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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ROBERT C. BOLUS, SR., : Civ. No. 3:23-CV-1378

 : 

Plaintiff, : 

 : 

v. : 

 : (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

 : 

BRIAN BOLUS, et al., : 

 : 

Defendants. : 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This case calls to mind Tolstoy’s observation that: “All happy families are 

alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”1

 The plaintiff, Robert C. 

Bolus, Sr., is a prodigious but prodigiously unsuccessful litigant, who has in the past 

had a number of cases dismissed either voluntarily or by court order for lack of merit 

or failure to prosecute.2

1 Anna Karenina, L. Tolstoy at 1 (1877). 

2 See e.g. Bolus v. D.A. of Lackawanna, et al, 3:01-cv-01990; Bolus Truck Parts and 

Towing Services, Inc. et al v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. et al 3:11-cv-00621; 

Bolus v. DeNaples, 3:13-cv-01773; Bolus v. Wolf, 3:18-cv-02027; Bolus v. Dillard 

et al, 3:20-cv-00318; Bolus v. Gaughan et al., 3:21-cv-01315.

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In the instant case, Bolus appears to be suing his son, daughter-in-law, and 

grandchild, alleging that they have breached some sort of contract relating to a piece 

of real estate and tortiously interfered with another contract that the plaintiff had with 

a third party to sell some real estate. (Doc. 14). While the nature of these claims 

remains stubbornly obscure despite the plaintiff filing an amended complaint in an 

effort to clarify his claims, it appears that the gist of Robert Bolus, Sr.’s tortious 

interference with contract claim rests on the notion that his son, Brian, falsely claimed 

to have a one half interest in this property. (Doc. 14, ¶¶ 10-24). However, as Robert 

C. Bolus, Sr., concedes in his amended complaint, this issue has been litigated in state 

court and the state courts concluded that Brian Bolus was, in fact, the owner of a half 

interest in this property. Therefore, at bottom, Robert C. Bolus, Sr.’s, latest foray into 

federal court would necessarily invite us to set aside these state court findings in order 

to sustain at least some of his claims. 

On October 18, 2024, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in 

this case and an accompanying brief. (Docs. 30-32). Robert C. Bolus, Sr. never 

responded to this motion. Therefore, on November 20, 2024, we entered an order 

which instructed the plaintiff in clear and precise terms as follows:

IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff is directed to respond to the motion 

on or before December 2, 2024. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.7 the movants 

may then file a reply brief on or before December 16, 2024. All briefs 

must conform to the requirements prescribed by Local Rule 7.8. No 

further extensions shall be granted, absent compelling circumstances. 

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The plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, is advised that Local Rule 7.6 

of the Rules of this Court imposes an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to 

respond to motions, and provides that: 

Any party opposing any motion, other than a motion for 

summary judgment, shall file a brief in opposition within 

fourteen (14) days after service of the movant's brief, or, if 

a brief in support of the motion is not required under these 

rules, within seven (7) days after service of the motion. Any 

party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not 

to oppose such motion. Nothing in this rule shall be 

construed to limit the authority of the court to grant any 

motion before expiration of the prescribed period for filing 

a brief in opposition. A brief in opposition to a motion for 

summary judgment and LR 56.1 responsive statement, 

together with any transcripts, affidavits or other relevant 

documentation, shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days 

after service of the movant’s brief. 

Local Rule 7.6 (emphasis added). 

It is now well-settled that “Local Rule 7.6 can be applied to grant a 

motion to dismiss without analysis of the complaint's sufficiency ‘if a 

party fails to comply with the [R]ule after a specific direction to comply 

from the court.’” Williams v. Lebanon Farms Disposal, Inc., No. 09-

1704, 2010 WL 3703808, *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2010) (quoting 

Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (1991)). Therefore, a 

failure to comply with this direction may result in the motions being 

deemed unopposed and granted. 

(Doc. 33).

Despite this explicit warning, Robert C. Bolus, Sr., has not responded to this 

summary judgment motion and the deadline for responding has now passed. 

Therefore, given the plaintiff’s continued inaction, this case will be deemed ripe for 

resolution. 

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For the reasons set forth below, the case will be dismissed.

II. Discussion

A. Under The Rules of This Court This Defense Motion Will Be 

Deemed Unopposed and Granted. 

At the outset, under the Local Rules of this Court the plaintiff should be 

deemed to concur in this motion, since the plaintiff has failed to timely oppose the 

motion or otherwise litigate this case. This procedural default completely frustrates 

and impedes efforts to resolve this matter in a timely and fair fashion, and under the 

rules of this Court warrants dismissal of the action, since Local Rule 7.6 of the Rules 

of this Court imposes an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to respond to motions and 

provides that:

Any party opposing any motion, other than a motion for summary 

judgment, shall file a brief in opposition within fourteen (14) days after 

service of the movant's brief, or, if a brief in support of the motion is not 

required under these rules, within seven (7) days after service of the 

motion. Any party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not 

to oppose such motion. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit 

the authority of the court to grant any motion before expiration of the 

prescribed period for filing a brief in opposition. A brief in opposition 

to a motion for summary judgment and LR 56.1 responsive statement, 

together with any transcripts, affidavits or other relevant documentation, 

shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days after service of the movant=s 

brief. 

Local Rule 7.6 (emphasis added).

It is now well settled that “Local Rule 7.6 can be applied to grant a motion to 

dismiss without analysis of the complaint's sufficiency ‘if a party fails to comply with 

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the [R]ule after a specific direction to comply from the court.’” Williams v. Lebanon 

Farms Disposal, Inc., No. 09-1704, 2010 WL 3703808, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 

2010) (quoting Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991)). In this 

case, the plaintiff has not complied with the local rules, or this Court’s order, by filing 

a timely response to this motion. Therefore, these procedural defaults by the plaintiff 

compel the court to consider:

[A] basic truth: we must remain mindful of the fact that Athe Federal 

Rules are meant to be applied in such a way as to promote justice. See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. Often that will mean that courts should strive to resolve 

cases on their merits whenever possible. However, justice also requires 

that the merits of a particular dispute be placed before the court in a 

timely fashion . . ..@ 

Lease v. Fishel, 712 F. Supp. 2d 359, 371 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (quoting McCurdy v. 

American Bd. Of Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir.1998)). 

With this basic truth in mind, we acknowledge a fundamental guiding tenet of 

our legal system. A failure on our part to enforce compliance with the rules, and 

impose the sanctions mandated by the rules when such rules are repeatedly breached, 

“would actually violate the dual mandate which guides this Court and motivates our 

system of justice: ‘that courts should strive to resolve cases on their merits whenever 

possible [but that] justice also requires that the merits of a particular dispute be placed 

before the court in a timely fashion.’” Id. Therefore, we are obliged to ensure that one 

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party=s refusal to comply with the rules does not lead to an unjustified prejudice to 

those parties who follow the rules.

These basic tenets of fairness apply here. In this case, the plaintiff has failed to 

comply with Local Rule 7.6 by filing a timely response to this summary judgment 

motion. This failure now compels us to apply the sanction called for under Rule 7.6 

and deem the motion to be unopposed. 

B. Dismissal of this Case Is Warranted Under Rule 41.

In addition, Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a 

court to dismiss a civil action for failure to prosecute, stating that: “If the plaintiff 

fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may 

move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Decisions 

regarding dismissal of actions for failure to prosecute rest in the sound discretion of 

the court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Emerson v. 

Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). That discretion, 

however, while broad is governed by certain factors, commonly referred to as Poulis

factors. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted:

To determine whether the District Court abused its discretion [in 

dismissing a case for failure to prosecute], we evaluate its balancing of 

the following factors: (1) the extent of the party’s personal 

responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure 

to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of 

dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was 

willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than 

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dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the 

meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Poulis v. State Farm Fire and 

Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir.1984).

Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190. 

In exercising this discretion, “there is no ‘magic formula’ that we apply to 

determine whether a District Court has abused its discretion in dismissing for failure 

to prosecute.” Lopez v. Cousins, 435 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2008)). Therefore, “[i]n balancing the Poulis

factors, [courts] do not [employ] a . . . ‘mechanical calculation’ to determine whether 

a District Court abused its discretion in dismissing a plaintiff’s case.” Briscoe, 538 

F.3d at 263 (quoting Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992)). 

Consistent with this view, it is well settled that “‘no single Poulis factor is 

dispositive,’ [and it is] clear that ‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in 

order to dismiss a complaint.’” Id. (quoting Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218,

222 (3d Cir. 2003); Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373). Moreover, recognizing the broad 

discretion conferred upon the district court in making judgments weighing these six 

factors, the Court of Appeals has frequently sustained such dismissal orders where 

there has been a pattern of dilatory conduct by a pro se litigant who is not amenable 

to any lesser sanction. See, e.g., Emerson, 296 F.3d 184; Tillio v. Mendelsohn, 256 

F. App’x 509 (3d Cir. 2007); Reshard v. Lankenau Hospital, 256 F. App’x 506 (3d 

Cir. 2007); Azubuko v. Bell National Organization, 243 F. App’x 728 (3d Cir. 2007).

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In this case, a dispassionate assessment of the Poulis factors weighs heavily in 

favor of dismissing this action. At the outset, a consideration of the first Poulis factor, 

the extent of the party’s personal responsibility, shows that the failure to respond to 

the Court’s prior order is entirely attributable to the plaintiff, who has failed to abide 

by court orders or address this outstanding summary judgment motion.

 Similarly, the second Poulis factor— the prejudice to the adversary caused by 

the failure to abide by court orders—also calls for dismissal of this action. Indeed, 

this factor is entitled to great weight and careful consideration. As the Third Circuit 

has observed:

“Evidence of prejudice to an adversary would bear substantial weight 

in support of a dismissal or default judgment.” Adams v. Trustees of 

N.J. Brewery Employees’ Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873-74 (3d 

Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, 

prejudice includes “the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable 

dimming of witnesses’ memories, or the excessive and possibly 

irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.” Id. at 

874 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). . . . However, 

prejudice is not limited to “irremediable” or “irreparable” harm. Id.; see 

also Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003); 

Curtis T. Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. Int’l Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 683, 

693-94 (3d Cir. 1988). It also includes “the burden imposed by 

impeding a party’s ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial 

strategy.” Ware, 322 F.3d at 222.

Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 259-60.

In this case, the plaintiff’s failure to litigate this claim, or to comply with court 

orders, now wholly frustrates and delays the resolution of this action. In such 

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instances, the defendant is plainly prejudiced by the plaintiff’s continuing inaction 

and dismissal of the case clearly rests in the discretion of the trial judge. Tillio, 256 

F. App’x 509 (failure to timely serve pleadings compels dismissal); Reshard, 256 F. 

App’x 506 (failure to comply with discovery compels dismissal); Azubuko, 243 F. 

App’x 728 (failure to file amended complaint prejudices defense and compels 

dismissal).

When one considers the third Poulis factor—the history of dilatoriness on the 

plaintiff’s part—it becomes clear that dismissal of this action is now appropriate. In 

this regard, it is clear that “‘[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes 

a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response . . . , or consistent tardiness 

in complying with court orders.’” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 260-61 (quoting Adams, 29 

F.3d at 874) (some citations omitted). Here, the plaintiff has failed to comply with 

court orders or address the core issues raised by the summary judgment motion, as 

he was ordered to do. Thus, the plaintiff’s conduct begins to display “[e]xtensive or 

repeated delay or delinquency [and conduct which] constitutes a history of 

dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response . . . , or consistent tardiness in complying 

with court orders.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874. 

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The fourth Poulis factor—whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was 

willful or in bad faith—also cuts against the plaintiff in this case. In this setting, we 

must assess whether this conduct reflects mere inadvertence or willful conduct, in 

that it involved “strategic,” “intentional or self-serving behavior,” and not mere 

negligence. Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. At this juncture, when the plaintiff has failed to 

comply with instructions of the Court or respond to this summary judgment motion, 

we are compelled to conclude that the plaintiff’s actions are not isolated, accidental, 

or inadvertent but instead reflect an ongoing disregard for this case and the Court’s 

instructions. 

While Poulis also enjoins us to consider a fifth factor, the effectiveness of 

sanctions other than dismissal, cases construing Poulis agree that in a situation such 

as this case, where we are confronted by a pro se litigant who will not comply with 

the rules or court orders, lesser sanctions may not be an effective alternative. See, 

e.g., Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262-63; Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191. This case presents such 

a situation where the plaintiff’s status as a pro se litigant severely limits the ability 

of the Court to utilize other lesser sanctions to ensure that this litigation progresses 

in an orderly fashion. In any event, by entering our prior orders and counseling the 

plaintiff on his obligations in this case, we have endeavored to use lesser sanctions, 

but to no avail. The plaintiff still ignores his responsibilities as a litigant. Since lesser 

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sanctions have been tried, and have failed, only the sanction of dismissal remains 

available to the Court.

As we consider these Poulis factors, this case presents one other significant 

exacerbating circumstance. This is not Robert Bolus’ first failure to prosecute a case 

which he has brought in federal court. Quite the contrary, as we have previously 

noted, Bolus has had other cases dismissed for failure to make service, failure to 

prosecute, or failure to file briefs. Simply put, given this past history, the plaintiff 

knows better but still persists in failing to fulfill his responsibilities in this case.

Finally, under Poulis, we are cautioned to consider one other factor, the 

meritoriousness of the plaintiff’s claims. In our view, however, consideration of this 

factor cannot save this particular plaintiff’s claims since the plaintiff is now wholly 

noncompliant with the Court’s instructions. The plaintiff cannot refuse to comply 

with court orders which are necessary to allow resolution of the merits of his claims, 

and then assert the untested merits of these claims as grounds for declining to dismiss 

the case. Furthermore, it is well settled that “‘no single Poulis factor is dispositive,’ 

[and it is] clear that ‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss 

a complaint.’” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (quoting Ware, 322 F.3d at 222; Mindek, 

964 F.2d at 1373). Therefore, the untested merits of the non-compliant plaintiff’s 

claims, standing alone, cannot prevent dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute.

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In any event, these claims, which Robert Bolus has chosen not to defend,

appear to fail on their merits, yet another factor which weighs in favor of dismissal 

of this case. For example, the amended complaint contains a claim of breach of 

contract which Robert C. Bolus, Sr. lodges against the defendants. However, the 

well-pleaded allegations in this amended complaint fail to describe any intelligible 

contractual relationship between the plaintiff and these other family members. (Doc. 

14, Count II). In particular, there seems to be absolutely no privity of contract 

between Robert C. Bolus, Sr. and his grandchild and daughter in law, who are named 

as defendants in this breach of contract claim. Therefore, as pleaded, this claim fails.

Moreover, the lynchpin of the plaintiff’s tortious interference with contract 

claim is Robert Bolus’ allegation that Brian Bolus falsely claimed a half interest in 

property the plaintiff was attempting to sell to a third party. However, as Robert 

Bolus concedes in his amended complaint, this issue has been litigated in state court 

and the state courts concluded that Brian Bolus was, in fact, the owner of a half 

interest in this property. Therefore, at bottom, Robert C. Bolus, Sr.’s, latest foray 

into federal court would necessarily invite us to set aside these state court findings 

in order to sustain at least some of his claims. 

This we cannot do. Thus, to the extent that the plaintiff asks this Court to 

overturn a state court judgment finding that Brian Bolus possessed a half interest in 

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some property, the United States Supreme Court has spoken to this issue and has 

announced a rule, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which compels federal district 

courts to decline invitations to conduct what amounts to appellate review of state 

trial court decisions. As described by the Third Circuit:

That doctrine takes its name from the two Supreme Court cases that 

gave rise to the doctrine. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 

S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). The 

doctrine is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1257 which states that “[f]inal 

judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a state in which 

a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court....”. 

See also Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 

(3d Cir. 2003). “Since Congress has never conferred a similar power of 

review on the United States District Courts, the Supreme Court has 

inferred that Congress did not intend to empower District Courts to 

review state court decisions.” Desi's Pizza, 321 F.3d at 419.

Gary v. Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 200 (3d Cir. 2008). Because federal 

district courts are not empowered by law to sit as reviewing courts, reexamining state 

court decisions, “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a federal district court of 

jurisdiction in some circumstances to review a state court adjudication.” Turner v.

Crawford Square Apartments III, LLP, 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006). Cases 

construing this jurisdictional limit on the power of federal courts have quite 

appropriately:

[E]mphasized the narrow scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 

holding that it “is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine 

acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of 

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injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district 

court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and 

rejection of those judgments.” [Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

Industries Corp.], 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. at 1521-22; see also Lance

v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, ––––, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 1201, 163 L.Ed.2d 1059 

(2006)

Id.

However, even within these narrowly drawn confines, it has been consistently 

recognized that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents federal judges from 

considering lawsuits “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused 

by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced 

and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Id. 

In this case, Robert C. Bolus, Sr.’s tort claim against Brian Bolus rests upon 

a premise that has been rejected by the state courts; namely, the plaintiff’s insistence 

that Brian Bolus falsely claimed to have an interest in the property the plaintiff was 

attempting to sell. Pursuit of this claim in federal court would require us to set aside 

the state court judgment that Brian Bolus owned a half interest in the property the 

plaintiff attempted to sell. This we cannot do. We cannot provide relief to Robert 

Bolus, a state-court loser who complains of injuries caused by state-court judgments 

rendered before these federal proceedings commenced. Therefore, we must decline 

this invitation to review and reject these state court judgments designating Brian 

Bolus as the owner of a half interest in this property.

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Simply put, all of the Poulis factors now favor dismissal of this case. 

Accordingly, this complaint will be dismissed. An appropriate order follows.

S/Martin C. Carlson 

 MARTIN C. CARLSON

 United States Magistrate Judge

 

DATED: December 6, 2024

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