COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Frank, Clements and Senior Judge Coleman 

GWENDOLYN SALES 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

v. Record No. 0250-03-4 PER CURIAM 

 JULY 22, 2003 

ALEXANDRIA DEPARTMENT OF 

 SOCIAL SERVICES 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 

Donald M. Haddock, Judge 

 (Gwena Kay Tibbits; Law Offices of Gwena Kay 

Tibbits, on brief), for appellant. 

 (Mary Elliott; Office of the City Attorney, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 

 (Dorathea J. Peters; Peters & Mullins, on 

brief), Guardian ad litem for the children. 

 Gwendolyn Sales (mother) appeals the decision of the trial 

court terminating her residual parental rights in four of her 

children, Malik, William, Cristal and Moisha (collectively, "the 

children"). On appeal, mother contends the trial court erred by 

finding (1) she, without good cause, had been unwilling or unable 

to remedy substantially the conditions which led to the foster 

care placement of the children; and (2) the termination of her 

residual parental rights was in the best interests of the 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
children. The Alexandria Department of Social Services (ADSS) 

raises one issue on appeal: whether it was appropriate for the 

trial court to consider evidence as of the date of the trial 

rather than evaluating the facts as of the date of the foster care 

review hearing in the juvenile and domestic relations district 

court (JDR court). Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the 

parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. 

See Rule 5A:27. 

BACKGROUND 

 On appeal, we view the evidence and all the reasonable 

inferences in the light most favorable to appellee as the party 

prevailing below. See McGuire v. McGuire, 10 Va. App. 248, 250, 

391 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1990). 

 In her opening brief, mother admits that she is a chronic 

drug abuser. The record indicates mother has a twenty-year 

history of drug abuse. In December 1999, ADSS became involved 

with the family after one of the children was born addicted to 

illegal substances. ADSS implemented services to assist mother 

with the goal of teaching her effective parental skills. ADSS 

also coordinated mother's enrollment in an outpatient drug 

treatment program. However, in April 2000, mother dropped out of 

the program and disappeared for months. ADSS and the guardian ad

litem (GAL) for the children requested a show cause because mother 

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was not cooperating with ADSS and she was not involved in 

substance abuse treatment. In November 2000, mother vowed to 

cooperate and to reenter substance abuse treatment. 

 For about six months, mother complied with ADSS intensive 

services, and in February 2001 she was admitted into a drug 

clinic. Mother complied with the treatment until she had a 

relapse in May 2001. After May 2001, mother had sporadic contact 

with ADSS and she was discharged from the drug clinic due to 

testing positive for drug use, missing meetings, and 

non-compliance with the rules. 

 In August 2001, ADSS filed a petition alleging that the 

children were abused and/or neglected. The petition also 

requested that the JDR court order the removal of the children 

from mother's care and the placement of the children into foster 

care. ADSS made the requests based on mother's lack of 

cooperation with substance abuse treatment, her "drug environment 

lifestyle," her frequent absences from home, her provision of 

inadequate caretakers for the children, and her lack of 

cooperation with ADSS. In addition, some of the children had 

untreated medical and dental conditions. Several of the children 

were not enrolled in school, and one child was developmentally 

delayed. 

 In September 2001, the JDR court ordered the removal of the 

children from the home, finding that all of the children were 

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abused and neglected. The court also ordered mother to either 

enter a residential drug treatment program or go to jail. Mother 

entered a three-month residential drug treatment facility in 

September 2001. While there, she maintained contact with her 

children, but she did not participate in her children's therapy 

sessions. After completing the three-month program, the 

recommended treatment plan was for mother to enter a women's 

recovery facility. However, mother returned home. 

 On May 23, 2002, ADSS presented the JDR court permanency 

plans for the children with the goal of return to parent on the 

conditions that mother remain sober and initiate parental skills 

training. Mother maintained that she had been drug-free from 

September 7, 2001 until May 23, 2002. The JDR court set the 

matter for a full hearing and requested evidence that mother was 

maintaining consistent sobriety. After May 23, 2002, mother 

missed five substance abuse therapy sessions, she missed several 

drug screening tests, and she missed two court hearings. 

 Thereafter, in July 2002, ADSS changed the goal from return 

to parent to adoption, stating that it did not appear that mother 

would be able to reach a state of recovery and parental ability to 

meet her children's needs. A risk assessment completed prior to 

mother's most recent relapse indicated the children were at "high 

risk," meaning that it was "not likely that timely permanency 

and/or child well-being will be achieved." ADSS and numerous 

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drug-related services had worked intensively with mother for two 

and one-half years on her sobriety issues. ADSS also found that 

mother was "in denial" about the special needs of her children and 

the fact that her constant drug use had affected her children and 

resulted in their neglect. 

 On October 17, 2002, the JDR court approved the foster care 

plans with goal of adoption and terminated mother's parental 

rights to the four children. After the October 2002 termination 

hearing, ADSS informed mother that she could arrange for 

visitation with the children, but she never made the arrangements. 

On December 23, 2002, mother entered a social detoxification 

program, which consisted of daily group therapy meetings. Mother 

also appealed the decision of the JDR court to the circuit court. 

 At the time of the January 3, 2003 hearing in the trial 

court, mother had been "clean" for about thirty days. Tracy 

Underhill, a therapist and substance abuse worker for the City of 

Alexandria, testified that mother was in the early recovery stage 

of rehabilitation and would probably need several more years of 

substance abuse treatment. The GAL for the children joined ADSS 

in asking for the termination of mother's parental rights. The 

GAL stated that mother does not recognize that her addiction, 

lifestyle, and lack of parenting have caused problems with each of 

the children. The GAL also noted that although mother has had 

periods of sobriety, she has relapsed into drug use again. The 

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GAL opined that the termination of mother's parental rights would 

be in the best interests of the children. The GAL stated that 

mother "has a long way to go toward . . . learning what she needs 

to parent a child" and the GAL saw "no hope of it being done right 

now in the future." 

 The trial court terminated mother's parental rights pursuant 

to Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C). The trial court found that mother 

had primarily been making efforts to deal only with her addiction 

problems and "without great success." Yet, mother had "virtually 

no focus on improving the parenting skills." The trial court 

found that mother "is just not capable of taking care of those 

children, and albeit the addiction may be the root cause of that, 

her efforts to cure the addiction have been unsuccessful and her 

efforts to increase substantially her parenting skills have been 

non-existent." 

ANALYSIS 

Termination

 "Code § 16.1-283 embodies 'the statutory scheme for the 

termination of residual parental rights in this Commonwealth.'" 

Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 311, 456 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995) 

(citation omitted). Subsection (C)(2), one of the subsections 

under which the trial court terminated mother's parental rights in 

this case, requires proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that 

(1) the termination is in the best interests of the child, (2) 

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"reasonable and appropriate" services have been offered to help 

the parent "substantially remedy the conditions which led to or 

required continuation of the child's foster care placement," and 

(3) despite those services, the parent has failed, "without good 

cause," to remedy those conditions. Clear and convincing evidence 

is "'that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the 

mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the 

allegations sought to be established.'" Martin v. Pittsylvania

County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 21, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 

(1986) (citation omitted). 

 Mother contends she made substantial progress to remedy the 

conditions which led to the foster care placement of the children 

and the trial court's finding that she had been unwilling or 

unable to remedy substantially the conditions which led to their 

foster care placement was plainly wrong and without evidence to 

support it. However, the evidence, viewed in the light most 

favorable to ADSS, established that ADSS made "reasonable and 

appropriate efforts" to help mother remedy the conditions which 

both "led to" and "required continuation of" the children's foster 

care placement. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Nonetheless, mother 

failed to make reasonable progress toward eliminating the 

conditions which led to the placement. 

 Mother has been a chronic drug abuser for over twenty years. 

For more than two years, ADSS and other services made repeated 

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efforts to assist mother in substance abuse rehabilitation and to 

assist the children with counseling and other lifestyle matters. 

However, mother continued to have relapses and she cooperated with 

the service agencies only sporadically. Mother also lied about 

her continuing violent relationship with a man despite a 

protective order prohibiting contact between the children and the 

man. The evidence showed that this man had encouraged one of 

mother's children to steal. 

 Mother's drug use and chosen lifestyle greatly affected the 

lives of her children. In addition, because she has failed to 

remedy her addiction problems, mother has not addressed issues 

relating to her parenting skills and she has not sufficiently 

attended to the children's needs, such as enrolling them in 

school, providing adequate supervision, and providing appropriate 

medical treatment. Although a parent's limitations are factors 

for the court to consider, they do not necessarily constitute good 

cause for failing to remedy the conditions leading to foster care 

placement. See Lecky, 20 Va. App. at 312, 456 S.E.2d at 541. 

 Furthermore, "[i]t is clearly not in the best interests of a 

child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, 

or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his 

responsibilities." Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep't of Soc. 

Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990) (citation 

omitted). 

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 In determining what is in the best 

interests of the child, a court must 

evaluate and consider many factors, 

including the age and physical and mental 

condition of the child or children; the age 

and physical and mental condition of the 

parents; the relationship existing between 

each parent and each child; the needs of the 

child or children; the role which each 

parent has played, and will play in the 

future, in the upbringing and care of the 

child or children; and such other factors as 

are necessary in determining the best 

interests of the child or children. 

Barkey v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 662, 668, 347 S.E.2d 188, 191 

(1986). 

 All four of the children have significant needs, including 

physical, emotional, academic and medical necessities. Two of 

the children have been placed in therapeutic foster homes 

because of their extensive special needs. Mother has not 

provided a stable environment for the children, and she has been 

unable to address her lack of parenting skills because of her 

addiction. "The trial court's judgment, 'when based on evidence 

heard ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly 

wrong or without evidence to support it.'" Logan v. Fairfax 

County Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 

460, 463 (1991) (citation omitted). The record supports the 

trial court's finding that ADSS presented clear and convincing 

evidence satisfying the statutory requirements of Code 

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§ 16.1-283 and establishing that termination of mother's 

parental rights is in the children's best interests. 

Consideration of Evidence

 The trial court properly considered evidence of the 

family's circumstances between the time of the May 2002 hearing 

in JDR court and the date of the trial. An appeal from the 

juvenile court must be heard de novo by the circuit court. Code 

§ 16.1-136. "'A de novo hearing means a trial anew, with the 

burden of proof remaining upon the party with whom it rested in 

the juvenile court.'" Parish v. Spaulding, 20 Va. App. 130, 

132, 455 S.E.2d 728, 729 (1995) (citation omitted). "[A]t a 

trial de novo in the circuit court, the parties are not 

restricted to the evidence presented before the juvenile court. 

The circuit court must consider all relevant evidence, even if 

such evidence had not been considered by the juvenile court." 

Fairfax County Dep't of Family Servs. v. D.N., 29 Va. App. 400, 

406, 512 S.E.2d 830, 832 (1999). "A trial court is required to 

consider any relevant evidence developed prior to the hearing 

date that may impact on the child's best interests." Parish, 20 

Va. App. at 132-33, 455 S.E.2d at 729. 

 Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial 

court. 

 Affirmed.

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