NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEVEN KNOX, known individually as a 

Matrix System Offender, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

KATE BROWN, for the State of Oregon; et 

al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-35119 

D.C. No. 6:16-cv-01750-KI 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Garr M. King, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 15, 2017**

Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

Oregon state prisoner Steven Knox appeals pro se from the district court’s 

judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising from 

the denial of parole. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

NOV 17 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-35119 

novo. ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758 

(9th Cir. 2014) (abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)); Beets v. 

County of Los Angeles, 669 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under Heck 

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 478 (1994)). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed without prejudice Claims One and 

Three challenging defendants’ deferral of Knox’s parole release date because 

success on these claims would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of Knox’s 

confinement or its duration, and Knox failed to allege that his conviction or 

sentence has been invalidated. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 80-82 (2005) 

(a prisoner’s § 1983 claim is barred if success “would necessarily demonstrate the 

invalidity of confinement or its duration[,]” unless “the conviction or sentence has 

already been invalidated” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Contrary to Knox’s contentions, Claims One and Three did not allege procedural 

challenges that would “not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release.” Id. at 

81.

The district court properly dismissed without prejudice Claim Two under the 

Younger abstention doctrine because the district court was required to abstain from 

interfering with Knox’s pending state court appeal, as all of the requirements for 

abstention were met, and no exception to abstention applied. See ReadyLink 

Healthcare, Inc., 754 F.3d at 758-59 (setting forth requirements for Younger
3 17-35119 

abstention in civil cases); Baffert v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 617, 621

(9th Cir. 2003) (explaining exceptions to Younger and concluding that claimed 

constitutional violation “does not, by itself, constitute an exception to the 

application of Younger abstention”). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Knox’s motion for 

reconsideration because Knox failed to state any grounds warranting relief. See 

Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th 

Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 59(e)).

In light of this disposition, we do not consider the merits of Knox’s claims, 

and do not reach the question of whether denial of Knox’s motions for a 

preliminary injunction was proper. See Santa Monica Nativity Scenes Comm. v. 

City of Santa Monica, 784 F.3d 1286, 1291 n.1 (9th Cir. 2015).

Knox’s requests for judicial notice regarding defense counsel’s action in 

state court proceedings, set forth in his reply brief and in Docket Entry No. 32, are 

denied. 

Knox’s request for an order barring defendants’ appearance at oral argument 

(Docket Entry No. 35) is denied as unnecessary. 

AFFIRMED.