DA 22-0216

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2023 MT 12N

MATTHEW PEAVLER,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

 v.

ROCKY MOUNTAIN SUPPLY, INC.,

 Defendant and Appellee.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,

In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DV-21-1290B

Honorable Rienne H. McElyea, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Nicholas LeTang, Passamani & LeTang, PLLC, Helena, Montana

For Appellee:

Daniela E. Pavuk, Pavuk Law, PLLC, Billings, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: October 19, 2022

 Decided: January 24, 2023

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

01/24/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0216
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Justice James Jeremiah Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating 

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion, shall not be cited and does not serve 

as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s 

quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports. 

¶2 Matthew Peavler appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his action against his 

former employer, Rocky Mountain Supply, Inc. (RMS), alleging that RMS violated the 

Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA), Title 39, chapter 2, MCA. 

¶3 Peavler’s Complaint alleged the following. RMS employed both Peavler and his 

wife, Jessica. Peavler worked in an RMS store behind the gun counter. Jessica worked in 

RMS’s corporate office. In June of 2020, Jessica took maternity leave; before taking 

maternity leave, Jessica and Brad Gjermo, RMS’s CEO, had a disagreement. In August of 

2020, while Jessica was still on maternity leave, Gjermo called Jessica into the office and 

terminated her. 

¶4 Before Jessica’s termination, RMS allowed Peavler to work without a mask that was 

otherwise required of employees pursuant to COVID-19 protocols. Although Peavler had 

not provided RMS with a written medical exemption, he represented that he could provide 

one. Shortly after Jessica’s termination, RMS advised Peavler that he could no longer work 

without a mask until he produced a medical exemption. Peavler produced a medical note 

in a sealed envelope, but RMS refused to open it. RMS then terminated Peavler for the 

stated reason of job abandonment. 
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¶5 In his Complaint, Peavler alleged that RMS violated the WDEA when it “terminated 

[him] without cause for ‘job abandonment.’”

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 Peavler alleged that RMS allowed other 

employees to work without a mask when they produced medical notes, and Peavler’s 

medical note was the only one that RMS refused to consider. Peavler also alleged that the 

reason RMS gave for terminating him was pretextual and that his termination was due to 

Jessica’s dispute with RMS.

¶6 RMS moved the District Court to dismiss Peavler’s Complaint, arguing that Peavler 

failed to state a claim for wrongful discharge under the WDEA because his allegations 

concerned marital discrimination. The District Court granted RMS’s motion and dismissed 

Peavler’s Complaint pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The District Court concluded that, 

because all of Peavler’s factual allegations related to Jessica, his “[c]omplaint for wrongful 

discharge from employment under the WDEA, is premised entirely on underlying 

allegations of marital discrimination . . . .” 

¶7 “We review de novo an order granting a motion to dismiss under M. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6).” Barthel v. Barretts Minerals Inc., 2021 MT 232, ¶ 9, 405 Mont. 345, 496 P.3d 

541 (internal citation omitted). We take all well-pled factual assertions as true and construe

the complaint “in the light most favorable to the claimant, drawing all reasonable

inferences in favor of the claim.” Anderson v. ReconTrust Co., 2017 MT 313, ¶ 8, 390 

Mont. 12, 407 P.3d 692 (internal citations omitted). Under the notice pleading 

requirements of M. R. Civ. P. 8(a), a “complaint must set forth a short and plain statement 

1 Peavler also filed a complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau (HRB) alleging unlawful 

discrimination. Peavler’s HRB complaint is not the subject of this appeal.
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of a cognizable legal claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Anderson, ¶ 8 

(citing M. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). “An asserted claim is facially deficient only if it either fails to

state a cognizable legal theory for relief[] or states an otherwise cognizable legal claim but

fails to state sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle the claimant to relief thereunder.” 

Babcock v. Casey’s Mgmt., LLC, 2021 MT 215, ¶ 25, 405 Mont. 237, 494 P.3d 322 (citing

Anderson, ¶ 8). 

¶8 As pled, Peavler’s Complaint is inartful. As it pertains to the claims that rely on his 

marital relationship with Jessica, the District Court correctly held that they are not 

cognizable under the WDEA. Independent of his marital relationship, however, Peavler’s 

Complaint includes a cognizable claim under the WDEA that, if true, would entitle Peavler 

to relief under the WDEA. Relevant only to his WDEA claim, Peavler alleged in his 

Complaint:

1. RMS ordered that Peavler could not work until he produced a doctor’s 

note that exempted him from wearing a mask.

2. Peavler produced a doctor’s note in a mailed envelope, but RMS refused 

to open it.

3. After refusing to acknowledge his doctor’s note, RMS terminated Peavler 

without cause for “job abandonment.”

¶9 “A discharge may be wrongful if it was without good cause.” Barthel, ¶ 12 (citing 

§ 39-2-904(1)(b), MCA). Under Montana law, good cause for a discharge is “any 

reasonable job-related grounds for an employee’s dismissal based on[]” one of four 

enumerated reasons. Section 39-2-903(5), MCA. To prove that a discharge was without 

good cause, the employee must show either that the employer’s given reason for the 
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discharge is not good cause under Montana law “or that the given reason is a pretext and 

not the honest reason for the discharge.” Becker v. Rosebud Operating Servs., 2008 MT 

285, ¶ 24, 345 Mont. 368, 191 P.3d 435 (internal quotation and citations omitted).

¶10 An employee may not bring a wrongful discharge claim under the WDEA for 

marital discrimination. See Vettel-Becker v. Deaconess Med. Ctr. of Billings, Inc., 2008 

MT 51, ¶ 30, 341 Mont. 435, 177 P.3d 1034 (citing §§ 39-2-902, -912, MCA). However, 

“there can be facts supporting a claim for discrimination and other facts supporting a claim 

for wrongful discharge arising from the same case.” Vettel-Becker, ¶ 40. A party may seek 

relief from a district court under the WDEA “as long as that claim is not premised upon 

underlying allegations of discrimination.” Vettel-Becker, ¶ 40; Saucier v. McDonald’s 

Rests. of Mont., Inc., 2008 MT 63, ¶ 75, 342 Mont. 29, 179 P.3d 481. A claim is not 

premised upon underlying allegations of discrimination when it does not rest or depend 

upon establishing discrimination. Vettel-Becker, ¶ 39. 

¶11 RMS contends it had good cause to terminate Peavler because he abandoned his job. 

Peavler disputes that contention. Whether or not Peavler did, in fact, abandon his job and 

whether or not RMS did, in fact, have good cause to terminate him are, by definition, 

factual determinations that are not susceptible to a motion to dismiss. Under our notice 

pleading standard, Peavler’s Complaint alleged a cognizable claim under the WDEA. As 

noted above, to the extent that Peavler’s claims depend upon his marital relationship with 

Jessica, the District Court correctly held that they are not cognizable under the WDEA and 

Peavler may not assert those claims within the context of his WDEA suit. But construed 

in a light most favorable to Peavler, his Complaint includes factual assertions that support 
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a wrongful discharge claim independent of the extraneous factual assertions related to his 

marital relationship.

¶12 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our 

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal presents 

no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent 

or modify existing precedent. We conclude that the District Court erred in granting RMS’s 

Motion to Dismiss. We reverse and remand.

/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA

We Concur: 

/s/ MIKE McGRATH

/S/ LAURIE McKINNON

/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
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Justice Beth Baker, dissenting.

¶13 Peavler’s Complaint pleaded one claim for wrongful discharge and one claim for 

punitive damages. Peavler concluded the factual allegations of the Complaint by alleging 

that the stated reason for his termination was “pretextual” and that his termination “is a 

direct result of Jessica Peavler’s attempt to enforce public policy, i.e., Governor Bullock’s 

COVID mandates.” On that basis, he alleged that he was terminated without cause. 

Peavler’s claim for punitive damages again alleged that he “was terminated in direct 

retaliation to [sic] Jessica Peavler’s refusal to violate public policy when CEO Brad Gjermo 

ignored Governor Bullock’s mandate on quarantining after leaving the State of Montana.” 

The Complaint plainly alleged that “the honest reason for the discharge,” rather than the 

“pretextual” job-abandonment reason given, was “premised upon underlying allegations of 

[marital-status] discrimination.” Vettel-Becker, ¶¶ 40, 43. The punitive damage claim

reinforced the discrimination-rooted nature of Peavler’s Complaint.

¶14 As pleaded, Peavler failed to state a WDEA claim independent of his claim of 

discrimination. After RMS moved to dismiss, Peavler did not move for leave to file an 

amended complaint to allege a stand-alone wrongful discharge claim without the 

discrimination allegations, even though he acknowledged that discrimination-based claims 

were improper; he argued instead that his allegations “[did] not preclude alternative 

explanations to why Plaintiff was terminated—only that his termination was without cause

and could be a ‘direct result’ of Mrs. Peavler’s decision to uphold public policy.” 

(Emphasis in original.) At the same time, he resisted RMS’s alternative motion to strike 

from the Complaint the allegations related to Jessica Peavler’s Human Rights Complaint, 
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stating that the “Defendant has failed to state how Plaintiff’s allegations amount to 

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter under Rule 12(f).” (Emphasis in 

original.) Nor did Peavler agree to the Defendant’s request to at least dismiss the punitive 

damages claim that alleged only retaliation for his wife’s refusal to violate public policy.

¶15 The Court’s decision will allow Peavler a do-over to correct the defects in his 

pleading, despite Peavler’s deliberate choice not to narrow his WDEA claim to bring it 

within the reach of the statute. I dissent from that conclusion and would affirm the District 

Court’s order of dismissal.

/S/ BETH BAKER