n th e wester n side . Mean -

while, element s o f th e 511t h Infantry

had continued u p Rout e 1 nearly a mile

beyond Nichols Field's northwest corner.

Four days ' effor t ha d effecte d littl e

reduction i n th e amoun t o f Japanes e

fire originatin g fro m th e Nichol s Fiel d

defenses. Suppor t fires of Mindoro-based

A-20's an d th e division's ligh t artiller y

(75-mm. pac k howitzer s an d th e shor t

105-mm. howitzers ) ha d no t destroye d

enough Japanes e weapons t o permi t th e

infantry t o advanc e withou t takin g un -

duly heav y casualties . I n fact , th e vol -

ume o f fir e fro m Japanes e nava l gun s

of variou s type s wa s stil l s o grea t tha t

one infantr y compan y commande r re -

quested: "Tel l Halse y t o sto p lookin g

for th e Jap Fleet. It 's dug in o n Nichols

Field."33 The 11t h Airborne obviousl y

needed heavie r artiller y support .

For som e day s th e division's situatio n

had bee n a bi t anomalous , especiall y i n

regard t o co-ordinatio n o f it s artiller y

with tha t o f XI V Corp s t o th e north .

Sixth Army had directed XIV Corps not

only t o seiz e Manil a bu t als o t o driv e

south t o an objectiv e lin e running from

Cavite northeas t acros s th e Hagono y

Isthmus t o Tagi g o n Lagun a d e Bay. 34

The 11t h Airborne Divisio n had crossed

this line as early as 6 February, and ever y

step i t too k northwar d towar d Manil a

increased th e dange r tha t XI V Corp s

Artillery might inadvertently shoot it up.

The Sixt h an d Eight h Armie s ha d

both apparentl y mad e som e effor t t o

have General MacArthur establis h a formal boundary south of Manila, but wit h

no success . Fro m th e beginnin g GH Q

SWPA ha d intende d tha t th e 11th Airborne Division would ultimatel y pas s t o

Sixth Arm y control, an d i t appears tha t

theater headquarters , anticipatin g a n

early contact between th e 11t h Airborne

Division and the XIV Corps, saw no need

to establis h a forma l boundary . In -

stead, GHQ SWP A only awaited the contact t o mak e sur e Sixt h Arm y coul d

exercise effectiv e contro l whe n th e

transfer wa s made.

General Eichelberge r ha d becom e in -

creasingly worrie d a s th e uncertai n sit -

uation persisted . GH Q SWP A made n o

provision fo r direc t communicatio n be -

tween Sixt h an d Eight h Armie s unti l 7

or 8 February, an d unti l tha t tim e eac h

Army had learned of the others' progress

principally throug h GH Q SWP A chan -

nels.35 Whe n direc t communication be -

gan, th e 11t h Airborne Division and th e

XIV Corps quickly co-ordinated artillery

fire plan s an d establishe d a limi t o f fir e

line to demark their support zones about

midway betwee n Nichol s Fiel d an d th e

Manila city limits. Unde r th e provisions

of thi s pla n XI V Corp s Artiller y fire d

sixteen 155-mm . an d 8-inc h howitze r

concentrations i n suppor t o f th e air -

33

 Flanagan, The Angels, p . 85 . 34

 Sixth Arm y F O 47 , 2 Feb 45 .

35

 Eichelberger state d tha t h e kep t Kruege r con -

stantly informe d o f th e 11t h Airborne Division' s

progress by direct radio, but receive d no information

from Sixt h Arm y unti l 4 February . Eichelberge r

Comments, 21 Jan 57. O n the other hand, the earliest

message t o Sixt h Arm y tha t ca n b e foun d i n Eight h

Army file s i s dated 5 February .
268 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

borne division's attac k a t Nichol s Fiel d

before th e division passe d t o XIV Corps

control about 130 0 o n 1 0 February.36

"Welcome t o th e XI V Corps, " Gris -

wold radioed Genera l Swing , simultane -

ously dashing whatever hopes Swing may

have had t o continue north into Manila

in accordance with Eichelberger's earlier

plans. Fo r th e time being, Griswol d di -

rected Swing, the 11t h Airborn e Division

would continue to exert pressure against

the Japanese at Nichols Field but would

mount n o genera l assault . Instead , th e

division woul d ascertai n th e exten t an d

nature o f th e Japanes e defense s a t an d

east of th e airfield an d prepar e to secure

the Cavit e nava l bas e area , whic h th e

division ha d bypasse d o n it s wa y north

from Nasugbu . Furthe r orders would be

forthcoming once XIV Corps itself coul d

learn mor e about th e situatio n sout h o f

Manila.37

On 1 1 Februar y th e 511t h Infantr y

attacked nort h along the bay front i n its

sector t o Liberta d Avenue , scarcel y a

mile shor t o f th e cit y limits , losin g it s

commander, Colone l Haugen , durin g

the day . Griswol d the n halte d th e ad -

vance lest the 511t h cu t across the fronts

of th e 5t h an d 8t h Cavalr y Regiments ,

now headin g directl y towar d th e ba y

from th e northeast , an d upse t artiller y

support plans .

38

 Meanwhile , i n a serie s

of patro l actions, the 187t h Infantr y ha d

secured th e southeas t corne r an d th e

southern runway of Nichols Field. Gris -

wold authorized the 11t h Airborn e Division t o mount a concerted attack against

the fiel d o n th e 12th .

The attac k wa s preceded b y artiller y

and mortar concentrations and by an air

strike execute d b y Marin e Corp s SBD's

from th e Lingaye n Gul f fields , suppor t

that succeede d i n knockin g ou t man y

Japanese artiller y positions . Th e 2 d

Battalion, 187t h Infantry , attacke d gen -

erally east fro m th e northwest corner o f

the field ; th e 188t h Infantr y an d th e 1s t

Battalion, 187t h Infantry , drove in fro m

the sout h an d southeast . B y dus k th e

two regiments ha d cleare d mos t o f th e

field an d finishe d moppin g u p th e nex t

day. Th e fiel d was , however , b y n o

means read y to receive Allied Air Forc e

planes. Runway s an d taxiway s wer e

heavily mined , th e runway s were pitte d

by air an d artiller y bombardments, and

the fiel d wa s still subjecte d t o intermit -

tent artiller y an d morta r fir e fro m th e

Fort McKinle y area .

With th e seizure of Nichols Field, the

11th Airborn e Divisio n substantiall y

completed it s shar e i n th e battl e fo r

Manila. Sinc e it s landin g a t Nasugb u

the divisio n ha d suffere d ove r 90 0 casu -

alties. Of this number the 511th Infantr y

lost approximatel y 7 0 me n kille d an d

240 wounded ; th e 187t h an d 188t h In -

fantry Regiments had together lost about

36

 The foregoin g analysi s o f liaiso n problem s i s

based on : Sixt h Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 38 ; ibid., III ,

68; XI V Corps Rp t Luzon , pt . I , p . 98 ; XIV Corps

Arty Rpt Luzon , p. 11 ; Rad, G- 3 XI V Corps t o G-3

37th Div , 122 5 8 Feb 45 , 37th Di v G-3 Jn l File , 6-8

Feb 45 ; Rad , Eichelberge r t o MacArthur, 0900 3 Feb

45; Rad , Eichelberge r t o MacArthur , 113 0 5 Fe b 45 ;

Rad, Eichelberge r t o Krueger , 113 0 5 Fe b 45 ; Rad ,

Eichelberger t o MacArthur , 120 8 7 Fe b 45 ; Rad ,

Krueger t o Eichelberger , WG-139 , 8 Fe b 45 . Las t

five i n Eight h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e MIK E VI, 2-1 9 Fe b

45. Eichelberge r Comments, 2 1 Jan 57 . 37

 Rad, Griswol d t o Swing , 1 0 Fe b 45 , XIV Corp s

G-3 Jn l File , 1 0 Feb 45 .

38

 Rad, XI V Corps t o 11t h A/ B Div , 37t h Div , 1s t

Cav Div , an d XI V Corps Arty , 1 1 Feb 45 , XIV Corps

G-3 Jn l File , 11 Feb 45. This radi o als o established

a forma l boundar y betwee n th e 11t h Airborn e an d

1st Cavalr y Divisions , runnin g eas t alon g Liberta d

Avenue and Rout e 57 four mile s inland to the southwest corne r o f Fort McKinley .
ISOLATING TH E BATTLEFIEL D 269

100 me n kille d an d 51 0 wounded , th e

vast majorit y i n th e actio n a t Nichol s

Field.39 Th e divisio n an d it s ai r an d

artillery suppor t ha d kille d perhap s

3,000 Japanese in the metropolitan area ,

destroying th e 3d Naval Battalion an d

isolating th e Abe Battalion. Fro m the n

on th e division's activities in the Manila

area woul d b e directe d towar d securin g

the Cavit e region , destroyin g th e Abe

Battalion, and, in co-operatio n wit h th e

1st Cavalr y Division , assurin g th e sever -

ance of the Manila Naval Defense Force's

routes o f escap e an d reinforcemen t b y

clearing For t McKinle y an d environs .

For th e latter purpos e the airborne division woul d hav e t o maintai n clos e con -

tact with th e cavalry , alread y movin g to

complete th e encirclemen t o f th e

Japanese defenders i n th e city.

Completing the Encirclement

The 1s t Cavalry Division planned tha t

the 5t h Cavalry , th e uni t wit h th e most

direct approach to the Nichols Field area,

would b e th e firs t t o mak e contact wit h

the 11t h Airborn e Division . Bu t delays

in getting the rest of the regiment across

the Pasi g o n 1 1 February , combine d

with th e necessit y fo r patrollin g east -

ward alon g th e sout h ban k o f th e rive r

to see k ou t Japanes e machin e gu n an d

artillery position s near th e crossing site,

prevented th e 5t h Cavalr y fro m makin g

general advance s on tha t day . On the

right th e 8t h Cavalry , maintainin g contact wit h th e 37t h Division , drov e u p

almost t o th e Ester o d e Pac o alon g th e

division boundar y against scattere d op -

position. Th e lef t remaine d i n essenti -

ally th e sam e positio n i t ha d hel d th e

previous night , just sout h o f th e Philip -

pine Racin g Club, I n th e are a o f South

Cemetery, across the tracks of the Manila

Suburban Electri c Lin e (trolle y cars )

from th e club , a 511t h Infantr y patro l

made contact with an 8th Cavalry outpost

late in th e day.

The nex t day , 1 2 February, th e 5t h

Cavalry swep t rapidl y acros s Nielso n

Field against scattered rifle fir e an d about

0900 cam e u p t o Culi-Cul i an d Rout e

57, a n easter n extensio n o f th e sam e

street that , know n a s Liberta d Avenu e

further t o th e west , th e 511t h Infantr y

had reache d o n 1 1 February. Turnin g

west alon g thi s road , th e 5t h Cavalr y

made contact with the 511th Infantr y on

Libertad Avenu e proper abou t 1040 . A

few minute s late r th e cavalry' s leadin g

elements wer e o n th e shor e o f Manil a

Bay and spe d nort h anothe r 1,00 0 yards

to Villaruel Street .

The 8t h Cavalr y ha d als o continue d

westward during the morning but i n the

afternoon wa s relieved b y th e 12t h Cavalry. Th e latter , i n turn , ha d bee n re -

lieved along the line of communications

by th e 112t h Cavalr y RCT , whic h

Krueger ha d attached t o the 1s t Cavalr y

Division on 9 February. Genera l Mudge,

the divisio n commander , foun d i n thi s

relief a welcom e opportunit y t o recon -

stitute his normal brigade structure and

so sent th e 12t h Cavalr y sout h t o rejoin

the 5th Cavalr y under the control of the

1st Brigad e headquarters. Th e 8t h Cavalry then moved north t o go back unde r

2d Brigad e command .

Wasting little time , th e 12t h Cavalry,

during th e afternoo n o f 1 2 February ,

halted its right t o contain Japanese who

had alread y stalle d th e 8t h Cavalr y an d

39

 Since ther e ar e fe w divisio n records , casualt y

figures ar e fragmentary , an d th e figure s presente d

here ar e th e author's estimate s base d upo n stud y o f

all relevan t sources.
270 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

advanced it s lef t rapidl y southwestwar d

past Nielso n Fiel d an d o n t o Villarue l

Street, wher e i t mad e contac t wit h th e

5th Cavalr y troop s alread y alon g tha t

thoroughfare. About 1430 , the 2d Squadron, 12t h Cavalry, reached th e bay shore.

The 1s t Cavalr y Brigade's advanc e t o

the shore s o f Manil a Ba y o n 1 2 February, togethe r wit h th e establishmen t o f

contact betwee n tha t uni t an d th e 11t h

Airborne Division , complete d th e en -

circlement o f th e Japanes e force s i n

Manila. Admira l Iwabuch i and th e now

isolated troop s o f hi s Manila Naval Defense Force coul d choos e onl y betwee n

surrender an d a figh t t o th e death . An d

by evenin g o n 1 2 February an y privat e

in th e 1s t Cavalr y Division , th e 11t h

Airborne Division , o r th e 37t h Infantr y

Division coul d hav e tol d al l wh o care d

to as k tha t Iwabuch i ha d alread y

selected th e secon d course .
CHAPTER X V

The Drive Toward Intramuro s

Iwabuchi Entrapped

Although patentl y determine d a t th e

end o f Januar y t o defen d Manil a t o th e

last, Admira l Iwabuch i apparentl y wa -

vered i n hi s resolution durin g th e wee k

or s o followin g th e arriva l o f th e first .

American troop s i n th e city. 1 O n th e

morning o f 9 February , tw o day s afte r

the 37t h Divisio n bega n crossin g th e

Pasig, th e admira l decide d tha t hi s position i n th e Manil a are a ha d deteriorate d

so rapidly and completel y tha t h e shoul d

devote som e attentio n t o evacuatin g his

remaining forces. Accordingly , he moved

his headquarter s t o For t McKinley , evi -

dently plannin g t o direc t a withdrawa l

from tha t relativel y saf e vantag e point .

This transfe r precipitate d a serie s o f in -

cidents tha t vividl y illustrate s th e anom -

alies o f th e Japanes e command structur e

in th e metropolita n area .

About th e sam e tim e tha t Iwabuch i

moved t o For t McKinley , th e firs t defi -

nite informatio n abou t th e course o f th e

battle i n Manil a reache d Genera l Yoko -

yama's Shimbu Group headquarters. The

Shimbu commande r immediatel y bega n

planning a counterattack , th e multipl e

aims an d complicate d preparatio n o f

which sugges t tha t Yokoyam a ha d s o

little informatio n tha t h e coul d no t

make up his mind quit e wha t he wante d

to, o r could , accomplish .

Estimating th e strengt h o f th e Ameri -

cans i n th e Manil a are a a t littl e mor e

than a regiment , Genera l Yokoyam a ap -

parently fel t tha t h e ha d a goo d oppor -

tunity t o cu t of f an d isolat e th e Allie d

force. Conversely , he wa s also intereste d

in gettin g th e Manila Naval Defense

Force ou t o f th e cit y quickly , eithe r b y

opening a lin e o f retrea t o r b y havin g

Iwabuchi co-ordinat e a breakthrough ef -

fort with a Shimbu Group counterattack,

scheduled fo r th e nigh t o f 16-1 7 Febru -

ary. No t knowin g how fa r th e situatio n

in Manil a ha d deteriorated—communi -

cations wer e fault y an d Admira l

Iwabuchi ha d supplie d Yokoyam a wit h

little information—Yokoyama a t firs t di -

rected th e Manila Naval Defense Force

to hol d fast . Th e questio n o f a genera l

withdrawal, h e tol d Iwabuchi , would b e

held i n abeyanc e pendin g th e outcom e

of th e counterattack .

There is no indication that the Shimbu

Group commande r intended to reinforce

or retak e Manila . Rather , hi s primar y

interest was to gain time fo r the Shimbu

Group t o strengthe n it s defense s nort h

and northeas t o f th e cit y an d t o mov e

more supplie s ou t o f th e cit y t o it s

1

 The genera l Japanes e source s use d i n th e prep -

aration o f thi s sectio n are : SWPA His t Series , II ,

461-64; 14th Area Army T r Or g List ; Japanes e

Studies i n W W II , No . 125 , Philippin e Are a Nava l

Opns, pt . IV , pp . 29-32 ; Asan o Statement , States ,

I, 94-95 ; Hashimot o Statement , States , I , 278-81 ;

Colonel Koboyash i Statement , States , II , 250-52 ;

Kayashima Statement , States , II , 157-70 .
272 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

mountain strongholds , simultaneousl y

creating a goo d opportunit y fo r th e

Manila Naval Defense Force to withdraw

intact.

Such wa s th e stat e o f communication s

between Iwabuch i an d Yokoyam a tha t

Iwabuchi ha d decide d t o retur n t o Ma -

nila befor e h e receive d an y wor d o f th e

counterattack plans . Whe n Admira l

Iwabuchi left Manil a he had placed Colonel Noguchi , th e Northern Force com -

mander, i n contro l o f al l troop s

remaining within the city limits. Noguchi

found i t impossibl e t o exercis e effectiv e

control ove r th e nava l element s o f hi s

command an d aske d tha t a senio r nava l

officer retur n t o th e city. Iwabuchi , who

now feare d tha t For t McKinle y migh t

fall t o th e Americans before th e defense s

within th e city , himsel f fel t compelle d

to return, a step he took o n th e morning

of 1 1 February.

On o r abou t 1 3 February , Genera l

Yokoyama, havin g receive d mor e infor -

mation, decide d tha t th e situatio n i n

Manila wa s beyond repair , an d directe d

Iwabuchi t o retur n t o For t McKinle y

and star t withdrawin g his troop s imme -

diately, withou t awaitin g th e Shimbu

Group counterattack . Tw o day s late r

General Yamashita , fro m hi s Bagui o

command pos t 12 5 miles t o th e north ,

stepped int o th e picture . Censurin g

General Yokoyama , th e 14th Area Army

commander first demanded t o know why

Admiral Iwabuch i ha d bee n permitte d

to return t o the city and second directed

Yokoyama t o ge t al l troop s ou t o f

Manila immediately .

Not unti l th e morning of 1 7 February

did Iwabuch i receiv e Yokoyama' s di -

rective o f th e 13t h and Yamashita' s

orders o f th e 15th . B y those date s XI V

Corps ha d cu t al l Japanes e route s o f

withdrawal, a fac t tha t wa s readil y ap -

parent to Admiral Iwabuchi. A s a result,

he mad e n o attemp t t o ge t an y troop s

out o f th e cit y unde r th e cove r o f th e

Shimbu Group's counterattack , whic h

was jus t a s well , sinc e tha t effor t wa s

unsuccessful.

Yokoyama ha d planne d t o counterat -

tack wit h tw o columns. O n th e north , a

force compose d o f tw o battalion s o f th e

31st Infantry, 8th Division, and two provisional infantr y battalion s fro m th e

105th Division wa s t o strik e acros s th e

Marikina Rive r fro m th e cente r o f th e

Shimbu Group's defenses , aimin g a t

Novaliches Da m an d Rout e 3 nort h o f

Manila.2 Th e souther n prong, consisting

of thre e provisiona l infantr y battalion s

of th e Kobayashi Force—formerly th e

Army's Manila Defense Force—were t o

drive acros s th e Marikin a towar d th e

Balara Wate r Filter s an d establis h con -

tact wit h th e norther n win g i n th e

vicinity o f Grac e Park.

The 112t h Cavalr y RCT , whic h ha d

replaced th e 12th Cavalry alon g th e 1s t

Cavalry Division' s lin e o f communica -

tions, brok e u p th e norther n wing' s

counterattack betwee n 1 5 an d 1 8 Feb -

ruary. I n th e Novaliches-Novaliche s

Dam area , an d i n a serie s o f skirmishe s

further wes t an d northwest , th e 112t h

Cavalry RCT dispatche d some 300 Japanese, losin g onl y 2 me n kille d an d 3 2

wounded. Un-co-ordinate d fro m th e

start, th e northern counterattac k turne d

into a shambles, and th e northern attac k

2

 Additional informatio n o n th e counterattac k ef -

fort i s from : 1s t Ca v Di v G- 2 Summar y Luzon , pp .

12-15; 112t h RCT Rp t Luzon , pp . 6-8; 1s t Ca v Div

Rpt Luzon, pp. 13-14 ; 7th Cav Rpt Luzon, pp. 13-14 ;

1st Ca v Di v G- 2 Jnl , 15-20 Feb 45 ; 8t h Ca v Rp t

Luzon, Novaliches Water Shed Phase , pp. 1-2; 2d Cav

Brig Rp t Luzon , pp . 6-7.
THE DRIV E TOWAR D INTRAMURO S 273

force withdrew in a disorganized manner

before i t accomplishe d anything .

The Kobayashi Force's effor t wa s

turned bac k o n th e morning of the 16th ,

when America n artiller y caugh t thi s

southern win g a s i t attempte d t o cros s

the Marikin a River . Durin g th e nex t

three days all Japanes e attacks were piecemeal i n natur e an d wer e throw n bac k

with littl e difficult y b y th e 7t h an d 8t h

Cavalry Regiments , operatin g eas t an d

northeast o f Manila . B y 1 9 February ,

when th e souther n counterattac k forc e

also withdrew , th e 2 d Cavalr y Brigad e

and suppor t artiller y ha d kille d abou t

650 Japanes e i n th e are a wes t o f th e

Marikina from Novaliche s Dam sout h t o

the Pasig . Th e brigad e los t abou t 1 5

men kille d an d 5 0 wounded.

The fac t tha t th e counterattac k wa s

completely unsuccessful i n either cutting

the XI V Corp s lines o f communication s

or opening a route of withdrawal for the

Manila Naval Defense Force doe s no t

seem t o hav e greatl y concerne d o r sur -

prised Genera l Yokoyama . H e di d no t

have much hop e o f success fro m th e be -

ginning, and , indeed , hi s ardo r fo r th e

venture wa s undoubtedl y dampene d b y

Admiral Iwabuchi' s adaman t attitud e

about makin g an y furthe r attemp t t o

withdraw fro m th e city , a n attitud e th e

admiral made ampl y clear o n th e morning o f th e 17th , the ver y da y tha t th e

counterattack wa s t o hav e reache d it s

peak o f penetration .

That mornin g Iwabuchi , truthfull y

enough, informe d Yokoyam a tha t with -

drawal o f th e bul k o f hi s force s fro m

Manila was no longer possible. H e wen t

on t o sa y that h e stil l considered th e de -

fense o f Manil a t o b e o f utmost importance an d tha t h e coul d no t continu e

organized operation s i n th e cit y shoul d

he attemp t t o mov e his headquarters o r

any othe r portio n o f hi s force s out .

Again o n 1 9 and 2 1 February Yokoyama

directed Iwabuch i t o withdraw . Iwa -

buchi wa s unmoved, replyin g tha t with -

drawal would result in quick annihilation

of th e force s makin g the attempt, whereas continue d resistanc e withi n th e cit y

would result in heavy losses to the attacking American forces. Genera l Yokoyama

suggested that Iwabuch i undertake night

withdrawals b y infiltratin g smal l group s

of me n throug h th e America n lines .

Past experienc e throughou t th e Pacifi c

war, th e Shimbu Group commande r

went on , ha d prove n th e feasibilit y o f

such undertakings . Ther e wa s n o re -

corded answe r t o thi s message , an d o n

23 February all communication between

the Shimbu Group and the Manila Naval

Defense Force ceased. Admiral Iwabuchi

had mad e hi s bed , an d h e wa s t o di e

in it .

Meanwhile, th e fightin g withi n Ma -

nila ha d rage d unabate d a s XI V Corp s

compressed th e Japanes e int o a n eve r

decreasing area . Outside , th e 11th Airborne Divisio n ha d cut of f the Southern

Force's Abe Battalion on hig h ground at

Mabato Point , o n th e northwes t shor e

of Lagun a d e Bay . There , betwee n 1 4

and 1 8 February, a battalion-size d guer -

rilla forc e unde r Maj . John D . Vanderpool, a specia l agen t sen t t o Luzo n b y

GHQ SWP A in October 1944 , contained

the Japanese unit.3 Fro m 1 8 through 2 3

February an 11th Airborne Division task

force, compose d o f thre e infantr y battalions closel y supporte d b y artillery , tan k

destroyers, an d Marin e Corp s SBD's ,

besieged the Abe Battalion. I n this final

3

 G-2 GH Q FEC , Intelligenc e Activitie s i n th e

Philippines During th e Japanese Occupation, 1 0 Jun

48, pp . 87-88, in OCM H files .
274 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

action th e Japanes e unit los t abou t 75 0

men killed ; th e 11th Airborne Divisio n

lost les s tha n 1 0 me n kille d an d 5 0

wounded—the burden o f th e attac k ha d

been born e principall y b y th e artiller y

and air support elements. Th e Abe Battalion's final stand made no tactical sense,

and a t leas t unti l 1 4 February th e uni t

could hav e escape d northeastwar d

practically unmolested. 4

The 4th Naval Battalion, cu t of f a t

Fort McKinle y whe n th e 5t h an d 12t h

Cavalry Regiment s pushe d t o Manil a

Bay, playe d the game a bit more shrewdly.

From 1 3 through 1 9 February element s

of th e 11t h Airborn e Division , comin g

northeast fro m th e Nichol s Fiel d area ,

and troop s o f th e 1s t Cavalr y Brigade ,

moving east along the south bank o f th e

Pasig River, cleared all the approaches to

Fort McKinle y i n a serie s o f patro l ac -

tions. When , o n th e 19th , troops o f th e

11th Airborn e an d element s o f th e 1s t

Cavalry Divisio n complete d th e occupa -

tion o f th e For t McKinle y area , the y

found tha t th e bul k o f the Japanes e had

fled. Whethe r b y Iwabuchi' s authorit y

or not, the 4th Naval Battalion, together

with remnants of th e 3d Naval Battalion

from Nichol s Field, had withdraw n eastward towar d th e Shimbu Group's mai n

defenses durin g th e nigh t o f 17-1 8 February. Som e 30 0 survivor s o f th e 3d

Naval Battalion thu s escaped , whil e th e

4th probabl y managed to evacuate about

1,000 me n o f it s origina l strengt h o f

nearly 1,400. 5

Inside th e city , a s of 1 2 February, Ad -

miral Iwabuch i stil l ha d unde r hi s control his Central Force (1st an d 2d Naval

Battalions), th e Headquarters Sector

Unit, the 5th Naval Battalion, the Northern Force's 3d Provisional Infantry Battalion an d servic e units , remnant s o f

Colonel Noguchi's 2d Provisional Infantry Battalion, and , finally , th e man y

miscellaneous nava l "attache d units. "

The 37t h Divisio n ha d decimate d th e

1st Naval Battalion a t Proviso r Islan d

and durin g th e fightin g throug h Pac o

and Pandaca n Districts ; th e 2d Provisional Infantry Battalion had lost heavily

in actio n agains t th e 1s t Cavalr y an d

37th Division s nort h o f th e Pasig ; th e

2d Naval Battalion, originall y holdin g

the extreme southern section o f the city,

had lost considerabl e strength t o the 1s t

Cavalry Brigad e an d th e 11th Airborne

Division; al l th e res t o f th e Japanes e

units ha d suffere d losse s fro m America n

artillery an d morta r fire . Th e tota l

strength no w availabl e t o Iwabuch i

within Manil a probabl y numbere d n o

more tha n 6,00 0 troops.

Perhaps more serious, from Iwabuchi 's

point o f view , wer e th e Japanes e heav y

weapons losses . B y 1 2 Februar y XI V

Corps ha d destroye d almost al l his artillery. Carefull y lai d America n artiller y

and morta r fire was rapidly knocking out

his remaining mortars a s well a s all ma -

chine gun s excep t fo r thos e emplace d

well withi n fortifie d buildings . Soo n

Iwabuchi's me n woul d b e reduce d t o

4

 Detailed informatio n o n th e Mabato Point action

is to be found in : 11t h A/ B Div Rpt Luzon , pp. 6, 17,

29; 11t h A/ B Di v G-3 Pe r Rpts , 19-2 3 Feb 45 ; 1s t

Bn 187t h Gli Inf Chron Narrativ e MIKE VI Opn, p. 9. 5

 Information o n th e For t McKinle y action s i s

from: XI V Corp s Rp t Luzon , pt . I , pp . 94-96 , 99 ,

227-29; 11th A/B Div Rpt Luzon , pp. 6, 17 , 29; 11th

A/B Di v G-3 Pe r Rpts , 13-2 0 Feb 45 ; 5th Ca v Rpt

Luzon, pp . 14-17 ; 12t h Ca v Rpt Luzon , p. 11 ; 188th

Inf Rp t Luzon , pp . 8-9.

On 1 3 February , durin g th e attac k towar d For t

McKinley fro m th e south , Pfc . Manuel Perez , Jr., o f

Company A , 511t h Parachut e Infantry , wo n th e

Medal o f Hono r fo r heroi c actio n i n reducin g

Japanese pillboxe s tha t ha d hel d u p th e advanc e o f

his company .
THE DRIV E TOWAR D INTRAMURO S 275

fighting principall y wit h ligh t machin e

guns, rifles, and han d grenades. Eve n so,

they were to demonstrate that they were

capable o f conductin g a most tenaciou s

and fanati c defense .

The Battles at the Strongpoints

A Forecast

After 1 2 February XI V Corp s troop s

found themselve s in a steady war of attrition. Street-to-street , building-to-build -

ing, and room-to-room fighting

characterized eac h day' s activity . Prog -

ress wa s sometime s measure d onl y i n

feet; man y day s sa w n o progres s a t all .

The fightin g became really "dirty." The

Japanese, looking forward onl y to death,

started committin g al l sort s o f excesses ,

both agains t th e cit y itsel f an d agains t

Filipinos unluck y enoug h t o remai n

under Japanes e control . A s tim e wen t

on, Japanes e comman d disintegrated .

Then, viciousnes s becam e uncontrolle d

and uncontrollable ; horro r mounte d

upon horror . Th e me n o f th e 37t h In -

fantry Divisio n and th e 1st Cavalr y Division witnessed the rape, sack, pillage, and

destruction o f a larg e par t o f Manil a

and becam e reluctan t partie s t o muc h

of th e destruction.

Although XIV Corps placed heavy dependence upo n artillery , tank , tan k de -

stroyer, mortar, an d bazook a fir e fo r al l

advances, cleaning out individua l buildings ultimatel y fel l t o individua l rifle -

men. T o accomplis h thi s work , th e

infantry brough t t o fruitio n a syste m

initiated north of the Pasig River. Smal l

units worked their wa y from on e build -

ing t o th e next, usuall y tryin g t o secur e

the roo f an d to p floo r first , ofte n b y

coming throug h th e uppe r floor s o f a n

adjoining structure . Usin g stairway s a s

axes o f advance , line s o f supply , an d

routes o f evacuation , troop s the n bega n

working thei r wa y dow n throug h th e

building. Fo r th e mos t part , squad s

broke u p int o smal l assaul t teams , on e

holding entrance s an d perhap s th e

ground floor—whe n tha t wa s wher e en -

trance had been gained—while the other

fought throug h th e building . I n man y

cases, wher e th e Japanes e blocke d stair -

ways and corridors, the American troops

found i t necessary to chop or blow hole s

through wall s an d floors . Unde r suc h

circumstances, han d grenades , flam e

throwers, and demolitions usually proved

requisites t o progress. 6

Casualties wer e seldo m hig h o n an y

one day . Fo r example , o n 1 2 February

the 129t h Infantry , operatin g alon g th e

south ban k o f the Pasi g in th e area near

Provisor Island , was held to gains of 15 0

yards a t th e cost o f 5 men kille d an d 2 8

wounded. Lo w a s thes e casualt y figure s

were fo r a regimenta l attack , th e attri -

tion—over 9 0 percen t o f i t occurrin g

among the front-line riflemen—deplete d

the infantry companies' effectiv e fightin g

strength a t a n alarmin g rate .

Each infantr y an d cavalr y regimen t

engaged sout h o f th e Pasi g foun d a par -

ticular grou p of building s t o b e a foca l

point o f Japanes e resistance . Whil e b y

12 Februar y XI V Corp s kne w tha t th e

final Japanes e stan d woul d b e mad e i n

Intramuros an d th e governmen t build -

ings ringin g th e Walle d Cit y fro m th e

east around to the south, progress toward

Intramuros would be held up for days as

each regiment concentrated its efforts o n

6

 Further detail s o f th e method s o f fightin g em -

ployed sout h o f th e Pasi g ar e t o b e foun d i n XI V

Corps, Japanes e Defens e o f Cities , pp . 2 , 10 , 13-14, 
Map 6
THE DRIV E TOWAR D INTRAMURO S 277

eliminating th e particula r strongpoint s

to its front . Ther e was, of course , fight -

ing practicall y every step of th e wa y west

from Ester o d e Pac o an d nort h fro m

Pasay subur b i n additio n t o th e battle s

at th e strongpoints. Thi s othe r fightin g

was, however, often without definite pattern—it wa s laborious, costly , an d tim e

consuming, and no single narrative could

follow i t i n detail . I t wa s als o usuall y

only incidenta l t o th e battle s takin g

place a t th e mor e fanaticall y defende d

strongpoints. I n brief , th e action a t th e

strongpoints decided the issue during the

drive towar d Intramuros .

Harrison Park to the Manila Hotel

When th e 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments reached Manil a Ba y in Pasa y suburb o n 1 2 February , completin g th e

encirclement o f Admira l Iwabuchi' s

forces, the y immediatel y turne d nort h

toward the cit y limits.7 (Map 6) The firs t

known Japanese strongpoint in this area

was locate d a t Harriso n Par k an d a t

Rizal Memoria l Stadiu m an d associate d

Olympic Game s facilitie s nea r th e ba y

front jus t insid e th e cit y limits . Th e

park-stadium comple x extende d fro m

the ba y east 1,20 0 yards t o Taft Avenu e

and north fro m Vit o Cruz Street—marking th e cit y limits—som e 70 0 yard s t o

Harrison Boulevard , th e 1s t Cavalr y

Division-37th Divisio n boundary . O n

the bay front la y the Manila Yacht Club

and th e ruins of Fort Abad, an old Span -

ish structure. Harriso n Park, a generally

open area surrounded by tree-lined roadways, was next inland. Eas t of the sout h

end o f th e par k la y a basebal l stadiu m

similar to any of the smaller "big league"

parks i n th e Unite d States . Du e nort h

and adjacen t t o th e bal l fiel d wa s Riza l

Stadium, buil t fo r Olympi c trac k an d

field event s an d including , inter alia, a

two-story, covered , concret e grandstand .

Still furthe r east , nea r th e bank s o f a

small stream , wa s a n indoo r coliseum ,

tennis court, and a swimming pool, reading sout h t o north . Beyon d th e smal l

stream an d facin g o n Taf t Avenu e la y

the large , three-stor y concret e buildin g

of L a Sall e University . Th e 2d Naval

Battalion an d variou s attache d provi -

sional units defended all thes e buildings.

The 12t h Cavalry and th e 2 d Squad -

ron, 5t h Cavalry , too k tw o day s t o figh t

their way north through Pasay suburb to

Vito Cru z Street , rootin g ou t scattere d

groups of Japanese who had holed up i n

homes throughout th e suburb. 8 Durin g

the attack , the 2 d Squadron o f th e 12t h

Cavalry extende d it s righ t flan k acros s

Taft Avenu e t o Sant a Escolastic a College, tw o block s southeas t o f L a Sall e

University.

On th e mornin g of 1 5 February, afte r

an hour of preparatory fire by one battalion o f 105-mm . howitzer s an d a secon d

7

 The genera l source s for U.S. operations described

in thi s chapte r are : XIV Corps Rp t Luzon , pt . I ,

pp. 89-113 ; XI V Corps, Japanes e Defens e o f Cities ,

passim; 37t h Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 37-77 ; 37t h Di v

G-3 Pe r Rpts, 10-23 Fe b 45; 1st Ca v Div Rpt Luzon ,

Narrative, pp . 4-14; Wright, 1st Cavalry Division in

WW II, pp. 130-33; 1st Cav Div G-3 Opn s Rpts, 12-

26 Fe b 45 ; 1st Ca v Brig Rp t Luzon , pt . I , pp . 2-6;

1st Ca v Brig S- 3 Pe r Rpts , 12-2 3 Fe b 45 ; 37t h Di v

G-3 Jnl s an d Jn l Files , 10-2 3 Feb 45 ; 1s t Ca v Di v

G-3 Jnl , 10-26 Feb 45; 2d Cav Brig Jnl Files , 10-23

Feb 45; XIV Corps Art y Rp t Luzon , pp . 11-12 ; 37t h

Div Arty Rpt Luzon , pp. 9-10; 1st Ca v Div Arty Rpt

Luzon, pt . II , Chro n Rcd , pp. 5-15; ibid., pt . III, Unit Jnl, 10-23 Feb 45.

8

 Additional materia l o n 5t h an d 12t h Cavalry

operations i s from : 12t h Cav Rp t Luzon , pp . 8-14;

12th Cav Uni t Rpts , 12-2 3 Fe b 45 ; 5t h Ca v Rp t

Luzon, pp . 10-27 ; 5t h Ca v S-3 Pe r Rpts, 12-2 3 Feb

45; 5t h Ca v S-2/S-3 Jnl, 12-23 Fe b 45 .
278 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

RIZAL BASEBAL L STADIU M

of 155-mm . howitzers, th e 12t h Cavalry

forced it s wa y int o L a Sall e Universit y

and th e Japanes e Club , jus t t o th e

south o f the universit y o n th e same sid e

of Taf t Avenue . Th e regimen t als o

made an unsuccessful attempt to get into

Rizal Stadium . Meanwhile , th e 5t h

Cavalry's squadron drove north along the

bay front , forcin g Japanes e defender s

caught i n th e ope n a t Harriso n Par k

into the stadium. Lat e in th e afternoon

cavalrymen broke into both th e baseball

park an d th e stadiu m fro m th e east bu t

were force d ou t a t dus k b y Japanes e

machine gun, rifle, an d morta r fire .

The 5t h Cavalr y cleare d th e basebal l

grounds o n 1 6 Februar y afte r thre e

tanks, havin g blasted an d battere d thei r

way throug h a cemen t wal l o n th e eas t

side o f th e park , go t int o th e playin g

field t o suppor t th e cavalryme n inside .

Resistance cam e fro m heav y bunker s

constructed al l ove r th e diamond , most

of the m locate d i n lef t fiel d an d i n lef t

center, an d fro m sandbagge d position s

under th e grandstan d beyon d th e thir d

base-left fiel d fou l line . Flam e throwers

and demolition s overcame th e las t resistance, an d b y 163 0 the 5t h Cavalr y ha d

finished th e job. Meanwhile, element s

of th e 12th Cavalry ha d cleane d ou t th e

coliseum, Riza l Stadium , an d th e ruin s
THE DRIV E TOWAR D INTRAMURO S 279

of For t Abad . Th e tw o unit s finishe d

mopping up during the 18th.

In th e fightin g i n th e Harriso n ParkRizal Stadium-La Salle Universit y area ,

the 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments lost

approximately 4 0 me n kille d an d 31 5

wounded.9 Th e 2d Naval Battalion, destroyed a s an effectiv e comba t force , los t

probably 75 0 me n killed , th e remnant s

fleeing northwar d t o joi n unit s fightin g

against element s o f th e 37t h Division .

The succes s a t th e park-stadiu m are a

paved the way for further advance s north

along the bay front, an d th e 12th Cavalry

had begu n preparation s fo r jus t suc h

advances while it wa s mopping up.

On 1 6 February , i n th e mids t o f th e

fighting i n th e stadiu m area , th e 1s t

Cavalry Brigad e (les s th e 2 d Squadron ,

12th Cavalry ) passe d t o th e contro l o f

the 37t h Division . Genera l Beightle r

directed th e brigad e t o secur e al l th e

ground stil l i n Japanes e hand s fro m

Harrison Par k nort h t o Isaa c Pera l

Street—fifteen block s an d 2,00 0 yard s

north o f Harriso n Boulevard—an d be -

tween th e ba y shor e an d Taf t Avenue .

The 5t h Cavalry , unde r thi s program ,

was t o reliev e th e 148t h Infantry , 37t h

Division, a t anothe r strongpoint , whil e

the 12t h Cavalry (les s 2d Squadron) wa s

to mak e th e attac k nort h alon g th e ba y

front. Th e 12th' s firs t objectiv e wa s the

prewar offic e an d residenc e o f th e U.S .

High Commissione r t o th e Philippines ,

lying o n th e ba y a t th e wester n en d o f

Padre Faura Street, thre e blocks short o f

Isaac Peral. 10

The 1s t Squadron , 12t h Cavalry,

began its drive northward a t 110 0 on 1 9

February, oppose d b y considerabl e rifle ,

machine gun, and 20-mm . machin e cannon fir e fro m th e Hig h Commissioner' s

residence an d fro m privat e club s an d

apartment buildings north and northeast

thereof. Wit h clos e support o f mediu m

tanks, the squadron's right flan k reache d

Padre Faur a Stree t b y dusk , leavin g th e

residence and grounds in Japanese hands.

During th e da y a Chines e guerrill a in -

formant—who claime d tha t hi s nam e

was Charlie Chan—told the 12th Cavalry

to expec t stif f oppositio n a t th e Army -

Navy an d Elk s Clubs , lyin g betwee n

Isaac Peral and th e next street north, San

Luis.11 Th e unit s als o expecte d opposi -

tion fro m apartment s an d hotel s acros s

Dewey Boulevard east o f the clubs. Th e

two clu b building s ha d originall y bee n

garrisoned by Admiral Iwabuchi's Headquarters Sector Unit, an d th e Manila

Naval Defense Force commande r ha d

apparently use d th e Army-Nav y Club a s

his command post for some time. Apart -

ments an d hotel s alon g th e eas t sid e o f

Dewey Boulevar d wer e probabl y de -

fended b y element s o f Headquarters

Battalion an d som e o f th e provisiona l

attached units .

Behind clos e artiller y support , th e

cavalry squadro n attacke d earl y o n 2 0

February an d b y 081 5 had overru n th e

last resistanc e i n th e Hig h Commissioner's residenc e an d o n th e surroundin g

grounds. Th e impetu s of the attac k carried th e squadron on throug h th e ArmyNavy and Elk s Clubs and u p t o San Luis

Street and also through most of the apartments, hotels , an d privat e home s lyin g

on th e eas t sid e o f Dewe y Boulevar d

9

 About hal f th e wounde d wer e returne d t o dut y

without hospitalization. 10

 XIV Corp s Opn s Mem o 19 , 1 6 Feb 45 , i n fil e o f

corps opns memos; XIV Corps FO 7 , 1 7 Feb 45 , Sixth

Army G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 16-1 8 Feb 45 ; 37t h Di v

Opns Mem o 7 , 1 7 Feb 45 , XIV Corp s G- 3 Jn l File .

17-18 Fe b 45 ; 12t h Cav Rp t Luzon , pp . 11-12 . 11

 12t h Cav Unit Rp t 19 , 19 Feb 45 .
280 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

from Padr e Faur a nort h t o Sa n Luis .

Only 3 0 Japanes e wer e kille d i n thi s

once-important Manila Naval Defense

Force comman d pos t area ; th e res t ha d

fled int o Intramuro s o r bee n use d a s reinforcements elsewhere . Th e 1s t Squad -

ron, 12t h Cavalry , lost 3 men kille d an d

19 wounde d durin g th e day , almost th e

exact rati o o f casualtie s bein g incurre d

by othe r U.S. unit s fightin g throughou t

Manila.

Now facin g th e cavalrymen across San

Luis Stree t wer e th e wide , ope n par k

areas o f Ne w Luneta , Burnha m Green ,

Old Luneta , an d th e wester n portio n o f

Wallace Field , readin g fro m th e ba y in -

land. Abou t 500 yards north across Burnham Green loomed the five-story concrete

bulk o f th e Manil a Hotel , an d nort h o f

Old Lunet a an d Wallac e Fiel d la y In -

tramuros. Th e Sout h Por t Area la y just

northwest o f the Manil a Hotel , th e next

objective. I n preparatio n fo r th e attac k

on th e hotel, the 82 d Field Artillery Battalion intermittentl y shelle d th e build -

ing and surrounding grounds throughout

the night . A patro l o f Troop B dug i n

along the north edg e of Burnham Gree n

to preven t Japanes e i n th e hote l fro m

breaking ou t t o reoccup y abandone d

bunkers in th e open par k area .

With artiller y support an d th e ai d o f

two 105-mm . self-propelle d mount s an d

a platoo n o f mediu m tanks , th e 1s t

Squadron dashe d int o th e hote l o n th e

morning of 21 February. A s was the case

in othe r larg e building s throughou t th e

city, th e hote l containe d a serie s o f in -

terior strongpoints , th e basemen t an d

underground passage s bein g especiall y

strongly held . Nevertheless , th e hotel' s

eastern, o r old , wing wa s secured prac -

tically intac t b y midafternoon . Som e

Japanese stil l defende d th e basemen t

and th e ne w (west ) wing , bu t th e cav -

alrymen cleane d the m ou t th e nex t day .

The ne w wing , includin g a penthous e

where General MacArthur had made his

prewar home , wa s gutte d durin g th e

fight, an d th e general' s penthous e wa s

demolished.12

The New Police Station

Just a s on e Japanes e strongpoin t wa s

located o n th e lef t (west ) o f th e Ameri -

can force s fightin g i n Manila , s o ther e

was anothe r blockin g th e roa d t o Intra -

muros o n th e America n right , i n th e

sector o f th e 129t h Infantry , whic h ha d

completed th e reductio n o f Proviso r

Island on 1 2 February. Th e 129th' s particular bêt e noir e wa s a bloc k o f build -

ings bounde d o n th e nort h b y a n un -

named east-wes t extensio n o f th e Ester o

Provisor, o n th e eas t b y Marque s d e

Comillas Street , o n th e sout h b y Isaa c

Peral Street (her e the boundary between

the 129t h an d 148t h Infantr y Regi -

ments), an d o n th e wes t b y Sa n Mar -

celino Stree t — the whol e are a bein g

about 20 0 yard s wid e eas t t o wes t an d

400 yards long. Th e foca l poin t o f Japa -

nese resistance i n thi s are a wa s the Ne w

Police Station , locate d o n th e northwest

corner o f San Marcelin o and Isaa c Peral

Streets. A t th e northeas t corne r wa s a

three-story concret e sho e factory , nort h

of which , coverin g th e bloc k betwee n

San Marcelino and Marques de Comillas,

was the Manil a Club. Nort h o f th e club

were th e building s o f Sant a Teresit a

College, an d wes t o f th e college , acros s

12

 Personal observatio n o f th e author . I n Apri l

1945 the old win g was repaired an d here , ultimately,

were domicile d man y mal e officer s o f GH Q SWPA ,

though on e floo r wa s give n ove r t o WA C officer s

assigned t o tha t headquarters. N o attempt was made

to repair th e new wing during th e war.
THE DRIV E TOWAR D INTRAMURO S 281

MANILA HOTE L I N RUINS

San Marcelino , la y Sa n Pabl o Churc h

and attached convent. Al l approaches to

these building s la y across ope n groun d

and wer e covere d b y grazin g machin e

gun fire . Th e Japanes e ha d stron g de -

fenses bot h insid e an d outsid e eac h

building an d covere d eac h wit h mutu -

ally supportin g fire . Th e Ne w Polic e

Station, tw o storie s o f reinforce d con -

crete an d a larg e basement , feature d

inside an d outsid e bunkers , i n bot h o f

which machin e gunner s an d rifleme n

holed up . Th e 129t h Infantry , whic h

had previousl y see n actio n a t Bougain -

ville and against the Kembu Group, and

which subsequentl y ha d a roug h tim e

against th e Shobu Group i n norther n

Luzon, late r characterize d th e combined

collection o f obstacles in th e New Police

Station are a a s th e mos t formidabl e th e

regiment encountere d durin g th e war. 13

The realizatio n tha t th e strongpoint wa s

well defende d wa s n o comfor t t o th e

129th Infantry , sinc e unti l th e regimen t

cleared th e are a neithe r it s lef t no r th e

148th Infantry' s righ t coul d mak e an y

progress. Th e 37t h Division , moreover ,

13

 129t h In f Rp t Luzon , p . 6 . Additiona l materia l

on 129t h Infantr y operation s in this chapter is from:

129th Inf Rpt Luzon , pp. 7-9; 129t h In f Hist 1810 -

1945, pp . 62-66; 129t h In f S- 3 Pe r Rpts , 10-2 3 Fe b

45; 129t h In f Regt l Jnl, 10-33 Fe b 45 .
282 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

could not simpl y contain and bypass th e

strongpoint, for t o d o s o would produc e

a deep and dangerou s salient in th e division lines as the drive toward Intramuro s

progressed.

While th e 129t h Infantry' s right—th e

2d Battalion—ha d bee n completin g th e

reduction o f Japanes e defense s o n Pro -

visor Island , th e lef t an d center , o n 1 0

and 1 1 February, ha d move d westwar d

in th e are a betwee n Isaa c Pera l Stree t

and Proviso r Islan d generall y u p t o th e

line o f Marque s d e Comilla s Street .

During the 12t h th e 2d Battalion crossed

to th e mainlan d fro m th e west shor e o f

Provisor Islan d bu t despit e clos e an d

plentiful artiller y suppor t coul d mak e

scarcely 15 0 yard s westwar d alon g th e

south ban k o f th e Pasig . O n th e sam e

day th e res t o f th e regimen t di d littl e

more tha n straighte n ou t its lines alon g

Marques d e Comillas . Attack s o n th e

New Police Station and th e Manila Club

on 1 3 February were unsuccessful. Shell s

of supportin g 155-mm . howitzer s ha d

little effec t o n th e tw o buildings , an d

even point-blan k fir e fro m a tan k de -

stroyer's high-velocit y 76-mm . gu n an d

105-mm. high-explosive shells from Can -

non Company 's self-propelle d mount s

did littl e t o reduc e th e volum e o f

Japanese fire .

On th e mornin g o f th e 14th , Com -

pany A, 754th Tank Battalion , came u p

to reinforc e th e 129t h Infantry. 14 Be -

hind close support from th e tanks, Company B , 129t h Infantry , gaine d access t o

the Manil a Club ; Compan y A , 129t h

Infantry, entere d window s o n th e firs t

floor o f th e Ne w Polic e Station ; an d a

platoon of Company C made its way into

the polic e station' s basement . Havin g

attacked a t firs t light . Compan y A ha d

surprised th e Japanes e befor e the y ha d

reoccupied position s vacate d durin g th e

American preassaul t artiller y an d tan k

bombardment, bu t th e Japanes e soo n

recovered an d pu t u p a stron g figh t

through th e corridors an d room s o f th e

police station's firs t floor . Som e exten t

of th e strength and natur e of the defenses

is indicate d b y th e fac t tha t th e 129t h

Infantry destroyed thre e sandbagged ma -

chine gu n position s i n on e roo m alone .

Progress throug h th e basemen t an d

first floo r wa s slow bu t satisfactor y unti l

the Japanes e started dropping hand gre -

nades throug h hole s choppe d i n th e

second story' s floor . Wit h stairway s de -

stroyed o r to o wel l defende d t o permi t

infantry assault , Compan y A foun d n o

way t o counte r th e Japanes e tactics— a

good exampl e of wh y the troop s usuall y

tried t o secur e th e to p stor y o f a de -

fended buildin g first. Evacuatio n proved

necessary, an d b y dus k th e Compan y A

and C elements were back along Marques

de Comilla s Street , Company B holding

within th e Manil a Club .

On 1 5 and 1 6 February onl y probin g

attacks wer e mad e a t th e Ne w Polic e

Station, th e sho e factory , an d Sant a

Teresita College , whil e tanks, TD's, M 7

SPM's, an d 105-mm . artillery kep t u p a

steady fir e agains t al l building s stil l i n

Japanese hands. Eve n thes e probin g ac -

tions cost th e 1s t Battalion, 129t h Infan -

try, 1 6 me n kille d an d 5 8 wounded .

During the morning of the 17t h th e battalion secure d th e shattere d sho e factory

and entere d Sant a Teresita College , but

its hold a t th e college, tenuou s from th e

beginning, wa s given u p a s th e 1s t Bat -

talion, 145t h Infantry , move d int o th e

area t o relieve the 129th . Th e Ne w Po14

 Additional informatio n o n tan k actio n i s fro m

754th Tan k Battalio n Repor t Luzon , Phas e VI ,

Battle o f Manila .
THE DRIV E TOWAR D INTRAMURO S 283

lice Station , stil l th e majo r stronghold ,

was stil l firml y i n Japanes e hand s whe n

the 129t h Infantr y left .

The 1s t Battalion , 145t h Infantry ,

took u p th e attac k abou t 101 5 on th e

18th behin d hundred s o f round s o f pre -

paratory fir e fro m tank s and M7's. 15 The

battalion cleare d th e sho e factor y an d

Santa Teresit a Colleg e fo r good , an d

once mor e gaine d a foothol d insid e th e

New Polic e Station . Nevertheless , op -

position remaine d stron g al l throug h

the interio r o f th e polic e station , whil e

every movemen t o f me n pas t hole s

blown i n th e northwest walls by supporting artillery brought down Japanese machine gu n an d rifl e fir e fro m Sa n Pabl o

Church, tw o block s t o th e north . Th e

145th Infantry , lik e th e 129t h befor e it ,

found it s gri p o n th e Ne w Polic e Sta -

tion untenabl e an d withdre w durin g

the afternoon .

Throughout th e mornin g o f 1 9 Feb -

ruary th e polic e statio n an d th e churc h

were bombarde d b y th e 75-mm . guns o f

a platoo n o f Sherma n M 3 tanks , a pla -

toon o f M 4 tank s mountin g 105-mm .

howitzers, a platoo n o f 105-mm . SPM's,

and mos t o f a 105-mm . fiel d artiller y

battalion. Durin g th e afternoo n Com -

pany B , 145t h Infantry , fough t it s wa y

into th e eas t win g o f th e polic e station ,

while other troops cleaned out Sa n Pablo

Church an d th e adjoinin g conven t

against suddenl y diminishe d opposition .

The hol d o n th e Ne w Polic e Station —

the Japanes e stil l defende d th e wes t

wing — again prove d untenabl e an d

again th e troop s ha d t o withdraw . Fi -

nally, afte r mor e artiller y an d tan k fir e

had almos t demolishe d th e building ,

Company C, 145t h Infantry , secure d th e

ruins o n 2 0 February .

The reductio n o f th e Ne w Polic e

Station strongpoin t an d th e nearb y de -

fended building s ha d consume d eigh t

full day s o f heav y fighting . Th e seizur e

of th e polic e statio n buildin g alon e ha d

cost th e 37t h Divisio n approximatel y

25 me n kille d an d 8 0 wounded , whil e

the 754t h Tank Battalio n lost thre e me -

diums i n fron t o f th e structure . Th e

37th Divisio n coul d mak e n o accurat e

estimate o f Japanes e casualtie s sinc e th e

Japanese, who still controlled the ground

to th e west , ha d bee n abl e t o reinforc e

and evacuate at will. Durin g the fight the

37th Divisio n an d it s supportin g unit s

had demolishe d th e Ne w Police Station ,

virtually destroyed th e sho e factory , an d

damaged severel y San Pabl o Church an d

the Manil a Club . Havin g reduce d th e

strongpoint, th e 37t h Division' s cente r

was no w abl e t o resum e it s advanc e to -

ward Intramuros . Meanwhile , it s righ t

and it s lef t ha d bee n engage d a t othe r

centers o f resistanc e blockin g th e

approaches t o th e fina l objective .

The City Hall and the General

Post Office

Each strongpoin t o f th e Japanes e

defenses an d eac h buildin g withi n eac h

strongpoint presented peculiar problems,

and th e attackin g infantry , whil e oper -

ating withi n a genera l pattern , ha d t o

devise specia l offensiv e variation s fo r

each. Suc h wa s the cas e a t th e Genera l

Post Office , locate d near the south end o f

Jones Bridge, and a t the City Hall, a few

blocks sout h alon g Padr e Burgo s Stree t

18

 Additional informatio n i n thi s chapte r o n 145t h

Infantry operation s i s from : 145t h In f Rp t Luzon ,

pp. 20-29 ; 145t h In f S- 3 Pe r Rpts , 12-2 3 Feb 45 ;

145th Inf S-1 an d S-3 Jnls, 12-23 Feb 45; 716th Tank

Bn Rp t Luzon , Assaul t Gu n Platoo n Actio n i n

Manila.
284 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

NEW POLIC E STATIO N

from th e pos t offic e an d acros s Padr e

Burgos fro m th e fille d moa t alon g th e

east sid e o f Intramuros . Th e 129t h In -

fantry ha d cleare d building s alon g th e

south ban k o f th e Pasi g fro m Proviso r

Island t o withi n 30 0 yard s o f Quezo n

Bridge an d nort h o f th e Ne w Polic e

Station strongpoin t t o position s a bloc k

from th e Cit y Hall . Th e 1s t Battalion ,

145th Infantry , relieve d unit s o f th e

129th alon g th e Pasi g o n 1 7 February ,

while th e 3 d Battalion , 145th , too k ove r

in th e vicinit y o f th e Cit y Hal l o n th e

19th. The 81-mm . mortars o f th e 129t h In -

fantry ha d onc e se t afir e th e four-stor y

concrete City Hall, but th e fir e ha d done

little damag e an d ha d faile d t o driv e

out th e Japanes e defender s wh o num -

bered, a s of 2 0 February , approximately

200 men . On th e 20t h th e 105-mm .

SPM's o f Canno n Company , 145t h In -

fantry, aide d b y a single 155-mm . howitzer, ble w a hol e i n th e building' s eas t

wall throug h whic h a platoo n o f th e

145th Infantry , covere d b y machine gun

and rifl e fir e a s i t dashe d acros s inter -

vening open ground, gained access. Jap -

anese fir e force d th e platoo n ou t almos t

as fas t a s i t ha d entered . Th e nex t da y

all o f Compan y I , 145t h Infantry , go t

into the City Hall afte r SPM's and TD's

had knocke d dow n th e oute r wall s o f

the eas t wing . Agai n th e hol d prove d

untenable. O n th e mornin g o f 2 2 February tanks , TD's, SPM 's, an d 155-mm .

howitzers lai d point-blan k fir e agains t

the east wing , pulverizin g it, whil e 105 -

mm. howitzers , 4.2-inc h mortars , an d

81-mm. mortar s plastere d th e roo f an d

upper floor s wit h indirec t fire .

Company I re-entere d th e Cit y Hal l

about 090 0 o n th e 22d . Using subma -

chine guns , bazookas , flam e throwers ,

demolitions, an d han d grenades , th e

company fough t it s wa y throug h th e
THE DRIV E TOWAR D INTRAMURO S 285

sound par t o f th e structur e roo m b y

room an d overcam e most o f th e resist -

ance b y 1500 , but 20-od d Japanes e hel d

out i n a firs t floo r room . Sinc e the y

showed n o inclinatio n t o surrender —

although invite d t o d o so—Compan y I

blew hole s throug h th e ceilin g fro m

above and , stickin g th e busines s en d o f

flame thrower s throug h th e holes , sum -

marily ende d th e fight . Removin g 20 6

Japanese bodie s fro m th e Cit y Hall , th e

145th Infantr y als o quickl y cleare d th e

rubble fro m th e west wing , wher e i t se t

up machine gun position s in windows to

support th e assaul t o n Intramuros. 16

The figh t fo r th e Genera l Pos t Office ,

conducted simultaneousl y wit h tha t fo r

the Cit y Hall , wa s especiall y difficul t

because of th e construction o f th e build -

ing an d th e natur e o f th e interio r de -

fenses. A large , five-stor y structur e o f

earthquake-proof, heavily reinforced concrete, th e Post Offic e wa s practically im -

pervious t o direc t artillery , tank , an d

tank destroye r fire . Th e interio r wa s so

compartmented by strong partitions that

even a 155-mm . shel l goin g directl y

through a windo w di d relativel y littl e

damage inside . Th e Japanes e had heav -

ily barricade d al l room s an d corridors ,

had protecte d thei r machin e gunner s

and rifleme n wit h fortification s seve n

feet hig h an d te n sandbag s thick , ha d

strung barbe d wir e throughout , an d

even ha d haule d a 105-mm . artiller y

piece up to the second floor. Th e build -

ing wa s practicall y impregnabl e t o any -

thing excep t prolonged , heav y ai r an d

artillery bombardment , an d wh y th e

Japanese mad e n o greate r effor t t o hol d

the structur e i s a mystery , especiall y

since i t blocke d th e northeaster n ap -

proaches t o Intramuro s an d wa s con -

nected t o th e Walle d Cit y b y a trenc h

and tunne l system . Despit e thes e con -

nections, th e origina l garriso n o f th e

Post Offic e receive d fe w reinforcements

during th e fightin g and , manifestl y un -

der orders to hold ou t t o th e death, was

gradually whittle d awa y b y America n

artillery bombardmen t an d infantr y

assaults.

For thre e day s XI V Corp s an d 37t h

Division Artiller y pounde d th e Pos t

Office, bu t eac h tim e troop s o f th e 1s t

Battalion, 145t h Infantry , attempte d t o

enter th e Japanes e drov e the m out. Finally, o n th e mornin g o f 2 2 February ,

elements o f th e 1s t Battalio n gaine d a

secure foothold , enterin g throug h a sec -

ond stor y window . Th e Japanes e wh o

were stil l aliv e soo n retreate d int o th e

large, dar k basement , wher e th e 145t h

Infantry's troop s finishe d of f organize d

resistance on th e 23d. Nothin g spectacular occurred—the action was just another

dirty job of gradually overcoming fanatic

resistance, a proces s wit h whic h th e in -

fantry o f th e 37t h Divisio n wa s b y no w

all to o thoroughl y accustomed. 17

The Hospital and the University

The foca l poin t of Japanes e resistance

in th e 148t h Infantry' s zon e was the area

covered b y the Philippin e Genera l Hos -

pital an d th e Universit y o f th e Philip -

pines.18 Th e hospital-universit y complex

16

 GHQ SWP A ultimatel y use d th e wes t wing —

repaired b y mid-April—fo r offic e spac e durin g th e

headquarters' sta y i n Manilla .

17

 Additional informatio n o n th e Pos t Offic e figh t

came from: Milto n Comments, 1 5 Dec 56 ; Beightle r

Comments, 1 8 Ma r 57 . 18

 Additional informatio n o n 148t h Infantr y opera -

tions i s from : 148t h In f Rp t Luzon , pt . I , pp . 6-9 ;

148th In f S-1 an d S-3 Pe r Rpts , 12-2 3 Feb 45; 148th

Inf S- 3 Jnl, 12-23 Fe b 45 .
286 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

stretched abou t 1,00 0 yards sout h fro m

Isaac Pera l Stree t alon g th e wes t sid e o f

Taft Avenu e to Herran Street. Th e hos -

pital an d associate d building s extende d

west alon g th e nort h sid e o f Herra n

about 55 0 yard s t o Dakot a Avenu e

while, about midway between Isaa c Peral

and Herran , Padr e Faur a Stree t sepa -

rated th e hospita l an d th e universit y

grounds.

Fortified i n violatio n o f th e Genev a

Convention — Japan, lik e th e Unite d

States, wa s no t a signator y power , bu t

both had agreed t o abide by the convention's rules—th e hospita l buildings , al l

of reinforce d concrete , wer e clearl y

marked b y larg e re d crosse s o n thei r

roofs, an d the y contained man y Filipino

patients who were, in effect , hel d hostage

by th e Japanese . XI V Corp s ha d ini -

tially prohibite d artiller y fir e o n th e

buildings, bu t lifte d th e restrictio n o n

12 Februar y whe n th e 148t h Infantr y

discovered tha t th e hospita l wa s de -

fended. Th e presenc e o f th e civilia n

patients di d no t becom e know n fo r

another tw o or thre e days.

On 1 3 Februar y th e 148t h Infantry ,

having fough t ever y ste p o f th e wa y

from th e Ester o de Paco , bega n t o reach

Taft Avenu e an d ge t int o positio n fo r

an attac k o n th e hospital . O n tha t da y

the lef t flan k extende d alon g Taft fro m

Herran sout h fou r block s t o Harriso n

Boulevard, the 148t h Infantry-12t h Cav -

alry boundary . Th e infantry' s extrem e

right wa s hel d u p abou t thre e block s

short of Taft Avenue , unable to advance

until th e 129t h and 145t h Infantr y overran th e New Police Statio n strongpoint .

By evenin g th e cente r an d mos t o f th e

right flan k element s ha d learne d th e

hard wa y tha t th e Japanes e ha d al l th e

east-west streets east o f Taft Avenu e covered b y automati c weapons emplace d i n

the hospita l an d universit y buildings .

The 148t h could not emplo y these streets

as approache s t o th e objectives , an d th e

regiment accordingly prepared t o assault

via th e building s an d bac k yard s o n th e

east sid e o f Taft .

On 1 4 Februar y th e 2 d Battalion ,

148th Infantry , tryin g t o pus h acros s

Taft Avenue , foun d tha t th e Japanes e

had s o arranged their defense s tha t cross

fires covere d al l approache s t o th e hos -

pital an d universit y buildings . Th e

defenders ha d du g well-constructe d ma -

chine gu n emplacement s into th e foun -

dations o f most o f th e buildings ; insid e

they ha d sandbagge d position s o n th e

first floors ; lastly , Japanes e rifleme n an d

machine gunner s wer e statione d a t th e

windows of upper stories to good advan -

tage. Th e Japanese , i n brief , stoppe d

the America n battalio n wit h mortar ,

machine gun, an d rifl e fir e fro m th e Sci -

ence Buildin g an d adjacen t structure s

at th e northwes t corne r o f Taf t an d

Herran, fro m th e mai n hospita l build -

ings o n th e wes t sid e o f Taf t betwee n

California an d Oregon , an d fro m th e

Nurses' Dormitor y a t th e northwes t

corner o f Taft an d Isaa c Peral. O n th e

left th e 3 d Battalion , pushing west across

Taft Avenu e south of Herran Street, had

intended t o advanc e o n t o Manil a Bay ,

but halted , lest i t becom e cu t off , when

the rest o f th e regimen t stopped .

On th e 14th , a t th e cos t o f 2 2 killed

and 2 9 wounded , th e 148t h Infantr y

again coul d mak e onl y negligibl e gains.

Indeed, th e progress th e regiment mad e

during th e 14t h ha d depende d largel y

upon heav y artiller y an d morta r sup -

port. Th e 140t h Fiel d Artiller y fire d

2,091 round s o f high-explosiv e 105-mm .

ammunition, an d 4.2-inc h mortar s o f
THE DRIV E TOWAR D INTRAMURO S 287

the 82 d Chemica l Morta r Battalio n ex -

pended 1,10 1 round s o f hig h explosiv e

and 26 4 rounds o f whit e phosphorus. 19

The whit e phosphorus, setting some fire s

in a residential distric t sout h o f th e hospital, helpe d th e advanc e o f th e 3 d

Battalion, but neithe r this nor th e high -

explosive shell s appreciabl y decrease d

the scale of Japanese fire from th e hospital

and university .

On 1 5 Februar y th e 3 d Battalio n

reached Manil a Bay via Herran Street —

before th e 12t h Cavalry wa s tha t fa r

north—and then wheeled right to assault

the hospita l fro m th e south . Tha t da y

the 2 d Battalion, in th e center, was again

unable t o mak e an y gain s westwar d

across Taft Avenue , but o n th e 16t h ha d

limited succes s i n a genera l assaul t

against th e mai n hospita l buildings , th e

Science Building (a t the northwest corner o f Taf t an d Herran) , th e Medica l

School (jus t wes t o f th e Scienc e Build -

ing), an d th e Nurses ' Dormitory . Th e

Nurses' Dormitory , dominatin g th e

northern approache s t o th e universit y

buildings, actuall y la y i n th e 129t h In -

fantry's zone , but th e 148t h attacked th e

dormitory becaus e th e 129t h wa s stil l

held u p a t th e Ne w Polic e Station .

By afternoo n o f th e 16t h th e 148t h

Infantry ha d learne d tha t some Filipin o

civilians wer e i n th e hospital . Makin g

every possibl e effort t o protec t th e civilian patients , th e 2 d Battalion , 148t h In -

fantry, whic h ha d t o direc t th e fir e o f

tanks, tank destroyers, and self-propelle d

mounts agains t ever y structur e i n it s

path i n orde r t o gain an y ground a t all,

limited its support fires at the hospital to

the foundatio n defense s insofa r a s prac -

ticable. Wit h th e ai d o f th e clos e sup -

port fires, th e battalion grabbed and hel d

a foothold i n the Nurses' Dormitory after

bitter room-to-roo m fighting . Furthe r

south, othe r troops, still unabl e t o reach

the Medica l School , ha d t o giv e u p a

tenuous hol d i n th e Scienc e Buildin g

when most o f th e 2 d Battalio n withdrew

to th e eas t sid e o f Taft Avenu e fo r th e

night. Th e cos t o f th e disappointin g

gains wa s 5 men kille d an d 4 0 wounded

—the attritio n continued .

During 1 7 February , wit h th e ai d o f

support fire s fro m th e 1s t Battalion , now

on th e sout h sid e o f Herra n Street , th e

2d Battalio n smashe d it s wa y int o th e

two mos t easterl y o f th e hospital' s fou r

wings an d overra n th e las t resistanc e i n

the Nurses ' Dormitor y an d th e Scienc e

Building. Th e advanc e might have gone

faster ha d it not bee n necessary to evacu -

ate patients an d othe r Filipin o civilian s

from th e hospital . B y dus k ove r 2,00 0

civilians ha d com e ou t o f th e buildings;

the 148t h Infantr y conducted 5,000 more

to safet y tha t night . A t th e en d o f th e

17th th e 148t h ha d overcom e almost al l

opposition excep t tha t a t th e Medica l

School and i n a small grou p of buildings

facing Padr e Faur a Stree t a t th e north -

western corne r o f th e hospita l grounds.

Throughout the 18t h th e 148t h Infan -

try moppe d u p an d consolidate d gains ,

and o n th e mornin g o f th e 19t h th e 5t h

Cavalry relieve d th e infantr y regiment .

The cavalryme n wer e t o complet e th e

occupation o f th e hospita l buildings, de -

stroy the Japanese at th e university , and

clear Assumptio n College , lyin g west o f

the Medica l School. Th e 148t h Infantr y

relinquished it s hol d o n th e Medica l

School before th e 5th Cavalry completed

19

 Almost al l informatio n o n th e 148t h Infantry' s

mortar an d artiller y suppor t come s fro m th e regi -

mental S- 3 reports. Se e also 140t h F A Bn Uni t Jnl ,

12-23 Fe b 45; 140th F A Bn S-3 Pe r Rpts, 12-2 3 Fe b

45.
288 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

its relief, 20 an d th e cavalr y regimen t

started it s fightin g wit h a ne w assaul t

there, movin g i n behin d point-blan k

fire fro m supportin g mediu m tanks .

Troop G , 5t h Cavalry , gaine d acces s b y

dashing alon g a n 8-foot-hig h wal l con -

necting the Medical School to the Science

Building. Employin g flam e thrower s

and bazooka s a s it s principa l assaul t

weapons, th e troo p cleared th e Medica l

School b y dark o n th e 19th , claiming t o

have killed 15 0 Japanese in th e action.

21

The cavalr y als o secure d Assumptio n

College an d a fe w smal l building s o n

the hospita l ground s tha t th e 148t h In -

fantry ha d no t cleared . Th e 5th' s firs t

day o f actio n a t th e hospital-universit y

strongpoint cos t th e regimen t 1 kille d

and 1 1 wounded.

The 5t h Cavalry , leavin g element s

behind t o complet e th e mop-u p a t th e

hospital, turne d it s attentio n t o Riza l

Hall, the largest building on th e university campus. Centrall y locate d an d con -

structed o f reinforce d concrete , Riza l

Hall face d sout h o n th e nort h sid e o f

Padre Faur a Street . Th e Japanes e ha d

strongly fortifie d th e building , cuttin g

slits fo r machin e gun s throug h th e portion o f th e foundation s lyin g just abov e

ground, barricading doors and windows,

emplacing machine guns on th e fla t roof,

and setting up the ubiquitous sandbagged

machine gu n nest s inside .

After a two-hou r tan k an d tan k de -

stroyer bombardment , a Troo p B pla -

toon entere d fro m th e eas t abou t 113 0

on 2 0 February . Durin g th e shellin g

most o f th e Japanes e ha d take n refug e

in th e basement, but reoccupied defenses

on th e thre e uppe r floor s befor e th e

cavalry coul d gai n contro l o f th e stair -

ways. Nevertheless , th e platoo n cleare d

the firs t floo r an d secure d a foothol d o n

the secon d afte r tw o hour s o f fighting .

The smal l forc e the n stalled , bu t th e

squadron commande r decline d t o sen d

reinforcements int o th e building . First ,

the interio r wa s so compartmented tha t

only two or thre e men coul d actuall y be

engaged a t an y on e point ; mor e woul d

only get i n eac h other's way. Second, he

feared tha t th e Japanes e might blow th e

building at an y moment.

Accordingly, th e Troo p B platoo n

resumed it s lonel y figh t and , without

losing a single man, reached the top floo r

about 1700 . Half a n hou r late r th e

squadron commander 's fea r o f demoli -

tions prove d wel l founded , fo r Japanes e

hidden i n th e basemen t se t of f a terrifi c

explosion tha t tor e out th e entire center

of Riza l Hall , killin g 1 cavalryman an d

wounding 4 others . Th e platoo n

withdrew fo r th e night .

A simila r experienc e had bee n th e lot

of Troop G in the Administration Building at the southwest corner of the university campus . Th e troo p ha d cleare d

about hal f it s buildin g b y 1700 , whe n

explosions o n th e Japanese-hel d thir d

floor force d i t out. Action at Riza l Hall ,

the Administratio n Building , an d othe r

structures in th e university-hospita l are a

cost the 5th Cavalry another 9 men killed

and 4 7 wounded o n th e 20th .

The regimen t took the Administration

Building against littl e oppositio n o n 2 1

February, but did no t secur e Rizal Hall ,

20

 General Beightler , commentin g o n thi s passage ,

called it " a misstatemen t of fact " and a n "attemp t t o

belittle th e 37t h Division. " Beightle r Comments , 1 8

Mar 57 . Th e author' s accoun t i s base d upo n th e

5th Cavalry' s records : 5t h Ca v Rp t Luzon , p . 17 ;

5th Ca v S-2/S-3 Jnl, 19 Feb 45; 5t h Cav S-2 Pe r Rp t

14, 19-2 0 Fe b 45 ; 5t h Ca v S- 3 Pe r Rpt s 1 5 and 16 ,

18-19 an d 19-2 0 Fe b 45. The 148t h Infantr y records

contain n o informatio n o n th e point . 21

 The clai m probabl y include s dead foun d withi n

the building .
THE DRIV E TOWAR D INTRAMURO S 289

RIZAL HALL

which i t lef t i n a shambles , unti l th e

24th. Th e Japanes e garriso n a t Riza l

Hall alon e ha d numbere d a t leas t 25 0

men, th e last 75 of whom committed sui -

cide during the night of 23-24 February.

The 5t h Cavalr y cleare d othe r build -

ings o n th e campu s durin g 2 2 an d 2 3

February, and ra n int o some new defen -

sive installation s a t Universit y Hall, be -

tween Riza l Hall and th e Administration

Building. Her e Troo p E foun d cave s

dug throug h th e wall s o f th e basemen t

and coul d no t dislodg e th e Japanes e

even wit h flam e throwers . Thereupo n

engineers poure d a mixtur e o f gasolin e

and oil into the various caves and ignite d

it. Tha t appeare d t o tak e car e o f th e

situation neatly , bu t throug h a misun -

derstanding of orders Troop E withdrew

for th e night . Immediately , Japanes e

from building s t o th e wes t reoccupie d

University Hall , whic h th e cavalryme n

had t o recaptur e th e nex t mornin g i n a

bitter fight. Afte r that , only a little mopping u p wa s necessar y t o complet e th e

job a t th e university .

The battl e fo r th e hospital-universit y

strongpoint ha d occupie d th e tim e an d

energies o f th e 148t h Infantr y an d th e

5th Cavalr y fo r te n days . Succes s her e

played a majo r par t i n clearin g th e wa y

for furthe r advance s towar d Intramuro s

and th e governmen t buildings , bu t th e

success had been costly. The tota l American battl e casualtie s wer e roughl y 6 0

men kille d an d 44 5 wounded, whil e th e

148th Infantr y alon e suffere d 10 5 non -

battle casualties as th e result o f sickness,
290 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

heat exhaustion , an d comba t fatigue. 22

The rifl e companie s of th e 2 d Battalion ,

148th Infantry , whic h ha d born e th e

brunt o f th e fightin g a t th e hospital ,

were eac h nearl y 7 5 me n understrengt h

when the y cam e ou t o f th e line s o n 1 9

February.23

For th e Japanes e th e battl e a t th e

hospital-university strongpoin t marke d

the virtua l destructio n o f th e Central

Force as an organized fighting unit. Th e

5th Naval Battalion an d th e "attache d

units" als o suffere d staggerin g losses .

The remnant s — and a sorr y fe w the y

were—of al l thes e Japanes e units with -

drew t o th e governmen t building s an d

Intramuros.

With th e captur e o f th e universit y

and hospita l buildings , th e Ne w Polic e

Station an d associate d structures , th e

Manila Hotel, the City Hall, the General

Post Office , an d th e stadiu m area , th e

battles o f th e strongpoint s wer e over .

In their wake the 37th Infantr y Divisio n

and th e 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n ha d left ,

inevitably an d unavoidably , a serie s o f

destroyed an d damage d publi c an d pri -

vate buildings . Bu t whateve r th e cos t

in bloo d an d buildings , th e America n

units ha d successfull y conclude d th e

drive towar d Intramuros . Th e las t or -

ganized survivor s o f th e Manila Naval

Defense Force wer e confine d i n th e

Walled City , th e Sout h Por t Area , an d

the Philippin e Commonwealt h Govern -

ment building s of f th e southeaster n

corner o f Intramuros . Th e 37t h Divi -

sion wa s now read y t o begi n th e reduc -

tion o f thi s las t resistanc e an d planne d

an assaul t against Intramuros for 2 3 February, th e ver y da y tha t th e las t o f th e

university strongpoin t building s fell .

22

 No reliabl e figure s fo r th e 5t h Cavalry' s non -

battle casualtie s ca n b e foun d i n availabl e records ,

but i t appears tha t the y were i n proportio n t o thos e

of th e 148t h Infantry . 23

 The thre e companies ha d entered th e figh t wit h

an averag e understrength of 43 men, making th e ne t

loss during the battle 32 men pe r company . Th e 5t h

Cavalry's troop s wer e als o understrength , bu t n o

usable figure s ca n b e found .
CHAPTER XV I

Manila: The Last Resistance

After th e fightin g a t th e strongpoints,

the seizur e o f Intramuro s must i n som e

ways hav e bee n anticlimactica l t o th e

troops involved . Clearin g th e Walle d

City wa s primaril y a victor y o f U.S .

Army artillery , tanks , an d tan k destroy -

ers ove r medieva l Spanis h wall s an d

stone buildings. Th e subsequen t reduc -

tion o f th e governmen t building s repre -

sented th e triump h o f th e same weapons

over modern, American-built, reinforced

concrete structures . Thus , th e investi -

ture o f Intramuro s an d th e governmen t

buildings wa s a classical sieg e conducted

with moder n weapons . Bu t thi s i s no t

to detrac t fro m th e par t th e infantry —

and th e dismounte d cavalr y fightin g a s

infantry—played i n thes e fina l phase s

of th e battl e fo r Manila . Th e artiller y

alone coul d no t wi n th e fight ; a s usua l

the las t battl e belonged t o th e infantry .

Infantry ha d t o move i n t o secur e th e

ground th e artiller y ha d prepared , an d

infantry too k man y casualtie s before th e

battle ended.

Intramuros

Plans and Preparations

Plans fo r th e attac k o n Intramuro s

were lon g i n th e making , an d fro m th e

beginning planner s ha d t o tak e int o

account a number of closely interrelated

tactical considerations. 1 Availabl e infor -

mation le d t o th e conclusio n tha t th e

Japanese defense s wer e strongest o n th e

southern and easter n sides of the Walled

City an d tha t th e Japanes e expecte d

attack fro m these , th e mos t logica l di -

rections. Japanes e garrisons in the Legislative, Finance , an d Agricultur e Build -

ings jus t acros s Padr e Burgo s Stree t

southeast o f Intramuro s coul d cove r

these approaches . Th e 37t h Divisio n

could, o f course , tak e th e governmen t

buildings befor e launchin g a n assaul t

on Intramuros , bu t i t woul d b e easie r

to attack th e government buildings after

Intramuros fell .

Conversely, planner s deeme d i t feasi -

ble t o strik e int o Intramuro s fro m th e

west, sinc e Japanes e defense s alon g th e

west wall , acros s Bonifaci o Stree t fro m

the Manil a Hote l an d th e Sout h Por t

Area, appeare d weak . Bu t i n thi s case ,

American troops would first have to clear

the South Port Area and then, advancing

from th e west , woul d hav e t o attac k to -

ward muc h o f thei r ow n supportin g

1

 General source s fo r plannin g informatio n are :

XIV Corps Rpt Luzon , pt. I, pp. 114-19 ; XIV Corps,

Japanese Defens e o f Cities , pp . 24-25 ; Beightle r

Comments, 1 8 Mar 57 . Headquarters , 37th Division ,

actually di d mos t o f th e detaile d plannin g fo r th e

assault, consultin g closel y wit h XI V Corp s head -

quarters during the process. Th e division' s complete

plan wa s presente d t o an d approve d b y Griswol d

only th e da y befor e th e actua l assault .
292 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

artillery. Th e artillery' s bes t position s

for clos e support wer e on th e nort h an d

northeast, acros s th e Pasig , an d o n th e

east, i n th e area south fro m th e Genera l

Post Offic e t o th e Cit y Hall , an d muc h

of th e artiller y ultimatel y di d fir e fro m

these areas.

About halfwa y fro m th e northeast t o

the northwest corne r o f Intramuro s th e

ancient wal l ended , providin g direc t ac -

cess into the Walled Cit y at th e Government Mint . Th e onl y other obstacl e on

the nort h wa s a lo w se a wal l runnin g

along th e sout h ban k o f th e Pasig , an d

Japanese defense s alon g th e nort h fac e

appeared wea k excep t a t th e northeas t

corner. Planner s therefor e decide d tha t

there woul d b e a n excellen t chanc e t o

execute a successfu l amphibiou s assaul t

from th e north bank o f the Pasig against

the north-central side of the Walled City.

The planner s realize d tha t a prime requisite t o suc h a move woul d b e th e em -

placement o f artillery , tanks , an d tan k

destroyers t o provid e extremel y clos e

support fo r th e attackin g infantry .

Since the 37t h Divisio n knew tha t the

Japanese ha d devise d a n elaborat e tunnel syste m t o mov e troop s quickl y fro m

one sectio n o f Intramuro s t o another ,

the divisio n considere d i t necessar y t o

make mor e than on e assault i n order t o

keep th e Japanes e of f balanc e an d t o

divide their forces. The divisio n selected

a poin t nea r th e northeaster n entrance ,

Quezon Gate , a s th e sit e fo r th e secon d

assault. Becaus e th e Japanes e blocke d

and covere d bot h Quezo n Gat e an d

Parian Gate , 20 0 yard s t o th e south ,

from stron g pillboxe s jus t insid e th e

walls, the division decided it would have

to emplo y heav y artiller y t o blas t a n

additional poin t o f entr y throug h th e

thick wal l just south o f Quezo n Gate .

An assaul t nea r Quezo n Gat e woul d

require especiall y stron g artiller y sup -

port, becaus e th e Japanes e ha d majo r

defenses nea r th e gat e an d becaus e the y

could subjec t th e attackin g troop s t o

enfilade fir e fro m th e thre e governmen t

buildings to the south. Therefore , artil -

lery would have to neutralize the government building s durin g th e assaul t o n

Intramuros, an d smok e woul d b e lai d

between th e governmen t building s an d

the eas t wal l o f Intramuro s t o concea l

the attackers ' movements . Finally , th e

1st Cavalr y Brigade , operatin g t o th e

west and southwest of Intramuros, would

thwart an y attemp t o f Japanes e troop s

to escap e fro m th e Walle d City .

Planners devote d considerabl e atten -

tion to the problem of timing the attack.

They gav e though t t o nigh t operations ,

both to achieve surprise and to ease some

of th e problem s o f amphibiou s assault .

Earlier artiller y fir e ha d crumble d th e

sea wal l i n man y place s alon g the sout h

bank o f th e Pasi g and, as a result, much

of tha t ban k alon g th e nort h sid e o f

Intramuros was rubble strewn. A t hig h

tide, which would occur during the dark

of earl y morning and agai n i n th e earl y

afternoon o f 2 3 February, LVT's coul d

make their way across the rubble, whil e

landing craft coul d floa t ove r i t i n som e

places t o pu t troop s ashor e on th e quay

that ra n alon g th e nort h sid e o f th e

Walled City .

But th e tid e coul d no t b e allowe d t o

become th e controlling factor. Th e ele -

ment o f surpris e t o b e achieve d durin g

the nigh t hig h tid e wa s no t o f grea t

moment, fo r th e Japanes e kne w a n as -

sault wa s imminen t an d woul d b e pre -

pared fo r i t n o matte r wha t th e hour .

Moreover, a two-pronge d attac k int o

such a smal l are a demande d th e closest
MANILA: TH E LAS T RESISTANC E 293

possible co-ordinatio n betwee n artiller y

support an d infantr y action , a s wel l a s

among th e variou s infantr y units . Suc h

co-ordination coul d no t b e achieve d i n

a nigh t assault .

Planners als o decide d tha t th e attac k

could no t wai t fo r th e afternoo n hig h

tide. I f th e Japanes e defense s prove d

especially strong the assault troops might

be unabl e t o gai n a foothol d withi n

Intramuros befor e dark , a circumstanc e

that migh t wel l lea d t o th e inevitabl e

shambles of a night withdrawal. Havin g

weighed all the factors th e 37th Division,

with XI V Corp s concurrence, finally de -

cided t o launc h th e assaul t o n bot h th e

north an d th e northeas t a t 083 0 o n 2 3

February.2

Having dispose d o f th e problem s o f

time and place , corps and divisio n plan -

ners stil l ha d t o determin e ho w t o pre -

pare th e wa y fo r th e infantry . Genera l

Beightler, wh o realize d tha t th e attac k

on Intramuro s an d th e governmen t

buildings woul d probabl y prov e costly ,

began t o thin k i n term s o f employin g

aerial bombardmen t t o raz e th e Walle d

City an d th e othe r objective s a s well .

Griswold, th e corp s commander , agree d

to thi s pla n wit h som e reluctanc e afte r

he ha d conclude d tha t Intramuro s wa s

so strongl y defende d tha t th e assaul t

there migh t produc e prohibitiv e casualties unles s precede d b y intensiv e aeria l

bombardment.3

After XI V Corps had mad e unsuccessful attempt s t o induc e th e Japanes e

within Intramuro s t o surrende r o r a t

least t o releas e th e man y Filipin o civil -

ians they held hostage, General Griswold

informed Kruege r o f th e aeria l bom -

bardment plan . Th e corp s commande r

asked Kruege r fo r al l th e div e bombe r

squadrons o f Marin e Ai r Group s 2 4

and 3 2 (fro m Mangalda n Fiel d a t Lin -

gayen Gulf ) an d fo r a squadron o f Fift h

Air Forc e P-38' s equippe d t o conduc t

napalm strikes. 4

The proposal s inevitabl y ha d reper -

cussions. S o far, General MacArthur had

severely restricte d th e employmen t o f

air i n th e metropolita n area . I n lat e

January an d earl y Februar y Marin e

Corps SBD' s ha d bombe d o r strafe d a

few pinpointe d targets in th e North an d

South Port Areas an d ha d als o hi t som e

obvious Japanes e gu n position s i n th e

open areas of Luneta Park and Burnha m

Green. On e o r two strikes may also have

taken place against specific targets within

Intramuros, but al l in all it appears that

planes o f th e Allie d Ai r Force s fle w n o

more tha n te n o r twelv e individua l

sorties agains t target s withi n th e cit y

after 3 February. Befor e tha t time both

carrier-based an d land-base d aircraft ha d

presumably limite d thei r strike s t o targets withi n th e por t area s an d t o oi l

storage facilitie s i n Pandaca n an d Pac o

2

 37th Di v FO 30 , 22 Feb 45 ; Beightle r Comments,

18 Ma r 57 . 3

 Entry time d 201 0 16 Fe b 45 , 37t h Di v G- 3 Jnl,

16 Fe b 45 ; 37t h Div , Synopsis o f Pla n fo r Capturin g

Walled City , 1 6 Feb 45, 37th Di v G-3 Jn l File , 15-19

Feb 45 ; Rad , Support Ai r Part y wit h 37t h Di v t o

Fifth Ai r Force, 0845 1 7 Feb 45 , XIV Corps G- 3 Jn l

File, 17-1 8 Feb 45; Teletyp e Msg , Griswold to

Krueger, 141 0 1 6 Feb 45 , XI V Corp s G- 3 Jn l File ,

15-16 Fe b 45. Genera l Beightler. (i n Beightler Comments, 1 8 Ma r 57 ) denie d tha t h e eve r ha d an y

intention o f razin g th e Walle d Cit y an d othe r ob -

jectives, but merely wante d t o raze a small portion of

Intramuros a t th e northeas t corner , sit e o f th e

initial assault. This is not borne out b y the messages

cited above , an d i t i s certain tha t Genera l Griswol d

believed i t wa s Beightler' s inten t t o raz e al l o f

Intramuros. 4

 XIV Corps Rpt Luzon, pt. I, pp. 114-16 ; Teletype

Msg, Griswol d t o Krueger , 141 0 16 Feb 45 .
294 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Districts.5 O f cours e som e bomb s ha d

gone astray during these strike s and ha d

caused damag e withi n Intramuros, 6

while additiona l damag e withi n th e

Walled Cit y ha d resulte d fro m bot h

American an d Japanes e artiller y fir e

the firs t tw o week s o f th e battl e fo r

Manila.

Knowing an d understandin g Genera l

MacArthur's position o n th e destruction

of Manil a — and larg e section s o f th e

city ha d alread y bee n battere d beyon d

recognition—Krueger sought the theater

commander's view s o n th e propose d ai r

attacks, statin g tha t XI V Corps' request

would b e approve d unles s MacArthu r

objected.7

General MacArthur did indeed object:

The us e o f ai r o n a par t o f a cit y

occupied b y a friendl y an d allie d popula - tion i s unthinkable . Th e inaccurac y o f

this typ e o f bombardmen t would resul t be - yond questio n i n th e deat h o f thousand s of

innocent civilians . I t i s not believe d more -

over tha t this would appreciably lowe r ou r

own casualt y rat e althoug h i t woul d un -

questionably haste n th e conclusio n o f th e

operations. Fo r thes e reason s I d o no t ap -

prove th e us e o f ai r bombardmen t o n th e

Intramuros district. 8

Griswold and Beightle r were not will -

ing t o attemp t th e assaul t wit h infantr y

alone. No t expressl y enjoine d fro m em -

ploying artillery , the y no w planne d a

massive artiller y preparatio n tha t woul d

last fro m 1 7 t o 2 3 Februar y an d woul d

include indirec t fir e a t range s u p t o

8,000 yards as well as direct, point-blan k

fire fro m range s a s shor t a s 25 0 yards .

They woul d emplo y al l availabl e corp s

and divisio n artillery , fro m 240-mm .

howitzers down . I n addition , 75-mm .

tank weapons , 76-mm . tan k destroye r

guns, an d infantr y 105-mm . self-pro -

pelled mounts woul d b e use d fo r pointblank fire . Organi c infantry 81-mm . and

60-mm. mortar s an d 4.2-inc h chemica l

mortars woul d ad d th e weigh t o f thei r

fires, whil e fro m hig h building s suc h

as th e Cit y Hal l an d offic e building s o n

the nort h sid e o f th e Pasi g infantr y

heavy an d ligh t machin e gun s woul d

blanket th e wall s an d interio r o f Intra -

muros befor e th e assault. 9 Jus t ho w

civilian live s could b e save d b y this typ e

of preparation , as opposed to aerial bombardment, i s unknown . Th e ne t resul t

would b e th e same : Intramuro s woul d

be practicall y razed .

The bombardmen t o f Intramuro s i n

preparation fo r th e actua l assaul t bega n

on 1 7 Februar y whe n 8-inc h howitzers ,

with indirec t fire , starte d blastin g a

breach i n th e eas t wall , which , a t th e

point o f breaching , wa s 4 0 fee t thic k a t

the base , 1 6 feet high , an d abou t 2 0 fee t

across th e top . This wa s by n o mean s

the firs t artiller y fir e directe d a t Intra -

muros. I n suppor t o f previou s opera -

tions throughou t th e city , 37t h Divisio n

5

 Practically n o informatio n o n ai r operation s i n

the Manil a are a afte r 3 Februar y ca n b e foun d i n

available documents , althoug h earlie r strike s b y

carrier-based plane s ar e wel l documented . Fo r th e

period 3-23 February , see: Teletyp e Msg , G-2 Sixt h

Army t o G- 2 XI V Corps , Missio n Rpt , 10 Fe b 45 ,

XIV Corps G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 1 0 Feb 4 5 (Classifie d

Folder); Boggs , Marine Aviation in the Philippines,

p. 86; 37th Di v Rpt Luzon , p. 57. 6

 A Thir d Flee t photograph , take n durin g a strik e

by Thir d Flee t planes , als o showe d a bom b hol e i n

the roo f o f th e Legislativ e Building . 7

 Rad, Kruege r t o MacArthur , WG-417 , 1 6 Feb 45 ,

Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 14-1 6 Feb 45 . 8

 Rad, MacArthu r t o Krueger , CA-50503 , 1 6 Fe b

45, Sixt h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 16-1 8 Fe b 45 .

It i s interestin g t o not e tha t thi s radi o implie s tha t

General MacArthu r di d no t kno w tha t bot h land -

based an d carrier-base d aircraf t ha d previousl y hi t

parts o f Manila . 9

 37th Di v F O 30 , 2 2 Feb 45 ; 37t h Di v Rp t Luzon ,

pp. 77-79 .
MANILA: TH E LAS T RESISTANC E 295

and XI V Corp s Artiller y ha d earlie r

fired o n pinpointe d targets, mainly Japanese artiller y an d morta r positions ,

throughout th e Walle d City . Consider -

able damag e t o th e ancien t building s

had alread y resulted , an d b y th e tim e

the assaul t preparatio n bega n mos t o f

the Japanes e artiller y an d mortar s ha d

long sinc e bee n knocke d out. 10

The 8-inc h howitzer s o f Batter y C ,

465th Fiel d Artiller y Battalion , mad e a

neat breach i n th e central portio n o f the

east wal l betwee n Paria n an d Victori a

Gates with 15 0 rounds of high explosive .

Later, a singl e 155-mm . howitze r o f th e

756th Fiel d Artillery, firin g a t a range of

about 80 0 yards , starte d blastin g awa y

to for m th e planne d breac h sout h o f

Quezon Gate . Wit h 15 0 round s thi s

weapon produce d a brea k 5 0 fee t lon g

that extende d abou t 1 0 fee t dow n fro m

the to p o f th e wall . A n 8-inc h howitze r

smoothed out th e resulting pile of debris

at th e oute r bas e o f th e wal l wit h 2 9

rounds o f indirec t fire , makin g a n eas y

ramp.

The 240-mm . howitzer s o f Batter y C,

544th Fiel d Artillery , bega n bombard -

ment to breach the north wall and knock

out a Japanes e strongpoin t a t th e Gov -

ernment Min t o n th e mornin g o f 2 2

February, 8-inc h howitzer s lendin g a

hand fro m tim e t o time . Th e 76-mm .

guns o f a platoo n o f th e 637t h Tan k

Destroyer Battalion used point-blank fir e

from acros s th e Pasi g t o blas t foothold s

along th e sout h qua y and i n th e rubbl e

along the river's bank in order to provide

the assaul t troop s wit h landin g points. 11

Throughout th e nigh t o f 22-2 3 Feb -

ruary, i n advanc e o f a fina l barrag e

before th e infantr y assaul t th e nex t

morning, 37t h Divisio n an d XI V Corp s

Artillery kep t u p harassin g fire s agains t

the wall s an d interio r o f Intramuros .

12

Meanwhile, durin g th e 22d , mor e gun s

moved into firing positions. A s of morning on the 23d artillery to fir e in support

of th e assaul t wa s disposed a s show n i n

Table 3 . I n addition , man y o f th e 105 -

mm. SPM's o f th e 37t h Division' s thre e

cannon companie s too k u p position s

along th e nort h ban k o f th e Pasi g o r

east o f Intramuros. Th e 148t h Infantr y

set u p twenty-si x heav y an d ligh t ma -

chine gun s i n building s nort h o f th e

river t o provide cover for the men of the

129th who were to make the amphibious

assault. Th e 145t h Infantry , whic h wa s

to attac k overlan d fro m th e east , woul d

have cove r fro m it s ow n machin e guns,

which woul d fir e fro m suc h point s o f

vantage a s th e uppe r floor s o f th e Cit y

Hall.

The fina l preparator y barrag e laste d

from 073 0 t o 083 0 o n th e 23d . Usin g

both are a an d poin t fire , th e artillery ,

tanks, TD's, SPM's, an d mortar s plas -

tered th e wall s o f Intramuro s an d cov -

ered th e entir e interio r excep t fo r a

section roughl y thre e block s wid e an d

four block s long in th e west-centra l portion o f th e Walle d City . A t 083 0 th e

10

 Entry time d 093 0 1 3 Fe b 4 5 an d Entr y time d

0930 1 7 Feb 45 , 37t h Di v G-3 Jnl , 13 and 1 7 Feb 45 ;

XIV Corp s Art y Rp t Luzon , p . 11 . 11

 XIV Corps Rpt Luzon, pt. I, pp. 116 , 119-20; XIV

Corps Art y Rp t Luzon , p . 12 ; 37th Di v Rp t Luzon ,

pp. 77-79 ; 756th F A Bn Rpt Luzon , p. 6.

12

 The remainde r o f th e subsectio n i s based upon :

XIV Corp s Rpt Luzon , pt. I, pp. 120-21 ; XIV Corps,

Japanese Defens e o f Cities , p . 25 ; XI V Corp s Art y

Rpt Luzon , pp . 11-12 , 16 ; 37th Di v Rp t Luzon , pp .

77-81; 37t h Di v Arty Rp t Luzon , p . 12 ; ibid., app. 5 ,

Action i n Manila ; ibid., app . 6 , Preparatio n fo r

Assault o n Intramuros ; ibid., app , 7 , Art y Direc t

Fire Positions; 37t h Di v G-3 Pe r Rp t 46 , 22-23 Feb

45, XI V Corp s G- 3 Jn l File , 23-2 4 Fe b 45 ; ACof S

G-3 Sixt h Army , Rp t o n Obsn s o f Attac k o n

Intramuros, Sixt h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 22-23

Feb 45 .
296 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

TABLE 3—ARTILLER Y I N SUPPOR T O F TH E ASSAUL T O N INTRAMURO S

Source: Relevan t sources cited in n. 12.

support fir e ceased , an d th e infantr y

assault began . Te n minute s late r artil -

lery bega n firin g again , this time laying

the hig h explosive , smoke , an d whit e

phosphorus alon g a 100-yard-wid e stri p

between th e east an d wes t wall s t o sea l

off th e southern third of Intramuros and

prevent th e Japanese i n tha t are a fro m

observing movement s t o th e nort h o r

sending reinforcements northward. This

fire laste d approximatel y hal f a n hour .

Table 4 give s th e amounts o f artiller y

fire expende d i n suppor t o f th e assault .

The tota l weight of the artillery fir e wa s

roughly 18 5 tons, t o whic h th e 4.2-inc h

mortars o f Companie s A an d D , 82 d

Chemical Mortar Battalion, added about

45 tons—ove r 3,75 0 rounds—o f smok e

and hig h explosive. 13

XIV Corps Artillery reported tha t b y

reason of their great accuracy th e 8-inc h

howitzers wer e th e bes t weapo n use d

against th e wall s whil e th e 240-mm .

howitzers, wit h thei r heavie r an d mor e

powerful projectile , prove d mos t effec -

tive agains t buildings . Wit h 155-mm .

howitzers, considerabl e advantage s

seemed t o hav e accrue d b y employin g

unfuzed high-explosiv e shell s t o ope n

13

 No breakdowns between the two types of 4.2 -inch

ammunition ca n be found , no r d o availabl e records

contain complet e informatio n o n th e ammunitio n expenditures of th e infantr y 105-mm . self-propelled

mounts, infantry mortars, and infantry machine guns.
MANILA: TH E LAS T RESISTANC E 297

TABLE 4—ARTILLER Y EXPENDE D I N SUPPOR T O F TH E ASSAUL T O N INTRAMURO S

Source: Relevan t source s cited i n n. 12 .

fissures i n th e walls , sinc e th e unfuze d

shells penetrated mor e deeply befor e ex -

plosion tha n di d thos e wit h impac t o r

delayed fuz e settings . Th e fissur e thu s

opened wa s easil y enlarge d b y subse -

quent employmen t o f high-explosiv e

shells wit h delaye d settings .

The Assault

Troops of the 3 d Battalion, 129t h In -

fantry, had begun loading aboard assaul t

boats manne d b y th e 117t h Engineers

about 082 0 o n 2 3 February , thei r lin e

of departur e th e mout h o f th e Ester o

de Binondo , opposit e th e Governmen t

Mint.14 (Map 7) Th e firs t boats reached

the south shore unopposed between 0835

and 0840 , an d th e infantr y quickl y

dashed throug h an d b y th e Min t int o

Intramuros. Puttin g its lef t o n Beateri o

Street, which ran northeast to southwest,

the 3 d Battalio n swun g its right towar d

Fort Santiago , a t th e northwes t corne r

of Intramuros . Th e battalio n estab -

lished contac t wit h th e 145t h Infantr y

about 085 0 a t Letra n University , a t th e

northeast corner .

As th e American troop s drove furthe r

into Intramuros , th e Japanes e bega n t o

recover fro m th e shoc k o f th e artiller y

bombardment an d t o offe r scattere d re -

sistance fro m isolate d machin e gu n an d

rifle positions . Compan y I , 129t h In -

fantry, o n th e left , an d Compan y L , i n

the center, reached th e west wal l shortly

after 1200 , having suffere d n o casualtie s

and havin g kille d onl y 1 0 Japanese o n

the way . The battalio n soo n isolate d

resistance i n it s sector t o For t Santiago ,

toward whic h Compan y L , attackin g

along th e wes t wal l an d throug h adja -

cent buildings, turned. Compan y K had

some difficult y reachin g th e west wall i n

the are a sout h o f For t Santiag o bu t go t

its righ t o n th e wal l t o mak e contac t

with Companie s I and L late in th e day.

In concert , th e thre e rifl e companie s

cleared th e wes t wal l nort h fro m Bea -

terio Street . Abou t 183 0 Company K

14

 The principa l source s fo r thi s subsectio n are :

XIV Corp s Rp t Luzon , pt . I , pp . 120-26 ; 37t h Di v

Rpt Luzon , pp. 77-83; 37th Div G-3 Pe r Rpts 46-49,

23-26 Fe b 45 ; 117t h Engr Bn Hist , 4 Feb-3 Ma r 45 ,

pp. 5-6; 129th In f Hist 1810-1945 , pp. 67-68; 129t h

Inf Rp t Luzon , p . 7 ; 129t h In f S- 3 Pe r Rpts, 23-2 7

Feb 45 ; 145t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 30-33 ; 145t h In f

S-1 Jnl, 23 Feb-4 Mar 45; 145th Inf S-3 Jnl, 23 Feb4 Ma r 45; 145t h In f S-3 Pe r Rpts, 2 3 Feb-4 Mar 45.
298 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

MAP 7

made contac t wit h element s o f th e 1s t

Cavalry Brigad e in th e Sout h Por t Area ,

beyond th e wes t wall .

Company L ha d a nast y figh t o n it s

hands a t For t Santiago . Th e preassaul t

artillery bombardmen t ha d demolishe d

the outlyin g defense s o f thi s ancien t

Spanish citade l an d ha d als o battere d

the walls o f th e for t proper . Th e Japa -

nese insid e ha d retire d int o inne r re -

cesses, a fe w undamage d outbuildings ,

some subterranea n dungeons , tunnels ,

and holes. On e b y one, the 129t h Infan -

try reduce d th e separat e strongpoints —

no co-ordinate d defens e existed—wit h

fragmentation an d whit e phosphoru s

grenades, demolitions , bazookas , an d

flame throwers . I n a fe w instance s en -

gineers poured gasolin e or oil int o hole s

and dungeons and the n ignited it. Com -

pany L ha d actuall y surrounde d an d

entered th e for t quickly , bu t face d a

bitter battl e throughou t th e afternoo n

and ha d t o leav e moppin g u p fo r th e

morrow.

The 145t h Infantry' s experience s during th e da y wer e no t dissimilar . Clam -

bering across the breach south of Quezon

Gate an d the n throug h th e gat e itself ,

the tw o leadin g platoon s o f th e 2 d Bat-
MANILA: TH E LAS T RESISTANC E 299

OBJECTIVE—THE WALLE D CITY

talion, 145th , wer e withi n Intramuro s

at 083 3 withou t a casualty . Followin g

troops walke d throug h Quezo n an d

Parian Gate s unopposed , an d b y 103 0

the battalio n ha d secure d th e firs t tw o

blocks southwes t o f Quezon Gate an d

had cleare d th e damage d buildin g o f

Letran University . Fiftee n minute s

later th e 1s t Battalio n cam e throug h

Parian Gate . Th e tw o units then started

southward wit h th e 2 d Battalion' s righ t

on Beateri o Street , i n contac t wit h th e

129th Infantry , an d th e 1s t Battalion' s

left alon g th e east wall .

Progress slowed as troops sought cover

from automati c weapon s an d rifl e fir e

originating i n th e souther n sectio n o f

Intramuros. A t 130 0 th e tw o battalion s

were fou r block s southwes t o f Quezo n

Gate an d ha d establishe d a lin e stretch -

ing fro m Beateri o almos t t o th e eas t

wall. A t thi s junctur e th e advanc e

stopped a s th e Japanes e bega n lettin g

nearly 3,00 0 civilia n hostage s dribbl e

out o f Sa n Augusti n an d De l Monic o

Churches, farthe r south . Th e refugee s

were women, children, and some Roman

Catholic nun s an d priests . Ther e wer e

very fe w mal e civilian s i n th e group —

the 129t h Infantr y ha d discovere d mos t
300 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

of th e men dea d i n Fort Santiago's dungeons, where the Japanese had murdered

them.15

After th e civilian evacuation wa s complete, American tank s and self-propelle d

mounts fired o n Japanes e positions within th e two churches and a t othe r strong -

points i n th e southwester n sectio n o f

Intramuros, includin g a fe w pillboxes .

Against stubbor n opposition , troop s o f

the 145t h Infantr y wer e unable t o reach

the south o r west walls befor e dark , an d

the tw o battalion s halte d fo r th e nigh t

generally tw o block s shor t o f th e wes t

wall an d fou r shor t o f th e southwes t

corner o f Intramuros.

The casualtie s o f th e 145t h Infantry' s

two battalion s fo r 2 3 Februar y num -

bered abou t 1 5 me n kille d an d 4 5

wounded; th e regiment ha d kille d som e

190 Japanese and capture d 2 0 Formosan

labor troops. 16

By 103 0 on 2 4 February th e 145t h In -

fantry ha d compresse d th e last resistance

in it s zon e int o th e Aquarium , locate d

in a bastio n of f the southwes t corne r o f

Intramuros. Sinc e Japanese holed u p i n

the governmen t building s acros s Padr e

Burgos Stree t covere d th e Aquarium 's

outer wall s wit h rifl e an d machin e gu n

fire, th e 145t h Infantr y wa s hard pu t t o

devise a plan o f attack unti l th e 1s t Bat -

talion discovere d a tunne l connectin g

the bastio n t o th e main wall . Compan y

C use d th e tunne l a s a n assaul t route ,

while th e rest o f th e Battalio n provide d

fire suppor t fo r th e attac k fro m th e

south wal l and Canno n Compan y SPM's

conducted a preparator y shelling . Th e

Japanese neglected t o defen d th e tunne l

approach, an d Compan y C , employin g

hand grenade s an d bazooka s liberally ,

broke int o th e Aquariu m wit h littl e

trouble. Th e fina l assaul t bega n abou t

1600. A n hou r an d a hal f an d 11 5 dead

Japanese later , th e 145t h Infantr y ha d

overcome th e las t organize d resistanc e

within Intramuros .

The 3 d Battalion , 129t h Infantry , o n

24 February , finishe d moppin g u p a t

Fort Santiago , and continued t o mop up

and patro l i n it s zon e unti l noo n th e

next day, when i t had t o withdraw t o get

out o f th e lin e o f fir e o f artiller y unit s

supporting infantr y attack s agains t th e

government building s t o th e eas t an d

southeast. Th e battalio n returne d t o

Intramuros when this fir e cease d an d re -

sumed its search o f th e rubbl e unti l th e

145th Infantr y relieved it about noon on

the 27th .

The casualtie s o f th e 3 d Battalion ,

129th Infantry , wer e amazingly lo w considering th e oppositio n th e uni t me t a t

Fort Santiago . Th e battalio n reporte d

that i t los t abou t 5 me n kille d an d 2 5

wounded i n Intramuros ; i t kille d per -

haps 50 0 Japanese , 40 0 o f the m a t For t

Santiago alone. Th e 145t h Infantr y suf -

fered mor e heavil y a t Intramuro s fro m

23 February through 1 March, when th e

regiment passe d t o th e contro l o f th e

Provost Marsha l General , Unite d State s

Army Force s i n th e Fa r East , fo r polic e

duties i n Manila . Th e 145t h Infantry' s

casualties wer e approximatel y 2 0 me n

killed an d 24 0 wounded, whil e th e regi -

ment kille d o r foun d dea d som e 76 0

Japanese.

The 37t h Division' s tota l losses —

roughly 2 5 kille d an d 26 5 wounded —

during th e reductio n o f Intramuro s

were quit e lo w i n compariso n t o th e

Japanese losses. The infantr y units alone

15

 The fac t o f thi s atrocit y i s wel l documente d i n such source s a s US A vs. Yamashita. 16

 Entry 1434 , 1840 23 Feb 45, 145t h In f S-3 Jnl , 23

Feb 45 .
MANILA: TH E LAS T RESISTANC E 301

INTRAMUROS AFTER TH E BATTL E

killed ove r 1,00 0 Japanes e an d too k 2 5

prisoner. Thi s hardl y provide s a n ac -

curate figur e o f Japanes e strengt h i n

Intramuros. Al l infantr y reports ar e ex -

tremely generous to th e supporting artillery and morta r units—both th e infantr y

records and eyewitnes s accounts indicat e

that th e artiller y preparatio n fir e fro m

17 February throug h th e morning of the

23d killed many hundreds of Japanese. It

would not, indeed , be surprising to learn

the Japanes e garriso n numbere d ove r

2,000 troop s o n 1 7 February .

Manifestly, artiller y ha d don e a n un -

usually effective job at Intramuros, and

one proo f o f th e effectivenes s o f th e

bombardment wa s th e fac t tha t Ameri -

can infantr y casualtie s wer e s o lo w i n

comparison wit h th e Japanes e losses .

That th e artiller y ha d als o almost raze d

the ancien t Walle d Cit y coul d no t b e

helped. T o th e XIV Corps and th e 37th

Division a t thi s stag e o f th e battl e fo r

Manila, America n live s wer e under -

standably fa r mor e valuabl e tha n his -

toric landmarks . Th e destructio n ha d

stemmed fro m th e America n decisio n t o

save live s i n a battl e agains t Japanes e

troops who had decide d t o sacrifice theirs

as dearl y a s possible .

The Government Buildings

While par t o f th e 37t h Divisio n ha d

been clearin g Intramuros , othe r troop s

of tha t division a s well as the me n o f the
302 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

attached 1s t Cavalr y Brigad e ha d bee n

devoting thei r attentio n t o th e govern -

ment building s an d t o th e Sout h Por t

Area. Betwee n 2 3 and 2 5 February th e

1st Squadron , 12t h Cavalry , an d th e 2 d

Squadron, 5th Cavalry, cleared the South

Port Area against opposition that was relatively light except at one strongpoint. 17

Most o f the Japanes e troop s i n th e are a

were Formosan , Chinese , an d Korea n

labor personnel , o f who m almos t 25 0

surrendered on 2 4 February alone. With

poor morale and poore r armament, the y

inflicted fe w casualties upon th e cavalry -

men, wh o finishe d thei r jo b rapidly .

Far differen t wa s th e actio n a t "th e

government buildings , wher e th e 1s t

Squadron, 5t h Cavalry , an d element s o f

the 148t h Infantr y ha d containe d Japa -

nese force s durin g th e fightin g fo r In -

tramuros an d th e Sout h Por t Area. 18

The imposing , columne d façad e o f th e

Philippine Commonwealth' s Legislativ e

Building—the Philippin e Capitol —

fronted o n Padr e Burgo s Stree t opposite

the southeas t corne r o f Intramuro s an d

lay 150 yard s sout h of the Cit y Hall .

About 100 yards south of the Legislativ e

Building was the Bureau of Finance, and

another 250 yards to the south-southeast,

near th e intersectio n o f Genera l Lun a

and San Luis Streets, lay the main building o f th e Burea u o f Agricultur e an d

Commerce,

Despite th e fac t tha t th e Japanes e i n

the thre e building s ha d advantage s o f

position an d elevatio n tha t permitte d

them t o endange r America n an d Fili -

pino movements ove r larg e areas of Ma -

nila, th e XI V Corp s an d th e 37t h

Division a t firs t considere d starvin g th e

Japanese garriso n out . Bu t th e tw o

headquarters soo n decide d thi s woul d

take too long. Informatio n fro m prison -

ers an d Filipin o hostage s wh o ha d es -

caped fro m th e building s indicated tha t

the Japanese garrisons in the three structures ha d sufficien t strength , ammuni -

tion, food , an d wate r t o withstan d a

protracted siege . Moreover , t o permi t

the Japanese to hold the buildings would

unduly dela y th e developmen t o f bas e

and headquarter s site s i n th e are a tha t

Japanese machin e gunners and rifleme n

could dominate . Accordingly , General s

Griswold an d Beightle r reluctantl y con -

cluded that they would have to call upon

their battle-wear y troop s t o assaul t th e

buildings.

The strengt h o f th e thre e Japanes e

garrisons is unknown, and i t is probable

that th e number s o f Japanes e withi n

each buildin g varied considerably . Th e

headquarters o f on e o f Admira l Iwa -

buchi's Central Force battalion s had op -

erated i n th e Legislative Building, 19 and

the garriso n ther e probabl y numbere d

over 25 0 me n a s o f 2 3 February . Ap -

parently, th e garrison s i n th e othe r tw o

buildings wer e smaller, but permanenc e

of abod e wa s no t on e o f th e character -

istics of the Japanese naval troop s i n th e

three structures. Durin g th e las t phase s

of th e battl e fo r Manil a Japanes e con -

trol had broken down almost completely,

and eve n befor e th e sieg e o f th e govern -

ment buildings and Intramuros Japanese

troops ha d rathe r aimlessl y wandere d

17

 For savin g his troop commander's life at th e cost of hi s ow n durin g th e figh t a t thi s strongpoint , th e Customs House , Pfc . William J . Grabiar z o f Troo p

E, 5th Cavalry , was posthumously awarded the Meda l

of Honor. 18

 Background an d plannin g informatio n i n thi s

section is from: XI V Corps Rpt Luzon , pt. I, p. 187 ;

XIV Corps , Japanes e Defens e o f Cities , pp . 22-23 ;

37th Di v Rpt Luzon , pp. 81-84; 37t h Div, Field Ms g

4, 27 Feb 45, 37th Div G-3 Jn l File , 25 Feb-6 Mar 45.

19

 Hashimoto Statement , States , II , 278-81 .
MANILA: TH E LAS T RESISTANC E 303

back an d fort h betwee n th e building s

and Intramuro s an d amon g th e thre e

buildings.

Architecturally simila r t o th e ol d Sen -

ate an d Hous e Offic e Building s i n

Washington, D.C., the three government

structures wer e modern , earthquake -

proof edifice s constructe d o f heavil y

reinforced concrete. 20 Th e oblon g Leg -

islative Building, with wing s fou r storie s

high an d a centra l portio n risin g an -

other tw o an d a hal f floors , wa s con -

structed aroun d tw o ope n courtyards .

The Financ e and Agriculture Buildings,

both five-stor y trapezoids , eac h feature d

a central courtyard. Th e building s were

strong no t onl y b y virtu e o f thei r con -

struction bu t becaus e al l approache s t o

them le d acros s wid e ope n ground .

Sandbag emplacements and barricade s of

other type s blocked all readily accessibl e

doors an d windows , an d window-em -

placed machin e gun s covere d al l ap -

proaches. Interio r fortification s wer e

similar t o thos e XI V Corp s troop s ha d

already encountered throughout Manila .

The XI V Corps-37th Divisio n plan of

assault calle d fo r intensiv e preparator y

bombardment o f eac h buildin g b y 155 -

mm. howitzers , Canno n Compan y 105 -

mm. SPM's , 75-mm . tan k guns , 76-mm .

TD weapons , an d 4.2-inc h an d 81-mm .

mortars. Upo n th e completio n o f bombardments, th e 148t h Infantry , 37t h

Division, woul d attac k firs t th e Legisla -

tive Building and the n mov e on t o seiz e

the Financ e Building . Th e 5t h Cavalr y

would simultaneousl y reduc e th e Agri -

culture Building . Artiller y fir e wa s t o

begin o n th e mornin g o f 2 4 February ;

the firs t infantr y assault s would not tak e

place unti l th e mornin g o f th e 26th .

Undeniably, th e preparator y bombard -

ments woul d lea d t o th e sever e damage ,

if no t th e destruction, of all thre e buildings, bu t agai n XI V Corp s reall y ha d

no choice .

The 155-mm . howitzer s o f th e 136t h

Field Artiller y Battalion , providin g

point-blank fir e a t range s fro m 15 0 t o

800 yards , prove d th e mos t effectiv e

weapon durin g th e preassaul t bombard -

ment.21 T o th e artilleryme n concerned ,

the credi t an d hono r tha t thu s accrue d

to the m wa s hardly commensurat e wit h

the risks involved. Bringin g its weapons

forward t o exposed position s where onl y

the thin gun shiel d provided an y protection fro m Japanes e fire , th e 136t h Fiel d

Artillery gaine d a quic k appreciatio n o f

the fact s o f lif e a s see n b y th e infantr y

and cavalry . B y th e tim e th e las t o f th e

government buildings had fallen , th e artillery battalio n ha d los t 5 me n kille d

and 5 4 wounde d t o Japanes e machin e

gun an d rifl e fire .

Shortly afte r 090 0 o n 2 6 February ,

following a final hour's artillery preparation, troop s o f th e 1s t Battalion , 148t h

Infantry, entere d th e ground floo r o f th e

Legislative Buildin g fro m th e rear , o r

east.22 Inside , th e Japanese conducted a

20

 The exterio r of th e Financ e Building, for example, bor e a strikin g resemblanc e t o th e Ol d Senat e

Office Buildin g i n Washington .

21

 Information o n support fire s comes mainly from:

37th Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 83-86 ; 37t h Di v G-3 Pe r

Rpts 47-51, 24-28 Feb 45; 37th Di v Arty Rpt Luzon ,

pp. 12-13 ; ibid., app. 7, Art y Direc t Fir e Positions ;

136th F A Bn Rpt Luzon , pt. I , pp . 19-23 . 22

 Further informatio n o n th e reductio n o f th e

buildings is from : XI V Corps Rp t Luzon , pt. I , pp .

130-34; 148t h In f Rp t Luzon , pt . I, pp . 9-10; 148th

Inf S-3 Pe r Rpts, 25 Feb-2 Mar 45; 148th Inf S-3 Jnl,

25 Feb- 2 Ma r 45; 148t h In f S-1 Pe r Rpts , 2 6 Feb-3

Mar 45 ; 5th Ca v Rpt Luzon , pp . 27-29 ; ibid., an. 4,

Casualties; 5t h Ca v S-2/S-3 Jnl, 26 Feb-1 Ma r 45 ;

5th Ca v S-2 an d S-3 Pe r Rpts, 26 Feb-1 Ma r 45.
304 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

LEGISLATIVE BUILDING—BEFOR E

defense a s stubbor n a s tha t th e Ameri -

cans ha d encountere d anywher e i n Ma -

nila, an d b y 130 0 the 1s t Battalion ha d

secured onl y th e firs t floo r o f th e nort h

wing an d th e firs t an d secon d floor s o f

the centra l section . Then , "exceedingl y

heavy resistance" stopped the attack completely.23

 Sinc e i t appeare d tha t furthe r

effort coul d produc e onl y man y casual -

ties and littl e or n o progress, th e troops

withdrew behin d smoke . Th e day' s at -

tacks had cost th e 148t h Infantr y 2 men

killed an d 5 2 wounded.

On th e mornin g o f 2 7 Februar y

artillery and mortars attempted to smoke

the Japanes e ou t o f th e building . Thi s

failed, an d 155-mm . howitzer s an d 105 -

mm. SPM' s thereupo n resume d point -

blank fir e fo r abou t tw o hours. A t th e

end o f thi s bombardment , th e nort h

wing had been demolished and the south

wing ha d bee n damage d beyon d repair.

Only th e battere d centra l portion , roof -

less an d gutted , stil l stoo d abov e it s

wings lik e a ghost arisin g from betwee n

toppled tombstones .

Just afte r 140 0 on th e 27t h th e 1s t

Battalion, 148t h Infantry , attacke d again

and b y 160 0 had retake n th e sorr y remnants o f th e firs t floor . Th e battalio n

cleaned ou t th e rest o f th e buildin g ex -

cept for isolated pockets in th e basement

by 1800 , and complete d moppin g u p

before noo n o n th e 28th . B y tha t tim e

the battalio n ha d los t anothe r 7 me n

wounded.

Meanwhile, th e 5t h Cavalr y ha d

assaulted th e Agricultur e Building . O n

the 26th , behin d artiller y support , th e 23

 37th Di v Rp t Luzon , p . 85 .
MANILA: TH E LAS T RESISTANC E 305

LEGISLATIVE BUILDING—AFTER

regiment attacked twice , but fir e fro m a

suicide-bent detachmen t o f Japanes e

riflemen i n th e nearby San Luis Terrace

Apartments force d th e cavalryme n t o

seek cove r afte r the y ha d los t abou t 5

men killed an d 3 0 wounded. Th e nex t

day, losin g anothe r 1 5 me n wounded ,

the 5t h Cavalr y cleane d ou t th e apart -

ment house and a few neighboring buildings i n preparatio n fo r anothe r assaul t

on the Agriculture Building on the 28th.

Action on the 28th began with a threehour preparatory artillery bombardment

on th e followin g schedule :

0800-0900

0900-1000

1000-1100

155-mm. point-blan k fir e

from th e west and nort h

75-mm. tan k fir e an d 76 - mm. tank destroyer fire, also

point-blank, from th e south

and eas t

155-mm. point-blank fir e

from th e west and north

The howitzers , tanks , an d tan k destroy -

ers, s o a s t o avoi d endangerin g troop s

attacking th e othe r tw o governmen t

buildings, aime d non e o f thei r fire s

higher tha n th e firs t floor . A s a result ,

much o f th e Agricultur e Buildin g collapsed on its own firs t floor . B y 1100 the

bombardment ha d disintegrate d th e en -

tire northeaster n corne r an d ha d dam -

aged beyon d repai r th e res t o f th e

building. Th e destructio n appeare d s o

complete tha t a s th e cavalryme n move d

in fro m th e sout h the y fel t tha t no t a

single Japanese could b e aliv e amid th e

mass of twisted steel and concrete rubble.

Encountering n o opposition , th e

troopers easil y gaine d acces s t o th e re -

mains of the first floor, bu t soon ran int o

strong resistanc e fro m pocket s a t th e

northwest and southeast corners. A tank

mounting a flam e throwe r thereupo n
306 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

came forwar d t o reduce a pillbox a t th e

southeast corne r o f th e building , whil e

other tank s lumbere d forwar d t o cove r

all sides of the structure with point-blank

75-mm. fire. Usin g small arms, bazookas,

and portabl e flam e throwers , th e 5t h

Cavalry cleare d th e above-groun d ruin s

by dusk , bu t lef t a fe w Japanese hidden

in basemen t holes. O n 1 March, afte r a

surrender appeal had failed , demolition s

and burnin g gasolin e an d oi l too k car e

of th e las t Japanes e resistance .

The 5t h Cavalr y reckone d tha t i t ha d

killed a t leas t 15 0 Japanes e durin g th e

assault, tha t artiller y fir e ha d kille d

many more , an d tha t rifleme n ha d cu t

down others a s they tried t o escap e during th e precedin g fiv e nights . Th e 5t h

Cavalry's ow n casualtie s durin g th e re -

duction of the Agriculture Building were

7 me n kille d an d 7 5 wounded.

Just a s th e 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n ha d

had th e hono r o f firs t enterin g Manila ,

the 37t h Infantr y Divisio n no w ha d th e

honor o f reducin g th e las t organize d

resistance withi n th e city , tha t i n th e

Finance Building . Throughou t 2 8 February an d 1 Marc h 155-mm . artillery ,

105-mm. SPM's , 76-mm . TD's, an d 75 -

mm. tan k gun s lambaste d th e Financ e

Building from al l angles. Abou t 143 0 on

1 March the fire stopped as a loudspeaker

blared fort h a n invitatio n t o surrender .

Twenty-two Japanese responded.24

After anothe r bombardmen t lastin g

from 080 0 t o 100 0 o n 2 March , th e 1s t

Battalion, 148t h Infantry , bega n a n as -

sault, but halte d whe n thre e mor e Japanese cam e ou t unde r a whit e flag . Th e

Japanese remainin g insid e too k advan -

tage of the lull to open up with machine

gun an d rifl e fire , catchin g man y o f th e

assault troops in exposed positions. Completely disgusted , th e infantr y withdre w

for a fina l artiller y an d tan k barrage ,

which laste d unti l 1300 . A t th e en d o f

this concentration th e Financ e Buildin g

was a shambles; the portions not knocked

down seeme d t o b e standin g onl y fro m

sheer forc e o f habit .

What prove d t o b e th e fina l attac k

began a t 1300 , an d b y dark onl y a small

pocket o n th e to p floo r remaine d t o b e

eliminated th e next day . Thi s last effor t

cost th e 148t h Infantr y 1 man kille d and

13 wounded . Abou t 7 5 Japanes e wer e

killed withi n th e Financ e Buildin g on 2

and 3 March.

Late o n 3 March , afte r h e ha d mad e

sure tha t al l oppositio n i n th e Intra -

muros an d governmen t building s are a

had bee n eliminated , Genera l Griswol d

happily reporte d t o Genera l Kruege r

that organize d resistanc e i n th e Manil a

area had ceased. 25 Thi s informatio n th e

Sixth Arm y commander relaye d t o Gen -

eral MacArthu r th e nex t day. 26 Th e

Battle o f Manil a wa s over.

The cos t o f retakin g Manil a ha d no t

been light . XI V Corp s los t ove r 1,00 0

men kille d an d 5,50 0 wounde d i n th e

metropolitan are a fro m 3 Februar y

through 3 March . Th e breakdow n

among major unit s is shown i n Tabl e 5 .

The Japanes e los t som e 16,00 0 me n

killed i n an d aroun d Manila . O f thi s

24

 The 148t h originall y planne d t o attac k a t 143 0

on 1 March, but th e surrender appea l postponed th e

effort. 148t h Inf , Plan fo r Assaul t o n Financ e Bldg ,

28 Feb 45, in 37th Div G-3 Jn l File, 25 Feb-6 Mar 45.

25

 Rad, Griswol d t o Krueger , 203 0 3 Mar 45 , Sixth

Army G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 1- 3 Ma r 45. 26

 Rad, Kruege r t o MacArthur, WG-107, 4 Mar 45,

Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 3- 5 Ma r 45.
MANILA: TH E LAS T RESISTANC E 307

TABLE 5—CASUALTIE S I N BATTL E FO R MANIL A

Source: Base d upo n a stud y o f relevan t corps, divisional , and regimenta l sources, all o f which , a s usual , provid e contradictory and irrec -

oncilable information.

total th e Manila Naval Defense Force

lost a t leas t 12,50 0 men , the remainde r

of Admira l Iwabuchi 's 17,000-ma n gar -

rison having escaped across the Marikina

River. Th e othe r 3,500 men killed were

members of various Shimbu Group units

overrun o n th e peripher y o f th e metro -

politan are a o r choppe d dow n durin g

the abortive counterattack effort. 27 Japa -

nese equipment capture d i n th e Manil a

area, eithe r intac t o r damaged , is shown

in Tabl e 6 .

The cos t of the battl e for Manil a cannot be measured in military terms alone.

The cit y wa s a shambles afte r th e battl e

was over—much of it destroyed, damaged

beyond repair, or reparable only at great

expense in time and money. Th e publi c

transportation syste m n o longe r existed ;

the wate r suppl y an d sewag e system s

needed extensiv e repairs ; th e electri c

power facilitie s di d no t function ; mos t

of th e streets needed repaving; 3 9 of 10 0

or mor e larg e an d smal l bridge s ha d

been destroyed, including the 6 over th e

Pasig River.

The Universit y of the Philippines and

the Philippin e Genera l Hospita l wer e

largely irreparable. Lowe r class residential districts north of the Pasig and upper

class apartment s sout h o f th e rive r ha d

been destroyed; the Philippine Commonwealth's government 's cente r ha d bee n

wiped out; th e 400-year-ol d landmar k o f

Intramuros had been nearly razed; severe

damage ha d bee n inflicte d o n th e eco -

nomically importan t installation s i n th e

North and Sout h Por t Areas; th e industrialized Pac o an d Pandaca n District s

had bee n badl y battered . Man y build -

ings still standing would ultimatel y have

to be torn down as unsafe fo r occupancy.

Millions upon millions of dollars' worth

of damag e had bee n done and, a s a fina l

shocking not e o f tragedy , a n estimate d

100,000 Filipin o civilian s ha d los t thei r

lives during the battle .

In brief , Manila' s economic , political ,

and socia l lif e woul d hav e t o star t ove r

almost fro m scratch. Fo r a cit y lef t i n

Manila's conditio n ther e coul d b e n o

return t o normalcy—instead, a new normalcy woul d ultimatel y develop . Th e

Battle of Manila was indeed over, but its

effects woul d lon g b e felt .

27

 These figure s ar e estimate s base d upo n a stud y

of relevant Japanese and American sources previously

cited. A s might b e expected , th e claim s o f al l U.S .

units engaged provid e a tota l divorced fro m realit y

and fa r greate r tha n th e strengt h o f th e Japanes e

garrison i n th e metropolita n area .
308 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

TABLE 6—JAPANES E EQUIPMEN T CAPTURE D I N MANIL A ARE A

a

 Minimum estimate .

Source: XI V Corp s Arty Rp t Luzon, p. 10 ; 37th Di v Arty Rp t Luzon , app. 4 , Japanese Arty i n Sector of 37th Di v Durin g Advance to

and Captur e of Manila; XIV Corps, Japanese Defens e of Cities, p. 11; 11th A/B Di v Rpt Luzon , p. 29; 1s t Cav Di v G-2 Summar y Luzon ,

p. 40. The caliber s listed for some of the artillery pieces are open to question—fo r example , the 6-inch vs. 150-mm.
CHAPTER XVI I

Back t o Bataan

The Plans for Opening Manila Bay

Although th e seizur e o f Manil a ha d

gained importan t militar y advantage s

for th e Allies , th e exploitatio n o f thos e

advantages woul d b e severel y limite d

until MacArthur' s force s als o secure d

Manila Bay . I t availe d littl e t o hav e

captured Manila 's port , railhead , an d

storage facilitie s i f acces s t o thos e facil -

ities could not b e obtained b y sea—even

repairs to port and transportation installations would hav e t o wai t until Manil a

Bay wa s saf e fo r Allie d shipping .

The necessit y for developing Manila's

base facilitie s becam e mor e pressin g

with eac h passin g day . The Lingaye n

Gulf beache s and th e temporary subbas e

established a t Nasugb u Ba y for th e 11th

Airborne Divisio n wer e straine d t o th e

utmost t o suppor t Sixt h Army . A n ex -

tended perio d o f ba d weathe r woul d

make i t nex t t o impossibl e t o continu e

moving supplie s ove r th e Lingaye n

beaches an d dow n th e Centra l Plains ,

and th e rainy season was approaching.

During th e battl e fo r Manil a XI V

Corps ha d cleare d th e easter n shor e o f

Manila Bay . T o assur e th e securit y o f

the res t o f th e bay , i t woul d b e neces -

sary t o clea r Bataa n Peninsula , formin g

the bay' s wester n shore ; Corregido r Is -

land, lyin g acros s th e entranc e t o th e

bay; smalle r island s of f th e southwest -

ern shore ; and , finally , th e southwester n

shore itsel f fro m Cavit e t o Ternate , a n

area the 11th Airborn e Division had by -

passed durin g its driv e o n Manil a fro m

the south .

On th e ev e o f th e entr y int o Manila ,

General Kruege r ha d aske d Genera l

MacArthur i f GH Q SWP A ha d devel -

oped any plans for opening Manila Bay. 1

At that time it had appeared to Kruege r

that th e captur e o f Manil a migh t no t

take lon g an d tha t XI V Corp s woul d

soon be able to participate in operations

to clea r th e bay's shores. Moreover , X I

Corps ha d recentl y lande d o n th e wes t

coast of Luzon northwest o f Bataan . X I

Corps, i t seemed , woul d soo n establis h

contact wit h XI V Corp s i n th e Centra l

Plains and woul d the n b e read y t o tur n

its attentio n towar d Bataan , securin g

the bay's wester n shore .

General MacArthur informed Kruege r

that GH Q SWP A plan s calle d fo r th e

earliest possibl e seizur e of Bataan , t o b e

followed b y th e captur e o f Corregido r

and th e clearing of th e bay's south shor e

to Ternate. 2 I t woul d b e up to General

Krueger t o formulat e detaile d plan s fo r

the executio n o f thes e tasks . No w feel -

ing that XIV Corps might have its hands

1

 Rad , Kruege r to MacArthur, WL-1230, 2 Feb 45,

Sixth Army G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 31 Jan-2 Feb 45. 2

 Rad, MacArthu r to Krueger, CA-50232, 3 Feb 45,

Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I, 113 .
310 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

full fo r som e tim e a t Manil a an d sub -

sequently against th e Shimbu Group i n

the mountain s eas t o f th e capital ,

Krueger mad e tha t corp s responsibl e

only fo r clearin g th e Cavite-Ternat e

shore. T o th e XI Corps, i n bette r posi -

tion fo r th e task s tha n th e XIV , he as -

signed responsibility for securing Bataan

and capturin g Corregidor. 3 Kruege r ex -

pected XI Corps to be ready to undertake

the Bataan and Corregidor operations by

mid-February,4 but first th e corps had t o

complete th e mission s assigne d t o i t

when i t ha d lande d o n Luzo n o n 2 9

January.

Maj. Gen . Charles P. Hall's XI Corps,

consisting of th e 38t h Infantr y Divisio n

and th e 24t h Division's 34t h RCT, ha d

once been prepared t o land at Vigan, on

Luzon's northwest coast a hundred miles

above Lingaye n Gulf. 5 GH Q SWP A

had cancele d this operation o n 1 1 January, tw o day s afte r Sixt h Army' s assaul t

at Lingaye n Gulf . A t tha t time , i n th e

light o f th e Japanese air reactio n a t th e

gulf, planner s a t GH Q SWP A fel t tha t

it woul d b e to o risk y t o sen d a n assaul t

convoy close r t o Formosa , where , Mac -

Arthur thought , man y o f th e Japanes e

counterattack aircraf t wer e based . Also ,

GHQ SWP A had learned tha t guerrillas

already controlle d muc h o f th e coast i n

the Vigan region; it was not conceivabl e

that th e Japanese troop s stationed ther e

posed a threa t t o Sixt h Army' s beach -

head. MacArthu r thereupo n directe d

XI Corp s to land o n th e Zambale s coast

of Luzo n northwest o f Bataan. 6

The locale selected for the new landing

was th e Sa n Antoni o are a o f Zambale s

Province, lyin g some fort y mile s west o f

the southwes t corne r o f th e Centra l

Plains an d twenty-fiv e mile s northwes t

of th e northwest corner of Bataan . Th e

coast is separated from th e Central Plains

by the Cabusilan Mountains, which form

part of the great Zambales Chain stretching northwar d fro m th e ti p o f Bataa n

to th e Bolina o Peninsul a o n th e wes t

side o f Lingaye n Gulf . Providin g th e

only military significant plains area along

the wes t coast , th e Sa n Antoni o regio n

was th e sit e o f Sa n Marcelin o Airstrip ,

about si x mile s inlan d vi a Rout e 7 .

Route 7, which runs down the west coast

from th e Bolina o Peninsula, leads south

from Sa n Marcelin o ove r gentl y risin g

ground thirtee n mile s t o th e U.S. Navy

base a t Olongapo , a t th e hea d o f Subi c

Bay an d a t th e northwes t corne r o f

Bataan. Fro m Olongap o th e highwa y

follows a twisting route eastward through

rough, jungled country across the base of

Bataan Peninsul a fiftee n mile s t o Dina -

lupihan. Th e highwa y run s northeas t

another twenty-five miles from Dinalupihan t o th e junctio n wit h Rout e 3 a t

San Fernando , whic h XI V Corp s ha d

secured o n 2 8 January.7

In 194 2 the Japanes e migh t wel l

have lande d o n th e Zambale s coast an d

cut acros s Bataa n befor e MacArthur' s

3

 Sixth Army Rpt Luzon , I, 39, 49; Sixth Army FO's

47, 48, and 53 , dated 2 , 7, and 1 9 Feb 45 , in ibid., I, 149-51, 155. 4

 Sixth Arm y F O 48 , 7 Feb 45 . 5

 GHQ SWPA , Staf f Stud y MIK E II I (Vigan) , S 3

Nov 44 , OP D Fil e AB C 38 4 Pacifi c (1-17-43 ) Sec .

8-F, GH Q SWP A O I 85 , 21 Dec 44, G-3 GH Q Jnl

File, 23 Dec 44.

6

 Rad, Advanc e GH Q SWP A t o GH Q SWPA , 1 1

Jan 45 , and Rad, Advance Hq Sevent h Flee t t o T F

77,11 Jan 45, both in Sixth Army G-3 Jnl File Luzon,

13-15 Ja n 45 . Th e forma l order , GHQ SWP A O I

87, changing XI Corps' assignment wa s issued o n 1 4

January. 7

 See above, ch . XII.
BACK T O BATAA N 311

Fil-American force s ha d complete d thei r

withdrawal int o th e peninsula , a con -

tingency tha t MacArthu r ha d no t the n

overlooked.8 Recallin g i n 194 5 the op -

portunity tha t th e Japanes e ha d misse d

three years earlier, MacArthur's decision

to lan d X I Corp s a t Sa n Antoni o bi d

fair t o la y t o rest Genera l Willoughby's

fears tha t th e Japanese migh t conduc t a

"historically repetitiv e delayin g action "

on Bataan. 9 Thus , X I Corps ' primar y

mission wa s t o driv e rapidl y acros s th e

base o f Bataa n i n orde r t o preven t an y

substantial Japanese withdrawal into the

peninsula. Second , th e corp s woul d

seize an d secur e airfiel d site s i n th e Sa n

Antonio-San Marcelin o are a s o tha t th e

Allied Air Forces could broaden the base

of its air deployment on Luzon and more

easily projec t ai r powe r ove r th e Sout h

China Sea. Finally, XI Corp s was to fal l

upon th e Kembu Group's righ t rea r i f

that Japanes e forc e wa s still holdin g u p

the XIV Corps advance to Manila Bay by

the tim e Genera l Hall' s troop s reache d

the Central Plain s from th e west coast. 10

Yamashita ha d n o plan s t o retir e int o

Bataan fo r th e purpos e o f denyin g

Manila Ba y t o th e Allies—o r fo r an y

other purpose. 11 Havin g decide d tha t

the defens e o f Manil a Ba y wa s beyon d

the capabilitie s o f hi s forces , Yamashit a

believed tha t i f h e concentrate d hi s

troops i n th e cul-de-sa c o f Bataa n the y

would b e cu t t o piece s mor e rapidl y

(and b y lesse r Allie d groun d strength )

that the y woul d i n th e thre e mountai n

strongholds h e ha d established . I n

northern Luzon , wher e h e concentrate d

the bul k o f his strength an d mos t o f his

best troops , h e woul d hav e fa r greate r

opportunity fo r maneuve r an d a con -

siderably greate r chanc e t o provid e hi s

forces wit h th e foo d requisit e t o a pro -

tracted stan d tha t h e woul d o n Bataan .

He considered he could longe r delay th e

reconquest of Luzon and, thereby, Allied

progress towar d Japan, fro m th e Shobu,

Kembu, an d Shimbu position s tha n h e

could fro m Bataan . A s it was, Japanes e

forces—acting agains t Yamashita' s or -

ders, it is true—were able to deny Manila

Bay t o th e Allie s fo r som e tw o month s

after Sixt h Army' s landin g a t Lingaye n

Gulf.12 I t seem s self-eviden t tha t th e

Luzon Campaig n o f 1945 , taken a s a

whole, woul d hav e bee n ove r fa r soone r

had Yamashit a decide d t o concentrat e

in th e blind alle y of Bataan. 13

Allied intelligenc e agencie s estimate d

that th e Japanes e ha d nearl y 13,00 0

troops in th e Bataan-Zambales Provinc e

area, 5,00 0 of them i n th e region imme -

9 diately nort h o f Bataa n an d th e rest o n G-2 GH Q SWPA DSEI 1017 , 8 Jan 45 , G-3 GH Q

Jnl Fil e 8 Jan 45. Se e also above, ch. II. 10

 GHQ SWP A O I 87 , 1 4 Jan 45 , G-3 Jn l File , 1 4

Jan 45 ; Rad, MacArthu r t o Krueger , CAX-50027, 1 7

Jan 45 , Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I, 112-13 . Se e also

above, ch . VIII. 11

 Japanese informatio n i n thi s sectio n i s mainl y

from: Statemen t o f Co l Sanenob u Nagayosh i (C O

39th Inf, 10th Div, and Comd r Nagayoshi Detachment), States , II , 625-26 ; 14th Area Army Opn s o n

Luzon, pp . 27 , 43, 58; 14th Area Army Op n Orde r

No. A-464, 28 Jan 45 , Trans, III, Item 3 ; 14th Area

Army T r Or g List . Fo r additiona l background , se e

above, ch . V .

12

 Actually, s o great wer e th e clearin g an d repai r

problems that it was well into April before the Allies

were abl e t o mak e muc h us e o f Manil a Ba y an d

Manila's por t facilities . 13

 For a n opposit e poin t o f view , se e Morton , Fall of the Philippines, p . 163 . Japanese officer s wh o re -

viewed The Fall of the Philippines i n manuscrip t

disagreed with Morton an d pu t fort h interpretation s

similar t o thos e of th e present volume . Se e Morton ,

op. cit., n. 9, p, 163.

9See Morton, Fall of the Philippines, p 166, 223.
312 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

the peninsula. 14 GH Q SWP A expecte d

that X I Corp s woul d mee t th e firs t sig -

nificant resistanc e alon g Rout e 7 across

the base of Bataan Peninsula, and furthe r

believed tha t operation s t o clea r th e

peninsula woul d probabl y follo w th e

pattern establishe d b y th e Japanes e i n

1942.15

Actually, th e Japanes e ha d les s tha n

4,000 troop s i n th e X I Corp s objectiv e

area. Th e principa l forc e wa s th e 10th

Division's 39th Infantry (les s 1st Battalion), whic h Yamashit a diverte d t o

Bataan lat e i n Decembe r whe n h e can -

celed plan s t o shi p th e uni t t o Leyte. 16

The regimenta l commander , Col . Sanenobu Nagayoshi , als o ha d unde r hi s

control tw o provisiona l infantr y com -

panies, a platoo n o f ligh t tanks , a rein -

forced batter y o f mixe d artillery , an d

minor Army and Nav y bas e defens e an d

service forc e detachments . Th e entir e

force, includin g th e 39th Infantry, wa s

designated th e Nagayoshi Detachment,

which wa s nominall y unde r Genera l

Tsukada, Kembu Group commander .

Having onc e instructe d th e Nagayoshi

Detachment t o bloc k Rout e 7 i n orde r

to protect th e Kembu Group righ t rear,

Tsukada, whe n XI V Corp s reache d th e

Clark Fiel d area , directe d Colone l

Nagayoshi t o pul l hi s troops ou t o f th e

Bataan-Zambales are a int o th e mai n

Kembu positions . Befor e thes e order s

reached th e Nagayoshi Detachment, that

Japanese forc e wa s unde r attac k b y X I

Corps, an d al l opportunit y t o mak e a n

orderly withdrawa l ha d vanished .

The Nagayoshi Detachment's strongest

concentration—some 2,75 0 men—wa s

dug i n athwar t Rout e 7 alon g th e bas e

of Bataa n Peninsula . Here , Colone l

Nagayoshi statione d th e 3d Battalion,

39th Infantry, hi s tanks , mos t o f hi s ar -

tillery, an d hi s regimenta l troops . On e

provisional infantr y compan y garrisoned

Olongapo; a compan y o f th e 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry, wa s at San Marcelin o

Airstrip; an d th e res t o f th e Nagayoshi

Detachment—about 1,00 0 troops—held

scattered outpost s alon g th e eastern ,

western, an d souther n shore s o f Bataan .

Against Nagayoshi' s 4,000 , X I Corp s

landed with nearly 40,000 troops, including 5,50 0 Allie d Ai r Force s personne l

who wer e t o prepar e a fighte r bas e a t

San Marcelin o Airstrip. Stage d a t Leyt e

by Eight h Army , X I Corp s saile d t o

Luzon aboar d vessel s o f Tas k Grou p

78.3, Admira l Strubl e commanding . A

small forc e o f cruisers , destroyers , an d

escort carrier s wa s availabl e t o provid e

gunfire an d ai r suppor t a t th e beach -

head. Fift h Ai r Forc e planes , responsi -

ble fo r protecting the convo y o n it s way

from Leyt e t o Luzon , wer e t o tak e ove r

air suppor t task s withi n a da y o r tw o

after X I Corp s landed . Onc e X I Corp s

had secure d a beachhea d an d capture d

San Marcelin o Airstrip , i t woul d pas s

from Eight h t o Sixt h Arm y control. 17

Already well along i n it s preparations

for th e Viga n operation , X I Corp s en -

countered fe w difficultie s i n makin g

ready fo r its new assignmen t othe r tha n

14

 Information o n Allie d estimate s i s from : G- 2

GHQ SWPA , Monthl y Summar y o f Enem y Disposi -

tions, 31 Dec 44, G-3 GH Q Jn l File , 31 Dec 44; G- 2

GHQ SWPA DSEI's, 1-31 Jan 45, G-3 GH Q Jnl Files,

2 Jan- 1 Fe b 45 ; 38t h Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 115-20 ;

Eighth Arm y Rp t Nasugbu-Bataan , pp . 92-94 ; 34t h

Inf Rp t Luzon , p . 5 . 15

 See Morton , Fall of the Philippines, chs . XII- XXVI. 16

 See above , ch . V .

17

 GHQ SWP A O I 87 , 1 4 Jan 45 ; Eight h Arm y F O

15, Amended , 1 6 Jan 45 , Eighth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e

MIKE VII, 12-20 Jan 45 ; XI Corp s F O 3 , 1 9 Jan 45 ,

XI Corp s F O File ; T G 78. 3 Opn Pla n No . 1-45, 20

Jan 45 , Nav y Dep t files .
BACK T O BATAA N 313

those involved i n collecting and disseminating terrai n data . Sufficien t informa -

tion wa s availabl e fo r tactica l plan s t o

be draw n u p quickly , an d onl y a fe w

minor change s ha d t o b e mad e in logis -

tical plans . Again , plannin g i n th e

Southwest Pacifi c Are a prove d remarka -

bly flexible . Loadin g and movemen t t o

the objectiv e are a wer e accomplishe d

without untowar d incident ; a t daw n o n

29 January th e ship s o f th e assaul t convoy wer e i n positio n of f Sa n Antonio ,

ready t o begi n landin g operations.

Sealing Off Bataan: A Study in Command

Maneuvering Inland

Preassault bombardmen t o f th e X I

Corps beachhead was scheduled t o begin

at 0730 on the 29th, but Admiral Struble

canceled i t whe n Filipin o guerrillas ,

sailing ou t i n smal l craf t t o gree t th e

American convoy , reporte d tha t ther e

were no Japanese in the landin g area. 18

XI Corp s the n proceede d t o lan d wit h

four regiment s abreast , th e 34t h Infan -

try o n th e righ t (south ) an d eac h regi -

ment i n colum n o f battalions , acros s a

front extendin g almos t si x mile s nort h

along th e coast fro m Sa n Antonio. Th e

first wave , reaching shore on schedul e at

0830, wa s greeted b y cheering Filipino s

who eagerly lent a hand a t unloading .

The 149t h Infantry , 38t h Division ,

dashed inland to take San Marcelino Airstrip, bu t upo n arriva l foun d tha t guer -

rillas unde r Capt . Ramo n Magsaysay ,

later Presiden t o f th e Republi c o f th e

Philippines, ha d secure d th e fiel d thre e

days earlier . Th e 24t h Reconnaissanc e

Troop, attached t o th e 34t h RCT, spe d

on sout h alon g Rout e 7 t o th e nort h

shore o f Subi c Ba y befor e dark . No -

where di d X I Corp s troop s encounte r

any oppositio n durin g th e day , and th e

only casualty of the assault seems to have

been a n enliste d ma n o f Compan y F ,

151st Infantry , 38t h Division , wh o wa s

gored b y on e o f th e notoriousl y ill -

tempered Filipin o carabao. 19 Tactica l

surprise ha d bee n complete . Colone l

Nagayoshi di d no t eve n lear n o f th e

landing until th e next day, and the n h e

thought tha t XI Corp s had come ashore

at Subi c Bay. 20

General Hal l assume d comman d

ashore abou t 080 0 o n 3 0 January , an d

simultaneously Eighth Army passed control o f XI Corp s t o Sixt h Army . A fe w

hours late r th e reinforce d 2 d Battalion ,

151st Infantry , seize d Grand e Island ,

lying across th e entranc e t o Subi c Bay ,

against n o opposition, an d afte r a sharp

skirmish a t th e outskirt s o f Olongap o

the 34t h Infantr y too k th e town .

With thes e two actions XI Corps-ha d

completed it s initia l tasks . Subi c Ba y

was secure for base development; the San

Marcelino Airstrip had bee n taken , an d

work o n th e fighte r fiel d ha d alread y

started. Th e entir e XI Corps was ashore,

and th e onl y significan t difficult y ye t

encountered ha d resulte d fro m poo r

beach conditions, which had delayed dis18

 This subsection is based generall y upon : Eight h

Army Rp t Nasugbu-Bataan , pp . 77 , 99 ; X I Corp s

Hist Sec , Hist o f X I Corps , 1 5 Jun 42-1 5 Mar 46 ,

p. 34 ; X I Corp s Rp t Luzon , pp . 3-4; ibid, an , 3 , Supply an d Evacuation , p . 2 ; 38t h Div Rp t Luzon ,

pp. 11-15 , 166; Rpt , Asst ACof S G- 3 Eight h Army , Obsns M- 7 Opn , 30 Jan 45 , Eighth Arm y G- 3 Jn l

File MIK E VII , 23 Jan-1 Fe b 45 ; T G 78.3 Rpt

Zambales, passim; 34t h In f Rp t Luzon , p. 5.

19

 151s t Inf Rp t Luzon , Account for 29 Jan 45 . Th e

151st Infantry's repor t i s divide d int o day-by-da y

narratives. 20

 Nagayoshi Statement , States , II , 626 .
314 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

XI CORP S LANDIN G ARE A O N WESTER N COAS T O F LUZON , Zambales Mountains

in background.

charge o f heav y equipment . Al l i n all ,

the operatio n ha d gon e unexpectedl y

well s o far , an d X I Corp s wa s read y t o

begin it s next job—th e driv e acros s th e

base of Bataan Peninsula to cut Japanes e

routes o f acces s an d establis h contac t

with XI V Corps .

General Hall's plan called for the 38th

Division, les s the 151s t RCT in XI

Corps Reserve , t o pass through th e 34th

Infantry a t Olongap o an d driv e rapidl y

eastward. H e directe d Maj . Gen . Henr y

L. C. Jones, th e commande r o f th e 38t h

Division, t o advanc e along Rout e 7 and

"routes nort h thereof, " th e advanc e t o

be s o conducte d tha t th e tw o columns,

moving alon g separat e axes , coul d b e

mutually supporting. 21 Genera l Jones ,

in turn , decided to push th e 152 d Infan -

try eas t alon g Rout e 7 whil e th e 149t h

Infantry, les s 1s t Battalio n i n divisio n

reserve, wa s t o strik e eastwar d vi a a

rough trai l tha t X I Corp s headquarters

believed parallele d Rout e 7 o n risin g

ground abou t 1,20 0 yards nort h o f th e

highway. Genera l Hal l apparentl y ex -

pected that the 149t h Infantry, bypassin g

whatever oppositio n migh t b e foun d

along Route 7, would reach Dinalupihan

quickly. The n th e regimen t could , i f

necessary, turn back west along the highway t o hel p th e 152 d Infantry reduc e

any Japanes e defense s tha t migh t stil l

be holdin g out. While h e se t n o tim e

limit fo r th e operation , subsequen t

events indicat e tha t Genera l Hal l fel t

that th e tw o regiments of th e 38t h Divi -

sion coul d clea r Rout e 7 throug h t o

Dinalupihan by evening on 5 February.22

Neither th e X I Corp s no r th e 38t h

Division a s yet had muc h detailed infor - 21

 Msg, XI Corps to 38th Div , 202 0 30 Jan 45 , Entry

82, 38th Di v G-3 Jnl , 3 0 Jan 45 . (Ther e are tw o sets

of folder s containin g 38th Divisio n G- 3 Journa l an d

Journal Fil e materials fo r Luzon , on e labele d "G-3

Journal 38th Infantr y Division " and the other "G-3

Journal, 38t h Division. " Th e firs t se t o f folder s i s

cited a s 38th In f Di v G-3 Jn l File ; th e secon d se t a s

38th Di v G-3 Jnl. )

22

 XI Corp s Rpt Luzon , p. 5; 38t h Div Rpt Luzon ,

p. 15 ; 38th Di v FO 10 , 31 Jan 45 , 38th Di v G-3 Jn l

File, 1 9 Jan-10 Feb 45; Jones Comments, 20 Dec 56.
BACK T O BATAA N 315

mation abou t Japanese strengt h an d de -

ployment alon g Rout e 7.23 Lt . Col .

Gyles Merrill, commanding guerrillas in

Zambales an d Bataa n Provinces , esti -

mated tha t 2,00 0 t o 5,00 0 Japanese ,

armed wit h machin e guns , artillery ,

tanks, antitan k guns, an d mortars , wer e

well dug in along Route 7 , but XI Corp s

seems t o hav e take n this estimat e with a

grain o f salt. 24 A s a matte r o f fact , th e

152d Infantr y bega n it s driv e acros s

Bataan wit h a n estimat e tha t i t migh t

meet a s few as 900 Japanese on Rout e 7

instead of the 2,750 or more that Colonel

Nagayoshi actuall y had statione d there. 25

As ha d bee n th e cas e fo r XI V Corp s

troops in Manila , th e XI Corps' advanc -

ing infantry would no t discover th e main

body o f th e Japanes e o n Rout e 7 unti l

actually i n contac t a t th e principa l de -

fenses, fo r Colone l Nagayosh i ha d estab -

lished onl y on e relativel y wea k outpos t

position betwee n Olongap o an d hi s

strongest concentrations . H e deploye d

his main strength i n a series of mutuall y

supporting strongpoint s alon g an d o n

both side s o f Rout e 7 i n a n are a tha t

began approximatel y thre e mile s north -

east of Olongapo and extende d eastward

another thre e mile s throug h roug h terrain known as ZigZag Pass. The Japanes e

defenses ran fro m northwes t to southeast

across Rout e 7 , whic h mean t tha t th e

left o f th e 152 d Infantry woul d com e

into contac t wit h th e Japanes e righ t

before th e 152d' s right eve n approache d

the Japanes e left .

Nagayoshi had chosen his ground well.

While more rugged terrain than th e ZigZag Pas s are a i s t o b e foun d o n Luzon ,

few piece s o f groun d combin e t o th e

same degre e bot h roughnes s an d dens e

jungle. Rout e 7 twists violently throug h

the pass, followin g a lin e of leas t terrai n

resistance tha t wil d pig s must originall y

have established. Th e jungl e flora i n the

region i s so thic k tha t on e ca n ste p fiv e

yards off the highway and no t b e abl e t o

see th e road . Th e Japanes e ha d honey -

combed ever y hil l an d knol l a t th e Zig -

Zag wit h foxhole s linke d b y tunnel s o r

trenches; a t particularl y advantageou s

points they had constructe d strongpoints

centered o n lo g an d dir t pillboxes . Al l

the defense s wer e wel l camouflaged , fo r

rich, jungl e foliag e covere d mos t posi -

tions, indicatin g tha t man y ha d bee n

prepared wit h grea t car e an d ha d bee n

constructed well before Nagayoshi's 39th

Infantry ha d reache d th e area in Decem -

ber.26 Fe w i f an y o f th e installation s

dated bac k t o 1942 , whe n element s o f

MacArthur's comman d tha t wer e de -

ployed i n th e ZigZa g Pas s area had with -

drawn int o Bataa n befor e constructin g

many defense s an d ha d lef t th e Japanese

to occupy the pass against no opposition.27

Colonel Nagayoshi ha d plent y o f foo d

and ammunitio n fo r a prolonge d stand ,

23

 Information o n Japanese defenses is based mainly

on: 38t h Di v Rpt Luzon , pp. 13 , 16-18, 116-18 , and

maps betwee n pp . 1 5 and 16 ; XI Corp s Rpts Luzon ,

an. 2, G-2 Rpt , p. 33. 24

 XI Corp s G- 2 Rpt s 2 an d 3 , 3 0 an d 3 1 Jan 45 .

Merrill, formerl y wit h th e 26t h Cavalry , Philippin e

Scouts, wa s a supply office r unde r Wainwright during

the 1941-4 2 campaign . 25

 152d Inf F O 2 , 31 Jan 45 .

26

 If n o wor k ha d bee n undertake n earlier , whic h

seems impossible , i t certainl y starte d immediatel y

upon th e arriva l of th e 39th Infantry. Se e Diary, 2d

Lt. Sabur o Kitano , 6th Company, 2d Provisional

Infantry Battalion, XI Corp s G- 2 Periodi c Repor t

No. 13, 10 February 1945. There are some indications

that man y o f th e defense s a t th e ZigZa g ha d origi -

nally been constructed by Japanese naval troops who,

previously statione d a t Olongapo , had move d t o th e main Kembu defense s i n January . 27

 Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp . 166 , 246, 279.
316 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

VISIBILITY ZERO , ZIGZA G PAS S

and h e als o possessed numerou s mortars

and machin e guns . Hi s artillery , how -

ever, was inadequate for the task at hand

and h e lacke d certai n type s o f medica l

supplies, especially malaria preventatives

and cures . Havin g lef t onl y on e mino r

outpost along Route 7 between Olongapo

and th e ZigZag , h e mad e n o attemp t t o

cover tha t open , three-mil e stretc h o f

road wit h fire . H e ha d s o scattere d hi s

mortars and artiller y i n orde r t o protect

them against America n artiller y an d ai r

strikes tha t his troop s woul d ofte n hav e

difficulty massin g their fires. Finally , his

defensive lin e wa s scarcel y 2,00 0 yard s

wide northwest to southeast, thus rendering hi s whol e positio n susceptibl e t o

vigorous outflankin g maneuvers . O n

the othe r hand , h e ha d goo d troops ,

well-prepared positions , an d excellen t

defensive terrain .

Into Contact

On th e mornin g o f 3 1 Januar y th e

152d Infantry , leavin g on e battalio n t o

reduce th e Japanes e outpost a mil e an d

a hal f northeas t o f Olongapo , marche d

on anothe r mil e and a half t o th e poin t

where Rout e 7 bega n climbin g jungle d
BACK T O BATAA N 317

MAP 8

hills int o th e ZigZag. 28 Oppositio n s o

far ha d bee n limite d t o scattere d rifl e

fire an d a fe w bursts o f long-rang e ma -

chine gun fire , bu t a s attacks against th e

first Japanes e strongpoint s bega n th e

next morning , 1 February , th e 152 d

Infantry ran into increasingly determined

resistance.29 O n 1 February the problem

of th e actua l locatio n o f th e variou s

American units arose to plague the 152 d

Infantry, th e 38t h Division , an d th e X I

Corps. Rout e 7 twisted so violently an d

the terrai n throug h whic h i t passe d wa s

so densel y jungle d tha t th e 152 d ha d

considerable troubl e orientin g itsel f o n

the map , whic h wa s non e to o accurat e

to begi n with . Secondly , th e 38t h Divi -

sion wa s employin g a ma p cod e tha t

soon prove d highl y susceptibl e t o gar -

blings an d misunderstanding s a s on e

echelon reporte d it s suppose d location s

to another. 30 Finally , th e 152 d Infantr y

often ha d troubl e gettin g it s radio s t o

work properl y i n th e thic k vegetatio n

of th e ZigZa g area .

The 152 d Infantry , durin g th e morning o f 1 February, approached th e west -

ern entranc e t o a n irregularl y shape d

horseshoe curv e o n Rout e 7 . (Map 8)

The horseshoe curve rounded, and partly

crossed, the nose of a northwest-southeast

ridge. Ope n on th e north, the horseshoe

measured som e 20 0 yard s wes t t o eas t

across it s norther n points ; th e wester n

leg wa s about 25 0 yard s long , nort h t o

south; th e easter n le g 32 5 yard s long ;

and th e souther n leg , almos t 27 5 yards

across, west t o east. I n th e center, a t it s

broadest, th e horseshoe measured nearl y

300 yards. A t 38t h Divisio n headquar -

ters o n 1 February i t wa s the consensu s

that th e 152 d Infantry' s leadin g battal -

ion ha d fough t its way around the horseshoe and b y dusk was anywhere from 15 0

to 30 0 yards east along Rout e 7 beyond

the horseshoe's northeastern corner. Ac -

cording t o th e regimenta l operation s

officer, th e leading battalion did not even

reach th e horsesho e o n 1 February .

Rather, the battalion, which faced strong

opposition all day , mad e onl y 50 0 yards

in a n easterl y directio n an d du g i n fo r

28

 The genera l source s fo r th e stor y o f th e reduc - tion of the ZigZag are: 38t h Div Rpt Luzon, pp. 16 -

29; 38th Div G-3 Pe r Rpts, 1-5 Fe b 45; 38th Div G-3

Jnl Files, 1 9 Jan-28 Feb 45; Ltrs, Hall t o Krueger, 3,

4, 5, an d 6 Feb 45 , Decker Papers, folde r 4 ; Intervs,

Falk wit h L t Co l Davi d J. Wilso n (S- 3 152 d Inf) , 1 4

and 2 2 Au g 52 , an d Interv , Fal k wit h Bri g Ge n

John A. Elmore (Cof S XI Corps), 3 Apr 52, copies of

interv notes in OCMH files; Jones Comments, 20 Dec

56 and 2 6 Jan 57 . 29

 Additional material on 152 d Infantry operation s

is from : 152 d Inf Rp t Luzon , 2 9 Jan-2 Ma r 45 , pp.

2-6; 152 d Inf Uni t Jnl, 1-1 5 Fe b 45; 2d Bn 152 d Inf

Rpt Luzon , pp. 1-2 ; 2 d Bn 152 d In f Uni t Jnl, 1-1 5

Feb 45 ; Ma j Noble F . Schlatter (S- 2 152d Inf), Rpt

for 152 d Inf , 173 0 1 Feb-0800 2 Feb 45 , 38th Inf Di v

G-3 Jn l File , 1 9 Jan-10 Feb 45; Ltr, Hal l t o Jones,

4 Fe b 45; sub: Opn s of 38th Di v . . . , 3 1 Jan 5 to

2 Feb , enclose d i n Ltr , Hal l to Krueger, 6 Feb 45 . 30 The basi c tric k of the map code was to measure

co-ordinates o n th e 1:50,00 0 ma p th e troop s wer e

using by means of the yard scale from a 1:20,000 map.
318 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

MAP 9

the night of 1- 2 Februar y a t a point almost 20 0 yard s wes t o f th e horseshoe 's

northwestern corner. 31 A stud y o f al l

available regimenta l an d battalio n rec -

ords indicates that on 1 February at least

one compan y o f th e 152d 's leadin g battalion reache d th e southeaster n corne r

of th e horsesho e bu t withdre w befor e

dark t o rejoi n th e res t o f th e battalio n

west o f th e horseshoe. 32

Whatever its location, the 152 d Infantry ha d begu n t o figh t it s wa y int o a

veritable hornet's nest of Japanese. Th e

leading battalion , th e 1st, had roug h

going all day, and had had to spend most

of it s tim e tryin g t o fin d an d isolat e

Japanese positions . Durin g th e follow -

ing night, the Japanese launched a number o f small-scal e counterattack s against

the battalion and harassed it with mortar

and artiller y fire , whic h inflicte d som e

casualties no t onl y o n th e 1s t Battalio n

but als o o n th e 2 d an d 3d , no w abou t

1,500 yard s t o th e wes t alon g Rout e 7 .

By daw n o n 2 Februar y th e regiment 's

casualties sinc e i t ha d begu n movin g

through th e 34t h Infantr y abou t noo n

on 3 1 January totale d 1 7 men killed , 48

wounded, an d 2 missing.

Plans for 2 February called for the 152d

to sweep rising ground alon g both side s

of Rout e 7 , simultaneousl y smashin g

through th e ZigZa g alon g th e highway .

That da y th e 3 d Battalio n discovere d

strong Japanese defense s alon g a north -

west-southeast ridg e nort h o f th e horse -

shoe. (Map 9) Unable to locate the north

flank o f these Japanese positions, the battalion hit th e defense s i n th e center bu t

gained nothing. Japanese pressure forced

the uni t generall y southeas t alon g th e

western slop e of th e ridge , an d th e battalion sideslippe d bac k t o Route 7 near

the northwester n corne r o f th e horse -

shoe. Th e 2 d Battalion, operating south

of th e highway, mor e tha n kep t abreast

of th e 3 d but, because o f th e southeast -

ward slant o f th e Japanes e line , locate d

no stron g defenses. Sinc e ther e seeme d

to b e littl e poin t i n holdin g groun d n o

Japanese occupied , an d sinc e th e 3 d

Battalion ha d mad e n o progress against

the Japanese right north of Route 7, the

2d Battalion pulled back to the highway.

In th e center , meanwhile , th e 1s t Battalion ha d gained n o new ground alon g

Route 7 through th e horseshoe .

31

 Interv, Fal k wit h Wilson , 2 2 Aug 52 . Wilso n

stated that he was often surprised to find where 38th

Division G- 2 an d G- 3 report s place d th e regimen t

and state d tha t divisio n location s wer e ofte n a t

variance wit h location s h e ha d sen t t o divisio n

headquarters. Th e present author found many amazing disagreements, especially during the firs t wee k o f

the action , amon g locations recorde d i n regimenta l

division G-2 , division G-3 , and divisio n artiller y

reports. X I Corps reports sometimes disagreed wit h

all four ! 32

 General Jones believed tha t th e entire battalion

had reached "a point a little beyond the horseshoe."

Jones Comments, 20 Dec 56.
BACK T O BATAA N 319

The 152d' s position s at dark on 2 February wer e agai n a matte r o f som e dispute. Genera l Jone s no w believe d tha t

the 2 d an d 3 d Battalion s wer e o n th e

horseshoe's easter n le g nea r th e north -

eastern corner, 33 an d tha t th e 1s t Bat -

talion was well into the horseshoe. Other

reports indicate, however, that the entire

regiment reassembled fo r th e night west

of th e horseshoe . Fro m subsequen t de -

velopments, i t appear s tha t element s o f

the 152 d had reache d th e northeaster n

corner o f th e horsesho e o n 2 Februar y

but tha t th e 2 d and 3 d Battalion s actu -

ally held for the night along the western

leg whil e th e 1s t Battalio n occupie d it s

previous night's bivoua c t o th e west .

Casualties on 2 February numbere d 5

men killed , 2 6 wounded, and 1 missing,

for a tota l sinc e noon o n 3 1 January o f

22 killed , 7 4 wounded , an d 3 missing .

It i s perhaps indicativ e of th e natur e o f

the terrai n i n whic h th e 152 d Infantry

was fightin g tha t th e regimen t claime d

to hav e kille d onl y 1 2 Japanes e fro m

noon o n 3 1 Januar y t o dar k o n 2

February.

The attac k o f 2 Februar y ha d devel -

oped somewha t slowly , primaril y be -

cause the 1st and 3 d Battalions had been

shaken u p b y th e Japanes e counterat -

tacks and artiller y and morta r fir e o f the

previous night and, having lost some key

company officer s an d NCO 's, face d seri -

ous reorganizatio n problems . A t an y

rate, when Genera l Hal l came up t o the

front abou t noon , h e foun d th e 152 d

Infantry barel y unde r way . Dissatisfie d

with th e progress . Hal l informe d Gen -

eral Jones tha t th e exhibition o f Jones's

division was the worst he had eve r seen34

—a rather severe indictment of an entire

division, onl y on e regimen t o f which ,

the 152 d Infantry, ha d ye t seen an y real

action on Luzon . Th e 152 d was a green

unit tha t ha d bee n i n comba t scarcel y

forty-eight hours by noon on 2 February.

General Jones , i n turn , wa s non e to o

happy about the conduct of the 152 d and

had bee n especiall y displease d b y th e

performance o f th e 3 d Battalion . Lat e

that day he relieved the regimental commander, Col . Rober t L . Stillwell . Lt .

Col. Jess e E . McIntosh, the regimenta l

executive officer , thereupo n too k ove r

the command . No t satisfie d tha t thi s

change woul d produc e th e result s h e

desired, Genera l Hal l directe d th e 34t h

Infantry t o pas s throug h th e 152 d an d

continue th e attac k eastward . Th e 34t h

would operat e unde r th e direc t contro l

of Headquarters , X I Corps ; th e 152 d

Infantry, remainin g unde r Jones's command, woul d follo w th e 34t h throug h

the ZigZa g t o mo p u p bypasse d pocket s

of Japanes e resistance. 35 Dividin g th e

command a t th e poin t o f contact , Gen -

eral Hall i n effec t lef t Genera l Jones i n

command o f onl y on e regiment , th e

152d Infantry . Th e 151s t Infantry wa s

still i n X I Corp s reserv e and th e 149th ,

while ostensibl y unde r Jones' s control ,

was still off on th e bypassin g mission t o

Dinalupihan tha t ha d bee n undertake n

at corp s direction .

The relie f o f th e 152 d Infantry an d

its commander, an d th e insertio n o f th e

34th Infantr y a t th e horsesho e unde r

corps control, reflecte d primaril y a com33

 Note tha t Genera l Jone s n o longe r believe d th e

152d wa s beyon d th e horseshoe . Eithe r h e wa s i n

error the previous night or th e 152 d had lost ground

on 2 February.

34

 Ltr, Hall to Krueger, 3 Feb 45. 35

 Ibid.; 38th Di v Rp t Luzon , p . 18 ; Lt Co l Alex - ander G . Kirby (G- 3 38th Div), Notes of Con f wit h

Col Colin S. Monteith (G- 3 XI Corps), 2000 2 Feb 45,

38th Di v G- 3 Jn l File , 1 9 Jan-10 Fe b 45 ; Jone s

Comments, 20 Dec 56.
320 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

MAP 10

bination of Hall's expectation of a rapid

drive across Bataa n an d a misapprehension on his part concerning the strength

and locatio n o f th e Japanes e defense s

along Rout e 7 . Hal l believe d tha t th e

152d Infantr y ha d a t mos t encountere d

only a n outpos t lin e o f resistance , tha t

the principa l Japanes e defense s la y a

mile o r s o eas t o f th e horseshoe , an d

that the 152d Infantry had foun d "noth -

ing tha t a n outfi t read y t o g o forwar d

could not overcom e quickly." 36 The

38th Division and th e 152 d Infantry , o n

the other hand, were convinced tha t the

152d wa s u p agains t somethin g "big "

and had reached th e Japanese main line

of resistance . A s events wer e t o prove ,

the 38th Division and th e 152d Infantr y

were mor e nearl y correc t a s o f evenin g

on 2 Februar y than wa s XI Corps .

Frustration at the Horseshoe

The 1s t Battalion , 34t h Infantry ,

encountered som e harassin g fir e fro m

Japanese mortar s an d artiller y o n th e

morning o f 3 Februar y a s i t passe d

through th e 152d Infantry an d move d

deep int o th e horseshoe. 37 (Map 10)

While on e compan y struc k nort h an d

northeast fro m th e horseshoe' s north -

western corner, the rest o f th e battalion

followed Rout e 7 around t o th e easter n

leg, retracin g th e 152 d Infantry's path .

The 34th' s compan y o n th e north , hitting some of the same ridge line defenses

that the 3d Battalion , 152 d Infantry , had

previously encountered, sli d bac k south -

east just as had th e 152d' s battalion, and

dug i n fo r th e nigh t no t fa r east o f th e

horseshoe's northwester n corner . Th e

main bod y o f th e 1s t Battalion , 34t h

Infantry, wa s unable to move more than

halfway nort h alon g th e easter n le g be -

fore Japanese fire from high , dominating

terrain 20 0 yards east of that arm halte d

it. Seekin g t o outflan k thi s opposition ,

Company A struc k of f t o th e southeas t

from th e horseshoe's southeastern corner.

The compan y reache d a poin t o n th e

northern slope s o f Familia r Pea k abou t

700 yards southeast o f its lin e o f departure, bu t wa s the n pinne d dow n an d

surrounded. Meanwhil e th e 2 d an d 3 d

Battalions, 152d . Infantry , patrollin g behind th e 34t h Infantry' s battalion , ha d

knocked ou t a fe w isolate d Japanes e

strongpoints an d du g i n fo r th e nigh t

both north and east along Route 7 from

the horseshoe's southwestern corner. The

1st Battalion , 152d , remained wes t o f

the horseshoe .

If on e thin g wa s obviou s b y dus k o n

3 February it was that the 34th Infantr y

36

 Ltr, Hall t o Krueger, 3 Feb 45. 37

 Additional material on th e 34th Infantry is from:

34th Inf Rpt Luzon, pp. 53-99; 34th RCT Uni t Rpts,

3-6 Fe b 45 , an d othe r material s i n 34t h RC T Jn l

File Luzon, 4-7 Fe b 45; 34th In f Unit Jnl Luzon , 3-

6 Fe b 45 .
BACK T O BATAA N 321

MAP 11

had employe d insufficien t strengt h fo r

the task at hand—it had committed only

one battalio n t o d o a jo b tha t thre e

battalions o f th e 152 d had bee n unabl e

to accomplish . Accordingly , Col . William W . Jenna , commandin g th e 34th ,

decided t o emplo y hi s entir e regimen t

in a three-pronge d attack . Hi s 1s t Bat -

talion woul d concentrat e agains t th e

Japanese on th e dominating ground east

of th e horseshoe 's easter n leg ; the 2 d

Battalion would clea r the Japanese from

the northeaster n corne r area , undertak -

ing flankin g maneuver s nort h o f Rout e

7; an d th e 3d Battalio n would clea r th e

highway t o an d beyon d th e northeast -

ern corner , initiall y followin g th e 2 d

Battalion.

On 4 February th e 34th's attack wen t

well at first , bu t i n th e fac e o f continued

strong opposition, includin g heavy mortar and artillery fire, the regiment before

dusk had to give up much of the ground

it gaine d durin g th e day. The 1s t Bat -

talion dug in fo r the night farther sout h

along th e horseshoe' s easter n le g tha n

it ha d th e previou s night , althoug h i t

retained a hold o n som e terrai n eas t o f

that leg. The 2 d Battalion had knocke d

out som e strongpoints alon g th e southern en d o f th e Japanes e righ t flan k de -

fenses i n th e are a north o f Route 7 , but

Japanese fire drove most of the unit back

to th e roa d lat e in th e afternoon . (Map

11) Th e 3 d Battalion , becaus e th e 2 d

had mad e n o permanen t progress , ha d

not gone into action.

General Jones had meanwhile directed

the 152 d Infantry t o rene w it s attack s

against th e Japanes e right , nort h o f

Route 7 . Th e 1s t Battalion , 152d , in

a wid e envelopmen t fro m th e west , a t

first ha d considerabl e success , bu t lat e

in th e afternoon , jus t whe n i t seeme d

that th e battalion wa s about t o overru n

the stronges t position s alon g th e ridg e

line, a vicious Japanese mortar and artillery barrag e drov e th e uni t bac k sout h

to Rout e 7 . Thi s wa s the fourt h tim e

in thre e day s tha t th e Japanes e ha d

thwarted American attempts to clear the

ridge north o f th e horseshoe .

The fightin g a t th e horsesho e o n 3

and 4 Februar y cos t th e 34t h Infantr y

41 men killed, 13 1 wounded, and 6 missing whil e o n th e sam e day s th e 152 d

Infantry lost 4 men killed , 48 wounded,

and 1 missing. Th e 34t h Infantr y ha d

extended th e fron t a littl e t o th e nort h

of th e horsesho e an d a bi t eas t o f th e

eastern leg, but neither the 34th Infantry

nor th e 152 d Infantry ha d mad e an y

substantial gain s beyon d th e poin t th e

152d ha d reache d o n 2 February. Th e

Japanese still held strong positions north

of the horseshoe and they still controlled

the northeaster n corne r an d abou t hal f

the easter n leg . The 34t h Infantry' s

greatest contributio n durin g th e tw o
322 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

days, perhaps , wa s t o hav e helpe d con -

vince Genera l Hal l tha t th e Japanes e

had stron g defense s throughou t th e Zig -

Zag are a an d tha t th e regimen t ha d in -

deed reache d a Japanes e mai n lin e o f

resistance. I t had not been until evening

on 3 February tha t th e X I Corps ' G- 2

Section had been willing to concede that

the Japanese might have strong defenses

at th e ZigZag , an d i t wa s not unti l th e

next evening tha t General Hall was convinced tha t th e 34t h an d 152 d Infantr y

Regiments ha d encountere d a well -

defended Japanes e line. 38

Apparently, Hall's conviction that his

troops ha d com e u p agains t a Japanes e

main lin e of resistanc e led to a secon d

conviction that the fight a t the horseshoe

would hencefort h g o better if he unifie d

the comman d there . A t an y rate , lat e

on the 4th, Hall attached the 34th Infan -

try t o th e 38t h Divisio n an d directe d

Jones to attack eastwar d earl y on 5 February wit h al l th e strengt h h e coul d

bring to bear. Speed , General Hall went

on, wa s essential. 39

General Jone s planne d t o reduc e th e

Japanese strongpoints methodically with

a serie s o f simultaneous , co-ordinated ,

battalion-sized attacks. H e expecte d th e

152d Infantr y t o d o mos t o f th e wor k

initially, whil e th e 34t h Infantr y com -

pletely cleare d th e horsesho e are a an d

then drov e eastwar d o n th e sout h sid e

of Rout e 7 . Foreseein g difficultie s i n

arranging artiller y support , Jone s lim -

ited general artillery support fire s t o targets east o f th e Sant a Rit a River, which

crossed Rout e 7 a mile east of th e horse -

shoe, an d require d tha t request s fo r

closer suppor t b e cleare d throug h regi -

mental headquarters. 40 Individua l in -

fantry battalions under this arrangement

would b e abl e to ge t clos e support onl y

after som e delay . Th e pla n als o spli t

the 152 d Infantry, placin g tw o o f it s

battalions nort h o f th e 34t h an d th e

third south . Colone l Jenna , commanding th e 34t h Infantry , objected , suggest -

ing that control and co-ordination would

be easie r i f th e 34t h Infantr y concen -

trated it s effort s sout h o f Rout e 7 while

all the 152 d remained north o f the road.

Jones did not agree , and directed Jenn a

to execut e his attacks as scheduled. 41

General Jone s realize d tha t hi s pla n

left somethin g t o b e desire d an d tha t

he wa s calling fo r a comparativel y slo w

course o f action . Actually , h e woul d

have like d t o undertak e an eve n slowe r

course by pulling the 34th Infantr y back ,

adjusting al l hi s artiller y an d mortar s

carefully, an d the n stagin g a co-ordi -

nated, two-regiment attack behind heavy

artillery and mortar concentrations. This

would hav e take n abou t tw o days , an d

he knew that General Hall would brook

no suc h delay . H e therefor e fel t tha t

his plan, which calle d fo r extensiv e out38

 G-2 X I Corps , Phot o Interpretatio n 8 , 3 Fe b

45; Ltrs, Hal l t o Krueger , 4 and 5 Feb 45 . 39

 Rad, X I Corp s to 38t h Div, 2040 4 Feb 45 , Entry

50, i n 38t h Di v G- 3 Jnl , 4 Fe b 45 ; Ltr, Hall t o

Krueger, 4 Feb 45 . Genera l Jones felt tha t th e transfer of the 34th Infantry t o his control was an attempt

by Genera l Hal l "t o pus h th e blam e o n m e fo r th e

failure o f th e 34t h Infantry ." Jone s Comments , 20

Dec 56.

40

 This crossing of th e Sant a Rit a is in accordanc e

with th e AM S 8712, 1:50,000 map o f 194 4 the troop s

were using a t th e time . Accordin g t o th e AM S S71 1

1:50,000 map of 1952 , Edition 2, the proper name for

the stream is the Jadjad River . 41

 Proposed Pla n C G 38th Div , 4 Feb 45 , and 38t h

Div F O 11 , 5 Feb 45 , both i n 38t h In f Di v G- 3 Jn l

File, 1 9 Jan-10 Feb 45 ; Rad, Jenna t o Bn s of 34t h

Inf, 073 0 5 Feb 45, Entry 592, 34th RCT Jn l Fil e 4-6

Feb 45; Rad, Jones to Jenna, 0955 5 Feb 45, Entry 658,

34th RCT Jn l Fil e 4-6 Fe b 45; 152d Inf FO 4, 5 Feb

45, atch d t o 152 d In f Rp t Luzon , 2 9 Jan-2 Ma r 45 ;

Jones Comments, 2 0 Dec 56.
BACK T O BATAA N 323

MAP 12

flanking maneuver s nort h o f Rout e 7

by th e 152 d Infantry, wa s th e onl y on e

that promise d success under th e circumstances, an d h e indicate d t o Genera l

Hall tha t i f th e pla n di d no t wor k ou t

he woul d change it . Jone s premised his

plan on th e belief tha t the 34t h Infantr y

would b e abl e t o carr y it s shar e o f th e

load i n th e ne w attack , bu t i t appear s

that h e did no t hav e a clear ide a o f th e

regiment's situation and condition, probably becaus e th e regiment had bee n o p

crating unde r corp s contro l fo r tw o

days.42

Although operation s o n 5 Februar y

started ou t i n a promisin g manner, th e

situation i n th e horsesho e are a soo n

turned int o a shambles. Th e 2 d Battalion, 34t h Infantry , whic h ha d bee n harassed by Japanese mortar fire throughout

the night of 4-5 February , started off on

the 5t h tryin g t o reduc e a Japanes e

strongpoint near the northeastern corner

of th e horseshoe . Maneuverin g t o out -

flank th e strongpoint , th e battalio n

moved wel l north of Rout e 7, upsetting

plans fo r clos e artiller y suppor t o f th e

152d Infantry 's battalions . (Map 12)

About th e tim e tha t th e 2 d Battalion ,

34th Infantry , fel t i t wa s makin g goo d

progress, Japanes e artiller y fir e pinne d

it down . Aroun d 1130 , having received

a numbe r o f casualties, th e battalion re -

quested permissio n t o withdraw. Jenn a

assenting, th e battalio n bega n movin g

back t o th e wes t sid e o f th e horseshoe .

About th e sam e time , increasingl y con -

cerned ove r th e casualtie s hi s regimen t

was takin g fro m Japanes e morta r an d

artillery fire , Jenn a radioe d Jones:

I a m convince d tha t th e entir e Japanes e

position opposin g X I Corp s canno t b e

cracked unles s ther e i s a withdrawa l t o a

point wher e entir e Corp s Artiller y an d al l

available air wor k i t ove r with ever y possible means for at least 48 hours. M y 1st an d

2nd [Battalions ] have suffered terrifi c casu -

alties an d i t is becoming questionable how

long they can hold up under this pounding. . . . 43

Jenna's thinkin g wa s obviously i n lin e

with tha t of General Jones, but th e 38t h

Division commander , mindfu l o f Hall 's

insistence upo n speed , did no t ac t upon

Jenna's recommendatio n an d sen t n o

immediate repl y t o th e regimenta l

commander.

Shortly afte r 1200 , whe n hi s 1s t Bat -

talion, o n th e horseshoe' s easter n leg ,

began reportin g heav y casualtie s fro m

Japanese artillery , Colone l Jenn a de -

cided t o withdraw tha t uni t west o f th e

horseshoe. Hi s reserve battalion, the 3d,

had move d u p t o th e northwester n

corner o f th e horseshoe an d ha d starte d

42

 Proposed Pla n C G 38t h Div , 4 Fe b 45 ; Jone s

Comments, 2 0 Dec 56 and 2 6 Jan 57 .

43

 Rad, Jenn a t o Jones, 113 6 5 Feb 45 , Entry 629 ,

34th RCT Jnl File, 4-6 Fe b 45.
324 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

to prob e acros s it s ope n end , ove r th e

ridge line , i n preparatio n fo r it s shar e

in th e attack. Whe n th e 1st and 2 d Battalions bega n withdrawing , th e 3 d ha d

to hold to cover. Th e 1s t Battalion, during its withdrawal i n th e afternoon , wa s

harassed b y Japanese artiller y an d mor -

tar fire , whic h also hit forwar d elements

of th e 3d. B y 1740 on th e 5t h th e entire

34th Infantr y wa s agai n wes t o f th e

horseshoe — the regimen t was , indeed ,

behind it s lin e o f departur e o f th e

morning of 3 February.

Having received informatio n tha t th e

152d Infantry' s attack s were going well ,

Jenna apparentl y fel t tha t hi s with -

drawal could not redoun d t o th e advantage o f th e Japanese. H e was , however,

primarily concerned wit h th e welfar e o f

his regiment , whic h ha d los t anothe r

20 men kille d an d 6 0 wounde d durin g

the previou s twenty-fou r hours . Th e

34th Infantr y ha d suffere d a total of 32 5

battle casualtie s an d 2 5 psychoneurosis

cases since coming ashore on 2 9 January,

almost al l o f the m durin g th e perio d

3-5 February . In its thre e day s at the

ZigZag the regiment had lost nearly half

as man y me n a s i t ha d durin g 7 8 day s

of combat on Leyte. 44 Man y of th e casualties a t th e ZigZa g ha d bee n amon g

key personne l an d include d th e regi -

mental executive officer, 1 battalion commander, 4 compan y commanders , an d

3 first sergeants. Th e 34t h was no longer

an effectiv e comba t unit , an d abou t

1900 o n 5 Februar y Genera l Hal l di -

rected Genera l Jone s t o replace i t wit h

the 38th Division's 151st Infantry , which

so fa r had see n practicall y n o fighting. 45

The 152 d Infantry' s operation s o n 5

February met with limite d success. Th e

2d Battalio n relieve d Compan y A , 34t h

Infantry, at the latter's isolated perimeter

some 700 yards off the horseshoes's southeastern corne r wit h littl e difficulty , th e

Japanese wh o had surrounde d th e com -

pany havin g disappeare d durin g th e

night. Th e 2 d Battalio n remaine d i n

the are a fo r th e rest of th e da y and tha t

night, findin g onl y abandoned Japanes e

positions. Nort h o f th e horsesho e th e

1st Battalion , 152 d Infantry , resume d its

attacks agains t th e Japanes e ridg e lin e

defenses, again moving in from th e west.

The battalio n mad e goo d gain s durin g

the mornin g an d cleare d muc h o f th e

northern an d centra l portion s o f th e

ridge. Th e attac k slowe d durin g th e

afternoon, however , as Japanes e opposi -

tion stiffened. 46 B y no w th e battalio n

was nearin g th e souther n en d o f th e

Japanese-held ridg e an d wa s locate d

about 60 0 yard s north-northwest o f th e

horseshoe's northwester n corner . Th e

unit bega n settin g u p nigh t defense s i n

apparently abandone d Japanes e posi -

tions whe n suddenly , fro m a maz e o f

previously undiscovere d foxholes , tun -

nels, an d trenche s withi n an d withou t

the perimete r Japanes e rifleme n an d

machine gunner s starte d pourin g ou t

point-blank fire . The 1s t Battalio n could

not emplo y artiller y o r morta r suppor t

to dispers e th e Japanese and th e battal -

ion's me n foun d i t virtuall y impossibl e

to return th e Japanes e rifl e fir e withou t

hitting eac h other . Th e bes t thin g t o

44

 Jenna Comments, 5 Jan 57 . 45

 Ltr, Hal l t o Krueger , 5 Fe b 45 ; Rad , Hal l t o

Jones, 191 0 5 Fe b 45 , 38th Di v G-3 Jnl , 5 Fe b 45 .

46

 General Jone s believed th e stiffenin g oppositio n

marked redeploymen t o f Japanes e afte r th e with -

drawal o f th e 34t h Infantry . Jone s Comments , 20

Dec 56 . Th e autho r ha s bee n unabl e t o fin d an y

evidence o f suc h redeployment s i n eithe r Japanes e

or America n records .
BACK T O BATAA N 325

do seemed to be to escape from th e Japanese ambus h an d th e battalio n starte d

withdrawing, apparently in a rather disorganized fashion . Abou t dar k th e firs t

troops bega n reachin g th e perimete r o f

the 3 d Battalio n o f th e 34t h Infantry ,

which wa s i n reserv e nea r th e north -

western corne r o f th e horseshoe , bu t i t

was noo n th e nex t da y befor e al l th e

1st Battalion , 152d , had completely reassembled an d reorganized . Th e battal -

ion's losse s fo r 5 Februar y numbere d 9

men kille d an d 3 3 wounded, includin g

many ke y NCO' s an d company-grad e

officers. Fo r example , Compan y C ha d

no officer s lef t an d Compan y B ha d

only one.

Thus, b y evening o n 5 February, th e

attack a t th e ZigZa g ha d ende d i n fail -

ure. Excep t fo r th e terrai n hel d b y th e

2d Battalion , 152d Infantry, southeas t

of th e horseshoe , th e 152 d and 34t h In -

fantry Regiment s wer e n o farthe r for -

ward tha n th e 152d had bee n o n th e

evening o f 2 February. Th e fightin g a t

the ZigZa g ha d cos t th e 34t h Infantr y

roughly 70 men killed and 20 0 wounded,

and man y o f th e me n lef t i n it s thre e

infantry battalions could not be counted

as combat effectives. Th e 152 d Infantry ,

with casualtie s o f abou t 4 0 me n kille d

and 15 5 wounded , wa s actuall y littl e

better off , fo r it ha d los t an eve n greater

proportion o f junio r officer s an d senio r

NCO's. Th e 1s t Battalion , for instance ,

had onl y 1 5 officer s an d 66 0 enliste d

combat effectives , an d th e entir e regi -

ment face d seriou s reorganizatio n prob -

lems. Ye t 5 Februar y ha d no t bee n

entirely voi d o f goo d news . Th e 38t h

Division's 149t h Infantry , whic h ha d

taken th e "hig h road " eastward , ha d

reached Dinalupiha n an d ha d mad e

contact wit h XI V Corps troop s there.

149th Infantry Mix-up

At dus k o n 3 1 Januar y th e 149t h

Infantry ha d assemble d a t a branchin g

of th e Santa Rita Rive r thre e and a half

miles northeast of Olongap o and abou t

a mil e an d a quarte r northwes t o f th e

152d Infantry 's forwar d element s o n

Route 7 hal f a mil e wes t o f th e horse -

shoe.47 O n 1 February Col. Winfred G .

Skelton, th e regimenta l commander , in -

tended to march eastward along the trail

XI Corp s ha d designate d a s fa r a s a

north-south lin e throug h Bulate , a tin y

barrio o n Rout e 7 a t th e easter n exi t

of th e ZigZa g an d som e fou r mile s eas t

of th e horseshoe. Onc e on this line, th e

regiment would halt pending new orders.

The marc h started on 1 February with

guerrillas an d loca l Negrito s guiding .

About 130 0 Skelton reported to General

Jones tha t th e 149t h woul d reac h it s

objective lin e withi n thre e hours , an d

also tha t h e wa s on th e XI Corps ' trai l

at a poin t nearl y tw o mile s eas t o f th e

horseshoe and roughly 1,20 0 yards north

of Rout e 7. Jones , mindful o f XI Corps'

admonition to keep the 149t h and 152 d

Infantry Regiment s withi n supportin g

distance o f eac h other, now fel t tha t th e

149th was getting too far east of the 152d, and directe d Colone l Skelto n t o hal t

approximately 2,50 0 yard s wes t o f th e

original objective line. Wel l before dark,

Skelton reporte d tha t his leading battalion wa s at General Jones's new objective

and wa s digging i n alon g th e XI Corps'

trail at a point about 750 yards north o f

47

 Additional information o n 149t h Infantr y opera -

tions i n thi s an d th e nex t tw o subsection s i s from :

149th In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 5-20; 149t h In f Uni t Jnl,

1-15 Fe b 45; 149th In f Summar y of Lessons Learned

M-7 Opn, pp. 2-5.
326 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Route 7 a t barri o Balsic , a mil e wes t

of Bulate .

At this juncture Genera l Jone s began

receiving report s fro m 38t h Divisio n

Artillery liaiso n plane s tha t th e 149t h

Infantry wa s no plac e near th e locations

Colonel Skelto n ha d reporte d fo r it .

Jones believe d tha t th e 149th' s leadin g

elements wer e abou t thre e mile s north -

west of their reported location.48 Colonel

Skelton, on th e other hand , insisted that

his troop s wer e i n th e positio n h e ha d

reported, whil e a n X I Corp s Artiller y

liaison plan e placed th e regiment a mile

and a thir d northwest of Skelton's claim

and ove r a mil e an d a hal f southeas t o f

the are a i n whic h Jone s believe d th e

regiment wa s located. Genera l Hall evidently chose to believe the report of the

XI Corp s Artiller y aircraft .

In th e end , it appears , nobod y wa s

right. First , th e trai l tha t th e XI Corp s

thought parallele d Rout e 7 simpl y di d

not exist . Instead , almost two miles east

the Santa Rita River branching the trail

swung off to th e northeast . Second , th e

area throug h whic h th e 149t h Infantr y

was moving was not onl y densely wooded

but wa s als o unmapped—th e 1:50,00 0

maps the troops were using showed onl y

white fo r a larg e are a beginnin g som e

2,000 yard s north o f Rout e 7—an d th e

liaison planes' reports could at best only

be guesses. Third , th e guide s tha t Skel -

ton ha d take n with him had prove d un -

reliable an d h e ha d sen t the m bac k t o

camp. Finally , a stud y o f al l relevan t

sources o f informatio n indicate s that ,

when i t halted , Skelton' s leadin g bat -

talion was almost two miles due nort h of

the positio n h e though t i t ha d reached .

There the n ensue d a complete break -

down o f communication s between 38t h

Division headquarter s an d th e 149t h

Infantry tha t create d mor e confusion .

About 210 0 on th e 1s t o f February Gen -

eral Jone s radioe d Skelto n t o retur n t o

Santa Rit a an d star t over . Th e 149t h

Infantry neve r received the message. O n

the othe r hand, thre e time s b y 113 0 on

the 2d , Skelto n radioe d Jone s fo r ne w

orders. Befor e receivin g a n answer ,

Skelton ha d learne d tha t h e ha d incor -

rectly reporte d hi s previou s positions ,

but guerrillas informed him that he need

only follo w th e trai l h e wa s already o n

to swing back southeast to Rout e 7 near

Dinalupihan. Thoug h h e relaye d thi s

information t o Genera l Jone s b y radio,

division headquarters never received the

message.

By now , mutual misunderstandin g

was leadin g fro m confusio n t o chaos .

Believing tha t th e 149t h Infantr y wa s

already o n it s wa y bac k t o Sant a Rita ,

Jones had see n no necessit y fo r replying

to Skelton' s firs t tw o request s fo r ne w

orders. Skelton' s thir d request , whic h

division receive d abou t 1115 , finall y

brought fort h instruction s fro m Jone s

for Skelto n t o mov e th e whol e regiment

back t o th e Sant a Rit a for k a t once .

Jones apparently had decided t o employ

the 149th along Route 7, for he informed

Skelton tha t his regiment could b e use d

"to bette r advantag e here." 49 Skelto n

received thi s messag e abou t noon , an d

immediately starte d bac k ove r th e trail ,

followed b y his regiment.

48

 Jones Comments, 20 Dec 56. Genera l Jones states

that h e ha d thre e report s fro m Divisio n Artiller y

planes tha t th e 149t h wa s about thre e mile s north -

west o f Skelton' s reporte d position . Th e autho r could fin d onl y one repor t o f suc h a natur e i n 38t h

Division Artiller y an d othe r divisio n records , an d

this report place d th e regiment fou r mile s northwest of th e locatio n Skelto n ha d reported .

49

 Rad, 38t h Di v t o 149t h Inf, 1145 2 Feb 45 , Entry

31, 38th Di v G-3 Jnl , 2 Feb 45 .
BACK T O BATAA N 327

Colonel Skelto n reache d th e 38t h

Division's comman d pos t a mil e north -

east o f Olongap o abou t 193 0 o n 2 February, an d explaine d th e situatio n t o

General Jones . Despit e Jones's apparent

desire t o emplo y th e 149t h o n Rout e 7 ,

XI Corp s wante d th e regimen t t o tr y

again t o reac h Dinalupiha n o n th e by -

pass trail , an d no w Genera l Hal l lifte d

his previou s restrictio n tha t th e 149t h

Infantry kee p within supporting distance

of unit s o n Rout e 7 . A t 2330 , accord -

ingly, Jone s directe d Skelto n t o star t

back ove r th e trai l a t 070 0 o n th e 3d .

Jones ordere d Skelto n t o tr y t o follo w

the line of the trail XI Corps had mapped

out, bu t fel t tha t i t woul d no t mak e

much difference whic h trail the 149t h followed a s long as it reache d Dinalupiha n

quickly.50

Taking of f as directed o n th e 3d , th e

149th Infantr y followe d th e trai l tha t

arcked to the northeast, swung back southeast a t a poin t abou t tw o and a quarte r

miles nort h o f Balsic , an d abou t 024 5

on 5 February mad e contac t nea r Dina -

lupihan wit h patrol s o f th e 40t h Divi -

sion, XI V Corps , whic h ha d alread y

reached th e town. Th e marc h back ove r

the trail ha d gone without incident , but

the bypas s maneuve r t o Dinalupiha n

had take n fiv e day s rathe r tha n th e tw o

it woul d hav e consume d ha d X I Corps'

original order s bee n les s restrictiv e an d

had communications been better. Nevertheless, th e 149t h Infantr y ha d com -

pleted on e of XI Corps' most important

missions, tha t o f denyin g th e Japanes e

access to Bataan from th e Central Plains.

The rea l credit for this accomplishment,

however, had t o be given t o XIV Corps,

for it s troops , alread y i n Manil a b y 5

February, ha d ha d th e Japanes e cu t of f

from Bataa n fo r a t leas t thre e days. 51

A Change in Command

Although troop s o f X I Corp s ha d

reached Dinalupihan , th e corp s ha d no t

yet cleare d Rout e 7 acros s th e bas e o f

Bataan Peninsula, and until that job was

substantially complet e th e corp s coul d

not mov e t o secur e th e res t o f Bataa n

and undertak e it s shar e o f operation s

to clear Manil a Bay. General Hall, who

had apparentl y expecte d tha t hi s work

in norther n Bataa n woul d b e ove r b y

5 February , wa s fa r fro m please d wit h

the cours e o f event s s o far, and h e lai d

the blam e fo r th e failur e o f hi s force s

to brea k throug h th e ZigZa g o n th e

shoulders o f Genera l Jones , th e com -

mander o f the 38t h Division . Hal l had,

indeed, been thoroughly dissatisfied wit h

the 38th Division's performance for some

days, and ha d already informe d Genera l

Jones i n considerabl e detai l wha t h e

thought wa s wrong wit h th e division. 52

The clima x o f Genera l Hall' s dissatis -

faction cam e o n 6 February.

As of th e mornin g of th e 6t h Genera l

Jones ha d unde r hi s comman d i n th e

vicinity o f th e horsesho e onl y th e 152 d

Infantry. X I Corp s ha d release d th e

151st Infantr y t o hi m fro m X I Corp s

Reserve, bu t th e firs t element s o f tha t

regiment, th e 1s t Battalion , woul d no t

reach th e forwar d are a unti l afte r 0900 ,

and th e res t o f th e regimen t no t unti l

morning o f th e 7th. Genera l Hal l ha d

50

 Msg, 38t h Di v t o 149t h Inf, 2330 2 Feb 45 , Entry

70, 38t h Di v G- 3 Jnl , 2 Fe b 45 ; Jone s Comments ,

20 Dec 56. Jone s felt tha t since XI Corps had directed

the 149t h Infantry t o undertake the marc h alon g the

trail, the regimen t wa s now under XI Corp s control.

General Jones , however , issue d th e actua l marc h

orders to the regiment.

51

 See above, ch. XII. 52 Ltr, Hal l to Jones, 4 Feb 45.
328 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

MAP 13

pulled th e 34th Infantr y ou t o f the figh t

and had sen t i t back t o the rea r for rest

and recuperation . H e ha d als o take n

the 149t h Infantr y awa y fro m Genera l

Jones and had directed tha t regiment to

start a n attac k westwar d fro m Dina -

lupihan on th e morning of 7 February.53

General Jone s fel t tha t h e probabl y

could no t brea k throug h wit h onl y th e

one battalio n o f th e 151st Infantry an d

the two battalions of the 152 d tha t were

available to him (th e 1st Battalion, 152d

Infantry, wa s no t fi t for comba t o n th e

6th). Jone s ha d als o decide d t o mov e

the 2 d Battalion , 152 d Infantry, bac k

from it s isolate d positio n southeas t o f

the horsesho e i n orde r t o concentrat e

his forces . Th e tim e require d t o reor -

ganize and redeplo y his units fo r a new

attack, togethe r wit h th e relativel y slo w

arrival o f th e echelon s o f th e 151s t Infantry a t th e front , gav e Genera l Jone s

what he considered a heaven-sent oppor- tunity t o adjust artiller y an d undertak e

concentrated bombardment s befor e

pushing hi s infantr y bac k int o th e Zig -

Zag. Jone s (an d Jenna o f th e 34t h

Infantry, a s well) ha d previousl y recommended tha t on e o r tw o day s o f aeria l

and artiller y bombardmen t b e throw n

against the Japanese, but until the morning o f th e 6t h Jones had ha d n o oppor -

tunity t o eve n star t employin g hi s

artillery i n suc h a manner.

The schedule d artillery concentrations

were delaye d whil e th e 38t h Divisio n

waited fo r a n ai r strik e tha t wa s late i n

coming. Shortl y after th e artillery finally

began firin g lat e i n th e mornin g Gen -

eral Hal l arrive d i n th e forwar d area .

Incensed whe n h e foun d th e infantr y

was not attacking, Hal l aske d Jones how

long th e artillery fir e wa s to last . Whe n

Jones replie d tha t h e expecte d t o tak e

all da y t o mak e sur e th e artiller y care -

fully registered o n al l know n an d sus -

pected targets, Hall told the 38th Division

commander "t o cu t ou t suc h precis e

stuff" and get the attack under way again.

Reluctantly, Jone s starte d th e 152d Infantry forward. 54

 Th e artiller y registra -

tion that Jones had been able to execute

apparently di d som e good , fo r th e 3 d

Battalion, 152 d Infantry, behin d clos e

artillery support , reduce d th e last Japa -

nese defense s a t th e northeast corne r o f

the horsesho e during th e da y and spen t

the followin g nigh t alon g Rout e 7 just

east o f tha t corner . (Map 13) Neithe r

the res t o f th e 152 d Infantry no r th e

1st Battalion , 151st Infantry, gaine d new

ground on the 6th, and the 2d Battalion,

53

 Rad, XI Corps to 38th Div , 1630 5 Feb 45, Entry

53, 38t h Di v G-3 Jnl , 5 Fe b 45 ; Rad, X I Corp s t o

38th Div, 2030 6 Feb 45, Entry 70, 38th Div G-3 Jnl ,

6 Fe b 45 ; Jone s Comments , 2 0 De c 56 . Th e las t

elements of th e 34th Infantr y lef t th e horseshoe area

about 103 0 on 6 February .

54

 Ltr, Hal l to author, 1 5 Mar 52; Jones Comments,

20 Dec 56 . Th e quotatio n i s fro m th e Hal l letter .
BACK T O BATAA N 329

152d Infantry , gav e u p terrai n a s i t

withdrew t o Rout e 7 fro m it s positio n

southeast o f th e horseshoe.

About noo n o n th e 6th, while o n hi s

way bac k t o X I Corps ' comman d post ,

General Hal l decide d tha t th e figh t a t

the ZigZag would go better under a new

commander, an d h e too k th e ste p tha t

he ha d apparentl y bee n contemplatin g

as earl y a s evenin g o n 2 February . H e

relieved Genera l Jones an d place d Brig .

Gen. Ro y W . Easley , th e assistan t divi -

sion commander, in temporary control.55

The nex t day , 7 February , Genera l

Chase, who had led the advance elements

of th e 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n int o Manil a

and wh o wa s i n lin e fo r a promotion ,

arrived t o tak e permanen t comman d o f

the 38t h Division. 56

General Hall , whos e actio n ha d no t

surprised Genera l Jones, 57 gav e a s hi s

reasons fo r th e relie f o f Jones:

. . . lac k o f aggressivenes s o n th e par t o f

his division, unsatisfactory tactical planning

and executio n an d inadequat e reconnais -

sance measures . H e faile d t o produc e th e

results wit h hi s divisio n whic h migh t b e

reasonably expected. 58

The Reduction of the ZigZag

Just wha t Genera l Hal l expecte d t o

result fro m th e chang e o f comman d a t

the 38t h Divisio n i s not clear , althoug h

it appear s tha t h e anticipate d tha t th e

division migh t b e abl e t o clea r th e ZigZag b y evenin g o n 7 February. 59

 I f so ,

Hall wa s again t o be disappointed .

Operations a t th e ZigZa g afte r 6 February varie d littl e i n natur e fro m thos e

before tha t date. 60 Complicate d maneu -

vers throug h dens e jungl e an d ove r

rough, broke n groun d characterize d

each day' s action . Agai n ther e wa s considerable backin g an d fillin g a s som e

ground gained had to be given up in th e

face o f Japanes e artiller y an d morta r

fire an d loca l counterattacks. Fo r exam -

ple, o n 8 February elements of the 151st

Infantry, makin g a bypassing movement

south of Route 7, reached the Santa Rita

River crossin g ove r a mil e eas t o f th e

horseshoe, but returned to the horseshoe

on th e 10th.

During th e perio d t o 6 February ,

General Jone s ha d ha d onl y on e regi -

55

 Ltr, Hal l t o Krueger , 6 Fe b 45 ; Ltr, Hal l t o

author, 1 5 Mar 52 ; Interv, Fal k wit h Elmore , 3 Apr

52; Jone s Comments, 2 0 De c 56 ; 38t h Di v G- 1 Jnl ,

5 and 6 Feb 45. Strangely , at 164 0 o n 5 February, the

Chief o f Staff , 38t h Division , informe d th e Divisio n

G-1 tha t Jones was about to be relieved, and late that

night th e G- 1 Sectio n prepare d order s fo r Easley' s

assumption o f command . Neithe r Hal l no r Elmor e

(the X I Corp s chief o f staff ) coul d offe r an y explanation of this action, and Hal l insisted tha t h e did no t

make up his mind t o relieve Jones until noon on th e

6th. Jone s did no t commen t o n th e strange circumstances. I t i s probabl e tha t th e 38t h Divisio n staf f

sensed wha t wa s obviousl y abou t t o happe n an d

prepared itsel f accordingly , or i t ma y be tha t Jones,

feeling tha t hi s relie f wa s imminent , alerte d hi s

chief o f staff . 56

 38th Di v G- 1 Jnl , 6 an d 7 Fe b 45 . Genera l

Krueger selected Chase for the comman d of th e 38t h

Division. Kruege r Comments , 1 8 De c 56 . 57

 Jones Comments , 2 0 De c 5 6 an d 2 6 Ja n 57 . I t

was Jones's opinion tha t Genera l Hal l ha d expected

that th e 34t h Infantry , operatin g unde r X I Corp s

control, woul d hav e broke n throug h th e ZigZa g i n

a da y or two , thus givin g Hal l a n excus e t o reliev e

Jones. Then , Jone s continued , whe n th e 34t h In -

fantry faile d t o produce, Hall placed it under Jones's

command s o tha t Hal l coul d blam e Jone s fo r th e 34th Infantry's failure. Th e attempte d adjustment of

the artiller y o n 6 Februar y was, i n Jones's opinion ,

simply th e inciden t tha t Hal l wa s waitin g fo r t o

precipitate Jones' s relief . Ther e was , in Jones' s

opinion, "nothing that I could have done to keep my

command." Jone s Comments , 2 6 Ja n 57 . 58

 Ltr, Hall t o Krueger , 6 Fe b 45 . 59

 Rad, X I Corp s t o 149t h Inf, 200 0 6 Fe b 45 , an d

Rad, X I Corp s t o 38t h Div , 2030 6 Fe b 45 , both i n

XI Corp s G- 3 Jn l File , 5-6 Fe b 45. 60

 Additional genera l source s employe d fo r thi s

subsection are: 151st Inf Rpt Luzon, Accounts for 6-

11 Fe b 45 ; Crave n an d Cate , AAF V, pp . 424 , 429 .
330 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

ment unde r his command a t th e ZigZa g

most o f th e time . B y contrast , Genera l

Chase wa s abl e t o emplo y thre e regi -

ments, les s on e infantr y battalion , fro m

the tim e h e assume d comman d o n 7

February.61 Th e 151s t and 152 d Infantry Regiment s attacke d fro m th e wes t

side of the ZigZag while the 149t h Infan -

try, les s on e battalion , struc k fro m th e

east beginnin g o n th e 7th . General

Chase had anothe r advantag e tha t Jones

had no t enjoyed . O n 6 Februar y Fift h

Air Forc e P-47's starte d operatin g from

the Sa n Marcelin o Airstrip , makin g

close air support readily available . Tha t

day the planes began an intensiv e bombing and strafing program, and simultane -

ously starte d givin g th e ZigZa g a goo d

going ove r wit h napalm . A t th e sam e

time, corp s an d divisio n artiller y wer e

able t o step up th e pace of their support

firing.62 Nevertheless , th e Japanese con -

tinued t o hang on doggedly , an d almos t

foot-by-foot progress , attained i n a series

of smal l uni t actions , marke d th e 38t h

Division's operation s fo r nearl y a wee k

following Genera l Jones's relief. I n fact ,

the only difference troop s on th e ground

could see in th e fighting afte r 6 February

was tha t dail y gain s coul d usually—bu t

not always—b e measured .

The 151s t an d 152d Infantr y Regi -

ments reduce d th e las t importan t de -

fenses i n th e vicinit y o f th e horsesho e

by evenin g o n 8 February, an d b y dus k

on th e 11t h the tw o unit s ha d mad e

sufficient progres s eas t o f th e horsesho e

to permit th e relie f o f the 151st Infantry

for operation s elsewher e on Bataa n Peninsula. (Map 14) I t wa s not unti l after -

noon o f 1 3 February tha t th e 149t h an d

152d Infantr y wer e abl e t o mak e thei r

first fleetin g contac t fro m thei r respec -

tive side s o f th e ZigZag . Th e 149t h

Infantry overra n the last organize d Japanese strongpoint on th e 14th and o n th e

following da y tha t regimen t an d th e

152d complete d mopping-u p operations.

Through 1 5 February, th e 38t h Divi -

sion an d attache d units , includin g th e

34th Infantry , ha d kille d nearl y 2,40 0

Japanese i n th e ZigZa g regio n an d ha d

taken 2 5 prisoner . Th e 300-od d me n

remaining aliv e fro m th e origina l Japa -

nese garriso n o n th e highwa y retreate d

south int o Bataa n wit h Colone l Nagayo -

shi.63 Th e 38t h Divisio n an d th e 34t h

Infantry ha d suffere d abou t 1,40 0 com -

bat casualties, including 25 0 men killed ,

during th e proces s o f destroyin g th e

Nagayoshi Detachment.

By 1 5 February, then , X I Corp s ha d

completed th e tas k a t th e ZigZa g an d

had secure d position s fro m whic h t o

launch subsequen t operation s aime d

more directl y a t securin g Manil a Bay ,

operations tha t had , indeed, begu n be -

fore th e ZigZag Pass fight wa s quite over.

The "campaign " fro m Sa n Antoni o t o

Dinalupihan ha d no t gon e a s Genera l

Hall ha d expected , an d th e corp s commander ha d bee n bitterl y disappointe d

with th e tur n o f event s a t th e ZigZag .

Not ever y operation can go according to

plan and expectation—to o many imponderables ar e involved. X I Corps' attac k

61

 On th e 5th , i t i s true , bot h th e 152 d an d 34t h

Infantry Regiment s wer e unde r Jones' s command ,

but th e 34t h ha d t o b e withdraw n tha t day . O n th e

6th, Jone s had th e 152d plus a battalion of the 151st ,

but o n tha t da y on e battalio n o f th e 152 d had t o

spend it s tim e reorganizing . Durin g mos t o f th e

final stage s for th e figh t fo r th e ZigZag , one battalion

of th e 149t h Infantr y hel d an d patrolle d i n th e

Dinalupihan are a an d di d no t ente r th e fight . 62

 See artiller y ammunitio n expenditur e chart s

following pag e 16 4 i n th e 38t h Division' s Report ,

Luzon.

63

 Nagayoshi Statement , States , II , 626 ; 38th Div

Rpt Luzon , p. 116.
BACK T O BATAA N 331

MAP 14

across Bataa n strikingl y illustrate d th e

degree t o whic h som e o f th e imponder -

ables coul d an d di d affec t th e outcom e

of th e operation.

Clearing Bataan Peninsula

The Situation and the Plans

General Krueger' s pla n fo r XI Corp s

operations t o clea r Bataa n Peninsul a

south o f Rout e 7 called for one RC T t o

drive down th e east coast whil e another

seized Mariveles , a t th e souther n ti p o f

the peninsula , by an amphibiou s assault

from Subi c Bay , Kruege r initiall y se t

D-day for th e tw o attacks as 12 February,

but a s plannin g progresse d i t becam e

evident tha t X I Corp s wa s muc h to o

involved a t th e ZigZag t o meet tha t target dat e o r t o releas e fro m th e ZigZa g

all th e force s required . Accordingly ,

Krueger reschedule d D-da y fo r 1 5 February and , t o mak e u p Genera l Hall' s

troop shortages, sent south the 6th Division's 1s t Infantry , whic h ha d recentl y

completed its part in I Corps operations

to seiz e San Jose.64

Hall divide d hi s Bataa n Peninsul a

forces int o tw o groups. East Forc e an d

South Force. Eas t Force—the reinforced

1st RCT , 6th Division—woul d operat e

under the control of Brig. Gen. William

Spence, commande r o f 38t h Divisio n

Artillery. I t woul d pus h sout h alon g

Bataan's east coas t road , th e sam e roa d

the Japanese had followed i n 1942 , starting it s driv e sout h o n 1 4 Februar y i n

order t o divert Japanes e attentio n fro m

the Marivele s landing , whic h Hal l se t

for th e 15th . Sout h Forc e — the 38t h

Division's 151s t RCT — would operat e

directly unde r Genera l Chase 's com -

mand. Afte r landing at Mariveles, South

Force would establish control over southern Bataa n an d the n strik e u p th e eas t

64

 Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I, 49-51 ; Rad, Krueger

to MacArthur, WG-194, 9 Feb 45, and Rad, Krueger to Hall , WG-199 , 1 0 Fe b 45 , bot h i n Sixt h Arm y

G-3 Jnl File Luzon, 8-1 0 Fe b 45.
332 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

coast road to make contact with Spence's

East Force. 65

The amphibiou s phase s o f th e opera -

tion wer e directe d b y Admira l Struble ,

commander o f Tas k Grou p 78.3, whic h

was supported by cruisers and destroyers

of Tas k Grou p 77. 3 under Admira l

Berkey. I n additio n t o landin g Sout h

Force, Task Group 78.3 would also sweep

mines fro m th e water s acros s th e en -

trance t o Manil a Bay , paying especia l

attention t o th e are a between Marivele s

and Corregidor and the channel between

Corregidor and Caballo Island, a mile to

the south . Fift h Ai r Forc e plane s fro m

Mindoro and Luzo n woul d provid e necessary preliminary bombardment for the

landing at Marivele s and woul d support

subsequent groun d operation s o n

Bataan.66

Sixth Arm y an d X I Corp s estimate d

that 6,00 0 Japanese were still o n Bataa n

south of the ZigZag. On e concentration ,

believed t o includ e a battalio n o f th e

39th Infantry, wa s thought to be holding

the Pilar-Baga c road , runnin g eas t t o

west acros s th e cente r o f th e peninsula ;

the remaining Japanese presumably garrisoned th e Marivele s area. 67

 Actually ,

Nagayoshi probabl y ha d les s tha n 1,40 0

troops, including remnants of his ZigZag

Pass force , o n Bataa n sout h o f Rout e 7 .

Of these , aroun d 1,00 0 held position s

in th e Baga c are a o n th e wes t coast o r

along th e Pilar-Baga c road . Abou t 30 0

Japanese, scattere d i n variou s smal l de -

tachments, wer e locate d i n souther n

Bataan, bu t fe w wer e nea r Mariveles .

Nagayoshi mus t hav e expecte d attac k

from th e west , fo r th e fe w forma l de -

fenses he had along the Pilar-Baga c road

were oriented in tha t direction. H e was

also abl e t o incorporat e int o hi s de -

fenses o n th e roa d som e position s tha t

MacArthur's Fil-America n force s ha d

originally constructe d i n 1942. 68

Bataan Secured

The 38t h Division's 151st RCT loaded

at Olongap o o n 1 4 February , an d th e

ships o f Tas k Grou p 78. 3 sortied th e

same day.69 Th e 6t h Division's 1st RCT

started ou t o f Dinalupiha n o n th e after -

noon o f 1 2 February , plannin g t o b e

seven mile s t o th e southeast , a t Orani ,

by morning of th e 14th. (Map 15) Mine

sweeping and preliminary bombardment

began on the 13th. During that day and

the nex t Tas k Grou p 78. 3 swept abou t

140 mines from th e bay, 28 of the m lef t

over fro m th e day s o f th e America n de -

fense i n 1942 , Mines a t th e entranc e t o

Mariveles Harbor damage d tw o destroyers o f Tas k Grou p 77.3 , bu t sweepin g

continued without other incident except

for som e fir e fro m Japanes e gun s o n

Corregidor.

Task Grou p 78. 3 completed a fina l

65

 XI Corp s F O 5 , Confirme d Copy , 1 0 Fe b 45 ,

Sixth Army G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 12-14 Fe b 45. 66

 TG 78. 3 Opn Pla n No . 4-45 , 10 Fe b 45 , an d

TG 77. 3 Opn Order No. 1-45, 9 Feb 45, both in Sixth

Army G-3 Jnl Fil e Luzon, 16-18 Feb 45; Sixth Army

FO 48 , 7 Feb 45 , Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 149-50 . 67

 XI Corp s F O 5 , 1 0 Feb 45 ; an . I , Intel , t o X I

Corps FO 6 , 1 7 Feb 45 ; Sixth Arm y G- 2 Estimat e of

the Enem y Situatio n Wit h Referenc e t o Bataan -

Corregidor, 4 Feb 45 , G-2 Sixt h Army , Forme r To p

Secret Jnl.

68

 38th Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 30 , 119-22 ; Japanes e

Studies i n W W II , No . 125 , Philippine Are a Nava l

Opns, pt . IV , p. 16 ; Nagayoshi Statement, States, II,

626; Morton , Fall of the Philippines, ch . XVIII. 69

 General source s for this subsection are: T G 78. 3

Action Rp t Mariveles-Corregidor , passim; 38t h Di v

Rpt Luzon , pp . 31-43, 120 ; 38th Di v G-3 Pe r Rpts ,

11-21 Fe b 45 , an d othe r material s i n 38t h In f Di v G-3 Jn l File , 11-2 8 Feb 45 ; 1st In f Rp t Luzon , pp .

29-34; 1st Inf S-3 Opn s Rpts, 11-16 Feb 49; 151st Inf

Rpt Luzon , Mariveles-Bataa n Account ; 149t h In f

Rpt Luzon , pp. 21-23 .
BACK T O BATAA N 333

MAP 15

sweep o f Marivele s Harbo r a t 090 0 o n

15 Februar y a s destroyers moved i n fo r

close suppor t fir e an d Fift h Ai r Forc e

B-24's bombe d th e landin g beaches .

The 151s t Infantry starte d ashor e i n

LCVP's at 1000 , oppose d b y a little machine gu n an d rifl e fire . A nea r mis s

from a Japanes e gu n o n Corregido r

wounded 1 7 infantrymen a s the y board -

ed a n LCP R a t th e sid e o f a n AP D

(Transport, Hig h Speed) , whil e some -

what late r a n LS M carryin g th e 24t h

Reconnaissance Troop shoreward struck

a min e an d caugh t fire , wit h resultan t

casualties an d th e los s o f mos t o f th e

unit's equipment. Poo r beach conditions

slowed al l discharge , bu t a t 140 0 Gen -

eral Chase , who had accompanied Sout h

Force, assume d comman d ashore .

The 151s t Infantr y found no Japanese

before sunset , but durin g the night 75 -

100 Japanes e attacke d th e perimete r o f

the 3d Battalion about three miles northeast of Mariveles. Th e battalio n beat off
334 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

the attac k afte r killin g 60 or mor e Japanese. Sout h Force's casualties during the

day wer e 3 killed, 4 3 wounded , an d 1 4

missing, all incurred in th e course of the

landing. Th e 151s t Infantr y spen t th e

next fe w day s securin g th e Marivele s

area, simultaneousl y dispatchin g patrols

northward alon g bot h side s o f Bataa n

Peninsula. O n 1 8 February a patro l established contac t wit h Eas t Forc e a t

Limay, a thir d o f th e wa y u p th e eas t

coast.

Moving out of Orani on th e 14th, East

Force had reached Pila r befor e dark an d

on th e next da y probed sout h t o Orion ,

four mile s beyond Pilar. There had been

little opposition an d th e only hindrance

to faste r progres s ha d bee n th e too -

thorough jo b guerrilla s ha d don e i n

destroying th e man y bridge s carryin g

the coastal road ove r tidal streams. Dur -

ing th e night o f 15-1 6 Februar y a n estimated 30 0 Japanes e attacke d th e 1s t

Infantry's perimeter near Orion, but th e

U.S. regiment , losin g 1 1 kille d an d 1 5

wounded, bea t of f th e Japanes e an d

killed 80 of them i n a melee of confused,

sometimes hand-to-han d fighting . Th e

incident marke d th e en d o f organize d

Japanese resistanc e i n souther n Bataan .

The nex t day General MacArthur had

a narro w escap e fro m injur y i f no t

death. Visitin g Eas t Force' s zone , th e

theater commande r proceede d sout h

along th e coasta l roa d t o a poin t nearl y

five mile s beyon d th e 1s t Infantry 's

front lines . Hi s part y encountere d n o

Japanese, bu t patrollin g Fift h Ai r Forc e

P-38's, observin g th e movement , as -

sumed tha t the y ha d discovere d a Japa -

nese moto r colum n an d requeste d

permission t o bom b an d strafe . Befor e

granting permissio n Genera l Chas e di -

rected a furthe r investigation , a n inves -

tigation tha t disclose d tha t th e smal l

group o f vehicle s containe d American s

only. MacArthu r and his party returned

northward safely .

During th e perio d 17-2 0 Februar y

East Force , augmente d b y the 149t h In -

fantry an d othe r element s o f th e 38t h

Division, drov e across Bataa n t o Bagac ,

finding onl y abandone d defensiv e posi -

tions an d a few Japanese stragglers. O n

21 Februar y troop s o f th e 1s t Infantr y

made contac t wit h patrol s o f th e 151st

Infantry south o f Bagac, while the 149t h

Infantry starte d patrollin g north u p th e

west coast fro m Bagac .

The contac t sout h o f Baga c marke d

the en d o f th e tacticall y significan t por -

tions o f th e Bataa n campaig n o f 1945 .

XI Corps had not met the resistance General Hal l had expected—th e corps' casu -

alties were about 50 men kille d an d 10 0

wounded, whil e know n Japanes e casu -

alties numbered 20 0 killed. Nagayoshi' s

remaining troops , abou t 1,00 0 i n all ,

holed u p nort h o f th e Pilar-Baga c roa d

along th e jungle d slope s o f Mt . Natib ,

where elements of th e 38t h Division , o f

the 6th Division , and Filipin o guerrillas

successively hunte d the m down . Thes e

Japanese presente d n o threa t t o Allie d

control o f Bataan , an d mos t o f the m

died o f starvatio n an d diseas e befor e

American and Filipin o troops could find

and kil l them .

With th e clearin g o f Bataan , X I

Corps ha d execute d th e firs t ste p o f th e

GHQ SWPA-Sixt h Army plan for opening Manila Bay. And as XI Corps troops,

on 1 6 February, broke the last organized

Japanese resistanc e o n th e peninsula ,

operations t o secur e Corregido r Islan d

began.
CHAPTER XVII I

Corregidor

The Plan of Assault

Four salien t feature s marke d th e

planning fo r an d th e recaptur e o f Cor -

regidor Island. 1 First , unlik e th e situa -

tion i n 1941-4 2 whe n MacArthur' s

forces hel d th e islan d a s a fina l fortress ,

Corregidor ha d n o significan t plac e i n

Japanese plans for the defens e o f Luzon,

Second, plannin g wa s based upo n intel -

ligence estimates that reckoned the Japanese garrison a t less than one-sixt h of its

actual strength. Third , th e assault pla n

called fo r a parachut e regiment t o drop

onto a small , roug h are a il l suite d t o

such an undertaking. Fourth , the operation involve d th e mos t difficul t o f al l

modern militar y maneuvers— a co-ordi -

nated parachut e and amphibiou s attack,

which ha d s o fa r durin g th e wa r me t

with only limited success.

Corregidor, logicall y th e ke y t o th e

defense o f Manila Bay , wa s important to

forces occupyin g Luzo n onl y i f th e de -

fenders electe d t o hol d th e strategicall y

vital bay region. Thus , when Yamashita

turned t o a stati c defens e i n hi s moun -

tain strongholds , th e Japanes e garriso n

on Corregido r becam e a n isolate d out -

post o f n o strategi c significanc e t o him .

Nevertheless, unti l th e islan d wa s se -

cured, the Japanese on Corregidor could

harass Allie d shippin g withi n Manil a

Bay and coul d als o use the islan d as a

refuge fo r escapee s fro m th e mainland .

Even i f all military reasons for th e earl y

seizure o f Corregido r coul d b e brushe d

aside a s o f n o moment , ther e stil l re -

mained th e matte r o f sentiment. Man y

officers a t GHQ SWP A fervently awaited

the recaptur e o f "Th e Rock, " an d i f i t

could b e don e dramatically—b y mean s

of a parachut e drop , fo r instance—s o

much th e better.

When MacArthur had outlined GH Q

SWPA plan s for securing Manila Ba y to

General Krueger, h e ha d tol d th e Sixt h

Army commande r tha t thos e plan s en -

visaged takin g Corregido r b y parachut e

drop, by amphibious assault, or by both.

The fina l decision , th e commande r i n

chief wen t on, would await the results of

an intensive aerial bombardment.2 Upon

receipt o f this informatio n o n 3 February, th e Sixt h Army' s G- 3 Sectio n

quickly prepare d a pla n callin g fo r th e

principal effort t o be an airborne assault

by th e separat e 503 d Parachut e RC T

1

 This sectio n i s base d principall y upon : Sixt h

Army Rp t Luzon , I , 49-54 ; G- 2 Sixt h Army , G- 2

Estimate of the Enem y Situatio n Wit h Referenc e t o

Bataan-Corregidor, 4 Feb 45; USAFF E Board , Rpt

308, Corregido r Islan d Operation , 503 d Parachut e

RCT, 1 6 February-8 March 194 5 (hereinafte r cite d as

USAFFE B d Rp t Corregidor) , 1 6 May 194 5 ( 2 vols.),

I, 1-6 , OCM H files ; 503 d RC T Rp t Corregidor ,

pp. 1-2 ; an . 1, Intel, to 503d Prcht Inf FO (Correcte d

Copy), 1 3 Feb 45 , USAFFE Bd Rpt Corregidor , II.

2

 Rad, MacArthu r to Krueger, CA-50232, 3 Feb 45,

Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I, 113 ,
336 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

from Mindoro , wher e th e regiment ha d

been statione d sinc e it s landin g o n 1 5

December. Krueger' s planners also pro -

posed a nearl y simultaneou s an d sup -

porting shore-to-shor e operation , t o b e

conducted b y a reinforce d battalio n o f

the 34t h Infantry , 24t h Division , fro m

Mariveles, Bataan . Th e dat e o f th e

attack wa s set fo r 1 6 February.

MacArthur approve d th e combine d

parachute-amphibious plan o n 5 February,3

 an d simultaneousl y cancele d hi s

proposal to awai t the results of air bom -

bardment—which ha d no t ye t begun i n

earnest—before deciding upon a definite

course o f action . Indeed , th e Sixt h

Army's plan was prepared an d approve d

so quickl y a s t o sugges t tha t planner s

were so familiar wit h th e concept o f th e

dual assaul t o n Corregido r tha t onl y a

bare hint was needed fo r a preconceived

plan t o become a reality. 4

The decisio n t o emplo y paratrooper s

to make th e principa l assaul t against a n

objective of Corregidor's size and terrain

merits attention. Shape d lik e a tadpole ,

with it s bulbou s hea d pointin g west to -

ward th e Sout h Chin a Sea , Corregidor

is bu t thre e an d a hal f mile s lon g an d

one an d a hal f mile s acros s a t it s poin t

of greatest width. (Map VII) Th e easter n

—tail—section i s sandy , wooded , an d

gently sloping, its highest point not much

more than 15 0 feet abov e the bay . Nea r

the cente r o f th e island , tunnele d Mal -

inta Hil l rise s abruptl y t o a heigh t o f

some 350 feet, whil e immediately t o th e

west the ground falls away just as steeply

to a 500-yard-wid e waist risin g fro m se a

level t o a saddle about 10 0 feet high .

Known a s Bottomside t o th e tw o generations o f America n soldier s wh o garrisoned Corregido r befor e Worl d Wa r

II, the waist boasted small docks on both

the north and th e south and wa s the site

of th e demolishe d barri o o f Sa n Jose .

Bottomside's sand y beache s provide d

good point s fo r amphibiou s assault .

Equally good and wide r beaches were t o

be foun d alon g th e tai l section—i t ha d

been o n th e nort h shor e o f th e tai l tha t

the Japanese had made their main assault

in 1942 .

West o f Bottomsid e la y a graduall y

rising area known a s Middleside , givin g

way on th e west to steeper slope s leading

to Topside, as the central portion o f the

tadpole's hea d wa s labeled. Coverin g a

fairly eve n surfac e fro m 40 0 t o 50 0 fee t

in height, Topside dropped precipitatel y

to Manil a Ba y o n th e north , west , an d

south. Othe r tha n th e slope s from Mid -

dleside, ther e were only two feasibl e ap -

proaches t o Topside : Jame s Ravin e o n

the nort h an d Chene y Ravin e o n th e

west, bot h easil y defensible . Acces s t o

the wester n par t o f Middlesid e an d t o

Topside's easter n slope s coul d als o b e

had a t Ramsa y Ravine , a t th e southeast

corner of the tadpole's head.

Topside is th e ke y terrain featur e o n

Corregidor, an d agains t a defens e cen -

tered ther e conquest o f th e islan d coul d

be an extremely bloody affair. From Topside almost al l logica l site s fo r amphibious attack can be brought under fire, and

even troop s landin g o n th e tai l section ,

masked fro m fla t trajector y fir e b y Mal -

inta Hill , woul d b e expose d onc e the y

tried t o move past th e hil l towar d Mid -

dleside and Topside. Amphibious assault

at an y poin t coul d prov e costly , a s th e

3

 Rad, MacArthu r t o Krueger , CAX-50271 , 5 Fe b

45, Sixth Army Rpt Luzon , I, 113-14 . 4 "The pla n fo r opening Manil a Ba y had bee n i n

process o f formulatio n a t Headquarter s Sixt h Arm y

for som e time. " Krueger , From Down Under to

Nippon, p . 262 .
CORREGIDOR 337

Japanese had learned in May 1942, when

they ha d los t approximatel y hal f thei r

initial assaul t force. 5

The prospectiv e cos t o f amphibiou s

assault was , indeed, on e o f th e chie f

factors tha t led t o a decision t o use paratroopers. Planner s saw the obvious risks

in sending parachute troops against such

a small and roug h target , but i n vie w o f

the GHQ SWP A estimate that th e Japanese garriso n numbere d onl y 85 0 men,

the cost of the airborne operation promised t o b e less tha n tha t involve d i n a n

amphibious attack. Kruege r intended to

land almos t 3,00 0 troop s o n Corregido r

on 1 6 February , ove r 2,00 0 o f the m b y

parachute. Anothe r 1,00 0 me n o r mor e

would come i n b y parachute or landin g

craft th e next day. Planners hope d tha t

such preponderan t strength , combine d

with intensiv e ai r an d nava l bombard -

ment, migh t rende r th e seizur e o f th e

island nearl y bloodless.

An equall y importan t (i f no t eve n

more decisive) facto r leading to the decision to employ paratroops was the desire

to achiev e surprise . GH Q SWP A an d

Sixth Arm y planner s hope d tha t th e

Japanese o n Corregido r woul d judg e

that n o on e i n hi s righ t min d woul d

even conside r droppin g a regimen t o f

parachutists o n suc h a target . Th e de -

fenses, th e planner s thought , woul d

probably b e oriente d entirel y towar d

amphibious attack.

There wa s onl y on e reall y suitabl e

dropping groun d o n Corregidor , a pre -

war landin g strip , know n a s Kindle y

Field, o n th e centra l par t o f th e tail .

This area wa s quite small and, no t hav -

ing been utilize d b y the Japanese, badl y

overgrown. Nevertheless , Col . George

M. Jones, commandin g th e 503 d RCT,

recommended tha t Kindle y Fiel d b e

used a s th e dro p groun d afte r h e ha d

made a persona l aeria l reconnaissanc e

over th e island. 8 Genera l Kruege r over -

ruled th e proposa l quickly . A dro p a t

Kindley Field , h e thought , woul d no t

place th e 'trooper s o n th e ke y terrai n

feature quickl y enough , and, worse, th e

men landin g o n th e airstri p woul d b e

subjected t o th e same plungin g fir e tha t

troops makin g a n amphibiou s assaul t

would hav e t o face .

The onl y othe r possibl e location s fo r

dropping paratrooper s wer e a parad e

ground an d a gol f cours e o n Topside ,

which wa s otherwis e nearl y covere d b y

the ruin s o f prewa r barracks , officers '

homes, headquarters buildings, gun positions, an d othe r artiller y installations .

The parad e groun d provide d a dro p

zone—that is , a n are a no t dotte d wit h

damaged buildings and other obstacles—

325 yard s long and 25 0 yards wide ; th e

sloping gol f cours e landin g are a wa s

roughly 35 0 yard s lon g an d 18 5 yard s

wide. Bot h were surrounded b y tangled

undergrowth tha t ha d sprun g u p sinc e

1942, b y tree s shattere d durin g air an d

naval bombardments , an d b y wrecke d

buildings, whil e th e ope n area s wer e

pockmarked b y bom b an d shel l crater s

and littere d wit h debri s a s well . Bot h

fell of f sharply a t th e edge s and, on th e

west an d south , gav e wa y t o stee p cliffs.

Despite thes e disadvantages, planner s

selected th e parad e ground an d th e golf

course a s th e site s fo r th e 503d' s drop .

The planner s based this decision largely

upon th e though t tha t i f th e Japanes e

5

 See Morton , Fall of the Philippines, ch . XXXI .

6

 Rad, Jone s t o MacArthur , 6 Feb 45 , Sixth Arm y

G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 4-6 Fe b 45.
338 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

considered the possibilit y of a parachute

invasion at all, they certainly would no t

expect a drop on Topside. 7

In formulatin g fina l plan s fo r th e

drop, planner s ha d t o correlat e factor s

of wind direction and velocity , the speed

and fligh t directio n o f th e C-47 aircraft

from whic h the 503d RCT woul d jump,

the optimu m heigh t fo r th e plane s during th e drop, th e tim e th e paratroopers

would tak e t o reac h th e ground , th e

'troopers' drift durin g their descent, and

the best fligh t formatio n fo r th e C-47's.

Planners expecte d a n easterl y win d o f

fifteen t o twenty-five miles per hour with

gusts o f highe r velocity . Th e directio n

corresponded roughly to the long axes of

the dro p zones, bu t eve n so , eac h C-4 7

could not b e over the dropping grounds

for mor e tha n si x seconds . Wit h eac h

man takin g a hal f secon d t o ge t ou t o f

the plan e an d anothe r twenty-fiv e sec -

onds t o reac h th e groun d fro m th e

planned dro p altitud e o f 40 0 feet , th e

wind woul d caus e eac h paratroope r t o

drift abou t 250 feet westward during his

descent. Thi s amoun t o f drif t woul d

leave no more than 10 0 yards of ground

distance a t eac h dro p zon e t o allo w fo r

human erro r o r shar p change s i n th e

wind's spee d o r direction.

The 503 d RC T an d the 317th Troop

Carrier Group—whos e C-47' s wer e t o

transport an d dro p th e paratroopers —

decided t o emplo y a fligh t patter n pro -

viding fo r tw o column s o f C-47's , on e

column over each drop zone. Th e direc -

tion o f fligh t woul d hav e t o b e fro m

southwest t o northeast becaus e th e best

line o f approach—wes t t o east—woul d

not leav e sufficien t roo m betwee n th e

two plane columns and would bring the

aircraft mor e quickl y ove r Manil a Bay ,

increasing th e chance s tha t me n woul d

drop into the water or ove r cliffs. Sinc e

each plan e could b e ove r th e drop zon e

only si x seconds , eac h woul d hav e t o

make tw o o r thre e passes , droppin g a

"stick" of six to eight 'troopers each time.

It would be an hour or mor e before th e

1,000 o r s o troop s o f th e firs t airlif t

would b e o n th e ground . Then , th e

C-47's would have to return to Mindoro,

reload, an d brin g a second lif t forward .

This second group would not be on th e

ground unti l som e fiv e hour s afte r th e

men o f the first lift ha d starte d jumping.

Planners kne w tha t the y wer e violat -

ing th e airborn e experts ' corollar y t o

ground warfare's principal of mass—that

is, t o ge t th e maximu m forc e o n th e

ground in the minimum time. Bu t there

was no choice. Terrai n and meteorological condition s playe d thei r shar e i n th e

formulation o f th e plan ; lac k o f troop .

carrying aircraf t an d pilot s traine d fo r

parachute operation s di d th e rest . Th e

margin of safety was practically zero, and

the hazards were such that planners were

reconciled t o acceptin g a jump casualty

rate a s hig h a s 2 0 percent—Colone l

Jones estimate d tha t casualtie s migh t

run a s high a s 50 percent. T o som e extent the casualty rate would depend upon

whether or not th e parachute drop took

the Japanese on Corregidor b y surprise.

And, if air and nava l bombardments had

not reduced the Japanese on Topside to

near impotency by the time of the drop,

a tragi c shambles might ensue.

Planners wer e als o concerne d ove r

casualties durin g th e amphibiou s phas e

of th e assault, for they realized that losses

could ru n eve n highe r durin g landing s

on th e beach tha n during the parachute

drop. Bu t th e planners had severa l im - 7

 Krueger Comments , 1 8 De c 56 .
CORREGIDOR 339

portant reason s fo r includin g th e am -

phibious attack , primar y amon g the m

being th e difficul t proble m o f aeria l re -

supply an d th e impossibilit y o f aeria l

evacuation. Amphibiou s assaul t troops ,

planners believed , woul d probabl y b e

able to establish an early contact with the

paratroopers on Topside and thus open an

overwater suppl y an d evacuatio n route .

Moreover, th e amphibiou s attacker s

stood a goo d chanc e o f seizin g Malint a

Hill befor e th e Japanes e garrison could

recover fro m th e shoc k o f preparator y

air and naval bombardment and th e surprise o f th e parachut e drop . I n an y

case, America n troop s would - hav e t o

secure th e hil l befor e the y coul d clea r

the tai l o f Corregidor , Bottomside , an d

parts o f Middleside . Withou t th e hel p

of amphibiou s forces , th e 503 d RC T

would have to attack Malint a Hill across

the ope n are a o f Bottomside—a n opera -

tion that , planner s believed , woul d b e

most unpleasant .

To minimiz e expecte d casualtie s during th e shore-to-shor e attack , th e am -

phibious troops would make their assault

two hours afte r th e paratroopers started

jumping. B y tha t time , planner s ex -

pected, th e parachutist s woul d b e abl e

to provid e som e fir e suppor t fo r th e

amphibious assault , whil e Japanes e at -

tention woul d be largely diverted t o the

manifest enormit y o f th e situatio n o n

Topside.

To allo w visuall y directe d ai r an d

naval bombardment as well a s good visibility fo r th e airborn e assault , planner s

scheduled th e parachut e jump fo r 083 0

and se t th e amphibiou s attack fo r 1030 .

The whol e plan , o f course , depende d

upon generall y fai r weather ; a n inclem -

ent daw n o n 1 6 Februar y woul d forc e

postponement of both assaults.

Thus, carefully , planner s mad e pro -

vision fo r most eventualities. Th e grea t

imponderable was, of course , th e Japa -

nese reaction, and here Sixth Army and

all othe r force s involve d wer e due fo r a

surprise. Informatio n concernin g th e

isolated Japanese garrison on Corregidor

had bee n s o scant y tha t th e estimat e o f

850 had , i n fact , hardl y attaine d th e

status of an educate d guess, even though

it wa s necessar y t o us e tha t figur e a s a

basis fo r planning . Actually , th e Japa -

nese had over 5,000 troops on Corregidor,

all bu t 50 0 of them nava l personnel. 8

Corregidor an d th e othe r island s i n

Manila Ba y wer e garrisone d b y th e

Manila Bay Entrance Force unde r Capt.

Akira Itagaki , IJN, who reported to Admiral Iwabuch i i n Manil a an d whos e

headquarters was on Corregidor. Itagaki's

forces, whic h include d thre e Arm y provisional infantr y companie s an d tw o

Army provisional artillery batteries, were

organized int o provisiona l unit s an d

assigned defensiv e sectors.

As Sixt h Arm y expected , Captai n

Itagaki di d no t anticipat e a n airborn e

envelopment. H e ha d deploye d hi s

troops for defense against amphibious attack an d ha d place d hi s strongest posi -

tions a t James , Cheney , an d Ramsa y

Ravines and a t Malint a Hill . Ove r hal f

his troops were ready for action a t thes e

points; th e rest of the garrison he apparently kept in reserve on Malint a Hill or

in th e tunnels below . A fe w men hel d

8

 Japanese informatio n i s principall y from : Japa -

nese Studie s i n W W II , No . 9 , Luzo n Opn s o f th e

Shimbu Gp, p . 12 , and No . 125 , Philippin e Are a

Naval Opns, pt. IV, p. 16 ; Statement of Capt Masayo -

shi Kom a (IJN ) (Staff, Southwest Area Fleet), States,

II, 293 ; Col Kobayash i Narrative , pp. 2 , 6, 10th I&H

Staff Study , Japanese Opns on Luzon ; XI Corp s G-2

Per Rpt, 2 6 Feb 45 , Sixth Arm y G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon,

25-27 Fe b 45; an. 1 , Or g Chart , t o 503 d RC T S- 2

Rpt Corregidor; USAFF E Bd Rpt Corregidor I, 2-3 .
340 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

isolated positions along the tail. Itagaki 's

ravine defense s ha d n o communicatio n

with eac h othe r o r wit h Malint a Hill ,

Wire communications from eac h strong -

point le d bac k t o a centra l locatio n o n

Topside, but . even s o i t woul d b e diffi -

cult fo r Itagak i t o mov e force s quickl y

from on e position to another around the

periphery o f Topside . Moreover , th e

early destruction o f th e communications

center woul d lea d t o complet e disrup -

tion o f control . Thus , whil e h e com -

manded a stron g an d fairl y well-arme d

force, Itagaki' s means o f controlling th e

operations o f hi s troops wer e extremel y

precarious.

Securing "The Rock"

Preparations

Corregidor ha d bee n unde r attac k b y

Allied Ai r Force s plane s eve r sinc e 2 2

January, whe n Genera l MacArthu r firs t

designated th e islan d a s a target. 9 Th e

Allied Air Force s stepped u p its attacks

at th e beginning of February and b y the

16th o f the month Fift h an d Thirteent h

Air Force planes had dropped some 3,125

tons o f bomb s o n th e island . O n th e

morning o f 1 6 Februar y 2 4 B-24 's hi t

known an d suspecte d gu n positions , 1 1

B-25's struc k antiaircraf t gu n emplace -

ments and th e entire south coast, and 3 1

A-20's bombe d an d strafe d generally ,

some o f the m payin g attentio n t o tin y

Caballo Island , a mile to th e south.

Naval bombardmen t bega n o n 1 3

February i n conjunctio n wit h th e bom -

bardment and mine sweeping in preparation fo r th e seizur e o f Mariveles . Th e

cruisers an d destroyer s o f Tas k Grou p

77.3 directe d mos t o f thei r fir e a t th e

north side of Corregidor, where the Japanese defenses seemed strongest. The nex t

day Japanese fir e fro m Corregido r dam -

aged a mine sweeper and tw o destroyers,

the mine sweeper so severely that it later

had t o be sunk . Admira l Berkey 's ship s

proved unable to silence all the fir e from

Corregidor an d ha d mad e larg e inroad s

in thei r ammunitio n suppl y i n th e at -

tempt. Therefore , Admira l Kinkaid sent

3 heav y cruiser s an d 5 destroyers sout h

from Lingaye n Gulf t o augmen t th e fir e

of th e 5 ligh t cruiser s an d 9 destroyers

Berkey already had unde r his command.

The ne w arrivals joined i n th e bom -

bardment abou t 123 0 o n 1 5 February .

During th e mornin g o f th e 16t h

cruisers and destroyers blasted th e south

shore o f Bottomside , wher e th e 3 d Bat -

talion, 34t h Infantry , wa s t o land ; ex -

pended considerabl e ammunitio n o n

Caballo Islan d gu n positions; an d stoo d

by fo r cal l fir e th e res t o f th e day . P T

boats, whic h ha d alread y strafe d som e

Corregidor shore batteries, were in position t o rescu e paratrooper s wh o migh t

land in Manil a Bay . A s the troop carrying C-47's hove into view, seventy A-20's

of th e Allie d Ai r Force s bombe d an d

strafed the eastern sectio n of Corregidor

and also worked over Caballo.

The 503 d RC T ha d stage d a t Min -

doro under the direction of Eighth Army.

At daw n o n th e 16t h th e paratrooper s

boarded plane s of the 317th Troop Carrier Group, a task completed quickly and

without incident . Jus t a s th e troop s

making an amphibious assault are under

control o f th e nava l command fro m th e

time o f stagin g until a beachhea d i s es9

 This subsection is based principally upon: Craven

and Cate , AAF V, pp. 340-34 ; T G 78. 3 Actio n Rp t

Mariveles-Corregidor, passim; Sixt h Arm y Rp t Lu -

zon, I , 53 ; Sixt h Arm y F O 48 , 7 Feb 45 , i n ibid., I,

149-51.
CORREGIDOR 341

tablished, so the 503 d RCT was under

the control of the Commanding General,

Fifth Air Force , from th e time the troop.

carrying C-47's too k of f until th e dro p

was executed . Upo n reachin g th e

ground, th e RCT passe d t o th e contro l

of Sixt h Army and Hall's XI Corps. Fo r

the purpose s o f centralizin g contro l o f

operations o n Corregidor , Genera l Hal l

had organize d Roc k Force—th e 503 d

RCT an d th e reinforce d 3 d Battalion ,

34th Infantry. Th e organizatio n of Rock

Force, which was commanded by Colonel

Jones o f th e 503 d RCT, was to become

effective whe n Jones reached Corregidor

with the firs t lif t fro m Mindoro .

Aerial and Amphibious Assault

Floating earthward without being fired

upon b y th e Japanese , th e firs t ma n o f

the firs t lif t o f paratrooper s wa s o n th e

ground a t 0833, 1 6 February, three minutes behin d schedule. 10

 Jumper s fro m

following aircraf t encountere d sporadi c

Japanese rifl e an d machin e gun fire , bu t

on the ground at Topside drop zones the

paratroopers foun d onl y a fe w smal l

groups of Japanese armed with light machine gun s an d rifles . Thes e th e para -

chutists eithe r kille d o r drov e of f wit h

little trouble . B y 0945 th e firs t lif t wa s

on the ground and assembled at Topside

drop zones—the 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry; Batter y C, 162d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion; a platoon o f Battery D,

462d Parachute Field Artillery; Company

C, 161s t Airborne Enginee r Battalion ;

and abou t two-third s o f Headquarter s

and Headquarters Company, 503d RCT,

including Colonel Jones.

The mission s of the troops in th e first

lift wer e t o secur e an d hol d th e dro p

zones fo r th e secon d lift ; prepar e t o

move out t o clea r all Topside upon th e

arrival o f th e secon d lift ; provid e fir e

support fo r th e assaul t o f th e 3 d Bat -

talion, 34th Infantry, at Bottomside; and,

finally, establis h physica l contac t wit h

the latte r uni t a s soo n a s possible . B y

1000 th e 'trooper s ha d successfull y ac -

complished th e firs t mission , ha d com -

pleted preparation s fo r th e second , an d

had moved two .50-caliber machine guns

in position on th e southeast side of Topside to help cover the amphibious attack.

The machin e gunners, whose support fire

was no t neede d initially , ha d a magnificent vie w o f th e assaul t a t Bottomside .

The 3 d Battalion , 34t h Infantry , ha d

come t o Marivele s wit h th e 151st RCT

on 1 5 February,11 and ha d left Marivele s

Harbor aboard twenty-fiv e LCM's of the

592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment

at 0830 on the 16th. Taking a circuitous

route around the west end o f Corregidor,

the firs t boat s hi t th e sout h beac h a t

1028, tw o minute s ahea d o f schedule .

Contrary t o al l expectations , ther e wa s

no opposition as the men o f the first fou r

waves poure d ashore . Bu t a s th e fift h

wave cam e i n Japanes e machin e gun s

opened u p fro m Ramsa y Ravin e an d

Breakwater Point , t o th e lef t rear —

southeast—and fro m cliff s a t Sa n Jos e

Point, lyin g a t th e southwes t corne r o f

Malinta Hill .

10 The source s for the remainder of the Corregidor

action, unless otherwis e indicated , are: USAFFE B d

Rpt Corregidor , I , 3-9; Sixt h Arm y Rp t Luzon , I ,

53-55; 503 d RC T Rp t Corregidor , pp . 3-6; 503 d

RCT S- 2 Rp t Corregidor, pp. 1-7; 503d Inf S-2 Per

Rpts, 1 6 Feb-2 Ma r 45 ; 503 d In f S- 3 Pe r Rpts , 1 6

Feb-2 Mar 45; 1st Bn 503d Prcht Inf Hist, Phase XII,

16-29 Fe b 45 , passim; 503 d Prch t In f S- 1 Rp t Cor -

regidor, an . 3 , Casualties; 34t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp .

138-54. 11

 See above, ch. XVII.
342 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

AIRDROP, TOPSID E

As vehicle s reache d shor e the y bega n

detonating mine s alon g th e Bottomsid e

beaches. I n rapi d successio n a medium

tank of the 603d Tank Company, an My

self-propelled moun t o f Canno n Com -

pany, 34t h Infantry , an d a 37-mm. antitank gu n o f Antitan k Company , 34t h

Infantry, wer e destroyed . Nevertheless ,

Companies K an d L , 34t h Infantry ,

pushed rapidl y forwar d an d gaine d a

firm hol d ato p Malint a Hil l b y 1100 .

To tha t tim e amphibiou s landin g casu -

alties ha d bee n 2 me n kille d an d 6

wounded, far below the anticipated rate.

Surprise wa s complete . Th e lac k o f

opposition t o th e firs t parachut e drop s

and t o th e initia l landin g waves at Bottomside ca n b e attribute d bot h t o th e

shock o f preparatory naval an d air bombardment an d t o th e fac t tha t th e Japa -

nese had not expected a parachute attack.

Evidently circlin g bombers an d fighter s

of th e Allie d Ai r Force s ha d kep t th e

Japanese unde r cove r whil e th e LCM' s

and escorts approachin g from Marivele s

apparently diverte d Japanes e attentio n

from th e incoming C-47's. Indeed , since

the C-47' s resemble d "Betty " bomber s

of the Japanese Army Air Force, the Japanese nava l troop s o n Corregido r ma y

have assume d tha t th e troop-carrying

aircraft wer e mor e America n bombers .
CORREGIDOR 343

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT, BOTTOMSID E

In turn , th e parachut e dro p diverte d

Japanese attention from th e amphibious

craft movin g on Corregidor . Obviousl y

confused b y the co-ordinated assault, the

Japanese did no t kno w what t o do first .

By th e tim e the y ha d recovere d thei r

wits sufficientl y t o tak e meaningfu l ac -

tion, th e 3 d Battalion s o f th e 34t h an d

503d Infantr y Regiment s ha d secure d

their initia l objective s wit h negligibl e

combat losses.

However, jum p casualtie s amon g th e

paratroopers o f th e firs t lif t ha d ru n

higher tha n anticipate d — roughly 2 5

percent o f th e 'trooper s o f tha t lif t ha d

been injured, an d many others had failed

to lan d o n Topside . Ther e ha d bee n a

number o f contributin g factors . Fo r

one thing, in their first pass over the drop

zones th e leadin g plane s ha d disgorge d

paratroopers fro m a n altitud e o f 550 -

600 fee t instea d o f th e planne d 40 0 feet.

This increase d descen t drif t an d sen t

some men onto the cliffs south and southwest o f th e dro p zone s whil e other s

barely hit th e narrow beache s below the

bluffs. Drif t als o had increase d becaus e

the wind velocit y was over twent y mile s

per hou r (fiv e mile s o r mor e pe r hou r

stronger tha n th e velocit y the n consid -

ered saf e fo r parachut e operations) an d

because th e win d cam e mor e fro m th e
344 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

north than planners had expected. Colo -

nel Jone s an d th e commande r o f th e

317th Troo p Carrie r Group , circlin g

overhead i n a comman d plane , wer e i n

radio contact with the C-47's. The y were

able t o hav e th e troo p carriers progres -

sively reduc e thei r altitud e unti l b y th e

time th e firs t dro p had ende d al l plane s

were flying at the right height. Neverthe -

less, most of the men o f the first lift missed

the assigne d dro p zone s an d landed on ,

in, and amon g buildings and tree s away

from th e two fields.

Some o f th e officer s wh o cam e dow n

with the first lift felt that conditions were

too hazardou s t o risk droppin g th e rest

of th e 503 d an d wante d t o hal t th e sec -

ond lift. 12 Bu t n o comman d actio n wa s

taken t o sto p th e secon d lift , whic h

began droppin g a t 124 0 hours, twenty -

five minute s behind schedule. Thi s lif t

was composed o f th e 2 d Battalion , 503 d

Parachute Infantry ; Batter y B , 462 d

Parachute Fiel d Artiller y Battalion ;

Service Company, 503d Infantry; and the

remainder o f Headquarters, 503 d RCT .

The plane s cam e i n a t th e prope r alti -

tude, and , althoug h th e win d wa s stil l

strong, most o f th e 'troopers lande d o n

the drop zones. Th e secon d lift encoun -

tered some fir e from Japanes e automatic

weapons, bu t suffere d fewe r casualtie s

than ha d th e firs t drop. 13

Of th e 2,050 men dropping on 1 6 February, jum p casualtie s numbere d approximately 280 . Th e resultan t rat e o f

14 percent was 6 percent lower than that

the planners had been willin g to accept.

Japanese fir e an d crashe s int o buildings

had kille d approximatel y 2 0 'troopers ,

roughly 21 0 wer e injure d o n landing ,

and Japanes e fir e ha d wounde d anothe r

50 men during the descent.

While Colone l Jone s talke d wit h hi s

staff abou t th e advisability of continuing

jump operation s o n 1 7 February , th e

troops on the ground began expanding a

hurriedly forme d perimete r aroun d th e

drop zones. Th e 2 d Battalion too k ove r

at th e two drop fields an d th e 3 d Battal -

ion's Companie s G an d H—ther e wer e

only thre e companie s pe r battalio n i n

the 503d Infantry—se t ou t t o secure the

rest of Topside. Compan y H, assembling

at the parade ground, rapidly cleared the

main barrack s buildin g o f a fe w Japa -

nese stragglers and then moved 300 yards

northward t o secure the gutted hospital,

whence on e platoo n dashe d 60 0 yard s

northeast to seize a knoll dominating the

entire northeast section of Topside. Company G , meanwhile , advance d eastwar d

down th e slope s towar d Middlesid e t o

set u p nigh t position s nea r th e hea d o f

Ramsay Ravine, only 250 yards from th e

closest elements of the 3d Battalion, 34th

Infantry. Th e res t o f th e 503d's troops,

patrolling al l ove r Topside , discovere d

that Japanes e strengt h seeme d t o b e lo -

cated west an d sout h o f th e drop zones.

By dus k comba t casualtie s numbere d

about 5 5 me n wounded , a muc h lowe r

figure tha n anticipated .

In the meantime, the question of additional drop s ha d bee n settled . Colone l

Jones fel t tha t sinc e th e operatio n ha d

been successful beyond hope , opposition

had bee n lighter tha n expected, and th e

Japanese wer e obviousl y surprise d an d

12

 Anonymous, Comba t Ove r Corregidor , 1 6 Feb -

ruary 1945 , Carrie d Ou t b y th e 503 d Parachut e

Combat Tea m . . . , p. 38. This persona l account ,

prepared b y a 503d RCT medica l officer , is available

in photosta t i n OCM H files . I t i s hereinafte r cite d

as Anon., Comba t Ove r Corregidor. 13

 Fire against the second lift came from a Japanese

20-mm. machin e canno n an d tw o America n .50 -

caliber machin e gun s that , droppin g wid e o f thei r

mark durin g the first lift , ha d quickl y been pu t int o

action b y the Japanese. Jone s Comments, 8 Feb 57 .
CORREGIDOR 345

disorganized, ther e wa s no nee d t o ris k

further jum p casualties . Accordingly ,

he requeste d X I Corp s t o cance l th e

drop of the rest of the regiment in favo r

of sendin g it forward b y landing craft t o

Bottomside. Th e reques t was approved,

and onl y supplie s wer e droppe d o n

the 17th. 14

One unexpecte d blessin g resulte d

from th e scattere d dro p of paratroopers

in th e 0830 lift. Captai n Itagaki, having

been informe d tha t landin g craf t wer e

assembling of f Mariveles , ha d hurrie d

with a smal l guar d t o a n observatio n

post nea r Breakwate r Point , obviousl y

more concerned wit h th e imminen t amphibious assaul t tha n wit h th e possibil -

ity tha t paratroopers migh t drop out o f

the C-47 's alread y i n sigh t o f Corregi -

dor. Suddenly , his attention wa s rudely

diverted a s twenty-fiv e t o thirt y para -

troopers wh o had bee n blow n ove r th e

cliffs nea r the point began peltin g down

around th e observatio n post . Fire d o n

by th e Japanese , th e smal l America n

group quickl y assemble d an d attacked .

In th e ensuin g skirmish eigh t Japanese ,

including Captain Itagaki , wer e killed .

Effective contro l amon g th e Japanes e

units, alread y rendere d practicall y im -

possible b y th e destructio n o f th e communications center during the preassault

air and nava l bombardment, now ceased

altogether. Leaderless , th e remainin g

Japanese wer e n o longe r capabl e o f co -

ordinated offensiv e o r defensiv e efforts .

Each grou p woul d figh t o n it s ow n

from isolate d an d widel y separate d

strongpoints.

Clearing the Island

Once Roc k Forc e wa s ashore , opera -

tions on Corregidor evolved into a largescale mop-up. Th e siz e of the island and

the natur e o f th e terrai n preclude d ma -

neuver b y unit s muc h large r tha n a

platoon, whil e th e generall y stati c an d

disorganized defens e o f the Japanese led

to a "campaign " o f smal l uni t assaults .

Colonel Jones 's pla n calle d fo r th e 3 d

Battalion, 34t h Infantry , t o secur e Ma -

linta Hil l an d contai n th e Japanes e o n

the easter n en d o f th e islan d whil e th e

503d Infantr y cleare d Middlesid e an d

Topside. Afte r th e 503d's job had been

finished, Roc k Forc e would overru n th e

tail. Withi n this framework , operation s

proceeded i n a serie s o f generall y

uncorrelated incidents.

On th e afternoo n o f 1 7 Februar y th e

1st Battalion , 503 d Infantry , an d othe r

reinforcements reache d Bottomsid e b y

landing craft . Japanes e rifl e an d ma -

chine gu n fire , mos t o f whic h passe d

overhead, "expedited " th e movemen t

ashore, an d th e battalio n soo n joine d

the res t o f th e regimen t o n Topside .

The troop s alread y o n Topsid e ha d

spent th e da y expandin g their hold ,

systematically reducin g th e firs t o f th e

many Japanes e bunkers , pillboxes , an d

underground defense s the y wer e t o en -

counter, an d ha d develope d a patter n

for th e destructio n o f th e Japanes e

installations.

First, aircraf t o r nava l fir e suppor t

ships — the ai r ar m usin g napal m

extensively—were calle d upo n t o strik e

positions accessibl e t o thes e type s o f

bombardment; the n th e infantr y at -

tacked almost a s the last shel l o r bom b

burst. Whe n thi s metho d failed , th e

503d's ow n 75-mm . pac k howitzer s an d

lesser weapon s wer e brough t forwar d

for direc t fire . Next , havin g statione d

men wit h submachine guns and rifle s a t

14

 Rad, XI Corp s t o Sixth Army , QP-3748 , 1 6 Feb

45, Sixth Arm y G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 16-18 Feb 45.
346 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

advantageous points to cover approaches

to a Japanes e position , infantr y assaul t

teams move d forwar d behin d whit e

phosphorus han d grenade s an d th e ex -

tremely clos e suppor t o f flam e throwe r

teams. T o avoi d backflas h an d assur e

the deepest possibl e penetratio n o f cav e

defenses, flam e throwe r operator s ofte n

projected thei r fue l unignited , an d the n

used whit e phosphoru s grenade s t o fir e

it. I f th e Japanese within th e cave s still

could no t b e induce d t o giv e u p th e

fight, enginee r demolitio n expert s

blocked th e cav e entrances.

One Japanes e tacti c wa s both advan -

tageous and disadvantageous t o the 503d

Infantry. Eac h nigh t smal l group s o f

Japanese woul d attemp t t o reoccup y

positions cleare d durin g th e previou s

day. To th e 503d, this often mean t some

dirty, repetitiv e work , an d additiona l

casualties. O n th e othe r hand, th e Japanese sometime s reoccupie d tacticall y in -

defensible position s tha t prove d eas y t o

take out . Th e 503 d Infantr y seem s t o

have bee n happ y t o le t th e Japanes e

occasionally retur n t o suc h positions ,

secure i n th e knowledg e tha t th e onl y

result woul d b e mor e Japanes e kille d

at n o cos t t o th e attackers . Th e onl y

way t o kee p th e Japanes e fro m reoccu -

pying les s vulnerabl e position s wa s t o

stop nigh t infiltration , a process tha t i n

turn required the blocking of the underground passageway s tha t abounde d o n

Topside.

By thes e method s Japanes e casualtie s

began t o moun t rapidly . O n th e 17th ,

for example , ove r 30 0 Japanes e wer e

killed; nearl y 77 5 wer e kille d th e nex t

day. I n th e same two days Rock Force's

casualties wer e approximatel y 3 0 kille d

and 11 0 wounded .

Apparently i n a n effor t t o redee m

their losse s i n a blaz e o f glory, Japanese

at th e souther n an d southwester n sec -

tions o f Topsid e attempte d a counter -

attack i n th e predaw n hour s o f 1 9

February. Shortl y afte r 020 0 abou t 4 0

Japanese committe d suicid e b y blowin g

up an ammunition dump a few hundred

yards north and inlan d from Breakwate r

Point, simultaneousl y killin g or wound -

ing 15-2 0 men o f th e 503 d Infantr y

who, unawar e of their danger, ha d bee n

occupying a buildin g directl y ove r th e

ammunition. Abou t th e same time Japanese from Chene y Ravine and Wheele r

Point, 800 yard s southeast o f the ravine ,

started a groun d counterattac k tha t

reached its peak aroun d 0600. Th e Jap -

anese force , nearl y 40 0 strong , pushe d

some o f it s troop s al l th e wa y t o th e

barracks area o n Topside, bu t th e 503d

Infantry finall y drov e the m bac k afte r

0800.15 B y 110 0 th e 503 d ha d hunte d

down th e las t straggler s fro m th e coun -

terattack and had resumed its daily process o f smal l uni t action s against know n

strongpoints. Operation s o n th e 19th,

including th e event s durin g th e night ,

cost Roc k Forc e ove r 3 0 men kille d and

75 wounded , th e Japanes e nearl y 50 0

killed. I n addition , th e 503 d ha d cap -

tured 3 Japanese , th e firs t prisoner s o f

the battle .

The effor t o f th e mornin g o f 1 9 February was the last major offensiv e actio n

taken b y th e Japanes e o n Topside , al -

though smal l group s continue d t o exe -

cute un-co-ordinated banzai attack s from

time t o time . Som e Japanes e officer s

retained contro l o f force s a t th e south -

15

 Pvt. Lloyd G . McCarte r o f th e 503 d Parachut e

Infantry wa s awarded th e Medal of Honor for heroic

action in helping to repel this counterattack and fo r

another heroi c deed on the 16th.
CORREGIDOR 347

western corner , an d her e resistanc e

continued t o bea r som e semblanc e o f

organization. Th e las t significan t op -

position, centere d a t Wheele r Point ,

ended wit h a small-scal e banza i charg e

on th e morning of 2 3 February, an d b y

1800 tha t da y th e 503 d Infantr y ha d

substantially cleared th e wester n sectio n

of Corregidor. Colone l Jones could now

direct Roc k Force 's ful l energie s towar d

clearing th e are a eas t o f Malint a Hill ,

which th e 3 d Battalio n o f 34t h Infantr y

had hel d sinc e th e 16th .

The battalio n ha d no t bee n inactiv e

at Malint a Hill . Th e ver y firs t nigh t

ashore i t ha d t o bea t off a series of small

but determine d Japanes e counterattacks

along th e nort h sid e o f th e hill . I n

these skirmishe s 1 0 American s wer e

killed an d a lik e numbe r wounded ,

while about 3 5 Japanese lost thei r lives.

On th e 17t h the battalio n devote d

most o f it s tim e t o securin g th e road s

leading throug h Middlesid e s o tha t th e

wounded o f th e 503 d Infantr y coul d b e

evacuated an d supplie s could b e sen t t o

Topside. Here , a s on Malint a Hil l an d

Topside, muc h o f th e fightin g involve d

the laboriou s proces s o f cleanin g ou t

small caves or, failin g that , sealin g them

with explosives . A t Malint a Hil l ever y

night wa s marke d b y numerou s smal l

counterattacks, execute d b y Japanes e

from Corregidor' s tai l o r fro m withi n

the hill's tunnels. Everyon e feare d tha t

at an y tim e th e Japanes e migh t se t of f

tons o f ammunitio n an d explosive s

known t o b e store d i n th e tunnels, an d

during th e nigh t 21-2 2 February th e

expected happened . A t 213 0 a deafen -

ing explosio n literall y rocke d th e hill ;

flames sho t ou t o f tunne l entrances ;

rocks an d othe r debri s fle w i n ever y

direction; fissure s opene d alon g th e

slopes; 6 me n o f Compan y A , 34t h In -

fantry, wer e burie d aliv e b y a landslid e

on th e sout h side .

Apparently, the Japanese had planned

a controlle d explosio n t o se t th e stag e

for a counterattack or to allow the troops

inside—now estimate d t o numbe r 2,00 0

—to escape t o th e tai l are a i n th e ensu -

ing confusion . I f so , th e explosio n ha d

gotten completel y ou t o f hand , killin g

an unknown number o f Japanes e within

the tunnels . Troop s o f th e 34t h Infan -

try killed other Japanese who counterattacked westward , bu t severa l hundre d

Japanese did manag e t o make their way

eastward unde r cove r o f th e explosio n

and the counterattack. Additiona l explosions, apparently marking the suicid e of

Japanese stil l i n th e tunnels, shook th e

hill during the night of 23-24 February.

Meanwhile, Rock Forc e had prepare d

plans fo r th e fina l assaul t against th e

east en d o f th e island . Th e attac k wa s

to be undertaken by the 1s t an d 3 d Battalions, 503 d Infantry , whil e th e regi -

ment's 2 d Battalio n continue d t o mo p

up a t Topsid e an d th e 3 d Battalion ,

34th Infantry , continued to hold Malinta

Hill, Bottomside , and Middleside . Espe -

cially heavy air and nava l bombardmen t

preceded th e attack , whic h bega n o n

24 February , an d th e 503d 's ligh t artil -

lery laid down the heaviest concentration

of whic h i t wa s capable.

The 503d 's battalion s firs t encoun -

tered seriou s resistanc e at Enginee r

Point, of f th e northeas t corne r o f Ma -

linta Hill , and whe n the y overcame this

they develope d stil l stronge r oppositio n

at Infantr y Point , 80 0 yard s eastwar d

along th e nort h shore . Her e som e 60 0

Japanese attempte d t o assembl e fo r a

counterattack, bu t 30 0 o f the m wer e

killed b y artiller y an d infantr y defen -
348 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

sive fire s befor e th e attac k go t wel l

under way . The remainin g Japanes e

retreated eastward , an d b y nightfal l o n

the 24t h unit s of th e 503 d hel d al l bu t

the las t 3,00 0 yard s o f th e tail .

On th e 25t h th e America n troop s

decreased thi s distanc e abou t 1,00 0

yards. Tha t night's lines ran fro m Cav -

alry Point , o n th e nort h shore , south -

southeast som e 70 0 yard s t o th e sout h

shore a t Monke y Point . Th e 503 d ha d

encountered stif f resistance , includin g

some banza i charges , nea r Monke y

Point, an d durin g th e afternoo n man y

of th e Japanes e stil l remainin g o n th e

tail attempte d t o escap e b y swimmin g

to Bataa n o r Caball o Island . Thos e

refusing t o surrende r t o cruisin g PT's

or enginee r LCM' s wer e kille d b y th e

boats' gunner s an d strafin g planes .

As dark came on the 25th , Rock Force

was confiden t tha t th e morro w woul d

see th e en d o f significan t resistanc e o n

Corregidor. Th e 3 d Battalion , 34t h In -

fantry, woul d no t b e ther e t o shar e i n

the glory , fo r wit h th e 24t h Divisio n

assembling o n Mindor o fo r operation s

in th e souther n Philippines , th e battal -

ion ha d t o leave . It s plac e wa s take n

by th e 2 d Battalio n o f th e 38t h Divi -

sion's 151st Infantry, whic h move d ove r

from Mariveles .

Shortly after 110 0 o n 2 6 February the

Japanese o n Corregido r execute d thei r

final, suicida l tou r de force , blowin g an

underground arsena l a t Monke y Poin t

amid scene s o f carnag e o n bot h sides .

As the dus t fro m terrifi c explosion s settled, a hollo w appeare d wher e a smal l

knoll ha d previousl y stood. Debri s ha d

flown a s far a s Topside wher e one man,

almost a mil e fro m th e explosion , wa s

injured b y flying rock. Othe r debris hit

a destroye r 2,00 0 yard s offshore . A me -

dium tan k wa s hurled 5 0 yards throug h

the air, most o f it s cre w killed. 16 Bit s

and piece s o f America n an d Japanes e

troops splattered the ground; rock slide s

buried aliv e othe r me n o f bot h forces .

Over 20 0 Japanese were killed outright ,

while Roc k Forc e los t som e 5 0 me n

killed an d 15 0 wounded . Medic s too k

an hour and a half t o clear the casualties

from th e area , an d a t th e en d o f tha t

time on e medica l officer , a n eyewitnes s

to the horrors, could onl y report:

As soo n a s I go t al l th e casualtie s off , I sa t down o n a rock and burs t out crying.

1 couldn't stop myself and didn't even want

to. I ha d see n mor e tha n a ma n coul d

stand an d stil l sta y normal . . . . When I

had th e case s t o car e for , that kep t m e

going; bu t afte r tha t i t wa s too much. 17

The explosio n marke d th e en d o f

organized resistanc e o n Corregidor, and

by 160 0 o n 2 6 February elements of th e

503d Parachut e Infantr y ha d reache d

the eastern ti p of the island. Th e battl e

was ove r excep t fo r moppin g u p smal l

groups o f Japanes e hole d u p i n water -

line caves. Thi s process the 503 d Infan -

try had to hurry along since the regiment

had been alerted to get back to Mindoro

no later than 1 0 March in order to make

ready fo r participatio n i n operation s t o

clear th e southern Philippines .

By 2 March General Hall and Colone l

Jones ha d conclude d tha t moppin g u p

had progresse d t o th e poin t tha t the y

could se t a n officia l termina l dat e fo r

the Corregidor operation . Casualtie s t o

2 March , including those from th e para -

chute drop, numbered ove r 1,00 0 killed,

16

 The 503 d Infantr y borrowe d a n acetylen e torc h

from a Seventh Fleet destroyer and cut open the tank

to save the sole survivor. Jone s Comments, 8 Feb 57. 17

 Anon., Combat Ove r Corregidor, p. 107 .
CORREGIDOR 349

RAISING TH E FLAG , CORREGIDO R

wounded, injured , an d missing . (Table

7) Japanes e losses—actuall y counted —

numbered abou t 4,50 0 kille d an d 2 0

captured. A n additiona l 20 0 Japanes e

were estimated to have been killed while

trying to swim away, and i t was thought

that a t least 50 0 might hav e been seale d

in cave s an d tunnels ; a fe w remaine d

alive i n variou s hideaways. 18

On 2 March 194 5 General MacArthur

returned t o Corregidor , jus t nin e day s

short o f thre e years afte r hi s departure .

A simple yet impressive flag-raising cere -

mony was held. The theate r commander

and thos e members o f his staf f wh o ha d

shared th e terribl e days of 194 2 on Th e

Rock mus t hav e ha d larg e lump s i n

their throat s a s Colone l Jone s steppe d

forward, saluted , an d reported : "Sir , I

present t o yo u Fortres s Corregidor." 19

18

 The 503 d RC T lef t Corregido r on 8 March an d

the 2 d Battalion , 151s t Infantry , departe d i n mid -

April, bein g relieved b y the 1s t Battalion . Element s

of th e 6t h Infantr y Divisio n garrisone d th e islan d

after earl y May .

19

 Harold Templeman , The Return to Corregidor

(New York : Stran d Press , 1945) . Mr . Templeman ,

American Re d Cros s Fiel d Directo r wit h th e 503 d

RCT, jumpe d wit h th e infantr y o n Corregidor.
350 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

TABLE 7—CASUALTIE S I N CORREGIDO R OPERATION S T O MARC H 194 5

Source: Uni t record s cited in preceding footnotes.
CHAPTER XI X

Manila Bay — Minor Operations

The clearin g o f Bataa n an d th e cap -

ture of Corregidor concluded th e majo r

operations involve d i n th e openin g o f

Manila Bay . The tas k o f securin g th e

bay are a wa s not , however, complete d

until XIV Corps cleaned ou t th e south -

ern shor e fro m Cavit e t o Ternat e an d

XI Corp s cleare d th e smal l island s be -

tween Corregido r an d th e south shore .

(See Map VII.)

The South Shore

XIV Corps cleared th e southern shor e

of Manil a Bay while XI Corp s was making its drive t o secur e Bataan. 1

 I n fact ,

elements o f th e 511t h Parachute Infan -

try, 11t h Airborne Division , occupie d

Cavite Peninsula and adjacent mainlan d

areas o n th e sam e da y tha t th e 151s t

Infantry, 38t h Division , lande d a t

Mariveles, Bataan .

Important a s th e Cavit e are a wa s t o

the securit y o f Manil a Bay , the 11t h

Airborne Divisio n ha d bypasse d th e

prewar nava l bas e durin g it s driv e t o

Manila becaus e guerrill a report s an d

aerial reconnaissanc e ha d indicate d n o

Japanese wer e i n th e Cavit e region .

From 1 5 through 2 0 February troop s o f

the 511th Infantry, thoroughl y combing

the Cavit e Peninsul a an d th e nearb y

mainland, foun d onl y a fe w Japanes e

stragglers. Th e regimen t seize d a larg e

quantity o f Japanes e equipmen t o n th e

peninsula, for th e Manila Naval Defense

Force's 5th Naval Battalion, togethe r

with Japanes e antiaircraf t unit s onc e

stationed a t Cavite , ha d lef t supplie s

and heav y weapon s behin d whe n the y

hurriedly withdre w northwar d int o

Manila o n 2 February. 2

Affairs a t Ternate, about twenty miles

southwest o f Cavite, moved in a different

fashion. Her e wa s locate d a Japanes e

garrison of about 1,000 men built around

the 111th Surface Raiding Base Battalion

and attache d units , includin g a fe w

pieces o f artillery . I n addition , aroun d

350 nava l personne l wh o ha d recentl y

evacuated Carabao Island in Manil a Bay

also hole d u p a t Ternate .

A small guerrilla forc e unde r the control of the 11th Airborne Division began

probing int o th e Japanes e defense s a t

Ternate on 1 9 February, but foun d th e

Japanese position s to o stron g t o attac k

without artiller y support . The 188t h

Glider Infantry , 11t h Airborne Divi -

sion, starte d movin g int o th e Ternat e

area on 27 Februar y and launche d an

assault o n 1 Marc h behin d th e clos e 1

 This sectio n i s base d upon : 11t h A/B Di v Rp t

Luzon, pp. 7, 15-18, 30; 11th A/B Div G-3 Pe r Rpts,

15 Feb- 4 Ma r 45 ; 511t h Prcht In f S- 3 Jnl , 15-20

Feb 45; 188t h Gl i Inf Rp t Luzon , pp. 10-12 . 2

 See above , ch . XIII.
352 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

support o f Fift h Ai r Forc e A-20's , a

medium tan k company, and 75-mm. and

105-mm. artillery battalions. Har d fighting too k plac e o n 2 March , bu t th e

188th an d attache d guerrilla s secure d

the entire Ternate area by midafternoon

the nex t day . The regimen t ultimatel y

discovered tha t mos t o f th e Japanes e

once du g i n a t Ternat e ha d escape d

into rough , risin g groun d t o th e sout h

and southeast . A t Ternat e th e 188t h

Infantry killed abou t 35 0 Japanese, captured o r destroye d th e bul k o f th e artillery th e Japanes e ha d manne d i n th e

area, and seize d intac t some 3 0 Japanese

Army suicid e boats . Th e casualtie s o f

the reinforce d 188t h Infantr y ar e

unknown.3

The captur e o f Ternat e marke d th e

completion o f XI V Corps' shar e i n op -

erations t o secur e Manil a Bay , fo r o n

the same day the corps' troop s had overcome the last organized resistance within

Manila. X I Corp s ha d alread y reduce d

all Japanes e oppositio n alon g othe r

points o n th e bay' s shore s an d ha d

secured Corregidor . All tha t remaine d

was t o clea r th e smal l island s betwee n

Corregidor an d th e sout h shore .

The Small Islands

The smal l island s tha t X I Corp s had

to secur e wer e Caballo , a mil e sout h o f

Corregidor; Carabao , huggin g th e Ternate shore; and E l Fraile, about midway

between th e othe r two . The Japanes e

on thos e island s pose d n o threa t t o

Allied shippin g — their ordnanc e wa s

too light—but , lik e othe r bypasse d Japanese garrisons , the y ha d t o b e take n

sometime. Althoug h th e island s ha d

little o r n o militar y significance , th e

operations t o secur e them offe r interest -

ing example s o f militar y ingenuit y an d

unorthodox tactics .

Caballo Island

There wa s no grea t hurr y t o launc h

attacks agains t th e thre e mino r objec -

tives and i t was, indeed, past mid-March

before X I Corp s could spar e any troops

for th e job. On th e 18th Genera l Chase,

the 38th Division commander, requested

and receive d permissio n fro m X I Corp s

to reconnoite r Caball o Island. 4 Th e

next da y a platoo n o f th e 2 d Battalion ,

151st Infantry , too k off from Corregido r

by LC M an d lande d unoppose d a t th e

eastern en d o f Caballo . Patrollin g in -

land, th e platoon discovere d stron g Japanese defens e on hig h groun d in the

center o f th e island, whic h wa s onl y a

mile long, east to west, and 500 yards wide.

Withdrawing th e platoon , Genera l

Chase schedule d a n assaul t wit h th e

reinforced 2 d Battalio n fo r 2 7 March .

In preparatio n Fift h Ai r Forc e planes ,

which ha d bee n usin g Caball o fo r a

practice bombin g range , bombe d an d

strafed whil e Allie d Nava l Force s de -

stroyers shelled Japanese positions along

Caballo's beaches . O n th e mornin g o f

the 27th , B-25' s an d P-51' s bombed ,

strafed, an d dropped napalm; destroyers

3

 The autho r could fin d n o casualty figure s for the

Ternate actio n i n availabl e records , bu t Genera l

Swing, th e 11t h Airborn e Division' s commander ,

stated that the battle cost the 188t h Infantry "significant casualties." Swin g Comments, 1 0 Jan 57 .

4

 The accoun t o f th e captur e o f Caball o is from :

38th Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 50-54 , 123-2 4 an d ma p

after p . 49 ; 151st Inf Rp t Luzon , Caball o Account ;

151st In f S-2 an d S- 3 Jnls , 27 Mar-13 Apr 45 ; Sixth

Army Rpt Luzon , I, 78; TU 78.9.11 , Action Rpt, 27-

28 Mar 45, Opns Caballo Island, passim.
MANILA BAY—MINO R OPERATION S 353

and rocket-equippe d PT' s bombarded

for twent y minutes; artillery on Corregidor an d Bataa n joine d in ; an d 151s t In -

fantry 81-mm. mortars lobbed shells over

from Corregidor . A t 090 0 LCM' s o f

the 592d Enginee r Boat and Shor e Regiment bega n puttin g th e assaul t infantr y

ashore.

At firs t ther e wa s no opposition . Th e

Japanese garriso n o f som e 40 0 Arm y

and Nav y troop s wa s stunne d o r wa s

hiding i n defense s centerin g aroun d

three smal l knoll s that , varyin g fro m

150 t o 25 0 fee t i n height , la y nea r th e

middle o f th e island. 5 Withi n fiftee n

minutes th e 2 d Battalion , 151s t Infan -

try had secure d Hill 1 , the most easterly ,

and ha d begu n a n advanc e towar d Hil l

2. A t Hil l 2 concentrated machin e gun ,

mortar, and rifl e fir e a s wel l a s the hill' s

rough, stee p slope s slowe d th e attack .

Nevertheless, th e battalion capture d th e

crest b y th e en d o f th e day . Withi n

another day it cleared all Caballo except

for a group o f approximatel y 20 0 Japa -

nese wh o had retire d t o prewa r morta r

pits and tunnels near the base of Hill 2 's

eastern slopes .

The Japanes e i n th e pits and tunnel s

created a n almost insolubl e problem fo r

the 2 d Battalion , 151s t Infantry . Th e

Japanese had so emplaced their weapons,

which include d machin e guns and mor -

tars, tha t the y controlled al l approache s

to th e morta r pit s bu t coul d no t b e

reached by American artiller y o r morta r

fire. Whe n th e 151s t Infantr y concen -

trated it s morta r fir e agains t th e pits '

entrances, the Japanese simply withdrew

into th e tunnels . Whe n th e America n

fire ceased—a t th e las t possibl e momen t

before an infantr y assault—th e Japanese

rushed ou t o f th e tunnel s t o ma n thei r

weapons. Tank s were of n o hel p t o th e

American troops . Fro m position s nea r

the rim o f the pits the tanks were unable

to depres s thei r gun s sufficientl y t o d o

much damag e t o th e Japanese . I f th e

tanks tried to approach fro m above , they

started slidin g down Hil l 2 's slopes int o

the pits. N o combination o f tank , artil -

lery, an d infantr y actio n prove d o f an y

avail, and th e 151s t Infantr y ha d t o give

up it s attempt s t o tak e th e Japanes e

positions b y assault ,

On 3 1 March engineers trie d t o pou r

diesel oi l int o on e o f th e tunnel s con -

necting th e morta r pits , employin g fo r

this purpose a single ventilator shaft tha t

was accessibl e t o th e 151s t Infantry .

Nothing came o f th e effor t sinc e i t wa s

impossible to get enough oil up the steep

slopes o f th e hil l t o creat e a conflagra -

tion o f significan t proportion s withi n

the tunnels . Nevertheless , burnin g th e

Japanese ou t seeme d t o promis e th e

only metho d o f attac k tha t woul d no t

risk th e undul y heav y casualtie s o f a

direct infantr y assault . N o one , of

course, wante d t o thro w awa y th e live s

of experience d troop s o n suc h a n

insignificant objective .

Finally, th e commande r o f th e 113t h

Engineers, 38t h Division , suggeste d

pumping oil u p th e hill fro m th e beach

through a pipelin e fro m a shi p o r land -

ing craf t anchore d a t th e shor e line .

The Allie d Nava l Force s happily fell i n

with thi s ide a an d supplie d th e 151s t

Infantry wit h tw o oil-fille d ponto n

cubes; th e Allie d Ai r Force s provide d

a 110-horsepowe r pum p an d necessar y

lengths o f pipelin e an d flexibl e hosing ;

and th e 592 d Enginee r Boa t an d Shor e

5

 Additional informatio n o n th e Japanes e o n Ca -

ballo is fro m Japanes e Studie s i n W W II , No . 125 ,

Philippine Are a Nava l Opns, pt. IV , pp. 16-18 .
354 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

CABALLO ISLAN D

Regiment came through with an LCM to

carry th e pum p and th e ponto n cubes. 6

On 5 April over 2,500 gallons of diesel

fuel wer e pumped into the pits and tun -

nels throug h th e ventilato r an d wer e

then ignite d b y whit e phosphoru s mor -

tar shells . "Results, " th e 38t h Divisio n

reported, "wer e mos t gratifying." 7 A

huge flas h fir e ensued , followe d b y a

general conflagratio n an d severa l explo -

sions. Th e engineer s repeated th e proc -

ess o n 6 and 7 April, an d o n th e latte r

day carefull y lowere d tw o larg e demolition charges through the ventilator shaft

and place d anothe r a t an accessibl e tun -

nel entrance . Se t of f simultaneously ,

the thre e charge s cause d a n enormou s

volume o f flame s an d severa l terrifi c

explosions.

For th e nex t fe w days th e 2 d Battal -

ion, 151s t Infantry , trie d t o persuad e a

few Japanes e wh o ha d live d throug h

the holocaust s t o surrende r an d als o

executed a few infantry probin g attacks.

On 1 3 April a patro l entere d th e pit s

and tunnels , kille d th e lon e survivin g

Japanese, an d reporte d th e position s

cleared an d secured .

6

 In additio n t o source s cite d previously , th e description of the oil operations at Caballo is derived

from Brig . Gen . Willia m F . Heavey , Down Ramp!

The Story of the Army Amphibian Engineers,

(Washington: Infantr y Journa l Press , 1947 ), pp .

155-56. 7

 38th Di v Rpt Luzon , p. 52.
MANILA BAY—MINO R OPERATION S 355

FORT DRU M

El Fraile

The nex t smal l islan d targe t wa s E l

Fraile, about fiv e mile s south o f Caballo

and a littl e ove r tw o mile s off Ternate.

Basically a reef , E l Frail e ha d bee n

turned int o a formidabl e fortres s lon g

before Worl d Wa r I I b y U.S . Arm y

engineers, who had constructed ato p the

reef a concrete, battleship-shaped citadel

known as Fort Drum. Th e fortres s walls

were 2 5 t o 3 6 fee t thick , th e to p wa s

20 fee t thick ; th e battleshi p wa s abou t

350 fee t lon g an d 14 5 fee t wide , an d i t

rose 40 feet abov e mean low water. Th e

fort's fou r 14-inc h gun s an d fou r 6-inc h

guns had bee n knocke d ou t by Japanese

fire o r America n demolition s i n 194 2

and ha d neve r bee n repaire d b y th e

Japanese.8

Manifestly, som e specia l metho d o f

attack ha d t o be devised fo r Fort Drum,

especially sinc e Japanes e machin e gun s

covered th e onl y feasibl e entrance , a

sally port at th e east end. The existenc e

of a Japanese garriso n ha d bee n discov -

ered i n lat e Februar y whe n th e cre w o f

an Allie d Nava l Forces P T boat , havin g

decided tha t the fortress wa s abandoned,

made a n unschedule d reconnaissance .

The Japanes e garrison o f sevent y nava l

troops permitted seve n of the Americans

to make their way into a sall y port an d

about a thir d o f th e wa y through For t

Drum's corridors. Suddenly , a Japanes e

machine gu n opene d up , killin g on e

American nava l office r an d woundin g

another. Th e landin g part y mad e a

hurried withdrawal , an d i t wa s th e sec -

ond wee k o f April before a n attemp t t o

clear th e fortres s wa s undertaken. 9

The 38t h Division , responsibl e fo r

the captur e o f For t Drum , develope d a

plan o f attac k tha t followe d naturall y

from th e on e employed successfull y a t

Caballo Islan d — get troop s ato p For t

Drum and the n feed oi l and demolitions

down ventilato r shafts. 10 Sinc e th e for -

tress wall s wer e unscalable , th e 113t h

Engineers, 38t h Division , rigged a drawbridgelike ram p t o th e connin g towe r

of a n Allie d Nava l Force s LSM , and

Company F , 151s t Infantry , o n th e

morning o f 1 3 April, dashe d acros s th e

8

 Rpt of the Harbor Defense s of Manila an d Subi c

Bays, p . 4 (an . VIII t o Rp t o f USAFF E an d USFIP ,

1941-42, otherwis e know n a s Wainwright' s Rpt) ,

OCMH files ; Morton , Fall of the Philippines, pp .

478ff.

9

 Teletype Msg, G-2, XI Corps to G-2 Sixt h Army ,

1430 5 Mar 45, Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 3-5

Mar 45. 10

 The stor y o f th e reductio n o f For t Dru m i s

based on : 38t h Di v Rpt Luzon , pp . 55-60; 151st Inf

Rpt Luzon , For t Dru m Account ; Heavey , Down

Ramp!, pp . 156-57 ; US S LSM 51, Actio n Rp t For t

Drum, passim; Japanese Studies in WW II , No . 125 ,

Philippine Area Nava l Opns, pt. IV, p. 18 .
356 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

BOARDING FORT DRUM FRO M LS M

bridge t o th e to p o f Fort Drum. Whil e

the infantr y covere d al l openings , engi -

neers followe d acros s th e ram p wit h a n

oil lin e and 60 0 pound s o f TNT. Th e

LCM employe d a t Caball o Islan d the n

began pumpin g oi l int o a n ope n ven t

and engineer s lowere d TN T int o an -

other opening . Afte r th e engineer s li t

a 30-minut e fuze , al l hand s withdre w

and th e LCM kept pumping. Suddenly ,

rough sea s brok e th e oi l line . Maj .

Paul R . Lemasters, commandin g the 2 d

Battalion, 151st Infantry, togethe r wit h

a fe w enliste d men , dashe d bac k ove r

the ram p t o cu t th e demolitio n fuz e

with onl y minute s t o spare . Engineer s

then repaire d th e oi l lin e an d resume d

pumping.

The Japanes e insid e Fort Drum wer e

strangely quiet throughout all this activity, althoug h a fe w rifl e shot s fro m a n

old gu n port wounded a seaman aboard

the LSM . Pumping continue d withou t

incident, an d shortl y afte r 102 0 the

LSM, th e LCM, and a few LCVP's tha t

had kep t th e LS M alongsid e th e fort ,

pulled of f t o a respectfu l distance . B y

that time nearly 3,00 0 gallons of oil ha d

been pumpe d int o th e ventilator .

The initia l explosion, occurring about

1035, prove d a disappointing, weak, and

scarcely nois y failure . Bu t whil e th e

commanders concerne d wer e gatherin g

aboard Admiral Barbey's flagship t o discuss th e failure , burnin g oi l seepe d

through opening s create d b y th e firs t

explosion an d reache d th e fort 's maga -

zines, most o f them containing ammunition fro m 194 2 that th e Japanes e ha d

never haule d away . A t approximatel y

1045 ther e wa s a deafenin g roa r fro m

the fort . Grea t cloud s o f smok e an d

flame sho t skyward ; a serie s o f violen t

explosions threw steel plates and chunk s

of concret e hundreds of fee t int o the air

and a thousan d yard s ou t t o sea; smoke

and flame s poure d from ever y vent, gun

port, shel l hole , an d sall y port . Th e

holocaust exceede d al l expectations .

Fires an d explosion s o f som e magni -

tude continue d unti l lat e afternoon ,

while smoke, heat, and minor explosions

made reconnaissanc e o f th e fort' s inte -

rior impossibl e until 1 8 April. O n tha t

day infantr y patrol s penetrate d For t

Drum's innermos t recesse s an d foun d

69 Japanes e bodies . Th e entir e Japa -

nese garriso n o f a seemingl y impregna -

ble stronghol d ha d bee n wipe d ou t a t

the cos t t o th e attacker s o f on e ma n

wounded.

Carabao Island

Troops o f th e 1s t Battalion , 151s t

Infantry, o n 1 6 April assaulte d Carabao

Island, which , lyin g a mile off the Ter-
MANILA BAY—MINO R OPERATION S 357

CARABAO UNDE R FIR E

nate shore , wa s th e las t objectiv e i n

Manila Bay. 11 Two day s of air and nava l

bombardment preceded the attack. Th e

1st Battalion encountered no opposition,

and th e onl y livin g bein g i t foun d o n

the islan d wa s on e ver y badl y shake n

pig. Th e 35 0 Japanese naval troops who

had onc e garrisone d Caraba o ha d with -

drawn t o th e mainlan d a t Ternate. 12

The dispositio n o f th e pi g the y lef t be -

hind i s no t note d i n th e records , bu t

it would no t b e unreasonable t o assume

that som e o f th e me n o f th e 1s t Battal -

ion, 151s t Infantry , ha d fresh por k chops

for suppe r o n 1 6 April 1945 .

With th e seizur e o f Caraba o Island ,

XI Corps brought to a successful conclu -

sion its campaign t o secure th e entrance

to Manil a Bay . The ba y ha d actuall y

been saf e fo r Allie d shippin g sinc e 1 6

February, th e da y of th e assault o n Cor -

regidor, an d Allie d vessel s bega n usin g

the grea t harbo r o f Manil a wel l befor e

the seizur e o f Carabao . Th e captur e o f

Carabao, El Fraile, and Caballo was but

a mino r sid e sho w i n th e Luzo n Cam -

paign, an d th e operation s t o tak e th e

three island s had diverte d onl y a miniscule portio n o f X I Corps' energies—it s

main strengt h ha d lon g sinc e move d

against th e Shimbu Group o n th e 11 mainland. The Carabao (For t Frank) story is based on: 38th

Div Rp t Luzon , pp . 61-64 , 126-27 ; 151s t In f Rp t

Luzon, Caraba o Islan d Account ; Japanes e Studie s

in WW II, No . 125 , Philippin e Area Naval Opns, pt.

IV, pp. 18-19 ; TU 74-3-5 , Action Rpt Carabao Island,

passim; Heavey , Down Ramp!, p . 157 .

12

 For th e subsequen t histor y o f thes e Japanes e

naval troops, see the firs t sectio n of this chapter and

also Chapte r XXIII , below.

PART FIV E

THE SHIMBU GROUP

AND TH E

VISAYAN PASSAGE S

CHAPTER X X

American Plans for

Post-Manila Operations

While X I Corp s wa s concluding th e

operations t o secur e Manil a Bay , Sixth

Army ha d turne d it s attentio n t o com -

pleting plan s fo r th e destructio n o f th e

Shobu an d Shimbu Groups, th e tw o

largest concentration s o f Japanes e

strength lef t o n Luzo n afte r Sixt h Army

had brought th e Kembu Group an d th e

Manila Naval Defense Force unde r at -

tack.1 Sixt h Army 's offensive s agains t

the Shobu an d Shimbu Groups wer e

slow t o gather momentum, although th e

necessity fo r launchin g suc h offensive s

had been obviou s from th e beginning of

the campaign.

By earl y Februar y Sixt h Army' s I

Corps, poised along the northern edge of

the Centra l Plains , an d XI V Corps ,

smashing it s wa y int o Manila , ha d at -

tained position s fro m whic h the y coul d

strike agains t th e Shobu an d Shimbu

Groups. I f Sixt h Arm y postpone d fo r

long th e I Corp s offensiv e agains t th e

Shobu Group, tha t norther n Japanes e

force would have ample time—too much

time—to read y it s defense s an d gathe r

the supplie s o f al l type s fro m th e Cag -

ayan Valle y necessar y t o a protracte d

stand i n th e mountain s o f north Luzon .

Each da y tha t passe d befor e attack s

against th e Shobu Group bega n woul d

render I Corps ' ultimat e tas k mor e

costly and tim e consuming. B y the same

token, Genera l Kruege r knew , Sixt h

Army woul d fin d i t difficul t i f no t im -

possible to completely assure the security

of th e Manil a Ba y regio n unti l XI V

Corps could launch an attack against the

Shimbu Group concentratio n i n th e

mountains nort h an d northeas t o f Ma -

nila. O f urgent importance to American

development of th e Manil a area wa s the

dismal fac t tha t th e Shimbu Group con -

trolled th e mai n source s o f Manila' s

water supply .

From th e beginnin g o f th e Luzo n

Campaign, Genera l Krueger ha d known

that he would hav e insufficien t resource s

to undertake simultaneous, concerted attacks against al l th e Japanese concentra -

tions on Luzon, no matter how desirable

1

 The genera l source s employe d fo r this chapte r

are; Ltr , MacArthur t o Krueger, et al., 5 Feb 45, sub:

Course of Luzo n Campaign , Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon ,

I, 113 ; GHQ SWP A O I 84/8 , 7 Fe b 45 , G-3 GH Q

Jnl File , 1 9 De c 44 ; Ltr , Chamberli n (formerl y

ACofS G- 3 GH Q SWPA ) t o author, 2 9 Jul 54 , copy

in OCM H files ; Rad , MacArthur t o Krueger , CX -

10389, 1 6 Feb 45 , Sixt h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon ,

14-16 Fe b 45 ; Rad , MacArthu r t o Kruege r an d

Eichelberger, CX-10011, 1 0 Feb 45, Sixth Arm y Rp t

Luzon, I , 114 ; Sixt h Arm y Rp t Luzon , I, 45-47 , 56-

57, 59-60, 62, 64-65, an d 81 ; Sixt h Arm y FO' s 49 -

58. variousl y date d betwee n 9 Fe b an d 2 3 Ma r 45 ,

Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 151-62 ; persona l knowl -

edge o f th e author , wh o serve d i n th e Historica l

Division, G-3, GHQ SWPA, during the period under

consideration. Background material concerning some

of th e decision s se t fort h i n thi s chapte r i s t o b e

found i n chapte r II , above .
362 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

such a cours e o f actio n migh t appea r t o

him. Hi s earlies t plan s fo r operation s

against th e Shobu Group, fo r example ,

called fo r th e employmen t o f a t leas t

five, possibl y six, divisions i n concurren t

offensives i n norther n Luzon. 2 A s o f

early February , however , h e coul d no t

provide I Corps with such strength with -

out strippin g XIV an d X I Corp s o f th e

forces required t o secure the Manila Ba y

region—a ste p h e obviousl y coul d no t

take. However , Krueger did expec t that,

with th e exceptio n o f certai n element s

of th e 24t h Division , he coul d retain o n

Luzon almos t al l th e troop s deploye d

on th e islan d a s o f earl y February . H e

anticipated tha t wit h thes e units , plu s

reinforcements scheduled to reach Luzon

later i n th e month , h e coul d procee d

fairly rapidly with th e destructio n o f th e

Shobu an d Shimbu Groups, Fo r th e

purpose o f mounting attacks against th e

two Japanes e group s h e woul d als o re -

deploy, a s they became available, the divisions he had already committed against

the Kembu Group and the Manila Naval

Defense Force.

General Krueger was not t o realize his

expectations. Durin g th e firs t wee k o f

February Genera l MacArthu r decide d

that Sixt h Arm y coul d secur e th e most

important strategi c objectiv e o f th e

Luzon Campaign , th e Centra l Plains -

Manila Ba y region , wit h considerabl y

less strengt h tha n theate r planner s ha d

originally contemplated . Furthermore ,

MacArthur fel t tha t bas e developmen t

projects o n Luzon—no t onl y fo r th e

support o f Sixt h Arm y operation s bu t

also for th e support o f subsequent offen -

sives throughou t th e Pacific—woul d re -

quire Sixth Army to commit much of its

strength t o operation s othe r tha n offen -

sives aime d a t th e quic k destructio n o f

the Shobu an d Shimbu Groups. Attack s

against thes e tw o Japanes e forces , th e

theater commande r informe d Krueger ,

should assum e secondar y importanc e i n

plans fo r operation s followin g immedi -

ately upon th e clearanc e of th e ManilaManila Ba y area:

It i s possibl e tha t th e destructio n o f

enemy force s i n th e mountain s o f nort h

and eas t Luzo n wil l b e tim e consumin g

because the nature of the terrai n will prob - ably channelize operations and limi t development o f ful l power . Initially , hostil e

forces should be driven into the mountains, contained and weakened, and our principal

effort devote d t o area s where greater powe r

may b e applied. 3

MacArthur fel t tha t development o f a

safe, shor t shippin g rout e throug h th e

central Philippines—that is, through the

Visayan Passages—wa s a n urgen t re -

quirement for the establishment of large

air, naval , an d logisti c base s o n Luzon .

Ever sinc e 9 January , Allie d shippin g

had been movin g into Philippine waters

at Leyt e Gulf , sailin g thenc e southwes t

through Suriga o Strai t an d th e Min -

danao Sea into the Sul u Sea . Following

the rout e employe d b y th e Lingaye n

Gulf invasion convoys, the shipping then

turned nort h t o pas s wes t o f Mindor o

Island, int o th e Sout h Chin a Sea , and

finally u p th e west coast o f Luzon. Th e

Southwest Pacifi c Are a coul d sav e con -

siderable tim e and , ultimately, ship s i f

it coul d shorte n thi s roundabou t rout e

to on e beginnin g a t Sa n Bernardin o

Strait, whic h separate s Sama r Island ,

north o f Leyte , fro m th e southeaster n

tip of Luzon . Sailin g throug h San Bernardino Strait, Allied vessels could move

2

 For furthe r detail s o f thes e plan s se e below , ch .

XXIV. 3

 Ltr, MacArthur t o Krueger, et al., 5 Feb 45.
AMERICAN PLAN S FO R POST-MANIL A OPERATION S 363

into th e Sibuya n Sea , sail northwes t

through th e Verd e Islan d Passag e be -

tween norther n Mindor o an d souther n

Luzon, move o n int o Manil a Bay , Thi s

second rout e save d som e 50 0 nautica l

miles an d wa s les s hazardou s fo r smal l

vessels tha n th e open , ofte n storm y

waters of the Sulu and Sout h China Seas.

General MacArthu r kne w tha t th e

Japanese maintaine d covey s o f suicid e

craft a t various hideouts along the south -

ern coas t o f Luzo n an d th e souther n

shore o f th e Bico l Peninsula , southeast -

ern Luzon , H e als o ha d reaso n t o be -

lieve tha t th e Japanes e ha d emplace d

coast artiller y o n th e sout h coas t o f

Luzon, th e Bico l Peninsula , some o f th e

small island s o f th e Visaya n Passages ,

and norther n Samar . Hi s force s woul d

obviously hav e t o clea r al l thes e area s

before h e coul d mak e us e o f th e wate r

passages through th e central Philippines,

Accordingly, MacArthu r directe d Sixt h

Army t o clea r souther n Luzo n an d th e

Bicol Peninsula , an d simultaneousl y

ordered Eight h Arm y t o captur e th e

smaller island s and th e northern portion

of Samar .

Another objectiv e o f post-Manil a op -

erations, MacArthu r informe d Krueger ,

was th e earl y openin g o f Batanga s Bay ,

on th e south-centra l coas t o f Luzon , t o

Allied shipping . GH Q SWP A ha d

drawn u p plan s fo r extensiv e bas e an d

port development a t Batanga s Bay . Th e

theater intended to locate a large staging

base for th e invasio n o f Japan alon g th e

bay's shores; i t planne d t o set up i n th e

same region , whic h la y comfortabl y distant from th e crowded Manil a metropolitan area , a major hospita l center t o take

care o f casualtie s expecte d durin g th e

invasion o f Japan ; and , among othe r

things, theate r engineer s planne d t o es -

tablish a landing craft assembl y plan t a t

Batangas Bay. GH Q SWP A also planned

base developmen t o f lesse r magnitud e

for Balaya n Bay , wes t an d northwes t o f

Batangas Bay .

Finally, Genera l MacArthu r pointe d

out t o Krueger , developmen t o f greate r

cargo discharg e capacit y a t al l existin g

and potentia l base s on Luzo n wa s a con -

tinuing requirement. Thi s requirement,

MacArthur realized , coul d b e largel y

met b y planne d logistica l developmen t

at Manil a and Batanga s Bays, but h e be -

lieved it necessary to establish additiona l

port facilitie s alon g th e northwester n

coast o f Luzon . Th e theate r ha d t o un -

dertake suc h development—th e firs t o f

it t o b e locate d a t Sa n Fernando , L a

Union, a t th e northeas t corne r o f Lin -

gayen Gulf—not onl y to ease the existing

burden upo n th e overtaxe d facilitie s a t

Lingayen Gul f bu t als o t o suppor t sub -

sequent operation s o f Sixt h Arm y i n

northern Luzo n an d t o provid e ports o f

entry for matériel t o be employed i n th e

construction an d us e o f airfield s tha t

GHQ SWP A intended to establish along

Luzon's northwester n coast. 4

Thus, i n earl y February , Genera l

MacArthur limite d Krueger' s freedo m

of actio n b y directin g hi m t o execut e

operations tha t woul d mak e i t impossi -

ble fo r Sixt h Arm y t o deplo y effectivel y

its principa l strengt h agains t th e mai n

bodies of the Shimbu and Shobu Groups.

About th e sam e time , th e theate r com -

mander pu t additiona l restraint s upo n

4

 Further details on earl y plan s fo r th e captur e of

San Fernand o ar e t o b e foun d i n ch . XXIV , below.

See also : Rad , Luzon Bas e Se c USASO S t o Sixt h

Army, 1069 , an d Rad , Sixt h Arm y LUBSEC , WG -

587, bot h date d 1 1 Mar 45 , Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e

Luzon, 9-1 1 Mar 45 ; Rad , GH Q SWP A t o Sixt h

Army, USASOS , an d AN F SWPA, CX-12542, 1 9 Mar

45, Sixt h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 17-1 9 Ma r 45 .
364 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Krueger b y detaching troops from Sixt h

Army. Wit h Leyte, southern Samar, and

Mindoro alread y cleared , an d wit h th e

Luzon Campaign well along, MacArthur,

anxious t o reassert American hegemon y

throughout th e res t o f th e Philippines ,

decided t o spee d th e destructio n o f

major center s o f Japanes e resistanc e i n

the bypasse d centra l an d souther n is -

lands o f th e Philippin e archipelago .

Theater comba t strengt h wa s b y n o

means inexhaustible , an d th e initiatio n

of th e campaig n i n th e souther n Philip -

pines, MacArthu r knew , woul d requir e

some reorientation of effort fro m Luzon .

The theate r commande r realize d tha t

this redirection o f effor t woul d slo w th e

conquest of Luzon, but tha t was a penalty

he was willing to accept.

Having made the decision, MacArthur

proceeded t o implemen t i t b y reducing

the strengt h h e ha d originall y allocated

to Sixth Army for the prosecution of the

Luzon Campaign . First , on 7 February,

the theate r commande r informe d

Krueger tha t th e 41st Infantry Division ,

already loade d fo r shipmen t t o Luzon ,

would b e give n t o Eight h Arm y fo r op -

erations i n th e souther n Philippines .

Then, i n rapi d succession , Kruege r re -

ceived i n earl y February th e unwelcome

news tha t th e 24t h Infantr y Division' s

34th RCT , which ha d bee n operatin g

with X I Corps , woul d soo n hav e t o g o

back t o Mindor o to make ready fo r participation i n Eight h Arm y operation s

in th e souther n Philippines ; tha t th e

two battalion s o f th e 24t h Division' s

19th Infantry an d othe r 24t h Divisio n

units tha t had been attache d t o the 11th

Airborne Divisio n sout h o f Manil a

would hav e to be sen t bac k t o Mindor o

immediately; tha t th e 503 d Parachut e

RCT woul d soo n have to be redeployed

from Corregido r to the southern islands;

and tha t th e entir e 40t h Infantr y Divi -

sion would be withdrawn from Luzo n t o

take part in the Eighth Army's campaign

in th e souther n Philippines . Support -

ing combat and servic e units would also

depart fo r th e south , an d Sixt h Arm y

would no t receiv e othe r comba t an d

service units i t ha d expecte d t o emplo y

on Luzon . Next , MacArthu r informe d

Krueger that the 37th Infantry Division ,

once i t ha d complete d operation s i n

Manila, would be tie d down for perhaps

two month s a s a garriso n forc e fo r th e

metropolitan area .

Instead o f th e eleve n division s an d

four separat e RCT 's Kruege r ha d ex -

pected t o emplo y o n Luzon , h e woul d

have onl y nin e division s (on e o f whic h

would hav e t o remai n i n th e Manil a

area fo r som e time ) an d tw o separat e

RCT's. I n all , taking int o accoun t ar -

tillery, armored , an d servic e unit s tha t

were also redeployed from Luzo n t o th e

southern Philippine s o r wer e stricke n

from th e Luzo n reinforcemen t list ,

Krueger los t th e equivalen t o f thre e

divisions permanentl y and a fourth , th e

37th, temporarily. 5

The combine d impact of MacArthur's

operational and redeploymen t directives

forced Genera l Kruege r t o undertak e a

5

 As o f earl y Februar y th e allocatio n o f regula r

ground comba t units to Luzo n ha d encompasse d th e

equivalent o f twelv e infantr y division s plu s tan k

strength greate r tha n tha t o f a n armore d division . The redeployment s t o th e souther n Philippines ,

together wit h th e cancellatio n o f planne d move -

ments t o Luzon , reduce d th e tota l t o roughl y nin e

and one-hal f division s wit h a n attache d tan k

strength o f less tha n o f a n armore d division . I t ap -

pears tha t o f al l th e comba t unit s eithe r o n o r

scheduled t o be sent to Luzon, Krueger had expected

to los e only th e element s of th e 19th Infantry, 24t h

Division, tha t ha d operated i n southern Luzo n wit h

the 11th Airborne Division .
AMERICAN PLAN S FO R POST-MANIL A OPERATION S 365

wholesale reshufflin g o f unit s alread y

committed o n Luzon , t o mak e carefu l

plans fo r th e futur e employmen t o f

forces lef t o n th e island , an d t o mak e

sweeping change s i n tentativ e plan s fo r

operations al l ove r Luzon . Krueger' s

first proble m wa s t o fin d a replacemen t

for th e 40t h Infantr y Division , whic h

was fightin g agains t th e Kembu Group

west o f Clar k Field. 6 Sixt h Arm y ha d

one eas y solutio n t o thi s problem—t o

replace th e 40t h wit h th e 33 d Infantr y

Division, whic h reache d Luzo n fro m

New Guine a an d Morota i o n 1 0 February.7

 However , Krueger knew that the

tired 43 d Divisio n an d th e 158t h RC T

needed some rest and rehabilitation after

their har d fightin g i n th e Damortis -

Rosario region . Havin g learne d fro m

GHQ SWP A tha t th e 40t h Divisio n

would no t hav e t o leav e Luzo n unti l

early March, Krueger decided t o use the

33d Division to relieve the 43d Division

and th e 158t h RCT . Then , afte r tw o

weeks' rest , th e 43 d woul d mov e sout h

to replac e th e 40t h Divisio n i n th e

Kembu area . Th e 158t h RCT, afte r it s

rest, woul d b e employe d i n souther n

Luzon.8

Simultaneously, Kruege r decide d tha t

he would use the 11t h Airborne Division

—which wa s stil l fightin g i n th e are a

immediately sout h o f Manil a i n earl y

February—in souther n Luzo n fo r oper -

ations designe d t o clea r th e norther n

shores o f th e Visaya n Passage s an d t o

open Batanga s an d Balaya n Bays . H e

estimated tha t th e 11th Airborne Divi -

sion and the 158t h RCT woul d be ready

to mov e against souther n Luzo n b y th e

first wee k o f March , Together , th e tw o

units woul d no t attai n th e strengt h o f a

standard infantr y division , bu t Kruege r

was unwillin g to assig n an y more force s

to th e campaign i n souther n Luzo n im -

mediately, sinc e h e believed i t necessar y

to initiat e a t leas t a limite d offensiv e

against th e mai n bod y o f th e Shimbu

Group i n th e mountains east and north -

east o f Manil a befor e th e en d o f Febru -

ary. Unles s he mounted some sort o f an

attack agains t th e Shimbu Group,

Krueger fel t h e woul d b e unabl e t o

assure th e securit y o f th e vita l Manil a

Bay region , becaus e h e estimate d tha t

the Shimbu Group possesse d a stron g

offensive capabilit y that it might exercise

at an y time .

With al l th e othe r operation s Sixt h

Army already had planned or under way,

Krueger foun d i t difficul t t o assembl e

sufficient strengt h t o launc h eve n a limited offensive against the Shimbu Group.

By mid-Februar y th e onl y units h e ha d

not already committed to specific courses

of actio n tha t demande d continuou s at -

tacks agains t Japanes e defensiv e posi -

tions were the 2 d Cavalry Brigade of the

1st Cavalr y Division , jus t finishin g th e

task o f clearin g Manila 's northeaster n

suburbs, an d th e smal l 112th Cavalr y

RCT, which wa s protecting XIV Corps'

long lin e o f communication s dow n th e

eastern side of the Central Plains. These

two unit s wer e patentl y o f insufficien t

strength t o undertak e a n attac k agains t

the Shimbu Group, whic h Krueger' s

6

 See above, ch. XI 7

 For previou s operations of th e 33 d Division , see:

Smith, Approach to the Philippines, pp . 276-79 ;

The 33 d Division Historica l Committee, The Golden

Cross, a History of the 33d Infantry Division in

World War II (Washington : Infantr y Journa l Press,

1948), pp. 51-87. 8

 For additiona l detail s o n th e relie f o f th e 43 d

Division an d th e 158t h RCT , se e below , Chapte r

XXIV. Th e operation s o f th e 43 d Divisio n agains t

the Kembu Group are covered in Chapter XI, above,

while th e activitie s o f th e 158t h RC T i n souther n

Luzon ar e treate d i n Chapte r XXIII, below.
366 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

G-2 Section , in a gross underestimation,

reckoned ha d nearl y 20,00 0 troop s i n

the hills immediately east and northeast

of Manila. 9 Therefore , th e Sixt h Arm y

commander reluctantl y decide d t o re -

deploy th e 6t h Infantr y Divisio n (les s

the 1s t RCT , whic h wa s already opera -

ting o n Bataa n unde r X I Corps ) sout h

from th e I Corp s sector t o provid e XI V

Corps wit h adequat e strengt h t o mov e

against th e Shimbu Group. Thu s de -

priving I Corps of strength require d fo r

an early , concerte d attac k agains t th e

Shobu Group i n norther n Luzon ,

Krueger realize d tha t I Corp s woul d

have t o strik e ou t agains t tha t norther n

Japanese forc e wit h thre e division s

rather than th e minimum o f fiv e tha t h e

had originall y planne d th e corp s woul d

use. Th e Sixt h Arm y commander kne w

that h e wa s delayin g th e ultimat e de -

struction o f th e Shobu Group, bu t Gen -

eral MacArthur' s directive s ha d lef t

Krueger no alternative. H e ha d to carry

out MacArthur 's orders wit h th e mean s

the theate r commande r ha d lef t him. 10

At th e same time that Kruege r starte d

the bul k o f th e 6t h Infantr y Divisio n

southward fro m th e I Corp s area , h e directed XI Corp s t o relieve the division's

1st RCT o n Bataa n and dispatc h i t eastward t o rejoi n th e res t o f th e divisio n

for th e XI V Corp s driv e agains t th e

Shimbu Group. Finally , bette r t o en -

able XIV Corps to concentrate its efforts

against the Shimbu Group an d Japanese

forces i n southern Luzon, Krueger eased

the corps ' administrativ e an d tactica l

burdens b y transferrin g responsibilit y

for th e furthe r conduc t o f operation s

against the Kembu Group t o XI Corps. 11

Thus, a s o f lat e February , whe n

Krueger could foresee the successful completion o f operation s t o secur e th e

Manila-Manila Ba y area , XI V Corp s

could make preparations to send th e 6th

Infantry Divisio n an d th e 2 d Cavalr y

Brigade against the Shimbu Group's principal concentrations. XI V Corps was also

in a position to direct the 11t h Airborn e

Division an d th e 158t h RC T t o mov e

into souther n Luzon , bu t unti l earl y

March th e corp s woul d hav e t o emplo y

the 37t h Infantr y Divisio n an d th e 1s t

Cavalry Brigade t o reduc e th e last Japa -

nese resistance in Manila, while the 112t h

Cavalry RCT woul d continue to operate

along the corps' line of communications.

To begi n it s attack s agains t th e Shobu

Group i n norther n Luzon , I Corp s ha d

left th e 25th , 32d , an d 33 d Infantr y Di -

visions. X I Corp s ha d unde r its control

the 38t h Infantr y Division , th e 40t h

Infantry Divisio n (whic h i t wa s soon t o

lose), an d th e 43 d Infantr y Division .

The 503 d Parachut e RCT an d th e 24t h

Division's 34t h RC T woul d remai n

under X I Corp s comman d unti l earl y

March, but woul d the n hav e to leave for

the souther n Philippines . Genera l Griswold, commanding XIV Corps, was not,

of course , worrie d abou t th e strengt h o f

other corps on Luzon—hi s worry wa s to

find th e strength necessar y to execute all

the task s Sixt h Arm y ha d assigne d him .

9

 Sixth Arm y G- 2 Wkl y Rpts 7 5 and 76 , 1 2 and 2 1

Feb 45 , G-2 D A Files. Se e below, Chapte r XXI , fo r

further discussio n o f Shimbu Group strengt h an d

Sixth Arm y estimates . 10

 For furthe r informatio n o n th e effec t o f th e

redeployment o f th e 6t h an d 43 d Division s on Sixt h

Army plan s an d I Corp s operations , se e below ,

Chapter XXIV . 11

 See also above , ch . XI.
CHAPTER XX I

The Reductio n o f the Shimbu Group

Phase I: Turnin g th e Shimbu Left

Plans

XIV Corps Plan of Attack

Although XI V Corp s launche d it s attack against the Shimbu Group primarily

to assur e th e security o f the Manil a Ba y

area, the corps knew that the attainment

of its goal wa s but a means t o a n end —

the rehabilitatio n an d developmen t o f

the ba y region. 1 O f majo r significanc e

in al l plan s of development wa s the fac t

that th e Shimbu Group controlle d ex -

tremely importan t installation s o f th e

metropolitan wate r suppl y system . O n

the Angat River nearly twenty-five mile s

northeast o f Manila , th e Japanes e hel d

Ipo Dam , which provide d th e cit y wit h

a thir d of its water. (See Map V.) The y

also possesse d a goo d par t o f a n aque -

duct throug h whic h th e water s o f th e

Angat flowe d fro m Ip o Da m t o Nova -

liches Reservoir , te n mile s northeast o f

Manila. Withou t Ip o Dam's wate r sup -

ply, Novaliche s Reservoi r was capable

of meetin g onl y half th e city's wate r re -

quirements. Th e headquarter s o f Sixt h

Army an d XI V Corp s also believed tha t

the smaller Wawa Dam, on the Marikina

River fiftee n mile s northeast o f Manila ,

formed a n integra l par t o f th e metro -

politan wate r system . Actually , Waw a

Dam ha d bee n abandone d a s a sourc e

of wate r fo r Manil a upo n th e comple -

tion o f th e Ip o an d Novaliche s installa -

tions in 1938 , and sinc e then the smaller

diversion da m ha d principall y serve d

irrigation project s i n th e Marikin a Val -

ley. However , th e ol d pipelin e connec -

tion t o the city water system still existed

and presumabl y could b e use d i f certain

repair material s wer e available . Eve n

reconnected, th e Waw a Da m sourc e

could provid e onl y 1 5 percen t o f

Manila's wate r requirements .

Basing hi s plan s partiall y upo n th e

erroneous informatio n concernin g th e

Manila water sources and partiall y upon

equally erroneou s informatio n o n th e

strength an d deploymen t o f the Shimbu

Group, Kruege r directe d XI V Corp s t o

seize firs t Waw a Da m an d it s pipelin e

connections an d the n secur e Ip o Da m

and associate d installations . Genera l

Griswold, commandin g th e XI V Corps ,

ordered th e 2 d Cavalry Brigad e and th e

6th Infantr y Divisio n t o launc h offen -

sives t o thes e end s by 2 0 February. H e

directed th e two units to strike eastward

from th e Marikin a Rive r t o a 28-mile -

1

 This subsectio n i s base d mainl y upon : Sixt h

Army Rpt Luzon , I, 39 ; Sixth Arm y FO's 47, 51, and

53, date d 2 , 15 , and 1 9 Feb 45 , i n ibid., I, 149 , 152, 155; Rad , Sixt h Army t o XIV Corps, 5 Feb 45 , Sixth

Army G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 4- 6 Fe b 45 ; XIV Corps FO 7 , 1 7 Fe b 45 ; XI V Corp s Opn s Mem o 21 , 1 8

Feb 45 .
368 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

long objectiv e line . Th e firs t north -

south par t o f th e line , 1 0 mile s long ,

connected th e tw o dams ; anothe r 1 0

miles extende d th e lin e sout h fro m

Wawa Da m t o Antipol o i n th e south -

western foothill s o f th e Sierr a Madre ;

the las t sectio n o f th e lin e ben t south -

west t o Tagig, a t th e northwester n corner o f Lagun a d e Ba y an d 7 mile s

southeast o f Manila . Th e 6t h Divisio n

was responsibl e fo r th e seizur e o f th e

two dams ; th e 2 d Cavalr y Brigad e wa s

to secure th e Antipolo-Tagig area. Th e

boundary betwee n th e tw o unit s la y

roughly four mile s south o f Wawa Dam.

In accordanc e wit h thi s concep t General Patrick , commandin g th e 6t h Divi -

sion, directe d th e 20t h Infantry , o n hi s

right, to strike directly east toward Wawa

Dam. Th e 112t h Cavalry RCT, now attached t o th e 6t h Division , woul d con -

tinue t o protec t th e XI V Corp s lin e o f

communications sout h alon g Rout e 5

and fro m it s position s on th e lef t o f th e

6th Divisio n woul d patro l towar d Ip o

Dam. Th e division's 63d Infantry, going

into the line between th e 112th Cavalry

and th e 20t h Infantry , woul d patro l to -

ward Ip o Da m wit h it s left , meanwhil e

mounting an attac k towar d Waw a Da m

with it s right i n concer t wit h th e 20t h

Infantry.2 O n th e Antipolo-Tagig front,

the 2 d Cavalr y Brigad e woul d sen d it s

7th Cavalr y agains t Antipol o whil e th e

8th Cavalry , o n th e right , woul d secur e

the Antipolo-Tagig section o f th e corps'

objective line. 3 Bot h th e 6t h Divisio n

and th e 2d Cavalry Brigade would jump

off fro m a lin e o f departur e alon g th e

west ban k o f th e Marikin a River , flow -

ing generall y sout h throug h a wid e val -

ley from Montalban , three miles west o f

Wawa Dam, t o a junction with the Pasig

River nea r Tagig .

Shimbu Group Plans

and Dispositions

The Sixt h Army' s estimat e tha t th e

Shimbu Group ha d about 20,00 0 troops

in th e hig h groun d eas t an d northeas t

of Manil a wa s low. 4 Wit h a tota l o f

some 50,00 0 troops, Shimbu Group ha d

deployed abou t 30,00 0 men i n th e are a

of immediat e interes t t o XI V Corps. 5

The 30,00 0 wer e firml y entrenche d i n

excellent defensiv e terrai n an d well -

prepared position s int o whic h Genera l

Yokoyama, Shimbu Group commander ,

had directe d hi s me n t o withdra w afte r

the collaps e o f th e mid-Februar y

counterattack towar d Manila. 6

2

 6th In f Di v FO 19 , 18 Feb 45 , 6th Di v FO File . 3

 1st Ca v Div FO's 2 6 and 27 , 17 and 1 9 Feb 45, 1st

Cav Di v FO File ; 2 d Ca v Brig FO 16 , 20 Feb 45 , 2 d

Cav Bri g Jnl File , 2 0 Feb 45 .

4

 This subsection is based on: Interro g of Col Shujiro Kobayashi (Staff, Shimbu Gp), Interrog , I, 420-

22, 441-43 ; Co l Kobayash i Narrative , Interrog , an d

atchd maps, 10th I&H Staff Study , Japanese Opns on

Luzon; Statemen t o f Ma j Ge n Susum u Noguch i

(CG 81st Inf Brig, 105th Div, and Comd r Noguchi

Force, Shimbu Gp), States , II , 709-10 ; Statemen t o f

Col Kazu o Okit a (C O 186th Ind Inf Bn, 105th Div,

and Comd r Okita Detachment, Noguchi Force),

States, III, 148; Kayashima Statement , States , II ,

162-63; Statemen t o f L t Co l Nobutak a Kogur e

(Comdr 1st Surface Raiding Base Force an d Comd r

Kogure Detachment, Shimbu Gp), States, II , 260 ;

SWPA His t Series , II , 455 , 464-65 , an d Plat e 120 ;

14th Area Army T r Or g List ; Japanes e studie s i n

WW II, No . 9, Luzon Opn s of the Shimbu Gp, pp. 6,

13, 31-33, and Ma p 1 . 5

 The computatio n o f 50,000 tota l fo r th e Shimbu

Group concern s onl y th e force s i n th e mountain s

north an d northeast of Manila. I t leave s out of con -

sideration th e Fuji Force i n souther n Luzon , th e

troops stil l i n Manil a an d o n th e ba y island s a s o f

20 February , an d th e unit s statione d o n th e Bico l

Peninsula o f southeaster n Luzon . Al l nominall y

under th e Shimbu Group, thes e othe r force s wer e

operating quit e independentl y b y lat e February .

6

 See above, ch. XV.
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I 369

Anchored o n high , rugge d terrai n 2

miles nort h o f Ip o Dam , the norther n

section o f th e Shimbu Group's western -

most defense s extende d south-southeas t

some 9 miles t o Mt . Oro, 4 miles north

of Waw a Dam . The lin e the n turne d

south (an d slightly west ) t o Mt . Paca -

wagan, lyin g o n th e sout h ban k o f th e

Marikina an d dominatin g a n east-wes t

stretch of that river between Wawa Dam

and Montalban . Th e defense s contin -

ued sout h acros s th e steep , grassy , west -

ern slope s o f th e Sierr a Madr e foothills

to a point abou t a mil e and a half wes t

of Antipolo. A t Antipole the line swung

southeast ove r broken , ope n groun d t o

the valle y of th e Moron g River, flowin g

into Lagun a d e Ba y seven mile s south -

east o f Antipolo. Fro m Mt . Or o south ,

the defense s provide d the Japanese with

perfect observatio n o f th e open, heavil y

cultivated Marikin a Valley . Th e de -

fenses on the Ipo Dam front, also located

on rising, broken ground, controlled th e

approaches t o th e dam . All defense s

were organize d i n considerabl e depth ,

west to east, but lacked good north-south

lines o f suppl y and reinforcement .

The force s deployed along the Shimbu

Group's defensiv e lin e wer e a hetero -

geneous mas s o f recentl y forme d pro -

visional organizations , man y o f the m

built around a nucleus of 8th an d 105th

Division units. 7 O n th e Ip o Da m fron t

was th e 9,000-ma n Kawashima Force.

The principa l comba t strengt h o f thi s

force wa s organized into two provisional

infantry regiments , whil e thre e provi -

sional infantr y battalion s and abou t two

battalions o f artiller y operate d directl y

under forc e headquarters . Th e onl y

"regular" infantr y uni t wa s th e 358th

Independent Infantry Battalion o f th e

105th Division, itsel f forme d i n 194 4

from miscellaneou s garriso n units.

South o f th e Kawashima Force, th e

12,000-man Kobayashi Force extende d

the defense s t o a poin t abou t midwa y

between Wawa Dam and Antipolo. Th e

Kobayashi Force include d 3 provisional

infantry regiments , 3 provisiona l infan -

try battalion s unde r forc e headquarter s

control, 1 artiller y battalion , 2 heav y

(150-mm.) morta r battalions , a rocke t

battalion, an d othe r miscellaneou s combat an d servic e units. Th e onl y "regu -

lar" organization s wer e 5 infantr y com -

panies assemble d fro m 3 differen t

divisions.

The nex t uni t t o th e sout h wa s the

Noguchi Force, wit h som e 9,00 0 men. 8

This forc e include d two provisiona l in -

fantry regiments , fou r infantr y battal -

ions unde r forc e headquarter s control ,

and variou s artiller y an d morta r units.

The "regulars " were four understrengt h

independent infantr y battalion s o f th e

105th Division. Th e force' s line extended from its boundary with the Kobayashi

Force, nort h o f Antipolo , southeas t t o

Pililla, o n th e north-centra l shor e o f

Laguna d e Ba y about twelv e miles from

Antipolo.

At Pilill a th e Noguchi Force main -

tained contac t with th e Kogure Detachment, a provisional infantry regimen t of

some 2,25 0 me n buil t aroun d th e sui -

cide boa t squadrons and bas e battalions

of th e 1st Surface Raiding Base Force.

The detachment' s missio n wa s t o pro -

tect th e Shimbu Group rea r agains t at -

tack fro m Lagun a d e Bay , the Bico l

7

 See app. E, p. 674.

8

 This Noguchi Force i s no t t o b e confuse d wit h

the Noguchi Detachment, or Northern Force, of th e

Manila Naval Defense Force. Se e above , ch . XII.
370 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

NORTHERN SECTIO N O F MARIKINA VALLE Y

Peninsula, o r Lamo n Ba y o n Luzon' s

east coast . Th e detachmen t ha d a fe w

pieces of artillery unde r its control alon g

the shor e o f Lamo n Bay . Co-operatin g

with th e detachmen t fo r th e defens e o f

Lamon Ba y wer e abou t 3,00 0 nava l

troops, most o f whom ha d escape d fro m

Manila. Som e 7,000 other nava l personnel, mainl y noncombat troop s an d civil -

ian employee s an d thei r families , wer e

holed u p alon g th e valle y o f th e Boso -

boso River , southeast o f Waw a Dam .

Shimbu Group Reserve, numberin g

5,000 troops, include d th e 31st Infantry

of th e 8th Division, less its 3d Battalion

but otherwis e reinforced; th e reinforce d

3d Battalion o f th e 17th Infantry, 8th

Division; th e 2d Battalion, reinforced ,

of th e 26th Independent Mixed Regiment; the 8th Reconnaissance Regiment
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I 371

of th e 8th Division; and tw o provisional

infantry battalions—al l in all, the cream,

of Genera l Yokoyama' s groun d comba t

strength. Anothe r 2,75 0 men—three artillery battalion s an d element s o f th e

various 8th Division servic e units—als o

operated unde r th e direc t contro l o f

Shimbu Group headquarters . Yokoyama

concentrated most of the Shimbu Group

Reserve i n th e Bosobos o Valle y behin d

the Kobayashi an d Noguchi Forces, Al l

the reserv e units coul d mov e rapidl y t o

threatened section s o f th e line s hel d b y

these tw o forces, bu t woul d nee d thre e

or fou r day s t o reac h th e Kawashima

Force front . Fro m th e deploymen t o f

his reserve , i t appear s tha t Yokoyam a

correctly guessed tha t XIV Corps' initia l

attacks woul d b e directe d agains t hi s

left an d center .

Most o f th e Shimbu Group supplie s

were concentrated i n th e Ipo and Waw a

Dam areas , althoug h som e supplies , in -

cluding thos e belongin g to nava l forces ,

were store d alon g th e Bosobos o Valley .

Anticipating tha t h e woul d soo n los e

control o f th e roa d ne t wes t o f th e

Marikina, Yokoyam a ha d directe d th e

construction o f a north-sout h mai n sup -

ply rout e behin d hi s front . Th e south -

ern sectio n wa s a truc k road , buil t ove r

an ol d hors e trail , runnin g generall y

northeast si x mile s fro m Antipol o t o

barrio Ne w Bosoboso , o n th e Bosobos o

River eigh t mile s southeas t o f Waw a

Dam. Existin g trails along the Bosobos o

to a poin t nea r th e da m wer e als o im -

proved fo r truc k traffic , bu t fro m thi s

point o n a narrow trail , negotiable only

by hand-carryin g parties , le d throug h

the trackles s terrai n separatin g Ip o an d

Wawa Dams. Cuttin g some trails north

and sout h throug h th e roug h countr y

lying betwee n th e Bosobos o an d Mari -

kina Rivers, th e Shimbu Group mad e a

minimum provisio n fo r front-lin e sup -

ply an d reinforcemen t movement s be -

tween th e Noguchi an d Kobayashi

Forces. However , th e lac k o f a n ade -

quate north-sout h lin e o f communica -

tion i n th e regio n remaine d a weakness

of Shimbu Group defenses .

As o f lat e Februar y th e Kawashima

and Kobayashi Forces ha d plent y o f

supplies, bu t th e Noguchi Force suppl y

problem wa s acut e fro m th e first , muc h

of tha t uni t havin g recentl y an d hur -

riedly withdrawn fro m th e Bico l Penin -

sula. Th e Shimbu Group expecte d t o

supplement it s foo d supplie s fro m ric h

agricultural area s alon g th e norther n

shores of Laguna de Bay , the Lamo n Ba y

region, an d th e Bosobos o Valley. Yoko -

yama knew he woul d hav e to hol d thes e

areas fo r a protracte d period i n orde r

to obtai n muc h foo d fro m them , fo r in -

tensive farmin g i n al l th e localitie s ha d

ceased earl y in 1942 .

The XIV Corps Offensive

The First Attacks

From Montalba n sout h t o th e Pasi g

River, a distanc e o f thirtee n miles , a

ridge 15 0 feet hig h form s th e west ban k

of th e Marikin a River. (Map VIII) Th e

2d Cavalr y Brigad e an d th e 6t h Infan -

try Divisio n coul d assembl e alon g th e

western slope s o f th e ridg e an d b e rea -

sonably wel l conceale d fro m Japanes e

eyes acros s th e Marikin a Valle y i n th e

Sierra Madre . Fro m th e cres t o f th e

ridge the infantry an d cavalr y could look

across th e hot , dry, ric e paddie s o f th e

Marikina Valley , ove r fou r mile s wid e

on th e sout h an d tw o mile s wid e a t

Montalban, t o th e Sierr a Madre , risin g
372 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

steadily eastwar d i n serrie d tie r upo n

tier. Fro m Montalba n sout h t o Lagun a

de Ba y th e wester n slope s o f th e Sierr a

Madre are steep , open , an d grassy . Fur -

ther east, the higher mountains appeared

forested, but onc e on thes e higher slopes

the infantr y an d cavalr y woul d fin d ac -

tual forest rathe r spotty and intersperse d

with dens e jungl e undergrowth . What -

ever th e stat e o f vegetation , th e moun -

tains eas t o f th e Marikin a looke d

ominous—you kne w th e Japanes e wer e

in them , but yo u couldn't see them: you

knew o n th e othe r han d tha t they 'd b e

able to see you all to o well as you started

across th e valley . Th e prospect s wer e

thoroughly unpleasant. Th e firs t tes t o f

how unpleasan t thing s migh t becom e

was whethe r th e Japanes e woul d knoc k

the hel l ou t o f yo u a s yo u crosse d th e

broad Marikin a Valley .

During th e afternoo n o f 2 0 Februar y

the 7t h Cavalry , 2 d Cavalr y Brigade ,

popped ove r the crest of the ridge along

the wester n ban k o f th e Marikina ,

marched rapidly down the eastern slopes,

and forde d th e rive r near th e Marikina -

Pasig confluence. 9 Ther e was no opposition. Th e nex t da y th e regiment , stil l

unopposed, followed Route 21 to Taytay,

four mile s eas t o f th e ford . Occupyin g

Taytay against negligibl e resistance , th e

7th Cavalr y bega n probin g int o th e

Sierra Madr e foothill s o n 2 2 February.

Meanwhile, th e 8t h Cavalr y crosse d th e

Marikina and, securin g Tagig against no

opposition, marche d eas t behin d th e

7th. Th e Japanese , incredibly , ha d permitted th e entir e 2 d Cavalr y Brigad e t o

move acros s th e ope n Marikin a Valle y

virtually unmolested . Wha t wer e the y

waiting for ?

Two road s led fro m Tayta y t o Antipolo, th e 2 d Brigade' s objective . Rout e

60-A, th e best , covere d fou r mile s o f

rising, roug h groun d betwee n th e tw o

towns; loopin g throug h stil l roughe r

ground t o th e nort h wa s a privat e roa d

of th e Luzo n Bu s Company, twistin g six

miles o n it s wa y to Antipolo . Th e ter -

rain betwee n Tayta y and Antipol o rise s

to over 600 feet. I t provide d the cavalry

with som e cove r bu t littl e concealment,

for cogo n gras s an d patche s o f bambo o

thicket wer e th e mai n vegetation . Th e

ground was rocky limestone pockmarked

by innumerabl e natura l cave s o f ever y

size. Basin g it s defense s o n th e caves ,

many o f whic h i t ha d improved , th e

Noguchi Force ha d honeycombe d th e

foothills wit h subterranea n strongholds ,

one monstrous example of which boasted

thirty-two separat e entrances . Sandba g

or lo g bunkers protecte d mos t cav e en -

trances, natural camouflage covered most

installations.10 Machin e gun s guarde d

all avenue s o f approac h t o individua l

positions, man y of whic h wer e mutually

supporting. Noguchi Force artiller y was

also usuall y cave-emplace d an d showe d

itself onl y lon g enoug h t o fir e a fe w

rounds befor e withdrawin g int o cave s

for protection . Eve n wit h thi s self-im -

9

 Information o n 2 d Cavalry Brigad e operations in

this subsection is from: 1s t Cav Div Rpt Luzon , Narrative, pp . 14-18 ; ibid., G- 2 Summary , pp . 15-18 ;

1st Ca v Div G- 3 Opn s Rpts, 2 0 Feb-4 Ma r 45 ; 7t h

Cav Rp t Luzon , Antipol o Phase , pp . 1-2 ; 7t h Ca v

S-3 Pe r Rpts, 20 Feb-4 Ma r 45; 8th Cav Rpt Luzon ,

Taytay-Antipolo Phase, pp. 1-7 ; 8th Cav Opns Rpts.

20 Feb-4 Mar 45.

10

 Which indicate s tha t man y o f th e defense s ha d

been prepared well before the Noguchi Force arrived

on th e scene . Man y units of th e 105th Division ha d

been i n th e are a fo r some time , an d Genera l Nogu -

chi, upo n hi s arriva l fro m th e Bico l Peninsula , ha d

taken ove r command o f 105th Division units already

in plac e nea r Antipolo .
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I 373

posed limitation , th e Noguchi Force

could mak e excellen t us e o f its artiller y

to haras s an d dela y th e 2 d Cavalr y Bri -

gade, an d coul d supplemen t its artiller y

fire wit h rocke t an d morta r barrages.

It di d no t tak e th e 2d Brigad e ver y

long to fin d ou t wha t th e Japanese were

waiting for . O n 2 3 Februar y th e 7t h

Cavalry starte d towar d Antipol o alon g

both the bus road and Route 60-A, while

the 8th Cavalr y struck eastwar d throug h

the open, broke n groun d sout h o f th e

highway. Fro m the n unti l 4 March ,

when ne w attac k plan s wer e promul -

gated, the 2 d Brigade measured its daily

progress i n feet . Supportin g aircraf t

and artiller y did thei r best t o knock ou t

Japanese installations , bu t onl y direc t

hits a t cav e entrance s ha d appreciabl e

effect upo n th e defenses . Sinc e th e percentage o f suc h hit s wa s small , th e 2 d

Brigade had t o fal l bac k upo n time-con -

suming, laborious, and costl y smal l unit

tactics. Coverin g eac h othe r closely ,

squads reduce d th e Japanes e position s

one b y one, employin g demolition s an d

flame thrower s a t ever y bunke r an d

cave. Al l unit s spen t considerabl e tim e

patrolling t o pinpoint Japanese defense s

so tha t ai r an d artiller y coul d provid e

the most accurat e support possible.

The Noguchi Force conducte d a generally passiv e defense , bu t mounte d

small-scale infiltratio n attack s nightly .

The attack s were not designed t o regain

lost ground , bu t t o haras s th e 2 d Brigade so as to delay, rather tha n halt, th e

cavalry's progress . Th e Japanes e pla n

attained considerable success, for by evening on 4 March th e 2 d Brigade was still

a mil e and a half shor t of Antipolo. The

gains, quite disappointing to XIV Corps,

had prove d costly . Th e brigad e ha d

lost nearl y 6 0 me n kille d an d 31 5

wounded an d ha d kille d les s tha n 50 0

Japanese i n groun d action . Amon g th e

Americans wounded wa s the 1s t Cavalry

Division's commander , Genera l Mudge ,

whose plac e wa s take n b y Brig . Gen .

H. T . Hoffman , formerl y 2 d Brigad e

commander.11

To th e north , th e 6t h Divisio n ha d

started acros s th e Marikin a o n 2 2 February.12

 O n tha t da y th e 20t h Infantr y

forded a t Marikin a town , eigh t mile s

south o f Montalban , whil e th e 63 d In -

fantry sen t it s righ t acros s th e rive r a t

Montalban an d Sa n Mateo , thre e mile s

to th e south . B y evenin g o n th e 23 d

troops o f th e 20t h Infantr y wer e a mil e

into steep , grass y hill s northeas t o f

Marikina; th e 63d' s me n wer e probin g

into high groun d eas t o f Sa n Mateo . A s

in th e 2 d Cavalr y Brigade' s sector , th e

Japanese ha d mad e n o significan t effor t

to stop the 6th Division's advance across

the open Marikin a Valley. Th e Shimbu

Group ha d los t th e best opportunit y i t

would eve r hav e t o cho p a n America n

force t o bits.

Facing th e 6t h Divisio n betwee n

Montalban an d Sa n Mate o wer e th e

grassy, open , an d stee p slope s o f Mt .

Pacawagan, aroun d 1,50 0 feet high , an d

Mt. Mataba , som e 1,30 0 feet high . Th e

barrier forme d b y thes e tw o heights ,

split b y th e deep , steep-sided gorge o f

the tiny Mango River, was oriented north

to sout h an d stretche d fo r a distanc e o f

almost seve n mile s fro m th e norther n

11

 Col. William J. Bradley , th e 8th Cavalry' s com -

mander, replace d Hoffma n a t brigade , whil e Col .

Charles E . Brad y replace d Bradle y a t regiment . 12

 Information o n 6t h Divisio n actio n i n thi s subsection i s from : 6t h Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 40-49 ; 1s t

Inf Rp t Luzon , pp . 38-41 ; 20t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp .

29-35; 63 d In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 16-22 ; S- 3 Pe r Rpt s of th e 1st, 20th, and 63 d In f Regts, 1 9 Feb-5 Mar 45 .
374 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

MTS. PACAWAGA N AN D MATABA

slopes of Mt. Pacawaga n t o a shallow in -

dentation mad e b y th e Nanc a River .

The barrie r formed the northwestern and

western extension s o f a generall y ope n

and bare-slope d ridg e an d hil l comple x

dominated b y Mt . Baytangan , risin g t o

a heigh t o f ove r 1,50 0 fee t o n th e wes t

bank o f th e Bosobos o Rive r si x mile s

southeast o f Montalban. The Kobayashi

Force ha d stron g defense s o n bot h Mt .

Pacawagan and Mt. Mataba, and its positions extended south t o an east-wes t lin e

across Mt . Baytangan . Cave s wer e no t

as numerou s her e a s i n th e Noguchi

Force's zone , bu t th e Kobayashi Force

was prepare d t o emplo y skillfull y th e

many defensiv e advantage s afforde d b y

the open , rough , an d sharpl y risin g

terrain i t held .

The 6t h Divisio n directe d it s initia l

attacks against bot h Mt . Pacawaga n an d

Mt. Mataba , th e 20t h Infantr y makin g

the main effort. O n 2 3 and 2 4 February

the regimen t gaine d littl e ground , an d

when th e 1s t Infantr y arrive d fro m Ba -

taan o n th e 25t h Genera l Patrick , th e

division commander , decide d t o rede -

ploy hi s forces . H e ordere d th e ne w

arrivals to clear th e northern two-third s

of Mt . Matab a an d th e souther n thir d

of Mt . Pacawaga n an d the n strik e to -

ward Waw a Da m i n concer t wit h th e

63d Infantry , whic h wa s t o seiz e th e

northern two-third s o f Mt . Pacawagan .

The 20t h Infantry , o n th e right, woul d

secure the southern third of Mt. Mataba;

extend its right t o a n indentatio n mad e

by the upper reaches of the little Ampid

River, som e tw o mile s sout h o f Mt .

Mataba's crest ; an d the n strik e eas t

toward Mt . Baytanga n an d th e corp s

objective line . Patric k hope d hi s three -

regiment attack would achieve a decisive

penetration o f th e Shimbu Group's cen -
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I 375

ter—the Kobayashi Force's zone . I f th e

center collapsed , Patric k reasoned , XI V

Corps could probabl y roll u p th e flank s

—the Kawashima an d Noguchi Forces

—rapidly.

Hopes wer e one thing , realizatio n an -

other. B y 4 Marc h righ t flan k element s

of th e 63 d Infantr y ha d gaine d a pre -

carious foothol d o n th e norther n cres t

of Mt . Pacawagan , bu t th e 1s t Infantry ,

on th e right, had not bee n abl e t o clear

its portio n o f tha t mountai n an d ha d

also bee n unsuccessfu l i n it s attack s

against Mt . Mataba . Righ t flan k ele -

ments of the 20th Infantry made the only

significant gain s across the 6th Division's

front t o 4 March . Unabl e t o overru n

Japanese defense s o n it s thir d o f Mt .

Mataba, the 20t h concentrated its efforts

along th e Ampi d Rive r an d brok e al -

most tw o mile s int o Japanes e position s

on th e southwester n an d souther n ap -

proaches to th e mountain. A t dusk o n 4

March th e regimen t wa s ready t o sen d

troops northwar d alon g th e cres t o f a

1,000-foot-high ridg e leadin g t o Mt .

Mataba, o r t o strik e eastwar d alon g an -

other bare-crested , 1,000-foot-hig h ridg e

rising towar d Mt . Baytangan . A s in th e

2d Cavalry Brigade's sector, the 6th Division's gain s ha d bee n disappointing .

Moreover, sinc e 2 2 Februar y th e divi -

sion ha d los t approximatel y 8 5 me n

killed an d 25 5 wounde d i n th e equiva -

lent o f th e tw o infantr y regiment s i t

had committed. 13 Th e divisio n an d it s

supporting ai r an d artiller y ha d kille d

perhaps 1,10 0 Japanese. 14

New Plans and Objectives

By 4 Marc h Genera l Griswol d ha d

decided tha t his corps wa s going to hav e

more troubl e crackin g th e Shimbu

Group defense s tha n h e ha d originall y

anticipated, and h e had als o determined

that th e succes s o f hi s attac k demande d

concentration of force s across a narrower

front.15 S o far , employin g tw o cavalr y

regiments (eac h les s tha n two-third s th e

strength o f a n infantr y regiment ) an d

the equivalen t o f tw o regiment s o f in -

fantry, XI V Corp s ha d bee n attackin g

across a fron t almos t fiftee n mile s wide ,

north t o south . Lackin g th e mas s t o

succeed, th e attac k wa s doome d fro m

the beginnin g i n th e fac e o f th e con -

centrated defense s o f th e Noguchi an d

Kobayashi Forces. Griswol d had t o commit additiona l strengt h o n a narrowe r

front, an d h e ha d t o commi t decisiv e

strength i n th e are a tha t i n hi s opinion

would provide the key to a breakthrough.

Griswold decide d t o concentrat e

against th e Noguchi Force an d th e lef t

of th e Kobayashi Force. H e though t his

troops migh t b e abl e t o outflan k th e

Noguchi Force on the south, an area now

known t o b e weakl y held , an d t o de -

bouch int o the Bosoboso Valley i n orde r

to surroun d an d destro y th e mai n bod y

of th e Noguchi Force. Meanwhile , i f

the attack s agains t th e Kobayashi lef t

succeeded, Griswol d coul d subjec t th e

remainder o f th e Kobayashi Force t o

flanking attac k fro m th e sout h o r strik e

it fro m th e rea r — from th e Bosobos o

Valley.

13

 The 6t h Divisio n ha d committe d al l th e 20t h

Infantry, on e battalio n o f th e 1s t Infantry , an d tw o

battalions o f th e 63 d Infantry . 14

 Patrolling on the 6th Division's left, th e attached

112th Cavalr y RC T ha d los t 5 me n kille d an d 5

wounded an d ha d kille d abou t 5 0 Japanese .

15

 Planning materia l i n thi s subsectio n i s from :

Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 41 , 61; XI V Corp s Rp t

Luzon, pt. I, pp . 142-45 ; XIV Corps FO 8, 4 Mar 55;

XIV Corps Opn s Memos 32 and 35 , 1 and 6 Mar 45 ;

6th Di v Rpt Luzon , pp . 49-50 .
376 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Griswold selecte d a limite d are a a s

the objectiv e o f th e ne w XI V Corp s

effort, a n oval-shape d piec e o f terrai n

lying abou t a mil e an d a quarte r o n

each sid e o f a lin e drawn du e nort h fo r

six and a half mile s from Antipolo . Th e

objective are a ha d n o particula r terrai n

pattern. O n th e extrem e nort h o f th e

oval wa s th e uppe r (eastern ) en d o f th e

shallow Ampi d Rive r valley , just t o th e

south o f whic h la y th e 1,000-foot-high ,

mile-wide, ridg e leadin g eas t t o Mt .

Baytangan. Th e souther n slope s o f thi s

ridge fel l steepl y off to th e Nanc a Rive r

valley, no w t o mar k th e boundar y be -

tween th e 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n an d th e

6th Infantr y Division . Sout h o f th e

Nanca Rive r the terrain, quite open and

extremely broken , wa s lowe r tha n tha t

to th e north , a t onl y on e o r tw o place s

reaching a heigh t o f 1,00 0 feet . I n gen -

eral, th e objectiv e regio n containe d th e

Noguchi Force's stronges t defense s a s

well a s th e position s o f th e Left Sector

Unit, on e o f the Kobayashi Force's thre e

provisional infantr y regiments . Th e

Noguchi-Kobayashi Force boundar y fol -

lowed th e ridg e lin e risin g eas t towar d

Mt. Baytangan .

In plannin g his new attack , Griswol d

entertained tw o misconception s abou t

the situatio n o n th e Shimbu Group's

western front. First , XIV Corps believed

that the group's tactical supply trails west

of th e Bosobos o Rive r constitute d th e

Japanese main north-south suppl y route.

As ye t havin g n o informatio n o n th e

Antipolo - New Bosoboso - Wawa Da m

road, XI V Corp s believe d tha t i f i t

seized th e ne w objectiv e are a i t woul d

sever th e Shimbu Group's mai n suppl y

route. Second , th e XIV Corp s G- 2 Sec -

tion erroneousl y estimate d tha t Genera l

Yokoyama ha d n o reserve s wit h whic h

he coul d eithe r reinforc e hi s wester n

front o r stag e a counterattack .

With thi s informatio n a t hand , Gris -

wold planne d t o attac k wit h virtuall y

his entire force, hoping for quick success.

He kep t ou t onl y on e battalio n a s a n

infantry reserv e and directe d th e rest o f

his availabl e forces , eac h componen t o f

which wa s understrength, t o strik e east -

ward.16 Th e 6t h Division , fo r example ,

now ha d 2,63 0 fewe r me n tha n i t ha d

brought t o Luzon . Th e entir e 1s t Cav -

alry Divisio n wa s available, bu t it s fou r

regiments totale d onl y 5,10 0 effective s

as against an authorize d strength o f ove r

7,625. Th e 112t h Cavalr y RCT , stil l

attached t o th e 6t h Division , ha d a n

authorized strengt h o f roughl y 2,625 ,

but coul d muste r les s tha n 2,00 0 effec -

tives as of the first week i n March . Non e

of th e unit s ha d receive d an y replace -

ments, othe r tha n returne d casualties ,

since arrivin g o n Luzon. 17 Th e onl y

reserve fo r th e 6t h Divisio n wa s th e in -

fantry battalio n tha t als o serve d a s XI V

Corps Reserve . Initially , th e 1s t Cavalry

Division ha d onl y on e cavalr y squadro n

as a reserve , bu t th e 103 d Infantry , 43 d

Division, reached Taytay o n 7 March t o

become 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n Reserve .

The arriva l o f th e 103 d Infantr y pre -

saged th e imminen t relie f o f th e 1s t

Cavalry Divisio n i n preparatio n fo r re -

deployment to southern Luzon, a process

that agai n require d considerabl e reshuffling o f Sixt h Arm y units . I n decidin g

16

 XIV Corp s F O 8 , 4 Ma r 45 . Othe r reserve s

included a tan k battalio n les s 2 companies; a tan k

destroyer battalio n les s a company ; a n amphibiou s

tractor battalion ; an d 2 4 .2-inch morta r battalions ,

less 6 o f thei r 8 firin g companies . 17

 6th Div G-1 Pe r Rpt 26 , 8 Mar 45; 6th Di v G-1

Rpt Luzon , p . 1 ; Effectiv e Regt l Strengths , 1s t Ca v

Div, 2 7 Feb 45 , Entr y 70 , XIV Corp s G- 3 Jn l File ,

2 Ma r 45; XIV Corps Strength Rpt , 7 Mar 45 , Entry

39, XIV Corps G-3 Jn l File , 8 Mar 45.
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I 377

to employ the 43d Division to relieve the

1st Cavalr y Division , Genera l Kruege r

selected a unit that , havin g been i n ac -

tion te n day s against the Kembu Group

after replacin g the 40th Division west of

Clark Field , woul d hav e virtuall y n o

rest befor e movin g to th e attac k against

the Shimbu Group. Kruege r chos e t o

use th e 43 d Division instead o f th e rela -

tively fres h 38t h Division , whic h ha d

seen little action sinc e reducing Bataan's

ZigZag Pass on 1 5 February, becaus e h e

had greater confidenc e i n th e 43d , a

more experience d division. 18

The arriva l of the 43d Division's 103d

Infantry o n th e Shimbu front , togethe r

with th e fact tha t the rest of the division

was o n it s wa y fro m th e Kembu area ,

may wel l hav e influence d Griswol d t o

launch hi s attac k wit h virtuall y hi s en -

tire force . Whateve r th e reasons for the

decision, XI V Corp s wa s t o undertak e

a ne w driv e o n a bi t o f a shoestring ,

even thoug h i t ha d no w concentrate d

its force s o n a narrowe r front . I f th e

Shimbu Group prove d stronge r tha n

anticipated, o r i f tha t Japanes e forc e

could moun t a n effectiv e counterattack ,

XIV Corp s migh t b e i n fo r trouble .

Attack and Counterattack,

8-15 March

General Griswol d directe d th e 1s t

Cavalry Divisio n an d th e 6t h Infantr y

Division t o strik e o n 8 March. B y evening on th e 7th the 1st Cavalr y Brigade ,

coming i n fro m Manila , ha d move d u p

to a lin e o f departur e a mil e an d a hal f

into th e Sierr a Madr e foothill s t o th e

north an d wes t o f th e 2 d Cavalr y Bri -

gade.19 Th e 2 d Brigad e attacke d fro m

positions astrid e Rout e 60-A , it s line s

extending from th e highway a mil e an d

a hal f wes t o f Antipol e southeas t t o

Benchmark 1 1 Hill, a mil e south o f th e

town. A s operations developed , th e 1s t

Cavalry Divisio n foun d tha t Noguchi

Force defenses too k th e for m o f an elon -

gated Z . Th e Japanes e line s slante d

northwest fro m Benchmar k 11 , crossing

Route 60- A a mil e wes t o f Antipole ;

switched bac k northeas t t o Benchmar k

9 Hill , a mil e nort h o f Antipole ; the n

led northwest agai n t o th e Nanc a Rive r

at Hil l 740 . The Noguchi Force als o

had a strong outpost o n Hil l 520 , threequarters o f a mil e wes t o f Hil l 740 .

For the 2d Cavalry Brigade, operations

after 8 Marc h continue d i n th e sam e

style t o whic h th e uni t ha d becom e al l

too thoroughl y accustomed . B y 1 1

March, whe n element s o f th e 43 d Divi -

sion came into the line, th e 2d Brigade's

left wa s across Rout e 60-A a quarter o f

a mil e shor t o f Antipolo ; righ t flan k

units ha d overru n cav e defense s o n

Benchmark 11 . Patrol s ha d entere d

Antipolo, finding the town shattered and

empty, bu t stil l covere d b y Japanes e

artillery an d mortar s emplace d i n th e

hills t o th e nort h an d northeast . Gen -

erally, th e 2 d Brigad e hel d position s

just int o th e southwester n edg e o f XI V

Corps' oval-shape d objectiv e area .

18

 Krueger Comments, 18 Dec 56; XIV Corps FO 8,

4 Ma r 45 ; 1s t Ca v Div FO 29 , 4 Mar 45 ; 1st Ca v Di v

Opns Memo 4, 7 Mar 45 ; XIV Corps Opns Memo 35,

6 Ma r 45; 6t h Di v FO 22 , 5 Ma r 45 ; Sixth Army FO

56, 6 Ma r 45 , in Sixt h Arm y Rp t Luzon , I, 157 .

19

 Information o n 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n operation s

in thi s subsectio n i s from : 1s t Ca v Di v G- 3 Opn s

Rpts, 5-14 Ma r 45; 1st Cav Brig S-3 Rpts , 5-13 Mar

45; 2 d Ca v Bri g Opn s Rpts, 5-13 Mar 45 ; 5t h Ca v

S-3 Rpts , 5-13 Mar 45; 12th Cav Unit Rpts , 5-1 3

Mar 45; 7th Cav S-3 Pe r Rpts, 5-11 Mar 45; 8th Cav

Opns Rpts , 5-11 Mar 45 ; 5t h Ca v Rp t Luzon , pp .

31-36.
378 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

The 1s t Brigade' s attac k ha d bee n

somewhat more successful. B y 1 1 March

its right flank , havin g fought ever y inc h

of th e way , ha d cleare d th e bu s roa d t o

within a quarte r o f a mil e o f Antipolo .

The brigad e ha d als o secure d Bench -

mark 9 and ha d pushed a mile northeast

of Benchmar k 9 and seize d a n unname d

hill, 800 fee t high , lying at th e ver y center o f tha t portio n o f th e XI V Corps '

objective are a withi n th e 1s t Cavalr y

Division's zone. I n addition, the brigade

had cleare d Hill s 52 0 an d 740 , but th e

units o n it s lef t ha d barel y reache d th e

line markin g th e wester n limit s o f th e

corps' objectiv e oval .

Results o f th e 6t h Division's offensiv e

were more promising . Decidin g tha t h e

needed tw o regiment s o n hi s righ t t o

assure success , Genera l Patric k ha d

pulled th e 1s t Infantr y fro m th e ap -

proaches to Mt. Mataba and sent it south

to th e 20th Infantry' s right . Directe d t o

drive eas t acros s a two-mile-wid e fron t

with it s righ t o n th e Nanc a River , th e

1st Infantr y wa s t o secur e almost al l o f

that portion of the XIV Corps' objectiv e

area lying within the 6th Division's zone,

simultaneously clearin g muc h o f th e

mile-wide ridge rising to Mt. Baytangan.

The 20t h Infantry , i n support, would be

ready eithe r t o reinforc e th e 1s t Infan -

try or , assumin g th e succes s o f th e 1s t

Infantry's attack , driv e nort h towar d

Wawa Da m alon g th e trails believe d t o

constitute th e Shimbu Group's mai n

north-south suppl y route .

The redeploymen t o f the 1s t Infantr y

left a ga p i n th e 6t h Divisio n line s tha t

the 63 d Infantr y migh t hav e filled , bu t

Patrick di d no t fee l tha t tha t regimen t

was stron g enoug h t o maintai n al l th e

tenuous hold s th e divisio n ha d secure d

on th e risin g groun d eas t o f th e Mari -

kina Rive r fro m Sa n Mate o nort h t o

Montalban. H e therefor e gav e u p tha t

area, includin g th e to e hol d o n Mt .

Pacawagan, an d directe d th e 63 d Infan -

try t o establis h a defensiv e lin e wes t o f

the Marikin a fro m Sa n Mate o nort h t o

hills about two miles northwest of Montalban. Th e 20t h Infantr y withdre w

from som e o f th e groun d i t ha d secure d

further sout h t o concentrat e it s forces ,

abandoning position s o n th e souther n

and southwester n slope s o f Mt . Mataba .

Patrick directed th e 112th Cavalry RCT

to continue to protect th e 6th Division's

flank nort h an d northwes t o f th e 63 d

Infantry.20

During the first tw o days of the attack

the 1s t Infantry , encounterin g unex -

pectedly ligh t opposition , secure d posi -

tions alon g th e wester n en d o f th e

1,000-foot ridg e leading east t o Mt . Baytangan. O n th e 10t h th e regiment committed mor e strengt h t o keep pac e with

the 1s t Cavalr y Brigade , t o th e south ,

and t o tak e Benchmar k 8 Hill . Lyin g

two and a half miles north of Benchmark

9 i n th e 1s t Brigade' s zone , Benchmar k

8 dominated th e terrain between Bench -

mark 9 an d th e ridg e lin e approac h t o

Mt. Baytangan . Th e seizur e o f Bench -

mark 8 would secure for the 6th Division

some o f th e advantage s o f observatio n

so far reserved t o th e Japanese .

The 1s t Infantr y drov e a mil e an d a

half int o th e norther n sectio n o f th e

XIV Corps ' objectiv e are a b y evenin g

on 1 1 March, penetrating deeply between

the Kobayashi lef t an d th e Noguchi

right. Th e regimen t seize d Benchmar k

8 against stubborn resistance and cleared

20

 XIV Corp s Rpt Luzon , pt. I, p . 145; 6th Div FO

22, 5 Ma r 45 ; 63 d In f F O 3 , 5 Ma r 45 , and supple -

ment thereto , 6 Mar 45 ; 63d In f S- 3 Rpts , 5- 7 Ma r

45; 20t h In f S- 3 Pe r Rpt , 7 Mar 45 .
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I 379

a thir d o f th e northern half o f th e corps

objective. Th e 1s t Infantr y als o cut tw o

north-south trails of the presumed Shimbu mai n suppl y route. 21

 Feelin g tha t

the 1s t Infantry' s succes s demande d ex -

ploitation, Genera l Patric k directe d th e

20th Infantr y t o institut e a n immediat e

drive northwar d towar d Waw a Da m

along the trails the 1st Infantr y ha d cut .

The latte r regimen t woul d continu e its

attack eastward. 22

There wer e additiona l change s i n

plans fo r operation s farthe r south . Th e

103d Infantr y relieve d th e 2 d Cavalr y

Brigade o n 1 1 March an d bega n prepa -

rations t o outflan k Noguchi Force de -

fenses southeas t o f Antipol e beginnin g

on 1 2 March. Th e 172 d Infantr y o f th e

43d Divisio n wa s o n it s wa y forward t o

take ove r fro m th e 1s t Cavalr y Brigade ,

and Genera l Wing , th e 43d's commander, ha d plan s t o undertak e a concerte d

attack o f his own o n 1 4 March, when h e

was t o assum e responsibility fo r th e fur -

ther conduc t o f operation s o n th e XI V

Corps right. 23

At thi s junctur e Genera l Yokoyama ,

the Shimbu Group commander , decided

to take a more decisive hand i n th e pro -

ceedings.24 Greatl y concerne d ove r th e

6th Division' s penetratio n alon g th e

Kobayashi-Noguchi boundary , Yokoya -

ma recognize d al l th e threats containe d

in o r implie d b y th e division's advance .

He wa s also perturbe d b y th e 1s t Cav -

alry Division's progress o n th e Noguchi

Force lef t an d abou t 1 0 Marc h decide d

that th e Noguchi Force's forwar d posi -

tions wer e n o longe r tenable . Accord -

ingly, Yokoyam a directe d th e Noguchi

Force t o pul l bac k t o second-lin e de -

fenses, whic h ha d bee n unde r construc -

tion fo r ove r a month . Th e ne w lin e

was anchored o n th e north abou t a mile

and a hal f west-southwes t o f Mt . Bay -

tangan o n th e ridg e lin e alon g whic h

the 1s t Infantry , 6t h Division , wa s ad -

vancing. Th e lin e then ran sout h nearly

three mile s fro m th e ridge t o Sugarloa f

Hill an d swun g thenc e southeas t acros s

the Moron g Rive r valle y fo r som e fiv e

miles to Benchmark 2 3 Hill, which, lying

six mile s eas t o f Antipole , controlle d

the open, rocky , souther n approache s to

the Bosobos o Valley .

Yokoyama might also have pulled back

the Kobayashi Force—its lef t havin g already bee n pushe d eastward—bu t fo r a

variety o f reason s decide d no t t o d o so .

For on e thing , th e Kobayashi lef t wa s

now almos t a s fa r eas t a s th e righ t o f

the new Noguchi Force line . Moreover ,

on th e Kobayashi cente r and right ther e

was neithe r th e goo d defensiv e terrai n

nor th e necessar y maneuve r roo m be -

tween th e existin g fron t an d th e Boso -

boso Valley requisite to the establishment

of a ne w line . Therefore , an y with -

drawal of the Kobayashi center and right

might hav e t o b e carrie d al l th e wa y

across the Bosoboso River. Suc h a course

of actio n woul d mea n abandonin g th e

excellent defensiv e position s o n Mts .

Pacawagan an d Matab a an d givin g u p

Wawa Da m withou t a fight . Yokoyam a

21

 6th Div Rpt Luzon, pp. 50-55; 1st Inf Rpt Luzon,

pp. 43-46; 1st Inf S-3 Jnl , 8-1 5 Ma r 45; S-3 Pe r Rpts

of th e 1st , 20th , and 63 d Inf Regts, 8-1 5 Ma r 45; 6th

Div G- 3 Opn s Rpts, 9-1 5 Ma r 45 ; 112t h Ca v RCT

S-3 Opn s Rpts , 8-1 5 Ma r 45 . (Thi s footnot e als o

covers operations of th e 6th Divisio n describe d late r

in thi s subsection. ) 22

 6th Di v F O 23 , 1 0 Mar 45 . 23

 103 d RC T S- 3 Rpts , 11-1 2 Ma r 45 ; 103 d RC T

Opns Memo 2 . 1 2 Mar 45 ; 43 d Di v F O 8 , 1 2 Mar 45 . 24

 Japanese materia l i n thi s subsectio n i s mainl y

from: SWP A His t Series , II , 466 , an d Plat e 120 ;

Luzon Opn s of the Shimbu Gp, pp. 14-15 , and Ma p

3; Interro g o f Ma j Ge n Takash i Kobayashi , Inter - rogs, I, 455-56; Gen Kobayashi Statement, States, II,

252-53.
380 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

was b y n o mean s read y t o tak e suc h

steps, an d i t appeare d t o him , accord -

ingly, tha t if th e Kobayashi Force coul d

not withdraw , an d i f i t coul d no t hol d

on it s left , h e woul d hav e t o counter -

attack t o eliminat e th e 6t h Division' s

salient.

The Shimbu Group commande r set -

tled upon a counterattack plan typifyin g

a majo r weaknes s o f Japanes e tactica l

operations throughou t Worl d Wa r II .

He schedule d a serie s o f complicate d

maneuvers tha t require d meticulou s co -

ordination i n terrai n wher e suc h co -

ordination wa s virtuall y unattainabl e

and tha t demande d a contro l o f com -

munications that the Shimbu Group did

not possess . Hi s artiller y wa s neithe r

strong enoug h no r suitabl y deploye d t o

provide prope r support fo r the counterattack; he had to employ a large proportion of provisional units and second-class

troops wh o had littl e o r n o uni t train -

ing. Unde r th e circumstances, eve n th e

best-trained unit s woul d hav e foun d

execution o f Yokoyama' s pla n a mos t

challenging task .

The Shimbu Group counterattack was

to begi n o n 1 2 Marc h wit h a three -

pronged assaul t b y seve n infantr y bat -

talions. Th e mai n effor t woul d b e

launched b y thre e battalion s o f th e

Shimbu Group Reserve — two o f th e

31st Infantry an d a provisional battalion

—plus a n independen t infantr y battal -

ion of the 105th Division that Yokoyama

detached fro m th e Noguchi Force.

These four, assembling near Wawa Dam,

would march west past the dam and the n

south t o a line of departure a t Mt . Ma -

taba, whenc e the y woul d strik e sout h

and southeas t agains t th e 6t h Divisio n

salient. Anothe r Noguchi Force inde -

pendent infantr y battalion , turned ove r

to Kobayashi Force control , wa s t o at -

tack fro m th e eas t t o recaptur e Bench -

mark 8 Hil l an d hi t th e righ t flan k o f

the 6t h Divisio n salient . Finally , th e

Kawashima Force wa s t o sen d it s lon e

independent infantry battalion , together

with a provisiona l battalion , south fro m

the Ipo Da m area t o attack 6t h Divisio n

rear installation s wes t o f th e Marikin a

River.

Just ho w Yokoyam a expecte d hi s

counterattack t o succee d i s no t clear .

In mid-Februar y h e ha d launche d a n

unsuccessful attac k wit h a stronger forc e

against a much weake r concentration o f

XIV Corp s troops. 25 I t migh t therefor e

be presume d tha t Yokoyam a no w ha d

his tongu e i n hi s cheek—tha t h e reall y

did no t hop e fo r succes s an d tha t h e

was actuall y stagin g a delayin g action .

In an y event, h e di d no t kno w tha t hi s

counterattack wa s t o star t o n th e ver y

day tha t th e 6t h Divisio n wa s to launc h

a ne w offensive . Eve n i f al l wen t well ,

the fou r Japanes e battalion s attackin g

south fro m Mt . Matab a would , o n 1 2

March, com e fac e t o fac e wit h th e 20t h

Infantry institutin g it s driv e nort h to -

ward Waw a Dam . Th e Japanes e bat -

talion strikin g towar d Benchmar k 8

would, b y th e sam e token , clas h wit h

right flan k element s o f th e 1s t Infantr y

as tha t regimen t renewe d it s thrus t

toward Mt . Baytangan .

Operations di d no t g o a t al l wel l fo r

the Shimbu Gro up.

26

 First , ai r an d

25

 See above , ch. XV . 26

 Additional informatio n o n th e Shimbu counter -

attack i s from: XI V Corps Rp t Luzon , pt . I , p . 152 ;

6th Di v Art y Rp t Luzon , pp . 37-39 ; 6t h Di v G- 2

Per Rpts, 12-1 5 Ma r 45; 6th Div Arty S- 3 Rpts , 10 -

12 Ma r 45 ; Msgs , 6t h Di v t o XI V Corps , 1 1 and 1 2

Mar 45 , sub : Ai r Summary , 6t h Di v G- 3 Jn l File ,

11-15 Ma r 45.
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I 381

artillery strike s pavin g th e wa y fo r th e

6th Divisio n attack of 1 2 March knocked

out o r force d int o cave hideaway s many

of th e artiller y piece s upo n whic h th e

Japanese ha d depende d fo r suppor t o f

their counteroffensive. Then , the American artiller y interdicte d o r rendere d

temporarily impassabl e man y trail s tha t

the fiv e southernmos t Shimbu Group

battalions wer e t o emplo y a s route s o f

approach, disrupte d th e group 's alread y

inadequate communications, struc k an d

put ou t o f action man y command posts ,

and mad e untenabl e th e four-battalio n

assembly are a a t Mt . Mataba . Ameri -

can air an d artiller y bombardments also

inhibited movemen t o f th e Kawashima

Force's counterattac k units . A s a result,

the Shimbu Group counterattac k wa s

broken u p virtuall y befor e i t go t unde r

way. Demoralize d unit s disperse d al l

through th e hills, commanders lost con -

trol o f their men , contac t between units

ceased. Wha t followe d bor e n o resem -

blance t o Yokoyama' s plans , an d th e

counterattack turne d int o a n abysma l

failure. T o illustrat e ho w striking tha t

failure was, i t is only necessary to record

that th e 6t h Divisio n ha d n o ide a i t

was bein g attacked . Instead , th e divi -

sion merel y reporte d particularl y per -

sistent bu t otherwis e no t unusua l nigh t

infiltration operation s b y smal l group s

of Japanes e durin g th e perio d 1 1

through 1 5 March.

Disgusted, Yokoyam a calle d of f th e

effort o n 1 5 March. Th e failur e vividl y

demonstrated t o hi m tha t th e Shimbu

Group wa s incapabl e o f effectiv e offen -

sive action , an d th e counterattac k ha d

resulted i n losse s Yokoyam a kne w h e

could ill afford. Th e Noguchi Force had

been irretrievabl y weakened by the near

annihilation o f th e tw o battalion s Yokoyama had take n from i t fo r th e counterattack; participating units of the Shimbu

Group Reserve had als o suffered heavily .

To Yokoyama , th e ultimat e fat e o f th e

Shimbu Group wa s even more obviously

a foregon e conclusio n tha n i t ha d bee n

when XI V Corp s bega n it s attac k o n

20 February . Al l h e coul d d o no w wa s

to trad e live s fo r terrai n an d time .

Final XIV Corps Operations,

12-14 March

While th e so-calle d counterattac k wa s

under way , th e Noguchi Force ha d been

executing its withdrawal, hurrie d alon g

by pressur e fro m element s o f th e 43 d

Division.27 O n 1 2 March th e 103 d In -

fantry (unde r 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n con -

trol) occupie d Antipolo and o n the next

day sen t troop s cross-countr y towar d

Benchmark 7 Hill, tw o and a half mile s

to the southeast. Controlling the Morong

Valley fo r tw o mile s nort h an d sout h

of Rout e 60-A , Benchmar k 7 , the 103 d

Infantry believed , wa s th e souther n

anchor of Noguchi Force defenses. Th e

regiment wa s no t surprised , therefore ,

to fin d considerabl e Japanes e strengt h

on th e hill , but i t wa s astonished whe n

reconnaissance element s foun d unde -

fended th e junctio n o f Route s 60- A

and 21 , four mile s southeas t o f Bench -

mark 7 . I t appeare d tha t excep t fo r

the isolate d groupmen t a t Benchmar k 7

the Noguchi Force lef t flan k wa s wid e

open.

27

 Information o n 43 d Divisio n operation s i n thi s

subsection i s from : 43 d Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 31-32 ;

43d Di v G- 3 Rpts , 11-1 5 Ma r 45 ; 103 d RC T Rp t

Luzon, pp . 48-51 ; 172 d In f Rp t Luzon , Phas e III ,

Antipolo, pp . 1-2 ; S- 3 Pe r Rpt s o f th e 103 d RC T

and 172 d Inf , 11-1 5 Ma r 45 ; 172 d In f Uni t Jnl , 12 -

14 Ma r 45 .
382 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

The 43 d Divisio n planne d t o exploi t

this weakness wit h a n attac k beginnin g

on 1 4 March , whe n i t ha d complete d

relief o f th e 1s t Cavalry Division . Firs t

clearing th e remainde r o f XI V Corps '

oval-shaped objectiv e are a withi n it s

zone, th e 43d Division intended t o drive

on eas t an d northeas t t o rough , open ,

high groun d alon g th e wes t sid e o f th e

Bosoboso Valley . Genera l Win g hope d

his troop s could gai n th e to p o f a bare -

crested, north-sout h ridg e lin e domi -

nated b y Mt . Yabang , a mil e an d a hal f

southeast o f Mt . Baytanga n i n th e 6t h

Division's zone . Steep-sloped Mt. Cay -

mayuman, three-quarters o f a mile south

of Mt . Yaban g an d o n th e sam e ridg e

line, was another 43d Divisio n objective .

The 172 d Infantry, strikin g nort h u p

the Moron g Valley , wa s t o seiz e Mts .

Yabang an d Caymayuman . Th e 103 d

Infantry woul d firs t clea r Benchmar k 7

and secur e Rout e 60-A from Antipol o

to th e junctio n wit h Rout e 21 , an d

would the n strik e nort h alon g th e eas t

side o f th e Moron g Valley to Mt . Tana -

uan, a bare-sloped , roug h heigh t tw o

miles south-southeas t o f Mt . Caymayu -

man. Formin g part of the ridge complex

that included Mts. Yabang and Caymayuman, Mt. Tanauan controlled the northern en d o f th e Moron g Valley as well a s

the extrem e southeaster n reache s o f th e

Bosoboso Valley . I f th e 43 d Division' s

attack agains t Mts . Yabang , Caymayu -

man, an d Tanaua n prove d successful ,

the divisio n woul d hav e overru n th e

Noguchi Force's principa l second-lin e

defenses, woul d have turned th e Shimbu

Group's left , an d woul d hav e opene d a

route int o th e Bosobos o Valley .

On 1 4 March, against scattered , ligh t

resistance, th e 172 d Infantry cleare d th e

southern thir d o f th e XI V Corps ' ova l

objective area , whil e th e 103d Infantry

secured mos t o f Rout e 60-A. Noguchi

Force unit s a t Benchmar k 7 conducte d

a stubbor n defense , bu t element s o f th e

103d Infantry probin g nort h alon g th e

eastern sid e o f th e Moron g Valle y en -

countered onl y a fe w stragglers . No t

knowing tha t th e Noguchi Force wa s

withdrawing t o ne w defenses , th e 43 d

Division face d th e prospec t o f continu -

ing th e attac k o n 1 5 March with consid -

erable enthusiasm . An d wh y not ?

Having gaine d u p t o a mil e an d a hal f

on it s cente r an d left , th e divisio n ha d

made a s muc h progres s i n on e da y a s

had th e 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n durin g

the previou s ten.

Meanwhile, th e attac k th e 6t h Divi -

sion ha d launche d o n 1 2 March ha d als o

gained som e measur e o f success. 28 Fro m

12 throug h 1 4 Marc h th e 20t h Infantr y

drove ove r a mil e northwar d o n th e

1st Infantry 's left , cleane d ou t th e ex -

treme norther n portio n o f th e XI V

Corps' objectiv e area , an d secure d a

foothold o n a grassy , ope n ridg e les s

than a mil e southeas t o f Mt . Mataba' s

peak, openin g a ne w axi s o f advanc e

toward th e mountain. Th e 1s t Infantr y

did no t begi n its part of the attac k unti l

the 14th , findin g i t necessar y t o spen d

the 12t h and 13t h moppin g u p an d

waiting fo r th e improvemen t an d ex -

tension of regimental supply roads. Once

under way , the regimen t encountere d

steadily increasin g resistance . Abou t

midmorning o n th e 14th , a burs t o f

Japanese machine gun fir e from a hidden

position caugh t a grou p o f officer s wh o

28

 Material o n 6t h Divisio n operation s is from: 6t h

Div Rp t Luzon , pp . 53-54 ; 20t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp .

36-37; 1s t In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 46-47 ; 20t h In f S- 3

Per Rpts , 12-1 5 Ma r 45 ; 1s t In f S- 3 Opn s Rpts ,

12-15 Ma r 45; 20t h In f Uni t Jnl, 12-14 Ma r 45 .
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I 383

BENCHMARK 7

were incautiousl y bunche d i n th e ope n

at the regiment's forward command post.

General Patric k wa s mortall y wounde d

and Col . Jame s E . Rees , th e 1s t Infan -

try's commander , wa s kille d outright .

Brig. Gen . Charle s E . Hurdis . divisio n

artillery commander , replace d Genera l

Patrick; Lt . Col. Franci s J. Corbin , pre -

viously commander o f th e 1s t Battalion ,

1st Infantry , too k ove r th e regimenta l

reins.

By midafternoo n o n th e 14t h stron g

Japanese opposition had brought th e 1st

Infantry t o a halt , ye t th e regiment 's

left ha d drive n al l th e wa y across XI V

Corps' ova l objectiv e are a an d wa s o n

a bar e pea k som e 1,25 0 fee t hig h onl y

a mil e an d a quarte r southwes t o f Mt .

Baytangan. Th e righ t flan k ha d pushe d

about halfway across the corps' objectiv e

oval an d ha d kep t pac e wit h th e 43 d

Division's lef t alon g th e Nanc a River .

By evenin g o n 1 4 Marc h XI V Corp s

had mad e substantia l contribution s to -

ward th e destructio n o f Shimbu Group.

Progress ha d ofte n bee n painfull y slo w

and costly , bu t i t had been steady . Th e

corps had drive n a wedge deep between

the Noguchi an d Kobayashi Forces, i t

had compelle d Genera l Yokoyam a t o

pull th e Noguchi Force bac k t o second -

line defenses, it had prompted Yokoyama

to launch a costly and unsuccessfu l counterattack, an d i t ha d gon e fa r towar d
384 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

turning th e Shimbu Group left . Thes e

achievements XI V Corp s ha d mad e

against a well-armed Japanese force tha t

had hel d stron g position s i n excellen t

defensive terrai n an d tha t had—fo r th e

Japanese Arm y — made uncommonl y

fine us e o f it s artillery . Finally , XI V

Corps estimate d (conservatively ) tha t i t

had kille d som e 3,35 0 troop s o f th e

Shimbu Group fro m 2 0 Februar y

through 1 4 March .

On th e debi t sid e o f th e ledge r wer e

XIV Corps ' ow n battl e casualties: 29

Unit

1st Cavalr y Divisio n

6th Infantr y Divisio n

43d Infantr y Divisio n

112th Cavalr y RCT

Total

Killed

130

150

10

5

295

Wounded

585

420

25

10

1,040

Total

715

570

35

15

Nonbattle casualtie s als o too k a heav y

toll o f effectiv e front-lin e strength . Fo r

example, ove r 1,60 0 troops o f th e 6t h

Division ha d t o leave th e fron t becaus e

of sicknes s o r comba t fatigue. 30

The secon d debit factor wa s that XIV

Corps had launche d n o offensiv e towar d

Ipo Dam . O n th e othe r hand , th e 6t h

Division wa s farthe r fro m Waw a Da m

than i t had bee n te n day s earlier, whe n

the 63 d Infantr y ha d give n u p it s hol d

on Mt . Pacawagan . Moreover , XI V

Corps had launche d no offensiv e towar d

Ipo Dam . O n th e othe r hand , th e 6t h

and 43 d Divisions had an uncontestabl e

hold o n th e groun d gaine d throug h 1 4

March, and the y had secured goo d posi -

tions from which to continue their drives

east an d north .

The Collapse of the Shimbu Left

Late on 1 4 March General Hall, commanding XI Corps, took over responsibility for th e conduct of operations against

the Shimbu Group. I t was up to him to

determine ho w best t o emplo y th e 6t h

and 43 d Division s s o a s t o exploi t th e

gains mad e by XIV Corps and t o spee d

the capture o f Wawa an d Ip o Dams.

XI Corps and Shimbu Group Plans

General Hall decide d t o continue th e

drive agains t th e Shimbu Group's left ,

the only real difference betwee n his plan

and tha t followe d b y Genera l Griswol d

being that Hall intended t o concentrate

initially against th e Noguchi Force in -

stead of operating against both that unit

and th e lef t o f th e Kobayashi Force a s

had XI V Corps. 31 X I Corp s base d it s

plan o n a n overoptimisti c intelligenc e

estimate that the Kobayashi and Noguchi

Forces wer e n o longe r i n contac t an d

that th e Kobayashi Force ha d fe w if any

troops south o f the Mang o River, which

separates Mts. Pacawaga n an d Mataba .

Once th e Noguchi Force wa s destroyed,

Hall reasoned, he would swing XI Corps

north agains t th e Kobayashi Force and ,

finally, concentrat e al l hi s unit s t o

destroy th e Kawashima Force.

Whatever Hall' s intentions , h e actu -

ally continue d th e attac k agains t th e

Kobayashi Force left , fo r he ordered th e

6th Divisio n t o resum e th e driv e east -

ward i t ha d initiate d unde r XI V Corp s

control. Hal l lef t unchange d th e exist -

29

regimenta The figure l source s ares base citedd previously upon division , a,d brigade ar e irrecon , andcilable with thos e of XIV Corps records. 30

 No usabl e nonbattl e casualt y figure s ca n b e

found fo r th e othe r unit s committe d durin g th e

period 2 0 February-1 4 March .

31

 Information on XI Corps plans in this subsection

is mainly from: X I Corps Rpt Luzon , p. 21; XI Corps

FO 9 , 1 4 Mar 45 ; XI Corp s G-2 Wkl y Rpt 2 , 12 Mar

45; 6t h Di v F O 24 , 1 5 Mar 45 ; 6t h Di v Rp t Luzon ,

p. 55 ; 43 d Di v FO 8 , 1 2 Mar 45 .
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I 385

ing boundar y betwee n th e 6t h an d 43 d

Divisions; at first set up no specific objec -

tives fo r eithe r unit ; dre w n o definit e

objective lines . Fo r th e 43 d Division ,

the XI Corps orders required no change

in plans. Th e 6t h Division, on the other

hand, ha d t o foreg o it s pla n t o swin g

the 20t h Infantr y northward , an d ha d

to concentrat e fo r a driv e eastwar d

abreast o f th e 43 d Division . Directe d

to secur e th e ridge lin e overlookin g th e

Bosoboso Valle y fro m th e norther n

slopes of Mt . Yabang north a s far as Mt.

Baytangan, th e 6t h Divisio n instructe d

the 20t h Infantr y t o strik e eastwar d i n

concert wit h th e 1st Infantry . Th e ne w

boundary betwee n th e tw o regiments ,

drawn alon g th e 1,000-foot-hig h ridg e

line risin g eastwar d t o Mt . Baytangan ,

coincided closel y t o tha t betwee n th e

Noguchi an d Kobayashi Forces.

The Noguchi Force had completed its

withdrawal o n 1 5 March , a s scheduled ,

but ha d no t take n u p th e exac t line s

General Yokoyama had expected.32 Th e

force's cente r an d righ t ha d occupie d

good defense s extendin g from Sugarloa f

Hill nort h almos t tw o mile s acros s th e

Nanca River , holdin g Sugarloa f Hil l

with abou t a battalio n o f infantr y an d

the are a t o th e nort h wit h anothe r in -

fantry battalion . Bu t the Noguchi Force

had bee n unabl e t o assembl e sufficien t

strength t o hol d th e Sugarloaf-Bench -

mark 2 3 sectio n o f it s intende d secon d

defensive lin e an d ha d therefor e con -

centrated it s lef t flan k strength , a rein -

forced independen t infantr y battalio n

of th e 105th Division, a t Mt . Tanaua n

in partiall y complete d defense s origi -

nally intende d a s par t o f a thir d defen -

sive line. A provisional infantry battalion

held Mts . Yabang an d Caymayuma n t o

back u p th e Sugarloaf-Mt . Tanaua n

line. Element s o f th e Kogure Detachment, which ha d just sent about half it s

effectives nort h to reinforce th e Noguchi

Force, wer e als o i n th e Mts . YabangCaymayuman-Tanauan area .

As o f 1 5 March th e Kobayashi Force's

Left Sector Unit wa s desperately tryin g

to stabiliz e it s lines . O n o r abou t th e

same da y a t leas t on e battalio n o f th e

Shimbu Group Reserve move d u p t o

reinforce th e Left Sector Unit, whic h

also absorbed remnant s o f som e organizations choppe d u p durin g th e Shimbu

Group counterattack . Th e unit 's fron t

lay a mil e t o a mil e an d a hal f wes t o f

Mt. Baytanga n an d extende d nort h t o

south fro m som e tw o an d a hal f mile s

across the ridge leading to the mountain.

General Yokoyam a stil l viewe d th e

Kobayashi Force lef t a s th e critica l are a

along th e Shimbu front , fo r h e kne w

that hi s entir e left flan k woul d collaps e

if th e 6t h Divisio n penetrate d an y fur -

ther towar d Mt . Baytangan . Havin g

failed t o eliminat e th e 6t h Division' s

salient, h e no w intende d t o contai n it ,

and he accordingly directed th e Kobayashi Force t o maintain its left a t all costs.

XI Corps' First Week

On th e mornin g o f 1 5 Marc h th e

103d Infantry, 43 d Division , se t griml y

about th e tas k o f reducing th e Japanes e

defenses on Benchmar k 7 Hill and clearing a two-mil e stretc h o f Rout e 60- A

32

 Shimbu Group informatio n i n thi s subsection i s from: Luzo n Opn s o f th e Shimbu Gp, p . 15 , an d

Maps 1 and 3 ; Ge n Kobaysh i Interrog , Interrogs, I ,

445-46; 43d Div G-2 Rp t Luzon, Sec. II, Enemy O/B,

pp. 6-10; XI Corp s G-2 Wkl y Rpts 3 and 4 , 1 9 and

26 Ma r 45 ; 6t h Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 53 , 55-58; 6t h

Div G-2 Pe r Rpts, 15-2 6 Mar 45; SWPA Hist Series,

II, 465-68 .
386 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

that the Japanese still controlled.33 Bot h

tasks ha d t o b e complete d i n orde r t o

secure Rout e 60- A as a lin e o f com -

munication fo r th e suppor t o f th e

planned regimenta l attac k nort h u p th e

Morong Valley . Th e 103 d Infantr y

finally overra n th e defense s o n Bench -

mark 7 o n 1 8 March , killin g abou t 25 0

Japanese in the process. 34 Th e Japanes e

battalion ther e ha d delaye d th e 103d' s

attack towar d Mt . Tanaua n unti l th e

morning of 1 8 March, but b y evenin g of

that day the regiment's troops had begun

swarming u p th e bare , rocky , souther n

and southwester n slope s o f th e moun -

tain. Fo r th e nex t thre e day s th e 103 d

Infantry literall y inche d its way upward

through a maz e o f cav e an d bunke r de -

fenses, spending much of its time pinned

down b y Japanes e machin e gu n an d

artillery fire . Fightin g o n behin d th e

close support o f air, artillery, an d mor -

tar fire , th e 103 d reache d th e cres t o f

Mt. Tanaua n lat e o n 2 1 Marc h a s th e

remnants of the Noguchi Force's defend -

ing battalion, leaving some 30 0 dead be -

hind, fle d northeas t across th e Bosobos o

River.

Meanwhile, othe r troop s o f th e 103 d

Infantry ha d take n Benchmar k 2 3 Hill,

three mile s southeas t o f Mt . Tanauan ,

and ha d patrolle d northwar d int o th e

southeastern reache s o f th e Bosobos o

Valley. O n 2 2 Marc h a comba t patro l

reached Mt. Balidbiran, on the east bank

of th e Bosobos o a mil e an d a hal f eas t

of Mt . Tanauan. Th e 103d Infantry ha d

outflanked th e Noguchi Force lef t an d

had drive n tha t unit 's leftmost element s

across th e Bosoboso .

To th e north , th e 172 d Infantry ha d

at firs t struc k t o seiz e grassy-slope d

Sugarloaf Hill , tw o and a quarte r mile s

west o f Mt . Tanauan . Th e Japanes e

fanatically defende d al l th e roug h ap -

proaches t o th e hil l an d b y evenin g o n

the 19th had stoppe d th e 172 d Infantry

in it s tracks. Accordingly , th e regimen t

contained Sugarloa f o n th e wes t and ,

bypassing it to the north an d east, began

new attack s towar d Mts . Yabang an d

Caymayuman. Th e 1s t Battalion , mov -

ing acros s th e norther n en d o f th e

Morong Valle y alon g th e Shimbu

Group's rea l mai n north-sout h suppl y

route, encountere d onl y a fe w delayin g

positions an d b y evenin g o n 2 2 Marc h

had reached a point about three-quarters

of a mile southeast of Mt. Caymayuman's

crest. Th e 2 d Battalion , bypassin g

Sugarloaf Hil l o n th e north , ha d no t

done as well, and at the end o f XI Corps'

first wee k o f attac k wa s stil l a mil e an d

a hal f wes t o f Mt . Yabang .

The 6t h Division's initial attack under

XI Corp s contro l di d no t begi n unti l

17 March. 35 Tha t da y th e 1s t Infantr y

jumped of f with it s 1s t Battalio n alon g

the ridg e risin g towar d Mt . Baytanga n

33

 43d Divisio n operation s i n thi s subsectio n ar e

reconstructed from : 43 d Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 32-34 ;

43d Div G-3 Per Rpts, 15-23 Mar 45; XI Corp s Rpt

Luzon, pp. 22-23; 103 d RCT Rp t Luzon, pp. 51-56;

103d Inf S- 3 Pe r Rpts , 15-2 3 Mar 45; 172d In f Rp t

Luzon, Phas e III, Antipolo, pp . 2-4; 172d Inf S- 3

Rpts, 15-2 2 Mar 45 . 34

 During th e nigh t o f 16-1 7 March abou t 30 0

Japanese escape d fro m th e hil l an d hole d u p o n

Benchmark 2 7 Hill, tw o mile s t o th e south . Thes e

Japanese wer e unmoleste d unti l th e firs t wee k o f

April when , havin g becom e bothersome , the y wer e

wiped out b y elements of the 172 d Infantry.

35

 Information o n 6t h Divisio n operation s is from:

6th Di v Opn s Rp t Luzon , pp . 55-59 ; 1s t In f Rp t

Luzon, pp. 47-49; 1s t In f S-3 Opn s Rpts, 15-23 Mar

45; 1s t In f S- 3 Jnl , 15-22 Ma r 45 ; 20t h In f Rp t

Luzon, pp . 37-39 ; 20t h In f S- 3 Pe r Rpts , 15-2 3

Mar 45 .
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I 387

and th e 3 d Battalio n strikin g east fro m

the vicinity of Benchmar k 8 Hill. Unti l

late afternoon th e attac k wen t well , and

at 170 0 th e 1s t Battalio n bega n diggin g

in alon g th e ridg e a littl e ove r a mil e

west-southwest of Baytangan's crest while

the 3 d Battalio n du g i n abou t three -

quarters o f a mil e southwest o f th e 1st.

An hou r late r th e roo f fel l i n o n th e

1st Battalion . First , at least sixty rounds

of 150-mm . morta r fir e struc k th e tw o

forward companies . Then , lighte r mortars bega n bombardin g th e battalion' s

lines as Japanese infantry started maneuvering against th e unit's expose d north -

ern an d souther n flanks . It s position s

rapidly becomin g untenable , th e battal -

ion withdrew over a mile westward, back

beyond it s mornin g lin e o f departure ,

with losse s numberin g 1 2 me n kille d

and 3 5 wounded. Th e uni t lef t behin d

an artiller y liaiso n radio , a jeep , tw o

37-mm. antitank guns , tw o 60-mm. mortars wit h ammunition , an d som e

.30-caliber rifl e ammunition .

After thi s reverse , th e 1s t Infantr y

adopted ne w tactics . Spendin g on e da y

advancing generally eastward , mainl y i n

a serie s o f patro l actions , th e regimen t

would spen d th e nex t da y consolidating

its gain s an d moppin g up . Th e Japa -

nese continue d t o pu t u p determine d

but somewha t disorganize d resistanc e

and nightl y launched infiltratio n attack s

all across th e 1s t Infantry' s front . Japa -

nese artiller y an d morta r fir e als o harassed th e regimen t continuousl y an d

delayed the construction o f supply roads,

already a difficul t enoug h tas k i n th e

very roug h an d broke n groun d throug h

which th e 1s t Infantr y wa s fighting . B y

dusk o n 2 2 Marc h th e regimen t wa s

little close r t o Mt . Baytangan' s cres t

than i t ha d bee n o n th e 17th .

The 20t h Infantr y ha d als o met stub -

born resistanc e i n it s secto r o n th e 1s t

Infantry's left . Althoug h th e oppositio n

to th e 20t h Infantr y wa s not wel l organized, i t wa s so widesprea d tha t th e regi -

ment foun d i t difficul t t o concentrat e

forces a t an y on e poin t t o achiev e deci -

sive penetration s and, lik e the 1s t Infan -

try, ha d t o advanc e i n a serie s o f patro l

actions. B y evenin g o n 2 2 Marc h th e

20th wa s generall y a mil e an d a hal f

west o f Mt . Baytangan , bu t on e com -

pany, workin g around t o th e north, had

gained a foothol d o n a woode d ridg e

overlooking the Bosoboso Valley less than

a mil e west-northwes t o f Baytangan' s

crest.

By thi s tim e Genera l Hall , th e X I

Corps commander , ha d begu n t o fee l

that th e 6t h Divisio n wa s bogged dow n

in interminabl e smal l uni t actions . I n

the 43 d Division' s are a th e 172 d Infantry's gain s wer e scarcel y mor e satisfying .

Only i n th e 103d Infantry's secto r ha d

progress bee n suc h tha t Hal l coul d stil l

feel tha t hi s plan s were basicall y sound .

Meanwhile, stead y attritio n fro m bot h

battle an d nonbattl e casualtie s ha d re -

duced th e effectiv e strengt h o f th e fou r

regiments committed . Together , the y

had los t approximatel y 12 0 men kille d

and 32 5 wounde d durin g th e perio d

from 1 5 throug h 2 2 March . Th e rifl e

companies o f th e 172 d Infantry ha d fe w

more tha n 5 0 effective s apiece ; th e 1s t

and 20t h Infantr y Regiment s wer e 90 0

and 85 0 effectives , respectively , unde r

authorized strength . Eac h o f th e fou r

regiments i n th e lin e wa s losin g 55-6 0

men a da y killed , wounded , injured , o r

evacuated fo r sickness or combat fatigue.

Such attritio n woul d soo n destro y th e

regiments a s effectiv e comba t units, an d

it began t o appear tha t X I Corp s would
388 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

have t o hal t unti l th e regiment s coul d

either b e replace d o r brough t bac k u p

to strength. Certainly , a stalemate, jeopardizing th e succes s o f th e corps' plans ,

threatened.

The Shimbu Group Withdraws

Its Left

Shimbu Group solve d X I Corps' im -

mediate problems i n a most unexpecte d

fashion. B y 2 0 March, sinc e th e Kobayashi Force ha d slowe d bu t no t halte d

the 6t h Division , Genera l Yokoyam a

had decide d tha t th e situatio n o f hi s

left wa s hopeless . Accordingly , h e di -

rected th e Kobayashi Force Left Sector

Unit an d th e entir e Noguchi Force t o

fall bac k t o ne w position s eas t o f th e

Bosoboso River. H e issue d thes e orders

on 2 0 March, bu t suc h wa s th e stat e o f

the Shimbu Group's communication s

that mos t o f th e forwar d unit s di d no t

get the word unti l lat e on th e 22d . The

Japanese units concerned bega n retreat -

ing eastwar d durin g th e nigh t o f 22-2 3

March, and whe n th e 6t h an d 43 d Divisions resumed their attacks on th e morning o f th e 23 d th e withdrawa l wa s i n

full swing. 36

The 6t h an d 43 d Division s encoun -

tered onl y scattered , disorganize d oppo -

sition fro m 2 3 through 2 6 March. 37 O n

the fa r left , o r north , th e 20t h Infantr y

met littl e resistanc e a s i t cleare d mor e

ground alon g th e wester n an d norther n

slopes of Mt. Baytangan and sen t patrols

across the mountain's northern shoulde r

as fa r a s th e Bosobos o River . B y even -

ing o n th e 26t h tha t regimen t an d th e

1st Infantr y ha d secure d position s fo r

over a mil e nort h an d sout h o f Mt .

Baytangan alon g th e ridg e lin e over -

looking the Bosobos o Valley; th e 1s t Infantry too k th e cres t o f th e mountai n

the nex t da y against n o opposition . O n

26 Marc h th e 1s t Infantr y mad e contac t

with th e 172 d Infantry, 43 d Division ,

at a poin t abou t a mil e northwes t o f

Mt. Yabang .

The 172 d had seize d Mt . Yaban g

against scattered resistanc e on th e morning of 24 Marc h and had als o cleare d

most o f Mt . Caymayuma n th e sam e day.

The regimen t overran th e last organized

opposition i n it s sector , tha t a t Sugar -

loaf Hill , o n th e mornin g o f th e 27th .

In th e meantime , th e 103 d Infantry

had bee n makin g eas y gain s alon g bot h

sides o f th e Bosobos o River . Th e regi -

ment occupie d barri o New Bosoboso o n

the 24th , capturin g grea t quantitie s o f

supplies o f al l type s i n th e area . Mt .

Balidbiran, o n th e eas t bank , fel l th e

same day, as di d Benchmar k 2 1 Hill, a

mile an d a hal f furthe r east . Sign s o f

recent and hurrie d Japanes e withdrawa l

abounded throughout the regiment's sector, an d the only indications of organized

Japanese activit y wer e foo t an d moto r

movements alon g a roug h roa d leadin g

northeast fro m Ne w Bosobos o int o th e

fastnesses o f th e Sierr a Madre . Th e

Shimbu Group's lef t ha d disappeared .

Conclusions

With th e collaps e o f th e Shimbu

Group left , X I Corp s coul d tur n it s at36

 Luzon Opn s o f th e Shimbu Gp, p . 15 ; SWP A

Hist Series , II , 468 ; Gen Kobayash i Interrog , Interrogs, I, 446-47. 37

 The remainde r of this subsection is based mainly

on: 20t h Inf Rpt Luzon , p. 39; 20th Inf S-3 Pe r Rpts,

23-26 Mar 45; 1st In f Rp t Luzon , pp. 49-51; 1s t Inf

S-3 Opn s Rpts, 23-2 7 Ma r 45 ; 43 d Div Rpt Luzon ,

pp. 34-35 ; 172 d Inf Rp t Luzon , Phas e III, Antipolo,

p. 3 ; 172 d In f S- 3 Rpts , 23-2 7 Ma r 45 ; 103d RCT

Rpt Luzon , pp. 56-59; 103d Inf S-3 Pe r Rpts, 23-27

Mar 45 .
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE 1 389

tention t o th e captur e o f Waw a Da m

and th e destructio n o f th e Kobayashi

Force element s remainin g wes t o f th e

Bosoboso River. Th e gain s of 15 through

26 Marc h tha t put X I Corp s i n positio n

to mak e plan s fo r a n attac k towar d

Wawa Da m ha d bee n achieve d a t som e

cost:38

U.S. Casualties

Unit

1st Infantr y

20th Infantr y

103d Infantr y

172d Infantr y

Total

Killed

35

35

40

30

140

Wounded

105

90

90

395

Total

140

130

140

535

Japanese

Killed

635

625

450

3,225

The tota l cos t o f X I an d XI V Corp s

operations agains t th e Shimbu Group

from 2 0 Februar y throug h 2 6 Marc h

was approximatel y 43 5 me n kille d an d

1,425 wounded ; th e Japanes e ha d los t

nearly 7,00 0 kille d durin g th e sam e

period.39

As fa r a s Genera l Yokoyama wa s con -

cerned, th e decisiv e operatio n sinc e th e

beginning o f XI V Corps ' attac k o n 2 0

February ha d bee n th e 6t h Division' s

penetration betwee n th e Kobayashi an d

Noguchi Forces. Thi s penetratio n ha d

rendered th e Shimbu Group's lef t flan k

defenses untenabl e and , threatenin g en -

circlement o f th e Noguchi Force, ha d

prompted Yokoyam a t o withdra w hi s

left wel l before he had anticipate d doing

so. O f onl y slightl y lesse r importanc e

had been th e 43d Division's penetratio n

into the Bosobos o River valle y from th e

south, a penetratio n tha t woul d ulti -

mately hav e force d Yokoyam a t o with -

draw his left eve n if the 6t h Divisio n had

not drive n it s wedg e dee p betwee n th e

Kobayashi an d Noguchi Forces. Fro m

the X I an d XI V Corp s point s o f view ,

the tw o America n drives—th e on e con -

ducted by the 6th Division and the other

executed first by the 1st Cavalr y Division

and the n take n u p b y th e 43 d Divisio n

—must be considered as complementary.

Manifestly, th e simultaneou s drive s had

hastened the collapse of the Shimbu left .

Had th e two corps had more strength,

they coul d hav e achieve d th e sam e re -

sults mor e quickly . Th e 6t h Divisio n

had bee n abl e t o commit onl y tw o regiments t o th e attack , findin g i t necessar y

to hol d th e 63 d Infantr y ou t t o safe -

guard it s lef t rear . Onl y tw o regiments

of th e 43 d Infantr y ha d bee n available ,

and neithe r brigad e o f th e 1s t Cavalr y

Division ha d bee n muc h stronge r tha n

an infantr y regiment . Throughou t th e

attack XI V an d X I Corp s had bee n op -

erating on shoestring s holdin g out scan t

reserves an d expectin g norma l result s

from generall y understrengt h units.

The Shimbu Group's operation s t o

26 Marc h reflecte d man y o f th e group 's

weaknesses, suc h a s th e heterogeneou s

nature o f it s forces , th e preponderanc e

of second-class , ill-trained troops, th e in -

adequate strengt h o f th e Noguchi Force

for th e missio n assigne d it , poo r com -

munications, and th e gradua l deteriora -

tion o f contro l al l acros s th e group 's

southern front . O n th e other hand, that

the Shimbu Group wa s able to maintain

its lef t fo r ove r a mont h indicate s tha t

Yokoyama's defenses were generally well

conceived an d lon g i n preparation .

38

 The figure s ar e based upo n divisiona l an d regi -

mental source s cite d previously . 39

 The Japanes e losse s ar e thos e th e America n

regiments engaged reported t o have killed i n ground

action. Man y othe r Japanes e wer e foun d dea d i n

the area—fo r example , the 172 d Infantr y discovere d

at leas t 200 unburied dea d Japanes e wh o ha d bee n

killed b y America n artiller y o r ai r bombardmen t i n

the Mts . Yabang-Caymayuma n sector .
390 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Throughout th e period , moreover , th e

Japanese had all the advantages of terrain

and observation. Genera l Yokoyama had

another important , i f unmeasurable ,

factor workin g for him—th e willingness

of th e Japanes e soldie r t o figh t an d di e

in plac e n o matte r ho w hopeles s hi s

situation.
CHAPTER XXI I

The Reductio n o f the Shimbu Group

Phase II: Th e Seizur e

of Wawa an d Ip o Dam s

Having turne d th e Shimbu Group's

left an d havin g virtuall y destroye d th e

Noguchi Force, XI Corp s reoriented its

attack. Genera l Hal l no w planne d t o

strike generall y nort h towar d Waw a

Dam, destroyin g the Kobayashi Force on

the way and simultaneousl y clearing sufficient terrai n t o assur e th e securit y o f

the are a wes t o f th e Bosobos o River .

Hall designated an objective line stretching from Mt . Oro, thre e and a half mile s

north of Wawa Dam, south-southeast for

fifteen mile s alon g th e firs t dominatin g

high ground east of the Bosoboso. About

90 percent of the terrain t o this new line

lay within the 6th Division's zone. Tha t

division would have to drive north from

Mt. Baytanga n t o Mt . Oro ; advanc e

across th e Bosobos o Rive r t o clea r Mt .

Purro, lyin g jus t southeas t o f an d con -

trolling th e confluenc e o f th e Bosoboso ,

Marikina, and Montalban Rivers; reduce

known Kobayashi Force strongpoints a t

Mts. Matab a an d Pacawagan ; and , las t

but no t least , seiz e Waw a Dam . Th e

43d Division , for th e tim e being, would

do littl e mor e tha n mo p u p o n th e

Shimbu Group's lef t i n orde r to protect

the 6t h Division's right rear. 1

Protecting the Right Rear

During th e perio d fro m 2 4 throug h

31 Marc h th e 103 d Infantry , 43 d Divi -

sion, provide d considerabl e protectio n

to the 6th Division's right rea r with th e

seizure of Hill 1200 , on th e east bank o f

the Bosobos o Rive r a littl e ove r a mil e

east of barrio New Bosoboso.2 Th e regi -

ment se t up a combined roadbloc k an d

patrol bas e just north o f Hill 120 0 on a

road tha t Shimbu Group force s em -

ployed a s thei r mai n rout e o f with -

drawal int o th e Sierr a Madre . A n im -

proved hors e trail , thi s roa d ende d a t

1

 XI Corp s F O 11 , 2 6 Ma r 45 ; 43 d Di v Opn s

Memo 7 , 2 8 Ma r 45 ; 6t h Di v FO 26 , 2 5 Ma r 45 ; X I

Corps Rp t Luzon , pp . 24 , 26. 2

 This section is based on : 43 d Div Rpt Luzon , pp.

36-37, 40-43; 43d Div G-3 Pe r Rpts, 27 Mar-3 May

45; 103 d RC T Rp t Luzon , pp . 59-60 , 73-74 ; 103 d

RCT S- 3 Pe r Rpts, 27 Mar-1 Ap r and 2 1 Apr-2 May

45; 172 d In f Rp t Luzon , Phas e III , Antipolo , pp .

4-6; 172 d Inf S- 3 Rpts , 27 Mar-1 Ma y 45; 1 12th Cav

RCT Rp t Luzon , pp . 26-32 ; 112t h Ca v RCT S- 3

Opns Rpts, 2-3 1 Ma y 45.
392 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Santa Inez , o n th e Lenati n Rive r eigh t

rough, mountainou s mile s northeas t o f

New Bosoboso . Th e roa d marke d th e

boundary betwee n th e 6t h an d 43 d

Divisions i n th e regio n eas t o f th e

Bosoboso River . Element s o f th e 43 d

Division continue d patrollin g i n th e

area sout h o f th e Sant a Ine z roa d unti l

2 May , whe n th e entir e divisio n rede -

ployed t o th e Ip o Dam front. It s operations fro m 2 7 Marc h throug h 2 Ma y

cost th e 43 d Divisio n abou t 3 0 me n

killed an d 12 0 wounded ; th e divisio n

killed approximatel y 83 0 Japanes e

during the same period.

Ultimately, th e 112t h Cavalr y RC T

took ove r i n th e regio n sout h o f Hil l

1200, whil e elements o f th e 38t h Infan -

try Divisio n move d int o th e are a be -

tween Hil l 120 0 an d th e Sant a Ine z

road. Continuin g t o patro l eastward ,

the 112t h Cavalry found n o trace s of organized Japanese resistance. B y the end

of Ma y th e regimen t ha d kille d abou t

170 Japanes e straggler s i n th e are a i t

covered, itsel f losin g 2 me n kille d an d

12 wounded .

The operation s i n th e regio n sout h

of th e Sant a Ine z road wer e not spectac -

ular, bu t the y serve d th e purpos e fo r

which the y were designed. Withou t th e

security th e patrollin g action s o n th e

right rear provided, the 6th Division and

other X I Corp s unit s woul d hav e bee n

unable t o brin g t o bea r thei r ful l

strength agains t th e Kobayashi Force

and th e Wawa Dam defenses.

Breakthrough in the Center

The 6th Division Strikes North

The 6t h Division's firs t plan s fo r th e

capture of Wawa Dam called fo r th e 1s t

and 20t h Infantr y Regiment s t o driv e

northward abreast , th e 1s t Infantr y o n

the east.3 Wit h its right on the Bosoboso

River, th e 1s t Infantr y wa s t o strik e

north acros s a fron t a mil e an d a hal f

wide. (Map 16) The terrai n i n th e regiment's zone was dominated by a partially

wooded, steep-side d ridg e lin e runnin g

north-northwest fro m Mt . Baytangan ,

the regiment 's lin e o f departure . Th e

first sectio n o f th e ridg e nort h o f Mt .

Baytangan th e 1st Infantr y soo n dubbed

Woodpecker Ridg e afte r th e larg e

number an d constan t chatte r o f Jap -

anese machin e gun s tha t characterize d

the defenses . Th e regimen t hope d i t

could quickl y clea r Woodpecke r Ridg e

as fa r a s dominatin g ground jus t south -

west o f th e Bosoboso-Marikin a conflu -

ence, groun d tha t als o controlle d th e

upper reache s o f th e Mang o Rive r i n

the 20t h Infantry' s zone .

The 20t h Infantry' s firs t majo r objec -

tive wa s Mt . Mataba . Par t o f th e regi -

ment wa s to strike toward thi s objectiv e

along a 1,000-foot-hig h bar e ridg e lead -

ing west-northwest fro m Mt . Baytangan .

The ridg e gav e wa y to a n open-slope d

north-south ridge line, the northern en d

of whic h la y a mile east o f Mt. Mataba's

crest and joined that crest across a saddle

over 75 0 fee t high . A s o f 2 8 March ,

when th e 6t h Division's ne w attac k wa s

to start , th e 20t h Infantr y alread y ha d

one infantry company on the north-south

ridge a t a kno b a mil e an d a hal f

southeast of Mataba's peak.

The 63 d Infantr y woul d suppor t th e

20th Infantr y b y executing diversionary

attacks alon g th e wester n slope s o f Mt .

Mataba. Genera l Hurdis , th e 6t h Divi -

3

 Planning informatio n her e is from : 6t h Di v F O

26, 25 Mar 45 ; XI Corp s FO 11 , 26 Mar 45 .
Map 16
394 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

sion commander, hoped tha t th e attack s

would forc e th e Kobayashi Force t o dis -

close th e locatio n o f machin e gun , mor -

tar, an d artiller y emplacements, thereb y

permitting the division's supporting air -

craft an d artiller y t o delive r timel y an d

accurate fir e fo r th e 20t h Infantry . Th e

6th Reconnaissanc e Troop , fo r simila r

purposes, woul d prob e eas t acros s th e

Bosoboso River toward Mt. Purro, which

overlooked al l th e 1s t Infantry' s zone .

Intense small arms, machine gun , an d

mortar fire , occasionall y augmente d b y

accurate harassin g artiller y bombard -

ments, characterize d th e resistanc e th e

1st an d 20t h Infantr y Regiment s en -

countered durin g th e wee k beginnin g

28 March. 4 Operation s seesawe d bac k

and fort h a s th e America n unit s gav e

ground tha t prove d untenable , but the n

attacked t o regain th e same ground. A t

the en d o f th e wee k Japanes e resistanc e

seemed stronge r tha n whe n th e attac k

began. Th e 20t h Infantr y ha d move d

less than half a mile toward Mt . Mataba ,

and th e 1s t Infantr y ha d secure d hardl y

250 yard s o f groun d i n a northerl y di -

rection. Bot h regiments wer e becomin g

bogged down.

General Hurdis had hope d his attack,

directed agains t th e Kobayashi Force

southern flank , woul d b e fa r mor e suc -

cessful, bu t th e Kobayashi Force, rapidly

and efficiently , ha d reoriente d it s de -

fenses, whic h i t ha d lai d ou t primaril y

to fac e a n attac k fro m th e west. 5 Th e

force's tw o remaining provisiona l infan -

try regiments , th e Central an d Right

Sector Units, wer e still relativel y intact ,

and the Central Sector Unit, bearing the

brunt o f th e 6t h Division' s offensive ,

had recentl y bee n reinforce d b y rem -

nants o f th e Left Sector Unit an d

elements of th e Shimbu Group Reserve.

Other factor s bearin g o n th e 6t h Di -

vision's slow progress were the declining

strength an d deterioratin g comba t effi -

ciency o f it s infantr y regiments . Th e

20th Infantr y coul d muste r onl y 2,08 5

effectives o n 3 April ; som e o f it s rifl e

companies wer e reduce d t o th e comba t

strength o f platoons . Th e situatio n

within th e 1s t Infantry , with an effectiv e

strength o f 2,150 , wa s littl e better . A s

of 3 April th e commanders of both regi -

ments rated their units' combat efficiency

only a s "fair, " th e lowes t rankin g o f

three term s eac h ha d employe d sinc e

the Lingaye n Gulf assault. 6

The X I Corp s an d th e 6t h Divisio n

would hav e to make some changes if th e

division wer e t o continu e th e offensive ,

and durin g th e perio d 3- 5 April , Gen -

erals Hal l an d Hurdi s effecte d som e o f

the most necessar y ones . First , Genera l

Hall reduce d th e 6t h Division' s front ,

organizing a provisiona l brigad e com -

posed o f th e 112t h Cavalr y RC T an d

the 169t h RCT , 43 d Division , t o tak e

over th e are a nort h o f a n east-wes t lin e

across Mt. Oro , a line tha t corresponded

closely t o th e boundar y betwee n th e 4

 The principa l source s fo r U.S . operation s de -

scribed i n thi s subsectio n are : 6t h Di v Rp t Luzon ,

pp. 64-75 ; 6t h Di v Arty Rp t Luzon , pp . 43-54 ; 6t h

Div G- 2 Pe r Rpts , 2 7 Mar-3 0 Ap r 45; 1s t In f Rp t

Luzon, pp . 50-55 ; 1s t In f S- 3 Opn s Rpts , 2 7 Mar -

24 Apr 45 ; 20t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 40-44 ; 20t h In f

S-3 Opn s Rpts , 2 7 Mar-1 8 Ap r 45 ; 63 d In f Rp t

Luzon, pp . 25-30 ; 63 d In f S- 3 Pe r Rpts , 2 7 Mar -

29 Ap r 45 .

5

 Japanese informatio n i n thi s subsectio n i s from :

6th Di v G- 2 Pe r Rpts , 2 7 Mar-30 Ap r 45 ; 6t h Di v

Rpt Luzon , pp . 62 , 67, 71. 6

 6th Di v G- 1 Dail y Strengt h Rpt , 4 Ap r 45 , 6t h

Div G- 3 Jn l File , 1-1 5 Ap r 45; 20th In f Rp t Luzon ,

p. 42 ; 20th In f S-3 Opn s Rp t 85 , 3 Apr 45 ; 1s t In f

Rpt Luzon , p. 53 ; 1s t In f S-3 Rp t 85 , 3 Apr 45.
Terrain Defended By Kobayashi Force
396 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Kobayashi an d Kawashima Forces. Hal l

placed th e brigade unde r th e command

of Brig . Gen . Julia n W . Cunningha m

and designate d th e provisiona l uni t

Baldy Force. 7 Cunningham' s commands

were almos t alway s "cursed " wit h thi s

name, fo r th e general , lik e Fria r Tuck ,

had jus t a fringe o f hair around his pate.

The chang e of boundarie s on the

north release d th e bul k o f th e 63 d In -

fantry fo r Genera l Hurdis' us e in a new

attack against th e Kobayashi Force. The

63d Infantr y ha d abou t 2,42 5 relativel y

fresh comba t effective s a s of 3 April and

was read y fo r a goo d scrap . Hurdi s di -

rected th e uni t t o reliev e th e 20t h In -

fantry an d continu e th e attac k nort h

toward Mt. Mataba . Fo r th e time being

the 1s t Infantr y woul d hol d th e littl e

ground it had gained along Woodpecker

Ridge an d confin e it s activitie s t o

patrolling.8

From 6 through 9 April the 63d Infantry mad e onl y limite d advance s an d o n

the 10t h switche d th e emphasi s o f it s

attack t o a driv e u p th e wester n slope s

of Mt . Mataba . Ove r a mont h earlie r

the 1st Infantry ha d faile d i n a n attemp t

to tak e Mt . Matab a fro m th e west , bu t

now th e 63 d Infantry , movin g forwar d

behind a heav y artiller y preparation ,

found th e mountain's bare western slopes

weakly defended. O n 1 0 April th e regiment secure d th e southwester n quarte r

of th e mountain , bu t the n discovere d

that th e Kobayashi Force still retained a

remarkable degre e o f maneuverability .

Having pulle d man y troop s ou t o f it s

western defense s t o mee t th e attac k

from th e south , th e Kobayashi Force

quickly transferred strengt h bac k t o Mt .

Mataba from th e north-south ridge. The

Japanese did no t hav e sufficient strengt h

to hol d bot h terrai n feature s fo r long ,

but the y wer e abl e t o kee p th e 63 d In -

fantry of f Mt . Mataba' s cres t unti l 1 7

April.

The 63 d Infantry' s succes s a t Mt .

Mataba on th e 17t h wa s accompanied by

a renewe d 1s t Infantr y effor t t o driv e

north alon g Woodpecke r Ridge . Th e

effort failed , and b y the end o f the day it

became evident that until supporting artillery an d aircraf t coul d reduc e man y

more defense s i n th e 1s t Infantry' s zon e

the regimen t coul d gai n groun d alon g

Woodpecker Ridg e onl y a t th e ris k o f

prohibitive casualties . Fo r th e secon d

time i n tw o week s Genera l Hurdi s

ordered th e 1s t Infantr y t o halt .

Hurdis hope d t o mov e immediatel y

against Mt . Pacawaga n an d Wawa Dam ,

but h e agai n face d personne l problems .

As of 1 7 April the 1s t Infantry's effectiv e

strength was 2,190; the 63 d Infantr y ha d

less tha n 2,33 5 effectives ; an d th e 20t h

Infantry, buil t bac k u p t o a strengt h o f

2,485 effectives , stil l neede d rest . Th e

rifle companie s o f th e 1s t Infantr y aver -

aged onl y 10 5 effectives apiece , th e 20t h

Infantry's wer e a t 125 , an d th e 63d' s

companies coul d muste r les s tha n 12 0

effectives each. 9

The proble m wa s solved i n somewha t

the sam e fashio n tha t i t ha d bee n o n 3

April. Th e 145t h Infantr y o f th e 37t h

Division cam e ou t o f Manila , an d th e

20th Infantr y o f th e 6t h Divisio n wen t

into th e cit y t o tak e u p garriso n duties .

Out o f comba t fo r ove r a month , th e

7

 XI Corp s FO 13 , 3 Apr 45 . 8

 6th Di v FO 27, 3 Apr 45 .

9

 6th Di v G-1 Dail y Strengt h Rpt , 1 7 Apr 45, and

6th Di v G-1 Battl e Casualty Rpt , 1 7 Apr 45, both in

6th Di v G-3 Jn l File , 15-1 9 Ap r 45.
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I I 397

145th Infantr y ha d a n effectiv e strengt h

of 3,00 0 troop s and , rested, wa s read y

to strike into the mountain s against th e

Shimbu Group. Genera l Hurdi s di -

rected th e regimen t t o mov e o n Mt .

Pacawagan fro m th e west ; h e ordere d

the 63d Infantr y t o provid e th e ne w arrivals with fire support from Mt . Mataba;

and h e instructe d th e 1s t Infantr y t o

hold and patro l pending the outcome of

the 145t h Infantry 's attack . Th e latte r

was t o hav e th e followin g support: 10

Division and Corps Artillery

3 105-mm. howitzer battalions

2 155-mm. howitzer battalions

1 155-mm . gun batter y

1 240-mm. howitzer battery

1 8-inch howitzer battery

2 90-mm. AAA gun batterie s

From the 63d RCT on Mt. Mataba

5 M7 105-mm . SPM howitzers of Canno n

Company

8 81-mm. mortars

8 4.2-inch mortars

2 57-mm. AT gun s

11 .50-caliber machine guns

12 .30-caliber heavy machine guns

The suppor t fire s almos t pulverize d

Japanese defense s o n th e wester n an d

southern slope s o f Mt . Pacawagan , ye t

the 145t h Infantry , startin g its attack o n

21 April , coul d no t secur e a hol d o n

much o f th e mountai n unti l th e 30th .

Even then , th e Kobayashi Force main -

tained position s o n th e extrem e north -

eastern pea k an d o n a spu r hil l abou t

three-quarters o f a mil e south-southeas t

of th e northeaster n crest . Th e gain s

through 3 0 April ha d cost th e 145t h In -

fantry 5 5 me n kille d an d 22 0 wounded

—in nin e day s th e regimen t ha d in -

curred mor e casualtie s tha n ha d an y

regiment o f th e 6t h Divisio n fo r th e

entire mont h o f April .

During the 145th Infantry 's attac k the

1st and 63 d Infantr y Regiments had continued t o hol d th e groun d the y alread y

occupied until relieved late in the month

by th e 151st an d 152 d Infantry Regi -

ments of the 38th Division. O n 3 0 April

responsibility fo r furthe r offensive s

against th e Kobayashi Force an d towar d

Wawa Da m passe d fro m th e 6t h t o th e

38th Division. 11

Having virtuall y destroye d th e Kobayashi Force's Left Sector Unit b y th e

end o f March , th e 6t h Divisio n an d it s

attachments had mad e significant stride s

during April towar d th e eliminatio n o f

the Central an d Right Sector Units. I n

fact, th e Japanes e unit designation s ha d

apparently los t meanin g b y th e en d o f

April an d Headquarters, Kobayashi

Force, ha d take n ove r direc t contro l o f

defensive operation s i n fron t o f Waw a

Dam. Tha t Japanes e forc e ha d los t

about 3,00 0 me n kille d fro m 2 8 March

through 3 0 April, and ha d give n u p im -

portant defensive terrain. Th e casualtie s

of America n unit s engage d agains t th e

Kobayashi Force from 2 8 March through

30 Apri l were: 12

10

 6th Di v Opn s Mem o 2 , 1 6 Apr 45 , 6t h Di v F O

File; 6t h Di v F O 28 , 1 8 Apr 45 ; 6t h Di v Art y Rp t

Luzon, p. 51; Memo, Asst ACof S G-3 Sixt h Army for

ACofS G-3 Sixt h Army , 23 Apr 45, sub: Rp t o f Visi t

to 6t h Di v 21 Apr, Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon ,

22-24 Ap r 45 .

11

 6th Div G-3 Opn s Rpts, 25-30 Apr 45; 145th Inf

Rpt Luzon , pp. 36-37; 145t h Inf S-3 Pe r Rpts 18-30

Apr 45 ; 152 d Inf Rp t Luzon , 3 Mar-30 Jun 45 , pp.

3-4; ibid., Intel-Summaries, 25-31 [sic] Apr 45; 152 d

Inf S- 3 Pe r Rpts, 25-30 Ap r 45. 12

 The figure s ar e base d primaril y o n regimenta l

records cited previously in this subsection. No figure s

available fo r th e 151st .
398 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Unit

1st Infantr y

20th Infantr y

63d Infantr y

145th Infantr y

151st Infantry

152d Infantr y

Total

Killed

40

40

35

55

5

175

Wounded

115

130

140

220

10

615

Total

155

170

275

275

15

790

When relieve d b y th e 38t h Division ,

the 6t h Divisio n wa s i n poo r shape .

Morale was down, men an d officer s alik e

were tired an d worn , and al l units were

sadly understrength , especiall y i n com -

bat effectives . Sinc e 2 2 Februar y th e

6th Divisio n ha d suffere d approximate -

ly 1,33 5 comba t casualties—33 5 kille d

and 1,00 0 wounded—an d ove r thre e

times tha t numbe r o f me n ha d bee n

evacuated fro m th e fron t line s eithe r

permanently or temporarily for noncombat injuries , sickness , an d psychoneu -

rotic causes . Th e Sixt h Army 's twi n

millstones o f th e Luzo n Campaign —

lack o f combat replacements and lac k o f

strength t o effect timel y rotation of units

in contact—ha d weighe d heavil y upo n

the division .

The 38th Division Attacks,

1-18 May

During th e perio d 1- 3 Ma y the 38t h

Division executed probin g attack s i n

preparation for a concerted drive toward

Wawa Dam beginning on the 4th.13 X I

Corps, anticipatin g quick succes s i n thi s

new attack , estimate d tha t th e bul k o f

the Kobayashi Force ha d eithe r alread y

withdrawn o r wa s i n th e proces s o f re -

treating east across th e Bosobos o River.

The corp s als o estimate d tha t th e Japa -

nese unit maintained only small delaying

attachments wes t an d sout h o f Waw a

Dam.

The X I Corps ' estimate s wer e quit e

inaccurate. Fa r fro m abandonin g th e

ground i n fron t o f Wawa Dam, Genera l

Yokoyama was preparing a limited counteroffensive i n th e for m o f a serie s o f

harassing, delayin g actions . Yokoyam a

felt tha t th e Kobayashi Force wa s strong

enough fo r at least one mor e good fight .

Since 2 0 Februar y th e force , togethe r

with it s attachment s fro m th e Noguchi

Force an d th e Shimbu Group Reserve,

had lost ove r 7,00 0 men kille d but, having bee n reinforce d fro m tim e t o time ,

still had a strength o f at least 6,500 men

as of 3 May . Thes e troop s forme d a cohesive unit , not, as X I Corp s ha d esti -

mated, a grou p o f isolate d delayin g

detachments. Finally, the remaining ele -

ments o f th e Shimbu Group Reserve,

some 3,00 0 me n locate d a t o r nea r Mt .

Purro, backe d u p th e Kobayashi Force,

One o f th e reason s tha t prompte d

General Yokoyama to undertake another

counteroffensive despit e th e miserabl e

failure o f hi s previou s tw o attempt s

would undoubtedl y hav e embarrasse d

XI Corp s ha d tha t corp s learne d o f it .

Yokoyama ha d no t bee n impresse d b y

the corps' progress during April. O n the

contrary, h e ha d become perturbe d a t

what h e terme d a lul l i n operation s o n

his wester n front . S o marke d ha d thi s

lull seemed to Yokoyama that by the end

13

 Information o n America n an d Japanese plans in

this subsection is from: X I Corp s Rpt Luzon , pp. 28 ,

31; X I Corp s FO's 15, 16 , an d 17 , dated 2 0 an d 2 8

Apr and 1 May 45; 38th Div Rpt Luzon , pp. 95, 134-

36; 38th Di v FO 24, 30 Apr 45, 6th Di v G-3 Jn l File , 28-30 Apr 45; 38th Di v FO 25 , 1 May 45, Sixth Army

G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 30 Apr-2 Ma y 45; 38th Di v FO

26, 3 May 45, 38th Di v G-3 Jnl , 16 Apr-27 Ma y 45;

38th Div , G- 2 Estimat e o f th e Enem y Situatio n a s

Pertains t o th e Mt . Or o . . . Mt. Purr o Area , 2 0

Apr 45 , atchd t o 152 d In f F O 15 , 22 Apr 45, 152 d In f

FO File ; SWP A Hist Series, II, 482-85 ; Luzo n Opn s

of th e Shimbu Gp, pp. 16-17 .
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I I 399

of Apri l h e ha d decide d tha t X I Corp s

must be moving the bulk o f its troops to

northern Luzon , i f no t of f Luzo n alto -

gether. I f so , Yokoyam a ha d faile d t o

execute hi s primar y mission—t o pi n

down a sizabl e numbe r o f U.S . force s

for a protracte d period . Th e onl y wa y

Yokoyama coul d fin d t o aver t thi s fail -

ure wa s t o stag e limite d counterattack s

to forestal l furthe r X I Corp s redeploy -

ment an d t o forc e th e retur n t o th e

Shimbu are a o f America n unit s tha t

might alread y hav e moved north .

The Shimbu Group commande r

planned n o attemp t t o retak e an d hol d

lost ground. Rather , he hoped tha t with

a serie s o f stron g infiltratio n attack s h e

could creat e s o muc h chao s an d confu -

sion withi n th e X I Corp s are a tha t hi s

ends would be realized . H e directe d his

troops t o execut e thei r operation s during the hours of darkness and t o hide out

during the day . Th e infiltratio n attack s

were to begin o n 1 0 May, an d al l partic -

ipating units wer e t o b e reassemble d i n

their origina l position s b y th e 25th .

On 1 0 Ma y tw o battalion s o f Kawashima Force wer e to begin harassin g the

38th Division' s lef t rea r nort h o f Mont -

alban t o cove r preparation s fo r th e

Shimbu Group's mai n effort , whic h wa s

to star t o n th e 12th . Th e principa l

striking forc e o f th e mai n bod y woul d

be th e understrengt h 31st Infantry o f

the Shimbu Group Reserve and three or

four battalions—averagin g less tha n 30 0

men apiece—o f Kobayashi Force. These

units were apparently t o converge upo n

the tow n o f Marikina . Wha t wa s lef t o f

the Noguchi Force woul d provid e addi -

tional suppor t fo r th e mai n effor t b y

launching raids along XI Corps' southern

flank.

As had been the cas e with Yokoyama's

mid-March counterattack, 14 everythin g

went wron g wit h hi s earl y Ma y effort .

Again, he did no t hav e th e slightest inkling of XI Corps intentions. H e did no t

know, fo r example , tha t th e corp s wa s

redeploying th e 43d Division t o th e Ip o

Dam fron t t o begi n a n offensiv e ther e

before th e en d o f th e firs t wee k o f May ;

he ha d n o ide a tha t th e 38t h Divisio n

was to start an all-out drive toward Wawa

Dam o n 4 May ; h e ha d wrongl y guessed

that X I Corp s wa s transferrin g troop s

away fro m th e Waw a Da m front . In -

deed, th e whol e cours e o f Yokoyama' s

planning a t this junctur e seem s t o indicate tha t th e Shimbu Group wa s n o

longer capabl e o f acquirin g eve n th e

most rudimentar y element s o f tactica l

intelligence.

During the XI Corps' probin g attacks

of 1- 3 Ma y the 145t h Infantry , 37t h Division, secure d al l thos e portion s o f Mt .

Pacawagan havin g th e greates t militar y

value t o bot h th e Kobayashi Force an d

the 38t h Division , t o whic h th e 145t h

was now attached. A t th e same time th e

152d Infantry , 38t h Division , ha d mad e

gains o f hal f a mile on Woodpecke r

Ridge.15 Th e 145t h Infantr y wa s now

to strik e directl y eas t t o seiz e Waw a

Dam, an d th e 152 d Infantr y wa s to continue north along Woodpecker Ridg e in

a supportin g attack . Tw o battalion s o f

the 151st Infantry guarde d th e flank s o f

the 38t h Division ; th e third hel d a t Mt .

Mataba.

On 4 Ma y th e 145t h Infantr y gaine d

up to 1,00 0 yard s along the northern and

14

 See above, ch. XXI. 15

 The 152 d Infantr y wa s now "well commanded "

by Colonel Ives, who had earlier been relieved of the command o f th e 20t h Infantry , 6t h Divisio n (se e

above, ch . XI). Comments, o n 3 Decembe r 1956 , o f

Maj. Gen . Willia m C . Chase, Commandin g General,

38th Division , a t th e tim e o f thi s actio n o n Luzon .
400 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

northeastern slope s o f Mt . Pacawagan ,

but could secur e little new ground in a n

easterly direction. 16 Th e 152 d Infantry

advanced abou t 50 0 yard s northwar d

along Woodpecke r Ridge . Thes e gains,

unspectacular a s the y were , ha d a pro -

found effec t upo n th e Shimbu Group's

plans. Suddenly , Yokoyam a realize d

that X I Corp s ha d mounte d a serious ,

immediate threa t t o hi s center . Sinc e

the threa t ha d bee n developin g for ove r

a month , i t i s difficul t t o ascertai n jus t

what cause d Yokoyam a t o chang e hi s

mind abou t X I Corp s disposition s an d

intentions. Probabl e contributin g fac -

tors wer e th e intensit y o f th e artiller y

preparations fo r th e 38t h Division' s at -

tack o f 4 May , the scal e o f th e artiller y

and morta r suppor t provide d th e 145t h

and 152 d Infantry Regiment s through -

out th e 4th, and th e gain s mad e b y th e

38th Divisio n afte r 1 May. Whatever

the reasons , Yokoyam a o n 4 Ma y di -

rected hi s force s t o initiat e thei r infil -

tration attack s immediatel y instea d o f

waiting until 1 0 May.

While th e Japanes e wer e hurriedl y

trying t o mov e int o positio n fo r thei r

attacks, th e 145t h Infantr y struc k east -

ward t o seiz e th e rock y pinnacl e o f Mt .

Binicayan, risin g sharpl y t o a heigh t o f

1,250 fee t o n th e sout h ban k o f th e

Marikina River at Wawa Dam. With its

equally rocky twin, Mt. Pamitinan north

of th e Marikina , Mt . Binicaya n domi -

nated th e Marikin a Valle y fro m th e

northeastern slope s of Mt. Pacawaga n t o

the Marikina-Bosobos o junction . Ac -

cordingly, th e 145t h Infantry 's seizur e of

Binicayan's cres t o n 9 Ma y wa s a sub -

stantial achievement , an d th e los s wa s

one the Kobayashi Force could ill afford .

Indeed, that Japanese unit had expended

most o f its efforts durin g the perio d 5- 9

May i n a vai n an d costl y attempt—40 0

men killed—t o kee p th e 145t h Infantr y

off Mt . Binicayan . Th e fac t tha t th e

Kobayashi Force ha d faile d t o defen d

Binicayan i n greate r strengt h wa s a

tactical mistak e o f considerabl e magni -

tude. Risin g shee r fro m th e gorg e o f

the Marikin a a t Waw a Dam , the cave -

pocked, rocky peak, adequately defended,

would hav e prove d virtuall y impregna -

ble. Moreover , adequat e defense s o n

Mt. Pamitinan , acros s th e river , coul d

have rendere d muc h o f Mt . Binicaya n

untenable fo r th e 145t h Infantry .

Probably on e reaso n th e Kobayashi

Force ha d no t bee n abl e t o hol d Mt .

Binicayan wa s that muc h o f its strengt h

had bee n redeployin g t o tak e par t i n

Yokoyama's schedule d counterattack .

But th e Kobayashi Force's shar e i n th e

counterattack effor t neve r go t of f th e

ground. Tha t uni t sho t its bolt defend -

ing Mt . Binicaya n an d Woodpecke r

Ridge, an d th e 145t h Infantr y neve r

knew i t wa s being counterattacked . I n

the 152d Infantry's sector action followed

different lines . Operatin g against Japa -

nese defense s o n th e ridge—an d no w

undertaking wide envelopments instea d

of costl y fronta l assaults—th e 152 d ran

headlong int o troop s o f th e Shimbu

Group Reserve wh o wer e movin g wes t

across th e Bosobos o Rive r t o tak e par t

in th e counterattack . Th e ne w arrivals

16

 The remainde r o f thi s subsectio n i s base d on :

38th Di v Rpt Luzon , pp . 96-101, 137; 145th In f Rp t

Luzon, pp. 45-59; 145t h Inf S-3 Pe r Rpts, 1-18 May

45; 152 d Inf Rpt Luzon , 3 May-30 Jun 45, pp. 3-5;

152d In f S- 3 Pe r Rpts , 1-1 9 May 45; 152d Inf Inte l

Summaries, 1-18 Ma y 45; 151st Inf S-3 Pe r Rpts, 1 -

18 Ma y 45; Luzo n Opn s of th e Shimbu Gp, pp . 17 -

18; SWP A His t Series , II, 484-85 ; Statemen t o f Ma j

Noriaki Akuts u (Staf f Kawashima Force), i n States ,

I, 22-26 ; Narrativ e o f Co l Kobayashi , i n 10t h I&H

Staff Study , Japanes e Opn s o n Luzon .
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I I 401

6TH DIVISIO N APPROAC H T O WAWA DA M

slowed th e 152 d Infantry , whil e a t th e

same tim e th e Japanes e foun d i t neces -

sary to fight hard even to hold the ground

from whic h thei r infiltratio n attack s

were t o be launched . I n th e end , coun -

terattack actio n i n th e 152 d Infantry' s

sector wa s limite d t o a serie s o f daw n

and dus k raid s beginnin g o n 1 4 Ma y

and lastin g about a week.

Elsewhere acros s th e X I Corp s front ,

the Shimbu Group's effor t ha d no effect .

By th e tim e th e Kawashima Force's tw o

battalions were ready to move south, the

43d Divisio n ha d struc k towar d Ip o

Dam, pinnin g the Japanese units to that

front. O n th e fa r south , th e Noguchi

Force remnants were unable to make any

significant contributions . Recognizin g

that th e whol e affai r ha d prove d futile ,

Yokoyama o n 1 5 May ordered al l unit s

involved t o withdra w immediately , or -

ders tha t apparentl y di d no t reac h th e

Shimbu Group Reserve units operatin g

in th e Woodpecke r Ridg e are a fo r al -

most a week . Nevertheless , Yokoyam a

had achieve d some degree of success. B y

delaying the progress o f the 152 d Infan -

try alon g Woodpecke r Ridge , th e Japa -

nese ha d als o delaye d th e captur e o f

Wawa Dam , fo r Maj . Gen . Willia m C .

Chase, commandin g th e 38t h Division ,

believed i t to o risk y t o pus h th e 145t h

Infantry t o th e dam unti l th e 152 d ha d

cleared Woodpecker Ridge . Th e perio d

of th e counterattack—roughly 4 through

18 May—cost the 145th , 151st , and 152 d

Infantry Regiment s approximatel y 8 5

men kille d an d 30 5 wounded; th e Kob-
402 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

ayashi Force los t almos t 1,30 0 men

killed durin g the same period.

Wawa Dam and Beyond, 19-31 May

The 38t h Divisio n face d som e per -

plexing tactica l problem s a t evenin g o n

18 May . The 145t h Infantr y hel d a

dangerously exposed salien t a t Mt. Bini -

cayan, and almost a mile of rough terrai n

separated th e regimen t fro m th e 152d' s

forward element s o n Woodpecke r

Ridge.17 Th e Japanes e could stil l mov e

forces i n betwee n th e 145t h an d 152 d

from th e eas t sid e o f th e Bosobos o

River. At th e same time , Genera l Chas e

felt i t necessary to either overrun or neu -

tralize Japanes e position s o n th e hig h

ground nort h o f Waw a Da m befor e

launching a fina l attac k towar d th e dam.

The onl y goo d suppl y rout e ove r whic h

he could support th e fina l attac k t o seiz e

the da m wa s a narro w grave l roa d run -

ning alon g th e sout h ban k o f th e Mari -

kina fro m Montalba n t o th e dam . Th e

Japanese controlled the road by artillery,

mortar, an d machin e gu n fir e fro m th e

heights north o f th e dam .

So far , Genera l Chas e ha d bee n un -

able t o stag e an y offensiv e nort h o f th e

Marikina. Th e la y of th e groun d there ,

together wit h th e locatio n o f Japanes e

defenses i n th e area , require d tha t an y

advance b e mad e acros s a fron t extend -

ing nort h fro m Mt . Pamitina n fou r

miles t o Mt . Oro. To 1 8 May, th e 38t h

Division ha d bee n unabl e t o plac e mor e

than on e battalio n o f th e 151s t Infantr y

in th e region , a forc e patentl y to o smal l

to attac k acros s s o broad a front .

Shortages o f artiller y an d 81-mm .

mortar ammunitio n ha d als o playe d a

major par t i n Genera l Chase' s decisio n

not t o launc h a n offensiv e nort h o f th e

Marikina. H e ha d ha d troubl e provid -

ing adequate ammunition to support the

operations o f th e 145t h an d 152 d Infan -

try Regiment s durin g th e perio d 4-1 8

May, an d th e shortage s ha d helpe d

prompt hi m t o kee p his 149t h Infantr y

in reserv e durin g tha t period . Th e

shortages were , perhaps , no t a s critica l

as th e 38t h Divisio n commande r be -

lieved. On e o f th e reasons th e Japanes e

gave fo r th e failur e o f thei r Ma y coun -

terattack wa s tha t America n artiller y

had broke n u p th e effor t befor e i t wa s

well unde r way .

General Chas e finall y decide d tha t

once th e 152 d Infantry' s attac k t o clea r

Woodpecker Ridg e ha d gaine d momen -

tum, th e 151s t Infantry, los s on e battal -

ion, woul d launc h a driv e i n th e are a

north o f th e Marikin a t o clea r Mt .

Pamitinan and Mt . Hapanong-Banoy ,

three quarter s o f a mil e t o th e north .

The 149t h Infantr y woul d reliev e th e

145th i n plac e and , afte r th e attack s o f

the 151s t an d 152 d showed promis e o f

certain success, th e 149t h would descend

on Wawa Dam, its flank s secure d an d it s

supply rout e safe .

On 1 9 and 2 0 May th e 152 d Infantry

continued envelopin g maneuver s a t

Woodpecker Ridg e whil e 38t h Divisio n

engineers bulldoze d road s t o th e fron t

lines t o permi t mediu m tanks , flam e

thrower tanks , an d half-track s mountin g

multiple .50-calibe r machin e gun s t o

make their way forward. Wit h this close

fire suppor t (th e flame throwe r tank s

17

 Information i n thi s subsection is based primaril y

on: 38t h Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 101-09 , 140; 38th Div

G-3 Pe r Rpts , 19-3 1 Ma y 45; 152 d In f Rp t Luzon ,

3 Mar-3 0 Ju n 45 , 5-6; 152d In f Inte l Summaries ,

19-31 Ma y 45; S-3 Pe r Rpt s o f th e 149th , 151st , an d

152 In f Regts , 19-3 1 Ma y 45 ; SWP A His t Series , II ,

484-85; Luzo n Opn s o f th e Shimbu Gp, pp . 20-21 .
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I I 403

proved especiall y effective) , th e 152 d

Infantry resume d fronta l attack s alon g

the ridg e o n 2 1 May . Japanes e resis -

tance bega n t o collapse . Th e nex t da y

the collapse turned int o rout, and b y 2 5

May th e regimen t controlle d th e junc -

tion o f th e Marikin a an d Bosobos o

Rivers. Fro m th e 25th until th e end o f

the mont h th e regimen t outposte d th e

west ban k o f th e Bosobos o fro m thi s

confluence sout h t o Mt . Baytanga n an d

sent patrol s acros s th e Bosobos o t o fee l

out Japanes e strengt h a t Mt . Purro .

The 151s t Infantr y ha d initiate d it s

drive north o f th e Marikin a o n 2 1 May.

By th e 26t h its troops were o n th e western slope s o f Mts. Pamitinan an d Hapanong-Banoy, an d Japanes e resistanc e

began to melt away. Th e 149t h Infantr y

struck towar d Waw a Da m o n th e 27t h

and, encounterin g n o opposition , se -

cured i t intac t a t midmornin g o n th e

28th. Th e las t remnants of the Kobayashi

Force ha d withdrawn .

General Yokoyam a ha d ha d littl e

choice bu t t o orde r a retrea t afte r th e

failure of the Kobayashi Force to achieve

lasting results with th e mid-May counterattack. Th e force' s fron t had , indeed,

virtually collapse d b y 2 2 May. At th e

same time th e Kawashima Force, on th e

Ipo Da m front , wa s provin g incapabl e

of holdin g back th e 43d Division . Wit h

his righ t an d cente r breakin g apart just

as hi s lef t ha d folde d a t th e en d o f

March, Genera l Yokoyama , o n 2 7 May ,

ordered a genera l withdrawal . Organ -

ized remnants of th e Kobayashi Force i n

the Waw a Da m are a acte d o n thes e

orders durin g th e followin g night , pursued o n subsequen t day s b y patrol s o f

the 38t h Division . B y 3 1 Ma y Genera l

Chase ha d ampl e evidenc e t o conclud e

that the Kobayashi Force had withdrawn.

Wawa Dam, h e knew, was secure beyond

the shadow of a doubt; in th e futur e th e

38th Divisio n woul d mo p u p an d pur -

sue rathe r tha n mak e concerte d attack s

against organize d Japanes e lines.

The Ma y operations t o secur e Waw a

Dam ha d cost th e 38t h Division , includ -

ing th e attache d 145t h Infantr y o f th e

37th Division , som e 75 0 comba t casual -

ties—160 killed and 59 0 wounded. Dur -

ing th e month th e Kobayashi Force ha d

lost anothe r 3,00 0 men killed i n ground

action alone , whil e countless others ha d

died o f starvation , disease , o r a s th e re -

sult o f America n ai r an d artiller y bom -

bardment. A t th e en d o f Ma y th e

Kobayashi Force ha d followe d th e Noguchi Force int o oblivion a s an effectiv e

combat unit; as of 31 May Headquarters,

Kobayashi Force, had under its control an

organized group of less than 3,000 troops.

The Shimbu Group Reserve had also suffered heavily during the month and probably coul d no t muste r ove r 1,50 0 effec -

tives. Meanwhile , th e Kawashima Force

had suffere d heavil y a t th e hand s o f th e

43d Division .

The Seizure of Ipo Dam

The 43 d Division' s redeploymen t t o

the Ip o Da m fron t i n earl y Ma y ha d

been a departur e fro m Genera l Hall' s

plan fo r th e destructio n o f th e Shimbu

Group an d fro m Genera l Krueger' s

schedule o f operation s fo r th e seizur e o f

the component s o f th e Manil a wate r

supply system. Bot h plan s had called fo r

the seriati m destructio n o f th e Shimbu

Group's thre e wester n fron t force s b y

steady attack fro m sout h t o north. Thus,

from X I Corps ' poin t o f view , th e 43 d

Division's displacemen t ha d bee n pre -

mature, and th e decision t o move the di-
404 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

vision northwar d ha d bee n force d upo n

General Hal l b y highe r headquarters .

Offensive and Defensive Plans

The necessit y for initiating a drive on

Ipo Da m befor e completin g operation s

to seiz e Waw a Da m stemme d fro m Ma -

nila's wate r suppl y problems . B y mid -

April a n acut e wate r shortag e ha d

developed withi n th e city . Informin g

General Kruege r o f thi s problem , Gen -

eral MacArthu r tol d th e Sixt h Arm y

commander tha t sout h o f th e Pasi g

Manila wa s withou t wate r excep t tha t

supplied b y Army tan k truck s an d shal -

low, usuall y contaminate d wells . Sew -

age disposa l throughou t th e cit y wa s

becoming increasingl y difficul t becaus e

water pressure from th e overtaxed Nova -

liches Reservoir—th e onl y dependabl e

source—was insufficien t t o carr y of f

refuse. Flus h toilets were clogged; many

citizens ha d t o emplo y gutter s an d

esteros fo r defecation . Restaurant s an d

night clubs, happil y and heavil y patron -

ized b y off-dut y America n troops , wer e

finding i t impossibl e t o maintai n mini -

mum sanitar y standards. Th e problem s

increased with a steady, continued influ x

of militar y unit s an d civilian s t o th e

metropolitan area . Ther e wa s very rea l

danger tha t sever e epidemic s migh t

break ou t withi n th e cit y a t an y

moment.18

On 1 9 April Genera l MacArthu r sug -

gested t o Kruege r tha t th e Sixt h Arm y

could solv e Manila's water suppl y prob -

lems b y seizin g "th e reservoi r i n th e

Montalban area, " an d wen t o n t o as k

Krueger how soon that installation would

be captured. 19 Th e quer y puzzle d

Krueger, wh o no w kne w tha t th e onl y

true reservoir s tie d int o th e Manil a

water syste m la y wes t o f th e Marikin a

River an d ha d bee n i n America n hand s

since February. Krueger had also learned

that th e wate r suppl y installatio n near -

est Montalban—Waw a Dam—wa s n o

longer connecte d t o th e metropolita n

system. H e therefor e aske d Genera l

MacArthur i f b y th e phras e "reservoi r

in th e Montalba n area " th e theate r

commander mean t Ip o Dam , th e onl y

major wate r installatio n still in Japanes e

hands.20 Krueger' s questio n apparentl y

prompted furthe r stud y o f Manila' s

water system a t GH Q SWPA , and o n 2 2

April MacArthu r radioe d Kruege r tha t

Ipo Da m wa s th e preferre d objective .

The captur e of the Ipo installation , MacArthur wen t on , woul d solv e Manila' s

water suppl y problems. 21

Upon receivin g MacArthur's message ,

Krueger directe d X I Corp s t o launc h a

drive o n Ip o Da m a s soo n a s possible. 22

General Hall , i n turn , ordere d th e 43 d

Division (les s th e 169t h RCT , alread y

on th e Ipo front ) t o redeploy northward

from th e corps ' righ t flank . H e simul -

taneously disbande d th e provisiona l

Baldy Forc e an d instructe d Genera l

Cunningham's 112t h Cavalr y RC T t o

take ove r th e position s o n th e sout h

vacated b y th e 43 d Division .

18

 Rad , MacArthu r t o Krueger , C-14734 , 1 0 Ap r

45, Sixt h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 18-2 0 Ap r 45 .

19

 Ibid. 20

 Rad, Kruege r t o MacArthur , WG-1303 , 2 1 Apr

45, Sixt h Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 115 . 21

 Rad, MacArthu r to Krueger, C-14552, 22 Apr 45,

Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 20-22 Ap r 45. 22

 Subsequent materia l o n America n plan s i n thi s

subsection i s from : Sixt h Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 74 ;

XI Corp s FO's 1 6 and 17 , 28 Apr an d 1 May 45 ; X I

Corps Rp t Luzon , p . 31 ; 43 d Di v F O 12 , 30 Ap r 45 ;

43d Div Opns Memo 9, 5 May 45; 43d Div Rpt Luzon ,

pp. 44-46.
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I I 405

Another facto r urge d a n earl y attac k

toward Ipo Dam—the rainy season would

be unde r wa y by th e en d o f May . Th e

generally ope n terrai n i n th e Ip o Da m

area, ful l o f rocky outcroppings and cu t

by th e gullie s of innumerable , intermittent, wet-weathe r streams, wa s every bi t

as roug h a s tha t o n th e approache s t o

Wawa Da m and , althoug h no t a s high ,

gave promis e o f bein g eve n mor e diffi -

cult i n ba d weather . Th e 43 d Divisio n

knew of the need for speed, but th e time

the division required for its preparations

made i t impossibl e fo r Genera l Hal l t o

schedule the beginning of the attack an y

earlier tha n 7 May .

The mos t logica l avenu e o f approac h

to Ip o Da m wa s Rout e 52 , a two-lan e

graveled roa d runnin g generall y north -

east fro m Manil a throug h Novaliche s

and o n t o th e dam . Abou t si x mile s

northwest of Montalban, Route 64, coming i n from th e west, joined Rout e 52 at

a junctio n lon g know n a s Ho t Corne r

because Kawashima Force artiller y ha d

had th e junctio n zeroe d i n eve n whe n

the 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n ha d passe d b y

on it s wa y t o Manil a i n th e earl y day s

of February . Rout e 5 2 ra n nort h fro m

Hot Corne r abou t fiv e mile s t o Bigti ,

whence i t swun g northeas t an d eas t t o

the dam , fou r an d a hal f mile s distant .

Route 65- B le d northwes t fou r mile s

from Bigt i t o Norzagara y o n th e Anga t

River, th e water s o f whic h Ip o Da m

diverted int o a n aqueduc t abou t seve n

miles east o f Norzagaray .

Before th e 43d Division moved north,

Baldy Force had held outposts along the

line Norzagaray-Bigti-Ho t Corner , an d

during the period 7-1 2 Apri l had undertaken a reconnaissance-in-force from thi s

line toward Ipo Dam . The n Baldy Force

had discovere d tha t th e Kawashima

Force had thoroughly fortified th e Route

52 approac h t o th e da m an d obviousl y

expected a n attac k astrid e tha t road. 23

The 43 d Division's subsequent searc h

for anothe r rout e o f advanc e wa s a dis -

couraging task. Th e vegetatio n throughout the area was tropically lush, although

spotty. Eve n o n th e brightes t day s th e

entire region , sparsel y inhabite d an d

unsuited t o agriculture, bore an oppressive, weir d aspect . Wildl y tosse d roc k

outcroppings wer e th e pervadin g fea -

ture. Som e stretching horizontally across

the land , som e pyramidin g dizzil y t o

sudden, jumble d heights , thes e dar k

grayish outcroppings and sharp pinnacles

looked lik e th e produc t o f a fantasti c

nightmare induce d b y studyin g a Dal i

portraiture o f th e moon' s surface .

Formed o f bot h sharp-edged rock slab s

and rounde d boulders o f al l imaginabl e

sizes and shapes , and sometime s so brokenly pile d a s t o provid e muc h o f thei r

own bulk with shadow, the outcroppings

often supporte d a sufficien t verdur e o f

brush an d tree s t o giv e Japanes e de -

fenders concealmen t fro m th e pryin g

eyes o f America n groun d an d ai r ob -

servers. B y th e ver y natur e o f thei r

structure th e formations , eve n th e most

bare, als o supplie d th e Japanes e wit h

many a cav e hideaway . Depressing —

although no t withou t a touc h o f wild ,

desolate beauty—th e terrai n looke d

downright unhealthy . T o realiz e tha t a

strong, well-arme d Japanes e forc e de -

fended th e region only lent an additional

foreboding ton e t o th e whole .

The generall y risin g groun d an d a

high range of partially wooded hills tha t

ringed Ip o Da m o n th e north, east , and

south controlle d al l th e approache s t o

23

 112t h Cav RC T Rp t Luzon , pp . 18-21 ; Sixt h

Army Rp t Luzon , I, 73-74 .
406 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

APPROACHES T O IP O DA M

the da m fro m Norzagara y sout h t o Ho t

Corner. Fro m thi s groun d th e Kawashima Force's artillery , mortars, and ma -

chine gun s coul d delive r devastating ,

observed fir e agains t th e 43 d Division .

An attac k betwee n th e Bigti-Ip o Da m

stretch of Route 52 and th e Angat River,

to the north, would have to be channeled

through a two-mile-wid e corrido r i n

rocky, partl y ope n groun d droppin g of f

to th e steep-sided, boulder-strewn gorg e

of th e Angat . Nort h o f th e strea m th e

terrain, more wooded, wa s so rough an d

broken tha t i t seeme d t o preclud e th e

employment of larg e units. Sout h o f th e

Bigti-Ipo Da m stretc h o f Rout e 5 2 th e

ground wa s quit e open , trackless , an d

rough. Here , engineer s woul d hav e t o

bulldoze suppl y road s ove r an d aroun d

rocky outcroppings , workin g u p risin g

terrain wher e Japanes e coul d observ e

every movement .

Nevertheless, Genera l Wing , th e 43 d

Division's commander, decide d t o mak e

his mai n effor t sout h o f Rout e 52 . H e

reached hi s decisio n primaril y becaus e

the Apri l reconnaissance-in-forc e ha d

disclosed tha t Kawashima Force defense s

south o f th e roa d wer e considerabl y

weaker tha n thos e i n th e vicinit y o f th e

highway. Furthermore , h e hope d tha t

a driv e fro m th e sout h migh t achiev e

tactical surprise , fo r th e Japanes e migh t

not expec t attac k throug h th e inhospita -

ble, forbiddin g groun d sout h o f Rout e

52.
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I I 407

The 103 d Infantry , o n th e division's

right, would mak e the main effort. Strik -

ing fro m a lin e o f departur e abou t tw o

miles eas t o f Ho t Corner , th e 103 d

would driv e eas t fou r mile s t o Mt .

Katitinga, at . th e souther n en d o f a

broken, rock y ridg e lin e stretchin g fou r

miles northwar d t o th e Anga t Gorg e a t

Ipo Dam . Onc e a t Mt . Katitinga , th e

regiment woul d us e th e ridg e lin e a s its

principal rout e o f attac k towar d th e

dam. Th e 172 d Infantry, i n support ,

was t o strik e towar d th e da m acros s a

two-mile-wide fron t o n th e 103 d Infan -

try's left , advancin g firs t east-northeas t

and the n swingin g nort h t o cu t Rout e

52 abou t midwa y betwee n Bigt i an d th e

dam i n orde r t o isolat e stron g Japanes e

defenses i n th e vicinit y o f Bigti . Th e

169th Infantry , o n th e 172d' s left , woul d

demonstrate alon g Rout e 52 to hel p pin

down th e Japanes e i n th e Bigt i region .

General Win g ha d anothe r forc e a t

his disposal , a guerrill a regimen t tha t

had bee n activ e wit h th e 43 d Divisio n

on X I Corps ' souther n flank . Aide d b y

the 43 d Divisio n i n th e matters o f arm s

and training , th e regiment , commande d

by Col. Marcus V. Augustin , wa s known

as Marking's Fil-American Yay Regiment

—short titl e Marking Regiment. 24 Wing

planned t o emplo y th e regimen t i n a n

operation tha t h e originall y intende d a s

a feint . Crossin g th e Anga t Rive r nea r

Norzagaray, th e Markin g Regimen t

would driv e eastwar d nort h o f th e rive r

toward Mt . Kabuyao , thre e an d a hal f

miles nort h o f Ip o Dam , and woul d b e

prepared t o exploi t whateve r succes s i t

might achieve . Element s o f th e Mark -

ing Regiment would also probe eastward

along the south bank o f the Angat. Th e

guerrillas' operation s woul d b e con -

ducted under the direction o f Brig. Gen.

Alexander N . Stark , th e assistan t

commander o f th e 43 d Division .

To enhanc e th e chance s fo r tactica l

surprise, th e 43 d Division , less the 169t h

RCT, move d northwar d i n smal l incre -

ments between 2 and 5 May, assembling

behind a lin e o f outpost s th e 169t h In -

fantry maintained . Th e divisio n kep t

reconnaissance t o a bar e minimum, an d

units deploye d alon g thei r line s o f de -

parture under cove r of darkness in prep -

aration fo r jumpin g off during the night

of 6- 7 May . A nigh t attac k i n terrai n

not thoroughl y reconnoitered was known

to b e risky , bu t th e desir e t o achiev e

surprise overrod e othe r considerations .

Artillery woul d mar k initia l objective s

of th e nigh t attac k wit h whit e phospho -

rus an d thu s offse t th e lac k o f reconnaissance t o som e extent . I n th e actua l

event, thi s worke d bette r tha n th e 43 d

Division ha d hoped , bu t th e artillery' s

markings wer e admittedl y n o substitut e

for complet e reconnaissance .

Speed wa s as importan t a s surpris e t o

General Wing , fo r h e di d no t wan t t o

give th e Japanes e tim e t o redeplo y de -

fensive forces. Finally , Wing was willing

to emplo y mas s agains t th e Kawashima

Force's prepare d defenses . H e realize d

he migh t b e invitin g heav y casualties ,

but h e ha d t o accep t th e ris k i n th e

light, o f th e urgen t nee d fo r th e earl y

capture o f Ip o Dam .

Before 6 Ma y th e Kawashima Force

had n o ide a tha t a ful l America n divi -

24

 Marking wa s Augustin' s nom de guerre. Th e

unit wa s also known a s th e 1s t Ya y Regiment, Marking's Guerrillas . Th e Ya y i n th e regimenta l titl e

derived fro m Ya y Panililio , Augustin' s common-la w

wife who was a well-known newspaperwoma n i n pre -

war Manila . Befor e th e wa r Augusti n ha d bee n a

bus driver on th e Manila-Antipol o route . Fo r addi -

tional information , se e Colone l Yay , The Crucible

(New York : Th e MacMilla n Co. , 1950).
408 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

sion wa s assemblin g o n th e Ip o Da m

front.25 O n tha t day , the Japanes e uni t

had som e 7,00 0 effective s left—th e 43 d

Division estimate d 5,25 0 maximum—o f

the 9,00 0 troop s assigne d t o i t o n 2 0

February, an d mos t o f th e 7,00 0 wer e

south of th e Angat River , Th e norther n

anchor o f th e defense s wa s a grou p o f

small hill s o n th e Angat' s sout h ban k

three mile s nort h o f Bigti . Element s o f

the Kasama Battalion (th e reinforced

358th Independent Infantry Battalion,

105th Division), whic h containe d th e

Kawashima Force's onl y "regular " in -

fantry, hel d thi s anchor . Sout h o f th e

hills th e Hanabusa Detachment, on e o f

the Kawashima Force's tw o provisiona l

infantry regiments , maintaine d defense s

across Rout e 52 . Th e othe r provisiona l

regiment, th e Tomono Detachment, ex -

tended th e defense s fo r about tw o miles

south an d southeas t o f th e Bigt i area .

The mai n strengt h o f th e Kasama Battalion hel d th e groun d southeas t o f th e

Tomono Detachment t o the ridge along

which th e 103 d Infantr y wa s to advance .

The souther n en d o f thi s ridge—th e

Mt. Katiting a are a — was defende d a t

first b y th e Narukami Battalion o f th e

Hanabusa Detachment. Th e regio n

north o f the Anga t was the responsibility

of th e Muroya Battalion, which operated

under th e direc t contro l o f Kawashima

Force headquarters . Th e bul k o f th e

Muroya Battalion wa s stationed o n hig h

ground o n th e nort h ban k o f th e Angat

to clos e th e open , norther n en d o f a

horseshoe-shaped bend around which the

river flowe d o n it s way across Ip o Dam .

In accordanc e wit h Genera l Yoko -

yama's counterattac k pla n o f 4 May ,

the Kawashima Force ha d ordere d th e

Narukami Battalion south towar d Montalban. Th e thre e day s o f heav y ai r

attack tha t precede d th e 43 d Division' s

assault mad e i t impossibl e fo r th e Japa -

nese unit t o assemble for us mov e south,

and o n th e evenin g of 6 Ma y th e battalion's marc h wa s barel y unde r way .

Guessing the n tha t a majo r attac k wa s

about t o hi t him , Maj. Gen. Osamu

Kawashima, th e Kawashima Force com -

mander, calle d of f furthe r attempt s t o

send troop s southwar d t o participat e i n

the Kobayashi Force's effort s t o delay th e

progress o f th e 38t h Divisio n towar d

Wawa Dam. 26 I t wa s o n thi s not e tha t

the Kawashima Force belatedl y bega n

to prepar e t o mee t th e 43 d Division' s

attack, whic h bega n a t 2200 , 6 May .

The First Phase, 6-14 May

Exploiting th e elemen t o f surpris e

the nigh t attac k achieved , th e 103d and

172d Infantry Regiment s mad e excel -

lent progres s during th e firs t da y o f th e

offensive.27 (Map 17) Th e 103 d Infan -

try encountere d onl y scattere d opposi -

25

 Japanese informatio n i n thi s subsectio n is from :

Akutsu Statement , States, I , 23-25 ; Narrativ e o f Co l

Kobayashi, an d atch d Map s Nos . 2, 3 , an d 5 , 10t h

I&H Staf f Study , Japanes e Opn s o n Luzon ; SWP A

Hist Series , II, 483-85 ; an . I, Intel , t o X I Corp s F O

17, 1 May 45 ; an . II , Intel , t o 43 d Di v F O 12 , 30 Ap r

45; 43 d Di v G-3 Pe r Rpt s 68, 69, and 85 , dated 9 , 10 ,

and 2 6 Ap r 45 ; 43 d Di v G- 2 Rp t Luzon , Sec . II,

Enemy O/B, pp . 12-13.

26

 Kawashima ha d previousl y commande d th e 82d

Infantry Brigade, 105th Division, th e brigad e t o

which th e 358th IIB ha d belonged . Kawashim a ap -

parently too k hi s actio n withou t consultin g Genera l

Yokoyama, th e Shimbu Group commander . 27

 This subsection is based mainl y on: 43 d Div Rpt

Luzon, pp. 46-50 ; 43 d Div G-3 Pe r Rpts , 6-14 May

45; 43 d Di v G-3 Jnl , 6-14 Ma y 45; 103 d RCT Rp t

Luzon, pp . 76-78 ; 172 d Inf Rp t Luzon , Phas e IV ,

Ipo Dam , pp . 2-3; S- 3 Pe r Rpt s o f th e 103d , 169th ,

and 172 d Inf Regts , 6-15 Ma y 45; 43 d Di v G-2 Pe r

Rpts, 7-19 May 45; Akuts u Statement , States, I , 25 -

26; SWP A His t Series, II, 484 .
Map 1 7
410 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

tion, gaine d th e wester n slope s o f Mt .

Katitinga and , bypassin g the rest o f tha t

mountain, spe d u p th e ridg e lin e t o

rocky, woode d Hil l 1000 , les s than thre e

miles sout h o f Ip o Dam . Th e 172 d

Infantry a t dus k o n 7 Ma y wa s nearin g

the foo t o f a rocky ridge two miles southeast o f Bigti . Nort h o f th e Angat , th e

Marking Regimen t me t n o resistanc e a s

it marche d ove r seve n mile s eastward ,

halting fo r th e nigh t onl y a mil e an d a

half northwes t o f Mt . Kabuyao , it s ini -

tial objective . Th e onl y significan t re -

sistance th e 43 d Division' s unit s ha d

encountered durin g th e da y ha d bee n

at Hil l 53 5 where , o n th e sout h ban k

of th e Anga t thre e mile s nort h o f Bigti ,

part o f th e Kasama Battalion ha d re -

pulsed a compan y o f th e Markin g

Regiment.

Japanese oppositio n ha d prove d s o

unexpectedly weak tha t the 43 d Divisio n

pressed it s attac k throug h th e nigh t o f

7-8 May , an d continue d it s advanc e

without letu p throug h th e 11th . The n

rough terrain , unseasonabl y earl y an d

heavy rains , an d increasingl y stubbor n

resistance combine d t o slo w th e 103 d

Infantry. B y evenin g o n th e 11t h the

regiment's lef t wa s u p th e north-sout h

ridge lin e t o Hil l 805 , tw o mile s sout h

of Ip o Dam ; th e righ t ha d move d eas t

across the tiny Ipo River and had reached

Hill 810 , tw o mile s south-southeas t o f

the dam . Meanwhile , righ t flan k ele -

ments of th e 172 d Infantr y ha d advance d

to th e southwester n slope s o f rock y Hil l

815, hal f a mile nort h o f Hil l 805 . Lef t

flank unit s ha d begu n probin g int o Jap -

anese defense s o n For k Ridge , two miles

east o f Bigt i an d fallin g awa y o n th e

north t o a boulder-strew n strea m bed .

North acros s thi s strea m la y Osbo y

Ridge, overlookin g Rout e 5 2 fro m th e

south. Patrol s of th e 169t h Infantr y ha d

already discovere d tha t th e Kawashima

Force's, principa l defense s ra n acros s th e

western slope s o f Osbo y Ridg e — the

ridge woul d hav e t o b e cleare d befor e

the 172 d Infantr y coul d safel y pus h it s

left an y furthe r northward .

The Markin g Regiment , north o f th e

Angat, had me t wit h unexpecte d success.

Overrunning a Japanes e outpost o n Mt .

Kabuyao, th e guerrill a uni t o n 1 1 Ma y

reached th e Muroya Battalion's mai n

defenses a t Four-Corne r Hill , les s tha n

two mile s nort h o f Ip o Dam . Durin g

the da y th e guerrilla s mounte d thre e

assaults at Four-Corne r Hill, but at dusk,

having los t 2 5 me n kille d an d 5 5

wounded, the y withdrew .

By evening on th e 11th General Wing

knew tha t al l element s o f th e 43 d Divi -

sion wer e i n fir m contac t wit h th e

Kawashima Force's mai n lin e o f resist -

ance. Th e thrus t fro m th e sout h ha d

gone wel l s o far , bu t oppositio n ther e

was stiffening—th e Kawashima Force, at

first caugh t of f balance , ha d begu n t o

transfer troop s eastwar d fro m th e BigtiOsboy Ridg e are a t o mee t th e threa t

posed b y th e 103 d Infantry . Hopin g t o

halt thes e Japanes e movements , Win g

directed th e 169t h Infantr y t o increas e

the strength o f its demonstrations and t o

mount a limite d attac k a t Osbo y Ridge .

At th e sam e tim e h e too k anothe r loo k

at th e rol e o f th e Markin g Regiment .

What ha d starte d ou t a s a fein t fro m

which n o significan t result s wer e neces -

sarily expected , no w bi d fai r t o becom e

as muc h a part o f th e mai n effor t a s the

103d Infantry' s driv e north . Th e attac k

toward Ip o Dam , originall y conceive d

as on e dependin g fo r succes s upo n th e

103d Infantry' s progress , ha d develope d

into a full-fledge d doubl e envelopment .
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I I 411

Indeed, a rac e fo r th e da m wa s on be -

tween th e Markin g Regimen t an d th e

103d Infantry .

On 1 2 Ma y th e guerrill a unit , fo r

the firs t tim e ampl y supporte d b y 43 d

Division artillery , brok e throug h th e

Four-Corner Hil l defenses , losin g an -

other 1 5 me n kille d an d 7 5 wounde d

and killin g abou t 8 0 Japanese . Th e

remnants o f th e Muroya Battalion —

probably no t 40 0 stron g t o star t wit h

and no w reduce d t o abou t 10 0 effectives

—fled southwar d t o Hil l 803 , hal f a mile

north o f Ip o Dam . Elsewher e o n th e

43d Divisio n front , gain s o n 1 2 Ma y

were relativel y unimportant .

For th e Kawashima Force, all wa s not

necessarily lost whe n th e Markin g Regiment had seize d Four-Corne r Hill. Gen -

eral Kawashim a probabl y ha d sufficien t

strength t o hol d th e guerrilla s a t Hil l

803 for some time ; h e coul d hav e begu n

sending reinforcement s t o tha t hil l o n

the 12th . Bu t from th e content of orders

he receive d fro m Shimbu Group head -

quarters, th e 12t h o f Ma y mus t hav e

seemed ruinou s t o Kawashima .

Because o f communication s o r intel -

ligence failures , Genera l Yokoyam a ha d

not ye t learne d tha t a reinforce d U.S .

division wa s attackin g th e Kawashima

Force. Furthermore , the Shimbu Group

commander stil l fel t tha t th e Kobayashi

Force front wa s of more vital importanc e

than tha t o f the Kawashima Force. Since

the situatio n i n th e Kobayashi Force

zone was critical, and sinc e his scheduled

counterattack agains t th e 38t h Divisio n

had virtuall y collapsed b y 1 2 May, Gen -

eral Yokoyam a directe d th e Kawashima

Force t o launc h a ne w counterattac k

against th e lef t an d lef t rea r o f th e 38t h

Division o n 1 4 May. Wit h hi s ow n de -

fenses crumbling , Genera l Kawashim a

unsuccessfully trie d t o argu e Yokoyam a

into cancelin g th e order . Upo n th e

failure o f hi s pleadings , Kawashim a re -

luctantly directe d th e Kasama Battalion

to undertak e th e attac k against th e 38t h

Division.

The mai n bod y of the Kasama Battalion move d ou t o f it s line s wes t o f th e

Ipo Rive r durin g th e nigh t o f 12-1 3

May, forde d th e Ip o nea r th e dam , an d

assembled o n hig h groun d behin d th e

Narukami Battalion. Th e mov e wa s

covered b y nigh t attack s agains t th e

103d an d 172 d Infantr y Regiments ; ele -

ments o f th e Hanabusa Detachment

spread thinl y eastwar d i n a n attemp t

to tak e ove r th e Kasama Battalion's

positions.

The effec t o f th e redeploymen t wa s

about what Genera l Kawashim a ha d ex -

pected. O n 1 3 Ma y th e 103 d Infantr y

swept across Hill 805 to Hill 860, diggin g

in fo r th e nigh t hardl y three-quarter s

of a mil e south o f Ip o Dam . Simultane -

ously, th e 172 d Infantry 's righ t flan k

cleared mos t o f Hil l 815 . Elsewher e

south o f th e Anga t America n troop s

made only minor gains, but nort h of th e

stream th e Markin g Regimen t capture d

the cres t o f Hil l 803 .

General Kawashim a ha d see n enoug h

and, withou t askin g Yokoyama' s per -

mission, directe d th e Kasama Battalion

to retur n t o th e line s southwes t o f Ip o

Dam. Maj . Tetsuyuk i Kasama , a com -

mander o f som e initiative , ha d antici -

pated thes e order s b y te n o r twelv e

hours. Fro m a vantag e poin t southeas t

of th e da m h e ha d bee n watchin g th e

American attac k develo p o n th e morn -

ing o f th e 13t h whe n h e learne d tha t

the las t Narukami Battalion position s

on Mt . Katitinga , controllin g hi s route

of marc h southward , had fallen , Kasam a
412 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

IPO DA M

had therefor e halte d hi s battalio n an d

at dus k o n th e 13t h started bac k wes t

across th e Ipo River .

The Kasama Battalion wa s dismayed

to fin d man y o f it s ol d defense s i n th e

Hills 815-86 0 are a occupie d b y 43 d

Division troops , bu t attacke d i n a futil e

effort t o regai n th e los t ground . Whe n

dawn brok e o n th e 14t h the Kasama

Battalion, having lost over 10 0 men during th e night , coul d muste r n o mor e

than 25 0 effectives. Thes e survivors dug

in alon g th e slope s o f Hil l 86 0 and ,

fighting fanatically , hel d th e 103 d and

172d Infantr y Regiments to minor gains

on 1 4 May.

Meanwhile the Marking Regiment, on

a technicality , ha d alread y wo n th e rac e

to Ip o Dam. Takin g advantage of Japanese preoccupatio n sout h o f th e da m

during th e nigh t o f 13-1 4 May, a guer -

rilla patro l crep t dow n th e souther n

slope of Hill 803 and mad e its way across

the Anga t vi a th e dam . The patro l

found th e da m intac t an d th e power -

house on th e south bank largel y undamaged. To o wea k to hold the installations,

the patro l returned befor e daw n t o th e

crest o f Hil l 803 , wher e th e rest o f th e

regiment ha d it s hand s ful l moppin g

up.28

Securing Ipo Dam, 14-31 May

Late o n 1 4 Ma y th e 43 d Divisio n

paused t o mak e ne w attac k plans. 29 S o

far th e divisio n ha d mad e littl e progress

toward Rout e 52 , an d i t no w seeme d

necessary an d timel y t o commi t th e

169th Infantr y t o a n attac k t o clea r th e

road t o th e dam . First, th e divisio n

urgently neede d th e roa d a s a rout e o f

supply an d evacuation . Eve r sinc e it s

attack ha d begun , rain s ha d intermit -

tently halte d groun d an d aeria l supply ,

evacuation, an d ai r suppor t operations .

Hampered by the weather and th e rough

terrain, divisio n engineers had been un -

able t o construc t an d maintai n suppl y

roads a t a pac e commensurat e wit h th e

infantry's advances . Airdrop s and hand -

carry ha d kep t th e comba t units ' sup -

plies a t th e minimu m require d level ,

but evacuatio n o f sic k an d wounde d re -

mained a majo r problem . Finally , o n

14 May , th e entir e divisio n are a wa s

weathered in, and fo r th e firs t tim e since

6 May the Fifth Ai r Forc e was unable to

fly a singl e ai r suppor t o r ai r suppl y

mission.

28

 Information o n thi s Markin g Regimen t patro l

is from : 43 d Di v G- 2 Rp t 73 , 1 4 May 45 ; 43 d Di v

G-3 Pe r Rp t 126 , 1 4 May 45; Entr y 44 , 2025 1 3 May,

43d Di v G- 3 Jnl , 13-14 Ma y 45 ; Entr y 12 , 0807 1 4

May, 43 d Di v G-3 Jnl , 14-15 Ma y 45. 29

 Planning information her e is from: 43 d Di v Rpt

Luzon, pp. 49-51; 43d Div G-3 Pe r Rpts, 14-1 7 May

45; 43d Di v Opn s Memo 10 , 1 4 May 45.
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I I 413

Second, th e 43 d Divisio n kne w tha t

sizable groups of the Tomono an d Hanabusa Detachments had shifte d fro m thei r

Route 52 defenses t o mee t th e 103 d an d

172d Infantr y Regiments ' attack s fro m

the south . Genera l Win g therefor e fel t

that th e 169t h Infantry , strikin g directly

along Route 52, would hav e a fa r easie r

and les s costl y tas k tha n i t woul d hav e

faced a wee k earlier . I n addition , a n

attack b y th e 169t h coul d forestal l fur -

ther Japanes e redeployment s eastward ,

speed th e capture of Ip o Dam , an d draw

off Japanes e troop s fro m For k Ridge ,

where the 172 d Infantry's left wa s bogged

down.

General Win g directe d th e 103 d Infantry t o secur e th e Rout e 5 2 terminu s

at Ip o Dam , tak e th e dam , and the n

clear th e hig h groun d nort h o f th e road

and west of the dam. H e ordered the 172d

Infantry t o seiz e Hil l 804, whose north -

ern slope s Rout e 5 2 crosse d a t a poin t

two mile s wes t o f th e dam. The 169t h

Infantry wa s t o clea r th e las t Japanes e

defenders ou t o f th e Bigti area an d the n

drive eastwar d alon g Rout e 5 2 t o gai n

contact wit h th e 172d . Wing evidentl y

expected tha t th e 103d Infantr y coul d

accomplish it s mission s o n 1 5 May; th e

attacks o f th e 169t h an d 172 d Infantry

Regiments wer e t o star t o n th e 16th ,

but poo r weathe r conditions , whic h

forced cancellatio n o f ai r strike s o n th e

15th, prompte d Win g to postpone thos e

two regiments ' jump.of f unti l th e 17th .

Lack o f ai r support , togethe r wit h sup -

ply problems , als o mad e i t impossibl e

for th e 103 d Infantry t o ge t unde r wa y

before th e 17th .

More concentrate d ai r suppor t tha n

previously provide d durin g an y attac k

against Shimbu Group position s pre -

ceded th e 43 d Division' s offensiv e o f 1 7

May.30 O n th e 16th, fo r example, about

185 fighter-bomber s o f th e Fift h Ai r

Force droppe d som e 50,00 0 gallon s o f

napalm o n Japanes e defense s i n th e

Bigti-Osboy Ridge area. Late r the same

day othe r plane s bombe d an d strafe d

Japanese artiller y emplacement s i n th e

vicinity o f Hil l 804 , employin g thre e

tons o f fragmentatio n bombs . Startin g

at 103 0 o n th e 17t h about 24 0 fighter -

bombers dropped ove r 62,50 0 gallons of

napalm alon g and nea r Rout e 52 in th e

Hill 80 4 area an d o n Japanes e positions

northwest of Hill 804. During the after -

noon te n ligh t bomber s hi t Japanes e

defenses a mil e nort h o f Bigt i an d the n

returned t o strafe . Althoug h sodde n

ground an d vegetatio n i n th e targe t

areas somewhat inhibited the spread and

fury o f napal m fires , th e 43 d Divisio n

thought th e napal m strike s t o b e

remarkably effective .

Meanwhile, X I Corp s an d 43 d Divi -

sion Artiller y ha d steppe d u p th e pac e

of thei r suppor t fires , an d durin g th e

period 1 5 throug h 1 7 Ma y expende d

ammunition abou t a s follows:

 3 1

Weapon

90-mm. antiaircraft gun s

105-mm. howitzers

155-mm. howitzers

155-mm. guns

155-mm. GPF gu n

8-inch howitzers

Rounds

740

5,865

2,000

955

15

145

30

 Air support informatio n her e i s from : Crave n

and Cate , AAF V; p. 436; 43 d Di v Rp t Luzon , pp .

50-51; 43 d Di v G- 3 Pe r Rpts , 15-1 7 Ma y 45; X I

Corps Arty Daily Rpts, 15-17 May 45. 31

 The 155-mm . GPF gun was an American weapon

captured b y th e Japanes e in 194 2 an d recapture d by

the 43 d Division , whic h traine d a cre w o f Filipin o

guerrillas t o ma n th e piece . B y the en d o f Ma y th e

43d Divisio n ha d organize d a guerrilla artillery bat -

tery compose d o f th e 155-mm . GP F gun , tw o mor e

recaptured piece s of th e sam e typ e an d history , and

a capture d Japanes e 75-mm. weapon.
414 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

On 1 7 Ma y th e principa l succes s o f

the 43 d Division' s attac k cam e a t Ip o

Dam, a succes s tha t create d a mino r

controversy betwee n th e 103 d Infantr y

and th e Markin g Regiment . A t mid -

morning o n th e 17t h th e 103d . havin g

cleared th e last Japanes e fro m Hil l 860 .

sent a small patrol clown th e hill's steep,

grassy norther n slope s t o th e sout h en d

of th e dam . Ou t o f contac t wit h th e

rest o f th e regimen t an d unabl e t o fin d

any sign s o f friendl y force s i n th e da m

area, th e patro l returne d t o th e to p o f

Hill 86 0 almos t immediately . Then ,

shortly after noon , a second patro l o f the

Marking Regiment came down the slopes

of Hil l 80 3 o n th e opposit e sid e o f th e

Angat, waded across the river at the dam

and, abou t 1330 , raise d th e America n

flag ove r th e powerhous e o n th e sout h

bank. Th e 130d Infantr y note d thi s

activity an d sen t a larg e comba t patro l

back dow n Hil l 86 0 to establis h contac t

with th e guerrillas . Whe n thi s patro l

reached th e powerhous e a t 1530 , nearly

250 men o f th e Marking Regiment wer e

on the ground at both sides of Ipo Dam.32

Out o f loyalt y t o hi s troop s Col .

Joseph P . Cleland , th e 103 d Infantry 's

commander, sought a major shar e of th e

credit fo r th e captur e o f Ip o Dam ,

radioing t o Genera l Wing :

We're no t concedin g anythin g t o guer - rillas. W e ha d patrol s a t [the ] da m thi s

morning an d sa w n o guerrillas . Whe n w e

returned thi s evenin g the y wer e there. 33

Whatever Cleland' s opinion , th e Mark -

ing Regimen t ha s to be give n th e lion's

share o f th e credi t fo r th e captur e o f

Ipo Dam . Th e regimen t wa s th e firs t

to hav e troop s a t th e dam—th e nigh t

patrol o f 13-1 4 May—an d wa s th e firs t

to permanentl y occup y th e groun d a t

the dam . O n th e othe r hand , i t i s certain tha t th e Japanes e woul d stil l hav e

been holding the dam a t dark o n 1 7 May

had no t th e Markin g Regimen t and th e

103d Infantry attacked in concert toward

that objective .

With th e captur e o f Ip o Da m intact ,

the 43 d Divisio n ha d accomplishe d it s

major mission . Th e Japanes e ha d pre -

pared demolition s a t bot h th e dam an d

powerhouse bu t ha d faile d t o se t the m

off. Th e 43 d Divisio n ha d take n a n

important ste p towar d solvin g Manila 's

water suppl y problems , bu t befor e th e

division coul d assur e th e securit y o f th e

dam an d th e aqueduc t t o Novaliche s

Reservoir, i t woul d hav e t o clea r Kawashima Force remnant s fro m th e regio n

west o f th e dam . Moreover , th e 43 d

Division ha d no t ye t secure d Rout e 52 ,

and suppl y an d evacuatio n problem s

were becomin g dail y mor e vexing .

The tas k facin g th e 43 d Divisio n

proved easie r tha n anticipated . Th e

Kawashima Force wa s spli t b y th e lin e

of th e ridg e runnin g sout h fro m Ip o

Dam t o Mt . Katitinga ; it s unit s west o f

the lin e ha d bee n disorganize d an d de -

moralized b y th e ai r an d artiller y bombardments, especially the napalm strikes,

of 16-1 7 May . Finally , Genera l Kawa -

shima ha d decide d tha t furthe r effort s

to hold Ipo Dam would be futile . Eithe r

late o n th e 16t h o r earl y o n th e 17t h

he ha d ordere d wha t wa s lef t o f hi s

command t o withdra w t o a n assembl y

point o n th e wester n slope s o f Mt .

Maranat, thre e mile s east o f th e dam. 34

32

 The foregoin g stor y i s base d upo n numerou s

entries in th e 43d Division's G-3 Journa l fo r 1 7 May,

the 103 d Infantry' s S-3 Journa l for the same day, and

the 43 d Division's G- 2 Periodi c Report fo r 1 7 May. 33

 Rad, Clelan d t o Wing , 183 0 17 May, Entry 77 ,

43d Di v G- 3 Jnl , 1 7 May 45 . 34

 Akutsu Statement , States, I, 26.
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I I 415

Events moved rapidly during the next

four day s a s isolate d element s o f th e

Kawashima Force began infiltratin g eastward throug h th e 43 d Divisio n line s

while th e divisio n se t abou t th e mess y

job of mopping up. The divisio n opened

Route 5 2 from Bigt i t o Ip o Da m o n th e

19th an d b y th e 21s t ha d cleare d th e

last organize d resistanc e fro m th e are a

west o f th e dam an d sout h o f th e Angat .

North o f th e rive r th e Markin g Regi -

ment ha d littl e troubl e moppin g up .

Many Japanes e ostensibl y trappe d a s o f

17 Ma y certainl y escape d eastward , bu t

the 43 d Divisio n kille d o r foun d dea d

850 Kawashima Force troop s i n th e are a

west o f Ip o Da m fro m 1 8 throug h 2 1

May. Sinc e 6 May , when th e 43 d Divi -

sion had begun its attack, the Kawashima

Force ha d los t ove r 2,00 0 me n kille d

and approximatel y 4 0 captured . Th e

43d Division' s casualtie s fo r th e perio d

from 6 throug h 2 1 Ma y were :

Regiment

103d Infantr y

169th Infantr y

172d Infantry

Marking

Total

Killed

25

40

110

Wounded

105

80

150

145

480

Total

130

95

180

175

590

The 43 d Divisio n continue d it s mopping-up operation s throug h 3 1 May ,

patrolling eastward across the Ip o River,

northeast u p th e Anga t fro m th e dam ,

and throughou t th e area ove r whic h th e

worst fightin g ha d take n place . Th e

Kawashima Force, havin g n o offensiv e

intent, confine d it s activitie s t o reassem -

bling east o f Ip o Da m i n preparatio n fo r

further retrea t dee p int o th e Sierr a

Madre. Durin g th e las t te n day s o f

May th e 43 d Divisio n kille d o r foun d

dead approximatel y 72 5 Japanes e an d

captured 7 5 others ; th e division' s ow n

losses wer e roughl y 1 0 kille d an d 3 5

wounded.35

The Destruction of the Kogure

Detachment

By th e en d o f Ma y X I Corp s ha d

destroyed a s effectiv e comba t organiza -

tions th e Shimbu Group's fou r stronges t

subdivisions — the Kawashima, Kobayashi, an d Noguchi Forces and the Shimbu

Group Reserve. Whil e X I Corp s ha d

been devotin g it s mai n energie s t o th e

defeat o f thes e wester n fron t Shimbu

forces, par t o f th e corps , an d late r ele -

ments o f XI V Corps, had undertake n t o

destroy th e Shimbu Group's fift h majo r

component, th e Kogure Detachment.

Originally deploye d t o protec t Shimbu

Group's lef t rea r against attack fro m th e

Bicol Peninsula , the east coast o f Luzon ,

and th e eastern shore of Lagun a d e Bay,

the Kogure Detachment, i n lat e March ,

had los t hal f it s bes t troop s b y transfe r

to the Noguchi Force, then i n desperat e

need o f reinforcement. 36 Filipin o guerrillas, 43 d Divisio n patrols , Allie d air -

craft, an d a n increasingl y hig h rat e o f

sickness had furthe r deplete d the Kogure

Detachment until , b y 1 April, th e uni t

had scarcel y 80 0 effective s lef t o f it s

original strengt h o f 2,250 .

Operations agains t th e Kogure Detachment entere d int o th e campaig n

against th e Shimbu Group i n a rathe r

35

 43d Di v G-2 an d G- 3 Pe r Rpts , 22-3 1 May 45;

S-3 Pe r Rpt s of th e 103d , 169th , and 172 d Inf Regts,

22-31 Ma y 45 . 36

 Japanese informatio n i n thi s sectio n i s from :

Kogure Statement , States , II , 260 ; Statement o f Ma j

Hisaishi Suguwar a (Comdr , 10th Surface Raiding

Base Bn), States, III, 312-14; 43d Div G-2 Rp t Luzon ,

Sec. II , Enem y O/B , Rp t o f O/ B Tea m No . 11 , pp.

10-11; 1s t Ca v Div G-2 Rp t Luzon , pp. 24-26.
416 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

indirect fashion . Abou t 1 0 Marc h ele -

ments o f XI V Corp s ha d initiate d a n

offensive agains t Shimbu Group's semi -

detached Fuji Force in southern Luzon. 37

By th e end o f th e month th e XIV Corp s

units ha d drive n wel l eas t across Luzo n

in th e regio n sout h o f Lagun a d e Bay .

Retreating befor e XI V Corps' pressure ,

some 2,00 0 me n o f th e Fuji Force ha d

employed Rout e 21 , runnin g nort h

along th e easter n sid e o f Lagun a d e

Bay, an d th e Sant a Mari a Valley , cen -

tering o n th e northeaster n shor e o f

Laguna d e Bay , as avenue s o f escap e

from souther n Luzon .

General Kruege r believe d tha t thes e

Fuji Force troop s ha d joine d th e mai n

body of the Shimbu Group i n th e mountains eas t o f Manila , tha t mor e me n o f

the Fuji Force woul d tr y t o joi n th e

group, an d tha t Japanes e force s o n th e

Bicol Peninsul a migh t als o mak e thei r

way northwestwar d t o th e Shimbu

Group's lines . Krueger' s G- 2 Sectio n

estimated tha t a s man y a s 10,00 0 Japa -

nese coul d reac h th e Shimbu Group

western fron t fro m souther n an d south -

eastern Luzon . Eve n i f poorl y arme d

and equipped , thes e Japanes e coul d

hardly provid e X I Corp s wit h an y ai d

and comfor t a s tha t uni t continue d it s

offensive agains t th e Shimbu Group's

main body . Accordingly , Kruege r lai d

plans t o sto p th e possibl e flo w o f Japa -

nese reinforcement s aroun d th e easter n

and norther n shore s o f Lagun a d e Bay .

lie directe d XI Corp s to clear the northern shor e o f th e lake , bloc k th e Sant a

Maria Valley , an d clos e Rout e 2 1 b y

making fir m contac t wit h XI V Corp s

along th e lake' s easter n shore . Genera l

Hall, commandin g X I Corps , assigne d

the task s t o th e 43 d Division , whic h i n

turn mad e th e 103 d RCT responsibl e

for th e executio n o f th e missions. 38

Having complete d it s shar e i n th e

operations to destroy the Noguchi Force,

the 103d Infantry turne d t o it s new jo b

on 3 0 March. 39 Takin g elaborat e pre -

cautions t o avoi d alertin g th e Kogure

Detachment, th e regimen t displace d

eastward alon g th e norther n shor e o f

Laguna d e Ba y i n smal l increments . A t

0400 o n 4 Apri l th e regimen t bega n

moving int o th e Sant a Mari a Valley ,

catching th e Japanes e ther e completel y

by surprise . (Map 18) B y midmornin g

the 103d was i n Siniloan , a t th e north -

east corner of Lagun a d e Bay . Tw o day s

later, afte r tw o or thre e sharp skirmishe s

with Fuji Force troop s comin g nort h

from souther n Luzon , th e 103d made

contact wit h XI V Corp s unit s nea r Pag -

sanjan, a t Lagun a d e Bay' s southeaster n

corner. Fro m 6 throug h 2 1 April, whe n

elements o f XI V Corp s relieve d it , th e

103d Infantr y patrolle d throughou t th e

Santa Mari a Valle y an d probe d north -

eastward from Siniloa n alon g Route 455 ,

leading t o th e eas t coas t o f Luzo n a t

Lamon Bay . Its shar e i n th e operation s

to bloc k Japanes e movement s aroun d

Laguna d e Ba y cos t th e 103 d Infantr y

about 1 0 me n kille d an d 2 0 wounded ;

the regimen t kille d som e 24 0 Japanes e

in scattere d contacts .

37

 See below, ch . XXIII.

38

 Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 62-64 , 67-69 ; Sixt h

Army F O 58 , 2 3 Ma r 45 , i n ibid., I , 162 ; X I Corp s

FO 12 , 30 Ma r 45 ; 43d Di v F O 9 , 30 Ma r 45 ; 43d Di v

Opns Mem o 8 , 3 0 Ma r 45 . 39

 Information o n 103 d RC T operation s i n thi s

section is from: 43 d Di v Rpt Luzon , pp . 37-41; 103d

RCT Rp t Luzon, pp. 60-73; 103 d RC T S-3 Pe r Rpts,

31 Mar-21 Ap r 45 .
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I I 417

MAP 18

The mos t surprisin g developmen t

during th e 103d Infantry's operation s

was th e discover y tha t th e Kogure Detachment woul d mak e n o rea l effor t t o

defend th e Sant a Mari a Valle y an d en -

virons, a n are a fro m whic h th e Shimbu

Group ha d hoped to replenish its rapidly

dwindling foo d stocks . Instead , th e de -

tachment ha d withdraw n t o good defen -

sive positions at Kapatali n Sawmill, four

miles u p Rout e 45 5 fro m Siniloan , t o

block tha t roa d t o Lamo n Bay . In th e

light o f th e effectiv e strengt h lef t t o it ,

the detachment 's decisio n t o evacuat e

the ope n Sant a Mari a Valle y regio n

seems quit e sound .

XIV Corps, a s it move d troop s t o th e

Santa Mari a Valle y o n 2 1 April, hope d

to moun t a n immediat e driv e towar d

Lamon Bay, but until 6 May could spare

only th e 7t h Cavalry Regiment, less on e

squadron, fro m it s commitment s i n

southern Luzon . O n th e 6t h th e 8t h

Cavalry too k ove r i n th e valley , an d th e
418 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

entire 7t h Cavalr y bega n th e postpone d

drive alon g Rout e 455. 40

Japanese defense s a t Kapatali n Saw -

mill wer e locate d i n hilly , densel y jun -

gled terrai n a t a horseshoe-shape d ben d

of Rout e 455 . Th e groun d an d defense s

bore strikin g resemblance , albei t o n a

smaller scale , t o th e ZigZa g Pas s horse -

shoe o n Bataan. 41 Perhap s lesson s ha d

been learne d fro m th e 38t h Division' s

experience at th e ZigZag ; a t an y rate th e

7th Cavalr y di d no t attac k unti l i t ha d

obtained a complete pictur e o f th e Japanese defense s fro m capture d document s

and patro l actions, napal m an d artiller y

had lai d bar e th e terrai n a t th e sawmill ,

air an d artiller y bombardment s ha d re -

duced th e bul k o f th e defense s t o rub -

ble, an d fou r artiller y battalion s wer e

in positio n t o provid e extremel y clos e

support. Th e cavalry' s attac k wen t wel l

and overra n th e defense s b y midafter -

noon, 9 May . Th e 7t h Cavalr y kille d

some 35 0 Japanes e i n th e are a fro m 7

through 9 May ; almos t al l o f th e res t

of th e origina l 65 0 defender s o f th e saw -

mill are a ha d bee n kille d b y th e ai r

and artiller y bombardments . Th e 7t h

Cavalry los t 4 me n kille d an d 1 7

wounded, an d attache d guerrilla s los t

2 kille d an d 4 wounded .

Pausing only briefl y t o reorganize, th e

7th Cavalr y marche d o n u p Rout e 45 5

and, leavin g its vehicle s behind , reached

Lamon Ba y o n 1 3 May . LCM' s o f th e

592d Enginee r Boa t an d Shor e Regi -

ment brough t supplie s an d vehicle s

around th e Bico l Peninsul a t o Lamo n

Bay i n preparatio n fo r a n attac k o n In -

fanta, th e principa l tow n o n th e bay' s

shores. Th e engineer s als o transporte d

a guerrill a battalio n unde r Lt . Col.

Bernard L . Anderson , USA , t o th e In -

fanta area . A s th e cavalryme n an d guer -

rillas converged on the town the Japanes e

garrison, mainl y nava l troops , fle d wes t

into th e Sierr a Madre . Infant a fel l o n

25 May , an d b y evenin g th e nex t da y

the reinforce d 7t h Cavalr y ha d cleare d

the entir e fiat , rice-ric h regio n aroun d

the tow n agains t scattered , ineffectiv e

resistance. Maintaine d b y overwate r

supply movements , th e 7t h Cavalr y in -

stituted a n intensiv e patrolling program.

The 8t h Cavalry , meanwhile , cleane d

out th e norther n sectio n o f th e Sant a

Maria Valley , patrolle d nort h int o th e

Sierra Madre , an d maintaine d contac t

with th e 112t h Cavalry , whic h ha d re -

placed th e 43 d Divisio n i n th e regio n

east fro m Ne w Bosobos o an d Antipolo .

From 3 1 Marc h t o th e en d o f Ma y

operations agains t th e Kogure Detachment an d th e Japanes e nava l force s i n

the Lamo n Ba y regio n cos t th e 103 d

RCT, th e 2 d Cavalr y Brigade , an d at -

tached guerrilla s — mainly Anderson' s

Battalion—approximately 6 5 men kille d

and 18 0 wounded . Th e Japanes e los t

at leas t 1,25 0 me n kille d i n groun d ac -

tion, whil e America n ai r an d artiller y

bombardments, a s a conservativ e esti -

mate, accounte d fo r anothe r 50 0

Japanese.

The End of the Shimbu Group

By the end o f Ma y the Shimbu Group

was no longe r an effectiv e fightin g force ,

40

 Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I, 69 ; Sixt h Arm y F O 61 ,

18 Ap r 45 , i n ibid., I , 163-64 , XI V Corp s F O 13 , 19

Apr 45 ; XIV Corps Rp t Luzon , pt . I , p . 201 . 41

 The remainde r o f thi s sectio n i s base d on : 2 d

Cav Bri g Rp t Luzon , pp . 10-11 ; 2 d Ca v Bri g Opn s

Rpts, 6 May-1 Ju n 45 ; 7th Cav Rpt Luzon , pp. 22-30;

7th Ca v S-3 Pe r Rpts, C May-1 Ju n 45 ; 8th Ca v Rpt

Luzon, Siniloan-Tanay Phase , pp. 1-5; 8t h Cav Opns

Rpts, 7-31 Ma y 45.
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I I 419

7TH CAVALR Y A T KAPATALA N SAWMIL L

a fac t tha t Genera l Yokoyama ha d recog -

nized when, on th e 27th , he had ordere d

a genera l withdrawa l al l across his west -

ern front. 42 Th e grou p stil l ha d a

strength o f nearl y 26,00 0 me n — over

half it s tota l a s of 2 0 February—bu t th e

survivors wer e th e dregs , fo r X I an d

XIV Corp s ha d decimate d th e best -

trained an d best-equippe d units . Abou t

13,000 o f th e survivor s wer e lef t i n or -

ganized units , th e comba t effectivenes s

of whic h i s worth y o f mentio n onl y i n

passing. O f th e othe r 13,000 , aroun d

5,000 wer e undergoin g whateve r medi -

cal treatmen t th e Shimbu Group wa s

capable o f providing . Th e fina l 8,00 0

were neither controlled nor controllable ,

having broke n u p int o smal l group s t o

forage fo r foo d o r t o tr y t o mak e thei r

way t o norther n Luzon .

The Shimbu Group's suppl y pictur e

at th e en d o f Ma y wa s eve n gloomie r

than it s personne l picture . Th e grou p

had bee n unabl e t o transpor t int o th e

Sierra Madr e an y significan t par t o f th e

huge stockpile s o f supplie s i t ha d

brought ou t o f Manila , an d th e onl y

supplies i t stil l ha d plent y o f wer e am -

munition fo r smal l arm s an d machin e

42

 Japanese informatio n i n thi s sectio n i s from :

Luzon Opu s o f th e Shimbu Gp, pp . 18-23 , 25 , 27 ;

SWPA His t Series , II , 485 , an d ma p afte r II , 482 ;

Kobayashi Narrative , 10t h I& H Staf f Study , Japanese

Opns o n Luzon .
420 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

guns an d medica l matériel employe d i n

the treatmen t o f comba t wounds. Lac k

of foo d wa s the principal problem. Th e

early loss—befor e th e harvest—o f th e

Bosoboso Valley , th e shore s o f Lagun a

de Bay , the Sant a Mari a Valley , an d th e

Infanta regio n ha d deprive d th e grou p

of expecte d foo d stocks , while almost all

the foo d brough t ou t o f Manil a ha d

already bee n consumed . Th e organize d

remnant o f th e Noguchi Force, fo r ex -

ample, coul d issu e onl y tw o ounce s o f

rice pe r da y to eac h man , and eve n tha t

meager amoun t woul d b e gon e b y midJune. Th e Kobayashi Force wa s littl e

better off; th e Kawashima Force, was still

able t o issu e 6- 8 ounce s o f rice pe r day .

Most troop s wer e reduce d t o eatin g

roots, bark , grass , an d foo d scrounge d

from long-abandone d Filipin o gardens .

Needless t o sa y there wa s not a Filipin o

pig, carabao , or do g lef t aliv e within th e

sight o f th e Shimbu Group remnant s

before man y day s o f Jun e ha d passed .

Recognizing tha t mer e existenc e wa s

the major problem , Yokoyama hope d t o

move hi s organize d unit s int o area s

where the y migh t hav e som e chanc e t o

raise food , scatterin g the m throug h th e

Sierra Madre . X I Corps , however , wa s

not goin g t o giv e Yokoyam a muc h rest .

General Hal l directed th e 38t h Divisio n

to moun t limite d attack s eastwar d fro m

the Wawa Dam area an d attache d t o the

division fo r thi s purpos e th e 2 d Provi -

sional Regiment , Eas t Centra l Luzo n

Guerrilla Area . Recentl y reorganize d

and re-equippe d b y XI Corps , th e guerrillas wer e commande d b y Maj . Edwin

P. Ramsey , AUS , who ha d no t surren -

dered bac k i n 1942 . The 43 d Division ,

the 112t h Cavalr y RCT, th e 2 d Cavalr y

Brigade, an d th e Anderso n Battalio n

would continu e t o patro l i n th e area s

they alread y held. 43

As operation s evolve d afte r 1 June ,

the 38t h Division' s objectiv e becam e

Santa Iñez , a t th e en d o f th e Shimbu

Group supply road into the Sierra Madre

northeast of New Bosoboso.44 Th e 112t h

Cavalry RCT, employin g mountain and

river valle y trails , mounte d a converg -

ing attac k towar d Sant a Iñe z fro m th e

south, takin g th e tow n agains t ligh t op -

position o n 9 June . Th e Japanes e de -

fended mor e stubbornl y agains t th e

151st Infantry , 38t h Division , whic h

drove towar d Sant a Iñe z alon g th e road

from Ne w Bosoboso , an d th e 151s t wa s

unable t o mak e contac t wit h th e 112t h

Cavalry until 1 8 June. Meanwhile, other

troops o f th e 38t h Division , an d th e

169th Infantr y o f th e 43 d Divisio n a s

well, slowl y presse d east int o th e moun -

tains fro m th e Wawa Da m area . B y the

end o f June th e onl y evidenc e o f organ -

ized Japanes e resistanc e i n a n are a fiv e

miles north an d te n mile s east o f Wawa

Dam wa s confined t o th e Lenati n Rive r

valley abou t thre e mile s nort h o f Sant a

Iñez, th e regio n int o whic h Shimbu

43

 XI Corp s FO's 1 8 an d 19 , 2 an d 4 Ju n 45 ; 38t h

Div FO's 27 and 28 , 30 Ma y an d 4 Ju n 45 ; 43 d Di v

FO 13 , 1 Jun 45 . 44

 Operational information i n th e remainder of this

section i s from : 38t h Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 108-14 ;

38th Di v G- 3 Opn s Rpts , 1-3 0 Ju n 45 ; 149t h In f

Rpt Luzon , 5 May-2 6 Ju n 45 , pp . 6-14 ; 151s t In f

Rpt Luzon , ch. III, pp. 2-4; 152 d Inf Rpt Luzon , pp.

6-7; 152 d In f Inte l Summaries , 4-1 7 Ju n 45 ; S- 3

Per o r Opn s Rpts o f th e 149th , 151st , an d 152 d Inf

Regts, 1-3 0 Ju n 45 ; 43d Di v Rpt Luzon , p . 53 ; 43 d

Div G- 2 an d G- 3 Pe r Rpts , 1-3 0 Ju n 45 ; S- 3 Pe r

Rpts o f th e 103d , 169th , an d 172 d Inf Regts , 1-3 0

Jun 45 ; 2 d Ca v Bri g S- 2 Pe r Rpts , 1-3 0 Jun

45; 7t h Cav Rpt Luzon , pp . 29-33 ; 7t h Ca v S- 3 Pe r

Rpts, 1-3 0 Ju n 45 ; 8t h Ca v Rp t Luzon , Siniloan -

Tanay Phase , pp. 5-13; 8t h Ca v Opns Rpts an d S- 2

Per Rpts , 1-3 0 Ju n 45 ; 112th Cav RCT Rp t Luzon ,

pp. 33-40 ; 112t h Ca v RC T (and/o r Bald y Force )

S-3 Opn s Rpts, 1-3 0 Ju n 45.
THE REDUCTIO N O F TH E SHIMBU GROUP—PHASE I I 421

Group headquarter s ha d withdrawn .

North an d eas t o f Ip o Dam , 43 d Divi -

sion patrol s foun d n o sign s o f organize d

resistance. Th e 2 d Cavalr y Brigad e i n

the Sant a Mari a Valley-Infant a area ,

dispersed th e las t organize d remnant s

of th e Kogure Detachment an d th e

Japanese nava l unit s a t Lamo n Bay .

There wa s no dramati c conclusio n t o

XI Corps ' mopping-u p operation s dur -

ing June . Instead , th e corp s pulle d it s

regular unit s ou t o f th e mountain s t o

wet-weather camp s fo r rest an d rehabili -

tation i n preparatio n fo r th e invasio n

of Japan , whil e guerrill a units , reorgan -

ized an d re-equipped , too k ove r th e tas k

of huntin g dow n Japanes e stragglers .

During Jun e X I Corp s ha d projecte d

its strengt h int o th e Sant a Iñe z area —

the ver y cente r o f a regio n tha t Genera l

Yokoyama ha d expecte d t o hol d mor e

or less indefinitely— forcin g th e Shimbu

Group remnant s int o trackless, partiall y

unexplored wilderness . It s Jun e opera -

tions ha d cos t X I Corp s roughl y 11 0

men kille d an d 37 0 wounded, includin g

approximately 35 killed and 75 wounded

among attache d guerrill a units . Japa -

nese losse s during th e mont h wer e 7,54 0

killed o r foun d dea d an d 1,10 5 captured.

Certain tactica l innovation s o f th e

June mop-up period meri t specia l atten -

tion. First , th e 38t h Divisio n mad e ex -

tensive us e o f antiaircraft searchlight s t o

illuminate it s fron t line s a t night . Be -

gun durin g th e las t stage s o f th e divi -

sion's drive to Wawa Dam i n May , night

illumination wa s brough t nearl y t o th e

status o f a n exac t scienc e durin g June ,

Another innovation , subsequentl y t o se e

far-reaching development , wa s th e em -

ployment o f helicopters . I n th e 112t h

Cavalry RC T an d th e 38t h Divisio n sectors helicopter s evacuate d sic k an d

wounded fro m inaccessibl e mountai n

positions, obviatin g th e nee d fo r dan -

gerous and tirin g hand-carry evacuation s

that ofte n consume d a s much a s twenty -

four hours . Finally , i n lat e Ma y an d

throughout June troop s of th e 38t h an d

43d Divisio n combat-teste d 57-mm . an d

75-mm. recoilles s rifle s an d 4.2-inc h re -

coilless mortars. The troops , who wanted

many o f th e weapon s immediately , en -

thusiastically praise d th e ne w 57-mm .

and 75-mm . weapons , late r t o se e muc h

development, bu t supplie s o f th e rifle s

were s o limite d tha t n o distributio n

could b e made . Th e recoilles s mortar ,

on th e other hand, proved unsatisfactory.

It wa s inaccurate , o f limite d mobility ,

and ver y difficul t t o emplac e becaus e i t

required suc h a larg e clearanc e zon e t o

its rear .

At th e end o f Jun e the Shimbu Group

remnants wer e i n sorr y shape , an d al -

most al l o f it s element s ha d broke n u p

into smal l partie s concerne d primaril y

with a hunt for food. 45 Durin g June th e

group had los t thre e men dea d o f starva -

tion o r diseas e t o ever y on e ma n kille d

in combat , an d befor e Jul y wa s over th e

ratio ha d mounte d t o nearl y te n t o one.

U.S. Arm y estimate s o f Shimbu Group

strength a s of 3 0 Jun e varied fro m 3,30 0

to 6,500, 46 bu t Genera l Yokoyam a actu -

ally ha d nearl y 15,00 0 troop s unde r hi s

nominal command .

The 149t h an d 151s t Infantr y Regi -

ments, 38t h Division , aide d b y almos t

10,000 guerrillas , continue d t o operat e

45

 Additional materia l fo r th e perio d afte r 3 0 June

is from ; Eight h Arm y Rpt , Luzon Mop-u p Opn, pp .

31-33; Kobayash i Narrative , 10t h I& H Staf f Study ,

Japanese Opn s o n Luzon ; Luzo n Are a Command ,

Eighth Army , G- 2 Pe r Rpts , 1 6 Sep-14 Nov 45. 46

 38th Div , G-2 Estimat e of th e Enem y Situation ,

27 Ju n 45 , XI Corp s G- 3 Jn l File , 28-2 9 Jun e 45 ;

Eighth Arm y Rpt, Luzo n Mop-up , p . 7 .
422 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

in th e Shimbu are a until th e en d o f the

war. Eac h regimen t rotate d battalion s

into th e mountains , bu t th e battalion s

largely confine d thei r activitie s t o sup -

port an d contro l o f guerrill a units . B y

mid-August 1945 the Fil-American forces

had killed , foun d dead , o r capture d an -

other 5,00 0 Japanes e i n th e Shimbu

Group's mountai n retreat . Afte r th e

end o f th e wa r approximatel y 6,30 0

Shimbu survivor s surrendered . Wit h

2,000 prisoners captured befor e Septem -

ber 1945 , these wer e al l tha t remaine d

alive o f Yokoyama' s origina l 50,00 0

troops.47

47

 A stric t accountin g from al l availabl e figure s o n

Japanese casualties, both kille d an d captured , leave s

about 5,50 0 troop s o f th e Shimbu Group unac -

counted for . Man y o f thes e me n probabl y mad e

their wa y northward throug h th e mountain s t o b e

killed, captured, or foun d dea d i n area s outside the

Shimbu Group's origina l sector ; th e bodie s o f th e

rest wer e simpl y neve r found .
CHAPTER XXII I

Securing th e Visaya n Passage s

Sixth Arm y ha d no t waite d fo r th e

destruction o f th e Shimbu Group, no r

even fo r th e captur e o f Waw a an d Ip o

Dams, t o launc h operation s t o clea r

southern Luzon , t o secur e th e norther n

side o f th e Visaya n Passages , an d t o gai n

control ove r th e shore s o f Batanga s an d

Balayan Bay s i n orde r to develo p logistical base s there . Genera l Krueger' s plan s

for Sixt h Army' s shar e i n th e progra m

to clea r th e Visaya n Passage s calle d fo r

XIV Corps to strike into southern Luzo n

during the firs t wee k o f March, by whic h

time tha t corps' attac k agains t th e mai n

body of the Shimbu Group i n th e mountains eas t o f Manil a woul d b e les s tha n

two week s old . First , XI V Corp s woul d

secure thos e section s o f th e norther n

shores of th e Visaya n Passage s lyin g west

of th e Bico l Peninsul a o f southeaster n

Luzon, simultaneousl y clearin g th e

Batangas-Balayan Bay s area . Onc e XI V

Corps operation s i n souther n Luzo n

were well unde r way , Sixt h Army would

stage a n amphibiou s attac k agains t th e

southeastern sectio n o f th e Bico l Penin -

sula t o secur e th e norther n sid e o f th e

eastern entranc e to the Visaya n Passages.

Forces undertakin g th e Bico l operatio n

would ultimatel y driv e northwestwar d

up th e peninsul a t o establis h contac t

with XI V Corp s unit s advancin g east -

ward acros s souther n Luzon , thereb y

completing th e tas k o f clearin g th e

northern littora l o f th e passages . Mean -

while, Eight h Arm y woul d b e chasin g

the Japanes e fro m norther n Samar , a t

the sout h sid e o f th e easter n entranc e

to th e Visaya n Passages , an d then , i n a

series o f mino r amphibiou s operations ,

would seiz e th e smalle r island s lyin g

athwart th e shipping routes throug h th e

inner section s o f th e passages. 1

Southern Luzon

Fitting the Plan to the Terrain

For descriptiv e purpose s i n thi s nar -

rative, souther n Luzo n i s considere d t o

be tha t par t o f th e islan d lyin g wes t o f

the Bicol Peninsul a and sout h o f Laguna

de Bay . Tw o narro w corridors on eithe r

side o f Lagun a d e Ba y provid e acces s

to souther n Luzo n fro m Manila , whil e

the nine-mile-wide Bondoc Isthmus, sep -

arating Lamo n Ba y o n th e nort h fro m

Tayabas Ba y o n th e south , connect s

southern Luzo n t o th e Bicol Peninsula .

Balayan, Batangas , an d Tayaba s Bays ,

reading wes t t o east , scallo p th e sout h

coast o f souther n Luzon . Th e regio n

contains som e rough , mountainou s

country, bu t muc h o f it , immensel y pro -

ductive agriculturally , i s fla t o r gentl y

1

 The backgroun d of the plans to clear th e Visayan

Passages, souther n Luzon , an d th e shore s o f Batan -

gas an d Balaya n Bay s i s se t fort h i n Chapte r XX ,

above.
424 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

rolling terrai n wel l suite d t o th e devel -

opment of major air an d logistica l bases.

(Map IX)

Three terrai n complexe s dominat e

southern Luzon : th e Lake Taal Uplan d

on th e west , th e Mt . Banaha o Distric t

to the east , and th e Batanga s Mountain s

on th e south-centra l coast . Th e grea t

caldera, o r volcani c depressio n o f Lak e

Taal, centering fort y mile s sout h o f Ma -

nila, i s fourtee n mile s lon g nort h t o

south an d abou t eigh t mile s wide. Nearly surrounded by a steep rim, Lake Taal

drains int o th e northeaster n corne r o f

Balayan Bay . Rocky, alternatin g ridge s

and gullies , radiatin g lik e th e spoke s o f

a whee l fro m th e encirclin g escarpment,

inhibit movemen t aroun d th e caldera.

Mt. Banahao , lik e th e Lak e Taa l

caldera, i s anothe r volcani c formation ,

but on e tha t rise s sharpl y fro m sur -

rounding fla t ground . Dominatin g th e

eastern sectio n of southern Luzon , 7,150 -

foot-high Mt . Banaha o drop s of f t o

Laguna d e Ba y o n th e nort h an d t o

Tayabas Ba y o n th e south . It s easter n

slopes fal l awa y t o a saddl e leadin g t o

the souther n ridge s o f th e Sierr a Madre ,

in turn descending steeply to Lamon Ba y

or givin g wa y t o th e roug h hill s o f th e

Bondoc Isthmus . Banahao' s wester n

slopes descen d t o fla t groun d of f th e

eastern sid e o f Mt . Malepunyo , whic h

lies between Mt. Banaha o and the eastern

ridges o f th e Lak e Taal caldera.

The Batanga s Mountains , formin g a

30-mile-wide peninsul a betwee n Batan -

gas an d Tayaba s Bays , li e southwes t o f

Mt. Banahao , sout h o f Mt . Malepunyo ,

and southeast o f Lak e Taal. Th e moun -

tains dro p sharpl y awa y o n th e sout h

to a steep, broken coast line overlookin g

the Verde Island Passage, the name given

that section o f the Visaya n Passage s lying

between souther n Luzo n an d norther n

Mindoro. Th e norther n reache s o f th e

Batangas Mountain s slop e mor e gentl y

to a generall y fla t farmin g region .

Served by a good highway and railroad

network (there are no navigable streams),

southern Luzo n i s compartmentalize d

by corridors that , separatin g th e princi -

pal terrai n complexes , channe l militar y

traffic. Th e easies t axis o f advanc e fro m

Manila int o southern Luzo n is a narrow

flat alon g th e wester n an d southwester n

shores of Laguna d e Bay. From th e west

side of th e Hagono y Isthmus , separatin g

Laguna d e Ba y an d Manil a Bay , tw o

good roads , Route s 2 5 an d 17 , follo w

rising ground from th e vicinit y of Cavite

to th e Lak e Taa l escarpmen t a t Tagay -

tay Ridge , wher e th e 511t h Parachute

Infantry ha d droppe d durin g th e 11t h

Airborne Division's drive from Nasugb u

to Manil a i n February . Th e groun d

west o f Lak e Taal largel y confine s mili -

tary maneuve r t o Rout e 1 7 from Tagay -

tay Ridg e t o th e Nasugb u area . Nea r

Nasugbu th e highwa y turn s southeas t

across roug h groun d leadin g t o th e

northwest corne r o f Balaya n Bay . A

narrow, fla t corrido r extend s alon g th e

northern shore of Balaya n Ba y and, passing sout h o f Lak e Taal , provide s acces s

from th e wes t t o th e norther n shore s o f

Batangas Bay. A five-mile-wid e corrido r

separating th e Batanga s Mountain s an d

the Mt . Malepuny o comple x connect s

the flats a t Batanga s Bay to coastal plain s

at Tayaba s Bay . Another narrow , east -

west corridor, controlled by Mt. Maquiling an d associate d hig h ground , follow s

the souther n shor e o f Lagun a d e Bay .

A third east-west corridor is a mile-wide,

sharp defil e betwee n th e souther n sec -

tion o f th e Mt . Maquilin g complex an d

the norther n slope s o f Mt . Malepunyo .
SECURING TH E VISAYA N PASSAGE S 425

Centering abou t te n mile s eas t o f

Lake Taal , Mt . Malepuny o give s wa y

on the west to the most important northsouth corrido r o f souther n Luzon—th e

Lipa Corridor . Connectin g th e south -

western shore s o f Lagun a d e Ba y to th e

Batangas Ba y plains, th e Lip a Corrido r

is bounded on th e west by the Lake Taal

caldera an d o n th e eas t b y Mts . Male -

punyo and Maquiling . A t th e cente r o f

the Lip a Corrido r (whic h provide s ac -

cess t o al l th e east-wes t corridors ) lie s

the commercia l cente r o f Lipa , nea r

which th e Japanes e ha d partiall y com -

pleted a n ambitiou s airfiel d complex .

Another north-south corridor, between

Mts. Maquilin g an d Malepunyo , o n th e

west, an d Mt . Banahao , o n th e east ,

connects th e souther n shor e o f Lagun a

de Ba y t o th e northwester n corne r o f

the Tayaba s Ba y plains. A thir d north -

south corridor , les s well-define d tha n

the othe r two , follow s th e saddl e be -

tween Mt . Banaha o an d th e Sierr a

Madre t o joi n th e southeaster n corne r

of Lagun a d e Ba y t o th e northeaster n

section o f th e Tayaba s Ba y flats .

American planners clearly understoo d

that contro l o f th e Lip a Corrido r wa s

requisite t o th e successfu l prosecutio n

of operation s i n souther n Luzon. 2 XI V

Corps, accordingly, planned t o drive rapidly sout h an d eas t throug h th e wester n

and centra l portion s o f souther n Luzon ,

securing al l th e groun d eas t t o includ e

the Lip a Corridor. I n th e course o f this

drive th e corps would clea r th e northern

side of th e Visayan Passage s east a s fa r a s

Batangas Bay , at th e sam e tim e securin g

the shores of Batangas and Balaya n Bays.

Then th e corps woul d prepar e t o strik e

eastward throug h th e thre e east-west corridors exitin g fro m th e Lip a Corridor ,

clear th e remainde r o f souther n Luzon ,

and secur e th e nort h sid e of th e Visaya n

Passages east t o th e Bondo c Isthmus .

To execut e thi s pla n XI V Corp s ha d

available onl y th e 11t h Airborn e Divi -

sion an d th e separat e 158t h Regimenta l

Combat Team. 3 Thes e tw o units wer e

to execut e a pincers movemen t int o th e

Lipa Corridor. On e arm—the 11th Airborne Division's 511th Parachute Infan -

try an d 187t h Glide r Infantry—woul d

strike towar d Lip a fro m th e nort h an d

northwest, securin g th e norther n en d o f

the Lip a Corridor , th e wester n entranc e

to th e Lagun a d e Ba y east-west corridor,

and th e wester n entranc e t o th e east -

west corrido r betwee n Mts . Malepuny o

and Maquiling . Th e othe r arm—th e

158th RC T — would assembl e nea r

Nasugbu an d attac k southeas t alon g

Route 1 7 to Balaya n Bay . Then, swing -

ing eastward , th e 158t h woul d clea r th e

shores o f Balaya n an d Batanga s Bays ,

gain contro l ove r th e souther n en d o f

the Lip a Corridor, and clos e the western

entrance t o th e east-wes t corrido r be -

tween Mt . Malepuny o and th e Batanga s

Mountains. Havin g execute d thes e

tasks, th e 158t h RC T woul d driv e north

to seiz e Lip a an d establis h contac t wit h

the 11t h Airborne Division .

The operatio n woul d b e launche d o n

a bi t o f a shoestring , especiall y i n th e

light of intelligence estimates that placed

anywhere fro m 10,00 0 t o 17,00 0 Japa -

2

 American planning material in this subsection is

mainly from : Sixt h Arm y Rp t Luzon , I, 60, 62; Sixt h

Army F O 55 , 2 8 Fe b 45 , in ibid., I, 156 ; XI V Corp s

FO 8 , 4 Mar 45 ; 11th A/B Di v FO 20 , 5 Mar 45 .

3

 For th e reason s promptin g th e assignmen t o f

these units t o th e souther n Luzo n operatio n an d fo r

the reason s tha t XI V Corp s ha d n o othe r force s im -

mediately available , se e above , Chapte r XX .
426 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

nese i n souther n Luzon .

4

 Th e 11t h

Airborne Divisio n woul d strik e int o

southern Luzo n wit h onl y 7,00 0 effec -

tives, al l o f who m ha d ha d scan t res t

after th e divisio n ha d complete d it s op -

erations a t Manila. 5 Th e 158t h RCT ,

also understrength , ha d ha d abou t tw o

weeks rest afte r it s arduous campaign i n

the Rosario-Damorti s are a a t Lingaye n

Gulf. Combined , th e tw o units ha d a n

effective strengt h o f littl e mor e tha n

two-thirds tha t o f a standar d infantr y

division, an d no t al l thi s strength woul d

be immediatel y availabl e fo r th e ne w

offensive. Becaus e it s reinforcin g unit s

from th e 24t h Infantr y Divisio n ha d t o

leave Luzo n fo r operation s i n th e South -

ern Philippines, the 11th Airborne Division woul d hav e t o emplo y it s 188t h

Glider Infantr y t o protec t it s lin e o f

communications.

Japanese Defensive Preparations

General Yokoyama , commandin g th e

Shimbu Group, had vested responsibility

for th e defens e o f souther n Luzo n i n

the Fuji Force, compose d o f th e 17th

Infantry (les s th e 3d Battalion) o f th e

8th Division; th e 3d Battalion, rein -

forced, o f th e sam e division's 31st Infantry; a provisiona l infantr y battalio n o f

unknown strength ; a battalio n an d a

half o f mixe d artillery ; an d element s

of variou s 8th Division servic e units. 6

Colonel Fujishige , commandin g the Fuji

Force (an d the 17th Infantry a s well) ,

also ha d contro l fo r groun d operationa l

purposes o f th e suicid e boa t squadron s

and bas e battalion s o f th e 2d Surface

Raiding Base Force, an d o f Japanes e

naval troop s wh o ha d escape d fro m th e

Manila Ba y islands . Anothe r grou p

under Fujishige' s comman d wer e th e

troops organic t o or attache d t o the 86th

Airfield Battalion, a 4th Air Army

ground uni t statione d a t Lipa .

Fujishige's tota l strengt h numbere d

approximately 13,00 0 men , o f whom n o

more tha n 3,00 0 wer e traine d infantr y

combat effectives . Som e 2,50 0 o f hi s

13,000, includin g abou t 75 0 infantry -

men, wer e cu t of f wes t o f Lak e Taal .

Southwest o f Tagayta y Ridg e wer e th e

remnants of the West Sector Unit (buil t

around th e 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry),

while in th e rough hills south of Ternate

was th e decimate d 111th Surface Raiding Base Battalion o f th e 2d Surface

Raiding Base Force, hole d u p alon g

with mos t o f th e nava l troop s wh o

remained alive .

It wa s not Fujishige' s missio n t o hol d

the norther n shor e o f th e Visaya n Passages. Rather , Genera l Yokoyam a ha d

directed him t o preven t American force s

from roundin g th e easter n shor e o f

Laguna d e Ba y to outflan k th e Shimbu

Group's mai n defenses . Genera l Yoko -

yama, fro m th e first , lef t Colone l Fuji -

shige plent y o f leewa y i n arrangin g hi s

defenses—in fact , afte r 1 Marc h Yoko -

yama ha d littl e othe r choice . B y tha t

time communications ha d broke n dow n

4

 Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 62 ; XI V Corp s Rp t

Luzon, pt . I, p . 167 ; XI V Corps, G-2 Estimat e of th e

Enemy Situatio n . . . Batanga s Bay , 3 Mar 45 , atchd

to XI V Corp s F O 8 , 4 Ma r 45 . 5

 11th A/ B Di v Rpt Luzon , p . 57 . 6

 This subsectio n i s base d on : Japanes e Studie s i n

WW II , No . 9, Luzo n Opn s o f th e Shimbu Gp, pp .

1-2, 9 . 25-26 , 32-33 , an d Ma p 1 ; Tsutsum i State -

ment, States , IV , 426-28 ; 14th Area Army T r Or g

List; 11th A/B Div Rpt Luzon , pp. 13 , 17-19, 32-35;

Kuriya Statement , States, II , 371-73 ; 10th I&H Staf f

Study, Japanese Opn s i n th e Batanga s Area , passim;

see also above, chs. XI I an d XIX .
SECURING TH E VISAYA N PASSAGE S 427

between th e Fuji Force an d Shimbu

Group headquarters , an d Fujishig e wa s

on hi s own .

The dispositio n o f his force s indicate s

that Fujishig e ha d analyze d th e militar y

topography o f souther n Luzo n i n muc h

the same manner as had America n plan -

ners. Fo r example , h e deploye d a con -

siderable portio n o f hi s strengt h alon g

a lin e extendin g from Lo s Baños, o n th e

south-central shor e o f Lagun a d e Bay ,

southwest across Mt. Maquilin g to Sant o

Tomas, wher e Route s 1 an d 1 9 joine d

twelve mile s nort h o f Lipa . Fro m

this lin e h e controlle d no t onl y th e

northern sectio n o f th e Lip a Corrido r

but als o the western entrance to the east -

west corrido r betwee n Mts . Maquilin g

and Malepunyo . Fujishig e also stationed

troops a t Tanauan , tw o mile s sout h o f

Santo Tomas, t o block a third-class road

that cam e int o th e Lip a Corrido r fro m

the northeaster n corne r o f Lak e Taal ,

connecting tha t corne r t o Tagayta y

Ridge b y othe r poo r road s tha t coul d

only suppor t ligh t militar y traffic .

Fujishige's defens e o f th e souther n

entrance t o the Lipa Corridor was based

upon position s extendin g fro m Mt .

Macolod, a t th e southeaster n corne r o f

Lake Taal , southeas t acros s Rout e 417 ,

the bes t roa d leadin g nort h fro m Ba -

tangas Bay . T o protec t his rear o r east -

ern flan k agains t surpris e attack , h e

stationed smal l detachment s a t variou s

road junction s i n th e Tayaba s Ba y

plains. H e spli t his best traine d units —

the tw o battalion s o f th e 17th Infantry

—into smal l increments . Havin g onl y

these tw o battalion s o f regula r infantry ,

he divide d the m amon g many defensiv e

positions, apparentl y i n th e hop e tha t

he could thu s bolster th e effectiveness o f

the man y third-clas s an d provisiona l

units tha t mad e u p th e bul k o f hi s

strength. H e held out no central reserve.

The Fuji Force ha d plent y o f score s

to settl e wit h bot h th e American s an d

Filipinos i n souther n Luzon , an d fro m

the man y atrocitie s tha t occurre d i n th e

region afte r th e 11th Airborne Divisio n

had lande d a t Nasugbu , i t appears tha t

the Fuji Force di d no t car e ho w i t went

about settlin g thos e scores . First , Fuji -

shige ha d los t som e o f his best troops —

those o f th e West Sector Unit—to th e

11th Airborn e Divisio n durin g Febru -

ary. Second , th e 11t h Airborne ha d

trapped approximatel y anothe r 1,35 0

men i n th e Ternat e region . Third , b y

1 Marc h Allie d Ai r Force s plane s an d

Allied Nava l Force s F T boat s ha d

sought ou t an d destroye d almos t al l th e

suicide boat s o f th e 2d Surface Raiding

Base Force. Fourth , southern Luzon had

become a veritable hornets' nest of guerrilla activity , creatin g a situatio n wit h

which Colone l Fujishig e wa s scarcel y

able t o cope . Fifth , an d probabl y th e

most embarrassin g an d vexing , Fil -

American force s had snatche d over 2,00 0

American an d Allie d civilia n internee s

almost from unde r Fujishige's eyes .

On th e morning of 2 4 February a tas k

force compose d o f th e 1s t Battalion ,

188th Glide r Infantry , element s o f th e

511th Parachut e Infantry , attache d guerrillas, an d supportin g artillery , tan k de -

stroyers, an d amphibiou s tractor s mad e

a daring , carefully time d rescu e of 2,14 7

internees fro m a n intermen t cam p nea r

Los Baños on Lagun a de Bay. Guerrillas

and element s o f th e 188t h Glide r Infan -

try invested the camp by land, coming in

from th e west; othe r troop s of th e 188t h

Infantry cam e across Lagun a d e Ba y b y

amphibious tractors, and trooper s of the

511th Infantr y droppe d ont o th e cam p
428 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

proper. Annihilatin g th e Japanes e garrison of nearly 250, the tas k force escaped

through enemy-controlle d territor y be -

fore Fujishig e wa s abl e t o organiz e a

counterstroke.7

The March Offensive in

Southern Luzon

The norther n ar m o f th e pincer s i n

southern Luzo n bega n t o mov e o n 7

March, whe n th e 187t h Glide r Infantr y

descended th e stee p souther n slope s o f

Tagaytay Ridg e t o th e norther n shor e

of Lak e Taal. 8 Turnin g east , th e regi -

ment me t n o oppositio n until , o n th e

afternoon o f th e 8th , it cam e upon Fuji

Force defense s a t a hil l tw o mile s wes t

of Tanauan . Wit h th e ai d o f clos e ai r

and artiller y support th e regiment over -

ran thes e defenses on 1 1 March, but the n

halted pending the outcome of the 511t h

Infantry's attac k sout h through th e Lipa

Corridor towar d Sant o Tomas.

The 511t h had assemble d a t barri o

Real, seven mile s north of Santo Tomas.

Here Rout e 1 , whic h run s fro m Manil a

to Tanaua n an d the n eas t throug h th e

corridor betwee n Mts . Maquiling an d

Malepunyo, join s Rout e 21 , leadin g

eastward, throug h Lo s Baños , alon g th e

south shor e o f Lagun a d e Bay . Th e

511th Infantry' s firs t tas k wa s t o reduc e

Fuji Force defense s o n Mt . Bijiang , a

rough pea k locate d a t th e northwester n

corner o f th e Mt . Maquilin g hil l mas s

and controllin g Route s 1 an d 2 1 fo r

about fiv e mile s sout h an d southeas t o f

Real. Th e 511t h Infantry launche d un -

successful fronta l attack s agains t Mt .

Bijiang fro m 1 0 throug h 1 3 March .

Thereafter, supportin g ai r an d artiller y

reduced th e defenses , whic h guerrilla s

finally overra n o n th e 19th. Withou t

waiting fo r this inevitabl e outcome , elements o f th e 511t h had pushe d dow n

Route 1 t o withi n a mil e o f Sant o

Tomas. Meanwhile , othe r troop s of th e

regiment ha d move d eas t alon g Rout e

21 t o a poin t abou t thre e mile s short o f

Los Baños , wher e th e Japanes e ha d

reorganized thei r defenses .

Neither th e 511t h Infantry no r th e

187th Infantry , no r eve n both operatin g

in concert , ha d th e strengt h require d to

overrun th e stron g Japanes e position s

in th e Sant o Tomas—Tanaua n region .

Therefore, unti l 2 3 March, the tw o regiments moppe d u p i n th e area s the y

already held, warded off numerous smallscale Japanes e counterattacks , patrolle d

to locate Japanese defenses, an d directe d

air and artiller y bombardments on Japanese positions . Element s o f th e 1s t

Cavalry relieved both units on 23 March.

To th e southwes t an d south , mean -

while, th e 158t h RC T ha d mad e some -

what greate r progress. 9 Strikin g fro m

the vicinity of Nasugbu o n 4 March, th e

158th Infantr y secure d th e tow n o f

Balayan, a t th e northwester n corne r o f

Balayan Bay , the sam e day . The regi -

ment the n drove eastwar d against negli -

gible opposition , cleare d th e norther n

7

 Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I, 41 . 8

 Information o n 11t h Airborne Divisio n opera -

tions in thi s subsectio n i s from: XI V Corp s G- 3 Pe r

Rpts, 5-24 Mar 45; 11th A/B Div Rpt Luzon , pp. 8 ,

18-20, 32 ; Flanagan, The Angels, pp . 102-05 ; 11th

A/B Di v G-3 Pe r Rpts , 2-24 Mar 45 ; 187t h Gl i In f

Rpt Luzon , pp . 6-9; 187t h In f S- 3 Pe r Rpts , 1-2 4

Mar 45 ; 511t h Prch t In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 21-24 ;

511th In f S-2/S-3 Jnl, 4-24 Mar 45.

9

 Additional sources of information fo r 158t h RCT

operations are : 158t h RC T Rp t Luzon , pp . 17-23 ;

158th In f S- 3 Rp t Luzon , Balayan-Batanga s Opn ,

pp. 1-3; 158t h RC T S- 3 Pe r Rpt, 4-2 4 Mar 45.
SECURING TH E VISAYA N PASSAGE S 429

shores o f Balaya n an d Batanga s Bays ,

and o n 1 1 Marc h reache d th e tow n o f

Batangas, o n th e northeaster n shor e o f

Batangas Bay. On it s wa y east th e regi -

ment ha d bypasse d stron g element s o f

the 2d Surface Raiding Base Force o n

the Calumpa n Peninsula , whic h sepa -

rates Balaya n an d Batanga s Bays . Th e

regiment ha d t o clea r th e peninsul a t o

assure th e securit y o f th e norther n sid e

of th e Verde Island Passag e and t o mak e

the shore s o f Balaya n an d Batanga s Bay s

safe for base development; it gave the job

to a reinforced battalion. I n an operation

marked b y mino r shore-to-shor e opera -

tions b y bot h Japanes e an d America n

units, the American forc e cleared the peninsula by 1 6 March. Mos t of the Japanes e

garrison escape d t o island s i n th e Verde

Island Passag e o r t o th e Luban g Islands,

which contro l th e wester n entranc e t o

the Visaya n Passages .

Meanwhile, othe r element s o f th e

158th Infantr y ha d mad e contac t wit h

strong Japanes e defenses blockin g Rout e

417—the Batangas-Lip a road—a t Mt .

Macolod. Numberin g som e 1,25 0 men

in all , the Japanes e ha d th e suppor t o f

a 300-mm . howitzer , tw o 70-mm . guns ,

ten o r mor e 81-mm . mortars , a fe w

lighter mortars, and a wealth o f machine

guns an d machin e cannon , includin g

many remove d fro m disable d Japanes e

aircraft a t th e Lipa airstrips. Th e 158t h

Infantry, launchin g a n attac k a t Mt .

Macolod on 1 9 March, had the support of

two 105-mm . an d tw o 155-mm . howitze r

battalions.

From 1 9 through 2 3 March th e 158t h

Infantry overra n oute r defense s eas t o f

Route 417 and southeast of Mt. Macolod,

which la y wes t o f th e road . Bu t th e

regiment mad e littl e progres s a t Mt .

Macolod proper and b y 23 March, whe n

it ha d t o disengag e t o prepar e fo r op -

erations o n th e Bicol Peninsula , th e

Japanese stil l ha d a fir m hol d o n th e

mountain.

Thus, by 23 March th e 11t h Airborne

Division an d th e 158t h RC T ha d closed

with th e Fuji Force mai n lin e o f resist -

ance a t th e norther n an d souther n en -

trances to the Lipa Corridor, had cleared

the shore s o f Balaya n an d Batanga s

Bays, and ha d secure d th e northern sid e

of th e Verd e Islan d Passage . Simulta -

neously, element s o f th e 11t h Airborne

Division ha d considerabl y reduce d th e

threat t o it s lin e o f communication s

posed b y th e Fuji Force unit s isolate d

west o f Lak e Taal , althoug h i t wa s 1

April befor e th e 188t h Infantr y over -

came th e last organize d resistanc e i n th e

rough hill s south o f Ternate. Casualtie s

for th e period from 4 through 2 3 March

were:10

U.S. Casualties

Unit

187th Infantry

188th Infantry

511th Infantr y

158th Infantry

Attached

guerrillas

Total

Killed

5

20

15

35

15

90

Wounded

15

30

85

125

45

300

Total

20

50

100

160

60

390

Japanese

Killed

205

250

350

685

(unknown)

1,490

Securing the Lipa Corridor

Sixth Army plans to speed the clearing

of th e res t o f th e norther n sid e o f th e

Visayan Passage s b y strikin g int o th e

Bicol Peninsul a cause d Kruege r t o re -

10

 Most o f th e guerrilla s operate d wit h th e 188t h

Infantry i n th e regio n wes t o f Lak e Taal , bu t eac h

of th e othe r unit s ha s some guerrilla s attached . N o

breakdown fo r Japanes e killed b y guerrilla s is available; suc h figure s ar e include d i n th e regimenta l

totals.
430 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

lieve th e 158t h RC T a t Mt . Macolod. 11

Initially, Krueger had intended to relieve

the 158t h RC T o n 1 7 March , simulta -

neously pullin g th e 511th Infantry (les s

3d Battalion) out of the lines in southern

Luzon t o ac t a s Sixth Army Reserv e fo r

the Bicol Peninsula operation. Upo n reexamination o f his plan , Kruege r bega n

to fea r tha t wit h th e strengt h lef t t o i t

the 11t h Airborne Divisio n migh t fin d

it impossibl e t o hold th e gain s made i n

southern Luzo n by mid-March. Also , he

learned tha t th e Allie d Ai r Force s an d

the Allied Nava l Force s could no t mak e

ready for the Bico l attack as soon a s they

had anticipated . Accordingly , Kruege r

postponed the Bicol invasion a week, giving himself tim e to move the 1s t Cavalr y

Division into southern Luzo n before th e

158th RCT ha d t o leave.

Desperately i n nee d o f rest an d reha -

bilitation after its fighting in Manil a and

against th e Shimbu Group i n th e mountains eas t o f th e city , th e 1s t Cavalr y

Division go t onl y a ten-da y breathe r be -

fore movin g int o souther n Luzon . Th e

43d Divisio n too k ove r fro m th e cavalr y

unit o n th e Shimbu fron t o n 1 2 March,

and o n th e 23 d the 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n

relieved al l element s o f th e 11t h Airborne Divisio n i n th e Sant o Tomas -

Tanauan area at the northern en d of the

Lipa Corridor . O n th e sam e day , in a

rapid truc k movemen t aroun d th e wes t

side o f Lak e Taal , th e 11t h Airborne

Division relieve d th e 158t h RCT i n th e

Mt. Macolo d sector .

XIV Corp s no w divide d souther n

Luzon so as to place Lipa , Mt. Macolod,

and Mt . Malepuny o i n th e 11t h Airborne Division's sector i n th e south; th e

1st Cavalr y Divisio n ha d th e regio n t o

the north . Genera l Griswold , th e corp s

commander, directe d th e 11th Airborne

to complet e th e reductio n o f Japanes e

defenses a t Mt . Macolod, seize Lipa, and

clear Rout e 19 , the mai n roa d throug h

the Lip a Corridor , fo r fiv e mile s nort h

of Lipa . Th e 1s t Cavalry Division would

seize Sant o Toma s an d Tanaua n an d

advance sout h alon g Rout e 1 9 t o gai n

contact with the 11t h Airborne Division.

The 11t h Airborne Divisio n agai n

faced th e proble m o f assemblin g suffi -

cient strengt h t o execut e it s missions .

The divisio n controlled onl y one battalion of the 511th Infantry, and on e of the

188th Infantry' s tw o battalion s wa s still

engaged sout h o f Ternate . Genera l

Swing organize d hi s remainin g unit s

into tw o regimenta l tas k forces . Th e

187th Infantry , reinforce d b y tanks ,

guerrillas, an d artillery , was to seiz e Mt.

Macolod; th e 188t h Infantry , les s its 1s t

Battalion bu t wit h th e 511t h Infantry's

3d Battalio n attached , woul d strik e to -

ward Lip a u p road s lyin g eas t o f Mt .

Macolod. Tank destroyers and guerrillas

reinforced th e 188t h Infantry' s group -

ment. The 1s t Cavalry Division assigned

responsibility for its drive south through

the Lip a Corrido r t o th e 2 d Cavalr y

Brigade. The 1s t Cavalr y Brigade would

secure th e division's rea r area , mo p u p

at Mt . Maquiling , an d advanc e eas t

along the sout h shor e o f Laguna de Ba y

as far a s Los Baños.

Except a t Mt . Macolod , th e tas k o f

clearing the Lipa Corridor proved unex11

 Planning materia l i n thi s subsectio n i s from :

Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 60 , 63-64 ; Sixt h Arm y

FO's 53, 1 9 Feb, 55, 28 Feb, 56, 6 Mar, 57, 11 Mar 45 ,

and Amendmen t No . 1,1 3 Mar 45 , to F O 57 , al l i n

ibid., I , 155-58 ; XI V Corp s Rp t Luzon , pt . I , pp .

171-72; XI V Corp s Opn s Memo s 4 0 an d 41 , 1 9 and

22 Ma r 45 ; 11th A/B Di v FO 22 , 24 Mar 45 ; 1st Ca v

Div Opn s Memo s 13 , 14 , an d 15 , date d 19 , 23 , an d

24 Ma r 45 ,
SECURING TH E VISAYA N PASSAGE S 431

LIPA AFTER BOMBARDMEN T

pectedly easy . Leavin g th e tow n o f Ba -

tangas o n 2 4 March, the 188t h Infantr y

task forc e encountere d n o seriou s re -

sistance until, on th e evening of the 26th,

it reache d hil l defense s tw o an d a hal f

miles southeas t of Lip a hel d by the

Fuji Force's 86th Airfield Battalion.12

The nex t da y the tas k forc e overra n th e

Japanese positions , an d durin g th e fol -

lowing nigh t mos t o f th e Japanes e re -

maining i n th e Lip a are a withdre w

eastward t o Mt . Malepunyo , afte r al -

legedly setting fire t o the town . Actually,

American ai r an d artiller y bombard -

ments had already battered Lip a beyond

recognition. Th e fire , n o matte r ho w

started, could have done little additional

damage.

The 2 d Cavalr y Brigad e ha d move d

equally fast. 13 Th e 8t h Cavalr y too k

12

 Information o n 11t h Airborn e Divisio n opera -

tions i n thi s subsectio n i s from : XI V Corp s Rp t

Luzon, pt . I , pp . 175-78 , 193-95 ; XIV Corps G- 3

Per Rpts , 2 3 Mar-2 2 Ap r 45 ; 11t h A/ B Di v Rp t

Luzon, pp . 7-8 , 20-22 , 34 ; Flanagan , The Angels,

pp. 107-13 ; 11t h A/ B Di v G-3 Pe r Rpts , 2 4 Mar22 Ap r 45 ; 188t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 14-16 .

13

 Information o n 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n operation s

in thi s subsectio n i s from : XI V Corp s Rp t Luzon ,

pt. I , pp . 175-78 , l80 ; XIV Corp s G- 3 Pe r Rpts ,

24-30 Ma r 45 ; 1s t Ca v Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 20-22 ;

2d Ca v Bri g Rp t Luzon , p . 9 ; 7t h Ca v Rp t Luzon ,

Los Baños-Malva r Phase , passim; 8t h Ca v Rp t

Luzon, Sant o Tomas-Lip a Phase , passim; 5t h Ca v

Rpt Luzon , pp . 42-46 ; 1s t Ca v Div G-3 Rpts , 23-30

Mar 45 ; 1st Ca v Bri g S- 3 Rpts , 25-3 0 Ma r 45; 12t h

Cav Uni t Rpts , 25-3 0 Ma r 45 .
432 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Santo Tomas o n 2 4 March afte r a sharp

fight; Tanaua n fel l o n th e 26t h a s Japanese resistanc e throughou t th e 2 d Bri -

gade's secto r bega n t o collapse . O n th e

27th, XI V Corp s reassigne d responsi -

bility fo r th e captur e o f Lip a t o th e 1s t

Cavalry Division, 14 an d behin d clos e air

support tha t complete d th e destructio n

of the town, the 8th Cavalry secured Lipa

against littl e oppositio n o n 2 9 March .

That evenin g th e regimen t mad e con -

tact wit h patrol s o f th e 188t h Infantr y

task forc e sout h o f Lipa .

Meanwhile, troop s o f th e 7t h Cavalr y

had advance d abou t fiv e mile s east int o

the corrido r betwee n Mts . Maquilin g

and Malepunyo . Th e 1s t Cavalr y Bri -

gade ha d bee n makin g goo d progres s

along the Route 21 corridor on the south

shore o f Lagun a d e Bay—i t too k Lo s

Baños on th e 25th , an d b y th e 29t h ha d

troops fou r mile s beyon d tha t town .

Reconnaissance element s move d acros s

Laguna de Bay in small craft an d lande d

near the southeastern corner of the lake,

finding fe w sign s o f Japanese . Th e 1s t

Cavalry Division and th e 188t h Infantr y

task forc e ha d complete d thei r share s i n

the operation s t o secur e th e Lip a Cor -

ridor an d bot h wer e read y t o swin g

eastward i n strengt h throug h th e east -

west corridors. A t Mt . Macolod , how -

ever, th e 187t h Infantr y tas k forc e wa s

facing a fa r different situation .

The 187t h bega n it s attac k a t Mt .

Macolod o n 2 4 March , bu t i t wa s no t

until 1 April tha t th e tas k force , havin g

encircled th e landwar d side s o f th e ter -

rain feature , wa s able t o concentrat e its

entire strengt h agains t th e mai n Japa -

nese defenses. Then, down to an effective

strength of less than 1,25 0 men, the tas k

force launche d a n unsuccessfu l assaul t

against the Japanese defenders—300 men

holding well-prepare d position s i n

excellent defensiv e terrain .

There wa s a hiatu s i n operation s a t

Mt. Macolo d fro m 3 throug h 1 7 April ,

when th e bul k o f th e 187t h Infantr y

concentrated nea r Lipa . Th e regimen t

renewed th e attac k o n th e 18t h with

reinforcements including a company each

of mediu m tanks , tan k destroyers , an d

4.2-inch mortars, and ove r 500 guerrillas.

By 21 April the reinforce d regimen t had

overcome th e last resistance , completing

the job tha t th e 158t h RCT ha d starte d

on 1 9 March.

Sweeping Eastward

While the 187t h Infantr y had been reducing the defense s a t Mt . Macolod, the

rest of XIV Corp s ha d been drivin g east

beyond th e Lip a Corridor . Tw o factor s

prompted Genera l Griswol d t o strik e

east before Mt . Macolod fell. First , General Kruege r wa s puttin g pressur e o n

the corp s t o clea r th e Tayaba s Ba y section o f th e northern sid e of th e Visayan

Passages quickly. Second , in lat e March,

the Sixth Army commander had directed

XI and XIV Corps to gain contact along

the easter n shor e o f Lagun a d e Ba y i n

order t o preven t troop s o f th e Fuji

Force fro m escapin g fro m souther n

Luzon i n orde r t o joi n th e mai n bod y

of th e Shimbu Group.15

Griswold planne d to plac e the emphasis o n hi s driv e eastwar d o n hi s left , th e

1st Cavalry Division's sector, not only because o f Krueger 's orders t o mak e con -

tact wit h X I Corp s eas t o f Lagun a d e

Bay but als o because the 11th Airborne

14

 XIV Corps Opns Memo 42, 27 Mar 45 . 15

 See also above , ch. XXII.
SECURING TH E VISAYA N PASSAGE S 433

Division was, in late March, too scattered

and to o wea k t o undertak e a concerte d

attack. A s of 3 0 March the 187t h Infan -

try still had its hands full at Mt Macolod;

the 511th Infantry, less 3d Battalion , was

still i n Sixt h Arm y Reserv e fo r th e

Bicol Peninsul a operation ; an d on e battalion o f th e 188t h Infantr y wa s stil l

occupied wes t o f Lak e Taal . Griswol d

therefore expecte d littl e mor e fro m th e

11th Airborn e Division , a t least fo r th e

time being , tha n reconnaissanc e east -

ward towar d Tayaba s Ba y fro m th e

southern par t o f Lipa Corridor. 16

The ne w XIV Corp s driv e starte d o n

30 Marc h a s th e 12t h Cavalry , 1s t Cav -

alry Brigade , struc k eastwar d fro m th e

vicinity o f Lo s Baños.17The regimen t

moved firs t t o Calauan , seve n mile s

beyond Lo s Baños, and the n marche d

southward alon g a secondar y roa d to -

ward Sa n Pablo , a t th e easter n exi t t o

the east-wes t corrido r betwee n Mts .

Maquiling and Malepunyo . Stron g Japanese force s hel d defense s i n rocky ,

bare-sloped hill s betwee n Calaua n an d

San Pablo , but i n a n attac k lastin g fro m

1 throug h 5 Apri l th e 12th Cavalr y

overran thos e positions , losin g 2 0 me n

killed an d 6 5 wounde d whil e killin g

about 14 0 Japanese . O n th e las t da y o f

this figh t th e 12t h Cavalry made contact

with 5t h Cavalr y patrol s comin g nort h

from Sa n Pablo , seve n mile s sout h o f

Calauan. Th e 5t h and 7t h Cavalry Regiments had fough t thei r way through th e

Mt. Maquiling-Mt. Malepunyo corridor

against stif f bu t rathe r disorganize d Japanese oppositio n an d ha d reache d Sa n

Pablo o n 2 April.

On 5 Apri l th e 1s t Cavalr y Brigad e

and element s o f th e 8t h Cavalr y fro m

the 2 d Brigad e bega n patrollin g north -

east, east, an d southeas t fro m Sa n Pabl o

and Calauan , roundin g th e southeas t

corner o f Lagun a d e Ba y an d probin g

into th e north-sout h corrido r betwee n

Mts. Malepuny o an d Banahao . Resis -

tance melte d awa y an d th e cavalryme n

encountered onl y small , disorganize d

groups of Japanese in th e area patrolled.

On 6 Apri l th e 5t h Cavalr y mad e con -

tact wit h X I Corp s troop s a t th e south -

eastern corne r o f Lagun a d e Bay , thus

completing one of the XIV Corps tasks.18

Twenty-odd mile s t o the south , meanwhile, th e 11t h Airborn e Divisio n ha d

accomplished fa r mor e tha n Genera l

Griswold ha d expecte d o f it. 19 Inter -

preting it s reconnaissanc e rol e i n th e

broadest fashion , th e 11t h Airborne Division o n 1 Apri l ha d starte d pushin g

elements o f th e 188t h Infantr y eas t

through th e corridor between Mt . Male -

punyo an d th e Batanga s Mountains .

The leadin g troop s emerge d a t Tiaong ,

in th e north-sout h corrido r betwee n

Mts. Malepuny o an d Banahao , o n 3

April, and th e nex t da y established contact wit h 5t h Cavalr y patrol s fro m Sa n

Pablo, eigh t mile s t o th e north . Th e

188th Infantr y nex t dispatche d patrol s

into th e Tayaba s Plain s regio n sout h o f 16

 Sixth Arm y F O 58 , 2 4 Mar 45 ; XIV Corps FO 10 ,

30 Ma r 45; XIV Corp s Rp t Luzon , pt. I, pp . 189-90 . 17

 Information o n 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n operation s

in thi s subsectio n i s from : XI V Corp s Rp t Luzon ,

pt. I , pp . 183-86 , 192 ; 1st Ca v Di v Rp t Luzon , pp .

22-27; 1s t Ca v Div G-3 Rpts , 3 0 Mar-12 Ap r 45; 2 d

Cav Bri g Rp t Luzon , p . 9 ; 2 d Ca v Bri g Opn s Rpt ,

31 Mar-1 1 Ap r 45; 1st Ca v Brig Rpt Luzon , pp . 5-6;

1st Ca v Bri g S- 3 Rpts , 3 1 Mar-1 1 Ap r 45 .

18

 See als o above , ch . XXII. 19

 Informatio n o n 11t h Airborne Divisio n opera -

tions i n thi s subsectio n i s from : XI V Corp s Rp t

Luzon, pt . I, pp . 189-92 ; 11t h A/B Di v Rpt Luzon ,

pp. 7-8 , 20-21; 11t h A/ B Di v G- 3 Pe r Rpts , 3 0

Mar-12 Ap r 45; XIV Corps G- 3 Pe r Rpts , 3 0 Mar12 Ma r 45 ; Flanagan, The Angels, pp. 110-11 ; 188t h

Inf Rp t Luzon , pp . 15-16 .
434 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Mt. Banahao , findin g th e plain s fre e o f

Japanese an d unde r th e contro l o f Fili -

pino guerrillas. Whe n on 6 April troops

of th e 188t h Infantr y reache d Lucena ,

the larges t tow n o n Tayaba s Bay , XIV

Corps ha d finishe d th e jo b o f securin g

the northern side of the Visayan Passages

in its zone.

Mop-up in Southern Luzon

From Lucena , Rout e 1 ran eastwar d

across the Bondoc Isthmu s t o Atimonan

on Lamo n Bay ; Route 2 3 wen t nort h

from Lucen a throug h th e corrido r be -

tween Mt. Banahao and the Sierra Madre

to a junctio n wit h Rout e 2 1 at Pagsanjan, poin t o f contac t betwee n th e X I

and XI V Corps . O n 7 April patrol s o f

the 11th Airborne Division started north

from Lucen a an d 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n

patrols lef t Pagsanja n o n thei r wa y

south. Makin g contact on 1 0 April, th e

patrols fro m th e tw o division s secure d

the Mt. Banahao-Sierra Madr e corridor

against negligibl e resistance .

General Kruege r ha d already directed

XIV Corp s t o continu e eastwar d fro m

the Banahao-Sierr a Madr e corrido r t o

the shore s o f Lamo n Ba y i n orde r t o

seal of f th e Bico l Peninsul a an d mak e

ready t o launc h a driv e southeas t

through th e peninsul a t o gai n contac t

with th e 158t h RCT , coming north -

west.20 Accordingly , o n 1 1 April a company of the 188t h Infantry, meeting little

opposition, followe d Rout e 1 across th e

Bondoc Isthmu s to Atimonan. Th e pre -

vious day troop s o f th e 5t h Cavalr y ha d

reached Lamo n Ba y a t Mauban , eight -

een mile s northwest o f Atimonan . Stra -

tegically, th e campaig n i n souther n

Luzon ha d ended—th e onl y tas k stil l

facing XIV Corps was to track down and

destroy organize d remnant s o f th e Fuji

Force.

Before th e beginnin g o f Apri l XI V

Corps ha d learne d tha t th e Fuji Force

was withdrawing into the Mt. Malepunyo

hill complex . Indeed , fro m th e incep -

tion o f operation s i n souther n Luzon ,

Colonel Fujishig e ha d include d suc h a

withdrawal i n hi s plan s an d ha d lon g

since begun preparation s for a last-ditch

stand a t Mt . Malepunyo . Bu t Fujishig e

had expecte d his Lipa Corridor defense s

to hold ou t longe r tha n the y did, and h e

had no t anticipate d tha t hi s unit s wes t

of Lak e Taal woul d b e cu t off . A s a re -

sult, h e ha d gathere d onl y 4,00 0 troop s

at Mt . Malepuny o b y earl y April ; o f

these n o mor e tha n 1,80 0 were comba t

effectives, an d h e wa s unabl e t o ma n

many o f hi s prepare d defenses . Ove r

2,000 more troops of the Fuji Force were

alive o n souther n Luzo n i n earl y April ,

but the y had littl e hope o f reaching Mt.

Malepunyo.21

The force s availabl e to XIV Corps for

an attac k agains t Mt . Malepuny o in -

cluded onl y th e 8t h Cavalry , one squad -

ron o f th e 7t h Cavalry , an d th e 511t h

Parachute Infantry , release d fro m Sixt h

Army Reserv e o n 1 2 April . Th e 1s t

Cavalry Brigad e wa s committe d t o th e

thrust int o th e Bico l Peninsula ; th e 7t h

20

 Sixth Arm y F O 59 , 7 Ap r 45 , Sixt h Arm y Rp t

Luzon, I , 163 ; XIV Corp s F O 11 , 9 Apr, 45.

21

 XIV Corp s Rp t Luzon , pt . I , p . 195 ; 11th A/B

Div Rpt Luzon , pp. 19-23 , 36; Flanagan, The Angels.

p.126 (Interro g of Fujishige) ; 1s t Ca v Di v G-2 Rp t

Luzon, pp . 20-23 , and Map 6 . Actually , som e 8,50 0

Fuji Force troop s wer e probabl y aliv e a t th e en d o f

March, th e 6,00 0 accounte d fo r abov e an d possibl y

as many as 2,500 who had escape d aroun d th e eastern shore o f Lagun a d e Bay . Using thes e figures , i t

appears tha t Fujishig e ha d los t aroun d 5,00 0 me n killed sinc e th e 11t h Airborn e Divisio n ha d lande d

at Nasugb u o n 3 1 January.
SECURING TH E VISAYA N PASSAGE S 435

Cavalry, les s on e squadron , ha d move d

north o f Lagun a d e Ra y t o reliev e X I

Corps unit s i n th e Sant a Mari a Valley ;

the 187t h an d 188t h Infantr y Regiments

were neede d fo r moppin g u p an d se -

curity mission s throughou t th e res t o f

southern Luzon. 22

During th e perio d 6-12 April patrol s

had discovere d tha t th e principa l Fuji

Force defense s wer e locate d i n th e

northwestern quadran t o f th e Male -

punyo complex , an d b y th e 16t h preliminary attack s ha d compresse d

resistance int o a n are a aroun d Mt .

Mataasna-Bundoc, a pea k 2,37 5 fee t

high a t th e northwester n shoulde r o f

the hil l mass. 23 Furthe r attack s fro m 1 7

through 2 1 April, productiv e o f limite d

results, serve d mainl y t o illustrat e th e

fact, tha t mor e strengt h wa s needed .

Accordingly, XI V Corp s adde d th e

188th Infantr y t o th e attackin g force ,

simultaneously unifyin g th e comman d

(previously divide d betwee n th e 511t h

Infantry an d th e 2 d Cavalr y Brigade )

under Headquarters , 11t h Airborne

Division.

On 2 7 April, followin g tw o days' bombardment b y seve n battalion s o f artil -

lery, th e 511t h Infantry , th e 188t h

Infantry, th e 8t h Cavalry , on e squadro n

of th e 7t h Cavalry , an d almos t 1,00 0

attached guerrilla s launche d a fina l at -

tack. B y coincidence , Colone l Fujishig e

had starte d t o withdra w hi s remainin g

troops eastwar d t o Mt . Banaha o tha t

very day, and s o found hi s defensive an d

withdrawal plan s completel y upset . B y

dark o n th e 30t h th e combine d force s

under 11t h Airborn e Divisio n contro l

had overcom e organize d resistanc e a t

Mt. Malepunyo . Sinc e 6 Apri l Colone l

Fujishige ha d los t almost . 2,50 0 me n

killed i n th e futil e defens e o f th e

Malepunyo hil l mass .

Colonel Fujishig e ultimatel y gathered

over 2,00 0 troop s along th e uppe r slope s

of Mt . Banahao , includin g a fe w me n

who infiltrate d throug h XI V Corp s

lines from th e region west o f Lak e Taal,

The Fuji Force commande r an d hi s

remnants wer e quit e conten t t o remai n

in hidin g fo r th e res t o f th e war , an d

somehow 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n an d guer -

rilla patrol s faile d t o discove r them . A t

the en d o f th e wa r th e colone l cam e

down off Mt. Banaha o to surrende r with

nearly 2,00 0 men. 24

Clearing the Smaller Islands

Even befor e XI V Corp s ha d starte d

into southern Luzo n t o secure the northern shore s o f th e Visaya n Passages , th e

Eighth Arm y ha d institute d it s cam -

paign t o clea r th e souther n sid e o f Sa n

Bernardino Strait—th e easter n entranc e

to th e wate r passes—an d t o seiz e th e

small island s controlling their inne r passages. A s a matte r o f fact , operation s

leading to th e clearin g of Eight h Army's

portion o f th e Visaya n Passage s ha d

begun earl y i n Januar y a s par t o f th e

deception activitie s tha t precede d Sixt h

22

 XIV Corps Rp t Luzon , pt . I , p . 199 ; Sixth Arm y

FO 60. 12 Ap r 15 , Sixt h Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 163 ;

XIV Corp s F O 12 , 11 Apr 45 ; 11t h A/B F O 25 , 1 2

Apr 45 . 23

 Sources fo r th e Mt . Malepuny o stor y are : XIV

Corps Rp t Luzon , pt . I , pp. 192 , 195-203 ; 11th A/B

Div Rp t Luzon , pp . 8 , 21-22 ; Flanagan , The Angels,

pp. 112-18 ; 11t h A/ B Di v G- 3 Pe r Rpts , 6 Apr -

3 May 45 ; 511t h Inf Rp t Luzon , pp. 26-30 ; 188t h In f

Rpt Luzon , pp . 18-19 ; 1s t Ca v Di v Rp t Luzon , pp .

23-32; 1s t Ca v Di v G-2 Rp t Luzon , pp . 22-23 ; 1st

Cav Di v G-3 Rpts , 6-22 Ap r 45.

24

 Fujishige wa s execute d afte r th e wa r a s a wa r

criminal, bein g hel d responsibl e fo r crime s allegedl y

committed b y hi s troop s i n souther n Luzon .
436 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Army's assault a t Lingaye n Gulf. A t th e

time, element s o f th e Wester n Visaya n

Task Forc e from southwester n Mindor o

had secure d th e norther n an d easter n

coasts o f Mindor o an d ha d seize d

Marinduque Island , thirt y mile s eas t o f

Mindoro.25 Troop s of the 19th and 21st

Infantry Regiments , 24t h Division , ha d

executed thes e earl y attacks . Th e firs t

operations Eight h Arm y undertoo k i n

accordance with plan s drawn specificall y

for clearin g th e Visaya n Passage s wer e

carried ou t betwee n mid-Februar y an d

early Marc h b y th e America l Divisio n

from base s o n Sama r Island , nort h o f

Leyte.

The Eastern Side of the Inner Passes

Eighth Army' s pla n calle d fo r th e

Americal Division , beginnin g o n 1 9

February, t o seiz e northwester n Sama r

and adjacen t islet s fo r th e purpos e o f

securing th e souther n sid e o f Sa n Ber -

nardino Strait , betwee n Sama r an d th e

Bicol Peninsula. 26 A smal l tas k forc e

built aroun d th e 1s t Battalio n o f th e

division's 182 d Infantry execute d th e

attack. Landin g craf t o f th e 542 d En -

gineer Boa t an d Shor e Regiment , 2 d

Engineer Specia l Brigade , transporte d

the battalio n northwar d fro m a bas e i n

west-central Samar , an d als o carried forward a batter y o f 105-mm . howitzer s o f

the 246t h Fiel d Artiller y Battalion ,

Americal Division . Th e 1s t Battalion ,

182d Infantry , lande d firs t o n Capu l Is -

land, te n mile s off Samar's northwester n

coast, durin g th e afternoo n o f 1 9 Feb -

ruary. (Map X) By the 25t h th e battalion

had secure d Capu l a t th e cost o f 5 men

killed an d 1 0 wounded ; th e Japanes e

lost 7 5 me n killed . Tha t th e Japanes e

might hav e ha d som e though t o f em -

ploying Capu l a s a bas e fro m whic h t o

try t o den y Sa n Bernardin o Strai t t o

Allied shippin g i s indicate d b y th e fac t

that th e 1s t Battalion , 182 d Infantry ,

captured thre e 75-mm . artiller y piece s

on th e island .

On 2 0 Februar y element s o f th e 1s t

Battalion, 182d , attacked Biri Islan d and

associated islet s te n mile s of f Samar 's

northern coast . On e infantr y company ,

carried aboar d fou r enginee r LCM's ,

made th e assaul t o n Biri , supporte d b y

four P T boat s an d b y a singl e P-38

plane, whic h strafe d th e beac h befor e

the landing . Abou t 15 0 yard s fro m

shore th e LCM' s struc k a reef , simulta -

neously encounterin g intens e machin e

gun an d morta r fir e fro m th e Japanes e

on th e island . Thi s fir e kille d o r

wounded man y o f th e enginee r crew -

men, bu t fortunatel y som e o f th e infan -

trymen, experience d i n amphibiou s

operations, ha d ha d sufficien t instruc -

tion i n th e operatio n o f LCM' s t o bac k

the craf t of f an d reassembl e a t a saf e

distance.

Meanwhile, a 105-mm . howitze r bat -

tery o f America l Divisio n artiller y ha d

landed o n a n isle t sout h o f Biri an d ha d

set u p t o bombar d th e islan d i n suppor t

of anothe r assault . Marin e Corp s SBD's

from a fiel d i n souther n Sama r pro -

vided additiona l support . Strikin g fo r

a differen t beach , th e 182d Infantry's

25

 See above, ch . III. 26

 This subsection is based mainly on: Eight h Army

Rpt Leyte—Samar—Visaya n Passages , pp . 21-23 ;

Eighth Arm y F O 19 , 1 5 Fe b 45 ; X Corps , Pla n fo r

Clearing th e Souther n Exit s t o San Bernardin o Strait

and Verd e Islan d Passages , 1 6 Fe b 45 , Eight h Arm y

G-3 Jn l Fil e Clearanc e o f Visaya n Passages ; Capt .

Francis D . Cronin , Under the Southern Cross, The

Saga of the Americal Division (Washington : Comba t

Forces Press , 1951) , pp . 246-64 ; America l Di v Opn s

Rpt. Leyte, an. I, p . 1 .
SECURING TH E VISAYA N PASSAGE S 437

company mad e a successfu l landin g during th e afternoon . B y 2 3 February ,

when th e America l Divisio n declare d

Biri secure , troop s o f th e 182d Infantry

had kille d som e 7 0 Japanes e o n th e is -

land. Losse s o f th e America n engineer s

and infantryme n involve d totale d

approximately 5 killed an d 5 0 wounded.

Following th e actio n a t Biri , troops of

the 1s t Battalion , 182 d Infantry, foun d

other islet s of f Sama r voi d o f Japanes e

and, agains t n o resistance , establishe d a

base o n Samar' s northwester n tip . Pa -

trols operatin g fro m thi s bas e foun d n o

Japanese o n th e nort h coast , bu t lo -

cated a scattere d grou p southward alon g

the wes t coast . Reinforce d b y element s

of th e 1st Filipin o Infantry , U.S. Army, 27

the 182d' s battalio n overra n organize d

resistance o n northwester n Sama r b y 1

March, an d o n th e 4t h o f th e mont h

relinquished responsibilit y for patrollin g

in th e regio n t o th e 1s t Filipin o Infan -

try an d attache d guerrillas . Th e south -

ern sid e o f Sa n Bernardin o Strai t wa s

secure.

The America l Divisio n nex t moved t o

other island s i n th e easter n sectio n o f

the Visayan Passages . On 3 March troop s

of th e reinforce d 1s t Battalion , 132d

Infantry, wen t ashor e a t Tica o Island ,

twenty-five mile s northwes t o f Capu l

Island an d onl y twelv e mile s fro m th e

nearest poin t o f th e Bico l Peninsula .

Other troop s o f th e 132 d landed th e

same da y a t Buria s Island , twent y mile s

northwest o f Ticao . Th e battalio n

found n o Japanes e o n Tica o bu t kille d

60 of a l00-ma n garriso n o n Burias .

Guerrillas too k ove r a t bot h island s o n

11 March , bringin g to an end th e Americal Division's shar e i n th e operation s t o

clear th e Visaya n Passages .

The Western and Central Islands

While th e America l Divisio n wa s op -

erating a t th e easter n entranc e t o th e

Visayan Passages , units o f th e 24t h Divi -

sion launche d attack s fro m Mindor o t o

secure th e wester n exit s o f th e passages .

The 24t h Division' s firs t objectiv e wa s

Verde Island , controllin g th e Verd e Is -

land Passag e betwee n Mindor o an d

Luzon an d believe d t o b e garrisone d b y

a Japanes e forc e mannin g fou r o r fiv e

75-mm. guns. 28 A reinforce d compan y

of th e 1s t Battalion , 19th Infantry ,

landed o n Verd e Islan d o n 2 3 February,

killed abou t 2 0 Japanese , captured thre e

75-mm. pieces, and returne d t o Mindoro

on th e 26th , leavin g guerrilla s t o garri -

son th e island . Th e guerrilla s wer e un -

able to overcome the remaining Japanes e

resistance an d durin g the perio d 2 7 February-1 Marc h th e 19th Infantr y an d

the 21s t Infantry sen t troop s bac k t o

Verde, troop s tha t broke th e last opposi -

tion o n 3 March. Japanes e casualties o n

Verde Islan d totale d abou t 8 0 me n

killed; th e America n unit s los t 6

wounded.

The nex t objectiv e wa s th e Luban g

Islands, fifty-fiv e mile s west o f Verde and

blocking th e wester n entranc e t o th e

27

 Composed mainl y o f Filipin o resident s o f th e

United States .

28

 Information o n th e Verd e Islan d operatio n i s

from: Ltr , Ma j Ge n Roscoe B. Woodruf f (C G 24t h

Div) to C G Eight h Army , 2 0 Fe b 45 , sub: Plan t o

Clear Verd e Island, Eighth Arm y G- 3 Jn l File Clearance o f Visaya n Passages ; Eight h Arm y G- 3 Opn s

Rpts, 2 4 Feb-3 Ma r 45 ; 24t h Di v G- 3 Opn s Rpts ,

24 Feb- 3 Ma r 45 ; Eight h Arm y Rp t Leyte-Samar -

Visayan Passages , pp . 24-26 ; LC I (L) G p 72 , Rpt o n

Clearing . . . Verd e Is , 2 8 Fe b 45 , passim; Rads ,

24th Di v t o Eight h Army , CA-92 4 an d CA-939 , 2 5

Feb 45 , Eight h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Clearanc e o f

Visayan Passages .
438 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Verde Islan d Passage. 29 O n 2 8 February

the reinforce d 1s t Battalion , 21s t Infan -

try, precede d th e previou s nigh t b y a

small reconnaissanc e force , mad e a n un -

opposed landin g o n Lubang , th e mai n

island o f th e group , an d th e Japanes e

fled int o th e hilly , jungled interior. O n

9 Marc h Compan y E , 19t h Infantry , re -

lieved th e 1s t Battalion , 21s t Infantry ,

and a t th e en d o f th e mont h responsi -

bility fo r moppin g u p passe d t o loca l

guerrillas. Fo r th e America n force s in -

volved th e cos t o f securin g Lubang —

the othe r island s o f th e grou p prove d

void o f Japanese—wa s abou t 1 0 me n

killed an d 2 0 wounded . Th e Japanes e

lost 23 0 killed, amon g the m som e wh o

had fle d t o Luban g a s th e 158t h Infan -

try, i n souther n Luzon , ha d cleare d th e

Calumpan Peninsul a betwee n Balaya n

and Batanga s Bays .

The Eight h Arm y no w turne d it s at -

tention t o th e centra l island s o f th e Vis -

ayan Passages—the islands of the Sibuyan

Sea, eas t o f Mindoro . Her e th e firs t ob -

jectives wer e Romblon , fift y mile s eas t

of Mindoro , an d Simara , twenty-fiv e

miles northwest o f Romblon. 30 I n orde r

to achiev e surprise , reinforce d compa -

nies o f th e 1s t Battalion , 19t h Infantry ,

attempted landing s o n eac h islan d dur -

ing th e nigh t o f 11-1 2 Marc h despit e

rough seas , pitc h dark , an d frequen t

rain squalls . Th e nigh t landin g a t

Romblon wen t of f successfully , bu t a t

Simara poo r visibilit y an d th e failur e

of prearrange d signal s fro m guerrilla s

forced postponemen t unti l dawn .

Between 1 2 and 2 1 March 19t h Infan -

try troop s o n Simar a kille d almos t 12 0

Japanese, losin g 1 0 me n kille d an d 2 0

wounded befor e leavin g th e islan d t o

guerrillas an d movin g o n t o Romblon .

The 19t h Infantry 's element s overcam e

the las t resistanc e a t Romblo n O n 3

April, havin g lost 1 5 men kille d an d 3 5

wounded an d havin g kille d 14 0 Japa -

nese. Guerrilla s had alread y secured th e

larger island s o f Tabla s an d Sibuyan ,

respectively wes t an d southeas t o f

Romblon.

The seizur e o f Romblo n an d Simar a

left onl y Masbate , fift y mile s wes t o f

Samar, amon g th e majo r island s o f th e

Visayan Passage s stil l partiall y unde r

Japanese control. 31 Th e Japanes e gar -

rison o n Masbate , numbering about 400

troops, wa s compose d mainl y o f disor -

ganized an d ill-equippe d survivor s o f

ships sunk during the Japanes e attempts

to reinforc e Leyt e i n th e fal l o f 1944 .

Filipino guerrillas, b y lat e Marc h 1945 ,

already controlled much of Masbate, and

on th e 29t h o f the month guerrilla reinforcements fro m Leyt e lande d o n th e

island behin d a short bombardmen t ex -

ecuted b y LCI(G)' s o f th e U.S . Sevent h

Fleet. Th e 2 d Battalio n o f th e 108t h

Infantry, 40t h Division , reache d Mas -

bate fro m Leyt e i n tw o echelon s o n 3

and 7 April . Pursuin g scattere d Japa -

29

 Information o n th e Luban g Island s operatio n

is from : Rpt , Eight h Arm y G- 3 Liaiso n Of f wit h

24th Di v t o ACof S G- 3 Eight h Army , 2 Ma r 45 ,

Eighth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Clearanc e o f Visaya n

Passages; Eight h Arm y G- 3 Opn s Rpts, 1- 9 Ma r 45 ;

24th Di v G- 3 Opn s Rpts , 2 8 Feb- 7 Ma r 45 ; T U

78.9.7, Rp t o n Luban g I s Opn , 9 Ma r 45 , passim;

Eighth Arm y Rp t Leyte-Samar-Visaya n Passages ,

p. 26. 30

 Information o n Romblo n an d Simar a i s from :

Eighth Arm y F O 22 , 5 Ma r 45 , an d 24t h Di v F O 3 ,

7 Ma r 45 , both i n Eight h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Clearance o f Visaya n Passages ; Eight h Arm y Rp t Leyte -

Samar-Visayan Passages , pp . 28-29 ; Eight h Arm y

G-3 Opn s Rpts , 1 1 Mar-4 Ap r 45 ; 24t h Di v G- 3

Opns Rpts , 1 0 Mar- 3 Ap r 45 ; T U 78.9.7 , Rp t o n

Simara-Romblon Opn , 1 7 Ma r 45 , passim.

31

 Information o n th e Masbat e operatio n i s from :

Eighth Arm y G- 3 Opn s Rpts , 2- 3 Ap r 45 ; Eight h

Army Rp t Leyte-Samar-Visayan Passages, p . 29 .
SECURING TH E VISAYA N PASSAGE S 439

nese remnant s throug h Masbate' s hill s

and jungles, th e combined Fil-America n

forces kille d abou t 12 0 Japanes e an d

captured 1 5 b y 4 May , whe n th e 108t h

Infantry's battalio n returne d t o Leyte .

U.S. Arm y losse s o n Masbat e wer e

approximately 5 me n kille d an d 1 0

wounded.

The Japanes e o n Masbat e ha d neve r

posed a real threa t t o America n contro l

of th e Visaya n Passages, a fac t tha t Gen -

eral Eichelberger, the Eighth Arm y commander, ha d recognize d a s earl y a s 2 9

March whe n th e guerrill a forc e fro m

Leyte disperse d th e firs t grou p o f Japa -

nese encountered o n th e island. Accord -

ingly, o n 5 April, Eichelberge r reporte d

to Genera l MacArthu r tha t th e Eight h

Army's share in th e operations to secur e

the Visaya n Passage s ha d bee n brough t

to a successfu l conclusion. 32 Th e nex t

day, i n souther n Luzon , th e 188t h In -

fantry o f th e 11t h Airborne Divisio n

made contac t wit h guerrilla s alon g th e

shores o f Tayaba s Bay , thu s completin g

operations t o secur e th e norther n sid e

of th e Visaya n Passage s east t o th e Bico l

Peninsula. Al l tha t remaine d wa s fo r

the 158t h RCT t o clear th e Bicol Penin -

sula, a tas k th e regimenta l comba t tea m

had bee n abou t sinc e 1 April.

The Bicol Peninsula Operation

The Preliminaries

Very irregularl y shaped and characterized b y rough , mountainou s terrai n o f

volcanic origin , th e Bico l Peninsul a

stretches southeas t fro m Atimona n o n

the Lamo n Ba y shor e o f th e Bondo c

Isthmus nearly 17 0 miles to the tip of the

subsidiary Sorsogo n Peninsula , Luzon' s

most southerl y extension. 33 Th e bes t

route o f communicatio n i n prewa r day s

was a branc h o f th e Manil a Railroa d

that woun d it s wa y throug h th e penin -

sula t o Legaspi , fort y mile s northwest o f

the Sorsogo n Peninsula' s tip . The rail -

road, however , ha d bee n unusabl e a t

least sinc e Decembe r 1944 , when Allie d

Air Force s plane s from Leyt e had begu n

to knock ou t bridge s and destro y rollin g

stock. Guerrilla s ha d len t a hand t o th e

work o f destruction , an d ha d als o con -

ducted sabotag e operation s along Rout e

1, likewis e leadin g southeas t int o th e

Bicol Peninsul a fro m Atimonan . Pave d

only throug h a fe w town s befor e th e

war, Rout e 1 was a two-lane , gravel road

over mos t o f it s distance . I n som e o f

the mor e rugge d part s o f th e peninsul a

the highway , whic h th e Japanes e ha d

not maintaine d an y to o well , narrowe d

to on e lan e o f grave l o r dir t an d wa s

subject t o washouts an d landslides .

The souther n shore s o f th e Sorsogo n

Peninsula form th e norther n sid e of San

Bernardino Strait . Therefore , Sixt h

Army an d Allie d Nava l Force s planners

gave consideratio n t o proposal s t o lan d

32

 Rad, Eichelberge r t o MacArthur , FB-294 , 5 Apr

45, Eight h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Clearanc e o f Visaya n

Passages.

33

 Principal source s fo r thi s subsectio n are : Sixth

Army Rp t Luzon , I , 64-65 ; Sixt h Arm y F O 57 , 1 1

Mar 45, and amendments thereto, in ibid., I, 157-62 ;

Memo, Comdr VII Amphib Force to CG Sixth Army ,

12 Ma r 45 , Sixt h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 11-1 3

Mar 45 ; Memo , Ass t ACof S G- 3 Sixt h Arm y fo r

ACofS G- 3 Sixt h Army , 2 0 Ma r 45 , sub : Note s o n

Conf Aboar d Blue Ridge [th e AG C tha t wa s head -

quarters shi p fo r th e VII Amphi b Force ] on Legasp i

Opn, Sixt h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 19-2 1 Ma r 45 ;

TG 78- 4 Rp t o n Bico l Opn , passim; T G 78 .4 Opn

Plan No . 3-45 , Sixt h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon ,

23-24 Ma r 45 ; 158t h RC T F O 3 , 2 4 Ma r 45 ; 158t h

RCT, Summar y o f Enem y Inf o Alba y Province , 2 2

Mar 45 , an d supplemen t thereto , 2 7 Ma r 45 , 158t h

RCT S- 3 Jn l File , 16-2 5 Ma r 45.
440 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

the 158t h RC T directl y o n tha t penin -

sula, but soo n foun d tha t th e region ha d

few goo d landin g sites, lacke d protecte d

anchorages, and ha d poo r overlan d com -

munications. O n th e other hand Legaspi

Port, o n th e shore s o f Alba y Gul f tw o

miles east o f Legaspi , ha d goo d landin g

beaches, th e bes t por t facilitie s i n th e

Bicol area , an d offere d acces s t o over -

land route s t o both th e Sorsogo n Penin -

sula an d th e rest o f th e Bico l Peninsula .

Moreover, Alba y Gul f provide d a larg e

protected anchorag e area . Finally ,

quick seizur e o f th e Legaspi-Legasp i

Port are a woul d giv e the 158t h RC T a n

excellent chanc e t o cu t of f Japanes e

forces o n th e Sorsogo n Peninsul a an d

prevent othe r Japanes e fro m withdraw -

ing int o tha t peninsul a i n a n attemp t t o

maintain contro l ove r Sa n Bernardin o

Strait.

A landin g a t Legasp i Port , however ,

would pos e certai n problems . Sixt h

Army's G-2 Sectio n estimated tha t 1,50 0

to 2,00 0 Japanese hel d stron g beac h de -

fenses, includin g heav y artillery , i n th e

Legaspi are a o r wer e s o deployed a s t o

be withi n eas y strikin g distanc e o f th e

shores o f Alba y Gulf . Intelligenc e offi -

cers als o believe d tha t th e Japanes e

maintained min e field s i n Alba y Gul f

and San Bernardino Strait and tha t other

Japanese manne d coas t defens e gun s o n

the Sorsogo n Peninsul a i n orde r t o con -

trol th e strait, the shortest water route to

Albay Gulf from th e 158t h RCT's staging

area in southern Luzon.

The necessit y fo r min e sweepin g

Albay Gul f an d Sa n Bernardin o Strait ,

as wel l a s tha t fo r intensiv e preassaul t

aerial bombardmen t alon g th e Alba y

Gulf beaches , ha d a s muc h influenc e o n

General Krueger' s decisio n t o postpone

the landin g a t Legasp i Por t a s ha d th e

necessity fo r movin g th e 1s t Cavalr y

Division int o souther n Luzo n befor e

taking th e 158t h RC T out . Moreover,

the bul k o f th e nava l resource s i n th e

Pacific wa s committe d t o th e Centra l

Pacific Area' s invasio n o f th e Ryuky u

Islands, beginning in lat e March; t o th e

support o f Eight h Arm y operation s i n

the souther n Philippines , no w pickin g

up momentum ; an d t o th e suppl y an d

reinforcement run s t o Luzon . Scan t

naval mean s wer e lef t ove r t o stag e th e

Bicol Peninsul a operation—th e Allie d

Naval Force s ha d n o heav y bombard -

ment ships , no r coul d th e Allie d Nava l

Forces redeplo y th e necessar y min e

sweepers fro m th e souther n Philippine s

in tim e t o mee t Krueger' s initia l targe t

date fo r th e Legasp i assault , 2 5 March .

The tas k o f reducin g th e Alba y Gul f

beach defense s devolve d upo n th e Fift h

Air Force , bu t wit h it s othe r commit -

ments, th e Fift h Ai r Forc e coul d no t

begin large-scal e bombardment a t Alba y

Gulf unti l 2 3 March.

Allied Nava l Force s planner s pointe d

out tha t a two-da y aeria l bombardmen t

would b e inadequat e t o assur e destruc -

tion o f know n an d suspecte d beac h de -

fenses. Unabl e t o fac e wit h aplom b th e

prospect o f stagin g a n amphibiou s as -

sault agains t defende d beache s i n th e

mined an d restricte d water s o f Alba y

Gulf, th e Allie d Nava l Force s insiste d

that th e Fift h Ai r Forc e b e give n tim e

to obliterat e th e defenses. Havin g littl e

choice i n th e fac e o f al l thes e problems,

General Kruege r finall y se t th e dat e fo r

the Legasp i assaul t at 1 April.

The 158t h RC T woul d stag e a t Bal -

ayan Bay—some cargo and a few attached

units would loa d a t Subi c Bay—an d sai l

eastward aboar d th e vessel s o f Tas k

Group 78.4 , Capt . Home r F . McGee ,
SECURING TH E VISAYA N PASSAGE S 441

USN, commanding . Th e firs t wav e

would g o ashor e i n LCVP's , bu t s o fe w

of thes e craf t wer e availabl e tha t th e

158th RC T woul d b e abl e t o lan d onl y

two companie s abreast i n th e initia l as -

sault. Planner s di d no t thin k i t to o

risky t o sen d suc h a smal l forc e shore -

ward, for they expected tha t th e preliminary air an d nava l bombardmen t o f th e

beaches woul d hav e drive n mos t o f th e

Japanese three to four mile s inland. The

Japanese, eve n i f s o inclined , woul d

probably b e unabl e t o organiz e a coun -

terattack befor e th e res t o f th e 158t h

RCT ha d lande d b y LCI , LSM , an d

LST.

Upon assemblin g ashore , th e 1s t Bat -

talion, 158t h Infantry , woul d secur e th e

beachhead area , clea r th e tow n o f

Lcgaspi, an d captur e a smal l airstri p a

mile nort h o f th e town . Th e 2 d Bat -

talion woul d mak e read y t o swin g south

and southeas t int o th e Sorsogo n Penin -

sula; th e 3 d Battalio n woul d b e i n re -

serve. Afte r securin g the beachhead an d

the Sorsogon Peninsula , the 158t h RCT ,

upon order s fro m Sixt h Army , woul d

strike northwestwar d u p th e Bico l Pen -

insula t o gai n contac t wit h XI V Corps ,

which woul d b e movin g southeas t int o

the peninsula from souther n Luzon . The

Sixth Army 's tas k o f clearin g th e north -

ern sid e o f th e Visaya n Passage s woul d

then b e completed .

Sixth Army' s estimat e tha t th e Japa -

nese had over 1,50 0 troop s in the Legaspi

area wa s quite accurate. 34 Th e Japanes e

garrison ther e include d abou t 1,00 0

naval troop s o f th e 35th Naval Guard

Unit, amon g who m som e 50 0 me n

could b e counte d a s traine d comba t ef -

fectives, an d 600-70 0 Japanes e Arm y

troops, comprising a reinforced compan y

of th e 26th Independent Mixed Regiment an d element s o f variou s 4th Air

Army groun d servic e units. Aroun d 50 0

more Japanese , includin g abou t 17 5

Formosan labo r troop s an d som e strag -

glers fro m Samar , wer e o n th e Sorsogo n

Peninsula. Th e remainin g 1,40 0 Japa -

nese o n th e Bico l Peninsula , distribute d

among thre e concentration s fa r north -

west o f Legaspi , wer e almos t al l fro m

the 4th Air Army, Japanes e comman d

on th e peninsula wa s divided. Th e 35th

Naval Guard Unit reported to Headquarters, 33d Naval Special Base Force, o n

Cebu Island; the Army troops were ostensibly under th e direct control of Shimbu

Group headquarters, but by 1 April were

out o f contact wit h tha t headquarters.

The Japanes e o n th e Bico l Peninsul a

were no t intereste d i n th e defens e o f

the norther n shore s o f th e Visaya n Pas -

sages, an d th e 4th Air Army troop s o n

the Sorsogo n Peninsul a ha d n o inten -

tion o f denyin g Sa n Bernardin o Strai t

to Allie d shipping . Th e earlie r tas k o f

the air forc e unit s ha d bee n t o maintain

an airstri p tha t th e Allie d Ai r Force s

had lon g sinc e pu t ou t o f action . No w

the principa l missio n o f al l Japanes e o n

the Bico l Peninsul a wa s t o den y Sixt h

Army th e us e o f tha t peninsul a a s a

route o f advanc e agains t th e rea r o f

Shimbu Group's mai n bod y of troops.

34

 Information o n th e Japanes e i n th e res t o f thi s

section an d it s subsection s i s from : Sixt h Arm y G- 2

Wkly Rp t 80 , 2 1 Ma r 45 , i n G- 2 D A Files ; 158t h

RCT S- 2 Pe r Rp t 10 , 1 0 Apr 45 , in 158t h RC T Jn l

File, 7-1 4 Ap r 45 ; 158t h RC T Rp t Luzon , p . 32 ;

Japanese Studie s i n W W II , No . 9 , Luzo n Opn s o f

the Shimbu Gp, pp . 2 , 26 , 33 ; No . 125 , Philippin e

Area Nava l Opus, pt. IV, pp. 26-27; 14th Area Army

Tr Or g List , p . 20 ; Statemen t o f Co l Kobayashi ,

States, II , 247 ; Statemen t o f Comd r Tada o Kusum i

(Staff Southwest Area Fleet), States , II , 381 , 388 ;

Statement o f L t Ge n Yoshitak e Tsud a (C G 105th

Div), States , IV , 407 .
442 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

LANDING A T PORT LEGASP I

The Japanes e ha d establishe d tw o

defensive liner s in th e Legasp i area. They

anchored th e firs t (easterly ) lin e o n th e

south a t Mt . Bariway , 2 mile s southwest

of Legaspi , extendin g th e lin e nort h

4 miles along a low ridge to barrio Busay,

3 mile s northwest o f Legaspi . Busa y la y

on Rout e 164 , the connectin g lin k be -

tween Legasp i Por t an d Rout e 1 a t

Oainalig, 6 mile s northwes t o f Legaspi .

The 35th Naval Guard Unit defende d

the secon d line , whic h la y i n rough ,

densely jungle d groun d alon g th e

Cituinan Hill s sout h an d southeas t o f

Camalig. Thes e hill s controlle d th e ap -

proaches t o Camali g vi a Rout e 164 ,

from th e east , an d vi a Rout e 1 from th e

south an d west .

The Beachhead and the Sorsogon

Peninsula

Task Grou p 78. 4 move d throug h Sa n

Bernardino Strai t an d int o Alba y Gul f

on 1 April withou t incident . Th e onl y

opposition t o th e 158t h Infantry' s land -

ing a t Legasp i Por t wa s a few rounds

of artiller y fir e fro m a weapo n tha t a

destroyer quickl y pu t ou t o f action. 35

Hitting th e beac h abou t 1000 , the 158t h

Infantry secure d Legasp i Port , Legaspi ,

and th e airstri p nort h o f Legasp i b y

1300, findin g n o Japanese . I n th e lat e

afternoon troop s move d o n t o Daraga ,

a mil e an d a hal f northwes t o f Legaspi ,

and the n advance d southwar d alon g a

secondary roa d leadin g t o Rout e 1 .

About 80 0 yard s sout h o f Darag a Japa -

nese machin e gu n fir e fro m th e Mt .

Bariway-Busay Ridg e pinne d dow n th e

158th's leadin g company , an d durin g

the followin g nigh t Japanes e infantr y

surrounded th e unit . Th e nex t morn -

35

 This subsectio n is based mainl y on : Sixt h Arm y

Rpt Luzon , I , 65-67 ; 158t h RC T Rp t Luzon , pp .

25-28, 40 ; 158t h RC T 3- 2 an d S- 3 Pe r Rpts , 1-1 9

Apr 45 ; 158t h In f S- 3 Rp t Luzon , Legaspi Opn , pp.

1-2; 158t h In f S- 3 Jnl , 1-18 Ap r 45 ; Uni t Jnl s o f

the 1st , 2d , an d 3 d Bns , 158t h Inf , 1-18 Ap r 45 .
SECURING TH E VISAYA N PASSAGE S 443

ing, wit h the aid o f a diversionary attack

staged b y othe r element s o f th e 158t h

Infantry, th e beleaguere d compan y fel l

back east o f Daraga . Meanwhile , patrols

had uncovere d mor e Japanes e defense s

on th e ridg e lin e northwes t o f Daraga .

The 158t h Infantr y ha d gaine d fir m

contact, wit h th e Japanes e firs t lin e o f

defense. The 158t h RC T wa s now i n a bi t o f

a dilemma . Unde r order s t o clea r th e

Sorsogon Peninsul a a s quickl y a s possi -

ble, th e RC T ha d foun d th e onl y over -

land mean s o f acces s t o tha t objective ,

Route 1 , blocke d b y th e Japanes e de -

fenses sout h an d southwes t o f Daraga .

The RC T woul d eithe r hav e t o driv e

off th e Japanes e there , o r i t woul d hav e

to mov e troop s t o th e Sorsogo n Penin -

.sula i n a shore-to-shor e operation . Brig .

Gen. Hartfor d MacNider , commandin g

the 158t h RCT , coul d no t choos e th e

latter cours e a t thi s time . First , s o fe w

landing craft wer e availabl e t o hi m tha t

to divert an y from genera l unloadin g t o

move eve n a battalio n t o th e Sorsogo n

Peninsula migh t ver y wel l creat e insolu -

ble logistica l problem s a t th e Legasp i

beachhead. Second , Tas k Grou p 78. 4

had foun d n o sign s o f Japanes e alon g

the souther n shore s o f th e Sorsogo n

Peninsula a s th e tas k grou p ha d trans -

ited Sa n Bernardin o Strait . Third ,

Eighth Arm y ha d alread y cleare d th e

southern shore s o f th e strait . MacNide r

therefore fel t tha t h e coul d safel y post -

pone hi s advanc e int o th e Sorsogo n

Peninsula unti l suc h tim e a s th e 158t h

Infantry coul d us e th e overlan d route .

Finally, lackin g precis e informatio n o n

the strengt h an d exten t o f th e Japanes e

defenses i n th e Darag a area , MacNide r

was loat h t o diver t muc h strengt h t o

the Sorsogo n Peninsula . Th e 158t h In -

fantry, havin g onl y 2,00 0 comba t

effectives, wa s som e 90 0 me n unde r

authorized strength .

From 2 throug h 1 0 Apri l th e 158t h

Infantry fough t har d i n rough , jungle d

terrain t o overcome the resistance in th e

Daraga region , th e regimen t losin g 4 5

men kille d an d 20 0 wounded, the Japa -

nese ove r 50 0 killed . Th e battl e too k

considerably longe r tha n Genera l Mac -

Nider ha d anticipate d an d threatened

to caus e a n undu e dela y i n th e occupa -

tion o f th e Sorsogo n Peninsula . There -

fore, o n 6 April, deciding he could wai t

no longer , h e ha d loade d th e Antitan k

Company, 158t h Infantry , o n fiv e LCM's

of th e 592 d Enginee r Boa t an d Shor e

Regiment an d ha d dispatche d i t t o

Bacon, o n th e nort h shor e o f th e penin -

sula. Landin g agains t n o opposition ,

the Antitan k Compan y quickl y secure d

Bacon an d th e Philippin e terminu s o f

the transpacifi c cable , an d the n move d

on southwes t fiv e mile s t o occup y th e

town o f Sorsogo n agains t n o resistance .

By 9 Apri l patrol s ha d discovere d

that mos t o f th e Japanes e o n th e Sor -

sogon Peninsul a ha d concentrate d i n

low hill s nort h o f Bulan , o n th e penin -

sula's southwestern coast. O f insufficien t

strength t o attac k thi s Japanes e concentration, th e Antitan k Compan y contin -

ued patrollin g unti l th e 2 d Battalion ,

158th Infantry , afte r a n unoppose d mo -

tor marc h alon g Rout e 1 from Daraga , reached Bula n o n 1 2 April . Supporte d

by a 105-mm . howitze r batter y o f th e

147th Fiel d Artiller y an d b y Fift h Ai r

Force planes , th e reinforce d 2 d Battal -

ion broke up the Japanese concentration

near Bula n b y 1 6 Apri l a t th e cos t o f

only 6 me n wounded . Th e battalion ,

which returne d t o Darag a o n th e 18th ,

had kille d o r foun d dea d ove r 15 0 Japa-
444 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

nese i n th e Bula n region , an d ha d ac -

cepted th e willin g surrende r o f 15 5

Formosan labo r troops . Guerrilla s too k

over th e tas k o f moppin g up .

Clearing the Bicol Peninsula

The 158t h RCT , actin g upo n ne w

instructions fro m Sixt h Army , turne d

its energie s t o clearin g th e res t o f th e

Bicol Peninsul a an d t o gainin g contac t

with XI V Corps, which Sixt h Arm y had

directed t o start drivin g int o th e penin -

sula fro m souther n Luzon. 36 Withou t

waiting fo r th e 2 d Battalio n t o retur n

from th e Sorsogo n Peninsula , th e re -

mainder o f th e 158t h RCT, o n 1 1 April

had struc k towar d Carnalig from Daraga ,

employing Route s 1 and 16 4 a s axe s o f

advance.37 Troop s alon g Rout e 16 4 bypassed th e Japanes e defense s a t th e

Cituinan Hill s t o th e nort h an d entere d

Camalig unoppose d o n th e afternoo n

of th e 11th .

Since th e Japanes e i n th e Cituina n

Hills pose d a threa t t o th e 158t h RCT's

line o f communicatio n bac k t o Legaspi ,

General MacNide r fel t tha t a n advanc e

in strengt h beyon d Carnali g befor e re -

ducing th e Cituina n defense s woul d

overreach th e bound s o f a calculate d

risk. Accordingly , o n 1 2 April, th e 1s t

and 3 d Battalions , 158t h Infantry , at -

tacked int o th e hills . Slowe d b y thic k

jungle and roug h terrai n almost as much

as b y th e Japanese , an d constantl y harassed b y night attacks, th e tw o battalions

had no t overru n th e defense s when , o n

19 April, th e 2 d Battalion returned from

the Sorsogon Peninsul a t o join th e fight .

Progress continued t o be painfull y slow ,

and i t was not unti l 2 8 April tha t organized Japanese resistance finally collapsed.

The tas k o f clearin g th e Cituina n Hill s

cost th e 158t h Infantr y approximatel y

40 me n kille d an d 23 5 wounded ; th e

Japanese los t almos t 70 0 me n kille d i n

the region .

Although th e 158t h RC T di d no t

know it , th e reductio n o f th e Cituina n

Hills marke d th e en d o f large-scal e or -

ganized resistanc e o n th e Bico l Penin -

sula, wher e no mor e than 1,40 0 Japanese

remained aliv e a s o f th e en d o f April .

On th e 29t h th e main bod y o f th e 158t h

began movin g northwestwar d fro m

Camalig, followin g a reinforce d com -

pany tha t ha d reache d Iraga , twenty-fiv e

miles distant , o n 1 4 April. Rapidly , th e

regiment overra n potentiall y stron g en -

emy position s i n excellen t defensiv e

terrain a s th e remainin g Japanese , de -

moralized, offere d onl y toke n resistanc e

before meltin g awa y int o hills o n eithe r

side o f Rout e 1 . O n 2 Ma y patrol s o f

the 158t h Infantr y establishe d contac t

with th e 5t h Cavalr y a t barri o San Agus -

tin, o n Rout e 1 fiftee n mile s northwes t

of Iraga .

Troops o f th e 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n

had begu n movin g ont o th e Bico l Pen -

insula o n 1 2 April, whe n the y relieve d

units o f th e 11t h Airborne Divisio n a t

Atimonan.38 Th e nex t da y the 5t h Cav -

alry struc k eas t fro m Atimona n an d o n

the 14t h reached Calauag , thirt y mile s 36

 Sixth Arm y F O 60 , 1 2 Ap r 45 , Sixt h Arm y Rp t

Luzon, I , 163 . 37

 Subsequent informatio n o n 158t h RC T opera -

tions is from: 158t h RC T Rp t Luzon , pp . 29-37 , 39 :

158th RC T S- 3 Pe r Rpts , 1 0 Apr-16 Ma y 45; 158t h

Inf Rp t Luzon , Legaspi Opn, p . 2 ; 158t h In f S-3 Jnl .

11 Apr- 2 Ma y 45 ; Sixt h Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 68-70 .

38

 Information o n 1s t Cavalr y Divisio n operation s

in thi s subsectio n i s from : Sixt h Arm y Rp t Luzon ,

pt. I, 69-70; XIV Corps Rpt Luzon , pt. I, pp. 192-93 ,

203-08; 1s t Ca v Div Rpt Luzon , pp . 28-36 ; 5t h Ca v

Rpt Luzon , pp . 53-86 .
SECURING TH E VISAYA N PASSAGE S 445

away. Al l th e wa y fro m Atimona n t o

Calauag, Rout e 1 was in poo r condition

and beyon d Calaua g suppl y movement s

were almos t impossible . Th e spee d o f

advance no w hinge d o n th e spee d o f

engineer roa d an d bridg e repairs . Ac -

cordingly, th e 5t h Cavalr y secure d th e

eastern shor e o f Tayaba s Ba y an d se t

up a suppl y poin t a t th e bay' s north -

eastern corner so that LCM's could bring

forward ammunition , food , an d equip -

ment fro m Batangas . Beginnin g o n 2 7

April th e mai n bod y o f th e regimen t

began movin g b y LC M acros s Raga y

Gulf, th e firs t indentatio n o n th e sout h

coast o f th e Bico l Peninsul a beyon d

Tayabas Bay. On th e 28th th e regiment,

encountering n o resistance , move d fro m

the shore s o f Raga y Gul f t o Naga , eigh t

miles northwes t o f barri o Sa n Agustin ,

and ha d n o troubl e marchin g sout h t o

meet th e 158t h Infantry ,

Guerrillas ha d informe d XI V Corps ,

which acquire d contro l o f th e 158t h

RCT o n 2 2 April, tha t a Japanes e forc e

of som e 2,50 0 men wa s dug i n alon g th e

slopes o f Mt . Isarog , a n extinc t volcan o

centering eigh t mile s northeas t o f Sa n

Agustin. Thi s repor t th e 5t h Cavalr y

and 158t h Infantr y prove d fals e i n a

series o f patro l action s betwee n 2 an d

15 May . The nex t day , the 16th , General MacNide r radioe d t o Genera l Gris -

wold tha t th e Bico l Peninsula was secure

and tha t n o sign s o f organize d Japanes e

resistance remained .

The tw o regiments continue d patrol -

ling fo r som e week s until , o n 6 June ,

the 5t h Cavalr y returne d t o souther n

Luzon. Th e 158t h RC T busie d itsel f

with th e proble m o f reorganizin g an d

equipping guerrill a force s an d i n mid -

June turne d ove r responsibilit y fo r fur -

ther moppin g u p t o th e Filipinos . T o

that tim e th e operation s t o clea r th e

Bicol Peninsul a ha d cost th e U.S. Army

units involve d approximatel y 9 5 me n

killed an d 47 5 wounded. Th e Japanes e

had los t ove r 2,80 0 kille d an d 56 5 cap -

tured, includin g 35 0 Formosa n labo r

troops who m th e Japanes e Arm y ha d

left t o fen d fo r themselves .

The strategi c goa l o f th e Bico l Penin -

sula operation—t o finis h clearin g th e

Visayan Passages—had been realized on 2

May with th e contac t between th e 158t h

Infantry an d th e 5t h Cavalr y a t Sa n

Agustin. Th e fina l patrollin g and mop -

ping u p th e tw o regiment s undertoo k

had provide d th e necessar y capstone s t o

the combined Sixt h Army-Eighth Arm y

campaign t o assur e th e safet y o f th e

Visayan Passage s fo r Allie d shipping .

Undertaken agains t generall y ill -

equipped, poorl y fed , second-class an d

third-class Japanese forces, th e campaign

had ye t prove d costly . U.S . Army unit s

involved had lost roughly 300 men killed

and 1,13 0 wounded ; th e Japanese , t o

mid-June, ha d los t a t leas t 8,12 5 killed

and nearl y 750 captured. Th e campaig n

had prove d logisticall y mor e importan t

than i t ha d strategicall y o r tactically .

Sixth Army , Eight h Army , an d Allie d

Naval Force s ha d no t foun d th e Japa -

nese coast artiller y an d min e field s the y

had expecte d t o discove r emplace d s o a s

to endange r Allie d shippin g i n th e passages. Nevertheless , Genera l MacArthu r

would ultimatel y hav e ha d t o direc t his

subordinate echelon s t o eliminat e th e

Japanese from souther n Luzon, the Bicol

Peninsula, norther n Samar , an d th e is -

lands of the inner passage s if for no othe r

reason than to liberate from th e Japanese

yoke th e man y thousand s o f Filipin o inhabitants of thos e regions and t o restore

to the Filipinos their lawfu l government .

PART SI X

THE CONQUES T O F

NORTHERN LUZO N

CHAPTER XXI V

Northern Luzon :

The Situatio n an d th e Plans

Almost fro m th e hou r o f th e assaul t

at Lingaye n Gulf , Sixt h Army' s tas k o n

Luzon wa s complicate d b y th e fac t tha t

the arm y wa s compelle d t o figh t man y

battles simultaneousl y o n widel y sepa -

rated fronts . I n lat e Februar y Genera l

Krueger's Force s wer e i n actio n a t Ma -

nila, o n Bataa n and Corregidor , agains t

the Kembu Group wes t o f Clar k Field ,

and agains t th e Shimbu Group i n th e

mountains east o f Manila . Kruege r ha d

already ordere d XI V Corp s t o projec t

some of its strength into southern Luzon .

I Corps , havin g capture d Sa n Jos e an d

seized contro l ove r th e junctio n o f

Routes 3 an d 1 1 near Rosario , ha d bu t

recently complete d operation s t o secur e

the Sixt h Army' s bas e are a an d flank s

and t o provide protection to XI V Corps'

rear. No w Genera l Kruege r was preparing t o launc h still anothe r offensive , an d

had alerte d I Corp s t o mak e read y t o

strike int o norther n Luzo n agains t th e

Shobu Group.

The Terrain and the Defenses

in Northern Luzon

The General Situation

By th e beginnin g of Februar y I Corp s

had attaine d excellen t position s fro m

which t o strik e nort h agains t th e Shobu

Group, th e stronges t concentratio n o f

Japanese strengt h o n Luzon , bu t Gen -

eral Kruege r ha d ha d t o postpon e a

concerted offensiv e i n norther n Luzon .

General MacArthur' s redeploymen t an d

operational directive s of earl y Februar y

had restricte d th e Sixt h Army's freedo m

of maneuver , concomitantl y reducin g

its strength. Genera l Kruege r ha d there -

Core foun d i t impossibl e t o concentrat e

adequate force s for a n immediate , major

thrust agains t th e Shobu Group. A t

least unti l X I an d XI V Corp s coul d

assure th e successfu l outcom e o f opera -

tions t o secur e th e Manil a Ba y area ,

Krueger decided , h e coul d no t star t I

Corps northwar d i n a determine d driv e

against th e Shobu Group. Th e strengt h

left t o th e corps—thre e division s instead

of th e fiv e o r mor e Krueger ha d expecte d

to b e abl e to emplo y i n norther n Luzo n

—was no t enough. 1

Krueger realize d onl y to o wel l tha t

any dela y i n startin g a n attac k nort h

against th e Shobu Group woul d inevita -

bly redound t o th e advantage of th e Jap -

anese. B y mid-February , a t least , th e

Sixth Arm y commande r ha d sufficien t

information a t hi s disposa l t o conclud e

that th e Shobu Group wa s beginning t o

realign it s force s fo r a protracte d stan d

1

 For detail s o f th e redeploymen t an d reductio n

directives o f earl y February , se e Chapte r XX , above .
450 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

in th e mountain s o f nort h Luzon , an d

he hope d th e Japanes e woul d no t hav e

too much tim e to dig in. Wha t Kruege r

did no t kno w wa s tha t Genera l Yama -

shita ha d long had plans t o mov e th e

Shobu Group int o th e triangula r re -

doubt i n norther n Luzon , tha t Yama -

shita's troops had been readying defenses

in th e mountain s sinc e lat e December ,

and tha t Yamashit a ha d initiate d a gen -

eral withdrawa l int o th e mountain s

before th e en d o f January. 2

Among Yamashita' s majo r concern s

through Februar y wer e th e reorganiza -

tion an d rehabilitatio n o f unit s Sixt h

Army ha d battere d durin g January, an d

the proble m o f deployin g thes e units ,

as wel l a s others no t ye t committed , i n

the mos t effectiv e position s fo r th e de -

fense o f th e triangula r redoubt . Th e

Shobu Group als o ha d t o mov e t o cen -

trally located depots the supplies shipped

north fro m Manil a an d Centra l Plain s

dumps durin g Decembe r an d January .

The Japanes e woul d likewis e hav e t o

gather foo d fro m th e ric h Cagaya n

Valley an d distribut e i t t o troop s

throughout norther n Luzon' s moun -

tains. Tim e wa s o f th e essenc e i n al l

the Shobu Group preparations . N o re -

lationship o f tim e t o defensiv e plan s

was mor e importan t tha n tha t involve d

in retainin g contro l ove r th e resource s

of th e Cagaya n Valley , fo r th e grou p

had bee n cu t of f from al l outside sources

of supply .

Heartland an d ric e bow l o f norther n

Luzon, th e Cagaya n Valle y average s 4 0

miles i n widt h an d extend s fro m Aparr i

on Luzon' s norther n coas t sout h nearl y

200 mile s t o Bamban g o n th e Maga t

River.3 O n th e eas t th e rugge d an d

partially unexplore d norther n portio n

of th e Sierr a Madre , a 35-mile-wid e barrier, separate s th e Cagaya n Valle y fro m

the Pacifi c Ocean . Wes t o f th e valle y

lies th e equall y roug h Cordiller a Cen -

tral, which wit h th e coastal Iloco s Mountains—also know n a s th e Malay a Rang e

—forms a 70-mile-wid e barrie r betwee n

the Cagayan Valley and th e South Chin a

Sea. Th e comple x Caraball o Moun -

tains, formin g a lin k betwee n th e south -

ern reache s o f th e Cordiller a Centra l

and th e Sierr a Madre , bloc k acces s t o

the Cagaya n Valle y fro m th e Centra l

Plains. (Map 19)

Except acros s th e Aparr i beaches , th e

entrances t o th e Cagaya n Valle y follo w

winding, ill-pave d road s an d trail s

through tortuou s mountain passes. Coming nort h fro m Sa n Jose , gravel-pave d

Route 5 , scarcel y tw o lane s wide , twist s

over th e Caraball o Mountain s int o th e

Magat Valle y vi a Balet e Pass. Rout e 11 ,

the othe r mai n roa d fro m th e south ,

leads northeas t fro m Bagui o fift y mile s

to Bontoc , th e norther n ape x o f th e

Shobu Group's defensiv e triangle . Trav -

ersing spectacularly beautifu l bu t roug h

mountain country , Rout e 1 1 i n 194 5

was grave l an d roc k pave d an d varie d

between on e an d tw o lane s i n width .

From Bonto c Rout e 11 , hardl y mor e

than a hors e trail , follow s th e rugged ,

deep gorge of the Chic o Rive r northeast

to th e norther n sectio n o f th e Cagaya n

Valley.

2

 For th e backgroun d o f Yamashita' s triangula r

defense concept , se e above , Chapte r V . Informatio n

on th e initiatio n o f th e Shobu Group's withdrawa l is

set fort h i n Chapte r I X an d XI .

3

 Actually, ther e i s n o broa d valle y connectio n

between th e Maga t an d Cagaya n Rive r valleys , fo r

the Magat , th e Cagayan' s majo r tributary , run s

through a canyo n befor e i t join s th e Cagayan . O n

the othe r hand , Filipin o usag e usuall y applie s th e

name Cagaya n Valle y t o tha t portio n o f th e Maga t

Valley sout h o f th e canyon .
Map 19
Bontoc, The Northern Apex
NORTHERN LUZON : TH E SITUATIO N AN D THE PLAN S 453

Baguio i s reache d b y comin g u p th e

Bued Rive r gorge from th e Route s 3-11

junction nea r Rosario , followin g a n

asphalt-paved, two-lan e section o f Rout e

11. Rout e 9 , anothe r pave d road , lead s

to Bagui o fro m th e Sout h Chin a Se a

coast a t Bauang , 20-od d mile s nort h o f

Damortis. Fro m Libtong, 55 miles north

of Damortis , narrow , gravel-pave d

Route 4 lead s throug h unbelievabl y

precipitous terrai n t o a junctio n wit h

Route 1 1 a t Sabangan , a fe w mile s

southwest o f Bontoc . Joinin g Rout e 1 1

as fa r a s Bontoc , Rout e 4 the n turn s

southeast t o th e Maga t Rive r an d a

junction wit h Rout e 5 a t Bagabag , 3 0

miles northeas t o f Bambang .

The easies t entranc e t o th e Cagaya n

Valley i s a t Aparri . Th e nex t best ,

since i t provide s direc t acces s t o th e

southern portio n o f th e Cagaya n Valley ,

is Rout e 5 vi a Balet e Pass . Rout e 1 1

northeast fro m Bagui o i s a poo r thir d

choice, and , lik e al l othe r entrance s ex -

cept Rout e 5 an d Aparri , i s so tortuou s

as to preclud e its employment fo r majo r

military operations.

Japanese Defense Plans

The militar y problem s presente d b y

the topograph y o f norther n Luzo n im -

pose upo n attacke r an d defende r alik e

a peculia r combination o f concentratio n

and dispersio n o f forces. 4 Yamashita' s

problem wa s further complicate d b y his

plan t o establis h a triangula r redoub t

and simultaneousl y retain control o f th e

Cagayan Valle y fo r a s lon g a s possible .

He woul d hav e t o concentrat e strengt h

at th e three apexes (Baguio, Bontoc , and

Bambang) o f hi s defensiv e triangle , bu t

he woul d als o hav e t o deplo y force s t o

defend al l possibl e approache s t o th e

Cagayan Valley .

Yamashita base d his defensive deploy -

ment upo n th e assumptio n tha t Sixt h

Army woul d mak e it s mai n effort s o n

the Bagui o an d Bamban g fronts . H e

did not , however , ignor e th e othe r ap -

proaches t o hi s triangula r redoub t an d

the Cagaya n Valley , an d h e too k int o

consideration th e possibilit y tha t Sixt h

Army migh t stag e a n airborn e assaul t

into the valley. H e hel d a t Aparri about

two regiment s o f infantr y an d tw o bat -

talions o f artillery , all unde r th e contro l

of Headquarters, 103d Division. O n

Luzon's northwes t coast—i n th e Vigan -

Laoag are a — he statione d th e Araki

Force, th e equivalen t o f a regimenta l

combat tea m an d forme d fro m variou s

103d Division an d provisiona l units .

Initially, a n understrengt h independen t

infantry battalio n o f th e 103d Division

held Rout e 4 inlan d fro m Libtong .

The 19th Division wa s originall y re -

sponsible fo r holdin g th e coas t sout h

from Libton g and fo r blockin g Rout e 9

from Bauan g t o Baguio . Durin g Janu -

ary Filipin o guerrilla s becam e s o activ e

along Route 4 and o n Rout e 1 1 between

Bontoc an d Bagui o tha t Yamashit a be -

gan t o fea r a n amphibiou s assaul t i n

the vicinit y of Libton g and a subsequent

American driv e inlan d t o Bontoc . Ac -

cordingly, h e decide d t o mov e th e bul k

of th e 19th Division nort h t o hol d Bon -

toc, clea r Rout e 4 west t o Libtong , an d

4

 Principal source s use d fo r thi s subsectio n are :

14th Area Army Opn s Orders Nos. A-468, 29 Jan 45 ,

A-487, 3 Fe b 45 , A-516, 1 3 Fe b 45 , an d A-517 , 1 3

Feb 45 , Trans , III , ite m 3 ; SWP A His t Series , II ,

468-71, 477-80 ; Japanes e Studie s i n W W II , No . 8 ,

14th Area Army Opn s o n Luzon , pp . 89-91 , 99-102,

104, 109 ; Sat o Statement , States , III , 255-56 ; Sixt h

Army G-2 Wkl y Rpts 77-80, 28 Feb-21 Mar 45, G-2

DA files .
454 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

drive th e guerrilla s of f th e Baguio-Bon -

toc section o f Route 11 . Th e movemen t

started lat e i n February .

The transfe r o f th e 19th Division

necessitated realignmen t of force s o n th e

Baguio front, an d Yamashit a ha d begu n

reshuffling troop s ther e befor e th e en d

of February . Th e 58th IMB starte d

pulling north t o defen d Rout e 9 and t o

block som e mountai n trail s leadin g to -

ward Bagui o betwee n Rout e 9 an d th e

section o f Rout e 1 1 sout h o f Baguio .

The Hayashi Detachment, a regiment -

sized provisiona l uni t tha t hel d th e re -

gion fro m Bauan g t o Sa n Fernando ,

passed t o th e contro l o f th e 58th IMB.

Simultaneously, th e 23d Division bega n

establishing a new main line of resistance

across Route 1 1 at Camp 3, between Rosario and Baguio. The division' s right was

to extend northwes t t o connect wit h th e

58th IMB left ; th e division's lef t woul d

stretch southeas t almos t fiftee n mile s

across th e Arodoga t Rive r valle y t o th e

upper reache s o f th e Agn o River . Th e

Arodogat provide d a n axi s alon g whic h

American troop s migh t outflan k Rout e

11 defense s o n th e east , whil e th e gorg e

of th e uppe r Agno led t o road s running

into Bagui o fro m th e southeast . Th e

Agno's canyo n als o provide d a rout e t o

the Baguio-Arita o supply road tha t Yamashita was constructing as a link between

his Bagui o an d Bamban g apexes.

The ne t effec t o f thes e realignment s

on th e wes t wa s t o strengthe n th e de -

fenses i n fron t o f Baguio. Th e Japanes e

forces regrouped alon g a narrower front ,

permitting the m t o emplo y thei r dwin -

dling strengt h t o th e bes t advantage ;

they provide d fo r protectio n alon g al l

flanking routes ; an d the y move d int o

terrain eve n mor e favorabl e fo r defens e

than tha t th e 23d Division an d 58th

IMB ha d hel d durin g th e figh t fo r th e

Routes 3-1 1 junction .

To guar d the northern Cagayan Valley

against airborn e assault , th e 103d Division statione d a reinforce d infantr y bat -

talion a t Tuguegarao . Here , 5 0 mile s

south o f Aparri , wer e locate d airfield s

that th e Japanes e Nava l Air Servic e ha d

employed sinc e th e earl y month s o f th e

war i n the Pacific . Fo r th e same purpose

the Takachiho Unit, a provisiona l in -

fantry regimen t forme d fro m 4th Air

Army groun d troops , som e antiaircraf t

units, an d a few paratroopers, held vari -

ous 4th Air Army field s a t Echague , 6 5

miles sout h o f Tuguegarao and 3 0 miles

northeast o f Bagabag .

As o f earl y Februar y 5,00 0 t o 7,00 0

men o f th e 105th Division—the rest o f

the division was with th e Shimbu Group

east o f Manila—hel d Bagaba g and Bam -

bang. Thi s forc e include d a regiment ,

less on e battalion , o f th e 10th Division,

Initially statione d i n th e Bamban g are a

to stam p ou t guerrill a activity , th e 10th

Division regiment redeployed southward

late i n th e month .

The defens e o f th e approache s t o

Bambang fro m Sa n Jos e wa s anchore d

on a n ML R crossin g th e Caraball o

Mountains an d Rout e 5 abou t midwa y

between th e tw o towns. 5 Th e ke y are a

along th e Sa n Jose-Bamban g stretc h o f

Route 5 wa s th e Balet e Pass-Sant e F e

region, nearl y twenty-fiv e mile s int o th e

5

 Additional informatio n o n th e defense s sout h

of Bamban g comes from : SWP A Hist Series, II, 446 ,

477-78; Japanes e Studie s i n W W II , No . 8 , 14th

Area Army Opn s o n Luzon , p . 51 ; 14th Area Army

Orders Nos. A-447, 2 3 Jan 45 , and A-526 , 1 6 Feb 45 ,

Trans, III , ite m 3 : Statement s o f Konum a (Vic e

CofS 14th Area Army an d Comd r Bambang Branch

14th Area Army), States , II, 300-306 , 339 ; Statemen t

of Ma j Ge n Saka e Tsuchiy a (Cof S 10th Div), States,

III, 402-03 ; Sixt h Arm y G- 2 Wkl y Rp t 83 , 1 1 Apr

45, G- 2 D A files .
NORTHERN LUZON : TH E SITUATIO N AN D THE PLAN S 455

BAGUIO

Caraballo Mountain s fro m Sa n Jose .

Lying thre e mile s nort h o f th e pass ,

Santa F e i s th e terminu s o f th e Vill a

Verde Trail, which winds northeast from

the Centra l Plain s ove r a spu r o f th e

Caraballo range west o f Route 5. Balet e

Pass i s locate d a t th e norther n exit s o f

the mos t tortuou s terrai n Rout e 5

traverses o n it s wa y north.

Responsibility fo r th e defens e o f th e

Route 5 approac h t o Bamban g wa s

vested i n th e 10th Division. Althoug h

the Japanes e estimate d tha t th e mai n

effort o f an y Sixt h Arm y attac k towar d

Bambang woul d com e u p Rout e 5 , th e

10th Division wa s instructe d t o guar d

all flankin g approache s carefully . Th e

Villa Verd e Trai l provide d a rout e fo r

outflanking th e Rout e 5 defense s a t

least a s fa r nort h a s Sant a Fe , an d nea r

its easter n en d provide d acces s t o th e

river valley s b y mean s o f whic h a flank -

ing forc e coul d mov e north , wes t o f

Route 5 , almos t t o Bambang , cuttin g

the suppl y roa d t o Bagui o o n th e way .

East o f Rout e 5 lay Route 100 , a third -

class roa d that , beginnin g i n th e foot -

hills te n mile s southeas t o f Sa n Jose ,

swung t o th e northwes t throug h Car -

ranglan an d cam e int o Rout e 5 a t

Digdig, midwa y betwee n Sa n Jos e an d

Balete Pass . Fro m Carrangla n a roug h

trace known a s the Ol d Spanis h Trail—

of whic h ther e wer e dozens i n th e Phil -

ippines—ran nort h throug h th e Sierr a

Madre t o Rout e 5 a t Aritao , easter n

terminus o f th e ne w suppl y roa d t o

Baguio an d ove r halfwa y fro m Balet e

Pass to Bambang. Finally , lying between

the Vill a Verd e Trai l an d th e Agn o

Valley i s th e valle y o f th e Ambayaban g

River. B y trail connection t o th e Agno,
456 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

the Ambayaban g Valle y offere d a possi -

ble rout e o f acces s t o Bagui o fro m th e

southeast an d alon g it s ow n length , a s

well a s b y th e Agn o connection , pro -

vided othe r routes by which Sixt h Arm y

troops migh t pus h nort h t o cu t th e

Baguio-Aritao suppl y road . Th e fron t

assigned t o th e 10th Division stretche d

from th e uppe r Ambayaban g southeas t

over twenty-fiv e mile s t o Carranglan .

It i s presumed tha t some tie-in with th e

23d Division o n th e Bagui o fron t wa s

to b e mad e alon g eithe r th e Agn o o r

the Ambayaban g Rivers.

In providin g for defense of the various

flanking routes , th e Japanes e expecte d

that th e Ol d Spanis h Trail-Rout e 10 0

approach migh t wel l b e th e locatio n o f

a secondar y attack . Th e Japanes e con -

sidered th e terrai n on tha t approach less

formidable tha n tha t alon g th e Vill a

Verde Trail , which , th e Japanes e

thought, Sixt h Arm y might us e only fo r

a very minor diversionar y attack. Thus ,

of th e thre e understrengt h RCT 's o r

equivalent availabl e t o th e 10th Division a s o f earl y February—troop s tha t

included organi c units , attache d regu -

larly organized regiments and battalions,

and provisiona l unit s o f al l sorts—on e

RCT wa s posted to hold the Route 100-

Old Spanis h Trai l junctio n a t Carrang -

lan an d tha t sectio n o f Rout e 10 0 lying

between Carrangla n and Rout e 5. A

force roughl y equivalen t t o a n infantr y

battalion hel d th e southwester n sectio n

of th e Vill a Verd e Trai l an d anothe r

battalion, plus a battery of artillery, wa s

stationed o n th e centra l sectio n o f th e

trail. On e provisiona l infantr y battal -

ion wa s schedule d t o mov e int o th e

Ambayabang Valley .

Originally, th e res t o f th e 10th Division was to hold an MLR across Route 5

near barri o Minuli , roughl y fiv e mile s

south o f Balet e Pass. However , by earl y

February, whe n th e fal l o f Sa n Jos e t o

the U.S. I Corps presage d a n immediat e

attack nort h alon g Rout e 5 , defense s i n

the Minul i are a wer e b y n o mean s i n

shape t o withstan d a sudde n onslaught .

Therefore, seekin g t o gai n tim e fo r de -

fense constructio n alon g th e MLR , th e

10th Division deploye d a n RCT-size d

delaying force across Route 5 at Puncan,

a barri o lyin g about te n mile s nort h o f

San Jos e and th e sam e distanc e south o f

Minuli. Th e remainde r o f th e divisio n

worked feverishl y o n th e defense s o f the

MLR.

One othe r uni t wa s available o n th e

Bambang front—th e shattere d 2 d Tank

Division, whic h ha d bee n destroye d a s

an armore d forc e i n th e defens e o f th e

approaches t o Sa n Jos e durin g January.

Less a 250-ma n grou p operatin g o n th e

Villa Verd e Trai l an d i n th e Ambaya -

bang River valley, the 2d Tank Division

reassembled a t Dupax , just of f Route 5

near Aritao . There , earl y i n February ,

the divisio n starte d reorganizing , re -

equipping, an d retrainin g a s a n under -

strength infantr y division , weavin g int o

its depleted rank s casuals, replacements,

and provisiona l units o f all sorts.

A descriptio n o f Yamashita' s specia l

command arrangement s complete s th e

outline o f Japanes e defensiv e prepara -

tions i n norther n Luzon . A s held tru e

throughout th e cours e o f th e Luzo n

Campaign, Yamashit a wa s plagued b y

inadequate communications in northern

Luzon, posin g fo r hi m majo r problem s

of comman d and control . For the Bambang are a h e therefor e se t u p wha t

amounted to a corps headquarters under

Maj. Gen . Haru o Konuma , a vic e chie f

of staf f o f th e 14th Area Army. A s com-
NORTHERN LUZON : TH E SITUATIO N AN D THE PLAN S 457

mander o f th e Bambang Branch, 14th

Area Army, Genera l Konum a wa s t o

control th e operation s o f th e 10th an d

105th Divisions an d th e 2d Tank Division, as well a s independent units i n th e

area, withi n th e framewor k o f broa d

directives issue d b y Yamashita . Yama -

shita himsel f kep t hi s headquarter s a t

Baguio, retainin g direc t contro l ove r

operations o n th e Bagui o an d Bonto c

fronts.

The Sixth Army's Plan

Sixth Army 's plan s fo r operation s

against th e Shobu Group di d no t sprin g

full grow n int o bein g wit h I Corps '

arrival o n th e Damortis-San Jose-Bale r

Bay line. 6 Indee d suc h plan s a s existe d

at th e beginnin g o f Februar y ha d t o b e

discarded fo r th e most par t a s th e origi -

nal allocations of divisions to Sixth Army

were cu t bac k an d mor e informatio n

was accumulate d concernin g Japanes e

strength, dispositions, an d intention s i n

northern Luzon . Ther e wa s n o "se t

piece" pla n of operation s such a s that o f

the Shobu Group. Instead , Sixth Army's

plan wa s evolutionary i n character .

Early Plans

It wa s Genera l Krueger' s firs t inten -

tion t o concentrate his forces firs t o n th e

Baguio fron t an d Luzon' s wes t coas t

from Damorti s nort h t o Sa n Fernando .

The earl y capture of Baguio would pro -

duce certai n obviou s tactica l advantage s

and woul d als o hav e propagand a valu e

since th e cit y was the sit e of Yamashita's

combined 14th Area Army-Shobu

Group headquarters . Th e developmen t

of th e port a t Sa n Fernand o would eas e

the burde n upo n overtaxe d Lingaye n

Gulf facilitie s an d woul d provid e a n

additional bas e are a fro m whic h opera -

tions i n norther n Luzo n coul d b e

supported.7

Krueger originally planned to use two

divisions i n th e Baguio-Sa n Fernand o

area—the 43d , alread y o n th e ground ,

and th e 33d , whic h reache d Luzo n o n

10 February . Whil e thes e tw o wer e

making th e mai n effort , th e 25t h an d

32d Division s woul d operat e o n th e

Bambang fron t i n wha t a t firs t wa s ex -

pected t o b e a holdin g attack. 8 Lac k o f

resources mad e i t impossibl e fo r Sixt h

Army t o pla n a n airborn e invasio n o f

the Cagaya n Valley , bu t Genera l

Krueger, throug h Februar y an d March ,

did hop e t o moun t attack s i n norther n

Luzon in addition to those contemplated

for th e Baguio and Bamban g fronts. H e

planned tha t on e divisio n (th e 37th )

would undertak e a serie s o f shore-to -

shore operation s alon g th e wes t coas t

north fro m Damortis , presumabl y a s fa r

6

 The genera l source s use d i n th e preparatio n o f

this sectio n are : Sixt h Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 35 , 45-

47, 56-57, 80-85, 89-90; Sixt h Arm y FO' s 49 , 51, 53,

55, 56 , an d 58 , variousl y date d betwee n 9 Fe b an d

23 Ma r 45, all i n ibid., I, 151-62 ; I Corp s FO's 7-13.

variously date d betwee n 2 8 Jan an d 2 5 Mar 45 , and

Amendments 1-4 , date d 2-1 3 Ma r 45 , t o F O 12 , 21

Feb 45 , all i n I Corp s F O file ; Ltr s of Instr, I Corp s

to 33 d Div , 15 , 20, and 2 2 Feb 45 , an d 3 , 12 , and 1 6

Mar 45 , all in I Corp s File , Ltr s to an d from 33 d

Div; USAFI P (NL) Opn s Rpt , pp . 3-8, 10-17.

7

 Additional informatio n o n plan s fo r th e earl y

seizure of San Fernando can b e found , inter alia, in:

Rad, LUBSE C t o Sixt h Army , 1069 , an d Rad , Sixt h

Army t o LUBSEC , WG-587, bot h 1 1 Ma r 45 , Sixt h

Army G- 3 Jn l File Luzon , 9-1 1 Ma r 45 ; Rad, GH Q

SWPA t o Sixt h Army , USASOS , AN F SWPA , CX -

12542, 1 9 Ma r 45 , Sixt h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon ,

17-19 Ma r 45 . 8

 Memo , ACof S G- 3 Sixt h Arm y fo r Cof S Sixt h

Army, 1 7 Feb 45 , Sixt h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon ,

16-18 Fe b 45 .
458 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

as Libton g an d Vigan , th e operation s

to begi n i n lat e Marc h o r earl y April .

Krueger als o considere d th e possibilit y

of mountin g a n amphibiou s operatio n

against Aparri b y late May. 9

Thus, Krueger's early plans for operations i n norther n Luzo n calle d fo r th e

employment o f fou r division s o n th e

Baguio an d Bamban g front s i n simul -

taneous attack s tha t woul d star t afte r

mid-February. H e woul d commit a fift h

division alon g th e wes t coas t b y Apri l

and woul d possibl y emplo y a sixt h a t

Aparri durin g May . Th e plan s neve r

came t o fruition .

Factors Affecting the Plan

General MacArthur 's redeploymen t

and operationa l directive s o f earl y Feb -

ruary no t onl y mad e i t impossibl e fo r

Krueger t o concentrat e force s fo r a ma -

jor offensiv e agains t th e Shobu Group

but als o force d Kruege r t o mak e sweep -

ing change s i n al l existin g o r tentativ e

plans fo r operations i n norther n Luzon .

The mos t immediat e effec t o f Mac -

Arthur's directive s wa s th e relie f o f th e

43d Divisio n an d th e 158t h RC T i n

the Damortis-Rosari o are a an d th e re -

placement o f thos e unit s wit h th e 33 d

Division. Th e nex t mov e wa s the rede -

ployment o f th e 6t h Divisio n sout h t o

Bataan an d th e Shimbu front . I n a

week, I Corp s los t on e an d one-thir d

divisions.

Even thoug h th e redeployment o f th e

43d Divisio n an d th e 158t h RC T lef t

only on e divisio n availabl e fo r th e

Baguio front , Kruege r stil l wante d t o

make his main effor t o n tha t front. Th e

32d Division , whic h ha d move d int o a

sector betwee n th e 25t h an d 43 d Divi -

sions i n lat e January, could b e mad e t o

substitute for the 43d Division. Th e 32 d

could swin g northwest u p th e Ambaya -

bang, Agno, and Arodoga t Rive r valley s

from th e sout h an d southeast , whil e th e

33d Divisio n coul d driv e nort h towar d

Baguio via Route 11. 10 Under this concept, any effort b y the 25t h Division, left

alone on the Bambang front b y the redeployment o f th e 6t h Division , woul d

certainly b e relegate d t o th e statu s o f a

holding attack .

Before Sixt h Arm y coul d wor k ou t

the detail s o f suc h a plan , th e result s

of I Corp s operation s durin g Februar y

prompted new changes. Th e corps ' primary mission s afte r th e advanc e t o Sa n

Jose wer e t o protec t Sixt h Army' s lef t

rear and block any attempts by the Japanese to move south out of the mountains.

Krueger als o directe d th e corp s t o re -

connoiter northwar d an d gav e i t per -

mission t o stage local attacks t o improv e

positions and fee l ou t Japanes e strengt h

in anticipatio n o f a late r all-ou t offen -

sive on either the Baguio or the Bambang

front.11

9

 Sixth Army , Pla n fo r Employmen t o f Corp s an d

Divisions in Luzo n Campaign , 20 Feb 45 , Sixth Army

G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 6- 7 Fe b 4 5 (th e documen t ap -

pears t o b e misdated , althoug h th e pla n seem s t o

have bee n stil l unde r consideratio n a s o f 2 0 Feb -

ruary); Rad, Sixth Army t o GH Q SWP A (G- 3 Sixt h

Army fo r Ass t G- 3 Sixt h Army , the n a t a GH Q

conference), WG-635 , 2 7 Fe b 45 , Sixt h Arm y G- 3

Jnl Fil e Luzon, 25-27 Feb 45; Rad, Engr Sixt h Arm y

to Eng r GHQ SWPA , WG 456, 9 Mar 45, Sixth Arm y

G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon, 9-11 Ma r 45; Memo, Asst ACof S

G-3 Sixt h Arm y fo r ACof S G- 3 Sixt h Army , 3 Mar

45, sub: Resume of Con f a t GHQ , 2 8 Feb-2 Ma r 45 ,

Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon. 1- 3 Ma r 45.

10

 For evidenc e of such a plan, see, inter alia, Sixth

Army, Pla n fo r Employmen t o f Corp s an d Division s

in Luzo n Campaign , 2 0 Fe b 45 , Sixt h Arm y G- 3

Jnl Fil e Luzon , 6-7 Fe b 45 . 11

 Sixth Arm y FO' s 46-53 , date d betwee n 3 0 Ja n

45 an d 1 9 Fe b 45 .
NORTHERN LUZON : TH E SITUATIO N AN D THE PLAN S 459

In accordanc e wit h thes e concepts , I

Corps ordere d th e 43 d Division—whic h

was no t relieve d unti l 1 5 February—t o

secure th e terrai n gaine d b y th e en d o f

January, locat e an d develo p Japanes e

positions nort h o f th e Damortis-Rosari o

section o f Rout e 3 , an d maintai n pres -

sure against Japanes e unit s holdin g ou t

along th e Hil l 600-Hill 150 0 ridge lin e

east o f th e Rosario-Pozorrubi o sectio n

of Rout e 3 . Th e division , t o whic h th e

158th RC T remaine d attached , wa s also

instructed t o avoi d involvemen t i n a

battle o f suc h proportion s tha t i t migh t

have t o commit th e bul k o f its strength.

Following these instructions, the 158t h

RCT foun d unmistakabl e signs of a general Japanes e withdrawa l i n th e are a

north o f th e Damortis-Rosari o road an d

discovered tha t th e coas t lin e wa s clea r

of Japanes e fo r a t leas t fiftee n mile s

north o f Damortis. 12 Th e 43 d Division ,

on th e othe r hand , foun d th e Japanes e

determined t o hol d Rout e 1 1 northeast

from Rosario , an d ever y attemp t t o

penetrate Japanes e defense s alon g th e

Hills 600-1500 ridge line brought about

an immediat e Japanes e counterattack .

Moreover, 43 d Divisio n patrols , includ -

ing man y th e attache d guerrilla s con -

ducted, wer e unabl e t o mov e u p th e

Arodogat Rive r valle y i n th e fac e o f a

strong Japanes e counterreconnaissanc e

screen.

When th e 33 d Divisio n too k ove r

from th e 43 d Divisio n an d th e 158t h

RCT o n 1 5 February , th e 33 d ha d

orders t o concentrate fo r a drive u p th e

coast t o San Fernando—Sixt h Army was

still contemplatin g th e ide a o f swingin g

the 32 d Division bac k northwest towar d

Baguio. Accordingly , I Corp s directe d

the 33 d Divisio n t o clea r th e Hill s 600 —

1500 ridg e lin e i n orde r t o secur e th e

division's righ t (east ) flan k befor e mov -

ing t o th e coast . Th e divisio n woul d

also continu e reconnaissanc e northwar d

to develo p Japanes e position s an d see k

avenues o f approac h towar d Bagui o

other tha n Rout e 11.13

The 33 d Division' s lef t (west ) flan k

units, probin g nort h afte r 1 5 February,

learned tha t th e 58th IMB withdrawa l

was wel l unde r way. 14 I n th e center ,

division unit s patrollin g northwar d

along bot h side s o f Rout e 1 1 found , a s

had th e 43 d Division , tha t Japanes e de -

laying position s an d counterreconnais -

sance operation s blocke d th e road .

Finally, I Corps' instructions to clear the

Hills 600-150 0 ridg e lin e involve d th e

33d Divisio n i n a battl e o f large r scal e

than ha d bee n anticipated . Fro m 1 9

through 2 2 February troops of th e 130t h

and 136t h Infantr y Regiments , a t th e

cost o f approximately 3 5 men kille d and

75 wounded, fough t successfull y t o clea r

the last Japanes e fro m th e north-centra l

section o f the ridge line. Som e 400 Japa -

nese, most o f the m fro m th e 1st Battalion o f th e 71st Infantry, 23d Division,

were kille d i n th e area . Th e fe w Japa -

nese wh o did no t hol d ou t t o th e death

12

 Information o n 43 d Divisio n an d 158t h RC T

operations i n thi s subsectio n i s from : 43 d Di v G- 2

Per Rpts , 1-1 5 Fe b 45 ; 43d Di v G-3 Pe r Rpts , 1-1 5

Feb 45; I Corp s G-3 Opn s Rpts, 1-15 Feb 45.

13

 Ltr o f Instr , I Corp s t o 33 d Div , 1 5 Feb 45 , I

Corps File , Ltrs to an d fro m 33 d Div . 14

 Information o n 33 d Divisio n operation s is from :

I Corp s G- 3 Opn s Rpts, 15-2 2 Fe b 45 ; 33d Rc n T r

Rpt Luzon , p.1 ; 33d Di v G- 3 Opn s Rpts , 13-2 2

Feb 45 ; 123 d In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 1 , 4-5; 130th Inf

Rpt Luzon , pt . III, an . A , Battl e o f Benchmark -

Question Mar k Hills ; 136t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 3 ,

16-18.
460 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

withdrew southward t o join compatriots

on th e Hill 600 complex.

As o f th e beginnin g o f th e las t wee k

of February , th e Japanes e had rebuffe d

all 33 d Divisio n effort s t o secur e Hil l

600 and to push into the Arodogat Valley

to the east. I t appeared that the division

would hav e to spend so much time an d

effort securin g th e valle y an d th e Hill s

600-1500 ridg e lin e tha t th e propose d

concentration o n th e coas t fo r a mov e

on Sa n Fernand o would b e delaye d un -

duly. Th e effor t tha t could be expended

on patrollin g northward woul d als o be

circumscribed. Moreover , th e 33 d Di -

vision's patrolling had disclose d to Sixt h

Army th e ver y significan t fac t tha t th e

Japanese withdrawal s o n th e Bagui o

front ha d resulte d i n considerabl e

strengthening o f th e defense s i n fron t

of tha t city. Manifestly , th e 33d Division

was no t stron g enoug h t o hold a defen -

sive line , clear th e Hills 600-1500 ridge

line, secure the Arodogat Valley, advance

toward Sa n Fernando, patrol northward

throughout its area of responsibility, and

still mount an attack against the strengthened Japanes e defense s aroun d Baguio .

From th e first Sixt h Army had known

that tw o division s woul d b e neede d t o

achieve decisiv e result s o n th e Bagui o

front, an d th e operation s o f th e 33 d

Division confirme d tha t opinion . Bu t

even a s Sixt h Arm y wa s obtainin g this

confirmation, Kruege r ha d t o reasses s

the ide a tha t th e 32 d Division migh t b e

swung northwes t agains t Bagui o whil e

the 33 d move d o n Sa n Fernando.

The souther n boundar y o f th e secto r

that th e 32 d Division began taking ove r

on 2 7 January ra n fro m Urdaneta , o n

Route 3 , across a spu r o f th e Caraball o

Mountains t o Rout e 5 at barri o Digdig,

extending thenc e alon g Rout e 10 0 t o

Carranglan.15 O n th e northwest , th e

32d-43d (an d later 33d ) Division

boundary ra n eas t fro m Pozorrubi o t o

the Arbored o Rive r valle y an d the n

northeast t o Malatorre , o n th e Agn o

some eigh t mile s nort h o f Sa n Manuel .

From Malatorr e th e boundar y swun g

north t o Sapit , nea r th e headwater s o f

the Arbored o an d abou t fou r mile s

southeast o f Cam p 3 , th e Rout e 1 1

strongpoint o n th e 23d Division's new

MLR.

In th e souther n par t of th e 32 d Divi -

sion's secto r th e terrai n ros e slowl y t o

the east . Th e mos t importan t town i n

the secto r wa s Tayug , o n th e eas t sid e

of th e Agno and a t th e junctio n of roads

from Urdaneta , Sa n Manuel , an d Sa n

Quintin. Fro m Tayug , Rout e 27 7 runs

northwest fiv e mile s t o th e Cabalisiaa n

River a t Sant a Maria , wher e th e Vill a

Verde Trail begin s its steep ascent int o

the Caraballo Mountains. Anothe r road

runs east-northeast five miles from Tayug

to Batchelor, when a rough trac e swings

northeast t o Valdes , si x mile s int o th e

Caraballo spur . Valde s wa s a trai l cen -

ter fro m whic h foo t patrol s could strike

north throug h th e spur towar d th e Villa

Verde Trail, northeast towar d Sant a Fe ,

and east to Rout e 5.

For th e firs t fiv e mile s o r s o o f it s

length nort h fro m Sant a Maria , th e

Villa Verda Trail twists up th e east sid e

of a rough, bare , mile-wide ridg e boun -

ded on th e east by the Cabalisiaan Rive r

and o n th e wes t b y th e Ambayabang .

This portio n o f the trai l wa s negotiable

15

 Materia l o n 32 d Divisio n operation s i s base d

principally upon : I Corps FO's 7-12, variously dated

between 2 9 Jan an d 2 1 Feb 45 ; 32 d Di v Rp t Luzon ,

pp. 1-11 ; 127t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 4-10 ; 127t h In f

Daily Unit Rpts, 4-24 Fe b 45 ; 128t h In f Rp t Luzon ,

pp. 4-8; 32 d Rcn Tr Rp t Luzon , pp . 2-4 .
NORTHERN LUZON : TH E SITUATIO N AN D THE PLAN S 461

for jeep s in 1945 , bu t beyon d tha t there

was a fifteen-mil e stretch—countin g the

various twist s an d turns—ove r whic h

even foo t troop s woul d hav e troubl e

making their way and ove r which supply

movements would be extremely difficult.

At th e northeas t en d o f th e trai l ther e

was a five-mil e stretch , between Imuga n

and Sant a Fe , tha t ligh t truck s coul d

negotiate.

The 32 d Division' s firs t missio n wa s

to mov e i n strengt h north , northeast ,

east, an d southeas t roughl y fiv e mile s

beyond Tayug , simultaneousl y patrol -

ling up th e rive r valley s an d eas t acros s

the Caraballo spur. The divisio n reached

its ne w lin e b y 1 February withou t op -

position an d durin g th e nex t tw o day s

pushed it s center o n t o Sant a Maria , a t

the sam e tim e startin g o n it s reconnaissance missions . Divisio n patrol s opera -

ting west o f th e Vill a Verd e Trail soo n

ran int o counterreconnaissanc e screens

in the Arboredo and Agno River valleys.

The Japanes e strengthened th e Ambay -

abang Valley , undefende d i n earl y February, afte r th e middl e o f th e month ,

and th e 32 d Divisio n quickl y learne d

that th e Japanes e wer e preparin g t o

defend al l thre e valleys.

From th e beginnin g th e chie f valu e

of th e valley s ha d bee n th e possibilit y

that movement s alon g the m woul d

achieve tactica l surprise . Whe n i t wa s

learned tha t chances to gain surprise had

passed, th e logistica l problem s involve d

in supportin g an y attac k throug h th e

valleys bega n t o outweig h whateve r

tactical advantage s migh t redoun d fro m

operations alon g thos e route s o f ap -

proach. Th e ide a tha t th e 32d Division

might b e abl e t o swin g northwes t to -

ward Bagui o throug h th e valley s bega n

to loo k les s attractive .

To th e east, meanwhile, th e 32d Division ha d sen t a battalio n u p th e Vill a

Verde Trail in a reconnaissance-in-force.

By th e evenin g o f 7 February , havin g

been opposed every step of the way from

Santa Maria , th e battalio n ha d broke n

through a serie s o f mino r outpos t posi -

tions and , about tw o an d a hal f mile s

north-northeast o f Sant a Maria , ha d

reached th e principa l Japanes e OPL R

defenses on th e Villa Verde Trail. Sinc e

a majo r effor t woul d b e require d to dislodge thes e Japanese , th e 32 d Divisio n

held wha t i t had, having been instructe d

to avoi d a large-scal e battle . A s i t was ,

by discoverin g tha t abou t a battalion o f

Japanese defende d th e souther n sectio n

of th e Vill a Verd e Trail , th e divisio n

had successfull y accomplishe d it s initia l

reconnaissance mission i n tha t sector.

Small group s fro m th e 32 d Divisio n

had been patrolling across the Caraballo

spur whil e th e divisio n wa s movin g

units u p th e Villa Verd e Trail an d th e

river valleys , an d th e report s brough t

back b y patrols operatin g i n th e moun -

tains were of considerable importance to

future Sixt h Arm y plans . First , th e

patrols discovered tha t most o f th e trails

through th e spu r seeme d t o hav e bee n

used befor e Februar y 194 5 by wil d pig s

rather tha n huma n beings. Th e groun d

proved t o be so rough tha t th e logistica l

support o f an y larg e forc e attemptin g

to us e th e trails a s a mean s o f outflank -

ing Japanes e defense s o n eithe r Rout e

5 o r th e Vill a Verd e Trai l woul d b e

virtually impossible .

Next, th e fe w patrols tha t ha d man -

aged t o reac h th e northeas t sectio n o f

the Vill a Verd e Trail i n th e vicinit y o f

Imugan reporte d tha t th e Japanes e

were sendin g reinforcements west alon g

the trail . Thi s rout e o f approac h t o
462 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

VILLA VERD E TRAIL NEA R SA N NICOLA S

Bambang, i t appeared , wa s going t o b e

more strongly defended than anticipated.

If so , th e 32 d Divisio n wa s goin g t o b e

hard pu t t o diver t an y effor t a t al l to -

ward Baguio . Furthermore , 32 d Divi -

sion patrol s penetrating a s fa r a s Rout e

5 learne d tha t th e stretc h o f highwa y

north o f Digdi g wa s obviousl y goin g t o

be th e scen e o f a majo r Japanes e defen -

sive effort . A s event s turne d out , the

results of this patrolling would prov e of

more importanc e t o th e 25t h Divisio n

than t o th e 32d, but th e possibilit y tha t

the 25t h rathe r tha n th e 32 d migh t be -

come responsibl e fo r securin g Rout e 5

north o f Digdi g wa s not , apparently,

even a drea m when , i n earl y February ,

the 25th Division started patrolling north

from Sa n Jose .

Like th e 32d , the 25t h Divisio n ha d

both reconnaissanc e an d holdin g mis -

sions unti l lat e February. 16 Th e lin e

that th e divisio n wa s require d t o hol d

lay eas t an d wes t o f Rosaldo , a tin y

16

 Additional informatio n o n 25t h Divisio n opera -

tions is from : 25t h Di v FO's 9-12, dated betwee n 7

and 1 9 Feb 45 ; 25t h Di v Rp t Luzon , pp. 35-39 ; 27t h

Inf Rp t Luzon , pp . 16-17 ; 27t h In f S- 3 Pe r Rpts ,

10-21 Fe b 45 ; 35t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 20-21 ; 35t h

Inf S- 3 Pe r Rpts , 8-21 Feb 45; 161st Inf, Battle fo r

Japanese Puncan-Wes t Sector , pp . 1-10 ; 25th Rc n

Tr Rp t Luzon , pp. 4-6.
NORTHERN LUZON : TH E SITUATIO N AN D THE PLAN S 463

barrio on Route 5 about five miles northeast o f Sa n Jose . Wes t o f Rout e 5 th e

"secure line " la y about a mil e int o th e

Caraballo spu r an d parallele d Rout e 8 ,

running northwes t fro m Sa n Jos e t o

Umingan. Eas t o f Rosald o th e lin e ex -

tended thre e mile s t o Mt . Bolokbok ,

whence i t swun g generall y sout h alon g

the Pampang a Rive r t o Rizal , a t th e

southern end o f Route 10 0 and te n miles

southeast of San Jose . The divisio n

would reconnoite r nort h o f thi s lin e t o

the 25th-32d Division boundary, crossing

Route 5 at Digdig .

Patrols o f th e 25t h Divisio n operatin g

in th e southern sectio n o f th e Caraball o

spur foun d th e terrai n eve n wors e tha n

that i n th e Valde s regio n t o th e north .

More important , divisio n unit s tha t

managed t o travers e th e spu r discovere d

that th e Punca n are a wa s strongl y de -

fended, providin g Sixt h Arm y wit h th e

first indicatio n o f th e 10th Division's in -

tention o f stationin g a delayin g force o f

one RCT acros s Rout e 5 at tha t point.

In th e center, along Route 5, the 25th

Division sen t a battalion-sized reconnaissance-in-force u p th e highwa y just a s the

32d Divisio n ha d pushe d a battalio n u p

the Vill a Verde Trail. Th e result s were

nearly identical . Th e 25t h Division' s

battalion reache d Rosald o o n 1 4 February and a week later, having probed cau -

tiously northward , wa s i n contac t wit h

an organize d Japanes e delaying positio n

another fiv e mile s up th e highway . An y

further effor t woul d obviousl y involv e

major operations . Therefore , it s recon -

naissance mission accomplished, the 25t h

Division halte d it s battalio n jus t a s th e

32d Divisio n ha d stopped its unit on th e

Villa Verd e Trail.

To th e eas t othe r 25t h Divisio n pa -

trols, thei r reports augmente d b y infor -

mation acquire d fro m guerrillas , foun d

substantial indication s that th e Japanese

were goin g t o defen d bot h Rout e 10 0

and th e Ol d Spanis h Trail. B y 2 1 February it was clear tha t th e Japanes e were

not missin g an y more defensiv e bet s o n

the 25t h Divisio n fron t tha n the y wer e

in the zones of the 32d and 33 d Divisions.

Thus, I Corp s operation s o n th e

Baguio an d Bamban g fronts durin g th e

first thre e week s o f Februar y mad e i t

obvious tha t th e Japanese were going to

defend ever y avenue of approach t o th e

north, wit h th e possibl e exceptio n o f

Route 3 on th e west coast . There , 33 d

Division reconnaissanc e ha d no t carrie d

sufficiently fa r northwar d t o dra w an y

conclusions abou t Japanes e defenses .

The Japanes e withdrawa l i n fron t o f

Baguio, Sixt h Arm y ha d learned , di d

not indicat e weakness bu t actuall y fore -

shadowed a tightenin g an d strengthen -

ing o f defensiv e lines . Sixt h Arm y ha d

expected t o fin d stron g defense s o n

Route 5 , bu t i t no w appeare d tha t th e

Japanese were willing and able to devote

greater effor t t o th e defens e o f th e rive r

valleys, th e Vill a Verd e Trail , Rout e

100, an d th e Ol d Spanis h Trai l tha n

Sixth Army' s G- 2 Sectio n ha d a t firs t

estimated.

From th e beginning of planning, General Kruege r ha d realize d tha t I Corp s

would nee d a t leas t tw o division s t o

achieve decisiv e result s o n th e Bagui o

front. No w it . was also obviou s tha t th e

corps woul d requir e tw o division s o n

the Bamban g fron t i n orde r t o moun t

even a limited-objectiv e holdin g attack .

But I Corp s ha d onl y thre e division s

available. I t wa s tim e t o reasses s plan s

with a view toward deciding along which

front th e mor e decisiv e results could b e

achieved.
464 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

BAGABAG

Guerrillas and Additional

Intelligence

While I Corp s wa s bus y gatherin g

important informatio n throug h groun d

reconnaissance, other intelligence poured

into Sixt h Army headquarters fro m aer -

ial reconnaissance, guerrilla reports, captured documents , and , presumably ,

radio intercepts . Throug h a combina -

tion o f thes e sources Sixth Army , during

the firs t week s o f February , learne d o f

the Shobu Group's pla n fo r the triangu -

lar defensive redoubt. Of perhaps greater

importance fo r futur e plannin g wa s th e

discovery o f th e Baguio-Arita o suppl y

road. Sixt h Arm y ha d previousl y con -

sidered th e Bagui o an d Bamban g de -

fensive sectors to be more or less isolated

from on e another , bu t th e existenc e o f

the suppl y roa d mad e i t apparen t tha t

the Japanes e coul d rapidl y mov e troop s

from on e fron t t o th e other. I f tha t lin k

in th e Japanes e defensiv e syste m coul d

be severed , Sixt h Arm y woul d achiev e a

significant tactica l success . A decisio n

had t o b e mad e selectin g th e fron t o n

which t o put th e effort necessar y to close

one en d o f th e suppl y road .

The distanc e fro m th e 33 d Division's

front line s o n Rout e 1 1 t o th e Bagui o

end o f th e suppl y road wa s shorter tha n
NORTHERN LUZON : TH E SITUATIO N AN D THE PLAN S 465

that fro m th e 25t h Division' s advance d

position o n Rout e 5 t o Aritao . Bu t o n

the Baguio side the approach ran all th e

way throug h easil y defensibl e terrain ,

whereas north of Santa Fe th e terrain t o

Aritao wa s fairl y open . Othe r factor s

favored th e Rout e 5 approach. Havin g

learned o f Yamashita' s triangula r de -

fense concept, Krueger foresaw that a

I Corps advance up Route 5 would not

only threaten the Aritao terminus of the

supply road but would als o pose a direct

threat to the Bambang anchor o f the triangle. Moreover , no t to o fa r beyon d

Bambang la y th e junctio n o f Route s 4

and 5 at Bagabag. I f I Corps seize d tha t

junction, i t woul d cu t th e triangula r

redoubt off from supplie s in the Cagayan

Valley excep t fo r wha t th e Japanes e

could mov e over Rout e 1 1 from Tugue -

garao, a stretc h o f miserabl e roa d tha t

guerrillas constantl y blocked . Th e cap -

ture of both the Routes 4-5 junctio n and

the Arita o entranc e t o th e suppl y roa d

would no t onl y ope n tw o additiona l

routes ove r whic h Sixt h Arm y troop s

could advanc e int o th e Shobu Group

redoubt bu t woul d als o ope n th e wa y

into th e Cagaya n Valley , a n eventualit y

that promise d t o cut of f strong Japanese

forces fro m th e rest of the Shobu Group.

All i n all, it appeare d tha t i f th e Sixt h

Army coul d pus h t o an d beyon d Arita o

the Shobu Group woul d fac e disaster .

Such decisiv e result s coul d no t b e

achieved o n th e Bagui o front , fo r fro m

Baguio th e Shobu Group force s coul d

make a fightin g withdrawa l alon g easil y

defensible Rout e 11 , retiring eve n fur -

ther int o th e mountain s whil e continu -

ing to receive supplies from th e Cagayan

Valley. Finally , b y th e thir d wee k i n

February, Kruege r had decided i t would

be unsound t o reorient the 32d Division

from th e fir m contac t th e uni t ha d es -

tablished alon g th e Vill a Verd e Trail ,

such a n obviou s rout e t o outflan k th e

Shobu Group's Rout e 5 defenses .

Krueger's decisio n woul d hav e t o favo r

the Bamban g front.

Before th e en d o f February , then ,

Krueger ha d ha d t o reorien t Sixt h

Army's plans completely. Th e 25t h and

32d Division s woul d mak e th e majo r

effort agains t th e Shobu Group, strikin g

north o n th e Bamban g front . Th e

Baguio fron t Kruege r relegate d t o a

holding status . There , unti l th e 37t h

Division coul d move nort h fro m Ma -

nila, th e 33 d Divisio n woul d hav e a

supporting, secondar y role .

While making these decisions, Krueger

still ha d t o worr y abou t th e Japanes e

19th Division, which , h e kne w b y mid -

February, ha d withdraw n fro m th e

Baguio region. H e learne d tha t th e division wa s movin g nort h towar d th e

hitherto undefended Bonto c area, northern ape x o f Yamashita' s triangula r re -

doubt. Fo r obviou s reasons , Kruege r

wanted t o contai n th e 19th Division i n

the Bonto c area , bu t wit h al l availabl e

American division s committe d t o defi -

nite course s o f actio n o n th e Bagui o o r

Bambang fronts , h e coul d spar e n o

troops fo r th e jo b o f pinnin g th e 19th

Division i n place . Ther e was, however,

a forc e upo n whic h h e could depend fo r

help—the United State s Army Force s in

the Philippines, Norther n Luzon .

Usually know n a s th e USAFIP(NL) ,

this organized guerrill a forc e wa s led b y

Col. Russell W. Volckmann, a U.S. Army

regular who, at th e ris k o f sudden death

at th e hand s of the Japanese (i f not ulti -

mate court-martial by th e U.S. Army for

disobeying surrende r orders ) ha d take n

to th e hill s upo n th e fal l o f th e Philip -
466 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

pines i n 1942. 17 Whe n Sixt h Arm y

reached Luzo n o n 9 Januar y Colone l

Volckmann's force ha d numbered abou t

8,000 men, of whom only 2,000 were well

armed. Afte r th e invasio n Sixt h Arm y

started runnin g supplie s t o th e

USAFIP(NL), firs t b y smal l craf t tha t

put int o variou s guerrilla-hel d beache s

on th e west coast and late r b y C-47 aircraft tha t flew t o guerrilla-held dropping

grounds an d airstrips . Withi n tw o

months afte r th e landin g a t Lingaye n

Gulf, Filipin o enthusias m ha d brough t

Volckmann's strength u p to 18,00 0 men,

while th e suppl y o f arm s increase d no t

only becaus e o f Sixth Army's efforts bu t

also because their ow n new strength en -

abled th e guerrilla s t o captur e equip -

ment fro m isolate d Japanes e outpost s

and patrols.

Volckmann divide d hi s organizatio n

into command, combat, an d servic e echelons, respectivel y numberin g 1,400 ,

15,000, an d 2,70 0 troops . Th e comba t

echelon wa s in tur n broke n dow n int o

five infantr y regiments—th e 11th, 14th,

15th, 66th , an d 121st—eac h wit h a n

"authorized" strengt h o f 2,90 0 officer s

and men, and each subdivided into three

rifle battalion s o f fou r rifl e companie s

apiece. Th e comba t echelo n wa s soo n

strengthened b y th e additio n o f a battalion o f mixed fiel d artillery , equippe d

with capture d Japanes e ordnance .

At th e beginnin g o f Februar y Volck -

mann's headquarter s wa s a t Darigayo s

Cove, o n th e coast abou t fiftee n mile s

north o f Sa n Fernando . Hi s mission s a s

assigned b y Sixt h Army , whic h assume d

control o f USAFIP(NL ) o n 1 3 January,

were to gather intelligence, ambush Japanese patrols , seiz e o r destro y Japanes e

supplies, disrup t Japanes e line s o f communication, an d bloc k Japanes e route s

of withdrawa l int o an d exi t fro m th e

Cagayan Valley.18 I t was not, apparently,

initially intende d tha t Volckmann' s

force woul d engag e i n sustaine d effort s

against majo r Japanes e units, an d ther e

seems t o hav e bee n littl e hop e tha t

Volckmann's, o r an y othe r guerrill a

unit, woul d eve r becom e effectiv e com -

bat organizations. Th e mos t hel p GHQ

SWPA an d Sixt h Arm y probabl y ex -

pected wa s i n th e for m o f harassin g

raids, sabotage , an d intelligence .

But Volckmann—an d othe r guerrill a

leaders on Luzo n as well—interprete d

his mission s a s broadl y a s hi s strengt h

and armamen t permitted . B y th e en d

of Februar y USAFIP (NL 

much o f th e west coast o f Luzo n nort h

of Sa n Fernando and als o controlled th e

north coas t west o f Aparri. Volckman n

had rendere d Rout e 1 1 between Bagui o

and Tuguegarao and Rout e 4 from Lib -

tong t o Bagaba g virtually impassabl e t o

the Japanese. Indeed , as has been shown,

one o f th e mai n reason s tha t Yamashit a

moved th e 19th Division nort h ha d

been t o regai n contro l ove r th e tw o

vital highway s s o tha t supplie s coul d

continue movin g into th e fina l redoubt .

While USAFIP(NL) di d no t posses s sufficient strengt h t o attack majo r Japanes e

concentrations o r t o hol d ou t agains t

large-scale punitiv e expeditions , i t ha d

diverted an d pinne d dow n Japanes e

forces tha t could undoubtedly have been

used t o bette r advantag e elsewhere . I t

would appea r tha t b y mid-Februar y

17

 Additional informatio n o n th e USAFI P (NL) is

derived fro m USAFI P (NL) Operations Report, pages

3-6, 8 , 10-17 . Volckman n hel d th e ran k o f majo r

in 1942 . He wa s promoted t o lieutenan t colone l i n

October 194 4 and t o colone l i n Februar y 1945 .

18

 Lt r o f Instr , Sixt h Arm y t o Volckmann , et al.,

2 Fe b 45 , Sixt h Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 149 .
NORTHERN LUZON : TH E SITUATIO N AN D THE PLAN S 467

USAFIP(NL) had accomplished far more

than GH Q SWP A o r Sixt h Arm y ha d

either expecte d o r hoped .

While Sixt h Arm y ha d probabl y no t

planned t o us e guerrilla s extensively , i t

seems tha t th e loss o f th e 40t h an d 41s t

Divisions, couple d wit h th e othe r diffi -

culties involve d i n securin g sufficien t

regular troop s fo r operation s i n north -

ern Luzon , prompte d Genera l Kruege r

to reassess th e rol e guerrilla s coul d an d

would play. 19 Durin g Februar y mor e

and mor e guerrill a unit s wer e outfitte d

with weapons and clothes , some of the m

relieving regula r force s i n guar d dutie s

and mopping-u p action s whil e other s

were sen t t o th e fron t fo r direc t attach -

ment t o an d reinforcemen t o f comba t

units. I n th e cas e o f USAFIP(NL), supply effort s wer e redoubled , a broa d pro -

gram o f ai r suppor t wa s se t u p an d ai r

support partie s were sent to Volckmann,

and, a s tim e passed , Volckmann' s mis -

sions wer e enlarged . Indeed , Volck -

mann's force s cam e t o substitut e fo r a

full division , takin g th e plac e o f th e

regular divisio n tha t Kruege r ha d

planned t o sen d u p th e wes t coas t i n a

series o f shore-to-shor e operations , a n

undertaking that , b y mid-February ,

USAFIP(NL) successe s ha d rendere d

unnecessary.

The Plan in Late February

Thus, a s o f lat e Februar y Genera l

Krueger ha d availabl e fo r operation s i n

northern Luzo n th e 25th , 32d, and 33 d

Divisions an d th e USAFIP(NL ) a s a

substitute fo r a fourt h division . H e ex -

pected th e 37t h Divisio n t o becom e

available, one RCT a t a time, beginning

in lat e March .

With thes e forces , Sixt h Army' s pla n

called fo r th e firs t mai n effor t i n north -

ern Luzo n t o be mad e on th e Bamban g

front b y th e 25t h an d 32 d Divisions .

Meanwhile, th e 33 d Divisio n woul d

mount holdin g attack s o n th e Bagui o

front, whic h woul d explode into decisive

action onc e th e 37t h Division , release d

from it s garriso n dutie s a t Manila ,

moved north . Initially , USAFIP(NL )

would continu e it s harassin g mission s

and provid e suc h hel p i n th e Sa n Fer -

nando an d Bagui o area s a s wa s feasible.

(Two o f its battalions had bee n fightin g

under 43d and then 33d Division control

since lat e Januar y an d othe r unit s wer e

already movin g towar d Sa n Fernando. )

When th e 37t h Divisio n bega n movin g

into positio n o n th e Bagui o front ,

USAFIP(NL) woul d undertak e a driv e

inland alon g Rout e 4 towar d th e junc -

tion o f Route s 4 an d 1 1 a t Bontoc .

These plan s ha d no t emerge d al l of a

piece fro m th e G- 3 Sectio n o f Sixt h

Army headquarters . Th e concep t o f

making th e mai n effor t alon g th e Bam -

bang approache s develope d durin g th e

first thre e week s o f February ; th e fina l

plans fo r th e employmen t o f th e 37t h

Division an d USAFIP(NL ) di d no t de -

velop muc h befor e mid-March ; th e ide a

that th e 33 d Divisio n woul d hav e a

holding missio n unti l th e 37t h Divisio n

reached th e Bagui o fron t wa s clear wel l

before th e en d o f February .

19

 The fac t tha t Kruege r establishe d machiner y fo r

controlling guerrilla s i n a Specia l Intelligenc e Sec -

tion unde r hi s G- 2 seem s indicativ e o f th e limite d

use t o whic h Sixt h Army , a t leas t initially , intende d

to pu t guerrillas .
CHAPTER XX V

The Collaps e of the Baguio Front

The 33d Division's Holding Mission

The Situation in Late February

The decisio n t o relegate the 33d Division t o a holding mission o n th e Baguio

front di d not affec t th e task s the division

had alread y assumed. 1 First , th e uni t

had t o clea r th e remainin g Japanes e

from th e bare-sloped, sharp-crested Hills

600-1500 ridg e lin e dominatin g Rout e

3 from Pozorrubi o north t o the junction

of Route s 3 and 1 1 near Rosario. Simul -

taneously, th e division wa s to secure th e

terrain eas t o f th e ridg e t o includ e th e

Arodogat Rive r valley . I t woul d als o

reconnoiter u p th e coas t t o Agoo , si x

miles nort h o f Damortis ; fro m Rosari o

northward seve n mile s t o Pugo ; an d

from th e Route s 3-1 1 junctio n north -

eastward alon g Rout e 1 1 si x mile s t o

Camp 2 . Th e reconnaissanc e lin e ra n

eastward fro m Cam p 2 almost fiv e mile s

across th e rugge d souther n reache s o f

the Cordiller a Centra l t o th e 32d-33 d

Division boundar y a t Sapit .

Route 11 , th e 33 d Divisio n woul d

soon learn , wa s th e mos t strongl y de -

fended an d mos t easil y defensibl e ap -

proach t o Baguio . Runnin g northeas t

and the n nort h int o Bagui o fro m it s

junction wit h Rout e 3 nea r Rosario ,

Route 1 1 lies dee p i n th e gorg e o f th e

Bued River , th e headwater s o f whic h

rise withi n th e Bagui o cit y limits .

Noses o f steep-side d ridge s ris e sharpl y

from th e gorge i n ever y direction, tower

to a height o f 3,50 0 t o 4,00 0 fee t withi n

half a mil e o f th e highway , an d the n

ascend t o mountai n crests o f 6,00 0 feet .

So shar p i s th e gorg e o f th e Bue d tha t

much of Route 1 1 can lie in deep shadow

cast by the dominating ridges, while one

or tw o thousan d fee t u p th e slope s th e

sun brightl y illuminate s th e terrain .

A fe w sharp , shor t ravine s leadin g

into th e mountain s fro m th e Bue d

Gorge hav e a ric h verdur e o f dens e

jungle undergrowth , an d som e o f th e

ridge slope s towerin g abov e th e gorg e

have respectable , althoug h rathe r thin ,

stands o f timber . Fo r th e mos t part ,

however, th e stee p ridges' side s ar e cov -

ered b y shor t grasse s intersperse d wit h

scattered trees ; roc k outcropping s ar e

not uncommon . Asphalt-pave d Rout e

11, th e best roa d i n norther n Luzon , i s

easily blocked and broken. Betwee n th e

Routes 3-11 junction and Baguio, Route

11 crosse s the Bue d Rive r fiv e time s and

bridges th e dee p ravine s o f tributar y

1

 This subsectio n i s base d on : 33 d Di v G-3 Opn s

Rpts, 20-2 2 Fe b 45 ; I Corp s FO' s 10-12 , date d 12 ,

17, and 2 1 Feb 45 ; I Corps Ltrs of Instr t o 33 d Div ,

15, 20 , an d 8 2 Fe b 45 ; 33 d Di v F O 11 , 1 3 Fe b 45 ;

33d Di v Rp t Luzon , pt . II , Intel , Sec . 2, Enem y

O/B pp . 3-8; SWPA His t Series , II , 471-72 ; ibid.,

Map 122 ; 14th Area Army Opn s Orders Nos. A-487

and A-516 , 3 and 1 3 Feb 45 , Trans, III, Ite m 3 , pp .

29-33: Japanes e Studie s i n W W II , No . 8 , 14th

Area Army Opn s o n Luzon , pp . 89-94 , 99-106 .
THE COLLAPS E O F TH E BAGUI O FRON T 469

ROUTE 1 1 WINDIN G SOUT H FRO M BAGUI O

streams a t anothe r fourtee n points . A t

most o f th e ninetee n crossing sites along

the twent y mile s betwee n th e junctio n

and Bagui o th e bridge s ar e 5 0 t o 10 0

feet abov e th e rocky bed o f the Bue d o r

the variou s steep-side d ravin e bottoms .

Without th e bridges , it . is virtuall y im -

possible t o mov e heav y equipmen t u p

the highway . A s o f lat e Februar y 194 5

the Allied Air Force s an d guerrilla s ha d

already destroye d severa l o f th e spans ;

those remainin g intac t troop s o f th e

Japanese 23d Division woul d knoc k ou t

as the y retreate d northwar d unde r pres -

sure fro m th e 33 d Division . A rapi d

advance u p Rout e 11 , the 33 d Divisio n

quickly realized , woul d presen t a s many

engineering a s tactica l problems .

Tactically, th e terrai n along Route 1 1

gave ever y advantag e t o th e defenders ,

who wer e wel l entrenche d o n dominat -

ing groun d fro m whic h the y ha d excel -

lent observation . Th e 33 d Divisio n

would clea r on e sid e o f a ridg e nose ,

round th e nose , an d fin d th e Japanes e

just a s stron g o n th e opposit e side . At -

tack alon g th e highwa y promise d onl y

an arduous , time-consuming , an d costl y

process o f clearin g th e adjacen t terrai n

inch b y inch . Wit h a relativel y smal l

force, th e Japanes e coul d hol d u p th e

entire 33 d Divisio n almos t indefinitely .

A second approach to Baguio in which

the 33 d Divisio n becam e intereste d

began a t Pugo , seve n mile s nort h o f

Rosario alon g a fairl y goo d grave l roa d

that traverse s eas y terrain . Fro m Pugo ,

a narrow, rocky trace known at the Tuba

Trail wind s it s wa y tortuousl y nort h

and northeas t throug h sometime s for -

ested an d sometime s semibarre n moun -

tains t o barri o Tuba , tw o an d a hal f

miles southwest of Baguio. A fairly good

gravel roa d le d fro m Tub a t o Rout e 1 1

at th e souther n edg e o f Baguio. 2 Alon g

the Tub a trai l th e terrai n woul d agai n

give th e defender s al l th e advantages.

A thir d approac h t o Bagui o began a t

Caba, o n th e coast eigh t mile s nort h o f

Agoo. A good, one-lan e grave l roa d ra n

east thre e mile s fro m Cab a an d the n

connected wit h a n abandone d railroa d

bed. Wit h som e breaks , th e railroa d

grade continue d eastwar d anothe r fiv e

miles ove r roug h mountain s t o Galiano ,

about nine miles west of Bagui o and sit e

of a small hydroelectri c plant that served

the cit y o f Baguio . A t Galian o anothe r

all-weather grave l road , followin g th e

2

 In Apri l 195 7 th e roa d fro m Rout e 1 1 was pave d

for perhap s fou r mile s sout h o f th e junction . A t a

point abou t a mil e an d a hal f sout h o f th e junctio n

a goo d gravel road le d of f westward t o Tuba, a mile

distant. Beyon d Tub a th e Tuba Trai l had no t bee n

kept in repair an d not even a jeep could negotiat e it.
470 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

GALIANO VALLE Y APPROAC H T O BAGUI O

old railroa d bed , ra n uphil l throug h

Asin—site o f anothe r smal l hydroelec -

tric plan t an d a ho t salt bat h resort—t o

Route 9 at th e wester n edg e of Baguio. 3

Between the end o f the gravel road fro m

Caba an d th e beginnin g o f th e grave l

road a t Galian o thi s approac h run s

through fairl y lo w bu t rugged , broke n

hill country . Th e roa d fro m Galian o

to Asin, a distanc e o f almost fou r miles,

is eas y enough , bu t Asi n sit s i n a dee p

bowl surrounde d b y partiall y woode d

mountains tha t ris e sharpl y t o a heigh t

of ove r 2,00 0 feet . Jus t eas t o f Asi n th e

road passe s throug h tw o short , narro w

tunnels, from whic h i t is a steady uphill

climb throug h fairl y ope n countr y t o

the junctio n wit h Rout e 9 . Asi n i s th e

key are a alon g thi s approach , fo r fur -

ther progres s towar d Bagui o demand s

a breakthroug h acros s th e dominatin g

terrain at th e bowl and th e two tunnels.

The fourt h approac h t o Baguio in th e

33d Division' s zon e was Route 9, origi -

nating a t Bauang , o n th e coas t seve n

miles nort h o f Caba . Fro m Bauan g

3

 In Apri l 195 7 the roa d t o Asi n an d Galian o wa s

paved fo r perhap s tw o mile s ou t o f Bagui o an d wa s

maintained a s a goo d gravel , one-lan e roa d thenc e

to Asi n an d Galiano . Beyon d Galian o th e trai l wa s

virtually impassabl e t o a poin t abou t fiv e mile s

from Caba . Th e railroa d be d wa s originall y con -

structed i n 1914-1 7 fo r a rac k an d pinio n branc h o f

the Manil a Railroad . Th e ventur e wa s abandoned

before th e bed wa s completed an d befor e an y bridges

had bee n constructed .
THE COLLAPS E O F TH E BAGUI O FRON T 471

ROUTE 9 NEA R BURGOS , LOOKIN G EASTWAR D

this two-lane , macada m highwa y run s

generally southeas t twent y miles —

straight-line distanc e — into Baguio .

Much o f th e terrai n alon g Rout e 9 i s

less forbidding tha n tha t along the othe r

three approaches, an d th e highwa y usu -

ally run s ove r an d alon g ridge s rathe r

than throug h gorge s an d valleys . Alto -

gether th e easies t approac h t o Baguio ,

Route 9 stil l passe s man y point s wher e

a determine d defendin g forc e coul d di g

in an d hol d bac k a muc h superio r

attacking group.

As of 21 February 1945 , whe n it began

patrolling alon g o r towar d th e ap -

proaches t o Baguio , th e 33 d Divisio n

had divide d it s zon e int o thre e regi -

mental sectors . On e regimen t wa s re -

sponsible fo r th e entir e are a fro m th e

coast east almost a s far a s Rout e 11 ; the

second wa s to reconnoiter u p Rout e 11 ;

the third would clear the Hills 600-1500

ridge lin e an d th e Arodoga t Valley ,

patrolling a s fa r a s Sapit .

The Japanes e had divided th e ground

in muc h th e sam e manner . On e regi -

ment covere d th e groun d east o f Rout e

11, includin g th e Agn o Valley; a second

regiment wa s astride Rout e 11 ; a thir d

had troop s alon g th e Tub a Trai l ap -

proach. Th e 58th IMB defende d bot h

Route 9 and th e Galiano-Asi n approac h

to Baguio . A s o f th e las t wee k o f Feb -

ruary, the bulk o f the 58th IMB an d th e

23d Division wa s establishe d alon g a n

MLR; th e 23d Division still maintaine d
472 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

outposts on the Hills 600-1500 ridge line

and i n th e Arodoga t Valley .

The Japanes e believe d tha t Sixt h

Army would mak e its main effort o n th e

Baguio fron t alon g Rout e 11 . The y

thought Sixt h Arm y migh t launc h sec -

ondary attacks up th e Agno and Ambay -

abang Rive r valleys , an d the y als o

estimated tha t som e America n force s

might strik e towar d Bagui o alon g th e

Tuba Trail . Thi s earl y i n th e battl e

for Baguio , th e Japanes e wer e littl e

worried abou t America n advance s ove r

the Galiano-Asi n roa d o r alon g Rout e

9. However , th e Japanes e deploymen t

indicates tha t th e 58th IMB wa s pre -

pared t o defen d thes e tw o approache s

should th e necessit y arise .

Probing Operations to Mid-March

During th e last wee k o f Februar y an d

the firs t fe w days of Marc h th e 33 d Divi -

sion me t wit h considerabl e and, in som e

areas, unexpecte d succes s i n accomplish -

ing it s missions. 4 O n th e east , behin d

precisely adjuste d fir e o f tw o artiller y

battalions, 33 d Divisio n troop s overra n

the last Japanes e position s o n th e Hill s

600-1500 ridg e lin e withou t sufferin g a

single casualty. Then , after a sharp fight

at a hil l dominatin g th e entrance , th e

American troop s ha d n o troubl e clear -

ing a fe w Japanes e straggler s fro m th e

Arodogat Valley . (Map 20)

Along Rout e 11 , however, th e stor y

was different . Her e th e 71st Infantry o f

the 23d Division conducte d a fightin g

withdrawal, an d b y th e middl e o f th e

first wee k i n Marc h 33 d Divisio n patrols

were still a mile and a half short of their

reconnaissance objective , Cam p 2 .

Meanwhile, units patrolle d u p th e roa d

from Rosari o to Pugo against little opposition, bu t the n foun d th e firs t stretche s

of th e Tuba Trail defended b y elements

of th e 64th Infantry, 23d Division, holding position s o n hig h ground . Farthe r

north, othe r patrol s reache d barri o Sa n

Jose, midwa y betwee n Cab a an d Gali -

ano, findin g n o sign s o f Japanese . Th e

most startling development of the period

was th e unoppose d occupatio n o f Ago o

and th e concomitan t discover y tha t

no Japanes e defende d Rout e 3 fro m

Agoo fiv e mile s north alon g th e coast t o

the Aringa y River .

As a resul t o f it s patro l successes , th e

33d Divisio n becam e ambitious. I t ha d

uncovered a genera l patter n o f Japanes e

withdrawal al l alon g it s front , and , although th e withdrawa l wa s of a fightin g

nature alon g Rout e 11 , the divisio n be -

lieved i t coul d pus h o n muc h faste r

toward Baguio . Maj . Gen . Perc y W .

Clarkson, th e 33d' s commander , ha d

from th e star t bee n unhapp y a t havin g

been assigne d a holdin g mission , an d

saw i n th e Japanes e withdrawa l o n hi s

front a welcom e chanc e t o driv e o n to -

ward Bagui o immediately. H e propose d

to Genera l Swift , th e I Corp s com -

mander, tha t th e 33 d Divisio n strik e fo r

a ne w "secur e line " extendin g fro m

Aringay southeas t throug h Pug o t o

Route 1 1 at Twi n Peaks , a mil e shor t

of Cam p 2 , an d the n exten d it s

reconnaissance northwar d accordingly .

4

 The remainde r o f thi s sectio n i s base d princi -

pally on : 33 d Di v Rp t Luzon , pt . III , Battl e o f

Baguio, p . 1 ; 33 d Di v G-3 Opn s Rpts, 2 1 Feb-8 Apr

45; I Corps Rpt Luzon , pp. 61-71; I Corp s G-3 Opn s

Rpts, 2 1 Feb- 9 Ap r 45 ; 130t h In f Rp t Luzon , pt .

III, Ge n Opns , pp . 6-32 ; 130t h In f S- 3 Opn s Rpts ,

21 Feb-1 0 Ap r 45 ; 123 d In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 4-6 ;

123d Inf S- 3 Opn s Rpts , 2 1 Feb-1 0 Ap r 45 ; 136t h

Inf Rp t Luzon , pt. III, Opns , pp. 16-41 ; 33d Div Rpt

Luzon, an , 12 , 33d Rc n T r Opns , pp . 1-3 .
THE COLLAPS E O F TH E BAGUI O FRON T 473

MAP 20

Swift approve d Clarkson' s pla n an d

set a ne w reconnaissanc e lin e tha t

stretched fro m th e coas t a t Cab a eas t

through Galian o t o Bagui o an d thenc e

southeast abou t seve n mile s t o th e 33d32d Division boundary at Balinguay , ten

miles nort h o f th e previou s reconnais -

sance limi t poin t o f Sapit . Th e 33 d

Division's displacemen t northward ,

Swift continued , woul d star t o n 7

March.5

The patter n of operations for the next

week or s o followed almost precisely tha t

of th e previou s week an d a half. O n th e

west 33 d Divisio n patrol s secure d Arin -

5

 Ltr of Instr, I Corps to 33d Div , 3 Mar 45; I Corps

FO 12-2 , 7 Ma r 4 5 (Amendmen t No . 2 t o F O 1 2 of

21 Feb 45) .
474 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

gay and Cab a against no opposition an d

started eas t alon g th e trai l t o Galiano .

Other troop s cleare d th e Japanes e fro m

hills at th e entrance t o the Tuba Trail,

and befor e th e en d o f th e secon d wee k

of Marc h patrol s wer e thre e windin g

miles northeas t alon g th e trai l fro m

Pugo. A s before , ther e wer e n o signifi -

cant gain s o n th e east , where even smal l

patrols foun d i t difficult , i n th e fac e o f

Japanese counterreconnaissanc e opera -

tions, to penetrate along Route 1 1 as far

as Twin Peaks .

The almos t complet e lac k o f opposi -

tion alon g th e coas t a s fa r a s Cab a wa s

certainly surprising , an d stil l mor e surprising wa s th e fac t tha t guerrill a an d

33d Divisio n patrol s reporte d virtuall y

no Japanes e strengt h a t Bauan g where ,

seven mile s nort h o f Caba , Rout e 9

began a t its junction with Rout e 3 . And

again, a s fa r a s patrol s ha d penetrated ,

Japanese defenses alon g th e Tuba Trail

and th e trail s t o Galian o di d no t see m

strong. Moreover, terrain reconnaissanc e

parties reporte d tha t n o inordinat e en -

gineer effor t woul d b e required t o bulldoze road s tha t truck s an d artiller y

could us e a t leas t i n dr y weathe r alon g

the Tub a Trai l an d th e Galian o road .

All i n all , the situatio n o n th e wes t

seemed t o Genera l Clarkso n t o invit e

immediate exploitation , and , in mid -

March, h e ha d a pla n o f exploitatio n

ready.

Limited Objective Attacks to

Late March

Clarkson propose d sendin g battalio n

combat team s towar d Bagui o alon g

Route 11 , th e Galian o road , an d th e

Tuba Trail . H e wante d t o concentrate

the rest o f th e division—tw o RCT's less

one battalio n hel d i n reserve—alon g

Route 9 fo r a quic k das h int o th e city .

If h e coul d ge t force s i n positio n fo r

such a co-ordinate d effor t b y 1 April,

Clarkson believed, he would hav e an excellent chance t o seiz e Bagui o before 1 5

May. Th e pla n require d tha t stron g

guerrilla forces, alread y operating in th e

San Fernand o are a onl y seve n mile s

north o f Bauang, hold in plac e to secure

the division's norther n flank. 6

Like Clarkson , Swif t wa s n o ma n t o

let opportunit y g o b y withou t bein g a t

least touched , i f no t seized . Als o lik e

Clarkson, th e I Corp s commande r ha d

concluded b y mid-Marc h tha t th e west -

ern approaches to Baguio promised more

decisive result s tha n thos e alon g Rout e

11 or th e river valleys to the east. Ther e

was n o logi c i n permittin g th e Japanese

to redeplo y force s fo r th e defens e o f

Route 9 unmolested , an d i t mad e sens e

to tak e advantag e o f apparen t Japanes e

weakness i n th e Bauan g region. O n th e

other hand , Swif t thought , i t woul d b e

advantageous to keep the Japanese thinking tha t th e mai n effor t towar d Bagui o

would come along Route 1 1 and t o promote a belie f tha t n o attack s woul d b e

launched ove r th e Galian o roa d an d

Tuba Trail approaches.

Thus, i t appear s tha t Genera l Swif t

was o f a min d t o approv e Clarkson' s

proposals, an d Clarkson' s pla n migh t

well hav e worked . Th e 33 d Division ,

however, neve r go t th e chanc e t o fin d

out. Sixt h Arm y ha d alread y draw n u p

plans t o ope n th e thir d fron t i n north -

ern Luzon , plan s tha t require d rede -

ployment o f USAFIP(NL ) troop s fro m

6

 Ltr, Cof S 33 d Di v t o ACof S G- 3 Sixt h Army , 1 4

Mar 45 , Sixt h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 17-1 9

Mar 45 .
THE COLLAPS E O F TH E BAGUI O FRON T 475

the Sa n Fernand o area . I n addition ,

Swift ha d certai n reservation s about th e

33d Division's proposals. H e sa w a possibility tha t a strong , sudde n Japanes e

counterattack migh t forc e hi m t o rede -

ploy element s o f th e 25t h o r 32 d Divi -

sions fro m th e Bamban g fron t i n orde r

to pull 33d Division chestnuts out o f the

fire shoul d Clarkson' s somewha t ambi -

tious plan s resul t i n overextension . A s

a result , Swif t woul d no t giv e blanke t

approval t o Clarkson' s suggestions . O n

the othe r hand , th e corp s commande r

was willin g t o le t th e 33 d Divisio n

mount limite d objectiv e attacks . First ,

he instructe d Clarkso n t o pus h on e

regiment (les s a battalion) u p Rout e 1 1

as fa r a s Camp 4 , about si x mile s north

of Twi n Peaks. I n mountin g th e attac k

the 33 d Divisio n wa s to avoi d becomin g

so involve d tha t i t woul d b e force d t o

commit to o muc h strengt h o n it s diversionary front. Second , Swift directe d th e

division t o temporaril y hal t stron g at -

tacks alon g th e Tub a Trai l an d th e

Galiano roa d an d ceas e it s enginee r

work alon g th e Tub a Trail , les t th e

Japanese sen d stron g reinforcement s t o

that approach . Finally , I Corps directed

the 33 d Divisio n t o sen d a battalion -

sized reconnaissance-in-forc e int o Bau -

ang an d thenc e inlan d fou r mile s alon g

Route 9 to Naguilian, Th e forc e wa s to

withdraw quickl y i f i t encountere d

strong oppositio n o r i f th e Japanes e

showed sign s o f counterattacking. 7

The I Corp s orders , unsatisfyin g a s

they wer e t o Clarkson , establishe d th e

pattern o f th e 33 d Division's operation s

for th e latte r hal f o f March . O n th e

east, moving slowly so as to avoid pitched

battle, troop s o n Rout e 1 1 took a wee k

to secur e th e Cam p 3 area . Sinc e th e

23d Division ML R la y jus t nort h o f

Camp 3 and sinc e th e Japanes e blocke d

all trail s o n bot h side s o f Rout e 11 , the

33d Division' s forc e o n th e highwa y

halted. I t wa s evident tha t an y attemp t

to g o o n woul d involv e th e divisio n i n

just th e sor t o f figh t Genera l Swif t ha d

ordered it to avoid. I n the center patrols

encountered n o oppositio n a s the y

moved t o withi n a mil e o f Galiano ,

but othe r patrol s foun d increasin g evi -

dence tha t th e Japanes e wer e prepare d

to defen d th e Tuba Trail tenaciously .

Again th e ke y actio n too k plac e o n

the division's left . O n 1 9 March troop s

seized intac t th e Rout e 3 bridg e acros s

the Bauan g Rive r an d secure d th e tow n

of Bauan g agains t negligibl e resistance .

Patrols quickly starte d east alon g Rout e

9 t o Naguilia n an d occupie d tha t tow n

against mino r oppositio n o n 2 3 March .

Four day s late r reconnaissanc e elements

were almost a s fa r a s Burgos, fou r mile s

east o f Naguilian an d approximatel y th e

same distanc e shor t o f 58th IMB ML R

defenses o n Rout e 9 .

Without definit e informatio n abou t

Japanese defense s eas t o f Naguilian ,

General Clarkso n ha d begu n t o thin k

that Rout e 9 migh t b e wid e ope n a s far

as Baguio . H e fel t tha t h e neede d onl y

a littl e protectio n o n hi s left rea r befor e

he coul d launc h a majo r attac k dow n

Route 9 t o Bagui o and , wit h hi s divi -

sion frettin g unde r th e restriction s o f

its holdin g mission , agai n propose d t o

Swift a n immediat e driv e t o Baguio .

For a fe w days, a t least , Clarkso n coul d

also sugges t t o Swif t tha t th e 33 d Divi -

sion's lef t rea r ha d adequat e protection .

USAFIP(NL) force s a t Sa n Fernando ,

with who m th e 33 d Divisio n ha d mad e

7

 Ltrs o f Instr , I Corp s t o 33 d Div , 1 2 and 1 6 Ma r

45; 33 d Di v Opn s Memo s 2 4 and 26 , 1 3 and 1 7 Ma r

45; 33 d Di v F O 15 , 1 6 Ma r 45 .
476 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

contact o n 2 0 March , reported tha t Sa n

Fernando was clear of Japanese, tha t th e

coast fro m Bauan g to Sa n Fernand o was

secure, an d tha t th e Japanes e force s

formerly holdin g th e Sa n Fernand o

region ha d withdraw n int o Baguio .

The USAFIP(NL) at San Fernando

With on e battalio n o f its 121st Infan -

try, th e USAFIP (NL) had begun opera -

tions agains t Sa n Fernand o i n earl y

January, jus t befor e Sixt h Arm y ha d

started ashor e a t Lingaye n Gulf. 8 Tha t

battalion — its missio n wa s t o gathe r

intelligence—was reinforced b y a second

during February , and a concerted attac k

on Sa n Fernand o bega n lat e i n th e

month whe n Marin e Corp s SBD 's fro m

the Mangalda n stri p a t Lingaye n Gul f

started providin g the USAFIP(NL) clos e

support. Th e guerrill a regimen t wa s

moving agains t th e 3,000-ma n Hayashi

Detachment — thre e infantr y battalion s

and som e artillery—whic h ha d becom e

responsible fo r th e defens e o f Sa n Fer -

nando afte r th e 19th Division lef t th e

region.9

Recognizing tha t Sa n Fernand o wa s

an indefensibl e cul-de-sac , th e Hayashi

Detachment place d it s mai n defense s i n

hills north , east , an d southeas t o f th e

town and, for lack o f strength, withdrew

most of the troops it once had at Bauang,

leaving th e vita l Route s 3- 9 junctio n

virtually wide open. Sinc e San Fernando

was no t a road junctio n town , th e onl y

explanation fo r th e decisio n t o defen d

there rathe r tha n a t Bauan g mus t hav e

been th e hop e tha t supplie s an d rein -

forcements migh t ye t b e brough t int o

Luzon throug h th e Sa n Fernand o port .

During late February and earl y March

the tw o USAFI P (NL) battalion s at -

tacked wit h onl y limited success. Abou t

mid-March anothe r o f th e 121st' s bat -

talions, release d fro m attachmen t t o th e

33d Division , cam e nort h t o joi n i n

the action, while about the same time the

Hayashi Detachment los t on e o f its battalions, which th e 58th IMB pulle d bac k

to Bagui o a s a reserve . Th e Hayashi

Detachment the n abandoned its last outposts withi n Sa n Fernando , an d o n 1 4

March guerrilla s entered th e town unopposed, simultaneousl y continuin g th e

attack agains t th e Japanes e i n th e

surrounding hills .

When troop s o f th e 33 d Divisio n

reached Bauang , th e 58th IMB ordere d

the Hayashi Detachment t o withdraw ,

directing i t t o reinforc e th e ML R posi -

tions at Sablan, about eight miles beyond

Naguilian. Mos t o f th e Japanes e uni t

then move d southeast ove r bac k countr y

trails, guerrilla s i n pursuit , whil e on e

group, som e 25 0 strong , attempte d t o

withdraw south along Route 3 to Bauang

8

 Additional informatio n o n USAFI P (NL) opera -

tions i s fro m USAFI P (NL ) Report , page s 27-36 . 9

 Japanese informatio n i n thi s an d th e nex t sub -

section i s from : SWP A His t Series , II , 471-74 ; 14th

Area Army Opn s o n Luzon , pp . 89-94 , 106-08 ; 114 -

231; Statemen t of Ma j Ge n Naokat a Utsunomiy a (a n

ACofS 14th Area Army), States , IV , 452-53 ; Sat o

Statement, States , III, 255-56; Interro g o f L t Ge n

Fukutaro Nishiyam a (C G 23d Div), USAFI P (NL)

Rpt, p . 165 ; Interrog o f Ma j Ge n Teshimits u

Takatsu (Cof S 23d Div), USAFIP (NL) Rpt, pp. 171 -

72; 33 d Di v Rp t Luzon , pt . II , Intel , Sec. 2, Enemy

O/B, pp . 4-9.

The Hayashi Detachment include d th e 544th IIB

of th e 58th IMB; th e 1st Battalion o f th e 75th Infantry, 19th Division; som e 58th IMB artillery ; an d

miscellaneous Japanes e Arm y por t an d shippin g

units organize d int o a provisiona l infantr y bat -

talion. Volckman n estimate d tha t th e Japanes e a t

San Fernand o totale d 4,50 0 troop s (Volckman n

Comments, 1 0 Jan 57) . It woul d appea r tha t th e

additional 1,50 0 Japanese Volckman n account s fo r

must hav e been unarme d servic e troops not formin g

part o f th e Hayashi Detachment.
THE COLLAPS E O F TH E BAGUI O FRON T 477

and thenc e eas t alon g Rout e 9 . Thi s

group obviousl y di d no t kno w tha t th e

33d Divisio n ha d occupie d Bauang ,

with th e resul t tha t i t los t almos t 20 0

men killed . Durin g th e Japanes e with -

drawal USAFIP(NL ) unit s moppe d u p

at Sa n Fernand o an d b y 2 3 Marc h ha d

secured th e entir e area .

Transition on the Baguio Front

On th e same day Sixth Army directe d

USAFIP(NL) t o institut e a drive inlan d

along Rout e 4 fro m Libtong , openin g

the thir d fron t i n norther n Luzon. 10

All hop e tha t th e 33 d Divisio n ha d o f

guerrilla ai d an d protectio n o n it s lef t

rear wa s no w gone , fo r o n 2 5 Marc h I

Corps ordere d Clarkso n t o reliev e

USAFIP(NL) units in th e San Fernando

region.11 A fe w day s late r Clarkson' s

latest plan s fo r mountin g a quic k driv e

into Baguio received the coup de grâce.

12

The 32 d Divisio n wa s encountering unexpected difficult y alon g th e Vill a Verde

Trail an d sorel y neede d th e troop s i t

had deploye d i n th e Arboredo , Agno ,

and Ambayaban g Rive r valley s o n th e

33d Division' s right . Therefore , Swif t

directed th e 33 d Divisio n t o exten d it s

zone eas t t o includ e th e Ambayaban g

Valley.13

 Wit h it s force s no w to o scat -

tered fo r a concerte d attac k towar d

Baguio, th e 33 d Divisio n agai n receive d

orders t o hol d an d limi t its activitie s t o

patrolling—orders tha t wer e beginnin g

to hav e a morale-shatterin g effec t upo n

a divisio n tha t wa s still itchin g t o mov e

and believe d i t coul d captur e Bagui o

in shor t order .

Even a s th e 33 d Divisio n wa s reluc -

tantly settlin g bac k o n it s haunches ,

events wer e afoo t tha t woul d spee d th e

pace o f operation s against Baguio . Gen -

eral Krueger , wh o ha d bee n shor t o f

troops fo r hi s campaig n i n norther n

Luzon eve r sinc e lat e February , i n lat e

March prevaile d upo n GH Q SWP A t o

release the 129t h RC T o f th e 37t h Divi -

sion fro m it s Manil a garriso n duties .

Krueger planne d t o mov e th e RCT u p

to Rout e 9 , permitting the 33 d Divisio n

to concentrate its strength o n th e south -

western an d souther n approache s t o

Baguio. A s soon a s th e res t o f th e 37t h

Division coul d reac h th e Bagui o front ,

an even t Kruege r expecte d i n earl y

April, I Corp s coul d moun t a two-divi -

sion driv e on Baguio . I n th e meanwhil e

the 129t h RCT , attached t o th e 33 d

Division, would help reconnoiter towar d

Baguio i n preparatio n fo r th e all-ou t

attack.

Clarkson no w planne d t o hav e th e

129th RC T sen d a battalio n reconnais -

sance-in-force eas t alon g Rout e 9 . Th e

123d Infantry , 33 d Division , would con -

tinue patrollin g towar d Bagui o ove r th e

Galiano road and th e Tuba Trail, whil e

the 136t h Infantry , o n Rout e 11 , would

strike nort h towar d Cam p 4 , almost fiv e

miles beyon d Cam p 2 . Th e 130t h In -

fantry woul d cove r th e groun d o n th e

east flan k jus t acquire d fro m th e 32 d

Division.

The Japanes e opposing th e reinforced

33d Division were no longer in the shape

they ha d bee n a t th e en d o f February .

The 58th IMB an d the 23d Division had

10

 Sixth Arm y F O 58 , 2 3 Mar 45. 11

 I Corp s F O 12 , 25 Mar 45 . 12

 The remainde r o f thi s subsectio n i s base d pri -

marily on : Sixt h Arm y F O 58 , 2 3 Ma r 45 ; I Corp s

FO's 1 3 and 13-1 , 25 Mar an d 3 Apr 45; 33d Div FO's

16 an d 17 , 26 Ma r an d 3 Ap r 45 ; Ltrs , C G 33 d Di v

to C G I Corps, 3 0 Ma r an d 3 Apr 45 ; 33d Di v Opns

Memos 27-30 , variousl y date d betwee n 2 6 an d 3 1

Mar 45 ; Comments o f Co l Fran k J . Sackto n (G- 3

33d Div) , 3 Jan 57 . 13

 See als o below , ch . XXVI.
478 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

both suffere d heav y losses during March,

losses tha t probabl y stemme d largel y

from lac k o f foo d an d medica l supplie s

rather tha n fro m comba t action . B y

mid-March Japanes e suppl y problem s

on th e Baguio front ha d progressed from

bad throug h wors e t o impossible . First ,

supplies ha d move d westwar d ove r th e

new Baguio-Arita o supply road fa r more

slowly tha n anticipated , a developmen t

attributable i n larg e measur e t o Allie d

Air Forces strike s on tha t road and alon g

Route 5 nort h an d sout h o f Aritao .

Second, operation s o f th e 66t h Infantry ,

USAFIP(NL), alon g Rout e 1 1 nort h

from Baguio , an d th e activitie s o f th e

11th Infantry, USAFIP(NL) , i n th e Ca -

gayan Valley , ha d mad e i t virtuall y im -

possible fo r th e Japanes e t o brin g an y

food int o th e Bagui o are a fro m th e

north. Third , th e Japanes e trie d t o d o

too muc h wit h th e limite d amoun t o f

supplies availabl e o n th e Bagui o front .

They wer e attemptin g t o suppl y 23d

Division and 58th IMB troop s along the

MLR; sen d certai n militar y supplie s

north u p Rout e 1 1 fo r th e 19th Division; fee d 14th Area Army headquarter s

and a larg e civilia n populatio n i n

Baguio; an d establis h suppl y dump s

north an d eas t o f th e cit y agains t the .

time o f eventua l withdrawal. 14

Almost inevitabl y th e principa l suf -

ferers wer e th e front-lin e troops . B y

mid-March th e best-fe d Japanes e combat

troops o n th e Bagui o fron t wer e gettin g

less tha n half a poun d o f rice pe r da y as

opposed t o a minimu m dail y require -

ment o f nearl y tw o an d a hal f pounds .

Before th e en d o f th e mont h th e troop s

on th e ML R wer e dow n t o les s tha n a

quarter o f a poun d o f rice a day. Starvation an d diet-associate d disease s fille d

hospitals an d sappe d th e strengt h o f th e

combat units. Generally , effectiv e front -

line strength was far lower than reported

ration strengt h indicated . Medica l sup -

plies were consumed rapidly , an d b y th e

end o f March , fo r example , ther e wa s

virtually n o malari a phophylaxi s lef t i n

Baguio are a hospitals .

Looking upo n th e situatio n o n th e

Baguio fron t wit h fran k pessimism ,

Yamashita i n mid-Marc h directe d in -

spection o f terrai n north , northeast , and

east o f th e cit y wit h a vie w towar d pre -

paring a ne w defens e line . Hi s attitud e

became eve n plaine r when , o n o r abou t

30 March , h e ordere d Japanes e civilian s

and th e Filipin o puppe t governmen t t o

evacuate Baguio . Indeed , th e futur e o n

the Bagui o fron t wa s s o blea k b y th e

end o f Marc h tha t almos t an y othe r

army woul d hav e withdraw n t o ne w

defenses forthwith , thereb y savin g troops

for futur e battle . Bu t no t s o th e Japa -

nese. Yamashit a decide d tha t th e exist -

ing ML R woul d b e hel d unti l th e

situation becam e hopeless .

At th e en d o f Marc h tha t portio n o f

the ML R hel d b y th e 23d Division wa s

still intact , an d th e 58th IMB wa s bus y

deploying additiona l strengt h alon g it s

section o f th e line . On e independen t

infantry battalio n wa s o n hig h groun d

north o f Rout e 9 a t Sablan ; an d an -

other hel d defense s a t Sablan . A rein -

forced compan y wa s a t Burgo s and, less

14

 According t o Colone l Volckmann , tha t th e Japanese ha d an y succes s movin g supplie s nort h ou t o f

Baguio fo r th e 19th Division wa s attributabl e t o th e

fact that , upo n order s fro m th e 33 d Division , tw o

battalions o f th e 66t h Infantry , USAFI P (NL), previously operatin g nort h an d northeas t o f Baguio ,

were redeploye d t o joi n th e attac k o n th e cit y fro m

the wes t an d south . This , i n Volckmann' s opinion ,

was an imprope r employmen t of guerrillas, especially

in ligh t o f th e 66t h Infantry' s equipmen t an d or -

ganization a t th e time . (Volckman n Comments ,

10 Ja n 57 .)
THE COLLAPS E O F TH E BAGUI O FRON T 479

that company , anothe r independen t in -

fantry battalio n hel d reserv e position s

at Calot , a mil e an d a hal f southeas t o f

Sablan. On e understrengt h battalio n

was responsibl e fo r defendin g th e roug h

terrain fro m Sabla n si x mile s sout h t o

Mt. Apni, wher e a tie-i n wa s made wit h

the righ t flan k o f th e 23d Division.

Maj. Gen . Bunzo Sato , commandin g

the 58th IMB, expected tha t th e em -

phasis o f an y Allie d driv e i n hi s secto r

would com e alon g Rout e 9 , bu t h e di d

not neglec t th e othe r approac h i n hi s

area, th e Galian o road. Sinc e th e understrength battalio n statione d astrid e th e

road was not strong enough to withstand

a concerte d attack , h e directe d hi s mai n

reserve force , th e 1st Battalion o f th e

75th Infantry, 19th Division, t o mov e

west ou t o f Bagui o t o defense s a t Asin .

This ste p lef t i n Bagui o a reserv e forc e

of roughl y thre e provisiona l infantr y

"battalions," whic h togethe r probabl y

could no t muste r ove r 75 0 effectives .

Patrolling wit h limite d seizure s o f

new territor y marke d 33 d Divisio n op -

erations th e las t fe w day s o f Marc h an d

the firs t wee k o r s o o f April , an d ther e

were n o significan t change s i n positio n

in th e ne w are a take n ove r fro m th e

32d Divisio n an d o n Rout e 11 . O n th e

Tuba Trai l patrol s advance d anothe r

three mile s i n a northeasterl y direction ,

reporting increasingl y heav y Japanes e

resistance an d increasingl y roug h ter -

rain. Th e stor y wa s much th e sam e o n

the Galian o road , wher e on e battalion ,

after reachin g a poin t a mil e eas t o f

Galiano b y 3 0 March , wa s slowe d b y

scattered bu t determine d opposition .

As wa s routin e b y thi s time , th e ke y

action fo r th e perio d too k plac e o n th e

far left , o r north . Her e th e 129t h RC T

occupied Burgo s o n 2 8 Marc h afte r a

sharp skirmish , an d b y 1 April wa s a t

Salat, les s tha n a mil e short o f th e Japa -

nese MLR positio n a t Sablan . Th e 58th

IMB hurriedl y reinforce d a n outpos t a t

Salat, bu t b y 9 Apri l th e 129t h RC T

had broke n throug h thi s positio n an d

had starte d t o maneuver against th e Japanese defense s a t Sablan . I n general ,

Japanese defense s alon g Rout e 9 , th e

Galiano road , an d th e Tub a Trai l

still seeme d unexpectedl y wea k an d

invited immediate exploitation. Al l that

was neede d t o star t a fina l driv e wa s

more strength , an d tha t strengt h wa s

forthcoming.

The Drive to Baguio

The Plans for Exploitation

By 7 Apri l Genera l Kruege r ha d

persuaded GH Q SWP A t o releas e th e

rest o f th e 37t h Division , les s th e 145t h

RCT, fro m Manila. 15 H e directe d I

Corps t o g o ahea d wit h a two-divisio n

drive o n Bagui o a s soo n a s th e 37t h

Division coul d concentrat e alon g Rout e

9. I Corps , i n turn , ordere d a n all-ou t

attack t o begi n o n 1 2 April.

The mai n effor t wa s t o b e mad e o n

Route 9 by th e 37t h Division . Th e 33 d

Division woul d advanc e alon g al l thre e

approaches to Bagui o in its area, placin g

emphasis o n th e Galian o roa d sinc e a n

attack ther e woul d suppor t th e 37t h

Division's actio n an d th e terrai n o n th e

Galiano approach , a t leas t eas t fro m

Asin, appeare d th e easies t i n th e 33 d

15

 General sources for this subsection include : Sixth

Army Rp t Luzon , I, 84-85; Sixt h Arm y F O 59 , 7 Apr

45, in ibid., I, 163 ; I Corp s F O 14 , 8 Apr 45 ; 33 d Di v

FO 18 , 9 Ap r 45 ; Utsunomiy a Statement , States, IV ,

449-50; Sat o Statement , States , III, 256 ; SWP A His t

Series, II , 474 .
480 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Division's zone. Th e 33 d Divisio n made

its 136t h Infantry , reinforce d b y th e 33 d

Reconnaissance Troo p an d th e 2 d Bat -

talion o f th e 66t h Infantry , USAFI P

(NL), responsibl e for continuing pressure

along Rout e 1 1 and u p th e thre e rive r

valleys t o th e east . Th e 123d Infantr y

would pus h northeas t ove r th e Tub a

Trail. Th e 130t h Infantr y woul d con -

centrate o n th e Galian o road . Th e

129th Infantr y wa s t o lea d th e 37t h

Division attac k dow n Rout e 9 , wit h th e

148th Infantr y initiall y hel d i n reserve .

Despite th e alread y eviden t pressur e

on Rout e 9 , th e Japanese , a s of th e sec -

ond wee k i n April , still fel t tha t I Corps'

main effor t woul d come along Route 11 .

As a result , the y di d no t redeplo y

strength t o counte r th e growin g threa t

on thei r right , bu t instea d seeme d con -

tent t o si t bac k an d wait , nursin g a

strangely uncharacteristi c defeatis t atti -

tude. Suc h a n attitud e wa s certainl y

not helpe d b y redouble d effort s o n th e

part o f 14th Area Army headquarter s

to mov e civilian s an d supplie s ou t o f

Baguio. Wha t Yamashit a though t about

the situatio n wa s mad e ampl y clea r b y

his persona l preparation s t o depar t fo r

the Bamban g front , a n even t tha t too k

place o n 1 9 April.

As h e ha d don e earlie r fo r th e Bam -

bang area , Yamashit a se t u p a n inde -

pendent command fo r th e Bagui o front ,

leaving Maj . Gen . Naokata Utsunomiya ,

one o f hi s assistan t chief s o f staff , i n

charge.16 Utsunomiy a als o ha d nomina l

command ove r th e 19th Division nort h

of Baguio , a contro l tha t h e wa s unabl e

to exercis e becaus e o f communication s

difficulties. Th e firs t ste p Utsunomiy a

took seem s t o hav e bee n t o remov e th e

58th IMB fro m th e contro l o f th e 23d

Division. Next , directe d b y Yamashit a

to hold Bagui o as long as possible before

withdrawing t o a ne w defens e line ,

Utsunomiya issue d a tongue-in-chee k

order fo r al l troop s alon g th e existin g

MLR t o hol d ou t t o th e last man.

Getting Under Way

For th e perio d fro m 1 2 April throug h

the seizur e o f Baguio , i t i s possibl e t o

omit detai l i n tracin g th e operation s o f

33d Divisio n unit s i n th e Arboredo ,

Agno, an d Ambayaban g Rive r valleys ,

along Route 11 , an d o n th e Tuba Trail,

since thes e unit s playe d a relativel y

minor, indirec t par t i n th e captur e o f

Baguio.17 Th e bes t th e unit s o n th e

east could do wa s defend against possible

surprise counterattack s an d maintai n

pressure b y patro l action , thereb y help -

ing t o pi n dow n Japanes e force s tha t

might hav e otherwis e bee n use d agains t

the mai n drives . O n th e Tub a Trai l

troops spen t mos t o f thei r tim e bogge d

down b y rain , fog , incredibly ba d ter -

rain, an d steady , determine d Japanes e

resistance. Thus , neithe r o f th e 33 d

Division's tw o righ t flan k regiment s wa s

able t o mak e a direc t contributio n t o

the succes s o f th e driv e o n Baguio ; sub -

sequent events prove d tha t th e units o n

Route 1 1 did no t eve n keep in plac e the

16

 Utsunomiya's appointmen t wa s a strang e on e i n

that i t place d him , a majo r general , ove r tw o lieu -

tenant generals , th e commander s o f th e 19th and

23d Divisions. Ther e are , however, n o indication s

that thi s ha d an y effec t upo n th e conduc t o f opera -

tions o n th e Bagui o front .

17

 General sources for th e rest of this section an d it s

subsections include : 33 d Di v Rp t Luzon , pt . III,

Battle o f Baguio , pp . 2-3; 33 d Di v G-3 Opn s Rpts,

10-27 Ap r 45; I Corp s Rp t Luzon , pp . 74-78 ; 37t h

Div Rp t Luzon , pp . 93-113 ; 37t h Di v G- 3 Opn s

Rpts. 10-2 7 Apr 45.
THE COLLAPS E O F TH E BAGUI O FRON T 481

Japanese force s tha t face d the m a s o f

12 April . Therefore , th e descriptio n o f

the driv e t o Bagui o o f necessit y centers

on th e operations along Route 9 and th e

Galiano road.

Although th e two-divisio n attac k wa s

not t o star t unti l 1 2 April , th e 37t h

Division, i n orde r t o maintai n momen -

tum an d contact , move d o n 1 1 Apri l

against th e Japanes e know n t o b e en -

trenched a t an d nea r Sablan . Durin g

the perio d 11-1 4 April th e 129t h Infan -

try broke throug h th e Japanes e defense s

at Sablan i n a battle marked b y extreme -

ly clos e artiller y an d mediu m tan k fir e

support.18 O n th e 14th the 148t h Infan -

try too k ove r and b y th e en d o f the nex t

day ha d secure d Rout e 9 through Calot .

During thos e tw o days the regiment als o

captured man y ammunitio n an d othe r

supply dump s tha t th e 19th Division

had lef t behin d whe n i t ha d redeploye d

through Bagui o to the north. Th e Japa -

nese ha d ha d neithe r th e tim e no r th e

means t o move thes e supplie s north , and

their los s woul d ultimatel y prov e seri -

ous. Equall y seriou s wa s th e fac t tha t

from 1 1 through 1 5 April th e 37t h Divi -

sion's artillery , supportin g aircraft , an d

attached tan k unit s had destroye d nearl y

all th e artiller y piece s availabl e t o th e

58th IMB.

Thoroughly alarme d a t th e unex -

pected spee d o f th e 37t h Division' s ad -

vance, Genera l Sato , o n 1 5 April, bega n

attempts t o reinforc e defense s alon g

Route 9 southeas t o f Calot . Tha t da y

he ordere d tw o infantr y companie s o f

his reserve forward t o a barrio two mile s

southeast o f Calot, bu t befor e th e troops

could reac h thei r destination , th e 148t h

Infantry had passed this point and moved

on throug h Yagyagan , anothe r mil e t o

the southeast .

The seizur e of Yagyagan wa s to assume

considerable importance , fo r fro m tha t

barrio a trai l le d southwes t dow n stee p

slopes to Asin on the Galiano road. Th e

130th Infantry , 33 d Division , ha d bee n

stalled b y determine d Japanes e resist -

ance west o f Asin.

19

 I f th e 37t h Divisio n

could secure the Yagyagan trail entrance,

part o f th e 130t h Infantr y coul d mov e

around t o Rout e 9 an d fal l upo n th e

Asin defense s i n a nea t envelopment .

To secur e th e trai l entranc e an d t o

assure it s ow n progres s alon g Rout e 9 ,

the 37t h Divisio n ha d t o brea k throug h

known Japanes e defense s where , jus t a

mile southeast o f Yagyagan, th e highwa y

dipped acros s th e gorg e o f th e Irisa n

River. Th e six-da y battl e tha t ensue d

at th e Irisa n Gorg e prove d t o b e th e

critical actio n o f th e entire , driv e t o

Baguio. I t was , indeed, on e o f th e fe w

cohesive action s o n th e Bagui o fron t

after th e captur e o f th e Route s 3-1 1

road junctio n b y th e 43 d Divisio n i n

late January , an d i t serve s as an exam -

ple of much of the fighting on th e Baguio

front fro m lat e Februar y on .

The Battle at the Irisan River

The Irisa n Gorg e was the best natural

defensive positio n alon g Rout e 9 be -

18

 Additiona l informatio n o n th e 37t h Divisio n

operations i s from : 129t h In f His t 1810-1945 , pp .

72-76; 129t h In f Rpt Luzon , pp. 9-10; 129th In f S-3

Per Rpts , 11-2 8 Apr 45 ; 129t h In f Regt l Jnl, 11-28

Apr 45 ; 148th In f Rp t Luzon , pt . II , 5 Mar-30 Jun,

pp. 1-3; 148t h In f S-3 Pe r Rpts, 14-2 8 Apr 45; 148th

Inf S- 3 Jnl , 14-28 Ap r 45 .

19

 On 1 3 April , durin g thi s "stalled " period , Pfc .

Dexter J . Kerstette r o f Compan y A , 130t h Infantry ,

exhibited dauntless leadership and remarkabl e heroism a s h e guide d a n attac k agains t a Japanes e hil l

position. Fo r hi s action , Privat e Kerstette r wa s

awarded th e Meda l o f Honor .
482 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

IRISAN GORG E

tween Bauan g and Baguio , but wa s only

belatedly recognize d a s such b y Genera l

Sato. Beginnin g o n 1 6 April h e franti -

cally sen t reinforcement s t o th e Irisan ,

apparently actin g unde r Utsunomiya 's

orders t o mak e a last desperat e stan d a t

the river . Practicall y ever y able-bodie d

soldier i n Bagui o wa s sen t forward ,

troops wer e remove d fro m outpost s

along the Arboredo, Agno, and Ambayabang Valleys, and about half th e strength

was taken from defense s alon g Route 11 .

All i n all , th e Japanes e ma y hav e dis -

patched mor e tha n 1,50 0 me n t o th e

Irisan, although probabl y n o mor e tha n

one-third o f tha t tota l wa s actually present o n th e battlegroun d a t on e time .

Route 9 ran generall y southeast fro m

Yagyagan an d too k a shar p tur n east -

ward some 200 yards short of a destroyed

bridge over th e Irisan. 20 Her e the highway slithere d aroun d th e sid e o f th e

gorge unde r th e souther n an d easter n

slopes o f a stee p ridg e know n t o th e

148th Infantr y a s Ridg e A . A t th e

bridge sit e th e highwa y too k a right -

angle turn to the south-southeast, crossed

the river, an d proceede d towar d Bagui o

under th e eas t sid e o f 200-yard-lon g

Ridge D-E . Immediatel y eas t o f th e

bridge sit e th e Irisa n too k a shar p tur n

corresponding t o tha t o f Rout e 9 , bot h

twists dominate d o n th e northeas t b y

steep, bare-slope d Ridg e H . Alon g th e

south ban k o f th e rive r — across th e

stream fro m Ridg e A — lay woode d

Ridge C, whic h wa s west o f an d a t righ t

angles t o Ridg e D-E. (Map 21)

Running nort h an d northwes t fro m

the Route 9 turn a t the destroyed bridg e

was a trai l that , crossin g th e easter n

slopes o f Ridg e A , passe d throug h a

slight dra w abou t 15 0 yard s northwes t

of th e river . Th e dra w wa s bounde d

on th e east b y Ridg e B and o n th e west

by a n unname d hil l formin g a north -

western hig h poin t o n Ridg e A . An -

other 15 0 yards east across a broad saddle

from Ridg e B la y Ridg e G , separate d

from Ridg e F, immediately to th e south,

by a shar p gully . Ridg e H la y acros s

another draw southeast of Ridge F. Th e

trail branche d jus t northwes t o f Ridg e

B, the west fork leadin g back t o Rout e 9

a mil e o r s o northwes t o f th e Irisa n

crossing, th e othe r strikin g northeas t

along th e nort h sid e o f Ridg e G an d

ending six mile s from th e for k a t Trinidad, a town o n Rout e 1 1 about th e same

distance nort h o f Baguio .

20

 The pas t tens e is used her e i n th e descriptio n o f

Route 9 becaus e th e locatio n o f Rout e 9 ha s bee n

changed immediatel y wes t o f th e bridge .
THE COLLAPS E O F TH E BAGUI O FRON T 483

MAP 21

The Japanes e defense s wer e se t up t o

meet a powe r driv e alon g Rout e 9 .

Positions o n Ridg e A dominate d th e

east-west stretc h o f th e highway ; thos e

on Ridge s F and H controlled th e rightangle tur n i n th e roa d a t th e river , a s

well as the bridge site; Ridge B positions

overlooked th e trai l forkin g northwes t

of th e bridge ; Ridg e G controlle d th e

trail t o Trinidad . Fe w troop s wer e o n

Ridge C , sinc e th e Japanes e apparentl y

considered th e terrai n ther e to o roug h

and woode d t o b e use d a s a rout e o f

attack towar d Ridg e D-E , which wa s

well defended . Th e D- E positio n served

as a backsto p fo r defense s o n othe r

ridges, a s a means to hel p maintai n control ove r th e crossing site , and , finally ,

for securin g Route 9 south o f th e Irisa n

as a n axi s o f reinforcemen t o r with -

drawal. I n general , al l Japanes e posi -

tions i n th e are a wer e o f a hast y nature,

with th e possibl e exceptio n o f som e

caves i n whic h antitan k gun s wer e em -

placed t o contro l th e east-wes t stretc h

of Rout e 9 . Bu t mos t emplacements ,

especially thos e fo r machin e guns , th e

Japanese ha d chose n wit h a n excellen t

eye fo r terrain , an d installation s o n

every ridg e wer e mutuall y supportin g

when th e terrai n permitted .

The 148t h Infantr y di d no t pla y th e

game accordin g t o th e rule s th e Japa -

nese ha d lai d down , a t leas t no t afte r

the mornin g o f 1 7 April . Tha t morn -

ing tw o companie s o f th e 2 d Battalion ,

148th Infantry , reinforce d b y mediu m

tanks, 105-mm . self-propelle d mounts ,

and 76-mm . tank destroyers, were bloodily repulse d i n a n attemp t t o attac k

along th e east-wes t sectio n o f Rout e 9

just wes t o f th e bridg e site . Japanes e

antitank fir e knocke d ou t tw o American

tanks a s the y cam e aroun d a nos e o f

Ridge A a t th e bridge , whil e well -

directed Japanes e machin e gu n an d

small arm s fir e fro m Ridge s F an d H

and th e eastern par t o f Ridg e A turne d

back th e 148t h Infantry' s troops . Dur -

ing th e engagemen t th e Japanes e los t

two ligh t tanks .

In th e afternoo n th e 148t h bega n a

series o f envelopin g maneuvers . First ,

one platoon struck directly north u p th e

steep wester n slop e o f Ridg e A fro m a

point nea r tha t wher e Rout e 9 turne d

east. Unde r cover o f this fronta l assaul t

the res t o f Compan y F , infiltratin g t o

the rea r o f Japanes e positions , cam e i n

from th e northwest ; elements o f th e 1s t

Battalion, also driving southeast, secure d

the unname d hil l markin g th e hig h

point o f Ridg e A. B y dusk mos t o f th e

ridge wa s i n 148t h Infantr y hands , an d

the troop s hel d o n despit e stron g Japa -

nese counterattack s durin g th e night .

The day' s wor k cos t th e 148t h Infan -

try about 1 0 men killed and 75 wounded;

the Japanes e los t ove r 10 0 killed . I n
484 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

return fo r it s casualties , th e 148t h ha d

secured terrai n fro m whic h i t could control mos t o f th e east-wes t sectio n o f

Route 9 and fro m whic h i t coul d strik e

toward Ridge s B , G , an d F . Plan s fo r

the morro w calle d fo r th e 2 d Battalion ,

supported b y 1s t Battalio n fire , t o seiz e

Ridge B. Th e 3 d Battalion, under cover

of th e 2d' s attack , woul d moun t a wid e

envelopment, crossin g th e Irisa n abou t

500 yard s west-southwes t o f th e bridg e

site and then , turning east along wooded

Ridge C , ultimatel y fal l upo n Ridg e

D-E fro m th e west .

Stiff resistanc e greete d th e 2 d Battal -

ion o n 1 8 April , an d b y dus k forwar d

elements ha d barel y secure d a foothol d

on th e open souther n slope s of Ridge B,

once again demonstratin g th e futilit y o f

frontal attack s o n Japanes e position s a t

the Irisa n Gorge . Moreover , th e battalion discovere d durin g the day that Japa -

nese weapons o n Ridg e F coul d (an d

did) provid e excellen t suppor t fo r th e

Japanese o n Ridg e B . Unti l th e Ridg e

F emplacement s coul d b e neutralized ,

at least, the 2d Battalion would probably

get nowhere .

Operations sout h o f th e Irisa n me t

with mor e success . Supporte d b y 105 -

mm. self-propelle d mount s and tan k de -

stroyers emplace d alon g Rout e 9 nort h

of th e river, th e 3 d Battalio n surprise d

the fe w Japanese wh o wer e i n positio n

along Ridg e C . Whil e moppin g u p

along tha t ridge , th e battalio n mad e

preparations t o mov e o n agains t Ridg e

D-E th e next day .

On th e mornin g o f 1 9 April a heav y

air strike and one artillery concentration

knocked ou t most o f the Japanese weapons o n Ridg e F , an d anothe r artiller y

concentration softene d u p Ridg e B fo r

two companies of the 2 d Battalion. However, progres s wa s virtuall y ni l unti l a

machine gun squad , infiltratin g throug h

heavy woods , suddenl y foun d itsel f i n

a positio n o n th e eas t sid e o f Ridg e B

whence i t coul d tak e under fir e mos t o f

the Japanes e defense s an d defenders .

This small-scale envelopment so worried

the Japanese and so diverted their attention tha t a renewe d attac k fro m th e

south was successful, and th e 2d Battalion

secured Ridg e B befor e dark .

During the same morning the 3 d Bat -

talion encountere d surprisingl y ligh t

opposition a s i t move d agains t Hil l D ,

at th e north en d o f Ridg e D-E . Unde r

cover o f fir e fro m Ridg e C an d Hil l D ,

elements o f Compan y L , movin g eas t

from Ridg e C, penetrated almost t o th e

middle o f Japanes e defense s o n Hil l E

before being discovered. Apparentl y expecting a n attac k fro m th e north , th e

Japanese o n Hil l E wer e s o surprise d

by the infiltratio n tha t most of them fle d

southeastward alon g Rout e 9 with littl e

attempt t o hold .

With th e seizur e o f Ridg e D- E th e

3d Battalion , 148t h Infantry , ha d over -

run th e Japanes e backsto p an d ha d

gained contro l o f th e mai n Japanes e

route o f withdrawa l an d reinforcement .

To th e north th e 2d Battalion's capture

of Ridg e B ha d equall y importan t re -

sults. Th e battalio n now controlled th e

fork i n th e trai l just northwest of Ridg e

B, and could , therefore, preven t th e Japanese fro m usin g th e trai l fro m Trini -

dad to move reinforcements to the Irisan

Gorge. B y this tim e th e Japanes e hel d

only Ridge s G , F , an d H ; Ridg e F had

been s o worked ove r by air an d artiller y

that i t wa s no longe r a stron g position .

Company C too k Ridg e F wit h eas e

on th e mornin g o f 2 0 April, bu t Com -

pany A, trying a frontal assaul t on Ridge
THE COLLAPS E O F TH E BAGUI O FRON T 485

G, wa s stoppe d o n th e stee p wester n

slopes. Compan y C the n turne d agains t

the south flan k o f th e Japanese on Ridg e

G, and , wit h thi s support , Compan y A

gained th e crest befor e noon . Th e res t

of th e da y th e tw o companie s moppe d

up an d bea t of f th e usua l determine d

but small-scal e an d un-co-ordinate d

counterattacks tha t followe d th e captur e

of mos t Japanes e position s a t th e Irisa n

Gorge.

At dus k o n th e 20t h mos t o f th e

remaining Japanes e i n th e gorg e regio n

withdrew t o Ridg e H , whic h receive d

the ful l treatmen t from ai r an d artiller y

the nex t morning . Afte r th e bombard -

ment, th e 1s t Battalio n swun g agains t

Ridge H , comin g i n o n th e nort h flan k

of th e remainin g defenses . Th e battal -

ion cleare d th e ridg e durin g th e after -

noon an d wit h thi s action completed th e

breakthrough a t Irisa n Gorge . Th e sur -

viving Japanese fle d eas t towar d Bagui o

or nort h towar d Trinidad . Th e battl e

had cost th e 148t h Infantr y approxi -

mately 4 0 men kille d an d 16 0 wounded;

the Japanes e ha d los t nearl y 50 0 me n

killed.

Into Baguio

The fina l event s of the drive to Baguio

came rapidly. Unde r cove r o f th e 148t h

Infantry's operation s a t th e Irisan , th e

130th Infantry , 33 d Division , ha d rede -

ployed tw o battalion s fro m th e Galian o

road t o th e Yagyaga n trai l junctio n o n

Route 9 . Attackin g on th e 22d , the tw o

battalions, co-ordinatin g thei r effort s

with a battalion left west of Asin, opened

the Galian o roa d b y afternoo n o f 2 3

April, Th e 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry,

was virtuall y annihilate d durin g th e ac -

tion. Th e Japanes e uni t had take n posi -

tion a t Asi n less tha n 50 0 strong , an d i t

lost ove r 35 0 me n kille d i n th e defense .

The 130t h Infantry' s casualtie s wer e ap -

proximately 1 5 killed an d 6 0 wounded .

Back o n Rout e 9 , o n 2 2 April , th e

129th Infantr y relieve d th e 148t h an d

that da y advance d agains t scattere d re -

sistance a s fa r southeas t a s th e junctio n

of th e highwa y an d th e Galian o road .

The spee d an d eas e of this advanc e gave

pause t o I Corp s an d 37t h Division . I t

seemed impossibl e tha t Rout e 9 coul d

be a s wid e ope n a s i t appeared , and ,

moreover, a threa t seeme d t o b e devel -

oping on th e 37t h Division's left (north )

flank. Th e Japanes e survivor s o f th e

Irisan Gorg e wer e evidentl y concentrat -

ing i n th e Trinida d area , an d fro m

available informatio n i t als o appeare d

that th e uncommitte d 379th Independent. Infantry Battalion wa s i n th e sam e

region. Wit h a lon g an d ill-protecte d

line of communications back t o Bauang ,

the 37t h Divisio n fel t tha t i t neede d

reinforcements t o safeguar d it s lef t be -

fore i t coul d ris k sendin g stron g force s

into Baguio .

I Corp s coul d provid e n o reinforce -

ments and, o n th e 22d , directe d th e 37t h

Division t o hol d i n place . Befor e mov -

ing on , th e 37t h Divisio n wa s t o clea r

the high ground for at least a mile north

of Rout e 9 i n th e are a betwee n Sabla n

and Irisa n and se t up strong blocks along

the trail t o Trinidad. The 33 d Division ,

also directe d t o halt , wa s t o finis h mop -

ping u p i n th e Asi n are a an d then ,

patrolling eastward , ascertai n i f ther e

were an y threa t t o th e 37t h Division' s

right (south ) flank . Bot h division s were

ordered t o ge t troop s int o positio n t o

launch an attac k o n Mt . Mirador, a t th e

western outskirt s o f Baguio . Japanes e

thought t o b e holdin g Mt . Mirado r
486 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

could no t b e bypassed , fo r the y coul d

dominate th e junctio n o f th e Galian o

road an d Rout e 9 an d cove r muc h o f

Baguio prope r wit h fire. 21

I Corps' precautions were unnecessary.

When o n 1 6 April Genera l Sat o had be -

gun reinforcin g hi s Irisa n Gorg e de -

fenses, Genera l Utsunomiy a ha d decide d

to mov e th e ML R close r t o Baguio ,

employing th e Irisa n positio n a s th e

northern ancho r o f a ne w line . Fro m

the Irisan the new MLR stretche d southsouthwest fou r mile s t o Mt . Calugong ,

which, controllin g th e Tuba Trail , wa s

already bein g contested b y th e 123d In -

fantry, 33 d Division , and th e 64th Infantry, 23d Division. Th e ne w lin e ra n

southeast fro m Mt . Calugon g across Mt .

Santo Toma s an d o n t o Rout e 1 1 a t

Camp 4 , tw o mile s northeas t o f th e

earlier ML R strongpoin t a t Cam p 3 .

The ML R continue d eas t t o th e

Ambayabang Valley from Cam p 4.

Utsunomiya never establishe d his new

MLR. B y evening on 2 2 April the Irisan

anchor wa s gone , defense s a t Asi n wer e

about t o fall , an d th e 123d Infantry wa s

making tactically important gain s at Mt .

Calugong. I t was obvious to Utsunomiya

that ther e wa s n o longe r an y sens e i n

trying to hold, and th e next mornin g he

ordered a general withdrawa l nort h an d

northeast from Baguio . A delaying force

would b e lef t nea r th e cit y t o cove r th e

withdrawal, an d anothe r suc h forc e

would temporaril y di g i n nea r Trini -

dad les t th e 37t h Division , drivin g u p

the Irisan-Trinida d trail , reach Route 1 1

north o f Bagui o befor e th e genera l

withdrawal wa s complete .

Once unde r way , the Japanese retreat

was rapid . A patro l o f th e 129t h Infan -

try, 37t h Division , entere d Bagui o o n

24 April , an d tw o day s late r th e regi -

ment secure d mos t o f th e cit y agains t

negligible opposition . Th e Japanes e

holding forc e o n Mt . Mirado r Wa s virtually wipe d ou t betwee n 2 4 an d 2 6

April by elements of the 123 d and 130t h

Infantry Regiments , 33 d Division . Th e

123d Infantr y reache d Tuba o n 2 4 April

after a n unoppose d marc h southwes t

from Mt . Mirador ; a battalio n lef t i n

the Mt . Calugon g are a straggle d int o

Tuba fro m th e wes t durin g th e nex t

two days . O n 2 7 Apri l patrol s o f th e

33d Divisio n move d int o Bagui o prope r

from th e sout h an d southwest , makin g

contact with th e 129t h Infantr y an d thu s

marking the end o f th e driv e t o Baguio .

Results of the Capture of Baguio

As a campaig n t o destro y Japanese ,

the driv e t o Bagui o wa s onl y partiall y

successful, becaus e th e hal t I Corp s or -

dered o n 2 2 April ha d permitte d Gen -

eral Utsunomiy a t o extricat e som e

10,000 troop s fro m hi s defense s i n fron t

of Bagui o an d fro m th e cit y proper .

Given th e informatio n availabl e t o it ,

I Corp s wa s undoubtedl y justifie d i n

its decisio n t o halt , althoug h th e 33 d

Division, agai n disappointe d a t bein g

forced t o hold, could no t bu t tak e a dim

view o f th e order . Th e 33 d Divisio n

did no t kno w tha t Genera l Swif t wa s

planning t o redeplo y th e 37t h Divisio n

to the Bamban g front an d tha t h e there -

fore coul d no t ris k involvin g Genera l

Beightler's comman d i n a majo r fight .

The I Corp s hal t orde r ma y hav e

stemmed i n par t from inadequat e reconnaissance by th e 33 d an d 37t h Divisions.

21

 37th Di v Rp t Luzon , p . 107 ; Rad , I Corp s t o

37th Div , FT-451, 2 2 Ap r 45 ; 37t h Div , unnum -

bered Opn s Memo , 2 2 Ap r 45 ; Ltr , 37th Di v t o

I Corps , sub : Plan o f Opns , 2 3 Apr 45 . Las t thre e

documents i n 37t h Di v G- 3 Jn l File , 22-2 5 Ap r 45 .
THE COLLAPS E O F TH E BAGUI O FRON T 487

A case might be made that faster, deeper,

and mor e aggressiv e patrollin g shoul d

have disclose d th e genera l patter n o f

Japanese withdrawa l a t least b y evenin g

on 2 3 April . A s event s turne d out , i t

was no t unti l th e 26t h tha t corp s an d

division intelligenc e officer s wer e abl e

to conclud e tha t a Japanes e retrea t wa s

definitely unde r way . I t i s als o possibl e

that the redeployment of elements of th e

66th Infantry , USAFIP(NL) , fro m th e

area nort h o f Bagui o t o joi n i n th e at -

tack fro m th e sout h an d wes t contrib -

uted t o th e dela y i n learnin g o f th e

Japanese withdrawal . O n th e othe r

hand, the guerrilla regiment ha d prove d

of grea t aid , especially t o th e 33 d Divi -

sion, alon g th e approache s t o Baguio .

The uni t coul d no t b e ever y plac e a t

once.

South o f Bagui o th e 136t h Infantry ,

33d Division , di d no t lear n unti l wel l

after th e even t tha t full y hal f th e 23d

Division force s statione d alon g Route 1 1

had redeploye d t o th e Irisa n Gorg e during th e perio d 16-2 2 April. No r di d

the American regimen t discover that th e

remaining 23d Division troop s on Rout e

11 ha d withdraw n throug h Bagui o until

the withdrawa l was practically complete.

But again , operatin g i n th e dee p gorg e

of th e Bue d River , th e 136t h Infantr y

was har d pu t a t an y poin t i n th e cam -

paign t o mak e mor e tha n a n educate d

guess a t th e strengt h o f Japanes e force s

along Rout e 11 , an d th e terrai n wa s

such tha t i t wa s ofte n a s difficul t fo r

the regiment t o knock ou t on e Japanes e

machine gun nest a s it woul d hav e bee n

to destro y a n entir e Japanes e infantr y

battalion.

It had , indeed , bee n largel y th e ter -

rain problem s alon g th e route s ove r

which i t wa s advancin g towar d Bagui o

that ha d prevente d th e 33 d Divisio n

from makin g mor e direc t contribution s

to th e captur e o f Bagui o durin g th e

period 12-2 6 April. I n tha t fortnigh t

the 136t h Infantr y ha d mad e virtuall y

no progress . O n th e Tub a Trai l th e

123d Infantry, whos e terrai n difficultie s

were compounde d b y fo g and torrentia l

tropical cloudbursts, had fough t dogged -

ly u p an d dow n knife-creste d ridge s

where a markedl y inferio r Japanes e

force ha d al l th e advantage s th e terrai n

could provide. 22 Likewis e th e terrai n

advantages enable d th e 1st Battalion,

75th Infantry, t o hol d u p th e 130t h In -

fantry i n th e bare-side d bow l a t Asin .

Ultimately, th e 123 d an d 130t h Regi -

ments ha d t o complet e thei r mission s

by envelopmen t ove r road s secure d b y

the 37t h Division .

However, th e 33 d Divisio n ha d mad e

significant indirec t contribution s t o th e

capture of Baguio . O n th e ground sinc e

mid-February, th e division , pressin g re -

lentlessly forwar d wheneve r Sixt h Arm y

and I Corps orders permitted i t to do so,

had seriousl y weakene d th e 58th IMB

and th e 23d Division. Moreove r be -

tween 1 6 and 22 April th e 33 d Divisio n

had kep t pinne d dow n considerabl e

Japanese strengt h tha t migh t otherwis e

have bee n redeploye d agains t th e 37t h

Division. Certainly , i t i s impossibl e t o

conceive tha t th e 37t h Division' s driv e

could hav e succeede d whe n an d a s i t

did ha d no t th e 33 d Divisio n als o bee n

striving fo r Baguio .

22

 In Apri l 1957 , going ove r som e o f thi s ground ,

the autho r wa s caugh t i n a fo g cum cloudburs t

phenomenon along the road t o Tuba tha t force d th e

jeep i n whic h h e wa s riding t o halt fo r nearl y fiftee n

minutes. Th e fo g was s o thic k an d th e rain , pelting

down i n hug e drops , s o heav y tha t on e coul d no t

even se e th e fron t en d o f th e jeep , le t alon e th e

sides of th e road.
488 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Since th e Japanes e ha d retire d i n

fairly goo d orde r t o ne w defense s i n

front o f th e Rout e 1 1 terminu s o f th e

Baguio-Aritao suppl y road , nort h o f

Baguio, th e campaig n o n th e Bagui o

front ha d no t achieve d it s strategic goal,

and man y o f th e advantage s accruing t o

Sixth Arm y fro m th e seizur e o f th e cit y

were psychologica l i n nature . Neverthe -

less, ther e wer e als o importan t militar y

results. Sixt h Arm y ha d overru n th e

first o f th e thre e origina l anchors o f th e

Shobu Group's defensiv e triangle .

Troops o f th e 33 d an d 37t h Division s

had seize d ton s o f supplie s th e Japanes e

could il l affor d t o lose , ha d drive n th e

Japanese farthe r int o mountai n fast -

nesses fro m whic h ther e coul d b e n o

escape, and , finally, ha d tor n hole s i n

the rank s o f th e 58th IMB an d th e 23d

Division that the Japanese could not fill .

From lat e Februar y throug h 2 7 April

the 23d Division had lost over 2,00 0 men

killed i n combat ; nonbattl e death s ha d

been muc h higher . Whe n th e divisio n

reassembled i n ne w line s northeas t o f

Baguio, i t coul d muste r n o mor e tha n

7,000 troops , o f who m les s tha n hal f

could b e considere d comba t effectives .

The first-lin e infantr y strengt h o f th e

58th IMB wa s reduced t o a battalio n o f

no mor e tha n 35 0 troops , whil e th e

brigade's total strengt h probabl y did no t

exceed 3,250 , includin g miscellaneou s

attachments. Th e 58th IMB ha d los t

all it s artillery ; th e 23d Division ha d

only thre e o r fou r gun s left .

The Baguio Front, to the End of May

Between 2 7 April an d 5 May the 37t h

Division secure d th e Trinida d area ,

mopped u p isolate d pockets o f Japanes e

in th e hig h groun d nort h o f Rout e 9 ,

cleared Rout e 1 1 fro m Bagui o nort h

to Trinidad , an d patrolle d northeas t

three mile s o n Rout e 1 1 from Trinida d

to Acop 's Place . Th e divisio n encoun -

tered organize d resistanc e onl y nea r

Trinidad.23 Th e 33 d Division , unti l 5

May, mopped u p along Tuba Trail an d

Route 1 1 north t o Baguio , the n move d

on t o occup y th e cres t o f hig h groun d

two t o thre e mile s east an d southeas t o f

the city. 24 Th e 130t h Infantry , advanc -

ing b y company-size d comba t patrols ,

began marchin g over secondar y roads t o

Balinguay, 7 mile s east-southeas t o f Ba -

guio; t o Itogon , abou t 2 miles sout h o f

Balinguay; an d t o Pitican , o n th e Agn o

River 4 mile s southeast o f Itogon , seek -

ing to make contact with other 33d Division troop s operatin g i n th e Agn o an d

Ambayabang Rive r valleys . O n 5 Ma y

the las t element s o f th e 37t h Divisio n

left th e Bagui o are a fo r th e Bamban g

front, th e 33 d Divisio n takin g ove r th e

areas wes t an d nort h o f Baguio .

With th e departur e o f th e 37t h Divi -

sion, th e 33 d Division , muc h t o it s disappointment, agai n foun d itsel f wit h a

holding mission , thi s on e designe d t o

secure th e Baguio-Bauang-Sa n Fernan -

do area. Th e divisio n was also responsible fo r establishing firm contac t between

its force s a t Bagui o an d thos e i n th e

Ambayabang an d Agn o Valleys, fo r pa -

trolling ten miles northeast along Rout e

11 fro m Baguio , an d fo r reconnoiterin g

eastward alon g th e Baguio-Arita o sup -

ply roa d fro m Rout e 1 1 a t Kilomete r

23

 37th Di v Rpt Luzon , pp . 111-16 ; 37t h Di v G-3

Per Rpts , 2 7 Apr-5 Ma y 45. 24

 Information o n 33 d Divisio n operation s i n thi s

section i s from : I Corp s G- 3 Opn s Rpts, 2 7 Apr-29

May 45 ; 33 d Di v Rp t Luzon , pt . III, Battl e fo r

Baguio, p . 3 ; 33 d Di v G- 3 Opn s Rpts , 2 7 Apr-2 9

May 45 ; 123 d Inf Rp t Luzon , p . 7 ; 130t h In f Rp t

Luzon, pp . 45-48 ; 136t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 43-59 .
THE COLLAPS E O F TH E BAGUI O FRON T 489

Post (KP ) 21, the highwa y an d suppl y

road junction. 25

As o f 5 Ma y th e Japanes e o n th e

Baguio front, despit e their losse s o f men

and matérie l durin g th e previou s tw o

and a hal f months , wer e almos t bette r

off tha n the y ha d bee n whe n fightin g

in fron t o f Baguio—o r the y soo n woul d

be if the 33d Division did no t mount an

immediate pursuit north fro m Baguio. 26

For th e tim e being , a t least , th e Japa -

nese comba t troop s ha d mor e supplie s

than they had ha d fo r many weeks, since

they coul d no w dra w o n larg e suppl y

dumps aroun d K P 2 1 an d o n lesse r

stockpiles nort h u p Rout e 1 1 an d eas t

along th e Baguio-Arita o suppl y road .

Moreover, becaus e ther e wa s no imme -

diate pursuit, the 58th IMB an d th e 23d

Division ha d som e leisur e t o di g i n

across Rout e 1 1 a t K P 21 . Th e Japa -

nese sources make it clear tha t had ther e

been a pursui t befor e th e en d o f th e

first wee k in May , America n forces could

have cu t th e tw o Japanese units t o ribbons, openin g wid e th e road s furthe r

into norther n Luzon .

The 33 d Divisio n wa s more than willing and, in it s own opinion , quit e abl e

to go. I t appears that Genera l Swift , th e

I Corp s commander , woul d hav e bee n

amenable t o a n immediat e pursui t op -

eration, but Sixt h Army had other ideas.

The 33 d Divisio n ha d a vas t are a t o

secure, i t stil l ha d som e moppin g up t o

complete i n it s zone , som e o f it s unit s

badly neede d rest an d tim e fo r rebuild -

ing, i t ha d a n enormou s reconnaissanc e

responsibility, and the possibility existed

that th e division might become involved

in a majo r figh t fo r whic h i t ha d insuf -

ficient strength . Sixt h Army planne d t o

employ the 33d Division i n th e invasio n

of Japa n an d therefor e wante d t o with -

draw th e uni t fro m activ e comba t a s

soon a s possible . Finally , Sixt h Arm y

as ye t ha d littl e informatio n abou t th e

Japanese situatio n nort h an d northeas t

from Baguio—th e first jo b on the Baguio

front woul d be to regain th e contact lost

with th e Japanes e afte r 2 3 April. What -

ever th e case , Sixt h Army mad e n o pro -

vision t o secur e th e mos t importan t

military objectiv e o n th e Bagui o front ,

the Rout e 1 1 terminu s o f th e Baguio -

Aritao suppl y road . Thi s wa s unfortu -

nate, fo r althoug h Sixt h Arm y di d no t

know it , Rout e 1 1 o n 5 Ma y wa s clea r

from Bagui o to Acop's Place, about fou r

miles short o f K P 21 , and th e Japanes e

holding at K P 2 1 were by no means prepared t o withstan d a sudden , stron g

attack.

As event s turne d out , th e 33 d Divi -

sion's operation s t o lat e Ma y were lim -

ited t o minor loca l gains and long-rang e

reconnaissance. Th e onl y actio n o f significant proportion s occurre d alon g a

trail connectin g Santa Rosa , i n th e Ambayabang Valley, to Tebbo, on the Agno

five mile s sout h o f Pitican . There , th e

33d Division directed its energies toward

clearing Japanes e of f hig h groun d be -

tween th e mai n trai l an d th e uppe r

reaches of the Ambayabang . A battalion

of th e 130t h Infantry , comin g sout h

from Bagui o via Pitican, reached Tebbo

on 9 May, findin g th e barrio abandoned.

On 5 May the 136t h Infantr y ha d begun

an advanc e u p th e Ambayaban g and ,

three mile s sout h o f Tebbo , became in -

volved i n a ten-da y figh t tha t le d onl y

25

 I Corp s FO's 15, 27 Apr, 15-1, 29 Apr, and 16 ,

2 May 45 ; 33 d Di v F O 20 , 2 May 45. 26

 Japanese informatio n i n thi s sectio n i s from :

SWPA His t Series, II, 475 ; Sat o Statement, States, II,

258; 14th Area Army Opn s o n Luzon , pp . 129-31 ,

151; Interro g o f Nishiyama , USAFI P (NL) Rpt , pp.

165-66; Interro g o f Takatsu , in ibid., p. 172 .
490 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

to th e killin g o f a coupl e o f hundre d

Japanese wh o constitute d n o threa t t o

the 33 d Divisio n an d whos e principa l

mission wa s t o bloc k th e Ambayaban g

Valley agains t an y America n attac k to -

ward th e Baguio-Arita o suppl y roa d

from th e south.

With th e rain y seaso n comin g on ,

I Corp s an d th e 33 d Divisio n ha d lon g

since abandone d plan s t o emplo y th e

valley a s a rout e o f advanc e towar d th e

Japanese suppl y link , an d th e 136t h In -

fantry gav e up th e terrai n i t ha d gaine d

along th e valley an d th e trai l t o Tebbo

almost a s soon as it had wo n th e ground.

On 1 5 Ma y all 33 d Divisio n troop s be -

gan withdrawing . Extricatin g th e men ,

supplies, an d equipmen t prove d n o

mean feat , fo r b y th e tim e th e with -

drawal wa s wel l unde r wa y rain s ha d

turned the Pitican-Tebbo trail and trails

in th e Ambayaban g Valle y int o quag -

mires. Th e fina l destructio n o f th e Jap -

anese blockin g forc e i n th e valle y ha d

no bearin g upo n I Corp s o r Shobu

Group plan s o r dispositions , an d th e

Japanese soo n replace d thei r outposts .

For th e rest , b y th e en d o f Ma y th e

33d Divisio n wa s executin g it s recon -

naissance mission s withou t significan t

contacts o r majo r advances . Restivel y

holding, the divisio n was forced t o await

developments o n th e Bonto c an d Bam -

bang front s befor e Sixt h Arm y woul d

permit i t t o launc h a ne w drive deepe r

into th e mountain s o f norther n Luzon .
CHAPTER XXV I

The Bamban g Front — I

The Villa Verde Trail

The Situation and the Plans

At th e beginnin g o f th e las t wee k i n

February th e 25t h an d 32 d Division s

had establishe d contac t wit h Japanes e

outpost line s o f resistanc e o n th e Bam -

bang front . Th e 32 d Divisio n ha d

undertaken a battalion-size d reconnais -

sance-in-force abou t tw o mile s nort h

from Sant a Mari a alon g the Vill a Verd e

Trail, an d th e 25t h Divisio n ha d dis -

covered Japanes e delayin g position s

nearly seven mile s up Rout e 5 from Sa n

Jose. Patrol s o f th e 32 d Divisio n wer e

probing up the Ambayabang, Agno, and

Arboredo River valleys, west of the Vill a

Verde Trail , an d ha d foun d defensiv e

outposts i n th e first - an d last-name d

valleys. Othe r reconnaissanc e unit s o f

the 32 d ha d explore d acros s a spu r o f

the Caraball o Mountain s betwee n th e

Villa Verd e Trai l an d Rout e 5 , reporting intens e activit y o n th e highwa y an d

reinforcing movement s alon g th e trail .

Units o f th e 25t h Divisio n ha d estab -

lished contac t wit h a Japanes e outpos t

on Rout e 100 , running nort h throug h

the mountain s betwee n Rout e 5 an d

Luzon's eas t coast . I t wa s obviou s tha t

the Japanes e wer e prepare d t o defen d

all approache s t o th e firs t vita l objective

on th e Bamban g front—th e Sant a Fe -

Balete Pas s area—an d i t appeare d tha t

they woul d plac e defensiv e emphasi s

along Rout e 5 .

Having establishe d fir m contac t wit h

Japanese force s o n th e Bamban g front ,

the 25t h an d 32 d Division s ha d com -

pleted thei r curren t assignments . The y

were read y t o initiat e a concerted driv e

northward a s soo n a s Genera l Kruege r

determined tha t th e succes s o f opera -

tions in th e Manila Bay area was assured

and tha t ther e wa s no longe r an y possibility troop s migh t hav e t o b e with -

drawn from norther n Luzon to reinforce

the division s i n th e south . Befor e th e

beginning o f th e las t wee k o f February ,

able t o forese e th e successfu l outcom e

of operation s a t Manila , Kruege r de -

cided tha t ther e wa s no furthe r nee d t o

restrain th e 25t h an d 32 d Divisions. 1

On th e contrary , h e ha d ver y cogen t

reasons fo r startin g th e tw o division s

northward befor e th e Japanes e o n th e

Bambang fron t coul d furthe r develo p

their defenses . Accordingly , o n 1 9 February, Kruege r directed I Corps to begin

advancing it s righ t towar d Bambang .

I Corp s ordere d th e 32 d Divisio n t o

move u p t o a secur e lin e runnin g east -

1

 The remainde r o f thi s sectio n i s base d largel y

upon: Sixt h Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 45-47 , 81 ; Sixt h

Army FO's 53-55 , date d 18 , 25 , an d 2 8 Fe b 45 , i n

ibid., I , 155-56 ; I Corp s Rp t Luzon , pp . 60-62 ; I

Corps FO 12 , 21 Feb 45 , and 12-1 , 2 Ma r 45 .
492 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

ward fo r 2 0 mile s fro m th e 32d-33 d

Division boundar y a t Sapi t t o th e junc -

tion o f the Villa Verde Trail an d Rout e

5 a t Sant a Fe . Th e 32 d Division woul d

also clear th e Ambayaban g Valley—west

of th e Vill a Verd e Trail—nort h abou t

10 mile s t o th e vicinit y o f Lawican ,

thereby openin g a possibl e rout e o f ad -

vance towar d Baguio. 2 Wit h it s right ,

the 32 d Divisio n wa s t o clea r Rout e 5

from Sant a F e sout h t o th e 25th-32 d

Division boundar y a t Digdig , a Route 5

barrio lyin g 1 3 miles north o f Sa n Jose ,

and woul d als o secur e th e terrai n fro m

Route 5 east abou t 6 mile s t o th e Ol d

Spanish Trai l i n th e regio n nort h o f a

line draw n betwee n Digdi g an d Car -

ranglan, a t th e junctio n o f Rout e 10 0

and th e Ol d Spanis h Trail . I Corp s

directed the 25th Division to clear Route

5 north t o Digdig, Route 10 0 from Riza l

(10 miles southeast o f Sa n Jose ) north t o

Carranglan, an d th e 6-mil e stretc h o f

Route 10 0 betwee n Carrangla n an d

Digdig. Bot h division s woul d patro l

northward i n thei r respectiv e zone s t o a

reconnaissance lin e tha t la y abou t 1 5

miles nort h o f th e secur e line .

I Corp s manifestl y expecte d th e 32 d

Division t o mak e th e decisiv e effor t o n

the Bamban g front , anticipatin g tha t

that division , i n a quic k driv e u p th e

Villa Verd e Trail, would seiz e Sant a F e

and the n fal l upo n th e rea r o f stron g

Japanese defenses tha t th e 25t h Divisio n

would undoubtedl y encounte r alon g

Route 5 . Whateve r Genera l Swift' s ini -

tial concep t o f th e driv e towar d Bam -

bang, i t wa s clear tha t th e firs t divisio n

to reac h Sant a F e woul d achiev e th e

decisive breakthrough . I t wa s equall y

obvious tha t neithe r divisio n coul d

achieve succes s withou t th e hel p o f th e

other, for if all I Corps' right flank force s

concentrated o n on e axis o f advanc e th e

Japanese, in turn , would be abl e t o concentrate thei r ful l defensiv e potential .

A converging attack towar d Sant e Fe by

two division s wa s necessar y fro m th e

beginning—in th e en d i t woul d b e th e

Japanese wh o woul d decide , i n effect ,

which attac k woul d prov e th e mor e

decisive.

Prologue to Stalemate

The Villa Verde Trail, 21 February5 March

The 32 d Division' s plan s t o execut e

I Corps' order s calle d fo r th e 126t h In -

fantry t o prob e u p th e rive r valley s o n

the division's lef t an d fo r th e 127t h In -

fantry t o initiat e th e driv e u p th e Vill a

Verde Trail.3 The 128t h Infantr y woul d

protect th e division' s rea r an d woul d

continue patrollin g ove r th e Caraball o

spur towar d Rout e 5 , completin g a re -

connaissance progra m initiate d befor e

21 February .

On 2 5 Februar y a battalio n o f th e

126th Infantr y starte d u p th e Ambaya -

bang Valley and, in a series of company -

sized envelopments, overran two Japanese

delaying position s an d reache d Lawica n

on th e secur e lin e durin g th e afternoo n

of 5 March . (Map XI) Patrol s i n th e

Agno Valley , si x mile s furthe r west ,

found n o sign s o f Japanese . Instead , i n

2

 See above , Chapte r XXIV, fo r th e backgroun d o f

the pla n t o advanc e th e 32 d Division' s lef t towar d

Baguio.

3

 Information o n 32 d Divisio n operation s i n thi s

subsection i s from : 32 d Di v F O 15 , 2 2 Feb 45 ; 32 d

Div Rp t Luzon , pp . 10-14 , 20 ; 32 d Di v G- 3 Opn s

Rpts, 2 1 Feb- 6 Ma r 45 ; 126t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp .

3-6; 127t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 8-12; 127th In f Dail y

Unit Rpts , 2 2 Feb- 6 Ma r 45 , 127t h In f Regt l Jn l

Files, 23 Feb-6 Mar 45; 128th Inf Rpt Luzon , pp. 7-8.
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—I : TH E VILL A VERD E TRAI L 493

this sectio n o f th e Agn o Valle y the y

found th e terrai n s o inhospitabl e an d

the Agn o lyin g i n suc h a dee p canyo n

that even two- or three-man patrols could

scarcely pus h northward . I n th e Arbo -

redo Valley , anothe r fe w mile s t o th e

west, 32 d Divisio n troop s encountere d

strong 23d Division outposts , whic h

blocked tha t flankin g approac h t o

Baguio, an d b y 5 Marc h patrol s i n th e

Arboredo Valle y wer e stil l te n mile s

short o f th e division's secur e line . Wit h

additional strength , th e 126t h Infantr y

could undoubtedl y hav e accomplishe d

more i n th e rive r valleys , bu t th e 32 d

Division coul d spar e n o mor e troop s

for thes e secondar y operations . Th e at -

tack alon g th e Vill a Verd e Trai l wa s

placing increasingly heavy demands upon

the division' s resources .

On 2 2 Februar y th e 127t h Infantr y

began a concerte d attac k agains t th e

Japanese outpos t lin e o f resistanc e tha t

the regimen t ha d uncovere d acros s th e

Villa Verd e Trai l tw o week s earlier .

Along this southern section of its length,

the Vill a Verd e Trai l twist s erraticall y

up th e easter n slope s o f a ridg e lyin g

between th e Cabalisiaa n River , o n th e

east, an d th e Ambayaban g River, t o th e

west. A mil e wid e a t th e star t o f th e

Villa Verd e Trai l a t Sant a Maria , thi s

ridge broaden s t o roughl y thre e mile s

where, som e fiv e mile s north-northeas t

of Sant a Maria , th e trai l bear s eas t an d

crosses th e Cabalisiaan . Th e straight -

line distanc e of fiv e mile s between Sant a

Maria an d th e Cabalisiaa n crossin g pre -

sents a deceivin g figure , fo r th e Vill a

Verde Trai l twist s alon g th e ridg e t o

such a n exten t tha t th e actua l trai l dis -

tance i s approximatel y nin e miles .

On it s wa y t o th e Cabalisiaa n th e

Villa Verd e Trail climb s rapidly , risin g

from a poin t abou t 40 0 fee t abov e se a

level nea r Sant a Mari a t o on e 3,50 0 fee t

high clos e t o th e crossing . Dippin g t o

about 2,50 0 fee t a t th e crossing , th e

trail the n hang s alon g terrai n varyin g

from 3,50 0 t o 4,50 0 fee t i n heigh t mos t

of th e wa y t o Sant a Fe , itsel f sittin g i n

a river valley almost 2,50 0 fee t u p i n th e

mountains. Alon g th e ridg e t o th e

Cabalisiaan the terrain is wide open, and

the stee p slope s o f th e ridg e ar e gras s

covered. Acros s th e rive r th e groun d

over whic h th e trai l passe s become s

steadily mor e heavil y woode d until ,

about tw o mile s east-northeas t o f th e

crossing th e trai l begin s t o ru n throug h

dense tropical forest. The trai l then continues eastward throug h heav y fores t fo r

another si x miles—straight-lin e distanc e

—and break s ou t int o more ope n coun -

try agai n som e tw o mile s wes t o f Sant a

Fe.

From man y point s o f vantag e alon g

the ridg e t o th e Cabalisiaa n crossing ,

the Vill a Verd e Trail afford s a magnifi -

cent view of th e Centra l Plains, opening

in broa d vist a fro m th e foo t o f th e Cara -

ballo Mountains . T o th e west , ther e i s

an occasiona l glimps e o f th e narrowin g

Ambayabang Valley ; t o th e east ris e th e

imposing height s o f th e Caraball o spu r

that form s suc h a rugge d barrie r be -

tween th e souther n reache s o f th e Vill a

Verde Trai l an d Rout e 5 . An d con -

stantly, of f t o th e northeas t a s on e as -

cends th e trai l fro m Sant a Maria , loo m

the foreste d mountain s throug h whic h

the trai l passe s after i t crosse s th e Cabalisiaan. O n 2 2 February 194 5 i t wa s this

view, ominousl y interesting , tha t cap -

tured the attention of the 127t h Infantry .

That regiment's troops had no particular

liking for th e vie w o f the Centra l Plain s

they obtaine d alon g th e Vill a Verd e
494 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Trail, for they knew all too well that the

Japanese, wit h th e sam e view highe r u p

the trail , coul d watc h ever y mov e th e

regiment mad e a s i t struggle d u p th e

bare ridge from Sant a Maria .

Assaulting th e Japanes e outpos t line ,

one battalio n of the l27t h drove straigh t

up th e Vill a Verd e Trail , Element s o f

another battalion , comin g i n fro m th e

Ambayabang Valley , too k th e Japanes e

on th e wes t flank . Stil l othe r troops ,

working u p th e Cabalisiaa n River , by -

passed th e Japanes e an d establishe d a

block o n th e trai l nort h o f th e mai n

Japanese defenses . Wit h thes e maneu -

vers, an d wit h th e hel p o f artiller y em -

placed nea r Sant a Maria , th e 127t h

Infantry brok e throug h th e Japanes e

outpost lin e lat e o n 2 4 February.

The outpos t line had been held by the

10th Division's 10th Reconnaissance

Regiment, a uni t wit h a n authorize d

strength les s tha n tha t o f a standar d in -

fantry battalion. 4 B y evenin g o n 2 4

February th e 10th Reconnaissance, with

a remnan t forc e o f n o mor e tha n 25 0

effectives, wa s bypassin g th e roadbloc k

the 127t h Infantr y ha d establishe d o n

the Vill a Verd e Trail . Th e uni t in -

tended t o mak e anothe r stan d a t th e

Cabalisiaan Rive r crossin g bu t scarcel y

had tim e t o ge t int o positio n before , o n

1 March , th e 127t h Infantr y wa s agai n

upon it . A s th e 10th Reconnaissance

withdrew onc e more, the 127t h Infantr y

left on e battalion to mop up at the crossing are a and , pressing o n wit h anothe r

battalion, regaine d contac t wit h th e

Japanese o n 3 Marc h a t a stron g posi -

tion abou t a mile and a half beyon d th e

stream.

General Konuma , commandin g th e

Bambang Branch, 14th Area Army, had

not bee n greatl y perturbe d whe n th e

10th Reconnaissance withdre w a s fa r a s

the Cabalisiaan , for h e ha d expected th e

unit t o hol d fo r som e tim e i n th e goo d

defensive terrai n a t th e crossing. 5 Bu t

on 2 March , whe n h e learne d o f th e

regiment's serious losse s to that dat e and

of it s retrea t beyon d th e Cabalisiaan ,

Konuma becam e thoroughl y alarmed .

Only thre e mile s northeast o f th e cross -

ing la y th e wester n edg e o f th e Salacsa c

Pass area , which provide d thre e mile s of

the best defensive terrai n along the Villa

Verde Trail. I f the battered 10th Reconnaissance Regiment coul d no t hol d th e

western entranc e t o th e pass , th e 32 d

Division migh t sli p throug h t o Sant a F e

and cu t of f the 10th Division o n Rout e

5. Obviously , th e 10th Reconnaissance

could no t hold—Konum a ha d t o d o

something an d d o i t quickly .

Konuma's firs t ste p wa s t o reinforc e

the 10th Reconnaissance wit h troop s already i n th e Salacsa c Pas s vicinity . I n

mid-February h e ha d dispatche d t o th e

pass a s a reserv e forc e a two-compan y

infantry battalio n an d a n understrengt h

artillery battalio n (thre e 150-mm . how -

itzers an d a mediu m morta r company) .

Two othe r two-compan y infantry battal -

ions, o n thei r wa y t o th e Ambayaban g

Valley, wer e als o o n th e Vill a Verd e

Trail. O n 3 March , h e place d al l fou r

units unde r th e 10th Reconnaissance,

bringing tha t regimen t u p t o a strengt h

of abou t 55 0 infantr y effectives . O n th e 4

 Japanese informatio n i n thi s sectio n an d it s subsections i s from : SWP A His t Series , II , 478-80 ;

Konuma Statement , States, II, 309-14 ; 14 Area Army

Opns on Luzon , pp. 99-110; Kawa i Statement, States,

II, 148-49 ; Kawa i Interrog , Interrogs , I , 323-25 .

5

 Note, a s a t Baguio , Yamashit a ha d a majo r gen -

eral commandin g th e force s wit h thre e lieutenan t

generals unde r him , the commander s o f th e 10th

and 105th D ivisions an d th e 2d Tank Division.
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—I : TH E VILL A VERD E TRAI L 495

same da y he directe d th e 10th Division

to dispatc h fou r rifl e companie s fro m

Route 5 to Salacsa c Pass.

When al l thes e units arrived th e 10th

Reconnaissance woul d hav e roughl y

1,100 troops , hardl y sufficient , Konum a

knew, to hold the 32d Division if the latter, whic h had s o far been able to deploy

less tha n a regimen t o n th e Vill a Verd e

Trail, coul d reac h terrai n wher e i t

could commit its ful l strength . Konum a

therefore ordere d th e 2d Tank Division,

still reorganizin g an d retrainin g a t Du -

pax, t o mov e t o Salacsa c Pas s immedi -

ately. Genera l Iwanaka , th e divisio n

commander, wa s t o assum e contro l o f

all troop s o n th e Vill a Verde Trail.

The 2d Tank Division starte d ou t o f

Dupax o n 4 Marc h wit h a strengt h o f

roughly 4,35 0 men . The majo r com -

ponents wer e fou r infantr y battalion s o f

three companie s apiece , eac h battalio n

averaging 42 5 men; a n 8-gu n artiller y

battalion; and about 1,00 0 servic e troops.

The attachmen t o f th e recentl y rein -

forced 10th Reconnaissance Regiment

brought Genera l Iwanaka' s strengt h t o

nearly 5,000 , an d withi n th e nex t wee k

or tw o anothe r 1,00 0 infantrymen , in -

cluding th e fou r companie s dispatche d

from Rout e 5 b y th e 10th Division,

would arriv e i n th e Salacsa c area .

While the 2d Tank Division was moving up, th e 127t h Infantr y wa s devoting

part o f it s energie s t o overrunnin g th e

outpost position tha t it had encountered

on 3 March. Sinc e the Japanese defenses

were mainly o n hig h groun d alon g both

sides o f th e trail , on e battalio n o f th e

American regimen t containe d th e Japa -

nese whil e anothe r pushe d o n alon g th e

trail. O n 5 Marc h th e latte r uni t

stopped a t th e wester n entranc e t o Sal -

acsac Pas s i n fron t o f troop s o f th e 2d

Tank Division, jus t arrivin g fro m Du -

pax. Th e hastil y reinforce d an d reor -

ganized 10th Reconnaissance Regiment,

fighting fro m hastil y prepare d positions ,

had managed t o delay the 127t h Infantry

just lon g enoug h fo r th e 2d Tank Division t o com e up . B y the tim e th e tan k

division arrived , th e 10th Reconnaissance ha d abou t 8 0 me n lef t o f th e 750 -

odd wit h whic h i t ha d begu n operation s

on Luzo n i n January .

For th e Japanese , th e commitmen t

of th e 2d Tank Division a t Salacsa c

Pass wa s unfortunatel y premature , fo r

Konuma ha d expecte d tha t th e uni t

would hav e a t leas t anothe r mont h t o

retrain an d fles h ou t it s depleted ranks .

Events ha d move d faste r tha n antici -

pated. Th e threa t pose d b y the 32 d Division's driv e u p th e Vill a Verd e Trail,

which h e ha d considere d a n impractica -

ble rout e o f advanc e towar d Sant a Fe ,

left hi m n o choice . Th e division , how -

ever, woul d justif y th e fait h h e place d

in i t when, o n 4 March, h e ordered i t t o

hold th e Salacsa c Pass a t al l costs.

The Situation and the Terrain,

5 March

Coming int o Salacsa c Pas s fro m th e

west, the Villa Verde Trail twist s up th e

wooded wester n slope s o f a steep-side d

height know n t o th e 32 d Divisio n a s

Hill 502. (Map XII) Anothe r peak, bare

crested, formin g par t o f th e sam e hil l

mass an d name d Hil l 503 , center s 25 0

yards northeast o f th e cres t o f Hil l 502 ,

while a lik e distanc e t o th e southeas t i s

Hill 504 . Windin g alon g th e souther n

slopes o f Hill s 50 2 an d 504 , the trai l

continues eastwar d throug h a lo w sad -

dle about 500 yards long, climbing again

up th e foreste d northwester n sid e o f
496 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

SALACSAC PAS S No . 2

Hill 505 , After crossin g tha t hill , th e

trail follow s a twistin g cours e 60 0 yard s

—as th e cro w flies—eastward , huggin g

the densel y woode d norther n slope s o f

Hills 506A an d 506B . Of f the northeast

corner o f Hil l 506 B th e trai l turn s

south fo r 1,00 0 yards—agai n a straight -

line distance—and traverse s the east side

of th e noses of Hill 507, designated from

north t o south A, B, C, and D . Turnin g

sharply eas t agai n nea r Hil l 507D , th e

trail continue s eas t anothe r 70 0 yard s

and the n enter s a deep , woode d saddl e

between Hill 508, on the south, and Hil l

515, t o the north. Afte r passin g through

this saddle , whic h i s abou t 25 0 yard s

long east t o west, th e trail goe s o n east -

ward, dominate d o n th e nort h b y Hills

516 an d 525 . Roughly 1,25 0 yards be -

yond the saddle the trail twists across the

northern slope s of Hil l 526 , which lyin g

about 50 0 yard s southeas t o f Hil l 525 ,

marks th e easter n limit s o f th e Salacsa c

Pass area . A mil e an d a quarte r o f les s

rugged but stil l forested an d difficul t ter -

rain lie s betwee n Hil l 52 6 an d barri o

Imugan, in turn two and a quarter miles

west o f Sant a Fe .
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—I : TH E VILL A VERD E TRAI L 497

The Japanes e an d th e 32 d Divisio n

each divide d th e Salacsa c Pass are a int o

two sections. Salacsa c Pass No. 2 was the

name a t firs t narrowl y applie d t o th e

saddle betwee n Hill s 50 4 an d 505 , but

in a large r sens e i t cam e t o mea n th e

entire foreste d are a betwee n Hill s 50 2

and 507D . B y the same toke n th e name

Salacsac Pas s No . 1 wa s a t firs t give n

to the saddle between Hills 508 and 515 ,

but wa s eventuall y assigne d t o tha t

stretch o f th e trai l runnin g fro m th e

west sid e o f th e saddl e east t o Hil l 526 .

Although th e extremel y rough , pre -

cipitous mountai n countr y o f th e Sal -

acsac Pas s area , averagin g 4,50 0 fee t

above se a level , wa s covere d b y dens e

rain forest , fro m Hil l 506 B t o Hil l 526 ,

there was sufficient ope n ground throughout t o provid e th e defende r wit h excel -

lent observation . I t wa s not to o difficul t

for th e Japanese to fin d positions whence

they coul d cove r wit h fir e ever y squar e

foot o f th e Vill a Verd e Trai l throug h

the pas s area . Th e twistin g o f th e trai l

also provide d defens e opportunities , fo r

in a give n 1,00 0 yard s o f straight-lin e

distance through the pass, the trail might

actually cover a ground distance of 3,000

yards.

Whatever it s shortcoming s i n othe r

fields, th e Japanes e Arm y alway s ha d a

feel fo r terrain , exploitin g t o th e ful l

every advantag e th e groun d offered .

Thus, a s it move d up , th e 2d Tank Division se t t o wor k t o establis h a syste m

of mutuall y supportin g defensiv e posi -

tions i n orde r t o contro l ever y twis t o f

the Vill a Verd e Trail an d ever y fol d i n

the groun d throughou t th e pas s area .

Every knol l an d hilloc k o n o r nea r th e

trail wa s the sit e of a t least on e machin e

gun emplacement ; ever y woode d dra w

providing a route for outflankin g a position wa s zeroed i n fo r artiller y o r mor -

tars. Th e cave , natura l o r man-made ,

came t o characteriz e th e defenses . Ar -

tillery wa s employe d i n quantit y an d

quality no t ofte n encountere d i n en -

gagements against th e Japanese, who , a s

usual, mad e excellen t us e o f thei r ligh t

and mediu m mortars . Finally , th e 2d

Tank Division wa s overstocked i n auto -

matic weapons, evidentl y havin g availa -

ble man y mor e tha n th e 32 d Divisio n

could brin g t o bear.

Against suc h defense s th e 32 d Divi -

sion's difficul t operation s i n th e Salacsa c

Pass are a coul d hardl y avoi d takin g o n

a monotonou s pattern . First , ther e

would b e unsuccessfu l fronta l attack s

against hillsid e strongholds. Failing , the

troops woul d wai t fo r ai r an d artiller y

support t o softe n u p th e opposition an d

try again . The n ther e woul d b e com -

pany an d battalio n outflankin g maneu -

vers, som e successful , som e endin g i n

near disaster , an d all , as th e resul t o f

Japanese defensiv e dispositions , inevita -

bly winding up a s frontal assaults . Ever y

type o f actio n woul d b e repeate d da y

after drear y day , either i n hea t ener -

vating t o th e extrem e o n clea r days , o r

in cloudbursts , fog , and mud . Th e

nights were cold and , as the rainy season

approached, increasingl y damp and wet -

To reduc e Japanes e cav e positions ,

the 32 d Divisio n woul d necessaril y hav e

to attac k a t leas t tw o mutuall y support -

ing cave s simultaneously , a t th e sam e

time endeavorin g t o kee p flankin g de -

fensive installation s neutralize d b y ma -

chine gu n an d morta r fire . Advance s

would depen d upo n a serie s o f closel y

co-ordinated platoo n actions , wit h pla -

toons providin g fir e suppor t fo r eac h

other whil e each attacke d it s ow n ob -

jectives. Eac h cave , onc e neutralized ,
498 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

would hav e t o b e sealed ; eac h positio n

of othe r types would have to be occupied

or th e jo b would hav e t o b e don e ove r

and ove r again . Da y afte r da y unit s

would hav e t o patro l i n orde r t o locat e

routes t o outflan k know n Japanes e positions, ascertai n Japanese flank s an d pin -

point Japanes e defense s fo r ai r an d

artillery bombardments .

In brief, th e battle for the Villa Verde

Trail becam e a knock-down , drag-ou t

slug fest . Th e spectacula r coul d hardl y

happen — there wasn' t roo m enough .

Troops woul d becom e tire d an d dis -

pirited; nonbattl e casualtie s woul d ex -

ceed thos e injure d i n combat . Suppl y

would b e ver y difficult , th e evacuatio n

of th e sick an d wounded an even greate r

problem. Thi s was combined mountai n

and tropica l warfar e a t it s worst . Th e

32d Divisio n ha d alread y ha d plent y o f

both, fro m th e jungle s o f Ne w Guine a

to th e mountain s o f western Leyte. 6

The Battle for Salacsac Pass No. 2

The First Attempt

By 7 Marc h th e 1s t Battalion , 127t h

Infantry, ha d secure d th e cres t o f Hil l

502, bu t wa s the n unabl e t o mak e an y

appreciable progress eastward. 7 Suc h a n

eventuality had been anticipated, for the

division an d regimenta l staff s ha d plan s

to outflan k th e Salacsa c Pas s defense s

from th e south . First , th e 3 d Battalion ,

127th Infantry , struggle d nort h throug h

Valdez, i n th e Caraballo spur, t o hi t th e

Salacsac Pas s No . 2 defense s fro m th e

southeast. Th e uni t reache d position s

about 1,00 0 yard s sout h o f Hil l 507 D

and Hil l 50 8 b y 9 Marc h bu t wa s the n

unable t o mak e an y furthe r progres s

toward th e Vill a Verde Trail an d coul d

not establis h contac t wit h th e 1s t Bat -

talion, 127t h Infantry , a t Salacsa c Pas s

No. 2 .

On 1 5 March th e 2 d Battalion , 128t h

Infantry, attache d t o th e 127t h Infantry ,

also starte d u p th e trai l fro m Valdez .

After i t reache d a poin t a mil e south -

west o f Imuga n an d tw o mile s eas t o f

the 3 d Battalion , 127t h Infantry , th e 2 d

Battalion, 128th , wa s stopped cold—th e

Japanese wer e prepare d fo r jus t suc h

maneuvers.

Further west , meanwhile , th e res t o f

the 127t h Infantr y fough t it s wa y fro m

Hill 50 2 to Hil l 50 4 bu t di d no t reac h

the cres t o f Hil l 50 4 unti l 2 3 March ,

and eve n the n lef t th e norther n slope s

in Japanes e hands . Th e 3 d Battalio n

managed t o ge t on e compan y t o th e D

nose o f Hil l 507 , an d th e 2d , simulta -

neously, pushe d a compan y fro m Hil l

504 t o 505. 8 Wit h onl y three-quarter s

of a mil e separatin g th e forwar d ele -

6

 See other volume s in this series: Smith , Approach

to the Philippines; Samue l Milner, Victory in Papua,

UNITED STATE S ARM Y I N WORL D WA R I I

(Washington, 1957) ; Cannon , Leyte; Joh n Miller, jr.,

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington ,

1959). 7

 This subsectio n i s base d primaril y upon : 32 d

Div Rp t Luzon , pp. 21-27 ; 32 d Div G-3 Opn s Rpts,

5-25 Ma r 45 , 32 d Di v G- 3 Jn l File s fo r th e sam e

period; 127t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 10-19 ; 127t h In f

Daily Uni t Rpt s an d Overlays , 4-2 5 Ma r 45 ; 127t h

Inf Uni t Jnl , 5-2 5 Ma r 45 ; 12 8 Inf Rp t Luzon , pp .

8-11.

On 1 0 March , durin g on e o f th e man y attempt s

by th e 1s t Battalion , 127t h Infantry , t o advanc e

beyond th e crest o f Hil l 502 , Pfc . Thoma s E . Atkin s

of Compan y A earne d th e Meda l o f Hono r when ,

although severel y wounded , h e playe d th e majo r

role i n repellin g a loca l Japanes e counterattack . 8

 On 2 0 March, during the attac k fro m Hil l 502 to

Hill 505 , S . Sgt . Ysmae l R . Villega s o f Compan y F ,

126th Infantry , wa s mortally wounded whil e leading

his squa d agains t a serie s of Japanes e foxholes. Fo r

his heroi c leadership , Sergean t Villega s wa s post -

humously awarde d th e Meda l o f Honor .
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—I : TH E VILL A VERD E TRAI L 499

ments of the two battalions, there seemed

and excellen t chanc e o f puttin g th e

squeeze o n th e Japanese a t Salacsa c No .

2.

However, wit h it s force s sprea d thi n

and it s strengt h dwindling , th e 127t h

Infantry wa s i n n o stat e t o exploi t it s

apparently advantageou s position . Th e

Japanese, o n th e othe r hand , coul d stil l

move reinforcement s t o th e Salacsa c

Pass No . 2 are a a t will , an d the y wer e

well awar e o f th e threa t presente d b y

the 3 d Battalion' s penetratio n t o Hil l

507D. Durin g the night of 20-21 March

the Japanes e concentrate d almos t al l

their availabl e artiller y an d morta r fir e

against th e 3 d Battalion' s forwar d ele -

ments, forcin g the m of f Hill 507 D wit h

a los s o f abou t 1 0 me n kille d an d 3 0

wounded. Th e Japanes e also seeme d t o

be preparin g a counterattack against th e

2d Battalion , 128t h Infantry , an d wer e

already threatenin g tha t unit' s lin e o f

communications bac k throug h Valdez .

The outflankin g effort s bega n t o loo k

less an d les s promising . Suppl y fo r th e

two battalion s operatin g ou t o f Valde z

was becomin g increasingl y difficult—i t

took thre e day s fo r carryin g partie s t o

make a trip through th e Caraballo spur.

Nor di d th e picture at Salacsa c Pass No.

2 loo k muc h brighter . Th e 1s t an d 2 d

Battalions, 127t h Infantry , ha d take n

over tw o week s t o ge t troop s fro m Hil l

502 t o Hil l 505 , a distanc e o f 1,00 0

yards. An y further move eastward would

be fraught wit h danger, for the Japanese

maintained strong forces on high ground

north of the area between Hills 502 and

505, presentin g a constan t threa t t o th e

127th Infantry' s left . Then , too , Japanese strengt h i n th e Salacsa c Pas s are a

was proving far greater than anticipated,

making i t eve r mor e obviou s tha t suc -

cess demanded a concentration o f force s

across a relativel y narro w fron t i n lie u

of th e thre e widel y separate d battalion -

sized attack s tha t ha d bee n goin g o n s o

far.

Another facto r promptin g reconsideration o f plan s wa s th e numbe r o f casu -

alties suffered b y the 127t h Infantry . B y

23 Marc h th e uni t ha d los t approxi -

mately 110 men killed and 22 5 wounded;

an additiona l 50 0 me n ha d bee n evacu -

ated fo r sickness, a larg e proportio n o f

them classe d i n th e comba t fatigu e

category. Almos t al l th e battalio n an d

company commanders th e regiment ha d

when i t reached Luzo n ha d bee n killed ,

wounded, o r hospitalize d fo r othe r rea -

sons; man y o f th e rifl e platoon s wer e

now le d b y privates. Th e regimen t wa s

almost 1,10 0 men understrength , an d

barely 1,50 0 troop s of th e approximately

2,150 availabl e t o i t coul d stil l b e

counted comba t effectives. 9 Immediat e

relief wa s an obviou s necessity.

Preparing Another Effort

Beginning o n 2 3 Marc h th e 3 d Bat -

talion, 127t h Infantry , an d th e 2 d Bat -

talion, 128t h Infantry , withdre w fro m

their dangerou s position s sout h o f th e

Villa Verde Trail. O n th e same day the

128th Infantry started relieving the 127t h

at Salacsa c Pas s No . 2 , th e change-ove r

being complete d b y th e 25th. 10 Plan s

now calle d fo r th e 128t h Infantr y t o

mount a n attac k eas t wit h tw o battal -

ions abreast. Th e 126t h Infantr y woul d

9

 The casualt y figure s ar e principall y fro m th e

127th Infantr y Uni t Report s cite d previously ; se e

also Rad , G- 3 I Corp s t o G- 3 Sixt h Army , 2 2 Mar

45, Sixt h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 21-2 3 Mar. 45 . 10

 Div Rpt Luzon , pp. 26-27 ; 128t h In f Rpt Luzon ,

pp. 11-12 .
500 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

HILL 50 4 AFTE R JAPANESE COUNTERATTACK , 1 APRIL

continue it s probin g operation s i n th e

river valley s t o th e west ; th e 127t h In -

fantry, rehabilitating , woul d guar d th e

division's rea r areas. 11

Since th e 32 d Divisio n ha d move d

more slowl y tha n anticipated , an d sinc e

the 25t h Divisio n wa s makin g bette r

progress tha n hope d alon g Rout e 5 ,

General Swif t decrease d th e 32 d Divi -

sion's area o f responsibility, thereby permitting th e uni t t o bette r concentrat e

its forces . H e se t th e division' s objec -

tive a s Santa Fe , an d reduce d th e unit 's

responsibility along Rout e 5 to the are a

halfway fro m Sant a F e t o Balet e Pass. 12

While thes e change s mad e i t appea r

that th e 32 d Divisio n migh t b e abl e t o

advance faste r ove r the , Villa Verd e

Trail, Swift , o n 2 5 March , issue d addi -

tional orders that inhibited the division's

build-up alon g th e trail . O n tha t dat e

the I Corps commander directed the 32d

Division t o prepar e t o attac k u p th e

Ambayabang an d Arbored o Rive r val -

leys towar d Bagui o in conjunctio n wit h

a 33 d Divisio n advance toward th e same

city. Th e ide a tha t th e 32 d Divisio n

might pla y a majo r par t i n th e captur e

of Bagui o ha d no t ye t bee n quit e lai d

to rest.13

By 25 March th e 32 d Division's 126t h

Infantry wa s little further u p th e valleys

than i t had been over two weeks earlier,

and had actually lost some ground in the

Ambayabang Valley.14 T o th e 32 d Divi- 11

 Ibid.; 32 d Div FO 16 , 22 Mar 45 . 12

 I Corp s FO's 3-12 and 4-12, 11 and 1 3 Mar 45 .

This wa s actuall y th e thir d tim e sinc e 2 1 February

that Swif t ha d reduce d th e 32 d Division' s are a o f

responsibility. Se e als o below , ch . XXVII .

13

 I Corp s F O 13 , 25 Ma r 45 . 14

 32d Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 14-18 ; 126t h In f Rp t

Luzon, pp . 6-11.
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—I : TH E VILL A VERD E TRAI L 501

sion, at least , th e rive r valle y operations

were alread y provin g unprofitable .

Worse still , the y wer e becomin g mor e

and mor e o f a drain upon th e division's

resources a t th e ver y tim e th e divisio n

desperately neede d additiona l strengt h

on th e Vill a Verd e Trail . There , th e

128th Infantr y wa s runnin g int o a s

much troubl e as had th e 127t h before it .

From 2 3 Marc h throug h 4 Apri l th e

128th Infantr y drov e bloodil y eastward .

The regimen t cleare d Hil l 503 , whic h

the 127t h ha d bypassed ; secure d most o f

Hill 504 ; an d expande d th e hol d o n

Hill 505 , sout h o f th e trail . Th e Japa -

nese soo n challenge d thes e gains . Dur -

ing th e nigh t o f 3 1 March-1 April the y

laid dow n a heav y artiller y barrag e o n

Hill 504 , followin g i t wit h a banza i at -

tack launche d b y ove r 15 0 troops. Th e

single company of the 128t h Infantr y o n

Hill 504 wa s soon force d off , and onl y a

dawn counterattac k b y a ful l battalio n

prevented th e los s o f al l groun d eas t o f

Hill 502 . A s it was, o n 1 April th e Japa -

nese again held th e northern an d north -

eastern slope s of Hill 504, so laboriously

cleaned off during the precedin g week.15

By 4 April th e 128t h Infantr y bi d fai r

soon t o b e eve n mor e depleted tha n th e

127th Infantry . I n th e tw o week s th e

128th ha d been on th e trail i t lost abou t

85 men killed and 25 0 wounded, approximately th e same numbe r th e 127t h ha d

lost i n thre e weeks. An d lik e th e 127th ,

the 128t h Infantr y wa s now mor e tha n

1,000 troop s understrength. 16 Fo r I

Corps, expectin g th e Japanes e t o con -

tinue thei r fanati c resistanc e a t Salacsa c

Pass No. 2 , no furthe r proo f wa s needed

that th e 32 d Division ha d t o hav e mor e

troops o n th e Vill a Verd e Trail . Th e

only wa y th e corp s coul d suppl y th e

necessary reinforcements was to have the

33d Divisio n reliev e th e 126th Infantr y

in the river valleys, an actio n that forced

postponement o f th e attac k o n Baguio .

Having mad e thi s decision , th e corp s

went o n t o direc t th e 32 d Divisio n t o

move it s 126t h Infantr y t o th e Vill a

Verde Trail an d moun t a two-regimen t

attack towar d Sant a Fe. 17

The 32 d Division, havin g failed i n at -

tempts t o outflan k th e Salacsa c defense s

for th e south , decide d t o tr y a flankin g

maneuver nort h o f th e trai l wit h th e

126th Infantry , whil e th e 128t h con -

tinued th e fronta l attac k a t Salacsa c

Pass No . 2 . Th e 126t h Infantr y wa s t o

strike of f th e Vill a Verd e Trai l fro m a

point abou t a mil e an d a hal f wes t o f

Hill 50 2 and pus h northeas t alon g th e

Miliwit Rive r valley . It s firs t objective s

were Hill s 51 8 an d 519 , lyin g roughl y

1,500 yard s north (an d slightl y east ) o f

Hill 504 . Th e stronges t regiment o f the

32d Divisio n o n 5 April, whe n it s drive

began, th e 126t h Infantr y wa s almos t

900 men understrength. 18

15

 32d Di v Rpt Luzon , pp . 27-33 ; 128t h In f Rp t

Luzon, pp . 11-13 ; 128t h In f Dail y Unit Rpts, 23 Mar

-5 Ap r 45. During th e Japanes e attac k o n Hil l 504 , Pfc . Wil -

liam R . Shockle y o f Compan y L heroicall y covere d

the withdrawa l o f hi s squa d a t th e cos t o f hi s ow n

life. Fo r thi s action , Privat e Shockle y wa s post -

humously awarde d th e Meda l o f Honor .

16

 Ibid.; Rpt , Ass t G- 3 Sixt h Arm y t o G- 3 Sixt h

Army, sub: Rpt s o f Obsr Visit t o 32 d Div , 1 Apr 45 ,

Sixth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 1- 3 Ap r 45. 17

 Ibid.; 32 d Di v Rp t Luzon , p . 32 ; I Corp s Rp t

Luzon, pp. 71-73; I Corp FO 13-1 , 3 Apr 45; 32d Div

FO 17 , 4 Ap r 45 . Se e above , Chapte r XXV , fo r th e

effect o f thes e orders o n 33 d Divisio n operations . 18

 32d Di v F O 17 , 4 Ap r 45 ; 32 d Di v G- 3 Opn s

Rpts, 4-6 Ap r 45; 126th In f Unit Rpt , 6 Apr 45 (th e

only availabl e copie s o f th e 126t h Infantry' s uni t

reports ar e t o b e foun d i n th e 32 d Divisio n G- 3

Journal Files) .
502 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

By th e tim e th e new , two-pronged

offensive began , th e 32 d Divisio n ha d

actually accomplishe d mor e tha n i t

thought in the Salacsac Pass No. 2 area.19

General Iwanaka , commandin g th e 2d

Tank Division, had by now decided tha t

his position s i n Salacsa c Pass No. 2 were

practically untenabl e an d ha d starte d

making plan s t o redeplo y force s fo r th e

defense o f Salacsa c Pass No . 1 . Hi s casu -

alties at the western pass were mounting

rapidly—he estimated tha t in th e month

ending 4 Apri l h e ha d los t ove r 1,00 0

troops killed. 20 Moreover , Allie d ai r

and artiller y bombardment s wer e mak -

ing i t virtuall y impossibl e fo r th e 2d

Tank Division t o mov e supplie s t o Salacsac Pas s No . 2 excep t b y infiltratin g

small amounts throug h wood s o n eithe r

side of th e trail under cover o f darkness.

Iwanaka di d no t propose , however, t o

abandon the Salacsa c Pass No. 2 defenses.

Instead, h e directe d th e troop s ther e t o

remain i n plac e an d hol d ou t t o th e

death an d h e als o committe d som e re -

serves t o a counterattac k designe d t o

gain tim e fo r preparation s a t Salacsa c

Pass No . 1 . Whe n th e counterattack —

executed during the night of 31 March1 April—faile d t o b e a s effectiv e a s

hoped, Iwanaka decided to make no further attempt s t o reinforc e Salacsa c Pas s

No. 2 . Nevertheless , th e troop s lef t

there, th e 32 d Divisio n soo n learned ,

were willin g t o carr y ou t t o th e lette r

Iwanaka's orders to die in place .

Breakthrough at Salacsac Pass No. 2

By 7 Apri l th e 126t h Infantr y ha d

secured Hill s 51 8 an d 51 9 agains t sur -

prisingly ligh t opposition. 21 Th e regi -

ment als o cu t a Japanes e trai l leadin g

north fro m Hil l 50 4 acros s th e easter n

slopes o f Hil l 51 9 an d thenc e u p Mt .

Imugan, th e 5,700-foo t cres t o f whic h

arose approximatel y tw o an d a hal f

miles north o f Salacsa c Pass No. 1 . Thi s

trail, a secondary route of Japanese reinforcement an d supply , connecte d nea r

Hill 51 9 wit h th e valle y o f th e Catalu -

donan River , runnin g eas t t o joi n th e

Imugan Rive r a mil e an d a hal f nort h

of Imugan . Th e 126t h Infantr y coul d

thus eithe r maneuve r eastwar d t o exe -

cute a wid e envelopmen t o f th e entir e

Salacsac Pass throug h Imugan , o r strik e

south agains t bot h Salacsa c Passes .

Quick t o se e th e threats , Iwanak a

started t o deplo y ne w reinforcement s

(which ha d begu n reachin g th e Vill a

Verde Trai l i n earl y April ) acros s th e

path o f th e U.S. regiment . H e als o dispatched troops to Mt. Imugan, probably

to presen t a counterthreat o n th e 126t h

Infantry's lef t an d rear. Thes e measures

were reasonably effective , fo r i t too k th e

126th Infantr y fro m 7 April throug h 1 3

April t o secur e Hill 511 , only 75 0 yards

beyond Hil l 519 , and t o tak e Hil l 512 ,

300 yards beyond Hil l 511. By the 13th,

the regimen t ha d improve d it s positio n

for a strik e eastwar d o r a driv e south -

ward agains t th e flank s an d rea r o f th e

19

 Japanes e informatio n her e an d i n th e followin g

subsection i s from : SWP A His t Series , II , 478-79 ;

Kawai Interrog , Interrogs , I , 323-27 , 330 ; Kawai

Statement, States, II , 148 ; 14th Area Army Opn s o n

Luzon, pp . 121-22 , 124 . 20

 The 32 d Divisio n estimate d i t ha d kille d 2,10 0

Japanese i n th e area .

21

 U.S. sources fo r this and th e subsequen t subsec -

tions include : 32 d Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 32-40 ; 32 d

Div G- 3 Opn s Rpts , 4-1 8 Apr 45 ; 126t h In f Rp t

Luzon, pp. 12-15 ; 126t h Inf Unit Rpts, 6-18 Apr 45;

128th Inf Rpt Luzon , pp. 13-15 ; 128t h Inf Unit Rpts,

5-18 Apr 45.
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—I : TH E VILL A VERD E TRAI L 503

Japanese still holding the 128t h Infantr y

at Salacsa c Pas s No . 2 .

After th e Japanes e counterattac k o f

31 March , th e 128t h ha d ha d it s hand s

full reorganizing , regaining lost ground ,

and beatin g off a number of minor night

raids. Moreover , throughou t th e firs t

week o f Apri l unseasonabl y heav y rain s

and dens e fo g severel y curtaile d opera -

tions. O n 7 Apri l th e 128t h Infantr y

launched a n attac k t o clea r th e hig h

ground sout h o f th e Vill a Verd e Trai l

from Hil l 50 5 east t o Hil l 506B , wher e

the trai l turne d sharpl y south . B y 1 0

April th e regimen t ha d secure d th e

saddle between Hills 505 and 504—tech -

nically Salacsa c Pas s No . 2 . Th e Japa -

nese, however , stil l hel d Hil l 50 6

(southwest o f Hil l 506B ) an d Hil l 50 7

as wel l a s all o f it s fou r noses . Fro m 1 1

through 1 7 Apri l th e 128t h Infantr y

struggled determinedl y t o secur e thi s

high groun d bu t attaine d onl y limite d

success. Establishin g block s alon g th e

north-south stretch o f the trail from Hil l

506B to the D nose of Hill 507 , th e regiment denie d th e Japanes e th e us e o f

that sectio n o f th e trail . Th e Japanese ,

holding ou t i n isolate d strongpoint s

along th e Hil l 50 7 complex , i n tur n

prevented th e 128t h Infantr y fro m

employing th e sam e par t o f th e trail .

Nevertheless, excep t fo r thes e isolate d

strongpoints, th e 128t h Infantry , b y 1 7

April, ha d cleare d almos t th e entir e

Salacsac Pass No . 2 area.

Personnel Problems

But th e 128t h Infantr y coul d d o n o

more and, at leas t temporarily , wa s fin -

ished a s a fightin g unit . Durin g th e

period 5 through 1 7 April th e regimen t

had suffere d a n additiona l 27 5 battl e

casualties, 6 0 me n kille d an d 21 5

wounded. It s total battle casualties since

moving int o actio n alon g th e Vill a

Verde Trail now amounted t o 71 0 men

killed o r wounded . Evacuation s fo r

sickness an d comba t fatigu e ha d take n

an additiona l tol l until , b y 1 7 April ,

the regimen t wa s reduced t o fe w more

than 1,50 0 effectives , abou t th e sam e

number remaining to the 127t h Infantr y

when it pulled off the trai l on 2 5 March.

The 126t h Infantry , i n th e perio d 5-17

April, ha d los t approximatel y 7 0 me n

killed an d 14 5 wounded. I t coul d no w

muster n o mor e tha n 2,10 0 effectives .

During th e secon d wee k o f Apri l ob -

servers fro m Sixt h Arm y headquarter s

reported t o Genera l Kruege r tha t th e

32d Divisio n ha d a majo r moral e prob -

lem, a report tha t reinforced a n opinio n

Krueger ha d forme d fro m earlier , per -

sonal observation . Th e troop s o f th e

126th an d 128th Infantr y Regiment s

were approachin g complet e menta l an d

physical exhaustion ; front-lin e me n wit h

considerable tim e oversea s wer e becom -

ing supercautious ; rotatio n bac k t o th e

United State s ha d becom e th e principa l

topic o f conversatio n a t al l echelon s o f

the division ; th e comba t troops ' aggres -

sive spiri t wa s diminishin g rapidl y an d

markedly. Wit h it s low strength and it s

personnel problems , th e divisio n wa s

going to fin d i t impossibl e to make spec -

tacular gains , bu t i f i t coul d no t spee d

the pac e o f it s advanc e alon g th e Vill a

Verde Trail i t ha d n o hop e o f reaching

Santa Fe even by 1 June. I f th e division

were s o delayed, i t migh t b e caugh t o n

the trai l b y th e heav y downpour s o f th e

rainy season—beginnin g i n lat e May —

and woul d fin d i t extremel y difficul t t o

extricate itsel f an d it s equipmen t fro m

the mountains.
504 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Meanwhile, th e Japanes e stil l hel d

terrain advantage s tha t enable d the m t o

use thei r force s economicall y an d rein -

force thei r fron t line s almos t a t will .

Conversely, th e terrai n drasticall y lim -

ited th e 32 d Division' s freedo m o f ma -

neuver, forcin g th e divisio n t o emplo y

its diminishing strength i n costl y frontal

assault tim e an d tim e again . Terrai n

and th e weathe r wer e undoubtedl y th e

major problem s th e divisio n faced , bu t

the personne l proble m promise d t o

loom increasingl y importan t a s a facto r

limiting th e division's progress. 22

The 32 d Division' s personne l prob -

lem ha d com e abou t honestl y an d hon -

orably. Th e divisio n had reache d Luzo n

tired an d understrengt h afte r a n ar -

duous two-mont h campaig n i n th e

mountains o f wester n Leyte. 23 A s a

whole th e divisio n ha d ha d les s tha n

three week s res t — some component s

scarcely tw o — before reachin g Luzon ,

where i t arrive d wit h barel y 11,00 0 offi -

cers an d men , almos t 4,00 0 under -

strength. Roughl y 3 0 percen t o f th e

division's troop s ha d bee n oversea s fo r

nearly thre e year s an d ha d participate d

in thre e t o fiv e othe r operation s befor e

Luzon, Eve n a s th e divisio n starte d u p

the Vill a Verd e Trai l it s wa s scrapin g

the botto m o f it s personne l barre l t o

find qualifie d noncommissione d officers ,

and i t coul d il l affor d th e office r an d

noncommissioned office r losse s it ha d in -

curred t o mid-April. Th e deterioratin g

quality o f leadership , combine d wit h

increased interes t i n an d desir e fo r rotation, adde d t o moral e problems. More -

over, replacements wer e scarc e an d slo w

to arrive , an d Sixt h Army' s lac k o f

strength mad e i t necessar y t o leav e 32 d

Division regiments in th e line long afte r

they shoul d hav e bee n relieve d fo r res t

and rehabilitation .

By mid-Apri l th e onl y wa y Sixt h

Army coul d hav e markedl y improve d

the situatio n o n th e Vill a Verd e Trai l

would hav e bee n t o inser t a fres h divi -

sion there . N o suc h divisio n wa s available; Sixt h Arm y could no t eve n provid e

I Corp s wit h sufficien t force s t o reliev e

the 126t h and 128t h Infantr y Regiments

simultaneously. Th e bes t thin g I Corp s

and th e 32 d Divisio n coul d arrang e wa s

to reliev e eac h regimen t i n sequence .

First, th e 127t h Infantry , whic h ha d ha d

three weeks ' res t an d ha d bee n buil t

back u p t o 2,65 0 men—stil l 50 0 unde r

authorized strength—woul d reliev e th e

128th Infantry . Th e 128t h woul d the n

rest fo r te n day s t o tw o weeks , afte r

which i t woul d retur n t o th e fron t t o

relieve th e 126t h Infantry. 24

Despite it s gri m personne l picture ,

the 32 d Divisio n ha d actuall y accom -

plished a goo d dea l betwee n 4 an d 1 8

April. Th e 128t h Infantr y ha d broke n

through th e Japanes e defense s a t Salac -

sac Pass No. 2 ; the 126th ha d cut th e 2d

Tank Division's secondar y rout e t o an d

from th e pass and ha d take n some of the

pressure of f the 128th . I t appeare d tha t

the 127t h Infantr y woul d hav e littl e

trouble mopping up at Hill 50 7 and , i n

conjunction wit h a driv e sout h b y th e

22

 Memo, Ass t ACof S G- 3 Sixt h Arm y fo r ACof S

G-3 Sixt h Army , 1 3 Apr 45 , sub: Rp t o f Visi t t o 32 d

Div, 10-1 1 Ap r 45 , and Memo , Asst ACof S G- 3 Sixt h

Army fo r ACof S G- 3 Sixt h Army , 1 4 Ap r 45 , sub :

Rpt o n Visi t t o 128t h Inf , 1 3 Apr 45 , bot h i n Sixt h

Army G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 11-1 3 Apr 45 : Kruege r

Comments, 1 8 De c 56 . 23

 See Cannon , Leyte.

24

 Asst ACof S G- 3 Sixt h Arm y Rp t o n visi t to

128th Inf , 1 3 Ap r 45 ; 32 d Di v F O 19 , 1 8 Apr 45 .
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—I : TH E VILL A VERD E TRAI L 505

126th Infantry , woul d soo n b e abl e t o

launch a stron g attac k agains t Japanes e

defenses a t Salacsa c Pass No. 1 .

It woul d probabl y hav e been o f littl e

consolation t o the 32 d Division t o know

that a s o f mid-Apri l th e 2d Tank Division's personne l proble m ha d als o

reached a critica l stage . Sinc e 5 Apri l

the Japanese unit had lost another 1,12 5

men killed, 25 whil e al l th e reinforce -

ments Genera l Konuma , commande r o f

Bambang Branch, 14th Area Army, fel t

he coul d spar e wer e alread y eithe r i n

place alon g th e Vill a Verd e Trai l o r

were o n thei r wa y there. I n all, the 2d

Tank Division ha d receive d som e 1,60 0

fresh troop s durin g th e firs t hal f o f

April—far mor e tha t th e 32 d Divisio n

received i n th e sam e period . B y th e

1 7th th e Japanese had committe d a tota l

of 8,75 0 me n t o th e defens e o f th e Vill a

Verde Trail . Th e 32 d Divisio n ha d

killed approximatel y 2,50 0 o f these. 26

Only 25 0 Japanese remaine d a t th e iso -

lated strongpoint s i n th e Salacsa c Pas s

No. 2 area, an d Iwanak a ha d lon g sinc e

dismissed the m fro m hi s mind. H e wa s

making hi s fina l preparation s t o hol d

Salacsac Pass No. 1 , knowing tha t a n as -

sault agains t it s defense s wa s imminent .

Salacsac Pass No. 1 to Imugan

The Isolation of Salacsac Pass No. 1

General Iwanak a intende d t o hol d a

north-south lin e extendin g fro m Mt .

Imugan tw o an d a hal f mile s t o Hil l

508, sout h o f th e trail. 27 Thi s line , already ben t b y th e 126t h Infantry 's ad -

vance t o Hills 511 and 512 , blocke d th e

Cataludonan Valley , th e mos t obviou s

outflanking rout e nort h o f th e Vill a

Verde Trail . Iwanak a als o defende d

trails leadin g nort h fro m Valde z b y sta -

tioning a 500-ma n forc e o n hig h ground

lying a mile o r s o southwest o f Imugan .

Reserves, 300-50 0 men i n all, were held

along ridge s immediatel y wes t o f

Imugan.

As it prepare d t o attack towar d Salac -

sac Pas s No . 1 , th e 32 d Division' s ulti -

mate objectiv e wa s stil l th e Sant a F e

area. Maj . Gen. William H . Gill , th e

division commander , se t a firs t interme -

diate objectiv e a s th e pas s an d a secon d

as th e hig h groun d wher e Iwanaka' s re -

serves wer e located . Apparentl y feelin g

that a wid e envelopin g maneuve r

through th e Cataludona n Valle y woul d

be to o dangerou s an d to o har d t o sup -

port logistically , Gil l chos e t o sen d th e

126th Infantr y sout h agains t Salacsa c

Pass No . 1 and th e 127t h Infantr y east .

Patrols woul d moun t a diversionar y ef -

fort b y movin g nort h fro m Valdez , th e

patrolling t o b e conducte d b y th e 1s t

Battalion o f th e Buen a Vist a Regiment ,

a guerrill a uni t tha t th e 32 d Divisio n

had outfitte d an d trained. 28

The 127t h Infantr y bega n movin g up

to relieve the 128th o n 1 7 April an d immediately institute d operation s t o clea r

the last Japanes e fro m th e Hil l 50 7 area

25

 This estimat e i s base d upo n Japanes e sources .

For th e period 5-17 April, th e 32 d Divisio n claime d

only 85 0 Japanese killed . 26

 32d Divisio n claim s fo r th e perio d 1 March-1 7

April accoun t fo r 2,95 0 Japanes e killed , whil e fro m

Japanese source s a figur e o f 2,25 0 kille d ca n b e

derived.

27

 Japanese informatio n i n thi s subsectio n come s

from: Kawa i Interrog , Interrogs, I , 323-24 , 330-31 ;

32d Di v Rpt Luzon , an . 2 , G-2 Rpt , pp. 15-16 . 28

 32d Di v Rp t Luzon , p . 38 ; 32 d Di v FO's 18 and

19, 1 2 and 1 8 Apr 45 , respectively .
506 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

and nearb y terrain. 29 Th e 127t h foun d

the missio n considerabl y mor e difficul t

than anticipated , an d no t unti l 3 Ma y

was th e north-sout h stretc h o f th e Vill a

Verde Trai l betwee n Hill s 506 B an d

507D safe fo r 32 d Divisio n traffic . Never -

theless, sufficien t groun d i n th e are a wa s

clear b y 2 6 Apri l fo r th e 2 d Battalion ,

127th Infantry , t o star t a driv e eas t

along an d sout h o f th e trail , strikin g

toward Hil l 50 8 a t th e sout h sid e o f

Salacsac Pas s No . 1 .

The Japanes e reacted violently t o this

new drive and durin g the nex t tw o days

launched a series o f counterattack s from

the east an d north , at least on e o f whic h

was execute d b y a grou p o f ove r 150 .

The Japanese , losing 75-100 men killed,

at best cause d a day's delay i n th e 127t h

Infantry's progress, and th e 2 d Battalion

pressed o n t o reach th e crest o f Hil l 50 8

late o n 2 9 April. Tha t nigh t ove r 20 0

Japanese, supporte d b y machin e gu n

and morta r fire , undertoo k anothe r

counterattack, comin g u p th e nort h

slopes o f th e hill . Whe n th e initia l

impetus of th e attac k died , th e Japanes e

continued wit h small-scal e raid s unti l

dawn o n th e 30th . Thi s tim e th e Japa -

nese lost some 10 0 men killed ; th e 127t h

Infantry's casualtie s wer e approximatel y

5 killed an d 1 0 wounded. Th e Japanes e

continued small-scal e attack s against th e

foothold o n Hil l 50 8 throug h 4 May ,

but t o n o avail .

While beatin g of f thes e Japanes e at -

tacks, th e 2 d Battalion , 127t h Infantry ,

expanded it s hol d o n Hil l 50 8 an d es -

tablished a bloc k o n th e Vill a Verd e

Trail t o th e north. Som e troop s o f th e

battalion sough t t o clea r th e are a be -

tween Hil l 50 8 an d Hil l 509 , which ,

lying 50 0 yard s t o th e southwest , fel l t o

the 3 d Battalio n o n 3 May. Next, Japanese cu t of f west o f Hil l 50 8 bega n t o

harass th e 3 d Battalion , bu t tha t uni t

had littl e difficult y consolidatin g it s

hold.

North o f th e Vill a Verd e Trai l th e

126th Infantr y ha d als o attaine d som e

measure o f success , thoug h it s opera -

tions wer e a s laboriousl y slo w a s thos e

of th e 127th . Strikin g sout h fro m Mil l

511 o n 1 8 April, th e 2 d Battalion , 126th

Infantry, o n 2 4 Apri l reache d th e cres t

of Hil l 515 , which marke d th e nort h

side o f Salacsa c Pas s No . 1 . Thi s drive ,

covering perhap s three-quarter s o f a

mile, wa s especiall y noteworth y i n tha t

its success depende d i n larg e par t upo n

fire suppor t provide d b y troop s o f th e

127th Infantr y o n Hil l 506B .

Meanwhile, element s o f th e 1s t Bat -

talion, 126t h Infantry , ha d struc k eas t

from Hill s 51 1 an d 51 2 t o Hill s 51 3

and 514 , respectively 750 and 1,00 0 yards

east o f Hil l 512 . Th e battalio n the n

pressed sout h t o Hil l 516 , 750 yards east

of Hil l 515 , and b y 2 7 Apri l ha d ad -

vanced anothe r 50 0 yard s southeas t t o

the crest o f Hil l 525 . The nex t da y th e

unit se t u p a bloc k o n th e Vill a Verd e

Trail immediatel y sout h o f Hil l 516 ,

effectively cuttin g th e Japanes e mai n

line o f communication s t o Salacsa c Pas s

No. 1 . Fo r al l practica l purpose s th e

29

 The principa l source s fo r th e res t o f thi s sub -

section are : 32d Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 38-47 ; 32 d Di v

G-3 Opn s Rpts , 1 8 Apr-5 Ma y 45 ; 127t h In f Rp t

Luzon, pp . 21-35 ; 127t h In f Uni t Rpts , 1 8 Apr- 5

May 45 ; 126t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 15-19 ; 126t h In f

Unit Rpts, 1 6 Apr-4 Ma y 45 .

On 2 5 April, during the course of the 127t h Infan -

try's actio n describe d i n th e followin g paragraphs ,

Pfc. Davi d M . Gonzale s o f Compan y A wa s kille d

as, exposed t o enem y fire , h e helpe d di g ou t a number o f hi s fello w me n wh o ha d bee n burie d a s th e

result of a landslide caused b y a bomb tha t ha d gon e

astray fro m supportin g aircraft . Fo r hi s heroi c

action, Privat e Gonzale s wa s posthumousl y awarde d

the Medal of Honor.
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—I : TH E VILL A VERD E TRAI L 507

32d Divisio n ha d isolate d th e pass—th e

only rout e o f withdrawa l o r reinforce -

ment no w lef t t o th e Japanes e le d

.through broken , heavil y woode d terrai n

immediately sout h o f th e trai l an d eas t

of Hil l 508 .

Into Imugan

The isolatio n o f Salacsa c Pas s No . 1 ,

like earlier operations in th e Villa Verde

Trail section , cause d th e 32 d Division's

casualties t o moun t a t a rapi d rate . I n

the perio d 1 7 April- 4 Ma y th e 126th

and 127t h Infantr y Regiment s togethe r

had incurre d anothe r 70 0 battle and 50 0

nonbattle casualties , broke n dow n a s

follows: 3 0

Killed

Wounded

Nonbattle

Total

126th

Infantry

56

173

233

462

127th

Infantry

128

353

270

751

Total

184

526

503

By earl y Ma y th e 126t h Infantr y coul d

muster bu t 1,87 5 front-lin e effectives ;

the 127t h Infantr y approximatel y 2,175 .

Morale problem s wer e stil l pressin g and

many o f th e nonbattl e casualtie s wer e

again liste d a s comba t fatigu e an d psy -

choneurotic cases . I n th e 127t h Infan -

try 10 of the nonbattle casualties involved

self-inflicted gunsho t wounds .

It was manifestly tim e to get the 128th

Infantry bac k int o th e line t o relieve th e

126th and , insofar a s possible , lighte n

the burde n upo n th e 127t h Infantry. 31

The relie f bega n o n 3 May, whe n troop s

of th e 2 d Battalion , 128th Infantry , too k

over fro m 126t h Infantr y element s a t

Hill 525 . The 2 d Battalion , 128t h In -

fantry, the n struc k southeas t acros s th e

Villa Verd e Trai l an d seize d Hil l 526 ,

500 yard s distant , o n 7 May . The bat -

talion's lef t drov e east o n th e nort h sid e

of th e trai l towar d Hil l 527 , whic h wa s

about three-quarter s o f a mil e beyon d

Hill 52 5 an d forme d par t o f th e hig h

ground jus t befor e Imugan . Iwanaka' s

reserves hel d u p th e 128th Infantry' s

men alon g th e northwester n slope s o f

Hill 52 7 on 7 May.

In th e meantime , th e 126t h Infantr y

had continue d effort s t o clea n ou t th e

terrain fro m Hill s 51 5 an d 51 6 sout h

to th e Vill a Verd e Trail, an d th e 127t h

Infantry moppe d u p alon g th e slope s o f

Hills 50 8 an d 509 . On 6 Ma y th e 1s t

Battalion, 128th Infantry , too k u p posi -

tions o n th e trai l wes t o f Hil l 508 , and

the 3 d Battalio n prepare d t o follo w th e

1st int o th e line . Ther e wer e no w

enough relativel y fres h troop s availabl e

for th e 32 d Divisio n t o complet e th e

relief o f th e 126th Infantr y an d mak e

plans fo r a ne w attack .

To execut e th e ne w pla n th e 128t h

Infantry woul d hav e t o sen d on e battal -

ion eas t throug h Salacsa c Pas s No . 1 to

join th e troop s o n an d nea r Hil l 526 .

The 2 d Battalio n wa s t o continu e it s

advance a t Hil l 527 , simultaneousl y en -

deavoring t o revers e it s righ t flan k an d

send i t back west throug h th e pass. Th e

127th Infantr y woul d hol d an d mo p u p

all rea r areas, relieving th e 126t h Infan -

try's units north o f th e trai l and a t Hills

515 an d 516 . Until tha t relie f coul d b e

completed, th e 126t h Infantr y woul d 30

 The tabl e is based o n th e 126t h an d 127t h uni t

reports cite d i n th e previou s subsection . 31

 The remainde r o f thi s subsectio n i s base d gen -

erally on : 32 d Di v Rpt Luzon , pp . 42-43 , 45-46, 48-

54; 32 d Di v G-3 Opn s Rpts, 4-30 May 45; 126t h In f

Rpt Luzon , pp . 19-20 ; 127t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp .

35-53; 127t h In f Uni t Rpts , 5 May- 2 Ju n 45 ; 128t h

Inf Rp t Luzon , pp. 16-23 ; 128th Inf Uni t Rpts, 4-30

May 45 .
508 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

continue it s effort s t o clea r th e groun d

from thos e tw o hills sout h t o th e trail .

General Gil l schedule d th e ne w attac k

to start o n 8 May.

By th e 8t h th e Japanese situation wa s

deteriorating rapidly, since the 32d Division ha d breache d Iwanaka' s Mt . Imu -

gan-Hill 50 8 defensiv e line. 32 Nort h o f

the Villa Verde Trail the 2d Tank Division's righ t flan k unit s wer e pivotin g

eastward o n th e Mt . Imuga n anchor ;

its lef t flan k troop s wer e virtuall y cu t

off. Iwanak a realize d tha t Salacsa c Pas s

No. 1 wa s lost , bu t h e ha d n o choic e

except t o han g on . H e ha d apparentl y

wanted t o us e th e troop s poste d a t Mt .

Imugan t o moun t a counterattac k

against th e 32 d Division' s left , but , if

he wa s t o hol d ou t an y longer , h e ha d

to us e the m t o reinforc e position s eas t

of Salacsa c Pas s No . 1 . I n doin g s o h e

hoped t o establis h ye t anothe r defensiv e

line alon g th e hig h groun d jus t wes t

of Imugan .

It seem s probabl e tha t Iwanak a fel t

that h e woul d hav e n o chanc e t o se t u p

a new line unless h e eithe r destroyed o r

pushed wes t th e element s o f th e 128t h

Infantry alread y o n th e slope s o f Hil l

527. A t an y rate , beginnin g o n 8 May,

he starte d dispatchin g troop s t o cu t th e

supply lin e t o th e 2 d Battalion , 128t h

Infantry. Thi s rout e ra n throug h rug -

ged, foreste d countr y southeas t fro m

Hill 51 1 to Hill s 51 5 and 51 6 and con -

tinued eas t across Hil l 52 5 towar d Hill s

526 and 527 . O n 1 0 May Japanese forces

cut the trac k between Hills 525 and 516 ,

forcing muc h o f th e 128th Infantr y an d

one battalio n o f th e 127t h t o devot e a

considerable portio n o f thei r effort s t o

eliminating th e Japanes e pocket . I f de -

lay ha d bee n Iwanaka's purpose , h e suc -

ceeded admirably , fo r i t wa s 1 9 Ma y

before th e suppl y lin e wa s onc e agai n

secure an d th e 2 d Battalion , 128t h In -

fantry, could return to its drive east from

Hill 525.

Meanwhile, th e 1s t Battalion , 128th ,

had grabbe d a bea r b y th e tai l a t Salac -

sac Pass No. 1 and durin g the two weeks

following 8 Ma y wa s abl e t o mak e les s

than 50 0 yard s eas t fro m Hil l 508 .

Troops o f th e 2 d Battalion , movin g

west fro m Hil l 526 , gained eve n les s

ground, an d when , o n 1 6 May , th e 3 d

Battalion starte d t o driv e sout h an d

southeast fro m Hil l 516 , it foun d tha t

strong Japanes e force s ha d reoccupie d

many position s tha t th e 126t h Infantr y

had onc e overrun . No t unti l 2 4 Ma y

did th e 128t h Infantr y clea r th e las t

Japanese fro m th e trapeziu m forme d b y

Hills 515, 516 , 526 , an d 50 8 an d repor t

to Genera l Gil l tha t i t ha d secure d

Salacsac Pass No . 1 .

Meanwhile, th e 2 d Battalion , 128th

Infantry, ha d seize d Hil l 527 , an d th e

1st Battalion , Buen a Vist a Regiment ,

had starte d a driv e northwar d fro m

Valdez tha t culminate d o n 2 8 Ma y wit h

the captur e o f Hil l 528 , lying o n th e

south side of the Villa Verde Trail opposite Hil l 527 . The tw o battalion s ha d

cleared th e hig h groun d immediatel y

west o f Imugan , no w th e 32 d Division's

final objective .

Until 2 3 Ma y th e divisio n ha d bee n

aiming fo r Sant a Fe , bu t o n tha t da y

I Corps—realizin g that th e 32 d Division

had n o chanc e o f reachin g Sant a F e be -

fore th e 25t h Division , whic h wa s driving nort h alon g Rout e 5—onc e agai n

32

 Additional informatio n o n th e Japanes e i s de -

rived from : Kawa i Interrog , Interrogs , I , 325-27 ,

331-32; Kawa i Statement , States, II, 149 ; SWP A Hist

Series, II, 480-82; 14th Area Army Opn s on Luzon ,

pp. 157-61 ; 32d Div Rpt Luzon , an. 2, G-2 Rpt , p. 16 .
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—I : TH E VILL A VERD E TRAI L 509

moved th e 25-32 d Divisio n boundar y

westward. Fo r al l practica l purpose s the

capture of Hill 52 8 by th e 1s t Battalion ,

Buena Vista Regiment, marked th e completion o f th e 32 d Division' s shar e i n

the driv e towar d Sant a Fe , an d o n 2 8

May, enterin g th e remnant s o f barri o

Imugan against no opposition , th e guerrilla uni t pu t th e finishin g touche s o n

the 32 d Division' s campaign . Fo r th e

first tim e sinc e 2 1 February th e divisio n

had successfull y carrie d ou t t o th e lette r

the provision s of an I Corp s directive .

In achievin g its fina l success , th e 32 d

Division ha d receive d indirec t assistanc e

from th e 2d Tank Division. O n 2 4 May

Iwanaka starte d withdrawin g th e re -

mains o f hi s battere d force s nort h u p

the valle y o f th e Imuga n River . Th e

25th Divisio n wa s threatening hi s mai n

supply route , for th e 10th Division's last

defenses o n Rout e 5 ha d collapsed .

Iwanaka therefor e realize d tha t ther e

was no longe r any tactical purpos e t o be

served b y continuin g his effort s t o hol d

the Vill a Verd e Trail , an d h e acte d

accordingly.

The las t ac t o f th e dram a alon g th e

trail cam e t o a swif t end . On 2 9 Ma y

the 1s t Battalion , Buen a Vist a Regi -

ment, mad e contac t wit h element s o f

the 126t h Infantr y northeas t o f Imugan .

Operating unde r 25t h Divisio n control ,

the 126t h ha d trucke d u p Rout e 5 and

had struc k towar d Imuga n from th e east

and southeast . B y th e 29th , encounter -

ing onl y scattere d group s o f Japanese ,

the regimen t ha d gaine d contro l ove r

the Vill a Verd e Trail fro m Sant a F e t o

Imugan. Excep t fo r th e 126t h Infantry ,

all element s o f th e 32 d Divisio n bega n

to withdra w fro m th e trai l o n 3 0 May .

Still under th e contro l of th e 25t h Divi -

sion, th e 126t h Infantr y continue d pa -

trolling west fro m Sant a F e an d u p th e

Imugan Rive r valle y fo r anothe r tw o

weeks.

The fina l phas e o f operation s alon g

the Vill a Verd e Trail—fro m 5 throug h

31 May—ha d again cost the 32 d Division

dearly. Th e 128t h Infantry , whic h ha d

borne th e brunt o f th e fightin g a t Salac -

sac Pas s No . 1 , ha d suffere d especiall y

heavy casualties :

 33

Unit

126th Infantr y

127th Infantry

128th Infantry

Total

Killed

1 5

55 120

190

Wounded

40

75

390

505

Nonbattle

75

350

425

Totals

130

480

510

1,120

The thre e infantr y regiments of th e 32 d

Division ha d suffere d th e followin g bat -

tle casualtie s durin g thei r operation s t o

clear th e Villa Verde Trail and adjacen t

terrain:34

Unit

126th Infantry

127th Infantry

128th Infantry

Total

Killed

195

350

280

825

Wounded

460

750

950

2,160

Total

655

1,100

1,230

2,985

In addition , anothe r 6,00 0 o r s o o f th e

32d Divisio n wer e evacuate d fro m th e

33

 The tabl e i s derive d fro m th e regimenta l uni t

reports cited previously . Th e 126t h Infantr y wa s out

of actio n fro m 9 to 2 4 May ; it s totals do no t includ e

the casualtie s fo r th e perio d 24-3 1 May, whe n i t

operated unde r 25t h Divisio n control . Th e 127t h

was engage d primaril y i n moppin g u p durin g th e

period. N o nonbattl e casualt y figure s ca n b e foun d

for th e 128th . 34

 The figure s i n th e tabl e ar e approximation s de -

rived fro m al l availabl e pertinen t data . A s usual ,

the variou s source s employe d provid e irreconcilabl e

information. Th e figure s fo r th e 126t h Infantr y d o

not includ e th e regiment' s battl e casualtie s fo r th e

period 24-3 1 May, whe n th e regimen t operate d

under 25th Divisio n control; the figures do , however,

include th e regiment's casualties—approximatel y 5 5

killed and n o wounded—fo r th e period 2 1 February

-5 April , when most of the unit operated in the river

valleys wes t o f th e Vill a Verd e Trail .
510 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

VILLA VERD E APPROAC H T O IMUGA N

front line s eithe r permanentl y o r fo r

varying period s o f tim e becaus e o f sick -

ness an d diseas e o f al l types , mainl y

respiratory infections , ski n troubles , in -

testinal afflictions , an d comba t fatigu e

and associate d psychoneuroti c upsets .

During th e fina l phas e o f operation s

along the Villa Verde Trail the 2d Tank

Division los t 2,30 0 men killed, 35 an d b y

the end o f May at least 5,750 of the 8,75 0

troops th e Japanes e ha d committe d t o

the defense of the trail were dead. 36 Th e

2d Tank Division wa s finishe d a s a n

effective infantr y comba t unit , jus t a s

it ha d bee n destroye d a s a n armore d

force durin g th e defens e o f th e ap -

proaches t o Sa n Jos e i n Januar y an d

early February .

The 32 d Divisio n ha d no t accom -

35

 American an d Japanes e estimate s o f Japanes e

killed durin g Ma y coincide remarkabl y well .

36

 The figur e 5,75 0 is derived principall y fro m th e

Japanese sources . Th e claim s o f th e 32 d Division' s

three infantr y regiment s provide d a tota l o f 8,75 0

Japanese killed—equa l t o th e tota l Japanes e com -

mitment o n th e trail . Th e 32 d Division's G- 2 an d

G-3 Section s estimate d tha t approximatel y 7,67 5

Japanese wer e kille d alon g th e trail.
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—I : TH E VILL A VERD E TRAI L 511

plished it s origina l mission s — to clea r

the Vill a Verd e Trail , seiz e Sant a Fe ,

and secur e Rout e 5 from Sant a Fe south

to Digdi g — but thi s i s no t t o detrac t

from th e division's very real an d impor -

tant accomplishments . Initially , Sixt h

Army an d I Corp s ha d expecte d to o

much o f th e 32 d Division , especiall y i n

the ligh t o f th e unit' s personne l prob -

lems. Whe n I Corps finall y reduce d th e

32d's mission t o on e withi n reac h o f it s

capabilities, th e divisio n succeede d i n

executing it s orders . Moreover , Sixt h

Army and I Corps, in assigning the division it s origina l missions , ha d under -

estimated terrai n difficultie s alon g th e

Villa Verd e Trai l a s wel l a s Japanes e

capabilities an d intention s wit h regar d

to th e defens e o f tha t approac h t o

Santa Fe .

Assessing th e 32 d Division' s accom -

plishments, it is hardly necessary to loo k

further tha n the fact that the unit pinned

down th e 2d Tank Division an d it s at -

tachments t o th e defens e o f th e Vill a

Verde Trail . Destroyin g th e 2d Tank

Division an d makin g sur e tha t almos t

6,000 Japanes e wer e n o longe r aliv e t o

fight again , th e 32 d Divisio n ha d un -

doubtedly mad e possibl e th e relativel y

more decisiv e operation s o f th e 25t h

Division alon g th e Rout e 5 approach t o

Santa Fe . Eve n wit h th e hel p provide d

by th e 32 d Division' s operations , th e

25th Divisio n had reached Sant a Fe only

one da y before th e 32 d overra n th e last

organized Japanes e defense s wes t o f

Imugan, les s tha n thre e mile s wes t o f

the Vill a Verde Trail-Route 5 junction

at Sant a Fe .
CHAPTER XXVI I

The Bamban g Front — II

The 25t h Division On Rout e 5

The 25th Division's Drive Begins

On 2 1 February, whe n th e 25t h an d

32d Division s bega n thei r convergin g

attacks toward Sant a Fe , it ha d appeared

to Sixth Army and I Corps that the principal Japanes e defenses o n th e Bamban g

front wer e locate d alon g Rout e 5 . Fo r

this reason, I Corps had initially assigned

the 32 d Divisio n broade r mission s tha n

the 25th , a t least i n term s o f terrai n an d

objectives. I Corp s ha d expecte d th e

32d Divisio n t o clea r th e Vill a Verd e

Trail, seiz e Sant a Fe , an d the n secur e

Route 5 from Sant a F e sout h t o Digdig ,

which i s eleve n mile s nort h o f Sa n Jos e

as th e cro w flies . Th e 25t h Divisio n

would clear Route 5 from Sa n Jos e north

to Digdig ; ope n Rout e 10 0 fro m Riza l

(ten mile s southeast o f Sa n Jose ) nort h

seventeen mile s t o Carranglan ; an d se -

cure Rout e 10 0 fro m Carrangla n wes t

six mile s t o tha t road' s junctio n wit h

Route 5 at Digdig. 1

The Terrain and the Plan

Route 5 , i n Februar y 194 5 a good ,

two-lane grave l road , run s northeas t

about fou r mile s throug h open , fla t

country betwee n Sa n Jos e an d barri o

Rosaldo, whic h element s o f th e 25t h

Division had take n on 1 4 February. (See

Map XI.) Nea r Rosald o th e highwa y

swings northward throug h a narrow sec -

tion o f th e valle y of th e Talavera River ,

which change s its name to Digdi g Rive r

north o f barri o Digdig . Thre e mile s

north o f Rosaldo , at Lumboy , th e high -

way leave s th e rive r an d swing s north -

northeast abou t seve n mile s t o Digdig ,

where i t drop s dow n a shar p slope bac k

into th e rive r valley . Th e terrai n wes t

of Rout e 5 between Rosald o and Digdi g

is generall y woode d an d rise s steepl y

from 50 0 fee t a t th e highwa y t o 1,00 0

feet withi n a quarte r o f a mil e o f th e

road. T o th e east , th e groun d rise s jus t

as sharply , bu t o n thi s sid e o f th e high -

way muc h o f th e terrai n i s mor e ope n

and man y o f th e slope s ar e grassy .

Starting a t a poin t abou t 50 0 fee t

above se a leve l a t Rizal , Rout e 100 , a

narrow dir t road , wind s north-northeast

about te n mile s through rough hills tha t

rise t o a heigh t o f 1,00 0 feet . Th e roa d

then turn s nort h an d northwest , trav -

ersing te n mile s o f open , gentl y slopin g

country On its way to Carranglan . Fro m

Carranglan wes t t o Digdig , followin g a

course that takes it over grassy hills about

1

 I Corp s F O 12 , 2 1 Fe b 45 ; se e als o above , ch .

XXVI.
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—II : 25T H DIVISIO N O N ROUT E 5 513

1,000 fee t high , Rout e 10 0 i s a good ,

two-lane grave l road .

The 25t h Division , o n 2 1 Februar y

1945, ha d discovere d tw o othe r possibl e

routes o f advanc e northwar d i n it s sec -

tor. Th e firs t wa s a narro w trai l origi -

nating a t Lupao , o n Rout e 8 nine miles

northwest o f San Jose , and runnin g eastward acros s th e tough , foreste d terrai n

of th e Caraball o mountain s t o Puncan ,

on Rout e 5 thre e mile s south o f Digdig .

The secon d wa s an ill-define d trai l tha t

originated nea r barri o Rosald o an d ra n

north throug h th e same mountains, west

of Rout e 5 , t o joi n th e firs t trai l nea r

Puncan. O n 2 1 February a battalio n o f

the 25t h Division' s 161st Infantr y wa s

in contac t wit h Japanes e outposts alon g

both trail s a t point s abou t tw o mile s

south an d southwes t o f Puncan . Th e

27th Infantr y ha d halte d i n fron t o f a

Japanese strongpoin t o n Rout e 5 nea r

Lumboy; th e 35t h Infantr y ha d troop s

along Rout e 10 0 not fa r nort h o f Rizal .

With th e extan t dispositions , th e

methods of attack amon g which Genera l

Mullins, th e divisio n commander , could

choose t o reac h Digdi g wer e obvious. 2

He coul d moun t a powe r driv e u p

Route 5 wit h th e 27t h Infantry , o r h e

could stag e wid e flankin g maneuver s

with eithe r o r bot h th e 35t h an d 161s t .

Infantry Regiments . A fronta l assaul t

up th e highwa y migh t prov e quit e cost -

ly, o r migh t permi t Japanes e defensiv e

forces tha t th e 25t h Divisio n kne w wer e

located a t Punca n t o escap e northward .

West o f Rout e 5 th e terrai n wa s such a s

to inhibi t th e logisti c suppor t o f suffi -

cient forces to achieve quick, decisive results durin g a n attac k towar d Digdig .

The remainin g choic e seeme d th e bes t

to Mullins—t o hav e th e 35t h Infantr y

mount a flankin g attac k vi a Rout e 100 ,

swing on t o Rout e 5 at Digdig , an d cu t

off th e Japanese at Puncan , fallin g upo n

them fro m th e rear. Meantime , the 27t h

Infantry wa s to maintain pressur e north

along Rout e 5 ; th e 161s t was t o strik e

for hig h groun d overlookin g Puncan o n

the west , read y t o continu e nort h ove r

this terrain a s far as Digdig .

North to Digdig

Starting nort h o n 2 3 Februar y an d

encountering negligibl e opposition , th e

35th Infantr y reache d Carranglan on th e

26th.3 On e battalio n the n file d dow n a

rough trai l leadin g int o Punca n fro m

the northeast , an d o n 1 Marc h secure d

heights overlookin g th e battere d town .

The nex t day, as patrols entered deserted

Puncan, th e rest o f th e regiment probed

cautiously wes t alon g Rout e 10 0 fro m

Carranglan. Muc h t o the regiment's and

division's surpris e thi s stretc h o f th e

road als o prove d t o b e virtuall y unde -

fended, an d o n 3 March th e 35t h Infan -

try occupie d Digdi g withou t resistance .

Their attentio n diverte d b y operation s

of th e 27t h an d 161s t Infantr y Regi -

ments sout h an d southwes t o f Puncan ,

the Japanes e ha d faile d t o protec t th e

left an d rea r o f thei r delayin g force , th e

Puncan Sector Defense Unit, a t Puncan.

The Puncan Sector Defense Unit ha d

employed mos t o f it s artiller y an d mor -

2

 The remainde r of this subsection is based mainl y

on: 25t h Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 35-44 ; 25t h Di v FO's

13 an d 14 , 21 an d 2 7 Fe b 45 .

3

 This subsectio n i s base d generall y on : 25t h Di v

Rpt Luzon , pp . 39-44; 37t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp. 10 -

19: 35t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 20-27 ; 161st Inf Rp t

Luzon, Battl e of Punca n West Sector, pp. 1-16 ; 161st

Inf S- 3 Rpts , 21 Feb-5 Ma r 45.
514 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

tars against th e 161st Infantry, an d ha d

likewise sent most o f its infantr y against

that America n regiment . Nevertheless ,

the 161s t secured th e trai l junctio n a

mile southwest o f Punca n o n 2 8 February, an d tw o days later made contact o n

Route 5 wit h th e 27t h Infantry , whic h

had driven north astride the highway.

The 27t h Infantry , startin g nort h o n

23 February , encountere d bitte r resist -

ance, especially in the high ground abutting th e wes t sid e o f Rout e 5 . I t too k

the regimen t unti l 2 7 February t o clea r

the Lumbo y area , bu t th e nex t da y

organized resistanc e bega n t o collaps e

throughout th e Lumboy-Punca n region.

By 4 Marc h th e thre e regiments o f th e

25th Divisio n ha d establishe d fir m

contact at Puncan. 4

While th e last defense s aroun d Pun -

can wer e falling, th e 161st Infantry con -

tinued nort h along high groun d west o f

Route 5 . Advancin g agains t steadil y

diminishing resistance , th e regiment 's

leading troops were on hill s overlooking

Digdig by 5 March, and o n the same day

made contact wit h element s o f th e 35t h

Infantry in the barrio. All that remained

before Mullin s coul d declar e th e high -

way secur e from Sa n Jose t o Digdi g was

for th e 35t h t o clea n ou t a Japanes e

pocket o n th e eas t sid e o f Rout e 5 be -

tween Punca n an d Digdig . Thi s tas k

the regimen t complete d quickl y agains t

organized, determined , bu t scattere d

resistance.

The Japanese Reaction

During th e period 2 1 February- 5

March th e 25t h Divisio n los t approxi -

mately 40 men kille d and 16 5 wounded.

Virtually wipin g ou t th e Puncan Sector

Defense Unit, th e divisio n ha d kille d

some 1,25 0 Japanese in th e same thirteen

days. Ther e ar e man y possibl e explana -

tions fo r thi s wid e disparit y o f casualt y

figures. Fo r one , the Japanes e defense s

were o f a hast y nature , manne d b y a

force hurriedl y assemble d fro m si x o r

seven regula r an d provisiona l units .

Moreover, th e 25t h Divisio n ha d ad -

vanced behin d exceptionall y heav y aeri -

al, artillery , an d morta r support , t o

which capture d Japanes e diarie s gav e

credit fo r unusua l effectiveness . Then ,

the 35th Infantry , encirclin g th e Puncan

Sector Defense Unit, ha d effecte d a de -

gree o f demoralization amon g th e Japa -

nese tha t wa s normall y foreig n t o

Japanese troop s holdin g stati c defensiv e

positions. Contro l withi n th e Japanes e

unit, not wel l established whe n th e 25t h

Division starte d north , brok e dow n

quickly an d completely .

Upon it s organization , th e Puncan

Sector Defense Unit ha d ha d protectio n

on it s rear . A n understrengt h infantr y

battalion wa s deployed alon g Route 10 0

between Carrangla n an d Digdig , whil e

the 11th Independent Infantry Regiment (les s on e battalion ) hel d Carranglan an d th e Ol d Spanis h Trail , leadin g

north from Carrangla n to Route 5 about

twelve mile s northeast o f Sant a Fe . Bu t

the Japanes e ha d no t conducte d ade -

quate reconnaissanc e alon g Rout e 10 0

and ha d attache d n o significanc e t o th e

35th Infantry' s advanc e u p tha t road .

The Japanes e garriso n i n Carrangla n

simply withdre w t o bette r defensiv e

positions u p th e Ol d Spanis h Trai l a s

4

 For heroi c action s o n 2 4 February , durin g th e

attack agains t Lumboy , S . Sgt. Raymond H . Coole y

of Compan y B , 27t h Infantry , wa s awarde d th e

Medal o f Honor .
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—II : 25T H DIVISIO N O N ROUT E 5 515

the 35t h Infantr y approached , evidentl y

expecting th e 35t h t o continu e nort h

rather tha n swin g west towar d Digdig. 5

Meanwhile, th e infantr y battalio n o n

Route 10 0 between Carranglan and Dig -

dig move d ove r t o Rout e 5 to reinforc e

the Puncan Sector Defense Unit, per -

mitting th e 35t h Infantr y t o reac h Pun -

can and Digdi g before th e Japanese even

realized th e regimen t ha d starte d wes t

from Carranglan .

As lat e a s 2 5 Februar y Genera l

Konuma, commanding th e Bambang

Branch, 14th Area Army, fel t tha t th e

Puncan Sector Defense Unit wa s i n n o

danger, an d h e mad e optimisti c plan s

for th e uni t t o counterattack . Indeed ,

it wa s no t unti l Konuma , o n 2 March ,

found ou t tha t th e Puncan Sector Defense Unit wa s don e fo r tha t h e halte d

counterattack preparations. Stil l th e loss

of Rout e 5 a s fa r nort h a s Digdi g di d

not distur b Konuma . Hi s attitud e i n

this respec t i s demonstrated b y th e fac t

that o n 3 Marc h h e directe d th e 10th

Division, responsible fo r holdin g Rout e

5, t o sen d fou r companie s o f infantr y

west alon g th e Vill a Verd e Trail t o th e

Salacsac Passes , where , fro m th e Japa -

nese poin t o f view , th e situatio n wa s far

more critical tha n along Route 5. Mani -

festly, Konum a ha d fait h tha t th e 10th

Division would be able to hold along the

MLR i t wa s buildin g nort h o f Digdig .

Digdig to Putlan

The unexpectedl y rapid success of th e

25th Divisio n i n it s driv e t o Digdi g

prompted Genera l Swift , th e I Corp s

commander, t o exten d th e division' s

zone o f responsibility . O n 2 March , h e

directed th e divisio n t o pus h si x mile s

northward alon g Rout e 5 fro m Digdi g

to Putlan. 6 Sinc e mopping-u p opera -

tions wer e largel y complete d i n th e

Puncan-Digdig secto r b y evenin g o n 5

March, Mullins ' unit s wer e read y t o

start for Putlan. Mullins ' plan for reaching Putla n wa s cu t fro m th e sam e pat -

tern tha t ha d produce d th e successfu l

actions against Puncan and Digdig. Th e

161st Infantr y woul d attac k acros s th e

high groun d wes t o f Rout e 5 , th e 27t h

would strik e along and eas t o f th e high -

way, an d th e 35t h woul d stag e anothe r

wide envelopment . Thi s tim e th e 35t h

would march north-northwest from Car -

ranglan u p th e Bong a Rive r valley ,

swing northwest from th e headwater s o f

the Bong a over a fair trai l leadin g to th e

eastern reaches of th e Putla n River, an d

descend th e Putla n abou t tw o mile s t o

its junctur e wit h th e Digdig , hal f a mil e

north o f barri o Putlan. 7

The Japanes e ha d lef t th e eas t flan k

approach t o Putla n eve n les s wel l pro -

tected tha n the y ha d th e Rout e 10 0 approach t o Digdig. 8

 A s a result, th e 35t h

Infantry's lea d battalion , leavin g Car -

ranglan o n 6 March , ha d n o difficult y

occupying Putlan by evening on th e 8th.

The nex t da y th e battalio n mad e con -

tact wit h th e 27t h Infantry , whic h ha d

5

 Additional informatio n o n th e Japanes e i n thi s

section i s from : SWP A His t Series , II , 478-80 ; 14th

Area Army Opn s o n Luzon , p p 99-110 ; Konum a

Statement, States , II , 300-14 ; Tsuchiy a Statement ,

States, IV, 402-03.

6

 I Corps FO 12-1 , 2 Ma r 45 . 7

 25th Di v FO 15 , 5 Ma r 45 . 8

 The remainde r o f thi s subsectio n i s base d on :

25th Di v Rpt. Luzon, pp. 44-47 ; 27t h In f Rp t Luzon ,

p. 20; 27th In f Uni t Rpts, 2-20 Ma r 45; 35th In f Rp t

Luzon, pp. 28-30; 35t h In f S-3 Opn s Rpts, 5-11 Ma r

45; 161s t In f Rp t Luzon , Pursui t an d Approac h

March Punca n t o Minuli , pt . I , pp . 1-3 ; ibid., pt .

II, pp . 4-5 ; 161s t In f S-3 Opn s Rpts , 5-1 5 Ma r 45,
516 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

come u p Rout e 5 fro m Digdi g against

little opposition . Takin g over fro m th e

35th Infantr y i n th e Putla n area , th e

27th ha d som e difficult y clearin g Japa -

nese straggler s fro m ravine s eas t o f

Route 5 nea r th e barri o an d di d no t

finish moppin g u p unti l 1 5 March .

Battling both terrai n and determined,

albeit scattered , Japanese resistance , th e

161st Infantr y ha d a harde r tim e mov -

ing north . Nevertheless , its forward ele -

ments gained high ground west of Route

5 opposit e Putla n b y 1 0 March . Tw o

days late r on e compan y wa s o n com -

manding groun d wes t o f th e highwa y

halfway t o Minuli , a tin y barri o o n

Route 5 two mile s north o f Putlan . B y

that tim e Rout e 5 was saf e fo r militar y

traffic a s fa r a s Putlan . Agai n th e 25t h

Division ha d secure d a n objectiv e mor e

rapidly tha n anticipated .

Objective: Balete Pass

Nothing succeed s lik e success , o r s o

General Swif t mus t hav e though t when ,

on 1 1 and agai n o n 1 3 March, h e twic e

more extende d th e 25t h Division's zon e

of responsibilit y northward . First , h e

directed th e divisio n t o secur e Rout e 5

to barri o Kapintalan , fiv e mile s beyon d

Putlan. Tw o day s later , reassessin g th e

progress o f th e 32 d Divisio n alon g th e

Villa Verde Trail, Swift instructe d Mullins t o driv e o n throug h Balet e Pass ,

two and a half mile s north of Kapintalan

and tw o mile s sout h o f th e junctio n o f

the Vill a Verd e Trai l an d Rout e 5 a t

Santa Fe.9 Becaus e o f it s ow n succes s

and th e concentratio n o f th e 2d Tank

Division i n fron t o f th e 32 d Division,

the 25t h Divisio n wa s no w responsibl e

for a larg e par t o f th e are a Swif t ha d

originally assigne d t o th e 32d . So fa r

the 25t h ha d no t encountere d th e typ e

of oppositio n o r terrai n facin g th e 32d .

The Puncan Sector Defense Unit ha d

collapsed rathe r rapidly , an d th e 85t h

Division ha d me t n o significan t resist -

ance between Puncan and Putlan. How -

ever, the I Corps directive for the seizure

of Balet e Pass was to precipitate a battle

that would demonstrate to the 25th Division tha t th e 10th Division coul d figh t

as well a s the 2d Tank Division.

Plans and Obstacles

Initially, Genera l Mullin s lai d plan s

to execut e tw o separat e attack s towar d

Balete Pass. Th e 27t h an d 161st Infantry Regiment s woul d strik e northwar d

astride Rout e 5 i n wha t wa s essentially

a fronta l assault , bu t on e tha t ha d certain refinements . Th e 161s t Infantr y

would mak e th e mai n effort , drivin g

straight u p Rout e 5 an d alon g risin g

ground immediatel y wes t o f th e high -

way. Th e 27t h Infantry , t o execut e a

close-in envelopmen t o f Balet e Pass ,

would attac k ove r hig h ground adjacen t

to th e east sid e o f th e road . Th e regi -

ment woul d emplo y a s its mai n suppl y

route a roa d tha t Mullin s propose d t o

construct ove r th e mountain s abou t a

mile eas t o f an d paralle l t o Rout e 5 .

The secon d portio n o f th e division' s

attack woul d b e anothe r wid e envelop -

ment b y th e 35t h Infantry . Strikin g

north u p th e Ol d Spanis h Trai l fro m

Carranglan, th e 35t h woul d see k route s

by whic h i t coul d outflan k Balet e Pass ,

preparing t o mov e directl y o n th e pas s

or t o pus h o n t o Rout e 5 northeas t 9

 I Corp s FO's 12-3 an d 12-4 , 1 1 and 1 3 Mar 45 .
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—II : 25T H DIVISIO N O N ROUT E 5 517

of Sant a Fe , whicheve r prove d feasibl e

and necessary. 10

The terrai n int o which th e 25t h Division moved in March 1945 , only a degree

or tw o les s roug h tha n tha t alon g th e

Villa Verd e Trail , i s hardl y inviting ,

and bears superficial resemblance to tha t

along Route 1 1 from Rosari o to Baguio .

Just a s Route 1 1 lies in th e gorge o f th e

Bued River, so Route 5 follows th e deep,

sharp-sided valle y o f th e Digdi g Rive r

northward; a s along th e Bued , towerin g

ridges ris e abruptl y fro m th e Digdig ,

which ha s it s headwater s jus t sout h o f

Balete Pass . Bu t her e th e resemblanc e

ends. Alread y 1,00 0 feet abov e se a leve l

at Putlan , Rout e 5 rises t o 3,00 0 fee t a t

Balete Pass , dippin g dow n nort h o f th e

pass to approximately 2,500 feet a t Sant a

Fe. Twistin g northward along the noses

of innumerabl e grea t an d smal l ridges ,

Route 5 remain s eas t o f th e Digdig —

the 25t h Divisio n woul d no t hav e th e

bridging proble m tha t face d th e 33 d

Division o n Rout e 11 .

Unlike th e ridge s alon g Rout e 11 ,

most o f th e ridge s alon g Rout e 5 , espe -

cially thos e eas t o f th e highway , ar e

heavily wooded . Wes t o f th e roa d som e

of th e ridge s adjacen t t o th e Digdi g ar e

grassy slope d an d bar e crested; nort h o f

Balete Pas s Rout e 5 passe s throug h

densely foreste d territor y t o a poin t

about a quarter o f a mil e short o f Sant a

Fe an d the n hairpin s dow n th e ope n

slopes o f a stee p hill . O n th e eas t sid e

of Rout e 5 fro m Putla n t o Balet e Pas s

most o f th e ridge s descen d int o th e Digdig gorge from th e northeast ; thos e west

of th e highwa y com e dow n fro m th e

northwest—the patter n i s mor e regula r

than tha t alon g Rout e 11 . Wes t o f

Route 5 th e ridge s ris e t o a heigh t o f

over 4,50 0 fee t withi n a mile an d a half

of th e highway ; eas t o f th e roa d thi s

height is reached withi n tw o miles.

About three-quarter s o f a mil e wid e

at Putlan , th e valle y o f th e Digdi g narrows to virtually nothing at a steep-sided

gorge three and a half miles to the north.

The gorg e widens a bit at barrio Kapintalan, fou r an d a hal f mile s nort h o f

Putlan. Rout e 5 leave s th e rive r abou t

a mil e an d a hal f nort h o f Kapintala n

to twist u p th e last steep, foreste d slope s

to Balet e Pass . Valdez , th e trai l cente r

that element s o f th e 32 d Divisio n em -

ployed i n outflankin g maneuvers against

the Japanes e o n th e Vill a Verd e Trail ,

lies about fou r mile s west o f Kapintala n

—four mile s o f nearl y impassable ,

densely woode d terrai n o f th e Caraball o

Mountains.

Balete Pas s i s a lo w poin t o n a vas t

ridge comple x tha t form s a watershe d

dividing th e headwaters o f stream s flow -

ing nort h int o th e Cagaya n Valle y from

those flowing south t o the Central Plains.

The pas s proper leads over Balet e Ridge,

which originate s almost tw o mile s westnorthwest o f Balet e Pass an d extend s almost nin e mile s t o th e east-southeast .

In th e are a of immediat e interest t o this

account, th e highes t poin t o f th e ridg e

complex o f whic h Balet e Ridg e form s

a par t i s Mt . Imugan , crestin g a t 5,58 0

feet a mil e an d a hal f nort h o f Salacsa c

Pass No . 1 o n th e Vill a Verd e Trail .

Balete Ridg e itsel f jut s eastwar d of f a

long north-sout h ridg e lin e tha t crosse s

the Vill a Verd e Trai l a t Imuga n an d

merges int o th e jumble d terrai n o f th e

southern Caraball o Mountain s south -

west o f Putlan . Eas t o f Balet e Pass ,

10

 25th Di v F O 16, 1 1 Ma r 45 , an d Chang e No . 1

thereto, 1 4 Mar 45 ; 25t h Di v F O 17 , 1 5 Mar 45 .
518 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Balete Ridg e continue s east-southeas t

three an d a hal f mile s t o Mt . Minami ,

4,530 fee t high . Her e th e ridg e turn s

sharply southwar d fo r a mil e an d end s

at foreste d Mt . Kabuto , 4,600 feet abov e

sea level . Eas t o f Mts. Minami an d Ka -

buto th e slope s fal l awa y towar d th e

Old Spanis h Trail , abou t thre e mile s

distant. Th e Ol d Spanis h Trai l i n thi s

area traverse s partiall y woode d groun d

lying 2,50 0 t o 3,00 0 fee t u p i n th e

Caraballo Mountains.

To th e 25t h Divisio n th e ridges rising

on bot h side s of Route 5 presented, with

their separatin g ravines , difficul t cross -

compartments lying diagonal to th e division's direction of advance. The divisio n

soon learned that the separating ravines,

especially thos e eas t o f Rout e 5 , wer e

so thickl y woode d an d overgrow n wit h

lush, tropica l vegetatio n a s t o b e prac -

tically impassable . Fo r th e most , part ,

the divisio n woul d hav e t o see k footin g

along th e generall y razor-backe d crest s

of th e ridges. Th e divisio n als o quickl y

discovered tha t it s maneuve r possibili -

ties woul d b e limite d becaus e th e major

ridges ha d fe w latera l o r subsidiar y fin -

gers alon g whic h unit s coul d undertak e

outflanking thrusts .

The terrai n woul d provid e th e 25t h

Division wit h plent y o f cove r an d con -

cealment, but this was an advantag e that

would hav e t o b e share d wit h th e Japa -

nese. Indeed , one o f th e 25t h Division's

major problem s woul d b e t o fin d th e

Japanese. Observatio n i n thi s foreste d

terrain wa s so limited tha t troop s would

often b e unabl e t o fin d field s o f fir e an d

would alway s have difficult y clearin g for

the fields . A s on th e Vill a Verd e Trail

and o n Rout e 11 , the Japanes e woul d

have the advantages of observation along

Route 5 .

The 10th Division initially placed the

emphasis o f it s defense s eas t o f Rout e

5.

11

 I n mid-Marc h th e division' s east -

ernmost defense force , the understrength

11th Independent Infantry, wa s de -

ployed acros s th e Ol d Spanis h Trai l

seven o r eigh t mile s nort h o f Carrang -

lan. Th e 10th Infantry, les s tw o battalions, hel d th e easter n en d o f Balet e

Ridge a t Mts . Minam i an d Kabuto .

The regimen t als o ha d troop s o n Mt .

Kanami, th e hig h poin t o f a ridg e lin e

leading north-northwes t fro m Mt .

Minami t o Rout e 5 abou t tw o mile s

northeast o f Sant a Fe .

The 63d Infantry (les s on e battalio n

but wit h thre e provisiona l battalion s attached) defende d Mt . Myoko , on Balet e

Ridge a mil e west-northwes t o f Mt .

Minami, an d Lon e Tre e Hill , midwa y

between Mt . Myok o an d Balet e Pass .

Other troop s o f th e 63d wer e du g i n

along Myok o Ridge , whic h descend s

from th e southwester n corne r o f Mt .

Myoko about thre e miles to a branching

of th e Digdi g Rive r nea r Minuli . Th e

63d Infantry als o ha d force s o n Kapin -

talan Ridge , stretchin g southwes t fro m

Lone Tree Hill t o the Digdig gorge just

north o f barrio Kapintalan . A battalion

each fro m th e 10th and 63d Infantry

Regiments, reinforce d b y tw o provi -

sional battalions , defende d th e ridge s

west o f Rout e 5 north fro m Minuli . A s

of mid-March , the Japanes e had perhap s

8,000 me n i n lin e o n bot h side s o f

Route 5 and o n th e Ol d Spanis h Trail .

Some 6,00 0 o f thes e troop s wer e eas t o f

the highway , th e rest west.

11

 Japanese materia l i n thi s subsectio n i s from :

25th Di v Rpt Luzon , pp. 49-50; 161st In f Rpt Luzon ,

Battle fo r Balet e Pass , pt . I , Genera l Situation , pp .

2-4; Tsuchiy a Statement , States , IV , 403-05; SWP A

Hist Series, II, 478-80 .
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—II : 25T H DIVISIO N O N ROUT E 5 519

ROUTE 5 , heading south through Balete Pass.

The 25t h Divisio n ha d acquire d some

excellent informatio n concernin g th e

dispositions o f th e 10th Division. A

captured fir e pla n o f th e 10th Field

Artillery Regiment gav e th e America n

unit approximat e location s o f Japanes e

field artiller y piece s an d attache d me -

dium and heav y mortars, and, wit h othe r

captured documents, indicate d th e loca -

tion o f man y Japanes e infantr y uni t

command posts . Thoug h providin g in -

valuable order of battle information an d

thereby givin g th e 25t h Divisio n som e

indication o f Japanese strength, th e cap -

tured documents did no t offe r an y intelligence abou t th e locatio n o f infantr y

regimental an d battalio n gun s an d

infantry ligh t mortars. 12

The Plans Amended

The 35t h Infantry's share in the initial

phases o f th e driv e towar d Balet e Pas s

12

 25th Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 49 , 115-16 , 122 .
520 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

can be dismissed rather briefly , althoug h

the effec t o f th e regiment' s attac k u p

the Ol d Spanis h Trai l wa s of consider -

able mor e significanc e tha n th e 25t h

Division kne w a t th e time. 13 B y 1 1

March th e lea d companie s wer e seve n

miles u p th e trai l fro m Carranglan .

Stopping i n fron t o f a stron g Japanes e

roadblock thes e units , o n succeedin g

days, cam e unde r increasingl y heav y ar -

tillery an d morta r fire , agains t whic h

American supportin g artillery , firin g

from extrem e range s o n target s i n un -

mapped country, had difficult y deliverin g

effective counterbatter y fire . Mean -

while, 25t h Divisio n engineer s workin g

on th e Ol d Spanis h Trai l reporte d tha t

soil condition s wer e suc h tha t th e trai l

required extensiv e roc k fil l an d com -

pacting befor e section s o f i t woul d sup -

port heavy military traffic . Sinc e Mullins

felt tha t th e requisit e enginee r effor t

and tim e coul d b e bette r applie d alon g

and close r t o Rout e 5 , h e directe d th e

35th Infantr y t o ceas e it s attack .

For th e Japanese, who at first believe d

that a n entir e America n divisio n ha d

started nort h fro m Carranglan , th e 35t h

Infantry's probin g actio n ha d bee n

downright frightening . Reactin g quick -

ly, Genera l Konum a dispatche d th e

Takachiho Force, a two-battalio n provi -

sional regimen t buil t o n a nucleu s o f

paratroopers, sout h fro m Bamban g t o

reinforce th e 11th Independent Infantry, B y th e tim e th e Takachiho Force

reached th e fron t alon g th e Old Spanis h

Trail o n 2 0 March—th e sam e da y th e

35th Infantr y halted its attack—Konuma

had learne d tha t th e threa t ther e wa s

not as great as he had thought. However ,

he stil l ha d suc h scant y informatio n

about th e situatio n alon g th e trai l tha t

he lef t th e Takachiho Force ther e to -

gether with th e 11th Independent Infantry, thu s pinnin g dow n fou r battalion s

(2,500 t o 3,00 0 men) of hi s best troops .

His intelligenc e wa s so poor tha t i t wa s

not unti l lat e Apri l tha t Konum a con -

cluded tha t th e U.S . I Corp s lacke d th e

strength t o moun t simultaneou s stron g

attacks alon g both Rout e 5 and th e Ol d

Spanish Trail. Unti l then , he constantly

feared a n outflankin g thrus t fro m Car -

ranglan, a fea r tha t wa s logical i n ligh t

of th e earlier , successfu l envelopment s

conducted b y th e 35t h Infantr y a t

Puncan, Digdig , and Putlan .

Meanwhile, th e attack s o f th e 27t h

and 161s t Infantry Regiment s alon g

Route 5 ha d attaine d onl y limite d suc -

cess.14 Fro m 1 2 throug h 1 5 Marc h th e

161st Infantry , employin g onl y on e bat -

talion, secure d hig h groun d adjacen t t o

the west bank o f th e Digdi g Rive r fro m

Putlan nort h t o Minuli . (Map 22)

Troops also gained a foothold on Norton

Ridge, runnin g generall y northwes t

from a branchin g o f th e Digdi g hal f a

mile u p Rout e 5 fro m Minuli . Th e

27th Infantry , devotin g much o f its time

to mopping-up operations in th e vicinity

of Putlan , cleare d Rout e 5 t o a poin t

13

 Information o n th e 35t h Infantry' s attac k an d

the Japanes e reactio n i s from : 25t h Di v Rp t Luzon ,

pp. 27-28 ; 35t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 31-32 ; 35t h In f

S-3 Opn s Rpts , 6-2 5 Ma r 45 ; Konum a Statement ,

States, II, 309-14.

14

 Tactical informatio n i n th e res t o f thi s sub -

section an d i n th e nex t is from: 25t h Di v Rp t Luzon ,

pp. 51-54 ; 25t h Di v G- 3 Opn s Rpts , 11-2 8 Mar 45 ;

27th In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 20-22 ; 27t h In f Uni t Rpts,

11-30 Ma r 45; 35t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 33-36 ; 35t h

Inf S- 3 Opn s Rpts , 12-2 9 Ma r 45; 161st Inf Rp t

Luzon, Battl e fo r Balet e Pass , pt . II , pp . 1-2 ; ibid.,

pt. III, Opn s fo r Norton's Knob , pp . 1-3 ; 161s t Inf

S-3 Opn s Rpts, 12-3 1 Mar 45.
Map 22
522 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

1,000 yard s nort h o f Minul i b y 1 5

March.

Since th e 35t h Infantry' s attac k ove r

the Ol d Spanis h Trai l alread y showe d

clear sign s o f boggin g down , an d sinc e

the 27t h an d 161s t Infantr y Regiment s

had mad e disappointingl y slo w progres s

along Rout e 5 , Genera l Mullins , o n th e

15th, decide d t o revis e hi s plans . H e

relegated th e driv e nort h astrid e Rout e

5 t o th e statu s o f a holdin g attac k an d

planned t o mak e hi s mai n effor t twi n

flanking thrust s eas t o f th e highway .

The 161s t Infantry an d a battalio n o f

the 27t h woul d execut e th e holdin g at -

tack, th e forme r continuin g north alon g

the rising , roug h groun d wes t o f Rout e

5 an d th e latte r clearin g th e highwa y

from Minul i t o Kapintalan . Th e bul k

of th e 27t h Infantr y wa s t o undertak e

one o f th e flankin g attacks , envelopin g

Balete Pas s vi a Myok o Ridge , Mt . My -

oko, an d Lone Tree Hill. Onc e at Lone

Tree Hil l th e regimen t woul d strik e

west-northwest alon g Wolfhound Ridge ,

the nam e applie d t o tha t sectio n o f

Balete Ridg e lyin g betwee n Lon e Tre e

Hill an d Balet e Pass. 15 Th e 35t h Infan -

try, redeployin g fro m th e Ol d Spanis h

Trail, would attac k o n th e right, o r east ,

of th e 27th . Th e 35t h woul d assembl e

near Putla n an d marc h eastwar d fo r

three an d a hal f mile s alon g th e valle y

of th e Putla n River . Th e uni t woul d

then swin g nort h t o seiz e Mt . Kabuto ,

striking thenc e northwestwar d alon g

Balete Ridg e t o gai n contac t wit h th e

27th Infantr y a t Mt . Myoko . Th e 25t h

Division's 65t h Enginee r Battalio n wa s

to buil d comba t suppl y road s int o th e

mountains behin d al l thre e regiments. 16

Reorientation of Effort

The 161s t Infantry launched its attack

west o f Rout e 5 o n 1 6 March , strikin g

for Norton' s Knob , th e northwester n

terminus o f Norto n Ridge . A bare -

crested pea k nearl y 3,00 0 fee t high , Norton's Kno b la y abou t tw o an d three -

quarters mile s northwest o f Minul i an d

a mil e southwes t o f Kapintalan . On e

battalion o f th e 161st , movin g alon g

wooded, conceale d route s wes t o f Nor -

ton Ridge , initiate d th e attac k b y securing th e easter n slope s o f Hil l 4250 ,

three-quarters o f a mile west of Norton's

Knob an d a high poin t along th e north -

south ridg e parallelin g Rout e 5 . Wit h

its lef t an d lef t rea r secured , th e 161s t

then starte d maneuverin g ove r densel y

forested slope s to advance upon Norton's

Knob from th e south and southeast . Fo r

days, stubbor n Japanes e oppositio n

stalemated progress ; poo r visibilit y als o

helped t o slo w th e attack . Visibilit y im -

proved greatl y afte r 105-mm . an d 155 -

mm. howitzers and 4.2-inc h mortars sent

nearly 10,00 0 round s o f hig h explosiv e

and whit e phosphoru s agains t Norton' s

Knob an d it s approaches.

The fina l assaul t a t Norton' s Kno b

entailed a three-pronge d attack fro m th e

west, south , an d southeas t behin d ex -

tremely clos e suppor t o f 37-mm . anti -

tank guns , Canno n Compan y M7's , and

two Sherma n tank s mountin g 105-mm .

howitzers, al l laboriousl y brough t int o

position along Norton Ridge. Th e kno b

fell o n 2 8 Marc h i n th e culminatio n o f 15

 The nam e Wolfhoun d Ridg e derive d fro m th e

27th Infantry' s nickname . Th e Wolfhounds . Th e

names fo r Mts . Myoko, Kanami , Minami , an d Ka -

buto an d associate d ridge s wer e Japanes e i n origin .

16

 25th Di v Rpt Luzon , pp . 53-54 , 58-59 , 169-70 ;

35th In f Rp t Luzon . p . 33 ; 25t h Di v F O 17 , 1 5

Mar 45 .
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—II : 25T H DIVISIO N O N ROUT E 5 523

NEUTRALIZING TH E ENEM Y O N CLIMB T O NORTON' S KNOB

an attack tha t since the 12th had cost th e

161st Infantr y abou t 4 0 me n kille d an d

155 wounded . Th e Japanes e ha d los t

150 killed , bu t manage d t o extricat e

many survivors in goo d order, deploying

them i n ne w position s alon g th e nex t

ridges an d hill s t o th e north .

The 27t h Infantry , lik e th e 161st ,

had som e troubl e gathering momentum,

mainly becaus e unti l 2 2 Marc h i t ha d

to leav e tw o battalion s alon g Rout e 5

to secur e th e division' s rear . O n 2 2

March, finally , th e 1s t Battalion , 27t h

Infantry, bega n spreading eastward from

Route 5 int o high , woode d terrai n u p

to 2,00 0 yard s fro m th e highway , per -

mitting th e 2 d Battalion , whic h ha d al -

ready starte d int o th e hill s nort h o f

Minuli, t o concentrat e its force s fo r th e

drive northeast u p Myok o Ridge . A s o f

28 Marc h th e 1s t Battalio n wa s stil l

1,250 yard s shor t o f Kapintala n alon g

Route 5 an d risin g terrai n adjacen t t o

the road . Th e 2 d Battalio n ha d prog -

ressed almos t 3,75 0 yard s u p foreste d

Myoko Ridge, and wa s on approximately

the sam e east-west lin e a s th e 1s t Battalion. Th e 2 d Battalio n ha d overru n on e

group o f Japanes e outpost s alon g th e

ridge and , fighting onwar d agains t in -
524 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

creasingly stron g resistance , ha d b y 2 8

March gaine d contac t wit h wha t ap -

peared t o b e th e 10th Division's mai n

line o f resistance . Th e 27t h Infantr y

and th e 25th Divisio n had now acquired

sufficient informatio n fro m a variet y o f

sources t o conclud e tha t th e Japanes e

were goin g t o conduc t a determine d

defense o f Myok o Ridg e an d tha t th e

10th Division wa s rapidl y reinforcin g

along th e ridg e an d a t Mt . Myoko .

The 35t h Infantry 's attemp t t o en -

velope vi a Mt . Kabut o starte d ou t wel l

but di d no t en d u p a s hoped. Strikin g

up wooded , steep , trackles s slopes , on e

battalion o f th e 35t h bypasse d th e crests

of Mts . Kabuto and Minam i t o th e east

and the n swun g aroun d t o th e north -

western sid e o f Mt . Kanami . Th e map s

the troop s ha d wer e s o inadequat e tha t

the 35t h Infantr y coul d no t b e certai n

where it s forwar d companie s were , bu t

it appears tha t th e leading units actually

reached a poin t nea r th e cres t o f Mt .

Kanami befor e the y encountere d signifi -

cant opposition. Evidentl y striking westward alon g th e souther n slope s o f Mt .

Kanami, th e tw o forwar d companies , b y

22 March , apparently reached th e northern slop e o f Balet e Ridg e about , tw o

and a hal f mile s eas t o f Balet e Pass .

By this time the Japanese had become

well awar e o f th e 35t h Infantry' s threat .

Accordingly, the y starte d movin g par t

of th e Takachiho Force westwar d fro m

the Ol d Spanis h Trai l t o Mt . Kanam i

and simultaneousl y brough t sout h fro m

Bambang previousl y uncommitte d ele -

ments o f th e 10th Division. Wit h thes e

troops th e Japanes e bega n a serie s o f

counterattacks an d harasse d th e 35t h

Infantry's suppl y line . B y 2 8 March th e

35th wa s stalemated—the problems

involved i n protectin g it s suppl y lin e

made i t impossibl e fo r th e regimen t t o

send sufficien t strengt h forwar d t o Mt .

Kanami t o assur e a continue d advance .

General Mullin s decide d onc e agai n t o

call of f a n attempte d envelopmen t b y

the 35t h Infantry , this time giving a s his

reasons:

First, tha t th e casualtie s incurred i n continuing th e advanc e woul d h e prohibitiv e

as th e terrai n permitte d n o roo m whatso - ever fo r maneuver ; second , th e suppl y

problem coul d ge t ou t o f hand shoul d th e

Japanese elec t t o attac k i n forc e usin g th e

Putlan Rive r Valle y a s a rout e o f ap -

proach; third , a desire t o kee p th e divisio n

front a s tigh t a s wa s tacticall y possible. 17

It woul d appea r tha t th e thir d o f thes e

reasons possesse d th e greates t validity ,

for th e 35t h Infantry' s casualtie s sinc e

15 March ha d bee n appreciably less than

those o f th e othe r tw o regiment s an d

the terrai n i n it s zon e wa s no t muc h

worse tha n tha t close r t o Rout e 5 , espe -

cially i n th e 27t h Infantry' s area. 18

The 25t h Division' s thre e regiment s

were operatin g acros s a fron t si x mile s

wide, al l o f i t i n rough , densely wooded

terrain. The y wer e findin g i t nearl y

impossible t o brin g decisiv e forc e t o

bear a t critica l points an d wer e unable ,

thinly sprea d a s the y were , t o assur e

steady progres s agains t increasingl y

strong Japanese resistance. Though find -

ing it necessar y t o concentrate his forces,

17

 25th Di v Rpt Luzon , p . 53. 18

 Casualties fo r th e perio d 16-3 1 March were :

Regiment

27th

35th

161st

Total

Killed

50

25

35

110

Wounded

160

40

145

345

Total

210

65

180

455

The figure s deriv e fro m al l relevan t regimenta l

sources. Th e divisio n G- 3 Sectio n liste d th e casualties fo r th e sam e perio d a s 12 5 kille d an d 29 0

wounded.
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—II : 25T H DIVISIO N O N ROUT E 5 525

Mullins coul d no t redeplo y th e 27t h

and 161s t Regiments, for to do s o would

open grea t gap s alon g hi s front . Th e

obvious solutio n wa s t o redeplo y th e

35th Infantry .

New estimate s concernin g th e Japa -

nese strengt h o n th e approache s t o th e

pass als o influence d Genera l Mullins .

When th e 25t h Divisio n ha d starte d

north i n lat e February , i t ha d estimate d

that n o mor e than 4,00 0 Japanes e would

defend Rout e 5 an d tha t mos t o f thes e

were concentrate d nea r Sant a Fe . Now ,

in lat e March , th e divisio n G- 2 Sectio n

was estimatin g tha t 8,00 0 t o 10,00 0 Japanese wer e i n positio n t o defen d Rout e

5 an d tha t th e 10th Division mai n lin e

of resistanc e la y sout h o f Balet e Pass. 19

If thi s wer e so—an d th e ne w estimate s

were quit e accurate—i t wel l behoove d

the 25t h Divisio n to apply the principles

of mass and econom y of force . Th e divi -

sion simpl y did no t hav e th e strengt h t o

continue operation s o n s o wid e a front .

From 1 3 Marc h t o th e en d o f th e

month progress had not been that anticipated, bu t th e perio d ende d wit h per -

haps th e mos t importan t singl e tactica l

decision 25t h Divisio n planner s mad e

during th e driv e t o Balet e Pass . O n 2 8

March Genera l Mullin s directe d th e

35th Infantr y t o mov e t o Rout e 5 be -

tween th e 27t h an d 161s t Infantry Regi -

ments. Th e 35t h an d 161st , hi s orders

read, would join i n an attac k northward

astride th e highwa y whil e th e 27t h In -

fantry woul d press with th e utmost vigor

its attac k u p Myok o Ridg e t o envelo p

Balete Pas s fro m th e southeast. 20 Th e

orders se t th e patter n o f 25t h Divisio n

operations fo r th e nex t tw o months .

Another Month's Progress

During th e las t phase s o f th e 161s t

Infantry's attac k a t Norton' s Knob , th e

regiment's 3 d Battalio n ha d lai d som e

groundwork fo r a continuatio n o f th e

attack nort h ove r th e hig h groun d wes t

of Rout e 5.21 Th e battalio n had secured

a foothol d o n th e southwester n portio n

of Highle y Ridge , th e nex t ridg e lin e

north o f Norto n Ridge . Unlik e th e

rest o f th e ridg e line s wes t o f Rout e 5 ,

bare-crested Highle y Ridg e run s south -

west t o northeast , extendin g fro m Hil l

4250 tw o mile s t o a branchin g o f th e

Digdig River half a mile north of Kapintalan. The most prominent feature along

Highley Ridg e i s open-creste d Crum p

Hill, locate d a littl e ove r a mil e north -

east o f Hil l 425 0 an d three-quarter s o f

a mil e north o f Norton's Knob . A creek

the 25t h Divisio n calle d th e Murphre e

River run s throug h th e sharp , woode d

ravine separatin g Norton' s Kno b fro m

Crump Hill. 22

After 2 8 March th e 3 d Battalion , 161st

Infantry, drov e northeast alon g Highle y

Ridge towar d Crum p Hill , whil e othe r

troops o f th e regimen t attempte d wit h

limited succes s t o wor k thei r wa y north

to th e hil l fro m Norton' s Knob . Th e

regiment establishe d a bas e o f fir e o n

Norton's Kno b t o suppor t th e attac k

and se t u p a fir e directio n cente r ther e

to contro l th e fire s o f a heterogeneou s

collection o f weapons . Include d wer e

19

 25th Di v G- 2 Pe r Rpts , 2 1 Feb-3 1 Ma r 45 ,

passim, 35t h In f Jn l Files , 2 1 Feb-3 1 Ma r 45 . 20

 25th Di v FO 18 , 28 Mar 45 .

21

 Information o n 161st Infantry operation s in this

subsection i s from : 25t h Di v Rpt Luzon , pp . 55-58 ,

64; 161s t Inf Rp t Luzon , Battl e fo r Balet e Pass , pt . II, Commentary, pp. 2-3; ibid., pt. IV, 2d Bn Engagements on Highley Ridge, pp. 1-2; ibid., pt. V, 1st Bn

Engagement fo r Balet e Pass , p . 1 ; ibid., pt . VII, 3d

Bn Attac k Highle y Ridge , pp . 1-4 ; 161s t In f S- 3

Opns Rpts, 2 8 Mar-21 Ap r 45. 22

 The name s Norton , Crump , Highley , an d Murphree derive fro m member s of th e 161st Infantry.
526 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

the 2 d Battalion' s heav y machin e gun s

an 81-mm. mortars, a platoon of 4.2-inch

mortars, th e 2 d Battalion's 37-mm. antitank guns, tw o M7's from Canno n Company, an d tw o mediu m tank s wit h

105-mm. howitzers . Th e fir e directio n

center als o controlle d th e employmen t

of th e 105-mm . howitzer s o f th e 89t h

Field Artiller y Battalion , emplace d

farther south .

Although th e 3 d Battalio n gaine d th e

crest o f Crump Hil l o n 8 April an d wa s

ready t o pus h on , Genera l Mullin s or -

dered th e 161st Infantry t o halt . Th e

regiment's righ t flan k wa s no w danger -

ously exposed , fo r th e 35t h Infantry ,

striking nort h alon g an d immediatel y

east o f Rout e 5 , ha d no t kep t pace , an d

Mullins deeme d i t a n unjustifiabl e ris k

to send th e 161st Infantr y farthe r north -

ward. A s it was, the regiment saw plenty

of actio n whil e moppin g u p i n th e

ground i t ha d gaine d — not unti l 2 8

April di d i t overcom e th e las t pocket s

of Japanese resistance in the Crump Hill

area.

The 35t h Infantry' s zon e extende d

about 50 0 yard s wes t o f Rout e 5 an d

2,000 yard s int o th e hig h groun d eas t

of tha t road.23 Th e regimen t began mov -

ing int o its ne w are a o n 2 9 Marc h bu t

until mid-April , require d t o protect th e

25th Division's rear areas, could emplo y

only on e battalio n i n th e attack . Th e

battalion move d firs t agains t a 500-yard -

long ridg e lyin g 2,00 0 yard s southeas t

of Kapintala n an d abou t 1,00 0 yard s

west o f position s th e 27t h Infantr y ha d

attained o n Myok o Ridg e a t th e en d o f

March. Japanes e patrol s fro m base s o n

the shor t ridg e wer e sallyin g fort h t o

harass th e 27t h Infantry' s suppl y lines ,

and unti l th e 35t h Infantr y cleare d tha t

ridge neithe r i t no r th e 27t h woul d b e

able t o advanc e muc h farther .

By 1 1 Apri l th e 35t h Infantr y ha d

captured th e short ridg e an d then , wit h

two battalion s abreast , swun g westwar d

through ravine s an d ove r lo w ridge s t o

Route 5 a t barri o Kapintalan . Troop s

entered the destroyed barrio on 2 1 April,

making Rout e 5 saf e fo r militar y traffi c

that fa r north . A s wa s th e cas e i n th e

161st Infantry 's zone , th e 35t h Infantr y

area neede d a considerabl e amoun t o f

mopping up, an d i t wa s 28 April befor e

the uni t cleane d th e last Japanes e fro m

the ridge s an d ravine s immediatel y eas t

of Rout e 5 betwee n Minul i an d

Kapintalan.

While th e lef t an d cente r regiment s

were makin g slo w progres s u p t o a n

east-west lin e throug h Kapintalan , th e

27th Infantr y wa s havin g a roug h tim e

along Myoko Ridge.24 T o brea k through

the Japanes e defens e lin e tha t i t ha d

discovered some two miles up th e ridge,

the regimen t directe d tw o rifl e com -

panies t o execut e close-in envelopment s

up an d dow n th e ridge' s stee p slope s

while a thir d compan y maintaine d di -

rect fronta l pressure . A singl e mediu m

tank wa s brought u p th e ridg e ove r a

supply road the 65th Engineers had bulldozed alon g the crest. Beyon d th e completed sectio n o f thi s roa d th e terrai n

was such tha t th e tan k foun d i t difficul t

to ge t tractio n an d continuall y threat -

23

 Information o n 35th Infantry operations is from:

25th Di v Rpt Luzon , pp. 55-57; 35th In f Rpt Luzon ,

pp. 36-41 ; 35t h In f Opn s Rpts, 2 9 Mar-23 Ap r 45 ;

35th In f Strengt h an d Casualt y Rpts , 2 9 Mar-2 3

Apr 45 .

24

 Information o n 27t h Infantr y actio n i s from :

25th Di v Rpt Luzon, pp. 59-61; 25t h Div G-3 Opn s

Rpts, 3 0 Mar-22 Ap r 45 ; 27t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp .

22-25; 27t h In f Uni t Rpts, 30 Mar-22 Ap r 45.
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—II : 25T H DIVISIO N O N ROUT E 5 527

ened t o bell y o n th e ridge' s razorbac k

crest.

Believing a t firs t tha t th e Japanes e

had onl y hast y position s o n Myok o

Ridge, th e 27t h Infantr y hope d t o driv e

forward rapidly , bypassin g Japanes e

strongpoints i n orde r t o retai n momen -

tum an d s o complet e th e envelopmen t

of Balet e Pass before th e Japanese could

send mor e reinforcements t o Mt . Myok o

and Balet e Ridge . I n accordanc e wit h

this concept, th e 27t h lef t behin d a Jap -

anese pocke t du g i n alon g a 500-yard -

long, open-toppe d ridg e — The Sca r —

jutting westwar d fro m th e poin t o n

Myoko Ridg e tha t th e regimen t ha d

reached o n 2 8 March . Th e regimen t

also bypasse d a secon d strongpoin t o n

Myoko Ridg e prope r abou t 50 0 yard s

northeast o f Th e Scar .

After movin g aroun d th e secon d

strongpoint, the 27th encountered strong

defenses a t Wood y Hill , a densel y for -

ested prominenc e almost 4,00 0 fee t hig h

centering three-quarters o f a mile northeast o f Th e Scar . Abou t 50 0 yard s lon g

northeast t o southwest , Wood y Hil l

marked th e beginnin g o f th e centra l

mass of Mt. Myoko, a mass that extended

northeastward anothe r mil e an d a hal f

from Wood y Hill's crest t o th e junctio n

of Myok o an d Balet e Ridge s a t Elbo w

Hill. Mt . Myok o itsel f creste d a t ove r

4,500 feet . Nea r th e cente r o f Wood y

Hill la y a forested kno b designate d Th e

Pimple; 30 0 yard s furthe r northeast , o n

the norther n slop e o f Wood y Hill , wa s

another knob , dubbe d Th e Wart .

By 1 2 April, afte r a tw o weeks ' strug -

gle durin g whic h th e terrai n prove d a

more formidabl e enem y tha n th e Japa -

nese, th e 27t h Infantr y ha d secure d a

tenuous foothol d o n th e souther n slope s

of Wood y Hill , markin g a n advanc e o f

no more than 1,000 yards northeast from

the junctio n o f Th e Sca r an d Myok o

Ridge. Japanes e from Th e Sca r and th e

other bypasse d strongpoin t ha d helpe d

inhibit faste r progress . Harassin g th e

27th Infantry' s suppl y line along Myok o

Ridge, the y ha d force d th e regimen t t o

devote muc h o f it s energie s t o cleanin g

out the two pockets, a job not completed

until 1 2 April.

The relativel y slow American advances

between 3 0 Marc h an d 1 2 Apri l gav e

the Japanese ample opportunit y t o reinforce thei r Myok o Ridg e defenses. 25

During this perio d th e Japanese sen t t o

the Myoko Ridge-Mt. Myoko sector four

understrength infantr y battalions , in -

cluding two from th e Old Spanis h Trail.

Thus, whe n th e 27t h Infantr y wa s able

to concentrat e afte r 1 2 April t o resum e

its attack , i t foun d Japanes e defense s

greatly improve d an d defensiv e fire s

augmented by newly arrived mortars and

machine guns. B y the 15th of April th e

regiment's lea d battalio n ha d gaine d

only 25 0 yards , bu t ha d secure d Th e

Pimple. Thi s gai n ha d depende d i n

large measur e upo n tan k support . Ma -

neuvering with grea t difficult y alon g th e

slopes o f Wood y Hill , th e tanks—thre e

were now in th e forward area—no t onl y

provided neede d fir e suppor t t o th e in -

fantry but also had a profound psycholog -

ical effec t upo n th e Japanese , wh o

greeted wit h consternatio n th e appear -

ance o f tank s i n suc h impossibl e terrain.

Not expecting to fin d tank s along Myoko

Ridge, th e Japanes e ha d brough t for -

ward n o antitan k weapon s an d man y

Japanese, overcom e b y surpris e a s tank s

25

 Additional informatio n o n th e Japanese is from:

25th Di v G-2 Pe r Rpts , 30 Mar-21 Apr 45; Tsuchiya

Statement, States, IV , 402-05.
528 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

loomed up through the forest, abandoned

prepared defense s an d fled .

Striking o n fro m Th e Pimple , th e

27th Infantr y seize d Th e War t o n 1 6

April, an d it s leadin g battalio n the n

drove o n towar d a pea k that , ultimatel y

known a s 1s t Battalio n Objective , la y

350 yard s northeast acros s a steep-sided ,

deep ravin e fro m Th e Pimple . Fou r

days an d a doubl e envelopmen t later ,

the 27t h secured 1s t Battalio n Objective .

The regimen t the n turne d it s attention

to 2 d Battalio n Objective— a hil l lyin g

400 yard s northeas t acros s a heavil y

wooded saddl e fro m 1s t Battalio n

Objective. Attacks against 2 d Battalio n Objectiv e

had actuall y begu n o n 1 8 April , whe n

the 27t h Infantr y ha d attempte d a n en -

velopment fro m th e west . Then , th e 2 d

Battalion ha d starte d ou t fro m th e en d

of a 200-yard-lon g ridg e juttin g north -

west fro m Th e Wart , firs t descendin g

into roug h groun d covere d b y dens e

jungle undergrowth . Swingin g north -

eastward unde r th e wester n slope s o f

Myoko Ridge , th e battalio n wa s withi n

a hundre d yard s o f it s targe t b y evenin g

on 2 1 April, bu t the n wa s stoppe d col d

by Japanes e fire . Attempt s t o mov e

around th e flank s o f the Japanes e proved

fruitless — th e 2 d Battalio n coul d fin d

no flank s i n tha t jungle d terrain . Mean -

while, every effort o f th e 1s t Battalio n t o

drive northeastwar d across th e saddl e t o

2d Battalio n Objectiv e ha d als o failed .

The 27t h Infantr y had evidentl y reached

an impasse .

Changing Concepts, 21-23 April

From 2 8 Marc h throug h 2 1 April th e

35th an d 161st Infantry Regiment s ha d

advanced onl y three-quarter s o f a mil e

northward astrid e Route 5, and th e 27t h

Infantry ha d gaine d scarcel y a mil e an d

a quarte r northeast along Myoko Ridge .

With hi s leading elements stil l tw o an d

a quarte r mile s shor t o f Balet e Pass ,

General Mullins, understandably, began

to wonde r if his attack plan s would eve r

be successfull y executed . True , resist -

ance ha d bee n stubborn , an d th e diffi -

cult terrai n had give n all th e advantage s

to th e Japanese . O n th e othe r hand ,

American casualtie s ha d no t bee n ab -

normally high , an d th e thre e attackin g

regiments claime d t o hav e killed a tota l

of 1,60 0 Japanese durin g th e period .

Their ow n losses were :

 26

Unit

27th Infantr y

35th Infantry

161st Infantr y

Total

Killed

65

30

65

160

Wounded

150

145

185

480

Total

215

175

250

460

Whatever th e cause s for th e failur e t o

achieve decisive results, General Mullins

began t o conside r entirel y reorientin g

the division' s effort . H e contemplate d

relegating th e 27t h Infantry' s envelop -

ing maneuve r t o a holdin g attack , vir -

tually placin g th e regimen t i n a reserv e

role. Th e mai n thrust , h e decided ,

might bette r b e a n assaul t astride Route

5 o n a fron t 1,50 0 yards wide . Her e

he woul d plac e emphasi s o n th e 161st

Infantry's zon e west of the highway, with

the 35t h Infantr y continuin g nort h i n

a supportin g drive. 27

At thi s junctur e th e 27t h Infantr y

unexpectedly altere d th e genera l disma l

picture. O n 1 7 Apri l Col . Phili p F .

26

 The source s fo r thes e figure s ar e th e regimenta l

records cited i n the previous subsection. The claime d

figure o f Japanes e kille d i s manifestl y exaggerated . 27

 25th Di v Opn s Pla n B , 2 1 Ap r 45 , 25t h Di v

FO File .
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—II : 25T H DIVISIO N O N ROUT E 5 529

Lindeman, th e regimenta l commander ,

had mad e a n aeria l reconnaissanc e o f

terrain wes t o f Myok o Ridg e an d Mt .

Myoko an d ha d decide d tha t groun d

lying som e 1,00 0 yard s wes t o f Mt .

Myoko migh t provid e a mor e favorabl e

route o f advanc e t o Balet e Ridg e tha n

did th e Mt . Myok o mass itself. 28 Whe n

on th e morning of 21 April his regiment

was stil l stalemate d a t 2 d Battalio n

Objective, Lindema n decide d upo n a

ground reconnaissanc e o f som e o f th e

terrain h e ha d observe d fro m th e air.

He dispatche d tw o six-ma n patrol s west

and northwes t fro m Th e War t an d 1s t

Battalion Objective. 29

During th e cours e o f th e da y Linde -

man furthe r decide d tha t he could prob -

ably sav e tim e an d effor t i f h e sen t ou t

a reconnaissanc e forc e stron g enoug h t o

seize a foothol d o n Balet e Ridg e west -

northwest o f Mt . Myoko . I f th e uni t

succeeded, h e could quickly reinforce it ,

thereby outflankin g th e Japanes e no t

only o n 2 d Battalion Objectiv e bu t als o

on Elbo w Hill , 50 0 yard s nort h o f 2 d

Battalion Objective . Opportunit y migh t

then aris e fo r a quic k das h alon g Balet e

Ridge t o Balet e Pass .

In accordanc e wit h thi s pla n a rein -

forced platoo n o f Compan y G , 27t h In -

fantry struc k northwest from th e vicinit y

of 2 d Battalio n Objectiv e a t 080 0 o n

22 April . Takin g a differen t rout e from

those followed b y the two smaller patrols

—which ha d foun d onl y poo r terrai n

and man y sign s o f Japanes e counter -

reconnaissance—the reinforce d platoo n

escaped detectio n an d lat e i n th e after -

noon was on the southern slope of Balete

Ridge a t a poin t abou t hal f a mil e

northwest o f 2 d Battalio n Objective .

Colonel Lindema n immediatel y mad e

plans t o sen d th e res t o f Compan y G

over th e platoon' s rout e t o Balet e

Ridge.30

Thus, a t th e ver y momen t th e 27t h

Infantry ha d becom e stalemated , th e

regiment ha d discovere d a ga p i n th e

Japanese defensive lin e and a new route

of advanc e towar d Balet e Pass . I f th e

regiment coul d sen d a stron g forc e t o

Balete Ridge , bypassin g Mt . Myoko , 2 d

Battalion Objective , an d Elbo w Hill , i t

could regai n it s los t momentum . Ac -

cordingly, o n 2 3 Apri l th e res t o f th e

2d Battalion , 27t h Infantry , starte d ou t

after Compan y G wit h order s t o driv e

west-northwest along Balete Ridge as far

as Lone Tree Hill, a mile and a quarter

beyond Elbo w Hill . Anothe r battalio n

would continu e th e attac k a t th e Mt .

Myoko mass wit h th e ai m o f openin g a

ridge-crest suppl y lin e tha t woul d avoi d

the extremel y rough groun d ove r whic h

the 2 d Battalio n ha d t o pas s o n it s wa y

to Balet e Ridge . Meanwhile , th e 161st

Infantry would continue its attack northward o n th e wes t sid e o f Rout e 5 an d

would endeavo r t o envelop e Balet e Pass

from th e west . Th e 35t h Infantr y wa s

to plac e th e emphasi s o f it s attac k o n a

drive u p Kapintala n Ridge , ascendin g

northeastward fro m barri o Kapintala n

to Lon e Tree Hill . Wit h thi s attac k o f

the 35th , Genera l Mullin s hope d t o

28

 27t h In f Uni t Rp t 21 , 17 Apr 45 . 29

 Rad, C O 27t h In f t o G- 2 25t h Div , 0945 2 1 Apr

45, and Tel e Msg, S-3 27t h In f t o CO 27t h Inf, 1415

21 Ap r 45 , both in 27t h In f Jnl File , 21 Apr 45 .

30

 Tele Msg, S-2 2 d Bn to S- 2 27t h Inf, 0850 22 Apr;

Tele Msg , CO 2 d B n t o C O 27t h Inf , 162 0 22 Apr;

Tele Msg , CO 27t h In f t o C O 2 d Bn , 181 5 22 Apr;

Rads, C O 27t h In f t o C G 25t h Div , 1825 an d 183 0

22 Apr; 2d B n 27t h In f Uni t Rpt, 1200 2 1 Apr-1200

22 Ap r 45 . Al l i n 27t h In f Jn l File , 22 Apr 45 .
530 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

open a shorte r suppl y rout e t o th e 27t h

Infantry tha n th e roundabou t Myok o

Ridge route. 31

The Envelopment of Balete Pass

Resuming the Attack

The 27t h Infantr y presse d forwar d

enthusiastically, an d o n 2 5 April th e 2 d

Battalion, havin g encountere d negligi -

ble resistance , wa s ato p Lon e Tre e

Hill.32 Th e Japanese , preoccupie d wit h

the situatio n a t Mt . Myoko , ha d lef t

Balete Ridg e wide ope n betwee n Elbo w

and Lon e Tree Hills.

By 2 7 Apri l th e 2 d Battalio n ha d

advanced hal f a mile beyond Lon e Tree

Hill, an d it s forwardmost element s were

only three-quarter s o f a mil e shor t o f

Balete Pass . Here , however , th e battal -

ion ha d t o halt . Japanes e resistanc e wa s

growing stronger ; ther e wer e sign s tha t

a counterattac k wa s brewing ; an d th e

battalion's suppl y situatio n wa s becom -

ing difficult—the Japanes e at Mt. Myok o

still prevente d th e res t o f th e regimen t

from openin g a relativel y eas y Myok o

Ridge-Balete Ridge supply route. Carrying partie s wer e takin g twelv e hours t o

reach th e 2 d Battalio n vi a th e bypas s

west of Elbow Hill , and advers e weathe r

conditions wer e inhibitin g aerial suppl y

operations.

Additional strengt h arrive d a t Lon e

Tree Hil l beginnin g o n 2 8 April whe n

the 3 d Battalion , 27t h Infantry , starte d

moving up , leavin g a battalio n o f th e

35th Infantr y a t Mt . Myok o (th e 1s t

Battalion, 27t h Infantry , guarde d supply

routes). Unfortunately , thi s movemen t

complicated supply problems, for neither

Myoko no r Kapintala n Ridg e wa s ye t

open fo r suppl y movements. Therefore ,

the 2 d Battalion , 27t h Infantry , starte d

a driv e southwest fro m Lon e Tree Hil l

along Kapintala n Ridg e t o hel p troop s

of th e 35t h Infantry , alread y drivin g u p

the ridg e fro m Rout e 5 , t o spee d th e

opening o f a ne w suppl y route .

The 35t h Infantr y ha d starte d u p

Kapintalan Ridg e on 2 3 April, an d fou r

days late r it s leadin g troop s reache d a

knob abou t midwa y betwee n Rout e 5

and Lone Tree Hill.33 Durin g the course

of th e advanc e th e 35t h Infantr y ha d

learned tha t Kapintala n Ridg e wa s a

major Japanes e stronghol d fro m whic h

the Japanes e coul d seriousl y dela y th e

opening o f a suppl y rout e t o th e 27t h

Infantry o n Balet e Ridge . Moreover ,

the Japanes e wer e als o abl e t o mak e i t

difficult fo r th e 35t h Infantr y t o clea r

Route 5 nort h fro m barri o Kapintalan ,

since fro m Kapintala n Ridg e th e Japa -

nese controlle d th e highwa y fo r a mil e

and a hal f sout h o f Balet e Pass .

During th e wee k followin g 2 7 Apri l

a battalio n o f th e 35t h Infantr y secure d

Route 5 fo r three-quarter s o f a mil e

north o f Kapintalan , bu t o n Kapintala n

Ridge th e regiment mad e painfull y slo w

progress. B y 4 Ma y troop s ha d gaine d

only 35 0 yard s o f ne w groun d northeas t

31

 25th Di v Rpt Luzon , pp . 61-64; 25t h Di v G-3

Opns Rpts , 23-2 4 Ap r 45 ; 27t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp .

25-27; 35t h In f Rp t Luzon , p . 41 ; Tele Msg , CO 2 d

Bn t o S- 3 27t h In f (Movemen t Orders, 2 d Bn), 183 0

22 Apr, and Tel e Msg, CO 2 d B n t o CO 27t h In f (2 d

Bn Pla n fo r 2 3 Apr) , 210 0 2 2 Ap r 45 , bot h i n 27t h

Inf Jn l File , 2 2 Ap r 45 . 32

 Materia l o n 27t h Infantr y operation s i n thi s

subsection i s from : 25t h Di v Rpt Luzon , pp . 62-63 ;

27th In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 25-28 ; 27t h In f Uni t Rpts ,

23 Apr-4 Ma y 45 .

33

 Information o n 35t h Infantr y operation s is from:

25th Di v Rpt Luzon , pp. 63-64; 35t h In f Rpt Luzon ,

pp. 41-47; 35t h In f S-3 Opn s Rpts, 22 Apr-5 May 45.
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—II : 25T H DIVISIO N O N ROUT E 5 531

from th e midwa y knob , whil e element s

of th e 27t h Infantr y ha d advance d onl y

500 yards southwest along the ridge from

Lone Tre e Hill . O n th e 4t h th e tw o

regiments wer e stil l 80 0 yard s apar t o n

Kapintalan Ridg e and, sinc e othe r unit s

had mad e n o appreciabl e progres s a t

Mt. Myoko , th e 27t h Infantry' s suppl y

situation alon g Balet e Ridg e wa s stil l

precarious.

While th e 27t h an d 35t h Infantr y

Regiments wer e strugglin g t o secur e

Kapintalan Ridge , th e 161s t Infantry

had initiate d its drive t o envelo p Balet e

Pass o n th e west. 34 Th e 161st' s initia l

objective wa s Kenb u Ridge , th e south -

eastern nos e o f whic h fel l t o th e Digdi g

River gorg e abou t a mil e nort h o f

Kapintalan an d a mil e an d a hal f sout h

of Balet e Pass . Stretchin g northwest -

ward a mile and a quarter, Kenb u Ridg e

joined th e lon g north-sout h ridge , par -

alleling Rout e 5 , hal f a mil e sout h o f

Poulton Hill , the pea k o f which marke d

the wester n en d o f Balet e Ridge . Be -

tween th e 161s t Infantry an d Kenb u

Ridge la y Northwes t o r Banza i Ridge ,

descending fro m Hil l 462 5 o n th e

north-south ridge .

To protec t th e regimenta l lef t agains t

counterattack from th e north-south ridge

line, elements of th e 2 d Battalion , 161st

Infantry, struggle d u p Northwes t Ridg e

to position s nea r Hil l 4625 . Th e res t

of th e battalion , togethe r wit h al l th e

1st Battalion , the n attacke d generall y

north toward Kenb u Ridg e from Crum p

Hill o n Highle y Ridge , which th e 161st

Infantry ha d secure d b y 2 8 April. O n

the mornin g of 4 Ma y th e 1s t Battalio n

grabbed th e southeastern nos e of Kenbu

Ridge, whil e th e 2 d Battalio n pushe d

troops o n t o th e ridg e a hal f a mil e t o

the northwest . Althoug h th e Japanes e

controlled th e intervenin g gap , it ap -

peared tha t wit h anothe r day' s effor t

the 161st woul d clea r al l Kenb u Ridge .

Then th e regimen t coul d pres s rapidl y

on t o steep-sloped , partiall y woode d

Haruna Ridge , th e name give n tha t sec -

tion o f Balet e Ridg e betwee n Balet e

Pass an d Poulto n Hill . Indeed , b y th e

morning o f 4 Ma y troop s al l acros s th e

25th Division' s fron t wer e poise d fo r a

final driv e o n Balet e Pass, awaitin g only

a solutio n t o th e 27t h Infantry' s suppl y

problem befor e jumpin g off.

Planning the Final Drive

Events no w bega n t o mov e wit h

bewildering rapidity. 35 T o Sixt h Arm y

and I Corp s a breakthroug h a t Balet e

Pass seeme d a s imminen t a s i t di d t o

the 25t h Division , bu t Kruege r an d

Swift kne w tha t i f th e breakthroug h

were to be exploited , fres h troop s would

be neede d o n th e Bamban g front .

As o f 4 Ma y condition s withi n th e

25th Division were somewhat better than

those s o seriously affectin g th e 32 d Division's operation s alon g th e Vill a Verd e

Trail. Whe n th e 25t h Divisio n ha d

reached Luzon , i t ha d bee n ou t o f ac -

tion fo r nearl y fiftee n months . Thor -

oughly rested , complete d re-equipped , 34

 Material o n 161s t Infantr y operation s i n thi s

subsection is from : 25t h Di v Rpt Luzon , pp . 64-65 ;

161st In f S-3 Opn s Rpts, 2 3 Apr-5 May 45: 161st Inf

Rpt Luzon , Battl e fo r Balet e Pass , pt . II , Commen -

tary, pp. 3-4; ibid., pt. IV, 2d Bn Engagemen t High -

ley Ridge , p . 2 ; ibid., pt . V , 1s t B n Engagemen t

Balete Pass , pp . 2-3 .

35

 Planning materia l i n thi s subsectio n i s from :

I Corp s Rpt Luzon , pp . 81-84 ; I Corps FO 16 , 2 May

45; 25t h Di v Rp t Luzon , pp. 65-66 ; 25t h Di v FO 19 ,

3 Ma y 45 .
532 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

rebuilt, an d u p t o strength , th e divi -

sion's onl y moral e problem s i n Januar y

1945 wer e thos e stemmin g fro m inac -

tion. Durin g it s operation s o n Luzo n

to 2 1 February , th e divisio n ha d in -

curred abou t 1,00 0 battle casualties, but

when i t ha d starte d u p Rout e 5 i t ha d

already receive d som e replacements an d

had suffere d n o impairmen t t o it s

morale.

Nevertheless, th e 25t h Division' s op -

erations fro m 2 1 Februar y t o 4 Ma y

had bee n bot h costl y an d tiring . Dur -

ing tha t period th e divisio n ha d los t

approximately 480 men kille d and 1,41 5

wounded — the 32 d Divisio n too k 65 0

killed an d 1,50 0 wounded durin g th e

same te n weeks . A s was the cas e withi n

the 32 d Division , sicknes s an d diseas e

were als o beginnin g t o sa p th e comba t

strength o f th e 25th' s thre e infantr y

regiments, althoug h i t appear s tha t th e

25th Division' s nonbattl e casualt y rat e

was no t quit e two-third s tha t o f th e

32d.36 Whateve r th e case, the 25t h Division wa s not, afte r ove r tw o months '

attack, i n conditio n t o exploi t a

breakthrough a t Balet e Pass .

The recen t collaps e o f Japanes e de -

fenses a t Bagui o provide d Sixt h Arm y

and I Corp s wit h a n opportunit y t o

start sendin g a t leas t relativel y fres h

troops t o th e Bamban g front . Accord -

ingly, o n 2 Ma y th e 148t h Infantr y o f

the 37t h Divisio n bega n pullin g int o

the 25t h Division' s are a fro m Baguio .

This reinforcement t o the 25th Division,

together with th e 32 d Division's current

slow progres s a t Salacsa c Pas s No . 1 ,

prompted I Corp s t o exten d th e 25t h

Division's zon e o f responsibilit y onc e

again. Genera l Swif t directe d Mullin s

to strik e nort h throug h Balet e Pas s t o

seize Sant a Fe , secur e Rout e 5 t o Sant a

Fe, clea r th e Vill a Verde Trai l fo r a

mile wes t o f th e village , an d clea n of f

the hig h groun d fo r tw o mile s eas t o f

Santa Fe .

General Mullin s foun d i n th e arriva l

of th e 148t h Infantr y a n opportunit y t o

realign an d concentrat e hi s force s fo r

the fina l driv e throug h Balet e Pass . H e

directed th e 148t h Infantr y t o secure the

25th Division' s rea r an d tak e ove r th e

task o f clearin g th e las t Japanes e fro m

the Mt . Myok o massif . Simultaneously ,

he ordere d th e 27t h an d 161s t Infantry

Regiments to concentrate all their troops

(except thos e require d t o clea r Kenb u

and Kapintala n Ridges ) fo r a n attac k

to envelo p Balet e Pas s fro m th e eas t

and th e west , makin g th e pas s prope r

the 27t h Infantry' s objective . H e in -

structed th e 35t h Infantr y t o emplo y

one battalio n alon g Kapintala n Ridg e

and us e th e rest o f its strength t o secur e

Route 5 north t o Balet e Pass. Al l three

regiments wer e t o b e prepare d t o strik e

quickly towar d Sant a F e onc e th e pas s

was captured .

Mullins wa s callin g fo r a renewed ,

accelerated effor t fro m th e tirin g troop s

of hi s division , on e regimen t o f whic h

still ha d a delicat e suppl y situation . In -

sofar a s the 27t h Infantr y wa s concerned,

Mullins wa s takin g a calculate d risk .

Until tha t regimen t an d th e 35t h Infan -

try coul d ope n th e Kapintala n Ridg e

supply line , th e 27t h Infantr y woul d

have t o depen d upo n intermitten t air -

drops—the weather wa s becoming stead36

 The onl y directl y comparativ e figure s availabl e

show tha t a s o f 4 Ma y th e 35t h Infantry , 25t h Divi -

sion, ha d 2,45 0 effectives—75 0 me n understrength .

On th e sam e da y th e 126t h an d 127t h Infantr y

Regiments o f th e 32 d Divisio n ha d 1,87 5 and 2,175

effectives, respectively .
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—II : 25T H DIVISIO N O N ROUT E 5 533

ily mor e inclemen t wit h th e approac h

of th e rain y season—o r o n hand-carr y

over th e tortuou s bypas s aroun d Mt .

Myoko.

As it prepare d fo r its fina l attack , th e

25th Divisio n ha d reaso n t o believe tha t

the las t Japanes e defense s i n fron t o f

Balete Pas s wer e abou t t o crac k — an

estimate with whic h th e Japanes e would

have agreed . B y 4 Ma y th e 10th Division kne w i t coul d no t hol d ou t muc h

longer.37 Sinc e earl y Marc h th e divi -

sion's defense s acros s Rout e 5 had bee n

strengthened b y tw o battalion s o f th e

10th Infantry, seve n provisional infantr y

battalions, an d th e bul k o f thre e o f th e

four battalion s onc e stationed alon g th e

Old Spanis h Trail . No w no mor e rein -

forcements wer e available , fo r Genera l

Yamashita (wh o had reache d th e Bam -

bang fron t fro m Bagui o i n lat e April )

had decide d t o hol d ou t uncommitte d

units i n th e Bambang-Bagaba g region s

against emergencie s tha t migh t aris e

after th e impendin g fal l o f Balet e Pass .

In all , the Japanes e ha d committe d

perhaps 12,00 0 troop s t o th e defens e o f

Route 5 an d th e Ol d Spanis h Trail .

Probably n o mor e tha n 3,00 0 Japanes e

were stil l i n positio n i n th e Balet e Pas s

area o n 4 May . Such wa s th e stat e o f

communications withi n th e 10th Division tha t th e divisio n commande r ha d

lost almos t al l contro l ove r th e unit ,

though h e apparentl y stil l retaine d rea -

sonably tight control ove r anothe r 3,00 0

troops i n th e Sant a F e are a an d alon g

the Ol d Spanis h Trail .

Denouement at Balete Pass

During th e fina l attac k towar d Balet e

Pass operations to secure the Kapintalan

Ridge supply route to the 27t h Infantry ,

deemed s o vita l o n 4 May , proved rela -

tively unimportant , fo r b y th e tim e th e

25th Divisio n ha d opene d th e suppl y

line, the need for it had virtuall y passed.

Suffice i t t o sa y that i t too k element s o f

the 27t h an d 35t h Infantr y Regiment s

until 1 1 May t o overcom e th e las t orga -

nized resistance along Kapintalan Ridge ,

and th e tw o unit s di d no t finis h mop -

ping u p unti l th e 13th. 38 Th e chronol -

ogy an d significanc e o f 148t h Infantr y

operations a t Mt . Myok o wer e quit e

similar. There , organized resistanc e collapsed on 1 0 May, and th e 148t h finishe d

mopping u p tw o day s later . O n th e

13th th e 3 d Battalio n o f th e 148t h In -

fantry bega n relievin g 27t h Infantr y

troops alon g Balet e Ridg e betwee n Mt .

Myoko and Lon e Tree Hill. 39

While par t o f Mullins ' forc e wa s

bringing thes e periphera l action s t o a

successful conclusion, the drive to Balete

Pass ha d continue d unabated . Th e firs t

step o f th e last attac k too k plac e o n th e

afternoon o f 4 Ma y whe n a comba t

37

 Japanes e informatio n i n thi s subsectio n i s from :

SWPA His t Series , II , 480-82 ; Tsuchiy a Statement ,

States, IV, 402-05; Japanese Studies in WW II, No . 8,

14th Area Army Opn s on Luzon , pp. 127-28 , 130-34 ,

38

 Information o n operation s o f th e 27t h an d 35t h

Regiments i n thi s subsectio n i s from : 25t h Di v Rp t

Luzon, p . 66 ; 27t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 28-30 ; 27t h

Inf Uni t Rpts , 5-14 May 45 ; 35t h In f Rp t Luzon ,

pp. 43-44; 35 h In f S-3 Pe r Rpts , 4-14 May 45. 39

 Informatio n o n th e 148t h Infantr y i n thi s sub -

section i s from : 148t h In f Rp t Luzon , pt . II , Nor -

thern Luzon , pp . 3-4; 148th In f S- 3 Pe r Rpts, 5-14

May 45 .

On 8 May , during a Japanes e counterattac k o n a

newly wo n positio n i n th e Mt . Myok o region , Pfc .

Anthony L. Krotiak o f Company I, 148t h Infantry , at

the cos t o f hi s life , thre w himsel f upo n a Japanes e

hand grenade , thereb y savin g fou r fello w soldier s

from seriou s wound s o r possibl e death . Fo r thi s

heroic action , Privat e Krotia k wa s posthumousl y

awarded th e Meda l o f Honor .
534 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

patrol o f Compan y L , 161s t Infantry,

started du e nort h fro m th e southeaster n

end o f Kenb u Ridge. 40 Ascendin g a

partially wooded north-south ridge lyin g

roughly 50 0 yard s wes t o f Rout e 5 , th e

patrol encountere d littl e oppositio n an d

soon found itsel f safel y o n Haruna Ridge

not mor e tha n 50 0 yard s west o f Balet e

Pass. Durin g the lat e afternoo n an d th e

next mornin g th e res t o f th e 3 d Bat -

talion, 161st, moved up to Haruna Ridge

and, whil e patrollin g i n al l directions ,

held agains t a serie s o f mino r counter -

attacks. Th e battalio n migh t hav e bee n

able t o seiz e Balet e Pas s prope r o n 5

May, bu t mad e n o attemp t t o d o s o

because th e pas s still la y within th e 27t h

Infantry's zon e and becaus e artillery and

mortar fir e supportin g th e latte r regi -

ment's attac k mad e i t impossibl e for th e

161st's 3 d Battalio n t o mov e eastward .

The 27t h Infantry' s attac k towar d th e

pass bega n o n 5 Ma y wit h th e 3 d Bat -

talion striking west-northwest from Lon e

Tree Hil l alon g Wolfhoun d Ridge .

Small group s o f Japanes e defende d

fanatically fro m mino r strongpoint s a t

various knolls an d knobs, an d o n 5 May

the 27th' s battalio n ha d mad e onl y 35 0

yards befor e Japanes e fir e fro m a well -

organized strongpoin t stoppe d it . Tw o

days an d 7 5 dea d Japanes e late r th e

strongpoint fell .

On 8 Ma y Compan y I , 27t h Infantry ,

struck southwes t fro m thi s strongpoin t

along a bare-crested ridge that descended

to Rout e 5 a t a poin t approximatel y

650 yard s south o f Balet e Pass. B y midafternoon th e company , encounterin g

scattered bu t stubbor n resistance , wa s

over halfwa y dow n th e ridge . A t th e

same tim e Compan y A , 27t h Infantry ,

came u p alon g Rout e 5 , deploye d i n

the 161st Infantry's zon e near th e south -

eastern nose of Kenbu Ridge, and starte d

up th e las t reache s o f th e Digdi g Rive r

gorge, her e onl y 5 0 t o 7 5 yard s wes t o f

Route 5. Th e compan y intended to push

to within 50 0 yard s of Balet e Pass, estab -

lish contac t wit h Compan y I o n th e

ridge eas t o f th e highway , an d patro l

to fee l ou t Japanes e strongpoints a t th e

pass. Compan y L woul d tak e u p th e

attack alon g Wolfhoun d Ridg e directl y

toward th e pass, whil e Compan y I hold -

ing o n it s ridge , woul d patro l towar d

Route 5 .

During th e mornin g of 9 Ma y a Company I patrol reached Rout e 5 at Balet e

Pass, findin g n o Japanese , an d lat e tha t

afternoon th e patrol gained contac t with

elements of Company A coming up to the

pass fro m th e south . Meanwhile , othe r

troops of Company A made contact wit h

the 3 d Battalion , 161s t Infantry, o n

Haruna Ridge . O n th e 10th Companies

A an d L , 27t h Infantry , co-operate d t o

clear th e las t Japanes e fro m Wolfhoun d

Ridge jus t eas t o f th e pass . T o al l in -

tents an d purpose s th e 27t h Infantr y

had secure d th e objectiv e fo r whic h th e

25th Divisio n ha d bee n strivin g sinc e

late February. Al l tha t remaine d befor e

General Mullin s coul d declar e Balet e

Pass secur e wa s for th e 35t h Infantr y t o

complete th e jo b o f clearin g Rout e 5

from Kapintala n nort h t o th e pass .

The 35t h Infantr y encountere d a considerable amoun t o f determine d al -

though scattere d resistanc e from isolate d

Japanese strongpoints along the east sid e

of Rout e 5 , bu t o n 1 0 Ma y establishe d

40

 Information o n 161s t Infantry actio n i n this subsection i s from : 25t h Di v Rp t Luzon , pp . 66 , 79 ;

161st In f S-3 Opn s Rpts, 4-14 May 45; 161st Inf Rpt,

Luzon, Battl e fo r Balet e Pass, pt. IV , 2 d B n Engage -

ment Highle y Ridge , pp . 2-3 ; ibid., pt . V , 1st B n

Engagement Balet e Pass, pp. 3-4; ibid., pt. VI, Opns

for Balet e Pass, pp. 1-2 .
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—II : 25T H DIVISIO N O N ROUT E 5 535

contact wit h 27t h Infantr y patrol s fro m

Wolfhound Ridge . Th e 35t h finishe d

mopping u p o n th e 13th , an d o n th e

same da y Genera l Mullin s reporte d t o

General Swif t tha t Rout e 5 wa s ope n

from Sa n Jos e throug h Balet e Pass.

The driv e nort h t o Balet e Pas s fro m

21 Februar y throug h 1 3 Ma y ha d cos t

the 25t h Division' s thre e regiment s

nearly 2,20 0 battle casualties, distributed

as follows:

 41

Regiment

27th

35th

161st

Total

Killed

225

150

170

545

Wounded

560

525

565

1,650

Total

785

675

735

2,195

In additio n th e 148t h Infantry , fightin g

under 25t h Divisio n control since 5 May,

lost about 20 men killed and 95 wounded

during the period 5-13 May.

While th e 25t h Divisio n wa s abl e t o

realign it s force s an d pus h o n towar d

Santa Fe , th e fal l o f Balet e Pass marke d

the en d o f th e 10th Division a s an effec -

tive comba t unit . Sinc e 2 1 Februar y

that divisio n ha d lost almost 7,00 0 me n

killed. It s contro l an d communication s

had broke n dow n completely , i t ha d

lost contac t wit h th e Bambang Branch,

14th Area Army, it s supplie s wer e vir -

tually exhausted , and almos t ever y piec e

of divisio n artiller y ha d bee n capture d

or destroyed . A few isolated units might

continue resistance , bu t a s a whol e th e

10th Division wa s reduce d t o remnan t

status.

Santa Fe and the Villa Verde Trail

Psychologically, t o th e battle-wear y

troops o f th e 25t h Division , th e Luzo n

Campaign mus t hav e seeme d complet e

with th e seizur e o f Balet e Pass. 42 Bu t

with th e division's missio n enlarge d b y

I Corp s o n 2 May, Balete Pass ha d actu -

ally becom e bu t on e mor e spo t o n th e

terrain durin g th e lon g struggl e u p

Route 5 . Th e 25t h Division' s final e

would no t com e unti l th e divisio n ha d

seized th e junctio n o f Rout e 5 an d th e

Villa Verd e Trail a t Sant a Fe . A s long

as Santa Fe remained i n Japanese hands,

just so long could th e 2d Tank Division

continue it s figh t o n th e Vill a Verd e

Trail—even th e shattere d remnant s o f

the 10th Division migh t b e reorganize d

into somethin g resemblin g a n effectiv e

combat uni t i f Yamashit a change d hi s

mind an d decide d t o sen d reinforce -

ments sout h throug h Sant a F e fro m

Bambang. Finally , Sant a F e wa s i n a

very real sens e th e gatewa y t o th e uppe r

Cagayan Valley .

On th e da y tha t Genera l Mullin s

declared Rout e 5 secure throug h Balet e

Pass, th e 25t h Divisio n starte d north -

ward i n accordanc e wit h plan s lai d be -

fore th e pas s fell . Th e 27t h Infantry ,

on th e right , o r east , struc k nort h an d

northeast fro m Wolfhoun d Ridg e t o

clear th e Sawmil l Rive r valley , leadin g

north t o the valley of the Santa Fe Rive r

at Rout e 5 a mile northeast o f Sant a Fe .

Left open , th e Sawmil l Rive r valle y

would provid e th e 10th Division's rem -

nants a rout e o f withdrawa l towar d

Bambang, or , alternatively , giv e Yama -

shita a belated opportunit y to reinforc e

that division .

41

 The figure s ar e based upo n all relevant divisional

regimental source s cite d previousl y i n thi s chapter ,

sources tha t are, as usual , irreconcilable .

42

 General source s fo r this section include : I Corp s

Rpt Luzon , pp. 87-95; I Corps FO's 1 6 and 17 , 2 and

19 May 45; 25t h Di v Rpt Luzon , pp . 71-77 , 82 ; 25th

Div G-3 Opn s Rpts, 1 3 May-1 Jun 45 ; 25th Div FO's

19 an d 20 , 3 an d 1 1 Ma y 45 .
536 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

From 1 4 throug h 2 2 May , operatin g

for th e mos t par t i n heavil y forested ,

rough terrain , th e 27t h Infantr y fough t

to destro y fanaticall y resistin g Japanes e

groups blockin g th e wester n approache s

to the Sawmill Valley. Thi s job finished,

the 3 d Battalio n sprea d ou t ove r th e

valley's souther n reaches , an d th e 1s t

Battalion swun g nort h t o clea n ou t th e

valley t o Rout e 5, task s accomplished b y

24 May. Th e 1s t Battalio n then wheele d

east against Kanam i Ridge , which , end -

ing a t Rout e 5 tw o an d a hal f mile s

north o f Sant a Fe , ha d becom e a Japa -

nese secondar y rout e o f acces s t o bot h

Balete Ridge and th e Old Spanis h Trail.

The 27t h Infantr y foun d considerabl e

scattered resistanc e alon g th e ridge , bu t

by th e en d o f Ma y ha d secure d sufficien t

terrain t o assur e th e safet y o f Sant a F e

against counterattac k fro m th e east. 43

On th e 25t h Division' s lef t th e 161s t

Infantry had to reduce a strong Japanese

pocket o n Mt . Haruna , a pea k o n

Haruna Ridg e half a mile west of Balet e

Pass, befor e advancin g o n northward .

The 161s t overra n th e last resistanc e o n

forested Mt . Harun a durin g 2 2 May ,

and o n th e 24t h tw o battalion s bega n

descending th e norther n slope s o f

Haruna Ridg e towar d th e Vill a Verd e

Trail. Th e unit s foun d th e rough , for -

ested groun d defende d onl y b y a fe w

small group s o f Japanese , an d o n 2 7

May th e 1s t Battalio n reache d th e Vill a

Verde Trail a t a point a mile and three -

quarters west o f Sant a Fe . O n th e sam e

day th e 3 d Battalio n hi t th e trai l hal f

a mil e west of Sant a Fe and immediatel y

dispatched patrols eastward to make contact wit h th e 35t h Infantry , whic h ha d

been drivin g nort h fro m Balet e Pass. 44

Many smal l group s o f Japanes e tha t

were hole d u p i n cave s along both side s

of Rout e 5 north fro m Balet e Pas s ha d

rendered difficul t th e 35t h Infantry' s

task o f clearin g th e highwa y fro m th e

pass t o Sant a Fe . I n a serie s o f patro l

actions tw o battalion s cleare d mos t o f

the regimenta l zon e b y 2 6 May, and o n

the next day the 1s t Battalio n descende d

the last , bare-slope d hil l int o Sant a Fe .

That da y th e battalio n mad e contac t

with th e 161s t Infantr y t o th e wes t an d

the 27t h Infantr y t o th e east .

During the pus h t o Sant a Fe , I Corp s

had agai n extende d th e 25t h Division' s

area o f responsibility . Sinc e th e 32 d

Division wa s still stalled a t Salacsa c Pass

No. 1 Genera l Swift , o n 2 3 May , ha d

directed th e 25t h t o swin g west t o clea r

the Vill a Verd e Trai l a s fa r a s Imuga n

and t o secur e th e dominatin g terrai n

up t o a mil e north o f th e trai l betwee n

Santa F e an d Imugan . T o hel p seiz e

this ne w ground , Swif t attache d th e 32 d

Division's 126t h Infantr y t o th e 25t h

Division, sendin g th e regiment b y truc k

to Balet e Pas s o n 2 4 May .

Passing throug h th e 161s t Infantry ,

the 1s t Battalio n o f th e 126t h struc k

north acros s th e Vill a Verd e Trail ; th e

3d Battalio n drov e nort h o n th e 1st' s

right; th e 2 d Battalio n patrolle d th e

high groun d wes t o f Rout e 5 and nort h

of th e Vill a Verd e Trail i n th e vicinit y

of Sant a Fe . Th e 126t h Infantr y me t

only ligh t an d scattere d resistanc e dur -

ing it s operations, an d b y 2 9 Ma y ha d

cleared almos t al l th e terrai n fo r whic h

43

 27th In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 31-32 ; 27t h In f Uni t

Rpts 12-31 May 45.

44

 161st In f S- 3 Opn s Rpts , 13-3 0 Ma y 45; 161s t

Inf Rp t Luzon , Battl e fo r Balet e Pass, pt . V, 1st B n

Engagement Balet e Pass, pp. 3-5; ibid., pt. VI, Opns

for Balet e Pass, pp. 2-3.
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—II : 25T H DIVISIO N O N ROUT E 5 537

ROUTE 5 , winding south from Santa Fe.

it wa s responsible. O n th e same day the

regiment mad e contac t wit h troop s o f

the 32 d Divisio n nea r Imugan .

If an y single event can b e sai d t o have

marked th e end of the campaign t o open

the Sant a F e approac h t o th e Cagaya n

Valley, it was this 29 May contact between

the force s unde r 25t h an d 32 d Divisio n

control. Tw o day s earlie r Genera l

Mullins ha d reporte d t o I Corp s tha t

Route 5 was secure all th e wa y to Sant a

Fe. O n th e 31st , afte r th e 126t h Infan -

try ha d moppe d up , h e declare d th e

Villa Verd e Trail secur e fro m Sant a F e

to Imugan . Th e convergin g attac k o n

Santa F e wa s over.

Conclusions

With th e completio n o f th e driv e t o

Santa Fe , th e operation s o f Sixt h Arm y

in norther n Luzo n wer e abou t t o pas s

to a ne w stage . Th e tim e wa s ripe t o

exploit th e breakthroug h tha t ha d re -

sulted fro m th e virtua l destructio n o f

the 2d Tank Division and the 10th Division an d t o drive rapidly nort h int o the

Cagayan Valley. Sixt h Army and I Corps
538 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

had alread y lai d plan s fo r suc h a n at -

tack. Fo r th e Japanese , th e fina l col -

lapse o f th e las t defense s a t Balet e Pass ,

Imugan, an d Sant a F e wa s perhaps no t

of a s great immediat e significanc e a s wa s

the seizure of those places to Sixth Army,

for th e 14th Area Army, o n o r abou t

24 May , had alread y directe d th e rem -

nants o f it s tw o division s t o withdra w

to Bambang . Bu t that's anothe r story—

and on e tha t i n n o wa y detracts fro m

the succes s th e 25t h an d 32 d Division s

had achieve d i n drivin g th e Japanes e

out o f thei r defense s o n th e approache s

to th e Bamban g ancho r o f Yamashita' s

defensive triangle .

There can b e n o doub t tha t th e 25t h

Division, a s event s turne d out , ha d

played th e decisiv e rol e i n th e converg -

ing driv e t o Sant a Fe , bu t i t mus t als o

be mad e clea r tha t th e 32 d Division ,

pinning th e 2d Tank Division t o th e

defense o f th e Vill a Verde Trail, ha d i n

large measur e mad e th e 25t h Division' s

success possible . Th e Japanes e had , indeed, bee n force d t o sen d fres h troop s

to Salacsa c Pas s No . 1 to hol d bac k th e

32d Divisio n eve n a s troop s o f th e 25t h

Division wer e climbin g th e las t slop e t o

Balete Pass .

For th e cos t t o th e infantr y force s

engaged i n th e converging attack towar d

Santa F e fro m 2 1 Februar y throug h 3 1

May, se e Table 8 . Th e 2d Tank Division an d th e 10th Division (includin g

attachments) los t a t leas t 13,50 0 me n

killed, o f who m th e 32 d Divisio n dis -

patched abou t 5,75 0 i n th e Vill a Verd e

Trail sector and th e 25t h Divisio n 7,75 0

in th e Rout e 5 zone. 45 Th e Japanes e

losses in killed alone amounted t o nearly

two-thirds o f th e 20,75 0 o r mor e troop s

the Bambang Branch, 14th Area Army,

had committe d t o the Route 5 and Vill a

Verde Trai l battles .

In assessin g th e conduc t o f th e driv e

toward Sant a Fe , on e coul d questio n

whether operation s migh t hav e turne d

out bette r if , from th e initiatio n o f th e

offensive o n 2 1 February, eithe r th e 25t h

or 32 d Division s ha d bee n committe d

on th e Ol d Spanis h Trail an d th e othe r

division concentrate d alon g Rout e 5 .

Much o f the terrai n alon g the Old Span -

ish Trai l nort h fro m Carrangla n i s les s

formidable tha n tha t i n th e Vill a Verd e

Trail secto r — I Corp s migh t hav e

achieved decisiv e result s o n th e Ol d

Spanish Trai l mor e quickl y an d a t les s

cost agains t a Japanes e forc e equa l i n

strength t o tha t defendin g th e Vill a

Verde Trail .

However, whe n th e offensiv e bega n

in lat e February , bot h Sixt h Arm y an d

I Corp s ha d believe d i t necessar y t o

maintain a continuou s lin e acros s th e

corps fron t fro m th e west coast o f Luzo n

east a t leas t a s fa r a s Sa n Jose . More -

over, plan s ha d the n calle d fo r th e 32 d

Division t o devot e par t o f it s energie s

to an attac k towar d Bagui o u p th e rive r

valleys betwee n th e Vill a Verd e Trai l

and Rout e 11 . To hav e redeploye d th e

32d Divisio n eastwar d woul d hav e lef t

a hug e ga p i n th e I Corp s center, a ga p

inviting Japanes e counteraction . Then ,

when th e 33 d Divisio n sprea d eastwar d

in earl y Apri l t o tak e ove r th e rive r

valleys o n th e 32 d Division' s left , i t

would hav e bee n uneconomica l t o hav e

redeployed th e 32 d Division . I n an y

case, ha d th e 32 d move d ove r t o th e

Old Spanis h Trai l i n April , i t woul d

45

 The figure s fo r Japanese kille d ar e base d upo n a

study of all relevant Japanese and U.S . Arm y sources.

The 32 d Divisio n claime d i t kille d 7,67 5 Japanes e

and th e 25t h Divisio n claime d approximatel y 9,150 ,

a tota l o f 16,825 .
THE BAMBAN G FRONT—II : 25T H DIVISIO N O N ROUT E 5 539

TABLE 8—U.S . INFANTR Y CASUALTIE S I N ATTAC K TOWAR D SANT A F E

21 FEBRUARY-3 1 MA Y 1945

Source: Derive d fro m source s cite d previousl y i n this chapte r an d i n Chapte r XXVI. Broke n dow n anothe r way , th e figure s sho w tha t

infantry unit s o f th e 32 d Divisio n los t a tota l o f 3,02 5 men—83 5 kille d an d 2,19 0 wounded ; th e 25t h Division , proper , ha d a tota l of 2,57 0

casualties—650 kille d an d 1,92 0 wounded .

have ha d t o leav e a t leas t a regimen t

behind t o bloc k th e Vill a Verd e Trai l

and contai n th e Japanese there . I n tha t

event, th e divisio n migh t no t hav e ha d

sufficient strengt h t o achiev e decisiv e re -

sults o n th e Ol d Spanis h Trail. Finally ,

the map s availabl e t o Sixt h Arm y an d

I Corp s i n lat e Februar y wer e s o inade -

quate an d inaccurat e tha t planner s a t

the tw o headquarter s coul d no t hav e

found an y advantage for the Old Spanis h

Trail ove r th e Vill a Verd e Trail .

In th e end , as i n th e beginning , th e

only rea l solutio n t o th e problem facin g

I Corp s woul d hav e bee n a t leas t on e

more infantry , division . A s a resul t o f

General MacArthur' s directive s o f earl y

February, Sixt h Arm y coul d mak e n o

more strengt h availabl e t o I Corps. T o

army an d corps , therefore , th e plan s un -

der whic h th e campaig n wa s conducte d

seemed thos e bes t calculate d t o assur e

safety agains t Japanes e counterattac k

while a t th e sam e tim e givin g promis e

of stead y progres s towar d Sant a Fe .

There ar e als o a fe w obviou s com -

ments tha t ca n b e mad e about th e Japanese conduc t o f th e defense . Th e 10th

Division, for instance, apparently di d a n

inordinately poo r job o f reconnaissance ,

as i s exemplifie d b y th e fac t tha t i t lef t

strong force s alon g th e Ol d Spanis h

Trail for nearly a month afte r th e threa t

there had passed , a month during whic h

the nee d fo r additiona l strengt h wa s

acute alon g Rout e 5 . Furthermore , th e

division seems t o hav e been preoccupie d

with it s defense s o n th e eas t sid e o f

Route 5 , an d lon g ha d insufficien t

strength west o f th e highway . Th e divi -

sion wa s also s o concerned wit h th e de -

fense of the obvious approaches to Balete
540 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Ridge tha t i t faile d t o mak e adequat e

provision fo r th e defens e o f th e ridg e

proper. Finally , the 10th Division made

no rea l effor t t o seiz e clear opportunitie s

for counterattack . I t coul d hav e em -

ployed th e force s immobilize d alon g th e

Old Spanis h Trai l t o strik e eithe r

through th e Putla n Valle y o r agains t

the flan k o f 25t h Divisio n unit s a t Mt .

Myoko.46 On e can also question whether

the Japanes e mad e th e mos t effectiv e

use o f their opportunities fo r concentra -

tion an d econom y o f force . The y an -

swered I Corps ' two-divisio n driv e b y

dividing and spreading their force s fairl y

thin a t th e crucia l tim e an d ove r th e

critical terrain . Th e outcom e migh t

have been delaye d ha d th e 2d Tank an d

10th Divisions concentrate d alon g a

shorter, tighte r line .

The fiel d o f militar y operation s is —

either fortunatel y o r unfortunately—full

of possibilitie s for such interesting speculations, bu t i f on e thin g i s certain i t i s

that a t th e en d o f Ma y neithe r Genera l

Krueger no r Genera l Yamashit a wer e

indulging i n thought s o f wha t migh t

have been . O n th e on e han d th e Sixt h

Army commande r wa s bus y preparin g

to exploi t th e breakthroug h a t Balet e

Pass. O n th e other, the 14th Area Army

commander wa s franticall y tryin g t o

ready new defenses i n fron t o f Bambang.

Yamashita viewe d wit h disma y th e fac t

that th e 2d Tank an d 10th Divisions

had collapsed , leavin g ope n th e road t o

the Bamban g ancho r o f hi s defensiv e

triangle. A mont h earlie r th e Bagui o

apex o f th e triangl e had fallen , an d no w

the onl y forc e stil l holdin g at on e o f th e

three origina l apexe s wa s the 19th Division i n th e Bonto c region . Colone l

Volckmann's USAFIP(NL ) ha d bee n

attacking towar d thi s are a sinc e March ,

and a t th e en d o f Ma y the USAFIP(NL)

was poise d fo r a breakthrough .

46

 In SWP A Historica l Series, II , 480 , and i n Tsuchiva Statement, in Statements, IV, 402-05, ther e are

indications tha t th e 10th Division di d mak e som e

effort t o moun t a counterattac k i n mid-April . Th e

25th Division , durin g thi s period , remarke d onl y

increased Japanes e patrollin g activit y alon g th e

Putlan Rive r valley.
CHAPTER XXVII I

Action a t th e Northern Apex

Northwestern Luzon

The motive s tha t prompte d Genera l

Krueger t o direc t USAFI P (NL) t o at -

tack inlan d fro m Luzon' s west coas t to -

ward Bonto c wer e simila r t o thos e tha t

had led to I Corps' drives toward Baguio

and Bambang , fo r Bonto c wa s equall y

important i n th e Japanes e schem e o f

defense i n norther n Luzon. 1 Th e prin -

cipal roa d junction s o f northwester n

Luzon—that portio n o f th e islan d lyin g

north o f Sa n Fernando , L a Union , an d

west o f th e Cagaya n Valley—li e with -

in relativel y eas y distanc e o f Bontoc .

Krueger kne w tha t i f Volckmann' s

USAFIP (NL) coul d seiz e an d hol d

these roa d junctions , simultaneousl y

securing control o f Rout e 4 inland fro m

Libtong (o n th e coast ) t o Bontoc , th e

guerrilla divisio n woul d effectivel y iso -

late Japanes e force s i n northwester n

Luzon. Th e USAFI P (NL) woul d als o

be abl e t o bloc k Japanes e secondar y

routes o f acces s fro m th e Cagaya n Val -

ley t o Yamashita' s defensiv e triangle ,

making i t nearl y impossibl e fo r th e

Shobu Group t o mov e troop s an d sup -

plies from th e centra l an d norther n sec -

tions o f th e valle y int o th e redoubt .

The succes s o f USAFI P (NL)'s impend -

ing attack , togethe r wit h th e succes s o f

I Corp s operations at Baguio and Balet e

Pass, woul d seriousl y curtai l th e Shobu

Group's freedo m o f maneuve r aroun d

the peripher y o f th e defensiv e triangl e

—and onl y th e periphera l road s coul d

bear militar y traffic . Finally , i f i t suc -

ceeded i n opening Rout e 4 inland fro m

Libtong, th e USAFI P (NL) woul d pro -

vide Sixt h Arm y wit h a bac k doo r

entrance t o Yamashita' s triangula r re -

doubt. (See Map 19.)

The Roads and the Terrain

Bontoc, capita l o f Mountai n Prov -

ince, lie s i n th e valle y o f th e Caycaya n

River abou t 2,75 0 fee t u p i n th e Cor -

dillera Central , th e backbon e rang e o f

northwestern Luzon . Th e tow n i s th e

site o f on e o f tw o junctions o f Route s 4

and 11 . Comin g northeast from Baguio ,

Route 1 1 travels mor e o r les s alon g th e

top o f the Cordillera Centra l and, reaching spots over 8,500 feet abov e sea level,

alternately traverse s grass y slope s an d

forested ridges . Alon g it s ninet y mile s

of roa d distanc e t o Bontoc , th e highwa y

provides som e o f th e mos t spectacula r

scenery i n th e world .

Unpaved i n 194 5 betwee n Baguio and

Bontoc, Rout e 1 1 was scarcely tw o lanes

wide along most of its length. Th e road ,

only on e narro w lan e wid e an d poorl y

surfaced, continue s northeast fro m Bon -

toc along the canyon of the Chico River,

1

 Additional backgroun d materia l o n th e decisio n

to sen d th e USAFI P (NL) towar d Bonto c i s t o b e found i n Chapte r XXIV, above.
542 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

emerging into the central portio n o f the

Cagayan Valle y nearl y 3 5 miles—i n a

straight line—beyon d Bontoc . A t Sab -

angan, 1 6 mile s southwes t o f Bontoc ,

Route 1 1 make s it s firs t junctio n wit h

Route 4 , th e tw o travelin g togethe r t o

Bontoc. Rout e 4 , a narrow , unpave d

road, strike s southeast fro m Bonto c an d

after traversin g high , ver y roug h coun -

try, join s Rout e 5 a t Bagabag , abou t

twenty-five mile s nort h o f Bambang .

Over one-lan e Rout e 4 , th e distanc e

between Bonto c and Bagaba g is approximately sevent y miles .

The junctio n barri o o f Sabangan ,

3,500 fee t abov e se a level , i s 6 0 mile s

inland fro m Libton g vi a Rout e 4—a s

opposed t o 3 2 mile s straight-lin e dis -

tance. Abou t 2 4 roa d mile s wes t o f

Sabangan is the tow n o f Cervantes, lyin g

1,000 fee t abov e se a leve l i n th e valle y

of th e Abr a River . Goin g wes t fro m

Cervantes Rout e 4 traverse s firs t a mil e

or s o o f open , rice-padd y country , bu t

then starts abruptly up th e grassy eastern

slopes o f th e Ilocos , o r Malaya , Range .

In th e nex t tw o mile s o f straigh t dis -

tance westward , th e one-lan e unpave d

road climb s t o 4,60 0 fee t a t Bessan g

Pass,2 wher e i t goe s throug h a cu t i n a

sheer roc k ridg e nose . I n anothe r

straight-line distanc e o f som e fiv e miles ,

the roa d twist s violentl y dow n th e west -

ern slope s o f th e Ilocos Rang e t o a 500 -

foot elevatio n i n th e Amburaya n Rive r

valley.

Like Sabangan, Cervantes is an impor -

tant roa d junctio n town . Sout h fro m

Cervantes Rout e 393 , a one-lane , dir t

road, ascend s a spu r o f th e Cordiller a

Central, risin g fro m les s tha n 1,00 0 fee t

at Cervante s t o abou t 5,80 0 fee t a t it s

junction wit h Rout e 11 , fourteen mile s

in a straight line southeast of Cervantes. 3

Passing th e Lepant o Coppe r Min e an d

through th e municipalit y o f Mankayan ,

Route 39 3 join s Rout e 1 1 a t K P 90 ,

fifty-six mile s northeas t o f Bagui o an d

twenty mile s southwes t o f Sabangan .

Route 39 3 descend s th e eas t sid e o f th e

ridge alon g whic h Rout e 1 1 run s a t

KP 90 , dropping into the tiny but beau -

tiful Lo o Valley . Situate d abou t 5,10 0

feet abov e se a level , th e Lo o Valle y i s

on th e upper reaches of the Agn o River,

the headwaters of whic h ris e o n th e east

side o f Rout e 1 1 les s tha n fou r mile s

northeast o f K P 90 .

Mankayan wa s o f grea t importanc e

to th e Japanese who, in referrin g t o th e

northern apex of their defensive triangle ,

spoke o f Mankaya n an d Bonto c i n th e

same breath . On e reason , o f course ,

was tha t Mankaya n provide d th e Shobu

Group wit h a n idea l assembl y are a

whence troops could move rapidly either

to Rout e 1 1 o r t o Rout e 4 . O f mor e

importance wa s th e nearb y Lepant o

Copper Mine , si x twistin g mile s north -

west along Route 39 3 from K P 90 . Th e

Japanese ha d spen t a n extraordinar y

amount o f effor t developin g this mine—

coming close t o ruining it i n th e process

—and ha d trucke d th e ric h or e north -

west alon g Rout e 39 3 t o Cervante s an d

thence west along Route 4, over Bessan g

Pass, to the coast for shipment t o Japan.4

2

 Bessang Pas s i s actuall y a redundancy , sinc e i n

the loca l Filipin o dialec t a "bessang " is itsel f a cu t

or pass .

3

 Route 39 3 i s a wartim e designation , an d th e

road ha s n o officia l numerica l designatio n i n th e

Philippine highwa y system . 4

 The mine , of extreme antiquity, was worked lon g

before th e Spanish came to the Philippines . I n Apri l

1957, whe n th e autho r wa s a t th e mine , truck s n o

longer use d Rout e 39 3 t o Rout e 4 , but instea d too k

Route 39 3 t o K P 90 , followe d Rout e 1 1 to Baguio ,

and the n Route s 9 and 3 to San Fernando, La Union .
ACTION A T TH E NORTHER N APE X 543

Just a s th e headwater s o f th e Agn o

rise o n th e eas t sid e o f Rout e 1 1 near

KP 90 , s o th e headwater s o f th e Abr a

River ris e o n th e west sid e o f th e high -

way about a mile and a half sout h o f KP

90. Th e Abr a syste m i s rivale d i n siz e

on Luzo n onl y b y th e Agn o an d Pam -

panga, drainin g throug h th e Centra l

Plains, an d th e Cagayan-Maga t comple x

of th e Cagaya n Valley . Fro m it s head -

waters th e Abra , passin g b y Cervantes ,

flows almost due north fo r seventy miles.

Then, gathering to itself a n increasingl y

large numbe r o f tributaries , th e rive r

turns westwar d fo r som e sixtee n mile s

and emptie s int o th e Sout h Chin a Se a

near Vigan, on Rout e 3 about forty mile s

up Luzon' s wes t coast fro m Libtong .

Route 3 , th e coasta l highway , continue s

north from Viga n some fift y mile s to th e

large tow n o f Laoag , an d the n stretche s

on northwar d t o roun d Luzon' s north -

western ti p an d continu e east alon g th e

north coast t o Aparri , a t th e mout h o f

the Cagaya n Valley .

From Laoag , Rout e 2 extend s inlan d

about fiftee n mile s alon g variou s rive r

valleys. Th e rout e the n degenerate s

into a foo t trai l tha t crosse s th e Cor -

dillera Central , swing s southeast , an d

emerges a s a narro w roa d runnin g east -

ward throug h th e north-centra l par t o f

the Cagaya n Valle y t o th e Cagaya n

River. Originatin g a t Sulvec , te n mile s

south o f Vigan , i s Rout e 6 , whic h run s

inland along the valley s of th e Abra an d

other rivers for about thirt y miles. Th e

road the n turn s int o a n exhaustin g foo t

trail tha t crosse s th e Cordiller a Centra l

and join s Rout e 1 1 abou t twenty-fiv e

miles northeast of Bontoc. Neither Route

2 nor Rout e 6 throug h th e Cordiller a

Central i s a roa d ove r whic h significan t

military operation s ca n b e conducted ;

Route 1 1 from Bonto c t o th e Cagaya n

Valley fit s int o th e sam e category .

Except alon g th e coasta l river valleys ,

there i s scan t populatio n i n th e vas t

mountainous area of northwestern Luzon,

which extend s ove r 7 0 mile s fro m th e

west coast to the Cagaya n Valley and 14 0

miles nort h fro m Sa n Fernando , L a

Union, t o Cap e Bojeado r a t Luzon' s

northwestern tip . Barren i s th e wor d

to bes t describ e muc h o f th e country .

Imposing i n thei r grandeur, most o f th e

steep-sided mountain s ar e grass y sloped .

Thick fores t i s th e exceptio n i n thi s

region, an d i n clea r weathe r i t i s eas y

to pinpoin t movement s o f me n an d

vehicles at unbelievabl e distances. Som e

ravines among the mountains have fairly

thick wood s an d dens e undergrowth ,

but lus h tropica l growt h i s no t t o b e

encountered excep t alon g th e coast .

Along Route 4 inland fro m Libtong , fo r

example, ther e i s rathe r scrubb y jungl e

growth u p t o a height of 3,000 feet above

sea leve l alon g the wester n slope s o f th e

Ilocos Range . Fro m thi s poin t t o Bes -

sang Pas s scattere d pines , patche s o f

which ar e intersperse d wit h ope n grass -

land, account fo r most o f th e vegetation .

The eas t side of the Iloco s Range, where

Route 4 descend s t o Cervantes , i s

completely ope n an d grassy .

The jumbled , rough, and stee p mountainous terrai n o f northwester n Luzo n

makes a major militar y effort a problem

even i n dr y weather . Rout e 4 , th e

USAFIP (NL)'s axis o f approac h towar d

Bontoc, traverse s muc h roughe r terrai n

than Rout e 5 betwee n Sa n Jos e an d

Santa Fe , an d I Corp s observer s de -

clared durin g th e wa r tha t th e terrai n

along Rout e 4 wa s mor e difficul t tha n

that th e Villa Verd e Trail crosses. Th e

foot trai l portion s o f Route s 2 an d 6
544 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

make th e Vill a Verd e Trail loo k lik e a

superhighway, whil e Rout e 1 1 between

Bontoc an d th e Cagaya n Valle y i s on e

of th e roughest thoroughfare s o n Luzo n

to b e dignifie d b y th e name road.

The road s of northwester n Luzo n ar e

bad enoug h i n dr y weather . I n we t

weather, eve n i n peacetime , th e tas k o f

road maintenance is herculean. Summe r

rainfalls o f over te n inche s a day are no t

uncommon in the mountains. Fo r Rout e

4 from Libton g to Bontoc—and for other

roads a s well—suc h rain s mea n land -

slides an d washouts , couple d wit h flas h

floods tha t tea r ou t bridge s an d rende r

sections o f th e roa d impassabl e quag -

mires. Th e USAFI P (NL) woul d hav e

to strive to secure Route 4 from Libton g

to Bonto c befor e th e heav y rain s bega n

toward th e en d o f May , o r i t migh t b e

unable t o accomplis h it s mission .

The Protagonists

While it was not until lat e March tha t

General Kruege r directe d th e USAFI P

(NL) t o ope n a thir d fron t i n norther n

Luzon with a concerted offensiv e towar d

Bontoc, stron g element s o f Colone l

Volckmann's guerrilla forc e ha d been i n

action throughou t northwester n Luzo n

ever sinc e th e Sixt h Arm y ha d com e

ashore a t Lingaye n Gulf. 5 Th e regio n

north o f an east-west line through Viga n

was th e responsibilit y o f th e USAFI P

(NL)'s 15t h Infantry , Lt . Col . Rober t

H. Arnol d commanding. 6 Wit h a n os -

tensible muste r o f abou t 2,90 0 officer s

and men , the 15t h Infantry wa s understrength, ill trained, and poorly equipped.

In earl y Januar y th e regiment' s thre e

battalions wer e scattered alon g the western slope s of th e Iloco s Mountains from

Vigan t o a hideou t northeas t o f Laoag .

The countr y sout h o f th e lin e throug h

Vigan wa s the responsibility of th e 121st

Infantry, under Col. George M. Barnett.7

Most o f th e 121st was operating i n th e

vicinity o f Sa n Fernando , bu t th e 3 d

Battalion wa s in th e hill s nea r Rout e 3

from Libton g north towar d Vigan. Th e

3d Battalion , 66t h Infantry , wa s harassing Japanes e convoy s alon g Rout e 1 1

from Bagui o t o K P 90 ; troop s o f th e

1st Battalion , 11t h Infantry, wer e man -

ning ambushe s i n th e Sabangan-Bonto c

area and along Route 1 1 between Bontoc

and th e Cagaya n Valley . Th e bul k o f

the 66t h Infantr y late r move d sout h t o

support th e 43 d an d 33 d Division s o n

the Bagui o front ; th e res t o f th e 11th

Infantry operated in th e Cagayan Valley.

The Cagaya n Valley and its surrounding

hills wer e als o "home " fo r USAFI P

(NL)'s 14t h Infantry, whic h doe s no t

figure i n the stor y i n northwester n

Luzon.

In earl y January the principal missio n

of USAFI P (NL) unit s i n northwester n

Luzon wa s t o gathe r intelligenc e an d

institute a progra m o f sabotag e an d

demolitions designe d t o cu t Japanes e

lines o f communicatio n throughou t th e

region. Bu t a s wa s th e cas e everywher e

under Volckmann's spher e o f influence ,

Sixth Army's landin g precipitate d mor e

direct actio n amon g th e guerrill a unit s

in northwester n Luzon , leadin g ulti -

mately t o suc h operation s a s th e 121s t

Infantry's investitur e o f Sa n Fernando. 8

Thus, whil e mos t o f th e 121st Infantry

5

 Information o n th e USAFI P (NL) i n thi s sub -

section is based mainl y on: USAFI P (NL) Rpt, pp. 2 ,

12, 30-31, 38 , 41-45, 62-65. 6

 A Signa l Corp s office r who , statione d i n norther n

Luzon a t th e outbrea k o f war, "failed" t o surrender.

7

 Another unsurrendere d officer . 8

 See above, ch. XXV.
ACTION A T TH E NORTHER N APE X 545

concentrated i n th e Sa n Fernand o area ,

the regiment' s 3 d Battalio n move d t o

clear Rout e 3 fro m Libton g nort h t o

Vigan. Meanwhile , th e 15t h Infantry

started operation s t o driv e th e Japanese

from th e res t o f northwester n Luzon .

The Japanes e against whom th e USAFIP (NL)'s units began movin g i n earl y

January were little better prepared tha n

the USAFI P (NL) t o conduc t majo r

engagements. I n th e earl y week s o f the

Luzon Campaign (befor e th e 19th Division starte d nort h fro m Baguio) , ther e

were som e 8,00 0 Japanes e in north -

western Luzon, most of them near Vigan

and Laoag. 9 Th e tw o towns had been o f

considerable importanc e t o th e enem y

ever since the opening days of the Pacifi c

war, th e Japanes e havin g seize d Viga n

on 1 0 Decembe r 194 1 an d Laoa g th e

next day. 10 Throughou t th e wa r th e

Japanese ha d maintaine d a n airfiel d a t

Gabu, nea r Laoag , an d anothe r nea r

Vigan. Bot h town s wer e secondar y bas e

areas, althoug h mos t shippin g tha t pu t

into Luzo n nort h o f Sa n Fernand o use d

Salomague Harbor , fiftee n mile s nort h

of Vigan . Th e las t Japanes e convo y t o

reach Luzo n arrive d i n th e Viga n are a

on o r abou t 3 0 Decembe r 1944 , where

it suffere d heavil y a t th e hand s o f Fift h

Air Forc e planes. 11

In earl y Januar y th e majo r Japanes e

combat unit in northwester n Luzo n wa s

the RCT-size d Araki Force, whic h wa s

built aroun d tw o independen t infantr y

battalions o f th e 79th Infantry Brigade,

103d Division.

12 Ma j Gen . Shoj i Araki ,

the forc e commander , statione d abou t

2,500 o f hi s 3,00 0 me n alon g Rout e 6

from Sulve c northeas t fiftee n mile s t o

Bangued. Hi s othe r 50 0 troop s h e scat -

tered i n smal l detachment s alon g th e

coast fro m Viga n north . Arak i ha d n o

control ove r th e 500-ma n 357th Independent Infantry Battalion, 103d Division, whic h hel d Rout e 4 . Th e 357th

operated unde r th e direc t contro l o f

Shobu Group headquarter s i n Baguio ,

while Genera l Arak i reporte d t o 103d

Division headquarters , nea r Aparri .

The remainin g 4,50 0 Japanes e i n

northwestern Luzo n included a few antiaircraft units , Japanes e Arm y Air Forc e

ground organizations , an d som e Arm y

port an d servic e troops . O f thi s grou p

about 2,00 0 were stationed i n th e Laoa g

area, 2,00 0 mor e a t o r nea r Salomagu e

Harbor, an d 50 0 a t Vigan , wher e th e

Araki Force ha d 25 0 men. There wer e

minor garrisons, varyin g from 2 0 to 10 0

men i n strength , a t a numbe r o f coasta l

barrios an d inlan d a t suc h point s a s

Cervantes, Mankayan , Sabangan , an d

Bontoc.

Most o f Genera l Araki' s me n wer e

garrison troop s rendere d sof t an d inef -

ficient b y lon g servic e o n occupatio n

duties. Th e servic e unit s containe d a

large percentag e o f Formosan s an d 9

 Japanese information i n this chapter is based on: 14th Area Army Opn s o n Luzon , pp. 89-94, 99-108,

114-17, 128 ; 14th Area Army Opn s Orders Nos. A-487

and A-517 , 3 and 1 3 Feb 45 , Trans, III, item 3 : 14th

Area Army T r Or g List ; Interro g o f Co l Setom u

Terau (Cof S 19th Div), USAFI P (NL) Rpt, pp . 148 -

50; USAFI P (NL) Rpt, pp . 19-21 , 40-41, 61 ff.; Sixth

Army G-2 Wkl y Rpt 86 , 2 May 45; SWPA Hist Series,

II, 421, 470-71, 489; ibid., II, Maps following pp . 419,

468, an d 485 . 10

 See Morton , Fall of the Philippines, pp . 106-08 . 11

 See above, ch. III.

12

 As originally constituted , Araki Force wa s composed o f th e 176th IIB, th e 178th IIB les s tw o in -

fantry companie s an d a machin e gu n company , th e

26th Machine Gun Battalion less one company , 79th

Brigade headquarters , an d brigad e servic e troops .

Later, organizin g variou s servic e troop s an d antiair -

craft units in northwestern Luzon, Araki Force added

two provisiona l infantr y battalion s an d tw o machine

cannon (20-mm . o r 40-mm. ) companies.
546 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Koreans wh o wer e il l armed , poorl y

trained, and easil y disaffected. Fo r artil -

lery, Araki Force ha d onl y a few 70-mm.

battalion guns; i t lacke d ammunitio n o f

all type s excep t fo r smal l arms . Th e

force di d no t hav e enoug h weapon s t o

arm al l th e servic e units tha t wer e pass -

ing t o Genera l Araki's control ; medica l

supplies wer e short fro m th e start ; foo d

would b e a t a premium withi n a month

or tw o afte r 9 January .

Laoag, Vigan, and the Araki Force

Only a fe w days afte r th e Sixth Arm y

landed o n Luzo n th e Araki Force bega n

having seriou s clashe s wit h th e 15th

Infantry, USAFIP(NL). 13 The 15th's initial effort s centere d o n a campaig n o f

raids an d skirmishe s designe d t o clea r

Route 3 nort h o f Vigan , forc e mino r

Japanese garrisons out o f th e regimenta l

sector, an d captur e Japanes e supplie s

and equipmen t fo r us e i n late r opera -

tions. B y mid-Februar y th e regimen t

had secure d mos t o f Rout e 3 nort h o f

a poin t twenty-fiv e mile s north o f Vigan ,

and on the 15th the 1st Battalio n entered

Laoag. Th e Japanes e wh o ha d bee n

holding a t Laoa g retreate d t o th e Salo -

mague Harbor area , but unde r pressur e

from th e USAFI P (NL) withdre w o n

south t o Viga n durin g th e firs t wee k o f

April. Almos t immediatel y th e Araki

Force bega n a genera l retrea t fro m

Vigan, an d b y mid-Apri l nearl y al l th e

Japanese originall y stationed a t or nort h

of Viga n ha d withdraw n sout h an d in -

land t o join th e main bod y o f th e Araki

Force, no w deploye d alon g Rout e 6

about midwa y between Sulve c an d Ban -

gued. Th e 121st Infantry , USAFI P

(NL), ha d meanwhil e cleare d Rout e 3

south o f Vigan , thu s openin g th e high -

way al l th e wa y u p th e wes t coas t fro m

Lingayen Gulf .

Assembling alon g Rout e 6 , th e Araki

Force hope d t o den y th e USAFI P (NL)

access t o th e norther n reache s o f th e

Abra Rive r valley , a ric h farmin g are a

centering abou t twent y mile s inlan d

from Vigan . Araki 's me n wer e i n poo r

condition t o accomplis h thi s mission .

Almost al l supplie s excep t smal l arm s

ammunition ha d lon g sinc e vanished ,

and th e ill-equippe d servic e troops with -

drawing from th e coastal barrios quickly

consumed th e fe w supplie s lef t a t mid -

April. Communication s equipmen t wa s

nonexistent, an d Genera l Arak i ha d lost

contact with 103d Division headquarters.

In mid-Marc h Yamashita had transferre d

the Araki Force to Shobu Group control,

which di d no t help . Indeed , i t appear s

that Genera l Arak i wa s completel y ou t

of touc h wit h an y highe r headquarter s

from lat e Marc h unti l mid-May .

The 15t h Infantry planne d t o strik e

northeast astrid e Rout e 6 fro m Sulve c

with tw o battalion s whil e anothe r bat -

talion, employin g bac k countr y road s

and trail s t o ge t int o position , woul d

drive towar d Bangue d fro m th e east ,

taking th e Araki Force i n th e rear ,

Volckmann reinforce d th e 15th Infan -

try fo r thi s attac k wit h tw o companie s

from othe r USAFI P (NL) regiments .

Fifth Ai r Forc e plane s fro m Lingaye n

area field s provide d limite d support, and

the 15t h Infantr y operate d th e fe w

Japanese artiller y weapon s i t ha d

captured.

The 15t h Infantry bega n it s attac k

on 1 0 April an d i t too k onl y fiv e day s t o

convince Arak i tha t h e migh t a s wel l

13

 This section is based mainly on th e USAFIP (NL)

Report, page s 40-57.
ACTION A T TH E NORTHER N APE X 547

retreat again . A genera l Japanes e with -

drawal starte d o n th e 15t h o f April ,

and b y th e 25t h th e bul k o f th e Araki

Force ha d departe d southwar d fo r

the Abr a Rive r valley . Pursue d b y

the 15t h Infantry , th e Araki Force

headed fo r Gayaman , twenty-fiv e mile s

upstream (south ) fro m Bangued . Th e

15th Infantr y als o sen t a smal l en -

veloping forc e inlan d fro m Rout e 3 t o

Angaki, o n th e Abr a abou t twelv e mile s

north o f Cervantes . Element s o f th e

121st Infantry , USAFI P (NL), wer e al -

ready blocking the Abra Valley at Angaki

in order to prevent th e Araki Force from

moving o n sout h t o reinforc e Japanes e

units o n Rout e 4 wes t o f Cervantes .

Finding hi s way south closed , Genera l

Araki struc k eas t an d southeas t fro m

Gayaman ove r trackless , virtually unexplored section s of the Cordillera Central ,

passing throug h virgi n pin e forest s an d

over uncharte d stream s an d ridges .

Losing fa r mor e troop s fro m starvatio n

and diseas e tha n i n combat , an d becom -

ing increasingl y more disorganized , th e

Araki Force in mid-May began stragglin g

into Besao , a mountain barri o at the end

of a third-clas s road seve n mile s west o f

Bontoc. Fe w mor e tha n 1,50 0 me n o f

the Araki Force ha d survive d the coastal

skirmishes, th e battle s i n th e Bangue d

region, an d th e tortuou s overlan d tre k

to Besao , t o reassembl e lat e i n Ma y a t

Bontoc. O f th e nearl y 8,00 0 Japanes e

stationed i n northwester n Luzo n a t th e

beginning o f th e yea r som e 4,00 0 ha d

been kille d or ha d died of starvatio n and

disease b y th e en d o f May . Anothe r

1,500 ha d escape d t o Bontoc , an d th e

remaining 2,50 0 ha d scattere d int o th e

mountains i n smal l group s tha t Filipin o

guerrillas ultimatel y hunte d dow n o r

that als o died o f malnutritio n an d sick -

nesses. Th e losse s o f th e 15t h Infantry ,

USAFIP (NL), i n northwester n Luzo n

were approximatel y 12 5 men kille d an d

335 wounded. 14

Relatively unimportan t i n th e large r

picture o f th e whol e Luzo n Campaign ,

the 15t h Infantry 's operation s agains t

the Araki Force wer e t o stan d th e regiment i n goo d stead . A t th e en d o f Ma y

the regiment wa s in far better shape tha n

it ha d bee n o n 9 January ; i t wa s up t o

strength; i t had seize d arms and supplie s

from th e Japanese; i t had received muc h

equipment fro m th e Sixt h Army . Th e

four months ' figh t agains t th e Araki

Force, howeve r mino r i n natur e muc h

of th e fightin g ha d been , ha d give n al l

components o f th e 15t h Infantr y th e

experience, training , an d confidenc e

that onl y combat ca n provide . No w th e

15th Infantr y wa s t o mov e t o Rout e 4 ,

where it was urgently needed t o reinforce

the 121s t Infantry .

The Fight for Bessang Pass

Early Operations Along Route 4

When i n earl y Januar y the 15th Infantry, USAFI P (NL), ha d starte d t o clea r

Route 3 from Viga n north , th e 3 d Bat -

talion o f th e 121s t Infantr y bega n t o

secure th e highway from Viga n sout h t o

Libtong, th e junctio n o f Route s 3 an d

14

 USAFI P (NL) G- 3 Opn s Rpt s 2 1 an d 22 . Th e

15th Infantr y claime d killin g abou t 4,30 0 Japanese ,

while th e USAFI P (NL) Report, pag e 56 , provide s a

figure o f 6,406 Japanese killed in northwester n Luzon

to th e en d o f th e firs t wee k o f June . Bot h guerrill a

figures ar e undoubtedl y exaggerated , bu t i t seem s

logical t o assum e tha t certainl y n o mor e tha n 2,00 0

Japanese, includin g Araki' s grou p o f 1,50 0 tha t

went t o Bontoc , actuall y mad e thei r wa y fro m

northwestern Luzo n t o rejoi n othe r Japanes e forces.
548 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

4.15 Befor e th e en d o f Januar y th e bat -

talion ha d substantiall y complete d thi s

task. Colone l Volckmann wa s not, how -

ever, satisfied . H e decide d tha t th e

continued security of Route 3 demanded

that his troops clear Route 4 inland from

Libtong t o Cervante s s o tha t th e 357th

IIB, know n t o b e holdin g th e road ,

could mount no raids and counterattacks

toward th e coast . H e accordingl y direc -

ted th e 121s t Infantr y t o strik e inlan d

for Cervante s an d establis h roadblock s

in th e Cervante s are a alon g Rout e 393 ,

to th e south , an d Rout e 4 , t o th e east .

The onl y forc e tha t coul d b e assigne d

to this rather substantial mission wa s the

3d Battalion , 121s t Infantry .

While th e main bod y of th e battalio n

was assemblin g fo r th e driv e towar d

Cervantes, Company L destroyed a small

Japanese garriso n a t barri o Bitalag , a

mile and hal f inlan d fro m Libtong . O n

2 Februar y th e entir e battalio n move d

east ou t o f Bitala g an d fou r day s late r

was a t th e municipalit y o f Suyo , thre e

miles farthe r inland . Volckman n ther e

called a halt . Fo r th e tim e bein g Sa n

Fernando wa s a mor e importan t objec -

tive tha n Cervantes , an d h e neede d al l

the troop s h e coul d ge t fo r th e attac k

on tha t por t city . Accordingly , o n 6

February th e bul k o f th e 3 d Battalion ,

121st Infantry , departed , leavin g onl y

Company L a t Suyo .

By thi s tim e outpos t troop s o f th e

357th IIB, alon g wit h a fe w straggler s

from coasta l garrisons , ha d withdraw n

to Bessan g Pass , wher e th e Japanes e

battalion ha d starte d diggin g in . By -

passing th e pas s vi a back-countr y trails ,

Company L, 121st Infantry , entered Cervantes o n 2 4 February after a brisk figh t

with a smal l Japanes e garrison . Bu t a t

this junctur e elements o f th e 19th Division bega n pullin g int o th e Cervante s

area fro m Bagui o an d earl y i n Marc h

drove the guerrilla company out o f town.

Company L recapture d Cervante s o n 1 3

March, bu t soo n foun d itsel f unde r th e

sights o f Japanes e artiller y emplace d o n

rising ground t o the south.

Volckmann saw that Company L could

not hol d fo r lon g b y itsel f an d rein -

forced th e troops at Cervante s as best h e

could, formin g a provisiona l battalio n

under Capt . Serafi n V . Elizond o o f th e

11th Infantry . Th e component s wer e

Company A o f th e 11t h Infantry , whic h

had previously operated in the vicinity of

Sabangan; Compan y L o f th e 121s t In -

fantry; a n 81-mm . morta r sectio n fro m

the 121s t Infantry ; Compan y D o f th e

66th Infantry , whic h cam e u p fro m th e

Baguio area ; an d tw o platoon s fro m

the Replacemen t an d Casualt y Battal -

ion, USAFIP(NL) . The Provisiona l Bat -

talion hel d ou t a t Cervante s unti l 3

April, o n whic h dat e Japanes e pressur e

from th e eas t an d sout h force d th e uni t

into hill s northwes t o f th e town .

On 2 3 March, abou t a wee k afte r th e

Provisional Battalio n wa s organized an d

on th e sam e da y tha t USAFIP(NL )

cleared th e las t Japanes e fro m th e Sa n

15

 Th e remainde r o f thi s chapte r i s base d largel y

upon tw o MS S prepared b y Maj . Bill y C . Mossman ,

AUS, a t OCM H durin g th e summe r o f 1954 : Volck -

mann's Guerrilla s (2 0 pp.) , an d Volckmann' s Pro -

visional Battalio n ( 5 pp.) , bot h i n OCM H files .

The source s use d b y Majo r Mossma n include :

USAFIP (NL) Rpt , pp . 29-31 , 58-82 ; USAFI P (NL)

G-3 Opn s Rpts , 6 Jan-1 5 Ju n 45 ; USAFI P (NL)

FO's 1-29 , date d betwee n 4 Ja n an d 1 4 Ju n 45 ;

USAFIP (NL) G- 2 Pe r Rpts , 2 4 Apr-1 6 Ju n 45 ;

Terau Interrog , USAFI P (NL) Rpt , pp . 146-50 . Ad -

ditional source s fro m th e Japanes e side employed b y

the presen t autho r hav e bee n cite d previously . Als o

checked wa s Col . Russel l W . Volckmann , We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in

the Philippines (Ne w York : W . W . Norto n & Co.,

1954), pp . 208-12 .
ACTION A T TH E NORTHER N APE X 549

Fernando area , Genera l Kruege r di -

rected Volckman n t o ope n th e thir d

front i n norther n Luzo n wit h a driv e

inland along Route 4 to Bontoc. Krueger

set Cervante s a s USAFIP(NL)'s interme -

diate objective .

16

 Thes e order s wer e t o

project USAFIP(NL ) int o a figh t o f

three months ' duration .

The First Month

The onl y units tha t Volckman n could

muster fo r th e attac k towar d Cervante s

were th e Provisiona l Battalion , alread y

on th e ground , an d th e 121s t Infantry ,

which ha d jus t finishe d th e reductio n

of Sa n Fernando . Th e 11t h an d 14t h

Infantry Regiment s wer e scattere d

through th e Cagaya n Valle y an d coul d

not b e brough t out ; th e 66t h Infantr y

was attache d t o th e U.S . 33 d Divisio n

on th e Bagui o front ; an d th e 15t h In -

fantry wa s thoroughl y engage d agains t

the Araki Force.

The 121s t Infantry , wit h a strengt h

of les s tha n 3,00 0 troops , wa s th e bes t

equipped, bes t trained , an d mos t expe -

rienced regimen t o f th e USAFIP(NL) .

Its supporting artillery initially included

only capture d Japanes e weapons—tw o

70-mm. infantr y gun s an d tw o 47-mm .

antitank weapons. Th e tw o larger weap -

ons lacke d fir e contro l equipment , an d

ammunition wa s shor t fo r bot h types .

Lingayen-based plane s o f th e Fift h Ai r

Force woul d provid e air suppor t insofa r

as weathe r an d othe r commitments per -

mitted. Th e 121s t ha d tw o ill-equipped

engineer companie s attache d t o it ; it s

transportation consiste d o f seventee n

captured Japanes e trucks. Th e regimen t

had enoug h foo d an d possesse d plent y of

ammunition for small arms and machin e

guns. Medica l suppor t wa s adequate ,

although hardl y u p t o th e standar d a

regular U.S . Arm y regimen t woul d ex -

pect. Th e Provisiona l Battalio n wa s

attached to the 121st Infantry on 3 April,

and th e regiment brough t nort h wit h i t

from Sa n Fernand o on e compan y o f

USAFIP(NL)'s Military Police Battalion.

On 2 9 Marc h th e 121s t Infantr y

assembled a t barri o Butac , seve n mile s

inland alon g Rout e 4 fro m Libton g a t

the point wher e the road begins its steep

ascent t o Bessan g Pass . Th e regimen t

planned t o pus h tw o battalion s eas t

astride Rout e 4 , holdin g th e thir d bat -

talion i n reserve . Th e Provisiona l Bat -

talion wa s t o hol d Cervantes , bloc k th e

movement of Japanes e reinforcements t o

Bessang Pass , an d rever t t o a reserv e

role whe n th e 121s t Infantr y reache d

Cervantes. (Map 23)

About 2,00 0 yards east of Buta c Route

4 swing s northward , uphill , i n th e be -

ginning o f a n irregularl y shape d horse -

shoe bend , ope n o n th e south . Th e

distance acros s th e ope n en d o f thi s

horseshoe i s approximatel y tw o miles .

Dominating th e cente r o f th e horsesho e

is Lamaga n Ridge , risin g from a heigh t

of abou t 1,00 0 fee t a t th e southwester n

corner o f th e horsesho e t o mor e tha n

5,000 fee t a t th e center—a ris e o f almost

4,500 fee t i n les s tha n on e mile . Alon g

the wes t sid e o f Rout e 4 a t th e easter n

arm o f th e horsesho e i s Yub o Ridge ,

the norther n nos e o f which , crosse d b y

Route 4, was known to the USAFIP(NL)

as Baracba c Point . Ascendin g south -

ward, Yub o Ridg e give s wa y t o Lowe r

Cadsu Ridge , whic h i n tur n lead s t o a n

east-west ridg e line , risin g t o ove r 6,00 0

feet, know n a s Uppe r Cads u Ridge .

16

 Sixt h Arm y F O 58 , 2 3 Ma r 45 , Sixt h Arm y Rp t

Luzon, I , 162 .
550 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

MAP 23

East acros s Rout e 4 fro m Yub o an d

Lower Cads u Ridge s is Langiata n Hill ,

an extremel y steep-side d terrai n featur e

that reache s a heigh t o f ove r 4,00 0 feet .

Langiatan Hil l give s way on th e east t o

Magun Hill , som e 4,50 0 fee t high .

Bessang Pass , proper , th e roc k cut , lie s

at a southeastern nose of Langiatan Hill.

South o f the pass the terrain rise s within

two miles t o a pea k o f 6,83 0 fee t know n

as Mt . Namogoian .

In a wee k o f seesa w battlin g afte r 2 9

March th e 121s t Infantr y gaine d foot -

holds alon g th e norther n section s o f

Lamagan an d Yub o Ridges. Meanwhil e

the Provisional Battalion, now reinforced

by Compan y G o f th e 121st , attempte d

with littl e succes s t o strik e fro m th e

northeast agains t th e rea r o f Japanes e

positions a t Bessan g Pass . Unabl e t o

hold Cervante s o r Rout e 4 wes t o f th e

town, the Provisional Battalion faile d t o

prevent Japanes e reinforcement s fro m

reaching th e pass . B y th e en d o f th e

first wee k i n April , th e Provisiona l Bat -

talion had taken up new positions northeast of Magu n Hill and temporaril y was

out o f th e fighting .

The 121s t Infantry , o n th e wes t sid e

of Bessan g Pass, continued t o make slow

and painfu l progres s an d b y mid-Apri l

controlled Rout e 4 almost t o th e south -

eastern corne r o f th e horseshoe . Th e

regiment ha d cleare d Yub o an d Lowe r

Cadsu Ridge s and ha d gaine d foothold s

on th e wester n slope s o f Uppe r Cads u

and th e souther n portio n o f Langiata n

Hill. Th e Japanes e (th e 73d Infantry,

19th Division, and remnants of the 357th

IIB) stil l hel d som e o f Lamaga n Ridge ,

in th e cente r o f th e horseshoe , a s well

as mos t o f Uppe r Cads u Ridg e an d

Langiatan Hill . O n 2 1 April th e 121s t

Infantry overra n th e las t Japanes e posi -

tions o n Lamaga n Ridg e an d abou t a

week late r complete d th e occupatio n o f

Lower Cadsu .
ACTION A T TH E NORTHER N APE X 551

UPPER AN D LOWER CADS U RIDGE S

At th e en d o f April th e newl y forme d

1st Fiel d Artiller y Battalion , USAFIP -

(NL), arrive d alon g Rout e 4 t o rein -

force th e 121s t Infantry , bringin g u p a

Japanese 105-mm . howitzers, 2 Japanes e

75-mm. guns , an d 4 America n 75-mm .

pack howitzers . Th e ne w suppor t wa s

doubly welcome . Th e 2 Japanes e 70 -

mm. gun s the 121st Infantr y ha d started

out wit h ha d bee n los t durin g a Japa -

nese counterattack, an d advers e weathe r

conditions were beginning to curtail air

support operations drastically. Wit h th e

new artiller y support, th e 121st Infantr y

anticipated mor e rapi d progress .

The 19th Division Counterattacks

Contrary t o expectations, durin g th e

first part of May the 121st Infantr y liter -

ally inched forward ove r precipitous terrain against Japanese defenses tha t daily

became stronge r a s th e 19th Division

brought mor e reinforcement s forward ,

expending live s t o gai n time . B y midMay th e lines of th e 3 d Battalion , 121s t

Infantry, facin g north and northeast , extended fro m Rout e 4 a t Yub o Ridg e

east and southeas t across much o f Lang -

iatan Hill , Th e 2 d Battalion , reduce d

to tw o companie s b y th e attachmen t o f

Company F to th e Provisional Battalion ,

held alon g Route 4 from Baracba c Point

on Yub o Ridg e southeast almos t a mil e

and a quarter t o the southeastern corner

of th e horseshoe. Th e 1s t Battalio n held

a lin e stretchin g southeas t fro m thi s

corner o f th e horsesho e fo r three-quar -

ters o f a mile , endin g alon g th e easter n

section o f Uppe r Cads u Ridge . Con -

sidering thei r limite d fir e powe r an d

strength, al l thre e battalion s wer e badl y

overextended. Th e Provisiona l Battal -

ion, ou t o f contact wit h th e 121st Infan -

try, stil l occupie d position s nort h o f

Route 4 an d Magu n Hill .

At this juncture the USAFIP(NL) lost

almost ever y significan t piec e o f groun d

it ha d secure d sinc e 2 9 March , O n 1 7

May th e 73d Infantry, 19th Division,

behind ne w artiller y support , institute d

a series of strong counterattacks all across

the Bessan g Pass front , th e mai n weigh t

of th e effor t hittin g th e 1s t an d 2 d Bat -

talions, 121s t Infantry . Th e 73d pushed

both battalion s bac k acros s Lamaga n

Ridge an d completel y disperse d th e 1s t

Battalion, which, for a few days at least ,

just disappeared . Som e troop s o f th e

3d Battalio n als o retreate d fro m Lang -

iatan Hill , bu t element s o f tha t unit ,

cut off , succeeded in holdin g on t o rough

terrain alon g th e easter n slopes . Th e

Japanese als o struc k th e Provisiona l

Battalion, forcin g i t farthe r north .

Meanwhile, a 600-ma n battalio n o f

the 76th Infantry, 19th Division, bypassing Bessan g Pas s fa r t o th e south , ha d

begun moving toward Rout e 4 at barrio

Butac, almost two miles behind the 121st

Infantry's front . Whe n th e 76th Infantry battalio n neare d it s objective , jus t

before th e 73d bega n it s counterattac k
552 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

105-MM. HOWITZER FIRIN G A T EXTREME ELEVATIO N in Bessang Pass area.

at Bessan g Pass , ther e wer e fe w troop s

of th e USAFIP(NL ) a t Butac, 17 bu t fo r

reasons unknown th e Japanese battalion

milled around in the rough terrain south

of Buta c fo r tw o o r thre e day s befor e

attempting t o moun t a n attac k o n th e

barrio. B y tha t tim e th e USAFIP(NL )

had a stron g garriso n a t Butac , Volck - mann havin g brough t th e 2 d Battalio n

of th e 15t h Infantr y sout h t o Rout e 4 , This USAFIP(NL ) battalio n immedi - ately move d agains t th e Japanes e unit , which thereupo n withdrew , havin g

accomplished nothing .

Volckmann no w sen t th e entir e 15t h

Infantry int o a ne w offensiv e eastward , the 121s t Infantr y revertin g t o a reserve

role an d reorganizing . B y th e en d o f

May th e 15t h Infantr y ha d resecure d

the sout h flan k fro m Buta c t o Lamaga n

Ridge. Bypassin g pocket s o f Japanes e

on Lamaga n Ridge , th e regimen t nex t

started a driv e agains t Japanes e force s

holding Upper and Lower Cadsu Ridges. Before th e mont h ende d th e 1s t an d 2 d

Battalions, 121s t Infantry , ha d als o re - entered th e fight an d had begun t o clean

off Lamaga n Ridge . Th e 3 d Battalion , meanwhile, ha d regaine d som e o f th e

positions i t ha d los t o n Langiata n Hil l

and, thi s tim e attackin g fro m th e east , had retake n a foothol d o n Yub o Ridge .

17

 As fa r a s ca n b e ascertaine d fro m availabl e rec -

ords, a Militar y Polic e company an d a few Quartermaster troop s comprise d th e USAFIP(NL ) garriso n

at Buta c on 1 7 May.
ACTION A T TH E NORTHER N APE X 553

Order had begu n t o emerg e out o f nea r

chaos, an d Colone l Volckman n ha d be -

gun plannin g fo r a new , stronge r attac k

against 19th Division force s a t Bessan g

Pass.

Preparations for a New Attack

On 1 June , wit h operation s o n th e

Bambang and Baguio fronts entering the

pursuit stage , Genera l Kruege r turne d

operational contro l o f th e USAFIP(NL )

over t o I Corp s s o tha t Genera l Swif t

could mor e effectivel y co-ordinat e th e

efforts o f al l force s i n norther n Luzon .

Simultaneously, Kruege r directe d Swif t

to provid e USAFIP(NL ) wit h th e assist -

ance necessar y t o assur e th e earl y cap -

ture o f Cervantes , an d ordere d Swif t t o

return th e 66t h Infantry , USAFIP(NL) ,

to Volckmann's control from attachmen t

to th e 33 d Division . I Corps , i n turn ,

directed th e 33 d Divisio n t o sen d nort h

to Rout e 4 an d Bessan g Pas s th e 122 d

Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm . howitzers) and th e 1s t Battalion , 123 d Infan -

try. Swif t the n instructe d Volckman n

to mount an immediat e all-out offensiv e

toward Cervantes. 18

Volckmann set up an attack with three

regiments abreast . Th e 121s t Infantry

would clea r Rout e 4 aroun d th e horse -

shoe an d secur e th e norther n hal f o f

Lamagan Ridge . Th e 15t h Infantry ,

striking eas t ove r th e souther n hal f o f

Lamagan Ridge , would drive on t o seize

Upper Cads u Ridg e an d the n advanc e

generally northeast alon g th e sout h sid e

of Rout e 4 . Th e 66t h Infantr y woul d

first dea l wit h th e remnants o f th e 76th

Infantry's battalio n sout h an d southeas t

of Buta c and the n swing eastward o n th e

15th Infantry' s right . Th e Provisiona l

Battalion — now commande d b y Capt .

Herbert Swic k 1 9 an d consistin g of three

companies o f th e 11t h Infantr y a s wel l

as on e eac h fro m th e 66t h an d 121s t

Regiments — was t o clea r Magu n Hil l

and adjacen t dominatin g terrain . Th e

1st Battalion , 123 d Infantry , woul d re -

main a t Buta c a s USAFIP(NL ) reserve ,

would protec t th e 122 d Field Artillery ,

and woul d furnis h a n 81-mm . morta r

platoon t o support th e guerrill a attack .

The 122 d Fiel d Artillery , wit h th e 1s t

Field Artillery , USAFIP(NL) , attached ,

would provid e direc t an d genera l

support.20

As o f 1 Jun e th e 121s t Infantry,

USAFIP(NL), wa s stil l no t i n goo d

shape. Sinc e 1 5 Ma y th e regimen t ha d

lost abou t 15 0 me n kille d an d 31 5

wounded, losse s quit e harrowin g t o a

guerrilla unit. I t ha d not ye t completed

its reorganizatio n afte r th e Japanes e

counterattack; par t o f it s 3 d Battalio n

was stil l ou t o f contac t betwee n Lang -

iatan an d Magu n Hills ; on e o f it s rifl e

companies wa s attache d t o th e Provi -

sional Battalion . T o brin g the regiment

up t o strength , Volckman n attache d t o

it tw o companie s fro m th e 14t h Infantry an d thre e fro m th e Militar y Polic e

Battalion, USAFIP(NL) . Th e 15t h an d

18

 Sixth Arm y FO' s 62 an d 63 , 2 4 and 2 8 Ma y 45 ,

Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 164-65 ; I Corp s F O 18 ,

29 Ma y 45 . Th e portion s o f thes e order s relevan t

to th e USAFIP(NL ) becam e effectiv e o n 1 June .

19

 At the outbrea k o f wa r Swic k wa s a civilian gol d

mining enginee r i n norther n Luzon . Rathe r tha n

be interne d b y th e Japanes e h e ha d hidde n ou t i n

the mountain s an d ha d joine d th e guerrilla s i n

October 1942 . Capture d an d interne d a s a civilia n

early i n 1943 , Swic k ha d broke n ou t o f cam p wit h

USAFIP(NL) hel p i n Apri l 1943 . Volckmann , We

Remained, pp . 79 , 112 , 148 , 20

 USAFIP (NL) FO 27 , 30 May 45; 122d FA Bn Rpt

Luzon, p.9.
554 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

BESSANG PASS . LANGIATA N HIL L I S A T LEFT.

66th Regiments , althoug h bot h suffere d

from th e "disease " o f attachment s an d

detachments, were about u p t o strength.

The 1s t Fiel d Artiller y ha d lost th e two

Japanese 105-mm . howitzers and th e two

75-mm. gun s durin g th e Japanes e coun -

terattack, bu t ha d save d th e fou r Ameri -

can 75-mm . pac k howitzers . Sinc e th e

USAFIP(NL) lacke d th e heav y weapons

organic t o America n units , i t sorel y

needed th e artillery an d morta r support

the 33 d Divisio n provided .

The Japanes e a t Bessan g Pas s o n 1

June wer e i n wors e shap e tha n th e

USAFIP(NL).21 B y that dat e onl y 2,25 0

Japanese wer e lef t i n th e region—1,10 0

of th e 73d Infantry, 45 0 o f th e 76th

Infantry, an d th e rest artiller y an d serv -

ice troops . Japanes e supplie s wer e virtually exhausted and troop s were rapidly

dying fro m malaria , beriberi , an d othe r

diseases. Smal l arm s ammunitio n wa s

almost gone , an d th e artillery , althoug h

still possessin g numerou s weapons , wa s

reduced t o firin g a few rounds eac h eve -

ning. The counterattac k tha t had begu n

on 1 7 Ma y ha d represente d th e las t

major effort—eithe r defensiv e o r offen -

sive—of whic h th e Japanes e a t Bessan g

Pass wer e capable . N o reinforcement s

were available , fo r th e res t o f th e 19th

Division ha d orders t o hol d Mankayan ,

the Lepant o Mine , an d th e roa d junc -

tions a t K P 90 , Sabangan , an d Bontoc .

Breakthrough to Cervantes

During the period 1- 5 Jun e th e 15th

and 121st Infantry Regiment s ha d littl e

21

 Additional information o n th e Japanese is from:

An. 1, Intel, to USAFIP(NL) FO 27; 122d FA Bn Rp t

Luzon, pp . 11-12 .
ACTION A T TH E NORTHER N APE X 555

MAP 24

trouble clearing all Lamagan Ridg e and

Lower Cads u Ridge. 22 Th e 15t h the n

turned agains t Uppe r Cads u whil e th e

121st struc k directl y towar d Bessan g

Pass. O n 1 2 June, after a week o f bitte r

fighting, th e 15t h Infantry overra n th e

last organized resistance on Upper Cadsu

Ridge. Meanwhile , th e 66t h Infantry ,

coming in ove r trackles s terrai n sout h

of Rout e 4 an d chasin g Japanes e remnants befor e it , ha d reache d th e south -

western corne r o f Uppe r Cadsu . Th e

Provisional Battalion , afte r a serie s o f

minor setbacks , succeede d in clearin g

much o f Magu n Hil l b y 1 0 June .

(Map 24)

On th e 10t h the 121s t Infantr y

launched a fina l attac k towar d Bessan g

Pass, strikin g fro m th e wes t an d south -

west, an d th e nex t da y th e Provisiona l

Battalion bega n drivin g i n fro m th e

north an d northeast . Behin d exception -

ally clos e artiller y suppor t — the 122d

Field Artiller y place d concentration s as

close a s fift y yard s i n fron t o f th e guer -

rillas—the 121s t Infantry overra n th e

last organize d defense s a t Bessan g Pas s

on 1 4 June and mad e contact east of the

pass with th e Provisiona l Battalion . O n

the same day the last oppositio n melte d

away befor e th e 15t h an d 66t h Regi -

ments, sout h o f th e pass .

Japanese remnant s fle d eas t alon g

Route 4 towar d Cervantes , pursue d b y

elements of th e 15t h and 121s t Infantry

Regiments. Befor e dar k o n 1 5 June the

15th Infantr y ha d secured the town, and

on th e nex t da y th e 66t h Infantr y pu t

the finishin g touche s o n th e battl e b y

setting up a roadblock across Rout e 393

about tw o an d a hal f mile s south o f

Cervantes.

The las t phas e o f th e driv e throug h

Bessang Pass to Cervantes, covering 1-15

22

 Additional information fo r this subsection comes

from 122 d FA Bn Rp t Luzon , pp . 12-16 .
556 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

June, ha d cos t th e USAFIP(NL ) ap -

proximately 12 0 me n kille d an d 22 0

wounded, divided a s follows:

Unit

121st Infantr y

15th Infantr y

66th Infantr y

Provisional Battalio n

1st Battalion , 123 d Infantr y

1st Fiel d Artiller y Battalio n

122d Fiel d Artiller y Battalio n

Total

Killed

73

28

3

4

1

9

1

119

Wounded

139

71

2

1

1

4

2

220

Total

212

99

5

5

2

13

3

339

The USAFIP(NL ) estimate d tha t i t

killed som e 2,60 0 Japanes e i n th e sam e

period. Thi s figure , however , seem s ex -

aggerated i n ligh t o f th e fac t tha t th e

Japanese ha d n o mor e tha n 2,25 0 me n

in th e Bessan g Pass-Cervantes area a s of

1 Jun e an d tha t som e o f these , accord -

ing t o th e USAFIP(NL)' s ow n report ,

escaped towar d Mankaya n an d Bontoc .

Results of USAFIP(NL) Operations

Though by 1 5 June the USAFIP(NL )

had no t reache d Bontoc—th e objectiv e

Krueger ha d assigne d i t o n 2 3 March—

the "division " ha d accomplishe d th e

mission I Corp s ha d give n i t o n 1 June.

The succes s o f th e fina l attac k ca n b e

attributed almos t entirel y t o th e grea t

strength Volckman n wa s a t las t abl e t o

bring t o bear . Fro m lat e Marc h unti l

1 Jun e a boy—th e 121s t Infantry—ha d

been tryin g t o d o a man' s job . Onl y

that regiment' s spiri t an d th e inabilit y

of th e Japanes e t o follo w u p a n advan -

tage ha d save d th e 121s t Infantr y fro m

far greate r disaste r tha n th e retreat tha t

began o n 1 7 May .

The USAFIP(NL ) had , indeed, mad e

a substantia l contributio n towar d th e

Sixth Army' s campaig n i n norther n

Luzon. Eve n befor e th e Sixt h Army 's

offensives o n th e Bagui o an d Bamban g

fronts ha d begu n lat e i n February , th e

activities of the USAFIP(NL) had helped

prompt Genera l Yamashit a t o redeplo y

the 19th Division dee p int o norther n

Luzon. Afte r th e 121s t Infantry ha d

begun it s attac k towar d Cervante s lat e

in March , th e USAFIP(NL ) ha d kep t

the 19th Division pinned t o th e triangle

formed b y Bontoc , K P 90 , an d Bessan g

Pass. Ther e ca n b e n o questio n tha t

Yamashita could have employed the 19th

Division t o bette r profi t elsewhere , and

there ca n b e n o doub t tha t h e woul d

have done so had not Volckmann's forces

been operatin g i n norther n Luzon .

But th e stor y o f th e USAFIP(NL) 's

contributions does not end here. Taking

upon itsel f th e tas k o f seizin g Sa n Fer -

nando and clearing Route 3 up th e west

coast, th e USAFIP(NL ) ha d permitte d

the Sixt h Army to forge t abou t plan s to

use a "regular" division along that coast,

thereby allowin g Kruege r t o assig n a

division to more decisive operations elsewhere. Finally , th e USAFIP(NL ) ha d

been directl y o r indirectl y responsibl e

for th e deat h o f nearl y 10,00 0 Japanes e

in northwester n Luzo n between 9 Janu -

ary an d 1 5 June.23 Th e USAFIP(NL)' s

accomplishments ha d cos t th e guerrill a

unit roughl y 3,37 5 casualties: ove r 90 0

men killed , 2,36 0 wounded , an d n o

missing.24

In th e end , a s i n th e beginning , i t

must be noted tha t the USAFIP(NL) ac23

 This figur e is based upo n a study o f al l relevan t

Japanese, U.S . Army, an d USAFIP(NL ) source s

available. Th e USAFIP(NL ) claime d 19,70 0 Japa -

nese killed, including those killed b y units operating

under 43 d an d 33 d Divisio n contro l o n th e Bagui o front. 24

 These figure s includ e losse s o f 66t h an d 121s t

Infantry units operating under 43d and 33 d Divisio n

control o n th e Bagui o front .
ACTION A T TH E NORTHER N APE X 557

complished fa r more than GH Q SWPA ,

Sixth Army , o r I Corp s ha d apparentl y

expected o r hoped. Th e USAFIP(NL) 's

battles wer e no t over . Th e "division "

was nex t t o driv e sout h an d eas t fro m

Cervantes, joinin g th e res t o f I Corp s

in pursui t o f Shobu Group force s tha t

were retreatin g eve r farthe r int o th e

mountain fastnesse s o f norther n Luzon .

USAFIP(NL) an d I Corp s wer e layin g

plans fo r furthe r advance s eve n a s th e

15th Infantr y move d int o Cervantes .

Indeed, th e bul k o f I Corp s ha d alread y

become involve d i n pursui t operations .
CHAPTER XXI X

Pursuit in Northern Luzon

The Shobu Group Withdrawal Plans

Long befor e th e USAFIP(NL ) ha d

captured Cervante s an d lon g befor e th e

25th Infantr y Divisio n ha d broke n

through a t Balet e Pass , Genera l Yama -

shita, influence d b y th e collaps e o f th e

Baguio ancho r o f th e Shobu Group's

original defensiv e triangle , ha d begu n

laying carefu l plan s fo r th e group's ulti -

mate withdrawa l dee p int o th e Cordil -

lera Central. 1 O n 5 May, les s tha n tw o

weeks after th e fal l o f Baguio, Yamashita

distributed t o majo r component s o f th e

Shobu Group a n outlin e plan for future

operations throughou t norther n Luzon .

Yamashita constructe d hi s pla n o n

three basi c premises. First , he estimated

that th e Sixt h Arm y woul d continu e to

make its main effor t a drive north alon g

Route 5 and tha t Kruege r woul d mount

only secondar y attack s towar d Bonto c

along Route s 4 an d 11 . Second , h e calculated tha t a s o f 5 Ma y th e Shobu

Group woul d hav e abou t thre e month s

during which i t could stri p th e Cagayan

and Maga t Valley s o f foo d an d militar y

supplies requisit e t o a protracte d stan d

in th e mountains, thre e month s durin g

which th e group would mov e this matériel int o the Cordillera Centra l throug h

the junctio n o f Route s 4 an d 5 nea r

Bagabag, twenty-fiv e mile s nort h o n

Route 5 from Bambang . Third , he knew

that th e succes s o f hi s withdrawa l an d

of hi s futur e delayin g actions demanded

that th e Shobu Group maintai n contro l

over th e Route s 4-5 junctio n a s long as

humanly possible . I n thi s connection ,

Yamashita estimate d tha t hi s defense s

south of Santa Fe would hol d unti l midJune; tha t h e coul d construc t ne w de -

fenses acros s Rout e 5 betwee n Sant a F e

and Bamban g i n order t o hol d I Corp s

south of Bambang until the end o f June ;

and tha t h e woul d no t hav e t o giv e u p

the junctio n o f Route s 4 an d 5 unti l

the en d o f July .

Yamashita's 5 Ma y pla n require d th e

establishment o f thre e ne w defensiv e

phase line s o r perimeter s i n norther n

1

 This sectio n is base d mainl y o n tw o slightl y dif -

ferent translation s of: Shobu Group, Outlin e o f Fu -

ture Opnl Polic y fo r Norther n Luzon , 5 May 45, one

translation i n Trans , III, Item 3 ; th e othe r i n 14th

Area Army Opn s o n Luzon , pp . 135-50 . Als o con -

sulted were : 14th Area Army Opn s Orders Nos. A487, 3 Feb, A-517, 13 Feb, A-690, 27 Apr, and A-719 ,

8 Ma y 45, all in Trans, III, Item 3 ; 14th Area Army

Opns o n Luzon , pp . 157-67 ; SWP A His t Series , II ,

486-88; Statemen t o f Ma j Misusuk e Tanak a (Staf f

14th Area Army), States , IV, 193-94 ; Mut o Memoirs,

Trans, I , 47-48 ; Takats u Interrog , USAFIP(NL )

Rpt, pp . 171-73 ; Nishiyam a Interrog , USAFIP(NL )

Rpt, pp . 165-66 ; Tera u Interrog , USAFIP(NL ) Rpt,

pp. 150-54 ; Kawa i Narrative , 10t h I&H Staf f Study ,

Japanese Opn s on Luzon , pt. IV .
PURSUIT I N NORTHER N LUZO N 559

Luzon. Th e firs t perimeter' s southwestern ancho r la y eigh t mile s northeast o f

Baguio at K P 21 , the Rout e 1 1 terminus

of th e Shobu Group's Baguio-Arita o

supply road . Thenc e th e lin e stretche d

north throug h K P 90 , Mankayan , th e

Lepanto Mine , Bessan g Pass , an d bac k

northeast t o Bontoc . Fro m Bonto c th e

line slante d southeas t t o Banaue , o n

Route 4 som e twenty-fiv e mile s north -

west o f Bagabag , an d fro m Banau e con -

tinued southeast t o Oriung Pass, located

on Rout e 5 abou t seve n mile s eas t o f

Bagabag i n hill y countr y tha t separate d

the uppe r reache s o f th e Maga t an d

Cagayan Rivers . Fro m Oriun g Pass th e

perimeter went southwest along Route 5

to Balet e pas s an d the n swun g bac k

northwest throug h Salacsa c Pas s o n th e

Villa Verde Trail to KP 21 on Rout e 11 .

Yamashita expecte d t o star t redeploy -

ing his forces from th e first t o the second

phase lin e sometim e afte r mid-June .

Then, th e southwester n ancho r woul d

pull nort h u p Rout e 1 1 fro m K P 2 1

about si x miles. Th e secon d perimete r

would continue north t o Mankayan an d

thence northeast t o th e Sabanga n junc -

tion o f Route s 1 1 and 4—th e Japanes e

would abando n Rout e 4 west o f Saban -

gan. Bonto c remaine d a s th e norther n

apex o n thi s secon d perimeter , bu t

Yamashita wa s prepared t o withdraw o n

the eas t fro m Oriun g Pas s bac k t o

Bagabag. Th e southeaster n ancho r o f

the secon d perimete r wa s t o b e Bam -

bang, whenc e th e lin e stretche d wes t

across th e mountain s t o th e vicinit y o f

Ambuclao, i n th e Agn o Rive r valle y

about fiv e mile s eas t alon g th e Baguio -

Aritao suppl y roa d fro m K P 21 .

The thir d perimete r woul d enclos e

Yamashita's last-stand positions, at which

he expecte d th e Shobu Group t o figh t

until annihilated . Th e southwester n

anchor of the third line was to be located

at Bokod , abou t fiv e mile s eas t o f Am -

buclao. Th e lin e woul d continu e u p

the Agn o Valle y t o K P 9 0 an d woul d

again includ e Mankayan . Bontoc , how -

ever, woul d b e lef t ou t o f th e thir d

perimeter, an d th e lin e woul d exten d

from Mankaya n east-northeas t t o Rout e

4 a t Poli s Pass , betwee n Bonto c an d

Banaue. The lin e would continue southeast along Route 4 from Poli s Pass to the

Rayambugan Far m School , o n Rout e 4

about te n mile s northwes t o f Bagabag ,

Thence i t woul d strik e south-southwes t

across th e easter n slope s o f th e Cor -

dillera Centra l t o a poin t i n th e moun -

tains about fiv e mile s west o f Bambang ,

whence i t woul d swin g bac k westwar d

across th e mountain s t o Bokod .

Other detail s o f Yamashita' s pla n o f

5 Ma y made specia l provision s fo r hold -

ing th e Route s 4- 5 junctio n an d th e

Magat Valley from Bamban g to Bagabag.

For example , Yamashit a feare d tha t th e

Sixth Arm y migh t attemp t t o seiz e th e

vital roa d junctio n b y airborn e assault -

Therefore, h e directe d th e 105th Division t o establis h base s alon g th e Maga t

Valley fro m whic h t o launc h counter -

attacks against airborn e troops. H e als o

ordered the 105th to be prepared to hold

Route 5 a t Bat o Bridg e where , thre e

miles nort h o f Bambang , th e highwa y

crossed fro m th e eas t t o th e wes t sid e

of th e Magat .

Yamashita's plans called for the virtual

abandonment o f th e Cagaya n Valley ,

leaving ther e fo r th e tim e bein g onl y

the 103d Division, which ha d a strength

equivalent t o les s tha n tw o America n

RCT's. Th e division' s principa l dut y

would b e t o remov e fro m th e valle y al l

the rice and othe r food—includin g cara -
560 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

baos o n th e hoof—i t coul d gather , dis -

patching thes e an d othe r supplie s int o

the Cordillera Central through Bagabag .

Once thi s jo b wa s finished , th e 103d

would also withdraw into the mountains.

Yamashita's decisio n t o abando n th e

Cagayan Valle y was logical. H e realize d

that wit h th e strengt h h e stil l ha d avail -

able h e coul d no t hol d th e valle y ver y

long, an d fo r a variet y o f reason s ther e

seemed little necessity to maintain strong

forces ther e muc h longer . S o far , he

had kep t units i n th e valle y t o rais e an d

gather food ; t o den y th e Allie d Ai r

Forces, SWPA , th e us e o f airfield s ther e

as base s fro m whic h t o strik e Formos a

and Okinawa ; and t o hold Aparr i in th e

hope tha t supplie s an d reinforcement s

might ye t reac h Luzon . Bu t b y earl y

May Yamashit a ha d conclude d tha t th e

issue a t Okinaw a wa s alread y decide d

and tha t ther e was, accordingly, n o stra -

tegic purpos e t o b e serve d b y holdin g

the valle y airfields . Hop e fo r reinforce -

ments, he knew, had long since vanished.

Finally, his troops had gathered the early

rice harves t i n th e valley . A ne w cro p

would no t star t comin g i n unti l lat e

September, an d Yamashit a kne w h e

would neve r harves t tha t one .

I Corps ' breakthroug h t o Sant a Fe ,

coming a t least tw o week s befor e Yama -

shita expected , force d th e Shobu Group

commander t o mak e man y change s i n

his 5 Ma y plan . Firs t wa s hi s 2 4 Ma y

order t o th e 2d Tank Division t o with -

draw fro m th e Villa Verde Trail.2 Sinc e

the 25t h Divisio n alread y threatene d

the rout e throug h Sant a Fe , Yamashit a

directed th e 2d Tank Division to retrea t

up th e Imuga n Rive r t o Pingkia n o n

the Baguio-Arita o suppl y road . Here ,

about si x mile s west o f Aritao , th e sup -

ply roa d joine d anothe r roa d runnin g

northeast t o Bambang . Yamashit a stil l

expected th e 10th Division t o withdra w

in goo d shap e vi a Rout e 5 an d th e Ol d

Spanish Trail .

By 3 1 Ma y wha t Yamashit a ha d

intended a s a n orderl y withdrawa l

through successiv e delayin g position s

was, o n th e par t o f th e 2 d Tank an d

10th Divisions, turnin g int o a rout .

Yamashita suddenl y sa w tha t I Corp s

would reac h Bamban g befor e h e coul d

ready any strong delaying positions south

of tha t town , an d h e accordingl y di -

rected th e 2 d Tank an d 10th Divisions

to assembl e fo r a defensiv e stan d acros s

Route 5 a t Bat o Bridge . H e als o di -

rected th e 103d Division—less an under -

strength RC T i n th e norther n Cagaya n

Valley an d th e Araki Force—to mov e

into defense s alon g th e Maga t Valle y

between Bamban g an d Bagabag . H e

ordered th e 105th Division, whic h ha d

a tota l strengt h o f abou t 6,00 0 troops ,

to abando n th e defense s i t ha d bee n

readying a t Oriun g Pas s an d fal l bac k

to third-lin e positions up Rout e 4 at the

Rayambugan Far m School .

Only a da y o r tw o later , Yamashit a

learned tha t the 103d Division could not

reach Bagaba g befor e I Corps. There -

fore, h e instructe d th e divisio n t o mov e

into th e 105th's abandone d position s a t

Oriung Pass . A s oppose d t o th e 105th

Division's earlie r deployment , th e 103d

was t o orien t it s Oriun g Pas s defense s

against attac k fro m th e south . Yama -

shita no w intende d t o keep I Corp s ou t

of th e Cagaya n Valle y lon g enoug h fo r

the bul k o f th e troop s stil l there—ele -

ments o f th e 103d Division an d th e 4th

Air Division — to withdra w westwar d 2

 See above, ch. XXVI .
PURSUIT I N NORTHER N LUZO N 561

into th e Cordiller a Centra l ove r bac k

roads.

With th e 105th Division movin g t o

the Rayambuga n Far m Schoo l an d th e

103d Division digging in a t Oriung Pass,

the defens e o f th e Maga t Valle y t o th e

junction o f Route s 4 an d 5 depende d

almost entirel y upo n a fast , successfu l

withdrawal b y th e organize d remnant s

of th e 2d Tank an d 10th Divisions, Th e

only othe r comba t forc e Yamashit a ha d

available to defen d th e valle y wa s a hurriedly organize d antitan k unit . Com -

bining about te n ligh t tank s with a lik e

number o f 47-mm . an d 75-mm . guns ,

the unit , som e 25 0 men strong , wa s de -

ployed o n 1 Jun e alon g Rout e 5 jus t

south o f Aritao .

Sixth Army-I Corps Pursuit Plans

Preparing fo r pursui t operation s i n

northern Luzon , Sixt h Arm y estimate d

that sinc e th e Shobu Group ha d prob -

ably employe d th e bul k o f it s strengt h

as wel l a s its best troop s i n th e defens e

of Baguio , th e Vill a Verd e Trail , an d

Route 5 t o Sant a Fe , promp t exploita -

tion o f th e breakthroug h t o Sant a F e

would lea d t o th e quic k an d complet e

collapse of organized Japanes e resistance

throughout northern Luzon. 3 Therefore ,

just as Yamashita had estimated , Krueger

planned t o make his main pursui t effor t

a driv e u p Rout e 5 int o th e Cagaya n

Valley. Fo r thi s purpos e Kruege r in -

tended t o emplo y th e relativel y fres h

37th Division, including the 145t h RCT,

which wa s t o com e nort h afte r a brie f

rest followin g it s operation s against th e

Shimbu Group. Th e plan s fo r pursui t

required othe r redeployments, fo r Krue -

ger intende d t o us e th e 25t h an d 33 d

Divisions in the initial assault against the

Japanese hom e islands . Th e 32 d Divi -

sion woul d mov e of f th e Vill a Verd e

Trail beginnin g o n 1 Jun e and , after

a short rest , would reliev e th e 33 d Divi -

sion at Baguio. The 37t h Divisio n would

pass throug h th e 25t h Divisio n alon g

Route 5 an d b y 1 5 June woul d b e fol -

lowed b y th e 6t h Division , which ,

moving up from souther n Luzon , would

complete th e relie f o f th e 25t h Division .

Although plannin g to mak e th e main

effort a driv e u p Rout e 5 , Kruege r als o

wanted t o maintai n pressur e against th e

Shobu Group throughou t norther n

Luzon, Th e 33 d Division , and late r th e

32d Division , woul d moun t limite d

attacks u p Rout e 1 1 from Baguio . Th e

USAFIP(NL), while continuing its drive

to secur e Cervante s an d Bontoc , woul d

simultaneously intensif y guerrill a opera -

tions u p an d dow n th e Cagaya n Valle y

and assis t I Corp s i n denyin g th e us e o f

Aparri t o th e Japanese . Fo r th e latte r

purpose, I Corps organized a special combat grou p know n a s the Connoll y Tas k

Force. Commande d b y Maj . Robert V .

Connolly of th e 123 d Infantry, 33 d Divi -

sion, thi s 800-ma n tas k forc e include d a

reinforced rifl e compan y o f th e 127t h

Infantry, 32 d Division , on e compan y o f

the 6th Range r Infantr y Battalion , a battery of 105-mm . howitzers, and engineer ,

medical, an d por t detachments . Assem -

bling nea r Vigan , Connoll y Tas k Forc e

would follo w Rout e 3 around th e northwest ti p o f Luzo n t o th e vicinit y o f

Aparri, wher e a battalio n o f th e 11t h

3

 This section i s based on : Sixt h Arm y Rp t Luzon ,

I, 89-91; Sixt h Arm y FO's, 62 and 63 , 24 and 2 8 May

45, in ibid., I, 164-65 ; I Corps FO's 18 and 19 , 29 and

31 Ma y 45; I Corp s Rp t Luzon , pp . 92-98 ; USAFIP -

(NL) FO' s 27 an d 28 , 3 0 Ma y an d 3 Ju n 45 , an d

Amendments date d 3 and 7 Jun 4 5 t o F O 28 .
562 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Infantry, USAFIP(NL) , woul d join .

4

Ordered t o occup y th e Aparr i region ,

the tas k forc e wa s also t o prepar e mino r

port facilitie s an d a liaison plane airstrip

along the coast west of Aparri.

The 37t h Divisio n woul d firs t driv e

straight u p Rout e 5 fro m Sant a F e t o

Bagabag an d the n swin g eas t throug h

Oriung Pas s int o th e Cagaya n Valley ,

continuing nort h u p Rout e 5 to Aparri.

After th e 37t h Divisio n ha d passe d

through Bagabag , th e 6t h Divisio n

would strik e northwest u p Rout e 4 int o

the dee p Cordiller a Central . Th e 6t h

Division wa s als o t o strik e southwes t

from Bamban g along the road leading to

Pingkian o n th e Baguio-Arita o suppl y

road. Th e 25t h Division , with th e 126t h

RCT o f th e 32 d Divisio n stil l attached ,

would fo r th e tim e bein g continu e t o

secure Rout e 5 and mo p u p behin d th e

6th an d 37t h Divisions. 5

Compressing the Shobu Group

Santa Fe to the Cagayan Valley

With th e 129t h RC T leading , th e

37th Divisio n struc k nort h fro m Sant a

Fe o n 3 1 May. 6 I n a running figh t dur -

ing th e perio d 1- 4 June , th e Japanes e

antitank uni t sout h o f Aritao, now rein -

forced b y a fe w piece s o f artiller y fro m

the 2d Tank an d 10th Divisions a s well

as som e rea r are a servic e troops , de -

stroyed tw o tank s an d damage d anothe r

of th e 775t h Tan k Battalion , a company

of whic h reinforce d th e 129t h Infantry .

The figh t scarcel y slowe d th e 129t h In -

4

 Detailed compositio n o f Connoll y Tas k Force :

Co G , 127t h Inf , 32d Di v

Co B, 6th Range r In f B n

81-mm. Mortar Plt, Co H, 127t h In f

Battery C, 694th FA Bn

Co C (—) , 339th Eng r Con s Bn

Det, 543 d EB&SR , 3 d ES B

Det, 510t h Eng r Ligh t Ponto n C o

Det, 276th Port Co (TC )

Det, 601st QM Grave s Registratio n Co

Det, 58th Signal Bn

24th Por t Sur g Hos p

2d Plt , 637t h Me d Clearin g C o

To b e added a t Aparri:

2d Bn , 11t h Inf , USAFIP(NL )

Two Plts , C o D , Eng r Bn , USAFI P (NL)

Note: Thi s wa s the secon d o f tw o tas k force s o f th e

same name, Major Connoll y having had another, separate comman d a t Dingala n Ba y durin g May . Se e

below, footnot e 5 .

5

 The 25t h Divisio n als o relieve d element s o f th e 136th Infantry , 33 d Division , a t Dingala n an d Bale r

Bays on Luzon's east coast. Fo r ove r a month various

elements o f th e 33 d Divisio n ha d bee n protectin g

I Corp s saw mills at an d nea r Dingala n Ba y and ha d

been interceptin g Japanese tryin g t o mak e thei r wa y

north alon g th e coas t fro m th e Shimbu Group's

area t o joi n th e Shobu Group. O n 1 2 April th e pro -

tective force s wer e organized int o th e Connoll y Tas k

Force unde r Majo r Connoll y o f th e 123 d Infantry.

This groupmen t consiste d o f Compan y A an d ele -

ments o f Compan y D , 123 d Infantry ; Compan y D ,

6th Range r Battalion ; a reinforce d compan y o f th e

Anderson Battalio n o f guerrilla s (se e above , Ch .

XXII); a battalio n o f th e 2 d Provisiona l Regiment ,

East Centra l Luzo n Guerrill a Are a (se e above . Ch .

XXII); and, beginning on 1 0 May, Company D, 136t h

Infantry. O n 1 1 Ma y Pfc . Joh n R . McKinne y o f

Company A , 123 d Infantry , despit e a blood y hea d

wound fro m a Japanes e saber , playe d suc h a heroi c

and major par t in turning back a Japanes e attack that

he wa s awarde d th e Meda l o f Hono r an d wo n pro -

motion t o sergeant. O n 1 7 May Connolly Tas k Forc e

was replace d b y Ehrlic h Tas k Force , unde r Lt . Col -

Milton Ehrlic h o f th e 1s t Battalion , 136t h Infantry ,

33d Division . Ehrlic h Tas k Forc e consiste d o f th e

1st Battalio n an d th e guerrill a unit s alread y men -

tioned. O n 3 0 May th e 2 d Battalio n o f th e 161s t In -

fantry, 25t h Division , too k ove r and remaine d o n th e

east coas t unti l th e en d o f June . 6

 This subsection is based on: 37t h Div Rpt Luzon ,

pp. 119-50 ; 129t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 11-13 ; 129t h

Inf His t 1810-1945 , pp . 79-81; 145t h In f Rpt Luzon ,

pp. 62-69; 148t h In f Rpt Luzon , pt. II, Northern Luzon, pp . 4-5 ; Kawa i Statement , States , II , 148-49 ;

SWPA Hist Series , II, 487-88; 14th Area Army Opn s

on Luzon , pp . 1(10-67 ; Interro g o f L t Ge n Yutak a

Muraoka (C G 103d Div), USAFIP(NL) Rpt , pp.

176-80.
PURSUIT I N NORTHER N LUZO N 563

fantry, whic h entere d Arita o on 5 June.

Bambang fel l bloodlessl y th e nex t day ,

and th e 129t h encountere d onl y toke n

resistance a t Bat o Bridge . Speedin g

north, the regiment reached Bayombong,

eight miles beyond Bambang , on 7 June.

The 145t h RC T too k ove r th e lea d

on 8 June and b y dark tha t day had ad -

vanced anothe r te n mile s t o seize , with -

out eve n a skirmish , th e junctio n o f

Routes 4 and 5 near Bagabag , Th e nex t

day th e 145t h Infantr y secure d Bagaba g

and starte d crossin g back t o the east sid e

of the Magat River. Th e 148t h Infantr y

now came u p t o tak e over responsibilit y

for Bagaba g and th e importan t junction.

The onl y strengt h lef t betwee n th e

145th Infantr y an d th e Cagaya n Valle y

was the reinforced 179th IIB, 103d Division, th e sol e uni t th e 103d ha d bee n

able to move southward t o Oriung Pass.

Engaging the 145t h Infantr y on 1 0 June,

the 179th IIB di d a magnificen t jo b o f

delaying, but, outgunne d an d outnum -

bered, neve r ha d a chanc e t o sto p th e

American advance . The 145t h RCT

bulled it s wa y throug h th e pas s alon g

Route 5 , dependin g upo n th e shoc k

effect o f it s artillery , tanks , an d tan k

destroyers for breakthrough, which came

late o n 1 2 June. Th e three-da y battl e

cost th e 145t h RC T abou t 1 0 me n

killed an d 5 5 wounded ; th e 179th IIB

lost ove r 30 0 killed .

By evening on 1 3 June the 145t h RCT

was at Santiago , twenty-tw o mile s northeast of Bagabag. Her e the advance halted

because bypasse d element s o f th e 179th

IIB wer e threatenin g t o cu t th e lin e o f

communications no t onl y o f th e 145t h

RCT bu t als o of the 148t h RCT, which

had followe d th e 145t h throug h Oriun g

Pass, th e 129t h RC T havin g take n ove r

in th e Bagaba g area o n 1 2 June.

The 148t h had passed through Oriung

Pass b y dus k o n th e 13th . Following

close behind were Battery C, 136t h Field

Artillery; par t o f Compan y B , 775t h

Tank Battalion ; and a battalion o f guerrillas fro m th e Buen a Vist a Regiment ,

which ha d previousl y fough t wit h th e

32d Divisio n o n th e Vill a Verd e Trail .

About 173 0 on th e 13t h nearly 20 0 men

of th e 179th IIB jumpe d th e Fil-Ameri -

can column. Before th e melee ended, the

Japanese ha d destroye d a tan k an d a n

ammunition truck , damage d anothe r

tank an d 1 7 mor e trucks , an d kille d 5

men an d wounde d 3 5 others, includin g

10 guerrillas. B y dawn most of th e Japanese survivor s o f th e actio n ha d with -

drawn, an d th e 145t h RCT , which ha d

halted pending the outcome of the affray ,

resumed it s advance .

The actio n a t Oriun g Pas s durin g

the nigh t o f 13-1 4 June wa s th e las t

significant effor t mad e b y th e mai n

body o f th e 103d Division, whic h

melted westwar d across the Maga t Rive r

in th e are a nort h o f Oriun g Pas s

after th e 179th IIB collapsed . B y eve -

ning of 1 4 June advance elements of th e

37th Divisio n wer e a t Echague , a n air -

field cente r eigh t mile s east o f Santiago .

Two day s late r th e 145t h an d 148t h

RCT's bega n movin g int o Cauayan , fif -

teen mile s nort h alon g Rout e 5 fro m

Echague. (Map 25)

The Shobu Group

Plans Another Withdrawal

By 1 5 June th e Shobu Group's affair s

had reache d a crisis, a crisis demandin g

drastic revisio n o f th e carefu l plan s

Yamashita ha d formulate d i n earl y May.

One o f th e principa l event s bringin g

on th e situatio n ha d bee n th e inabilit y
564 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

ATTACKING THROUG H ORIUN G PAS S

of th e 2d Tank an d 10th Divisions t o

establish defense s acros s Rout e 5 sout h

of Bagaba g before th e 37t h Divisio n ha d

sped pas t th e town . I t wa s not, indeed,

until 1 2 June tha t th e 2d Tank Division

had reorganize d an d wa s ready t o mov e

toward Bambang . B y that dat e th e divi -

sion ha d assemble d aroun d 4,75 0 troop s

—including 1,750 service personnel from

the Bamban g area—abou t halfwa y fro m

Bambang alon g th e Bambang-Pingkia n

road. Bu t on th e 12th the 6t h Division's

20th Infantr y initiate d a driv e south -

west alon g the roa d fro m Bambang , an d

two day s late r par t o f th e 32 d Division's

126th Infantr y bega n pushin g wes t

toward Pingkia n fro m Arita o alon g th e

Baguio-Aritao supply road. The 2d Tank

Division suddenl y foun d itsel f force d t o

the defensive , it s las t chanc e t o reac h

Route 5 lon g sinc e gone. 7

The 10th Division, out of contact wit h

Shobu Group headquarters since 5 June,

had meanwhil e becom e hopelessl y cu t

off east of Rout e 5. Ultimately , the divi -

sion commande r assemble d abou t 2,50 0

survivors alon g th e Ol d Spanis h Trai l

south o f Aritao, but o n 1 1 June th e 25t h

Division bega n a two-pronge d attac k

against this group, sending one regiment

south fro m Arita o an d anothe r nort h

7

 Kawai Narrative , 10t h I&H Staf f Study , Japanes e

Opns o n Luzon , pt . IV ; Kawa i Interrogs , Interrogs ,

I, 319 ; SWP A His t Series , II , 488 ; 14th Area Army

Opns on Luzon , pp . 167-79 ; 20t h In f Rpt Luzon , pp.

51-53; 126t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 25-26.
Map 25
566 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

from Carranglan .

8

 B y 2 2 June th e 25t h

Division ha d cleare d th e trail . Thos e

left i n th e 10th Division, which ha d los t

about 75 0 me n kille d i n th e futil e figh t

since th e 11th , withdre w eastwar d dee p

into th e Sierr a Madre , n o longe r con -

stituting a forc e wit h whic h I Corp s ha d

to reckon. 9

Another even t promptin g Yamashit a

to review his May plans was the USAFIP-

(NL) breakthroug h a t Bessan g Pass ,

which Yamashit a kne w coul d onl y pre -

sage subsequen t drive s towar d Bonto c

and Mankayan . Meanwhile , farthe r

south, the 33d Division had breache d the

defenses nort h o f Bagui o muc h soone r

than Yamashit a ha d anticipated . Th e

130th Infantry , 33 d Division , reache d

KP 2 1 on 4 June , findin g th e 58th IMB

capable onl y o f wea k resistance . Poo r

weather condition s halte d th e 33 d Divi -

sion's effort s unti l 1 2 June, bu t b y th e

15th, swingin g eas t fro m K P 2 1 alon g

the Baguio-Arita o supply road, elements

of th e division ha d reached Ambuclao on

the Agn o River, whil e othe r troop s ha d

pushed tw o mile s u p Rout e 1 1 from K P

21. Th e carefull y planne d defense s o f

the 58th IMB an d th e 23d Division at the

southwestern ancho r o f th e firs t tw o de -

fense line s Yamashita ha d se t u p i n Ma y

had collapse d lik e a hous e o f cards. 10

Events in the Cagayan Valley were also

moving faste r tha n Yamashit a ha d ex -

pected. B y 1 5 Jun e th e 11t h an d 14t h

Infantry Regiments , USAFIP(NL) , ha d

cleared almost al l th e valle y west o f th e

Cagayan Rive r fro m Cauaya n nort h t o

Aparri an d ha d gaine d complet e control

over Route 1 1 from Bonto c to th e valley .

Meanwhile th e Connoll y Tas k Force ,

after a n uneventfu l march , ha d neare d

Aparri an d o n 1 1 June, with th e hel p of

the 11t h Infantry, USAFIP(NL) , ha d

begun an attac k to clear the last Japanes e

from th e Aparri area .

Most o f th e Japanes e comba t troop s

left i n th e valle y nort h o f Cauaya n wer e

members o f th e Yuguchi Force, a n un -

derstrength RC T o f th e 103d Division.

Upon th e fal l o f th e division' s defense s

at Oriun g Pass , th e Yuguchi Force ha d

started south from th e vicinity of Aparri,

apparently intending to cross to the west

side of th e Cagaya n Rive r nea r Cauaya n

and make its way to Yamashita's last-stand

area vi a Route 38 9 to Banaue , on Rout e

4. B y 15 June the Yuguchi Force's 177th

IIB wa s a t Tuguegarao , forty-fiv e mile s

north o f Cauayan , an d th e res t o f th e

unit wa s strung ou t alon g Rout e 5 fo r

some twenty miles north of Tuguegarao.11

The las t even t forcin g Yamashit a t o

alter hi s plan s cam e o n 1 3 June , whe n

the 6t h Division' s 63 d Infantr y bega n

probing northwes t u p Rout e 4 fro m 8

 Terrain problems during this operation wer e formidable, but th e regiments proved tha t troop s could

operate alon g th e Ol d Spanis h Trail . A n attempt t o

do s o during the 25t h Division' s driv e to Balet e Pass

had bee n abandoned . Se e above , ch . XXVII. 9

 14th Area Army Opn s o n Luzon , pp . 167 , 196-

200; Tsuchiy a Statement , States , IV , 405 ; 25th Di v

Rpt Luzon , pp . 78-82 ; Capt . Rober t F . Karolevitz ,

ed., The 25th Division and World War 2 (Bato n

Rouge, La.: Arm y & Navy Publishin g Co., 1945) , pp .

145-48. 10

 130t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 49-53 ; 136t h In f Rp t

Luzon, p. 63; Sato Statement, States, III, 258 ; Takatsu

Interrog, USAFIP(NL ) Rpt , pp . 172-73 .

During th e nigh t o f 6- 7 June , S . Sgt. Howar d E .

Woodford o f Compan y I , 130t h Infantry , heroicall y

steadied th e guerrill a compan y o f Capt . Doming o

D. Quibuyen , 1s t Tarla c Regiment , a s i t stoo d of f

a viciou s Japanes e counterattac k nea r Tabio , jus t

north o f K P 21 . Fo r a combination o f thi s action, in

which h e wa s killed, an d demonstratin g remarkabl e

leadership under fir e the previous afternoon, Sergeant

Woodford wa s posthumously awarde d th e Meda l o f

Honor. 11

 I Corp s G-3 Opn s Rpts , 4-1 6 Jun 45; USAFIP-

(NL) G- 3 Opn s Rp t 23 , 8-15 Ju n 45 ; 14th Area

Army Opn s o n Luzon , pp . 200-201 ; USAFIP(NL )

Rpt, pp . 104-116 .
PURSUIT I N NORTHER N LUZO N 567

Bagabag. Th e reconnaissanc e foreshad -

owed a pus h tha t Yamashit a especiall y

feared, sinc e Rout e 4 provide d direc t

access t o th e dee p Cordiller a Central .

The 105th Division, with defense s across

Route 4 a t th e Rayambuga n Far m

School, di d no t hav e sufficien t strengt h

to hol d th e highway , Yamashit a knew .

By 1 5 June, then , th e Shobu Group's

phased withdrawa l ha d progresse d s o

poorly tha t nowher e i n norther n Luzo n

did Yamashit a hav e th e strengt h h e ha d

expected whe n h e ha d formulate d hi s

plans i n earl y May. H e realize d tha t h e

could no t hop e t o hol d along any of th e

three perimeter s h e ha d establishe d i n

May, an d h e therefor e issue d new orders

calling fo r ultimat e withdrawa l int o a

last-stand area tha t he would set up along

the inhospitable valley of the Asin River,

between Route s 4 an d 11. 12

The Asi n Rive r flow s northwes t t o

southeast across Route 4 at a point about

six mile s northwest o f th e Rayambuga n

Farm School . Changin g it s nam e t o

Ibulao Rive r eas t o f th e highway , th e

stream join s th e Maga t abou t fiv e mile s

north o f Bagabag . Abou t thre e mile s

west o f th e strea m crossin g on Rout e 4

lies th e mountai n tow n o f Kiangan ,

in Jun e 194 5 th e sit e o f 14th Area

Army-Shobu Group headquarters . A n

abandoned roa d (onc e part o f Rout e 4)

connected Kiangan to Hucab, on Route 4

three mile s sout h o f th e Asi n crossing ,

and a n unpaved , one-lan e roa d le d

directly fro m Kianga n t o th e Asi n

crossing.

From Kianga n a poo r road, originall y

constructed a s a hors e trail, run s north -

west fiv e mile s t o th e Asi n Rive r a t

Kiangkiang. Her e connectio n i s mad e

with Rout e 390 , actuall y anothe r hors e

trail tha t comes cross-country from Rout e

4 a t Banaue , abou t te n mile s north -

northeast o f Kiangkiang . Th e Asi n Valley stretche s sout h ove r fiv e mile s fro m

Kiangkiang t o barri o Calaban , whenc e

it lead s westward throug h th e Cordiller a

Central to end near Toccucan, which lie s

about seven miles southeast of the KP 90

intersection o n Rout e 11 . Rout e 39 0

leaves th e Asi n Valle y abou t midwa y

between Calaba n an d Kiangkian g and ,

as a hors e trail , run s west-southwes t

through extremel y rugged , nearl y vertical terrain to Toccucan. Fro m Toccucan

fairly goo d trail s lea d northwes t t o th e

Loo Valley near KP 90 and west approximately fiv e mile s t o Buguias , o n th e

Agno about seven miles south of the Loo

Valley.

Two north-sout h trail s attaine d con -

siderable importanc e i n th e Shobu

Group's plan s fo r it s last-stan d defense .

From barri o Pacdan , tw o mile s west o f

Kiangan o n th e road t o Kiangkiang, one

trail le d sout h throug h Antipol o te n

miles t o Tubliao , abou t 1,50 0 fee t u p

along the eastern slopes of the Cordillera

Central a t a poin t abou t twelv e mile s

west-northwest o f Bagabag . Fro m Tub -

liao, rive r valle y an d mountai n trail s

connected t o th e 2d Tank Division's

concentration poin t o n th e Bambang -

Pingkian road, twenty miles to the south.

The othe r importan t trai l led sout h fif -

teen mile s alon g th e Agn o Valle y fro m

the vicinit y o f K P 9 0 t o Adaoay . A t

Adaoay thi s trai l forked , on e branc h

leading south eight miles to 23d Division

front line s a t Bokod , an d th e othe r

branch swingin g of f south-southwes t t o

the Baguio-Aritao supply road at Ambuclao, whic h th e 33 d Divisio n ha d reache d

by 1 5 June.

12

 I Corps Rpt Luzon , p. 108 ; SWPA His t Series, II,

488; 14th Area Army Opn s on Luzon , pp . 167-69 .
568 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Yamashita's mid-June plan s called fo r

his unit s t o star t withdrawin g slowl y

toward a ne w perimeter . Th e 105th

Division woul d retrea t fro m Rout e 4 t o

a lin e stretchin g sout h fiv e mile s fro m

Pacdan to Antipole;13 th e 2d Tank Division woul d com e nort h t o hol d th e line

Tubliao-Antipolo. Araki Force rem -

nants, whic h ha d alread y move d fro m

Bontoc southeast t o Banaue , were to de -

fend Rout e 39 0 a t Hapao , fiv e mile s

north o f Kiangkiang . Leavin g som e o f

its strength at th e Lepanto Copper Min e

and K P 90, the 19th Division would pul l

the bulk o f its troops into the Agno Valley to defend th e river line from th e Loo

Valley sout h t o Buguias , thu s blockin g

the western approaches to the Asin River

valley. Th e 58th IMB woul d hol d th e

Agno Valle y fro m Buguia s sout h t o

Adaoay, whil e th e 23d Division woul d

defend alon g th e lin e Adaoay-Bokod .

When this last-stand perimeter collapsed,

Yamashita planned , all remaining force s

would hole up in th e barren Asin Valley

between Toccucan and Kiangkiang, there

to figh t t o th e death. 14

The are a behind Yamashita's new laststand perimete r boasted excellent defen -

sive terrain , an d Yamashit a estimate d

that mos t o f hi s unit s ha d sufficien t

ammunition fo r machin e guns, mortars,

and smal l arm s t o hol d th e region fo r a

long time . Bu t th e situatio n i n regar d

to othe r supplie s hi s suppl y officer s

termed "distressing. " Whe n I Corps had

started u p Rout e 5 a t th e en d o f May ,

Shobu Group ha d jus t begu n t o mov e

food an d othe r militar y supplie s u p

Route 4 fro m th e Cagaya n Valle y an d

Route 5 . Th e grou p ha d virtuall y n o

medical supplie s left ; i t ha d n o stock s

of clothing; its food would be completely

exhausted b y mid-September. 15 Th e

Shobu Group coul d loo k forwar d onl y

to slow death by starvation and diseas e if

it wer e not firs t annihilate d b y th e forc e

of Fil-America n arms.

New Sixth Army-I Corps Plans

Mid-June foun d Sixt h Arm y an d I

Corps, lik e th e Shobu Group, makin g

significant changes in plans. 16 Apparently

still believin g tha t th e Shobu Group

would make its last stand in th e Cagaya n

Valley, Kruege r estimate d tha t i f th e

37th Divisio n coul d continu e it s fas t

drive towar d Aparri , th e divisio n migh t

be able to end th e Luzon Campaign with

one stroke . Th e mai n ris k woul d b e

the safet y o f th e division' s lengthenin g

supply line , but Kruege r though t tha t if

the divisio n coul d advanc e fas t enough ,

providing its ow n protectio n t o it s lin e

of communications , Japanes e resistanc e

would becom e s o disorganized tha t the y

would b e unabl e t o threate n th e supply

line.17

13

 Not t o b e confuse d wit h th e tow n o f Antipol e

east o f Manila . 14

 14th Area Army Opn s o n Luzon , pp . 167-72 ;

SWPA His t Series , II , 488 ; Takasu Interrog , USA -

FIP(NL) Rpt , pp. 172-73 ; Kawa i Statement , States ,

II, 149 ; Terau Interrog , USAFIP(NL ) Rpt , p. 151.

15

 Aoshima Narrative , 10th I& H Staff Study , Japa -

nese Opns on Luzon , pt. I; 14th Area Army Opn s on

Luzon, pp . 170-72 . 16

 This subsection is based mainl y on : Sixt h Arm y

Rpt Luzon , I, 93-94 ; Sixt h Arm y F O 69 , 1 5 Jun 45 ,

in ibid., I, 168-69 ; I Corp s FO 25 , 16 Jun 45 . 17

 General Beightler , th e 37t h Division' s com -

mander, agree d enthusiasticall y wit h Krueger' s

estimate, although i t appears tha t Swift , th e I Corp s

commander, wa s a bi t mor e cautious. I n Beightle r

Comments, 1 8 March 1957 , Genera l Beightle r wrote:

"During th e entir e campaig n . . . the corp s com -

mander wa s apprehensiv e o f ou r flan k protectio n

[and] urge d u s t o sto p o n numerou s occasion s [to ]

consolidate ou r positions , withou t actuall y orderin g

us t o d o so. "
PURSUIT I N NORTHER N LUZO N 569

While intendin g t o mak e th e 37t h

Division's drive the main effort, Krueger,

having learne d tha t element s o f th e

Shobu Group wer e withdrawing into the

Cordillera Central between Routes 4 and

11, directe d I Corp s t o maintai n stron g

pressure agains t th e mountainou s are a

from th e north , south , an d west . Gen -

eral Swif t accordingl y directe d th e 6th ,

25th, an d 33 d Division s t o emplo y suf -

ficient strengt h t o clea r th e Baguio -

Aritao suppl y road , thereb y sealin g of f

Yamashita's last-stan d are a o n th e south .

The USAFIP(NL) , whic h passe d t o

Swift's contro l o n 1 5 June, woul d strik e

east fro m Cervante s t o seiz e th e junc -

tion o f Route s 4 an d 1 1 a t Sabangan .

The 6t h Division' s 63 d Infantr y woul d

strike u p Rout e 4 fro m th e southeas t

—objective, Kiangan .

Securing the Cagayan Valley

The 37t h Divisio n resume d it s ad -

vance u p Rout e 5 o n 1 7 Jun e an d b y

1600 th e 148t h Infantr y wa s on th e eas t

bank o f the Cagayan Rive r at Naguilian ,

ten mile s nort h o f Cauayan . Tw o day s

later advance elements were twelve miles

beyond Naguilia n a t Bangag . Her e op -

position increased, because the 37th Division was banging headlong into elements

of th e Yuguchi Force tha t wer e stil l try -

ing t o mov e sout h alon g Rout e 5 . I n a

running figh t fro m 1 9 throug h 2 3 Jun e

the 37t h Divisio n kille d ove r 60 0 Japa -

nese an d capture d almos t 28 5 mor e i n

the fiftee n mile s betwee n Banga g an d

Balasig. I n th e sam e genera l are a th e

division destroye d o r capture d larg e

amounts o f Japanes e equipmen t an d

supplies, includin g fiftee n o r sixtee n

light tanks . B y th e en d o f th e perio d

the remnants of the Yuguchi Force wer e

in ful l fligh t eastwar d into the untracked

wilderness o f th e Sierr a Madre , separat -

ing th e Cagaya n Valle y fro m Luzon' s

east coast .

On 2 3 June the 129t h RCT too k ove r

the lead, strikin g for Tuguegarao, twen -

ty-five mile s nort h o f Balasig . Tugue -

garao, already under attack by a battalion

of th e 11t h Infantry , USAFIP(NL) ,

fell t o th e 129t h Infantr y o n 2 5 June .

Before dar k forwar d element s o f th e

129th wer e te n mile s beyon d Tugue -

garao, a t Iguig . Th e nex t da y a n ar -

mored colum n spe d northwar d anothe r

twelve mile s o r s o t o th e Pare t River ,

forded tha t stream , and , about three -

quarters of a mile beyond, made contact

with troop s o f th e 11t h Airborne Divi -

sion, wh o o n 2 3 Jun e ha d mad e a

parachute dro p farthe r nort h i n th e

Cagayan Valley. 18

General Kruege r ha d considere d i t

necessary t o stage a n airborn e operatio n

into th e norther n Cagaya n Valle y t o

clinch th e success o f th e 37t h Division's

drive.19 I t i s possibl e tha t Kruege r wa s

also motivate d b y a desir e t o clea n u p

northern Luzon before th e Eight h Army

took ove r control of operations, an even t

scheduled fo r 1 July. 20 Whateve r th e

motivation, an d despit e report s t o th e

contrary fro m th e USAFIP(NL) , I

Corps, th e 37t h Division , an d ALAM O

scout teams , Genera l Kruege r ha d con -

cluded tha t Japanes e force s i n th e Ca -

gayan Valley , upo n th e approac h o f th e

37th Division , wer e fleein g "i n wil d

18

 37th Di v Rpt Luzon , pp . 141-49 ; 148t h In f Rp t

Luzon, pp . 5-6; 129th In f Rp t Luzon , p . 13 ; 129t h

Inf His t 1810-1945 , p . 82 ; USAFIP(NL ) Rpt, p. 105 . 19

 Krueger Comments, 1 8 Dec 56 . 20

 White (G- 2 Sixth Army ) Comments, 2 3 Jan 57 .
570 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

disorder on Highway 5 toward Aparri."21

Actually, th e genera l tren d o f Japanes e

movement ha d bee n southwar d fo r

weeks, an d certainl y n o Japanes e forc e

intended t o hol e u p a t Aparri , a n

indefensible, flatlan d cul-de-sac. 22

In vie w o f Krueger' s estimat e o f th e

Japanese situation, "and in order to complete th e annihilatio n o f th e enem y

forces fleein g north , i t wa s decide d t o

make a vertical envelopment o f airborne

troops t o close the trap and preven t th e

enemy fro m al l possibilit y o f escapin g

from Aparri." 23 Accordingly , o n 2 1

June, Kruege r directe d a battalion com -

bat tea m o f th e 511t h Parachut e Infan -

try, 11t h Airborn e Division , t o dro p

near Aparr i o n 2 3 June.24

On th e ver y da y tha t Kruege r issue d

this order, Connoll y Task Forc e entered

Aparri unopposed . B y evening th e next

day element s o f th e tas k forc e an d th e

2d Battalio n o f th e 11t h Infantry , USA -

FIP(NL), wer e te n mile s sout h alon g

Route 5 fro m Aparr i an d ha d secure d

Camalaniugan Airstrip, three miles from

Aparri, o n thei r way. 25 Ther e wa s n o

trap for th e 511t h Parachut e Infantr y t o

close.

Despite the successe s o f th e reinforced

Connolly Tas k Force , Kruege r di d no t

change hi s min d abou t th e desirabilit y

and necessit y fo r th e airdrop . Instead ,

he concluded tha t th e "seizur e of Aparri

without oppositio n b y element s o f th e

Connolly Tas k Forc e o n 2 1 June 1945 ,

together wit h th e almos t unoppose d

advance o f th e 37t h Division , indicate d

clearly tha t th e tim e ha d com e fo r

mounting th e airborn e troop s t o bloc k

the enemy's retrea t i n th e Cagaya n Val -

ley."

 2 6

 I t i s not clea r jus t wha t retrea t

Krueger expecte d t o block .

The airborn e force totaled about 1,03 0

men, includin g th e reinforce d 1s t Bat -

talion o f th e 511t h Infantr y an d Batter y

C, 457t h Parachut e Fiel d Artiller y Bat -

talion. Aircraf t involve d wer e 54 C-47's,

14 C-46's, and 7 gliders, th e latte r being

used fo r th e firs t tim e i n th e Southwes t

Pacific Area . Th e droppin g ground wa s

Camalaniugan Airstrip, whic h 11t h Airborne Divisio n pathfinders , wh o arrived

at Connoll y Tas k Forc e headquarter s

on 2 2 June , marke d wit h ease. 27

No untowar d inciden t marke d th e

flight o f th e troop carriers from Batanga s

in souther n Luzo n t o the drop zone, and

paratroopers bega n droppin g o n th e

21

 Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I, 95. 22

 In additio n t o Japanes e source s supportin g thi s

conclusion, se e also : Rads , Chanc y ALAM O Scou t

Team t o G- 2 Sixt h Army , 1 9 an d 2 1 Jun 45 , Sixt h

Army G- 3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 18-2 1 Ju n 45 ; 37t h Di v

Rpt Luzon , pp . 171-74 ; USAFIP(NL ) G- 2 Pe r Rp t

81, C Jun, an d 91-95 , 16-2 0 Jun 45 . 23

 Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I, 95. 24

 Sixth Arm y FO' s 71 an d 72 , 2 1 an d 2 2 Ju n 45 ,

Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I, 173-74 . 25

 I Corp s G- 3 Pe r Rpts , 16-2 3 Ju n 15 : USAFIP -

(NL) G-3 Opn s Rp t 24 , 15-26 Jun 45.

26

 Sixth Arm y Rp t Luzon , I , 95 . 27

 11th A/ B Di v WO, 2 2 Ju n 45 , Sixt h Arm y G- 3

Jnl Fil e Luzon . 21-23 Ju n 45 ; 11th A/B Di v F O 32 ,

22 Ju n 45 , 11t h A/B Di v Gyps y Op n File ; Memo ,

Asst ACof S G- 3 Sixt h Arm y fo r ACof S G- 3 Sixt h

Army, 2 9 Jun 4 5 ( a rp t o f th e A/ B opn). Sixt h Arm y

G-3 Jn l Fil e Luzon , 3 0 fu n 45. Th e majo r compo -

nents o f th e airborn e groupment—designate d th e

Gypsy Tas k Force—were :

1st Bn , 511t h Prch t In f

Co G, 511th Prch t In f

Co I, 511t h Prch t In f

Battery C , 457t h Prch t F A B n

Det, 511th A/B Si g Co

Det, 711t h A/ B Or d C o

Det, Serv Co, 511t h Prcht In f

Language Det, 11t h A/B Di v

CIC Det , Hq, 11t h A/ B Di v

2d Pit , 221st Me d C o

11th Prch t Mait u C o

1st Plt . Co C, 127t h A/B Eng r Bn

Demolition Pit , H q Co , 511t h Prch t In f
PURSUIT I N NORTHER N LUZO N 571

morning o f 2 3 Jun e whil e Fift h Ai r

Force bomber s an d fighter s fle w cove r

and othe r plane s lai d smok e screen s t o

conceal th e drop zone from th e east an d

south. Th e paratrooper s wer e greete d

on th e groun d b y me n o f th e Connoll y

Task Forc e and th e 11th Infantry, USA -

FIP(NL).28 Onc e th e 'trooper s wer e

down, glider s brough t i n artiller y an d

other type s o f heav y equipment ; C-47's

and C-46's dropped additiona l material .

Jump casualtie s wer e 2 me n kille d an d

70 injured , a rat e o f abou t 7 percent ;

one glide r wa s damage d upo n landing .

Contributing factor s wer e a 20 - t o 25 -

mile-an-hour groun d wind—1 5 mile s a n

hour bein g considere d th e maximu m

safe velocity—an d th e roug h conditio n

of th e dro p zone .

29

While Connoll y Tas k Forc e hel d i n

the Aparri area , th e 1s t Battalion , 511th

Infantry, starte d sout h t o gai n contac t

with th e 37t h Division . Th e 'trooper s

saw onl y a fe w Japanes e straggler s o n

their way south an d o n 2 6 June met me n

of th e 37t h Divisio n nea r th e Pare t

River, thirty-fiv e mile s sout h o f Cam -

alaniugan Airstrip. 30 Th e airborn e operation ha d prove d bot h useles s an d

unnecessary.

Contact a t th e Pare t Rive r betwee n

the 129t h an d 511th Infantry Regiment s

marked th e en d o f Japanes e resistanc e

in th e Cagaya n Valley . Th e 37t h Divi -

sion (whic h gained control over the 11t h

Infantry, USAFIP(NL) ; th e airborn e

groupment; an d th e Connoll y Tas k

Force) no w bega n moppin g u p an d

patrolling eastwar d int o th e Sierr a

Madre, where perhaps as many as 10,00 0

Japanese, th e bul k o f the m servic e

personnel, hi d out .

Compressing the Kiangan Pocket.

While th e operation s t o clea r th e

Cagayan Valle y wer e bein g brough t t o

a successfu l conclusion , I Corp s ha d

continued pressur e agains t Yamashita' s

last-stand area , soo n t o becom e know n

as th e Kianga n Pocke t b y th e Fil-Ameri -

can force s involve d i n it s reduction .

Ultimately, th e mos t importan t driv e

against Yamashita's last-stan d are a woul d

turn ou t t o b e th e on e mounte d b y th e

6th Divisio n u p Rout e 4 fro m Bagabag ,

for thi s attac k pose d th e mos t direc t

threat t o th e Japanes e alon g th e easiest ,

route t o th e Asi n Rive r valley , bu t I

Corps di d no t neglec t t o appl y pressur e

from othe r directions . I n lat e Jun e th e

USAFIP(NL) struc k fro m Cervante s

both towar d Mankaya n an d Sabangan .

By th e en d o f th e mont h th e 19th Division, no w reduce d t o 2,00 0 effectives ,

was withdrawin g rapidl y fro m Bonto c

and Sabanga n towar d K P 90 , althoug h

still holdin g a stron g defensiv e lin e a t

the Lepant o Min e nea r Mankayan. 31

Farther south , th e 33 d Divisio n brok e

into th e Agn o Valle y o n th e 23d Division fron t and , probing eastwar d alon g

the Baguio-Arita o suppl y road , mad e

28

 Colone l Volckman n denie d th e 11th Infantry th e

pleasure o f displayin g groun d panel s readin g "Wel -

come t o Aparri . Th e 11t h Infantry." Volckman n

Comments, 1 0 Ja n 57 . 29

 Memo, Ass t ACof S G- 3 Sixt h Army , 2 9 Jun 45 ;

11t h A/ B Di v Rpt Luzon , p . 9; I Corps G-3 Pe r Rpt ,

23 Jun 15 . Volckman n say s tha t th e 11th Infantry

and th e Enginee r Battalion , USAFIP(NL) , fille d

shell hole s o n th e stri p and , jus t befor e th e drop ,

chased Carabao s off the dro p zone . Volckman n Com -

ments, 1 0 Ja n 57 . 30

 Memo, Ass t ACof S G- 3 Sixt h Army , 2 9 Jun 45 ;

I Corp s G-3 Pe r Rpts, 24-2 6 Jun 45.

31

 USAFIP(NL) Rpt , pp. 85-87 , 95-98 ; Tera u In -

terrog, i n ibid., pp . 150-51 ; 14th Area Army Opn s

on Luzon , pp . 174-77 .
572 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

contact o n 2 6 Jun e wit h element s o f

the 6th Division that had been patrolling

westward fro m Pingkian. 32 Th e rem -

nants o f th e 2d Tank Division, whic h

had barel y escape d entrapmen t alon g

the Bambang-Pingkia n road , escape d

northward vi a mountain trails and rive r

valleys an d bega n stragglin g int o th e

Tubliao area, twenty miles to th e north,

early i n July. 33

The 6t h Division's driv e u p Rout e 4

toward Kianga n bega n o n 1 6 June, th e

3d Battalion , 63 d Infantry , leading . B y

dusk th e nex t da y th e 63 d ha d broke n

through a 105th Division outpos t lin e

of resistanc e a t th e Rayambuga n Far m

School. I n technica l violatio n o f it s or -

ders, th e 105th Division ha d establishe d

only a n OPL R a t th e school , an d ha d

thrown it s ML R acros s Rout e 4 tw o

miles t o th e northwest , i n bette r defen -

sive terrain . Th e 63 d Infantr y reache d

the ML R o n 1 9 June, bu t i n fiv e days '

fighting, employin g onl y on e battalio n

in th e attack , wa s abl e t o gai n littl e

ground. Strengthene d o n 2 4 June , th e

63d bega n breakin g throug h th e ML R

on th e 26th and b y the 29t h had overru n

the las t organize d resistanc e i n th e re -

gion. B y evenin g o n th e 30t h o f Jun e

the leading troops were almost in Hucab,

where th e ol d sectio n o f Rout e 4

branched westwar d towar d Kiangan .

The 105th Division wa s by this tim e i n

full retrea t throug h Kiangan. 34

The End in Northern Luzon

The Situation at the End of June

At this juncture, with U.S . Army and

guerrilla units pressing the attack against

the Shobu Group o n al l fronts, Genera l

MacArthur relieve d th e headquarters of

Sixth Arm y an d o f I Corp s o f furthe r

operational responsibilit y o n Luzo n i n

order tha t th e tw o could begi n prepara -

tions fo r th e invasio n o f Japan . Th e

headquarters o f Eight h Arm y an d o f

XIV Corp s assume d responsibilit y fo r

the furthe r conduc t o f operation s

throughout Luzon , where the only Japanese forc e stil l capabl e o f effective , well -

organized resistanc e wa s th e Shobu

Group.

For Sixt h Arm y an d I Corps , th e

meeting o f th e 37t h Divisio n an d 11t h

Airborne Divisio n units south o f Aparri

on 2 6 June had marked th e strategic end

of th e campaig n i n norther n Luzon .

This conclusio n attaine d considerabl e

logic. Th e junctur e ha d divide d th e

Shobu Group's remainin g forces and had

occurred whil e Yamashit a wa s desper -

ately tryin g t o withdra w al l availabl e

units int o his last-stand area . Moreover ,

Sixth Arm y estimate d upo n relinquish -

ing contro l t o Eight h Arm y tha t n o

more tha n 23,00 0 Japanes e wer e lef t

alive i n norther n Luzo n an d tha t thes e

troops wer e disorganize d an d incapabl e

of effectiv e defensiv e operations . Sixt h

Army furthe r estimate d tha t onl y 12,00 0

of th e 23,00 0 Japanes e wer e locate d i n

the Cordiller a Centra l betwee n Route s

4 an d 11 , the res t i n th e Sierr a Madr e

east o f th e Cagaya n Valley .

XIV Corp s woul d b e able t o bring t o

bear agains t th e 23,00 0 Japanes e th e

reinforced 6th , 32d, and 37t h Division s

32

 130th Inf Rp t Luzon , pp . 53-55 . 33

 25t h Di v Rpt Luzon , p . 83; 6t h Di v Rpt Luzon ,

pp. 82-84; 20t h In f Rp t Luzon , pp . 53-56; 126t h In f

Rpt Luzon , pp . 26-29 ; Kawa i Statement , States , II ,

149; Kawa i Narrative , 10th I&H Staff Study , Japanese

Opns on Luzon , pt. IV . pp. 15-16 . 34

 6th Di v Rpt Luzon , pp . 82 , 86-88; 63 d In f Rp t

Luzon, pp . 34-37 ; 63 d In f S-3 Pe r Rpts , 15-3 0 Jun

45; 14th Area Army Opn s o n Luzon , pp . 174-77 .
PURSUIT I N NORTHER N LUZO N 573

(the relie f o f th e las t element s o f th e

25th an d 33 d Division s ha d take n plac e

at th e en d o f June) . I n addition , XI V

Corps woul d hav e unde r it s control th e

USAFIP(NL), no w a seasone d an d rea -

sonably well-arme d forc e o f 21,00 0 me n

supported b y tw o U.S . Arm y fiel d artil -

lery battalions . Als o unde r XI V Corp s

was th e experience d Buen a Vist a Regi -

ment, equivalen t i n siz e t o a U.S. Arm y

infantry regimen t les s supportin g arm s

and services . Al l i n all, it appeared tha t

XIV Corp s would becom e involve d onl y

in relativel y eas y mopping-u p an d

patrolling operations.

35

Sixth Arm y ha d greatl y underesti -

mated th e Japanes e strengt h lef t i n

northern Luzon , and Eight h Army 's estimates, mad e upo n it s assumptio n o f

command, wer e bu t littl e close r t o fact .

Actually, a t th e en d o f June , clos e t o

65,000 Japanese remained alive in north -

ern Luzon , 13,00 0 o f the m i n th e Sierr a

Madre an d 52,00 0 i n th e last-stan d are a

between Route s 4 an d 11. 36 Althoug h

organization, control , an d moral e wer e

deteriorating, an d althoug h mos t o f th e

troops wer e il l arme d an d poorl y sup -

plied, th e Japanese i n th e last-stan d are a

were stil l capabl e o f effectiv e resistanc e

when th e occasio n demanded . Th e tas k

confronting th e U.S. Army and guerrill a

units i n norther n Luzo n wa s o f fa r

greater magnitud e tha n an y headquar -

ters estimate d a t th e en d o f June.

Final Operations in Northern Luzon

XIV Corps plans for operations against

the remainde r o f th e Shobu Group dif -

fered onl y i n detai l fro m thos e I Corp s

had previousl y employed. 37 Reduce d t o

their simples t terms , bot h set s o f plan s

called fo r th e exertio n o f unremittin g

pressure against th e Shobu Group wher -

ever Shobu Group troop s wer e t o b e

found.

East o f th e Cagaya n Rive r th e 37t h

Division, an d fo r a tim e a regimen t o f

the 6t h Division , hampere d b y suppl y

problems an d torrentia l rains , patrolle d

vigorously, forcin g Japanes e troop s eve r

farther int o th e Sierr a Madre . Fro m 1

July throug h 1 5 August th e 37t h Divi -

sion an d attache d unit s kille d abou t

1,000 Japanes e east o f th e Cagayan , itself

losing approximatel y 5 0 me n kille d an d

125 wounded .

On th e northwest and west, opposition

was stronger an d bette r organized. Her e

the 15th Infantry , USAFIP(NL) , finall y

secured th e Sabangan junction o f Routes

4 an d 1 1 on 9 July , and o n th e nex t da y

the 11th Infantry occupie d Bontoc . Th e

19th Division's defense s i n th e Lepant o

Mines-Mankayan are a bega n t o fal l

apart befor e attack s o f th e 66t h Infan -

try, USAFIP(NL) , o n 1 0 July ; Man -

35

 Sixth Army Rp t Luzon , I, 97; Sixth Arm y F O 73 ,

25 Ju n 45 , in ibid., I, 174-75 ; Eight h Arm y Rp t o n

Luzon Mop-u p Opn , pp. 9-10. 36

 The figure s ar e th e author' s ow n estimate s fro m

a stud y of al l relevant Japanese and U.S . Army source

materials cited i n this chapter. Th e figure s leav e out

of consideratio n th e survivor s a s o f 3 0 June , o f th e

Shimbu Group, th e Kembu Group, an d th e Fuji

Force.

37

 This subsection is based mainly on: Eight h Arm y

Rpt o n Luzo n Mop-u p Opn , pp . 12-30 ; 10th I&H,

Operational Monograp h o n th e Luzo n Mop-u p Op -

eration, pp . 15-48 ; USAFIP(NL ) Rpt , pp. 83-102 ,

106-09, 111-24; 14th Area Army Opn s o n Luzon ,

pp. 174-204 ; Tera u Interrog , USAFIP(NL ) Rpt, pp .

152-54; Kawa i Narrative , 10th I&H Staf f Study , Japa -

nese Opn s o n Luzon , pt . IV ; Aoshim a Narrative ,

in ibid., pt . III ; Kawai Interrog , Interrogs , I , 325 ;

Muraoka Interrog , USAFIP(NL ) Rpt , pp. 176-80 ;

Statement o f Co l Atsutak a Saruwatar i (Cof S 4th Air

Div), States , III, 245-49.
574 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

kayan fel l o n th e 20th . Th e 66t h

Infantry secure d th e junction o f Route s

11 an d 39 3 a t K P 9 0 o n 2 5 July, makin g

contact th e sam e da y wit h troop s o f th e

15th Infantr y comin g dow n Rout e 1 1

from Sabangan . Th e 19th Division no w

began withdrawing into the upper Agno

Valley t o bloc k th e northern , western ,

and souther n approache s t o Toccucan ,

at th e wester n en d o f Yamashita' s last -

stand are a i n th e Asi n Valley . (Map 26)

The 15t h an d 121s t Regiments ,

USAFIP(NL), immediatel y bega n at -

tacks towar d Toccucan , bu t foun d th e

19th Division remnant s stil l capabl e o f

effective resistance . B y 1 5 Augus t th e

USAFIP(NL)'s leadin g unit s wer e fou r

miles shor t o f Toccuca n o n th e north -

west an d a mil e an d a hal f shor t o n th e

west.

Meanwhile , th e 66t h Infantry ,

USAFIP(NL), ha d struc k sout h fro m

KP 9 0 alon g Rout e 1 1 to mak e contac t

with troop s o f th e 32 d Division , comin g

north fro m K P 21 . Th e clearin g o f

Route 1 1 north from Bagui o had become

a matte r o f pressing urgency becaus e the

heavy summer rains were making it nearly impossible to supply the USAFIP(NL)

either by airdrop or ove r tortuous Route

4 fro m th e wes t coast . Mixe d force s o f

the 58th IMB an d th e 19th Division

held alon g Rout e 11 , thei r principa l

defenses locate d i n th e vicinit y o f Gam -

bang, abou t fiv e mile s sout h o f K P 90 .

Here, o n 2 9 July , th e 66t h Infantry ,

USAFIP(NL), an d th e 127t h Infantry ,

32d Division , finall y mad e contact .

The tw o regiment s nex t swun g east -

ward int o the Agn o Valley near Buguia s

and initiate d a driv e sout h alon g th e

valley t o gai n contac t wit h th e 126t h

Infantry, 32 d Division , coming north u p

the valle y fro m Ambucla o an d Bokod .

Starting of f o n 1 August, th e 126t h In -

fantry foun d fe w sign s o f th e 23d Division, whic h ha d melte d awa y eastwar d

into the inhospitable Cordillera Central.

On 8 August th e 126t h an d 127t h Regi -

ments mad e contac t nea r Buguia s an d

were preparing a drive towar d Toccucan

when hostilitie s ended .

On th e east side of the Shobu Group's

last-stand area , whil e th e 6t h Divisio n

was making its strongest effor t a n attac k

toward Kiangan , elements of the division

struck nort h u p Rout e 4 an d reache d

Banaue o n 2 0 July . Meanwhile , troop s

of th e 11t h Infantry , USAFIP(NL) , ha d

started south along Route 4 from Bonto c

and o n 2 1 July mad e contac t wit h th e

1st Infantry , 6t h Division , a t Poli s Pass,

five mile s nort h o f Banaue . Thi s con -

tact, couple d wit h tha t betwee n

USAFIP(NL) an d 32 d Division units on

Route 1 1 eigh t day s later , marke d th e

complete encirclemen t o f th e Shobu

Group last-stan d area .

The 1s t Infantry , 6t h Division , an d

the 11t h Infantry , USAFIP(NL) , turne d

east fro m Banau e alon g Rout e 389 , o n

which abou t 2,50 0 Japanes e o f th e 103d

Division an d th e 4th Air Division ha d

concentrated i n mid-July . Th e 11t h In -

fantry ultimatel y mad e it s mai n effor t

from th e nort h an d east , and , wit h th e

1st Infantr y i n support , cleare d Rout e

389 by 9 August.38 Th e Japanes e force d

off Rout e 38 9 hi d i n mountain s north o f

that roa d an d eas t o f Rout e 4 unti l th e

end o f th e war .

The fina l ancillar y attac k towar d th e

Shobu Group last-stan d are a wa s a drive

38

 Guerrilla unit s involve d i n th e fightin g t o clea r

Route 38 9 wer e th e 3 d an d Provisiona l Battalions ,

11th Infantry ; th e 1s t Battalion , 14t h Infantry ; an d

miscellaneous element s o f th e 11t h Infantry .
Map 26
576 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

KIANGAN VALLE Y

south fro m Banau e along the hors e trail

known a s Rout e 390 . Undertake n b y

elements o f th e 1s t Infantry , 6t h Divi -

sion, an d th e 11t h Infantry, USAFIP -

(NL), th e attac k reache d a poin t abou t

five mile s south o f Banau e b y 9 August,

but ther e th e driv e stoppe d fo r lac k o f

strength and becaus e of supply problems.

Throughout July an d th e firs t hal f o f

August th e mai n effor t continue d t o b e

the 6t h Division' s attac k fro m Rout e 4

toward Kiangan . Here , al l operation s

were virtuall y stoppe d abou t 1 July b y

incessant, torrentia l rain s tha t turne d

the roa d towar d Kianga n int o a n im -

passable quagmire. Th e problem s of the

6th Divisio n wer e aggravate d becaus e

the Fift h Ai r Force , i n "co-operation "

with th e Japanese, had mad e a shamble s

of section s o f th e ol d road , destroyin g

all bridge s and causin g many landslides.

Finally, rear-guar d troop s o f th e 105th

Division als o slowe d progress .

The 63 d Infantry , 6t h Division ,

reached Kianga n o n 1 2 July, ther e capturing all type s of Japanese military supplies i n larg e quantities. Bu t the n eve n

heavier rain s cam e down , an d fro m 1 6

through 2 0 Jul y th e regimen t wa s ma -

rooned a t Kiangan , barel y supporte d b y

hand-carrying parties. O n th e 24th , th e

20th Infantr y too k ove r an d bega n a n

advance toward Kiangkian g and the Asin

River, simultaneousl y sendin g on e bat -

talion sout h fro m Kianga n towar d

Tubliao an d th e remnant s o f th e 2d

Tank Division.

The 2d Tank Division ha d assemble d

about 5,30 0 troop s a t Tubliao—1,80 0

of its own, about th e same number fro m
PURSUIT I N NORTHER N LUZO N 577

the Hayakawa Naval Unit,

39

 and roughly

1,700 Arm y groun d forc e servic e troop s

from th e Bamban g region . Th e Japa -

nese uni t ha d onl y th e foo d i t coul d

find o n th e ground ; it s arme d troops ,

3,600 i n all , ha d onl y 8 0 round s o f am -

munition for each rifle; it had no artillery

and ver y few mortars and machin e guns.

The divisio n ha d hope d t o reac h th e

Asin Valle y last-stan d area , but th e 20t h

Infantry blocke d its route o f withdrawa l

until 7 August , whe n element s o f th e

63d Infantr y too k ove r alon g th e trai l

south fro m Kiangan . Rain-swolle n

streams, floode d ric e paddies, an d nearl y

impassable trail s restricte d th e 63d' s ac -

tivities to patrolling, and a s of 1 5 August

the regiment had no t establishe d contact

with th e mai n bod y o f th e 2d Tank

Division.

Meanwhile, th e Japanes e ha d bitterl y

opposed th e 6t h Division' s effort s t o

advance wes t fro m Kianga n towar d th e

Asin Valley . Instea d o f moppin g up ,

the divisio n soo n foun d itsel f involve d

in mountai n fightin g a s roug h a s tha t

experienced a t an y time o r a t an y plac e

throughout th e Luzo n Campaign , A t

the en d o f hostilitie s o n 1 5 August th e

20th Infantry , 6t h Division , wa s scarcel y

three mile s beyon d Kianga n alon g th e

trail t o Kiangkiang .

In a mont h an d a hal f o f bitte r fight -

ing i n incredibl y stee p terrai n an d i n

the mos t miserabl e typ e o f weathe r Fil -

American force s ha d faile d t o projec t

any strengt h int o th e Asi n Valley . Thi s

last mont h an d a hal f o f th e operatio n

in norther n Luzo n ha d cos t th e force s

engaged approximatel y 1,65 0 casualties ,

divided a s follows: 40

Unit

USAFIP (NL)

6th Divisio n

32d Divisio n

37th Divisio n

Other

Total

Killed

285

45

45

50

15

440

Wounded

715

190

140

130

35

1,210

Total

1,000

235

185

180

50

1,650

Eighth Arm y estimate d tha t Shobu

Group casualtie s fo r th e sam e perio d

were 13,50 0 me n kille d o r dea d o f

starvation an d disease .

Results and Conclusions

How muc h longe r th e Shobu Group

could hav e kep t Fil-America n troop s

out o f th e Asi n Valle y i s a moo t ques -

tion. Yamashit a ha d estimate d i n Jun e

that h e ha d sufficien t supplie s t o hol d

out unti l mid-September , an d fro m th e

scale o f effort Eight h Army was able and

willing t o pu t int o th e campaig n fro m

1 Jul y t o 1 5 August , i t appear s tha t

Yamashita woul d hav e me t hi s dead -

line. Whe n foo d wa s exhausted , h e

planned t o hav e hi s mos t effectiv e re -

maining troops attempt a breakout from

the Asi n Valle y t o th e mountain s o f fa r

northwestern Luzo n where , h e hoped ,

more foo d migh t b e found . Me n no t

participating i n th e breakou t wer e t o

39

 Mainly Nava l Ai r Servic e personne l fro m th e

Cagayan Valley .

40

 The USAFIP(NL ) casualtie s ar e fo r th e perio d

21 June-1 5 August ; th e res t fo r 1 July-15 August . The "other " include s Eight h Arm y an d XI V Corp s

troops, th e Buen a Vist a Regiment , an d miscellane -

ous guerrill a units .

On 2 9 July Cpl . Melvi n Mayfiel d o f Compan y D , 20th Infantry , brilliantl y an d bravel y gav e suc h a

demonstration o f leadershi p an d herois m unde r

heavy fir e tha t h e inspire d tw o attache d guerrill a

companies, previousl y pinne d down , t o resum e th e

advance agains t Japanes e position s i n th e rugge d

hills on th e wa y west fro m Kiangan . Fo r hi s actions,

Corporal Mayfiel d wa s awarded th e Meda l of Honor.
578 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

TERRAIN I N TH E LAST-STAN D AREA , Asin

Valley.

stage banzai attacks on all fronts t o cover

the effectives ' escape . Expectin g that ,

successful o r not , th e breakou t woul d

mark th e complet e disintegratio n o f his

forces, Yamashit a planne d t o commi t

hara-kiri durin g th e melee. 41 Thus , th e

end o f th e wa r cam e abou t a mont h

before Yamashit a wa s read y t o admi t

final defeat .

The effectivenes s o f the Shobu Group

operations i n norther n Luzo n mus t b e

assessed within the context of Yamashita's

concept of the strategic goal of the Luzon

Campaign. Fro m th e first , Yamashit a

had know n tha t h e ha d insufficien t

strength t o hol d al l Luzon o r t o prevent

MacArthur's force s fro m ultimatel y oc -

cupying al l th e island . Th e mos t h e

could accomplish , Yamashit a wa s con -

vinced a s earl y a s Decembe r 1944 , was

to dela y Allie d progres s towar d Japa n

by pinnin g dow n a s man y America n

divisions o n Luzo n a s possible . H e als o

realized tha t his strength, th e condition

of th e roads , bridges , an d railroad s o n

Luzon, and th e preponderanc e of Allied

air power, would make it impossibl e for

him t o moun t a decisiv e counterattac k

against th e invasio n force s o f th e Sixt h

Army. An y attac k employin g les s tha n

his entir e strengt h would , h e knew , b e

foredoomed t o disastrous failure, bu t h e

lacked th e capabilit y o f concentratin g

all his forces. H e wa s certain, therefore ,

that counterattack s coul d resul t onl y i n

the rapid , piecemea l destructio n o f th e

14th Area Army. Suc h destructio n

would, o f cours e defea t hi s mai n pur -

pose—conducting protracte d delayin g

actions o n Luzon .

It ha d bee n thi s reasonin g tha t ha d

led Yamashit a t o establis h hi s thre e

separate defensiv e position s i n Luzon' s

mountains. H e ha d concentrate d hi s

principal strength , the Shobu Group, i n

northern Luzo n becaus e th e siz e o f tha t

area and th e nature of its terrain afforded

him th e best opportunities for extended

delaying operations . Moreover , foo d

requisite t o suc h operation s wa s avail -

able i n th e Cagaya n an d Maga t Valleys,

the defens e o f norther n Luzo n woul d

deny th e Allie s th e us e o f th e Cagaya n

Valley airfields, an d hi s best an d strong -

est units were already in northern Luzon.

By an y standard , th e Shobu Group

accomplished th e delayin g missio n

Yamashita envisage d fo r it . Durin g th e

period o f Sixt h Arm y contro l o f opera -

tions o n Luzon , th e pea k commitmen t

of majo r groun d forc e unit s against th e

Shobu Group ha d bee n fou r reinforce d

U.S. Arm y infantr y divisions , on e sepa -

rate RCT , an armore d group , th e

USAFIP(NL), and the Buena Vista Regi41

 The pla n i s discussed i n Mut o Memoirs , Trans,

I, 58-59.
PURSUIT I N NORTHER N LUZO N 579

YAMASHITA COME S OU T O F THE VALLE Y

to surrender.

ment.42 Whe n hostilitie s cease d o n 1 5

August, th e Shobu Group wa s still "entertaining" thre e reinforce d U.S . Arm y

divisions—the 6th , 32d, and 37th—th e

greatly strengthene d USAFIP(NL) , th e

Buena Vista Regiment, and sundr y other

guerrilla units. Th e foregoin g doe s no t

include the considerable effort th e Allied

Air Force s expended in northern Luzon.

Sixth Army' s missio n vis-à-vi s th e

Shobu Group ha d bee n firs t t o contai n

and the n t o destroy tha t Japanese force .

There ca n b e n o argumen t tha t Sixt h

Army effectivel y containe d th e Shobu

Group—which i n tur n just a s effectively

contained abou t one-thir d o f th e Sixt h

Army. An d give n hi s 3 0 June estimat e

that onl y 23,00 0 Japanes e wer e lef t i n

northern Luzon , Genera l Kruege r ha d

reason t o believ e tha t Sixt h Arm y ha d

to all intents and purposes destroyed th e

Shobu Group. Th e destructio n wa s not

as complet e a s Kruege r believed , al -

though i t i s certainl y tru e tha t a s o f

30 June the Shobu Group wa s no longer

capable o f effectiv e o r significan t offen -

sive effort . A t th e en d o f June , th e

Shobu Group stil l had 65,00 0 men o f its

peak strengt h o f ove r 150,000 . O f th e

65,000, 52,00 0 comprise d a n organize d

force stil l firml y unde r Yamashita' s

control i n th e Asi n Valle y sector.

Eighth Arm y too k u p th e missio n o f

destroying the Shobu Group where Sixth

Army ha d lef t off , but whe n hostilitie s

ended o n 1 5 August th e Japanese group

could hav e hel d ou t a t leas t anothe r

month. Afte r th e end o f the war, roughly 50,50 0 Japanes e troop s cam e ou t o f

the mountains of northern Luzon, nearly

40,000 o f the m fro m th e Asi n Valle y

last-stand area . Thus , th e wa r ende d

with abou t one-thir d o f th e Shobu

Group's pea k strength still alive and still

capable o f conductin g organized , stub -

born delayin g operations . Th e conclu -

sion ca n hardl y b e avoide d tha t th e

Shobu Group, i n th e seve n an d a hal f

months from 9 January 1945, had indee d

executed a most effective delaying action.

42

 The precis e date of th e pea k commitmen t is difficult t o ascertain. Abou t 1 February, for example, the

commitment include d th e 6th , 25th, 32d , an d 43 d

Divisions; th e 158t h RCT; the bul k o f th e 13th Armored Group ; an d th e USAFIP(NL) . A t th e en d o f

June th e commitmen t wa s th e 25th , 32d , 33d, and

37th Divisions ; thre e tan k battalions ; a battalio n

combat tea m o f th e 11t h Airborne Division ; th e

USAFIP(NL); th e Buen a Vist a Regiment ; an d mis -

cellaneous othe r guerrill a units .

PART SEVE N

THE SOUTHER N PHILIPPINE S

CHAPTER XX X

The Campaig n Begins

The Plans and the Forces

American Plans o f Attack

The Luzo n Campaign had been under

way les s tha n a mont h whe n Genera l

MacArthur decide d tha t th e tim e ha d

come t o pu t int o effec t hi s plan s fo r

securing th e bypasse d island s o f th e

Southern Philippines. 1 Fo r a variet y o f

reasons th e theater commander regarded

speed essentia l fo r th e move int o th e

southern islands , althoug h h e kne w

operations ther e woul d diver t force s

from Luzo n an d dela y it s reconquest .

However, obviou s disadvantage s an d

dangers face d th e Filipino s o n th e by -

passed islands , garrisone d a s the y wer e

by Japanes e troop s wh o had n o hop e o f

succor an d whos e temper s an d moral s

could hardl y b e expecte d t o improv e a s

they cam e t o realiz e tha t Japan's defea t

was inevitable . T o leav e th e Filipino s

of th e souther n island s unnecessarily ex -

posed t o eviden t danger s fo r a n undul y

protracted period could tend only toward

undermining th e prestig e — seriously

damaged b y th e los s o f th e Philippine s

in 194 2 — that th e Unite d State s ha d

regained i n th e Fa r East wit h th e land -

ings o n Leyte , Samar , Mindoro , an d

Luzon.

Plans fo r th e strategi c conduc t o f th e

war als o demande d a n earl y mov e int o

the Souther n Philippines . Th e Allie d

Air Force s wa s responsible , withi n th e

limits o f it s capabilities, fo r helpin g t o

sever th e Japanes e line s o f communica -

tion throug h th e South Chin a Sea. This

responsibility made it imperativ e to capture airfield s a s soo n a s possibl e fro m

which th e Allie d Ai r Force s coul d pro -

ject land-base d ai r strengt h ove r th e

waters west o f th e Philippine s mor e ef -

fectively tha n i t coul d fro m th e Clar k

Field cente r o n Luzo n o r fro m south -

western Mindoro . Th e attentio n o f

Southwest Pacifi c planner s was, accordingly, draw n towar d Palawan , western -

most larg e islan d o f th e Philippin e

archipelago. Airfiel d site s o n Palawa n

were 25 0 mile s southwes t o f th e Min -

doro airstrips, 400 miles south-southwest

1

 General backgroun d source s fo r thi s subsectio n

are: GHQ, SWPA, Basic Outline Plan for MUSKETEE R

Opns (MUSKETEE R I), 1 0 Jul 44 ; MUSKETEE R II, 2 9 Aug

44; MUSKETEE R III, 26 Sep 44 ; GHQ, SWPA, PRINCE -

TON Basi c Outlin e Pla n fo r Reoccupatio n o f th e

Visayas-Mindanao-Borneo-NEI Are a (PRINCETO N

I), 3 1 Oc t 44 ; PRINCETO N II , 2 0 No v 44 ; MONTCLAI R

III (redesignatio n o f PRINCETON) , 2 5 Feb 45 . Copie s

of thes e plans ar e t o be foun d i n variou s file s o f th e

Operations Division , Wa r Department ; the y wer e

employed b y the presen t autho r in preparin g an un -

published manuscript , Th e Philippin e Campaign ,

1944-45, while a member of th e G-3 Historica l Divi -

sion o f GHQ SWPA-GH Q AFPAC i n 1944-4 6 (cop y

in OCM H files) , portion s o f whic h ar e publishe d i n

United State s Strategi c Bombin g Survey , Militar y

Analysis Division , Employment of Forces Under the

Southwest Pacific Command (Washington , 1947) .

Further backgroun d informatio n i s i n Chapter s I

and II , above . Se e also , Cannon , Leyte, ch . I .
584 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

of Clar k Field , an d aroun d 15 0 mile s

farther wes t tha n either .

MacArthur's plan s furthermor e calle d

for th e ultimat e reoccupatio n o f th e

East Indie s i n a campaig n tha t woul d

start wit h th e seizur e o f Japanese-hel d

oil resource s in northern Borne o as soon

as land-base d ai r suppor t becam e avail -

able. Excep t fo r th e projecte d ai r bas e

on Palawan , th e Allie s ha d n o field s

within medium bombe r o r fighte r rang e

of norther n Borneo , an d eve n Palawa n

was no t satisfactor y a s a fighte r base .

Therefore, Southwes t Pacifi c planner s

decided t o secur e airfield s o n th e south -

ern ti p o f th e Zamboang a Peninsul a o f

southwestern Mindanao , an d alon g th e

Sulu Archipelago , whic h stretche s south -

west fro m Zamboang a almos t t o th e

coast o f Borneo . (See map, p. 20.)

Weather als o playe d a part i n th e de -

cision t o launc h earl y attack s int o th e

Southern Philippines . Planner s kne w

how importan t i t wa s t o hav e th e cam -

paigns i n th e souther n island s wel l

under wa y befor e th e summe r rain s

began, an d the y recognize d th e impor -

tance o f havin g airfiel d constructio n i n

hand befor e we t weathe r create d engi -

neering problem s lik e thos e tha t s o de -

layed ai r bas e development s o n Leyt e

in lat e 1944 .

Motivated no t onl y b y a sens e o f stra -

tegic urgenc y bu t als o b y hi s well-pub -

licized persona l desir e t o liberat e al l

the Philippine s quickly , Genera l Mac -

Arthur waite d onl y t o b e certai n tha t

Sixth Arm y coul d secur e th e vita l ob -

jective are a o n Luzo n — the Centra l

Plains-Manila Ba y Regio n — within a

reasonable tim e befor e h e directe d th e

Allied Ai r Forces , th e Allie d Nava l

Forces, an d th e U.S . Eighth Arm y t o

launch th e campaig n i n th e souther n

islands. Accordingly , o n 6 Februar y

1945, afte r Sixt h Arm y troop s had bee n

in Manil a bu t thre e days , MacArthu r

ordered th e seizur e o f Palawan . A wee k

later h e issue d additiona l instruction s

for th e occupatio n o f th e Zamboang a

Peninsula an d th e Sul u Archipelago. 2

The succes s o f th e Palawan , Zambo -

anga, an d Sul u operation s woul d no t

only assur e a mor e effectiv e blockad e o f

the Sout h Chin a Se a an d provid e ade -

quate ai r suppor t fo r th e invasio n o f

Borneo but woul d als o result i n th e creation o f a virtuall y complet e aeria l

blockade o f th e Eas t Indie s an d south -

east Asia , assumin g th e succes s o f con -

current offensive s b y force s o f th e

Southeast Asi a Command. 3 Moreover ,

these openin g offensive s woul d dra w a

ring aroun d th e Japanes e i n th e rest o f

the Souther n Philippines , leavin g the m

isolated an d withou t chanc e o f rein -

forcement o r escape .

MacArthur intende d tha t operation s

to clea r th e othe r island s woul d begi n

as soo n a s possibl e afte r th e landing s

on Palawa n an d th e Zamboang a Penin -

sula. Th e remainin g islands—includin g

Mindanao east o f th e Zamboanga Penin -

sula—had n o strategic importanc e in th e

campaign fo r th e recaptur e o f th e Phil -

ippines an d th e Eas t Indies , bu t press -

ing politica l consideration s demande d

their immediat e recaptur e a s well .

These subsequen t offensive s woul d b e

directed towar d th e seizur e o f Philip -

pine rea l estat e a s such. The y wer e de -

signed fo r th e purpos e o f liberatin g

Filipinos, re-establishin g lawfu l govern -

2

 GHQ SWP A OI' s 89 and 91, 6 and 1 4 Feb 45 , G-3

GHQ Jn l Files, 6 and 1 4 Feb 45 . 3

 See Romanu s an d Sunderland , Time Runs Out

in CBI, Ch. X .
THE CAMPAIG N BEGIN S 585

ment, an d destroyin g Japanes e forces .

The Souther n Philippine s Campaig n

would entai l a serie s o f amphibiou s

operations by forces rangin g in siz e from

reinforced regimenta l comba t team s t o

a corp s o f tw o divisions. Th e amphibi -

ous assaults would diffe r littl e fro m pre -

vious operations in th e Southwest Pacifi c

Area excep t tha t Arm y amphibian s an d

landing craft woul d execute much o f the

ship-to-shore movemen t an d land-base d

planes woul d provid e al l ai r support .

MacArthur ha d alread y returne d t o

Admiral Nimit z al l th e CVE' s an d a

large percentag e o f th e amphibiou s lif t

that Nimit z had transferred t o the Allie d

Naval Forces , SWPA , fo r th e Leyte ,

Mindoro, an d Luzo n invasions , an d

these vessel s Nimit z wa s employin g fo r

the Iw o Jim a an d Okinaw a operations .

The Allie d Nava l Forces, moreover, had

to us e muc h o f th e shippin g remainin g

available t o i t o n resuppl y run s t o vari -

ous Luzo n beaches . Fir e suppor t ship s

left t o th e Allied Nava l Force s consisted

of onl y a fe w cruiser s an d destroyers .

Nevertheless, th e Allie d Nava l Forces ,

SWPA, ha d sufficien t mean s a t leas t t o

launch th e campaig n i n th e Souther n

Philippines. T o fin d shippin g fo r oper -

ations afte r th e seizur e o f Palawa n an d

Zamboanga, th e Allie d Nava l Force s

would judiciousl y stagge r invasio n tar -

get date s an d transfe r sout h vessel s n o

longer neede d t o suppor t Sixt h Arm y

on Luzon .

Major unit s availabl e t o Genera l

Eichelberger's Eight h Arm y fo r th e

reoccupation o f th e souther n island s

included X Corp s headquarters , th e

Americal Division , th e 24th , 31st , 40th ,

and 41s t Infantr y Divisions, and th e sep -

arate 503 d Parachut e RCT . A s of earl y

February X Corp s headquarters wa s on

Leyte, whil e th e America l Divisio n wa s

split betwee n tha t islan d an d Samar. 4

The bul k o f th e 24t h Divisio n wa s o n

Mindoro, wher e divisiona l unit s origi -

nally committe d o n Luzo n wer e als o t o

be concentrated , alon g wit h th e 503 d

RCT. Th e 31s t Divisio n ha d one RCT

at Sansapor in northwestern New Guinea;

the res t o f th e uni t wa s o n Morota i

Island, betwee n Mindana o an d Ne w

Guinea.5 Th e 40t h Division , previousl y

with Sixt h Army , wa s relieve d o f it s

combat mission s o n Luzo n i n lat e Feb -

ruary. Originally , th e 41s t Divisio n ha d

been schedule d t o reinforce Sixt h Army ,

but ha d stoppe d a t Mindor o afte r Gen -

eral MacArthu r decide d t o spee d th e

reconquest of the Southern Philippines. 6

Eighth Army was also to employ most o f

the 2 d an d 3 d Enginee r Specia l Bri -

gades, th e component s o f whic h wer e

scattered amon g man y Ne w Guinea ,

Morotai, Leyte , Mindoro , an d Luzo n

bases. Norma l reinforcin g units , suc h

as artillery an d tan k battalions , amphibian tracto r an d truc k companies , an d

service organization s o f al l types , woul d

assemble a t variou s Ne w Guine a an d

Philippine port s fo r attachmen t t o th e

infantry division s operatin g i n th e

southern islands.

Air support was, o f course, the responsibility o f th e Allie d Ai r Forces , South -

west Pacifi c Area. 7 Allie d Ai r Force s

4

 See above, ch. XXIII, and Cannon, Leyte, p. 365 . 5

 See Smith , Approach to the Philippines, pp .

480-93. 6

 See above , ch . XX . Th e 41s t Divisio n stage d a t

Biak, wher e th e uni t ha d bee n sinc e lat e May 1944 .

See Smith , Approach to the Philippines, chs . XII -

XVI. 7

 Additional informatio n o n ai r suppor t plannin g

is from: Crave n an d Cate , AAF V, pp. 448-58; Boggs,

Marine Aviation in the Philippines, pp . 108-14 .
586 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

delegated this responsibility to the Thirteenth Ai r Force , which , unde r th e com -

mand o f Brig . Gen. Pau l B . Wurtsmith,

was base d principall y o n Morota i an d

Leyte. Mindoro-base d aircraf t o f th e

Fifth Ai r Forc e woul d als o suppor t th e

Palawan an d Zamboang a invasions , an d

the Fift h woul d reinforc e th e Thir -

teenth a s necessar y durin g subsequen t

attacks. Afte r th e firs t landings, much o f

the suppor t fo r late r invasion s an d

almost al l th e clos e suppor t o f groun d

operations would b e executed by Marine

Air Group s 1 2 an d 14 , based o n Leyt e

and Sama r i n February , an d b y Marin e

Air Group s 2 4 an d 32 , whic h woul d

redeploy t o Zamboang a fro m Luzon .

Eighth Arm y expecte d t o emplo y

guerrillas to the maximum, and on many

of th e souther n island s well-develope d

guerrilla force s existed . O n Mindanao ,

once th e targe t fo r th e initia l invasio n

of th e Philippines, guerrilla s unde r Col.

Wendell W . Fertig , a U.S. Arm y reserv -

ist, ha d bee n carefull y nurtured , sub -

marine and aircraf t supplyin g them with

arms, ammunition, and othe r necessities.

Colonel Ferti g ha d ove r 33,00 0 o n hi s

rolls i n Februar y 1945 , som e 16,50 0 o f

them armed. A s commander o f the 10th

Military District, Fertig had groupe d his

forces int o si x divisions—organize d

more o r les s alon g th e line s o f a prewa r

Philippine Army division—an d th e Ma -

ranao Militi a Force , a loosel y organize d

"division" compose d o f Moros .

Similar t o th e 10t h Militar y Distric t

guerrillas i n effectivenes s an d degre e o f

organization wa s th e 6t h Militar y Dis -

trict, a guerrill a forc e o n Pana y com -

manded b y Col. Marcario L . Peralt a o f

the Philippin e Army . Activitie s o f po -

tentially stron g guerrill a organization s

on Negro s an d Ceb u wer e somewha t

inhibited b y th e siz e an d aggressivenes s

of Japanes e garrison s o n thos e tw o

islands. The Negro s guerrillas were commanded b y Lt . Col . Salvado r Abcede ,

Philippine Army , an d thos e o n Ceb u b y

Lt. Col . James M . Cushing , a n Ameri -

can civilia n wh o ha d bee n a minin g engineer i n th e Philippine s befor e th e

war. Boho l ha d a wea k guerrill a organization unde r Maj . Ismae l P . Ingeniero ,

Philippine Army , an d small , relativel y

ineffective guerrill a unit s existe d o n

Palawan an d o n th e island s o f th e Sul u

Archipelago.8

Until Februar y 1945 , militar y intel -

ligence ha d bee n th e principa l contri -

bution o f guerrilla units in th e Southern

Philippines. Nonetheless , th e organiza -

tions wer e enthusiasticall y willing , how -

ever limited their capabilities, to provide

combat reinforcements t o Eighth Army's

divisions. Th e guerrill a units ha d som e

preassault mission s suc h a s cutting Japanese overlan d line s o f communications ,

clearing prospectiv e beachhea d areas ,

and attemptin g to bottle Japanes e forces

into smal l areas.

The Japanese in the Southern

Philippines

The Japanes e force s o n th e souther n

islands wer e unde r th e contro l o f th e

35th Army, which had conducted the de8

 General informatio n o n guerrill a unit s through -

out th e chapter s o n th e Souther n Philippine s oper -

ations i s from : G- 2 GH Q FEC , Th e Guerrill a Re -

sistance Movemen t i n th e Philippines , passim. Ad -

ditional informatio n o n Mindana o guerrillas is from

Historical Record , Mindana o Guerrill a Resistanc e

Movement, Tent h Militar y District , Fro m 1 6 Sep -

tember 194 2 t o 3 0 Jun e 194 5 (hereinafte r cite d a s

Mindanao Guerrill a Record) , pp . 39-60 .
THE CAMPAIG N BEGIN S 587

fense o f Leyte. 9 I n Februar y 194 5 Gen -

eral Suzuki , commandin g 35th Army,

still ha d hi s headquarters o n Leyte , bu t

with th e approva l o f Genera l Yamashit a

had alread y begun a n attemp t t o evacu -

ate th e bes t o f th e troop s lef t o n Leyt e

to Negros, Cebu , Panay , an d Mindana o

Islands. Yamashita , o f course , ha d lon g

since writte n of f th e Souther n Philip -

pines, havin g neithe r th e intentio n no r

the capabilit y o f sendin g reinforcements

to th e islands . Hi s instruction s t o

Suzuki mirrore d th e 14th Area Army's

concept fo r th e defens e o f Luzon— 35th

Army woul d pi n dow n fo r a s lon g a s

possible a s man y Allie d division s a s i t

could.

Suzuki planne d t o mak e hi s stan d i n

east-central Mindanao , wher e h e hope d

to set up a little self-sustaining empire

that coul d hol d ou t indefinitely . Fo r

this purpos e h e woul d us e th e 30th an d

100th Divisions, already deployed i n tha t

portion o f Mindana o lyin g eas t o f th e

Zamboanga Peninsula , a s wel l a s a larg e

body o f nava l troop s statione d i n th e

same area . H e mad e n o plans , appar -

ently, t o redeplo y othe r force s i n th e

southern island s t o easter n Mindanao .

The 54th Independent, Mixed Brigade

and attached naval units would continue

to hol d th e Zamboang a Peninsula , an d

the 55th IMB woul d remai n alon g th e

Sulu Archipelago , concentrate d o n Jol o

Island. Th e 102d Division woul d con -

tinue t o garriso n Panay , Negros , Cebu ,

and Bohol . Abou t half o f the 102d Division ha d bee n sen t t o Leyte , bu t Suzuk i

anticipated tha t stron g reinforcement s

would reac h th e uni t fro m Leyte . Hi s

plans mad e n o provisio n fo r sendin g

Leyte evacuee s t o Zamboanga , Palawan ,

or th e Sul u Archipelago , althoug h h e

apparently hope d tha t element s o f

the 30th Division coul d retur n t o

Mindanao.10

Suzuki's attempt s t o evacuat e Leyt e

ended i n disma l failure . I n th e firs t for -

mal effort , undertake n i n mid-January ,

about 75 0 me n o f th e 1st Division man -

aged t o ge t across th e Camote s Sea fro m

northwestern Leyt e t o norther n Cebu .

Thereafter, Allie d aircraft an d P T boat s

prevented th e 20,00 0 Japanes e stil l aliv e

on Leyt e fro m undertakin g large-scal e

evacuation, althoug h abou t 1,00 0 Japa -

nese o f variou s units , i n ever y conceiv -

able typ e o f smal l craft , di d mak e thei r

way t o Ceb u durin g th e nex t tw o o r

three months . Suzuk i himsel f reache d

Cebu i n mid-March , bu t los t hi s lif e a

month late r a s h e attempte d t o sai l o n

to easter n Mindanao . Hi s chie f o f staff ,

Maj. Gen . Yoshiharu Tomochika ,

reached Mindana o i n lat e April afte r a n

epic tri p fro m Ceb u i n a smal l sailin g

vessel.

By Februar y 194 5 the tim e wa s lon g

past whe n th e Japanes e o n th e souther n

islands coul d hop e fo r anythin g mor e

than t o di e whil e conductin g a stati c

defense. Ther e wer e ove r 102,00 0 Japa -

9

 The main source s fo r thi s subsectio n are : Tomochika , Tru e Fact s o f th e Leyt e Opn , pp . 33-39 ;

10th I&H, Staff Stud y o f Operation s of Japanes e 102d

Div o n Leyt e and Cebu , Backgroun d Notes , pp . 2-5 ;

ibid., Org of th e 102d Div, p. 5; ibid., Dispositions of

the 102d Div, Jan-Ap r 45, pp. 1-2 ; 10th I&H Staf f

Study o f Operation s o f th e Japanes e 35th Army o n

Leyte, pt . I , Narrativ e of Ma j Gen Yoshihar u Tomo -

chika , pp . 11-12 ; 10th I&H, Staf f Stud y o f Japanes e

Operations o n Mindanao , Narrativ e o f Maj . Gen

Gyosaku Morozum i (C G 30th Div), pp . 2-3 , 6 ; ibid.,

Narrative o f L t Ge n Jir o Harad a (C G 100th Div),

pp. 3 , 7-8, 11; 10th I&H, Staf f Stud y o f Japanes e Op -

erations i n Zamboanga , Narrativ e o f Ma j Yasur a

Hanada (Cof S 54th IMB) , p . 1 ; 14th Area Army T r

Org List . Copie s o f al l foregoin g document s ar e i n

OCMH files . Se e also , Cannon , Leyte, pp . 365-67 . 10

 See apps. F an d G .
588 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

nese o n th e islands , includin g approxi -

mately 53,000 Army ground combat and

service troops; 19,40 0 me n o f th e Arm y

air forces , almos t al l o f th e servic e cate -

gory; 15,00 0 nava l personnel , mostl y o f

service units; an d 14,80 0 noncombatan t

civilians. Th e tota l include d fe w mor e

than 30,00 0 traine d groun d comba t ef -

fectives—infantry, artillery , armor , an d

combat engineer troops. Th e unit s were

scattered ove r man y islands , al l wer e

understrength, an d mos t wer e relativel y

poorly equipped . Moreover , the y wer e

psychologically il l prepare d fo r large -

scale fighting . A s a resul t o f preoccupa -

tion wit h th e Leyt e operation , Suzuki ,

who was also plagued by communications

difficulties, ha d bee n unabl e t o exercis e

effective contro l ove r th e unit s i n th e

Southern Philippine s fo r som e months .

It furthe r appear s tha t mos t o f th e uni t

commanders di d no t expec t America n

forces t o mak e a major attemp t t o retake

the Souther n Philippine s i n th e near fu -

ture. Rather , rememberin g ho w larg e

Japanese concentration s ha d bee n by -

passed previousl y during the Pacifi c war,

they believe d tha t th e Souther n Philip -

pines migh t b e forgotte n a s th e Allie s

moved towar d Japa n o r th e Indies; that ,

at most , U.S . Arm y formation s migh t

seize th e principa l por t cities ; an d tha t

advances inlan d woul d probabl y b e un -

dertaken b y guerrillas , wit h who m th e

Japanese fel t the y coul d cop e almos t

indefinitely.

The Japanes e i n th e Souther n Philip -

pines, therefore , apparentl y fel t quit e secure if not downrigh t complacent . Suc h

an outloo k woul d b e dangerou s enoug h

if share d b y first-clas s troops ; i t wa s doubly s o whe n hel d b y th e type s o f unit s

comprising th e bul k o f th e force s i n th e

southern islands . Th e 54th an d 55th

IMB's, fo r example , ha d bee n forme d

in th e Philippine s i n 194 3 fro m a con -

fusion o f garriso n units , replacements ,

and a miscellan y wit h n o comba t expe -

rience. Th e 100th an d 102d Divisions

were no t organize d unti l mid-1944 , hav -

ing the n bee n expande d fro m tw o independent mixe d brigade s forme d abou t

the sam e tim e an d i n muc h th e sam e

manner as had th e 54th and 55th IMB's.

Indeed, th e progenitor of the 102d Division ha d been o n garriso n dut y o n Min -

danao sinc e earl y Ma y 1942 . Probabl y

the best unit , a t leas t o n paper , wa s the

30th Division, whic h ha d forme d i n

Korea durin g 194 3 fro m element s o f

three "regular " division s tha t ha d ha d

considerable comba t experience . Th e

division, however , ha d los t abou t hal f

its comba t strengt h o n Leyte , an d th e

nature and exten t of th e unit 's defensive

preparations o n Mindana o rais e som e

doubts a s t o th e qualit y o f th e leader -

ship withi n th e organization . Th e bes t

defenses wer e thos e o f th e 54th IMB a t

Zamboanga an d o f th e 102d Division a t

Cebu City , Cebu .

Most o f th e Japanes e unit s i n th e

Southern Philippine s ha d enoug h mili -

tary supplie s t o star t a goo d fight , bu t

far fro m enoug h t o continu e organize d

combat fo r an y grea t lengt h o f time .

The mos t glarin g weakness , painfull y

evident t o th e Japanes e commanders ,

was a shortag e o f artiller y ammunition .

Wheeled transpor t wa s als o a t a pre -

mium, th e guerrilla s an d th e Allie d Ai r

Forces havin g destroye d mos t o f th e

trucks tha t ha d onc e bee n availabl e t o

the Japanes e o n th e souther n islands .

Certain classe s o f medica l supplies , es -

pecially malari a preventives , wer e als o

short, an d ther e wer e no t enoug h arm s

to suppl y ai r the availabl e servic e units,
THE CAMPAIG N BEGIN S 589

let alon e the able-bodie d mal e Japanese

civilians wh o coul d hav e bee n drafte d

into the armed services. Foo d wa s plentiful i n th e settled areas, but onc e forced

into th e mountainou s interior s o f th e

islands in the Southern Philippines, 35th

Army woul d fac e foo d shortage s simila r

to thos e tha t wer e s o debilitatin g th e

14th Area Army o n Luzon . A s was th e

case on Luzon, the Japanese in the Southern Philippines , give n thei r determina -

tion not to surrender, face d onl y one end

—death by combat, starvation, or disease.

Airfields on Palawan

Designated b y Eight h Arm y a s th e

unit responsibl e fo r executin g th e

ground phase s o f th e Palawan , Zambo -

anga, an d Sul u Archipelag o operations ,

the 41st Division, Maj. Gen. Jens A. Doe

commanding, organize d th e Palawa n

Force for the seizure of Palawan Island. 11

Palawan Forc e was commanded by Brig.

Gen. Harol d Haney , th e assistan t com -

mander o f th e 41st Division; it s princi -

pal comba t componen t was the 186t h

RCT, unde r Col . Olive r P . Newman .

Antiaircraft units , engineers assigne d t o

airfield construction , and norma l servic e

force attachment s mad e u p th e res t

of th e force , whic h numbere d approxi -

mately 8,150 men. Palawan Force loaded

at Mindor o aboard th e ship s of Admira l

Fechteler's Tas k Grou p 78.2 , an d lef t

Mindoro on th e evening of 2 6 February

in th e compan y of th e supportin g cruisers an d destroyer s o f Tas k Grou p 74. 2

under Rea r Adm. Ralph S. Riggs.

Following hal f a n hou r o f nava l gunfire, assaul t wave s o f th e 186t h Infantr y

landed unoppose d alon g th e norther n

shore o f Puert o Princes a harbor , east -

central Palawan , abou t 085 0 o n 2 8 February. (Map 27) Th e regimen t occupied

the tow n o f Puert o Princesa , a t th e

northwest corner o f the harbor entrance ,

about 103 0 against no resistance, secured

two airstrip s immediatel y eas t o f th e

town befor e noon , an d marche d t o th e

western an d souther n shore s of th e harbor lat e in the afternoon. Th e 186t h did

not sigh t a singl e Japanes e durin g th e

day an d foun d non e o n 1 March a s it s

troops combe d al l th e fla t lan d i n th e

Puerto Princes a are a an d establishe d a

defensive perimete r t o assur e th e safet y

of th e airfields , wher e engineer s ha d

already starte d work .

The Japanes e garriso n o n Palawa n

numbered abou t 1,75 0 men an d wa s

built aroun d tw o rifl e companie s fro m

the 102d Division, t o whic h som e 90 0

Air Forc e an d 25 0 Navy troop s wer e attached. Th e onl y significan t organize d

resistance conducted by the garrison wa s

confined t o hill s te n mile s north-north -

west o f Puert o Princesa . Durin g th e

period 3- 8 March , elements of the 186t h

Infantry reduced two or thre e fanatically

defended strongpoints in thos e hills, and

thereafter operation s o n Palawa n de -

volved int o a serie s o f far-flun g amphib -

ious an d overlan d patrol s th e 186t h

Infantry an d guerrill a unit s conducted .

The Japanes e wer e intereste d primaril y

in avoidin g contac t an d fough t onl y

when cornered . A s a result , th e tas k

of clearin g Palawan—27 0 mile s lon g

northeast t o southwes t an d abou t 2 0

miles across—wa s impede d mainl y b y

rough, trackless terrain and th e distances

involved.

Palawan Forc e als o reconnoitere d

many offshor e islets , finding n o Japanese

11

 The principa l sourc e fo r thi s sectio n i s 10t h

Information an d Historica l Service , Operationa l

Monograph o n th e Palawa n Operation , pages 16-82 .
Map 27
THE CAMPAIG N BEGIN S 591

on som e an d quickl y clearin g others .

American infantr y occupie d Dumara n

Island, of f th e northeas t coast , o n 9

March; secure d Coro n an d Busuanga ,

between Palawa n an d Mindoro , agains t

negligible resistanc e from 9 to 1 7 April;

and cleare d Balaba c an d Pandana n

Islands, of f Palawan' s southwester n tip ,

during th e perio d 12-2 1 April. B y 2 1

April all elements of the 186t h RCT ex -

cept for the 2d Battalion, 186t h Infantry,

and th e regimenta l Canno n Compan y

had lef t fo r Mindanao . Th e remainin g

units, protecting the new air base , stayed

on Palawa n unti l 4 July, whe n elements

of th e 368t h Infantry , 93 d Division , re -

lieved them . T o tha t dat e U.S . Arm y

forces o n Palawa n had los t about 1 0 men

killed an d 4 5 wounded . Japanes e losse s

had bee n 89 0 kille d o r foun d dea d an d

20 take n prisoner .

Airfield constructio n o n Palawa n di d

not proceed as rapidly as planned.12 Originally, th e Allie d Ai r Force s ha d hope d

to read y a 5,000-foo t dry-weathe r stri p

by 5 March , i n tim e t o provid e ai r support fo r th e landin g o n th e Zamboang a

Peninsula. A n all-weathe r field , 7,00 0

feet long , wa s also t o b e constructe d i n

the Puerto Princesa area. However , after

inspecting th e airfiel d sites , Thirteent h

Air Forc e engineer s conclude d tha t th e

soil i n th e are a compacte d s o poorl y

that i t woul d tak e a n inordinatel y lon g

time t o prepar e a dry-weather strip . Ac -

cordingly, th e engineer s repaire d an d

extended a concrete-paved Japanes e strip

already som e 4,50 0 fee t long . S o muc h

work wa s necessar y a t thi s fiel d tha t i t

was no t operationa l unti l 2 0 March, to o

late fo r an y Palawan-base d aircraf t t o

help suppor t th e Zamboang a landings .

Later, however , plane s fro m Palawa n

provided som e suppor t fo r operation s

in easter n Mindana o an d o n Borneo .

Allied Ai r Force s bomber s fro m Pala -

wan, a s planned , covere d vas t reache s

of th e Sout h Chin a Se a an d struc k a t

targets alon g th e Indochin a an d south -

ern Chin a coasts. Water-base d and land -

based patrol bombers of the Allied Naval

Forces, also stationed at Puert o Princesa,

co-operated i n th e ai r effor t t o cu t th e

Japanese line s o f communicatio n t o

the Indie s b y flyin g searc h an d comba t

missions ove r th e Sout h Chin a Sea . Although th e wa r ende d befor e th e Pala -

wan ai r bas e cam e t o serv e al l th e

purposes fo r whic h i t wa s intended , th e

strategic valu e o f th e ai r bas e seeme d

well wort h th e smal l pric e pai d fo r it s

seizure.

Zamboanga

Securing the Airfield Area

The fac t tha t a fighte r stri p wa s not

ready a t Palawa n a s earl y a s planne d

complicated preparation s fo r ai r sup -

port a t Zamboanga , since Eight h Arm y

and th e Allie d Nava l Force s considere d

it essentia l t o hav e aircraf t base d close r

to Zamboang a than Mindoro, Leyte , and

Samar.13 Th e proble m wa s solve d i n a

somewhat nove l manner. Troop s o f th e

guerrilla 105t h Division , Col . Hipolit o

Garma commanding , ha d lon g hel d a

good, prewa r landin g stri p a t Dipolog ,

12

 Informatio n abou t airfiel d constructio n an d ai r

operations fro m Palawa n i s from : 10t h I&H Opn l

Monograph Palawan , pp . 21 , 65; Eight h Arm y Rp t

Palawan an d Zamboang a Opns, pp . 15 , 115-16 , 118 ;

Craven an d Cate , AAF V, pp. 453-54 , 461, 465.

13

 The stor y o f providin g air suppor t fo r th e Zam -

boanga assaul t i s derive d from : Crave n an d Cate ,

AAF V, pp . 454-55 ; Boggs , Marine Aviation in the

Philippines, pp . 112-14; 10th I&H , Operational Monograph o n th e Zamboanga-Sul u Archipelag o Opera -

tion, pp. 31-32; Mindana o Guerrill a Record , passim.
592 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

DIPOLOG AIRSTRI P

on th e nort h coas t o f th e Zamboang a

Peninsula 14 5 miles from th e peninsula's

southern tip. 14 Allie d Air Force s plane s

taking supplies t o Fertig's guerrillas had

been usin g th e fiel d sinc e lat e 1944 ; th e

field ha d als o bee n th e sit e o f man y

emergency landing s b y America n air -

craft. Th e fiel d was known to be capable

of accommodatin g at least one squadro n

of fighters . Th e Thirteent h Ai r Forc e

therefore decide d t o sen d a squadro n

from Marin e Ai r Grou p 1 2 to Dipolo g

to supplement the air support tha t could

be provide d fro m othe r availabl e bases .

To strengthe n th e guerrill a garriso n

at Dipolo g durin g th e critica l suppor t

period, tw o reinforce d companie s o f th e

21st Infantry , 24t h Division, flew i n from

Mindoro on 8 March aboard C-47's. On

the sam e da y sixtee n Marin e Corsair s

arrived. Th e Marin e plane s fle w cove r

for th e naval bombardment and for mine

sweeping groups that began operating off

Zamboanga on 8 March, two days befor e

the amphibiou s assault ; augmente d ai r

cover fo r th e attac k convoy , whic h de -

parted Mindoro and Leyt e the same day;

and helpe d provid e clos e suppor t fo r

operations ashor e a t Zamboang a fro m

10 t o 1 5 March , Th e plane s the n lef t

Dipolog for Zamboanga. Th e 21st Infantry's tw o companie s evacuate d b y C-4 7

before th e en d o f th e month .

Colonel Ferti g ha d informe d Eight h

Army tha t unoppose d landing s could b e

made i n th e vicinit y o f Zamboanga City ,

and underwate r demolitio n teams , engi -

neers, an d guerrilla s ha d wit h impunit y

marked the landing beaches on 9 March.

Nevertheless, the Allied Naval Forces executed preassaul t bombardments against

landing beaches in th e Zamboanga vicinity a s scheduled o n 8 , 9, and 1 0 March.15

The bombardmen t vessels — and accom -

panying min e sweeper s — received fir e

from a fe w Japanes e 75-mm . artiller y

weapons emplace d o n hig h groun d tw o

to thre e mile s inland , bu t suffere d n o

damage. Th e bombardmen t covered th e

landing beache s thoroughl y an d reache d

inland t o knoc k ou t som e o f th e Japa -

14

 Garma wa s a forme r Philippin e Constabular y

officer. Th e Dipolo g fiel d wa s garrisone d b y th e

105th Division's 107t h Infantry , commande d b y Maj .

Marcelo Bonilla , PA .

15

 The remainde r o f th e stor y o f clearin g th e Zam -

boanga Peninsul a i s base d mainl y on : 10t h I& H

Opnl Monograp h Zamboanga-Sul u Archipelag o

Opn, pp . 9-10 , 27, 32-53, 61-65 ; Eight h Arm y Rp t

Palawan an d Zamboang a Opns , pp . 46-56 ; Boggs ,

Marine Aviation in the Philippines, pp . 112-16 ;

Intervs, autho r wit h Co l Ferti g (C O 10t h Mil Dist) ,

Lt Comd r (L t Col , 10th Mil Dist ) Sa m J . Wilso n

(CofS 10t h Mil Dist) , Ma j Patroceni o B . Garci a

(G-1 10t h Mi l Dist) , an d others , Chicago , III. , ex -

Mindanao Guerrill a Reunion , 2 6 Ju l 56 . A tap e

recording o f thes e interviews , whic h ar e hereinafte r

cited a s Ferti g Interviews , i s i n OCM H files .
THE CAMPAIG N BEGIN S 593

nese artillery . Th e min e sweeper s ha d

no troubl e clearin g Basila n Strait ,

between th e Zamboang a Peninsul a an d

Basilan Island, twelve miles south. Meanwhile, Rea r Adm . Forres t B . Royal' s

Task Grou p 78.1 , with th e 41st Divisio n

less th e 186't h RC T aboard , saile d sout h

and entere d Basila n Strai t fro m th e west

early o n 1 0 March,

Troops o f th e 162 d Infantr y lande d

virtually unoppose d abou t 091 5 nea r

barrio Sa n Mateo , fou r an d a hal f mile s

west-northwest of Zamboanga City. (Map

28) Ligh t machin e gu n fir e greete d th e

regiment's leadin g assaul t wave , an d ar -

tillery an d morta r fir e fro m th e inlan d

high ground harasse d late r echelons, but

no casualtie s resulted. B y 101 5 the regi -

ment ha d secure d Wolf e Field , a n aban -

doned prewa r stri p locate d hal f a mil e

inland, an d ha d begu n spreadin g ou t t o

the west, north , an d east. The 163d Infantry starte d ashor e about 0935 and tw o

hours late r ha d reassemble d t o strik e

eastward towar d Zamboang a City .

Opposed b y sporadi c long-rang e rifle ,

machine gun , an d morta r fire , th e 163 d

halted fo r th e nigh t a mil e northwes t

of th e city . Meanwhile , th e 162 d Infan -

try drov e inlan d a mil e an d a hal f an d

westward alon g th e souther n shor e o f

the peninsul a fo r a lik e distance .

As implie d b y Fertig's promis e o f un -

opposed landings, th e 54th Independent

Mixed Brigade ha d abandoned excellen t

defensive position s alon g th e souther n

shore o f th e Zamboang a Peninsul a and ,

leaving onl y a fe w outposts behind , ha d

withdrawn t o elaborat e new position s in

good defensiv e terrai n i n hig h groun d

two t o thre e mile s inland. 16 Fro m thi s

rising groun d Lt . Gen . Tokich i Hojo ,

commander o f th e 54th IMB an d al l

other Japanes e Arm y an d Nav y troop s

in th e Zamboang a are a — about 8,90 0

men i n al l — had complet e observatio n

of th e airfiel d an d beachhea d are a th e

41st Divisio n ha d taken .

Since th e Japanes e ha d withdrawn ,

the 162 d an d 163 d Infantr y Regiment s

had n o troubl e securin g th e remainde r

of th e coastal plain by dusk on 1 1 March.

That da y troop s o f th e 162 d reache d

Caldera Bay , a forme r Japanes e seaplane

base eigh t mile s west-northwes t o f Zam -

boanga City ; othe r troop s o f th e regi -

ment pushe d inlan d t o Malisay , tw o

miles nort h o f th e landin g beaches, an d

to th e vicinit y o f San Roque , a mil e and

a hal f southeas t o f Malisay . Th e 163 d

Infantry, meanwhile , secure d Zambo -

anga Cit y agains t negligibl e opposition ,

finding tha t preinvasio n ai r an d nava l

bombardment — whic h ha d probabl y

been unnecessar y — had practicall y lev -

eled it . Th e 163 d als o overran Japanese -

built Sa n Roqu e Airfield , a mil e an d a

half northwes t o f Zamboang a an d abou t

the sam e distanc e eas t o f Wolf e Field .

Since th e Sa n Roqu e stri p wa s in bette r

condition an d coul d b e mor e easil y ex -

tended tha n Wolf e Field , th e 873 d Engineer Aviatio n Battalio n immediatel y set

to work t o prepare a dry-weather runway

at San Roque. Th e engineer s completed

the stri p to a length o f 5,000 fee t lat e on

15 March .

Clearing the Peninsula

Having secured the Zamboanga coastal

plain, th e 41st Divisio n face d th e prob -

16

 Additiona l informatio n o n Japanes e operation s

on th e Zamboang a Peninsul a i s fro m 10t h Informa -

tion & Historical Service , Staf f Study , Japanes e Op -

erations i n Zamboanga , passim, whic h wa s largel y

prepared b y Majo r Hanada , chie f o f staf f an d late r

commander o f th e 54t h IMB.
Map 28
THE CAMPAIG N BEGIN S 595

AMPHIBIOUS LANDIN G AREA , ZAMBOANG A PENINSUL A

lem o f drivin g th e Japanes e fro m th e

high groun d overlookin g th e airfiel d

area. T o accomplis h it s shar e i n thi s

task, th e 163 d Infantry struc k generall y

north fro m Zamboang a Cit y astrid e th e

Tumaga River valley, its ultimate objective Mt . Pulungbata , fiv e mile s inland .

The 162 d Infantry advance d i n tw o columns, the right flank striking north from

the vicinit y o f Sa n Roqu e an d th e lef t

driving nort h fro m Malisay . Th e regi -

mental objective was Mt. Capisan, a mile

and a half nort h o f Malisay .

Guerrillas ha d a n importan t shar e i n

the pla n o f offense . Thre e years earlier,

when th e Japanes e invade d th e penin -

sula, th e small Fil-America n garriso n a t

Zamboanga ha d withdraw n u p th e eas t

coast o f th e peninsul a t o th e vicinit y o f

Belong, eightee n mile s north-northeas t

of th e city . Holdin g excellent defensiv e

terrain i n th e Belon g area , th e garriso n

had assemble d supplie s i n anticipatio n

of conductin g guerrilla warfar e bu t ha d

simultaneously kep t ope n a lin e o f re -

treat northwar d an d northeastwar d t o

permit ultimat e escape into eastern Mindanao. Th e genera l surrende r i n th e

southern Philippine s cam e befor e th e

Fil-American forc e ha d muc h opportu -
596 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

nity t o pu t eithe r guerrill a warfar e o r

escape plan s int o effect. 17 T o preven t

the Japanes e fro m repeatin g th e pro -

jected Fil-America n maneuve r o f 1942 ,

Eighth Arm y directe d Colone l Fertig' s

forces t o block th e east coast road i n th e

Belong area , a tas k Ferti g entruste d

to Capt . Donal d J . LeCouvre' s 121s t

Infantry, 105t h Division. 18

The tw o regiment s o f th e 41st Division faced arduous tasks. Genera l Hojo's

troops hel d excellen t defense s i n dept h

across a fron t fiv e mile s wide, some portions of th e lin e being thre e mile s deep.

All installation s wer e protecte d b y

barbed wire ; abandone d groun d wa s

thoroughly booby-trapped ; min e fields ,

some of them of the remote-control type ,

abounded; and a t least initially the 54th

IMB ha d a n ampl e suppl y o f automati c

weapons an d mortars . Whil e Japanes e

morale o n th e Zamboang a Peninsul a

was not o n a par wit h tha t o f 14th Area

Army troop s on Luzon , most of the 54th

IMB an d attache d unit s ha d sufficien t

spirit to pu t u p a strong figh t a s long as

they hel d prepare d positions, an d Hoj o

was abl e t o fin d me n t o conduc t harass -

ing counterattack s nigh t afte r night .

Finally, th e terrai n throug h whic h th e

41st Divisio n ha d t o attac k wa s roug h

and overgrown , giving way on th e north

to th e rai n forest s o f th e partiall y un -

explored mountai n rang e formin g th e

backbone o f th e Zamboang a Peninsula .

Only poo r trail s existe d i n mos t o f th e

area hel d b y th e Japanese , an d th e 41st

Division ha d t o limi t it s advanc e t o th e

pace o f bulldozers , whic h laboriousl y

constructed supply and evacuation roads.

Once th e America n troop s entere d th e

peninsula's foothills , tank s coul d no t

operate of f th e bulldoze d roads .

Behind continuou s artiller y fir e an d

with exceptionall y clos e suppor t fro m

Marine Corps planes, th e 41st Division's

two regiments pushe d slowl y bu t stead -

ily northwar d afte r 1 1 March . O n th e

20th th e 54th IMB's prepare d defense s

finally bega n t o disintegrate , an d o n o r

about th e 23 d th e 41st Division drov e

a wedge betwee n th e Japanese defensive

units i n th e Mt . Pulungbat a an d Mt .

Capisan sectors . O n th e 25t h th e 162 d

Infantry overra n th e las t organize d re -

sistance i n th e vicinit y o f Mt . Capisan ,

forcing northwar d th e remnant s o f th e

central o f thre e defens e units tha t Hoj o

had organized . Th e wester n unit , originally holding the hills north o f Caldera

Bay, ha d not ye t been subjected t o much

pressure, bu t ha d bee n seriousl y weak -

ened b y transfer s o f troop s t o reinforc e

the center and easter n sectors. Th e east -

ern uni t had, meanwhile, lost heavil y i n

the fac e o f stead y progres s o n th e par t

of th e 163 d Infantry.

On 2 6 March th e 186t h Infantr y (les s

its 2 d Battalion , o n Palawan ) bega n t o

relieve th e 163 d Infantry o n th e east .

On 3 0 and 3 1 March th e relativel y fres h

186th extende d th e fron t t o th e east and

drove rapidl y northwar d agains t dimin -

ishing opposition. Realizin g tha t i t wa s

no longe r possibl e t o continu e effectiv e

resistance, Genera l Hoj o ordere d a re -

treat late on the 31st, and before dark on

1 April all forces unde r his command had

17

 Col. A . T. Wilson , Pacifi c Wa r 1942—Th e De -

fense of Zamboanga , in Hist Rpt, Visayan Mindana o

Force, Defens e o f th e Philippines , 1 Sep 41-1 0 May

42, pp . 567-9 1 (an . XI t o Rp t o f Opn s o f USAFF E

and USFI P i n th e P.I. , 1941-42), cop y i n OCM H

files; Col . H . W . Tarkington , MS , Ther e Wer e

Others, pp . 230-39 , cop y i n OCM H files . 18

 LeCouvre, a n unsurrendere d Ai r Force s enliste d

man, ha d joine d Fertig' s guerrilla s i n Decembe r

1942 an d ha d bee n i n comman d o f th e 121s t Infantry sinc e August 1944 .
THE CAMPAIG N BEGIN S 597

begun withdrawin g northward . Thei r

logical route o f withdrawal—up th e east

coast—blocked b y th e guerrill a 121s t

Infantry a t Bolong , th e Japanes e ha d t o

strike into the wild interior of the peninsula. 41s t Division an d guerrill a patrol s

pursued. Physica l contac t betwee n pa -

trols o f th e 121s t and 186t h Infantr y

Regiments i n a rive r valle y tw o mile s

north-northeast o f Mt . Pulungbat a o n

2 April marked th e en d o f effectiv e Japa -

nese resistanc e i n th e Zamboang a area .

After 2 Apri l 41st Division troops and

guerrillas continue d patrollin g through -

out th e Zamboang a Peninsula , huntin g

down Japanes e concentration s whereve r

and wheneve r reported. Organize d remnants of th e 54th IMB, facin g incredibl e

hardships, first made their way across the

rough mountain s t o Sibuk o Bay, o n th e

west coast thirt y mile s nort h o f Zambo -

anga City . Chase d fro m thi s area i n lat e

April, som e unit s struc k northwar d an -

other thirt y mile s t o Sioco n Bay , while

others heade d eas t acros s th e peninsul a

and the n turne d north . B y th e en d o f

the wa r almos t al l survivor s ha d gath -

ered i n th e north-centra l par t o f th e

peninsula abou t midwa y betwee n Zam -

boanga an d Dipolog , wher e elements o f

the guerrill a 105t h Divisio n containe d

them.

When th e 54th IMB bega n its general

retreat i n earl y April , i t ha d lef t nearl y

5,000 o f it s origina l 8,90 0 troops . Ap -

proximately 1,38 5 men o f th e retreat -

ing force survived the war, joinin g about

1,100 mor e wh o wer e capture d befor e

15 August . Thus , roughl y 6,40 0 Japa -

nese wer e kille d o r die d o f starvatio n

and diseas e o n th e Zamboang a Penin -

sula. Th e casualtie s of the 41st Division

were abou t 2,2 0 men kille d an d 66 5

wounded t o earl y July , whe n th e 368t h

Infantry, 93 d Division , too k ove r o n th e

peninsula.

The Sulu Archipelago

Operations t o clea r th e Sul u Archi -

pelago, wher e additiona l airfield s wer e

to b e constructed , bega n wel l befor e or -

ganized resistanc e cease d o n th e Zam -

boanga Peninsula. 19 O n 1 6 Marc h a

reinforced compan y o f th e 162 d Infantry lande d unoppose d o n Basila n Islan d

and durin g th e nex t tw o day s combe d

Basilan an d offshor e islets , findin g n o

signs o f Japanese . Tw o guerrill a com -

panies the n too k ove r garrison dutie s on

Basilan t o provid e security fo r an Allie d

Naval Force s PT-boa t bas e o n th e

northwest shore. (Map 29)

The nex t invasio n alon g th e Sul u

Archipelago coincided wit h th e collaps e

of 54th IMB resistanc e o n th e Zambo -

anga Peninsula . O n 2 Apri l th e rein -

forced 2 d Battalion , 163 d Infantry,

landed o n Sang a Sang a Islan d o f th e

Tawitawi Group , 20 0 mile s southwes t

of Zamboang a an d les s tha n 4 0 mile s

from th e coas t o f Borneo . A littl e in -

effective morta r an d machin e gu n fir e

from a nearby islet, Bangao, was the only

opposition, an d b y 6 April th e battalion

had cleare d bot h Banga o an d Sang a

Sanga a t th e cost o f 2 me n kille d an d

4 wounded , th e Japanes e losin g abou t

30 me n killed . Th e Japanes e ha d al -

ready withdraw n fro m Tawitaw i Island ,

19

 This section is based largel y upon : Eighth Arm y

Rpt Palawa n an d Zamboang a Opns , pp . 28-29 , 41 -

42, 44 , 56-60 ; 10t h I&H, Opnl Monograp h Zam -

boanga-Sulu Archipelag o Opn , pp. 10-11 , 45-46 ,

53-61, 63-64 , 77 ; 10th I&H, Staf f Stud y o f Japanes e

Operations on Jol o Island , 9 Apr-16 Se p 45 , passim

(based mainly on materials supplied by Maj Tokichi

Tenmyo, C O 365th IIB 55th IMB); 163d Inf Uni t

Jnl 6 Apr-2 0 Jun 45 .
598 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

MAP 29

which guerrilla s ha d controlle d sinc e

mid-March.

In jumpin g fro m Zamboang a t o th e

Tawitawi Group , th e 41st Division ha d

bypassed th e onl y significan t concentra -

tion o f Japanes e alon g th e Sul u Archi -

pelago. O n Jol o Island , abou t midwa y

between Zamboang a an d Tawitawi , th e

garrison include d approximatel y 2,40 0

men o f th e 55th IMB, 1,000 Army Ai r

Force personnel, and 35 0 Japanese naval

troops. A s a t Zamboanga , th e Japanes e

on Jol o Island mad e no seriou s effor t t o

defend th e beaches , an d abou t 084 5 o n

9 Apri l th e reinforce d 163 d RCT (les s

2d Battalion , 163 d Infantry ) lande d

against n o resistanc e nea r Jol o Town ,

on th e island 's northwester n shore . B y

evening o n 1 1 April th e 163 d Infantry

had drive n Japanes e force s of f height s

immediately sout h an d southeas t o f th e

town an d ha d secure d a nearb y airstrip .

Having retire d t o hil l masse s farthe r

inland wher e defense s ha d bee n lon g in

preparation, the Japanese began t o resist

stubbornly. On e concentratio n wa s lo -

cated a t Mt . Daho , si x mile s southeas t

of Jolo , an d anothe r o n Mt . Tumatan -

gus, abou t th e sam e distanc e southwes t

of th e town . Attack s agains t th e Mt .

Daho defense s bega n o n 1 5 April, loca l

guerrillas unde r Col . Alejandro Suarez ,

Philippine Army , leadin g off. Since th e

guerrillas alon e wer e unabl e t o reduc e

the Japanese positions, th e 1s t Battalion

of th e 163 d Infantry joine d th e fight .

Artillery support and close air support by

Zamboanga-based Marin e Corp s plane s

enabled the combined 163d Infantry an d

guerrilla forc e t o overru n th e Japanes e

defenses o n 2 2 April . Som e o f th e de -

fenders escape d westwar d t o Mt . Tumatangus, wher e guerrilla s an d th e 3 d

Battalion, 163d Infantry, began an attack
THE CAMPAIG N BEGIN S 599

on 2 5 April. Thes e troops reduced most

of th e prepare d defense s a t Mt . Tuma -

tangus by 2 May, and operation s on Jolo

Island passe d t o th e mopping-u p stage .

Some organize d resistanc e continue d

in th e Mt . Tumatangu s are a int o July ,

when th e remaining Japanese attempte d

to mov e t o th e easter n en d o f Jolo .

Meanwhile, th e bul k o f th e 163 d RCT

had pulle d ou t o f actio n an d th e las t

elements lef t Jol o fo r Mindana o o n 1 9

June, t o b e replace d b y troop s o f th e

368th Infantry , 93 d Division , an d Colo -

nel Suarez ' guerrillas . Th e 163 d RCT

lost approximatel y 3 5 me n kille d an d

125 wounde d o n Jol o t o mid-June , b y

which tim e th e Japanes e ha d los t ove r

2,000 me n killed . Les s tha n 9 0 o f th e

Japanese no t kille d o r capture d b y midJune survived t o surrender afte r th e end

of th e war.

Zamboanga-Sulu Airfield Development

While th e landin g o n Jol o Islan d

marked th e en d o f th e mos t significan t

action o f th e groun d phas e o f th e Zam -

boanga-Sulu Archipelag o operation, th e

strategic purpose s fo r whic h th e opera -

tions ha d bee n designe d wer e no t satis -

fied unti l planne d airfiel d constructio n

had bee n completed. 20 Th e firs t fiel d a t

Zamboanga was a dry-weather strip 5,000

feet long , complete d o n 1 5 Marc h an d

immediately put t o use by Marine Corps

planes. Th e field , name d Calaria n

Drome, coul d no t answe r th e nee d fo r

an all-weathe r stri p 6,00 0 fee t long .

Accordingly, engineers constructed a new

strip, whic h th e Marin e aviator s base d

there calle d More t Field , abou t a mil e

to th e east , an d ha d i t read y fo r allweather operation s b y 1 6 May . Used

primarily b y Marin e Air Group s 12 , 24,

and 32 , More t Fiel d wa s also employe d

by a Thirteent h Ai r Forc e night-fighte r

squadron, a n emergenc y rescu e squad -

ron, an d Thirteent h Ai r Forc e B-24' s

and P-38' s stagin g throug h fo r strike s

against Borneo . Marin e Corp s plane s

on 1 6 Marc h execute d th e firs t suppor t

mission flow n fro m a fiel d i n th e Zam -

boanga area , coverin g th e landin g o n

Basilan Island . Later , Marin e Corp s

planes from Zamboang a fle w suppor t for

the Tawitaw i an d Jol o operation s an d

undertook preassaul t bombardmen t an d

cover fo r th e invasio n o f eastern Minda -

nao. Whil e Thirteenth Air Force planes

executed mos t o f th e suppor t fo r th e

invasion of Borneo, Marine Corps B-25's

from Zamboang a also flew some missions.

At Sang a Sang a Islan d ther e wa s a

Japanese coral-surfaced stri p about 2,800

feet long . Engineer s repaire d an d ex -

tended thi s stri p t o a lengt h o f 5,00 0

feet b y 2 May , whe n fighter s o f th e

Thirteenth Ai r Forc e bega n movin g t o

Sanga Sang a fro m Palawa n t o provid e

close support fo r th e initia l landing s o n

Borneo. Thes e U.S . Arm y plane s wer e

replaced i n mid-Ma y b y unit s o f th e

Royal Australia n Ai r Force , whic h em -

ployed th e all-weathe r Sang a Sang a fiel d

during late r operation s o n Borneo . Fi -

nally, a Japanese fiel d 3,80 0 fee t lon g on

Jolo Islan d wa s repaire d an d use d fo r

aerial suppl y an d evacuatio n operation s

in support o f ground troop s throughou t

the Sul u Archipelago .

20

 This subsectio n i s base d on : 10t h I&H, Opn l

Monograph Zamboanga-Sul u Archipelag o Opn , pp .

41, 58 ; Eight h Arm y Rp t Palawa n an d Zamboang a

Opns, pp. 97, 105, 116; Boggs, Marine Aviation in the

Philippines, pp . 114-17 , 121-22 , 125 ; Crave n an d

Cate, AAF V, pp . 456 , 466 ; Office o f th e Chie f Engi -

neer, Genera l Headquarters , Arm y Forces , Pacific ,

"Engineers o f th e Southwes t Pacific , 1941-1945, " VI,

Airfield and Base Development (Washington , 1951) ,

373.
600 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Planes base d a t bot h Zamboang a an d

Sanga Sang a wer e t o have had a share i n

the ai r suppor t o f post-Borne o opera -

tions i n th e Indies, and preparation s fo r

these operation s wer e wel l alon g whe n

the wa r ended . A s i t was , the Zambo -

anga an d Sang a Sang a field s ha d alread y

assumed greate r importanc e fo r opera -

tions i n th e Indie s tha n originall y con -

templated. Engineerin g problems a t the

first Borne o landin g area s wer e suc h

that airstrip s o n tha t islan d wer e no t

ready i n tim e t o provid e suppor t fo r

subsequent Borne o operations , s o th e

Philippine field s ha d t o serv e instead .

Strategically an d tactically , th e Zambo -

anga an d Sang a Sang a field s ha d prove d

invaluable, and i n th e process o f seizin g

the sites for these fields Eighth Army had

liberated som e 250,00 0 Filipinos.
CHAPTER XXX I

The Centra l Visayan Islands

Well before organize d Japanese resistance in th e Zamboanga-Sul u regio n ha d

collapsed, Eight h Arm y ha d initiate d

operations t o secur e th e centra l Visaya n

Islands. I n fact , 41st Division troops had

scarcely crosse d th e Zamboang a coasta l

plain when , o n 1 8 March , th e 40t h

Infantry Divisio n lande d o n Pana y Is -

land t o begi n a campaig n t o secur e

Panay, smaller offshore Guimara s Island,

and th e norther n sectio n o f Negro s Is -

land, eas t acros s Guimara s Strai t fro m

Panay. (See map, p. 20.)

Panay and Guimaras

The reinforce d 40t h Divisio n (les s

the 108th RCT, whic h move d to Leyte )

staged a t Lingaye n Gul f fo r th e Panay -

Guimaras-northern Negro s operation. 1

The force s fo r Pana y include d 40t h

Division headquarters , th e 185t h RCT,

the 2 d Battalio n o f th e 160t h Infantry ,

most o f divisio n artillery , an d norma l

combat an d servic e attachments . Th e

groupment lef t Lingaye n Gul f o n 1 5

March aboar d vessel s o f Tas k Grou p

78.3, Admira l Struble commanding, and

reached Mindor o th e nex t day . There ,

a group of 542d Engineer Boat and Shore

Regiment landing craft (mostl y LCM's)

from Leyt e joined. Takin g the engineer

craft i n tow , Task Grou p 78.3 made a n

uneventful voyag e t o Pana y an d wa s i n

position of f selected landin g beache s o n

the southeas t coas t befor e daw n o n 1 8

March.

Following a brie f destroye r bombard -

ment, th e 1s t an d 3 d Battalions , 185t h

Infantry, landed unopposed about twelve

miles wes t o f Iloilo , principa l cit y o f

Panay and thir d largest commercia l center in th e Philippines. Th e beac h bombardment wa s unnecessary —the firs t

assault wav e was greete d on shor e by

troops o f Colone l Peralta' s guerrill a

forces, draw n u p i n parad e formatio n

and "resplenden t i n starche d khak i an d

shining ornaments." 2 Numberin g ove r

22,500 men, about hal f o f the m armed ,

the Pana y guerrilla s controlled muc h o f

their island . GH Q SWP A ha d sen t

supplies t o Peralt a b y submarine , ha d

relayed som e b y smal l craf t throug h

Fertig's guerrilla s o n Mindanao , and ,

after th e landin g o n Leyte , ha d flow n

supplies t o guerrilla-hel d airfield s o n

Panay. Engage d primaril y i n intelli -

gence wor k unti l th e invasio n o f Leyte ,

the guerrilla s ha d expande d thei r con -

1

 This section is based mainly on: 10th I&H, Oper -

ational Monograph on th e Panay-Negros Occidental

Operation, pp . 6-14 , 22-32, 37-56 , 130-131 ; 10t h

I&H Staf f Stud y o f Japanes e Operation s o n Pana y

(based o n materials fro m Cap t Sadoyosh i Ishikawai ,

Opns an d Inte l Of f 170th IIB 102d Div); Eighth

Army Rp t Panay-Negro s and Cebu Opns, pp. 13-15 , 18, 21-27 .

2

 Rpt, Asst ACofS G-3 Eight h Arm y t o ACofS G-3

Eighth Army , 1 9 Mar 45 , Eighth Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e

VICTOR I (Panay) , 10-2 2 Mar 45 .
602 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

trol i n lat e 1944 , whe n ove r hal f th e

original Japanese garrison went to Leyte.

In Marc h 194 5 abou t 2,75 0 Japanes e

were o n Panay , includin g 1,50 0 comba t

troops and some 400 civilians. Th e prin -

cipal comba t units were th e 170th Independent Infantry Battalion o f th e 102d

Division an d a compan y eac h fro m th e

171st an d 354th IIB's, sam e division .

The remainde r of the garrison consiste d

of Ai r Forc e servic e personnel .

Most o f th e Japanese , commande d b y

Lt. Col . Ryoichi Totsuka , wh o wa s also

commander o f th e 170th IIB, were sta -

tioned at or near Iloilo. Totsuk a planned

to defend the Iloilo area and its excellent

harbor an d airfiel d facilitie s fo r a s lon g

as possible , bu t h e ha d n o intentio n o f

presiding ove r th e annihilatio n o f hi s

force i n a battl e h e kne w h e coul d no t

win. Therefor e h e decided t o withdra w

to th e rough mountain s o f south-centra l

Panay a s soo n a s h e fel t hi s Iloil o de -

fenses wer e no longer tenable . Avoidin g

contact wit h U.S . forces , h e woul d at -

tempt t o becom e self-sufficien t i n th e

mountains, wher e h e anticipate d h e

could hol d ou t almos t indefinitely .

Whether Totsuk a kne w i t o r not , his

plan wa s strikingl y simila r t o tha t exe -

cuted b y Col. Alber t F . Christie's Pana y

Force i n Apri l 1942 . Th e Fil-America n

garrison o n Pana y i n 194 2 ha d with -

drawn troop s an d equipmen t int o th e

mountains an d successfull y hel d ou t

until directe d t o surrender. 3

The 185t h Infantr y rapidl y expande d

its beachhea d o n 1 8 March 194 5 against

light, scattere d resistance , an d durin g

the afternoo n starte d alon g th e coasta l

road towar d Iloilo . B y dus k th e nex t

day Colone l Totsuk a ha d conclude d

that furthe r resistanc e woul d b e point -

less an d accordingl y directe d hi s force s

to begi n thei r withdrawa l tha t night .

Breaking throug h a n ar c o f roadblock s

that guerrilla s an d th e 40t h Reconnais -

sance Troo p ha d established , th e Jap -

anese mad e goo d thei r escape , an d b y

1300 o n 2 0 Marc h th e 185t h Infantr y

was i n complet e contro l o f Iloilo ,

(Map 30)

The Japanes e withdrawa l decide d th e

issue on Panay . Th e 40t h Division , esti -

mating tha t onl y 50 0 Japanes e i n dis -

organized smal l group s remaine d o n

Panay, mounte d n o immediat e pursuit ,

and i t wa s not unti l Apri l and Ma y tha t

Fil-American forces launched even minor

attacks agains t th e Japanes e concentra -

tions. Th e guerrilla s an d th e 2 d Bat -

talion, 160t h Infantry , whic h assume d

garrison dutie s o n Pana y o n 2 5 March ,

never close d wit h Totsuka's mai n body ,

and a t th e end o f the war Totsuka came

down ou t o f the mountain s to surrender

approximately 1,56 0 men. over hal f hi s

original garrison . U.S . Arm y casualtie s

on Pana y t o lat e June , whe n contro l

passed t o Colone l Peralta , numbere d

about 2 0 me n kille d an d 5 0 wounded .

Operations t o clea r Guimara s Islan d

began a s soo n a s th e 185t h Infantr y

secured Iloilo , an d o n 2 0 Marc h 40t h

Division patrol s foun d n o sign s o f Jap -

anese o n th e island . Next , me n o f th e

185th too k tin y Inampuluga n Island ,

off th e southeaster n ti p o f Guimaras .

The Japanes e o n Inampulugan , wh o

manned a contro l statio n fo r electri c

mines i n Guimara s Strait , fle d withou t

offering resistanc e whe n th e American s

landed.

3

 See Morton , Fall of the Philippines, pp . 502-03 ,

506-07, 579-81. Actually , about 9 0 percent of Christie's 7,00 0 me n faile d t o surrende r an d becam e th e

nucleus o f th e Pana y guerrill a movement . Peralta ,

who wa s on e o f thos e no t surrendering , ha d bee n

Christie's G-3.
Map 30
604 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

PANAY COASTA L PLAI N OPPOSIT E GUIMARA S ISLAND . Iloilo City, upper left; airstrip in

foreground.

Base development on Panay was rather

limited. Engineer s repaired a n existin g

airfield a t Iloil o fo r suppl y an d evacua -

tion planes , bu t kep t additiona l con -

struction t o tha t require d i n orde r t o

mount a reinforce d divisio n fo r th e in -

vasion of Japan. Th e 40t h Division was

to mount at Pana y fo r the initial assaul t

on th e Japanes e hom e islands , an d th e

5th Infantr y Division , upo n redeploy -

ment from Europe , was to stage at Iloil o

for subsequen t operation s i n Japan. 4

Northern Negros

On 2 4 Marc h Genera l Eichelberger ,

the Eight h Army's commander , decided

that operations on Pana y had proceeded

to th e poin t wher e th e 40t h Divisio n

could move against northern Negros and

set 2 9 Marc h a s th e dat e fo r th e ne w

attack.5 Th e 185t h RC T woul d mak e

the assault; th e 160t h RCT (les s the 2d

4

 GHQ AFPAC , Staf f Stud y OLYMPIC , 2 8 Ma r 45 ;

GHQ AFPAC , Staf f Stud y CORONFT , 1 5 Au g 45 ,

copies i n OCM H files .

5

 Principal source s fo r America n operation s i n

northern Negro s are : 10th I&H, Opn l Monograp h

on th e Panay-Negro s Occidenta l Opn, pp. 14 , 67-

115, 127-30 ; Eight h Arm y Rp t Panay-Negro s an d

Cebu Opns , pp . 16 , 27-44 , 125 , 137-38; 40t h Di v

G-3 Pe r Rpts, 29 Mar-1 Jun 45.
THE CENTRA L VISAYA N ISLAND S 605

Battalion, 160t h Infantry ) woul d follo w

on 3 0 March. 6 Th e 503 d Parachut e

RCT, stagin g a t Mindoro , woul d jum p

to reinforc e th e 40t h Divisio n upo n

orders from Eight h Army. Eight h Army

reserve fo r th e operatio n wa s the 164t h

RCT, America l Division, on Leyte. Th e

40th Divisio n coul d expec t hel p fro m

Negros guerrillas unde r Colone l Abcede

since, wit h abou t 14,00 0 troops , ove r

half o f the m armed , Abced e controlle d

two-thirds of th e island .

Lt. Gen . Takeshi Kono , commande r

of th e 77th Infantry Brigade, 102d Division, had around 13,50 0 men in northern Negros. 7

 Anothe r 1,30 0 Japanese

were concentrate d a t th e southeas t corner of the island but, tactically unrelated

to Kono 's force , reporte d t o a headquarters o n Cebu . Kon o commande d abou t

5,500 me n o f th e 102d Division, 7,50 0

troops o f th e 4th Air Army's 2d Air

Division, and 50 0 naval personnel. Th e

trained comba t effectives , abou t 4,00 0

in all, were fro m th e 102d Division.

8

Kono's troop s lacke d man y essentia l

items o f supply . Fo r example , less tha n

two-thirds o f hi s me n wer e armed—h e

had onl y 8,000 rifles. Smal l arms ammunition wa s fa r fro m adequate ; food ,

assuming n o losses , coul d las t fo r littl e

more tha n tw o months . O n th e othe r

hand, in some respects the Japanese were

very wel l armed . Hom e o f th e 2d Air

Division, norther n Negro s ha d bristle d

with antiaircraf t weapons , whic h Kon o

could use for ground operations. Kono 's

troops ha d als o remounte d numerou s

automatic weapon s take n fro m 2d Air

Division plane s destroye d o r damage d

on th e norther n Negro s fields .

Like Japanese commanders elsewher e

in the Philippines, Kono did not plan to

defend the most important ground under

his control, the airfield are a of the northwestern Negro s coasta l plain . H e in -

tended t o withdraw int o th e mountains

of north-centra l Negros for a long stand,

leaving onl y toke n force s behin d i n th e

coastal plai n t o dela y America n pene -

trations an d t o destro y bridge s an d

supplies. I n lat e March , accordingly ,

the bul k o f his forces wer e on their wa y

to inlan d positions , bu t unfortunatel y

for Kon o he was unable to take many of

the large r antiaircraf t gun s wit h him. 9

Kono's firs t defense , a n outpos t lin e o f

resistance, extende d alon g th e foothill s

of th e mountain s generall y seve n mile s

inland (east ) fro m Bacolod , twenty-fiv e

miles eas t acros s Guimara s Strai t fro m

Iloilo. Hi s mai n defense s la y fiv e t o si x

miles deepe r int o th e mountains.

6

 Additional plannin g information i s from: Eight h

Army FO 27 , 24 Mar 45 , and 40t h Di v FO 15 , 24 Mar

45, both i n Eight h Arm y G- 3 Jn l Fil e VICTO R I , 22 -

31 Ma r 45 . 7

 Japanese information i n this section is from: Nar -

ratives an d Interrog s o f L t Co l Shigekats u Aritom i

(Staff 102d Div an d 77th Inf Brig) an d L t Co l Kiyo -

shi Suzuk i (Staf f 2d Air Div), 10t h I&H, Staf f Stud y

of Japanes e Operations on Negros; Suzuki Statement,

States, III, 357-61. 8

 The majo r comba t component s were : 172d IIB,

less one company ; 354th IIB, less one company ; an d

355th IIB, less thre e companies . Al l wer e brough t

up t o strengt h b y absorbin g othe r units .

9

 Kono's armament , apparentl y afte r th e with -

drawal fro m th e coast , included :

Light machin e gun s

Heavy machin e gun s Dismounted aircraf t machin e gun s

75-mm antiaircraf t gun s

Antiaircraft machin e gun s

77-mm. gun s

57-mm. gun s

20

8

30

7

12

1

4

This informatio n i s fro m a revie w o f th e M S o f

this volume prepared b y forme r Japanes e Army an d

Navy officer s unde r th e auspice s of th e Foreig n Histories Division, Offic e o f th e Militar y Histor y Officer,

Headquarters, U.S . Arm y in Japan (hereinafte r cite d

as Japanese Review, 30 Sep 57).
606 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

90-MM. ANTIAIRCRAF T GU N FIRIN G GROUN D SUPPORT , NORTHER N NEGRO S

The 40t h Division' s firs t landin g o n

Negros too k plac e abou t 050 0 o n 2 9

March whe n a reinforce d platoo n o f

Company F, 185t h Infantry , wen t ashore

unopposed i n th e vicinit y o f Pulupan -

dan, fifteen mile s south o f Bacolod. Th e

platoon move d directl y inlan d abou t

three mile s t o secur e a bridg e ove r th e

Bago River , a bridg e tha t provide d th e

best and closest means of egress from th e

Pulupandan are a t o the Bacolo d region.

Clashing sharpl y wit h Japanes e bridg e

guards, the platoon seized the Bag o span

before th e guards , caugh t b y surprise ,

could se t off prepared demolitions. Th e

platoon the n hel d th e bridg e agains t

minor counterattack s unti l relieve d

about 093 0 b y th e mai n bod y o f th e

185th Infantry . Th e 185t h ha d begu n

landing a t Pulupanda n abou t 0900 ,

There wa s n o preliminar y nava l bom -

bardment an d ther e wa s n o Japanes e

resistance.

Spreading northwar d an d eastwar d

the 185t h Infantry , whic h th e 160t h

followed, secured almost the entire coastal plain of northwestern Negros by noon

on 2 Apri l a t th e cost o f approximatel y

5 me n kille d an d 1 0 wounded. B y evening o n th e 8t h th e tw o regiments ha d
THE CENTRA L VISAYA N ISLAND S 607

overrun th e Japanes e OPL R an d wer e

readying an attac k towar d Kono 's inne r

fortress. Meanwhile , n o nee d fo r th e

503d Parachut e Infantr y t o jum p o n

Negros havin g developed , th e regimen t

had flow n fro m Mindor o t o Pana y an d

moved t o Negro s aboar d smal l craft .

Assembling t o th e lef t o f th e 185t h In -

fantry (th e 160th was now on the 185th's

right), th e parachut e regiment prepare d

to participat e i n th e attac k agains t

Kono's mai n defenses .

Launching a general offensiv e o n 9

April, th e thre e regiments drov e slowl y

into rugge d terrai n wher e th e Japanes e

had ever y defensiv e advantage . Kono 's

men had prepared cave and bunker positions, most of them mutuall y supporting

and man y connecte d b y tunnel s o r

trenches. Th e Japanes e ha d du g tan k

traps alon g al l road s an d trail s i n th e

mountains, and ha d als o laid mine field s

using aeria l bombs . Kono 's me n ha d

excellent observation , fo r mos t o f th e

hills i n thei r last-stan d are a wer e open ,

grass covered , an d stee p sided . Durin g

daylight, th e Japanes e wer e conten t t o

conduct a static defense, bu t the y undertook harassing attacks almost every night.

Little purpos e ca n b e serve d b y de -

scribing in detai l th e mountai n fightin g

in norther n Negros . Th e battl e soo n

degenerated int o mountai n warfar e o f

the roughest sort involvin g all th e problems, frustrations , delays , failures , an d

successes tha t America n troop s wer e en -

countering i n th e mountain s o f Luzon .

The 40t h Divisio n employe d ai r an d

artillery suppor t liberally, 10 bu t i n th e

end, a s on Luzon , had t o close with each

individual Japanes e positio n wit h flam e

throwers an d th e rifle-carryin g infantry -

men. A s the campaign wore on, weather

also became a factor wit h which the 40th

Division ha d t o reckon , fo r dens e fog s

and heav y rain s slowe d al l operations .

By 2 June the 40th Division had over -

run almos t th e las t strong , organize d

Japanese resistanc e i n norther n Negros.

On th e 4th General Kono, realizin g tha t

his remainin g force s wer e incapabl e o f

further sustaine d effort , directe d a general withdrawal deep into the mountains

behind hi s broken defensiv e lines . Th e

surviving Japanes e disperse d int o smal l

groups seekin g foo d an d hideout s an d

trying t o avoi d contac t wit h Abcede' s

guerrillas who , under th e directio n o f

the 503 d Parachut e RCT , took ove r

responsibility fo r th e pursui t o f Kono' s

men. O n 9 Jun e th e 503 d relieve d al l

elements o f th e 40t h Divisio n i n north -

ern Negros . B y tha t dat e th e Japanes e

had los t ove r 4,00 0 me n killed . Kon o

lost anothe r 3,35 0 troops , mainl y fro m

starvation an d disease , before th e en d o f

the war. After th e general surrende r i n

August 1945 , ove r 6,15 0 Japanes e came

down fro m th e mountains to turn themselves in , joinin g abou t 35 0 others wh o

had been captured earlier. I n all, abou t

7,100 Japanes e lost thei r live s i n north -

ern Negros, pinning down the equivalent

of a n America n infantr y divisio n fo r

10

 Artillery suppor t availabl e fro m th e beginnin g

was compose d o f a 75-mm . pac k howitze r battalion ,

two 105-mm. howitzer battalions, a 155-mm. howitzer

battalion, th e 105-mm . SPM's of tw o regimental cannon companies , a 75-mm . tan k company , tw o batteries o f antiaircraf t automati c weapons , an d tw o

4.2-inch morta r companies . O n 2 0 Apri l a 90-mm .

antiaircraft gu n battalio n arrive d an d wa s se t u p

for employmen t against groun d targets .

On 2 3 May S. Sgt, John C . Sjogren o f Compan y I ,

160th Infantry , 40t h Division , singlehandedl y kille d

43 Japanes e an d destroye d 9 pillboxe s a s he le d hi s

squad during an attack i n th e rough hills of northern

Negros. Fo r hi s braver y an d aggressiv e leadership ,

Sergeant Sjogre n wa s awarded th e Meda l of Honor .
608 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

over tw o months. Th e 40t h Division' s

casualties fo r th e operation , includin g

those o f th e attache d 503 d Parachut e

RCT, totale d approximatel y 37 0 me n

killed an d 1,03 5 wounded .

Cebu

The Plan and the Japanese

The 40t h Divisio n had not begu n th e

third phas e o f it s campaig n t o secur e

Panay, Guimaras , an d norther n Negro s

when, o n 2 6 March, th e America l Division launche d a three-par t operatio n o f

its ow n t o clea r Ceb u Island , eas t o f

Negros; Bohol Island, southeast of Cebu;

and th e souther n sectio n o f Negro s

Island.

While primarily designed to clear Filipino rea l estat e an d liberat e Filipino s

from th e Japanese yoke, the Cebu operation wa s als o execute d t o secur e a n

additional stagin g bas e fo r th e assaul t

on Japan. Ceb u City , on th e east-central

shore o f th e 150-mile-lon g island , i s th e

second larges t cit y o f th e Philippine s

and boast s port facilitie s secon d onl y t o

those o f Manila . GH Q SWP A planne d

to develo p a t Ceb u stagin g facilitie s

adequate t o moun t a corp s o f thre e

reinforced divisions : th e America l Divi -

sion, and, upon their redeployment from

Europe, th e 44t h an d 97t h Infantr y

Divisions.11 Airfiel d developmen t on

Cebu woul d be limited t o tha t required

to provide a small base for transport and

evacuation aircraft .

For th e assault o n Ceb u th e Americal

Division (les s th e 164t h RCT , hel d ou t

as Eighth Army Reserve ) staged at Leyt e

and move d t o th e objectiv e aboar d ves -

sels of Task Group 78.2, Capt. Albert T.

Sprague commanding. 12 Wit h norma l

combat an d servic e uni t attachments ,

the Americal Divisio n numbere d nearl y

14,900 men . Th e divisio n prope r wa s

understrength, and , havin g recentl y

moved dow n ou t o f th e mountain s o f

northwestern Leyte , receive d fe w i f an y

replacements befor e stagin g fo r Cebu .

Already tired from arduou s mopping-up

operations o n Leyte , th e divisio n re -

ceived onl y th e rest it s hurrie d loadin g

operations afforded .

Maj. Gen . Willia m H . Arnold , com -

manding th e Americal , expecte d consid -

erable hel p fro m Ceb u guerrilla s unde r

Colonel Cushing , wh o ha d abou t 8,50 0

men i n hi s group. Befor e th e America l

Division landed, Cushing was to attempt

to secur e th e Ceb u Cit y wate r sources ,

located i n roug h hill s thre e mile s west -

northwest o f th e city . Afte r th e assault ,

the America l woul d provid e Cushin g

with arm s an d othe r militar y equip -

ment an d emplo y th e guerrilla s t o th e

maximum.

There wa s good reaso n fo r Arnold t o

hope for guerrilla aid. Lackin g one RCT

of hi s division , Arnol d expecte d t o en -

counter aroun d 12,25 0 Japanes e o n

Cebu, a n estimat e quit e clos e t o th e

actual strength—14,500—of th e Japanese

1 1

 GHQ AFPAC , Staf f Studie s OLYMPI C an d

CORONET, 2 8 Ma r an d 1 5 Aug 45 .

12

 The America n sid e of th e Ceb u operatio n is de -

rived mainl y from : 10t h I&H , Operationa l Mono -

graph Cebu-Bohol-Negro s Occidenta l Operation ,

pp. 18-81, 123, 130-33, and apps. I, II, and V; Eighth

Army Rp t Panay-Negro s an d Ceb u Opns , 56-57 ,

61-74, 137-39 ; Cronin , Under the Southern Cross,

pp. 273-308 ; Interv , autho r wit h Ma j Ge n Eugen e

W. Riding s (o n Cebu , Ass t Di v Comd r America l

Div), 1 9 Feb 57 ; Comments of Ma j Ge n Willia m H .

Arnold (C G America l Div) , 26 De c 56 .
THE CENTRA L VISAYA N ISLAND S 609

garrison.13 Roughl y 12,50 0 Japanes e

were deploye d i n an d nea r Ceb u City ,

while another 2,00 0 held positions in fa r

northern Cebu . Traine d groun d com -

bat strengt h wa s low . At Ceb u Cit y

there were less than 1,50 0 Army groun d

combat troops , mos t o f the m member s

of th e reinforce d 173d IIB, 102d Division.

14 Nava l groun d comba t strengt h

at Ceb u Cit y totale d 30 0 men , al l fro m

the 36th Naval Guard Unit, 33d Naval

Special Base Force. I n norther n Ceb u

the comba t elemen t numbere d abou t

750 me n o f th e 1st Division, wh o ha d

recently arrive d fro m Leyte . Finally ,

the 14,50 0 Japanes e o n Ceb u include d

about 1,70 0 noncombatan t civilians .

In lat e Marc h 1945 , th e Japanes e

command structur e o n Ceb u wa s i n a

somewhat confused state . Lt . Gen. Shimpei Fukue , commander of the 102d Division, was present bu t ha d bee n relieve d

of hi s comman d b y Genera l Sosak u

Suzuki, th e 35th Army commander , fo r

leaving Leyte without permission. Unti l

24 March , onl y tw o day s befor e th e

Americal Divisio n landed , al l Japanes e

in th e Ceb u Cit y regio n ha d nominall y

been unde r control o f Rea r Adm. Kak u

Harada, commandin g office r o f th e 33d

Naval Special Base Force. Harad a chos e

not t o exercis e all his authority an d lef t

defensive preparation s largel y i n th e

hands o f Maj . Gen . Takeo Manjome ,

commander of the 78th Infantry Brigade,

102d Division. Th e norther n Ceb u

groupment, independent of both Harada

and Manjome , wa s unde r Lt . Gen .

Tadasu Kataoka , Commanding General,

1st Division.

General Suzuki , whe n h e reache d

Cebu fro m Leyt e on 2 4 March, immediately too k step s t o centraliz e th e com -

mand. Assumin g control of all force s o n

Cebu, Suzuk i mad e Genera l Manjom e

de jure commande r i n th e Ceb u Cit y

region an d lef t Kataok a i n contro l i n

northern Cebu. A t the end o f the month

Suzuki wen t nort h t o prepar e fo r hi s

ill-fated attemp t t o escap e t o Min -

danao,15 leavin g Manjome complete discretion i n th e Ceb u Cit y sector . Man -

jome's command also embraced Japanese

forces o n Boho l Islan d an d souther n

Negros.

Manjome designe d hi s defense s s o a s

to control—not hold—th e coasta l plain s

around Ceb u City , an d fo r this purpos e

set up defenses in depth north and northwest o f th e city . A forwar d line , constituting a n outpos t lin e o f resistance ,

stretched acros s th e firs t risin g groun d

behind th e city , hill s tw o an d a hal f t o

four mile s inland. 16 A stronge r an d

shorter secon d line , th e mai n lin e o f

resistance, la y abou t a mil e farthe r in -

land an d generall y 35 0 fee t highe r int o

the hills . Bac k o f this MLR wer e Man -

jome's last-stan d defenses , centerin g i n

13

 The Japanes e side of the Cebu stor y comes from:

Narrative o f Ma j Ge n Yoshihar u Tomochik a (Cof S

35th Army) an d narrative of Col Junkichi Okabayashi

(CofS 1st Div), 10t h I&H Staff Study , 35th Army Opn s

on Leyte ; Dispositio n of 102d Div Units , Jan-Apr 45,

and Progres s Outlin e o f th e Ceb u Op n (base d o n

materials from Ma j Chuji Kaneko , Intel OH 102d Div,

and Co l Satosh i Wada , Cof S 102d Div), 10t h I&H,

Staff Stud y o f 102d Div Operation s o n Leyt e an d

Cebu; Statemen t of Col Okabayashi , States, III, 119-

21; Statemen t o f Cap t Kenkich e Shigak i (Staf f 33d

Naval Special Base Force), States, III, 283-84 . 14

 The 173d IIB's reinforcement s include d a com -

pany o f th e 355th IIB, 102d Division, an d a provi -

sional compan y compose d o f 54th IMB troop s

stranded o n Ceb u o n thei r wa y t o Leyte .

15

 See also above , ch. XXX. 16

 Before th e bul k o f th e 102d Division wen t t o

Leyte, thi s OPL R ha d bee n intende d a s a n MLR .

But whe n h e los t s o man y comba t troop s t o th e

35th Army on Leyte , Manjome decided he had insufficient strengt h t o hol d suc h a n extensiv e ML R s o

far forward .
610 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

rough, broken hills five miles or so north

of th e city . Anticipatin g tha t America n

forces woul d attemp t t o moun t wid e

envelopments o f hi s defensiv e lines ,

Manjome se t u p on e flan k protectiv e

strongpoint i n rugged , bar e hill s abou t

three an d a hal f mile s nort h o f barri o

Talisay, o n th e coas t abou t si x mile s

southwest o f Ceb u City , t o bloc k th e

valley o f th e Manang a River , a natura l

axis o f advanc e fo r force s envelopin g

from th e sout h an d west . Similarly , h e

established strongpoint s o n hi s lef t t o

block th e valley of the Butuanoan River,

roughly fou r mile s northeas t o f Ceb u

City. Agains t th e eventualit y tha t th e

American invadin g force s migh t lan d

north o f Ceb u Cit y an d strik e int o th e

Butuanoan Valley , Manjom e se t u p

another flan k protectiv e positio n i n lo w

hills overlookin g th e beac h a t Liloan ,

ten mile s northeast o f Ceb u City .

General Manjom e di d no t inten d t o

hold the beaches, but at both Talisay and

Liloan, th e bes t landin g point s i n th e

Cebu Cit y region, h e thoroughl y mine d

all logica l landin g areas. Th e Japanes e

also constructed tan k barrier s alon g th e

shore lin e an d plante d tan k trap s an d

mine field s alon g al l road s leadin g in -

land an d towar d Ceb u City . Th e inne r

defense line s wer e a syste m o f mutuall y

supporting machin e gu n position s i n

caves, pillboxes , an d bunkers . Man y o f

these position s ha d bee n complete d fo r

months and had acquired natural camouflage. Manjome' s troop s ha d a n ampl e

supply o f machin e gun s an d machin e

cannon and, lik e the Japanes e on Negros,

employed remounte d aircraf t an d anti -

aircraft weapons . Manjom e ha d som e

light an d heav y mortars, bu t onl y a fe w

pieces o f ligh t (70-mm . an d 75-mm. )

artillery. Fo r th e rest , however , Man -

jome's force s wer e fa r bette r supplie d

than Kono' s troop s i n norther n Negros .

The Cebu City Coastal Plain

The America l Divisio n encountere d

some problems at Cebu that merit special

attention, meetin g th e firs t a t Talisay ,

site o f th e assaul t beaches . Followin g

an hour' s bombardmen t b y thre e ligh t

cruisers an d si x destroyer s o f Admira l

Berkey's Tas k Forc e 74 , leadin g wave s

of th e 132 d an d 182 d Infantr y Regi -

ments, aboard LVT's, landed unoppose d

on beache s just north o f Talisay at 083 0

on 2 6 March. (Map 31) Withi n minute s

confusion bega n t o pervad e wha t ha d

started out to resemble an administrative

landing. Japanes e mines , onl y a fe w

yards beyond th e sur f line , knocke d ou t

ten o f the leading fifteen LVT's . Troop s

in th e firs t tw o wave s halte d afte r abou t

5 men wer e killed and 1 5 wounded from

mine explosions , an d a s subsequen t

waves cam e ashor e me n an d vehicle s

began jammin g th e beaches .

Colonel Gushin g ha d reporte d th e

existence o f min e field s a t Talisay , an d

the Americal Divisio n ha d sen t engineer

mine disposal teams ashore with th e first

waves. Th e min e field s prove d muc h

more extensiv e tha n anticipate d an d th e

mines themselve s quit e a problem. Th e

Japanese ha d place d 50-kilogra m (111 -

pound) aeria l bomb s unde r most o f th e

mines an d whe n thes e ble w the y tor e

LVT's apar t an d lef t hug e hole s i n th e

beach. Appalle d b y th e natur e o f th e

explosions, th e leadin g troop s wer e als o

surprised a t ho w thickl y th e Japanes e

had sow n th e mines , a s wel l a s b y th e

fact tha t th e preassaul t nava l bombard -

ment ha d no t detonate d th e bul k o f

them. Th e effec t wa s th e mor e seriou s
Map 31
612 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

LANDING A T CEB U

because th e troop s had ha d n o previou s

experience with an extensiv e and closel y

planted min e field . Anothe r elemen t o f

surprise tha t helped , paradoxically , t o

halt th e troop s o n th e beache s wa s the

complete absence of Japanese resistance.

Had a singl e Japanes e machin e gu n

opened fire , i t is probable that th e lead -

ing troop s woul d hav e struc k inlan d

immediately, mines or no mines.

Brig. Gen. Eugene W. Ridings, Assistant Divisio n Commander , foun d move -

ment a t a complet e standstil l whe n h e

came ashor e wit h th e secon d wave .

Feeling tha t commanders already ashore

had failed t o employ the means available

to the m t o clea r th e min e field s o r t o

find a wa y through them , Genera l Ridings se t me n o f th e 132 d Infantr y t o

work probin g fo r an d tapin g route s

through th e obstacles . Thi s work wa s

under wa y by th e tim e th e last boats o f

the thir d wav e reached th e beach, but i t

was nearly 100 0 befor e beac h traffi c wa s

completely unjamme d an d th e advanc e

inland ha d full y developed .

The air and naval preassault bombardments had not destroyed all the Japanese

defensive installation s i n th e Talisa y

area. Ha d Japanes e manne d th e posi -

tions tha t remaine d intact , America l

Division casualties , give n th e stoppag e

on th e beaches , migh t wel l hav e bee n

disastrous. Luckil y fo r th e division ,

Japanese tactica l doctrin e a t thi s stag e

of th e wa r calle d fo r withdrawa l fro m

the beaches to inland defenses. Th e fe w

outposts lef t i n th e Talisa y are a evi -
THE CENTRA L VISAYA N ISLAND S 613

CEBU CIT Y

denced n o stomac h fo r sittin g throug h

the nava l bombardmen t an d ha d fle d

when Tas k Forc e 7 4 opene d fire . Th e

Japanese ha d misse d a n almost unparal -

leled opportunit y t o throw a n America n

invasion forc e bac k int o th e sea .

Once pas t th e beac h min e fields , th e

Americal Division's leading units probed

cautiously throug h abandone d defense s

as the y advance d inlan d t o th e mai n

highway t o Ceb u City . Encounterin g

only on e delayin g forc e durin g th e day ,

the mai n bodie s o f th e 132 d an d 182 d

Infantry Regiment s nevertheles s halte d

for th e nigh t abou t a mil e an d a hal f

south o f th e city . Patrol s entere d th e

city befor e dar k bu t di d no t remai n fo r

the night . Th e nex t da y th e infantr y

secured Cebu Cit y against no opposition

and o n th e 28t h move d t o clea r Lahu g

Airfield, tw o mile s t o th e northeast .

While maneuverin g t o tak e th e air -

field, th e Americal Division encountered

its first strong , organized resistance. Ini -

tially, this took the form o f machine gun

and morta r fir e directe d agains t th e

left o f troops moving toward the airfield ,

but durin g th e afternoo n forwar d ele -

ments discovere d tha t Hil l 3 0 an d G o

Chan Hill, close together a mile north of

Cebu City , wer e infeste d wit h Japanese .

The 182 d Infantr y seize d Hil l 3 0 afte r

a shar p figh t o n 2 8 Marc h an d o n th e

next mornin g launche d a n attac k t o

clear G o Cha n Hill , hal f a mil e t o th e

east. Th e regimen t made some progress

during th e mornin g o f 2 9 March , bu t

Japanese machine gun an d rifl e fir e con -
614 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

tinned t o pou r down , unabated , alon g

all slope s o f th e hill . Th e assaul t bat -

talion prepare d t o withdra w fro m G o

Chan t o permit air an d artiller y t o giv e

the objectiv e a thoroug h going-over ,

but a t thi s junctur e th e Japanese , b y

remote control , ble w a n ammunitio n

dump locate d i n cave s alon g a n easter n

spur o f th e hill . I n th e resultin g explosions Compan y A , 182 d Infantry, los t

20 me n kille d an d 3 0 wounded ; Com -

pany B , 716th Tan k Battalion , los t on e

tank an d cre w an d suffere d damag e

to tw o mor e tanks . Th e infantr y com -

pany, alread y understrengt h a s th e re -

sult o f lon g servic e o n Leyte , cease d

to exist , an d th e regimen t distribute d

its survivors among Companies B and C .

In a revengefu l moo d almos t th e en -

tire 182d Infantry returne d t o the attack

on 3 0 March . Al l availabl e tanks , artil -

lery, an d mortars provide d support , an d

the 40-mm . weapon s o f th e 478t h Anti -

aircraft Automati c Weapon s Battalio n

joined in . B y dusk th e 182 d had cleared

all G o Cha n Hill .

Meanwhile, th e 132 d Infantr y ha d

cleared th e coasta l plain s are a nort h t o

the Butuanoa n River . Wes t o f Ceb u

City, since Cushing's guerrillas had faile d

to clea r th e terrain , th e 132d moved t o

secure th e city' s wate r suppl y sources .

The fightin g fo r fou r day s wa s bitter ,

and i t wa s no t unti l 2 Apri l tha t th e

132d ha d mad e th e wate r suppl y facili -

ties safe. Unopposed , troops of th e 132 d

Infantry ha d meanwhil e landed o n Mactan Island , tw o mile s eas t acros s Ceb u

Harbor fro m Ceb u City. 17 Japanes e fir e

from th e hill s overlookin g Lahu g Air -

field o n th e Cebu mainlan d ha d mad e it

impossible fo r engineers t o wor k a t th e

Lahug site , an d Eight h Arm y ha d ac -

cordingly directed the Americal Divisio n

to seiz e a stri p o n Mactan . Th e stri p

was operational for transport planes by 2

April, meetin g th e immediat e airfiel d

requirements fo r th e Ceb u operation .

The Main Defenses

By th e en d o f Marc h th e America l

Division had acquired a good ide a of the

nature and extent of General Manjome's

principal defenses, an d ha d learne d tha t

it ha d alread y overru n som e o f th e

strongpoints alon g th e Japanes e OPLR.

On th e other hand, the division ha d not

been abl e t o pinpoin t th e Japanes e

flanks. Wit h th e enem y firml y en -

trenched an d havin g al l th e advantage s

of observation , Genera l Arnol d kne w

that th e proces s o f reducin g Manjome 's

positions woul d b e slo w an d costl y n o

matter what type of maneuver the Americal Divisio n employed . Lackin g th e

strength require d fo r wid e envelop -

ments an d specifi c informatio n abou t

the Japanes e flanks , Arnol d hope d h e

might achiev e decisiv e result s wit h a

single sledgehamme r blo w agains t th e

Japanese center . H e therefor e decide d

to us e th e bul k o f hi s strengt h i n a

frontal assaul t int o th e hill s du e nort h

of Ceb u City .

This attac k th e 182d Infantr y

launched o n 1 April, an d b y th e 11th

the regimen t had reduced almost all th e

important defensiv e installation s alon g

the cente r o f Manjome 's secon d line .

Meanwhile, Genera l Arnol d ha d move d

most o f th e 132 d Infantry agains t th e

Japanese left. Strikin g up th e west bank

of th e Butuanoa n Rive r an d the n wes t

from tha t stream, th e 132d , by 1 1 April,

actually turne d th e Japanes e lef t an d

17

 It wa s on Macta n tha t Magella n wa s killed during hi s famou s voyag e o f circumnavigation .
THE CENTRA L VISAYA N ISLAND S 615

reached a poin t o n th e extrem e lef t o f

Manjome's last-stan d positions . Bu t th e

Americal Division , stil l lackin g infor -

mation o n Japanes e disposition s i n th e

hinterland, did no t recogniz e the signifi -

cance o f th e 132 d Infantry's gain s an d

made no immediat e provision t o exploit

the success .

Casualties durin g th e attack s between

1 an d 1 2 April wer e quite heavy , an d a s

early as the 3 d Genera l Arnol d ha d con -

cluded tha t h e wa s not goin g t o realiz e

his hopes for quic k breakthroug h i n th e

Japanese center . H e decide d tha t suc -

cess a t a reasonabl e cos t an d withi n a

reasonable time required a wide envelopment—as opposed t o th e 132d Infantry's

more o r les s fronta l attac k o n th e Japa -

nese left—an d fo r thi s purpos e h e aske d

General Eichelberge r t o releas e th e

164th RC T fro m Eight h Arm y Reserv e

and dispatc h it to Cebu. Arnold planne d

to hav e th e 164t h Infantr y envelo p th e

Japanese righ t an d righ t rea r vi a th e

Mananga River valley. Guerrilla s would

screen th e regiment' s movemen t wit h

operations of f th e eas t ban k o f th e

Mananga whil e th e 132 d an d 182 d Infantry Regiment s woul d concentrat e o n

the Japanes e left , undertakin g maneu -

vers th e Japanes e woul d interpre t a s

presaging a major attac k from th e Butuanoan River . (Th e 132d Infantry's at -

tack u p tha t rive r ha d i n larg e measur e

been tie d t o this deception plan. ) Final -

ly, Arnol d directe d th e 182d Infantry t o

employ part o f its strength i n a holdin g

attack agains t th e Japanes e center.

The 164t h Infantry, less one battalion,

reached Ceb u o n th e 9th an d started u p

the Manang a Valley during th e night o f

11-12 April , Haltin g throughou t th e

12th, th e regimen t the n swun g north -

east and during the night of 12-13 April

moved int o position about a mile northwest o f th e majo r strongpoin t o n th e

right rea r o f Manjome' s last-stan d area .

Hoping t o achiev e surprise , th e 164t h

attacked o n th e mornin g o f 1 3 Apri l

without, preliminar y artiller y bombard -

ment. Th e Japanese , however , reacte d

quickly an d strongly . Th e America n

unit soo n los t th e elemen t o f surprise ,

and b y th e en d o f th e da y found it s outflanking thrus t evolvin g int o anothe r

frontal assault .

Meanwhile, the 132d and 182d Infantry

Regiments ha d resume d thei r attacks .

The 182 d succeeded i n overrunnin g th e

last strongpoin t alon g th e Japanes e sec -

ond line , bu t th e 132 d Infantr y ha d

made n o significan t gain s b y 1 3 April .

All thre e regiment s o f th e America l

Division no w settled dow n t o a serie s o f

costly, smal l uni t attack s durin g whic h

they gaine d groun d painfully , yar d b y

yard, behin d clos e artiller y an d ai r sup -

port. Finally , o n 1 7 April , organize d

resistance in th e Japanes e last-stand are a

began t o collapse , an d b y evenin g tha t

day th e division ha d reduce d all of Manjome's majo r strongpoints . Th e en d o f

organized resistanc e i n th e hill s nort h

of Ceb u Cit y cam e o n th e 18th .

On 1 6 Apri l th e America l Divisio n

had estimate d tha t Manjom e coul d hol d

out i n hi s last-stan d are a fo r a t leas t

another tw o weeks, an d th e sudde n collapse o f organize d oppositio n cam e a s

something o f a surprise . Unknow n t o

the America l Division , Manjom e ha d

decided abou t 1 2 April tha t furthe r re -

sistance would be futile and had directed

a general withdrawal northward to begin

during the night of 16-1 7 April. B y the

morning o f th e 17t h the withdrawa l

was well under way, and some 7,500 men

managed t o extricate themselves in fairl y
616 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

good order . Manjom e lef t behin d larg e

stores of ammunition, weapons, and foo d

and als o lost a good many troop s a s the y

ran throug h a gantle t o f 132 d Infantr y

outposts.

After th e wa r on e Japanes e survivo r

of th e fightin g o n Cebu , Col . Satosh i

Wada, th e 102d Division's chie f o f staff ,

ventured th e opinio n tha t th e America l

Division ha d bee n inordinatel y slo w i n

mounting envelopments . H e believe d

the fronta l attac k i n th e center had bee n

wasteful o f tim e an d live s an d tha t th e

Americal woul d hav e don e bette r t o

execute a n early , stron g envelopmen t

of th e Japanes e lef t vi a th e Butuanoa n

Valley. H e fel t tha t th e Manang a Rive r

envelopment, on th e Japanes e right, had

started too late and had been too weak to

achieve muc h significance . I t appears ,

indeed, that th e Mananga Valley maneuver accomplishe d littl e mor e tha n t o

speed Japanes e preparation s fo r with -

drawal i n accordanc e wit h plan s Man -

jome ha d mad e befor e th e America l

Division eve r reached Cebu .

Colonel Wada' s hindsigh t analysi s

leaves a t leas t thre e importan t factor s

out o f consideration. First , until 9 April

General Arnol d ha d only tw o RCT's on

Cebu. Wit h thes e h e no t onl y ha d t o

execute an attack but also had t o protect

and secur e th e Ceb u Cit y coasta l area ,

clear Macta n Island , an d guar d agains t

the possibilit y o f a Japanes e counterat -

tack. Arnold , accordingly , di d no t fee l

he had sufficien t strengt h t o moun t wide

envelopments. Second , th e America l

Division ha d no t undertake n a n en -

velopment o f th e Japanes e lef t vi a th e

Butuanoan Valle y because , unti l almos t

mid-April, it ha d no t bee n abl e t o ascertain jus t wher e th e Japanes e lef t wa s

anchored—which ma y reflec t adversel y

on th e depth o f 132 d Infantr y reconnaissance. I n an y case , th e terrai n o n th e

Japanese lef t hardl y invite d concerte d

attack. Finally , th e America l Divisio n

had feare d tha t th e Japanes e a t Liloa n

(a forc e actuall y comprisin g som e 1,50 0

ill-armed servic e troops) might strike th e

exposed righ t flan k o f unit s pushin g

up th e Butuanoa n Valley . I t i s true ,

however, tha t th e envelopmen t vi a th e

Mananga Valle y di d no t tur n ou t a s

successfully a s anticipate d an d tha t fail -

ure to push the attack via the Butuanoan

Valley allowe d a large Japanese forc e t o

escape relativel y intac t int o norther n

Cebu.

Mop-up on Cebu

Following th e collaps e o f Japanes e

resistance i n th e hill s nort h o f Ceb u

City, th e America l Divisio n quickl y se t

up a pursui t operation , bu t ha d a diffi -

cult tim e findin g ou t wher e Manjome' s

forces ha d gone . Movin g over mountain

trails an d throug h unmappe d terrain ,

Manjome a t firs t hope d tha t h e migh t

somehow evacuat e th e bulk o f his troops

to norther n Negros . Quickl y realizin g

this hop e futile , h e endeavore d t o joi n

forces wit h 1st Division remnant s i n

northern Cebu . Her e agai n Manjome' s

hopes wer e frustrated , fo r th e America l

Division cu t hi s lin e o f march .

The division' s pursui t bega n o n 2 0

April whe n elements o f th e 132 d Infan -

try, movin g by small craft, lande d o n th e

east coast seventee n mile s north o f Cebu

City. Eigh t day s late r th e regimen t ha d

cleared th e coasta l highwa y fo r thirty -

five mile s nort h o f th e city . Th e 182 d

Infantry, meanwhile , ha d marche d overland t o Cebu 's wes t coast , swun g bac k

east ove r a n east-wes t roa d crossin g th e
THE CENTRA L VISAYA N ISLAND S 617

northern section of the island, and mad e

contact with th e 132 d o n 2 8 April. Th e

two regiments had thu s split th e 1st and

102d Division forces .

At th e en d o f th e firs t wee k o f Ma y

the 132 d Infantr y began a drive to break

up organize d resistanc e o n th e par t o f

the 1st Division groupmen t and , wit h

guerrilla aid , largel y accomplishe d it s

task i n a campaig n lastin g t o th e en d o f

the month. Durin g early June the bul k

of th e 132 d an d 182 d Infantr y Regi -

ments, reinforced b y two newly equipped

guerrilla regiments, turned south against

the 102d Division's groupment, which had

holed u p i n wild , mountainou s countr y

in the north-central portion of the island.

In tw o weeks ' tim e th e Fil-America n

units destroye d th e las t effectiv e Jap -

anese resistance , an d th e remainin g Japanese broke up into small groups seeking

only t o survive . B y 20 June most o f th e

Americal Division , withdrawin g fro m

action t o prepar e fo r th e invasio n o f

Japan, lef t furthe r patrollin g t o

Cushing's guerrillas .

The America l Division estimate d tha t

it kille d nearl y 9,00 0 Japanes e on Ceb u

from 2 6 March t o 2 0 June. Thi s figur e

seems exaggerated , fo r afte r th e surren -

der i n August 194 5 ove r 8,50 0 Japanes e

turned u p aliv e on Cebu. 18 I t therefor e

appears tha t roughly 5,50 0 Japanese lost

their live s o n Ceb u fro m 2 6 Marc h t o

the en d o f th e war . Th e America l Di -

vision, defeatin g a militar y forc e o f

approximately its own size—th e division

was considerabl y outnumbere d b y th e

Japanese unti l th e 164t h RC T reache d

Cebu o n 9 April—ha d suffere d battl e

casualties totalin g roughl y 41 0 me n

killed an d 1,70 0 wounded . I n addition ,

the divisio n ha d incurre d ove r 8,00 0

nonbattle casualties , mos t resultin g

from a n epidemi c of infectious hepatitis.

Other tropica l disease s als o too k a toll ,

and towar d th e en d o f th e operation ,

according t o th e Eight h Army' s sur -

geon, relaxe d disciplin e o n Ceb u le d

to a n increas e i n malari a an d venerea l

diseases.19

Bohol and Southern Negros

A week befor e Japanes e resistance col -

lapsed north o f Cebu City , the America l

Division, presse d b y Genera l Eichelber -

ger t o spee d its three-phase campaign t o

clear Cebu, Bohol, and southern Negros,

had sen t a battalio n comba t tea m o f th e

164th RC T t o Boho l Island. 20 O n 1 1

April th e battalio n lande d unoppose d

over beache s alread y controlle d b y guerrillas unde r Majo r Ingeniero . Patrol s

of th e 164t h Infantr y o n 1 5 April discovered the main body of the Japanese along

low hill s seve n o r eigh t mile s inlan d

from th e cente r o f Bohol' s sout h coast .

The Japanes e force , buil t aroun d a

company o f th e 174th IIB, 102d Division, numbered abou t 33 0 men i n all .

In a serie s o f attack s lastin g fro m 1 7

18

 Some of thes e 8,500 undoubtedl y include d a fe w

late escapee s fro m Leyte , fo r a tin y trickl e o f Jap -

anese continue d t o mak e thei r wa y t o Ceb u fro m Leyte eve n afte r 2 6 March.

19

 Eight h Arm y Repor t Panay-Negro s an d Ceb u

Operations, pp. 163-64 . Genera l Arnold , in his comments o n thi s M S date d 2 6 Decembe r 195 6 too k

exception t o th e part abou t relaxed disciplin e in th e

medical report . 20

 This sectio n i s base d primaril y on : 10t h I& H

Opnl Monograp h Ceb u - Bohol - Negro s Orienta l

Opn, pp . 88-114 , 123-25 , an d apps . II I an d IV ;

Eighth Arm y Rpt Panay-Negro s and Ceb u Opns, pp.

70-72; Narrativ e an d Interro g o f 1s t L t Kome i

Fujitomi (Staf f Of f 174th IIB 102d Div), 10t h I& H

Staff Study , Japanese Opns on Negros; Cronin, Under

the Southern Cross, pp. 309-34 .
618 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

through 2 0 Apri l th e 164t h Infantry 's

battalion brok e th e bac k o f Japanes e

resistance; i t overra n th e las t organize d

opposition b y th e 23d . Most America n

forces withdre w fro m th e islan d o n 7

May, leavin g th e mop-up to Majo r Inge -

niero's guerrilla s an d a detachmen t o f

the 21s t Reconnaissanc e Troop , Amer -

ical Division . A s of tha t date about 10 5

Japanese o n th e islan d ha d bee n killed ;

the 164t h Infantr y ha d los t 7 killed an d

14 wounded . Abou t 5 0 me n o f th e

Japanese garrison , harrie d an d hunted ,

survived t o surrende r a t th e en d o f th e

war.

While on e battalio n o f th e 164t h wa s

securing Bohol , th e rest o f th e regimen t

moved t o souther n Negros , wher e i t

landed unoppose d o n 2 6 April. Almos t

immediately afte r landin g th e 164t h

Infantry mad e contac t wit h element s o f

the 40t h Division' s 40t h Reconnaissanc e

Troop, whic h ha d rounde d th e nort h

coast o f th e islan d an d ha d spe d dow n

the east coast withou t encounterin g an y

Japanese. Th e 164t h Infantr y the n

turned t o th e tas k o f locatin g an d dis -

persing th e smal l Japanes e garriso n o f

southern Negros . Totalin g abou t 1,30 0

men, thi s garriso n wa s built aroun d th e

174th IIB, less three rifle companies, and

included groun d servic e troop s o f th e

2d Air Division a s wel l a s abou t 15 0

seamen from ship s sunk in the Mindana o

Sea durin g lat e 1944.

By 2 8 Apri l th e 164t h Infantr y ha d

located th e mai n forc e o f Japanes e i n

rough, partiall y jungle d hill s abou t te n

miles inland. Th e Japanes e repelled th e

first attacks , whic h on e battalio n o f th e

164th launched , an d o n 6 Ma y all avail -

able strength, includin g a guerrilla regiment, bega n a new, concerted offensive .

By 1 7 May the Japanese were withdrawing fro m thei r bes t defenses , bu t i t wa s

the 28t h befor e th e 164t h Infantr y an d

attached guerrilla s overra n th e las t or -

ganized resistance at the Japanese stronghold. Th e regimen t reduce d a fina l

pocket o f Japanes e oppositio n betwee n

7 an d 1 2 June, an d b y th e 14t h could

find n o furthe r sign s o f organize d

resistance.

On 2 0 June th e las t element s o f th e

164th Infantr y lef t souther n Negros, and

a compan y o f th e 503 d Parachut e In -

fantry cam e dow n fro m northwester n

Negros to control the guerrillas and hel p

hunt th e remainin g Japanese . Th e

southern Negros operation cost the 164th

Infantry roughl y 3 5 me n kille d an d 18 0

wounded, whil e th e Japanese , t o 2 0

June, lost abou t 53 0 me n kille d an d 1 5

captured. A s i t lef t Negros , th e 164t h

Infantry estimate d tha t no t mor e tha n

300 Japanes e wer e lef t aliv e i n th e

southern part of th e island , but afte r th e

war about 88 0 Japanes e came ou t o f th e

southern hill s t o surrender .

Conclusions

The en d o f organize d Japanes e resistance i n souther n Negro s marke d th e

completion o f Eight h Army 's campaig n

to recapture the central Visayan Islands.

During tha t campaig n th e reinforce d

Americal an d 40t h Division s (th e latter

less it s ow n 108th RC T bu t wit h th e

503d Parachut e RC T attached ) ha d

faced approximatel y 32,35 0 Japanese, o f

whom 8,50 0 ca n b e counte d a s traine d

combat effectives . B y 2 0 Jun e th e tw o

U.S. division s ha d los t som e 83 5 me n

killed an d 2,30 0 wounded ; a s o f th e

same dat e Japanes e losse s wer e approxi -

mately 10,25 0 kille d an d 50 0 captured .

Perhaps anothe r 4,00 0 Japanes e wer e
THE CENTRA L VISAYA N ISLAND S 619

killed o r die d o f starvatio n an d diseas e

from 2 0 Jun e t o 1 5 Augus t 1945 , bu t

almost 17,50 0 o f th e origina l 32,35 0

survived an d surrendere d afte r th e en d

of th e war.

The collaps e o f organize d oppositio n

on Panay , Cebu , Bohol , an d Negro s di d

not complet e Eight h Army 's jo b i n th e

southern Philippines . I n fact , eve n a s

the America l an d 40t h Division s wer e

finishing u p thei r task s o n th e centra l

Visayans, othe r unit s o f Eight h Arm y

were heavily engage d against th e strongest an d mos t effectiv e Japanes e concen -

tration i n th e souther n islands , tha t

holding eastern Mindanao .
CHAPTER XXXI I

The Conquest o f Eastern Mindanao

Plans, Preparations, and Penetration

The Concepts of Attack and Defense

Eighth Arm y assigne d th e tas k o f

destroying th e Japanes e holdin g tha t

portion o f Mindana o lyin g eas t o f th e

Zamboanga Peninsul a t o Maj . Gen.

Franklin C. Sibert's X Corps, compose d

of th e reinforce d 24t h an d 31s t Infantr y

Divisions.1 Arm y an d corp s plan s calle d

for th e 24t h Division , stagin g a t Min -

doro, t o lan d o n 1 7 Apri l alon g th e

shores o f Illan a Bay , on th e west-centra l

coast o f easter n Mindanao . Th e 31st

Division woul d g o ashor e o n 2 2 Apri l

over beache s th e 24t h Divisio n ha d

secured. Th e 31st's mountin g areas were

Morotai Island , betwee n Mindana o an d

New Guinea , an d Sansapor , o n th e

northwest coast o f Ne w Guinea .

Illana Ba y lies nearly a hundred mile s

northwest o f th e mai n objectiv e i n

eastern Mindanao , th e Dava o area , an d

only a poo r roa d connects its beache s t o

Davao. Still , Eight h Arm y ha d ampl e

reason t o selec t Illan a Ba y as th e sit e o f

the initia l assault . Fo r on e thing , th e

army kne w tha t th e Japanes e ha d thei r

main concentration s i n th e Dava o re -

gion, wher e the y seeme d especiall y wel l

prepared to repel an amphibious assault.

It woul d b e foolis h t o stic k one' s han d

into a hornet' s nes t i f ther e wer e n o

urgency fo r suc h action , an d Eight h

Army coul d not , of course , avoi d th e

long vie w tha t th e easter n Mindana o

operation wa s in essenc e a mopping-u p

campaign rathe r tha n a n actio n o f great

strategic importance . Second , th e Illan a

Bay area wa s relatively weakl y defende d

—the 24t h Divisio n woul d hav e a much

better chance t o achieve tactica l surpris e

there. Finally , X Corp s woul d hav e t o

seize and rehabilitat e an airstri p quickly

so tha t land-base d aircraft coul d provid e

proper suppor t fo r subsequen t opera -

tions i n easter n Mindanao , othe r ai r

bases bein g to o distant . A reasonabl y

good stri p existe d a t Malabang , o n th e

northwestern shore of Illana Bay . Give n

the estimat e tha t th e Japanes e main -

tained a wea k garriso n a t Illan a Bay ,

Malabang seemed th e spo t fo r th e mai n

assault.

After landin g a t Malabang , th e 24t h

Division wa s t o advanc e b y lan d an d

water t o secur e Paran g an d Pollo c Harbor, twent y mile s southeas t fro m Mala -

bang. Th e divisio n wa s the n t o strik e

south abou t fiftee n mile s t o seiz e Cota -

bato an d bloc k th e tw o mouth s o f th e

Mindanao River . X Corp s mad e n o

detailed plans before the assault for operations afte r th e occupatio n o f th e Mala -

1

 American plan s ar e derive d from : 10t h I&H,

Operational Monograp h o n th e Mindana o Opera -

tion, pp . 9 , 33-54; X Corp s Rp t Mindanao , pp . 6 -

10; Boggs . Marine Aviation in the Philippines, pp .

124-25, an d n . 26 , p . 126 ; Eight h Arm y F O 26 , 20

Mar 45 ; X Corps FO 27 , 25 Mar 45 .
THE CONQUES T O F EASTER N MINDANA O 621

bang-Cotabato region . However , i t wa s

generally understoo d tha t upo n th e

arrival o f th e 31s t Divisio n th e 24t h

would strik e eastwar d acros s Mindana o

via Rout e 1 t o Davao . Genera l Siber t

anticipated tha t fo r th e firs t fort y mile s

or s o inlan d th e 24t h Divisio n woul d

employ both Rout e 1 and th e Mindanao

River a s axe s o f advance , repeatin g a

pattern th e Japanes e ha d establishe d

three year s earlier. 2 Abou t forty-fiv e

miles inland , a t Kabacan , Rout e 1 joins

Route 3 . Rout e 3 , known locall y a s th e

Sayre Highway , run s northwar d almos t

150 mile s fro m Kabaca n t o Macajala r

Bay o n Mindanao' s north-centra l coast .

Sibert anticipate d tha t h e would hav e to

use th e entir e 31st Division i n a driv e

north along the Sayr e Highwa y i n orde r

to destro y stron g Japanese force s know n

to b e holdin g tha t road.

On 1 5 April, just tw o day s befor e th e

24th Divisio n wa s t o launc h it s assault ,

X Corp s mad e sweepin g change s i n it s

attack plans. Sinc e early March elements

of th e guerrill a 108th Division , par t o f

Colonel Fertig' s 10t h Militar y Distric t

guerrilla force , ha d bee n movin g against

the Japanes e garriso n a t Malabang. 3

The guerrilla s receive d som e suppor t

from Marin e Corp s plane s based o n th e

new field s a t Zamboanga and fro m Thir -

teenth Air Force planes from othe r bases,

all controlled b y a Thirteenth Air Forc e

air suppor t part y tha t ha d recentl y

reached Mindanao . B y lat e Marc h th e

guerrilla attac k ha d progresse d s o wel l

that L- 5 liaiso n plane s coul d us e th e

Malabang strip , an d o n 5 April Marin e

Corps aircraft starte d operating from th e

field, whic h wa s i n goo d condition . B y

the 11th o f April th e last Japanes e ha d

fled towar d Paran g an d th e guerrilla s

had complete d th e occupatio n o f th e

entire Malaban g region. 4 O n 1 3 Apri l

Colonel Fertig radioed Eighth Army that

X Corp s could lan d unoppose d a t Mala -

bang an d Paran g an d tha t th e Japanes e

had probabl y evacuate d th e Cotabat o

area a s well .

Receiving confirmatio n fro m Marin e

Corps aviators tha t guerrilla s held Mala -

bang, Eighth Army and X Corps changed

landing plans . Rea r Adm . Alber t G .

Noble's Task Group 78.2 would set only

one battalio n o f th e 24t h Divisio n

ashore a t Malabang ; th e res t o f th e

division woul d lan d i n th e vicinit y o f

Parang. Planner s als o cancele d nava l

bombardment agains t Malabang , bu t

despite subsequent message s from Ferti g

to the effec t tha t no nava l shelling would

be required anywhere along Illana Bay's

shores, di d no t cance l bombardmen t o f

the Paran g and Cotabat o areas.

American estimate s o f Japanes e

strength i n easter n Mindana o ra n fro m

34,000 (Eight h Army) , t o 40,00 0 ( X

Corps), t o 42,60 0 (Fertig) , wit h mor e

agreement o n th e deploymen t o f majo r

units. Fertig' s estimate s wer e th e clos -

est, fo r ther e were over 43,00 0 members

of th e Japanes e arme d force s i n easter n

2

 See Morton , Fall of the Philippines, pp . 510-13 . 3

 In additio n t o U.S, Army source s cited , guerrill a

information i n thi s chapte r come s from : Mindana o

Guerrilla Record , passim; Ferti g Interviews ; Ferti g

Comments, 2 May 57 . Th e 108t h Divisio n wa s commanded b y Lt . Col . Charles W . Hedges , a n un -

surrendered America n officer , whil e th e force s a t

Malabang were unde r Maj. Rex Blow , an Australia n

officer wh o had escaped fro m Borneo . Th e Malaban g

guerrilla force s include d th e Expeditionar y Battal -

ion, 108th Division ; par t o f th e 105t h Infantr y o f

the sam e division ; an d th e bul k o f th e separat e

Maranao Militi a Force , a Mor o organizatio n tha t

acted unde r th e operationa l contro l o f th e 108th

Division.

4

 The operation s cost th e guerrilla s 1 7 men kille d

and 2 1 wounded; th e Japanese lost perhap s 250 men

killed. Les s than 10 0 Japanese escaped from th e area.
622 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Mindanao, and ther e were , i n addition ,

nearly 12,85 0 Japanes e noncombatan t

civilians i n th e area. 5 Japanes e Arm y

ground comba t an d servic e troop s (in -

cluding abou t 7,35 0 civilian s recentl y

inducted int o th e arme d forces ) num -

bered roughly 28,600 . Ther e were some

8,000 Army Air Forc e troops, almost all

of th e service category, and around 6,450

Navy personnel . O f th e total , almos t

15,000, includin g 50 0 me n o f th e Navy ,

could b e classe d a s trained ground com -

bat effectives . Mos t of th e service troops

were arme d a s auxiliary infantry .

The majo r units in easter n Mindana o

were the 100th Division, commanded b y

Lt. Gen. Jir o Harada; th e 30th Division,

under Lt . Gen . Gyosak u Morozumi ; th e

32d Naval Special Base Force, headed b y

Rear Adm . Naoj i Doi ; an d th e Hosono

Unit, a n Ai r Forc e comman d o f ill -

armed servic e personnel . Th e 100th

Division, wit h th e 32d Naval Special

Base Force attache d fo r groun d comba t

operations, hel d th e Dava o are a an d

controlled th e southeaster n thir d o f

eastern Mindanao . Th e 30th Division

was responsibl e fo r th e defens e o f th e

rest o f easter n Mindanao. 6

Nominal comman d i n easter n Min -

danao reste d wit h Genera l Morozumi ,

who becam e de jure commande r o f th e

35th Army afte r Genera l Suzuki's deat h

during th e latter' s voyag e fro m Cebu. 7

But Morozum i chose no t t o exercis e his

authority excep t insofa r a s t o largel y

ignore advic e from Genera l Tomochika ,

35th Army chie f o f staff , wh o reache d

Mindanao i n lat e April. Bese t wit h for -

midable communications difficulties, an d

realizing tha t mos t inhospitabl e terrai n

separated th e mai n bodie s o f th e 30th

and 100th Divisions, Morozumi believed

he could rende r his best servic e b y staying wit h th e 30th, leavin g Genera l

Harada and Admiral Doi more or less to

their ow n devices.

Neither Harad a no r Morozum i ha d

any offensiv e missions . Rather , i n ac -

cordance wit h Yamashita' s Decembe r

1944 plans , th e Japanes e o n Mindana o

were t o direc t thei r effort s t o pinnin g

down a s man y America n unit s a s pos -

sible i n orde r t o dela y th e progres s o f

the war . Harad a an d Morozum i ha d

little hop e o f conductin g organized ,

major defensiv e operation s fo r mor e

than two months. Onc e American forces

had overru n thei r prepare d defenses ,

the tw o planne d t o retrea t int o largel y

unexplored mountain s o f east-centra l

Mindanao, organizin g a last-stan d are a

like Yamashita 's i n th e Asi n Valle y o f

northern Luzon .

The 30th an d 100th Divisions wer e

not i n good shap e to conduct a delaying,

defensive operation. Hopelessl y isolated,

short o f artillery , smal l arm s ammuni -

tion, transportation , an d communica -

tions equipment , the y ha d n o chanc e

of obtainin g supplies . The y ha d som e

5

 Japanese informatio n i n thi s subsectio n i s from :

G-2 X Corps, Summar y o f th e Defens e o f Mindana o

Gained fro m Interrog s of Officers o f 35th Army, 30th

Div, an d 32d Naval Base Force (hereinafte r cite d a s

X Corp s G- 2 Summar y Mindanao) , pp . 5-14 , 18 -

21; 10t h I& H Staf f Study , Japanes e Opn s o n Min -

danao (base d o n inf o fro m Ge n Morozumi , Ge n

Harada, an d Ma j Hirosh i Owada , Staf f Of f 100th

Div), passim ; Tomochika , Tru e Fact s o f th e Leyt e

Opn, pp . 36-40 ; Statemen t o f Co l Hyobunosuk e

Yamazu (Cof S 30th Div), States , IV , 509-19 ; State -

ment o f Co l Mueich i Hattor i (Cof S 100th Div),

States, I, 304-10; Kusum i Statement , States, II, 380 -

81; Statemen t o f Comd r Shinj i Saj i (Staf f Of f 32d

Naval Sp Base Force), States , III, 185-87; Japanes e

Review, 3 0 Sep 57 , pp. 34-35 . 6

 See apps. G- 1 an d G-3. 7

 See above , ch. XXX.
THE CONQUES T O F EASTER N MINDANA O 623

stocks o f food , bu t thei r transportatio n

shortage, couple d wit h th e poo r condi -

tion o f easter n Mindana o road s woul d

make i t mos t difficul t fo r th e Japanes e

to mov e thei r foo d fro m centra l depots

to th e mountains . Bot h division s als o

faced seriou s personne l problems . Fou r

of th e 30th Division's nin e infantr y battalions had gon e to Leyt e and ha d bee n

annihilated there . Garriso n units , som e

of whic h ha d le d a n eas y lif e o n Min -

danao sinc e earl y 1942 , forme d th e nu -

cleus o f eac h o f th e 100th Division's

eight independen t infantr y battalions .

Not mor e tha n te n officer s o f th e 100th

Division wer e regulars, an d th e qualit y

of th e division's junio r officer s an d mos t

of it s noncommissione d officer s ap -

proached th e lamentable . Moreover ,

about a third o f the division's men wer e

Koreans, no t note d fo r enthusiasti c ad -

herence t o th e Japanes e cause . Finally ,

there ca n b e littl e doub t tha t th e commanders and staff s o f bot h division s ha d

a defeatis t attitude . The y kne w tha t

once a n invasio n o f easter n Mindana o

began the y woul d ente r upo n a battl e

they coul d no t win , an d the y definitel y

had n o relis h fo r a defens e t o th e deat h

in place . I t als o appears that , pervade d

by a feelin g tha t th e wa r ha d passe d

them by , th e tw o divisions ' defensiv e

preparations wer e somewha t o n th e lei -

surely side. Afte r Zamboang a fel l t o th e

41st Division , Morozum i an d Harad a

anticipated no additional Allied landings

on Mindana o withi n th e nea r future .

When and if invasion did come , the two

commanders thought, it would probabl y

take plac e a t Macajala r Ba y o r Dava o

Gulf an d woul d probabl y b e limite d t o

the seizur e o f a smal l beachhea d are a

from whic h th e Allie s coul d provid e

support to Fertig's guerrillas. Th e Mala -

bang-Parang-Cotabato are a ra n a poo r

third i n Japanes e estimate s o f a likel y

site fo r an Allie d landing , an d no t even

the operation s o f th e guerrilla s ther e i n

March an d earl y April caused the m an y

concern.

The guerrilla s ha d adde d greatl y t o

the woe s o f Morozum i an d Harad a b y

April 1945 . For example , th e Japanes e

transportation problem s wer e man y

times compounde d b y guerrill a demoli -

tions, roadblocks, and bridge destruction.

Guerrilla raid s ha d destroye d communications equipmen t an d suppl y dumps .

It wa s impossibl e fo r th e Japanes e t o

send smal l truc k convoy s u p an d dow n

the road s o f easter n Mindanao , an d

small patrol s ha d bee n ou t o f th e

question fo r months.

Japanese i n th e Malabang-Cotabat o

area numbere d 1,50 0 me n — the rein -

forced 166th Independent Infantry Battalion, a 100th Division uni t operatin g

under 30th Division control . I n th e

event o f a n America n attack , th e 166th

IIB woul d conduct a fighting withdrawal

to th e Sayr e Highway-Rout e 1 junction

at Kabaca n an d woul d then hel p defend

the souther n sectio n o f th e Sayr e High -

way, alon g whic h Morozum i ha d de -

ployed th e bul k o f th e 30th Division.

There wer e n o Japanes e alon g Rout e 1

from Kabaca n southwest for thirty miles,

but th e 100th Division wa s responsible

for holdin g th e highwa y fo r th e nex t

twenty mile s t o Dava o Gulf .

Parang to Kabacan: Penetration

X Corp s landin g operation s a t Illan a

Bay began shortly after 073 0 on 1 7 April

when troop s o f th e 533 d Enginee r Boa t

and Shor e Regiment , 3 d Enginee r Spe -

cial Brigade , wen t ashor e o n tin y Ibu s
Map 32
THE CONQUES T O F EASTER N MINDANA O 625

LCM CARRIE S TROOPS UP MINDANA O RIVE R TO FORT PIKIT

Island, jus t of f Malabang. 8 A t 073 0

guerrillas greeted th e 3 d Battalion , 21st

Infantry (minu s Compan y K) , o n th e

beach nea r Malabang , an d abou t 074 5

Company K landed against no resistance

on Bong o Island , fourtee n mile s of f

Parang. A t 0900 , followin g a n unnecessary two-hour cruiser and destroye r bombardment, th e 19t h Infantry bega n

moving ashor e a t Paran g against n o

opposition; th e mai n bod y o f th e 21s t

Infantry followed . (Map 32) Durin g the

afternoon th e 19t h Infantr y secure d th e

entire Paran g area . Th e 24t h Recon -

naissance Troop , meanwhile , reconnoi -

tered an d foun d clea r th e shore s o f

Police Harbor and, aboard LVT's, poked

its nos e int o th e norther n mout h o f th e

Mindanao River .

The unit s ha d move d s o swiftl y tha t

X Corps , whic h ha d originall y antici -

pated spendin g thre e o r fou r day s consolidating th e beachhea d area , decide d

to launc h a n immediat e driv e towar d

Kabacan. Th e intermediat e objectiv e

was For t Pikit , thirty-fiv e mile s inland ,

where Rout e 1 crosse s th e Mindana o

River. Th e 19t h Infantr y woul d strik e

toward For t Piki t alon g Rout e 1 while

8

 Principal source s fo r thi s subsectio n are : 10t h

I&H Opn l Monograp h Mindanao , pp . 60-71 ; 24t h

Div Rp t Mindanao , pp . 2-11 ; 19th In f Rp t Min -

danao, pp . 1-2 ; 21s t Inf Rp t Mindanao , pp . 3-4;

34th In f Rp t Mindanao , pp . 4-8.
626 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

the 21s t Infantry , aboar d LCM' s o f th e

533d Enginee r Boa t an d Shor e Regi -

ment, woul d emplo y th e Mindana o

River a s it s principa l axi s o f advance .

The driv e to Pikit began o n 1 8 April

and b y dusk advance elements of the 21st

Infantry wer e about twenty miles up the

Mindanao River . Th e nex t da y troops

of the 21st, still aboar d LCM's and now

supported b y nava l an d enginee r gun -

boats, reached Paidu-Pulangi, nine miles

short o f For t Pikit . Althoug h th e 21st

Infantry ha d encountere d n o resistanc e

worthy o f note , Maj , Gen. Roscoe B .

Woodruff, commandin g th e 24t h Divi -

sion, wa s worried tha t th e regimen t wa s

getting to o fa r east—th e 19t h Infantry

had no t kep t pac e alon g Rout e 1—an d

directed the regiment to pull back downstream abou t te n mile s fo r th e night .

Crews o f fiv e enginee r LCM' s hel d

Paidu-Pulangi tha t nigh t an d through -

out 2 0 April. O n th e 21st a battalion of

the 34t h Infantr y cam e u p t o Paidu -

Pulangi and , movin g both overlan d an d

along the river—here called th e Pulangi

—reached For t Piki t lat e i n th e after -

noon. Th e infantr y found the old fort i n

the hands of troops from LC M gunboats

of th e 533 d Enginee r Boa t an d Shor e

Regiment.

The 19t h Infantry's advanc e alon g

Route 1 had bee n slowe d b y th e poo r

condition of the route, which was hardly

more tha n a trail , an d b y element s o f

the 166th IIB. Hea t an d th e necessit y

for hand-carryin g al l supplie s ha d als o

helped dela y th e 19t h Infantry, whic h

did no t reach Piki t until 3 3 April. Th e

remnants of the 166th IIB, cu t off by th e

seizure o f For t Pikit , melte d awa y int o

rough hill s nort h o f Rout e 1 .

Upon th e captur e o f Pikit , th e 24t h

Division turne d its attention towar d th e

Kabacan junctio n o f Rout e 1 and Sayr e

Highway, only nine miles distant. Sinc e

the leve l o f th e Pulang i Rive r ha d

dropped, th e divisio n ha d t o emplo y

Route 1 as its main axis of advance , but

happily foun d thi s sectio n o f th e roa d

in bette r shap e tha n th e Parang-Piki t

stretch. Element s o f th e 34t h Infantr y

reached th e junctio n abou t noo n o n 2 2

April. Durin g th e ensuin g nigh t an d

early th e nex t mornin g Japanes e ma -

chine gu n an d rifl e fir e harasse d bot h

infantry an d enginee r troop s i n th e

Kabacan area , bu t b y noo n o n th e 23 d

all Japanes e resistanc e ha d vanished .

The fir e that the 34th Infantr y encountered a t Kabaca n probabl y originate d

from element s o f th e 1st Battalion, 74th

Infantry, whic h Genera l Morozumi ,

upon hearin g o f th e X Corp s landing ,

had dispatche d southwar d alon g Sayr e

Highway t o reinforc e th e 166th IIB.

9

When h e learne d tha t America n troop s

had reache d For t Pikit , Morozum i im -

mediately directe d th e 74th's battalio n

to hal t les t it , too , b e cu t of f sout h o f

Kabacan. Next , h e ordere d th e uni t t o

pull back u p Sayr e Highway a few miles

and awai t developments .

Plans of Exploitation

To a large extent, th e 24t h Division's

seizure o f th e Kabaca n roa d junctio n

was strategically , i f no t tactically , deci -

sive in the eastern Mindanao campaign.10

9

 Japanese informatio n her e is from: X Corp s G-2

Summary Mindanao , pp . 12-14 ; Yamaz u Statement ,

States, IV , 509-19 ; 10t h I&H Staf f Study , Japanes e

Opns on Mindanao . 10

 This subsection is mainly derived from: 10t h I&H

Opnl Monograp h Mindanao , pp. 71-72, 75; X Corps

FO 28 , 21 Apr 45 ; X Corps FO 29 , 24 Apr 45; X Corps

Rpt Mindanao , pp . 21-22 ; 31s t Di v Rpt Mindanao ,

pp. 20-21 ; Woodruf f (C G 24t h Div ) Comments , 6

Jan 57.
THE CONQUES T O F EASTER N MINDANA O 627

Reaching th e junctio n a wee k o r s o

earlier tha n X Corp s ha d anticipated ,

the 24t h Divisio n ha d projecte d U.S .

Army strengt h int o th e ver y cente r o f

eastern Mindanao . Hopelessl y separat -

ing th e 30th an d 100th Divisions, th e

24th Divisio n ha d opene d tw o route s o f

further attack—th e firs t nort h u p Sayr e

Highway against th e 30th Division's con -

centrations an d th e secon d southeas t

along Rout e 1 toward Dava o Gul f an d

the mai n bod y o f th e 100th Division.

The cours e befor e Genera l Sibert ,

X Corps ' commander , wa s clear . T o

speed th e reconques t o f easter n Min -

danao, exploitin g th e succes s alread y

achieved, h e woul d hav e t o divid e hi s

forces. H e directe d th e 31s t Division ,

which bega n unloadin g o n 2 2 April, t o

start on e regimenta l comba t tea m u p

the Sayr e Highwa y fro m Kabacan . Th e

RCT's initia l objectiv e wa s Kibawe ,

forty-five mile s north o f Kabacan . Siber t

had informatio n tha t a fairl y goo d trai l

led southeas t across unmappe d an d par -

tially unexplore d mountain s fro m Kib -

awe t o Talom o o n th e northwester n

shore of Dava o Gulf, an d h e had a tenta -

tive ide a tha t elements o f th e 31st Division migh t b e abl e t o emplo y thi s trai l

in orde r t o fal l upo n th e rea r o f th e

100th Division i n th e Dava o area. 11

While on e RC T o f th e 31st Division

drove t o Kibawe , anothe r woul d protec t

the X Corp s line s o f suppl y fro m Illan a

Bay t o Kabacan . Th e division' s thir d

RCT woul d initiall y remai n ou t o f th e

fighting a s a reserve .

Simultaneously, Siber t ordere d th e

24th Divisio n (les s th e 21s t Infantry , i n

X Corp s Reserve ) t o moun t a n immedi -

ate driv e southeas t alon g Rout e 1 from

Kabacan. Th e division' s firs t objectiv e

was Digos, on th e western shore of Davao

Gulf approximatel y twent y mile s south -

west o f Davao . Afte r establishin g a bas e

at Digos, the division was to strike northeast t o secur e Dava o an d destro y th e

100th Division. Siber t als o mad e tenta -

tive plan s t o emplo y th e 31st Division's

reserve RC T i n a n amphibiou s landin g

at Davao Gulf i n th e event tha t th e 24t h

Division encountere d stron g oppositio n

at Digo s o r o n it s wa y t o tha t town .

Dive bombers o f Marin e Air Grou p 24 ,

which reache d th e Malaban g stri p fro m

Luzon o n 2 2 April , wer e t o provid e

close ai r suppor t fo r th e 24t h an d 31st

Divisions, whil e othe r Marin e Corp s

planes from th e new fiel d a t Zamboang a

would reinforc e MA G 2 4 as necessary.

12

The Destruction of the 100th Division

The Seizure of Davao

The 24t h Divisio n kne w tha t spee d

was o f th e essenc e i n it s driv e t o Digo s

in orde r t o preven t th e Japanes e fro m

setting up strong defenses alon g Route 1

west o f Digos or along the same highway

between Digo s and Davao . Accordingly ,

the 34t h Infantry , spearheade d b y th e

24th Reconnaissanc e Troop , se t ou t

from Kabaca n at a fast clip on th e morning o f 2 4 April. 13

 Slowe d mainl y b y

11

 For additiona l informatio n o n th e Kibawe -

Talomo Trail, see below, pp. 640, 644-45.

12

 Boggs, Marine Aviation in the Philippines, p .

128.

13

 This subsectio n i s based largel y upon : 10t h I&H

Opnl Monograp h Mindanao , pp . 74-96 ; 24t h Di v

Rpt Mindanao , pp . 11-21 , 26-30; 34t h In f Rpt Min -

danao, pp . 8-18; 19th Inf Rp t Mindanao , pp . 2-5;

X Corp s Rp t Mindanao , pp. 22-25 ; Statemen t o f Lt

Gen Tir o Harada , States, I, 261-66; Statemen t of Co l

Rinzo Shizur u (C O 163d IIB an d Digos District

Unit), States , III , 300-305; Co l Mueich i Hattor i

Statement, States , I , 304-10 ; 10t h I&H Staff Study ,

Japanese Opn s o n Mindanao .
628 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

ROUTE 1 . 19th Infantry heads through hemp

plantation toward Davao.

destroyed bridge s an d th e poo r condi -

tion o f Rout e 1 , th e 34t h reache d th e

outskirts o f Digo s i n midafternoo n o n

27 April .

Responsibility fo r th e securit y o f th e

Digos regio n wa s veste d i n th e Digos

District Unit, a comba t forc e o f abou t

3,350 troop s wh o ha d nearl y 60 0 Japa -

nese civilian s unde r thei r wing. 14 Pre -

pared t o defen d th e wester n shore s o f

Davao Gul f agains t amphibiou s assault ,

the Digos District Unit receive d n o in -

structions to reorient its defenses against

attack fro m th e wes t unti l 2 2 April .

Indeed, i t wa s no t unti l 2 2 April tha t

General Harada , commanding the 100th

Division, learne d tha t America n force s

had lande d o n Mindanao .

The Digos District Unit mad e franti c

preparations t o meet th e 24t h Division's

attack, but hel d ou t onl y until afte r dar k

on th e nigh t o f 27-2 8 April , whe n i t

withdrew t o th e foothill s o f Mt . Apo ,

a volcani c pea k crestin g about seventeen

miles nort h o f Digos . O n th e 28t h th e

34th Infantr y patrolle d throug h formi -

dable bu t abandone d beac h defense s i n

the Digo s area . Durin g th e perio d 2 9

April-12 Ma y element s o f th e 34t h In -

fantry an d th e Expeditionar y Battalio n

of th e guerrill a 108th Divisio n cleare d

the Dava o Gul f coas t fo r fiftee n mile s

south o f Digos. Othe r troops of th e 34t h

Infantry pursue d th e Digos District

Unit, whic h hel d it s ground i n th e Mt .

Apo regio n unti l 9 Ma y befor e with -

drawing northwar d t o joi n th e res t o f

the 100th Division.

Meanwhile, th e 19t h Infantry ha d

reached Digo s fro m Kabaca n and , passing throug h th e 34t h Infantry , ha d be -

gun drivin g northwar d towar d Davao .

The 24t h Divisio n wa s now responsibl e

for capturin g Davao , preparin g a n at -

tack agains t th e mai n bod y o f th e 100th

Division, an d gainin g contac t wit h th e

guerrilla 107th Division , whic h hel d a

line o f outpost s abou t twent y mile s

north o f Davao .

Starting nort h o n 2 8 April, th e 19t h

Infantry foun d n o stron g defenses alon g

Route 1 between Digo s an d Davao—i t

was plain tha t Harad a ha d n o intentio n

of makin g a determine d effor t t o hol d

the city . O n th e afternoo n o f 2 May th e

regiment overra n th e las t resistanc e i n

front o f th e cit y an d o n th e nex t da y

occupied Dava o agains t negligibl e op -

position, findin g th e cit y lon g sinc e

14

 Major comba t elements include d th e bul k o f th e

163d IIB; hal f o f th e 3d Battalion, 30th Field Artillery Regiment; an d th e 4th Naval Battalion, a provisional infantr y unit . Se e app. G-1.
THE CONQUES T O F EASTER N MINDANA O 629

bombed int o a shamble s b y Allie d

land-based an d carrier-base d aircraft .

Into Contact With the

100th Division

To th e 24t h Division , th e captur e o f

Davao wa s a s decisiv e a s th e seizur e o f

the Kabaca n roa d junctio n ha d bee n t o

X Corp s a s a whole. 15 Clearin g th e

shores o f Dava o Gul f fro m Digo s t o

Davao, th e divisio n ha d secure d fo r it -

self a n excellen t base area from whic h i t

could launc h subsequen t attack s agains t

the 100th Division. Th e 24t h Divisio n

had als o learne d tha t i t ha d bypasse d

the Japanese unit's main defenses, whic h

lay tw o to fou r mile s inland along rising

ground parallelin g th e northwester n

shore o f Dava o Gulf . Th e 100th Division ha d obviousl y retire d t o positio n

defenses; i t ha d n o offensiv e intent , an d

the 24t h Division's tas k wa s going t o b e

to roo t ou t th e Japanese . Fro m th e

theater poin t o f view , th e 24th' s futur e

operations woul d b e moppin g up , al -

though tacticall y speakin g th e divisio n

was about t o ente r upo n a fronta l attac k

as roug h a s an y th e U.S . Army troop s

had engage d i n th e Philippines. I n th e

end, though , th e 24t h Division' s opera -

tions ar e importan t mainl y as the y serv e

to amplif y an d illustrat e Eight h Army' s

share i n th e reconques t o f th e Philip -

pines.

One o f th e firs t problem s facin g th e

24th Divisio n a s i t prepare d t o driv e

against th e 100th Division's mai n de -

fenses woul d b e t o concentrat e sufficien t

strength t o carr y its attack throug h t o a

successful conclusion . Genera l Sibert ,

commanding X Corps , face d essentiall y

the sam e proble m i n regar d t o th e 31st

Division's proposed drive up Sayre Highway an d tentativ e envelopin g attac k

southeast toward Davao over the KibaweTalomo trail. Wit h their extended line s

of communicatio n an d supply , Siber t

knew, neithe r th e 24t h no r th e 31s t

Division woul d b e abl e t o mak e fas t

progress unles s h e coul d obtai n addi -

tional troops . Genera l Eichelberger ,

Eighth Army' s commander , recognize d

the problem an d gav e X Corp s th e 41st

Division's 162 d RCT, whic h ha d com -

pleted it s tasks a t Zamboanga . On e bat -

talion comba t tea m o f th e 162 d came t o

Digos t o protect th e 24t h Division's rear

areas. Th e remainde r too k ove r th e task

of protectin g th e regio n fro m Illan a

Bay's shore s inlan d t o Kabacan , leavin g

the 31s t Division fre e t o emplo y addi -

tional strengt h o n Sayr e Highway . Th e

arrival o f th e 162 d RCT als o permitte d

Sibert t o releas e th e 21s t Infantry fro m

X Corp s Reserv e an d retur n i t t o th e

24th Divisio n i n tim e t o engage i n th e

main attac k agains t th e 100th Division.

The 100th Division located th e southern ancho r o f it s defense s a t Catigan ,

thirteen mile s southwes t o f Davao , an d

the northern anchor in hills some twelv e

miles nort h o f Davao. 16 Th e Dava o

River, flowin g generall y south-southeas t

15

 American plannin g an d operationa l materia l i n

this subsectio n i s mainl y from : X Corp s FO's 30,

31, an d 32 , date d 2 7 Apr, 2 9 Apr, and 3 Ma y 45 ;

10th I& H Opn l Monograp h Mindanao , pp . 82-88 ,

96-101, 105-09 ; 24t h Di v Rp t Mindanao , pp . 21 -

22, 30-37 , 54-62 ; 19t h In f Rp t Mindanao , pp .

5-11; 21st Inf Rpt Mindanao , pp . 5-7; 34th In f Rp t

Mindanao, pp . 19-20 ; Woodruf f Comments , 6 Ja n

57; Ferti g Comments , 2 Ma y 57 .

16

 Japanese informatio n i n thi s subsection i s from:

Harada Statement , States , I , 261-66 ; 10t h I&H Staf f

Study, Japanese Opns on Mindanao, and atchd maps;

X Corp s G- 2 Summar y Mindanao , pp . 18-22 ; Comments b y Japanes e Stud y Group , p . 34 .
630 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

into Dava o Gul f a t Davao , divide d th e

defensive force s int o tw o groupments .

The Right Sector Unit, west of the river,

was composed o f fiv e infantr y battalions,

three regula r an d tw o provisional. Th e

territory east of the river was the respon -

sibility o f th e Left Sector Unit—two

regular infantr y battalions , tw o provi -

sional battalions , an d th e Ai r Force' s

Hosono Unit o f ill-arme d servic e per -

sonnel. Th e Right and Left Sector Units

had a littl e artiller y attached , fo r Gen -

eral Harad a kep t unde r hi s direc t con -

trol most o f th e artillery a s well as many

engineer an d servic e units. A s a reserv e

Harada had abou t a battalion o f regular

infantry.17

The centra l an d stronges t portio n o f

Harada's defense s reste d it s righ t o n

rising groun d overlookin g Libb y Air -

drome, tw o mile s northwest o f Talomo

on th e coast. Fro m this point the central

defenses, alon g whic h Harad a initiall y

deployed thre e battalions, extended eastward across the Talomo River an d some

rough hill s t o th e wes t ban k o f th e

Davao River . Th e foca l poin t o f th e

central defense s wa s Mintal , fou r mile s

up Rout e 1- D fro m Talomo . Anticipa -

ting ultimate withdrawal into the mountains vi a Rout e 1-D, the southeaster n

section o f th e so-calle d Kibawe-Talom o

trail, Harad a ha d prepare d defense s i n

depth alon g th e highwa y an d alon g

ancillary road s parallelin g it .

One phenomeno n o f flor a tha t th e

24th Divisio n wa s abou t t o fac e a s i t

moved agains t th e 100th Division de -

serves specia l mention . Muc h o f th e

region wes t o f th e Dava o Rive r fro m

Talomo northwest twelv e mile s t o Cali -

nan wa s covered wit h overgrow n abaca ,

or hemp , plantations . Resemblin g ba -

nana plants , an d growin g t o a heigh t o f

about twent y feet , th e abac a plant s ha d

originally bee n plante d i n row s te n fee t

apart, wit h te n fee t betwee n plants .

With harvestin g slac k durin g th e war ,

the plantation s ha d becom e thic k wit h

shoots, an d olde r plants had grow n t o a

foot o r s o in diameter. Plant s of various

sizes were , i n Apri l 1945 , scarcely a foo t

apart. Visibilit y wa s virtuall y nil , and

the hea t a t th e hem p plantation s wa s

like tha t o f a n oven .

On 3 0 April the 21st Infantry attacke d

to clea r Libb y Airdrome , Rout e 1- D

between Mintal and Talomo, and Mintal

itself. Bypassin g Libby Airdrome t o th e

west, on e battalio n cam e int o Minta l

from th e southwest o n 3 May. The res t

of th e regiment , reinforce d b y a battal -

ion o f th e 34t h Infantry , cleare d th e

airdrome b y 5 May , but coul d mak e

little progres s u p Rout e 1- D towar d

Mintal. Fo r a time , a t least , ther e wa s

a ver y rea l dange r tha t th e Japanes e

might surroun d an d annihilat e th e

battalion a t Mintal .

Elements o f th e 34t h Infantr y nex t

tried t o driv e nort h alon g hig h groun d

on th e eas t ban k o f th e Talom o Rive r

to bypas s th e Japanes e Rout e 1- D de -

fenses o n th e east . A battalio n o f th e

21st Infantry , attemptin g t o mak e a

pincers movement ou t o f th e attac k east

of th e Talom o River , crosse d t o th e

east sid e nea r Minta l o n 8 Ma y but, in

the fac e o f Japanes e artillery , mortar ,

and machin e gu n fire , ha d t o withdra w

back t o th e west ban k o n th e 10th . A

two-battalion attac k northwar d alon g

the east ban k o f th e Talomo starte d o n

12 May , and b y th e 14t h the troop s had

cleaned ou t s o man y position s fro m

which th e Japanese ha d directe d fir e o n

17

 For detail s o f Harada' s orde r o f battl e a t thi s

time, see app. G-1.
Map 33
632 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Route 1- D tha t th e 21s t Infantr y wa s

finally abl e to secure the highwa y all the

way nort h t o Mintal . Th e divisio n

thereby obtaine d a goo d suppl y rout e

for subsequen t advance s northwar d an d

simultaneously secure d it s lef t rear. 18

(Map 33)

Meanwhile, th e 19t h Infantr y ha d

been expandin g it s hol d i n th e Dava o

area an d o n 1 0 Ma y struc k int o hig h

ground controlling the coast road imme -

diately wes t o f th e Dava o River . Th e

34th Infantr y too k ove r i n thi s are a o n

15 May , befor e th e 19t h ha d complete d

its task . Othe r element s o f th e 19th ,

beginning 1 0 May, cleared scattered Japanese strongpoints o n hill s just nort h o f

Davao City , an d on e battalio n comba t

team cleare d Sama l Island , i n Dava o

Gulf jus t eas t o f th e city , i n orde r t o

halt Japanese artillery fir e tha t had bee n

harassing troop s i n th e cit y area .

Breakthrough in the Center

By 1 5 Ma y th e 24t h Division , havin g

established fir m contac t wit h th e 100th

Division all across its front, ha d evolve d

plans fo r futur e operations . Th e 21s t

and 34t h Infantr y Regiment s would at -

tack abreas t nort h an d northwes t i n a

drive agains t th e Japanes e center , th e

34th eas t o f th e Talomo Rive r an d th e

21st wes t o f tha t stream . Fo r th e tim e

being, th e 19t h Infantr y woul d hol d i n

the Dava o City area, but woul d prepar e

to strike north t o clear th e northeastern

shores o f Dava o Gulf , lin k u p wit h th e

guerrilla force s nort h o f th e gulf , and ,

ultimately, swin g westwar d agains t th e

100th Division's lef t flan k forces , whic h

were holdin g hig h groun d overlookin g

the gulf' s shore s fo r som e twelv e mile s

north o f Davao. 19

General Harada , th e 100th Division

commander, had been surprised tha t th e

24th Divisio n ha d mounte d n o attack s

against his flanks, an d b y th e en d o f th e

first wee k o f Ma y ha d conclude d tha t

the America n force s wer e goin g t o neg -

lect his flanks i n favo r o f a frontal assaul t

against his center.20 Anticipatin g a drive

astride Rout e 1-D , h e ha d shifte d tw o

battalions from his flanks t o the highway

sector, an d committe d th e bul k o f hi s

reserve t o th e sam e area . I n mid-May ,

however, Harada decided that these steps

were insufficien t t o mee t th e threa t t o

his center . Accordingly , h e undertoo k

a wholesal e reorganizatio n o f hi s force s

that involve d transferrin g mos t o f th e

Army groun d comba t force s statione d

east of the Dava o River t o th e are a west

of th e river . Contro l eas t o f th e rive r

was now veste d i n Admira l Do i a s commander o f th e Left District Unit, th e

major component s o f whic h include d

the Air Force's Hosono Unit, thre e pro -

visional infantr y battalion s o f nava l

troops, an d tw o reinforce d Arm y infan -

try companies . Betwee n th e Dava o

River an d a north-sout h lin e crossin g

Route 1- D nea r Minta l wa s th e Left

Front Line Unit, compose d o f abou t

two an d a hal f battalion s o f regula r in -

18

 Pfc. James H . Diamon d o f Compan y D , 21s t

Infantry, wa s awarde d th e Meda l o f Hono r fo r a

series o f unusuall y brav e action s durin g th e attack s

toward Mintal , action s tha t culminate d o n 1 4 Ma y

with wound s tha t cause d hi s death .

19

 24th Di v Rpt Mindanao , p. 23 ; X Corps FO's 3 2

and 33 , 3 and 1 1 May 45; 10t h I& H Opn l Monograph

Mindanao, p . 149 ; 19t h In f Rp t Mindanao , p . 11 ;

21st In f Rp t Mindanao , p . 7 . 20

 Japanese plannin g informatio n i s from: Harad a

Statement, States , I , 261-66 ; Shizur u Statement ,

States, III, 300-305 ; Co l Mueich i Hattori Statement ,

States, I , 304-10 ; 10t h I& H Staf f Study , Japanes e

Opns o n Mindanao .
THE CONQUES T O F EASTER N MINDANA O 633

fantry, a n Arm y provisiona l infantr y

battalion, a Nav y provisiona l infantr y

battalion, a reinforce d batter y o f artil -

lery, an d variou s servic e units . Th e

area wes t o f Minta l wa s th e responsi -

bility o f th e Right Front Line Unit,

which include d th e equivalen t o f thre e

regular infantr y battalions , abou t tw o

batteries o f artillery , miscellaneou s serv -

ice units, and, after 2 1 May, the remnants

of th e Digos District Unit.

21

The Left District Unit du g i n alon g

rising groun d overlookin g Dava o Gul f

between Dava o an d Bunawan , twelv e

miles t o th e north , an d hel d a serie s o f

outposts along Route 1 north o f Davao .

Admiral Doi' s strongest—an d last-stan d

—defenses wer e nea r Mandog , a hil l

barrio o n th e eas t ban k o f th e Dava o

River seve n mile s nort h o f th e city .

Doi's Hosono Unit too k littl e par t i n

subsequent operations , bu t hi d ou t i n

hilly countr y te n mile s northwes t o f

Bunawan.

Harada's ne w Left an d Right Front

Line Units complete d thei r deployment

on 1 7 May, th e ver y da y tha t th e 24t h

Division launche d a renewe d attack. 22

On th e 17t h the 19t h Infantr y struc k

north fro m Dava o t o establis h contac t

with the guerrilla 107th Division, which,

about 1,30 0 strong, ha d bee n tryin g

since 2 Ma y t o driv e i n Japanes e out -

posts nort h o f Davao . Th e guerrilla s

attained onl y limite d success , bu t di d

deny the Japanes e egress from th e Davao

coastal plains to th e north.23 B y 24 May

the 107t h Divisio n an d th e 19t h Infantry ha d establishe d contact , whil e th e

19th Infantr y had secure d Route 1 north

of Dava o an d wa s read y t o tur n wes t

against th e Left District Unit mai n

defenses.

The 21s t Infantry ha d struc k nort h

from Minta l on 1 7 May along two roads.

Route 1- D an d a secondary road east o f

the Talomo River. Three days later th e

regiment drov e into Tugbok, o n Rout e

1-D tw o mile s northwes t o f Mintal ,

against determine d opposition . Eas t o f

the Talomo , progres s wa s eve n slowe r

against artillery , machin e gun , rocket,

mortar, an d rifl e fire , an d i t wa s no t

until 2 7 Ma y tha t th e regiment 's righ t

flank ha d draw n abreast , seizin g a roa d

junction abou t a mil e eas t o f Tugbok .

The 21s t Infantry hel d i n plac e unti l

the 29th , whe n th e 34t h relieve d it .

To almos t th e en d o f Ma y th e 34t h

Infantry ha d ha d thre e battalion-sized ,

separate offensive s unde r wa y betwee n

the Talom o an d Dava o Rivers . Th e

dirtiest job the regiment faced wa s clearing coasta l hill s betwee n th e tw o rivers,

hills fro m whic h Japanes e unit s wer e

constantly launchin g harassin g attacks .

On 2 3 May the regiment largely finished

its task , bu t i t wa s 3 Jun e befor e i t

completed mopping up. O n 1 4 May the

regiment's lef t ha d attacke d nort h nea r

the eas t ban k of the Talomo . Costly ,

laborious, smal l uni t actions , combine d

with extremel y clos e an d heav y air an d

artillery support , produce d slo w bu t

constant progres s a s unit s ofte n foun d 21

 See app. G-2. 22

 The remainde r of this subsection is based mainly

on: 10t h I&H Opnl Monograph Mindanao , pp. 101-

05, 109-30 , 149-68 ; 24t h Di v Rpt Mindanao , pp. 35 ,

37-40, 62-66 ; 19t h Inf Rp t Mindanao , pp . 11-15 ;

21st In f Rpt Mindanao , pp. 7-8; 34t h In f Rp t Min -

danao, pp . 21-30 ; Mindana o Guerrill a Record ; Fertig Interviews ; Ferti g Comments, 2 Ma y 57 .

23

 Understrength, the 107t h Divisio n include d only

the 130t h Infantr y an d th e 111th Provisional Bat -

talion. Fro m 2 throug h 2 4 May th e division , which

was commande d b y Col . Claro Laureta , PA , los t

17 me n kille d an d 3 9 wounde d i n actio n nort h o f

Davao.
634 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

themselves hemme d in on thre e side s

by veritabl e hornets ' nest s o f Japanese .

On 2 8 May the 34th Infantr y made contact wit h th e 21st Infantry a t th e roa d

junction eas t o f Tugbok .

Disappointing as the tw o weeks' gain s

had bee n i n term s o f terrain , th e 21st

and 34t h Infantr y Regiment s ha d actu -

ally accomplishe d fa r mor e tha n th e

24th Divisio n though t a t firs t glance .

Penetrating a s fa r a s Tugbok , th e tw o

regiments ha d broke n throug h th e cen -

ter o f th e 100th Division's stronges t de -

fenses. The 21s t Infantry , moreover, had

decimated on e o f th e 100th Division's

independent infantr y battalions , whil e

four othe r regula r battalion s an d on e

provisional battalion ha d lost up to half

their strengt h durin g th e actio n t o 2 8

May.

Taking a secon d glanc e a t th e situa -

tion a t th e en d o f May , General Wood -

ruff realize d tha t th e Japanes e cente r

had begu n t o fal l apart , and h e ordered

the attac k continue d acros s a muc h

broader fron t tha n h e ha d previousl y

considered feasible . H e directe d th e

21st Infantr y t o strik e nort h alon g sec -

ondary road s lyin g west o f Rout e 1-D,

the 34th t o continue the drive up Route

1-D an d a secondar y roa d eas t o f tha t

highway. Th e 19t h Infantry' s missio n

was now to overrun all Japanese defenses

east o f th e Dava o Rive r an d destro y

Admiral Doi' s concentratio n i n th e

Mandog area. 24

Overrunning the Second Line

Whether th e 24t h Divisio n kne w i t

or not, the divisio n wa s going t o attac k

toward a secon d lin e o f 100th Division

defenses.25 B y th e en d o f Ma y Harad a

realized tha t h e woul d hav e t o tak e

some drasti c step s i f h e wante d t o con -

duct a n organize d defens e muc h longer .

Accordingly, he established new defenses

along a n east-wes t lin e crossin g Rout e

1-D i n th e vicinit y o f Ula , about thre e

and a hal f mile s north o f Mintal . Th e

right anchor was at Wangan, about fou r

miles wes t o f Ula , and th e lef t flan k

extended northeas t an d eas t fro m Ul a

to ti e i n a t th e Dava o Rive r wit h th e

Left District Unit defense s a t Mandog .

The righ t (west ) portion o f this second

defense line was manned by 25 May, the

left b y the end o f the month. Ho w lon g

Harada expecte d t o hol d hi s ne w lin e

is no t certain , bu t i t i s know n tha t a s

early a s 2 5 Ma y h e bega n preparin g

detailed plan s fo r th e ultimat e with -

drawal of all force s into the inhospitabl e

mountains northwest o f Wangan.

Attacks against Harada's positions east

of th e Dava o Rive r bega n o n 2 9 Ma y

when th e 19th Infantry, startin g fro m

the coas t nort h o f Davao , struc k west -

ward towar d Admira l Doi' s Mando g

defenses.26 Th e regimen t bega n closin g

with Doi' s mai n defense s o n 3 1 May ,

and on 7 June the 19th Infantry, having

overrun th e oute r defenses , wa s read y

to driv e int o th e mai n position s nea r

Mandog. Tha t day , attacking behin d

24

 10th I&H Opnl Monograp h Mindanao , pp . 116 ,

168-69; 24t h Di v Rp t Mindanao , pp . 40 , 66 ; 34t h

Inf Rp t Mindanao , p . 31 ; 21st Inf Rp t Mindanao ,

p. 8 ; 19t h Inf Rp t Mindanao , p . 15 ; X Corp s Rp t

Mindanao, pp . 33-34 . 25

 Japanese information i n thi s subsection is from:

Harada Statement , States, I, 261-66 ; 10t h I&H Staff

Study, Japanese Opns on Mindanao, and atch d maps. 26

 The remainde r o f thi s subsectio n come s from :

24th Di v Rpt Mindanao , pp. 40-48; 66-71; 19th Inf

Rpt Mindanao , pp. 15-23 ; 21st Inf Rp t Mindanao ,

pp. 8-9; 34th In f Rp t Mindanao , pp . 31-36 ; 10t h

I&H Opn l Monograp h Mindanao , pp . 116-30 , 169-

87.
THE CONQUES T O F EASTER N MINDANA O 635

close ai r support , th e regimen t pushe d

steadily forwar d an d o n th e 9t h overra n

the last major defenses. Fo r al l practica l

purposes the eastern section of the 100th

Division's secon d lin e ha d falle n apart ,

although i t wa s not unti l 1 5 June tha t

the 19t h Infantr y reduced the last organized oppositio n o n hill s a mil e o r s o

north o f Mandog. Sinc e Genera l Woodruff wante d t o pull the regiment out fo r

operations to th e west, i t se t up n o pur -

suit bu t rathe r mopped u p i n th e Man -

dog are a unti l 1 8 June, whe n guerrilla s

took over . Th e remnant s o f th e Left

District Unit retire d northwar d int o

rugged hill s where , lik e th e Hosono

Unit farthe r north , i t sa t ou t th e wa r

in relativ e security , losin g fe w me n i n

combat.

The 34t h Infantry' s attac k against the

center of Harada's second lin e began o n

30 May . Ula , a mile east o f Rout e 1- D

on a secondar y road , fel l o n 3 1 May ,

but the n progres s slowe d i n th e fac e o f

fanatic resistance . Th e 3 d Battalio n o f

the 163 d Infantry , 41st Division, whic h

had recentl y reache d Dava o fro m Zam -

boanga, too k ove r on th e 34t h Infantry' s

left, alon g Route 1-D , o n 4 June. Wit h

these reinforcements , th e 34t h Infantr y

had by the 6th progressed a mile beyond

Ula o n th e secondar y roa d an d ha d

reached a n opposit e poin t alon g Rout e

1-D. Element s o f th e regimen t the n

swung eastward i n a n attemp t t o cu t of f

portions o f Harada 's Left Front Line

Unit. Th e attemp t was not entirel y suc -

cessful, fo r by the time the 34t h Infantr y

reached th e wes t ban k o f th e Dava o

River i n th e vicinit y o f Mando g o n 9

June mos t o f th e organize d remnant s

of th e Left Front Line Unit ha d escape d

westward. Nevertheless , th e 34t h Infan -

try's swing to th e Davao River, togethe r

with th e 19t h Infantry 's capture of Mandog o n th e 9th , marke d th e collaps e o f

all tha t sectio n o f th e 100th Division's

second lin e eas t o f th e secondar y roa d

upon whic h Ul a lay .

The center , along Route 1- D an d the

Ula road , als o bega n t o collaps e o n 9

June. Tw o day s late r th e 34t h Infantr y

and th e attache d 3 d Battalion , 163 d

Infantry, wer e almost thre e mile s nort h

of Ul a alon g bot h road s an d wer e find -

ing fe w sign s o f organize d Japanes e

resistance.

On th e lef t (west ) flan k o f th e 24t h

Division, th e 21s t Infantr y ha d struc k

north fro m Lamogan , fou r mile s wes t

of Talomo , o n 3 1 May . Followin g sec -

ondary road s wes t o f Rout e 1-D , the

regiment seized Wangan, western anchor

of th e 100th Division's secon d line , o n

9 June , an d a s o f evenin g th e nex t da y

all element s o f Harada' s Right Front

Line Unit wer e i n ful l retrea t

northward.

Thus, b y dar k o n 1 0 Jun e th e 24t h

Division ha d overru n th e 100th Division's secon d lin e al l acros s th e fron t

from Wanga n east to Mandog, a distance

of ove r te n miles . A beate n force , th e

100th Division spe d its withdrawal int o

the mountains ; th e 24t h Division' s op -

erations entered the mop-up and pursuit

phase. Th e tas k o f crashing through th e

100th Division's organize d defense s ha d

cost th e 24t h Divisio n approximatel y

350 me n kille d an d 1,61 5 wounded ; th e

100th Division an d attache d unit s ha d

lost roughl y 4,50 0 me n kille d an d 3 0

captured fro m lat e April t o mid-June. 27

27

 X Corp s G- 2 Pe r Rp t 55 , 1 0 Ju n 45 ; X Corp s

G-3 Pe r Rp t 235 , 1 1 Jun 45 . Th e casualt y figure s

listed above include both 24t h Division and Japanese

casualties fro m 1 7 Apri l t o 1 1 Jun e i n th e 24t h

Division's zone s o f responsibility .
636 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

The Collapse of 30th Division Resistance

31st Division and 30th

Division Plans

While th e 24t h Divisio n ha d bee n

pushing th e 100th Division int o th e

mountains northwest o f Davao , th e 31st

Division ha d bee n methodicall y pro -

ceeding with the destruction o f the 30th

Division. I n accordanc e wit h X Corp s

plans, Maj . Gen. Clarence A . Martin ,

commanding the 31st Division, had upon

arrival o n Mindana o dispatche d hi s

124th RC T t o th e Kabaca n junctio n o f

Route 1 and Sayr e Highwa y t o prepar e

a drive north along the latter road. Th e

31st Division' s initia l objectiv e wa s the

junction of Sayr e Highwa y and th e trail

that wa s presume d t o lea d southwes t

from Kibawe , forty-fiv e mile s nort h o f

Kabacan, t o Talom o o n Dava o Gulf. 28

General Morozumi , commandin g th e

30th Division, ha d abou t 17,50 0 troop s

under hi s control. 29 Hi s strengt h in -

cluded 8,000-od d me n o f hi s ow n divi -

sion, aroun d 4,50 0 troop s o f attache d

combat and servic e elements, and nearly

5,000 Arm y Ai r Forc e personnel .

Trained groun d comba t effective s num -

bered roughl y 5,800 . Considerin g th e

Air Forc e troop s mor e o f a hindranc e

than a help—h e lacke d arm s t o emplo y

them profitabl y eve n i n a defensive rol e

—Morozumi kep t i n hi s line s onl y on e

battalion o f Air Forc e engineers, whic h

he turne d int o a provisiona l infantr y

outfit. Mos t o f th e rest o f th e ai r unit s

early move d int o th e mountain s east o f

the Sayr e Highwa y t o see k thei r ow n

salvation.

Morozumi divided his combat strength

among fiv e defensiv e units . Th e 24t h

Division, i n its drive from Illan a Ba y to

Kabacan, ha d virtuall y destroye d th e

Western Sector Unit, buil t upo n th e

100th Division's 166th IIB. Responsi -

bility fo r th e defens e o f Sayr e Highwa y

from Kabaca n nort h t o Kibaw e reste d

with th e 2,500-ma n Southern Sector

Unit, whic h include d a battalion o f regular infantry , th e equivalent of a battalion o f engineers , an d miscellaneou s

groups. Th e nex t 8 5 mile s o f highway ,

from Kibaw e north t o Maluko , was held

by the Central Sector Unit—5,500 troop s

including a n infantr y regimen t les s on e

battalion, a reinforce d artiller y battal -

ion, an d servic e units. Nea r Malabalay ,

over 4 0 air mile s north o f Kibawe , were

headquarters an d divisio n troop s o f th e

30th Division, another 1,00 0 men in all.

The Northern Sector Unit defende d th e

shores o f Macajala r Bay , o n Mindanao 's

north-central coas t 3 0 ai r mile s north -

west o f Malabalay , an d Sayr e Highwa y

from th e ba y southeas t 2 5 mile s t o

Maluko. Wit h aroun d 4,50 0 men , the

Northern Sector Unit include d the 30th

Division's reconnaissanc e regiment , a

regular infantry battalion, miscellaneous

combat and servic e units, and th e provisional infantr y battalio n Morozum i ha d

formed fro m Ai r Forc e engineers. 30

From th e deployment of his Central an d

Northern Sector Units—well ove r hal f

his strengt h — it seem s obviou s tha t

Morozumi was more concerned wit h th e

28

 X Corp s FO's 29, 30, an d 31 , dated 24 , 27, and

29 Apr 45; 31st Div FO 14 , 25 Apr 45. Se e also above,

p. 626 . 29

 Japanese information i n this subsection is from:

X Corps G-2 Summar y Mindanao , pp . 10-14 ; State -

ment of Maj Gen Gyosaku Morozumi, States, II, 594-

603: Yamaz u Statement , States, IV, 509-19; 10th I&H

Staff Study , Japanes e Opn s o n Mindanao , Ma p VI .

30

 For details of the 30th Division's Order of Battle,

see Appendix G-3.
THE CONQUES T O F EASTER N MINDANA O 637

possibility o f a n attac k fro m Macajala r

Bay tha n wit h an America n driv e nort h

from Kibawe .

Far northeast , at Butua n Bay , was the

2,200-man Eastern Sector Unit, buil t

around on e regula r infantr y battalion .

Morozumi ha d intende d t o brin g th e

unit westwar d t o Sayr e Highway , bu t

before th e en d o f April h e decide d tha t

the forc e coul d no t reac h centra l Min -

danao in time to be of use in th e defense

of th e highway—guerrilla s ha d blocke d

the road s an d destroye d al l bridge s th e

unit ha d t o use . Havin g alread y lai d

plans fo r th e 30th Division t o retrea t

east fro m Sayr e Highway , Morozum i

directed th e Eastern Sector Unit t o

move up th e Agusan Rive r fro m Butua n

Bay t o collec t foo d an d prepar e th e

southern reache s o f th e river 's broa d

valley as the last-stan d are a fo r th e main

body o f th e 30th Division.

As th e battl e fo r Sayr e Highwa y

began, Morozum i alread y ha d severa l

counts agains t him , some o f hi s ow n

making. Preoccupie d wit h th e prospec t

of attac k fro m Macajala r Bay , he ha d

prepared fe w defense s alon g th e south -

ern thir d o f th e highway . Hi s unit s

were so scattered u p an d dow n th e road

that unde r idea l condition s Morozum i

would hav e ha d difficult y redeployin g

or concentrating them. Conditions along

Sayre Highwa y wer e fa r fro m ideal .

Neglected b y the Japanese, the road wa s

in poo r repai r an d i n spot s overgrow n

with grass . Guerrill a activit y ha d seri -

ously inhibite d Japanese employment o f

the road ; ever y tim e th e Japanes e re -

built a bridg e th e guerrilla s woul d de -

stroy it again . Allie d dominatio n o f th e

air mad e i t nearl y impossibl e for Moro -

zumi t o undertak e dayligh t movements,

while element s o f th e guerrill a 106th

and 109t h Division s harasse d Japanes e

movements da y an d night. 31 Shor t o f

transportation befor e th e campaig n be -

gan i n April , an d shorte r stil l o f main -

tenance equipment , Morozum i woul d

soon se e almos t al l hi s vehicle s eithe r

destroyed o r deadline d fo r lac k o f spar e

parts an d fuel . Finally , Morozum i ap -

parently entere d upo n th e battl e fo r

Sayre Highwa y with a defeatist attitude ,

evidently expectin g t o hol d onl y lon g

enough t o permit th e bul k o f his force s

to escap e westwar d int o th e mountain s

through Malaybalay .

Kabacan to Kibawe

The 31s t Division's 124t h Infantr y

left Kabaca n abou t 180 0 on 2 7 Apri l

and advance d northwar d throug h gath -

ering darkness unti l afte r 2200 , whe n a

meeting engagemen t suddenl y opene d

with th e 1st Battalion, 7 4th Infantry.

32

Morozumi ha d earlie r dispatche d thi s

unit southwar d t o reinforc e th e 166th

IIB bu t ha d pulle d i t bac k when , o n

21 April , h e ha d learne d tha t th e 24t h

Division ha d reache d For t Pikit . O n

the 26th , n o America n thrus t u p Sayr e

Highway havin g developed , Morozum i

again starte d th e battalion south , directing i t t o hol d th e crossin g ove r th e

31

 The 106th Divisio n wa s commanded b y Lt. Col.

Frank D. McGee, a U.S. Army regular who had bee n

retired fo r physica l disabilit y afte r Worl d Wa r I .

He volunteere d fo r activ e dut y i n Decembe r 194 1

from hi s home o n Mindana o an d di d no t surrende r

in 1942 . The 109t h Divisio n wa s commande d b y

Lt. Col. James R. Grinstead , a reservist an d forme r

member o f th e Philippin e Constabulary , wh o als o

failed t o surrende r i n 1942 . 32

 Information o n 31st Division operation s i n thi s

subsection is from: 10t h I&H Opnl Monograph Mindanao, pp. 232-39; 31st Div Rpt Mindanao , pp . 21 -

24; 124t h In f Rpt Mindanao , pp. 4-14; 124th Inf S-3

Opns Rpts, 2 7 Apr-4 Ma y 45.
638 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Pulangi Rive r jus t nort h o f Kabacan. 33

At a point abou t nin e mile s north o f

the Pulang i crossin g th e 1st Battalion,

74th Infantry, wit h a strength o f 35 0 i n

the forward area , was caught by surprise

as it s poin t ra n headlon g int o th e fast -

moving advanc e element s o f th e 124t h

Infantry. Durin g th e ensuin g engage -

ment Batter y C , 149t h Fiel d Artillery ,

hurriedly unlimbere d it s 105-mm . howitzers an d delivere d accurat e suppor t

fire, employin g sound-rangin g adjust -

ment methods. Befor e th e skirmis h wa s

over a t daw n o n 2 8 April , th e 124t h

Infantry ha d los t abou t 1 0 me n kille d

and 2 5 wounded, and ha d kille d a t least

50 Japanese. It s morale apparently shattered b y th e unexpecte d tur n o f events,

the Japanes e battalio n brok e an d

disappeared fro m th e Sayr e Highway .

After 2 8 Apri l th e 124t h Infantr y

drove o n northwar d agains t ver y scat -

tered opposition , delayed mainl y b y th e

poor conditio n o f th e highway . Guer -

rilla demolitions , give n th e finishin g

touch b y engineers of th e Southern Sector Unit, ha d accounte d fo r most o f th e

bridges along the road north of Kabacan,

and ther e were some sevent y bridges, i n

varying state s o f ruin , fro m Kabaca n

north twenty-fiv e mile s t o th e Mulit a

River. Dee p gorge s an d landslide s in -

duced b y heavy rain s adde d t o th e 31st

Division's supply problems. A t one pair

of gorge s th e 124t h Infantr y an d th e

108th Enginee r Battalio n ha d t o ri g

cables t o ge t nort h jeeps , quarter-to n

trailers, three-quarter-to n weapon s car -

riers, and 105-mm . howitzers. I t was not

until 3 May, when enginee r bulldozer s

completed fills , tha t th e 124t h coul d

bring up heavier equipment. Obviously ,

the 31st Division would hav e t o depend

in larg e measur e upo n ai r suppl y t o

maintain it s advance northward .

By 3 Ma y leadin g element s o f th e

124th Infantr y ha d reache d Kibawe , se t

up roadblocks nort h o f tha t barrio , and

probed about a mile southeast along the

trail tha t supposedl y le d t o Talom o o n

Davao Gulf. Despit e its supply problems

the regimen t had, within a week's time ,

secured the 31st, Division's first objective .

The advanc e fro m Kabaca n t o Kibaw e

had cos t th e 124t h Infantr y approxi -

mately 1 5 men kille d an d 5 0 wounded ,

while th e Southern Sector Unit ha d lost

over 17 5 men killed .

Until th e firs t wee k o f Ma y th e 31st

Division ha d bee n abl e t o emplo y onl y

one RCT alon g Sayre Highway. 34 The n

the 41s t Division's 162 d Infantry

reached easter n Mindana o fro m Zam -

boanga, too k ove r responsibilit y fo r th e

protection o f th e X Corp s rea r area s

from Paran g t o For t Pikit , an d permit -

ted th e 3 1st Divisio n t o brin g its 155t h

RCT forward . Th e 167t h RCT, 31st

Division, aide d b y guerrill a units , pro -

tected th e suppl y line s fro m For t Piki t

to Kibawe .

Since tw o RCT's wer e no w availabl e

along Sayr e Highway , Genera l Siber t

assigned additiona l task s t o th e 31s t

Division. First , he directed th e division

to continue northward to clear the high -

33

 Information o n Japanese operations in thi s subsection i s from : X Corp s G- 2 Summar y Mindanao ,

p. 14 ; 10th I&H Staff Study , Japanese Opns on Min -

danao; Tran s o f capture d 1st Bn 74th Inf docu -

ments, 124t h In f Rp t Mindanao , pp . 5-10 .

34

 Subsequent materia l on America n plans is from:

10th I& H Opn l Monograp h Mindanao , pp . 72-73 ,

81-83, 231, 241, 260; X Corp s Rp t Mindanao , pp .

26-27; 31s t Div Rp t Mindanao , pp . 20-21 , 25-27 ;

X Corps FO's 31, 32, and 33 , dated 29 Apr, 3 and 1 1

May 45; 31st Div FO 15 , 9 May 45; Fertig Interviews;

Fertig Comments, 2 Ma y 57 .
THE CONQUES T O F EASTER N MINDANA O 639

CLEARING ENEM Y FRO M SAYR E HIGHWA Y

way an d t o establis h contac t wit h th e

108th RCT , 40t h Division . Genera l

Eichelberger, th e Eight h Army' s com -

mander, ha d decide d t o pu t th e 108th

ashore a t Macajala r Ba y both t o spee d

the conquest o f Mindana o an d t o ope n

a ne w suppl y rout e t o th e 31s t Division, th e suppl y problem s o f whic h

increased with ever y step its troops took

northward.

The 31s t Division' s secon d jo b wa s

to strik e southeas t alon g th e Kibawe -

Talomo trail . Genera l Sibert 's preoccu -

pation wit h thi s maneuve r reflect s th e

state o f mappin g an d o f weathe r infor -

mation th e Arm y ha d concernin g Min -

danao. Siber t soon learned from Colonel

Fertig tha t much of th e Kibawe-Talom o

trail wa s a figmen t o f th e imagination .

Wheeled vehicle s coul d negotiat e onl y

the firs t fiv e o r si x mile s o f th e trai l

south from Kibaw e even i n dr y weather,

and a s a recognizabl e trac e th e trai l

extended onl y thirtee n mile s southeas t

from Kibaw e t o th e Pulang i River . I n

the Dava o are a th e trai l wa s fairly goo d

from Calina n (terminu s o f Rout e 1- D

from Talomo ) northwest about six miles

to th e Tamoga n River , bu t the n dis -

appeared. I n th e unmappe d regio n be -

tween th e Pulang i an d Tamogan Rivers

rainfall i n April , May , and Jun e some -

times reached a tota l of fort y inche s pe r

month. Durin g Jun e an d Jul y 194 5

Japanese troop s hacke d a fairl y definit e

path through th e jungles and rain forest

across th e forty-fiv e mile s o f rugge d terrain separatin g th e Pulang i an d Tamo -
640 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

TRANSPORTING HOWITZE R OVE R GORG E B Y CABL E

gan Rivers , bu t neve r wa s thi s stretc h

such tha t larg e bodie s o f me n coul d

use it .

After makin g an aerial reconnaissance

over the ground southeast from Kibawe ,

General Eichelberge r pu t a n en d t o

plans t o mak e a majo r effor t southeas t

along th e trai l fro m Kibaw e an d abou t

10 Ma y directe d Siber t t o limi t opera -

tions o n th e trai l t o a battalion-size d

reconnaissance-in-force. B y thi s time ,

the 24t h Divisio n ha d th e situatio n wel l

in han d i n th e Dava o area an d th e 31st

Division coul d employ additional troops

to goo d advantag e alon g Sayr e High -

way. Siber t accordingly directed the 31st

Division to push one battalion southeast

from Kibaw e as far as the Pulang i Rive r

and wit h the rest of its available strength

to resum e th e driv e u p Sayr e Highway .

General Morozum i wa s als o makin g

changes i n hi s plan s i n earl y May. 35

Appalled b y th e spee d o f th e 31s t

Division's advance a s fa r a s Kibawe ,

Morozumi directe d hi s unit s t o star t

assembling a t Malaybala y immediatel y

in preparatio n fo r retrea t eastwar d t o

the Agusa n Valley . H e ordere d a bat -

talion of infantry southwar d to delay the

31st Divisio n in th e vicinity of Maramag,

fifteen mile s nort h o f Kibawe , unti l 1 0

May a t least , b y whic h dat e h e hope d

his mai n force s woul d hav e passe d

through Malaybalay . Th e Japanes e battalion wa s hardly i n positio n whe n th e

124th Infantry , whic h ha d starte d nort h

35

 Additional materia l o n Japanes e plan s i s from :

X Corp s G- 2 Summar y Mindanao , p . 14 ; Yamaz u

Statement, States, IV , 509-19; 10t h I& H Staf f Study ,

Japanese Opns on Mindanao .
THE CONQUES T O F EASTER N MINDANA O 641

from Kibaw e o n 6 May , reache d th e

Maramag region .

Clearing Sayre Highway

The Japanes e battalio n a t Marama g

more tha n accomplishe d its mission , fo r

it wa s no t unti l 1 2 May tha t th e 124t h

Infantry overcam e th e las t organize d

resistance i n th e area. 36 Th e fightin g

from 6 throug h 1 2 Ma y cos t th e 124t h

Infantry abou t 6 0 me n kille d an d 12 0

wounded, whil e th e Japanese , i n a tou r

de forc e o f fanatic resistance , lost at least

130 me n killed .

On 1 3 May th e 155t h Infantr y passe d

through th e 124t h t o continu e th e drive

northward. Organize d oppositio n alon g

Sayre Highway south o f Malaybala y ha d

now melte d away , an d th e 155t h Infan -

try wa s delaye d principall y b y suppl y

problems an d difficultie s entaile d i n

keeping supportin g artiller y withi n

range o f possibl e points o f Japanes e re -

sistance. Abou t noo n o n 2 0 Ma y th e

155th reache d th e outskirt s o f Malay -

balay, wher e fir e fro m remnant s o f th e

30th Field Artillery Regiment halted the

advance. Realizin g tha t th e regimen t

could no t hau l it s weapon s int o th e

mountains eas t o f Malaybalay , Moro -

zumi ha d lef t th e uni t a t Malaybala y to

fight a rear-guard action , which wa s successful i n keeping the 155t h Infantry out

of th e tow n unti l lat e on 2 1 May.

On 2 2 and 2 3 Ma y th e 155t h contin -

ued u p Sayr e Highway , encounterin g

elements o f Morozumi' s Northern Sector Unit tha t had not learned that American troop s had reache d Malaybala y and

were still withdrawing southward to join

the 30th Division's mai n body . Presse d

by troop s o f th e 108th Infantry , 40t h

Division, whic h ha d alread y lande d a t

Macajalar Bay , the retreating forces gav e

the 155t h Infantr y littl e troubl e and ,

about 140 0 on 2 3 May, the 155t h mad e

contact wit h th e 108th Infantr y nea r

Impalutao, twelv e mile s northwes t o f

Malaybalay.

The 108th Infantr y ha d landed unop -

posed alon g th e southeaster n shor e o f

Macajalar Ba y o n 1 0 May , making contact almos t immediatel y wit h guerrill a

units alread y operatin g i n th e region. 37

Advancing inland , th e 108th Infantr y

encountered no significant resistanc e until 1 3 May, when, eighteen mile s inland,

it cam e upo n stron g Japanes e defense s

where Sayr e Highwa y zigzag s u p an d

down th e stee p slope s o f th e Magim a

River canyon . Her e Morozum i ha d

posted a delayin g forc e o f abou t 1,25 0

men who had th e support of a few pieces

of ligh t artillery. 38

Although Morozumi probably did not

36

 Informatio n i n thi s subsectio n derive s mainl y

from: X Corps G- 2 Summar y Mindanao , pp . 14-16 ;

Yamazu Statement , States, IV, 509-19; 10th I&H Staff

Study, Japanes e Opn s o n Mindanao ; Morozum i

Statement, States , II , 594-603 ; 31st Div Rp t Min -

danao, pp . 25-28 , 50-57, 62; 31st Div G-3 Pe r Rpts ,

12-24 Ma y 45 ; 10t h I& H Opn l Monograp h Min -

danao, pp . 244-63 ; 124t h In f Rp t Mindanao , pp .

14-19; 124t h In f S- 3 Opn s Rpts, 6-13 Ma y 45.

37

 Additional informatio n o n 108th RC T opera -

tions is from: 10t h I&H Opnl Monograp h Mindanao,

pp. 260-63 ; Ferti g Interviews ; Mindana o Guerrill a

Record, passim. Guerrill a unit s involve d i n th e

Macajalar Ba y are a include d th e 120t h Infantry ,

108th Division ; th e 109th an d 111th Infantry Regi -

ments, 109t h Division ; an d th e 110th Infantry, 110th

Division. Th e commande r o f th e latte r divisio n

was Lt . Col . Pau l H . Marshall , wh o ha d escape d

from a Japanes e priso n cam p a t Dava o i n Apri l

1943 an d ha d joine d th e guerrillas . 38

 The Japanes e forc e wa s composed o f th e head -

quarters an d on e compan y o f th e 30th Reconnaissance Regiment; th e 6th Company o f the 74th Infantry; th e 103d Airfield Battalion, th e onl y Ai r Forc e

unit Morozumi ha d armed ; a few 30th Division engineers; and a provisional, two-gun battery of artillery.
642 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

know it , h e ha d statione d hi s delayin g

groupment at the same point a Fil-American forc e ha d chose n t o hol d just thre e

years earlier whe n a Japanese unit, fore -

shadowing th e 108t h RCT' s operation ,

had lande d a t Macajala r Ba y t o driv e

south alon g Sayr e Highway. 39 I n Ma y

1942 th e Fil-America n forc e ha d hel d a t

the Magim a Canyo n are a fo r fou r days ,

and no w i n Ma y 194 5 histor y repeate d

itself, fo r i t too k th e 108t h Infantry ,

40th Division , fro m 1 5 through 1 8 Ma y

to clean out the region.

Following this action th e 108t h Infan -

try—its rea r protecte d b y th e 3 d Bat -

talion o f th e America l Division' s 164t h

Infantry, which reached Macajalar Bay on

14 May—continue d sout h t o it s rendez -

vous wit h th e 31s t Divisio n o n 2 3 May .

Supply problem s slowe d th e 108t h In -

fantry's advanc e t o som e degree , bu t

Sayre Highwa y wa s i n s o muc h bette r

shape fro m Macajala r Ba y sout h t o

Malaybalay tha n i t wa s fro m Kabaca n

north tha t Eight h Arm y immediatel y

changed th e 31s t Division's supply route

to on e originatin g a t Macajala r Bay .

Its shar e i n th e tas k o f clearin g Sayr e

Highway cost th e 31s t Divisio n approximately 9 0 men kille d and 25 0 wounded,

while the 108t h Infantry , 40t h Division ,

lost roughl y 1 5 me n kille d an d 10 0

wounded. Together , th e tw o unit s

killed almos t 1,00 0 Japanes e durin g

their operations alon g th e highway , an d

captured nearl y 2 5 more.40

It take s littl e reflectio n t o conclud e

that th e 30th Division mad e a poo r

showing alon g Sayr e Highway . Moro -

zumi ha d employe d effectivel y jus t tw o

of th e si x regula r infantr y battalion s

available t o him , whil e onl y a t Malay -

balay ha d hi s artiller y becom e a facto r

with whic h X Corp s troop s had t o reckon. Fro m th e start Morozum i ha d ha d

no rea l intentio n o f conductin g a n all -

out defense of Sayre Highway, but rather

had bee n bus y withdrawin g th e bul k o f

his divisio n throug h Malaybalay . Thus ,

except fo r brie f stands , hi s force s ha d

melted away in on e o f th e sorriest showings mad e b y an y Japanese uni t durin g

the cours e o f th e war .

Mop-up and Pursuit in

Eastern Mindanao

With Sayr e Highwa y cleare d o f th e

30th Division an d wit h th e collaps e o f

the 100th Division second line of defense

northwest o f Davao , th e campaig n fo r

eastern Mindana o had reached a tactical

conclusion. However , as was the case on

most o f th e othe r island s o f th e Philip -

pines, th e wa r wa s not ove r i n easter n

Mindanao. X Corp s operation s no w

entered th e mop-u p an d pursui t phase .

Malaybalay to the Agusan Valley

General Morozum i planne d t o reas -

semble th e 30th Division force s h e ha d

withdrawn fro m Sayr e Highwa y a t o r

near Silae , eleve n mile s eas t o f Malay -

balay, an d hope d t o hol d i n th e Sila e

area fo r a t leas t a mont h befor e retreat -

ing furthe r acros s th e mountain s t o th e

upper reache s o f th e Agusa n Valley. 41

39

 See Morton , Fall of the Philippines, pp . 516-19 . 40

 X Corp s G- 3 Pe r Rpt s 216 , 218 , an d 221 , dated

23, 25, and 2 8 May 45; X Corps G-2 Pe r Rpts, 37 and

39, 2 3 an d 2 5 Ma y 45 ; 31s t Di v G- 3 Rp t 243 , 2 3

May 45 .

41

 Information o n Japanes e operations in thi s sub -

section is mainly from : X Corp s G- 2 Summar y Min -

danao, pp. 6 , 14-17 ; Morozum i Statement , States, II, 594-603; 10t h I& H Staf f Study , Japanes e Opn s o n

Mindanao.
THE CONQUES T O F EASTER N MINDANA O 643

Morozumi's inten t ha d becom e obviou s

to X Corp s befor e th e en d o f May , an d

as earl y as the 22 d elements of th e 124t h

Infantry ha d begu n probin g int o th e

mountains eas t fro m Sayr e Highway. 42

Rough terrai n an d poo r trail s slowe d

operations fro m th e inceptio n o f th e

pursuit, and aeria l supply wa s employed

continuously. Smal l group s o f Japanes e

constantly harasse d line s o f communica -

tion bac k t o Sayr e Highway ; heav y rains

inhibited aeria l observatio n o f Japanes e

activity; and, a s American troop s pushed

deeper int o th e mountains , Japanes e

resistance stiffene d markedly . I n con -

trast wit h thei r defens e o f Sayr e High -

way, troop s o f th e 30th Division mad e

the mos t o f thei r capabilitie s i n th e

mountains, wher e the y fough t tena -

ciously and fanaticall y over every inch o f

ground. Nevertheless , element s o f th e

124th Infantr y reache d Sila e o n 9 June,

and fou r day s late r troop s o f th e 108t h

Infantry, brough t int o th e driv e eas t

from th e highway , reache d th e Bobona -

wan Rive r seve n mile s sout h o f Silae .

Another si x mile s t o th e sout h me n o f

the 155t h Infantr y arrive d o n th e Pu -

langi Rive r o n 1 2 June , an d element s

of th e 162 d Infantry, 41s t Division ,

struck twent y mile s int o th e mountain s

east fro m Marama g durin g th e perio d

13-26 June .

On 5 June Morozumi gave up his plan

to hold in the Silae area for a month and

started hi s bes t troop s eastwar d towar d

Waloe, i n th e Agusan Rive r valley some

35 mile s eas t o f Sila e an d 5 5 mile s up -

stream fro m th e Agusan' s mout h o n

Butuan Bay . Th e ne w Japanes e with -

drawal wa s no t lon g i n gatherin g mo -

mentum, and American units soon found

it difficul t t o locat e an y Japanese u p t o

15 mile s east o f th e Sayr e Highway . A t

the en d o f Jun e troop s o f th e guerrill a

109th an d 110t h Division s too k ove r i n

the territor y eas t o f th e highwa y fro m

Maramag nort h t o Malaybalay. 43

The 30th Division wa s not permitte d

to reassembl e a significan t forc e i n th e

Agusan Valley . Eve r sinc e Morozumi 's

Eastern Sector Unit ha d starte d u p th e

river in late April to prepare an ultimate

refuge fo r th e 30th Division, guerrilla s

of th e 110t h Divisio n ha d bee n harass -

ing Japanes e u p an d dow n th e valley. 44

Thus th e leadin g elements o f th e Eastern Sector Unit di d no t reac h Walo e

until lat e June, just in time to be chased

out of the barrio by guerrillas and troops

of th e 155t h Infantry , 31s t Division. 42 45 Material o n America n operation s i n thi s sub -

section i s from : 10t h I&H Opn l Monograp h Min -

danao, pp . 263-69 , 274-75 ; 31s t Di v Rpt Mindanao ,

pp. 29-31, 35: 31s t Di v G- 3 Pe r Rpts , 2 2 May-3 0

Jun 45 ; 124t h In f Rp t Mindanao , pp . 19-31 ; 124t h

Inf S- 3 Opn s Rpts, 22 May-30 Jun 45 ; X Corps G-3

Opns Rpts, 2 2 May-30 Jun 45 .

On 5 Jun e Cpl . Harr y R . Har r o f Compan y D ,

124th Infantry , 31s t Division , i n actio n wit h a

southern colum n o f th e 124t h Infantr y headin g

into th e mountain s sout h o f th e mai n trai l fro m

Malaybalay t o Silae , wa s kille d a s h e covere d a

Japanese han d grenad e wit h hi s body , savin g a t

least fou r fello w soldier s fro m seriou s wound s o r

possible death . Fo r hi s courageou s act , Corpora l

Harr wa s posthumousl y awarde d th e Meda l o f

Honor.

43

 By th e tim e thi s relie f wa s effected , th e 109t h

Division's commander , Colone l Grinstead , ha d gon e

back t o th e Unite d States . Hi s plac e wa s take n b y

Lt. Col . Ceci l E . Walter , a n America n civilia n resi -

dent o f Mindana o wh o ha d joine d th e guerrilla s

in 1944 . 44

 The principa l guerrill a forc e i n th e valle y a t

this time was the 113t h Infantry , 110t h Division . Th e

regiment wa s commande d b y Maj . Khali l Khodr , a

Syrian wh o ha d bee n a minin g enginee r o n th e

island befor e th e war . 45

 Fertig's headquarter s ha d bee n a t Walo e fro m

mid-May t o earl y June .
644 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

A battalio n comba t tea m o f th e 155t h

Infantry, makin g its way u p th e Agusa n

River aboard engineer LCM's, assembled

near Walo e o n 2 7 June , an d th e rem -

nants o f th e Eastern Sector Unit with -

drew eas t an d south . Japanes e troop s

from th e Sila e secto r bega n t o straggl e

into th e Walo e are a o n 3 August , har -

assed b y 31st Division artiller y and Marine Corp s aircraft . Morozum i gathere d

the troops he was able to keep organized

about seve n mile s u p th e Agusa n fro m

Waloe, an d a t th e en d o f th e wa r wa s

preparing t o mov e o n t o Mindanao' s

inhospitable eas t coast .

The Kibawe-Talomo Trail

Pursuit operation s alon g th e so-calle d

Kibawe-Talomo trail were shared b y the

24th an d 31s t Divisions.40 Afte r over -

running the 100th Division's secon d line

of resistanc e o n 1 0 June, th e 24t h Divi -

sion struc k towar d Calinan , terminu s o f

Route 1- D fro m Talomo . Genera l Harada employe d most o f his best troop s t o

defend th e roa d junctio n tow n o f Cal -

inan and , managing t o hol d i t unti l 1 9

June, extricate d hi s organize d remnant s

from possibl e entrapmen t eas t o f Rout e

1-D. America n unit s participatin g i n

the driv e t o Calina n include d th e 21s t

Infantry, 24t h Division , an d th e 41s t

Division's 162 d Infantry, les s its 2 d Battalion bu t wit h th e 3 d Battalion , 163 d

Infantry, attached .

Taking ove r a t Calina n o n 1 9 June ,

the 34t h Infantr y o f th e 24t h Divisio n

reached th e Tamoga n River , si x mile s

northwest, o n 2 3 June . Th e nex t da y

elements o f th e 19t h an d 34t h Infantr y

Regiments secure d a crossin g ove r th e

Tamogan an d fo r a fe w day s thereafte r

the 100th Division's retrea t turne d int o

a rout. B y 26 June, followin g a portio n

of th e Kibawe-Talom o trai l tha t th e

Japanese ha d recentl y improved , troop s

of th e 34t h Infantr y reache d th e moun -

tain barri o o f Kibangay , tw o mile s be -

yond th e Tamogan . Her e th e pursui t

halted, an d Harad a wa s abl e t o restor e

some semblanc e o f orde r amon g hi s

forces. Th e 100th Division hel d de -

fenses i n th e Kibanga y are a unti l mid -

July when , wit h foo d supplie s runnin g

out, Harad a directed his remaining units

to dispers e an d forag e fo r themselve s i n

the mountains . Takin g ove r fro m th e

24th Divisio n i n lat e July , me n o f th e

guerrilla 107t h Divisio n continue d t o

hunt dow n Japanes e straggler s t o th e

end o f th e war , graduall y extendin g

control ove r th e southeaster n sectio n o f

the Kibawe-Talom o trail. 47

Far t o th e northwest, units of the 31st

Division ha d bee n probin g southeas t

along th e uppe r sectio n o f th e Kibawe -

Talomo trai l ever sinc e earl y May , and

on th e 11th o f tha t mont h a battalio n

combat tea m o f th e 167t h Infantr y

46

 Information o n operation s alon g th e south - launched th e reconnaissance-in-forc e

eastern sectio n o f th e trai l i s from : 10t h I&H Opn l

Monograph Mindanao , pp . 186-209 ; 24t h Di v Rp t

Mindanao, pp . 68-74 ; 19t h In f Rp t Mindanao , pp .

23-27; 21st Inf Rpt Mindanao, pp. 9-10; 34th Inf Rpt

Mindanao, pp. 36-46; Ferti g Interviews; Ferti g Comments, 2 Ma y 57; Harad a Statement , States , I , 261 -

66; Hattor i Statement , States , I , 304-10 ; 10t h I& H

Staff Stud y o f Japanes e Opn s o n Mindanao , an d

atchd maps .

47

 By this time Colonel McGee , formerly comman d

ing th e 106th Division , ha d succeede d Colone l Lau -

reta a s commande r o f th e 107t h Division . McGe e

was als o attache d t o th e 24t h Divisio n a s office r i n

charge o f al l guerrilla s i n th e 24th's sector . McGe e

was kille d b y a Japanes e snipe r o n 7 August .
THE CONQUES T O F EASTER N MINDANA O 645

directed b y General Sibert , the X Corp s

commander.48 Japanes e alon g thi s sec -

tion o f th e trail , about 1,00 0 men i n all ,

comprised a conglomerat e mas s o f serv -

ice troop s wit h a smal l leavenin g o f

infantry. Contro l wa s vested i n Genera l

Tomochika, chie f o f staf f o f th e 35th

Army, who had set up a small headquarters groupmen t nea r barri o Pinamola ,

about twent y mile s southeas t o f

Kibawe.49

The Japanes e forc e ha d a defensiv e

potential fa r greate r tha n it s strengt h

and natur e woul d indicate , fo r th e terrain gave the Japanese every conceivable

advantage. Bounde d o n bot h side s b y

dense jungl e an d thic k rai n forest , th e

trail as far as Pinamola ran u p an d down

steep ridge s an d wa s scarcely jeep-wide .

Rains o f lat e Ma y soon rendere d al l sec -

tions o f th e trai l completel y impassabl e

to wheeled vehicles, and supplie s had t o

come i n b y airdrop, supplemented whe n

possible b y hand-carryin g partie s an d

laden Carabaos . Th e mu d wa s s o dee p

that ofte n troop s ha d t o pull , push , o r

even jack the Carabaos out of gooey holes.

Delayed b y th e Japanese , th e terrain ,

and th e weather , th e 167t h Infantry' s

battalion di d no t reac h th e Pulang i

River, thirtee n mile s southeas t o f Ki -

bawe, until 29 May. Then , although the

Japanese fro m th e trai l coul d n o longe r

offer an y threat to th e 31st Division, the

battalion continue d sout h towar d Pina -

mola, aide d considerabl y b y guerrillas. 50

Troops o f th e 167t h Infantr y finall y

reached Pinamol a o n 3 0 Jun e a s th e

remaining Japanes e wer e withdrawin g

southward anothe r eigh t mile s t o th e

crossing of the Kuluma n River. Progres s

as fa r a s Pinamol a ha d cos t th e 167t h

Infantry approximatel y 6 0 me n kille d

and 18 0 wounded , whil e th e Japanes e

had lost almost 400 killed along the same

section o f th e trail. 51

Elements o f th e 167t h Infantr y hel d

along th e northwester n sectio n o f th e

Kibawe-Talomo trai l unti l th e en d o f

the war , and a s o f 1 5 August th e regi -

ment was preparing to send troops across

the Kuluma n Rive r t o continu e th e ad -

vance southeastward . O n tha t dat e

nearly 3 0 mile s o f Japanese-improve d

trail—only 1 9 air miles—stil l separate d

the 167t h Infantr y fro m guerrill a unit s

operating i n th e vicinit y o f Kibangay .

Organized remnant s o f Harada' s 100th

Division hole d u p unti l th e en d o f th e

war i n rugge d terrai n nort h o f thi s 30 -

mile stretc h o f th e trail. 52

48

 Information o n operation s alon g th e north -

western sectio n o f th e trai l i s from: 10th I&H Opn l

Monograph Mindanao, pp. 269-74; 31st Div Rpt Min -

danao, pp . 23 , 25, 32-34, 52 , 57-58, 63 , 67 ; 31st Div

G-3 Pe r Rpts , 3 May-3 0 Ju n 45 ; 167t h In f Rp t

Mindanao, pp. 1-2; 167th Inf S- 3 Pe r Rpts, 1 0 May30 Jun 45 ; Mindanao Guerrilla Record , passim; Fertig Interviews; Ferti g Comments, 2 May 57; X Corps

G-2 Pe r Rpts, 1 0 May-30 June 45; Tomochika, True

Facts o f th e Leyt e Opn, pp . 40-41 , 44 ; X Corp s G- 2

Summary Mindanao , p . 5 . 49

 See app . G-4.

50

 Elements o f th e 106th an d 109t h Division s sup -

ported th e 167t h Infantry . Th e guerrill a comba t

commander wa s Maj . Pedr o Aquino , especiall y se -

lected by Fertig as a good "troubl e shooter." Aquino's

normal jo b wa s th e commande r o f th e 108t h Infan -

try, 108t h Division . 51

 167t h In f Rp t Mindanao , pt . VI , Battl e Casual -

ties, 1 8 Apr-g o Ju n 45 ; 167t h In f S- 2 Pe r Rp t 40 ,

30 Ju n 45 ; 167t h In f S- 3 Pe r Rp t 110 , 3 0 Ju n 45 . 52

 In Jun e and Jul y abou t 30 0 infantryme n o f vari -

ous 100th Division unit s move d northwes t fro m

Kibangay t o reinforc e th e Japanes e holdin g a t th e

Kuluman River . Wit h whateve r means the y ha d a t

hand, th e Japanes e worked unti l th e en d o f th e wa r

to improv e th e Kibangay-Kuluma n stretc h o f th e

Kibawe-Talomo trail .
646 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Sarangani Bay: Anticlimax to the

Campaigns in the Philippines

From th e beginnin g o f hi s plannin g

for th e retur n t o th e Philippines , Gen -

eral MacArthu r ha d intende d to initiat e

his campaig n wit h th e seizur e of airfiel d

sites alon g th e shore s o f Sarangan i Bay ,

on th e south-centra l coas t o f easter n

Mindanao, abou t seventy-fiv e mile s

southwest o f Davao . Wit h th e decisio n

of mid-Septembe r 194 4 t o launc h th e

Philippine campaig n wit h th e invasio n

of Leyte , GHQ SWP A quietly laid aside

its plan s t o lan d a t Sarangan i Ba y with

a two-divisio n corps. Ove r nin e month s

later planner s o f th e Southwes t Pacifi c

Area agai n turne d their attention t o the

bay. Thus , by a sharp turn in th e march

of events , Sarangani Bay became the sit e

of th e last attac k against hitherto unmo -

lested Japanes e force s o n th e Philippin e

archipelago. However , instea d o f com -

mitting a corp s o f tw o reinforce d divi -

sions, th e Sarangan i Ba y operatio n a s

ultimately execute d involve d a forc e

scarcely equivalen t t o on e regimenta l

combat team. 53

The Japanes e at Sarangani Bay in July

1945, whe n operation s t o clea r th e are a

began, numbere d approximatel y 2,00 0

troops, includin g roughly 1,50 0 infantry

and artiller y fro m variou s 30th an d

100th Division unit s an d som e 45 0

miscellaneous nava l personnel. 54 I n

April an d Ma y the Japanes e artiller y a t

Sarangani Ba y ha d attempte d t o escap e

northward, bu t findin g it s route s o f

withdrawal to Sayre Highway and Dava o

cut, ha d give n u p th e attempt . Ulti -

mately organize d a s th e Sarangani District Unit, th e forc e a t th e ba y se t u p

defenses abou t te n mile s inlan d where ,

having a t thei r disposa l th e resource s of

rich agricultura l lands , th e Japanes e

lived bountifull y unti l July , onl y occa -

sionally harassed by elements of the guerrilla 116t h Infantry, 106th Division. 55

If fo r n o othe r reason , Fil-America n

operations t o secur e th e Sarangan i Ba y

region ar e interestin g becaus e o f th e

varied an d complicate d natur e o f th e

maneuvers involved . Th e operation s

began o n 4 Jul y whe n a patro l o f th e

24th Reconnaissanc e Troop , 24t h Divi -

sion, comin g fro m Dava o Gul f aboar d

Allied Nava l Force s P T boats , lande d

on th e southeaster n shor e o f th e ba y t o

establish contac t wit h th e 116t h Infantry. B y 1 1 Jul y th e guerrill a unit , t o

which 15 0 M1 rifle s wer e delivered, an d

the reconnaissanc e patro l ha d cleare d

the bay's shore s against negligibl e resistance. O n 1 2 Jul y a battalio n comba t

team fro m th e 24t h Division' s 21st Infantry lande d o n th e northwes t shore .

Meanwhile, X Corp s ha d assemble d

a provisiona l infantr y battalio n o f U.S .

Army antiaircraf t troop s a t For t Piki t

and ha d sen t i t sout h aboar d enginee r

LCM's som e thirt y mile s t o Lak e Bu -

luan. Unloadin g on th e lake's southern

shores, th e battalio n picke d u p Batter y

B, 496th Antiaircraft Gu n Battalion , and

53

 Background informatio n o n th e foregoin g plan -

ning is to be foun d i n ch. II, above. Se e also, Cannon,

Leyte, ch . I ; Smith , Approach to the Philippines,

ch. I. 54

 See app. G-1.

The remainde r o f thi s subsectio n i s base d on :

Statement of Ma j Makoto Takasuka (C O 1st Bn 30th

FA Regt an d Comd r Saragani District Unit), States ,

IV, 48-51 ; 10t h I&H Opn l Monograp h Mindanao ,

pp. 290-301 ; Sarangan i Tas k Forc e Rpt , 4 Jul-1 1

Aug 45 , pp . 1-88 ; Ferti g Comments , 2 Ma y 57 .

55

 Colonel Grinstead , previously th e commande r o f

the 109t h Division, succeeded t o the comman d of th e

106th Division on 2 5 June 1945 just before h e lef t fo r

the Unite d States . Th e commande r o f th e 116t h

Infantry was Maj. Herbert Page , a 68-year-old retired

Army officer.
THE CONQUES T O F EASTER N MINDANA O 647

the Comba t Compan y o f th e guerrill a

118th Infantry , 106th Division , bot h o f

which ha d com e overlan d fro m Pikit .

The battalio n starte d southeas t towar d

Sarangani Ba y fro m th e Lak e Bulua n

region o n 9 July, le d b y Col . Rober t V.

Bowler, Fertig' s secon d i n command .

Still anothe r forc e involve d i n th e

Sarangani Ba y operation wa s th e Expe -

ditionary Battalion , 108t h Division ,

which ha d bee n operating with th e 24t h

Division eve r sinc e the landin g at Mala -

bang in April.56 Strikin g southwest from

the shore s o f Dava o Gul f o n 8 July, th e

Expeditionary Battalion followed a n ol d

cattle drive trail throug h dense rain for -

est an d b y 1 2 Jul y wa s withi n fiftee n

miles o f Sarangan i Bay .

With al l element s o f th e Sarangan i

Bay Tas k Forc e (int o whic h th e varie d

echelons wer e finall y organized ) o n th e

march b y 1 2 July, events began t o move

rapidly. O n th e 13t h th e provisiona l

infantry battalio n fro m Piki t an d th e

1st Battalion , 21s t Infantry , mad e con -

tact at a point about sixteen miles northwest o f th e bay' s northwester n corner .

On the 15t h th e guerrilla 116t h Infantr y

and th e Expeditionar y Battalio n gaine d

contact about te n mile s northeast o f th e

bay. A fe w day s late r th e combine d

forces discovere d the mai n body of Japanese hidin g ou t alon g rive r valley s an d

hilly peak s abou t fiftee n mile s nort h o f

the bay . Organize d Japanes e resistanc e

collapsed o n 2 5 July , an d operation s

entered th e mop-u p an d pursui t stage .

By 1 1 August, whe n mos t o f th e Saran -

gani Ba y Task Force returned t o Davao,

the tas k o f securin g th e ba y regio n ha d

cost th e Fil-America n unit s involve d 1 3

men kille d an d 1 3 wounded, whil e th e

Japanese had lost 450 killed.57 Th e cam -

paign o n Mindana o wa s finished .

The End of the War in

Eastern Mindanao

On 3 0 Jun e Genera l Eichelberge r

declared th e easter n Mindana o opera -

tion closed , an d reporte d t o Genera l

MacArthur that organized oppositio n i n

the region had ceased. Actually , fighting

against organized bodies of Japanese continued afte r tha t date , bu t ther e ca n b e

no doubt tha t by 30 June the main ends

of th e campaig n ha d bee n realized .

U.S. Arm y casualtie s o f th e campaig n

to secur e easter n Mindanao , throug h 1 5

August 1945 , totale d approximatel y

3,700. (Table 9) Throug h 3 0 June U.S .

Army unit s an d attache d guerrilla s ha d

killed almost 10,54 0 Japanese in easter n

Mindanao, o f whic h numbe r th e 24t h

Division had killed roughly 6,585. Fro m

30 Jun e throug h 1 5 August Fil-Ameri -

can units killed anothe r 2,32 5 Japanese.

Roughly 60 0 Japanes e prisoners , ove r

250 o f the m civilians , wer e capture d

before 15 August , and afte r the war

about 22,25 0 Japanese troops and 11,90 0

civilians turne d themselve s in . Thes e

figures accoun t fo r a tota l o f 47,61 5

Japanese. Wit h approximatel y 55,85 0

Japanese i n easter n Mindana o a s o f 1 7

April 1945 , th e tota l o f 47,61 5 leave s

8,235 unaccounte d for . I t appear s tha t

this numbe r o f Japanes e must hav e lost

their live s fro m starvatio n an d diseas e

between April and th e war's end .

56

 It wa s the 24t h Division's opinion tha t th e Expeditionary Battalio n wa s an excellen t uni t and tha t it

was the only battalion-sized guerrilla unit with which

the 24t h Divisio n cam e i n contac t tha t wa s capabl e

of cohesiv e offensiv e action . Woodruf f Comments ,

6 Jan 57 .

57

 U.S. Arm y casualtie s wer e 4 kille d an d 7

wounded.
648 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

TABLE 9—U.S. ARM Y CASUALTIES , EASTER N MINDANAO ,

THROUGH 1 5 AUGUS T 1945

Source: Base d on source s cited previousl y in the chapter. The 24t h Divisio n casualtie s include the U.S. Army casualtie s of the Sarangan i

Bay Task Force , and those of the 162d RCT (les s 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry) an d th e 3 d Battalion , 163d Infantry, whil e attached t o th e

division. The Bugo-De l Mont e Area Command , existing from 2 9 May t o 2 3 June, included antiaircraft units , elements of engineer boat an d

shore regiments, and various service force units.
PART EIGH T

CONCLUSION

Conclusion

The forma l en d t o hostilitie s i n th e

Pacific cam e whil e fightin g wa s still un -

der wa y i n th e Philippines . O n 1 5

August 194 5 almos t 115,00 0 Japanes e

—including noncombatan t civilians —

were still at larg e on Luzo n and th e central and souther n islands. On e Japanese

force, th e Shobu Group i n norther n

Luzon, wa s still occupyin g th e energie s

of majo r portion s o f thre e U.S . Arm y

infantry division s and th e USAFIP(NL)

as well. Indeed , on 1 5 August the equivalent o f thre e and two-third s Army divisions wer e engage d i n activ e comba t

against Japanes e force s o n Luzon , whil e

the equivalen t o f anothe r reinforce d

division wa s i n contac t wit h Japanes e

forces o n th e centra l an d souther n is -

lands. O n Luzo n th e 21,00 0 guerrilla s

of th e USAFIP(NL) wer e still in action ,

and som e 22,00 0 othe r Luzo n guerrilla s

were engage d i n patrollin g an d mop -

ping-up activities . A t leas t anothe r

75,000 guerrilla s wer e moppin g u p o n

the centra l an d souther n islands .

Tactically, then, th e campaign for the

reconquest o f Luzo n an d th e Souther n

Philippines wa s no t quit e finishe d a s o f

15 August 1945 . O n th e other hand, the

Sixth an d Eight h Armies, togethe r wit h

supporting ai r an d nava l forces , ha d

smashed th e 14th Area Army, the organized remnant s o f which , slowl y starvin g

to death , wer e incapabl e o f significan t

offensive action . Th e bul k of the American force s i n th e Philippine s wer e al -

ready preparin g fo r th e awesom e tas k

of assaultin g th e Japanes e home islands,

and man y guerrill a unit s wer e bein g

transformed int o regula r formation s

under Philippin e Arm y Table s o f

Organization an d Equipment .

Strategically, th e issue s i n th e Philip -

pines had long since been decided . Th e

principal strategi c priz e o f th e Philip -

pines—the Centra l Plains-Manil a Ba y

area o f Luzon—ha d bee n secur e sinc e

early March , fiv e an d a hal f month s be -

fore th e wa r ended . Befor e mid-Apri l

American force s ha d possessio n o f th e

most important secondary strategic prizes

—air base sites from whic h t o help sever

the Japanese line s o f communicatio n t o

the Indie s an d fro m whic h t o suppor t

projected groun d operation s i n th e In -

dies. Th e en d o f April found America n

forces holding virtually all the base areas

in th e Philippine s require d t o moun t

the schedule d invasio n o f Japan. B y 1 5

August base development was well along

throughout the archipelago, and th e first

troops o f a planne d mas s redeploymen t

from Europ e ha d reache d th e Philip -

pines. Finally , b y mid-August , fe w Filipinos were still unde r the Japanese yoke

—the Allies ha d free d million s an d ha d

re-established lawful civilian government

on most o f th e islands .

On Luzo n an d th e centra l an d south -

ern islands , force s o f th e Southwes t

Pacific Are a had containe d o r take n ou t

of th e wa r ove r 380,00 0 Japanese , ren -
652 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

dering them unavailabl e for th e defens e

of th e homeland. 1 Th e Japanes e ha d

already expende d anothe r 70,00 0 lives ,

more o r less , i n th e defens e o f Leyte ,

where th e Allie s ha d als o eliminate d

Japan's vaunted naval power as a significant factor in the Pacific war. Th e Allie s

had destroyed nin e of Japan's very best,

first-line divisions in the Philippines and

had also knocked out six other division s

or thei r equivalen t i n separat e brigades

and regiments. Losse s stemming directly

or indirectl y fro m th e defens e o f th e

Philippines ha d reduce d Japanes e ai r

power t o th e desperat e expedien t o f

kamikaze operations . I f n o othe r campaign o r operatio n o f th e wa r i n th e

Pacific ha d done so, then Japan's inability to hold the Philippines had made her

ultimate defea t clea r and certain .

The cos t had not been light . Exclud -

ing th e earlier campaign fo r th e seizur e

of Leyt e and Samar , the groun d comba t

forces o f th e Sixt h an d Eight h Armie s

had suffere d almos t 47,000 battle casualties—10,380 killed an d 36,55 0 wounded

—during their operations on Luzo n and

in th e Southern Philippines. Nonbattl e

casualties had bee n eve n heavier. Fro m

9 Januar y throug h 3 0 June 194 5 Sixth

Army o n Luzo n suffere d ove r 93,40 0

nonbattle casualties, losses that included

86,950 men hospitalized for various types

of sickness, 6,200 men injure d i n various

ways, and 26 0 troops dead o f sickness of

injury. Th e bul k of the battle casualties

occurred, o f course , o n Luzon , wher e

the heavies t fightin g too k plac e an d

where th e opposin g force s ha d thei r

greatest concentration of strength. Th e

operations t o recapture th e central and

southern island s cos t approximatel y

9,060 — 2,070 me n kille d an d 6,99 0

wounded.2 Bu t thes e personne l losse s

cannot reflec t th e tota l cost o f th e cam -

paign — the hug e losse s o f militar y

supplies an d equipmen t o f al l kinds ,

together wit h th e mone y an d tim e the y

represented.

As usual , th e Quee n o f Battle s too k

the brun t o f th e losses . Th e Infantr y

incurred roughly 90 percent of all Sixt h

Army casualtie s o n Luzo n an d 9 0 percent o f al l troop s kille d i n actio n o n

Luzon fro m 9 Januar y throug h 1 5

August.

The battl e casualt y rat e wa s highe r

in othe r campaign s o f World Wa r II —

for example , tha t o f Thir d Arm y i n

Lorraine and Tent h Army on Okinaw a

—than fo r Sixt h Arm y o n Luzon, bu t

it i s doubtfu l tha t an y othe r campaig n

of th e wa r ha d a higher nonbattle casualty rat e amon g America n forces . Fo r

this ther e wer e man y contributin g fac -

tors. Me n fro m th e mor e temperat e

United State s foun d th e climat e o f th e

Philippines enervating—i t wa s impossi -

ble fo r the m t o expen d thei r energie s

at th e rat e the y could a t home , yet th e

demands o f battle required just such an

expenditure. Th e troop s encountere d

new diseases , too , in th e Philippines ,

while th e contrasting hot, dry day s an d

cold, we t night s o f th e mountain s

created obviou s healt h problems .

Moreover, man y o f th e unit s tha t

fought i n th e Philippine s wer e tired .

With on e exception , al l th e division s

committed unde r Sixt h Army on Luzo n

had participated in a t least one previous

1

 See app. H-2. 2

 See app. H-1.
CONCLUSION 653

operation, and th e majority o f them had

been throug h two . As much a s a thir d

of th e officer s an d me n o f si x division s

had bee n oversea s thre e years ; almos t

all th e divisions and separat e regimental

combat team s ha d bee n i n th e Pacifi c

two years . Unde r suc h condition s de -

bilitation increased in geometric progression a s Sixt h Army , wit h th e limite d

forces availabl e t o it , ha d t o leav e

units in th e line for month afte r mont h

with littl e o r n o tim e fo r res t an d

rehabilitation.

The replacemen t proble m als o had a

great deal to do with th e high nonbattl e

casualty rate. Almos t all of Sixth Army's

combat unit s reache d Luzo n under -

strength; none received significant numbers o f replacement s unti l Apri l wa s

well along . Th e Infantr y replacement s

Sixth Arm y received fro m 9 January t o

30 Jun e wer e barel y sufficien t t o cove r

the army 's battl e losses—the y coul d no t

cope with the problem of filling th e gaps

left b y nonbattle casualties.

Actually, the bulk of the so-called nonbattle casualtie s wer e directl y attribut -

able t o comba t operation s althoug h no t

classed as battle casualties under the U.S.

Army's personnel accounting system. For

example, a n infantryma n hospitalize d

for pneumoni a contracted in th e moun -

tains o f norther n Luzo n wa s a s much a

loss as an infantryma n wh o was hospitalized with a wound inflicted by a Japanese

rifle bullet . Comba t fatigu e casualties ,

permanent o r temporary , fi t int o th e

same category .

In th e sens e o f lesson s learned , ther e

was littl e ne w fo r th e America n unit s

that fough t o n Luzo n and i n th e South -

ern Philippines . A s noted, al l bu t on e

of th e divisions had had previou s experience i n fightin g Japanes e o n groun d o f

Japanese choosing. I n th e reconquest of

the Philippines, therefore , unit s applied

lessons learne d bot h i n earlie r comba t

and i n training . Th e onl y really "new"

type o f actio n experience d wa s th e cit y

fighting in Manila, where the troops perforce mad e quic k an d thoroug h adjust -

ment t o differen t condition s o f combat .

Generally, America n arms an d arma -

ment prove d quantitativel y an d quali -

tatively superior to those of the Japanese.

The onl y significan t innovation s on th e

American sid e — helicopters, recoilles s

weapons, an d televisio n observatio n o f

the battlefield—cam e o n th e scen e to o

late i n th e campaig n fo r complet e an d

objective evaluation. All, however, gave

promise o f great thing s to come.

On th e Japanes e side , ther e wer e a

few items tha t th e American forces espe -

cially noted. Amon g these were the huge

rockets th e Shimbu Group employe d in

the mountain s northeast o f Manila . Although th e rocket s were generall y ineffective an d cause d fe w casualties , th e

experience wit h Japanes e rocket s o n

Luzon, together with similar experiences

of Tent h Arm y o n Okinawa , portende d

a possibl y mess y situatio n durin g th e

planned assaul t o n th e hom e islands .

Noteworthy als o was the abundanc e of

automatic weapon s th e Japanes e em -

ployed. Fo r example , to the men o f the

32d Infantr y Divisio n i t mus t hav e ap -

peared tha t at least every third Japanes e

defending th e Vill a Verd e Trai l wa s

armed wit h a machin e gun. Als o nota -

ble, if not downrigh t surprising, was the

fact tha t some Japanese units on Luzo n

proved themselve s capable of employing

artillery effectively . Allie d force s ha d

developed scan t respec t fo r Japanese artillery durin g previou s campaign s i n
654 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

the Pacific , bu t thos e U.S . Arm y unit s

that fought against the 58th IMB an d th e

10th Division o n Luzo n ha d a differen t

point o f view .

On Luzon , an d t o a lesse r exten t i n

the Souther n Philippines , th e Japanes e

proved themselves remarkably adaptable,

quick t o mak e th e bes t o f a n advers e

situation, possesse d o f a n excellen t fee l

for terrain , tenaciou s t o th e poin t o f

fanaticism o n th e defense , and , contrary

to genera l opinion , sufficientl y flexibl e

to chang e plan s an d disposition s a t a

moment's notice. Th e tactica l flexibility

of Yamashita' s plan s an d maneuver s

throughout norther n Luzon , considere d

within th e framewor k o f hi s defensiv e

concepts, i s certainl y notable . I t is , in -

deed, possibl e t o rais e question s con -

cerning th e Sixt h an d Eight h Armies '

flexibility a s compare d t o tha t o f 14th

Area Army and , in som e instances , t o

that o f Filipin o guerrill a forces . Th e

record suggest s tha t i n man y respect s

the Japanes e and the guerrillas may have

adapted themselves more effectively tha n

the Sixt h an d Eight h Armies to the conditions o f groun d warfar e obtainin g

throughout mos t o f th e Philippin e

archipelago.

Such a compariso n raise s question s

that d o no t necessaril y concer n leader -

ship or command, but rather involve the

training and generall y ponderous organization o f th e mechanize d force s tha t

the Unite d State s pu t int o th e field .

In previou s campaign s throughou t th e

Southwest Pacifi c Area , America n

ground force s ha d prove d themselve s

equal o r superio r t o th e Japanes e i n

flexibility an d adaptability . I n thos e

campaigns, the U.S. armies had employed

comparatively light force s t o seiz e island

perimeters or to clear small islands. Bu t

in th e Philippines , an d o n Luzo n espe -

cially, America n force s wer e face d wit h

the necessity of seizing and clearin g relatively larg e land masses. I n thes e operations, therefore , th e Sixt h an d Eight h

Armies had t o bring into play mass and

maneuver, an d ha d t o appl y othe r con -

cepts an d methods , includin g thos e en -

tailing logistica l operations , tha t th e

U.S. Arm y ha d develope d fo r wagin g

continental lan d warfare . Th e applica -

tion o f thes e concepts had a n inevitabl e

effect upo n flexibility . O n th e othe r

hand, th e recor d o f th e campaign s fo r

the reconques t o f th e Philippin e archi -

pelago raise s th e questio n whethe r th e

Sixth an d Eight h Armies , confronte d

with th e mor e obviou s requirements o f

ground operation s i n th e Philippines ,

may no t hav e moved to o fa r toward the

adoption o f th e method s an d concept s

of continenta l groun d warfare . I t als o

seems legitimat e t o suggest tha t th e tw o

armies migh t hav e employe d thes e concepts an d methods , as well a s the powe r

under thei r control , mor e resourcefull y

had thei r previou s experienc e i n th e

Southwest Pacifi c Are a prepare d the m

for th e typ e o f warfar e require d o n th e

land masse s o f th e Philippines .

For America n forces, departure s fro m

the norm of combat (i f such a thing ever

existed) involve d th e developmen t an d

employment o f fiel d expedient s t o mee t

special situations . Noteworth y i n thi s

category wa s extensive and effectiv e em -

ployment o f antiaircraf t artillery—bot h

90-mm. guns an d automati c weapons—

against groun d targets in th e mountainous Kembu, Shimbu, and Shobu strong -

holds an d o n norther n Negro s a s well .

It should also be noted that a few antiaircraft unit s that were not needed i n their
CONCLUSION 655

normal rol e came t o serv e creditably a s

Infantry.

Another notabl e departur e fro m nor -

mal operating procedur e wa s the varie d

use t o whic h th e artiller y liaiso n plan e

was put . Thi s versatil e ligh t aircraf t

served not only as the eyes of the artillery

but als o wa s employed i n a genera l in -

telligence role . I t evacuate d casualtie s

from remot e mountain airstrip s and wa s

often eve n pressed into service for supply

drops.

Other fiel d expedient s ar e worth y of

mention. LVT' s an d Dukw s were em -

ployed fo r long , overlan d suppl y hauls,

a tas k for which thes e vehicles were not

designed; flange d wheels were mounte d

on jeep s t o hau l supplie s ove r th e rail -

roads o f Luzo n unti l conventiona l en -

gines coul d b e foun d an d place d i n

service; Carabao s were used t o haul sup -

plies ove r mudd y trails tha t wheele d o r

tracked vehicle s could no t negotiate and

over whic h infantryme n coul d barel y

slog carryin g rifles ; and , finally , Arm y

engineer LCM's , a s wel l a s Nav y craft

of variou s types, were employe d o n th e

rivers of Mindanao. Non e of thes e fiel d

expedients originate d in the Philippines,

nor were some of them original with U.S.

forces. However , i n th e Philippine s

American comba t an d servic e unit s de -

veloped thes e and othe r fiel d expedient s

to suc h a degre e tha t the y became , i n

effect, par t o f th e Army' s standin g

operating procedure .

The roa d t o triump h i n th e Philip -

pines was not, o f course, solely the stor y

of th e Infantry . Th e contribution s o f

the ai r forces , th e nava l forces , th e

artillery, other supporting arms , and the

service echelon s wer e indispensable .

An evaluatio n o f ai r suppor t opera -

tions i s difficult . Generally , long-rang e

bombing attacks , b y whateve r ai r ele -

ment, were executed wit h dispatch , ac -

curacy, an d goo d effect . Th e stor y o f

close ground support operation s presents

a different picture . Ground comba t units

that a t on e tim e o r anothe r ha d clos e

support fro m bot h U.S . Army and U.S .

Marine Corp s aviatio n wer e virtuall y

unanimous i n preferrin g th e latter , a t

least durin g th e earlie r month s o f th e

campaigns. Later , when Fifth Ai r Force

units became more experience d i n clos e

ground suppor t activit y an d bega n t o

work more closely with the ground com -

bat forces , confidenc e in th e Army's air

arm grew . Nevertheless , th e campaig n

ended wit h almost all groun d unit s still

hoping fo r a n improved , mor e effectiv e

air-ground liaison system insofar as Army

air echelon s wer e concerned , an d als o

seeking method s b y whic h t o establis h

a closer, more effective working relationship betwee n th e Army' s groun d an d

air units.

Any evaluatio n o f th e effectivenes s o f

close air suppor t a s opposed t o artiller y

support is difficult. Eac h type of support

had capabilitie s no t possesse d b y th e

other, an d it was normal practic e if both

were availabl e t o emplo y whicheve r

could best do the job. Th e Japanes e ar e

not of much help in making a determination. Interrogate d afte r th e surrende r

by a groun d force s officer , a Japanes e

might sa y tha t artiller y wa s th e mor e

effective; interrogate d b y a n ai r office r

the sam e Japanes e migh t sa y tha t ai r

bombardment wa s mor e effective . O n

the othe r hand , th e Japanes e pointe d

out tha t aircraf t coul d conduc t strike s

against positions tha t artillery bombard -

ment could no t reach. Moreover , Allied

air superiorit y i n th e Philippine s se -
656 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

verely inhibite d Japanes e movements ,

forcing them to undertake marches under

cover o f darknes s o r t o mak e long , ex -

hausting detour s throug h wood s an d

forests. Th e sigh t o f a n artiller y liaiso n

plane i n th e sk y normall y prompte d

every Japanes e fo r mile s aroun d t o see k

cover.

There can be no denying the effective -

ness of artillery i n th e battl e for Manila .

Whether th e ai r ar m coul d hav e don e

the job more effectively and mor e rapidly

is, of course, an d unanswerabl e question

—General MacArthu r denie d i t th e

chance. On e o f th e majo r ai r successes ,

probably, cam e i n th e support provide d

the 43 d Infantr y Divisio n durin g tha t

unit's drive to capture Ip o Dam. Aeria l

bombardment and clos e support certainly contribute d i n larg e measur e t o th e

success o f th e 503 d Parachut e RCT' s

risky undertakin g a t Corregidor , an d i t

is no t possibl e t o dismis s th e ai r arm' s

contribution withou t mentionin g onc e

again th e fac t tha t th e 1s t Cavalr y Division's expose d lef t flan k wa s protecte d

during th e das h t o Manil a onl y b y air -

craft. Finally , on e o f th e mos t effectiv e

weapons throughout the entire campaign

to recaptur e Luzo n an d th e Souther n

Philippines wa s th e napal m al l ai r

elements dropped.

The campaig n produce d no insolubl e

logistical problems , an d ther e wer e n o

persistent, critica l shortage s o f supplie s

of an y type. A s might be expected, there

were man y logistica l difficulties , begin -

ning with th e advers e surf condition s at

Lingayen Gul f tha t upse t suppl y opera -

tions during the first week on Luzon and

brought t o light weaknesse s in th e plan -

ning an d executio n o f th e amphibiou s

undertaking. Mos t o f th e suppl y prob -

lems th e Sixt h an d Eight h Armie s en -

countered during the campaign, however,

grew ou t o f transportatio n difficulties .

These i n tur n resulte d fro m destructio n

of rai l and highwa y bridges, lack o f railroad rolling stock, problems inherent in

moving supplie s ove r th e rugged , track -

less terrai n wher e muc h o f th e fightin g

took place , th e poo r conditio n o f man y

roads, an d th e fac t tha t limitation s o n

shipping spac e mad e i t impossibl e fo r

most unit s t o brin g forwar d al l thei r

organic transportatio n durin g th e earl y

stages of the operation. Fiel d expedients

already mentione d solve d som e o f th e

transportation problems . Othe r solu -

tions, o n Luzon , include d th e leapfrog -

ging o f bridgin g equipment , and ,

throughout th e islands , th e extensiv e

employment o f Filipin o hand-carryin g

parties.

A theaterwid e shortag e o f artiller y

ammunition (an d o f som e type s o f

mortar ammunition ) compelle d Sixt h

Army on Luzo n t o impose a rather strict

rationing system . Th e rationing , i n a

larger sense , di d no t affec t th e ultimat e

outcome o f th e campaign , althoug h

some units may have lacked th e artillery

support they desired for a specific attack.

But i t must be remembere d tha t it is almost a principle of warfare that no infantry commande r eve r get s th e artiller y

support he wants or think s he needs.

Shortages o f othe r type s o f supplie s

were invariabl y temporar y an d usuall y

stemmed fro m transportatio n problems .

Whatever thei r causes , solutio n o f th e

multitude of majo r an d mino r logistica l

problems involve d i n a campaign o f th e

magnitude o f th e Luzon-Souther n Phil -

ippines operations demanded roun d th e

clock work. It is doubtful tha t the service

forces pu t i n longer hours on any Amer-
CONCLUSION 657

PHILIPPINE GUERRILL A SCOU T

ican battleground of World War II tha n

they di d o n Luzo n an d i n th e Souther n

Philippines.

One phenomeno n o f th e reconques t

of th e Philippine s wa s certainl y fa r dif -

ferent fro m an y othe r experience o f th e

war in the Pacific. Tha t was the presence

of a large , organize d guerrill a forc e

backed b y a generall y loya l populatio n

waiting onl y fo r th e chanc e t o mak e it s

contribution t o th e defea t o f Japan . I t

is debatabl e whethe r America n head -

quarters wer e adequatel y prepare d t o

make th e mos t effectiv e us e o f th e

guerrilla force s tha t existe d o n Luzo n

and i n th e Souther n Philippines ; i t i s

also questionabl e whethe r America n

forces mad e th e best possibl e us e o f th e

guerrillas afte r th e campaig n began .

From GH Q SWP A o n dow n throug h

infantry division s in th e field , th e orders

and plan s concernin g th e guerrillas , a s

well a s th e machiner y se t u p a t variou s

echelons to control and suppl y the guerrillas, indicat e tha t befor e th e invasio n

of Luzo n U.S . force s expecte d littl e

more o f th e guerrilla s tha n th e acquisi -

tion o f tactica l intelligenc e an d certai n

types o f servic e support. I t appears tha t

in many instances American commanders

were reluctan t t o assig n guerrill a unit s

specific comba t mission s o f eve n th e

most innocuou s sort . Sometime s guer -

rilla unit s acquire d a comba t missio n

only afte r the y ha d launche d a n opera -

tion themselves ; sometimes , a s seems t o

have bee n th e cas e wit h Sixt h Arm y

vis-à-vis USAFIP(NL) , th e comba t mis -

sion cam e onl y afte r America n head -

quarters realize d tha t the y di d no t hav e

sufficient regula r force s t o undertak e

assigned tasks . I n an y case , i t i s certain

that bot h th e Sixt h an d th e Eight h

Army ultimatel y mad e mor e extensiv e

use o f guerrilla s tha n wa s originall y

contemplated.

It is unfortunately impossibl e to measure in concrete terms the contribution of

guerrilla force s t o th e outcom e o f th e

campaigns. Som e units were good; some

were not . A n occasiona l guerrill a force ,

with politica l aim s o r unde r a leade r

with delusions of grandeur, caused more

trouble tha n i t wa s worth. I n th e end ,

however, almos t al l serve d i n on e wa y

or anothe r t o th e limits of their capabilities. Beyon d th e shadow of a doubt th e

guerrillas save d man y thousand s o f

American lives .

The stor y of the Filipino contribution

to th e fina l triump h i n th e Philippine s

does not en d wit h mention of guerrillas,
658 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

for thousand s o f othe r Filipino s aide d

the U.S . Army i n man y capacities. Fili -

pinos contribute d service s o f al l types ,

as railroad men, truck drivers, engineers,

clerks, government official s an d employ -

ees, guides, spies, and carriers who often

risked thei r live s hand-carryin g supplie s

to th e fron t lines . Ther e i s n o doub t

that th e guerrilla s an d th e othe r Fili -

pinos mad e th e tas k o f th e U.S . Arm y

infinitely les s difficult . I t is , indeed ,

difficult t o imagin e ho w th e Southwes t

Pacific Are a coul d hav e undertake n th e

reconquest o f th e Philippine s i n th e

time an d manne r i t di d withou t th e

predominately loyal and willing Filipino

population.

Though th e en d o f th e wa r cam e be -

fore th e Philippines (an d the Filipinos)

could fulfil l th e role s planne d fo r the m

in Japan's inevitabl e defeat , th e fac t o f

Japan's sudde n collaps e i n n o wa y de -

tracts fro m th e significanc e o f th e tri -

umph i n th e Philippines . Hindsigh t

arguments abou t th e desirabilit y an d

necessity o f tyin g u p stron g America n

forces—sixteen divisions , o r equivalent ,

in groun d comba t troop s alone—i n th e

reconquest o f Luzo n an d th e Souther n

Philippines ma y rag e fo r decade s t o

come, with justice and logic undoubtedly

to b e foun d o n bot h side s o f th e argu -

ment. Th e fac t remain s tha t i t wa s the

consensus o f militar y planner s i n th e

fall o f 1944 , whe n the y decided t o seiz e

Luzon an d bypas s Formos a i n favo r o f

a jum p t o Okinawa , tha t th e successfu l

prosecution o f th e wa r agains t Japa n

demanded th e reoccupatio n o f Luzon .

In th e military-politica l milie u o f Octo -

ber 1944 , i t is hard t o imagin e tha t th e

planners coul d hav e reache d an y othe r

decision.
















Appendix E

SHIMBU GROUP ORDE R OF BATTLE

HEADQUARTERS AN D SERVICE TROOP S

Headquarters, 8t h Divisio n

8th Engineer Regiment (les s 1st Company), 8th Division

8th Transport Regiment (les s 3d Company), 8th Division

Signal Unit (les s elements), 8th Division

Ordnance Service Unit, 8t h Division

Chemical Unit, 8th Division

Veterinary Unit, 8th Division

Water Supply and Purificatio n Unit , 8th Division

SHIMBU GROU P ARTILLER Y

22d Medium Artiller y Regiment (les s 1s t Battalion )

20th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion (les s 1st and 4th Batteries)

SHIMBU GROU P RESERV E FORC E

Kobayashi Unit

Headquarters, 31st Infantry , 8t h Division

1st Battalion, 31st Infantry, 8t h Division

2d Battalion (les s 6th Company and less two platoons, Machine Gun

Company), 31st Infantry, 8t h Division

Elements, Regimenta l Gun Company, 31st Infantry, 8t h Divisio n

Elements, Antitank Company , 31st Infantry , 8t h Division

Elements, Labor Unit , 31st Infantry , 8t h Division

Elements, Signal Unit, 31st Infantry, 8t h Division

11th Company , 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry , 8t h Divisio n

23d Independent Antitank Battalion

13th Independent Machine Gun Battalion (les s 1st Company)

12th Provisional Machine Gun Company

3d Company, 114t h Surfac e Raidin g Base Battalion, 2d Surface Raiding Bas e Force

Takahashi Platoon
APPENDIXES 675

Takanami Uni t

Headquarters, 26t h Independen t Infantr y

2d Battalion , 26t h Independen t Infantr y

Elements, Antitank Company , 26t h Independen t Infantr y

Elements, Regimenta l Gu n Company , 26t h Independen t Infantr y

Elements, Signa l Unit, 26th Independen t Infantry

Kuwazawa Unit

Headquarters, 3 d Battalion , 17t h Infantry , 8t h Divisio n

3d Battalion (les s 10t h Company), 17t h Infantry , 8t h Divisio n

2d Company, 1s t Battalion , 17t h Infantry , 8t h Divisio n

Elements, Regimenta l Gu n Company , 17t h Infantry , 8t h Division

Elements, Labor Unit, 17t h Infantry , 8t h Division

Elements, Signal Unit, 17t h Infantry , 8t h Division

1st Company, 21st Medium Mortar Battalion

Railway Provisiona l Infantr y Battalio n (8t h Railwa y Regiment)

Nagamatsu Provisiona l Infantr y Battalio n

1st Signa l Unit, Southern Area Army

4th Signa l Unit , Southern Area Army

Elements, 2 d Signal Unit , Southern Area Army

8th Reconnaissanc e Regiment, 8t h Division

EAST O F MANIL A NAVA L FORC E (FURUS E UNIT )

Elements, 31st Naval Special Bas e Force

Elements, 3d Naval Battalion, Manil a Naval Defense Forc e

Elements, 4th Nava l Battalion, Manila Naval Defens e Forc e

Elements, 1s t Independen t Nava l Battalion , Manil a Nava l Defens e Forc e

Fujiyoshi Uni t (Antiaircraft Artillery )

KAWASHIMA FORC E

Headquarters and Servic e Troops

Headquarters, 82d Infantry Brigade , 105t h Divisio n

Signal Unit, 82d Infantry Brigade , 105t h Division

Labor Unit , 82 d Infantry Brigade , 105t h Divisio n

10th Company , Engineer Unit , 105t h Divisio n

1st Platoon , 7th Company, Engineer Unit , 105t h Division

Elements, Field Hospital, 105t h Division

Elements, 2d Field Hospital, 8th Division

Elements, 4th Field Hospital, 8th Division

Elements, 137t h Line of Communications Hospital

Elements, 141st Line of Communications Hospital

Elements, Transport Unit, 105th Division

Elements, Water Supply and Purification Unit , 30th Division
676 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Antiaircraft Uni t (Ueda Detachment)

1st Company, 78th Field Antiaircraft Battalio n

51st Machine Cannon Company

52d Machin e Cannon Company

Kawashima Force Artillery (Setoguchi Detachment.)

Headquarters, 8th Field Artillery Regiment, 8th Division

2d Battalion, 8th Field Artillery Regiment, 8th Division (less 8th Battery)

3d Battalion, 8th Field Artillery Regiment, 8th Division (less 9th Battery)

4th Provisiona l Artillery Battery

11th Battery, 4th Battalion, 8th Field Artillery Regiment, 8th Division

12th Battery, 4th Battalion, 8th Field Artillery Regiment, 8th Division

1st Assault Regiment (Hanabusa Detachment)

Headquarters and Regimental Troops

Headquarters, 9th Air Intelligence Regiment

Maeda Unit

Nishimura Company

Harai Company

Yagi Company

Regimental Antitank Unit

1st Provisional Antitank Platoon

2d Provisional Antitank Platoon

Hattori Antitank Uni t

Regimental Machine Gun Unit

1st Company, 25th Independent Machine Gun Battalion

Araki Independent Machine Gun Unit

1st Battalio n

Headquarters, 10t h Air Intelligence Regiment

10th Air Intelligence Regiment (less elements)

1st Company, 13th Independent Machine Gun Battalion

118th Surface Raiding Base Battalion, 2d Surface Raiding Base Force

2d Battalion

9th Air Intelligence Regiment (less Headquarters)

3d Battalion

9th Provisiona l Infantr y Battalio n (convalescents from Manil a hospitals)

2d Assault Regiment (Tomono Detachment)

Headquarters, 12th Air Intelligence Regiment

23d Independent Antitank Battalion

1st Battalion

1st Company, 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, 8th Division

4th Company, 12t h Air Signal Regiment

3d Company, 359th Independent Infantry Battalion, 82d Infantry

Brigade, 105th Division

Elements, Southern Area Army Motor Transport Depot
APPENDIXES 677

4th Provisional Machine Gun Company

11th Provisional Machine Gun Company

Adachi Heavy Machine Gun Unit

Shigeo Machine Gun Uni t

Sato Antitank Platoon

Kanda Antitank Platoon

2d Battalion

2d Company, 12t h Air Signal Regiment

1st Company, 4th Special Air Signal Unit

10th Provisional Machine Gun Company

3d Battalion

4th Company, 10th Air Intelligence Regiment

Guard Company, 10th Air Intelligence Regiment

Machine Gun Company, 1st Battalion, 153 d Infantry, 49th Division

Muroya Provisional Infantry Battalio n

Headquarters, 2d Air Signal Regiment

Elements, 12t h Air Signal Regiment

Elements, 5th Air-Ground Signal Unit

Elements, 61st Air-Ground Signal Unit

124th Independent Radio Platoon

128th Independent Radio Platoon

129th Independen t Radio Platoon

Replacements and casuals, 132 d Infantry Regiment, 57th Division

Replacements and casuals, 154t h Infantry Regiment, 54th Division

Kasama Battalion

358th Independent Infantry Battalion, 82d Infantry Brigade ,

105th Division

4th Company (less 1st Platoon), 355th Independent Infantry Battalion,

78th Infantry Brigade, 102 d Division

1st Platoon, 3d Company, 359th Independent Infantry Battalion , 82d

Infantry Brigade , 105th Division

Elements, 2d Survey Regiment

Elements, 5th Air-Ground Signal Unit

Elements, 61st Air-Ground Signal Unit

2d Company, 25th Independent Machine Gun Battalion

2d Platoon, Antitank Unit, 82d Infantry Brigade , 105t h Division

KOBAYASHI FORC E

Headquarters and Service Troops

Headquarters, 1st Field Replacement Depot (Headquarters, Manila

Defense Force)

Elements, 63d Line of Communications Hospital

Veterinary Section, 85th Line of Communications Sector Headquarters
678 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

7th Company (less 1st Platoon), Engineer Unit, 105t h Division

1st Provisional Engineer Company

2d Provisional Engineer Company

1st Provisiona l Truck Company

Kobayashi Force Artillery

3d Battalion, 53d Field Artillery Regiment

Kobayashi Force Reserve

"X" Provisiona l Infantry Battalio n

1st Company, 359th Independen t Infantr y Battalion , 82 d Infantr y

Brigade, 105th Division

2d Company , 359t h Independen t Infantr y Battalion , 82 d Infantr y

Brigade, 105t h Division

2d Company, 355th Independent Infantry Battalion , 78th Infantr y

Brigade, 102 d Division

3d Company, 178t h Independent Infantr y Battalion , 79th Infantry

Brigade, 103d Division

1st Platoon , 4th Company , 355t h Independen t Infantr y Battalion ,

78th Infantry Brigade , 102d Division

5th Provisional Infantry Compan y

Elements, Signal Unit, 102d Divisio n

Elements, Signal Unit, 77th Infantry Brigade, 102d Division

Elements, Artillery Unit, 102 d Division

Yamauye Provisional Infantry Battalion

Kawabe Provisional Infantry Battalion

Right Sector Unit (Hayashi Detachment)

4th Provisional Infantry Battalio n

7th Provisiona l Infantry Battalio n

1st Platoon, 2d Provisional Machine Cannon Company

6th Provisional Antitank Company

Sector Machine Gun Unit

5th Provisional Machine Gun Company

10th Provisional Machine Gun Company

12th Provisional Machine Gun Company

Sector Artillery

2d Battery, 1st Battalion, 8th Field Artillery Regiment, 8th Division

5th Provisional Artillery Battery

7th Provisional Artillery Battery

Central Sector Unit (Degura Detachment)

10th Provisional Infantry Battalio n

Ebisu Provisiona l Infantr y Battalio n (prisone r o f wa r an d internmen t

camp guards fro m Manil a are a camps)

4th Medium Mortar Battalion
APPENDIXES 679

Left Secto r Unit (Nambu Detachment)

8th Provisional Infantry Battalio n

Imanari Provisional Infantry Battalio n

11th Company, 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, 8th Division

Elements, 14th Area Army Field Ordnance Depot

11th Air Sector Command Provisional Infantry Battalio n

Headquarters, 11t h Air Sector Command

77th Field Antiaircraft Battalio n

78th Field Antiaircraft Battalio n (less 1st Company)

11th Airdrome Battalion

134th Airdrome Battalion

148th Airdrome Battalion

149th Airdrome Battalion

180th Airdrome Battalion

111th Land Duty Company

8th Machine Cannon Company

5th Provisional Antitank Company

7th Provisional Machine Gun Company

Sector Artillery

6th Provisional Artillery Battery

3d Rocket Gun Battalio n

Ishimaru Unit 106t h Surfac e Raiding Base Battalion, 3d Su

NOGUCHI FORC E

Headquarters and Service Troops

Headquarters, 81st Infantry Brigade, 105th Division

Elements, 63d Line of Communications Hospital

Elements, Field Hospital, 105th Division

Elements, Veterinary Unit, 105th Division

Elements, Water Supply and Purification Unit , 105t h Division

Elements, Transportation Unit, 105th Division

22d Special Motor Transport Company

Signal Unit, 81st Infantry Brigade, 105th Division

Labor Unit, 81st Infantry Brigade, 105th Division

Elements, Signal Unit, 105th Division

2d, 8th, and 9th Companies, Engineer Unit, 105th Division

Noguchi Force Artillery

3d Battalion (less 9th Company), 53d Field Artillery Regiment

1st Battalion, 22d Medium Artillery Regiment

1st Company, Artillery Unit, 105th Division

3d Company, Artillery Unit, 105th Division
680 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

4th Company, 20th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion

3d Company, 21st Medium Mortar Battalion

2d Company, 21st Medium Mortar Battalion

Okita Detachment

186th Independent Infantry Battalion, 82d Infantry Brigade, 105th

Division

108th Surfac e Raidin g Base Battalion, 2d Surface Raiding Base Force

1st Company , 107th Surface Raidin g Base Battalion, 1st Surface Raid -

ing Base Force

1st Provisiona l Infantry Battalio n (replacements from Souther n Area

Army Replacement Depot, Manila)

Suzuki Provisional Infantry Battalion

22d Airdrome Construction Unit

136th Airdrome Construction Unit

137th Airdrome Construction Unit

Ogasawara Unit

1st Company , 109t h Surfac e Raidin g Base Battalion , 1st Surfac e

Raiding Base Force

2d Company, 107t h Surface Raiding Base Battalion, 1st Surface

Raiding Base Force

2d Company , 110th Surface Raidin g Bas e Battalion, 1st Surfac e

Raiding Base Force

Lusena Military Police Squad

1st Platoon, 3d Provisional Artillery Battery

Elements, 21st Shipping Engineer Regiment

Kuromiya Detachment

181st Independent Infantry Battalion, 81st Infantry Brigade ,

105th Division

Iwashita Provisional Infantry Battalion

Fukuzawa Provisional Infantry Battalion, 8th Division

Detachment Artillery

21st Medium Mortar Battalion (less 1st, 2d, and 3d Companies)

1st Company, 4th Medium Mortar Battalion

6th Company, Engineer Unit, 105t h Division

1st Platoon, 1st Provisional Engineer Company

Kimura Detachment

182d Independent Infantry Battalion (less 3d Company), 81st Infantry

Brigade, 105t h Division

2d Company, 113th Surface Raiding Base Battalion, 2d Surface

Raiding Base Force

Sugiyama Detachment

185th Independent Infantry Battalion, 81st Infantry Brigade,

105th Division
APPENDIXES 681

Fujita Provisional Infantry Battalion

1st Company (less one platoon), 183d Independent Infantry Battalion,

81st Infantry Brigade, 105th Division

2d Company (les s one platoon), 183d Independent Infantry Battalion,

81st Infantry Brigade, 105t h Division

3d Company, 183d Independent Infantry Battalion, 81st Infantry

Brigade, 105th Division

Kumazawa Provisional Infantry Battalion (24th Shipping Engineer

Regiment, less 1st Battalion)

Noguchi Force Reserve

107th Surfac e Raidin g Base Battalion (les s 1st and 2 d Companies),

1st Surface Raiding Base Force

109th Surface Raiding Base Battalion (less 1st Company), 1st Surface

Raiding Base Force

113th Surface Raiding Base Battalion (less 2d Company), 2d Surface

Raiding Base Force

KOGURE DETACHMEN T

Headquarters, 1st Surface Raiding Base Force

1st Surface Raiding Base Force Units

7th Surface Raiding Battalion (less one company)

9th Surface Raiding Battalion

10th Surface Raiding Battalion

110th Surface Raiding Base Battalion

107th Surface Raiding Base Battalion

Elements, 109th Surface Raiding Base Battalion

Other Units

Elements, 108t h Surface Raiding Base Battalion, 2d Surface Raiding

Base Force

2d Company, 10th Air Intelligence Regiment

5th Company, 10th Air Intelligence Regiment

1st Battalion, 24th Shipping Engineer Regiment
Appendix F

STRENGTH AN D DEPLOYMENT O F JAPANES E I N TH E SOUTHER N PHILIPPINE S

Palawan an d Offshor e Islets

Army ground force s . . . 60 0

Army air forces .... . 90 0

Naval force s ..... . 25 0

Noncombatant civilian s . —

1,750

Trained combat effectives

Army ....... . 30 0

Navy ....... . 5 0

350

Zamboanga Peninsula

Army groun d force s . . . 4,60 0

Army air forces .... . 80 0

Naval force s ..... . 3,50 0

Noncombatant civilian s . —

8,900

Trained comba t effective s

Army ....... . 3,50 0

Navy ....... . 1,00 0

4,500

Sulu Archipelago

Army ground force s . . . 2,40 0

Army air forces .... . 1,15 0

Naval force s ..... . 35 0

Noncombatant civilian s . —

3,900

Trained comba t effective s

Army ....... . 1,65 0

Navy ....... . 5 0

1,700

Panay an d Offshor e Islet s

Army ground force s . . . 2,23 5

Army air forces .... . 17 5

Naval force s ..... . 2 5

Noncombatant civilian s . 40 0

2,835

Trained combat effective s

Army ....... . 1,50 0

Navy ....... . —

1,500

Northwestern Negros Island

Army ground force s . . . 5,50 0

Army air forces .... . 7,50 0

Naval force s ..... . 50 0

Noncombatant civilian s . 10 0

13,600

Trained combat effective s

Army ....... . 4,00 0

Navy ....... . —

4,000
APPENDIXES 683

Cebu Islan d

Army groun d force s . . . 8,69 0

Army air forces .... . 40 0

Naval force s ..... . 3,71 0

Noncombatant civilian s . 1,70 0

14,500

Trained combat effective s

Army . ...... . 2,25 0

Navy ....... . 30 0

2,550

Bohol Island

Army groun d force s . . . 23 0

Army air forces .... . 5 0

Naval force s ..... . 5 0

Noncombatant civilian s . —

330

Trained comba t effective s

Army ....... . 18 0

Navy ....... . —

180

Southeastern Negro s Islan d

Army ground force s . . . 80 0

Army air force s .... . 35 0

Naval force s ..... . 15 0

Noncombatant civilian s . —

1,300

Trained comba t effective s

Army ....... . 50 0

Navy ....... . —

500

Eastern Mindana o

Army ground force s . . . 28,77 5

Army air forces .... . 8,05 0

Naval force s ..... . 6,46 5

Noncombatant civilian s . 12,58 0

55,850

Trained combat effective s

Army ....... . 14,37 0

Navy ....... . 50 0

14,870

Totals

Army ground force s . . . 53,81 0

Army air forces .... . 19,37 5

Naval force s ..... . 15,00 0

Total military ... . 88,18 5

Noncombatant civilian s . 14,78 0

Grand Total ... . 102,965

Trained ground comba t troops

Army ....... . 28,25 0

Navy ....... . 1,90 0

Total. ...... . 30,15 0
Appendix G

Japanese Orde r o f Battle in Easter n Mindana o

APPENDIX G-1—100TH DIVISION, 1 7 APRI L 1945

Davao Distric t Uni t (Lt , Gen. Jiro Harada , Commandin g General , 100t h

Division)

100th Divisio n Headquarters Uni t

Headquarters, 100t h Divisio n

167th Independen t Infantr y Battalion , less two companies

3d Company, 163 d Independent Infantry Battalio n

100th Divisio n Transportatio n Uni t

1st Field Hospital, 30th Division, less elements

13th Army Hospital

Elements, 35th Army Signal Unit

Elements, 35th Army Informatio n Sectio n

Elements, Provisional Chemical Unit

Elements, 14t h Area Army Field Freight Depot

Special Tank Platoo n (U.S. ligh t tanks)

Davao Coast Artillery Unit

Davao Line of Communications Squadron

2d Provisiona l Construction Dut y Compan y

100th Division Signal Unit

100th Division Artillery Unit, less one battery

100th Division Enginee r Unit, less fiv e companie s

Right Sector Unit (Maj. Gen. Ko Tochigi, Commanding General, 76th

Infantry Brigade , 100th Division)

Headquarters and Brigad e Troops, 76t h Infantr y Brigad e

352d Independen t Infantr y Battalio n

353d Independent Infantry Battalion

168th Independen t Infantr y Battalion , less 3 d and 4t h Companie s

8th Company, 100t h Division Engineer Unit

10th Company, 100t h Division Engineer Unit
APPENDIXES 685

Ide Battalio n

12th Airfiel d Battalio n

14th Airfield Battalio n

3d Nava l Battalion, 32d Naval Specia l Bas e Force

114th Naval Air Defens e Uni t

126th Nava l Air Defens e Uni t

28th Special Machine Cannon Uni t (Army )

Left Sector Unit (Maj . Gen. Muraji Kawazoe , Commanding General,

75th Infantry Brigade )

Headquarters an d Brigad e Troops, 75th Infantr y Brigad e

164th Independen t Infantry Battalio n

165th Independen t Infantr y Battalio n

Battery, 100t h Division Artillery Unit

Company, 100t h Division Engineer Unit

Elements, 1st Fiel d Hospital, 30th Divisio n

1st Nava l Battalion, 32d Naval Special Bas e Force

97th Naval Air Defense Unit

954th Naval Machine Cannon Unit

25th Special Machine Cannon Unit (Army )

26th Special Machine Cannon Unit (Army )

27th Special Machine Cannon Unit (Army )

2d Naval Battalion, 32d Naval Special Base Force

Force troops, 32d Naval Special Base Force

129th Nava l Air Defens e Unit

Headquarters, 32d Naval Special Bas e Force

Hosono Uni t

Headquarters, 13th Air Sector Command

8th Airfield Battalio n

127th Airfield Battalion

126th Field Airfield Construction Unit

Elements, 26th Airfield Construction Battalion

Strength, Davao Distric t Unit

Army ground force s ............ . 13,10 0

Army air forces .............. . 2,90 0

Naval force s ............... . 3,67 5

Noncombatant civilian s .......... . 12,00 0

Total ................. . 31,57 5

Digos Distric t Uni t (Col . Rinzo Shizuru , Commandin g Officer , 163 d Inde -

pendent Infantr y Battalion , 100t h Division )

Headquarters, 163 d Independent Infantry Battalio n

163d Independen t Infantry Battalion, less 3d Company
686 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

3d Battalion, 30th Field Artillery Regiment, 30th Division, less 9th

and 11th Batteries

Platoon, 100t h Divisio n Enginee r Unit

Headquarters, 4th Nava l Battalion, 32 d Naval Special Bas e Force

94th Nava l Air Defens e Uni t

225th Naval Construction Unit

22d Special Machine Cannon Unit (Army)

23d Special Machine Cannon Unit (Army)

24th Special Machine Cannon Unit (Army )

Naval Supply Depot

Naval Flying Unit

Strength, Digos Distric t Unit

Army ground force s ............ . 1,29 0

Army air forces .............. . 0

Naval force s ............... . 2,04 0

Noncombatant civilian s .......... . 58 0

Total ................. . 3,91 0

Sarangani District Unit (afte r 1 May ) (Maj . Makot o Takatsuka, Commanding Officer , 1s t Battalion , 30t h Fiel d Artiller y Regiment , 30t h Division )

Headquarters, 1st Battalion , 30t h Field Artillery Regiment

1st Battalion , 30th Field Artillery Regiment, less 3d Battery

Company, 168t h Independent Infantry Battalio n

Hospitalized patients, 1st Battalion, 74th Infantry, 30t h Division

Elements, 2d Field Hospital, 30th Division

Naval Construction Unit

Naval Air Defens e Uni t

Naval Flying Unit

Strength, Sarangani Distric t Unit

Army ground force s ............ . 1,05 0

Naval force s ............... . 45 0

Total ................. . 1,50 0

Kingking District Unit (eas t coast of Davao Gulf)

Company, 167th Independent Infantry Battalion

Company, 168t h Independent Infantry Battalion

Strength, Kingkin g Distric t Unit

Army groun d force s ............ . 40 0

Total ................. . 40 0
APPENDIXES 687

Total Japanese Strength in the 100th Division Area

Army ground combat and service elements, including civilians inducted

into the Army ground echelons, November 1944-Apri l 194 5 . . . 15,84 0

Army air force elements, all of the servic e category but some armed a s

auxiliary infantr y ..................... . 2,90 0

Naval comba t an d service elements .............. . 6,16 5

Noncombatant, nonmilitarized civilian s ............ . 12,58 0

Grand tota l ...................... . 37,48 5

Subtotal o f trained ground comba t effective s

100th Divisio n an d attached units ......... . 8,32 0

32d Nava l Special Bas e Force ........... . 50 0

Total .................... . 8,82 0

APPENDIX G-2—100TH DIVISION REORGANIZATIO N O F MID-MAY

(Major Comba t Unit s Only )

Headquarters, 100t h Division (Lt . Gen . Jir o Harada)

Right Front Line Unit (Maj. Gen . Muraj i Kawazoe , Commanding General, 75th Infantr y Brigade )

Headquarters and Brigad e Troops, 75th Infantr y Brigad e

164th Independent Infantry Battalion , less one company

165th Independent Infantr y Battalion , less one compan y

168th Independent Infantry Battalion , less one company

Company, 166t h Independent Infantry Battalio n

Remnants, 163 d Independen t Infantr y Battalio n

Remnants, 3d Battalion, 30th Field Artillery Regiment,

30th Division

Battery, 100th Division, Artillery Unit

Reinforced company , 100t h Divisio n Enginee r Unit

Left Fron t Lin e Uni t (Maj . Gen . K o Tochigi, Commandin g General ,

76th Infantr y Brigade )

Headquarters and Brigad e Troops, 76th Infantr y Brigad e

352d Independent Infantry Battalio n

353d Independent Infantry Battalio n

Ide Battalio n

167th Independen t Infantr y Battalion , les s two companie s

3d Naval Battalion, 32d Naval Special Base Force

100th Division Artillery Unit, less one battery (actual strength is

about one battery )

Two companies, 100t h Divisio n Engineer Unit

Left Distric t Uni t (Rea r Adm . Naoj i Doi , Commandin g Officer , 32 d

Naval Special Base Force)

Headquarters and Service Troops, 32d Naval Special Bas e Force

1st Nava l Battalion
688 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

2d Naval Battalion

Remnants, 4th Naval Battalion

Company, 164t h Independent Infantry Battalion

Company, 165t h Independent Infantry Battalion

Hosono Unit

APPENDIX G-3—30TH DIVISION, 1 7 APRI L 1945

Eastern Sector Unit

Headquarters, 3d Battalion, 41st Infantry, 30th Divisio n

3d Battalion , 41st Infantry

Platoon, 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry

1st Company, 19t h Shippin g Enginee r Regimen t

Surigao Coast Artillery Uni t

Elements, 30th Divisio n Ordnanc e Servic e Unit

Miscellaneous army units

Miscellaneous naval units

Strength, Eastern Sector Unit

Army ground force s ............. . 1,90 0

Naval force s ................. . 30 0

2,200

Northern Secto r Uni t (Col . Toshiro Nawa , Commandin g Officer , 30t h

Reconnaissance Regiment)

Headquarters, 30th Reconnaissanc e Regiment, 30th Division

30th Reconnaissance Regiment, less 3d Company

1st Battalion , 77t h Infantry , 30t h Division

3d Company, 1st Battalion , 74t h Infantry , 30t h Division

19th Shippin g Engineer Regiment , less 1s t Compan y

15th Debarkation Unit

61st Anchorage Headquarters

Provisional Artillery Battery , 30t h Fiel d Artiller y Regimen t

Reinforced company , 30th Enginee r Regiment

Headquarters, Del Monte Sector Air Force Unit

102d Airfiel d Battalion , less elements

103d Airfield Battalio n

1st Specia l Airfield Constructio n Uni t

Elements, 125t h Fiel d Airfiel d Constructio n Uni t

Elements, 37th Airfield Battalio n

Miscellaneous 2d Air Division units

Strength, Northern Secto r Unit

Army ground force s ............. . 2,10 0

Army air forces................. 2,40 0

4,500
APPENDIXES 689

Central Sector Unit (Col . Ka n Negishi , Commanding Officer, 74t h Infantry ,

30th Division )

Headquarters, 74th Infantry, 30t h Division

74th Infantry, less 1st Battalion

6th Company , reinforced, 77t h Infantr y

3d Company , 30t h Reconnaissanc e Regimen t

Headquarters, 30t h Fiel d Artillery Regimen t

2d Battalion, 30th Field Artillery Regiment

3d Battery , 1s t Battalion , 30th Fiel d Artillery Regiment

Company, 30th Enginee r Regimen t

Valencia Sector Air Force Unit

Rear Strong Point Construction Forc e

Headquarters, 31st Air Sector Comman d

32d Airfiel d Battalio n

37th Airfiel d Battalion , less elements

125th Field Airfield Constructio n Unit , less elements

Valencia Sector Force

1st Repair Depot, Manil a Air Depot

Headquarters, 3 d Airfiel d Constructio n Uni t

8th Specia l Airfield Constructio n Uni t

33d Airfiel d Battalio n

18th Specia l Machin e Canno n Uni t (Army )

19th Specia l Machin e Canno n Uni t (Army )

8th Independen t Maintenance Unit, 14th Field Air Depot

1st Branc h Depot, 2 d Repair Depot

Headquarters, 1s t Signa l Unit

Miscellaneous 2d Air Division units

Strength, Centra l Sector Unit

Army ground force s ............. . 2,90 0

Army air forces. ............... . 2,60 0

5,500

30th Division Headquarters Unit (Lt. Gen. Gyosak u Morozumi , Commanding General, 30t h Division ) (Locate d i n Centra l Secto r Unit's Area )

Headquarters, 30th Divisio n

30th Transportatio n Regiment, 30th Divisio n

Two companies , 30t h Enginee r Regimen t

2d Fiel d Hospital , 30th Divisio n

4th Fiel d Hospital, 30th Divisio n

4th Company, 1s t Battalion , 74th Infantr y

Water Supply and Purificatio n Unit , 30th Divisio n

Signal Unit, 30t h Division

Elements, Ordnance Service Unit, 30th Division
690 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Sick Hors e Depot, 30th Divisio n

Miscellany

Strength, Headquarters Uni t

Army groun d force s ............. . 1,00 0

Southern Sector Unit (Col. Koritaki Ouchi, Commanding Officer, 30t h Engineer Regiment)

Headquarters, 30t h Enginee r Regiment , 30t h Divisio n

30th Enginee r Regiment , less four companie s

7th Company , 100t h Divisio n Enginee r Uni t

9th Company , 100t h Divisio n Enginee r Uni t

1st Battalion , 74th Infantry , less two companies

3d Company , 166t h Independen t Infantr y Battalion , 100t h Divi -

sion, less tw o platoons

1st Fiel d Hospital , 30t h Divisio n

Medical Service Unit, 30th Divisio n (Muras e Battalion)

Strength, Southern Secto r Unit

Army groun d force s ............. . 2,50 0

Western Sector Unit (Lt. Col. Yutaka Takumi, Commanding Officer, 166t h

Independent Infantr y Battalion )

Headquarters, 166th Independent Infantry Battalion, 75th Brigade,

100th Divisio n

166th Independen t Infantr y Battalion , less 3 d Compan y (less two

platoons)

1st Company, 12t h Airfiel d Battalio n

Elements, Medica l Servic e Unit, 30th Divisio n

Elements, 4th Company, 100t h Division Engineer Unit

Miscellany

Strength, Western Sector Unit

Army ground force s ............. . 1,35 0

Army air forces. ............... . 15 0

Total Strength in th e 30th Division Area

Army ground combat and service elements ...... . 11,75 0

Army air force elements, all of the service category but some

armed as auxiliary infantr y ........... . 5,15 0

Naval force s ................... . 30 0

Grand tota l ................. . 17,20 0

Subtotal of trained ground combat effective s

30th Division and attached units ..... . 5,80 0

5,800
APPENDIXES 691

APPENDIX G-4—ORDE R O F BATTL E O F JAPANES E FORCE S ALON G

THE NORTHWESTER N SECTIO N O F TH E KIBAWE-TALOM O TRAIL

Ca. 1 0 May 45

Command Groupment, Chief o f Staff, 35t h Army (Maj. Gen. Yoshiharu

Tomochika)

Chief o f Staff' s Offic e

Elements, 35th Army Signal Unit

100th Divisio n Field Hospita l

13th Souther n Army Hospital

Headquarters, 58t h Fiel d Roa d Constructio n Battalio n

58th Fiel d Roa d Constructio n Battalio n

Remnants, 4th, 7th, an d 9t h Companies, 100t h Divisio n Engineer Uni t

1st an d 2 d Provisiona l Constructio n Dut y Companie s

Platoon, 37t h Constructio n Dut y Company

Company, 30t h Transportatio n Regiment , 30t h Divisio n

Elements, Medica l Servic e Unit , 30t h Divisio n

One-half Machin e Gun Company , 1st Battalion , 74th Infantr y

Stragglers, rifle companies, 1st Battalion , 74th Infantr y

Elements, 1st Shipping Engineer Replacemen t Unit

Elements, 3d Company, 19th Shipping Engineer Regiment

Service troops ........... . 75 0

Combat troop s ........... . 25 0

Total ............. . 1,00 0

Added i n mid-June

Understrength company , 163 d Independent Infantr y Battalion , 100t h

Division

Understrength company , 353 d Independen t Infantr y Battalion , 100t h

Division

Added i n lat e July

Remaining remnants , 353 d Independen t Infantr y Battalion , 100t h

Division
Appendix H

The Cos t o f the Campaign s

APPENDIX H-1—BATTLE CASUALTIE S O F U.S. ARM Y GROUN D

COMBAT FORCES , LUZO N AN D THE SOUTHER N PHILIPPINES , 1945 a

a

 While primarily reflecting th e casualties of ground comba t

units, the figure s i n the table include the casualties of ASCOM

units whil e unde r Sixt h Arm y contro l fro m 9 Januar y t o 1 3

February, an d als o includ e th e casualtie s o f groun d servic e

units attache d directl y t o groun d comba t units. Suc h casual -

ties were usually reported as those of division, corps, and army

troops. Because of many obvious duplications, it is impossible

to deriv e an y reliabl e figure s fo r servic e unit s a s a whole .

There bein g n o reliabl e figure s excep t fo r the USAFIP(NL) ,

guerrilla casualties are not included. Slight differences betwee n

the figures given in the text and those in the table are explained

on th e on e han d b y difference s i n tim e coverag e an d o n th e
APPENDIXES 693

other b y th e fac t tha t th e tex t figure s ar e normall y thos e o f

the infantr y regiments alone. As an exampl e of th e difference s

in tim e coverage , i t ca n b e note d tha t th e text' s figure s fo r

Corregidor ar e a s o f 4 March, whil e th e table's figure s carr y

the casualtie s through the en d of the war. b

 Includes XI V Corp s casualtie s onl y fro m 9 throug h 1 7

January; I Corp s casualtie s from 9 January throug h 3 0 June;

Eighth Arm y casualtie s fro m 1 July throug h th e en d o f th e

war,

c

 Include s XI V Corp s casualtie s (excep t fo r unit s i n th e

Kembu area) during the last stages of the approach to Manila,

31 January- 3 February , an d als o th e casualtie s o f al l unit s

engaged agains t th e Shimbu Group fro m 2 0 Februar y t o th e

end o f th e war.

d

 Covers the perio d 3 February-1 March only .

e

 Includes jum p casualtie s o f th e 503 d Parachut e RC T an d

casualties incurred on the smalle r islands of Manila Bay .

f

 Includes X I Corp s operation s fro m th e Zambale s landin g

beaches t o th e northwester n bas e o f Bataa n Peninsul a an d

also operations on Grande Island.

g

 Includes jump casualties o f th e 511t h Parachut e Infantr y

and al l othe r 11th Airborne Divisio n casualtie s throug h 4

February.

h

 Includes Army casualtie s resultin g from kamikaz e raids a t

Lingayen Gulf ; ASCO M units t o 1 3 February; th e casualtie s

of corp s and army troops that cannot be placed on the ground

(for example , th e XI V Corp s ha d operation s a t Manil a an d

against the Kembu and Shimbu Groups unde r wa y at th e same

time); an d th e casualtie s o f attache d servic e unit s afte r 1 3

February.

i

 Excludes Leyt e an d Sama r excep t fo r th e operation s i n

northwestern Sama r an d o n offshor e islet s tha t wer e par t o f

the Eight h Army' s campaig n t o clea r th e Visaya n Passages .

j

 Includes Arm y casualtie s resultin g fro m kamikaz e attacks

and include s bot h Sixt h an d Eight h Arm y operation s o n

Mindoro.

Source: Th e tabl e i s base d upo n al l relevan t America n

sources cited in the text. The primar y source s are, for the most

part, th e regimenta l an d divisiona l records . Casualtie s o f

corps an d arm y troop s ar e derive d fro m th e record s o f th e

Sixth an d Eight h Armie s an d th e I, X , XI , an d XIV Corps.

The table comprises deliberate approximations because various

sets o f source s ar e mutuall y irreconcilable . I n general , sinc e

the Japanes e took ver y few prisoners, th e figure s fo r Missin g

in Action are included in the Kille d i n Action column. Missing

in actio n figure s fo r all echelon s o f th e command s wer e ver y

incomplete an d contradictory . The figure s i n thi s tabl e wil l

not necessaril y agre e wit h th e officia l figure s arrive d a t b y

The Adjutan t Genera l afte r th e war. In this connection, however, i t shoul d b e note d tha t a simila r breakdow n relativ e t o

location canno t b e obtaine d fro m th e latte r source .
694 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

APPENDIX H-2—JAPANES E CASUALTIES ,

LUZON AN D THE SOUTHER N PHILIPPINES , 194 5

a

 Al figure s includ e civilians, of whom ther e were, originally,

about 23,50 0 o n Luzo n an d approximatel y 14,78 0 in th e central an d souther n islands . Thi s tota l o f 38,28 0 Japanes e

civilians include d governmen t official s an d families ; civilia n

employees of th e arme d forces , man y o f who m ha d a quasi -

military statu s befor e 9 Januar y 1945 ; businessmen an d their

families; farmer s an d thei r families , especiall y o n Mindanao ;

and som e familie s o f servic e personnel . Excep t fo r th e ex -

tremely age d an d th e ver y young , almost al l thes e Japanes e

civilians came to serv e the armed force s in one way or another.

For example , o n Luzo n mos t mal e civilian s wer e ultimatel y

drafted int o th e servic e t o hel p for m provisiona l Infantr y

battalions, while on Mindana o many mal e civilian s were use d

as filler s i n comba t unit s or wer e forme d int o labo r organiza -

tions. Lac k o f informatio n make s i t impossibl e t o furnis h an y

breakdown fo r civilian casualties. b

 Include s both th e Japanese kille d a s a direc t resul t of mili -

tary operation s and thos e who die d o f diseas e and starvation .

Most o f th e latte r succumbe d afte r organize d resistanc e

ceased an d unit s broke up into small groups foragin g fo r food .

c

 Includes the origina l strengt h o f th e Shobu Group (roughl y

141,000) plu s abou t 10,00 0 other troops, mainl y o f th e 105th

Division, wh o wer e transferre d northwar d fro m th e Shimbu

Group durin g January.

d

 The initia l strengt h figur e fo r th e Shimbu Group exclude s

the 105th Division contingen t tha t wa s transferre d t o th e

Shobu Group; i t include s approximatel y 4,50 0 troop s o f th e

Manila Naval Defense Force wh o escape d entrapmen t i n

Manila an d a grou p o f som e 2,50 0 me n wh o mad e thei r wa y

northward t o th e Shimbu are a fro m souther n Luzo n befor e th e

evacuation rout e a round th e easter n shor e o f Lagun a d e Ba y

was cut. Th e casualt y figure s fo r Manil a an d Souther n Luzon ,

reflecting thes e redeployments , ar e accordingl y considerabl y

lower than the initial strength i n both areas, while the casualt y

figures fo r th e Shimbu Group ar e highe r tha n th e initia l

strength figure .

e

 Includes the smalle r island s in Manila Bay . A few Japanese

— n o reliabl e figure s ca n b e found—swa m fro m Corregido r

and Bataa n an d wer e kille d o r capture d there . Ther e is ,

therefore, some obvious but mino r error in both the Corregido r

and Bataa n figures .

f

 Includes X I Corp s operation s fro m th e Zambale s landin g

beaches t o th e northwester n bas e o f Bataa n Peninsul a an d

also operations on Grand e Island . Se e als o notee.

g

 Excludes Leyt e an d Samar , excep t fo r th e operation s i n

northwestern Sama r an d o n offshor e islet s tha t wer e par t o f

the Eight h Army' s campaig n t o clea r th e Visaya n Passages .

h

 Some Japanes e carrie d a s kille d o r die d o n Palawa n un -

doubtedly escape d t o Borne o b y smal l craft , bu t n o reliabl e

figures ca n b e foun d fo r suc h a n exodus .

Source: Th e tabl e is base d upo n al l relevan t Japanes e an d

American source s cite d i n th e text . Sinc e virtuall y al l sets o f

figures employe d ar e mutuall y irreconciliable , th e tabl e repre -

sents deliberat e approximations.
The Sources: A Critical Note

This volume is based primaril y upo n

the officia l record s o f th e Unite d State s

armed services involved in the operations

described. Additiona l materia l o n stra -

tegic plannin g wa s taken fro m th e rec -

ords o f Allie d an d America n combine d

and join t agencie s an d headquarters .

Information o n th e Japanese side o f the

story derive s principall y fro m Japanes e

sources, th e bul k o f the m postwa r i n

nature. Th e writte n recor d ha s bee n

supplemented b y correspondence , inter -

views, an d comment s upo n al l o r part s

of th e draf t manuscrip t b y participant s

in th e action described . Supplementar y

and complementary sources include both

published works and unpublished manuscripts. Unles s otherwis e indicated , al l

records employe d i n th e preparatio n o f

this volum e ar e i n th e Worl d Wa r I I

Records Division , Nationa l Archive s

and Record s Servic e (NARS) , Genera l

Services Administratio n (GSA) .

Official Records

Materials on strategic planning in this

volume deriv e mainl y fro m th e record s

of th e U.S.-U.K . Combine d Chief s o f

Staff, th e U.S . Joint Chiefs o f Staff , an d

their variou s subordinat e committees .

Copies of these materials are to be foun d

in th e file s o f th e wartim e Operation s

Division, Genera l Staff , U.S . Arm y

(OPD). Additiona l material s o n strate -

gic plannin g ar e locate d i n th e centra l

decimal file s o f OPD ; in th e Chie f o f

Staff's Log , filed i n th e Staf f Communi -

cations Branch , Offic e o f th e Chie f o f

Staff, U.S. Army; and i n th e file s o f General Headquarters , Southwes t Pacifi c

Area (GH Q SWPA). Som e of the GHQ

SWPA records are i n th e custod y o f th e

NARS.

The record s o f th e Combine d an d

Joint Chief s o f Staf f contai n invaluabl e

material upo n th e backgroun d o f major

strategic decision s relevan t t o th e cam -

paigns tha t le d t o th e triump h i n th e

Philippines. Th e OP D file s contai n important supplementary material on OPD

planning an d proposal s regarding th e

conduct o f th e wa r i n th e Pacifi c an d

provide informatio n concernin g th e

Army's poin t o f vie w o n plan s thrashed

out a t th e join t an d combine d levels .

The Chie f o f Staff' s lo g include s suc h

items a s JCS message s t o Genera l Mac -

Arthur an d Admira l Nimitz ; record s o f

radio-telephone conversation s betwee n

officers a t GH Q SWP A an d i n Wash -

ington; an d radio s betwee n General s

Marshall an d MacArthur .

Strategic plannin g materials i n GH Q

SWPA file s duplicat e t o som e exten t

that available in th e collections of Washington agencies , bu t als o includ e addi -

tional materials setting forth th e theater's

point o f vie w o n variou s problem s an d

such item s a s th e theater 's plan s fo r it s

campaigns. Unfortunately , som e GH Q

SWPA record s collection s tha t existe d
696 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

during th e wa r hav e no t a s yet been lo -

cated. Thes e includ e th e file s o f th e

Chief o f Staff 's Office , th e G- 3 Plannin g

Division, an d par t o f th e G- 3 Histor -

ical Divisio n materials . Ther e i s reaso n

to believe that part of the G-3 Plannin g

Division file s wer e los t i n a n airplan e

crash i n th e Pacifi c durin g 1947 . Dili -

gent searc h an d extensiv e correspond -

ence hav e faile d t o disclos e th e locatio n

of othe r missin g file s o f GH Q SWPA ,

although i t appears that some important

bodies of papers are stil l i n th e hand s o f

former rankin g officer s a t GH Q SWPA .

The mos t fruitfu l source s o f informa -

tion concerning the tactica l plans for the

campaigns i n th e Philippine s ar e th e

records o f th e G- 3 Sectio n o f GH Q

SWPA an d o f U.S. Sixth Army . Th e

most valuabl e GH Q SWP A collection s

in thi s categor y ar e th e decima l file s o f

the G- 3 Administratio n Offic e an d th e

G-3 Dail y Journa l File . Th e Sixt h

Army's G-3 record s are particularl y val -

uable i n tha t the y contai n muc h im -

portant planning information tha t is not

to b e locate d i n othe r availabl e collec -

tions, and includ e man y documents tha t

would normall y be foun d i n th e missing

GHQ SWP A files . Importan t materia l

on nava l planning, including many planning papers o f th e Allie d Nava l Forces ,

SWPA, and the III an d VII Amphibious

Forces a s well , ar e als o t o b e foun d i n

the Sixt h Arm y collection . I n general ,

most o f th e importan t plannin g paper s

in th e Sixt h Army collection ar e located

in th e Sixth Army G-3 Journa l File s for

the Mindor o an d Luzo n operations .

Some of the Luzon G-3 Journa l Files are

in th e custod y o f th e Federa l Record s

Center Annex , GSA , Kansas City , Missouri. A valuable supplementary sourc e

of Sixt h Arm y plannin g information ,

and fo r certai n operationa l informatio n

as well, wa s the fil e maintaine d b y Brig .

Gen. Georg e H . Decker , Chie f o f Staff ,

Sixth Army . Th e material , comprisin g

eleven folder s o f letters, memorandums,

and specia l report s a t variou s echelon s

of th e command s i n th e Southwes t Pa -

cific Area , was loaned t o th e Offic e o f the

Chief o f Militar y Histor y (OCMH ) b y

General Decker , bu t ha s been returne d

to him . The collectio n i s cite d i n th e

footnotes o f thi s volum e a s Decke r

Papers.

Valuable plannin g materials concern -

ing the U.S. Eighth Army's participation

in th e campaign s describe d i n thi s volume ar e t o b e foun d i n Eight h Arm y

G-3 Journa l Files. Additiona l plannin g

material a t al l level s i s locate d i n th e

after actio n reports* of the various units

involved i n th e operation s o n Luzo n

and i n th e souther n Philippines , whil e

more information o n nava l planning can

be foun d i n th e report s o f th e nava l

commands participatin g i n th e cam -

paigns. Logistica l plannin g material can

be foun d i n al l th e foregoin g source s a s

well a s i n th e report s o f suc h agencie s

as the Army Service Command on Luzo n

and i n th e file s of the U.S . Arm y Services

of Supply (USASOS), SWPA, the latter in

the Federal Records Center Annex, GSA,

Kansas City , Missouri . Ai r plannin g

information i n thi s volum e ha s bee n

derived principall y fro m material s i n

GHQ SWP A an d Sixt h Arm y file s an d

* The ter m After Action Report, a s use d i n thi s

note, refer s t o th e narrativ e portion s o f report s o f

Army units , i n accordanc e wit h regulations , sub -

mitted followin g th e operation s describe d i n th e

volume. Th e titl e After Action Report wa s no t

employed wit h consistency , an d variou s unit s use d

variations such as Report, Operations Report, Action

Report, an d Repor t Afte r Action . Mos t nava l units

employed th e ter m Action Report o r Report on

Participation.
THE SOURCES : A CRITICA L NOT E 697

from th e Ai r Forces ' officia l histor y o f

World Wa r I I (se e below , Published

Works).

The proble m o f Arm y groun d force s

operational record s fo r th e preparatio n

of Triumph in the Philippines wa s one

of plethora . Th e Sixt h an d Eight h

Armies, th e I , X , XI , an d XI V Corps ,

the divisions , enginee r specia l brigades ,

separate regimenta l comba t teams , an d

all othe r unit s involve d generall y main -

tained excellen t record s fo r th e opera -

tions. Mos t o f th e units submitted good

narrative after actio n reports which, with

supporting document s suc h a s journal s

and journa l files , provide d mor e tha n

ample informatio n upo n whic h t o bas e

the contents o f th e volume . Th e en d o f

Japanese resistanc e i n Augus t 194 5 gave

most unit s tim e t o assembl e bette r an d

more complet e report s an d supportin g

documents than had been possibl e under

earlier condition s o f almos t constan t

combat, training , o r movement .

There are , unfortunately , a fe w out -

standing exception s t o thes e generaliza -

tions. Th e mos t intensiv e effort s faile d

to locat e th e I Corps' G- 3 Journa l File s

or othe r I Corp s G- 3 Sectio n material s

except fo r a n incomplet e an d abbrevi -

ated G- 3 Journal . Th e 40t h Infantr y

Division's G- 3 Journa l File s ar e incomplete fo r th e earl y day s o f operation s o n

Luzon, an d virtuall y n o record s fo r th e

division's 108t h an d 160t h Infantr y

Regiments can b e locate d fo r th e period

9-11 January , th e critica l day s o f th e

invasion. Th e mos t frustrating cas e concerns th e record s o f th e 11t h Airborn e

Division. Tha t uni t los t virtuall y it s

entire collectio n fo r th e Luzo n Cam -

paign i n a disastrou s fir e a t it s head -

quarters buildin g whil e o n occupatio n

duty i n Japan . Th e autho r manage d t o

assemble less tha n a fil e drawe r o f 11t h

Airborne Divisio n records , includin g a

short afte r actio n report , fro m Arm y

depositories and th e division's home sta -

tion a t Camp Campbell, Kentucky . Ad -

ditional materials are to be found i n the

records o f adjacen t unit s an d highe r

headquarters. Upo n occasio n — as, fo r

instance, i n th e cas e of th e entir e collection o f XI V Corp s G- 3 Journa l Files —

operational materia l i s t o b e foun d i n

Federal Record s Cente r Annex , GSA ,

Kansas City , Missouri , wher e mos t o f

the administrativ e file s (use d onl y spar -

ingly i n thi s volume ) fo r al l unit s ar e

also located,

Generally, bu t b y n o mean s always ,

the lowe r th e echelon th e more accurat e

and complet e ar e th e narrativ e afte r

action reports. Th e Sixt h Army's narrative stand s hea d an d shoulder s abov e

almost al l th e other s fo r reliabilit y an d

coverage. I an d X I Corp s narrative s

leave much to be desired; the XIV Corps

narrative, prepared largely by the Corps'

chief o f staff , Col . Hug h M . Milton , i s

by contras t a ver y goo d piec e o f work .

Some divisio n reports , lik e tha t o f th e

40th, are quite poor. Regimenta l reports

attain ever y conceivabl e degre e o f quality an d quantity . Ther e i s often , bu t

not always , a n apparen t i f not rea l rela -

tionship between th e qualit y o f a unit's

report an d record s an d it s performanc e

in th e field .

Useful a s th e afte r actio n reports are ,

they d o no t provid e th e basi s fo r com -

plete an d accurat e coverag e o f opera -

tions. Fo r this it is essential to rely upon

the supportin g documents suc h a s journals, journa l files , messag e files , dail y

operational an d intelligenc e reports ,

overlays, sketches , an d specia l reports ,

of th e various echelons of th e commands
698 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

engaged. Fo r thi s volum e th e norma l

level o f such sourc e material fo r comba t

coverage is that of the infantr y regiment.

Despite the almost embarrassing abundance o f records , ther e ar e stil l gaps .

It i s seldom possibl e t o correlat e infan -

try an d artiller y actio n — reports an d

records of artillery units do no t contai n

sufficient detai l fo r that . Detaile d infor -

mation o n air support operations is also

difficult t o come by. Th e infantr y units

made fe w systematic attempts t o recor d

the time, target, and results of air strikes,

although they almost invariably recorded

the fac t tha t a n ai r strik e wa s lat e o r

misplaced. Detail s o f tank-infantr y op -

erations are equally difficult t o assemble.

The tan k battalion s di d no t hav e th e

records-keeping facilitie s o f large r unit s

and the y normall y fough t broke n dow n

to companies or platoons, far from thei r

parent battalio n headquarters . Detail s

of suppl y operation s withi n division s

and regiment s ar e als o usuall y impossi -

ble t o ascertain—th e problem s ar e se t

forth "b y th e numbers " bu t th e solu -

tions ar e a t bes t generalized . I n a fe w

cases G-4 o r S- 4 staf f sectio n reports and

journal files provide good and interesting

coverage o f tactica l suppl y operations .

Detailed informatio n o n th e activities

of regimenta l canno n companie s i s an -

other commo n gap , an d i t i s usuall y

impossible t o obtai n an y meaningfu l

data o n th e operation s o f divisiona l

Quartermaster, Ordnance , an d Signa l

units. O n th e othe r hand , mos t divi -

sional Enginee r battalion s submitte d

valuable afte r actio n report s wit h sup -

porting documents. A most bafflin g an d

frustrating ga p i n th e informatio n i s

that pertainin g to th e activitie s o f divi -

sional reconnaissanc e troop s an d regi -

mental intelligenc e an d reconnaissanc e

platoons. Almos t neve r i s materia l o n

these units included among the records,

and eve n whe n som e dat a ar e availabl e

they are all too seldom related to division

or regimenta l plan s an d operations.

Naval operationa l record s employe d

in th e preparatio n o f thi s volum e ar e

limited fo r th e mos t par t t o actio n re -

ports o f th e variou s tas k forces , tas k

groups, an d tas k unit s involve d i n th e

operations described . Som e o f thes e re -

ports hav e abbreviate d wa r diarie s o r

logs (correspondin g roughly to an Army

unit's G- 3 Journal ) attached . Materia l

on Thir d Flee t supportin g operation s

for th e Mindor o an d Luzo n invasion s

comes mainl y fro m Admira l Nimitz '

monthly operations reports (CINCPACCINCPOA, Operation s i n th e Pacifi c

Ocean Areas, December 194 4 an d Janu -

ary 1945) . Copie s o f suc h nava l reports

as ar e no t t o be foun d i n Arm y depositories ar e locate d i n th e Classifie d

Operational Archives , Nava l Histor y

Division, Offic e o f th e Chie f o f Nava l

Operations, Departmen t o f th e Navy .

The requirement s o f thi s volum e di d

not mak e i t necessar y t o consul t nava l

unit war diaries or individual ship's logs,

which ar e als o file d i n th e Classifie d

Operational Archives.

This volume being primarily the story

of U.S . Arm y ground combat operations,

no requiremen t existe d fo r extensiv e

research int o Air Forc e source s an d de -

tailed coverag e o f ai r operation s ha s

been lef t t o th e U.S . Arm y Air Forces '

official history . Som e informatio n o n

air operation s is to be foun d i n groun d

force records already described; the rest,

including tha t o n Marin e Corp s avia -

tion, derive s fro m secondar y sources .

The principa l collectio n o f Ai r Forc e

unit reports an d supportin g documents
THE SOURCES : A CRITICA L NOT E 699

is locate d a t th e Ai r University , Max -

well Air Forc e Base , Alabama. Origina l

records on Marine Corps aviation i n th e

Philippines are file d i n th e Records and

Research Section, Historical Branch, G-3

Section, Headquarters , U.S . Marin e

Corps.

The mai n bod y o f relevan t Arm y

Service Force s uni t record s ar e locate d

in th e Federa l Record s Cente r Annex ,

GSA, Kansa s City , Missouri , bu t fo r th e

most par t th e volum e make s littl e us e

of servic e force s record s an d leave s th e

details o f suppl y operation s t o th e historians of logistics. The principa l sources

of informatio n o n suppl y matter s ar e

the record s o f USASO S an d it s subor -

dinate echelons. Som e o f th e record s o f

the Arm y Servic e Comman d o n Luzo n

(the Sixt h Army 's ASCOM ) ar e als o i n

the Federal Records Center Annex, GSA,

Kansas City , Missouri . Th e ASCO M

report fo r th e perio d befor e th e head -

quarters passed to USASOS was adequate

for th e purpose s o f thi s volume . Rec -

ords of service units organic to divisions,

already mentioned , ar e t o b e foun d i n

division files .

Reports o f Philippin e Civi l Affair s

Units (PCAU 's) ar e sometime s file d a s

attachments t o th e report s o f th e com -

mands wit h whic h th e PCAU 's worked ;

other PCA U record s ar e scattere d be -

tween the Federal Records Center Annex,

GSA, Kansa s City, Missouri, and NARS .

The PCA U record s ar e generall y dis -

appointing in both quality and quantity ,

being usuall y limite d t o statistica l dat a

with littl e meaningfu l discussio n o f

problems an d thei r solutions . Mor e

materials o n civi l affairs , re-establish -

ment o f civilia n government , an d civi l

relief ar e t o b e foun d i n th e record s o f

the Civi l Affair s Section s o f variou s

headquarters. Usuall y classe d a s administrative records , th e material s o f suc h

sections ar e ofte n t o b e foun d i n th e

Federal Record s Cente r Annex , GSA ,

Kansas City , Missouri .

A majo r deficienc y i n th e record s o f

the campaign s describe d i n thi s volume

is th e absenc e o f materia l o n guerrill a

units. Th e bes t guerrill a repor t i s tha t

of th e U.S . Army Force s i n th e Philip -

pines (Norther n Luzon) , which include s

not onl y a good narrative not unlik e the

after actio n report o f a regula r divisio n

but als o supportin g documents suc h a s

biweekly intelligenc e an d operation s re -

ports. Th e onl y othe r forma l guerrill a

report i s th e Historica l Record , Min -

danao Guerrill a Resistanc e Movement ,

Tenth Militar y District , 1 6 Septembe r

1942 t o 3 0 Jun e 1945 . A cop y o f thi s

document, which is weak o n operationa l

material for the period after th e X Corps'

landing o n Mindanao , wa s borrowe d

from Colone l Fertig .

No report can b e found fo r the Mark -

ing Guerrillas, whic h operate d wit h th e

XI and XIV Corps on the Shimbu front;

for th e Anderso n Battalion , o n th e

Shimbu Group's rear ; fo r th e Buen a

Vista Regiment , whic h fough t wel l wit h

the 32 d Division ; no r fo r man y othe r

guerrilla unit s whic h playe d significan t

parts i n th e campaigns . Fo r th e mos t

part, accordingly , guerrill a informatio n

has bee n derive d fro m relativel y scant y

materials i n U.S . Arm y records . Th e

Historical Section , Philippin e Army ,

maintains a collection of documents concerning guerrill a operations , bu t thi s

collection, some of whic h i s not i n Eng -

lish, could no t b e exploite d fo r this vol -

ume. I n brief , a grea t dea l o f wor k

remains t o b e don e i n assembling , correlating, an d exploitin g th e source s o n
700 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

guerrilla operation s t o giv e th e guer -

rillas prope r coverag e i n th e campaign s

for th e reconques t o f th e Philippines .

Sources of Japanese Information

The mos t comprehensiv e availabl e

accounts o f Japanes e operation s de -

scribed i n thi s volum e ar e t o b e foun d

in th e serie s Japanes e Studie s i n Worl d

War II , compile d afte r th e wa r b y

former Japanes e Army and Nav y officer s

in Toky o unde r th e directio n o f th e

Historical Division , G- 2 GH Q FEC .

Translation of these studies—which total

almost 15 0 separate reports—was accomplished b y th e Allie d Translato r an d

Interpreter Servic e (ATIS) , Suprem e

Commander fo r th e Allie d Power s

(SCAP). (Thi s ATI S wa s a linea l de -

scendant o f ATIS GH Q SWPA , a sub -

ordinate agenc y o f G- 2 GH Q SWPA. )

Dubious parts of a few translations were

checked b y Japanes e languag e expert s

formerly wit h th e Pacifi c Section ,

OCMH, whil e som e o f th e earlies t

studies came out i n revise d version s during the preparation of this volume. Th e

Japanese wh o prepare d th e studie s re -

lied upo n availabl e officia l documents ,

on persona l diaries, o n thei r ow n memories, and o n th e memorie s of othe r Jap -

anese officer s participatin g i n th e event s

described. Checkin g o f thes e studie s

against othe r source s o f information ,

such a s capture d Japanes e record s an d

U.S. Arm y materials , indicate s tha t th e

studies ar e remarkabl y accurat e a t thei r

level o f treatment . Thei r majo r defi -

ciencies involv e lac k o f informatio n o n

command decision s at divisio n an d regi -

mental levels , togethe r wit h a paucit y

of dat a concernin g exac t strength s an d

dispositions o f units .

The serie s provide s invaluabl e infor -

mation concernin g Japanes e high-leve l

command decisions , planning , orders ,

personnel, orde r o f battle , an d movements tha t canno t b e foun d i n othe r

records. Fo r Japanese strategic planning

the mos t valuabl e singl e stud y i s th e

History o f th e Army Section, Imperial

GHQ, 1941-1945 . Othe r especially valuable studie s fo r thi s volum e are : 14th

Area Army Operation s o n Luzon , 14th

Area Army Plans , 1944 , Operations o f

the Kembu Group, Luzo n Operation s

of th e Shimbu Group, an d Philippin e

Area Nava l Operations, Part IV .

Copies o f bot h th e translate d an d

Japanese version s o f th e studie s ar e i n

the file s o f th e OCMH . Sinc e ther e

were man y change s i n th e numberin g

and titlin g system s o f th e serie s durin g

the earl y stage s o f it s preparation , th e

OCMH copie s hav e differen t number s

than thos e assigne d b y G-2 GH Q FEC .

The number s employed i n the footnotes

of thi s volume ar e thos e o f th e OCM H

collection.

Another extremel y importan t sourc e

of Japanes e informatio n comprise s a

four-volume serie s entitle d Statement s

of Japanes e Official s o n Worl d Wa r II ,

also prepared i n Tokyo under th e direction o f th e Historica l Divisio n o f G- 2

GHQ FEC. These statements compris e

narratives o f Japanes e official s rangin g

from cabine t ministers t o infantr y company commanders , an d contai n invalu -

able informatio n o n ever y phas e o f

Japan's conduc t o f th e war . Indeed,

without thes e statements , take n i n con -

junction wit h th e studie s describe d

above, i t is difficult t o se e how th e tacti -

cal informatio n o n Japanes e unit s contained i n Triumph in the Philippines

could hav e bee n produced .
THE SOURCES : A CRITICA L NOT E 701

Supplementing th e foregoin g state -

ments t o som e exten t i s a two-volum e

series entitle d Persona l Histor y State -

ments, which compris e brief biographie s

of th e official s contributin g t o th e four -

volume series . Als o prepare d i n Japa n

under th e directio n o f th e Historica l

Division, G- 2 GH Q FEC , this two-vol -

ume serie s is on fil e i n th e OCM H with

the four-volum e series .

After th e wa r th e 10t h Information

and Historica l Servic e (10t h I&H) o f

Headquarters, Eight h Army , produce d

in Japa n a serie s o f work s entitle d Staf f

Studies covering, from th e Japanese side,

many phase s of th e campaign s described

in this volume. Thes e Staf f Studie s contain bot h narrative s an d interrogation s

of variou s Japanes e commanders i n th e

Philippines an d ar e supplemente d b y

maps produce d b y th e Japanese . T o

some exten t th e Staf f Studie s duplicat e

information t o b e foun d i n th e Studie s

and Statement s describe d above , bu t i n

many instance s the y provid e consider -

ably more tactical detail. Th e 10t h I& H

series includes Staff Studie s entitled Jap -

anese Operation s o n Luzon , th e Batan -

gas Area , Mindana o Island , Zamboanga ,

Panay, Negro s Island , Jol o Island , an d

the 102d Division o n Leyt e an d Cebu .

Translations o f Japanes e document s

have als o prove d a valuabl e sourc e o f

information. Th e mos t importan t war -

time translations are thos e of ATIS G-2

GHQ SWPA , broken down fo r the most

part int o tw o serie s entitle d Curren t

Translations an d Enem y Publications .

ATIS ha d smal l advanc e detachment s

with comba t unit s o n Luzo n an d th e

southern Philippines . The detachments '

translations ar e normall y t o b e foun d

in th e uni t G- 2 o r S- 2 files , an d Sixt h

Army G- 2 weekl y report s als o contai n

some valuable translations. Fo r th e most

part thes e wartim e translation s ar e o f

value primaril y fo r orde r o f battl e

information, althoug h th e ATI S G- 2

GHQ SWP A serie s i s usefu l i n helpin g

to trac e th e developmen t o f Allie d

intelligence estimates .

The larges t an d mos t valuabl e singl e

body o f postwa r translation s i s a four -

volume serie s entitle d Translation s o f

Japanese Documents , prepare d unde r

the directio n o f th e Historica l Division ,

G-2 GH Q FEC . This serie s contain s

mostly translation s o f document s con -

fiscated i n Japan, and include s such valuable item s a s th e memoir s o f Lt . Gen .

Akira Mut o (the 14th Area Army's chie f

of staff) , a s wel l a s a serie s o f 14th Area

Army plans, orders, and situation reports.

Wartime interrogation s o f Japanes e

prisoners fal l int o tw o categories : th e

preliminary "tactical " interrogations

made a t th e fron t b y ATI S languag e

experts attache d t o comba t units ; an d

more extende d interrogation s b y ATIS

at prisone r o f wa r compound s i n rea r

areas. Th e "tactical " interrogation s are

useful fo r orde r o f battl e information .

Many o f th e mor e extende d interroga -

tions ad d littl e t o th e groun d comba t

story bu t ar e valuabl e fo r tracin g th e

development o f Allie d intelligenc e

information.

An importan t grou p of postwa r interrogations comprises two volumes entitled

Interrogations o f Japanes e Official s o n

World War II, produced in Tokyo under

the directio n o f th e Historica l Division,

G-2 GH Q FEC . Mos t o f thes e supple -

ment informatio n i n th e serie s State -

ments of Japanese Officials an d ar e quit e

brief. I n additio n t o thi s group , ATI S

conducted man y specia l interrogation s

in Japa n afte r th e war , most o f whic h
702 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

are o n fil e i n OCMH . A n equall y im -

portant serie s o f postwa r interrogation s

are thos e o f th e Unite d State s Strategi c

Bombing Surve y (USSBS) , som e o f

which hav e bee n publishe d (se e below,

Published Works). Som e unpublishe d

USSBS interrogation s use d fo r thi s volume are on fil e in OCMH. Occasionall y

the USSB S interrogation s wer e influ -

enced by the branch o f service and ran k

of th e interrogator. Finally , th e reports

of som e o f th e comba t unit s o n Luzo n

contain interrogation s o f high-rankin g

Japanese commanders obtained immedi -

ately afte r th e surrender.

"Before th e Militar y Commissio n

Convened b y th e Unite d State s Arm y

Forces Western Pacific , Unite d State s of

America versus Tomoyuk i Yamashita ,

Public Trial, " i s th e ful l titl e o f th e

complete transcript of the famou s Yamashita trial . Th e testimon y o f variou s

defense witnesses , includin g Genera l

Yamashita, togethe r wit h sundr y at -

tached exhibit s o f ever y conceivabl e

nature, provid e invaluabl e informatio n

on Japanese plans and policie s in regard

to th e conduc t o f operation s i n th e

Philippines, an d suppl y dat a o n defen -

sive disposition s an d operation s supple -

menting tha t t o b e locate d i n othe r

sources o f Japanes e information . Th e

testimony an d th e exhibits ar e absolut e

"musts" fo r an y stud y o f Japanes e

operations o n Luzon , and ar e especiall y

valuable i n tha t the y bring t o ligh t disagreements between Japanese Army and

Navy force s an d contai n muc h materia l

on operation s at Manila .

A valuabl e narrativ e sourc e fo r Japa -

nese operation s i n th e souther n Philip -

pines i s a bookle t entitle d Th e Tru e

Facts o f th e Leyt e Operatio n b y Maj .

Gen. Yoshihar u Tomochika , th e chie f

of staf f o f th e 35th Army, Originall y

published in Japan by Keisuke Sata, the

volume was translated by the 166t h Language Detachment , G- 2 Eight h Army ,

and distribute d by the 10t h I&H . Tomochika's wor k i s valuabl e fo r Triumph

in the Philippines i n tha t i t describe s

the attempte d evacuatio n o f th e 35th

Army from Leyte , the command arrangements on Cebu , plans fo r th e defens e o f

eastern Mindanao , and operation s along

the northwestern section o f th e Kibawe -

Talomo trail. A copy is in OCMH files.

A valuabl e sourc e fo r Japanes e orde r

of battl e i n th e Philippine s i s th e 14th

Area Army Troo p Organizatio n List , a

booklet originall y publishe d i n Japa n

by the 14th Area Army Home Organization Board , a sort o f veterans' organiza -

tion. Going as far as the level of infantry

battalions, th e orde r o f battl e i s goo d

for infantr y units . Generall y accurat e

as fa r a s i t goes , th e lis t doe s no t cove r

the late r phase s o f th e campaign s and i s

not complet e fo r provisiona l units, miscellaneous combat organizations, or serv -

ice units. A translated copy is in OCMH

files.

Used i n conjunctio n wit h th e fore -

going list , a n ATI S G- 2 GH Q SWP A

publication providin g a translate d lis t

of Japanes e Arm y officers , givin g ran k

and positio n a s o f Septembe r 1942 ,

proved a valuabl e source . A cop y i s in

OCMH files . Th e Nava l Histor y Divi -

sion, Chief o f Nava l Operations (CNO) ,

maintains a mor e up-to-dat e an d com -

plete roste r o f Japanes e Nav y officers .

Miscellaneous Japanese information is

to b e foun d i n th e seria l publication ,

Military Reports, of the Military Intelligence Division (G-2) , Wa r Departmen t

General Staff , fo r th e last months of th e

war. Additiona l source s of informatio n
THE SOURCES : A CRITICA L NOT E 703

on the Japanese can be found in the G-2

library, G- 2 GH Q SWPA , i n NARS .

The lis t o f Japanes e sourc e materia l

would not be complete without mention

of a revie w o f th e draf t manuscrip t o f

this volume that a group of former Japa -

nese Arm y an d Nav y officer s undertoo k

in 1957 . The draf t wa s sen t t o Japan ,

where th e Foreig n Historie s Division ,

Office o f th e Militar y Histor y Officer ,

Headquarters U.S . Army Japan , trans -

lated pertinen t section s o f th e manu -

script an d submitte d them , togethe r

with som e 25 0 question s o n specifi c

points, to the Japanes e study group, which

Col. Susum u Nishiur a (i n 195 7 chief o f

the Japanese Self Defense Force Historical

Records Section ) directed . Th e princi -

pal Japanese officers (wit h wartime rank

and position ) wh o contribute d t o th e

review were :

Lt. Gen . Shizuo Yokoyama , Com -

manding General , 41st Army

Maj. Gen . Haru o Konuma , Chie f o f

Staff, 14th Area Army

Col. Takushir o Hattori , Chief , Army

Operations Section, Imperial GHQ

Lt. Col. Shige o Kawai, Staff , 2d Tank

Division

Maj. Katsum i Hirabayashi , Staff , 10th

Division

Maj. Chuj i Kaneko , 102d Division

Capt. Toshikaz u Ohmae , IJN, Chief,

Navy Operations Section, Imperial

GHQ

Capt. Masatak a Nagaishi , IJN , Navy

Aeronautical Department

Comdr. Tada o Kusumi , IJN , Staff ,

Southwest Area Fleet

The review , file d wit h othe r externa l

reviews o f th e draf t manuscrip t i n th e

OCMH, wa s valuabl e i n clearin g u p

some mist y point s suc h a s unit designa -

tions an d strengths , an d i n providin g

background o n variou s Japanese tactica l

decisions.

Unfortunately, financia l limitation s

left unexploite d a majo r min e o f un -

translated Japanes e sourc e materials , a

collection of Japanes e documents turned

over t o th e Nationa l Archive s b y th e

Central Intelligenc e Agency (CIA). This

collection, whic h contained , inter alia,

records of the Japanes e Army and Nav y

ministries dating back t o th e days of th e

Meiji Restoration , wa s confiscate d b y

U.S. agencie s i n Japa n afte r th e war .

Amounting t o abou t 7,00 0 linea r fee t

the collection, while in American hands,

was neve r properl y organize d o r cata -

logued. A partia l descriptio n of its contents appears i n a n articl e b y James W.

Morley, "Chec k Lis t o f Seize d Japanes e

Records i n th e Nationa l Archives, " i n

Far Eastern Quarterly, IX , No . 3 (May ,

1950). A grant fro m th e For d Founda -

tion permitte d microfilmin g o f a por -

tion of the collection under the direction

of Dr . Chitosh i Yanag a o f th e Depart -

ment o f Politica l Science , Yal e Univer -

sity, whil e th e Nava l Histor y Division ,

CNO, undertoo k t o microfil m certai n

records o f th e Nava l Ministr y a s well a s

a large body of material concerning Japanese nava l operations . N o provisio n

was mad e t o microfil m th e larg e quan -

tity of Japanese unit operational records

or th e record s o f th e Arm y Ministry —

in fact , n o complet e lis t o f th e Arm y

operational records exists. Th e CI A and

G-2, Genera l Staff , U.S . Army, trans -

lated o r microfilme d som e smal l group s

of records , bu t thi s work, togethe r wit h

that o f Yal e Universit y an d th e Nava l

History Division , probabl y represent s

less tha n a quarte r o f th e tota l bul k o f
704 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

the collection. Th e entir e collection was

returned t o Japan i n th e fal l o f 1958 .

Maps

Considering the forty-odd years United

States militar y force s ha d spen t i n th e

Philippines befor e America 's entr y int o

World Wa r II , th e stat e o f mappin g o f

the island s wa s nothin g short o f lamen -

table. A s a result , th e onl y reasonabl y

accurate tactica l map s availabl e befor e

the wa r covere d onl y th e Manil a Ba y

area an d portion s o f th e Centra l Plain s

of Luzon .

The basi c tactica l ma p wit h whic h

forces o f th e Southwes t Pacifi c entere d

upon th e reconques t o f Luzo n wa s th e

1:50,000 scal e Arm y Ma p Servic e Serie s

S712, publishe d i n 1944 . This map wa s

based mainl y upo n a 1:250,00 0 U.S .

Coast an d Geodeti c Surve y serie s pro -

duced i n 1933 ; upon ver y restricte d

coverage o f Luzo n a t scal e 1:31,680 ,

published b y th e Engineer , Philippin e

Department, i n 1939 ; and upo n a topo -

graphical ma p a t scal e 1:63,36 0 o f ex -

tremely limited coverage and based upon

military surveys of th e perio d 1911-14. *

The AM S S71 2 series lef t muc h t o b e

desired. Hopelessl y ou t o f dat e eve n

before i t wa s published , i t containe d

many glarin g inaccuracie s eve n fo r th e

Central Plains-Manil a Ba y area . Th e

coverage wa s virtually ni l fo r larg e portions o f Luzon' s mountainou s regions .

The serie s include d n o panel s a t al l fo r

some mountai n areas , whil e o n othe r

panels onl y a roa d o r tw o showed—th e

rest o f th e pane l woul d b e blank .

Recognizing the need for better map s

even before th e Luzon Campaign began,

GHQ SWP A ha d institute d a progra m

of aeria l photograph y of Luzo n (an d

the central and souther n island s as well)

late i n 1944 . The remappin g progra m

for Luzo n continued as the troops moved

out of the Centra l Plains into the mountains, unti l som e panels o f th e 1:50,00 0

coverage ha d gon e throug h a s man y a s

five edition s before th e war ended. Mos t

of th e ma p revisio n wor k wa s accom -

plished unde r th e directio n o f th e Engineer, Sixt h Army , an d th e map s wer e

produced b y th e 671s t Enginee r Topo -

graphic Battalion , attache d t o Sixt h

Army headquarters. Othe r panel s wer e

revised b y th e 650t h Enginee r Topo -

graphic Battalion , GHQ , SWPA. Base d

as the y wer e upo n aeria l photograph y

with littl e o r n o groun d control , eve n

these late r edition s di d no t approac h

the optimu m i n accurac y an d coverage .

In man y area s o f Luzo n th e troop s

fought t o th e en d o f th e wa r supple -

menting their ma p coverag e wit h aeria l

photography, usuall y a t scal e 1:10,000 ,

and wit h sketche s produce d i n th e field .

After Worl d Wa r I I a co-operativ e

effort o f th e U.S. Air Forc e and th e U.S.

Army le d towar d th e productio n o f an -

other 1:50,00 0 series, compiled by photogrammetric (multiplex ) method s wit h

close groun d control . Wit h th e serie s

number S711, this ma p starte d comin g

out i n 1956 , bu t publicatio n is not com -

plete at thi s writing . Th e ma p was prepared b y th e 29t h Enginee r Battalio n

(Base Topographic) under th e direction

of th e Engineer , U.S . Army Force s i n

the Fa r Eas t (USAFFE ) /Eighth Army .

Comparison o f thi s ne w coverag e wit h

that of the wartime AMS S71 2 series and

its revision s bring s hom e vividl y th e

handicaps unde r whic h th e troop s o n

Luzon operate d i n 1945 . * See Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pages 597-99, for additiona l informatio n o n thes e prewar maps.
THE SOURCES : A CRITICA L NOTE 705

For th e central island s and Mindana o

no coverage existed that approached even

the AM S S712 serie s fo r Luzo n i n ac -

curacy an d coverage . A s a result , th e

production o f tactica l map s fo r thes e

islands was undertaken i n th e theate r i n

1944 an d 1945 , mainly upo n th e basi s

of aeria l photography, with scant ground

control, an d upo n incomplet e prewa r

U.S. Coas t an d Geodeti c Surve y maps .

Map productio n fo r Mindana o wa s primarily a n Australia n effor t an d wa s ac -

complished principall y by Nos. 2/1 an d

6 Australia n Army Topographi c Survey

Companies an d th e LH Q Cartographi c

Company, Australian Survey Corps. The

U.S. Army 's 648t h Enginee r Topo -

graphic Battalion , GH Q SWPA , ha d a

hand i n som e o f th e compilation , an d

certain revision s o f th e first-publishe d

1:50,000 panel s wer e mad e i n th e fiel d

by th e 67t h Enginee r Topographi c

Company, X Corps.

U.S. Arm y Air Force s an d U.S . Navy

aerial photography, together with prewar

U.S. Coas t an d Geodeti c Surve y maps ,

scale 1:200,000 , provide d mos t o f th e

information fo r 1:50,00 0 tactica l map s

troops employe d i n th e centra l islands .

The Bas e Ma p Plant, U.S. Army, GH Q

SWPA, prepare d mos t o f thi s coverage ,

which wa s no t complete d durin g th e

war an d whic h lef t muc h t o b e desire d

by wa y of accuracy.

The Japanes e labore d unde r eve n

worse handicap s tha n di d th e American

forces. Th e Japanes e mad e n o system -

atic attemp t t o ma p th e island s durin g

the occupatio n an d fo r th e mos t par t

depended upo n prewa r America n coverage. America n force s captured fe w good

Japanese map s fo r an y regio n i n th e

Philippines, and indication s are tha t th e

Japanese restricted their mapping activities mainl y t o productio n o f rough ,

unsatisfactory sketc h map s o f specific ,

limited localities .

The stor y of terrain informatio n avail -

able t o th e combat force s i n th e Philip -

pines woul d no t b e complet e withou t

mention o f th e wor k o f th e Allie d Geo -

graphic Section , SWPA , a subordinat e

agency o f G- 2 GH Q SWPA . Directe d

by a n Australian , Col. W . V . Jardine -

Blake, AIF, the ACS SWP A wa s organized lat e i n th e summe r o f 194 2 and

immediately set to work t o produc e and

disseminate a serie s o f Terrai n Studies ,

Terrain Handbooks , an d Specia l Re -

ports, al l invaluabl e fo r bot h plannin g

and tactica l purposes . AG S SWP A as -

sembled it s informatio n fro m prewa r

sources, aeria l photography , an d inter -

rogations o f ex-residents , travelers , missionaries, an d governmen t official s wh o

had intimat e knowledge of the Japaneseoccupied areas . It s publication s con -

tained suc h vita l informatio n a s roa d

and trai l description , data o n town s and

cities, wate r sources , sketc h map s o f

various localities , transportatio n facili -

ties, airfields, flor a and fauna , and prewa r

pictures. Place d i n th e hand s o f bot h

planners an d tactica l units , th e AG S

SWPA publication s prove d o f inesti -

mable valu e a s guidebook s t o th e area s

involved.

Interviews, Correspondence,

and Comments

Unlike man y othe r theater s durin g

World Wa r II , n o team s o f historian s

were availabl e i n th e Southwes t Pacifi c

Area t o conduc t comba t interview s o n

the battlegrounds, t o tak e contemporary

notes o n actions , o r t o prepar e prelimi -

nary studies. Interview s were used rather
706 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

sparingly durin g th e preparatio n o f

this volum e and , postwar i n nature ,

were confine d t o a fe w specifi c points .

Dr. Stanle y L . Falk , researc h assistan t

on much of the volume, conducted interviews wit h Brig . Gen . Joh n A . Elmore ,

who ha d bee n th e chie f o f staf f o f th e

XI Corps , an d wit h Lt . Col . David J .

Wilson, formerl y th e S- 3 o f th e 152 d

Infantry, 38t h Infantr y Division . Th e

author interviewe d Admira l Thoma s C .

Kinkaid (Ret.), formerly th e commander

of th e Allie d Nava l Forces , SWPA ,

and th e U.S . Sevent h Fleet , an d Col .

Wendell W. Fertig, a guerrilla leader on

Mindanao, i n a join t intervie w wit h

some o f hi s guerrill a subordinates .

Copies of the interview notes (th e Fertig

Interviews ar e o n tape ) ar e o n fil e i n

the OCMH.

In additio n t o th e forgoin g mor e o r

less forma l interviews , th e autho r ha d

opportunity t o tal k informall y t o addi -

tional officer s wh o visite d th e OCM H

during th e cours e o f th e preparatio n o f

the volume . Thes e include d Genera l

Elmore; Genera l Walter Krueger, Commanding General , Sixt h Army , durin g

the Luzon Campaign; Maj. Gen. Richard

J. Marshall , wh o wa s deput y chie f o f

staff, GH Q SWPA ; and Brig . Gen. Hanford MacNider , formerl y commandin g

general, 158t h RCT . No note s wer e

made durin g thes e discussions , whic h

proved valuabl e mainl y fo r backgroun d

information.

As in the case of interviews, the author

conducted a certai n amoun t o f corre -

spondence fo r th e purpos e o f seekin g

information o n a fe w specifi c points .

Principal correspondents were: Lt. Gen.

Stephen J. Chamberlin , Assistan t Chie f

of Staff , G-3 , GHQ SWPA ; Lt . Gen .

Charles P . Hall , Commanding General ,

XI Corps; Col . Frank J. Sackton , Assistant Chie f o f Staff , G-3 , 33d Infantr y

Division; Col . Harry A . Skerry , US A

(Ret.), formerl y Chie f Engineer , Nort h

Luzon Force s an d I Philippin e Corps ,

1942; Colone l Fertig ; Lt . Col. Don R .

Pepke, Commanding Officer, 2 d Battalion,

63d Infantry , 6t h Infantr y Division ; and

Maj. Gen . Clovis E. Byers, Chief o f Staff ,

Eighth Army .

Before publicatio n of Triumph in the

Philippines seventy-fiv e U.S . Army ,

Navy, an d Ai r Forc e officer s (o r forme r

officers no w civilians ) wh o participate d

in the events described or who otherwise

had som e intimat e knowledg e o f eithe r

planning o r operations , rea d an d com -

mented upo n al l o r part s o f th e manu -

script. Thes e officer s ofte n supplie d

valuable additiona l information , espe -

cially upo n th e reasonin g behin d com -

mand decisions; the y offere d suggestion s

on coverage ; an d i n som e cases , takin g

issue wit h statement s i n th e text , the y

stimulated revisions . Fe w officer s wh o

reviewed any part of the manuscript had

an a x to grind; rather, th e vast majorit y

brought t o thei r tas k a refreshingl y ob -

jective an d helpfu l poin t o f view . Th e

reviewing grou p include d army , corps ,

and divisio n commanders, forme r mem -

bers of the Operations Division, General

Staff, U.S . Army, o r th e Join t Chief s o f

Staff an d subordinat e committees , flee t

commanders, tas k forc e commanders ,

and staf f officer s fro m variou s headquarters. A lis t o f th e officer s commenting ,

together wit h their remarks, is on fil e i n

the OCMH with the drafts an d note s for

the volume .

Valuable comment s o n terrain , roa d

conditions, an d th e statu s o f bridge s

throughout Luzo n wer e obtaine d fro m

Mr. James J. Halsema o f the U.S. Infor -
THE SOURCES : A CRITICA L NOT E 707

mation Service , a prewa r an d postwa r

resident of the Philippines and a civilian

internee o f th e Japanes e o n Luzo n

during World Wa r II . Mr . Clark e Ka -

wakami, formerl y wit h th e Historica l

Division o f G- 2 GH Q FEC , supplie d

additional informatio n o n Japanes e

plans fo r th e defens e o f the Philippines.

Both set s o f comment s ar e i n OCM H

files.

Manuscript Sources

A usable and usefu l outline , high-level

treatment o f bot h Allie d an d Japanes e

planning and operation s is contained i n

the so-calle d MacArthu r History . Thi s

two-volume work , entitle d Southwes t

Pacific Are a Series , wa s prepared i n Ja -

pan afte r th e wa r unde r th e directio n

and editorshi p o f Maj . Gen . Charle s A .

Willoughby, MacArthur 's Assistan t

Chief o f Staff , G-2 . Ostensibl y th e afte r

action repor t o f GH Q SWP A an d suc -

cessor commands , th e fina l versio n o f

this work is printed o n gloss y paper and

is replet e wit h colo r reproduction s o f

maps, photographs , an d paintings. Th e

volumes wer e printe d i n Japa n b y th e

Dai Nippo n Printin g Company, Tokyo,

but have never been published. A bound

copy o f th e entir e work , togethe r wit h

footlockers ful l o f supporting documents

upon which it is based, is in th e custod y

of th e World Wa r I I Record s Division ,

NARS.

Volume I bear s th e titl e Th e Cam -

paigns o f MacArthu r i n th e Pacifi c an d

covers th e wa r i n th e Southwes t Pacifi c

Area fro m th e openin g o f th e Japa -

nese offensiv e throug h th e surrende r

of Japan . Volum e I , Supplement , ha s

the self-explanatory titl e MacArthu r i n

Japan, The Occupation : Militar y Phase.

Volume I I i s entitle d Japanes e Opera -

tions i n th e Southwest Pacifi c Area , an d

summarizes th e Japanes e sid e o f th e

story. Volum e I , excludin g th e supple -

ment, i s largel y base d upo n a n earlie r

historical serie s entitle d Studie s i n th e

History o f th e Southwes t Pacifi c Area ,

originally produce d i n th e G-3 Histori -

cal Divisio n o f GH Q SWP A an d GH Q

U.S. Arm y Forces, Pacifi c (AFPAC) , b y

the present author, Lt. Robert A. Gardner, Jr. , Lt . Thoma s P . Govan , an d th e

late Lt . Jete r A . Isely , USNR . Thei r

work, an d othe r materials assemble d b y

the G- 3 Historica l Division , wa s take n

over b y th e newl y forme d G- 2 Histori -

cal Division i n Tokyo late in 1946 . Vol -

ume I I o f th e MacArthu r Histor y wa s

prepared b y a smal l grou p o f Japanes e

officers whos e principa l source s were th e

Japanese Studie s i n Worl d Wa r II , th e

Statements o f Japanes e Official s o n

World Wa r II , an d othe r Japanes e ma -

terials describe d abov e unde r Japanes e

Sources.

Volume I , no t entirel y objective , i s

most valuabl e fo r settin g fort h th e Mac -

Arthur and GH Q SWP A points of view

on variou s problem s an d fo r providin g

a summar y histor y o f th e Southwes t Pa -

cific Area, Volum e II bring s together in

a single, coherent narrativ e Japanese information fro m a multitud e o f sources .

It contain s som e dat a o n Japanes e op -

erations no t easil y foun d elsewhere ,

but neithe r volum e contain s an y star -

tling revelation s o r importan t ne w

information.

A secon d importan t unpublishe d

source i s a serie s entitle d Operationa l

Monographs, produced b y the 10t h I& H

after th e wa r an d coverin g th e Eight h

Army's operation s i n th e Philippines .

The serie s consists of detailed narratives

based fo r the most part o n uni t records
708 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

and occasionall y containin g additiona l

material secure d fro m interview s an d

special reports of various types. Al l treat

the operation s i n a considerabl y mor e

complete fashion tha n the Eighth Army's

official afte r actio n reports fo r th e sam e

undertakings. Th e monograph s usefu l

for Triumph in the Philippines are :

The Luzo n Mop-U p Operation , Th e

Cebu-Bohol-Negros Orienta l Opera -

tion, Th e Panay-Negro s Occidenta l

Operation, The Zamboanga-Sul u Archipelago Operation , an d th e Mindana o

Operation.

Invaluable informatio n upo n th e

workings o f th e variou s intelligenc e

agencies i n th e Southwes t Pacifi c Are a

is to be obtained from a group of studies

entitled Th e Intelligenc e Series , G- 2

USAFFE-SWPA-AFPAC-FEC-SCAP,

prepared i n Japan afte r th e war by G-2

GHQ FEC . Genera l Willoughby , MacArthur's G-2 , closely supervise d th e

preparation o f th e manuscript s an d un -

dertook a thoroug h editin g tas k befor e

their fina l reproduction ; th e volume s

contain som e a x grinding . Ther e ar e

some gap s i n th e coverage , mainl y be -

cause o f securit y problems , an d i t fur -

thermore appears tha t th e serie s is chary

about givin g credit t o guerrill a source s

of informatio n i n th e Philippines. Th e

separate volume s are:

Introduction

I

II

A Brie f Histor y o f th e

G-2 Section , GHQ,

SWPA, an d Affiliate d

Units

The Guerrill a Resist -

ance Movemen t i n th e

Philippines

Intelligence Activitie s

in th e Philippine s

III

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

IX

During th e Japanes e

Occupation

Operations o f th e Mil -

itary Intelligenc e Sec -

tion, GH Q SWP A

Operations o f th e

Allied Intelligenc e

Bureau, GH Q SWP A

Operations o f th e

Allied Translato r an d

Interpreter Service ,

GHQ SWP A

Operations o f th e

Allied Geographi c Sec -

tion, GHQ SWP A

Operations o f th e

Technical Intelligenc e

Unit i n th e SWP A

Operations o f th e

Counter Intelligenc e

Corps i n th e SWP A

Operations o f th e

Civil Intelligenc e Sec -

tion, SCA P

Some o f th e volume s touc h upo n th e

activities o f intelligenc e agencie s no t

listed in the titles, and several have illustrative documentar y appendixes . Th e

volume o n th e guerrill a movemen t i n

the Philippines contains mainly reprints

of material s distribute d b y G- 2 GH Q

SWPA i n lat e 194 4 and earl y 194 5 and

covers onl y the developmen t and organization o f th e majo r guerrill a unit s

up unti l th e tim e America n troop s

landed o n eac h o f th e islands.

Two manuscript s provid e extremel y
THE SOURCES : A CRITICA L NOT E 709

valuable and interesting material on the

Corregidor Islan d operation . Th e first ,

anonymously written, is entitled Combat

Over Corregidor, 1 6 February 1945, Carried Ou t by the 503d Parachute Combat

Team. A photosta t cop y is available i n

OCMH files . A personalize d account,

this narrative was apparently written b y

one o f th e 503d's medica l officers . I t i s

overemotional bu t i s nevertheles s valu -

able fo r personal reactions t o th e action

and i t paints a graphic pictur e o f som e

of th e most striking horrors of the affray .

The secon d Corregido r manuscript , re -

produced at Headquarters, United States

Army Force s i n th e Fa r East , bears th e

title USAFF E Boar d Repor t No . 308 ,

16 Ma y 45 , Corregido r Islan d Opera -

tion, 503 d Parachut e RCT , 1 6 Feb- 8

Mar 45. Simila r to an after action report,

but containin g some analytical material,

this manuscrip t comprise s a sober , fact -

ual, an d detaile d narrativ e account,

accompanied b y maps , overlays , an d

photographs.

Published Works

While no t al l th e publishe d work s

listed below have been cited in Triumph

in the Philippines, the y al l furnish , a t

the ver y least , importan t backgroun d

information bearin g upon th e plannin g

and executio n o f th e operation s de -

scribed. Th e listing s ar e no t a n all-in -

clusive bibliograph y o f th e campaign s

in the Philippines, nor are they intended

as such .

Official Publications

Appleman, Ro y E. , Jame s M . Burns ,

Russell A . Gugeler , an d Joh n Stevens .

Okinawa: The Last Battle. UNITE D

STATES ARM Y I N WORL D WA R

II. Washington , 1948 .

Boggs, Maj . Charles W. , Jr. , USMC .

Marine Aviation in the Philippines.

Washington: Historica l Division , H q

U.S. Marin e Corps, 1951 . A good monograph o n th e subjec t bu t unfortu -

nately light o n th e details of air support

operations.

Cannon, M . Hamlin . Leyte: The

Return to the Philippines. UNITE D

STATES ARM Y I N WORL D WA R

II. Washington , 1954 .

Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea

Cate, eds . The Pacific: MATTERHORN to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945. Vol . V, "The Army Air Forces

in World War II. " Chicago : Universit y

of Chicag o Press, 1953 . A volume in th e

Air Forces' officia l histor y of World War

II, thi s work provide s valuable informa -

tion o n ai r plannin g an d operations .

Insofar a s the Philippines are concerned,

the volume seldo m come s t o grip s wit h

the problem s o f ai r suppor t tactic s an d

doctrine.

Crowl, Phili p A. , an d Edmun d G .

Love. Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls. UNITE D STATE S ARM Y I N

WORLD WA R II . Washington , 1955 .

Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee, The. Japanese Naval and Merchant

Shipping Losses During World War II

By All Causes. Washington : Nav y De -

partment, 1947 . A detailed listin g based

upon officia l Allie d an d Japanes e rec -

ords. Informatio n obtaine d sinc e pub -

lication disclose s som e error s i n th e

listings.

Miller, John, jr. CARTWHEEL: The

Reduction of Rabaul. UNITED STATES

ARMY I N WORL D WA R II . Wash -

ington, 1959 .

Milner, Samuel . Victory in Papua.
710 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II . Washington , 1957 .

Morison, Samue l Eliot . The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas: 1944-1945. Boston :

Little, Brown and Company, 1959. This

is Volume XIII of Morison's semiofficial,

monumental serie s "Histor y o f Unite d

States Nava l Operation s i n Worl d Wa r

II." I n the preface t o the volume, Morison gracefull y acknowledge s his indebtedness to Triumph in the Philippines, a

manuscript cop y o f whic h wa s available

to him. A t th e tim e Admira l Moriso n

used th e manuscript , i t appeare d tha t

Triumph woul d b e publishe d lon g be -

fore The Liberation, but i n th e end th e

reverse proved true . Th e publicatio n of

The Liberation before Triumph permit s

the presen t autho r t o retur n Admira l

Morison's compliment and acknowledg e

an indebtedness to The Liberation. Fo r

the purpose s o f Triumph in the Philippines, Admira l Morison 's volum e wa s

primarily valuabl e fo r additiona l infor -

mation o n kamikaz e attack s an d thei r

results.

Morton, Louis. The Fall of the Philippines. UNITE D STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WA R II . Washington , 1953 .

Office o f th e Chie f Engineer , Genera l

Headquarters, Army Forces, Pacific. Airfield and Base Development. Vol . VI,

"Engineers o f th e Southwes t Pacific ,

1941-1945." Washington : OC E GH Q

AFPAC, 1951 . Ostensibly th e report o f

the Chie f Engineer , GH Q SWP A an d

GHQ AFPAC , the volumes of this series

were prepared under th e general editorship of Lt. Col. George A. Meidling, CE.

They represen t a n immens e an d pains -

taking research effort an d provid e a valuable, well-documente d sourc e o f infor -

mation. Othe r title s i n th e serie s are :

Engineers in Theater Operations; Organizations, Troops, and Training; Engineer Intelligence; Amphibian Engineer

Operations; Combat Engineer Operations; Engineer Supply; an d Critique.

Public Informatio n Division , Depart -

ment of the Army. The Medal of Honor

of the United States Army. Washington ,

1948. A listin g o f individual s an d

citations.

Romanus, Charle s F. , an d Rile y Sun -

derland. Time Runs Out in the CBI.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II. Washington , 1959.

Smith, Robert Ross. The Approach to

the Philippines. UNITE D STATE S

ARMY I N WORL D WA R II . Wash -

ington, 1953 .

United State s Strategi c Bombin g Survey. Summary Report (Pacific War).

Washington, 1946 . A brie f accoun t

emphasizing the role o f air power .

————. Militar y Analysi s Division .

Air Campaigns of the Pacific War.

Washington, 1947 .

————. Militar y Analysi s Division .

Employment of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific Command. Washington ,

1947. A brie f accoun t tha t is actually a

paraphrase o f th e monograp h serie s

"Studies in th e Histor y of the Southwest

Pacific Area ," describe d abov e (se e

Manuscript Sources) i n th e discussion of

the MacArthur History.

————. (Pacific) , Nava l Analysis Division. Interrogations of Japanese Officials. 2 Vols. Washington , 1946 . Valuable interrogation s o f Japanes e cabine t

members an d militar y commanders .

Some of th e interrogations must be use d

cautiously, for th e Japanes e occasionally

tended t o respon d i n accordanc e wit h

the questioner' s ran k an d branc h o f

service.
THE SOURCES : A CRITICA L NOT E 711

General Works

Colonel Yay. [Pseudony m of Yay Panililio]. The Crucible. Ne w York: Th e

Macmillan Co. , 1950. A persona l history containin g informatio n o n th e de -

velopment o f th e Markin g Guerrill a

unit. Wea k o n postinvasio n guerrill a

operations.

Eichelberger, Lt. Gen . Rober t L., and

Milton Mackaye . Our Jungle Road to

Tokyo. Ne w York: Th e Vikin g Press ,

1950. Thi s volume provides some interesting sidelights on Genera l Eichelberg -

er's experiences . Neithe r scholarl y no r

always objective, it contains many minor

inaccuracies concerning both operation s

and planning .

Gunther, John . The Riddle of MacArthur. Ne w York : Harpe r & Bros. ,

1951. Thi s and other biographical treatments of MacArthu r listed subsequentl y

leave no doubt that an objective, accurate,

scholarly, and reasonabl y complet e biography o f thi s controversia l figur e i s ye t

to b e produced .

Halsey, Flee t Admira l Willia m F. ,

USN, an d Lt . Comdr . J . Brya n III ,

USNR. Admiral Halsey's Story. Ne w

York: Whittlese y House , McGraw-Hil l

Book Co. , Inc. , 1947 . A well-written and

interesting account providing, inter alia,

a recor d o f Halsey' s oppositio n t o th e

Formosa operation .

Harkins, Philip . Blackburn's Headhunters. Ne w York : W . W . Norto n & :

Co., 1955 . The stor y of Lt. Col. Donal d

D. Blackbur n an d th e 11th Infantry ,

USAFIP(NL). Use d in conjunction wit h

Volckmann's book (below) , this volume

contains valuabl e informatio n o n th e

USAFIP(NL).

Heavey, Brig . Gen. Willia m F . Down

Ramp! The Story of the Army Amphibian Engineers. Washington : Infantr y

Journal Press , 1947 . A goo d summar y

account.

Hunt, Frazier . The Untold Story of

Douglas MacArthur. Ne w York : Th e

Devin-Adair Co., 1954.

Kenney, Georg e C . General Kenney

Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War. Ne w York: Duell , Sloa n an d

Pearce, 1949 . Presenting Genera l Ken -

ney's point of view, this volume contains

some inaccuracie s bu t include s muc h

information concernin g persona l rela -

tionships tha t i s no t t o b e foun d i n

official records .

Krueger, General Walter. From Down

Under to Nippon: The Story of Sixth

Army in World War II. Washington :

Combat Force s Press , 1953 . A mos t

disappointing volum e sinc e i t i s littl e

more tha n a paraphras e o f th e Sixt h

Army's wartime afte r actio n reports.

Leahy, Flee t Admira l Willia m D . I

Was There. Ne w York : McGraw-Hil l

Book Co., Inc., 1950. Good o n strategi c

planning, althoug h i t give s th e impression tha t Admira l Leah y ha s lef t ou t

much tha t h e knows a great dea l about .

Lee, Clark , an d Richar d Henschel .

Douglas MacArthur. Ne w York: Henr y

Holt and Co. , 1952 .

Reel, A. Frank . The Case of General

Yamashita. Chicago : Universit y of Chi -

cago Press, 1949 . A case study that take s

issue wit h th e procedure s an d finding s

of th e Yamashit a tria l tribunal . Thi s

volume is a "must" for anyone interested

in th e wa r i n th e Philippines.

Sherwood, Rober t E . Roosevelt and

Hopkins, An Intimate History. Rev . ed .

New York: Harpe r &: Bros., 1950.

Stimson, Henr y L. , an d McGeorg e

Bundy. On Active Service in Peace and

War. Ne w York: Harpe r &: Bros. , 1948 .
712 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Comparatively wea k o n th e Pacifi c war.

Templeman, Harold. The Return to

Corregidor. Ne w York : Stran d Press ,

1945. A short , personalize d accoun t b y

the American Re d Cros s Fiel d Directo r

with th e 503 d Parachut e RCT .

Valtin, Jan . Children of Yesterday.

New York : The Readers ' Press , 1946 .

Contains, inter alia, a fictionalize d ac -

count o f th e Luban g Island s operation .

Volckmann, Col . Russell W . We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy

Lines in the Philippines. Ne w York :

W. W . Norto n & Co., 1954. While providing some invaluable information, this

volume b y th e commande r o f th e USA -

FIP(NL) is disappointing in tha t i t fail s

to come to grips with problems of organization, personnel , civilia n loyalty , an d

other facet s o f th e guerrill a movement .

A definitiv e histor y o f an y guerrill a

movement in th e Philippines is yet to be

written.

Whitney, Maj. Gen. Courtney. MacArthur: His Rendezvous With History.

New York: Alfre d A . Knopf, 1956 . Her o

worship, b y on e o f MacArthur 's staf f

officers.

Willoughby, Maj . Gen. Charles A. ,

and Joh n Chamberlin , MacArthur:

1941-1951. Ne w York : McGraw-Hil l

Book Co., Inc., 1954. A n attempt to produce a simultaneou s apologi a fo r bot h

MacArthur an d Willoughby .

Unit Histories

After th e wa r man y unit s publishe d

their ow n accounts , mos t o f the m pre -

pared b y an d fo r th e Worl d Wa r I I

veterans. Man y verg e o n bein g publi c

relations blurbs , other s ar e quit e wel l

done an d reflec t soun d scholarshi p an d

extensive research . Almos t al l contai n

interesting sidelights on personalities and

on smal l uni t operation s tha t d o no t

appear in officia l records. Th e followin g

works wer e consulte d durin g th e prep -

aration o f Triumph in the Philippines.

Anonymous. 40th Infantry Division.

Baton Rouge: Arm y & Navy Publishing

Co., 1947 .

Anonymous. History of the Second

Engineer Special Brigade, United States

Army, World War II. Harrisburg : Th e

Telegraph Press , 1946 .

Anonymous. History of the 31st Infantry Division in Training and Combat,

1940-1945. Bato n Rouge : Th e Arm y

&: Navy Publishing Co., 1946.

Anonymous. Surf and Sand: The

Saga of the 533d Engineer Boat and

Shore Regiment and 1461st Engineer

Maintenance Company, 1942-1945. An -

dover: Th e Andove r Press, Ltd., 1947.

Cronin, Capt , Franci s D . Under the

Southern Cross: The Saga of The Americal Division. Washington : Comba t

Forces Press , 1951 . A good , detaile d

volume based o n extensive research.

Flanagan, Maj . Edward M. , Jr . The

Angels: A History of the 11th Airborne

Division, 1943-1946. Washington : In -

fantry Journa l Press , 1947 . As a resul t

of th e los s o f th e division 's record s i n

Japan, thi s volum e i s a n invaluabl e

source.

Frankel, Stanley A. The 37th Division

in World War II. Washington : Infantry

Journal Press, 1948 . An excellen t piec e

of wor k tha t reflect s extensiv e research .

Karolevitz, Capt. Robert R. , ed . The

25th Division and World War 2. Baton

Rouge: Arm y & : Navy Publishin g Co. ,

1946.

Lancaster, Roy . The Story of the

Bushmasters. Detroit : Lancaste r Publi-
THE SOURCES : A CRITICA L NOT E 713

cations. A brief but informative account

of 158t h RC T operations .

McCartney, 1s t Lt . Willia m F . The

Jungleers: A History of the 41st Infantry

Division. Washington : Infantr y Jour -

nal Press, 1948 . Fair .

6th Infantr y Division , Publi c Rela -

tions Section. The 6th Infantry Division

in World War II, 1939-1945. Washing -

ton: Infantr y Journa l Press, 1947 . On e

of th e better unit histories.

33d Divisio n Historica l Committee ,

The. The Golden Cross: A History of

the 33d Infantry Division in World War

II. Washington : Infantr y Journal Press,

1948. A well-done volume tha t is much

better tha n th e division 's afte r actio n

report for Luzon.

Wright, Maj , Bertram C . The 1st

Cavalry Division in World War II.

Tokyo: Toppa n Printin g Co. , Ltd. ,

1947. Excellent .

Zimmer, Col. Josep h E . The History

of the 43d Infantry Division, 1941-1945.

Baton Rouge: Arm y & Navy Publishing

Co.
Glossary

AAF

A/B

ACofS

Admin

AE

AFD

AFPAC

AGC

AGF

AGO

AGP

AGS

AIF

AK

AKA

AKD

AKE

AKF

AKN

ALAMO

AM

Amphib

AMS

AN

ANF

AO

AOG

AP

APA

APD

APH

AR

ARD

ARG

ARL

Armd

ARS

Allied Air Forces

Airborne

Assistant Chief of Staff

Administrative

Ammunition ship

Mobile floating drydock

U.S. Army Forces, Pacific

General communications vessel

Army Ground Forces

Adjutant General's Office

Motor torpedo boat tender

Allied Geographic Section

Australian Imperial Force

Cargo ship

Cargo ship, attack

Deep hold cargo ship

Ammunition transport

Refrigerated cargo ship (1943)

Net cargo ship

Code for U.S. Sixth Army while operating as a

special ground task force headquarters directly

under GHP SWPA

Mine sweeper

Amphibious

Army Map Service

Net laying ship

Allied Naval Forces

Oiler, or fuel oil tanker

Gasoline tanker

Transport

Transport, attack

Transport (high speed)

Transport, hospital

Repair ship

Auxiliary repair dock (floating drydock)

Repair ship, internal combustion engine

Repair ship, landing craft

Armored

Salvage vessel
GLOSSARY 715

Arty

ASCOM

Asst

Atchd

ATF

ATIS

ATO

AVP

AW

Bd

BLT

Bn

Brig

Btry

CA

Cav

CB

CenPac

CG

Chron

CINCPAC

CINCPOA

CINCSWPA

CL

CM

CM-IN

CM-OUT

Co

CO

Comdr

COMGENPOA

COMINCH

Conf

Com

CORONET

CP

CTF

CTG

CTU

CV

CVE

DA

DCofS

Artillery

Army Service Command

Assistant

Attached

Ocean tug , flee t

Allied Translator and Interpreter Service

Ocean tug , ol d

Seaplane tender, small

Distilling ship

Board

Battalion landing team

Battalion

Brigade

Battery

Heavy cruiser

Cavalry

Naval construction battalion

Central Pacific

Commanding general

Chronological

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacifi c Fleet

Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas

Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area

Light cruiser

Mine layer

Classified message, incoming

Classified message, outgoing

Company

Commanding officer

Commander

Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas

Commander in Chief, U.S . Nav y

Conference

Construction

Invasion o f th e islan d o f Honsh u a t th e Toky o

plain

Command post

Commander, Task Force

Commander, Task Group

Commander, Task Unit

Aircraft carrier

Aircraft carrier, escort

Department of the Army

Deputy Chief of Staff
716 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

DD

DE

Dept

Div

DM

DMS

DSEI

Dukw

EB&SR

Engr

ESB

ExecO

FA

FEC

FIVESOME

FM

FO

G-2

G-3

GHQ

Gli

Gp

GPF

Hist

How

Hq

I&H

IIB

IJN

IMB

Inf

Info

Insp

Instr

Intel

Interrog

Interv

Is

IX

Destroyer

Destroyer escort

Department

Division

Light mine layer

Mine sweeper (converted DD)

Daily Summary of Enemy Intelligence

Amphibian, 21⁄2-ton, 6x6 truck

Engineer boat and shore regiment

Engineer

Engineer special brigade

Executive officer

Field artillery

Far East Command

Agreement involvin g co-ordinatio n o f operation s

in th e Southwes t Pacifi c

Field manual

Field order

Intelligence Divisio n

Operations Division

General headquarters

Glider

Group

Grande Puissance Filloux

Historical, history

Howitzer

Headquarters

Information an d Historica l

Independent infantry battalion

Imperial Japanese Navy

Independent mixed brigade

Infantry

Information

Inspection

Instruction

Intelligence

Interrogation

Interview

Island

Miscellaneous unclassified (fo r any unclassified ship s

in the Navy)
GLOSSARY 717

JANAC

JCS

Jnl

JPS

KP

LCI(G)

LCI(L)

LCI(M)

LCI(R)

LCM

LCPR

LCT

LCVP

LI

LofC

LOVE III

LSD

LSI

LSM

LST

LSV

Ltr

LUBSEC

LVT

LVT(A)

MAG

MIKE I

MIKE II

MIKE III

MIKE IV

MIKE VI

MIKE VII

Min

MLR

MONTCLAIR

MTB

Mtg

MUSKETEER

NARS

NCO

NEI

Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee

Joint Chiefs o f Staff

Journal

Joint Staff Planners

Kilometer post

Landing craft, infantry , gunboat

Landing craft, infantry , large

Landing craft, infantr y (mortar ship)

Landing craft, infantr y (rocket ship)

Landing craft, mechanize d

Landing craft, personnel, ramp

Landing craft, tan k

Landing craft, vehicle and personnel

Logistics instructions

Line of communications

Plan for invasion of Mindoro

Landing ship, dock

Landing ship, infantry

Landing ship, medium

Landing ship, tank

Landing ship, vehicle

Letter

Luzon Base Section

Landing vehicle, tracked

Landing vehicle , tracke d (armored )

Marine Air Group

Plan for invasion of Lingayen Gulf

Plan for invasion of Dingalan Bay

Plan for invasion of Vigan

Plan for invasion of Nasugbu and Balaya n Bays

Plan for invasion of Batangas and Tayabas Bays

Plan fo r invasion o f Zambales coast

Minutes

Main line of resistance

Redesignation of PRINCETO N

Motor torpedo boat

Meeting

Basic outline plans for Philippine operations

National Archives and Records Service

Noncommissioned office r

Netherlands East Indies
718 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

O/B

OBB

Obsn

Obsr

Off

OLYMPIC

OPD

OPLR

Opnl

Opns

Org

PA

Para

PC

PCAU

PCE(R)

PD

Per

PF

Plt

POA

POW

Prcht

PRINCETON

PT

RAAF

Rad

RAGC

Rcd

Rcn

RCT

Regtl

RENO

Rpt

S-1

S-2

S-3

Order of Battle

Old battleshi p

Observation

Observer

Officer

Operations instructions

Plan for March 1946 invasion of Kyushu, Japan

Operations Division

Outpost line of resistance

Operational

Operations

Organization

Philippine Army

Parachute

Patrol vessel, submarine chaser

Philippine Civil Affairs Uni t

Patrol craft, escort (rescue)

Ponton dock

Periodic

Patrol vessel, frigate

Platoon

Pacific Ocean Areas

Prisoner of war

Parachute

Basic outline pla n fo r reoccupatio n o f th e Visayas -

Mindanao-Borneo-Netherlands Eas t Indie s are a

Patrol vessel, motor torpedo boat

Royal Australian Air Force

Radiogram

Relief genera l communications vessel

Record

Reconnaissance

Regimental combat team

Regimental

SWPA plan s fo r operation s i n th e Bismarc k Archi -

pelago, along northern coast o f Ne w Guine a an d

thence t o Mindanao , P.I.

Report.

Personnel sectio n o f a uni t no t havin g a genera l

staff; office r i n charg e o f th e sectio n

Military intelligenc e sectio n o f a uni t no t havin g

a genera l staff ; office r i n charg e o f th e sectio n

Operations an d trainin g sectio n o f a uni t no t hav -

ing a general staff ; office r i n charg e of th e sectio n
GLOSSARY 719

SBD

SC

SCAP

SCR

Sec.

Serv

SHOBU

Sp

SPM

SWPA

TD

Tech

Tele

Telecon

TF

TG

TM

Tng

TO

Tr

Trans

TU

USAFFE

USAFIP(NL)

USASOS

USFIP

USSBS

VICTOR I

WD

Wkly

WO

WVTF

XAK

YD

YMS

YW

Douglas dive bombers

Submarine chaser

Supreme Commande r fo r th e Allie d Powers

Signal Corp s radio

Section

Service

Northern groupmen t o f Japanes e force s i n Luzon ;

code nam e fo r 14th Area Army

Special

Self-propelled mount

Southwest Pacific Area

Tank destroyer

Technical

Telephone

Telephone conference

Task forc e

Task group

Technical manual

Training

Transportation Officer , Tabl e of Organizatio n

Troop

Translations

Task unit

United States Army Forces in the Far East

U.S. Arm y Force s i n th e Philippine s (Norther n

Luzon)

United States Army Service s of Supply, SWPA

United States Forces in the Philippines

United States Strategic Bombing Survey

Panay and Negros Occidental operation

War Department

Weekly

Warning order

Western Visayan Task Force

Cargo ship, merchant marine manned

District derrick, floating

District motor mine sweeper

District barge, water (self-propelled)
Basic Military Map Symbols *

Symbols within a rectangl e indicate a militar y unit , withi n

a triangl e a n observatio n post , an d withi n a circl e a suppl y

point.

Military Units—Identification

Antiaircraft Artiller y

Armored Comman d

Army Air Force s

Artillery, except Antiaircraft an d Coast Artillery

Cavalry, Horse

Cavalry, Mechanized

Chemical Warfare Service

Coast Artiller y

Engineers

Infantry

Medical Corp s

Ordnance Department

Quartermaster Corps

Signal Corps

Tank Destroyer

Transportation Corp s

Veterinary Corps

Airborne unit s ar e designate d b y combinin g a gul l win g

symbol wit h th e arm o r servic e symbol:

Airborne Artillery

Airborne Infantry

*For complet e listin g o f symbols i n us e durin g th e Worl d Wa r I I period , see

FM 21-30 , dated Octobe r 1943 , fro m whic h thes e ar e taken .
SYMBOLS 721

Size Symbols

The followin g symbols placed eithe r in boundary lines or

above the rectangle , triangle, or circle inclosing the identifyin g

arm o r service symbol indicate the size of military organization:

Squad

Section

Platoon

Company, troop, battery, Air Force flight

Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron

Regiment or group; combat team (wit h abbreviation CT fol -

lowing identifying numeral)

Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division , or Air Force

Wing

Division or Command of an Ai r Force

Corps or Air Force

Army

Group of Armies

EXAMPLES

The lette r or number to the left o f the symbol indicates the

unit designation; that t o the right, the designation of the parent

unit t o whic h i t belongs. Letters o r number s abov e o r belo w

boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines:

Company A, 137t h Infantr y

8th Field Artillery Battalion

Combat Command A, 1s t Armored Divisio n

Observation Post, 23d Infantry

Command Post, 5th Infantry Divisio n

Boundary between 137t h and 138t h Infantry

Weapons

Machine gun

Gun

Gun batter y

Howitzer or Mortar

Tank

Self-propelled gu n
UNITED STATE S ARM Y IN WORL D WA R I I

The followin g volumes have been published or are in press:

The War Department

Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945

The Army and Economic Mobilization

The Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground Forces

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops

The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Arm y Service Forces

The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Wester n Hemisphere

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense

Guarding the United States and Its Outposts

The Wa r in the Pacific

The Fall of the Philippines

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive

Victory in Papua

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls

Campaign in the Marianas

The Approach to the Philippines

Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

Triumph in the Philippines

Okinawa: The Last Battle

Strategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy

Salerno to Cassino

Cassino to the Alps

The Europea n Theater of Operations

Cross-Channel Attack

Breakout and Pursuit

The Lorraine Campaign

The Siegfried Line, Campaign

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge

The Last Offensive

The Supreme Command
724 THE TRANSPORTATIO N CORPS

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume 1

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II

The Middl e East Theater

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India Theater

Stilwell's Mission to China

Stilwell's Command Problems

Time Runs Out in CBI

The Technica l Services

The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War

The Chemical, Warfare Sennet: From Laboratory to Field

The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat

The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan

The Corps of Engineers: The, War Against Germany

The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor

Theaters

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War

The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply

The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany

The Signal Corps: The, Emergency

The, Signal Corps: The Test

The. Signal, Corps: The Outcome

The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations

The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Special Studies

Chronology: 1941-1945

Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945

Rearming the French

Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt

The Women's Army Corps

Civil, Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors

Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces

The Employment, of Negro Troops

Manhattan: The, U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb

Pictorial Record

The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Japan
Index

A-20's: 132-33 , 162, 235, 267, 340, 351-52

Abar No . 2: 192 , 198

Abcede, Lt. Col . Salvador: 586 , 604-05, 607-08

Abe, Capt. Saburo : 241, 245

Abra Rive r an d Valley : 542-43 , 546-47

Abucayan River : 17 4

Acop's Place : 488-8 9

Adaoay: 567-6 8

Advance Commande r Suppor t Aircraft : 3 7

Aga: 226-2 7

Agno Rive r an d Valley: 31-32 , 73, 77, 79, 86-87, 98-101 , 114-15, 117, 128-30, 148-53, 157-58, 

Agoi River : 8 6

Agoo: 468-69 , 472

Aguilar: 79 , 115-17

Agusan Valley : 637 , 640-44

Air Force , Japanese. See Japanese Arm y Ai r Force .

Air operation s

air-ground co-ordination : 235-3 6

aircraft losses : 48 , 50-51

carrier-based attack s

Bataan: 31 2

Central Plains : 139-4 0

Clark Field : 59 , 16 8

Formosa: 36 , 58, 63-65

Lingayen Gulf : 58-67 , 69, 75 , 100 , 104-05,

128, 131

Manila: 59 , 240, 293-94

Mindanao: 628-2 9

Mindoro: 4 7

Okinawa: 6 4

Pescadores: 36 , 58

Ryukyus: 36 , 58

South Chin a Sea : 59 1

Southern Philippines : 591-9 3

command structure : 37-3 8

firing o n friendl y troops : 183 , 198, 234-36

land-based attack s

Baguio: 477-78 , 484-85

Bataan: 315-16 , 328-29, 332-33

Bicol Peninsula : 439-4 1

Central Plains: 20 0

China theater : 36 , 591

Clark Field : 58 , 168, 171, 177, 182-83, 206

Corregidor: 335-40, 342-43, 348, 656

Formosa: 56 0

Japan: 4, 9, 14-17, 36

Lingayen Gulf : 57 , 100, 129-30

Air operations—Continue d

land-based attacks—Continue d

Luzon: 45 , 53, 57, 63, 91

Manila: 238-40 , 264, 293-94

Manila Ba y area: 340 , 352-53, 356-57

Mindanao: 599 , 628-29

Mindoro: 47 , 50-51

northern Luzon : 545 , 576

Okinawa: 56 0

South Chin a Sea : 583-84

southern Luzon : 408 , 418, 428, 430-31

Villa Verd e Trail : 50 2

Visayan Islands : 612-1 3

Visayan Passages : 43 6

napalm, use of: 200, 293, 330, 346, 352-53, 413-14.

418, 656

plans: 18 , 21-25, 34-38, 45, 57-60, 63-65, 310-11,

655-56

reconnaissance

Bataan: 326 , 334

Central Plains : 18 9

Clark Field : 20 3

Corregidor: 33 7

Lingayen Gulf : 35-36 , 67-68, 85, 10 9

Manila: 235 , 264

Manila Ba y area : 35 2

Mindanao: 640 , 643

Mindoro: 49-5 0

Nasugbu-Tagaytay Ridge : 22 6

northern Luzon : 464 , 528-29

reinforcements: 49-50 , 52, 59, 63

strategic support : 16-17 , 35-36, 141-42

strength: 45-46 , 52, 312

supply b y

Corregidor: 338-3 9

Mindanao: 638 , 643, 645

Nasugbu-Tagaytay Ridge : 23 4

northern Luzon : 465-66, 530, 532-33, 571

southern Luzon : 41 2

Southern Philippines : 59 9

Visayan Islands : 601-0 2

tactical support , carrier-based

Lingayen Gulf : 35 , 67, 83-84, 108, 131

Manila: 23 6

Nasugbu-Tagaytay Ridge : 221-2 2

tactical support , land-based

Baguio: 476 , 481

Bataan: 330 , 332

Bicol Peninsula : 443-4 4

Central Plains : 151-53 , 162, 192-95, 200

Clark Field : 202-0 4
726 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Air operations—Continue d

tactical support , land-based—Continued

Corregidor: 33 9

Lingayen Gulf : 3 5

Manila: 235-36 , 249-50, 268, 273-74, 656

Manila Ba y area : 351-5 2

Mindanao: 591, 599, 621, 627, 633-35, 637, 644

Nasugbu-Tagaytay Ridge : 226-27, 235

northern Luzon : 467 , 514, 546-47, 549

southern Luzon : 373 , 375, 380-81, 386, 389n,

392, 403, 412-15, 418, 428, 431-32, 656

Villa Verd e Trail : 49 7

Visayan Islands : 607 , 613-15

Air operations , Japanese. See also Japanes e Arm y

Air Force .

aircraft losses : 47-49, 51, 57-62, 64-66

attacks: 28, 46-47, 49, 51, 59-67, 240

plans: 58-59 , 62-63, 66-67

reinforcements: 28 , 49, 58, 62, 90

strength: 28 , 37, 48-49, 58, 62-63

Airborne operation s

Corregidor: 335-39 , 341-46

Nasugbu: 225-29 , 235

northern Luzon : 569-7 1

southern Luzon : 427-2 8

Southern Philippines : 59 2

training: 227-2 8

Visayan Islands : 604-0 7

Airborne Division , 11th: 29, 187 , 202-03 , 217, 221-36 , 240-41, 265-70, 273-74, 307, 309, 

Airborne Enginee r Battalion , 161st: 34 1

Airborne Medica l Company , 221st: 570 n

Airborne Ordnanc e Company , 711th: 57 0

Airborne Signa l Company , 511th: 570 n

Aircraft. See by type or name.

Airfields, development of . See also by name.

China theater : 3 , 9, 14

Formosa: 4, 9, 14-15

Leyte: 23-25 , 584, 586, 591-92

Lingayen Gulf : 41 , 118, 131-33

Luzon: 19 , 21-22, 141-42, 181, 186, 312-14, 329-30,

363, 454, 560, 562, 586

Marianas 14-1 5

Mindanao: 584 , 620

Mindoro: 21-22, 25, 48-53, 583-84, 586, 591-92

Morotai: 58 6

Philippines: 4, 7, 14-15, 651

Samar: 436-37 , 586, 591-92

Southern Philippines : 583-84 , 589-93, 597, 599-

600

Visayan Islands : 602-05, 608, 614

Aitape: 54-5 6

AK's: 124 , 127

AKA's: 124 , 126-27

Akutsu, Maj. Noriak i (PA) : 400n

Alacan: 81-82 , 85-87, 98-100, 102-03, 133

Alaminos 76 , 115-17

ALAMO Scout Team: 569-70

Albay Gulf : 439-40 , 442-43

Allied Ai r Forces, SWPA. See also Arm y Ai r Forces.

Baguio drive : 468-69 , 477-78

Bataan: 310-1 2

Bicol Peninsula : 439-4 2

Central Plains : 141-42 , 168, 192, 232, 236

Clark Field : 168 , 171-72, 181, 186

Corregidor: 34 0

Lingayen Gulf : 34-38 , 41-42, 57, 59, 63-64, 129-

30, 132

Luzon: 25-26, 53-54, 63

Manila: 249-50 , 268, 293-94

Manila Ba y area: 340 , 353-54

Mindoro: 44-5 2

Nasugbu-Tagaytay Ridge : 221 , 232

northern Luzon : 560 , 578-79

southern Luzon : 427 , 429-30

Southern Philippines : 583-85 , 588-91

Allied Nava l Forces, SWPA. See also Navy , U.S.

Bicol Peninsula : 439-41, 445

Iwo Jima an d Okinawa : 58 5

Lingayen Gulf : 32-42 , 55, 58, 65-66, 115-18

Luzon: 22-23 , 25-26, 53

Manila Ba y area : 352-5 6

Mindoro: 44-45, 47-51

Nasugbu—Tagaytay Ridge : 221 , 228-29, 236

southern Luzon : 427 , 429-30

Southern Philippines : 584-85 , 591-93, 597, 646

Ambayabang Rive r and Valley: 144-45 , 455-56, 458, 460-61 

Ambuclao: 559-60, 565, 567, 574

Amburayan Rive r an d Valley : 54 2

Ambushes, Japanese: 108, 324-25, 563

Americal Division . See Infantry Divisions, Americal.

Amlang: 108-09 , 152

Ammunition, shortages of: 40, 402, 656-57

Ammunition, shortages of , Japanese: 545-46 , 554,

576-77, 588-89, 605, 622-23.

Amoy: 11-13, 17, 53

Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 672d: 259

Amphibian Truck Company, 466th: 12 3

Amphibious operations . See also Assaul t shipping .

Bataan: 312-14, 331-34

beach clearing: 127-2 8

beachmasters: 119-21, 123, 126-27

Bicol Peninsula: 423, 439-43

carrier support: 15-1 7

command structure: 32, 34, 45, 47

Corregidor: 335-39, 341-43, 347

Leyte: 22-2 3

Lingayen Gulf : 31-34 , 44-69, 73-87, 118-28

Manila Ba y area: 335-57

Mindanao: 620-21, 623-28, 641, 646-47

Nasugbu: 221-25, 234

northern Luzon : 453-54, 457-58
INDEX 727

Amphibious operations—Continued

shore parties: 41, 48, 77, 118-31, 133-34

Southern Philippines : 585 , 589 , 592-93 , 597-98

Visayan Islands : 601 , 605-06 , 610-13, 616-18

Visayan Passages: 423, 436-39

Amphibious operations, Japanese (1942) : 641-4 2

Ampid Rive r and Valley: 374-76

Amtrac's: 427-28

Anao: 117 , 167-6 8

Anderson, Lt. Col . Bernar d L. : 418-20 , 562n

Angaki: 54 7

Angat Gorge : 40 7

Angat River : 212-17 , 233-34, 367, 405-1 5

Angeles, Luzon: 175 , 180 , 182

Animals, use of: 655

Antiaircraft Automati c Weapon s Battalion , 478th:

614

Antiaircraft defenses : 61 , 654-55

Antiaircraft defenses , Japanese: 48-49, 265-66, 605,

610

Antiaircraft Gu n Battalion , 496th: 646-4 7

Antipolo (nea r Kiangan) : 567-6 8

Antipolo (nea r Manila) : 367-73 , 376-79, 381-82,

389-90

Antipolo-New Bosoboso-Waw a Da m road : 37 6

Antitank operation s

Baguio: 483-8 4

Clark Field : 204-06

Manila: 263-64, 273-75, 282-84, 287-88, 292, 294 -

97, 303-06

northern Luzon : 522-23, 525, 563

southern Luzon: 427-28, 430, 432

Antitank operations, Japanese: 195 , 483 , 562-63, 610

Aoshima, Col. Ryoichiro : 90n

P's: 56n , 124 , 12 7

APA's: 124 , 127

Apangat River: 105-06

Aparri: 18-19 , 21-22, 450-54, 457-58, 466-67, 543,

545, 569-70

APD's: 224-25, 332-33

Aquino, Maj. Pedro : 645n

Araki, Maj. Gen . Shoji : 545-47

Arboredo Rive r an d Valley : 158-59 , 460-61, 477,

480-82, 491-93, 500

Aringay: 98-99, 106n, 471-7 2

Aringay River: 47 1

Aritao: 98 , 454-56, 464-65, 477-78, 487-90, 560-64

Aritao-Baguio suppl y road: 558-60, 562-63, 564-67, 569, 571-7 2

Aritomi, Lt. Col. Shigekatsu : 605n

Armies

Third: 65 2

Sixth:

casualties: 87, 652

Leyte: 1 8

Luzon: 18-54 0

Mindoro: 44-45, 47-48, 51-52

Armies—Continued

Eighth:

casualties: 65 2

Luzon: 29 , 187, 221-36 , 265-69, 312-14

Mindanao: 620-48

Samar: 42 3

Southern Philippines : 30 , 363-64, 440, 583 -

650

Visayan Islands : 601-19

Visayan Passages: 436-39, 443, 44 5

Tenth: 65 2

Armor a s fixe d defenses , Japanese: 150-58 , 192-93

Armor-infantry co-ordination : 112-14 , 162

Armor-infantry co-ordination , Japanese: 197-9 8

Armored Group, 13th: 29 , 31-32, 87, 579n

Army Ai r Forces. See also Allie d Ai r Forces, SWPA.

Fifth: 35-36 , 45-46, 48-49, 132-33, 162, 183-84 , 186 

Seventh: 35-36, 45, 53-54

Thirteenth: 35 , 340, 586 , 591-92 , 599, 62 1

Fourteenth: 3, 14, 16-17, 34-38

Twentieth: 3 6

XX Bombe r Command : 3 6

XXI Bombe r Command : 3 6

308th Bombardmen t Wing : 132-33 , 235

310th Bombardmen t Wing : 45-46, 223, 23 5

18th Fighte r Group : 13 2

317th Troo p Carrie r Group : 227-28, 338, 340-41 , 343-4 

82nd Tactica l Reconnaissanc e Squadron : 13 2

547th Nigh t Fighte r Squadron : 13 2

Army Bas e Area, Luzon: 13 3

Army Beachhea d Line . See Lingaya n Gulf , Army

Beachhead Line .

Army Service Command (ASCOM) : 38, 41, 130, 132 -

35

Arnold, Gen. Henr y H.: 6, 17n

Arnold, Lt. Col. Robert H.: 544

Arnold, Maj. Gen . Willia m H.: 608, 614-16, 617n

Arodogat Rive r an d Valley : 147 , 454 , 458-60 , 468,

471-72

Artillery operation s

artillery-infantry co-ordination : 292-93

artillerymen use d a s infantry: 646-47 , 654-55

Baguio: 471, 481, 483-85

Bataan: 315-16, 322-25, 328-30

Bicol Peninsula: 443-44

Central Plains: 139-40 , 151-53, 159, 162, 193-96, 200

Clark Field : 176-78 , 182-85, 202-03, 206

Corregidor: 347-4 8

Lingayen Gulf : 77 , 83-84, 106-08, 112

Manila: 249-50 , 254-64, 266-68, 273-75, 277-84, 286-87 

Manila Bay area: 351-53

Mindanao: 633-34, 638, 641 , 64 4
728 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Artillery operations—Continued

Nasugbu-Tagaytay Ridge : 226-27 , 230

northern Luzon , 466, 514 , 519-26, 533-34, 551, 553-54 , 561-63

Philippines: 655-5 7

restrictions on : 263-64, 286, 294, 322

southern Luzon : 373, 375, 380-81, 386, 389n, 392-

94, 396-97, 402-03, 410-11, 413-14, 418, 427-31

Southern Philippines: 596, 598-99

strength: 29, 215, 223, 296

Villa Verde Trail: 494, 497, 502

Visayan Islands: 607, 613-15

Visayan Passages: 436-37

Artillery operations, Japanese

artillerymen use d a s infantry : 628n , 641, 646-47

Bataan: 315-16, 318-21, 323-24, 329, 332-33

Bicol Peninsula : 440, 442

Central Plains: 148-53, 161-62, 193-96

Clark Field : 171-72 , 175-80, 183, 185, 203-04

Corregidor: 34 0

Lingayen Gulf : 81-85 , 105-12, 122-23, 125

Manila: 215-16, 248, 256, 259-63, 266-68, 293-94, 58 5

Mindanao: 630-32, 633, 641-42

Nasugbu-Tagaytay Ridge : 226-27, 231

northern Luzon : 513-14 , 519-20 , 545-46 , 551, 560-6 3

Philippines: 653-5 4

shortages: 622-2 3

southern Luzon : 372-73, 377, 380-81, 383-84, 386-

87, 394, 402, 405, 429

Southern Philippines : 592-9 3

strength: 104-05 , 158, 173-74

Villa Verd e Trail: 597, 599, 601

Visayan Islands : 61 0

Asano, Col. Kenichiro : 94n , 243n

Asin: 470-72, 479-81, 485-87

Asin Rive r an d Valley: 566-68, 576, 573-74, 576-79

Agingan: 15 7

Assault shipping . See also Amphibiou s operations .

AK's: 124 , 127

AKA's: 124 , 126-27

AP's: 124 , 127

APA's: 124 , 127

APD's: 224-25, 332-33

DUKW's: 118 , 124, 129-31, 234, 655

LCI's: 77 , 440-41

LCI(G)'s: 57 , 73-74, 438-39

LCI(M)'s: 7 5

LCM's: 77 , 118, 120-29, 341-43, 348, 352-56, 418, 436-37 , 443-45, 601, 626, 644, 646-47, 6

LCM(3)'s: 125-2 6

LCM(6)'s: 125-2 6

LCPR's: 224-25, 332-36

LCT's: 47-48, 77, 118, 124-26

LCVP's: 77 , 118 , 120-21, 124-27 , 332-33 , 356, 440-4 1

Assault shipping—Continued

LSM's: 56-57 , 124-26, 332-33, 356, 440-41

LST's: 56-57 , 69 , 76-77 , 118-21 , 123-27 , 234 , 440-4 

LVT's: 33 , 69, 76, 78, 118, 128-31, 234, 259, 292, 610-12 

LVT(A)'s: 33 , 69, 76-78, 118

Atimonan: 434 , 439, 444-45

Atkins, Pfc. Thoma s E.: 498n

Augustin, Col. Marcu s V. : 392 . See also Marking' s

guerrillas.

Australia, as staging area: 54-55

Australia, HMAS: 6 5

Australian Air Force: 35 , 45, 48-49, 599

Australian Army : 3 0

Australian Navy : 32-33, 61, 65-66

B-24's: 57 , 340, 599

B-25's: 49-50, 198, 340, 352-53, 599

B-29's: 4, 9, 14-17, 36-38, 41, 45

Bacnar: 79 , 115, 117

Bacolod: 605-0 6

Bacon: 44 3

Bactad: 160-61 , 164

Bagabag: 453-55, 464-67, 533, 541-42, 558-64, 566-

67, 571

Bagac: 332 , 334

Bago River : 605-6 6

Baguio: 94 , 97-100, 104, 144-48, 153, 155, 158, 165,

272, 450-67, 468-90, 491-93, 500-501, 532, 538-

39, 541-42, 544, 548, 553, 556-58, 561-62, 566,

574

Balabac Island: 589-91

Balara Water Filters: 252-53, 256, 272

Balasig: 56 9

Balayan: 428-2 9

Balayan Bay : 222n, 363, 365, 423-25, 428-29, 438,

440-41

Baler Bay : 99, 101-62, 190, 199, 201, 457, 562

Balete Pass : 97-102, 453-56, 491, 500, 516-40, 558-

59, 566

Balete Ridge : 517-22, 524, 527-31, 533, 536, 539-40

Balinguay: 473-74, 488

Ballngueo: 129 n

Baliuag: 216-17, 233

Baloc: 18 8

Balsic: 325-2 7

Balungao: 16 4

Bamban: 142-45 , 169-77, 179-80

Bamban airfield : 17 1

Bamban River : 169-75 , 177, 182-85, 202, 205-06

Bambang: 97-102 , 450-58, 461-65, 467, 474, 480,

488, 490, 520, 524, 532-33, 535-42, 553, 556-64,

576-77. See also Route 5: Villa Verde Trail.

Banaue: 559, 566-68, 574-76

Bangag: 56 9

Bangao Island : 597-9 8

Bangued: 545-4 7
INDEX 729

Banzai Ridge : 53 1

Barabac Point: 550-51

Barbed wire , use of, by Japanese : 28 5

Barbey, Rear Adm . Daniel E. : 119n , 127-28

Barnett, Col. George M.: 544

Base development . See Logistics, base developmen t

and port development .

Base K, Leyte: 135

Base M, Luzon: 133-3 5

Bases, logistical. See Logistics, base development.

Basilan Island: 592-93, 597, 599

Basilan Strait: 592-93

Bataan Peninsula : 99 , 142 , 180-82, 187, 221-23, 309-34, 348, 351, 458

Batangas: 427-31 , 444-45, 570-71

Batangas Bay : 363, 365, 423-25, 427-29, 438

Batangas Mountains: 424-25, 433-34

Batchelor: 460-6 1

Bato Bridge: 559-60, 562-63

Bauang: 99-100, 453-54, 469, 474-77, 481-82, 488-89

Bauang River: 475-76

Bayambang: 79, 117, 129-30, 167, 233

Bayombong: 562-6 3

Bazooka operations : 275 , 284-85, 287-88, 298, 300,

305-06

Beach defense , Japanese: 31 , 67-69, 440

Beach operations: 118-2 8

Beach party operations: 77, 118-24

Beaches. See Amphibiou s operations .

Beachmaster operations : 119-21 , 123, 126-27

Beightler, Maj. Gen . Robert S.: 182, 184-85, 212-14,

217n, 218n, 233 , 258-60, 279, 288n, 293-94, 302, 486, 568n

Benchmark Hill : 150-51, 154-55

Benchmark 7 Hill: 381-82, 385-86

Benchmark 8 Hill: 378-80, 386-87

Benchmark 9 Hill: 377-79

Benchmark 1 1 Hill: 37 7

Benchmark 2 1 Hill: 388

Benchmark 23 Hill: 379, 385-86

Benchmark 2 7 Hill: 386n

Berkey, Rear Adm. Russel l S.: 332, 340, 610

Besao: 57 4

Bessang Pass: 542-44, 552-57, 566

Bicol Peninsula : 97 , 363, 423-24, 436-37, 439-45

Bigaa River: 233

Bigti: 405-11, 413, 415

Binalonan: 32 , 100, 102-03, 111-12, 140, 144-46, 155-60, 164

Binday: 81

Binloc River: 128-2 9

Binondo District : 255

Biri Island: 436-37

Bitalag: 54 8

Blow, Maj. Rex : 621n

Blue Ridge, USS: 56-57

Bobonawan River: 643

Bohol Island: 586-87, 608-09, 617-18

Boise, USS: 56-57

Bokod: 559, 567-68, 574

Bolinao peninsula: 74-76, 115-17, 310

Bolong: 595-97

Bombardment, aerial. See Air operations.

Bombardment, naval . See Navy , U .S., gunfir e

support.

Bondoc Isthmus: 423-25, 434, 439

Bonga Rive r and Valley : 515

Bongabon: 101-02 , 201

Bongo Island: 624

Bonilla, Maj. Marcelo : 591-92

Bontoc: 97, 450-54, 456-57, 465, 490, 540-49, 554-59,

561-62, 566, 568, 571, 573-74

Borneo: 18 , 584, 591, 599-600

Bosoboso Rive r an d Valley: 369-71, 374-76, 479-80,

382, 384, 386-89, 391-94, 398-402, 420

Bottomside, Corregidor: 336, 339-46, 348

Bougainville: 54-56

Bowen, Brig. Gen. Fran k S.: 230n

Bowler, Col. Rober t V.: 646-47

Bradley, Col. Willia m J.: 373 n

Brady, Col. Charle s E.: 373 n

Breakwater Point: 341, 345-47

Bridging operation s

construction an d repair: 41 , 117-18, 128-31, 218,

232-34, 444-45, 656

demolition: 171, 232, 334, 449-50, 517, 623, 637-38

equipment: 40, 129-30, 232-35

ponton: 118-20, 124-25, 127

shortages: 40, 129-30

Bridging operations, Japanese

construction an d repair: 128-29, 171, 232

demolition: 169 , 232-34, 240-41, 252-53, 255, 257 - 58, 306, 627-28, 638

Brush, Maj. Gen , Rapp: 39n, 56n, 79, 203

Bued Rive r an d Gorge: 80, 84, 104-05, 110, 112-13, 145, 232-33, 450, 468-69, 487, 517

Buguias: 567-68, 574

Bulan: 443-4 4

Bulate: 325-2 6

Bulldozers: 118-20, 129

Bunawan: 63 3

Bunker defenses, Japanese: 607, 610

Burgos: 475-76, 478-79

Burias Island: 437

Burnham Green: 280, 293-94

Busuanga Island: 589-91

Busay: 441-4 2

Busay Ridge : 44 1

Bush, Col. Georg e E.: 139-40

Butac: 549-5 3

Butuan Bay: 637, 643

Butuanoan River and Valley: 610, 614-16

Byers, Maj. Gen . Clovis E.: 230 n
730 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

C-46's: 570-7 1

C-47's: 132 , 227-28, 338, 340-45, 465-66, 570-71,

592

Caanawan: 192 , 198

Caba: 469-7 4

Cabalisiaan River: 460-61, 493-94

Cabalitan Bay: 115-17, 133

Caballo Island: 332, 348, 352-54

Cabanatuan: 142 , 169-70, 181, 188-90 , 198, 201,

212-16, 232-33

Cabaruan: 16 1

Cabaruan Hills : 98-100 , 102-03, 114-15, 140, 144,

161-66, 194-95

Cabusilan Mountains: 310

Cadsu Ridges: 549-54

Cagayan Rive r an d Valley: 18-19, 94-100, 139, 144,

361, 450-54, 457, 464-66, 469, 517, 535-38, 541-

44, 558-72

Calaban: 56 7

Calarian Drome: 599

Calasiao: 78-80, 129n

Calauag: 444-45

Calauan: 43 3

Caldera Bay: 593, 596

Calinan: 630, 640, 644

Calmay River: 76-79, 128-29

Calot: 478-79, 481

Calumpan Peninsula : 428-29, 438

Calumpit: 211-14, 216, 232-33

Camalaniugan airstrip : 570-71

Camalig: 442, 444

Camiling: 117 , 167-68

Camotes Sea: 587

Camouflage, Japanese: 60 , 148, 193, 203-04, 265-66,

315, 372, 610

Camp 2: 468, 472, 47 7

Camp 3: 454, 460, 475, 486

Camp 4: 474-75, 477, 486

Camp O'Donnell: 169 , 207

Camranh Bay: 49-50

Candaba Swamp : 211-12

Capas: 169-7 0

Cape Bojeador: 54 3

Capul Island: 436

Caraballo Mountains : 98 , 158 , 196, 450, 454-55,

460-63, 491-94, 498-99, 512-13, 517-18

Carabao Island: 352, 356-57

Carmen: 160-61, 164, 167

Carney, Vice Adm. Rober t B. : 1 0

Carranglan: 455-56 , 460, 491-92, 512-20, 538, 565

Carrier-based air attacks. See Air operations, carrierbased attacks .

Casey, Maj. Gen . Hugh J.: 13 5

Casualties. See also Casualties , by uni t

Baguio: 483-8 5

Bataan: 313 , 318-19, 321-22, 324-25, 330-34

Bicol Peninsula : 443-45

Casualties—Continued

Central Plains : 149-53 , 155, 159-60, 188, 195-96,

198-200, 207-08

Clark Field : 177-79 , 183, 185 , 204-0 6

civilian: 30 7

Corregidor: 338-39 , 342-44, 347-49

evacuation of: 41-42, 183, 186, 199-200, 206, 289-

90, 324, 347-49, 384, 387-88, 412, 414, 421, 654-

55

infantry casualt y ratio : 65 2

Lingayen Gulf : 41-42 , 78, 82-83, 87, 106-07, 109,

111-15, 117

Manila: 254-57, 260-64, 266, 268, 272-75, 279-80,

282-83, 286-90, 300, 303-07

Manila Ba y area : 35 6

Mindanao: 621n , 633n, 635, 638, 641-42, 645 ,

647-48

Mindoro: 51-5 3

Nasugbu-Tagaytay Ridge : 229 , 231

northern Luzon : 459-60, 514, 522-24, 528, 534-35,

539, 563, 573, 577

Philippines: 652 , 654-55

southern Luzon : 373 , 375, 384, 387-89, 391-92,

397-98, 401-63, 410-11, 412, 414-16, 418, 421,

429, 433

Southern Philippines : 589-91 , 597-99

Villa Verd e Trail : 499 , 501, 503, 508-07, 509-10,

539

Visayan Islands : 602 , 606-07, 610, 614 , 618-19

Visayan Passages: 436-39, 445

Casualties, Japanese

Baguio, 477, 483-85, 488

Bataan: 319, 330, 333-34

Bicol Peninsula : 443-45

Central Philippines : 149 , 152-53, 155, 157, 160,

163, 164-65, 188, 196, 200-201, 207-08

Clark Field : 167-68, 177, 179, 186, 204-06

Corregidor: 345-4 9

Leyte: 65 2

Lingayen Gulf : 78-79 , 83, 87, 112-14

Manila: 218-19, 256-57, 266, 268-69, 272-74, 279-

80, 283-85, 287-89, 297-98, 300, 306-07

Manila Bay area: 351-52, 356

Mindanao: 621n, 635, 638, 641-42, 645, 647

Mindoro: 51-53

northern Luzon : 459-60 , 514, 522-23, 528, 535 ,

538, 547, 556-57, 563, 565, 569, 573, 577

Philippines: 651-5 2

southern Luzon : 373 , 375, 383-86, 388, 391-92,

397-98, 400-403, 411-12, 415-16, 418, 421-22,

433, 434n, 435

Southern Philippines : 589-91 , 597-99

Villa Verd e Trail : 495 , 502, 505-06, 510, 53 8

Visayan Islands : 607-08 , 617-19

Visayan Passages : 636-38 , 445
INDEX 731

Casualties, by uni t

Armies

Sixth: 87 , 652

Eighth: 65 2

Corps

I: 11 7

X: 64 8

XI: 207-08 , 334, 388-89 , 421, 42 9

XIV: 117 , 206 , 289-90, 303-07, 384, 388-8 9

Divisions

Americal: 436-37 , 610, 614 , 617-1 9

1st Cavalry: 256-58, 273, 270-80, 288-90, 304-

07, 373, 384 , 418 , 433 , 44 5

6th Infantry : 83 , 115, 150-52, 155, 162-64, 195 , 198-200, 208n, 334, 375 , 384 , 387-89 , 39

11th Airborne : 202-03 , 231, 266 , 273-74 , 307

24th Infantry : 49 , 53, 321-22, 324-25, 330,

342, 346 , 349 , 437-38 , 635, 64 8

25th Infantry : 157 , 188 , 196, 200-201, 514,

524, 528 , 531-32, 534, 53 9

31st Infantry : 638 , 641-42 , 645, 64 8

32d Infantry : 499 , 501 , 503 , 506-07 , 509-10, 532, 539 , 577 n

33d Infantry : 459-60 , 485

38th Infantry : 207 , 313 , 318-19 , 321-22, 324-

25, 330, 332-34 , 348, 356 , 397-98 , 401-03

40th Infantry : 78 , 177, 179 , 183 , 185-86 , 204-

07, 438-39, 602, 606-08 , 618-19, 642, 64 8

41st Infantry : 589-91 , 595-99, 648

43d Infantry : 87 , 106-07, 109, 111-14 , 149-51, 153 , 155, 157, 150-60 , 207, 384 , 387-89, 39

Regimental Comba t Team s

112th Cavalry : 384 , 39 2

158th Infantry : 108-10 , 144, 429 , 443-4 5

503d Parachut e Infantry: 343-44 , 348-49, 608

Cataguintingan: 105 , 152-5 4

Cataludonan River and Valley: 502, 50 5

Catigan: 629-3 0

Cauayan: 563 , 566 , 56 9

Cauringan River: 150-51, 154-55

Causeways, ponton: 118-20, 124-25, 127

Cavalry Brigade s

1st: 214-15 , 269-70, 274, 279 , 292 , 301-02 , 366, 377-79, 430, 433-3 5

2d: 214-15, 269, 273 , 365-66, 367-68, 371-73, 375,

377, 379 , 418-21 , 430-33, 435

Cavalry Division , 1st: 20-30 , 140, 181 , 187 , 212-21 , 234-35 , 251-307, 367-90, 418, 428-35 , 440, 444 -

45

Cavalry Point : 34 8

Cavalry Regiment s

5th: 214-20 , 252-57, 264-65, 268-70, 271, 277-79 ,

287-90, 303-06, 433-34, 444-45

7th: 214-15 , 256, 273 , 368 , 372-73, 417-18, 430, 8th : 214-21 , 251-53, 255-57, 2

Cavalry Regiments—Continue d

12th: 214-16 , 269-70, 272-74, 277-79, 286-87, 433

26th (Philippin e Scouts): 17 1

112th RCT : 29 , 140, 181, 269, 272-73 , 365-66,

368, 376 , 378 , 384 , 392 , 394-36 , 404, 418-2 1

Cavalry Squadron s

1st, 5t h Cavalry : 288, 30 2

2d, 5th Cavalry : 215-16, 218-19, 252-54, 277, 287 -

90, 301-02

1st, 8th : 215-1 6

2d, 8th: 216-17 , 251-54

1st, 12th : 279-80, .301-62

2d, 12th : 260-70, 277, 279

Cave defenses , Japanese. See Defenses , Japanese,

cave an d tunnel .

Cavite Peninsula : 217 , 241-42 , 244-45, 267-69, 309-

10, 351, 42 4

Caycayan River: 541

Cebu City : 588 , 608-10 , 613-14, 616-18

Cebu Island : 441 , 586-87 , 605, 608-1 8

Central Pacifi c Area: 4n, 34-35, 440

Central Plains : 139-208 , 450, 454-55 , 493-94, 517,

543. See also Clar k Field .

Cervantes: 542-58 , 561-62, 569, 57 1

Chamberlin, Maj. Gen . Stephe n J. : 21-2 4

Chan, Charlie: 279

Chase, Maj. Gen . Willia m C. : 215 , 218-21 , 233-35,

251-54, 328-34, 352, 399n , 401, 40 3

Chemical Morta r Battalion s

82d: 272 , 295-9 6

98th: 158-5 9

Chemical morta r operations : 7 5

Cheney Ravine: 336, 339-40 , 346

Chico River: 450, 541-4 2

China coast-Formosa-Luzo n triangle : 4-17

China theater: 3-4 , 7 , 9, 13-17, 36, 591

Christie, Col. Alber t F.: 602

Cicchetti, Pfc. Joseph J.: 260 n

Cituinan Hills: 442 , 44 4

Civil affairs administration : 40-41

Civilians

casualties: 30 7

employment of: 656-58

in Japanese combat forces: 249

repatriation of: 233, 251-54 , 299-300

Clark Field : 27, 47, 58-59, 62-63, 96, 118, 132 , 167 -

86, 187, 202-06, 211-12

Clarkson, Maj. Gen . Perc y W.: 472-77

Cleland, Col. Joseph P.: 414

Climate. See Weather .

Close ai r support . See Ai r operations , tactica l

support.

Coast defenses, Japanese: 363 , 44 0

Coleman, Lt. Col. Georg e T.: 254-5 5

Colorado, USS: 65 , 67n

Columbia, USS: 6 5

Combat effectivenes s

Bataan: 319 , 324-25 , 327-38
732 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Combat effectiveness—Continue d

northern Luzon: 531-32, 547, 549, 553-57

Philippines: 652-54

southern Luzon : 387-88, 394, 396, 398, 425-26, 430

Villa Verd e Trail: 498-99, 503-05, 507, 510, 531-

32

Visayan Islands : 60 8

Combat effectiveness , Japanese

Baguio: 477-78, 480, 489-90

Bataan: 315-16

Bicol Peninsula: 441, 444-45

Clark Field : 172, 175, 182-83, 206

Lingayen Gulf : 110-1 1

Luzon: 90, 93-94

Manila: 249, 257-58, 301-02

Mindanao: 621-23, 636, 642-43

northern Luzon : 450 , 514, 535, 539-40, 545-46,

554, 566, 572-73, 576-79

Philippines: 651 , 653-54

southern Luzon : 380-81 , 389-90, 414-15, 418-19,

421-22, 426, 434

Southern Philippines: 587-88, 596

Villa Verde Trail: 505

Visayan Islands: 605, 608-09

Visayan Passages: 438-39, 445

Command an d contro l

air operations: 34-36, 235-36, 312

airborne operations: 221-22, 225-29, 335-41, 344-

45, 569-71

amphibious: 46 , 47, 57, 119-24 , 126 , 223, 312,

332, 440-41

Bataan: 310-3 2

Bohol: 61 7

CBI: 13-1 4

Cebu: 608 , 610-13, 614

eastern Mindanao : 620-21, 627, 638-39, 646-47

Joint an d Combined Chief s of Staff: 3 , 6, 7, 15

logistical, general: 38-39 , 54-56, 119-24, 126-28,

133-35

Luzon, general: 363-66 , 457-59, 463-67, 538-40,

553, 561, 572-73

Manila: 212-15, 217, 221-23, 226-29, 249-51, 254,

258, 265, 267-68, 288, 291-94

Mindoro: 44-46, 51

naval: 32-3 4

Negros: 604-05 , 618

Pacific theaters , general: 4, 9, 10

Palawan: 58 9

Panay-Guimaras: 601-0 2

Southern Philippines, general: 585-8 6

Southwest Pacifi c Area : 4 , 10, 15, 19, 21-23, 26,

29-36, 363-66

Zamboanga: 591-92, 595-96

Command an d control, Japanese

Bohol: 61 7

Cebu: 608-1 0

eastern Mindanao : 621-23 , 628-32, 636-37, 643, 645-46

Command an d control, Japanese—Continued

Luzon: 90-103 , 143-46, 173-75, 190-93, 202-03,

207, 223-24

Manila-Manila Ba y area: 240-48, 271-75, 339-40

Negros: 605, 618

northern Luzon : 453-57, 480, 494-95, 514-15, 520,

545-46, 558-61, 563-68, 577-79

Palawan: 58 9

Panay-Guimaras: 60 2

Philippines, general: 88-8 9

Shimbu area : 368-71 , 407-08, 411-12, 415

southern Luzon-Visaya n Passages : 426-27 , 441

Southern Philippines , general: 586-8 9

Sulu Archipelago: 597-98

Zamboanga: 594, 596-97

Commander Support Aircraft Luzon : 3 7

Communications, ship-to-shore: 12 3

Communications deficiencie s

Bataan: 326-2 7

Lingayen Gulf : 10 7

Visayan Passages : 43 8

Communications deficiencies, Japanese: 587-88

Baguio: 48 0

Central Philippines : 14 5

Corregidor: 339-4 0

Luzon: 26-2 7

Manila: 271-7 3

Mindanao: 622-2 3

northern Luzon : 456-57 , 533, 535, 546, souther 

Communications facilitie s

Corregidor: 343-4 4

Manila: 267-6 8

Concordia College : 260 , 263-64

Connolly, Maj. Rober t V.: 561-62

Construction operations. See Airfields, development

of; Bridgin g operations ; Enginee r support ;

Logistics, base developmen t and por t develop -

ment; Roa d constructio n an d repair .

Convoys. See Logistics .

Cooke, Rear Adm . Charle s M. : 16 n

Cooley, Staff Sgt . Raymond H. : 514 n

Corbin, Lt. Col. Francis J.: 382-8 3

Cordillera Central : 450 , 468, 541-43, 547, 558-62,

566-67, 569, 572, 574

Coron Island : 589-9 1

Corps

I: 29 , 41, 54-57, 74, 76, 78-87, 104-15, 117-18, 122-29 

X: 18 , 30, 45, 585-600, 620-48

XI: 29 , 142-43, 180-82, 187, 206-08, 217, 221-36, 309-50 

XIV: 29, 31, 41, 54-57, 74-79, 82-87, 99, 104-06, 115-27 
INDEX 733

Corps—Continued

XIV—Continued

47, 249-315, 325, 327, 351-52, 361-62, 366-90, 415-35 , 441-45, 449, 572-79

XXIV: 18 , 45

Corps Artiller y

I: 10 8

XI: 323 , 326, 413

XIV: 267-68 , 294-97

Corregidor: 332-50 , 656

Corsairs: 59 2

Cotabato: 620-21 , 623

Counterattacks: 50 1

Counterattacks, Japanese: 109 , 112-14, 118, 151, 154, 150-57 , 159-60, 183-84, 204, 261, 271-73

07, 318-19, 329, 333-34, 347-48, 373, 377-81, 398-401 , 403, 411, 428, 459, 483-84, 515, 524, 530 

Crump Hill : 525-26, 531

Culayo: 179-80 , 183

Culi-Culi: 26 9

Cunningham, Brig. Gen , Julian W. : 394-9 6

Cupang River: 15 2

Cushing, Lt. Col. James M.: 586, 608, 610-12, 614, 617

Cuyapo: 160-62 , 164-65, 168-69

Dagupan: 78-79, 87, 129-30, 132-34

Dagupan River : 76 , 78, 80, 133

Dalton, Col. Jame s L. , II: 156-5 9

Damortis: 32 , 104-69, 114, 139-40, 143-44, 147-48,

150-54, 193, 453, 457-59, 468

Daraga: 442-4 4

Darigayos Cove : 46 6

Dashiell, USS: 4 6

Dasol Bay: 115-17

Dau: 179-8 0

Davao: 47, 620-23, 627-34, 636, 640, 642, 646-47

Davao Gulf : 623 , 627-33, 636, 638, 646-47

Davao River: 630-35

Death March : 16 9

Defenses, Japanese. See also Camouflage , Japanese.

armor as fixed: 156-58, 192-93

Baguio: 483, 486

Bataan: 315-16, 324-25

beach: 31, 67-69, 440

bunker: 607, 610

cave and tunnel: 84 , 104, 108, 110-12, 148, 175-

78, 288-89, 292, 298, 300, 315, 324-25, 346-49, 353-54 , 372-74, 377, 380-81, 386, 405, 483, 497-

98, 536, 607, 610, 614

Central Plains : 148 , 156

Clark Field : 171-78 , 202-04

coast: 363 , 440

Corregidor: 346-4 9

Lingayen Gulf : 83-84 , 104, 108, 110-12

Manila: 240-41, 246-47, 256, 261. 263-66 , 275-82, 285-86 , 288-89, 291-92, 298, 300, 303

Manila Bay area: 353-54

Defenses, Japanese—Continued

Mindanao: 623, 629-30, 634, 637, 646

northern Luzon : 512 , 514, 536, 558-59, 568

southern Luzon : 369 , 372-74, 377, 380-81, 386, 389-90 

Southern Philippines : 59 6

Villa Verd e Trail : 495 , 497

Visayan Islands : 605 , 609-10, 614-15

Demolitions operations. See also Underwate r demo -

litions.

Corregidor: 346-4 8

Lingayen: 12 8

Luzon: 53-5 4

Manila: 240, 266, 275, 278-79, 284-85, 290, 305-06

Manila Ba y area: 354-5 6

Mindanao: 62 3

southern Luzon : 37 3

Southern Philippines : 59 2

Demolition operations, Japanese

Corregidor: 347-4 9

Lingayen Gulf : 128-3 0

Manila: 213-14 , 218-20, 245-46, 255-58, 263, 288

Manila Ba y area: 211-12, 241-42

Nasugbu-Tagaytay Ridge : 225 , 230-31

northern Luzon : 576

southern Luzon : 414

Visayan Islands: 614

Diamond, Pfc. Jame s H.: 631 n

Digdig: 455-56, 460-63, 491, 510, 512-16

Digdig Rive r and Gorge: 512 , 515-22, 525, 531, 534

Digos: 627-2 9

Dinalupihan: 310, 314, 319—20, 325-31

Dingalen Bay : 99, 101-02, 190, 199, 201, 562n

Dipolog: 591-92, 597

Division Artiller y

Americal: 436-3 7

1st Cavalry : 21 5

37th: 29 5

43d: 41 3

Doe, Maj. Gen . Jens A.: 589

Doi, Rear Adm, Naoji: 622, 632-35

Dolores: 184-8 5

DUKW's: 118, 124, 129-30, 132, 234, 655

Dumaran Island: 589-91

Dumpay: 7 9

Dunckel, Brig, Gen. William C.: 46

Dupax: 456 , 495

Easley, Brig. Gen. Roy W.: 329

East Force, Bataan: 331-34

Echague: 96 , 454, 563

Eguchi, Lt. Col. Seizuke: 173-74

Ehrlich, Lt. Col. Milton: 562n

Eichelberger, Lt. Gen. Robert L.

and Manila : 267-68

and Mindanao: 629-30, 640, 647

and Nasugbu-Tagayta y Ridge: 221-30
734 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Eichelberger, Lt. Gen. Robert L.—Continue d

and Souther n Philippines: 585

and Visayan Islands: 604-05, 615, 617-18

and Visaya n Passages: 439

El Deposito: 257

El Frail e Island: 352, 355-56

Elbow Hill: 527, 529-30

Elizondo, Capt. Serafin V. : 548

Elmore, Brig. Gen. John A.: 317n, 329n

Engineer Aviatio n Battalion s

873d: 59 3

1874th: 48-4 9

Engineer Boa t Maintenanc e Company , 1462d: 12 3

Engineer Boa t an d Shor e Regiment s

532d: 22 3

533d: 623-2 6

542d: 436 , 601

543d: 122 , 562n

592d: 341, 352-54, 418, 443

Engineer Comba t Battalion s

6th: 12 9

65th: 522 , 526-27

108th: 638-3 9

113th: 353-5 6

117th: 129 , 233, 259, 297

Engineer Constructio n Battalion , 339th: 562 n

Engineer Constructio n Brigade , 5202d: 129 , 133-35

Engineer equipment shortage : 12 2

Engineer Heav y Ponto n Battalion , 556th: 232-3 3

Engineer Ligh t Ponto n Companie s

510th: 562 n

530th: 232-3 3

Engineer Point : 34 7

Engineer Specia l Brigade s

as shore parties: 127-2 8

2d: 48, 223, 436, 585

3d: 122, 585, 623-25

4th: 133-3 4

Engineer support . See also Airfields , development

of; Bridgin g operations ; Logistics , port devel -

opment; Roa d constructio n an d repair .

Baguio: 474-7 5

Bicol Peninsula : 444-4 5

Corregidor: 346-4 8

Lingayen Gulf : 109-10, 117, 128-33

Manila: 218, 232-34, 259, 288-89

Manila Bay area: 353-56

Mindanao: 625-26, 638

Mindoro: 45-46, 48-49

northern Luzon : 519-20 , 522, 526-27, 549, 561-62

southern Luzon : 402-03 , 405-06, 412, 418

Southern Philippines : 589-93 , 596, 599-600

Visayan Islands : 602-04 , 610-12, 614

Ermita District: 245

Estero, defined: 25 9

Estero de Binondo: 297

Estero de Concordia: 259-60

Estero d e Paco : 259-60 , 264-65, 269, 275-77, 286

Estero de Tonque : 260-6 3

Estero Provisor: 261, 263, 280

European Theate r o f Operations , redeploymen t

from: 12-13 , 604, 608

Falk, Stanley L.: 169 n

Familiar Peak : 32 0

Far Eastern University : 252-54

Fechteler, Rear Adm . William M.: 223, 589

Ferrying operations: 128-3 1

Fertig, Col. Wendel l W. : 586, 591-96, 601-02, 621-

23, 639, 643n, 645n

Field Artiller y Battalions . See also Parachut e Fiel d

Artillery Battalions .

6th: 29 6

53d: 20 0

61st: 256-5 7

80th: 20 0

82d: 280 , 296

89th: 525-2 6

103d: 106-0 7

122d: 553-5 5

135th: 29 6

136th: 260 , 296, 303, 563

140th: 260 , 286-87, 296

147th: 108 , 443-44

149th: 63 5

192d: 10 7

246th: 43 6

465th: 295-9 6

544th: 295-9 6

674th: 23 0

694th: 562 n

756th: 295-9 6

947th: 256-5 7

Filipinos. See also Civilians .

contribution of: 12, 656-58

demonstrations by: 68-69, 216, 230

employment of: 77, 109-10, 120-21, 125-26, 129-

32

Flame thrower s

Central Plains: 163-6 4

Corregidor: 346

Manila: 266 , 275, 278-79, 284-85, 287-89, 298, 305-0 

southern Luzon: 373, 402-03

Visayan Islands: 607

Flying columns : 215-21 , 233-35. See also Cavalr y

Division, 1st.

Food shortages : 234-3 5

Food shortages , Japanese:

Baguio: 477-7 8

Luzon: 9 1

Mindanao: 64 4

northern Luzon : 546-47 , 568, 576-77

southern Luzon : 418-2 0

Southern Philippines : 588-8 9

Visayan Islands : 60 5
INDEX 735

Foreign troops , use of, b y Japanese : 175 , 251-52,

300-02, 441, 443-45, 545-46, 622-23

Fork Ridge : 410, 412

Formosa: 4-8 , 9, 11-17, 21, 36, 53-54, 58, 63-65,

310, 560, 658

Formosa-Luzon-China coas t triangle : 4-1 7

Formosa-Luzon debate : 3-17, 658

Fort Abad: 277-79

Fort Drum: 352, 355-56

Fort McKinley : 243-45, 248, 265-66, 268-69, 271-72,

274

Fort Pikit : 625-26, 637-39, 646-47

Fort Santiago : 238-39, 297-300

Fort Stotsenburg: 171-77 , 180-85, 202

Fortifications, Japanese. See Defenses, Japanese.

Four-Corner Hill : 410-1 1

Friendly troops, fire on

by aircraft: 183 , 198, 234-36

by antiaircraft weapons: 60, 65

by artillery : 84, 183, 198

Fujishige, Col. Masatoshi : 223-24 , 426-28, 434-35

Fujitomi, 1st Lt . Kornei: 617n

Fukudome, Vice Adm. Shigeru: 88n

Fukue, Lt. Gen. Shimpei: 60 9

Furuse, Capt. Takusue, IJN: 24 5

Gabu: 54 5

Galiano: 469-81, 485-86

Gambang: 57 4

Gapan: 216, 232

Garcia, Maj. Patroceni o B.: 592 n

Garma, Col. Hipolito: 591-92

Gas Supply Company, 198th: 12 3

Gasoline suppl y an d storage . See PO L products .

Gayaman: 546-4 7

General Headquarters , SWPA: 22 , 132, 135, 221, 225 , 249-50, 267-68, 273-74, 285

37, 363-65, 404, 466-67, 477, 479, 557, 583-84, 601-02 , 608, 657. See also MacArthur , General

of th e Arm y Douglas .

Geneva Convention , Japanese violatio n of : 28 6

Gerona: 16 8

Gilbert Islands : 4

Gill, Maj. Gen . William H.: 505, 507-08

Glider Infantr y Battalion s

1st, 187th: 226-27, 266, 268

2d, 187th: 225-27, 268

1st, 188th: 225

Glider Infantr y Regiments . See also Airborn e Divi -

sion, 11th.

188th: 223-29, 266-69, 351-53, 425, 427-35, 439

187th: 223, 225, 268-69, 425, 428, 430-35

Gliders, use of: 570-71

Go Chan Hill: 613-14

Gonzales: 18 8

Gonzales, Pfc. Davi d M.: 506n

Grabiarz, Pfc. William J.: 302 n

Grace Park: 220-21, 238, 254, 272

Grande Island: 313-14

Graves Registration Company, 601st: 562n

Grenades, use of: 275, 284-85, 298, 300, 346

Grenades, use of, Japanese: 247, 282

Grinstead, Lt. Col. James R.: 637n, 643n, 646n

Griswold, Lt. Gen. Oscar W.

and Bico l Peninsula: 445

and Centra l Plains: 143 , 202

and Clar k Field : 167-70 , 175-76, 179-82, 184-85,

203

and Lingaye n Gulf: 11 7

and Manila : 212 , 217, 220, 250 , 254, 258 , 268,

293-94, 302, 30 6

and souther n Luzon : 366-68 , 375-77, 384, 430,

432-34

Guerrilla operation s

Baguio: 468-69, 474-77, 479-80, 486-87

Bataan: 313-15, 325-26, 334

Bicol Peninsula: 439, 443-45

Central Plains: 164, 189, 201

Clark Field: 168, 171, 180

Lingayen Gulf: 79, 85, 100, 117, 12 8

Luzon: 26-27, 53-54, 91, 310

Manila: 212 , 218, 220-21, 232, 249, 252, 263-64,

273-74, 279

Manila Ba y area: 351-52

Mindanao: 586 , 621, 623-25, 628-29, 632, 633-35,

637-41, 643-47

Mindoro: 51 , 53

northern Luzon : 453-55, 459, 463-67, 541-57,

561-63, 566, 569-76

Philippines: 654 , 657

southern Luzon : 407-22 , 427-28, 430, 432-35

Southern Philippines : 30 , 586, 588-93, 595-99

Villa Verd e Trail : 505-06, 508-09, 563

Visayan Islands : 601-05 , 607-09, 614-15, 617-18

Visayan Passages: 437-39

Guerrilla operations, Japanese: 20 7

Guerrilla unit s

Anderson Battalion : 418-20, 562n

Buena Vist a Regiment : 505-06, 508-09, 563, 572-

73, 577n, 578-79

Bugo-Del Monte Area Command: 648

East Centra l Luzo n Guerrill a Area : 42 0

2d Provisiona l Regiment: 420, 562n

1st Tarlac Regiment: 566n

Marking Regiment: 407-15

6th Militar y District: 58 6

10th Militar y District: 586, 621

Maranao Militia Force: 586, 621n

Divisions

105th: 591-92, 595-97

106th: 637, 645n

107th: 628-29, 633, 644

108th: 62 1

109th: 637, 643, 645n 110th: 643
736 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Guerrilla units—Continue d

10th Militar y District—Continue d

Infantry Regiment s

105th: 621 n

107th: 591-9 2

110th: 641 n

111th: 641 n

113th: 64 3

116th: 646-4 7

118th: 646-4 7

120th: 641 n

121st: 596-9 7

130th: 633 n

Battalions

Expeditionary: 621n, 628, 647

111th Provisional: 633 n

United State s Arm y Force s i n th e Philippine s

(Northern Luzon )

Infantry Regiment s

11th: 466 , 477-80, 484-85, 561-62, 566,

569-71 573-7 6

14th: 466 , 544, 549, 553-54, 566, 576n

15th: 466 , 544-49, 551-57, 573-74

66th: 466 , 477-80, 486-87, 544, 548-49,

553-56, 573-74

121st: 466 , 476, 544-57, 573-74

Battalions

Engineer: 562n, 571n

Military Police : 549, 553-54

Provisional: 522-28

Replacement an d Casualty : 54 8

1st Fiel d Artillery : 550-51 , 553-56

Guimaras Island: 601-05

Guimaras Strait: 605-06

Guimba: 143 , 160, 164-65, 168-69, 187-88

Hagonoy Isthmus : 221 , 241, 244-45, 267, 424

Hall, Lt. Gen. Charle s P .: 310-11, 313-14, 319-24,

326-31, 334, 340-41, 348, 384-85, 387-88, 391,

394-95, 403-04, 416, 420

Halsema, James J.: 211 n

Halsey, Adm. William F.: 10, 24-25, 63n

Hanada, Maj. Yasura : 587n, 593n

Hand grenades. See Grenades.

Haney, Brig. Gen. Harold : 589

Hapao: 56 8

Harada, Lt. Gen . Jiro : 587n , 622-23, 627n, 628-35,

644-45

Harada, Rear Adm. Kaku : 609

Harada, Col. Kazuo : 102n

Haraden, USS: 4 6

Harr, Cpl. Harr y R.: 643 n

Haruna Ridge : 531, 533-34, 536

Hashimoto, Col. Hiroshi : 240 n

Hattori, Col. Mueichi : 622n, 627n, 631n

Hattori, Col. Takushiro : 88 n

Haugen, Col. Ori n D. : 229, 268

Hayashi, Lt. Col. Toshio: 251-52

Hedges, Lt. Col. Charle s W.: 621n

Helicopters: 42 1

Highley Ridge : 525-26, 531

Hill Drome : 48-4 9

Hill E: 176-77, 179

Hill G: 176-7 9

Hill 1 , Caballo Island: 353

Hill 2, Caballo Island: 35 3

Hill 5 : 179, 185

Hill 7 : 205

Hill 30, Cebu: 613-14

Hill 200: 82-83, 98-99, 111-12, 144, 147n

Hill 247: 81-82, 107

Hill 318 : 84, 110-11

Hill 350: 177

Hill 351: 84

Hill 355: 83-84, 110-11, 144, 147-49

Hill 363: 107-08

Hill 385: 81-82, 84

Hill 470: 81, 84

Hill 500: 175-76

Hill 502: 495-99 , 501-02

Hill 503: 495-96, 501

Hill 504: 495-99, 501-03

Hill 505: 495-96, 498-99, 501-03

Hill 506: 503

Hill 506 A and B: 495-97, 502-03, 505-06

Hill 507: 503-06

Hill 507 A to D: 495-99, 503, 505-06

Hill 508: 495-96, 498, 505-08

Hill 509: 506-07

Hill 511: 502-03, 505-08

Hill 512: 502-03, 505-07

Hill 513: 506-07

Hill 514: 506-07

Hill 515: 495-97, 506-08

Hill 516: 495-96, 506-08

Hill 518: 501-02

Hill 519: 501-03

Hill 520: 377-78

Hill 525: 495, 506-08

Hill 526: 495-97, 507-08

Hill 527: 507-09

Hill 528: 508-0 9

Hill 535: 408-10

Hill 565: 106-07

Hill 580: 84, 105-07

Hill 600: 147-54, 178-79, 459-60, 468, 471-72

Hill 606: 154

Hill 620: 183

Hill 636: 176-79, 182-83

Hill 665: 106-07

Hill 700: 150-51

Hill 740: 377-78

Hill 800: 150-51

Hill 803: 411-14

Hill 804: 413

Hill 805: 410-1 1
INDEX 737

Hill 810 (Kembu area) : 205

Hill 810 (Shimbu area) : 410

Hill 815: 410-12

Hill 860: 411-14

Hill 900: 153-54

Hill 1000 (Kembu area) : 205

Hill 100 0 (Shimbu area) : 408-10

Hill 1200: 391-9 2

Hill 150 0 (Clark Field): 205

Hill 150 0 (Rosario area) : 147-48 , 150-51, 154-55,

459-60, 468, 471-72

Hill 4250: 522 , 525

Hill 4625: 531

Hoffman, Brig. Gen. Hugh T.: 37 3

Hojo, Lt. Gen. Tokichi: 593-97

Hollandia: 54-55

Holliday, Col. Ralph C.: 107-08

Horseshoe Curve : 317-30

Hospitalization: 41-42, 363

Hostages, held b y Japanese : 251-52 , 286-87, 293,

299-300

Hot Corner: 405-07

House-to-house fighting. See Street fighting .

Howerth, USS: 4 7

Hucab: 567, 572

Hull, Maj. Gen. John E.: 21n

Huon Gulf: 56

Hurdis, Maj. Gen . Charle s E. : 188n , 195n, 382-83,

392-97

Hydrographic survey: 67, 118-19

Ibulao River: 567

Ibus Island: 623-2 4

Ida, Col. Kumpei: 102n

Iguig: 56 9

Iimura, Lt. Gen. Jo: 88n, 89

Illana Bay : 620-21, 623-25, 627, 629-30, 636

Ilocos (Malaya ) Range : 450 , 454-55

Iloilo: 601-0 6

Impalutao: 64 1

Imperial General Headquarters: 89-90 , 92-93

Imugan: 460-62, 495-96, 498-99, 502, 505-11, 517- 18, 536-38

Imugan Rive r an d Valley : 502 , 509, 560

Imus: 230-3 1

Inada, Maj. Gen . Masazumi : 92-9 3

Inampulugan Island : 602-04

Indochina: 59 1

Infanta: 418-2 1

Infantry Battalion s

1st, 1st Infantry : 386-8 7

3d, 1st Infantry : 386-8 7

1st, 19th Infantry : 437-3 8

1st, 20th Infantry : 161-62, 194-95

2d, 20th Infantry : 161-63, 195

3d, 20th Infantry: 123, 161-62, 194-95

1st, 21st Infantry : 437-38, 647

2d, 21st Infantry : 43 8

Infantry Battalions—Continue d

3d, 21st Infantry : 45 , 49

1st, 27th Infantry : 523-24, 528, 530, 534-36

2d, 27th Infantry: 523, 528-30

3d, 27th Infantry : 530 , 534-36

1st, 34th Infantry: 320-21, 323-24, 347-48

2d, 34th Infantry : 320-21 , 323-24

3d, 34t h Infantry : 320-21 , 323-25, 340-42, 344, 347-48

1st, 35th Infantry : 196 , 536

3d, 35th Infantry : 19 7

1st, 63d Infantry : 154-5 5

2d, 63d Infantry : 154-5 5

3d, 63d Infantry : 150-51 , 154-55, 572

1st, 103rd Infantry : 8 3

2d, 103d Infantry : 83 , 151

3d, 103d Infantry : 83, 149-50

2d, 108th Infantry : 77, 438-39

1st, 123d Infantry : 55 3

1st, 126th Infantry : 506-07, 536-37

2d, 126th Infantry : 506 , 536-37

3d, 126th Infantry : 536-3 7

1st, 127th Infantry : 498-9 9

2d, 127th Infantry : 498-99, 505-06

3d, 127th Infantry : 498-500, 506

1st, 128th Infantry : 507-0 8

2d, 128th Infantry : 498-500, 507-09

3d, 128th Infantry : 507-0 8

1st, 129th Infantry : 186 , 263, 282-83

2d, 129th Infantry: 261-63, 282

3d, 129th Infantry : 184 , 297-98, 300

1st, 132d Infantry : 46 7

1st, 136th Infantry : 562 n

1st, 145th Infantry : 258-59 , 282-85, 298-300

2d, 145th Infantry : 298-9 9

3d, 145th Infantry : 284-8 5

1st, 148th Infantry : 287 , 303-04, 306, 483-85

2d, 148th Infantry : 218 , 253-54, 286-87, 289-90,

483-85

3d, 148t h Infantry : 259-60 , 286-87, 483-85, 533

1st, 149th Infantry : 31 4

1st, 151st Infantry : 327-29, 349n, 356-57

2d, 151st Infantry : 313-14, 349, 352-56

3d, 151st Infantry : 333-3 4

1st, 152d Infantry : 318-21, 324-25, 328

2d, 152d Infantry : 318-20, 324-25, 328

3d, 152d Infantry : 318-20, 328-29

1st, 158th Infantry : 441, 444

2d, 158th Infantry : 441, 443-44

3d, 158th Infantry : 441, 444

1st, 160th Infantry : 206

2d, 160th Infantry : 206 , 601-02

1st, 161st Infantry : 156-59 , 531, 536

2d, 161st Infantry : 158-59 , 200, 525-26, 531, 562n

3d, 161s t Infantry : 150-59 , 206, 525-26, 533-34, 53 
738 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Infantry Battalions—Continue d

2d, 162 d Infantry : 64 4

1st, 163d Infantry : 598-9 9

2d, 163d Infantry : 597-9 8

3d, 163d Infantry : 598-99, 635, 644, 648

3d, 164th Infantry : 642, 648

2d, 169th Infantry : 148-49 , 151

1st, 172d Infantry : 80 , 85, 386

2d, 172d Infantry : 81-82, 153, 386

3d, 172 d Infantry : 8 0

1st, 182d Infantry : 436-37, 614

1st, 185th Infantry : 77-79, 601-02

2d, 185th Infantry : 77 , 605-06

3d, 185th Infantry : 601-02

2d, 186th Infantry : 589-91, 596-97

Infantry Divisions . See also Airborn e Division, 11th ; Calvar y Division, 1st.

Americal Division : 30 , 435-37, 585, 608-19, 642, 64 8 See also Infantr y Regiment

6th: 15 , 54-57, 78, 80-86, 99, 105, 107, 114-15, 122-23 , 127-29, 139-40, 143, 147-48, 150-52, 15

Infantry Regiments , 1st, 20th, and 63d.

24th: 29-30, 44-45, 49, 53, 223, 225, 310, 313, 318-

25, 327-30, 335-36, 342-50, 361-62, 364, 366, 425-26 , 435-38, 585, 592, 620-36, 639, 6

See also Infantr y Regiments, 19th, 21st, 34th.

25th: 29, 31, 54-57, 86, 114-15, 126, 140, 143, 149-

50, 155-60, 164-66, 181, 188-90, 193, 195-202, 366 , 457-58, 461-65, 467, 491-95, 500, 508

See also Infantr y Regiments, 27th, 35th, 161st.

31st: 30 , 585, 620-21, 627, 629-30, 636-45, 648.

See also Infantr y Regiments , 124th, 155th, 167th.

32d: 29 , 140, 181, 193, 366, 457-67, 473, 474, 477, 491-512 , 516, 531-32, 535-39, 561-64, 572-

ments, 126th, 127th, and 128th .

33d: 29-30 , 54-57, 76, 78-85, 87, 115-17, 128-30, 143 , 150n, 160, 167-88, 202, 212-21, 23

403, 457-60, 463-65, 467-90, 500-501, 517, 532-

33, 535, 538-39, 544, 549, 553, 556n, 561-65, 567-73 , 577n, 579n. See also Infantr y Regiments , 

37th: 76 , 78-79, 83, 117, 167-70, 179-80, 181-

86, 202-03, 212-14, 218, 233, 258-55, 258- 60, 261, 263-64, 275, 279-90, 293-95, 297- 300, 302-04, 306, 396-403, 477, 479-83, 485-

86, 532-33, 535, 539, 561-63, 569, 571. See

also Infantr y Regiments , 129th. 145th, 148th.

38th: 29-30 , 207-08, 310-34, 336-40, 348-49, 351, 356 , 366, 392, 397-403, 411, 420-22

also Infantr y Regiments , 149th, 151st, 152d.

152d.

40th: 29 , 30, 39, 54-57, 76-79, 115-17, 120, 128-

Infantry Divisions—Continue d

40th—Continued

29, 143, 167-68, 175-87, 202-08, 327, 364-66, 376-77 

43, 648 . See also Infantr y Regiments , 10

41st: 29-30 , 222, 364, 585, 589-99, 601, 623, 629-

30, 635, 638, 643-44, 648. See also Infantr y

Regiments, 162d, 163d, and 186th .

43d: 29 , 54-57, 80-85, 87, 105-07, 109-15, 122, 127-29 

96, 399, 401-21, 430, 457-60, 467, 544, 556n, 579n 

77th: 22n, 29-30, 45n

93d: 30 , 389-91, 397, 599

Infantry Point : 34 7

Infantry Regiments . See also Glide r Infantr y Regi -

ments; Parachut e Infantr y Regiments .

1st: 236n , 331-34, 366, 374-75, 378-80, 382-88, 392-98 

1st Filipino : 43 7

19th: 29-30, 44, 47-48, 51, 223, 225, 364, 435, 437-

38, 625-26, 628-29, 632, 633-35, 644

20th: 80, 82-83, 86, 140, 161-65, 188, 193-97, 199-

201, 368, 373-75, 378-80, 382-85, 387-88, 392-

97, 563, 576-77

21st: 45, 49, 51, 53, 223, 435-37, 592, 625-27, 629-

32, 633-35, 644, 646

27th: 156-60, 188-89, 193, 195-97, 512-17, 520-39

34th: 29-30 , 310, 313, 318-25, 327-28, 330n, 335, 342-49 

35th: 143 , 157, 181, 188-89, 195-97, 200, 512-39

63d: 80 , 83 , 86, 105-10, 114-15, 129, 139-40, 147-

55, 160-165, 197-98, 200-201, 368, 373-75, 378, 384 

103d: 80-83 , 109-14, 140, 145, 148-51, 156, 376-

77, 379, 381-82, 385-88, 391-418

108th: 79 , 169, 176-77, 179, 182-83, 185-86, 202-

06, 601, 618-19, 639-43, 648

123d: 477 , 479-80, 486-87, 561-62

124th: 636-4 3

126th: 492-93 , 499-510, 532n, 536-39, 561, 563-

64, 574

127th: 492-95 , 498-510, 532n, 539, 561, 574

128th: 492 , 499-510, 539

129th: 78-79 , 83, 117, 167-70, 181-86, 202-03, 258-59 

99, 477, 479-81, 485-86, 562-63, 569, 571

130th: 459-60 , 477, 479-81, 485-90, 566

132d: 437 , 610-17

136th: 459-60 , 477, 479-80, 487, 489-90, 562n

145th: 79 , 168-69, 179-80, 182-83, 185, 213-14, 254-55 

148th: 78-79 , 168-69, 179-80, 182, 212-14, 218, 253-55 
INDEX 739

Infantry Regiments—Continue d

148th—Continued

302-04, 306, 479-83, 485, 532-33, 535, 539, 563, 569

149th: 313 , 319, 325-28, 334, 402-83, 421-22

151st: 313-14, 319, 324, 327-34, 351, 353-57, 398- 99, 402-03, 420-22

152d: 314-22, 325-30, 398-403

155th: 638-41 , 643-44

158th RCT : 29, 31-32, 53-57, 104-10 , 112-14 ,

126, 139-40, 143-44, 147-48, 152-55, 193, 364-

66, 428-35, 438-45, 458-59, 579n

160th: 77-79, 117, 167-71, 175-79, 182-86, 202-06, 604-07

161st: 156-60 , 197, 200-01, 512-17, 520-39

162d: 593-99 , 629-30, 638, 643-44, 648

163d: 593-9 9

164th: 604-05 , 608, 615, 617-18

167th: 638, 644-45

169th: 80-85, 105, 109-14, 140, 148-51, 207, 394-

96, 404, 407, 410-15, 420-21

172d: 80-86 , 105-13 , 129 , 139-40, 148 , 152-55,

379, 382, 386-88, 391-415

182d: 436-37 , 610-17

185th: 77-79 , 115-17, 182, 203-06, 601-07

186th: 589-93 , 596-97

306th: 45n

368th: 589-91, 597, 599

Ingeniero, Maj. Ismae l P.: 586, 617

Intelligence estimates

Baguio: 486-87

Bataan: 310-12, 314-15, 321-22, 332

Bicol Peninsula : 440-4 1

Central Plains: 141 , 189-90

Clark Field: 169-70, 172, 176, 179-81

Corregidor: 335, 337-39

Lingayen Gulf: 59, 64, 68, 74, 85, 105-86

Luzon: 26-29, 62-63, 93-94, 141

Manila: 211-12, 249, 265

Mindanao: 621-22

Mindoro: 4 4

Nasugbu-Tagaytay Ridge : 223-24

northern Luzon: 463-67, 525, 569-70, 572-73, 579

southern Luzon : 365-68 , 376, 384, 398, 407-08,

416, 418, 421-22, 425-26

Southern Philippines: 586

Villa Verde Trail: 510

Visayan Islands: 608-09

Intelligence estimates, Japanese

Baguio: 472, 480

Manila: 245-46, 271

Mindanao: 62 3

Route 5: 52 0

southern Luzon: 370-71, 398-99, 411

Intramuros: 239-40, 244-46, 249, 271-307

Ipo Dam: 367-71, 380, 384, 399, 401-15, 421, 423

Ipo River: 410-12, 415

Iraga: 444

Irisan Gorge : 481-87

Irisan River: 481-86

Ishikawa, Lt. Col. Kikuo: 90n

Ishikawa, Capt. Sadoyoshi: 601n

Itagaki, Capt, Akira, IJN: 339-40, 345

Italy: 3 0

Itogon: 488

Ives, Col. Washington M., Jr.: 162 , 174, 399n

Iwabuchi, Rear Adm. Sanji: 92 , 96-97, 241-49, 258,

270-77, 279, 286, 339

Iwanaka, Lt. Gen . Yoshiharu : 96 , 495, 502-03, 505,

507-09

Iwo Jima: 10-11, 16-17, 24, 26, 36, 141-42, 585

Jadjad River : 322 n

James Ravine: 336 , 339-40

Japan

B-29 attack s on: 4, 9, 14-15, 17, 36

lines of communication to: 3-4, 8, 141-42, 651

plans for invasion of: 651-54

Japanese Arm y Ai r Force: 49 , 58, 172, 545-46, 589,

598, 621-22, 630-36, 652

personnel use d a s groun d troops : 172-74 , 426, 441-42 

22, 630-33, 636-37, 641n

Japanese Army Air Force units

4th Air Army: 92-97, 426, 441-42, 454, 605

2d Air Division: 605, 618

4th Air Division: 560-61, 574

86th Airfield Battalion: 426, 430-31

103d Airfield Battalion: 641n

10th Air Sector Unit: 173 n

Hosono Unit: 622, 630-35

Japanese Army units

Area Army, 14th: 73, 88-94, 100, 112, 114, 143-46, 192-93 

Armies

Southern: 89-93

35th: 89, 586-89, 609-10, 622, 644-45

Divisions

1st: 587, 609, 616-17

2d Tank: 94-96, 99-102, 142-45, 156, 172-74,

188-93, 199-201, 213, 456-57, 494-97, 502,

504-85, 508-10, 516, 535-40, 560-64, 560-

68, 571-72, 576-77

8th: 44, 96-97, 102, 223-24, 241, 272, 369-71, 426

10th: 93-96, 99-102, 144-45, 189-92, 199, 312, 454-57 

25, 532-40, 560-66, 653-54

19th: 93-96, 99-100, 144, 147-48, 453, 465-

67, 476-81, 540, 545, 548, 550-57, 568, 571, 573-7 

23d: 93-96, 98-103, 104, 110-12, 114, 117, 144, 146-48 
740 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Japanese Army units—Continued

Divisions—Continued

23d—Continued

468-72, 475, 477-80, 487-89, 492-93, 566-68, 571-72, 574

26th: 99

30th: 587, 622-23, 627, 636-43, 646

32d: 11 7

100th: 587-88, 622-36, 642, 644-46

102d: 587-89 , 602, 605, 608-10, 616-18

103d: 94-96 , 98-99, 192, 453-54, 545-46, 559-

66, 574

105th: 44 , 96-97, 102, 144-45, 190-93, 199,

272, 369, 372n, 380, 385, 407-08, 454-57,

494, 559-61, 566-68, 572, 576

Brigades

3d Tank: 100n 54th Independent Mixed: 587-88, 593, 596-98

55th Independent Mixed: 587-88, 598

58th Independent Mixed: 94-96, 98-100, 102-

08, 112-13, 144, 146-47, 152-53, 155, 165-

66, 453-54, 459-60, 471-72, 475-81, 487-89,

566, 568, 574, 653-54

61st Independent Mixed: 94-96

77th Infantry: 60 5

78th Infantry: 60 9

79th Infantry: 54 5

81st Infantry: 368 n

82d Infantry: 408 n

Group, 1st Airborne Raiding: 96, 173

Regiments

2d Glider Infantry: 173-7 4

2d Mobile Artillery: 102, 158, 192

2d Mobile Infantry: 94-96 , 99-102, 156, 158,

173-74, 188

5th Infantry: 96-9 7

6th Tank: 102n , 145, 192

7th Tank: 100n, 156, 158, 192

8th Reconnaissance: 370-71

10th Field Artillery: 519

10th Infantry: 145 , 518, 533

10th Reconnaissance: 144-45, 494-95

10th Tank: 102, 192

11th Independent Infantry: 99n , 514-15, 518,

520

17th Infantry: 223-24 , 426-27, 605

23d Reconnaissance: 11 7

26th Independent Mixed: 192, 370-71, 441

30th Field Artillery: 628n, 641

30th Reconnaissance: 641n

31st Infantry: 223-24 , 272, 370-71, 380, 399

36th Infantry: 14 5

39th Infantry: 145 , 312, 315n, 332

63d Infantry: 51 8

64th Infantry: 110-13 , 147, 149, 156, 471, 486

71st Infantry: 112-13 , 147-48, 161, 459-60, 471

72d Infantry: 112-13 , 117, 147, 149

73d Infantry: 550-52 , 554

Japanese Army units—Continued

Regiments—Continued

74th Infantry: 626 , 637-38, 641n

75th Infantry: 476n , 479, 485, 48 7

76th Infantry: 551 , 553-54

Surface Raidin g Forces

1st: 368n, 369-70

2d: 223-24, 426-29

3d: 245

Maritime Transport Command, 3d: 92-93, 245

Battalions

10th Surface Raiding Base: 415n

26th Machine Gun: 545n

111th Surface Raiding Base: 351, 426

163d Independent Infantry: 628 n

166th Independent Infantry: 623-26 , 636-38

170th Independent Infantry: 60 2

171st Independent Infantry: 60 2

172d Independent Infantry: 605 n

173d Independent Infantry: 608-0 9

174th Independent Infantry: 617-1 8

176th Independent Infantry: 545 n

177th Independent Infantry: 56 6

178th Independent Infantry: 545 n

179th Independent Infantry: 56 3

182d Independent Infantry: 605 n

183d Independent Infantry: 605 n

184th Independent Infantry: 605 n

186th Independent Infantry: 368 n

354th Independent Infantry: 601-02 , 605n

355th Independent Infantry: 605 n

356th Independent Infantry: 606-0 7

357th Independent Infantry: 545 , 547-48,

550-51

358th Independent Infantry: 369 , 407-08

359th Independent Infantry: 192 n

379th Independent Infantry: 48 5

544th Independent Infantry: 476 n

Japanese Arm y units, provisional

Groups

Kembu: 96 , 99-102, 143-45, 172-75, 177-78, 180-86 

12, 315, 361-62, 364-66, 376-77, 423, 573n, 654-5 

Shimbu: 96-97 , 102, 144, 188, 190-92, 199,

213-14, 216-17 , 223-24 , 240-44 , 271-74 ,

306-07, 309-11, 357, 361-435, 441-42, 449,

454-55, 458, 561-62, 573n, 653-55

Shimbu Reserve: 370-71 , 380-81, 385, 394,

398-403, 415

Shobu: 94, 97-102, 112, 139, 144-45, 157, 165-

66, 188, 190, 198-99, 201-02, 281-82, 311, 361-64 

Forces

Araki: 453, 545-49, 560, 568

Fuji: 223-24, 415-16, 426-35, 573n
INDEX 741

Japanese Army units, provisional—Continued

Forces—Continued

Kawashima: 369-71, 373-74, 380-81, 384, 394, 399 , 401-15, 420

Kobayashi: 245, 272-73, 369-71, 373-80, 383-

85, 388-89, 391-403, 408, 411, 415, 420

Manila Defense: 241 , 245, 272, 351

Noguchi: 368n , 369-86, 388-91, 398-99, 401-

03, 415-16, 420

Takachiho: 520, 524

Yuguchi: 565, 569

Detachments

Eguchi: 173-75, 182-86, 202, 204-05

Hanabusa: 407-08, 411-12

Hayashi: 453-54, 476-77

Ida: 102 , 145, 192, 200

Kogure: 368n, 373, 385, 415-18, 420-21

Kubota: 117, 143-44

Nagayoshi: 31 2

Noguchi: 241-42, 244-45, 369n Okita: 368 n

Omori: 161 , 164-66

Shigemi: 100-102 , 112-14 , 144-46 , 150-61 , 164-6 6

Takaya: 173-75, 182-86, 202-04

Takayama: 173-79, 182-83, 202, 204

Tomono: 408 , 413

Tsuda: 99, 101-02, 145, 199

Yanagimoto: 173-75 , 180, 182-86, 202, 204-85

Battalions Abe: 242 , 245, 268-69, 273-74

Inoue Provisional Infantry: 192 n

Kasama: 408-12

Muroya: 408, 410

Narukami: 408, 411-12

2d Provisional Infantry: 244-45 , 274

3d Provisional Infantry: 244-45 , 274

Units

Central Sector, Luzon: 394 , 397-98

Central Sector, Mindanao: 63 6

Digos District: 628, 631-33

Eastern Sector, Mindanao: 637 , 643-44

Left Front Line, Mindanao: 632-33, 635

Left Sector, Luzon: 376 , 385, 388, 394, 397- 98

Left Sector, Mindanao: 630

Left District Unit, Mindanao: 632-35

Marauding Unit, Mindoro: 4 4

Northern Sector, Mindanao: 630-37, 641

Puncan Sector Defense, Luzon: 513-16

Right Front Line, Mindanao: 632-33, 635

Right Sector, Luzon: 394 , 397-98

Right Sector, Mindanao: 63 0

Sarangani District: 64 6

Southern Sector, Mindanao: 636, 638

Takachiho: 45 4

West Sector, Luzon: 224, 220-27

Western Sector, Mindanao: 636

Japanese Nava l Air Service: 49, 58, 265-66, 454, 589

26th Air Flotilla: 96, 174

Japanese nava l unit s

Fleets

Southwest Area: 49, 92-93, 241

3d Southern Expeditionary: 9 2

Manila Naval Defense Force: 241-48, 265, 268-73, 279-80 

Headquarters Battalion: 245, 279

Headquarters Sector Unit: 245, 274, 279

Central Force: 245, 259, 274, 290, 302-03

Manila Bay Entrance Force: 33 9

Northern Force: 244-45 , 252, 257-58, 271, 274 

Southern Force: 245-46, 265-66, 273-74

Naval Specia l Bas e Force s

31st: 92 , 96-97, 241-42, 249

32d: 62 2

33d: 441 , 608-09

Naval Battalion s

1st: 245, 258, 260-61, 265-66, 274

1st Independent: 244-45 , 256-58

2d: 245, 274, 277, 279

3d: 245, 265-66, 268-69, 274

4th: 245 , 266, 274, 628n

5th: 245, 274, 290, 351

Combat Sector s

13th: 202, 206-07

14th: 202, 205-07

15th: 202, 205-06

16th: 202, 200-07

17th: 202, 206-07

Hayakawa Naval Unit: 576-7 7

Naval Guar d Unit s

35th: 441-42

36th: 608-09

37th: 17 4

Japanese Nav y

eliminated: 65 2

forces use d a s groun d troop s

Bataan: 31 2

Bicol Peninsula : 44 1

Clark Field : 172 , 174-75, 202-03, 205-06

Corregidor: 339 , 342-43

Luzon: 92 , 90-97

Manila: 241-42, 244-45, 249, 271-72

Manila Bay : 351, 355

Mindanao: 621-22, 632-33, 646

northern Luzon : 576-7 7

southern Luzon : 369-70 , 426

Southern Philippines : 587-89, 598

Visayan Islands : 605 , 608-09, 618

gunfire support : 49-5 0

Jenna, Col. William W.: 320-24, 328

Jerome, Col. Clayto n C. , USMC: 133 n

Joint Assault Signal Company, 293d: 12 3

Joint Chiefs of Staff: 3-11, 15-17, 17n, 22, 24, 140-41
742 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Joint Logistic s Committee : 12-1 3

Jolo Island: 587, 598-99

Jolo: 59 8

Jones Bridge: 255, 283

Jones, Col. George M.: 237-38, 240-47, 347, 349

Jones, Maj. Gen . Henry L, C.: 314, 318n, 319-30

Kabacan: 621, 623-30, 636-42

Kamikaze attack s

Lingayen Gulf: 59-68

Luzon: 60-67, 363

Mindoro: 46-51

Okinawa: 66-67

Kanami Ridge: 53 6

Kaneko, Maj. Chuji : 609 n

Kapatalin Sawmill: 417-18

Kapintalan: 516-26, 529-31, 534

Kapintalan Ridge: 518, 529-33

Kasama, Maj. Tetsuyuki : 411-12

Kataoka, Lt. Gen. Tadasu: 609

Kawai, Col. Shigeo : 90n, 99n, 201n

Kawashima, Maj. Gen. Osamu: 408, 411-12, 414

Kayashima, Lt. Comdr. Koichi: 241n

Kenbu Ridge : 531-34

Kenney, Lt. Gen . Georg e C. : 10, 23-25, 35-36, 236

Kerstetter, Pfc. Dexte r J.: 481n

Khodr, Maj, Khalil: 643n

Kiangan pocket: 567, 569, 571-72, 574, 576-77

Kiangkiang: 567-68, 576-77

Kibangay: 644-45

Kibawe: 627, 636-41, 645

Kibawe-Talomo trail: 629-30, 639-40, 644-45

Kilometer Post 21: 488-89, 559, 566, 574

Kilometer Pos t 90 : 542-44 , 554-59, 567-68, 571,

573-74

Kindley Field : 33 7

King, Adm. Ernes t J. : 4-6, 9-10, 13, 15-17, 21-22

Kinkaid, Vice Adm . Thomas C. : 10 , 21-25, 33-34,

37, 40, 56-57, 340

Kira, Maj. Gen . Goichi: 90 n

Kitano, 2d Lt . Saburo : 315 n

Kobayashi, Col. Shujiro : 90n , 241n, 368n

Kobayashi, Maj. Gen. Takashi: 241, 245, 379n

Kogure, Lt. Col. Nobutaka: 368 n

Koma, Capt. Masayoshi, IJN: 241n , 339n

Kono, Lt. Gen. Takeshi: 605-08

Konuma, Maj. Gen . Haruo: 97n , 454n, 456-67, 494-

95, 505, 515, 520

Krotiak, Pfc. Anthon y L.: 533 n

Krueger, Gen. Walte r

and Baguio : 477 , 479

and Bataan : 33 1

and Bico l Peninsula : 429-30 , 440

and Centra l Plains: 139-44, 163, 166, 187-90, 195n, 198-99 , 201-02

and Clar k Field: 167-69, 180-82, 184, 202-03

and convo y schedules: 40

and Corregidor: 335-37

Krueger, Gen. Walter—Continue d

heads Sixth Army: 1 8

and Lingaye n Gulf : 33-34 , 56-57, 86-87, 105-06,

115, 117, 128-30

and Luzon : 211, 361-65

and Manila : 212-13 , 217, 232, 236, 249-50, 258,

269, 293-94, 306

and Manil a Ba y area: 309-10, 335-36

and norther n Luzon : 449-50, 457-60, 463-67, 531-

32, 540, 541, 544, 548-49, 553, 556, 561, 568-70, 57 

and souther n Luzon : 361-68, 376-77, 403-04, 416,

423, 429-30, 432-34

and Vill a Verd e Trail: 491, 503

Kubota, Lt. Col. Shohei : 11 7

Kuluman River: 645

Kuriya, Lt. Col. Tsugunori: 224n

Kusumi, Comdr, Tadao: 441n

L-5's: 621, 654-55

La Paz: 168-69

La Salle University: 277-79

Lafe Hill : 175-7 9

Laguna d e Bay: 222 , 241, 244-45, 273-74, 367-72, 415-16 

Laguna Province : 250-51

Lahug Airfield: 613-14

Lake Buluan: 646-47

Lake Taal: 424-30, 434

Lake Taal Upland: 424

Lamagan Ridge : 549-54

Lamogan: 63 5

Lamon Bay : 369-71, 416-21, 423-24, 434, 439

Land-based air attacks. See Air operations, landbased attacks .

Landing craft . See Assaul t shipping .

Langiatan Hill: 550-54

Laoag: 453, 543-47

Las Piñas: 230-31

Las Piñas River: 230-31

Laureta, Col. Claro: 633n, 644n

Lawican: 491-93

Laws, Staff Sgt . Robert E.: 110n

LCI's: 77, 440-41

LCI (G)'s: 57, 73-74, 438-39

LCI(M)'s: 7 5

LCM's: 77 , 118, 120-29, 341-43, 348, 352-56, 418, 436-37 

LCM(3)'s: 125-2 6

LCM(6)'s: 125-2 6

LCPR's: 224-25 , 332-36

LCT's: 47-48, 77, 118, 124-26

LCVP's: 77 , 118, 120-21, 124-27, 332-33, 356, 440-

41

Leaf, Col. Willia m N.: 134-35

Leahy, Adm. William D.: 8n, 10, 13-15

LeCouvre, Capt. Donald J.: 59 6
INDEX 743

Legaspi: 21, 439-44

Legaspi, Miguel Lopez de: 23 8

Legaspi Port: 439-40, 442-43

Lemasters, Maj. Paul R.: 355-56

Lenatin Rive r and Valley: 367, 419

Lepanto Coppe r Mine : 542-43 , 554, 558-59, 568,

571, 573-74

Letran University : 297-99

Leyte: 3 , 7, 10-11, 12-13, 88-90, 135, 586-87, 652

airfield developmen t in : 23-25, 584, 586, 591-92

as stagin g area : 46 , 54-57, 312, 362-63, 438-39,

585, 592, 601, 608

Libby Airdrome : 63 0

Libtong: 453-54 , 457-58, 466-67, 477, 541-45, 547-

50

Licab: 181 , 187-90

Liloan: 610 , 616

Limay: 333-3 4

Lindeman, Col. Phili p F. : 528-2 9

Lines o f communicatio n

Bicol Peninsula: 439-40, 444

Clark Field : 169 , 182

to Formosa: 4-6, 13

to Japan: 3-4, 8, 141-42

Luzon: 1 3

Manila: 186, 215-16, 252, 258-59, 273

Mindanao: 625-26, 629-31, 638-39, 642-43

Nasughu-Tagaytay Ridge: 225

northern Luzon : 524 , 526-27, 530, 533, 551, 553-

54, 563, 568

southern Luzon : 368 , 385-86, 425-26, 429

Southern Philippines : 595-9 6

Villa Verd e Trail : 499 , 508

Lines o f communication , Japanese

Aritao-Baguio: 485, 558-60, 562, 564-66, 567, 569, 571-7 2

Central Plains: 101-101, 149, 188-89, 199

Clark Field : 202-0 3

from Japan : 65 1

Luzon: 52 , 98

Manila: 265 , 268-69, 271-73

northern Luzon : 544-46, 558-59, 564

South China Sea: 583-84

southern Luzon: 37 1

Southern Philippines: 583-84, 586, 591

Villa Verde Trail: 506-07

Lingayen Attac k Force : 32-3 3

Lingayen Gulf : 3-135 , 228-33, 309

Army Beachhea d Line : 73, 76, 79, 81, 85-87, 109-

10, 114-15, 117, 140, 147, 160-61

assault plans: 29-35

landing phase: 69-87

logistical plan s an d operations: 38-42, 118-35

Lipa: 425, 427, 429-32

Lipa corridor: 425-3 4

Logistics. See also Amphibiou s operations.

base developmen t

Central Plains: 147-66, 211

Logistics—Continued

base development—Continued

Lingayen Gulf: 41, 309, 363, 457-58

Luzon: 362-63

Manila Ba y area: 133 , 309, 311n, 313-14, 363, 387 

Mindanao: 18 , 626-27, 629

Nasugbu-Tagaytay Ridge : 30 9

Philippines: 651-5 2

Samar: 43 7

southern Luzon : 423 , 428-29

Southern Philippines : 18 , 597

Subic Bay : 133, 313-14, 441

command an d control: 57 , 133-3 5

convoy plans : 21-23 , 25, 46-48, 56-57

port developmen t

Bicol Peninsula : 439-4 0

Lingayen Gulf : 13 3

Luzon: 56 2

Manila: 118 , 130-31, 133

Manila Ba y area : 35 7

Visayan Islands : 60 8

shipping losses : 46-51, 59-61, 64-66, 131

shipping requirements : 38-40 , 585

shipping routes : 21-23, 25, 52, 362-63

shortages

ammunition: 40 , 402, 656-57

bridging equipment : 40 , 129-30

engineer equipment : 12 2

food: 234-3 5

manpower: 121-2 3

POL: 23 4

transportation: 23 1

trucks: 121-22 , 120-27, 130-31

vehicles, general: 12 5

water: 107-0 8

staging area s

Aitape: 54-5 6

Australia: 54-5 5

Biak: 585 n

Cebu: 60 8

development of : 4

Hollandia: 54-5 5

Huon Gulf : 5 6

Leyte: 46, 54-57, 312, 362-63, 438-39, 585, 592 

Lingayen Gulf : 60 1

Luzon: 363 , 440, 570-71, 581, 601

Manus Island : 5 6

Mindoro: 52 , 228-29, 335-36, 340, 348, 435-

37, 585, 589, 592, 601, 605, 607, 620

Morotai: 54-55, 585, 620

New Britain : 54-5 6

New Caledonia : 54-5 5

New Guinea : 55 , 585

Noemfoor: 54-5 5

Panay: 60 4

Philippines: 651-5 2
744 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Logistics—Continued

staging areas—Continued

Samar: 435-36, 585

Sansapor: 54-56, 585, 620

Visayan Islands: 605, 608

supply operation s

Bicol Peninsula : 443-4 5

Central Plains: 142-43 , 167, 207, 309

Clark Field : 168-69 , 181, 186, 206

Corregidor: 34 7

Lingayen Gulf: 38-42, 55, 82-83, 109-11, 118-

35, 309

Luzon: 21, 26-27, 361, 440, 585

Manila: 233-3 5

Mindanao: 623-26, 629, 638, 641-42, 645

Mindoro: 45-4 6

Nasugbu-Tagaytay Ridge : 23 4

norther 529-33n Luzon , 547, 549 : 461, 568 , 465-66 , 573-7, 5136 , 516-17, 524,

Philippines, general: 655-5 7

southern Luzon : 382-83, 387, 402, 412, 414

Southern Philippines : 586, 595-96

Villa Verd e Trail: 498-99, 505

Visayan Islands : 601-02 , 608

Logistics, Japanese

shipping losse s

Formosa: 6 5

general: 8 9

Lingayen Gulf : 57-60 , 64

Mindoro: 48, 50-51

shortages ammunition: 545-46 , 554, 576-77, 588-89 , 605 , 622-23

artillery: 622-2 3

food: 91 , 418-20, 477-78, 546-47, 568, 576-

77, 588-89, 605, 644

general: 9 1

medical: 315-16 , 420, 478, 545-46, 568, 588- 89

POL: 9 1

transportation: 90-92 , 588-89, 622-23, 637

supply operation s

Baguio: 476-78, 481, 489

Bataan: 315-1 6

Central Plains: 144, 190, 192-93, 199

Clark Field : 202-0 3

Lingayen Gulf : 38 , 12 9

Luzon: 90-92, 97-98, 578

Manila: 240-4 1

Mindanao: 622-2 3

northern Luzon : 450 , 464-67, 535, 546, 554, 558-60 , 568, 577

southern Luzon : 371 , 376, 378-79, 386, 417, 42 0

Southern Philippines: 588-89

Villa Verd e Trail: 50 2

Lone Tre e Hill : 518, 522, 529-31, 533-34

Loo Valley : 542, 567-68

Los Baños: 427-28, 432-33

Louisville, USS: 6 0

LSM's: 56-57, 124-26, 332-33, 356, 440-41

LST's: 56-57, 69, 76-77, 118-21, 123-27, 234, 440-41

Lubang Islands: 428-29, 437-38

Lubricants. See POL products.

Lucena: 433-34

Lumboy: 512-14

Lunec: 161-62

Luneta Park: 293-94

Lupao: 101-02, 144-45, 181, 187-93, 195-200, 512-13

Luzon Attac k Force: 32-34, 37, 56-57, 59-67, 104-05

Luzon Bas e Section : 134 . See also Arm y Servic e

Command.

Luzon Bus Company road: 372-73, 378

Luzon-Formosa-China coast triangle: 4-17

Luzon-Formosa debate: 3-17, 658

LVT's: 33, 69, 76, 78, 118, 128-30, 132, 234, 259, 292,

610-12, 624, 655

LVT(A)'s: 33 , 69, 76-78, 118

Mabalacat: 171 , 179-80

Mabalacat East Airfield: 170-8 0

Mabato Point: 245, 273-74

Mabilao: 80-82, 105

Macajalar Bay : 621 , 623, 636-37, 639-42

MacArthur, General o f th e Arm y Douglas: 280 . See

also Genera l Headquarters , SWPA.

and Bataan: 310-11 and Central Plains: 139-43, 187 and Clark Field: 168-69, 180, 184

and Corregidor: 335-36, 340, 350

and Leyte : 10-11

and Lingayen: 33-34, 56-57, 86-87 and Luzon: 11, 13, 18-26, 310, 362-65

and Luzon-Formosa debate: 6-9, 11, 13-16

and Manila : 212, 249-50, 260n, 267, 293-94, 306

and Manil a Bay: 309-10, 333-36

and Mindanao: 10-11, 646-47

narrow escape: 334

and Nasugbu-Tagayta y Ridge : 221-23 , 225-26, 229-3 

and northern Luzo n operations: 449, 458, 539, 572

and Philippines: 6-11, 18, 656

and Route 5: 539

and southern Luzon: 361-66, 404

and Southern Philippines: 583-85

tactics of, 1941: 94

and Visayan Passages: 439, 445

MacNider, Brig. Gen. Hanford: 443-45

Mactan Island : 614, 616

Magalang: 179-80

Magat Rive r and Valley: 450, 453, 543, 558-63, 567,

578

Magima River and Canyon: 641-42

Magsaysay, Capt. Ramon: 313

Magun Hill: 550-54
INDEX 745

Maison, Lt. Col. Harold G.: 107-08, 111

Makati: 245, 251, 265

Malabang: 620-27, 647

Malacañan Palace: 238-39, 252, 259-60

Malasiqui: 79, 114-17, 129n, 160-61

Malasiqui-Manaoag line: 160-61

Malatorre: 460

Mayala Range. See Ilocos Range.

Malaybalay: 636-37, 640-44

Malinta Hill: 336-42, 347-48

Malisay: 593-95

Malolos: 212-13, 217

Malolos-Plaridel line : 213, 217

Maluko: 636-37

Mananga Rive r and Valley: 610, 615-16

Manaoag: 83 , 111-15, 144, 156-57, 160-61

Mandog: 633-35

Mangaldan: 80, 82, 132-34, 235, 476

Mangarin Bay : 4 4

Mango River: 373-74, 384, 392

Manila: 31 , 59, 73, 92-93, 105-06, 142-43, 180-81,

186, 187, 189-90, 198, 202, 206-07, 211-307, 309, 428, 656

Manila Bay area: 31 , 73, 241, 244, 246, 301-57, 424,

426, 449, 491. See also Bataa n Peninsula ; Cor- regidor; Manila .

Manila Railroad : 128-30 , 167-68, 171-72, 174-75,

179-81, 186, 188, 194, 211-14, 259, 439, 469n

Manila Suburban Electric Line: 269

Manila-Tanauan road. See Route 1, Luzon.

Manjome, Maj. Gen . Takeo: 609-16

Mankayan: 542-43, 545-46, 554-55, 558-59, 566, 571,

573-74

Manus Islan d stagin g area : 5 6

Maps, deficiencies in : 251, 317, 326, 524, 538-39, 639

Maramag: 640-41, 643

Marcus Island, USS: 4 7

Mariana Islands: 4, 7, 14-15

Marikina: 373 , 399

Marikina Rive r an d Valley : 238 , 240-41, 244, 250,

256-58, 272-73, 367-69, 371-73, 378, 380, 391-

92, 400, 402-04

Marilao: 213-14, 218

Marinduque: 53 , 435-36

Marine Corp s Aviatio n

Baguio: 47 6

Luzon: 35-36, 132-33, 151

Manila: 235-36, 268, 273-74, 293-94

Mindanao: 621, 627, 644

Philippines: 65 5

Southern Philippines : 586 , 591-92, 596, 598-99

Visayan Passages: 436

Mariveles: 331-34, 340, 351

Mariveles Bay: 332-33, 341

Marking's guerrillas: 407-1 5

Marshall, General of the Army Georg e G.: 6, 9-11,

13

Marshall, Lt. Col. Paul H.: 641

Marshall, Maj. Gen . Richard J.: 15-1 6

Marshall Islands : 4

Martin, Maj. Gen . Clarence A.: 636

Masbate Island: 438-39

Mauban: 43 4

Mayfield, Cpl. Melvin: 577n

Mayruso River: 78

McCarter, Pvt. Lloyd G.: 346 n

McGaha, Master Sgt. Charles L.: 200n

McGee, Lt. Col. Frank D.: 637n, 644n

McGee, Capt. Homer F., USN: 440-4 1

McGuire, Maj. Thoma s B.: 57n

McIntosh, Lt. Col. Jesse E.: 319

McKinney, Sgt. John R.: 562n

McNarney, Lt. Gen. Joseph T.: 6

McSevney Point: 203-06

Medal o f Hono r winner s

Atkins, Pfc. Thoma s E, : 498n

Cicchetti, Pfc. Josep h J.: 260 n

Cooley, Staff Sgt. Raymond H.: 514n

Diamond, Pfc. Jame s H.: 632 n Gonzales, Pfc. Davi d M.: 506n

Grabiarz, Pfc. Willia m J.: 302 n

Harr, Cpl. Harry R.: 643n

Kerstetter, Pfc. Dexte r J.: 481 n

Krotiak, Pfc. Anthon y L.: 533 n

Laws, Staff Sgt . Robert E.: 110 n

Mayfield, Cpl. Melvin : 577n

McCarter, Pvt. Lloyd G.: 346 n

McGaha, Master Sgt. Charles L.: 200n

McGuire, Maj. Thoma s B.: 57n

McKinney, Sgt. John R.: 562n

Parrish, T/4 Laverne : 158n

Perez, Pfc. Manuel, Jr.: 274n

Reese, Pfc. John N., Jr.: 260n

Rodriguez, Tech. Sgt. Cleto: 260n

Rudolph, Tech. Sgt. Donal d E.: 199n

Shockley, Pfc. Willia m R.: 501n

Shomo, Maj. William A.: 57n

Sjogren, Staff Sgt. John C.: 607n

Thomas, Pfc. Willia m H.: 207n

Viale, 2d Lt. Robert M.: 255n

Villegas, Staff Sgt. Ysmael R.: 498 n

Woodford, Staff Sgt . Howard E.: 566n

Medical Battalion, 263d: 123

Medical Clearing Company, 637th: 562n

Medical suppl y shortages , Japanese: 315-16 , 420,

478, 545-46, 568, 588-89

Medical support . See Casualties, evacuation of.

Merrill, Lt. Col. Gyles: 314-15

Meycauyan: 23 3

Middleside, Corregidor: 336-37, 339, 344, 345-47

Military police : 30 0

Military Polic e Company , 36th: 12 3

Miliwit Rive r an d Valley : 501-0 2

Milton, Hugh M., II: 55n

Mindanao: 10-11 , 18, 47, 584-87, 591, 599, 620-48
746 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Mindanao River: 620-21, 625-26

Mindanao Sea: 46, 59, 362-63, 618

Mindoro: 21-26 , 44-53, 89, 223, 227, 235, 267, 332,

337, 583-84, 586, 591-92

Mindoro Attac k Group . See Nava l units , Tas k

Groups, 78.3

Mindoro Close Covering Group: 45

Mindoro Heav y Coverin g and Carrie r Group : 45-48

Mining operation s

marine

Bataan: 332-3 3

Bicol Peninsula : 44 0

Corregidor: 34 0

Lingayen: 60-62 , 67-69

Luzon: 66-6 9

Southern Philippines : 592-9 3

land

Clark Field : 18 3

Corregidor: 34 2

Manila: 246-47 , 252-53, 256-57, 264-65, 268

Manila Bay: 241-42

Visayan Islands: 607, 610-13

Mining operations, Japanese: 440

Mintal: 630-3 4

Minuli: 456, 516, 518-24, 526

Miyazaki, Lt. Gen. Shuichi: 88n, 89

Moale, USS: 4 7

Moncada: 117, 167-69

Monkey Point: 34 8

Montalban: 368-69 , 371-74, 378, 399, 402, 404-05,

408

Montalban River : 39 1

Morale status, Japanese: 175 , 20 6

Moret Field: 59 9

Morison, Samuel Eliot: 46n, 47n, 49n, 50n

Morong Rive r an d Valley: 369, 379, 381-82, 385-86

Morotai: 4, 54-55, 585, 586, 620

Morozumi, Lt. Gen. Gyosaku: 587n , 622-26, 636-44

Mortar ammunition shortage: 402

Mortar operation s

Bataan: 322, 324-25

Central Plains: 158-59, 161-62, 194, 196

Clark Field: 177 , 184

Lingayen Gulf: 83, 106-07, 112

Manila: 257-58 , 261-64, 266, 268, 274-75, 284,

286-87, 294, 296-97, 300, 303

Manila Bay: 352-53

northern Luzon : 514, 522, 525-26, 533-34, 553

southern Luzon : 386 , 397-98, 421, 432

Villa Verde Trail: 497-97

Visayan Islands: 61 4

Mortar operations, Japanese

Bataan: 315-16, 318-21, 323-24, 329

Central Plains: 148-49, 151-53, 196

Clark Field : 169-72 , 176-77, 179, 183-85, 203-04

Lingayen Gulf : 81-85 , 106-09, 123, 125

Manila: 247-48 , 259-63, 265-68, 277-78, 286

Manila Bay : 35 3

Mortar operations, Japanese—Continued

Mindanao: 630-31, 633

Nasugbu-Tagaytay Ridge: 224-27

Route 5: 513-14, 519-20, 527-28

southern Luzon : 372-73 , 377, 387, 394, 399-400, 402 

Southern Philippines: 593, 597-98

Villa Verde Trail: 497, 499, 506

Visayan Islands: 610, 613-14

Visayan Passages: 436

Morton, Louis: 3, 311n

Mossman, Maj. Bill y C.: 548 n

Mount Aiming : 226-27

Mount Alava : 84 , 110-11, 144, 147, 189-90

Mount Apni: 478-79

Mount Apo: 628

Mount Arayat: 17 1

Mount Balidbiran: 386, 388

Mount Banahao: 424-25, 433-35

Mount Banahao District: 424

Mount Bariway : 441-43

Mount Batulao: 226

Mount Baytangan: 373-76, 382, 378-80, 382-88, 391-

92, 402-03

Mount Bijiang : 42 8

Mount Binicayan : 400-402

Mount Bolokbok: 462-63

Mount Calugong: 486

Mount Capisan : 593-96

Mount Cariliao: 226

Mount Caymayuman : 382, 385, 386, 388-89

Mount Daho : 598-99

Mount Hapanong-Banoy : 402-03

Mount Haruna : 536

Mount Imugan: 502-03, 505, 508, 517-18

Mount Isarog : 44 5

Mount Kabuto: 517-18, 522, 524

Mount Kabuyao : 407-10

Mount Kanami : 518, 522n, 524

Mount Katitinga : 407-12, 414

Mount Macolod: 427 , 429-3 3

Mount Malcpunyo: 424-28, 432-35

Mount Maquiling : 424-28, 430-33

Mount Maranat: 414

Mount Mataasna-Bondoc : 435

Mount Mataba : 373-75, 378-82, 391-97, 399

Mount Minami: 517-18, 522n, 524

Mount Mirador: 485-86

Mount Myoko : 518 , 522-24, 527-33, 539-40

Mount Namogoian: 54 7

Mount Natib: 33 4

Mount Oro: 369, 391, 394-96, 402

Mount Pacawagan : 369 , 373-75, 378-80, 384, 391,

396-97, 399-400

Mount Pamitinan: 400, 402-03

Mount Pulungbata : 593-97

Mount Purro : 391-94, 398-99, 402-03

Mount Santo Tomas: 486
INDEX 747

Mount Tanauan: 382 , 385-8 6

Mount Tumatangus: 598-99

Mount Yabang: 382 , 384-86 , 388-89

Mudge, Maj. Gen . Vern e IX : 214-15, 252-53, 269,

373

Mulita River: 638-3 9

Mullins, Maj. Gen . Charle s L., Jr. : 157-58 , 160, 195 -

97, 513-17, 519-22, 524-26, 528-30, 532-37

Muñoz: 101 , 145 , 181 , 188-20 1

Muraoka, Lt. Gen . Yutaka : 562 n

Murphree River: 52 5

Muto, Lt. Gen . Akira : 88n , 89-92 , 103

Myoko Ridge: 518 , 522-3 0

Naga: 44 5

Nagayoshi, Col. Sanenobu : 311n , 312-16 , 330, 332 ,

334

Naguilian: 99-100, 474-76, 569

Nampicuan: 11 7

Nanca Rive r an d Valley: 373 , 376-78 , 383, 38 5

Napalm. See Air operations, napalm, use of.

Nashville, USS: 4 6

Nasugbu: 424-25, 428-29

Nasugbu Bay : 222-2 5

Nasugbu-Tagaytay Ridge : 221-31, 234-36, 309, 42 7

Naval Service Command: 41, 133

Naval unit s

Fleets

Third: 22-25 , 33-37, 45-48, 54, 58-67, 168

Seventh: 23 , 32-34, 438-39

Amphibious Force s

III: 32-33 , 55-57, 76-77, 119-20, 124, 12 7

VII: 32-33 , 56-57, 64, 119-20, 123-24, 127-28

Task Force s

74: 610 , 612-1 3

77: See Luzon Attac k Force.

78: 3 3

79: 32-3 3

Task Group s

74.2: 58 9

77.2: 57 , 59-60

77.3: 45 , 47-48, 57, 332, 34 0

77.4: 57 , 59

77.6: 57 , 60

77.9: 12 6

77.12: 45-4 8

78.1: 592-9 3

78.2: 223-25 , 589, 608 , 62 1

78.3: 45-48 , 312, 332-33 , 601

78.4: 440-4 3

Task Unit s

77.1.1 56-5 7

77.1.2 56-5 7

77.3.1 22 3

Navy, U.S.

Advance Commande r Suppor t Aircraft : 3 7

base development : 41 , 13 3

Commander Suppor t Aircraf t Luzon : 3 7

Navy, U.S.—Continued

construction battalions : 12 6

gunfire suppor t

Bataan: 312-13, 332-33

Bicol Peninsula : 440-41

Central Plains: 139-4 0

Corregidor: 337-40, 342-43, 347

Iwo Jima: 585

Lingayen Gulf : 60 , 62, 67-69, 75, 83-84, 100,

104-05, 108, 128

Luzon: 67-6 9

Manila Bay : 340 , 352-53 , 356-57

Mindanao: 621 , 62 4

Nasugbu-Tagaytay Ridge: 221-25

Southern Philippines: 585 , 589 , 592-9 3

Visayan Islands: 601-02, 610-13

Visayan Passages: 438-40

losses: 332-33 , 340

reconnaissance: 35 5

support plan s

Lingayen Gulf : 32-3 4

Luzon: 21-22, 24-26, 32-34

Mindoro: 23-24, 45-46

Okinawa: 58 5

Negros Island : 46, 586-87, 604-10, 616-19

Nielson Field : 245 , 266 , 269-7 0

Netherlands East Indies: 584-85, 591, 60 0

in strategi c plans : 18 , 651

Netherlands Navy : 32-3 3

New Bosoboso: 371 , 376 , 388 , 418 , 420-2 1

New Britain: 54-56

New Caledonia : 54-55

New Guinea : 4, 55, 585

Newman, Col. Olive r P. : 58 9

Nichols Field: 265-69, 274

Night operation s

Baguio: 483-84

Bicol Peninsula : 442-44

Clark Field : 169 , 18 3

Corregidor: 346-48

Lingayen Gulf : 113-1 4

southern Luzon : 373 , 381 , 387 , 399 , 407-12 , 414

Villa Verde Trail: 501-03, 506

Visayan Islands: 60 7

Visayan Passages: 438

Nimitz, Adm. Cheste r W. : 4-14, 16-17 , 22, 24-25

Nishimura, Maj. Gen . Toshio : 88n

Nishiyama, Lt. Gen . Fukutaro : 147-48 , 476n

Noble, Rear Adm . Alber t G.: 621

Noemfoor: 54-5 5

Noguchi, Col . Katsuzo : 241 , 244-45 , 252, 257-58 ,

271-72

Noguchi, Maj. Susumu : 368n, 372n

North Africa : 3 0

North Port Area: 255 , 293-94 , 307

Northern Apex : 541-58

Northern Luzon : 449-79, 558-79

Northwest (Banzai) Ridge: 531
748 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Norton Ridge: 520-23, 525-26

Norton's Knob: 522-23, 525-26

Norzagaray: 216-18, 405-07

Novaliches: 219-20 , 233-35, 244, 250, 252, 272-73,

405

Novaliches Dam : 250 , 256, 272-73, 367, 404, 414

Object Hill : 205-06

O'Connor, Col. George G.: 108n, 195n

Oil, fuel, and lubricating . See POL products.

Oil suppl y an d storage . See POL products .

Okabayashi, Col. Junkichi : 609n

Okada, Col. Yasuji: 90n, 173n

Okamoto, Lt. Gen. Yasuyuki: 14 5

Okinawa: 10 , 13, 15, 16-17, 24-26, 36, 64, 60-67,

67n, 141-42, 560, 585, 653-54, 656

Okita, Lt. Col. Kazuo : 368 n

Okochi, Vice Adm. Denshichi : 92, 241-43

Old Bilibid Prison : 252-54

Old Spanis h Trail : 455-56 , 463, 491-92, 514-24,

527-28, 533, 536, 538-40, 560, 564, 566

Oldendorf, Rear Adm . Jess e B. : 61-63

Olongapo: 310, 312-17, 325, 327, 332

Orani: 332, 334

Ordnance Ammunitio n Company , 622d: 12 3

Ordnance Bom b Disposa l Squad , 108th: 12 3

Ordnance Heavy Maintenanc e Company, 3608th: 123

Ordnance Light Maintenance Companies,

163d: 12 3

706th: 12 3

737th: 13 0

Ordnance Mediu m Maintenanc e Company , 48th:

123

Orion: 33 4

Oriung Pass: 559-65

Osboy Ridge : 410-11, 413

Owada, Maj. Hiroshi : 622 n

Ozaki, Lt. Gen. Yoshiharu: 99n, 100

P-38's: 49-50, 132, 235, 293, 334, 599

P-40's: 49-50, 132, 235

P-47's: 48-50, 235, 329-30

P-51's: 132 , 352-53

P-61's: 48-50, 132

Pacdan: 56 7

Paco District : 240, 259-60, 274, 293-94, 307

Paco Railroad Station: 529-60, 263-65

Paco School: 260, 263-64

Page, Maj. Herbert : 646 n

Pagsanjan: 416 , 434

Paidu-Pulangi: 62 6

Palacpalac: 111 , 113-14, 140, 144, 148-49

Palau Islands: 4, 54

Palawan: 583-9 1

Palico River : 224-2 6

Pampanga River : 181-82 , 211-16, 233, 462-63, 543

Panay Forc e (1942) : 60 2

Panay Island: 586-87, 601-07

Pandacan District : 240 , 259-60, 274, 293-94, 307

Pandanan Island: 589-91

Panililio, Yay: 407 n

Paniqui: 117-2 0

Pantal River : 78 , 129

Parachute Field Artillery Battalions

162d: 34 1

457th: 57 0

462d: 341 , 344

Parachute Infantr y Battalion s

1st, 503d: 345 , 347

2d, 503d: 344 , 347

3d, 503d: 341-44 , 347

1st, 511th: 230-31 , 571

2d, 511th: 230-31, 570

3d, 511th: 430 , 432-33

Parachute Infantr y Regiment s

503d RCT : 29-30, 44-45, 47-48, 51, 335-49, 364, 366 

511th: 222-31, 235, 266-69, 351, 425, 427-30, 434-

35, 570-71

Parañaque: 230-31, 245, 265-66

Parañaque River: 231, 234, 265-67

Parang: 620-21, 623-26, 638

Paret River: 569, 571

Parrish, T/4 Laverne : 158n

Pasay: 275-7 7

Pasig District : 25 5

Pasig River : 217, 238-41, 244-45, 246, 251-60, 264-

70, 273-77, 282, 284, 291-300, 307

Patalan River: 80, 86

Patrick, Maj. Gen . Edwi n D. : 161-64, 194-200, 368,

374-75, 378-79, 382-83

Pearl Harbor conference: 7- 8

Pemienta: 18 8

Peñaranda River: 216

Pepke, Lt. Col. Do n R.: 107n

Peralta, Col. Marcari o L.: 586, 601-02

Perez, Pfc. Manual , Jr.: 274 n

Pescadores Islands: 36, 58

Philippine Army, organization of: 651

Philippine Bas e Section: 134 . See also Arm y Servic e

Command.

Philippine Civil Affairs Units: 40-41

Philippine General Hospital: 285-90

Philippine Government, restoration of: 19, 40, 651-

52

Philippine operations . See also by geographical

name.

planning for: 3-69 , 383-86, 658

results of: 651-58

Photography, aerial: 62-63 , 118-19 . See also Ai r

operations, reconnaissance.

Pilar: 332 , 334

Pililla: 369-7 0

Pimple, The: 505-0 6

Pinamola: 644-4 5

Pingkian: 560, 562-64, 467, 571-72
INDEX 749

Pitican: 488-9 0

Plaridel: 212-13, 216-17, 233-34

POL products : 41 , 133, 234, 288-89, 298, 305-06,

353-56

POL shortages, Japanese: 91

Polis Pass: 559, 574

Police Harbor: 620-21, 625

Port Companie s

244th: 12 3

276th: 562 n

294th: 12 3

Port Sual: 32, 76-79, 115-17, 133-34

Portable Surgical Hospital, 24th: 261-62

Ports. See Logistics, port development.

Potpot: 112-1 4

Poulton Hill : 53 1

Pozorrubio: 32 , 111-12, 140, 143, 147-51, 155-57,

459-60, 468

President Polk, USS: 56n Prince of Wales, HMS: 3 7

Prisoners of war, Japanese Bataan: 33 0

Bicol Peninsula : 443-4 5

Central Plains: 189, 207-08

Clark Field: 168, 186

Corregidor: 34 6

Luzon: 57 9

Manila: 300-302, 306

Mindanao: 635, 642, 647

northern Luzon: 569, 579

Philippines: 651-52

southern Luzon : 421-22

Southern Philippines: 597, 599

Visayan Islands: 602, 607-08, 617-19

Visayan Passages: 445

Provisor Island : 250-51 , 258-65, 274-75, 280, 282, 284

Provost Marsha l General, USAFFE: 300

Proximity fuze : 6 1

PT boats : 45-46 , 133, 340, 348, 352-53, 355, 427,

436, 587, 646

Public utilities , securing of: 250-51, 258-65, 404

Puerto Princesa: 589-91

Pugo: 468-74

Pugo Valley : 15 4

Pulangi River: 626, 637-40, 643, 645

Pulupandan: 606 n

Puncan: 456, 463, 512-16, 520

Pura: 16 8

Putlan: 515-2 2

Putlan Rive r an d Valley: 515 , 522, 524, 539-40

Quartermaster Company, 6th: 12 3

Question Mar k Hills: 150-51

Quibuyen, Capt. Domingo D.: 566n

Quingua River: 213-14

Rabon: 8 6

Radio communications: 10 7

Radio intercepts: 464

Ragay Gulf: 444-45

Railhead Company , 558th: 12 3

Railroad constructio n an d repair : 130-3 1

Railway system s

Bicol Peninsula : 439

Luzon: 9 1

southern Luzon : 42 4

Ramsay Ravine : 336, 339-41, 344

Ramsey, Maj. Edwin P.: 420

Ranger Battalion , 6th: 29, 54-57, 87, 561-62

Rayambugan Far m School : 55 9

Real: 42 8

Recoilless rifl e tests : 42 1

Reconnaissance, aerial. See Air operations, recon- naissance.

Reconnaissance, ground. See also Ai r operations ,

reconnaissance.

Baguio: 468 , 472-77, 479-81, 485-90

Bataan: 320, 327, 330n, 333-34

Bicol Peninsula : 442-4 5

Central Plains : 150-53 , 156, 160-61, 167, 188-89,

197, 201-02, 207-08

Clark Field : 168-70, 181-82, 185, 203

Lingayen Gulf : 78-85, 105, 108-09, 114-15, 117

Manila: 213-14, 216, 218, 255-56, 263-65, 268-69,

274, 280, 300

Manila Bay : 352, 354, 356

Mindanao: 625 , 628, 640, 643, 646

Mindoro: 5 1

Nasugbu-Tagaytay Ridge: 226, 229

northern Luzon : 458-63, 513, 518, 528-29, 533-37,

566-67, 571-73, 576-77

southern Luzon : 368 , 371-73, 375n, 377, 386-88, 391-94 

Southern Philippines: 589-91, 597

Villa Verd e Trail: 491-92, 497-98, 505-06, 509

Visayan Islands : 602-04 , 613, 617-18

Visayan Passages . 437-3 8

Reconnaissance, ground, Japanese

Central Plains: 145, 148-49, 188-90

Lingayen Gulf: 81-83, 104, 107, 110-11

Mindanao: 62 3

northern Luzon : 459-61 , 514-15, 518, 526, 529,

540, 540n, 548

southern Luzon : 369, 373-74, 389-90, 405-06

Southern Philippines : 59 3

Villa Verde Trail: 494, 497, 518

Visayan Islands: 607, 614

Reconnaissance Squadron , Provisional: 215-1 6

Reconnaissance Troop s

6th: 114-15 , 164-65, 188, 201, 392-94

21st: 61 8

24th: 313, 332-33, 625, 627-28, 646

25th: 188-89

33d: 479-80
750 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Reconnaissance Troops—Continued

37th: 79, 168, 182, 211-12, 258-59

40th: 77, 115-17, 169, 182 , 602, 61 8

302d: 215-16

Redeployment of troop s fro m ETO : 12-13, 604, 608

Rees, Col. James E.: 382-83

Reese, Pfc. Joh n N., Jr.: 260 n

Rehabilitation: 652-5 3

Repulse, HMS: 3 7

Richardson, Lt. Gen. Robert C.: 1 0

Ridges A to H: 481-85

Ridings, Brig. Gen. Eugene W.: 608n, 612

Riggs, Rear Adm. Ralph S.: 589

Rio Chico de la Pampanga: 17 1

Ritchie, Col. William L.: 10 n

River-crossing operations , Pasig : 258-60 , 264-65 ,

269, 292-300

Rizal: 181 , 190, 192, 196-99, 201-02, 462-63, 491-92,

512-13

Road constructio n an d repai r

Bicol Peninsula: 444-45

Lingayen Gulf: 41, 109-10, 129

Route 5: 516-17, 519-20, 522, 526-27

southern Luzon : 402-03, 405-06, 412

Southern Philippines: 596

Road constructio n an d repair, Japanese

Luzon: 98 , 558-60, 562-63, 564-66, 567, 569, 571-

72

Mindanao: 645 n

Road system s

Baguio: 468-72, 481-82

Bicol Peninsula : 439, 441-42

Central Plains: 155-5 7

Clark Field: 18 0

Lingayen Gulf: 104 , 107-08

Luzon: 91, 541

Mindanao: 620-23, 627, 639-40, 645

northern Luzon : 450 , 455-56, 460-61, 464-65, 512-13 , 517, 541-44

southern Luzon : 372-73 , 405, 424, 427-28, 434

Southern Philippines: 59 6

Villa Verde Trail: 493, 497, 51 7

Roadblocks

Central Plains: 152-53, 197, 200, 207-08

Lingayen Gulf : 81-82

Mindanao: 623, 637, 639

northern Luzon : 547-48, 554

southern Luzon: 391-92

Southern Philippines: 595-96

Villa Verde Trail: 494, 503, 506-07

Visayan Islands: 602

Roadblocks, Japanese

Manila: 252-53

Nasugbu-Tagaytay Ridge: 230

Route 5: 519-20

Rockets, use of: 352-53

Rockets, use of, Japanese: 248, 372-73, 633, 653-54

Rodriguez, Tech. Sgt. Cleto: 260n

Romblon Island: 438

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 7-8

Rosaldo: 462-63, 512-13

Resales: 160-61, 164, 188

Rosario: 32 , 104-05, 108-09, 139-40, 144, 148, 152-

54, 453-54, 459, 568-71, 517 . See also Damortis . Ross, Lt. Col. Tom H. : 21 6

Route I , Luzon : 23 , 31, 245, 265-67, 427-28, 434,

439, 442-45

Route 1, Mindanao: 620-21, 623-29, 633, 636

Route 1-D, Mindanao: 630-35, 639, 644

Route 2: 543-44

Route 3 , Luzon : 82-83 , 98-100, 102-03 , 108-17 ,

140-44, 147-49 , 152-56 , 160-61 , 164, 167-82,

186-87, 203, 206, 211-14, 218, 233-34, 272, 310 , 453-54, 459-00, 463, 468-77, 481, 543-48, 556,

561-62

Route 3, Mindanao. See Sayre Highway.

Route 3-11 junction : 104-05 , 109-11, 114, 139-40,

143, 146, 147-50, 154-55, 165-06, 211

Route 4 : 97, 453-54, 464-67, 477, 541-54, 558-76

Route 5: 97-102, 144-45, 169, 180-81, 187-94, 197-

202, 212-16, 233-34, 368, 450-56, 460-05, 477-

78, 491-95, 500-501, 508-44, 558-06, 568-70

Route 6: 543-47

Route 7: 115, 181-82, 212, 310-32

Route 8: 97-102, 153, 164, 181, 188-97, 462-63,

512-13

Route 9: 99-100, 453-54, 469-88

Route 11 : 97-98, 155, 165, 450-54, 459-00, 464-89,

517, 538-39 , 541-44, 558-59, 561-62, 566-67, 569, 572-74

Route 13: 77-78, 115, 117, 167-68

Route 17: 222, 224-31, 234, 424-25

Route 19 : 427, 430

Route 21: 372, 381-82, 415-16, 428, 432 , 434

Route 23: 43 4

Route 25: 230-31, 424

Route 52: 218-20, 405-08, 412-15

Route 57: 268n, 269

Route 59: 24 5

Route 60-A:. 372-73, 377, 381-82, 385-86

Route 64: 218-19, 405

Route 65: 216-17

Route 65-B: 405

Route 96: 97-98

Route 99: 192-05, 197

Route 100 : 456, 460, 462-63, 491-92, 512-16

Route 164: 441-44

Route 277: 460-01

Route 389: 565, 574-76

Route 390: 567, 574-76

Route 393: 542-43, 547-48, 555, 573-74

Route 417: 427, 429

Route 455: 410-18

Royal, Rear Adm. Forrest B.: 592-93

Royal Australian Air Force: 35, 45, 48-49, 599
INDEX 751

Royal Australian Army: 30

Royal Australian Navy : 32-33, 61, 65-66

Royal Netherlands Navy: 32-33

Rudolph, Tech. Sgt. Donald E.: 199n

Ryukyu Islands: 36, 58, 440

Sabang: 216-18, 233

Sabangan: 453 , 541-42, 544-46, 548, 554, 559, 569,

571, 573-74

Sablan: 476-79, 481, 485-86

Sabotage: 43 9

Sackton, Col. Fran k J.: 477 n

Sacobia Ridge: 205-06

Sacobia River. See Bamban River.

Saji, Comdr. Shinji, IJN: 622 n Salacsac Pass: 494-98, 559

Salacsac Pas s No . 1: 497, 502, 504-09, 515, 517-18,

532, 536, 538

Salacsac Pass No. 2: 497-503, 515

Salat: 479

Salomague Harbor: 545-46

Samal Island: 63 2

Samar: 363, 423, 435-37, 485, 486, 591-92

San Agustin : 444-45

San Antonio, Zambales: 310-13, 330-31

San Bernardino Strait: 362-63, 435-43

San Carlos: 129n , 130

San Fabian Attac k Force: 33

San Fabian : 67-69 , 74, 80, 82, 87, 104, 110, 130,

133-34

San Felipe-Bactad line: 15 7

San Felipe-Cuyapo line: 180-8 1

San Fernando , La Union : 57 , 67-69, 98-100, 363,

541, 543-45 , 548-49, 556

San Fernando , Pampanga: 181-82 , 212, 259, 453,

457-60, 466-67, 474-77, 488-89

San Fernando River: 212

San Isidro: 192 , 197, 200-201

San Jacinto: 82, 111

San Jose, Corregidor: 336

San Jose , Luzon: 97-104 , 144-46, 157, 165-66, 168,

180-81, 188-202 , 211-13, 331 , 450, 454-58, 461- 63, 472 , 491 , 510, 512-14 , 534-35 , 538-39 , 543-44

San Jose, Mindoro: 44, 48-49

San Jose Point: 341

San Juan del Monte Subdivision: 243, 245, 256-58

San Juan Reservoir: 250, 256

San Juan River: 256

San Leon: 99-100

San Manuel : 100-103 , 112, 144-46, 155-60, 165-66, 460-61

San Marcelino airstrip: 310-14, 329-30

San Mateo, Luzon: 373-74, 378

San Mateo, Zamboanga: 593

San Miguel : 16 8

San Nicolas: 144-45, 157

San Nicolas District: 255

San Pablo: 433-34

San Pabl o Church: 280-81, 283

San Quintin : 460-61

San Roque, Luzon: 195-9 6

San Roque, Zamboanga: 593-95

Sanga Sang a Island: 597-600

Sanitation facilities. See Public utilities, securing of.

Sansapor: 54-56, 585, 620

Santa Ana District: 240, 264-65

Santa Barbara: 129 n

Santa Cru z Bridge: 255

Santa Cruz District: 255

Santa Escolastic a College: 277

Santa Fe : 454-56, 460-61, 464-65, 491-96, 500-501, 503 

44, 558, 560-63

Santa Fe River: 535-3 6

Santa Iñez : 391-92, 420-21

Santa Maria, Bulacan: 217-18

Santa Maria, Pangasinan: 460-61, 491, 493-94

Santa Mari a River: 216-19

Santa Mari a Valley: 416-21, 435

Santa Rita: 326-37

Santa Rit a River: 326, 329

Santa River: 322, 325

Santa Rosa : 489-90

Santa Teresit a College: 280, 282-83

Santiago Island: 67-68

Santiago: 56 3

Santo Tomas: 427-28, 430-32

Santo Tomas University: 221n, 233, 251-54

Sapit: 460, 468, 470-72, 491

Sarangani Bay: 646-48

Saruwatari, Col. Atsutaka : 573n

Sato, Maj. Gen . Bunzo : 99n, 479, 481-82, 486

Sawmill River and Valley : 535-36

Sayre Highway: 621, 623-27, 629-30, 636-43, 646

SBD's: 132-33, 235, 268, 273-74, 293-94, 436-37, 476

Scar, The: 52 7

Scattered Trees Ridge: 205-06

Seaplane base development: 115-17, 133

Searchlight employment: 42 1

Service Company, 4188th: 12 3

Sherman, Rear Adm. Forrest P.: 16 n

Services of Supply, SWPA: 38-42, 55, 134-35

Shigaki, Capt. Kenkiche, IJN: 609 n

Shigemi, Maj. Gen. Isao: 100n, 156-58

Shimbu Group: 361-445

Ship-to-shore operations. See Amphibious operations.

Shipping, See Logistics; Logistics, Japanese.

Shizuru, Lt. Col. Rinzo: 627n

Shockley, Pfc. William R.: 501n Shomo, Maj. William A.: 57n

Shore parties . See Amphibiou s operations , shore

parties. Shortages. See Logistics, shortages; Logistics , Japanese, shortages.
752 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Shropshire, HMAS: 61

Sibert, Lt. Gen. Franklin C. : 620-21, 627, 629-30,

638-40, 644-45

Sibuko Bay: 59 7

Sibuyan Island: 438

Sibuyan Sea: 362-63 , 438

Sicily: 3 0

Sierra Madre : 189 , 367-68, 371-72, 377, 388, 391-

92, 415, 418-20, 424-25, 434, 450, 455-56, 566, 569 , 571-73

Signal Battalion, 58th: 562n

Silae: 642-44

Simara Island: 438

Siniloan: 416-17

Siocon Bay: 597

Sison: 102-03, 110-12, 148-49

Sjogren, Staff Sgt . John C.: 607 n

Skelton, Col. Winfre d G. : 325-27

Skerry, Col. Harr y A.: 232n

Smoke, tactical use of: 292, 295-96, 303-04, 570-71

Snake Hill North: 204-05

Snake Hill West: 205-06

Snipers, Japanese: 247

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Breho n B.: 6, 10

Sorsogon: 443

Sorsogon Peninsula : 439-45

South Chin a Sea : 36-37, 313, 362-63, 450, 453, 543,

583-84, 591

South Force, Bataan: 331-34

South Pacifi c Area : 1 0

South Port Area, Manila: 280, 290-94, 297-98, 301-

02, 307

Southeast Asia : 584

Southeast Asia Command: 584

Southern Luzon: 367-445. See also Bicol Peninsula;

Visayan Passages.

Southern Philippines: 18, 30, 52, 583-648

Southwest Pacifi c Area : 651-54. See also General

Headquarters, SWPA.

Special Security Force, 37th Division: 259

Spence, Brig. Gen. William: 331-32

Staging areas. See Logistics, staging areas.

Stanley, USS: 4 6

Stark, Brig. Gen. Alexande r N.: 407

Steele, Tech. Sgt. Robert C.: 230-31

Stillwell, Col. Rober t L.: 319

Stilwell, Gen. Josep h W.: 13-14

Storm Kin g Mountain: 202-04

Strategic ai r support . See Air operations, strategic

support. Strategic plans

China: 3-4, 16-17

Formosa: 4-8, 11-17, 21, 658

Japan, invasion of: 3-4, 651-54

Netherlands East Indies: 18 , 651

Okinawa: 10, 13, 15, 440, 656

Pacific theater: 3-4, 7

Philippines: 3-69, 361-66, 658

Strategic plans—Continued

Southern Philippines: 18, 364, 583-84

Strategic plans, Japanese: 88-89

Street fighting : 230 , 252, 255-56, 258, 266, 271-307

Strength, troop units. See Troop unit strength.

Struble, Rear Adm. Arthur D.: 46, 312-13, 332, 601

Sturgis, Lt. Gen. Samuel : 135n

Suarez, Col. Alejandro : 598-99

Subic Bay: 133 , 310, 313-14, 331, 441

Submarines, Japanese: 60

Sugarloaf Hill : 379, 385-87, 388

Sugimoto, Rear Adm. Ushie : 96, 174-75

Sugita, Col. Kazutsugu : 88n

Suguwara, Maj. Hisaishi: 415n

Suicide attacks: 224, 242, 347-48. See also Kamikaz e

attacks.

Sulipan Canal: 232-33

Sulu Archipelago: 584, 586-87, 589, 597-600

Sulu Sea: 362-63

Sulvec: 543, 545-47

Supply operations . See Air operations , supply by ;

Logistics, supply operations; Logistics, Japanese, suppl 

Surigao Strait: 46, 57, 362-63

Sutherland, Lt. Gen. Richard K.: 22-25, 230n

Sutton, Lt. (jg ) James P., USNR: 219-20

Suyo: 548

Suzuki, Lt. Col. Kiyoshi: 605n

Suzuki, Lt. Gen. Sosaku : 89, 586-88, 609, 622

Swick, Capt. Herbert: 553

Swift, Lt. Gen. Innis P.

and Baguio: 471-77, 486, 489 and Central Plains: 140, 146, 163-64, 193

and Clark Field: 16 9

and Lingayen Gulf: 86, 105, 111, 114-15

and northern apex: 553

and northern Luzon: 568n, 569

and Rout e 5: 515-16, 531-32, 534-36

and Villa Verde Trail: 492, 500

Swing, Maj. Gen . Josep h M.: 221, 229, 268, 352n, 430

Tabang: 233-34

Tabio: 566n

Tablas Island: 438

Taconda: 183-8 4

Tactical ai r support . See Ai r operations, tactical

support, carrier-based, and land-based .

Tactical plan s

Baguio: 469, 472-77, 479-80, 490, 541

Bataan: 309-14, 320, 322, 325-28, 331-32

Bicol Peninsula: 363, 423, 429-30, 434, 439-41

Central Plains: 130-43, 148, 158-59, 161, 187-93,

196-200

Clark Field : 141-44 , 159-61, 168-69, 175, 177-78,

180-85, 203

Corregidor: 300-10, 335-41, 345-46, 347

Lingayen Gulf: 20-35, 73

Luzon: 26-38, 300-10, 361-66
INDEX 753

Tactical plans—Continue d

Manila 258-5991-97: 140-43 ,, 303 265-66 , 361-6, 170 , 268-69 6 , 187, 211-1372, 273-77 , 217,, 249-51 282-83,,

Manila Bay: 309-13, 330-31, 334, 353-56, 362

Mindanao: 18, 584-85, 620-23, 627, 629, 632, 636-

37, 638-40, 646

Nasugbu-Tagaytay Ridge: 221-23, 229

northern Luzon : 449-53 , 512-13, 515-22, 525, 528-33 , 535-36, 538-39, 541, 546-49, 55

Samar: 363, 423

southern Luzon : 361-68, 373-77, 379, 382, 384-85, 391-94 , 402-08, 412-13, 416, 421 , 423-26, 429-

30, 432-34

Southern Philippines: 583-86

Villa Verde Trail: 491-92, 497-500, 507-08, 532

Visayan Islands: 604-05, 608, 614-16

Tactical plans, Japanese

Baguio: 483

Bataan: 311-12, 332

Bicol Peninsula: 369-70, 441-42

Central Plains: 94-96, 99, 143-46, 190-93

Clark Field : 96 , 118, 132, 142-43, 172, 174-75, 202-0 3

Corregidor: 335, 337-40, 346-47

Leyte: 88-90

Lingayen Gulf : 94

Luzon: 89-90, 92, 94-103, 142, 311, 577-79

Manila: 96-97, 240-49, 271-75

Mindanao: 587 , 622-23, 628-30, 634, 637 , 640-41, 642-4 3

northern Luzon: 453-57, 539, 558, 563-68, 577-78

Philippines: 654

southern Luzon : 368-71 , 373, 379-80, 384-85, 398-90 , 408, 426-28, 434

Southern Philippines: 586-88

Villa Verde Trail: 494-95, 502, 505 , 50 8

Visayan Islands: 602, 605, 609-10, 612-13

Tagaytay Ridge: 266, 424, 426-28

Tagig: 267, 367-68, 372

Tagumising River: 156-5 7

Takahashi, Col. Masaichi : 99n

Takaya, Maj. Saburo : 173-7 4

Takatsu, Maj. Gen . Teshimitsu : 476n

Takayama, Lt. Col. Koshin: 173-7 4

Talavera: 187-89

Talavera River: 197-98, 512

Talipapa: 218-2 0

Talisay: 610-13

Talomo: 627, 630, 635, 639 , 644

Talomo River: 630-32, 633-34

Tamogan River: 639-40, 644

Tanaka, Maj. Misusuke : 558n

Tanauan: 427-28, 430-32

Tanauan-Manila road. See Route 1, Luzon.

Tank Battalions

44th: 162 , 215-16, 251, 256-57

Tank Battalions—Continue d

716th: 112 , 148, 157-60, 614

754th: 183 , 205, 258-59, 282-83, 296

775th: 87, 562-63

Tank Company, 603d: 342

Tank Destroye r Battalions

637th: 184 , 258-59, 295-96

640th: 205

Tank destroyer operations. See Antitank operations.

Tank operations

losses: 114 , 159-60, 162-64, 184, 256-57, 342, 483,

562-63

support by

Baguio: 481, 483

Central Plains: 148-49, 157-59, 161, 190, 195

Clark Field: 178 , 183-85, 202-06

Lingayen Gulf: 11 2

Manila: 220-21, 251-52, 256-59, 263-64, 275, 279-80 

Manila Bay area: 351-52

northern Luzon: 522-23, 525-28, 563, 569

southern Luzon: 402-03, 430, 432

Southern Philippines: 596, 614

Tank operations, Japanese

losses: 113-14, 156-57, 150-60, 164, 184 , 188, 199-

201, 483, 569

strength: 158 , 173-74

support: 112-14 , 156-57, 159-61, 169, 180, 184,

193-95, 200, 560-61

Tarlac: 143 , 167-69

Task Forces, Army. See also Flying columns.

Baldy Force: 394-96, 404-05

Connolly: 562, 565, 570-71

Gypsy: 570-71

Palawan Force . See Infantry Divisions, 41st.

Rock Force: 340-4 9

Sarangani Bay: 64 7

Western Visayan: 44-45, 48, 51-53, 59-60, 435-36

Task forces, naval. See Naval units, Task Forces.

Tawitawi Island : 597-9 9

Tayabas Bay: 221, 423-25, 427, 432-34, 439, 444-45

Tayabas Plains: 433-34

Taytay: 372, 376

Tayug: 100-102, 144-45, 460-61

Tebbo: 489-90

Templeman, Harold: 350n

Tenmyo, Maj. Tokichi : 597n

Terau, Col. Setomu: 545n

Terauchi, Field Marsha l Count Hisaichi: 89

Ternate: 309-10, 351-52, 356-57, 426-27, 423-30

Terrain

Baguio: 468-71, 481-82, 487, 517

Bataan: 310, 315, 317, 319, 329

Bicol Peninsula: 439-40

Central Plains: 31, 145, 148, 155-56, 158, 161, 193,

517

Clark Field : 171-78, 182-83
754 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Terrain—Continued

Corregidor: 336-38, 345

Lingayen Gulf: 31, 74, 78, 80-81, 83, 104-05, 656

Luzon: 18-19, 94, 362

Manila and approache s to: 211-12, 259

Mindanao: 63 0

Mindoro: 4 4

Nasugbu-Tagaytay Ridge: 226

northern Luzon : 450-53 , 460-61 , 463, 517-18, 541-44 , 550, 566n, 577

Route 5: 512-13, 516-18, 526-27, 538

southern Luzon : 369 , 371-74, 376, 392, 405-06, 423-2 5

Southern Philippines: 596

Villa Verd e Trail : 492-98 , 502, 510, 517-18, 538, 543-44

Thomas, Pfc. William H.: 207n

Thrall Hill: 18 5

Tiaong: 433-34

Ticao Island: 437

Toccucan: 567-68, 573-74

Tominaga, Lt. Gen. Kyoji : 92-93, 96

Tomochika, Maj. Gen . Yoshiharu: 88n , 587, 609n,

622, 644-45

Tondo District: 238-40, 254-55, 258

Top o f the World: 185-86, 202-04

Topside, Corregidor: 336-48

Totsuka, Lt. Col. Ryoichi: 602

Transportation operations. See also Trucks.

divisional: 9 1

expedients in: 655

Lingayen Gulf : 130-3 1

northern apex : 54 9

Philippines: 656-5 7

shortages: 231

traffic management: 233-34

Transportation shortages, Japanese

Luzon: 90-92

Mindanao: 622-23, 637

Southern Philippines: 588-89

Trinidad: 482-86, 488

Troop unit strengt h

Bataan: 312 , 320-21

Bicol Peninsula : 443

Central Plains: 141, 147-48

Corregidor: 33 7

Lingayen Gulf : 104-0 5

Luzon: 29, 364, 601

Manila: 264, 275-77, 289-90

Mindoro: 45-46

northern Luzon : 449 , 465-67, 532, 549, 553-57, 570-7 3

Philippines: 651, 653, 658

southern Luzon : 376 , 387-89, 394, 396-97, 426-27, 42 8

Southern Philippines: 586, 589

Villa Verde Trail: 499, 501-04, 507, 532n

Visayan Islands: 601-02, 604-65, 608, 616

Troop unit strength—Continue d

Visayan Passages: 36 5

Troop unit strength, Japanese

Baguio: 479, 485, 488

Bataan: 311-12, 314-15, 332

Bicol Peninsula: 440-41, 444

Central Plains : 141 , 147-48, 158, 161, 192, 196, 207-0 

Clark Field: 172-74, 176, 202-03, 206

Corregidor: 335, 337, 339, 347

Formosa: 1 2

Lingayen Gulf: 27-28, 104-06, 110-11

Luzon: 27-28, 92-97, 141, 579, 651

Manila: 92-93, 241-42, 244-45, 259, 261, 274, 300, 302-0 

Manila Bay : 351 , 353, 355

Mindanao: 621-23, 628, 636-37, 646

Mindoro: 4 4

Nasugbu-Tagaytay Ridge : 22 3

northern Luzon : 518 , 525, 533, 538, 545, 554-55, 560-01 

Philippines: 630

southern Luzon : 365, 368-71, 385, 398, 403, 407-

08, 415-16, 418-19, 421-22, 425-26, 429

Southern Philippines: 587-89, 591, 598

Villa Verde Trail: 494-95, 505, 538

Visayan Islands: 602, 605, 608-10, 616-19

Truck Company, Provisional, 6th Division: 12 3

Trucks. See also Transportation operations.

shortages: 121-22, 126-27, 130-31

waterproofing: 118-1 9

Tsuchiya, Maj. Gen. Sakae: 454n

Tsuda, Col. Tsukada : 99

Tsuda, Lt. Gen. Yoshitake: 441n

Tsukada, Maj. Gen . Rikichi: 96 , 172-75, 177, 184,

186, 202-04, 206-07, 312

Tsutsumi, Lt. Col. Norio: 224n

Tuba Trail: 469-75, 477-81, 486-88

Tubliao: 567-08, 571-72, 576-77

Tugbok: 633-34

Tuguegarao: 454, 464-67, 566, 569

Tuliahan River: 219-20, 233

Tumaga River and Valley : 593-95

Tunnel defenses, Japanese. See Defenses, Japanese,

cave and tunnel.

Twin Peaks: 471-75

Ula: 634-3 5

Umezu, General Yoshiharu: 88n

Umingan: 145 , 188-97, 462-63

Underwater demolitions: 67, 592-93

Unified command . See Command and control.

Unit of fire, defined: 39 n

United State s Arm y Force s i n th e Philippine s

(Northern Luzon) : 67n , 449-90, 541-82. See

also Guerrilla units; Volckmann, Col. Russel l W.

University of the Philippines: 285-90, 307

Unryu (IJN) : 49 n
INDEX 755

Urbiztondo: 79, 117, 167

Urdaneta: 100 , 110-12, 114-15, 140, 156-57, 160-61,

164-65, 460-61

Utsunomiya, Maj. Gen. Naokata: 476n, 480-88, 486

Valdez: 460-61, 463, 498-99, 505-06, 508-09, 517

Vanderpool, Maj, John D.: 273-74

Verde Island: 362-63, 437

Verde Island Passage: 424, 437-38

Viale, 2d Lt, Robert M.: 255n

Victoria: 143 , 160, 164-65, 167-69, 187-88

Vigan: 57 , 309-10 , 312-13 , 453, 457-58, 543-48,

561-62

Villa Verd e Trail: 100-02, 144-46, 157, 454-56, 460-

65, 491-512, 515-18, 532, 535-39, 543-44, 559-61

Villasis: 114-15, 117, 160-62, 164-65, 233

Villegas, Staff Sgt . Ysmael R.: 499 n

Visayan Islands: 601-19

Visayan Passages: 21-23, 25, 66, 362, 365, 423-45

Volkmann, Col. Russell W.: 67n, 90n, 465, 466, 476n,

478n, 540-57, 571n

Wainwright, Lt. Gen. Jonathan M.: 26-27

Wada, Col. Satoshi: 609n, 616

Wallace Field: 280

Walled City. See Intramuros.

Waloe: 643-44

Walter, Lt. Col. Cecil E.: 643n

Walton, Capt. Do n H.: 21 6

Wangan: 634-35

Wart, The: 527-2 9

Wasatch, USS: 56-57

Water shortage: 107-0 8

Water supply facilitie s

Manila: 250-51, 256-58, 361, 367, 404

Visayan Islands: 608, 614

Waterproofing: 118-1 9

Wawa: 117, 129

Wawa Dam : 367-71, 374-75, 378-84, 388-89, 391-

404, 420-21, 423

Weapons. See by type.

Weapons evaluation: 653-54

Weather, effect o f

Baguio: 480-81, 487, 490

Central Philippines: 151

Corregidor: 338-39, 343-44

Lingayen Gulf : 25 , 58, 60, 64-65, 73-74, 107-68, 124 , 127-28

Mindanao: 643, 645

Mindoro: 44, 47-48, 50

northern Luzon : 530 , 532-33, 544, 551, 566, 571, 573-74 , 576-77

southern Luzon: 405

Southern Philippines: 584

Villa Verde Trail: 497, 502-04

Visayan Islands: 607

West, Capt. George: 261

Western islands, securing: 437-39

Western Visaya n Tas k Force : 44-45, 48, 51-53, 59-

60, 435-36

Wheeler Point: 34 7

White, Col. Horton V.: 141-42

White phosphorus, use of

Corregidor: 346

Manila: 287, 295-96, 298

Manila Ba y area: 354

Route 5: 522

southern Luzon : 407

Wilkinson, Rear Adm. Theodore S.: 34

Willoughby, Maj. Gen. Charles A.: 26-28, 63, 93-94,

141-42

Wilson, Lt. Col. David J.: 317n , 318n

Wilson, Lt. Comdr. Sam J., USN: 592n

Wing, Maj. Gen . Leonar d F. : 84, 105-11, 139-40, 147-50 

Withdrawals, tactical

Bataan: 318, 323-25, 328-39

Bicol Peninsula: 442-43

Central Plains: 149-51, 196

Clark Field: 180n, 183

Lingayen: 10 8

Manila: 252-53, 282-83, 285, 287, 300, 303-04

Mindanao: 630-32

northern apex: 548, 551

southern Luzon: 378, 387

Southern Philippines: 595-96, 599

Villa Verde Trail: 499-501, 509

Visayan Islands: 602, 613-14

Withdrawals, tactical, Japanese

Baguio: 472, 475-79, 484-87, 532, 540, 548

Bicol Peninsula : 371, 416

Central Plains: 139-40, 153, 159-60, 165, 196, 199-201 

Clark Field: 168-69, 182, 184-85, 204

Leyte: 89, 586-87

Lingayen Gulf: 85, 112-14

Manila: 240-46 , 257-58, 260, 271-74, 279-80, 306-0 

Manila Bay: 351-52, 356-57

Mindanao: 621-30, 634-35, 637, 640-46

Nasugbu-Tagaytay Ridge: 226-27

northern Luzon : 449-50, 459-60, 463, 465, 514-15, 522-23 

southern Luzon : 368, 379-82, 385-86, 388-89, 391-

92, 401-63, 411-12, 414-19, 428-31, 434-35

Southern Philippines: 593, 596-99

Villa Verde Trail: 494, 509, 560

Visayan Islands: 602-05, 607-68, 612-13, 615-18

Wolfe Field : 593

Wolfhound Ridge : 532, 534-36

Woodford, Staff Sgt . Howard E.: 566n

Woodpecker Ridge: 392, 396, 399-403

Woodruff, Maj. Gen. Roscoe B.: 437n, 626, 634-35

Woody Hill: 527-28
756 TRIUMPH I N TH E PHILIPPINE S

Wurtsmith, Brig. Gen. Pau l B.: 586

Yagyagan: 481-82, 485

Yamashita, Gen. Tomoyuk i

and Baguio : 478-80

and Bataan: 311-12

and Central Plains: 139, 143-46, 165-66, 190-93, 19 9

and Leyte : 586-87

and Lingayen : 11 2

and Luzon: 88-103, 311, 335, 577-79

and Manila : 240-42, 272

and Manil a Bay : 31 1

and Mindanao : 622

and northern apex: 541, 546, 555-5 7

and northern Luzon: 449-50, 453-54, 456-57, 464-

67, 558-61, 573-69, 572, 577-78 and Philippines: 654

and Route 5: 533, 533-36, 538, 540

and Southern Philippines: 586-87

Yamamoto, Comdr. Shigeichi: 241n

Yamazu, Col. Hyobunosuke , 622n

Yanagimoto, Capt.: 173-74

Yay, Colonel. See Panililio, Yay

Yokoyama, Lt. Gen . Shizuo : 93-97 , 240n, 241-45, 271-73 

Yon, Col . Everet t M.: 195n

Yubo Ridge: 550-53

Zambales Mountains : 96 , 171, 181-82, 187, 202-03,

207, 31 0

Zambales Province: 310-11, 314-15

Zamboanga: 584-97, 599-600, 621, 623 , 627 , 629

Zamboanga City: 592-97

Zamboanga Peninsula: 620

Zapote: 230-31

Zapote River: 230-31

ZigZag Pass: 315-32

U.S. GOVERNMEN T PRINTING OFFICE: 1993 333-16 1