IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAYMOND SKOLODA, :

 :

 Petitioner : 

 :

 v. : CIVIL NO. 4:14-CV-00883

 :

SUPERINTENDENT GLUNT, et al. : (Judge Brann) 

: 

 Respondents :

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner Raymond Skoloda has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a conviction and sentence imposed by 

the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1). In this 

petition, Skoloda puts forth two counts of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

Id. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied. 

I. Background

On September 13, 2007, Skoloda’s trial commenced for two counts of 

aggravated indecent assault, one count of indecent assault, and one count of 

corruption of minors. (Doc. 18, Ex. 1). The first witness called by the prosecution 

was E.M., the sixteen year old victim in the incident. Id. at 3-4. E.M. testified that 

she was best friends with Skoloda’s daughter, and on the evening of December 9, 

2006, she was sleeping over at Skoloda’s house. Id. at 5. That evening, E.M. went 

to sleep in the same bed as her friend. Id. at 6. At some point the next morning, 

Case 4:14-cv-00883-MWB-MA Document 19 Filed 03/02/15 Page 1 of 15
2

E.M. awoke to find Skoloda’s hand down her pants and fingers were inside her 

vagina. Id. at 7. Although she was scared, E.M. told Skoloda to get off of her, at 

which point Skoloda told her to “meet him in his bedroom in five minutes.” Id. 

E.M. testified that she was scared, and therefore did not run out of the house; 

instead, she waited until her friend awoke to tell her what had happened. Id. at 8. 

E.M. did not wake her friend right away to tell her because she was “afraid that she 

would stop being friends with me.” Id. After E.M. told her friend about the 

incident, the friend got her mother, Barbara Skoloda from downstairs. Id. at 9. 

E.M. then told Ms. Skoloda what had occurred. Id. E.M. waited to call her father 

because she was scared what he would do, but after she told her father, they went 

to police station. Id. at 9-10. 

E.M. had spent the night at Skoloda’s house several times previously, and 

testified that nothing appeared out of the ordinary on December 9, 2006. Id. at 11-

12. E.M. and her friend were sleeping fairly close to each other on a full size bed

which could fit two people, but could “[n]ot really” fit a third person. Id. at 14-15. 

E.M. was sleeping under the covers while wearing a t-shirt and sweatpants. Id. 

When she woke the next morning, Skoloda was “partially on top of [her] and 

alongside of [her] with his fingers in [her] privates[.]” Id. E.M. clarified 

Skoloda’s position by stating that he was “leaning on the bed” near her head with 

his hands under the covers, but he was not on the blankets. Id. at 16.

Case 4:14-cv-00883-MWB-MA Document 19 Filed 03/02/15 Page 2 of 15
3

When asked whether the bed shook when Skoloda got off the bed, E.M. 

stated that it did not really shake because Skoloda “wasn’t really all the way on it.” 

Id. at 17. Rather, Skoloda was kneeling on the floor. Id. E.M. testified that her 

friend did not wake up during this incident. Id. E.M. never went to the hospital as 

a result of this incident, nor did she ask Ms. Skoloda to call the police. Id. at 21. 

She waited approximately four or five hours to call her father because she was 

scared that he “would beat up” Skoloda. Id. at 22-23. 

After E.M. testified, Skoloda’s daughter Sammy testified. Id. at 25. Sammy 

stated that on December 9, 2006, E.M. was sleeping over at her house. Id. at 27. 

Sammy testified that the next morning, E.M. was upset and “a wreck[;]” she then 

proceeded to tell Sammy what had occurred earlier that morning. Id. at 28. 

Sammy went downstairs and told her mother what had happened, and her mother 

went upstairs to speak with E.M. Id. at 29. Sammy testified that during the events 

that morning, she did not wake up, and agreed with Skoloda’s counsel that she was 

“a pretty heavy sleeper[.]” Id. at 32. Sammy did not see any of the events that 

transpired. Id. 

Ms. Skoloda was then called to testify. Id. at 39. Ms. Skoloda stated that on 

December 9, 2006, E.M. was staying at her home. Id. at 40-41. At 5:30 in the 

morning on December 10, 2006, Ms. Skoloda was awoken by her husband forcing 

his penis into her mouth. Id. at 41. Thereafter, Ms. Skoloda got up and went 

Case 4:14-cv-00883-MWB-MA Document 19 Filed 03/02/15 Page 3 of 15
4

downstairs to sleep on her couch, where she remained until she was awakened at 

11:30 a.m. by her scared and pale-faced daughter telling her they needed to speak 

upstairs. Id. at 42. When Ms. Skoloda reached her daughter’s room, E.M. was 

crying on the bed, but tearfully explained what had occurred. Id. at 43. Ms. 

Skoloda told E.M. to call her father, but E.M. was hesitant because she did not 

want her father to hurt Skoloda. Id. 

On cross-examination, Ms. Skoloda acknowledged that she neither saw nor 

heard anything occur between E.M. and Skoloda that morning. Id. at 45. When 

she confronted Skoloda, he denied that anything had happened. Id. She argued 

with Skoloda about the incident, at which point he left the house and did not return 

for one month. Id. at 46. 

Finally, Harry Madara, E.M.’s father, was called to testify. Id. at 53. 

Around 11 a.m. on December 10, 2006, Mr. Madara received a phone call from his 

daughter. Id. at 55. E.M. was crying and asked to be picked up, but was evasive 

about what had occurred. Id. Mr. Madara asked to speak with Ms. Skoloda, who 

explained what had occurred; at that point, Mr. Madara went to pick up his 

daughter. Id. at 55-56. Mr. Madara then spoke on the phone with Skoloda, who 

denied remembering what had happened. Id. at 56. 

After the prosecution rested, Skoloda testified to the events that had 

occurred. Id. at 59. He stated that on the evening of December 9, 2006, he and his 

Case 4:14-cv-00883-MWB-MA Document 19 Filed 03/02/15 Page 4 of 15
5

wife were fighting, so she slept on the downstairs couch while he slept on the 

loveseat downstairs. Id. at 63. Skoloda testified that he first became aware that he 

was being accused of molesting E.M. when his wife woke him up in the morning 

“screaming in [his] face[.]” Id. at 65. Skoloda told his wife that he had not 

touched anyone because he was sleeping on the loveseat the entire time. Id. He

informed his wife and E.M. that if they believed he had touched E.M. 

inappropriately, they should call the police and E.M.’s father. Id. at 66. Skoloda 

stated that his wife and daughter screamed at him for three hours until he left, but 

never called the police. Id. at 67. 

After leaving his home, Skoloda checked himself into a hospital for fourteen 

days. Id. at 67-68. Skoloda stated that he visited his home every day during the 

next month, but was not aware that the police were looking for him until January 

30, 2007, when the police took him to the police station for questioning. Id. at 68. 

Skoloda further testified that he had contact with E.M. after the incident, and that 

she had spent the night at his house again after that. Id. at 70. He further asserted 

that during the phone conversation with Mr. Madara, he denied ever touching 

E.M., and insisted that Mr. Madara was lying about their conversation. Id. at 71. 

Skoloda testified that his daughter’s bed was small, but he did not know 

whether E.M. had slept in the bed that night because he never entered the room. 

Id. at 72. Skoloda reiterated that he never touched E.M. and never performed the 

Case 4:14-cv-00883-MWB-MA Document 19 Filed 03/02/15 Page 5 of 15
6

acts that E.M. accused him of. Id. at 73. Skoloda also insisted that his wife was 

lying; he had never slept in the bedroom with her, and had never attempted to force 

his penis into her mouth. Id. at 77. Skoloda theorized that E.M. made the story up 

“[p]robably to get me out of the house because they wanted me out of the house.” 

Id. Skoloda also insisted that his wife, his daughter, and E.M. were all lying about 

E.M. having no contact with him after the incident occurred. Id. at 78-79. 

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Skoloda guilty on all counts. 

Id. at 105. 

A. PCRA Hearing

On October 7, 2010, Skoloda’s Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) 

hearing was held. (Doc. 18, Att. 3). At that hearing, Skoloda testified that he had 

met with his trial attorney once before trial for approximately twenty minutes. Id.

at 15, 18. At that meeting, Skoloda’s attorney allegedly told him “it doesn’t matter 

if you’re innocent or you’re guilty. You’re going to jail anyway.” Id. at 15. 

Skoloda’s attorney purportedly never discussed trial strategy with him, and never 

discussed any of the other witnesses. Id. at 15, 19. Skoloda further testified that

his attorney told him at trial to “sit here and be quiet.” Id. at 20. 

Skoloda primarily believed his attorney did not do an effective job on crossexamination. Id. at 21. Specifically, Skoloda argued that, if acts such as those 

described by the victim had occurred, there would be no way that his daughter 

Case 4:14-cv-00883-MWB-MA Document 19 Filed 03/02/15 Page 6 of 15
7

would have continued sleeping and not be awakened by the noises or movements

that occurred. Id. Skoloda further believed that his attorney did not argue 

passionately in his closing argument, and his statement that Skoloda “has 

maintained his innocence” was subpar. Id. at 22-23. Skoloda did admit that his 

attorney had asked Skoloda’s daughter why she did not wake up during this 

incident, and the daughter stated that she was a heavy sleeper. Id. at 29-30. 

B. Procedural History

On December 30, 2010, the PCRA Court denied Skoloda’s petition. (Doc. 

14, Ex. 1). Thereafter, Skoloda filed an appeal with the Pennsylvania Superior 

Court, claiming that his counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct an adequate 

cross-examination and failing to perform adequately during closing arguments. Id. 

On April 23, 2013, the Superior Court denied Skoloda’s appeal, concluding that 

there was no merit to his arguments. Id. On November 12, 2013, the Supreme 

Court of Pennsylvania denied allowance of appeal. Com. v. Skoloda, 622 Pa. 758 

(2013). On May 8, 2014, Skoloda filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus before 

this Court. (Doc. 1). 

In accordance with United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 1999), and 

Mason v. Meyers, 208 F.3d 414 (3d Cir. 2000), this Court issued formal notice to 

Skoloda that he could either have the petition ruled on as filed but lose his ability 

to file a second or successive petition, or withdraw his petition and file one allCase 4:14-cv-00883-MWB-MA Document 19 Filed 03/02/15 Page 7 of 15
8

inclusive § 2254 petition within the one-year statutory period prescribed by the 

Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). (Doc. 5). On May 30, 

2013, Skoloda returned the notice of election, indicating that he wished to proceed 

with his petition for writ of habeas corpus as filed. (Doc. 6). On August 11, 2014, 

the Respondents filed a response. (Doc. 16). Skoloda filed a traverse on August 

28, 2014, rendering this matter ripe for disposition. (Doc. 16). 

II. Discussion

Under the AEDPA, “federal courts are to review a state court’s 

determinations on the merits only to ascertain whether the state court reached a 

decision that was ‘contrary to’ or involved an ‘unreasonable application’ of clearly 

established Supreme Court law, or if a decision was based on an ‘unreasonable 

determination’ of the facts in light of the evidence presented.” Fahy v. Horn, 516 

F.3d 169, 189 n. 20 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). Any factual 

determinations “made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct[,]” and the 

petitioner bears the “burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear 

and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

A state court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law 

“if the state court reaches a conclusion opposite to the Supreme Court's own 

conclusion on a question of law or decides the case differently where the Supreme 

Court was confronted by a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Harris v. 

Case 4:14-cv-00883-MWB-MA Document 19 Filed 03/02/15 Page 8 of 15
9

Ricci, 607 F.3d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting McMullen v. Tennis, 562 F.3d 231, 

236 (3d Cir. 2009)). 

“Similarly, a state court ruling is considered an ‘unreasonable application’ if 

the state court unreasonably applies the correct legal rule to the particular facts, 

unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context, or unreasonably refuses to 

extend the principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id. Under this 

standard, the state court decision must have been “‘objectively unreasonable,’ not 

merely wrong; ‘clear error’ will not suffice.” White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 

1702 (2014) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75–76 (2003)). In 

applying AEDPA's standards, a district court must review “the state courts’ last 

reasoned opinion” on the matter. Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 289 (3d Cir. 2008). 

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Skoloda asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in two ways. (Doc. 1). 

First, he contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to properly crossexamine Skoloda’s daughter. Id. Specifically, he argues that his counsel should 

have pressed her further on why, if indecent sexual contact was occurring in the 

same bed that she was sleeping in, she did not wake up. Id. Second, he argues that 

his counsel was ineffective for failing to bring up purported inconsistencies in the 

victim’s testimony during closing arguments. Id. 

Case 4:14-cv-00883-MWB-MA Document 19 Filed 03/02/15 Page 9 of 15
10

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an individual must satisfy a 

two-pronged test. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). First, the 

petitioner must show that his or her counsel’s “performance was deficient” by 

demonstrating that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” 

Id. There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance to the 

petitioner, and judicial scrutiny “of counsel’s performance must be highly 

deferential.” Id. at 689.

Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that “the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. “This requires showing that counsel’s errors 

were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 

reliable.” Id. The petitioner must establish that “there is a reasonable possibility 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.” Id. at 694. 

When an individual asserts ineffective assistance of counsel in a Section 

2254 habeas petition, “[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court’s 

application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable[, not whether] defense 

counsel’s performance fell below Strickland’s standard.” Harrington v. Richter, 

131 S.Ct. 770, 785 (2011). “A state court must be granted a deference and latitude 

that are not in operation when the case involves review under the Strickland 

Case 4:14-cv-00883-MWB-MA Document 19 Filed 03/02/15 Page 10 of 15
11

standard itself.” Id. Thus, a “state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit 

precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the 

correctness of the state court’s decision.” Id. at 786 (quoting Yarborough v. 

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

1. Contrary to Clearly Established Supreme Court Law

Here, the state court determination was not contrary to clearly established 

Supreme Court law. On appeal, the state court considered Skoloda’s claim under 

the correct Pennsylvania standard. See, doc. 14, ex. 1. Because Pennsylvania 

courts apply a substantially identical standard to that required under federal law, 

the court did not reach a conclusion opposite to the Supreme Court's conclusion on 

a question of law. See, Baker v. Patrick, 345 F.App’x 840, 842 (3d Cir. 2009). 

Furthermore, Skoloda identified only one United States Supreme Court case

in his brief: Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975). This case does not 

involve a set of facts that was materially indistinguishable from the facts of this 

case. In Herring, the trial court denied defense counsel any opportunity to present 

closing arguments to the jury. Id. at 856. In that case, the Supreme Court 

concluded that, by entirely denying the opportunity to present closing arguments, 

the court had denied the defendant “the assistance of counsel that the Constitution 

guarantees.” Id. at 864. In contrast, here Skoloda’s counsel did in fact present 

closing arguments. Because the facts presented in Herring were markedly different 

Case 4:14-cv-00883-MWB-MA Document 19 Filed 03/02/15 Page 11 of 15
12

from the facts of this case, Skoloda has not established that the state court 

decisions were contrary to firmly established Supreme Court precedent. 

2. Unreasonable Application of Supreme Court Precedent

Additionally, Skoloda has not argued that the state court misapplied relevant 

federal case law. See, docs. 1, 2, 16. Skoloda has, with the exception of Herring, 

cited exclusively to state court cases in his contention that he was denied effective 

assistance of counsel. Id. Even assuming that the state court wrongly applied state 

court cases to the facts at hand, such error does not rise to the level required to 

grant habeas relief. For a Federal court to grant habeas relief, the state court must 

have unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(1). Incorrect application of state law will not suffice. Reliance on state 

court cases is not sufficient to grant habeas relief, and a thorough reading of the 

state court decision provides no basis for an argument that firmly established 

Federal law was unreasonably applied in this instance.

3. Unreasonable Determination of the Facts

Finally, the state court did not reach an unreasonable determination in light 

of the evidence. In that respect, the Superior Court reached two conclusions. First, 

it concluded that Skoloda’s counsel was not ineffective in his cross-examination of 

Skoloda’s daughter because he did in fact ask her why she did not wake up during 

the incident. (Doc. 14, Ex.1). Furthermore, the daughter’s testimony “could not 

Case 4:14-cv-00883-MWB-MA Document 19 Filed 03/02/15 Page 12 of 15
13

have established the impossibility of the assault” as Skoloda claimed, and therefore 

counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to elicit such testimony. Id. 

Second, the Superior Court concluded that Skoloda’s counsel was not ineffective 

for failing to discuss allegedly inconsistent testimony in his closing arguments 

because no inconsistent testimony had been offered by the victim. Id. 

Both conclusions were supported by the evidence presented. As the 

Superior Court correctly noted, Skoloda’s counsel did cross-examine the daughter 

regarding whether she woke up during the assault; Skoloda’s daughter replied that 

she did not wake during the incident, and asserted that she was a “pretty heavy 

sleeper[.]” (Doc. 18, Ex. 1, p. 32). Thus, Skoloda’s counsel did effective crossexamine the daughter. Furthermore, the Superior Court properly noted that “the 

daughter could only testify about what she did or did nor observe” and could not 

“establish that the assault could not have happened without her being awakened[.]” 

(Doc. 14, Ex. 1). Given the factual support for these conclusions, it cannot be said 

the state court’s determination was unreasonable in light of the evidence presented.

Finally, the Superior Court concluded that Skoloda’s counsel was not 

ineffective for failing to point out inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony. In that 

vein, on direct examination E.M. testified that she was lying in bed, and Skoloda 

was “next to” her. (Doc. 18, Ex. 1, p. 15). E.M. later clarified that Skoloda was 

leaning against the bed, but was not on top of it. Id. at 16. On cross-examination, 

Case 4:14-cv-00883-MWB-MA Document 19 Filed 03/02/15 Page 13 of 15
14

E.M. again confirmed that Skoloda was not on the bed. Id. at 17. Thus, the 

Superior Court correctly concluded that no inconsistent testimony existed, and 

Skoloda’s counsel could not be ineffective for failing to discuss such testimony. 

Because “fairminded jurists” could at least disagree on the correctness of the state 

court’s decision, this Court must deny Skoloda’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786. 

B. Certificate of Appealability

Under the AEDPA, a court may not issue a certificate of appealability 

“unless ‘the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.’” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000) (quoting 28 

U.S.C. 2253(c)). Thus, the “petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists 

would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or 

wrong.” Id. at 484. Skoloda has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right and, as a result, a certificate of appealability will not be issued.

Case 4:14-cv-00883-MWB-MA Document 19 Filed 03/02/15 Page 14 of 15
15

IV. Conclusion

A review of the record reveals that the state court decision was not contrary 

to, and did not involve an unreasonable application of, firmly established Federal 

law. Furthermore, the state court determinations were not unreasonable in light of 

the evidence presented. Therefore, the petition for writ of habeas corpus will be 

denied. 

A separate Order will be issued.

 

BY THE COURT:

s/Matthew W. Brann 

Matthew W. Brann

United States District Judge 

Dated: March 2, 2015

Case 4:14-cv-00883-MWB-MA Document 19 Filed 03/02/15 Page 15 of 15