UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

Special Studies 

MANHATTAN: 

THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB 

by 

Vincenl C. Jones 

CENTER OF MILITA R Y HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WASHING TON, D.C, 1985 



Foreword

The U.S. Army played a key role in the formation and administration of the Manhattan Project, the World War II organization which

produced the atomic bombs that not only contributed decisively to

ending the war with Japan but also opened the way to a new atomic

age. This volume describes how the wartime Army, already faced with

the enormous responsibility of mobilizing, training, and deploying vast

forces to fight a formidable enemy on far-flung fronts in Europe and

the Pacific, responded to the additional task of organizing and administering what was to become the single largest technological project of its

kind undertaken up to that time.

To meet this challenge, the Army—drawing first upon the long-time

experience and considerable resources of its Corps of Engineers—

formed a new engineer organization, the Manhattan District, to take

over from the Office of Scientific Research and Development administration of a program earlier established by American and refugee scientists to exploit the military potentialities of atomic energy. Eventually,

however, the rapidly expanding project turned for support and services

to a much broader spectrum of the Army, including the War Department, the Ordnance Department, the Signal, Medical, Military Police,

and Women's Army Corps, the Military Intelligence Division of the

War Department General Staff, and the Army Air Forces. These and

other Army elements worked together in close collaboration with

American industry and science to win what was believed to be a desperate race with Nazi Germany to be first in producing atomic weapons. For both soldiers and civilians this history of the Army's earlier

experience in dealing successfully with the then novel problems of

atomic science seems likely to offer some instructive parallels for finding appropriate answers to the problems faced in today's ever more

technologically complex world.

DOUGLAS KINNARD

Washington, D.C. Brigadier General, USA (Ret.)

1 March 1984 Chief of Military History

vii
The Author

Vincent C. Jones, after graduating from Park College (Parkville,

Missouri) with a B.A. in history, earned an M.A. degree at the University of Nebraska with a thesis on German public opinion in World War I

and spent a year as a Sanders Fellow in History at George Washington

University. Moving to the University of Wisconsin, he began work on a

doctoral degree in modern European history just before the outbreak

of World War II in Europe. During the war, he was a noncommissioned officer in a heavy weapons company of the 81st Infantry Division, participating in the Peleliu-Angaur and Leyte campaigns in the

Pacific Theater. He was in training in the Philippines in August 1945,

preparing for the impending invasion of Kyushu, when the Army Air

Forces dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Following

the surrender of Japan, he served in the American occupation forces in

that country before returning to the University of Wisconsin as an

instructor in history.

Completing his doctorate at Wisconsin in 1952, Dr. Jones served a

year as a research associate in American history at the State Historical

Society of Wisconsin and as an assistant professor of history at the

Central State College of Connecticut. Since January 1955 he has been a

historian on the staff of the U.S. Army Center of Military History,

where he has been a major contributor to The Army Almanac and the

ROTC textbook American Military History. In addition to the present

volume, Dr. Jones is author of articles and reviews in professional

journals and of biographical sketches of military figures in a number of

encyclopedias.

viii
Preface

During the nearly four decades since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, much has been written about the

developments leading up to that climactic moment in world history.

Within days of that event, the War Department released its official account, the well-known semitechnical report by Professor Henry D.

Smyth of Princeton University. Soon popular histories also appeared,

and with the gradual opening of the archival records relating to the top

secret World War II program known as the Manhattan Project, scholars

began examining in detail the scientific, technological, strategic, and

diplomatic story of atomic energy and the atomic bomb (see Bibliographical Note). Yet amid this outpouring of books, none has provided

an adequate and full account of the United States Army's participation

in the atomic program from 1939 to the end of 1946. It is the purpose

of this volume to tell that story.

Stated in its simplest terms, the achievement of an atomic bomb resulted from the highly successful collaboration of American science and

industry carried out under the direction and guidance of the U.S.

Army. This triad—scientists, industrialists and engineers, and soldiers—was the product of a decision in early 1942 by America's wartime leaders to give to the Army the task of administering the atomic

program. Convinced that the Allies were in a race with Germany to be

the first to develop an atomic weapon, they decided that only the Army

could provide the administration, liaison services, security, and military

planning essential to the success of a program requiring ready access

to scarce materials and manpower, maximum protection against espionage and sabotage, and, ultimately, combat utilization of its end

product.

In telling how the Army met the challenge of its unique assignment,

eventually achieving results that would have the most profound implications for the future of mankind, I have taken a broadly chronological

approach but with topical treatment of detailed developments. The

focu s of the narrative is from the vantage point of the Manhattan

Project organization, which functioned under the able direction of Maj.

Gen. Leslie R. Groves and such key scientific administrators as Vannevar Bush, James B. Conant, Arthur Compton, and J. Robert Oppenheimer in compliance with policies established at the highest levels

of the Washington wartime leadership. The volume begins with a

ix
prologue, designed to provide the reader with a brief survey of the history of atomic energy and to explain in layman's terms certain technical

aspects of atomic science essential to an understanding of the major

problems occurring in the development of an atomic weapon. Early

chapters describe the beginning of the Army's atomic mission, including the formation of the Manhattan District, the first steps in acquiring

the means to produce atomic weapons, and the appointment of General Groves. Subsequent topical chapters trace the building and operation of the large-scale process plants for the production of fissionable

materials; the administration of a broad range of support activities,

such as security and community management; and the fabrication, testing, and combat employment of atomic bombs. A concluding section

describes how the Army dealt with the difficult problems arising during

its unexpectedly prolonged postwar trusteeship of the project until December 1946, when the newly created civilian agency—the United

States Atomic Energy Commission—assumed responsibility for atomic

energy matters.

The Army did not program a volume on the Manhattan Project in

its multivolumed historical series, the U.S. Army in World War II, until

1959. Two developments in the late 1950's had made available the essential records for research by Army historians: the instituting of a historical program by the Atomic Energy Commission, with the objective

of preparing an unclassified account of its own origins; and the opening of access to the Manhattan District records, the so-called General

Groves collection, then located in the Departmental Records Branch of

the Adjutant General's Office but subsequently retired to the National

Archives and Records System.

A great many individuals are deserving of mention for their assistance and support in the preparation of this volume. For aiding me in

my task of researching the voluminous and widely scattered records

controlled by the Department of Energy, I wish to thank Mr. Roger

Anders, Dr. Richard G. Hewlett, and Mr. Thomas J. Pugliese in Germantown, Maryland; Mr. Floyd F. Beets, Jr., Mr. William J. Hatmaker,

Mr. Frank Hoffman, and Mr. James R. Langley in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Mr. Ralph V. Button and Mr. Milton R. Cydell in Richland, Washington; Mr. King Derr, Mr. David A. Heimbach, Mrs. Lucille McAndrew, and Mr. Robert Y. Porton in Los Alamos, New Mexico;

Mrs. Eleanor Davisson in Berkeley, California; and Mr. E. Newman

Pettit in Lemont, Illinois. For facilitating my use of the Manhattan

Project records at the National Archives, I wish to thank Mr. Sherrod

East, Dr. Lee Johnson, Dr. Herman Kahn, Mr. Wilbert B. Mahoney, Mr.

Wilbur J. Nigh, Dr. Benjamin Zobrist, and, especially, Mr. Edward

Reese, who on countless occasions rendered expert assistance in using

the indispensable General Groves collection. And for making available

interviews and photographs which they assembled for use in their own

excellent account of the construction aspects of the Manhattan Project,
I wish to thank Miss Lenore Fine and Dr. Jesse F. Remington, formerly

of the Historical Division, Corp of Engineers.

Adding another dimension to my understanding of the atomic

project were my visits to several Manhattan research, production, and

community sites, arranged by Mr. Tom Cox and Mr. William McCluen

at Oak Ridge, Mr. R. M. Plum and Mr. James W. Travis at Richland, Mr. Charles C. Campbell at Los Alamos, and Mr. P. M. Goodbread at

Berkeley.

Many others gave generously of their time in reading and critiquing

all or parts of the manuscript: Dr. James B. Conant, Col. William A.

Consodine, Lt. Col. John A. Derry, Mr. Julian D. Ellett, Mr. Joseph R.

Friedman, Dr. Crawford H. Greenewalt, Lt. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, Dr.

Walter G. Hermes, Col. John E. Jessup, Jr., Dr. Richard G. Hewlett,

Col. John Lansdale, Jr., Dr. Maurice Matloff, Col. Franklin T. Matthias,

Maj. Gen. Kenneth D. Nichols, Mrs. Jean O'Leary, Mr. Robert R.

Smith, Maj. Harry S. Traynor, and Col. Gerald R. Tyler. To each of

them, I extend a special note of thanks.

At each stage in the preparation of this volume, I also benefited

from the unique combination of talents available among my colleagues

in the Army's historical office. Fellow staff historians—Dr. Stanley F.

Falk, Dr. Maurice Matloff, and Dr. Earl F. Ziemke—helped expedite initial research into the atomic project records, serving with me as members of a team under the direction of Dr. Stetson Conn, the chief historian; in addition, Dr. Falk conducted a number of interviews and wrote

the first draft of the Prologue, Chapters I-IV, and Chapter X. Miss

Carol Anderson, in the library, and Miss Hannah Zeidlik, in the records

branch, cheerfully and expertly dealt with my many requests and kept

me abreast of newly available records and publications on atomic

energy. Mr. Arthur S. Hardyman designed the graphically handsome

maps, some of them in color, and oversaw the layout of the photographs. His colleague, Mr. Roger D. Clinton, provided the clearly

drawn charts, which will help the reader understand the complex organization of the Manhattan Project, and assisted in the selection of photographs. The skillful typing of Mrs. Joyce Dean, Mrs. Margaret I.

Fletcher, Mrs. Edna Salsbury, and Miss LaJuan R. Watson, the eagleeyed proofreading of Mrs. Rae T. Panella, and the meticulous indexing

of Mrs. Muriel Southwick contributed to the efficient preparation of my

technically difficult and heavily documented manuscript. Lt. Col. John

R. Pipkin shepherded the draft manuscript through clearance by several

government agencies in record time, considering the potential sensitiveness of its subject matter. Finally, Miss Joanne M. Brignolo edited

the volume. She demonstrated a remarkable capacity for quickly grasping the intricacies of atomic science, enabling her to make readable my oftentimes obscure text and to give order and consistency to

its complex documentation. I am obliged to her for whatever literary

merit my book may have.

xi
For her understanding and unremitting support during the many

years this volume was in preparation, I wish to thank my wife, Kay Cox

Jones, who, as an employee at the Argonne National Laboratory in Chicago in the immediate post-World War II period, first brought my attention to the history of the atomic bomb.

For the many others not here mentioned who, over the years this

volume has been in the making, have contributed in some way to its

ultimate completion, I express my gratitude. The author alone, of

course, takes responsibility for the facts presented and the conclusions

reached in this volume.

Washington, D.C. VINCENT C. JONES

1 March 1984

xii
Contents

Page

PROLOGUE: A HISTORY OF ATOMIC ENERGY TO 1939.................. 3

Uranium and Fission..................................................................... 8

Efforts To Enlist Support of the U.S. Government............................ 12

Part One: Beginnings of the Atomic Mission

Chapter

I. THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM,

1939-1942..................................................................................... 19

Origins of the Army's Role ............................................................. 19

Decision To Develop Atomic Weapons.............................................. 21

Establishment of the NDRC and OSRD.......................................... 26

New Advances in Atomic Research, 1940-1941 .............................. 28

Top Policy Group: Preparing for Army Take Over ............................ 30

Progress in Research and Development: The Nuclear Steeplechase ....... 35

II. ESTABISHING THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT .................... 40

Organizing the District................................................................... 41

Army-OSRD Planning Meeting, 25 June 1942 ............................... 46

Progress in Research and Development............................................. 50

III. FIRST STEPS FOR WEAPON DEVELOPMENT ....................... 55

Securing an Architect-Engineer-Manager ......................................... 55

Obtaining Funds........................................................................... 56

Securing a Priority Rating ............................................................. 57

Procuring Essential Materials......................................................... 61

Site Selection................................................................................. 67

Reaching Decisions: The Meeting at Bohemian Grove ....................... 70

IV. GENERAL GROVES TAKES COMMAND.................................. 73

Reorganization and the Selection of Groves ...................................... 73

First Measures .............................................................................. 78

Establishment of Los Alamos .......................................................... 82

Manhattan Project Organization and Operation ............................... 88

xiii
Chapter Page

Part Two: Producing Fissionable Materials

V. ORGANIZING FOR PRODUCTION........................................... 95

Plutonium Project.......................................................................... 95

Reassessment of Processes To Produce a Bomb .................................. 101

Contract Negotiations..................................................................... 105

Hanford Engineer Works ............................................................... 108

Plutonium Semiworks: Argonne vs. Tennessee ................................... 111

Program Funding.......................................................................... 115

VI. THE ELECTROMAGNETIC PROCESS ..................................... 117

Electromagnetic Research and the Army, 1942-1943 ....................... 118

Research and Development, 1943-1945: Radiation Laboratory ........ 120

Design and Engineering, 1943-1945 ............................................. 126

Building the Electromagnetic Plant.................................................. 130

Plant Operation ............................................................................ 140

VII. THE GASEOUS DIFFUSION PROCESS .................................... 149

Gaseous Diffusion Research and the Army, 1942-1943.................... 149

Design and Engineering................................................................. 150

Building the Gaseous Diffusion Plant.............................................. 159

Plant Operation ............................................................................ 165

VIII. THE LIQUID THERMAL DIFFUSION PROCESS..................... 172

Research and Development: The Role of the Navy ............................ 172

Reassessment: Decision for Full-scale Development............................. 174

Plant Design, Engineering, and Construction ................................... 178

Plant Operation ............................................................................ 180

IX. THE PILE PROCESS ................................................................... 184

Research and Development: Metallurgical Laboratory........................ 185

Organization for Plutonium Production............................................ 198

The Semiworks: Clinton Laboratories............................................... 204

The Hanford Production Plant....................................................... 210

Part Three: Support Activities

X. ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION.................................. 227

Breakdown of Interchange .............................................................. 227

The Quebec Agreement................................................................... 232

Implementing the Agreement............................................................ 242

New Partnership Strains: Repatriation of French Scientists................ 248

xiv
Chapter Page

XI. SECURITY.................................................................................... 253

Early Aspects ............................................................................... 253

The District's Security System.......................................................... 254

Counterintelligence Activities........................................................... 259

Safeguarding Military Information.................................................. 268

XII. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS............................... 280

Organization of the ALSOS Mission ............................................... 280

ALSOS Operations in Italy ............................................................ 281

Manhattan's Special Intelligence Activities, 1944............................. 282

ALSOS Operations in Western Europe, 1944-1945......................... 285

XIII. THE RAW MATERIALS PROGRAM.......................................... 292

Geographic Search and Field Exploration......................................... 292

Ore Control Agency: Combined Development Trust............................ 295

Ore Acquisition in Foreign Areas..................................................... 299

XIV. THE FEED MATERIALS PROGRAM ......................................... 307

Program Organization and Support Activities................................... 307

Feed Materials Procurement............................................................ 310

Feed Materials Production.............................................................. 314

Quality Control Program................................................................ 317

XV. LAND ACQUISITION.................................................................. 319

Clinton Engineer Works................................................................. 319

Los Alamos................................................................................... 328

Hanford Engineer Works ............................................................... 331

Other Sites.................................................................................... 342

XVI. MANPOWER PROCUREMENT .................................................. 344

Personnel Organization .................................................................. 345

Scientific and Technical Personnel................................................... 348

Industrial Labor............................................................................ 350

Civilian and Military Personnel...................................................... 355

XVII. MANPOWER CONSERVATION................................................. 363

Labor Turnover: The Problem and Its Cure ..................................... 363

Special Problems With the Selective Service System ............................ 366

Labor Relations: Union Activities and Work Stoppages ..................... 369

XVIII. ELECTRIC POWER..................................................................... 377

Power Requirements and Sources..................................................... 377

Implementation of the Power Program ............................................. 386

Distribution: Clinton Engineer Works.............................................. 388

Distribution: Hanford Engineer Works ............................................ 391

xv
Chapter Page

XIX. COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION..................... 394

Communications............................................................................ 394

Transportation.............................................................................. 397

XX. HEALTH AND SAFETY .............................................................. 410

The Health Program...................................................................... 411

The Safety Program....................................................................... 426

XXI. THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN TENNESSEE ..................... 432

Oak Ridge: The Operating Community ............................................ 432

The Construction Camps ................................................................ 440

Community Management................................................................ 443

XXII. THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN WASHINGTON STATE... 450

Selecting Sites................................................................................ 450

Hanford: The Construction Camp ................................................... 452

Richland: The Operating Community .............................................. 456

Community Management................................................................ 460

XXIII. THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN NEW MEXICO.................. 465

Los Alamos: The Operating Community ........................................... 465

Trinity: The Base Camp................................................................. 478

Part Four: The Bomb

XXIV. THE LOS ALAMOS WEAPON PROGRAM................................ 485

Planning Phase............................................................................. 485

Laboratory Administration.............................................................. 491

Post Administration ....................................................................... 496

XXV. WEAPON DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING.............................. 503

Building the Bomb......................................................................... 503

Project Trinity: The Test of the Bomb.............................................. 511

XXVI. THE ATOMIC BOMBING OF JAPAN........................................ 519

Preparations for an Atomic Bombing Mission ................................... 519

The Decision To Use the Bomb ....................................................... 530

Dropping the Bomb........................................................................ 534

The Surrender of Japan.................................................................. 541

Survey of the Bombing Effects......................................................... 543

xvi
Chapter Page

Part Five: Completing the Atomic Mission

XXVII. THE ATOMIC AGE AND ITS PROBLEMS ............................... 553

The Atomic Story: Informing the Public ........................................... 553

Atomic Energy: Planning for Postwar Control.................................. 562

XXVIII. THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM,

1945-1947..................................................................................... 579

A Postwar Trusteeship ................................................................... 579

The Final Act: Transfer to Civilian Control..................................... 596

EPILOGUE: AN ATOMIC LEGACY.......................................................... 602

APPENDIX—EINSTEIN'S LETTER .......................................................... 609

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ...................................................................... 611

GUIDE TO ARCHIVAL COLLECTIONS ................................................. 627

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS....................................................................... 631

INDEX.......................................................................................................... 643

Tables

No.

1. Stone and Webster Engineering and Design Personnel........................ 127

2. Land Acquisition at CEW, 1942-1944 ................................................... 321

3. Comparative Estimates of Atomic Bombing Casualties

in World War II.................................................................................. 547

Charts

1. Organization of the Manhattan Project, April 1943 .............................. 88

2. Organization of the Manhattan District, August 1943........................... 90

3. Organization of the Manhattan District, January 1945.......................... 166

4. Feed Materials Network, January 1945 .................................................. 309

5. Estimated Officer Personnel Requirements for the

Manhattan District, January 1943....................................................... 356

Maps

1. Projected Site for Atomic Production Plants, Tennessee, 1942 ............ 48

2. Manhattan Project, 1942-1946 ............................................................... 63

3. Clinton Engineer Works, Tennessee, 1943-1945 .................................. 131

4. Hanford Engineer Works, Washington, 1943-1945............................... 213

xvii
No. Page

5. Los Alamos Site, New Mexico, 1943-1945............................................. 330

6. Trinity Test Site, 1945 ........................................................................... 479

7. The Atomic Bombing of Japan, August 1945 ........................................ 525

Illustrations

Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves.................................................................. Frontispiece

Ernest O. Lawrence, Arthur H. Compton, Vannevar Bush,

and James B. Conant ............................................................................... 29

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson............................................................ 32

Brig. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer ....................................................................... 41

Brig. Gen. James C. Marshall...................................................................... 42

Col. Kenneth Nichols.............................................................................. 43

Silver-wound Magnet Coils for the Electromagnetic Process..................... 68

Approach Road to the Los Alamos Ranch School for Boys....................... 85

Manhattan Project Emblem......................................................................... 89

Mrs. Jean O'Leary and General Groves...................................................... 90

Col. E. H. Marsden...................................................................................... 113

Excavation at the Tennessee Site................................................................ 135

Alpha I Racetrack, Electromagnetic Plant, CEW........................................ 137

Electromagnetic Plant Under Construction................................................ 140

CEW Training Facilities .............................................................................. 143

Electromagnetic Plant in Full Operation .................................................... 147

Gaseous Diffusion Plant Under Construction, CEW.................................. 162

K-25 Steel-frame Construction ................................................................... 163

Completed Plant Section............................................................................. 168

Completed Gaseous Diffusion Plant........................................................... 170

Richard C. Tolman...................................................................................... 177

Liquid Thermal Diffusion Plant, CEW........................................................ 181

Billboard at the S-50 Plant Site.................................................................. 182

University of Chicago Physics Building....................................................... 186

Argonne Laboratory Near Chicago............................................................. 187

124th Field Artillery Armory in Chicago .................................................... 188

New Chemistry Building, Metallurgical Laboratory, Chicago .................... 189

Heavy Water Plant at the Wabash River Ordnance Works........................ 192

Maj. Arthur V. Peterson .............................................................................. 195

Clinton Laboratories Pilot Pile, CEW......................................................... 207

Clinton Laboratories.................................................................................... 211

300 Area, HEW............................................................................................ 215

100 B Pile Area, HEW................................................................................. 216

Chemical Separation Plant Under Construction, HEW.............................. 219

Completed Chemical Separation Plants...................................................... 220

Sir James Chadwick, General Groves, and Richard Tolman ...................... 244

xviii
Page

Changing of the Guard, CEW............................... ..................................... 259

Security Sign at the Tennessee Site............................................................ 269

Farm at the Tennessee Site......................................................................... 322

Typical Terrain of the Los Alamos Site...................................................... 329

Military and Civilian Workers, CEW........................................................... 355

Women's Army Corps Detachment, CEW.................................................. 359

Enlisted Men at CEW During Off-Duty Hours........................................... 360

Large Troop Contingent at Los Alamos on Parade................................... 361

Power Plant, HEW....................................................................................... 379

K-25 Power Plant, CEW.............................................................................. 384

Unimproved Santa Fe-Los Alamos Road ................................................... 399

Improved Santa Fe-Los Alamos Road........................................................ 400

Oak Ridge Bus Terminal............................................................................. 402

Gallaher Bridge Road at the Tennessee Site.............................................. 405

Col. Stafford L. Warren............................................................................... 414

Hazardous Materials Storage Area, Los Alamos......................................... 421

Oak Ridge Hospital..................................................................................... 423

Oak Ridge Shopping Mall and District Headquarters................................ 437

Black Workers, CEW ................................................................................... 438

Prefabricated Houses and Apartment Dwellings, CEW.............................. 440

Enlisted Men's Barracks, CEW.................................................................... 441

Gamble Valley Trailer Camp, CEW............................................................ 442

Oak Ridge Elementary School ................................................................... 444

Main Post Office and Theater in Oak Ridge.............................................. 445

CEW Reservation Entry Point..................................................................... 447

Chapel-on-the-Hill in Oak Ridge ................................................................ 448

Hanford Construction Camp, HEW............................................................ 452

Camp Administrative and Residential Areas, HEW ................................... 453

Richland Village, HEW................................................................................ 456

Typical Building at the Los Alamos Ranch School.................................... 467

Family Apartment Units at Los Alamos ...................................................... 470

Military Mess Facility at Los Alamos........................................................... 471

Los Alamos Ranch Trading Post................................................................. 472

Street Scene in Los Alamos......................................................................... 473

Pupils at the Los Alamos Community School............................................. 474

Trinity Base Camp....................................................................................... 480

J. Robert Oppenheimer............................................................................... 486

Lt. Col. Curds A. Nelson............................................................................. 501

Technical Area at Los Alamos .................................................................... 505

Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Farrell and General Groves.................................... 512

Trinity Control Dugout and Observation Post........................................... 515

The Atomic Explosion at Trinity, 16 July 1945.......................................... 516

Little Boy ..................................................................................................... 522

Fat Man........................................................................................................ 523

Col. Elmer E. Kirkpatrick, Jr. ...................................................................... 527

General Groves Checking Location of Bombing Targets .......................... 531

xix
Page

Col. Paul W. Tibbets, Jr., and Ground Crew at Tinian .............................. 535

Enola Gay at Tinian..................................................................................... 537

Mushroom Cloud Over Hiroshima ............................................................. 539

Physical Damage at Hiroshima.................................................................... 546

Atomic Bombing Casualties at Nagasaki..................................................... 548

Survivors of the Nagasaki Bombing............................................................ 549

General Groves Holding a Press Conference............................................. 557

Henry D. Smyth and Richard Tolman ........................................................ 559

Oppenheimer Congratulating the Troops.................................................. 582

Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson and General Groves ....................... 585

Transfer of Control to the Atomic Energy Commission............................ 600

Illustrations courtesy of the following sources: p. 89 from Typography and Design Division, Government Printing Office; pp. 361, 474, and

582 from Col. Gerald T. Tyler; and p. 600 from Wide World Photos. All

other illustrations are from the files of the Department of Defense and

the Department of Energy.
MANHATTAN:

THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

PROLOGUE

A History of Atomic Energy

to 1939

The concept of the atomic structure

of matter first emerged in the fifth

century B.C. with the Greek theory of

minute particles, or atoms, as the unchangeable and indivisible units comprising all material things.1

 This new

idea, however, lay dormant for nearly

two thousand years because Aristotle's view that all matter is continuous and composed of four elements—

fire, earth, air, and water—prevailed

in the minds of men. Following the

Renaissance in Europe such philosophers and scientists as Galileo, Descartes, Bacon, Boyle, and Newton

supported the early concept, and in

the nineteenth century chemists

(somewhat later, physicists) transformed this atomic theory into a material reality.

One of the first and important

steps was the theory proposed by

English chemist John Dalton in 1803

that each element is composed of like

atoms, distinguishable from the atoms

forming other elements primarily by

differences in mass. He thus provided

a practical and specific standard for

nineteenth century scientists' descriptions of ninety-two chemical elements

(substances that cannot be broken

down or transformed by chemical

means). By the end of the century, all

known elements had been arranged in

a table, with similar properties in related positions, in numerical order according to atomic mass; it ranged

from element 1, hydrogen, which was

the lightest, to element 92, uranium,

the heaviest. This "periodic table"

not only enabled scientists to predict

the properties of undiscovered elements but also became the basis of

chemical and physical knowledge of

the elements.

Beginning in the last decade of the

nineteenth century, scientific discoveries by those European and American physicists who sought to explain

the phenomenon of radioactivity

opened the way for the modern development of atomic energy. This

phenomenon is a property possessed

by some elements to spontaneously

emit radiation that ionizes gas and

1

 A simple but excellent explanation of the atomic

concept, including a good historical summary, is

Selig Hecht, Explaining the Atom, 2d ed. (New York:

Viking Press, 1954). The already classic, semitechnical history is H. D. Smyth, A General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic Energy for Military

Purposes Under (he Auspices of the United States Government, 1940-1945 (Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office, 1945), hereafter cited as Smyth

Report. See Bibliographical Note.
4 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

makes it capable of conducting electricity. Investigating electrical discharges in gases in 1895, German

physicist Wilhelm Roentgen observed

radiation emissions that penetrated

opaque objects and also produced fluorescence. Roentgen's discovery of

these radiations, which he called

X-rays, led French physicist Henri

Becquerel to test fluorescent salts of

uranium to see if they also would

produce penetrating rays. In 1896,

Becquerel demonstrated that uranium

emits penetrating radiations that

would ionize gas, proof that it was

radioactive. In England, physicist J. J. Thomson

and a young student from New Zealand, Ernest Rutherford, used X-rays

to ionize gases, providing further evidence that the penetrating rays were

charged particles much smaller than

atoms. In 1897, Thomson published

data proving the existence of these

particles, each having a mass of about

one two-thousandth of a hydrogen

atom. The following year he suggested that these particles, subsequently

designated electrons, formed one of

the basic building blocks comprising

all atoms.

Rutherford's succeeding investigations showed that the penetrating

streams of emitted particles are composed of at least three different kinds

of rays—alpha, beta, and gamma.

Alpha ray particles are heavy, highspeed, positively charged bodies, later

shown to be nuclei of helium atoms;

beta ray particles are electrons; and

gamma rays are similar in composition to X-rays. In 1911, Rutherford

proposed the theory of the nuclear

atom, with its mass and positive

charge at the center. The work of

Rutherford, Niels Bohr, a Danish

physicist, and others led to the concept of the atom as a miniature solar

system, with a heavy positive nucleus

orbited by much lighter electrons.

Rutherford finally achieved, in

1919, what man had been attempting

unsuccessfully for centuries: the artificial transmutation of an element.

Since the discovery of natural radiation, scientists had known that disintegration of radioactive elements in

nature caused them to change spontaneously into other elements. Bombarding nonradioactive nitrogen with

high-energy alpha particles given off

by naturally radioactive radium, Rutherford caused the nitrogen to disintegrate and change into what subsequently proved to be a form of

oxygen. His achievement, although

somewhat removed from the ancient

alchemist's dream of transmuting

base metals into gold, was far more

valuable and important. It was not

only the first artificially induced transmutation; it was also the first controlled artificial disintegration of an

atomic nucleus.

A further Rutherford achievement

was isolation and identification of yet

another basic building block of

atomic structure. In addition to

oxygen, nitrogen transmutation had

produced a high-energy particle with

characteristics similar to the positively

charged nucleus of the hydrogen

atom. Later study showed it was a hydrogen nucleus, and scientists gave it

the name proton. Such a positively

charged particle as a fundamental

unit in the structure of all atoms had

long been hypothesized; demonstration of its presence in nitrogen and

other elements confirmed its identity.
A HISTORY OF ATOMIC ENERGY TO 1939 5

Discovery of the proton pointed

toward the existence of a third particle. In 1932, James Chadwick, Rutherford's co-worker at Cambridge University, discovered this third particle,

the neutron, an uncharged body approximately equal in weight to the

proton.

Now the atom was viewed as composed of a positively charged nucleus,

containing protons and neutrons, orbited by negative electrons equal in

number to the protons. The number

of protons determined the atomic

number, or numerical position, of the

parent element in the periodic table.

Thus hydrogen, element 1, has but a

single proton; helium, element 2, two

protons; and uranium, element 92,

ninety-two protons. For each proton

there is a balancing electron. The

mass, or atomic weight, of an element

is the sum of its protons and neutrons; the electrons, with negligible

weight, do not materially affect the

mass of the atom. The weight of each

element is stated in relation to that of

hydrogen, the lightest. Hydrogen,

with a single proton and no neutrons,

has an atomic weight of 1; helium,

with 2 protons and 2 neutrons of

equal weight, a mass of 4; and uranium, with 92 protons and 146 neutrons, a mass of 238. The chemical

symbols for these elements are written 1H1

,

 2He4

 and 92U238.

Thus far, three characteristics of

elements had been identified: chemical uniqueness, atomic number, and

atomic weight. But scientists also discovered that many elements exist in

more than one form, differing solely

in the number of neutrons that each

contains. For example, there are two

forms of helium, each with two protons and two electrons. They are

chemically identical but one form has

a single neutron, thus an atomic mass

of 3, and the other, more prevalent

form two neutrons, thus an atomic

mass of 4. These substances are

called isotopes (from the Greek words

iso, meaning alike or same, and topos,

meaning place) because they occupy

the same place in the periodic table.

The chemical symbols for the helium

isotopes are written 2He3 and 2He4, or

simply He-3 and He-4; or they may

be spelled out, helium 3 and helium

4. Many other isotopes exist, either

naturally or through scientific transmutations, and they are important in

the story of atomic energy.

James Chadwick's discovery of the

neutron was not the only significant

development in 1932. That same year

British scientist J. D. Cockcroft and

Irish scientist E. T. S. Walton, working together at Cambridge University's Cavendish Laboratory, used a

particle accelerator to bombard lithium with a stream of protons, causing

the element to disintegrate. Unlike

Rutherford, who experimented with

alpha particles from natural sources,

Cockcroft and Walton, in effect, produced their own protons through artificial means.

This artificially induced nuclear disintegration, however, was only one

aspect of Cockcroft and Walton's accomplishment. As a hydrogen nucleus, or proton, struck a lithium nucleus, the latter body disintegrated into

two alpha particles of helium nuclei.

The hydrogen atom with a mass of 1

united with a lithium nucleus having a

mass of 7, thereby making a total

mass of 8, and then this body immediately divided into two helium

nuclei, each with a mass of 4. Thus,
6 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

the two scientists were also the first

to bring about atomic fission—or, in

the popular phrase, to split the atom.2

Still another result of the Cockcroft-Walton experiment, and at the

time considered most important, was

its confirmation of Einstein's theory

of relativity, proposed in 1905, that

matter and energy are merely different forms of the same thing. The

atomic weights of the lithium, hydrogen, and helium nuclei expressed by

Cockcroft and Walton in their experiment were only approximate. The

combined mass of a lithium nucleus

and a hydrogen nucleus is, in fact,

very slightly more than the combined

mass of two helium nuclei. Thus, the

formation of two helium nuclei had

resulted in a loss of mass. This lost

mass was converted into energy in an

amount that could be calculated by

the Einstein equivalence formula

E = mc2 (energy is equal to mass multiplied by the square of the velocity of

light) or derived from the speed of

the helium nuclei as they flew apart

from the lithium. Because the two calculations provided answers in very

close agreement, they confirmed Einstein's theoretical projection and

opened the prospect of using atomic

fission as a major new source of

energy.

In the experiments conducted so

far, however, the total energy required to bombard the atomic nucleus and produce fission was much

greater than the energy released. This

initially high input of energy enabled

the charged particle to approach and

penetrate the atom, overcoming the

repulsion of their mutual electrical

charges. Furthermore, even when

high-speed particles were used, only

one in a million succeeded in hitting

its target. This inefficiency led Rutherford to describe using nuclear fission as an energy source as practical

as "moonshine,"

 3

 and so it indeed

appeared to many.

But Chadwick's discovery of the

neutron provided the solution. The

neutron, because it was an uncharged

particle, would not be repelled and

therefore could penetrate a nucleus

even at relatively slow speeds. Proof

was to come from Italy, where in

1934 Enrico Fermi and his co-workers

set about systematically bombarding

the atoms of all known elements with

neutrons. They soon demonstrated

that the nuclei of several dozen elements could be penetrated by neutrons and thereby broken down and

transmuted into nuclei of other elements. Their best results were obtained when the bombarding neutrons were first slowed down by passing them through such moderators as

carbon or hydrogen.

The most important result of

Fermi's work was not fully understood for another four years. Among

the substances he had bombarded

with slow neutrons was uranium,

which was naturally radioactive and

the heaviest of all known elements.

Theory and chemical analysis seemed

to indicate that the substance produced by uranium transmutation was

nothing hitherto known, but was in

fact a new and heavier element. Uranium is element 92; this new element 2 appeared to be element 93, or possi- Sir John Cockcroft, "The Development and

Future of Nuclear Energy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 6 (Nov 50): 326. 3

 Ibid.
A HISTORY OF ATOMIC ENERGY TO 1939 7

bly even element 94. Fermi, so it

seemed, had created transuranic elements not present in nature, and the

popular press hailed his achievement

as a major advance in science.4

Yet many scientists were skeptical,

and Fermi himself was uncertain. The

properties exhibited by the new substances were not those they had expected to find in transuranic elements. For the next four years, physicists and chemists were hard at work

attempting to identify exactly what

Fermi had produced. Progress was

slow, exacerbated by the uncertainty

of the times; fearing the advancing

wave of political oppression, many

scientists in Germany, Austria, and

Italy fled to havens elsewhere in

Europe and in the United States. Nevertheless, out of Nazi Germany, the

answer finally came. Just before

Christmas of 1938, the radiochemists

Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann concluded that one of the products of

Fermi's experiment was not a transuranic element at all. It was, rather,

the element barium, with an atomic

weight approximately half that of

uranium.5

When Hahn informed his former

co-worker, Lise Meitner, of the conclusions that he and Strassmann had

reached, the Austrian physicist—who

had recently escaped from Germany

to Sweden—quickly comprehended

the significance of the findings. Working with her nephew, British (Austrian-born) physicist Otto Frisch, she

concluded that the bombardment of

uranium by slow neutrons produced

two elements of roughly half the

weight of uranium. In the splitting

process there was a tremendous release of energy, far more than necessary to cause fission. Without delay

she passed this exciting information

on to Niels Bohr, who was about to

leave Denmark for an extended stay

at the Institute for Advanced Study at

Princeton University. Thus, even as

Hahn and Strassmann published the

results of their work in Europe, Bohr

carried news of their conclusions to

the United States.6

Further experiments confirmed the

discovery of atomic fission and raised

the possibility that a practical means

of obtaining atomic energy could at

last be realized. Splitting the uranium

atom released not only energy but

also two or three additional neutrons.

Perhaps, under the right conditions,

these neutrons might smash other

atoms, releasing more neutrons to

bombard more atoms while simultaneously generating a continuous

emission of energy. This process, or

chain reaction, would be self-sustaining and would continue for as long as

uranium atoms were present to be

split.

4

 Laura Fermi, Atoms in the Family: My Life With

Enrico Fermi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1954), Ch. 6 and passim; Enrico Fermi, United States,

1939-1954, The Collected Papers of Enrico Fermi,

ed. Emilio Segre et al., Vol. 2 (Chicago: University

of Chicago Press, 1965). 5

 See Charles Weiner, "A New Site for the Seminar: The Refugees and American Physics in the

Thirties," in The Intellectual Migration: Europe and

America, 1930-1960, Perspectives in American History, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass.: Charles Warren

Center for Studies in American History, Harvard

University, 1968), pp. 190-234; Norman Bentwich,

The Rescue and Achievement of Displaced Scholars and Scientists, 1933-1952 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,

1953).

6

 Lise Meitner, "Looking Back," Bulletin of the

Atomic Scientists 20 (Nov 64): 2-7; S. Rozental, ed.,

Niels Bohr: His Life and Work as Seen by Friends and Colleagues (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co.,

1967).
8 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

During 1939, scientists in America,

England, France, Germany, the Soviet

Union, Japan, and other countries

worked intensively to extend both the

theoretical and experimental knowledge of atomic fission. By the end of

the year, nearly one hundred papers

on the subject had been published.7

In the United States, native Americans and a group of European refugees combined their energies and scientific talents to investigate various

aspects of the complex problem, carrying on their work at such institutions as Columbia, Johns Hopkins,

Princeton, the University of California

at Berkeley, and the Carnegie Institution in Washington, D.C.8

Uranium and Fission

Uranium is considered a rare element, although it is a thousand times

more prevalent than gold. Uranium is

more widely dispersed and occurs infrequently in a relatively concentrated

form. Found always with radium, primarily as uranium oxide, it occurs

mainly in pitchblende and in carnotite

ores. Before World War II the main

value of these ores lay in their radium

content, although uranium was also

used for coloring glassware and ceramics, for tinting photographic film,

and for making certain steel alloys.

Uranium was rarely produced as a

metal; metallurgists had not yet measured its melting point accurately.

Substantial radium-uranium concentrations in the Shinkolobwe mine

in Katanga Province of the Belgian

Congo were owned by the Union

Miniere du Haut Katanga, a Belgian

firm that completely dominated the

world market. So rich were the Shinkolobwe concentrations that in 1937

the company, having stockpiled sufficient ore to satisfy the anticipated

world demand for radium and uranium for the next thirty years, ceased

mining operations.

Important but less productive deposits were located in the Eldorado

mine at Great Bear Lake in northern

Canada, and ores of much lower

grade were found in the Colorado

Plateau region in the western United

States; however, Colorado Plateau

radium and uranium producers were

forced to close down because they

could not compete commercially with

those in the Congo and Canada. In

addition, other uranium deposits of

varying quality were located in

Czechoslovakia, Portugal, England,

Madagascar, and elsewhere.9

Natural uranium is composed of

three isotopes: U-238, about 99.28

percent; U-235, about 0.71 percent;

7

 Summarized in Louis A. Turner, "Nuclear Physics," Reviews of Modern Physics 12 (Jan 40): 1-29. 8

 Among the many scientists at work in the

United States on fission research were Herbert L.

Anderson, John R. Dunning, Enrico Fermi, George

B. Pegram, Leo Szilard, and Walter Zinn at Columbia; Edwin M. McMillan at the University of California, Berkeley; Edward Teller at George Washington

University; and John A. Wheeler and Eugene

Wigner at Princeton. In France were Frederic JoliotCurie, Hans von Halban, and Lew Kowarski; in England, George P. Thomson, James Chadwick, Rudolph Peierls, and others; and in Germany, Otto

Hahn, Fritz Strassmann, and Werner Heisenberg.

The Soviet Union, too, had a number of able and

active physicists in fission research. See Arnold Kramish, Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union (Stanford:

Stanford University Press, 1959), Chs. 1-3.

9

 "The Distribution of Uranium in Nature," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 1 (Feb 46): 6; Ms, Office of

the Historian, Armed Forces Special Weapons

Project, "Manhattan District History" (hereafter

cited as MDH), ed. Gavin Hadden, 8 bks., 36 vols.

(Dec 48), Bk. 7, Vol. 1, "Feed Materials and Special

Procurement," pp. 1.1-1.7, 2.1-2.2, 3.1-3.2, 4.1-

4.2, DASA.
A HISTORY OF ATOMIC ENERGY TO 1939 9

and U-234, just a trace. Experimenting with the isotopic properties of

uranium, scientists eventually proved

that U-235 was fissionable by both

slow and fast neutrons, although

more controllably so by the former.

When U-235 fissions, it emits fast

neutrons, which are captured by the

U-238. The U-238 does not fission

but becomes radioactive and disintegrates. For a chain reaction to be selfsustaining, at least one neutron emitted by the U-235 has to penetrate

another U-235 atom. Because the fast

neutrons are most easily absorbed

by the U-238, the 140-to-1 ratio of

U-238 to U-235 in natural uranium

makes it even more improbable that

the neutrons can escape the U-238

and be captured by U-235 atoms.

Many neutrons, moreover, escape altogether from the uranium and others

are absorbed by impurities within it.

This is why uranium does not fission

in its natural state and why an emission of neutrons does not occur in

any ordinary lump of uranium.

Proper conditions for achieving a

chain reaction required that the

number of neutrons absorbed by impurities in uranium and the number

of neutrons lost through its surface or

captured by its U-238 isotope be kept

to a minimum. Neutron absorption

could be decreased by using a careful

chemical process to remove the impurities, although the technique was difficult and posed major problems. Because the number of neutrons lost

from a piece of uranium depends on

the area of the surface and because

the number of neutrons captured depends on its mass or volume, neutron

escape or capture could be reduced

by using a suitable shape and size.

The greater the amount of uranium,

the smaller would be its surface area

relative to volume and thus, proportionately, the fewer neutrons that

could be lost through the surface or

captured by the U-238. During fission, production of at least one neutron in excess of those lost or captured would cause the uranium to

reach its critical mass and possibly

trigger a chain reaction.

The dilemma researchers faced in

1939 was ascertaining the exact size

of this critical mass. The consensus

was that a tremendous amount of uranium—far more than had ever been

produced and concentrated—would

be necessary. A practical solution to

the supposed enormity of the problem therefore was to reduce the size

of the critical mass by decreasing the

number of neutrons captured by the

U-238. The U-235 could be separated from the U-238, or the ratio of

U-235 to U-238 could be increased

artificially.

Theories about what should be

done, however, did not quite coincide

with what could be done at this stage

of the research. Because the two uranium isotopes were chemically identical, their separation by chemical

means was impossible. And the about

1-percent difference in mass between

U-235 and U-238 meant that separation by physical means would be most

difficult. Although producing a sufficient amount of pure U-235 or

U-235-enriched natural uranium to

maintain a chain reaction in a critical

mass of practical proportions appeared only barely possible, there

were those who continued to work on

the multistage problem of separating

what were considered, in Fermi's
10 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

words, "almost magically inseparable"

isotopes.10

All separation methods deemed

possible were based on the difference

in atomic weight. One process, the

electromagnetic method, employed a

mass spectrometer or spectrograph.

In this process a stream of charged

particles of a given element is projected through a magnetic field, which

deflects them from their original path.

Because the atoms of a heavier isotope will be more strongly affected by

the magnetic field than those of a

lighter isotope, the stream of particles

will be separated into two or more

streams, each containing a different

isotope, which can then be collected

in different receivers. Alfred O. Nier

of the University of Minnesota did the

initial work on this process. At this

time, the electromagnetic method

proved to be not only ridiculously

slow but also quantitatively insufficient. It would have taken twentyseven thousand years for each mass

spectrometer to produce a single

gram of U-235 or 27 million spectrometers a whole year to separate a

kilogram of the isotope.

Another process, the gaseous diffusion method, was based on the principle that if two gases of different

atomic weights are passed through a

porous barrier, the lighter gas will

diffuse through more readily. First,

uranium would have to be transformed from its naturally solid state

into a gas; then, because of the 140-

to-1 ratio of U-238 to U-235, the diffusion process would have to be repeated in order to produce any appreciable amount of U-235 or U-235-

enriched uranium. Scientists in Great

Britain performed most of the early

theoretical and experimental work on

this method. In the United States, it

was not until late 1940 that physicist

John R. Dunning and a small group

of collaborators at Columbia University began intensive research into the

technical problems of gaseous

diffusion.11

A third method was the centrifuge

process, in which uranium in a gaseous form is rotated rapidly in a cylinder. Because centrifugal force causes

the atoms of the heavier isotope to

amass along the outer walls and those

of the lighter isotope to concentrate

around the axis of rotation, the desired isotope can then be drawn off.

Jesse W. Beams at the University of

Virginia and others in the United

States seemed to offer the best initial

promise for separating uranium isotopes, but the magnitude of the engineering problem was such that, as

with the other separation methods,

the centrifuge process offered no

quick or easy solution.

The avenues of research were not

solely limited to isotope separation

methods. At Columbia University,

Enrico Fermi and Leo Szilard, a

refugee physicist from Hungary, experimented with the possibility of

achieving a chain reaction in uranium without separating its isotopes—

research that in the not too distant

future would culminate in the world's

first chain reaction. Basing their investigations on research that Fermi

had carried out five years earlier on 10

 Enrico Fermi, "Physics at Columbia University:

The Genesis of the Nuclear Energy Program," Physics Today 8 (Nov 55): 14.

11

 For Cunning's work see MDH, Bk. 2, Vol. 2,

"Research," pp. 3.1-3.2, DASA.
A HISTORY OF ATOMIC ENERGY TO 1939 11

the use of moderators to slow down

neutrons, they explored the likelihood

that a moderating substance might be

mixed with natural uranium in such a

way that the high-speed fission-produced neutrons could be sufficiently

slowed before meeting other uranium

atoms so as to escape capture

by U-238 and remain free to penetrate the U-235.

The two most promising moderators were hydrogen and carbon.

Water might make a good moderator;

however, because hydrogen exists in

two natural isotopes (light hydrogen,

the more prevalent, with a mass of 1,

and heavy hydrogen, or deuterium

with a mass of 2), "heavy water," containing deuterium, should make an

even better one. Scientists in France

and England had investigated the use

of heavy water, but it was extremely

costly to produce and was highly volatile. Feeling that heavy hydrogen was

in some ways less efficient as a moderator, Fermi and Szilard turned their

attention to carbon, which was readily

available in the form of graphite.

Proving its feasibility through theoretical investigation and experimentation

would take time, energy, and money,

but the two scientists were confident

they could achieve a chain reaction.12

Because such a chain reaction could

provide a tremendous amount of

energy in a form that might be converted into power, this uraniumgraphite system promised to have

ready military application for driving

large ships or aircraft but seemed impractical for use as a bomb. A bomb

would have to be so large that the

sudden release of energy in an uncontrolled nuclear explosion would

blow it apart before more than a

small amount of energy was freed;

that amount was not worth the great

effort necessary to detonate it.

Yet, if it were possible to separate

U-235 from the naturally more prevalent U-238 or to enrich natural uranium greatly in its U-235 isotope, then

a fast-neutron chain reaction might be

achieved and extremely powerful

bombs, far smaller than any explosive

uranium-graphite system, could probably be built. Controlled energy from

a fast-neutron chain reaction could, of

course, be used as a power source;

but, uncontrolled, it would provide a

far more powerful explosion than

ever before attained by man. Though

perhaps too heavy for a conventional

bomber, a U-235 bomb could be

brought by ship into an enemy port

and exploded with devastating effect.

In early 1939, however, the chances

of constructing a bomb of U-235 appeared far less certain than those of

building a power-producing uraniumgraphite system. To use Fermi's

words, there seemed "little likelihood

of an atomic bomb, little proof that

we were not pursuing a chimera."

 13

Nevertheless, possible military application of atomic energy was of increasing interest to a group of foreign-born physicists now living and

working in the United States. These

men—including Enrico Fermi from

Italy; Leo Szilard, Eugene Wigner,

and Edward Teller from Hungary;

12

 For the activities of Fermi and Szilard during

1939 see Enrico Fermi, "Physics at Columbia," pp.

12-16; Ms, Leo Szilard, "Documents Relating to

Period March 1939 to July 1940" (hereafter cited as

Szilard Documents), Incl to Ltr, Compton to

Groves, 13 Nov 42, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201

(Szilard), MDR. 13

 Laura Fermi, Atoms in the Family, p. 164.
12 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

and Victor Weisskopf from Austria—

knew that government-supported nuclear research was under way at the

Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin,

and the likely military consequences

of a German breakthrough worried

them very much. As most of them had

only recently fled their homelands to

escape fascist tyranny, they had no

wish to see Nazi Germany acquire a

means of dominating the whole

world. Indeed, if any nations were to

exploit atomic energy for military

purposes, they believed the democracies would do well to be first.

These physicists therefore directed

their energies toward two ends: keeping all advances in nuclear research a

secret to discourage an all-out

German effort, and obtaining support

from the American government for

further nuclear research. The group

almost achieved one of its goals in

early 1939, when leading physicists in

the United States and Great Britain

pledged not to publish the results of

their work in the field. However, in

France, Frederic Joliot-Curie refused,

and his determination to publish his

own research led to continued publication by scientists in other countries.

It was not until late 1940, after a

large number of articles had appeared

in scientific journals and the popular

press, that publication on atomic

energy generally ceased.

Efforts To Enlist Support of the

U. S. Government

The atomic scientists' first attempt

to gain support from the U.S. government for their atomic energy research

came in March of 1939, even as

German troops were completing the

occupation of Czechoslovakia. Scheduled to give a lecture in Washington,

D.C., on the sixteenth, Enrico Fermi

arrived in the national capital with a

letter of introduction from Dean

George B. Pegram of Columbia to

Rear Adm. Stanford C. Hooper, director of the Technical Division,

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. On the morning of the seventeenth, Fermi met with Admiral

Hooper and other individuals, including Ross Gunn, a physicist and technical adviser of the Naval Research Laboratory. Pegram, who was also a physicist, had explained in his letter what

Fermi discussed in his lecture,

namely, the importance of atomic

energy and its possible uses for mankind, although both men were prudent about making predictions.

Gunn and his associates at the

Naval Research Laboratory already

were aware of the potentialities of

atomic energy; however, they were

more interested in the prospects for

nuclear ship propulsion than in developing an atomic bomb. Now Fermi's

visit spurred them on to continue

their own investigations, but it did

not lead to any naval support for the

scientists working at the universities.14

 A second approach to Gunn,

made by Szilard in June, was no more

successful. While the Navy pursued its

own program of research on uranium

isotope separation, Gunn indicated to

Szilard in July that "it seems almost

impossible, in the light of the restric14

 Ibid., pp. 162-65; Testimony of Gunn in U.S.

Congress, Senate, Special Committee on Atomic

Energy, Atomic Energy: Hearings on S. Res. 179, 79th

Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 27 Nov 45-15 Feb 46

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,

1945-46), pp. 365-67. Gunn testified that Army officers were present at the 17 March conference, but

this does not appear to have been the case.
A HISTORY OF ATOMIC ENERGY TO 1939 13

tions which are imposed on Government contracts for services, to carry

through any sort of agreement that

would be really helpful to you."

 15

By mid-July, then, Szilard, Teller,

and Wigner concluded that another

channel had to be found. The results

of ongoing nuclear research indicated

that a chain reaction could very probably be achieved in a uranium-graphite system, "and that this possibility

had to be considered as an imminent

danger."

 16

 There was, moreover,

ominous news from Europe of continued German interest and progress in

nuclear research. American scientists

returning from visits to Germany reported a growing emphasis on the investigation of isotope separation, with

the apparent objective of achieving a

fast-neutron chain reaction in U-235,

the basis of an atomic bomb.17 After

moving into Czechoslovakia, the Germans closed the door on the country's uranium ore exports. Convinced

that the need to keep other uranium

deposits from falling into German

hands required action at the highest

level, Szilard, Teller, and Wigner approached Einstein. At first, Szilard

thought to have Einstein approach

the Department of State and use his

acquaintance with the royal family in

Belgium as a means for stopping uranium ore shipments to the Germans.

But, after further discussion, he decided a direct approach to the White

House was necessary. Through a refugee journalist friend, Szilard secured

an introduction to Alexander Sachs, a

Wall Street economist and student of

international affairs who had long

been an informal adviser of President

Franklin D. Roosevelt. Sachs was familiar with the subject of atomic

energy, having read avidly Hahn and

Strassmann's first report and having

followed subsequent publications on

atomic fission. Also, he had become

acutely aware of the possible military

applications of atomic energy during

Niels Bohr's visit to the Institute of

Advanced Study at Princeton. Indeed,

the growing tensions in Europe and

Germany's increasing threat to world

peace eventually led him to discuss

the Hahn-Strassmann report and its

possible effect on the international

situation in a brief session with

Roosevelt early in March.

Sachs agreed to help, and he and

Szilard concluded that a letter from

Einstein to Roosevelt would emphasize the importance of their message.

The letter, primarily the work of Szilard, was drafted in Sachs's office. Szilard and Teller took it to Einstein,

who was vacationing on Long Island,

on 2 August. Sources disagree over

whether Einstein rewrote the SachsSzilard draft or merely put his name

to it; but, in any event, Szilard returned to Sachs with a signed letter

from Einstein to the President.18

15

 Ltr, Gunn to Szilard, 10 Jul 39, Szilard Documents, MDR. 16

 Szilard Documents, p. 7, MDR. 17

 Arthur Holly Compton, Atomic Quest: A Personal

Narrative (New York: Oxford University Press,

1956), p. 118.

18

 Account of approach to President Roosevelt

through Sachs based on Interv, Stanley L. Falk with

Sachs, 18 Jul 60, CMH; Ms, Alexander Sachs, "Early

History [of] Atomic Project in Relation to President

Roosevelt, 1939-40" (hereafter cited as Sachs History), 8-9 Aug 45, pp. 1-6, Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

201 (Sachs), MDR; Testimony of Sachs in Atomic

Energy Hearings on S. Res. 179, pp. 2-11 and 553-59;

Szilard Documents, p. 7, MDR; Otto Nathan and

Heinz Norden, eds., Einstein on Peace (New York:

Simon and Schuster, 1960), pp. 291-97; Nat S.

Finney, "How F.D.R. Planned To Use the A-Bomb," Continued
14 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

This letter, a milestone in the American atomic energy program, states

that "it is almost certain that this [a

chain reaction in a large mass of

uranium] could be achieved in the immediate future" and that this phenomenon could possibly lead to the

construction of a new type of an extremely powerful bomb.19

To this letter, Szilard himself added

a careful memorandum. In it he explained in more detail the scope and

effects of research on atomic fission,

the unproved nature of its conclusion,

and the need for financial support for

further investigation. He pointed out

that atomic energy released through a

chain reaction achieved with slow

neutrons could be utilized for ship or

aircraft propulsion, and also raised

the possibility that a fast-neutron

chain reaction would result in a powerful explosive. Szilard also reemphasized the need for acquiring large

stocks of uranium ore from the Belgian Congo and suggested that another attempt to arrange for the withholding of publications on the subject

of nuclear research might be necessary.20

 Included with the letter and

memorandum were reprints of two articles from the Physical Review that

provided documentation of the scientific points raised by Einstein and

Szilard.

Despite the agreed upon necessity

for haste, almost two months passed

before Sachs was able to bring Einstein's letter and its inclosures to the

White House. "Mere delivery of

memoranda was insufficient," he

felt.21 In the hectic days of August

and September 1939, with war in

Europe first an imminent danger and

then a frightening actuality, there

seemed little likelihood that Roosevelt

could spare Sachs more than a few

moments. Not until early October did

Sachs find a time he felt was suitable

to approach the President.

The story of Sachs's visit to the

White House has been told frequently

and with several variations. Suffice it

to say that Sachs met with Roosevelt

for over an hour on 11 October.

Reading aloud, Sachs prefaced Einstein's letter and Szilard's memorandum with a letter of his own in which

he summarized and amplified the

other material, emphasizing German

nuclear research, the danger of

German seizure of Belgian uranium,

and the "urgent" need to arrange for

American access to the uranium ore

of the Belgian Congo. He stressed the

necessity of enlarging and accelerating experimental work, which could

not be done on limited university

budgets, and seconded the suggestion

made in Einstein's letter for liaison

between the government and the

scientists.22

The President's initial reaction was

one of skeptical interest. He was

doubtful about the availability of

funds to support nuclear research and

Look, 14 Mar 50, pp. 25-27; Geoffrey T. Hellman,

"A Reporter at Large: Contemporaneous Memoranda of Dr. Sachs," New Yorker, 1 Dec 45, pp. 73-76;

Edward Shils, "Leo Szilard—A Memoir," Encounter

23 (Dec 64): 35-41; Eugene Rabinowitch, "1882-

1964" and "1898-1964" (obituaries on James

Franck and Leo Szilard, respectively), Bulletin of the

Atomic Scientists 20 (Oct 64): 16-20. 19

 Ltr, Einstein to Roosevelt, 2 Aug 39, reproduced in the Appendix to this volume. 20

 Memo, Szilard to Roosevelt, 15 Aug 39, Szilard

Documents, MDR.

21

 Testimony of Sachs in Atomic Energy Hearings on

S. Res. 179, p. 556. 22

 Ltr, Sachs to Roosevelt, 11 Oct 39, Exhibit 3,

Sachs History, MDR.
A HISTORY OF ATOMIC ENERGY TO 1939 15

felt, moreover, that there were other

aspects of national defense with a

higher claim for attention. Nevertheless, he invited Sachs to breakfast the

next morning and, at this second

meeting, was convinced of the necessity for action.

President Roosevelt's 12 October

decision to explore the potentialities

of atomic energy eventually led to

complete governmental direction of

nuclear research in the United States.

And, in the early years of its development, no single government agency

was to play a more important role

than the United States Army.

PART ONE

BEGINNINGS OF THE ATOMIC MISSION

Chapter I

The Army and the Atomic Energy

Program, 1939-1942

At eight o'clock on the evening of

17 June 1942, Col. James C. Marshall

received a teletype message from

Washington, D.C., to report to Maj.

Gen. Eugene Reybold, chief of the

Corps of Engineers, "for temporary

duty,"

 1

 thus interrupting his present

assignment as commanding officer of

the Syracuse (New York) District. Arriving at General Reybold's office the

next day, Marshall received further

instructions to report to Brig. Gen.

Wilhelm D. Styer, chief of staff to the

commanding general of the War Department's Services of Supply, a

major division newly created to oversee Army logistics. Late in the afternoon, Colonel Marshall learned from

General Styer the precise nature of

his new assignment: General Reybold

had chosen him to form a new engineer district "for construction of a

new manufacturing plant."

 2 The location had not been selected but,

Styer explained, the plant would be

part of a project already in progress

to develop atomic energy for military

purposes. Thus the Army became directly involved in a project in which it

had been playing a minor and somewhat intermittent role since the fall of

1939.

Origins of the Army's Role

The Army's expanded role in the

American atomic energy program in

mid-1942 grew out of developments

that had occurred as a result of the

outbreak of World War II and the

subsequent involvement of the United

States in that conflict. On the morning of 12 October 1939, persuaded by

Alexander Sachs's urgent arguments,

President Roosevelt agreed to investigate the desirability of providing

some preliminary support for independent and private research.

Roosevelt's military aide, Maj. Gen.

Edwin M. Watson, immediately requested that the Army and the Navy

send officers to the White House to

talk to an "inventor" about a new explosive. At two o'clock that same

afternoon, the Army sent Lt. Col.

1

 Col James C. Marshall, Chronology of District X

(hereafter cited as Marshall Diary), 17 Jun 42-31

Oct 42, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, Groves Files, Misc

Recs Sec, behind Fldr 5, MDR. On Marshall's earlier

career see George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of

the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy, 9

vols. (1-3, 3d rev. ed. and enl., Boston: Houghton,

Mifflin and Co., 1891; 4-9, aegis of Association of

Graduates, U.S. Military Academy, 1901-50),

6B:1978, 7:1298, 8:366, 9:258. 2

 Marshall Diary, 18 Jun 42, MDR.
20 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Keith F. Adamson, chief of the Ammunition Division, Ordnance Department, and his chief civilian assistant,

Arthur Adelman; the Navy sent

Comdr. Gilbert C. Hoover, also an

ordnance specialist. In General Watson's office, Sachs repeated much of

his earlier presentation to the President. After some discussion, the

group broke up with the understanding that Watson would advise them

what specific action the President

desired.3

The Army's Chemical Warfare

Service (CWS) also received Sachs's

material on atomic energy. Lt. Col.

Haig Shekerjian, the CWS executive

officer, and another chemical warfare

officer may have been present at the

meeting in the White House, or they

may have been briefed later in the

afternoon. General Watson's objective

was to test Sachs's information

against the knowledge and experience

of the technical services most likely to

be concerned with development of

nuclear research and bombs. Ironically, the technical service that eventually had the most to do with development of the atomic bomb, the Corps

of Engineers, was not consulted.4

The first reaction of the Army

representatives to the military potentialities of atomic energy was not generally enthusiastic. Colonel Adamson

displayed a cool skepticism, although

he later warmed to the subject. He

apparently questioned whether nuclear research had advanced far enough

for the government to support it with

any reasonable hope of success.

Moreover, with an eye to Sachs's Wall

Street background, he was suspicious

of the financier's motives in urging

purchase of Belgian Congo uranium.5

A similar response came from the

Chemical Warfare Service. Despite

Colonel Shekerjian's favorable reaction, Maj. Maurice E. Barker, chief of

the CWS Technical Division, expressed a decidedly negative view.

After studying Einstein's letter and

Szilard's memorandum, Major Barker

concluded that there was "no basis"

for believing that the bombardment

of uranium by neutrons would

produce an explosion. While conceding that the proposed nuclear

research "would be extremely interesting, and might have considerable

scientific value," he thought that "the

chance of anything of military value

being developed ... so slight that it

would not justify the expenditure of

funds available for research for that

purpose."

 6

The Army's initial skepticism may

be attributed to a number of factors.

For all of Alexander Sachs's enthusiasm, even the group of American and

foreign-born physicists still regarded

the potentialities of atomic energy as

only a "reasonable possibility,"

 7

 as 3

 Intervs, Stanley L. Falk with Adamson, 22 Apr

60, and with Sachs, 18 Jul 60; Ltr, Adamson to Maj

Gen Levin H. Campbell, Jr. (Chief of Ord), 26 Jun

44; Memo, Arthur Adelman, sub: Fission Explosives

(hereafter cited as Adelman Fission Memo), 30 Jun

44, p. 4. All in CMH. 4

 Adamson and Sachs Intervs, 22 Apr 60 and

18 Jul 60; Interv, Falk with Shekerjian, 27 Oct 59;

Ltr, Adamson to Campbell, 26 Jun 44; Adelman Fission Memo, pp. 4-5; Ltr, Shekerjian to Falk, 11 Sep

59. All in CMH.

5

 Adamson and Sachs Intervs, 22 Apr 60 and

18 Jul 60, CMH; Ltr, Adamson to Campbell, 26 Jun

44, CMH; Washington Post, 26 Mar 46. 6

 Quotation from Memo for File, Barker, sub:

Uranium Activated by Neutrons as an Explosive and

Source of Power (Proj A 10), 13 Oct 49, Incl G to

Adelman Fission Memo. Shekerjian Interv, 27 Oct

59. Ltr, Shekerjian to Falk, 11 Sep 59. All in CMH. 7

 Louis A. Turner, "Nuclear Physics," Reviews of

Modern Physics 12 (Jan 40): 21.
THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, 1939-1942 21

the tentative tone of Einstein's letter

and Szilard's memorandum readily

showed. Unlike the Navy, in 1939 the

Army had no central research organization that might have seized upon

the abstract possibilities of atomic

energy. Consequently, budget-minded

Army officers, who had served

through a period of extremely restricted military expenditures in the

1930's, were not likely to lose their

restraint over new and possibly farfetched ideas. They had witnessed

drastic cuts in funds, especially for

Army research and development,

which was allotted only 1.1 percent of

military expenditures in fiscal year

1939. Army policy called for immediate development of critical items

rather than eventual production of

better weapons and equipment

through prolonged research. Ordnance and chemical officers were, of

course, particularly aware of this situation. Thus, it was hardly surprising

that Sachs's proposals failed to translate their scientific conservatism into

military enthusiasm.8 Not until civilian research and development had

buttressed the theoretical predictions

of the physicists with undisputable

scientific evidence and the nation was

involved in war would the Army

assume a principal role in developing

the military potentialities of atomic

energy.

Decision To Develop Atomic Weapons

Through the President's Advisory

Committee on Uranium, established

on 12 October 1939, the Army had

an opportunity to express its generally negative reaction to the military

potentialities of atomic energy. This

small group, charged with making

recommendations on the ideas and materials submitted by Sachs, was comprised of Colonel Adamson, Commander Hoover, and, as chairman,

Lyman J. Briggs. Briggs was director

of the National Bureau of Standards,

which was one of the principal government agencies of the pre-World

War II period concerned with research in the physical sciences.9

The first meeting of the Uranium

Committee, as it came to be called,

took place on the morning of 21 October at the Bureau of Standards. The

committee had invited Alexander

Sachs and, at his suggestion, also Leo

Szilard, Edward Teller, Eugene

Wigner, and Albert Einstein to attend

its session. Einstein was unable to be

present but two other physicists, Fred

L. Mohler of the Bureau of Standards

and Richard B. Roberts of the Carnegie Institution, attended to provide

the committee with technical guidance. Szilard, Teller, and Wigner outlined the steps they believed necessary to attain a chain reaction in the

uranium-graphite system proposed by

Fermi and Szilard. During their pre- 8

 Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and

Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 31-32 and 42-44; Constance

McLaughlin Green, Harry C. Thomson, and Peter

C. Roots, The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions

for War (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1955), pp. 204-08; Leo Brophy and George

J. B. Fisher, The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing

for War (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1959), pp. 37-38. All in the series U.S. Army

in World War II.

9

 Smyth Report, p. 32; Ltr, Sachs to Wigner, 17

Oct 39, Exhibit 4, Sachs History, MDR; Ltr, Roosevelt to Einstein, 19 Oct 39, President's Secy's Files,

Sachs Fldr, FDR; Sachs Interv, 18 Jul 60, CMH;

Rexmond C. Cochrane, Measures for Progress: A History of the National Bureau of Standards (Washington,

D.C.: National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1966), p. 362.
22 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

sentation, the three scientists requested $6,000 to purchase the graphite

and emphasized the need for secrecy

about all activities relating to nuclear

research.

In the discussion that followed,

three schools of thought became apparent. Colonel Adamson and Commander Hoover, generally skeptical,

stated their belief that several years of

further research would be needed

even to determine whether the military possibilities of atomic energy

were sufficient to justify government

support. In contrast, Sachs, Briggs,

and Teller were almost enthusiastic

about the chances of success. Maintaining a more conservative approach,

Szilard and Wigner portrayed the

great possibilities of their work but

also stressed the as yet tentative

nature of their conclusions.10

In spite of the cautious attitude of

Adamson and Hoover, the Uranium

Committee's report to the White

House on 1 November gave the scientists in effect what they wanted. While

conceding that the harnessing of

atomic energy for power or bombs

was still only a theoretical possibility,

the committee nevertheless recommended that "in view of the fundamental importance" and "potential

military value" of nuclear research,

"adequate support for a thorough investigation of the subject should be

provided." This support should include funds for immediate purchase

of 4 metric tons of pure graphite and,

if the results of initial experiments

warranted continuing the program,

additional funds to obtain 50 tons of

uranium oxide.11

The Uranium Committee submitted

its report and recommendations to

President Roosevelt through General

Watson. Apparently viewing the

report as preliminary, Watson asked

Chairman Briggs for a special recommendation before he advised the

President. Until then, no executive

action could be expected.

Consequently, the members of the

Uranium Committee kept in touch

with the nuclear research program at

Columbia University, awaiting word

of progress from the scientists. In the

interim, the Naval Research Laboratory continued its interest in university

research that pertained to its own investigations into isotopic separation.

At this stage, however, neither the

Navy nor the Uranium Committee

made any effort to coordinate or link

the various nuclear research programs

in progress. Such attempts as were

made came from the scientific community and from Sachs rather than

from any governmental agency.12

Then, in January 1940, Briggs took

the first concrete step to obtain government funds for the university scientists. From the Navy, up to now

more interested in nuclear research

than the Army, Briggs obtained a

10

 Sachs History, pp. 6-7, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Sachs), MDR; Adamson and Sachs Intervs, 22 Apr 60 and 18 Jul 60, CMH; Washington

Post, 26 Mar 46; Memo, Szilard, sub: Mtg of 21 Oct

39 in Washington, D.C., 26 Oct 39, Incl H to Adelman Fission Memo, CMH; Szilard Documents, p. 7,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Szilard), MDR.

11

 Quoted words from Memo, Briggs, Adamson,

and Hoover to President, sub: Possible Use of Uranium for Submarine Power and High Destructive

Bombs, 1 Nov 39, Exhibit 5, Sachs History, MDR

(also in Adelman Fission Memo, following p. 5,

CMH). Testimony of Sachs in Atomic Energy Hearings

on S. Res. 179, p. 560. 12

 Sachs History, pp. 10-11, MDR; Ltr, Adamson

to Campbell, 26 Jun 44, CMH; Adamson Interv,

22 Apr 60, CMH; Testimony of Gunn in Atomic

Energy Hearings on S. Res 179, p. 367.
THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, 1939-1942 23

promise of $3,000. On 15 January, he

called on Maj. Gen. Charles M.

Wesson, the chief of Army Ordnance,

and asked him to match this sum.

Briggs outlined the potentialities of

atomic fission. "It appears," reads the

account of the conversation in General Wesson's office diary, "that this development has possibilities from an

explosive viewpoint." These "possibilities" and Briggs's reference to the

fact that the President was "interested

in this project" were enough to make

the Ordnance chief agree to advance

$3,000 out of Picatinny Arsenal funds

for the development of explosives.13

The Army and Navy funds went to

the Bureau of Standards, which allotted them to Columbia University in

mid-February. Fermi and his colleagues used the money to purchase

graphite in quantities that, at the

time, seemed huge. They needed a

sufficient amount of the highly purified carbon substance to determine its

capture cross section, that is, its capacity to absorb neutrons. With this

information they could then ascertain

the practicability of achieving a slowneutron chain reaction in a uraniumgraphite system.14

Meanwhile, Alexander Sachs and

the scientists exerted increasing pressure on the President and the Army

and Navy. Einstein wrote to Sachs on

7 March, summarizing the situation

and suggesting that the information

concerning new evidence of German

interest in atomic energy be passed

on to President Roosevelt. This Sachs

did, including also Einstein's recommendations that steps be taken to halt

publication of articles on atomic subjects and that a "general policy . . .

[be] adopted by the Administration

with respect to uranium." But Einstein's views brought no immediate

response from the White House. In

fact, after discussion with Colonel Adamson and Commander Hoover in

late March, General Watson accepted

Adamson's suggestion that no further

action be taken until an official report

on the research at Columbia was

available.15

The official report was not ready,

however, when the Uranium Committee held its second meeting on 27

April 1940. The meeting took place

as a result of several factors, including Sachs's continued urgings for

greater support, the reports of promising progress in the nuclear experiments at Columbia and elsewhere,

and an ominous turn of events in the

war of Europe. Since the first meeting

in October 1939, the atomic scientists

had proven definitely that fission occurred only in the U-235 isotope and,

in experiments with the centrifuge

system of isotopic separation at the

University of Virginia, had been successful in enriching a gram of uranium to 10 percent U-235. In Europe,

the Germans had successfully invaded

Norway in early April and, as a result,

secured control of the Norsk Hydro

plant, the only large facility in the 13 world producing heavy water. Thus Min, Wesson Confs: Jan-Jun 40, 15 Jan 40, Ord

Historical Files, Hist Br, OCO. 14

 Memo, Briggs to Watson, sub: Your Memo of

Feb 8th, 20 Feb 40, Exhibit 6b, Sachs History,

MDR; Min, Wesson Confs, 15 Jan 40, OCO; Enrico

Fermi, "Physics at Columbia," Physics Today 8 (Nov

55): 15.

15

 Sachs History, pp. 11-12; Ltrs, Einstein to

Sachs (source of quotation), 7 Mar 40, Exhibit 7a,

Sachs to President, 15 Mar 40, Exhibit 7b, Watson

to Sachs, 27 Mar 40, Exhibit 7c, ibid.; Szilard Documents, pp. 8-9, MDR.
24 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

they had obtained a ready source of

the substance they were suspected of

using as a moderator to achieve a

slow-neutron chain reaction.

Chairman Briggs, Colonel Adamson, and Commander Hoover now listened more sympathetically to the arguments presented by Alexander

Sachs, Enrico Fermi, George Pegram,

Leo Szilard, Eugene Wigner, and

Rear Adm. Harold G. Bowen, director

of the Naval Research Laboratory.

While the committee still did not

make any formal recommendations, it

reached general agreement that nuclear research should be vigorously

pursued, even if this required large

sums of money, and that steps should

be taken, as Szilard strongly urged, to

halt further publications on atomic

matters.16

Developments in May 1940 in the

laboratory and on the war front

brought further justification for providing additional funds for nuclear research. Promising results at Columbia

led scientists there to propose a plan

to study methods of uranium isotope

separation, hopefully with Navy support, and to establish a large-scale experimental program that would demonstrate beyond any doubt that a

chain reaction could be maintained in

a uranium-graphite system. The Germans' successful invasion of Belgium

and Holland in mid-May and new reports on their interest in uranium research underlined Sachs's efforts to

secure action on control of Belgian

uranium and to obtain financial and

administrative support for atomic research in the United States.17

New funds came from a variety of

sources. On 23 May, the Carnegie Institution of Washington allotted

$30,000 for research on uranium by

members of its own staff. A short

time later, Colonel Adamson furnished $20,000 from Army Ordnance

funds to combine with a substantially

larger contribution from the Navy and

some money from the Bureau of

Standards, making a total of more

than $100,000. This amount was

more than sufficient to underwrite

contracts at Columbia and the University of Virginia and to increase support of the work at the Naval Research Laboratory.18

German occupation of Belgium

gave urgency to the question of how

the United States could control and

acquire the rich uranium ore in the

Congo. Seeking a solution, Alexander

Sachs met with President Roosevelt at

the end of May and, a few days later,

also with Uranium Committee Chairman Briggs, Professor Harold C.

Urey, a chemist on the staff at Columbia University, and Admiral Bowen of

the Naval Research Laboratory. At

16

 Smyth Report, p. 33, errs in giving the date

of the Uranium Committee's second meeting as

28 April. Sachs History, pp. 12-20, MDR; Szilard

Documents, pp. 9-10, MDR; Testimony of Gunn in

Atomic Energy Hearings on S. Res. 179, pp. 367 and

370; Ltr, Pegram to Bowen, 7 Apr 40, Incl I to

Adelman Fission Memo, CMH; William L. Laurence,

Men and Atoms: The Discovery, the Uses, and the Future of

Atomic Energy (New York: Simon and Schuster,

1959), pp. 73-74.

17

 Sachs History, pp. 20-25, MDR; Szilard Documents, p. 10, MDR; Ltr, Pegram to Briggs, 6 May

40, Incl K to Adelman Fission Memo, CMH; Laurence, Men and Atoms, p. 41. 18

 James Phinney Baxter 3rd, Scientists Against

Time, Science in World War II (Boston: Little,

Brown and Co., 1946), p. 423; Adelman Fission

Memo, p. 6 and Incls A-E, CMH; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol.

4, "Auxiliary Activities," pp. 12.2-12.3, DASA; Adamson Interv, 22 Apr 60, CMH; Ltr, Adamson to

Campbell, 26 Jun 44, CMH; Testimony of Gunn in

Atomic Energy Hearings on S. Res. 179, pp. 367-71;

Smyth Report, p. 33; Compton, Atomic Quest, p. 29.
THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, 1939-1942 25

Briggs's suggestion, Sachs began

looking into the possibility of getting

uranium directly from the Congo.

For some time Sachs had been

aware that Edgar Sengier was in New

York. Managing director of Union

Miniere du Haut Katanga, the Belgian

firm that controlled the Shinkolobwe

mine in Katanga Province of the

Congo, Sengier had come to New

York from Brussels in the fall of

1939, aware of the rising importance

of uranium from conversations with

French and British scientists. He had

ordered shipped to America all

radium held by his firm in Belgium—

some 120 grams worth nearly $2 million. At the same time, he had directed that uranium ores stocked by

Union Miniere at Oolen, Belgium,

also be shipped to the United States,

but little or none was sent before the

German invasion made it impossible.

Sachs and Urey went to see Sengier

in New York in early June 1940. Sengier gave them considerable information on the status of Congo uranium

but would not agree to Sachs's proposal that Union Miniere ship ore to

the United States, even with the stipulation that U.S. officials would not reexport the ore without special

permission.19

Failure to achieve an agreement

with Sengier left the uranium research program dependent upon Canadian sources. Fortunately, by the

end of 1940, small amounts of Canadian uranium were available as a

result of arrangements based on earlier conversations between Dean

George B. Pegram of Columbia University and a representative of Eldorado Gold Mines, Ltd., owner of the

Canadian deposits.20

Funds contributed in the summer

of 1940 began a two-year period of

rapid growth in the program to exploit atomic energy for military purposes. During this time, American

governmental leaders left development of the new energy source to civilian organizations, in spite of its obvious application to military objectives and its close relationship to the

expanding conflict in Europe and

Asia. Army participation ceased

almost completely, and the Navy continued only a relatively small isotope

separation project. Under civilian

guidance, the work on atomic energy

became a major component in the

federal government's greatly broadened program to apply the achievements of American science to the requirements of modern warfare. Thus,

by early 1942, when the Army

renewed its participation in the development of atomic energy, the program had evolved into a large

research and development enterprise, 19

 Sachs History, pp. 25-26, MDR; Ltrs, Sachs to with civilian scientists carrying on

Watson, 23 May 40, Exhibit 11a, and Briggs to

Sachs, 5 Jun 40, Exhibit 18, ibid.; Leslie R. Groves,

Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project

(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), pp. 33-34;

Compton, Atomic Quest, p. 96; Smyth Report, p. 33;

Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The

New World, 1939-1946, A History of the United

States Atomic Energy Commission, Vol. 1 (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press,

1962), p. 26.

20

 Memo, Szilard to Briggs, sub: Possibility of

Large-scale Experiment in Immediate Future, 26

Oct 39, Incl to Szilard Documents, MDR; Supreme

Court of the State of New York, Eldorado Mining and

Refining (formerly Eldorado Gold Mines) vs. Boris

Pregel et al., Statement to Pregel, 18 Oct 46, Investigation Files, Gen Corresp (Boris Pregel), MDR;

MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 1, "Feed Materials and Special

Procurement," pp. 3.1-3.3, DASA.
26 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

program activities at a number of

sites across the country.

Establishment of the NDRC and OSRD

The organizational framework of

the American atomic energy program

first began to take shape in the

summer of 1940. In June, a number

of the scientific leaders took the initiative in providing a more effective administrative organization. At Leo Szilard's suggestion and with the backing

and approval of Admiral Bowen and

Lyman Briggs, Harold Urey organized

a committee of scientists to advise

Briggs on atomic energy and to study

the question of security. This group,

the Advisory Committee on Nuclear

Research, met for the first time on

the thirteenth under Urey's chairmanship. One of its first actions was to

formulate, with support of American

scientific journals, a policy on secrecy

that eventually halted publication of

scientific papers on atomic energy in

the United States. Thus, a beginning

was made in solving what was to

become another major and persistent

problem—how to maintain a level of

secrecy hitherto never attempted in

so large and diverse a project.21

Even as the Advisory Committee on

Nuclear Research was meeting, events

were taking place that would increase

effective leadership and direction for

the entire American scientific war

effort, including the atomic energy

program. Since the invasion of Belgium, Sachs had been urging

Roosevelt to establish a "Scientific

Council of National Defense" to administer "the testing and execution of

technical projects of utility for national defense." Another strong advocate

for such a council was Vannevar

Bush, president of the Carnegie Institution of Washington since 1939.22

For some time he had discussed his

ideas with several of the nation's foremost scientists and had gained their

support for the project. In addition,

the country's military leaders, including both Army Chief of Staff General

George C. Marshall and Chief of

Naval Operations Admiral Harold R.

Stark, strongly favored the proposal.

Consequently on 15 June 1940, the

President established the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC),

with Bush as chairman, to direct, coordinate, and carry out a national

program of military research and development. Membership was drawn

from the National Academy of Sciences, with Brig. Gen. George V.

Strong, chief of the War Plans Division, representing the Army and Rear

Adm. Harold G. Bowen, director of

the Naval Research Laboratory, representing the Navy.

With establishment of the NDRC,

the President made provision for con,-

tinuation of the atomic energy program. He asked Vannevar Bush to

reconstitute the original Uranium

Committee as a subcommittee of the

NDRC. The new Committee on Uranium, reporting to Bush and with

Briggs continuing as its chairman, included six other scientists but lacked

the service representation that the

21

 Szilard Documents, pp. 10-11, MDR; Ltr, Urey

to Szilard, 7 Jun 40, Incl to ibid.

22

 Sachs History, p. 24, MDR; Ltr, Sachs to

Watson (source of quotation), 15 May 40, Exhibit

15a, ibid. Bush enjoyed a distinguished career in applied mathematics and electrical engineering at MIT

in the two decades following WW I and achieved a

reputation as a scientific administrator of great skill.
THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, 1939-1942 27

original committee had. Briggs was

authorized "to maintain close and

direct contact with those officers of

the Army and Navy most directly interested," but only Ross Gunn of the

Naval Research Laboratory continued

to serve on the new committee.23

On 1 July, Briggs reviewed for

Bush the earlier activities of the Committee on Uranium. At the same time,

he requested the $140,000 that he

and Urey's Advisory Committee had

agreed was necessary for purchasing

uranium metal and pure graphite and

for making further measurements of

the fundamental nuclear constants. At

its first formal meeting the next day,

the NDRC considered Briggs's request, but its members found themselves in a dilemma. The basic NDRC

mission was research and development of weapons and equipment with

direct application to the war. NDRC

scientists still regarded the chances of

an atomic weapon as "very remote,"

in Bush's words, and even the possibility of nuclear power for battleships

or submarine propulsion seemed a

distant eventuality at best. Given the

need for funds and trained scientists

in other areas, there was grave doubt

as to the wisdom of allocating money

and energy to "what might eventually

appear to have been wild research."

Yet, there was a danger that German

nuclear research might prove successful. Committee members concluded,

therefore, that prudence demanded

acquisition of knowledge of the fundamental physics of atomic energy.

Accordingly, the NDRC approved

Briggs's request in principle and

asked him for further definite proposals for "a careful, but not elaborate or

expensive program."

 24

Promise of NDRC funds opened

the way for the future rapid expansion on atomic research in the United

States. But until these new funds

became available, the atomic program

had to continue to draw upon money

supplied earlier by the Army and the

Navy. Even the $40,000 for the first

NDRC contract for atomic research,

an agreement signed with Columbia

University in early November, came

out of the remaining Army-Navy

funds.

Beginning with the NDRC's allotment on 25 October of the $140,000

requested by Briggs on 1 July, there

followed a series of contracts and

transfer agreements arranging for nuclear research by various institutions.

By the spring of 1941, the NDRC had

committed nearly $500,000 for work

at Columbia, Harvard, Princeton, the

University of Minnesota, the Standard

Oil Development Company, Iowa

State College, Cornell, the University

of Chicago, Johns Hopkins, the Carnegie Institution of Washington, the

University of California (Berkeley),

the University of Virginia, the Bureau

of Standards, and the Department of

Agriculture. While the NDRC's expenditure for atomic energy was small

compared with amounts allotted to

23

 Quoted words from Ltr, Roosevelt to Briggs,

15 Jun 40, Exhibit 19, Sachs History, MDR. Baxter,

Scientists Against Time, pp. 12-16; Ltr, Roosevelt to

Bush, 15 Jun 40, HLH; Watson, Chief of Staff, pp.

49-59; Smyth Report, p. 34.

24

 Quoted words from National Defense Research

Committee Report for First Year of Operation, 27

Jun 40-28 Jun 41 (hereafter cited as NDRC Rpt,

1940-41) pp. 34-35, Incl to Ltr, Bush to President,

16 July 41, FDR. Szilard Documents, pp. 10-11,

MDR; Irvin Stewart, Organizing Scientific Research for

War, Science in World War II (Boston: Little, Brown

and Co., 1948), pp. 120-21 and 230; Baxter, Scientists Against Time, pp. 423-24.
28 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

other wartime scientific research, it

represented a significant financial

boost for the American program. As

Alexander Sachs observed a few years

later, the program had become "invested with the importance, the resources and the secrecy available to

the Government of the United States

. . . for the translation of the idea

into a reality. . . ."

 25

While the NDRC was able to focus

the energy and capabilities of civilian

scientists on many aspects of military

technology, it left certain gaps in the

program to mobilize American science for war. Hence, at the end of

June 1941, President Roosevelt established the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD),

with the NDRC as one of its subordinate agencies. Bush became OSRD

director and James B. Conant, president of Harvard University, succeeded Bush as NDRC chairman. In this

reorganization the Committee on

Uranium under Briggs remained

within the NDRC, but it was somewhat enlarged and was renamed the

Section on Uranium. Again it included no Army or Navy representatives,

and even Ross Gunn of the Naval Research Laboratory was no longer a

member.26

New Advances in Atomic Research,

1940-1941

In mid-July 1941, enthusiastic over

reports that atomic scientists in America and Great Britain were making

significant progress in atomic research, Vannevar Bush reported to

the President that "new knowledge"

made "it probable that the production of a super-explosive may not be

as remote a matter as previously appeared."

 27

 At Columbia, supported

by investigations at Princeton and the

Universities of Chicago and California

(Berkeley), researchers produced sufficient favorable data on the capture

cross sections for the neutrons of

U-235 and U-238 and on the absorption qualities of graphite to justify construction in July 1941 of the

first lattice pile—a large graphite cube

in which containers of uranium oxide

were distributed at equal intervals.

The research results also convinced

many more scientists that a chain reaction in a uranium-graphite system

eventually would be achieved.

At Berkeley, physicists working with

Ernest O. Lawrence on the bombardment of uranium with neutrons

discovered that the capture of fast

neutrons by U-238 transmuted that

isotope first into element 93 and then

into element 94, which they named

neptunium and plutonium, respectively. After further investigation of these

transuranium elements, neither of

which was then known to exist in

nature, Lawrence's group concluded

that plutonium had the same fission

characteristics as U-235; it could be

split by neutrons and would, in turn,

release more neutrons. U-238, hitherto regarded as worthless for energy

25 purposes, was in fact a prime source. Quoted words from Sachs History, p. 27, MDR.

Smyth Report, pp. 34-35; Stewart, Organizing Scientific

Research for War, pp. 121 and 123; Baxter, Scientists

Against Time, p. 424; Testimony of Gunn in Atomic

Energy Hearings on S. Res. 179, pp. 367 and 371. 26

 Stewart, Organizing Scientific Research for War, pp.

34-40 and 121; Smyth Report, p. 35.

27

 NDRC Rpt. 1940-41, p. 35, Incl to Ltr, Bush

to President, 16 Jul 41, FDR. Except as indicated,

following section on progress of atomic research in

the United States during 1940-41 based on Smyth

Report, pp. 26, 36, 38-41, 47-49.
THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, 1939-1942 29

ERNEST O. LAWRENCE, ARTHUR H. COMPTON, VANNEVAR BUSH, AND JAMES B.

CONANT (left to right), four of the Manhattan Project's scientific leaders (1940 photograph)

Furthermore, as there was reason to

believe that chemical separation of

plutonium from uranium might prove

more practicable than isotopic separation of U-235 from U-238, chances

that an atomic bomb based on a fastneutron chain reaction could be built

were tremendously increased.

American atomic scientists learned

of encouraging British developments

on isotopic separation by gaseous diffusion and on heavy water as a moderator in a slow-neutron chain reaction system through a scientific information exchange program, begun in

the fall of 1940. With the support of

the War and Navy Departments,

NDRC members conferred informally

with British scientific representatives,

both in the United States and in England, achieving a limited exchange of

data about the progress of nuclear research in each country.28

28

 See Ch. X for discussion of a formal program

of information interchange with Great Britain on

nuclear matters. Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic

Energy, 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan and Co., St.

Martin's Press, 1946), pp. 115-26; J. G. Crowther

and R. Whiddington, Science at War (London: His

Majesty's Stationery Office, 1947), pp. 143-46; H.

Duncan Hall and C. C. Wrigley, Studies of Overseas

Supply, History of the Second World War (London:

His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), pp. 358-85

and 405-13; Sir George Thomson, "Anglo-U.S. Cooperation on Atomic Energy," American Scientist 41

(Jan 53): 78.
30 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

In the summer of 1941, a special

reviewing committee of the National

Academy of Sciences supported

Bush's optimism. The committee, established at Briggs's suggestion that

an impartial evaluation of the atomic

program was needed, first met in May

under the chairmanship of Arthur H.

Compton, head of the physics department and dean of the Division of

Physical Sciences at the University of

Chicago. The committee's initial

report was buttressed by supporting

remarks from Briggs, and on 18 July

the NDRC approved contracts and

transfers amounting to nearly

$400,000 for chain reaction, nuclear

power, and isotope separation research. While the NDRC remained

cautious in its estimate of whether

atomic energy could be harnessed in

time to affect the outcome of the war,

it recognized that continued progress

in nuclear research would eventually

require establishment of a long-range

program so vast and expensive that in

wartime only the Army or Navy could

carry it out.29

The pressure of an all-out attack on

the problem of atomic energy grew

rapidly. At the University of California, Lawrence was more and more

convinced of the feasibility of using

plutonium to make an atomic bomb

and he communicated his enthusiasm

to both Compton and Conant. Compton was especially interested and he,

in turn, talked with other nuclear researchers. From Urey and physicist

John Dunning, who also was on the staff

at Columbia, he learned of progress on

isotope separation, and from Fermi

he received encouraging news of the

results of experiments with the lattice

pile. Most of the scientists now involved felt that the atomic energy

program should be pushed, and in

mid-October, at Conant's suggestion,

Compton reconvened his reviewing

committee, now somewhat enlarged,

to prepare another report.30

On 3 October, Bush received the

first official copy of a British review of

atomic energy that had been completed in mid-July, but he was not yet at

liberty to disclose its contents to the

NDRC. The British scientists had optimistically concluded that a uranium

bomb could be built with an explosive

power of 1,800 tons of TNT. They indicated a rough idea of its critical

mass and possible methods of assembly and fusing. They thought the gaseous diffusion method offered the

best answer to the problem of separating a sufficient amount of U-235 and

the uranium-heavy water system gave

promise as a means for producing

power and plutonium.31

Top Policy Group: Preparing for

Army Take Over

Increasing conviction that atomic

bombs were feasible prompted Bush

to take immediate steps to obtain the

high-level policy decisions he had

foreseen would be necessary to assure

aggressive pursuit of the uranium

program. On 9 October 1941, almost

29

 Baxter, Scientists Against Time, pp. 424-26;

Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 45-49; Smyth Report, pp.

35 and 49; Stewart, Organizing Scientific Research for

War, p. 121; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp.

36-43.

30

 Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 6-9 and 53-56;

Smyth Report, p. 36; Hewlett and Anderson, New

World, pp. 45-49. 31

 Smyth Report, p. 36; Crowther and Whiddington, Science at War, pp. 144-45; Thomson, "AngloU.S. Cooperation," pp. 78-79; Gowing, Britain and

Atomic Energy, pp. 83-86 and 116-17.
THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, 1939-1942 31

two years to the day on which Alexander Sachs first informed the President

about atomic energy, Bush had a long

conversation with Roosevelt and Vice

President Henry A. Wallace. In late

July, Bush and Wallace had discussed

the progress of the American program; now, supported with more concrete evidence of possible success at

hand, they were considering what the

President could do to further develop

the program. The OSRD director outlined the current status of research in

both the United States and Great

Britain, pointing up the general optimism of the scientists in both countries but, at the same time, emphasizing that their predictions could not be

guaranteed. He indicated, too, that

much work would be required before

success could be anticipated.

President Roosevelt agreed that the

atomic energy program must be provided with a better organization and

more funds and that arrangements

should be made for a complete interchange of information with the British. He directed formation of what

was informally designated the Top

Policy Group, to be headed by himself—although he never actually participated in its proceedings—and to

consist of Vice President Henry A.

Wallace, Secretary of War Henry L.

Stimson, Army Chief of Staff General

George C. Marshall, Vannevar Bush,

and James B. Conant.32 Thus the

President took the first step in implementing a maximum effort to develop

an atomic bomb as soon as possible.

He also decided that the Army, and

not the Navy, would be given the primary responsibility for attaining this

goal.

The NDRC had concluded that no

private institution or relevant government agency had the means or personnel to carry out the extraordinarily

large tasks of plant construction and

administering development of a nuclear weapon. The choice, then, was

the Army or the Navy. When

Roosevelt appointed Secretary Stimson and General Marshall to the Top

Policy Group that had no naval representation, he decided in effect that

the Army was to manage the job.

Why had the President selected the

Army when the Navy had exhibited

much greater interest in nuclear research? Indications are that Bush and

his associates had decided that the

Army was the more appropriate

choice for the project. The end product was to be a bomb, presumably delivered by an Army bomber. Also the

Army, judged on the basis of its past

experience and its organization, appeared better fitted to undertake the

vast construction program.33

The President also had agreed to

establish an effective exchange of information with the British. On 11 October he communicated with Prime

Minister Winston S. Churchill, suggesting that they correspond or talk

about atomic developments, inaugu32

 Baxter, Scientists Against Time, p. 427; Smyth

Report, p. 37; Ltr, Bush to President, 9 Mar 42, HB

Files, Fldr 58, MDR.

33

 Col. James C. Marshall, who would head the

new Army engineer district that would administer

the atomic bomb program, reported that Bush, in

the fall of 1942, told him and other Army officers

that the Navy "had been left out of the present

project at the explicit direction of the President."

See Marshall Diary, 21 Sep 42, MDR. The Navy,

nevertheless, would continue to support research already under way on liquid thermal diffusion. See

Ch. VIII.
32 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

SECRETARY OF WAR HENRY L. STIMSON

rating a period of regular interchange

between the two countries.34

The President's efforts to strengthen the American atomic energy program were reinforced a few weeks

later by Compton's National Academy

reviewing committee. On 6 November, the committee issued another report that, while not as optimistic as the

earlier British study, nevertheless constituted a strong endorsement of an

expanded atomic bomb program. Because Compton's group had prepared

its report without access to the British

conclusions—Bush up to now had

been bound not to disclose them—its

findings consisted of both a further

verification of the British views and an

independent recommendation.

The committee report stated that

"within a few years . . . military superiority" might be determined by

U-235 bombs and that building these

bombs seemed "as sure as any untried prediction based upon theory

and experiment can be." The amount

of U-235 needed for each bomb

would be between 2 and 100 kilograms, producing an explosive energy

per kilogram of U-235 equal to that

of about 300 tons of TNT and a destructive effect equivalent to about 30

tons of TNT. Atomic bombs could

thus be of "decisive importance" in

defeating Germany and, based on an

estimate that military and industrial

targets in Germany could be devastated with 500,000 tons of TNT bombs,

from 1 to 10 tons of U-235 would be

needed to do the same job. This

much U-235 could be obtained, continued the report, by one or more

methods of isotope separation, of

which the gaseous diffusion and centrifuge methods appeared to be furthest along in development. In accordance with instructions from Bush,

the committee did not discuss plutonium and it purposely played down

the expense of producing U-235

bombs to avoid arousing government

fears of excessive costs. "If all possible effort is spent on the program,"

the report concluded, "fission

bombs" might "be available in significant quantity within three or four

years."

 35

34

 Ltr, Roosevelt to Churchill, 11 Oct 41, FDR;

Churchill's reply quoted in Msg, Prime Minister to

Harry L. Hopkins, 27 Feb 43, HLH; Crowther and

Whiddington, Science at War, p. 146; Smyth Report, p.

37. For detailed discussion of efforts to establish effective interchange in late 1941 see Ch. X.
THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, 1939-1942 33

This prediction came at a time

when only infinitesimal amounts of

plutonium had been produced and

when no appreciable quantity of

U-235 had been separated from

U-238, no large amounts of uranium

metal or moderators produced, and,

as yet, no chain reaction achieved.

Nevertheless, the committee report,

as had its British counterpart, reflected the substantial progress that had

been made in research. Although

some scientists were still no more

convinced that atomic weapons were

imminently possible than they had

been a year earlier, the threat of

American involvement in war now

seemed far stronger, with the result

that large expenditures of money and

effort were no longer seen as extravagances but rather as necessary

precautions.

Bush's first action after receiving

Compton's committee report was to

show it to Secretary of War Stimson.

Whether the 6 November meeting

was Stimson's first word of his appointment to the Top Policy Group is

not clear, but there is no doubt about

his reaction to the awesome possibilities of an atomic bomb. "A most terrible thing," he called it, sensing the

grave responsibility falling upon those

who would unleash the power of such

a devastating weapon.36

During the next few weeks, Bush

apparently reviewed the entire American atomic energy program and, in

compliance with the President's instructions, devised a plan for an administrative reorganization designed

to expedite efforts "in every possible

way."

 37

 Finally, on 27 November,

Bush forwarded the report of Comption's reviewing committee to Roosevelt and, presumably, his own recommendations for the new organization. The NDRC endorsed these

recommendations on the twentyeighth. Then on 6 December 1941,

the day before the Japanese attack on

Pearl Harbor, Conant—speaking for

Bush—announced the details of the

new organization to those persons

who would now join together in a

maximum effort to develop an atomic

bomb.

Under the new organization, the

atomic energy program was divorced

from the NDRC and placed under the

immediate supervision of Bush as the

OSRD director. Bush reported directly to the President, at the same time

keeping Vice President Wallace and

Secretary Stimson fully informed. The

scientific group under Bush was now

called the OSRD S-1 Section, dropping the word uranium for security

reasons. Its function was to recommend and coordinate action on nuclear research, ensure that authorized assignments were carried out, and,

within six months, prepare a final

35

 Both quotations from Rpt, Academy Committee

on Uranium, sub: Rpt to President of the Natl Academy of Sciences, 6 Nov 41, OSRD. Portions of the

report are reproduced in the following sources:

Smyth Report, pp. 49-52; Smyth Ms (containing

some material not included in final version), Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Smyth Rpt), MDR;

Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 56-59; Baxter, Scientists

Against Time, pp. 426-28.

36

 Diary of Henry L. Stimson (hereafter cited as

Stimson Diary), 6 Nov 41, HLS; Henry L. Stimson,

"The Decision To Use the Bomb," Harper's 194

(Feb 47): 98-99; Compton, Atomic Quest, p. 59. 37

 Ltr, Bush to President, 9 Mar 42, MDR.
34 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

report on the feasibility of building

atomic bombs.

Conant, acting as Bush's representative, had oversight of the whole program. Briggs stayed on as chairman

of the S-1 Section, with Dean Pegram

of Columbia as vice chairman and a

number of outstanding scientists serving as consultants. In addition, three

program chiefs, each a Nobel Prize

winner, were in charge of three distinct programs in physics. Arthur H.

Compton of the University of Chicago

headed the program of basic physics

studies and measurements of nuclear

properties pertinent to the chain reaction. His program also included exploring the problem of plutonium

production by means of the controlled fissioning of uranium. Ernest

O. Lawrence of the University of California, Berkeley, had responsibility

for producing the first small samples

of fissionable elements, isotope separation by the electromagnetic method,

and experimental work on the properties of plutonium. Finally, Harold

C. Urey of Columbia University had

charge of isotope separation by the

diffusion and centrifuge methods, as

well as research on heavy water

production.

To supervise engineering procurement and production plant construction—activities that Bush and his associates knew must shortly be turned

over to the Army—the OSRD director

set up a planning board, headed by

Eger V. Murphree, vice president of

the Standard Oil Development Company, an affiliate of Standard Oil

Company (New Jersey). The OSRD

would enter into and finance all contracts negotiated in support of the reorganized atomic energy program.

The board would make recommendations to Bush concerning those contracts for engineering, for development of the diffusion and centrifuge

processes, and for the heavy water

program. Briggs and Conant, with the

interested program chiefs, would recommend all other contracts. When

the Army took over administration of

much of the atomic energy program,

many OSRD contracts had to be

renegotiated.38

America's entry into World War II

hastened the move for the Army to

take over the primary direction and

control of the bomb development

project. Concrete steps to bring about

this change came up for discussion at

a meeting of the Top Policy Group

called by Vice President Wallace on

16 December. In attendance were

Secretary Stimson, Bush, Wallace,

and, in addition, Harold D. Smith, director of the Budget Bureau. Conant

and General Marshall were unable to

attend. According to Secretary Stimson, that meeting was significant. The

group discussed, he recorded, "some

of the new inventions, many of them

diabolical, that are coming out of the

Scientific Research Commission"

[NDRC] and "decided to go ahead

with certain experiments." Bush himself noted the group's strong opinion

"that OSRD should press as fast as

possible on the construction of pilot

plants."

 39

 He estimated this aspect of

38

 Ibid, and Incl; Smyth Report, pp. 53-55; Baxter,

Scientists Against Time, p. 428; Compton, Atomic Quest,

pp. 62-63 and 68-78; Stewart, Organizing Scientific

Research for War, pp. 121-22; Hewlett and Anderson,

New World, pp. 40-51; Charles Sterling Popple,

Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) in World War II

(New York: Standard Oil Co., 1952), p. 295. 39

 Stimson Diary, 16 Dec 41, HLS; Bush quoted in

Smyth Report, p. 55.
THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, 1939-1942 35

the work would cost $4 to $5 million

and stated that the Army should take

over when full-scale construction

began, presumably when the pilot

plants were ready. He recommended

that a suitably trained Army officer

should familiarize himself with the

general nature of the program.

The Top Policy Group then approved Bush's reorganization of the

atomic energy program and his plans

and recommendations for action.

They also agreed that the international aspects were clearly a presidential

responsibility, with Bush's function

limited to liaison solely on technical

matters.40

Progress in Research and Development:

The Nuclear Steeplechase

Two days later, on 18 December,

the new OSRD S-1 Section held its

first meeting, a session "pervaded by

an atmosphere of enthusiasm and urgency."

 41

 Conant explained again

the decision to proceed with the development of the bomb and stressed

the necessity of a maximum effort.

His words were seconded by Urey

and Pegram, recently returned from

England, who described British

progress on the gaseous diffusion

method of isotope separation and in

experiments with heavy water. They

also emphasized that Britain greatly

feared Germany might produce

atomic bombs before the Allies. Probably the most enthusiastic presentation was Lawrence's description of his

success in testing the electromagnetic

method as a possible process for separating uranium isotopes. As a

member of Compton's reviewing

committee the previous summer, Lawrence had become convinced of the

great potentialities of this method in

spite of the widely prevailing belief

among scientists that the so-called

space charge limitation—mutual repulsion of ions, making sharp focus of

a beam of particles impossible—made

it impractical for large-scale separation. Lawrence asserted that experiments at his Berkeley-based Radiation

Laboratory with the mass spectrograph proved that the technical difficulties that tended to reduce the efficiency of the electromagnetic process

could be overcome.42

A 184-inch cyclotron magnet,

nearly five times wider than the 37-

inch magnet used for previous experiments, had been under construction

at the University of California, Berkeley, funded by the Rockefeller Foundation. Work had stopped because of

the war, but now an extra appropriation from the foundation permitted

Lawrence to complete the project by

the end of May 1942, providing a

means, as Lawrence wrote later, that

"made it seem possible that we might

be able to get somewhere ... in time

to be of value in this war."

 43

With the Radiation Laboratory researchers concentrating increasingly

on electromagnetic separation, most

40

 Smyth Report, p. 55; Ltr, Bush to President,

9 Mar 42, MDR; Hewlett and Anderson, New World,

pp. 51-52. 41

 Smyth Report, p. 55.

42

 Rpt, W. M. Brobeck and W. B. Reynolds, sub:

On Future Development of Electromagnetic System

of Tube Alloys Isotope Separation, 15 Jan 45, OCG

Files, Gen Corresp, Groves Files, Fldr 10, MDR;

Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 76-77; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 56-57. 43

 Ltr, Lawrence to Warren Weaver (Natural Sciences Div Dir, Rockefeller Foundation), 20 Aug 45,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (W), MDR; Smyth

Report, pp. 46, 49, 55, 136-40; Compton, Atomic

Quest, pp. 73-74.
36 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

of the work on plutonium was left to

Compton's University of Chicago

group that was investigating the feasibility of achieving a chain reaction. In

January 1941, Compton decided to

move the scientists working under his

supervision at Columbia and Princeton to the University of Chicago. By

early February, he concentrated the

various research and development activities under what was called, for security reasons, the Metallurgical Laboratory. Compton's group devoted

itself henceforth to three main tasks:

achievement of a chain reaction; study

of the chemistry of plutonium, including development of a means for separating it from uranium; and the

design of plutonium-producing piles.

Because these tasks depended upon

an adequate supply of uranium and

graphite, representatives of the Metallurgical Laboratory also actively supported the S-1 Section's planning

board in the procurement program,

contributing much to its success.44

At the same time, research on the

gaseous diffusion process and on the

production of heavy water went forward under Harold Urey's direction

at Columbia, and investigations on

the centrifuge method of separation

progressed under the general supervision of Eger Murphree at the University of Virginia, where physicist Jesse

W. Beams directed the program, and

at the Standard Oil Development

Company in New Jersey, where research begun earlier at Columbia was

continued.

Work was also proceeding on still

another separation method, liquid

thermal diffusion, based on the tendency of one of two isotopes in a fluid

to concentrate near the hotter of two

opposing surfaces. Philip H. Abelson

had started research on this process

at the Carnegie Institution but later

moved to facilities at the Naval Research Laboratory. While development of the thermal diffusion process

was not a part of the OSRD program,

it would prove highly useful to the

atomic project at a later date.45

Thus the OSRD was at work simultaneously on five methods of producing fissionable materials—three

isotope separation processes (electromagnetic, gaseous diffusion, and

centrifuge) for producing U-235 and

two pile processes (uranium-graphite

and uranium-heavy water) for manufacturing plutonium—projects Conant

referred to as five "horses" in a

race.46 Choosing a favorite and predicting an outcome, however, were

almost impossible because any one of

the horses might encounter insurmountable obstacles. Although concentrating all resources on the most

promising horse would have been

more efficient and economic, playing

this odd just might have enabled Germany to be the first to build an

atomic bomb.

In support of this nuclear steeplechase, the OSRD, by early February

1942, had entered into ten contracts

with twelve institutions totaling more

than $1 million, figures that roughly

doubled in the next month. On the

44

 Smyth Report, pp. 56 and 63-65; Compton,

Atomic Quest, pp. 80-98.

45

 Smyth Report, pp. 47 and 56; Testimony of

Gunn in Atomic Energy Hearings on S. Res. 179, pp.

367-68. 46

 In his account of the development of alternate

methods for producing fissionable materials in early

1942, Compton counted only four "horses" in the

race, perceiving the two pile processes as a single

method. See Atomic Quest, pp. 77-78.
THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, 1939-1942 37

twentieth, Conant recommended that

all five methods "be pushed vigorously" until 1 July, by which time he

hoped many of the contracts could be

dropped or revised in accordance

with whatever progress had been

made. Indeed, Conant continued, if

by then the electromagnetic method

of separation demonstrated a clear capability "of producing grams per

day," work on other methods of producing fissionable materials might be

dropped or at least continued at a

slower pace. Furthermore, even if all

five horses had to be kept running "at

full speed down the course" until the

beginning of 1943, the OSRD research program might still be completed for between $10 and $17

million.47

The "intense scientific research and

engineering planning now underway"

was the subject of a guardedly optimistic progress report that Bush submitted to the President on 9 March.

"The possibility of actual production

appears more certain," he wrote, but

"the way to full accomplishment is

still exceedingly difficult." A full-scale

effort might achieve completion of

the project in 1944, or possibly six

months sooner, and success for either

the Allies or the enemy could "be determining in the war effort." Bush

pointed out that the work was "rapidly approaching the pilot plant stage,"

with selection of the best methods of

production not too far off. The

summer of 1942, he believed, would

"find the matter ready to turn over to

Army control, for actual production

plant construction." A further reason

for transferring "the whole matter . . .

to the War Department," Bush

added, was the necessity for instituting tight security measures once

actual production began.48

With the Army's entrance into the

atomic energy program only a few

months off, it was time to assign a

suitable officer to follow nuclear developments. For this mission, General

Marshall personally chose Brig. Gen.

Wilhelm D. Styer, chief of staff of the

Services of Supply (SOS). A graduate

of the U.S. Military Academy, with an

additional degree in civil engineering

from Massachusetts Institute of Technology and two decades of experience

as a Corps of Engineers officer supervising various kinds of construction

projects, Styer was well qualified to

lay the groundwork for Army participation in the atomic energy program.

He immediately began an intensive

study of the project, in close coordination with Bush and the S-1 Section.

Despite the demands of his SOS

duties, from this point until his departure for an overseas assignment late

in the war, General Styer would play

an important part in the Army's effort

to produce an atomic bomb.49

47

 Conant's words as quoted in Baxter, Scientists

Against Time, p. 433; Smyth Report, p. 56; Rpt to

President, sub: Status of Tube Alloys Development,

9 Mar 42, Incl to Ltr, Bush to President, same date,

MDR.

48

 Ltr, Bush to President, 9 Mar 42, MDR. 49

 1st Ind, Styer to Chief of Mil Hist, 15 Aug 61,

to Ltr, Chief of Mil Hist to Styer, 17 Jul 61, CMH;

Memo, Bush and Conant to Wallace, Stimson, and

Marshall, sub: Atomic Fission Bombs, 13 Jun 42,

Incl to Ltr, Bush to President, 17 Jun 42, HB Files,

Fldr 6, MDR (cf. Ltr, Bush to President, 9 Mar 42,

and Incl, MDR). On Styer, see John D. Milieu, The

Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces, U.S.

Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 5, 32, 369, and

passim; Cullum, Biographical Register, 6B:1806,

7:1121-22, 8:306, 9:207.
38 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Meanwhile, the five horses were in

the running, four of them neck and

neck, with a fifth one now bidding to

join the race. This was the alternate

method of producing plutonium by

using heavy water instead of graphite

as the moderator in a chain reaction

pile, a process strongly championed

by Urey. As work approached the

pilot plant stage, the need to concentrate on one or more of these horses

was becoming increasingly apparent.

To conserve time, design and construction of actual production plants

should begin even before the pilot

plants were finished. However,

Conant believed there was "a desperate need for speed" to build the

bombs before the Germans could and

he only solution was to go ahead on

all five.50

On 23 May, S-1 Section Chairman

Lyman Briggs met with Compton,

Lawrence, Urey, and Murphree to

make final recommendations on the

program. In a report submitted to

Bush two days later, the group concluded that practical atomic bombs of

either U-235 or plutonium, with an

energy release equal to that of several

thousand tons of TNT, were definitely feasible. Underestimating the

amount of fissionable material later

found necessary for each bomb, as

well as the time required for development and construction, they believed

the bombs would be available in small

quantities by about July 1944. They

recommended funding of all five

methods, although, for reasons advanced primarily by Compton, they

gave the uranium-graphite pile a definite priority over the heavy water pile.

They also proposed a pilot diffusion

plant and preparation of complete engineering designs for a full-scale diffusion installation. They advised constructing a centrifuge plant by January 1944, an electromagnetic plant by

late 1943, a plutonium-producing

atomic power installation by early

1944, and, as an auxiliary to the

latter, heavy water plants by May

1943.

Bush, Conant, and General Styer

approved these recommendations

and, on 13 June, Bush and Conant

submitted them to the Top Policy

Group with detailed plans to expand

the atomic energy program. They underlined the danger of German success in building an atomic bomb and

endorsed the proposal to continue

work on all major methods of production. At the same time, they warned

that such a course would interfere

with other military research and

called for careful judgment, when further study made it possible, to

achieve a better balance.51

Importantly, Bush and Conant recommended that construction of the

separation plants and development of

the power project be turned over to

the Army, specifically "to be in [the]

charge of a qualified officer designated by the Chief of Engineers and reporting to him. . . ." They also suggested that this officer be assisted on

a full-time basis by leading civilian

scientists and engineers, "preferably

in the status of officers."

 52

 Funds for

50

 Quoted in Baxter, Scientists Against Time, p. 434.

51

 Ibid., pp. 434-35; Memo, Bush and Conant to

Wallace, Stimson, and Marshall, 13 Jun 42, Incl to

Ltr, Bush to President, 17 Jun 42, MDR; Smyth

Report, pp. 56-57; Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 98-

103.

52

 Memo, Bush and Conant to Wallace, Stimson,

and Marshall, 13 Jun 42, Incl to Ltr, Bush to President, 17 Jun 42, MDR.
THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, 1939-1942 39

this work—$54 million in fiscal year

1943—should be made available to

the Engineers chief who, to avoid

delay, should be authorized to spend

or overobligate any money under his

control with the understanding that

he would be reimbursed later. After

consulting with the S-1 Section's

planning board, the Engineers chief

should also begin immediately to let

contracts for the detailed design of all

plants.

Under the Bush-Conant proposals,

the OSRD would continue to direct

and control research and development, with $31 million directly

available for this purpose and an additional $5 million held in reserve for

contingencies in the next fiscal year.

There would be frequent meetings

between representatives of the OSRD

and the Corps of Engineers in order

to coordinate and report on research,

development, and construction. Research and development on the actual

military uses of atomic energy would

be under the Joint Committee on

New Weapons and Equipment of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition,

Bush and Conant suggested that sites

be selected, priorities established, and

close security regulations imposed on

the entire project.

With the approval of Vice President

Wallace, Secretary Stimson, and General Marshall, Bush forwarded the

proposed program to the President

on 17 June 1942. "If you also approve," he wrote, "we will proceed

along these lines immediately." The

President's initials—"OK FDR"—

were affixed that day, signaling the

decision to go ahead.53

The United States was now firmly

and fully committed to an all-out

effort to build an atomic bomb. From

initial skepticism and only casual interest, the attitude of the government

had changed gradually to one of

active support. The ultimate decision

to build the bomb was a presidential

one and, as such, had been made at

the meeting with Wallace and Bush

on 9 October 1941. But laying the

groundwork for that far-reaching decision were the intermediate steps

taken by Bush and his scientific associates in early December 1941, reinforced by Stimson and Wallace later

that month, and confirmed by members of the S-1 Section and the Top

Policy Group in the spring of 1942.

As for the Army, the President's decision on 17 June brought it back into

the atomic bomb program, this time

to participate on a far broader scale.

Within hours of that decision, the

Army designated Col. James C. Marshall, who had nearly twenty-five

years as a regular in the Corps of

Engineers, to begin the task of organizing and carrying out its vast new

assignment as administrator of all

construction work for that program.

53

 Ltr, Bush to President, 17 Jun 42, MDR.
CHAPTER II

Establishing the Manhattan District

Undeterred by the unusual nature

of the atomic energy program, the

Army Corps of Engineers in June

1942 prepared to carry out its new

wartime construction assignment.

After his initial conference with Brig.

Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer late in the

afternoon of the eighteenth, Col.

James C. Marshall experienced a certain restlessness as he tried to comprehend the scope of the new task at

hand. The next day, he received some

of the answers to his many questions

when Styer took him to the Office of

Scientific Research and Development

to call on Vannevar Bush. The OSRD

director gave the two officers several

documents, among them a copy of

the program for continued development of atomic energy that President

Roosevelt had approved on the seventeenth. From these papers Marshall

learned that the Army was now

charged with "all large-scale aspects,"

 l

 as Bush put it, of the atomic

energy program, with the OSRD retaining responsibility for scientific research and pilot plant experimentation. The Army's mission included

building both pilot and full-scale

plants for producing fissionable materials to be used in the manufacture of

atomic bombs, letting contracts for

these plants and others to be under

OSRD direction, and extensive site

selection, acquisition, and development—all to be carried out in close

coordination with the OSRD.

That afternoon, again in General

Styer's office, Colonel Marshall received formal orders on the Army's

phase of the atomic energy project.

On the covering letter of the approved program, Styer wrote the following endorsement to Marshall:

"This is referred to you for information and appropriate action in accordance with our discussion of this subject with Dr. Bush this morning."

 2

This simple statement constituted the

basic directive to the Corps of Engineers for its work on development of

the atomic bomb. Styer also emphasized that the orders had come directly from the War Department's Services

of Supply (SOS) and that Colonel

Marshall would furnish all details of

the new project to the Engineers

chief, Maj. Gen. Eugene Reybold.

In the weeks that followed the hurried orientation of the past two days,

Colonel Marshall became more familiar with the current status of the pro1

 Memo. Bush to Conant, sub: Tubealloy [Tube

Alloys] Prgm. 19 Jun 42, HB Files. Fldr 6, MDR.

2

 1st Ind, Styer to Marshall, 19 Jun 42, to Ltr,

Bush to Styer, same date, HB Files, Fldr 6, MDR.
ESTABLISHING THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT 41

BRIG. GEN. WILHELM D. STYER

(1941 photograph)

gram and what the Army's role was to

be in the months ahead. He was to

have broad authority to use engineer

facilities, choose personnel, and take

whatever steps were necessary to

carry out his assignment. Marshall

soon realized, however, that he was

going to need all the assistance he

could muster in order to have any

hope of success in achieving his

mission.3

Organizing the District

The Engineers chief normally oversaw construction projects through an

engineer district, the basic unit of the

engineer field organization for supervising construction work. The district

engineer customarily was responsible

to a division engineer, who headed

one of the eleven geographical divisions in the United States (which, in

1942, constituted regional administrative headquarters of the Engineer Department of the Corps). Because of

the special character, scope, and importance of Colonel Marshall's mission, however, the new district to

oversee atomic energy construction

would be directly subordinate to the

Engineers chief and, unrestricted by

geographical limitations, its field of

operations would extend into other

districts and divisions. Furthermore,

although designated a district engineer, Marshall was to have all the authority, responsibility, and independence regularly granted to a division

engineer. Indeed, in many respects,

he was to have far more.4

While Marshall's responsibility was

to the Engineers chief, in practice he

worked with Reybold's assistant, Brig.

Gen. Thomas M. Robins, who was in

charge of construction, and particularly with his deputy, Col. Leslie R.

Groves. During the summer of 1942,

Robins and Groves reviewed Marshall's plans and furnished him with

the support and assistance necessary

to get the project started. Appropriate agencies of the chief's staff also

cooperated fully with Marshall, who

was able to make good use of other

engineer facilities and War Department assistance. On all important de3

 Marshall Diary, 19 Jun 42, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, Groves Files, Misc Recs Sec, behind Fldr 5,

MDR.

4

 AR 100-20, 18 Sep 42; Paul W. Thompson,

What You Should Know About the Army Engineers (New

York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1942), pp. 194-96.

Subsection based primarily on Marshall Diary, MDR,

and Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 11-18.
42 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

BRIG. GEN. JAMES C. MARSHALL

(1946 photograph)

cisions, Marshall consulted with Generals Reybold and Styer; the latter, in

addition to his many duties as SOS

chief of staff, kept well abreast of current nuclear developments. To enforce strict secrecy, Army Chief of

Staff General George C. Marshall

originally had forbidden Styer to

reveal to the SOS commander, Lt.

Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, anything

about the atomic energy program. In

June, however, with the entrance of

the Army into an active role in the

project, General Marshall directed

Styer to brief Somervell and to enlist

his support.5

In late June, Colonel Marshall

opened a liaison office in Washington, D.C., in the New War Department Building at 21st Street and Virginia Avenue, NW. At the same time,

he set up temporary district headquarters at 270 Broadway in New

York, where he had ready access not

only to the colocated administrative

facilities of the Engineer Department's North Atlantic Division but

also to the Manhattan office of the

Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation, soon to become a major

contractor for the atomic project. To

staff the district, Colonel Marshall received authorization from the Engineers chief to draw on officers and civilians who had served under him in

the Syracuse District, among them Lt.

Col. Kenneth D. Nichols, whom he

appointed assistant district engineer.

The Syracuse District recently had

completed the major part of its wartime construction program and, as the

volume of work decreased during the

summer, Marshall was able to draw

more and more personnel from his

former command. Soon over a dozen

men had transferred to the new district. Several who were civilians at the

time subsequently received reserve

commissions and went on active duty.

To provide still more officers, General Robins directed other districts to

give Marshall a priority on any surplus personnel they might have.6

5

 Styer's recollection is that he was not authorized

to bring in Somervell until September, but contemporary evidence indicates Somervell was participating in late June. 1st Ind, Styer to Chief of Mil Hist,

15 Aug 61, to Ltr, Chief of Mil Hist to Styer, 17 Jul

61, CMH (cf. Marshall Diary, 26 Jun and 10 Jul 42,

MDR). On the Engineers organization in early 1942

see Blanche D. Coll, Jean E. Keith, and Herbert H.

Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 132-36. 6

 Details on the engagement of Stone and Webster as a major contractor for the atomic project are

Continued
ESTABLISHING THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT 43

COL. KENNETH D. NICHOLS (1945 photograph)

Engineer districts normally took

their names from the city where they

were located, but Colonel Marshall's

new district lacked a permanent headquarters. Some convenient designation was needed, however, that would

conceal the real nature of the project.

On 26 June, Generals Somervell,

Styer, and Reybold agreed on the

elaborate cover name of Laboratory

for the Development of Substitute

Materials, or DSM. Within the next

two weeks Marshall's plans and organization for a new district were approved and he submitted to Colonel

Groves the draft of a general order

establishing a DSM District. To

Groves, the term DSM seemed likely

to arouse attention and curiosity. Accordingly, the two officers reached

agreement that the name Manhattan,

where Marshall had established his

temporary headquarters, would be a

better name. On 13 August, General

Reybold issued a general order (effective on the sixteenth) officially establishing "a new engineer district, without territorial limits, to be known as

the Manhattan District, . . . with

headquarters at New York, N.Y., to

supervise projects assigned to it by

discussed later on in this chapter. Interv, Stanley L.

Falk and Author with Charles Vanden Bulck (former

Syracuse District civilian employee before serving as

Chief, Admin Div, MD) and his assistant Capt W. R.

McCauley, 22 Jun 60, CMH; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 1,

"General," p. 3.13, DASA. See also Ltr, Marshall to

Robins, 16 Nov 42, Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

231.2, MDR, in which Marshall's procurement priority was extended to supplies and equipment as well

as personnel, and the word surplus was dropped.
44 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

the Chief of Engineers."

 7 The term

DSM continued in use as an official

code name for the entire project, but

the word Manhattan—symbolically

representing the Army's contribution

in the development of the atomic

bomb—gradually superseded it.8

Meanwhile, Vannevar Bush carried

out the necessary changes in the

OSRD organization. Under the provisions of the newly approved program,

the OSRD retained responsibility for

pilot plants for the centrifuge, diffusion, and electromagnetic separation

processes, as well as for further research and development on the latter

method, for the heavy water project,

and for additional miscellaneous research. Acting upon a suggestion of

James B. Conant, based upon his

review of past operating procedures

of the uranium project, Bush abolished the S-1 Section and its planning

board and, in their place, established

the S-1 Executive Committee. Membership of the new committee included most of the individuals who had

previously served in the S-1 Section:

Conant, as chairman; Lyman J.

Briggs; Ernest O. Lawrence; Arthur

H. Compton; Harold C. Urey; and

Eger V. Murphree, with the addition

of Irvin Stewart, the OSRD executive

secretary. H. T. Wensel, formerly of

the planning board, became technical

aide. Only Dean George B. Pegram of

Columbia dropped out.

Bush charged the new S-1 Executive Committee with recommending

contracts and supervising contract operations and enjoined its members to

begin work immediately, in close coordination with the Army Corps of

Engineers. Bush particularly cautioned them on the importance of

maintaining the "greatest secrecy" on

all phases of the project, and stated

that "we will continue ... to adhere

to the principle that confidential information will be made available to an

individual only insofar as it is necessary for his proper functioning in

connection with his assigned

duties."

 9

An additional, though temporary,

responsibility of the S-1 Executive

Committee was overseeing experimentation on the military applications

of atomic energy. As outlined in the

atomic energy program approved by

the President, the Joint Committee on

New Weapons and Equipment of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff had primary responsibility for this administrative

mission. Vannevar Bush also headed

this committee. Serving with him

were Brig. Gen. Raymond G. Moses,

chief of the Supply Division (G-4) of

the Army General Staff, and Rear

Adm. Willis A. Lee, Jr., who held a

similar position as Assistant Chief of

Staff (Readiness), U.S. Fleet. With

these officers Bush raised the question of establishing a subcommittee to

consider military uses of atomic

energy—formed, not hastily, but with

"great care." Pending organization of

this new group, Bush directed the S-1

Executive Committee to continue its

work on military applications.10

7

 WD, OCE, GO 33, 13 Aug 42. While the legal

designation of the new district was Manhattan District, it was often referred to as the Manhattan Engineer District. 8

 Smyth Report, p. 59.

9

 Quoted words from Memo, Bush to Conant,

19 Jun 42, MDR. See also Stewart, Organizing Scientific Research for War, p. 122; Smyth Report, p. 59. 10

 Ltr, Bush to Styer, 19 Jun 42, and Memo, Bush

to Conant, 19 Jun 42, MDR; Min, 6th Mtg of JNW,

16 Jun 42, 334, JCS; Ms, Vernon E. Davis, "Organi- Continued
ESTABLISHING THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT 45

The relationship between the Manhattan District and the OSRD S-1

Committee during the summer of

1942 can best be described as a cooperative one. While each agency had its

assigned functions within the overall

atomic energy program, they coordinated either formally or informally on

all major decisions. But they did not

act together as a joint directorate, for

each organization was free to proceed

as it wished to carry out decisions, or

other activities, strictly within its own

area of competence.

Periodic meetings of the S-1 Committee with Colonel Marshall and one

or more other officers of the Manhattan District provided the formal link

between the two organizations. Representatives of the principal engineering or industrial firms connected with

the project also attended frequently.

During this period, the S-1 Committee met at least once a month, usually

in executive session in the morning—

while Marshall was conferring with his

military superiors—and then opened

the meeting to the Manhattan representatives. These joint meetings encouraged a free exchange of views,

provided scientific briefings for Marshall and his colleagues, enabled the

scientists to seek Army assistance

where necessary, and generally enhanced coordination.11

Army-OSRD links were further

strengthened by cooperation between

Manhattan officers and civilian scientists working together on specific

projects. In the beginning these ties

were kept inconspicuous, especially to

conceal the Army's interest. In their

visits to university or industrial laboratories, Army officers usually wore

civilian clothing, and every effort was

made to hide the relationship between the Corps of Engineers and

OSRD-directed projects. This effort

was sometimes frustrated when a few

scientists, unaccustomed to working

under rigid security conditions, talked

more freely than they should have

about the Army's interest in their

work. And despite Bush's warnings,

even the S-1 Committee was careless

on occasion. In mid-August, for example, Colonel Marshall had to point

out that highly classified material

should not be sent to him through

the regular mail. In general, however,

the good relationship between the

Manhattan District and the S-1 Committee helped to keep such occurrences to a minimum.

Details of the Army-OSRD meetings reached the Top Policy Group

through twin channels: scientific and

military. Conant reported to Bush

and Colonel Marshall to his superiors

in General Reybold's office, or sometimes directly to General Styer. The

latter then passed on information

about the atomic project to Generals

Somervell and Marshall. Secretary of

War Henry L. Stimson appears to

zational Development: Development of the JCS

Committee Structure," The History of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff in World War II, Vol. 2 (Washington,

D.C.: Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

1972), pp. 308-12, NARS. 11

 In addition to material from the Marshall Diary,

MDR, detailed summaries of the S-1 Committee

meetings are included in the DSM Chronology,

OROO. The latter is a rough first-draft summary of

events relating to the Manhattan District, covering

most developments in some detail through April

1943 and for the single month of July 1944, leaving

a gap from May 1943 through June 1944. The chronology, apparently prepared in late 1944 by Maj.

Harry S. Traynor, a Manhattan staff officer, is based

not only on sources cited in this volume but also on

certain other materials not available to the present

author.
46 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

have received only limited data on developments during the summer of

1942; Vannevar Bush submitted only

one formal report to Harvey Bundy,

the Secretary's special assistant for

scientific affairs. To what extent Vice

President Henry A. Wallace received

information on atomic developments

is unclear; the Top Policy Group did

not meet during this period and there

is no other indication that reports

were sent to Wallace. Even the President's information and activities were

evidently limited to the question of

nuclear collaboration with Great Britain, and he seems to have discussed

that only with Bush. In effect, then,

the S-1 Executive Committee and

Manhattan District were free to act on

any mutually approved decision.

Their scientific or military superiors

could always exercise the right of

veto, but in the summer of 1942 they

apparently did not do so. Only later,

when major changes were to be made

in the atomic energy program, would

they once more actively enter the

picture.12

Army-OSRD Planning Meeting,

25 June 1942

On the occasion of the first meeting of the S-1 Executive Committee,

convened at the Carnegie Institution

in Washington, D.C., on 25 June

1942, General Styer, Colonels Marshall and Nichols, Vannevar Bush,

and the regular members of the committee reached several important decisions regarding site selection, contracting with engineering firms, and

obtaining government priorities for

needed materials and equipment.13

War Department policy normally

required location of new munitions

plants out of range of enemy carrierbased planes, in a great inland zone

between the Appalachian and Rocky

Mountains and approximately 200

miles from the nation's borders with

Canada and Mexico.14 General Styer

stated that the main atomic energy installations should be placed within

this zone and that, to ensure secrecy,

all manufacturing plants should be

built at a single site. The group generally agreed with Styer on plant concentration, which would enable rapid

and economical construction and facilitate control over the work. To support the extensive facilities, a continuous supply of approximately 150,000

kilowatts of electricity would be

needed by the end of 1943 and hundreds of thousands of gallons of

water per minute. There would have

to be a climate suitable for construction in winter, a ready supply of

labor, an accessibility to transportation, a relative immunity from enemy

attack, and a terrain cut up by ridges

that would limit the effects of any accidental explosion.

Some steps for finding a satisfactory site already had been taken. An

OSRD-directed study group in early

April had picked out an area near

Knoxville, close to the region under

intensive development by the Tennes12

 Smyth Report, pp. 58-60; Stimson Diary for

summer of 1942, HLS; Memo, Bush to Bundy, 29

Aug 42, HB Files, Fldr 58, MDR; 1st Ind, Styer to

Chief of Mil Hist, 15 Aug 61, to Ltr, Chief of Mil

Hist to Styer, 17 Jul 61, CMH.

13

 Subsection based primarily on Marshall Diary,

25 Jun 42, MDR, and DSM Chronology, 25 Jun 42,

Sec. 2(e), OROO. 14

 Lenore Fine and Jesse A. Remington, The Corps

of Engineers: Construction in the United States, U.S. Army

in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office, 1972), pp. 134-35.
ESTABLISHING THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT 47

see Valley Authority, as suitable for

the full-scale centrifuge and diffusion

separation plants. (See Map 1.) About

the same time, members of Arthur

Compton's team at the Metallurgical

Laboratory in Chicago had been seeking a site for the full-scale plutonium

production plant. They seriously

weighed the possibilities of two locations near Chicago, but finally concluded that the Tennessee Valley was

also the best area for their purposes.

In mid-June, Bush expressed his liking

for the Tennessee site to General

Styer, and Colonel Marshall, in one of

his first moves as district engineer,

also discussed its merits with Colonel

Groves. Groves made a quick survey of

the electric power situation and indicated his approval of the Knoxville

area. Thus, Army representatives recommended the Tennessee Valley location for all the large-scale production

plants.15

All scientific leaders at the 25 June

planning meeting accepted this recommendation save Lawrence, who

maintained that the electromagnetic

separation plant ought to be located

closer to his research operations in

California. Bowing to his objections,

the conferees agreed to postpone a

decision on location of the electromagnetic plant, pending further

progress in basic research on this

process. Even though research for the

centrifuge and diffusion methods was

still at a stage where firm planning

for production installations was impractical, the group decided that the

plants for these processes as well as

for the plutonium process would be

located on a 200-square-mile site in

the Tennessee Valley. The Army, the

planning group agreed, should begin

steps at once to select and acquire

this site.

The planners also considered sites

for two other operations. The first

was a pilot plutonium plant required

by the Metallurgical Laboratory. This

plant needed to be within commuting

distance of the laboratory; but, for

reasons of safety and security, it could

not be built in heavily populated Chicago. Consequently, Compton and his

colleagues selected an isolated area

known as the Argonne Forest, a part

of the Cook County Forest Preserve

about 20 miles southwest of the city.

This selection was tentatively approved on 25 June and the next day

Compton and Colonel Nichols

reached final agreement on the general plan for the Argonne site.16

In 1941, the OSRD had sponsored

laboratory tests at Princeton University, under the direction of British

chemist Hugh S. Taylor, to develop a

technique for large-scale production

of heavy water by a hydrogen-water

exchange process. Taylor had found

that this process operated most efficiently when using the electrolytic

method to produce hydrogen. The

Consolidated Mining and Smelting

Company, a Canadian firm, operated

an ammonia plant at Trail on the Columbia River, situated a few miles

15

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, "Clinton Engineer

Works," pp. 2.1-2.6 and Apps. A140-A142, DASA;

Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 154-55; Ltr, Bush to

Styer, 15 Jun 42, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.3,

MDR; Marshall Diary, 19 Jun 42, MDR; Groves, Now

It Can Be Told, pp. 13-14.

16

 Ms, Arthur Compton, "Mr. Fermi, the Argonne

Laboratory and the University of Chicago," 28 Jul

44, p. 1, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 080 (ArgonneUniv of Chicago), MDR; Marshall Diary, 26 Jul 42,

MDR; Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 110-11; MDH,

Bk. 1, Vol. 12, p. 2.5, DASA.

ESTABLISHING THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT 49

north of the Canadian-U.S. border,

that was the largest producer of hydrogen by the electrolytic method in

North America. In an effort to tap

this resource for heavy water, Taylor

met with company officials to discuss

the possibility of Consolidated Mining

allowing its plant to be altered so that

heavy water could be extracted from

the hydrogen supply without using up

any appreciable quantities of the hydrogen. The reaction was favorable.

The OSRD therefore made the final

arrangements and, in May of 1942,

engaged the Boston construction firm

of E. B. Badger and Sons to proceed

with the engineering and design work

on plant alterations. During the 25

June meeting, Army-OSRD representatives approved the plan for Trail

and, on the twenty-sixth, shifted responsibility for construction to the

Army but left the financing and direction of research with the OSRD.17

A few days before the meeting,

Colonel Marshall had talked with

Groves about his urgent need for

competent engineering advice in organizing the atomic project and

Groves had recommended Stone and

Webster. The well-known Boston firm

already was involved in an OSRD

project on the diffusion method and

was currently maintaining a good

record on several contracts for the

Corps of Engineers. Marshall proposed to the Army-OSRD group that

it engage Stone and Webster as architect-engineer-manager for the atomic

project, to monitor site development

and major construction.18

The Army-OSRD conferees approved Marshall's proposal and

agreed that Stone and Webster would

be primarily concerned with site development and housing construction

in Tennessee and with engineering

and building the centrifuge and electromagnetic plants. In addition, the

firm would build the Argonne pilot

plant and, eventually, the full-scale

plutonium production plant. The

group also decided to engage the

M. W. Kellogg Company of New

Jersey. This firm had extensive experience in the design and construction

of petroleum refineries and chemical

installations and was already assisting

the scientific team at Columbia on

diffusion research under an OSRD

contract. Kellogg would take responsibility for the diffusion plant and

Badger and Sons would continue on

the job at Trail.19

The Army-OSRD group decided

that a substantial number of OSRD

research contracts already in operation should be extended at the discretion of the S-1 Executive Committee. To continue these contracts

beyond the end of the fiscal year—

less than a week away—the atomic

program urgently needed $15 million.

Marshall promised to obtain the

money immediately from engineer

funds. This sum represented slightly

less than half of the $31 million included for the OSRD in the program

17

 Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 66-67;

MDH, Bk. 3, "The P-9 Project," Secs. 1-2, passim,

DASA; Marshall Diary, 26 Jun 42, MDR; DSM Chronology, 25 Jun 42, Sec. 2(e), OROO.

18

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 12-13; Marshall

Diary, 25, 27, and 29 June 42, MDR. 19

 DSM Chronology, 25 Jun 42, Sec. 2(a), OROO;

Stephane Groueff, Manhattan Project: The Untold Story

of the Making of the Atomic Bomb (Boston: Little,

Brown and Co., 1967), pp. 22-23.
50 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

approved by President Roosevelt on

17 June. Yet it sufficed, for the Army

gradually took over most OSRD functions in the field of atomic energy

and the $15 million proved to be

more than enough to finance all further OSRD expenditures for the

atomic program.20

The final subject at the ArmyOSRD meeting was the urgent need

to obtain government priorities sufficiently high to ensure a ready supply

of critical materials and equipment.

Some required items were in extremely short supply and the OSRD

was having little success obtaining

them. What was needed, OSRD representatives told Colonel Marshall,

was some means of coordinating their

requirements and gaining the necessary priorities to satisfy them. They

requested that the Army designate a

priorities officer to meet with them

and to establish an office in Washington, D.C. Marshall agreed and indicated that, as a first step, he would

eliminate obvious competition by coordinating Army and OSRD procurement on the atomic project.

The decisions of the Army and

OSRD representatives had served to

inaugurate officially a new phase in

the atomic energy program, a period

of Army-OSRD cooperation that

would last until late spring of 1943.

Progress in Research and Development

For Colonel Marshall and his Manhattan District associates, the summer

of 1942 was a period of organization

and planning to lay groundwork

for developing an unprecedented

weapon. The scope of the problem

was broad. To the normal administrative headaches of setting up a very

large construction and manufacturing

project were added the problems of

expediting and coordinating research,

experimentation, industrial application, and design of a weapon based

on materials that in all probability

would not be available for testing

until the weapon itself had been built.

Of all the problems to be dealt with—

the execution of engineering, construction, and operating contracts; the

selection and acquisition of sites; the

obtaining of large sums of money and

of adequate priorities; the procurement of materials; the maintenance of

security—the first and most basic to

the success of the whole project was

that of continued progress in scientific development. On this rested the

outcome of the entire atomic enterprise. And, in mid-1942, Marshall

found that nearly all problems he

faced were connected in one way or

another with the vital task of research

and experimentation.

The program adopted on 17 June

called for backing all five methods of

producing fissionable materials—until

one or more proved most certain of

success. Thus, each process was subject to intensive research efforts that

summer. Objectives for the centrifuge

process were a pilot plant and, by

January 1944, a full-scale plant producing 100 grams of U-235-enriched

uranium per day. A low-yield pilot

plant and a 1-kilogram-per-day production plant were planned for the

diffusion process and a 5-gram-perday pilot plant and, by late 1943, a

100-gram-per-day production plant

for the electromagnetic process. The

20

 Marshall Diary, 29-30 Jun 42, MDR; Stewart,

Organizing Scientific Research for War, p. 123.
ESTABLISHING THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT 51

plutonium project needed a 100-

gram-per-day production plant, as

well as heavy water plants producing

0.5 tons per month by May 1943.21

The diffusion and centrifuge methods, which had seemed most promising the previous autumn, now appeared less certain than the others.

And of the pile and electromagnetic

processes, the latter appeared to offer

the best immediate hope.

Although the feasibility of the gaseous diffusion method had been demonstrated, two major problems stood

in the way of achieving large-scale

separation of uranium isotopes. First

was development of a material that

would be sufficiently porous to permit

passage of uranium hexafluoride

through thousands of stages, as well

as be resistant to the exceptional corrosiveness of this gas and suitable for

fabrication by mass production methods. The second was to design and

manufacture corrosion-resistant mechanical equipment—a variety of

pumps, valves, seals, and instruments—to move the gas through

miles of pipe, maintaining required

vacuum conditions, temperatures, and

pressures.

These problems were being studied

mainly at Columbia University under

John Dunning and Harold Urey, but

also by the M. W. Kellogg Company,

whose chief concern was major production of diffusion equipment and,

eventually, construction of a full-scale

plant. At a meeting of the OSRD S-1

Executive Committee on 30 July

1942, Urey reported his hope that the

diffusion method would be producing

enough enriched uranium by the fall

of 1944 to begin using that material

in an atomic weapon.22

Work on the centrifuge process was

going equally slow. Under the general

direction of Eger Murphree, theoretical and experimental research continued at Columbia University and the

University of Virginia, respectively;

design and development at the Westinghouse Research Laboratories, a

subsidiary of the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company; and

engineering studies at the Standard

Oil Development Company. Feasibility of the method had long been demonstrated, but major technical and

mechanical difficulties prevented

rapid progress. Nevertheless, a pilot

plant had been designed at Standard

Oil and actual production of parts

and models for the pilot plant was

under way at Westinghouse. Like the

diffusion process, the centrifuge process would require many hundreds of

stages to achieve large-scale separation. Also by Murphree's estimate, the

centrifuge method could not produce

a sufficient amount of enriched uranium for use in atomic weapons before

autumn of 1944.23

Of all the programs in progress

that summer, perhaps the most extensive was the pile process for manufacturing plutonium under the leadership of Arthur Compton at the

University of Chicago. The objectives

of the Chicago program were to

prove experimentally that a chain re21

 Ltr, Bush to President, 17 Jun 42, and Incl, HB

Files, Fldr 6, MDR.

22

 Smyth Report, pp. 125-35; MDH, Bk. 2, Vol. 3,

"Design," pp. 2.1-2.2, DASA; DSM Chronology,

30 Jul 42, Sec. 2(e), OROO; Compton, Atomic Quest,

p. 152. 23

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4, "Auxiliary Activities," pp.

14.1-14.24, DASA; DSM Chronology, 30 Jul and

26 Aug 42, each Sec. 2(e), OROO; Marshall Diary,

24-26 and 28 Aug 42, MDR.
52 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

action was actually possible, then to

devise a means to produce plutonium

on a large scale and extract it chemically from uranium, to work out the

necessary data for bringing about an

explosive chain reaction with either

plutonium or U-235, and, finally, to

design the atomic bomb itself. Investigations into all of these problems

were being conducted simultaneously

by large research staffs at the University of Chicago and other institutions.24

 One particularly important

group at the University of California

(Berkeley) had been organized in

June by J. Robert Oppenheimer, then

widely regarded as "the leader of theoretical aspects of atomistics and

similar subjects of physics."

 25

 Under

Oppenheimer's direction a number of

the nation's ablest theoretical physicists undertook a study that, in Oppenheimer's words, "for the first time

really came to grips with the physical

problems of atomic bombs, atomic

explosions to initiate thermonuclear

reactions." By the latter he meant the

possibility of a hydrogen bomb, a

matter that he raised with Compton

and Bush that summer and that was

to lie heavy on his mind for many

years to come.26

The University of Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory staff also devoted

most of its energies to theoretical

studies. Lack of basic materials—uranium, plutonium, highly purified

graphite, and heavy water—made any

extensive experimentation program

impossible. Nevertheless, at the

30 July meeting of the S-1 Committee, Compton estimated that plutonium would be ready for use in an

atomic weapon by fall of 1944.27 The

process that appeared to offer the

best hope for producing fissionable

materials was the electromagnetic

method under study at Princeton and

at the University of California (Berkeley), where Lawrence's work with the

giant 184-inch magnet attracted the

most attention. As with other approaches, this method had been faced

with major technical difficulties, but

as the months passed Lawrence enthusiastically reported success in

meeting and overcoming these problems. Most important, he had actually achieved the separation of small

amounts of U-235, even though only

in milligram quantities.28

A visit in late July to Berkeley by

Colonel Marshall and Stone and

Webster representatives convinced

them that, in Marshall's words, "Lawrence's method is ahead of the

other[s] . . . and should be exploited

to the fullest without delay." The

colonel was anxious that work on "a

sizeable pilot plant," as well as a fullscale production plant, begin as soon

as possible.29 The S-1 Committee ap24

 Account of work carried out at Chicago based

on Compton's book Atomic Quest, pp. 80-98; Smyth

Report, pp. 63-74; Testimony of Oppenheimer in

Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter of J. Robert

Oppenheimer: Transcript of Hearing Before Personnel Security Board (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1954), pp. 11-12 and 27-28. 25

 Testimony of Bush in Oppenheimer Hearing, p.

563.

26

 Quotation from Ltr, Oppenheimer to Nichols,

4 Mar 54, Oppenheimer Hearing, p. 11. See also

Memo, Bush to Bundy, 29 Aug 42, HB Files, Fldr

58, MDR.

27

 Smyth Report, p. 67; DSM Chronology, 30 Jul

42, Sec. 2(e) OROO. 28

 Discussion of electromagnetic process based on

Marshall Diary, 9, 20, 30-31 Jul and 5, 17-19, 22

Aug 42, MDR; Smyth Report, pp. 136-41 and 143-

45; DSM Chronology, 9 and 30 Jul 42, each Sec.

2(e), OROO. 29

 Marshall Diary, 20 Jul 42, MDR.
ESTABLISHING THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT 53

proved Colonel Marshall's recommendation on 30 July and decided that

the Army, rather than the OSRD,

would be responsible for building the

pilot plant on land rented from the

University of California. Lawrence estimated that material from the electromagnetic process would be ready

to go into an atomic weapon by the

spring of 1944.

In mid-August, Colonel Nichols visited Berkeley and gave his tentative

approval to plans for the pilot plant.

With him was Maj. Thomas T. Crenshaw, whose job it was to set up the

new California Area Engineers Office

of the Manhattan District, to support

and assist Lawrence, and to represent

Colonel Marshall during construction

and operation of the pilot plant. Nichols felt that Lawrence was "making

great progress and that the whole

project should be pushed into fullscale production as fast as possible,"

an opinion with which Lawrence

agreed wholeheartedly. Indeed, because Lawrence's only question concerned the actual efficiency of the

separation units, he felt that construction of the full-scale production plant

should be started concurrently with

that of the pilot installation.30

At the 26 August meeting of the

S-1 Committee, both August C.

Klein, Stone and Webster's chief mechanical engineer, and Colonel Marshall supported Lawrence's proposal,

and there was general agreement,

based upon Lawrence's optimistic

report, that the electromagnetic

method would probably be first to

yield material in substantial amounts.

The plutonium process, though progressing satisfactorily, was still

months away from even the pilot

plant stage and the other methods

lagged even further behind. Had a

decision been made at this time to

back a single horse in the nuclear

race and to scratch the others, Lawrence very likely would have been the

one rider left on the course.

Yet no one was certain that the

electromagnetic method would prove

to be the best process in the long

run. In fact, the group conjectured

that the ultimate full-scale plant

would probably have several times the

capacity of the contemplated electromagnetic production plant and was

likely to be comprised of a combination of methods, with one process

producing enriched uranium and the

electromagnetic method providing the

final stage of separation. They

thought a decision to proceed with an

electromagnetic production plant was

unrealistic and might be interpreted

as a final decision in favor of the electromagnetic process, causing the development of the other methods to be

slowed down—or even eliminated.

At last the conferees at the 26 August meeting agreed to continue work

as rapidly as possible on the four

pilot plants and on the production of

heavy water at Trail. A start on a fullscale plutonium production plant

would be delayed, pending the outcome of experiments at the Argonne

pilot plant. Design and construction

of an electromagnetic production

plant would be postponed until midSeptember, when the S-1 Committee

was to visit the Berkeley project and

make further recommendations. Van30

 Quotation from Marshall Diary, 17-18 Aug 42,

MDR. See also Memo, Crenshaw to Dist Engr, sub:

Weekly Progress Rpt, 22 Aug 42, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 001 (Mtgs), MDR.
54 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

nevar Bush approved these conclusions and passed them on to Secretary Stimson with the warning that the

time would soon be at hand for a

major decision on the extent of the

effort the United States should make

on the atomic energy program.31

31

 Marshall Diary, 26 Aug 42, MDR; DSM Chronology, 26 Aug 42, Sec. 2(e), OROO; Memo, Bush

to Bundy, 29 Aug 42, HB Files, Fldr 58, MDR.
CHAPTER III

First Steps for Weapon

Development

In those incredibly busy two

months following the planning meeting of 25 June 1942, the military leaders—working closely with project scientists and technicians—energetically

set about not only to organize the

operational requirements for the

Army's administration of the project

but also to carry out the specific steps

for development of an atomic

weapon. On the twenty-sixth Maj.

Gen. Eugene Reybold, chief of the

Corps of Engineers, held a briefing

with Brig. Gen. Thomas M. Robins,

the assistant chief; Col. Leslie R.

Groves, the deputy assistant; Col.

James C. Marshall, the new district

engineer; and Lt. Col. Kenneth D.

Nichols, the deputy district engineer.

During the session Reybold reviewed

some of the immediate problems of

the atomic project, placing special

emphasis on two that required

prompt action: selection and acquisition of a site for atomic production

facilities in the Tennessee Valley, and

securing a contract with the Stone

and Webster Engineering Corporation to serve as architect-engineermanager (AEM).

Securing an Architect-Engineer-Manager

Consistent with Army policy that

the industrial operator of a proposed

installation should have a strong voice

in selection of the specific site, the

district engineer gave his first attention to securing a working agreement

with Stone and Webster, which was

slated to have the chief responsibility

for the Tennessee plants.1 Following

Colonel Marshall's orders, Colonel

Nichols went to New York on Saturday, 27 June, to visit Stone and Webster President John R. Lotz. Nichols

outlined the role projected for the

firm and Lotz responded enthusiastically. The following Monday, Lotz

and other company officials met with

Robins, Groves, Marshall, and Nichols

in Washington, D.C. Lotz assured

them the AEM job would not seriously interfere with the firm's work on

other important Corps of Engineers

contracts and that the firm could

meet the strict security requirements

of the atomic project. The group then

drew up a letter of intent, which Lotz

1

 Marshall Diary, 26 Jun 42, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, Groves Files, Misc Recs Sec, behind Fldr 5,

MDR; Fine and Remington, Corps of Engineers: Construction, p. 135.
56 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

and Marshall signed, authorizing

Stone and Webster to begin work immediately on preliminary investigations and surveys, procurement of

supplies, and initiation of design. The

following afternoon, Vannevar Bush,

director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD),

gave the Stone and Webster representatives a thorough explanation of

the technical processes involved in

the atomic project. This completed

the preliminary discussions.

Stone and Webster now became the

Army's agent for managing the

atomic energy project, charged with

overseeing and subcontracting all research and development, procurement, engineering, and construction

that fell within the Army's sphere of

responsibility. Company officials established a separate engineering

group to operate with the utmost secrecy under the direct control of the

firm's senior engineers. Project leaders had hoped that a single company

could perform all AEM tasks; however, by the time Stone and Webster

signed the formal contract (backdated

to 29 June) several months later, the

Army had to seek the assistance of

other major firms to share with Stone

and Webster the vast and complex

job.2

Obtaining Funds

The Stone and Webster agreement

required immediate funds. The approved program had allotted $85 million—$54 million for the Army Corps

of Engineers and $31 million for the

OSRD—but had not indicated the

source of this money.3 An effort in

early June to obtain this sum from the

President's Emergency Fund was unsuccessful. Marshall's pressing financial obligations totaled $38 million:

$10 million to cover the letter of

intent issued to Stone and Webster,

$15 million to repay the sum advanced to the OSRD, $6 million for

site acquisition, $2 million for the

projected Argonne pilot plant, and $5

million for the purchase of materials.

He also required "practically unlimited authority," as he put it, to spend

it.4

By 16 July, Marshall was able to arrange for an allotment from the

Office of the Chief of Engineers, specifically from the Engineer ServiceArmy category of available funds. The

$15 million for the OSRD had already

been provided, $5 million was furnished immediately, and the remainder became available a few weeks

later at the time of the formal allocation of the total sum. Marshall also

received assurances from the War Department's budget officer that all restrictions on the use of these funds

that could legally be removed had

been set aside. These included regulations on establishing title to property, the placing of government contracts, employment in the United

States and abroad, rentals and im2

 Marshall Diary, 27, 29-30 Jun and 1 Jul-23 Oct

42, MDR; Completion Rpt, Stone and Webster, sub:

Clinton Engr Works, Contract W-7401-eng-13,

1946, pp. 6 and 143, OROO; Stone and Webster, A

Report to the People: Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation in World War II ([Boston]: Stone and Webster,

1946), pp. 9-13; Smyth Report, p. 28.

3

 Ltr, Bush to President, 17 Jun 42, and Incl, HB

Files, Fldr 6, MDR. 4

 Marshall Diary, 10 Jul 42, MDR. Section on

funds based on entries in ibid, for 29-30 Jun, 9-11

and 16 Jul 42; Memo, Marshall to Groves, sub: Allotment of Additional Funds to MD, 29 Sep 42,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 110 (Appropriations),

MDR; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 15-16.
FIRST STEPS FOR WEAPON DEVELOPMENT 57

provements of property, and several

other controls. Colonel Marshall appeared to be well on the way to attaining the fiscal means and independence that the atomic project

required.

Securing a Priority Rating

Even as fiscal problems eased, the

atomic project encountered serious

difficulties on the matter of priorities.

In the summer of 1942, competition

for critical materials was strong and

unremitting as America prepared to

halt the worldwide Axis offensive.

With these conditions prevailing,

Colonel Marshall soon realized that

access to the scarce supplies and

equipment needed for atomic research, construction, and production

might be blocked unless he could

secure a high-priority rating for the

project.

In the wartime economy, the establishment of priorities for military and

civilian demands was the responsibility of the War Production Board

(WPB), succinctly characterized by

one World War II historian as "the

supreme industrial mobilization control agency."

 5 The Army and Navy

Munitions Board (ANMB) administered the priority system for military

and related agencies, theoretically

subject to WPB approval, but in 1942

the War Department's Services of

Supply (SOS) gradually began to take

over the ANMB's responsibilities relating to the Army. The SOS, particularly through its staff divisions for requirements and resources that formed

the ANMB's Army Section, controlled

and coordinated all War Department

procurement activities. SOS officers,

moreover, served on WPB committees. For example, Brig. Gen. Lucius

D. Clay, the SOS deputy chief of staff

for requirements and resources, had

an important voice in the establishment of policy and would play a key

role in the matter of assigning priorities to the atomic project.

Major programs received ratings of

AA-1 through AA-4, in decreasing

order of precedence, whereas lesser

projects received ratings in a more

extensive category, the highest designation of which was A-1-a. A special

top rating of AAA, reserved for emergencies, could not be assigned to an

entire program but was limited to

expediting delivery of small quantities of critical items. Although the

program approved by President

Roosevelt did not mention a specific

priority designation for the new

project, it did imply that the program

should be given a relatively high

rating, which was to be balanced

against the needs of other critical

projects.6 When Colonels Marshall

and Nichols met with General Clay on

30 June, they requested only an AA

rating—without, apparently, asking

for a specific classification within that

category. Marshall assured Clay that

the project "would issue such lower

ratings as were possible whenever we

did not need the A."

 7 General Clay,

5

 R. Elberton Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington,

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 517.

Discussion of DSM priority problems based primarily on Marshall Diary, 25 Jun-16 Sep 42, MDR; DSM

Chronology, Jun-Sep 42, Sec. 18, OROO; Memo,

Bush to Bundy, 29 Aug 42, HB Files, Fldr 58, MDR;

Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 16 and 22-23.

6

 Ltr, Bush to President, 17 Jun 42, and Incl,

MDR. 7

 Marshall Diary, 30 Jun 42, MDR.
58 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

who had known Marshall since their

days as West Point classmates, told

Marshall and Nichols that all DSM requests would be given prompt attention and the highest preference in

processing, and that he personally

would take immediate steps to obtain

an AA rating for the project and

would be available at any time for any

specific request.

Despite Clay's assurances, nearly

two weeks passed with no priority

rating forthcoming. Finally, on 13

July, following some persistent prodding by Colonel Nichols, the ANMB

approved a rating of AA-3 for the

atomic project.8 This rating, with

which Clay concurred, came as a

grave disappointment. It was based,

however, on an ANMB directive that

limited AA-1 and AA-2 ratings to the

most essential and urgently needed

weapons and equipment—airplanes,

ships, guns, and tanks scheduled for

production in 1942. Even AA-3 ratings were reserved for those items of

military equipment and construction

that constituted an essential part of

the 1942 program or were required in

1942 for the 1943 program. Under

the circumstances, a rating of AA-3

was the highest the atomic project

could have received. Indeed, given

the as yet unproved nature of the

project, the cautious estimates of how

long it might take to produce atomic

weapons, and the absence of a specific presidential directive assigning it a

high priority, the wonder is that the

atomic program fared as well as it

did. Because the ANMB was limiting

AA-1 and AA-2 ratings, Clay told the

protesting Nichols that an AA-3

should be adequate for the atomic

project. If difficulties did arise, he

promised the project could obtain an

AAA priority to pry loose certain

critical items. With this assurance, the atomic project leaders had to be

satisfied.

The anticipated problems were not

long in appearing. Badger and Sons

soon reported that the heavy water

reconversion work on the Trail plant

was coming into competition with its

commitments in the synthetic rubber

program. Both projects had an AA-3

rating, with the rubber program

having first choice on materials and

skilled workmen because of its earlier

start. By mid-August 1942, Badger officials estimated the Trail plant would

probably not go into operation until

August 1943, although an AA-1

rating might better this date by at

least two or three months. This, however, would cause a delay in the

rubber program and, as S-1 Committee Chairman James B. Conant pointed out to Colonel Nichols, it would

be bad politics to push for a higher

priority at Trail at the expense of

such a critical project as synthetic

rubber. As a matter of fact, General

Clay had already indicated his opposition to such a move. Thus, for the

moment, the best policy seemed to be

to go ahead at Trail under the AA-3

rating.

Procurement was generally an S-1

Executive Committee responsibility,

and only when the OSRD was unable

to secure the necessary priorities did

it turn to the Army for help. During

8

 Written confirmation came ten days later. 1st

Ind, Col Joseph L. Phillips (Priorities Br chief, Resources Div, SOS) to Chief of Engrs, 23 Jul 42, to

Ltr, Nichols to Priorities Div, ANMB, Attn: Col Phillips, sub: Preference Rating [for] DSM Proj, 23 Jul

42, in MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 9, "Priorities Program,"

App. A3, DASA.
FIRST STEPS FOR WEAPON DEVELOPMENT 59

July, difficulties in obtaining small but

essential quantities of scarce materials

held back progress on important experimental work. Two much-needed

nickel shipments totaling less than 85

pounds, for example, were threatened

with a delay of several months and

were only cleared for delivery after

two weeks of effort by OSRD members, General Clay, and Maj. Gen.

Wilhelm D. Styer, the SOS chief of

staff.9

On 30 July, the S-1 Committee

raised this problem with Colonels

Marshall and Nichols, and the group

decided to urge OSRD Director Vannevar Bush to ask WPB Chairman

Donald Nelson for a blanket AA-1

priority for all atomic project orders

below a value of $1,500 or $2,000, to

eliminate bottlenecks without interfering unduly with other wartime programs. The next day Marshall, accompanied by Nichols, went again to see

General Clay, making one last attempt to secure the desired rating

before going over his head. Clay repeated that the atomic project was entitled to no higher rating than AA-3,

except in very few specific instances,

and said he would oppose any effort

to secure a blanket AA-1 rating. That

afternoon, Marshall, Nichols, Conant,

and others met with Bush, emerging

with an agreement that the OSRD director would confer with the WPB

chairman. Receptive to Bush's proposal, Nelson promised to discuss the

matter further with Army Chief of

Staff General George C. Marshall, but

whether or not he actually did is unclear. In the end, the matter was referred back to the ANMB, which still

refused to grant a higher rating but

worked out a procedure that eliminated the bottleneck on small orders.

Meanwhile, the priorities situation

worsened. Securing materials became

progressively more difficult. Steel, for

example, would soon be virtually unobtainable with less than an AA-2

rating. Without access to this basic

material, the atomic project would

come to a standstill. Marshall was already receiving reports of delays in

plant construction and, in midAugust, the ANMB questioned continued assignment of even an AA-3

priority to the Trail project. Prompt

action by General Clay ended that

threat, however.

On 26 August, Marshall, Nichols,

and Stone and Webster representatives met with the S-1 Executive

Committee, and again priorities were

a major topic. Most small orders were

now being handled without undue

delay, but there was serious general

concern about the large-scale procurement soon to be required for the

production plants. A limited number

of firms had the organization and experience needed to build and operate

the major facilities, and they were all

heavily engaged on other AA-3 programs for which orders had been

placed before atomic project orders.

The only way to push ahead of other

programs was to get a higher priority.

With an AA-1 priority, the electromagnetic separation pilot plant would

probably be ready by April instead of

August 1943 and earlier completion

dates for other plants would also be

assured. The effect of achieving this

end, however, would be that of delaying the progress of other vital

9

 Correspondence relating to this incident, beginning with Ltr, Styer to Dr. H. T. Wensel (Natl Bur

of Standards), 26 Jun 42, filed in AG 313.3 (22 Aug

47).
60 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

projects. Clearly a decision was

needed, perhaps from the President

himself, on the relative importance of

the atomic project and other war programs. Either atomic energy should

be pushed with a higher priority, or it

should remain an experimental

project for postwar application, with a

lower priority.

As a result of these conclusions, on

29 August Colonel Nichols again

called on General Clay. With concurrence from General Styer, Nichols

now outlined the status of the atomic

energy program and presented the

unanimous opinion of its Army and

OSRD leaders that a higher priority

was necessary. If Clay would indicate

exactly what procedure must be taken

to secure an AA-1 priority from the

ANMB and WPB, Bush would obtain

a letter signed by the President and

addressed to whomever Clay thought

necessary. Clay suggested that a letter

go from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to

the ANMB and that it simply state

that the atomic project should be

granted a higher priority. But he himself opposed this course. He did not

believe that the presidential approval

of 17 June ever implied the granting

of an overall AA-1 rating and he was

convinced that the project was less

important than "tanks and other munitions of war." Clay would support

the AA-3 priority, but nothing higher.

In Nichols's presence, he telephoned

Brig. Gen. Theron D. Weaver—director of the SOS Resources Division

and, thus, the ANMB's senior Army

representative—and directed that the

AA-3 rating assigned to the atomic

project should not be questioned.10

On the same day, Vannevar Bush

wrote to Harvey Bundy, Stimson's

special assistant who served as the

Secretary's personal agent in scientific

affairs. Bush knew that his memorandum would come to Stimson's attention. He summarized the current

status of the atomic energy project

and its plans and hopes for the future

in relation to the problem of priorities. He emphasized that if the

ANMB persisted in its view that Manhattan did not need a higher priority

rating, the entire atomic bomb program would be delayed. The time had

come, he continued, for weighing the

relative importance of the atomic program against other wartime programs

with which it might interfere and, on

that basis, deciding the best way to

expedite its development. "From my

own point of view," he concluded,

"faced as I am with the unanimous

opinion of a group of men that I consider to be among the greatest scientists in the world, joined by highly

competent engineers, I am prepared

to recommend that nothing should

stand in the way of putting this whole

affair through to conclusion, on a reasonable scale, but at the maximum

speed possible, even if it does cause

moderate interference with other war

efforts."

 11

Bundy showed Bush's memorandum to the Secretary a few days later,

10

 Marshall Diary, 29 Aug 42, MDR. Quoted

phrase in Nichols's recollection, recorded in the

diary, of what Clay told him. 11

 Memo, Bush to Bundy, 29 Aug 42, MDR. On

Harvey Bundy's position in Stimson's office see

Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active

Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and

Brothers, 1947), pp. 343-44. Harvey Bundy, a

Boston lawyer, served as Assistant Secretary of State

under Stimson, from 1929 to 1933.
FIRST STEPS FOR WEAPON DEVELOPMENT 61

but there is no indication that Stimson took any immediate action.12

Meanwhile, Stone and Webster representatives reported that steel companies had reacted negatively to their

attempts to place orders and the

ANMB warned Manhattan officers

that the rating was scarcely sufficient

to secure the steel needed for the

projected electromagnetic pilot plant.

Stone and Webster experienced a

similar response to its efforts to

obtain copper required for the Trail

project. Capt. Allan C. Johnson, assigned in August to head the project's

liaison office in Washington, D.C.,

found that WPB and ANMB officials

viewed the AA-3 rating as indicating

that the atomic bomb program was,

as he phrased it, "an unimportant

miscellaneous type."13 On 12 September, Marshall asked the ANMB for

an AAA rating for the Trail copper.

Three days later, backed by Colonel

Groves, the district engineer went to

see General Weaver of the ANMB

and the following day the board assigned the rating, but only with the

understanding that the metal would

be drawn from the normal quota of

the Corps of Engineers. Unfortunately this delayed other engineer

projects, but Marshall had no alternative. His action opened the way for

the work at Trail to proceed on

schedule.

Despite the victory on copper procurement for Trail, there was universal agreement among those concerned with the atomic energy program that improvement in the whole

priorities picture was an absolute necessity if the entire project was not to

founder. Groves felt that DSM leaders

would be able to justify a higher priority rating only after sites were definitely selected, plans were firmly

adopted, and actual construction was

under way. He urged Marshall to

move ahead on these matters with all

possible speed. As chairman of the

S-1 Executive Committee, Conant

had concluded that nuclear developments had become more important

than the highly rated synthetic rubber

program and now believed that they

should be given preference. Bush,

too, saw the immediate need and

called for assignment of a higher priority. The problem in mid-September

1942, as Groves later recalled it, was

"quite simple." If atomic energy "was

really the most urgent project, it

should have the top priority."

 14

 The

solution to this problem was not far

off, but it would not come before the

atomic project itself had undergone

major organizational changes.

Procuring Essential Materials

Certain materials essential to the

program had never been in sufficient

demand for industrial or commercial

use to have been produced in quantities. At the time the Army entered the

atomic project, three such materials

were urgently required: processed

uranium feed material (chemical compounds and metal), highly purified

graphite, and heavy water. The Manhattan District had to develop its own

sources of supply for these essential

materials. 12

 Stimson Diary, 1 Sep 42, HLS. 13 Marshall Diary, 2 Sep 42, MDR. 14

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 22.
62 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Uranium

In early 1942, the OSRD S-1 Section's planning board had located sufficient raw uranium ore in North

America to satisfy the anticipated requirements of the project for many

months to come. But the means for

converting this uranium into the various kinds of feed materials needed

for the different methods of producing fissionable materials were almost

wholly lacking. While the OSRD had

taken some steps to secure these materials, the major task of procurement

remained to be carried out by the

Army.

The most immediate demand was

for processed uranium in the form of

metal for the Metallurgical Laboratory. Raw uranium ore is customarily

refined either as uranium oxide, commonly termed black oxide, or as uranium salts. The oxide or the salts can

be converted into metal by additional

processing; however, at the beginning

of 1942, this was still complicated and

expensive and only a limited quantity

was available in the United States—

several grams of good quality produced experimentally by the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing

Company and a few pounds in the

form of pyrophoric powder manufactured by Metal Hydrides, Inc., of Beverly, Massachusetts. Both Westinghouse and Metal Hydrides had obtained the black oxide from the Canadian Radium and Uranium Corporation of New York.

Canadian Radium's source was the

mine owned by Eldorado Gold Mines,

Ltd., at Great Bear Lake in Northwest

Canada (Map 2). Eldorado processed

the ore in its refinery at Port Hope,

Ontario, and then marketed it in the

United States through Canadian

Radium. The mine itself had been

closed and allowed to fill with water

in the summer of 1940, because sufficient ore had been stockpiled to satisfy anticipated demand for five years.

The uranium for early atomic research in the United States had come

from these stockpiles. When the

OSRD placed a sizable order in 1941,

it obtained additional equipment and

supplies for getting the mine back

into operation and, meanwhile, Canadian Radium continued to supply

amounts of black oxide refined from

the stockpiled ores.15

As deliveries increased during the

spring of 1942, project scientists intensified their efforts to develop

better methods of purifying the material and transforming it into metal.

Experiments at the National Bureau

of Standards demonstrated that an

ether process, long known, could

remove all impurities by a single extraction method, greatly simplifying

the conversion of black oxide into

uranium dioxide, or brown oxide, the

starting point for uranium metal production. Arthur Compton arranged

with Edward Mallinckrodt, an old

friend who owned the Mallinckrodt

Chemical Works in St. Louis, to develop large-scale production of brown

oxide, using the ether process. To

ensure an adequate supply of uranium oxide, Colonel Nichols directed

Stone and Webster to buy 350 tons

from Canadian Radium to cover the

project's needs for the year ahead.16

15

 Smyth Report, pp. 65-66; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, p. 65; MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 1, "Feed

Materials and Special Procurement," p. 3.1, DASA. 16

 MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 1, App. F2, DASA; Marshall

Diary, 7 Jul 42; MDR; DSM Chronology, 7 Jul 42, Continued

64 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Thanks to these measures, by the fall

of 1942 Mallinckrodt's production of

brown oxide from Eldorado's ore had

increased sufficiently to supply the

project's requirements. Mallinckrodt

and other chemical firms converted

the brown oxide into uranium tetrafluoride, or green salt, the feed material employed in most uranium metalmaking processes. Westinghouse had

abandoned a photochemical method

in favor of a faster process using

green salt and soon was producing at

a satisfactory rate. At first Metal Hydrides was less successful, failing to

provide a metal of sufficient purity

with pyrophoric powder.

Intensive research during the

summer at Massachusetts Institute of

Technology, Iowa State College, and

the Bureau of Standards had developed new and improved metalmaking techniques. Most important

was a steel-bomb process for reducing green salt to metal, employing

highly purified calcium—and later

magnesium—as a reduction agent. By

early 1943, using this method, Iowa

State had developed a manufacturing

program and Metal Hydrides had significantly increased its output. New

Army contracts with the Electro Metallurgical Company of Niagara Falls,

New York, a subsidiary of Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation, and

with E. I. du Pont de Nemours and

Company further increased production, and the acute metal shortage

was largely relieved by 1944.17

In September 1942, Colonel Marshall placed Capt. John R. Runoff in

charge of all uranium metal production. Runoff had been a chemical engineer at Mallinckrodt, assisting in the

uranium oxide program, and when he

was inducted into the Army that

summer, Manhattan officials had arranged his assignment to the District

as its area engineer in St. Louis, with

headquarters at the Mallinckrodt firm.

Then in October, Marshall formed a

Materials Section in the District office

to administer the whole feed materials program. He selected Lt. Col.

Thomas T. Crenshaw of the California Area Engineers Office to head the

section and had Ruhoff transferred to

New York to serve as Crenshaw's

assistant.18

Meanwhile, project leaders knew

the reopened Eldorado mine would

probably not be able to produce and

ship ore for at least another year and

that stockpiles at the Port Hope refinery were insufficient for the 350 tons

of oxide ordered for the project in

July. They urgently needed a source

that could provide high-grade uranium on short notice. Such a source, in

fact, had long been close at hand.

Late in 1940, when German seizure of

much of Africa appeared likely, Edgar

Sengier—head of Union Miniere with

whom Alexander Sachs of Wall Street

and Harold Urey of Columbia had

earlier conferred—had ordered shipment of approximately 1,200 tons of

high-grade ore from the Shinkolobwe

stockpile in the Congo via Portuguese

West Africa to New York. Storing the

Sec. 20, OROO; Memo, [Ruhoff] to Groves, sub:

Summary of Ore Contracts, 15 Feb 44, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 161 (African Metals), MDR; Compton,

Atomic Quest, pp. 93-95. 17

 MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 1, pp. 10.1-10.9, DASA;

Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 87-88 and

293-94; Memo, Nichols to Groves, 21 Dec 44,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1, MDR; DSM Chronology, 4 Sep 42, Sec. 20, OROO. 18

 MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 1, pp. 1.16-1.17, DASA;

Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 95-96.
FIRST STEPS FOR WEAPON DEVELOPMENT 65

ore in a warehouse in Port Richmond

on Staten Island, Sengier apparently

made no effort to call it to the attention of American government officials

until after the United States entered

the war. Attending a meeting in

Washington, D.C., in March 1942, he

mentioned his Staten Island cache to

Thomas K. Finletter and Herbert

Feis, State Department officials concerned with international economic

affairs, but neither state nor defense

officials indicated any immediate interest in the ore—why is not entirely

clear. Nevertheless, it was soon

common knowledge in trade circles

that Sengier was interested in selling

the ore.19

It was early September 1942, however, before word of the Congo ore

reached Manhattan District officials.

The Standard Oil Development Company, working on the centrifuge process, had opened negotiations with

Sengier for procurement of the uranium oxide it needed. Through

Standard Oil, Metallurgical Laboratory staff members learned of the

Staten Island ore and sought to purchase additional quantities. Through

his Union Miniere outlet in New

York, the African Metals Corporation,

Sengier had submitted a request to

the State Department for a license to

ship ore from Port Richmond to Eldorado's refinery in Ontario, for

processing into black oxide. On 7

September, Colonel Nichols received

a query from Finletter concerning the

request from African Metals—his first

inkling of the existence of the Congo

ore. Nichols acted promptly; he met

with Finletter and Feis at the State

Department on 12 September and

then dispatched Captain Ruhoff to

consult with Stone and Webster in

Boston and Sengier in New York,

while he himself hurried to California

for the meeting of the OSRD S-1 Executive Committee on the thirteenth

and fourteenth. The committee recommended that all Sengier's ore be

acquired.20 Thus, at just the time

when an acute shortage of uranium

threatened to seriously delay the

atomic project, the store of rich

Congo ore became available to provide most of its wartime

requirements.

Graphite, Heavy Water, and Silver

Either highly purified graphite or

heavy water to use as a moderator in

the atomic pile was essential for the

plutonium program and the other

work under way at the Metallurgical

Laboratory. Ample graphite was already being produced commercially

in the United States; the question was

one of "purity and priority." The

main quality required in the graphite

was low-neutron absorption, which

was directly dependent on its purity.

Unfortunately, the standard product

had too many impurities, particularly

boron. Scientists at the National

Bureau of Standards traced the boron

in commercial graphite to the coke

used for its production. By substituting petroleum for coke and altering

certain manufacturing techniques,

both National Carbon Company and

Speer Carbon Company were soon 19

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 33-35; Hewlett

and Anderson, New World, pp. 85-86; Lewis L.

Strauss, Men and Derisions (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1962), pp. 181-82.

20

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 36; Marshall

Diary, 7 and 12-13 Sep 42, MDR; DSM Chronology,

13 Sep 42, Secs. 2(e) and 20, OROO.
66 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

producing highly purified graphite

that absorbed 20 percent fewer neutrons and satisfied the stringent requirements of the Metallurgical Laboratory. With the WPB's cooperation

in arranging the necessary priorities,

the OSRD was able to place large

orders with these firms, essentially

solving the atomic energy program's

graphite problem.21

Heavy water was another matter.

Scientific leaders knew that heavy

water could not be available in large

quantities for many months or even

years. Researchers at the Metallurgical Laboratory had directed their primary interest toward developing a

uranium-graphite pile, viewing heavy

water as an alternate solution should

the problems with graphite prove

insuperable. Meanwhile, the OSRD

moved ahead with its plans for a

heavy water plant at Trail (see Map 2),

but priority difficulties delayed construction and the plant did not begin

operating until June 1943.22

A store of approximately 400

pounds—almost all the heavy water in

the world outside of that being produced by the German-controlled

Norsk Hydro plant in southern

Norway—was in the hands of British

scientists. This heavy water had an interesting history. Nuclear research in

France by Frederic Joliot-Curie and

his collaborators, Hans von Halban

and Lew Kowarski, had concentrated

on using heavy water as a moderator

to achieve a slow-neutron reaction. In

March 1940, just before the German

attack on Norway, Joliot-Curie had secured about 160 to 165 liters (169 to

174 quarts) of heavy water from

Norsk Hydro. Shortly before the fall

of Paris in mid-June, he sent von

Halban and Kowarski with most of

this precious store to England, where,

after a hazardous trip, the two men

joined the growing team of British

and refugee scientists doing atomic

research. Work with this stock of

heavy water had contributed to the

optimistic British reports on a uranium-heavy water system. When the

group relocated to Canada at the end

of 1942, the heavy water went

along.23

The need for large quantities of

silver had not been anticipated. At

the Army-OSRD meeting on 9 July,

Ernest Lawrence of the University of

California, Berkeley, pointed out that

he needed several thousand tons of

copper for magnet coils. Because

copper was high on the list of critical

materials and might be impossible to

obtain, he thought that silver, a good

electrical conductor and not on the

critical materials list, would do as

well. Accordingly, Colonel Nichols

21

 Smyth Report, pp. 65-68 (quotation from p.

68); Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 97-98; MDH, Bk. 1,

Vol. 4, "Auxiliary Activities," pp. 12.7-12.9, DASA. 22

 Smyth Report, p. 65; Compton, Atomic Quest, pp.

79 and 98-99; Marshall Diary, MDR, and DSM

Chronology, OROO, for the summer of 1942,

passim; MDH, Bk. 3, "The P-9 Project," pp. 4.1-4.7

and 5.4, DASA.

23

 H. D. Smyth, "British Information Service

Statement, 'Britain and the Atomic Bomb,'

August 12, 1945," in Atomic Energy for Military Purposes, 8th ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University

Press, 1948), p. 276; Cowing, Britain and Atomic

Energy, pp. 49-51; Crowther and Whiddington, Science at War, pp. 144-45 and 148; Sir George Thomson, "Anglo-U.S. Cooperation on Atomic Energy,"

American Scientist, 41 (Jan 53): 77-78 and 80; Glasstone, Sourcebook on Atomic Energy, 3d ed. (Princeton,

N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1967), n. on p. 513. The

figure given for the amount of heavy water that the

French secured from Norsk Hydro varies somewhat

in the different accounts. Most state that there were

about 160 to 165 liters, an amount that would have

weighed about 176 to 182 kilograms (388 to 410

pounds).
FIRST STEPS FOR WEAPON DEVELOPMENT 67

visited Under Secretary of the Treasury Daniel W. Bell to find out if silver

would be available. Although Nichols

did not provide specific details of the

DSM project, Bell appeared receptive.

"How much silver do you want?" he

asked. "About fifteen thousand tons,"

answered Nichols. Visibly startled,

Bell exclaimed: "Young man, ... I

would have you know that when we

talk of silver we speak in terms of

ounces."

 24

Ounces or tons, that the DSM

project would get what it wanted was

soon clear. With relatively good

speed, considering the need for secrecy and the number of clearances required, the Department of the Treasury, the ANMB, and the WPB approved the necessary arrangements.

On 29 August, in a letter to Secretary

of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau,

drafted jointly by Manhattan and

Treasury representatives, Secretary of

War Stimson requested the transfer

of 175 million fine troy ounces (about

6,000 tons of silver) "to the War Department to be used as a substitute

for copper" for an "important

project" that was "highly secret." "At

this time," read Stimson's letter, "the

interests of the Government do not

permit my disclosing the nature of

the use."

 25

The endorsement of the Treasury

Department on a second letter that

day constituted an agreement between the two agencies for the transfer. It provided that the silver would

remain in the United States; would be

returned to the Treasury in five years,

or sooner if required; would be utilized in government-owned plants essential to the war effort; and would

be protected against loss. Subsequent

agreements in 1943 and 1944 would

raise the quantity involved to roughly

14,700 tons, worth about $304 million.26

 Under constant heavy guard,

the bars of silver were transferred—

after being melted, cast in cylindrical

billets, rolled into strips, and finally

fabricated into magnet coils. Because

the electromagnetic process seemed

the most promising in the summer of

1942, this turn of events was indeed

encouraging.

Site Selection

Project leaders in the summer of

1942 were well aware that acquisition

of suitable sites was as important to

the success of the atomic program as

obtaining adequate priorities. At the

Army-OSRD meeting of 25 June, they

had confirmed an earlier decision to

build a heavy water plant at the Trail

site and approved location of the proposed plutonium pilot plant in the

Argonne Forest near Chicago. The

Army delayed actual acquisition of a

specific area in the Argonne Forest

preserve pending receipt of further

24

 As related by Compton, Atomic Quest, p. 157.

Subsection based on Marshall Diary, 9 Jul-29 Aug

42, MDR; MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 4, "Silver Program,"

DASA; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 107-09.

Groves gives the impression that Marshall himself

visited Under Secretary Bell, but Marshall's 3 Aug

42 entry in his diary indicates that he sent Nichols

to confer with Bell on the question of securing

silver for the Manhattan Project. 25

 Ltr, Stimson to Secy Treas, 29 Aug 42, in

MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 4, App. B-1, DASA.

26

 The Atomic Energy Commission did not return

the last of the 14,700 tons of silver to the U.S.

Treasury until May 1970, a quarter of a century

later. See news item in Washington Post, 29 May 70.
68 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

SILVER-WOUND MAGNET COILS FOR THE ELECTROMAGNETIC PROCESS

information from the Metallurgical

Laboratory concerning the size of site

needed for the plutonium pilot plant.

In early July, Colonel Nichols obtained clarification of the specific Argonne requirements in discussions

held in Chicago with Stone and Webster officials and Compton and his

staff, opening the way for lease in

August of 1,000 acres from Cook

County. At the same time, the University of Chicago agreed to provide an

additional acre on the campus for

future construction of additional laboratory space. To administer the site

acquisitions and oversee construction

activities, Colonel Marshall established the Chicago Area Engineers

Office in August and assigned Capt.

James F. Grafton as area engineer.27

For the main production plants,

Colonels Marshall and Nichols and

representatives of Stone and Webster

and the Tennessee Valley Authority

(TVA) began a survey of possible

sites in the Knoxville area on 1 July.28

27

 Marshall Diary, 6-7, 10, 13, 17 Jul and 13 Aug

42, MDR; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 2, "Research," Pt. 1,

pp. 2.5-2.7 and 7.2, DASA. 28

 Paragraphs on Tennessee site based on Marshall Diary, 1-3, 9, 10, 14, 15, 23, 29, 31 Jul and 3,

17-19, 26-27 Aug and 2-5, 10 Sep 42, MDR; MDH,

Bk. 1, Vol. 10, "Land Acquisition CEW," pp. 2.3-

2.4 and 2.20-2.21, and Vol. 12, "Clinton Engineer

Works," pp. 2.2-2.4, DASA; DSM Chronology, 9,

30 Jul and 26 Aug 42, each Sec. 2(e), OROO;

Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 15; Memo, Crenshaw

to Dist Engr, sub: Weekly Progress Rpt, 22 Aug 42,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 001 (Mtgs), MDR.
FIRST STEPS FOR WEAPON DEVELOPMENT 69

(See Map 1.) Requisite conditions for

the site were a nearby source of a

large amount of continuous electric

power, enough for a fair-sized city;

availability of a very large quantity of

water for cooling and processing as

well as construction and operating requirements; and proximity to a main

line railroad and good access roads,

to ensure delivery of heavy construction materials and supplies. Topography, too, was important. An area

bounded by natural barriers, such as

rivers and hills, would be securer and

individual plant sites separated by

ridges far safer in case of an explosion, although the slopes of these

ridges should be gentle enough for

easy construction. The substratum

should provide adequate foundation,

yet not be so full of rocks as to make

excavation unnecessarily difficult and

time-consuming. Finally, there should

be adequate and suitable space for a

town with facilities for housing and

serving thousands of workmen and

technicians and their families.

The survey and subsequent investigations filled nearly three days,

during which Colonel Marshall and

his colleagues examined several possible sites. None seemed at first glance

exactly right, but one, at least, had

possibilities. TVA officials seemed

certain that the 150,000-kilowatt

power requirement of the plants

could be met if Marshall could hasten

the delivery of some badly needed

heavy-generating equipment. As

project priorities were indefinite at

this time, Marshall agreed to look

into the matter; however, he emphasized that because an entirely suitable

site had not been found, he would

have to consider an area near Spokane, Washington, where the Bonneville Power Administration might

more easily meet his requirements.

Site problems were a key issue at

the next Army-OSRD meeting on

9 July. John R. Lotz, head of Stone

and Webster, reported that his firm

had surveyed the Spokane area and

concluded that it lacked sufficient

transmission lines to supply the required power. The group reaffirmed

in principle its earlier decision for a

site in Tennessee. Also, Marshall and

the Stone and Webster engineers

agreed that half of the 200 square

miles previously believed necessary

would be adequate, and even a site of

this size would not be required were

it not for the plutonium plant. The

danger of highly radioactive fission

products escaping, or even of a nuclear explosion, dictated building this

plant 2 to 4 miles from any other installation and an equal distance in

from the boundaries of the site.

The 9 July Army-OSRD meeting

ended without a decision on a specific

Tennessee site or any indication of

when one might be made. Nor was

there, for that matter, any clear forecast of scientific developments that

might help determine the choice.

Only a tentative and, as soon became

clear, excessively optimistic construction schedule emerged. As Colonel

Groves pointed out to Colonel Marshall that afternoon, a general air of

vagueness seemed to pervade the

whole atomic project, with the starting dates for development of many of

its phases still too indefinite. He

urged Marshall first to insist upon the

prompt and complete programming

of all contemplated steps and then to

see that this schedule was adhered to

as far as possible. An obvious neces-
70 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

sity was a swift decision on the major

production site.

Shortly thereafter, Marshall and

Stone and Webster officials agreed to

try to obtain a site in Tennessee by

10 August so that construction on the

project administration building and

some housing facilities could begin,

even if plant construction could not.

Stone and Webster drew up a formal

site report on the most promising

area, about 12 miles west of Knoxville, and prepared maps indicating

the exact tracts of land to be acquired. To avoid having a public

highway run through the site, an obvious security hazard, the firm also

studied the possibility of relocating

Tennessee 61, which then crossed the

northern portion of the area. The

Ohio River Division of the Engineer

Department then prepared an appraisal of the cost of acquiring the approximate 83,000 acres in the area,

comprised of land in the Roane,

Loudon, Knox, and Anderson Counties of Tennessee. On 30 July, at the

next Army-OSRD meeting, Colonel

Marshall reviewed the steps taken

toward acquisition of the site and the

entire group agreed that the Tennessee Valley seemed the best location,

although some of the scientists felt

that a site farther east in the Great

Smoky Mountains, where the climate

was not as warm, might prove more

desirable in the future for a proposed

permanent central laboratory.

Hardly had the way been cleared

for immediate acquisition of the Tennessee site when Colonel Marshall,

with the approval of General Robins,

decided to postpone carrying it out.

He knew that the site and making the

necessary pre-construction changes

and improvements, not including relocation of Tennessee 61, would cost

an estimated $4.25 million and

require resettlement of some 400

families living in the area. Marshall

reasoned there could be no harm in

delaying acquisition until more definite information on the plutonium

process was available. At worst, a

postponement would cause only a few

weeks delay, for the Engineers' Real

Estate Branch was sure that the land

could be acquired to the point of

right of entry within ten days of his

order to proceed. Meanwhile, he

would try to get the TVA the needed

priorities and, when scientific developments warranted, order acquisition

of the site.

Although Ernest Lawrence indicated he was now willing to have the

full-scale electromagnetic separation

plant built in Tennessee, locating the

plants in the Shasta Dam area of California was seriously studied and the

proposal was not completely abandoned until early September. Nevertheless, Colonel Marshall felt he was

"about ready to recommend purchase

of at least part of the Tennessee site"

by 26 August, the next S-1 Executive

Committee meeting. When the committee, however, delayed a decision

on production facilities, acquisition of

the site was postponed, despite the

urgings of Robins and Groves to the

contrary.29

Reaching Decisions: The Meeting at

Bohemian Grove

About 10-12 miles northwest of

San Francisco, across the Golden

Gate and amidst the giant redwood

29

 Marshall Diary, 26 Aug 42, MDR.
FIRST STEPS FOR WEAPON DEVELOPMENT 71

trees of the Muir Woods National

Monument, there is a beautiful area

known as the Bohemian Grove. In

this impressive setting, not too far

from Lawrence's laboratory at the

University of California, Berkeley, the

S-1 Executive Committee met on 13

and 14 September 1942 to consider

at length and in detail the major

problems of the DSM project.30

Present along with the committee at

this fifth Army-OSRD meeting were

Colonel Nichols and the California

area engineer, Maj. Thomas T. Crenshaw—both in civilian clothes to mask

from casual observers the Army's interest in the work at Berkeley—as well

as J. Robert Oppenheimer and two

other scientific consultants.

The first major decision was to acquire the Tennessee site immediately.

But on which plants could construction begin? The gaseous diffusion and

centrifuge separation methods still

appeared feasible and promising, but

neither had produced any appreciable

amounts of U-235 and both would require hundreds or thousands of process stages for large-scale separation.

The plutonium process had yet to see

a self-sustaining chain reaction, much

less production and separation of plutonium. Thus far, only the electromagnetic method had achieved significant production. Because one electromagnetic unit could separate 10

milligrams of U-235 per day, it was

not inconceivable that fifty thousand

units could separate a pound, and, in

the same period, a billion units could

separate a ton. To design and build

these units would be difficult and expensive, and the full-scale plant

would require considerably more research and engineering development

as well as the training of large numbers of skilled operators. But the

process appeared sufficiently feasible

to justify starting work on a production plant. After a visit to Lawrence's

laboratory, where the Executive Committee viewed experimental separation units in actual operation, the

group agreed to proceed with the

construction of a large-scale electromagnetic plant.

This 100-gram-per-day (the output

specified in the 17 June program)

electromagnetic installation would be

erected in Tennessee at an estimated

cost of $30 million. Design and procurement for the plant were to begin

immediately, subject to cancellation at

any time before New Year's Day of

1943 if further developments so warranted. On that date, the group

hoped, design would be frozen and

construction could begin. At the same

time, a small electromagnetic pilot

plant was projected for Tennessee;

however, at a later date, this plan was

dropped.

The experimental plutonium plant

planned for the Argonne Forest site

was now switched to Tennessee. This

change was necessitated by growing

evidence that operations at this

plant—including chemical studies on

extracting the plutonium, training of

operators, and testing of equipment

and processes—would be on a scale

too large for the Argonne site. Stone

and Webster would arrange a subcontract with a chemical company to

develop and operate the chemical engineering equipment needed for plu30

 Section on Bohemian Grove meeting based on

Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 150-54 and photograph

facing p. 140; Marshall Diary, 13 Sep 42, MDR;

DSM Chronology, 13-14 Sep 42, Sec. 2(e), OROO;

Smyth Report, pp. 140-41.
72 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

tonium separation. Now the experimental pile from the Metallurgical

Laboratory could be relocated from

the heart of south Chicago to the

safer Argonne location. In further

support of the plutonium project,

construction of the heavy water plant

at Trail would be pushed as rapidly as

necessary to complete this work by

1 May 1943.

The meetings on 13 and 14 September brought an end to much of

the indecision that the course of

events had imposed on the atomic

energy program during the summer

of 1942. The decisions reached at the

Bohemian Grove, in the words of one

participant, "were destined to shape

the entire future development of the

project."31 Indeed, even as these decisions were taking form, changes

were under way that would have a

profound effect on the organization

and direction of the atomic bomb

program. The early period of Army

participation, marked by a slow and

deliberate entrance into the project,

was coming to an end.

31

 Compton, Atomic Quest, p. 150.
CHAPTER IV

General Groves Takes Command

As the son of an Army chaplain,

Leslie R. Groves spent many of his

boyhood years on different military

posts in the western United States.

During these formative years, young

Groves often listened to the old Indian

fighters who frequented the posts

recount many a stirring tale of how

the West was won. Their tales fired

the boy's imagination, yet he lamented that those days were past and that

there were no more frontiers left for

him to conquer. He could not know,

of course, that the opportunity to realize his youthful dreams to lead in

the exploration and conquest of a

new frontier—his to be a scientific

and technical one whose developments would have a decisive impact

on the future and fate of all mankind—would come as the result of the

administrative reorganization of the

American atomic energy program in

the summer and fall of 1942 and his

selection as a 46-year-old career Army

officer to be officer in charge of the

project.1

Reorganization and the Selection

of Groves

On 17 June 1942, President

Roosevelt had approved the proposals, made by Vannevar Bush and

James B. Conant to the Top Policy

Group, that the Army assume overall

direction of the atomic program and

that the Joint Committee on New

Weapons and Equipment (JNW) establish a special subcommittee to consider the military application of

atomic energy. Bush, however, who

served as JNW chairman, did not see

any need for immediate appointment

of the subcommittee and thus waited

until 10 September to propose to

Secretary of War Stimson that a small

group of officers be assigned the task

of considering possible strategic and

tactical uses of atomic energy. When

Stimson informed Army Chief of Staff

General George C. Marshall of Bush's

request, the general indicated that he

felt it was premature and expressed

grave concern about the increasing

problem of security as more and

more people became aware of the existence of the atomic energy program.

Despite Marshall's reservations, it

soon became evident that a special

committee was needed not only to

consider the ultimate uses of atomic

energy but also to determine general

policies and supervise the growing

project. The sequence of events in

September 1942 that led to formation 1

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 415.
74 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

of a policymaking committee and to

strengthening the military leadership

of the project seems to have been

about as follows.

 2

Early that month—almost certainly

before learning the results of the Bohemian Grove meeting and possibly

even before Bush made his recommendations to Stimson—General

Styer discussed the status of the

atomic energy program with his commander, Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, Services of Supply (SOS) commanding general, and then with

General Marshall. In outlining developments in the program, he emphasized that the Army's responsibilities

were now becoming increasingly

large. Then on the sixteenth, or possibly a day or so earlier, Bush, Styer,

and Somervell met to discuss the toplevel organization of the atomic

project. Under Secretary of War

Robert P. Patterson also may have

been present, or perhaps Somervell

saw him separately. At any rate, two

decisions were reached: A policy committee would be formed to oversee

the program, and an Army officer

would be chosen to carry out the

policies established by this committee.

Anxious to counteract General Somervell 's tendency to favor giving the

Army dominant control of the

project, thus relegating the scientists

to a lesser role, Bush proposed that

the committee should be organized

first. Styer and Somervell, however,

wanted to choose an officer immediately. The obvious choice was Styer

himself, but the job was a full-time

one and Somervell was unwilling to

lose his chief of staff. Styer then,

without hesitation, proposed Colonel

Groves, a recommendation readily approved by Generals Somervell and

Marshall.

In addition to his impressive general qualifications,3

 another factor made

2

 Description of events through 22 Sep 42 reconstructed from Memo, Bush and Conant to Wallace,

Stimson, and Marshall, sub: Atomic Fission Bombs,

13 Jun 42, Incl to Ltr, Bush to President, 17 Jun 42;

Ltr, Bush to Styer, 19 Jun 42. Both in HB Files, Fldr

6, MDR. Stimson Diary, 10 Sep 42, HLS. Memo,

Bundy to Stimson, 10 Sep 42, HB Files, Fldr 5,

MDR. 1st Ind, Styer to Chief of Mil Hist, 15 Aug

61, to Ltr, Chief of Mil Hist to Styer, 17 Jun 61,

CMH. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 3-5 and 21-

23. Marshall Diary, 16-21 Sep 42, OCG Files, Gen

Corresp, Groves Files, Misc Recs Sec, behind Fldr 5,

MDR. Memo (penciled note), VB [Bush] to Bundy,

in envelope marked 9/17, HB Files, Fldr 7, MDR.

Diary of Lt Gen Leslie R. Groves (hereafter cited as

Groves Dairy), 17-22 Sep 42, LRG. The diary was

an office record maintained by Groves's secretaries

to list visits, telephone calls, etc. It covers the

period from 1 Jan 42 to 7 Nov 45. Entries of later

years are more complete than for the early period of

the Manhattan Project. No entry was written by

Groves, nor was each one necessarily seen by him.

It appears to be accurate, although incomplete.

3

 Leslie R. Groves entered the U.S. Military Academy in 1916 following three years as a student at

the University of Washington (1913-14) and the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1914-16).

His class at West Point did not graduate until November 1918, too late for him to see active duty in

World War I. Assigned to the Corps of Engineers,

for more than a decade after the war he held a variety of engineer positions in the United States,

Hawaii, and Nicaragua. During the 1930's, he attended the Command and General Staff School at

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Army War College in Washington, D.C., and also served in the

Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE), on the Missouri River Division staff, and on the War Department General Staff. Beginning in 1940, he held important administrative posts in the rapidly expanding military construction program, moving quickly

from the rank of captain to full colonel. As chief of

the Operations Branch, Office of the Quartermaster

General (OQMG), he acted as special assistant to

the quartermaster general for Army construction.

When the Construction Division was transferred

from OQMG to OCE at the end of 1941, he became

deputy chief of the division under Brig. Gen.

Thomas M. Robins. Having an excellent background

of experience on a variety of major construction

projects, the best known being the huge Pentagon Continued
GENERAL GROVES TAKES COMMAND 75

Groves the logical choice to head the

atomic project: As deputy chief of the

Engineers' Construction Division, he

had spent considerable time advising

District Engineer Marshall in his

quest for power resources and in his

selection of sites for the Manhattan

District facilities. Furthermore, with

military construction in the United

States past its wartime peak, Groves

was seriously considering taking another assignment, probably overseas.

On the morning of 17 September,

Groves had to testify on a military

housing bill before the House Military

Affairs Committee. When he left the

hearing room, he encountered General Somervell and learned of his new

assignment. Groves later recalled that

his first reaction was one of great disappointment at the prospect of missing overseas duty. Somervell, undoubtedly sensing Groves's lack of

enthusiasm for his new job, expressed

the opinion that a successful conclusion to the atomic energy program

could well have a decisive impact on

winning the war.4

Shortly after leaving Capitol Hill,

Groves, accompanied by Colonel

Nichols (Colonel Marshall was on the

West Coast), reported to General

Styer for orders. Styer explained the

new high-level organization of the

project and Groves's role in it.

Groves was to be relieved of his position in the Construction Division. He

was, however, to continue to exercise

control over construction of the

nearly completed Pentagon. In this

way he would avoid arousing public

curiosity at his sudden absence from

this project, which was viewed with

great interest by Congress. After the

Pentagon job was finished in a few

months, Groves was to devote himself

entirely to the atomic energy

program.

The directive for Groves's new assignment—Styer had consulted with

him on its wording—ordered the Engineers chief, General Reybold, to relieve him "for special duty in connection with the DSM project."

 5 The directive emphasized, however, that

Groves was to operate closely with

the Construction Division and other

elements of the Corps of Engineers.

He was to have full responsibility for

administering the entire project and

to make immediate arrangements for

priorities, for formation of a committee to formulate military policy governing use of the project's product

output, and for procurement of the

Tennessee site as the location for its

major activities. He was also instructed to make plans for the organization,

construction, operation, and security

of the project and, after they had

been approved, to undertake the

measures necessary to carry them out.

building, Groves earned the reputation among his

professional colleagues as an able, aggressive, and

industrious officer who repeatedly demonstrated superior engineering, administrative, and organizational abilities. See 1st Ind, Styer to Chief of Mil

Hist, 15 Aug 61, to Ltr, Chief of Mil Hist to Styer,

17 Jul 61, CMH; WD Press Release, Oct 46, CMH;

Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 465; Fine and Remington, Corps of Engineers: Construction, pp. 158-59

and 254-55. A detailed listing of Groves's military

assignments may be found in Cullum, Biographical

Register, 6B:2010, 7:1338, 8:382, 9:271. 4

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 3-4; Fine and

Remington, Corps of Engineers: Construction, pp. 586-

603.

5

 Memo, Somervell to Chief of Engrs, sub: Release of Groves for Special Assignment, 17 Sep 42,

OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab B,

MDR. Directive to Groves reprinted in his book Now

It Can Be Told, App. I, pp. 417-18.
76 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Styer also informed Groves that

General Marshall had directed that he

be promoted to the grade of brigadier

general. As the list of new promotions would be out in a few days,

Groves suggested (and Styer agreed)

that he should not take over the

project officially until he had received

his star. "I thought that there might

be some problems in dealing with the

many academic scientists involved in

the project," he wrote later, "and I

felt that my position would be stronger if they thought of me as a general

instead of a promoted colonel." The

new military chief of the atomic

project, however, seems not to have

considered that for several months

Colonel Marshall and other officers

had been dealing successfully with

project scientists in spite of their relatively low military rank.6

Following the conference with

Styer, Groves delivered the directive

covering his new assignment to General Reybold and also stopped in the

office of his erstwhile chief, General

Robins, to brief him on its contents.

He then sat down with Colonel Nichols to learn from the deputy district

engineer more about the actual status

of the project. He was not very

pleased with what he learned. "In

fact," he recalled subsequently, "I

was horrified. It seemed as if the

whole endeavor was founded on possibilities rather than probabilities."

 7

On the afternoon of the same day

(17 September), Groves and Nichols

called on Bush. Unfortunately, no one

had yet officially informed the OSRD

director of Groves's assignment to the

project. Furthermore, Bush was disturbed that this action was additional

evidence that Somervell was intent on

having the Army take over control of

the atomic energy program to the

complete exclusion of the scientists.

Consequently, he was most reluctant

to answer Groves's questions and the

whole conversation was somewhat

one-sided, relatively brief, and, in

Groves's words, "far from satisfactory

for both of us."

 8

As soon as Groves departed, Bush

hurried over to see Styer. He repeated his views that the proposed policy

committee should choose its own

agent; he "doubted whether he

[Groves] had sufficient tact for such a

job." Bush recollected later that Styer

disagreed with him on the first point

and, while acknowledging that Groves

was "blunt etc., . . . [he] thought his

other qualities would overbalance."

Styer went on to explain that Groves's

assignment already had been approved

by General Marshall. Returning to his

office, Bush wrote to Harvey Bundy,

Stimson's assistant for scientific matters: "I fear we are in the soup."

 9

6

 Groves received the grade of brigadier general

on 23 Sep 42 and, subsequently, the grade of major

general on 9 Mar 44, a rank he continued to hold

for the rest of the time he served as commander of

the Manhattan Project. He moved up to the rank of

lieutenant general, effective 24 Jan 48, but shortly

thereafter (29 Feb 48) retired from active duty on

his own application. At the time of his retirement,

Congress enacted a special measure giving him the

honorary rank of lieutenant general, effective 16 Jul

45, in recognition of his services in directing the

atomic bomb project. See Cullum, Biographical Register, 9:271. Quotation is from Groves, Now it Can Be

Told, p. 5.

7

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 19. 8

 Ibid., p. 20. See also Hewlett and Anderson, New

World, p. 81. 9

 Paragraph on Bush's reaction to Groves's assignment based on Memo, Bush to Bundy, in envelope

marked 9/17, MDR.
GENERAL GROVES TAKES COMMAND 77

For the next few days, Groves was

busy preparing for his new assignment, including conferences with

Colonel Marshall and Generals Styer

and Robins. Robins made a point that

the Engineer Department of the

Corps of Engineers would have no

further responsibility for the program

and that the Manhattan District would

henceforth report to Groves rather

than to the Engineers chief.

On 21 September, Colonels Groves

and Marshall called on Bush. This

time the OSRD director was cordial

and open. He explained his earlier reluctance to talk freely, then briefed

Groves thoroughly on the scientific

and historical background of the

project and cautioned him on the

need for tightening security measures.

Thus, from what Groves himself later

termed an "inauspicious beginning,"

relations between the two leaders of

the atomic project soon grew into a

firm and fruitful friendship, with each

expressing the greatest respect for

the other's capabilities.10

On the afternoon of 23 September,

a few hours after Groves had been

sworn in as a brigadier general and

had taken official charge of the

atomic project, he went to a meeting

convened by Secretary Stimson at the

War Department. Present also were

Bush, Conant, Bundy and Generals

Marshall, Somervell, and Styer. The

group agreed to establish a small

Military Policy Committee, responsible to the Top Policy Group, to formulate project policies on research

and development, construction and

production, and strategic and tactical

matters. Bush was chosen chairman,

with Conant as his alternate; the

other members were General Styer

and Rear Adm. William R. Purnell,

who had replaced Rear Adm. Willis

A. Lee, Jr., on the JNW Committee.

General Groves was to sit with the

committee and to act as its executive

officer in carrying out its policies.

The new committee was directed to

report periodically to the Top Policy

Group. The OSRD S-1 Executive

Committee was to continue to advise

on scientific aspects of the program,

with most of the research activities

under OSRD direction.11

As soon as the Military Policy Committee had received written approval

from the Top Policy Group and the

JNW Committee, it assumed virtually

complete control of all aspects of the

atomic energy program, acting

through General Groves as, to use

Stimson's phrase, "the executive head

of the development of the

enterprise."

 12

10

 Quoted phrase from Groves, Now It Can be Told,

p. 21. Bush acknowledges in his memoirs that Styer

"was right when he insisted that Groves was the

man for the job" [see Vannevar Bush, Pieces of the

Action (New York: Willliam Morrow, 1970), p. 61].

Groves implies in his account (pp. 21-22) that his

second meeting with Bush occurred on 19 September, whereas the Marshall Diary, 21 Sep 42, MDR,

indicates that the meeting actually took place on the

twenty-first. Groves saw Styer again on the twentysecond, but he fails to mention this meeting in his

book. Curiously enough, however, the two pages describing the events of that date are missing from

both copies of the Marshall Diary, and although the

Groves Diary, 22 Sep 42, LRG, records the fact that

the meeting took place, no other details are given.

11

 Rpt, Bundy, sub: S-1 Mtg at Secy War's Office,

23 Sep 42; Memo A, signed by all Top Policy Group

(except President) and JNW members, 23 Sep 42;

Ltr, Bush to Patterson, 13 Oct 45. All in HB Files,

Fldr 6, MDR. DSM Chronology, 26 Sep 42, Sec.

2(e), OROO. Smyth Report, pp. 59-60. 12

 Stimson Diary, 23 Sep 42, HLS.
78 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

First Measures

Acquiring the Tennessee Site

Making a hurried departure from

the 23 September meeting at the War

Department, Groves went directly to

Union Station and caught an overnight train for Knoxville, Tennessee.13

 (See Map 1.) The next morning

he met Colonel Marshall, who had

been rechecking the proposed site for

the project. Groves and Marshall

spent the day going over the site as

carefully and thoroughly as was practicable on existing roads. "It was evident that it was an even better choice

than . . . [he] had anticipated."

 14

Well satisfied that the site would meet

all requirements, and knowing that

preliminary steps for acquisition were

under way, Groves telephoned Col.

John J. O'Brien of the Engineers'

Real Estate Branch to proceed at

once with formal acquisition.

The roughly rectangular site, about

16 miles long and 7 miles wide, covered substantial portions of both

Roane and Anderson Counties. It was

located approximately midway between the two county seats, Kingston

and Clinton, and about 12 miles west

of Knoxville, the nearest city. Bounded on three sides by the meandering

Clinch River and on the northwest by

Black Oak Ridge, the terrain of the

site was typical of the region.

Wooded ridges, running more or less

parallel to its long axis, rose generally

about 200 feet above narrow valleys.

Of the approximately one thousand

families, most resided on farms or in

one of several small hamlets.

On 29 September, Under Secretary

of War Patterson authorized the Engineers to acquire the some 56,000

acres at an estimated cost of $3.5 million. Subsequent additions brought

the total to about 59,000 acres. On

7 October, a court-approved condemnation for the whole area went into

effect, and within a month the first

residents began to leave. Construction began almost immediately. Ultimate acquisition of the entire site

would not be completed without

many problems, but now, at least, the

first essential step toward building the

great plants for producing fissionable

materials had been taken.15

For security reasons earliest public

references to the site indicated it was

an artillery and bombing practice

area, and for several weeks it was

known as the Kingston Demolition

Range. The official designation, however, and the name that was released

to the public in late January 1943,

was the Clinton Engineer Works.

Project leaders chose the name of the

town located a few miles northeast of

the site as being least likely to draw

attention to the atomic energy activities at the site. The Clinton Engineer

Works continued to be the Tennessee

13

 Subsection based on Marshall Diary, 29-31 Jul

and 19, 23, 24, 26 Sep 42, MDR; Ltr, Robins (Act

Chief of Engrs) to CG SOS, sub: Acquisition in Fee

of Approx 56,200 Acres of Land for Demolition

Range Near Kingston, Tenn., and Inds, 29 Sep 42,

Incl to Memo, O'Brien to Lt Col Whitney Ashbridge

(CE Mil Constr Br), sub: Land Acquisition in Connection With MD, 17 Apr 43, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 601 (Santa Fe), MDR; Groves, Now It Can

Be Told, pp. 24-26; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 10, "Land Acquisition CEW," p. 2.21 and App. Fl, and Vol. 12,

"Clinton Engineer Works," pp. 2.6-2.8, DASA;

George O. Robinson, Jr., The Oak Ridge Story (Kingsport, Tenn.: Southern Publishers, 1950), p. 27. 14

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 25.

15

 Land acquisition problems are dealt with in Ch.

XV.
GENERAL GROVES TAKES COMMAND 79

area's official designation as long as it

remained under Army control. In

mid-1943, when permanent housing

for the site's growing population was

erected along Black Oak Ridge, the

townsite became known as Oak

Ridge, and this name was used as the

post office address.16

Procuring Uranium

Whether the Manhattan Project had

sufficient uranium ore to fulfill its

mission, Groves felt, was of paramount importance.17

 Immediately

after his 17 September departure

from the Corps and before he officially assumed his new position as Manhattan commander, he took steps to

ascertain the availability of uranium

to the project. Informed by Colonel

Nichols of the contracts already made

with Edgar Sengier of Union Miniere

and of the Bohemian Grove decision

to acquire the company's reserve of

ore on Staten Island, Groves directed

Nichols to press the negotiations with

the mining executive.

During the previous week Colonel

Nichols, Capt. John R. Ruhoff, assistant chief of the District's Materials

Section, and officials of the Standard

Oil Development Company and the

Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation had agreed that Ruhoff

should arrange for a test of the Staten

Island ore to determine the percentage of recoverable U3O8

 (uranium

oxide) and, on the fifteenth, Ruhoff

had secured Sengier's release of 100

tons for shipment to Eldorado Gold

Mines' Port Hope refinery. In the

meantime, Nichols had obtained the

necessary export licenses through the

State Department.

In follow-up negotiations with Sengier on 18, 23 and 25 September,

Nichols arranged for procurement of

the Staten Island ore. The time required to work out the necessary

arrangements with both Eldorado

Gold Mines and its marketing agent,

the Canadian Radium and Uranium

Corporation, delayed signing of the

contract until 19 October. It called

for purchase by the United States of

the uranium content of 100 tons of

ore, with Union Miniere's African

Metals retaining ownership of the

radium in the ore. Also, the United

States was to have an option to purchase the remaining 1,100 tons of

uranium ore on Staten Island, assayed

at 65 percent uranium oxide, as well

as about twice that amount of approximately 20 percent ore in storage

in the Belgian Congo. Except for that

16

 Knoxville Journal, 31 Jan 43; Groves, Now It Can

Be Told, pp. 25-26. Groves notes that not until establishment of the AEC in 1947 did the name Oak

Ridge become the official designation of the Tennessee project. 17

 Subsection based on Memo for File, Merritt,

sub: Foreign Sources of Material Which Should Be

Further Investigated, 23 Feb 43; Memo, Merritt to

Nichols, sub: Resume of Production of Uranium

Products for MD in Colorado Plateau Area, 26 Jan

45. Both in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 410.2 (Uranium), MDR. Rpt, Military Policy Committee to Top

Policy Group, sub: Present Status and Future Prgm

(hereafter cited as MPC Rpt), 15 Dec 42, Incl to Ltr,

Bush (for MPC) to President, 16 Dec 42, OCG Files,

Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab B (original of

covering letter, with Roosevelt's approval, filed

herein), MDR. Marshall Diary, 14 Sep-15 Oct 42,

MDR. Ltr, Bush to Styer, 11 Sep 42, OSRD. Memo,

[Ruhoff] to Groves, sub: Summary of Ore Contracts,

15 Feb 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 161 (African

Metals), MDR. Contract W-7405-eng-4 (signed by

Nichols and Sengier), 19 Oct 42, OROO. Kenneth

D. Nichols, Comments on Draft Hist "Manhattan:

The Army and the Atomic Bomb," Incl to Ltr, Nichols to Chief of Mil Hist, 25 Mar 74, CMH. MDH,

Bk. 7, Vol. 1, "Feed Materials and Special Procurement," passim, DASA. Smyth Report, p. 66. Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 96-97. Groves, Now It Can Be

Told, pp. 33-37.
80 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

ore shipped immediately to Port

Hope for processing (the first 100

tons reached there in November), all

Staten Island ore was to be transferred to Seneca Ordnance Depot at

Romulus, New York, for safekeeping.

Subsequent contracts covered purchase of additional Congo uranium

on terms similar to those set forth in

the 19 October agreement.

Working in close consultation with

Maj. Gen. Charles P. Gross, the

Army's Transportation chief, Manhattan officials arranged for shipping the

ore from Africa by the safest and

swiftest means available. Based upon

Sengier's recommendations, fast

motor ships traveling out of convoy

were employed to traverse the submarine-infested South Atlantic. Because

the ore arrived at the port of New

York considerably faster than it could

be refined, it was assayed and stored

in a warehouse at Middlesex, New

Jersey, especially leased by the Army

for that purpose.18

In a move to further expedite the

uranium program and, at the same

time, to relieve overburdened Stone

and Webster of part of its extensive

assignment, the Manhattan District assumed responsibility for procurement

and preliminary refining of the ore.

Capt. Phillip L. Merritt, a trained geologist who was already on the staff,

was assigned to monitor these activities. Working under the general guidance of Colonel Nichols, Merritt gave

special attention to the project's

worldwide search for possible additional sources of uranium.

Toward the end of 1942, the Eldorado mine in Canada resumed operations. Meanwhile, the District made

arrangements for uranium extraction

from tailings of Colorado Plateau carnotite ores mined originally for their

radium and vanadium content. In January 1943, the War Production Board

(WBP) issued orders (subsequently

amended in August) that future sale

or purchase of uranium compounds

was limited to the atomic program,

except for essential military and industrial applications. Even before the

board acted, Manhattan's Military

Policy Committee had reported optimistically to the President that the

project had "either in hand or on the

way, sufficient uranium for the entire

program up to and including military

use."

 19

Obtaining Priority Ratings

In June 1942, President Roosevelt

had endorsed a recommendation by

the Top Policy Group that the atomic

energy program should be assigned

the highest priorities to facilitate procurement of the tools and materials

required to produce an atomic

bomb.20 Yet, by September, as

18

 During the war only two shipments of ore, totaling 200 tons, failed to reach the United States—

one aboard a vessel torpedoed in late 1942 and the

other on a ship that sank as a result of a marine accident in early 1943. See MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 1, p. 2.5,

DASA.

19

 MPC Rpt, 15 Dec 42, MDR. 20

 Except where indicated, discussion of priorities

based on MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 9, "Priorities Program,"

DASA, with many of the basic documents relating to

the priorities problem reproduced in App. A. Ibid.,

p. 2.5 and App. Bl, DASA; Ltr, Weaver (Resources

Div Dir, SOS) to Groves, sub: Special Priorities Authority for Dist Engr, 26 Sep 42, copy in ibid., App.

A5, DASA; Memo, Marshall to All Area Engrs, sub:

Requests for Out-of-line Ratings, 16 Oct 42, copy in

ibid., App. A12, DASA; Marshall Diary, 17, 19, 26

Sep and 1 Oct 42, MDR; Memo, Johnson to Groves,

sub: Current Events, 30 Sep 42, Admin Files, Gen Continued
GENERAL GROVES TAKES COMMAND 81

Groves assumed overall administrative leadership of the project, it was

evident that the AA-3 base rating

Colonel Marshall had secured in July

was not going to be adequate to

ensure the uninterrupted development of the atomic program. Consequently, following consultation with

General Styer, Groves moved immediately to obtain for the project the

priority rating he believed was essential for its successful continuation.

Both generals had decided to seek

broad authority for the District to

issue an AAA priority whenever there

was a need to break a bottleneck.

When Groves called on WPB Chairman Donald Nelson on 19 September, he had with him the draft of a

brief letter—addressed to himself and

to be signed by Nelson—in which he

had incorporated the idea of assigning the desired AAA authority to the

project. As Groves later recalled, Nelson's first reaction was negative; however, when the general threatened to

take the matter to the President, the

chairman changed his mind. Whether

or not other pressure already had

been brought to bear on Nelson is

not known, but he did agree to sign

the letter as Groves had written it.

I am in full accord [it read] with the

prompt delegation of power by the Army

and Navy Munitions Board [ANMB]

through you to the District Engineer,

Manhattan District, to assign an AAA

rating, or whatever lesser rating will be

sufficient, to those items the delivery of

which, in his opinion, cannot otherwise

be secured in time for the successful

prosecution of the work under his

charge.21

On 26 September, the ANMB

issued the District a blank check to

assign the AAA priority. But General

Weaver, senior Army representative

on the ANMB, warned Groves that

use of this AAA authority must not

interfere unnecessarily with other

high-priority programs and that, with

each use of the rating, a written

report must be submitted within a 24-

hour period. That same day, at his

first meeting with the S-1 Executive

Committee, Groves explained to the

group that the AAA priority would

not be used for the entire project, but

only when progress would be unduly

delayed by employment of any lower

rating. And to ensure retention of

AAA authority, an AA-3 or lesser priority would be utilized whenever possible. Before adjourning, the conferees agreed that the OSRD would continue to deal with its own priority

problems as far as possible, with the

Army lending assistance when necessary, and that the Washington Liaison

Office of the Manhattan District

would handle the general administration and coordination of priorities for

all future procurement for the atomic

project.

Now that the District had AAA authority as a backup to overcome procurement obstacles, both Groves and

Corresp, 319.1, MDR; DSM Chronology, 26 Sep 42,

Sec. 2(e), OROO; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp.

22-23; MPC Rpt, 15 Dec 42, MDR; Groves, S-1 Ex

Committee Mtg (hereafter cited as MPC Min—actual

summaries of actions required and decisions

reached at MPC meetings), 5 Feb 43, OCG Files,

Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 23, Tab A, MDR;

Memo, Weaver to Chief of Engrs, sub: Priority

Rating for MD, 22 Mar 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 322.011 (LC), MDR; Memo, Demon, ASF, to

Chief of Engrs, Attn: Groves, sub: MD, 1 Jul 44,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 400.1301 (Priority),

MDR.

21

 Ltr, Nelson to Groves, 19 Sep 42, OCG Files,

Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab B, MDR.
82 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Styer believed that development of

the atomic program could continue

with the AA-3 base rating. By 1943,

however, the project's unfolding requirements revealed that for even

routine procurement the AA-3 rating

was inadequate and the AAA rating

unnecessarily high. To remedy this

situation, Groves wrote to General

Weaver in early February and requested that the District's priority

"authority given in [the] letter of September 26, 1942 be amplified to include use of AA-1 and AA-2 ratings."

 22

 Although the Nelson letter

had referred to the use of lesser ratings than AAA whenever these would

suffice, the fact that the Joint Chiefs

of Staff had forbidden use of AA-1 or

AA-2 for construction projects had

ruled out their earlier use by the District. Weaver officially responded on

22 March, upgrading the rating of

AA-3 to AA-2X—a new priority created to provide supplies and services

for urgent foreign and domestic industrial programs.

Groves, however, still was not satisfied and, in the months that followed,

continued to press ANMB officials to

assign the maximum AA-1 base

rating. Time passed, but the general

persisted in order to achieve his objective. Finally, on 1 July 1944, the

District received AA-1 authority.

Following District policy, the Washington Liaison Office was to use the

lowest rating that would bring about

the required delivery of materials. But

to counter the threat from other

urgent wartime programs during the

District's massive procurement and

construction phase between 1943 and

early 1945, the officer assigned emergency priorities at the AAA level for

more than $77 million worth of

orders. At times, the Manhattan

Project was using more AAA ratings

than the combined total for all other

Army and non-Army programs. Yet,

through the exercise of discretion,

Groves and his staff were able to

avoid not only strong criticism of

their actions but also attempts to

revoke the District's AAA authority.

Groves's success in obtaining the successive advances in the priority status

of the Manhattan Project ensured

that, despite occasional problems and

annoyances, procurement needs for

the atomic program were met.

Establishment of Los Alamos

In the late summer of 1942,

J. Robert Oppenheimer, the University of California physicist who was directing the theoretical aspects of designing and building an atomic bomb,

became convinced a change was

needed. Studies under his direction

had been going on in various institutions that were equipped for fast-neutron studies. Now Oppenheimer and

his associates felt that further

progress could be best achieved by

concentrating everything in one central laboratory devoted exclusively to

this work. Taking this step would not

only eliminate waste and duplication,

but it would also permit a freer exchange of ideas and provide for the

centralized direction of all work, including studies of chemical, engineering, metallurgical, and ordnance

22

 Ltr, Groves to Weaver, sub: Out-of-line Ratings,

7 Feb 43, copy in MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 9, App. 7,

DASA.
GENERAL GROVES TAKES COMMAND 83

problems that so far had received

little or no attention.23

Groves first met Oppenheimer in

early October while on his initial trip

to familiarize himself with the atomic

programs at the Universities of Chicago and California (Berkeley). The

general heard a report from Oppenheimer on the eighth and the two

men hit it off at once. Groves was interested in Oppenheimer's proposed

central laboratory and, a week later

when the two met again with Marshall

and Nichols on a Chicago-New York

train, Groves asked Oppenheimer to

come to Washington, D.C., to explore

the idea. There, they talked with

Arthur Compton and Vannevar Bush,

and on 19 October Groves approved

the decision to establish a separate

bomb laboratory. Pleased with what

had been accomplished and confident

that Groves's support in this step

would "bear good fruit in the future,"

Oppenheimer left immediately for

Boston to brief Conant at Harvard,

where the latter held the post of university president.24

Oppenheimer and Compton had

spoken of placing the laboratory at

the Tennessee site, or possibly in

Chicago, but neither they nor General

Groves were satisfied with these

choices. For this most secret part of

the secret Manhattan Project isolation

and inaccessibility were most essential, and neither the Clinton Engineer

Works nor Chicago offered these. In

addition to the obvious requirements

of a climate that would permit yearround construction, safety from

enemy attack, ready transportation,

and access to power, fuel and water,

there were several other important

considerations. The site would have

to provide an adequate testing

ground; it should be in a sparsely

populated area, for reasons of safety

as well as security; the land should be

relatively easy to acquire; and it

should already have sufficient buildings to house most of what was anticipated would be a comparatively small

staff.25

Groves briefly considered two other

sites. One near Los Angeles, he rejected on security grounds; the other,

near the California-Nevada border, on

the east side of the Sierra Nevada in

the vicinity of Reno, he found unsatisfactory because it was too inaccessible

and heavy snows would interfere with

winter operations. He agreed with

Oppenheimer that the region around

Albuquerque, New Mexico, seemed to

offer the most attractive possibilities.

Oppenheimer owned a ranch in this

vicinity, and his general knowledge of

the countryside contributed considerably to making an accurate appraisal

of the area. Air and rail service to Albuquerque were excellent; the climate

was moderate throughout the year;

23

 Testimony of Oppenheimer in Oppenheimer Hearing, pp. 12 and 28; Smyth Report, p. 74. 24

 Quotation from Ltr, Oppenheimer to Groves,

19 Oct 42, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 322 (Los

Alamos), MDR. See also Testimony of Oppenheimer in Oppenheimer Hearing, p. 28; Nichols, Comments on Draft Hist "Manhattan," Incl to Ltr, Nichols to Chief of Mil Hist, 25 Mar 74, CMH; Marshall

Diary, 15-16 Oct 42, MDR; Groves Diary, Oct 42,

LRG; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 61.

25

 Paragraphs on selection of bomb laboratory

site based on Groves, Now It Can be Told, pp. 63-67;

MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, "General," Sec. 2, DASA; Rpt,

U.S. Engrs Office, Albuquerque Dist, sub: Proposed

Site for Mil Proj at Los Alamos Ranch School,

Otowi, N.Mex., 23 Nov 42, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.03, MDR; Groves Diary, Nov 42, LRG;

Testimony of Oppenheimer in Oppenheimer Hearing,

pp. 12 and 28; Interv, Author with Edwin M. McMillan (Rad Lab, Univ of Calif at Berkeley), 8 Jul 64,

CMH.
84 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

and the area was not only isolated but

also sufficiently far inland from the

West Coast to be beyond any serious

danger from the by now remote possibility of Japanese interference.

At the end of October, Maj. John

H. Dudley, one of Colonel Marshall's

assistants who was familiar with the

general area, made some preliminary

surveys. He recommended a site at

Jemez Springs, about 50 miles north

of Albuquerque. (See Map 2.) Engineers from the Albuquerque District

surveyed the site and, on 16 November, Groves met Oppenheimer and

several others for a personal inspection of the area. They soon concluded, however, that the Jemez Springs

site would not do; the land would be

difficult to acquire and the nature of

the terrain would prevent later expansion of the installation.26

Still hoping to find a suitable location in this general area, Groves and

the others drove east and slightly

north toward the tiny settlement of

Los Alamos. This community, atop a

high, level tableland, actually consisted of little more than the Los Alamos

Ranch School for Boys. Otherwise the

area was virtually uninhabited, with

the nearest town located some 16

miles away. The school buildings and

the complete isolation of the site were

arguments in its favor. There appeared to be sufficient water, if the

supply were carefully used, and all

other characteristics seemed satisfactory. The only question was how willing the owners of the school would

be to give it up to the Army. If they

seriously opposed government acquisition, the resultant publicity would

run counter to the secrecy desired by

the project leaders.

While Groves and Oppenheimer

headed back to Washington, D.C.,

Dudley and engineers of the Albuquerque District began a formal

survey of a proposed site at Los

Alamos. The desired area consisted of

about 54,000 acres in Sandoval

County, somewhat more than 20

miles airline distance northwest of

Santa Fe, of which all but about 8,000

acres was in national forest land already owned by the United States

government. Grazing lands and the

Los Alamos Ranch School comprised

the rest of the area. Because the

school was having some difficulty getting instructors during the war and

was in serious financial trouble, the

owners were willing to sell. As for the

grazing lands, there appeared to be

no problem in acquiring them.

Even before the reports of this

survey came in, General Groves had

called a meeting in Washington to

confer about the site with Oppenheimer, as well as with two of his scientific colleagues from California,

Ernest Lawrence and Edwin McMillan, and with Arthur Compton. Then,

on 23 November, with the reports in

hand, Oppenheimer, Lawrence, and

McMillan again inspected the area

with Major Dudley and made recommendations on possible locations for

26

 Account of inspection of sites in Los Alamos

area based primarily on Groves, Now It Can Be Told,

pp. 65-67, and Testimony of Oppenheimer in Oppenheimer Hearing, p. 28. Another member of the inspection party was Edwin M. McMillan, a physicist

on the faculty at the University of California, Berkeley, and a long-time associate of Oppenheimer. As

McMillan recalled, he, Oppenheimer, and Dudley

had gone on horseback to the Jemez Springs area

earlier in the day and then had been joined by

Groves in the afternoon. McMillan had been a guest

at Oppenheimer's ranch on earlier occasions and

was therefore generally familiar with the Los

Alamos area. See McMillan Interv, 8 Jul 64, CMH.
GENERAL GROVES TAKES COMMAND 85

APPROACH ROAD TO THE LOS ALAMOS RANCH SCHOOL FOR BOYS

laboratories and housing. "Lawrence

was pleased by the site," Oppenheimer reported to Groves, "and so,

again, were we."

 27

And so, again, was Groves. Two

days later he approved the Los

Alamos site and began steps to acquire the land. Right of entry to the

heart of the site had already been obtained from the school director and,

although the actual legal acquisition

would take several months, Groves

was able to authorize the Albuquerque District to proceed with construction on 30 November. The whole

business was carried out, to use Oppenheimer's words, "with unbelievable dispatch."

 28

As with the Clinton Engineer

Works, the Los Alamos site in the beginning also was referred to, for security reasons, as a demolition range—a

somewhat ironic reference for a laboratory where an atomic bomb would

be built. The site also had several

names, the most common being Site

Y, Project Y, Zia Project, Santa Fe, or

simply, Los Alamos, its official title

and the name by which it would be

most widely known in the future.29

27

 Ltr, Oppenheimer to Groves, 23 Nov 42,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.1 (Santa Fe), MDR. 28

 Memos, Groves to Albuquerque Dist Engr, sub:

Proj Constr at Los Alamos, N.Mex., 30 Nov 42, and

Groves to SWD Div Engr, sub: Constr in Vic of Albuquerque, N.Mex., 30 Nov 42, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 600.1 (Santa Fe), MDR; Ltr, Robins (Act

Chief of Engrs) to CG SOS, sub: Acquisition of

Land for Demolition Range at Los Alamos, N.Mex.,

25 Nov 42, Incl to Memo, O'Brien to Ashbridge,

sub: Land Acquisition in Connection with MD, 17

Apr 43, MDR; MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, Sees. 2-3,

passim, DASA. Quoted words from Testimony of

Oppenheimer in Oppenheimer Hearing, p. 28. For detailed account of land acquisition at Los Alamos see

Ch. XV. 29

 Memo, Groves to CG SOS, sub: Activation and

Administration of Los Alamos, 27 Feb 43, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 319.2 (Los Alamos), MDR.
86 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Once the choice of Los Alamos had

been made, events moved swiftly.

"The last months of 1942 and early

1943," recalled Oppenheimer later,

"had hardly hours enough to get Los

Alamos established."

 30

 Vigorously

supported by Groves, Compton,

Conant, and others, Oppenheimer

launched an extensive recruitment

program. He traveled all over the

country, urging scientists of recognized ability to join the new laboratory. Restricted to revealing only what

was absolutely necessary about the

project, Oppenheimer faced no easy

task trying to arouse the interest of

scientists, technicians, and mechanics

in the program, in indicating its sense

of urgency, and in persuading them

to sign up for work at a military post

in the middle of the New Mexico

desert, where they and their families

might have to remain isolated for the

duration of the war. Nevertheless, he

was highly successful in these efforts.

Recruits from Princeton, Chicago,

California, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and

other universities joined the program,

the first contingent arriving at Los

Alamos with Oppenheimer in March

1943, long before construction at the

site was completed.

With the university scientists came

their equipment: a cyclotron from

Harvard, two more particle accelerators from Wisconsin, another from Illinois. Locating and securing this essential equipment was difficult

enough; shipping it to New Mexico

was an additional problem. "Everybody," Oppenheimer later recalled,

"arrived with truckloads of junk and

equipment." Under a contract with

the University of California, erection

of the first cyclotron began at Los

Alamos in mid-April, and the first experiment was performed early in July.

Already, Oppenheimer continued,

"we were finding out things that

nobody knew before."

 31

Los Alamos was officially activated

as a military establishment on 1 April

1943, with Oppenheimer as its scientific chief and Col. John M. Harman

as its military head. It was unique

among Manhattan Project installations in that it was established as a

separate organization, directly responsible to General Groves. It came

under the district engineer only for

routine administrative matters. As its

civilian director, Oppenheimer had

broad authority and administrative responsibility. In charge of all scientific

work as well as "the maintenance of

secrecy by the civilian personnel

under his control,"

 32

 he was responsible only to Groves and Conant. This

arrangement relieved Compton and

the Metallurgical Laboratory of the

responsibility for bomb design and

construction and left them free to

concentrate on plutonium production.

The relations between Oppenheimer

and Colonel Harman were based on

close cooperation, rather than control. Harman, who also reported to

Groves, had little or nothing to do

with scientific matters. His primary

responsibility was to oversee Los

30

 Testimony of Oppenheimer in Oppenheimer

Hearing, p. 12. This and following paragraph based

on ibid., pp. 12-13 and 28-29; Smyth Report, p. 151;

Compton, Atomic Quest, p. 130.

31

 Quoted words from Testimony of Oppenheimer

in Oppenheimer Hearing, p. 29. See also Memo, Oppenheimer to Groves, 7 Nov 42, and Styer correspondence with Univs of Ill and Wis, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 400.12 (Equipment), MDR. 32

 Ltr, Conant and Groves to Oppenheimer, 25

Feb 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Los

Alamos), MDR.
GENERAL GROVES TAKES COMMAND 87

Alamos as a military reservation, including those housekeeping and

guard functions necessary to support

Oppenheimer's program.33

The other major element in the administration of Los Alamos was the

prime contractor, the University of

California. Under a War Department

contract, its role was largely to

provide business management and

technical procurement. For reasons of

security, the university had no representative at Los Alamos with authority

comparable to that of Oppenhemier

or Colonel Harman.

Project leaders wanted to make the

work and the living conditions at Los

Alamos as attractive as possible; however, for reasons of security and

safety, General Groves wished to

maintain as much control as he could

over the scientists. One idea he favored was to put key civilians in uniform as army officers. This plan

seemed attractive to Oppenheimer

but aroused strong opposition from

many of the other scientists. The Military Policy Committee finally agreed

to drop the idea for the period of initial experimental studies, but insisted

that the scientific and engineering

staff be composed entirely of commissioned officers when final experiments and the construction of the

bomb began. Yet, when this time arrived, Project Y had grown so large

that the plan was dropped as being

impractical and unnecessary.

The most important personnel

problem at Los Alamos was choice of

a scientific director, and Oppenheimer's appointment was no simple

matter. While he had been the leader

of the group studying the theoretical

aspects of constructing atomic bombs,

the Los Alamos program was to be a

practical operation, and carrying it

out would require considerable administrative and organizational abilities. The chiefs of the three other

major Manhattan laboratories—

Compton, Lawrence, and Urey—were

all Nobel Prize winners. Oppenheimer

was not, and there was some feeling

among the scientists that this might

disqualify him as head of the Los

Alamos Laboratory. General Groves,

while impressed with Oppenheimer's

great intellectual capacity, also was

not entirely certain. Bush and Conant

shared his hesitation; Lawrence,

Compton, and Urey all indicated

some reservations.

Nevertheless, a tentative decision in

favor of Oppenheimer appears to

have been made quite early, because

neither Lawrence nor Compton—the

only other candidates—could be

spared from his own vital project. Oppenheimer's appointment as "Scientific Director of the special laboratory

in New Mexico" was formalized on 25

February in a letter to him from

Groves and Conant;

 34

 it did not,

33

 Except where noted, this and following paragraphs based on ibid.; Memo, Groves to CG SOS,

sub: Activation and Administration of Los Alamos,

25 Feb 43, MDR; Testimony of Oppenheimer and

Groves in Oppenheimer Hearing, pp. 28 and 171-72;

Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 129-30; Memo, Marshall

to Groves, sub: Major MD Contracts, 27 Apr 43,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 161, MDR (also see

WD-Univ of Calif Contract W-7405-eng-36,

20 Apr 43, LASL); MDH, Bk, 8, Vol. 2, "Technical," pp. 1.5-1.6, III.6, App. 7, DASA; MPC Min, 5

Feb 43, MDR. See Ch. XXIII for further discussion

of the administrative organization at Los Alamos.

34

 Quotation from Ltr, Conant and Groves to Oppenheimer, 25 Feb 43, MDR. See also Groves, Now

It Can Be Told, pp. 60-64; Compton, Atomic Quest, p.

129; Testimony of Bush in Oppenheimer Hearing, pp.

560-61; Ltr, Conant to Groves, 21 Dec 42, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 334 (Postwar Policy Committee- Continued
88 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

however, become final until mid-July

because of security clearance problems. As was well-known to most of

the project leaders, Oppenheimer had

an extended history of supporting

Communist-front organizations and

causes and of association with Communists and fellow-travelers. Only

through direct action by Groves was

Oppenheimer, who was already at

work in Los Alamos, finally cleared.35

Manhattan Project Organization

and Operation

With the establishment of Los

Alamos on 1 April 1943, the basic

structure of the Army's organization

for administering the atomic bomb

program was essentially completed. In

the months that followed, detailed

and sometimes substantial changes

were made in that organization.36 For

example, in mid-August, the Manhattan District moved from its temporary

location in New York to permanent

quarters at Oak Ridge, and Colonel

Nichols, the deputy district engineer,

replaced Colonel Marshall as district

engineer when the Corps of Engineers reassigned Marshall to a post

where he might receive his long overdue promotion to the rank of brigadier general.37

 But these subsequent

changes in key personnel and in the

location of certain elements would

not significantly affect the basic structure of the Manhattan Project, the term

that by mid-1943 most accurately described the Army's overall administrative organization for the atomic bomb

program.

The administrative elements that

comprised the Manhattan Project

Chicago), MDR; Leslie R. Groves, Comments on

Draft Ms "Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the

Manhattan Project," LRG; Interv, British writer

Hailey with Groves, 13 Dec 57, LRG. 35

 See Ch. XI for full story of the security investigation and clearance of Oppenheimer. 36

 Subsection based on Org Charts, U.S. Engrs

Office, MD, 27 Jan, 1 and 30 Apr 43, OROO; Org

Charts, U.S. Engrs Office, MD, 15 Aug and 1 Nov

43, 15 Feb, 1 Jun, 28 Aug, and 10 Nov 44, and

26 Jan 45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 020 (MEDOrg), MDR; Gen Corresp, Dist Engr to MD Subordinates, Sep 42-late 43, OROO [e.g., see Memo, Lt

Col Thomas T. Crenshaw (Mat Sec chief) to Dist

Engr, sub: Org Chart, 13 Nov 42, and Memo, Lt

Col Robert C. Blair (Ex Off, Engr and Opns, MD)

to Dist Engr, sub: Proposed Org for Maint and Opn

of Gen Facilities, 22 Jan 43]; Interv, Fine and Remington (Hist Div, OCE) with Marshall, 19 Apr 68,

CMH; Interv, Stanley L. Falk and Author with

Charles Vanden Bulck and Capt W. R. McCauley,

22 Jun 60, CMH; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 1, "General,"

pp. 3.13-3.21, DASA; Groves, Now It Can Be Told,

pp. 2 and 27-32.

37

 Marshall's new assignment was as commanding

officer, Engineer Replacement and Training Center,

Camp Sutton, N.C., with the rank of brigadier general. He remained in this assignment only until November 1943, when he went overseas to the Southwest Pacific Area to serve in a variety of positions in

Australia, New Guinea, and the Philippines (December 1943 to February 1945). Marshall had first suggested to Groves that he be relieved as district engineer of the Manhattan District at the end of 1942,

after realizing that Groves was not going to function

simply as a liaison officer in Washington, D.C., but

intended to take a very direct and active role in the

detailed administration of the District. Marshall later

recalled he thought having two senior and experienced engineer officers exercising the command

function was unnecessary duplication. Furthermore,

Marshall, who was senior to Groves in permanent

Regular Army rank, realized his own chances of promotion to general officer rank were remote as long

as he remained in a subordinate position under

Groves. Groves, however, responded negatively to

Marshall's request, stating he felt that he must have

an officer of Marshall's experience and capabilities

in the key district engineer position. Thus, Marshall

resigned himself to serve as district engineer for the

duration of the project; however, in August 1943,

Groves unexpectedly informed him that his request

for relief had been approved. For further details on

Marshall's relief and reassignment see Marshall

Interv, 19 Apr 68, CMH; Marshall Diary, 19 Sep 42,

MDR; and Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 29. In his

account of Marshall's reassignment, Groves errs in

stating that Marshall was relieved for an immediate

"key assignment overseas," overlooking Marshall's

intervening assignment to command Camp Sutton.

GENERAL GROVES TAKES COMMAND 89

MANHATTAN PROJECT EMBLEM

(unofficial, circa 1946}

were divided into two major categories: those that functioned as integral

elements of the Manhattan District

and those that operated outside the

structure of the District, mostly in the

area of high-level policymaking or in

the executive direction of the atomic

project (Chart 1). The central element

in the high-level administrative hierarchy of the Manhattan Project was

General Groves's personal headquarters. The headquarters organization

consisted of only a very small group:

Groves; Mrs. Jean O'Leary, his secretary who served as his administrative

assistant in lieu of an executive officer; and several clerical employees.38

Shortly after becoming Manhattan

commander, and knowing from experience that any effort on his part to

expedite important project activities

would require access or negotiations

with government agencies and officials, Groves decided to locate his

personal headquarters in rooms adjacent to those already occupied by the

Manhattan District's Washington Liaison Office in the New War Department Building on Virginia Avenue, a

few blocks from the White House.

Considered at first to be temporary,

time proved that location especially

well suited to the project's need, and

Groves's office remained there for the

duration of the Army's administration

of the atomic bomb program.

When Groves replaced Marshall as

the Army's project director, the Engineers chief pointedly removed himself

from any further administrative responsibility for the program. Although

the Corps of Engineers continued to

assist the project, the latter functioned

as a basically independent organization, with the Manhattan commander

having responsibility to the Army

Chief of Staff and Secretary of War

and through them to the President.

Committees continued to play an

important role in guiding, advising,

and instructing the Army administrators of the project and, to some

extent, limiting their authority. Beginning in late 1942, the group most involved in providing guidance for the

day-to-day administration was the

Military Policy Committee, which derived its authority for policymaking

from the Top Policy Group. Although

the group never formally convened, it

continued, as during the OSRD

period, to review and ratify all major

policies and decisions relating to development and employment of atomic

energy for military purposes in World

War II. The OSRD S-1 Executive

Committee also continued to function

as an advisory group until the transfer

of most atomic activities from the

38

 Through most of the war, the headquarters organization remained small. Then in 1945, in anticipation of employment of atomic bombs against

Japan, Groves enlarged it to include a public information group.
90 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

MRS. JEAN O'LEARY REVIEWING PROJECT REPORTS WITH GENERAL GROVES

OSRD to the Army was completed in

mid-1943.39

Responsibility for execution of the

plans, policies, and decisions made by

the various advisory groups of the

Manhattan Project devolved first

upon General Groves and through

him upon the Manhattan District.

Groves, as officer in charge of the

atomic bomb program for the Army,

exercised command authority over

the District, but he was not its chief

executive officer. That position was

held by the district engineer, who reported to Groves.

The district engineer presided over

an organization that was, as it

emerged in mid-1943, similar in many

respects to the engineer districts that

had been formed by the Corps of Engineers in the past to carry out special

assignments (Chart 2). Its administrative elements were grouped into two

major categories: operating units,

which were involved primarily in the

day-to-day monitoring of contractor

operations; and staff units, which

were engaged in overseeing and pro39

 Subsequently, three other advisory groups contributed significantly to administration of the

project. These were the Combined Policy Committee (CPC), formed in late 1943, which was concerned with collaboration and exchanges of information on atomic matters with the British and Canadian governments; the Combined Development

Trust (CDT), established in June 1944, which was

involved in the international aspects of procurement, supply, and control of uranium and thorium

ores; and the Interim Committee (IC), organized in

May 1945 by the Secretary of War with approval of

the President to advise on postwar control of atomic

energy at home and abroad, on release of information to the public, and on employment of the bomb

against Japan. See Ch. X for a detailed discussion

on the establishment and work of the CPC, Ch. XIII

on the CDT, and Ch. XXVI on the IC.

GENERAL GROVES TAKES COMMAND 91

viding services. In both types of units,

military personnel headed virtually all

administrative elements down to the

section level, although many of the

District employees filling positions

that required special knowledge or

training were civil service workers.

The chiefs of each of these units reported directly to the district engineer, who functioned with the assistance of a small headquarters group

comprised of an executive officer, two

administrative assistants, and legal

and medical advisers.

Operating units, each headed by a

unit chief or an area engineer, were

formed to monitor each of the major

contractor-operated activities. The

number and precise character of these

operating units varied considerably

due to the quantity and type of contract operations under District supervision. Thus, in the early period of

the District's operation the units conformed to the emphasis on construction activities, whereas later they reflected the shift to plant-operating activities. By the time of the District

headquarters move in August 1943

from New York City to Oak Ridge,

five major operating units—Madison

Square Area, Hanford Engineer

Works, Clinton Engineer Works, New

York Area, and Special Products—had

been established.

The elements concerned with overseeing project operations and services

were divided among seven major staff

components: the Y-12 (electromagnetic), K-25 (gaseous diffusion), X-10

(plutonium), and P-9 (heavy water)

unit chiefs; and the Technical, Service

and Control, and Administrative Divisions. The four unit chiefs were responsible for the overall supervision

of the construction and operations

phases of the production processes.

The Technical Division had responsibility for the major contractor-operated research and development programs at Columbia and the Universities of California (Berkeley), Chicago,

and Rochester;40 the Service and

Control Division, for control functions, intelligence and security matters, labor relations, safety, and military personnel; and the Administrative Division, for procurement and

contracts, fiscal matters, civilian personnel, priorities and materials, correspondence and the library, classified

files and mail and records, and the

District's Washington Liaison Office.

Additionally, the latter division provided the Los Alamos Laboratory with

specified routine services.

With the rounding out of the

Army's organization for administration of the American atomic energy

program in mid-1943, General

Groves and his District staff were in a

much firmer position to convert the

OSRD-inherited research and development organization into an industrial complex for producing fissionable

materials for atomic weapons. During

the months that followed, the Army

had to make further internal reorganizations to meet the new requirements

resulting from the shift from plant

construction to plant-operating activities and the addition of new facilities.41

 But with Groves at the helm,

40

 In early 1943, Groves selected Professor Stafford L. Warren of the University of Rochester to

direct a medical research program on the effects of

radiation. See Ch. XX. 41

 While from mid-1943 until the end of World

War II the basic pattern of the Manhattan District's

administrative organization remained relatively

fixed, the district engineer in 1944 established new Continued
92 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

carrying out the Military Policy Committee's decisions and overcoming

seemingly insurmountable obstacles,

the atomic project moved ahead.

operating units for specific functions—for example,

to administer divisions charged with supervising operation of community and site facilities in Tennessee, to supervise construction and operation of the

third major production plant (thermal diffusion),

and to expedite production in all of the project's

major plants. He also abolished the staff unit's Service and Control and Technical Divisions, placing

part of their functions in the Administrative Division

(for example, labor relations) and shifting the rest

into special staff elements that reported directly to

him. Thus, by late 1944, the special staff included

control, research control, safety, and historical

record sections, medical and naval detachment elements, a public relations and special services office,

a legal adviser, a district inspector, and a special assignments officer (cover designation for officer responsible for liaison with Canadian atomic program

officials). Not on the special staff but functioning as

units in the District headquarters were intelligence

and security, patents, fire protection, and liaison

elements in Washington, D.C.
PART TWO

PRODUCING FISSIONABLE MATERIALS

CHAPTER V

Organizing for Production

In June 1942, the Army took its

first step to form a production organization for the manufacture of fissionable materials with negotiation of

an AEM (architect-engineer-manager)

agreement with the Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation of

Boston; however, as the complexity of

the AEM job became evident in the

following months, attempts were

made to involve a number of other

leading American industrial and construction firms. The Army's task of

getting the skilled manpower and

technical know-how required to

produce fissionable materials in quantities sufficient to fabricate atomic

weapons was not easy. It was complicated greatly by the absolute necessity

for speed, which meant that contracts

had to be let before the customary

preliminary plans and technical data

were available. This lack of specific

information—blueprints, specifications, and similar data—was an added

handicap because many of the scientific and technical processes involved

were virtually unknown in industrial

circles. Also, because many industrial

organizations already had committed

most of their resources to war production, the managers and engineers

of these organizations were reluctant

to take on additional responsibilities

for a project of such unusual and uncertain character. The Army therefore

was faced with the problem of somehow convincing them that the success

of the program was so crucial to the

outcome of the war they simply could

not refuse to participate.

Plutonium Project

The question of who should have

responsibility for carrying through the

plutonium program to the production

stage had been a matter of controversy for some time at the Metallurgical Laboratory.1

 Some of the scientists had proposed that they themselves direct the design, development

and engineering, and construction of

the plutonium plant. Metallurgical

Laboratory Director Arthur Compton,

who early in his career had worked as

an employee and consultant for large

electrical companies, knew that this

proposal ran counter to the procedure customarily followed in American industry, namely, the assigning of

research, development, and production to separate departments—a prac1

 Paragraphs on the Metallurgical Laboratory

based on Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 108-10;

Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 44-46; DSM Chronology, 25 Jun 42, Sec. 2(e), OROO; Hewlett and

Anderson, New World, p. 184.
96 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

tice that experience had shown generally brought the most efficient results.

He suggested that time would be

saved by securing an experienced industrial firm already accustomed to

carrying out large-scale projects, leaving the research to the Metallurgical

Laboratory staff.

The staff's reaction, he recalled

later, "was a near rebellion."

 2 The

younger scientists pointed out that

they had demonstrated their ability to

supervise development of processes

to the stage of large-scale production

by the success they had so recently

achieved in increasing the output of

pure uranium metal and graphite.

After having contributed so much to

its initiation and development, they

wanted to see the plutonium program

through to final fulfillment. And solidly backing them were those laboratory scientists who had been born and

educated in Europe. Most of them

were inclined to suspect the motives

of large industrial firms. Also, most

had a more extensive knowledge of

engineering techniques than their

American counterparts learned as a

regular part of their scientific

training.

By early summer of 1942, progress

in research required that a decision

soon be reached. Compton assembled

some seventy-five members of his research and administrative staff to

agree on a plan of organization. It

soon became apparent they were not

going to reach a consensus, so Compton announced he would proceed

without their approval. At the OSRD

S-1 Executive Committee meeting of

25 June, Compton supported the decision to assign AEM responsibility

for the plutonium as well as the other

processes to Stone and Webster.

Although the S-1 Committee had

suggested that the University of Chicago might operate the pilot facility

to be built in the Argonne Forest area

southwest of the city, no action had

yet been taken. In mid-August,

Compton urged Colonel Marshall that

an operator should be selected

promptly as construction of this unit

was about to begin. He also pointed

out that the operator of the Argonne

chemical facility probably would have

responsibility for the separation works

of the main plutonium plant; therefore, the operator's engineering and

design personnel should have an opportunity to observe construction of

the plant at Argonne.

As possible operators, Compton

recommended that Marshall approach

E. I. du Pont de Nemours Company,

Standard Oil Development Company,

or Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation. For reasons of security, Marshall wanted to hold to a minimum

the number of firms to be brought in

to build and operate project facilities.

He proposed that for the time being

Stone and Webster add operation of

the Argonne separation plant to its

other responsibilities. Both Compton

and the engineering firm promptly accepted this arrangement—the latter,

however, with a proviso that it be permitted to secure technical assistance

from other organizations.

At the Bohemian Grove meeting in

early September, the S-1 Committee

recommended that Stone and Webster get the technical assistance it required. General Groves, newly appointed as Manhattan commander,

and Stone and Webster agreed on 2 Compton, Atomic Quest, p. 109.
ORGANIZING FOR PRODUCTION 97

26 September that Du Pont should

be approached and the S-1 Committee accepted their decision. Two

weeks later, Du Pont assented to

design and procure not only the

chemical separation equipment but

also part of the pile equipment for

the plutonium pilot plant. At first Du

Pont had resisted taking on any responsibility for the piles, pleading

lack of experience and strain on its facilities as a result of its other government projects. But Groves and Compton finally persuaded the company

that this was the logical solution to a

difficult problem.3

Because Du Pont's contract covered

only design and procurement of

equipment and because Stone and

Webster would operate only the Argonne separation installation, the

most important plutonium production

problem—securing an operator for

the other pilot facilities and the production plant—remained to be solved.

Both Groves and Compton were

moving rapidly toward the view that

the size and complexity of this task

required the selection of a company

other than Stone and Webster. The

Manhattan chief paid his first visit to

the Metallurgical Laboratory in early

October 1942. Reviewing the plutonium program with Compton and his

senior staff, Groves quickly concluded

that to bring this process into production was going to be a far greater

project than anyone had anticipated.

After further consultation, Groves

and Compton decided that Stone and

Webster should be relieved of all responsibility for the plutonium project,

a decision concurred in by both Vannevar Bush and James B. Conant.4

As General Groves learned more

about the plutonium process, he also

came to the conclusion that it would

be preferable to turn the entire

project of design, engineering, construction, and operation over to a

single firm. If the proper organization

were chosen, the gain in efficiency of

operation would ease his own task of

coordination. One Du Pont policy, in

particular, impressed Groves. Unlike

most American industrial firms, the

company had a long-established practice of building its own plants. Hence,

Du Pont had the resources and experience necessary to carry out all aspects of the plutonium production

plant, an advantage from the standpoint of both security and speed of

getting into production.

When Groves proposed to Compton, Bush, Conant, and other leaders

that Du Pont be asked to assume sole

responsibility for the plutonium production project, replacing Stone and

Webster, he received a generally favorable response. But the Manhattan

chief was fully aware that several key

members of the Metallurgical Laboratory, with whom Du Pont engineers

would have to work quite closely, remained unreconciled to any course

that would take plutonium production

out of their hands. Furthermore, 3

 Marshall Diary, 14, 18, 26 Sep and 2, 9 Oct 42,

OCG Files, Gen Corresp, Groves Files, Misc Recs

Sec, behind Fldr 5, MDR; DSM Chronology, 14-15

Aug 42, Sec. 16, 13 Sep 42, Sec. 2(e), and 26 Sep

42, Sec. 15(b), OROO; Ms, Leslie R. Groves, "Now

It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan

Project" (hereafter cited as Groves Ms), pp. 95-96,

CMH.

4

 Account of negotiations with Du Pont drawn

primarily from Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 46-

52; Memo, sub: Prelim Negotiations . . . Between

United States of America and Du Pont . . . , Incl to

Ltr, R. E. DeRight (Du Pont) to Groves, 30 Oct 43,

OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 2F, MDR;

DSM Chronology, 10 Nov 42, Sec. 23(b), OROO.
98 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

some members of this dissatisfied

group would be especially upset over

the selection of Du Pont, which in

many ways seemed to them to epitomize big industry.

Groves, nevertheless, decided to

take immediate steps to negotiate an

agreement with Du Pont. On 30 October, he invited Willis Harrington,

senior vice president of the firm, to

meet with him and Conant, who himself once had served as a consultant

to Du Pont. Harrington came the next

day, accompanied by chemist Charles

Stine, also a vice president of Du

Pont and a friend of Conant. Groves

and Conant gave the two Du Pont executives data on the pile program and

general information about the other

processes and the military objectives

of the project, emphasizing the urgency of the program and frankly admitting there were serious questions

as to its feasibility.

Harrington and Stine were appalled

at the idea that their company should

assume major responsibility for this

phase of the atomic program. As they

perceived it, the technical requirements were formidable, the operating

conditions unorthodox, and the scientific field one in which Du Pont had

no special experience and competence. Faced, however, with Groves's

insistence that Du Pont was the only

industrial organization in America

with the capacity to build the plutonium plant, they reluctantly indicated

the company might be able to do the

job. But a final decision could only be

made by Du Pont President Walter S.

Carpenter, Jr., and other members of

the firm's executive committee following an investigation by company

chemists and engineers. Consequently, a day or two later, Groves granted

the company permission to send a

team of experts to the Metallurgical

Laboratory to see the work in

progress.

On 10 November, General Groves,

Colonel Nichols, the deputy district

engineer, Arthur Compton, and

Norman Hilberry, who was associate

director of the Metallurgical Laboratory, went to Wilmington, Delaware,

to plead further for Du Font's assistance. Groves emphasized to Carpenter that the project was of utmost importance to the war effort, adding

that President Roosevelt, Secretary of

War Stimson, and Chief of Staff Marshall also shared this opinion. Furthermore, he continued, there was

reason to believe the Axis states

might soon be producing fissionable

materials in quantities sufficient to

manufacture atomic weapons. The

only known defense against such

weapons was "fear of their counteremployment."

 5 If the United States

could develop such weapons before

the enemy, it could materially shorten

the war and potentially reduce American casualties by the tens of

thousands.

Following his conference with Carpenter, Groves went to a meeting of

the Du Pont executive committee.

There, he was joined by Nichols,

Compton, and Hilberry. With Carpenter presiding at the meeting,

Groves repeated what he had said

earlier to the Du Pont president.

Some committee members expressed

reservations, many of them traceable

to the report of the team of company

chemists and engineers who had just

returned from a visit to the Metallur5

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 49.
ORGANIZING FOR PRODUCTION 99

gical Laboratory. The team had reported that the laboratory scientists

had neither demonstrated a self-sustaining chain reaction nor furnished

adequate information concerning the

basic problem of controlling and removing the tremendous amount of

heat that would be generated in a pile

operation. And though they were at

work on three different pile designs,

none—at least when judged in terms

of practical engineering—seemed

likely to provide a prototype for a

large-scale production pile. Progress

on the plutonium separation process

did not appear much more encouraging. The scientists had yet to demonstrate a method that would separate

more than microscopic amounts of

plutonium from radioactive fission

products. On the basis of its observations, the Du Pont team estimated

that only minute amounts of plutonium could be produced in 1943, not

much more in 1944, and only

enough, possibly, in 1945 to fulfill the

planned rate of production for

weapon purposes.

The pessimistic tone of the Du

Pont executive committee's evaluation

was not surprising; they concluded,

nevertheless, that the pile method was

probably feasible. To be certain of

this, however, they felt Du Pont must

have control over all aspects of the

project. Furthermore, the government

should guarantee the company

against loss from the obviously great

hazards inherent in the process. Carpenter informed General Groves on

12 November that Du Pont would

take the job, and the Manhattan commander immediately directed Colonel

Nichols to draft the terms of a

contract.

With Du Pont's participation apparently assured, the Military Policy

Committee cautiously endorsed going

ahead with plans to build a plutonium

plant capable of producing 1.0 kilogram of fissionable material per day.

It also directed that Du Pont take

over from Stone and Webster at Chicago, relieving the Boston firm of virtually all of its AEM responsibilities

for plutonium project activities.6

Hardly had that question been settled when important new data cast serious doubt on the explosive characteristics of plutonium. Wallace A.

Akers, technical chief of the British

Directorate of Tube Alloys (corresponding to the S-1 Executive Committee), was in Washington, D.C., on

14 November to discuss information

exchange with Conant. During a

luncheon conversation, Akers revealed that British atomic scientists

had discovered that plutonium had

premature fissioning tendencies that

might make it unsuitable for use in a

weapon. Greatly disturbed, Conant

checked with Ernest Lawrence and

Arthur Compton. When they told him

that both Oppenheimer and Glenn

Seaborg, a chemist who had done extensive research on plutonium at the

University of California, Berkeley, expressed some concern about the possibility of obtaining material of sufficient purity to ensure the fissioning

qualities in a weapon, Conant got in

touch with General Groves. The Manhattan chief responded immediately

by setting up an investigating team

composed of Lawrence, Compton,

6

 MFC Min, 12 Nov 42, OCG Files, Gen Corresp,

MP Files, Fldr 23, Tab A, MDR.
100 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

and Oppenheimer, as well as physicist

Edwin McMillan.7

On 18 November the four scientists

reported back to Groves in optimistic

terms.8 Basing their recommendations on the conclusion that despite

"many difficult but solvable problems

it should be possible to produce a satisfactory bomb . . . from 49 [plutonium] probably during 1945," they

urged maximum speed in building a

plutonium production plant. The scientists supported their recommendations with Oppenheimer's estimate of

the degree of plutonium purity required for a bomb.

Instead of convincing Conant and

Du Pont of the feasibility of plutonium, Oppenheimer's data had the opposite effect. By chance, the Harvard

University president had just received

figures on plutonium purity requirements from British scientist Sir James

Chadwick, and when he compared

these with Oppenheimer's, he was

shocked to find that the latter's estimates allowed for a degree of impurity ten times as great. This discrepancy

was so large that Conant momentarily

suspected American scientists had

erred seriously in their calculations.

Not until he received additional data

and written assurances from Compton

and Lawrence was his confidence in

the feasibility of plutonium fully

restored.9

As for Du Font's engineers, Oppenheimer's estimate appeared so exacting that it would be unattainable in

any reasonable period of time. In

Groves's office on 18 November,

Charles Stine and Crawford H.

Greenewalt, a chemical engineer serving as chemical director of Du Font's

Grasselli Chemicals Department, complained with some feeling that the

Manhattan commander was asking the

firm to undertake the most difficult

and unpromising of the processes for

producing fissionable materials and

suggested the company might be

better qualified to carry out one of

the other processes. Greenewalt's lack

of enthusiasm at this juncture can be

traced to his pessimistic interpretation

of some information he had received

a short time before, leading him to

conclude that there was only about a

60-percent chance that a sustained

chain reaction would be achieved.10

Compton, who was also present,

was shocked by Stine's assertion that

the odds were 100 to 1 against

achieving plutonium production in

time to be of any value to the war

effort. For the Metallurgical Laboratory chief this marked the beginning of

a gradual disillusionment with Du

Pont. By the end of December he

would be seriously suggesting that

some other firm be brought in to

build the production plants. Compton

later recalled that he "probably took

Stine's words much more seriously

than they were intended." Neverthe7

 DSM Chronology, 14 Nov 42, Sec. 2(a), and 19

Nov 42, Sec. 23, OROO; Hewlett and Anderson,

New World, pp. 109-10. See Ch. X for details on

problems with information interchange between the

British and American atomic programs. 8

 Team's report in Memo (for File), Lawrence,

Compton, Oppenheimer, and McMillan, 18 Nov 42,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 401.1-410.2 (Materials),

MDR. 9

 Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 109-10;

Ltr, Lawrence to Conant, 23 Nov 42, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 201 (Conant), MDR; Ltr, Compton to

Conant, 8 Dec 42, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1,

MDR. 10

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 52; Ltr, Lawrence to Conant, 23 Nov 42, MDR; Compton, Atomic

Quest, pp. 132-34. Du Pont purchased the Grasselli

Chemical Company of Cleveland in 1928 and incorporated it as a separate department in the firm.
ORGANIZING FOR PRODUCTION 101

less, under those immediate circumstances, he felt that he could not

"have drawn such a conclusion without considering the task a waste effort

as far as the present war was concerned." Therefore, Compton determined immediately to try to change

"their [Du Font's] point of view to

one of optimism."

 11

Reassessment of Processes To

Produce a Bomb

At the meeting on 10 November,

the Du Pont executive committee suggested that a reappraisal of all aspects

of the project would help the company in determining the precise role it

should play in the atomic energy program. Seeing the logic of this suggestion, Groves and Conant thought the

time was appropriate for a reassessment because project emphasis was

shifting from research and development in scientific principles to practical application on an industrial scale.

Furthermore, the Military Policy

Committee shortly was going to have

to prepare a progress report to the

President on the project.12

Lewis Reviewing Committee

Groves acted promptly to implement reassessment of the project. On

18 November, following close consultation with Conant, he appointed

a five-man reviewing committee,

headed by Warren K. Lewis, a highly

respected professor of chemical engineering at Massachusetts Institute of

Technology (MIT). Groves made certain that Du Pont was well represented on the committee, appointing

Crawford H. Greenewalt, who had

been a student under Lewis at MIT

and was an expert on research; Tom

C. Gary, manager of the Design Division in the Engineering Department

and a specialist in construction; and

Roger Williams, chemical director of

the Ammonia Department, who was

an expert on plant operations. The

fifth member, Eger V. Murphree of

Standard Oil Development Company

and former head of the OSRD S-1

Section's planning board, became ill at

the last minute and was unable to participate in the committee's activities.13

The committee's mission was to review the entire project from a manufacturing standpoint. To accomplish

this, committee members would visit

Harold Urey's project at Columbia

University, investigate Arthur Compton's research on the pile process at

the Metallurgical Laboratory, and assess Ernest Lawrence's work on the

electromagnetic process at the Radiation Laboratory. They would not

evaluate the centrifuge method. The

consensus was that this process was

unlikely to produce U-235 in sufficient quantities to be of use during

the war. The Military Policy and S-1

Executive Committees agreed that all

work, including that on a pilot plant,

should be reduced to the minimum

necessary to establish the feasibility of

the method. Although some support

11 for the centrifuge process still per- Quotations from Compton, Atomic Quest, p. 134.

See also ibid., pp. 132-33, and Groves, Now It Can

Be Told, pp. 55-57. 12

 MPC Min, 12 Nov 42, MDR; MPC Rpt, 15 Dec

42, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab

B, MDR.

13

 DSM Chronology, 19 Nov 42, Sec. 23, OROO;

Groves Diary, 18, 19, 21 Nov 42, LRG; Groves, Now

It Can Be Told, p. 52; Compton, Atomic Quest, pp.

134-35.
102 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

sisted, in time it would be dropped as a

major method for producing fissionable material for the bomb.

After conferring briefly with Groves

and Conant in Washington, D.C., on

21 November, the Lewis reviewing

committee began its tour in New

York. There, committee members met

with leaders of the gaseous diffusion

project and inspected the experimental equipment in the laboratories at

Columbia University, as well as conferred with representatives of the

M. W. Kellogg Company which had

been assigned work on the diffusion

process. Leaving New York by train,

the committee reached Chicago on

the twenty-sixth, Thanksgiving Day.14

Compton had first heard about the

committee's impending visit on the

nineteenth. Sensing that the occasion

would afford him the chance to convince Du Pont and the leaders of the

Manhattan Project that plutonium

could be produced in quantity, and

also that the rest of the atomic program was feasible and of great importance for the war, he and his scientific

staff immediately had directed all possible resources into a twofold effort:

completing as soon as possible the

chain reaction experiment under way

since October, and preparing a report

to demonstrate conclusively the feasibility of the plutonium project.15

Unfortunately the experiment was

still in progress when the committee

arrived, but a hundred-page feasibility

report was ready for study. This carefully organized and documented

report presented a most optimistic estimate of the situation. Plutonium

could be produced in one or more of

several types of chain-reacting piles,

of which a uranium-graphite system

cooled with helium, preferably, or

with ordinary pure water seemed to

offer the most practical solution.

Also, chemical extraction of plutonium in a sufficiently pure state to be

used successfully in a bomb was feasible. Moreover, this bomb would probably be more effective than previous

estimate had indicated. Provided the

plutonium project received adequate

support, the goal to produce sufficient fissionable material in 1944 and

to attain the production stage in 1945

should be possible. Report in hand,

the committee left for Berkeley

Thanksgiving evening.16

Achievement of the Chain Reaction

The Lewis reviewing committee returned from the West Coast via Chicago on 2 December. Stopping over

between trains, they consulted further

with the Metallurgical Laboratory

staff. "I'm sorry," Compton explained, "but Enrico Fermi has an important experiment in hand in the

laboratory and has asked to be

excused."

 17

The "important experiment" was,

of course, the continuing attempt to

achieve a controlled chain reaction in

the experimental pile then under construction at the Metallurgical Laboratory. In October, after laboratory scientists had accumulated a sufficient

amount of uranium metal and graph14

 MPC Min, 12 Nov 42, MDR; DSM Chronology,

14 Nov 42, Sec. 2(f), and 19 Nov 42, Sec. 23,

OROO. 15

 Compton, Atomic Quest, p. 135.

16

 Ibid., pp. 135-36; Rpt, Compton, sub: Feasibility of "49" Proj, 26 Nov 42, OSRD; Smyth Report,

Ch. 6, especially pp. 64-65 and 74-76. Smyth based

this chapter largely on the feasibility report. 17

 Compton, Atomic Quest, p. 140.
ORGANIZING FOR PRODUCTION 103

ite of requisite purity, two alternating

teams began piling graphite blocks intermixed with lumps of uranium in a

carefully devised pattern atop a

timber framework on the floor of a

squash court under the West Stands

of Stagg Field, the University of Chicago football stadium. When news of

this ongoing experiment reached

Groves and Conant during the 14 November S-1 meeting, both men expressed great alarm; however, buttressed with evidence from several

tests carried out while the pile was

under construction and supported by

the senior scientists on his staff,

Compton assured Groves and Conant

that the experiment posed no great

hazard to the heavily populated area

adjacent to the university. Although

Groves decided not to interfere, he

nevertheless alerted the area engineer

at the Metallurgical Laboratory to

inform him immediately of any signs

or developments that indicated the

Chicago scientists were underestimating the element of danger.18

Based on the results of earlier experiments, the scientists constructing

the pile knew that when it reached a

certain size it would become critical,

thus initiating what was hoped would

be a self-sustaining chain reaction. To

prevent the possibility of premature

fission and also to be able to control

the reaction once it began, the scientists inserted several neutron-absorbing cadmium strips as control rods.

Removal of these control rods would

release the flow of neutrons in the

lumps of uranium and permit the

chain reaction to begin; their reinsertion would halt the process. Various

measuring instruments also were attached to or placed in the pile, and

the whole setup was watched over by

Fermi and his colleagues with all the

care and nervous intensity that so

unique and critical an experiment

inspired.

Late in the afternoon of 1 December, Fermi's crew placed the last lump

of uranium and layer of graphite

blocks on the pile, by now a massive

structure, essentially square in shape

and solid-appearing from the floor up

to about two-thirds of its height, and

from that point to its top near the

high ceiling, a series of setbacks.

On the morning of 2 December,

the entire experimental group assembled for the crucial test. Most of

those present were on the balcony of

the court, either as observers or operators of the instrument control cabinet located there. Norman Hilberry,

equipped with an axe, was prepared

to sever a rope tied to the balcony

rail, which would drop into place an

emergency safety rod suspended over

the pile. A young scientist from the

laboratory staff, George Weil, remained on the floor of the court to

handle the final control rod. On a

platform above the pile, three men

stood ready to flood it with a cadmium salt solution, which would absorb

sufficient neutrons to halt a runaway

reaction if the pile's other control

mechanisms should fail. A hundred

feet away, behind two concrete walls,

another group monitored the test by

means of instruments and an intercommunication system. Should anything go wrong on the squash court,

incapacitating the group there, the

"remote control" men could throw a

switch to activate electrically operated 18

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 53-54.
104 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

safety rods and halt the chain

reaction.

In midmorning, Fermi sent word to

Compton that the test was about to

begin and the Metallurgical Laboratory chief, accompanied by Crawford

Greenewalt, whom he had selected as

the representative of the Lewis reviewing committee, hastened from

nearby Eckhart Hall to the stadium.

As they arrived, Fermi was testing the

pile systematically. As Weil slowly

withdrew the final control rod, Fermi

carefully checked the recording instruments. With each foot the rod was

pulled out, the pile came closer to

criticality, and the instruments measuring the neutron activity clicked

faster. By about 11:30 A.M. the growing tension among the scientists in

the squash court had become obvious. "I'm hungry," said Fermi, suddenly breaking the spell. "Let's go to

lunch."

Shortly after 2:00 P.M. the tests

were resumed. Faster and faster

clicked the neutron counters as the

control rod was slowly withdrawn. At

about 3:25, Weil moved the rod another foot. Fermi made a rapid computation with his slide rule and, turning to Compton, exclaimed: "This is

going to do it." As the neutron count

ran faster, it was obvious Fermi was

right. The rate of rise of the count

was now constant. "The reaction is

self-sustaining," announced Fermi,

meaning that the slow fissioning of

uranium atoms in the pile would continue to produce enough neutrons to

keep the process going.

After nearly half an hour of operation, when the radiation around the

pile began to rise to dangerous levels,

Fermi ordered the control rods reinserted. The world's first self-sustaining nuclear reaction had been initiated, allowed to run, and then stopped.

Man had accomplished the controlled

release of atomic energy.19

Lewis Reviewing Committee Report

While practical demonstration of a

chain reaction did much to relieve the

hesitancy of Du Pont, the company's

management was perhaps even more

encouraged by the report of the

Lewis reviewing committee, submitted

on 4 December. On the premise that

"production must be substantially 25

kilos of '25' [U-235] or 15 kilos of

'49' [plutonium] per month," the

committee felt that the diffusion process had the best chance of producing

enough fissionable material of the desired quality and, equally important,

that it would probably be the first to

attain full-scale production. They

agreed that the electromagnetic process was probably the most immediately feasible of all methods under

consideration, but it seemed least

likely to produce U-235 in the quantity that would be needed. Despite

problems, the pile process now had a

much better chance of success and

might even provide "the possibility of

earliest achievement of the desired

result." Accordingly, the committee

recommended construction of a diffu19

 Quotations from WD Press Release, "Background Material for Use in Connection With Observance of the Fourth Anniversary, December

Second, of the Scientific Event of Outstanding Significance in the United States Program of Development of Atomic Energy," 1 Dec 46, pp. 10-11,

CMH. See also Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 136-43;

Smyth Report, pp. 70 and 177-81; Enrico Fermi,

"The First Pile," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 18

(Dec 62): 19-24. Many of the other published works

cited in this volume also contain lengthy descriptions of this event.
ORGANIZING FOR PRODUCTION 105

sion plant, of a pile pilot plant and

several full-scale production piles,

and of facilities for producing heavy

water. It urged continued developmental work on the electromagnetic

process, including building a pilot

plant to produce small quantities of

U-235 for use in experiments. Finally,

the committee recommended that

companies with appropriate experience be given the responsibility necessary for operating all these projects.

There no longer seemed any doubt

concerning the feasibility of producing sufficient quantities of fissionable

material.20

When the Military Policy Committee met on 10 December in General

Groves's office, it had before it the

report of the Lewis reviewing committee. The effect of this report and the

events that had taken place in Chicago

a week earlier were evident. At its

meeting on 12 November, the Military Policy Committee had agreed to

proceed with the construction and operation of a small electromagnetic

separation plant; a pilot diffusion

plant and, if practicable, a small production plant; and a plutonium

plant.21 Now a month later, the committee's decisions were far more optimistic. The pile method for producing plutonium, it decided, would "be

carried forward full blast." Design for

the pilot diffusion plant was well advanced and construction of test units

was already under way at Columbia

University. But rather than await completion of the pilot plant, the committee decided that work on the design

and construction of a full-scale production plant should begin at once.

The electromagnetic plant would be

comprised of only 500 tanks "in

order to get the earliest possible production of material, even though it

may be in small quantities."

 22

 Thus,

the Military Policy Committee had

opened the way to rapid development

of those processes that seemed most

likely to provide large-scale production of fissionable materials.

Contract Negotiations

In rapid sequence during the next

few weeks, Groves and the Manhattan

staff oversaw negotiation of construction and operation contracts. The

first of these was a letter contract for

Du Pont on 21 December (effective as

of 1 December 1942), pending completion of negotiations for a formal

contract. It provided that the company secure designs, procure equipment, and erect facilities for a largescale plutonium production plant,

which it would also operate. Although

the agreement of 1 December superseded the letter contract of 3 October, which had provided that Du Pont

design and procure equipment for

plutonium pilot installations, it did

not specify that the firm would build

a pilot plant. New location problems

had made temporary postponement

of settling this aspect expedient.23

20

 Conclusions of Reviewing Committee, 4 Dec 42,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 334 (Special Reviewing

Committee), MDR. These conclusions, but without

the statistical analysis portion, are also in the MPC

Rpt, 15 Dec 42, MDR. See also Compton, Atomic

Quest, p. 145. 21

 MPC Min, 12 Nov 42, MDR; Groves Diary,

10 Dec 42, LRG.

22

 MPC Min, 10 Dec 42, MDR; MPC Rpt, 15 Dec

42, MDR. 23

 Ltr Contract W-7412-eng-1, 1 Dec 42 (accepted 21 Dec 42), Tab B; Ltr, E. B. Yancey (Gen Mgr,

Explosives Dept, Du Pont) to Lt Col J. M. Harman,

21 Dec 42, Incl to Memo, Maj A. Tammaro to Maj Continued
106 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Du Pont did not want to manufacture plutonium after the war and

made clear it was agreeing to do so

now only because of the expressed

desire of the Army. Accordingly, in

the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, Du

Pont waived all profits and accepted

the assignment on the basis of reimbursement for the company's expenses on the project, plus a fixed fee

of $1.00. However, arrangements

were made to protect the firm from

financial losses that might arise, because the hazards concomitant to the

new process were not yet fully known

or understood and conceivably could

result in catastrophic losses for the

company. Du Pont requested that the

contract be submitted to the comptroller general of the United States

for approval, particularly the sections

covering reimbursement and indemnification, which the company feared

might otherwise be upset by a future

ruling. General Groves agreed and, as

further assurance to Du Pont, Vannevar Bush also forwarded a letter to

President Roosevelt, explaining the

basis upon which the government was

assuming responsibility for the unique

hazards involved in the project.24

The Army had to negotiate with a

number of companies for design, construction, and operation of the gaseous diffusion plant. Because the M. W.

Kellogg Company had been working for nearly a year on research and

design for a pilot plant, the Military

Policy Committee decided at its

10 December meeting that this firm

should also design and engineer the

production plant. Hence, on the

twelfth, General Groves requested

Kellogg to act as architect-engineer

for the diffusion project and, two days

later, the company signed the necessary letter contract. To simplify operations and for reasons of security,

Kellogg created a wholly-owned subsidiary, the Kellex Corporation,25

 for

the project. After consulting with

Kellex representatives, the Manhattan

commander asked Union Carbide and

Carbon Corporation to operate the

plant. By late January, the Carbide

and Carbon Chemicals Corporation—

a subsidiary of Union Carbide—had

signed a Manhattan letter contract

and its engineers had begun working

closely with Kellex on difficult design

problems.

While earlier plans had called for

Stone and Webster to build the diffusion plant, it soon became clear this

job would overburden the engineering firm's already heavily taxed resources. Some consideration also was

given to having Kellex construct the

plant, but Groves decided that organization would have its hands full with

the design and engineering problems.

Groves remembered that he had been

favorably impressed by the management, skill, and integrity of the J. A.

Jones Construction Company of

Charlotte, North Carolina, which had

Claude C. Pierce, Jr. (Washington Liaison Office),

sub: Du Pont Contract W-7412-eng-1, 5 Dec 44,

Tab G. Both in OCG Files, Gen Corresp, Groves

Files, Fldr 19, MDR. Copies of formal contract,

completed on 8 Nov 43, on file in OROO. See also

amendments and amplifications to this contract,

same file, and Du Pont, Stockholders Bulletin, 13 Aug

45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 161 (Du Pont),

MDR. 24

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 46-59; Memo,

sub: Prelim Negotiations . . . , Incl to Ltr, DeRight to Groves, 30 Oct 43, MDR; DSM Chronology, 10 Nov 42, Sec. 23(b), OROO; Compton, Atomic

Quest, pp. 131-34.

25

 The name Kellex was derived from "Kell" for

Kellogg and "X" for secret.
ORGANIZING FOR PRODUCTION 107

built several large camps for the

Army. The company accepted a letter

contract covering this assignment on

18 May 1943.26

Arrangements already had been

made for Stone and Webster to build

the electromagnetic plant; however,

because project leaders had decided

that the task of operating the plant

would be beyond the firm's practical

capabilities, Groves offered the job to

the Tennessee Eastman Corporation,

a subsidiary of the Eastman Kodak

Company, which had considerable experience in chemical processes. On

5 January 1943, Tennessee Eastman

informed Groves that it would accept

the job and the next day signed a

letter of intent, pending negotiation

of a formal contract. Within a few

days key personnel of the company

went to the Radiation Laboratory at

Berkeley to familiarize themselves

with Lawrence's experimental electromagnetic separation units.27

Upon examining the plans for various types of piles at the Metallurgical

Laboratory in early November 1942,

Du Pont engineers had rated the pile

with a heavy water moderator second

only to the helium-cooled graphite

pile. It now appeared to be the logical

choice "as a second line of defense"

in case the graphite pile should fail.

Accordingly, Du Pont recommended

that the Manhattan commander take

immediate steps to increase the

monthly production of heavy water to

approximately 3 tons per month: 0.5

tons to be produced by the electrolytic process at the Trail plant already

under construction, and 2.5 tons by

the distillation process at new plants

to be built by Du Pont as adjuncts to

ammonia-producing facilities already

under construction by the company at

government-owned ordnance plants.

(At the request of the S-1 Committee,

Du Pont earlier had investigated and

ascertained the practicability of employing the distillation process to

produce heavy water.)

 28

Both the Military Policy and S-1

Committees endorsed Du Pont's recommendations. Under the terms of a

letter contract of 16 November, Du

Pont agreed "to select a process and

provide facilities for the production of

heavy water in order to make available a supply of this material at the

earliest possible date."

 29

 Groves authorized the company to expand facilities under construction at Morgantown Ordnance Works, near Morgan26

 MPC Min, 10 Dec 42 and 21 Jan 43, MDR;

DSM Chronology, 12 Dec 42, Sec. 4, 28 Dec 42,

Sec. 15(b), 30 Dec 42, Sec. 16, 14 Jan 43, Sec. 2(f),

OROO; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 111-12;

MDH, Bk. 2, Vol. 3, "Design," Sec. 3, Vol. 4, "Construction," Sec. 3, and Vol. 5, "Operation," pp. 2.1-

2.4, DASA. Copies of formal CPFF contracts executed with M. W. Kellogg Co. on 11 Apr 44 (Contract

W-7405-eng-23, effective 14 Dec 42), with Carbide

and Carbon Chemicals Corp. on 23 Nov 43 (Contract W-7405-eng-26, effective 18 Jan 43), and with

J. A. Jones Construction Co. on 2 Mar 44 (Contract

W-7421-eng-11, effective 18 May 43) on file in

OROO. See also List, sub: Signed Prime and Subcontracts Over $100,000, Incl to Memo, Lt Col E.

H. Marsden (Ex Off, MD) to Groves, 31 Aug 43,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 161, MDR. 27

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 96-97; DSM

Chronology, 28 Dec 42, Sec. 2(e), OROO; MDH,

Bk. 5, Vol. 6, "Operation," Sec. 2, DASA. Groves

Diary, 30-31 Dec 42 and 5 Jan 43, LRG. Copy of

formal CPFF contract executed with Tennessee

Eastman Corp. on 7 Jun 43 (Contract W-7401-eng23, effective 6 Jan 43) on file in OROO.

28

 DSM Chronology, 10 Nov 42, Sec. 23(i), and

14 Nov 42, Sec. 2(f)(k-m), OROO; MDH, Bk. 3,

"The P-9 Project," p. 2.4, DASA. 29

 Copy of Ltr Contract W-7412-eng-4, 16 Nov

42, on file in OROO. See also MPC Min, 12 Nov

42, MDR.
108 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

town, West Virginia; the Wabash

River Ordnance Works, adjacent to

Newport, Indiana; and the Alabama

Ordnance Works, near Sylacauga,

Alabama. (See Map 2.) Du Pont would

build and operate the facilities,

making as extensive use as possible of

existing steam plants and other installations. Because Du Pont already had

contracts with the Army's Ordnance

Department for construction and operation of munitions-making facilities

at each of these ordnance plants, it

was agreed the additional work could

be covered by supplements to these

contracts, thus eliminating the need

for the Manhattan chief to negotiate

new agreements. Nevertheless, for

reasons of security, each heavy water

plant was to be built and operated

almost entirely under the immediate

supervision of the local area engineer

and general supervision of the Manhattan District. The Ordnance Department, in Colonel Marshall's

words, was "not to be involved in the

design or knowledge of use of the

product."

 30

Hanford Engineer Works

Until November 1942, project leaders had assumed that the main plutonium production plant would be

located at the Tennessee site.31 However, Du Pont was greatly concerned

about the hazards of manufacturing

plutonium on a large scale. An atomic

explosion might devastate an area

surrounding a plant and send a lethal

cloud of radioactive dust and gases

over a much larger zone. Such an explosion less than 20 miles from Knoxville could be a catastrophic disaster.

Groves himself already had qualms

about placing a hazardous operation

adjacent to electromagnetic and gaseous diffusion plants and near other

important war production facilities in

the Tennessee Valley Authority

(TVA) region. Even if the physical effects were limited, an explosion

would compromise the security of the

whole project. If the plant were to be

built at the Tennessee site, more land

than originally contemplated would

have to be acquired, a time-consuming process. Furthermore, there was a

strong possibility that a power and

labor shortage in the TVA area might

30

 Dist Engr, Monthly Rpt on DSM Proj, 21 Jan

43, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 28, Tab

A, MDR; DSM Chronology, 29 Dec 42, Sec. 4,

OROO; Memo, Brig Gen R. E. Handy (Asst, OCO)

to Maj G. W. Boush (Ord Ammo Prod Office), sub:

New Constr at Alabama Ord Works . . . , 13 Jan 43,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 161 (Du Pont), MDR;

Memos, Handy to Alabama, Morgantown, and

Wabash River Ord Works CO's, sub: New Constr at

Alabama [and other] Ord Works, 1 Jan 43, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 600.1 (Constr), MDR; MDH, Bk.

3, Secs. 2-3, DASA; Groves Ms, pp. 214-15, CMH.

31

 Section based on Groves, Now It Can Be Told,

pp. 69-77; DSM Chronology, Nov 42-Jan 43,

passim, OROO; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 3, "Design," Sec.

2, and Vol. 4, "Land Acquisition," Secs. 1-2, DASA.

Diary of Col Franklin T. Matthias (hereafter cited as

Matthias Diary), prior to 1 Feb 43, OROO; Rpt, Du

Pont, sub: Special Investigation of Plant Site Location, 2 Jan 43, Incl to Ltr, E. G. Ackart (Engr Dept

chief, Du Pont) to Groves, sub: Pro 9536, 5 Jan 43,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.03, MDR; Rpt, OCE,

sub: Basic Data on Hanford Engr Works, 19 May

43, same files, 601 (Hanford), MDR; Ltr, Robins

(Act Chief of Engrs) to CG SOS, sub: Acquisition of

Land for Cable Proj, Pasco, Wash., 8 Feb 43, Incl to

Memo, O'Brien to Lt Col Whitney Ashbridge (CE

Mil Constr Br), sub: Land Acquisition in Connection

With MD, 17 Apr 43, same files, 601 (Santa Fe),

MDR; Smyth Report, p. 81; MPC Rpt, 15 Dec 42,

MDR; Compton, Atomic Quest, p. 166; Ltr, Groves to

Herbert S. Marks (Power Div, WPB), 7 Feb 43, and

related correspondence, Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

675, MDR.
ORGANIZING FOR PRODUCTION 109

interfere with construction and operation of the plutonium plant.

All of these factors entered into the

decision of the Military Policy Committee on 10 December that "a new

plant site [for plutonium production]

will have to be selected in an isolated

area, but near power and water."

 32

Groves sent Colonel Nichols and Lt.

Col. Franklin T. Matthias to Wilmington on the fourteenth to discuss

choice of a new site with Du Pont officials and with Compton and other

representatives of the Chicago

project. Matthias, an experienced civil

engineer in civilian life, had been

working with Groves on various problems, including the atomic energy

program, and, while he had not yet

been officially assigned to the Manhattan District, he was Groves's tentative choice for the key position of

area engineer on the plutonium

project. The Wilmington conference

concentrated on developing guidelines, with the main emphasis on

safety limitations, for the new site.

When Matthias returned, Groves directed him to make an inquiry concerning sites where sufficient electricity would be available.

Matthias consulted first with those

Corps of Engineers officials whom

Groves had indicated would know a

great deal about the wartime power

situation. As a result, when he sat

down with Groves and two Du Pont

officials on 16 December to draw up

more specific plans, he had considerable information about potential sites.

The precise criteria that emerged

from this discussion indicated that the

site selected would have to be relatively large, isolated from centers of

population, easily acquired, and with

access to a large amount of water and

power. Based on the estimated space

needed for six atomic piles and three

separation plants, an area 12 by 16

miles would be necessary for the production facilities alone. This amount

of space would allow for contingencies well beyond the then anticipated

requirements. It would permit a distance of 1 mile between each of the

piles and 4 miles between each of the

separation plants. Laboratories would

have to be at least 8 miles away from

these separation plants, and the workers' village and nearest railroad or

highway at least 10 miles away. About

100,000 kilowatts of continuous

power would be required, as well as

25,000 gallons of water (preferably

soft) per minute for use in cooling

the piles. A relatively mild climate,

level terrain, a ready supply of sand

and gravel, and ground and subsurface conditions favorable for heavy

construction were also desirable for

speed and economy in building the

various facilities. And finally, along

with other considerations, an area of

comparatively low land values would

reduce costs and facilitate acquisition.

As Groves, Matthias, and the two

Du Pont representatives visualized it,

the site would contain at least 700

square miles, with no main highway

or railroad traversing it. This central

area would consist of a restricted

zone, 24 by 28 miles in size, in the

center of which would be a 12- by 16-

mile plant area. If possible, the site

should be centered in a sparsely populated area, 44 by 48 miles in size,

with no towns of more than one thousand inhabitants. The outer 10 miles

of this last-named area would consti- 32

 MPC Min, 10 Dec 42, MDR.
110 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

tute a buffer zone from which all residents would be removed, although it

would not necessarily have to be purchased by the government.

Groves favored the Pacific Northwest, convenient to the growing

power resources of the great Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) on

the Columbia River. (See Map 2.) In

this he was supported by Brig. Gen.

Thomas M. Robins, the assistant chief

of the Corps of Engineers, and Carl

H. Giroux, the Corps' chief power

expert, who also suggested possible

sites in the southwest as alternate

choices.

Matthias and the Du Pont representatives investigated possible site

locations from the California-Arizona

border near Hoover Dam to the great

Grand Coulee Dam in northeast central Washington. They checked a

score of potential locations and studied maps and detailed reports prepared by the Los Angeles, Sacramento, and Seattle district engineers.

Four sites appeared promising: two in

Washington—one near Grand Coulee

Dam and the other in the vicinity of

Hanford, a community in the south

central part of the state; a third on

the Pit River, near the almost completed Shasta Dam in northern California; and the last on the CaliforniaArizona border in the Needles-Blythe

area, easily accessible to power from

Hoover Dam. Because Matthias and

his colleagues strongly favored the

Hanford location, General Groves

directed Col. John J. O'Brien, head of

the Engineers' Real Estate Branch, to

begin a preliminary appraisal of the

site. Meanwhile, Groves also made a

personal inspection of the area on

16 January 1943 and gave it his

approval.

Before asking for War Department

authorization for acquisition of the

Hanford site, Groves sought and received the BPA's assurance that it

could provide adequate power when

needed. The site selection team had

found that the BPA's only recently

completed trunk transmission line

running between Grand Coulee and

Bonneville Dams traversed the western portion of the projected Hanford

site, with a major substation located

at Midway, just outside the site area.

This meant that a connection into the

BPA system could be made quickly,

guaranteeing an initial power supply

for plant operations as soon as

needed.

The Hanford Engineer Works, as

the plutonium production site was

designated officially, comprised about

670 square miles (slightly smaller

than contemplated) in an isolated part

of the south central Washington

region near the confluence of the Columbia and Yakima Rivers. It lay primarily in Benton County, but also included parts of Yakima, Grant,

Adams, and Franklin Counties. Very

sparsely settled, the site included only

three tiny communities: Hanford,

White Bluffs, and Richland. A few

miles to the southeast was the larger

town of Pasco, an important rail

center. Yakima, some 20 miles to the

west, was a small city serving as a

trade center for a surrounding rich

agricultural area.

The major population centers of

Seattle, Tacoma, Portland, and Spokane were all more than 100 miles

distant. The Columbia River provided

ample cold water of unusually high

purity for cooling; the terrain and climate were close to ideal. Bounded
ORGANIZING FOR PRODUCTION 111

generally on the south by the Yakima

River, on the east and north by the

Columbia, and on the west and southwest by a steep 3,500-foot ridge line,

the site was, for the most part, flat or

slightly rolling, with only the 1,000-

foot-high Gable Mountain rising to

the north from the otherwise unbroken terrain. Excellent rail transportation lines ran nearby and a fairly extensive, existing road system could be

extended without much difficulty over

the level terrain.

The shape of the site was irregular,

but roughly circular, extending on a

north-south line about 37 miles at its

widest point and with a maximum

east-west breadth of about 26 miles.

The tentative plan called for purchase

of a little less than half of the land

and for lease of the remainder. The

outer 10-mile security buffer zone was

no longer considered necessary, but

two smaller areas totaling some 60

square miles, adjacent to an important sector of the site, were to be

leased for security purposes. The estimated cost of acquiring the entire site

was slightly over $5 million.

With Under Secretary of War Patterson's approval on 9 February, acquisition began immediately. By late

spring much had been acquired, but

gaining control of the entire site

would be a long process. Had General Groves been able to foresee the

troubles that lay ahead, he might well

have selected another site.33

Plutonium Semiworks: Argonne

vs. Tennessee

The decision to shift the site of the

main plutonium production plant

from Tennessee to the Pacific Northwest threw open to question once

again the location of the semiworks

for the pile process.34 In December

1942, after learning that the main

production facilities probably would

not be built at the Tennessee site,

Arthur Compton and his Metallurgical Laboratory staff favored going

back to the original plan of centering

plutonium experimentation, testing,

and pilot plant production of fissionable material at the conveniently situated Argonne Forest site.35

 (See Map 2.)

But Du Pont, having full responsibility for the plutonium program,

strongly opposed this alternative. Du

Pont engineers placed considerable

emphasis on the hazards involved in

setting up operations near a large

33

 See Ch. XV for a detailed account of land acquisition at the Hanford site.

34

 A semiworks is a developmental plant in which

the equipment and the amounts of materials used

are larger than those employed in regular laboratory

research. In the context of this discussion, the term

semiworks refers to the intermediate stage for transforming research data into a large-scale production

process. See MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 1, "General Features," App. A3, and Vol. 2, "Research," Pt. 2, pp.

2.1-2.3, DASA. 35

 Subsection based on Compton, Atomic Quest,

pp. 150-52 and 170-72; Groves, Now It Can Be Told,

pp. 68-69; DSM Chronology, 13-14 Sep 42, each

Sec. 2(a), OROO; ibid., 6, 8-9 Jan 43, each Sec. 3,

OROO; ibid., 16 Jan 43, Sec. 5, OROO; Min. Tech

Council, 10 and 28 Dec 42 (Rpt CS-371), ANL;

Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 190-91;

Supp. No. 1, 4 Jan 43, to Ltr Contract W-7412-

eng-1, 1 Dec 42, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, Groves

Files, Fldr 19, Tab B, MDR; Completion Rpt, Du

Pont, sub: Clinton Engr Works, TNX Area, Contract

W-7412-eng-23, 1 Apr 44, p. 2, OROO; Ltr, Williams to Yancey, 12 Jan 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 337 (Univ of Chicago), MDR; Groves Diary, 9-

11 and 16 Jan 43, LRG; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 2, Pt. 2,

pp. 3.1-3.2, DASA.
112 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

metropolitan area; they did not think

there would be enough room at the

Argonne site; and they also saw certain disadvantages in having the

semiworks readily accessible.

Du Pont also objected to the Metallurgical Laboratory staff assuming it

could dictate plans and policies on

matters that the company held to be

its own prerogatives. Compton had

already detailed physicist Martin D.

Whitaker, who had worked with Fermi

on the first pile, and other staff members to supervise development of research facilities that would operate in

connection with the semiworks. Du

Pont, however, had a long-established

policy that a research staff must not

be permitted to exert too much control over the design and construction

phases of a project. When this happened, the company had found, the

staff had a tendency to keep making

changes that seriously interfered with

construction progress. In the world of

industry, Du Pont felt, the research

laboratory was the servant of management, not its master.

General Groves realized that if the

differences between the Metallurgical

Laboratory scientists and the Du Pont

industrial engineers could not soon

be resolved, there was serious question as to whether they would ever

function efficiently as a team. From

the Army's point of view, achievement

of a harmonious working agreement

on the design, construction, and location of the semiworks was crucial, not

only for present operations but also

for future plans regarding the main

production plant. Now that Du Pont

had made significant progress on its

design and procurement of essential

equipment for the works, both Groves

and Du Pont officials felt that no further delays could be tolerated. Furthermore, the efforts of Crawford

Greenewalt, Du Pont's liaison representative, to establish an agreement

with the Chicago scientists had not

been too successful. Consequently, on

4 January 1943, Du Pont accepted the

Army's alternative solution that the

company design and construct the

buildings to house the pilot pile and

chemical separation facilities.

The Army-Du Pont agreement,

however, still left the question of the

location of the semiworks unsettled,

and this issue was the main item on

the agenda of a conference held in

Wilmington on 6 January. Hoping to

get a prompt decision, General

Groves sent two of his ablest officers

from District headquarters—Colonel

Nichols and Lt. Col. E. H. Marsden—

to assist the area engineer at Wilmington, Maj. William L. Sapper, in presenting the Army's views to the representatives of Du Pont and the Metallurgical Laboratory. The Manhattan

chief's strategy succeeded; the meeting closed with a tentative agreement

that the semiworks be erected at the

Tennessee site.

The tentative agreement almost,

but not quite, settled the issue. Under

a previous agreement governing relations between Du Pont and the Metallurgical Laboratory, all important decisions had to receive final approval

from both Compton and Greenewalt.

Greenewalt's assent was a foregone

conclusion, but Groves knew that

Compton was not likely to give in

without at least an effort to salvage

something for the Argonne site. In

anticipation of this, he sent Colonel

Nichols to Chicago.
ORGANIZING FOR PRODUCTION 113

COL. E. H. MARSDEN (1946 photograph). Marsden became executive officer of the

Manhattan District in July 1943.

Conferring with Compton and his

assistant, Norman Hilberry, Colonel

Nichols stressed the greater safety of

the Tennessee site. Nichols's argument, however, failed to alter Compton's conviction that the Argonne site

was adequately safe and eminently

suitable. Furthermore, he contended,

to shift to Tennessee now would be a

severe blow to the morale of his laboratory staff. The Metallurgical Laboratory did not have enough scientists

and technicians to staff another major

research center in addition to those at

Chicago and Argonne. If the decision

was going to be to erect the

semiworks in Tennessee, Compton

concluded, then the Argonne Laboratory should be authorized to build for

its own use a pile of sufficient size to

produce the supply of plutonium it

needed for experimental purposes.

Nichols suggested to Groves that a

meeting between Compton and Roger

Williams, head of Du Pont's TNX Division (the company's special organization for carrying out its atomic

energy program commitments), might

pave the way to an agreement. Sensing that the time had arrived for decisive action on his part, Groves immediately arranged to meet with Williams, Compton, Hilberry, and Fermi

on 11 January in Chicago. Colonel

Marshall also came from District

headquarters in New York to assist in

pressing for a decision.

The meeting opened with Williams

reiterating Du Pont's opposition to

Argonne. Then the group considered
114 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

alternative sites. Williams warned that

a site other than Tennessee or Argonne would result in a further serious delay. Location at Hanford, for

example, would require too much

time, would very likely interfere with

construction of the production facilities, and would place the installation

too far away from Wilmington and

Chicago. Finally, with Compton still

reluctant, the group agreed that the

semiworks should be built in

Tennessee.

The question of who would operate

the semiworks also came up for discussion at the Chicago meeting.

Taking advantage of Williams's presence, both Groves and Compton proposed that Du Pont operate as well as

build the semiworks. But Williams,

pleading lack of authority, avoided

making a commitment.

The next opportunity for discussing

the semiworks problem came at a

conference on pile project policies,

held in Wilmington on 16 January.

General Groves was away on an inspection trip at the Hanford site, but

Colonel Nichols and Maj. Arthur V.

Peterson, the Chicago area engineer,

were on hand. Compton, accompanied by Hilberry and Whitaker, came

determined to persuade Du Pont that,

as builder and operator of the main

production plant, it logically should

also perform both these functions for

the semiworks. But Williams, acting

again as spokesman for a strong Du

Pont delegation, had ready some effective counterarguments. In perfecting any new technical process, he

pointed out, Du Pont always left operation of the experimental plant

stage to the research staff. Furthermore, Williams continued, Du Pont

felt especially unqualified to operate

the semiworks because it involved

major processes entirely outside the

field of chemistry, the company's

normal area of specialization. Williams thus proposed that the University of Chicago operate the semiworks

and Du Pont furnish the university

with engineers, accountants, and similar personnel.

Compton obviously was profoundly

shocked by Williams's proposal. Neither in terms of its fundamental purpose nor of its proper function, he

said, could a university operate an essentially industrial enterprise at a location some 500 miles from its

campus. The Du Pont representatives

countered with the observation that

the university would be performing at

least one appropriate function: educating company personnel in the special art of making plutonium. Compton knew that the Army would prefer

not having Du Pont take on operation

of the semiworks because it believed

the firm's resources would be taxed

to the limit in building and operating

the plutonium production plant and

in carrying out its other war contracts. He agreed to consult with

Conant in Washington, D.C., and

with the administration of the University of Chicago.

There can be little doubt that

Compton still held serious reservations on the task of operating the

semiworks. He was even more dubious that the University of Chicago administration could be persuaded to

agree to the task. Conant gave him no

encouragement; the Harvard president took a dim view of a university

running an industrial plant. Hence,

perhaps no one was more relieved

than Compton when the University of
ORGANIZING FOR PRODUCTION 115

Chicago agreed to accept a contract

for operation of the plutonium

semiworks. An exchange of letters between Groves and University of Chicago President Robert Maynard

Hutchins in March 1943 provided the

necessary formal agreement for negotiation of a War Department contract.

Hutchins, who happened to be absent

from the campus at the time the

actual decision was made, remarked

to Compton the next time he saw him

on the street: "I see, Arthur, that

while I was gone you doubled the size

of my university."

 36

For General Groves, successful resolution of the plutonium semiworks

problem was a major administrative

achievement. As the program developed, this accomplishment set the

standard for future cooperation between Du Pont and Compton's plutonium research and development activities—a key factor in working out

the far more complex problems of

building and operating the great plutonium production works at Hanford.

Program Funding

As the size and complexity of the

atomic energy program increased, the

Army had to face the problem of additional funding. The decision to develop four processes was obviously

going to cost a great deal more than

could be covered by the original financial commitment. A few days after

Groves took command of the Manhattan Project in September 1942, Colonel Marshall discussed with him the

necessity for speed in appropriating

the remainder of the $85 million earlier approved for the program. Only

$38 million had actually been allocated during the summer, and the rest

would soon be needed. Groves, however, did not take any immediate

action. In early November, Marshall

again raised this question but now reported that future needs would total

around $400 million. Agreeing with

this estimate, Groves earmarked the

remainder of the $85 million for the

Manhattan Project and laid the

groundwork for a drastic increase in

its funding.

On 15 December, the Military

Policy Committee forwarded the $400

million estimate to the President, recommending that the necessary additional funds be made available early

in 1943. Also, the committee urged

that General Reybold, the Engineers

chief, be authorized to enter into contractual obligations beyond the funds

then under his control, should obstacles arise to prevent an early appropriation of additional money.

Roosevelt approved the committee's recommendations, and preparations were begun to secure the funds

confidentially within regular Army appropriations. By April 1943, the need

for General Reybold to exercise his

authority to spend additional money

was clear. Some $50 million would be

36

 Quoted in Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 172-74.

See also Dist Engr, Monthly Rpt on DSM Proj, 21

Jan 43, MDR. In his report the district engineer already refers to the University of Chicago as the "operator" of the plutonium semiworks, more than six

weeks before the university had formally agreed to

take this responsibility. Other items pertinent to

negotiation of the semiworks operation contract are

Ltr, Conant to Compton, 4 Mar 43, OSRD; Ltrs,

Groves to Hutchins, 10 Mar 43, and Hutchins to

Groves, 16 Mar 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 161,

MDR; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 2.3, and Pt. 2,

pp. 3.1-3.2, DASA; WD-Univ of Chicago Contract

W-7405-eng-39, 1 May 43, OROO, with pertinent

extracts found in Cert of Audit MDE 179-46, E. I.

du Pont de Nemours and Co., 30 Jun 46, Fiscal and

Audit Files, Cert of Audit (Sup), MDR.
116 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

required by the end of June and an

additional $286 million within another six months. In late May, General Somervell, the Army Service Forces

commander,37 authorized Reybold to

make available to the Manhattan

Project $300 million from engineer

funds; however, by this time, an additional $400 million was needed to

carry the project through to the end

of 1944. This sum, too, was soon

made available under disguised purposes in the Military Appropriations

Act of 1944. At least for the immediate future, it appeared fiscal requirements had been met. When the problem rose again in the following year,

new means would have to be devised

to solve it.38

By spring of 1943, approximately

six months after General Groves's assignment to the Manhattan Project,

major advances in the atomic program provided more promise than at

any time in the past of success in

building an atomic bomb. These included achievement of a self-sustaining chain reaction in the pile method;

assurance of an adequate supply of

uranium ore; selection of plant sites

and work on their acquisition; letting

of contracts for construction and

plant operation; and appropriation of

requisite funding through 1944. Work

on the design of a bomb was progressing, bolstered by satisfactory

progress in the research and development of methods to isolate a sufficient quantity of U-235 and of the apparent feasibility of obtaining and

using plutonium as a fissionable explosive. Project officials now believed

there was a good chance that the production of bombs on a one-permonth basis would begin in the first

half of 1945. By mid-1943, the Manhattan District had taken over administration of most of the OSRD research contracts and was preparing to

assume responsibility for the rest in

short order.39 Now that the period of

joint Army-OSRD administration of

the program was coming to an end,

all work on the development of the

atomic bomb would continue under

the direction of the Army.

37

 Initially called the Services of Supply (SOS),

the name was changed to Army Service Forces

(ASF) by WD GO 14, 12 Mar 43. 38

 Correspondence (Sep 42-May 43) on this subject filed in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 110 (Appropriations), MDR. See also MPC Rpt, 15 Dec 42,

MDR; ibid, 12 Aug 43, Incl to Memo, Groves (for

MPC) to Chief of Staff, same date, OCG Files, Gen

Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab E, MDR; MPC Min,

5 May 43, MDR; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 5, "Fiscal Procedures," App. B2, DASA.

39

 Dist Engr, Monthly Rpt on DSM Proj, 23 Apr24 May 43, MDR.
CHAPTER VI

The Electromagnetic Process

Considered from the viewpoint of

basic military objectives, the single

most important problem of the Manhattan Project was how to produce

fissionable materials in the quantity

and of the quality required to make

an atomic bomb. By the end of 1942,

because project leaders were reasonably certain that a considerably greater amount of fissionable materials

than had been previously estimated

would be needed, the Military Policy

Committee decided to proceed with

full-scale development of three production methods: for plutonium, the

pile process; for U-235, the gaseous

diffusion and electromagnetic processes. Of the three, project leaders

agreed that the electromagnetic

method most likely would be the first

to produce an appreciable quantity of

fissionable material, although not

nearly enough for an atomic weapon.

There remained, however, some

major reservations concerning the

feasibility of the electromagnetic

method as a large-scale production

process. In its recommendation that

the Army initiate construction of a

100-grams-per-day electromagnetic

plant, the S-1 Executive Committee

indicated that all contractual arrangements should be drawn up so that

they could be readily canceled should

"subsequent developments warrant

... a change of plans."

 l Similarly,

following its fact-finding tour of the

project's research laboratories, the

Lewis reviewing committee reported:

"We do not see that the electromagnetic method presents a practical solution to the military problem at its

present capacity. . . ."

 2 An electromagnetic plant capable of producing

1 kilogram of fissionable material per

day would require at least twenty-two

thousand separation tanks, whereas

the same output could be achieved by

a diffusion plant of only forty-six hundred stages or three 250,000-kilowatt

plutonium piles. These figures implied that an electromagnetic plant

would take longer to build, use up far

more scarce materials and manpower,

require more electrical power to operate, and cost a much greater sum

than either a gaseous diffusion or plutonium plant with equivalent production capabilities.3

In spite of the drawbacks of the

electromagnetic method as a large1

 DSM Chronology, 13 Sep 42, Sec. 2(e), OROO. 2

 Rpt of Lewis Reviewing Committee, in MPC

Rpt, 15 Dec 42, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files,

Fldr 25, Tab B, MDR. 3

 Conclusions of Reviewing Committee, 4 Dec 42,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 334 (Special Reviewing

Committee), MDR.
118 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

scale industrial process, each of the

three committees concluded that the

method presented advantages which

outweighed its obvious defects. Based

on a proven laboratory tool, the mass

spectrograph, the electromagnetic

method was the most certain of the

processes to produce at least some

fissionable material, albeit not very efficiently. Also, a mass production

level could be more rapidly attained

because an electromagnetic plant

could be built in relatively small, selfsufficient sections, each of which

could begin producing material as

soon as it was completed. Neither the

gaseous diffusion nor pile methods

had this advantage. Finally, too, General Groves and S-1 Chairman James

B. Conant, as well as several of the

other project leaders, perceived the

leadership of Ernest Lawrence as

giving a distinct advantage to the

electromagnetic process. The University of California scientist repeatedly

had demonstrated an ability to find

quick, practical solutions to even the

most difficult technical problems that

had arisen in development of the

process.4

Electromagnetic Research and the Army,

1942-1943

Only weeks after Colonel Marshall's

assignment as district engineer, the

Army began to take over administration of engineering, construction,

procurement, and related aspects of

the electromagnetic program, leaving

to the Office of Scientific Research

and Development (OSRD) continued

supervision of research and development activities and fiscal and budgetary matters. In August, Marshall

opened the California Area Engineers

Office at Berkeley and assigned Maj.

Thomas T. Crenshaw as area engineer and Capt. Harold. A. Fidler as

his assistant. Crenshaw soon established himself in the university's

Donner Laboratory, adjacent to Lawrence's office.5

During the fall and winter of 1942-

43, Major Crenshaw's office became

increasingly involved in procurement

of materials and equipment for the

research and development program

and with providing liaison between

the Berkeley program and other elements of the atomic project. In this

period, an important phase of the

staff's liaison function was arranging

visits to the Radiation Laboratory for

the various individuals and groups involved in trying to decide what the

role of the electromagnetic process

should be.6

4

 MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 2, "Research," pp. 1.6-1.8,

DASA; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 96; Smyth

Report, pp. 145-46; Stone and Webster, A Report to

the People, p. 18.

5

 MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 2, pp. 2.1-2.2, DASA; Memo,

Crenshaw to Dist Engr, sub: Weekly Progress Rpt,

22 Aug 42, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 001 (Mtgs),

MDR; Interv, Author with Fidler, 6 Jul 64, CMH. 6

 Subsection based on DSM Chronology, 13-14

Sep 42, Sec. 2(e), 11 Nov 42, Sec. 2(d), 14 Nov 42,

Sec. 2, OROO; Hewlett and Anderson, New World,

pp. 96, 112, 141-47, 157-58; Rpt, Capt Arthur V.

Peterson, sub: Visit to Berkeley Proj, 17 Oct 42,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 680.2 (Berkeley), MDR;

Groves Diary, 1-9 Nov 42, LRG; Rpt, sub: R & D at

Univ of Calif Rad Lab, 24 Apr 45 (prepared as Bk.

5, Vol. 2, of MDH), Figs. 6 and 7, SFOO; MDH, Bk.

5, Vol. 2, pp. 1.4, 3.9-3.10, 4.1-4.3, and Vol. 3,

"Design," pp. 2.6-2.10, 3.5-3.6, App. C6, DASA;

MPC Min, 10 Dec 42, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP

Files, Fldr 23, Tab A, MDR; Memo, Lawrence to

Fidler, 8 Mar 43, LRL. For a detailed discussion of

the electromagnetic process, see the appropriate

volumes in Division 1, Electromagnetic Separation

Project, of the National Nuclear Energy Series (see

Bibliographical Note).
THE ELECTROMAGNETIC PROCESS 119

These visitors came to learn firsthand more about Lawrence's method

and how it was progressing. After

clearances by Crenshaw's staff and

the laboratory's security officials,

Lawrence and his technical staff

showed them the impressive physical

facilities and equipment. They toured

the conventional laboratories on the

university grounds and then the great

domed cyclotron building with its adjacent shops and facilities located in

the hilly area east of the main

campus. There they observed the intensive investigations under way into

the physics and chemistry of separating U-235 from ordinary uranium by

the electromagnetic method. Lawrence had committed the largest part

of his staff and resources to the physics or physical aspects of the separation process, centering this research

in two buildings, one housing a 37-

inch magnet and the other a 184-inch

magnet. The availability of these cyclotron magnets, which were exceptional in size and strength, was the

single most important factor in

making possible research into the feasibility of the electromagnetic method

as a production process. Research

into the chemical aspects of the separation process under Lawrence's direction was a much smaller program,

with laboratory investigations in

progress at both the Berkeley and

Davis campuses of the University of

California.7

Lawrence and his scientist colleagues repeatedly emphasized to visitors that their ultimate success or failure depended on development of the

calutron—a name derived from the

words California, university, and cyclotron. If they could redesign the calutron, a novel hybridization of two

well-known laboratory tools—the

mass spectrograph and the cyclotron

magnet—so that it would operate not

only intermittently, as in the laboratory, but also on an around-theclock, day-after-day, month-aftermonth basis without breakdown, then

they would have the means for producing a significant amount of enriched uranium for an atomic weapon.

Lawrence had made some design

modifications in the first calutron, installed in the 37-inch magnet, following successful experiments in February 1942. He found, however, that he

was unable to test the validity of these

changes until he had access to a more

powerful magnetic field. This became

available in the spring with completion of the 184-inch magnet. The redesigned calutron became the prototype for the first production units at

the Tennessee plant. Mounted on a

metal door, this calutron could be

taken out of its vacuum tank as a

single unit, which greatly facilitated

recovery of any of the valuable uranium feed material adhering to components and also expedited reloading

and maintenance.

At the same time, Lawrence's group

had also developed the essential

supporting components—magnet,

vacuum pumps, cooling systems, and

7

 Not all research into the chemistry of the electromagnetic process was located at the University of

California, Berkeley. The OSRD also had contracted

with Brown, Purdue, and Johns Hopkins to investigate some aspects. Subsequently, too, the electromagnetic production plant operator, the Tennessee

Eastman Corporation, carried on chemical research

for the process in Eastman Kodak laboratories in

Rochester, N.Y., and near the plant site in Oak

Ridge, Tenn. See MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 2, pp. 1.1-1.2,

3.1, 4.1, DASA.
120 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

electrical power and control equipment. While these components were

more conventional in design and

function, they still had to be adapted

to conform to the requirements of the

electromagnetic process. The design

engineers, for example, decided that

the most efficient layout for the magnets and tanks was in an oval-shaped

pattern, thus creating the racetrack

configuration that characterized each

major element of the production

plant. A special system of pumps

achieved and maintained the required

vacuum equivalent of one one-hundred-millionth of normal atmospheric

pressure in hundreds of calutron

tanks.

Involving less space, fewer personnel, and mainly conventional procedures, the chemical aspects of the

electromagnetic process must have

appeared far less important; nevertheless, both the first and final stages of

the process were essentially chemical

operations and required new techniques and chemical substances about

which relatively little was known. For

the first stage the chemists had to develop a method of large-scale production of uranium tetrachloride, the

most promising feed material for the

calutrons. For the last stage they had

to devise an efficient method to extract the enriched uranium produced

by the calutrons and prepare it for

use by the Los Alamos Laboratory

scientists in developing an atomic

bomb. By early 1943, the chemists

had made substantial progress on

both the feed material and extraction

techniques.

Virtually all who visited the Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley came

away impressed with the feasibility of

the electromagnetic research program

and with the eminently empirical

approach of Lawrence and his staff.

This approach, characterized by a

frequently demonstrated talent for

finding practical solutions to every

problem, inspired project leaders with

further confidence in Lawrence's

process as they prepared to transform

the research data and devices into an

industrial production plant at the

Tennessee site.

Research and Development, 1943-1945:

Radiation Laboratory

As the electromagnetic program

shifted from basic research to the

problems of designing, building, and

operating a major production plant,

the Army brought the project more

directly under its administrative jurisdiction. Replacing OSRD contracts

with War Department contracts was

an important step in attaining this

goal.

The University of California accepted a letter contract from the district

engineer, effective 1 April 1943,

pending the working out of details of

a formal War Department contract.

Then on the sixteenth, representatives of the Manhattan District,

OSRD, and the university's Board of

Regents reached final agreement on

terms of a new prime contract covering most aspects of the atomic research program in progress at the Radiation Laboratory. The new contract

went into effect on 1 May, bringing to

an end the OSRD's formal connection

with the California project. Henceforth, until the Army terminated control of the atomic energy program at

the end of 1946, this new agreement,
THE ELECTROMAGNETIC PROCESS 121

renewed annually, provided the contractual basis for continuing the research and development activities requisite to construction and operation

of the electromagnetic plant in Tennessee. In recognition of the overriding requirements of security, the regents assented to leaving all details of

managing the program as they related

to the university to their secretary,

Robert M. Underbill, and to Lawrence. Some subsequent modifications in the prime contract relating to

health and chemistry activities did not

result in major changes in the Radiation Laboratory program, nor in the

Army's relationship to it.8

In general, fiscal arrangements remained the same as they had been

under the OSRD contract, with one

significant exception. The War Department contract provided that an

amount equal to 25 percent of the

total funds allotted for salaries and

wages could be used by the university

to defray its overhead expenses in operating the Radiation Laboratory; the

OSRD contract had provided 30 percent for this purpose. Partly in reaction to this reduction in overhead allotment, in November 1943 business

representatives of the University of

California, University of Chicago, and

Columbia University requested the

Manhattan District to include a provision in prime contracts guaranteeing

the universities, in view of their nonprofit status, against a profit or loss

in administering atomic research programs. Following several months of

negotiation with the universities, the

District agreed in May 1944 that the

government would compensate them

if their overhead costs should exceed

their 25 percent allowance and, conversely, they would return to the government any surplus that might result

from this allowance.

At the same time, the District

added a provision in the prime contracts with California, Chicago, and

Columbia for a so-called welfare fund.

Thus, in the case of California, the

government established a fund of

$500,000, which was to continue in

existence for a period of ten years

after termination of its contract with

the War Department. Any claims

made by Radiation Laboratory employees or their relatives during that

time because of death or disability resulting from a specified list of unusual

hazards in atomic research activities—

for example, radioactivity, high voltages, and movement of objects by

magnetic forces—would be paid from

this fund. The government provided

the money for the fund and the university administered it with assistance

of a private insurance company. The

welfare fund took the place of the

8

 Ltr Contract W-7405-eng-48, Marshall to Univ

of Calif, Attn: R. M. Underhill, 1 Apr 43, copy in

MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 2, App. C3, also see pp. 2.1-2.3,

DASA; Historical Summary of Contract W-7405-

eng-48, May 43-Aug 47, comp. by Russell H. Ball,

Jan 48, with significant correspondence on subcontracts W-7405-eng 48A (health) and W-7405-eng

48B (chemistry) under Tab 6, pp. 35-49 and 50-60,

SFOO; NDRC and OSRD Contracts with Univ of

Calif, Jun 41-Sep 42, SFOO; Rpt, sub: R & D at

Univ of Calif Rad Lab, 24 Apr 45, pp. 19-28, SFOO;

Fidler Interv, 6 Jul 64, CMH. The Radiation Laboratory health research program, directed by J. D.

Hamilton, functioned as a part of the project-wide

health program of the Manhattan District, which was

centered at the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago.

A chemistry program, directed by W. M. Latimer,

had grown out of the participation of the University

of California's chemistry department in the early

phases of atomic research at Berkeley. When the

OSRD contracts for these programs came up for renewal in June 1943, the Army continued them as

separate projects operating under the prime

contract.
122 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

OSRD's private indemnification insurance, which the District had continued only until such time as a government-financed system could be

established.9

The Army's first major administrative task after the formal contract

became effective was to supervise

preparation of the program's fiscal

year (FY) 1944 budget. As of mid-1943,

cost of the program had reached about

$500,000 a month, and was following

an upward trend. District and university officials agreed upon a request for

$7.5 million (an average of $625,000

per month) for FY 1944. By November,

however, Regents Secretary Underhill

was warning Captain Fidler, who had

replaced Major Crenshaw as area engineer, that even this increased sum was

not likely to be enough to meet mushrooming costs. Underhill estimated

that the university would need an additional $1.5 to $2 million in the remaining months of FY 1944. Consequently,

the District approved a supplementary

appropriation, bringing total cost to

$9.5 million.

The Army's negotiations with the

University of California for the FY

1944 budget set the pattern for subsequent years. Even after the electromagnetic production plant began operations in the spring of 1944, the

electromagnetic research program

continued to require a large staff to

solve production problems and make

improvements in plant operations.

Thus, for the FY 1945 budget, the

Army scheduled $8.5 million, although only $6.5 million was actually

expended. By the time the war ended

in August 1945, total outlay for the

electromagnetic research program

had reached about $20 million—some

$3.7 million under OSRD contracts before 1 May 1943 and the

remainder under the War Department

contract.10

Increases in cost reflected the very

rapid expansion of the Radiation Laboratory, both in terms of personnel

and physical facilities. In May 1943,

when the Army assumed full responsibility for the research program, the

laboratory was occupying a number of

buildings in two different locations on

the Berkeley campus. Starting out

modestly in 1941 in the prewar Radiation Laboratory building, atomic research activities gradually had spread

into four adjacent structures, including the new Donner Laboratory, and,

by mid-1942, to the new 184-inchcyclotron building in Berkeley Hills.

Soon the circular-shaped cyclotron

building, standing on the slope of a

hill some 900 feet above the campus

proper, was ringed with smaller additional structures housing a machine

shop, chemistry laboratories, warehouses, and other facilities essential

to operating and testing calutrons

and other equipment prototypes designed for the production plant in

9

 Rpt, sub: R & D at Univ of Calif Rad Lab, 24

Apr 45, pp. 24-27, SFOO; MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 2, p.

2.3, DASA; Ltr, Underhill to Nichols, 13 Mar 44,

Tab 6, Historical Summary of Contract W-7405-

eng-48, SFOO; Ltr and Incl, Nichols to Lawrence,

15 Apr 44, Tab 9, ibid.

10

 Rpt, Underhill, sub: Hist of Contract W-7405-

eng-48, [probably 1948], Tab 1; Ltr, Underhill to

Fidler, 10 Nov 43, Tab 5b; Ltr, Fidler to Underhill,

16 Feb 44, Tab 5e; Memo, Fidler to Dist Engr, sub:

Contract W-7405-eng-48, 18 Feb 44, Tab 5d;

Memo, Priestly to O. Lundberg, sub: Budgets for

1944-45 for Projs 48, 48A and 48B, 29 Jun 44, Tab

7; Ltr, Nichols to Univ of Calif Regents, Attn: Un derhill,- 

ry of Contract W-7405-eng-48, SFOO. See also

Ltr, Lawrence to Nichols, 24 Mar 44, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 001 (Mtgs), MDR.
THE ELECTROMAGNETIC PROCESS 123

Tennessee. Part of the chemistry program, too, had overflowed facilities

on the Berkeley campus and been

moved to the University of California's School of Agriculture at Davis.

For each new structure or renovation, Lawrence and his staff laid out

preliminary plans and estimates,

which went to the area engineer's

office for approval and checking. Detailed supervision of construction was

left to Radiation Laboratory business

manager Kenneth Priestly. To expedite the work and minimize security

problems, Priestly let contracts to the

local firms that the university had employed extensively in the past. For the

same reasons, most contracts were of

the fixed-fee or lump-sum type. By

mid-1945, Priestly had allocated for

various types of construction more

than $300,000 from funds allotted

under the University of California's

War Department contract.11

By far, the largest expenditures

were for salaries and wages of the research staff and for the laboratory

equipment and materials they needed.

Annual payroll costs were running at

a level of nearly $3 million in May

1943, when the Army assumed full

control of the Manhattan Project, and

had reached a high point of about

$3.7 million a year later. Equipment

and other expenses, although somewhat less than personnel, attained a

maximum of nearly $300,000 a month

in November 1943.12

Starting in 1941 with personnel of

the University of California's Radiation Laboratory, which Lawrence

had been building up since the

1930's, the staff at Berkeley grew rapidly. By May 1943, as primary emphasis began to shift from basic research

to engineering and developmental

problems and training of operational

personnel for the Tennessee plant, it

numbered almost nine hundred scientists, technicians, engineers, mechanics, clerks, skilled workers, and others.

By mid-1944, there were nearly

twelve hundred on the Radiation Laboratory payroll, and total employment

remained well above one thousand

until the end of the war.13

The basic organization of the Radiation Laboratory had taken shape

under Lawrence's guidance in the

years immediately preceding the outbreak of World War II and conformed, more or less, to the conventional pattern for peacetime academic

research programs, with a major division into research and administrative

staffs. While Lawrence, as director,

theoretically exercised equal control

over both divisions, he devoted his

energies to the research staff, delegating to the OSRD and then the Army

the administration of nonscientific activities. Major responsibilities for

these activities devolved upon Captain Fidler, the area engineer. Fidler

worked closely with Regents Secretary

Underhill and also with Priestly who,

11

 Constr Completion Rpt, Univ of Calif Rad Lab,

sub: Contract W-7405-eng-48, 1 May 43-1 Aug 46,

comp. by Calif Area Engrs Office, 1 Sep 46, SFOO

(with maps of the two campus areas where major

laboratory facilities were located and with selected

photographs of important buildings); Rpt, W. B.

Reynolds (Rad Lab Man Engr), sub: Notes on 184-

inch Cyclotron, 16 Jun 45, SFOO; "Domed Building

Fitted to Research Needs," Engineering News-Record, 9

Apr 42, pp. 64-66; MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 2, pp. 2.7-2.8,

DASA.

12

 Chart, Proj 48 Expenses Estimated by Months

to Nearest $5,000, in MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 2, App. B11,

DASA. 13

 Chart, Lab Personnel by Months (UCRL), in

MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 2, App. B2, DASA.
124 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

as the laboratory's business manager,

supervised administration of finances

and personnel.14

In providing personnel, security,

and other administrative services for

the research staff, the area engineer

dealt with teams of scientists and

technicians organized along functional lines under three broad areas of investigation. The physics division, by

far the largest, worked on the experimental calutrons, vacuum problems,

mechanical and electrical design, reassembly of equipment, and fundamental physical research. The chemistry

division, much smaller, investigated

problems of preparing feed material

for the calutrons and recovery and

purification of their output of U-235

and ordinary uranium. The biological

group constituted a subsidiary element of the Manhattan District's medical research program that had its

headquarters at the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago. The area engineer provided its director with administrative support in coordinating the

activities of his group with Lawrence's

program, based upon primary guidance from the Chicago medical scientists. The Army was helpful, too, in

assisting the laboratory in recruitment

and maintenance of a staff of several

hundred technicians and skilled workmen, who supported the work of the

scientists and engineers.

Adding to the complexity of administering the Radiation Laboratory

were the periodic influxes of scientific, engineering, and other technical

delegations not only from the major

American contractors but also those

from abroad. Such firms as the Stone

and Webster Engineering Corporation, Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, and especially

the Tennessee Eastman Corporation

sent their personnel to Berkeley to

assist in plant development, or for

orientation and training in the electromagnetic process. And in November 1943, Australian physicist Marcus

L. E. Oliphant, who had played a significant role in the development of

radar, and thirty of the British scientists who had come to the United

States to aid in the atomic project

were assigned to the laboratory—

some until the end of the war—to

work on various aspects of electromagnetic research.

The arrival and processing of each

of these groups presented special

problems to the area engineer in security and safety, to the laboratory

business manager in personnel and finance, and to the laboratory director

in program and staff coordination.

These problems were further multiplied and magnified by their high

turnover rate, the result of the

project's need for scientific expertise

at other facilities. As early as 1943,

the Army had begun to send many of

the contractors' specialists to the

Clinton Works to assist Tennessee

Eastman in preparing to operate the

electromagnetic plant. The area engi14

 Paragraphs on the Radiation Laboratory based

on Rpt, Peterson, sub: Visit to Berkeley Proj, 17 Oct

42, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 680.2 (Berkeley),

MDR; Directory of Personnel, MD and Univ of Calif

Personnel of R & D Group, 20 May 43, SFOO; Rpt,

sub: R & D at Univ of Calif Rad Lab, 24 Apr 45, pp.

30-46, SFOO; MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 2, pp. 5.2-5.4, and

Vol. 3, pp. 5.1-5.3 and App. B5 (Org Chart, Univ of

Calif Lab Proj), DASA; Interv, Author with Reynolds, 6 Jul 64, CMH; Visitors Permits [Rad Lab],

Oct 43 through 1946, Visitors Info File, SFOO;

Fidler Interv, 6 Jul 64, CMH; Min, Coordination

Committee Mtgs, Oct 42-Mar 44, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 337 (Mtgs and Confs-Univ of Calif), MDR;

Hewlett and Anderson, New World, p. 150.
THE ELECTROMAGNETIC PROCESS 125

neer's staff facilitated their transfer,

eventually permanently reassigning a

sizable number. Again, in September

1944, the staff oversaw the move of

one-third of the British scientists to

the Tennessee site.

For the most part, the area engineer's staff was not directly involved

in the many meetings of committee

and group leaders who planned

research, assessed the results of experimental work, and advised on reassignment of technical and scientific

personnel. But the area engineer and

other Manhattan representatives did

participate in one key group, the Coordination Committee. Business and

scientific leaders of the laboratory

and representatives of the major contracting firms attended the weekly

meetings of this committee, which

Lawrence had established to ensure

coordination of effort between his

program and the many outside organizations collaborating on design and

construction of the electromagnetic

production plant. After each session

Captain Fidler, who had extensive

training and experience in both engineering and science, prepared a written report of the entire proceedings

to keep General Groves, and other

District personnel, up to date on the

progress of research and development

activities at Berkeley. Whenever

Groves visited the laboratory, usually

once a month during the crucial

period from October 1942 to November 1943, Lawrence convened the

weekly committee meeting to coincide

with the commander's itinerary. Feeling that the meetings provided an excellent means of communication with

the key members of the laboratory

staff, Groves took an active role in the

free-for-all discussions of electromagnetic problems.

The area engineer's staff also carried on a number of other activities,

most of them of a routine character.

It took part in the negotiation and interpretation of contracts and the

review of fiscal plans and policies; assisted in those aspects of personnel

administration involving military

problems, especially the obtaining of

deferments for key scientific and technical employees; expedited procurement of equipment and materials,

particularly those in scarce supply;

and supervised the more ordinary aspects of security. For example, to

avoid any possibility of revealing the

connection of the University of California with the Army and the atomic

project, Groves always conducted his

inspections of the laboratory in civilian clothes. When he arrived at the

San Francisco airport, Fidler met

Groves clandestinely and whisked him

off to his own house so that the general could change from military into

civilian attire before going to the

university.

Even the remarkably smooth course

of the collaboration between the University of California, Berkeley, and

the Manhattan District—a testimony

to the success of Captain Fidler's liaison efforts, Groves's strenuous endeavors to keep himself fully informed, and Lawrence's exceptional

administrative capabilities—on occasion was punctuated with a few problems, primarily because the university

administration had to accept Manhattan's substantial requirements largely

on faith for reasons of security. In

mid-January 1943, sensing a disruption to normal university activities,
126 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

William J. Norton, the university business manager, complained to Groves

in no uncertain terms: "To date I

have not seen the scratch of a pen—

one written word setting forth the

suggestions or directives of the government representatives in regard to

the conduct of the Radiation Laboratories on the Berkeley campus. . . ."

Noting that he was aware that in the

past half year several Army officers,

including Groves, had visited the

campus, Norton continued that "invariably, after one of these visits, . . .

[my] office is deluged with requests

by numerous persons for more office

space, laboratory space, entire buildings, shops, more guards, more of

this and that—all in the name of the

General or the colonel, or the captain

who has just visited the various

plants. But for some reason I am

never in on the discussions at the

start." Norton then assured Groves

that he wished to have the project run

smoothly, an objective that could be

much more easily achieved, he said, if

the general would only let him know

the importance of the project and

who on the campus officially represented the Manhattan District.15

Groves wrote to University of California President Robert G. Sproul,

carefully explaining the reasons for

the secrecy of the project and for the

complicated and sometimes confusing

relationships that existed between the

Army, the university, and the contracting firms. He then outlined briefly the anticipated requirements for

further space in university buildings.

"Captain Fidler has been instructed,"

he stated, "to keep you [President

Sproul] fully informed ... at all

times" concerning the physical needs

of the project.16 Groves also had requested that the War Department explain to Sproul the importance of the

work in progress at the Radiation

Laboratory. "[Its] energetic prosecution . . . ," Secretary of War Stimson

wrote, "is a vital military necessity,

for it is one of the foundation stones

of an extremely important, probably

the most important, development

project in our war activities."

 17

Not all basic research for the electromagnetic process was done under

the University of California contract.

In June 1943, District representatives

arranged with Tennessee Eastman to

carry out research on certain aspects

of process chemistry, using laboratory

facilities (leased from Eastman Kodak)

in Rochester, New York, and at the

plant site in Tennessee. Cost of these

research contracts, as well as those

for process improvement in 1944 with

Johns Hopkins and Purdue Universities, were small by comparison with

the expenditures at the University of

California, totaling considerably less

than $2 million.18

Design and Engineering, 1943-1945

At its 25 June 1942 meeting, the

S-1 Executive Committee decided

that Stone and Webster would have

primary responsibility for basic design

and engineering of both buildings

15

 Ltr, Norton to Groves, 14 Jan 43, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 161 (Univ of Calif), MDR.

16

 Ltr, Groves to Sproul, 27 Jan 43, Tab 2, Historical Summary of Contract W-7405-eng-48, SFOO. 17

 Ltrs, Stimson to Sproul, 27 Jan 43, and Groves

to Fidler, 8 Feb 43, Tab 2, Historical Summary of

Contract W-7405-eng-48, SFOO. 18

 MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 2, pp. 1.1, 2.5-2.10, Apps.

B4, B6-B9, B12-B15, DASA; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, p. 158.
THE ELECTROMAGNETIC PROCESS 127

TABLE 1—STONE AND WEBSTER ENGINEERING AND DESIGN PERSONNEL

a

 Clinton and elsewhere.

Source: MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 3, "Design," p. 3.52.

and equipment at the Tennessee

site.19 For security, the company

formed a separate design organization, which by mid-1944 had nearly

750 employees occupying thirteen

floors in four buildings in Boston

and, in addition, a subordinate unit at

the Berkeley campus and a liaison

office at the Tennessee site (Table 1).

To monitor the Stone and Webster

design group, the district engineer established in August 1942 the Boston

Area Engineers Office and assigned

Maj. Benjamin K. Hough, Jr., to head

a relatively small staff. From the beginning, one of Major Hough's most

important responsibilities was to

ensure that the Stone and Webster

design group functioned under maximum security conditions. The special

group thus worked separately from

other company employees, and overall knowledge of the electromagnetic

project was limited to a few key officials and to August C. Klein, the company's chief mechanical engineer and

newly appointed project engineer for

the electromagnetic plant. The area

engineer's staff also assisted the company in developing special security

control measures in distribution of

thousands of drawings to General

Electric, Westinghouse, and other

firms providing equipment and materials. The designs reflected the emphasis on security and speed in every

phase of development. Wherever feasible, Stone and Webster designers

planned to use standard items of

equipment and customary methods of

construction, primarily to save time.

There was, however, a limit to the

extent that standardization would be

possible because of the special character of the processes; the need for

exceptionally close tolerances and

performance capabilities; and, as

proven by experience, inevitable

changes in equipment design.20

19

 In addition to the main production facilities,

Stone and Webster also designed most of the electromagnetic plant auxiliary, service, and support facilities—including experimental racetracks to train

plant operators, shops, steam plants, a foundry,

warehouses, cafeterias, and community utilities. 20

 Cert of Audit MDE 177-46, Boston Area,

26 Apr 46, Fiscal and Audit Files, Cert of Audit

Registers, MDR; Org Charts, U.S. Engrs Office,

MD, 15 Aug 43, 28 Aug and 10 Nov 44, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 020 (MED-Org), MDR; List of Continued
128 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

By the turn of the year, Lawrence

and his staff at the Radiation Laboratory had made significant progress

not only in their electromagnetic research but also in the areas of preliminary design and engineering of plant

facilities, the results of which they forwarded to Stone and Webster. But

before design of the plant could proceed very far, company engineers

needed answers to two important

questions: How rich in U-235 must

the final product be and would a

single-stage electromagnetic plant

achieve that degree of enrichment?

On 4 January 1943, Oppenheimer

furnished Lawrence with a tentative

answer. The goal, he wrote Lawrence,

must be near-perfect separation, that

is, production of practically pure U235 as the final product. Any lesser

enrichment, Oppenheimer believed,

would require such a large amount of

the very heavy uranium that its weight

would make it unacceptable for a

weapon.21 The degree of enrichment

possible with a single-stage plant was

not definitely known, but it would not

be enough to meet such stringent

standards. A second-stage facility

might take uranium processed in the

original 500-tank plant and bring it to

the required higher degree of

enrichment.

At the Coordination Committee

meeting in early February, Lawrence

expressed the view that design of the

second-stage might reasonably be delayed for another two months, pending receipt of data on the degree of

enrichment attained in the experimental XA calutrons nearing completion at Berkeley. If this data indicated

eventual achievement of 70- to 80-

percent enrichment, no second stage

would be necessary. Groves disagreed. There always had been the

possibility that the electromagnetic

process would be coordinated with

some other isotopic separation process (he probably had in mind the gaseous diffusion plant), and he believed

the second-stage facility would be

necessary either as a supplement to

the first stage of the electromagnetic

plant or as part of a plant for enhancing the slightly enriched product from

another plant.

As Groves departed from Berkeley

on 14 February, he urged that prompt

decision should be reached on the

Beta process, as it now came to be

called to distinguish it from the first

stage, or Alpha process. The Radiation Laboratory staff had convinced

him that the Beta tanks could probably be designed to make maximum

use of Alpha-type equipment, but he

needed further assurance from Stone

and Webster that a second stage

would not delay completion of the

first stage.

General Groves and Colonel Marshall conferred with Stone and Webster on 17 March. Marshall took the

initiative in securing a firm agreement

that the first five Alpha racetracks at

the Clinton Engineer Works (CEW)

would be identical in design and

Key Personnel, MD Area Offices (ca. Nov 44),

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 231.001 (LC), MDR;

MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 3, pp. 3.51-3.52, DASA; Tables

(Employment by MD on Design, Research and

Constr as of 31 May, 31 Jul, and 31 Oct 43) in Rpt,

sub: MD Proj Data as of 1 Jun 43 (most items as of

1 Jun 43, but tables appear to have been added at

later date), Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Projs

and Prgms), MDR; Completion Rpt, Stone and

Webster, sub: Clinton Engr Works, Contract W7401-eng-13, 1946, p. 143, OROO. 21

 Ltr, Oppenheimer to Lawrence, 4 Jan 43,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Lawrence), MDR.
THE ELECTROMAGNETIC PROCESS 129

equipment, to guarantee their completion at the earliest possible date.

When the company assured Groves

that Beta construction would not

delay the Alpha units, he gave his approval for the second stage.22

By late spring, design development

for both stages was in full swing. The

Berkeley, Clinton, and Boston design

staffs worked under constant pressure

from Groves and other project leaders to produce thousands of blueprints for five Alpha and two Beta

racetracks. The emphasis on speed

took its toll. Frequently, General

Electric, Westinghouse, and the other

firms manufacturing components for

the racetracks had to incorporate essential design changes after equipment was fabricated and installed,

and inevitably some equipment failures occurred. Everyone connected

with the electromagnetic project soon

realized design, redesign, and process

improvement would continue long

after the first major units of the plant

began production operations.23

By summer, with most blueprints

for Alpha I completed and procurement contracts for plant equipment

arranged, Groves approved design

changes in the fifth Alpha I racetrack.

In September, he authorized construction of Alpha II, comprised of

four additional racetracks incorporating the improved design (a step recommended earlier by the Military

Policy Committee). He also approved

two more Beta racetracks, to process

the additional output from Alpha II.

Thanks to experience gained on the

Alpha racetracks, design of the Beta

racetracks posed fewer problems.

Beta chemical equipment, however,

was quite a different story, because of

the small quantities of material undergoing processing and the fantastically

high value of U-235. To prevent even

a minimum loss of output, the designers made the equipment as small as

possible and used corrosion-resistant

materials and special devices to recover the last traces of U-235.

With the start of plant construction,

continuing design activities assumed a

secondary role. Lawrence and his colleagues continued to propose innovations and design alterations in the

racetracks, but General Groves consistently followed a policy of approving only changes that clearly would

speed up progress. Hence, Radiation

Laboratory scientists, in 1944 and

1945, were relegated largely to the

role of consultants to Stone and Webster, Tennessee Eastman, and the

other contractors, assisting them to

improve design and operation of the

existing plant facilities.

22

 Min, Coordination Committee Mtgs, 3 and 13

Feb 43, MDR; Excerpt from Memo, M. P. O'Brien

(Rad Lab Ex Engr) to Fidler, 14 Feb 46, quoted in

par. 1d of Memo, Fidler to Groves, sub: Initiation of

Work on Y-12 Beta Process, 22 Oct 46, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1, MDR; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 151-52. 23

 This and following paragraphs on electromagnetic design based on MDH, Bk. 5, Vols. 2-3,

DASA; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 149-

67; Ltr, Lawrence to Groves, 14 Jun 43, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 440.17 (Mfg-Prod-Fab), MDR;

Lawrence to Groves, 3 Aug 43, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 095 (TEC LC), MDR; Memo, Maj Wilbur

E. Kelley (Y-12 Opns Div chief, CEW) to Lt Col E.

H. Marsden (Ex Off, MD), sub: Summary of Y-12

Proj as of 9 Aug 43, same date, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, Misc File, MDR; Min, Coordination Committee Mtgs, 2, 9, 30 Sep and 17 Nov 43, MDR;

MPC Min, 13 Aug 43, MDR; Rpt, sub: R & D at

Univ at Calif Rad Lab, 24 Apr 45, pp. 17 and 23,

SFOO; Dist Engr, Monthly Rpts on DSM Proj, Sep

and Nov 43, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files,

Fldr 28, Tab A, MDR.
130 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Building the Electromagnetic Plant

Actual construction began in February 1943 on a tract of 825 acres located in Bear Creek Valley, some distance southwest of the rapidly growing community of Oak Ridge (Map 3).

Project engineers had selected this

location because they hoped the

wooded ridges paralleling the valley

would limit possible lethal effects of a

major explosion or similar accident.

There was more than ample room between ridges to permit adequate spacing of the numerous plant facilities

that, at the height of plant operations,

would include nine main process

buildings and some two hundred auxiliary structures, comprising nearly 80

acres of floor space.24

Construction Procurement

Stone and Webster had primary responsibility for procuring the materials, equipment, and field construction

force needed for building the production plant; however, the Army had directed that the firm consult regularly

with the Radiation Laboratory and

with the major manufacturing contractors in carrying out materials and

equipment procurement.25 Both

Stone and Webster and Manhattan officials had agreed that, because of the

special nature of much of the equipment required for the electromagnetic

process, only the leading manufacturing firms in the electrical equipment

field were likely to have the resources

and capabilities necessary to supply it.

Consequently, in early 1943 Stone

and Webster, with considerable assistance from District officials, negotiated

subcontracts with General Electric,

Westinghouse, Allis-Chalmers, and

several smaller firms to design and

manufacture such items as regulators,

rectifiers, calutron tanks, diffusion

pumps, magnet coils, and vacuum

valves that would meet the project's

high standards for workmanship and

performance and, at the same time,

comply with its stringent procurement

deadlines.26

As Stone and Webster negotiated

contracts, it also developed an elaborate purchasing organization at its

Boston office. This organization

worked closely with the Boston Area

Engineers Office and, through a procurement unit established at the Tennessee site, with the CEW Construction Division. In addition to the 150

persons employed in Boston and

Tennessee, Stone and Webster maintained another 250 representatives in

the field at contractor plants and in

major industrial areas. These field

workers checked equipment for conformity to specifications, expedited

deliveries, and assisted in locating

scarce materials for subcontractors.

Stone and Webster's procurement organization also worked closely with

the Washington Liaison Office, especially in obtaining critical materials,

24

 A detailed discussion of most aspects of electromagnetic plant construction may be found in

MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 5, "Construction," DASA. 25

 A detailed discussion of the procurement of

manpower for the electromagnetic project appears

in Ch. XVI.

26

 Subsection based on MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 2, pp.

3.3, 3.9, 4.6, Vol. 3, pp. 4.1 and 4.3-4.24, and Vol.

5, pp. 6.1-6.2, DASA; Completion Rpt, Stone and

Webster, sub: CEW, Contract W-7401-eng-13,

1946, pp. 19, 21-23, 146-48, OROO; Org Charts,

U.S. Engrs Office, MD, 15 Aug and 1 Nov 43, MDR;

Fine and Remington, Corps of Engineers: Construction,

p. 678; Min, Coordination Committee Mtgs, 23 Dec

42 and 23 Jan, 6 and 13 Feb, 29 Apr, 21 Oct 43,

MDR.

132 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

on which it achieved an excellent

record of placing most orders within

a few days of construction authorization. Maj. Wilbur E. Kelley, a young

engineer from Indiana who was responsible for overseeing electromagnetic activities for the Manhattan District, and Lt. Col. Warren George,

head of the CEW Construction Division, also kept a watchful eye on procurement. (See Chart 2.)

The sheer quantity and variety of

materials and equipment that rolled

in by the trainload over a recently

built spur track to the construction

site taxed the monitoring capabilities

of the CEW Construction Division.

Starting in the spring of 1943, the

builders of the plant moved into the

site more than 2,157 carloads of electrical equipment; 1,219 of heavy

equipment; 5,389 of lumber; 1,407 of

pipe and fittings; 1,188 of steel; 257

of valves of all sizes; and 11 of welding electrodes. The Construction Division was responsible for seeing that

all of this material was brought to the

site as nearly on schedule as possible.

If items arrived early, the division had

to help find storage space—not

always an easy task because of limited

warehousing facilities.

Because parts and machinery could

not be fabricated on schedules that

dovetailed precisely with construction

progress, much had to be accepted as

the manufacturers were able to turn it

out. Those items that arrived ahead

of schedule had to be closely guarded; protected from dirt, corrosion,

and other kinds of damage; and carefully inventoried so that they would

be immediately available as needed.

Chemical equipment posed problems

because of special manufacturing and

handling requirements, and the

equipment often arrived late or just

barely on time.

Schedules had to be adapted to

last-minute changes in design and to

many uncertainties. Discouragingly

few items were commercially available. Tanks, magnets, vacuum pumps,

cubicles, and most of the chemical

equipment, for example, were either

completely new in design or so much

larger or so much greater in capacity

that nothing of the kind previously

had been manufactured. Many less

obvious items also carried performance specifications that far exceeded

anything ever attempted on a commercial scale. For instance, the calutrons required electrical cable that

could carry a high-voltage load continuously. The only commercial product that came near meeting this specification was the heaviest X-ray cable,

and it was designed to operate intermittently. Even when the commercial

equipment could be used, suppliers

often had to add to their productive

capacity or build entire new plants to

furnish the items required in the

enormous quantities they were

needed. Thus, in the first equipping

of the racetracks some eighty-five

thousand vacuum tubes were required. In the case of one type of

tube, procurement officials ordered in

advance the entire national output for

1943 as well as that from a plant still

under construction. In the early

months of plant operation, when

tubes burned out faster than predicted, some feared the racetracks might

prove inoperable simply through inability to maintain the tube supply.

New methods had to be developed

for machining and shaping the graphite in those parts of the calutron sub-
THE ELECTROMAGNETIC PROCESS 133

ject to intense heat. No standard material would endure the high potentials, mechanical strain, and temperature changes to which bushings in the

high-voltage elements in the sources

were continuously subjected. After

months of investigation, Stone and

Webster found an insulator made of

zirconium oxide, a new and still very

expensive substance. Similarly, use of

large quantities of liquid nitrogen to

condense moisture created a demand

for a substance hitherto not produced

on a commercial scale anywhere in

the country.

Nowhere were Manhattan District

personnel more spectacularly involved in procurement than in the

project's need for vast amounts of

silver.27 Because copper was in great

demand for all kinds of wartime uses

and because silver could serve as a

substitute in electrical equipment,

Colonel Marshall in the summer of

1942 had detailed Nichols to negotiate

an agreement with the Treasury for

withdrawal of silver from the United

States Bullion Depository in West

Point, New York.

District officials arranged to have

the silver processed through the Defense Plant Corporation, which was

conducting a silver program of its

own in connection with other war industries. The silver, in 1,000-ounce

bars, was moved by guarded truck to

Carteret, New Jersey, where it was

cast into billets, and then to Bayway,

New Jersey, where it was extruded

into strips 5/8's of an inch thick, 3

inches wide, and 40 to 50 feet long.

From Bayway, under the protection of

Manhattan District guards, the coiled

strips were moved by rail freight to

the Allis-Chalmers plant in Milwaukee. There, some 258 carloads of

silver were fabricated into coils and

bus bars, then sealed into welded casings, and finally shipped on open, unguarded flatcars, by various routes

and on irregular schedules, to the

Clinton Works.

A central control section in the

New York Area Engineers Office administered the silver program, but as

a double check the District retained

the services of a firm of auditors and

a metallurgical concern. Some precautions taken to avoid unnecessary loss

included weighing the silver each

time it entered or left one of the

plants, storing the pieces in stacks

that would permit minimum handling

during each eight-hour accountability

check, and painstakingly collecting

the scrap—even the minute amounts

that might accumulate on a worker's

clothing or shoe soles.28

27

 Paragraphs on silver procurement based on

MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 4, "Silver Program," DASA. For

details on Nichols's role in the silver negotiations,

see Ch. III. Groves presents a good, brief account in

his own book Now It Can Be Told, pp. 107-09. District officials had to account for and protect nearly

one-third billion dollars of silver ultimately withdrawn from the Treasury for the use in the electromagnetic plant.

28

 When the time came to return the silver to the

Treasury after the war was over, Manhattan District

workmen disassembled and cleaned part by part the

machines where it had been used, dismantled the

furnaces in which it had been melted, and even took

up the burned wooden floors to recover every trace

possible. As a result, in the final accounting, less

than one thirty-six-thousandth of 1 percent of the

more than 14,700 tons borrowed by the District for

the atomic project was missing, most of which was

an unavoidable melt loss. See MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 4,

pp. 4.1-4.5, DASA; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p.

109; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, p. 153.
134 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Plant Construction

As work crews began excavating

building sites and laying foundations

early in the summer of 1943, Stone

and Webster foremen knew plant construction must move ahead with maximum speed during the prime summer

building season, to meet the extremely short deadlines projected by the

Army. Reluctantly, Stone and Webster officials agreed to have the first

Alpha racetrack building ready to turn

over to Tennessee Eastman, the plant

operator, by November and the remaining Alpha units at approximately

monthly intervals thereafter. Project

leaders were convinced that only adherence to this rigorous schedule

would produce sufficient fissionable

materials to fulfill the requirements

for design and fabrication of an

atomic weapon in time to affect the

outcome of the war.

Stone and Webster had little difficulty in maintaining force-draft construction schedules for the plant

buildings, mainly designed along the

lines of structures in common use by

industry. The only unexpected delay

was the discovery of unfavorable subsoil conditions; excavation crews thus

had to do some extra blasting and

mucking and laying of 6-foot-thick

concrete mats to ensure firm foundations for the enormously heavy electromagnetic machines. Through use

of more thorough soil-sampling techniques, Stone and Webster was able

to minimize the time lost in providing

adequate footings for the later racetrack buildings.

Internal construction of the plant,

however, was characterized by unconventional methods and unorthodox

problems that seemed certain to

cause delays and setbacks in working

schedules. Project leaders had anticipated some problems. They knew, for

example, that installing equipment

while the building shells were under

construction was likely to lead to

complications because riggers, pipe

fitters, and mechanics were not ordinarily accustomed to working elbow

to elbow with concrete pourers, form

builders, and other building construction workers. Also, security measures

and the need to maintain extreme

cleanliness in certain areas would require guards and a pass system to

limit access to some parts of the

buildings. And they well understood

that assembling the complex racetrack

and other production units involved

demanding and time-consuming

measures.29

Consequently, Manhattan District

officials were pleasantly surprised

when Colonel Nichols, who had replaced Marshall as district engineer,

reported to General Groves in

September that the electromagnetic

construction was about 34 percent

completed, including the turnover to

Tennessee Eastman of the first operational facilities. These were the two

tanks and three magnet coils of the

XAX development plant with auxiliary

supporting units to be used for training production plant workers. At the

same time, Colonel Nichols noted

that construction on the crucial main

Alpha equipment was no more than a

few weeks behind the ambitious

schedules set up by Groves earlier in

the year. Stone and Webster engineers had reported to him that they

29

 MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 5, pp. 3.1 and 3.9-3.10,

DASA.
THE ELECTROMAGNETIC PROCESS 135

EXCAVATION OF TYPICAL ROCKY SUBSTRATUM AT THE TENNESSEE SITE

expected the first Alpha racetrack to

be operational by 1 December 1943.

The only disquieting note in Nichols's

optimistic September estimate was

mention of discovery of some "bugs"

when the XAX tanks underwent their

initial test operation.30

Partly on the basis of this impressive progress, General Groves authorized start of work on four of the improved Alpha II-type racetracks and

two additional Beta units in September. Stone and Webster organized a

whole new field force and the district

engineer reorganized the CEW Construction Division, enlarging its personnel and establishing separate construction divisions to monitor the

three major building projects in

progress at the Tennessee site: the

electromagnetic, gaseous diffusion,

and plutonium semiworks facilities.

Colonel George continued as head of

the newly formed Electromagnetic

Construction Division, but with additional officers assigned to branches to

monitor Stone and Webster's nine

construction subunits and a special

expediting section. Thus, as Stone

and Webster's engineers prepared to

carry out a test run of the nearly completed Alpha I unit, District officials

were confident that the electromagnetic project was well on the way to

successful completion. Had they taken

more careful note of the "bugs" that

persisted in the XAX calutron test operations, they might have been better

30

 Dist Engr, Monthly Rpt on DSM Proj, Sep 43,

MDR; MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 5, p. 3.16 and App. D11

(Chart, Employees on Stone and Webster's Payroll),

DASA; Memo, Kelley to Marsden, sub: Summary of

Y-12 Proj as of 9 Aug 43, same date, MDR.
136 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

prepared for setbacks the project was

to suffer in the months ahead.31

The first of the unanticipated problems with the newly completed Alpha

I racetrack was reported to Colonel

Nichols in early November. A few

days after they had started test runs,

plant engineers discovered that the

14-ton calutron tanks, which stood

back to back between the coils, had

moved apart as much as 3 inches,

causing a tremendous strain on the

piping used to maintain a vacuum in

the tanks. After investigation they determined that the powerful magnetic

field set up in the racetrack had created such a force between the tanks

that they "walked" away from each

other when they were jarred, as

during installation or removal of a

door. Following a few days study of

the phenomenon, Stone and Webster

reported that the adverse effects of

the magnetic field could be overcome

by installing heavy steel tie straps to

hold the tanks firmly in place.32

No such simple solution was possible, however, for the second major

problem that the November test operations revealed. The symptoms were

intermittent electrical shorts with

wide fluctuations in magnetic field

strength as successive magnet coils

were energized. Colonel Nichols reported the problem to General

Groves in early December, by which

time the complete failure of several

coils seemed to threaten the whole

future of the process. Plant engineers

indicated that dirt in the oil coolant

inside the coils was probably the

major cause of the malfunction and

the only sure cure was to drain the oil

and dry out the coils. Very much

upset by the ominous developments,

the Manhattan commander directed

Nichols to take all measures necessary, pending his own arrival at the

site to discuss such other steps as

might be required, including "a reorganization of personnel in charge of

the Y-12 [electromagnetic] construction work so that similar occurrences

[would] be avoided in the future."

 33

Groves arrived at the Clinton

Works on 14 December for a hurried

two-day inspection visit. On hand already were project engineer August

Klein from Stone and Webster and a

team of experts from Allis-Chalmers,

where the unsatisfactory coils had

been manufactured. Their further

checking, Groves learned, had revealed that the trouble stemmed not

only from mill scale and rust in the

cooling oil but also from moisture in

the cloth and fiberboard insulation,

and too close winding of wire. Groves

set in motion a thorough reorganization of the Clinton electromagnetic

administrative team and reemphasized

his earlier directive to Lawrence that

he concentrate Radiation Laboratory

resources on finding a solution for

the defects in the racetrack

equipment.34

31

 Org Charts, U.S. Engrs Office, MD, 15 Aug

and 1 Nov 43, MDR; MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 5, pp. 6.1-

6.4 and Apps. D7 and D10, DASA. 32

 Min, Coordination Committee Mtg, 11 Nov 43,

MDR; Dist Engr, Monthly Rpt on DSM Proj, NovDec 43, MDR.

33

 Msgs, Nichols to Groves and reply, 6 Dec 43,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 412.41 (Motors), MDR. 34

 Msg, Nichols to Groves (at Hanford), 6 Dec 43;

Msg, Lt Col Thomas T. Crenshaw (Ex Off, CEW) to

Groves, [probably 7 or 8 Dec 43]; Memo, Peterson

to Groves, 9 Dec 43. All in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 412.41 (Motors), MDR. MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 5,

pp. 3.10-3.11, DASA. Groves Diary, 14-15 Dec 43,

LRG.
THE ELECTROMAGNETIC PROCESS 137

ALPHA I RACETRACK, ELECTROMAGNETIC PLANT, CEW

A new administrative hierarchy resulted from the reorganization of the

eletromagnetic team, which took

effect in January 1944. Lt. Col. John

S. Hodgson, who had considerable

experience as a civilian contractor, replaced Colonel George as chief of the

Electromagnetic Construction Division; Maj. William A. Bonnett moved

up from a position as a liaison officer

with Stone and Webster field units to

be Hodgson's assistant; and Maj.

Walter J. Williams, who had had assignments on a number of ordnance

plant construction projects, took over

responsibility for completion of the

original electromagnetic plant. Only

Maj. Mark C. Fox, who had served as

area engineer on other Corps of Engineers projects, continued in his recently assigned task of overseeing

construction of extensions to the

original electromagnetic plant. At the

same time, Stone and Webster

brought in Frank R. Creedon from

the synthetic rubber program to be

general manager of all the company's

operations at the Clinton Works.

Creedon had had an earlier association with General Groves, having

worked as a civilian employee of the

Army's Construction Division on ordnance projects before 1942.

The first big task facing the new

team was how to solve the technical

defects in the Alpha I electrical equipment. Project technicians decided the

only sure remedy was to return the

malfunctioning magnet coils to AllisChalmers' Milwaukee plant for cleaning and rewinding, as well as to have

equipment crews disassemble and
138 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

clean all oil lines in the racetrack

building. It took about three months

to complete these corrective measures, and thus the first Alpha I racetrack was not fully operative again

until early March 1944.35

With the distressing days of technical problems in the past, by spring

the somber mood of Manhattan and

Stone and Webster officials concerning the electromagnetic method had

dissipated, and they were enjoying a

revived sense of optimism. One argument in favor of the process had been

that the production plant could be

built in segments which would

become operational as soon as they

were completed, making possible the

early detection of defects and the addition of indicated improvements.

And now, because the trying experiences of Stone and Webster engineers with the first Alpha I racetrack

had enhanced their understanding of

the problems and the reasons for

them, they were able to make changes

in equipment handling and installation techniques for subsequent racetracks. On the second Alpha I racetrack, for example, the engineers introduced much more rigid standards

of cleanliness, including such measures as drying out pipe lines by circulating preheated oil through them

and adding filters for each coil.36

Initial failure of Alpha I also reaffirmed a cardinal principle of General

Groves's administrative policy for the

atomic project. For months, the Manhattan commander had been emphasizing that the major resources and

personnel at the atomic research laboratories should be concentrated on

the single objective of securing production of militarily significant

amounts of fissionable materials in

time to be of use during the war. On

more than one occasion during his

visits to the Radiation Laboratory in

the fall of 1943, Groves had reminded

Lawrence's scientific staff that the

Army was not interested in advancing

pure science. Their mission, he

stated, once the research and development for the production plant was

completed, was to support in whatever way was necessary the design,

construction, and operation of that

plant. The natural tendency of the

Radiation Laboratory scientists was to

resist limiting themselves solely to socalled debugging activities for the

Tennessee plant, but the crisis caused

by Alpha I's failure forced Lawrence

to push new research entirely into the

background and, in December, to

completely redefine laboratory priorities in terms of two objectives: increasing the output and efficiency of

the electromagnetic plant; and developing new ideas, methods, and engineering designs for expanding that

plant.37

35

 Org Chart, U.S. Engrs Office, MD, 15 Feb 44,

MDR; MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 5, pp. 3.10-3.11 and 6.1,

DASA; Fine and Remington, Corps of Engineers: Construction, pp. 684-86; Groves, Now It Can be Told, p.

102 and 427; Dist Engr, Monthly Rpt on DSM Proj,

Mar 44, MDR. 36

 MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 5, pp. 3.11, DASA; Memo, E.

W. Seckendorff (Y-12 Process Engr) to T. R.

Thornburg (Gen Supt, Y-12, Stone and Webster),

sub: Detailed Method of Cleaning and Altering Pipe

at Racetrack B-Bldg 9201-1, CEW, Area Y-12, 30

Dec 43, Incl to Memo, Crenshaw to Groves, 1 Jan

44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 337 (Kellex LC),

MDR. 37

 Min, Coordination Committee Mtg, 17 Nov 43,

MDR; Dist Engr, Monthly Rpt on DSM Proj, NovDec 43 and Feb 44, MDR; Ltr, Lawrence to Nichols,

22 Mar 44, MDR.
THE ELECTROMAGNETIC PROCESS 139

The Army's prompt administrative

measures to counter the adverse consequences of Alpha I's failure proved

to be highly effective. The engineers

were successful in making the second

Alpha I operational by the end of January 1944, the first Beta and the first

and third Alpha I in March, and the

fourth Alpha I in April. Impressed

with the rapid progress being

achieved, Colonel Nichols reported to

Groves that he was now convinced

that the prediction given to President

Roosevelt in December 1942—completion of an atomic weapon by early

1945—would be realized if persisting

manpower shortages could be

overcome.38

Meanwhile, Stone and Webster had

been moving ahead with construction

of other major elements of the electromagnetic plant. Construction time

for building the extension units—the

Alpha II racetracks—was far less in

comparison to that required for

Alpha I. The Stone and Webster

crews' rapid progress was in part due

to certain design modifications, such

as using cement asbestos brick for the

outer siding of buildings and making

the racetrack shape rectangular rather

than oval. Also, the experience gained

on Alpha I expedited installation of

equipment in Alpha II. The first racetrack in the extension plant began operating in July 1944 and all four were

ready for operation by 1 October.39

At the same time, Stone and Webster and its subcontractors constructed the Beta units, where the Alphaprocessed material would be further

enriched, and built the facilities for

chemical preparation and recovery for

both Alpha and Beta plants. In spite

of several changes in plans, resulting

in considerable expansion of the Beta

and chemical facilities, the Electromagnetic Construction Division kept

the work on or even ahead of schedule, avoiding delays in processing material from the Alpha plants. From

original plans in 1943 for only a

single Beta unit to process Alpha I

output, the number grew to four: one

for Alpha II; another to handle additional output from Alphas I and II

that resulted from using partially enriched feed material from the gaseous

diffusion plant; and still another in

1945 so that there would be enough

Beta facilities to process enriched material coming directly from the diffusion plants. Similarly, each expansion

of the Alpha and Beta units required

an increase in the number of chemical

and other processing facilities, giving

the division additional work in expediting procurement, monitoring revision in contracts, and inspecting completed construction. This continuing

high-level of construction activity occasioned Colonel Hodgson to reorganize his division in late 1944 and to

establish five separate branches

(structures, electrical, expediting,

process piping, and mechanical). Not

until early 1945, when the Military

Policy Committee decided that the indicated successful operation of the

gaseous diffusion and plutonium

plants would make further large-scale

expansion of electromagnetic produc38

 Dist Engr, Monthly Rpts on DSM Proj, Jan and

Mar 44, MDR; Rpt, Nichols, sub: Info for Groves, 8

Apr 44, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 28,

Tab A, MDR. 39

 MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 5, pp. 3.17-3.20, 3.22, 5.2,

DASA.
140 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

ELECTROMAGNETIC PLANT UNDER CONSTRUCTION

tion facilities unnecessary, did the division's workload ease significantly.40

Plant Operation

Terms of the June 1943 contract

for operation of the electromagnetic

plant provided that Tennessee Eastman operate it on a cost-plus-fixedfee basis, serve as a consultant on

plant design, obtain and train operating personnel, and carry on research

to improve the process and its product. For performing these services,

the government agreed to pay the

firm a basic operating fee of $22,500

each month plus $7,500 for each

racetrack up to seven and $4,000 for

each one over that number.41

40

 Ibid., pp. 3.13-3.15, 3.20-3.23, App. D6 (Tabulation of Bldg Statistics), DASA; Dist Engr, Monthly Rpts on DSM Proj, Oct 43 and Aug and Nov 44,

MDR; MPC Min, 10 May 44 and 25 Feb 45, MDR;

Completion Rpts, Stone and Webster, sub: CEW,

Contract W-7401-eng-13, 1946, pp. 49-50, and

Contract W-14-108-eng-60, 1946, pp. 6-8, OROO;

Rpt, W. M. Brobeck and W. B. Reynolds, sub: On

Future Development of Electromagnetic System of

Tube Alloys Isotope Separation, 15 Jan 45, OCG

Files, Gen Corresp, Groves Files, Fldr 10, MDR.

41

 WD Contract W-7401-eng-23, 7 Jun 43, with

supps., OROO; MDH, Bk, 5, Vol. 6, "Operation,"

pp. 2.2-2.5 and 3.1-3.5, DASA.
THE ELECTROMAGNETIC PROCESS 141

Preparations

In early 1943, when Tennessee

Eastman initiated preliminary operational activities at the Tennessee site

and at the Berkeley and Rochester research facilities, the district engineer

formed a CEW Division in the New

York office and assigned Major Kelley

as division chief to supervise electromagnetic operations. Kelley's division

not only monitored the contractor's

activities relating to administration,

chemical processes, electrical processes and plants, and special accounts

but also established liaison with its

Berkeley and Boston administrative

units that coordinated with the Radiation Laboratory and Stone and Webster. Tennessee Eastman's Boston

staff, however, moved to the Tennessee site in August, in keeping with the

firm's frequently expressed desire to

center its plant operations activities

there.42

During construction Major Kelley

and his operating unit staff were busy

assisting Tennessee Eastman in recruiting and training personnel to operate the Alpha, Beta, and chemical

process equipment. Early estimates of

the number of employees needed

were far too low and requirements

were repeatedly revised upward. Although recruiting was carried on in

all sections of the country through regional offices of the United States

Employment Service, the best results

were attained in Knoxville and vicinity. For the many jobs requiring technical knowledge and background, the

electromagnetic project had to resort

to procurement through military

channels. Many of the scientifically

trained personnel in the Manhattan

District's Special Engineer Detachment (SED) at the Clinton Works

were assigned to work in the plant,

reaching a total of 450 SED enlisted

personnel by August 1945. The District also assisted in the temporary assignment of technically trained Navy

officers to the plant in 1944, their

number reaching a maximum of 143

in July of that year.43

Tennessee Eastman made a major

effort to develop a training program

for the thousands of operators who

would be required when the plant was

ready for full-scale operation. Working closely with Radiation Laboratory

scientists, the firm's Berkeley staff laid

the groundwork for systematic training of workers and supervisory personnel. While many practiced with

the Alpha experimental equipment at

Berkeley, others went to the University of California's Davis campus to

learn chemical processing techniques.

Radiation Laboratory scientists and

Manhattan District representatives

carefully reviewed all training material, the latter group giving special

attention to the security problem.

Tennessee Eastman technicians deliberately compiled the training material

to give the would-be operator only

the information needed to perform

42

 Subsection based on Org Chart, U.S. Engrs

Office, MD, 1 Nov 43, MDR; MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 5,

Sec. 3, and Vol. 6, pp. 3.3-3.5 and 8.1-8.3, DASA;

Min, Coordination Committee Mtgs, 23 Jan, 6 Mar,

and 24 Jun 43, MDR; Dist Engr, Monthly Rpts on

DSM Proj, Sep 43 and Mar 44, MDR; Min, Special

Progress Mtg, 5 Aug 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

337 (Mtgs and Confs-Univ of Calif), MDR; Hewlett

and Anderson, New World, p. 162; Rpt, F. T.

Howard, sub: The DSM Proj, Synthetic Catalyst Div,

22 Apr 43, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr

28, Tab A, MDR.

43

 For a more detailed account of manpower recruitment, and the SED's formation and organization, see Ch. XVI.
142 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

the job, without revealing the true

character or purpose of the end product. Experimentation demonstrated

that trainees with preliminary orientation in the nature of the electromagnetic process made the most rapid

progress. Meanwhile, by September

1943, intensive recruiting efforts by

the company had resulted in the

hiring of some eighteen hundred operator trainees, most of them from

the Knoxville area.

Some preliminary instruction took

place in facilities of the University of

Tennessee, because the large-scale

training program at the plant site did

not start until early fall. By that time

hundreds of trainees were on hand to

begin training on two experimental

XAX electromagnetic production

tanks that had started operating in

the development plant. Tennessee

Eastman moved all but a few of its

personnel from Berkeley to the Tennessee site to participate in training

the twenty-five hundred operators

deemed necessary for the five Alpha I

racetracks. With the addition of the

Alpha II and Beta buildings, the trainee program expanded to provide several times that many operators. By

early 1944, Tennessee Eastman's payroll had increased to ten thousand

and by mid-1945 it would rise to

more than twenty-five thousand.

The typical operator trainee was a

woman, recently graduated from a

nearby Tennessee high school, with

no scientific training whatsoever.

Using one of the XAX electromagnetic tanks in the development plant, the

instructional staff taught her how to

operate complex control panels in the

calutron cubicles adjacent to the racetracks. They gave her only information essential to her task as an operator and, for security reasons, actually

mislead her as to the real purpose

and character of the product. The

training program was surprisingly

successful, supplying operators on

schedule for each Alpha and Beta

racetrack as it went into operation.

Production Activities

Starting up in late 1943, the electromagnetic chemical units eventually

were producing thousands of pounds

of the charge material necessary for

the production operation of the racetracks. The first really effective production of the U-235-enriched final

product came in late January, when

the second Alpha I racetrack began

operating. In the five-month period

following, as the remaining three

Alpha I and the first two Beta tracks

became fully operational, production

steadily increased. And by mid-1944,

the Army could view the electromagnetic start-up operations as, in the

main, successful.44

Manhattan District officials, however, were unprepared for the almost

continuous problems that arose as the

electromagnetic plant moved into the

sustained production phase of its operation. One mechanical or equipment failure after another plagued

plant operations; short circuits and

shortages, breakdowns and breakages

cropped up on all sides. In spite of

the best efforts of Tennessee Eastman

and District procurement officials, the

spare parts situation skirted the edge

of chaos for months. Lack of experience, of standardization, and of a suf44

 MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 6, pp. 4.2 and 4.4-4.5,

DASA; Dist Engr, Monthly Rpts on DSM Proj, JanJun 44, passim, MDR.
THE ELECTROMAGNETIC PROCESS 143

CEW TRAINING FACILITIES (background), where electromagnetic plant employees received

preliminary instruction. District headquarters buildings are in the foreground.

ficient number of suppliers all contributed to the severe parts procurement difficulties. Nevertheless, the

District's electromagnetic staff and

Tennessee Eastman—working in close

coordination—managed sufficiently to

overcome the adverse effects of these

many problems so that in March 1944

plant workers shipped the first of several hundred grams of Alpha product,

containing 13 to 15 percent U-235, to

Los Alamos. Three months later the

first shipment of the much more

highly enriched Beta product reached

the New Mexico laboratory.45

But Manhattan and Tennessee

Eastman officials were well aware that

this output of sample quantities represented only the first steps in bringing the electromagnetic plant up to a

maximum rate of production, a complicated undertaking with pitfalls at

every turn.46 They readily perceived

that part of the difficulty was inherent

in the basic nature of the process that

used large complex machines and significant quantities of electric power

and raw materials to isolate an infinitesmally small amount of final product. The basic feed material, orangecolored uranium oxide shipped in

from refineries operating under direction of Manhattan's Madison Square

Area Engineers Office, moved

through a series of very complex

steps. A chemical preparation process

converted it into a gaseous form, uranium tetrachloride, which plant work- 45

 MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 6, pp. 4.2 and 4.4-4.5,

DASA; Memo, J. C. White (Gen Mgr, Tenn East) to

Groves, 28 Jun 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 095

(TEC), MDR.

46

 Paragraphs on electromagnetic plant operations based primarily on MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 6, Sec.

4, DASA.
144 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

ers then fed into the Alpha racetracks.

Here part of the feed material separated, while the rest adhered to various parts of the interior of the calutron, where it had to be recovered for

recycle. The separated portion went

to the Beta chemical preparation

stage and then into the Beta racetracks for further separation. That

separated portion emerged as U-235

final product and, after concentration,

workers shipped it to the Los Alamos

Laboratory. The rest had to be recovered, recycled through the Beta

racetracks, and concentrated for

shipment.

Only 1 in 5,825 parts of charge material fed into the Alpha racetracks

emerged as final product; 90 percent

of the charge material was left in the

feed bottles or scattered around the

tanks. Of the 10 percent that passed

into the ion beams, only a very small

quantity entered the receivers. The

amount reaching the receivers was

limited by the capacity of the calutrons. It could not be increased

except through use of enriched

charge material, or by construction of

more racetracks. Furthermore, the

amount actually recovered from the

receivers, because of its minute quantity and the essentially violent nature

of the process, could not be made to

reach 100 percent even by the most

practicable methods.

Because of the high intrinsic value

of the final product, recovery had to

be as complete and thorough as possible, yet with no undue holdup time

in the chemical apparatus to slow

down the process. The Beta chemistry

facilities included a salvage department which used batteries of extractors, reactors, filters, centrifuges,

evaporators, and driers so that the

very last traces of enriched uranium

might be recovered. Justification for

these intensive efforts was demonstrated when worn-out carbon receiver parts from the calutrons were

burned. They yielded enough enriched uranium to raise the January

1945 production a full 10 percent.47

Even under the best of conditions,

a small amount of U-235-enriched

product always remained in solutions,

or bound in solids, or adhered to

costly and scarce equipment parts;

however, it was economically unfeasible for this material to be recovered.

A certain percentage also remained in

that part of the uranium feed matter

which passed through the ion beam

but did not enter the receivers. It was

imperative that this material—constituting nine-tenths of the uranium fed

into the Alpha calutrons and seveneighths of that going into the Beta

racetracks—be prevented from contaminating the enriched uranium and

be recovered and stored for possible

future reprocessing. To keep losses at

a minimum and to prevent theft, Tennessee Eastman instituted a strict material accounting system. Stock room

employees inventoried the Alpha

stocks every four weeks, the Beta

every two weeks. In spite of this careful check, surprisingly large amounts

of material (17.4 percent of Alpha

product by September 1945 and 5.4

percent of Beta product by December

1946) were lost unavoidably in the

various kinds of wastes created by the

separation process itself.48

47

 Memo, Kelley to Groves, sub: Present Status of

Beta Chemistry Opns, 8 Sep 44, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 600.1 (Constr CEW), MDR; Hewlett and

Anderson, New World, pp. 295-96. 48

 Data concerning losses of feed materials and

recovery problems is derived from MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. Continued
THE ELECTROMAGNETIC PROCESS 145

The most crucial phase of the recovery operation took place in Beta

chemistry. Alpha workers moved the

final Alpha product, stored in receiver

pockets on the removable doors of

the Alpha calutrons, to the Beta

chemistry buildings. After dismantling

the pockets, Beta workers first

scraped, bleached, and burned the

graphite parts and then leached and

electrostripped the metal parts. Finally, chemists processed the resulting

solutions and solids to extract all enriched uranium. They then purified

this enriched uranium and converted

it into Beta feed material.

The Beta preparatory chemical

process proved to be one of the most

persistently troublesome operations

in the electromagnetic plant. The

process was slow, requiring, even

under optimum conditions, about

three weeks. More worrisome, however, only about 60 percent of the enriched uranium brought from Alpha

was showing up as an end product of

the Beta chemical process, causing a

serious shortage of feed material for

the Beta racetracks. In July 1944,

Groves himself went to the Clinton

Works to discuss the problem with

plant and District officials. As a result,

Tennessee Eastman temporarily shut

down all Beta production in August

so that company engineers and outside consultants could thoroughly

analyze the process and equipment.

Their investigations revealed that the

trouble lay in the overly complex

piping and equipment and in the

tendency of certain materials in this

equipment to absorb too much

uranium.

District and Tennessee Eastman officials immediately instituted changes

in equipment, techniques, and organization to overcome these weaknesses

in Beta chemistry. Project engineers

set about removing, cleaning, and redesigning piping; replaced glass-lined

tubes with pyrex; put in more parts

made of graphite from which absorbed uranium could be recovered

by burning; and made other changes

to speed up the process. For varying

periods during the fall of 1944, experts like Frank H. Spedding, the

metallurgist who headed Manhattan's

research program at Iowa State College, and John P. Baxter, one of the

British scientists assisting in the bomb

development program, came to the

Clinton Works to study Beta chemistry with an eye to improving techniques employed in the process. And,

in December, District officials negotiated contracts with Johns Hopkins

and Purdue Universities to study

methods for increasing recovery and

reducing holdup time in the Beta

process. Tennessee Eastman, now

more fully aware of the chemical difficulties of isotopic separation, completely reorganized its Clinton chemistry division and greatly increased

the number of personnel.

In spite of the difficulties with Beta

chemistry operations, in January 1945

the district engineer reported to the

Manhattan commander that there had

been a dramatic increase in Beta production during the second half of

1944, with output being about 60

percent greater at the close of December. This increase was attributable primarily to the much higher productive capacity of Alpha II calutrons,

and the fact that all Alpha II's were

6, pp. 4.16-4.17 and App. C (with illustrations),

DASA.
146 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

fully operational by November. Consequently, Beta output in November

was more than ten times the July rate,

increasing even more in December to

twice the November rate. The Alpha

II's, however, were far from troublefree. The major problem experienced

had to do with the insulators burning

out at a high rate, but the engineers

quickly corrected this defect by recommending that zircon be substituted

for the less durable material in the

bushings.49

Not all of the production problems

of the electromagnetic project were

mechanical or technical in nature.

When the spare parts crisis occurred

in June 1944, Groves looked into

project management by Tennessee

Eastman and District officials. Following a visit to the plant, he wrote to

Conant that he had observed a

number of ways in which he thought

production might be increased. Supervisors ought to make more frequent inspections, especially in installation and servicing of calutrons.

More should be done to build up and

maintain employee morale. Lack of

sufficient organization charts and the

presence of "too many people" in the

operating rooms gave Groves the impression that the plant managers were

not making the most efficient use of

personnel. Also, he wondered if Frederick R. Conklin, the Tennessee Eastman works manager, and Major

Kelley, chief of the District's Electromagnetic Operations Division, were

"too similar in disposition," noting

that neither Conklin nor Kelley was a

"hard driving, optimistic executive.

Instead of setting an impossible goal

and then breaking their hearts to

almost achieve it, they set a nice,

comfortable goal making plenty of allowances for difficulties and then feel

very proud of themselves for having

been proven right in their pessimistic

outlook."

 50

General Groves took no immediate

steps to institute major changes in

management. He could not overlook

the fact that Major Kelley got along

extremely well with the key executives

of Tennessee Eastman and also was

held in very high regard by Lawrence

and the staff of the Radiation Laboratory. It was not until September, with

the spare parts problem partially relieved and the Beta chemistry bottleneck on the way to solution, that the

Manhattan commander directed the

district engineer to replace Kelley.

Colonel Nichols selected Lt. Col.

John R. Ruhoff, a chemical engineer

by profession, because of his familiarity with electromagnetic problems; he

had been assistant chief of the District's Materials Section and, since

1943, chief of the Madison Square

Area Engineers Office where he was

responsible for overseeing the provision of feed materials for the electromagnetic process. In early 1945,

Ruhoff assumed responsibility for

overseeing all electromagnetic activities at the Clinton Works and continued in that post until the end of the

war. Major Kelley did not leave the

49

 Memos for File, Kelley, sub: Notes on 3 and 14

Jul Confs, 4 and 15 Jul 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 337 (LC), MDR; Memo, Kelley to Groves, sub:

Present Status of Beta Chemistry Opns, 8 Sep 44,

MDR; Dist Engr, Monthly Rpts on DSM Proj, Jul

44-Jan 45, passim, MDR; Hewlett and Anderson,

New World, pp. 295-96; MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 6, pp. 4.9-

4.10 and 5.3, DASA.

50

 Ltr, Groves to Conant, 5 Jun 44, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 400.17 (Mfg-Prod-Fab), MDR; Ltr,

White to Groves, 28 Jun 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 095 (TEC LC), MDR.
THE ELECTROMAGNETIC PROCESS 147

ELECTROMAGNETIC PLANT IN FULL OPERATION

Manhattan Project, but replaced

Ruhoff as head of the Madison

Square Office.51

Although there was a gradual, but

not spectacular, improvement in electromagnetic production, intermittent

expressions of dissatisfaction with the

way the plant was operating continued. For example, British scientists

working at the Radiation Laboratory

came away from a visit to the plant

highly critical of certain design features of process equipment and of the

alleged gross inefficiency of the service crews. Marcus Oliphant, head of

the British group, also found serious

fault with personnel and organization.

He wrote to Sir James Chadwick in

November 1944, expressing concern

at the "poor quality of the higher

grade personnel in TEC [Tennessee

Eastman Corporation] . . . [and] the

clumsiness of the army organization,

which neither controls nor checks the

operation except in a very desultory

and inefficient manner."

 52

Partially as a reaction to this continuing criticism, but chiefly as a reflection of frayed nerves under the

long strain, Tennessee Eastman executives complained bitterly in April

1945 to Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Farrell,

51

 Ltr, Lawrence to Nichols, 12 Jul 44, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 020 (MED-Org), MDR; MDH,

Bk. 5, Vol. 6, p. 8.1, DASA.

52

 Ltr, Oliphant to Chadwick, 2 Nov 44, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Chadwick, J), MDR;

Baxter, Notes on Alpha and Beta Output, 6 Nov 44,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Y-12), MDR.

See also Interv, Author with Dr. Elkin Burckhardt

(physicist, Y-12), CMH.
148 MANHATTAN. THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

who had been serving as Groves's

deputy since February, that the firm

was not getting the recognition it deserved for what it had accomplished

at the Clinton Works. Operation of

the electromagnetic plant should be

viewed for what it actually was, a

huge pilot plant, not a normal industrial operation. While, undoubtedly,

there were deficiencies that the firm

could correct, there were also handicaps which it could not possibly overcome. The plant had been designed

with few interchangeable parts; the

damage to equipment had been

greater than projected; and the program had been constantly changing,

as in the case of the recent shifts to

thermal and gaseous diffusion feed

materials. In the light of all these

mitigating factors, they were especially disturbed by the implication of

General Groves's remark to the operating supervisors that "they should

work until they fell into their graves

just as the war was over."

 53

The criticisms and complaints

began to lose some of their sting by

late spring of 1945 as rapidly increasing production provided concrete evidence that the plant was going to be

a success. In January, all the racetracks had demonstrated their ability

to perform at predicted capacity, even

though delays in servicing, chemistry,

and procurement of parts still imposed a drag on full production. In

February, the first slightly enriched

(1.4 percent) uranium feed had come

from the new thermal diffusion plant,

and in March the first enhanced

(5 percent and up) material from

the gaseous diffusion plant. In April,

the gaseous plant began turning out

uranium sufficiently enriched to go

directly into the Beta racetracks,

gradually increasing product enrichment until it reached 23 percent on

5 August: the day before the first

bomb was dropped on Japan.

Because of the higher enrichment

of the Beta feed material, the Alpha

stage was no longer necessary. In

early September 1945, with the occupation of Japan going forward successfully, plant officials ordered the

Alpha racetracks shut down. They

had produced more than 88 kilograms of final product with average

enrichment of 84.5 percent. Beta continued in operation until the end of

the year, producing an additional 953

kilograms of final product with an enrichment of about 95 percent.54

53

 Memo, Farrell to Groves, sub: Apr 18th Conf at

Clinton, 19 Apr 45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 337

(CEW), MDR.

54

 MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 6, pp. 4.13-4.14 and Top

Secret App., DASA.
CHAPTER VII

The Gaseous Diffusion Process

By late 1942, atomic project leaders

had authorized development of four

technically and theoretically different

processes—the electromagnetic, gaseous and liquid thermal diffusion, and

gas centrifuge—as potential methods

for producing sufficient U-235 of a

quality to be militarily useful in

World War II. Work on these processes had been in progress for about

two years, long enough to make apparent the relative advantages and disadvantages of each.

Because no single method appeared

capable by itself of producing the

badly needed U-235, Manhattan leaders conceived the possibility of employing two or more of the processes

in combination. They readily endorsed the electromagnetic as one of

the methods; unlike the other three, it

could begin producing adequately enriched U-235 from an only partially

completed plant. Selection of the

other process for full-scale development in tandem with the electromagnetic came in early December. The

Lewis reviewing committee gave the

gaseous diffusion process a solid endorsement, recommending construction of a 4,600-stage plant capable of

producing 90 percent U-235 in substantial quantities. Meeting on the

tenth, the Military Policy Committee

then approved this recommendation,

basing its decision upon the conclusion that even though project scientists had yet to satisfactorily design

the key components for a gaseous diffusion plant, the process was, nevertheless, more likely to produce a sufficient quantity of fissionable material

suitable for an atomic weapon than

either the liquid thermal diffusion or

centrifuge processes.1

Gaseous Diffusion Research and the

Army, 1942-1943

Research and development on the

diffusion process, which had started

in 1940, centered at Columbia Uni1

 The Military Policy Committee approved continued but limited support for research and development of the liquid thermal diffusion and centrifuge

processes. The detailed arguments for and against

full-scale development of these processes may be

found in Memo, Richard C. Tolman (Groves's scientific adviser) to Groves, sub: Visit to Centrifugal

Plant at Bayway, N.J., 20 Dec 43, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 201 (Tolman), MDR; Draft Rpt, Lt Col

John R. Ruhoff, sub: Summary on Atomic Energy,

17 Jun 46, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12

(Atomic), MDR; MPC Min, 12 Nov and 10 Dec 42,

OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 23, Tab A,

MDR; MDH, Bk. 2, Vol. 3, "Design," pp. 3.1-3.2,

DASA; Conclusions of Reviewing Committee, 4 Dec

42. Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 334 (Special Reviewing Committee), MDR; Ltr, Urey to Conant, 4 Sep

43. Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Urey), MDR.

See also Chs. VI and VIII.
150 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

versity under the direction of two

members of the faculty, Harold C.

Urey, an eminent physical chemist

and Nobel Prize winner (1934), and

John R. Dunning, a young physicist.

Supported since 1941 by funds from

the Navy and an OSRD contract, diffusion research by December 1942

had made substantial progress toward

development of a large-scale expansion of the process. On the basis of a

theory provided by Karl P. Cohen, a

young mathematician on the Columbia staff, the Columbia research

group had built Pilot Plant No. 1, a

small twelve-stage apparatus, in the

university's Pupin Hall. And operation of this unit in the fall of 1942

had furnished valuable data on the

major elements of a diffusion plant,

most significantly, the material for the

barrier component that filtered the

process gas in each separating stage.2

When the Army began taking over

direction of the atomic bomb project

in the summer of 1942, the Columbia

diffusion research program continued

to operate under OSRD contracts.

Beginning in the fall, the Manhattan

District gradually extended its control

over administration of the program,

culminating with Columbia's acceptance of a War Department contract

on 1 May 1943. Shortly thereafter

university and District representatives

reorganized the diffusion research

program, redesignating it as the SAM

(for Special Alloyed Materials) Laboratories and appointing Urey as director. (See Map 2.) Maj. Benjamin K.

Hough, Jr., who had come to Columbia in the spring as area engineer for

the program, reorganized his office to

conform to the SAM organization and

moved with most of the rapidly expanding research activities from

campus laboratories to more spacious

facilities in the university's Nash

Building, a few blocks north of the

campus.3

Design and Engineering

The Military Policy Committee,

after deciding to give priority to fullscale development of the gaseous diffusion process, selected the M. W.

Kellogg Company to design and engineer the production plant, designated

K-25 for security reasons. The choice

was a logical one, for the firm was already extensively involved in diffusion

research under OSRD contracts, including design of a ten-stage pilot

plant for barrier development. On 14

December 1942, Kellogg accepted a

letter contract from the Manhattan

District, with some unusual provisions

that reflected the unique character of

the project. The Army required no

guarantees from the firm that it could

successfully design, build and put into

operation a gaseous diffusion production plant. For reasons of security, the

company agreed to set up a separate

corporate entity, the Kellex Corporation, to function as a self-sustaining

and autonomous organization for carrying out the project. Because of the

great uncertainty regarding the pre2

 Smyth Report, pp. 125-26 and 132-33; Hewlett

and Anderson, New World, pp. 97-101; MDH, Bk. 2,

Vol. 2, "Research," pp. 4.11-4.12, 4.14-4.15, 7.2-

7.3, DASA.

3

 Cert of Audit MDE 103-46, Columbia Area,

27 Feb 46, Fiscal and Audit Files, Cert of Audit

Registers, MDR; MDH, Bk. 2, Vol. 2, pp. 2.1-2.2,

11.1-11.3, App. B (Org Chart, Columbia Area,

4 Aug 43), DASA; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 111.

Groves remembered the code name SAM as standing for Substitute Alloy Materials rather than Special Alloyed Materials.
THE GASEOUS DIFFUSION PROCESS 151

cise scope and cost of the project, the

District and Kellogg also agreed to

defer fixing any financial terms until

later execution of a formal fixed-fee

contract. (This was not actually accomplished until April 1944, when

Kellogg accepted payment of about

$2.5 million for its work.)

 4

Kellogg provided the Kellex Corporation with its own research, engineering, expediting, accounting, and

service divisions. It designated one of

its own vice presidents, Percival C.

Keith, a Texas-born chemical engineer and graduate of Massachusetts

Institute of Technology, to be executive in charge at Kellex. Keith, who

had already gained considerable familiarity with the atomic bomb

project through his service on the

OSRD S-1 Section's planning board,

not only drew upon managerial and

technical employees of Kellogg but

also borrowed personnel from other

firms in order to staff Kellex. Kellex

employees—some thirty-seven hundred at the height of the firm's activities in 1944—worked in the New York

area at Kellex's headquarters in the

downtown Manhattan Woolworth

Building, at Columbia University's

laboratory facilities in the Nash Building, and at Kellogg's Jersey City

plant; and in Tennessee at the Clinton Engineer Works.5

To oversee the work of Kellex, as

well as to handle the administrative

details relating to the large number of

Special Engineer Detachment personnel assigned to the firm (nearly one

hundred by mid-1944), the district

engineer in January 1943 established

the New York Area Engineers Office

in the conveniently located Woolworth Building and assigned Lt. Col.

James C. Stowers not only as the new

area engineer but also as the unit

chief for the entire K-25 project. At

the start Stowers supervised a military

and civilian staff of less than twenty;

it remained small, never numbering

more than seventy. While monitoring

performance on the Kellogg contract,

this New York staff also coordinated

the unusually complex developmental

diffusion research of numerous contractors—including Princeton University working on barrier corrosion;

Ohio State University on chemical

compounds as feed materials and process gas; and Union Carbide's Carbide

and Carbon Chemicals Corporation,

Linde Air Products Company, and

Bakelite Corporation, Western Electric's Bell Telephone Laboratories,

and Interchemical Corporation, all on

suitable barrier fabrication.6

4

 Ltr Contract W-7405-eng-23, 14 Dec 42, and

Formal Contract W-7405-eng-23, 11 Apr 43, both

in Contract Files, OROO; MDH, Bk. 2, Vol. 2, pp.

3.4-3.6 and App. A, DASA; Memo, Nichols to Carroll L. Wilson (Ex Asst to Bush), sub: Background

on P. C. Keith, 10 Jan 47, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Keith), MDR; Ltr, Keith to WD, Attn:

Groves, 25 Jan 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 167,

MDR. 5

 Memo, Nichols to Wilson, sub: Background on

P. C. Keith, 10 Jan 47, MDR; Groves, Now It Can Be

Told, pp. 112 and 428; Ltr, M. W. Kellogg to

Groves, 9 May 45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

231.21 (Kellex), MDR; Ltr, Keith to WD, 25 Jan 44,

MDR; MDH, Bk. 2, Vol. 3, pp. 18.5-18.7 and Apps.

C14-C15 (Org Charts), DASA. 6

 Ltr, R. B. Van Houten (Asst Proj Mgr, Kellex) to

John H. Arnold (Kellex R & D Dir), sub: SED Personnel Assigned to Nash Bldg (with attached rosters), 28 Jun 44, Army Personnel Files, Box 73A (1-

A), Kellex, OROO; Cert of Audit MDE 202-46, New

York Area, 1 Nov 45, MDR; Memo, Groves to Dist

Engr, sub: List of Personnel, 27 Sep 43, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Gen), MDR; Org Chart,

Kellex Corp., 8 Apr 45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

231.21 (Kellex), MDR; Org Charts, U.S. Engrs

Office, MD, 15 Aug and 1 Nov 43, 10 Nov 44,

26 Jan 45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 020 (MED- Continued
152 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Theoretical and Practical Problems

The complexities and difficulties in

gaseous diffusion plant design arose

from the nature of the process itself,

which required a stable compound of

uranium that would exist as a fluid at

ordinary temperatures, and also from

the almost total lack of any adequate

data on what would happen when the

process was transformed from a laboratory phenomenon into a mass production operation.7

 In 1941, Karl P.

Cohen had worked out the fundamental theory of the gaseous diffusion

process by applying the well-established Graham's Law to the only

known gaseous compound of uranium, the highly corrosive uranium

hexafluoride. Briefly stated, Graham's

Law holds that if a mixture of two

gases of unequal densities is placed in

a porous container surrounded by an

evacuated space, the lighter gas will

tend to escape at a more rapid rate

than the heavier. If the process can be

controlled, separation can be carried

forward by stages until an almost

pure concentration of the lighter

component is achieved. How much

more of the lighter than the heavier

component passes through a single

stage depends upon the density of the

gases and the difference in their molecular weights. In the case of uranium hexafluoride, the difference is

very small indeed, the lighter U-235

constituting only 0.85 percent.

Hence, the highest enrichment of the

lighter isotope in a single stage is

1.0043 times that of the heavier.

In practice, the degree of singlestage separation actually attainable is

affected by the size, number, and distribution of the apertures, or pores,

in the barrier through which the process gas passes and the variations in

the pressure of the gas itself. After investigating whether these limiting factors could be overcome sufficiently to

make possible construction of an efficient plant in terms of time and

output, Cohen proposed building a

plant of forty-six hundred stages to

produce 90 percent U-235. This

plant would operate as a single cascade, with each stage feeding enriched material to the next higher

stage and depleted material to the

stage below. Operating at a relatively

high pressure, the plant would have a

low holdup of material in the barrier,

thus reducing the equilibrium time—

that is, the time required to complete

the process.

Org), MDR; MDH, Bk. 2, Vol. 2, pp. 2.2-2.5, Vol. 3,

pp. 18.2-18.5 and Apps. C7-C13 (Org Charts), and

Vol. 4, "Construction," App. C16 (Org Chart),

DASA; Ltr, Keith to Nichols, 6 Aug 43, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, Misc File (unmarked fldr), MDR; Ltr,

Tolman to Groves, sub: Visit to Bell Tel Labs To

Discuss Work on Barrier Problem, 9 Oct 43, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Rpts), MDR. 7

 Subsection based on MDH, Bk. 2, Vol. 2 (especially pp. 2.4 and 8.5-8.6) and Vol. 3, and Bk. 7,

Vol. 1, "Feed Materials and Special Procurement,"

pp. 9.6-9.9, DASA; Hewlett and Anderson, New

World, pp. 125-131; Gowing, Britain and Atomic

Energy, pp. 57-58 and 218-25; Completion Rpt, M.

W. Kellogg Co. and Kellex Corp., sub: K-25 Plant,

Contract W-7405-eng-23, 31 Oct 45, pp. 5 (revised)6, OROO; Interv, Author with Cohen, 8 Jul

82, CMH; Karl Cohen, The Theory of Isotope Separation

as Applied to the Large-scale Production of U-235, ed.

George M. Murphy, in Division III, Special Separations

Project, National Nuclear Energy Series, Vol. 3 (New

York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1951), pp. 5-29;

Memo, Dunning to George T. Felbeck (K-25 Proj

Mgr, Kellex), Albert L. Baker (Kellex Chief Engr),

and Keith, sub: Importance of Low Humidity at K25 Plant Site, 17 Apr 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

601 (CEW), MDR; Safety Committee, Bull SM-2,

Safety Committee Regulations for Handling G-126

(Fluorine), Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 729.31,

MDR. On the question of cooler design, see Calendar of Events, Internal vs. External Coolers, 6 May

44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 001, MDR.
THE GASEOUS DIFFUSION PROCESS 153

The single cascade design contrasted with the diffusion plant design on

which British atomic scientists had

been working since 1940. Their proposed plant would employ a cascadeof-cascades arrangement with low

pressure and high holdup. Such a

plant had certain advantages over the

American design; its lower-operating

pressure and temperature made the

solution to the barrier problem easier

and reduced the corrosive effect of

the process gas. The British scientists

also claimed their cascade-of-cascades

plant would have greater operating

stability and present fewer maintenance problems, but American engineers rejected the design because its

high holdup would increase the equilibrium time substantially.

With the results of Cohen's studies

and the British experiments at hand,

SAM scientists and Kellex engineers

worked as a team to design the basic

gaseous diffusion production unit.

This unit, designated the stage, had

three main elements: a converter,

control valve, and centrifugal pumps.

The converter consisted of a barrier,

its most central feature, and a cooler.

The highly porous metallic barrier,

initially comprised of flat plates but in

final design made up of annular bundles of small tubes arranged and supported in much the same fashion as

the conventional shell-and-tube heat

exchanger long employed in steampowered engines, filtered the process

gas to separate uranium isotopes; the

cooler, a circular bundle of finned

copper tubes in the head of the converter, removed the process-generated heat and controlled the stage temperature. The system's control valve,

an adaptation of the conventional

butterfly valve, maintained the required stage pressure, and its centrifugal pumps, consisting of a booster

and blower, transported and fed the

process gas from one stage to

another.

The Columbia-Kellex designers

considered combining the stage's converter, control valve, and pumps in a

completely sealed unit. This design

offered certain advantages, especially

with respect to maintaining a vacuum

and preventing leaks. The unit, however, would be bulky and its components difficult to service. And, more

importantly, its fabrication would require more time than separate fabrication of its component parts. To

overcome these disadvantages, the

designers modified their original diffusion stage concept. Final equipment

designs called for the control valve

and the pumps and its motors to be

outside the converter. Although Carbide and Carbon engineers had suggested that the cooler be removed

from the converter and manufactured

as a separate unit, the ColumbiaKellex team rejected this proposal,

feeling that such a change would slow

down delivery of the converters.

This modified stage design, nevertheless, forced the Columbia-Kellex

designers to contend with another

mechanical problem—how to prevent

leakage. After extensive testing they

proposed that both pumps and

motors be encased in a vacuum-tight

enclosure containing inert gas, thereby eliminating the primary obstacle in

centrifugal pump design: the need for

seals. The Westinghouse Electric and

Manufacturing Company built several

models of this design, which Columbia scientists later successfully employed in laboratory tests. But before
154 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Columbia could develop a production

model, researchers at the Elliott Company in Pennsylvania had invented a

radically different type of seal for centrifugal pumps. When tested at Columbia in early 1943, the designers

determined that this new type of seal

met all the requirements for the K-25

plant.

Some of the most difficult design

problems arose from the necessity of

using the highly corrosive uranium

hexafluoride as the process gas. Because earlier efforts by the OSRD to

find a substitute for uranium hexafluoride had failed, the Army expanded research by SAM, Princeton, and Du

Pont scientists in an effort to devise

ways to cope with the corrosive character of the gas. These investigations

established that the adverse effects of

corrosion could be inhibited through

pre-installation conditioning of the

process equipment and contributed to

the design of treatment methods.

The Barrier Problem

The heart of the gaseous diffusion

system was the barrier, the component that proved most difficult to

design and fabricate.8 Two objectives

guided barrier research and development at Columbia University, as well

as at Kellex: find a material that

would efficiently separate U-235 and

U-238 in a hexafluoride compound,

and develop mass production methods for making the material into barriers. Ongoing tests soon revealed

that this material had to have certain

essential characteristics, namely, be

highly porous; resistant to the reactive nature of uranium hexafluoride;

capable of withstanding the stresses

of fabrication, installation, and utilization; and suitable for mass

production.

Columbia research had experimented with a great variety of metals and

alloys over a two-year period (1941-

42), testing many of them in Pilot

Plant No. 1, but with repeated disappointment. Finally, in December

1942, the experiments of researchers

Edward Norris and Edward Adler

with a form of corrosion-resistant

nickel revealed the material's highly

promising characteristics for satisfying

the exacting and rigorous barrier requirements. To manufacture the

Norris-Adler barrier material in a

continuous process, as well as to test

other equipment under conditions approaching those anticipated in a

large-scale diffusion plant, the research team at Columbia in January

1943 started building Pilot Plant

No. 2, a six-stage cascade unit, in the

8

 Subsection based on MDH, Bk. 2, Vol. 2, pp.

4.1-4.30 and 4.32-4.33, DASA; DSM Chronology,

16 Jun 44, Sec. 10, OROO; MPC Min, 13 Aug 43,

MDR; Ltr, Tolman to Groves, sub: Visit to Bell Tel

Labs To Discuss Work on Barrier Problem, 9 Oct

43, MDR; Ltr, Edward Mack, Jr. (SAM Labs), to

Urey, 31 Mar 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1

(Kellex and Others), MDR; Ltrs, Urey to Groves,

10 May 43, and Urey to Hough, 10 Nov 43, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Urey), MDR; Ltrs, Keith to

Groves, 23 Oct 43, and W. A. Akers (British group)

to Stowers, 26 Jun 44, and Min, Follow-up Review

Conf (K-25), 5 Jan 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

001, MDR; Memo, Stowers to Groves, 7 Jan 44,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 095 (Kellex), MDR;

Hewlett and Anderson, New World, p. 139; Memo,

Tolman to Grove, sub: Status of Work on Pilot

Plants, Barriers, etc., in N.Y., 13 Mar 44, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Tolman), MDR; Memo,

Nichols to Groves, sub: Requirement for Nickel

Powder, 2 Mar 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

600.12 (Research), MDR. In response to the atomic

program's need for large quantities of powdered

nickel, International Nickel Company built additional manufacturing facilities in West Virginia, New

Jersey, and New York.
THE GASEOUS DIFFUSION PROCESS 155

Nash Building. In early summer, this

pilot plant began producing the

Norris-Adler barrier material. Initial

tests, however, revealed distressing

structural weaknesses and production

deficiencies; the nickel material's brittleness made fabrication into tubes

difficult and the complex character of

the manufacturing techniques created

problems in achieving uniform quality

of production.

Manhattan leaders, nevertheless,

continued to be confident that the

barrier problem would be solved satisfactorily. They intensified barrier research and testing efforts of the Columbia team, as well as those of the

Kellex-Bell-Bakelite barrier research

group experimenting with a powdered

nickel barrier. The progress and results of these ongoing barrier-development experiments were reviewed and

discussed in August, when the Military

Policy Committee convened on the

thirteenth. With cautious optimism,

the committee concluded that a suitable—if not ideal—barrier would soon

be designed and fabricated, an improved version of either the NorrisAdler or Kellex barrier. But ensuing

results from months of testing dashed

the Columbia scientists' hopeful expectations of producing good-quality

barrier material; their Norris-Adler

prototype, though much improved,

was still too brittle and lacking in uniform quality. The Kellex-Bell-Bakelite

team's experiments, however, particularly those with a material that combined some of the best features of the

Norris-Adler and the powdered nickel

barriers, demonstrated that its new

barrier achieved good separation characteristics and presented fewer fabrication problems.

In early November, Groves endeavored to reach a workable solution as

to the direction barrier development

should proceed. After listening to arguments from Urey and the Columbia

scientists in support of the latest barrier they had devised and to Keith

and the Kellex group concerning the

advantages of their improved powdered nickel barrier, Groves decided

that the most feasible policy was to

continue work on both types, the

Kellex barrier providing insurance

against the possible failure of the Columbia barrier. Predictably, this compromise was unpopular with both

sides. Urey, in particular, who from

the start had resented the diversion of

effort from his own project to the

Kellex group to accelerate barrier development, saw it as further indication of Groves's intention to exclude

Columbia from all useful work on the

atomic project, and he reminded the

Manhattan commander that he had already transferred both the pile experiments and the heavy water research from Morningside Heights to

Chicago.

Contributing to Urey's harsh judgment of the intent of Groves's action

was his awareness of the discouragement felt by many of those working

on the barrier problem. In fact, by

the end of 1943, morale had plummeted to a very low point. Not the

least of the factors causing this prevailing pessimism was adverse criticism of the Columbia-Kellex plant

design by some members of the British delegation of scientists assigned to

the atomic project. The British expressed decided preference for the

cascade-of-cascades design of their

own plant, arguing that the single cas-
156 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

cade design of the American plant

would not eliminate the "surges"—

sudden, sharp variations in gas pressure—that might well make the Tennessee plant inoperable. While also

stating a preference for Kellex's improved powdered nickel barrier over

Columbia's, the British considered

even the Kellex barrier to be far from

perfected. Finally, too, the visiting scientists indicated great skepticism that

Kellex would have the production

plant in operation by the projected

date, 1 July 1945. Groves sharply disagreed with the British on this last

point, holding that, if Kellex was reasonably certain the plant would be

operating by that date, it probably

would be in production even sooner.

Keith and his Kellex colleagues particularly resented the visit of the British scientists. In January 1944, the

Kellex chief asserted that the British

had set progress back a month because of time spent answering questions and assisting them in making

studies, many duplicating studies

made by his own engineers months

earlier. At the same time, he complained to the New York area engineer that Groves appeared to be

avoiding a decision on the barrier

question and also seemed to be trying

to push back the plant completion

date. Colonel Stowers wrote hurriedly

to General Groves, expressing anxiety

at the alarming decline of enthusiasm

he noted in the normally ebullient

and confident Kellex chief.

But much of the gloom prevailing

at Kellex and Columbia was dispelled

by developments in the early months

of 1944. On 16 January, Groves met

with representatives of Kellex, Carbide and Carbon, SAM Laboratories,

and the Houdaille-Hershey Corporation to discuss progress on the barrier. The group convened at Decatur,

Illinois, where Houdaille-Hershey was

building a new plant for the manufacture of barriers of the Norris-Adler

type. At the conclusion of the meeting Groves announced that the Decatur plant would be converted immediately so that it could produce Kellex's

improved powdered nickel barrier,

because it was considerably easier to

fabricate and manufacture than the

Norris-Adler. Fortunately, a lot of

precious production time was not lost

during the conversion process. Most

of the equipment and many of the

procedures for producing the NorrisAdler barrier were readily adapted for

producing the Kellex type.

An important factor in Groves's decision to go ahead with mass production of the Kellex barrier was his

knowledge of the International Nickel

Company's successful production of a

high-quality powdered nickel, thus

providing a ready source of the type

of nickel out of which the Kellex barrier could be best fabricated. In what

proved to be a most fortuitous move,

the Manhattan commander had directed Colonel Nichols in the spring

of 1943 to have the company build facilities for the manufacture of barrier

material. And because of this early

start, company technicians by early

1944 had developed a process for

producing powdered nickel of a type

and quality especially suitable for fabricating the Kellex barrier. In fact, by

April, the firm had accumulated in its

storage facility some 80 tons, more

than enough for immediate shipment

to the diffusion pilot plants in New

York.
THE GASEOUS DIFFUSION PROCESS 157

Meanwhile, barrier developments at

Columbia also provided more reason

for optimism. Pilot Plant No. 2 had

begun turning out sizable amounts of

a good-quality Norris-Adler barrier.

Thus, before receipt of the District's

orders in April to convert No. 2 to

manufacture Kellex's improved powdered nickel barrier, Columbia scientists had the satisfaction of being the

first to achieve quantity production of

their material.

Pilot plant testing and production

of barrier materials continued apace

into the summer of 1944. While providing the first opportunity to ascertain the separation qualities of the

Kellex barrier under conditions simulating large-scale plant operations,

these pilot plant tests demonstrated

the need for more improvements.

But, at this juncture, with the continuing lack of barrier components

threatening to hold up further

progress in design and construction

of the main diffusion plant at the

Clinton site, Manhattan Project leaders knew the time for experimentation

was at an end. They now felt the urgency of directing all of their efforts

to expediting Houdaille-Hershey's

mass production of the less than ideal

Kellex barrier in sufficient quantity to

equip each of the thousands of stages

of the Tennessee plant.

Plant Design

In the early stages of planning, everyone had assumed that the objective was to design and build a gaseous

diffusion plant capable of producing

a 90-percent-enriched product. But

data that became available to the

design teams from ongoing research

and pilot plant studies indicated that

considerable time in design and engineering would be saved if the cascade

equipment were limited to that producing a product of lower enrichment. Theoretically, a cascade constructed with tubular barriers would

be efficient up to the point of a 36.6-

percent concentration; for higher

product enrichment, quite differently

designed barriers would be necessary.

Furthermore, the plant designers

soon discovered that, because of the

greater capacities required, the centrifugal pumps under development

for the lower stages could not be

used above the 36.6-percent level. In

other respects, too—for instance, increased likelihood of critical product

accumulation—the design of the

upper stages presented special

problems.

General Groves, as early as February 1943, cited an alternative solution

that would save much time and

seemed certain to work: Why not take

the output from the lower stages of

the gaseous diffusion plant and feed

them into the Beta phase of the electromagnetic plant? By mid-year, electromagnetic plant construction was

going so well that this solution

seemed all the more feasible. Groves

therefore asked Kellex to submit estimated completion dates for 5-, 15-,

36.6-, and 90-percent plants. On the

basis of these estimates, he then instructed Keith and the Kellex design

teams to draw up plans for a 36.6-

percent plant. Meanwhile, research on

the upper stages continued on a reduced scale.

As a consequence, by late 1943,

project design was making substantial

progress in most directions. The

knottier aspects of pump design and
158 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

procurement appeared to be solved;

soon, the Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company and several smaller

firms would be able to satify all of the

District's requests for pumps in whatever quantities needed. Also, the

pump seal problem appeared to be

well on the way to solution.9

Although lack of a really suitable

barrier had prevented development of

adequate equipment for testing the

diffusion operation on something approaching production plant scale, it

had not held up completion of Kellex

designs for the overall plant. These

designs projected as the main gaseous

diffusion production unit a cascade of

2,892 stages, connected in a single

series. Ideally, Kellex engineers might

have incorporated into the plant

design a requirement for a converter

and pumps of slightly smaller size at

each successive stage in the cascade.

Because this, however, would have resulted in extremely complicated and

costly manufacturing and installation

problems, they compromised. They

provided for five different-sized

pumps and four different-sized converters, thus dividing the whole cascade into nine variably pressurized

sections. The sections normally would

function as a single cascade, although

each could be operated individually.

Within each section the smallest operable unit was the cell, containing 6

stages enclosed in a sheet metal cubicle that would be supplied with dry

air and kept heated to a uniform

temperature.10

Design of the cascade unquestionably constituted the single most important and difficult feature of the

gaseous diffusion production plant.

But for the Kellex engineers it was

only a small part of the job. Working

in cooperation with numerous equipment and supply contractors, they

also had to prepare blueprints and

specifications for a vast array of support and control facilities. Cascade

operation, for example, required

purge cascades, process gas recovery,

surge and waste, and product removal

systems, as well as a large number of

instruments for maintaining a constant check on all conditions throughout the plant. Plant instrumentation

had to be extremely reliable, for even

slight variations in such factors as

pressure or temperature could

produce adverse effects.

To house the main cascade and its

auxiliary facilities, Kellex engineers

designed a huge structure of fifty-four

contiguous units, or buildings, arranged in a gigantic U-shaped pattern more than half a mile long on

each side and a quarter of a mile

wide. They laid out the interior of

these buildings on four different

levels: a basement housing lubricating

and cooling equipment, ventilating

fans and ducts, and transformers and

electrical switchgear; a cell floor containing the steel-encased cells lined

up in two parallel rows extending the

length of a building; a pipe gallery

carrying the main process lines and

numerous auxiliary lines; and an op9

 Min, Coordination Committee Mtg, 13 Feb 43,

and Ltrs, S. B. Smith (Kellex) to Stowers, 7 Sep 43,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 337 (Univ of Calif) and

(Kellex), respectively, MDR; Ltr, Oppenheimer to

Nichols, 1 Jul 43, and Memo, Arnold and Dunning

to Keith, sub: The Diffusion Plant, 28 Apr 43,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Projs and

Prgms: K-25), MDR; MDH, Bk. 2, Vol. 2, pp. 5.1-

5.28, and Vol. 3, pp. 7.1-7.3 and 8.12-8.14, DASA.

10

 MDH, Bk. 2, Vol. 3, Secs. 8 and 9, DASA; Completion Rpt, Kellex Corp., sub: K-25 Plant, 31 Oct

45, pp. 5(revised)-8, OROO.
THE GASEOUS DIFFUSION PROCESS 159

erating floor, the location of most of

the control devices and meters for

cascade operation. At the operating

floor level they placed a central control room at the base of the U, with

instruments to keep track of the

whole process and remote controls

for all motorized valves.

After completion of the cascade

design for the plant at the Clinton

Engineer Works (CEW), most of the

research and development teams at

Columbia and Kellex, and elsewhere,

turned their primary energies to engineering and testing equipment and

support facilities. With Groves's permission, however, a few SAM and

Kellex researchers and engineers continued work on developing diffusion

equipment that could achieve a

higher product enrichment. In support of this investigation, in late

summer of 1944 Kellex placed a 10-

stage pilot plant in operation. By midJanuary 1945, Kellex was ready to

begin engineering and procurement

for an extension to the upper stages

of the K-25 plant that would bring

the level of its product to an enrichment of approximately 85 percent.

Groves authorized Kellex to proceed,

but canceled the extension when data

showed a greater product output

could be achieved by increasing the

amount of uranium of a lower percentage of enrichment for feeding

into the electromagnetic plant. To

achieve this goal, Groves directed

Kellex to design and engineer a 540-

stage side-feed unit (later designated

K-27) in which the waste output from

the main K-25 cascade could be combined with natural uranium to

produce a slightly enriched product.

By feeding the K-27 output into the

higher stages of K-25, plant designers

estimated the total production of

U-235 could be increased by 35 to

60 percent. Kellex hoped to get the

K-27 extension into operation early in

1946.11

Building the Gaseous Diffusion Plant

The Tennessee site for the gaseous

diffusion plant consisted of a tract of

5,000 acres in the northwest corner of

the CEW reservation, approximately

15 miles southwest of the town of

Oak Ridge.12 (See Map 3.) Enclosed

11

 Dist Engr, Monthly Rpts on DSM Proj, MarApr 45 to Mar 46, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP

Files, Fldr 28, Tab A, MDR; MDH, Bk. 2, Vol. 3,

Sec. 14, DASA; Completion Rpt, M. W. Kellogg Co.

and Kellex Corp., sub: K-27 Extension, 31 Jan 46,

p. 3 (revised), OROO. 12

 Subsection based on Completion Rpt, Kellex

Corp., sub: K-25 Plant, 31 Oct 45, pp. 4, 8-10, 14-

28, 30-31, 33 (revised), and maps following p. 40,

OROO; MDH, Bk. 2, Vol. 4, pp. 2.6-2.7, 3.3-3.9,

3.46-3.51, 3.73-3.75, 5.1-5.4, 7.1, and Apps. C1

(Chart, Actual K-25 Constr Progress), C7 (Chart,

Process Area Constr Progress), C16 (Org Chart),

C25 (Chart, Daily K-25 Constr Forces), and Vol. 5,

"Operation," pp. 6.3-6.4, DASA; Memo, Dunning

to Felbeck, Baker, and Keith, sub: Importance of

Low Humidity at K-25 Plant Site, 17 Apr 43, MDR;

Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 12 and 116-17;

Completion Rpt, Kellex Corp., sub: K-27 Extension,

31 Jan 46, p. 21 (p. 2 of attached cost statement),

OROO; Dist Engr, Monthly Rpts on DSM Proj,

1 Jul-9 Aug and Sep 43, Apr, Jun, Aug and Oct 44,

and Mar and Sep 45, MDR; Org Charts, U.S. Engrs

Office, MD, 15 Aug and 1 Nov 43, and 15 Feb 44,

MDR; Maj William T. St. Clair (MD officer who

monitored K-25 plant construction), Daily Diary,

9 Nov 43-13 Sep 45, passim, Kellex Records, Box

748, OROO; Draft Article, Maj Gen Leslie R. Groves,

"Development of the Atomic Bomb," Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 000.74 (Mil Engr), MDR; Ltrs, Keith

to Stowers, 6 Oct 44, Stowers to Dist Engr, sub:

Change of Estimate Opn Date of Case I, 10 Oct 44,

and Groves to Dist Engr, 1 Nov 44, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Projs and Prgms: K-25),

MDR; Ltr, Tolman to Groves, sub: Status of Case V,

1 Feb 45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Rpts),

MDR.
160 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

on the north, south, and east by thickly wooded ridges and on the west by

the Clinch River, the site had few

roads, no railroads (although a main

line was located a few miles to the

north), and only one substantial structure (a country schoolhouse). Project

engineers would have preferred a different location, especially one with

lower average humidity; however, because the land at Clinton had been

available for immediate purchase in

early 1943, Manhattan leaders did not

perceive the engineers' concern as

critical as their own desire to get

plant construction under way. Furthermore, they felt that the site satisfied other major requirements. It had

a readily available water supply and a

relatively level area of about 1,000

acres for the plant facilities, and its

location was distant from the other

production plants and the densely

populated areas.

Under terms of the prime contract

with M. W. Kellogg, Kellex was to not

only design and engineer the K-25

plant but also supervise its construction, using its own large field forces

plus numerous contractors and subcontractors. The prime construction

contractor was the J. A. Jones Construction Company of Charlotte,

North Carolina, whose reputation on

other Army projects had impressed

Groves. Typical of the more than

sixty subcontractors were the D. W.

Winkleman Company for grading and

drainage of the site, the Bethlehem

Steel Corporation for steel work, and

the Interstate Roofing Company for

installation of heating and ventilating

systems.

Wherever possible, Kellex delegated to Jones and the other contractors

specific procurement of equipment

and supplies needed in construction.

Similarly, it contracted out thousands

of orders for process and auxiliary

equipment. Major equipment manufacturers were Allis-Chalmers for centrifugal pumps and motors of all

kinds; the Chrysler Corporation for

converters; and Houdaille-Hershey,

Linde Air Products, and Bakelite for

barrier material. Some of these

firms—for example, Allis-Chalmers,

Chrysler, and Houdaille-Hershey—

had to build entirely new plants or

undertake extensive conversion of existing facilities.

Through its rapidly expanding

Manhattan District organization, the

Army monitored and reviewed the

many hundreds of agreements negotiated by Kellex, Jones, and other firms

in late 1943. During the first few

months of relatively limited operations at the building site, District Engineer Nichols exercised control over

the project through the New York

Area Engineers Office, whose staff

maintained constant contact with the

Kellex and Columbia University

groups, and through the CEW Construction Division. But rapid expansion of construction and procurement

activities eventually compelled Colonel Nichols to reorganize his Tennessee headquarters staff, establishing

construction and operations divisions

for each major production project. In

his capacity as the K-25 unit chief,

and in keeping with normal Corps of

Engineers practice, Colonel Stowers

organized the new K-25 Construction

Division to parallel the organizational

structure set up by the principal construction contractors—Unit I for the

power plant, Unit II for the conditioning facilities, and Unit III for the
THE GASEOUS DIFFUSION PROCESS 161

the process plant—and assigned Maj.

William P. Cornelius as division

chief.13

Actual construction started on the

day after Memorial Day 1943, when a

survey party began laying out the

power plant site at an area adjacent to

the east bank of the Clinch River.

Two months later grading began in

the area for the conditioning facilities—a large structure to house the

treatment apparatus for coating process equipment with fluorine gas, thus

providing protection against the extremely corrosive action of the uranium hexafluoride process gas, and a

number of smaller buildings for the

generation and storage of fluorine,

production of gaseous nitrogen, and

neutralization. To ensure these facilities would be ready in time so that

K-25 workers could treat the process

equipment before installation in the

main production plant, Kellex and

District authorities decided to engage

a second major construction contractor—the firm of Ford, Bacon, and

Davis—to build them.

Ground preparation on the main

plant site did not start until 20 October 1943. Although relatively level by

comparison with the surrounding terrain, the site was broken into ridges

and valleys that required cuts up to

50 feet and fills averaging 25 feet.

The great weight of the buildings that

would house the cascade and its complicated, interconnected equipment

made exceptionally stable foundations

necessary. Ordinarily, such foundations would have been carried down

to bedrock, a procedure that would

have required thousands of concrete

columns of different lengths. But, to

save time, Kellex used the then novel

method of compacted fill. Foundation

workers put down earth in 6-inch

layers, constantly checking in a field

laboratory for proper moisture content and soil mixture. Then they compacted the fill with sheepsfoot rollers

to a density slightly greater than that

of undisturbed soil.14 Next they

poured the foundation footings directly on top of the undisturbed earth

in the cut sections and on the compacted fill in the filled-in sections. In

spite of the abnormally rainy weather

in the fall of 1943, the K-25 workers'

use of innovative construction techniques enabled them to complete

laying down the foundations far more

quickly than would have been possible with more traditional methods.

Kellex engineers also employed

other time-saving methods, consistent

with their basic goal of completing

the production plant as rapidly as

possible. Thus, wherever feasible,

they overlapped activities normally

carried out separately. The day grading began, J. A. Jones crews also

poured concrete for the first building.

And, as soon as the foundations had

hardened, crews moved in heavy

gooseneck cranes (the foundations

had been deliberately designed to

carry their weight) and began lifting

the structural steel frames of buildings into place.

13

 The conditioning area was comprised of facilities for preparing process equipment for installation

in the process buildings. See Ch. XVIII for a fuller

description of the design and construction of the

K-25 power plant.

14

 Used to compact clay soil, a sheepsfoot roller is

a towed roller with a large number of 4-inch-long

steel bars welded radially to the surface of the roller

drum. See Dictionary of Civil Engineering, s.v. "sheepsfoot roller."
162 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT CEW

Another objective of Kellex's

speedup techniques was to get some

sections of the huge plant into operation as soon as possible. The firm's

initial construction schedule, adopted

in August 1943, provided for, first,

completing one cell for testing;

second, finishing one building as a

so-called 54-stage pilot plant; and

third, completing enough of the plant

to produce an enriched product containing 0.9 percent U-235. The

schedule designated this first production section, Case I. Three additional

cases, with outputs of 5-, 15-, and 36-

percent product enrichment,15 would

be finished as of 1 June, 15 July, and

23 August 1945, respectively. As construction progressed, Kellex engineers revised the original schedule to

conform to changing conditions.

Thus, the schedule of August 1944

called for completion in 1945 of Case

I (0.9 percent) on 1 January, Case II

(5 percent) on 10 June, Case III (15

percent) on 1 August, Case IV (23

percent) on 13 September, and a new

Case V (36 percent) as soon as possible thereafter.

To ensure adherence to this highly

complex and, in many respects unorthodox construction schedule, Kellex 15

 In their projections of estimated output the

Kellex design engineers reduced the original 36.6-

percent level of product enrichment to 36 percent.

See Completion Rpt, Kellex Corp., sub: K-25 Plant,

p. 3, OROO.
THE GASEOUS DIFFUSION PROCESS 163

K-25 STEEL-FRAME CONSTRUCTION

adopted a variety of rigid control

measures. Typical were the two complete and identical charts the firm

maintained, one in its New York

office and the other at the construction site, on which it recorded the

current manufacturing and delivery

status of the hundreds of thousands

of items required for building the

plant.

There were times, however, when

labor shortages, especially in the

skilled categories, were acute. The

contractors endeavored to overcome

some of the shortages by on-the-job

training and simplifying construction

tasks wherever possible. Fortunately,

too, because each stage of the plant

was comprised of similar basic components, construction crews gained

skill and speed from the repetitiveness of their work. With the Army's

support, J. A. Jones and Ford, Bacon,

and Davis also sought to improve

living conditions and undertook other

ameliorative steps for their workers,

which reduced labor turnover and

limited work stoppages to about 0.1

percent of total man-hours.16

One unusual feature of the construction work on the K-25 plant was

the exceptionally stringent emphasis

16

 See Chs. XVI and XVII for a more detailed discussion of manpower problems. See Ch. XXI for a

description of efforts to improve living conditions

for K-25 construction employees.
164 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

on cleanliness. Because even minute

amounts of foreign matter would have

highly deleterious effects on process

operations, construction workers had

to cleanse all pipes, valves, pumps,

converters, and other items of equipment thoroughly before installation.

Workmen in a special unit performed

this vast operation in the large conditioning building, using equipment for

solvent degreasing, alkaline cleaning,

acid pickling, scratch brushing, surface passivation, and a variety of

other procedures. When they finished, they sealed all openings to interior surfaces and kept them sealed

until installation teams put the equipment into place.

To make certain no dust or other

foreign matter polluted the system

during installation, J. A. Jones instituted a rigid schedule of surgical

cleanliness in installation areas. Isolating these areas with temporary partitions, the workers installed pressure

ventilation, using filtered air. Then

they cleaned the areas thoroughly,

and inspectors carefully checked all

personnel and material that entered

them. Maintenance crews with mops

and vacuum cleaners continued to

remove any foreign substances that

seeped in. When trucks had to enter,

workers hosed them down at the

entrances.

Workers wore special clothes and

lintless gloves. Because certain work

on equipment to be used in plant installations could not be done in the

dirt-free areas, such as welding pipes

and other small jobs, J. A. Jones installed special inflatable canvas balloons and the work was done inside

them. The cleanliness control measures required many additional guards,

inspectors, and supervisors, but they

did not appreciably slow down the

work. In fact, in some ways the good

housekeeping actually facilitated the

progress of construction.

Even more painstaking was the installation of more than 100 miles of

pipe without flanged joints, and with

welds that had to meet tightness specifications more severe than any ever

encountered before in commercial

construction. Pipe-fitting crews developed fourteen special welding techniques. Individual welders then learned the techniques, each specializing in

those required for a particular type of

installation. At the height of construction, there were some twelve hundred

welding machines in use. All of the

work required rigid control and tedious inspection to ensure joints were

tight and no internal scale formed

that might later find its way into the

process system

At last, on 17 April 1944, the first

6-stage cell of the main plant was

ready for test runs. Brief trial operations of this unit continued in May.

During the summer months, as construction crews finished additional

stages, technicians put them through

trial runs. Although barrier tubes

were not available (installation of the

first did not begin until fall of 1944),

these tests permitted assembly of valuable data concerning performance of

other plant components and detection

of mechanical defects, such as leaks

and sealant failures. Approximately

two months behind schedule, equipment contractor workmen completed

Case I (402 stages) to the point where

processing of feed material could

begin, but at least another month

passed before the unit attained the

0.9-percent level. The other cases
THE GASEOUS DIFFUSION PROCESS 165

were completed either on time or

ahead of schedule. Kellex and J. A.

Jones transferred the last K-25 plant

unit to Carbide and Carbon, the operating contractor, on 11 September

1945. Total construction cost, including the 540-stage side-feed extension

(K-27) unit completed after the war,

was $479,589,999.

Plant Operation

In late 1942, when the atomic

project leaders were considering potential operators for the gaseous diffusion plant, Kellex's Percival Keith

expressed a strong preference for the

Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation.17

 In this leading chemical firm

Keith saw a versatile organization

with skilled personnel who would be

able to not only operate the complex

diffusion production process but also

provide design, engineering, and construction assistance to hard-pressed

Kellex engineers. Satisfied with

Keith's opinion, Groves directed Manhattan representatives to commence

negotiations with Union Carbide officials. Finally, in January 1943, Union

Carbide agreed to become the prime

operating contractor—but through its

subsidiary, the Carbide and Carbon

Chemicals Corporation—and selected

one of its vice presidents, physical

chemist and engineer George T. Felbeck, as project manager in charge of

K-25 operations.

In the letter contract with Carbide

and Carbon, Keith made certain that

there was a provision for Kellex to

obtain help in plant construction.

Later modifications in the formal contract, signed in November 1943, extended the operating contractor's

area of responsibility to include coordination of barrier research and development, construction and operation of a plant for producing nickel

powder, conversion of Bakelite facilities to produce special barrier material, and assumption in February 1945

of the SAM Laboratories research

program, hitherto operated by Columbia University.

Under terms of the prime contract,

Carbide and Carbon was to receive an

operator's fee of $75,000 per month

for full plant operation, and additional payments as warranted. Although it

would shoulder principal responsibility for production activities, it did not

agree—as did Du Pont with the

plutonium plant and the Tennessee

Eastman Corporation with the electromagnetic plant—to serve as sole

operator of the gaseous diffusion

plant. Carbide officials did not want

responsibility for conditioning the

process equipment against the corrosive nature of the uranium hexafluoride process gas, nor did they want the

potentially hazardous task of manu17

 Subsection based on DSM Chronology, 12 Dec

42, Sec. 4, OROO; Hewlett and Anderson, New

World, pp. 120-22, 298-302, 374, 624-25; Dist

Engr, Monthly Rpts on DSM Proj, Dec 44 and JanSep 45, MDR; MDH, Bk. 2, Vol. 1, "General Features," pp. 4.6 and 5.7, Vol. 2, pp. 2.2-2.3, and Vol.

5, pp. 2.1-2.7, 3.1-3.6, 4.3-4.4, 8.1-8.16 (especially

table following 8.3), 10.1-10.5, 12.1-12.2, and

Apps. Bl (Chart, K-25 Vacuum Testing Opns and

Progress), B22 (Org Chart, Ford, Bacon, and Davis,

31 Mar 44), F2 (Key Personnel, Carbide and

Carbon), DASA; Smyth Report, p. 133; Org Charts,

U.S. Engrs Office, MD, 15 Feb 44, 1 Jun 44, 28 Aug

44, 10 Nov 44, 26 Jan 45, MDR; Memo for File, Maj

Wilbur E. Kelley (Y-12 Opns Div chief), 23 Sep 44,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Projs and

Prgms: K-25), MDR; Completion Rpt, Kellex Corp.,

sub: K-25 Plant, p. 3, OROO; Memo for File, Brig

Gen Thomas F. Farrell (Groves's Dep), sub: Jul 12th

Confs in New York, N.Y., 13 Jun 45, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 337 (LC), MDR.
166 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

facturing the volatile fluorine gas

used for conditioning.

As an alternative, District officials

had arranged with Chrysler, already

under contract for manufacturing the

converter component of the diffusion

system, to do the conditioning. But

when Kellex and Army authorities

came to working out details of the

equipment contract with the automobile firm, they learned that it lacked

the necessary facilities for fluorine

conditioning in its Detroit plant. Following months of delay, Manhattan

and Carbide officials resolved the

problem in November 1943. Based on

recommendations by Union Carbide,

Carbon and Carbide officials temporarily assigned responsibility for operating the conditioning facilities to the

building contractor, Ford, Bacon, and

Davis, and building and operating responsibility for the fluorine production facilities to the Hooker Electrochemical Company. Up until early

1945, when Carbide and Carbon assumed full operational control of

these facilities, this arrangement permitted the prime operating contractor

to concentrate its efforts on the process and power plants.

Preparations

During 1943, with gaseous diffusion plant production activities on a

limited scale, the Manhattan District

monitored the work of the several operating contractors through its K-25

Construction Division. When operations began to expand rapidly in early

1944, the district engineer established

a K-25 Operations Division, headed

by Maj. John J. Moran (Chart 3).

For months Moran's division functioned with only eight officers and

five civil service employees. Then as

the main diffusion plant became operational in 1945, the division acquired

some additional personnel and, by

the fall of that year, was operating

with fourteen officers, nine enlisted

men, and twenty civil service employees. But this was a relatively small

staff to oversee the multifarious activities of a production plant that at the

peak of its operations employed more

than eleven thousand workers. It

proved adequate, however, because

Colonel Stowers, the K-25 unit chief,

employed the staff of the New York

Area Engineers Office, which he also

continued to head, to assume a considerable part of the load of maintaining liaison among the major companies involved in gaseous diffusion

operations.

In the spring of 1944, about the

time construction crews were completing the first cell in the main process building, Carbide and Carbon

began setting up its production organization at the plant site. The firm

had been recruiting personnel for an

operating force since late 1943, but

with only limited success. And because recruitment difficulties also extended to supervisory and technical

positions, the district engineer eventually had to augment the K-25

technical staff with skilled personnel

from the District's Special Engineer

Detachment.18

18

 On specific problems in recruitment of supervisory and technical personnel see Memo, Stowers to

Marshall, sub: K-25 Proj Requirements, 21 Jan 43,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Projs and

Prgms: K-25), MDR; MDH, Bk. 2, Vol. 5, pp. 2.1-

2.4, DASA.

THE GASEOUS DIFFUSION PROCESS 167

As newly recruited workers reported in, Carbide and Carbon made

preparations for their orientation and

training. By October 1944, a sufficient number of instructors and trainees were on hand to establish an operations training center in a building

formerly occupied by the local public

school. At the start, the center's curriculum consisted of two major courses: process training and vacuum test

training. Later, courses were added

for process maintenance men and instrument mechanics. In the beginning, only men were enrolled, but the

continuing shortage of workers compelled Carbide and Carbon to recruit

a large number of women as process

operators. After employees had received more than eighty hours of

formal classroom training, they underwent a period of on-the-job training before final assignment to an operating position.

In August 1944, some new workers

had the opportunity to acquire practical experience on the operation of the

54-stage pilot plant, an experimental

unit located at the base of the U in the

main process building. The barrier

tubes were not yet available, so the

cell stages were fitted with steel orifices instead of converters. This

meant, of course, that no isotope separation could occur. But, using either

nitrogen or "test fluid,"

 19

 the operator trainees simulated actual plant operations and plant managers were

able to develop operating techniques,

provide realistic training for foremen

and key operators, and test performance of seals, pumps, and valves. In

January 1945, Carbide moved all

training activities from outlying buildings to the 54-stage pilot plant.

Production Activities

By the end of 1944, J. A. Jones

construction crews were ready to turn

over the first 60 of the 402 stages of

Case I—the first major section of the

production plant. Jones employees

tested pumps, instruments, and other

equipment for operability in the presence of Carbide and Carbon representatives, noting in an acceptance

report all deficiencies that would require adjustment, repair, or replacement. Witnesses from both firms then

had to approve the report before a

completed plant section could be

turned over to the operating staff for

another series of tests preliminary to

actual production.

A typical preoperation test was to

make certain no leaks existed in the

process system, because the separation process would operate effectively

only under conditions approaching an

absolute vacuum, with an infinitesimally small pressure buildup. SAM

Laboratories vacuum technicians and

Carbide and Carbon employees, all

specially instructed in detecting leaks,

worked together to carry out the delicate preoperation test. The test teams

pumped down the process equipment

19

 "Test fluid," the chemical compound n-perfluoroheptane (C7F16) project chemists had developed for process building test runs, was a nonhydrogenous gaseous material with characteristics

similar to the process gas, uranium hexafluoride,

except that it was noncorrosive. During test operations in the first three buildings, however, C7F16

exhibited a number of technical deficiencies. Consequently, in February 1945, project chemists decided

to discard it in favor of using the process gas in

final test runs, realizing that the latter—although

highly corrosive—would provide the same test information with a considerable savings in both time and

labor. See MDH, Bk. 2, Vol. 5, pp. 3.4-3.5, DASA.
168 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

COMPLETED PLANT SECTION with corrugated steel sheathing

to a high vacuum and then played a

stream of helium water over every

welded joint, instrument, and valve. If

there were leaks, helium would enter

the system, where a mass spectrometer would detect it. Some four hundred to six hundred test personnel ultimately had to devote about eight

months to complete a check of the

whole gaseous diffusion plant.

As soon as a unit, or building, successfully passed the leak-test requirements, plant operators prepared it for

a test run with regular process gas.

Before they could do this, however,

they had to make a thorough check

and calibration of all instruments and

carry out final conditioning of equipment. The 130,000 instruments in the

main process area—probably up to

that time the largest number ever installed in a single production plant—

included many that were of special

design and development and some

that (for example, the mass spectrometers) were extremely delicate and

complicated. Many, too, never before

had been used routinely in a commercial-scale plant. Consequently, months

of painstaking testing, calibrating, and

checking were necessary before the

final steps to put the plant into

operation.

Units in the production plant cascade began operating for the first

time on regular process gas in February 1945, testing procedures that subsequently were employed throughout

the plant. The initial step was vaporization of the feed material—solid uranium hexafluoride from the Harshaw

Chemical Company in Cleveland—by
THE GASEOUS DIFFUSION PROCESS 169

subjecting it to a series of hot baths

to convert it into a gas. The feed material then entered the process stream

in its gaseous form at any convenient

feed intake point and flowed through

the cascade of enriching stages.

Emerging from these stages, the process gas went through a stripping section that carried depleted gas from

the higher enrichment stages back to

the lower part of the cascade for

recirculation.

By early March, construction crews

had completed sufficient additional

cells to permit start-up of a two-building cascade. Unfortunately, on the

ninth, as the actual start-up procedure

began, nitrogen flooded the twobuilding cascade, because a worker

had failed to close a valve in a bypass

line. But quick purging action by

plant crews soon cleared the system

and, by the twelfth, they not only had

the two-building cascade in partial

production but also had connected

two more buildings to the system. On

the twenty-fourth, the whole of Case I

went on stream. In the months following, Cases II through IV were finished at the rate of a case per month,

until in mid-August the full plant cascade of 2,892 stages was in operation.

From the start, production results

were much better than anticipated,

despite occasional minor interruptions because of equipment failures

and operational errors.20 By May

1945, Cases I and II were turning

out a product containing 1 percent

U-235. In the following month, using

slightly enriched material from the

liquid thermal diffusion plant as feed,

operators drew off some product containing nearly 7 percent U-235. After

the full plant cascade went on stream,

product concentration increased to 23

percent. During the fall, the plant

demonstrated a productive capacity

far higher than its designers had predicted. Contributing to this increased

rate of output was a cell stream efficiency and barrier performance greater than expected.

In early 1945, the District's Production Control Committee, appointed

earlier by Colonel Nichols to coordinate production by the diffusion processes and the electromagnetic process, had worked out a plan to achieve

the maximum feasible output of

U-235. Based upon a careful analysis

of each process, the committee directed that K-25 would not be brought

into the production chain until it

demonstrated a capability of producing a product enrichment of 1.1 percent. The K-25 plant attained the 1.1-

percent level in April, and project

workers began sending the output to

the electromagnetic plant for final enrichment. At the same time, thermal

diffusion plant workers who had been

sending the plant's output to the relatively inefficient Alpha I stage of the

electromagnetic plant now began delivering the entire product output to

K-25. Thus, the gaseous diffusion

process became an integral part of

the U-235 production chain and,

during the spring and summer of

1945, contributed substantially to

the manufacture of the fissionable

material used in the fabrication of

atomic weapons at the Los Alamos

Laboratory.

The Army's success in bringing the

vast and complex gaseous diffusion

20

 For a detailed listing of these interruptions

during the period of getting the K-25 plant into full

operation in the spring and summer of 1945 see

ibid., pp. 8.4-8.7, DASA.
170 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

COMPLETED GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT. The K-27 extension unit subsequently was

erected adjacent to Poplar Creek, at the upper right.

plant into full-scale production was to

a considerable extent due to its

having formed in the union of Kellex

and Carbide and Carbon an effective

organization with the requisite resources, industrial knowledge, and

skilled personnel. Fortunately, during

most of the 1943-45 period when

first the K-25 plant and then its K-27

extension were being brought from

the draftsman's table to fully operating production units, the various

Kellex-Carbide elements functioned

together surprisingly smoothly and efficiently considering the unrelenting

pressure of time and the frustrations

created by all kinds of wartime shortages in material and manpower.

Inevitably, however, there were occasional misunderstandings and personality conflicts that threatened to

disrupt the teamwork of the organization. One such incident occurred in

June 1945, when Kellex was phasing

out participation in the project and

leaving primary responsibility for

plant operation to Carbide and

Carbon. At this time, a dispute arose

over the role of Kellex's strongminded executive in charge, Percival

Keith. The problem seemed to be

that Carbide officials thought Keith

was no longer devoting as much time

to gaseous diffusion as he should,

whereas Keith felt that he should be

the judge of how much of his time

should be spent on the project. After

exceptional effort on the part of General Groves and his staff, Keith yielded to persuasion and agreed to stay
THE GASEOUS DIFFUSION PROCESS 171

on in an advisory capacity to assist

Carbide and Carbon in operating the

production plant.

Considered in terms of its ultimate

production capabilities, the gaseous

diffusion plant did not attain a significant level of output until the fall of

1945. after World War II had ended.

This was not the result of poor planning or a failure to fulfill, in the main,

established construction and production schedules. Rather it stemmed

from the fact that when Groves and

the other leaders of the atomic energy

program were working out the plans

for the plant in 1943, the consensus

of opinion was that the war against

Japan would last at least until mid1946. Had this been the case, the

K-25 plant would have attained the

level of maximum output at the time

when U-235 would be needed in

large quantities for the weapons fabrication program. Events, of course, did

not unfold quite as the atomic project

planners had anticipated, and the war

ended in August 1945. Consequently, full-scale operation of K-25 and its

K-27 extension constitutes an episode

in the immediate postwar history of

the Manhattan Project rather than its

wartime aspect. In this postwar period,

the great industrial complex so hurriedly designed, erected, and placed in

operation, employing largely inexperienced personnel working under far

from favorable conditions, demonstrated that it was the most efficient

and productive of all the process

plants built to manufacture U-235.

Shortly after the war was over, the

Manhattan District shut down the

liquid thermal diffusion plant and the

Alpha units of the electromagnetic

plant. But the gaseous diffusion plant

continued in operation as the basic

source of U-235 for the entire atomic

project. And in the postwar era, the

great plant at the bend of the Clinch

River became the prototype for new

facilities built elsewhere in the United

States to increase output of U-235,

and also for the production units built

in other countries to manufacture fissionable uranium for atomic energy

programs.21

21

 See Ch. XXVIII on the closing down of the

liquid thermal diffusion plant and the Alpha units of

the electromagnetic plant.
CHAPTER VIII

The Liquid Thermal Diffusion

Process

Leaders of the atomic energy program had decided against large-scale

development of the liquid thermal

diffusion process in early 1943, partly

because they judged the process infeasible and partly because transfer of

a Navy project to the Army-directed

Manhattan Project was likely to result

in major administrative and security

problems. By the spring of 1944,

however, significant progress in thermal diffusion research—coupled with

the threat of not reaching the requisite production level of fissionable

uranium because of delays in getting

the electromagnetic and gaseous diffusion plants into full operation—

opened the way for serious reconsideration of this method as a means for

providing a supplementary supply of

partially enriched material for the Los

Alamos Laboratory weapon program.

Research and Development:

The Role of the Navy

One advantage of the liquid thermal diffusion method of separating

isotopes was its relative simplicity.

When a liquid containing isotopes of

a given element is placed in the annular space between two vertical concentric receptacles, the inner one

heated and the outer one cooled,

thermal diffusion—that is, the passage

of heat from the hot to the cold

wall—tends to concentrate lighter isotopes near the hot wall and heavier

isotopes near the cold wall and, simultaneously, because of convection,

to carry the hotter liquid upward and

the cooler fluid downward. The result

is accumulation of lighter isotopes at

the top of the receptacle and heavier

isotopes at the bottom, thus permitting extraction of both fractions.

This method, first tested in the late

1930's by German scientists using

zinc salts dissolved in water, had produced a small amount of separation;

however, the phenomenon remained

a little-known scientific curiosity until,

in 1940, wartime events precipitated

intensive research by American scientists to secure the fissionable materials necessary for the atomic project.

In Washington, D.C., chemist Philip

H. Abelson of the Carnegie Institution and physicist-technical adviser

Ross Gunn of the Naval Research

Laboratory simultaneously sought financial support from the government

for a liquid thermal diffusion research
THE LIQUID THERMAL DIFFUSION PROCESS 173

program. Abelson, who had worked

with chemist Glenn Seaborg on plutonium chemistry at the University of

California, Berkeley, wrote to Uranium Committee Chairman Lyman

Briggs at the National Bureau of

Standards and described how uranium isotopes might be separated by

thermal diffusion, and Gunn, also a

member of the Uranium Committee,

passed on to other committee members his own interest in the potentialities of the process. Acting on Briggs's

suggestion, the Navy decided to support research in hopes that it might

provide fuel for a nuclear power plant

suitable for submarines.

Abelson started his research at the

Carnegie Institution, but in October

1940 moved his experiments to the

Bureau of Standards. Then in June

1941, at Gunn's suggestion, Abelson

became an employee at the Naval Research Laboratory, which had been

providing funds for his experiments

since September 1940, and shifted his

equipment to that institution. Using

36-foot columns consisting of two

vertical concentric pipes, the inner

carrying hot steam and the outer

process liquid, Abelson began actual

tests with uranium hexafluoride, a

compound so little known at the time

that he had to devise his own method

for producing the substance in quantity. Results were disappointing at

first; however, by changing the spacing between the hot and cold walls of

the columns, Abelson was able to

demonstrate that a separation factor

as high as 21 percent could be

achieved and an equilibrium separation could be attained in about two

days.1

In August 1942, when Abelson's research had progressed to the stage

where he needed a pilot plant to ascertain the feasibility of operating a

large-scale plant, the Navy undertook

the task of building the first thermal

diffusion pilot plant at its Anacostia

Station near the Naval Research Laboratory facilities. Completed by November, the original pilot plant consisted of five (later others were

added) 36-foot columns and the requisite pumps, piping, and other

equipment; a recently installed 20-

horsepower gas-fired boiler provided

the necessary steam. From the start of

operations in December, the plant

proved amazingly reliable, running

for days at a time with scarcely any attention from the operating staff.

Then in early 1943, the staff discovered that greater operational efficiency resulted from increasing the temperature of the hot wall. Although the

higher temperature complicated

design because of the high pressures

required for hotter steam, it largely

overcame the excessively long equilibrium time required for the plant to

reach the stage of producing significant amounts of U-235.

1

 On the early history of the liquid thermal diffusion method see Progress Rpt, Philip H. Abelson,

sub: Liq Therm Diff Research (Rpt 0-1977), 5 Jan

43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Therm Diff

Proj), MDR; MDH, Bk. 6, Sec. 2, "Research and Development," pp. 2.1-2.4, DASA; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 32 and 168-70; Smyth

Report, p. 47.
174 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Reassessment: Decision for Full-scale

Development

For a time in late 1942, the liquid

thermal diffusion method appeared to

have been eliminated from further serious consideration for the atomic

weapon program. In September, General Groves and Colonel Nichols had

visited the Naval Research Laboratory

and had talked to Gunn, but the small

size of the project and the apparent

lack of urgency of its developmental

program had left the Manhattan commander unimpressed. Groves, too, recalled that Vannevar Bush, director of

the Office of Scientific Research and

Development, had just told him that

in March President Roosevelt had directed that the Navy be excluded

from the S-1 program. Yet in late November, the S-1 Executive Committee

reassessed all of the more promising

methods for mass production of fissionable materials and, at the last

moment, decided to include Abelson's project in its review.2

General Groves and the S-1's reassessment group, the Lewis reviewing

committee headed by MIT Professor

Warren K. Lewis, visited the Naval

Research Laboratory on 10 December

and were sufficiently impressed with

Abelson's progress to recommend

continued support of the thermal diffusion project. Bush took steps to get

continued support from the Navy,

channeling his efforts through Rear

Adm. William R. Purnell of the Military Policy Committee to avoid conflict with the President's directive to

keep the Navy out of the S-1 project.

Purnell had Abelson's latest scientific

reports sent to S-1 Committee Chairman James B. Conant, who turned

them over to the S-1 Executive Committee. An S-1 subcommittee, comprised of Lyman Briggs, Eger V.

Murphree, and Harold C. Urey, reviewed the reports and visited the

Navy project. On 23 January 1943,

they informed Conant that "the Naval

Research Laboratory . . . [had] made

excellent progress in the separation

of isotopes by liquid thermal diffusion . . . ,"

 3 but expressed concern

over the lack of solid production data

and the excessive length of the equilibrium time. Consequently, the subcommittee limited its recommendation to suggesting that a commercial

organization be invited to prepare

preliminary designs for a production

plant, a stage of development that the

gaseous diffusion and centrifuge

projects had attained nearly a year

earlier. But two days later Murphree

reviewed his own estimate of Abelson's project and proposed that the

Manhattan leaders consider substituting liquid thermal diffusion for gaseous diffusion in the lower stages of a

U-235 separation plant.4

At the beginning of February, General Groves submitted the various

proposals concerning thermal diffusion and the reports from Abelson to

the Lewis reviewing committee. After

due consideration the committee sug- 2

 Ltr, Briggs, Murphree, and Urey to Conant,

23 Jan 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12

(Therm Diff Proj), MDR; Marshall Diary, 21 Sep 42,

OCG Files, Gen Corresp, Groves Files, Misc Recs

Sec, behind Fldr 5, MDR; Groves, Now It Can Be

Told, p. 23; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp.

169-70.

3

 Ltr, Briggs, Murphree, and Urey to Conant,

23 Jan 43, MDR. 4

 Memo, Nichols to Groves, 20 Jan 43, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Liq Therm Diff), MDR;

Hewlett and Anderson, New World, p. 171 (based on

Ltr, Murphree to Briggs, 25 Jan 43, OSRD).
THE LIQUID THERMAL DIFFUSION PROCESS 175

gested continuing with a limited program of research and preliminary engineering designs. The S-1 Executive

Committee accepted this recommendation on the tenth, and another

review by Lewis, Briggs, Murphree,

and Urey toward the end of the

summer resulted in essentially the

same recommendation.5

From September 1942 until April

1943, there was an almost complete

loss of contact between the Navy program and the Manhattan Project. This

temporary exclusion from the main

arena of atomic energy activities did

not, in the long run, seriously impede

continued development, although

Groves's refusal in October to approve Abelson's request for additional supplies of uranium hexafluoride

momentarily threatened the program.

Groves soon relented, however, when

Navy officials reminded him that

Abelson was the scientist who had devised the process for producing large

quantities of uranium hexafluoride.

Abelson needed the increased quantities of the compound for the threehundred-column high-pressure pilot

plant he planned to build at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, where there was

an adequate supply of steam available. The Navy finally authorized construction of the new plant in November and work started on a one-hundred-column segment in January

1944.6

The final impetus for full-fledged

development did not come from the

Army or the S-1 Committee, but

from that element most vitally concerned with obtaining an early and

adequate supply of fissionable materials: the Los Alamos Laboratory.

In particular, Laboratory Director

J. Robert Oppenheimer was constantly

on the alert for any means that gave

promise of speeding up large-scale

production of fissionable materials. At

a time when the electromagnetic plant

at the Clinton Engineer Works was

just beginning to produce a sizable

amount of enriched uranium and

completion of the gaseous diffusion

and plutonium production plants still

was many months away, Oppenheimer reviewed certain fragmentary

data received earlier on the thermal

diffusion project. His information included two nearly year-old reports by

Abelson and some oral reports received from Capt. William S. Parsons,

the naval officer in charge of ordnance at Los Alamos.

Parsons had just returned from a trip

to the East, during which he had made

inquiries about the pilot plant under

construction at Philadelphia. He had

learned that the plant was scheduled

to begin operating on 1 July, using

one hundred columns to produce an

estimated 5 grams per day of an enriched product containing 5 percent

U-235. Oppenheimer knew that partially enriched material in such small

quantities would not begin to fulfill

the requirements of the atomic

5

 Ltr, C. H. Greenewalt (TNX Tech Div chief, Du

Pont) to Groves, 8 Feb 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Therm Diff Proj), MDR; Hewlett and

Anderson, New World, pp. 171-72; Rpt, Murphree

and Urey, sub: Prgm for Experiments To Be Carried Out on Therm Diff Method, 19 Feb 43, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Liq Therm Diff), MDR;

Ltrs, Briggs, Urey, Murphree, and Lewis to Conant,

8 Sep 43, and Conant to Purnell, 15 Sep 43, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 334 (Mil Policy), MDR.

6

 Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 171-72;

MDH, Bk. 6, Sec. 2, pp. 2.4 and 2.9, DASA; Smyth

Report, p. 147
176 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

project; however, the thought occurred to him that if the one hundred

columns of the plant could be connected in parallel rather than as a

fractionating pyramid, they might be

made to produce something like 12

kilograms a day of an enriched product containing about 1 percent U-235.

And this output would be tripled

if Abelson carried out his plan to

erect a total of three hundred columns, the number that could be operated on the steam available at the

Philadelphia Yard. On 28 April, Oppenheimer wrote to Groves that development of the thermal diffusion

process to provide partially enriched

uranium feed for the electromagnetic

process would give "hope that the

production of the Y-12 [electromagnetic] plant could be increased by

some 30 or 40 percent, and its enhancement somewhat improved, many

months earlier than the scheduled

date for K-25 [gaseous diffusion]

production."

 7

Groves did not reply immediately.

In later years he stated he did not

know why he or someone else had

not suggested thermal diffusion as a

feeder process for the electromagnetic plant at least a year before; perhaps, he conjectured, this occurred

because everyone at first had thought

of using a single process to achieve a

final product enrichment and, as a

single production system, thermal diffusion had certain technical drawbacks. But by August 1943, Manhattan leaders had adopted the feeder

concept for the gaseous diffusion

plant, proposing to use its output to

feed the Beta cycle, and in this new

context they were then able to perceive the potentialities of thermal

diffusion.8

Unquestionably, too, development

by an organization outside the Armyadministered Manhattan District was

an important factor contributing to

the delay. For this reason it did not

attract the active interest of most of

the scientists and engineers who organized the bomb project, and the Army

administrators feared security problems from bringing outside agencies

into the Manhattan Project. That the

latter consideration created at least

some reservation in Groves's mind as

to the feasibility of Oppenheimer's

suggestion seems borne out by the

fact that the Manhattan commander,

who was not characteristically a man

to allow grass to grow under his feet,

let a whole month pass before acting

upon it. Finally, on 31 May 1944,

Groves appointed a committee consisting of Lewis and Murphree, who

had previously investigated the Navy

project, and physicist Richard C.

Tolman, who was serving as his scientific adviser. This committee confirmed Oppenheimer's information,

except they found his prediction regarding the potential output of the

one-hundred-column plant overly optimistic. Groves informed Oppenheimer that he did not know yet

whether the Manhattan District would

avail itself of the Navy's facilities but

that "arrangements have been made

for this eventuality if it should be

desirable."

 9

7

 Ltr, Oppenheimer to Groves, 28 Apr 44, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Therm Diff Proj), MDR;

Oppenheimer Hearing, pp. 164-65.

8

 Oppenheimer Hearing, pp. 119-20. 9

 Ltr, Groves to Oppenheimer, 3 Jun 44. See also

Memos, Groves to Lewis, Murphree, and Tolman, Continued
THE LIQUID THERMAL DIFFUSION PROCESS 177

RICHARD C. TOLMAN (1945 photograph)

On 5 June, Groves sent Conant and

Lewis to District headquarters to

confer with Colonel Nichols concerning the practical feasibility of using

the Navy pilot plant at Philadelphia

and constructing a thermal diffusion

plant at the Tennessee site, employing steam available from the K-25

powerhouse. The two scientific leaders ultimately concluded the thermal

diffusion plant "would probably be a

feasible [and] desirable adjunct to the

Y-12 process."10

Then on the twelfth, Groves requested that Murphree, who had extensive industrial experience, make a

study to determine the cost, construction time, and amount of high-pressure steam needed for a thermal diffusion plant capable of producing 50

kilograms a day of enriched uranium

with concentrations of U-235 ranging

from 0.9 to 3.0 percent. Murphree

asked Tolman and the scientists Karl

P. Cohen and W. I. Thompson, both

of whom had participated in previous

investigations of the Navy project, to

assist him in making the study. They

concluded that the 1.25-million

pounds per hour of steam that the

K-25 powerhouse (with some modifications) could supply would be approximately sufficient to operate a thermal

diffusion plant of sixteen hundred

tubes, costing about $3.5 million, and

capable of enriching 50 kilograms of

uranium a week to slightly less than

0.9-percent concentration.11

Groves decided on 24 June to go

ahead with construction. Such a plant

promised to be relatively cheap. It

could use the already available steam

capacity at the gaseous diffusion plant

site at least for several months, pending completion of the K-25 cascade.

While its product would contain only

about 20 percent more U-235 than

natural uranium, this enrichment

would be translated into a vital 20-

percent-greater output by the electromagnetic plant. But Groves decided

against the recommendation to include the existing Navy facilities, besub: Possible Utilization of Navy Pilot Therm Diff

Plant, 31 May 44, and Lewis, Murphree, and

Tolman to Groves, same sub, 3 Jun 44. All in

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Therm Diff

Proj), MDR. 10

 Memo, Nichols to Groves, 11 Oct 44, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Projs and Prgms),

MDR. See Ch. XVIII for a detailed description of

the K-25 powerhouse.

11

 Ltr, Murphree to Groves, 22 Jun 44. See also

Rpt, Thompson and Cohen, sub: Process Design for

Liq Diff Plant, 17 Jun 44; Rpt, Thompson and

Cohen, Sub: Rough Prelim Estimate of Plant Cost,

19 Jun 44; Ltrs, Tolman to Groves, subs: Further

Info as to Steam Capacity at Tenn., 19 Jun 44, and

Still Later Info as to Steam Capacity at Tenn.,

20 Jun 44. All in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1

(Liq Therm Diff), MDR.
178 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

cause the Navy installation would not

be under direct control of the Army

and because he was convinced that

the Manhattan District would build

the thermal diffusion plant more

quickly if it were not diverted by the

problems of operating the Navy plant.

Both Groves and Nichols held to the

view that the key factor was getting

the plant into operation at the earliest

possible date to fill the anticipated

gap between the time the electromagnetic plant reached full capacity and

the gaseous diffusion plant began

producing large quantities of enriched uranium feed.12

Plant Design, Engineering, and

Construction

The need for exceptional speed in

both design and construction of the

thermal diffusion plant, designated

S-50 for security reasons, was an important consideration in Groves's selection of the H. K. Ferguson Company as the prime contractor. In earlier

defense projects, the Manhattan commander had been greatly impressed

with the Cleveland firm's ability to

complete a job on schedule. Against

the advice of his advisers, who

thought six months was an optimistic

schedule, Groves determined that the

plant must be in full operation in four

months. Furthermore, the first production unit should begin operating

only seventy-five days after start of

construction. Groves offered the

high-pressure services of Manhattan's

Washington Liaison Office for expediting procurement; instructed the

company to place its orders without

competition and by wire or telephone, using wherever practicable the

same manufacturers who had supplied

equipment for the Navy pilot plant;

and ordered that plant components

be identical copies of those developed

for Abelson's project.13

To further ensure that Ferguson

would have access to all available assistance the Army could provide,

Colonel Nichols in June 1944 established an S-50 Division in the Manhattan District office. (See Chart 3) He

assigned Lt. Col. Mark C. Fox as unit

chief for the thermal diffusion project

and Maj. Thomas J. Evans, Jr., as his

assistant, with special responsibility

for overseeing plant construction. In

anticipation of the need for special

measures to enable Ferguson and its

subcontractors to successfully carry

out the extraordinarily demanding

terms of the S-50 contract, Colonel

Fox organized an Expediting Branch

in the division, which functioned

through District procurement officers

in industrial centers throughout the

United States.14

With only a few weeks in which to

complete blueprints and let procurement contracts, the Ferguson Company had no alternative but to adhere as

closely as practicable to the Naval Research Laboratory design. Ferguson

engineers visited the laboratory and

the Navy turned over to them all of

the drawings and blueprints needed

12

 Memo, Nichols to Groves, 11 Oct 44, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Projs and Prgms),

MDR; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 120-21.

13

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 121; MDH, Bk. 6,

Sec. 3, "Design and Construction," pp. 3.15-3.17,

DASA. 14

 MDH, Bk. 6, Sec. 6, "Organization and Personnel," p. 6.2, DASA; Org Chart, U.S. Engrs Office,

MD, 28 Aug 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 020

(MED-Org), MDR. When Colonel Fox was assigned

to another part of the Manhattan Project in March

1945, Major Evans replaced him as S-50 unit chief.
THE LIQUID THERMAL DIFFUSION PROCESS 179

for construction of the columns and

racks. They modified Navy designs

and developed new ones for certain

elements of the auxiliary equipment

only to the extent necessary to meet

the different conditions existing at the

Tennessee location. To save time

they based much of the construction

on simple field sketches, postponing

completion of detailed drawings until

after the plant was built.15

As laid out in the Ferguson engineers' designs, the plant consisted of

2,142 columns, each 48 feet in height,

distributed in twenty-one racks.16

Each of the columns had three concentric tubes, comprised of a 11⁄4-inch

nickel pipe inside; a slightly larger

copper pipe in the middle; and a

4-inch galvanized iron jacket on the

outside. In the small (one one-hundredth of an inch) annular space between the outer wall of the nickel

pipe and inner wall of the copper

pipe the diffusion process would

occur. Steam, under a pressure of 100

pounds per square inch and at a temperature of 545 degrees Fahrenheit,

would circulate downward through

the nickel pipe while water at 155 degrees Fahrenheit would flow upward

through the iron jacket; simultaneously, uranium hexafluoride would flow

into the base of each column from a

reservoir, specially designed to maintain at the bottom of each column a

concentration of U-235 approximating that in natural uranium. Designed

into the top of each column was a

system of freezing coils; this feature

eliminated the need for complicated

mechanical valves, and would permit

plant employees to draw off small

amounts of the enriched product at

frequent intervals.

All the racks, each with 102 columns, occupied a single main process

building, a huge black structure 522

feet long, 82 feet wide, and 75 feet

high. Running the full length of the

west side of this building was a mezzanine partitioned into eleven control

rooms, one for each two racks, and an

equal number of transfer rooms containing process equipment for supplying feed material and removing enriched product and depleted uranium

hexafluoride from the columns. The

engineers designed the final rack with

separate control and transfer rooms

so that it could be used for employee

training and experimental work.

On 9 July 1944, Ferguson workers

began clearing the S-50 plant site in

the area adjacent to the K-25 powerhouse. In less than three weeks they

had completed foundations for the

main process building and by midAugust were installing the process

equipment. Pipe fitters and welders

concentrated on the major task of

erecting the twenty-one racks of columns during September and October.

Test operations, however, soon revealed that many of the columns

leaked at the top and bottom and

would require additional welding; yet

in spite of this delay, all racks were

ready for start-up operations by January 1945 and became fully operational by mid-March. In the meantime,

the District had closed out the Ferguson construction contract, assigning

completion of subcontracts for remaining insulation and electrical system work to other firms available in

the Clinton area. These subcontrac15

 MDH, Bk. 6, Sec. 3, p. 3.6, DASA. 16

 This and following paragraph based on MDH,

Bk. 6, Sec. 4, "Description of Plant," pp. 4.1-4.5,

DASA.
180 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

tors also completed auxiliary buildings, including a new S-50 steam

plant to supplement the K-25

powerhouse.17

Plant Operation

Because time was so short, and to

avoid endangering security by bringing in yet another outside firm, General Groves insisted that the H. K.

Ferguson Company also operate the

plant.18 At first Ferguson officials objected, stating that as an engineering

construction company it maintained a

closed shop and, therefore, could anticipate union trouble on its other

wartime jobs if it attempted to carry

on a nonunion operation at the Clinton Engineer Works, where security

regulations prohibited employee

unions. But District representatives

soon overcame this objection by resorting to a corporate fiction similar

to that which had worked so well with

the M. W. Kellogg Company on the

gaseous diffusion project. They permitted Ferguson to form a wholly

owned subsidiary, designated the Fercleve (from the words Ferguson and

Cleveland) Corporation. Fercleve then

accepted a letter contract on 1 July

(and a formal contract in late 1944),

according to which it would procure

supplies and materials; train personnel; and inspect, supervise, and operate the thermal diffusion plant in

return for a fee of $11,000 a month.

To monitor the Fercleve contract,

Colonel Fox established an Operations Branch in the S-50 Division.

While Fercleve wasted no time in

taking steps to set up an operating

organization, its late start presented it

with some difficult problems. When

company personnel officials attempted to recruit an operating force, they

found the other plants had already

cut deep into the local labor market.

And they could not offer housing on

the reservation, a main inducement

used by the other operating companies. Problems also arose in Fercleve's efforts to train operators. As a

beginning step, the company sent

four of its own employees and ten enlisted men from the Manhattan District's Special Engineer Detachment

to Philadelphia to receive training

from Abelson. This group acquired

some experience in conditioning techniques but learned little about operations because the Navy plant was not

yet completed. Then, on 2 September, an explosion wrecked a large

part of the Navy pilot plant, injuring

several of the trainees. This unfortunate incident not only ended the initial training program but also raised

for a time some severe doubts concerning the design of the Clinton

plant. Subsequently, however, Abelson and fifteen of his experienced

staff moved to the Tennessee site,

where they gave valuable assistance,

first in conditioning the production

plant and then in getting it into

operation.19

In spite of recruiting difficulties,

Fercleve by April 1945 had an operat17

 Ibid., Sec. 3, pp. 3.18-3.20, DASA. To equip

this boiler plant, the District acquired twelve surplus

boilers from the Navy, fabricated for use in destroyer escort vessels, and the Washington Liaison Office

secured a number of 25,000- and 482,000-gallon

tanks from excess Army stocks. 18

 Except as otherwise indicated, section based on

ibid., Sec. 5, "Operations," DASA; Org Chart, U.S.

Engrs Office, MD, 10 Nov 44, MDR. See also

Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 120, n. 8. 19 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 122.
THE LIQUID THERMAL DIFFUSION PROCESS 181

LIQUID THERMAL DIFFUSION PLANT (long, dark building) AT CEW. The adjacent K-25

power plant drew water from the Clinch River.

ing force, exclusive of military personnel, of about 1,600 at the Clinton

Engineer Works. In addition, Special

Engineer Detachment enlisted personnel, comprised primarily of men

trained in engineering or science,

served as operators and supervisors

in the plant, their number reaching

a total of 126 at the height of

operations.

While plant construction was still in

progress, Fercleve crews began conditioning Rack 21 for start-up operations. When they opened the valves

to let high-pressure steam from the

K-25 power plant flow into the rack,

great quantities escaped with an earsplitting noise, and parts of the rack

were soon shrouded in hot vapor.

Under ordinary conditions such clearly demonstrated indications of defective equipment would have resulted in

an immediate shutdown. But faced

with Groves's insistence that the first

units must be in operation by early

fall, Fercleve's plant manager had no

choice but to proceed with start-up

activities. Consequently, in the last

months of 1944, operating personnel

pressed ahead with start-up of additional racks, and soon plant employees came to accept the noise of escaping steam, accompanied by great

clouds of vapor, as almost normal operating conditions.

There can be little doubt that the

haste to get into production increased

already inherent operating hazards in

the thermal diffusion plant. In the

confined spaces of the diffusion columns, high-pressure steam and uranium hexafluoride, which expanded 35
182 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

BILLBOARD AT THE S-50 PLANT SITE

percent in passing from a solid to a

liquid, created highly explosive

forces. During the period of full operation, the plant did have a somewhat

higher accident rate than the other

Manhattan production units, but the

incidence of really serious accidents

was not as great. Most were attributable to lack of training and the

inevitable confusion occasioned by

construction and operating crews having to work in the same area

simultaneously.20

During the first months there were

times when results scarcely seemed to

justify the risks. The combined disadvantages of largely inexperienced personnel and numerous equipment deficiencies seemed to forebode many

months of low output and work stoppages before the plant attained an acceptable level of production. Thus,

Colonel Nichols reported to General

Groves that total output in October

1944 was only a token 10.5 pounds of

uranium containing 0.852 percent

U-235. While production increased to

171.8 pounds in November, it fell

back to 20 pounds the following

month, when steam leaks forced numerous shutdowns. With six racks in

operation during the first half of January 1945, production for the first

time approached predicted levels, but

shutdown of some of the K-25 steam

units for repairs in the last half of the

month reduced output again. February production reached a total of

3,158 pounds in spite of an inadequate steam supply—an anticipated

deficiency eventually overcome

through the prompt construction of

the S-50 steam plant. In the spring

and early summer of 1945, plant

output went up rapidly, reaching a

peak of 12,730 pounds in June. It

dropped back briefly in July because

of the changeover to the S-50 steam

plant, but by that time the thermal

diffusion process had served its purpose for the wartime program. The

slightly enriched material it produced—sent first to the electromagnetic plant for further enrichment and

then, beginning in late April 1945, directly to the gaseous diffusion plant—

added enough to the total output of

U-235 to guarantee a sufficient

amount for one bomb of an appropriate design by the end of July.21

Operational studies made after the

surrender of Japan in August 1945

showed that, except in an emergency,

the gaseous diffusion plant, which was

20

 For data on injury rates on the thermal diffusion project as compared with those on the other

Clinton projects see MDH, Bk. 6, App. D8, DASA.

See also Ch. XX.

21

 Dist Engr, Monthly Rpts on DSM Proj, Jul 44-

Jul 45, passim, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files,

Fldr 28, Tabs A and B, MDR; Smyth Report, p. 147;

Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 299-301.
THE LIQUID THERMAL DIFFUSION PROCESS 183

just approaching full production,

could henceforth handle the lower degrees of enrichment alone and do it

more economically than the thermal

diffusion plant. Consequently, operating crews made preparations for shutting down the thermal plant. After

continuing in production long enough,

to extract the last product from material remaining in the columns, the

plant ceased operating on 9 September 1945, less than a year after its

first unit had started up in the fall of

1944.22

22

 Dist Engr, Monthly Rpt on DSM Proj, Sep 45,

OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 28, Tab B,

MDR.
CHAPTER IX

The Pile Process

Of the three fissionable materials

production processes (electromagnetic, gaseous diffusion, and pile)

endorsed by the Military Policy Committee in 1942 for full-scale development, the greatest gamble of all

appeared to be the pile method, primarily because of a number of difficult technical problems facing project

scientists.1 Experimentation with research piles at the University of Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory had

revealed that plutonium production

on a large scale would require the

design and engineering of special

process techniques and equipment to

cope with radioactivity and energy,

mostly in the form of heat, more intense and pervasive than ever before

encountered in an industrial process.

Similarly, investigations into the

chemical separation of plutonium

from the transmutation residual of

natural uranium and highly radioactive fission products had demonstrated that there were still many unanswered questions as to the best way

to carry out this ancillary phase of

plutonium production.

The Military Policy Committee had

taken these problems into account

when it decided in December to proceed with mass production of plutonium. Several factors contributed to

this affirmative decision. The committee was much impressed by the

progress of research and development

in the plutonium process at the Metallurgical Laboratory and elsewhere,

and also was convinced that the vast

potential of the process warranted the

undoubted risks inherent in its development. From a military standpoint,

project scientists told the committee,

the process would produce not only

fissionable material for an atomic

weapon but also, as a by-product, radioactive fission materials that probably could be utilized as an exceptionally deadly chemical warfare weapon.

Even if the scientists and engineers

failed to develop the process in time,

the plutonium pile with its enormous

capabilities for producing heat could

become a major source of power for

peacetime uses. Given all of these

considerations, the Military Policy

1

 MPC Rpt, 15 Dec 42, OCG Files, Gen Corresp,

MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab B, MDR. The original nuclear reactor that Fermi and his scientific colleagues

constructed at the University of Chicago's Stagg

Field in late 1942 consisted of a cubic lattice of

lumps of uranium and graphite piled one layer upon

another. Hence, the structure came to be called a

pile, a convenient designation for reasons of security because it did not reveal the purpose of a chainreacting system. The term nuclear reactor did not

come into general use until after the end of World

War II.
THE PILE PROCESS 185

Committee could see no alternative to

continuing full-scale development of

the process.

Research and Development: Metallurgical

Laboratory

Following consolidation of most

plutonium research and development

at the Metallurgical Laboratory in

February 1942, Director Arthur

Compton formed an organization that

consisted of an engineering council,

headed by chemical engineer

Thomas V. Moore from industry,

and nine major divisions—physics,

theory, technical, chemistry, pilot

plant, fast neutron, clinical-biological

(subsequently health) physics, defense

measures, and engineering.2 One of

these divisions, fast neutron, was actually located at the University of

California, Berkeley, with work in

progress at several other institutions.

Other divisions, too, had some aspects of their work under way at

other sites (for example, chemistry, at

Iowa State, where metallurgist Frank

Spedding was testing the metallurgical properties of uranium; and at

California, where chemist Glenn Seaborg was investigating the virtually

unknown chemistry of plutonium).

Under Compton's supervision and

direction, the Metallurgical Laboratory scientific staff moved ahead effectively with devising and testing pile

and chemical separation designs for a

large-scale plutonium production

plant. With this experimental activity

proceeding apace, Compton reported

to District Engineer Marshall the

pressing need for additional research

facilities. Marshall immediately contacted Stone and Webster and had

the firm draw up plans to expand the

laboratory's physical facilities, directing that subcontracts be let to Chicago area construction companies. At

the same time, Deputy District Engineer Nichols worked out with Compton the land and building requirements for the Argonne Forest pilot

plant site, located southwest of the

city, and cleared the way for its acquisition by the Corps of Engineers'

Great Lakes Real Estate Office.

By the fall of 1942, the Army had

become an active partner in the Chicago program. To provide liaison

with the Manhattan District, as well as

to assist Compton in procurement

and personnel matters, Marshall

opened the Chicago Area Engineers

Office in the University of Chicago's

2

 Section on Metallurgical Laboratory based on

Org Chart attached to Rpt, Capt Arthur V. Peterson, sub: Visit to Chicago Proj, 29 Sep 42, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (misfiled under Therm

Diff Proj), MDR; Memo, Maj Peterson to Groves,

sub: Met Proj Org Chart, 14 Oct 43, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 201 (Gen), MDR; Smyth Report, pp.

63-65 and 92; Interv, Author with Norman Hilberry, 3 Jan 63, CMH; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 2, "Research," Pt. 1, pp. 2.5-2.8, 7.1-7.3, Apps. B3, B5-

B7, D2 (Constr Rpt Extracts), DASA; Completion

Rpt, Stone and Webster, sub: Clinton Engr Works,

Contract W-7401-eng-13, 1946, pp. 6-11, OROO;

Rpt, Compton, sub: Opn of Met Proj, by Univ of

Chicago, and Ms, Compton, sub: "Mr. Fermi, the

Argonne Laboratory and the University of Chicago," both 28 Jul 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 080

(Argonne-Univ of Chicago), MDR; Tables (Employment by MD on Design, Research and Constr as of

31 May, 31 Jul, and 31 Oct 43) in Rpt, sub: MD Proj

Data as of 1 Jun 43 (most items as of 1 Jun 43, but

tables appear to have been added at a later date),

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Projs and

Prgms), MDR; DSM Chronology, 13-14 Sep 42,

Sec. 2(a), OROO; Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 82-86,

110-11, 114-15, 151-52, 157, 170-71, 185-86; Marshall Diary, 25 Jun-5 Sep 42, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, Groves Files, Misc Recs Sec, behind Fldr 5,

MDR; Interv, Author with J. M. McKinley, 4 Jan 63,

CMH. Captain McKinley served as deputy area engineer at Chicago from about November 1943 to July

1945 and as area engineer until about November

1945.
186 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PHYSICS BUILDING

physics building, which was adjacent

to Compton's own headquarters and

the laboratory's administrative and

business offices, and assigned Capt.

James F. Grafton as area engineer.

Shortly thereafter, the decision to

reduce Stone and Webster's responsibilities for Metallurgical Laboratory

construction to limited architectural

and engineer services shifted much of

the burden of administering the expansion program upon Captain Grafton and his modest staff. The increased work load of letting and overseeing the great number of University

of Chicago subcontracts forced Grafton to enlarge his staff, which gradually increased in size from nearly 100

in the summer of 1943—when the

Army took over all OSRD-sponsored

research and development contracts—

to a total of approximately 250 in July

1945. To provide additional space for

the expanding Chicago area staff, the

Manhattan District leased the state of

Illinois' massive grey 124th Field Artillery Armory, located only a short

distance from the university campus.

Sharing the quarters with the area engineer's staff were the laboratory's

administrative personnel, an arrangement that facilitated closer coordination between the two groups in such

matters as security, labor and materials procurement, personnel, priorities, patents, and finances.

During the Metallurgical Laboratory building and remodeling program,

which continued uninterrupted until
THE PILE PROCESS 187

ARGONNE LABORATORY NEAR CHICAGO, one of the Metallurgical Project's

research facilities.

late 1944, the Chicago Area Engineers Office oversaw construction

that provided the Chicago program

with more than 500,000 square feet

of space, including an entirely new

chemistry building with an annex,

several new buildings at the Argonne

site, and extensively remodeled facilities in existing structures, all at an ultimate total cost of about $2.15 million. In carrying out this expansion,

the Army received the constant and

effective support of the University of

Chicago's administrative staff, which

consistently adhered to the policy set

forth at the beginning of the program

in 1942, namely, that it would "turn

the University inside out if necessary

to help win the war. Victory is much

more important than survival of the

University."

 3

Pile Design

In late 1942, as Army leaders

gradually became more familiar with

the plutonium phase of the atomic

bomb project, they realized that

progress in pile development at the

Metallurgical Laboratory was likely to

be the key factor determining how

soon large-scale production of fissionable material would be possible.4

 In

3

 Rpt, Compton, sub: Opn of Met Proj by Univ of

Chicago, 28 Jul 44, MDR. 4

 Subsection on pile designs based on Rpt, Peterson, sub: Visit to Chicago Proj, 29 Sep 42, MDR;

Min, Conf at Met Lab, 15 Oct 42, Admin Files, Gen Continued
188 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

124TH FIELD ARTILLERY ARMORY IN CHICAGO

September, General Groves, newly

appointed as Manhattan commander,

sent Capt. Arthur V. Peterson, a civil

engineer by profession, to visit the

Chicago scientists. Then using the detailed information in Peterson's

report as a guide, Groves arranged a

series of personal visits to Chicago in

early October, during which he attended the policymaking meetings of

the Metallurgical Laboratory Technical Council and conferred with members of its engineers and scientific

staff.

The Manhattan commander was impressed with the way in which CompCorresp, 337 (Univ of Chicago), MDR; Min, Tech

Council, 5 Oct 42 (Rpt CS-286), 12 Oct 42 (Rpt

CS-294), 13 Oct 42 (Rpt CS-306), 15 Oct 42 (Rpts

CS-309 and -311), 23 Dec 42 (Rpt CS-397), 22 Jan

43 (Rpt CS-414), ANL; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 2, Pt. 1,

pp. 3.1-3.16, and Pt. 2, pp. 4.2-4.7, and Vol. 3,

"Design," pp. 5.14-5.35, DASA; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 174-82 and 193-98; Smyth

Report, pp. 42, 75, 81-83; Groves Diary, 5, 10, 15

Oct 42, LRG; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 40-41

and 80-81; DSM Chronology, Nov-Dec 42, passim,

OROO; Memo, Peterson to Nichols, sub: Reassessment Sess at Chicago (12/2/42), 4 Dec 42, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 410.2 (Uranium), MDR; MPC

Rpt, 15 Dec 42, MDR; Rpt, Mtg with Greenewalt, 24

Feb 43 (Rpt CS-2644), ANL; Ltr, Greenewalt to

Groves, 8 Jul 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 080

(Argonne-Univ of Chicago), MDR; Compton, Atomic

Quest, pp 161-63 and 167-70; Completion Rpt, Du

Pont, sub: CEW, TNX Area, Contract W-7412-eng23, 1 Apr 44, p. 303, OROO; Dist Engr, Monthly Rpt

on DSM Proj, 23 Mar 43, OCG Files, Gen Corresp.

MP Files, Fldr 28, Tab A, MDR. For a detailed

discussion of the plutonium production process, see

appropriate volumes in Division 4, Plutonium Project,

of the National Nuclear Energy Series.
THE PILE PROCESS 189

NEW CHEMISTRY BUILDING, METALLURGICAL LABORATORY, on the University of Chicago campus. Barely visible is the gothic tower (at far left) of the football stadium where Enrico

Fermi achieved the first chain reaction in a graphite pile.

ton had organized the laboratory and

with the exceptional capabilities of

the scientific staff. He indicated his

general approval of the research program, expressing but one major criticism: The program was not moving

fast enough to permit a decision on

which proposed pile design should be

adopted for full-scale development. If

necessary, he said, the research scientists should develop more than one

design, regardless of the cost, because the earliest start possible on detailed design and construction was

tremendously important. Groves recalled later that he had quickly concluded that "the plutonium process

[of all the methods proposed] seemed

to offer . . . the greatest chances

for success in producing bomb

material."

 5

At the time of Groves's first visits,

Metallurgical Laboratory scientists

had achieved only limited progress in

transforming the results of pile research into concrete blueprints for

pile design. Seriously handicapped by

the lack of pure uranium metal in the

quantities needed for essential experiments, the research teams barely had

made a start on a program for pile

development that called for pile

design and engineering in three

stages: a 10,000-kilowatt experimental

unit, to ascertain whether a chain reaction could be sustained; a 100,000-

kilowatt pilot pile, to test helium cool5

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 41.
190 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

ing and the mechanical techniques of

loading and discharging; and a

second 100,000-kilowatt pile, also

helium cooled, to be the first unit of

the large-scale production plant. Each

of these piles would employ graphite,

now available in ample quantities

from commercial sources, as a moderator. The pile designers would have

preferred heavy water, which combined in a single element the moderating and cooling factor required, but

its continuing scarcity made design of

a pile employing that hydrogen isotope impractical.

Groves found, too, that project scientists had not reached agreement on

what was, in some respects, the most

crucial problem in pile design—how

safely and efficiently to disperse the

intense heat that would be produced

by the fissioning process in a highwattage pile. Under the three-stage

plan, Compton had given helium

cooling a priority position. At the

same time, however, physicists

Eugene Wigner and Leo Szilard, as

well as other staff scientists, were still

giving serious consideration to a

number of other coolants, including

diphenyl and bismuth.6 Even water,

with its corrosive reaction to uranium

and high-neutron absorption, could

not be discounted.

Groves and the Manhattan District

officers who visited the Metallurgical

Laboratory in the fall of 1942 quickly

learned that the feasibility of all pile

designs would have to remain in

doubt until physicist Enrico Fermi

and his colleagues had completed

construction of an experimental pile

capable of a sustained chain reaction

and also had accurately measured the

neutron-absorbing characteristics of

each pile component (lattice, controls,

loading and unloading mechanism,

shielding, and coolant). At this stage

the pile researchers felt that attaining

a state of criticality was possible with

a properly designed and assembled

lattice of sufficiently pure graphite

and uranium metal. But what they

were uncertain of, and could not ascertain until a chain reaction was set

going, was the actual size of the

multiplication factor k—the excess

number of neutrons above unity required to barely sustain fissioning in a

critical pile. And lacking this data,

design engineers found themselves

not knowing how much leeway they

had in selecting the materials for the

mechanical structure and coolant

system of the large-scale production

piles.7

Spurred by the Army's insistence

on moving into engineering and construction as rapidly as possible and by

the impending participation of E. I.

du Pont de Nemours and Company as

a full-time partner of the Metallurgical Laboratory, Compton and the pile

researchers decided to modify earlier

plans. Under the revised program,

Fermi and his staff were to complete

as quickly as possible a low-powered

pile, to demonstrate the feasibility of

a chain reaction and furnish the

much-needed data about the k factor;

6

 Diphenyl is a white crystalline hydrocarbon that

melts at 160 degrees Fahrenheit and readily conducts heat. Bismuth (Bi-83) is a grayish white metal,

with a reddish tinge, that absorbs relatively few neutrons and, like diphenyl, has a low melting point.

7

 Criticality, or critical size, in a pile fueled with

uranium may be defined as the condition in "which

the number of neutrons produced in the fission

process just balances those lost by leakage and by

capture." See Glasstone, Sourcebook on Atomic Energy,

p. 518, par. 14.45.
THE PILE PROCESS 191

and another team was to begin work

on a second pile of low wattage at the

Argonne site, to provide project

chemists with the additional small

quantities of plutonium they urgently

needed to test methods and equipment for separating the element. Pile

designers now would design only a

single 100,000-kilowatt helium-cooled

pile capable of producing an estimated 100 grams of plutonium daily; this

pile, they hoped, would function as

both the testing unit and the first unit

of the full-scale production plant. Finally, they were to continue testing

designs for piles cooled by water, diphenyl, and bismuth.

Fermi, achieving the historic first

sustained chain reaction on 2 December,8

 found that the k factor was considerably larger than he had anticipated. This discovery removed a chief

objection to water, diphenyl, or even

air as a coolant in high-powered piles,

since the greater margin of k would

permit more neutron absorption without reducing the efficiency of pile

operation. Also, the larger k factor

indicated a much greater choice in

materials of coolant pipes, the control

mechanism, and for load and discharge equipment.

Nevertheless, in view of the advanced status of the helium-cooled

pile design, both Du Pont and the

Army continued to favor its development as the prototype for the production units, even though Fermi's new

data and other Metallurgical Laboratory scientists' encouraging research

into alternate methods had made

liquid or air cooling seem far more

feasible. By the time the Military

Policy Committee decided on 10 December to shift the location of the

large-scale plutonium production

plant from the Clinton Engineer

Works in Tennessee to a more isolated area, preliminary designs for the

100,000-kilowatt helium-cooled pile

were sufficiently complete to provide

the Army with the requisite criteria

not only for determining the safety,

power, water, and other site requirements but also for compiling the

specifications list of materials.

An unresolved point of concern to

project engineers, especially those

from Du Pont, was the feasibility of

operating a graphite-moderated pile

on an industrial scale, whether cooled

by helium or any other type of coolant. Because so many technical uncertainties still remained, Du Pont scientists emphasized to Groves the need

for developing an alternate pile

design, as insurance against total failure, and expressed particular interest

in the technical and engineering advantages of a pile that could be both

moderated and cooled with heavy

water. The Military Policy Committee,

therefore, decided to continue the

heavy water research already in

progress, recommending the expansion of heavy water facilities. Some

weeks earlier, Du Pont had suggested

that the manufacture of heavy water

by the distillation method could be

carried out by modifying certain facilities at the Morgantown (West Virginia), Wabash River (Indiana), and

Alabama Ordnance Works, where the

company was manufacturing munitions for the government. Consequently, in late December, Groves approved negotiation of contracts with

8

 See Ch. V for a fuller description of the historic

first sustained chain reaction on 2 Dec 42.
192 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION PLANT AT THE WABASH RIVER ORDNANCE WORKS

Du Pont to build and operate heavy

water plants at these facilities. (See

Map 2.)

From the standpoint of pile engineering development, completion of a

pile design as quickly as possible was

a matter of considerable importance

to Du Pont. In January 1943, Du Pont

was still giving first priority to the

helium-cooled pile for the production

plant, even though company designers were experiencing little success in

resolving complex technical problems. A hopeful portent, however,

was Fermi's latest research finding

into the value of k, which revealed

that the margin of neutrons in a uranium-graphite pile was probably sufficient to make either liquid or air cooling feasible on a large scale. Encouraged by Fermi's data, Wigner and his

research team had pushed ahead on

designs for a water-cooled production

pile and were able to complete acceptable preliminary blueprints by

early January. At the same time, also

partly in response to Fermi's revelation, a team of Du Pont and Metallur-
THE PILE PROCESS 193

gical Laboratory engineers and scientists began intensive work on design

of an air-cooled pilot pile of moderate

wattage. In spite of minor difficulties,

the team completed virtually all pile

engineering designs and specifications

by the end of April. That same

month, in accordance with the earlier

decision to move the location of the

plutonium semiworks from Chicago

to Clinton, Du Pont commenced pile

construction at the Tennessee site.

Meanwhile, Wigner's group submitted the preliminary designs for the

water-cooled production pile to Du

Pont. Du Pont engineers at first were

skeptical about the feasibility of the

water-cooled pile, because they seriously doubted the problems of leakage and the water's corrosiveness

could be overcome; however, continuing problems with the helium-cooled

pile designs finally persuaded them

that Wigner's pile might be the

answer for the plutonium production plant. Terminating all helium

pile research in mid-February, Du

Pont design teams worked at an accelerated pace through the spring,

summer, and early fall to complete

blueprints for a water-cooled pile. In

October, as the early stages of building the plant at the Hanford site in

south central Washington State were

rapidly nearing completion, delivery

of the design specifications precluded

serious delays in meeting pile construction schedules.

Chemical Separation Process Design

In the fall of 1942, the problems of

developing the second stage of the

plutonium production process—the

chemical separation of the new element from irradiated uranium—appeared less formidable to General

Groves and Du Pont officials than

those relating to development of the

pile and separating the isotope U-235

from U-238, because chemical separation generally involved techniques

already familiar to chemists and

chemical engineers. But time proved

this optimism was not warranted;

project scientists and engineers spent

almost as long developing an industrial-scale separation process as they

did to complete design and engineering of a pile production process.

Since the beginning of the year, research teams at the Universities of

Chicago and California, Berkeley, and

at Iowa State College had worked

without letup to design a suitable separation process. Handicapped at first

by the unavailability of more than microgram quantities of plutonium, the

teams had tested a variety of methods, all of which had required handling the intensely radioactive byproducts by remote control. Deciding

finally in favor of a precipitation process employing lanthanum fluoride in

solution as the carrier, project chemists convened in Chicago on 15 October to present the results of their research to representatives of the Army,

Du Pont, and Stone and Webster.9

9

 For a fuller account of development of a process

for the chemical separation of plutonium consult

Met Lab Monthly Rpts, CN-114, -239, -250, -261,

-299, -343, -359, -419, -421, mostly 1942, ANL;

Min, Lab Council (Met Lab), 31 May 43 (Rpt CSContinued
194 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

General Groves, Colonels Marshall

and Nichols, and Captain Grafton

joined with officials from the two

firms serving as prime contractors on

the plutonium project and members

of the Metallurgical Laboratory staff

to hear leaders of the separation

process research teams describe why

they believed the lanthanum fluoride

method was feasible for a large-scale

production plant. Impressed by the

practicality of the research teams'

proposed separation process based on

the precipitation method, both Army

and industry representatives approved

going ahead with further tests. They

also were duly impressed by the evidence of intense radioactivity in the

separation process, a fact that subsequently contributed to the Military

Policy Committee's decision in December to shift the plutonium production plant from Tennessee to another location.

As further research in the winter

and spring of 1943 revealed that lanthanum fluoride presented certain

chemical problems not previously discerned, project scientists began testing other substances and found that

bismuth phosphate gave the best results. In May, Du Pont managers decided in favor of designing the chemical separation units at the Clinton

semiworks and the Hanford production plant to employ bismuth phosphate, with the possibility of lanthanum fluoride as a backup choice,

because both chemicals could be

employed in the same type of

equipment.

Du Pont Collaboration and

Other Problems

Steady progress on development of

pile and chemical separation process

designs in early 1943 demonstrated

the basic validity of the Army-orchestrated arrangements for collaboration

between the Metallurgical Laboratory

and Du Pont. On occasion, however,

some differences surfaced between

the two organizations that posed a

possible threat to fully effective joint

cooperation. When such instances occurred, the Army promptly intervened

and endeavored to provide the direction and guidance essential to maintaining viable collaboration. In January, for example, Major Peterson,

who recently had replaced Captain

Grafton as the Chicago area engineer,

joined with Compton in developing a

plan to move the first chain-reacting

pile from the University of Chicago's

West Stands squash court to the Argonne site. Fermi and his fellow scientists wanted to keep the pile on

campus; however, Army and Du Pont

officials considered pile operation in

the heavily populated university district much too hazardous. A short

time later, the Army also acted as arbitrator for Du Pont and the University of Chicago, securing an agreement

from the latter that it would operate

the Clinton semiworks.

694) and 3 Jul 43 (Rpt CS-749), ANL; Min, Conf at

Met Lab, 15 Oct 42, MDR; DSM Chronology, 14

Dec 42, Sec. 25, OROO; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 2, Pt. 1,

pp. 6.1-6.8, and Pt. 2, 5.2, and Vol. 3, pp. 6.5-6.6

and 6.9, DASA; Smyth Report, pp. 71-73, 86-88, 97-

100; Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 50-52, 55-56, 100-

101, 175-76; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 41-42;

Glenn Seaborg, The Transuranium Elements (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), pp. 20-27;

Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 182-85 and

204-05.
THE PILE PROCESS 195

MAJ. ARTHUR V. PETERSON

While collaboration between the

Metallurgical Laboratory and Du Pont

proceeded harmoniously on most

matters, the emergence of seemingly

innocuous misunderstandings in February portended more serious disagreement in the future.10

 One of the

first "minor" disputes erupted over a

question on the extent the physicists

who had designed the water-cooled

pile at the Metallurgical Laboratory

should participate in drawing up the

detailed engineering blueprints and

specifications for the production

plant. Crawford H. Greenewalt, Du

Pont's liaison representative to the

Metallurgical Laboratory, pointed out

that Du Pont's customary policy was

to rely primarily upon its own staff

for detailed design and that, while Du

Pont would want to have continued

access to the Chicago scientists for

occasional assistance, the initiative in

requesting such help should come

from the company. Eugene Wigner,

who had considerable training in engineering as well as physics, disagreed. He contended that his team

was entitled to an active role. When

Wigner learned Du Pont did not plan

to invite his group to Wilmington, he

concluded that his own earlier expressed opposition to having the firm

participate in the plutonium project

was the reason. He offered to resign

as group leader, hoping that would

clear the way for the rest of his team

to go to Wilmington. Compton explained that Du Pont's action was customary practice and not motivated by

any personal objection to the scientist. While Wigner's suspicions were

not entirely allayed, he agreed to continue with the project. He stayed only

briefly in Wilmington, however, and

then returned to Chicago, where

Compton diverted him to the expanding heavy water pile program.11

The Wigner incident pointed up a

major problem for the Army in administering the Manhattan Project. As

development of a process moved

from basic research into engineering,

10

 Memo, Compton to Groves, sub: Opn of Piles

I, II, and III, 19 Jan 43; Memo, Compton to Groves,

sub: Chain-reacting Unit on Univ of Chicago

Campus, 2 Feb 43; Rpt, Compton, Fermi, and

Robert S. Stone (Clinical-Biological Physics Div

chief, Met Lab), sub: Public Hazards at West Stands,

3 Feb 43. All in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12

(Projs and Prgms), MDR. Hewlett and Anderson,

New World, pp. 200-201. Ltr, Compton to Groves, 5

Feb 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (misfiled

under Therm Diff Proj), MDR.

11

 Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 168-69; Ltr, Wigner

to Compton, 5 Aug 43, Incl to Memo, Peterson to

Groves, sub: Dissatisfaction at Met Lab, 13 Aug 43,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 080 (Labs), MDR.
196 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

construction, and operations, many of

the scientists were no longer needed.

Yet Manhattan leaders had to have

ready access to the fundamental

knowledge and skills of these scientists. For security reasons, too, scientists who had become privy to important aspects of the program could not

simply be released and sent back to

the colleges and universities. One solution was to transfer them to laboratory positions at Clinton, Hanford,

Los Alamos, or to the staff of industrial firms under contract to the

project. But for the majority who

must be retained on the staff of basic

research organizations like the Metallurgical Laboratory, there had to be

continuing programs of meaningful

research and development. In such a

novel and relatively undeveloped

field, devising useful research projects

was not difficult; the problem was to

keep the always limited resources in

manpower and materials channeled

into those projects that would contribute most directly to the ultimate

production of atomic weapons.

By spring, Compton found a good

compromise solution in the project

for design of a heavy water pile, already under way on a limited scale

and acceptable to both Du Pont officials and Groves because they viewed

it as an essential backup for the Hanford plant. Furthermore, it was of interest to many of the Metallurgical

Laboratory scientists. The promise of

increasing supplies of heavy water

from both Trail (British Columbia)

and the Du Pont-operated distillation

plants prompted Compton to work

out an agreement with Greenewalt

and Colonel Nichols that provided for

centering all future heavy water research at the Metallurgical Laboratory

under the direction of Professor

Henry D. Smyth, head of the physics

department of Princeton University.12

But Major Peterson reported that,

in spite of the initiation of the heavy

water pile program, Metallurgical

Laboratory scientists continued to be

discontented with Du Pont's methods

and procedures. Many disliked the tedious work of reviewing the detailed

blueprints for the Hanford plant, a

chore made necessary because the

Metallurgical Laboratory had to approve all process designs. When they

found errors, they concluded Du Pont

was mismanaging pile development.

Wigner, too, again complained that

Du Pont was not consulting sufficiently with its Chicago counterpart on

heavy water pile design, thus delaying

its development.

In late June, Groves decided the

time had come to deal with what he

termed the "scientist problem." In

12

 For a detailed discussion of Manhattan

Project's heavy water program and heavy water pile

development see MDH, Bk. 3, "The P-9 Project,"

and Bk. 4, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, pp. 3.3-3.14, DASA. Brief

discussion in this and following paragraph on the

heavy water pile program at Chicago based on

Notes on Conf Held at Wilmington, Del., on April

16th, Incl to Memo, Nichols to Groves, 19 Apr 43,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 337 (Wilmington), MDR;

Ltr, Greenewalt to Compton, 12 Jun 43, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 441.2 (Polymer), MDR; Transmittal Ltr, Compton to P-9 Reviewing Committee

Members, sub: Memo on Transmittal of P-9 Rpt,

11 Aug 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 334 (P-9 Reviewing Committee), MDR; Memo, Capt Lawrence

L. Grotjan (Columbia Univ Area Engr) to Nichols,

17 Apr 46, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Urey),

MDR; MPC Min, 9 Sep 43, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 23, Tab A, MDR; DSM Chronology, 10 Nov 42, Sec. 23(i), OROO; Hewlett and

Anderson, New World, pp. 201-04; Smyth Report, pp.

101-02; Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 99-100; Groves,

Now It Can Be Told, p. 15, n. 8.
THE PILE PROCESS 197

line with a suggestion from the Military Policy Committee, he arranged

with President Franklin D. Roosevelt

to write a letter, addressed to him but

actually intended for the atomic

project scientists. Emphasizing first

the need for strictest adherence to security in atomic matters (there had

been incidents involving scientists,

particularly at Los Alamos), the President went on to say that he had

placed Groves in complete charge of

carrying out "all development and

manufacturing aspects of the work."

He concluded that "whatever the

enemy may be planning, American

Science will be equal to the

challenge."

 13

The Manhattan commander made

certain this letter received wide circulation among project scientists. In

Wigner's group, it appears to have

elicited an unfavorable response.

"They felt," Peterson reported to

Groves, "that it was unfair for the

President to give authority to you and

that his closing sentence concerning

American Scientists being equal to

any challenge was a farce since he allowed them neither responsibility nor

authority." In the opinion of some

members of the group, "the presence

of Du Pont and the Army slows the

project. . . ."

 14

In early August, General Groves

appointed a committee to review the

role the heavy water program should

have in the atomic bomb project, a

step that was, at least in part, also intended to allay dissatisfaction among

the Chicago scientists. Headed by

MIT Professor (chemical engineering)

Warren K. Lewis, with Standard Oil

Vice President Eger V. Murphree,

physicist Richard C. Tolman, who was

Groves's scientific adviser, and Harvard Professor (chemistry) E. Bright

Wilson, Jr., as members, the group

upheld the Army, Du Pont, and

Compton's earlier objectives. They

recommended continuation of a relatively modest heavy water pile research program at the Metallurgical

Laboratory "as insurance against a

possible failure of the Hanford graphite piles to produce 49 [plutonium] at

their rated capacity, and secondarily

to explore the possibilities of a

method for producing 49 which might

utilize uranium more efficiently than

graphite piles."

 15

By early fall, the scientists' dissatisfaction had declined substantially,

partly as a result of the chance they

had had to unburden their grievances

to members of the committee and

partly because the major design phase

of pile development was nearing an

end. Even Wigner, acceding to Compton's wishes, agreed somewhat reluctantly to continue to oversee work on

the heavy water pile. Nevertheless,

Compton later recalled that, although

the collaboration had achieved basic

design of the plutonium semiworks

and production plant by late 1943,

there remained in the relationship "a

13

 Ltr (source of quotations), Roosevelt to

Groves, 29 Jun 43, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP

Files, Fldr 25, Tab D, MDR; MPC Min, 24 Jun 43,

MDR. 14

 Memo, Peterson to Groves, sub: Dissatisfaction

at Met Lab, 13 Aug 43, MDR. Peterson erred in

paraphrasing from the President's letter, stating

"American Scientists" instead of "American

Science."

15

 Rpt, Committee on Heavy Water Work, 19 Aug

43, Att. 2 to MPC Min, 9 Sep 43, MDR.
198 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

state of tension that caused continual

concern to those responsible for the

success of the undertaking."

 16

Organization for Plutonium Production

In early 1943, General Groves and

the Military Policy Committee devoted considerable attention to assisting

Du Pont and the Metallurgical Laboratory staff in forming a plutonium

production organization. In this organization Du Pont was to have primary

responsibility for design, construction, and—except for the semiworks—

operation of the plutonium facilities.

Because of the uniqueness of the

processes involved, the firm's limited

experience in dealing with them, and

the overall urgency of the bomb

project, Du Pont felt its scientists and

engineers would need assistance from

the Metallurgical Laboratory staff in

all phases of the plutonium program.

Thus, as the setting for collaboration

was about to shift-although in a

somewhat altered form—from the

design to the construction and production phases, the Army once again

had the primary administrative task of

preventing fundamental differences in

the two organizations' modus operandi

from interfering with the progress of

the program.

Du Pont's TNX Division

At the end of 1942, after analyzing

the unusual nature of the problems

involved in the plutonium production

process and weighing the District's

stringent requirements for security

and safety, Du Pont established a special organization for plutonium activities within the company itself.17

Given the designation TNX Division,

this new unit functioned as a subordinate element of the company's Explosives Department, which already had

designed and was operating a number

of government-owned munitions

plants. Locating the TNX Division in

a regular company department was

consistent with Du Pont's decision to

organize and administer its plutonium

program in accordance with its standard operating procedures, and, concomitantly, because this arrangement

helped to conceal the true character

of TNX operations, it fully satisfied

the District's requirements for project

security.

Du Pont's operating procedures differed somewhat from comparable industrial firms in the early 1940's. The

company did not have a highly centralized organizational structure and

method of operation but was a kind

of industrial confederation of semiautonomous departments, each with

many of the characteristics of an independent business enterprise. Guided

by broad policies laid down by top

executives, a general manager administered each department very much in

the same fashion as the president of a

company, operating under his own

budget and making most of the routine decisions. When additional assist16

 Compton, Atomic Quest, p. 169.

17

 Except as otherwise noted, subsection on Du

Pont's plutonium organization based on E. I. du

Pont de Nemours and Company, Du Pont's Part in the

National Security Program, 1940-1945 (Wilmington,

Del.: Du Pont, 1946), pp. 8-9; Rpt, Du Pont, sub:

Constr at Hanford Engr Works, Contract W-7412-

eng-1, Du Pont Proj 9536, Proj Hist (hereafter cited

as Du Pont Constr Hist), 9 Aug 45, Vol. 1, pp. 22-

39, HOO; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 3, pp. 10.2-10.3 and

App. B7, DASA; Groves Diary, 16 Dec 42, LRG;

Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 187-88.
THE PILE PROCESS 199

ance was needed, the manager could

get it from Du Pont's permanent auxiliary departments—the Engineering

Department, for example—that furnished regularly required services,

such as plant construction and personnel recruitment.

Consistent with these operating

procedures, Du Pont's management

turned over to the general manager

of the Explosives Department, E. B.

Yancey, overall responsibility for most

of the company's plutonium program.

Yancey, already extensively involved

in other wartime projects, delegated

direct authority over the program to

his assistant general manager, Roger

Williams. A chemical engineer with

extensive experience in wartime construction for the government, Williams's introduction to the atomic

project had been as a member of the

Lewis reviewing committee. He now

became, in effect, the active head of

the TNX Division, with responsibility

for Du Pont plutonium activities at

Wilmington, Clinton, and Hanford.

Drawing personnel from most of

the departments of Du Pont, as well

as from company-operated war plants

and the Metallurgical Laboratory,

Williams organized TNX into two

major subdivisions: the Technical Division, which carried out design development in close collaboration with

the Chicago and Clinton researchers;

and the Manufacturing Division,

which advised the Engineering Department on construction of the plutonium facilities and planned and supervised production plant operations.

From the Grasselli Chemicals Department, Williams selected chemical engineer Crawford Greenewalt to head

the Technical Division. Serving, as

General Groves perceived it, "as the

bridge between the hard-driving,

thoroughly competent, industrialminded engineers and executives at

Wilmington and the highly intelligent

but theoretically inclined scientists at

Chicago," Greenewalt spent much of

his time at the Metallurgical Laboratory and Clinton semiworks and thus

left his assistant, George Graves, in

charge of routine administration.18

Williams's choice to head the Manufacturing Division was R. Monte

Evans, a production manager of long

experience, most recently with the

company's Ammonia Department.

The extensive involvement of Du

Pont's Engineering Department in the

atomic project came about as a result

of the company's policy of building its

own plants rather than contracting

them out to regular construction

firms. E. G. Ackart, Du Pont's chief

engineer and Engineering Department head, assigned to his deputy,

Granville M. Read, primary responsibility for the construction aspects of

the plutonium program and to John

N. Tilley the vital role of liaison officer to the Explosives Department.

Eventually, the Engineering Department committed more than 90 percent of its personnel and resources to

plutonium construction.

Metallurgical Project

In 1943, shortly after Du Pont had

established its TNX Division, Arthur

Compton, faced with the rapid

growth of the plutonium research

program, extensively restructured and

expanded its administrative organization. By October, the plutonium orga18

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 79.
200 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

nization, now designated the Metallurgical Project,19

 comprised the Metallurgical and Argonne laboratories

at Chicago; the newly designed Clinton Laboratories (cover name for the

plutonium semiworks) at the Tennessee site; and the many research programs under way at other institutions—eventually seventy—in the

United States.

Giving up his dual position as

chairman of the Metallurgical Laboratory and its Executive Committee

(which he abolished), Compton

became director of the Metallurgical

Project and appointed three associate

directors: Norman Hilberry, his

former student and longtime personal

assistant, as associate director for research;

 20

 Robert S. Stone, from the

University of California at Berkeley,

as associate director for health matters; and Wilbur C. Munnecke, from

the University of Chicago, as associate

director for administration. At the

same time, using the Metallurgical

Laboratory Technical Council as a

basis, he established the policymaking Metallurgical Project Council

and, as council members, selected

twenty-five leading staff scientists

from the subordinate laboratories.

The Metallurgical Project was from

its initiation "a novel enterprise" for

Arthur Compton, who, even before

the reorganization of the plutonium

program, had realized that its ultimate success in producing some hundreds of pounds of plutonium for the

wartime needs of the atomic project

was dependent on coordinating the

resources and talents of literally thousands of scientists and technicians. He

had made a substantial beginning

toward attaining the program objective in 1942 through the organization

and operation of the Metallurgical

Laboratory, and now he endeavored

to assure its success by providing in

the Metallurgical Project the organization with the means to carry through

to completion the research, development, design, and engineering of the

plutonium facilities.

District Area Offices

Starting in late 1942, as the scientific and industrial elements of the

plutonium program rapidly expanded,

the Army responded by enlarging its

own organization for overseeing the

program. As each major element

began to function, the Manhattan District established an area office for it.

By early 1943, area offices were operating in Chicago, Clinton, and Hanford; at Du Pont headquarters in Wilmington, Delaware; at the heavy water

plants in British Columbia, West Virginia, Alabama, and Indiana; and at

the larger research programs in

progress elsewhere in the country,

19

 Subsection on Metallurgical Project based on

Org Chart attached to Rpt, Peterson, sub: Visit to

Chicago Proj, 29 Sep 42, MDR; Memo, Peterson to

Groves, sub: Met Proj Org Chart, 14 Oct 43, MDR;

Rpt, Compton, sub: Opn of Met Proj by Univ of

Chicago, 28 Jul 44, MDR; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 1,

"General Features," pp. 9.2-9.3, and Vol. 2, Pt. 1,

pp. 2.1-2.2, 7.1, App. B5, DASA; Smyth Report, pp.

63-65 and 92; Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 82-86

(quotations from p. 84), 157, 170-71, 185-86; Hilberry Interv, 3 Jan 63, CMH. 20

 Hilberry, who served as Compton's personal

representative on those occasions when the latter

could not carry out some of his many professional

commitments, became, in effect, associate director

of the entire Metallurgical Project in late 1943,

when Compton moved his headquarters to Oak

Ridge. Hilberry remained at the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago, where he had his office. See

Compton, Atomic Quest, p. 185.
THE PILE PROCESS 201

such as at Iowa State College in

Ames.21 (See Chart 1.)

In the early phases of plutonium

development, the Chicago and Wilmington area offices were the largest

and most important. And once Du

Pont started construction of the plutonium semiworks in Tennessee, the

district engineer enlarged Major Peterson's Chicago area responsibilities

to include the Clinton installation.

After visiting the site, Peterson set up

a Clinton branch of his Chicago area

office, designating it the TNX Operating Division. In August 1943, when

the District headquarters moved from

New York City to Oak Ridge, this division became the Clinton Laboratories Division as a result of a major administrative reorganization. Peterson,

while continuing as the Chicago area

engineer, assumed additional responsibilities as the new division chief but

turned over immediate supervision of

the plutonium semiworks to his new

assistant, Captain Grafton, who had

been with the recently abolished Clinton Area Engineers Office, until he

(Peterson) could relocate to the Tennessee site. To handle most of the

routine administrative services for the

Chicago area office, the District headquarters furnished the area office's

new division with a token staff of

three District officers, five (later nine)

technically trained enlisted men, and

five civil service employees. By late

1943 and early 1944, with the shift

from research and development to

construction and operation of the

large-scale production plant, the area

office at Hanford expanded rapidly

while those at institutional research

centers reduced their activities and

staffs.

The precise character of the administrative relationships between the

Chicago, Wilmington, Hanford area

offices and the Manhattan District

headquarters in Oak Ridge varied

considerably. Certain factors, however, tended permanently to influence

this relationship. One of these was

geography. The stringencies of wartime travel and communications and

Hanford's relatively isolated location

resulted in the area engineer, Lt. Col.

Franklin T. Matthias, having a good

deal more administrative autonomy,

at least in routine matters, than Peterson in Chicago or Maj. William L.

Sapper in Wilmington. Matthias maintained a permanent liaison official,

Mr. H. J. Day, in the Oak Ridge office

to keep him informed on current

Manhattan developments and to serve

as a channel for expediting action on

Hanford requests. By way of contrast,

the Chicago office always maintained

a much closer day-to-day relationship

with the District headquarters, particularly after Peterson began spending a major part of his time in

Tennessee as of late 1943.22

21

 Except as indicated, subsection on area offices

based on Org Charts, U.S. Engrs Office, MD, 15

Aug 43, 1 Nov 43, 15 Feb 44, 1 Jun 44, 28 Aug 44,

and 26 Jan 45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 020

(MED-Org), MDR; Ltr, Groves to Styer, sub: Promotion of Lt Col Franklin T. Matthias, 25 Oct 44,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 210.2 (Off Promo),

MDR; Matthias Diary, Jan-Sep 43, passim, OROO;

Du Pont, In National Security Program, App. 3B (originally issued as Stockholders Bulletin, 24 Aug 45), p.

61; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, "Construction," Apps.

B57-B58, and Vol. 6, "Operations," pp. 18.1-18.6

and Apps. B8-B10, DASA; Compton, Atomic Quest,

pp. 107-08; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 72-73.

22

 On charts showing the organization of the U.S.

Engineers Office, Manhattan District, Oak Ridge, in

late 1943, H. L. Day is listed as the liaison officer

for the plutonium project. See Org Charts, 15 Aug Continued
202 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

While the Chicago area engineer

supervised plutonium research and

development activities, the Wilmington area engineer had primary responsibility for monitoring plutonium

engineering and design, with a secondary assignment of supervising Du

Pont's feed materials program at the

company's Chambers Chemical and

Dye Works in Deep Water, New

Jersey. Design activities centered in

Wilmington, where the Du Pont

design staff and visiting Metallurgical

Project scientists collaborated on the

engineering blueprints and specifications for the plutonium facilities in

Tennessee and Washington State.

Review and approval of these designs

before their dispatch to company engineers at the Clinton and Hanford

sites constituted the most important

tasks of Major Sapper's Wilmington

staff, which, much of the time, received assistance from personnel who

were temporarily detailed from the

Hanford area office. Because close coordination between the Wilmington

and Hanford area offices was essential

on all matters relating to construction

and operation of the production

plant, Sapper reported to the district

engineer through Colonel Matthias.

A civil engineer with considerable

experience in civilian construction,

Colonel Matthias recruited both military and civilian personnel, many

from other Corps of Engineers

projects, to form the operating nucleus (more than five hundred personnel

by 1944) of a burgeoning office organization. To complement Du Pont's

field construction organization at the

Hanford site, Matthias established

major divisions to monitor the many

construction-related activities of the

prime contractor and its numerous

subcontractors. Similarly, to reflect

the reorientation of plant activities

when Du Pont converted its construction organization into one for plant

operations, he revamped the Hanford

area office by expanding the production division; by forming a new engineering and maintenance operations

division; and, to the extent necessary,

by reorganizing the security, safety,

labor relations, fiscal audits, and community affairs sections.23

Army-Du Pont Administration

The Army-Du Pont plan for coordinating and controlling project activities at the Hanford Engineer Works

(HEW) illustrates the way in which

District and TNX officials went about

jointly administering the plutonium

production program.24 On matters of

general policy, TNX executives could

consult with Colonel Nichols, to

whom Groves had given broad responsibility for plutonium construction and production, or, if necessary,

directly with Groves—but only after

informing Nichols. On nonpolicy matters, TNX officials were to communicate with Colonel Matthias (or, where

and 1 Nov 43, MDR. Matthias noted in his diary on

2 Aug 43 that Day was going to be located at the

Oak Ridge headquarters, after 14 August. On the

relative autonomy of the Hanford area engineer see

Matthias Diary, 12 Sep and 28 Oct 43, OROO.

23

 On the area engineer and Du Pont construction and operations organization at Hanford Engineer Works see MDH, Bk. 4, Vols. 5 and 6, each

App. B, DASA; Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, HOO;

Intro to Rpt, Du Pont, sub: Memoranda for File on

HEW Opns, 1944-46 (hereafter cited as Du Pont

Opns Hist), Sep 46, HOO. 24

 Ltr, E. B. Yancey to Dist Engr, Attn.: Nichols,

sub: Corps of Engrs-Du Pont Corresp and Contracts of HEW, 4 May 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 161 (Du Pont), MDR.
THE PILE PROCESS 203

appropriate, with Lt. Col. H. R.

Kadlec, his construction chief); or

Major Sapper at Wilmington; or Maj.

James E. Travis at District headquarters, who in 1943 headed the Service

and Control Division at Oak Ridge.

On questions relating to nonpolicy

matters submitted by Matthias,

Kadlec, and other staff members, Du

Pont's officials at the Hanford site

could make decisions, furnish information, or provide recommendations

as they saw fit; when necessary, they

could consult with their department

or division in Wilmington by teletype.

In those instances when the Hanford

area engineer or his staff members

were dissatisfied with results of inquiries directed to the Du Pont field

staff, they were authorized to communicate directly with Roger Williams or

Granville Read or with Major Sapper.

Inevitably, many problems arose

that could not be readily resolved by

the local area engineer, or even by

the district engineer, and the majority

of these ended up on General

Groves's desk in Washington, D.C.

Most often they involved important

policy decisions or required extensive

negotiations with other wartime agencies. For example, during the design

and construction phases of the plutonium project, Groves had to deal with

problems of electric power supply at

Hanford, acute shortages of essential

workers at both the Hanford Engineer Works and Clinton Laboratories,

deferment of key civilian scientific

and technical personnel, and procurement of a great variety of materials

and equipment. Groves and his small

liaison staff frequently intervened personally to expedite solutions. In a

comparatively few cases, problems

had to be resolved by the Military

Policy Committee or by special reviewing committees that Groves appointed. Typical was the heavy water

research and experimentation program, which required an investigation

by a reviewing committee arid a decision by the Military Policy Committee

to determine the scope of this

program and the extent of interchange with the Canadians that was

permissible.25

Beginning in late 1942, the combined efforts of Groves, Compton,

Greenewalt, and Williams facilitated

effective Metallurgical Project-Du Pont

collaboration through an interchange

of both expert personnel and scientific

and technical information of all

kinds.26 To explain the Metallurgical

Laboratory scientists' preliminary helium- and water-cooled pile designs to

Du Pont's TNX staff, Compton dispatched the respective pile research

teams to Wilmington. While most of

the Chicago scientists stayed at Wilmington only for a limited time, at least

one young physicist, John A. Wheeler,

who was an expert on pile development, became a permanent member of

the Du Pont design staff. The design

teams from Wilmington that visited

the Metallurgical Laboratory in November were the vanguard of many

others who, in subsequent months, fol25

 For examples of problems relating to power

and labor see correspondence in HB Files, Fldr 51,

MDR. The extent of Groves's involvement in solving such problems can be traced in Groves Diary,

Apr-Jun 43, passim, LRG. On the heavy water problem see MPC Min, 9 Sep 43, MDR. 26

 Discussion of development of the means for

collaboration between the Metallurgical Project and

Du Pont based on Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp.

48 and 79-80; Smyth Report, pp. 92-93; Compton,

Atomic Quest, pp. 164-65; DSM Chronology, 25 Nov

42, Sec. 23(a), OROO; Rpt, Whitaker, sub: Conf at

Wilmington, 17-18 Dec 42 (Rpt CS-406), ANL.
204 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

lowed periodically to confer with the

Chicago scientists about the latest developments in the pile process.

Greenewalt, too, regularly spent extended periods in Chicago (and, later,

at Clinton) and assigned Du Pont

physicist J. B. Miles as his permanent

representative at the Metallurgical

Laboratory. Both Greenewalt and

Miles, when they were in Chicago,

attended meetings of the Metallurgical

Project Council and regularly conferred with the laboratory group

leaders.

The frequent interchange of expert

personnel gradually became a key feature of the collaboration, extending

eventually to include not only exchanges between the Chicago scientists and Wilmington designers but

also between the Wilmington designers and the Clinton researchers, and

among the Clinton, Chicago, and

Hanford scientific staffs. While Metallurgical Project scientists on occasion

complained bitterly that the Du Pont

design staff was not consulting adequately with them on some matters,

on the whole the interchange appears

to have been one of the most essential and profitable aspects of the

collaboration.

Consistent with the plan to employ the Metallurgical Project essentially as a Du Pont research and development division, the plutonium

project leaders incorporated into the

Metallurgical Project-Du Pont work

relations agreement certain special

provisions to ensure a continuous and

adequate exchange of scientific and

technical information. The Metallurgical Project scientists regularly sent

copies of pertinent reports to the Du

Pont design team; in turn, the Wilmington designers kept the Chicago

and Clinton researchers fully informed on current layout and process

design decisions, all of which then

had to be approved by appropriate

members of the Metallurgical Project

staff. A further interchange occurred

when Du Pont submitted completed

blueprints and process drawings to

the district engineer for the usual

contract review. The district engineer,

in compliance with the work agreement, then sent the completed designs to the Metallurgical Project staff

for final approval of the scientific and

technical aspects.

The Semiworks: Clinton Laboratories

In the early months of 1943, while

design groups were still developing

pile process designs and engineering

specifications, Du Pont construction

workers began building the plutonium semiworks—in April, for security

reasons, officially designated Clinton

Laboratories—at the Clinton Engineer Works in Tennessee. The

semiworks site, consisting of 112

acres and officially named the X-10

area, lay between two ridges along a

small creek in the isolated Bethel

Valley, some 20 miles southwest of

the town of Clinton and about 10

miles southwest of the planned community of Oak Ridge. Tentative plans

for the semiworks (they would be altered and expanded several times

during the period of construction)

called for an air-cooled uraniumgraphite pilot pile and chemical separation plant,27

 as well as an extensive

27

 Plutonium project officials conceived the Clinton pilot pile and separation plant as a true

semiworks for the Hanford production plant; how- Continued
THE PILE PROCESS 205

research laboratory and a number of

support, training, and administrative

facilities.

Construction

In his February 1943 progress

report to General Groves, District Engineer Marshall set 1 July as the construction completion date for the plutonium semiworks.28

 The X-10 pile

and separation plant had to be put

into operation as quickly as possible,

to provide not only the design and

operational data for the Hanford production plant but also the small quantities of plutonium so urgently

needed for ongoing research and testing. Furthermore, the facilities were

required to train key Du Pont employees in the techniques of plant

operation.

Pending completion of engineering

designs for the permanent installations, and less than a month after

Du Pont had signed the letter contract (8 January 1943), company construction crews began building the

temporary, service, and utility facilities. In March, other Du Pont crews

began work on the permanent installations, starting with the chemical

separation plant. Even though

Greenewalt, who was supervising

design of this plant, had not yet

reached a decision on which of several chemical processes would be employed in it, the Wilmington design

teams had accumulated sufficient engineering data to permit a start on its

basic components. As these neared

completion in the late summer,

Greenewalt decided to employ the

bismuth phosphate separation

method, which required installation of

miles of pipe as well as other process

apparatus. By early fall the chemical

plant was ready for test operations,

but these could not be carried out

until the pilot pile produced irradiated uranium slugs.

Construction work on the pilot pile

did not progress as swiftly and expeditiously as that on the separation

plant, because the Du Pont design

staff did not complete the engineering blueprints for the air-cooled pile

until the end of April and crews excavating the pile site unexpectedly

struck a large bed of soft clay, necessitating installation of much more

foundation work than had been anticipated. It was June before construction

crews started pouring concrete for

the 7-foot-thick walls of the pile's

great outer shell, which would prevent escape of radioactive emissions,

and late summer before they completed them. Thousands of holes pierced

the front facing of the shell, to permit

insertion of uranium fuel slugs. The

side and rear walls and the massive

top also had numerous openings of

varying sizes and shapes, to accommodate experimental and operating

equipment built into the pile. The

outer shell finished, technicians began

to assemble the pile itself, putting

ever, with the decision to use water to cool the Hanford piles, the air-cooled pilot pile, strictly speaking,

lost its function. The officials weighed the possibility of converting the Clinton pile, but finally decided

that early production of small quantities of plutonium was more important. Hence, only the separation

plant functioned as a true pilot facility. See Smyth

Report, p. 76; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 2, Pt. 2, p. 4.1,

DASA. 28

 Subsection on semiworks construction based

primarily on Completion Rpt, Du Pont, sub: CEW,

TNX Area, 1 Apr 44, OROO; Dist Engr, Monthly

Rpts on DSM Proj, Jan-Sep 43, MDR; MDH, Bk. 4,

Vol. 2, Pt. 2, pp. 2.1-2.10, DASA; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 207-10.
206 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

into place hundreds of carefully machined graphite bars to form its inner

core—a structure measuring 24 feet

square and weighing an estimated

1,500 tons. In the meantime, other

workmen constructed the four-story

concrete and wood building to house

the pile and its auxiliary facilities—a

control room, a small "hot" laboratory equipped to handle radioactive

materials, and a core removal area.

In spite of constant pressure by

General Groves on Du Pont's Engineering Department, completion of

the Clinton Laboratories was slow,

primarily because of the extent of the

support and training facilities the

semiworks required. Because of the

isolation of the Bethel Valley X-10

site from the Y-12 (electromagnetic),

K-25 (gaseous diffusion), and S-50

(liquid thermal diffusion) areas, Du

Pont had to provide the semiworks

with its own machine shops, water

supply and treatment installations, a

steam plant, storage areas, and classrooms and laboratories for training. A

number of other factors beyond the

control of company officials also contributed to serious delays. The addition of installations not included in

the original engineering designs and

major alterations in building plans

doubled the amount of construction.

Furthermore, building schedules

could not be maintained in the face of

persistent shortages in both common

and skilled labor in the region adjacent to the Tennessee site that, despite efforts, grew worse in late 1943.

Unsatisfactory housing and commuting conditions aggravated these shortages by increasing absenteeism and

worker turnover. Finally, there were

the chronic wartime difficulties in

procurement of essential building

materials.29

The Army, endeavoring to assist

Du Pont in overcoming specific bottlenecks, achieved its greatest success

in expediting materials and equipment procurement. For example,

when Du Pont found that its standard

5-cubic-yard trucks for hauling readymixed concrete were too heavy for

the poor condition of the entrance

road at the construction site, the Clinton area engineer obtained on short

notice enough lighter trucks from the

St. Louis District to do the job. Similarly, the area engineer's procurement

staff arranged for the transfer of

steam boilers, an item in extremely

short supply, from a Du Pont plant

near Nashville to the X-10 site. In another instance, when the quarry at the

site failed to supply all the crushed

stone needed, the area engineer secured authorization for Du Pont to

pay a higher rate for material required in road construction, thus enabling the company to purchase additional amounts from sources available

outside the reservation.30

The Army's resolution of procurement problems enabled Du Pont to

meet the District's revised schedule

for completion and start-up operations of the semiworks, which General Groves optimistically predicted

in his October construction progress

report to Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer,

29

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 78; Ltrs, Read to

Groves, 15 Apr 43, and. Groves to Read, 22 Apr 43,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Projs and

Prgms), MDR; Completion Rpt, Du Pont, sub: CEW,

TNX Area, 1 Apr 44, pp. 44-72, OROO. See Ch.

XVII for details on measures taken to try to solve

the CEW labor shortage. 30

 Completion Rpt, Du Pont, sub: CEW, TNX

Area, 1 Apr 44, pp. 70-71 and 203-04.

208 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

the Army Service Forces chief of

staff,31 could be expected by mid-De- cember. Events in the ensuing

months bore out Groves's optimism.

Clinton Laboratories workers began

"charging" the pile in early November and, before the end of the year,

were processing the first batch of irradiated slugs in the chemical separation plant and sending the resulting

product to the Metallurgical Laboratory for use in further experiments.

And by early 1944, only weeks later

than Groves had estimated, the Manhattan commander had the satisfaction of knowing the semiworks was

largely completed and well on the

way to full operation.32

Operation

As director of the plutonium program, Compton began to develop

plans for operating pile facilities at

the Tennessee site as early as September 1942. He asked physicist

Martin D. Whitaker, who had taken

part in the early planning for a laboratory at the site, to select Metallurgical Laboratory staff members to serve

as the nucleus of the X-10 operating

organization. While witnessing the

ongoing planning and construction of

the Clinton Laboratories in the ensuing months, Whitaker and his staff

made the necessary preparations for

its future operation, giving a high priority to manpower recruitment.33

To obtain the requisite number of

operating personnel to perform both

industrial and managerial functions,

Whitaker's staff relied heavily on the

resources of the Metallurgical Project

laboratories and Du Pont. The first

permanent operating personnel arrived from the Metallurgical Laboratory in April, at which time Du Pont

began to transfer its technicians. The

number of employees increased rapidly during the months that followed,

peaking in March 1944 at fifteen hundred, which included the first ten of a

contingent of one hundred enlisted

men from the District's newly formed

Special Engineer Detachment (SED).

From March until the end of January

1945, which was the period of full

semiworks operation, total personnel

(that is, permanent employees, trainees for Hanford, and the SED

contingent) averaged about thirteen

hundred.34

As the pilot pile attained full-scale

operation in January 1944, Whitaker

and Compton submitted to Major Peterson, now chief of the Clinton Laboratories Division, a projected research and development program. In

it they outlined a specific schedule for

plutonium production through March

and, in some detail, emphasized that

more than 75 percent of the laboratories' 160-man technical staff would

concentrate on product isolation studies, which were essential for Hanford 31

 The Army Service Forces, formerly the Services

of Supply, became the official designation with the

issue of WD GO 14 on 12 March 1943. 32

 Memo, Groves to Styer, sub: Constr Progress,

MD, 19 Oct 43, AG 313.3 (22 Aug 47); Dist Engr,

Monthly Rpts on DSM Proj, Apr, May, Sep, Oct,

Dec 43 and Feb 44, MDR; Completion Rpt, Du

Pont, sub: CEW, TNX Area, 1 Apr 44, pp. 303 and

313, OROO; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 2, Pt. 2, pp. 4.7 and

5.3, DASA.

33

 Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 210-12. 34

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 2, Pt. 2, pp. 8.2-8.4 and App.

B7 (Summary, Total Employees of Clinton Labs),

DASA; Stanley L. Falk and Author, Notes on Intervs

of X-10 Personnel at Oak Ridge, 22-24 Jun 60,

CMH. See Ch. XVI for details on the formation of

special military units, such as the SED, and on other

aspects of personnel recruitment.
THE PILE PROCESS 209

operations, and only 12 percent on

product production. Peterson approved the program, without major

changes, as the basis for semiworks

operation that would contribute most

effectively to the continued development of large-scale plutonium

production.35

Soon after the pilot pile began operating, the Clinton Laboratories operating staff introduced certain design

modifications with the goal of achieving greater pile productivity. Month

by month, as the staff raised the efficiency of pile operation, Colonel

Nichols kept General Groves informed of the increased output. By

May, the pile was operating at a

power level of 1,800 kilowatts, almost

double that conceived by its designers, and the addition of two large fans

in June and July significantly raised

the level to 4,000 kilowatts.36

These increases would have been to

no avail, however, had the separation

plant failed to perform as anticipated.

The operating staff remained very uncertain about the success of the chemical plant, because process designers—lacking more than minute

amounts of plutonium—had not been

able to make adequate laboratory

tests of either the bismuth phosphate

or alternate lanthanum fluoride separation method, so by early 1944 plutonium project officials were greatly

relieved when the separation plant

produced a small amount of relatively

pure plutonium out of the first batch

of slugs from the pile. In February,

with the pilot pile producing irradiated uranium at a rate of one-third of a

ton each day, the district engineer estimated that plutonium production

for the first month of the separation

plant's operation would total over

500 milligrams. During the next five

months of operation, the operating

staff introduced occasional modifications that eventually increased the efficiency of the separation plant from

40 to over 90 percent. The plant operated as a production unit until January 1945, when enough plutonium

had been produced to meet project

needs. The Clinton Laboratories then

undertook experiments with other irradiated materials as fissionable fuel.

At this stage the separation process

was no longer required and the plant,

which had processed a total of 299

batches of uranium slugs, ceased

operations.37

In addition to testing and operating

the pilot pile and separation plant,

the Clinton Laboratories technical

staff supplemented the Metallurgical

and Argonne laboratories staffs' efforts to find solutions to the many

day-to-day problems that arose directly out of the design, construction, and

operation of the Hanford plants. For

example, the Clinton staff had an

active role in improving the canning

of uranium slugs, including development of techniques to detect failure

and tests to ascertain the effects of

35

 Memo, Whitaker and Compton to Peterson,

sub: Clinton Labs Prgm as of 1 Dec 43, 25 Jan 44,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Projs and

Prgms), MDR. 36

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 2, Pt. 2, pp. 4.1 and 4.8-4.9,

DASA; Dist Engr, Monthly Rpts on DSM Proj, Jan

and Aug 44, MDR.

37

 Dist Engr, Monthly Rpts on DSM Proj, Jan,

Mar-Jun, Oct 44 and Jan 45, MDR; MDH, Bk. 4,

Vol. 2, Pt. 2, pp. 5.1-5.5, DASA; Smyth Report, pp.

76 and 102-04; Hewlett and Anderson, New World,

pp. 211-12; Compton, Atomic Quest, p. 190. The

Clinton Laboratories technical staffs recommendations for the separation process are in the Rpt CN2021, 1 Oct 44, OROO.
210 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

water corrosion. They also studied

high-neutron absorption by certain

fission products produced in pile operation, a phenomenon that might

cause the pile to become inoperative.

But from a study of two of these

products, samarium and gadolinium,

they concluded that these rare elements

would not lead to shutdown of the pile.

They failed, however, to observe that

another of the neutron-absorbing

products, a radioactive isotope of

the rare gaseous element xenon, was a

far more potent poisoning agent. The

Clinton staff used the pile, too, for

testing materials to be employed in

construction of the Hanford piles, including aluminum, graphite, brass, neoprene, bakelite, concrete, and masonite

(for shielding).38

With completion of the essential aspects of the Clinton Laboratories program, which ran for more than two

years (1 March 1943-30 June 1945)

and cost approximately $12.3 million

($6.8 million just for salaries), the

University of Chicago was anxious to

be relieved of its responsibility as operator of the plutonium semiworks—a

role it had accepted, but with the

greatest reluctance. Acceding to the

university's request, General Groves

discussed with Compton the question

of transferring operations of the laboratories to an industrial firm. Their

choice was the Monsanto Chemical

Company of St. Louis. Groves delegated to Charles A. Thomas, a company official who had been associated

with the atomic project in various capacities and was currently coordinator

of chemical and metallurgical work at

Los Alamos, the task of carrying out

negotiations. On 2 May 1945,

Thomas and Groves met with other

company representatives to approve

an agreement under which Monsanto

would take over operations of the

Clinton Laboratories from the University of Chicago on 1 July. On this

date, Monsanto activated a special division to handle general administration, appointing Thomas as division

head, and Martin Whitaker assented

to stay on as director of the laboratories, now to oversee operations for

the production of experimental materials, such as radioactive isotopes, and

the conduct of radiation research.39

The Hanford Production Plant

While Du Pont was building the

semiworks, its TNX Division was

moving ahead with plans and preliminary preparations for construction of

the production plant. As soon as the

Army acquired the site, both the TNX

chief and Hanford area engineer set

up field organizations that promptly

began overseeing the formidable task

of establishing, in the vast and remote

semidesert region along the Columbia River, the support facilities essential to construction and operation of a

highly complex industrial enterprise.

Except for railroads and power transmission lines, these facilities were

almost entirely lacking, and Du Pont

and the Army had to devote many

months and considerable manpower

and materials to providing them

before construction could begin on

the plant's permanent structures.40

38

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, pp. 6.2-6.8, DASA.

39

 Ibid., Pt. 2, pp. 3.5-3.6, DASA; Groves Diary,

23-25 Apr and 2 May 45, LRG; Compton, Atomic

Quest, p. 197; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, p.

627. 40

 Paragraphs on preliminary measures that Du Continued
THE PILE PROCESS 211

CLINTON LABORATORIES, consisting of the large pilot pile building, the chemical separation

plant (structure directly to the rear), and other support facilities

Consequently, during much of

1943, Du Pont and its subcontractors

extended and improved existing

roads and railroads, power and telephone lines and sewer and water systems. They built temporary facilities

that, because of the remoteness of the

site and also the safety and security

requirements, had to be unusually extensive, including the Hanford camp for

construction workers, numerous buildings to house Du Pont and Army administrative personnel in the field,

and a variety of shops. Thus, at White

Bluffs, adjacent to the site selected

for the plutonium separation plants,

they built shops to fabricate concrete

pipes, masonite panels, and steel

plate sections; at Hanford, near the

construction camp, erected a shop

to shape, cut, bore, face, and test

graphite; and at strategic points in

the plant construction area, installed

five concrete plants. In addition, they

provided repair and maintenance

Pont and the Army had to carry out in preparation

for construction of the Hanford plutonium plant

based on MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, Secs. 1-5, DASA; Du

Pont Constr Hist, Vols. 1-2, HOO; Matthias Diary,

1943, passim, OROO; Memo, Travis to Marsden

(Ex Off, MD), sub: Status of HEW as of 2 Jun 43,

same date, in Rpt, sub: MD Proj Data as of 1 Jun

43, MDR. See Chs. XIII-XIV and XVI for detailed

account of measures taken to solve the problems in

materials and manpower procurement for Hanford.
212 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

shops, including those for railroad,

automotive, electrical, and construction equipment.

Du Pont and the Army also were

able to begin some work that related

directly to the construction of the

production plant. For example, the

Army's Seattle district engineer supervised soil tests and borings at the

sites selected for the permanent plant

facilities. These tests and soil samples

provided Du Pont field engineers with

essential data on the weight-carrying

capacities of the ground, especially

significant because many of the plant

installations were enormously heavy;

on rock formations likely to cause difficulties in excavation work; and on

the availability of aggregate for

making concrete. Field survey teams

inspected existing transmission lines

and road nets in the plant areas,

reaching the conclusion that these facilities were adequate to meet the requirements for the earliest phases of

plant construction. The area engineer

and Du Pont were able to agree on

optimum locations for most of the

major plant installations, taking into

account also safety, security, transportation, availability of river water, and

other related factors.41

Construction

Decisions on the character and location of various plant installations

deviated surprisingly little from the

general layout of the production plant

developed back in mid-December

1942 to serve as a guide in site selection. These early plans had projected

initial construction of at least three

pile and two separation units, with

provision made for the addition, if

need be, of three more piles and another separation unit. In the main,

such changes as the Du Pont design

team did make reflected the subsequent decisions to employ water cooling rather than helium for the graphite piles and a bismuth phosphate

precipitation method in the separation units.42

The specific layouts provided for

seven separate process areas, six of

them located generally in the northern half of the 400,000-acre Hanford

reservation and the seventh in a

sector directly north of the operating

village of Richland in the southeastern corner of the reservation (Map 4).

The three production piles were located at the points of a triangle

formed by a bend in the Columbia

River near White Bluffs. Designated

as the 100 B (West), 100 D (North),

and 100 F (East) Pile Areas, each was

about 1 mile square and, for reasons

of safety, about 6 miles distant from

any neighboring installation. About

10 miles directly south of the pile

sites were the three separation process areas: 200 W (West), 200 E (East),

200 N (North). In the West Area

there were two separation plants, with

a mile of open desert between them;

in the East Area, only a single separation plant; and in the North Area,

41

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, pp. 2.1-2.7, DASA; Matthias Diary, 24 Feb 43, OROO. See Chs. XVIII and

XIX for more details on development of process

support facilities for the production plant.

42

 This paragraph and the several that follow

based on DSM Chronology, 14 Dec 42, Sec. 25,

OROO; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 3, pp. 2.1-2.2., 3.1-3.7,

Apps. A2 and A4 (Maps, Location of Major Instls),

and Vol. 6, pp. 2.1-2.5, DASA; Du Pont Constr

Hist, Vols. 3-4, HOO; Hewlett and Anderson, New

World, pp. 214-22 and map opposite p. 225. See Ch.

XV for general layout of the plant in relation to site

acquisition.

214 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

only the lag-storage facilities for holding the pile-processed uranium metal

until natural decay reduced its radioactivity to a point where it could be

sent to the separation plants. In the

seventh process site—the 300 Area—

were the metal testing and fabricating

facilities for preparing uranium to be

charged into the piles.

In scheduling construction of the

various permanent installations, Du

Pont gave priority to the 300 Area,

for it included many installations that

were essential both to building and

operating the rest of the plant. Here,

for example, were facilities for testing

many of the building materials to be

incorporated into the piles and separation units, for preparing uranium

metal to be charged into the piles,

and for assembly and calibration of

instruments to control production operations and protect workers against

radiation. One of the buildings

housed an operating test pile. Another held the machines that

"canned" uranium in metal containers to be inserted for processing in

the piles.

In spite of the high priority, however, Du Pont experienced great difficulty in meeting building schedules in

the 300 Area. Stabilizing designs was

the most frequent cause of delay, attributable primarily to the lack of previous experience. Related to the

design problem was the frankly experimental character of many of the facilities. Other factors slowing construction were the shortage of skilled

labor and the classified nature of

much of the work, requiring restriction of access to the 300 Area. Yet

construction crews pressed forward

during the summer and fall of 1943,

turning to the area engineer for assistance. Through Army intervention

with wartime labor officials, the company secured permission for double

work shifts of nine hours on urgently

required buildings. It also obtained

special handling in procurement of

certain materials. It let subcontracts,

which the area engineer approved, to

firms with specially qualified personnel and equipment and speeded up

procedures for approval and issue of

designs. These various expedients,

however, were never quite sufficient

to overcome the bottlenecks, and

work in the 300 Area remained consistently behind schedule.43

In the three pile areas and the 300

Area, Du Pont faced the problem of

erecting a great variety of facilities.

Each pile area comprised an industrial

complex made up not only of a production unit but also of support elements. The latter included equipment

for pumping vast amounts of water

from the nearby river and subjecting

it to treatment to make it suitable for

cooling the piles. It also included refrigeration and helium-purification

units and extensive storage facilities.

Each area, too, had its own facility to

provide steam and some electricity.

Most of the support elements had to

be housed in large industrial-type

buildings, some of them with tall

stacks and water storage tanks on

high steel-frame towers.

For the experienced Du Pont engineers and foremen, much of the work

was sufficiently conventional to

present no serious problems other

43

 Dist Engr, Monthly Rpts on DSM Proj, NovDec 43 and Dec 44, MDR; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, pp.

6.1-6.4 and Apps. B35-B37 (Tables and Charts,

Constr Progress and Subcontracts for Metal Fab and

Test Area), DASA.
THE PILE PROCESS 215

THE 300 AREA AT HEW, where Du Pont workers manufactured uranium slugs and tested

materials for the piles. The slogan on the water tower reads, "Silence Means Security."

than those attributable to geographic

isolation and wartime conditions. The

exception was the production piles.

Housed in concrete structures rising

more than 120 feet from the flat

desert floor, these great machines for

transmuting uranium into plutonium

presented construction problems

never encountered before, even by

Du Pont's highly competent field

forces. As in the 300 Area, but on a

far vaster scale, the construction

crews not only had to cope with

almost day-to-day changes in design

and specifications but also to adopt

many expedients based upon results

of tests, construction experience, and

limitations of materials.

Using water as a coolant required

installation of a complex system of

river pumps; purification, aeration,

and distillation units; and retention

basins for holding radioactive water

until natural decay permitted its

return to the Columbia. Because

keeping the piles at a proper temperature was crucial, plant designers included a refrigeration unit in both the

North (100 D) and East (100 F) Areas

as a precautionary measure to cool

river water during the summer

months; however, to save time, they
216 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

THE 100 B PILE AREA AT HEW, consisting of the production pile (building with single

stack), the steam-electric plant (building with twin stacks), the pump house (on the Columbia

River), and other support facilities

did not provide this unit in the West

(100 B) Area, gambling on the chance

it might not be necessary.44

Completion of at least one pile and

a separation unit would start production of urgently needed plutonium.

Accordingly, Du Pont and Army officials agreed to give the West Pile

Area priority, concentrating the limited materials and manpower available

to expediting its construction. Late in

1943, they scheduled the West Pile

for operation by June 1944, but by

February, with the plant only 27 percent complete, they rescheduled the

start-up date to mid-August. At the

same time, they established later completion dates for the North and the

East Pile Areas.

The pace of construction, however,

was disappointing. In general, the factors that slowed construction in the

300 Area also adversely affected the

pile areas—the isolated location of

the Hanford reservation, aggravating

shortages of manpower and essential

materials, the uniqueness of much of

the construction, and the continuing

need for alterations in original designs and specifications.

44

 Paragraphs on construction of production piles

based on MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, pp. 3.2-3.5, 6.5-6.22,

Apps. B38-B42, and Vol. 6, pp. 2.5-2.18, DASA;

Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 3, pp. 636-811, HOO;

Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 216-18; Dist

Engr, Monthly Rpts on DSM Proj, Jan-Mar 44, MDR.
THE PILE PROCESS 217

As in the 300 Area, the Army gave

its approval to Du Pont's various expedients to speed up construction.

The company instituted shift work in

September 1943, at the same time extending the regular work week to six

nine-hour days (in some cases,

manual labor temporarily put in ten

hours a day, seven days of the week).

It let more than thirty subcontracts to

firms that would carry out specialized

aspects of the job—for example,

boiler and elevated tank erection,

pipe work, concrete block and cement

brick construction, channel excavation—and thus gained access to desperately needed manpower and

equipment. And Du Pont repeatedly

turned to District procurement personnel in Hanford, Oak Ridge, and

Washington, D.C., for assistance in

obtaining a great variety of scarce materials and equipment, including such

items as solenoid valves, synthetic

cable, and stainless steel fittings and

valves. The Army also expedited shipment of many crucial items from suppliers distant from the isolated site,

authorizing use of air and rail express, trucks, and even the Army Air

Forces' Air Transport Command

planes. The Army, too, allowed Du

Pont's TNX Division to ease the persistent design bottlenecks by sending

out special personnel to work in the

division engineer's office at the West

Pile site, authorizing them to make

on-the-spot minor alterations without

clearing them with the home office.

By spring of 1944, these expedients

and a gradual easing of manpower

problems brought a decided improvement in the progress of pile area construction. The district engineer estimated that the West Pile Area was

nearly half completed, and in September he pronounced it ready to go into

operation. Du Pont construction

crews failed to meet the scheduled

October completion date for the

North Pile, requiring an additional

two months. Then, with the advantage of experience and a far more

adequate supply of labor, they managed to finish the East Pile Area on

10 February, five days earlier than the

projected completion date. Weeks

earlier, the West Pile had discharged

its first batch of "active metal," and

plant workers immediately sent it to

the West Separation Area for

processing.45

In building the chemical separation

facilities, Du Pont crews encountered

many of the same problems they

faced in construction of the production piles; however, for the most part,

the problems were never quite as

severe. There was more time to build

the separation units, as no irradiated

slugs would be ready for processing

until weeks or months after the first

pile began to operate, and there were

fewer installations to build, with a

total of thirty-two process buildings in

the three separation areas (200 E, W,

and N) as compared with fifty-three in

the three pile areas. Also, there was

less need for changes in specified

design, construction materials, and

equipment.46

45

 See MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, Apps. B41 (List, Subcontractors for Pile Area Constr) and B42 (List, Materials Used), DASA; Dist Engr, Monthly Rpts on

DSM Proj, Apr, Jun, Nov, Dec 44 and Feb 45, MDR. 46

 Paragraphs on construction of plutonium separation units based on MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, pp. 3.5-

3.7, 6.22-6.31, Apps. B43-B46, and Vol. 6, pp.

2.18-2.26, DASA; Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 3, pp.

812-983, HOO; Hewlett and Anderson, New World,

pp. 219-22; Dist Engr, Monthly Rpt on the DSM

Proj, Jan 44, MDR.
218 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Design problems were a significant

factor in delaying the construction of

the separation plants. Du Pont design

teams could do little toward providing detailed blueprints and specifications until project scientists and engineers reached a decision on the exact

chemical process to be employed.

Even after the decision to use the bismuth phosphate method, designers

had to await additional data from the

Clinton separation plant, still under

construction. Consequently, in 1943,

Du Pont had accomplished little

beyond site preparation and excavation in the separation plant areas.

Detailed blueprints and specifications, finally ready by early 1944, projected construction of four separation

plants—two in the East Area and two

in the West Area (in June, project officials canceled one East Area unit

when performance data at the Clinton

separation plant indicated it probably

would not be needed). Completed

layouts provided for a variety of process buildings and supporting facilities.

The dominant feature of each plant

area was a "cell building," an enlargement of the six-cell unit in the

Clinton plant. Viewed from a distance across the level desert, this

massive (800 feet long, 65 feet wide,

and 80 feet high) concrete structure

resembled an ancient mausoleum. A

railroad system interconnected the

various facilities and provided the

means for transporting the thickwalled portable casks that brought irradiated slugs from the pile areas for

temporary storage in the North Area

and final processing in the East or

West Separation Areas.

Insufficient manpower proved a

major problem never fully solved, but

partially alleviated by Army-sanctioned reallocation of workers from

other parts of the project, very frequent use of shift and Sunday work,

and extended hours. Materials shortages, most notably of stainless steel,

resulted in serious delays. With District assistance, Du Pont saved three

to four months in obtaining stainless

steel for more then 700,000 feet of

piping; 150,000 bolts; and other

equipment. The company saved time,

too, by subcontracting (with approval

of the area engineer) work on structural steel, railroads, pipe and tank

installation, and other aspects of

construction.

The disappointing progress in construction reported by the district engineer at the end of December 1943

clearly indicated that his earlier projections had been far too optimistic.

Thus in February 1944, Du Pont

issued new start-up dates for various

elements of the pile and separation

areas, which became the basis for

subsequent building schedules. Although plagued by continuing delays

in delivery of stainless steel, Du Pont

completed the two West Area separation plants and the North Area lagstorage facilities in December, in time

to accept the first irradiated slugs

from the West Pile. Finally, in early

February 1945, with the East Separation Area ready to be turned over to

operating crews, Colonel Nichols reported to General Groves that the

Hanford Engineer Works was substantially completed.47

47

 Dist Engr, Monthly Rpts on DSM Proj, Jan,

Apr, Jun, Dec 44 and Jan 45, MDR.
THE PILE PROCESS 219

CHEMICAL SEPARATION PLANT UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT HEW

Operation

Although construction crews were

months away from completing all of

the major elements of the plant, Du

Pont operating crews took the first

step in starting plant operations when

they began charging the West Pile

with aluminum-covered uranium slugs

on 13 September 1944.48 As with the

electromagnetic and diffusion plants

at the Clinton Engineer Works, production of plutonium at Hanford was

a highly technical operation, carried

out, for the most part, by an operating force comprised of Du Pont engineers, technicians, and trained plant

personnel. The Army had only a limited role in plant operations, its primary function being to maintain those

conditions in the plant areas and

Richland village community that

would enhance in every way possible

production of plutonium. To this end,

the Hanford Area Engineers Office

continued to provide most of the

services instituted in the period of

site development and plant construction, including security, safety, transportation and communications, personnel and materials procurement,

fiscal and contract review, and community support.

48

 Except as indicated, subsection on production

plant operation based primarily on MDH, Bk. 4,

Vol. 6, DASA; Du Pont Opns Hist, HOO; Matthias

Diary, Sep 44-Aug 45, OROO; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 304-10. The Army's activities

in providing essential services are described in subsequent chapters, especially XVI-XX.
220 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

COMPLETED CHEMICAL SEPARATION PLANTS (foreground and background), serviced by

the twin-stacked steam-electric facility

In mid-August, Du Pont operating

personnel began taking over the West

Pile building, although construction

crews continued to work in the area.

On the seventeenth, Colonel Matthias

notified Colonel Nichols at Oak Ridge

that he thought "anytime after the

27th of August would be a good time

to come out for the initial starting operations." Both Nichols and Groves

found reasons for visiting: ostensibly,

as project officials, to confer on labor

and safety problems; tacitly, as engineers, undoubtedly drawn by the natural desire to see near completion a

project to which they both had devoted many months of effort. Groves arrived on 1 September and Nichols on

the following day. Matthias took each

on a personal inspection tour. Both

gave special attention to the crucial

preparation of the uranium fuel. They

were pleased to learn that a welding

process had largely eliminated leaks

in the cans, or slugs that held the uranium fuel, a problem that for many

months had posed a threat to the

whole process.49

Neither Groves nor Nichols could

be present on 13 September, when

the plant workers started up the West

49

 Matthias Diary, 1-2 Sep 44 and 17 Aug 45

(source of quotation), OROO; Groves Diary, 1 Sep

44, LRG. On uranium canning problem see MDH,

Bk. 4, Vol. 6, pp. 4.7-4.9 and 5.7-5.8, DASA; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 223-26 and 303-

04.
THE PILE PROCESS 221

Area production pile for the first

time. But Colonel Matthias was on

hand, as were Compton and Fermi

from the Metallurgical Project and

Greenewalt and Williams from Du

Pont. In a scene somewhat reminiscent of that dramatic occasion when

Fermi had achieved the first controlled chain reaction, the redoubtable Italian physicist inserted the initial

uranium fuel can into the production

pile at 5:43 P.M. Thus began the slow

procedure, interrupted by many tests

that would bring the pile, on the fifteenth, to that level of reactivity

known as dry critical. At this stage,

without cooling water present in the

fuel tubes, the pile contained enough

uranium to sustain a chain reaction.

Up to this point the pile was performing precisely as anticipated.50

For the next few days the loading

crews, under Fermi's guidance, inserted additional slugs, building up to the

number he estimated would be required for the pile to be reactive with

cooling water in the tubes. They

reached this number—actually 838

tubes loaded—late in the afternoon of

18 September and began final tests of

the cooling system. These tests and

other measurements continued for

several days, until shortly before midnight on the twenty-sixth. At 10:48

P.M., with more than 900 of the 2,004

tubes loaded, they started withdrawal

of the control rods to begin for the

first time plutonium manufacture on a

production scale. But to their surprise, when they tried to increase the

power level, the level of reactivity

began to decline and, by 6:30 P.M. on

the twenty-seventh, the pile shut

down completely. Colonel Matthias

immediately informed General

Groves, who was visiting the Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley. Arriving

in San Francisco on the thirtieth,

Matthias explained to Groves that the

pile operators at first believed that

water, or some other neutron-absorbing substance, had leaked into the

pile. Yet when they found no evidence of this, they concluded that unanticipated buildup of a fission byproduct had inhibited reactivity

of the pile. Matthias suggested to

Groves "that certain of the high-ranking

scientists come out to Hanford immediately to supervise corrective action."

 51

Meanwhile at Hanford, Greenewalt

had turned to the Metallurgical

Project scientists for an explanation.

Nothing in the Clinton operations

seemed to provide an answer, but the

Argonne staff discovered that when

they ran the heavy water pile at its

highest power level for a period of

twelve hours (which they had not previously done), its reactivity first rose

and then declined following a pattern

similar to that observed at Hanford.

The data from the Argonne pile also

confirmed that the "poisoning" of the

pile was caused by one of the fission

by-products, a radioactive isotope of

the rare gaseous element xenon. At a

meeting with Compton and Metallurgical Project scientists in Chicago on

50

 Matthias Diary, 13-14 Sep 44, OROO; Rpt,

Matthias to Dist Engr, sub: Monthly Opns, 30 Sep

44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Misc), MDR;

Du Pont Opns Hist, Intro, p. 22, and Bk. 4, HOO.

51

 Quotation from Matthias Diary, 30 Sep 44

OROO. See also ibid., 16-17, 19-21, 25-29 Sep 44,

OROO; Groves Diary, 29-30 Sep 44, LRG; Dist

Engr, Monthly Rpt on DSM Proj, Sep 44, MDR;

Memo, Matthias to Groves, sub: Status of 100 B

Area Opns, 18 Sep 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

319.1 (Misc), MDR; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 6, pp. 4.9-

4.10 and App. D1 (Xenon Poisoning), DASA.
222 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

3 October, Groves was highly critical

of the scientists for not having discovered a phenomenon that might well

prevent production of sufficient plutonium in time to be used in the war.

Sensing the gravity of Groves's

words, Compton left immediately for

Hanford so that he could take direct

action.52

By the time Compton reached Hanford on the fourth, operating personnel working under Greenewalt, Hilberry and others had found that by

adding more uranium slugs to the

pile charge they could increase the

power level without inducing a decline in reactivity. This demonstrated

that pile operation at a higher power

level overcame the dampening effects

of xenon poisoning, but it still did

not tell the pile operators how much

more uranium they would have to

load into the pile to raise the power

level to that point where it would efficiently produce plutonium. Nor did it

indicate whether the existing controls

and instrumentation of the pile were

adequate for such operation.

For answers to these critical questions they had to carry out a timeconsuming series of tests. They

gradually increased the uranium load,

carefully checking and adjusting the

complicated control devices and instruments of the pile. By late November, they showed conclusively that by

fully loading the pile, including slugs

in the extra tubes that Du Pont's conservative designers had installed

against the advice of the scientists,

the pile would operate at its designed

power level. As a final precaution, the

operating personnel tried operating

the 100 D pile (completed in November) with uranium in all tubes, but

without cooling water. The success of

this dry critical test clearly demonstrated that the 100 B pile, with the

added protection of cooling water,

was likely to function as designed. On

28 December, the 100 B pile, with all

its 2,004 tubes loaded went into operation, marking at last the start of fullscale production of plutonium.53

Xenon poisoning and uranium canning problems were not the only

technical difficulties faced by Du

Pont's operating personnel as they

took over control of the other units of

the plutonium production plant. But

none of the other start-up problems

posed so serious a threat to the effective operation of the plant, and Du

Pont engineers found solutions adequate to eliminate or counteract their

adverse effects upon the plutonium

production process.54

52

 Memo, Compton to Groves, sub: Oscillation

Effect of W Pile, 30 Oct 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 400.12 (Experiments), MDR; Memos, Walter

Zinn (Argonne Lab scientist) to Compton, 3 Oct 44,

Compton to Groves, sub: Draft Notes to Mtg at Chicago, 3 Oct 44, and Matthias to Groves, sub: Startup Opns of 100 B Area, 3 Oct 44, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 319.1 (Misc), MDR; Oppenheimer Hearing, p.

174; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, pp. 3.13-3.14 and

5.2-5.3, and Pt. 2, pp. 6.4-6.5, DASA; Hewlett and

Anderson, New World, pp. 306-07; Dale F. Babcock,

"The Discovery of Xenon-135 as a Reactor Poison,"

Nuclear News 7 (Sep 64): 38-42.

53

 Dist Engr, Monthly Rpts on DSM Proj, NovDec 44, MDR; Memo, Compton to Mrs. O'Leary,

Attn: Groves, 7 Oct 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

400.17 (Mfg-Prod-Fab), MDR; Groves, Notes on

Conf with Greenewalt in New York, 18 Oct 44,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 337 (Confs), MDR;

Memos, Matthias to Groves, sub: Start-up Opns of

100 B Area, 17 and 20 Oct 44, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 319.1 (Misc), MDR; Matthias Diary, OctDec 44, passim, OROO; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 6, pp.

4.10-4.12 and App. D1, DASA; Compton, Atomic

Quest, pp. 191-94; Hewlett and Anderson, New

World, pp. 307-08. 54

 For a more detailed account of some of the

other operating problems that developed in Hanford pile operations see MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 6, pp.

4.12-4.19, DASA.
THE PILE PROCESS 223

With attainment in March 1945 of

full-scale production at Hanford, the

plutonium project leaders turned with

renewed energy to establishing firm

production schedules and to reaching

agreement on final specifications for

the product. General Groves, aware

that the war in Europe was rapidly approaching an end and knowing that

the scientists at Los Alamos would

soon need substantial quantities of

plutonium, arranged with Du Pont to

run the two refrigerated production

piles above their rated operational

level during the spring and summer

of 1945. Carried out at some risk, this

procedure substantially increased

product output and thus provided the

plutonium for an atomic device in

July and for one of two bombs in

August. Through these events, vindication finally came to the atomic

project leaders on their late-1942 decision to go ahead with the development of the pile process—a decision

that, in the intervening years, when

the plutonium program experienced

repeated setbacks, may well have appeared to many to have been a serious error in judgment.55

55

 The correspondence concerning speeding up

plutonium production at Hanford is in two separate

MDR files. In Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 400.17

(Mfg-Prod-Fab): Ltrs, Groves to Williams, 13 Jan 45,

and Williams to Groves, 16 Jan 45. In OCG Files,

Gen Corresp, Groves Files, Fldr 5: Ltrs, Williams to

Groves, 14 Feb 45, and Groves to Williams, 15 Feb

45, both Tab I; Memo, Nichols to Groves, sub: Site

W Prod Schedule, 9 Mar 45, Tab J; Ltr, Groves to

Oppenheimer, 22 Mar 45, Tab L; Ltr, Groves to

Williams, 22 Mar 45, Tab J; Ltr, Williams to Groves,

9 Apr 45, Tab M; Memo, Groves to Nichols, 20 Jul

45, Tab S. See Ch. XXIV on the relationship between the development of the implosion bomb at

Los Alamos and the rate of plutonium production at

Hanford.

PART THREE

SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

CHAPTER X

Anglo-American Collaboration

On 15 December 1942, the Military

Policy Committee submitted its first

report to the Top Policy Group on

the "present status and future program" of the Manhattan Project. The

report dealt at length with such matters as scientific progress, the organization of the project, the need for

funds, the availability of raw materials, and the status of the Anglo-American atomic partnership. The latter,

reported the committee in something

of an understatement, needed "clarification."

 l In effect, at the urging of

OSRD Director Vannevar Bush, S-1

Chairman James B. Conant, and

General Groves, the Military Policy

Committee was proposing a reconsideration of American policy on the exchange of information and a presidential decision not only on the immediate problem but also on the farreaching one of postwar relations in

the field of atomic energy.2

This call to reevaluate Anglo-American collaboration on atomic energy

research and development was a

result of the extensive and rapid expansion of the Manhattan Project

during the past six months. Until then

the American effort had faced serious

problems and its leaders had been

willing, even eager, to compare notes

with their British counterparts. But,

by the fall, with both the scientific

and engineering programs moving

ahead, the project's military and civilian administrators had made an impressive start at cutting away red

tape, thus assuring the atomic program a strong and solidly backed position in the American war effort. As

the need for British assistance seemed

less urgent, a new attitude about interchange took hold, and in December project leaders voiced their increasing reluctance, reinforced by

growing security considerations, to

give the British the fruits of American

labors.

Breakdown of Interchange

The atomic partnership between

the United States and Great Britain,

which the allies had begun on a

small scale in the fall of 1940 and

developed into a full exchange program by late 1941, first underwent

a slight modification in the early

summer of 1942. Meeting at Hyde

1

 MPC Rpt, 15 Dec 42, OCG Files, Gen Corresp,

MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab B, MDR. 2

 Memo, Stimson, 29 Oct 42, HB Files, Fldr 47,

MDR; MPC Rpt, 15 Dec 42, MDR. This theme is developed at length in Hewlett and Anderson, New

World, pp. 256-67.
228 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Park on 20 June, President Franklin D.

Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston

S. Churchill agreed that the United

States should take the major role in

atomic weapons production and that

Great Britain should devote its already severely limited resources to

the more immediate problems of

fighting the war. In spite of this

somewhat qualified yet carefully considered arrangement, which would

permit the British to avoid the risk

that large-scale atomic installations

might be damaged or destroyed by

German air raids, Churchill left the

conference with the "understanding

. . . that everything was [still] on the

basis of fully sharing the results as

equal partners," and shortly thereafter Roosevelt reported to Bush that

he and Churchill were "in complete

accord."

 3

It appeared that the two wartime

leaders had reaffirmed continuation

of the free and open exchange of

atomic information; however, developments in the months following the

Hyde Park summit clearly illustrate

the slow waning of Anglo-American

collaboration. On 5 August, six weeks

after the Roosevelt-Churchill talks,

the British Cabinet officer in charge

of atomic energy, Sir John Anderson,

Lord President of the Council—who

was to the Tube Alloys program what

Secretary Stimson was to the DSM

program—wrote to Bush. He proposed integrating the British gaseous

diffusion project into the American

program and, as a consequence, providing British representation for the

OSRD S-1 Executive Committee.4

Thus, with the simultaneous transfer

of the British heavy water research

group to Canada, which Sir John concurrently was suggesting to Canadian

authorities, most Tube Alloys activities would be removed beyond the

danger of German air attacks. Sir

John also made reference to the

broader question of controlling

atomic energy, both during the war

and afterwards. For this, he recommended immediate implementation of

a joint policy on patents and raw materials and the early establishment of

an Anglo-American commission on

atomic energy.

Anderson's proposals reached Bush

at a time when the Manhattan Project

still was beset with major difficulties;

scientific problems loomed large, adequate priorities were lacking, no decision had been reached on site questions, and even the basic matter of

organization remained unresolved.

Bush, accordingly, was in no position

to commit himself to anything farreaching, no matter how much he still

desired British assistance. Finally on

1 September, after checking with

Stimson's assistant, Harvey Bundy,

Bush replied to Anderson, expressing

general approval of close AngloAmerican collaboration but putting

off for the moment any specific implementation of this principle. Only

3

 Quotations from Msg, Prime Minister to Harry

L. Hopkins, 27 Feb 43, HLH, and Memo, Roosevelt

to Bush, 11 Jul 42, FDR. See also Ltr, Bush to

Styer, 19 Jun 42, HB Files, Fldr 6, MDR; Ltr, Bush

to President, 19 Jun 42, FDR; Winston S. Churchill,

The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate (Boston:

Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), pp. 374-81.

4

 The terms Tube Alloys and DSM (Development of

Substitute Materials) were the official code names

for the British and American atomic energy projects

in WW II. See Ltrs, Anderson to Bush, 5 Aug 42,

HB Files, Fldr 47, MDR; Gowing, Britain and Atomic

Energy, pp. 188-89; George C. Laurence, "Canada's

Participation in Atomic Energy Development," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 3 (Nov 47): 326.
ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION 229

the transfer of the heavy water

group to Canada—an action subsequently taken—elicited his immediate

concurrence. For the rest, he said, he

would reply "somewhat later when

other broad phases have been

resolved."

 5

Within the next few weeks, Manhattan leaders were successful in overcoming many of the uncertainties. Yet

a strong desire for the kind of close

partnership Anderson had suggested

still was lacking; indeed, when General Groves raised the question of

Anglo-American relations at the S-1

Committee meeting in Stimson's

office on 23 September, no one

pressed for immediate action. Because some members felt working

closely with the British might even

slow down American research, the

committee agreed to delay any decision until Stimson had talked with the

President. When Bush wrote to Anderson a week later, he outlined the

new American organization and urged

continued close contact, but he purposely avoided a precise commitment,

pending word from the President.6

It was the end of October before

Stimson was able to discuss the issue

with Roosevelt, for this was a period

when relations between the Secretary

of War and the President were somewhat strained by disagreement over

the forthcoming North African operations and Stimson saw Roosevelt infrequently. Finally, following a Cabinet meeting on the twenty-ninth, he

seized the opportunity to talk with

Roosevelt alone. After pointing out

that the United States was doing most

of the work on atomic energy, the

Secretary added that Manhattan leaders wanted to learn what commitments the President had made to the

British. When the President assured

him his conversation with Churchill

had been "of a very general nature,"

Stimson suggested going "along for

the present without sharing anything

more than we could help." The President agreed but indicated that he,

Churchill, and Stimson had better talk

over the whole problem before too

long. And there the matter rested.7

Meanwhile, as the American Army

took over management of more aspects of the atomic project, the British were becoming disturbed at the

trend toward an independent course

that minimized Anglo-American cooperation. Hence, no one was surprised

when Anderson proposed that

Wallace A. Akers, the engineer who

headed the British Directorate of

Tube Alloys (which was comparable

to Conant's position as chairman of

the S-1 Executive Committee) should

visit Washington, D.C. During the

weeks that followed Akers' arrival in

early November, he assiduously consulted with Bush, Conant, and

Groves, seeking ways to link more

closely the American-British atomic

energy programs but achieving only

an agreement on steps to set up and

support the British heavy water research group in Canada.

5

 Ltr, Bush to Anderson, 1 Sep 42, OCG Files,

Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 16, Tab A, MDR. See

also Memo, Bush to Bundy, 1 Sep 42, HB Files,

Fldr 47, MDR. 6

 Rpt, Bundy, sub: S-1 Mtg at Secy War's Office,

23 Sep 42, HB Files, Fldr 6, MDR; Groves, Now It

Can Be Told, p. 128; Ltr, Bush to Anderson, 1 Oct

42, HB Files, Fldr 47, MDR; Ltr, Bush to Bundy,

1 Oct 42, HB Files, Fldr 7, MDR.

7

 Memo, Stimson, 29 Oct 42, MDR. See Stimson

Diary, HLS, for the state of Stimson's relations with

the President during this period.
230 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

What Akers wanted, based on his

understanding of agreements reached

"at the highest levels," was a "really

cooperative effort between the two

countries."

 8 This would include joint

research, development, and production efforts, and complete interchange

of information on all aspects. British

scientists and engineers would work

in American plants and their American counterparts would do the same

in England. Each country would make

available to the other all atomic data

in its possession, including theoretical

and developmental information, plant

designs, and operational details. This

approach, insisted Akers, was the

most efficient way of assuring success

for the program and, moreover,

would be in harmony with the understanding between the President and

the Prime Minister.

The position taken by Bush,

Conant, and Groves—as worked out

among themselves and at meetings of

the Military Policy and S-1 Executive

Committees—fell considerably short

of Akers' view. They were still uncertain about what Roosevelt had told

Churchill, and especially about what

he now desired, and because they

were not convinced that complete cooperation on all phases of the program would necessarily build an

atomic bomb any sooner, they preferred that cooperation and interchange of information be restricted to

matters that would be of use to each

partner in the successful prosecution

of the war. The three Americans

also shared the suspicion that Akers'

arguments most probably were "influenced by an undue regard for possible postwar commercial advantages."

 9 Another serious concern was

the growing problem of security,

which would increase if British scientists were permitted access to all

project developments. Finally, too,

joint Anglo-American production certainly would complicate production

efforts in the United States and might

actually impede, rather than speed

up, the manufacture of atomic bombs.

From the American view, the extent

of atomic cooperation that would be

desirable varied according to the specific phase of the program concerned.

Bush, Conant, and Groves felt there

should be no interchange whatsoever

on the electromagnetic separation

process, because the British were not

working on this method and presumably had no "need to know." Akers

replied with the argument that complete cooperation had been agreed

upon, regardless of which country developed the idea or of where the production plants were to be built.

Progress on one method had a direct

bearing on work being done on other

methods, he insisted, and there ought

to be full interchange on the electromagnetic process.

On the gaseous diffusion process,

where the British had done considerable work, the American project leaders were willing to permit unrestrict8

 Quotation from Ltr, Akers to Conant, 15 Dec

42, HB Files, Fldr 47, MDR. See also Draft Memo,

sub: Interchange With British and Canadians on

S-1, 15 Dec 42, Incl to Ltr, Conant to C. J. Mackenzie (Canada's Natl Research Council head), 2 Jan

43, HB Files, Fldr 47, MDR; MPC Rpt, 15 Dec 42,

MDR; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 264-

67; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 128-29; MPC

Min, 12 Nov and 10 Dec 42, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 23, Tab A, MDR; DSM Chronology, 14 Nov 42, Sec. 2(f), OROO; Groves Diary,

13 Nov and 8 Dec 42, LRG; Gowing, Britain and

Atomic Energy, pp. 148-54. 9

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 129.
ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION 231

ed interchange on experimental and

design problems, but felt that exchange of information beyond this

was unnecessary. Akers argued that

limiting exchange on gaseous diffusion to these aspects was not acceptable. The British should be given full

information on construction and operation of the production plant, and

British engineers and scientists actually should be employed in it. Not only

did this fall within his understanding

of the Churchill-Roosevelt agreement,

but also, as he emphasized, the British were already working on a diffusion plant.

As for production data on U-235,

Bush, Conant, and Groves held that

none should be given to the British

because of the fact that their interest

in uranium production was only for

experimental purposes. The same applied to plutonium. The three Americans were willing to exchange information about scientific findings, but

not about the design, construction, or

operation of production plants. Heavy

water, which might be used to manufacture plutonium, fell into the same

category. Akers continued to argue,

although in vain, for full British participation in American efforts.

Regarding the work at Los Alamos,

Bush, Conant, and Groves proposed

that there should be no interchange

with the British on information pertaining to weapon research and development. Once again Akers urged full

reciprocity of information, and again

his arguments were without effect.

As a direct result of these extended

discussions, the Military Policy Committee prepared a comprehensive

progress report on its views on future

U.S.-British relations in the field of

atomic energy. The report, dated

15 December, identified "only one

reason for free interchange of secret

military information between allied

nations—namely, to further the prosecution of the war in which both are

engaged."

 10

 The consensus of the

committee was that, because the British had now given up any intention of

manufacturing atomic bombs or significant amounts of fissionable materials during the war, making production data available to them would not

increase their military capabilities. Although the work of British scientists

on diffusion and heavy water was well

along, the results of their research

was not essential to the Manhattan

Project; American efforts in these

areas were considerably advanced. A

complete halt of interchange on diffusion and heavy water would be an inconvenience, but it would not seriously hinder progress of the American

program.

Nor did the committee see any

moral objections to halting interchange. Both countries had worked

on the basic concept, as, indeed, had

the Germans. British studies on diffusion probably had benefited from

American research, and vice versa.

Heavy water had been used in a uranium pile first in France and then in

Britain at the instigation of refugee

French scientists. But only after the

discovery in the United States that

plutonium was fissionable by fast neutrons had the British given a high priority to the heavy water program.

And, as Conant emphasized, the British had not followed a policy of unre10

 MPC Rpt, 15 Dec 42, MDR. Hewlett and Anderson (New World, p. 266) state that the section on

interchange in this report was drafted by Conant

with the concurrence of Groves and Bush.
232 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

stricted interchange in the past. They

had been unwilling to share with

American scientists information about

several of their own developments—a

secret bomb disposal method for

one—because they would not help the

American military effort.11

The committee concluded that halting interchange would not unduly

hinder the Manhattan Project, could

hardly be regarded as unfair, and had

obvious security advantages. However, complete cessation certainly would

cause friction with the British and

might adversely affect the flow of uranium from Canada and other areas.

Thus, in its report the committee recommended that a policy of limited interchange, confined to information

that could be used to win the war,

should be adopted as national policy.

With the approval of three members of the Top Policy Group, the

Military Policy Committee report, a

copy of a letter from Akers to Conant

restating the British position, and a

separate summary by Bush of both

British and American views reached

the White House on 23 December.

Two days after Christmas, Stimson

went to see Roosevelt. The British, he

had just learned, had signed a treaty

with the Soviet Union in September

to exchange information on new

weapons, including any that might be

developed in the future. The treaty,

said Stimson, came as a complete surprise and had a direct bearing on any

Anglo-American exchange of information. Obviously, it posed the possibility that weapons development data

passed on to the British eventually

would reach the Russians. This news

apparently reinforced the arguments

set forth by the Military Policy Committee, and the next day, 28 December, the President told Bush that he

approved the committee's recommendations.12

 In so doing, he adopted

for the United States a new policy of

limited interchange with its atomic

partner across the Atlantic—one that

restricted collaboration to information of use during the war.

The Quebec Agreement

With the United States' position on

limited atomic partnership solidly affirmed, Conant undertook the task of

informing both the British and the

Canadians. The day after New Year's

(2 January 1943), he wrote to Dean C.

J. Mackenzie, head of Canada's National Research Council, and explained how the new American policy

would affect the work on heavy water

under way in Montreal.13 Then on the

seventh, he prepared a lengthy

memorandum in which he outlined

the specific regulations for AngloAmerican cooperation. Because Conant never officially presented this

memorandum to the British, it was in

effect only a working paper. Its contents, however, generated consider11

 Note by Conant, in Ms, "Diplomatic History of

the Manhattan Project," p. 7n, HB Files, Fldr 111,

MDR. That the British were unwilling to provide information on certain of their own developments was

not mentioned in the final version of the report submitted to the President. See also Memo, Bush to

Hopkins, 26 Feb 43, HLH.

12

 Ltrs, Bush to President, 16 Dec 42, with added

note of 23 Dec 42, and President to Bush, 28 Dec

2, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25,

MDR; Ltr, Akers to Conant, and Draft Memo, sub:

Interchange With British and Canadians on S-1,

both 15 Dec 42, HB Files, Fldr 47, MDR; Stimson

Diary, 26-27 Dec 42, HLS; Gowing, Britain and

Atomic Energy, pp. 154-55. 13

 Ltr, Conant to Mackenzie, 2 Jan 43, MDR.
ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION 233

able controversy, and Churchill later

complained to presidential aide Harry

Hopkins that Conant's memorandum

"drastically [limits] interchange of

technical information and entirely destroys [Roosevelt's] . . . original conception" of a " 'coordinated or even

jointly conducted effort between the

two countries.' " 14

Although Akers had read Conant's

memorandum, he apparently had

elected to keep his thoughts to himself. But on the twelfth, he ran headlong into the practical effects of the

new policy at a meeting with Colonel

Nichols of the District staff and Percival C. Keith of Kellex. When Akers

asked for full exchange of information

and access for British scientists to the

American diffusion production plant,

Nichols informed him that such requests would be "subject to General

Groves' decision," the outcome of

which the British representative could

by now undoubtedly guess.15

The problem came to a head on

the afternoon of the twenty-sixth at a

meeting with Groves and Conant.

Akers protested, argued, and bargained, largely in vain, for a relaxation of the American attitude. All he

achieved was Groves's statement that

America probably would be willing to

reopen information exchange on

heavy water production if Great Britain would make significant use of it

before the end of the war and would

indicate a willingness to make slight

adjustments regarding interchange on

the diffusion process. On other matters—electromagnetic separation, the

use of heavy water in a chain reaction,

the furnishing of uranium metal and

purified graphite to the Canadian

group, the chemistry of plutonium,

and the design and construction of a

weapon—the American project leaders remained adamant. Unsuccessful

in his mission, Akers returned home

to England a few days later.16

Meanwhile, word had reached the

Moroccan town of Casablanca, where

Churchill and Roosevelt were meeting

to discuss Anglo-American strategy.

During the military talks the subject

of atomic energy was not even mentioned; but, in confidence, the Prime

Minister asked the President about

the American position on Tube

Alloys. Roosevelt's reply, as the Prime

Minister related it to Bundy, was to

assure Churchill again that atomic

energy was a joint enterprise. Hopkins, also present during the exchange, quickly added that the problem could be easily straightened out

as soon as the President returned to

the White House.17

14

 Quotation from Msg, Prime Minister to Hopkins, 27 Feb 43, HLH. Memo, Conant, sub: Interchange With British and Canadians on S-1, 7 Jan

43, OSRD; the essential points in this memorandum

are reprinted in Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p.

156. See also Hewlett and Anderson, New World, p.

268. Churchill was quoting the letter he received

from Roosevelt, dated 11 Oct 41, FDR. 15

 Memo for File, Nichols, sub: Mtg With Akers on

Jan 12th, 13 Jan 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 001

(Mtgs), MDR.

16

 Note by Akers and attached extract of his cable,

26 Jan 43, Incls to Ltr, Akers to Groves, 29 Jan 43,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 091 (British), MDR;

Groves Diary, 26 Jan 43, LRG; Msg, Prime Minister

to Hopkins, 27 Feb 43, HLH. 17

 Dates of Casablanca Conf: 14-24 Jan 43.

Msg, Prime Minister to Hopkins, 16 Feb 43, and

Memo, J. M. Martin (principal private secretary for

Churchill at Casablanca) to Hopkins, 23 Jan 43,

HLH; Memo, Bundy, sub: 22 Jul 43 Mtg at 10

Downing Street, HB Files, Fldr 47, MDR; Richard

C. Tolman, sub: Diary of Trip to England, 29 Oct

43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 334 (British Interchange), MDR; Hewlett and Anderson, New World,

p. 270. While Hewlett and Anderson accept Bundy's Continued
234 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

The two leaders parted, Roosevelt

to Washington and Churchill to

London via the Middle East. Soon

after returning home in early February, the Prime Minister apparently received a thorough briefing on Akers'

disturbing experience in the United

States and, on the sixteenth, he

cabled Hopkins to remind him of his

assurances given at Casablanca. "The

American War Department," complained Churchill, "is asking us to

keep them informed of our experiments while refusing altogether any

information about theirs."

 18

That Churchill had expressed his

perturbation to Hopkins rather than

directly to Roosevelt indicates the importance he attached to the problem.

The Prime Minister was well aware

of Hopkins's close relationship with

Roosevelt and regarded him as a

"most faithful and perfect channel of

communication."19 A personal representation by "Lord Root of the

Matter," as he once called Hopkins,

would be more effective than a simple

cable direct to the President. Yet, curiously enough, Hopkins apparently

knew little about atomic energy matters. Certainly his ready assurances at

Casablanca indicated his unfamiliarity

with the complexities of the problem.20

But in the weeks that followed

Churchill's cable, Hopkins set about

familiarizing himself with the problem

of Anglo-American interchange. Now

well briefed by Conant and Bush, and

perhaps by Lt. Gen. Brehon B.

Somervell, the Army Service Forces

(ASF) commander, he replied to

Churchill's continued prodding with

cables that avoided a direct answer

and thus left the American position

unchanged. Bush, in turn, reviewed

the policy separately with Conant and

Stimson and collectively with fellow

members of the Military Policy Committee at its 30 March meeting.

"None of us," he reported to Hopkins on 31 March, "can see that the

present policy, which was approved

by the President after it had had the

careful review and approval of General Marshall, Secretary Stimson, and

Vice President Wallace, is in any way

unreasonable, or such as to impede

the war effort on this matter. Neither

can we see that the application

is at present unwise." Supporting a

strongly worded memorandum from

Conant, which he enclosed, Bush

stressed, as had Conant also, the

growing American belief that British

desire for information about the

American program was not for wartime weapons development but,

rather, for postwar commercial and

industrial application. This might perhaps be considered in another context, said Bush, but it should in no

way be allowed to interfere with the

Manhattan Project or with the

"proper conduct of the secure development of a potentially important

statement in his memorandum of 22 Jul 43 that at

Casablanca Churchill spoke directly to both Roosevelt and Hopkins on Tube Alloys, Margaret Gowing

(Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 159) suggests that the

discussion may have been only between Churchill

and Hopkins. 18

 Msg, Prime Minister to Hopkins, 16 Feb 43,

HLH. 19

 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The

Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950),

pp. 24-25. 20

 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An

Intimate History (New York: Harper and Brothers,

1948), p. 5. The first reference to atomic energy in

the Hopkins papers (HLH) appears on 23 Jan 43,

during the Casablanca Conference.
ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION 235

weapon."

 21

 Apparently convinced of

the correctness of the American

policy, Hopkins allowed the matter to

drag on through April without resolution. Even though he had promised

British Foreign Secretary Anthony

Eden a telegram that would give his

"views fully," he never sent it.22

Except for limited exchange between the Montreal and Chicago

groups, Anglo-American collaboration

slowed almost to a standstill. Sir John

Anderson, fearing a weakening of

Churchill's negotiating position, refused an American request that chemist Hans von Halban, a refugee from

the French atomic program, be permitted to come to New York to confer

with Fermi and Urey on heavy water

problems, and in partial reaction the

Military Policy Committee reduced

American support of the heavy water

project at Montreal. Hopkins's procrastination did nothing to improve

the steadily deteriorating situation,

and British scientists began thinking

seriously of building their own U-235

plant. During this time, the only

answer the British received to

Churchill's protests was an indirect

one: an explanation of the American

position by Bush and Conant to Dean

Mackenzie of the Canadian project as

he passed through Washington, D.C.,

on his way to London to discuss the

problem with his British colleagues.

By then, however, Churchill had

decided to pay a personal call on

Roosevelt.23

The TRIDENT Conference, as

Churchill dubbed his third major wartime meeting with Roosevelt, began

in Washington on 12 May; however, it

was not until the twenty-fifth, his last

day in the national capital, that he

raised the problem of atomic interchange. Hopkins telephoned Bush,

and that afternoon the two Americans

met with Professor Frederick Lindemann (Lord Cherwell), the British

physicist who was one of Churchill's

closest advisers. An able negotiator,

Lord Cherwell had already formed

some strong opinions about who was

responsible for the new American position. The whole situation, he had

told Canadian Prime Minister William

Lyon Mackenzie King a week earlier,

was the fault of the American Army,

which had taken over the atomic

energy program from the scientists.

"They are as difficult about it in their

relation with Britain," King noted in

his diary, "as Stalin had been in telling of what was being done in

Russia."

 24

21

 Quoted phrases from Memo, Bush to Hopkins,

31 Mar 43 (enclosed is Memo, Conant to Bush, 25

Mar 43), HLH. See also Msgs, Prime Minister to

Hopkins, 16 Feb, 27 Feb (two), 20 Mar, 1 Apr 43,

and Hopkins to Prime Minister, 24 Feb and 20 Mar

43; Memos, Bush to Hopkins, 26 Feb 43, and Hopkins to Lord Halifax (British ambassador to U.S.),

15 Apr 43. All in HLH. See also MPC Min, 30 Mar

43, MDR. 22

 Memo, Halifax to Hopkins, 14 Apr 43; Msg,

Hopkins to Eden, 15 Apr 43 (source of quotation);

Memo, Hopkins to Halifax, 15 Apr 43. All in HLH.

23

 Memo, Bush to Hopkins, 27 Apr 43, HLH;

Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 782-83; Gowing, Britain

and Atomic Energy, pp. 157-64. 24

 Quoted from J. W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie

King Record, 1939-1944, Vol. 1 (Toronto: University

of Toronto Press, 1960), p. 503. For TRIDENT, see

Churchill, Hinge of Fate, Ch. 20, and Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-

1944, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington,

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959), Ch. VI.

For Cherwell, see R. F. Harrod, The Prof: A Personal

Memoir of Lord Cherwell (London: Macmillan and Co.,

1959). A less sympathetic view is C. P. Snow, Science

and Government (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961). This account of the meeting at

Hopkins's office is based on Memo for File, Bush,

sub: Conf With Harry Hopkins and Lord Cherwell

at White House, 25 May 43, Incl to Memo, Bush to Continued
236 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

The meeting resulted in an impasse, although it did clarify matters

to some extent. After Bush restated

the American position and explained

the reasons, Lord Cherwell pressed

for a change. He denied Great Britain

was aiming at any postwar commercial advantage, but admitted the British wanted to be in a position to build

atomic weapons once the war was

over. During the war, he added, his

government was willing to depend on

the United States for these weapons,

but in the postwar period it could not

afford to rely on any other power for

military security. Bush and Hopkins

immediately pointed out this was a far

different question than had been previously discussed. It concerned broader problems of postwar international

relations, the solutions to which,

Hopkins noted, the Roosevelt administration constitutionally could not

commit its successor. Lord Cherwell

indicated that if the United States refused to provide the desired information on atomic production, the British

might—to guarantee their own future

security—have to undertake an immediate production program of their

own, diverting whatever was necessary from the main war effort. But he

did not put this in the form of an outright threat.

The main question had at last been

isolated: Was it necessary for America

to provide Britain with production

data during the war to ensure her

military security in the postwar era? It

was clear to Hopkins where the problem lay and he told Bush to do nothing further on the matter. Presumably, Hopkins would take it up with

the President.

That evening, Churchill apparently

discussed the problem privately with

Roosevelt. There is no record of this

meeting. Indications are that the

President was not informed of the

Bush-Hopkins-Cherwell conference.

Once again he showed his earlier willingness to cooperate fully with the

British. The next morning Churchill

cabled Sir John Anderson that the

President, foreseeing that the general

agreement on wartime interchange

would be fulfilled by the almost certain use of the bomb in the war, had

"agreed that the exchange of information on Tube Alloys should be resumed and that the enterprise should

be considered a joint one."

 25

Whatever Roosevelt told Churchill,

he did not pass it on to Bush or Stimson. How much Hopkins knew is not

clear, but he was at least aware that

Roosevelt had promised Churchill

something. A month after TRIDENT,

Bush had his first opportunity to brief

the President on this talk with Lord

Cherwell. Roosevelt seemed impressed, but he said nothing about

any arrangements he might have

made with the Prime Minister and

simply told Bush to "sit tight" on interchange.26

Hopkins, 26 May 43, HLH. A copy of Bush's memorandum of 25 May is also in Ms, "Diplomatic Hist of

Manhattan Proj," Ann. 9, HB Files, Fldr 111, MDR.

25

 Msg, Prime Minister to Lord President (Sir

John Anderson), 26 May 43, quoted in Churchill,

Hinge of Fate, p. 809. See also Ltr, Roosevelt to

Bush, 20 Jul 43; Ltr, Cherwell to Hopkins, 30 May

43; Msg, Prime Minister to Hopkins, 10 Jun 43. All

in HLH. The latter message implies that Hopkins

may have been present at the Churchill-Roosevelt

discussion. On Roosevelt's ignorance of the BushHopkins-Cherwell conference, see Hewlett and Anderson, New World, p. 274. 26

 Memo for File, Bush, sub: Conf With President, 24 Jun 43, quoted in Hewlett and Anderson, Continued
ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION 237

Meanwhile, the British had sent

Akers to Ottawa, and during his stay

in the Canadian capital, Churchill had

cabled Roosevelt once again, seeking

to implement their agreement on

atomic energy. He received no satisfactory reply. Finally in mid-July, the

President asked Hopkins what to do

about interchange. Hopkins replied

that he [Roosevelt] had "made a firm

commitment to Churchill in regard to

this when he was here and there is

nothing to do but go through with

it."

 27

 Accepting this fact, on the twentieth the President cabled Churchill

that he had arranged matters "satisfactorily." The same day he wrote

Bush, who was in London attending

to other scientific matters, that because "our understanding with the

British encompasses the complete exchange of all information," he should

"renew . . . the full exchange of information with the British Government regarding the Tube Alloys."28

The President's letter should have

settled the matter. Yet, by one of

those peculiar quirks of fate, the new

directive did not reach the OSRD director in time to be effective.

On the fifteenth, an unexpected

confrontation by an agitated Prime

Minister, who daily was becoming

more and more disturbed over the interchange problem, had occasioned

Bush to refer him to Secretary Stimson, who, with Bundy, also was

visiting England. Two days later,

Churchill asked Stimson to "help him

by intervening in the matter."

 29

 Harboring strong feelings about the value

of close Anglo-American collaboration on all wartime activities, Stimson

arranged for a conference on the

twenty-second. Shortly before the

meeting, the Secretary met with Bush

and Bundy. Particularly concerned

about the need for careful international cooperation under the new

world conditions that atomic energy

would create, Stimson questioned

Bush carefully and forcefully, and at

times the OSRD director felt almost

as if he were being cross-examined by

the distinguished lawyer. When

Bundy suggested constitutional limitations on the President's power to

make long-term commitments, Stimson dismissed this as "the argument

of a police-court lawyer." But in the

end, he agreed that Bush should

present the American position to the

British as he saw it.30

That afternoon, the three Americans sat down with the Prime Minister, Anderson, and Lord Cherwell.

Because Churchill, for reasons

that are not known, had not yet

received Roosevelt's cable, none of

the participants were aware of the

New World, p. 274. Stimson's diary does not indicate

that he discussed interchange with Roosevelt during

this period. Hopkins's probable knowledge may be

inferred from Msg, Prime Minister to Hopkins, 10

Jun 43; Msg, Hopkins to Prime Minister, 17 Jun 43;

Ltr, Cherwell to Hopkins, 30 May 43. All in HLH. 27

 Memo, Hopkins to President, 20 Jul 43, HLH.

See also Msg, Former Naval Person (Churchill) to

Roosevelt, 9 Jul 43, FDR; Memo, Roosevelt to Hopkins, 14 Jul 43, FDR; Gowing, Britain and Atomic

Energy, pp. 164-65. 28

 Msg, President to Former Naval Person, 20 Jul

43, and Ltr, Roosevelt to Bush, 20 Jul 43, HLH;

Hewlett and Anderson, New World, p. 275.

29

 Quotation from Stimson Diary, 17 Jul 43, HLS.

See also Rpt, Stimson to Roosevelt, sub: Trip to

United Kingdom, attached to entry of 10 Aug 43,

HLS. 30

 Quotation from Elting E. Morison, Turmoil and

Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), p. 617.

See also ibid., p. 618; Stimson Diary, 22 Jul 43,

HLS; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 275-

76.
238 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

President's decision to reaffirm a

policy of full interchange. Churchill

opened the session with a vigorous

defense of the British position, emphasizing his fear that unless Great

Britain had the means and knowledge

of how to develop atomic weapons,

Germany or Russia might "win the

race for something which might be

used for international blackmail." He

seemed particularly concerned about

the possible atomic threat from

Russia, which appeared to be at the

root of his worries about the postwar

world. If the United States would not

"interchange fully," he said, Great

Britain would have to undertake its

own development "parallel" to that of

the Manhattan Project, no matter how

this might affect the rest of the war

effort.31

As diplomatically as possible, Bush

attempted to restate the American

view and to point out that the main

U.S.-British differences lay in the area

of "postwar matters." Stimson seconded this approach by reading aloud

a short, clear analysis of the situation

he had written in preparation for the

meeting.32 The Prime Minister then

proposed a five-point agreement to

be signed by Roosevelt and himself.

Under this agreement, there would be

"free interchange" of atomic information within a "completely joint enterprise"; neither government would

"use this invention against the other";

neither would "give information to

any other parties without the consent

of both"; neither would use atomic

weapons "against any other parties"

without the other's consent; and, finally, "in view of the large additional

expense incurred by the U.S.," British

commercial or industrial use "should

be limited" in whatever way the President deemed "fair and equitable."33

Stimson agreed to pass these proposals on to the President. He could

not comment officially, but he was

obviously pleased. "Satisfactory atmosphere produced,"

 34

 he noted in

his diary. Bush, too, felt somewhat

better, for while the Prime Minister's

proposed free interchange still

seemed dangerous from a security

viewpoint, Churchill had made a convincing disclaimer of any postwar

commercial motivations. When

Churchill received Roosevelt's 20 July

message several days after the conference, he was unable to determine

from the general terms of the message that the President, in fact, had

completely reversed the American position. Only Roosevelt's explicit instructions in his 20 July letter to Bush

would have indicated this shift in

policy. But the letter of instructions,

which the OSRD cabled to Bush on

the twenty-eighth, was somehow garbled in transmission or decoding; it

ordered Bush to review, rather than

renew, full interchange. Even this mild

wording gave Bush some concern, but

not nearly as much as the original

version would have.35

31

 Memo for File, Bundy, sub: 22 Jul 43 Mtg at 10

Downing Street, MDR. See also Bundy's penciled

notes written at the meeting, same file. On the Russian threat see Pickersgill, Mackenzie King Record, pp.

532 and 543. 32

 Stimson's penciled notes are filed in HB Files,

Fldr 47, MDR.

33

 Memo for File, Bundy, sub: 22 Jul 43 Mtg at 10

Downing Street, MDR. 34

 Stimson Diary, 22 Jul 43, HLS. See also draft

of Msg, Stimson to Marshall, unsigned but written

in the Secretary's hand, HB Files, Fldr 47, MDR. 35

 Hewlett and Anderson, New World, p. 277; Msg,

President to Former Naval Person, 20 Jul 43, HLH; Continued
ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION 239

On the same day Churchill approved a formal draft of the British

proposal, which he forwarded to

Stimson on the thirtieth. This version,

drafted by Anderson and revised by

Churchill, was basically the same as

the one the Prime Minister had presented orally. It eliminated the specific references to "free interchange"

within a "completely joint enterprise," substituted a general statement about pooling "all available

British and American brains and resources," and made even more explicit the British disclaimer on "industrial

and commercial aspects." Sir John

Anderson would go to Washington

at once, said Churchill, to help arrange "for the resumption of

collaboration."

 36

Back in Washington, Bush learned

the actual wording of the President's

instructions. He also found awaiting

him a strong memorandum from

Conant, which reiterated the Harvard

president's "conviction . . . that a

complete interchange with the British

is a mistake" and authorized Bush, if

he saw fit, to quote him "on this

point to those in higher authority."

 37

This proved unnecessary, for the British remained unaware of Roosevelt's

actual position and continued negotiating on the basis of American policy

as explained by Bush in London.

With the approval of Secretary

Stimson, Bush carried out final negotiations with Anderson. He kept in

close touch with the Secretary,

Bundy, and General Marshall—Vice

President Wallace and General

Groves were out of town—and especially with Conant, who participated

in the opening talks with Anderson

on 3 August. Stimson and Marshall

also had lunch with the British representative, but their conversation appears to have been more of a general

discussion than a bargaining session.

On the sixth, after an exchange of

letters, Bush and Anderson came to a

meeting of minds on a proposed

agreement to be signed by Roosevelt

and Churchill. This agreement was

based on the four-point draft

Churchill had sent Stimson a week

earlier, but added a fifth section "to

ensure full and effective collaboration." This section provided for establishment of the Combined Policy

Committee, which would determine

the role of each country, maintain an

overall review of the project, allocate

critical supplies, and have the final

say in interpreting the joint agreement. There would be interchange on

all sections of the project. Details

would be regulated by ad hoc agreements, subject to committee approval,

and Bush stipulated that information

made available to committee members would be general in nature. Anderson also agreed that the committee would not interfere with the

Msgs, Bush to Bundy, 27 and 28 Jul 43, HB Files,

Fldr 47, MDR; Ltr, Carroll L. Wilson (Ex Asst to

Bush) to Roosevelt, 28 Jul 43, FDR. 36

 Ltr, Churchill to Stimson, [30] Jul 43 (date derived from internal evidence), and Incl (draft heads

of agreement between President of the United

States of America and Prime Minister of Great Britain, 28 Jul 43), HB Files, Fldr 47, MDR. See also

Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 168; Msgs,

Roosevelt to Churchill, 26 Jul 43, and Churchill to

Roosevelt, 29 Jul 43, FDR. 37

 Memo, Conant to Bush, sub: Exchange of Info

on S-1 Proj With British, 30 Jul 43, HB Files, Fldr

47, MDR.
240 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Army's control of the Manhattan

Project.38

The next day, Bush forwarded the

draft agreement and copies of his correspondence with Anderson to the

President. He acknowledged the delayed directive of 20 July sent to him

by Roosevelt, but then went on to

state his conviction that his understanding with Anderson "provided

adequately for appropriate interchange, with due regard to the maintenance of security, and with the

object of providing the British with all

of the information they can utilize in

this connection in the prosecution of

the war, in return for the benefit of

the deliberations of their own scientific and technical groups."

 39

 In a separate note to Bundy, Bush urged that

Secretary Stimson "impress upon the

President" the desirability of limiting

agreements to wartime objectives and

the dangers of making commitments

for the postwar period.40

General Marshall, too, urged caution, and Bundy strongly recommended to Stimson that the President talk

with Bush, or at least carefully read

the Bush-Anderson correspondence,

before signing any agreement with

Churchill. He emphasized to the Secretary that Bush and Conant were

trying to protect Roosevelt from any

possible charges that he was exceeding his legal authority or acting from

any other motivation than a desire to

win the war. Strongly impressed by

Bundy's urging, Stimson went to the

White House on 10 August, determined to make these points. Whether

or not he did is unclear, but he did

describe the negotiations with

Churchill and raise at least one

caveat. He asked the President whether a problem might arise from

Churchill's proposal that neither

country would use atomic energy

against third parties without the consent of the other. Roosevelt indicated

he saw no danger in the provision.41

Even as Stimson met with

Roosevelt, the Prime Minister was settling himself in Quebec, in preparation for meeting with the President at

the QUADRANT Conference that would

begin in a few days. Only then did

General Groves, who had been busy

on inspection trips to the West Coast

and New York, learn of the forthcoming conference and realize the proposed agreement would be discussed.

More than half a year had passed

since the President had had a report

on the Manhattan Project from the

Military Policy Committee, and

Groves felt Roosevelt should have an

up-to-date summary before his meeting with Churchill. Groves drew up a

twenty-page report; cleared it with the

committee; and, on 21 August, with38

 Ltrs, Anderson to Bush, 4 (source of quotation)

and 6 Aug 43, and Bush to Anderson, 6 Aug 43,

HB Files, Fldr 47, MDR; Ltr, Bush to Anderson,

3 Aug 43, and Incl (extracts from report dated 15

Dec 42), copy in U.S. Department of State, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, Foreign Relations of the United States, [Diplomatic Papers],

1943 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1970), pp. 640-41; Memo, Conant to Bush,

sub: Exchange of Info on S-1 Proj With British, 6

Aug 43, HB Files, Fldr 47, MDR; Ltr, Bush to President, 7 Aug 43, FDR; Stimson Diary, 5 Aug 43,

HLS; Groves Diary, 3-6 Aug 43, LRG. See also

Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 277-79;

Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, pp. 168-71. 39

 Ltr, Bush to President, 7 Aug 43, FDR. 40

 Ltr, Bush to Bundy, 6 Aug 43, HB Files, Fldr

47, MDR.

41

 Memo, Bundy to Stimson, 6-7 Aug 43, and attached penciled notes by Stimson; Memo, Bundy to

Marshall, 6 Aug 43, and penned comment by Marshall. Both in HB Files, Fldr 47, MDR. See also

Stimson Diary, 10 Aug 43, HLS.
ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION 241

out showing it to Wallace or Stimson,

directed Colonel Nichols to hand

carry it to General Marshall in

Quebec, where QUADRANT was already

under way. The report, which covered

all Manhattan activities, included a

brief summary of relations with the

British and, in the light of the BushAnderson negotiations, asked the

President for further instructions. But

when Colonel Nichols arrived in

Quebec with the document, General

Marshall informed him that Roosevelt

and Churchill had already signed an

agreement on atomic energy.42

The two leaders had approved the

proposed agreement at Hyde Park,

where Churchill had visited Roosevelt

from 12 to 14 August.43 But it was

not until the nineteenth, in Quebec's

historic fortress known as The Citadel, that they actually affixed their

signatures to the "Articles of Agreement Governing Collaboration Between the Authorities of the U.S.A.

and the U.K. in the Matter of Tube

Alloys," or, simply, the Quebec

Agreement. It called for the earliest

possible completion of the Tube

Alloys project, ruled out "duplicate

plants on a large scale on both sides

of the Atlantic," and acknowledged

the "far greater expense" borne by

the United States. It agreed "never"

to "use this agency against each

other" and "not to use it against third

parties without each other's consent,"

and it prohibited giving "any information about Tube Alloys to third parties except by mutual consent." In

view of the heavier burden carried by

the United States, "any post-war advantages of an industrial or commercial character" would be "dealt with

... on terms to be specified by the

President . . . ," and the Prime Minister specifically disclaimed "any interest" in them "beyond what may be

considered by the President ... to

be fair and just and in harmony with

the economic welfare of the world."

Finally, using the Bush-Anderson arrangement for interchange as the

basis, the Quebec Agreement established the Combined Policy Committee in Washington, D.C., and designated six members.

On the choice of members,

Roosevelt apparently did not consult

any of his advisers, except possibly

Hopkins. American members were

Stimson, Bush, and Conant; British

members were Field Marshal Sir John

Dill, head of the British Joint Staff

Mission in Washington, and Col. John

J. Llewellin, Washington representative of the British Ministry of Supply.

The sixth member was Canada's Minister of Munitions and Supply, Clarence D. Howe, an American-born engineer whose appointment Churchill

had cleared earlier with Mackenzie

King. The British had felt that the Canadians, even though they were not

a party to the Quebec Agreement,

should have representation on the

high-level committee because they

would be making important contributions to the atomic energy project

in Montreal.

The Quebec Agreement set the official basis for Anglo-American atomic

relations for the rest of the wartime

period. It did not establish the free

and open interchange the British had

desired and that the President,

42

 MPC Rpt, 21 Aug 43, OCG Files, Gen Corresp,

MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab E, MDR; Groves, Now It Can

Be Told, p. 135; Groves Diary, 4-23 Aug 43, LRG;

MPC Min, 13 Aug 43, MDR. 43

 Pickersgill, Mackenzie King Record, p. 543.
242 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

indeed, had offered in his letter of

20 July. It called for "full and effective collaboration," and both Roosevelt and Churchill believed they had

provided the basis for it; however, in

reality, collaboration would comprise

only what was necessary for the war

effort, avoiding any form of interchange that might conceivably hinder

progress of the Manhattan Project.44

Implementing the Agreement

Combined Policy Committee

Despite pressure by Bush and General Marshall, and the presence in

Washington of Akers and four leading

British scientists who were anxious to

implement interchange,45 two weeks

passed before the President revealed

the details of the Quebec Agreement

to Manhattan officials, including particulars on the Combined Policy Committee. With Churchill visiting at the

White House, the President first

wanted the Prime Minister's concurrence in the contents of the Military

Policy Committee's report before any

meeting of the new committee took

place.46

On 8 September, after lunch at the

White House, Stimson discussed the

Quebec Agreement with Roosevelt

and Churchill. Having learned only

that morning that he was to be chairman of the Combined Policy Committee, he asked permission to name ASF

chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D.

Styer, as his deputy—a request the

President and Prime Minister readily

approved.47

An hour or so later, the first informal meeting of the Combined Policy

Committee took place in the Pentagon. One reason for the hasty convening was to accommodate the four

British scientists, waiting impatiently

to exchange data. Bush was out of

town and Howe had not yet arrived

from Canada, but Stimson, Conant,

Dill, and Llewellin proceeded without

them. General Styer was also present,

as was Bundy, acting as secretary.

They formed a technical subcommittee, with Styer as chairman, to make

recommendations on the American

and British programs, to prepare directives for interchange of research

and development data, and to propose ad hoc arrangements for interchange in the area of plant design,

construction, and operation. The subcommittee consisted of three scientists who had a thorough knowledge

of the American, British, and Canadian projects—Richard C. Tolman, who

44

 The American original of the Quebec Agreement is in HB Files, Fldr 49, MDR. The full text

was published in the New York Times, 6 Apr 54. A

copy of the agreement is also in U.S. Department of

State, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, pp.

1117-19. Available records do not indicate that

Roosevelt discussed the Quebec Agreement with

any American from the time of his conference with

Stimson on 10 August until after the document was

signed. 45

 Sir Francis Simon of Oxford University, Sir

James Chadwick of Cambridge University, and Sir

Rudolph E. Peierls and Marcus L. E. Oliphant, both

working at the University of Birmingham. 46

 MPC Rpt 21 Aug 43, MDR; Memo, Bush to

President, sub: Tube Alloys-Interchange With British, 23 Aug 43, HLH; Memo, Marshall to President,

6 Sep 43, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr

25E, MDR; Memo, Col Frank McCarthy (Gen Staff

Secy, OCS) to Marshall, 6 Sep 43 (with Marshall's

penned endorsement to Bundy), and Ltr, Dill to

Marshall, 7 Sep 43, HB Files, Fldr 7, MDR; Stimson

Diary, 7 Sep 43, HLS; Ltr, Bush to Styer, 20 Aug

43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Bush), MDR;

paraphrase of Msg, Lord President to Prime Minister, 28 Aug 43, HLH. 47

 Stimson Dairy, 8 Sep 43, HLS; Memo, J. M. M.

[Martin] to Prime Minister, sub: Tube Alloys, 9 Sep

43, HLH.
ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION 243

was General Groves's scientific adviser; Sir James Chadwick, the eminent

British physicist; and C. J. Mackenzie

of the Canadian National Research

Council. Despite some hesitation by

Dill and Llewellin about delegating

their authority, the Combined Policy

Committee authorized the subcommittee to act independently on interchange whenever there was unanimous agreement among its four

members.48

Working Out Interchange Arrangements

Styer's subcommittee met on 10

September, to consider a plan drafted

by General Groves and submitted by

the Military Policy Committee. Because this plan hewed fairly closely to

the earlier American proposals on interchange, it fell considerably short of

what the British desired. On weapon

development it recommended assignment of two British scientists to Los

Alamos under the same security restrictions governing American scientists there. On the gaseous diffusion

and heavy water pile processes it suggested interchange of scientific information through a joint committee. On

the centrifuge and thermal diffusion

processes, which would probably soon

be dropped, Styer's subcommittee

should decide whether interchange

"might affect this decision." As for

the electromagnetic and graphite pile

processes, on which the British had

done little work, interchange would

serve no useful purpose, for these

methods had reached the stage where

changes "would result in serious

delay in completion."

 49

The subcommittee, largely at the

insistence of Chadwick, recommended

some modifications to the plan favorable to the British view. On the gaseous diffusion and heavy water pile

processes, interchange should extend

to some aspects of development and

production. There should be exchange of scientific data on the

graphite pile to the extent it might be

helpful in the Anglo-Canadian development of the heavy water pile process. Chadwick's contention that the

British might be able to contribute to

development of the electromagnetic

process should be explored by a committee consisting of Groves, Tolman,

and Australian physicist Marcus L. E.

Oliphant. In keeping with the Military

Policy Committee's recommendations,

the subcommittee reached agreement

on possible personnel for other committees or representation needed to

carry out interchange on the various

processes. Chadwick and Sir Rudolph

E. Peierls, the University of Birmingham physicist, would serve as British

representatives at Los Alamos; von

Halban with Metallurgical Project Director Arthur Compton, or one of his

principal assistants, as a committee to

exchange data on the heavy water pile

process; Sir Francis E. Simon, physicist at Oxford's Clarendon Laboratory, and Peierls with Keith, the Kellex

head, and Urey on a gaseous

diffusion committee; and Oliphant,

Simons, and Peierls on a committee

with American representatives desig48

 CPC Min, 8 Sep 43, and Ltr, Llewellin to

Bundy, 10 Sep 43, HB Files, Fldr 9, MDR. See also

earlier draft of Bundy's minutes, same file. Stimson

Diary, 8 Sep 43, MDR.

49

 MPC Min, 9 Sep 43 (source of quotation),

MDR; Tech Subcommittee Min, 10 Sep 43, HB

Files, Fldr 28, MDR. See also MPC Rpt, 15 Dec 42,

MDR.
244 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

SIR JAMES CHADWICK (left) consulting with General Groves and Richard Tolman on

Anglo-American interchange

nated by Bush or Conant to decide

the extent of interchange on the

centrifuge and thermal diffusion

processes.50

Despite the considerable progress

made by the subcommittee, there was

little specific interchange in the weeks

that followed. Part of the difficulty lay

in the lack of specific working procedures. To set these up, Tolman went

to England in October to consult with

Chadwick and other British scientists

and with Sir John Anderson. General

Groves, who was becoming increasingly impatient to implement interchange in those areas where it was

sanctioned, closely monitored Tolman's negotiations from his Washington office and attempted to facilitate

Anglo-American coordination by keeping members of the Military and Combined Policy Committees regularly

informed.51

50

 Tech Subcommittee Min, 10 Sep 43, MDR.

51

 In Admin, Files, Gen Corresp, MDR, see following files: 334 (British Interchange), for information on Tolman's trip; 201 (Conant) for Memo,

Groves to Conant, 2 Nov 43; 680.2 for Ltrs, Llewellin to Groves, 10 Nov 43, with enclosed draft, and

Groves to Llewellin, 12 Nov 43; 371.2 (Scty) for

Ltrs, Capt Horace K. Calvert (Intel and Scty Sec

chief) to Lt Col John Lansdale (Groves's Spec Asst

for Scty), sub: Visit of British Natls to DSM Proj

7 Oct 43, and Maj Robert S. Furman (Groves's Spec

Proj Off) to Calvert, same sub, 21 Oct 43. See also

MPC Min, 14 Dec 43 (with Memo, Groves to MPC,

10 Dec 43, as Att. 1), MDR; Memo, Styer to CPC,

14 Dec 43, HB Files, Fldr 28, MDR; CPC Min, 17

Dec 43, HB Files, Fldr 10, MDR; MPC Rpt, 4 Feb

44, Incl to Ltr, Groves (for MPC) to President, same

date, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25,

Tab C, MDR; Groves Diary, 27 Oct, 2 and 4 Nov

43, LRG. For the British perspective on drawing up Continued
ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION 245

When Groves received word that

another team of British scientists

soon would be arriving in the United

States, the need for a speedy procedural agreement on interchange

became even more critical to him. Yet

not until mid-December were the

British and Americans able to complete interchange procedures. With

the approval of the Military and Combined Policy Committees, the new

procedures went into effect on the

fourteenth. Naming Chadwick as the

"immediate scientific adviser to the

British members" of the Combined

Policy Committee, the terms of this

agreement permitted that he have

"access" to all work on "research and

plant scale" on both sides of the Atlantic. The slight and unassuming

Cambridge professor, who, surprisingly enough, got along exceptionally

well with the robust and outspoken

Groves, would also help guide experimental work at Los Alamos, where he

would be joined by a small number of

other British scientists. Peierls, and

one or two others, would work with

Kellex on the diffusion process and

also would discuss theoretical problems of bomb construction with

American scientists; he could not,

however, visit Los Alamos. Oliphant

and six assistants would work with

Ernest Lawrence at Berkeley on research and design and then move to

Los Alamos to assist on ordnance

problems. Oliphant would continue

his close contacts with the electromagnetic project during production

and would be free to visit England to

supervise any similar research there.

About fifteen British scientists and industrialists, led by Akers, would exchange information on diffusion at

Columbia University and Kellex. Research on heavy water piles at Montreal would be continued under a

joint program to be worked out with

those doing similar work in the

United States.52

This arrangement was, in effect, the

implementation of the Quebec Agreement. While it did not actually provide full information exchange, it

went further than most members of

the Manhattan Project administrative

staff would have preferred. Certainly

the arrangements were more liberal

than Groves would have wished, although he later claimed full credit for

having drawn up these "rules regulating the . . . British scientists."

 53

While anxious to get any British help

that might speed the progress of the

American program, he was generally

opposed to providing Great Britain

with anything more than was absolutely necessary to gain this aid. "I

was not responsible for our close cooperation with the British," he asserted a decade later. "I did everything to

hold back on it."

 54

By the end of January 1944, eighteen British scientists had reached

New York, Washington, D.C., Berkeley, and Los Alamos, and more were

expected. Only one problem remained outstanding, namely, arrangements for cooperation between the

Montreal and Chicago scientists on

interchange arrangements see Gowing, Britain and

Atomic Energy, pp. 233-34. Colonel Llewellin was replaced on the CPC by Sir Ronald I. Campbell, a veteran member of the British embassy staff in

Washington.

52

 Memo, Groves to MPC, 10 Dec 43, Att. 1,

MDR; MPC Min, 14 Dec 43, MDR; Gowing, Britain

and Atomic Energy, pp. 234 and 236-37. 53

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 136-37. 54

 Oppenheimer Hearing, p. 175.
246 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

pile research. Around the middle of

the month, senior members of both

groups had discussed a joint program

of research that would lead to the

construction of a heavy water pile.

Yet to Manhattan leaders in Washington, it seemed doubtful the venture

would be of significant value during

the war, and Groves and Conant, at

least, preferred that it should not

begin.55

On 17 February, however, at the

next meeting of the Combined Policy

Committee, Chadwick pressed for approval of a Canadian heavy water pile

to undertake large-scale production of

plutonium. Great Britain and Canada

would provide the funds, the United

States the heavy water, and the three

nations would exercise joint control

over the project. Neither Groves, who

was not a committee member, nor

Styer was present, but Bush and

Conant apparently raised some questions. Would the project result in militarily significant production before the

end of the war? Was it advisable to use

up resources, especially ore? The committee turned the problems over to a

subcommittee composed of Groves,

Chadwick, and Mackenzie.56

The subcommittee discussed a

heavy water pile with Compton,

Fermi, and others at Chicago and

with von Halban and his colleagues at

Montreal. Then, on 6 April, it submitted its report to the Combined Policy

Committee. The Hanford Engineer

Works, the subcommittee concluded,

would produce enough plutonium to

satisfy "essential military needs" for

the war, and production at the proposed Canadian plant could not begin

in time "to have an appreciable influence on the outcome of the present

war." On the other hand, the potentialities of the heavy water pile were

so great that its development could

not be "wholly neglected." Accordingly, it recommended continued research and development at both Chicago and Montreal, with an increased

staff and the appointment of a director for the Canadian project; the

design and construction of a heavy

water pilot pile in Canada by the

United States, Great Britain, and

Canada; and future consideration of a

small production pile when the experimental stage was further advanced. A

week later the Combined Policy Committee adopted this program, and in

the ensuing months Groves, Chadwick, and Mackenzie continued to

keep an eye on the project for the

committee and see to it that the approved recommendations were carried out.57

The new Montreal director was

physicist John D. Cockcroft, and his

staff was rapidly reinforced with British and Canadian scientists. In early

May, as plans for construction of the

pilot plant matured, General Groves

approved an isolated site previously

selected by the Canadians, near Chalk

River, Ontario, on the south bank of 55 the Ottawa River and about 110 miles MPC Rpt, 4 Feb 44, MDR; Laurence, "Canada's Participation in Atomic Energy Development,"

p. 325; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, p. 282. 56

 CPC Min, 17 Feb 44, OCG Files, Gen Corresp,

MP Files, Fldr 9, Tab B, MDR; Stimson Diary,

17 Feb 44, HLS; Hewlett and Anderson, New World,

pp. 282-83.

57

 Rpt, Groves, Chadwick, and Mackenzie to CPC,

sub: Joint Development of Heavy Water Pile, 6 Apr

44, HB Files, Fldr 28 (also in Fldr 103), MDR. See

also CPC Min, 13 Apr 44, DS, and pertinent documents in HB Files, Fldrs 12 and 105, MDR.
ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION 247

northwest of the Canadian capital.

(See Map 2.) Late in the month, Cockcroft, von Halban, and others from

Montreal visited Chicago. A second

meeting was held in Montreal two

weeks later. Discussion was limited by

the rules governing interchange that

Groves, Chadwick, and Mackenzie

were in the process of drafting. These

regulations, which the Combined

Policy Committee approved formally

on 19 September, limited interchange

to information necessary for the

design, construction, and operation of

the Chalk River pilot plant. Scientists

at Montreal could learn about the

pilot pile at Clinton and the research

piles at Argonne, and receive basic

scientific data essential to the heavy

water pile. They were not to be furnished with information about production plant construction at Hanford

or the chemistry of plutonium or the

method of separating that element,

because these developments were not

necessary for work at Chalk River. Finally, the regulations directed that the

Montreal group should establish strict

security in the transmittal of all data.

General Groves designated Maj.

Horace S. Benbow as his liaison officer at Montreal, or Evergreen, to use

its code name, and directed that the

Chicago area engineer handle all Evergreen requests. For scientific liaison, Groves assigned physicist William W. Watson and chemical engineer J. R. Huffman to report directly

to him rather than the Metallurgical Laboratory director.58

The policy established in the spring

of 1944 for interchange on the Canadian project completed the arrangements approved the previous December for Anglo-American information

exchange on atomic energy and fulfilled the terms of the Quebec Agreement of August 1943. British scientists were now working with Americans in the United States on several

phases of the overall program and

were reviewing a limited amount of

information. In the remaining months

of the war, Anglo-American relations

steadily improved, although, inevitably, minor problems arose.59

Patent Problems

One of the problems relating to interchange with which the Combined

Policy Committee had to concern

itself periodically during 1943 and

1944 was patent rights. The United

States and Great Britain in August

1942 had concluded an executive

agreement on exchange of patent

rights that provided a general basis

for negotiating more specific arrangements applicable to particular areas of

interchange.60 At the time of this agree58

 Rpt, A. W. Nielson and W. H. Sullivan, sub:

Review of Liaison Activities Between Canadian and

United States Atomic Energy Projs, 19 Feb 47, HB

Files, Fldr 103, MDR; Rpt (to CPC), sub: Progress

on Canadian NRX Proj, 24 Aug 44, HB Files, Fldr

103, MDR; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4, "Auxiliary Activities," Ch. 9, DASA; MPC Min, 10 May 44, MDR;

DSM Chronology, 7 and 15 Jun 44, each Sec. 15,

8 Jun 44, Sec. 2(b), and 12 Jun 44, Sec. 7, OROO;

CPC Min, 19 Sep 44, HB Files, Fldr 13, MDR;

Groves Diary, May-Jun 44, LRG; Ltr, Howe to W.

L. Webster (British Supply Council in North America), 29 Apr 44, HB Files, Fldr 12, MDR. See also

Evergreen progress reports, etc., HB Files, Fldr 32,

MDR. 59

 For details on British implementation of interchange see Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, pp.

239-44. 60

 U.S. Department of State, Interchange of Patent

Rights, Information, Inventions, Designs, or Processes:

Agreement Between the United States of America and Great

Britain, Signed at Washington, August 24, 1942, Executive Agreement Series 268, Pub 1803.
248 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

ment, Sir John Anderson had suggested to Bush the adoption of a joint

patent policy relating specifically to

atomic energy as an important aspect

of international control. Bush, however, did not think the time was propitious for establishing such a policy;

instead, he recommended that participating countries could facilitate eventual establishment of controls by

seeing to it that most patent rights

concerning atomic energy within their

own borders were publicly owned.61

The need for patent arrangements

became even more obvious after the

signing of the Quebec Agreement.

With scientists of both countries

working together, a common policy

was necessary to protect both individual and national rights. Secrecy and

security aspects further complicated

the difficult technicalities inherent in

all patent matters.

In the fall of 1943, Arthur Blok,

patent expert in the British Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, and Capt. Robert A. Lavender, retired American naval officer

who advised Bush and later Groves

on patent questions, attempted to

reach some agreement. They concluded that the 1942 agreement did not

apply to atomic developments and

drew up a new proposal.62 When

Bush pointed out certain inadequacies

in the Blok-Lavender proposal at

the Combined Policy Committee on

13 April 1944, the committee referred

the problem to its recently appointed

joint secretaries, Harvey Bundy and

W. L. Webster of the British Supply

Council. During the summer the two

men studied the question, conferring

frequently with Lavender, Blok, Bush,

and others; and in September, they

drew up a lengthy administrative procedure, which the committee approved at its meeting on the nineteenth. But project lawyers found that

the procedure was in conflict with the

United States patent law, and not

until February 1945 was it properly

amended. As finally approved at

the 8 March committee meeting, the

arrangement was still an ad hoc procedure, neither final nor complete, leaving the negotiation of a permanent

settlement to the future.63

New Partnership Strains: Repatriation

of French Scientists

The liberation of France following

the Allied invasion of Western

Europe in the summer of 1944 placed

new strains upon the British-American atomic partnership.64

 The imme61

 Ltr, Anderson to Bush, 5 Aug 42, MDR; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 262-63. 62

 Ltr, Blok and Lavender to CPC Subcommittee,

1 Oct 43 (recommendations were shown to Chadwick but submitted directly to the CPC, because

Styer's group was not familiar enough with patent

problems to add anything to basic suggestions);

Memo, Webster to Bundy, sub: Memo on Patents

Signed by Arthur Blok and Capt Robert A. Lavender, 7 Mar 44. Both in HB Files, Fldr 18, MDR.

Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 418-20.

63

 In HB Files, MDR, see following files: Fldr 18

for Memo, Bundy and Webster to CPC, sub: Certain

Aspects of Patent Matters Arising from Special Proj,

18 Sep 44 (containing drafts and related correspondence); Fldr 47 for Ltrs, Webster to Howe,

26 Aug 44, and Howe to Webster, 29 Aug 44; Fldr

13 for CPC Min, 19 Sep 44; Fldr 18 for Memo,

Bundy to Lavender, sub: Annex A to CPC Memo, 2

Apr 45 (containing drafts and related correspondence); and Fldr 46 (copy in Fldr 105) for CPC Min,

8 Mar 45. 64

 Except as indicated, section on problem with

French scientists based on HB Files, Fldr 36 (French

Situation) and Fldr 55 (S-1 U.S. Cables), MDR; Continued
ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION 249

diate source of the dispute was the

repatriation of five French scientists—

Hans von Halban, Pierre Auger, Lew

Kowarski, Jules Gueron, and Bertrand

Goldschmidt—who had fled to England from France after the German

invasion in 1940 and then gone on to

Montreal in 1943 to work in the Canadian atomic program. When they

began to apply for permission to visit

or return permanently to their homeland, American atomic leaders contended such visits posed too great a

security risk, particularly because

physicist Frederic Joliot-Curie, head

of the French atomic program, was

known to be a member of the Communist Party.

The Americans, and especially General Groves, took the view that the

French should not be allowed to go

back to France until the war was over.

In May 1944, when Pierre Auger terminated his employment with the Canadian project, citing a desire to

return to France to assist Joliot-Curie

in rebuilding French science, Groves

and the British representatives in

America agreed that neither he nor

any of the other French scientists in

Canada should be permitted to do so

and that measures should be taken to

prevent any atomic information from

reaching that country. Nevertheless,

when Auger went to London in

August to become a full-time member

of the French Scientific Mission in

that city, British authorities permitted

him to visit France.

In October, Gueron requested permission to visit France on personal

matters. Groves, who had learned that

Gueron planned to see Joliot-Curie,

opposed the visit because Gueron

knew a great deal about the atomic

project and was reputed to be an

"ardent Free Frenchman" and supporter of General Charles de Gaulle.

But British authorities indicated they

had agreed to let Gueron go. When

Groves learned this, he determined to

have the French scientist kept under

surveillance by Manhattan security

personnel while in France. The British objected strongly. Gueron was "a

man of integrity," they asserted, and

ought not to be treated as if he were

a prisoner.65

Manhattan leaders interpreted

these British actions to be a clear violation of the terms of the Quebec

Agreement, which forbade communication of atomic information to third

parties without mutual consent, and

requested the American ambassador

in London, John G. Winant, to secure

an explanation. Sir John Anderson replied that the British had made agreements with the French scientists

before they went to Canada. The first

to come to England—von Halban and

Kowarski—had negotiated an agreement for exchange of patent rights relating to atomic energy between

France and the United Kingdom.

Later when Auger, Gueron, and

Goldschmidt reached England, they

had worked out employment arrangeOCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 12 (Intel

and Scty), Fldr 16 (Special Rpts), and Fldr 26,

MDR; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 331-

35; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 224-29; Bertrand Goldschmidt, The Atomic Adventure: Its Political

and Technical Aspects, trans. Peter Beer (Oxford, England, and New York: Pergamon Press and Macmillan

Co., 1964), pp. 12-43; Wilfrid Eggleston, Canada's

Nuclear Story (London: Harrap Research Publications, 1966), pp. 29-181; Gowing, Britain and Atomic

Energy, pp. 289-96 and 343-46.

65

 Quotations from General Groves's memorandum (26 Dec 44) to Secretary of War on French situation, HB Files, Fldr 36, Tab K, MDR.
250 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

ments that assured them their right to

return to France as soon as the war

made it feasible and also their status

as French civil servants and as adherents of General de Gaulle and the

Free French. Because the French scientists had made a "very special contribution" to the Tube Alloys project,

in the form of "research already started by Joliot and by his action at the

time when France was over-run," Sir

John contended the French had "a

better claim than any other fourth

country to participate in any post-war

T. A. arrangements," and he did not

think it wise to embark on a course of

action that would "lead the French

authorities to raise the matter prematurely and with a sense of grievance

already established."

 66

Anderson's revelation came as a

shock to leaders of the American program. Except for some information

on British acquisition of rights under

von Halban's patents that Vannevar

Bush had learned about earlier, they

had known nothing about the agreements between the British and French

scientists. Sir John had not mentioned

them during negotiations for the

Quebec Agreement, yet, as Groves

saw it, these third-party obligations

were in obvious contradiction to that

agreement. He also thought Sir John

was wrong to feel he had to placate

Joliot-Curie and furnish him with information about the American

project.

Consequently, Groves expressed

some reluctance in consenting to a

British request in November 1944

that von Halban be allowed to visit

London, with the understanding that

the French scientist would not be allowed to go to France. But as soon as

von Halban arrived in England, Sir

John went to Ambassador Winant

with the plea that von Halban should

be permitted to see Joliot-Curie to

ensure preservation of the status quo

with France. Faced with Sir John's insistent request, Winant asked Groves

to come to London to talk with the

Chancellor, but Groves did not go because he was too involved in urgent

atomic project matters. Under continuing pressure from Sir John,

Winant finally consented to von Halban's visit to Paris. The British provided the French scientist with an

agenda establishing limits for information about the American atomic

project that he was to give to JoliotCurie, but Manhattan intelligence

agents learned subsequently that von

Halban had furnished the French

atomic chief with much additional

highly secret data about the American

project. There were strong indications, too, that Joliot-Curie himself

was shortly going to request assignment to work on the Manhattan

Project.67

When Groves learned of von Halban's visit more than a week after it

66

 Sir John Anderson's reply was sent in the form

of an aide-memoire, a copy of which is in HB Files,

Fldr 18, Tab J, MDR. See also at Tab J, Memo,

Groves to Winant, 31 Oct 44, and Incl (comments

by Maj William A. Consodine, a Manhattan security

officer). Consodine explains how he obtained a copy

of the aide-memoire for the Manhattan commander in

Memo (extract), Consodine to Groves, received on

28 Oct 44, HB Files, Fldr 107, MDR.

67

 See correspondence relating to von Halban

case in OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, MDR. In

Fldr 26, Tab I, especially Memo, Lansdale to

Groves, 2 Dec 44; Draft Transcription of Lansdale

Notes and Rpt, Hans [von] Halban to Akers, sub:

Nov 24-Dec 5 Visit to France, 5 Dec 44. In Fldr 16,

Tab A, Ltr, Richard W. Perrin to W. L. Gorell

Barnes (both British Foreign Svc officials), 8 Dec

44.
ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION 251

had taken place, he determined to

bring an end to what he perceived as

a deliberate British policy to secure

postwar commercial advantage in the

atomic energy field largely at the expense of the United States. As Groves

saw it, Anderson was continuing to

permit disclosure to the French of important information relating to atomic

research that had been "developed by

Americans with American money, and

given to the British pursuant to interchange agreements subsidiary to the

Quebec Agreement."

 68

On 14 December, Groves wrote to

the Secretary of War, stating that

"pending the receipt of instructions

from you, I will take steps to safeguard the security of the DSM project

by delaying insofar as practicable the

passing of vital information concerning it to the representatives of any

government other than our own."

 69

Stimson met with Groves, Bundy, and

Harrison the next day. He informed

them he would take the matter up

with the President at the earliest opportunity. He instructed Groves to

prepare a complete resume of the

French situation and requested Bundy

to notify Ambassador Winant that,

until the Combined Policy Committee

met to discuss the situation, he

should refer to Washington "any further British proposals for disclosures

or contacts which might lead to disclosures to the French. . . ."

 70

It was not until 30 December that

Stimson was able to see the President.

Groves accompanied the Secretary to

the White House and the two reviewed for Roosevelt the entire

French problem, emphasizing that

Anderson appeared to have deliberately deceived Winant and other

American representatives in England

regarding Britain's commitments on

atomic energy matters to France.

Roosevelt's reaction was that Winant

had been "hoodwinked." What, he

wished to know, were the French

after? Stimson and Groves said they

believed France wanted to secure a

full partnership in the tripartite

atomic agreement. Roosevelt indicated that France in its current unstable

political situation was not a suitable

partner and, even if it were, he saw

no justification for letting it share in

the partnership. The discussion then

turned to other matters relating to

the atomic energy program.71

With the backing of the President,

Stimson and Groves, assisted by

Bundy, endeavored to prevent further

disclosures of atomic secrets to the

French during the winter and spring

of 1945.72 They had a statement ap68

 Memo, Groves to Secy War, 26 Dec 44, HB

Files, Fldr 36, Tab K, MDR; Groves, Now It Can Be

Told, pp. 226-27. 69

 Ltr, Groves to Secy War, 14 Dec 44, HB Files,

Fldr 36, Tab L, MDR. 70

 Msgs, Bundy (sent by Groves) to Winant,

26 Dec 44 (source of quotation), and Winant to

WD, 27 Dec 44, HB Files, Fldr 55, MDR; Stimson

Diary, 15 Dec 44, HLS. Groves's resume is in

Memo, Groves to Secy War, 26 Dec 44, MDR.

71

 Memo, Stimson, sub: Conf With President,

30 Dec 44; Memo for File, Groves, 30 Dec 44;

Memo, Groves to Chief of Staff, 30 Dec 44; Notes

by Stimson To Aid in Preparation of Agenda for

Mtg of President and Secy War with Groves. All in

OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 24, MDR.

Stimson and Groves Diaries, 30 Dec 44, HLS and

LRG. 72

 In HB Files, MDR, see the following files: Fldr

14 (copies in Fldrs 22 and 105) for CPC Min, 22 Jan

45; Fldr 46, Tab C, for Memo, Howe to CPC, 6 Mar

45; Fldr 103 for Ltr, Mackenzie to Stimson, 8 Mar

45; and Fldr 107 for Memo, Groves to Secy War, 13

May 45, and Incl, Ltr, Chadwick to Groves, 8 May

45. See also Stimson Diary, 19 and 22 Jan 45, HLS.

The Secretary of War makes no mention in his diary

of later developments in the French situation in the

spring and summer of 1945.
252 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

proved by the Combined Policy Committee for Sir John Anderson to use

if, as anticipated, the French requested full participation in the atomic

energy program. The gist of this

statement was that, for reasons of

security, all detailed discussion of

atomic matters with the French must

be postponed until the end of the

war, when the British would guarantee "fair treatment of any claims

. . . relating to commercial or industrial applications of nuclear sources of

power."

 73

When Sir John met with JoliotCurie on 23 February in London, he

did not present the formal statement,

but he did adhere generally to the

policy set forth in it. He indicated

that, because of the continuation of

the war and because British leaders

could not readily get together with

their French counterparts, progress

on shaping postwar policies had not

been possible. Anderson found that

Joliot had concluded from the favorable British actions with regard to

von Halban and Gueron, and the

other French scientists, that Great

Britain recognized the interests of

France in atomic energy matters and,

in the postwar period, would strongly

support her in the pursuit of these

interests.

Fear that there might be another

breakdown in Anglo-American interchange if he persisted in his strong

support of French atomic interests

appears to have engendered a modicum of moderation in Sir John; however, he persisted in efforts to have

British leaders propose that the

French be assured of greater participation in atomic matters as soon as

security considerations made this feasible. Two pressing concerns motivated Sir John's actions: his belief that

Britain owed this support to the

French atomic scientists for their contribution to the British and Canadian

atomic programs, and his fear that

any policy that offended France might

drive her into the Russian camp in

the postwar period.

In March 1945, Bundy and Groves

worked out an acceptable arrangement with the British and Canadian

authorities for keeping the French

atomic scientists (except Auger who

was now in Paris working with Joliot)

in the United States or Canada until

the war was over. In early May,

Auger's status temporarily gave cause

for concern when word reached

Groves through Chadwick that Joliot,

under pressure from one of the ministers in the French government, felt

compelled to begin an active atomic

energy program, including a survey of

French territories for uranium and

the start of research projects for the

preparation of pure uranium metal

and graphite. But Auger assured British scientists he would take no active

part in the proposed program, and by

summer of 1945 atomic developments

in the United States had reached a

point where the French problem no

longer constituted a major threat to

the security of the Manhattan

Project.74

73

 Paper, [Bundy], sub: Problems With Respect to

the French, 19 Jan 45, HB Files, Fldr 36, Tab I,

MDR.

74

 Memo, Groves to Secy War, 13 May 45, and

Incl; Ltr, Chadwick to Groves, 8 May 45, MDR; Rpt,

sub: Summary [of French Situation], Incl to Memo,

Groves to Secy State James F. Byrnes, 13 May 45,

OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 12, Tab D,

MDR.
CHAPTER XI

Security

The leaders of the American atomic

energy program, aware of the tremendous military potentiality of atomic

weapons and reports of German

atomic research, recognized almost

from the beginning the need for

maintaining a high degree of secrecy.

An important factor in their decision

in early 1942 to turn over administration of the program to the Army was

their conviction that it was the organization best prepared during wartime

to enforce a foolproof system of security. Such a system would ensure that

the Axis powers remained ignorant of

Allied interest in developing atomic

weapons; reduce the likelihood that

the Axis states, particularly Germany,

would accelerate their own efforts to

produce atomic weapons and undertake espionage and sabotage activities

against the American program; and,

most significantly, from the standpoint of military effectiveness, allow

the Allies to employ these weapons

against the Axis nations with maximum surprise.1

Early Aspects

First efforts to establish security in

atomic matters had occurred in 1939,

when refugee physicists in the United

States attempted to institute a voluntary censorship on publication of

papers concerning uranium fission.

American scientists did not accept

this suggestion initially, but the outbreak of World War II brought home

to many of them the need for control

over publications relating to atomic

fission. To formalize a censorship

program, the Division of Physical Sciences of the National Research Council in April 1940 established a committee that succeeded in getting most

scientists to withhold publication of

papers on sensitive subjects, particularly those concerned with uranium

fission.2

In June, when the governmentsponsored Committee on Uranium

1

 Knowledge of the progress of the Germans, or

the other Axis states, in atomic research and development was not based upon precise and accurate intelligence information, for such was not available to

the Allies. Nevertheless, because the Allies lacked

specific information to the contrary, they had to

assume that at least Germany would make a serious

attempt to develop atomic weapons. See Rpt to

President, sub: Status of Tube Alloys Development,

9 Mar 42, Incl to Ltr, Bush to President, same date,

HB Files, Fldr 58, MDR; DSM Chronology, 26 Sep

42, Sec. 2(e), OROO; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, "Intelligence & Security," p. 1.1, DASA; Groves, Now It

Can Be Told, 140-41; MPC Rpt, 7 Aug 44, Incl to

Memo, Groves to Chief of Staff, same date, OCG

Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab K, MDR. 2

 On the early efforts to establish a voluntary censorship program see the Prologue to this work and

the Smyth Report, pp. 331-32.
254 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

became a subcommittee of the newly

constituted National Defense Research Committee (NDRC), it also

became subject to the security measures currently in effect for federal

agencies. The NDRC, knowing that it

was to be concerned chiefly with

projects for the Army and Navy,

adopted security regulations that conformed to those of the two military

services. Under these regulations

NDRC subcommittees were required

to adhere to a policy of strict compartmentalization of information, to

classify all sensitive materials, and to

obtain security clearances for all

employees.

Transfer of the NDRC uranium

program to the Office of Scientific

Research and Development (OSRD)

in November 1941 did not significantly alter existing security arrangements, because the OSRD patterned

its own security system largely along

the lines of the NDRC program. As

the OSRD became more involved in

negotiation and administration of

contracts with industrial and research

organizations, however, it expanded

its security controls to provide a more

adequate coverage, adding security

measures for personnel administration, classified information, and plant

protection.3

The modest OSRD security system

sufficed until, in the spring of 1942,

the start of the uranium program's

rapid expansion—the letting of numerous contracts with industrial

firms; the employment and interaction of ultimately tens of thousands of

workers, scientists, and engineers;

and the formation of complex organizations to construct and operate the

large-scale production plants and

their atomic communities—enormously complicated the problems of

security just at the time the Army undertook its new role as project administrator. Although these measures

were necessary for the more rapid

achievement of a successful fission

weapon, they also tended to weaken

security.4 Consequently, the Army

almost immediately undertook a reorganization and expansion of the existing OSRD security system and, eventually, also endeavored to bring the

system more directly under control

of the Manhattan District. The system that finally evolved was in many

respects unique and introduced

a number of innovations in technique and organization that subsequently would be adopted as standard

features of government security

programs.

The District's Security System

The security system, as it took form

in the newly established Manhattan

District, resembled that already in existence in most other engineer districts. Under Army regulations in

force in 1942, the security program of

an engineer district was limited to

routine local security requirements.

When broader problems arose, the

3

 Stewart, Organizing Scientific Research for War, pp.

27-31 and 246-55.

4

 Ibid., pp. 246-47; Ltr, Compton to Conant,

8 Dec 42, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Rpts),

MDR. Compton's letter to Conant complained that

the security-inspired policy of compartmentalization

was delaying determination of the purity standards

that must be met for the plutonium to be employed

in an atomic weapon. This well illustrates the recurring conflict in the Manhattan Project between the

demands of the program and the requirements of

security.
SECURITY 255

district engineer or security officer

could call upon the resources of the

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, in the

War Department. Since June 1939,

under provisions of a presidential

proclamation, the War Department's

Military Intelligence Division (MID)

had shared responsibility for matters

of espionage, counterespionage, and

sabotage in the United States with the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

and the Office of Naval Intelligence.

In the latest revision (February 1942)

of this Delimitations Agreement—so

designated because it set forth the

area of jurisdiction of each agency—

the MID's assignment was to cover

the military establishment, including

War Department civilian employees

and civilians on military reservations

or under military control, plus a large

part of the munitions industry.5

Organization and Scope

Colonel Marshall, in organizing the

Manhattan District security program

soon after becoming district engineer

in June 1942, formed the Protective

Security Section. Under direction of a

member of Marshall's staff, this section emphasized such aspects as personnel, plant, and military information security. At the same time, to

provide the District security staff with

counterintelligence assistance, Marshall arranged with the Assistant

Chief of Staff, G-2, Maj. Gen. George

V. Strong, for security liaison with the

MID's operating element, the Military

Intelligence Service (MIS). From his

staff, General Strong assigned counterintelligence responsibility for the

atomic project to Maj. John Lansdale,

Jr., who had been a lawyer in civilian

life.

Because effective security operations required maximum secrecy,

Major Lansdale personally visited the

Western Defense Command G-2 and

each service command and requested

that they each select an officer to

report directly to him, bypassing both

the G-2 and the commanding general

of each service command.6 To further

facilitate carrying out the internal security functions for the atomic

project, Lansdale also organized a

quasi-clandestine counterintelligence

group. This group operated under

cover of the Investigation Review

Branch, Assistant Chief of MIS for Security, which Lansdale headed. He reported directly to General Groves,

and his group in effect was answerable to the Manhattan Project commander in all substantive respects,

even though it functioned from the

G-2 office in the Pentagon.7

5

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, p. 7.1, DASA, OCE Cir

1070, sub: Org for Protective Scty Svc in OCE

Constr Div and in Office of Div and Area Engrs,

15 Jun 42, CE 025.1 CXP, Engrs Library, Fort Belvoir, Va.; Ms, Capt C. J. Bernardo, "Counterintelligence Corps History and Mission in World War II"

(Fort Holabird, Baltimore, Md.: CIC School, n.d.),

pp. 4 and 13, NARS; Ms, Army Service Forces, Intelligence Division, "History of the Intelligence Division," 4 vols. (Army Service Forces, ca. 1946),

1(2):13-14, 1(8):1-2, 1(9):10-11, NARS; Groves,

Now It Can Be Told, p. 138.

6

 An organization formerly called a corps area,

serving as a field agency of the Army Service Forces

in a specified area. Under the reorganization of the

War Department on 9 Mar 42, there were nine geographical service commands throughout the United

States, each providing services (including administrative, financial, legal, statistical, medical, welfare,

etc., for Army elements), constructing facilities, furnishing fixed communication services, and procuring, storing, maintaining, and distributing supplies

and equipment for Army use. See WD TM 20-205,

Dictionary of United States Army Terms, 1944, p.

249.

7

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, pp. 7.1-7.2, DASA;

Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 138-39; Marshall Continued
256 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

By early 1943, the pace of the District's growth—both geographically

and in terms of personnel—and its increasing security requirements emphasized the need for a more comprehensive counterintelligence program.

In February, General Strong transferred Capts. Horace K. Calvert and

Robert J. McLeod to the District

headquarters, where they formed the

District's new Intelligence Section. To

ensure that this section, which Captain Calvert headed, had full access to

the intelligence and security facilities

of the Army service commands,

Strong requested that each command

designate a staff officer to act as a

point of liaison with the Manhattan

District and, to guarantee secrecy, authorized that each correspond directly

with Calvert's section. At the same

time, Groves continued his earlier

practice of meeting with G-2 officers

to make certain that District security

problems were brought to the attention of appropriate Army officials.8

The counterintelligence program

became the foundation for a countrywide permanent organization of this

aspect of the District's security

system. During the course of the year,

the District organized its own Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) and, as its

staff increased in size, assigned new

personnel to those areas where there

was the greatest concentration of

project activities. Ultimately, the

project had a total of eleven branch

intelligence offices at key points

across the United States, from New

York to Pasadena (California). An officer assigned to a branch usually

worked out of an area engineer's

office and, in addition to his intelligence duties, served as security officer on the engineer's staff. While in

matters of command these officers

came under control of the Manhattan

District intelligence and security officer and reported to him, they also

maintained a direct liaison channel

with the director of intelligence of the

service command that had jurisdiction

over their area.9

Expansion and Centralization

Rapid growth also necessitated expansion of other aspects of the Manhattan Project's security system. In

1942, the District's relatively modest

internal security organization had

served well enough for a program

that consisted primarily of administering research and development activities carried on in university and industrial laboratories; but, by summer

of 1943, a vast program of plant construction and operation had begun.

The move of the District headquarters from New York to Oak Ridge in

August provided an opportune time

for reorganization. (See Chart 2.) The

first step was consolidation in July of

the Protective Security and Intelligence Sections. Captain Calvert took

over responsibility for the combined

unit, designated the Intelligence and

Security Section. Although this

change was relatively minor from an

administrative standpoint (the section

continued in a distinctly subordinate

position in the District's Service and

Diary, 20 Jul 42, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, Groves

Files, Misc Recs Sec, behind Fldr 5, MDR; Ltr, Lansdale to Col R. W. Argo, Jr. (Dep Chief of Mil Hist),

3 Jan 75, CMH. 8

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, p. 7.2, DASA; Groves, Now

It Can Be Told, pp. 138-39. 9 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, pp. 7.2-7.4, DASA.
SECURITY 257

Control Division), it represented a

significant shift towards centralization

in security matters. This change was

consistent with General Groves's conviction that only through a high

degree of centralized control could he

and his administrative staff maintain a

close and constant scrutiny over the

security program.10

Shortly after the District had completed its move to Oak Ridge, a reorganization in the Army's administration of counterintelligence operations

in the zone of interior (ZI) posed a

threat to Groves's control and cognizance over the project's internal security functions. To economize on internal investigative operations and to

concentrate G-2 efforts on expanding

counterintelligence operations overseas, the War Department directed

the transfer, effective 1 January 1944,

of the WDGS (War Department General Staff) G-2 counterintelligence activities in the ZI to the Office of the

Provost Marshal General. The effect

was to decentralize even further the

Army's ZI counterintelligence functions to the service commands, including maintenance of data files on

individuals which Manhattan intelligence officials considered essential to

their operations. The change also

seemed certain to enhance the difficulties the atomic project already was

experiencing in coordinating its internal security operations with the service commands.11

From his vantage point as head of

the atomic project's counterintelligence group inside G-2, Colonel

Lansdale endeavored to have the

group exempted from the reorganization requirements. When his efforts

failed, General Groves decided that

the only acceptable solution was to

move Lansdale's unit into the Manhattan District. The G-2 sanctioned

this change in December, and Lansdale secured authorization to establish a special counterintelligence detachment. Groves arranged for Lansdale's transfer to the Manhattan District; however, instead of placing him

in charge of the new CIC Detachment, he brought Lansdale into his

Washington office as his special assistant for security affairs. Lansdale's

assignment was to keep the Manhattan chief abreast of problems and developments affecting internal security

and foreign intelligence wherever

they might arise in the project.12

The shift of all project counterintelligence activities to the District required major changes in its security

organization. (See Chart 3.) The Intelligence and Security Section in February 1944 became a full-fledged division and, in keeping with Groves's

10

 Org Charts, U.S. Engrs Office, MD, 15 Aug

and 1 Nov 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 020

(MED-Org), MDR; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p.

139.

11

 Ms, ASF, "Hist Intel Div," 1(9):10-11; Ms, Bernardo, "CIC Hist," pp. 14-15. Both in NARS. WD

Cir 324, sub: Transfer of CI Functions Within the

ZI, 14 Dec 43. Memos, CG OIG (Maj Gen Virgil L.

Peterson) to Dep Chief of Staff (Lt Gen Joseph T.

McNarney), sub: Intel Activities in Svc Cmds, 6 Nov

43, and Col O. L. Nelson (Asst to McNarney) to CG

ASF and to ACS G-2, same sub, 25 Nov 43, reproduced in Monograph, Office of the Provost Marshal

General, "The Loyalty Investigations Program,"

Tab 45, CMH (see also pp. 52-58 for details on the

elimination of unnecessary investigations). Millett,

Army Service Forces, pp. 358-59. Ltr, Strong to CG

4th Svc Cmd, sub: Personnel on DSM Proj, 27 Dec

43, reproduced in MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, App. A2,

DASA. Ibid., pp 7.5-7.7, DASA. WD Bur of Pub

Rels, sub: Script for Radio Broadcasts, 12 Aug 45,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 000.73 (Radio Broadcasts), MDR. 12

 Ltr, Lansdale to Argo, 3 Jan 75, CMH; Testimony of Lansdale in Oppenheimer Hearing, pp. 259-60.
258 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

centralization policy, moved from the

Service and Control Division into the

district engineer's own office. To replace Captain Calvert, whom Groves

had selected for a special intelligence

mission in London, Colonel Nichols—

the district engineer since August

1943—brought in an experienced intelligence officer, Lt. Col. William B.

Parsons, to head the new division. In

this capacity Parsons administered the

District's security program with the

assistance of Major McLeod, the

deputy, and Capt. Bernard W. Menke,

the executive officer, and with support from a large operating staff of

military and civilian personnel. Although Parsons officially reported to

Nichols, he personally kept General

Groves appraised of all developments.

Expanding intelligence and security

activities necessitated procurement of

additional personnel to carry out supportive security functions, such as

plant inspections and technical and

undercover investigations, Colonel

Parsons drew 25 officers and 137 enlisted men from the War Department's counterintelligence manpower

pool and the District's personnel specialists recruited a large number of civilians. In May 1944, to provide administrative services for the expanding security force, Nichols activated

the 13th Special Engineer Detachment (Provisional) and assigned Parsons the additional duty of unit commander. Concerned about achieving

greater efficiency in security operations, Parsons requested and received permission in January 1945 to

combine the 13th with the CIC

Detachment.13

By this time, Parsons' Intelligence

and Security Division had become a

highly centralized unit, organizationally divided into six separate

branches: Clinton Engineer Works

(CEW), Security, Administration,

Safeguarding Military Information

(SMI), Branch Offices, and Evaluation

and Review. The CEW, Security, and

Administration Branches, for which

McLeod had direct responsibility,

dealt primarily with security matters

at the Tennessee site. The CEW

Branch administered the local civilian

guard force and the military police

contingent that protected the Tennessee reservation; coordinated subordinate security offices in the K-25 (gaseous diffusion), Y-12 (electromagnetic), and X-10 (pile) process areas;

and, through a board established for

the purpose, reviewed security cases.

The Security Branch chiefly monitored activities related to security of

project manufacturing plants, especially at the Clinton site, and the shipping of classified materials and equipment. The Administration Branch was

concerned primarily with personnel

security problems, both military and

civilian, but also provided facilities for

the special handling of the division's

mail and records and administered

certain confidential funds.

The SMI, Branch Offices, and Evaluation and Review Branches, for

which Captain Menke had direct responsibility, eventually evolved as a

13

 Org Charts, U.S. Engrs Office, MD, 15 Feb 44,

MDR; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, pp. 7.7-7.8, DASA;

Memo, Strong to CG ASF, sub: CIC Detachment for

MD, 18 Dec 43, reproduced in ibid., App. B3,

DASA; Ltr, Col Donald E. Antes (Spec Insp for

Fiscal Procedures) to Groves, sub: Investigation of

Promotions, MD Intel Br, 13 Jul 45, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Recs Insp: Hanford, 1945-46),

MDR.
SECURITY 259

CHANGING OF THE GUARD: MILITARY POLICE CONTINGENT AT CEW

central clearinghouse for intelligence

and security matters that related not

only to the Tennessee site but also to

the various project operations elsewhere. The principal responsibility of

the SMI Branch was that of projectwide monitoring of programs in security education, censorship, and the

handling of classified materials. The

Branch Offices Branch, as its name

would indicate, was responsible for

coordinating field security operations

in the eleven geographical areas

where atomic energy activities were in

progress and for reporting the area

engineers' security problems to the

division's Evaluation and Review

Branch. The latter branch concentrated in one office functions hitherto

performed by several of the branch

intelligence offices—most notably,

those concerned with the conduct of

subversive investigations and the

preparation of special reports on District security matters for higher

echelons.14

Counterintelligence Activities

Counterintelligence activities constituted one of the most significant

aspects of the District's security program. Through effective counterintelligence measures, the District sought

to provide the shroud of secrecy nec14

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, pp. 7.2-7.13 and App. A7

(Org Chart), DASA; Memo, Col Elmer E. Kirkpatrick, Jr. (Dep Dist Engr) to Groves, sub: Insp of

Intel Div, Oak Ridge, 15 Dec 44, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 319.1 (Insp of Intel Div), MDR.
260 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

essary to forestall all attempts by the

enemy not only to gain information

about the American atomic energy

program but also to sabotage it.

Yet by its very nature, the Manhattan Project remained vulnerable to espionage and sabotage. The District's

recruitment of thousands of individuals with almost every conceivable

kind of background and from all parts

of the country made likely the employment of some potential spies and

saboteurs, no matter how efficient its

clearance procedures might be, and

its widely scattered installations made

implementation and maintenance of

uniform security procedures throughout the project very difficult. The reality of these conditions forced

project leaders to assume that, sooner

or later, Germany and Japan—and

even the Soviet Union—would learn

of the atomic energy program and,

more importantly, use espionage to

expand their knowledge of it and sabotage to destroy America's military

advantage.15

To detect and counter potential espionage and sabotage activities, the

District's CIC Detachment relied primarily upon extensive intelligence investigations. The majority of these investigations were of a preventive

character, designed to minimize the

likelihood that security might be

breached. Of this type, for example,

were the many security checks into

the unauthorized transmission of classified information. In most instances,

CIC personnel found that the information leaks thus uncovered were the

result of carelessness or ignorance on

the part of the employee or individual

with knowledge of the project. But

because it was always possible such

leaks were surface ramifications of

much more dangerous espionage activity, all cases of careless handling of

classified data received prompt and

rigorous corrective action.

A second type of preventive investigation was the supplementary and

more thorough check into the background of employees earlier subjected to routine clearance procedures.

Most supplementary investigations

were made because preliminary data

indicated an employee might be a potential security risk or routine procedures had not produced adequate information about the person's background. Typical cases were those involving scientists or technicians who

recently had come from abroad, especially those who had come from areas

under control of the Axis powers.

Faced with a continuing shortage of

scientifically and technically trained

personnel, project leaders early had

adopted the policy of weighing the

degree of risk against the contributions an employee with security clearance problems could make in development of atomic weapons. "All

procedures and decisions on security,

including the clearance of personnel,"

Groves recalled, "had to be based on

what was believed to be the overriding consideration—completion of the

bomb. Speed of accomplishment was

paramount."

 16

Perhaps the most notable example

of the application of Groves's dictum

on employing talented individuals 15

 Rpt to President, sub: Status of Tube Alloys

Development, 9 Mar 42, Incl to Ltr, Bush to President, same date, MDR.

16

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 141-42. See

also MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, pp. 2.1-2.2, DASA.
SECURITY 261

who were security risks was the case

of J. Robert Oppenheimer. When the

Manhattan commander decided to appoint Oppenheimer as head of the

Los Alamos Laboratory in February

1943, he did so with full knowledge

that the theoretical physicist, who had

worked on the project since late

1941, had only an interim security

clearance from the OSRD. OSRD Director Vannevar Bush, S-1 Committee Chairman James B. Conant, and

the other scientific leaders were generally aware of Oppenheimer's past

record of association with Communist-related organizations and individuals. They knew that during the

1930's he had been attracted to a

number of Communist-front organizations and, while never a member of

the party itself, made fairly regular

contributions to Communist-supported causes. Communist fellow-travelers, including his former fiancee, were

among his friends, and his wife and

brother and sister-in-law were former

Communists. With the signing of the

Nazi-Soviet pact in 1939, Oppenheimer had begun to have serious

doubts about the Communists; however, he continued to contribute to

the Spanish War Relief through party

channels until the spring of 1942 and

to maintain a casual contact with his

former friends.17

Despite his record of past Communist associations, Groves decided Oppenheimer was the best choice to

direct the bomb laboratory at Los

Alamos, for since 1941 he had been

involved in this aspect of research

and development under Metallurgical

Laboratory Director Arthur Compton

and in the summer of 1942 had

become head of the project team concentrating on that work. Hardly had

Oppenheimer arrived at Los Alamos

in the spring of 1943 when the question of his clearance arose in a new

form. At the request of the Manhattan

commander, Lt. Col. Boris T. Pash,

chief of the Counterintelligence

Branch of the Western Defense Command, began an investigation of suspected Soviet espionage in the Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley. Several

men known or thought to be associated with Oppenheimer came under

suspicion and, as a result, so did Oppenheimer himself.18

 On 29 June,

Pash submitted his conclusion that

Oppenheimer "may still be connected

with the Communist Party." He offered three possible courses: to replace Oppenheimer as soon as possible; to train a second-in-command at

Los Alamos as a possible replacement; and, Pash's recommendation,

to have Oppenheimer meet with Generals Groves and Strong in Washington so that they could brief him on

"the Espionage Act and its ramifications" and also instruct him that the

government was fully aware of his

Communist "affiliations," that no

"leakage of information" would be

tolerated, and that the entire project

would be held under "rigid control."

In recommending this procedure,

17

 Discussion of Oppenheimer security clearance

based on Oppenheimer Hearing, especially testimony of

Oppenheimer, Groves, Pash, and Bush; Memo,

Groves to Secy War, sub: Loyalty Clearance of J. R.

Oppenheimer, 24 Mar 47, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 333.5 (Clearance Ltrs), MDR; Groves, Comments on Draft Ms "Now It Can Be Told," LRG;

Interv, British writer Hailey with Groves, 13 Dec 57,

LRG.

18

 See Rpt, MID, sub: Investigations of Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians, Local 25, 13 Aug 43, Incl to Memo, Groves to

Bundy, 17 Aug 43, HB Files, Fldr 61, MDR.
262 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Pash was of the opinion that Oppenheimer's "personal inclinations would

be to protect his own future and reputation and the high degree of honor

which would be his if his present

work is successful, and, consequently,

. . . that he would lend every effort

to cooperating with the Government

in any plan which would leave him in

charge." In any event, he suggested,

Oppenheimer should be told that two

bodyguards were being assigned to

protect him against violence from

Axis agents. These bodyguards

should be specially trained counterintelligence agents who would not only

serve as bodyguards but also keep a

check on Oppenheimer.19

Colonel Pash's report did not

change Groves's opinion. After a

quick visit to Los Alamos, during

which he presumably discussed matters with Oppenheimer, Groves directed on 15 July that he be cleared.

On his return to Washington a few

days later, he directed "that clearance

be issued for the employment of

Julius Robert Oppenheimer without

delay, irrespective of the information

which you have concerning Mr. Oppenheimer. He is absolutely essential

to the project."

 20

 As he wrote the

Secretary of War four years later, "it

was apparent to me that [Oppenheimer] would not be cleared by any

agency whose sole responsibility was

military security. Nevertheless, my

careful study made me feel that, in

spite of [his] record, he was fundamentally a loyal American citizen and

that, in view of his potential overall value to the project, he should be

employed."

 21

Most security cases investigated by

the District's CIC Detachment involved breaches of classified information or allegations against employees

handling classified work of disloyalty

to the United States or of affiliation

with organizations espousing subversive ideologies. While many such

cases presented the possibility of espionage, in fact, investigations turned

up only about one hundred instances

of such activity. When suspected cases

appeared on the increase in 1943, the

Manhattan commander selected a

number of the District's own CIC personnel to serve as special undercover

agents. They occupied strategically located positions in project offices, laboratories, and plants, set up listening

posts, checked intensively into personnel and other records of individuals under suspicion, and took other

measures designed to solve espionage

cases.22

The appointment of special agents

was a move towards greater formalization of the procedure for dealing

with espionage, which continued to

increase as the project grew in size

and scope. Another constructive

measure was the establishment of a

group of permanent surveillance

19

 Memo, Pash to Lansdale, sub: J. R. Oppenheimer, 29 Jun 43, reproduced in Oppenheimer Hearing, pp. 821-22. 20

 Memo (source of quotation), Groves to Dist

Engr, sub: J. R. Oppenheimer, 20 Jul 43, reproduced in Oppenheimer Hearing, p. 170; Groves Diary,

14-20 Jul 43, LRG.

21

 Memo, Groves to Secy War, sub: Loyalty Clearance of J. R. Oppenheimer, 24 Mar 47, MDR. 22

 Details on appointment of special agents and

surveillance squads based on MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14,

pp. 2.3-2.4, DASA; Ltr, Lansdale to Argo, 3 Jan 75,

CMH; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 139; MPC Rpt,

21 Aug 43, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr

25, Tab E, MDR. The section on Russian activities,

which deals with espionage incidents at Berkeley,

provides a good example of Groves's reports to the

Top Policy Group on intelligence developments.
SECURITY 263

squads to carry out supplemental and

nonroutine personnel investigations.

Members of these squads, as well as

other District security agents, soon

became adept in employing professional counterespionage techniques

and in using such surveillance equipment as cameras with special lenses

(telephoto and other types) and concealable listening and recording devices. During their investigations of

persons suspected of espionage activities, either District employees or individuals who had contact with project

personnel, the agents operated in the

guise of diverse roles—to mention

only a few, hotel clerks, bell captains,

tourists, electricians, painters, contractors, and gamblers.

To ensure effective functioning and

control of the surveillance squads and

other special security agents on a

countrywide basis, District security officials developed new channels of

coordination and communication.

Through Colonel Lansdale's counterintelligence staff at Groves's Washington headquarters, field security teams

at the various branch intelligence offices had access to information from

the FBI and other government security agencies. These field teams also

had to file written reports of their

findings and activities on a regular

basis with the Evaluation and Review

Branch of the Intelligence and Security Division. As these reports accumulated in the files at District headquarters, they became an important source

of information for operation of the

whole counterintelligence program.

General Groves, in particular, made

use of the data garnered from these

reports in concert with information

acquired from other government

agencies in preparing his periodic

Military Policy Committee and Top

Policy Group briefings on intelligence

developments affecting the atomic

program.

Espionage Incidents

The most serious espionage activity

came not from the enemy but from

America's wartime ally: Soviet Russia.

Having in the United States a large

diplomatic and consular staff as well

as other officials for overseeing lendlease and other assistance programs,

the Russians had a more than adequate reservoir of personnel for maintaining an extensive espionage apparatus in this country. Soviet agents,

masking as diplomatic and consular

officials, turned to members of the

Communist Party of the United States

and to party sympathizers for assistance in penetrating American wartime

institutions and projects. The Russians, making the plea that the American government was withholding important information and thus unnecessarily delaying Allied victory, recruited many native Communists and

fellow-travelers to assist them in obtaining vital secrets about wartime

activities.23

As early as February 1943, counterintelligence agents of the FBI and

Western Defense Command became

aware that the Russians were obtaining data concerning activities of the

Radiation Laboratory at the University of California. Further investigation

revealed that, in October 1942, a

leading member of the American

Communist Party on the West Coast

23

 Ms, ASF, "Hist Intel Div," 1(7):8-10, NARS.
264 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

had advised a fellow party member

employed at the Radiation Laboratory

to retain his position so he could

obtain knowledge of the secret work

under way there. This employee and

other Communists or Communist

sympathizers working at the laboratory were passing on information about

the atomic project at Berkeley to

Communist Party members, who

promptly turned it over to the Soviet

vice consul in San Francisco. Evidence came to light in early April that

a high official in the Soviet embassy

in Washington had recently given

money to a West Coast Communist

leader, to be used for espionage. Intensive investigation by Western Defense Command counterintelligence

agents resulted in prompt identification of those Radiation Laboratory

employees who were engaging in espionage activities. The laboratory discharged the suspects and, where feasible, the Army inducted them into

service, placing them in nonsensitive

assignments in which they could be

kept under regular observation.24

The District's CIC Detachment

scarcely had completed breaking the

original espionage chain at Berkeley

when, in late August, Oppenheimer

reported his suspicion that new leaks

apparently had developed in the laboratory's security system. On the occasion of a visit to Berkeley, Oppenheimer met with Colonel Pash and

told him he had learned that a

member of the University of California staff, a man who had been a close

friend, was acting as an intermediary

for transmission of data from certain

Radiation Laboratory employees to

representatives of the Soviet Union.

By Oppenheimer's account, his friend

had been recruited by an official of

the Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians, a

CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations) union currently trying to organize employees of the Radiation

Laboratory. In subsequent questioning, Oppenheimer refused to disclose

the name of his friend on the grounds

that he was certain the friend was no

longer passing information to Soviet

representatives. Oppenheimer's uncooperativeness at this juncture resulted in the Manhattan commander

taking personal action. Groves

promptly met with the Los Alamos

Laboratory chief and, because the security of the atomic project was at

stake, ordered him to reveal the name

of his friend. Faced with Groves's insistence in the matter, Oppenheimer

named Haakon Chevalier, a professor

of romance languages at the University of California. A short time later,

the university dismissed Chevalier

from his teaching post and he left

Berkeley. In retrospect, the likelihood

that Chevalier passed any classified

information about the project to the

United States seems remote.25

24

 MPC Rpt, 21 Aug 43, MDR; MPC Min, 29 Dec

44, Exhibit F (summary of U.S.-based counterintelligence developments affecting Manhattan Proj),

OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 23, Tab A,

MDR; Rpt, sub: Summary [of] Russian Situation,

Incl to Memo, Groves to Secy State James F.

Byrnes, 13 May 45, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP

Files, Fldr 12, Tab D, MDR.

25

 In 1954, Oppenheimer testified before the

AEC's Personnel Security Board, which was holding

hearings to consider serious charges against the

former director of the Los Alamos Laboratory that

would lead ultimately to the withdrawal of his government security clearance. Oppenheimer admitted

that he had fabricated the story about Chevalier's

espionage activities; however, he never adequately Continued
SECURITY 265

The Chevalier case was not the

final incident of espionage at the Radiation Laboratory. Less than a year

later, another serious security leak

had developed there. With assistance

from Communist Party members

living in the San Francisco area, a key

scientist from the laboratory met with

officials from the local Soviet consulate. The scientist passed on information concerning the pile process, certain chemical data, and the recently

arrived British scientists. The District's CIC Detachment was able to

end this espionage activity effectively

by securing immediate discharge of

the offending scientist, after which, as

far as is known, representatives of the

Soviet Union made no further attempts to get information from the

Berkeley project.26

Meanwhile, probably acting on the

basis of information gained at the Radiation Laboratory, the Russians had

assigned one of their best men to the

Chicago area, with the task of establishing an espionage channel at the

Metallurgical Laboratory. By early

1944, this Soviet agent, who was a

highly trained engineer with working

experience in both Russian and

American industry, had made contacts

with several Metallurgical Laboratory

employees. By the time the FBI

learned of his activities in April, the

Soviet agent had obtained considerable technical information, which he

had passed on to the Russian consulate in New York. Once identified, the

laboratory summarily dismissed the

suspected employees. Subsequently,

the District's CIC Detachment discovered that one of the discharged workers—a reserve officer who had been

called to active duty and assigned to

the Northwest Territory in Canada—

had taken highly classified material

with him when he left the Metallurgical Laboratory. Fortunately, District

security officials were able to arrange

for confiscation of this material (it

was located in the officer's baggage)

and for transfer of the officer to a

post in the Pacific Theater of Operations where he would have no opportunity to pass on his knowledge to

Russia or the Axis powers.27

Judged in terms of the ultimate utility of the information gained, Russian

efforts at espionage at the Los

Alamos Laboratory in late 1944 and

early 1945—the crucial period of

bomb development—were the most

successful of the wartime period. But

project counterintelligence agents did

not learn of this activity until the late

summer of 1945, after the war was

over. In a sensational postwar trial,

Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and

Morton Sobell were convicted of stealing classified data from the laboratory

explained why he had done so. Oppenheimer's testimony in 1954 and documents relating to it are in

Oppenheimer Hearing, passim. For fuller accounts of

the Oppenheimer case see Strauss, Men and Decisions, pp. 267-95, and Philip M. Stern, The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial (New York: Harper and

Row, 1969). For further details on espionage activities at the Radiation Laboratory and the Oppenheimer case see MPC Rpt, 4 Feb 44, OCG Files,

Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab C, MDR; Rpt,

sub: Summary [of] Russian Situation, Incl to Memo,

Groves to Byrnes, 13 May 45, MDR; Interv, Author

with Lt Col Peer de Silva (former CIC staff member,

G-2, West Def Cmd, with special assignment to

Rad Lab), 8 Apr 75, CMH; Diary of Lt Col E. H.

Marsden (hereafter cited as Marsden Diary), 20 July

43. OROO. Marsden was the District's executive

officer. 26

 MPC Min, 10 May 44, MDR; MPC Rpt, 7 Aug

44. MDR; Rpt, sub: Summary [of] Russian Situation,

Incl to Memo, Groves to Byrnes, 13 May 45, MDR.

27

 Rpt, sub: Summary [of] Russian Situation, Incl

to Memo, Groves to Byrnes, 13 May 45, MDR.
266 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

with the assistance of Mrs. Rosenberg's brother, David Greenglass, an

Army sergeant at Los Alamos, and of

transmitting it to Russian agents. Los

Alamos, too, was the place where the

German refugee scientist, Klaus

Fuchs, while serving as a member of

the British team sent to the United

States under the interchange program, gained a substantial part of the

technical knowledge of the bomb that

he subsequently passed on to the

Russians, first in June 1945 and

thence periodically until his arrest by

British authorities in early 1950.28

Project leaders also had anticipated that, as the Russians, the

Axis powers—particularly Germany—

would launch an equally vigorous espionage campaign, but they uncovered no evidence of such activity

during the war. In early 1944, at a

time when available Allied intelligence indicated that the Germans

might well have attained an advanced

stage in the development of atomic

weapons, the Military Policy Committee reported to the Top Policy Group

that "no espionage activities by the

Axis nations with respect to this

project have been discovered, although there have been suspicious

indications."

 29

Measures Against Sabotage

In a project where the ultimate goal

depended upon continuous progress

in intricate and closely related production processes, unscheduled

delays or interruptions of any kind

could be disastrous. Sabotage in any

form, whether perpetrated by outsiders or insiders bent upon slowing

down or disrupting a particular process, constituted an ever-present

hazard. Recognizing the seriousness

of this threat, General Groves directed that any suspicion of sabotage be

reported to him immediately. In keeping with Groves's policy of constant

vigilance to detect any hint of sabotage, the District's CIC Detachment

thoroughly investigated every instance

of mechanical failure, equipment

breakdown, fire, accident, or similar

occurrence not readily attributable to

normal causes, and kept under constant observation all processes and activities that might attract the efforts of

saboteurs. In addition, other security

personnel regularly inspected the security systems and personnel clearance procedures at the project's various installations, with the objective of

detecting and correcting possible

weaknesses that might invite

sabotage.30

Illustrative of Groves's policy was

the investigation into the mystifying

failure of the first great magnets installed in the electromagnetic plant at

the Clinton Engineer Works. Following a brief period of operation, the

magnets began to malfunction. After

28

 Postwar revelations of espionage activities at

Los Alamos during World War II may be traced in

Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 143-45, and in Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield,

1947-1952, A History of the United States Atomic

Energy Commission, Vol. 2 (University Park, Pa.:

Pennsylvania State University Press, 1969), pp. 312-

14, 415, 472. 29

 MPC Rpt, 4 Feb 44, MDR.

30

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, pp. 2.5-2.6, DASA. For a

detailed discussion of typical measures undertaken

to provide for the physical and personnel security of

a specific project installation—in this instance, the

gaseous diffusion project at Clinton—see MDH,

Bk. 2, Vol. 1, "General Features," pp. 6.2-6.3, Vol.

2, "Research," pp. 9.2-9.4, Vol. 3, "Design," pp.

16.2-16.6, Vol. 4, "Construction," p. 4.2, and Vol.

5, "Operation," pp. 9.2-9.10, DASA.
SECURITY 267

disassembling one of the magnets

piece by piece, Kellex engineers

found that in its oil circulation and

cooling system rust and dirt particles

were bridging the gaps between the

silver bands forming the coil component, which they attributed to the

manufacturer's failure to maintain

sufficiently rigid standards of cleanliness. The significance of this incident

was that it revealed the inherent vulnerability of the electromagnetic installations and the need for constant

surveillance in order to thwart possible sabotage.31

The district's continuous and thorough efforts to protect the project's

installations and operations against

sabotage were signally successful.

During the war years, there were no

definitely established incidents of sabotage traceable to enemy agents. In

most cases where breakdowns or

other failures occurred under suspicious circumstances, investigations revealed they were probably the result

of causes other than enemy sabotage.

For example, during construction of

the original gaseous diffusion plant at

the Tennessee site, inspectors discovered someone had driven nails

through the rubber coverings of vital

electric cables leading underground

from the power plant to the main

production plant. The perpetrators of

this act were never found, although

the evidence indicated strongly it was

the work of disgruntled employees.32

A quite different type of interference with plant operation briefly

threatened the Hanford Engineer

Works in early 1945. Groves reported

to the Military Policy Committee in

February that Army and Navy intelligence had recorded more than fifty

incidents of Japanese balloons at various sites along the Pacific Coast,

some of them carrying incendiary and

fragmentation bombs. While none of

these appears to have been directed

specifically against the Hanford installations, on 10 March a balloon of this

type struck a high-tension transmission line running between the Grand

Coulee and Bonneville generating stations and caused an electrical surge

through the interconnecting Hanford

line that carried power to the production piles. Automatic safety devices at

the three piles were activated, briefly

shutting down their operation. Fortunately, the bombs attached to the

balloon did not explode and the

transmission line was not seriously

damaged.33

Other Functions

One of the most unusual duties assigned to the District's CIC Detachment was that of furnishing bodyguards for key Manhattan scientific

leaders. CIC personnel accompanied

J. Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, Arthur Compton, and Enrico

Fermi almost continuously. They accompanied other scientists at intervals, when they were at work on

projects that required their special

31

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 104-05; MDH,

Bk. 5, Vol. 3, "Design," p. 4.6, and Vol. 5, "Construction," pp. 3.10-3.11, DASA. 32

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 112-13; Completion Rpt, M. W. Kellogg Co. and Kellex Corp.,

sub: K-25 Plant, Contract W-7405-eng-23, 31 Oct

45, p. 12, OROO.

33

 MPC Min, 24 Feb 45, MDR; Memo, Matthias to

Groves, sub: 10 Mar 45 Power Outage, 29 Mar 45,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 675, MDR; Matthias

Diary, 25 Feb and 10-11 Mar 45, OROO.
268 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

protection. Colonel Marshall had

originated the idea of bodyguards,

suggesting that they serve also as

drivers, to conceal their true function

and to reduce the likelihood of accidents. Compton's bodyguard, a

former Chicago policeman, traveled

with him in the guise of a special assistant. When Compton was in residence at Oak Ridge, his guard served

as a member of the local police force.

District security officials exercised

considerable care in selecting individuals for bodyguards, seeking those

who had demonstrated ability to

adapt themselves readily to the kind

of situations in which scientists were

likely to be involved.34

Safeguarding Military Information

Even though District security officials had planned and implemented a

multi-faceted security system to protect all aspects of project operations

and developments, they fully realized

that maintenance of total secrecy in

such a vast project was unlikely. What

was more feasible, they believed, was

to prevent leakage of any useful

knowledge of the program's special

scientific concepts, industrial techniques, and military objectives—or, in

Army parlance, "safeguarding military

information."

 35

Compartmentalization Policy

Under the provisions of Army security regulations, the basic responsibility for the protection of classified information rested upon "all military

personnel, civilian employees of the

War Department, and . . . the management and employees of all commercial firms engaged in classified

work or projects for the War Department."

 36

 In applying this principle to

the atomic program, District security

officials placed particular emphasis

upon limiting the amount of classified

information permitted to any single

individual or group of individuals.

District security regulations established two basic rules which were to

"govern the right to possess classified

information"; a person must need the

information in order to carry out his

job and have access only to the

amount of information "necessary for

him to execute his function." To

make doubly certain an individual employee was restricted to "the minimum necessary for the proper

performance of his duties," District

regulations further directed that "employees . . . shall be organized into

small working groups or teams so far

as possible, each working on its own

phase of the job and not being permitted to inspect or discuss the work

being done by others."

 37

This Compartmentalization policy

became a far more pervasive influence in the project after the Army as34

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, pp. 2.10-2.11, DASA;

Marsden Diary, 20 Jul 43, OROO; Nichols, Comments on Draft Hist "Manhattan," Incl to Ltr, Nichols to Chief of Mil Hist, 25 Mar 74, CMH; Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 183-84. 35

 AR 380-5, 28 Sep 42. The War Department

issued a substantially revised version of AR 380-5

on 15 Mar 44, adding the category Top Secret to

the previously existing categories Secret, Confidential, and Restricted. See Sec. 1, par. 3.

36

 Ibid., Sec. 1, par. 9. 37

 Quotations from MD, Intel Bull 5, Safeguarding Mil Info Regs, 27 Nov 43 (revised 1 Sep 44),

Sec. 3, reproduced in MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, App.

B7, DASA.
SECURITY 269

SECURITY SIGN AT THE TENNESSEE SITE

sumed full responsibility for its administration. Where the OSRD had

applied compartmentalization primarily to research and development organizations, the Army incorporated it

into virtually every type of activity undertaken by the project. Typical was

the District's insistence that production plant blueprints be broken down

and distributed in such a way as to

reveal as little as possible to any one

individual about the overall character

of the project. Similarly, the District

required that equipment orders to

commercial firms specify that an item

not be manufactured and assembled

at the same location. And when the

production plants reached the point

of start-up operations, plant managers

received instructions to split up

orders for raw materials among a

number of suppliers so that the purpose for which they were being used

could not be readily ascertained.

While project leaders agreed that

some compartmentalization of information was necessary, considerable

difference of opinion prevailed on the

extent of limiting scientific and technical interchange, both between sections functioning within a laboratory

or plant and between the various interrelated installations of the project.

Military administrators, in contrast to

their civilian counterparts, favored the

enforcement of stricter controls.

These generally took the form of

written agreements covering those organizations and installations that

needed to exchange data. The agreements specified in detail how and

what information could be inter-
270 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

changed. Inevitably occasions arose

when developments required interchange of classified information not

covered in agreements. In such instances, project leaders applied directly to the district engineer or to

General Groves for special permission

to exchange the data needed.38

One of the most important interchange arrangements formed occurred in June 1943, when General

Groves met with Compton and Oppenheimer for the purpose of establishing "the principles which should

govern the interchange of information

between the Chicago [Metallurgical

Laboratory] and Los Alamos projects. . . ." As a basic criterion determining what information should be

interchanged, they set up the test that

only data that would "benefit work at

both Chicago and Los Alamos"

should be exchanged. The agreement

that resulted spelled out, in considerable detail, exactly what information

could and could not be interchanged

(the latter included those categories

relating to production piles, military

weapons, and the time schedules of

various developments); designated by

name those individuals at each installation who were qualified to carry on

interchange; and outlined exact procedures of exchange—by formal reports, secret correspondence, or visits

and conferences. On the most sensitive matters, or where there was serious doubt about interchange, the only

channel of exchange was through a

visit to the Chicago laboratory by

either Oppenheimer or a specifically

designated group leader. Although

negotiators of the agreement must

have been aware of the generally restrictive character of its provisions,

they nevertheless emphasized that its

major objective was "to maintain as

rapid and effective interchange of information as possible."

 39

Compartmentalization of information probably aroused more adverse

criticism—both from participants in

the atomic program and from some of

those who, in retrospect, have reviewed its history—than any other

single aspect of the project's security

system. Among the participants, the

most vociferous critics were the scientists, accustomed to working in college and university laboratories where

they could freely interchange the results of their work with scientific colleagues in all parts of the world.

Project scientists, such as Leo Szilard,

held that overcompartmentalization

was a primary cause of extended

delays in achievement of scientific and

technical objectives of the program.

Testifying before a committee of

Congress after the war, he asserted,

for example, that "compartmentalization of information was the cause for

. . . failure to realize that light uranium [U-235] might be produced in

quantities sufficient to make atomic

bombs. . . . We could have had it

eighteen months earlier. . . . We did

not put two and two together because

the two two's were in a different com38

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 80 and 140;

Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 150; Talk,

Groves to Women's Patriotic Conf on Natl Def (25-

27 Jan 46), sub: "The Atomic Bomb," Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 337 (Women's Patriotic Conf on Natl

Def), MDR; Memo, Marshall to Only Those Concerned, sub: DSM Proj-Clinton Engr Works, 18 May

43, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 28, Tab

A, MDR; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, pp. 6.3-6.4, DASA.

39

 Memo, Groves to Compton and Oppenheimer,

sub: Interchange of Info Between Chicago and Los

Alamos, 17 Jun 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201

(Tolman), MDR.
SECURITY 271

partment. . . ."

 40

 On another occasion he contended also that compartmentalization was not really "too successful" because "significant matters

gradually leak through anyway."

 41

Joining Szilard in condemning compartmentalization in the strongest

possible terms was Edward U.

Condon, the prominent American

physicist who had come to the atomic

project from the Westinghouse Research Laboratories. In fact, after

spending only a month at Los

Alamos, Condon came to the conclusion that he would be of more use to

the war effort at Westinghouse than

at the New Mexico laboratory. The

project's security policy, he asserted,

had a morbidly depressing effect on

him. "I feel so strongly," he continued, "that this policy puts you in the

position of trying to do an extremely

difficult job with three hands tied

behind your back that I cannot accept

the view that such internal compartmentalization ... is proper."

 42

Most other contemporary critics

took a somewhat less extreme position. Concerned about insufficient interchange of data among atomic

project scientists causing delays in the

solutions of problems related to

bomb development, Compton suggested to the OSRD S-1 Committee

in December 1942 that it might be

wise to increase the number of "responsible persons who are free of

compartmentalization. . . ."

 43

 Similarly, in June 1943, physicist Richard

C. Tolman, in his role as Groves's scientific adviser, expressed concern that

the "proposed regulations [to govern

interchange between the Chicago and

Los Alamos scientists were] perhaps

not quite as liberal as may later prove

warranted." In the weeks following

the institution of these regulations,

both Oppenheimer and Edward

Teller, who was working on a parttime basis at Los Alamos, were troubled by what they viewed as inadequate liaison channels between the

New Mexico laboratory and the other

installations where related work was

in progress.44

When British officials and scientists

came to the United States in late

1942, they were surprised to learn

that General Groves planned further

compartmentalization, which many of

them viewed as already having been

applied to an extent that made efficient operation impossible. Furthermore, the British soon found that the

Americans used the policy as a convenient excuse for withholding information. Thus, the policy became intermeshed with the whole question of

interchange with the British, a problem that was resolved only after many

months of negotiation.45

40

 Excerpts from Szilard's statements before Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy given in

Memo, Nichols to Groves, 12 Jan 46, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 201 (Szilard), MDR. 41

 Memo for File, William S. Shurcliff, sub: Transcript of Notes Taken on 8-11 Oct 44 Trip to Chicago, 14 Oct 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 001

(Mtgs), MDR. Shurcliff, a liaison official with the

OSRD, talked to Szilard about security measures

and recorded his comments in this memorandum. 42

 Ltr, Condon to Oppenheimer, 26 Apr 43, Investigation Files, Gen Corresp, Personnel Scty Investigations (Condon), MDR.

43

 Ltr, Compton to Conant, 8 Dec 42, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1, MDR. 44

 Ltr, Tolman to Groves, 11 Jun 43, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 000.71 (Releasing Info), MDR. See

also Ltr, Teller to Urey, Incl to Memo, Nichols to

Groves, 11 Aug 43, and Ltr, Oppenheimer to

Groves, sub: Liaison With Site X, 4 Oct 43, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 001, MDR. 45

 Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, pp. 150-51.

See Ch. X.
272 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

By early 1944, most project personnel had come to accept the policy as a

fact of life. In looking back after the

war was over, even some scientists

who had found compartmentalization

so distasteful grudgingly conceded it

had probably been necessary. The

eminent American (German-born)

physicist James Franck, for example,

while speaking at a conference on

atomic energy at the University of

Chicago in September 1945, concluded that "so far as secrecy is concerned, they [Army officers] were unrelenting and, in all honesty, we have

to admit that they had to be." But, he

went on to remind his listeners that

the policy had exacted a "stiff price"

in the "wasting of talent and scientific

manpower and the loss of precious

time. . . ."

 46

From the military point of view,

compartmentalization was precisely

what was required, both for security

and for achieving the most efficient

functioning of scientists and technologists. As General Groves expressed

his conviction in retrospect:

Compartmentalization of knowledge, to

me, was the very heart of security. My

rule was simple and not capable of misin- terpretation—each man should know ev- erything he needed to know to do his job

and nothing else. Adherence to this rule

not only provided an adequate measure

of security, but it greatly improved over- all efficiency by making our people stick

to their knitting. And it made quite clear

to all concerned that the project existed

to produce a specific end product—not to

enable individuals to satisfy their curi- osity and to increase their scientific

knowledge.47

Policy Exception: Informing Congress

The District's policy of compartmentalization of information on the

atomic project, in Groves's words, applied "to everyone, including members of the Executive Department,

military personnel and members of

Congress." No one was to have access

"solely by virtue of his commission or

official position." Adherence to this

policy was possible as long as Manhattan's funding came from sources

already earmarked for the War

Department. But project leaders

anticipated considerable trouble in

the future, because securing new

funds would entail congressional

authorization.48

By early 1944, the compartmentalization policy was becoming less and

less feasible with Congress because of

the increasing size of the program, its

rapidly rising cost, and the need to

begin planning for its postwar administration. Under the original directive

from the President, the atomic program obtained funds from the money

appropriated under the Engineer

Service-Army budgetary category.

Funds from this source sufficed as

long as Manhattan's budgets remained relatively modest. But when

project leaders estimated that the

program would need at least $600

million for fiscal year (FY) 1945, they

decided they would have to find a way

to provide some information to selected members of Congress who had

a need to know. They consulted with

President Roosevelt, who thereupon

46

 As quoted by Alice Kimball Smith in A Peril and

a Hope: The Scientists' Movement in America, 1945-47

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 95. 47

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 140.

48

 Ibid, (source of first quotation), p. 360; MD,

Intel Bull 5, Safeguarding Mil Info Regs (source of

second quotation), 27 Nov 43 (revised 1 Sep 44),

Sec. 3, DASA.
SECURITY 273

directed that Stimson, Bush, and

General Marshall brief the leaders of

both parties in the House and the

Senate.49

On 18 February, Stimson, Bush,

and Marshall went to the office of

Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn,

where they were joined by Majority

Leader John W. McCormack and Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin, Jr.

Stimson outlined the history of the

atomic project, including its cost to

date, and estimated the total amount

needed to complete it; Bush described the project's scientific background and indicated the likely destructive power of an atomic weapon;

and Marshall discussed the potential

role of atomic bombs in the Allied

strategy for winning the war. The legislators pledged their unreserved support, stating that they viewed its high

cost as well worth the price. They

promised to work out a system for

handling the Manhattan appropriations in committee so that there

would be no danger of disclosure of

their purpose. Bush found that the

"entire meeting was most reassuring,

as it was quite evident the three

congressmen were exceedingly anxious to be of aid to the War Department in carrying a very heavy

responsibility."

 50

In June, Stimson, Bush, and Maj.

Gen. George J. Richards, the War Department budget officer who was substituting for Marshall while he was

out of town, repeated the briefing for

the leaders of the Senate. Present

were Majority Leader Alben W. Barkley and Minority Leader Wallace H.

White, as well as Chairman Elmer

Thomas and Senior Minority Member

Styles Bridges of the military subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations

Committee. Stimson recalled that

"the four gentlemen who met with us

were very much impressed. They . . .

promised that they would help and

keep absolute silence about it and

prevent discussion in public as to

what it was about."

 51

During the remaining months of

1944, congressional leaders succeeded in keeping the vast majority of the

members of Congress ignorant of the

atomic project. Accustomed to wartime restrictions, most members were

willing to accept—without protest—

the assurance of their leaders that the

work was secret and that the needed

appropriations were essential to the

war effort. But for a few members this

policy was unacceptable, and they directed individual inquiries to the War

Department about rumored developments at the atomic sites.

A case in point was Congressman

Albert J. Engel of Michigan, a

member of the House Appropriations

Committee, who in February 1945

was unwilling to accept automatically

the War Department's request for FY

1946 funding from money appropriated under the Expediting Production

budgetary category. In a visit to

Under Secretary Patterson on the

twenty-fourth, the Michigan representative stated that he had heard 49

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4, "Auxiliary Activities,"

Ch. 1, pp. 2.4-2.5, DASA. Groves, Now It Can Be

Told, pp. 360-62; Stimson Diary, 14-15 Feb 44,

HLS. 50

 Memo, Bush to Bundy, 24 Feb 44, OCG Files,

Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 14, Tab A, MDR;

Stimson Diary, 18 Feb 44, HLS.

51

 Stimson Diary (source of quotation), 10 Jun 44,

HLS; Memo for File, Bush, 10 Jun 44, OCG Files,

Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 14, Tab A, MDR;

MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4, Ch. 1, pp. 2.8-2.11, DASA.
274 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

rumors of extravagance and waste

and that he wanted more information

before approving the War Department's FY 1946 funds. Remembering

that in late 1943 War Department officials had dissuaded him from

making a proposed trip to the Clinton

site, this time he firmly insisted that

Patterson allow him to inspect the

atomic installations. When Stimson

heard from Patterson of Engel's insistence upon visiting project facilities, he sought assistance from the

leaders of the House of Representatives. As Speaker Rayburn was away,

Stimson turned to Congressman John

Taber of New York, another member

of the Appropriations Committee. He

and Taber sat down with Engel and

persuaded him to forgo objections to

funds on the floor of the House, but

only after promising him an opportunity to visit some "outside installations" of the project.52

This experience convinced the Secretary of War and the Manhattan

commander, as well as other project

leaders, that more and more members

of Congress would be demanding

current information about Manhattan's activities. Consequently, they arranged to have a selected delegation

from each House visit Clinton and, if

they wished, also Hanford. With the

President's approval for this plan,

Groves and Stimson, accompanied by

the Secretary's aide, Col. William H.

Kyle, visited Clinton on 10 April to

prepare "for future trouble with

Congressmen."

 53

Upon the unexpected death of

Roosevelt on the twelfth, the inspection trip to Clinton was delayed, but

only temporarily. In May after President Truman had given his assent,

Speaker Rayburn helped select five

members from the House Appropriations Committee—Clarence Cannon,

the chairman, George H. Mahon,

J. Buell Snyder, Engel, and Taber.

Under the careful guidance of the

Manhattan commander and the district engineer, the five congressmen

spent two days inspecting the Clinton

Engineer Works. The legislators returned to Washington convinced that

public funds had been well spent and

prepared to support the project's

budgetary requests for FY 1946. A

visit by a comparable Senate delegation to inspect atomic facilities was

not feasible until after V-J Day, when

a group from the upper house toured

the Hanford Engineer Works.54

Administrative Aspects

As security requirements increased,

the Army established a variety of

units to administer its highly compartmentalized information security program. By necessity, the program from

about late 1942 up until the District's

major intelligence and security reorganization in early 1944 was limited

in scope. Faced with a rapid influx of

new personnel, both civilian and mili52

 Stimson Diary, 26 (source of quoted words) and

28 Feb 45, HLS; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 363;

MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4, Ch. 1, pp. 2.5-2.6, DASA. 53

 Stimson Diary, 31 Mar 45, HLS.

54

 Ibid., 15 Mar, 2, 6-11, and 25 Apr, 4 and 30

May 45, HLS. Groves Diary, 22-24 May 45, LRG.

Notes on Trip to Knoxville, Tenn., 10 Apr 45, Incl

to Memo, Kyle to Bundy, 11 Apr 45; Ltrs, Stimson

to Bush, 31 Mar 45, and Bush to Stimson, 2 Apr 45.

All in HB Files, Fldr 7, MDR. MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4,

Ch. 1, pp. 2.12-2.13, DASA. Groves, Now It Can Be

Told, pp. 363-65. Hewlett and Anderson, New World,

pp. 302 and 339-40.
SECURITY 275

tary, the District's Protective Security

Section concentrated chiefly on developing ways for instructing them in the

meaning of classified information and

the correct methods for handling it.

To facilitate this education process,

the small staff hurriedly prepared and

distributed a manual that provided a

"statement of District policy regarding Protective Security procedures . . . ," including an extensive

section on safeguarding classified

information.55

An intensification of protective

measures during the first half of 1943

resulted in the establishment in

August of the Plant Security Section

for Safeguarding Military Information. In an effort to assure attainment

of the desired security objectives, the

SMI staff developed a new intelligence bulletin. This bulletin, issued

in November, set forth in detail the

requirements and procedures for

safeguarding military information,

emphasizing that "matters of vital importance to the government must be

protected at all times whether at war

or at peace . . . [and thus] great caution [must] be exercised in the handling and in the dissemination of all

information—written or oral—relative

to this Project at any time."

 56

By early 1944, consolidation of the

District's intelligence and security facilities opened the way for a more

comprehensive information security

program, and the establishment in

May of a separate SMI Section (redesignated SMI Branch in 1945, when

organizationally restructured as a subordinate unit of the District's Intelligence and Security Division). Under

the expanded program, security officials launched studies of all aspects of

the atomic project—equipment, material, products, processes, operations,

administrative matters—to determine

the appropriate classification for their

mention in correspondence and other

documents. They set up code names

(some already in use) for major sites,

important materials, items of equipment, and even for the more widely

known scientists working on the

project. Under this scheme, for example, Los Alamos became Site Y, plutonium became 94, the implosion bomb

became Fat Man, and scientist Arthur

H. Compton became A. H. Comas.

Using the staff and resources of the

SMI Section, District authorities directed attention to those areas where

security leaks were most likely to

occur. Thus, the section regularly reviewed project correspondence with

other government agencies, such as

the Selective Service concerning deferment of key personnel, and advised

on the security classification that

should govern each of the thousands

of contracts that the District negotiated with outside individuals and

firms.57

The establishment and maintenance

of effective adherence to security requirements among the project's thou

sands of contractor organizations

comprised one of the most challenging and complex aspects of the infor55

 WD, U.S. Engrs Office, MD, Protective Scty

Manual, 1 Feb 43, reproduced in MDH, Bk. 1, Vol.

14, App. C5, DASA. 56

 MD, Intel Bull 5, Safeguarding Mil Info Regs,

27 Nov 43 (revised 1 Sep 44), Sec. 3, DASA.

57

 MDH, Bk. 1. Vol. 14, pp. 6.3-6.5, DASA;

Memo, Marshall to Only Those Concerned, sub:

DSM Proj-Clinton Engr Works, 18 May 43, MDR;

Ltr. Oppenheimer to Groves, sub: [Use of Cover

Names], 2 Nov 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp. 680.2

(Visits), MDR; Compton, Atomic Quest, p. 182.
276 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

mation security program. District authorities oversaw contractors' security

activities through several channels.

The branch intelligence offices in

principal cities throughout the United

States provided a convenient point of

contact, and periodic checks of contractor facilities and operations by security inspectors from District headquarters constituted a second avenue

of control. These inspectors particularly observed methods of handling

classified materials and storing documents. District security officials also

investigated contractors' personnel

recruitment programs, written correspondence, stock registration statements to the Securities and Exchange

Commission, and similar activities in

which security leaks were likely to

occur. Finally, when a contractor terminated his contract with the atomic

program, District security officials

made certain that all classified materials were returned to project control

or that the contractor provided for

their adequate protection.58

Security problems involving firms

under contract most frequently arose

where these organizations were carrying out large-scale development of

project facilities. Such development,

as at the Clinton and Hanford sites,

inevitably brought overcrowding of

local housing, acute labor shortages,

greatly increased road traffic, and

other adverse changes that placed a

severe strain on normal community

activities. The resulting public resentment, generally focused on the contractor firms, created an environment

in which threats to security were more

likely to occur. In the spring of 1943,

for example, Du Pont's effort to arrange for housing and other facilities

for the thousands of employees who

would work on the Hanford project

stirred up resentment in surrounding

communities, already aroused by the

Army's land acquisition program. The

spread of rumors, adverse criticism in

the local newspapers, and unfounded

statements by local officials tended to

draw widespread public attention to

the project, posing a serious threat to

security. Lt. Col. Franklin T. Matthias,

the Hanford area engineer, and members of his staff spoke at meetings of

service clubs in communities adjacent

to the project, in an endeavor to

counter the rumors and misinformation concerning Du Pont's role in the

project. By these and similar efforts

they laid the groundwork for obtaining the support and good will of the

local citizenry—an absolute essential

to maintaining the security of the

project.59

Efforts to maintain good community relations was an important aspect

of the District's information security

program, which had as its prime objective the forestalling of security

breaks, first by anticipating them and

second by teaching project personnel

how to be "instinctively alert-minded

and security-wise."60 Although the

SMI Section had primary responsibility for carrying out the program, employee education in security matters

devolved chiefly to the SMI staffs at

the branch intelligence offices. Each

staff, for example, conducted orienta58

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, pp. 6.7-6.8, DASA.

59

 Memo, Matthias to Groves, sub: Public Mtgs in

Which Du Pont Participated, 23 Apr 43, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 001 (Mtgs), MDR; Matthias

Diary, 20 and 28 Apr 43, OROO. 60

 MD, Intel Bull 3, Scty Educational Prgm,

15 Sep 43, reproduced in MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14,

App. B8, DASA.
SECURITY 277

tion and refresher sessions for Corps

of Engineers personnel; provided

each contractor with instructional materials for in-house security education

briefings for its personnel; and used a

variety of media—training films, circulars and handbills, payroll inserts,

telephone stickers, and editorials in

project newspapers—to remind District employees of the importance of

unremitting attention to the demands

of security.61

Because of the policy of compartmentalization, the quantity and variety of educational subject matter available for training purposes was limited. Most workers had knowledge of

only the project activity under way at

the site where they were employed,

and most generally did not even know

exactly what was being made in the

facility where they worked. And even

in some instances, project officials

had concocted for employees—those

working at the electromagnetic

plant—a plausible but inaccurate and

misleading explanation of the process

involved and the product produced,

with the warning that this information

was given to them only to help them

carry out their jobs. Lacking concrete

data on which to base an appeal to

employees, security officials had to

request that they accept the necessity

for strict adherence to secrecy largely

on faith and out of a sense of patriotism and loyalty to the men on the

fighting fronts.

As did most wartime agencies involved in secret work, the Manhattan

District resorted to censorship of various kinds as a means of safeguarding

classified information. In the first few

months after the Army assumed responsibility for the atomic program,

the District and branch security staffs

began a cursory review of a few leading daily newspapers and periodicals

and gradually enlarged this check of

publications until it covered some 370

newspapers and 70 magazines. The

censors, several of whom were

Women's Army Corps members, were

particularly on the lookout for publication of anything that would reveal

classified information, attract attention to the project, or furnish an

enemy agent or anyone else with

knowledge sufficient to determine the

nature of the project.62

While review of newspapers, periodicals, and other publications provided some protection against damaging revelations about the project, the

fact remained that once such information appeared in print an element of

secrecy was lost. Much more effective

was a system that prevented publication of sensitive information. Under

the Office of Censorship's "Codes of

Wartime Practices for the American

Press and American Broadcasters,"

newspapers, periodicals, and radio

broadcasters voluntarily agreed to refrain from discussing certain specified

subjects and mentioning certain

terms. In February 1943, Vannevar

Bush proposed that the atomic energy

program be brought under this voluntary censorship. At first, both General

Strong, the Army intelligence chief,

and General Groves had serious reservations about making the atomic

energy project subject to this censorship arrangement, fearing that the re61

 Ibid., pp. 6.10-6.11, DASA.

62

 Ibid., pp. 6.12-6.15, and Bk. 5, Vol. 6, "Operation," p. 6.1 and App. B1, DASA; Groves, Now It

Can Be Told, p. 146.
278 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

suits "might be more detrimental

than otherwise."

 63

Finally, military leaders reluctantly

agreed to the voluntary press censorship plan, persuaded primarily by the

insistence of Nathaniel R. Howard, assistant director of the Office of Censorship and a former editor of the

Cleveland News, that this was the only

way to maintain press security of the

project. On 28 June 1943, Byron

Price, director of the Office of Censorship, sent out a special request to

all editors and broadcasters that they

extend the previously issued precaution not to publish or broadcast anything about "new or secret military

weapons . . . [or] experiments" to

include:

Production or utilization of atom

smashing, atomic energy, atomic fission,

atomic splitting, or any of their

equivalents. The use for military purposes of

radium or radioactive materials, heavy

water, high voltage discharge equipment, cyclotrons. The following elements or any of their

compounds: polonium, uranium, ytterbi- um, hafnium, protoactinium, radium, tho- rium, deuterium.64

The aim of censorship was to prevent all mention of the atomic program in the American press; however,

on the advice of the Office of Censorship, the District permitted a limited

amount of information about certain

aspects of the project to appear in

newspapers published in communities

near the Clinton and Hanford sites.

Office of Censorship officials pointed

out that complete suppression of information about activities at these locations would actually draw more attention than a policy of judicious release of news of local interest, carefully controlled so as not to reveal any

vital secrets. They cited as an example the land acquisition at Hanford,

which required relocation of many

people and resulted in court proceedings. Stories on these events in newspapers of the Washington-Oregon

region would not violate essential security as long as they did not reveal

the purpose of the acquisition or

the interconnection of the Hanford

project with other parts of the atomic

program. General Groves assented to

this policy but took the added precaution, suggested by Office of Censorship officials, of having Manhattan

District representatives visit the editors or publishers of local newspapers

and operators of local radio stations

to request their cooperation in maintaining the security of the project.65

At Los Alamos, security authorities

endeavored to keep all mention of the

site and its activities out of the press.

Total exclusion was more feasible at

the New Mexico installation because

of its military administration and geographic isolation from surrounding

communities. The policy was reinforced in late 1943 through the use of

63

 Strong's reaction to the proposal during a discussion with General Styer, who later reported the

discussion to Groves in Memo, Styer to Groves,

18 Feb 43, AG 313.3 (22 Aug 47), copy in CMH. See

also Memo, Bush to Styer, 13 Feb 43, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 000.73 (Censorship), MDR; Groves,

Now It Can Be Told, p. 146. 64

 Price, sub: Note to Editors and Broadcasters—

Confidential—Not for Publication, 28 Jun 43, Incl to

Ltr, Howard to Groves, 28 Jun 43, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 000.73 (Censorship), MDR. See also

Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 146; MPC Min,

24 Jun 43, MDR.

65

 Ltr, Howard to Lt Col Whitney Ashbridge

(Asst, Opns Br, Constr Div, OCE), 1 Apr 43, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 000.73 (Censorship), MDR;

Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 146-47.
SECURITY 279

regular mail censorship and other

measures to minimize the likelihood

that knowledge of the site would

come to the attention of the press.66

It was inevitable that a voluntary

censorship system would not be totally effective, and on those occasions

when some reference to the project

or atomic energy occurred in the

press or on the radio, the District security office and the Office of Censorship took immediate steps to limit its

circulation and to run down it origins.

A rash of censorship violations occurred in late 1943. A columnist in

the Washington Post announced that

the Senate's Truman Committee was

about to investigate a "half-a-billion

dollar" War Department project in

the state of Washington that was "reported to be one of the largest single

projects that's to be built from scratch

in the Nation's history." On the same

day the Post article appeared in the

Spokane Spokesman-Review, and soon

thereafter the wire services picked up

the news item. Almost simultaneously,

several newspapers in Tennessee ran

a story on the state's Selective Service

that contained a passing reference by

the head of the service, Brig. Gen.

Thomas A. Frazier, to "the Clinton

Engineer Works in secret war production of a weapon that possibly might

be the one to end the war." In both

instances, prompt action by the Office

of Censorship led to withdrawal of

the articles before they had received

wide circulation. Subsequent action

by the War Department resulted in

tracing down the sources of the leaks

and in implementing improved security measures to prevent such occurrences in the future.67

66

 Ltr, Groves to Oppenheimer, 1 Nov 43; Ltr,

Capt Peer de Silva (Santa Fe Area Intel Off) to

Lansdale, sub: Censorship at Los Alamos, 8 Nov 43;

Memo, Lansdale to Groves, same sub, 10 Nov 43.

All in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 311.7 (Santa Fe),

MDR. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 147.

67

 Memo (source of first quotation), Groves to

Secy War, sub: Publicity Concerning DSM Proj,

15 Dec 43; Memo (source of second quotation),

Groves to Secy War, sub: Violation of Vital Scty

Provs by Brig Gen Thomas A. Frazier, 10 Jan 44,

and Incl; Rpt, Lansdale, sub: Publicity Concerning

Clinton Engr Works, 3 Jan 44. All in HB Files, Fldr

62, MDR. References to atomic energy and the

atomic project—some intentional, some accidental—

occurred many times in the public media during the

war. Examples of those investigated by Manhattan

District security officials may be found in HB Files,

Fldr 7, MDR, and in Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

000.73 (Censorship), MDR.
CHAPTER XII

Foreign Intelligence Operations

The Manhattan Project's security

system involved the conduct of not

only domestic but also foreign intelligence operations, for in terms of military strategy gaining all possible information about atomic activities in

the Axis nations—especially Germany—was as important as safeguarding

state-of-the-art information on American nuclear research and developments. Hitler's recurring claims that

Germany had devised secret weapons,

as well as existing intelligence reports

on both German interest in the nuclear research of French physicist Frederic Joliot-Curie and German production of heavy water at the Rjukan

(Norway) plant, convinced project administrators of the likelihood that

Germany had under way a well-developed atomic energy program. In

order to carry out necessary countermeasures against these presumed

enemy efforts to produce atomic

weapons, Allied military leaders in

1943 and 1944 intensified their foreign intelligence operations in the

European Theater of Operations

(ETO), giving a high priority to securing more information about enemy

atomic activities. Manhattan Project

officials initiated much of this intelligence effort, but eventually the War

Department General Staff, General

Marshall, Secretary Stimson, and a

number of other military leaders contributed directly to its success.1

Organization of the ALSOS Mission

Upon receipt of any intelligence information on atomic developments in

enemy nations, the Army G-2, the

Office of Naval Intelligence, and the

Office of Strategic Services, as well as

other existing intelligence agencies,

dispatched a current intelligence

report to the Manhattan District for

the attention of General Groves. Until

the fall of 1943, this reporting system

had served to keep the Manhattan

commander and other project leaders

apprised of at least the accessible

areas of enemy atomic activities. But

in September, after the Fifth Army

had landed in southern Italy, Groves

perceived a unique opportunity for

the Army to exploit new sources of

information, especially about the

German atomic program, as U.S.

forces moved up the Italian peninsula. With the firm support of OSRD

Director Vannevar Bush, Groves met

with Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, the

Army G-2, to explore ways of achiev1

 MPC Min, 13 Aug 43, OCG Files, Gen Corresp,

MP Files, Fldr 23, Tab A, MDR.
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 281

ing this objective. The proposed

course of action, with which Bush

concurred, was the establishment of a

special intelligence mission in Italy.

Shortly thereafter, Strong met with

General Marshall and suggested that

a small group of civilian scientists, assisted by military personnel, be sent

to Italy to conduct inquiries into scientific projects in that country, with

the hope that they might reveal something about German developments.

Marshall promptly approved the plan

and asked Groves to take responsibility for foreign intelligence related to

atomic energy. Apparently the Chief

of Staff was convinced that Manhattan

Project personnel and direction

would result in better coordination,

coverage, and less risk to security.2

Manhattan, OSRD, Army G-2, and

the Navy all furnished personnel for

the newly designated ALSOS mission,3

which completed its organization by

late fall of 1943. As chief of ALSOS

General Strong appointed Lt. Col.

Boris T. Pash, an intelligence officer

whose earlier competence in the Manhattan District's espionage investigations at the Radiation Laboratory had

impressed Groves. When the new

mission reached Italy in late December, it had fourteen members, including Pash, an administrative officer,

four scientists—two OSRD, one

Army, one Navy—four interpreters,

and four attached counterintelligence

agents. Opening the ALSOS field

headquarters near Naples on the seventeenth, Pash established liaison

with the Fifth Army Intelligence

Section and representatives of Marshal Pietro Badoglio's Italian civil

government.

ALSOS Operations in Italy

ALSOS teams in the early weeks of

1944 interviewed Italian scientists and

examined captured technical documents in Naples, Taranto, and Brindisi, and elsewhere in the zone of occupation.4

 They soon realized that little

data on scientific developments in

Germany and northern Italy was available in southern Italy, but discovered

that Rome held more promise. To

gain access to the Italian capital,

ALSOS officials prepared two alternate

plans: the first, have ALSOS personnel

enter Rome with the Fifth Army as

soon as the city fell; the second, bring

Italian scientists out of Rome and

northern Italy even before this occurred. Neither plan succeeded, however, because of the unexpectedly

slow advance of the Allies. ALSOS

teams also had little success securing

information from Italian scientists

behind enemy lines, and by March

2

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 185 and 189-90;

Ms, Col Bruce W. Bidwell, "History of the Military

Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff" (Washington, D.C.: Department of the

Army, n.d.), Pt. 5, p. 6.25, copy in NARS. 3

 Inadvertently, the letters of the code name

ALSOS form the Greek word meaning "grove." General Groves's first reaction, when a scholarly colleague informed him of the meaning of the word,

was to request the G-2 to adopt a more innocuous

name. After further consideration, however, he decided against making the change because he feared

that to do so would create an even greater security

hazard because of the attention it would draw to the

mission. See Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 191.

4

 Except as otherwise indicated, section based on

Ms, Bidwell, "Hist Mil Intel Div," Pt. 5, pp. 6.25-

6.26, NARS; MDH, Bk. 1. Vol. 14, "Intelligence and

Security," Foreign Intel Supp. 1, pp. 1.1-3.6, DASA;

Groves, .Now It Can Be Told, pp. 190-94; Lincoln R.

Thiesmeyer and John E. Burchard, Combat Scientists,

Science in World War II (Boston: Little, Brown and

Co., 1947), pp. 164-65; Boris T. Pash, The ALSOS

Mission (New York: Award House, 1969).
282 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

most team members had returned to

the United States.

From the information secured in

southern Italy, ALSOS scientists concluded that the Germans were carrying on little, if any, experimental activity with atomic energy. From their

reports Groves estimated that the

German program was at about the

same stage the American program

had been when the Army assumed responsibility for its further development. But the evidence was not sufficient. For this reason and with an eye

to the coming invasion of Western

Europe, ALSOS scientists recommended that measures be undertaken to

secure knowledge of scientific developments in new theaters of

operation.5

When Colonel Pash, who was in

London preparing the ALSOS mission

to accompany the invasion of Western

Europe, received word that Allied

troops had entered Rome on 4 June,

he immediately left for Italy. Arriving

in Rome on the fifth, he helped to

identify a number of important scientific intelligence objectives, including

questioning of the members of the

physics laboratory at the University of

Rome. A reconstituted ALSOS group

for Italy carried out this and other

tasks. Two Manhattan officers, Maj.

R. C. Ham, who took charge of the

group when Pash returned to England, and Maj. Robert R. Furman, a

special projects officer from Groves's

Washington staff, played an important

part in its work. The results of the

group's investigations tended to reaffirm those of the earlier ALSOS mission that German atomic activities

were on a very limited scale.6

Manhattan's Special Intelligence

Activities, 1944

Anticipating that ALSOS would continue its operations in Western

Europe, Groves established a liaison

office in London. In December 1943

he sent Major Furman to make preliminary arrangements with the British government, and in January 1944

he assigned Capt. Horace K. Calvert,

chief of the Manhattan District's security program, to head the new office.

Calvert quickly established working

relations with G-2, European Theater

of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA),

with the American embassy, and with

the British atomic energy organization, and also assembled a small staff

of researchers and investigators.

In the early months of 1944, Calvert's group concentrated on collecting further background data on

German atomic activities, seeking especially to obtain more information

on the number of atomic scientists

and technicians at work, on the location of physics laboratories and industrial facilities engaged in operations

related to atomic energy, and on the

mining and stockpiling of ores containing fissionable materials (uranium

and thorium). For example, by perusing German physics journals and

questioning refugee European scientists, they learned the names and

likely whereabouts of the most important German atomic scientists; and by

periodic aerial surveillance of the

5

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 194; MPC Min,

28 Jul 44 and 24 Feb 45, MDR.

6

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 208-10; Pash,

ALSOS Mission, pp. 30-32.
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 283

mines at Joachimsthal (Jachymov),

Czechoslovakia, they maintained a

check on the production of uranium

ore, an indicator of the extent of

German atomic activities. Thus by the

time a revived ALSOS mission prepared to follow the Allied invasion

that summer, the London group had

ready a promising list of matters to

be investigated.7

At the same time, other representatives of the American program were

in England to advise the Allied military leaders on development of defense measures against atomic weapons. There had been a growing conviction among a number of the administrative and scientific leaders of

the Manhattan Project that the Germans might employ some type of

atomic weapon, either in attack upon

Great Britain or in defense against an

Allied landing in Western Europe.

Most American scientists believed that

if the Germans did attempt to employ

nuclear materials on the battlefield,

they would use radioactive fission

products in the form of some kind of

poison gas. The Germans, the American scientists reasoned, were most

likely to have concentrated their efforts on development of a plutoniumproducing pile, because this was the

method that promised to produce the

most active material with the least investment in plants and fissionable materials. The Americans knew from

their own experience that pile operation produced not only plutonium

but also a large amount of radioactive

by-products. If the Germans had succeeded in developing and operating a

pile—and no one was certain they had

not—they would have built up a considerable supply of these radioactive

materials.8

General Groves, very much aware

of the possibility of radioactive warfare, took specific measures to inform

American and British military leaders

of how to deal with the threat. In late

1943, he directed that a project team

prepare an instruction manual on the

use of radioactive materials in warfare, for distribution to the military

leaders, and in December, with the

concurrence of General Marshall, he

authorized a briefing of four officers

from the ETOUSA staff temporarily

on duty in the United States. Maj.

Arthur V. Peterson, a chemical engineer long associated with the pile

program, conducted the briefing at

the Metallurgical Laboratory, including information on probable uses of

the materials, their effects and how

they could be treated, and possible

defense measures. He also instructed

the four officers to inform key officers

in ETOUSA, suggesting they report

any unusual or unexplained symptoms observed by medical personnel

and fogging of films detected by

signal or air personnel. Headquarters,

ETOUSA, took the recommended actions promptly, but in the early

months of 1944 found no evidence of

7

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 194-98.

8

 MPC Min, 14 Dec 43, MDR; MPC Rpt, 4 Feb 44,

OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab C,

MDR; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 199-200. See

also the several reports, memorandums, and other

documents pertaining to how the Germans might

use radioactive materials for military purposes in

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1, MDR. Because of

this threat, the Manhattan District during the

summer of 1943 supplied its area offices in Boston,

Chicago, New York, and San Francisco, as well as

Groves's headquarters in Washington, D.C., with

Geiger counters as a means to detect the presence

of radioactivity in the event of an air raid.
284 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

the use of radioactive materials by the

Germans.9

As time for the Allied invasion of

Western Europe approached, General

Groves turned his attention to the

possibility that the Germans would

employ radioactive warfare to disrupt

the landings on the Continent. He

consulted with a number of Manhattan Project leaders but did not get

any information or helpful advice,

except from James B. Conant. He decided, nevertheless, to warn General

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commanding

General, Supreme Headquarters,

Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF),

directly of the danger of radioactive

poisoning. With approval from General Marshall, he sent Major Peterson

to England to brief Eisenhower and

his chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Walter

Bedell Smith, and other members of

the SHAEF and ETOUSA staffs. Eisenhower's reaction was restrained.

"Since the Combined Chiefs of Staff

have not brought this information officially to my notice," he wrote to

Marshall, "I have assumed that they

consider, on the present available intelligence, that the enemy will not implement this project. Owing to the

importance of maintaining secrecy to

avoid a possible scare, I have passed

this information to a very limited

number of persons; moreover, I have

not taken those precautionary steps

which would be necessary adequately

to counter enemy action of this

nature."

 10

Nevertheless, Eisenhower did take

several measures to alert his command. Briefings on radioactive warfare were held for the chiefs of the

American Navy, Army Air Forces, and

logistical commands in Europe, as

well as for a limited number of their

staff members. He also informed Lt.

Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay, Chief of

Staff to Prime Minister Churchilk At

the request of the Supreme Headquarters, ETOUSA prepared a plan of

operation for the American forces

under the code name PEPPERMINT,

which provided that detection equipment be readied for quick dispatch to

the Continent, if needed, and made

arrangements for obtaining more

equipment and the technical personnel required to use it. The plan also

called for briefing of specified staff

officers and again requested reports

of unexplained fogging of photographic film and certain types of clinical symptoms and medical cases. The

British subsequently devised a similar

plan. A short time before the invasion

of Normandy, Headquarters, Chemical Warfare Service, ETOUSA, carried out rehearsals of Operation PEPPERMINT to test the plan and equipment. Aerial and ground surveys

checked for presence of radioactivity

in bombed areas along the coast of

England and at troop- and supplyconcentration centers. Survey results

indicated that the Germans had not

used radioactive materials, so Oper9

 Memo, Maj Peterson to Groves, sub: Special Instruments, 14 Jun 43; Memo, Nichols to Groves,

30 Oct 43; Manual on Use of Radioactive Materials

in Warfare, no author. All in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1, MDR. Memo, Groves to Chief of Staff,

23 Jul 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 020 (Chief of

Staff), MDR. MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, Foreign Intel

Supp. 2 (by Lt Col Arthur V. Peterson), pp. 4-6,

DASA. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 200.

10 Quotation from Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall,

11 May 44. See also Memo, Groves to Chief of

Staff, 22 Mar 44. Both in OCG Files, Gen Corresp,

Groves Files, Fldr 18, Tab A, MDR.
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 285

ation PEPPERMINT never went into

effect.11

ALSOS Operations in Western Europe,

1944-1945

In early 1944, while planning its

special intelligence objectives, the

Manhattan Project also took the initiative to reestablish an even larger

ALSOS mission in Western Europe.

Groves and Bush in March requested

the newly assigned Army G-2, Maj.

Gen. Clayton L. Bissell, to form a

new ALSOS group along the same

lines as the earlier Italian mission.

Bissell agreed a new high-level scientific organization was needed to exploit intelligence opportunities in the

wake of the invasion armies, but there

was indecision in the War Department

General Staff as to what kind of organization should be used. Concerned

by the delay, Groves personally intervened with the G-2. As a result, the

Deputy Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Joseph

T. McNarney, approved a reorganization plan on 4 April, with Groves and

Bush selecting the military and civilian scientific personnel and General

Bissell the intelligence and administrative staff.12

The new ALSOS mission had its own

advisory committee, a scientific director, and an enlarged staff of military

and civilian personnel. The advisory

committee was comprised of the directors of Naval Intelligence and the

OSRD, the commanding general of

the Army Service Forces, and the

Army G-2, each of whom appointed a

deputy to carry out the actual work of

supervising the mission. The committee members and their deputies

shared responsibility with the scientific director, Samuel A. Goudsmit, a

physicist from the University of Michigan, who had been on leave to work

at MIT's Radiation Laboratory.

Born in the Netherlands and educated in European universities,

Goudsmit had a first-rate scientific

reputation and a command of several

languages. As a student and later a

frequent visitor to many of the scientific centers of Europe, he had

become personally acquainted with

many of the leading physicists on the

Continent. That he had not been employed on the Manhattan Project was

an advantage, because, in the event of

his capture by the enemy, he could

not be forced to reveal secret information about the atomic program.13

11

 Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 11 May 44; Admin

Memo 58, Office of Chief Surg, ETOUSA, sub: Rpt

of Epidemic Disease, 3 May 44. Both in OCG Files,

Gen Corresp, Groves Files, Fldr 18, Tab A, MDR.

Admin Memo 60, Office of Chief Surg, ETOUSA,

sub: Rpt on Fogging or Blackening of Photographs

or X-ray Film, 3 May 44, reprinted in Groves, Now It

Can Be Told, pp. 203-04. MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14,

Supp. 2, pp. 6-10, DASA. 12

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 207; Ms, Bidwell, "Hist Mil Intel Div," Pt. 5, pp. 6.26-6.27,

NARS; Groves Diary, 2, 6, 10 Mar and 3 Apr 44,

LRG.

13

 Except as otherwise indicated, account of

second phase of the ALSOS mission based on MDH,

Bk. 1, Vol. 14, Supp. 1, pp. 2.2-2.4 and 4.1-4.50,

DASA; Ms, Bidwell, "Hist Mil Intel Div," Pt. 5, pp.

6.26-6.41, NARS; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp.

207-49; Thiesmeyer and Burchard, Combat Scientists,

pp. 165-79; Pash, ALSOS Mission, pp. 52-248;

Samuel A. Goudsmit, ALSOS (New York: Henry

Schuman, 1947), pp. 14-127. Data on the German

atomic program in World War II drawn from David

Irving, The Virus House (London: William Kimber,

1967), subsequently published in an American edition under the title The German Atomic Bomb: The History of Nuclear Research in Nazi Germany (New York:

Simon and Schuster, 1968); Albert Speer, Inside the

Third Reich—Memoirs, trans. from the German by

Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Macmillan

Co., 1969), pp. 269-72; Michel Bar-Zohar, The Hunt

of German Scientists, trans. by Len Ortzen from the

French La Chasse aux Savants allemands (New York:

Hawthorn Books, 1967).
286 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

With assistance from the OSRD,

Goudsmit expanded the civilian scientific staff until, by the end of August,

it included more than thirty scientists.

Colonel Pash, after establishing a

London office, recruited additional

military personnel required for the increased administrative and operational duties of a larger mission. For purposes of military administration and

supply, ALSOS was attached to the

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff,

G-2, ETO. In spite of direct support

from Eisenhower's headquarters, Pash

experienced some difficulties in securing adequate counterintelligence

personnel and in making other organizational arrangements. Part of the

problem was that ALSOS'S high security classification limited knowledge of

its purpose and activities to only a

few high-ranking Allied officers.

While the directive establishing the

new ALSOS stated its mission in very

broad terms (it was to secure "all

available intelligence on enemy scientific research and development, particularly with reference to military

application"), both its military and

scientific leaders viewed its primary

purpose to be uncovering and analyzing German atomic activities. Furthermore, the limited size of its staff

(there were never more than slightly

over one hundred military and civilian

personnel) precluded any extensive

investigations outside the nuclear

physics field, although it did give

some attention to bacteriological warfare, aeronautical research, proximity

fuses, guided missiles, and similar

developments.

The first ALSOS operations in

France were largely unproductive investigations at the University of

Rennes and at L'Arcouest, where

Joliot-Curie's summer home was located. Joliot was not in L'Arcouest,

but Colonel Pash, Major Calvert, and

two counterintelligence agents found

him in his laboratory at the College

de France when they accompanied the

2d French Armored Division as it led

the forces liberating Paris in late

August 1944. After receiving news of

the French physicist's whereabouts,

the ALSOS scientific director proceeded to Paris to interview Joliot. Goudsmit subsequently learned that the

German scientists had used Joliot's

cyclotron and other laboratory facilities; however, he failed to obtain

enough data during the interview to

determine the extent of enemy

progress in atomic matters.14

ALSOS investigative efforts became

much more productive following relocation of its headquarters from

London to Paris in mid-September

1944. ALSOS teams established contact with officials of the Belgian uranium mining firm, Union Miniere du

Haut Katanga, and obtained information on the shipments of uranium

products that had gone into Germany. They also learned that there were

still uranium materials in Belgium and

that other stock had been shipped to

France. Groves undertook immediate

measures to bring these materials

under control of the Manhattan

Project agency that had been formed

for that purpose, the Combined Development Trust, and dispatched

Major Furman, who had taken part in

the Italian ALSOS mission, to locate all

uranium stocks in areas under Allied

control.

14

 Key provisions of the ALSOS directive are

quoted in Ms, Bidwell, "Hist Mil Intel Div," Pt. 5, p.

6.29, NARS.
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 287

Soon ALSOS teams had tracked

down and secured 68 tons of uranium

materials in Belgium and about 30

tons at Toulouse, France. Groves directed prompt shipment of these

stocks to England and thence later to

the United States for safekeeping. A

subsequent ALSOS mission located

and eventually secured substantial

uranium stock in storage near Stassfurt in central Prussia.15

As Allied armies moved eastward

toward the Rhine in the fall of 1944,

ALSOS teams gained considerable

knowledge about the probable locations of German atomic activities. Research had begun at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin but had been

moved near the small towns of Hechingen and Bissingen in Wuerttemberg, located in the Black Forest

region of southwest Germany, when

heavy bombing of the German capital

started in 1943. Aerial photo surveillance instituted by the Manhattan intelligence office in England that

summer had concluded new construction there was not an atomic plant,

but other Allied intelligence sources

indicated the Germans had some kind

of atomic operations in progress in

the area. Questioning of German prisoners, too, had cast suspicion on the

town of Oranienburg, 18 miles north

of Berlin, as a possible location of a

processing plant for thorium and

other ores related to atomic energy

research.

Finally, in late November 1944,

ALSOS representatives were able to

question German atomic scientists at

the University of Strasbourg. The 6th

Army Group's special unit, the Strasbourg T-Force, and ALSOS teams entered the city with the first Allied elements. From the scientists and the

documents they found there, they

learned that Germany's wartime

atomic research program had begun

in early 1942. It had not, however,

gotten beyond the research and development stage. When the Nazi leaders had learned of the possibility of

producing atomic weapons, they had

offered to provide the atomic program with more money. But the

German scientists had turned down

the funds as premature. By 1944, they

still had not discovered an effective

way to separate U-235 from ordinary

uranium, although they had succeeded in manufacturing uranium metal

for use in the piles they had built.

They had not, however, attained a

chain reaction in these piles.16

While the Strasbourg data indicated

strongly that the Nazis had not

achieved significant progress toward

the fabrication of atomic weapons, it

was not sufficient to convince General

Groves, Allied military leaders, and

Allied scientists. Some argued, for example, that the Strasbourg evidence

might have been planted deliberately.

In fact, some ALSOS military members

advocated bombing raids on suspected German atomic sites in the Black

Forest region, but ALSOS scientists

dissuaded them from this course.

The latter group, however, raised 15 no objections to Groves's request for On the Combined Development Trust see Ch.

XIII. For further details on the seizure and handling

of captured stock see Ms, "Diplomatic Hist of Manhattan Proj," pp. 31-32, HB Files, Fldr 111, MDR,

and MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, Supp. 1, pp. 4.36-4.37,

DASA.

16 For a description of the efforts of the Nazi government to provide support for the German atomic

program see Speer, Inside the Third Reich, pp. 269-

71, and Stimson Diary, 13 Dec 44, HLS.
288 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

bombing of installations at Oranienburg. The town was in the projected

Russian occupation zone and therefore could not be investigated by

ALSOS. Groves dispatched an officer

from his staff to explain the mission

to General Carl A. Spaatz, commander of the United States Army Strategic

Air Forces in Europe, who on 15

March 1945 ordered Eighth Air Force

bombers to drop almost 1,300 tons of

bombs and incendiaries on the facilities at Oranienburg.17

Preparing to follow the Allied

armies into Germany in early 1945,

ALSOS corrected certain organizational weaknesses revealed during the

Strasbourg operations. Full-time assignment of German-speaking scientists helped ensure their prompt availability when they were most needed.

Establishment of close liaison with

SHAEF and ETOUSA headquarters,

in Paris, and with the 21st, 12th, and

6th Army Groups headquarters enabled Colonel Pash to keep more

abreast of front-line military developments, and hence in a better position

to exploit intelligence opportunities.

The reorganized ALSOS units demonstrated their greater effectiveness

as they followed the Allied armies

toward the Rhine in February 1945.

Establishing another advance base at

Aachen, they investigated scientific intelligence objectives in the university

cities of Cologne and Bonn, at metalmaking plants in Frankfurt, and, a

short time later, at the IG Farben Industries plants in Ludwigshafen. As

ALSOS scientists had anticipated, none

of these investigations turned up significant information on German

atomic developments. But they

helped to prepare the way for

effective exploitation of the important atomic objectives in southwest

Germany.

The first of these to become accessible in the spring of 1945 was Heidelberg. There an ALSOS team captured several leading German atomic

scientists; nuclear equipment, including a cyclotron; and many valuable

documents. Data uncovered in Heidelberg also further substantiated earlier evidence that most of the other

important German atomic scientists

and their research installations were

in the region south and east of Stuttgart. But ALSOS penetration of this

area posed a problem because of the

decision by the Allied leaders in early

1945 that it fell within the French

zone of operations.

In April 1945, while American

atomic leaders endeavored to work

out a solution to the French zone

problem, ALSOS teams operating out

of advanced base headquarters at

Heidelberg and Aachen investigated a

variety of atomic targets at other

points in west and southwest Germany. Northeast of Frankfurt, at the

town of Stadtilm in Thuringia, where

the German government had relocated a part of the physics branch of

the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, ALSOS

found many technical documents relating to the atomic program, parts for a

low-temperature pile, heavy water

equipment, and 8 tons of uranium

oxide. The Gestapo had evacuated

17

 Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds.,

Europe: Argument to V-E Day, January 1944 to May

1945, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 3

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 53

and 753. The account of the bombing of Oranienburg on 15 Mar 45 indicates that the town was a

railroad center and site of aircraft plants, but does

not mention atomic facilities. See also Groves, Now

It Can Be Told, pp. 230-31.
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 289

the most important laboratory staff

members, but ALSOS scientists interviewed a number of lesser status who

had remained in Stadtilm. At the university town of Goettingen, located

south of the city of Hannover, and at

the adjoining village of Lindau, another ALSOS team found several scientists and technicians who had considerable knowledge of German wartime

scientific programs. Most notable

among this group was the chief of the

planning board of the Reichsforschungsrat (National Research Council), the

central German agency for scientific

research for military purposes. From

Goettingen, an ALSOS team pushed

north to Celle, located 22 miles

northeast of Hannover, where, according to information obtained at

Stadtilm, the Germans had installed

an experimental centrifuge for separating uranium isotopes. On the

seventeenth, the team found the centrifuge in a laboratory located in a

spinning mill guarded by British

troops.

These various findings by ALSOS

teams appeared further to confirm

that the German wartime atomic

energy program was of relatively

modest character and had made little

progress toward producing atomic

weapons. But the American atomic

leaders could not be fully satisfied

that this was the case until ALSOS

teams had investigated the reported

atomic facilities relocated by the Germans from the Berlin area to the

Black Forest region in Wuerttemberg

and had captured the principal

German atomic scientists believed to

be residing in that area. They also

agreed that, for reasons of security,

American troops must be the first to

occupy and inspect these facilities.

Their first hope was that zone boundaries in southwest Germany could be

adjusted to exclude the atomic facilities from the French zone. But by

early April, the State Department's insistence upon having full knowledge

of the reasons for making readjustments—a request incompatible with

Manhattan's security requirements—

convinced Groves that other means

must be found to assure American

penetration ahead of the French in

the crucial Wuerttemberg region. On

the fifth, Groves, Marshall, and Stimson agreed that the Manhattan commander should implement his own

proposal that ALSOS teams, accompanied by American troops, move into

the Wuerttemberg region, question

German atomic scientists found there,

remove appropriate records, and destroy the atomic installations.18

Marshall directed Groves to coordinate with the Operations Division of

the War Department and SHAEF in

developing a plan for what came to

be known as Operation HARBORAGE.19

 Groves sent his special assistant for security affairs, Lt. Col. John

Lansdale, Jr., to Europe to assist the

SHAEF planners. They first considered carrying out a combined parachute and ground operation, but by

20 April the rapidly shifting tactical

situation had eliminated the need for

the air phase of the operation. Instead, SHAEF ordered Colonel Pash

to undertake a conventional intelligence operation, with the objective of

seizing appropriate persons, documents, buildings, and materials. For

18

 Stimson Diary, 4-5 Apr 45, HLS. 19

 General Groves gives a detailed account of his

role in the planning of Operation HARBORAGE in

Now It Can Be Told, pp. 233-36.
290 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

this purpose, the Supreme Headquarters created a new special task force,

designated T-Force. Comprised of

fourteen American and seven British

officers, five scientists, eight counterintelligence agents, and fifteen enlisted men, T-Force was attached to the

6th Army Group and reinforced by

the 1269th Engineer Combat Battalion (less Company B), all under the

command of Pash. When French

forces appeared to be on the verge of

moving in to the Wuerttemberg area

in late April, SHAEF gave Pash permission to launch Operation HARBORAGE. On the twenty-second, Pash, accompanied by Brig. Gen. Eugene L.

Harrison, G-2 of the 6th Army

Group, led T-Force across a bridgehead at Horb, on the Neckar River,

about 56 miles east of Strasbourg.

They moved south and east 20. miles

to Haigerloch, which they seized on

the twenty-third. In the next two

days, T-Force elements also occupied

Hechingen, 9 miles east of Haigerloch, and Bissingen, a few miles

southwest, and Tailfingen, a few miles

southeast of Hechingen, thus completing a sweep of the Black Forest

villages suspected of having atomic

installations or personnel.

What the ALSOS scientists found in

these communities finally and definitely confirmed the limitations of the

wartime German atomic program. "It

was so obvious," Samuel Goudsmit

later recalled,

that the whole German uranium set up

was on a ludicrously small scale. Here [at

Hechingen] was the central group of lab- oratories, and all it amounted to was a

little underground cave, a wing of a small

textile factory, a few rooms in an old

brewery. To be sure, the laboratories

were well-equipped, but compared to

what we were doing in the United States

it was still small-time stuff. Sometimes we

wondered if our government had not

spent more money on our intelligence

mission than the Germans had spent on

their whole project.20

Besides laboratories and equipment, ALSOS teams found concealed

supplies of heavy water, 1.5 tons of

metallic uranium cubes, 10 tons of

carbon, and miscellaneous other nuclear materials. They also located important scientific and technical

records, but most significant were the

German scientists they took into custody. These included Otto Hahn,

who, with Fritz Strassmann, had conducted in 1938 the experiments that

resulted in the fissioning of uranium

by neutrons, subsequently confirmed

by Lise Meitner and Otto R. Frisch.

Not all of the known remaining

leaders of German atomic science

were found in the Black Forest

region, but information uncovered

there led to capture in May 1945 of

those still at large by other ALSOS

teams operating in Bavaria. These included the world-famous Werner Heisenberg, a Nobel Prize winner, and

Walther Gerlach and Kurt Diebner,

two of the chief administrative officials in the German atomic program.

After preliminary interviews by ALSOS

field teams, Allied authorities removed the captured scientists by easy

stages to rear areas—first to Versailles, then Belgium, and finally in

July to England—where they were

subjected to further intensive interrogation. Although the enemy scientists

were under British administrative

control during their extended internment in England, representatives of

20

 Goudsmit, ALSOS, pp. 107-08.
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 291

the Manhattan Project exercised a

consultative role in determining their

intelligence exploitation and ultimate

disposal. Unwilling to see the German

scientists come under Russian control, both British and American

atomic authorities insisted on detaining them in England until there was a

reasonable assurance that when they

returned to Germany they would

reside and work in either the British

or American occupation zone, a condition that was not finally met until

the end of 1945.21

ALSOS continued operating in the

wake of the Allied armies in the

summer and fall of 1945, seeking additional evidence of German atomic

developments. Penetrations to Hamburg, Berlin, Vienna, and elsewhere

resulted in the capture of a few more

scientists but provided little additional new information or facilities. When

the ALSOS mission finally disbanded

in November, it had, as General

Groves later assessed its results,

"only confirmed what we already

knew and it was quite clear that there

was nothing in Europe of further interest to us."22

When the interned German scientists learned that the United States

had dropped atomic bombs on Japan

in August 1945, they endeavored to

explain why Germany failed to develop an atomic weapon. Their explanation coincided generally with the

picture that ALSOS teams had pieced

together from the evidence they had

gathered in Germany. Although

German scientists had begun research

on the practical application of atomic

energy in 1939, they soon had come

to the conclusion that, because of limited resources and facilities available

to them, production of atomic explosives was not feasible and had concentrated on developing an atomic

engine as an alternate source of

power. They had persisted along

these limited lines even after Albert

Speer, the Nazi Minister of Armaments, had offered in 1942 to increase financial support for the

atomic program. Speer later recalled

that Heisenberg and other German

atomic scientists had given him the

distinct "impression that the atom

bomb could no longer have any bearing on the course of the war."23

Administrative problems, too, had

plagued the program; a partial consolidation in 1942 had not ended the

fragmentation and duplication that had

developed when atomic research had

been divided among three different

and competing governmental agencies. In the estimate of the historian

of the German program, the combined effect of these negative factors

was that "after the middle of 1942,

Germany virtually marked time until

the end of the war, gaining in those

three years knowledge that could

have been won in as many months

had the will been there. . . . Germany's nuclear scientists failed to win

the confidence of their government,

and were left stranded on the shores

of the atomic age."

 24

21

 On the internment and treatment of the

German scientists in England see Groves, Now It

Can Be Told, pp. 333-40. 22

 Ibid., p. 248.

23

 Speer, Inside the Third Reich, p. 271. 24

 Irving, The Virus House, p. 274. See also Alan D.

Beyerchen, Scientists Under Hitler: Politics and the Physics Community in the Third Reich (New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1977), pp. 188-89, 193-97, 201-

02.
CHAPTER XIII

The Raw Materials Program

From the very beginning of the

atomic energy project, one of the

most important activities was procurement of basic raw materials, many of

them never before in great demand.

The Office of Scientific Research and

Development had begun acquiring a

number of these materials through

the planning board of its S-1 Section

and through Stone and Webster, and

in mid-1942, when the project was

placed under the direction of the

Army, the Manhattan District assumed responsibility for the ongoing

materials program. With the longrange objective of ensuring America's

control of the world's more significant deposits of uranium and thorium,1

 the District almost immediately

became involved in acquisition efforts

at an international level. This, project

leaders felt, was critical to national security and would prevent unfriendly

nations from securing these supplies.

Geographic Search and Field Exploration

In October 1942, shortly after General Groves became executive officer

of the Manhattan Project, Deputy District Engineer Nichols and Union

Miniere Director Edgar Sengier successfully completed negotiations for

the District's acquisition of the company's remaining stocks of mined uranium ore, stored on Staten Island and

in the Congo,2 thus assuring the

atomic program a sufficient supply to

meet its wartime requirements. Yet in

the ensuing months, project leaders

gradually came to realize that raw materials procurement could not be limited to meeting only the immediate

wartime demands. First, by their decision to build and operate several

large production plants, they had established a requirement for a continuing supply of uranium, not only for

the wartime weapons program but

also for postwar armaments and development of atomic energy as a great

new source of power. Second, they

became increasingly aware of important strategic considerations as, beginning in 1943, the United States negotiated interchange agreements with

1

 When thorium 232 captures a slow neutron, it

converts into thorium 233. The thorium then disintegrates quickly into protoactinium 233, which then

decomposes, but more slowly, into uranium 233.

Uranium 233 is fissionable by slow neutrons and

thus potentially a material for sustaining a chain

reaction. Thorium, like uranium, occurs widely in the

earth's crust, but similarly not often in sufficient

concentration to provide economically workable deposits. Before World War II, it was most commonly

used in the manufacture of gas mantles.

2

 See Ch. IV for details on acquisition of Belgian

ore.
THE RAW MATERIALS PROGRAM 293

Great Britain. Both the American and

British leaders concluded that the

best future interest of the two countries would be served by a joint effort

to seek out and gain control over as

much of the world's uranium and thorium deposits as possible; this policy,

they reasoned, would ensure their

governments ready access to major

new resources of inestimable value

and would keep these resources out

of the hands of their potential enemies. Furthermore, project leaders

perceived that, strictly from the viewpoint of national interest, it would be

better for the United States to conserve its own apparently limited domestic resources and use whatever

raw materials it could acquire from

other countries instead.3

Although occupied with a myriad of

other matters relating to plant construction in early 1943, General

Groves took time to develop an organization for carrying out the project's

long-range raw materials objectives.

He presented his ideas to the Military

Policy Committee at its 5 February

meeting, emphasizing that he wanted

to have "a competent mining expert

examine the possibility of developing

in the United States a suitable source

of supply of the crucial ores." By late

March, the Manhattan commander

was discussing the possibility of engaging the Union Carbide and

Carbon Corporation, already under

contract to operate the gaseous diffusion plant at Clinton, to undertake a

broad program of ore exploration for

the Manhattan Project.4

Groves's selection of Union Carbide rather than some other company, or the Manhattan District, or another government agency was due to

a number of considerations, with the

security aspect of primary importance.

Because Union Carbide made regular

foreign purchases of many uranium

minerals, he felt it was highly unlikely

that the chemical firm's ore exploration activities for the District would

attract any undue attention. Also especially attractive was the fact that the

company, because of its long experience in mineral surveys and explorations, currently had an organized—

although inactive—subsidiary, the

Union Mines Development Corporation, to administer the ore program.

Following negotiations, Union Carbide agreed to activate Union Mines,

and on 24 May, Union Mines President J. R. Van Fleet accepted a letter

contract. Under terms of this contract, Union Mines would carry out a

worldwide search for new sources of

uranium, evaluate its findings, and

make recommendations as to the best

way for the United States to explore

them; the government would pay all

costs; and Union Mines would work

without a fixed fee or profit.

For reasons of security, and to

avoid duplication of administrative

overhead operation, Union Mines located its headquarters in the New

York City office building already occupied by other elements of Union

Carbide. Security also was the main

consideration in the administrative 3

 MPC Rpt, 21 Aug 43, Fldr 25, Tab E; MPC Min,

24 Jun 43, Fldr 23, Tab A. Both in OCG Files, Gen

Corresp, MP Files, MDR. Groves, Now It Can Be

Told, p. 180. Ms (unsigned), "Atomic Bombs," Apr

45, HB Files, Fldr 15, MDR.

4

 MPC Min, 5 Feb (source of quotation) and

30 Mar 43, MDR.
294 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

decision to set up a separate Manhattan unit for monitoring Union Mines

survey and exploration activities, as

well as to maintain liaison with District headquarters and its major procurement office at Madison Square.

On 15 June, in rooms adjacent to

those of Union Mines, the district engineer established the Murray Hill

Area Engineers Office and, as area

engineer, assigned Maj. Paul L.

Guarin.5

While Major Guarin was organizing

a small staff of technical experts and

clerks, Union Mines started recruiting

trained personnel for its staff. By

mid-1944, the company had assembled approximately 130 individuals,

assigning half of them to the New

York office and the rest to field

projects in the United States and

abroad. To achieve its program objectives, Union Mines organized staff

functions along several lines. The

New York-based geologists, translators, and clerks concentrated on a

thorough search of available technical

literature on world mineral resources,

in all languages. Field teams of

mining engineers and geologists investigated known or suspected

sources of uranium and thorium. A

small group in New York studied

ways to improve the methods and

equipment for ore exploration, and

another small unit at Union Mines

headquarters oversaw research on

beneficiation and metallurgical processes that might be suitable for concentration of uranium ores. Making

maximum use of the nearby facilities

of Union Carbide, Union Mines was

able to administer the entire ore program with a relatively small overhead

staff and at a cost of approximately

$600,000 a year.6

During the period of its wartime

operations, Union Mines supplied

Manhattan leaders with a variety of

reports. After studying the various instruments and techniques for area

surveying and ore testing, Union

Mines research staff compiled data on

the latest or improved devices for detecting uranium and thorium deposits

and for testing ore samples. It also

examined some sixty-five thousand

volumes and, based on its findings,

produced fifty-six reports covering

occurrences of uranium and thorium

in about fifty different countries, including not only enemy-controlled

lands such as Czechoslovakia and

Thailand but also areas as remote as

Greenland and Madagascar. And from

the company's field exploration program, field teams prepared a total of

fifty-seven reports of investigations

carried out in thirty-six states and the

territory of Alaska and about fortyfive reports of investigations conducted in some twenty foreign countries.7

5

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 180; First Annual

Rpt, Murray Hill Area Engrs Office, sub: Proj S-37,

30 Jun 44, pp. 1-2, OROO; Memo, Guarin to

Groves, sub: Union Mines Proj, 6 Jul 44, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 095 (Union Mines), MDR;

MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 2, "Geographical Exploration,"

pp. 1.1-1.3, DASA.

6

 Rpt, Murray Hill Area Engrs Office, 30 Jun 44,

pp. 2-8, 12-13, 42-44 (Charts 2-4), OROO;

Groves, sub: Union Mines Proj, 6 Jul 44, MDR;

MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 2, pp. 1.2-1.3 and 3.2-3.5, DASA. 7

 MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 2, pp. 1.4-1.16 and Apps. B1

(list and summary of all reports by Literature Research Div-B5), DASA. Rpt, Murray Hill Area Engrs

Office, 30 Jun 44, pp. 22-34, OROO. Memo, Merritt to Nichols, sub: Resume of Prod of Uranium

Products for MD in Colorado Plateau Area, 26 Jan

45, 410.2 (Uranium); Rpt, Union Mines, sub: Summary of Investigations to 1 Feb 44, same date, 095

(Union Mines). Both in Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

MDR. Ltr, Stimson to MacArthur (Cdr in Chief, SW

Continued
THE RAW MATERIALS PROGRAM 295

Beginning in early 1944, the

Murray Hill area engineer used the

Union Mines data to provide the district engineer with comprehensive

lists appraising uranium production

possibilities in various countries. A

typical list, for example, rated occurrences in the Belgian Congo as excellent; those in the United States,

Canada, and Sweden as good; those

in Czechoslovakia, Portugal, and

Union of South Africa as fair; and

those in Madagascar, Australia, Brazil,

and England as poor. By 1945, the

area engineer was also including reports on thorium. Brazil and India

were rated excellent, while the United

States, Korea, Netherlands East

Indies, Malaya, and Siam were judged

fair. In this manner, the Union Mines

data provided the essential guidelines

for reaching the long-range objective

of the ore program.8

Ore Control Agency: Combined

Development Trust

By the summer of 1943, the American atomic project's supply requirements for sufficient raw materials had

convinced its leaders of the importance of establishing adequate control

over the world's more significant deposits of uranium and thorium. In its

21 August report to the President, the

Military Policy Committee advanced

this idea, warning that "the major

world supply [is] in the Belgian

Congo [and] not under our control in

any way.9 This situation, the committee felt, did not bode well for the

United States, especially in the postwar era: America's knowledge and

technical capability to fabricate atomic

weapons would be of no avail without

the raw materials to do the job.

How to secure these raw materials

became a priority issue for project

leaders, who felt one way was to gain

control over the Congo supply.

During the fall, Colonel Nichols attempted to convince Union Miniere

Director Edgar Sengier that the flooded Shinkolobwe mine should be reopened and its entire future output

sold to the United States; however,

Sengier, who understood the potential of atomic power, did not wish to

make any commitments that he could

not later justify to the Belgian government as having been based upon

military requirements.

The American failure to secure a

long-term contract from Sengier for

future production of Congo ore came

up for discussion at the 14 December

meeting of the Military Policy Committee. The consensus of the committee was that, with the Belgian government in exile in London and British

commercial interests apparently holding or having direction over nearly a

third of Union Miniere stock, Great

Britain was likely to gain control of

the Congo uranium. So from the

American point of view, the committee concluded, the best move would

be to secure joint control. ConsePacific Area), 31 Mar 44, HB Files, Fldr 25, MDR.

Stimson wrote to MacArthur requesting clearance

for a visit by a Union Mines representative interested in "information [on] certain natural resources

which might be found in your theater." 8

 Rpt, Murray Hill Area Engrs Office, 30 Jun 44,

pp. 8-11, OROO. MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 2, pp. 1.16-

1.21, DASA. Rpt, Union Mines, sub: Summary of

Investigations to 1 Feb 44, same date; Memo,

Guarin to Groves, sub: Union Mines Proj, 6 Jul 44.

Both in Admin Files, (Gen Corresp, 095 (Union

Mines), MDR.

9

 MPG Rpt, 21 Aug 43, MDR. Although signed by

Bush, Groves had drafted this report.
296 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

quently, on the seventeenth, the

American and British members of

the Combined Policy Committee,10

agreed to begin studies preparatory

to recommending joint action.11

Speaking for the Military Policy

Committee, General Groves recommended to the President in February

1944 that the Belgians be "strongly

encouraged" to reopen the Shinkolobwe mine and that the United

States and Great Britain take whatever steps were necessary to ensure

"joint control" of uranium in the

Congo. The two countries also should

collaborate to secure all accessible

supplies elsewhere, "not only for the

period of the war, but for all time to

come." The Top Policy Group endorsed these recommendations and,

on the fifteenth, Secretary Stimson

and OSRD Director Vannevar Bush

lunched with Roosevelt and secured

his approval.12

Following these recommendations,

the Combined Policy Committee gave

its tentative approval to a draft plan

for American-British-Canadian collaboration on 17 February. The committee would establish a Washingtonbased business corporation, or similar

agency, headed by a board of six directors (three to be chosen by the

United States, two by Great Britain,

and one by Canada), and the United

States would pay half the cost of the

organization, Great Britain and

Canada the rest. As directed by the

committee, the new organization

would give first consideration to obtaining control of the Congo ore

deposits.13

10

 Churchill and Roosevelt's signing of the

Quebec Agreement on 19 Aug 43 established the

Combined Policy Committee in Washington, D.C.,

with membership as follows: Secretary Henry L.

Stimson (United States), as chairman, Dr. Vannevar

Bush (United States), Dr. James B. Conant (United

States), Field Marshal Sir John Dill (United Kingdom), Col. John J. Llewellin (United Kingdom), and

Mr. Clarence D. Howe (Canada). Field Marshal Dill

was head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, Colonel Llewellin was the Washington representative of the British Ministry of Supply, and

Mr. Howe was Canada's Minister of Munitions and

Supply. See Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, pp.

170-72, and Groves, Now It Can Be Told pp. 133-37. 11

 MPC Min, 14 Dec 43, MDR; CPC Min, 17 Dec

43, HB Files, Fldr 10, MDR; Ms, "Diplomatic Hist

of Manhattan Proj," p. 18, HB Files, Fldr 111,

MDR; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 170. After the

breakdown of Anglo-American collaboration on

atomic matters in early 1943, Great Britain developed a strong interest in securing a reliable source

of uranium for its future needs. Two actions by the

United States, however, caused leaders of the British atomic project to feel genuinely alarmed: in the

spring, when the United States contracted to purchase practically the entire output of the Canadian

Eldorado mine (hitherto the chief source of uranium

for the British program) through the end of 1945;

and in the fall, when the United States attempted to

buy the entire output of the Belgian-owned Shinkolobwe mine in the Congo. The first incident was

sufficient impetus for the British to seek a resumption of Anglo-American cooperation, and in August

the two allies signed the Quebec Agreement. The

signing of this agreement opened the way for the

two atomic partners to pursue a joint program to

obtain control of the world's uranium resources. Although the fall incident seemed threatening to British interests, the United States realized by the end

of the year that Great Britain occupied a better vantage point and thus took the initiative to implement

joint cooperation and control measures. For an account of Anglo-American problems and coordination on uranium supplies see Gowing, Britain and

Atomic Energy, pp. 179-85.

12

 Quotations from MPC Rpt, 4 Feb 44, OCG

Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab C, MDR.

See also Memo, Bush to Bundy, 14 Feb 44, OCG

Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25, MDR; Stimson Diary, 15 Feb 44, HLS; Gowing, Britain and

Atomic Energy, pp. 298-99. 13

 CPC Min, 17 Feb 44, OCG Files, Gen Corresp,

MP Files, Fldr 9, Tab B, MDR; Stimson Diary,

17 Feb 44, HLS; Articles of Agreement Governing

Collaboration Between the Authorities of the United

States of America, the Kingdom of Great Britain,

and the Dominion of Canada in the Matter of Uranium Ore, draft of 14 Feb 44, HB Files, Fldr 23,

MDR. The draft adopted on the seventeenth does

not appear to have differed substantially from that Continued
THE RAW MATERIALS PROGRAM 297

Final negotiations on this wartime

agreement took place in London between Sir John Anderson, now Chancellor of the Exchequer, and American Ambassador John G. Winant.

This arrangement made for a somewhat ticklish situation, for neither

Secretary of State Cordell Hull nor

anyone else in the Department of

State knew anything about the existence of the Manhattan Project. In the

interest of continued secrecy, President Roosevelt took the view that

Ambassador Winant was his representative, not Secretary Hull's, and

that negotiations could be conducted

through Winant without recourse to

the Department of State. He designated Secretary Stimson to oversee the

negotiations, and instructions reached

Winant over Stimson's rather than

Hull's signature. For these delicate

negotiations then, the War Department assumed a role normally accorded to the State Department. Although

highly irregular, the War Department

continued to play this role in subsequent quests for overseas uranium

and thorium resources.

Winant's instructions were carried

by Maj. Harry S. Traynor, a highly

trusted officer on the Manhattan District staff, whom General Groves detailed to brief and assist the ambassador.14

 Traynor arrived in London in

mid-March, armed with a letter from

the President, a copy of the draft

agreement, and instructions to do

everything in his power to assist

Winant in completing the accord as

quickly as possible. "Any delay in negotiations," wrote Roosevelt to his

ambassador, "might prejudice a successful conclusion."

 15

Despite this admonition for speed,

nearly three months passed before

the London conferees were able to

resolve the intricate problems associated with preparing the so-called

Agreement and Declaration of Trust.

Some of these problems were legal in

nature, and to aid in their solution

Winant requested the assistance of

Brig. Gen. Edward C. Belts, judge advocate general of General Eisenhower's European Theater of Operations

headquarters, and Secretary Stimson

complied. Belts, whom Winant trusted implicitly, also enjoyed the confidence of Sir Thomas Barnes, Sir John

Anderson's legal adviser, and the two

men worked well and easily with each

other.

One legal question that arose even

before Traynor left for England was

raised by the President himself: If

the proposed organization was established as a corporation, could its

existence and transactions be kept

a secret under United States law?

There was general agreement that

Roosevelt's concern for security was

justified, and after considerable legal

study, Sir Thomas suggested and

General Belts agreed that the best solution was to make the organization a

common law trust.

dated on the fourteenth (cf. Hewlett and Anderson,

New World, p. 286). The arrangement was strictly for

wartime purposes. Following the end of hostilities,

it was subject to review and such revisions as might

be necessary to meet postwar conditions. 14

 Description of London negotiations based on

voluminous collection of memorandums, reports,

cables, drafts, and similar materials in HB Files,

Fldrs 48, 54, 56, 60, 65, and 99, MDR. See especially narrative reports by Major Traynor in Fldr 89 and

an account by him reproduced in Groves, Now It

Can Be Told, pp. 171-74. See also Stimson Diary,

Mar-Jun 44, passim, HLS.

15

 Ltr, Roosevelt to Winant, 3 Mar 44, HB Files,

Fldr 60, MDR.
298 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

A second legal problem was whether the President had the authority to

enter into the type of agreement contemplated. Two briefs were prepared

on this question—the first, at the direction of Secretary Stimson, by Brig.

Gen. Boykin C. Wright, the Army

Service Forces' International Division

director, who as a civilian had headed

a New York law firm; and the second,

on General Groves's orders, by three

lawyers on the Manhattan staff: Lt.

Col. John Lansdale, Jr., Maj. William

A. Consodine, and Pvt. Joseph Volpe,

Jr. Both briefs agreed that the proposed arrangement was within the

power of the President to make executive agreements without recourse to

Congress, but both also questioned

the legality and practicability of establishing a corporation. General Betts

seconded these conclusions, which

further supported the recommendation that the organization be established as a trust.

There were also other questions.

Should Canada be a signatory to the

trust agreement? Should thorium be

included with uranium as a valuable

source of fissionable material? The

question concerning Canada arose because it was not a party to the

Quebec Agreement. The conferees

decided to drop all references to the

country from the trust agreement, but

Winant and Anderson stipulated in an

exchange of letters that one of the six

directors of the trust would be a Canadian.16

 As for thorium, because

Metallurgical Laboratory scientists in

the spring of 1944 had concluded

that it might eventually prove to be

the best fuel for atomic piles, the conferees in London decided to include

it with uranium in the Declaration of

Trust.

The negotiations were monitored

carefully from Washington, where

Secretary Stimson, Harvey Bundy, as

Stimson's special assistant for scientific affairs, and General Groves kept in

close communication with Winant.

Drafts of the proposed trust agreement were sent back and forth between the two capitals, and in the

midst of the London talks Traynor

traveled to Washington to confer with

his superiors. This coordination, however, did not result in a timely resolution of the discussions, which were

complicated by the fact that Ambassador Winant, Major Traynor, Sir John

Anderson, and W. L. Gorell Barnes, a

representative of the British Foreign

Office, simultaneously were involved

in quite lengthy negotiations with

Belgian officials in London regarding

an agreement on future control and

development of the rich Congo ore—

the primary reason for establishing

the trust.17

It was early June before the conferees had coordinated and affirmed in

final form all aspects of the Declaration of Trust. Prime Minister

Churchill signed first, affixing his signature on two copies of the agree16

 Earlier the British and Americans had agreed

that Canada should share in controlling the Congo

uranium supply. See Ltr, Field Marshal Dill to

Bundy, 6 Mar 44, HB Files, Fldr 48, MDR.

17

 Copies of various drafts of trust agreement and

related work papers in HB Files, Fldr 48, MDR.

Drafts and final text of Belgian Agreement in HB

Files, Fldr 57, MDR. See also Major Traynor's

Notes on [First] Trip to London, England, 12 Apr

44, and Rpt on Second Trip to London, 22 May 44,

submitted to Bundy, Attn: Secy War. Both in HB

Files, Fldr 99. MDR.
THE RAW MATERIALS PROGRAM 299

ment. Forthwith, a special courier carried the documents to Washington,

where, on the thirteenth, President

Roosevelt also signed them. This

trust agreement established the Combined Development Trust which,

under the general direction of the

Combined Policy Committee, would

supervise the acquisition of raw materials in "certain areas" outside of

American and British territory.18 The

individuals named as trustees, whom

the committee approved at its next

meeting in September, were: for the

United States, Charles K. Leith, a distinguished mining engineer, George

L. Harrison, a businessman and special assistant to Stimson who had

been helping out on Manhattan problems, and General Groves; for Great

Britain, Sir Charles J. Hambro, head

of the British Raw Materials Mission,

and Frank G. Lee, a British Treasury

representative; and for Canada,

George C. Bateman, a deputy minister and member of the Combined Resources Board in that country. At the

first meeting of the Trust on the fourteenth, Groves was elected chairman

and Sir Charles deputy chairman of

the group.19

Ore Acquisition in Foreign Areas

For the leaders of the American

atomic energy project, the much enlarged program of exploration, control, and acquisition of radioactive

ores in foreign areas represented the

logical continuation and expansion of

the ongoing ore program in the

United States and Canada.20 Because

the deposits would be in countries

not under American or British control, they left the problem of acquisition to the Combined Policy Committee and the Combined Development

Trust. Operating at the international

level, these joint American-British

groups were technically outside the

direct control of the Manhattan District; however, their activities inevitably were influenced greatly and related closely to those of the American

project, not only because in the foreseeable future the latter would have

the greatest need for fissionable materials but also because two of its influential personalities held key posts

in both organizations. General

18

 One of two originals of Agreement and Declaration of Trust, dated 13 Jun 44, the day Roosevelt

signed, filed in HB Files, Fldr 49, MDR. The term

certain areas was introduced so as not to offend Russian sensibilities when the terms of the agreement

became public. Msg, Stimson to Winant, 17 Apr 44,

HB Files, Fldr 106, MDR. 19

 CPC Min (draft version of minutes prepared by

Bundy and Webster, the CPC's joint secretaries),

19 Sep 44, HB Files, Fldr 13, MDR; CDT Prov

Min, 14 Sep 44, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files,

Fldr 9, Tab B, MDR.

20

 In July 1943, Union Mines surveyed the Great

Bear Lake region in Canada through a Canadian

subcontractor, Ventures, Ltd. This firm was authorized to make purchases for Union Mines, but the

project was barely under way when in September

the Canadian government decided to take control of

all radioactive substances in the Yukon and Northwest Territories, promising to keep the United

States fully informed concerning all ore discoveries

and to exploit them for the mutual benefit of both

countries. In the spirit of the Quebec Agreement,

General Groves subsequently arranged to have

Union Mines terminate its contract with Ventures

and transfer all of its claims to the Canadian government. Union Mines settled its contract with Ventures in late 1944, agreeing to a lump-sum payment

to cover all costs incurred by the Canadian firm. See

MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 2, pp. 2.2-2.4, DASA. Memo,

Groves to Bush, Purnell, and Styer, 27 Sep 44;

Memo, Nichols to Groves, 17 Oct 44, Incl to Memo,

Nichols to Groves, sub: Agreement With Canadian

Govt, 8 Nov 44. All in OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP

Files, Fldr 2, MDR. Stanley W. Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939-

1945, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington,

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959), pp. 287-
300 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Groves, as chairman of the Combined

Development Trust, tended to dominate its activities. And in the Combined Policy Committee, Maj. Gen.

Wilhelm D. Styer headed the important technical subcommittee, whose

reports furnished much of the data

for the parent committee's decisions

on matters relating to Manhattan's

production and weapons development

program.21

The first important achievement for

the United States and Great Britain

was final agreement with the Belgians

in early fall of 1944. As soon as the

two countries had reached agreement

in June on establishment of the Trust,

General Groves and Sir Charles

Hambro, acting on behalf of the

Trust, began direct negotiations with

Edgar Sengier to expedite arrangements with the African Metals Corporation for reopening Union Miniere's

Shinkolobwe mine. The diplomatic

negotiations finally culminated in the

Belgian, or Tripartite, Agreement of

26 September, effected by an exchange of letters among Foreign Minister Paul H. Spaak of Belgium, Chancellor Anderson, and Ambassador

Winant.22

Under terms of the agreement, Belgium granted the United States and

the United Kingdom an option on all

of its uranium and thorium resources

in recognition of the fact that "the

protection of civilization" required

"effective control of said ores. ... "

The option was to continue in effect

for the period needed to carry out

ore contract arrangements set up

under the agreement, as well as for

an additional ten-year period. Belgium reserved the right to retain such

ore as might be needed for "her own

scientific research and . . . industrial

purposes. . . . "

 23

But the two atomic partners did not

secure this control over the Congo

ore deposits without making some

major concessions. President Roosevelt had approved the concessions in

August 1944, harking to the advice of

Stimson, who monitored the negotiations, that if they were not granted

the Belgians might delay indefinitely

reopening the Shinkolobwe mine. Of

particular importance was the two

allies' agreement to enter into a contract between the Trust and African

Metals for purchase of 3.44 million

pounds of uranium oxide under terms

acceptable to the Belgian government. In addition, they also assented

to furnish Union Miniere with the

new equipment and materials it would

require to reopen and operate the

Shinkolobwe mine. Finally, they

granted the Belgians the right to participate in any future utilization that

might be made of the Congo ores "as

21

 CPC Min, 8 Sep 43, HB Files, Fldr 9, MDR;

CDT Prov Min, 14 Sep 44, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 9, Tab B, MDR. 22

 Ltrs, Spaak to Winant and Anderson, both 26

Sep 44, and Incl (Memo of Agreement); Ltrs, Anderson and Winant to Spaak, both 26 Sep 44. All in

HB Files, Fldr 49, MDR. Extensive materials, including copies of correspondence, cables, notes of meetings, drafts and texts of agreements, relating to the

Belgian Agreement and the arrangement with the

African Metals Corporation are in HB Files, Fldrs

17, 54, 55, 57, 106, MDR, and in OCG Files, Gen

Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 16, MDR. A brief description of the negotiations and an analysis of the

agreements made may be found in Ms, "Diplomatic

Hist of Manhattan Proj," pp. 17-18 and 25-26, HB

Files, Fldr 111, MDR.

23

 Memo of Agreement, Incl to Ltrs, Spaak to

Winant and Anderson, both 26 Sep 44, MDR.
THE RAW MATERIALS PROGRAM 301

a source of energy for commercial

purposes. . . ."

 24

Meantime, representatives of the

Trust and African Metals, conferring

in New York, had worked out the

terms of the contract to cover the

procurement of the 3.44 million

pounds of uranium oxide. On 17 October, they signed the formal contract. It provided that the Trust

would purchase only the oxide in the

uranium ore, letting African Metals

retain the radium and other precious

metals contained in the concentrate.

Reaching agreement on a fair price

was difficult, for its value had never

been determined on the open market

and depended ultimately upon the

success of the atomic bomb project.

They finally settled upon a price

based primarily on known cost factors—$1.45 a pound for high-grade

material, five cents less for low grade,

free on shipboard at the port of

Africa (Lobito in Angola or Matadi in

the Belgian Congo). Perhaps partly to

compensate for any losses likely to

result from the uncertainty as to a fair

price, the Trust agreed to reimburse

Union Miniere for costs it incurred up

to $550,000 in reopening Shinkolobwe mine, and also to assist it in

procuring materials, equipment, and

skilled labor. With this assistance,

Union Miniere, which already had

taken preliminary steps for resumption of uranium mining operations in

the Congo, estimated that it could

begin delivery of new oxide to the

Manhattan Project by late 1945 or

early 1946.25

In anticipation of the heavy financial obligations that the Trust would

have to meet under terms of the African Metals contract, as well as under

other ore acquisition contracts that it

expected to negotiate in the future,

the American trustees had already

taken steps to secure funds for payment of the United States' share of

the cost of Trust operations. This had

turned out to be a fairly complex

problem, because the Trust's requirement for extreme secrecy and for

continuous access to funds without

time limitations to meet contractual

obligations tended to run counter to

legally established governmental fiscal

procedures. General Groves had undertaken responsibility for coming up

with a plan that would circumvent

these legal barriers without impairing

the contractual capabilities or security

of Trust operations. Groves presented his plan to the Combined Policy

Committee on 19 September 1944,

emphasizing that the objectives of the

agreement under which the Trust had

been set up in the previous June

made absolutely necessary an access

to adequate funds. The committee

unanimously endorsed the plan and

Groves set about immediately to put

it into effect.26

The essential feature of Groves's

plan was a special fund to be deposited with the Department of the Treasury, from which he or other designat24

 Ibid.; Memo, Stimson to President, 25 Aug 44,

HB Files, Fldr 49, MDR. 25

 Ltr, Groves to Stimson, 24 Nov 44, HB Files,

Fldr 27, MDR; CPC Min. 19 Sep 44, MDR; Groves,

Now It Can Be Told, pp. 177-78.

26

 Groves had in mind paragraph 2 of the Agreement and Declaration of Trust, dated 13 Jun 44,

which directed that the CDT should "gain control

of and develop production of Uranium and Thorium supplies in certain areas . . . and for that purpose . . . take such steps as it may in the common

interest think fit" to accomplish this objective. The

original of this agreement is in HB Files, Fldr 13,

MDR.
302 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

ed American members of the Trust

could draw money as needed, without

further authorization being required.

Money from this fund would be

placed in the Federal Reserve Bank in

New York City to cover the United

States' share of payments on Trust

contracts. On 21 September, Under

Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson

directed allocation to Groves of an

initial sum of $12.5 million from

funds already appropriated for national defense purposes. By the time

Groves received the check, however,

his legal staff had found that funds

deposited with the Treasury were

subject to handling and processing by

many employees in both the Treasury

and the General Accounting Office,

too great a security risk for the Manhattan Project. A possible alternative

was to deposit the money directly in

the Federal Reserve Bank in New

York City or in a private banking institution in that city. But after further

consultation with War Department

lawyers and with Secretary Stimson

and George Harrison, a fellow trustee, Groves concluded that probably

not even this step could be taken

without first informing Secretary of

the Treasury Henry Morgenthau.

On 17 October, Groves and Harrison met with Stimson in his office to

try to resolve the Trust's quandary

over its funds. There appeared to be

no legal way around the requirement

that the Trust must secure the consent of Secretary Morgenthau before

depositing the $12.5 million with the

Treasury. Yet Stimson was convinced

Morgenthau would insist on having

full knowledge of the atomic bomb

project before giving his consent.

This, Stimson felt, he could not do

without permission from the President, whom he did not wish to bother

concerning such a relatively unimportant matter. Stimson finally was persuaded to attempt to get Morgenthau's sanction of the special fund

without telling him the reason for its

existence; but, as the Secretary of

War had predicted, he refused. Fortunately, however, further negotiations

between Manhattan District and

Treasury officials revealed that Secretary Morgenthau maintained several

accounts in his office which were not

subject to the usual auditing and accounting procedures and that Trust

funds might be placed in one of them

without danger of exposure. Groves

visited the Treasury Secretary on

27 October and, still without revealing the purpose, received permission

to place Trust money in one of the

special accounts. Henceforth, Groves

made withdrawals from the account,

depositing them in the Bankers Trust

Company of New York to cover payments on the African Metals and

other contracts. In the period from

late 1944 until he resigned from the

Trust at the end of 1947, the Manhattan commander deposited a total of

$37.5 million in the Trust's Treasury

account.27

27

 The complex history of CDT financing may be

traced in the following documents. Except as otherwise indicated, all items are in MDR, OCG Files,

Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 9, Tab B: CDT Prov

Min, 14 Sep 44; Memos, Und Secy War to WD

Budg Off, 21 Sep 44 and 4 Aug 45; Memos for File,

Groves, both 17 Oct 44; Memo, Groves to Secy

War, 27 Oct 44; Ltr, Daniel W. Bell (Act Secy

Treas) to Groves, 30 Oct 44; Ltr, Groves, Harrison,

and Leith to Sloan Colt (Bankers Trust Co. president), 15 Nov 44; Memo, Groves to Secy War, 6 Jun

45, HB Files, Fldr 37, MDR; Memo, Groves to Und

Secy War, 4 Aug 45; Ltr, Groves to Fred M. Vinson

(Secy Treas), 14 Aug 45; Memo, Groves to WD

Budg Off, 24 Aug 45; Memo, Col Ernest C. Bomar Continued
THE RAW MATERIALS PROGRAM 303

In late 1944, the British were interested in devising a more comprehensive plan for a long-range procurement program for raw materials.

They expressed a particular need for

a study that would provide information on developing radioactive ore

sources within British areas outside of

Canada. At its 19 September meeting,

the Combined Policy Committee

agreed unanimously that the Trust

should undertake a worldwide survey

of current and potential sources of radioactive materials. Committee members also acknowledged the need for

more data on requirements, but they

emphasized the theoretical nature of

scientific and technical information

and the difficulty of obtaining accurate estimates. Nevertheless, the committee directed its technical subcommittee to investigate and report on

the uranium required for a "unit explosive of specified energy . . ." and

for the next stage in development of

atomic weapons, as well as scientific

and technical factors that might have

an important effect on future ore requirements for atomic explosives.28

The technical subcommittee completed its report in mid-November;

however, after hearing a brief oral

summary of its contents in January

1945, the Combined Policy Committee laid it aside without further

action. The committee followed a

similar course with the Trust's ore

survey, which Groves had sent to

Stimson on 24 November. Although

based upon more complete data from

the Murray Hill Area Engineers Office

sources compiled by Union Mines and

from the British Directorate of Tube

Alloys, the survey did not substantially alter the overall picture that Union

Mines had depicted in its earlier reports submitted to the district

engineer.29

As chairman of the Trust, General

Groves made some specific recommendations based on data from the

Trust's ore survey. The United States

and Great Britain should continue investigation into uranium and thorium

resources, organizing permanent

survey groups in England and Canada

similar to the Union Mines teams operating in the United States; every

effort should be made to build up

stockpiles in territories controlled by

the two countries; major ore deposits

outside these territories (for example,

uranium in the Congo and thorium in

Brazil) should be purchased and

shipped for storage to areas under

control of the two atomic powers; and

lesser deposits (for example, in Portugal, Czechoslovakia, and Madagascar)

(Act WD Budg Off) to CG ASF, Attn: Office of

Fiscal Dir (Col Foster), sub: CDT, 28 Aug 45, and

1st Ind, HQ ASF, Office of Fiscal Dir, fwd to Und

Secy War, Attn: Col Freidlich, 30 Aug 45, HB Files,

Fldr 51, MDR; Ltr, Groves to Secy Treas, sub: Termination of Account, 5 Dec 47; Ltr, E. F. Bartlet

(Fiscal Asst Secy, Treas) to Groves, 8 Dec 47; Ltr,

Groves to Secy Army, 8 Dec 47. See also Groves,

Now It Can Be Told, pp. 176-77. 28

 Quoted phrase from CPC Min, 19 Sep 44,

MDR. Memo, Sir Ronald I. Campbell (British CPC

member) to CPC Joint Secys, sub: Development of

Coordinated Prgms for Procurement of Raw Material for T(ube) A(lloys) Proj, 24 Aug 44; Ltr, Bundy

and Webster to Styer, 2 Oct 44. Both in HB Files,

Fldr 27, MDR.

29

 CPC Min, 22 Jan 45, HB Files, Fldr 14, MDR;

Memo, Tech Subcommittee to CPC, sub: Ore Requirements for Prod of Explosives, 16 Nov 44, HB

Files, Fldr 27, MDR; Chart (analysis of estimated requirements of uranium ore for each of several proposed types of atomic weapons), OCG Files, Gen

Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 2, MDR; Rpt, CDT, sub:

Survey of World's Resources of Uranium and Thorium, 26 Oct 44, Incl to Ltr, Groves to Stimson,

24 Nov 44, MDR.
304 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

should be brought under control by

purchase or by political agreements.

The United States and Great Britain

endeavored to carry out most of

these recommendations. Where political or diplomatic negotiations were

required, action was taken through

appropriate government channels.

Where commercial agreements

would suffice, the Trust initiated

negotiations.30

The quest for other sources continued in 1945. Early in the year British

officials began negotiations with the

British and Portuguese owners of uranium mining properties in Portugal,

preparing the way for their purchase

by the Trust. At the end of January,

Colonel Guarin, Manhattan's raw materials expert, returned from an extended inspection trip to the Congo

with new information on the progress

being made by Union Miniere in reopening the mines there, and as a

result of his report, the Trust negotiated with African Metals for the purchase of more Congo ores that

summer. Even the advancing Allied

forces in Belgium, France, and Germany furnished additional small

quantities of captured uranium ore

stores.31

These seized stocks became a

matter of slight disagreement between the United States and Great

Britain. The Declaration of Trust provided that all uranium, or thorium,

secured from whatever source was to

be held jointly, but it was generally

understood that the first objective of

the atomic program in both countries

must be to supply the American

project with the raw materials it

needed to develop and build sufficient atomic weapons to win the war.

However, some British scientists felt

that at least a part of the captured

ore, which had been shipped from the

Continent to England for temporary

storage, ought to remain there to

ensure that the British Tube Alloys

project would have adequate supplies

on hand. Groves disagreed. When he

learned in June 1945 that ore captured in Germany was being held in

Great Britain, he wrote Secretary

Stimson and asked that the Combined

Policy Committee request its prompt

shipment to the United States "to increase our margin of safety of raw

material." British committee members

expressed concern that allocation of

all of the ore to the United States

would leave Great Britain with virtually no reserves at the end of the war.

The committee, nevertheless, reaffirmed the policy that while the war

lasted all raw materials received by

the Trust, including that captured,

should go to the United States for

weapon production. At the same

time, to placate British fears, the committee stated that if the Trust should

acquire more than needed for the

manufacture of weapons, it should

hold it in reserve to be shared jointly

after the war.32

30

 Ltr, Groves to Stimson, 24 Nov 44, MDR. 31

 CPC Min, 22 Jan 45, Fldr 14; CPC Min, 8 Mar

45, Fldr 46 (copy in Fldr 105); CPC Min, 4 Jul 45,

Fldr 37 (copy in Fldr 105); Ltr, Stimson to Secy

State, 29 Jul 44, Fldr 7; Ms, "Diplomatic Hist of

Manhattan Proj", pp. 31-32, Fldr 111. All in HB

Files, MDR. Groves Diary, 29 Jan 45, LRG. Gowing,

Britain and Atomic Energy, pp. 313-14.

32

 Quoted phrase from Memo, Groves to Stimson, 23 Jun 45, HB Files, Fldr 37, MDR. Agreement

and Declaration of Trust, 13 Jun 44, Fldr 49; Rpt,

CDT, sub: Survey of World's Resources of Uranium

and Thorium, 26 Oct 44, Incl to Ltr, Groves to

Stimson, 24 Nov 44, Fldr 27; CPC Min, 8 Mar 45,

Fldr 46. All in HB Files, MDR.
THE RAW MATERIALS PROGRAM 305

Incoming mineral survey reports indicated that kolm, a coal-like material

intermixed with oil shale deposits

mined in Sweden, contained uranium.

In early 1944, a British team and a

group of Swedish mineral experts

concluded that kolm's potentialities

were sufficient to warrant denying

other powers access to the mineral.

At the request of the Combined

Policy Committee, the American minister in Stockholm, Herschel V. Johnson, opened negotiations with the

Swedes. The negotiations, conducted

with the knowledge of the British

minister in Stockholm, ended without

a formal agreement. The Swedish

government, however, prohibited

export of uranium-bearing ores and

agreed to inform the United States

and Great Britain if in the future it

should decide to permit their

export.33

While the British gave full support

to the program for control and acquisition of uranium, they were much

less enthusiastic about a similar program for thorium. On 27 January

1945, British committee member Sir

Ronald I. Campbell, who had replaced Col. John J. Llewellin, wrote to

Stimson, expressing doubt as to the

wisdom of Groves's suggestion that

the Trust, without direct committee

approval, should undertake measures

that would likely require political

agreements and trade options. In Sir

Ronald's view, both the Combined

Policy Committee and the two governments ought to have time to examine the implications of such negotiations before the Trust proceeded.

Sir John Anderson advanced similar

views, emphasizing that widespread

occurrence of thorium limited the

possibility that the United States and

Great Britain could effectively prevent

other nations from acquiring and purchasing substantial quantities of the

material. He also suggested that, because limited amounts of thorium

were needed in the immediate future,

the two allies should rely upon the

rather ample commercial production

available from the Indian state of

Travancore.

The United States, however, did

not want to rely solely on British

controlled thorium supplies and in

mid-February proceeded—without informing the British government—to

investigate acquisition of supplies outside of British-American control. In

the meantime, Sir John had read

Colonel Guarin's report on the obstacles to a rapid increase in uranium

ore production from the Congo and

also had learned of new information

that emphasized the potential of thorium. Because of these developments,

he agreed in early March to go along

with a more vigorous policy on thorium. But he was overtaken by events,

for the United States was already

engaged in secret unilateral negotiations with Brazil to gain access to its

thorium resources.34

Playing a significant role in laying

the groundwork of these negotiations

33

 CPC Min, 4 Jul 45, Fldr 37; Draft of Proposed

Agreement With Swedish Govt and Related Papers,

Jul-Aug 45, Fldr 53; Ms, "Diplomatic Hist of

Manhattan Proj," pp. 29-30, Fldr 111. All in

HB Files, MDR. Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy,

p. 314.

34

 Ltr, Groves to Stimson, 24 Nov 44; Ltr, Campbell to Stimson, 27 Jan 45; Memo, sub: Supplies and

Requirements for T(ube) A(lloys), 3 Mar 45 (addendum to memo giving Sir John Anderson's views,

dated 3 Feb 45). All in HB Files, Fldr 27, MDR.

Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 316.
306 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

was General Groves, who was very

much aware that most atomic scientists, including those in Germany and

the Soviet Union, recognized that

thorium might soon have to replace,

or supplement, scarce uranium. When

he learned Secretary of State Edward

R. Stettinius, Jr., would be passing

through Brazil in mid-February, en

route from the Yalta Conference

(3-11 February) to attend an interAmerican meeting in Mexico City, he

saw an opportunity to approach the

Brazilians secretly. Taking advantage

of a conference with the President on

other matters, Groves requested and

received permission to brief Stettinius

on the atomic project. He subsequently talked with Stettinius and also

arranged to have an officer from the

Manhattan staff, Maj. John E. Vance,

accompany the Secretary of State to

Brazil.35

On 17 February, Stettinius conferred with President Getulio Vargas

on the question of thorium and the

Brazilian chief executive approved the

opening of negotiations. In the ensuing months, specially appointed Brazilian and American delegations—the

United States representatives included three Manhattan officers: Col.

John Lansdale, Jr., Major Vance, and

1st Lt. Joseph Volpe, Jr.—worked out

details of an agreement, signed on 6

July 1945. It provided that the United

States would purchase each year for

three years at least 3,000 tons of thorium-bearing monazite ore. In addition, the United States would have an

option to buy all other thorium-bearing compounds Brazil might produce

in the initial three-year period, with

the right to renew this option for ten

more successive three-year periods.

The British had no knowledge of the

agreement, but in September the

United States agreed to the understanding reached earlier in March by

the Combined Policy Committee that

each country should have equal privileges in any arrangement for thorium

acquisition and control made with

Brazil.36

When the committee approved the

start of negotiations with Brazil, it

also endorsed taking steps to obtain

control of thorium in India and in the

Netherlands East Indies. The British

began discussions with Travancore

authorities in the summer of 1945,

but the negotiations proved difficult

and not until 1947 was a less than

satisfactory agreement reached. Negotiations conducted at the same time

with the Dutch concerning the East

Indian sources were more successful,

and in August 1945 an agreement

granted thorium purchase options to

the United States and Great Britain.37

35

 Memo, Groves to Bundy, 6 Feb 45, HB Files,

Fldr 27, MDR; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 184.

36

 Memo, Groves to Bundy, 6 Feb 45, MDR;

Memo, Groves to MPC, 23 Feb 45, OCG Files, Gen

Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 23, Tab A, MDR; Ltr,

Groves to Secy War, 8 Mar 45, OCG Files, Gen

Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 9, Tab B, MDR; CPC Min,

8 Mar 45, HB Files, Fldr 46, MDR; Ms, "Diplomatic

Hist of Manhattan Proj," pp. 27-28 and Anns. 24-

25, HB Files, Fldr 111, MDR; Gowing, Britain and

Atomic Energy, p. 317. 37

 CPC Min, 8 Mar 45, Fldr 46; CPC Min, 4 Jul

45, Fldr 37; Memo, Groves to Stimson, 7 Jun 45,

Fldr 37. All in HB Files, MDR. Gowing, Britain and

Atomic Energy, pp. 317-18. Groves, Now It Can Be

Told, p. 184.
CHAPTER XIV

The Feed Materials Program

The Manhattan District's acquisition of uranium- and thorium-bearing

ores was only the initial step in providing the essential materials for the

large-scale electromagnetic, diffusion,

and pile processes.1 The District also

had to bring under contract and to

monitor the operation of a complex

network of processing plants for refining and converting the ore, first

into pure concentrates of uranium

oxide (black oxide) or sodium uranate

(soda salt) and then into the chemical

feed forms of uranium dioxide and

trioxide, uranium tetrafluoride and

hexafluoride, and uranium metal.

Thus for the Army, development and

management of the feed materials

program, begun by the Office of Scientific Research and Development

(OSRD) and Stone and Webster in

1941-42, proved to be one of its

most challenging and difficult tasks

in administering the atomic bomb

project.2

Program Organization and

Support Activities

With ore acquisition activities proceeding apace, District Engineer Marshall in October 1942 formed a Materials Section to monitor the shipment

of uranium-bearing ores and other

materials from mines, tailing piles,

storage depots, and processing plants,

as well as their treatment through

various stages of refinement and conversion into feed materials. He selected Lt. Col. Thomas T. Crenshaw as

section head and assigned several District officers already familiar with

some aspect of materials procurement

to assist him—including Capt. Phillip

L. Merritt, a geologist by training,

and Capt. John R. Ruhoff, a chemical

engineer who, when serving as the St.

Louis area engineer, had overall responsibility for the District's uranium

metal production. Also, because of

Colonel Nichols's deep involvement

in the earlier OSRD acquisition

program, Marshall had his deputy continue to give his special attention and

expertise to the District's feed materials program.3

1

 Because thorium has fissionable properties similar to uranium, Manhattan Project leaders vigorously pushed a program to locate and control world resources of this heavy element. But existence of adequate supplies of uranium for the atomic bomb

project made unnecessary procurement and processing of thorium during World War II. 2

 MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 1, "Feed Materials and Special

Procurement," pp. 1.1-1.5, DASA.

3

 Unless otherwise indicated, details on the administrative and personnel aspects of the feed materials program are based on ibid., pp. 1.15-1.22 and Continued
308 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

The relocation of District headquarters from New York to Oak

Ridge in mid-August 1943 occasioned

a complete reorganization of the Materials Section. (See Chart 2.) Colonel

Nichols, now the district engineer, decided to leave the materials group in

New York City, close by the ports of

entry and storage points for ores

coming from overseas and also convenient to the headquarters of many

of the firms under contract to supply

feed materials. He redesignated the

section as the Madison Square Area

Engineers Office and, with transfer of

Colonel Crenshaw to Oak Ridge as

the officer in charge of all Clinton operations, assigned Ruhoff, recently

promoted to lieutenant colonel, to be

the Madison Square area engineer.

Colonel Ruhoff took over administration of a burgeoning materials group,

numbering nearly four hundred by

early 1944, and an indication of its

key role during the period of the

project's greatest activity, from late

1943 to the fall of 1944, was Nichols's

practice of coming to New York for

weekly meetings with Ruhoff and his

staff.4

The Madison Square staff, threequarters of which worked in the New

York City area and the rest at various

points in the field, oversaw a program

comprised essentially of four operations: a search for additional raw materials; their procurement in whatever

form might be available; their refinement; and their conversion into feed

materials. To ensure a steady flow of

raw and semirefined materials to the

project's processing plants, staff

members closely monitored the

scheduling of ore shipments from

Africa to the port of New York; made

or expedited arrangements for their

storage; approved procurement of

partially processed uranium-containing materials; and assisted in contracting with crude ore refining firms

(African Metals Corporation, Eldorado Mining and Refining Company,

and Vitro Manufacturing Company)

to obtain uranium oxide, uranium

sludge, radium and radioactive lead,

and similar products. They also oversaw various research programs

(Princeton and Yale Universities, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,

and National Bureau of Standards),

supplying them with an ever-increasing variety of other chemicals and

special materials.

Staff members in the field provided

liaison between the Madison Square

office and seven area offices reporting

to Ruhoff (Chart 4). Of these, two—

the Murray Hill Area Engineers Office

in New York and the Colorado Area

Engineers Office in Grand Junction—

monitored materials procurement,

while five—Iowa (in Ames), St. Louis,

Wilmington, Beverly (near Boston),

and Tonawanda (near Buffalo)—oversaw feed materials processing operApps. B1-B4 (Org Charts), DASA; Rpts, Mat Sec

(later Mad Sq Area Engrs Office), Oct 42-Aug 45,

passim, MD-319.1 (Rpts MSA), OROO. The period

covered in these reports on the materials program

varies from a single week to two months. The newly

organized Materials Section on 28 Oct 42 submitted

its first report to the district engineer for Colonel

Nichols's attention, and the reconstituted Madison

Square Area Engineers Office on 6 Aug 43 submitted its first report through Lt. Col. E. H. Marsden,

executive officer at the new District headquarters in

Tennessee, for the attention of the district engineer. 4

 Rpt, Mad Sq Area Engrs Office, 29 Apr 44, App.

3, OROO; Nichols, Comments on Draft Hist "Manhattan," Incl to Ltr, Nichols to Chief of Mil Hist,

25 Mar 74, CMH. Nichols arrived at the new designation of the area office because of its location near

Madison Square, at Fifth Avenue and Twenty-third

Street.
CHART 4—FEED MATERIALS NETWORK, JANUARY 1945

Source: MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 1, App. B4, DASA.
310 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

ations. A single area engineer administered the Iowa and St. Louis offices,

traveling between the headquarters

located at Iowa State College and the

Mallinckrodt Chemical Works. In Wilmington, the busy area engineer at

Du Pont kept a check on that firm's

production of feed materials in addition to overseeing its plutonium program. In Beverly, the area engineer

supervised the District's contract for

uranium metal production with Metal

Hydrides, Inc. And in Tonawanda,

the area engineer had responsibility

for contracts with the Linde Air Products Company, a subsidiary of the

Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation, for production and chemical

processing of uranium oxide into its

dioxide and salt forms and with the

Electro Metallurgical Company for

production of uranium metal; later he

supervised contracts with the Harshaw Chemical Company of Cleveland, which made uranium tetrafluoride and uranium hexafluoride, and

with the Hooker Electrochemical

Company of Niagara Falls, New York,

which reclaimed uranium from slag

produced in the mining of Carnotite

and other ores.5

Feed Materials Procurement

Raw Materials

From 1943 to the end of the war

the Manhattan Project steadily increased its supplies of uranium ore,

to ensure sufficient stores for conversion into the black oxide needed for

the feed materials processing plants.

Ore procurement activities, which

reached a high point in 1944 and

then leveled off somewhat in early

1945, were concentrated in three

major areas: Africa, Canada, and the

United States. Project leaders were

aware in 1943 that the wartime needs

of the bomb program were likely to

exhaust both the immediately available domestic and Canadian deposits,

and the security implications of this

situation ultimately led to a District

policy of using, to the greatest extent

possible, ore from foreign sources.6

The most significant foreign source

of natural uranium was the Belgian

Congo, where the Belgian mining

firm, Union Miniere du Haut Katanga, controlled all mineral rights. Following negotiations, the District procured the African ore through Union

Miniere's subsidiary, the African

Metals Corporation. For the period

October 1942 to December 1944, cost

of 30,000 tons of Congo ore containing 3,800 tons of black oxide totaled

more than $9 million, based on the

price of oxide averaging about $1.12

per pound. The District's Washington

Liaison Office arranged for purchase

of additional Congo ore, containing

more than 3,100 tons of oxide and

costing more than $10 million.7

All Canadian ore, procured through

the Eldorado Mining and Refining

Company (formerly, until June 1943,

5

 MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 1, pp. 2.1-6.3 and App. I1,

DASA. List, sub: MD Contracts With Various Univs,

Incl to Memo, Marsden to Groves, 2 Nov 43; List,

sub: Signed Prime and Subcontracts Over $100,000,

Incl to Memo, Marsden to Groves, 31 Aug 43. Both

in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 161, MDR.

6

 MPC Rpt, 21 Aug 43, OCG Files, Gen Corresp,

MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab E, MDR; U.S. Engrs Office, Mad Sq Area, sub: Notes on ... Ltr to Sen [Edwin

C.] Johnson [Colo.], 5 Dec 45, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 312.1, MDR. 7

 Data on uranium ore purchases in this and subsequent paragraphs based on charts in MDH, Bk. 7,

Vol. 1, Apps. F1-F3, DASA.
THE FEED MATERIALS PROGRAM 311

Eldorado Gold Mines), came from the

Great Bear Lake area. In May 1943,

with completion of Stone and Webster's initial purchase order (15 July

1942), the District negotiated another

contract with a representative of Eldorado's sales agency in the United

States. But procurement officials soon

experienced serious difficulties in implementing this contract and decided

to terminate it. Colonel Ruhoff,

acting in his capacity as chief of the

newly constituted Madison Square

Area Engineers Office, agreed in September to the terms of a new contract

with Eldorado; he approved a second

agreement in December 1944. For the

period July 1942 to December 1944,

cost of 4,200 tons of Canadian ore

containing 1,137 tons of black oxide

was slightly over $6.6 million, based

on the price of oxide varying from

about $1.95 to over $4.00 per

pound.8

Domestic sources of natural uranium were in the Colorado Plateau

region of the states of Colorado,

Utah, and New Mexico. The uranium

in this region occurred in Carnotite

ores, which also contained vanadium—an element urgently needed in

the war effort because of its use as a

hardening agent in the manufacture

of steel. District procurement officials,

learning in late 1942 that those firms

actively mining Carnotite ores and refining vanadium did not extract the

relatively small amount of uranium in

the refuse materials, began negotiations in early 1943 to acquire these

tailings. Because these tailings were

in the form of sand, and thus too

heavy for economical shipment, they

arranged contracts with several vanadium operators—the governmentowned and -financed Metals Reserve

Corporation,9 the privately owned

and operated Vanadium Corporation

of America, and the United States Vanadium Corporation, a Union Carbide subsidiary—and proposed they

convert the tailings into concentrates

(sludges). The advantage of the concentrates was that they would yield a

higher percentage of uranium for

conversion into black oxide and that,

in this form, shipment to the Buffaloarea processing firms would be a less

costly operation. For the period November 1942 to February 1945, cost

of 380,000 tons of Carnotite sands

containing 1,350 tons of black oxide

was more than $2.1 million, based on

the price of oxide averaging about

$0.80 per pound.10

Uranium ore from North America

yielded considerably less black oxide

than that from Africa, primarily be8

 Ibid., pp. 3.1-3.3 and App. F2, DASA; MPC Min

(and attached documents), 24 Feb 45, OCG Files,

Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 23, Tab A, MDR;

Memo, 1st Lt Winston H. Pickett (Intel & Scty Div)

to Groves, sub: Contract Disclosure in Current Canadian Case (Relating to Ore Supply Prgm in WW

II), 15 Mar 46, Investigation Files, Gen Corresp,

Boris Pregel, MDR.

9

 The Metals Reserve Corporation, a subsidiary of

the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, was established under legislation enacted by Congress in

1940, with the objective of providing for purchases

of strategic and critical materials. By late 1944,

Metals Reserve, which Congress had supplied with

adequate funds and power to procure items needed

by war industries and for stockpiling, had spent

some $1.7 billion for 19 million tons of materials.

See Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, pp.

203-04. 10

 MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 1, pp. 4.1-4.8, 7.8-7.13,

App. F3, DASA; Memo, Merritt to Nichols, sub:

Resume of Production of Uranium Products for MD

in Colorado Plateau Area, 26 Jan 45, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 410.2 (Uranium), MDR; Rpts, Mat Sec

(later Mad Sq Area Engrs Office), 3 Jul-13 Aug 43,

OROO.
312 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

cause of the much greater oxide content of the latter. The African ore

from the Belgian Congo contained an

estimated average of over 2-percent

black oxide, whereas Canadian ore

from the Great Bear Lake area assayed at somewhat more than 0.5 percent and domestic ore from the Colorado Plateau region at 0.25 percent.

For this reason, the combined quantity of estimated black oxide in uranium ore purchased from the North

American sources accounted for only

one-third of the total contracted for

the entire project.11

Special Materials

So tremendously important to the

success of the atomic project was securing and processing raw ores that

this operation tended to obscure another significant activity of the District's feed materials program: procurement of special materials. A

number of these materials were difficult to obtain in the quantities needed

or completely unavailable from commercial sources. Hence, their procurement was often not simply a

matter of District officials approving a

purchase order or letting a contract,

but required planning and implementing means for the radical expansion of such limited sources as existed

or for even approving construction of

entirely new plants. Two separate sections in the Madison Square Area

Engineers Office had responsibility

for special procurement—the Special

Materials Branch and the Special

Projects Branch.12

Demands for special chemicals and

other materials of the project's research and production facilities increased rapidly in 1943 and 1944. For

testing and operating atomic piles

there was need for radium and radioactive lead as a neutron source,

graphite and beryllium as neutron

moderators, and helium as a coolant;

for the heavy water project at Trail,

nickel chromium for a catalyst; for the

gaseous diffusion project, elemental

flourine and a variety of fluorinated

chemicals, including those suitable for

cleaning, cooling, lubricating, and

sealing; for the manufacture of uranium metal, magnesium and calcium;

and for the design and test of the

bomb at Los Alamos, a seemingly

endless list of materials—bismuth,

tungsten, boron, beryllium, and many

others.

The quantity and variety of special

materials needed by the project presented the Madison Square staff with

a whole spectrum of challenging

problems. Some proved to be relatively simple. For example, radium

and radioactive lead, which were byproducts of uranium processing,

could be obtained from the same

firms that refined the ore. In the early

period, project officials purchased

most of the radium required through

the New York firm, Canadian Radium

and Uranium Corporation, which procured most of its supply from Eldorado Mining and Refining. In 1943,

however, difficulties in reaching

agreement on contractual terms and

prices caused them to turn to Joseph

A. Kelly, who acted as agent for the

Radium Chemical Company of New

York. After 1943, Kelly supplied most

11

 MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 2, "Geographical Exploration," pp. 1.6-1.7, DASA. 12

 MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 1, pp. 1.9, 6.1, Apps. B and

G-K (see charts), DASA.
THE FEED MATERIALS PROGRAM 313

of the radium required by the project.

As for radioactive lead, the District

obtained most of its requirement for

this material from Eldorado Mining's

ore-refining operations at Port Hope,

Ontario.13

Acquisition of a suitable pile moderator was one of the most difficult

procurement problems in the early

months of the project's plutonium

program. Pile designers finally decided to employ graphite rather than

heavy water or beryllium, because it

was the only one of these neutron-absorbing substances available in quantity from commercial sources and

because Metallurgical Laboratory scientists and researchers at the National

Carbon and Speer Carbon Companies

recently had devised a process that

would produce an adequate supply of

high-grade graphite for the program.

This success with graphite did not,

however, end interest in obtaining beryllium and heavy water for experimental purposes. Project scientists,

particularly those at Los Alamos,

showed an increasing interest in beryllium metal in the later years of the

war. Only a single American firm,

Brush Beryllium Company of Lorain,

Ohio, produced beryllium commercially for the fabrication of certain

alloys. From 1943 to 1946, the

Madison Square staff concentrated its

efforts on increasing the production

capacity of this firm, assisting it in obtaining priorities on new equipment

and other materials from the War

Production Board and also in expanding its plant. By 1945, these measures

had led to a substantial increase in

production of beryllium metal.14

Generally speaking, District procurement officials had to cope with

no more than the usual stringencies

of the tight wartime economy in obtaining moderate quantities of such

elements as magnesium, calcium, bismuth, tungsten, boron, and helium.

Because early decisions for heliumcooled production piles appeared to

forecast a future need for very large

amounts of the gaseous element, they

arranged with the Bureau of Mines,

which controlled helium distribution,

for large-scale procurement, including

transfer directly of funds from the

War Department to Interior to pay

the costs. In 1943, they also assisted

in negotiation of a contract with the

General American Transportation

Company of Chicago for purchase of

special tank cars to ship the helium to

Hanford. But the decision by pile designers later that year to use water as

the primary coolant greatly reduced

the need for helium, and the District

materials group sharply cut back the

earliest procurement schedules for

the element.15

Another material that presented

special procurement problems was

elemental fluorine, to include its

chemical derivatives. This highly corrosive, and therefore hazardous-tohandle, element was the choice of the

project designers for combining with

uranium to make the gaseous feed

material (uranium hexafluoride) for

operating several of the main produc13

 Ibid., pp. 6.1-6.3 and Apps. F5-F6, DASA. 14

 Ibid., App. K, DASA; Rpt, Ruhoff, sub: Mat Developments for 11-27 Oct 42, 27 Oct 42, MD-319.1

(Rpts MSA), OROO; Rpts, Mat Sec (later Mad Sq

Area Engrs Office), 9 Nov 42, 6 and 13 Aug 43,

OROO; Smyth Report, p. 65. 15

 MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 1, App. I, DASA; List, sub:

Signed Prime and Subcontracts Over $100,000, Incl

to Memo, Marsden to Groves, 31 Aug 43, MDR.
314 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

tion plants. Because of the huge requirements of just the gaseous diffusion plant, as well as the problems of

shipment, the designers decided to

build a fluorine gas production plant

right at the diffusion plant site. The

District's materials group also played

a significant role in letting contracts

and overseeing the activities of a

number of private research institutions (Johns Hopkins, MIT, Purdue)

and chemical firms (American Cynamid, Du Pont, General Chemical,

Harshaw Chemical, Hooker Electrochemical, Kinetic Chemicals, Penn

Salt) in the development and supply

of the numerous fluorinated hydrocarbon chemical compounds—in the

form of coolants, sealants, and lubricants—needed to operate the plants

safely and efficiently with the highly

corrosive feed material.16

Feed Materials Production

The initial phase of the feed materials production network was conversion of the uranium-bearing crude

ore into pure concentrates of black

oxide and soda salt by various industrial firms under contract to the District. In each case the refining treatment was quite similar and involved

subjecting the crude ore to the successive processes of pulverization into

a sandlike material, acid immersion,

precipitation to eliminate impurities,

and roasting (drying).

Eldorado Mining at its Port Hope

refinery processed all Canadian ore

and some Congo ore into black oxide,

whereas the Vitro Manufacturing

Company at its Cannonsburg (Pennsylvania) refinery processed only

Congo ore into soda salt. Designed

only for treating the higher-grade

Congo and Canadian ores, neither the

Eldorado nor Vitro plants could

properly process the Carnotite concentrates from the Colorado Plateau

region. Aware that the Linde Air

Products Company had produced for

the OSRD a satisfactory grade of

black oxide from Carnotite concentrates, the District's Materials Section

at the end of 1942 made arrangements with Linde to refine new stocks

of concentrates at its plant in Tonawanda, New York, as well as to

produce other feed materials for the

project. With assistance of the Tonawanda area engineer, Linde expanded

its black oxide production facilities,

but, by late 1943, was phasing out domestic ores and using its facilities to

refine higher-yielding African ores.17

Figures compiled by the Madison

Square Area Engineers Office, beginning in September 1943, show that

the amount of uranium from all

sources available for refinement in

the United States and Canada, and

the quantity of black oxide and soda

salt extracted from this ore, grew dramatically from 1943 to 1945. Thus, at

the end of September 1943, the Manhattan District had available 2,920

tons of uranium ore and produced

1,660 tons of black oxide and soda

salt. A year later, the quantities rose

16

 MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 1. App. K, DASA; List, sub:

Contracts To Be Taken Over by MD, Incl to Ltr, H.

T. Wensel (Tech Aide, OSRD) to Marshall, 20 Mar

43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 161, MDR; List, sub:

MD Contracts With Various Univs, Incl to Memo,

Marsden to Groves, 2 Nov 43, MDR.

17

 MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 1, pp. 1.20, 7.1-7.8, Apps.

C-1A and F7, DASA. Details of early development

of black oxide production by Linde in 1942-43 may

be followed in Rpts, Mat Sec (later Mad Sq Area

Engrs Office), Oct 42-Aug 43, 30 Oct, 30 Nov, and

31 Dec 43, 29 Jan 44, OROO.
THE FEED MATERIALS PROGRAM 315

to 5,640 tons available and 3,500 tons

of black oxide and soda salt produced. And at the close of September

1945, the figures stood respectively at

6,600 tons of ore and 5,150 tons of

black oxide and soda salt.18

The final phase in the feed materials production network was the conversion of black oxide and soda salt,

through a series of chemical treatments, into one of the several chemical feeds suitable for processing in

the electromagnetic, diffusion, and

pile plants. The first step changed

black oxide or soda salt into brown

oxide (uranium dioxide) or orange

oxide (uranium trioxide), the latter an

important feed material for the electromagnetic process in its early stages

of development. The second step

transformed brown oxide into green

salt (uranium tetrafluoride). The

third, and final, step converted green

salt into one of a number of uranium

compounds—for example, gaseous

uranium hexafluoride for the gaseous

and liquid diffusion processes and the

electromagnetic process in its last

stage of development—or into uranium metal, the prime feed material

for the pile process.19

Because the OSRD had made considerable progress in arranging contracts with industrial firms to provide

for each of the different chemical

treatments required to produce feed

materials, the principal task remaining

for Manhattan leaders was that of

shaping the project's feed materials

processors into a production network

capable of supplying most of the

feeds for the Clinton and Hanford

production plants, regardless of the

adverse effects of sabotage, technical

failures, or other inhibiting factors.

By early 1943, having extended

OSRD contracts and negotiated new

agreements, they organized and expanded this network so that, in effect,

it comprised three parallel chemicalprocessing chains, the first link in

each chain consisting of processors of

both brown and orange oxide; the

second, those of green salt; and the

third, those of uranium metal.20

Mallinckrodt, Du Pont, and Linde

comprised the brown and orange

oxide links. Mallinckrodt, which had

pioneered in development of the

highly efficient ether process for refining uranium under the leadership

of Ruhoff, provided the most important link. During the course of the

wartime project, it produced nearly

4,200 tons of brown and orange

oxide, nearly twice the output of the

other two firms, and including almost

all of the oxide used by the electromagnetic project. In cooperation with

Yale University, it continued research

that culminated in design and construction of a plant for continuous extraction of brown oxide from raw ore

(pitchblende), not completed until

1946. The Du Pont plant, built adjacent to the company's big Chambers

Chemical and Dye Works across the

Delaware River from Wilmington in

Deep Water, New Jersey, processed

18

 Rpts, Mad Sq Area Engrs Office, 30 Oct 43,

31 Oct 44, 29 Nov 45, OROO. 19

 Ibid., Sep-Dec 43, OROO; MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 1,

pp. 8.1-10.10, DASA.

20

 See Ch. I on the origins in the atomic bomb

program of the idea of parallel production chains,

characterized as a nuclear steeplechase involving

various methods for producing fissionable materials.

List, sub: S-1 Contracts, Incl to Ltr, Irvin Stewart

(Ex Secy, OSRD) to Groves, 14 Dec 45, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 161 (S-1 Contracts), MDR;

MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 1, pp. S10-S13 and App. F8,

DASA.
316 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

mainly scrap and by-products material

to produce almost 2,000 tons of

brown oxide. Linde, operating the

third plant, processed black oxide

from its own refinery to produce a

total of about 300 tons of brown

oxide.21

Four chemical firms comprised the

green salt links. Three were the same

firms that produced brown oxide and

the fourth was the Harshaw Chemical

Company of Cleveland, which the

OSRD had originally brought under

contract to produce green salt in the

summer of 1942. District procurement officials drew up new contracts

for a substantially enlarged output in

the fall of 1942—with Harshaw in

September and the other three companies in November. These contracts,

except for that with Harshaw, remained in effect for the duration of

the war and resulted in production of

more than 7,200 tons of green salt:

2,926 by Mallinckrodt, 2,060 by

Linde, 1,640 by Harshaw, and 608 by

Du Pont. When more uranium hexafluoride was needed for the diffusion

plants, the Madison Square Area Engineers Office renegotiated the contract with Harshaw, providing in a

new agreement that the Cleveland

firm convert black oxide into green

salt and then into uranium hexafluoride. At the same time, the Madison

Square office also arranged to have

Harshaw raise its output of uranium

tetrachloride, which it had been producing in small quantities since early

1943, to meet a sudden increase in

demand for the electromagnetic production plan.22

Four commercial firms and a college formed the uranium metal links.

Mallinckrodt, Du Pont, Electro Metallurgical, Metal Hydrides and Iowa

State, at one time or another, were

involved in metal production for the

wartime atomic project, although only

the first three firms constituted the

permanent links in the parallel feed

materials chains. Uranium metal procurement dated back to the earliest

days of the atomic energy program,

because the material was required for

laboratory research and experimentation. Both the National Bureau of

Standards and the OSRD had let contracts to university research laboratories and commercial chemical firms to

develop a process for mass production of uranium metal of a high

degree of purity. The processes devised by Metal Hydrides proved to

have serious drawbacks. Iowa State,

however, had developed a method for

reducing green salt with calcium

(later, magnesium proved more effective) at high temperatures inside a

steel bomb and recasting the end

product into metal in an inductionheated furnace. So successful was this

method that Iowa State itself employed it to manufacture a considerable amount of metal for the project.

Subsequently, the Army let contracts

to Mallinckrodt, Du Pont, and Electro

Metallurgical to produce metal using

the steel bomb method.23

When the Army took over direction

of materials procurement, it continued the metal-production contracts

21

 MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 1, pp. 8.1-8.7, DASA. 22

 Ibid., pp. 9.1-9.9 and App. F8, DASA; Rpts,

Mad Sq Area Engrs Office, 31 Oct and 30 Dec 44,

31 Jan 45, OROO. 23

 MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 1, pp. 10.1-10.9, DASA. See

also Ch. III.
THE FEED MATERIALS PROGRAM 317

with Metal Hydrides and Iowa State

and negotiated new contracts with

Electro Metallurgical and Du Pont. In

several instances, District officials had

to monitor construction of additional

plant buildings, at government expense, to expedite the production of

uranium metal under these contracts.

Metal Hydrides and Du Pont had serious operating problems that limited

their output of metal, although Metal

Hydrides subsequently developed a

highly successful metal-recasting operation. Nevertheless, by the time District officials shut down most production of new metal in late 1943—Iowa

State continued its output until late

1944—the various contractors had

manufactured several thousand tons.

By late August 1944, the Madison

Square area engineer reported delivery of nearly 3,500 tons of metal to

Hanford and Clinton, comprised of

1,000 tons from Electro Metallurgical,

900 from Iowa State, 650 from Mallinckrodt, 610 from Metal Hydrides,

and lesser amounts from other

processors. These deliveries included

both new metal and metal recast

into ingots from turnings and other

scraps from machining and fabricating

operations.24

Quality Control Program

One factor that made materials procurement difficult was the almost universal requirement for previously unheard of standards of quality. In the

feed materials program, for example,

procurement schedules required that

uranium metal contain no more than

0.1 of 1 percent of impurities that

would affect its efficiency in the pileoperating process. Similarly stringent

standards were established for graphite, fluorinated chemicals, and other

materials. Because most of the commercial contractors who furnished

these materials were unprepared to

carry out the physical and analytical

tests necessary to maintain these high

standards, the materials group had to

build up its own quality control

organization.25

In February 1943, Colonel Crenshaw's staff began negotiations with

Princeton, MIT, the chemical section

of the Metallurgical Laboratory, and

the National Bureau of Standards,

with the objective of forming these

research institutions into a central

quality control laboratory group. The

plan was to have the scientists at each

institution analyze and test samples

from the uranium metal production

plants, as well as to devise more effective methods of metal analysis, to

furnish personnel and facilities when

needed to supplement those of the

manufacturing plants, to investigate

other materials, and to provide general guidance for the control program.

In addition, the Metallurgical Laboratory was to carry out physical tests of

brown oxide and finished metal for

the pile process. Because all of these

institutions already were engaged in

some aspect of analysis and testing of

uranium, the Materials Section simply

supplemented or revised existing contracts with them to provide the neces24

 Ibid., pp. 10.2-10.9 and App. F8, DASA; Rpts,

Mat Sec (later Mad Sq Area Engrs Office), Sep-Dec

42 and 31 Aug 45, OROO.

25

 MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 1, pp. 12.1 and App. G,

DASA; Rpts, Mat Sec, 15 Feb and 4 Mar 43,

OROO.
318 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

sary organization of the central quality control laboratory group.26

By spring, the Materials Section

had completed satisfactory arrangements with Princeton, MIT, and the

Bureau of Standards. Colonel Crenshaw reported in May that these three

institutions were "doing an excellent

job, and have attacked the problem as

a job of commercial analysis, which is

the case."

 27

 The Metallurgical Laboratory expressed a preference for carrying out its part of the analytical

work under its existing overall research contract, but Crenshaw opposed this, because he knew it would

prevent the Materials Section from

exercising direct control over the laboratory's part in the analytical program. The reasons why the laboratory

did not want such a contract soon

became apparent: The scientists did

not relish performing routine analysis

and testing of metal samples because

it took time and used facilities they

would rather devote to more original

and challenging research and development activities.28

Colonel Crenshaw arranged a meeting with Richard L. Doan, associate

director of the University of Chicago's

Clinton Laboratories in Tennessee,

and George E. Boyd, chief of the analytical chemistry group at the Metallurgical Laboratory. The two scientists agreed that the Metallurgical

Laboratory would continue to perform routine chemical analysis and

testing of brown oxide and uranium

metal until the workload in this area

declined. This would occur shortly,

they knew, when Iowa State completed facilities for quality testing its own

metal output. By fall of 1943, the

other institutions had taken over most

of the routine chemical analytical

work that the Metallurgical Laboratory had been doing. The Madison

Square area engineer attested to the

effectiveness of the quality control

program when, at the end of November, he reported to Colonel Nichols

that the feed materials program was

making metal of a higher degree of

purity than any previously produced

by the atomic energy project.29

Development of the feed materials

program ahead of the fissionable materials production and weapon programs was a matter of necessity, for

the latter were completely dependent

upon an adequate supply of the feed

and other materials essential to their

operation. In less than two years, the

Manhattan District's materials organization was able to expand the already

existing OSRD program, solving serious technical problems and securing

the requisite priorities to meet on

schedule the requirements for the research and development, testing, and

start-up in operations of the major

production plants for the manufacture

of fissionable materials. By late 1944

and in 1945, the District could begin

to phase out, or reduce, some aspects

of the program and to give some attention to the postwar requirements

26 of the atomic energy program. MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 1, pp. 12.1-12.2, DASA;

Rpts, Mat Sec, 15 Feb and 3 Apr 43, OROO; Cochrane, Measures for Progress, p. 383. 27

 Rpt, Mat Sec, 18 May 43, OROO. 28

 Ibid., 3 Apr, 4 and 18 May, 5 Jun 43, OROO.

29

 MDH, Bk. 7, Vol. 1, pp. 12.2-12.4, DASA; Rpts,

Mat Sec (later Mad Sq Area Engrs Office), 18 Jun

and 30 Nov 43, OROO.
CHAPTER XV

Land Acquisition

During the war the Manhattan District assembled extensive real estate

holdings for its principal installations

in Tennessee, New Mexico, and

Washington State, as well as smaller

tracts for its support facilities in other

places, totaling more than 500,000

acres. Manhattan acquired most of

this land, at least up to the point of

occupancy, during the period September 1942 to August 1943; however,

because of unavoidable legal delays in

closing out procurement of original

sites and recurring demands for additional space, it continued to be involved in some acquisition activities

through September 1945.1

Land acquisition for the atomic

energy project presented special

problems hitherto never encountered

by War Department agencies in their

World War II real estate procurement

programs. The Manhattan Project required absolute secrecy and unheard

of speed in acquiring the needed

sites. Yet these essential objectives

were, in fact, inherently self-defeating, for land acquisition activities

tended to attract widespread public

attention and measures to expedite

quick settlements tended to conflict

with those for maximum secrecy.

Nonetheless, convinced that the ultimate success of the project was at

stake, Manhattan officials persisted in

enforcing strict security measures,

even though the latter produced a

far-reaching tide of local opposition

at the Tennessee and Washington

sites.2

Clinton Engineer Works

The District's acquisition program

in Tennessee officially began on

29 September 1942,3 when Under

Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson

approved Maj. Gen. Eugene Reybold's letter directive requesting procurement of land for the Kingston

Demolition Range, so-called for security reasons but in January 1943 officially redesignated the Clinton Engi1

 Site selection for the major Manhattan installations is discussed in detail in Chs. III-V.

2

 Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, pp.

441-42; U.S. Statutes at Large, 1942, Vol. 56, Pt. 1,

Second War Powers Act, Title II, p. 177; MDH, Bk.

4, Vol. 4, "Land Acquisition, Hanford Engineer

Works," pp. 4.19-4.20, DASA. 3

 Except as otherwise indicated, facts and figures

pertaining to the Tennessee land acquisition program are drawn from MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 10, "Land

Acquisition CEW," and from the appendices to that

volume. Figures on the total acreage of the site and

other statistics relating to the acquisition program

are summarized on pp. 2.47-2.49. Many of the documents pertinent to the program are reproduced in

App. B.
320 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

neer Works (CEW).4 (See Map 3.)

Under terms of this directive, the Engineers chief had official authorization

to purchase approximately 56,200

acres5 (Table 2), primarily in eastern

Tennessee's Roane and Anderson

Counties, using money appropriated

from the Engineer Service-Army category of available funds.

In anticipation of approval of this

directive, the Engineers' ORD (Ohio

River Division) Real Estate Branch on

28 September had opened a project

office, designated the CEW Land Acquisition Section, at Harriman, a

Roane County town a few miles west

of the site. The ORD staff began immediately to secure for the section

the services of some fifty appraisers

for the job of appraising an estimated

800-850 separate tracts. The fact that

division personnel currently were involved in another large-scale acquisition program for the Dale Hollow

Dam and Reservoir, situated on a

branch of the Cumberland River near

the Tennessee-Kentucky border, compounded the difficulty of their new

task; however, they resolved the problem by arranging to borrow the appraisers, on a short-term basis, from

several regional Federal Land Banks

and from the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) real estate staff. In

keeping with War Department practices of basing appraisals mainly on

an estimate of prevailing property

values as determined by a review of

comparable sales, on interviews with

owners, and on actual physical inspection of each tract, the appraisers were

able to complete most of the work on

the original site by the end of 1942.6

The directive of 29 September had

authorized procurement of the original site by condemnation. This permitted not only immediate acquisition

of those parts of the area needed for

preliminary construction but also expedited acquisition of properties with

defective titles. On 6 October (effective 7 October), the U.S. District

Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, Northern Division, issued an

order of possession at the request of

ORD Real Estate Branch attorneys.

The court took cognizance of the

hardship to landowners facing remov4

 Ltr, Robins (Act Chief of Engrs) to CG SOS,

sub: Acquisition in Fee of Approx 56,200 Acres of

Land for Demolition Range Near Kingston, Tenn.,

and 2d Ind (directive approval), Col Marion Rushton (Asst Ex, Office of Und Secy War) to Chief of

Engrs, both 29 Sep 42, Incls to Memo, Col John J.

O'Brien (CE Real Estate Br chief) to Lt Col Whitney

Ashbridge (CE Mil Constr Br), sub: Land Acquisition in Connection With MD, 17 Apr 43, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 601 (Santa Fe), MDR. The town

of Kingston was located about 7 miles southwest of

the site area. 5

 Acquisition of ten additional parcels of land, authorized in subsequent directives issued from June

1943 through August 1944, brought the District's

real estate holdings to a total of approximately

58,900 acres. These parcels of land were mostly

small tracts required for the adequate development

and protection of the original site. (See Map 3.) Several tracts were secured to facilitate development of

the transportation network, notably 70 acres in July

1943 for the right of way of a spur track built from

the Southern Railway at Blair south along Oxier

Creek to the north boundary of the original site.

The largest additions were made in 1944, when the

gaseous diffusion plant on the Clinch River at the

western end of the reservation needed more

ground. In April of that year the TVA granted the

District a temporary-use permit for some 279 acres,

and in August the CEW Land Acquisition Section

acquired another 2,800 acres, consisting chiefly of

an elevated area along Black Oak Ridge needed to

improve perimeter security near the gaseous diffusion plant.

6

 Ltr, Fred Morgan (CEW Land Acquisition Sec

Proj Mgr) to Joseph G. Colgan (House Mil Affairs

Committee investigator), 6 Aug 43, copy in MDH,

Bk. 1, Vol. 10, App. B2i, DASA; Memo, Marshall to

Groves, sub: Major MD Contracts, 27 Apr 43,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 161, MDR; Knoxville Journal, 4 Feb 43.
LAND ACQUISITION 321

TABLE 2—LAND ACQUISITION AT CEW, 1942-1944

a

 Figures given here represent the amounts estimated in the real estate directive, the sum totaling about

59,500 acres. The actual acreage finally acquired was less, approximately 58,900 acres.

Source: MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 10, pp. 1.3-1.4, 2.21-2.26, App. B1, DASA

al on short notice by limiting the government's right of immediate exclusive possession to those sections

where it was "essential to full and

complete development of the

project. . . ."

 7

The Manhattan District did not take

exclusive possession of any tracts for

construction purposes before 15 November, although it had exercised

right of entry at many points before

that date. The CEW Land Acquisition

Section requested that owners and

tenants, most of whom were

farmers, be prepared to vacate at

various times between 1 December

1942 and 15 February 1943. In some

instances, where immediate vacating

would cause undue hardship, the District permitted landowners to stay on

even beyond the 15 February date.

The effectiveness of this lenient

policy is attested to by the fact that

project officials never had to resort to

a court order to secure eviction of an

owner from the Clinton site.

As soon as the ORD Real Estate

Branch had assembled sufficient data

to meet legal requirements concerning areas needed immediately for

military construction, branch attorneys filed declarations of taking. They

filed the first declaration on 20 November 1942, covering a segment

comprised of 13 tracts. By mid-January 1943 declarations were on file for

184 tracts covering 9,614 acres and,

by May, for 742 tracts constituting

7

 Copies of the condemnation petition, 6 Oct 42,

filed by U.S. Atty James B. Prexier, Jr. et al., and the order of possession (source of quotation), 6 Oct 42,

signed by Judge George C. Taylor, in MDH,

Bk. 1, Vol. 10, App. G7, DASA.
322 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

FARM AT THE TENNESSEE SITE, typical of those acquired by the Manhattan District

53,334 acres—or nearly all privately

owned property of the original site.

Meanwhile, during the winter and

spring of 1943, CEW Land Acquisition Section negotiators had succeeded in obtaining stipulation agreements on more than half the tracts in

litigation. By the end of May, agreements of this type had been worked

out on 416 tracts comprising 21,742

acres. In those cases where the negotiators failed to secure stipulation

agreements, branch attorneys consented to submit them to a jury of

view, an institution provided for

under Tennessee law to assist

litigants in reaching agreement on

settlement prices for expropriated

property. The jury, comprised of five

persons named by the Federal District

Court, visited each of the tracts in

contention and then advised new settlement prices uniformly higher than

those established by War Department

appraisers. When the owners were

unwilling to accept even these higher

prices, the government stopped using

this method of settlement.8

The rise of local opposition to the

acquisition program seriously threatened to delay efforts by Department

of Justice special attorneys to quickly

bring the remaining unsettled cases to

trial. Contributing to the opposition

8

 Knoxville Journal, 9 Jan 43; Remarks of Congressman John Jennings, Jr. (Tenn.), U.S. Congress,

House, Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.,

22 Apr 43, Vol. 89, Pt. 10, pp. A1197-99.
LAND ACQUISITION 323

was the Federal District Court's late1942 publication in its registry of the

amounts placed on deposit for advanced payment to landowners, in

compliance with the declaration-oftaking procedure. Because these

amounts represented a percentage of

the total valuation of the tracts, the

landowners easily deduced the War

Department's appraised valuation on

the various tracts. The coincidence of

a local political campaign provided

candidates with an opportunity to

promise, if elected, to secure higher

prices than those established by government appraisers. Area newspapers

publicized widely the appraised prices

and the local politicians' comments

and, in general, were hostile to the

acquisition program and its

methods.9

By the end of November, many

landowners were thoroughly aroused.

On the twenty-third, a delegation of

property holders petitioned the

project manager of the CEW Land

Acquisition Section, protesting the

low appraisal prices. That evening

more than two hundred owners met;

they formed a landholders investigation committee and made arrangements to hire lawyers and appraisers

so that committee members could receive expert assistance. Taking note

of these developments, a Knoxville

newspaper commented that "the

public of course actually knows nothing in detail of the justice of the protests being made by these

citizens. . . . We do know that since

everybody else is getting a fair price

for the material and labor which will

go into this Federal project, there is

certainly no justification for these

farmers being singled out for an

economy slaughter."

 10

Dissatisfaction with appraised

values was not the only cause for opposition. Relocation of more than one

thousand landowners and tenants

with their families proved difficult.

Recent TVA acquisition of much of

the good river bottom farmland in the

vicinity had created a shortage of

available vacant farms, enhanced local

land values, and forced many farm

people to move. Some of the displaced farmers who had moved to the

Clinton site naturally resented having

to move again. Even vacant houses in

nearby towns were at a premium because of the influx of construction

workers for the new project. Many

landowners lacked sufficient ready

cash to move on short notice. The

War Department had no funds to aid

them and adequate assistance was not

immediately obtainable from other

government agencies, such as the

Farm Security Administration. Even

owners with financial resources found

that the District's deadlines on vacating did not give them sufficient time

to hire moving vehicles, which were

in short supply in the local area.11

9

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 10, pp. 2.9 and 2.42-2.43,

DASA; Knoxville Journal, 1, 20, and 25 Nov 42; Fine

and Remington, Corps of Engineers: Construction, pp.

174-84. Numerous examples of local opposition to

War Department land acquisition are presented in

the last-named source.

10

 Knoxville Journal, 24 Nov, 25 Nov (source of

quotation), 30 Dec 42; Remarks of Jennings, Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 22 Apr 43, Vol.

89, Pt. 10, pp. A1197-99. 11

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 10, pp. 2.40-2.42, DASA;

Telg, Jennings to Secy War, 24 Oct 42, copy in

ibid., App. B2b, DASA; Robinson, Oak Ridge Story,

pp. 26 and 28.
324 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Rumors contributed considerably to

fomenting local opposition. One persistent rumor was that the Clinton

site was being acquired for the benefit

of a large private corporation in flagrant abuse of the right of eminent

domain. But overriding security requirements prevented District officials

from providing the public with a general explanation. Thus, in an attempt

to abate public criticism, Col. John J.

O'Brien, chief of the CE (Corps of

Engineers) Real Estate Branch, requested that the Department of Agriculture investigate the appraisal program. The department's factfinders

later stated in their report that "the

general management of the project,

the appraisal of the land and the approach to the landowners have been

fair and just, and we do not see what

would be accomplished by a reappraisal of the land." The Engineers'

resurvey of the area had revealed,

they continued, that in many instances the tracts were actually smaller than recorded in existing property

deeds; that the owners had tended to

overvalue their land because they

were prone to exaggerate its productivity; and, because many were veterans of one or more of the five previous TVA land acquisition projects

within 70 miles of the Clinton site,

that they had developed "a technique

of complaining" that had proved to

be very effective in securing higher

prices for their property.12

Meanwhile, disaffected farmers

sought the assistance of their congressman, John Jennings, Jr., a Republican from Knoxville. As early as

October 1942, Jennings had written

to Secretary Stimson on behalf of his

constituents: "I realize the necessity

of the step taken but I do hope adequate steps will be taken to safeguard

these people, that they speedily be

paid for their farms, and every step

possible be taken to see that they are

relocated on farms."

 13

 Although the

War Department promptly had assured him "that every effort will be

made to preserve the interests of the

landowners concerned,"

 14

 the protests continued to increase. Feeling

the futility of his earlier efforts, Jennings submitted a resolution to the

House of Representatives on 1 February 1943, requesting creation of a

select committee to investigate the

prices offered landowners. "A large

number of owners . . . ," the resolution read, "assert that the War Department has had the land appraised

by nonresidents of the State of Tennessee who are totally unfamiliar with

the value of such land. . . . Inexpert

and unfair appraisals . . . are resulting in the forced sale of such land

. . . at prices totally inadequate to

enable the former owners to acquire

homes and farms of comparable

value."

 15

The House took no immediate

action on Jennings' resolution, and he

continued to seek relief for his constituents through War Department

12

 Memo, George E. Farrell (Agri Dept specialist)

to O'Brien, sub: Kingston Demolition Range,

19 Feb 43, copy in MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 10, App. B2e,

DASA.

13

 Ltr, Jennings to Secy War, 17 Oct 42, copy in

ibid., App. B2a, DASA. 14

 Ltr (source of quotation), John W. Martyn

(Admin Asst to Secy War) to Jennings, 27 Oct 42,

App. B2a; Telgs, Jennings to Secy War, 24 Oct 42,

and Und Secy War to Jennings, 3 Nov 42, App.

B2b. Copies in ibid., DASA. 15

 Quotation from H. Res. 91, Congressional Record,

78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 Feb 43, Vol. 89, Pt. 1, p.

508. See also Remarks of Jennings on H. Res. 91,

ibid., 2 Feb 43, p. 509; Knoxville Journal, 4 Feb 43.
LAND ACQUISITION 325

channels. In late February, he informed Under Secretary of War Patterson that he was receiving numerous complaints of destruction of

buildings and other facilities on the

site before providing owners the

usual opportunity to salvage them.

Patterson replied that such salvage

was not feasible because it would take

too long and interfere with construction activities already in progress.

Furthermore, he assured Jennings, no

waste was involved because Manhattan District engineers were converting

existing buildings on the site for use

by the project wherever this was possible. Again in April, Jennings complained to Corps of Engineers officials that improper statements

concerning landowners were being

made by their personnel in testimony

before the jury of view. Corps observers who had attended the jury hearings said the congressman's allegations were not true. Finally, on 9 July,

Chairman Andrew J. May of the

House Military Affairs Committee, to

which the resolution had been

referred for review, appointed Representative Clifford C. Davis, a

Democrat from the Tenth District of

Tennessee, to carry out an inquiry.

Davis selected Representatives Dewey

Short, a Republican from Missouri,

and John Sparkman, a Democrat from

Alabama, as members of an investigating subcommittee and also invited

Jennings to be present at the subcommittee's public hearings.16

Announcement of the pending investigation came while the Justice Department special attorneys were pushing ahead with trial of condemnation

cases on the Clinton tracts. The federal court juries, almost without exception, substantially increased payments to property holders. This

seemed to further confirm the prevailing local view that the original appraisals were far too low and farmers

who had accepted payment ought to

be entitled to supplementary compensation. After consulting with Manhattan officials, the Justice Department

decided to suspend further trials, at

least temporarily, as the congressional

investigation might result in a major

revision of the appraisal data upon

which the government was basing its

prosecution of condemnation cases.17

The War Department determined

to adhere to a policy of full cooperation with the congressional investigators. The ORD division engineer instructed the CEW project manager to

take "extreme care . . . to prevent

adverse reaction because of any

claims being made that the War Department is pursuing a non-cooperative policy."

 18

 Manhattan officials did

not interfere when a subcommittee

investigator interviewed landowners

who had written letters of complaint.

The CEW project manager responded

promptly to a written request from

the House Military Affairs Committee

general counsel for a comprehensive

16

 Ltrs, Jennings to Und Secy War, 27 Feb 43,

Und Secy War to Jennings, 13 Apr 43, and Lt Col

C. C. Fletcher (Act Real Estate Off for ORD Div

Engr) to Reybold, sub: Ltr of Jennings Re Alleged

Improper Statements of J. H. McKenzie (Just Dept

Spec Atty), 15 Apr 43, copies in MDH, Bk. 1, Vol.

10, App. B2d-e, DASA. See also ibid., pp. 2.11-

2.12, DASA; Knoxville Journal, 10-11 Jul and 13 Aug

43.

17

 1st Ind, Fletcher to Morgan, 13 Jul 43, to Ltr,

Morgan to ORD Div Engr, sub: Investigation of Appraisals by Congressional Investigating Committee,

12 Jul 43, copies in MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 10, App. B2h,

DASA. 18

 Ibid.
326 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

statement of its functions and activities, including a list of the appraisers

who had worked on the project, together with a description of their

qualifications; however, he did not release any records to the subcommittee without approval of the ORD division engineer.19

The subcommittee held two public

hearings: on 11 August at Clinton, for

the benefit of Roane County residents; and the following day at Kingston, for Anderson County residents.

About three hundred persons, mostly

land owners and their families, attended at Clinton, but considerably

fewer were present in Kingston. The

CE Real Estate Branch head sent his

chief appraiser and an officer to represent the Engineers chief, General

Reybold, at the hearing; the ORD division engineer, also his chief appraiser; and the district engineer, the CEW

project manager.20

At Clinton, Congressman Jennings

reviewed the history of the acquisition, emphasizing particularly the

landowners' complaints that they had

been underpaid for properties taken

over by the government and, as a

final comment, declaring that all of

his own efforts to have the War Department reconsider appraisals had

been turned down "as cold as ice."

 21

In subsequent testimony, War Department officials, disgruntled landowners, and project appraisal staff members asserted that appraisers had

greatly undervalued most properties,

failed to interview owners, and used

coercion in getting stipulations. Some

witnesses charged that the CEW

project manager had promised

owners they would have an opportunity to salvage their buildings and

equipment, but they were not permitted to do this. The ORD chief appraiser took the tack in his testimony

that if the appraisers and negotiators

had done all that was alleged by the

landowners, they were acting contrary

to all instructions issued by General

Reybold. He urged that the appraisers and negotiators be given a hearing, but only two witnesses representing this group were called to testify,

and they both vehemently denied

most of the charges that had been

made against them. The subcommittee adjourned on 12 August, after

hearing testimony from Anderson

County owners at Kingston.22

The congressional committee did

not make its report public until December. The report consisted chiefly

of ten recommendations for improving War Department real estate acquisition practices, only two of which related specifically to the CEW program. The first stated that the War

Department should review and make

adjustments in all those cases at the

Clinton site where "the landowner

was persuaded, against his better 19

 Ibid.; Ltrs, Colgan (for H. Ralph Burton,

House Mil Affairs Committee general counsel) to

Morgan, 3 Aug 43, and Morgan to Colgan, 6 Aug

43, copies in MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 10, App. B2i, DASA. 20

 The town of Clinton was located 4 miles northwest of the site. Ltr, Col R. G. West (Ex Off, ORD)

to Reybold, sub: Investigation of CEW Land Acquisition at Harriman, Tenn., 30 Aug 43, copy in

MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 10, App. B2m, DASA. 21

 Ibid.

22

 Ltrs, Morgan to Fletcher, subs: Rpt on Hearing

Before House Mil Affairs Subcommittee in Connection With Land Acquisition at Harriman, Tenn.,

11 Aug 43, and Rpt of House Mil Affairs Subcommittee—CEW, 13 Aug 43; Ltr, West to Reybold,

sub: Investigation of CEW Land Acquisition at Harriman, 30 Aug 43. Copies of all in MDH, Bk. 1, Vol.

10, App. B2q and m, DASA. Knoxville News-Sentinel,

12-13 Aug 43. Knoxville Journal, 12-13 Aug 43.
LAND ACQUISITION 327

judgment, by coercion, threat, or

promise, for whatever reason or reasons, to accept less than the true

value of his property." The second

recommended that "landowners who

suffered losses on standing crops

. . . for any reason not attributable

to the landowner, should be properly

compensated for said losses." The

rest of the recommendations, taken as

a group, constituted a critique of War

Department acquisition policies in

general. More care should be taken to

ensure protection of landowners' constitutional rights as guaranteed under

the Fifth Amendment. In ascertaining

fair prices on land, the government

real estate appraisers should give

more attention to determining

comparable land values and take into

consideration all factors relating to

relocation of the owner on property

similar to that he had given up. To

make sure that these objectives were

achieved, War Department real estate

agencies should employ only fully

qualified appraisers and negotiators.

The Corps of Engineers' real estate

manual should be revised to cover

unusual conditions, such as those

found at the Clinton site. Finally, no

promises or commitments should be

made to property holders, except

where they could be made a matter of

written official record.23

Save for a brief delay in prosecuting the condemnation cases, the congressional investigation interfered

very little with land acquisition

progress and not at all with construction of the U-235 production facilities. Nothing came of the committee's

rather severe criticism of appraisal

prices, as neither Congress nor the

War Department took steps to give

additional compensation to landowners whose property had been acquired

under stipulation agreements. By

August 1944, all of the original

56,700-acre site had been acquired.

As finally constituted, it consisted of

806 tracts secured by purchase, 38

tracts held under easements, and 4

tracts obtained under TVA temporary-use permits. In September, three

months after closing down operations, the CEW Land Acquisition

Section reopened its Harriman office

to monitor the additional acquisition

of approximately 2,800 acres. Needed

to ensure greater security of the gaseous diffusion plant, this acquisition

involved negotiations on 41 separate

tracts and was not completed until

March 1945.24

Total cost of the CEW real estate

acquisition program cannot be determined, because project records list

administrative charges as part of the

overall expenditures for engineer

military activities. The actual sum

paid out for purchase of land and improvements, for severance damages,

and for certain other nonadministrative costs totaled slightly more than

$2.6 million, substantially less than

the estimated cost of $3.5 million in

the original directive of 29 September

1942. Of the total, the Army expended the largest part, $2.58 million, in 23

 The recommendations were printed in the

Knoxville Journal on 6 Dec 43. Comments defending

War Department procedures as they related to each

of the recommendations are given in MDH, Bk. 1,

Vol. 10, pp. 2.12-2.16 and App. F5, DASA. See also

U.S. Army CE Real Estate Manual, 1942.

24

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 10 pp. 2.45-2.46 and App.

E1-E4, DASA; Ltr, Robins (Dep Chief of Engrs) to

CG ASF, sub: Acquisition of Additional Land for

Scty Purposes in K-25 Area, 28 Aug 44, copy in

ibid., App. B1f, DASA.
328 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

outright acquisition of slightly more

than 55,000 acres, purchased at an

average cost of about $47 per acre.25

Los Alamos

Although the size of the Los

Alamos site approached that of the

Clinton site, its acquisition presented

far fewer problems for the CE Real

Estate Branch. Federal agencies already owned and controlled 90 percent of the land needed for the site,

and for this the War Department had

only to negotiate a comparatively

simple transfer agreement with each

agency. Furthermore, because a relatively small number of private owners

held title to the remaining parcels,

branch officials anticipated that negotiations with individual owners would

be a far less time-consuming operation than at the Tennessee site.26

On 25 November 1942, Under Secretary of War Patterson approved a

directive to acquire a site at Los

Alamos "for establishment of a Demolition range." In support of his request for approval of this acquisition,

the Engineers chief had submitted

data derived from two comprehensive

preliminary reports—one prepared by

the division engineer of the Southwestern Division (SWD) at Dallas,

Texas, and the other by that division's district engineer at Albuquerque, New Mexico. These reports indicated that the Manhattan Project required approximately 54,000 acres,

most of it semiarid forest and grazing

lands located on the east slopes of the

Jemez Mountains in Sandoval County.

Cost of acquisition, the reports estimated, would be small, because all

but about 8,900 acres were federally

owned and the grazing and forest

lands were of relatively low value.

The directive set the approximate

cost at $440,000 and authorized the

Engineers chief to finance the acquisition from available engineer funds.27

Because the process of acquiring

the Los Alamos site promised to be

relatively uncomplicated and speedy,

there was little need for establishing a

special real estate project office. The

SWD Real Estate Branch in Albuquerque had sufficient staff and resources

to oversee the myriad details and the

district engineer had assigned one of

his assistants, Maj. John H. Dudley, to

coordinate and supervise all phases.

Working closely with Lt. Col. John M.

Harman, the Los Alamos post commander designate, the Albuquerque

real estate staff took immediate steps

to implement the plan to purchase 25

 Ibid., p. 2.47, DASA; Ltr, W. T. Brooks (State

of Tenn Hwy Engr) to ORD Div Engr, 8 Jul 43; Ltr,

West to Brooks, 3 Sep 43; Ltr, J. W. Love (Harriman Power Dept Mgr) to Sen Tom Stewart (Tenn.),

10 Jan 44; Ltr, Robins to Sen Kenneth D. McKellar

(Tenn.), 11 Feb 44; 1st Ind, O'Brien to ORD Div

Engr, 25 Jul 44, to Ltr, Fletcher to Reybold, sub:

Edgemoor Bridge and Solway Bridge, Tenn., 17 Jul

44. Copies of all in ibid., App B2f and n-o, DASA.

Robinson, Oak Ridge Story, pp. 26 and 28. Some

3,720 of the total 58,900 acres brought under CEW

control already were owned by the government or

were acquired by lease, easement, or use permit. 26

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, "General," pp. 3.5-3.6,

DASA. Selection of the Los Alamos site is discussed

in detail in Ch. IV.

27

 Quoted phrase from Ltr, Robins (for Chief of

Engrs) to CG SOS, sub: Acquisition of Land for

Demolition Range at Los Alamos, N.Mex., and 2d

Ind (directive approval), Patterson to Chief of

Engrs, both 25 Nov 42, Incls to Memo, O'Brien to

Ashbridge, sub: Land Acquisition in Connection

With MD, 17 Apr 43, MDR. See also Prelim Real

Estate Rpt, SWD Div Engr, sub: Los Alamos Proj,

21 Nov 42, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Rpts),

MDR; Rpt, U.S. Engrs Office, Albuquerque Dist,

sub: Proposed Site for Mil Proj at Los Alamos

Ranch School, Otowi, N.Mex., 23 Nov 42, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 600.03, MDR.
LAND ACQUISITION 329

TYPICAL TERRAIN OF THE LOS ALAMOS SITE

the site in five separate sections (A, B,

C, D, and E), which ensured compliance with the War Department's

policy of taking possession of property only as it was actually needed.28

(See Map 5.)

Area A comprised a large block of

land at the center of the site, which

include the fifty-odd buildings and expansive campus grounds (several hundred acres) of the Los Alamos School

that the Army acquired first and had

full title to by early 1943 under terms

of a $350,000 direct-purchase contract. The other areas—Area E to the

north of Area A and Areas B, C, and

D to the south—formed a kind of security belt to protect the central facilities planned for Area A, and also assured the Army control over the

scarce existing water sources.29 The

largest tract in these areas comprised

a part of the Santa Fe National Forest

under jurisdiction of the Department

of Agriculture's Forest Service. In response to Secretary Stimson's request, Agriculture Secretary Claude

Wickard authorized the War Department "to occupy and use for so long

as the military necessity continues

. . ." an area of some 45,667 acres.

Colonel Harman and the Forest Service's regional forester at Albuquerque

worked out the details of the transfer,

including administration or termination of any rights and privileges

granted local residents and provision

for management and fire protection

28

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1. pp. 7.11-7.12, DASA.

29

 Detailed data pertaining to the water supply

problem at Los Alamos can be found in Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 671.1 (Water Supply), MDR.

LAND ACQUISITION 331

of the forests. Subsequently, the SWD

Real Estate Branch secured several

additional small tracts of public land

to meet the project's needs for a 25-

mile power line right of way, bringing

the total acquisition at Los Alamos

during the war to 45,737 acres. Final

cost of all property at Los Alamos

purchased outright, leased, secured

by easement, and otherwise acquired

during the war was $414,971.30

Hanford Engineer Works

Although the District's real estate

acquisition program in south central

Washington started in February 1943,

adjudication of land cases resulting

from it ran on for many months after

the war was over.31 Legal complications, unfavorable publicity, administrative difficulties, the possibility of

congressional inquiries, and the usual

local opposition all threatened to

frustrate the combined efforts of General Groves and the Hanford Area

Engineers Office and CE Real Estate

Branch staffs. Only by instituting the

most vigorous countermeasures, both

at the Hanford Engineer Works

(HEW) and in Washington, D.C.,

were they able to prevent serious

delays in Du Pont's construction activities and major violations of project

security.

On 9 February, Under Secretary of

War Patterson approved a letter directive (dated 8 February) authorizing

acquisition of more than 400,000

acres at the Hanford site. (See Map 4.)

Shortly thereafter, the PD (Pacific Division) Real Estate Branch established

a local project office, designated the

HEW Land Acquisition Office, in

Prosser, county seat of Benton

County. Branch attorneys immediately

requested an order of possession

from the U.S. District Court for the

Eastern District of Washington State,

Southern Division, and District Court

Judge Lewis B. Schwellenbach on the

twenty-third issued the order, opening the way for the project real estate

office to begin collection of specific

appraisal data and to gain right of

entry to the site. Almost all of the

land was being used for crops or

grazing. More than 88 percent (about

30

 Compton, Atomic Quest, p. 129; Groves, Now It

Can Be Told. p. 67; Memo, Dudley to Groves, sub:

Cooperative Arrangements With Other Govt Agencies, 13 Jan 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 380.01,

MDR; MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 2.7, 3.3-3.6, 5.15-

5.21, DASA; CE Constr Div, Map of Los Alamos

Demolition Range, 6 Aug 43, copy in ibid., App.

A3, DASA; Ltrs, Secy War to Secy Agri, 22 Mar 43,

and Secy Agri to Secy War, 8 Apr 43 (source of

quotation), and Memo of Understanding Between

Harman and Frank C. W. Pooler (Region 3 forester,

Albuquerque), 22 Mar 43, copies in ibid., Apps. D2-

D8 and F, DASA. See Ch. XVIII on the acquisition

of a right of way for a connection with the Bernalillo-Santa Fe line of the New Mexico Power Company and SWD map of power transmission line in

ibid., App. 5, DASA. 31

 For detailed accounts of land acquisition at

Hanford see MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 4, DASA; Du Pont

Constr Hist, Vol. 1, pp. 11-13, HOO; Groves, Now

It Can Be Told, pp. 75-77; Ltr, Gavin Hadden

(Constr Div, OCE) to O'Brien, sub: Hist of Land

Acquisition, HEW, 30 Jul 45, and Incls, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 601 (Hanford), MDR; Ltr,

Robins (Act Chief of Engrs) to CG SOS, sub: Acquisition of Land for Gable Proj, Pasco, Wash., 8 Feb

43, and 2d Ind (directive approval), Patterson to

Chief of Engrs, 9 Feb 43, Incls to Memo, O'Brien to

Ashbridge, sub: Land Acquisition in Connection

With MD, 17 Apr 43, MDR. The term Gable, mentioned in the above directive, referred to one of the

most prominent topographical features of the Hanford site, Gable Mountain. On approval of the site

by Du Pont and the Metallurgical Laboratory see

Ltr, Roger Williams (TNX Div chief, Du Pont) to Lt

Col Franklin T. Matthias (Hanford Area Engr),

2 Feb 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 601.1 (Hanford), MDR, and Memo, Compton to Maj Arthur V.

Peterson (Chicago Area Engr), sub: Safe Distance at

Area 100, 1 Feb 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

600.12 (Projs and Prgms), MDR.
332 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

378,000 acres) was sagebrush range

land interspersed with volcanic outcroppings, where some eighteen

thousand to twenty thousand sheep

grazed during winter and spring.

Some 11 percent (almost 49,000

acres) was farmland, much of it irrigable but not all under cultivation. Less

than 1 percent (under 2,000 acres)

consisted of town plots, rights of way,

school sites, cemeteries, and similarly

used land, most of it in or near the

three small communities of Richland,

Hanford, and White Bluffs.32

More than one-third of the Hanford

area was government owned: federal

government, nearly 71,000 acres;

Washington State, over 45,000 acres;

and five local counties (Benton,

Yakima, Grant, Franklin, and Adams),

about 41,000 acres. Railroad companies (chiefly the Chicago, Milwaukee,

St. Paul and Pacific) owned almost

46,000 acres. More than 225,000

acres belonged to private individuals

or to corporate organizations, including over 6,000 acres owned by several

irrigation districts.

The overall plan called for division

of the site into five areas. The PD

Real Estate Branch chief designated

areas A, B, C, D, and E in accordance

with their anticipated use and in relation to how they would be acquired.33

 Area A, a tract averaging

about 14 miles in diameter at the

center of the site, would be the location of the main production facilities

and would be purchased outright because, for safety and security, all persons not involved in plant operations

would eventually have to be cleared

from the area. Area B, a safety belt

averaging 4 miles in width, surrounded Area A and would be leased, with

any owners who remained on it subject to eviction on short notice. Area

C, two narrowly connected parcels in

the southeast corner of the site constituting a protective zone for Richland, the operating village, and for

the nearby support installations for

the plutonium production plants in

Area D, would be leased or purchased

as necessary. Most of Area D, lying

immediately west of the Columbia

River and adjacent to the village site,

would be purchased. Finally Area E,

two small appendages athwart the

river at the northwest corner of the

site and comprised principally of

lands in an irrigation district, would

be acquired only to the extent necessary for project security and

operations.

In one very important respect the

Hanford acquisition program differed

from those at Clinton and Los

32

 Statistics in this paragraph and the one that follows on the classification and utilization of land

making up the Hanford site have been drawn from

MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 4, pp. 2.4-2.8, 3.1-3.3, Apps. A

and C, DASA. The figures cited appear to be based

upon a thorough analysis of the various sources relating to real estate acquisition, including Corps of

Engineers maps, the real estate directives, and a

summary of land acquisition issued in December

1946. Other sources consulted, most of them based

on data collected while the acquisition program was

in progress, reveal considerable discrepancy in the

statistics given for ownership and utilization of the

Hanford area in 1943 as compared with the data

given in the MDH. See, for example, OCE, Basic

Data on HEW, Pasco, Wash., 19 May 43, pp. 1-9,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 601.1 (Hanford), MDR.

33

 Analysis of the plan based on Ltr, Robins to

CG SOS, sub: Acquisition of Land for Gable Proj,

Pasco, Wash., 8 Feb 43, Incl to Memo, O'Brien to

Ashbridge, 17 Apr 43, MDR; Groves, Now It Can Be

Told, pp. 75-76; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 4, p. 2.2 and

App. A (maps), DASA; Memo, Norman G. Fuller

(Act HEW Real Estate Proj Mgr) to Landowners in

Hanford Engr Proj, 23 May 43, copy in ibid., App.

C11, DASA; Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, pp. 11-

12, HOO.
LAND ACQUISITION 333

Alamos. Except for procurement of

certain key tracts required for preliminary construction activities, the PD

Real Estate Branch had considerably

more time in which to acquire the

site. In February 1943, research,

design, and procurement activities for

the plutonium production facilities

barely had begun, and both the Army

and Du Pont considered large-scale

construction before summertime

highly unlikely. This meant that clearing construction areas would not have

to begin for a period of nearly six

months. Project officials therefore decided to follow an acquisition procedure that they hoped might help limit

the inevitable rise of local opposition.

Branch attorneys delayed issuance of

the usual declarations of taking, while

HEW Land Acquisition Office negotiators endeavored to secure as many

tracts as possible by direct purchase,

the procedures for which had been

made easier in January as a result of

changes in the regulations authorizing

higher initial payments to landowners.

Both Justice Department attorneys assigned to the acquisition project and

HEW officials were hopeful that the

direct purchase procedure would

result in more settlements out of

court. They were also hopeful that,

because direct purchase would allow

farmers more time to harvest mature

crops, it would counter the public

criticism bound to arise from the apparent adverse effects of acquisition

on the current national program for

production of more "food for

victory".

 34

By early March, the HEW Land Acquisition Office was ready to commence with site acquisition. In cooperation with the PD Real Estate

Branch and the Hanford area engineer, Lt. Col. Franklin T. Matthias,

the office hired a large staff of appraisers and negotiators from nearby

states, many previously employed by

the Federal Land Bank at Spokane,

and in April opened a branch office at

Richland to ensure closer liaison with

the area engineer's staff and Du Pont

officials. Matthias kept a careful eye

on the office's activities, keeping in

close touch through the PD Real

Estate Branch liaison officer in his

headquarters. He worked zealously

for more efficient management of the

acquisition process, adherence to

proper procedures in transfer of land

to the area office before occupancy by

Du Pont personnel, and just treatment for the landowners. Whenever

practicable, he approved the requests

from those individual farmers who

had to vacate but who wanted to

remain on their farms past the imposed deadlines so that they could

harvest the matured crops.

The HEW Land Acquisition Office

acquired the first tract on 10 March

1943. During the spring and summer,

acquisition and vacating of specified

areas progressed reasonably well, although in early July the area engineer

had to arrange for court eviction of

seven holdout landowners whose continued presence in Area A threatened

project security and obstructed land

needed immediately by Du Pont. In

early August, General Groves, Colonel Matthias, and CE Real Estate

Branch officials met with representatives of the Justice Department and,

34

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 4, pp. 4.2 and 5.1, DASA;

Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 76-77; Matthias

Diary, 12 Mar 43, OROO.
334 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

seeking to avoid prolonged litigations, agreed upon certain changes in

acquisition plans, including a revision

in procedures for procuring lands

held by irrigation districts.35

But the early progress was deceptive, and the holdout and irrigation

district litigation problems were

straws in the wind of rising opposition. After two of the irrigation districts had initiated legal steps to

secure compensation for their bonded

indebtedness, they became rallying

points for other dissatisfied elements.

United in a common cause, the protesters joined together to complain

that the government's real estate

valuations were much too low and its

advance allowances to owners

inadequate.36

The crucial point of disagreement

between the Hanford farmers and

project appraisers was the question of

how much compensation the landowners should receive for the crops

(cherries, apples, pears, peaches, and

other kinds of fruits, as well as asparagus, mint, and alfalfa) on their land

at the time of acquisition. Many

owners contended that if they were

not to be permitted to stay on their

land until crops could be harvested,

they should be compensated for

them, as well as for the land itself.

Because the growing season for 1943

proved to be one of the most bountiful on record, the farmers' claims

were greatly strengthened. By late

spring, no longer able to ignore the

crop question, the PD Real Estate

Branch agreed to a proposal made by

Justice Department attorneys that all

tracts not yet acquired be reappraised

to include crop values at the date of

their taking.37

Project security and construction

requirements made necessary the

clearing of many of the farms before

their crops could be harvested. Furthermore, on all the farms eventually

taken over by the project, the Hanford area engineer had to provide for

continued maintenance of the orchards and the preservation of the irrigation systems. For this purpose

Matthias was able to work out arrangements for bringing prisoners

from the McNeil Island Penitentiary, a

federal institution located near

Tacoma, to serve as a semipermanent

agricultural work force. While this

saved many crops, it did not fully placate the landowners' frustration, primarily because the government

agency supervising the prisoners, the

Federal Prison Industries, had no

means to pay the owners the additional compensation many hoped to

receive as a result of the exceptional

abundance of the harvest.38

35

 Memos, Matthias to Groves, sub: Crop Control

and Disposal, HEW, 21 Aug 43, and O'Brien to

Groves, sub: Revision of Boundaries of Area A,

3 Aug 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 601.1 (Hanford), MDR; Matthias Diary, 5 Jul and 7 Aug 43,

OROO. 36

 Memo, Hadden to Groves, sub: Rpt on Trip to

HEW (21 Nov-4 Dec 44), 4 Dec 44, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 601.1 (Hanford), MDR. This memo,

with its accompanying inclosures, constituted a detailed report on the history and status of the program. MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 4, pp. 4.1-4.2, DASA. Resolution of John Lindblad Post No. 71, American

Legion, White Bluffs, Wash., 21 Apr 43, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 601.1 (Hanford), MDR. Copies

of this resolution, which was typical of the form that

protests against the acquisition took, were sent to all

members of the Washington State delegation in

Congress and to the national headquarters of the

American Legion.

37

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 76-77; MDH,

Bk. 4, Vol. 4, pp. 4.20-4.21, DASA. 38

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 76-77; MDH,

Bk. 4, Vol. 4, pp. 4.2, 4.13, and 4.20-4.21, DASA; Continued
LAND ACQUISITION 335

Adding to the discontent were

rumors that the War Department was

using the right of eminent domain for

the special benefit of Du Pont and

was circulating information that cast

doubt on the value of farmlands in

the area. News of controversy over

the Hanford acquisition program

reached Washington just at the time

the administration was greatly concerned about the likelihood of severe

food shortages in the country. In response to an inquiry from the President, the War Department replied

that the Army was doing everything

possible to protect agricultural interests at Hanford and anticipated salvaging more than three quarters of

the crops.39

The Military Policy Committee,

meeting on 30 March, discussed the

President's concern over the possible

adverse effects of the Hanford acquisition on the administration's food

production campaign and decided to

address the issue. Acting on behalf of

the committee, OSRD Director Vannevar Bush shortly thereafter communicated with Roosevelt "as to the

need for so much land, the need for

taking the town site in Richland and

the effect on agriculture."

 40

 Bush did

not succeed in ending the President's

disquietude, and when the matter

came up again at a Cabinet meeting

on 17 June, Roosevelt raised the

question as to whether the leaders of

the atomic bomb project might not

consider moving the plutonium production installation to another site.

The President's query was just that,

and not a directive. Political considerations may have been the pressing

motivation. At the time, the Truman

Committee,41 alerted by letters from

Hanford area residents, was making

inquiries to the War Department concerning the government's acquisition

of so much agricultural land, and congressmen from Washington State

were channeling the complaints they

had received on the matter to both

the War and Justice Departments.

Faced with having to answer to the

President, Stimson looked to the

Manhattan commander for an explanation of the Hanford situation. Late

in the afternoon of the seventeenth,

General Groves explained to the Secretary that representatives of Du Pont

and Manhattan, including himself,

had weighed most carefully the factors favoring selection of Hanford

and concluded that it was the only

place in the United States "where the

Matthias Diary, 30 Mar, 10 Jun, 7 Jul, 17 and 22

Aug, 3 Sep 43, OROO; Memo, Matthias to Groves,

sub: Crop Control and Disposal, HEW, 21 Aug 43,

MDR; Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 4, pp. 1348-49,

HOO. 39

 Memo, Matthias to Groves, sub: Public Mtg in

Which Du Pont Participated, 23 Apr 43, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 600.1 (Constr-Hanford), MDR;

MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 4, pp. 4.23-4.24, DASA; Matthias

Diary, 16 Mar and 27-28 Apr 43, OROO; Memo,

Reybold to Maj Gen Edwin M. Watson (Mil Aide to

Roosevelt), sub: Gable Proj, and Incl (draft of letter

for President's reply to letter from A. S. Goss, chairman of The National Grange), 8 Apr 43, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 601.1 (Hanford), MDR; Groves

Ms, pp. 175-76, CMH; Bureau of the Budget, The

United States at War: Development and Administration of

the War Program of the Federal Government (Washington, D.C.: Committee of Records of War Administration No. 1, War Records Section, Bureau of the

Budget, 1946), pp. 324-26 and 365.

40

 MPC Min, 30 Mar 43, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 23, Tab A, MDR. 41

 The Truman Committee was a special committee of the U.S. Senate, formed in 1943 at the instigation of Democratic Senator Harry S. Truman of

Missouri to investigate the conduct of the national

defense program. The committee continued its

hearings until June 1948 under the successive chairmanship of Senators Truman, James M. Mead, and

Owen Brewster.
336 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

work could be done so well." Reassured, Stimson called the President

and "satisfied his anxiety."

 42

Stimson's assurance to the President by no means ended the threat of

interference in the project by other

interested agencies, especially Congress and the Department of Justice.

When Representative Hal Holmes,

the Republican congressman in whose

district the site was located, had requested information from the War

Department about the project, Groves

directed Colonel Matthias to supply

the congressman with data sufficient

to answer questions from his constituents. After conferring with Matthias,

Holmes agreed to cooperate fully

with the acquisition program, although he emphasized that he did not

wish the impression to be given to

local landowners that he favored location of the project at Hanford. While

he frequently interceded thereafter

with Matthias and the War Department on behalf of his constituents in

the Hanford area, Holmes abided by

his pledge of cooperation with

Manhattan.43

Washington's junior senator, Mon

C. Wallgren, a Democrat, proved to

be more of a problem. In April 1943,

he forwarded to the Department of

Justice correspondence that he had

received from an attorney representing a group of dissatisfied Hanford

landowners. This correspondence, as

Wallgren undoubtedly knew it would,

came to the attention of Norman M.

Littell, assistant attorney general in

charge of the Lands Division, the section of the Justice Department responsible for prosecution of all court

cases arising from War Department

condemnation procedures in land acquisition projects. Littell, who had

practiced law in Seattle before his appointment to the Justice Department

in 1940, was currently interested in

promoting enactment of a bill he had

drafted "that would provide for

speedy and summary notice in proceedings to condemn property for

war purposes, and to accelerate distribution of deposits and awards to persons entitled thereto in such

cases. . . ."

 44

Littell used the opportunity to promote support among members of the

Washington State congressional delegation for his bill, which Harry F.

Byrd of Virginia had introduced into

the Senate on 7 April. On the twentysixth, he sent a long letter to all

members of the delegation, giving extensive details about the Hanford acquisition and expressing skepticism

that the War Department could keep

the project secret in view of the

public character of condemnation

proceedings. Littell also enclosed a

copy of his bill, outlining reasons why

it should be enacted. The Military

Policy Committee considered the se42

 Stimson Diary (source of quotation), 17 Jun 43,

HLS; Groves Diary, 17 Jun 43, LRG; Ltr, Hugh

Fulton (Truman Committee chief counsel) to Julius

M. Amberg (Spec Asst to Secy War), 15 Jun 43, in

Senate Committee Investigating Natl Def Prgm, Ord

Plants Recs, Ord Establishment, Hanford Ord

Plants, USS. 43

 Matthias Diary, 5 and 8-9 Mar, 21 Apr, 3-4 Aug

43, OROO.

44

 Quotation from title of 5. 975, Congressional

Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 Apr 43, Vol. 89,

Pt. 3, p. 3029. For details on Littell's pre-1940 activities see the biographical sketch in Who's Who in

America, 1946-47, Vol. 24, pp. 1416-17, and Memo,

MD Intel and Scty Div to OIC, sub: Littell's Request

for Delay in Setting Hanford Condemnation Cases

To Permit Reappraisal, 10 Nov 44, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 601.1 (Hanford), MDR. This memo

was, in fact, the intelligence report Lansdale submitted to Groves.
LAND ACQUISITION 337

curity aspects of Littell's letter but acceded to a request from General

Styer, who undoubtedly was expressing Groves's wishes, "that in view of

the general situation no action be

taken on the matter."

 45

A short time later the Truman

Committee, of which Wallgren was a

member, exhibited an interest in the

Hanford acquisition, which Littell well

may have encouraged. In early June,

the committee sent inquiries to the

president of Du Pont and to Julius M.

Amberg, special assistant to the Secretary of War. Amberg was asked to

supply the committee with data on

"the factors governing the choice of

this location, the estimated cost of the

project, the status of construction at

present, and [with] suitable comment

with respect to the need for such an

extensive tract of farm land."

 46

 Responding to these inquiries, General

Groves, Harvey Bundy, Stimson's assistant, and Brig. Gen. Wilton B. Persons, the War Department's congressional liaison officer, reached agreement that the Secretary of War

should request Senator Truman to

eliminate Hanford from his investigation for reasons of military security.

Truman heard from Stimson on the

seventeenth and, with the understanding that the Secretary would assume

full responsibility for project activities, agreed to stop further

investigation.47

In preparation for the condemnation trials scheduled for early fall,

Colonel Matthias arranged a meeting

with Judge Schwellenbach and Justice

Department officials on 27 August in

Spokane. Participants included, besides the area engineer and Schwellenbach, representatives of the CE

Real Estate Branch and Department

of Justice lawyers assigned to prosecute the cases. The group discussed

a number of problems, including the

possibility of arranging for partial

payments to landowners and giving

the Justice Department attorneys

more authority to increase appraised

values in pretrial conferences. Apparently no firm agreement was reached

on either of these matters, but Matthias found the meeting with Judge

Schwellenbach worthwhile, "as it

cleared up a number of misunderstandings concerning the Judge's philosophy and the decisions which he

had been making in connection with

the project." Following the meeting,

the HEW Land Acquisition Office

also sought permission from authorities in Washington, D.C., to increase

allowances for a large number of

tracts still in litigation.48

In October, the first condemnation

trial by jury began at Yakima, and additional cases followed at regular intervals through the winter season,

until early March 1944. Complying

with the regular court procedure in

Washington State, the selected jury

for each case visited the Hanford site 45

 Ltrs, Littell to Wallgren and to Holmes, both

26 Apr 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 601.1 (Hanford), MDR; MPC Min (source of quotation), 5 May

43, MDR. 46

 Ltr, Fulton to Amberg, 15 Jun 43, USS. 47

 Ltr, Rudolph Halley (Fulton's Ex Asst) to

Walter S. Carpenter, Jr. (Du Pont president), 8 Jun

43; Outline of [Proposed] Telecon with Sen

Truman, 11 Jun 43; Memo, Bundy to Secy War,

11 Jun 43, and attached note bearing initials ECH

(Miss Neary), 17 Jun 43. All in HB Files, Fldr 62,

MDR. See also Ltrs, Carpenter to Halley, 14 Jun 43,

and Amberg to Halley, 24 Jun 43, USS; Groves

Diary, 11 Jun 43, LRG; Stimson Diary, 17 Jun 43,

HLS. 48

 Matthias Diary, 27 (source of quotation) and

31 Aug 43, OROO.
338 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

to inspect the particular tract(s) under

adjudication before the trial proceeding. The trial results indicate that the

juries found the landowners' claims to

be just and that they consistently

awarded payments greatly in excess of

project appraisals. An official observer for the project attributed the

higher payments to a general rise in

land values in the months since the

appraisals had been made, to the prevailing local prejudice against Federal

Land Bank appraisers, and to the

widely held belief that the project

had no connection with the war

emergency.49

While the Army opposed excessive

payments to the owners, of greater

concern was the slow progress of land

acquisition during the trials. Settlements on more than 1,200 tracts averaged no more than seven cases per

month. If this slow pace continued,

Groves feared the essential secrecy of

the project would be jeopardized, because of jury inspections in areas

where construction was beginning

and the inevitable public attention focused on the trials. As a way of

speeding up the process, he arranged

with the Justice Department for the

assignment of more judges and requested an end to jury inspections.50

On 24 April 1944, General Groves,

Colonel Matthias, and CE Real Estate

Branch officials conferred with Assistant Attorney General Littell in a

meeting at Yakima, arranged by Army

Service Forces commander, Lt. Gen.

Brehon B. Somervell, at Groves's instigation. They agreed that the Justice

Department special attorney and the

HEW Land Acquisition Office manager together could make adjustments

in the appraised value of tracts to facilitate settlement of cases out of

court. They also detailed the special

attorney and the manager to work out

means for closer coordination between the project real estate office

and Justice Department officials in

Yakima. Finally, Littell assented to establishment of a second court and additional judges.51

Under Secretary of War Patterson

made the formal request for additional judges to Attorney General Francis

Biddle, who agreed to the plan as

worked out by Littell and Groves. Patterson pointed out to Biddle that

soon, because of security requirements, the Army could no longer

permit jury inspections of tracts. In

late May, Littell informed Patterson

that he had arranged for extra judges

and, provided the Under Secretary

could expedite the securing of parts

needed for the Yakima courtroom air

conditioning system, that the trials

would continue through June and

July.52

In spite of these efforts to speed up 49 the acquisition process, the results Memo, Matthias to OCE (Attn: Groves), sub:

Real Estate Appraisals, 18 Oct 43; Rpt, sub: Results

of Trials—HEW (no date and, although no signature, appears to have been prepared by the HEW

Land Acquisition Office at Prosser for the Office of

the Division Engineer, Seattle, Wash.). Both in

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 601.1 (Hanford), MDR.

Matthias Diary, 1 Nov 43, OROO. 50

 Memo, Groves to Reybold and to CG ASF, sub:

HEW, 23 Mar 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 601.1

(Hanford), MDR.

51

 Ibid. Colonel O'Brien, chief of the CE Real

Estate Branch, refers to the memorandums of understanding in a letter to Littell, 13 May 44, same

files. Matthias Diary, 24 Apr 44, OROO. 52

 Ltrs, Und Secy War to Biddle, 2 May 44, and

Biddle to Und Secy War, 10 May 44, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 601.1 (Hanford), MDR; Telg, Littell

to Und Secy War, 24 May 44, HB Files, Fldr 80,

MDR; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 4, p. 4.4, DASA.
LAND ACQUISITION 339

were disappointing. Toward the end

of the summer Littell seems to have

decided that faulty War Department

appraisal work was at the root of the

acquisition difficulties at Hanford.

Consequently, he directed an experienced appraiser on his own staff to

make a sample reappraisal of some of

the more than 700 tracts remaining

unsettled. According to Littell, the

appraiser found many cases of "inadequate and faulty appraisal work."

 53

After a conference with Patterson

on 1 September, Littell took another

step, apparently on his own initiative,

to expedite the condemnation trials.

He appointed C. U. Landrum as a

special assistant to the U.S. attorney

to conduct those cases coming up for

trial in September. Littell described

Landrum as "one of the outstanding

trial lawyers of the country . . . ,"

but, at the same time, emphasized

that Landrum's assignment was not to

be interpreted as an indication that

the previously assigned special attorney had not done a good job in the

earlier cases. Verdicts in the September trials, however, were even less

satisfactory than those handed down

in the preceding cases. Juries awarded

payments to landowners that constituted an even greater percentage of

increase over original government appraisals than those previously granted. In some instances, the payments

were higher than the largest amounts

demanded by attorneys for the

owners.54

At this juncture, Littell wrote directly to Patterson, outlining the unfavorable trend in the recent trials.

"It has been clear for some time that

either the appraisals of the War Department were too low or the jury

verdicts on the trial of condemnation

cases were too high. . . . I am having

a further and more extensive recheck

[made] of valuations in this project

and will be guided by the outcome of

this work in the disposal of future

cases in the Hanford Project." In

reply, General Groves and CE Real

Estate Branch officials prepared a defense of the Army's role in the acquisition at Hanford for the attention of

Attorney General Biddle; however,

before it was dispatched, Littell took

direct action.55

On 13 October, in Washington to

participate in the Democratic campaign for the 1944 presidential election, Littell suddenly appeared before

the district court in Yakima and made

a request to Judge Schwellenbach that

no more condemnation cases be

brought to trial until the Justice Department had an opportunity to reappraise all tracts upon which suits were

pending. Although Groves had been

alerted to the fact that Littell was

making a trip to the Hanford area, his

appearance before the court came as

a complete surprise to project officials

53

 Ltr (source of quotation), Littell to Und Secy

War, 28 Sep 44; Draft Memo, Groves to Und Secy

War, sub: HEW, 13 Oct 44. Both in Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 601.1 (Hanford), MDR; MDH, Bk. 4,

Vol. 4, pp. 4.14, 5.2, App. B1, DASA; Matthias

Diary, 24 Nov 44, OROO.

54

 Ltr (source of quotation), Littell to Und Secy

War, 28 Sep 44, MDR; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 4, pp. 4.4-

4.5, DASA. 55

 Ltr (source of quotation), Littell to Und Secy

War, 28 Sep 44, MDR; Draft Memo, Groves to Und

Secy War, sub: HEW, 13 Oct 44, and attached Draft

Ltr, Und Secy War to Atty Gen, MDR (memo and

letter never dispatched); Groves Diary, 11-13 Oct

44, LRG.
340 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

and Schwellenbach, none of whom

had been notified of his intentions.

Littell reviewed the history of the

land acquisition at Hanford, criticizing the War Department for the

piecemeal fashion in which it had

taken possession of many of the

tracts. This practice, he asserted,

caused confusion and resentment

among the owners so that an unusually large proportion of the cases had

to be brought to trial for settlement.

He reiterated that the major cause of

difficulty was the inadequate appraisal

work by the Corps of Engineers, a

fact uncovered by his own appraisal

expert during an investigation. He

promised Judge Schwellenbach that

he would expedite reappraisals and

settlements at once, optimistically

predicting that a majority of cases

would be ready for final settlement

within a month. Schwellenbach stated

that he had not anticipated Littell's

motion but would take it under

advisement.56

Littell's remarks before the district

court received wide publicity in area

newspapers, which played up the obvious political overtones of his statement. The local press also published

a considerable number of editorials

and letters from readers, as well as

additional reports on the condemnation cases, during the latter part of

October and early November, and a

major news service picked up at least

one story.57

Groves, who was not informed of

Littell's court appearance until 16 October, saw the action as "obviously incompatible with essential military security, the need for which had been

carefully explained to him [Littell].

His statement to the court has resulted in a considerable amount of undesirable publicity concerning a project

which the President has personally directed should be blanketed with the

utmost secrecy." A further unfortunate aspect of the incident, Groves

noted, was that it gave the public the

false impression that the War and Justice Departments were at odds on

land acquisition policies, when, in reality, any differences that arose could

be quickly settled by conference, as

had been done at Yakima for the

Hanford project in April 1944.58

Groves, now determined to take decisive action, worked closely with CE

Real Estate Branch officials and Julius

Amberg in preparing a new statement

of the War Department's position,

which Under Secretary of War Patterson sent to Attorney General Biddle

56

 Memo, MD Intel and Scty Div to OIC, sub: Littell's Request for Delay in Setting Hanford Condemnation Cases To Permit Reappraisal, 10 Nov 44,

MDR. Newspaper stories reporting Littell's statement to the court were published in two Spokane

dailies on 14 Oct 44: the Spokesman-Review and the

Daily Chronicle. Copies in Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

601.1 (Hanford), MDR. See also MDH, Bk. 4.

Vol. 4, pp. 4.14-4.15, DASA; Matthias Diary, 14

Oct 44, OROO; Groves Diary, 11 Oct 44, LRG.

57

 Memo, MD Intel and Scty Div to OIC, sub: Littell's Request for Delay in Setting Hanford Condemnation Cases To Permit Reappraisal, 10 Nov 44,

MDR; Msgs, Matthias to Dist Engr, Attn: Lt Col

William B. Parsons (Intel and Scty Div chief),

20 and 24 Oct 44; Msgs, Matthias to Wash Liaison

Office and Dist Engr, Attn: Lansdale and Parsons,

1-3 Nov 44; Memo, Maj Claude C. Pierce, Jr. (Wash

Liaison Office) to Groves, sub: Editorial in Spoksman's [sic] Review, 2 Nov 44. All in Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 601.1 (Hanford), MDR. This file also contains copies of many of the stories appearing in the

local press. 58

 Ltr (source of quotation), Und Secy War to

Atty Gen (prepared for Patterson's signature by

Groves and the CE Real Estate Br), 7 Nov 44,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 601.1 (Hanford), MDR;

Groves Diary, 16 Oct 44, LRG.
LAND ACQUISITION 341

on 7 November. This statement emphasized Littell's utter disregard of

essential security and the one-sided

character of much of his criticism of

appraisal policies. It pointed out further that the War Department consistently had tried to cooperate with the

Department of Justice and therefore

could see no justification for Littell's

"public airing of alleged differences

between the Departments in contravention of expressed executive

policy." At the same time, Groves

launched a thoroughgoing investigation of the Littell incident and its

aftermath of publicity. He sent his

staff security officer, Lt. Col. John

Lansdale, Jr., to the Hanford area to

survey the situation. Lansdale submitted a comprehensive intelligence

report to Groves on 10 November

and took measures to curb newspaper

publicity, particularly by Justice Department special attorneys.59

On 21 November, Groves dispatched a special three-man investigation team to Hanford. Heading the

team was Gavin Hadden, a long-time

civil employee in the Engineers' Construction Division whom Groves had

used on previous occasions as a troubleshooter. The team's instructions

were to secure "a firsthand knowledge of conditions which influenced

the problems of acquisition of Real

Estate at ... [the Hanford site] from

February 1943 to date."

 60

 Yet before

Hadden could submit a preliminary

report, developments in the Justice

Department contributed substantially

to resolving the acquisition problems

at Hanford. A feud of long-standing

between Biddle and Littell over administration of the Lands Division

had culminated on the eighteenth

with the Attorney General's formal

request that Littell resign. Instead of

resigning promptly, however, Littell

procrastinated and took advantage of

his delay to submit to the Mead (formerly Truman) Committee a list of

grievances against Biddle, expressly

charging maladministration of certain

land cases. Finally, when Littell ignored a second request for his resignation on the twenty-second, the

Attorney General solicited the direct

assistance of President Roosevelt to

remove Littell from office, which occurred on the twenty-sixth. At the

same time, Biddle dissuaded the

Mead Committee from taking further

interest in the controversy. Littell

thus was prevented from making political capital out of his charge that he

had been dismissed for testifying

before the Senate committee, and further congressional inquiries into War

Department land policies, which undoubtedly would have exposed the

59

 Ltr (source of quotation), Und Secy War to

Atty Gen, 7 Nov 44, and covering Memo, Groves to

Und Secy War, 2 Nov 44. Both in Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 601.1 (Hanford), MDR. Copies of the

letter are also in HB Files, Fldrs 51 and 80, MDR.

Memo, Patterson to Roosevelt, 9 Dec 44, HB Files,

Fldr 51, MDR, indicates that a copy of the 7 Nov 44

letter was sent to the President on that date. Memo,

Amberg to Und Secy War, sub: Condemnation Proceedings With Respect to HEW Land, 7 Oct 44, HB

Files, Fldr 51, MDR. Groves Diary, 16, 19, 23 Oct

and 3, 4, 6 Nov 44, LRG. Msg, Matthias to Wash Liaison Office and Dist Engr, 1 Nov 44; Background

Paper (no title or signature, but probably written in

Groves's office as preparation for the 7 Nov 44

letter to Atty Gen Biddle), 3 Nov 44; Memo, MD

Intel and Scty Div, Littell's Request for Delay in Setting Hanford Condemnation Cases To Permit Reappraisal, 10 Nov 44. All in Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

601.1 (Hanford), MDR.

60

 Memo, Hadden to Groves, sub: Rpt on Trip to

HEW, 4 Dec 44, MDR.
342 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Hanford project to widespread publicity, were avoided.61

With the departure of Littell there

was a rapid return to normal relations

between the War Department and Department of Justice in the land acquisition program at Hanford. The security problem posed by the legal right

of juries to inspect properties in litigation was resolved in negotiations

between Judge Schwellenbach and

Colonel Matthias in March 1945.

Henceforth, juries would be denied

the right to inspect tracts subject to

acquisition, because visits to the

project site would be personally

hazardous.62

By spring of 1945, settlement of

those cases where outright purchase

of land was necessary again attained

an average rate of more than one

hundred each month and continued

at this pace until the end of the war

in Europe in May brought a general

slowing down of all acquisition activities. The land acquisition program at

Hanford remained uncompleted at

the end of December 1946, when the

Army transferred control of the Manhattan Project to the newly created civilian agency, the United States

Atomic Energy Commission. Total

cost of real estate secured at Hanford

by direct purchase and condemnation

procedures up to that time had

amounted to more than $5 million.63

Other Sites

Land acquisition was not a major

activity at the many other sites occupied by Manhattan Project facilities.

In most cases where acquisition was

necessary, the Army usually was not

as directly involved as at the Clinton,

Hanford, and Los Alamos sites, although on occasion the local area engineer or the CE Real Estate Branch

provided key assistance to project

contractors seeking more land for

their operations. Generally speaking,

the major research and development

programs located at universities employed existing facilities and expanded them on land already available on

the campus or in nearby areas. This

was true of most of the University of

Chicago facilities for the Metallurgical

Laboratory, although, for reasons of

safety and security, the Army assisted

the university in acquiring use of a

small site in the forest preserve southwest of the city for the Argonne Laboratory. The University of California,

61

 The main developments in the Littell-Biddle

controversy may be traced in the following documents: Memo, Littell to Charles Fahy (Act Atty

Gen), 21 Aug 44; Ltr, Fahy (U.S. Solicitor Gen) to

Mead, 1 Jan 45; Ltr, Littell to Rudolph Halley

(Mead Committee chief counsel), 21 Nov 44 (which

contains Littell's statement to the Yakima District

Court concerning Hanford land cases); Memo, Littell to Mead Committee, sub: Issues Between Biddle

and Littell . . . , 27 Nov 44; Ltr, Biddle to Mead,

27 Nov 44; Ltr, Littell to Mead, 30 Nov 44; Press

Release, Mead Committee, 29 Nov 44; Atty Gen's

Statement to Senate Committee on Immigration,

9 Dec 44 (in which Biddle further defended his dismissal of Littell); Memo, Sen Harley M. Kilgore

(Mead Committee member), 4 Dec 44; Ltr, Littell to

Mead Committee, sub: Answering Biddle's 9 Dec 44

Statement Re Reasons for Requesting Writer's Resignation as Asst Atty Gen, 8 Jan 45; Mead's Statement to U.S. Senate, 6 Dec 44. All in Senate Committee Investigating the Natl Def Prgm, Minor Investigations, Subject File, Norman Littell Controversy, USS. See also New York Times, 30 Nov 44;

Spokesman-Review, 1 Dec 44; Groves Diary, 23 Nov

44, LRG. 62

 Matthias Diary, 16 Mar 45, OROO.

63

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 4, pp. 5.2-5.4, 6.1-6.4, 7.1-

7.2, Apps. B1-B2, DASA. Cost figures are based on

Military Acquisition Reports, CR Form 5 and ENG

Form 1010, 28 Feb 43 to 15 Dec 46, and on Land

Acquisition Summary as of 31 Dec 46, cited in ibid.,

Apps. E10-E11, DASA.
LAND ACQUISITION 343

operating under an OSRD contract,

had acquired an 8.3-acre tract 2 miles

north of the Berkeley campus as the

site of most Radiation Laboratory activities. Other research centers, such

as the SAM Laboratories at Columbia

University and the Ames project at

Iowa State College, used existing facilities and leased needed additional

space adjacent to their campuses. For

the three heavy water plants built in

the United States at the Morgantown,

Wabash River, and Alabama Ordnance Works, the Army's Ordnance

Department made available land already previously acquired for munitions facilities. In the case of the Trail

heavy water plant in Canada, the War

Department leased an area of less

than an acre from the operating contractor. Similarly, at the many other

places where the atomic bomb program sponsored activities of some

type, the project or its contractors acquired use of whatever land and facilities were necessary to their

operations.64

For the more than 500,000 acres of

land that the Manhattan Project purchased, leased, rented, or otherwise

acquired during World War II, it paid

out a sum of about $7.5 million.

There were no major instances where

failure to acquire land seriously delayed progress of the bomb project,

primarily because of the vigorous and

alert administrative actions on the

part of General Groves and a great

many Manhattan District and Corps

of Engineers real estate staff members

and, when needed, the strong support

from Secretary Stimson and other key

War Department officials. Their coordinated and effective efforts directly

contributed to the Army's achievement of the essential goal of its land

program: rapid acquisition of needed

areas without compromising project

security.

64

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4, "Auxiliary Activities," pp.

11.3-11.5; Bk. 2, Vol. 2, "Research," pp. 2.1-2.5

and 11.1-11.2; Bk. 3, "The P-9 Project," pp. 3.3,

3.11, 3.13, 3.15; Bk. 4, Vol. 1, "General Features,"

p. 2.4 and App. B3; Bk. 4, Vol. 2, "Research," pp.

2.6 and 2.8; Bk. 5, Vol. 2 "Research," pp. 2.7-2.8,

DASA. See Ch. V (Argonne Lab and heavy water

plants); Ch. VI (Rad Lab); Ch. VII (SAM Labs); and

Ch. IX (Met Lab).
CHAPTER XVI

Manpower Procurement

The Manhattan Project in its manpower requirements and problems, as

in so many other respects, was unique

among wartime programs. Its work

force, for example, was notable for its

great diversity, running the gamut

from completely unskilled manual laborers to the most highly trained scientists and technicians from all parts

of the United States and from

Canada, Great Britain, and many

other countries. While the majority of

its employees were civilians, representatives from all the military services were assigned to it. And in terms

of total number of workers employed,

Manhattan was one of the single largest wartime enterprises.

Less than two years after the Army

took over active administration of the

project, Manhattan was employing

nearly 129,000 persons in its various

operations. This peak figure, reached

at the end of June 1944 when construction activity on the fissionable

materials production plants was at a

height, included contractor employment of 84,500 construction workers

and 40,500 operating employees. In

addition, there were slightly fewer

than 1,800 military personnel assigned to the project and an equal

number of civil service employees. Although construction activity gradually

declined after the summer of 1944,

total employment on the atomic

project would continue at more than

100,000 into the summer of 1945,

with military personnel reaching a

peak of about 5,600 in the fall of that

year.1

In recruiting and holding this vast

work force, especially during the

midwar period when competition for

manpower from other important wartime programs was intense, Manhattan had to contend with a number of

serious difficulties. Many of the skills

the atomic project required were in

chronic short supply; location of the

major production plants in relatively

remote areas with limited housing, inadequate transportation, and sparse

population compounded existing

manpower procurement obstacles;

and the increasingly stringent requirements of the Selective Service System

threatened to take away virtually irreplaceable technically trained workers

at the most critical juncture in project

operations. Even Manhattan's eventual attainment of the highest priority

among wartime programs recruiting

personnel with scarce skills did not

1

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, "Personnel," pp. 1.1-1.2

and Apps. A1, A1.1, A13 (Chart, Mil Personnel

Strength, MD, Jul 42-Dec 46), DASA.
MANPOWER PROCUREMENT 345

completely compensate for the many

problems.2

The Manhattan Project, as other

World War II employers, operated in

general compliance with existing

labor laws, regulations, and policies,

modified in certain instances to meet

the exigencies of wartime conditions.

Among those most affecting the program were the Davis-Bacon Act, the

Convict Labor Law, the Eight-Hour

Law, the Fair Labor Standards Act,

the National Labor Relations Act, the

Selective Training and Service Act,

the Building and Construction Trades

Wage Stabilization Agreement, and

the "Little Steel" Formula. There

were also the various modifications of

these basic statutes and regulations

embodied in executive orders and engineer directives. The single most important modifying factor in the

project's adherence to existing manpower laws and regulations was its requirement for the most rigid security

in all of its operations. Thus, for example, the Manhattan District placed

strict limitations on union activities,

established special grievance procedures in lieu of public hearings by the

National Labor Relations Board, and

provided its own internal administration of the Fair Labor Standards Act.3

Personnel Organization

Until mid-1942, Manhattan's manpower problems were limited primarily to recruiting scientific and technical

personnel. The National Research

Council, under its contract with the

National Defense Research Committee (NDRC), had established the

Office of Scientific Personnel in the

spring of 1941, primarily to assist

those wartime programs requiring scientifically trained persons. But as the

demand rapidly increased, more drastic measures were needed to ensure

an efficient and equitable employment of scientific manpower. Accordingly, Vannevar Bush, as head of the

Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), had appointed

the Committee on Scientific Personnel. This committee, which held its

first meeting in June 1942, not only

recommended measures for securing

scientific personnel but also actively

assisted OSRD contractors in such

matters as determining proper rates

of compensation for scientific employees, securing deferments from military service for them, and recruiting

additional scientists.4

The decision to proceed with construction of the production plants

brought a major change in the atomic

program's manpower requirements.

Henceforth, the emphasis became one

of fulfilling requirements for a complex industrial enterprise. Project recruiters now had to procure many

engineers and technicians, tens of

thousands of skilled and unskilled

2

 Ibid., pp. 1.1-1.2, DASA; Memo, Groves to Und

Sec War, sub: MD's Labor Problems, 1 Nov 43, HB

Files, Fldr 80, MDR; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp.

98-101; Ltr, Arthur L. Hughes (Personnel Dir, Los

Alamos Lab) to Samuel T. Arnold (MD Consultant

for Tech Personnel), 15 Jan 44, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 201 (Gen), MDR. The subject of the letter

concerned the effect of the changes in the Selective

Service regulations on the laboratory's scientific

staff. 3

 For an analysis of applicable statutes, regulations, and policies relating to manpower in World

War II see MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, App. B1, DASA. For

an example of a District modification of an existing

policy on grievance procedures see Ltr, Dist Engr to

All Operating Contractors, CEW, 27 Sep 44, copy

in ibid., App. B11, DASA. 4

 Stewart, Organizing Scientific Research for War, pp.

256-57.
346 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

workers from the ranks of American

labor, and the additional administrative personnel, both civilian and military, requisite to managing the farflung activities of this vast new army

of atomic employees.5

The Army continued the OSRD

practice of delegating most recruitment activities to project contractors.

Generally speaking, Manhattan recruited only the District headquarters

staff of specialists, whose primary role

in manpower procurement was to

assist project contractors and the

hundreds of firms that supplied essential equipment and services to the

project. The District personnel staff

devoted considerable time to such

measures as wage adjustments and

improvement of working conditions

that contributed to procurement and

maintenance of an adequate work

force. More often than not the District's role was to serve as the liaison

channel through which project contractors and suppliers could communicate with various governmental

agencies, with labor unions, and with

other wartime organizations that

could provide assistance in the solution of manpower problems.6

Under the original organization of

the district engineer's office, various

personnel activities were distributed

among several divisions. (See Chart 1.)

The Military Personnel Section, which

also carried on liaison with the Selective Service, constituted a part of the

District's Administrative Division. The

Labor Relations Section, which was

concerned mostly with wage and

salary schedules, formed part of the

Service and Control Division and operated in combination with the SafetyAccident Prevention Section. Other

departments administered routine

personnel matters. Personnel problems from area engineers in the field

were similarly distributed to the appropriate headquarters office for

disposition.7

Following the move of the Manhattan District headquarters from New

York to Oak Ridge in August 1943,

the district engineer took steps to

centralize the administration of many

functions, including those relating to

manpower. (See Chart 2.) He shifted

the Military Personnel Section, including its Selective Service functions,

from the Administrative to the Service

and Control Division. This left the

Administrative Division with supervision chiefly over civil service and

other civilian personnel of the District

and of the Clinton Engineer Works

(the District headquarters had absorbed most functions of the Clinton

Area Engineers Office when it moved

to Oak Ridge). Finally, in February

1944, the district engineer created a

separate Personnel Division, placing

in it all those manpower functions

hitherto carried out by the Service

and Control Division. To provide

more assistance to area engineers and

contractors as manpower problems

reached a peak, both the Selective

Service and the Labor Relations Sections of the new Personnel Division

opened field offices in New York,

5

 Smyth Report, p. 83; Memo, Bush to Conant,

sub: Tube Alloys Prgm, 19 Jun 42, HB Files, Fldr 6,

MDR. 6

 Marshall Diary, 19 and 27 Jun 42, OCG Files,

Gen Corresp, Groves Files, Misc Recs Sec, behind

Fldr 5, MDR; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 12-13;

DSM Chronology, 26 Sep 42, Sec. 15(b), OROO.

7

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, App. A2, DASA; Org Chart,

U.S. Engrs Office, MD, Aug 43, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 020 (MED-Org), MDR.
MANPOWER PROCUREMENT 347

Chicago, and Oak Ridge, and at

Pasco, Washington, near the Hanford

Engineer Works.8

Organizational arrangements at

field installations did not conform to

any set pattern. Each area engineer or

post commander set up the type of

organization required for the kind of

personnel needed to perform the

work in progress at his installation. At

the Hanford Engineer Works, for example, where manpower requirements resembled those at the Clinton

Engineer Works, the area engineer

established an organization similar to

that in Oak Ridge. A large labor relations section worked in close coordination with Du Pont and local labor

officials in the recruitment and employment of thousands of construction and production workers. A smaller personnel section dealt with problems relating to employees of the area

engineer's office.9

At the Los Alamos Laboratory and

the University of Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory, the work force consisted primarily of civilian scientists

and technicians employed under university contracts, a few civil service

employees, some military personnel,

and a varying number of workers

brought in by construction and service contractors. Because there were

no large production plants at either

site, labor relations with construction

and production workers constituted

only a minor administrative problem.

At Los Alamos, which the Army administered as a military post, the post

commander established a small civilian personnel section in his administrative office to deal with nonmilitary

manpower problems and to assist

J. Robert Oppenheimer, the civilian

project director, in recruiting scientists, technicians, and other specialists. At the Metallurgical Laboratory,

manpower problems were similar to

those at Los Alamos, except that

there were fewer military personnel.

The area engineer for the laboratory

designated the personnel staff in his

office as the Deferments Branch,

which was indicative of its primary

function.10

Neither the district engineer nor

the area engineers by themselves

could solve some of the most crucial

manpower problems. Procurement of

industrial workers with scarce skills,

recruitment of scientific and technical

specialists, and obtaining deferments

for key personnel were examples of

manpower problems so vitally related

to the entire war effort that they

could not be adequately dealt with

except through officials who controlled the nationwide recruitment

and employment of manpower. Consequently, General Groves made his

personal headquarters in Washington,

D.C., available as a liaison point

through which project personnel officials at District headquarters and in

the field installations could channel

manpower problems to appropriate

Washington officials or agencies.

More often than not, the Manhattan

commander himself would take the

initial steps.11

8

 Org Charts, U.S. Engrs Office, MD, Aug 43-Jan

45, MDR; MDH, Bk 1, Vol. 8, pp 1.4-1.5 and App.

A3, DASA. 9

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, "Construction," pp. 4.1-

4.26, 12.3-12.4, App. B57, DASA.

10

 Ibid., Vol. 2, "Research," pp. 7.1-7.3 and

Apps. B5 and B8, and Bk. 8, Vol. 1, "General,"

Apps. B2 and B3, DASA. 11

 For examples of Groves's frequent personal involvement in manpower procurement problems see Continued
348 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

General Groves was able to deal effectively with the problems of wartime

manpower without building up a complex organization in his own office

because he could secure assistance

whenever he needed it from manpower specialists in the Office of the

Under Secretary of War, the Army

Service Forces' (ASF) Industrial Personnel Division, and the Office of the

Chief of Engineers (OCE). Also, in

matters pertaining to military personnel, he could channel project requests

directly to Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, the ASF commander. Furthermore, through these various War Department channels Groves had ready

access to union leaders, manpower officials in federal agencies, and others

who controlled important elements of

the country's manpower pool.12

Manpower procurement activities of

the atomic project generally fell into

three major categories: the quest for

scientific and technical personnel, nationwide recruitment of industrial

labor, and securing military and civilian administrative personnel. Each

aspect of manpower procurement

presented its own special problems

and the Army administrators of the

project would devote a considerable

amount of time and energy to their

resolution.13

Scientific and Technical Personnel

Even though there was a decrease

in research and development activities

after mid-1942, the need for more scientists and technicians did not decline

proportionately. Because of the highly

technical and unusual character of the

laboratory-devised methods for producing fissionable materials, the firms

engaged in building the production

plants had to rely upon the project's

research organizations for the technological knowledge to design, engineer, test, and operate the plants. Not

only did these research organizations

have to solve many crucial technical

problems of plant construction and

operation, they also had to supply

from their own staffs on a more or

less permanent basis many of the experts who supervised the equipping

and operation of the plants.14

In addition to maintaining the staffs

of these existing research organizations at a reasonable level of efficiency during 1943, Manhattan recruiters

had to find scientists and technicians

to staff an entire new research and

development center operating under

a University of California contract,

the Los Alamos Laboratory in New

Mexico. At the peak of its activities in

1945, this installation required more

than seven hundred scientifically

trained persons on its staff. While

many of the division and group leaders came from the project's other research organizations, many of the

technicians and junior scientists and

correspondence in HB Files, Fldr 80, MDR, and Ltr,

Tolman to Groves, 26 Jul 43, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 231.2 (Physicists), MDR. 12

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 99-101; Ltr,

Marshall to Robins, 16 Nov 42, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 231.2, MDR. Typical examples of Groves's

employment of manpower specialists in the Under

Secretary of War's office to expedite solution of

personnel problems on the Manhattan Project may

be found in HB Files, Fldrs 51, 79, and 80, MDR. 13

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 2.1-2.2 and 7.1-7.2,

DASA.

14

 See Chs. VI-IX. See also Compton, Atomic

Quest, pp. 170-74 and 184-85.
MANPOWER PROCUREMENT 349

some of the most important senior

personnel were newly recruited.15

By 1943 junior scientists, typically

graduate students with little or no

practical experience, were about the

only available scientifically educated

manpower, and many of them were

subject to the draft. In fact, a large

number of the young scientists who

came to work for the project after

1943 were already in uniform or,

shortly after joining the atomic program, were called into service and assigned to the project's Special Engineer Detachment.16

During the OSRD's administration,

each research and development organization had recruited its personnel

with assistance and guidance from the

OSRD's Committee on Scientific Personnel. The Army continued essentially the same policy, with General

Groves and the project's Washington

Liaison Office replacing the Committee on Scientific Personnel as the

chief channel through which the directors of Manhattan's research organizations could obtain assistance in

difficult cases. The Manhattan commander, for example, often intervened directly with government or

academic manpower officials to

ensure an adequate staff for the new

Los Alamos Laboratory, or to aid

Manhattan contractors in obtaining

technical personnel. Because most

personnel in these categories already

were employed on other important

wartime projects, Groves frequently

had to seek assistance at the highest

levels to secure their transfer to the

Manhattan Project.17

One method that proved to be

most effective was a direct communication—usually a letter—from Groves

to the appropriate university administrator, corporation president, or government agency head, pointing out

the vital character of the atomic program and requesting the release or

loan of scientists to the Manhattan

Project. In other instances, Groves

enlisted the aid of OSRD Director

Vannevar Bush or Harvey Bundy,

special assistant to Secretary Stimson,

and, through Bundy, of the Secretary

himself. Stimson, for example, was instrumental in recruiting Norman F.

Ramsey, the radar specialist who

helped design the atomic bomb.18

15

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, "Technical (Project Y History)," App. Graph No. 2, DASA; Ltr, Groves to

Bush, 20 Apr 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 231.2

(Scientists), MDR; Memo, Maj Peer de Silva (Mil

Intel Br chief, Los Alamos Lab) to Groves, sub: Procurement of Scientific Personnel, 27 Sep 44, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Gen), MDR. 16

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, p. III.17, DASA. On procurement of scientists from other wartime projects

see MDR, HB Files, Fldr 24, correspondence relating to radar specialist Norman F. Ramsey, and Ltr,

Styer to W. M. Peirce (New Jersey Zinc Co., Palmerton, Pa.), probably Sep 43, MD, 1942-45, Somervell

Desk File, ASF.

17

 Ltr, Oppenheimer to Isidor I. Rabi (Rad Lab,

MIT), 26 Feb 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 161

(Univ of Calif), MDR. See also Groves's letters in

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 231.2 (Scientists), MDR. 18

 Numerous examples of the extensive correspondence by Groves and others on the procurement of scientists for the Manhattan staff are in

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 231.2 (Scientists), MDR.

On the recruiting of Ramsey see HB Files, Fldr 24,

MDR, for Memo, Edward L. Bowles (consultant to

Secy War) to Bundy, sub: Dr. Norman F. Ramsey,

12 Jun 43; Memo, Groves to Bundy, sub: Need for

Dr. Norman F. Ramsey, 5 Jul 43; Memos, Bundy to

Bowles, 7 Jul and 19 Aug 43; Memo, Bundy to Secy

War, 10 Sep 43; Memo for File, unsigned (probably

Bundy), 14 Sep 43. See MD, 1942-45, Somervell

Desk File, ASF, for Memos, Styer to Groves, 18 and

23 Sep 43. In the same file is General Styer's correspondence on the recruitment of scientists already

in military service. See Memo, Styer to Brig Gen

Joseph N. Dalton (Act Chief of Staff, Personnel,

SOS), 9 Feb 43; Memo, Groves to Styer, sub: Assignment of Capt O. H. Greager, CWS, to MD, Continued
350 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Groves also turned often to his

military and scientific advisers. Both

Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer and Rear

Adm. William R. Purnell of the Military Policy Committee assisted in securing scientists and technicians in

active military service. Richard C.

Tolman and James B. Conant were

instrumental in procuring a number

of key scientists for the Los Alamos

project. Tolman drew up for Groves a

comprehensive list of all atomic scientists in the United States and had

them rated by scientists already assigned to the atomic project as to

their ability, experience, qualities of

leadership, and availability. Conant

played an important part in persuading George B. Kistiakowsky, an explosives expert on the NDRC staff, to

leave this position for one at Los

Alamos and then in assisting him to

secure additional scientists for his implosion research team at the laboratory. Supplementing the efforts of

Tolman and Conant was Dean

Samuel T. Arnold of Brown University, a chemist by training, engaged

in 1943 as a consultant to recruit

technical personnel at educational

institutions.19

By late 1944, the Manhattan Project

was employing virtually all available

specially trained personnel. Hence,

the only solution to answering the

specific needs of the various project

installations was to transfer scientists

from one area to another area of the

atomic program. For example, when

Oppenheimer requested approximately fifty scientists holding a doctor of

philosophy degree in physics, or its

equivalent, to staff a major new division at the laboratory, he suggested

that this number was available in the

Metallurgical Project, serving as

standby crews for the Hanford plant.

After consultations with Metallurgical

Project Director Arthur Compton,

Groves directed him to release the

fifty physicists from his program. By

December 1944, Compton had complied, but only by placing on a virtual

standby all research and development

activities related to physics at the

Clinton, Argonne, and Metallurgical

laboratories.20

Industrial Labor

As in the procurement of scientific

and technical personnel, the Manhattan Project employed a variety of

methods and drew upon many

sources in recruiting both skilled and

unskilled labor. For assistance in procuring skilled construction workers

and some maintenance personnel

(carpenters, bricklayers, electricians,

9 Feb 43; Memo, Groves (for Reybold) to Styer,

sub: Transfer of 2d Lt Rollin D'Arcy Morse, 5 Mar

43.

19

 On Kistiakowsky see Ltrs, Capt William S. Parsons (Ord Div chief, Los Alamos Lab) to Conant,

19 Feb 44, Groves to Bush, 20 Apr 44, and Kistiakowsky to Groves, 1 May 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 231.2 (Scientists), MDR. On other aspects of

the program to recruit scientists see Memo, Parsons

to Lt Col Whitney Ashbridge (CO, Los Alamos

Lab), 23 Jun 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 620

(Santa Fe), MDR, and Hewlett and Anderson, New

World, p. 247. Two versions of Tolman's list appear

in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, MDR: the first, undated (probably Jul 43), is in 201 (Gen); the second,

Incl to Ltr, Tolman to Groves, 26 Jul 43, is in 231.2

(Physicists). On Dean Arnold see MDH, Bk. 1, Vol.

8, p. 2.3, DASA.

20

 Memo, de Silva to Groves, sub: Procurement of

Scientific Personnel, 27 Sep 44; Ltrs, Groves to

Compton, 31 Oct 44, and Compton to Groves,

7 Dec 44. All in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201

(Gen), MDR. See also Ltr, Compton to Groves, sub:

Transfer of Physicists to Proj Y, 6 Oct 44, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 230.35 (Changes of Station and

Transfer), MDR.
MANPOWER PROCUREMENT 351

pipe fitters, mechanics, and related

trades), Manhattan turned to the

unions comprising the Building and

Construction Trades Department of

the American Federation of Labor.

For unskilled or common labor and

some semiskilled personnel (cafeteria

employees, plant operation trainees,

and similar job categories), it depended primarily upon recruiters hired by

project contractors or by the Army,

who followed regular routes established by the War Manpower Commission in their search for available

workers. Supplementing these recruiters, but a far less productive source,

were the offices of the United States

Employment Service in each important employment center. Finally, for

much of the manpower that supervised work forces for both plant construction and operation, the project

relied upon personnel furnished directly by the major contractors.21

Manhattan's multifaceted and farranging quest for workers was necessary because, by 1943, when the

project was beginning its large-scale

procurement of construction labor,

the nation had used up the large pool

of unemployed carried over from the

Depression and was experiencing an

actual labor shortage. Project recruiters had anticipated problems at the

Hanford Engineer Works because it

was located in Region XII of the War

Manpower Commission, an area that

long had had serious labor shortages.

But they were surprised when a

severe shortage of common labor developed at the Clinton Engineer

Works where contractors were recruiting from Region VII (Alabama,

Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, South

Carolina, and Tennessee), an area

that still had a labor surplus. Nevertheless, by June, lack of some three

hundred laborers was jeopardizing

the construction schedule at Clinton,

and the indications were that neither

the common laborers' union nor the

regular itinerant recruiters working

through the U.S. Employment Service

were going to be able to procure the

additional numbers needed.22

For a solution, General Groves

looked to manpower agencies in

Washington, D.C. Using War Department channels, specifically Under

Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson's office and the ASF's Industrial

Personnel Division, he negotiated

with officials of the War Manpower

Commission. His objective was to

secure a change in certain commission practices. One such practice was

the reluctance of its field organization

to permit Manhattan recruiters to interview prospective workers in re21

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, pp. 2.2-2.5, DASA. For

specific accounts of contractor participation in labor

recruitment see Completion Rpt, Du Pont, sub:

Clinton Engr Works, TNX Area, Contract W-7412-

eng-23, 1 Apr 44, pp. 73-93, OROO; Completion

Rpt, Stone and Webster, sub: Clinton Engr Works,

Contract W-7401-eng-13, 1946, pp. 144-45,

OROO; Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, pp. 50-67,

HOO. See also Ltr, M. W. Kellogg (Kellogg Co.

president) to Groves, 9 May 45, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 231.21 (Kellex), MDR.

22

 Byron Fairchild and Jonathan Grossman, The

Army and Industrial Manpower, U.S. Army in World

War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1959), pp. 55 and 255-56; Robert R. Palmer,

Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, The Procurement

and Training of Ground Combat Troops, U.S. Army in

World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office, 1948), pp. 36-37, 45, 503; MDH,

Bk. 1, Vol. 8, pp. 2.3-2.4 and App. A1, DASA;

Memo, Maj Warren George (Clinton Area Engr) to

Dist Engr, sub: Labor Supply-Apparent Inability

To Supply Required Labor, 25 Mar 43, OROO;

Memo for File, Labor Rels Sec, same sub, 22 Mar

43, OROO; Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. I, p. 50,

HOO.
352 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

gions other than those in which

atomic facilities were located until all

local and regional employment needs

in those other regions had been met.

Another was what Groves claimed was

its tendency to route Manhattan's itinerant recruiters to small towns where

few prospective workers were available, rather than to the cities where

there was a surplus of labor. Du Pont

officials at Hanford also had complained to Groves about this inconsistency in policy, "necessitating recruitment in a certain manner in one

town and in a different manner in a

similar nearby town."

 23

As an immediate result of Groves's

negotiations with the Manpower

Commission, the Manhattan Project

in late summer of 1943 received a

very limited and temporary priority

for recruiting common labor. Taking

care to maintain very strict control

over what was to be the first wartime

instance of establishing a system of

priorities in manpower recruitment,

the commission assigned a special

representative to the Manhattan District, giving him authority to issue

certificates of availability to potential

recruits for the project's common

labor force. The representative could

issue the certificates only to workers

employed in nonessential jobs. Armed

with these certificates, workers could

leave their nonessential employment

and go to work for Manhattan even

though their employers were opposed

to the move. At the same time, the

Manpower Commission directed that

all workers in the common labor category who had looked for employment

through the U.S. Employment Service

should be referred first to interviewers of Manhattan District contractors.

When even these priority arrangements failed to secure all the common

laborers needed, the commission authorized Manhattan recruiters to seek

workers on a temporary basis in areas

immediately adjacent to Region VII.

The manpower priority system applied initially only to recruiting for

the Clinton Engineer Works, but in

September 1943 the commission also

granted similar privileges to recruiters

seeking common labor for the Hanford Engineer Works in Region XII.24

The Manpower Commission's special concession only temporarily relieved the project's labor recruiting

problems. In late 1943 and early

1944, when requirements for both

construction and production workers

mushroomed, the atomic installations

developed new manpower shortages.

By April 1944, General Groves estimated that the project required an

additional ten thousand construction

workers at the main production plants

and more than eighteen hundred research personnel at the research laboratories. He noted that the major

deficiencies were a shortage of four

thousand common laborers and

twelve hundred operating personnel

at Clinton and Hanford, respectively,

and, in addition, of eight hundred

millwrights at the latter site. The

chief of the Labor Branch of ASF's

Industrial Personnel Division, Lt. Col.

23

 Du Pont Constr Hist (source of quotation),

Vol. 1, p. 67, HOO; Memo, Groves to Und Secy

War, sub: MD's Labor Problems, 1 Nov 43, MDR;

Memo, W. D. S. (undoubtedly Maj Gen W. D. Styer)

to [James] Mitchell (Industrial Personnel Div Dir,

ASF), 7 Dec 43, MD, 1942-45, Somervell Desk File,

ASF; Memo, Patterson to Groves, 14 Feb 44, HB

Files, Fldr 80, MDR.

24

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, pp. 2.3-2.4, DASA; Du

Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, p. 52, HOO.
MANPOWER PROCUREMENT 353

John K. Collins, confirmed Groves's

figures for the Clinton Engineer

Works after an inspection trip there

in May, adding the further observation that, as a result of the shortage,

some seventeen hundred carpenters

were doing laborers' work at carpenters' wage rates. Colonel Collins

cited, too, the need for electricians,

estimating the requirements to be

twenty-five hundred—more than twice

the number Groves had mentioned.25

In spite of these shortages, General

Groves remained optimistic that the

atomic program had a good chance to

produce a bomb during the first part

of 1945, provided that the project

continued to have the "highest priority in supplies, personnel, and equipment."

 26

 When the Manhattan commander expressed this view at a meeting of the Combined Policy Committee, Secretary Stimson, who was presiding, assured him that the project

would continue to have first priority

in manpower recruitment. In March

1944, the War Production Board

placed Manhattan at the top of its list

of the twelve most urgent programs

currently in progress. Then in November 1944, the War Manpower

Commission further strengthened

Manhattan's top-priority position by

awarding the project the highest category under its system for priority referral of workers seeking jobs through

the U.S. Employment Service.27

Manhattan, however, did not rely

solely upon a high-priority rating.

Working in close coordination with

labor officials in Under Secretary of

War Patterson's office, the District

arranged for assignment of special recruiting teams to Clinton and Hanford, composed of eight or nine military officers from the Manpower

Commission, the ASF's Industrial

Personnel Division, and the Corps of

Engineers. Special representatives

designated by the commission and the

War Department coordinated the activities of the teams and provided

them with a direct channel of communication to Washington manpower

agencies. Because of the success of

these special military teams, Manhattan continued to use them well into

1945. In late 1944, for example, the

Los Alamos Laboratory desperately

needed 190 additional machinists and

toolmakers, a category of skilled

workers always difficult to recruit.

The District organized several

teams—each composed of an Army

officer, a professional recruiter, and a

security agent—and dispatched them

into six manpower areas (Regions I,

II, III, V, VI, and VII). In less than a

month they had procured all of the

machinists and toolmakers required

by the New Mexico installation.28

25

 Table (Schedule of Estimated Labor Requirements for All Constr Contractors, 1 Dec 43-1 Jul

44, CEW), Incl to Memo, Lt Col Thomas T. Crenshaw (Ex Off, CEW) to Groves, sub: Labor Forecast,

11 Dec 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Gen),

MDR; Memo, Lt Col John K. Collins (Labor Br

chief, Industrial Personnel Div, ASF) to Groves, sub:

Visit to Clinton Engr Works (16-17 May 44), 22

May 44, HB Files, Fldr 79 (Jack Madigan), MDR; Du

Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, pp. 57-61, HOO. 26

 Memo, unsigned (undoubtedly Groves), after

13 Apr 44, HB Files, Fldr 109, MDR.

27

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, pp. 2.4-2.5 and App. B6

(WMC Field Instruction No. 416, Supp. No. 2, to

All Regional Manpower Dirs, sub: Establishment of

Categories of Employer Orders for Priority Referral

and Factors To Be Considered in Determining Eligibility of Orders for Priority, 27 Nov 44), DASA;

CPC Min, 13 Apr 44, DS; Fairchild and Grossman,

Army and Industrial Manpower, pp. 30, 146-49, 200. 28

 Outline for WD-WMC Mtg Re MD Projs,

25 Apr 44, HB Files, Fldr 79 (Jack Madigan), MDR; Continued
354 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Procurement of certain types of essential skilled labor, such as pipe fitters and electricians, defied efforts of

even special recruiting teams, and

other measures had to be instituted.

When construction at Hanford in the

summer of 1944 required several

hundred additional pipe fitters, Du

Pont, the prime contractor, and the

International Association of Plumbers

and Pipe Fitters jointly launched a

major recruiting effort, even though

the absolute unavailability of pipe fitters in the civilian labor market foredoomed them to failure. There were,

however, many soldiers with this skill

in Army units stationed in the United

States. Consequently, Secretary Stimson directed Army Chief of Staff Marshall to transfer 200 enlisted men

with pipe fitting skills into the Enlisted Reserve Corps for a period of 90

days (subsequently extended to 180

days). The soldiers had to be in limited service status, that is, not qualified

for overseas duty, and willing to work

at Hanford. By early September, the

first of an eventual total of 198 military pipe fitters were reporting for

duty at the plutonium site.29

About the same time, a shortage of

some twenty-five hundred electricians

was seriously jeopardizing meeting

construction schedules at both Hanford and Clinton, and project recruiters indicated to General Groves that

there was little likelihood of obtaining

them through normal employment

channels. In this emergency the Manhattan commander once again turned

to Under Secretary of War Patterson's

office for assistance. Patterson immediately got in touch with Edward J.

Brown, president of the International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,

and Laurence W. Davis, manager of

the National Electrical Contractors

Association, as well as officials at the

War Manpower Commission. In due

course he and Groves worked out an

agreement with these organizations,

the so-called Patterson-Brown Plan,

by which Manhattan had authority to

borrow for a ninety-day period electricians already employed on jobs not

essential to the war. To make the

plan attractive, there was provision

for payment of travel expenses and a

guarantee that the individuals would

not lose their seniority rights and

could return to their previous place

of employment after completing

ninety days of service on the atomic

project. To encourage cooperation of

employers, the plan provided that all

organizations that released electricians to work at Hanford or Clinton

would receive official recognition. A

news release from Patterson's office

gave the plan wide publicity in the

newspapers, and General Styer requested the appropriate Army service

commands to furnish whatever assistance they could. In a few months, this

novel solution supplied the electricians needed to meet both Hanford

and Clinton construction deadlines.30

MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, pp. 2.6-2.7, DASA; Memos,

Brig Gen Edward S. Greenbaum (Ex Off for Und

Secy War) to Capt Walker E. Stagg et al., 13 and

18 Nov 44 and 20 Apr 45, HB Files, Fldr 80, MDR.

These memos, prepared by the District and approved by Groves, detailed the specified individuals

to undertake a special recruitment program. 29

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, pp. 4.8-4.9, DASA;

Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 101; Du Pont Constr

Hist, Vol. 1, pp. 64-65, HOO.

30

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, p. 2.6 and App. B7; Bk. 4,

Vol. 5, pp. 4.7-4.8; and Bk. 5, Vol. 5, "Construction," pp. 5.1-5.2, DASA. Ltrs, Patterson to Brown

and to Davis, 21 Jun 44, and Patterson to CG's of Continued
MANPOWER PROCUREMENT 355

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN WORKERS AT CEW

After the fashion of the fringe benefits of the Patterson-Brown Plan,

project recruiters frequently offered

special inducements to attract persons

with critical skills, usually in the form

of payment of all or part of a worker's

transportation costs in traveling to

Hanford or Clinton, a guarantee of

housing (but usually not for family),

and furnishing recreational and other

community facilities. On occasion,

Manhattan applied to the National

War Labor Board for modification or

adjustment of the prevailing wage

rates. Thus, in July 1943, Under Secretary of War Patterson secured a

wage rate increase ($0.50 to $0.575

an hour) for common labor at the

Clinton Engineer Works and, a year

later, one for skilled maintenance

workers, especially electrical repairmen and machinists. The latter increase was necessary because these

workers could earn a higher wage at

construction jobs, at TVA installations, and at some of the major war

industries in the local area than as

employees of the atomic plants.31

Civilian and Military Personnel

Although most Manhattan workers

were employees of project contractors, two important groups were not:

civil service employees at District

headquarters and in the several area

offices, and military personnel serving

on the District staff, in the area offices, and in the various military units.

Combined numbers of these two

groups, even at the height of project

activities, amounted to considerably

less than 10 percent of the Manhattan

Project's total manpower. But because

many members of these groups held

key positions in administration and

operations, they exercised an influence over the course of the atomic

bomb program far out of proportion

to their relatively small numbers.

From the start of its administration

of the project, the Army employed civilians in staff positions at both the

District and area levels. Generally,

they served in positions requiring

special administrative or technical

knowledge and experience, such as

2d, 5th, 6th, and 7th Svc Cmds, 5 Jul 44, HB Files,

Fldr 51, MDR. Ltr, Maj Gen Thomas G. Terry (CG

2d Svc Cmd) to Act Secy War Patterson, 10 Jul 44,

HB Files, Fldr 80, MDR. Groves, Now It Can Be Told,

p. 99. Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, p. 65, HOO. 31

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, p. 3.4, DASA; Memo, Patterson to Groves, 14 Feb 44, and Ltr, Patterson to

William H. Davis (NWLB chairman), 12 Jun 44, HB

Files, Fldr 80, MDR; Ltr, Greenbaum to Fred M.

Vinson (Office of Economic Stabilization Dir),

26 May 44, and Statement on Requested Increase

in Operating Rates at CEW, attached to covering

Memo, 14 Jun 44, HB Files, Fldr 51, MDR; Du Pont

Opns Hist, Bk. 1, pp. I and 4, HOO.
356 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

those relating to finance, insurance,

safety, contracts, and office management, as well as in jobs that women

could fill. Most were recruited

through regular civil service channels

or were transferred to the Manhattan

Project from other government agencies. When Colonel Marshall formed

the original Manhattan District headquarters organization, he primarily recruited civilian employees who were

members of his former Syracuse (New

York) District staff. Included in this

group were a number of veteran

Corps of Engineers civilians who, as

the District headquarters expanded,

received military commissions. The

District continued to hire additional

civil service employees, securing

many from other engineer projects,

from other government agencies, and

from the civilian staffs of the other

military services. Project area engineers also followed similar policies in

forming their local administrative

staffs.32

For reasons of security and for convenience, the District carried its civilian workers on its employment roles

as if they were regular engineer employees. While this arrangement facilitated administrative aspects, it subjected the District to all wartime manpower regulations. For example, the

presidential proclamation of December 1942 suspended the eight-hour

day and that of February 1943 established a 48-hour workweek for all

full-time workers in areas of labor

shortage. Consistent with these regulations, the War Department provided

in May that its civilian employees

could work a six-day, 48-hour week,

receiving overtime pay for work on

Sunday or beyond eight hours on a

weekday, and the District adopted this

policy in June, including in it a provision for overtime work up to sixtyfour hours a week when specific

emergency situations required it. In

actual practice, only lower-salaried

employees received overtime pay.

Higher-paid employees, such as section and division chiefs, who put in

overtime did so voluntarily, without

additional compensation.33

An unforeseen disadvantage of this

administrative arrangement was that

the District also had to conform with

OCE manpower ceilings, as required

by the ASF or the War Department.

Thus in the hectic summer of 1943,

when the project was on the threshold of rapid expansion, OCE personnel officials notified General Groves

that the District must reduce its personnel by some 13 percent. The Manhattan commander immediately registered vigorous objection. General

Styer interceded with OCE officials,

who then arranged to have other

engineer agencies absorb the staff reductions prescribed for the Manhattan District. A year later, OCE personnel authorities again informed the

District that substantial reduction in

both civilian and military personnel

32

 List of Key Personnel, MD Area Offices (ca.

Nov 44), Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 231.001 (LC),

MDR; Marshall Diary, 21-23 Jun 42, MDR; Org

Charts, U.S. Engrs Office, MD, 1 Nov 43, 15 Feb

and 10 Nov 44, MDR.

33

 Presidential Proclamation, sub: Suspension of

Eight-Hour Law as to Laborers and Mechanics Employed by WD on Public Works in the United

States, 28 Dec 42; WD Orders H, sub: Hours of

Work and Overtime Compensation for Civilian Employees, 14 May 43; MD Cir Ltr, sub: Hours of

Work and Overtime Compensation for Civilian Employees, 11 Jun 43; Memo, Lt Col E. H. Marsden

(Ex Off, MD) to Groves, 24 Aug 43. All in Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Gen), MDR.

MANPOWER PROCUREMENT 357

were necessary. Lt. Col. Charles

Vanden Bulck, head of the District's

Administrative Division, instructed

area office and division and section

heads to initiate appropriate measures, such as reassignment or separation of unsatisfactory workers and

elimination of duplication of functions. By this time some personnel reduction in those staffs primarily concerned with site development and

design and building of production facilities was possible, but operational

activities were expanding rapidly, requiring enlargement of District and

area staffs overseeing plant operations and bomb development. The

net result was continued growth in

total personnel, a trend that was to

persist until the fall of 1945.34

Militarization of the atomic project

did not begin until the summer of

1942 (Chart 5). The first group of

military personnel came to the newly

activated Manhattan District as part of

an OCE authorization of sixty-two officers, assigned primarily to fill key

supervisory and administrative posts

in the District headquarters and area

offices. For many months, however,

the number of active duty personnel

remained small (as late as December

1943, no more than four hundred).

Subsequently, additional authorizations from OCE, ASF, and, in certain

special cases, the Secretary of War

himself, furnished a continuing inflow

of officers and warrant officers. The

majority came under a series of supplementary bulk allotments, but some

were also included in personnel authorizations for military police, Counterintelligence, Women's Army Corps

(WAC),35 and other units assigned to

the project. The District procured

some hard-to-secure specialists—for

example, patent attorneys, engineers,

chemists, and physicists—by obtaining

authorization to have naval officers

assigned to Manhattan and to commission qualified civilians directly.

The District's Military Personnel Section in Oak Ridge remained in charge

of the procurement and central administration of all project-commissioned personnel throughout the war,

numbering more than six hundred by

the summer of 1945 and stationed in

many different parts of the United

States as well as in several overseas

areas.36

34

 Memo, F. M. S. [Col Frank M. Smith, Asst to

ASF chief of staff] to Styer, 29 Jul 43, MD, 1942-45,

Somervell Desk File, ASF. MD Bull, Vanden Bulck

(for Dist Engr) to Office, Div, and Sec Heads, sub:

Decrease in Personnel, 19 Aug 44, Admin Files, MD

Directives, MDR. MDH, Bk, 1, Vol. 12, "Clinton Engineer Works," App. C2 (Chart, Employment at

CEW); Bk. 4, Vol. 6, "Operation," App. B8 (Chart,

Employment at HEW); and Bk. 8, Vol. 1, App. B7

(Chart, Employment at Los Alamos Lab), DASA.

35

 On 30 Sep 43, the Women's Army Auxiliary

Corps became a part of the Army of the United

States and received its new official designation,

Women's Army Corps. See Mattie E. Treadwell, The

Women's Army Corps, U.S. Army in World War II

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,

1954) pp. 218-30. 36

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, pp. 7.3-7.4, 7.8, 8.1-8.3,

App. A13, and Vol. 14, "Intelligence & Security,"

pp. 7.5-7.7, DASA; Org Charts, U.S. Engrs Office,

MD, Aug 43-Jan 45, MDR; List, sub: MD Offs on

Duty at Los Alamos and Their Duties, 6 May 44,

Incl to Memo, Ashbridge to Groves, 14 Jun 44,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Gen), MDR; Memo,

Groves to CG SOS, sub: Org and Assignment of Mil

Orgs, 28 Jan 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 322

(Los Alamos), MDR; Memo, Groves to CG ASF,

sub: Spec WAAC Det, MD, 31 May 43, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 323.42 (LC), MDR; Memo, Groves to

CG ASF, sub: Prov MP Det No. 1, 17 Mar 43,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 231.001, MDR; Memos,

Greenbaum to Bundy, sub: Patent Offs, 21 Feb 44,

Groves to Bundy, same sub, and Personnel Div, G1,

to TAG, sub: Procurement Objective for Chief of

Engrs, 13 Apr 44, HB Files, Fldr 24, MDR; Memo,

Bundy to Maj Gen Stephen G. Henry, G-1 (approving direct commissioning of second lieutenants for

MD), 1 Sep 44, HB Files; Fldr 8, MDR.
358 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Beginning in 1943, the District regularly requisitioned military personnel

to carry out functions that, for reasons of security or lack of civilian

manpower, could not be performed

by civilian employees. In January,

General Groves requested the Services of Supply (ASF's earlier designation) to allot military police, medical,

and veterinary personnel for a special

military police company to protect

and service the highly secret operations at Los Alamos. In March, he

asked for additional military personnel to form provisional military

police, medical, and engineer detachments to be used at the other major

project sites. The ASF promptly authorized the requested military manpower, providing for their activation

and training at appropriate training

centers of the 6th and 8th Service

Commands.37

When rapid expansion created an

urgent need for additional military

personnel to handle classified mail

and records, Groves requested the

ASF to provide Manhattan with a detachment from the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) to perform that

type of clerical work. The processing

of mail and records at District headquarters, as well as at the Clinton,

Hanford, and Los Alamos installations, Groves pointed out, provided

such a broad view of project activities

that it must be kept in the hands of

personnel under strict military control. The 1st Provisional WAAC Detachment was activated at Fort Sill,

Oklahoma, on 17 April, and a few

days later an officer and six auxiliaries

reported to Los Alamos. In June, the

ASF authorized Manhattan's request

for a total of three WAAC officers

and seventy-five enlisted women, and

in subsequent months granted the

District substantial WAC allotments.

In the period from 1943 through

1945, those WAC members assigned

to units at Clinton, Hanford, Los

Alamos, and other project installations worked not only as handlers of

classified material but also at a great

variety of other jobs, some of them

highly technical and scientific.38

By spring of 1943, project leaders

were anticipating problems in recruiting and holding younger technicians

and scientists who were subject to

military service. The obvious solution

was to constitute a military organization within the Manhattan Project to

which these technicians and scientists

could be assigned. Accordingly, in

May, the District established a Special

Engineer Detachment (SED) and requested ASF authorization for an allotment of 675 men to form a headquarters element and four separate

companies. Recruiting began in late

1943 through the Army Specialized

Training Program, the National

Roster of Scientific and Specialized

Personnel in Washington, D.C., and

37

 Memos, Groves to CG SOS, subs: Org and Assignment of Mil Orgs, 28 Jan 43, and Prov Engr Det

No. 1, 11 Mar 43, 322 (Los Alamos) and 200.3, respectively; Memos, Groves to CG ASF, subs: Prov

Engr Det No. 1, 29 Jul 43, and Prov Med Det No. 1,

12 and 17 Mar 43, 200.3 and 231.001, respectively.

All in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, MDR.

38

 Memo, Groves to CG ASF, sub: Special WAAC

Det, MD, 31 May 43 (and appended note, dated 2

Jun 43 and signed by Col F. M. Smith); Ind to ibid.,

Brig Gen Russel B. Reynolds (Mil Personnel Div

chief, ASF) to Chief of Engrs, 3 Jun 43; Memo,

Marsden to Groves, sub: Spec WAC Det, MD,

29 Dec 43. All in Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

323.42 (LC), MDR. Marsden Diary, 29 May and 3,

9, 17 Jun 43, OROO. Treadwell, Women's Army

Corps, pp. 327-29, Unit Hist, WAC Det, 9812th

Tech Svc Unit, CE, MD, copy in WAC Files, CMH.
MANPOWER PROCUREMENT 359

WOMEN'S ARMY CORPS DETACHMENT AT CEW

universities and colleges in all parts

of the country. Personnel officials also

screened and interviewed qualified individuals in Army camps and directed

inquiries to other government agencies and private industrial firms concerning former employees who were

in the military service.39

The District assigned most of its

scientific and technical enlisted personnel to the SED unit. In those instances, however, when the District

had to place enlisted men on duty

with private contractors or in small

communities, it transferred them to

the Enlisted Reserve Corps. This permitted the men to work in an inconspicuous civilian status yet to remain,

for reasons of security, under military

control. It also reduced the cost of

military administration for small numbers of enlisted personnel stationed

in outlying areas.40

In providing for the efficient and

adequate administration of Manhattan

Project enlisted personnel, whether

in scientific and technical, clerical,

housekeeping, or military intelligence

and security units, the District encountered special problems. Some of

these stemmed from the rapidity of

increase in enlisted personnel—from

several hundred in early 1944, to

twenty-six hundred by year's end, and

continuing up to a maximum total of

39

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8. pp. 7.3-7.4 and App. C18,

DASA; Msg, Marshall to Nichols, 18 May 43, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 200.3 (SED), MDR.

40

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8. p. 7.4, DASA; Memo, Lt

Col Curtis A. Nelson (Personnel Div chief, MD) to

Groves, sub: Enlisted Reservists, 29 Aug 45, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 220.3, MDR.
360 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

ENLISTED MEN AT CEW DURING OFF-DUTY HOURS, studying U.S. Armed Forces

Institute courses

about five thousand by the fall of

1945. Other problems arose from the

wide geographical distribution of enlisted personnel, making any effort to

achieve effective centralized administrative control from District headquarters in Oak Ridge impracticable.41

Under normal circumstances, a solution would have been attachment of

the District's scattered military units

to the various area service commands

for purposes of administration, but

such arrangements presented a security risk. Consequently, the district

engineer assigned responsibility for

administering enlisted personnel to

the commissioned officers at the

larger sites and to the experienced

noncommissioned officers at the remaining project locations, making

them directly responsible to the District's Military Personnel Section in

Oak Ridge. Administrative policies

varied, depending upon conditions

prevailing at each particular location.

The policy on rations and quarters

for enlisted personnel is illustrative.

Enlisted men at all areas except Oak

Ridge, Los Alamos, and Richland received a rental allowance in lieu of

quarters. The same was true for rations, except at Los Alamos and Richland. Similarly, WAC enlisted personnel received a monetary allowance in

lieu of both quarters and rations,

41

 The organization, procurement, and administration of the project's military intelligence and security units are discussed in detail in Ch. XI. MDH,

Bk. 1, Vol. 8, pp. 7.6-7.8 and App. A13, DASA.
MANPOWER PROCUREMENT 361

THE LARGE TROOP CONTINGENT AT LOS ALAMOS ON PARADE

except at Oak Ridge, Richland, Los

Alamos, and New York; those at Oak

Ridge and in New York lived in government quarters and received a daily

monetary allowance in lieu of

rations.42

In early 1945, the OCE, which had

been serving the project as a higherechelon channel for manpower procurement and organization, provided

the Manhattan District with a military

designation: 9812th Technical Service

Unit, Corps of Engineers, Manhattan

District. Effective on 1 February, most

of the uniformed personnel, including

SED units at Clinton, Hanford, and

Los Alamos, were assigned to the

9812th. At Los Alamos, however,

military police, WAC, and other service elements continued to be assigned

to the 4817th Service Command Unit,

an element of the 8th Service

Command.43

Success in the procurement of tens

of thousands of new employees with a

variety of skills and talents, perhaps

unmatched by any other World

War II program, was directly attributable to the personnel policies and organization developed by the Army for

the Manhattan Project in late 1942

and 1943. General Groves and the

District personnel staff had persevered during the period of severe

42

 Ibid., pp. 7.6-7.10, DASA; Memo, Col Elmer E.

Kirkpatrick, Jr. (Dep Dist Engr), to Groves, sub: Mil

Personnel at Oak Ridge, 19 Oct 44, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Rpts), MDR.

43

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, p. 7.7, and Bk. 8, Vol. 1,

pp. 7.3.-7.8, DASA; Memo, Nelson to Groves

(through his assistant, Brig Gen Thomas F. Farrell),

22 May 45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 200.3, MDR.
362 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

manpower shortages and—by combining effective use of existing manpower procurement facilities in the

OSRD, the War Department, and the

War Manpower Commission with

those developed for the Manhattan

District—were able to meet substantially all of the atomic program's requirements for scientific and technical

workers, skilled and unskilled industrial labor, and civil and military personnel on schedule. Consequently, by

late 1944, with most of the manpower

procurement needs attained, project

officials could shift their primary

focus to conservation of the work

force in face of such potentially eroding factors as the demands of Selective Service and labor union organizing activities.
CHAPTER XVII

Manpower Conservation

In a wartime environment of persistent labor shortages and extensive

labor turnover on most jobs, the

Manhattan Project's problems of

maintaining an adequate work force

almost matched those of manpower

procurement. In fact, for a variety of

reasons, the District had to contend

with an above-average rate of employee turnover, Selective Service demands, and work stoppages. Fortunately, many of the measures adopted

to recruit scarce workers, such as

granting special fringe benefits and

paying above-average wage rates,

also helped retain employees on

the job. These did not solve all

the manpower-depleting problems,

however, and the Army had to undertake a number of special measures to

conserve the work force.

Labor Turnover: The Problem

and Its Cure

Turnover of construction workers

at the Clinton and Hanford sites

during the first half of 1944, a period

of peak employment of this type of

labor, averaged about one-fifth of the

total construction work force, a rate

considerably above that at comparable wartime projects elsewhere in the

United States. The rate was slightly

higher at Hanford than at Clinton—

some 20 percent as compared with 17

percent. Turnover was less serious

among plant-operating employees,

but still sufficiently high to constitute

a continuing manpower problem.

Thus at the period of peak operations

during the summer of 1945, the gaseous diffusion plant had an average

turnover of about 13 percent a month

and the electromagnetic and plutonium production plants each a little

over 6 percent a month.1

Seeking to reduce excessive labor

turnover, Manhattan administrators

undertook aggressive countermeasures. As a first step, the District established exit interview offices at its area

employment centers near Manhattan

installations. Each employee leaving

the project—whether voluntarily, for

cause, or as a result of reductions-inforce—was encouraged to have an

exit interview with District personnel

officials. Through this means they

were able not only to gain an insight

1

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, "Personnel," p. 3.1 and

Apps. A5 (Chart, MD Labor Turnover)-A6 (Graphic

Experience of Principal MD Projs in Labor Turnover, Absenteeism, etc.), DASA; Fairchild and Grossman, Army and Industrial Manpower, p. 141 (Table 2,

Monthly Labor Turnover Rate Per 100 Employees

in Aircraft, Munitions, and Nonmunitions Industries: 1943-44).
364 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

into the nature of the employees'

major complaints but also, in many

instances, to persuade them to stay

on the job.2

Ranking high on the employees' list

of complaints was their dissatisfaction

with employment conditions, including inadequate wages, excessive

hours, and lengthy commuting distance to and from the job site. For

example, in mid-1944, 13 percent of

the construction workers voluntarily

leaving jobs at Hanford and 14 percent of those at Clinton cited some

aspect of employment conditions as

the reason for their departure. Another recurring complaint concerned

living conditions, with more workers

in 1944 finding these unsatisfactory at

Clinton than at Hanford. Surprisingly

large numbers of workers also left to

take jobs they viewed as better than

the ones they had held on the atomic

project. That so many workers could

do this was indicative of a major underlying problem in maintaining a

work force—the fact that for much of

the time in 1943 and 1944 there were

more jobs available in the areas near

the atomic installations than there

were qualified workers to fill them.3

Analysis of data accumulated in the

exit interviews indicated that most

project employees were interested

primarily in earning the highest

hourly wages possible. Accordingly,

District manpower authorities took

steps to make Manhattan wage rates

competitive, if not better, than those

on other wartime projects. Working

through the War Manpower Commission, the National War Labor Board,

and other manpower agencies, they

secured significant adjustments in

Manhattan wage scales, bringing them

up to the pay levels of competing

projects. Exit interview data also revealed that project workers did not

object to long hours if they received

overtime pay for time put in beyond

the regular workweek. For example,

when Du Pont in the summer of 1943

reduced the workweek on construction jobs at Hanford from fifty-eight

to forty-eight hours, eliminating most

overtime, workers began leaving at a

greatly accelerated rate. Only when

General Groves personally intervened, directing Du Pont to extend

the workweek to fifty-four hours, did

employee turnover decline to an acceptable rate.4

The frequency of complaints about

living conditions made it evident that

new community facilities were needed

at Clinton and Hanford. District officials began with a renewed emphasis

on securing greater cooperation from

the leaders of existing communities

adjacent to the sites in the provision

of housing, commercial and recreational facilities, transportation, and

the other more urgent requirements

of project workers temporarily residing in those communities. At the

same time, the District made every

effort to speed up construction of

housing and other facilities in the

towns of Oak Ridge and Richland.5

While the District could overcome

some glaring deficiencies in employment and living conditions, it could

2

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, pp. 3.1-3.2, DASA. 3

 Ibid., App. A5, DASA.

4

 Statement on Requested Increase in Operating

Rates at Clinton Engineer Works, attached to covering Memo, 14 Jun 44, HB Files, Fldr 51, MDR;

MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, p. 3.3, DASA. 5

 See Chs. XXI and XXII for a more detailed discussion on the development of community facilities

and relations.
MANPOWER CONSERVATION 365

not hope to provide the comforts and

conveniences available in long-established, thickly populated communities. District officials, however, tried

to inculcate great toleration and acceptance among project workers for

the unavoidable hardships and inconveniences. This was the goal, for example, of an extensive campaign

begun in the summer of 1944 to raise

the morale of the work force.

Through public media—stories in

company newspapers, strategically located billboards and posters, and film

trailers shown in local theaters—the

District personnel office circulated

materials designed to appeal to the

workers' sense of patriotism and their

pride in contributing to the completion of a difficult job under adverse

conditions.6

Despite these countermeasures, absenteeism and labor turnover continued to rise in 1944. After consultation

with officials of the War Manpower

Commission, District manpower authorities decided to dispatch special

investigative teams to Clinton and

Hanford. These teams—each comprised of a representative of the Manpower Commission, a labor officer

from the Army Service Forces (ASF)

headquarters, and an officer from the

District staff—conducted thoroughgoing labor surveys of several weeks'

duration.7

Rather surprisingly, the Clinton

team came up with a recommendation

that no special efforts be made to

solve the turnover problem. They reported that the amount of absenteeism and turnover at Clinton was

indeed high; in fact, much higher

than at Hanford. Nevertheless, the

team members felt that District manpower authorities had progressed so

far in developing good labor relations

and in providing suitable living conditions and community facilities that the

problems with the work force no

longer posed a threat to completion

of the project. Further confirmation

of the optimistic report came from

the chief of the Labor Branch of the

ASF's Industrial Personnel Division,

Lt. Col. John K. Collins. Wishing to

consult with the team members on

their findings and to assess the situation firsthand, Collins made an inspection visit in mid-May. He concurred that facilities for workers were

"uncommonly good," and discovered

that the high rate of absenteeism and

turnover indicated in the team's statistics was not primarily the result of

the construction workers' dissatisfaction with working and living conditions but more directly attributable to

the fact that many of them came from

nearby farms and periodically had to

take time off to do farm work.8

While lacking the glowing optimism

of the labor survey reports on Clinton, the report from the Hanford

team was highly commendatory of

efforts made to achieve the best facilities feasible under rugged circumstances. The team considered employment conditions comparable with

those on similar heavy construction

projects in progress, and pointed out

6

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, pp. 3.3-3.4 and App. B8

(Documents Illustrative of Use of Public Media To

Curtail Job Turnover and Absenteeism), DASA. 7

 Ibid., Bk. 1, Vol. 8, pp. 3.5, DASA.

8

 Ltr, Maj L. Dale Hill (MD member of labor

survey team) to Dist Engr, sub: Labor Survey at

CEW, 23 May 44, copy in MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, App.

B10, DASA; Memo, Collins to Groves, sub: Visit to

CEW (16-17 May 44), 22 May 44, HB Files, Fldr 79

(Jack Madigan), MDR.
366 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

the various ways in which management had endeavored to eliminate the

more trying and irritating inconveniences. Chief causes for absenteeism

and labor turnover, the team concluded, were rumors that misrepresented

conditions at Hanford and the recruitment of many older, inexperienced,

and less physically able employees

who could not readily adjust to the

demands of the work. The team recommended that both the War Manpower Commission and the United

States Employment Service could

assist in reducing labor turnover by

taking steps to curb unsubstantiated

rumors and making greater efforts to

screen out poor risks among job

applicants.9

As building of the Clinton and

Hanford plants neared completion,

the project's need for construction

workers declined. Concerned about

the disrupting effect of large-scale reductions-in-force, the District implemented a policy of recruiting the operating staffs from among employees

on the construction work force. Because these jobs were more secure

and employment and living conditions had greatly improved, the rate

of turnover and absenteeism among

plant-operating employees was much

less than among construction workers. The District, nevertheless, continued a vigorous program of manpower

conservation into the postwar period.

The most crucial period of plant operation came in the first half of 1945,

and personnel supervisors constantly

had to counteract the tendency

among employees to relax their efforts as Allied victory over the Axis

powers seemed assured.10

Special Problems With the Selective

Service System

Operation of the Selective Service

System created special problems in

manpower conservation for the Manhattan Project. Although other major

wartime industrial enterprises experienced similar problems, certain factors made Manhattan less able to tolerate losses from its civilian work

force to military service. Because of

the unique and complex technology

involved in many of its operations,

the project employed a higher percentage of workers, especially among

its scientists and technicians, who had

indispensable and often irreplaceable

skills. Also, because of the enormous

urgency of the bomb development

program, the project faced an almost

continuous series of construction and

production deadlines that could be

met only if key employees at all levels

could be kept on the job. Finally, because of the highly secret nature of

project activities, Army administrators

had to exercise great care that compliance with Selective Service regulations did not result in serious

breaches of security.11

Faced with these unusual problems,

the Manhattan District had to develop

special measures for dealing with the

Selective Service System to prevent

an unacceptable erosion of its civilian

9

 Rpt, Spec WMC-WD Team Assigned to HEW

Proj (prepared by Ned McDonald, WMC, Maj I. B.

Cross, Jr., ASF, and Maj R. I. Newcomb, CE),

20 Jun 44, copy in MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, App. B9,

DASA.

10

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, pp. 3.5-3.6 and Apps. A1,

A1.1, A6, DASA. 11

 Selective Service System, Industrial Deferment,

Special Monograph No. 6, Vol. 1 (Washington,

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 1-2.
MANPOWER CONSERVATION 367

employees. The civilian force was

comprised of those employed by

project contractors and civil servants

assigned to the District headquarters

or area offices. The first category of

workers constituted the greater problem in terms of Selective Service policies, because this group far outnumbered their federal counterparts; the

second category of workers was subject to the somewhat modified Selective Service regulations that governed

all civil service employees in World

War II. Because Selective Service regulations generally prohibited group

deferments, the Manhattan Project, as

did every other wartime employer,

dealt with its draft problems in terms

of the case of each individual worker

and mostly at the level of the local

Selective Service Board. From the administrative standpoint, especially that

of security, this approach greatly complicated the draft problem for District

manpower authorities because it

meant they had to negotiate with hundreds of different local boards. And

in each case they had to decide

whether to permit a particular employee to be inducted into service, to

request a delay in his induction until

he could be replaced, to seek his temporary or permanent deferment, or to

have him inducted and then assigned

to a Manhattan military unit, such as

the Special Engineer Detachment.12

Until late in 1943, when major

changes occurred in draft regulations,

manpower requirements of the Selective Service System did not present a

serious threat to the project. Consequently, the District placed a priority

on maintaining security, rather than

obtaining deferments for its personnel. Instead of setting up a special

staff, the District delegated to project

contractors the task of resolving the

draft problems of their employees

and limited its intervention in Selective Service problems to the relatively

few cases involving its own government employees. This policy was generally feasible as long as Selective

Service regulations exempted a large

body of manpower for family dependency. Project contractors hired most

of their workers from this group and

also could usually secure replacement

for those employees who were drafted

from this reservoir of manpower. Inevitably, there were some exceptions.

For example, uniquely qualified scientists and technicians could not be replaced by members of any exempted

class. In these instances, District manpower officials, with strong support

from Secretary Stimson, intervened

with Selective Service authorities to

obtain deferments.13

After the Japanese attack on Pearl

Harbor and America's entry into the

war, the Selective Service had moved

steadily toward inducting men from

hitherto deferred classes. By late

1943, the need for additional manpower for the armed forces was so

critical that the Selective Service informed local boards to consider drafting fathers as of 1 October. Within

two months, following passage of

congressional legislation extending

12

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, pp. 6.6-6.15, DASA; Industrial Deferment, pp. 231-32.

13

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, pp. 6.6-6.15, DASA; Selective Service System, Dependency Deferment, Special

Monograph No. 8 (Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office, 1947), pp. 33-51; Ltrs, Secy War to

Chairman, WD Central Deferment Board, 8 Mar 43,

and Secy War to Maj Gen Lewis B. Hershey (Selective Svc System Dir), 1 May 43, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 231.1, MDR.
368 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

and ratifying this policy, the atomic

project faced the prospect of losing

thousands of key employees at the

very time when its own manpower

needs were reaching a peak. The

draft regulations also placed in question the occupational deferments of

many younger scientists, technicians,

and skilled workers who had no dependents, for public opinion consistently favored selection of younger

men without family responsibilities.14

To avert the deleterious effects of

any manpower losses, the District

abandoned its earlier hands-off policy

and assumed a more decisive role in

draft matters by reorganizing Selective Service functions. In late 1943,

control over deferment procedures

through the District was centralized at

the Oak Ridge headquarters under

administration of a newly formed Selective Service Section. In December,

the section took over the Selective

Service functions of the former Clinton Area Engineers Office. Shortly

thereafter, in support of its more

active participation in draft matters,

the District established branch offices

in New York City and Chicago and at

the Hanford Engineer Works, where

the area engineer subsequently

formed a separate section to process

deferments for operating personnel in

the plutonium facilities. Finally, to

assist the District's Selective Service

Section in review of draft cases involving project civil service employees, the Secretary of War appointed a

regional deferment committee that

was comprised of three commissioned officers from the Manhattan

District.15

Organized and functioning much

like a state Selective Service headquarters, the District's Selective Service Section instituted a variety of

measures that facilitated the prompt

resolution of draft problems. It reviewed each draft case and advised

the district engineer on procedures to

be followed in its resolution, and also

regularly issued to project contractors

and area engineers circular letters

containing all pertinent Selective

Service information allowable within

the security requirements of the

project. Then in early 1944, under

the so-called West Coast Plan that

provided for deferment of workers in

critical war industries, the section successfully obtained for project contractors at thirteen Manhattan establishments (including the Metallurgical

Laboratory, Clinton Laboratories,

Hanford Engineer Works, and the

Kellex Corporation) authorization to

defer those employees essential to

maintain construction and production

schedules. These measures contributed to the relief of state Selective

Service directors from personal responsibility for Manhattan District deferments granted earlier—deferments

that, under the pressure of manpower

shortages in 1944, state directors, not

really understanding why atomic

project workers were essential, were

more and more prone to question.16

14

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, pp. 6.6-6.11, DASA; Dependency Deferment, pp. 53-58.

15

 Org Charts, U.S. Engrs Office, MD, 1 Jun,

28 Aug, 10 Nov 44 and 26 Jan 45, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 020 (MED-Org), MDR; MDH, Bk. 1,

Vol. 8, pp. 6.15-6.17, and Bk. 4, Vol. 5, "Construction," pp. 4.18-4.19, DASA; Industrial Deferment, pp.

243-45. 16

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, pp. 6.6-6.11 and Apps.

A9-A11, DASA; Industrial Deferment, pp. 112-13 and

166-69.
MANPOWER CONSERVATION 369

A new threat to project manpower

needs arose in January, when the Selective Service began enforcing a

more stringent policy on occupational

deferments for younger men (generally under age thirty). Administrators at

Los Alamos, for example, predicted

that such a policy would be disastrous

for the entire project. Wasting no

time, the District's Selective Service

Section began providing local draft

boards with detailed data on the educational background, work experience, and contributions to the project

of thousands of its younger employees. At the same time, it also urged

project contractors to actively support continued deferment of workers

classified as disqualified for military

service (4-F) or for limited service

(LA-1). By the time the war ended,

the District had approved and forwarded to the Selective Service

System more than thirty-eight thousand original deferment cases and renewed more than ten thousand of

these cases. In addition, area engineers had directly processed thousands more.17

In the period after the war, some

critics asserted that the Selective

Service System had "greatly crippled"

the atomic project. Manhattan administrators disagreed, however. According to Colonel Nichols, for example,

in the approximately sixty thousand

deferment actions handled up

through June 1946, "no one has been

lost to the project whose services

were essential."

 18

 Certain Selective

Service measures had threatened key

project operations, but the District's

effective policy of energetic counteraction had enabled Manhattan officials to avert any serious interference

with the progress of the bomb development program.

Labor Relations: Union Activities

and Work Stoppages

Employer-employee relations was

an important factor in the conservation of the Manhattan Project work

force.19 Given the industrial character

of its activities, these relations naturally centered on questions of unionization and unions. But unusually

stringent security requirements greatly circumscribed the extent to which

normal labor activities could be pursued. Nevertheless, consistent with

the War Department policy established in the early months of the war,

the Army permitted workers on the

atomic project to carry on union activities as long as they did not interfere with achievement of the major

17

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, pp. 6.11-6.13 and App.

A12, DASA; Ltrs, Arthur L. Hughes (Personnel Dir,

Los Alamos Lab) to Samuel T. Arnold (MD Consultant for Tech Personnel), 15 Jan 44, and Oppenheimer to Groves, 8 Apr 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Gen), MDR. See also Memo, unsigned

(probably Groves), ca. Apr 44, HB Files, Fldr 105,

MDR.

18

 Statement by Nichols, 7 Jun 46, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 201 (Gen), MDR. 19

 Section based on MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, pp. 4.1-

4.14 and Apps. A2 (Table, Manhattan Proj Contractors' Employment, Aug 42-Dec 45) and A7 (Table,

Analysis of Work Stoppages-Constr Contractors);

Bk. 4, Vol. 6, "Operations," p. 13.3; Bk. 8, Vol. 1,

"General," p. 6.62. All in DASA. Fairchild and

Grossman, Army and Industrial Manpower, pp. 72 and

129-30. Rpt, John H. Ohly, sub: Formulation of

Labor Policies To Govern Opn of CEW, 10 Nov 44;

Memo, Ohly to Brig Gen Edwin S. Greenbaum

(Und Secy War's labor adviser), ca. 11 Nov 44;

Memos for File, Ohly, sub: MD, 13, 18, and 21 Dec

44; Ltr, A. C. Joy (Act Dir, Tenth Region, NLRB,

Atlanta, Ga.) to Und Secy War, sub: Roane-Anderson Co., Case 10-R-1369, 28 Nov 44. All in HB

Files, Fldr 80, MDR. Memos, Und Secy War to

Byrnes, 27 and 30 Nov 44, HB Files, Fldr 51, MDR.

Marsden Diary, 29 Nov 44, OROO.
370 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

objectives of the program. This policy

excluded, of course, resorting to

strikes and any other labor activities

that would interrupt war production

or compromise security.

To deal with Manhattan Project

labor relations problems, the Army

relied extensively on experience

gained, starting with the period of

emergency preparedness in 1940-41,

as an employer of thousands of workers in arsenals and depots and on

Corps of Engineers construction

projects and as administrators of government-owned, contractor-operated

(GOCO) plants that produced munitions of war. From this experience

the Army learned that the most efficient means for recruiting workers

was through those unions affiliated

with the Building and Construction

Trades Department of the American

Federation of Labor (AFL). This

method minimized union-organizing

and -recruiting activities on the job,

because the Army and the AFL had

agreed that contractors must maintain a closed-shop policy.

In the event that unions would be

unable to satisfy Manhattan's quotas

for skilled and unskilled workers, the

Army-AFL agreement permitted contractors to procure them elsewhere,

with the provision that they join the

appropriate union before starting

their employment. When the AFL laborers union could supply only a

fraction of the quota needed at the

Clinton Engineer Works, the contractors—working with District manpower

authorities—turned to the War Manpower Commission and federal employment agencies for recruitment assistance. Recruitment of workers

through government channels, however, obviated compliance with the

existing policy of union membership.

To have required it, General Groves

pointed out to District personnel

monitoring labor problems, would

mean, in effect, that the government

was subsidizing recruitment for a

labor organization.

The District's efforts to minimize

those union activities likely to impact

negatively on construction and production schedules, as well as pose a

threat to security, generally were effective. But work stoppages—for the

most part, of very brief duration—did

occur. The largest number resulted

from jurisdictional disputes between

crafts. In April 1943, for example,

when electricians and ironworkers at

Clinton disagreed over the handling

of heavy electrical equipment, they

walked off the job. The walkout lasted

two days, during which 522 manhours were lost. Some work stoppages occurred over discharge or

transfer of employees. Typical was a

case in February 1944, when members of the welders union at Hanford

struck briefly to protest transfer of

one of their members to the night

shift, allegedly because of a grudge

between the area superintendent and

the employee. Time lost totaled 171

man-hours.

Dissatisfaction with wage rates and

employment conditions caused a few

work stoppages. Plumbers at Clinton

walked off the job briefly in December 1943 in protest against a rule requiring that they use a parking lot

more than half a mile from the point

where they punched their timecards,

and millwrights engaged in construction of a plant for the atomic project

at Decatur, Illinois, ceased work for a

few hours in August 1944 in dispute
MANPOWER CONSERVATION 371

over payment of shift time. In one or

two instances where a large number

of key construction employees were

involved (for example, electricians at

Clinton in December 1944), the loss

of man-hours was considerable (in

this case some forty thousand hours).

But quick settlement of most disputes

averted any disastrous slowdown in

the building program.

The District faced far more novel

and complex labor relations problems

in administering the project's operating employees. Many operating employees had to be made privy to

highly classified data and equipment,

whereas most construction employees

had no need for secret information.

Typically, too, the atomic project's

unique operating processes were far

more vulnerable, and labor activity

that interfered with operations simply

could not be tolerated. Furthermore,

most operating employees were not

union members and their work did

not fit nicely into any of the usual job

categories.

Most of the commercial and

industrial firms and the research institutions that accepted operating

contracts with the atomic project customarily adhered to an open-shop

policy. Du Pont, with major operational responsibilities at various

project installations, had never been

unionized in its private commercial

operations. The same was true of the

Tennessee Eastman Corporation, operator of the electromagnetic plant at

Clinton. Similarly, most of the university contractors were nonunion employers. There were a few exceptions.

The University of Chicago had a written agreement with the State, County,

and Municipal Workers of America, a

CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations) union, but it had little effect

on employee relations at the Metallurgical Laboratory. The University of

California recognized the right of the

Alameda County Building Trades

Council unions to establish pay rates

and conditions of employment for all

maintenance employees hired by the

university.

There were exceptions, too, among

the commercial and industrial contractors. The primary business of

the community service contractors

(Robert E. McKee at Los Alamos, the

Morrison-Knudsen Company in the

Hanford area, and the Oak Ridgebased Roane-Anderson Company, a

subsidiary of the Turner Construction

Company of New York) was construction work. They were accustomed to

dealing with the construction unions

and found that they could secure

most of the employees needed for

community operation and maintenance through the AFL Building

Trades unions. A number of the operators of smaller project plants also

normally employed union labor and

continued to do so in carrying out

their Manhattan contracts. The Houdaille-Hershey Corporation of Decatur, Illinois, for example, which made

barrier material for the gaseous diffusion process, signed an agreement

with the Building Trades unions.

Also, many of the firms manufacturing equipment and materials for Manhattan—such as the Allis-Chalmers

Manufacturing Company, Chrysler

Corporation, and Hooker Electrochemical Company—already were

unionized.

For reasons of security, District

manpower authorities frequently had

to substitute for government and
372 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

union officials in carrying on labor relations with nonunion operating employees. In cases of alleged violations

of the Fair Labor Standards Act and

the Walsh-Healey Act and in the conduct of inquiries made by the Fair

Employment Practices Committee,

they served in lieu of government

representatives; in the few instances

when operating employee elections

were necessary, they supervised the

balloting; and when federal agencies

took the initiative in requesting an investigation of employees or when national labor unions sought to hold

elections, they endeavored to persuade the agencies or unions to waive

the security-threatening procedure

and, failing in this, to let Manhattan

carry out whatever procedure was

deemed necessary.

Several unions pressed District

manpower authorities for recognition

as bargaining agents for plant-operating employees at the major production sites. To mediate the issue, each

union filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board and requested a formal hearing. The International Brotherhood of Firemen and

Oilers filed the first petition in

August 1944, seeking to represent the

Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation employees who worked at

the gaseous diffusion power plant,

and subsequently the International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

joined with the Firemen and Oilers

union in its petition. When the National Labor Relations Board scheduled a hearing for 24 October, District authorities promptly intervened

to prevent a serious security threat.

They negotiated with board officials,

who, in the end, agreed to postpone

the hearing. The postponement, however, was only a temporary victory for

the District, as the mediators indicated an ultimate hearing on the petition

was mandatory.

General Groves, determined to find

a permanent solution to the labor

problems of plant-operating employees, turned to War Department labor

experts for advice and assistance. As

Groves saw it, the atomic program

had to achieve three objectives: It had

to maintain production schedules; its

operations had to be protected from

sabotage and subversive interference

and from disclosure of information

useful to a foreign power; and it had

to maintain maximum efficiency and

economy. The Manhattan commander

felt strongly that District labor policies must be formulated to further

these objectives, which, he frankly

stated, might best be achieved by forbidding unions among plant-operating employees who worked in restricted areas. This policy, as he visualized

it, would mean exclusion of all outside agencies (including the National

Labor Relations and the National War

Labor Boards) and a ban on all types

of union activities. Groves immediately granted, however, that so restrictive a labor policy was probably not

feasible and the District undoubtedly

would have to be satisfied with a compromise arrangement. He suggested a

policy that would permit unions, limiting membership in them to employees of those contractors who had

signed a secrecy agreement, would

forbid outside union representatives,

and would require Army inspection

and control of all union activities. If

disputes should arise that could not

be settled in negotiations between the

contractor and the union, they would
MANPOWER CONSERVATION 373

have to be submitted to the Secretary

of War for arbitration.

War Department labor officials

were in agreement with General

Groves that there was no feasible way

for the Army to deny to the project's

plant-operating employees all rights

to organize. Their views were summarized in a report prepared in November 1944 by John H. Ohly of the

ASF's Industrial Personnel Division.

After conferring with Groves and several other District representatives,

Ohly concluded that labor problems

at Clinton were similar to those of the

Army's GOCO plants, but there were

significant differences: the overall urgency of the atomic project, its employment of several major contractors

at one site, its unusually strict security

requirements, the sensitivity of its

processes to stoppage, and the exceptionally large percentage of its

workers residing within a military reservation. Yet these differences,

Ohly reported, did not justify denying plant-operating employees the

right to organize. "The right to join

or associate with others in establishing a union of his own choosing without interference from his employer,"

Ohly noted, was a basic right possessed by the American working man,

and the War Department consistently had adhered to the policy of permitting employees in war industries

to continue to exercise that right to

the maximum extent practicable

under wartime conditions.20 The

extent to which workers at the Clinton plant would try to organize, Ohly

believed, depended largely on the attitude of the national union leaders—

William Green, Philip Murray, John L.

Lewis, and their chief subordinates—

toward these efforts. If these leaders

should encourage unionization of the

atomic plants, Ohly was confident

that this labor activity could be accommodated without unduly imperiling the major objectives of the

project.

General Groves was willing to go

along with the view that production

workers should be permitted some organizing activities, but he opposed

admission of outside union representatives to project areas and the conduct of public hearings on petitions

by labor board officials. He did not

succeed, however, in the time gained

through several postponements of the

union hearings, in attaining an agreement for withdrawal of the petition.

Finally, on 24 November, representatives of the National Labor Relations

Board notified the District that under

the law they must act on the petition

and thus scheduled a hearing for

19 December. The Manhattan commander immediately wrote to Under

Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson:

"We can no longer merely delay

action by NLRB. A definite position

must now be taken. If the cooperation

of the unions could be secured, the

problem would be solved. . . . In

view of the nature and importance

of the project, it is not too much

to ask them in furtherance of the

national interest to refrain from unionizing the Clinton Engineer Works for

the duration. This is the only feasible approach to the problem. No

20

 Rpt, Ohly, sub: Formulation of Labor Policies

To Govern Opn of CEW, 10 Nov 44, MDR.
374 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

rights are denied and no security is

sacrificed."

 21

Groves had expressed his views to

Patterson in the course of responding

favorably to the Under Secretary's

proposal that Manhattan should seek

the assistance of James F. Byrnes, director of the Office of War Mobilization, in securing the cooperation of

the unions. When Byrnes assented to

applying his well-known persuasive

powers to securing an understanding

with the Electrical Workers and Firemen and Oilers unions, Patterson

made the necessary arrangements for

a meeting on 5 December. To ensure

the support of the major operating

contractors at Clinton for any agreement reached at this meeting, Groves,

Nichols, and Lt. (jg.) John J. Flaherty,

a Navy officer serving as special assistant for labor matters on the district engineer's staff, conferred in

New York on 30 November with representatives of Carbide and Carbon,

Tennessee Eastman, and the Fercleve

Corporation.

The meeting on 5 December in

Byrnes's office at the White House

laid the groundwork for the eventual

establishment of a satisfactory policy

governing labor activities of operating

employees at the Clinton Engineer

Works—and, by extension, to those

working at the other major atomic installations—for the duration of the

war. With Byrnes's assistance, Groves,

Patterson, and Edward McGrady, the

Under Secretary's labor adviser obtained a tentative agreement from

A. L. Wegener, head of the Electrical

Workers, and Joseph P. Clark, who

served in a similar capacity for the

Firemen and Oilers, to postpone indefinitely the labor hearings with the

proviso that the two unions be permitted to represent their membership

in the handling of any grievances that

might arise. In the days immediately

after the White House meeting, the

Firemen and Oilers and the Electrical

Workers unions confirmed this agreement, as did the International Association of Machinists, which had

petitioned for bargaining rights on

28 November with Roane-Anderson.

The Machinists union also filed a

petition to organize the thousands of

workers employed by Tennessee Eastman in the electromagnetic plant at

Clinton, but held it in abeyance in

keeping with the agreement. Some

local labor leaders, particularly those

in the Electrical Workers union, were

reluctant to forego organizing activities, for they were convinced that the

operating contractors simply had used

the Army to push through the ban on

union organization which they desired. Only through the combined

efforts of War Department-District

labor officials and national union representatives were the skeptical local

labor leaders finally persuaded to give

the District's alternative grievance

procedures a chance to be tested

before renewing their organizational

activities.

The procedures adopted for hearing grievances were patterned on

those used in GOCO plants. In September 1944, the district engineer directed that all operating contractors

at Clinton institute their own grievance procedures, requiring only that

the latter conform to general standards laid down by District manpower

21

 Memo, Groves to Und Secy War, 28 Nov 44,

Incl to Memo, Und Secy War to Byrnes, 30 Nov 44,

HB Files, Fldr 51, MDR.
MANPOWER CONSERVATION 375

authorities. These procedures guaranteed each operating employee equal

access to "a fair and complete review

of his grievance."

 22

 They also ensured him a hearing without delay

and resolution of his case within

thirty days. The employee could take

his grievance through the various

levels of plant supervision—foreman,

superintendent, and so forth—up to a

final hearing by a representative of

the district engineer. In this final

review, the aggrieved worker could be

represented by a union steward, who,

for reasons of security, must be an

employee of the same contractor as

the worker.

The question of unions and union

activities among operating employees

at the other two major atomic installations—Hanford and Los Alamos—

never became a serious problem.

Workers at Hanford, many of them

already members of construction

unions, briefly attempted to organize

operating employees in the production plants administered by Du Pont.

But Lt. Col. Franklin T. Matthias, the

area engineer, promptly intervened.

Similarly, outside unions requested

permission to organize Hanford workers, but agreed to postpone their

effort as long as it would constitute a

threat to security. Occasionally individual AFL members in the plutonium production plants endeavored to

recruit members, but achieved little

success.

Most operating workers at Los

Alamos were either civil service or

contractor employees, some of whom

belonged to unions. By late 1944,

there were indications that union

members generally opposed employment of nonunion workers in civil

service positions. In November, a representative from the Office of the

Chief of Engineers in Washington,

D.C., meeting in Santa Fe with the director of the Thirteenth U.S. Civil

Service Region (which now included

New Mexico) and local labor leaders,

stated that there would be no discrimination between union and nonunion

members in the hiring of civil service

employees for Los Alamos. In the

case of union workers employed at

Los Alamos by project contractors, no

labor relations problems of consequence occurred during the period of

the war.

The modifications required by the

Army in the normal labor activities of

Manhattan's operating employees

proved to be both workable and effective. In the period of maximum plant

operations from late 1944 until September 1945, there was no compromise of security or interruption of

production schedules that could be

charged to labor activities among

operating employees. Furthermore,

most production workers came to

accept the limitations on their employee rights as being necessary

under the circumstances. Consequently, these limitations did not seriously

affect employee morale or result in

large-scale defections from the job.

Perhaps the most concrete evidence

of the effectiveness of the project's

labor policies was the almost complete absence of work stoppages from

late 1944 to the end of the war.

Among the tens of thousands of operating employees at Clinton in this

period, there was only one instance of

22

 Ltr, Dist Engr to All Operating Contractors,

CEW, 27 Sep 44, copy in MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, App.

B11, DASA.
376 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

stoppage—a brief walkout of general

repairmen in May 1945 at the Carbide and Carbon installations. Work

stoppages of somewhat greater length

did occur at several plants producing

essential materials for the project in

Detroit, in Decatur (Illinois), and in

Uravan (Colorado), but none caused

serious interference with production

schedules. Even in the immediate

postwar period, when restraints on

union activities inevitably were weakened, work stoppages traceable to

employee organizations or grievances

were remarkably low. As of the end of

December 1946, when the Army was

preparing to turn over control of the

atomic project to the Atomic Energy

Commission, Manhattan production

plants had lost only about eighty-six

thousand man-hours, or about 0.028

percent of their potential working

time, as a result of work stoppages.

From 1943 through early 1945, the

Manhattan Project faced relentless

construction and production schedules that could only be met if the adequacy and efficiency of its large and

heterogeneous work force could be

maintained. Consequently, the military and civilian leaders of the project

early realized that they must take

strong countermeasures against such

prevalent manpower-eroding tendencies in the American wartime environment as high labor turnover, the demands of military conscription, and

labor union activities. Making use of

many of the same War Department

and other governmental channels earlier employed for procuring workers

for the project, General Groves, the

Manhattan District's manpower staff

at Oak Ridge, and the area engineers

at the field installations were able to

secure approval for such labor turnover antidotes as higher wages and

improved housing, to work out special arrangements for retaining critically needed workers with the Selective Service System, and to obtain the

cooperation of American union leaders in postponing labor activities that

would have jeopardized the production goals and security of the project.
CHAPTER XVIII

Electric Power

Reasonable access to the essential

process support elements of electric

power, water, communications, and

transportation was—as the safety and

security of geographic isolation—a

critical factor in Manhattan's selection

of suitable sites. Attainment of both

of these desired features was a difficult challenge, for often they were not

compatible with each other. Yet without compromising project requirements, the Army resolved the dilemma by choosing sites that were in

comparatively isolated regions of

Tennessee, Washington State, and

New Mexico and by developing those

process support resources available in

neighboring and adjacent areas.

Overseeing process support development, particularly when the nation

was experiencing a chronic shortage

of electric generators, boilers, copper

wire, water pipes, and other equipment and materials, became one of

the most important activities undertaken by the Army in administering

the Manhattan Project. Illustrative of

this fact was that Army personnel at

every level participated in some

aspect of these activities: General

Groves and the Washington Liaison

Office coordinated with appropriate

Washington agencies to secure essential procurement priorities; the district engineer and area engineers supervised process support activities at

field installations and major procurement centers; and the Army Engineers and the Signal and Transportation Corps contributed substantially

in their respective fields of expertise.

And while the problems were most

pressing in the early months of site

development, Army personnel from

the project and other War Department agencies continued to be involved in their solution on a lesser

scale throughout the war.

Power Requirements and Sources

Of all the aspects of process support required for the atomic project,

none was more vital than electric

power. Electricity constituted, so to

speak, the very lifeblood of almost

every important production process,

as well as of many other project activities. In planning and developing

the project's electric power program,

the Army faced three basic problems.

The first was how to procure large

amounts of electricity from a wartime

economy that was only beginning to

overcome chronic shortages. Project

leaders initially had estimated a need

for approximately 150,000 kilowatts,

but the decision to relocate the pluto-
378 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

nium production facilities at a separate site had upped the requirement

to more than a quarter of a million

kilowatts, an amount of electricity that

at the time would have met the needs

of a typical American city with a population of half a million. As large as

these early estimates of power requirements for the project were, time

would prove them to have been far

too low.1

A second problem was to ensure

electric service that would never be

interrupted. This requirement for virtually unparalleled transmission reliability arose from the peculiarly hazardous character of the industrial

processes. Only continuous operation

of pumps, fans, and refrigeration

equipment would dissipate heat and

remove radioactive gases adequately.

Also, in the electromagnetic and diffusion processes, almost any interruption in the progressive purification

stages would play havoc with closely

coordinated production schedules.2

The third problem was a matter of

security, and related not to supply but

to distribution of electric power. Because the quantity of power required

could not be produced by generating

plants located within the confines of

the atomic reservations, much of it

had to be brought over extended

transmission lines running through

areas beyond the reach of effective security protection. Project engineers,

therefore, had to devise special techniques that would thwart the efforts

of potential saboteurs.3

During the early period of project

development, Manhattan's administrative and engineering staffs devoted

considerable attention to procuring

electric power for the proposed

atomic installations, especially for the

site(s) that would house the major

production plants. Preliminary site investigations in Tennessee and later in

Washington State occasioned talks

with the Tennessee Valley Authority

(TVA) and the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA). The objective of

these talks was to obtain assurances

from the power agencies that sufficient power would be available when

needed, or could be developed from

new generating facilities under construction.4

 The Army succeeded in

1

 Marshall Diary, 25 Jun 42, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, Groves Files, Misc Recs Sec, behind Fldr 5,

MDR; Ltr, Groves to Herbert S. Marks (Act Dir,

Power Div, WPB), 7 Feb 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 675, MDR; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, "Clinton Engineer Works," p. 12.2 and App. C7, and Bk. 4,

Vol. 3, "Design," p. 7.1, and Vol. 6, "Operations,"

p. 2.17, DASA; Memos, Brig Gen Thomas F. Farrell

(Groves's Dep) to Groves, sub: Power Requirements, 5 Jun 45, and Carl H. Giroux (OCE power

expert) to Farrell, sub: Power Requirements for

CEW, 8 Jun 45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 675

(CEW), MDR. A watt, as used in this context, is a

unit of power equal to the rate of work represented

by a current of one ampere (one coulomb per

second) under a pressure of one volt. Thus, project

leaders in 1942 were predicting that 150 million

watts of power would have to be available on a constant basis to fulfill the operating needs of the

atomic production plants. 2

 Memo, Lt Col James C. Stowers (New York Area

Engr) to Marshall, sub: K-25 Proj Requirements,

21 Jan 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Projs

and Prgms: K-25), MDR; Ltr, Percival C. Keith

(Kellex Corp. chief) to Stowers, sub: K-25 Proj

Power Supply and Requirements, 25 Mar 43, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 675 (CEW), MDR; MDH, Bk. 4,

Vol. 3, pp. 5.1 and 7.1, DASA. 3

 Ltrs, Groves to J. A. Krug (OWU Dir), sub: MD,

CEW, 2 and 30 Jun 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

675 (CEW), MDR; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 3, pp. 7.1-7.3,

DASA; Memo, WPB (by Joseph Whelan, Rec Secy)

to BPA, sub: Power Svc for WD, HEW, 11 May 44,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 675, MDR; Groves, Now

It Can Be Told, p. 112. 4

 The TVA, which in 1942 had twelve new dams

and a large coal-steam power plant under construction, anticipated raising its capacity from approximately 1.4 to over 2.5 million kilowatts by mid- Continued
ELECTRIC POWER 379

POWER PLANT (foreground) AT HEW, one of several facilities providing steam and backup

electricity for the production piles and separation plants

getting these assurances, but at best

they were tentative and did not in any

sense constitute a firm guarantee to

deliver power to a specified point on

a given date. In fact, at the time neither the TVA nor BPA had an appreciable amount of surplus power. Most

of their output was committed to war

industries, particularly producers of

aluminum, and to the many communities located in their service areas.5

1945—an increase more than adequate to meet requirements at Clinton. The BPA anticipated generating some 800,000 kilowatts at the new Grand

Coulee Dam by mid-1944, in addition to the 86,000

kilowatts it was producing at the Bonneville Dam.

See Tennessee Valley Authority, Annual Report of the

Tennessee Valley Authority for Fiscal Year Ending 30 June

42 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,

1946), pp. 8 and 19-23: ibid., Annual Report of the

Tennessee Valley Authority for Fiscal Year Ending 30 June

45 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,

1945), p. 58; U.S. Department of Interior, Bonneville Power Administration, Report on Columbia River

Power System, Fiscal Year 1945 (Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 8. The BPA

report actually covers operations from 1 Jul 38 to

30 Jun 45.

5

 Marshall Diary, 21 Sep 42, MDR. Background information on TVA and BPA activities may be found

in the following sources: Roscoe C. Martin, ed.,

TVA: The First Twenty Years (Knoxville: University of

Tennessee Press, 1956), p. 86; "Bonneville Dam,

Oregon" and "Tennessee Valley Authority," in The

World Almanac and Book of Facts for 1946, ed. Harry

Hansen (New York World Telegram, 1946), pp. 234

and 703-04; U.S. Engineers Office (Portland, Oreg.)

and U.S. Department of Interior, Bonneville Power

Administration, The Bonneville Project: Improvement of

the Columbia River at Bonneville, Oregon (Washington,

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 3.
380 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Manhattan leaders' early recognition that a very high priority must go

to securing firm commitments for an

adequate supply of electric power for

the atomic production plants led

them to seek immediate assistance

from several agencies in the War Department, especially the Office of the

Under Secretary of War and the

Corps of Engineers, that had developed the organization and personnel

prerequisite to negotiating priorities

and arranging procurement for electric power and scarce electrical equipment in the wartime economy. General Groves, for example, frequently

drew extensively upon the vast

amount of data on the nation's electrical resources in engineer files, accumulated since 1920 in carrying out

a continuous survey for War Department mobilization planning purposes.

Groves also borrowed expert personnel from the engineer staff, including

Carl H. Giroux, who became chief

adviser on power matters for the

Manhattan District.6

Groves and Capt. Allan C. Johnson

of the District's Washington Liaison

Office handled most of the many matters that, in the tightly controlled wartime economy, required clearance

through the Power Division (later

called the Office of War Utilities) of

the War Production Board. They also

took responsibility for those aspects

of the Hanford negotiations with the

BPA that required approval from the

Department of Interior. Keeping in

close touch with Groves and Johnson,

District headquarters officials assisted

in many aspects of the Clinton negotiations with the TVA, which had its

headquarters in Knoxville, conveniently near the Tennessee site.7

Because of the tentative nature of

earlier TVA power commitments,

Groves directed Captain Johnson to

visit the War Production Board. Inquiring about the status of these commitments, the board assured Johnson

that more than sufficient power would

be available at the Tennessee site

when needed. These commitments,

however, were based on Manhattan's

original power assessment for the site,

which, by October 1942, project engineers had determined was too low.

New electric power projections were

calculated, and on the nineteenth

Deputy District Engineer Nichols informed Herbert S. Marks, acting director of the Power Division, that a

maximum of 75,000 instead of 60,000

kilowatts would be required by midsummer of 1943, increasing to

125,000 kilowatts by October of that

year. Upon reviewing the estimated

power requirement of 150,000 kilowatts for early 1944, Nichols remarked that this figure was probably

too high and suggested the total be

reduced to about 130,000 kilowatts. A

final concern was if this requirement

would absorb the extra power resources the TVA was accumulating

for emergency use, but Marks reas6

 Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, pp. 95-

96. Evidence of the many occasions when Office of

the Under Secretary of War and Corps of Engineers

personnel were involved in Manhattan Project

power negotiations may be found in MDR, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 675 (CEW).

7

 Donald M. Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy: The Story

of American War Production (New York: Harcourt,

Brace and Co., 1946), p. 365. See also WPB Org

Chart in Civilian Production Administration, Bureau

of Demobilization, Industrial Mobilization for War: History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies,

1940-45, Program and Administration, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), p.

593 (henceforth cited as History of WPB).
ELECTRIC POWER 381

sured Nichols that all power requirements for Clinton would be met.8

Yet sweeping changes under way in

the War Production Board's policy relating to nonmilitary government construction threatened the TVA's program for expanding its generating

facilities. On 20 October, WPB Chairman Donald Nelson directed all federal agencies involved in large-scale

building programs to cease nonmilitary construction not directly essential

to the war effort. When news of the

directive reached Captain Johnson, he

conferred at once with Groves, Nichols, and board officials. Meanwhile,

General Styer sent word that TVA

Chairman David E. Lilienthal already

had asked Under Secretary of War

Patterson to resolve this dilemma in

face of increasing War Department

demands for TVA power.

Johnson interpreted these developments to mean that Manhattan should

await the outcome of Lilienthal's consultations with Patterson before submitting a protest, thereby avoiding

any contretemps. Patterson subsequently intervened with the War Production Board and obtained permission for the TVA to complete one of

its largest projects—the Fontana Dam

on the Little Tennessee River in western North Carolina—on the grounds

that it was essential to the war effort.

And to give additional support to the

TVA's case for continuing work on

the dam, Groves had the Engineers

deputy chief inform the agency that

the Manhattan District's maximum

power requirements would be between 125,000 and 150,000 kilowatts.

Bottlenecks removed, direct action assured completion of the major Fontana generating facilities by early

1945, in time to furnish the Clinton

installations with the additional power

they would need.9

The Military Policy Committee's

December 1942 decision to shift location of the plutonium production facilities from Tennessee to another

site presented project leaders with another major problem in power procurement. Project engineers estimated

that the plutonium installations would

require approximately 140,000 kilowatts of electricity by early 1944. Although General Groves was aware of

this requirement, he had not obtained

a preliminary commitment from the

War Production Board and the BPA

when Hanford was selected as the

plutonium site. Groves was apparently

relying on ample evidence that major

units of the great Grand Coulee Dam

hydroelectric plant, which would have

an operating capacity of more than

800,000 kilowatts by mid-1944, were

nearing completion. He knew from

site reports that the BPA's existing

Midway Substation was strategically

located at the western edge of the

area, where project transmission lines

could readily tap the BPA system.

Also, lines owned by the Pacific

Power and Light Company, a privately owned utility that supplied most of

the electricity to local communities in

the area, crisscrossed the Hanford

8

 Marshall Diary, 2 Jul, 21 Sep, 19 Oct 42, MDR;

Chart, Site X Electric Power Requirements, 24 Oct

42, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 675 (CEW), MDR.

9

 Ltr, Nelson to Lilienthal, 20 Oct 42, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 675 (CEW), MDR; History of

WPB, p. 401; Marshall Diary, 22 Oct 42, MDR;

Memo, Lt Col R. H. Tatlow (WD Rep, WPB Facility

Review Committee) to Und Secy War, sub: TVA

Projs, 22 Oct 42, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 675

(CEW), MDR; Martin, TVA: The First Twenty Years, p.

86; DSM Chronology, 2 Nov 42, Sec. 26, OROO.
382 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

reservation at several points, providing an immediately available source

of power for early construction

activities.10

As early as mid-January 1943, the

War Production Board learned that

the Manhattan Project would be seeking a large block of electric power

somewhere in the Pacific Coast area,

but it did not hear officially from

Groves until early February. On the

seventh of that month, Groves submitted a brief description of Hanford's anticipated requirements to the

Power Division. Beginning in April,

he indicated, the plutonium project

would need about 10,000 kilowatts

for construction purposes. By December, this requirement would grow to

40,000 kilowatts and then rise in regular increments to a maximum load of

approximately 140,000 kilowatts in

1944. Meanwhile, Groves noted, preliminary studies were already under

way to determine what electrical

equipment must be procured for the

plutonium plants and their power distribution system.11

The War Production Board

promptly notified Groves that the

BPA could meet Hanford's power requirements from its Midway Substation and stated its general agreement

with the preliminary plans for electrical equipment and distribution for the

plutonium site. With this confirmation, Groves turned over to Giroux,

his power consultant, the detailed

task of reserving blocks of power to

be available on specified dates. In negotiations with the BPA office in

Washington, D.C., Giroux paved the

way for a firm agreement on power

reservations, which project officials

reached in mid-March with the BPA

administrator.12

Because of the urgent need for

speed, Manhattan had to go ahead

with preliminary arrangements for

power at both Clinton and Hanford

on the basis of only a minimum of information concerning precise design

and operating characteristics of the

production plants. Consequently, as

construction and operation processes

were developed in greater detail,

project engineers frequently had to

revise estimated power requirements—usually upward. New surveys

conducted at Clinton in March 1943

revealed that total power needs by

May 1944 would be about 285,000

kilowatts (electromagnetic plant,

114,000; gaseous diffusion plant,

160,000; plutonium semiworks, 1,200;

the town of Oak Ridge and other installations, 9,500), nearly twice the

original estimate. Faced with the considerable increase in previously projected requirements, General Groves

dispatched Giroux to the War Production Board. Following negotiations with the TVA, the board reported back to Giroux that the TVA could

furnish the indicated 285,000 kilowatts of firm power without unduly

10

 Matthias Diary, 7 Feb 43, OROO; Groves, Now

It Can Be Told, pp. 74, 89, 207-09; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol.

3, p. 7.1, and Vol. 4, "Land Acquisition, Hanford

Engineer Works," pp. 2.11-2.12, DASA; Du Pont

Constr Hist, Vol. 1, p. 10, and Vol. 4, pp. 1059-67

and 1072, HOO; Data on BPA in World Almanac for

1946, p. 234. 11

 Ltrs, Marks to Groves, 18 Jan 43, and Groves

to Marks, 7 Feb 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 675,

MDR.

12

 Ltrs, Marks to Groves, 8 Feb 43, and Paul J.

Raver (BPA Admin) to Chief of Engrs, Attn.: Giroux,

17 Mar 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 675, MDR.
ELECTRIC POWER 383

interfering with its commitments to

other users.13

At about the same time, important

new information came from Kellex

Corporation designers on plans for

the gaseous diffusion (K-25) plant:

Total dependence upon outside

power resources would not be practicable or safe. The diffusion process

required a vast system of motordriven pumps and blowers and the

Kellex studies showed that even the

briefest interruption in power supply

would cause an unacceptable reduction in productivity. "For many

months . . . ," Groves later recalled,

"we labored under the belief that if

the plant was shut down through

power failure or for any other

reason—for as much as a fraction of a

second—it would take many days,

some said seventy, to get back into

full operation."

 14

The obvious solution was to provide the gaseous diffusion facility with

its own electric generating unit, and

Kellex designers advanced a number

of reasons for favoring an on-site location for this power source. An onsite plant could be designed to

produce the variable-frequency current required for the diffusion process, thus eliminating the need for

expensive, complicated, and difficultto-procure equipment to transform the

TVA's fixed-frequency current. And,

a power plant on the reservation

would be far less exposed to sabotage

than the TVA's off-site facilities, especially its extended transmission lines

running miles across open country to

the Clinton site. Furthermore, there

was always the chance that the TVA,

with so many wartime industries dependent upon its resources, might

not be able to supply uninterrupted

power. With these arguments, Kellex

officials persuaded project engineers

that a steam-electric plant capable of

generating the basic power load for

the diffusion process should be built

immediately adjacent to the main

K-25 works. Groves, in particular,

was impressed by the highly positive

security and engineering advantages

of an on-site power plant.15

Kellex's persuasive arguments led

to the District's decision in mid-April

1943 to build the steam-electric plant

and, shortly thereafter, to contract

with the prime construction contractor for K-25, the J. A. Jones Construction Company, for its erection.

By early summer work was under way

on the generating unit, one of the

largest of its type to be built up to

that time. Its original design called

for nine turbogenerators, operating

with coal-heated steam from three

13

 Memo, Lt Col Robert C. Blair (Ex Off, MD) to

Marshall, sub: CEW Power Requirements, 30 Mar

43; Draft Ltrs, unsigned to J. E. Moore (Power Prod

Br chief, WPB), 30 Mar 43; Memo, Giroux to

Groves, 15 Mar 43. All in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 675 (CEW), MDR. 14

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 112.

15

 MDH, Bk. 2, Vol. 3, "Design," pp. 12.1-12.3,

DASA. Memo, Stowers to Marshall, sub: K-25 Proj

Requirements, 21 Jan 43, MDR. Ltr, Keith to

Stowers, sub: K-25 Proj Power Supply and Requirements, 25 Mar 43; Telecon, Groves and Albert L.

Baker (Kellex Chief Engr), sub: Separate Power

Plant Instead of Using TVA, 26 Jun 43; Ltr, Groves

to Krug, 30 Jun 43. All in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 675 (CEW), MDR. Groves Diary, 26 Jun 43,

LRG. Groves, Notes [in] Black Notebook, OCG

Files, Gen Corresp, Groves Files, MDR. The notes

are in a small (10" x 7"), loose-leaf, three-ringed

binder and were maintained personally by Groves as

an aid to memory and as a repository of data on virtually all aspects of atomic project activities from

May 1943 through May 1945. Data on power at

Clinton are in the section tabbed "Permanent

Notes." See also Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 112.
384 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

K-25 POWER PLANT AT CEW

750,000-pound boilers, to produce a

maximum of 238,000 kilowatts of

variable-frequency power. With this

anticipated output, project engineers

could reduce estimates of fixed-frequency power needed from the TVA

for K-25's "nonvital requirements" to

approximately 35,000 kilowatts.16

Building a major power plant

added substantially to Manhattan's

procurement problems during K-25

construction, so District procurement

officials frequently turned to the War

Production Board's Office of War

Utilities for aid in obtaining a variety

of scarce equipment. The utilities

agency, for example, persuaded a

Chicago firm to cancel its order for

two already partly fabricated 750,000-

pound boilers and also reassigned

priorities previously granted to other

war projects, thus enabling Manhattan

to obtain not only the essential boilers but also eight 25,000-kilowatt turbogenerators. Manhattan subsequently sought a ninth generator to meet

16

 Dist Engr, Monthly Rpt on DSM Proj, 23 Mar22 Apr 43, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr

28, Tab A, MDR; Completion Rpt, M. W. Kellogg

Co. and Kellex Corp., sub: K-25 Plant, Contract W7405-eng-23, 31 Oct 45, p. 11, OROO; Telecon,

Groves and Baker, sub: Separate Power Plant Instead of Using TVA, 26 Jun 43, MDR; MDH, Bk. 1,

Vol. 12, pp. 12.4-12.6, 12.19, 12.23-12.26, and Bk.

2, Vol. 3, pp. 12.1-12.4, DASA. The Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 675 (CEW), MDR, contains a series of

progress charts on construction of the K-25 power

plant through September 1943. General Groves

used the terms vital and nonvital to distinguish between the kinds of power required for basic plantoperation and for other uses on the K-25 project.

See Groves Ms, p. 364, CMH.
ELECTRIC POWER 385

peak demands to protect against sabotage, but War Utilities Director J. A.

Krug balked at the request, pointing

out to Groves that power from outside sources could be brought to the

plant over two separate transmission

circuits. Each would carry electricity

from a different power source, but

each would be capable of transmitting

the entire power load available in the

area. Furthermore, the two TVA circuits were of lightningproof construction and there was a third independent circuit that could be tied in with

them if necessary. "Except for simultaneous sabotage of all circuits," Krug

concluded, "a failure of external

power supply is virtually inconceivable. Certainly the combined reliability of several such circuits is incomparably higher than that of a ninth

generator unit."

 17

Krug's arguments failed to budge

Groves, who countered with the statements that the gaseous diffusion process simply could not afford to

depend upon outside sources for any

part of its power and that there would

be technical difficulties converting the

TVA's current to variable frequency.

Groves was willing, however, to consider a compromise solution suggested by Kellex, the substitution of two

small turbogenerators capable of producing almost as much current as one

large generator. Krug agreed, but the

two small units did not suffice and

eventually three more turbogenerators were added, bringing the total to

fourteen.18

While solving the huge electric

power requirements of the major production plants at Clinton and Hanford, Manhattan's administrative and

engineering staffs also took care of

the lesser power needs of the

project's research and development

installations, including those of Los

Alamos. Expanding facilities in Chicago were typical. The Metallurgical

and Argonne laboratories required a

comparatively small but reliable

source of electricity to operate their

many research and development

projects, and Captain Johnson negotiated with the War Production Board

for allocation of adequate power from

existing local sources. The Los

Alamos Laboratory, because of its geographic isolation, presented different

problems. There, the Army post commander assisted project engineers in

procuring several small, easily obtainable diesel generators capable of producing the relatively small amount of

current required to meet initial

needs.19

17

 Ltrs, Krug to Groves, sub: MD, CEW, 11 Jun

43 (source of quote, Krug's italics), and Groves to

Krug, same sub, 2 Jun 43; Draft Ltr, unsigned

(probably Baker to Stowers), sub: Power Supply

Equipment, 30 Mar 43, and appended data. All in

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 675 (CEW), MDR.

MDH, Bk. 2, Vol. 3. pp. 12.5-12.6, DASA.

18

 Ltr, Groves to Krug, 30 Jun 43, MDR; MDH,

Bk. 2, Vol. 3, pp. 12.6 and 12.20, DASA. In September 1945, a K-25 power plant operator accidentally

threw a wrong switch, briefly cutting off the electrical supply. The damage to equipment and loss in

production proved much less than had been predicted by Kellex in 1943. For further details on this

power outage see Memo, Col Walter J. Williams

(K-25 unit chief) to Nichols, sub: Power Failure to

Section 2b on 16 Sep, 25 Oct 45; Ltr, Baker to

Stowers, sub: Rpt of K-25 Power Failure on 16 Sep,

19 Oct 45, and Incl. Both in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 675 (CEW), MDR. Groves, Now It Can Be Told,

pp. 112-13. See Ch. XI for a description of an attempt to sabotage the K-25 supply of electrical current. 19

 Marshall Diary, 27 Oct 42, MDR; MDH, Bk. 3,

"The P-9 Project," pp. 3.2, 4.6-4.7, 4.13, 4.19, and

Bk. 8, Vol. 1, "General," pp. 5.14-5.15, DASA.
386 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Implementation of the Power Program

Manhattan had largely completed

the acquisition phase of its power

program by mid-1943. Its next task

was to bring these resources to bear

upon achievement of basic program

objectives through negotiation of

complex purchase contracts and operating agreements with the TVA, BPA,

and other outside suppliers; through

design and construction of distribution systems; and through procurement of materials and equipment.

Manhattan's general purchase contract for power service to Clinton was

based on policy agreement that TVA

Chairman Lilienthal and Under Secretary of War Patterson had drafted in

the fall of 1942. Under terms of this

agreement, the TVA would supply all

War Department projects at its lowest

primary rate, that is, the rate normally

granted only to purchases made

under long-term contracts; the War

Department could terminate any purchase contract on thirty-days' notice

without penalty; and, as needed, the

TVA would construct additional

transmission lines while the War Department would build substations and

connecting lines.20

The earlier view that War Department purchases would constitute a

relatively small part of the TVA's

total power production came under

close scrutiny in 1944, because power

requirements at Clinton had multiplied greatly. Consequently, when Lilienthal prepared to approve Manhattan's power contract in April, he

began to have serious qualms about

the long-range impact of its future

purchases upon the economy of the

TVA system. He pointed out to Patterson that if, under the terms of the

1942 agreement, Manhattan should

suddenly decide to terminate its purchases of electricity on thirty-days'

notice, the TVA would face the prospect of excessive financial loss. Under

normal commercial purchase agreements, the TVA protected itself by

long-term contracts and higher rates.

Lilienthal requested that the War Department provide that "the contemporary record make it clear that the

loss, should it occur, is one of the

costs of the war and therefore not

one that the consumers of electricity

in the Tennessee Valley should be

singled out to bear."

 21

The Under Secretary of War acknowledged that the TVA was indeed

likely to suffer substantial losses

should Manhattan elect to exercise

the right of thirty-days' cancellation

of service and therefore agreed that,

if the TVA did not at once find other

purchasers for the power it was furnishing the Clinton site, the War Department would support the agency in

claiming that such losses were compensable. Manhattan's basic power

supply contract for Clinton was

signed on 25 April 1944 (effective

1 October 1943), with supplemental

provisions for a variety of other electrical services subsequently added.

Because the TVA viewed all Clinton

activities as being for a single consumer, it billed Manhattan in the

same manner as the other large commercial users of power on the TVA

system.22

20

 Ltr, Lilienthal to Patterson, 26 Apr 44, HB

Files, Fldr 80, MDR.

21

 Ibid. 22

 Ltr, Patterson to Lilienthal, 1 May 44, HB Files,

Fldr 80, MDR; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 12.1, 12.9, Continued
ELECTRIC POWER 387

The BPA's general purchase contract for power service to Hanford, although agreed upon in February

1944, was not completed in final form

until November. The primary cause of

delay was General Groves's conviction

that the purchase contract did not

provide sufficient guarantees for reliable service. Patterson requested the

Office of War Utilities to grant additional priorities that would give Hanford first claim on Bonneville power

resources under all circumstances and

would expedite procurement of materials and equipment needed to make

its distribution system more reliable.

To establish Hanford's prior claim to

power from the Bonneville system,

the War Utilities director had his staff

prepare a draft priorities directive.

This directive, to become effective

when the plutonium facilities began

actual operations, indicated that the

War Production Board had approved

all requests for materials and equipment for the BPA-Hanford electrical

distribution system to date and that it

would continue to do so in the

future.23

Before giving Hanford prior claim

to BPA power, the Office of War Utilities required negotiation of a satisfactory operating agreement. Precise

terms, however, were not completed

until August 1944, when Manhattan

finally forwarded a completed draft to

the BPA administrator. The latter

took strong objection to certain key

provisions, especially those ensuring

maximum reliability of electrical service to Hanford. Such provisions, the

administrator contended, not only

would place unreasonable restrictions

on the BPA's generating and transmission facilities, resulting in serious

financial losses, but also would prevent the BPA from meeting the full

demands of its other customers and

from securing new users.

Faced with the prospect of further

delay in negotiating a satisfactory

agreement with the BPA, General

Groves once again turned to Under

Secretary of War Patterson. The Manhattan commander explained to Patterson that the BPA administrator's

objections were essentially the same

as those earlier advanced by Lilienthal

concerning the terms of TVA service.

On 11 August 1944, acting on behalf

of Patterson, Assistant Secretary of

War John J. McCloy informed the

BPA administrator that if the Bonneville system should incur losses because of "the particular conditions

necessarily imposed by the war effort

in this instance [service in Hanford],

such losses would be one of the costs

of the war."

 24

13 and App. A (Nos. 80, 83-88, 90, 92, 95-96, 209,

211-12, 217), DASA. The original contract provided

that Manhattan could not resell current to commercial users, but a 1 Jul 45 supplement granted the

project permission to resell limited amounts to concessionaires located within the site boundaries. This

supplement also contained a provision that any surplus electricity produced by the K-25 power plant

was, if requested, to be made available to the TVA

system. 23

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, "Construction," p. 7.1 and

App. C25, DASA; Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 4, p.

1059, HOO. Du Pont Opns Hist, Bk. 3, "Electrical

Power Distribution Experience to July 1, 1945," p. 3

HOO. Ltrs, Patterson to Krug, sub: Power Svc for

HEW, 22 Feb 44, and Krug to Patterson, same sub,

31 Mar 44; Ltr, Edward Falck (OWU Dir as of Apr

44) to Raver, sub: Power Svc for WD, HEW, 6 May

44; Ltrs, Falck to Patterson, same sub, 11 May 44,

and Patterson to Falck, 3 Jul 44, and Incl (Draft Directive). All in HB Files, Fldr 51, MDR. Matthias

Diary, 29 Jul 44, OROO. 24

 Quoted words from Ltr, McCloy (for Patterson)

to BPA Admin, 11 Aug 44, HB Files, Fldr 51, MDR. Continued
388 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

As soon as the BPA received solid

assurances from the War Department

that such losses would be covered, it

notified the Under Secretary that it

would promptly approve the agreement. Under terms of the agreement,

the BPA guaranteed Hanford 150,000

kilowatts of electricity and agreed to

supervise the remodeling, equipping,

maintenance, and repair of the existing transmission system to ensure a

stable and uninterrupted flow of

power under all predictable conditions. The BPA's approval of the operating agreement cleared the way for

the Office of War Utilities to issue the

long-delayed priorities directive, thus

removing the last obstacle to the

development of Hanford's power

service.25

Implementation of the power resources to meet the relatively modest

needs of Manhattan's other installations presented few problems. In

most instances, these facilities simply

established whatever hookups were

required into the already existing

transmission systems. No special priorities or operating agreements were

necessary as long as the demands of

the project did not place an undue

burden on the supply of power available. Atomic laboratories on the campuses of universities (for example, at

Chicago, California-Berkeley, and Columbia) tapped into available facilities. The heavy water plants at Trail,

British Columbia, and at the Army's

three munitions installations likewise

drew upon existing sources of power.

The situation differed somewhat at

Los Alamos, where the nearest highpower transmission line was almost

25 miles distant from the installation

site. For more than a year, small

diesel-powered generators supplied

the bomb laboratory with sufficient

electricity. But in August 1944, when

power demands increased beyond the

maximum load that could be safely

generated over an extended period

by existing units, project engineers

recommended securing additional

sources of electricity. Based on their

investigation that procurement of an

additional generator would take

longer and provide less flexibility

than constructing a high-voltage line

to tie in to the New Mexico Power

Company's nearest transmission line,

the Army authorized the connecting

line. Projected power requirements

for 1945, however, surpassed the

supply available from the new source.

To overcome this shortfall, two more

diesel generating units were procured

and, in 1946, began providing the additional power needed by the bomb

laboratory.26

Distribution: Clinton Engineer Works

Both the Clinton and Hanford sites

were selected in part because of their

location near major power transmission lines, but neither had within its

boundaries a well-developed local

electrical distribution system. Of the

two major sites, Clinton was more deficient in this respect. The thinly popSee also Memo, Groves to Patterson, 11 Aug 44,

HB Files, Fldr 80, MDR; Dist Engr, Monthly Rpt on

DSM Proj, Sep 44, MDR. 25

 Ltrs, S. E. Schultz (Act BPA Admin) to Patterson, 24 Aug 44, J. J. Gendron (Act BPA Admin) to

11 Oct 44, Patterson to BPA Admin, 17 Oct 44, and

Raver to Patterson, 28 Oct 44, HB Files, Fldr 51,

MDR; Du Pont Opns Hist, Bk. 3, pp. 3-4, HOO.

26

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, "General," pp. 5.14-5.17,

DASA.
ELECTRIC POWER 389

ulated, largely rural Tennessee countryside had only the low-voltage distribution facilities required to provide

local farmers and villagers with

modest amounts of electricity. Hence,

an immediate task for Manhattan engineers in the fall of 1942 was to

plan, design, and build a complex and

elaborate system capable of meeting

the substantial, highly diversified, and

ever-changing power needs for constructing and operating large-scale

production plants and their supporting community facilities. Preliminary

studies established that such a system

required two major types of construction: a net of connecting and tie lines

to carry current from the TVA's highvoltage transmission systems, and a

number of substations to receive, step

down, and distribute the high-voltage

electricity.27

Getting the electrical distribution

system at Clinton built and in operation was a matter of high priority,

for site development hinged on a

supply of adequate electricity. As

soon as Manhattan had assurances

from the War Production Board and

the TVA that sufficient power would

be available, it began negotiating a

series of contractual agreements with

the TVA. These agreements, most of

them completed in early 1943, provided for construction of various

transmission line. At the same time,

the District assisted Stone and Webster and Du Pont in making arrangements with the TVA to furnish electricity for preliminary construction

work via the existing low-voltage

transmission system.

To ensure that the system's complex substations would be ready when

needed, the District arranged for the

construction contractors to build

these units. In supplemental contracts

negotiated in early 1943, Stone and

Webster agreed to build two substations in the electromagnetic (Y-12)

plant area that would serve that installation and the Oak Ridge community. Similarly, the A. S. Schulman

Electrical Company, working with

Kellex on the gaseous diffusion plant,

assented to construct the substation

that would give that installation

access to TVA power.28

As 1943 unfolded, the TVA and the

construction contractors moved ahead

rapidly with the distribution system—

a system that would continue to

expand and change throughout the

war as new demands were made upon

it. The availability to Manhattan of

the TVA's large staff of experienced

electrical engineers and of subcontractors with the necessary equipment

and line crews helped to expedite

construction. To keep abreast of all

developments, the district engineer

maintained close supervision over the

work through his unit chiefs in charge

of construction on Y-12, K-25, and

the Oak Ridge community.29

The first part of the Clinton electrical distribution net to take shape was

the basic transmission line, a 154-kilovolt loop, to supply electricity to the

electromagnetic plant and the first

section of the town of Oak Ridge.

The TVA, under terms of a subcon27

 Ibid., Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 12.9-12.11, DASA;

Completion Rpt, Stone and Webster, sub: Clinton

Engr Works, Contract W-7401-eng-13, 1946, p. 56,

OROO.

28

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12 pp. 12.1-12.2, 12.9-

12.11, 12.19-12.27, DASA. 29

 Org Chart, U.S. Engrs Office, MD, 1 Nov 43,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 020 (MED-Org), MDR;

MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 12.14-12.27, DASA.
390 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

tract with Stone and Webster, designed and built this loop, completing

it in June 1943. At a point some distance northeast of the Tennessee site

the loop cut into an existing 154-kilovolt TVA line, which carried current

generated in hydroelectric plants on

the Tennessee River at Norris Dam,

northeast of the Clinton site, and

Watts Bar Dam, southwest of the site,

and ran a distance of 3.6 miles to

substation Elza Number 1, built by

Stone and Webster adjacent to the

electromagnetic plant.30

That summer, when electrical service from the TVA's existing rural 12-

kilovolt line to the plutonium (X-10)

semiworks became unsatisfactory, the

TVA, with District authorization, built

a new 13.8-kilovolt connecting line.

This line, which extended some 6

miles from the switch house at the

K-25 power plant to the X-10 area,

ensured the comparatively small requirements—never more than 1,000

kilowatts—of the semiworks and its

laboratory facilities.31

By fall, expansion of the electromagnetic plant and rapid growth of

the town of Oak Ridge created a

demand for more electricity. To

supply additional power, the TVA,

again operating under a Stone and

Webster subcontract, designed and

built a new 154-kilovolt line. Completed in mid-1944, this 14-mile line

ran from the TVA's Fort Loudoun

Dam generating facilities on the

Clinch River south of the site to substation Elza Number 2, built by Stone

and Webster at the west end of the

extended electromagnetic plant area.

It also included a 1.3-mile tie line

from Elza 1 to Elza 2, making possible the interchange of power between

the two switching points.32

The reliability and efficiency of the

distribution system was further increased with the addition of a 154-

kilovolt line between the electromagnetic plant in the eastern sector of the

reservation and the gaseous diffusion

facilities in the western sector. The

TVA, with District authorization, designed and built this additional transmission line, which ran between

Elza 1 and a step-down transformer

at the K-25 site. When finished in

late 1943, this line not only gave the

K-25 area a temporary source of

power, pending completion of its own

substation, but also furnished the

means for satisfying unanticipated

power requirements from surpluses

available elsewhere in the TVA

system.33

An increasing demand for TVA

power was a corollary to the rapidly

expanding atomic production facilities

at Clinton, but precisely where it

would occur and in what quantities

was difficult to predict. This was particularly the case in the gaseous diffusion plant area, where the decision in

1944 to use steam from the K-25

power plant for operating the thermal

diffusion (S-50) process and in 1945

to build a side-feed extension (K-27) 30

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 12.13-12.14 and

12.20-12.22, DASA; Completion Rpt, Stone and

Webster, sub: CEW, pp. 61-62, OROO. 31

 Completion Rpt, Du Pont, sub: Clinton Engr

Works, TNX Area, Contract W-7412-eng-23, 1 Apr

44, pp. 32-33, 36-37, 535, OROO; MDH, Bk. 1,

Vol. 12, pp. 12.18-12.19, DASA.

32

 Completion Rpt, Stone and Webster, sub:

CEW, pp. 61-62, OROO; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp.

12.3-12.4 and 12.14-12.15, DASA. 33

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 12.4-12.5 and 12.23-

12.26, DASA; Completion Rpt, Kellex Corp., sub:

K-25 Plant, p. 12, OROO.
ELECTRIC POWER 391

unit made further tapping of the TVA

system mandatory. To compensate

for the lower electrical output of the

K-25 powerhouse, the TVA agreed to

build a 154-kilovolt line from its Fort

Loudoun Dam to the K-25 substation, adjacent to the main gaseous

diffusion plant, and a supplementary

connection from its Norris-Watts Bar

line to the newly erected K-27 and

existing K-25 substations. A number

of other connections were in the planning, but the end of the war obviated

their construction.34

By mid-1945, transmission facilities

and power sources at the Tennessee

site were capable of providing current

at a peak demand rate of 310,000

kilowatts, distributed as follows: Y-12,

200,000; town of Oak Ridge, 23,000;

K-25, 80,000; S-50, 6,000; and X-10,

1,000. Actual peak demand during

the wartime period never quite

reached the maximum figure of

310,000 kilowatts. The highest

demand rate recorded was 298,800

kilowatts on 1 September 1945. Peak

consumption for any extended period

during the war occurred in August

1945, when the electricity used by all

facilities for the month totaled about

200 million kilowatt hours.35

Distribution: Hanford Engineer Works

As at the Tennessee site, the nucleus of the electrical distribution system

for the Hanford site was the existing

net of transmission lines and substation facilities, built and operated by

local utility firms, including the Pacific Power and Light Company. While

awaiting outcome of the prolonged

negotiations with the BPA, the Corps

of Engineers' Real Estate Branch

moved ahead with acquiring these existing facilities. At the same time, Lt.

Col. Franklin T. Matthias, the area

engineer, and his staff, joined with

BPA, Pacific Power, and Du Pont engineers in drawing up plans for the

extensive alteration and addition to

the existing distribution system, and

expediting procurement of materials

to carry these out.36

Project engineers surveying the existing electrical distribution facilities

at the Hanford site found that transmission lines crisscrossed the area at

a number of points, constituting a

basic power net that could be readily

adapted to project requirements. The

BPA had built two 115-kilovolt lines

through the area that hooked in to

the main Bonneville-Coulee twin 230-

kilovolt high line at the Midway Substation, located near the western

boundary of the site. One of these

115-kilovolt lines extended through

site territory east to Hanford village,

and thence southeast to Walla Walla,

Washington, where it terminated; the

other ran generally west from Midway

across the western boundary of the

site and then northwest to Ellensburg,

Washington. Pacific Power's utility

lines in the area had been built to

serve the small local communities and

34

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 12.4-12.5, 12.16-

12.18, 12.23-12.27, DASA; Dist Engr, Monthly Rpt

on DSM Proj, Apr 45, MDR; Completion Rpt, M.

W. Kellogg Co. and Kellex Corp., sub: K-27 Extension, 31 Jan 46, pp. 9-10, OROO. See Ch. VIII for

a detailed description of the thermal diffusion plant

and its demands on the K-25 power plant. 35

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 12.5-12.6 and App.

C7, DASA.

36

 Ibid., Bk. 4, Vol. 4, pp. 2.11-2.12, DASA;

Matthias Diary, 16-17, 26 and 31 Mar 43, OROO;

OCE Basic Data on HEW, Pasco, Wash., 19 May 43,

pp. 10-11, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 601.1 (Hanford), MDR.
392 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

some individual farms. Its main line,

carrying 66 kilovolts, ran north from

Pasco through Richland, Hanford,

and White Bluffs, thence west to the

Priest Rapids Irrigation District's hydroelectric plant on the Columbia

River at the northwest corner of the

site; this 66-kilovolt line tied into the

BPA's 115-kilovolt line at Hanford,

thus making it possible for Pacific

Power to secure current as needed

from the Bonneville system. Short

sections of additional 66-kilovolt

lines, which provided service to communities in the vicinity of the site,

also traversed the project area. To

ensure effective control and avoid unnecessary duplication of facilities,

Manhattan eventually acquired all of

Pacific Power's lines and substations

within the site.37

While the existing transmission net

at Hanford proved to be more than

adequate for initial construction activities, it was not capable of bringing

the high-voltage loads required for

the production plants. For this purpose, BPA engineers designed a 230-

kilovolt loop, approximately 52 miles

long, that tapped the BonnevilleCoulee lines at the Midway Substation

and then ran eastward in a circular

configuration that brought it near

each pile and separation plant. To

ensure complete reliability of service,

the BPA built this loop so that current might be fed in from either end

and also constructed two additional

230-kilovolt feeder lines to supplement those already running between

the Bonneville and Grand Coulee hydroelectric plants. Substations erected

in the plant areas reduced the highvoltage current to the levels required

for the different plant operations.38

The lines acquired from Pacific

Power also became an integral part of

the Hanford power network. Electricity for the metal fabrication and testing area, the administration area, and

Richland village—all located in the

southeastern corner of the site—was

fed in through the existing BPA 115-

kilovolt line from Midway to Hanford,

and thence carried southward over

the power company's 66-kilovolt Hanford-Pasco line. This latter section

was the only part of the company's

original system retained as part of the

permanent distribution net after Du

Pont completed construction. Experienced Pacific Power crews, under subcontract to the Hanford Engineer

Works, did much of the construction

and modification work on the transmission system.

On 25 February 1944, Du Pont

took over complete responsibility for

operation and maintenance of all

electrical facilities that were not an integral part of the BPA system. The

only exception was the Priest Rapids

plant, which Pacific Power operated

under a separate government contract

with technical assistance from Du

Pont. This plan was consistent with

the Army's stringent security policy of

reducing to a minimum the number

of firms involved in operational

phases of producing fissionable materials. Even though BPA crews continued to maintain and repair its lines in

the project area, the area engineer

37

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 4, pp. 2.11-2.12 and App. A5

(Map, Transmission Systems at HEW), DASA; Du

Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, p. 10, and Vol. 4, p. 1059,

HOO.

38

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 3, pp. 7.1-7.3, and Vol. 5, p.

7.3, DASA; Matthias Diary, 22 and 27 Jul 43,

OROO; Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 4, pp. 1059-63,

HOO; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 89.
ELECTRIC POWER 393

kept them under constant security

surveillance.39

In developing Hanford's complex

transmission facilities, the BPA and

Pacific Power found that procurement

of electrical equipment—in particular,

wire, generators, and utility poles—

was one of their most difficult problems and repeatedly sought assistance

from Manhattan. The BPA, for example, had to prepare extensive data to

justify its many priorities requests for

electrical equipment, and Colonel

Matthias assigned an electrical engineer from his staff to the BPA's engineering office in Portland to assist

with this task. A typical problem for

the Hanford distribution system was

procurement of cable for the 230-

kilovolt loop in the production plant

area. When Manhattan applied for an

allotment of scarce copper for this

purpose, the War Production Board

recommended that it use aluminum

cable. Project engineers assented to

using aluminum, but then experienced both difficulty and delay in securing the board's sanction for the

substitution. As a result, Hanford

could not begin procurement of the

cable until July 1943. Fortunately,

continuing and vigorous expediting

efforts by the Army enabled the BPA

to complete the loop in time to furnish the electrical energy essential for

initial operations of the plutonium

production piles in late 1944.40

When considered against the background of severe shortages of both

electric power and equipment in a

wartime economy, securing an adequate supply and distribution of electric power for the atomic installations

was a significant achievement for the

Manhattan Project and its Army administrators. Their early recognition

of the need for firm priorities commitments and skillful use of War

Department resources for obtaining

them guaranteed Manhattan continuous access to the electric power

essential for all of its wartime

operations.

39

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 3, p. 7.3, and Vol. 5, pp. 7.2-

7.5, DASA; Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 4, pp. 1061-

62 and 1065-67, HOO; Ltr, Robins (Act Chief of

Engrs) to CG SOS, sub: Acquisition of Land for

Gable Proj, Pasco, Wash., 8 Feb 43, Incl to Memo,

Col John J. O'Brien (CE Real Estate Br chief) to Lt

Col Whitney Ashbridge (CE Mil Constr Br), sub:

Land Acquisition in Connection With MD, 17 Apr

43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 601 (Santa Fe),

MDR; Matthias Diary, 21 and 27 Apr 43, OROO;

Memo, G. P. Church (Du Pont's Field Proj Mgr) to

T. W. Brown, R. E. Burton et al. (Du Pont and Hanford area office staff members), 17 Apr 43, Incl to

Ltr, Matthias to Dist Engr, sub: Proposed Policy for

HEW, 23 Apr 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 161

(Du Pont), MDR.

40

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 3, pp. 7.1-7.2, and Vol. 5, p.

7.3, DASA; Matthias Diary, 15 Jun, 19, 22-23 and

28-30 Jul, and 6 Aug 43, OROO; Groves Diary, 29-

30 Jun and 1, 7, 9, 12-16, 20 Jul 43, LRG; Du Pont

Const Hist, Vol. 4, p. 1062, HOO; Groves, Now It

Can Be Told, p. 89.
CHAPTER XIX

Communications and

Transportation

Along with electric power, communications and transportation constituted vital process support elements for

the Manhattan Project's laboratories,

production plants, and atomic communities. With the major sites located

in widely separated regions of the

country, successful project operations

were dependent on achieving effective

coordination via an efficient communications network and on timely procurement of materials from suppliers

in all parts of the United States via

readily accessible rail and highway

transport. Because preliminary surveys of the Tennessee, Washington

State, and New Mexico sites revealed

that existing local communications

and transportation facilities were relatively rudimentary, the Army—under

conditions demanding extraordinary

measures of safety and security—

faced the large task of developing

them into the complex and sophisticated systems required by the atomic

installations.

Communications

A common sight in and around the

Clinton, Hanford, and Los Alamos installations during their developmental

phase was linemen busily stringing

and connecting miles of wire or cable,

in some instances, across great

stretches of mostly open and uninhabited countryside. While much of this

was for power transmission, a considerable part was for complex and

highly integrated communications

systems.

Communications at each of the

atomic installations, for all practical

purposes, had to be constructed from

the ground up, because none of them

had more than the minimum facilities

normally found in rural, sparsely populated regions in the United States

before World War II. Of the three

sites, Hanford had the most complete

existing system with telephone service

being furnished to the towns and

farms in the area by five independent

companies and the Pacific Telephone

and Telegraph Company. Furthermore, the Bonneville Power Administration maintained for its own use a

two-way radio network in the vicinity

of its 115-kilovolt lines in the Hanford area. In contrast, Clinton had

only one telephone line, a 6-mile section of the Clinton-Harriman toll line,

that served a few of the farmers who
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION 395

lived in the area and Los Alamos had

only a government-owned Forest

Service line, operated by the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph

Company and providing service to the

boys' school located on the site. With

respect to all of the privately owned

communications facilities found on

the atomic sites, the War Department's policy was to acquire them

and, wherever feasible, to integrate

them into the extensive systems being planned for Manhattan's atomic

installations.1

At each of the major sites, Manhattan worked closely with the Army

Signal Corps, with local telephone

and telegraph companies, and with

prime contractor organizations to

install the most up-to-date communications available under wartime procurement conditions. Because of

unusual safety and security requirements, these communications included such specialized instruments as

alarm devices, to warn of fire and

other hazardous conditions in time to

guarantee evacuation of dangerous

areas, and two-way radio networks

and radio-monitoring devices. Connections into the nationwide Army

Command Administrative Network

teletype circuit with codification

equipment provided rapid and secure

communication between the various

facilities of the Manhattan District, including General Groves's personal

headquarters in Washington, D.C.

Other TWX equipment furnished

direct teletype service between prime

contractors' field organizations and

their home offices. An example was

Du Pont's private teletypewriter

service between its Hanford and

Richland offices and head office in

Wilmington.2

The Army was more directly concerned with details of designing,

building, and operating communications than in most other process support activities, partly because its

Signal Corps had the necessary expertise to furnish communications speedily and the Army Command Administrative Network was an established

communications system that could

serve the specialized needs of the

project. Also, the Army wished to

maintain close control over all aspects

of the project's security system in

which all forms of communications

played a vital role.

The extent of the Signal Corps'

participation in development of

atomic project communications varied

from site to site. At Clinton, the 4th

Service Command signal officer

served chiefly in an advisory capacity

to the district engineer, participating

most actively in the period before the

establishment of a communications

unit in the Clinton Area Engineers

1

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, "Clinton Engineer Works,

Central Facilities," p. 15.1; Bk. 4, Vol. 5, "Construction," pp. 7.7-7.8; and Bk. 8, Vol. 1, "General," pp.

5.23-5.24, DASA. Matthias Diary, 12 Mar and 7 Apr

43, OROO. In Admin Files, Gen Corresp, MDR, see

601.1 (Hanford) for OCE, Basic Data on HEW,

19 May 43, p. 11, and Ltr, Robins (Dep Chief of

Engrs) to CG ASF, sub: Acquisition of Land for

HEW Proj, 5 Jun 44; and 601 (Santa Fe) for Ltrs,

Robins (Act Chief of Engrs) to CG SOS, subs: Acquisition in Fee of Approx 56,200 Acres of Land for

Demolition Range Near Kingston, Tenn., 29 Sep 42,

and Acquisition of Land for Gable Proj, Pasco,

Wash., 8 Feb 43, Incls to Memo, Col John J.

O'Brien (CE Real Estate Br chief) to Lt Col Whitney

Ashbridge (CE Mil Constr Br), sub: Land Acquisition in Connection With MD, 17 Apr 43.

2

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 15.5-15.6; Bk. 4,

Vol. 5, p. 7.8; and Bk. 4, Vol. 6, "Operations," pp.

12.2-12.3, DASA. Matthias Diary, 16 Mar, 7 Apr,

6 May 43, OROO. Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 4, pp.

1357-60, HOO.
396 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Office in April 1943. At Los Alamos,

the Signal Corps' contribution was

limited to furnishing technical advice

and some items of equipment. But at

Hanford, planning and overseeing

construction of the telephone system

was one of the largest single jobs undertaken by the Signal Corps in the

United States during the war.3

In early 1943, after the Signal

Corps had agreed to Colonel Marshall's request to assist Manhattan in

building the Hanford telephone

system, 9th Service Command signal

officers participated in a series of

planning meetings with representatives of the State of Washington

Public Utilities Commission, local

telephone companies, Du Pont, and

the Hanford Area Engineers Office. A

problematic issue was the division of

responsibilities for design and construction of the Hanford system: Du

Pont and the Signal Corps both

wanted the task. Apprised of this situation in June, Groves immediately

conferred with officials in the Office

of the Chief Signal Officer in Washington, D.C., and, after emphasizing

the project's requirement for complete secrecy, successfully worked out

an arrangement with them for Du

Pont to design the system in conformity with standard specifications of

Army telephone installations. According to this working agreement, the

Signal Corps' Plant Engineering

Agency of Philadelphia would provide

Du Pont with its technical expertise, if

needed; Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company crews, under supervision of the 9th Service Command

signal officer, would construct the

system; both the Signal Corps and

area engineer would take responsibility for procuring equipment and materials; and Du Pont would give Pacific Telephone and Telegraph any

assistance it needed in handling materials and securing workmen.4

The division of responsibilities for

design and construction of the Clinton and Hanford communications facilities followed a similar pattern; the

prime contractors had responsibility

for overseeing the task and the local

telephone company for actual construction. At Clinton, Stone and Webster designed the system in consultation with the 4th Service Command

signal officer and erected the telephone buildings, but shared the line

construction work with the Southern

Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company. At Los Alamos, the Mountain

States Telephone and Telegraph

Company performed whatever construction was necessary.5

As Manhattan's production installations reached the operations stage,

the Army increased security by tightening up its administrative machinery

for control and supervision of communications. At Clinton, for example,

the administrative element supervis3

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 15.1, and Bk. 8,

Vol. 1, "General," pp. 5.23-5.24, DASA; George

Raynor Thompson, Dixie R. Harris, Pauline M.

Oakes, and Dulany Terrett, The Signal Corps: The

Test, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957), pp.

440-41; Matthias Diary, 7, 9, 24 Apr 43, OROO; Du

Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 2, pp. 513-15, and Vol. 4,

pp. 1067-68, HOO.

4

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, pp. 7.5-7.7, DASA; Matthias Diary, 20 May 43, OROO; Du Pont Constr

Hist, Vol. 4, pp. 1068-71, HOO; Groves Diary, 10-

11 Jun 43, LRG. 5

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 15.1-15.3, and Bk. 8,

Vol. 1, pp. 5.23-5.24, DASA; Completion Rpt,

Stone and Webster, sub: Clinton Engr Works, Contract W-7401-eng-13, 1946, pp. 63, 68-69, 87-89,

116, OROO.
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION 397

ing communications—at first only a

unit in the Clinton area office, then

later part of a section under the District's executive officer—became in

early 1945 a separate branch of the

Operations Division at District headquarters in Oak Ridge. Similarly, at

Hanford, when the area engineer enlarged his communications staff, he

requisitioned Women's Army Corps

personnel because they were more

readily subject to close security control than civilian employees.6

During the war, however, the Army

never actually took over operation of

project communications facilities

except, of course, those that were

used to carry on the business of the

District itself and those at Los

Alamos, which operated as a military

post. Completed installations were

turned over to the operating contractors. At Hanford, where Du Pont was

both the construction and operations

contractor, the company's operational

staff continued to hire and supervise

employees who manned the switchboards, operated teletype machines,

and kept the lines in repair. Similarly,

at Clinton, the Roane-Anderson Company assumed responsibility for operating the Oak Ridge community facilities, built by Stone and Webster, and

also arranged with the Western Union

Company to provide telegraphic service for the town. And the operating

contractors took over plant communications facilities in the production

areas and employed Southern Bell

Telephone and Telegraph Company

crews, under supervision of the District's Communications Branch, to do

maintenance, repair, and installation

work.7

Transportation

Transportation problems for the

Clinton, Hanford, and Los Alamos

sites were similar to those of furnishing electric power and communications. Project site selection teams had

chosen locations near well-established

railroad lines and highways, but the

requirement for relative isolation

meant that the sites themselves generally lacked adequate access to these

nearby facilities. Clinton's primarily

rural acreage had only one major

highway and no rail line, although

main lines of the Southern Railway

and the Louisville and Nashville Railroad ran close by the reservation.

Hanford's semiarid farming and

ranching country had a highway

system adequate only to serve its

sparse agricultural population and, in

its northern area, a single-tracked,

second-class branch rail line. Los

Alamos was the most isolated of all,

with only a few secondary roads and a

branch of the Atchison, Topeka and

Santa Fe Railroad some 25 miles distant.8

Transportation problems fell into

two categories: those within the

6

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, p. 15.1, and Bk. 4, Vol. 5,

App. B57, DASA; Org Charts, U.S. Engrs Office,

MD, 1 Nov 43 and 26 Jan 45, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 020 (MED-Org), MDR.

7

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 15.1 and 15.5-15.6;

Bk. 4, Vol. 6, p. 12.1; and Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 5.23-

5.24, DASA. History of Roane-Anderson Company

(henceforth cited as Roane-Anderson Hist), Contract W-7401-eng-115, 30 Nov 51, p. 63 and App.

D, OROO. 8

 History of Passenger Transportation at Clinton

Engineer Works (henceforth cited as CEW Passenger Trans Hist), Jul 45, pp. 1-2, OROO. OCE,

Basic Data on HEW, 19 May 43, pp. 9-12, MDR.

MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 16.1, 17.1-17.2, 18.1; Bk.

4, Vol. 3, "Design," p. 7.4; and Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp.

2.4-2.6, DASA. Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, pp. 9-

10, HOO.
398 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

boundaries of a site, where Manhattan

could exercise a great deal of control

over their solution; and those within

the region immediately surrounding

the site, where control was much

more tenuous. The Army's objective

was to achieve a coordinated system

that would adequately serve the transportation needs in both the on- and

off-site areas. In the interests of economy, both in time and money, the

Army followed a consistent policy of

using, to the maximum extent feasible, all available means of transportation and adding new facilities only

where project requirements made

them absolutely necessary.

In those instances where the Army

had to provide new transportation facilities, it delegated as much of the

task as possible to nonmilitary agencies. Development of transportation

means within the boundaries of each

site became the responsibility of the

construction contractors. At Clinton,

the three major construction contractors—Stone and Webster, Du Pont,

and the J. A. Jones Construction

Company—designed and built the rail

and road system, respectively, for the

town of Oak Ridge and the electromagnetic plant, for the plutonium

semiworks, and for the diffusion

plants; at Hanford, Du Pont expanded

the existing road network and built an

on-site rail system; and at Los

Alamos, the M. M. Sundt and A. O.

Peabody construction companies, with

assistance from post work crews, improved the existing road system and

built many road extensions.

To the extent feasible, the Army

also assigned transportation as a function of the operating contractors.

Roane-Anderson, for example, provided transportation for the town of

Oak Ridge, the Tennessee Eastman

Corporation for the electromagnetic

plant area, the University of Chicagooperated Clinton Laboratories for the

plutonium semiworks, and the Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation for the diffusion plants area. At

Hanford, Du Pont and the Army

shared responsibility for the on-site

railroad net, but the area engineer

maintained the roads, controlled

highway traffic, and operated the bus

service within the site. At Los Alamos,

where security was an overriding consideration, the Army retained almost

exclusive control over operation of all

forms of transportation, limiting vehicular traffic within the reservation

to trucks, buses, and cars driven by

military personnel.9

Except for certain aspects that required negotiations with federal agencies, resolution of most transportation

problems was the responsibility of the

Army officer in charge of each of the

sites. He had, for example, to reach

agreement with state and local officials on building access roads and improving existing highways, to negotiate with local bus companies to increase service between nearby towns

and the site bus depots, to arrange

with the Transportation Corps' zone

officer for vehicle procurement, and

to supervise the construction and operating contractors. Each officer in

charge had to set up an appropriate

organization within his staff for this

particular purpose.

9

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 16.1-16.21, 17.1-17.7,

18.1, passim; Bk. 4, Vol. 5, pp. 7.8-7.13, and Vol. 6,

pp. 8.1-8.3; and Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 5.1-5.3 and 5.13-

5.14, DASA. CEW Passenger Trans Hist, p. 1,

passim, OROO. Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, pp.

145-53, HOO.
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION 399

UNIMPROVED SANTA FE-LOS ALAMOS ROAD

During the period when construction was the dominant activity at

Clinton, the district engineer administered day-to-day transportation

matters through a section in the Construction Branch of the District's Clinton Engineer Works (CEW) Central

Facilities Division. He formed a CEW

Transportation Board in December

1943, comprised of representatives of

the prime contractors, to assist him in

formulating area-wide policies and

procedures concerning passenger

transport, traffic regulations, licenses

and regulatory activities, and government-owned vehicles. In mid-1944, he

reorganized the administration of

transportation, forming in the Services Branch of the Facilities Division

two separate sections—Automotive

and Bus Transportation—to monitor

automotive, rail and motor freight,

and bus operations. At the same time,

he transferred the CEW Transportation Board's functions to his policymaking operational group, the Central Facilities Advisory Committee.10

At Hanford, the area engineer established in March 1943 a Transportation Department in his office to

maintain and operate all transportation except railroads, which Du Pont

operated, and to oversee all vehicular

procurement—usually surplus stocks

from other Corps of Engineers

projects or from Transportation

10

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 18.4-18.5, DASA;

CEW Passenger Trans Hist, pp. 9-10, OROO; Org

Charts, U.S. Engrs Office, MD, 1 Nov 43, 1 Jun,

28 Aug, and 10 Nov 44, 26 Jan 45, MDR.
400 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

IMPROVED SANTA FE-LOS ALAMOS ROAD, ascending to the Pajarito Plateau from the Rio

Grande valley

Corps sources. Burgeoning transportation requirements resulted in a departmental reorganization in late

1944, first as the Transportation

Office under the chief of operations

and finally as the Transportation

Branch in the Administrative Division.

These requirements gradually declined in early 1945 with the completion of major construction at the site,

making possible a substantial reduction of employees in the branch.11

Primarily for security reasons, but

also consistent with its administration

as a military post, the Army furnished

and operated almost all types of

transportation at Los Alamos. In mid1943, the post commander assigned

responsibility for transportation to a

supply and transportation officer in

the Supply Division, who, in turn, delegated actual operation of the Motor

Pool and Motor Maintenance Section

to an assistant transportation officer.

This administrative arrangement, with

only minor changes, continued for

the duration of the war.12

Motor Vehicles and Roads

Manhattan's transportation requirements were out of the ordinary, even

for a wartime activity. For example, 11

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, p. 9.1 and App. B57, and

Vol. 6, pp. 8.1, 18.2, App. B8, DASA; Matthias

Diary, 6 May and 23 Jun 43, OROO.

12

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 6.22-6.27 and App. B3,

DASA.
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION 401

the project was unusually dependent

upon the motor vehicle for transporting its employees relatively long distances from the communities where

they lived. Primarily for safety and security, major installations at both

Hanford and Clinton were not only

miles apart but also a considerable

distance from their operating communities, Oak Ridge and Richland, and

from off-site towns where many other

project employees lived. Plant-operating employees residing at Richland

had a round trip of from 58 to 76

miles each day. Workers coming from

Knoxville by bus rode some 17 to 20

miles to the Oak Ridge terminal and

then transferred to other means of

transportation to get to specific site

locations, including the gaseous diffusion plant nearly 10 miles west of the

terminal. Even at Los Alamos, where

the need for exceptional security dictated housing as many employees as

possible on the site, hundreds of construction and service personnel commuted long distances from off-site

communities. Typical was the 35- to

45-mile trip from Santa Fe over

mountainous and generally poorly

maintained state highways.13

 (See

Maps 3, 4, and 5.)

Manhattan relied primarily upon

motor buses to cope with its huge

commuter problem. At Hanford, the

Transportation Department regularly

maintained, scheduled, dispatched,

and operated more than 900 buses,

making it probably the world's largest

motor bus operator in a given area

during World War II.14

 From April

1943 to March 1945, a total of 20

million passengers rode some 340

million miles on the Hanford system.

The Tennessee bus system, which was

maintained and operated by civilian

firms under government contract, was

considerably smaller. Nevertheless, by

the end of 1944, more than 350 buses

were in off-area service. In addition, a

substantial number more, operated by

Roane-Anderson's CEW Bus Authority formed in December 1943, provided service within the boundries of the

site (as, for example, for the townspeople living in Oak Ridge). Manhattan regularly received assistance from

the Transportation Corps, acting

through its appropriate zonal commands, in procurement of most of the

buses used at Clinton and Hanford

and in the operation of its various bus

systems.15

As on countless other war projects,

thousands of Manhattan workers commuted in private automobiles. At

Clinton, this was the major means of

passenger transportation in the early

stages of the project, and by early

1944 nearly twenty-five thousand

automobiles were passing through the

reservation gates each day. The Army

took steps to supervise and control

13

 Ibid., Bk. 4, Vol. 5, App. B1 (Area Mileage

Tabs), and Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 2.4-2.5 and 6.2-6.3,

DASA; Du Pont Opns Hist, Bk. 16, "Transportation

Department: Automotive Operations to July 1,

1945," pp. 1-2, HOO; CEW Passenger Trans Hist,

pp. 2 and 7, OROO; Completion Rpt, Stone and

Webster, sub: CEW, pp. 12-13, OROO.

14

 Chicago, for example, with the largest city bus

system in the United States, had some 800 buses in

regular operation during the war. See MDH, Bk. 4,

Vol. 4, "Land Acquisition, Hanford Engineer

Works," p. 9.5, DASA. 15

 Ibid., pp. 9.1-9.5, DASA; CEW Passenger

Trans Hist, pp. 11-39 and Exhibits B and D,

OROO; Matthias Diary, 30 Oct 43, OROO; Du Pont

Opns Hist, Bk. 16, pp. 1 and 7, HOO. At Hanford,

Du Pont had responsibility for operation and maintenance of all project automotive equipment in

plant areas and of that in Richland that was not

under direct Army control.
402 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

OAK RIDGE BUS TERMINAL

this heavy traffic, encouraging sharethe-ride programs; assisting employees in procurement of rationed tires

and gasoline; and trying, without too

much success, to provide automobile

repair and maintenance facilities.16

Manhattan's heavy dependence

upon buses and automobiles placed

further strain upon existing road networks, which already were disintegrating under the pounding they received

from the hundreds of trucks and

other vehicles operated by the construction contractors. While the Army

itself did not undertake to build and

maintain roads for the project, area

engineer personnel at each of the

sites devoted much time to supervising the efforts made by the major

construction firms to improve original

roads, design and build efficient new

plant road networks and connecting

routes, and maintain all road and

highway facilities essential to project

operations. In most instances, the

major contractors followed the practice of subcontracting road work to

local construction firms that had

equipment and working crews for the

job.

Road development at Hanford will

serve as an example of what in general was done at all the major sites. In

January 1943, the site selection team

had reported to General Groves that

the road system of the Washington

site consisted essentially of two main

state highways: one running east from

Yakima through what would become

the heart of the production plant

area, thence to Hanford and on to 16 CEW Passenger Trans Hist, pp. 44-51, OROO.
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION 403

Spokane; and the other running from

Richland to Hanford by way of the

Yakima River horn. This major existing axis, plus a few secondary roads,

eventually became the nucleus for a

system of 350 miles of roads of all

types, most of them asphalt surfaced,

including two four-lane divided highways running from the vicinity of the

pile and separation plants southeastward to Richland. When critics later

questioned the wisdom of building

these broad thoroughfares across

miles of arid sagebrush grazing lands,

Groves pointed out that they were

consistent with the Army's policy of

preparing for every forseeable contingency. Manhattan had to provide for

the quick evacuation of thousands of

workers in the event of an explosion,

or similar accident, in the production

area that conceivably might spread

deadly radiation over a wide zone.

Under the day-to-day supervision and

inspection of the area engineer's staff,

Du Pont planned and built the Hanford road system, employing two California road-building firms to do most

of the actual earth moving, grading,

and paving.17

Existing access roads near the Manhattan reservations were generally inadequate and poorly maintained. The

Army improved the original off-site

road networks to keep them in usable

condition and arranged for construction of certain new connecting routes.

Whenever and wherever possible,

Manhattan tried to secure agreements

with county, state, and federal highway officials for sharing the work of

carrying out improvements on access

roads. For example, in November

1943, District representatives met

with officials of the state of Tennessee, the Public Roads Administration,

Roane and Anderson Counties, and

the principal contractors to work out

an overall access road program,

agreeing to assignment of priorities

so that each project would be undertaken in order of its urgency. In carrying out the program, however,

Manhattan found that while state and

local highway officials endeavored to

plan and build the sorely needed

routes, they were unable in most

cases to provide them in time to meet

project requirements. Consequently,

much access road work had to be

done by Manhattan itself.18

Typical was the case of the Gallaher

Bridge and Blair Roads. Manhattan

submitted plans and specifications for

these new roads to the Public Roads

Administration in November 1943 as

a basis for approval and allotment of

the necessary funds, but the normal

procedures of the Public Roads Administration and the Tennessee Department of Highways and Public

Works preliminary to construction of

a new road were so complicated and

time-consuming that a start on building of the two access routes was not

likely to be made until April 1944.

Because the roads were needed urgently to provide good access from

the west and north to the gaseous diffusion area, the Army built them as

17

 Prelim Rpt, sub: HEW Site Investigation, 2 Jan

43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.03, MDR; Matthias Diary, 7 and 17 Apr, 6 May, 27 Jul, 9 Nov 43,

OROO; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 3, pp. 7.4-7.5, and Bk. 4,

Vol. 5, pp. 7.9-7.11 and App. B4 (Summary of Contracts and Subcontracts), DASA; Du Pont Constr

Hist, Vol. 1, pp. 5 and 9-10, and Vol. 4, pp. 484-

85, 1089-92, 1094-96, 1101-06, 1111-12, HOO;

Du Pont Opns Hist, Bk. 16, pp. 1-2, HOO.

18

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 16.10-16.11, DASA;

Matthias Diary, 17 Apr and 9 Nov 43, OROO; Du

Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 4, p. 1096, HOO.
404 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

quickly as possible. The Real Estate

Branch, Ohio River Division, Corps of

Engineers, acquired the rights of way

and the district engineer contracted

with two road-building firms to do

the actual construction. Work on the

Gallaher Bridge Road started in midJanuary and on the Blair Road at the

beginning of February. Both roads

were in use by May 1944.19

In spite of vigorous efforts, the

Army experienced considerable difficulty in maintaining project road networks, especially those outside the

reservations. Constant and heavy use

of roads originally designed to carry

only secondary traffic was one of the

factors that contributed to maintenance headaches. Another was the

problem of coordinating the activities

of state, county, and local authorities

who had responsibility for repair and

upkeep of many of the off-area access

roads. State and county maintenance

crews were handicapped by lack of

equipment, workmen, and funds. At

Clinton, the Army employed its own

project personnel and equipment for

road maintenance, financing the work

from funds allotted for the purpose

by the Public Roads Administration.

It followed a similar policy at Hanford, where the Public Roads Administration provided money to the

Washington State Highway Department and local county highway departments. At the Los Alamos reservation, the Army hired road-building

contractors to assist state and local

highway crews in maintenance of offsite roads.20

Railroads

While Manhattan made extensive

use of motor vehicles to transport

manpower, it shipped most materials

and equipment by rail. This meant

construction of miles of spur lines

and plant rail nets to connect installations with main-line railroads. The

expense and effort could be justified

because they eliminated costly and

time-consuming shipment by truck

from off-site railheads. Relatively few

rail transport problems arose for the

Army in Tennessee. But at the Washington site, Groves and the Hanford

area engineer became involved in a

prolonged controversy with some of

the western railroads concerning both

the quality and extent of service to be

provided for the plutonium works.

The rail net at Clinton consisted of

two separate and unconnected systems. Stone and Webster built and

operated the eastern rail net—or Central System, the popular designation

until Roane-Anderson took over in

1944—which provided service from

the Louisville and Nashville's Cincinnati-Knoxville line to the town of Oak

Ridge and the electromagnetic plant

area. (See Map 1.) The western rail

net, built and operated by J. A. Jones,

provided the gaseous diffusion plant

area with direct service from the

Southern Railway's Cincinnati-Chattanooga line. The only plant area not

directly served by rail was the plutonium semiworks. To cope with an early

shortage of transportation for workers

commuting from off-area towns, the

Army obtained an order from the

Office of Defense Transportation for 19

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 16.11-16.12, DASA. 20

 Ibid., pp. 16.16-16.17, DASA; Du Pont Constr

Hist, Vol. 4, p. 1096, HOO; Matthias Diary, 6 May

and 9 Nov 43, OROO. Los Alamos project records

available to the author did not reveal whether the

state of New Mexico received funds from the Public

Roads Administration.
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION 405

GALLAHER BRIDGE ROAD AT THE TENNESSEE SITE

the Louisville and Nashville to operate passenger trains between Knoxville and Oak Ridge. This service, unwanted by the railroad company and

never popular with the patrons,

ended in the summer of 1944 when

off-area bus service had increased

sufficiently.21

One important feature of the Richland-Hanford area was its proximity

to four main railroad lines: the Union

Pacific; the Northern Pacific; the Spokane, Portland, and Seattle; and the

Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific. (See Map 4.) Only the Milwaukee

Railroad's Priest Rapids Branch provided direct service into the site. This

branch ran from the main line at Beverly Junction, located north of the

site, some 46 miles (25 of them within

the project area) south and east along

the Columbia River to White Bluffs

and Hanford, where it terminated.

The other main-line railroads interconnected at Pasco, about 14 miles

down river from Richland. Pasco was

the location of a large Transportation

Corps holding and reconsignment

point with extensive warehouse facilities and a railroad siding. In February

1943, the Hanford area engineer arranged through the Corps of Engineers' Pacific Division and the 9th

Service Command for transfer of the

21

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 17.1-17.7 and 18.21,

DASA; CEW Passenger Trans Hist, pp. 11 and 40-

41, OROO; Completion Rpt, Stone and Webster,

sub: CEW, pp. 20 and 167 (map), OROO.
406 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

warehouses to the Manhattan District.

Combined with expert assistance from

Corps of Engineers officers assigned

to the holding point, these facilities

proved invaluable in handling the numerous shipments made to Hanford

while the Priest Rapids Branch underwent extensive reconditioning.22

Working closely with the area railroads, Du Pont drew up a rail service

improvement plan for Hanford, with

provisions for a thorough overhaul of

the second-class Priest Rapids Branch

and its extension from Hanford

southward to Richland; for building

of a complex access rail system in the

plant area; and for construction of a

southern rail connection to link Richland with the three major lines running out of Pasco to the south of the

site. Consistent with this plan, the

Milwaukee Railroad began reconditioning and extending the Priest

Rapids Branch in the spring of 1943.

Its objectives were strengthening the

existing track bed and numerous tres- tle bridges so that heavier trains

could be run over the line and, at the

point where the branch entered the

installation, constructing a large classification yard to serve as a switching

point for cars entering the plant rail

system.23

Although the Hanford Area Engi- neers Office closely supervised the

Milwaukee Railroad's work, actively

assisting in procurement of scarce

rails, ties, rolling stock, and other

items, there were interminable delays

in deliveries and a general inability to

cope with the ever-growing traffic. At

Groves's request, Lacey Moore, a

Corps of Engineers rail transportation

expert serving as an adviser to the

Hanford area engineer, inspected the

branch in September. He noted seri- ous defects in design of the line, in- cluding its excessive vulnerability to

sabotage. Corrective measures by late

November had somewhat improved

conditions on the branch, leading

Colonel Matthias to observe that

"there is no question that the Milwau- kee R.R. is now making every effort

to meet the requirements of our serv- ice, and to expedite freight shipments

as much as possible."

 24

 Yet systemic

deficiencies continued to be a prob- lem and were a cause of grave con- cern for several more months as con- struction activities at Hanford moved

into high gear.25

The access rail system in the plant

area comprised 125 miles of track, mostly in the northwest part of the

site, and served the pile and separa- tion plants, the metal fabrication and

testing areas, and the administrative

center at Richland. The Guy F. Atkin- son Company of San Francisco, sub- contracted by Du Pont, had responsi- bility for actual construction, with the

Hanford area office providing consid- erable procurement assistance for

hard-to-get rails, ties, rolling stock,

22

 OCE, Basic Data on HEW, 19 May 43, p. 12

and enclosed map, MDR; Matthias Diary, 23-25 Feb

and 3 Mar 43, OROO; Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1,

pp. 9 and 16, HOO; Department of the Army, The

Army Almanac: A Book of Facts Concerning the Army of

the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office, 1950), p. 153. 23

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 3, pp. 7.5-7.7, and Vol. 5,

pp. 9.2-9.3, DASA; Matthias Conf Notes, 1 Apr 43,

Wilmington, Admin Files, Gen Coresp, 337 (Wilmington), MDR; Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, p.

152, and Vol. 4, pp. 1087-88, HOO; Matthias Diary,

23 Apr 43, OROO.

24

 Matthias Diary, 26 Nov 43, OROO. 25

 Matthias Diary, 1943-44, passim, OROO; Du

Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, p. 152, HOO.
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION 407

and other equipment. Once completed, the Hanford area office and Du

Pont jointly supervised operation of

the plant rail net, with the latter providing operating personnel.26

Strong support existed for construction of the proposed southern

rail connection, which involved reconditioning existing lines and building

several miles of new tracks and a

bridge across the Yakima River. The

major railroads in the area wholeheartedly favored its construction, because of obvious benefits to them.

Manhattan supported the connection

not only as a shorter route than the

Priest Rapids line for freight coming

from suppliers in the central plains

and southern Midwest states but also

as an alternate rail access in the event

of sabotage. And Du Pont endorsed

the connection because it was not at

all certain that the Priest Rapids line

would be able to move, on schedule, the undetermined—but obviously

large—amount of construction materials that would have to be shipped by

rail at the height of the construction

period.

But the unsettled question over

who should bear the burden of cost

of new construction delayed any

prompt action. When lengthy negotiations in the spring and summer of

1943 failed to produce an agreement, General Groves—determined

to get a firm decision—personally visited Union Pacific President William

Jeffers, who was in Washington serving as the War Production Board's

rubber administrator. The informal

understanding that resulted provided

for construction of the southern connection by the Union Pacific and

Northern Pacific Railroads, with the

government bearing the entire cost of

any new construction and the railroads agreeing to pay a user's fee.27

Despite the Groves-Jeffers understanding, the participating railroads

were unable to break a stalemate over

financial terms, and new legal bottlenecks loomed up suddenly. At the

end of August, the Great Northern

Railroad, joint owner with the Northern Pacific of the Spokane, Portland,

and Seattle Railroad, began a formal

investigation to ascertain why its area

railroad had not been included in negotiations concerning the southern

connection. Meanwhile, the Office of

Defense Transportation informed

Union Pacific that it would not approve a contract between the War Department and the railroads for construction of the southern connection

and the Interstate Commerce Commission wrote to General Groves that

the connection could not be built

without its approval because it would

constitute a link in an interchange between the through lines of the Milwaukee and the Union Pacific and

Northern Pacific, which made it subject to ICC jurisdiction.28

When the Office of Defense Transportation issued an order in October

prohibiting construction, in spite of a

direct approach by Groves and the

26

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 3. pp. 7.6-7.7, and Vol. 5,

pp. 5.30, 7.11-7.12, App. B4, DASA; Du Pont

Constr Hist, Vol. 4, pp. 1085-86 and 1092-94,

HOO; Matthias Diary, 19 Apr and 19-21, 31 May

43, OROO.

27

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, pp. 9.2-9.3, DASA; Matthias Diary, Apr-Jul 43, passim, OROO; Groves

Diary, 21 and 29 Jul 43, LRG; Du Pont Constr Hist,

Vol. 4, p. 1091, HOO. Because the Priest Rapids

line ran through mountainous terrain and across

several rivers, it was more than usually susceptible

to both land slides and sabotage. 28

 Matthias Diary, Jul-Aug 43, passim, OROO.
408 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Under Secretary of War to ODT

Chairman Joseph T. Eastman, the

southern connection seemed doomed.

At this juncture, Groves and the Hanford area engineer worked through

channels in the Office of the Secretary of War to get the agency to reconsider the case. The area engineer

achieved partial success in this direction in mid-November 1943, when

ODT, 9th Service Command, and

Transportation Corps representatives

visited the Hanford installation.

These officials, who were assessing

traffic density on transcontinental rail

systems, expressed the view "that the

railroad connection was not only desirable but essential . . . [for dealing

with] the great activity on the transcontinental lines which is due in the

near future" and promised to recommend that it be given serious

reconsideration.29

Manhattan used the possibility that

the alternate connection might be

constructed as a powerful lever to

pressure the Milwaukee Railroad to

improve the still far from satisfactory

service over its Priest Rapids Branch.

Thus, in December, General Groves

told the railroad representatives that

if they could maintain adequate service, "we [will] take no further action towards developing the connection. . . . We will, however, . . . continue our design and layout and other

plans to insure their being ready to

construct the Southern Connection if

and when it is required." The strategy

worked; service on the Priest Rapids

Branch steadily improved in early

1944. But by mid-year, the plutonium

works had reached its operational

phase and rail service declined appreciably, thus obviating construction of

the southern connection.30

Air Transport

Ever in a race against time, Manhattan frequently utilized air transport

services to speed up movement of

materials and personnel over the

great distances separating its research

and development centers, procurement facilities, and plant production

areas. For the most part, Manhattan

relied upon the services of commercial airfreight companies for shipment

of such items as blueprints, parts,

tools, and chemicals and on the Army

Air Forces' Air Transport Command

for movement of key personnel.

Because of the rough character of

the terrain, neither Clinton nor Los

Alamos had airfields within the reservation. Clinton used the Knoxville

Airport, accessible over good roads

some 25 miles southeast of the site;

Los Alamos had to depend upon the

Air Command's shuttle service into

Kirtland Field at Albuquerque, some

114 miles by highway, parts of which

were mountainous and often poorly

maintained. At Hanford, where the

29

 Ibid., 28 Jul-16 Nov 43 (quotation from

16 Nov entry), OROO; MPC Min, 9 Sep 43, OCG

Files, MP Files, Fldr 23, Tab A, MDR; Groves Diary,

2 Aug, 6, 21 and 28 Sep, 8 Oct 43, LRG.

30

 Matthias Diary, Sep-Dec 43 (quotations from

23 Dec 43 and 12 Jan 44 entries), OROO. Further

evidence of the Milwaukee Railroad's intention of

exploiting its control of the sole rail access line into

the Hanford reservation was its application to the

Interstate Commerce Commission to have the line

from Beverly Junction to the project boundary abandoned as a common carrier. Fortunately, the commission did not approve this request, which would

have required the District to move freight from Beverly Junction to the site or pay the railroad special

switching charges for doing it. After further negotiations with railroad representatives in November,

Groves and Matthias were able to reach a reasonable agreement on freight charges.
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION 409

terrain was relatively flat, Manhattan

maintained a small airfield near the

construction camp. In early 1943, the

area engineer arranged with the Air

Command to fly critical items to the

Spokane Army Air Field, where a

shuttle service picked them up and

flew them to the Hanford airfield. In

emergencies, the six Army airplanes

of the Hanford security air patrol, piloted by civilians, were used to transport passengers and small freight

items.31

31

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, pp. 9.3-9.4, and Vol. 6, p. 8.3; and Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 6.24-6.26, DASA. Du

Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 2, pp. 498-99 and 551,

HOO. Matthias Diary, 30 Apr and 8 May 43,

OROO.
CHAPTER XX

Health and Safety

The health and safety of Manhattan

Project personnel were essential to

the success of the atomic bomb program. But in ensuring the workers'

health and safety, the Army faced one

of its most challenging administrative

tasks because of the many unique and

little understood hazards inherent in

bomb development. Among these

were the potentially deadly rays emitted by radioactive elements, the toxicity of a variety of chemical compounds and agents, the danger of

high-voltage electricity employed in

novel ways, the possibility of explosions in experimental work that involved the use of gas and liquids

under great pressure and of high explosives as propellants, or even the

likelihood of serious injury from

metal objects cast about by tremendous magnetic forces.1

The Army knew that these unusual

hazards must be properly controlled,

for the lives of thousands of atomic

workers were at stake. Although the

Army had a long and outstanding

record of carrying out public construction projects under extremely

adverse and hazardous conditions,

two factors peculiar to Manhattan

made its task of devising and administering appropriate health and safety

measures unusually complicated. One

was the unrelenting urgency that prevailed in almost every aspect of the

nuclear steeplechase to produce an

atomic weapon before the enemy

could do so, with the unfortunate

result that project managers often

were tempted to resort to shortcuts

and speedy solutions that imposed

greater health and safety risks. The

other was the strict policy of compartmentalization, which prevented any

widespread sharing of information

and experience gained in dealing with

special hazards. Fortunately, however,

the Army was able to rely on its past

experience on other projects and to

build on the early measures of its

predecessor, the Office of Scientific

Research and Development (OSRD),

to establish highly effective health

and safety programs.2

1

 Rpt, H. T. Wensel (Tech Secy, S-1 Ex Committee), sub: List of Hazards, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Projs and Prgms), MDR; MDH, Bk. 1,

Vol. 7, "Medical Program," p. 3.1, and Vol. 11,

"Safety Program," p. 1.1, and Bk. 8, Vol. 1, "General," Sec. 6, and Vol. 2, "Technical" (Project 'Y' History), pp. III.38 and IX.19, DASA. Where not otherwise indicated, discussion of health and safety problems and practices in the Manhattan District is

based on MDH, Bk. 1, Vols. 7 and 11, DASA.

2

 The OSRD policy permitted each research program to develop its own health and safety measures.

For example, the Metallurgical Laboratory employed medical scientist Robert S. Stone, who had Continued
HEALTH AND SAFETY 411

The Health Program

Manhattan's health program developed slowly but steadily during the

first months of District operation.

Health matters originally were the

sole responsibility of a single medical

officer, Capt. Hymer L. Friedell, who

devoted most of his time to urgent

pile process health problems at the

Metallurgical Laboratory. But in early

1943, when the Army implemented

measures to take over most OSRD

contracts, Manhattan's modest administrative arrangements for health matters came under close review. As a

consequence, pressed by a lack of

adequately trained medical personnel,

the District began its quest for expert

assistance to monitor not only the existing OSRD programs but also those

to be established by the Army in the

future.3

Aware that few American medical

scientists had the special knowledge

needed to understand and solve the

unique problems of the atomic program, General Groves launched a nationwide search for qualified medical

personnel. The search revealed that a

professor in the department of radiology at the University of Rochester,

Stafford L. Warren, was mentioned

most frequently as the best in his

field. Professor Warren, Groves decided in February, was the medical

scientist who, with the aid of the District staff, should coordinate the activities of all the individual health

groups established and to be established by project contractors. Under

the guise of discussing the radiological aspects of work to be done for the

government by the Eastman Kodak

Company of Rochester, Groves and

the district engineer met with Warren

at company headquarters. During the

meeting they asked him to direct an

important University of Rochester research program presumably related to

the Eastman project, and also to serve

part time as a medical consultant.

When he indicated he was already

fully involved in other wartime

projects, including one for the OSRD,

they asked him to take some time to

think over the proposal.4

Meanwhile, Groves weighed the

possibility of appointing either Major

Friedell or medical scientist Robert S.

Stone, who was working at the Metallurgical Laboratory on pile radiation

hazards, but concluded that neither

had the outstanding qualifications of

Professor Warren. By giving Warren

more specific information, the Manhattan commander reasoned, he

might be persuaded. Groves immediately arranged for Warren to confer

with other District officials concerning

contractual provisions for the proposed research program at the University of Rochester and to go on an

extensive knowledge and experience with radioactivity, and radiologist Simeon T. Cantril to develop a

system to protect workers from the hazards of radiation in pile experiments. Similarly, the Radiation

Laboratory launched a research program to investigate the best method for detecting the presence of

phosgene, the highly poisonous gas that would be

used in the electromagnetic plant's separation process. See Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 176-78; Stafford L. Warren, "The Role of Radiology in the Development of the Atomic Bomb," in Radiology in

World War II, Medical Department, United States

Army, ed. Kenneth D. A. Allen (Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 832 and 845-

46; MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 2, "Research," pp. 4.10-4.11,

and Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 6.43-6.44, DASA. 3

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vols. 7 and 11, each p. 6.1, DASA;

DSM Chronology, 11 Feb 43, Sec. 2(b), OROO.

4

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 7, p. 6.1, DASA; Memo for

File, Vincent C. Jones, sub: Telecon With Groves,

7 Jul 70, CMH.
412 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

inspection trip to some of the other

atomic installations, including a visit

to Oak Ridge to view a site for a hospital. Impressed greatly with what he

saw, and now convinced of the crucial

importance of the project, Warren

agreed in March 1943 to become a

full-time consultant to Groves with a

view to eventual assignment as chief

of the District's health program.5

Program Organization

At the end of June, Professor

Warren became chief of a provisional

medical section at District headquarters, with Major Friedell assigned as

his executive officer and another

Army doctor as his assistant. During

the summer, as the section found

itself overwhelmed with new health

problems, Warren repeatedly asked

for more personnel but his requests

proved to be of little avail, resulting

in employment of only two civilian

physicians for the Clinton Engineer

Works. Furthermore, the district engineer's announcement of the Medical

Section's formal organization in

August failed to include any provision

for the much-needed additional

personnel.6

Adequate staffing for the Medical

Section awaited solution of the problem of how to recruit and hold medical personnel for at least as long as

security and program continuity required. Medical personnel brought in

to staff project medical facilities had

to be privy to considerable secret data

in order to perform their jobs properly. Manhattan's proposed solution was

to militarize the medical staff, a step

that would require collaboration with

the Office of the Surgeon General

(OSG).7

Following extended negotiations,

Manhattan completed details of a

working agreement with the OSG in

September 1943. This agreement

provided that the OSG, giving full

cognizance to both the continuity and

security required for the District

health program, would furnish a

broad range of medical assistance—

for example, commission key District

civilian medical personnel, provide

additional trained personnel from the

Army Medical Department, supply

funds for the medical and dental care

of District military personnel, and furnish medical supplies through Medical Department facilities for District

use. To ensure that project security

would not be compromised, the OSG

appointed Col. Arthur B. Welsh as a

liaison officer on its staff, giving him

authority to approve all incoming requests from the District. The OSG

also granted permission to the District's Medical Section to retain in its

own files all reports that might reveal

the nature, scope, or military significance of the project and agreed to

secure approval from the district engineer for all transfers of Medical Department personnel from the project.

5

 Radiology in World War II, pp. 841-42 and 848-

49; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 421; Memo for

File, Jones, sub: Telecon With Groves, 7 Jul 70,

CMH. 6

 Radiology in World War II, pp. 841-42: MD Cir

Ltr, sub: Establishment of Med Sec, 29 Jun 43,

Admin Files, MD Directives, Ser. 43, Declassification

and Procedure, MDR; Memo, Nichols (for Dist

Engr) to Warren, sub: Responsibilities of Med Sec,

10 Aug 43, copy in MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 7, App. A1,

DASA; Marsden Diary, 19 Jun 43, OROO. Colonel

Marsden states that Warren sought authorization for

an allotment of 110 medical officers.

7

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 7, pp. 6.2-6.3, DASA; Ltr,

Groves to CG ASF, sub: MD Med Facilities, 21 Sep

43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 371.2 (Scty), MDR.
HEALTH AND SAFETY 413

These unusual arrangements with respect to security were consistent with

the Manhattan-OSG agreement that

responsibility for project health matters resided with the district engineer.

The OSG had protested this provision, but the District had secured an

order from General Somervell that

upheld it, and it remained in effect

for the duration of the Manhattan

Project.8

On 2 November, shortly after the

agreement became effective, Warren

received his commission as a colonel

in the Medical Corps and official appointment as chief of the Medical

Section. One of his first actions was a

reorganization of the section, to reflect the major areas of activity in the

District's health program. He divided

the unit into three branches: medical

research, industrial medicine, and

clinical medicine services; a fourth

branch to oversee the Hanford health

program never materialized, because

Du Pont, the prime contractor, took

over almost all responsibility for this

activity. Another of Warren's concerns

was to expand his staff by recruiting

civilian physicians to serve in clinical

assignments as commissioned officers.

Warren's basic organization continued with little change up until July

1945 (except for the clinical branch,

which then achieved the status of a

separate division); however, in order

to keep pace with the rapid growth of

the project, he had to greatly expand

its size—the original three-man staff

eventually numbering eighty medical

personnel.9

Active and continuing support not

only from the OSG but also from a

number of civilian medical organizations made possible the District's

rather remarkable success in recruiting a relatively large and specialized

medical staff in a period of the war

when medically trained personnel

were in extremely short supply. Especially valuable was the assistance provided by the national office and some

local branches of the Procurement

and Assignment Service.10 State

boards of medical and dental examiners, particularly those in Tennessee

and Washington, granted concessions

on licensing requirements. Numerous

universities, medical schools, and biological institutes agreed to provide on

a continuing basis medical specialists

and technicians for District research

laboratories and industrial hygiene

teams.11

8

 Ltr, Groves to CG ASF, sub: MD Med Facilities,

21 Sep 43, MDR; Blanche B. Armfield, Organization

and Administration in World War II, Medical Department, United States Army (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 229; Radiology in

World War II, pp. 846-47; Marsden Diary, 8 Oct and

2 Nov, OROO; Nichols, Comments on Draft Hist

"Manhattan," Incl to Ltr, Nichols to Chief of Mil

Hist, 25 Mar 74, CMH.

9

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 7, p. 6.2 and Apps. C12aC12e (Org Charts, MD Med Sec, May 43-Jul 45),

DASA; Radiology in World War II, p. 843; Armfield,

Organization and Administration in World War II, p. 229;

Marsden Diary, 29-30 Oct and 2 Nov 43, OROO.

Warren's eighty-man staff was comprised of seventytwo officers from the Medical Corps, three from the

Dental Corps, three from the Medical Administrative Corps, one from the Veterinary Corps, and one

from the Sanitary Corps. 10

 This was an agency established in November

1941 in the Office for Emergency Management, Executive Office of the President, to coordinate wartime allocation and employment of medical, dental,

and veterinary personnel for all federal services, including the War Department. For further details on

its organization and activities see John H. McMinn

and Max Levin, Personnel in World War II, Medical

Department, United States Army (Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 73-74 and

169-73 11

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 7, pp. 1.5-1.6, DASA.
414 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

COL. STAFFORD L. WARREN briefing the Oak Ridge hospital staff

The unique opportunities presented by the District's health program

also facilitated procurement of medical personnel. Medical scientists were

quick to recognize that research in radiation had significant applications in

the investigation of cancer, metabolism, and many other aspects of medicine. Fortunately, too, many had not

been recruited for military service because their specialty did not relate directly to military medical requirements; Colonel Warren and a number

of members of his staff were in this

category. Others came from the field

of internal medicine and from the

basic biological sciences. Colonel

Warren noted in retrospect that what

these men all had in common, without reference to their specialty, was

an interest "in using radiation or isotopes as tools to explore basic mechanisms in biologic systems."

 12

 The

atomic bomb program promised an

unexcelled chance to pursue this

interest.

Medical Research

The basic objective of Manhattan's

medical research program was collection of data on potentially damaging

effects of radioactive and highly toxic

materials so that measures and instrumentation could be incorporated into

plant design and operations for the

protection of atomic workers. An important corollary objective was to

12

 Radiology in World War II, p. 846.
HEALTH AND SAFETY 415

learn more about how to treat cases

of overexposure to radiation and poisoning from toxic substances. Responsibility for the medical research

projects at Manhattan laboratories

and a number of universities and biological institutes under contract

rested with the District's Medical Research Branch, headed by Major Friedell. Colonel Warren, too, with broad

expertise in the areas under investigation, gave a great deal of attention to

the various research projects.13

Collection of medical hazards data

was a direct outgrowth of expanding

scientific investigations into the pile

and electromagnetic methods of producing fissionable materials. More

adequate data became essential as the

number of workers involved in research activities increased and as

planning began for large-scale production. For example, with the goal

of establishing safety and health protection standards and developing safe

operating procedures for the pile

process, the Metallurgical Laboratory

at the University of Chicago formed a

health physics research group. Under

direction of medical scientist Robert

Stone, this group (numbering more

than two hundred by mid-1945) conducted extensive investigations into

the toxicity of radioactive materials,

giving particular attention to their

chemistry and pathology; designed

monitoring instruments and pile

shielding; and developed treatment

programs for clinical medicine problems related to pile hazards.14

The University of Chicago-operated

Clinton Laboratories in Tennessee

had a similar research program. Although Stone had administrative responsibility for the Clinton program,

he left actual direction to radiologist

Simeon T. Cantril, who had worked

under Stone at the Metallurgical Laboratory for more than a year. Using

the pile semiworks, the Clinton team

of scientists, physicians, and technicians tested the effects of radiation on

animals and developed monitoring instruments for the Hanford production

piles. Further investigations into the

toxicity of radiation were carried out

by other institutions under subcontract. For example, researchers at Columbia University in New York investigated the effects of fast-neutron dosages on mice, those at the Franklin

Institute in Newark (Delaware) conducted similar tests on dogs, and

those at the University of Washington

in Seattle studied the exposure of

X-rays and fission products on fish

and fish eggs.15

Investigations at the Metallurgical

Laboratory and Clinton Laboratories

were supported and supplemented by

the large University of Rochester

medical research program. Under direction of Stafford Warren, scientists

at Rochester pursued research in radiology, pharmacology, and instrumentation. The radiology section experimented with exposing animals to

high-voltage X-rays and conducted

beta radiation studies and genetic experiments relative to the effects of radiation on mice and fruit flies. The

13 pharmacology group tested radioac- MDH, Bk, 1, Vol. 7, pp. 5.2 and 5.16-5.17,

DASA. 14

 Ibid., pp. 5.1-5.23, DASA; Compton, Atomic

Quest, pp. 177-79; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp.

421-22.

15

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 7, pp. 5.4-5.8, 5.13-5.14,

5.16-5.17, DASA; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, n. on

p. 421; Compton, Atomic Quest, p. 177.
416 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

tive and potentially toxic chemical

substances. Two groups concentrated

on instrumentation problems, including the design of standard meters for

measuring alpha and beta particles

and gamma rays and the development

of film and instrument monitoring

methods and protective devices. To

ascertain under actual operating conditions the validity of measuring instruments and protective devices,

Rochester scientists tested them in

the plants at Clinton, Hanford, and

elsewhere in the project.16

The Army believed these various

research efforts would furnish all the

data and instrumentation the Los

Alamos Laboratory would need for its

health program. But unique requirements of the bomb development program forced laboratory groups to

launch separate medical research

projects. In the spring of 1944, for

example, essential monitoring apparatus was still not available, so members

of the health and electronics groups

combined their talents to develop the

necessary instruments. Similarly, the

industrial medicine group, faced with

handling large quantities of fissionable plutonium, were dissatisfied with

the available data on detecting overdoses, so they established their own

research project, employing scientists

from the health group and the metallurgical and chemistry division. These

ad hoc research activities, born of necessity, contributed much to the success of other health and safety programs at the laboratory.17

Industrial Medicine

The major objective of Manhattan's

industrial medicine research program

was to identify and control the industrial hazards associated with the

atomic processes. Effective application of the knowledge and techniques

developed from this research was the

responsibility of the District's Industrial Medicine Branch, headed by

Capt. John L. Ferry. To monitor the

project's various industrial hygiene

activities, Ferry organized his staff

from officers drawn from the Corps

of Engineers and the Medical Corps.

Beginning with one specialized

group to monitor the University of

Rochester's industrial medicine research program, Ferry subsequently

formed other groups to oversee the

hazards program in materials procurement at the Madison Square Area

Engineers Office, to deal with special

problems wherever they might arise,

to provide consultation on first aid

and other aspects of operations medicine as needed, and to carry on liaison with the programs at the electromagnetic and diffusion production

plants. Because of the special expertise of the Metallurgical Laboratory's

health physics research group in dealing with pile process hazards, that

group was given broad authority to

monitor the industrial hygiene programs at the Clinton Laboratories,

Hanford Engineer Works, and Monsanto Chemical Company plant in

Dayton, Ohio. Ferry's branch did not

have responsibility for the Los

Alamos Laboratory's industrial hygiene program, which was under the

direction of Washington University

internal medicine specialist Louis H.

16

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 7, pp. 5.4, 5.6-5.8, 5.10,

5.15-5.16, 5.20-5.22, DASA; Radiology in World War

II, pp. 852-53 and 862; Groves, Now It Can Be Told,

pp. 421-23. 17

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, pp. III.39-III.41 and

IX.15-IX.16, DASA.
HEALTH AND SAFETY 417

Hempelman, for the Army maintained

oversight of the bomb development

program through General Groves's

Washington headquarters.18

Because of the shifting and unpredictable character of plant design,

construction, and operational requirements, the Industrial Medicine

Branch adopted a broad and flexible

approach to its difficult task of monitoring the development of effective

industrial hygiene measures. To ascertain the precise nature of industrial

hazards, the branch had medical research scientists supplement their laboratory experiments with extensive

observations in the field. The scientists gave medical examinations to

plant employees to determine the potentially dangerous effects of handling

large quantities of uranium and fluorine; they took dust counts in production plants to ascertain the amount of

radioactive dust present in the different processes; and they detected areas

where exposure to radiation was likely

by having production workers wear

X-ray film badges.19

As soon as sufficient information

was in hand, the Industrial Medicine

Branch drew up industrial hygiene

standards and procedures that

became the basis for recommendations to project contractors, who were

responsible for their implementation.

These recommendations generally

took the form of bulletins or instructional materials. Typical were bulletins originally prepared by Kellex engineers and Ferry's staff for the firm's

employees. They outlined approved

methods for working with fluorine,

uranium hexafluoride, hydrofluoric

acid, and similar hazardous compounds, and included first aid procedures. The branch eventually gave

these bulletins wide circulation wherever these substances were being employed. On occasion, when the Los

Alamos health group requested supplemental training data for its educational program on plutonium-related

hazards, the branch furnished the

technical information.20

Through periodic inspections, the

Industrial Medicine Branch maintained a check on contractors' compliance with its recommendations. Often

the local area engineer would accompany branch inspectors on their

rounds, exercising his authority to institute immediate changes when necessary. Frequency and thoroughness

of inspections varied. Where the War

Department had complete financial

responsibility for all costs, as in costplus-fixed-fee contracts, the operating

practices of the contractor—regardless of his industrial expertise or lack

thereof—were likely to receive very

close scrutiny. Where the industrial

firm had primary liability, as under

other types of contracts, inspections

18

 Memo, Nichols to Warren, sub: Responsibilities

of Med Sec, 10 Aug 43, copy in MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 7,

App. A1, DASA. See also ibid., pp. 3.51-3.65 and

Apps. C12a-C12e, DASA. The organization charts

in the appendices indicate that medical personnel

trained and indoctrinated at the Metallurgical Laboratory eventually occupied key positions in the hygiene programs at Clinton Laboratories, Hanford,

and Monsanto. On the appointment of Hempelman

see ibid., Bk. 8, Vol. 2, III.38-III.39, DASA, and

Ltr, Oppenheimer to Groves, 25 Jan 43, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 231.2 (Scientists), MDR. 19

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 7, pp. 3.1-3.3 and 6.1,

DASA; Radiology in World War II, pp. 868-70; Memo,

Nichols to Warren, sub: Responsibilities of Med Sec,

10 Aug 43, DASA.

20

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 7, pp. 3.1-3.3, DASA; Safety

Committee, Bull SM-2, Safety Committee Regulations for Handling C-126 (Fluorine), Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 729.31, MD.
418 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

were more infrequent and less rigorous because of the firm's already

proven record for controlling hazards.

Branch inspection teams rated hazards control primarily upon results

from more or less continuous checks

upon employee health and from monitoring hazardous work areas, comparing the collected data with established standards.21

Chronologically speaking, among

the District's first industrial hygiene

problems were those in procurement

and processing of uranium ore and in

production of special chemicals

(fluorine, fluorocarbons, and boron)

required to manufacture fissionable

materials. As industrial hygiene measures, the Industrial Medicine Branch

recommended periodic physical examinations for workers exposed to

hazardous conditions, use of protective clothing and masks, and installation of more effective ventilation

systems.22

The principal hazard in the diffusion processes arose from the employment of highly toxic substances,

including uranium in its oxide and

hexafluoride forms, radium, and several fluorocarbons. While their use in

small quantities for pilot plant testing

presented little danger, their employment in enormously increased

amounts in the production plants

posed much greater hazards. To protect diffusion workers from these hazards, such as burns, lung irritation, or

even kidney failure, the Industrial

Medicine Branch collaborated with

construction and operating contractors to install closed ventilation systems and to develop special handling

techniques. The Carbide and Carbon

Chemicals Corporation, for example,

had its gaseous diffusion plant workers use protective clothing and Armytype gas masks when they repaired

the hundreds of pumps that were

cooled and lubricated with toxic

fluorinated hydrocarbons. Similarly,

the Fercleve Corporation had its thermal diffusion plant workers apply dry

ice to solidify the highly volatile uranium hexafluoride gas before transferring it in or out of the system.23

The considerable hazards present

in the research and development

phases of the electromagnetic process

were magnified during the production

phase, thus proportionately increasing

the control problem. Ironically, the

most serious hazard, phosgene gas,

was a deadly by-product of the most

effective method of preparing charge

materials for the production racetracks; other hazards included toxic

dusts, radiation, carbon dusts, and

toxic chemicals (principally carbon

tetrachloride and trichloroethylene),

and the use of high-voltage sources of

electricity to operate the racetrack Calutrons. As the operating contractor,

the Tennessee Eastman Corporation

collaborated with the District's Industrial Medicine Branch to institute a

hazards control program. Protective

measures developed included devices

21

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 7, p. 3.1, DASA; Radiology in

World War II, pp. 869-70; Groves, Now It Can Be

Told, pp. 71-73. 22

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 7, pp. 3.3-3.16, DASA;

Safety Committee, Bull SM-2, Rev 2, MDR; Memo,

Nichols to Brig Gen Thomas F. Farrell (Groves's

Dep), sub: Shipment Scty, 20 Jun 45, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Insp of Facilities at Rochester,

N.Y.), MDR; First Annual Rpt, Murray Hill Area

Engrs Office, sub: Proj S-37, 30 Jun 44, p. 19,

OROO.

23

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 7, pp. 3.19-3.27, and Bk. 2,

Vol. 1, "General Features," p. 6.2, DASA; Radiology

in World War II, pp. 856 and 859.
HEALTH AND SAFETY 419

for detecting phosgene gas and monitoring dust concentration and toxic

chemicals, as well as the requirement

for physical examination of employees—particularly those who would have

an above-average exposure to radiation emanations, uranium compounds,

and other hazardous conditions.24

Of all the processes, hazards in the

pile process were potentially the most

dangerous, for there was little previous industrial experience on which to

draw to devise adequate protective

measures for atomic workers. Perils

existed in each step of the process. In

preparing uranium metal as fuel for

the pile, there was radioactivity, uranium dust, and employment of highly

acid cleaning substances; in pile operations, radiation and poisonous radioactive fission products; and in extraction and concentration of the end

products, radioactive uranium slugs

and very poisonous plutonium. To

counter these hazards, project scientists and technicians worked with the

Industrial Medicine Branch to develop a variety of control measures.

One of the most effective measures

was the heavy shielding built into the

production piles. Others included radiation-monitoring instruments with

automatic alarms, which were placed

in all exposed areas; periodic fingerprinting and physical examinations

for workers; portable detection equipment, such as pocket ionization

meters, film badges, and ring-type

film meters; and protective clothing,

respirators, and goggles. In those

plant areas known to have radioactive

beta or gamma emissions above the

established tolerance level of 0.1

roentgen per 24-hour day,25 plant

health teams maintained a constant

check of clothing and equipment for

contamination. And in those situations where every possible protective

measure still did not prevent exposure above the tolerance level, employees rotated in and out of the dangerous zones.26

Of the dangers facing employees at

Los Alamos in bomb development

operations, including exposure to radiation, work with high-voltage current, testing with high explosives, and

handling of toxic materials and volatile gases, the single most serious

hazard was work with fissionable plutonium. When the first shipments of

plutonium began arriving in the

spring of 1944, the Los Alamos

health group exploited resources

within the laboratory's own organization and formed special committees

24

 MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 2, "Research," pp. 4.2-4.3

and 4.10-4.11, and Bk. 1, Vol. 7, pp. 3.31-3.35,

DASA; Radiology in World War II, pp. 855-56; Questions and Answers Taken From Senate Atomic

Energy Manual, ca. late 1945, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 032.1 (Legislation), MDR.

25

 In May 1943, the Metallurgical Laboratory

adopted the National Bureau of Standards radiation

tolerance dose of 0.1 roentgen per 24-hour day.

This was only one-half of the so-called international

tolerance dose, established in 1934 by an international agreement, and it remained the standard for

the atomic program until the end of the war. See

Radiology in World War II, p. 853; Memos, Stone to

Compton, 10 Apr and 15 May 43, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 600.12 (Projs and Prgms), MDR. 26

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 7, pp. 3.43-3.50, DASA;

Memos, Roger Williams (TNX Div chief, Du Pont)

to Groves et al., sub: Radioactivity Health Hazards

at Hanford, 26 Jun 44, and Warren to Nichols, sub:

Radiation Hazards, 1 Sep 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 700 (Med Rpts, Health Prgm, etc.), MDR; Rpt,

Cantril and Parker, sub: Status of Health and Protection at HEW, 24 Aug 45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 729.31 (Safety Prgm), MDR; Questions and

Answers Taken From Senate Atomic Energy

Manual, MDR; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 422-

23.
420 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

to devise and enforce the necessary

controls for handling plutonium.

While the committees concentrated

on developing monitoring, decontamination, and other technical controls, the health group compiled and

circulated appropriate health standards; established requirements for

pre-employment and job-termination

physical examinations; instituted tests

for detecting overexposure of workers; improved the statistical records it

maintained on individual employees;

and carried out an educational program to instruct workers in the particular problems of plutonium. These

efforts notwithstanding, laboratory

operations with plutonium were

plagued with a series of accidents.27

Clinical Medicine Services

The primary objective of Manhattan's clinical medicine services program was to provide the thousands of

project workers living on the closed

and isolated atomic reservations with

comprehensive on-site medical facilities. Providing full medical services,

the Army felt, would enhance not

only manpower recruitment but also

work force retention. Another important benefit would be increased

project security, for attending to the

resident employees' personal medical

needs on the reservation would obviate their having to seek treatment in

the surrounding communities where

services were often inadequate and

limited. Accordingly, overseeing the

establishment and operation of adequate on-site medical facilities—first

aid stations, field dispensaries, outpatient and dental clinics, and fullservice hospitals—became an important feature of the District's medical

activities.

Unlike the medical research and industrial medicine programs, the clinical medicine program at each of the

major atomic sites functioned with a

minimum of external supervision. At

Clinton, the Medical Section's Clinical

Medicine Services Branch, headed by

Lt. Col. Charles E. Rea, administered

medical facilities provided by construction and operating contractors

and the District. At Hanford, Du Pont

established and monitored its own

clinical medicine program, with the

Medical Section exercising only a

general supervisory role through a

small liaison unit in the area engineer's office. And at Los Alamos, the

post surgeon, Capt. James F. Nolan, a

specialist in radiology and obstetrics

and gynecology, administered the

community medical services program

under supervision of the post commander, who reported any medical

problems directly to General Groves.

The Manhattan commander, in turn,

27

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, pp. III.39-III.42 and

IX.15-IX.18, DASA. For a list of major hazards at

Los Alamos see Ltr, Oppenheimer to Robert M. Underhill (Board of Regents Secy, Univ of Calif),

15 Jan 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Y12), MDR. The shortage of certain types of safety

equipment, the general lack of knowledge about

plutonium, the rapid expansion of personnel and

operations, and insufficient control over many technical procedures directly contributed to a series of

accidents at Los Alamos, culminating in early 1945

in acute radiation exposure of four technical workers and the death of another during experimentation on critical assembly of fissionable material for

the bomb. For a description of an accident during a

bomb assembly test at Los Alamos see Ltr, Rudolph

E. Peierls to James Chadwick, 7 Jun 45, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Chadwick), MDR. On a

subsequent accident in 1946, resulting in the death

of Louis Slotin, an atomic scientist, see Robert

Jungk, Brighter Than a Thousand Suns: A Personal History of the Atomic Scientists, trans. by James Cleugh (New

York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1958), pp. 193-94

and 228-29.
HEALTH AND SAFETY 421

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS STORAGE AREA AT LOS ALAMOS. Technicians are removing

lead-lined container.

consulted with Colonel Warren, who,

in addition to being the Medical

Section chief, also served as Groves's

personal adviser on medical

matters.28

Planning for the medical resources

of the Oak Ridge community began in

the spring of 1943, when Professor

Warren and his University of Rochester staff developed a broadly conceived clinical medicine program.

They recommended that the residents

of Oak Ridge have access to a full

range of medical services, to include

surgery, medicine, pediatrics, obstetrics and gynecology, eye, ear, nose,

and throat, psychiatry, proctology,

neurology, urology, orthopedics, and

dermatology. They also suggested the

need for supporting X-ray and laboratory facilities.

Responding to these recommendations, District medical officials, working closely with both construction and

operating contractors, took steps to

provide for adequate medical facilities

in the town of Oak Ridge. For workers requiring hospitalization they initially had planned to use off-site hospitals, but a survey of the surrounding communities, including Knoxville,

revealed that the number of hospital

beds available was well below the na28

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 7, pp. 4.1-4.3, 4.23-4.27,

App. C12, DASA; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp.

423-24; Ltr, Groves to CG ASF, sub: MD Med

Facilities, 21 Sep 43, MDR. On the appointment of

Nolan see MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, p. 6.43, DASA, and

Radiology in World War II, p. 879.
422 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

tional average of 3.4 per thousand

population. Because of the survey

findings, the Medical Section decided

to build a hospital in Oak Ridge that

was substantially larger than required

by the national average. A confluence

of other factors also had entered into

this decision. Of particular concern

was the fact that more than an average number of workers were likely to

require hospitalization in cases of serious illness or contagious disease,

because they resided in dormitorystyle dwellings or were members of

families where everyone was employed. Compounding this concern

was the consensus that there would

not be enough physicians available to

make home visits.29

Construction began on a fifty-bed

hospital, as well as a medical service

building, in late 1943. But before

either was ready for service, rapid

population expansion had made both

inadequate. With population figures

revised from as many as ten thousand

to fifty thousand in early 1944, the

Medical Section authorized two additional wings, each with one hundred

beds, and a fully equipped outpatient

clinic. Again, however, community

growth outstripped estimates, reaching seventy-two thousand in early

1945, and made necessary an additional sixty-bed wing. Even with the

completion of this latter unit the hospital resources of the community were

greatly strained in the spring of 1945,

when there was an epidemic of severe

upper respiratory infections among

Oak Ridge residents.30

The pool of doctors, nurses, dentists, and other specialists to staff the

Oak Ridge medical facilities burgeoned with the mushrooming population. To maintain the national wartime ratio of 1 physician to each

1,500 persons, the Clinical Medicine

Services Branch procured Army Medical Corps personnel from the OSG

and some civilians. From 8 doctors

and 4 nurses in July 1943, the staff

was increased to 25 doctors and 72

nurses in July 1944 and to 52 doctors

and 144 nurses a year later, with analogous increases in outpatient treatments totaling 1,890 in July 1943,

10,403 a year later, and 19,599 in July

1945. Similarly, the branch enlarged

the dental staff at Oak Ridge. From 2

dentists and 1 assistant in September

1943, the staff was increased to 29

full-time dentists and 23 assistants by

March 1945. Most of the dentists

were civilians, because their work did

not require them to have access to

classified information.31

The Oak Ridge clinical medicine

services program also provided for

the public health needs of the community. In the early months of community development, Army veterinarians cared for government-owned animals of various kinds—horses, sentry

dogs, test animals—in use on the reservation and assisted community officials in meat and milk inspections.

29

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 7, pp. 4.1-4.4 and 4.13-4.14,

DASA. 30

 Ibid., pp. 4.1-4.7, and Vol. 12, "Clinton Engineer Works," pp. 10.1-10.4 and 10.9-10.10, DASA;

Completion Rpt, Skidmore, Owings and Merrill (architect-engineer), sub: Portion of Townsite Planning

of Oak Ridge, Contract W-7401-eng-69, 9 Sep 44,

pp. V.10, V.25-V.28, V.30-V.31, OROO; Robinson,

Oak Ridge Story, p. 56; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p.

423.

31

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 7, pp. 4.14-4.19, and Vol.

12, pp. 10.5-10.7, DASA; Completion Rpt, Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, sub: Portion of Townsite

Planning of Oak Ridge, 9 Sep 44, p. V.29, OROO;

Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 424; Radiology in

World War II, p. 874.
HEALTH AND SAFETY 423

OAK RIDGE HOSPITAL (multiwinged structure in foreground)

With the establishment of a formal

public health service in January 1944,

they also oversaw rabies inoculation

of pets and maintained the dog

pound and an animal hospital. The

public health service, which functioned very much as did that in a private civilian community of comparable size to Oak Ridge, devoted detailed attention to food production

and handling, inspection of water and

sewage facilities, and control of communicable diseases. And with films,

newspaper articles, and special

schools, it kept community residents

and plant workers informed concerning the latest developments and most

effective means for maintaining suitable public health conditions.32

Two aspects of the Oak Ridge clinical medicine program were unusual

for the times: a psychiatric and social

welfare consultation service, available

to both civilian and military residents;

and a low-cost medical and dental insurance plan (the Oak Ridge Health

Association), which was patterned

after the California Physicians Service.

Both contributed significantly to reducing the turnover of trained workers, a persistent problem throughout

the war. Dental coverage subsequently proved financially unworkable and

was abandoned, but comprehensive

32

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 7, pp. 4.20-4.23, and Vol.

12, pp. 10.7-10.9, DASA; Radiology in World War II,

p. 872.
424 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

medical care continued as a permanent feature.33

The Hanford clinical medicine services program was essentially civilian

in character. Du Pont, not the Army,

had primary responsibility for its direction, which was consistent with

Manhattan's larger policy of granting

the company the maximum autonomy

possible with efficient operation. Few

Army personnel were directly involved, and there was no effort to

militarize the civilian medical staff.

Also, as at Clinton and Los Alamos,

the District did not maintain special

medical facilities at Hanford for military personnel. Instead, the relatively

small military contingent depended

upon the contractor-administered

services for its medical and dental

needs.34

In early 1943, Army leaders had

few precedents for entrusting medical

care of tens of thousands of atomic

workers to a private industrial firm.

From 1943 through 1945, Du Pont

had to cope with problems similar to

those in Tennessee, including a rapidly expanding population, the necessity

for maximum secrecy, and a remote

location. In certain respects, however,

its problems were more difficult because of the greater isolation of the

site and the much larger proportion

of workers living on it. Nevertheless,

the Hanford clinical medicine program—including regular medical services, emergency dental care, and

public health—was a success. A close

observer of the program, the director

of health of the state of Washington,

commented in 1944 that he knew of

"no industry in this state doing a

more adequate and as thorough a job

as is being done at the Hanford Engineer Works."

 35

Residents of Los Alamos, as did

residents of Manhattan's other atomic

reservations, had access to complete

medical services. Provision of these

services was perhaps even more essential at the bomb laboratory than at

Clinton and Hanford. The location of

the New Mexico site was more than

50 miles via a tortuous mountain road

to the nearest hospital. The highly

secret nature of the work made it imperative, from the security standpoint,

that all travel away from the post—including that for medical purposes—be

limited to an absolute minimum. A

final factor, and one of central importance, was maintenance of high employee morale, for so many members

of the scientific and technical staffs

who had to work at a forced-draft

pace would find little opportunity for

relief from the unremitting pressure

of trying to solve extremely difficult

problems.36

In the first year of Los Alamos

operations, medical facilities were

extremely limited. For civilian patients there was only a five-bed industrial infirmary (eventually, through

33

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 7, pp. 4.7-4.13, and Vol. 12,

pp. 10.5 and 10.8, DASA; Radiology in World War II,

pp. 874-75; Robinson, Oak Ridge Story, p. 56. 34

 This and the following paragraphs are based

on MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 7, pp. 4.23-4.25, 4.28, 4.30-

4.31, 4.37-4.39, and Bk. 4, Vol. 5, "Construction,"

App. B66 (Org Chart, Constr Div, HEW), and Vol.

6, "Operation," App. B10 (HEW Org Charts, Contractors), DASA; Ms, Roy C. Hageman, "Hanford:

Threshold of an Era," 1946, pp. 26-27, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 461 (Hanford), MDR; Radiology

in World War II, pp. 875-78.

35

 Ltr, Dr. Lee Powers (Wash State Health Dir) to

E. L. Plenninger (HEW Proj Supt), 25 Sep 44,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 700 (Diseases, Cancer

Research), MDR. 36

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 2.4-2.6, and Vol. 2, pp.

III.12-III.13, DASA; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp.

164-66.
HEALTH AND SAFETY 425

severe overcrowding, it accommodated

twenty-four bed cases), staffed by two

physicians and three civilian nurses.

For military personnel the Army provided a separate three-bed infirmary,

staffed by a Medical Corps officer and

seven enlisted men. With the Army's

Bruns General Hospital in Santa Fe

available for civilian residents requiring lengthy hospitalization or special

treatment, these modest facilities sufficed as long as the population of the

site remained relatively small. Dependence upon Bruns Hospital, however, presented some serious drawbacks. The time-consuming trip to

Santa Fe resulted in a loss of manhours, which the project could ill

afford. There also was the inherent

risk to security in having personnel

leave the reservation, even though the

trips were carried out under military

supervision.

A reassessment of the post's limited

medical facilities occurred in late

1943 in order to meet the increased

health needs of a rapidly expanding

population, which had not only more

than doubled in size but also had

changed in composition. Beginning in

January with only fifteen hundred

construction workers, the population

by the end of the year had expanded

to over thirty-five hundred and now

included scientists, technicians, University of California and civil service

employees, military personnel, and

dependents. Providing them with

proper medical care was essential, especially for the larger proportion of

individuals who were likely to require

hospitalization. Several factors occasioned this situation: An increasing

number of workers had been rejected

for military service for medical reasons; a higher percentage of young

married couples were likely to need

obstetrical services and medical care

for small children; and a sizable element of the civilian population lived

in barracks or dormitories. Hence,

Captain Nolan recommended to Lt.

Col. Whitney Ashbridge, commanding

officer of the post, that the industrial

infirmary be expanded into a 60-bed

hospital, to include a 30-bed convalescent ward for use by both civilian

and military patients. Nolan did not

get all that he requested, but with

Colonel Warren's support he secured

authorization for expansion of the infirmary into a 54-bed unit. Because

civilian medical personnel were virtually unobtainable by mid-1944, most

of the additional staff had to come

from the Army Medical Corps.37

By late 1944, the New Mexico community had reasonably complete clinical medicine facilities. Most services

were available to permanent residents

at little or no cost, the only exceptions being that civilian in-patients at

the hospital paid a subsistence fee of

$1 a day and construction contractors

paid at established rates for emergency treatment of their personnel. Until

early 1944, periodic visits by dentists

from Bruns General Hospital provided the only on-site dental care, but in

March a full-time dentist became

available at the Los Alamos hospital.

Veterinary services had come much

earlier, when the military police detachment at the post brought in a

37

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 6.43-6.47 and 7.15,

DASA. Memo, Warren to Groves, sub: Hospital Requirements at "Y," 22 Jun 44; Memo, Warren to

Groves, sub: Insp of Med Facilities at "Y" (24-28

Oct 44), 16 Nov 44; Memo, Nolan to Ashbridge,

sub: Med Facilities and Activities in the Year 1943-

44, 9 Jun 44. All in Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

319.1 (Hospital), MDR.
426 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

medical officer in April 1943 to look

after the horses and war dogs used on

security patrols. Under direction of

Captain Nolan, the post veterinarian

and his staff cooperated with the clinical medicine staff to establish and

maintain public health services for the

community.38

As a major factor in maintaining

community morale, the clinical medicine services program was perhaps

more significant at Los Alamos than

at any of the other atomic sites. This

was particularly the case during the

hectic months of bomb development

and testing in late 1944 and early

1945. In this period, the strain of

working long hours on extremely difficult technical problems in the face

of pressing deadlines combined with

the stress of other factors—geographic isolation of the site, limited recreational opportunities, strict security

requirements including censorship of

mail, and not always adequate living

conditions—to place a severe burden

on both individual and community

morale.

In August 1944, Colonel Warren

sent a psychiatrist to the New Mexico

site to survey the situation. The psychiatrist found that "dissatisfactions

were expressed by every category of

resident interviewed." He recommended that a psychiatric social

worker would help ease tensions and

remove frictions in the civilian population and more intensive efforts by

the post chaplain and the WAC commanding officer would improve relationships among the diverse military

groups. Warren acted promptly to put

these recommendations into effect. In

the follow-up survey made in April

1945, the psychiatrist found community morale greatly improved. And in

the final hectic weeks of bomb assembly and testing in the summer of

1945, no key scientists or technicians

were lost to the effort because of illness or mental breakdown.39

The Safety Program

Start of large-scale project construction activities in the spring of

1943 brought the first big upsurge in

safety problems for the Manhattan

District. Anticipating this increase,

Colonel Marshall had transferred the

only safety engineer on his headquarters staff to the Clinton Engineer

Works. Consequently, in early 1943,

he began to look for a replacement,

this time seeking an engineer with the

ability and experience to organize and

direct a project-wide safety program.

Not until June did he find the man he

wanted. James R. Maddy was a veteran in the safety field, with broad experience and an outstanding record

of achievement on other government

projects. Marshall's instructions to his

new safety engineer were to form

from the District's existing safety staff

a separate section with sufficient personnel and expertise to oversee all

Manhattan safety activities.40

38

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 6.47-6.49, DASA;

Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 166.

39

 Quotation from Memo, Dr. Eric Kent Clarke

(consultant to MD) to Warren, sub: Mental Hygiene

Survey at "Y" (23-27 Aug 44), 29 Aug 44. See also

Memo for File, Clarke, sub: Psychiatric Problems in

Community at "Y," 2 May 45. Both in Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 700 (Disease, Cancer Research),

MDR. 40

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 11, pp. 6.1-6.6 and App.

C15, DASA; Marsden Diary, 2 Jun 43, OROO.
HEALTH AND SAFETY 427

Program Organization

Maddy's program organization coincided with the move of District

headquarters from New York to Oak

Ridge. The newly established SafetyAccident Prevention Section (in late

1944 it became a branch) henceforth

became responsible not only for the

project-wide safety program but also

for the Clinton program. At the same

time, however, the policy of granting

Hanford greater administrative autonomy relieved the section of all but

very general supervision of its safety

program.41

By the end of 1943, Maddy had a

staff of fifty full-time employees assigned to five subsections (construction, industrial, training, traffic, and

community safety). In subsequent reorganizations he consolidated the

construction and industrial units to

form an Occupational Safety Section

and the traffic and community units

to create a Public Safety Section.

Maddy's headquarters section supervised the program through resident

safety engineers, one of whom was assigned to each field activity where exposure to hazards amounted to at

least eighty thousand man-hours per

month and, beginning in May 1945,

one to the staff of each officer in

charge of a major operating division

at Clinton. The resident engineer was

usually a member of the area engineer's staff, performing the dual function of advising the area engineer on

safety matters and maintaining liaison

between his area and the safety office

in Oak Ridge.42

Maddy managed the District's safety

program with only modest additions

to the personnel of the Safety-Accident Prevention Section. This he was

able to do by close adherence to General Groves's basic policy of making

maximum use of available assistance

from existing outside organizations

operating in the safety field. Thus,

wherever feasible, he relied upon the

existing safety organizations of the

prime contractors, such as Du Pont

and Kellex, who employed full-time

safety engineers. Similarly, in community safety matters he encouraged voluntary safety committees, although

these were not always as effective as

relying on professional safety engineers. This was the case in Oak

Ridge, for example, where the collaborative efforts of Roane-Anderson

and a volunteer committee for a community safety program proved less efficient than the expertise of Maddy's

office.43

The safety program also received

indispensable assistance from the

Office of the Chief of Engineers

(OCE). Groves had established an effective liaison with the OCE's Safety

and Accident Prevention Division, enabling Manhattan safety personnel to

secure materials on standards and requirements, special studies, and even

personnel. Similar liaison arrangements with the Department of Labor

and the Bureau of Mines provided a

source of training materials and, from

the Bureau only, safety instructors.

41

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 11, pp. 6.1-6.2, DASA;

Matthias Diary, 12 and 24 Sep 43, OROO.

42

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 11, pp. 6.2-6.5 and Apps.

A6-A9 (Org Charts, MD Safety Org, 1943-45),

DASA. 43

 Ibid., pp. 6.2-6.3 and 6.7-6.8, DASA.
428 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Also many nongovernmental organizations—most notably the National

Safety Council, American Red Cross,

and International Association of

Chiefs of Police—supplied technical

data and special training. With this

extensive outside assistance, District

safety employees could devote most

of their time to solving urgent current

problems.44

Occupational and Community Aspects

At the Tennessee and Washington

sites, separate staffs administered occupational safety for the worker on

the job and community safety for residents of the atomic communities. In

each production plant at Clinton, a

resident engineer coordinated safety

measures with the appropriate construction and operating contractors.

At Hanford, Du Pont's own safety department, assisted by a central safety

committee comprised of all department heads and with advice from the

area engineer's safety office, administered occupational safety. Community

safety at Oak Ridge was the responsibility of a full-time safety director

functioning under supervision of the

resident engineer for the central facilities and at Richland, of the area

engineer's safety office. At the New

Mexico site, where the production organization and community were much

more closely integrated, a safety committee oversaw both occupational and

community safety until early 1945.

That year the Los Alamos administrative board employed a full-time professional safety director, who later

divided safety activities between a community program and a technical area

program.45

Manhattan's occupational safety

program came to resemble that found

in many large-scale wartime industrial

enterprises. The District safety staff

promulgated a great variety of regulations intended to minimize job-related injuries and illnesses. These required contractors to provide workers

with safe drinking water, goggles,

hard hats, safety shoes, and similar

items; to submit monthly reports on

all accidents; and to incorporate thousands of safety features in plant buildings and equipment. Compliance with

established safety codes and standards was verified through on-the-spot

inspections. To support the efforts of

resident safety engineers and contractors, the safety staff developed a program of safety indoctrination for all

employees, provided materials for

special courses, issued safety rule

books, and carried out a continuing

program to publicize safety matters in

community and plant newspapers, in

films shown in local theaters, and in

widely displayed posters.46

On the whole, the community

safety program was more conventional. Oak Ridge, Richland, and Los

44

 Ibid., pp. 6.9-6.10, DASA; Rpt, Natl Safety

Council, sub: Community Safety Prgm, Oct 43 (for

CEW) and Nov 43 (for HEW), with supplementary

reports made at each site in 1944, OROO.

45

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 11, pp. 6.4-6.5 and Apps.

A6-A9; Bk. 4, Vol. 5, Sec. 10, and Vol. 6, Sec. 7;

and Bk. 8, Vol. 1, p. 6.63, and Vol. 2, III.38 and

IX.19, DASA. Most other Manhattan installations

having more than eighty thousand man-hours of exposure to hazards per month had a full-time safety

engineer. The exceptions were Boston, where Stone

and Webster's work was not sufficiently hazardous

to require special safety measures, and Berkeley,

where the University of California accepted complete responsibility for safety matters. 46

 Ibid., Bk. 1, Vol. 11, pp. 2.1-2.11 and Apps.

C11 and H4 (Safety Progress Rpts), F1 and F4

(Safety Tng Bulls), F6 (Safety Films), DASA.
HEALTH AND SAFETY 429

Alamos required essentially the same

provisions for the safety of their residents as most normal American towns

of comparable size and population,

but with certain significant differences. One was their unusually great

dependence upon automobile transportation, creating special traffic

problems. Another was security,

making it necessary for the military to

perform certain safety functions usually assigned to civilian agencies, as,

for example, fire safety and the enforcement of traffic regulations. On

the other hand, the programs for

safety in public places (theaters,

recreation centers, playgrounds), in

schools, and in the home were not

unlike those in effect in most American communities.

District traffic engineers carefully

studied various statistical reports on

road congestion and accidents and

devised corrective measures, including institution of such advanced concepts as radio control of traffic flow,

unbalanced lanes for inbound and

outbound rush-hour traffic, and ingenious layouts to expedite turns. They

also drew up traffic regulations based

on the Uniform Vehicle Code in force

in many states, and therefore familiar

to most of the residents in the atomic

communities, and distributed copies

of these regulations widely among

District drivers.47

As a check on the public safety

standards and as an additional source

of professional expertise, the Army

requested National Safety Council experts on home, school, and traffic

safety to make periodic surveys. After

each survey the council issued recommendations, most of which the district

adopted. Thus, in early 1944, Maddy

reported to the district engineer that

of the sixty-nine recommendations

the council had made in a survey of

Oak Ridge, the District had adopted

thirty-two and was in the process of

adopting twenty-one others, more

than a third of them relating to traffic

problems.

A continuing problem for the District safety staff was how to maintain a

high level of adherence to project

safety regulations. Among the factors

that tended to reduce attention to

safety requirements below an optimum level were inadequate knowledge of current regulations or a general decline in morale, which occurred among atomic workers in 1944

and early 1945. One effective means

was to hold a safety exposition, presenting a combination of entertainment and exhibits designed to build

up morale and at the same time teach

safety measures. In the hectic last

months of the war, thousands of

project employees at Clinton and

Hanford viewed highly successful

safety expositions on industrial, offthe-job, and home safety.48

A precise assessment of the Manhattan District's relative success in its

public safety program is difficult because of a lack of detailed statistical

47

 Ibid., Bk. 1, Vol. 11, pp. 3.1-3.7 and Apps.

C12 (Traffic Regs for CEW) and D3-D4, and Bk. 8,

Vol. 1, pp. 6.33-6.35, DASA. In addition to District

regulations, government drivers operating in the

atomic communities had to comply with strict Corps

of Engineers requirements for vehicle inspection,

driver training, and driver records maintenance.

48

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 11, p. 3.8 and Apps. E7-E9

(Photos of Safety Exhibits), DASA; Memo, Groves

to Office of the Fiscal Dir, HQ ASF, Attn: E. F.

Naylor (Spec Asst), sub: HEW Safety Exposition

(24-29 Jul 44), 24 Sep 45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 729.31 (Safety and Evacuation, Hanford),

MDR.
430 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

records. Nevertheless, there is some

evidence that by 1944 the atomic

communities were achieving a public

safety record at least equal to that in

long-established civilian towns of

comparable size. Traffic safety was a

specific case. Workers commuting

from Oak Ridge and Richland to the

atomic plants were abnormally dependent upon motor vehicles driven

unusually long distances over roads

often poorly built and maintained.

Yet their record of traffic safety was

as good as that of war workers in

comparable civilian communities commuting under far less hazardous conditions. And in fact during one specific period in 1944, Oak Ridge drivers

had fewer fatalities per 10,000 vehicles in operation than towns of

similar size in other parts of the

country.49

In December 1945, the National

Safety Council presented the Manhattan Project with the Award of Honor

for Distinguished Service to Safety in

recognition of its unusually low incidence of occupational accidents from

January 1943 through June 1945, resulting in 62 fatalities and 3,879 disabling injuries during 548 million

man-hours. This record, statistically

speaking, gave the District an occupational injury rate 62 percent below

that for equivalent private industry.

Viewed in another way, District safety

programs, compared with the national

average, could be credited with

having saved 94 lives, prevented

9,200 disabling injuries, and contributed an additional 814,000 employeedays-of-work to the project. In some

respects, a more important achievement was that effectiveness increased

during the thirty-month period, as

demonstrated by the steady decline

of the frequency, fatality, and severity

rates of injury among District

workers.50

Insurance Plans

Acquisition of normal insurance

coverage for the atomic project was

virtually impossible. Even if complete

disclosure to a group of insurance

companies had been possible, they

would have been unable to write coverage because of the lack of knowledge and understanding of the hazards involved, the extent and duration

of the effects these hazards might

cause, and the ramifications of any

large-scale nuclear-related accident

that might occur. Consequently,

where normal insurance was not possible, the government had to assume

full responsibility for any claims that

might result.

Consistent with provisions relating

to insurance in the First War Powers

Act of 1941 and to procurement of

coverages in War Department Regulation 4, Manhattan developed an insurance plan to protect the interests of

the government and project contractors and employees. The number of

insurance carriers was limited deliberately to prevent knowledge of the

49

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 11, pp. 5.7-5.8 and Apps. B2

(Traffic Survey at Tenn. Site) and C12 (Traffic Regs

for CEW), DASA.

50

 Ltr, Ned H. Dearborn (Natl Safety Council

president) to Groves, 18 Sep 45, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 200.6 (Natl Safety Award), MDR; Rpt,

Cantril and Parker, sub: Status of Health and Protection at HEW, 24 Aug 45, MDR. See also MDH,

Bk. 1, Vol. 11, pp. 5.1-5.6 and Apps. A2-A5

(graphs showing occupational injury rates for MD)

and B3 (tables showing occupational injury experience for MD), DASA.
HEALTH AND SAFETY 431

project from becoming too widely

known in the insurance industry, and

District officials often had to perform

investigations, determine merits of

claims, conduct inspections, and examine contractors books on behalf of

the insuring companies. The District's

Insurance Section, organized in

August 1942, supervised these activities and helped administer a variety of

insurance rating plans and types of

insurance for project contractors, including guaranteed costs, industrial

accident and health, employees benefits, and group insurance.51

51

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 6, "Insurance Program,"

DASA; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 57.
CHAPTER XXI

The Atomic Communities in

Tennessee

Those mid-twentieth century Americans who came by the thousands to

live in the burgeoning atomic communities of the Clinton Engineer Works

(CEW) in east Tennessee moved into

a region with deep roots in the nation's history. European settlers had

been coming from the eastern seaboard colonies for two hundred years,

many by way of the much-traveled

trail through the Cumberland Gap, to

live in the valleys beneath the heavily

wooded ridges forming the foothills

of the Cumberland Mountains. But

their numbers had remained small,

limited to the few farm families that

the relatively poor soil would support.

Then in the 1930's, the arrival of the

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)

presaged the establishment of the

"Government village" that in the next

decade would tremendously alter the

quiet rural countryside.1 Indeed, as

the Manhattan Project got under way

in early 1943, the sudden influx of

the atomic workers soon created a

unique industrial community along

the south slopes of that prominent

terrain feature known for many years

as Black Oak Ridge.2

Oak Ridge: The Operating Community

Of necessity, planning for community facilities related directly to the

construction and operation of the

production plants and hence was subject to frequent revision, usually

toward expansion. Rather than adhering to long-range blueprints, Manhattan was compelled to adopt a policy

of expediency, responding as promptly as possible to each new major

change in industrial development,

with the hope that it could provide at

all times for at least a minimum of

community requirements. Achievement of even this minimum goal

often was difficult, because the

Army's general policy gave first priority to materials, equipment, and man1

 Manhattan and Stone and Webster engineers

regularly used the term Government village to designate the community they envisioned would be built

at the Clinton Engineer Works as an administrative

headquarters and residence for construction and operating workers. See reference in Marshall Diary,

9 Jun and 24 Jul 42, OCG Files, Gen Corresp,

Groves Files, Misc Recs Sec, behind Fldr 5, MDR.

2

 Robinson, Oak Ridge Story, pp. 32-41; U.S.

Atomic Energy Commission, AEC Handbook on Oak

Ridge (Oak Ridge, Tenn.: Oak Ridge Operations

Office, 1958), p. 11.
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN TENNESSEE 433

power for plant construction and

operation.3

First Phase, 1942-1943

Organization and planning for Oak

Ridge began in late June 1942, after

Stone and Webster had agreed to include site development and housing

construction in its responsibilities as

architect-engineer-manager of the

atomic project. Meeting with Manhattan leaders on the twenty-ninth, company officials indicated a special engineering group at their Boston office

would begin design work for the permanent operating community immediately. During the weeks that followed, Stone and Webster and Army

engineers collaborated closely on preliminary plans for the community.

Using such previously built government villages as Ocala, Florida (for

the Florida ship canal project), and

Eastport, Maine (for the Passamaquoddy project), as a basis, they envisioned an operating village of some

five thousand inhabitants.

Following a visit to the Tennessee

site, the engineers tentatively decided

that the best location for the village

would be in the northeastern corner

because Tennessee 61, the best highway traversing the site, ran northeastward to Clinton and then connected

with good roads to Knoxville, and

also because main lines of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and

the Southern Railway were nearby.

(See Map 3.) The topography, too, met

their requirements. The stream valley

formed by the East Fork of Poplar

Creek, a tributary of the Clinch River,

was relatively flat—if somewhat

narrow—and extended about 7 miles

southwestward from the northeast

boundary of the reservation. And paralleling the valley on the north and

south were Black Oak Ridge and Pine

Ridge, foothills that would provide

the necessary protection for the

future community from possible disastrous explosions at the nearby production plants and from unauthorized

observation from outside the reservation. The gentle slope of Black Oak

Ridge also promised to be suitable

for residential construction.4

Because the site under construction

was remote and all personnel, for

safety and security, would have to live

in one place, the village would need

numerous housing units and facilities

to provide atomic workers with minimum standards of comfort and service. But wartime restrictions on the

amount and cost of any kind of community construction and the difficulty

in procuring building materials made

it seem unlikely that adequate facilities could be provided. Thus, both

Brig. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, in his capacity as the Services of Supply's

deputy chief of staff for requirements

and resources, and Colonel Groves,

who was still serving as the Corps of

Engineers' deputy chief for Army

construction, took occasion to remind

District officials of these restrictions

3

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, "Clinton Engineer

Works," pp. 1.4-1.5; Bk. 4, Vol. 5, "Construction,"

pp. 5.1-5.2; and Bk. 8, Vol. 1, "General," pp. 5.7-

5.8, DASA. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 424.

4

 Marshall Diary, 25 and 29 Jun, 14 and 24 Jul,

2 and 23-24 Sep 42, MDR; DSM Chronology, 25

Jun 42. Sec. 2(e), 29 Jun 42, Sec. 15, 24 Jul and 2

Sep 42, each Sec. 9, OROO; Completion Rpt, Stone

and Webster, sub: Clinton Engr Works, Contract

W-7401-eng-13, 1946, pp. 12-14, OROO; Groves,

Now It Can Be Told, pp. 25-26. See Ch. 3 for a more

detailed discussion of the selection of the Tennessee

site.
434 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

and to caution them against overly

elaborate plans for village construction. Clay told Colonels Marshall and

Nichols that he saw little hope that

there would be any relaxation in

these restrictions for the atomic

project. Groves reaffirmed this view

and made a point of reminding Marshall of the $7,500-dollar cost limitation on individual quarters; he also

told Captain Johnson, the District liaison officer in Washington, D.C., that

he thought patterning the atomic

community after Ocala or Eastport

would be a mistake, for these two

towns were built under peacetime

conditions. Nevertheless, when

Groves—as the new officer in charge

of the project—personally inspected

the East Fork Valley section of the

Tennessee site in late September, he

shifted his position to concur with

Marshall's view "that primitive housing could not be expected to meet

family requirements of the class of

personnel to be employed on this

particular project."

 5

General Groves's approval of East

Fork Valley cleared the way for development of the atomic community. In

early October, Stone and Webster

construction crews started work on

the first phase. Bulldozers and graders cleared away existing structures,

grubbed out trees and shrubs from the

slopes of Black Oak Ridge, laid out

rights of way for roads, and provided

for a drainage system. At the same

time, Captain Johnson conferred with

the Corps' Construction Division

housing specialists, seeking data on

designs appropriate for the Tennessee site; Colonel Marshall visited the

Ocala village, coming away convinced

that its buildings, "with slight modification, would be ideal types for our

village at Clinton"; and Stone and

Webster worked closely with the

Boston Area Engineers Office to complete the general layout plans for the

village.6

Stone and Webster submitted its

general plan for the atomic community to the Manhattan area office on

26 October. What had begun as a

projected village of five thousand

people emerged as the blueprint for a

town of some thirteen thousand. Consistent with the Manhattan objective

that townsite construction remain secondary to plant construction, general

design specifications were based on

utility, on minimizing costs, and on

maximizing use of noncritical materials. Housing and other community facilities had only to furnish sufficient

accommodations and services so that

the majority of project workers would

live on the reservation. Employees

who did not have to commute daily to

off-site communities would perform

more efficiently in plant construction

and operations and would be much

less of a risk to the security of the

project.7

Under terms of the Army's original

contract, Stone and Webster was responsible for preparing detailed blueprints of not only the atomic community but also the large-scale electromagnetic plant. By November, howev5

 Quotation from Marshall Diary, 24 Sep 42,

MDR. See also ibid., 30 Jun, 24 Jul, 2 Sep 42, MDR,

and DSM Chronology, 30 Jun and 24 Jul 42, each

Sec. 9, and 2 Sep 42, Sec. 25, OROO.

6

 Marshall Diary, 7 Oct 42, MDR. 7

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 2.9, 4.1, 4.4-4.5,

DASA; Marshall Diary, 1 and 17 Oct 42, MDR; DSM

Chronology, 1 and 7 Oct 42, each Sec. 9, and

17 Oct 42, Sec. 16, OROO; Groves, Now It Can Be

Told, p. 425.
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN TENNESSEE 435

er, as the vast scope of plant design

became apparent, Manhattan realized

that Stone and Webster simply did

not have enough design personnel to

execute both facets and meet the

project's stringent time limits as well.

So on the twenty-first it relieved

Stone and Webster of town design

functions, leaving the firm with responsibility for overseeing construction, operating utilities, and maintaining the roads of the town. To replace

Stone and Webster in town design,

Manhattan in early 1943 negotiated

contracts with the John B. Pierce

Foundation of New York, nationally

known for its work on low-cost housing projects, and with Skidmore,

Owings and Merrill of Chicago, a

leading architectural firm. The two

organizations were to function as a

team, with the Pierce Foundation,

which was primarily a research group,

providing advice and plans on village

housing and with Skidmore, Owings

and Merrill furnishing architect-engineer services.8

Following the engagement of Skidmore, Owings and Merrill and the

Pierce Foundation, Colonel Marshall

established a new administrative

unit—the Town Management Division—to monitor the work of these

two contractors. This division, however, was abolished in a major reorganization of the District in April, at

which time the district engineer decided to separate the division's town

planning and management functions.

Two elements replaced the division, a

Central Facilities Planning Unit and a

Central Facilities Operating Division.

The function of the Planning Unit

was to coordinate the design work of

Skidmore, Owings and Merrill with

Stone and Webster construction activities at the townsite, whereas the

function of the Operating Division

was to provide management continuity to a developing community. Marshall also assigned two officers on his

staff special responsibilities for community matters—Capt. Samuel S.

Baxter for town planning and 1st Lt.

Paul E. O'Meara for town

management.9

Initial townsite construction was in

the section of Oak Ridge eventually

known as East Town, completed in

early 1944. Centered on an administration building, located just south of

Tennessee 61 and about 3 miles

southwest of the Elza entrance to the

Tennessee site, the East Town community comprised more than three

thousand family-type housing units.

Adjacent to the administration building was a town center of stores, service and recreation buildings, a guesthouse, several men's and women's

dormitories, cafeterias, and a hospital.

Overhead electrical and telephone

lines and a sewer and water system

built along main street, paralleling

8

 Completion Rpts, Stone and Webster, sub:

CEW, p. 14, and Skidmore, Owings and Merrill,

sub: Portion of Townsite Planning of Oak Ridge,

Contract W-7401-eng-69, 9 Sep 44, p. I.1, OROO;

Ltr, Dist Engr to Stone and Webster, sub: Scope of

Work at CEW, 21 Nov 42, OROO; DSM Chronology, 5 and 25 Nov 42, each Sec. 25, and 9 Dec 42,

Sec. 4, OROO; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 2.9 and

4.5-4.7, DASA.

9

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 3.5-3.7, 5.6-5.9, Apps.

C17 (Chart, Central Facilities Org, Mar 43) and C21

(Chart, MD Org, dated 1 Apr 43 but effective

1 May), DASA; Memo, Blair to Marshall, sub: Proposed Org for Maint and Opn of Gen Facilities,

22 Jan 43, and attached organization chart, OROO;

Completion Rpt, Du Pont, sub: Clinton Engr Works,

TNX Area, Contract W-7412-eng-23, 1 Apr 44, following p. 17 (Chart, Clinton Area Engrs Office Org,

31 Mar 43), OROO.
436 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Tennessee 61 and the house-lined

residential streets, provided East

Towners with complete public utility

services.10

Construction of the East Town section of Oak Ridge established the pattern for subsequent expansions in the

atomic community at the Tennessee

site. As in virtually every other aspect

of project construction, the primary

emphasis was on speed. This was particularly true with housing, because

throughout the wartime period there

was never enough of it. The two most

important obstacles to speedy construction were shortages of building

materials and construction workers,

and District and contractor officials

devoted much effort to trying to overcome these problems. Building plans,

wherever feasible, specified employment of available substitute materials,

such as the use of fiber or gypsum

board instead of wood for walls and

cement blocks instead of poured concrete for foundations. Building designs emphasized standardization and

simplicity of construction. When experience demonstrated that trailers

and prefabricated hutments, both in

reasonably good supply, would suffice

as homes for most plant workers,

town designers substituted them in

later expansions. With District approval, Stone and Webster let out

many lump-sum subcontracts for

much of the town construction. Not

only did these subcontractors speed

up construction, they also furnished

many additional employees who otherwise would not have been available

for the project.11

Concurrently with construction of

East Town, Stone and Webster built a

separate self-contained community

designated East Village, adjacent to

Tennessee 61 east of the center of

Oak Ridge near the Elza gate. Completed in late 1943 to house black

workers, this community comprised

fifty permanent family dwellings, four

dormitories, a cafeteria, and a church.

Black workers and their families never

took up residence in East Village because of a pressing need of more

housing for white employees. Black

families were housed elsewhere in

segregated hutment areas in Oak

Ridge and in the vicinity of the gaseous diffusion plant.12

Second Phase, 1943-1945

The second phase of the Oak Ridge

community development program,

which began in the fall of 1943 and

continued until late summer of 1944,

grew out of Manhattan's need to provide additional housing and support

services for a much larger population;

the original estimate of thirteen thousand had more than tripled to a new

high of forty-two thousand. Skidmore,

Owings and Merrill again provided

the principal architect-engineer services, establishing a field office where

personnel worked with Captain

10

 Completion Rpt, Stone and Webster, sub:

CEW, pp. 13-15, OROO; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp.

2.9, 4.2, 4.5, DASA; Robinson, Oak Ridge Story, pp.

48-49. For the layout of East Town see architectural

maps in Completion Rpt, Skidmore, Owings and

Merrill, sub: Portion of Townsite Planning of Oak

Ridge, pp. I.8-I.10, OROO, and aerial photographs

in Robinson, Oak Ridge Story, following p. 56.

11

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 5.2-5.5, DASA; Completion Rpt, Stone and Webster, sub: CEW, pp. 30-

44, OROO; DSM Chronology, 25 Nov 42, Sec. 25,

OROO. 12

 Completion Rpt, Skidmore, Owings and Merrill,

sub: Portion of Townsite Planning of Oak Ridge, p.

II.1, OROO; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 4.2-4.3. 7.8-

7.9, 7.20, DASA.
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN TENNESSEE 437

OAK RIDGE SHOPPING MALL (foreground) AND DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS (background)

Baxter. Stone and Webster oversaw

the construction, most of it contracted out to other building firms, notably John A. Johnson, Foster and

Creighton, A. Farnell Blair, O'Driscoll

and Grove, and Clinton Home Building, and to manufacturers of trailers

and prefabricated houses, including

Schult Trailers, Alma Trailers, National Homes, Gunnison Housing,

and E. L. Bruce.13

To keep pace with the increasing

requirements of the growing community of Oak Ridge, the District reorganized and greatly expanded its

central facilities administration. Effective 1 November, Colonel Nichols established the CEW Central Facilities

Division under the direction of Lt.

Col. Thomas T. Crenshaw. To facilitate the construction and operation of

the new community, Crenshaw set up

within the division six specialized

branches: town planning, town management, recreation and welfare, utility maintenance, engineering, and central facilities construction. The Town

Planning Branch, directed by Captain

Baxter, coordinated the work of the

architect-engineer and construction

contractors and assisted in formulating plans for new additions to the

community. The Town Management

Branch, headed by Captain O'Meara,

had responsibility for forming an organization to manage the community;

its five sections dealt with such matters as liaison with federal agencies,

commercial concessions, public

13

 Robinson, Oak Ridge Story, pp. 48-49; Marsden

Diary, 13 Sep 43, OROO; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12. pp.

4.2-4.3, 4.6-4.7, 5.2-5.3, 7.10-7.14, App. C5,

DASA; Completion Rpts, Skidmore, Owings and

Merrill, sub: Portion of Townsite Planning of Oak

Ridge, pp. I.1-I.3, and Stone and Webster, sub:

CEW, pp. 14 and 103-26, OROO; Dist Engr,

Monthly Rpt on DSM Proj, Sep 43, OCG Files, Gen

Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 28, Tab A, MDR.
438 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

BLACK WORKERS AT CEW

health, and operation of dormitories

and a guesthouse. The Recreation

and Welfare Branch, under Capt.

Thomas W. Taylor, oversaw the construction and operation of theaters,

playing fields, and other recreational

facilities in Oak Ridge. The Utility

Maintenance Branch, headed by Maj.

Melvin O. Swanson, oversaw the

broader aspects of ensuring the efficient operation of the town's electrical and communications facilities. The

Engineering Branch, directed by Maj.

Paul F. Rossell, monitored the public

services required by the community

on a continuing basis; its eight sections handled transportation, mechanical repairs, water and sewerage, electrical and telephone service, and related activities. Finally, the Central

Facilities Construction Branch, under

Capt. Edward J. Bloch, monitored

community development through

seven sections; five oversaw the construction of dwellings and other structures (stores, schools, and churches),

while two supervised the installation

of utilities and the building of roads.14

For the second phase of community

development, Skidmore, Owings and

Merrill's original plans called for

9,250 more family units and enough

additional dormitories to house seventy-six hundred persons. Reviewing

this proposal in November, Manhat14

 Org Charts, U.S. Engrs Office, MD, 1 Nov 43,

15 Feb and 1 Jun 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

020 (MED-Org), MDR; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp.

3.5-3.7 and 5.6-5.9, DASA; Dist Engr, Monthly Rpt

on DSM Proj, Jul 44, MDR.
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN TENNESSEE 439

tan accepted the figures for dormitory

space but decided 6,000 family units

would suffice for construction on

available sites in East Town and East

Village and in an undeveloped area

along Tennessee 61, about 2 miles

west of East Town. Only some 4,800

of the planned 6,000 family units

were built before completion of

second-phase construction. The new

housing included many prefabricated

units, based upon a design used successfully by the TVA, and some demountable types procured from other

government projects in Indiana and

West Virginia. Both met project requirements and were easily removable. The second-phase program also

produced more than 50 new dormitories, with a total capacity of seventyfive hundred, and a number of

prefabricated barracks to house the

rapidly increasing military population.

Stone and Webster also supervised

construction of the additional cafeterias, shopping centers, schools, laundries, utilities, and other facilities required for the expanding population

of Oak Ridge.15

Third Phase, 1945

By late 1944, employment figures

were again outstripping all earlier estimates. On the basis that at least a

part of the increase was temporary

and would decline as production

plants were built, District and contractor officials at first agreed to try

to cope with the new demand by maximum utilization of available housing.

But further expansion of both the

electromagnetic and diffusion plants

rendered this expedient infeasible. By

early 1945, with new estimates projecting the ultimate resident population of Oak Ridge at sixty-six thousand, Manhattan had no alternative

but to undertake a third phase of

community development.16

This new phase of community expansion added some 1,300 family

units, 20 dormitories, about 750 trailers, as well as the necessary commercial and service facilities. Again emphasis was on demountable housing.

Skidmore, Owings and Merrill served

not only as architect-engineer but also

as inspector of completed construction for the government, replacing

Stone and Webster in this function,

and the CEW Central Facilities

Division directly oversaw third-phase

construction carried out by various

subcontractors.17

With completion of the third phase

in the summer of 1945, the Clinton

site had community facilities that

more than adequately met the needs

of the resident population in the town

of Oak Ridge (sixty-one thousand)

and in the nearby temporary construction camps (fourteen thousand).

These facilities included 10,000

family units, 4,000 trailers, 3,000 hutments, 89 dormitories, and a variety

of other types of units in lesser quan15

 Completion Rpts, Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, sub: Portion of Townsite Planning of Oak

Ridge, pp. I.3-I.7 and I.8-I.10 (architect's maps of

Oak Ridge), and Stone and Webster, sub: CEW, pp.

13-18 and 72-84, OROO; Dist Engr, Monthly Rpt

on DSM Proj, Sep and Nov 43, MDR.

16

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 1.1-1.6 and 4.3-4.4,

DASA; Completion Rpt, Stone and Webster, sub:

CEW, pp. 13-15, OROO; Dist Engr, Monthly Rpt

on DSM Proj, Jun 44, MDR; Robinson, Oak Ridge

Story, pp. 48-49. 17

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 1.3-1.4, 4.3-4.4, 5.1-

5.3, DASA; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 425; MPC

Min, 22-23 Jan 44, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP

Files, Fldr 23, Tab A, MDR.
440 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

PREFABRICATED HOUSES (foreground) AND APARTMENT DWELLINGS (center) AT CEW

titles. Total cost of the three-phase

community development program was

more than $100 million, over half for

housing and the rest for support

facilities.18

The Construction Camps

Manhattan made other provisions

to accommodate its plant construction

workers, because the major portion of

the permanent housing facilities being

built was intended for plant-operating

personnel. As the construction workers would have only a temporary connection with the project, the Army

initially planned for them to live off

the atomic reservation and to commute to their jobs. But both District

officials and construction contractors

recognized early that the local economy, already strained with an influx of

workers for other nearby war plants,

would not be able to absorb the new

wave of Manhattan workers. Furthermore, the deplorable condition of

many local roads, the distance from

the site of towns where housing was

available, and the shortage of adequate transportation made commuting time-consuming and difficult. Accordingly, most Manhattan contracts

18

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 1.3-1.4, 5.3-5.6,

Apps. CI (Chart, CEW Population), C3b, and C4,

and Bk. 2, Vol. 4, "Construction," pp. 3.61-3.62,

DASA; Robinson, Oak Ridge Story, p. 49. For a detailed account of the provision of community services see MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, Secs. 8-17 and Apps.

B6-B11 and B13-B14, DASA.
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN TENNESSEE 441

ENLISTED MEN'S BARRACKS AT CEW

provided that, where necessary, the

major construction contractors would

furnish temporary housing for their

employees in on-site construction

camps.19

Housing in the construction camps

usually consisted of five-man prefabricated hutments (a type used with

great success on other wartime construction projects), house trailers,

and, in a few instances, dormitorytype structures. Surplus hutments and

trailers were available at locations

near the Tennessee site. Contractors

had only to arrange for transportation

to the site, where, with the addition

of a few hastily erected buildings to

house essential community services,

they sufficed to meet the minimum

needs of construction workers.

During late 1943 and early 1944,

Stone and Webster and its subcontractors established a number of hutment camps and seven trailer camps

in the vicinity of the Oak Ridge townsite. Skidmore, Owings and Merrill

helped design the largest of Stone

and Webster's trailer camps in

Gamble Valley, south and west of Oak

Ridge, which had more than four

thousand spaces, with sections for

both white and black workers. Du

Pont housed some of its construction

employees working on the plutonium

19

 For a detailed analysis of the type of problems a

contractor faced in providing adequate living facilities for its construction employees at the Tennessee

site see Completion Rpt, Du Pont, sub: CEW, TNX

Area, pp. 160-70, OROO.
442 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

GAMBLE VALLEY TRAILER CAMP AT CEW

semiworks in Stone and Webster hutments and others in an existing

school building, remodeled to serve

as a dormitory.

Contractors established four more

camps for thousands of diffusion

workers at the confluence of Poplar

Creek and the Clinch River, about 15

miles southwest of Oak Ridge. In

June 1943, the J. A. Jones Construction Company began building hutments in the Happy Valley area, directly southeast of the gaseous diffusion plant, to house the first of some

fifteen thousand workers. Later trailers, dormitories, and so-called Victory

Houses supplemented the hutments

and cafeterias; a shopping center and

a school supplied essential community

services. An overflow of diffusion

workers occupied two smaller camps

directly west of Happy Valley. And

when Ford, Bacon, and Davis began

construction on the plant-conditioning area in 1944, the contractor built

a separate camp for its workers a

short distance east of the plant site.

After the peak of construction had

passed, population of the camps declined, but they continued to be partially occupied for many months after

the war was over.20

20

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 7.7-7.9; Bk. 2, Vol. 4,

pp. 3.61-3.66 and App. B3 (Gen Layout of K-25

Plant, including K-27); and Bk. 5, Vol. 5, "Construction," p. 5.3, DASA. Dist Engr, Monthly Rpts

on DSM Proj, Mar-May 43, MDR. Completion Rpts,

Stone and Webster, sub: CEW, p. 17; Skidmore,

Owings and Merrill, sub: Portion of Townsite Planning of Oak Ridge, p. II.12; Du Pont, sub: CEW,

TNX Area, p. 160; and M. W. Kellogg Co. and

Kellex Corp., sub: K-25 Plant, Contract W-7405-

eng-23, 31 Oct 45, Sec. 1, pp. 31-32 and map of

K-25 area and aerial photograph of labor camps

following p. 40, OROO.
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN TENNESSEE 443

Community Management

Manhattan's community management program aimed to maintain adequate community facilities but with a

maximum economy of manpower and

materials and minimum risk to project

security. To attain these objectives,

the District's town management staff

instituted and experimented with a

variety of specific measures. For example, it turned over to the professional employees of civilian contractors the detailed administration of

community operations; it subsidized

dormitory rents and bus fares; and it

secured assistance from existing outside civilian organizations, such as the

American Red Cross, the TVA, and

certain governmental agencies of the

state of Tennessee. The test for all

such measures was the extent to

which they contributed to the principal objective of the Tennessee site:

production of sufficient fissionable

materials in time to fulfill the demands of the bomb development program at Los Alamos.21

To the casual visitor driving down

Tennessee 61 from the Elza gate in

the spring of 1943, the rapidly growing clusters of buildings on the slopes

of Black Oak Ridge gave every appearance of being an already thriving

village of some size. On closer examination, however, the visitor would

have found that most of the houses

were unfinished, the shopping centers

still under construction, and utilities

not yet operating. For Oak Ridge did

not begin to function as an organized

community until the summer of 1943,

when the first families began to move

in and some of the commercial and

service facilities opened their doors

for business. In fact, the town had no

name until Marshall's executive officer, Lt. Col. Robert C. Blair, requested employee suggestions. District officials finally chose "Oak

Ridge," appropriate because of the

location and because "its rural connotation held outside curiosity to a

minimum."

 22

With the opening of the first cafeteria and dormitories in East Town in

mid-June, the Central Facilities Operating Division—with Captain Baxter

serving for a time as town manager—

began active management of the community. But direct administration of

the community by the Army lasted

only a few months. The Army had

never been enthusiastic about having

District military personnel directly involved in the time-consuming day-today administration of Oak Ridge.

Groves and Nichols concluded that

direct military operation of the town

would require not only a large military staff but also much of the time

and energy of the district engineer

himself.23

The September 1943 decision to

further enlarge the town of Oak

Ridge precipitated a search for a civilian organization to manage it. Stone

and Webster and J. A. Jones were

likely candidates, but a study showed

that those firms had fully committed

most of their available supervisory

personnel to overseeing construction

21

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 6.1-6.2, 7.14-7.23,

9.1-9.2, 11.1-11.9, 18.11-18.12, DASA; Groves,

Now It Can Be Told, pp. 425-26.

22

 Quotation from Robinson, Oak Ridge Story, p.

50. See also Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 425-26;

MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, p. 5.6, DASA. 23

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, p. 5.8 and App. C21,

DASA; Org Chart, U.S. Engrs Office, MD, 15 Aug

43, MDR.
444 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

OAK RIDGE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

of the electromagnetic and diffusion

plants. So Manhattan decided to approach the Turner Construction

Company of New York. Groves knew

that the company had established a

fine record on other important war

projects, and Nichols recently had

worked closely with Turner officials

in his capacity as area engineer in

charge of construction of the Rome

(New York) Air Depot.24

By mid-month, Manhattan and

Turner representatives reached an

agreement that the company would

establish a wholly owned but completely separate organization—designated the Roane-Anderson Company,

after the two Tennessee counties in

which the atomic site was located—to

administer the town under a costplus-fixed-fee contract. According to

its provisions, Roane-Anderson would

manage, operate, and maintain the

government-owned facilities and services at the Clinton reservation, exclusive of restricted plant areas. For this

service the company was to receive a

fee of $25,000 a month, or slightly

less than 1 percent of $2.8 million—

the estimated total monthly cost of

operating the facilities. The terms of

the final contract were sufficiently

flexible to permit Manhattan to assign

a broad range of facilities and activities to the company's administration.

Faced with the unexpectedly rapid

growth of Oak Ridge, which brought

an immediate need for a multiplicity

of new community services, District

authorities found a ready and effec24

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 6.3-6.4, DASA;

Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 425; Cullum, Biographical Register, 9:593; Marshall Diary, 18 Jun 42,

MDR.
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN TENNESSEE 445

MAIN POST OFFICE AND THEATER IN OAK RIDGE

tive solution in a policy of "give it to

Roane-Anderson."

 25

Roane-Anderson gradually took

over responsibility for administration

of most community functions from

the Town Management Branch of the

CEW Central Facilities Division. In

certain respects its role was comparable to that of the municipal administration of a civilian community, but

there were also some major differences. It provided Oak Ridgers with

the usual publicly owned utilities and

also with steam heat and telegraph

service. It paid the policemen, firemen, and medical personnel, but the

District retained administrative control of the police, fire departments,

and hospital. The company provided

physical maintenance for the schools,

but the District delegated their actual

operation to Anderson County educational officials. In recreation, RoaneAnderson had no part at all. Instead,

the District, in July 1943, permitted

organization of a Recreation and Welfare Association, comprised of residents of the community, to operate

theaters, bowling alleys, athletic

fields, taverns, library services, and a

weekly newspaper.26

Where Roane-Anderson's role differed most greatly from that of an ordinary municipality was in its assumption of many of the activities normally

carried out by private enterprise in

American society. Thus, the company

managed and maintained virtually all 25

 Roane-Anderson Hist, Contract W-7401-eng115, 30 Nov 51, pp. 1 and 5 (source of quotation),

OROO. See also MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, p. 6.4,

DASA. The Roane-Anderson contract was formally

signed on 14 Feb 44, effective 15 Sep 43.

26

 Roane-Anderson Hist, pp. 23-62, OROO;

MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 6.5, 6.7, 9.1, 10.1, 11.2,

DASA.
446 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

of the real estate of the community—

housing of all kinds, farmlands (some

of which it actually cultivated), forested areas, public grounds, and some

fifty-four private cemeteries. It operated cafeterias (there were twenty at

the period of peak employment in

May 1945), laundry and dry cleaning

establishments, and cold storage and

warehouse facilities. It delivered coal,

fuel oil, and wood to community residents in winter and ice in summer. A

company concessions department

rented space and granted licenses to

private enterprise for grocery, drug,

and department stores; clothing, shoe

repair, and barber shops; and garages, service stations, and other

commercial establishments in the

town centers and neighborhood shopping areas. It operated a transportation system that included both on-site

and off-site bus service, the 35-mile

CEW Railroad, and the CEW Motor

Pool.27

By February 1945, Roane-Anderson

had more than ten thousand employees, recruited from among people

living both on and off the reservation.

From the start, the Army viewed

direct operation of so many functions

by a single contractor as a temporary

arrangement. Consequently, when

community growth began to level off,

it assisted Roane-Anderson in transferring many community activities to

more efficient specialized operators.

By granting concessions, letting subcontracts, returning certain operations to District control, and terminating activities, the company reduced its direct employment to about

five thousand by August 1945.

Among the major activities given up

by Roane-Anderson were bus operations (taken over by the American

Industrial Transit, Inc.), most housing

operations, trash and garbage collection, and distribution of ice, fuel, oil,

and coal.28

Through the CEW Central Facilities Division, the Army exercised

close supervision over Roane-Anderson and the various community subcontractors and concessionaires. Beginning in the fall of 1943, several

reorganizations of that division were

at least partially designed to realign

its various administrative sections so

that they would reflect the shift from

community construction to operations

and more nearly complement those of

the Roane-Anderson organization.

These organizational changes culminated finally in November 1944 in establishment of a Roane-Anderson

Branch within the division. Through

administrative service, maintenance,

utilities, transportation, and operations sections, this branch supervised

counterpart sections, in the company's community management organization. The chief of the branch, Maj.

Henry G. Hoberg, shared executive

direction of the community with

Roane-Anderson's project manager,

Clinton N. Hernandez. In addition, a

Central Facilities Advisory Committee, comprised of representatives of

all the major contractors (including

Roane-Anderson), assisted the division chief in coordinating community

operations.29

27

 Roane-Anderson Hist, pp. 23-62, OROO.

28

 Ibid., pp. 4-5, 22-63, App. F (Graphic Rec of

Roane-Anderson), OROO; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, p.

1.5, DASA. 29

 Org Charts, U.S. Engrs Office, MD, Nov 43

Continued
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN TENNESSEE 447

CEW RESERVATION ENTRY POINT

Limited reorganizations in 1945 did

not change the basic relationship between the CEW Central Facilities Division and Roane-Anderson. In January, the district engineer transferred

some of this staff's functions—safety,

special services (chiefly recreational

activities), and public relations—to Lt.

Col. John S. Hodgson, who had succeeded Colonel Crenshaw as division

chief in May 1944, and, at the same

time, changed Hodgson's title to executive assistant (to the district engineer) for operations. Roane-Anderson

also made some changes in its organization to adjust to its divestiture of

certain major activities.30

The average civilian resident of

Oak Ridge had most of the essential

community facilities and services that

would have been available in other

comparable wartime communities.

What he chiefly lost as long as he resided on the Clinton reservation were

some of his civic rights. The War Department had declared the Tennessee

site a closed military reservation effective 1 April 1943, with strict control of entry, guards at the gates,

fences at strategic points, and mounted patrolmen regularly checking unfenced sections of its boundaries. The

Army did not permit residents to

establish and participate in normal

municipal and township governments,

although it did allow them to form

certain social welfare organizations.31 and 15 Feb, 1 Jun, 28 Aug, 10 Nov 44, MDR;

Roane-Anderson Hist, Apps. E1-E4 (Org Charts,

20 Apr, 1 Sep, and 1 Nov 44), OROO; MDH, Bk. 1,

Vol. 12, p. 3.8 and App. C18 (Chart, Central Facilities Org, Mar 44), DASA. 30

 Org Chart, U.S. Engrs Office, MD, 26 Jan 45,

MDR; Roane-Anderson Hist, App. E5 (Org Chart,

6 Feb 45), OROO; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, App. C19

(Chart, Central Facilities Org, Mar 45), DASA. 31

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 1.5-1.6, DASA. See

also WD Cir 57, 20 Feb 43, Sec. 3.
448 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

CHAPEL-ON-THE-HILL IN OAK RIDGE

But residents were not entirely

without state and local civic rights.

The legislature of Tennessee, concerned over the loss of state lands

and taxes in earlier large cessions to

the federal government, declined the

War Department's request in early

1943 to cede sovereignty over the

Tennessee site: Oak Ridge's legal

status was that of a federal area, not a

federal reservation. Hence, its residents legally were citizens of either

Roane or Anderson County and of

the state of Tennessee, subject to

their criminal and civil laws and entitled to the civic privileges of those jurisdictions. They could, for example,

vote in state and county elections. If

they violated the law, they were subject to arrest by Oak Ridge policemen, deputized by the sheriff of Anderson County, and trial in local or

state courts. The schools for their

children, too, remained legally a part

of the Anderson County system, although they were built and operated

largely with federal funds. Because

the District, for reasons of security,

limited school attendance to the children of residents, the attorney general of Tennessee ruled that the schools

were nonpublic and therefore not

eligible for state aid.32

Residing in the atomic communities

in Tennessee during the war years

was in many respects similar to living

in frontier settlements or boomtowns:

mud in winter and dust in summer;

houses partially built and incompletely furnished; the stores with essential

items missing from their shelves;

overcrowded schools, churches, and

theaters; inadequate recreational activities, at least in the early months;

and countless other deficiencies associated with communities that have

grown too fast. Nevertheless, many

Oak Ridgers would later recall with

pleasure the prevailing sense of camaraderie and democracy among residents drawn from all walks of life—

Nobel Prize-winning scientists, corporate executives, plant managers,

skilled workers, officers and enlisted

servicemen, manual laborers, and

housewives—as they shared together

the many hardships of life and

worked together to solve the problems of day-to-day living under difficult circumstances. And for many

residents, the excitement and satisfaction of being part of a great and

32

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 12, pp. 9.1-9.9 and 11.1-

11.13, DASA; Robinson, Oak Ridge Story, pp. 60-61

and 63-64; Completion Rpt, Skidmore, Owings and

Merrill, sub: Portion of Townsite Planning of Oak

Ridge, pp. V.1-V.3, OROO.
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN TENNESSEE 449

unique enterprise that might well

prove to be the key to winning the

war sufficed to more than compensate

for the many drawbacks.33

33

 Robinson, Oak Ridge Story, pp. 46-47 and 51-

61; Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 158-60.
CHAPTER XXII

The Atomic Communities in

Washington State

The atomic communities of the

Hanford Engineer Works (HEW) in

south central Washington State were

in the vicinity of one of the great historical routes of immigration to the

Northwest United States. In 1805

Lewis and Clark had covered a portion of the famed Oregon Trail as

they made their way down the Snake

River to the Columbia, and a generation later thousands of settlers had

traversed it as they forged westward.

Indian wars, however, delayed settlement in central and eastern Washington until the 1850's and, thereafter,

the general aridity of the semidesert

sagebrush country in the vicinity of

the confluence of the Yakima and Columbia Rivers discouraged attempts at

agriculture, except for some sheep

raising. Finally, in the early 1900's,

limited development of irrigation attracted a few farmers, who planted

orchards and raised crops of mint and

alfalfa. It was they who, in the early

spring of 1943, suddenly faced displacement from their homes in three

tiny rural hamlets—White Bluffs,

Hanford, and Richland—to make way

for thousands of construction and operating employees of the plutonium

project. Events remote from the

peaceful agriculture pursuits of these

modern pioneers were to bring this

hitherto bypassed region into the

mainstream of American history.1

Selecting Sites

Faced with development of an area

isolated from any sizable city, Du

Pont and Army engineers began planning early for large on-site communities. Because of the omnipresence of

radioactivity in the plutonium processes, they could not follow the

normal practice of having construction and plant-operating employees

live adjacent to the production plants.

Scientists had indicated that it would

not be safe for plant-operating employees to reside within 10 miles of

the pile and separation production

units. And because these units would

have to be tested during the later

phases of plant construction, even

construction employees would have to

live some distance from them.

Saving time was another urgent

consideration in location planning.

1

 Dictionary of American History, rev. ed., s.v.

"Oregon Trail" by Robert Moulton Gatke; MDH,

Bk. 4, Vol. 4, "Land Acquisition, Hanford Engineer

Works," pp. 2.1-2.9, DASA; Du Pont Constr Hist,

Vol. 1, pp. 2-6, 8-9, and maps (pp. 3 and 5), HOO,

See also Ch. IV.
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN WASHINGTON STATE 451

Project engineers favored sites already occupied by rural villages,

where they would be able to take advantage of existing grading, buildings,

road networks, and utilities. To facilitate the selection process, they drew

up three alternate site plans. The first

proposed a combined construction

and operating community at Benton

City on the Yakima, a few miles west of

Richland and about 24 air miles from

the main process area. (See Map 4.)

The second proposed three separate

communities: Camp A, about 2.5

miles south of the existing village of

Hanford; Camp B, about 2 miles

north of Richland; and Camp C, in

the hamlet of White Bluffs. Under

this plan, when the time came for

startup of the process plants, the

three camps would be consolidated to

form an operating village at the Camp

A site. The third plan called for locating all construction and plant-operating employees at the Camp A site.2

After giving due consideration to

each plan, Du Pont and Army engineers agreed to establish two separate

communities: a construction camp at

Hanford and an operating village at

Richland. Reasons of safety and efficiency dictated that all construction

employees should reside in a single

community, and Hanford appeared

best to meet such requirements. Its

distance of about 6 miles from the

nearest process areas was sufficient

not only to ensure the workers' safety

during startup testing but also to provide them easy access to all the major

work sites. Its location at the intersection of the Connell-Yakima state highway and Pasco-White Bluffs road

and on a branch line of the Chicago,

Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad gave it the necessary road and

rail access. Water was available from

existing wells and the river and electricity from a Pacific Power and Light

Company substation. The natural

contour of the land at the village site

made grading for construction unnecessary and simplified sewerage and

drainage problems, and the existing

buildings provided the temporary

housing that would be needed by the

first construction crews.3

Safety was the determining factor in

the decision to locate the operating

community at a separate site. Project

engineers found that two locations—

Benton City and Richland—both met

the basic criteria: Each was about 25

miles from the production plant sites,

and each had adequate road and rail

access, a sufficient source of water

and electricity, and a number of existing buildings. But Benton City had

not been included in the original land

acquisition and project officials believed that, for reasons of security,

the operating village must be within

the reservation. They could have

taken steps to acquire the Benton

City area, but serious opposition had

arisen among local residents because of the extent of the government's original land acquisition. Seeking to avoid additional acquisitions

likely to inflame public opinion,

project community planners chose

Richland as the site for the operating

community.4

2

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, "Construction," pp. 5.2-5.3

and App. D13 (Alternate Site Plans for Hanford

Camp), DASA; Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, pp. 41-

42, HOO.

3

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, pp. 5.2-5.3, DASA; Matthias Diary, 25 Feb and 24-25 Mar 43, OROO; Du

Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, pp. 9-10 and 42-43, and

Vol. 2, pp. 348-49, HOO. 4

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 3, "Design," pp. 8.1-8.2,

DASA; Matthias Diary, 8 and 10 Mar 43, OROO;

Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, p. 102, HOO. See also

Ch. XV.
452 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

HANFORD CONSTRUCTION CAMP AT HEW. Aerial view shows its vast size.

Hanford: The Construction Camp

Once the planners had reached a

final decision concerning location, Du

Pont immediately began work on both

the construction camp and the operating community, with Du Pont and

Army personnel at the Hanford site

and Wilmington headquarters working in close cooperation. Planning

and design of the two communities

proceeded more or less simultaneously in early 1943, but the construction

camp which had to be ready for occupancy as soon as possible had first

priority.

At the outset, Du Pont's construction camp planning and design efforts

were handicapped by the tenuousness

of essential quantitative data. Only

indeterminate figures were available

on how many workers were likely

to reside in the camp, because

the Metallurgical Laboratory-Du Pont

design team had not progressed far

enough with plans for the plutonium

production facilities to provide an accurate estimate. A similar problem existed with figures on how many construction workers could live in off-site

housing, because more urgent matters had delayed the Hanford area engineer, Lt. Col. Franklin T. Matthias,

from making a survey of the Hanford

area.

Lacking this statistical data, Du

Pont had no choice but to go ahead

with plans and designs on the basis of
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN WASHINGTON STATE 453

CAMP ADMINISTRATIVE AREA (foreground) AND RESIDENTIAL AREA (background)

AT HEW

hurriedly prepared estimates that projected a total construction work force

of twenty-five thousand to twentyeight thousand, half of whom, the

company hoped, would live in off-site

housing. To circumvent inevitable revisions, Du Pont developed a planning strategy of adopting easily expansible layouts and building designs

and of learning the experience of

other firms that had built construction camps in isolated, semiarid regions with adverse climatic conditions. This circumspect approach

proved fortuitous, especially in view

of subsequent developments that revealed earlier projections on the size

of the construction force were grossly

inaccurate (nearly twice as many

workers would be required as originally estimated) and that very little

off-site housing was available. Meanwhile, General Groves made a thorough inspection of the Washington

site in March, after which he, Colonel

Matthias, and other Army representatives sat down with Du Pont's field

staff and worked out basic steps for

getting construction started.5

Field work began at the Hanford

campsite in early April. On the

fourth, Du Pont and Hanford area

5

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, pp. 5.1-5.2, DASA; Rpt,

sub: Investigations of Projs Having Similar Climatic

Conditions, ca. 1943, HOO; Matthias Diary, 24-25

Mar 43, OROO; Groves Diary, 24-25 Mar 43, LRG.
454 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

office personnel—with plans in hand

for the first barracks, mess hall, and

service buildings in the construction

camp—carried out a general reconnaissance of the area and reached

agreement that work should begin immediately on facilities adequate to

house and feed a starting work force

of two thousand. They also agreed to

proceed with orders for materials and

equipment in quantities sufficient to

provide units for four thousand workers and, at the same time, established

a construction schedule looking to

completion of the whole camp by

1 December. On 6 April, workers

began erection of the first barracks.6

Du Pont officials responsible for

Hanford construction met biweekly

(later weekly). They drew up procurement schedules for critical building

materials, establishing a policy of

keeping on order equipment for ten

barracks and one mess hall to forestall the inevitable delays in delivery.

In late July, Du Pont commissioned

the architect-engineer firm of Jones,

Couillan, Thery, and Sylliassen to

review all plans for the campsite and

assist in development of further layouts. The recommendations of the architect-engineer, combined with periodic subsequent studies of particular

problems by Du Pont's field engineers, provided the basis for the further development and operation of

the construction camp.7

In September, on the basis of

the Metallurgical Laboratory-Du Pont

design team's new report that construction of the plutonium production

plants would require a considerably

larger work force than previously

anticipated, the Army and Du Pont

moved to firmer ground in their projections of peak population requirements for Hanford. Actually, the peak

of construction came in November,

when for a period of more than a

month some fifty-three hundred

workers were employed in building

the camp, including some diverted

temporarily from the plant construction work force. But it was not until

July 1944 that Du Pont announced

that construction was 98 percent complete, with nearly twelve hundred new

and remodeled buildings and sufficient support facilities to house, feed,

and supply the daily necessities of the

fifty-one thousand people who, by

that time, were living at the construction camp.8

Completion of the camp facilities in

time to meet the peak population requirements was possible only because

of the close cooperation of the Hanford area engineer with Du Pont and

its subcontractors in overcoming

chronic labor shortages and procuring a variety of critical building materials. Du Pont benefited greatly from

Manhattan's countrywide recruiting

efforts in 1943 and 1944 and from

the Army's approval of its use of subcontractors who had access to local

labor. For example, the Walla Walla

(Washington) firm of A. A. Durand 6

 MDH, Bk. 4 Vol. 5, pp. 5.4-5.5 and 5.20-5.21,

DASA; Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 2, p. 374, HOO. 7

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, pp. 5.5-5.7 and 5.19,

DASA; Rpt, Jones, Couillan, Thery, and Sylliassen

(architect-engineer), sub: Housing and Traffic Analysis of the Hanford Camp Area, 17 Aug 43, HOO;

Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 2, p. 382, HOO.

8

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, pp. 5.21 and App. B19

(Hanford Camp Bldg Constr Dates), DASA; Dist

Engr, Monthly Rpt on DSM Proj, Jun 44, OCG

Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 28, Tab A, MDR;

Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 2, pp. 351 and 380-83,

HOO.
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN WASHINGTON STATE 455

and Sons drilled wells and the Seattle

firm of McManama and Company

erected boilers. Matthias and his staff

expedited procurement of many items

in short supply, including Army tents,

boilers, hot water heaters, toilet fixtures, fans, cooling and refrigeration

units, heating coils, and mess hall

equipment. Through Army channels

the area engineer arranged for transfer from other government projects of

many materials otherwise virtually unobtainable. The Army also actively

supported Du Pont's various measures to shorten construction time and

save materials, including employment

of prefabrication and preassembly

wherever feasible. An outstanding example was the decision by Groves and

Du Pont to substitute prefabricated

hutments for barracks.9

Because of the persistent problems

of procuring and conserving an adequate construction work force at the

Washington site, the Army stressed

those aspects of the Hanford camp

that would make living conditions

more tolerable for the average employee. An example was its effort to

ensure that Du Pont incorporate effective means for heating, cooling,

and ventilating housing units and hutments—a very important consideration in view of area climatic conditions characterized by extremes in

heat and cold, rapid changes in temperature, and occasional severe dust

storms. The system eventually installed employed hot air heated by

steam from a central plant. Although

this method was more costly than

having coal heaters in each individual

housing unit or hutment, it provided

a means for circulating air, cooled by

water evaporation, in the hot summer

months.10

Newly recruited workers found

themselves in what must certainly

have been one of the largest temporary communities ever erected.

Hundreds of one-story structures,

standing in evenly spaced rows along

freshly graded streets, filled the generally flat terrain west of the broad

Columbia River. The majority of

these structures were housing units.

At the center were row upon row of

wing-type barracks. To the south

were hundreds of much smaller hutments. On the north and west stood

thousands of family-sized trailers,

each positioned on its individual plot.

Interspersed at conveniently located

intervals were cafeteria buildings. In a

triangular-shaped area near the river

and between the barracks and the

north trailer camp were most of the

commercial and administrative buildings, some remodeled from existing

structures. Here also were many of

the community and recreational facilities—a theater, church, school, hospital, library, and an auditorium-gymnasium. Rising here and there above the

low level of most structures were the

smoke stacks of heating plants, water 9

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, p. 5.18-5.21 and Apps. B4

(Summary of Subcontracts), B23 (Hanford Camp

Subcontracts), and B24 (Completion Forecast-Hanford Camp), DASA; Matthias Diary, Apr 43-Jul 44

(see entries of 22 Apr, 18 May, and 11 Jun 43),

OROO; Ms, Hageman, "Hanford: Threshold of an

Era," 1946, p. 71, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 461

(Hanford), MDR; Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, pp.

51-68, 218-35, 282-323, HOO.

10

 Matthias Diary, 6, 8, and 15 Apr 43, OROO.

For a vivid description of the periodic dust storms

that occurred at the Hanford camp see Ted Van

Arsdol, Hanford: The Big Secret (Richland, Wash.: Columbia Basin News, 1958), pp 50-51. Du Pont Constr

Hist, Vol. 1, pp. 87-91, HOO.
456 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

RICHLAND VILLAGE AT HEW. Aerial view shows the commercial center (foreground),

buildings of the administrative headquarters (middle ground), and the residential area

(background).

and oil storage tanks, and a few trees.

Utility lines strung on tall poles lined

every street, seeming to bind together

the scattered segments of the Hanford camp.11

Richland: The Operating Community

Richland, with a population of 250,

was in early 1943 the center of an agricultural community of some 600

persons who derived their livelihood

from farming the irrigated bottomlands near the junction of the Yakima

and Columbia Rivers. Most of the

commercial and civic structures of the

village and some of its homes were

built along the axis of a state highway, providing a ready route of access

eastward to the important communication centers of Kennewick and

Pasco and northward to Hanford and

White Bluffs. The original buildings

of Richland were of substantial construction, many of them cement or

brick. Community services included

an underground water system (but no

central sewerage system), electricity,

and telephones. The roads were

chiefly gravel or packed earth, but

some had asphalt surfacing. Surrounding the village center were numerous small farms, planted with orchards or other irrigated corps.12

11

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, pp. 5.6-5.18 and App. A4

(Map, Hanford Camp Layout), DASA; Du Pont

Constr Hist, Vol. 2, p. 386 and 392-512, HOO.

12

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 3, pp. 8.2-8.3, DASA; Du

Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, pp. 6 and 101-06, HOO.
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN WASHINGTON STATE 457

As with the Hanford construction

camp, the Army turned over to Du

Pont the task of converting this farm

community into suitable headquarters

for the massive plutonium production

project and a home for thousands of plant-operating employees.

The Army's aim was to enable the

prime contractor to achieve maximum

operating efficiency in accomplishing

its task by combining requirements

and services needed for both the production plants and the village, and

thus from the outset General Groves

and Colonel Matthias emphasized the

importance of making the most economic use of project resources. Illustrative of this policy was the size of

permanent houses for the supervisory

and technical operating personnel. Du

Pont believed that such personnel

would require at least three-bedroom

homes, but the Army disagreed and

assigned most of them only one- or

two-bedroom homes. To ensure compliance with Army policy, the Hanford Area Engineers Office monitored

all housing activities.13

Colonel Matthias had considerable

authority as area engineer and utilized several channels to exercise

direct control over design and construction of Richland. Through his

legal officer, he reviewed and approved Du Pont's subcontracts and

other legal arrangements relating to

the building of the village. Through

his construction chief's so-called Richland Division, he maintained a more

specific check on construction activities. In addition, Matthias made frequent personal inspections of the village and conferred regularly with Du

Pont headquarters officials and field

representatives.14

With virtually all of its own design

and engineering personnel committed

to work on the production facilities or

other wartime projects, Du Pont had

few employees to spare for the village

project. Hence, with permission of

the Army, it opened negotiations with

several architect-engineer firms in the

Pacific Northwest. G. A. Pehrson of

Spokane was the low bidder and, in

mid-March, Du Pont signed a contract

with the firm.15

Pehrson started work immediately

on layout plans for the village community, using as a guide the Du PontArmy population projections that assumed a 40- to 50-percent occupancy

in off-site housing. Because these projections forecasted a population of

6,500 with possible expansion to

7,500, Pehrson drafted plans for 980

13

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 6, "Operations," p. 9.1,

DASA; Ltr Contract W-7412-eng-1, 1 Dec 42 (accepted 21 Dec 42), OCG Files, Gen Corresp,

Groves Files, Fldr 19, Tab B, MDR; Contract W7412-eng-1 (Du Pont), 8 Nov 43, OROO; Matthias

Diary, 2-3 Mar, 16-17 and 21 Apr, 20 May, 29 Nov

43 and 4 Jan 44, OROO. See also Ltr, H. T. Daniels

(Design Proj Mgr, TNX Div, Du Pont) to Groves,

sub: Proj 9536-Village, 25 Apr 43, and Msgs,

Matthias to E. B. Yancey (Gen Mgr, Explosives

Dept, Du Pont), 23 Apr 43, and Yancey to Matthias,

24 Apr 43; Ltr, Daniels to Groves, sub: Proj 9536-

HEW and 1100 Area-Townsite, 28 Apr 43, and

Msgs, Matthias to Yancey and Yancey to Matthias,

both 26 Apr 43; Memo, Matthias to Groves, 4 Sep

43. All in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 620 (Hanford),

MDR.

14

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, Apps. B57-B58 (Org

Charts, Hanford Area Engrs Office and Du Pont's

HEW Field Proj), DASA; Du Pont Constr Hist,

Vol. 1, pp. 23-139 (Org Charts, Hanford Area

Engrs Office and Du Pont's HEW Field Proj), HOO;

Matthias Diary, Feb 43-Dec 45, passim, OROO. 15

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 3, pp. 8.4-8.5 and App. B4

(Summary of Subcontracts), DASA; Matthias Diary,

2, 5, 9, 12, 15, and 17 Mar 43, OROO; Dist Engr,

Monthly Rpts on DSM Proj, Feb-Mar 43, MDR; Du

Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, pp. 106 and 285-86,

HOO.
458 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

conventional family units of relatively

permanent construction and also for a

few dormitories to house single men

and women. But Du Pont and Matthias soon discovered from incoming

employees that suitable places to live

in the surrounding communities were

extremely scarce. Consequently, in

June they revised initial estimates of

Richland's ultimate population to

7,750 with potential growth to 12,000

and instructed Pehrson to increase

the number of conventional family

dwellings to 2,000. Pehrson had

barely started on the expanded program when new calculations indicated

the Richland population was likely to

escalate to at least 16,000 (later revised to 17,500). Following consultation with Matthias, Du Pont directed

Pehrson to add another 1,000 family

units, bringing the total to 3,000.16

Faced with a vastly larger housing

program than anticipated, Du Pont

and Matthias began looking for ways

to expedite development of the Richland community. Aware that General

Groves had spoken quite enthusiastically of the advantages of portable

prefabricated housing being installed

at the Tennessee site, Colonel Matthias in late October went to Oak

Ridge's East Village to inspect the

units. Following his return to Hanford, the area engineer coordinated

with District officials to procure

sample prefab units and to arrange

for an on-site inspection visit by a

Tennessee Valley Authority portable

housing specialist. The decision to

use portable dwellings as supplemental housing at Richland came in late

December, at which time Manhattan

selected the Prefabricated Engineering Company of Portland, Oregon, to

supply the units. Du Pont negotiated

the initial contract for 500 prefabs,

which Matthias approved in early January 1944, and subsequently ordered

an additional 1,300, increasing the

total of new and existing units to

4,410. Coincident with this activity

was Du Pont's expanded construction

of other facilities, such as dormitories

(eventually 25 to house more than a

thousand persons) and commercial

and service buildings (stores, schools,

churches, recreational areas, and

utilities).17

To further facilitate community development, the Army approved Du

Pont's subcontracting of most construction to two firms familiar with

building problems in the Pacific

Northwest—Twaits, Morrison, and

Knudsen of Los Angeles and Smith,

Hoffman, and Wright of Portland.

They specified village layouts that

took advantage of natural terrain and

that preserved existing buildings, orchards, shade trees, roads, and

streets. They endorsed house plans

that included basic furnishings, recognizing the great difficulty workers

from other parts of the country would

16

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 3, pp. 8.3-8.8, DASA; Ms,

Hageman, "Hanford: Threshold of an Era," 1946,

p. 34, MDR; Dist Engr Monthly Rpts on DSM Proj,

Oct-Nov 43, MDR; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p.

89; Matthias Diary, 18 May, 3 and 24-25 Sep 43,

OROO; Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, pp. 108-10,

and Vol. 4, pp. 1223-25, HOO.

17

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 3, pp. 8.5-8.28, passim, and

Vol. 5, App. B51 (Chart, Richland Village Constr

Progress), DASA; Ms, Hageman, "Hanford: Threshold of an Era," 1946, pp. 34-35, MDR; Ltr, Matthias

to TVA, Attn: Gordon Clapp, 11 Dec 43, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 620 (Hanford), MDR; Dist Engr,

Monthly Rpts on DSM Proj, Jan and May-Jun 44,

MDR; Matthias Diary, 26 and 28-29 Oct, 8, 14, 16,

23-24 Nov 43 and 12 Jan 44, OROO; Du Pont

Constr Hist, Vol. 1, pp. 109-10 and 116-46, and

Vol. 2, pp. 1226-29, HOO.
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN WASHINGTON STATE 459

have in getting their household goods

moved in a wartime economy and the

limited availability of home furnishings in stores in towns near the site.18

These timesaving measures, for the

most part, were effective. Construction of the village moved ahead on

schedule, and the district engineer reported to General Groves in February

1944 that the village was more than

half finished. There were occasions,

nevertheless, when serious delays

were avoided only as a result of direct

and vigorous efforts of the Hanford

area engineer. A typical case was Prefabricated Engineering's problem of

transporting its portable housing

units to the village site.19

Prefabricated Engineering lacked

the equipment necessary to truck its

portable housing units to Richland

from its manufacturing plant in

Toledo, Oregon. So, in early 1944, it

subcontracted the job to a Chicagobased trucking firm and arranged for

routine clearances from the Office

of Defense Transportation and the

Interstate Commerce Commission.

Shortly thereafter, unforeseen complications developed. As soon as the

trucker began assembling his equipment in Oregon, both government

agencies raised strong objections to

the fact that Prefabricated Engineering was not conforming to established

rules, stating that wartime regulations

on conservation of scarce resources

required the company to employ local

truckers. At the same time, Pacific

Northwest representatives of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters

threatened to forbid use of union

drivers, claiming that the trucking

firm's equipment did not meet union

safety standards.

Apprised of this threatened delay in

the shipment of the portable housing

units, Colonel Matthias took immediate action. As a first step, in an effort

to relieve Prefabricated Engineering's

overtaxed storage facilities and to

prevent any serious disruption of the

Richland construction schedule, he

arranged to have the prefab units

transported by rail—a much more

costly procedure—until such time as

the obstacles to trucking could be

overcome. He then assumed the role

of a mediator in ongoing union-government negotiations, which dragged

on until April 1944. Matthias was successful in overcoming the objections

of the Teamsters union, but not those

of the government agencies. Consequently, Prefabricated Engineering

was left with no alternative but to

engage the services of a local trucking

firm, even though the latter's per-unit

hauling cost was considerably higher

than that of the Chicago company.20

By late spring of 1945, transformation of the little rural hamlet of Richland into a bustling industrial com18

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 3, pp. 8.8-8.9 and 8.12-8.13,

and Vol. 5, pp. 8.3-8.5 and App. B4, DASA; Du

Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, pp. 111-12, 288, 292-93,

301-02, 317, and Vol. 4, p. 1228, HOO. 19

 Dist Engr, Monthly Rpts on DSM Proj, Feb 44,

MDR; Matthias Diary, Dec 43-Feb 44, passim (especially 28 Dec 43 and 1 and 25-26 Jan 44), OROO;

Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 4, pp. 1223-25 (Chart,

Richland Village Constr Progress), HOO.

20

 Matthias, sub: Chronological Rpt on Hauling

Prefab Houses from Toledo, Oreg., to HEW, 16 Jul

45; Ltr, Matthias to Groves, sub: Cost of Hauling

Prefab Houses to Richland, 19 Jul 45; Office Memo,

Gavin Hadden (Groves's Asst) to Groves, sub:

Matthias Rpt (16 Jul 45) and Ltr (19 Jul 45) on Cost

of Hauling Prefab Houses to Richland, 26 Jul 45;

Memo, Groves to Matthias, sub: Chronological Rpt

on Hauling Prefab Houses from Toledo, Oreg., to

HEW, 31 Jul 45. All in Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

620 (Hanford), MDR.
460 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

munity of scientists, engineers, military administrators, and skilled workmen and their collective families was

very nearly complete. In a fenced-in

area at the center of the operating village were the wood-frame buildings

of varying size that housed the HEW

administrative headquarters. Immediately to the east and southeast of the

headquarters and toward the lowlying Columbia River was "downtown" Richland, built around the

original commercial center of the village. Here were stores and a variety

of service facilities, a hotel for visitors, a theater, churches, a cafeteria,

and the dormitories for single men

and women. Surrounding downtown

on the south, west, and northwest

were residential areas, with neighborhood stores and service facilities.

Most of the conventional houses were

clustered in two large sections—one

directly south of the village center,

the other to the northwest—with here

and there shade and fruit trees remaining from the farms that had occupied the area. On the outer fringes

of the conventional housing sections

were a few of the flat-roofed prefabricated houses, but most of the homes

of this type were concentrated in a

roughly rectangular zone directly west

of the administration buildings. Several main streets, which interconnected with the many new residential

streets, carried motor traffic northward from the village to the production plant area and south and east to

Kennewick and Pasco. A newly built

railroad spur line gave Richland a

direct connection with the Union Pacific and Northern Pacific Railroads a

few miles to the south of the

village.21

Community Management

Du Pont had complete responsibility for community management functions. The Hanford area engineer's

role was largely supervisory except on

certain matters, such as controls over

rents and real estate transactions.

Colonel Matthias established a Community Management Branch in the

Engineering and Maintenance Division of his office to exercise these

controls; review contracts; maintain

records on facilities, leases, and financial statements; and work with Du

Pont's HEW Service Department. The

company assigned overall community

management to one of the two assistant superintendents in this department. Division supervisors managed

housing, commercial concessionaires,

community services, public buildings,

and other facilities.22

Hanford Camp

For the Army and Du Pont, administration of the Hanford camp presented almost as many problems as

building it. To ensure its efficient operation, Du Pont, with Army approval,

21

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, Apps. A (Map, Richland

Area) and B51 (Chart, Richland Village Constr

Progress), DASA; Ms, Hageman, "Hanford: Threshold of an Era," 1946, Map Annex (HEW), MDR;

Matthias Diary, 29 Nov 43, OROO; Groves, Now It

Can Be Told, p. 89; Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, pp.

105 and 107-46, and Vol. 4, pp. 1233-1318 (photographs of area and structures with descriptions),

HOO. 22

 Contract W-7412-eng-1 (Du Pont), 8 Nov 43,

OROO; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 6, p. 9.1 and Apps. B8

(Org Chart, Hanford Area Engrs Office) and B12-

B13 (Org Chart, Du Pont's HEW Svc Dept), DASA;

Du Pont Opns Hist, Bk. 17, Pt. 1, pp. 1-14, HOO.
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN WASHINGTON STATE 461

obtained in April 1943 the services of

the Olympic Commissary Company of

Chicago, a professional management

organization. Olympic assumed responsibility under its contract for operation and maintenance of housing

(except trailer plots, which Du Pont

rented directly), mess hall, and recreational facilities. Du Pont also arranged leases with private operators

for stores, garages, a laundry, a bank,

and similar commercial services. It

left administration of the schools in

the hands of the Washington State

Department of Education. Du Pont,

however, retained direct responsibility

for fire protection and maintained a

Hanford Patrol to police the camp.23

The Army kept close check on the

performance of the various organizations providing services for Hanford.

On his periodic inspection trips to the

camp, General Groves gave close attention to Olympic's management of

mess halls and housing. As a result of

his complaints concerning certain deficiencies, Du Pont directed a reorganization of the company's operations

in June 1943. Again in December, the

area engineer reported to Du Pont

that management practices still

needed some reinforcing in the opinion of the Manhattan commander,

who felt "there is no reason why the

large losses recently being incurred in

camp operations could not be reduced." Finally, in February 1944,

after further changes in Olympic's

methods of operation, Groves indicated satisfaction with its management of

the camp.24

Because of the temporary character

of the Hanford camp, Manhattan

sacrificed comfort and convenience

and provided only minimum amenities in the housing facilities. This

policy caused considerable dissatisfaction among Hanford residents, some

of whom filed complaints with the

War Manpower Commission. In response to inquiries from commission

officials investigating these complaints, Groves explained that the

Army had to avoid overelaboration

and overexpenditure because of the

wartime shortages of construction

materials and labor and the need to

adhere to rigid construction schedules. Subsequently, a project survey

determined that the unsatisfactory

living conditions at the camp were a

chief factor in the continual turnover

of construction personnel, which approached an unacceptable rate of 21

percent in the crucial summer of

1944.

Other factors contributing to the

discontent were the demoralizing

sandstorms, the lack of sizable towns

to visit outside the reservation, overtaxed commercial facilities, and the

segregated housing policy. The latter

policy precluded families, even husbands and wives, from living together

and restricted occupancy on the basis

of sex and race. Recognizing, however, that some needed workers would

accept jobs on the project only if they

could bring their families, Du Pont

and the Army decided reluctantly to 23

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, pp. 5.12-5.18, Apps. B4 permit them in the trailer camps and

and B23. DASA; Matthias Diary, 25 Mar 43, OROO;

Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, pp. 91 and 154-62,

HOO.

24

 Matthias Diary, 18 and 23 Jun and 7 Dec 43

(source of quotation) and 18 Feb 44, OROO.
462 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

provided schools for their children,

but the policy remained to discourage

family groups.25

Unfortunately, neither the Army

nor Du Pont could do very much

about most of these problems in the

few months that were still required to

complete the production plants. What

was feasible, they decided, was to

pursue more intensively all available

means to raise and maintain the

morale of the workers, with the aim

of making them more willing to

accept the unavoidable hardships.

Manhattan officials, including General

Groves, spoke to assembled groups

and the camp newspaper, "The Sage

Sentinel," carried stories emphasizing

the importance of the project to the

war effort. Du Pont, with considerable assistance from the area engineer, greatly expanded the recreational facilities. They brought nationally

known entertainers and popular orchestras to the auditorium-gymnasium, which also doubled as a gigantic

dance hall; they encouraged regular

use of recreation halls for men and

women; they arranged for nightly

motion pictures in a quickly erected

tent theater; and they provided taverns, bowling alleys, a four-thousandseat baseball stadium, nine softball

diamonds, and many tennis, badminton, volleyball, and horseshoe courts.

Groves himself directed that beer be

sold in whatever quantities needed

and the Hanford Works Employees

Association licensed a concessionaire

to install 150 pinball machines. The

program was effective and wartime

residents of Hanford would later

recall that the camp came to have "a

kind of gaiety, a temporary feeling,

the mood of a fair or carnival or

circus,"

 26

 all enhanced by the continuous playing of music over a public

address system. Job terminations declined and in the hectic months of

late 1944 and early 1945 the construction work force brought to completion, on schedule, the great production units of the plutonium

plant.27

Richland Village

For Du Pont and the area engineer,

management of the Richland village

entailed all the usual problems of a

rapidly expanding wartime community, as well as the special problems

arising from the unique character of

the atomic project. From 1943

through early 1945, provision of adequate housing for the work force was

certainly one of the most challenging

problems for the village managers.

Lacking reliable guidelines to allocate

housing to the three major groups of

employees that made up the work

force—construction, operations, and

government personnel—managers

frequently had to shift percentages,

depending upon current need. Before

January 1944, they allocated most

25

 Matthias Diary, 6 and 18 May, 3-4 and 18 Jun,

21 Aug, 26 Oct, 14 Nov 43, OROO; Ltrs, Lawrence

A. Appley (Dep Chairman and Ex Dir, WMC) to

Groves, 23 Dec 43, and Groves to Appley, 7 Jan 44,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 620 (Hanford), MDR;

Du Pont Constr Hist, Vol. 1, pp. 86-91, and Vol. 4,

pp. 1361-65, HOO.

26

 Van Arsdol, Hanford: The Big Secret, p. 29. See

also pp. 50-53. 27

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 5, pp. 5.13-5.14, DASA;

Matthias Diary, 6 May 43 and 18 Feb 44, OROO;

Groves Diary, 10 and 18 Feb 44, LRG; Groves, Now

It Can Be Told, pp. 89-93; Du Pont Constr Hist,

Vol. 1, pp. 163-72, Vol. 2, pp. 409-11 and 415-17,

and Vol. 4, pp. 1342-44, HOO.
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN WASHINGTON STATE 463

housing to construction and government personnel, gradually altering

the basis until by March 50 percent

was going to operating employees, 40

percent to construction, and 10 percent to government. After the peak of

construction passed, the population

of Richland declined to the extent

that some prefabricated houses were

vacated. Occupants of houses in Richland paid rentals of between $27.50

and $80.00 a month, the amount

varying in relation to the size and

type of unit, and whether or not it

was furnished. The rent included all

utilities. Dormitory occupants paid

from $15.00 to $22.50 per month.28

As in the Hanford construction

camp, concessionaires operated most

of the commercial facilities in the village under contracts negotiated by Du

Pont's HEW Service Department. The

department employed competitive bidding in selecting the concessionaries,

choosing those offering maximum

service to the village and the highest

monetary return to the government.

These commercial operators made

available to residents of the community all normal items and services essential to daily living, such as food, drugs,

clothing, and entertainment, and department officials periodically checked

prices in order to maintain them at

levels comparable to those at stores in

nearby towns. In most cases the government provided building space, including stationary fixtures, for the

concessionaire and the latter furnished

any mobile equipment required.29

During World War II the Richland

community had no formally constituted institutions of local government.

Du Pont, through its HEW Service

Department, provided Richlanders

with most normal community services—utilities, street maintenance,

trash and garbage pickup, and fire

and police protection. A division of

the company's Plant Patrol, deputized

by the sheriff of Benton County,

served as the village police force, enforcing traffic regulations, investigating accidents, and overseeing a program of crime prevention. One exception to this pattern of Du Pont

control was the public schools: The

federal government furnished and

maintained the buildings, and the instructional staff functioned under the

jurisdiction of the local county superintendent of schools. Du Pont and

Hanford Area Engineers Office representatives served as advisory members

of the Richland school board, comprised of local residents. Most of the

money for operating the schools came

from the federal government under

provisions of the Lanham Act. Another exception was public transportation, including a government-owned

bus system that the area engineer

administered.30

Of the District's three operating

communities, Richland village most

nearly resembled the typical American

company town, owned and dominated

by a great industrial concern. This

was so partly because the Army's

presence was not nearly so apparent

as at Oak Ridge, with its District

headquarters and numerous technical 28

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 6, pp. 9.1-9.7 and App. B5,

DASA; Du Pont Opns Hist, Bk. 17, Pt. 2, pp. 1-31,

HOO. 29

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 6, pp. 9.14-9.16 and App. B4,

DASA; Du Pont Opns Hist, Bk. 18, Pt. 2, pp. 1-2

and 5.6, HOO.

30

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 6, pp. 9.7-9.14 and Apps

B4-B5 and B12-B13, DASA; Du Pom Opns Hist,

Bk. 17, Pt. 1, pp. 4-5, HOO.
464 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

employees in uniform, nor as at Los

Alamos, with its very substantial military population. Richland also had

fewer outward ramifications of physical security, such as the high encircling fence patrolled frequently by

military police and dogs at the New

Mexico site and the similar barriers

erected at crucial points along the

boundary of the Tennessee site. To

the uninformed casual visitor, the plutonium community appeared to be

just one more wartime boomtown

where the average employee and his

family had to endure the usual minor

hardships and inconveniences.
CHAPTER XXIII

The Atomic Communities in

New Mexico

Manhattan Project leaders' choice

of isolated and remote sections of

central New Mexico for developing

and testing the atomic bomb transformed two hitherto sparsely populated regions into two unique scientific

communities. Some 20 miles west of

the famous Santa Fe Trail, the rugged

Pajarito Plateau became the site of

the Los Alamos reservation, the operating community comprising the

bomb development laboratory with

technical installations and a residential area; and some 160 miles south of

Los Alamos, the desolate Jornada del

Muerto valley provided the location for

the Trinity base camp, the temporary

community comprising a bomb test

area with technical facilities and a

campsite. Because of the geographic

inaccessibility and arid climate of

these regions, few of the thousands of

persons who came into the Southwest—either over the trail or the railroad that replaced it—chose to settle

there, further enhancing their suitability for the highly secret activities

of the bomb development project.1

Los Alamos: The Operating Community

With the often snow-capped peaks

of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains

looming in the distance, the broad expanse of the Pajarito Plateau extended westward from an altitude of

7,300 feet at Los Alamos to the heavily wooded slopes of the 9,000-foot

Jemez Mountains and eastward to the

wide Rio Grande valley. Bypassed by

the mainstream of settlement and development, there were only a few

scattered ranches on the great plateau

by the early years of the twentieth

century. Of these ranches, the one situated atop the Los Alamos mesa—locally referred to as the Hill—attracted

the interest of two different purchasers, each with a different objective. In

1917, to realize a long-standing

dream, former Detroit businessman

Ashley Pond had bought the ranch as

the location for his Los Alamos Ranch

School for Boys. A quarter of a centu1

 Lansing Lamont in his history of the atomic

bomb (Day of Trinity [New York: Atheneum, 1965],

p. 70) suggests that Oppenheimer, pressed by Bainbridge for a suitable code name for the desert

site, selected "Trinity," having just read the opening lines of John Donne's Holy Sonnet XIV: "Batter

my heart, three-person'd God; for you / As yet but

knock, breathe, shine, and seek to mend." On the

Santa Fe Trail see Dictionary of American History, rev.

ed., s.v. "Santa Fe" by Francis Borgia Steck and

"Santa Fe Trail" by Bliss Isely.
466 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

ry later, to meet Manhattan Project

goals, the Army acquired this same

ranch as the location for one of its

atomic reservations.2 (See Map 5.)

Planning

On a wintry day in early November

1942, a small group of Army engineer

officers visited the Los Alamos Ranch

School. Of the several possible sites

they had examined, this one impressed them most as nearly meeting

all their criteria for security, safety,

ease of acquisition, and conversion

into a scientific research and development community. There was a large

enough area cleared of timber to

permit an immediate start on the

erection of technical structures and

the buildings of the school would

provide more than sufficient housing

for the relatively small group of scientists who would staff the bomb laboratory. Following Groves and Oppenheimer's inspection and approval a

few days later, the War Department

notified the owners of the school that

the government was starting condemnation proceedings to acquire the

property and that they had until midFebruary 1943 to vacate, time enough

for members of the small student

body to complete their academic

studies for the year.3

Weeks before the students finally

departed from the Hill, plans to

secure a construction contractor and,

as Stone and Webster's replacement,

a new architect-engineer for the Los

Alamos community development program were already under way. The

Albuquerque District surveyed construction firms in the region and, as

the construction contractor, chose the

M. M. Sundt Company of Tucson, Arizona, which was just completing a

job for the Army at a camp near Las

Vegas, New Mexico. The firm appeared attractive for the task not only

because it had available nearby equipment and manpower but also because, unlike many construction companies, it had its own fleet of trucks

and operated its own plumbing, electrical, and painting departments. This

meant that Sundt would have to

employ fewer subcontractors, a plus

from the standpoint of project

security.

When the Army signed its lumpsum contract with Sundt in mid-December, company representatives

were already in Santa Fe securing

office quarters and initiating procurement for workmen and building materials. These expeditious efforts permitted Sundt crews to begin clearing

the site by the end of the month,

when the Army also completed negotiations with Willard C. Kruger and

Associates of Santa Fe to be the new

architect-engineer. Kruger's location

near the newly established Santa Fe

Engineers Office and the area office

of the construction contractor facilitated the firm's ability to cope

promptly with changes and expansions in the community.4

2

 "The First 20 Years at Los Alamos, January

1943-January 1963," LASL News 5, no. 1 (Jan 63):

8-13. 3

 See Ch. XV for details on acquisition of the Los

Alamos site. See also "First 20 Years at Los

Alamos," pp. 12-13, and James W. Kunetka, City of

Fire: Los Alamos and the Atomic Age, 1943-1945, rev.

ed. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,

1979), pp. 10-16.

4

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, "General," p. 4.1-4.2, 5.1-

5.2, App. D12 (Major Contracts Supervised by Albuquerque Dist to Mar 44), and Vol. 2, "Technical," Continued
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN NEW MEXICO 467

TYPICAL BUILDING AT THE LOS ALAMOS RANCH SCHOOL FOR BOYS

Kruger used Stone and Webster's

original plans for Los Alamos, which

incorporated the ideas and specifications of Oppenheimer and other

project scientists, as the basis of its

initial blueprints for the community.

In these early plans, drawn up in late

1942 and approved by the prime contractor, the University of California,

the fifty-four school buildings formed

the nucleus of the community, with

the new houses, dormitories, barracks, service, and other buildings of

the nontechnical area located to the

northeast and with the installations of

the technical area, enclosed by a high

chain link fence, located to the south

along the precipitous rim of Jemez

Canyon. But these early plans constituted only a rudimentary beginning

for construction on the Hill. Further

planning in early 1943 by Groves and

scientific leaders of the project, especially Oppenheimer and James B.

Conant, revealed that the bomb development program was going to be a

far larger enterprise than originally

anticipated and that precise answers

to questions concerning the size of

the laboratory, its staff, technical facilities, and supporting community

would become available only after a

great deal more study and research.5

pp. I.5-I.6, DASA; "First 20 Years at Los Alamos,"

p. 36; Fine and Remington, Corps of Engineers: Construction, p. 694.

5

 MDH; Bk. 8, Vol. 1, Apps. A6 (Post Plan) and

A7 (Tech Area Plot Map), and Vol. 2, p. III.47,

DASA; Second Memo on Los Alamos Proj (by J. H.

Continued
468 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

As at Clinton and Hanford, there

was the same urgency at Los Alamos

to complete facilities in the shortest

possible time and at the lowest cost in

terms of manpower and critical materials. Hence, wherever feasible, design

and layout procedures were streamlined. On nontechnical community

structures (housing, service, and recreational buildings), the Albuquerque

District submitted requirements directly to Kruger without going

through the University of California.

Kruger then outlined the job specifications to each subcontractor, who in

turn provided a cost estimate. Once

Kruger and the subcontractor had

agreed on a reasonable cost, the proposal was submitted in the form of a

lump-sum contract to the Albuquerque District. The latter office reviewed the document and calculated

the profit made, and if this appeared

excessive, it required the subcontractor to return the overage.6

Plans for the New Mexico establishment followed the general pattern of

those for Clinton and Hanford: highly

tentative and subject to repeated and

drastic vicissitudes. Nevertheless, on

one project requirement—that of security—Manhattan remained vigilantly

uncompromising. Because the need

for secrecy was so crucial, Los

Alamos, unlike Clinton and Hanford,

was planned as a military post, with a

military commander and staff and various military units to perform post engineer and security functions. For the

same reason, project planners decided to provide on-site accommodations

and community services (commissary,

medical care, and recreation) for all

military personnel and civilian scientists and technicians, and, in many

cases, their families as well, because

of their respective post functions and

secret job assignments. As nontechnical civilian employees working in unclassified jobs did not pose a security

risk, Manhattan recommended that

they reside in the neighboring small

towns and use Army bus transportation to commute to and from the job.

They would, however, have access to

on-site housing based on its availability and their family need.7

Construction and Operation

Because of the unpredictable expansion in the size of the bomb development program, community construction tended to be an open-ended

process, with each new influx of civilian and military personnel requiring

additional facilities. Housing constituted by far the largest part of community construction, reflecting a rapidly expanding population. From an

estimated fifteen hundred persons in

January 1943, comprised mostly of

Sundt construction employees, the

population increased to almost thirtyfive hundred a year later, although

most Sundt personnel had departed,

and approached fifty-seven hundred

at the beginning of 1945.8

Stevenson, Proj Mgr), Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

322 (Los Alamos), MDR; "First 20 Years at Los

Alamos," pp. 15-19 (photographs of terrain features

and buildings); Rpt, sub: Complications of the Los

Alamos Proj, 12 Nov 46, Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

322 (Los Alamos), MDR. Daniel Lang provides a detailed description of Los Alamos as he observed it

in the immediate postwar period (1945-48) in his

Early Tales of the Atomic Age (New York: Doubleday

and Co., 1948), pp. 208-10. 6

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 4.2-4.3 and 5.1, DASA.

7

 Ibid., pp. 5.1-6.3, DASA. 8

 All statistics on the population of Los Alamos in

wartime represent rough estimates, because project

Continued
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN NEW MEXICO 469

With the completion of the first

major phase of community construction in the fall of 1943, the Sundt

Company withdrew its personnel and

equipment from the site and the post

commander prepared to take over

primary responsibility for community

maintenance as well as any further

minor construction. General Groves

had been concerned about having an

outside contractor and the Albuquerque District involved in the bomb

program and he now took steps to

tighten security. In early 1944, the

Manhattan District assumed full responsibility for supervising all further

construction. Lt. Col. Whitney Ashbridge, the post commander, recruited additional carpenters, plumbers,

and other workers and assigned them

to the Operations Division, which he

reorganized into two sections: one for

community maintenance and construction, the other for technical area

work. Work crews from the division,

often comprised of both civilians and

enlisted men from the Provisional Engineer Detachment (PED), undertook

many minor construction jobs ordinarily carried out by construction

contractors.

Division crews, however, could not

handle all the work, and occasionally

outside contractors were brought in

through the Albuquerque District. An

increase in the number of outside

contractors employed by Manhattan

occurred in March 1944, when both

the technical and community facilities

had to be expanded substantially. The

Army once again had to risk calling

upon the Albuquerque District to

begin a search for additional contractors. This time two El Paso, Texas,

firms were chosen: J. E. Morgan and

Sons, to install prefabricated apartment buildings; and Robert E.

McKee, to undertake the new phase

of technical construction.9

The unpredictable expansion of the

bomb program consistently outran

available housing. With on-site housing still under construction in the

spring of 1943, the first laboratory

staff members had to stay at guest

ranches in the vicinity of the Hill. By

June, these accommodations were so

overtaxed by the influx of technical

personnel that the Army had to acquire the National Park Service's Frijoles Lodge in Bandelier National

Monument, 14 miles south of Los

Alamos. From June to October 1943

and again for a brief period in JulyAugust 1944, overflow laboratory personnel resided at the Frijoles Canyon

lodgings amid the ruins of ancient

Indian dwellings. In 1944 and 1945,

the unavailability of sufficient dormitory housing for married enlisted men

of the Special Engineer Detachment

(SED) and the strict enforcement of

security regulations that forbade

bringing wives to live in nearby civilian communities severely strained the

morale of many junior scientists and

technicians. The continuing shortage

of family-type facilities resulted not

only from the unexpectedly rapid increase in personnel and the wartime

officials, for reasons of security, did not undertake

an official census until April 1946. However, some

indication of population trends can be derived from

payroll figures maintained for the various categories

of workers employed at Los Alamos. See ibid., p.

7.15 and App. B7 (Payroll Census Graph, Dec 42-

Dec 46), DASA.

9

 Ibid., pp. 5.4-5.9 and Apps. B3-B4 (Org Charts,

4 Feb 44 and 1 Feb 45) and D12, DASA; Fine and

Remington, Corps of Engineers: Construction, pp. 697-

98.
470 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

FOUR-FAMILY APARTMENT UNITS AT LOS ALAMOS

limitations on labor and materials but

also from the deliberate policy of

holding to a minimum the construction of family housing, except where

it contributed to recruiting personnel

and security. The Army persisted in

this policy because the addition of

each new family placed further strain

upon the limited number of service

personnel available, the supply of

water, electricity, and fuel, the sewerage system, and other community

services.10

Housing units at Los Alamos comprised numerous conventional

houses, apartments, and duplexes,

which the Army felt were of particular

value for recruiting essential personnel and for ensuring security. There

were also winterized hutments, Pacific

and National Hut apartments, government- and privately owned trailers,

and sixteen remodeled ranch houses

at various places on the reservation.

Eventually the combined capacity of

these various types of housing was

sufficient to accommodate more than

six hundred families.

Single individuals resided in barracks or dormitories, with the bestequipped dormitories reserved for

unmarried scientific personnel. Firemen, janitors, hospital attendants,

and other civilian service personnel

10

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 6.2-6.3, and Vol. 2,

pp. I.9, III.19, IX.11, DASA; "First 20 Years at Los

Alamos," pp. 16-17; Dorothy McKibbin, "109 East

Palace Avenue," LASL News 5, no. 14 (Jun 63): 6.

Mrs. McKibbin was in charge of Los Alamos' Santa

Fe office, located at the above-mentioned address,

which served as the first point of contact for most

incoming visitors and newly assigned personnel.
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN NEW MEXICO 471

MILITARY MESS FACILITY AT LOS ALAMOS

occupied more cheaply built units.

Most enlisted men had quarters in

theater of operations-type barracks

and enlisted women in modified

mobilization-style units. Construction

workers occupied temporary housing

built by their employers; Sundt crews

resided in more than 100 hutments,

subsequently used to house other

construction workers after the Tucson

contractor had completed its phase of

the work, and McKee crews lived in a

specially built 93-unit dormitory. Visitors to the site and some senior scientific personnel were given quarters in

the well-built stone-and-log structures

of the Ranch School.11

As an antidote to the admittedly

unsatisfactory housing conditions, the

isolation of the site, and the stringent

security regulations, the Army devoted considerable effort to providing

Los Alamos residents with efficient,

low-cost, and attractive food and service facilities. Meals were available to

civilians at cost in several conveniently located messes and at Fuller

Lodge—the latter intended primarily

for guests and transients. Army personnel ate at regular military messes.

Limited food service was available in

the post exchanges. In March 1945,

the post opened a new cafeteria specifically designed and operated to improve community morale. Open to 11

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 6.2-6.5, DASA; LASL,

Personnel Dept, Housing Manual for Laboratory

Employees and Supervisors, pp. 21-24; Barbara

Storms, "Western Area," The Atom 31 (Mar 66): 19-

23 and 36; Lang, Tales of the Atomic Age, p. 207.
472 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

LOS ALAMOS RANCH TRADING POST

everyone, it was better equipped, furnished, and decorated than the regular messes and served a more elaborate menu offered on an a la carte

basis at approximate cost.

Commissary facilities began operations in March 1943, with only Los

Alamos residents having privileges.

But experience demonstrated that the

majority of employees who lived off

the site had little opportunity to do

their shopping in nearby communities

because of commuting distances.

Consequently, the post commander

ordered extension of commissary

privileges to all who worked at the

reservation. One unusual commissary

service was check cashing for contractor employees, who, for security reasons, were not permitted to maintain

bank accounts in Santa Fe or other

communities adjacent to the site. Another ameliorative measure, as of

August 1944, was the sale of many

additional items not ordinarily authorized under Army regulations.12

Supplementing commissary service

were the post exchange facilities,

which were open to everyone on the

reservation. The Army set up the first

"trading post" in a small log building

of the Ranch School in early 1943,

but eventually opened outlets in several other locations, including one

12

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol 1, pp. 6.9-6.14, DASA;

Memo, Ashbridge to 1st Lt William Rice (Commissary Off, Los Alamos), 12 Aug 44, and Memo for

File, Ashbridge, 12 Aug 44, copies in ibid., App.

D24, DASA; Ltr, Col Gerald R. Tyler (CO, Los

Alamos) to Dist Engr, Attn.: Col Elmer E. Kirkpatrick. Jr. (Dep Dist Engr), sub: Request for Authority

to Cash Checks at Commissary, and 1st Ind, Kirkpatrick to CO, U.S. Engrs Office, Santa Fe, N.Mex.,

both 12 Feb 45, copies in ibid., App. D27, DASA;

LASL, Housing Manual for Laboratory Employees

and Supervisors, p. 23.
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN NEW MEXICO 473

STREET SCENE IN LOS ALAMOS. The fence separates the technical installations from the

residential area.

near the entrance of the technical

area and, as of June 1944, one convenient to the quarters of the SED

unit. The Army, however, discouraged the practice extensively employed at Oak Ridge, Hanford, and

Richland of granting commercial concessions to outside civilian businessmen. There were a few exceptions.

The post exchange manager let contracts for a cleaning and pressing

shop and a combination garage and

filling station. Whenever feasible, the

Army employed civilians to operate

the various service establishments.

But, because of the labor scarcity, it

had to supplement civilian staffs with

Women's Army Corps (WAC) members and PED enlisted men.13

Other community services were

comparable to those found at most

zone-of-interior military posts. Military and civilian crews under the direction of the post engineer officer

maintained and repaired all buildings

and were capable of undertaking new

construction on a limited scale. Other

post crews tended furnaces in winter,

delivered ice in summer, and collected the community's garbage and

trash. The post motor pool operated

the community's transportation

system, which was completely dependent upon motor vehicles. It provided a free bus service for the hundreds of commuting employees from

nearby towns and a trucking service

13

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 6.16-6.20 and App. B3

(Org Chart, U.S. Engrs Office, Santa Fe, N.Mex.,

5 Feb 44), DASA.
474 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

PUPILS AT THE LOS ALAMOS COMMUNITY SCHOOL viewing the Jemez Mountains

to the nearest railheads in Santa Fe

and Albuquerque.14

Management

The local government of the Los

Alamos community, which, legally

speaking, was a federal reservation

within the state of New Mexico, functioned through a composite of civilian

and military institutions. Although civilian Sundt Company guards performed internal security functions in

the earliest months of post operation,

the Army provided the community

with most of its protective and law

enforcement services. A Military

Police (MP) Detachment, assigned in

late April 1943 from the 4817th

Service Command Unit, 8th Service

Command, operated under the post

provost marshal's direction and was

responsible for guarding all points of

entry and patrolling the perimeters of

both the technical area and the reservation itself. Fire protection also

began as a civilian function, first provided by Sundt Company employees

and later by its construction crews

quartered on the post. Then in October, the Army decided to save scarce

housing by replacing civilian firemen

with enlisted PED soldiers, who could

live in the fire station. They retained

only a civilian chief.15

14

 Ibid., pp. 6.22-6.29, DASA; "First 20 Years at

Los Alamos," pp. 18-20; List, sub: MD Offs on

Duty at Los Alamos and Their Duties, 6 May 44,

Incl to Memo, Ashbridge to Groves, 14 Jun 44,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Gen), MDR.

15

 See Ch. XV for a further discussion of the legal

status of Los Alamos. See also copies of the correspondence between the Secretary of War and the

governor of New Mexico in MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1,

Apps. D9, DASA. Because Los Alamos was a federal

reservation, officials of New Mexico held that

people residing there were not legal residents of the

Continued
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN NEW MEXICO 475

Civil law administration was the responsibility of a town council, comprised of six members whom the residents elected to serve a six-month

term of office. Operating at first

under a joint directive issued by Ashbridge and Oppenheimer in August

1943, the council ultimately functioned under a constitution approved

by the post commander in April 1944.

With this authority the council had jurisdiction over enforcement of local

civil regulations, but it had to depend

upon the residents' voluntary compliance because there was no legally

constituted civil court on post to

which cases might be remanded. The

council, which met regularly with representatives of the laboratory and the

post commander, also submitted recommendations on community affairs

and devoted considerable time to

problems of community welfare. It

gave particular attention to measures

that would improve living conditions,

including establishment and operation of self-help laundries, more

convenient hours of operation at post

exchanges and messes, provision of

extra storage and living space in

apartments, reduction in rental rates,

and development of children's recreational facilities. Viewing the work of

the council in retrospect, General

Groves recalls that, though "it was a

thorn in the side of the station commander . . . , on the whole it was a

valuable adjunct, for it not only improved the morale of the community,

but kept the post administration on

its toes."

 16

As operating contractor, the University of California had the responsibility for the often difficult and delicate task of administering civilian

housing—establishing rental rates and

other charges, determining housing

assignment quotas, and providing for

additional facilities. The university set

up an on-site housing office, where an

Army liaison officer maintained dayto-day familiarity with developments

in this crucial area of community administration. Following the guidance

of General Accounting Office regulations, the university determined rates

in accordance with the annual salary

of the renter and then the district engineer, in compliance with Orders B

issued by the War Department in

1943, reviewed and approved these

rates. The university established

charges for utilities on the basis of a

study of rates assessed tenants in

other projects where the government

furnished housing and then submitted

its rate schedule to the District for approval. Although an investigation in

the spring of 1944 revealed that these

charges were far less than actual

costs, the Army decided not to increase them and further aggravate an

already restive civilian community.17

No effort received more careful attention and wider support from the

highly educated scientists and technicians than establishment of a free

public school system. In the spring of

stale. Hence, in the presidential election of 1944,

they could vote only by absentee ballot. Nevertheless, New Mexico did require that Los Alamos residents pay the state income tax. See ibid., pp. 6.33-

6.43 and 6.55, DASA.

16

 Quotation from Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p.

164. See also MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 6.59-6.60,

DASA. 17

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 6.5-6.9 and Apps. C1

(Utility Charges at Los Alamos), DASA; Ltr, Ash- Continued
476 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

1943, because existing school facilities were inadequate to accommodate

a burgeoning school-age population,

the post commander and laboratory

director acted jointly to appoint a sixman school committee (later, a permanent eight-man school board) to

supervise the construction of a new

school building, plan a curriculum,

and employ a teaching staff. As a consultant, the committee hired Walter

W. Cook, professor of education at

the University of Minnesota. Assisted

by B. E. Brazier, the laboratory's construction and maintenance division

chief, Cook developed plans for a

combined elementary and high school

building incorporating all the newest

features in school construction. The

school opened in the fall with 140

pupils, and enrollment by 1945 rose

to more than 300. Later, a partially

self-supporting nursery school, primarily intended for the preschool age

children of working mothers, supplemented the regular school system.

Except for the nursery school, attendance for Los Alamos residents was

completely free of charge, with the

government paying all expenses (directly for maintenance and, through

the University of California contract,

for teachers' salaries).18

For military personnel at Los

Alamos, the Army provided the standard information and education program authorized for military posts.

The post chaplain, Capt. Mathew

Imrie, who also served as the information and education officer, advised

MP, WAC, PED, SED, and other unit

commanders on educational matters,

arranged regular night school courses, and administered the U.S. Armed

Forces Institute correspondence

course program.19

Strong support for the best educational facilities was at least partially

motivated by continuing concern over

community morale. Not only did it

eliminate one dissatisfaction, but

after-hours educational opportunities

were a well-tested means for engaging

servicemen in a personally satisfying

activity during nonduty hours. The

causes for declining morale at Los

Alamos in 1944 and early 1945 were

many. Such irritants as censorship of

mail, alleged and real inequities in

wages, differences in social background, restrictions on access to service and recreational facilities, and

shortages of housing tended to be

magnified. Some of these factors, too,

enhanced the conflicts that often arise

between civilians and the military, especially where, as at Los Alamos,

most civilian scientists and technicians

came from an academic and social

background quite different from that

of many of the servicemen.20

bridge to Dist Engr, sub: Rent Reduction for Improvised Quarters, 7 Jan 44, copy in ibid., App. D18,

DASA; Ltr, Lt Col J. M. Harman (CO, Los Alamos)

to Dist Engr, sub: Establishment of Rates for Quarters for the Operating Contractors' Employees on

the Zia (Los Alamos) Proj, 10 Feb 43, copy in ibid.,

App. D20, DASA; Ltr, Tyler (CO, Los Alamos) to

Oppenheimer, Attn.: Charles D. Shane, sub: Rental

Rates for Family Quarters, 10 Mar 45, copy in ibid.,

App. D22, DASA; WD Orders B, 15 Jan 43; Second

Memo on the Los Alamos Proj (by Stevenson, Proj

Mgr), MDR. 18

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 6.65-6.67 and Apps.

C2 (Chart, Total Cost to Govt of Maintaining

Schools for Los Alamos During School Years, 1945-

46 and 1946-47) and D13 (Data on Misc Post

Bldgs), and Vol. 2, pp. III.9-III.10, DASA; Memo,

Oppenheimer to Groves, sub: Rpt of Spec Reviewing Committee on Los Alamos Proj, 27 May 43,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Development),

MDR; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 166. 19

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 6.56-6.57, DASA. 20

 Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. III.11, III.13-III.14, III.19-

Continued
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN NEW MEXICO 477

Typical of morale problems was a

custodial employee's complaint of

racial discrimination (in this case,

against a person of Spanish ancestry)

in assignment of housing. The employee wrote to both of New Mexico's

United States senators that post housing authorities had forced him to

move out of an apartment that he had

occupied for some time into inferior

quarters, in order to make room for

newly arrived scientific and technical

personnel. The Army informed the

two senators that the District had

built the housing in question for occupancy by highly paid staff members

of the laboratory. Pending arrival of

this professional personnel in Los

Alamos, housing officials had permitted custodial employees to live in it

on a temporary basis. Now these employees were being reassigned, without regard to race or nationality, to

other quarters that were in every respect adequate for their needs. To

make certain that the rather large

number of other Spanish-Americans

living on the post fully understood

the reasons for reassignment of housing units, Colonel Ashbridge met with

representatives of the group, assuring them that the Army was continuing its efforts to relieve the housing

shortage.21

To check the erosion of morale, the

Army, through its Special Services organization on the post, pursued a vigorous program of countermeasures in

other areas of community activity.

Special Services greatly expanded a

limited civilian program, begun by a

former teacher of the Ranch School.

It added tennis courts, softball fields,

a golf course, and a bowling alley; assisted residents in taking advantage of

the unexcelled opportunities for outdoor recreation (camping, hiking,

skiing, and mountain climbing); provided motion pictures and other programs in the two post theaters; and

encouraged residents to sponsor such

activities as lectures, dances, art

shows, and monthly musicals. The

Army also encouraged residents to

organize and participate in those

typical groups found in most American communities—Boy Scouts, a

chess club, a little theater group,

and so on—and assigned the post

chaplain responsibility for arranging religious services after the parttime services by priests and ministers

from Santa Fe had proved generally

unsatisfactory.22

Given the inherent character of

many of the factors that adversely affected morale, the Army, of course,

could never hope to find completely

satisfactory solutions for all the problems of the Los Alamos community.

Nevertheless, it was largely successful

in preventing any of these factors

from seriously disrupting the life of

the operating community and thereby

impeding or delaying development of

the atomic bomb.

III.22, DASA; Rpt, sub: Complications of Los

Alamos Proj, 12 Nov 46, MDR; Groves, Now It Can

Be Told, pp. 164-66 and 168-69. 21

 See correspondence in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 330.14 (Los Alamos), MDR especially Ltr, Sen

Carl A. Hatch (N.Mex.) to Secy War, 6 Mar 44, and

attached suggested reply prepared in Groves's

office; Ltr, Col R. R. Neyland (Div Engr, Dallas,

Tex.) to Sen Dennis Chavez (N.Mex.), 18 Mar 44;

and Memo, Ashbridge to Groves, 20 Mar 44.

22

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 6.55-6.56, 6.57-6.58,

App. D12, DASA; Groves Diary, 24 Jul 44, LRG.
478 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Trinity: The Base Camp

The establishment of the Trinity

base camp in the Jornada del Muerto

valley east of the Rio Grande in New

Mexico brought suddenly, albeit for a

very brief time, a great influx of men

and machines to a region hitherto

home for only a few hardy farmers

and ranchers.23 Unlike the residents

of the temporary Hanford construction camp in the sagebrush wilderness

west of the Columbia River in Washington State, the men of Trinity were

highly trained scientists and technicians from the parent community of

Los Alamos who had trekked from

the Pajarito Plateau to the desolate

Jornada to complete their unique

military-scientific mission: the test of

an atomic device. Dedicated in their

commitment to science, they now

turned to preparing the Trinity site

for this dramatic event, which, in an

instant, would alter, decisively, the

course of human history.

Flanked by low-lying mountains

that added a certain primitive beauty

to the otherwise drab sameness of the

seemingly endless desert landscape,

the Trinity site comprised an 18- by

24-mile tract of land in the northwest

corner of the Jornada, which itself

formed the northern portion of the

huge Alamogordo Army Air Field

(Map 6). In the summer of 1944, Kenneth Bainbridge, the Harvard physicist assigned by Oppenheimer to

oversee preparations for the bomb

test and the base camp, chose this expanse of New Mexico desert over several other locations because he felt it

best met the criteria established by

Los Alamos scientists: flat terrain for

minimizing extraneous blast effects

and for construction of roads and

communications lines; sufficient distance from populated areas but close

enough to Los Alamos to avoid an

undue loss of time in travel by laboratory staff members; clear and sunny

weather, on the average, that would

permit the extensive collection of optical data; and convenience to good

transportation by rail (main line of

the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe

Railroad) and by highway (U.S. 85 and

380).24

Beginning in the fall, Bainbridge

and his Project Trinity group worked

closely with Capt. Samuel P. Davalos,

post engineer at Los Alamos in

charge of the Operations Division's

Technical Area Section, to develop

plans for a base camp at the Trinity

site, to include a bomb test area with

technical facilities and a campsite that

would serve the needs of at least 160

men. Meanwhile, to expedite construction at the camp, the Army arranged a contract with a Lubbock,

Texas, construction firm, which soon

dispatched workmen to Trinity to

build barracks, officers quarters, a

mess hall, and other support facilities. At the end of December, when these

basic facilities were completed, a

23

 Section on the Trinity site based on MDH, Bk.

8, Vol. 1, pp. 6.30 and 7.10-7.11, and Vol. 2, pp.

XVIII.2-XVIII.4, DASA; Lamont, Day of Trinity, pp.

73-76 and 94-95; Kunetka, City of Fire, pp. 145-49.

24

 The choice of the Trinity site came after Bainbridge's group had considered seven other possible

locations for the test: three in New Mexico (the Tularosa valley northwest of the town of Alamogordo,

the lava region south of Grants, and the plateau

southwest of Cuba and northeast of Thoreau); two

in California (the Army's desert training area in the

southeast part of the state, near Rice, and San Nicolas Island in the Pacific Ocean, southwest of Los Angeles); one in Texas (the sandbars off the south

coast); and one in Colorado (the San Luis Valley

region near the Great Sand Dunes National Monument). See MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, p. XVIII.2, DASA.

480 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

TRINITY BASE CAMP

small MP detachment under the command of Lt. Harold C. Bush arrived

from Los Alamos to provide security

for the satellite community. This vanguard was soon followed by a much

larger group of scientists, technicians,

medics, civil service personnel, and

construction workers.

As 1945 unfolded, the activity of

the more than two hundred camp

residents intensified in a concerted

effort to ready all technical facilities

for the bomb test, tentatively scheduled for early summer. Under the supervision of the Project Trinity

group, civilian construction crews—

aided by additional construction personnel brought down from Los

Alamos—built warehouses; repair

shops; bomb-proof structures; an explosives magazine; a stockroom to

house equipment shipped from the

Hill; an unloading platform on the

railroad siding at Pope, which was

some 25 miles west of the site; a commissary; and more barracks. They also

constructed more than 20 miles of

blacktopped roads for a fleet of some

one hundred motor vehicles, erected

200 miles of telephone wire, and installed electric water pumps and portable generators.

As at Los Alamos, sustaining community morale among the residents of

Trinity was a continuing problem. Because of strict security requirements,

no one could leave the base camp

except on official missions. And as

the time for the test approached, increasingly long hours of work under

conditions of extreme heat and exposure to a variety of poisonous reptiles
THE ATOMIC COMMUNITIES IN NEW MEXICO 481

and insects added to the stress, strain,

and fatigue. Hence, project leaders at

Trinity made a special effort to supply

good food, reasonably comfortable

quarters, and a variety of recreational

sports and activities. Lieutenant Bush,

in particular, took a personal interest

in improving morale in the community. He assumed the additional duty of

making certain that adequate housing

and feeding facilities were available

for the expanding population, and he

also provided organized athletics,

local hunting trips, a game room, and

nightly movies. The success of these

measures is evidenced by the fact

that, by mid-summer 1945, the essential technical facilities at Trinity were

all ready for the crucial test of mankind's first atomic explosion.

While many times in the past the

Army had to establish communities

for special and unusual purposes in

remote and often inhospitable places,

nothing had quite prepared it for Los

Alamos and Trinity. For a number of

reasons, the parent community and its

satellite were unique in the American

experience: They assembled, for the

first time, a small army of scientists

and technicians in a central laboratory

to achieve a single objective; they isolated this group for many months

under difficult living conditions and

grueling work schedules; and they

functioned as a military reservation in

compliance with strict security regulations. These circumstances inevitably

produced some serious stresses and

strains on the fabric of community life

for the civilians, who were unaccustomed to the strong military direction

over their civic activities. But the

Army administration, working patiently and skillfully through Oppenheimer

and other civilian leaders, dealt effectively with each potentially disruptive

situation and succeeded in maintaining a community environment that

sustained the large-scale collaborative

effort between the government and

science to design and test an atomic

weapon.

PART FOUR

THE BOMB

CHAPTER XXIV

The Los Alamos Weapon Program

The ultimate focus of the Manhattan Project's manifold activities—

production of fissionable materials;

procurement of raw materials, manpower, and process support; establishment of security, health, and

safety programs; and construction of

atomic communities—was the Los

Alamos Laboratory weapon program.

Actively under way by the spring of

1943, its major objectives, as General

Groves succinctly summarized them,

were "to carry on research and

experiment[s] necessary to the final

purification of the production material, its fabrication into suitable active

components, the combination of these

components into a fully developed

usable weapon, and to complete the

above in time to make effective use of

the weapon as soon as the necessary

amount of basic material has been

manufactured."

 1

Planning Phase

Whether the Army could attain the

objectives of the Los Alamos weapon

program greatly depended on its ability to build and operate a major scientific and engineering organization

at the isolated New Mexico site. Because the technical problems corollary

to bomb development were in many

respects unique, few precedents existed to guide Manhattan's military

and civilian scientific leaders in organizing and staffing the bomb laboratory. Hence, in carrying out these first

steps of the weapon program, they

adopted a generally pragmatic and ad

hoc approach.

Efforts of Groves and Oppenheimer

Because of the need for maximum

security, the atomic leaders concluded

that a normal Corps of Engineers administrative organization—district engineer supervision and control, area

engineer liaison and support—was

not feasible at Los Alamos. For this

reason, Groves himself assumed many

functions of both offices. Working

closely with the civilian head of the

bomb laboratory, J. Robert Oppenheimer, the Manhattan commander

not only exercised broad policy control over the weapon program but

also regularly intervened in day-today operations, using telephone and

teletype means of communications

and frequent personal visits to main1

 Quotation from Ltr, Groves to Oppenheimer,

26 Jan 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12

(Y-12), MDR. This description of the objectives of

the Los Alamos program was a slightly amended

statement taken from MPC Rpt, 21 Aug 43, OCG

Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab E, MDR.
486 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

tain surprisingly close supervision.

Though his most important contact

was through Oppenheimer, he also

acted through the facilities of the Albuquerque District and the Los

Alamos military organization, as well

as through certain individual Army

and Navy liaison officers assigned to

the weapon program. With this administrative arrangement in effect, the

role of the prime contractor, the University of California, was narrowly

confined to the details of business

management and procurement for the

laboratory.2

The personal leadership of Groves

and Oppenheimer was particularly

evident in some of their early administrative actions. In late January 1943,

Groves selected Lt. Col. John M.

Harman, a Corps of Engineers officer

with a degree in civil engineering, as

the first commanding officer of the

Los Alamos post. At the same time,

he requested the War Department's

Services of Supply to furnish and

train military personnel for the post,

specifying allotment of military police,

engineer, and medical troops in time

for activation of Los Alamos as a

Class IV installation on 1 April 1943.

In consultation with James B. Conant,

he drew up a statement on the organization, function, and responsibilities

of the various elements that would be

located at Los Alamos, clearly delineating the division of local responsibilities between Oppenheimer, the

scientific director, and Colonel

Harman, the post commander. In

meetings with University of California

officials during February and March,

Groves worked out business and procurement arrangements for Los

Alamos, including establishment, for

reasons of security, of the laboratory's

main procurement office in Los

Angeles.3

2

 For a record of Groves's frequent personal interventions in Los Alamos operations see Groves

Diary, Nov 1942-Aug 1945, LRG. On the limited

role of the University of California see MDH, Bk. 8,

Vol. 2, "Technical," p. III.6, DASA; Interv, Fine,

Remington, and Ralph F. Weld with Groves, 11 Feb

64, CMH and OCEHD.

3

 Official Army Register, 1 Jan 44 (Harman's promotion to colonel, effective 15 Feb 43); Groves Diary,

27 and 29 Jan, 1, 13, 22-25, 27 Feb, 8, 10-12, 14-

15 and 19 Mar 43, LRG; Ltr, Conant and Groves to

Oppenheimer, 25 Feb 43, copy in MDH, Bk. 8,

Vol. 2, App. 1, DASA; Memos, Groves to CG SOS,

sub: Org and Assignment of Mil Org, 28 Jan and

22 Feb 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 322 (Los

Alamos), MDR; Memo, Groves to CG SOS, sub: Activation and Administration of Los Alamos,

27 Feb 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 319.2 (Los

Alamos), MDR; MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, "General," p.

7.1, Vol. 2, pp. I.5 and I.9, and Vol. 3, "Auxiliary

Activities," pp. 1.1-1.4 and App. A1, DASA. All

Army installations in the zone of interior were classified into four categories. Class IV installations

were technical in nature, such as government-owned

manufacturing plants, proving grounds, and the

Signal Corps Photographic Center in New York. Continued
THE LOS ALAMOS WEAPON PROGRAM 487

Meanwhile, Oppenheimer was visiting various universities and institutions to enlist a cadre of scientists for

his laboratory. But the shortage of

scientific manpower, caused by the

special needs of other war projects,

and certain misgivings about the restrictive military character of the new

laboratory hindered his initial efforts.

To alleviate the scientists' doubts on

this score, Oppenheimer reassured

prospective recruits with a promise

from Conant and Groves that, for at

least the first phase of the program,

the laboratory would function on a

strictly civilian basis and that the staff

would not be militarized until actual

fabrication of a weapon began.

This approach improved Oppenheimer's recruiting efforts, especially

among scientists already engaged in

some aspect of atomic research. Starting with members of Manhattan's

fast-neutron team—it included university scientists from California (Berkeley), Minnesota, Wisconsin, Stanford,

and Purdue—Oppenheimer added

other scientists from the University of

Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory,

among them the Hungarian-refugee

physicist Edward Teller, and from

Princeton University's now discontinued program for isotopic separation

of uranium. In addition, he attracted

a scattering of scientists from other

universities—Rochester, Illinois, Columbia, and Iowa State—and from

other research organizations, including the Geophysics Laboratory at the

Carnegie Institution, the Radiation

Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the Army's

Ballistic Research Laboratory at Aberdeen, Maryland, the National Bureau

of Standards, and the Westinghouse

Research Laboratories in Pittsburgh.4

Oppenheimer and a skeleton staff

of scientists arrived at Los Alamos in

mid-March, despite the unfinished

state of the community and technical

facilities. In the ensuing months, however, there was a rapid increase in the

influx of personnel, both military and

civilian. By early June, Los Alamos

had more than 300 officer and enlisted personnel and almost 460 civilians

(160 civil service employees and 300

scientists and technicians on the University of California payroll). Finally,

with sufficient personnel on hand,

both the new post commander, Lt.

Col. Whitney Ashbridge—Groves had

relieved Colonel Harman in May because of his inability to get along with

some of the scientific leaders—and

Oppenheimer turned to the many

problems of completing their respective organizations, especially those relating to establishment of essential

coordination between the laboratory

and post administrations. To guide

them in this task, they had at least the

initial outlines of the unfolding

weapon program.5

The duties of commanding generals of service commands to Class IV installations were limited to specified services. See Millett, Army Service Forces, pp.

314-15.

4

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, pp. I.7-I.8 and App. 1,

DASA; Ltr, Conant to Groves, 26 Mar 43, OCG

Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 23, MDR; Smyth

Report, pp. 143-44 and 151; Hewlett and Anderson,

New World, p. 231. 5

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, p. 7.2 and Apps. B2 (Org

Chart, Los Alamos Post Administration, 5 Jun 43)

and B7 (Graph, Payroll Census Data of Los Alamos,

1942-46), and Vol. 2, p. I.11, DASA; Groves Diary,

29 May 43, LRG; Fine et al. Interv, 11 Feb 64,

CMH and OCEHD.
488 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

The April Conferences

Basic planning for developing and

testing an atomic weapon was the responsibility of a formal steering

board, set up by Oppenheimer in late

March. The board began its work in

early April and conducted a series of

orientation and planning conferences

throughout the month. During the

orientation conferences, held in the

first half of the month, the board provided the newly arriving laboratory

staff members with state-of-the-art information on atomic energy as a

weapon of war. During the planning

conferences, held in the last half of

the month, the board and a group of

scientific professionals reviewed the

nuclear physics background and established research objectives for the

weapon program. Taking part is these

meetings were selected laboratory

staff members, visiting consultants

(Isidor I. Rabi from MIT's Radiation

Laboratory and Samuel K. Allison

and Enrico Fermi from the Metallurgical Laboratory), and members of a

special reviewing committee.6

The April conferences made it very

clear that what was known about the

explosibility of uranium and plutonium and the design of an atomic

weapon was still highly theoretical.

The one area in which nuclear research had progressed significantly

beyond the theoretical was in the

chemistry and metallurgy of uranium

and plutonium, and this had occurred

only because project scientists had

had to conduct extensive research

into this aspect of the two elements to

provide the necessary developmental

data for the fissionable materials production processes at Clinton and

Hanford. In virtually every other

aspect essential to bomb development—the experimental physics research; the design, engineering, and

fabrication of bomb components; and

the assembly and testing of a

weapon—the essential work remained

to be accomplished. What then precisely was known in April 1943?7

Theoretical research had established that a single kilogram of U-235

has a potential energy release of up

to 17,000 tons of TNT. To achieve

this release of energy there had to be

a fast-neutron chain reaction, which

was theoretically possible in uranium,

plutonium, and certain other elements, but most feasible in active material composed largely of the isotopes U-235 or Pu-239. A fast chain

reaction could occur only with the assembly of a sufficient quantity of

active material in a configuration in

which natural leakage of neutrons did

not occur at so high a level that the

chain reaction was quenched. An

important step was to design a

mechanism that would provide the

proper configuration for attaining

criticality upon detonation. Theoretical research had already given considerable attention to weapon design,

but the major problem still to be

solved was how to avoid prefissioning, or predetonation.

Addressing this problem, the conferees reviewed and discussed several

6

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2. p. I.11, DASA; Hewlett and

Anderson, New World, pp. 235-36.

7

 Discussion on the state of knowledge in April

1943 is based on MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, pp. I.11-1.12,

DASA; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 232-

35; Rpt, Spec Reviewing Committee on Los Alamos

Proj, 10 May 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12

(Development), MDR; Memo, Tolman, sub: Los

Alamos Proj as of Mar 43, OSRD.
THE LOS ALAMOS WEAPON PROGRAM 489

weapon assembly methods as possible

solutions. They immediately discounted those methods that required either

too much active material (as in

the autocatalytic, or self-assembling,

method) or employment of an atomic

explosion to trigger fusion (as in a

thermonuclear bomb using a mass of

deuterium as the source of its

energy). In their estimation the most

feasible design was the gun-assembly

method, comprised of a cannon in

which an explosive-propelled projectile containing one portion of active

material is shot through a second

target containing another portion of

material—thus achieving criticality.

The conferees were confident that

the gun-assembly method, if properly

engineered, would work with the isotope U-235, because of its properties;

however, they were considerably less

certain about its feasibility for Pu239, partly because the continued

scarcity of this isotope had limited the

amount of study that could be made

of its chemical and metallurgical

properties. Realizing the pile method

of producing Pu-239 made that substance most likely to be the active material available in the largest quantities, the conferees were especially

anxious to find a design suitable for

its employment. Continued discussions indicated that the implosion

concept offered the best promise of

success for plutonium. In a weapon of

this design, a quantity of active material in a subcritical shape would be

surrounded with layers of ordinary

explosive in such a way that, upon

detonation, the active material would

be compressed into a critical configuration and the fast chain reaction

would take place. Later research revealed that the implosion design

would produce an effective atomic explosion using considerably less active

material than the gun method—a fact

especially appealing to Manhattan

leaders.

The April conferences provided

Groves, Oppenheimer, and other

Manhattan leaders with new insight

into what the immediate emphasis

and direction of the weapon program

must be by identifying the specific research objectives that would produce

the necessary data not only for timely

design and fabrication of an atomic

weapon but also for an understanding

of its destructive effect. First, because

information on the amount of damage

that would result from an atomic blast

was almost totally lacking, the conferees prescribed the collection of systematic data on the likely physical,

psychological, and mechanical effects

of an explosion of the magnitude of

an atomic bomb—realizing, of course,

that part of that data would have to

await an actual test of an atomic

device. Second, they outlined a schedule of theoretical studies, experimental physics, and research in chemistry

and metallurgy that hopefully would

furnish the data needed to substantiate what was already known concerning the explosive potential of U-235

and Pu-239, to measure precisely the

critical mass of each, and to prepare

the fissionable and other materials to

be used in an atomic weapon.

Reliable estimates by the scientists

in the uranium and plutonium production programs at Clinton and

Hanford indicated that sufficient fissionable material for an atomic

weapon would be available in about

two years. Would the Los Alamos

Laboratory be able to fabricate a
490 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

weapon within that time? Because the

April conferences had failed to provide, except in very limited terms,

concrete proposals for the organization and work of an ordnance program to carry out the actual design

and fabrication of the weapon, it was

to this subject that the special reviewing committee particularly addressed

itself.8

Groves had established this committee in late March to ensure that

the program and organization of Los

Alamos were sound. Conant, acting as

Groves's scientific adviser in organizing the bomb project, had persuaded

the Manhattan chief of its appropriateness by pointing out that scientists

were accustomed to having such committees at universities and research

institutions to help plan and evaluate

research projects. Conant and Richard C. Tolman, vice chairman of the

National Defense Research Committee (NDRC), had helped Groves select

the committee members: as chairman,

chemist Warren K. Lewis of MIT; engineer Edwin L. Rose, who was director of research for the Jones and

Lamson Machine Company; theoretical physicist John H. Van Vleck and

chemist E. Bright Wilson, Jr., both

from Harvard; and Tolman, who had

agreed to serve as secretary. It was an

experienced group, with all members

except Rose already well informed on

the atomic project. Lewis earlier had

served as chairman of both the heavy

water and DSM reassessment reviewing committees; Wilson and Tolman

had been members of the heavy water

group; and Van Vleck had participated as far back as 1941 in reviews of

the uranium program.9

In its report issued on 10 May, the

special reviewing committee endorsed

most of the program discussed in the

April conferences, outlining what it

believed must be done in the way of

theoretical and experimental work on

the critical mass, efficiency of an explosion, and damage potentialities.

Placing primary emphasis on the ordnance and engineering aspects of

bomb development, the committee

recommended that the laboratory

expand the personnel and facilities

needed to design and fabricate a

weapon; it foresaw that the engineering program would more than double

the personnel of the laboratory and

require extensive facilities to test

weapon components, and also that arrangements would have to be made

with the Army Air Forces for assistance in bomb design and tests. The

committee further recommended that

the purification of Pu-239 "be made

a responsibility of the Los Alamos

group, not only because they must be

responsible for the correct functioning of the ultimate weapon, but also

because repurification will be a necessary consequence of experimental

work done at the site." This activity,

hitherto centered at the Metallurgical

Laboratory, would require a sub8

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, pp. I.11-I.12, DASA;

Groves Diary, 30 Apr and 1 May 43, LRG; Hewlett

and Anderson, New World, pp. 233-36.

9

 Memo, Maj Harry S. Traynor (MD HQ) to

Groves, 28 Apr 45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 334

(List of Committees), MDR. Ltr, Tolman to Groves,

20 Mar 43; Duplicate Ltrs, Groves to Lewis, Rose,

Wilson, and Van Vleck, 21 Mar 43; Rpt, Spec Reviewing Committee on Los Alamos Proj, 10 May 43.

All in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Development), MDR. MPC Min, 30 Mar 43, OCG Files, Gen

Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 23, Tab A, MDR. Hewlett

and Anderson, New World, pp. 36, 104, 110, 235-36.

See also Ch. V.
THE LOS ALAMOS WEAPON PROGRAM 491

stantial increase in personnel and

facilities.

Consistent with its recommendations for expansion of the program,

the reviewing committee also proposed appropriate organizational and

administrative changes. While it was

highly commendatory of Oppenheimer, it recommended that he

should be provided with more administrative assistance in his immediate

staff. It suggested appointing an associate director, capable of taking over

direction of the project when Oppenheimer was absent, and establishing

an administrative office, headed by a

civilian who could maintain good

working relations with the military

administration. The only aspect of the program's

administrative arrangements receiving

severe criticism was procurement.

While the Los Alamos procurement

office appeared to be functioning reasonably efficiently, the key office in

Los Angeles, under Army direction

but manned largely by University of

California personnel, was following

procedures that were "unduly slow

and cumbersome." The delays could

not be allowed to continue, because

"not only the satisfactory progress of

the work, but also the morale of the

organization is dependent on an efficiently functioning procurement

system." A partial solution, the committee suggested, would be to establish a procurement office in New York

for obtaining supplies and equipment

from firms in the eastern part of the

United States.10

Laboratory Administration

The recommendations of the April

conferences and the special reviewing

committee did not alter the basic plan

for operation of Los Alamos, as

worked out by Groves, Conant, and

Oppenheimer in early 1943, but entailed a considerable expansion of the

weapon program and support personnel. With these new guidelines,

Groves and Oppenheimer set about

to complete the organization of the

laboratory and its administrative and

technical staffs.

Administrative Organization

A number of factors complicated

Oppenheimer's task of forming a laboratory administration capable of

maintaining the required liaison with

the post administration, the necessary

communication with other Manhattan

District organizations, and effective

control over the increasingly complex

engineering activities of the bomb development program. One was security, particularly the requirement for

compartmentalization, which placed

severe limitations on communication

within the laboratory, between the

scientific and military organizations

and between the laboratory and outside agencies. Another was the acute

shortage of professional personnel

experienced in dealing with the broad

administrative problems of a research

laboratory. A third factor was the lack

of precedents to follow in organizing

a laboratory staff for a program that

ran the gamut from pure scientific research to the actual performance of 10

 All quotations in discussion of committee's recommendations from Rpt, Spec Reviewing Committee on Los Alamos Proj, 10 May 43, MDR. The Military Policy Committee heard an oral summary

(probably by Groves) of the principal recommendations of the report at its meeting on 5 May 43. See

MPC Min, 5 May 43, MDR.
492 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

ordnance manufacturing operations.

The combined effect of these factors

was to place an unusually heavy administrative burden on the laboratory

director and his immediate supervisory staff.11

Both Groves and Oppenheimer had

been aware of the need for a strong

administrative group in the director's

office, but their efforts in that direction had not been very successful.

Their first choice for associate director was physicist Edward U. Condon

from Westinghouse. Condon came in

April 1943, but left almost immediately when he found himself in

complete disagreement with security

arrangements. As an experienced scientific administrator, he perceived the

fundamental difficulty of trying to

maintain essential liaison within the

laboratory and with outside agencies

under the project's security system.12

With the strongly worded recommendations of the reviewing committee still very much on his mind,

Oppenheimer immediately sought to

replace Condon, as well as to fill the

other key positions on his administrative staff. He was generally frustrated,

however, in his efforts to recruit professionally trained, experienced scientific administrators. They simply were

not available. He appointed a staff assistant to carry on the absolutely essential day-to-day liaison with the

post administration, pending recruitment of a new associate director, but

this position as originally conceived

was destined never to be filled. In

other key positions, he had to be satisfied with either scientists with little

previous administrative experience or

administrators with appropriate experience in nonscientific fields (for example, construction or business administration). Two of his appointees

were physicists Dana P. Mitchell and

Arthur L. Hughes, both of whom had

no administrative experience in industry. Mitchell, selected to be procurement director, had been in charge of

procurement for the physics department at Columbia University;

Hughes, selected to be personnel director, previously served as chairman

of the physics department at Washington University in St. Louis.

To assist Hughes with the ever-constant manpower problem, Oppenheimer enlisted the services of Brown

University Dean Samuel T. Arnold,

who was serving as a technical personnel consultant for the project, to

recruit senior scientists and M. H.

Trytten of the National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel to

recruit junior scientists and technicians. But the very nature of Los

Alamos personnel requirements

seemed to resist all attempts at a satisfactory solution, and Groves became

convinced by the summer of 1944

that Hughes was not capable of solving the problem. The Manhattan

commander took immediate action:

He offered the position of personnel

chief to Dean Arnold. Arnold demurred but agreed to go on a temporary basis until a replacement could

be found. Eventually, on the basis of

Arnold's recommendation, Hughes

was replaced with astronomer Charles

11

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, pp. I.33 and III.8-III.9,

DASA. 12

 Ltr, Condon to Oppenheimer, 26 Apr 43, Investigation Files, Gen Corresp, Personnel Scty Investigations (Condon), MDR; Groves, Now It Can Be

Told, pp. 154-55 (see reprint of 26 April letter on

pp. 429-32); MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, pp. III.7-III.8,

DASA. See Ch. XI for more details on Condon's departure from Los Alamos.
THE LOS ALAMOS WEAPON PROGRAM 493

D. Shane, who had been working at

the Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley.

It was mid-1944 before Oppenheimer had found suitable personnel

for all positions—an administrative

officer; heads of personnel, procurement, business, and patent offices, as

well as of a health group, a maintenance section, and a library-documents room; and also an editor. He

finally rounded out his administrative

staff with appointment of a shops section chief in late 1944 and a safety

group head in early 1945.13

Technical Organization

The technical organization of the

laboratory took shape along the lines

of the expanded program of research

and development, as recommended in

the April conferences and reviewing

committee report. There were separate divisions for theoretical physics,

experimental physics, chemistry and

metallurgy, and ordnance. Within

each division were a number of working groups or teams, each devoted to

a particular aspect of bomb research

or development. For example, the

theoretical division had a diffusion

problems group; the ordnance division had an implosion experimentation group; and the chemistry and

metallurgy division had a uranium

and plutonium purification group.

Leaders of the groups reported to

their division leaders and the division

heads reported directly to Oppenheimer. As the work of the laboratory

progressed, groups completed their

projects and disbanded, and new

groups formed to take up investigation of new problems.14

To direct the complex activities of

the laboratory's technical divisions,

Oppenheimer relied chiefly upon the

assistance and advice of a governing

board and a coordinating council.

The governing board, comprised of

seven to ten administrative and technical staff heads, began as an advisory

group but gradually evolved as a

policy and decision-making body, its

primary function being to assist Oppenheimer in coordinating the various scientific and engineering facets

of the weapon program. Unlike the

governing board, the coordinating

council did not ordinarily concern

itself with policy. Comprised of scientists and technicians who were group

leaders or higher, the council provided a channel of communication between the second-level staff and the

governing board and primarily functioned as a forum for interchange

of information and opinion on current developments in the various

divisions.15

Keeping the staff scientists abreast

of the work going on in the various

technical divisions, in Oppenheimer's

opinion, was indispensable to the success of the weapon program. To facilitate this situation, Oppenheimer,

with approval of the governing board,

established in May 1943 a weekly col- 13

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, pp. II.4, III.7-III.9, III.17,

III.57, IX.10, IX.19-IX.23, DASA; Ltr, Hughes to

Arnold, 15 Jan 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201

(Gen), MDR; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 154,

n. 2; Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) Hist,

App. B (List of Manhattan Proj Committees), CMH;

Groves Diary, 18 May, 14, 16-17, 20, 23, 26, 29-30

Jun, 3-5 and 10 Jul 44, LRG.

14

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, pp. III.1 and IX.1, DASA;

DASA Hist, App. B, CMH; Hewlett and Anderson,

New World, pp. 237 and 310-12. 15

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, pp. III.1-III.3 and IX.1-IX.7,

DASA; DASA Hist, App. B, CMH; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 237-38 and 310-12; Groves,

Now It Can Be Told, pp. 159-61.
494 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

loquium for all laboratory staff members. General Groves had accepted

the coordinating council as a necessary risk to security, but when he

heard of the colloquium, he immediately protested to Oppenheimer that

he considered it to be a "major

hazard." Oppenheimer defended the

colloquium as an effective tool:

Giving the scientific staff adequate information, he believed, would actually

enhance security, for the scientists

would achieve a better understanding

of the necessity for secrecy. Groves

decided to defer to Oppenheimer's

wishes and let the colloquium continue, having concluded that the most

important reason Oppenheimer

wanted a colloquium was not to provide information but "to maintain

morale and a feeling of common purpose" in his scientific staff.16

The Military Policy Committee supported Groves's views concerning the

potential security risk of the Los

Alamos colloquium. Seeking a solution to the broader issue of which the

colloquium was symptomatic—how to

bolster the morale of all project scientists by getting them to accept the necessity for security restrictions—the

committee decided that the problem

was sufficiently serious to warrant

using its trump card, a letter from the

President himself to the scientists. In

late June, OSRD Chairman Vannevar

Bush took advantage of an appointment with Roosevelt to secure his approval for the proposed letter. The

President agreed enthusiastically, and

Conant drafted an appropriate communication for Roosevelt's signature.17

At the July meeting of the colloquium, Oppenheimer read the President's letter to the assembled scientists. The scientists, as a staff member

subsequently recalled, seemed much

encouraged by the President's expression of satisfaction with their "excellent work" thus far, his assurance that

the atomic project was of great significance to the war effort, and his indication of confidence in their "continued wholehearted and unselfish

labors" toward successful completion

of the project. They also appeared to

listen attentively to the President's explanation of why "every precaution

[must] be taken to insure the security

of your project," and his assumption

that they were "fully aware of the reasons why their endeavors must be circumscribed by very special restrictions." Although the presidential

letter undoubtedly achieved its twofold purpose, Oppenheimer chose not

to regard it as a directive to discontinue the colloquium. But he did carefully screen those permitted to attend

it and otherwise tightened security arrangements for its sessions.18

Manhattan's original concept that

Los Alamos should function in complete isolation obviated the laborato16

 Quoted words from Groves, Now It Can Be Told,

p. 167. See also MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, pp. III.3-III.4,

DASA; Oppenheimer Hearing, pp. 166-67; Hewlett and

Anderson, New World, p. 238.

17

 MPC Min, 24 Jun 43, MDR; Memo for File,

Bush, sub: Conf With President, 24 Jun 43, OSRD;

Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 238-39. The

President's letter received mixed reactions from

Metallurgical Laboratory scientists. See Ch. IX. 18

 Quoted phrases from Ltr, Roosevelt to Oppenheimer, 29 Jun 43, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP

Files, Fldr 25, Tab D, MDR. See also MDH, Bk. 8,

Vol. 2, pp. III.7, DASA. David Hawkins, the author

of this account of the wartime history of the Los

Alamos Laboratory, regularly attended meetings of

the colloquium as a special assistant on Oppenheimer's staff.
THE LOS ALAMOS WEAPON PROGRAM 495

ry's having any regularly established

channels of communication with other

Manhattan District or outside organizations. Consequently, whenever the

laboratory required technical information from these sources, it had to

obtain special permission from General Groves's Washington office. This

ad hoc system remained the basic

policy throughout the war, although

Groves had to grant some limited exceptions to it. For example, in June

1943, he allowed Los Alamos scientists not only to correspond but also

to visit certain members of the Metallurgical Laboratory to secure specified data on fissionable materials and

other chemicals. And again in November, he consented to let Oppenheimer

make a one-time visit to the Clinton

plants after the governing board at

Los Alamos had indicated repeatedly

that there were going to be serious

delays if someone at the laboratory

did not secure information on the

production schedules for fissionable

materials.19

The project's security system was

again severely tested in early 1944,

when a reorientation of the weapon

program from theoretical and experimental research to ordnance and engineering problems necessitated increased liaison between Los Alamos

and outside agencies. With strict compartmentalization still in effect, many

of the laboratory staff members who

required liaison with civilian agencies

resorted to a variety of clandestine

devices, such as using blind addresses

and NDRC identifications and requesting technical reports through

Tolman's NDRC office in Washington, D.C. Security barriers were less

formidable with other military elements, including the Army's Ordnance Department, the Navy's Bureau

of Ordnance, and the Army Air

Forces.20

The weapon program reorientation

provided Oppenheimer with an opportunity to form a more effective

laboratory administration and organization in mid-1944. Aware of

Groves's general dissatisfaction with

the existing organization, Oppenheimer realigned the administrative

and technical components of the laboratory to reflect the new emphasis on

engineering and ordnance development of atomic devices and, more

particularly, on solution of the still

formidable problems of implosion.21

One goal of the reorganization was

to realign the scientific leadership of

the laboratory so that its efforts were

brought to bear on the most urgent

phases of bomb development. By

abolishing the governing board and

dividing its functions between an administrative and a technical board,

Oppenheimer eliminated unnecessary

diversion of scientific leadership into

housekeeping activities. A series of

special conferences and committees

to supervise particular aspects of

bomb fabrication and testing ensured

concentration of effort on key problems. The intermediate scheduling

conference, which began meeting in

August 1944, coordinated work of

19

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, pp. III.4-III.5, DASA;

Memos, Groves to Compton and Oppenheimer,

17 Jun 43, and Oppenheimer to Groves, 4 Oct 43,

OSRD.

20

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, pp. III.5-III.6, DASA. 21

 Except as otherwise stated, discussion of Los

Alamos reorganization is based on MDH, Bk. 8,

Vol. 2, pp. IX.1-IX.7, DASA; DASA Hist, App. B,

CMH; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 310-

12 and 317-19.
496 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

those laboratory groups primarily

concerned with the implosion bomb.

The technical and scheduling conference, organized in December, undertook responsibility for programming experiments, use of shop time, and employment of active materials. The

cowpuncher committee, so designated

by laboratory officials because it was

established to "ride herd" on implosion, met for the first time in March

1945. Other committees supervised

weapon testing, procurement of detonators, scheduling of experiments

with U-235, and development of initiators for implosion devices.

Both Conant and Groves realized

that Oppenheimer was faced with

complex industrial problems, yet he

lacked an industrial expert on his staff

to advise him on these problems.

Consequently, in November 1944,

Groves recruited the services of Hartley Rowe of the United Fruit Company, an outstanding industrial engineer

who also had served with the NDRC

and as a technical adviser to General

Eisenhower, Supreme Commander,

Allied Expeditionary Force. Rowe

spent considerable time at Los

Alamos in late 1944 and early 1945,

guiding the technical divisions in the

development of the procedures by

which laboratory models could be

converted into production units—the

final phase in the weapon program.22

Oppenheimer's reorganization directly impacted on the makeup and

character of the laboratory's technical

divisions, transforming their focus

from problems of research and experimentation to those relating to engineering and fabrication of the

bomb. When measurement of the fission rate of plutonium indicated it

could not be used in a gun-type

bomb, technical activities shifted to

development of an implosion-type

bomb. Oppenheimer created new divisions and reduced the size of several of the older divisions. The theoretical and research divisions were

retained, but most personnel and facilities were funneled into the ordnance, weapon physics, explosives,

and chemistry and metallurgy divisions. In the spring of 1945, with fabrication of atomic devices proceeding

apace, Oppenheimer established new

off-site testing divisions: Project Alberta, to carry out all activities related

to combat delivery of both the gun

assembly and implosion bombs; and

Project Trinity, to test-fire the first

implosion bomb. While the new divisions comprised integral parts of the

laboratory organization, division field

teams from Los Alamos assembled

and tested the various components of

the weapons at other sites.23

Post Administration

The wartime character of the Los

Alamos post administration—its organization and personnel composition—

directly reflected the course of the

bomb development program. Thus,

22

 Groves Diary, 12, 26 Oct, 9 Nov 44 and 11, 20

Jan 45, LRG; Rowe to Capt John A. Derry (of

Groves's office), 13 Nov 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Hartley Rowe), MDR; Oppenheimer Hearing,

pp. 508-09.

23

 For further details on the organization and location of Project Trinity see final section of Ch.

XXV. Lansing Lamont's Day of Trinity provides a

popular account. On Project Alberta see MDH, Bk.

8, Vol. 2, pp. IX.6-IX.7 and XIX.1-XIX.13, DASA.

The account in MDH is based upon Ms, Norman F.

Ramsey, "History of Project A[lberta]," Incl to Ltr,

Ramsey to Brig Gen Thomas F. Farrell (MD Dep

Cdr), 27 Sep 45, LASL.
THE LOS ALAMOS WEAPON PROGRAM 497

when Colonel Harman began to organize the post in the spring of 1943,

he was guided by the then existing

plans for a small technical laboratory

with a supporting community of no

more than a few hundred civilian

and military personnel, but requiring

an extraordinary degree of protective

security and self-sufficiency. The

modest organization he formed for

this purpose was comprised of three

major divisions. The Administrative

Division looked after civilian personnel matters, provided various means

for internal and external communications, maintained essential records,

and audited post accounts. The Protective Security Division furnished

post security and administered the

military units assigned to Los Alamos,

including Military Police (MP) and

Provisional Engineer Detachments

(PED). The Operations Division provided and maintained most of the

community services—housing, utilities, commissary, and education and

recreation facilities—in cooperation

with the laboratory's community

council. Finally, a small, semiautonomous procurement group performed

quartermaster functions; monitored

contracts; and supervised property

and warehouse operations, including

the important Santa Fe receiving facility for laboratory shipments from the

Los Angeles procurement office.24

Personnel for the original post organization began arriving on the Hill

in late April 1943. By early June,

Colonel Ashbridge, who had just replaced Harman as post commander,

had a staff of 18 officers (including 1

WAAC officer). This staff directed the

activities of slightly over 450 military

and civilian personnel. There were

more than 200 enlisted men in the

MP unit, including attached medical

and veterinary personnel; 85 enlisted

men in the PED unit; 7 WAAC enlisted women; and somewhat fewer than

160 civil service employees. To meet

increased demands for post services

and support in the ensuing months,

Ashbridge obtained additional PED

and MP personnel from the 8th Service Command headquarters in Dallas.

And with General Groves's assistance,

additional civil service and military

personnel were procured through

Corps of Engineers and other channels—for example, the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), which

furnished enlisted men with scientific

and technical skills.25

Military personnel with scientific

and technical training were assigned

to the Manhattan District's Special

Engineer Detachment (SED), 9812th

Technical Service Unit; the latter unit

was a special engineer organization

formed at District headquarters to

retain scientific and technical employees subject to the draft and to recruit

additional technically trained personnel for the project. Los Alamos began

24

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 6.1-6.2 and App. B2,

DASA. See Ch. XXIII for a detailed discussion of

the administration of community affairs at Los

Alamos.

25

 Statistics in this and the following paragraphs

on military and civilian personnel assigned to the

Los Alamos post in 1943 are based on MDH, Bk. 8,

Vol. 1, pp. 7.3-7.15 and Apps. B2-B3 (Org Charts,

Los Alamos, 5 Jun and 5 Dec 43), and Vol. 2, p.

III.18 and App. Graph No. 2 (Number of Persons

Employed: Distribution Among Civilians, WAC, and

SED), DASA; List, sub: MD Offs on Duty at Los

Alamos and Their Duties, 6 May 44, Incl to Memo,

Ashbridge to Groves, 14 Jun 44, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 201 (Gen), MDR; Groves Diary, 25 Aug

and 3 Sep 43, LRG. See Ch. XVI for information on

the 8th Service Command's provision of troops for

the atomic project and on the ASTP, as well as on

the formation of the 9812th and the SED.
498 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

receiving SED personnel in August

1943 and, because of Groves's personal intervention, periodically thereafter. SED members worked at technical jobs for the laboratory, but were

assigned to the post administration

for rations and quarters.

By the end of the year, total personnel assigned to the post administration approached 1,100. The largest

numerical increase was in civil service

employees, nearly 450 as compared

with some 160 in June. Increases in

the military complement were more

moderate. The number of MP's grew

from 190 to 300 and that of PED's

from 85 to around 200. With the establishment of a regular WAC Detachment at Los Alamos, the number

of enlisted women was increased from

7 to 90. And because of the assignment of recent ASTP graduates to

Los Alamos, SED strength figures increased from 300 to about 475.

Even with expansion of bomb development activities and its concomitant increases in post personnel, the

basic structure of the post administration remained essentially the same,

with only the Operations Division undergoing a moderate reorganization.

In early 1944, when Manhattan assumed responsibility for all further

construction and maintenance activities at Los Alamos, Colonel Ashbridge strengthened the operating capability of the Operations Division by

reorganizing it into two major sections—one for community construction and maintenance, the other for

technical area work—and by recruiting more carpenters, bricklayers,

plumbers, painters, electricians, and

common laborers.

Increased demands for new technical-type construction soon outran the

capabilities of the division, so Manhattan engaged another professional

construction contractor, Robert E.

McKee of El Paso. In spite of this

major change, Colonel Ashbridge decided to retain the dual organization

of the division, which had the security

advantage of limiting access to the

sensitive technical area to one group

of workmen. But in early 1945, with

the decision to retain McKee on a

permanent basis to perform construction services at Los Alamos, the new

post commander, Col. Gerald R.

Tyler, rejected the dual organization

and reverted to a unified structure. In

this reorganization, which remained

in effect until after completion of the

wartime program, Tyler set up separate sections for contractor construction and administration, post construction and maintenance, and post

engineer services.26

The Army's principal role at Los

Alamos, as well as elsewhere in the

Manhattan Project, was ensuring effective administration and operational

efficiency. In the main, this was

achieved through the personal cognizance and direct action of the post

commander. As the military administrator, the post commander played a

key role in arranging military deferments for technical employees of the

University of California, which included most of the scientists and technicians, and in monitoring the shipments of fissionable materials to Los

26

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, pp. 5.6-5.11, 7.2, 7.13-

7.14, App. B4 (Org Chart, 1 Feb 45), DASA; Fine

and Remington, Corps of Engineers: Construction, pp.

697-700. Tyler replaced Ashbridge in late 1944,

when the latter's health began to fail under the

strain of the demands placed upon him as Los

Alamos post commander (see Groves Diary, 28 Oct

and 2, 14, 25 Nov 44, LRG).
THE LOS ALAMOS WEAPON PROGRAM 499

Alamos and the transmission of documents containing technical information from other parts of the Manhattan District. Coincident with his general supervision of post procurement

and construction and maintenance activities, he consulted with key members of the laboratory administration,

especially Oppenheimer and Capt.

William S. Parsons, the naval gunnery

officer in charge of the laboratory's

ordnance group. These consultations

increased in frequency as program

emphasis shifted from theoretical and

experimental research to ordnance

and engineering problems and requirements expanded for construction

of new technical facilities and procurement of additional materials and

equipment.27 Factors endemic to the

atomic project, however, presented

major obstacles to achievement of an

efficient procurement system at Los

Alamos. Among these were the

atomic reservation's location, more

than a thousand miles from any major

market and distribution center; security requirements that necessitated

time-consuming, roundabout routing

of the bulk of procurement through

Los Angeles and elsewhere; and the

highly technical and often unique

character of many of the items to be

procured. Another factor was the University of California's insistence that

all matters of purchasing and payments must be administered directly

by members of the university business

staff. But because the Army would

not permit university employees at

Los Alamos, the project located its

main purchasing office in Los

Angeles.28

In the face of these obstacles,

Groves, Lt. Col. Stanley L. Stewart of

the Los Angeles procurement office,

and Army procurement personnel at

Los Alamos worked with University of

California officials to increase procurement efficiency. Groves maintained direct and frequent contact

with the Los Angeles Area Engineers

Office, established in early 1943 to

supervise University of California procurement personnel. He sanctioned

the opening of branch purchasing offices in New York and Chicago to

provide the laboratory with direct

access to eastern markets, saving time

and reducing paperwork for the Los

Angeles office. Army and laboratory

procurement officials at Los Alamos

worked out an arrangement for requisition of certain available items locally

through the post supply organization.

As the volume of required materials

increased dramatically in late 1944,

Groves authorized a request by the

laboratory's ordnance division to set

up a separate procurement group.

The Army officer supervising this new

procurement channel maintained an

office in Detroit, which was an important source for many of the bomb

components. He also made frequent

use of the California Institute of

Technology's experienced procurement personnel at its Project Camel

site. In spite of all these efforts, the

flood of last-minute requisitions for

the implosion weapon test in the

spring of 1945 created threatening 27 delays. Oppenheimer convened an List, sub: MD Offs on Duty at Los Alamos and

Their Duties, 6 May 44, Incl to Memo, Ashbridge to

Groves, 14 Jun 44, MDR; DASA Hist, App. B,

CMH; Fine and Remington, Corps of Engineers: Construction, pp. 697-700.

28

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, pp. III.27-III.34, and Vol.

3, "Auxiliary Activities," pp. 1.1-3.3 and Apps. A1-

A2, DASA.
500 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

emergency meeting of project procurement officials at Los Alamos, and

they agreed to increase procurement

personnel and salaries, to establish

direct communications between the

New York and Chicago offices, and to

require improved drawings and specifications in requisitions from the

laboratory.29

The reorientation and expansion of

bomb development activities eventually created more and more opportunities for a surprisingly large number

of the military personnel assigned to

the post administration to contribute

directly to the technical side of the

weapon program. A number of WAC

enlisted personnel, for example,

moved from strictly clerical jobs in

the laboratory to technical work,

when scientists found they had the

requisite skills or training. Similarly,

several officers on the post commander's staff came to devote most of their

time to essentially scientific and technical work. The post legal officer in

the Administrative Division, Capt.

Ralph C. Smith, found that his principal assignment was solution of patent

problems, and several engineer officers who happened to have the necessary training or background in chemistry, metallurgy, or physics worked

extensively with scientists and technicians in the laboratory. Other post

staff officers worked full time in the

development and administration of

outlying test areas. Maj. Wilber A.

Stevens, for example, who began in

1943 as head of the Operations Division, eventually was spending all his

time supervising projects at outlying

sites; acting as a liaison officer between technical and military personnel; and assisting in coordinating the

work of group leaders in the laboratory. Stevens's subordinate, Captain Davalos, the post engineer heading the

division's Technical Area Section,

also became deeply involved in the

complexities of the technical program

in the course of helping to plan and

carry out construction and maintenance for the laboratory.30

The post commander, too, tended

to be drawn into more and more

direct concern with technical problems. In the earliest period, lack

of adequate liaison and General

Groves's policy of dealing personally

with the technical program had excluded the post commander from

knowledge or participation. Gradually, however, Colonel Ashbridge and

members of the laboratory staff developed avenues for more effective liaison. Oppenheimer's May 1943 appointment of a special assistant on his

staff to take responsibility for liaison

with the post administration had

opened one avenue of communication, and Ashbridge's assignment to

membership on the laboratory's administrative board in July 1944 provided further opportunity for the post

commander to keep informed of developments in the technical program.

General Groves, with the support

of his Washington staff, continued

throughout the war to be perhaps the

single most effective liaison channel

29

 Ibid., Vol. 2. pp. III.29-III.35, IX.8-IX.9,

IX.13-IX.14, and Vol. 3, pp. 2.8-2.9, DASA; Groves

Diary, Jul 44, 2 Nov 44, 26 Apr-May 45, LRG; Ltr,

Oppenheimer to Bush, 21 Nov 44, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Research), MDR.

30

 List, sub: MD Offs on Duty at Los Alamos and

Their Duties. 6 May 44, Incl to Memo, Ashbridge to

Groves, 14 Jan 44, MDR; MDH, Bk. 8, Vol.

1, pp. 7.5 and 7.12, and Vol. 2, pp. VII.1, VII.9,

XVI.1-XVI.2, DASA.
THE LOS ALAMOS WEAPON PROGRAM 501

LT. COL. CURTIS A. NELSON

between the laboratory and post administrations at Los Alamos. By frequent telephone calls to Oppenheimer, Ashbridge (later Tyler), and

Parsons, as well as to Colonel Stewart

in Los Angeles, the Manhattan commander kept in close touch with both

community and technical developments. As with other key installations

of the Manhattan Project, Groves supplemented his telephone calls with

teletype messages, memorandums,

and, about once every two or three

months, an inspection and consultation visit lasting two or three days. In

addition, Parsons visited Groves in his

Washington office about once a

month and Oppenheimer, Ashbridge,

and Stewart less frequently.31

To facilitate overall administration

and operation of the weapon program, Groves took special interest in

matters of security, construction, and

materials and manpower procurement. Of note are his personal efforts

to expedite manpower recruitment for

Los Alamos. In October, for example,

following Conant's expression of

alarm at the continuing deficiencies in

the senior scientific staff, Groves

worked out with a reluctant Compton

for the transfer of about fifty Metallurgical Project physicists. At the

same time, he brought pressure upon

the District's Personnel Division chief,

Lt. Col. Curtis A. Nelson, to maintain

a flow of junior scientists for the laboratory's SED unit. His prodding of

Nelson proved effective, for by early

1945 nearly half the working personnel on the Hill was in uniform.

Groves's frequent pleas to manpower

authorities in Washington to supply

the New Mexico installation with

more skilled workmen, especially machinists, were less productive. Hence,

when Oppenheimer uncovered an opportunity in late 1944 to establish a

liaison with the California Institute

of Technology's well-manned Navy

rocket development group in Pasadena, Groves personally intervened to

expedite an arrangement with the

Navy's Bureau of Ordnance that

made, under a newly created Project

Camel, both skilled workers and surplus facilities available to the

laboratory.32

31

 Groves Diary, Jan 44-Jul 45, LRG. For example, see specifically entries for 14 Mar and 18 and

24-26 May 44 (visits by Oppenheimer and Parsons

to see Groves in Washington, D.C.) and 11 Dec 43,

for his involvement in details of administration. For

Groves's correspondence with Oppenheimer on the

more technological aspects of the bomb development program see MDR, Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

400.17 (Mfg-Prod-Fab) for entries during the November 1943-August 1944 period. 32

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, p. IX.11, DASA; Groves

Diary, 16 Oct, 25, 28 Nov, 1, 5-6, 12, 27, 30 Dec 44

and 1, 3, 5, 25-26 Jan, 5-9 Feb, 3 Aug 45, LRG; Continued
502 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Although manpower conditions remained less than satisfactory throughout the war, the Manhattan commander's efforts directly contributed

in some measure to relieving personnel deficiencies at Los Alamos. Thus

in the summer of 1945, the number

of post personnel continued to increase, though not at a significant

rate. The SED unit had about 1,400

enlisted personnel by July. Others in

the post administration numbered

1,260 8th Service Command troops

(500 MP's, 500 PED's, 260 WAC's)

and more than 2,000 civilian employees. This total of more than 4,900—

with 1,300 scientists and technicians

at the laboratory and some 500 construction contractor personnel—gave

Los Alamos a total working population of approximately 6,700. At this

juncture, as the bomb development

program moved rapidly toward the

actual test of an atomic device, all at

Los Alamos were concentrating their

efforts on the technical preparations

for this climactic event.33

Ltr, Conant to Bush, 20 Oct 44, OSRD; Ltrs, Oppenheimer to Bush, 21 Nov 44, and Groves to Stewart (Los Angeles), sub: Assignment of Liaison Off

for OSRD Contract OEM sr-418 w/CIT, Pasadena,

Calif., 16 Jan 45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12

(Research), MDR; Hewlett and Anderson, New

World, p. 315. See Ch. XVI on transfer of physicists

from the Metallurgical Project.

33

 See Ch. XVI for the basis of these population

statistics. An official historical account of the project

written in 1947 estimated total population of Los

Alamos in December 1944 as 5,675 and at the end

of 1945 as 8,200. See MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, p. 7.15

and App. B7, and Vol. 2, App. Graph No. 2, DASA,

and Groves Diary, 17 Jan 44, LRG.
CHAPTER XXV

Weapon Development and Testing

A watershed in the development of

nuclear science was the Army's building and testing of the atomic bomb.

In early 1943, with America engaged

in what was believed to be a desperate race with Germany, American and

foreign-born physicists, chemists, metallurgists, and engineers, as well as

military technical experts, came together at Los Alamos to devise a

weapon with a power hitherto unmatched by man. This practical objective melded with the larger scientific

challenge of turning atomic theory

into a material reality and resulted in

a unity of purpose that sustained the

assembled scientists in their unique

atomic adventure.

Organized by Oppenheimer into

specialized research and technical divisions and groups, the Los Alamos

scientists divided their efforts between two fundamental tasks: solving

the theoretical and experimental

problems of a fission bomb,1 and

working out the complex ordnance

and engineering problems of weapon

design and fabrication. Their concentrated activity over a two-year period,

from 1943 to 1945, transformed the

laboratory, for all intents and purposes, into a weapon assembly and

test plant. The climax was Project

Trinity, the crucial test of their creation: the first atomic bomb.

Building the Bomb

By the fall of 1943, with the laboratory's administrative organization

largely worked out and the scientists'

talents and energies channeled into

various research programs, Oppenheimer, Groves, Conant, and the

other project leaders turned their attention to the problem of determining the most suitable design of an

atomic device.2 During inspection

1

 By late September 1943, Oppenheimer and his

scientific staff definitely had decided to concentrate

the laboratory's major resources on developing a

fission bomb, relegating work on the "super" (or

fusion) bomb to theoretical investigations by a small

group of scientists under the leadership of physicist

Edward Teller and then, in 1944, physicist Enrico

Fermi. Both Groves and Richard C. Tolman, the

Manhattan commander's chief adviser on weapon

development, supported this action to carry on

super bomb research even in the most hectic period

of fission bomb development, primarily because

they could not forget the known interest of the Germans in deuterium (heavy water)—the active material for the super bomb. See Groves Diary, 29-30 Sep

43, LRG; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 158;

Edward Teller and Allen Brown, The Legacy of Hiroshima (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co.,

1962), pp. 38-40; MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, "Technical,"

pp. XIII.1-XIII.10, DASA. 2

 Except as otherwise indicated, the discussion on

weapon development is based on MDH, Bk. 8, Vol.

2, pp. IV.1-VIII.32 and X.1-XVII.22, DASA, and

Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 240-54 and

310-21.
504 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

visits to Los Alamos, Groves found

that some of the scientific staff members, including Captain Parsons,

strongly favored the gun rather than

the implosion principle as more

feasible for developing a usable fission weapon. They pointed out that

the well-established mechanical techniques of the gun made this weapon

type almost certain to work if properly designed and that the design and

engineering of the outer configuration and mechanics of the gun were

already well advanced. Furthermore,

once the physicists, chemists, and metallurgists could provide the precise

nuclear specifications for the active

material—whether U-235, Pu-239, or

even U-233 from thorium—development of a workable gun-type weapon

would be only a matter of time.

Assessment of precise nuclear specifications for a fission weapon was the

responsibility of the laboratory's experimental physics division. Through

intensive research, the division's

physicists gathered considerable data

on the effect of cosmic rays on fissioning, on measurement of nuclear

cross sections, on scattering phenomena, and on other aspects of the fission process that related to bomb

specifications and efficiency. With this

data they were able to calculate by the

summer of 1944 that the destructive

effect of either an implosion- or guntype bomb would justify the effort required to fabricate it. They still lacked

an answer, however, to the question

on which the success of the entire

project hinged: How much fissionable

material would be needed for an effective weapon? Whether or not

atomic weapons would be available

for use in the war depended on the

answer to that question.3

One way to increase the efficiency

of a fission bomb was to achieve maximum purity in the active materials.

Hence, a major program of the laboratory's chemistry and metallurgy division was to improve the methods

for purifying U-235 and Pu-239. Because purity requirements for uranium were about one-third less than

those for plutonium and because,

until early 1944, there was not

enough Pu-239 available to permit effective work on its purification, the

chemists experimented with uranium

but with the purpose of developing

techniques that might also be used

with plutonium. When sufficient

amounts of Pu-239 arrived from the

Clinton pile, the chemists developed

both wet and dry purification processes. Subsequently, they employed the

more satisfactory wet process in final

purification of most plutonium for the

bomb.

Before U-235 or Pu-239 could be

used in a fission bomb, they had to be

converted into metal of the proper

configuration and purity. Metallurgists at Los Alamos faced a number

of problems in making uranium or

plutonium metal of the desired quality, including the tendency of uranium

to catch fire during processing and

the difficulty of handling the highly

reactive and poisonous plutonium.

For forming uranium into metal, they

experimented with electrolytic and

centrifuge processes but finally settled

upon a modification of the stationary

3

 MPC Rpt, 21 Aug 43, OCG Files, Gen Corresp,

MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab E, MDR; ibid., 4 Feb 44,

OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab C,

MDR.
WEAPON DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING 505

TECHNICAL AREA AT LOS ALAMOS, built around Ashley Pond and along Trinity Avenue

bomb method, devised earlier at Iowa

State. For plutonium, the metallurgists were as handicapped as the

chemists, with only microscopic quantities available. Fortunately, many of

the methods they developed for uranium proved adaptable to plutonium.

Again like the chemists, the metallurgists had to devote considerable

effort to devising improved recovery

methods so that virtually none of the

precious metal would be lost in processing it for use in a weapon.4

While awaiting the physical and nuclear specifications for the active materials, the laboratory's ordnance division worked on the development and

proving of the mechanical components for the first experimental guns.

First priority was design and fabrication of a plutonium-projectile gun.

This gun type posed more problems

than a uranium gun, because of Pu239's higher propensity to predetonation, but the division's theory that a

gun with sufficient muzzle velocity to

avoid predetonation with Pu-239 was

certain to be suitable for U-235 justified the concentration of effort.

Using standard ordnance and interior ballistics data obtained from the

National Defense Research Committee (NDRC), the ordnance division

had its design engineers complete the

drawings for a high-velocity gun and,

with subsequent approval from the

Navy's Bureau of Ordnance, ordered

forgings for two guns from the Naval

4

 Ltrs, Groves to Oppenheimer, 19 Jun 44, and

Oppenheimer to Groves, 27 Jun 44, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 729.31, MDR; Ltr, Oppenheimer to

Groves, 31 Aug 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

400.17 (Mfg-Prod-Fab), MDR.
506 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Gun Factory in Washington, D.C. In

the meantime, while the guns were

being manufactured, Captain Parsons

arranged for construction of the

Anchor Ranch Proving Ground, some

8 miles east of the central laboratory

facilities, where, by September 1943,

the division's proving ground group

began testing and perfecting gun performance techniques on a limited and

then increased basis.

By early 1944, gun research was advancing smoothly, despite a constant

shortage of experienced personnel

and difficulties in materials procurement. The division's design engineers

had established the exact specifications of a low-velocity gun, to be used

with U-235. Hence, because these

specifications were considerably less

stringent than previously anticipated

for a U-235 gun, the engineers were

able to reduce the original muzzle velocity requirements. This achievement

made it possible for the division to

place a March order with the Naval

Gun Factory for three of these uranium guns, which was much earlier than

expected and just days after the factory had delivered the first two plutonium prototypes to Los Alamos.5

Primarily because of the undeveloped state of the art, interest in implosion research for a time ranked

second to that in gun assembly research. Since April 1943, physicist

Seth H. Neddermeyer from the California Institute of Technology had

been conducting laboratory experiments with high explosives, designed

to test the feasibility of the implosion

principle. Handicapped by the shortage of experienced personnel and by

the general lack of enthusiasm for implosion among his colleagues, Neddermeyer's project had definitely remained a "dark horse" in the race for

completion of a workable atomic

device.

But all of this changed with the arrival of John von Neumann in midsummer 1943. The widely respected

Hungarian-born mathematician from

the Institute for Advanced Study at

Princeton had been carrying out work

on shock waves for the NDRC. Applying knowledge of explosives gained in

his work with shaped charges, he

theorized the likely effects of increasing the velocity of convergingly focused active material in the implosion

bomb. His calculations convinced him

that if the mechanical problems of

achieving higher velocity could be

solved, an implosion bomb would

attain criticality using less active material of a considerably lower level of

purity than hitherto believed possible.

If he were correct, implosion offered

a means to save precious months in

developing a weapon—provided, of

course, that ways could be devised to

avoid predetonation and achieve symmetry in the imploding shock wave

inside the bomb.

By early fall Oppenheimer, Groves,

Conant, and the other project leaders

were reevaluating implosion. Groves

conferred with George B. Kistiakowsky, the distinguished Harvard chemist who was an expert on explosives,

and with Oppenheimer and members

of the laboratory's implosion study

group. This led to a decision by Oppenheimer and the laboratory's governing board to expand the implosion

5

 Rpt, Parsons, sub: Summary of Ord Div, 15 Apr

44, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 19, Tab

A, MDR; Memo, Tolman to (probably Groves), sub:

Org of Ord Div at Y (Los Alamos), 1 Mar 44, OCG

Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab G, MDR.
WEAPON DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING 507

program immediately, beginning with

construction of an on-site plant for

casting and trimming test components

and installation of the unusual facilities required for testing implosion devices. In early November, Groves and

Conant outlined the advantages of

implosion to the Military Policy Committee. The following February, the

committee informed the President

that "there is a chance, and a fair

one, if a process involving the use of

a minimum amount of material

proves feasible, that the first bomb

can be produced in the late fall of

1944."

 6

Once project leaders had approved

undertaking a major developmental

program for the implosion bomb,

General Groves began a full and objective analysis of the laboratory's organization, personnel, and facilities

for carrying it out. Consulting with

von Neumann and Parsons in Washington, D.C., he arranged to have

Tolman visit Los Alamos for an extended period to investigate the program. Giving special attention to the

laboratory's ordnance division,

Tolman prepared a detailed analysis

of its organization and activities, including estimates of the additional

personnel that he believed the division would require to complete the

implosion program. Tolman found

that the laboratory had indeed made

considerable progress toward shifting

priority to implosion, although Oppenheimer was not yet prepared to

abandon some further efforts on the

almost certain-to-work plutonium gun.7

By the time of Tolman's visit, the

inevitable shift in emphasis from research and experimentation to engineering, fabrication, and testing was

already well under way. Construction

crews, under direction of Maj. Wilber

A. Stevens and partially comprised of

men from the Provisional Engineer

Detachment, had completed or were

at work on a number of essential test

areas (eventually there would be more

than thirty of these). They had built a

facility for casting containers for explosive charges at the Anchor Ranch

Proving Ground and, less than a mile

to the south, were well advanced on a

much larger and more elaborately

equipped area—designated S (for

Sawmill) Site—with a laboratory,

shops, powder magazines, and even a

dining hall. In addition, Major Stevens's crews had begun work on several outlying sites required especially

for testing various implosion devices.

Special Engineer Detachment (SED)

troops provided a considerable part

of the manpower operating these test

sites.

Ordnance teams from Los Alamos

also assembled and tested bomb components at test sites at Wendover

Field (Utah), Inyokern (California),

and Alamogordo Army Air Field

(New Mexico). (See Map 2.) For these

tests, the laboratory procured normal

weapon components and high explosives from a variety of government

and private suppliers—the Naval Gun

6

 Quotation from MPC Rpt, 4 Feb 44, MDR. See

also Groves Diary, 20 and 29-31 Oct 43, LRG, and

MPC Min, 9 Nov 43, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP

Files, Fldr 23, Tab A, MDR.

7

 Memo, Tolman to Groves, sub: Rpt on Status of

Ord Work at Y, 1 Mar 44, and attached report,

OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab G,

MDR; Groves Diary, 21 Jan, 22 Feb, and 2-3 Mar

44, LRG.
508 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Factory in Washington, D.C.; the

Naval Ordnance Plant in Centerline,

Michigan; the Naval Depot in Yorktown, Virginia; the Expert Tool and

Die Company in Detroit; the Hercules

Powder Company in Wilmington,

Delaware; the Monsanto Chemical

Company in Dayton, Ohio, to name

only a few. But for special parts and

materials that were unobtainable, the

laboratory itself had to function as an

ordnance manufacturing plant. Best

illustrating this concentration of effort

was the major task of converting

U-235 and Pu-239 into metal bomb

components.8

In early 1944, the laboratory intensified procurement efforts for specialized equipment for implosion testing.

In April, the IBM machines needed to

speed up analysis of useful data from

implosion tests arrived. And in July,

the Military Policy Committee approved procurement of a huge solid

steel receptacle for testing the first

implosion device, thus ensuring recovery of the active material in the

event of a fizzle. By then, implosion

development had made giant strides,

but still unknown were the relative efficiency of such a design and how

long it would take to build a moderately effective implosion device.9

Despite frequent changes in the

general specifications for an atomic

weapon, the laboratory's ordnance division had worked out the design of

two basic bomb models by the

summer of 1944. The gun-type

model, the "Thin Man," was about 10

feet in length, with a varying diameter

of 1.5 to 2.5 feet, and had an estimated weight (when loaded) of 5 tons.

The implosion-type model, the "Fat

Man," was almost as long (9 feet) but

thicker, tapering down from a hemispherical nose measuring 5 feet in diameter to a tailend of about 3 feet,

and had an estimated weight (when

loaded) of 6 tons. Captain Parsons

had the models constructed at the

Applied Physics Laboratory in Silver

Spring, Maryland, and tested at the

Naval Proving Ground on the Potomac River at Dahlgren, Virginia. The

laboratory's delivery group then conducted in-flight tests in a modified B-29, dropping dummy models

of both types of bombs, at the Muroc

Army Air Field near San Francisco.

The ballistical characteristics of Thin

Man were satisfactory, but Fat Man

displayed serious instability, fortunately soon overcome by a relatively simple

modification in the tail assembly.10

But the sense of having achieved

substantial progress in weapon design

and fabrication was marred by a

number of uncertainties. The feasibility of implosion had yet to be demonstrated and the rate at which U-235

and Pu-239 could be produced by the

Clinton and Hanford plants remained 8 very much in question. And in July, MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 1, "General," pp. 5.12-5.13,

6.12, Apps. A8 (Site Map) and D16 (Site Constr

Data), and Vol. 2, pp. VII.30-VII.31, XVI.12,

XVI.14-XVI.15, XIX.1-XIX.5, DASA; Hewlett and

Anderson, New World, pp. 312-17. 9

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 288-89; MPC

Min, 23 Jul 44, MDR. The bottle-shaped steel receptacle for the implosion device was designated

"Jumbo" because of its massive size (25 by 12 feet)

and weight (214 tons).

10

 MPC Rpt, 7 Aug 44, OCG Files, Gen Corresp,

MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab K, MDR. Ltr, Parsons to

Groves, 24 Dec 43; Rpt, Parsons, sub: Prgm for

Flight Test of Dummy Bombs from B-29 Plane, 24

Dec 43. Both in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.913,

MDR. Ltr, Parsons to Norman F. Ramsey (Delivery

Gp, Los Alamos Lab), 17 Jul 43, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 600.12 (Research), MDR.
WEAPON DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING 509

Los Alamos scientists furnished disquieting new data on the plutonium

that would be produced in the Hanford piles, indicating the composition

of its neutron background would

cause predetonation in the plutonium

gun.

Project scientists had known for

some time that in the process of irradiating uranium in the pile some of

the Pu-239 was likely to pick up an

extra neutron, forming Pu-240. When

plutonium from the Clinton pilot pile

became available in the spring of

1944, the radioactivity group at Los

Alamos ran a series of tests that confirmed the presence of Pu-240 and

indicated it would be present in far

larger amounts in plutonium from the

Hanford piles. Hence, the neutron

background of the active material for

the bombs would be several hundred

times greater than was permissible.

While the Pu-240 could be separated

from the Pu-239 by the electromagnetic process, construction of a plant

to do so would delay production of a

plutonium weapon for many months.

Oppenheimer informed Conant of

the 240 problem in early July. To

decide how best to deal with it,

Conant took immediate steps to assemble project leaders for a conference at the Metallurgical Laboratory

on the seventeenth. Besides Conant,

the following were in attendance: Oppenheimer, Compton, Charles A.

Thomas, in his capacity as coordinator of active material purification research, Fermi, Groves, and Nichols.

After some deliberation, the group

decided that the predetonation threat

posed by 240 made the use of plutonium in the gun-type bomb impracticable and work on this system should

be suspended immediately. With this

decision, even greater urgency was

placed on the development of a workable implosion weapon, in which the

240, because of the higher velocities

involved, would be unlikely to cause

predetonation.11

Abandonment of the plutonium

gun compelled General Groves to

revise his predictions on when an

atomic weapon would be ready for

employment against the enemy. In a

progress report to General Marshall

in early August, he presented a revised timetable of weapon production: five to eleven implosion bombs

in the period from March through

June 1945, with an additional twenty

to forty implosion bombs of the same

size by the end of the year. He cautioned, however, that this schedule

would not apply "if experiments yet

to be conducted with an implosion

type bomb do not fulfill expectations

and we are required to rely on the

gun type alone" and suggested that, if

this delay should occur, the first

bomb would not be ready until 1

August 1945, with one or two more

by the year's end. In Groves's opinion, any delay virtually guaranteed

that the bomb would not be used

against Germany, which by the late

summer of 1944 appeared likely to be

defeated within a few months. And to

many, even the bomb's use against

Japan seemed doubtful.12

11

 Groves Diary, 17-18 Jul 44, LRG; Ltrs, Oppenheimer to Conant, 11 Jul 44, and Tolman to

Groves, 21 Jul 44, OSRD; Ltr, Oppenheimer to

Groves, 18 Jul 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

400.17 (Mfg-Prod-Fab), MDR. 12

 Quotation from MPC Rpt, 7 Aug 44, MDR.

Groves continued to hold to the idea that the Germans might soon be ready to use an atomic weapon

against the Allies and, therefore, that the Americans

must continue to be prepared to counter this threat

Continued
510 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Through the remaining months of

1944 and the first half of 1945, programs to perfect the uranium gun and

implosion principle absorbed the

major energies and resources of the

reorganized laboratory. As predicted

by the Los Alamos scientists, development of the gun moved ahead

smoothly with few serious problems.

Experiments by the laboratory's

physicists proved the correctness of

earlier estimates of the critical mass

of the U-235 metal required for the

gun and the gun group conducted

successful firing tests, using a fullsized tube and substituting U-238 for

U-235.

Implosion, by way of contrast, continued to be afflicted with doubts and

uncertainties. Progress toward achieving sufficient symmetry in implosion

was discouragingly slow. Of the various implosion bomb designs, that

proposing the use of explosive

"lenses" appeared most feasible.13 A

more accurate assessment was

achieved with the first tests: Results

were so unpromising that in December 1944 Groves and Conant concluded that U-235 should not be used

in an implosion bomb but be conserved for the certain-to-work gun.14

As the new year opened, surprising

developments dispelled the lingering

air of discouragement. In February,

when Groves, Tolman, and Conant

visited Los Alamos, they found far

more reasons for optimism. A few

days before their arrival on the

twenty-seventh, the gun group finally

had frozen design on the U-235

weapon, indicating a usable model

would be ready by July. Implosion

also had made notable progress, and

laboratory leaders decided, in a conference that Groves attended, to manufacture the implosion model favored

by Oppenheimer. And to ensure at

least one implosion bomb test with

active material by 4 July, Oppenheimer also decided to use the California Institute of Technology's

Project Camel facilities for construction of a second model with alternate

design features. At this juncture, with

data from Hanford indicating that

shipments of plutonium in quantity

would begin to arrive at Los Alamos

in May, with experiments on accurate

establishment of the critical measurements on Pu-239 in progress at the

Metallurgical Laboratory, and with

construction of a much larger plant

for final purification of plutonium at

with their own atomic weapon. But Hewlett and Anderson (New World, p. 253) note that earlier developments all pointed to Japan, not Germany, as the

ultimate target for the bomb. As early as May 1943,

the Military Policy Committee (see MPC Min, 5 May

43, OGG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 23, Tab A,

MDR) concluded that the optimum target would

be the Japanese fleet anchored at Truk. Then in

September of that year choice of the new B-29,

scheduled for employment in the Pacific Theater,

over the British Lancaster seemed to imply that the

bomb was to be used against Japan. See Ch. XXVI. 13

 Tubes, shaped like optical lenses and filled with

high explosives, were placed in a symmetrical pattern around the active material (Pu-239). When the

explosives detonated, they created an inward blast

that compressed the active material until it reached

a critical mass.

14

 Rpt, Cmdr A. Francis Birch (Gun Gp Ldr, Los

Alamos Lab), sub: Gun-assembled Nuclear Bomb, 6

Oct 45, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 16,

Tab E; Ltr, Oppenheimer to Groves, 30 Jun 45, and

Rpt, prepared by British scientists at Los Alamos, 7

May 45, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 17;

Ltrs, Oppenheimer to Groves, 6 Oct and 14 Nov 44,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Research); Ltr,

Oppenheimer to Groves, 8 Dec 44, OCG Files, Gen

Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 19, Tab D. All in MDR. Rpt,

Conant, sub: Summary of Trip to Y, Dec 44, OSRD.

Groves Diary, 19 Dec 44, LRG. Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 317-21.
WEAPON DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING 511

Los Alamos well under way, the Trinity test date now appeared feasible.15

Project Trinity: The Test of the Bomb

Project Trinity was the final step of

the Los Alamos weapon program, the

culmination of the laboratory's reorientation from research and experimentation to engineering, fabrication,

and testing of an atomic device. Without Trinity, without the test of the

bomb, the feasibility of employing the

new weapon appeared to be much

more questionable. "If we do not

have accurate test data from Trinity,"

Oppenheimer and Kistiakowsky had

warned, "the planning of the use of

the gadget over the enemy territory

will have to be done substantially

blindly." As 1945 unfolded, the Trinity mission became the central focus

for the scientists at Los Alamos. With

the bomb test now first priority, the

tempo and intensity of Trinity preparations increased dramatically.16

In the critical months of early 1945,

making the gadget work consumed

the energies of both the bomb builders and Army leaders. While the scientists worked at perfecting implosion

assembly and field teams prepared

the remote Trinity test site at Alamogordo, General Groves and his new

deputy commander, Brig. Gen.

Thomas F. Farrell, devoted much

time to overseeing Trinity preparations. Because of pressures of other

responsibilities, including planning

for use of the bomb against Japan and

for the postwar control of atomic

energy, Groves managed only three

hurried visits to Los Alamos during

the months of full-scale preparations

(April to July), but he was able to

maintain day-to-day contact with

bomb test developments through

timely observation reports from Farrell, who made several extended tours

to the Trinity site.

As Trinity preparations began,

Groves had advised Colonel Tyler,

the Los Alamos post commander, that

he must carefully coordinate plans for

development of the bomb test with

the laboratory staff and with Farrell

"so that every part of it fits into a

time schedule." As procurement

crises built up in April and May,

Groves personally intervened in expediting requisition of lenses for the

implosion bomb and globe-shaped

container shells ("pumpkins") for imploding test devices. In May, with a

special report by Farrell on means to

improve the procurement situation at

the New Mexico installation to guide

him, the Manhattan commander con15

 Rpt, Birch, sub: Gun-assembled Nuclear Bomb,

6 Oct 45, MDR; Memo, Groves to Secy War, sub:

Atomic Fission Bombs, 23 Apr 45, OCG Files, MP

Files, Fldr 25, Tab M, MDR; Groves Diary, 27 Feb2 Mar 45, LRG. On the continuing program to establish

more exact measurements concerning plutonium see

Memos, Groves to Nichols, sub: Measurements

Prgm, 3 Apr 45, and Nichols to Groves, 10 Apr 45,

same sub, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 400.12 (Experiments), MDR. On the expansion of plutonium

fabrication facilities at Los Alamos see MDH, Bk. 8,

Vol. 2, XVII.20-XVII.22, DASA, and Ltr, Roger

Williams (TNX Div chief, Du Pont) to Groves, 16

May 45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 337, MDR. For

the views of the British scientists at Los Alamos on

the progress of bomb development in early 1945

see Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Chadwick),

MDR. 16

 Quotation from Rpt, Oppenheimer and Kistiakowsky, sub: Activities at Trinity, 13 Oct 44, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Los Alamos), MDR.

Except as otherwise indicated, the section that follows on the Trinity test is based on MDH, Bk. 8,

Vol. 2, pp. XVIII.1-XVIII.22, DASA, and Hewlett

and Anderson, New World, pp. 376-80. For a popular account see Lamont, Day of Trinity, pp. 2-13 and

72-236.
512 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS A. FARRELL (right)

with General Groves

tributed to the agreement with the

University of California to hire more

procurement personnel. Finally, in

the weeks immediately preceding the

test, Groves and Farrell devoted special attention to shipment and receipt

of active materials from Hanford and

Clinton.17

General Farrell represented the

Army at Trinity's first major event on

7 May—a rehearsal shot of 100 tons

of high explosives combined with a

very small amount of radioactive fission materials atop a 20-foot platform. Observers, including Tolman

and Oppenheimer, judged it a successful trial run for the final implosion test. It gave the various Project

Trinity teams practical experience in

performing their assignments under

difficult field conditions, demonstrated a need for improvements in the

transportation and communications

facilities, helped calibrate instruments, and provided a likely indication of the amount of radioactive materials needed for the final test.18

In early June, "Jumbo," the huge

steel container to be used in exploding the first atomic device, arrived at

Trinity. General Groves had maintained a special interest in the design,

procurement, and shipment of the

vessel, which was moved in early

April on a special railroad car from

Barberton, Ohio, via a carefully

planned route to a railroad siding at

Pope, New Mexico. There, Trinity

workers loaded it on a massive trailer

pulled by two tractors for the 25-mile

trip to the test site. When the vessel

finally came to rest some 800 yards

from the final test tower, there it remained never to be used. For by the

time of Jumbo's arrival, Los Alamos

scientists had decided to dispense

with the container, concluding that its

use would interfere with obtaining

adequate data on the nature of the

atomic explosion—the primary reason

for conducting the Trinity test.19

17

 In January 1945, after the Secretary of War had

advised the Manhattan commander that he should

select an officer who could replace him in the event

of his illness or death, Groves chose Farrell, a Corps

of Engineers officer who, in 1941, had served as his

deputy in the military construction program before

going overseas to the China-Burma-India Theater.

See Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 30-32; Groves

Diary, 9 Jan, 1 Feb, 23 Mar, 29 Mar (source of quotation), Apr-Jun 45, passim, LRG; Memo for File,

Groves, sub: Note Taken at Mtg at Y, 27 Jun 45,

OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 20, Tab F,

MDR.

18

 Rpt, sub: Trinity, 14 May 45, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 319.1 (Trinity Test Rpts-Misc), MDR;

Memo, Col Stafford L. Warren (MD Med Sec chief)

to Groves, sub: Analysis of Problems Presented by

Test II at Muriel (Trinity), 16 May 45, OCG Files,

Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 4, Tab H, MDR;

Groves Diary, 7 May 45, LRG. 19

 Trinity scientists, too, were much more confident of the success of implosion and certain that, Continued
WEAPON DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING 513

Although 4 July had been set as the

target date for the test, few scientists

at Los Alamos were convinced it

could be met. Precise scheduling depended upon bringing a tremendous

number of factors into proper juxtaposition, including weather, procurement of key components and equipment, production and shipment of

active material, preparation of many

experiments, and arrangement of security and safety measures. In midJune, Oppenheimer announced to the

laboratory's group leaders that 13

July was the earliest possible date,

with up to ten days later not unreasonable. He based his estimate upon

information provided by the laboratory's cowpuncher committee, which

had primary responsibility for coordination and scheduling of Trinity.

Following another review of developments on 30 June, this committee

advanced the test date to 16 July to

permit inclusion of certain additional

vital experiments. Two days later,

Oppenheimer indicated to Groves

that the laboratory leaders finally had

agreed on the seventeenth. Groves,

however, objected to the later date,

pointing out that the situation in

Washington required an earlier date.

With the end of the war in Europe,

Secretary Stimson was scheduled to

depart in early July for the Potsdam

Conference, with sessions starting on

the sixteenth. The Manhattan commander undoubtedly had conferred

with Conant, Tolman, and Stimson's

assistants, George L. Harrison and

Harvey Bundy, all of whom favored

carrying out the test on the fourteenth. Again Oppenheimer consulted

with the bomb test team, which reported continued difficulties with the

implosion device, wiring at Trinity,

and uncertainty concerning receipt of

active material. On that basis he informed Groves on 3 July that the test

date of the seventeenth must stand.

But final preparations advanced more

rapidly than expected, and Oppenheimer called Groves on the seventh

to announce that the test might take

place after all on the sixteenth.20

In the final days before the test, the

Army had the major responsibility for

completing security and safety arrangements. To meet the eventuality

that the people living in towns and on

ranches in the immediate vicinity

might have to be evacuated to avoid

radioactive fallout, the Army stationed a detachment of 160 enlisted

men with vehicles at Socorro (New

Mexico) and other strategic points

along main highways a few miles

north of the site. (See Map 6.) To supplement this detachment and also to

increase security, the Army detailed

about 25 CIC (Counterintelligence

Corps) members to towns and cities

up to 100 miles from the Trinity site,

with instructions to summon evacua- with the rapidly increasing production at the Hanford and Clinton Works, more active material would

be available. For further details on Jumbo see MDH,

Bk. 8, Vol. 2, p. XVIII.6, DASA; Groves Diary, 30

Mar 45, LRG; Memos, Groves to Albuquerque Dist

Engr, sub: Trans Contract, Trinity Proj, 7 Feb 45,

Capt Philip Firmin (Wash Liaison Office) to Groves,

sub: Status of Jumbo and Special Trailer, 30 Mar

45, and Farrell to Groves, sub: Jumbo, 4 Jun 45,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 400 (Equipment-Trinity), MDR; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 288-89.

20

 Memo, Oppenheimer to All Gp Ldrs (Los

Alamos), sub: Trinity Test, 14 Jun 45, File No.

314.7 (Trinity), LASL; Ltr, Tolman to Groves, sub:

Prgm for Trinity Test, 17 Apr 45, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 400 (Equipment-Trinity), MDR; Ltr, Oppenheimer to Groves, 27 Jun 45, OSRD; Groves

Diary, 2-4 and 7 Jul 45, LRG; Stimson Diary, 6 Jul

45, HLS.
514 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

tion troops if they were needed and

to help circulate the Manhattan

Project's cover story about an ammunition dump explosion. An officer

from Groves's headquarters had already taken this story to the commander of the Alamogordo base, to

be issued as soon as the test took

place. Another project officer took up

a station in the Associated Press

office in Albuquerque to suppress any

stories that might alarm the public

unduly. Earlier, Groves had arranged

with the Office of Censorship in

Washington, D.C., to keep news of

the explosion from getting into newspapers in other parts of the country.

Finally, the Alamogordo commander

had reluctantly acceded to the Army's

request to suspend all flights during

the test.21

Meanwhile, scientists and technicians at the Trinity site were completing preparations. On 12 July, two scientists from Los Alamos arrived in an

Army sedan with the Pu-239 core for

the implosion device. The next day a

convoy came from the Hill with the

nonnuclear components, including

the high explosives. Before the test

device assembly team moved the plutonium core to the tent at the base of

the 100-foot steel shot tower, General

Farrell signed a receipt for the active

material, thus formally completing

transfer of the Pu-239 from the scientists to the Army for use in the test.

With all components in place except

the detonating system, workers removed the tent and a hoist lifted the

device to a metal shed on a platform

at the top of the tower. The detonator group then completed the firing

circuit and other technicians added

apparatus for experiments. By five in

the afternoon of the fourteenth, the

device was ready for the test.22

The next day, a Sunday, Trinity

crews carried out last-minute inspections and observers checked into the

base camp, about 10 miles south of

the test tower. OSRD Director Vannevar Bush and Conant arrived from

Pasadena with General Groves; Army

sedans brought Charles Thomas from

Santa Fe and Ernest Lawrence, Sir

James Chadwick, and New York Times

science reporter William L. Laurence,

as well as others, from Albuquerque.

Compton had decided not to come.

Tolman and General Farrell were already on hand. The large contingent

from Los Alamos, aboard three buses,

did not reach Trinity until shortly

before three in the morning of 16

July, barely in time for the originally

scheduled zero hour, 4:00 A.M. They

stepped out into blustery and rainy

weather with occasional flashes of

lightning—not the clear skies and

moderate winds the Trinity meteorologists had predicted.23

21

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 299-301;

Memo, 14 May 45, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP

Files, Fldr 4, Tab A; Notes on Interim Committee

Mtg, 18 May 45, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, Groves

Files, Fldr 3, Tab O. See also materials and reports

in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Trinity Test

Rpts-Misc). All in MDR.

22

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, pp. XVIII.12-XVIII.14,

DASA; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, p. 378;

Product Receipt No. 5502, signed by Farrell and approved by Groves, 13 Jul 45, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab I, MDR. This is the receipt registering the transfer of Pu-239 from the

Los Alamos Laboratory to the Army. In a note appended by Farrell on 16 July, he states that he "witnessed the expenditure of the above materials in the

first nuclear explosion thus marking the birth of the

age of atomics." 23

 Groves Diary, 11-14 Jul 45, LRG; Groves, Now

It Can Be Told, pp. 290-91.
WEAPON DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING 515

TRINITY CONTROL DUGOUT AND OBSERVATION POST, located six miles from the

detonation point

Oppenheimer and Groves had reviewed the weather situation at midnight and then had gone forward

from the base camp some 7,000 yards

to the control dugout (10,000 yards

from the test tower) to wait with Farrell, physicist Kenneth Bainbridge,

who was the leader of the bomb test

team, and chief meteorologist Jack M.

Hubbard, who with Oppenheimer had

responsibility for making the final decision on whether to carry out the test

as scheduled. As four o'clock approached and the rain continued,

Groves and Oppenheimer weighed

the risks of going ahead—the likelihood of heavier radioactive fallout at

some points, electrical failures from

dampened circuits, and poor visibility

for the observation airplanes. They

decided to delay the shot an hour and

a half. The rain stopped at four and

shortly before five, with wind still

blowing in the right direction, they

gave the go-ahead signal for the

test.24

As the final countdown began,

Groves left Oppenheimer and Farrell

in the control dugout and returned to

the base camp, a better point of observation and in compliance with the

Manhattan chiefs rule that he and

Farrell must not be together in situations where there was an element of

danger. At approximately the same

time, the five Trinity scientists who

had been guarding the test device

drove away in their jeeps as bright

24

 Memo, Groves to Secy War, sub: The Test, 18

Jul 45, HB Files, Fldr 49, MDR; Groves, Now It Can

Be Told, pp. 291-95 and 433-40 (App. 8, which is a Continued
516 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

THE ATOMIC EXPLOSION AT TRINITY,

16 JULY 1945

lights illuminated the tower to foil

any would-be saboteurs. Precisely at

5:30 A.M., an automatic firing mechanism actuated the implosion device.

Data from hundreds of instruments

recorded what occurred in that desolate stretch of the Jornada del

Muerto valley: the dawn of the atomic

age. It began with a brilliant yellow light

that suffused the remotest recesses of

the Trinity site and was seen as far

away as Albuquerque and Los Alamos

to the north, Silver City (New

Mexico) to the west, and El Paso

(Texas) to the south. With the light

came a sensation of heat that persisted even as a huge ball of fire—like a

rising sun—took shape, then transformed quickly into a moving orange

and red column. Out of this broad

spectrum of colors rose a narrower

column that rapidly spilled over to

form a giant white mushroom cloud

surrounded by a blue glow. Only as

the glow began to fade did observers

at the base camp feel the pressure of

the shock wave, but its rumble reverberated for more than five minutes in

the surrounding hills.25

The effects of this explosion on

eyewitnesses were as varied as the observers themselves. What General

Farrell, for example, saw and heard

from the control dugout was "unprecedented, magnificent, beautiful, stupendous and terrifying. . . . The

whole country was lighted by a searing light with the intensity many times

that of the midday sun. It was golden,

purple, violet, gray and blue. It lighted every peak, crevasse and ridge of

the nearby mountain range with a

beauty . . . the great poets dream

about. . . . Thirty seconds after, the

explosion came . . . followed almost

immediately by the strong, sustained,

awesome roar which warned of

doomsday. . . ." What General

Groves recalled was that "Drs.

Conant and Bush and myself were

struck by an even stronger feeling

that the faith of those who had been

responsible for the initiation and the

carrying-on of the Herculean project

had been justified. I personally

thought of Blondin crossing Niagara

Falls on his tightrope, only to me this

tightrope had lasted almost three

years, and of my repeated, confidentappearing assurances that such a

reprint of the 18 Jul 45 memorandum with some

editorial changes and without inclosures); MDH, Bk.

8, Vol. 2, pp. XVIII.14-XVIII.15, DASA; Memo,

Warren to Groves, sub: Safeguards for Test II at

Muriel (Trinity), 27 Jun 45, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 4, Tab H, MDR. 25

 Hewlett and Anderson, New World, p. 379. See

also the eyewitness and other reports on the Trinity

test in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Trinity

Test Rpts-Misc), MDR.
WEAPON DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING 517

thing was possible and that we would

do it."

 26

But the Manhattan commander permitted himself only a fleeting moment

of relaxation. Less than half an hour

after the test shot he called his secretary in Washington, D.C., to inform

George Harrison so that he could

pass on word of the test to Stimson in

Potsdam. Groves's two main concerns

were the explosive strength of the implosion device and the impact of the

test on project security. There were

strong indications, Groves reported,

that the strength of the explosion was

at least "satisfactory plus" and perhaps far greater than estimated. As to

the effects of the test on project security, he would take the necessary

measures as soon as its impact on the

public had become apparent. By late

morning there was evidence that the

explosion had aroused considerable

excitement throughout New Mexico

and in west Texas, near El Paso.

Groves gave permission to the Associated Press at Albuquerque to release

the previously prepared cover story

with such changes as were necessary

to fit the exact circumstances of the

test:

Alamogordo, N.M., July 16

The commanding officer of the Alamo- gordo Army Air Base made the following

statement today:

Several inquiries have been received

concerning a heavy explosion which

occurred on the Alamogordo Air Base

reservation this morning.

A remotely located ammunition maga- zine containing a considerable amount

of high explosives and pyrotechnics

exploded. There was no loss of life or injury to

anyone, and the property damage outside

of the explosive magazine itself was

negligible. Weather conditions affecting the con- tent of gas shells exploded by the blast

may make it desirable for the Army to

evacuate temporarily a few civilians from

their homes.27

That same afternoon, news of the

momentous event reached Secretary

Stimson in Potsdam:

Operated on this morning. Diagnosis

not yet complete but results seem satis- factory and already exceed expectations. Local press release necessary as interest

extends great distance. Dr. Groves

pleased. He returns tomorrow. I will keep

you posted.28

A follow-up cable from Harrison confirmed the success, tentatively implied

in the first message:

Doctor has just returned most enthusi- astic and confident that the little boy is as

husky as his big brother. The light in his

eyes discernible from here to High Hold

and I could have heard his screams from

here to my farm.29

26

 In his 18 Jul 45 memorandum (source of quotations) for the Secretary of War in Potsdam describing the Trinity test in detail, Groves incorporated Farrell's description of the explosion. He also attached as an inclosure Ernest Lawrence's

"thoughts" on the Alamogordo test. See HB Files,

Fldr 49, MDR. The memorandum and inclosure are

also reproduced in U.S. Department of State, The

Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945,

Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic

Papers, 1945, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), 2:1361-70.

27

 The cover story released was one of several

possible versions prepared in May by personnel in

Groves's office. See Memo, 14 May 45, MDR. The

story is also reprinted in Groves, Now It Can Be Told,

p. 301. A transcription of Groves's telephone call to

his secretary (Mrs. Jean O'Leary) on 16 Jul 45 is in

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Trinity Test Rpt),

MDR. 28

 Msg, Harrison to Stimson, 16 Jul 45, CMOUT-32887, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files,

Fldr 5E, Tab A. Copy also in HB Files, Fldr 64.

Both in MDR. 29

 Msg, Harrison to Stimson, 17 Jul 45, CMOUT-33556, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files,

Fldr 5E, Tab A. Copy also in HB Files, Fldr 64.

Both in MDR.
518 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Stimson passed on this second cable

to Truman at once, explaining to the

President that Groves ("Doctor") was

convinced that the implosion bomb

("little boy") was as powerful as the

gun-type bomb ("big brother"). Proof

of its power was the fact that the light

of the explosion was visible for 250

miles (the distance from Washington

to Stimson's summer home at High

Hold on Long Island) and its sound

was audible for 50 miles (the distance

from Washington to Harrison's farm

near Upperville, Virginia). Stimson,

Truman, Churchill, and other Allied

leaders at Potsdam were quick to realize that this preliminary evidence of

the enormous power of the Trinity

explosion, followed soon by more detailed substantiating data from General Groves, had introduced a new

factor that would profoundly affect

not only their own deliberations on

how to end the war with Japan but

also the whole course of international

relations in the postwar world.30

30

 On the limited effect of the Trinity test on

project security see Notes, 1st Lt Thomas R. Mountain to Mrs. O'Leary, 17 Jul 45, Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, 371.2 (Scty), MDR; Stimson Diary, 16-18

Jul 45, HLS. Subsequent detailed conclusions on

the effectiveness of the implosion device are given

in Memo, Groves to Chief of Staff, 30 Jul 45, OCG

Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 4, Tab C, MDR.
CHAPTER XXVI

The Atomic Bombing of Japan

The explosion of an implosion device on 16 July 1945 at Trinity provided final confirmation to America's

wartime leaders that employment of an

atomic weapon in the war with Japan

was indeed a strategic reality. Until

1945, the Army's supersecret atomic

weapon program had not been a factor

in strategic planning for carrying on

the war, either in Europe or in the

Pacific.1 The successful Allied operations against Germany in the summer

of 1944 portended that country's imminent collapse and obviated the need

for an atomic weapon to end the conflict in Europe. Because of these developments, Manhattan Project leaders

thus considered using the bomb in the

war in the Pacific and accelerated preliminary planning with the Army Air

Forces (AAF) for a possible atomic

bombing mission against Japan.

Preparations for an Atomic

Bombing Mission

Preparations for the tactical employment of an atomic weapon

against Japan began in late March

1944, when General Groves first met

with General Henry H. Arnold, the

AAF commanding general.2 The

Manhattan commander briefed

Arnold, who already had some knowledge of the atomic program, on the

current status of bomb development,

estimating the probable time when

bombs would be ready for use in

combat. He then reviewed the latest

technical data from Los Alamos on

1

 Strategic planning for employment of the atomic

bomb always was limited to the relatively few military and civilian leaders who knew of its existence.

Most Army planners remained totally unaware of

the atomic weapon program. In the Operations Division only three senior officers—General Malin

Craig, Lt. Gen. John K. Hull, and Brig. Gen. George

A. Lincoln—learned about the bomb before it was

dropped on Japan. See Ray S. Cline, Washington

Command Post: The Operations Division, U.S. Army in

World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office, 1951). p. 347.

2

 Except as otherwise indicated, this account of

the long-range preparations for employment of the

atomic bomb in combat is based on Ms, "History of

the 509th Composite Group, 17 December 1944 to

15 August 1945," 31 Aug 45, SHRC; Cert of Audit

MDE 228-46, W-47 Spec Ord Det, 27 Sep 45,

Fiscal and Audit Files, Certs of Audit (Sup), MDR;

Historical Notes on Svc of Col Elmer E. Kirkpatrick,

Jr., With Manhattan Proj, 1944-47, Incl to Ltr, Kirkpatrick to OCEHD, 30 Sep 68, OCEHD; MDH, Bk.

8, Vol. 2, "Technical," pp. XIX.1-XIX.13, DASA;

Wesley Frank Craven and Janes Lea Cate, eds., The

Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. June 1944 to August

1945, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 5

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp.

704-09; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 253-62 and

277-87; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 252-

54, 313, 317-18, 321, 334; William L. Laurence,

Dawn Over Zero: The Story of the Atomic Bomb, 2d ed.

enl. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977), pp.

196-206.
520 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

the likely size, weight, and configuration of an atomic bomb, indicating

that the dimensions of the gun type

were reasonably well established but

those for the implosion type were still

very much in question.

The two leaders next took up the

question of what type of airplane

would be required to transport

atomic bombs. The Manhattan commander noted that Oppenheimer, on

the basis of investigations carried out

at Los Alamos and Muroc Army Air

Field, had concluded that a modified

B-29 probably had the requisite

weight-carrying capacity and range.

Should the B-29, which had gone

into production in September 1943,

prove not feasible, Groves suggested

the British Lancaster would have to

be considered. This displeased

Arnold, who stated emphatically that

an American-made airplane should

carry the bombs, and he promised to

make a special effort to have a B-29

available for that purpose.3

With this assurance that the AAF

would provide the necessary airplanes, the two leaders reached tentative agreement on a broad division of

responsibilities in making the preparations for that atomic bombing mission. The AAF would organize and

train the requisite tactical bomb unit,

which, for reasons of security, must

be as self-sustaining as possible and

exercise full control over delivery of

bombs on the targets selected. Manhattan would receive from the AAF

whatever assistance it needed in ballistic testing of bombs and air transportation of materials and equipment.

To facilitate close coordination between the two organizations, Groves

would continue to have as frequent

access to Arnold as he deemed necessary, and Maj. John A. Derry of

Groves's staff and Maj. Gen. Oliver P.

Echols, an AAF officer already serving

as a consultant with Manhattan,

would provide day-to-day liaison.

Echols subsequently designated an alternate, Col. Roscoe C. Wilson, who

since the latter part of 1943 had been

providing AAF liaison with the Los

Alamos delivery group in its work on

B-29 modification and testing.4

In the ensuing months, General

Groves personally assisted the AAF in

developing an overall and concrete

tactical plan. As soon as the anticipated schedule of fission bomb production was available, Groves supplied

Colonel Wilson with the crucial data.

Drawing upon estimates he had recently prepared for the Military Policy

Committee's August progress report

to the Secretary of War, Chief of

Staff, and Vice President, the Manhattan commander indicated to Wilson

that an implosion-type bomb might

be ready as early as January 1945 and

a gun-type bomb by June of that year.

Although these dates were slightly in

advance of those in the progress

report, they illustrate a precautionary

maneuver on Groves's part "to avoid

any possible unnecessary delay in the

use of the bomb. . . ."

 5 Pending

3

 Groves Diary, 21 Mar 44, LRG; H. H. Arnold,

Global Mission (New York: Harper and Brothers,

1949), p. 491.

4

 On the earlier liaison arrangements with the

AAF see MPC Min, 9 Nov 43, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 23, Tab A, MDR; MDH, Bk. 8,

Vol. 2, pp. VII.35-VII.39, DASA. The frequent consultations between Manhattan and AAF personnel

during the fall and winter of 1944 are recorded in

Groves Diary, Sep-Dec 44, passim, LRG. 5

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 256, n. 2.
THE ATOMIC BOMBING OF JAPAN 521

completion of the fission bombs,

Groves assured Wilson that, for testing purposes, Manhattan would

supply the AAF with several hundred

high-explosive bombs having ballistic

characteristics similar to the implosion-type model.6

On the basis of this data, Wilson

drafted a general plan outlining the

support the AAF would provide in

preparation for the atomic bombing

mission. The AAF committed itself to

supply the personnel and equipment

for a heavy bomb squadron, with attached special units as required, and

to make available an air base in the

southwestern United States for its

training. In addition, it agreed to

modify and complete delivery of fourteen B-29's to the squadron by 1 January 1945; to continue flight testing

of implosion-type bombs, with related

training under direction of Manhattan

and AAF specialists; and to assist

Manhattan personnel in testing equipment and assembling ballistic data. Finally, the AAF would participate in a

field inspection of a suitable site for

an overseas operating base on the

Mariana Islands in the Central Pacific.

To command the bomb combat

unit, subsequently designated the

509th Composite Group and formally

activated on 17 December 1944, General Arnold selected Col. Paul W.

Tibbets, Jr. Tibbets had an outstanding record in flying heavy bombers in

Europe and North Africa and had

gained a special knowledge of

the B-29 as a test pilot. Because of

the great importance and secrecy of

the 509th's mission, Arnold gave the

509th commander virtual carte blanche

to select the best-qualified personnel

available.

In September 1944, Colonel Tibbets began to assemble the elements

of the 509th at Wendover Field (see

Map 2), an isolated air base in western Utah with adequate security and

facilities and well located for air travel

to Los Alamos and the Salton Sea

Naval Air Station.7 The 509th commander devoted the next several

months to organizing his new command, consulting frequently with

Groves, Captain Parsons of the Los

Alamos ordnance group, and other

Manhattan representatives. Following

the security guidelines set forth in

Colonel Wilson's plan, Tibbets

formed the various elements of the

509th with the objective of making it

as self-sufficient as possible. Thus, he

included in the group not only a

normal B-29 unit, the 393d Bombardment Squadron (VH), but also a

number of supporting elements, including the 390th Air Service Group

(consisting of the 603d Air Engineering and 1027th Materiel Squadrons),

the 320th Troop Carrier Squadron,

and the 1395th Military Police Company (Aviation). Subsequently, for

special technical requirements, the

509th acquired the 1st Ordnance

Squadron, Special (Aviation), and the

1st Technical Detachment, War Department Miscellaneous Group, a

catchall unit comprised of both civilian

and military scientists and techni6

 See MPC Rpt, 7 Aug 44, Incl to Memo, Groves

(for MPC) to Chief of Staff, same date, OCG Files,

MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab K, MDR; Groves Diary, 31

Jul and 17, 21, 29 Aug 44, LRG.

7

 Los Alamos personnel, given the task of constructing bombing tables, acquired the necessary

data from field measurements taken at the Salton Sea

Naval Air Station, where an approach over water

simulated the near sea-level conditions that would

be encountered over Japan.
522 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

LITTLE BOY, the uranium bomb dropped on Hiroshima

cians—many from the Manhattan

Project but including Army, Navy,

and AAF personnel.8

At the beginning of September,

with the external shape and aircraft

requirements of the three basic bomb

models—one of the U-235 gun type

(now designated Little Boy instead of

Thin Man) and two of the Pu-239 implosion type (Fat Man)—now frozen,

the AAF started training the bomb

drop squadron and, with assistance

from Los Alamos technicians, completed necessary modifications on the

B-29. While awaiting delivery of the

first planes, scheduled under Colonel

Wilson's plan to be on the thirtieth of

the month, the squadron underwent

training that emphasized ground and

air techniques for handling atomic

bombs.

In October, only days past the

scheduled delivery date, the 393d received the first modified B-29's out

of a production lot of fifteen (one

more than originally requested).

Without delay, a continuing series of

essential test drops commenced at

Wendover. Over the next few

months, these tests furnished critical

information on ballistics, electrical

fusing, flight performance of electrical

detonators, operation of aircraft release mechanisms, vibration, and temperatures, as well as provided bomb

assembly experience. But, perhaps

more importantly, they revealed certain weaknesses in the original modifications and defective performance in

the flying capabilities of the big

bombers.

8

 For further details on organization and composition of the 509th see Ms, "Hist 509th Comp Gp,"

pp. 1-2 and 8-11, SHRC, and the unit's own postwar publication, 509th Pictorial Album: Written and

Published by and for the Members of the 509th Composite

Group, Tinian, 1945, ed. Capt Jerome J. Ossip (Chicago: Rogers Printing Co., 1946). By the summer of

1945, the 509th had substantially exceeded the authorized personnel of 225 officers and 1,542 men.
THE ATOMIC BOMBING OF JAPAN 523

FAT MAN, the implosion bomb dropped on Nagasaki

Because B-29's were in very short

supply, the AAF's lower echelons displayed some reluctance to satisfy the

Manhattan request for replacement of

the inadequate planes. In December,

shortly after the 393d Squadron was

detailed to Batista Field, Cuba, for

two months of special navigational

training, Groves decided to appeal

directly to General Arnold about

the B-29 problem. Without hesitation, the AAF chief responded emphatically that the 509th Composite

Group would get as many new planes

as it required. "In view of the vast national effort that had gone into the

Manhattan Project," as Groves later

recalled Arnold's words, "no slip-up

on the part of the Air Force was

going to be responsible for a failure."

 9 After the 393d returned to

Wendover, the fliers continued to

gain experience during tests with

dummy bombs of various types. Finally, in the spring of 1945, the second

lot of fifteen greatly improved versions of the B-29 reached the air

base, and training and ballistic tests

proceeded at a more intensive pace.

The Overseas Operating Base

With training of the 509th Composite Group and the Los Alamos program for testing bomb models well

under way, project leaders turned

their attention to establishing a base

of operations for the 509th in the Pacific Theater. At the end of December

1944, Manhattan and AAF officials,

including Groves and Arnold, met to

discuss plans for moving the 509th

overseas. The AAF recommended

that leaders of the Twentieth Air

Force in the Marianas—at the time

the only feasible location for the

509th base—be informed of the

atomic bomb mission. With permis- 9

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 257.
524 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

sion from General Marshall, Groves

accepted the AAF's offer to have Brig.

Gen. Lauris Norstad, its assistant

chief of staff for plans who would be

visiting Pacific bases in January 1945,

brief Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon,

deputy commander of the Twentieth

Air Force, and two of his staff officers. (Groves had to repeat the briefing again for Lt. Gen. Barney McK.

Giles, who in May became Twentieth

Air Force deputy commander after

Harmon and the two staff officers disappeared in a flight from Guam to

Washington, D.C.).10

The meeting reemphasized the

need for also informing the Navy

commanders in the Pacific of the

atomic bomb mission, as Navy support in the immediate area of operations would be indispensable. Furthermore, Admiral Chester W.

Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific

Ocean Areas (CINCPOA), had learned of the imminent arrival of the

509th in his theater and was asking

questions concerning its mission. In

February, Groves arranged with Rear

Adm. William R. Purnell of the Military Policy Committee to have

Comdr. Frederick L. Ashworth, Parsons' operations officer and military

alternate in charge of field operations

at Wendover, visit Nimitz's headquarters on Guam. Ashworth briefed

Nimitz, who in turn informed two

staff members of the 509th mission.11

Groves also had instructed Commander Ashworth to inspect carefully

both Guam and Tinian as possible

sites for the 509th base operations.

General Norstad had recommended

Guam, citing its excellent deepwater

harbor and maintenance facilities. But

Guam was 125 miles farther from

Japan than Tinian—a critical factor

considering the heavy load the B-29

would be carrying. Ashworth also

found that Guam had overtaxed port

facilities and a shortage of construction personnel to build an additional

airfield. In contrast, airfield and port

facilities under construction on Tinian

would be more than adequate for the

atomic bomb mission and would be

ready for use by the time the 509th

arrived in June. Furthermore, although the Army had jurisdiction

over Tinian, the Navy's 6th Naval

Construction Brigade was available

there to build the special installations

that would be needed by the

mission.12

With the information he had collected on Guam and Tinian, Commander Ashworth reported to Groves

on 22 February. The following day

Groves wrote to Norstad, indicating

his choice of Tinian as the more suitable site (Map 7). Norstad concurred,

and on 24 February Groves briefed

the Military Policy Committee. By end

of the month, Navy Seabees were at

work on the base facilities.13

10

 MPC Min, 29 Dec 44, Exhibit H (prepared by

Groves), MDR; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 278-

79; Craven and Cate, The Pacific, pp. 530-31. 11

 Ltr, Groves to Chief of Staff, 30 Dec 44, OCG

Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 23, Tab A, MDR;

Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 277.

12

 Memo, Ashworth to Groves, sub: Base of Opns

of 509th Comp Gp, 24 Feb 45, OCG Files, Gen

Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 23, Tab A, MDR; Craven

and Cate, The Pacific, pp. 516-17 and 518-19. 13

 Groves Diary, 22-24 Feb 45, LRG; MPC Min,

24 Feb 45, with Ashworth's 24 February memorandum attached as Exhibit A, MDR; Memo, Groves to

Norstad, sub: Decisions Concerning Movement of

509th Comp Gp, 23 Feb 45, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 5, Tab C, MDR; Craven and

Cate, The Pacific, p. 706; Groves, Now It Can Be Told,

p. 278.

526 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

At the end of March, General

Groves sent the District's deputy engineer, Col. Elmer E. Kirkpatrick, Jr.,

a long-time associate of the Manhattan commander on Army construction

projects, to the Marianas as his personal representative with the mission

of expediting delivery of the bomb

components to Tinian and making

sure that all essential construction

work there was completed on schedule. Groves had brought Kirkpatrick

to the project the previous September

for the specific purpose of preparing

him to monitor development of the

overseas operational base. Thus, in

the guise of a special assistant to

Groves, he had spent considerable

time at Los Alamos, Wendover Field,

and Kirtland Field (near Albuquerque), assisting in inspection of bomb

prototypes, observing the training of

the 509th Composite Group, and

helping to plan shipment of essential

equipment and bomb components to

Tinian.14

As soon as Kirkpatrick arrived on

Guam, he went to Admiral Nimitz

with a letter of introduction from

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral

Ernest J. King that explained his mission. Nimitz then assigned a member

of his own staff, Capt. Thomas B.

Hill, as Kirkpatrick's contact at

CINCPOA headquarters. Kirkpatrick

also delivered a similar letter from

General Arnold to Maj. Gen. Curtis

LeMay, commanding general of the

XXI Bomber Command. To maintain

the secrecy of his mission, Kirkpatrick

was identified simply as a special representative from the War Department

General Staff to the Twentieth Air

Force and its XXI Bomber Command,

reporting to General LeMay. He was

carried as an assistant operations officer of the bomber command and

quartered with the 313th Bombardment Wing, located at the same field

on Tinian that would be used by the

509th Composite Group.15

Kirkpatrick devoted April and May

to expediting facilities construction. A

typical problem was a delay in unloading ships at Tinian harbor. Kirkpatrick notified Groves, who went to

Admiral Purnell. The Navy representative on the Military Policy Committee obtained an order from Admiral

King to Nimitz that all material for

the 509th must be unloaded as soon

as it reached Tinian. Another problem arose in constructing facilities on

Iwo Jima for transferring an atomic

bomb from one B-29 to another, in

14

 Historical Notes . . . , Incl to Ltr, Kirkpatrick

to OCEHD, 30 Sep 68, OCEHD; List of Duties . . .

of Liaison Off to 509th Comp Gp, Incl to Memo,

Maj John A. Derry (Groves's Asst for Proj Opns) to

Groves, sub: Discussion of 5 Mar With Norstad, 10

Mar 45, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 5,

Tab C, MDR; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 279.

Colonel Kirkpatrick first worked with Groves in the

Construction Division of the Quartermaster Corps.

He came to the Corps of Engineers when the Construction Division was transferred to the Engineers

in December 1944.

15

 Historical Notes . . . , Incl to Ltr, Kirkpatrick

to OCEHD, 30 Sep 68, OCEHD; Memo, Groves (to

Nimitz), 8 Mar 45, sub: Preparation and Movement

of Personnel and Equipment to Tinian, OCG Files,

Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 5, Tab C, MDR.

Groves states in a note at the bottom of page 1 of

this memorandum that he had intended to show it

in person to Nimitz, who was in Washington attending strategy meetings on the war in the Pacific, but

he was unsuccessful in securing an appointment.

Consequently, at Groves's direction, Colonel Kirkpatrick memorized the contents of the memorandum before leaving on his trip to the Marianas and

subsequently passed on the information to Nimitz at

a meeting on Guam in early April. See also Craven

and Cate, The Pacific, pp. 706-07. The Air Force historians mistakenly identify Kirkpatrick as a "Twentieth Air Force engineer."
THE ATOMIC BOMBING OF JAPAN 527

COL. ELMER E. KIRKPATRICK, JR.

the event a bomber en route to Japan

should have to make an emergency

landing there. Kirkpatrick had arranged to have these facilities completed by 1 July, but an inspection by

a project officer there as of that date

revealed that virtually nothing had

been done. Kirkpatrick informed Captain Hill, and prompt action was

taken.16

In early May, Kirkpatrick came back

to the United States for conferences

with Groves and with personnel working on design and delivery of the

bomb. He visited Captain Parsons at

Los Alamos and other project officials

there and at Wendover Field and the

Inyokern test site. When Kirkpatrick

returned to Tinian toward the end of

the month, he found the first elements of the 509th arriving there.

The group brought with it a number

of C-54 transport planes, which were

soon operating as a continuous shuttle service to the United States mainland, greatly facilitating movement of

personnel and urgently needed equipment. By mid-July, all elements of the

group had reached Tinian, including

the 1st Technical Detachment comprised chiefly of civilian specialists

from Los Alamos, some of whom had

been brought temporarily into military service. Commanded by Parsons,

the detachment furnished and tested

weapon components for the 509th,

supervised assembly of bombs, and

checked out completed units, carefully inspecting them in bomb bays

before planes took off. Frequent communication with Los Alamos threatened project security, so Groves dispatched Lt. Col. Peter de Silva, chief

security officer at Los Alamos, to

Tinian to establish effective security

measures for the detachment, and

John H. Manley, a Los Alamos physicist, to Washington, D.C., to serve as

point of transmission for all project

messages to Tinian.17

Meanwhile, the 509th's combat

crews were undergoing intensive

flight training. This involved practicing navigation missions to Iwo Jima

and making bomb runs to nearby islands still in enemy hands, using

high-explosive projectiles with Fat

Man's pumpkin shape. At the end of

16

 Historical Notes . . . , Incl to Ltr, Kirkpatrick

to OCEHD, 30 Sep 68, OCEHD; Groves, Now It Can

Told, pp. 280-81.

17

 Historical Notes . . . , Incl to Ltr, Kirkpatrick

to OCEHD, 30 Sep 68, OCEHD; Memo, Kirkpatrick

to Groves, 26 May 45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

201 (Gen), MDR; Memo, de Silva to Lt Col John

Lansdale, Jr. (Groves's Spec Asst for Scty), 28 Jun

45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 371.2 (Scty), MDR;

Groves Diary, 10 May and 31 Jul 45, LRG; MDH,

Bk. 8, Vol. 2, pp. XIX.5-XIX.8, DASA; Groves, Now

It Can Be Told, pp. 282-83.
528 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

training, which lasted three weeks, the

crews in late July began a series of

combat strikes over Japan to gain familiarity with target areas and mission

tactics and also to accustom the Japanese to the appearance of small formations of B-29's flying at a great

height. Using the pumpkin-shaped

bombs, the 509th achieved excellent

results against enemy towns, most of

which had been hit by previous B-29

strikes. These towns—Koriyama, Nagaoka, Toyama, Kobe, Yokkaichi,

Ube, Wakayama, Maizuru, Fukushima,

and Niihama—were in the general

vicinity of those communities selected earlier as targets for atomic

bombing.18

The Bombing Targets

In the late spring and early summer

of 1945, Manhattan and AAF representatives met in Washington and Los

Alamos for the purpose of choosing

targets for the 509th's atomic bombing mission. Normally the selection of

specific bombing targets was a responsibility of the highest echelons in

a theater of war. But in April, after

briefing President Truman on the

atomic program, General Marshall decided that the nature of Manhattan's

security requirements and its inherently unique technical problems made

it imperative for project leaders to

have a major voice in the choice of

targets, subject to final approval by

himself and the Secretary of War.

Hence, instead of assigning the task

to the War Department General

Staff's Operations Division, the Army

Chief of Staff turned over this responsibility to General Groves.19

Although the Manhattan commander had not anticipated Marshall's decision, he moved immediately to carry

out his new responsibility. After conferring with General Arnold, he and

General Norstad selected a target

committee. The committee included

two members of Groves's staff (General Farrell, who served as de facto

chairman when Groves was not

present, and Major Derry), an AAF

officer (Col. William P. Fisher), and

five technical experts (John von Neumann, Robert R. Wilson, and William

G. Penney, a member of the British

team at Los Alamos, all from the

Manhattan Project, and Joyce C.

Stearns and David M. Dennison from

the AAF.20

At the opening meeting of the

target committee on 27 April, Groves

briefed its members, first emphasizing

the need for the highest degree of secrecy in its deliberations and then

laying down some general guidelines

for selection of targets. He suggested

that they choose four targets and indicated that General Marshall had

pointed out that ports on the west

coast of Japan, vital to that country's

communications with the Asiatic

mainland, should not be overlooked.

General Norstad then told the committee that the Twentieth Air Force

would provide it with whatever support it needed, including related

18

 Craven and Cate, The Pacific, pp. 708-09; Ms,

"Hist 509th Comp Gp," pp. 50-55 and 58-61,

SHRC; Memo, de Silva to Lansdale, 28 Jun 45,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 371.2 (Scty), MDR.

19

 Groves Diary, 23 Apr 45, LRG; Groves, Now It

Can Be Told, pp. 266-67. 20

 Groves Diary, 23 Apr 45, LRG; Groves, Now It

Can Be Told, pp. 266-68; Hewlett and Anderson,

New World, p. 365.
THE ATOMIC BOMBING OF JAPAN 529

information, operational analyses,

maps, and targets data.21

The second committee meeting

took place on 10 May in Los Alamos,

where committee members had an

opportunity to hear from the scientists and technicians who had worked

on the bomb. At the third meeting in

Washington on 28 May, Colonel Tibbets and Commander Ashworth, who

had returned from Tinian for consultation, and scientific adviser Richard

C. Tolman provided further data. The

committee carefully considered various criteria: the maximum range for

the loaded B-29 aircraft; the need for

visual bombing; likely weather conditions; and expected damage. The last

criterion weighed heavily on the committee, for it pointed up the necessity

to select targets where the bomb

would produce the maximum damage

and hence have the profoundest

impact upon enemy morale. Project

scientists had indicated that the bomb

would most likely achieve the desired

results if it were dropped on densely

built-up areas of significant value to

the Japanese war effort. They also

had emphasized that the targets

should not have been bombed previously, so the effects might be assessed

more accurately.22

Before concluding its 28 May meeting, the committee recommended

four targets to General Groves, who

promptly approved all of them. The

choices were Kokura Arsenal, one of

Japan's largest munitions plants, covering an area of 8 million square feet;

Hiroshima, a major military embarkation port and convoy assembly point

with a local army headquarters, railway yards, storage depots, and some

heavy industrial plants; Niigata, an

important seaport with significant industrial and commercial facilities, including an aluminum reduction plant,

a large ironworks, an oil refinery, and

a tanker terminal; and Kyoto, with a

concentrated 3-square-mile industrial

area and a population of about one

million people. As soon as he received the committee's list, Groves

prepared a plan of operations for

General Marshall based upon the

identified target choices.23

On 30 May, before delivering the

plan of operations to General Marshall, Groves visited the Secretary of

War on other business. The Secretary

used the opportunity to query the

Manhattan commander on the target

choices. As soon as Groves mentioned Kyoto, Stimson expressed

strong objection, noting that the city

had been the ancient capital of Japan

and was a place of great religious and

cultural significance to the Japanese.

Groves pointed out that Kyoto's large

population and military and industrial

importance made it an exceptionally

suitable target, but the Secretary of

War held fast to his views.

The target committee, nevertheless,

did not find an immediate substitute

for Kyoto. General Arnold included it

21

 Groves Diary, 27 Apr 45, LRG; Notes on

Target Committee Mtg, 27 Apr 45, OCG Files, Gen

Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 5, Tab D, MDR. 22

 Notes on Target Committee Mtg, 27 Apr and

28 May 45, MDR; Ms, Manhattan Engineer District,

"The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki," June 1946, pp. 5-8, LC; Groves, Now It Can

Be Told, p. 270."

23

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 272-73; Ltr,

Norstad through Dep Cdr, Twentieth Air Force, to

CG XXI Bomber Cmd, sub: 509th Comp Gp Spec

Functions, 29 May 45, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP

Files, Fldr 5, Tab C, MDR. This letter appears to

contain the substance of Groves's plan of operations, including reference to three of the four committee target choices (Kokura Arsenal is missing).
530 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

in his instructions in early June to the

Twentieth Air Force to withhold conventional bombing of the four selected targets. So did Groves in late June,

when he requested General Marshall

to inform General Douglas MacArthur

and Admiral Nimitz to refrain from

attacking the target cities, but probably with the intention of making certain that Kyoto was not subjected to

ordinary bombing. The Manhattan

commander endeavored to change

Stimson's mind on a number of occasions, but the Secretary remained adamant. Finally, on 21 July, Stimson,

who was in Germany attending the

Potsdam Conference, received a cable

signed by special assistant George L.

Harrison but certainly inspired by

Groves: "All your local military advisors engaged in preparation definitely

favor your pet city and would like to

feel free to use it as first choice if

those on the ride select it out of 4

possible spots in the light of local

conditions at the time."

 24

 After conferring with President Truman, Stimson replied: "Give name of place or

alternate places, always excluding the

particular place against which I have

decided. My decision has been confirmed by highest authority."

 25

When the atomic bomb directive was

issued to the United States Army

Strategic Air Forces (USASTAF) on 25

July, Nagasaki had replaced Kyoto on

the target list.26

The Decision To Use the Bomb

Meanwhile, the question of military

employment of the bomb against

Japan came up for consideration by

the Interim Committee, a temporary

body appointed by Stimson in May

1945 at the urging of project leaders

and with the approval of the President. The committee's function was to

advise and report on atomic energy

matters. Membership was comprised

of the Secretary of War, as chairman;

George Harrison, as alternate chairman; former War Mobilization Director James F. Byrnes, representing the

President; Vannevar Bush; James B.

Conant; MIT President Karl T.

Compton; Assistant Secretary of State

for Economic Affairs William L. Clayton; and Under Secretary of the Navy

Ralph A. Bard. At its first meeting on

the ninth, Stimson outlined the parameters of the committee's broad authority—from advising on wartime

controls and publicity releases to

making recommendations on postwar

policies concerning research, development, and control of atomic energy

(including legislation). He did not

mention that the committee would

also advise on the military use of the

bomb, but the interrelationship between this aspect of atomic energy

and war and postwar controls made

24

 Msg, Harrison to Stimson, 21 Jul 45, CMOUT-35987, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files,

Fldr 5E, Tab A, MDR. 25

 Msg, Stimson to Harrison, 23 Jul 45, CM-IN23195, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 5E,

Tab C, MDR. 26

 Ltr Directive, Gen Thomas T. Handy (Act

Chief of Staff) to Gen Carl A. Spaatz (CG USASTAF), 25 Jul 45; Memo, Groves to Norstad, 30

May 45; Memo, Groves to Chief of Staff, 30 Jun 45.

All in OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 5,

Tab B, MDR. Stimson Dairy, 30 May, 6 Jun, 22 and

24 Jul 45, HLS. In the entry of 30 May, Stimson

mentions the conference on S-1 but says nothing

about targets. Groves Diary, 30 May 45, LRG. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 625. Groves,

Now It Can Be Told, pp. 273-76. Nagasaki, the city

substituted for Kyoto on the bomb target list, was a

major military port—one of Japan's largest shipbuilding and repair centers—and a producer of

naval ordnance.
THE ATOMIC BOMBING OF JAPAN 531

GENERAL GROVES CHECKING LOCATION OF BOMBING TARGETS

its involvement in that decision

almost inevitable.27

At its next meeting on the fourteenth, the Interim Committee established a scientific panel, comprised of

Oppenheimer, Fermi, Arthur Compton, and Lawrence. This group presented its views on the technical and

political aspects of atomic energy at

the fourth meeting of the committee

on the thirty-first, which Generals

Groves and Marshall attended. While

recognizing that use of the bomb was

essentially a military matter, the panel

members nevertheless offered their

opinions concerning the way it should

be employed and the likely effects it

would have on the targets selected.

Oppenheimer closed the panel's

briefing by emphasizing that the

atomic bomb would have a different

impact from any previous weapon because "the visual effect . . . would be

tremendous, it would be accompanied

by a brilliant luminescence which

would rise to a height of 10,000 to

27

 See Ch. XXVII for a detailed discussion of the

Interim Committee's activities in the preparation of

press releases and public statements, and in planning for postwar controls and legislation. On the

committee's organization and first meeting see Stimson Diary, 25 Apr and 2-3 and 8-9 May 45, HLS;

Memo, Bundy to Secy War, 3 Mar 45, OCG Files,

Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 9, Tab A, MDR;

Groves Diary, 9 May 45, LRG. See also in MDR, HB

Files, the following: Notes on Interim Committee

Mtgs, 9 and 17 May 45, Fldr 100; Interim Committee Log, 9 May 45, Fldr 98; Ltrs, Secy War to

Conant, 4 May 45, and Conant to Secy War, 5 May

45, Fldr 69; Memo, Harrison to Secy War, sub: Interim Committee on S-1, 1 May 45, Fldr 69.
532 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

20,000 feet, [and] the neutron effect

. . . would be dangerous to life for a

radius of at least two-thirds of a

mile."

Taking a moment to reflect on the

discussion of targets and effects, Secretary Stimson proffered the conclusion that the atomic bomb should be

used against Japan with no advance

warning and, while not restricting the

target to a civilian area, should be

employed in such a way as "to make a

profound psychological impression on

as many of the inhabitants as possible." Both committee and panel

members generally agreed, and the

discussion continued. Conant suggested that the "most desirable target

would be a vital war plant employing

a large number of workers and closely

surrounded by workers' houses," and

Stimson indicated that was the type of

target he also visualized. When Oppenheimer proposed that several simultaneous strikes would be feasible,

Groves strongly objected. Such tactics, he stated, would eliminate the

possibility of "gaining additional

knowledge of the new weapon at each

successive bombing . . . , would require a rush job on the part of those

assembling the bombs and might,

therefore, be ineffective, [and] the

effect would not be sufficiently distinct from . . . regular Air Force

bombing. . . ."

 28

Panel members left the 31 May

meeting with the Secretary's instructions that they should prepare suggestions on postwar organization, research, and development for the Interim Committee. Arthur Compton

was very much aware that there was

great concern and substantial difference of opinion among Metallurgical

Laboratory scientists on how to deal

with postwar problems and programs.

And in the interest of maintaining the

morale of his scientific staff, he requested suggestions from them on

the future of atomic energy, which he

might then pass on to the scientific

panel. Among the various reports Compton received in the following two

weeks was one prepared by a group

of scientists under the leadership

of James Franck, an outstanding

German-refugee physicist who had

come to the Metallurgical Laboratory

from the staff of the University of

Chicago. Centering on the political

and social ramifications of an atomic

bombing, the Franck report favored

eventual international control of

atomic energy as the only safe solution. Using the bomb against Japan

without adequate warning, the report

cautioned, would arouse great animosity against the United States and

isolate her morally among the nations

of the world, making establishment of

international controls much more difficult. As an alternative, the report

advocated a demonstration of the

bomb in an uninhabited area, pointing out that this action would not prevent later military use of the bomb

against Japan, if this were necessary.29

28

 Quotations in this and the preceding paragraph

from Notes on Interim Committee Mtg, 31 May 45,

MDR. See also Memo, 1st Lt R. Gordon Arneson

(Interim Committee Secy) to Harrison, 6 Jun 45,

HB Files, Fldr 100, MDR; Hewlett and Anderson,

New World, pp. 356-59.

29

 The Franck report, signed by Franck and six of

his fellow scientists at the Metallurgical Laboratory

(David J. Hughes, James J. Nickson, Eugene Rabinowitch, Glenn Seaborg, Joyce Stearns, and Leo

Szilard), was published under the title "Before Hiroshima" in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1 May 46.

See also Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 233-36; Hewlett

and Anderson, New World, p. 366.
THE ATOMIC BOMBING OF JAPAN 533

Some members of the Franck group

did not feel that they could depend

upon the scientific panel to bring

their views to the attention of government leaders, so Franck himself carried the report to the capital. There,

Arthur Compton saw to its delivery

on 12 June to George Harrison's

office at the War Department. Harrison, acting in his capacity as alternate

chairman of the Interim Committee,

decided that the Franck report should

be turned over to the scientific panel

for possible inclusion in the latter's

own report on the use of the bomb.

Both the Franck report and the scientific panel's report were discussed

at the meeting of the Interim Committee on the twenty-first. In contrast

to the Franck report's recommendation that the bomb be used first in a

technical demonstration made public

to other countries, the panel's

report—which acknowledged the differing views of project scientists on

how the bomb should be employed—

concluded that it could "propose no

technical demonstration likely to

bring an end to the war . . . [and] see

no acceptable alternative to direct

military use."

 30

 After considering the

panel's views, the Interim Committee

reaffirmed its earlier position "that

the weapon be used against Japan at

the earliest opportunity . . . without

warning, and . . . on a dual target,

namely a military installation or war

plant surrounded by or adjacent to

homes or other buildings most susceptible to damage."

 31

On 21 July, Stimson received not

only Groves's detailed report on the

successful test at Trinity, delivered by

special courier, but also cables from

Harrison indicating that atomic

bombs would be ready sooner than

expected. He promptly passed the

word to American and British leaders

at Potsdam, including President

Truman, Prime Minister Churchill,

Secretary of State Byrnes (as of 3

July), General Marshall, and Lord

Cherwell, all of whom were elated by

the news. On the twenty-fourth, Stimson showed the President the tentative plan of operations, which Groves

had prepared and which he (Stimson)

had received the day before from

Harrison. This plan called for the first

atomic bombing mission any time

after 1 August, subject to completion

of preparations and suitable weather.

Truman accepted the plan without

reservation, for, Stimson recalled,

"that was just what he

wanted. . . ."

 32

30

 Rpt, Scientific Panel, sub: Recommendations on

the Immediate Use of Nuclear Wpns, 16 Jun 45.

This report, one of three prepared by the panel on

various aspects of the control and employment of

atomic energy, is attached to Ltr, Oppenheimer (for

Scientific Panel) to Secy War, Attn: Harrison, 16 Jun

45, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, Groves Files, Fldr 3,

Tab T, MDR.

31

 Notes on Interim Committee Mtg, 21 Jun 45,

MDR; Ltr, Compton to Stimson, 12 Jun 45, and Incl

(unsigned copy of Franck report), OCG Files, Gen

Corresp, Groves Files, Fldr 3, Tab T, MDR; Interim

Committee Log, 12 and 15-16 Jun 45, HB Files,

Fldr 98, MDR; Compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 233-36

and 239-41; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp.

365-69. 32

 Stimson Diary, 16-19 and 21-24 Jul 45 (quotation from 24 July), HLS. Memo, Groves to Secy

War, sub: The Test, 18 Jul 45, HB Files, Fldr 49,

MDR. Msgs, Harrison to Secy War, 21 Jul 45, CMOUT-35988, Tab B; Secy War to Harrison, 23 Jul

45, CM-IN-23487, Tab C; Harrison to Secy War,

23 Jul 45, CM-OUT-36792 and CM-OUT-37350,

Tab A, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 5E,

MDR (copies in HB Files, Fldr 64, MDR). Groves,

Now It Can Be Told, pp. 309-10. Truman later recalled that he had reached a decision in favor of

using the atomic bomb on the basis of recommen- Continued
534 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

On 25 July, General Marshall submitted to Stimson the draft of the

USASTAF directive to proceed with

the atomic bombing of Japan, and the

Secretary—with assurance that all the

Allied leaders favored going ahead

with employment of the bomb—approved it. The directive carefully

spelled out the procedures that were

to govern the atomic bombing

mission:

1. The 509 Composite Group, 20th Air

Force will deliver its first special bomb as

soon as weather will permit visual bomb- ing after about 3 August 1945 on one of

the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata

and Nagasaki. To carry military and civil- ian scientific personnel from the War De- partment to observe and record the ef- fects of the explosion of the bomb, addi- tional aircraft will accompany the airplane

carrying the bomb. The observing planes

will stay several miles distant from the

point of impact of the bomb. 2. Additional bombs will be delivered

on the above targets as soon as made

ready by the project staff. Further instruc- tions will be issued concerning targets

other than those listed above. 3. Dissemination of any or all informa- tion concerning the use of the weapon

against Japan is reserved to the Secretary

of War and the President of the United

States. No communiques on the subject

or release of information will be issued by

Commanders in the field without specific

prior authority. Any news stories will be

sent to the War Department for special

clearance. 4. The foregoing directive is issued to

you by direction and with the approval of

the Secretary of War and of the Chief of

Staff, USA. It is desired that you person- ally deliver one copy of this directive to

General MacArthur and one copy to Ad- miral Nimitz for their information.33

Dropping the Bomb

Manhattan played an important

supporting role in the AAF's execution of the 25 July directive. At the

top level, General Groves continued

to retain a voice in the general direction of the mission, through his

access to General Arnold's staff in

Washington, through his two representatives on Tinian (Colonel Kirkpatrick and, as of 31 July, General

Farrell) and through Admiral Purnell,

whom Admiral King had assigned to

coordinate the bombing with Navy

commanders in the Pacific Theater.34

General Farrell arrived in the Central Pacific area with specific instructions from Groves: to coordinate ongoing preparations for dropping the

first atomic bomb on Japan. Farrell

first stopped on Guam, where he conferred with General LeMay, who

would shortly become USASTAF

dations of his military advisers and after Churchill

had told him at Potsdam that he was convinced it

should be employed "if it might aid to end the war"

(see Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, 2 vols. [Garden

City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1955-56], 1:419).

Truman subsequently informed Air Force historians that he actually gave the order for dropping the

bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the mid-Atlantic while returning to the United States from

Potsdam on board the cruiser USS Augusta (2-7 Aug

45). See Ltr, Truman to Cate, 12 Jan 53, reproduced in Craven and Cate, The Pacific, between pp.

712-13. For a further discussion on the decision to

use the bomb see Louis Morton, "The Decision To

Use the Atomic Bomb," in Command Decisions, ed.

Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 493-518.

33

 Ltr Directive, Handy to Spaatz, 25 Jul 45,

MDR. A copy of the original directive is reproduced

in Craven and Cate, The Pacific, following page 696.

See also Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 308-09. 34

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 311; Memo,

Groves to Chief of Staff, sub: Plan of Opns-Atomic

Fission Bomb, 24 Jul 45, OCG Files, Gen Corresp,

MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab P, MDR; Groves Diary, 24-

26 and 31 Jul 45, LRG; Rpt, Farrell, sub: Overseas

Opns-Atomic Bomb, ca. 15 Sep 45, Admin Files,

Rpts Pertaining to the Effects of the Atomic Bomb,

Farrell, MDR; Testimony of Farrell in Atomic Energy

Hearings on S. Res. 179, p. 502.
THE ATOMIC BOMBING OF JAPAN 535

COL. PAUL W. TIBBETS, JR. (center), WITH GROUND CREW AT TINIAN

chief of staff, and with Admiral

Nimitz. Moving on to Tinian, Farrell

visited Admiral Purnell and Captain

Parsons.35

Farrell spent considerable time with

Parsons, who talked at length about

the intensive activities of the 1st

Technical Detachment on Tinian

during the month of July. The detachment, with assistance from other elements of the 509th and the Navy, had

installed the technical facilities required for assembly and testing of

bomb components, especially with

Little Boy, and had carefully checked

out the emergency reloading facilities

at Iwo Jima. Parsons also informed

Farrell about the function of his

newly formed project technical committee, namely, to assist him in planning and coordinating with AAF

elements the complex final tests and

assembly of both the gun-type and

implosion weapons.36

35

 Rpt, Farrell, sub: Overseas Opns-Atomic

Bomb, ca. 15 Sep 45, MDR; Historical Notes . . . ,

Incl to Ltr, Kirkpatrick to OCEHD, 30 Sep 68,

OCEHD.

36

 Memo, E. J. Doll (Delivery Gp, Tinian) to Parsons, sub: Summary of Spec Mtg (24 Jul 45) of

Wpns Committee, 27 Jul 45; Memo, Norman F.

Ramsey (Delivery Gp, Tinian) to Parsons, sub: Summary of Spec Mtg (27 Jul 45) of Proj Tech Committee, 28 Jul 45, and Incl (Table 1, Schedule of

Events); ibid., sub: Summary of Mtg (30 Jul 45) of

Proj Tech Committee, 6 Aug 45. All in OCG Files, Continued
536 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Component parts and active material for both types of atomic bombs

reached the detachment on Tinian

only shortly before they were actually

used in bombing missions. Those for

Little Boy arrived first. Most of its

components and the U-235 had left

Los Alamos in mid-July in custody of

Maj. Robert R. Furman, a special

projects officer from Groves's Washington headquarters, and Capt. James

F. Nolan, chief medical officer at the

New Mexico installation. They traveled by automobile from Santa Fe to

Albuquerque, by airplane to Hamilton

Field near San Francisco, thence to

Hunters Point to board the cruiser

Indianapolis. Crossing the Pacific in

record time, they reached Tinian on 26

July.37 Two Los Alamos security officers brought the remaining components and the rest of the active material for Little Boy aboard two C-54

cargo aircraft, the first arriving at

Tinian on the twenty-eighth and the

second on the following day.38

The 509th technical teams quickly

assembled the Little Boy unit, and

Parsons requested permission from

Groves to drop it as early as

1 August. But weather conditions for

the first four days of the month were

unsuitable. During this period, the

technical teams and bombing crews

worked on an around-the-clock basis,

perfecting plans for delivering Little

Boy and carrying out tests on Fat

Man rehearsal units. At the same

time, components for the Fat Man arrived at Tinian aboard two B-29's

that Groves had held at Albuquerque

for that purpose and plutonium active

material came in aboard a C-54.39

Finally, on the morning of the fifth,

AAF meteorologists indicated that

visual bombing should be possible

over the target cities on the following

day, and General LeMay directed that

the Little Boy mission would take

place on the sixth. Technical teams

loaded the bomb in the Enola

Gay B-29 aircraft and completed the

final testing of the unit. A few days

earlier bomb technicians had worked

out a method for reducing the danger

of a premature explosion by delaying

final arming until the aircraft was airborne. Captain Parsons, who was to

go on the flight as the bomb commander, had responsibility for performing this function.

The final briefing took place at

midnight, and the weather planes departed for the target area. Hiroshima

was the primary target, Kokura second, and then Nagasaki (see Map 7).

In the meantime, a C-54 had carried Colonel Kirkpatrick and a crew

from the technical group to Iwo Jima

to stand by to transfer the bomb to a

spare B-29 if the strike aircraft had to

land there.40 Tinian Files, Env B, 200 (Kirkpatrick), MDR. See

also MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, pp. XIX.7-XIX.8, DASA. 37

 A Japanese submarine sank the ill-fated Indianapolis four days later en route to the Philippines. See

Richard F. Newcomb, Abandon Ship! Death of the USS

Indianapolis (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,

1958). 38

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, pp. XIX.8-XIX.9, DASA;

Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 305-08; Craven and

Cate, The Pacific, pp. 714-15; Testimonies of Groves

and physicist Philip Morrison (Los Alamos Lab) in

Atomic Energy Hearings on S. Res. 179, pp. 39-40 and

234-35.

39

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, pp. XIX.8 and XIX.10,

DASA; Rpt, Farrell, sub: Overseas Opns-Atomic

Bomb, ca. 15 Sep 45, MDR; Historical Notes . . . ,

Incl to Ltr, Kirkpatrick to OCEHD, 30 Sep 68,

OCEHD; Groves Diary, 4 Aug 45, LRG; Memo,

Groves to Chief of Staff, 6 Aug 45, OCG Files, Gen

Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 5, Tab B, MDR. 40

 MDH, Bk, 8, Vol. 2, XIX.8-XIX.9, DASA;

Memo, Groves to Chief of Staff, 6 Aug 45, MDR; Continued
THE ATOMIC BOMBING OF JAPAN 537

ENOLA GAY AT TINIAN

At 0245 (Tinian time) on 6 August,

with Little Boy in her bomb bay and

Colonel Tibbets at the controls, the

Enola Gay lifted off the Tinian runway,

followed at two-minute intervals by

two observation planes carrying recording instruments and scientific observers, most of them from the Manhattan Project. Tibbets' instructions

were to choose the target on the basis

of reports from the weather planes—

Hiroshima was preferred because it

was the one target that had no American prisoner-of-war camp—and, if all

were closed in, to return with the

bomb.41

Captain Parsons kept the log of the

flight that described in terse phrases

the progress of the historic mission:

0300 Started final loading of gun.

0315 Finished loading.

0605 Headed for the Empire from Iwo.

0730 Red plugs in [these plugs armed

the bomb so it would detonate if

released].

0741 Started climb. Weather report received that weather over primary

and tertiary targets was good but

not secondary target.

0838 Leveled off at 32,700 feet. 0847 All Archies [electronic fuses]

tested to be OK.

0904 Course west.

Historical Notes . . . , Incl to Ltr, Kirkpatrick to

OCEHD, 30 Sep 68, OCEHD; Craven and Cate, The

Pacific, p. 176 41

 At the end of July, General Spaatz had cabled

General Groves, calling attention to the reported location of prisoner-of-war camps near some of the

target areas selected for atomic bombing and requesting advice on how this should affect his orders

to the 509th Composite Group. Groves consulted

with General Handy, the Acting Chief of Staff, and

they agreed that Spaatz should be told to disregard

the purported presence of prisoner-of-war camps in

issuing his orders. Handy, however, believed that

Stimson should be informed of this policy. Accordingly, Groves showed the Secretary of War both the

cable from Spaatz and his reply to the USASTAF

commander. Stimson, by taking no action, in effect

approved the policy. See Groves, Now It Can Be Told,

pp. 312-13.
538 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

0909 Target [Hiroshima] in sight. 09151⁄2 Dropped bomb [Originally sched- uled time was 0915]. Flash fol- lowed by two slaps on plane. Huge cloud. 1000 Still in sight of cloud which must

be over 40,000 feet high. 1003 Fighter reported. 1041 Lost sight of cloud 363 miles from

Hiroshima with the aircraft being

26,000 feet high.42

About fifteen minutes after the

bomb was dropped, Parsons radioed

back to Farrell on Tinian in a special

code: "Results clear cut, successful in

all respects. Visible results greater

than Trinity. Conditions normal in

airplane following delivery. Proceeding to Tinian." Farrell promptly relayed this first report to Groves,

waiting anxiously in Washington, but

because of unexplained communications delays, it did not reach him until

11:30 P.M. (Washington time), 5

August, more than four hours after

the dropping of the bomb. At 4:30

the next morning Groves received a

detailed cable from Farrell, dispatched after return of the Enola Gay

to Tinian. This cable became the

basis of Groves's report to General

Marshall at the Pentagon and, by telephone, to Stimson at home. Farrell's,

cable also provided most of the confirmation Groves needed to clear for

release to the press the President's

statement, prepared earlier by the Interim Committee. The one point on

which the cable lacked sufficient information was the amount of damage

inflicted on Hiroshima. To avoid any

chance of overstatement that might

reduce the announcement's effect on

the Japanese, Groves obtained from

General LeMay on Guam assurance

that the bomb appeared to have

caused enormous destruction. Then

at 11:00 A.M. the President's press

secretary (Truman was still en route

home from Potsdam) released the

statement to the waiting newsmen at

the White House, giving the American people their first news of the

atomic bombing of Japan and of the

wartime project that made it

possible.43

Meanwhile on Tinian, the 509th's

weapon assembly teams prepared for

the first Fat Man mission, scheduled

for 11 August. Rapid progress with

assembly of the implosion unit led

Parsons to propose to Tibbets on the

seventh that the mission be moved up

to the tenth. But forecasts indicated

that a period of bad weather was due

to begin on the tenth and last for five

days. Would it be possible, Tibbets

asked Parsons, to have the bomb

ready by the ninth? Parsons expressed uncertainty as to whether the

bomb could be safely readied in so

short a time, but agreed to try. Working without letup, the technical teams

succeeded in assembling, loading, and

checking the unit by the evening of

the eighth. Kokura was the primary

target and Nagasaki, the secondary

42

 The log is reproduced in MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2,

XIX.9-XIX.10, DASA.

43

 Quote from Rpt, Farrell, sub: Overseas OpnsAtomic Bomb, ca. 15 Sep 45, MDR. Groves, Now It

Can Be Told, pp. 320-31. Farrell's message to Groves

is reprinted on page 323. Groves's report to Marshall on the bombing of Hiroshima is the memorandum of 6 Aug 45, filed in MDR, OCG Files, Gen

Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 5, Tab B. The presidential

statement is in Harry S. Truman, 1945, Public Papers

of the Presidents of the United States (Washington,

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 197-

200.

540 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

objective. Niigata was excluded as

being too far away from Tinian.44

Shortly before dawn on 9 August,

the B-29 strike plane Bock's Car, with

Maj. Charles W. Sweeney as pilot and

Commander Ashworth as the bomb

commander, prepared to take off with

two observer aircraft. Sweeney's original flight plan designated the same

route to Japan via the Volcano Islands

followed by the Hiroshima mission,

again to provide for an emergency

stop if needed on Iwo Jima. Again

Colonel Kirkpatrick awaited with a

bomb-loading team and a spare B-29.

Just before lift-off, the Bock's Car crew

discovered that the fuel pump for the

plane's reserve gasoline tank in the

bomb bay was not working properly.

Normally such a mechanical problem

would have aborted the mission. But

faced with a prediction of worsening

weather and knowing the importance

to the Allied surrender negotiations

with Japan of having a second atomic

bomb attack closely follow the first,

Farrell decided to risk going ahead

with the mission.45

The defective fuel pump was only

one of a number of difficulties that

were to make the second atomic

bombing mission as eventful as the

first was routine. Taking off at about

0347,46 the strike plane and accompanying aircraft did not attempt to fly in

formation because of the bad weather

between Tinian and Iwo Jima. To get

around this weather and to save fuel,

they headed separately for a rendezvous point at Yaku-shima off the coast

of Japan. Commander Ashworth succinctly recorded in the log of the

flight the succeeding series of events

that threatened the mission with failure and very nearly with disaster:

0900 Arrived rendezvous point at Yaka- shima [sic] and circled awaiting ac- companying aircraft.

0920 One B-29 sighted and joined in

formation.

0950 Departed from Yakashima [sic]

proceeding to primary target

Kokura having failed to rendez- vous with second B-29. The

weather reports received by radio

indicated good weather at Kokura

(3/10 low clouds, no intermediate

or high clouds, and forecast of im- proving conditions). The weather

reports for Nagasaki were good

but increasing cloudiness was

forecast. For this reason the pri- mary target was selected. 1044 Arrived initial point and started

bombing runs on target. Target

was obscured by heavy ground

haze and smoke. Two additional

runs were made hoping that the

target might be picked up after

closer observations. However, at no time was the aiming point

seen. It was then decided to pro- ceed to Nagasaki after approxi- mately 45 minutes spent in target

area.

At this point, Ashworth and Sweeney determined they had only enough

gasoline to make a single bombing

run over Nagasaki, if they were to

reach the closest alternate landing

44

 MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, XIX.10-XIX.11, DASA;

Rpt, Farrell, sub: Overseas Opns-Atomic Bomb, ca.

15 Sep 45, MDR; Craven and Cate, The Pacific, pp.

718-19. 45

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 344. 46

 The 0347 takeoff time is recorded by Ashworth

in the log of the mission. Other sources vary as to

the precise moment of lift-off. Farrell states in his

15 September report that the time was 0348;

Craven and Cate, the Air Force historians, fix it at

0349 (The Pacific, p. 719); and New York Times science reporter William Laurence, who was riding as

an observer in one of the instrument planes, recorded it as 0350 (Dawn Over Zero, p. 231). Ashworth'slog is reprinted in MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, pp. XIX.11-

XIX.12, DASA
THE ATOMIC BOMBING OF JAPAN 541

field on Okinawa. More than one run

would require ditching Bock's Car:

1150 Arrived in Nagasaki target area. Approach to target was entirely by

radar. At 1150 the bomb was

dropped after a 20 second visual

bombing run. The bomb functioned normally in all respects. 1205 Departed for Okinawa after having

circled smoke column. . . .

1351 Landed at Yontan Field, Okinawa. 1706 Departed Okinawa for Tinian. 2245 Landed at Tinian.

Ashworth radioed first word of the

bombing of Nagasaki to Farrell on

Tinian while Bock's Car was en route

to Okinawa, indicating some uncertainty as to the results, although the

visible effects appeared to him about

equivalent to those at Hiroshima. On

Okinawa, Ashworth consulted with all

the crews and observers and concluded that the implosion bomb had been

satisfactorily placed over the target.

They reported that the flash was

brighter, the shock waves greater, and

the cloud was larger and moved up

faster than at Hiroshima. But photographs taken four hours after the

strike showed little because of the

cloud, smoke, and dust cover. Only

days later would additional photographs reveal that the entire industrial part of Nagasaki and a considerable

part of the residential area had been

destroyed.47

The Surrender of Japan

As soon as he received word of the

successful bombing of Nagasaki, General Groves felt certain Japan's capitulation would follow. He went at once

to see General Marshall to discuss

future operations against Japan. They

agreed that, in view of Stimson's

policy of using the bomb only to end

the war, shipment of materials for a

third bomb should be delayed until

13 August. When by that date the

Japanese still had not surrendered,

neither the Secretary of War nor the

Chief of Staff was available to Groves

for consultation because of the continuing negotiations for an armistice.

Groves then went to General Thomas

T. Handy, Acting Chief of Staff, and

informed him that he would order the

continued holding of all fissionable

materials in the United States, requesting Handy to pass this information on to Stimson and Marshall at

the earliest opportunity. Meanwhile,

project personnel at Los Alamos and

on Tinian also continued in full readiness to prepare and deliver additional

atomic bombs.48

The march of events vindicated

Groves in his decision. On 14 August,

President Truman received a message

from the Japanese government that

constituted full and satisfactory acceptance of the Allied terms of surrender, as set forth in the Potsdam

Declaration. The judicious employment of atomic bombs in tandem with

a series of warnings to the Japanese

government of more to come if it did

not yield had comprised the strategy

in the final successful maneuverings

for the surrender. To the average observer in the West in mid-1945, the

Japanese decision to comply with

Allied terms appeared to be the direct

result of the atomic bombing of Hiro- 47

 For other accounts of the bombing of Nagasaki

see Craven and Cate, The Pacific, p. 719-21; Laurence, Dawn Over Zero, pp. 228-43; Groves, Now It

Can Be Told, pp. 344-46. 48

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 352-53.
542 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

shima and Nagasaki, the Soviet

Union's declaration of war against

Japan on 9 August, and the Allied

promise not to alter the legal position

of Emperor Hirohito. Yet, with the

advantage of hindsight and a detailed

knowledge of developments within

Japan in the weeks preceding the surrender, a leading historian on the

subject makes clear that the "decision—in embryo—had long been

taking shape."

 49

By the spring of 1945, the Japanese

armed forces had brought the Empire

to the brink of disaster. Broad public

support for the military had begun to

disintegrate as the people of Japan

came to realize that the very survival

of their country was threatened.

When Premier Kantaro Suzuki replaced General Hideki Tojo in April,

the government initiated a definite

campaign to seek an end of the war

on terms acceptable to the ruling

elite. But this campaign, begun in

June with efforts to open peace negotiations through the Soviet Union,

was of little avail as long as the Japanese militarists dominated the government and the Allies were unwilling

to guarantee the future status of the

Emperor. Only the shock impact of

the atomic bombings of Hiroshima

and Nagasaki, combined with the

Soviet entry into the war, created

"that unusual atmosphere in which

the theretofore static factors of the

Emperor could be made active in

such an extraordinary way as to work

what was virtually a political miracle. . . . It was the nation's good fortune that, in spite of the existence of

a hard-headed and strongwilled corps

of fanatics, the men responsible for

the movement to terminate the war

were finally able, under the circumstances of 1945, to give the fullest

possible effect to the depth of appeal

in the voice of the man who is the supreme symbol in Japanese life and

thought."

 50

The surrender of Japan on 14

August completed the mission of

Manhattan's Project Alberta group,

assigned to the 1st Technical Detachment, on Tinian. Most technical personnel of the Alberta group originally

planned to return to the United

States on the twentieth, leaving only a

small team under General Farrell that

was to go to Japan to investigate the

results of the bombing. But when

delays developed in arranging surrender procedures, General Groves requested that essential project personnel remain on Tinian pending successful completion of the occupation

of Japan. Project Alberta scientists

and technicians finally left Tinian on

7 September. Colonel Kirkpatrick and

Commander Ashworth stayed behind

to make final disposition of project

property, taking special care to return

to Los Alamos under guard or to

dump in the sea any items likely to

reveal information about the bomb.

Some project property went with the

investigating teams assembled under

General Farrell, to be used in surveying the effects of atomic bombing on

Hiroshima and Nagasaki.51

49

 Robert J. C. Butow, Japan's Decision To Surrender

(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1954),

p. 231.

50

 Ibid., pp. 231 and 233. 51

 For the official account of the closing out of

Project Alberta see MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, p. XIX.13,

DASA.
THE ATOMIC BOMBING OF JAPAN 543

Survey of the Bombing Effects

The swift surrender of Japan

opened the way for American scientific teams to survey, on the ground, the

specific effects of the atomic bombing

of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Not only

were scientists, medical personnel,

and professional military men greatly

interested in learning the results of

the first employment of atomic weapons in warfare, but also the commanders of the occupation troops

that were scheduled shortly to move

into the two bombed cities desired a

check of the possible hazards with

which they might have to cope. Although Manhattan scientists were virtually sure that detonation of the

atomic bombs a considerable distance

above the ground had eliminated the

likelihood of any lingering large-scale

radioactivity in the two cities, lacking

previous experience they could not be

certain without actual inspection of

the affected areas.52

Thus, when General Groves heard

from General Marshall on 10 August

that the Japanese had started surrender negotiations, he took steps to organize Manhattan Project teams to

carry out atomic investigations in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as elsewhere in the home islands. On the

eleventh, the Manhattan commander

directed District Engineer Nichols to

select qualified project personnel and

procure the special equipment the

teams would need to perform their

mission. He also sent instructions to

General Farrell that he was to be in

command of the Manhattan survey

teams going into Japan. Farrell began

to assemble medical, scientific, and

intelligence personnel already on

Tinian to participate in the investigations. On the twelfth, three days

before General MacArthur's appointment as Supreme Commander for the

Allied Powers (SCAP), Japan, General

Marshall informed him of the purpose

of the survey groups, clearing the way

for their early entry into Japan.

Meanwhile, Colonel Nichols, with

assistance primarily from the medical

staff of the District, hurriedly brought

together fifteen officers and twelve

52

 This account of the effects of atomic bombs on

Hiroshima and Nagasaki is based primarily upon the

following sources: MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4, "Auxiliary

Activities," Ch. 6 (Investigation of the After Effects

of the Bombing in Japan), DASA; Ms, MED, "The

Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki," June

1946, LC; MED, "Photographs of the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki," June 1946, LC;

Austin M. Brues et al., comps., General Report of

Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, January 1947 (Washington, D.C.: National Research Council, 1947); The

Committee for the Compilation of Materials on

Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima

and Nagasaki, ed., Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings,

trans. Eisei Ishikawa and David L. Swain (New

York: Basic Books, 1981); United States Strategic

Bombing Survey, The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima

and Nagasaki (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946); Atomic Energy Hearings S. Res. 179,

Nov 45-Feb 46; Statements by Yoshio Nishina (Institute of Physical and Chemical Research, Tokyo,

Japan), 12 Aug 48 and 4 May 50, in Ms, Historical

Division, Military Intelligence Section, General

Headquarters, Far East Command, "Statement of

Japanese Officials on World War II," copy in CMH.

On medical aspects see Memo, sub: Toxic Effects of

the Atomic Bomb, 12 Aug 45, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 5, Tab G, MDR; Radiology in

World War II, pp. 831-919; Michihiko Hachiya, Hiroshima Diary: The Journal of a Japanese Physician, August

6-September 30, 1945, ed. and trans. Warner Wells

(Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina

Press, 1955); Office of Civil Defense, Office of the

Secretary of War (Japan), and Technical Management Office, U.S. Naval Radio, Analysis of Japanese

Nuclear Casualty Data, comps. L. Wayne Davis et al.

(Albuquerque, N.Mex.: Dikewood Corp., April

1966); United States Strategic Bombing Survey,

Medical Division, The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Health

and Medical Services in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947).
544 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

enlisted men from the Clinton Laboratories, Metallurgical Laboratory,

Los Alamos, the Monsanto Chemical

Company, and the University of

Rochester. Comprised chiefly of medical scientists and individuals trained

in taking radiation measurements, this

group rendezvoused on the twelfth at

Hamilton Field in California and departed for Tinian on the following

day.

When the project's survey group

reached Tinian on the sixteenth, they

joined the group General Farrell had

organized, which included not only

Manhattan personnel but also several

AAF representatives and two interpreters. Groves had designated Major

Furman, who had participated in

Manhattan's scientific intelligence activities in Europe, to lead a unit with

a similar mission of investigating the

progress of atomic research in Japan.

While the assembled survey personnel marked time in late August, General Farrell formed them into three

teams. The first team going to Japan

included Farrell himself, Brig. Gen.

James B. Newman, Jr., of the AAF,

who served as his deputy; medical

and intelligence officers; and officers

trained in metallurgy. In the other

two teams, he included chiefly medical officers. Col. Stafford L. Warren,

chief of the Manhattan District's Medical Section, commanded the Nagasaki

group, while his deputy in the Medical Section, Lt. Col. Hymer L. Friedell, led the Hiroshima team.

Negotiations with the Japanese to

arrange for an early entry into Hiroshima and Nagasaki culminated in

formation of a special party, comprised mostly of medical personnel

from the International Red Cross, the

Army Medical Corps, MacArthur's

staff, and the Manhattan Project. The

Manhattan contingent consisted of

Farrell, Newman, Warren (whom Farrell had relieved temporarily of his assignment as chief of the Nagasaki

team so that he could serve as his

medical consultant), and a medical

and an intelligence officer. The special party, accompanied by two

representatives of the Japanese

government, flew into Hiroshima on

8 September. Using Geiger counters

and other instruments, members of

the party checked through the destroyed area of the city, determining

that no significant amounts of radioactivity persisted. A Signal Corps

photographer with the party took

some of the first official pictures of

the damage wrought by the bomb.

Completing the preliminary survey in

a few days, the special party (except

for Farrell and Newman who had left

earlier for a hurried visit to Nagasaki)

returned to Tokyo.

Meanwhile, Colonel Warren's team

reached Nagasaki on 17 September

and began three weeks of intensive

investigation of damage and injuries

wrought by the bomb in that city. The

group concentrated on gathering data

concerning the nature of casualties. It

examined survivors in the nearby

Omura Naval Hospital and obtained

autopsy records of those who were

killed or died of injuries. A new detail

of officers from the Army Medical

Corps relieved Warren's team in early

October, and it departed from Nagasaki on the sixth, arriving back in the

United States on the fifteenth.

A series of typhoons prevented

Colonel Friedell's team from reaching

Hiroshima until 26 September. It had

only about a week to carry out investi-
THE ATOMIC BOMBING OF JAPAN 545

gations designed to supplement the

preliminary data collected by Farrell's

party. Departing Hiroshima on 3 October, Friedell's team joined the Nagasaki group for the return trip to the

United States.

Other investigative groups, some of

them sponsored by the Army, also

conducted surveys of the effects of

the atomic bombing of Japan in late

1945 and 1946. SCAP headquarters

had established a Joint Commission

for the Investigation of the Atomic

Bombing of Japan during the period

when the Manhattan Project survey

was in progress. Commission teams

comprised chiefly of Army medical

personnel and Japanese scientists

worked closely with the Manhattan

teams, which were viewed as part of

the commission's survey organization.

The commission's personnel continued to work in Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the departure of the Manhattan teams, extending studies

begun by the bomb project groups.

The Manhattan teams also cooperated with the group sent to Japan by

the United States Strategic Bombing

Survey (USSBS), an organization established by the War Department in

1944. The USSBS had received a request from the President in August

1945 to conduct a study of the effects

of all types of air attack in the war

against Japan, including the employment of atomic bombs. In addition,

the Secretary of War retained Maj. Alexander de Seversky, a well-known

aviator and aeronautics engineer, to

serve as his special consultant on the

results of employing air power in the

Pacific Theater, including the atomic

bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The Navy had its own special investigative unit, the Naval Technical Mission to Japan, which collaborated with

Manhattan teams. The British Mission

arrived too late to work with the Manhattan groups, but cooperated with

the USSBS in surveys of Hiroshima

and Nagasaki in November 1945.

All of the survey groups eventually

published reports of their observations and conclusions concerning the

effects of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Manhattan

District released its report on 30 June

1946, summarizing the physical

damage, medical findings, and other

pertinent observations made by its

survey teams.

Both cities had suffered extensive

physical damage to structures and

other inanimate objects as a result of

the tremendous blast and conflagration, the latter caused by heat from

the atomic explosion, collapse of

buildings, overturned stoves, shorting

out of electrical systems, and spread

of fire. Within a radius of 1 mile of

the epicenter of the explosion, destruction in both cities was virtually

complete, except for the frames of a

few reinforced concrete buildings. Because of differences in topography

and layout of the cities, more than 5

square miles of Hiroshima were totally devastated, while only 3 square

miles of Nagasaki were similarly destroyed. In the relatively flat terrain

of Hiroshima there was heavy damage

to almost everything up to 2 miles

from the blast center, destruction of

50 percent or more up to 3 miles,

and comparatively light damage for

several miles beyond, with broken

glass as far away as 12 miles. In the

rougher terrain of Nagasaki, severe

damage extended for about 3 miles

north and south in the valley where
546 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

PHYSICAL DAMAGE AT HIROSHIMA

the bomb had been dropped and generally shorter distances up the hillsides to the east and west, but with

partial damage or fire as far as 4

miles out from the blast center at certain points.

The various survey groups were

able to obtain a reasonably accurate

assessment of the actual physical

damage, but they all experienced

greater difficulty in securing a clear

picture of the effect on the inhabitants of the two cities. The Manhattan

teams, for example, were handicapped by the length of time that had

elapsed before they were able to

enter the cities. They also found that

Japanese public officials lacked precise statistical data on the actual population of the two stricken communities at the time of the bombings and

on the subsequent movement of

people in and out of the cities. The

extensive destruction of such recordkeeping civil organizations as hospitals, fire and police departments, and

other government agencies further

complicated the collection of accurate

statistics.

Thus, the Manhattan teams had to

derive most of their medical data

from examining the injured; analysis

of death records, including autopsy

reports; and tabulation of such data

as the Japanese had compiled. The

District released its survey results in

June 1946, including the estimate of

casualties that differed somewhat

from those released by other groups

(Table 3).
THE ATOMIC BOMBING OF JAPAN 547

TABLE 3—COMPARATIVE ESTIMATES OF ATOMIC BOMBING CASUALTIES IN WORLD WAR II

Sources: Ms, MED, "The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki," June 1946, LC; USSBS, The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Health and Medical Services in Hiroshima and Nagasaki; OSW (Japan) and USNR, Analysis of Japanese Nuclear Casualty Data. See also MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4, pp 6.12-6.15, DASA.

Manhattan's survey data did not

mention that American prisoners of

war held in a camp in Hiroshima were

among the atomic bombing casualties.

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Army

Forces, Pacific, had received information that about twenty American

airmen from the crews of airplanes

shot down over Japan were killed in

the bombing of Hiroshima. Subsequent information provided by Japanese officials appeared to confirm the

presence of the airmen in Hiroshima

on 6 August 1945.53

A primary objective of the Manhattan survey teams was to ascertain the

particular kinds of injuries suffered,

with special attention to the effects of

radioactivity. By far the largest

number of casualties resulted from

burns traceable to the heat of the explosion and the fires generated by it

and secondary causes. Other major

sources of injury were falling debris,

pressure of the blast, and radiation.

Most radiation injuries occurred from

exposure of the victims to gamma

rays at the time of the explosion.

There was little evidence of casualties

from alpha and beta rays and from residual radioactivity in the bombed-out

areas.

While giving less attention to the

psychological impact, the teams nevertheless ranked terror with physical

damage and human death and injury

as the three most important effects of

the new weapon. They particularly

noted the immediate panic caused by

the explosions, followed by a temporary mass exodus from the cities.

Residents who had generally ignored

the appearance of only one or two

enemy aircraft moved promptly into

air raid shelters at the slightest indication of enemy air activity overhead.

The USSBS, unlike the Manhattan

survey, devoted considerable effort to

trying to determine the effects of the

bombs on the attitude of the Japanese

people toward the war and the decision of the Japanese government to

surrender. It reaffirmed the substantial adverse impact the bombs had on

the morale of the local inhabitants of

53

 See CINCAFPAC Msgs, 23 Sep and 18 Oct 45,

HRC Files, 471.6 (Bombs, Atomic), CMH; Telecons,

Ruth Markwood (Gen Ref Br, CMH) to Maj G.

Chase (OCINFO, DA), sub: Names of Americans

Killed by Hiroshima Atomic Bombing, 17 and 26

Apr 72, HRC Files, 384.5 (Aerial Attacks and RaidsAtomic Bomb), CMH; Washington Post, 11-12 Jul 70.
548 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

ATOMIC BOMBING CASUALTIES AT

NAGASAKI

Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But the

USSBS found that, in the relatively

brief period between the dropping of

the bombs and the start of surrender

negotiations, people elsewhere in

Japan had "neither time nor understanding of the revolutionary threat

of the atomic bomb . . . to see in

[them] a final blow to Japan's prospects for victory or negotiated

peace."

 54

 The USSBS concluded also

that, while the bombs had some

impact on the leaders of the Japanese

government, their knowledge of the

awesome character of the new

weapon seems not to have played a

significant part in convincing them of

the need to surrender.

The USSBS and virtually all the

other survey groups that inspected

the results of the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki agreed with the

Manhattan teams' assessment that the

atomic bomb was indeed a revolutionary new device capable of inflicting

damage and casualties on a scale far

beyond any existing weapon available

for use in modern warfare. The one

dissent to this view among the survey

groups came from Major de Seversky,

who had made a hurried one-man inspection of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

in the fall of 1945. He contended that

the other survey groups had greatly

exaggerated the effects of the bombs

and misinterpreted the character of

the destruction they had wrought. He

asserted that about 200 B-29's loaded

with incendiaries could have accomplished an equivalent amount of

damage. Furthermore, he argued,

atomic bombs dropped on modern

cities, such as New York or Chicago,

would do no more damage than a 10-

ton blockbuster. The wide circulation

of de Seversky's conclusions in newspapers and the publication of his article, "Atomic Bomb Hysteria," in the

February 1946 issue of Reader's Digest

created a public controversy. As a

result, the Senate Special Committee

on Atomic Energy, at work on preparing legislation for the peacetime control of the new energy source, invited

de Seversky and representatives of

the Manhattan Project, the USSBS,

and other appropriate organizations

to present their views at its 15 February session.55

54 USSBS, The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima

and Nagasaki, p. 22.

55 Atomic Energy Hearings on S. Res. 179, pp. 453-

551. The Senate in late October 1945 had established a Special Committee on Atomic Energy to

deal with "problems relating to the development,

use, and control of atomic energy" (ibid., p. 1). De

Seversky reported to the Secretary of War on the Continued
THE ATOMIC BOMBING OF JAPAN 549

SURVIVORS OF THE NAGASAKI BOMBING returning to the devastated city

Representing the Manhattan Project

at the hearing were General Farrell

and Colonel Warren. Farrell concentrated on refuting de Seversky's

downgrading of the psychological and

physical effects of the bombing of

Japan. De Seversky, he said, underestimated the psychological damage created by the instantaneousness of an

atomic explosion and the lack of any

effective defense against it. He challenged the accuracy of de Seversky's

data on the comparative damage possible with conventional air weapons

and stated that the evidence collected

by the Manhattan survey teams indicated that at least 703 B-29's would

be required to do the physical

damage caused by the atomic bomb at

Hiroshima. While expressing concern

with the popular tendency to overestimate the power of the bombs, Farrell

asserted that "if two bombs will do

what was done to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, put two cities out of commission and stop a war, I think it is [sic] a

fairly effective weapon."

 56

Colonel Warren generally supplemented General Farrell's testimony

on the extensive physical damage,

caused by fire and the blast effect, in

Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He emphasized especially the difficulty of arriving at any accurate conclusions on

what had actually happened on the results of his study of air power in the Pacific Theater in a letter dated 1 1 February 1946. That part of

the letter which relates to the atomic bombing of

Japan is reproduced in ibid., pp. 493-501. 56

 Testimony of Farrell in ibid., p. 505.
550 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

basis of observations made and information gathered in the period of a

few days of hurried inspection, such

as that carried out by Major de Seversky. He cited, for example, the impossibility of arriving at an accurate

estimate of casualties without a great

deal more investigation and analysis,

as the Japanese themselves were not

able to furnish reliable statistics. Because of confusion, shock, and panic,

Japanese medical officials had not

kept adequate records of mortalities

and injuries caused by the bombs.

Colonel Warren reinforced General

Farrell's conclusion "that a tremendous amount of destruction occurred" and the atomic bomb had accomplished "the job it was intended

to do."

 57

For the most part representatives of

the USSBS and other experts supported the views expressed by Farrell

and Warren. In the face of almost

unanimous disagreement, de Seversky

persisted in his contention that a Hiroshima-type atomic bomb was not any

more effective against the stone, concrete, and brick structures in Western

cities than a well-placed 10-ton blockbuster. He did concede, however, that

a final understanding of the potentialities of atomic bombs as weapons of

war would be possible only after a

much more thorough and careful investigation and analysis of their effects on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Personnel of the Manhattan Project

had participated in almost every

aspect of the planning and preparations for employment of atomic

bombs against Japan: in the decision

to use the bombs against Japanese

cities; in the choice of targets; in the

development of an overseas base;

and, finally, in the assessment of the

damage wrought. The destruction of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked their

efforts with complete technical success and contributed significantly to

ending World War II. Yet the respite

that the project's success had afforded was momentary, for looming on

the horizon was another threat to the

security of the nations of the world—

how to control this revolutionary new

force in a peacetime environment. In

face of this profound problem, the

Manhattan Project would continue to

operate in the emerging postwar

period and its personnel would

assume a role in guiding the domestic

and international efforts to ensure

that atomic energy would best serve

the needs of mankind. 57

 Testimony of Warren in ibid., p. 513.
PART FIVE

COMPLETING THE ATOMIC MISSION

CHAPTER XXVII

The Atomic Age and Its Problems

Employment of an atomic bomb

against Japan demonstrated to the

world that atomic energy was no

longer an experimental hypothesis,

but a material reality. A creation of

the new atomic age, this awesome

weapon of mass destruction heralded

the onset of a multitude of fundamental political, social, and economic

problems for national leaders in the

emerging postwar era. As Secretary

Stimson cautioned in his memorandum to the press shortly after the

bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,

"great events have happened. The

world is changed and it is time for

sober thought."

 l

Anticipating the likely ramifications

of the atomic bombing mission, the

leaders of the Manhattan Project in

the summer of 1945 concentrated

their efforts on two problem areas

deemed as priority matters: releasing

just enough information on the

atomic project to inform the general

public without violating essential military security, and participating more

actively in developing the means of

peacetime control of the new source

of energy both at home and abroad.

"The result of the bomb is so terrific," the Secretary warned in his pronouncement, "that the responsibility

of its possession and its use must

weigh heavily on our minds and on

our hearts."

 2 Even those at Trinity

who had witnessed the birth of the

new age had felt within moments of

the first atomic explosion "their profound responsibility to help in guiding into right channels the tremendous forces which had been unlocked

for the first time in history".3

The Atomic Story: Informing the Public

The bombing of Japan, in an instant, catapulted the Manhattan

Project's closely guarded secret—development of an atomic weapon for

military use—into the public limelight. This event precipitated a seemingly endless barrage of requests for

information, but project leaders were

prepared with official statements on

selected aspects of the atomic story.

"In accord with its policy of keeping

the people of the nation as completely informed as is consistent with national security, the War Department

wishes to make known at this time, at

1

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4, "Auxiliary Activities," Ch.

8, Press Release No. 29, Comment by Secy War on

Use of Atomic Bomb, 9 Aug 45, DASA.

2

 Ibid. 3

 Ibid., Press Release No. 4, First Test Conducted

in New Mexico, 6 Aug 45, DASA.
554 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

least in broad dimension, the story

behind this tremendous weapon. . . .

Other statements will be released

which will give further details concerning the scientific and production

aspects of the project and will give

proper recognition to the scientists,

technicians, and the men of industry

and labor who have made this

weapon possible."

 4

The official statements released to

the public following the bombings of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the

result of a carefully designed public

relations program, begun in early

1944. At this time, Manhattan's military and scientific leaders had perceived that, from the standpoint of security, the release of some selected

information would make it easier to

maintain the secrecy of the highly

classified, patented aspects of the

project. With the objective of preserving essential military security while

also adequately informing the American people, the public relations program was planned along two broad

lines: preparation of a series of public

releases, and preparation of an administrative and scientific history of

the project.

Press Releases

Responsibility for preparation of

the press releases—to include public

statements for the President, the Secretary of War, and other government

leaders—in large measure, fell initially upon General Groves and his

Washington staff. The need for professional guidance was apparent.

Groves contemplated borrowing Jack

Lockhart, liaison official for atomic

energy matters in the Office of Censorship, but pressing job commitments made him unavailable for the

assignment. Lockhart, however, suggested that Groves approach William

Laurence, the well-known science reporter of the New York Times. Responding to the Manhattan commander's request, the managing editor of

the Times readily agreed to release

Laurence for as long as he was

needed by the atomic project.5

During the early months of 1945,

Groves cleared the way for Laurence

to visit the principal atomic installations and to interview the major participants. He also arranged for Laurence to observe the final significant

events in the development of atomic

weapons, including the Trinity test

and the bombing of Japan. With assistance from public relations personnel at each site, Laurence wrote most

of the press releases on various

project activities and events and then

circulated them to the appropriate

project officials for review.6

Because official releases from highranking members of government

would constitute important pronouncements on future atomic energy

policy, final responsibility for these

statements was assigned to the Interim Committee. The committee agreed

that Laurence should draft the statements and submit them to Arthur

Page, a long-time friend and aide of

the Secretary of War, for review.

Page, in turn, would submit the drafts

4

 Ibid., Press Release No. 2, Statement by Secy

War, 6 Aug 45, DASA.

5

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 325-26; MPC

Min, 24 Feb 45, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files,

Fldr 23, Tab A, MDR. 6

 For examples of the press releases prepared by

Laurence see MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4, Ch. 8, DASA.
THE ATOMIC AGE AND ITS PROBLEMS 555

to the committee. As work progressed, the committee asked 1st Lt.

R. Gordon Arneson, an officer on

Stimson's staff serving as the committee's secretary, to assist Laurence and

Page. The three worked first on the

Trinity test press releases and then

on those to be issued by the President

and the Secretary of War following

the bombing of Japan. At its meeting

on 21 June, the committee suggested

a number of changes to the preliminary drafts and formed a subcommittee, consisting of Page and a representative from General Groves's

office, to redraft the statements.7

After the June meeting, the burden

of shaping the press releases into

final form fell largely to the personal

staffs of Stimson and Groves. The

Secretary's staff took responsibility

for coordination with the British and

for securing approval of the statements by Stimson and the President.

The Potsdam Conference and the

defeat of Churchill in the British parliamentary elections at the end of July

complicated the coordinating process,

but did not result in any radical

changes in the statements as earlier

approved by the committee. Groves's

staff prepared such additional releases

as would be needed following that of

the Secretary of War.8

As the time neared for releasing information to the public, Groves reorganized the Manhattan Project's

public relations program to ensure

close coordination between the public

relations officers at each installation

and the District's Intelligence and Security Division and to retain within

his office strong control over all releases. He assigned Lt. Col. William

A. Consodine, a lawyer and experienced newspaper writer who was serving as a security officer on his staff, to

take charge of public relations in his

Washington headquarters and also

designated those officers who were to

oversee public relations activities at

each of the major installations.

Groves emphasized the necessity for

direct liaison at all times and specified, in some detail, the precise limitations on publication of information,

particularly on that relating to scientific matters. As a guide for the public

relations officers, the Manhattan commander provided the district engineer

with a specific list of those subjects

that were to be omitted from all

releases and outlined the mechanics

for clearing material for publication,

photographs, motion pictures, and

radio.9

When authorized, the release of

prepared statements was carefully

controlled and adroitly managed.

Within sixteen hours of the Hiro7

 See Ch. 26 on the establishment and membership of the Interim Committee. Interim Committee

Log, 9, 14, 19 May and 15, 18, 20-21 Jun 45, HB

Files, Fldr 98, MDR; Notes on Interim Committee

Mtgs, 14 May and 1 and 21 Jun 45, HB Files, Fldr

100, MDR. See also Notes on Interim Committee

Mtg, 18 May 45, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, Groves

Files, Fldr 3, Tab O, MDR. 8

 Interim Committee Log, 21, 26 Jun and 1, 5-7,

10-11, 19, 28 Jul 45, MDR; Notes on Interim Committee Mtg, 6 Jul 45, MDR; Memo, Conant and

Bush to Harrison, 25 Jun 45, HB Files, Fldr 79,

MDR; Memo, Arneson to Harrison, 25 Jun 45, HB

Files, Fldr 100, MDR; Memo, [Rogers Makins (British embassy staff member in Wash., D.C.) to Harrison], 16 Jul 45, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files,

Fldr 12, Tab S, MDR. The exchange of messages

(30 Jul-6 Aug 45) between the President and the

Secretary of War concerning last-minute changes in

the President's statement are in HB Files, Fldr 64,

MDR. 9

 Ltr, Groves to Dist Engr, sub: MED Pub Rels

Prgm, 26 Jul 45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 000.71

(Releasing Info), MDR.
556 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

shima bombing, the President announced to the American public: "It

is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing

of the basic power of the universe.

The force from which the sun draws

it[s] power has been loosed against

those who brought war to the Far

East." After giving the people a brief

glimmer into the atomic story, he

continued that "science and industry

worked under the direction of the

United States Army . . . [to effect]

the greatest achievement of organized

science in history [and that] the Secretary of War, who has kept in personal touch with all phases of the

project, will immediately make a

public statement giving further details."

 10

 The release of Stimson's

statement came shortly after the

President's. In it he provided selected

facts on Manhattan's atomic activities

and promised that "every effort is

being bent toward assuring that this

weapon and the new field of science

that stands behind it will be employed

wisely in the interests of the security

of peace-loving nations and the wellbeing of the world."

 11

In the press releases that followed

in the days before and after the

bombing of Nagasaki, the American

people learned the truth about the

"explosion" at Trinity and significant

aspects about harnessing atomic

energy and its future applications.

They also received selected background information on Manhattan's

atomic processes, production plants,

communities, and significant personalities, both military and civilian.

From a public relations standpoint,

War Department and Manhattan

Project officials could view their wellplanned and well-orchestrated program of public releases as a substantial success. While unfolding the

drama of the atomic story in surprisingly detailed episodes, the program

managed to adhere to its central objective, the preservation of essential

military security.

The Smyth Report

In the course of the development of

the atomic bomb, a number of the

scientific leaders of the project—notably James B. Conant, Vannevar Bush,

Arthur Compton, and Henry D.

Smyth—foresaw the need to release

to the public, as soon as an atomic

weapon was used, a report of some

type that recounted the technical

accomplishments of the wartime

project. General Groves went along

with this proposal, perceiving that the

release of carefully selected information would make maintaining the secrecy of the rest easier. Consequently,

in early April 1944, Groves conferred

with Conant and Smyth concerning

the preparation of a report for ultimate public release.

A short time later, after further

consideration of the proposed idea,

Groves requested Smyth to undertake

the task of preparing the report. Both

Groves and Conant viewed the

Princeton University physicist as an

excellent choice. He had been associated with the project in various capacities since 1941, starting as a member

of the Uranium Section of the National Defense Research Committee

(NDRC) and its successor organizations, then serving as a division head

10

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4, Ch. 8, Press Release No.

1, Statement by President of the United States,

DASA. 11

 Ibid., Press Release No. 2, DASA.
THE ATOMIC AGE AND ITS PROBLEMS 557

GENERAL GROVES (center left) HOLDING A PRESS CONFERENCE at District headquarters

and associate director of the Metallurgical Laboratory, and was currently

acting as a consultant to the University of Chicago program. On 21 April,

Smyth informed Groves that he would

be happy to accept the responsibility

for the assignment, and in May the

Military Policy Committee approved

both preparation of the report and

the selection of Smyth as its author.12

From the outset, General Groves

made a special effort to facilitate

Smyth's work. Manhattan provided

him secretarial service and guards for

his Princeton office, and Groves

cleared security barriers so Smyth

could visit the various project sites,

confer with key personnel, and examine pertinent documents. In a letter

to all heads of the major Manhattan

installations, Groves wrote: "The purpose is to give clearly and promptly

recognition to those who have worked

so long and necessarily so anonymously. . . . To accomplish his purpose, Dr. Smyth must have rather

complete information concerning

your phase of the project including

access to necessary documents . . .

[and] information and advice from

you and your principal assistants."

 13

12

 Ltrs, Bush to Conant, 9 May 44, and Conant to

Bush, 15 May 44, OSRD; Groves Diary, 10 Apr 44,

LRG; Ltrs, Groves to Smyth, 17 Apr 44, and Smyth

to Groves, 21 Apr 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

319.1 (Smyth), MDR; MPC Min, 10 May 44, MDR;

Hewlett and Anderson, New World, p. 368; Groves,

Now It Can Be Told, p. 348. Except as otherwise indicated, section that follows on Smyth Report based on

MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4, Ch. 13, DASA.

13

 Ltr, Jean O'Leary (for Groves) to Dist Engr,

sub: Info for H. D. Smyth, 13 May 44, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Smyth), MDR. Similar letters

to Oppenheimer, Lawrence, Urey and Matthias may

be found in the same file.
558 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

As Professor Smyth progressed

with his work, Groves, in effect,

became the coordinator of the

project. Whenever Smyth needed assistance, he applied for it directly to

the Manhattan commander. For example, Groves in the fall of 1944 approved his request to employ a fellow

Princeton physicist, Lincoln G. Smith,

as a research assistant. And, in December, he again aided Smyth in obtaining information about the thermal

diffusion program, emphasizing that

"it is particularly important . . . that

proper credits be given to the Navy

and to Abelson and Gunn."

 14

Starting as early as August 1944,

Smyth began submitting draft sections to Groves and completed eleven

of thirteen projected chapters by January 1945. In late February, he delivered the manuscript to Groves, lacking only a concluding chapter that

would "not be a very serious undertaking." In March, Conant and

Groves undertook a preliminary

review of the manuscript. After a

close scrutiny, they determined that

Smyth's treatment was too technical,

did not mention enough names of

participants, included too many of the

author's own critical comments on

events, and provided too much information about the work at Los

Alamos.15

As the time grew near when the

report had to be ready for release,

Groves arranged for an elaborate and

thorough review. He gave the heads

of the major project installations and

the leading contractor firms an opportunity to comment on the parts of

the report that pertained to their activities. After Smyth incorporated

whatever revisions these comments

made necessary, Groves turned over

the entire manuscript to his trusted

scientific adviser, Richard Tolman, for

a final review and editing. Two scientists in Tolman's NDRC office—Paul

C. Fine, a physicist from the University of Texas, and William S. Shurcliff,

Tolman's technical assistant—aided in

the final editing.16

To guide the reviewers on the key

issue of security, Groves had Smyth

and Tolman draw up a set of rules.

There was a general exclusion of everything concerning actual construction of an atomic bomb. Other information could be included if it satisfied at least one of the requirements

in each of the three categories set

forth by Smyth and Tolman:

I. (A) That it is important to a reasonable understanding of what had been done

on the project as a whole or (B) That it is

of true scientific interest and likely to be

truly helpful to scientific workers in this

country and 14

 On the assignment of Smith, who finally joined

the project in the spring of 1945, see Ltrs, Smyth to

Groves, 31 Aug 44, and Groves to Smyth, 9 Apr 45.

On the Navy and thermal diffusion see Ltrs, Smyth

to Groves, 31 Nov 44, and Groves to Smyth, 11 Dec

44 (source of quotation). All letters in Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Smyth), MDR. Groves Diary, 6

Apr 45, LRG. 15

 Ltrs, Smyth to Groves, 5 Aug 44 and 13 Jan

(source of quotation), 23 Feb, 23 Mar 45, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Smyth), MDR; Groves

Diary, 31 Mar 45, LRG.

16

 Oppenheimer's letter to Smyth, 14 Apr 45, provides a good example of the review comments by

project leaders. The letters exchanged between

Groves and Roger Williams of Du Pont on 12 Apr

and 3 May 45 are representative of those received

from industrial firms involved in the atomic project.

On the provisions for the final review and editing of

the manuscript see Ltr, Smyth to Groves 22 May 45.

These letters are filed in Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

319.1 (Smyth), MDR. See also Groves Diary, 18 Jun

45, LRG.
THE ATOMIC AGE AND ITS PROBLEMS 559

HENRY D. SMYTH (right) conferring with Richard Tolman

II. (A) That it is already known gener- ally by competent scientists or (B) That it

can be deduced or guessed by competent

scientists from what is already known, combined with the knowledge that the

project was in the overall successful or

III. (A) That it has no real bearing on

the production of atomic bombs or (B)

That it could be discovered by a small

group (15 of whom not over 5 would be

senior men) of competent scientists work- ing in a well-equipped college lab in a

year's time or less.17

The Smyth-Tolman security rules

resulted in many more changes in the

draft manuscript. Nevertheless,

Tolman and his editorial staff had

completed their work by early July.

Finally, to make certain that Smyth

had given recognition in the report to

all project personnel deserving it

(Groves was convinced that this was

the best means for avoiding future security violations), the Manhattan commander arranged for couriers to deliver selected chapters to appropriate

project scientific personnel for a hurried final review. Given only a few

hours, in most instances, to complete

this review, the majority of the scientists simply signed a statement indicating that they approved the portion

of the report they had received without making detailed suggestions. One

exception was Colonel Nichols, who

predicted the report would arouse

"controversy concerning the fairness

of credit given to different individuals. . . ." He also found that it gave

too much attention to the work of the

17

 The quoted material is from Ltr, Groves to

Smyth, 21 May 45, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP

Files, Flder 12, Tab N, MDR. See also Groves, Now

It Can Be Told, p. 349.
560 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Metallurgical Laboratory and to those

activities in which Professor Smyth

was a participant, and not enough to

the commercial firms and to Los

Alamos. For these reasons, the district engineer recommended that "if

the report is issued in its present

form, full credit be given to H. D.

Smyth for preparing it and that the

statement be made that the Army has

no responsibility for the report except

for asking him to do it." In the report

as ultimately published Nichols's first

recommendation was accepted; the

second was not.18

Once again Tolman and Smyth reviewed the report to make certain that

every section conformed to the established security rules, while Groves assembled a corps of stenographers,

some of whom had to be flown from

Oak Ridge, to do the final typing. By

the end of July, the manuscript was

ready to go to the printers. But a final

hurdle remained: obtaining the approval of the Secretary of War—and

probably the President—and, because

of interchange, at least tacit approval

from the British.19

Stimson had come back from the

Potsdam meeting on 28 July. In the

days following his return, the Secretary gave immediate attention to a

number of urgent issues on his accumulated agenda. Initially, he devoted

considerable time to consultations

with his two assistants, Harvey Bundy

and George Harrison, as well as other

staff members, and General Groves

on the subject of ongoing preparations of the public statements to be

made by the President and himself

after the first bomb drop. Then on

the morning of 2 August, he turned

to the question of publication of

Smyth's manuscript. Present at the

meeting in his office were Harrison

and Bundy; his military aide, Col.

William H. Kyle; Groves, Conant, and

Tolman as project representatives; Sir

James Chadwick, leader of the contingent of British scientists assigned to

the project; and Roger Makins, the

member of the British embassy staff

in Washington assigned responsibility

for atomic energy matters.

For almost two hours, the conferees

discussed the advantages and disadvantages of releasing what Stimson

called "the proposed statement to be

made by the scientists. . . ." Conant

and Groves argued strongly for publication and release as the best means

for protecting the future security of

the American program. Groves, in

particular, saw an analogy between

the information in Smyth's manuscript and "similar instruction given

people going west years ago when

they were told that they should go to

a water hole about 30 miles away and

that if it was dry they should go to

one about 10 miles beyond that."

 20

His point was that it provided facts

about the atomic project without revealing any vital secrets.

Stimson, having just returned from

18

 Ltr (source of quotations), Nichols to Groves,

sub: H. D. Smyth Ms, 25 Jul 45; Memo, Fine to

Consodine, sub: Msg for H. D. Smyth, 11 Jul 45;

Memo, Consodine (for Groves) to Compton, Urey

et al., sub: Instrs on Review of Smyth Ms, 13 Jul 45;

Ltr, Urey to Groves, 14 Jul 45; Msg, Oppenheimer

to Groves, 31 Jul 45. All in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Smyth), MDR. For Groves's views see

Now It Can Be Told. p. 349. Groves Diary, Jul 45,

LRG, contains entries that serve as a guide to the

final review process of Smyth's manuscript. 19

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 349-50.

20

 First quotation from Stimson Diary, 2 Aug 45,

HLS. Second quotation from notes on Smyth Ms

Mtg in Secy War Office, 2 Aug 45, OCG Files, Gen

Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 12, Tab O, MDR.
THE ATOMIC AGE AND ITS PROBLEMS 561

disquieting face-to-face encounters

with Soviet representatives at Potsdam, expressed serious doubts about

releasing any information that would

be helpful to the Russians. Chadwick,

who had not yet read the manuscript,

also had reservations. He found difficulty in understanding why the atomic

leaders in America saw the need to

publish such an extensive statement,

something he said that the British

would not do. Makins stated that Sir

John Anderson, the British Cabinet

officer in charge of atomic energy,

was convinced of the need for issuing

a report, but he feared its cumulative

impact. The meeting closed with

Stimson indicating "that he was practically prepared to accept" publication, relying upon the counsel of his

advisers, "because of my confidence

in the conservatism of General

Groves." Nevertheless, he concluded

that publication should not take place

until both the President and the British had approved of it.21

The following day Stimson dispatched a cable to the President, stating that on the unanimous advice of

his advisers he had decided to recommend the release of the report for

reasons of future security. While

awaiting an opportunity to see the

President, Chadwick, who in the

meantime had read the report, sent

an acknowledgment that he could see

the necessity for its release. When the

Secretary finally saw Truman on 8

August, two days after the bombing

of Hiroshima, he advised him that he

should make the decision, as "he

would have to bear the brunt of the

disapproval of Congress for giving

away such a valuable secret." After

hearing the views of Bush, Conant,

Groves, Stimson, Harrison, and Admiral William D. Leahy, his personal

chief of staff, at a White House meeting on the ninth, Truman decided in

favor of immediate publication.22

On 12 August, the War Department

released the first of a thousand copies

of the report entitled A General Account

of the Development of Methods of Using

Atomic Energy for Military Purposes Under

the Auspices of the United States Government, 1940-1945, which Groves had

printed earlier by the Pentagon's classified reproduction facilities in anticipation of the President's approval.

Issued with each copy of the report

was an accompanying statement that

sought to place its publication in the

proper perspective:

Nothing in this report discloses necessary military secrets as to the manufacture

or production of the weapon. It

does provide a summary of generally

known scientific facts and gives an account of the history of the work and of

the role played in the development by

different scientific and industrial organizations.

The best interests of the United States

require the utmost cooperation by all

concerned in keeping secret now and for

all time in the future, all scientific and

21

 Stimson Diary (source of quotation), 2 Aug 45,

HLS; Notes on Smyth Ms Mtg in Secy War Office, 2

Aug 45, MDR; Groves Diary, 27 Jul and 2 Aug 45,

LRG; Ltrs, Tolman to Groves, subs: Status of Smyth

Hist, 26 Jul 45, and Conversation This Morning

With Chadwick Re Symth Hist, 27 Jul 45, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Smyth), MDR.

22

 Stimson Diary (source of quotation), 9 Aug 45,

HLS; Msg, Secy War to President, 3 Aug 45, HB

Files, Fldr 64, MDR; Groves Diary, 9 Aug 45, LRG;

Bush, Pieces of the Action, pp. 294-95. On Chadwick's

views see Ltr, Chadwick to Field Marshal Henry

Maitland Wilson (head of British Joint Staff Mission,

Wash., D.C.), 4 Aug 45, OCG Files, Gen Corresp,

MP Files, Fldr 12, Tab H, MDR.
562 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

technical information not given in this

report or other official releases of infor- mation by the War Department.23

While the Smyth Report—as it came

to be popularly known—achieved its

basic purposes of informing the

American public without compromising vital project secrets, there were

inevitably objections and criticisms on

some points. Where appropriate, Professor Smyth made corrections and

additions for incorporation in later

printings. But none of these corrections and additions greatly altered the

original report, which, as Groves

noted in retrospect, was "on the

whole, . . . considering the rather

difficult conditions under which it was

prepared, . . . extraordinarily successful in its efforts to distribute

credit fairly and accurately."

 24

Professor Smyth himself felt the

report achieved considerably more

than this limited objective. In his view

the development of the atomic bomb

had raised many questions on postwar

atomic energy policy "that must be

answered in the near future . . . by

the people through their representatives." In accomplishing this, Smyth

looked to the men of science, "who

can understand . . . and explain the

potentialities of atomic bombs to

their fellow citizens," to use his

report as the vehicle for helping the

public gain some insight into the new

atomic world. "The ultimate responsibility for our nation's policy rests on

its citizens," Smyth wrote, "and they

can discharge such responsibilities

wisely only if they are informed."

 25

Atomic Energy: Planning for

Postwar Control

Release of selected information was

only one aspect of the much larger

problem of planning for peacetime

legislation and international agreements to control the use of atomic

energy in the postwar era. When

President Truman, in a message to

Congress on 3 October 1945, emphasized the importance of dealing with

this problem on "two fronts—the domestic and international," he focused

attention upon a matter that had long

been a cause of considerable concern

23

 WD, Bur of Pub Rels, Press Branch, Press Release, 12 Aug 45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1

(Smyth), MDR. The release also made an addition

to the text of the Smyth Report at paragraph 12.18,

which was intended to allay public anxiety concerning the dispersal of radioactivity by the bomb: "The

War Department now authorizes the further statement that the bomb is detonated in combat, at such

a height above the ground, as to give the maximum

blast effect against structures, and to disseminate

the radioactive products as a cloud. On account of

the height of the explosion practically all the radioactive products are carried upward in the ascending

column of hot air and dispersed harmlessly over a

wide area. Even in the New Mexico test, where the

height of explosion was necessarily low, only a very

small fraction of the radioactivity was deposited immediately below the bomb." A copy of the release is

reproduced in Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 351-

52.

24

 Groves, Now It Can be Told, p. 352. Typical examples of the reaction to the publication of the

Smyth Report may be found in Admin Files, Gen

Corresp, MDR. See 319.1 (Smyth) for Ltrs, August

C. Klein (Y-12 Proj Engr, Stone and Webster) to

Smyth, 30 Aug 45, and Smyth to Boris Pregel (Canadian Radium and Uranium Corp.), 14 Sep 45; and

095 (Metal Hydrides) for Ltrs, P. P. Alexander

(Metal Hydrides president) to Groves, 19 Sep 45,

Groves to T. Lindsley (Metal Hydrides), 5 Dec 45,

and Alexander to Irvin Stewart (OSRD Ex Secy), 12

Jan 46. In the privately published Princeton University edition (1945) of the report, Smyth added appendices giving the texts of the War Department's

release on the Trinity test of 16 Jul 45 and the

statements issued by the British Information Service

on 12 August and the Canadian Information Service

on 13 August. 25 Smyth Report, pp. v and 165.
THE ATOMIC AGE AND ITS PROBLEMS 563

for atomic project leaders and their

scientific staffs.26

Wartime Background

As many of the scientists completed

the basic research work required to

achieve the wartime objectives of the

atomic program, they began to consider the future possibilities in the exciting new field of atomic energy. The

situation in the Metallurgical Project

was typical. In the latter part of 1943,

rumors spread of an impending release of numerous personnel. To

counter the disquieting effects of

these rumors on his scientific staff,

Arthur Compton included in his new

program for the coming fiscal year

basic research projects as well as continuing support for the Hanford and

Los Alamos operations.

For the most part, Groves and his

scientific advisers opposed having

Metallurgical Project scientists undertake any new large-scale or longrange research activities until the war

was over, but they could see the necessity for limited research projects

for those scientists serving in a

standby capacity for the plutonium

production facilities and the bomb

development program. This concept

of limited research generally did not

satisfy most Metallurgical Project scientists. Accordingly, Compton endeavored to reduce their unrest by

giving them an opportunity to participate in postwar planning. In July

1944, he appointed a committee to

formulate "sound national postwar

policies . . . from the military, scientific and industrial standpoint." This

committee issued in November a

"Prospectus on Nucleonics." It discussed in detail future research and

industrial applications of atomic

energy in the United States and the

need for a world organization to prevent nuclear warfare.27

By August, the Military Policy Committee had also approved appointment of a special committee, suggested by Bush and Conant, "to recommend from a technical standpoint the

postwar policy for governmental research and development in the atomic

energy field." Groves, who later

stated that a prime purpose of this

committee was to convince project

scientists that the Army was not forgetting postwar problems, appointed

Tolman as chairman, with Warren K.

Lewis, Henry D. Smyth, and Rear

Adm. Earle W. Mills, assistant chief of

the Navy's Bureau of Ships, as members. Capt. Thorvald A. Solberg of

the Navy also sat in on all meetings.

This Postwar Policy Committee, as

it came to be called, interviewed scientists from all of the major Manhattan Project research centers and received a large number of written

memorandums. The committee,

26

 Truman, Memoirs, 1:530.

27

 "Prospectus on Nucleonics," prepared by Zay

Jeffries (committee chairman), Enrico Fermi, James

Franck, Thorfin R. Hogness, Robert S. Mulliken

(secretary), Robert S. Stone, and Charles A.

Thomas. The covering communication from which

the quotation in the above paragraph was taken is

Ltr, Jeffries, Fermi et al., to Compton, 18 Nov 44,

HB Files, Fldr 59, MDR. A copy is also on file in

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 334 (Postwar Policy

Committee-CEW). Hewlett and Anderson, New

World, pp. 324-25. Fermi's wife states that Metallurgical Laboratory physicist Eugene Rabinowitch also

had an important hand in drafting the report on nucleonics, although he was not a member of the committee; see Laura Fermi, Illustrious Immigrants: The Intellectual Migration From Europe, 1930-1941 (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 201. Rabinowitch later became the editor of the Bulletin of

the Atomic Scientists.
564 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

seeing the need for maintaining

United States military superiority, recommended continued production of

active materials and weapon development and government support of fundamental research and industrial applications. To administer the program, the committee proposed a national authority that, in the manner of

the Office of Scientific Research and

Development (OSRD), would make

funds available to government-operated military and civilian laboratories,

colleges and universities, and commercial firms.28

Another individual gravely concerned with postwar planning was

Niels Bohr, the eminent Danish physicist who had escaped from his occupied homeland in 1943. In conversation with Soviet officials at the Soviet

embassy in London in April 1944,

Bohr had learned that the Soviets had

heard rumors of the Manhattan

Project and were very much interested in the program. He concluded that

Russia would continue to push development of atomic energy and, considering the quality of the prewar work

of Soviet physicists added to the

knowledge they might gain from a defeated Germany, he thought they

would succeed. Bohr advocated that

the United States and Great Britain

should adopt an open atomic policy

after the war, using the revolutionary

new development to achieve effective

international relations with the Soviet

Union. Meeting with Churchill in

April and Roosevelt in August, the

Danish scientist zealously conveyed

his convictions to both of the wartime

leaders. Bohr experienced little success in communicating his ideas to

Churchill, but he received a much

more sympathetic hearing from

Roosevelt, who promised to take up

the matter with Churchill at their next

meeting.29

Roosevelt next met with Churchill

in early September at the OCTAGON

Conference in Quebec,30 called to

plan for the final campaigns against

Germany and joint operations against

Japan, but it apparently was not until

Churchill's two-day visit to Hyde Park

following the conference that the two

leaders discussed Bohr's proposals.

With Admiral Leahy present, they

considered the Danish scientist's suggestions for ending the secrecy of the

bomb and negotiating an agreement

with Russia to avoid a postwar arms

race, but decided that his ideas were

premature. They then turned to postwar Anglo-American atomic relations,

including the possibilities of industrial

28

 MPC Min (source of quotation), 5 Aug 44,

OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 23, Tab A,

MDR; Ltr, Groves to Tolman, 29 Aug 44, and

Memo, Tolman to Lawrence, sub: Committee on

Postwar Recommendations, 16 Sep 44, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 334 (Postwar Policy Committee, Corresp), MDR; Rpt, Postwar Policy Committee, 28 Dec

44, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, Groves Files, Fldr 3,

Tab A, MDR; Memo, Groves to Harrison, 19 Jun

45, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, Groves Files, Fldr 3,

Tab H, MDR; Hewlett and Anderson, New World,

pp. 324-25.

29

 Bohr visited the Soviet embassy in London in

April 1944 to pick up a letter from Peter Kapitza,

the Russian physicist who had been a member of

Ernest Rutherford's research team at Cambridge

University's Cavendish Laboratory in the 1920's.

Kapitza, upon hearing of Bohr's escape from Denmark, wrote to invite him to come with his family to

the Soviet Union to continue his scientific work. For

a detailed description of this and other aspects of

Bohr's activities in the spring and summer of 1944

see Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, pp. 346-48.

See also Memo, [Bohr], 3 Jul 44, and Ltr, Bush to

Bundy, 25 Apr 45, with inclosure by Felix

Frankfurter, HB Files, Fldr 19, MDR. 30

 For a detailed account of the OCTAGON Conference see Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, Ch. XXIII.
THE ATOMIC AGE AND ITS PROBLEMS 565

application, which Churchill perceived

could contribute to British economic

recovery, a subject he had discussed

with Roosevelt at Quebec.

Agreeing that the wartime atomic

partnership should continue after the

war, the Prime Minister and the President recorded their views in a brief

aide-memoire, typed on Churchill's official stationery and initialed in red ink

by both leaders. In it they rejected

any immediate announcement of the

existence of the Manhattan Project

and called for continuing "the utmost

secrecy"; they recommended that the

bomb "might perhaps, after mature

consideration, be used against the

Japanese, who should be warned that

this bombardment will be repeated

until they surrender"; and they

agreed that "full collaboration between the United States and the British Government in developing Tube

Alloys for military and commercial

purposes should continue after the

defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement." For the

two leaders, the aide-memoire constituted a preliminary statement of their

hopes and fears concerning future

use and control of the newly evolving

revolutionary source of energy, especially in its application to development and proliferation of nuclear

weapons.31

Meanwhile, Bush and Conant, undoubtedly influenced by the growing

unrest among project scientists as

well as by the progress of the war in

Europe, also sought to instigate planning for postwar control and use of

atomic energy. The day after the

Hyde Park meeting (about which they

knew nothing), the two scientific leaders wrote to Secretary Stimson, pointing out that the time was approaching

when the public would have to be informed about atomic developments

during the war and when national legislation would have to be enacted and

diplomatic measures taken. Release of

information, preferably in the form of

a detailed history, would become essential, they believed, either when the

bomb was used against the enemy or,

if Japan surrendered before that happened, when the war ended. Basic

atomic knowledge, they warned Stimson, could not be kept secret and for

a government to assume that by

doing so it would become secure

"would be extremely dangerous."

The Secretary, Bush and Conant suggested, should talk to the President

about drafting legislation to establish

a "national commission" and a treaty

with Great Britain and Canada that

would continue and extend the wartime arrangements for interchange of

technical information.32

Three days later, Bush received an

unexpected summons to the White

House to bring the President up-todate on atomic developments. When

31

 Aide-memoire, Roosevelt and Churchill, sub:

Tube Alloys, 18 Sep 44, FDR. Admiral Leahy, in his

account of the Hyde Park meeting, states that the

aide-memoire was signed on 19 September, but this

appears to be incorrect. See William D. Leahy, I

Was There (New York: Whittlesey House, McGrawHill Book Co., 1950), pp. 265-66. This account of

the atomic discussions at Hyde Park is based on Ms,

"Diplomatic Hist of Manhattan Proj," pp. 33-34,

HB Files, Fldr 111, MDR; Winston S. Churchill, The

Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy (Boston:

Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953), 160-62; Groves, Now

It Can Be Told, pp. 401-02; Hewlett and Anderson,

New World, pp. 326-28; Gowing, Britain and Atomic

Energy, pp. 358-60 and 447 (App. 8 gives text of the

aide-memoire). 32

 Memo, Bush and Conant to Secy War, sub: Release of Info to the Public, 19 Sep 44, HB Files,

Fldr 108, MDR.
566 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Roosevelt introduced Bush to Lord

Cherwell, Churchill's scientific adviser, and Admiral Leahy and then

began talking generally about the

bomb and interchange with the British without regard to Cherwell's continued presence, the OSRD director

became aware that the President had

been carrying on freewheeling discussions with Churchill, Bohr, and

others without benefit of consultation

with his regular advisers on atomic

matters. Without mentioning the aidememoire, Roosevelt stated that he had

talked to Churchill about complete

interchange as a way of keeping Britain strong after the war. Greatly concerned by Roosevelt's indication that

he was plunging ahead with postwar

planning for atomic energy without

sufficient guidance from those with an

expert knowledge of atomic matters,

Bush suggested that the President

should have a talk with Stimson.

Roosevelt agreed, but when Bush

proposed to Stimson three days later

(25 September) that he point out to

the President the dangers of an international armaments race if Russia

were not permitted to share in the interchange of scientific data, the Secretary demurred. He did not think, he

told Bush, that he could hold the

President's attention long enough to

impress upon him the seriousness of

the prospect. Bush then suggested

that he and Conant prepare a statement on international control that

Stimson could then pass on to the

President. The Secretary consented to

this arrangement.33

Bush and Conant submitted a statement on the "salient points concerning future international handling of

[the] subject of atomic bombs" on 30

September. They elaborated in some

detail "on the international post-war

aspects . . . of great importance to

the future peace of the world" and

predicted a successful demonstration

of an atomic bomb capable of a blast

damage equivalent to 1,000 to 10,000

tons of ordinary explosives before 1

August 1945. But, they continued,

this enormously powerful weapon was

only the first step in "an expanding

art." The future was likely to bring

development of a "super-super

bomb" using heavy hydrogen that

would produce blast damage equal to

that of "1,000 raids of 1,000 B-29

Fortresses delivering their load of

high explosives on one target." Because any nation having the necessary

technical and scientific resources

could produce in three or four years

atomic bombs equivalent to those the

United States and Great Britain would

soon have, the advantage held by

these two countries was only temporary.34

 Given the ever-present possi33

 The President apparently had turned over his

copy of the aide-memoire to his file room without ever

mentioning its existence to anyone associated with

the Manhattan Project. Not until after Roosevelt's

death in April 1945 did Manhattan leaders learn of

the aide-memoire from British sources, and not until a

decade later was the original American copy discovered, misfiled, in the Roosevelt papers, FDR. See

also Conference Memo, Bush, 22 Sep 44; Memos,

Bush to Conant, 23 and 25 Sep 44. All in OSRD.

Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 326-29.

Stimson Diary, 25 Sep 44, HLS. 34

 The prediction of Bush and Conant as to how

long other nations having the requisite resources

would require to produce an atomic bomb equivalent to that developed by the United States in 1945

proved to be amazingly accurate. President Truman

announced in September 1949 that the Soviet

Union had achieved an atomic explosion, only

slightly more than four years after the Americans

had set off the first such explosion at Alamogordo

in July 1945. See New York Times, 24 Sep 49.
THE ATOMIC AGE AND ITS PROBLEMS 567

bility of "the accidents of research,"

another country might attain as great

a temporary advantage as the United

States and Great Britain then held.

Nor was a continuing policy of complete secrecy after the war likely to

prevent other countries from producing nuclear weapons, for all the basic

scientific facts necessary to do so

already were known to physicists.

Hence, the soundest policy was to

disclose completely, as soon as the

first bomb had been demonstrated,

the history of its development in the

United States, keeping secret only

"manufacturing and military details."

Complete secrecy was certain to

result in an international armament

race, with secret development in the

Soviet Union and other countries.

Not even control of most of the

world's supply of uranium and thorium would prevent development of

the super-super bomb, using heavy

hydrogen, the supply of which is virtually unlimited. The wisest solution

for the postwar period was "free interchange of all scientific information

on this subject . . . under the auspices of an international office that derived its power from whatever association of nations is developed at the

close of the present war. . . . Under

these conditions," Bush and Conant

concluded, "there is reason to hope

that the weapons would never be employed and indeed that the existence

of these weapons might decrease the

chance of another war.35

The Bush-Conant statement

brought no immediate reaction from

Stimson. Toward the end of October,

the Secretary talked to Bush about

some of the points made in it, but he

did not indicate what action he intended to take. Bush's own view at

the time was that Stimson should

comment on the points and then send

them on to the President. Foreshadowing the ultimate establishment of

the Interim Committee, the OSRD

chief also suggested that Roosevelt

was going to need an advisory group

to guide him in reaching decisions on

atomic matters, but he felt the time

was not quite propitious yet for suggesting it to the President. Harvey

Bundy also proposed such a group.

He visualized a six-man commission

comprised of a representative of the

Secretary of War, the Secretary of

State, and the Secretary of the Navy,

and three scientists familiar with the

atomic project. After atomic weapons

had been used, this commission

would assist the President in preparing a brief public statement about the

importance and characteristics of

atomic energy and in outlining a program for its temporary and its permanent control in the United States.36

Not until early December did Bush

have another opportunity to broach

the subject of future atomic energy

problems at the War Department. On

the eighth, at a meeting with Bundy

and John J. McCloy, the Assistant

Secretary of War, Bush suggested that

the President should immediately

nominate an advisory group to pre35

 Quotations in paragraphs on Bush-Conant

statement from Memo, Bush and Conant to Secy

War, sub: Salient Points Re Future International

Handling of Atomic Bombs, 30 Sep 44, Incl to Ltr,

same addressees, same date, HB Files, Fldr 69,

MDR. Copies of the letter are also in OCG Files,

Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 10, Tab A, and Fldr

26, Tab L, MDR.

36

 Hewlett and Anderson, New World, p. 330;

Memo, Bush to Conant, 24 Oct 44, OSRD; Memo,

Bundy to Secy War, 16 Nov 44, HB Files, Fldr 108,

MDR.
568 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

pare press releases, draft legislation,

and advise on the development of a

postwar experimental program, emphasizing the need for bringing the

Department of State into the planning

for the international aspects of atomic

energy. Subsequently, both Bundy

and Bush briefed Stimson on the substance of the discussion. While agreeing that the State Department had to

be informed soon, Stimson was still

not ready to make decisions on an advisory committee or international exchange. Months would pass before he

reached a decision on either matter.37

After Roosevelt's death, Stimson

went to Truman with a suggestion to

appoint an advisory group on atomic

energy. The resulting Interim Committee, which began meeting in May,

did not take up the discussion of

postwar legislation for domestic control of atomic energy until July. On

the nineteenth, the committee considered the first draft of an atomic

energy bill, prepared by two War Department lawyers—Brig. Gen. Kenneth C. Royall and William L. Marbury. Under guidance from George

Harrison and with technical assistance

from the Manhattan District, Royall

and Marbury in drawing up the draft

bill had included the Bush-Conant

proposals and incorporated the basic

premise that, in the postwar period,

atomic energy would have to continue

to receive substantial federal support

and remain under strong federal

control.38

Many provisions seemed closely

patterned after the wartime program,

including continuation of essentially

military control with no significant relaxation of security restrictions on research and development activities.

The nine-man commission proposed

by the bill—five civilians, two representatives of the Army and two of the

Navy—resembled the Military Policy

Committee. The commission was to

be a part-time advisory group, whose

members could hold other government positions and would receive no

compensation. Assisting the commission would be four advisory boards

on military applications, industrial

uses, research, and medicine, each

comprised of technical experts appointed by the commission. Serving the commission would be a fulltime staff headed by an administrator

and deputy administrator, an arrangement not unlike that of Groves

and Nichols in the Manhattan Project,

particularly because the commission

could delegate all of its powers to

these officials.

The extensive powers granted to

the commission—in this Royall and

Marbury followed the earlier suggestions of Bush and Conant—were similar to those held by the Army in the

wartime program. They included custody of raw materials, facilities and

equipment, technical information and

patents, and all contracts and agreements related to production of fissionable materials. As in the Manhattan Project, the administrator would

have authority to carry on atomic research in commission-owned facilities

or to have it done by other institutions under contract. For this or any

other commission activities, he would

37

 Conference Memo, Bush, 8 Dec 44; Memo,

Bush to Conant, 13 Dec 44. Both in OSRD. Hewlett

and Anderson, New World, pp. 330-31. 38

 Royall-Marbury draft bill, 18 Jul 45, HB Files,

Fldr 77, MDR (copy also in OSRD); Notes on Interim Committee Mtg, 19 Jul 45, MDR; Hewlett and

Anderson, New World, pp. 412-14.
THE ATOMIC AGE AND ITS PROBLEMS 569

have broad powers to acquire property, facilities, or services. The commission would administer its own security, personnel, and audit regulations.

Finally, the bill provided that the

commission would direct, supervise,

and regulate all atomic activities,

even those pursued by outside

organizations.39

Bush and Conant felt that the two

War Department lawyers had granted

the commission more sweeping

powers than were needed for a peacetime organization. They also proposed, and Groves and Harrison

agreed with them, that only civilians

should be members of the commission. Harrison noted that the armed

services would be adequately represented on the advisory board on military applications.40

The War Department asked General Royall to revise the bill on the

basis of the comments made by Manhattan leaders and Interim Committee

members. With the objective of

making only minor changes so as to

provide the basis for compromise, he

reduced the number of officers on the

commission to four and, to a limited

extent, the commission's powers over

nuclear research, stating that its mission would be to minimize interference in private research and to make

more use of it.

But these modest changes did not

satisfy Bush, who requested that the

War Department bill be completely

reviewed with the aim of subjecting

the commission to the usual government controls except where exemptions were clearly necessary. The bill

underwent several revisions in late

July and early August, yet it did not

fundamentally change in its original

approach and continued to prescribe

a considerable amount of military

control and governmental dominance

in nuclear research activities. Consequently, when the War Department

submitted its proposals for domestic

control of atomic energy to Congress,

they largely took the form and direction laid down in the Royall-Marbury

bill.41

Postwar International Aspects

After the atomic bombing of Japan,

the problem of international control

of atomic energy loomed large for the

leaders of the American and British

governments, and each gave the

matter their immediate attention.42 In

his 9 August radio message to the

American people on the Potsdam

Conference, President Truman declared that the United States intended

to make the new force of atomic

energy into a weapon for peace and

that information on weapon design

39

 Royall-Marbury draft bill, 18 Jul 45, MDR;

Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 412-13. 40

 Notes on Interim Committee Mtg, 19 Jul 45,

MDR; Ltr, Bush to Harrison, 19 Jul 45, OSRD.

41

 Ltr, Bush to Harrison, 7 Aug 45, OSRD; Interim Committee Log, 20 and 25 Jul 45, MDR; Draft

bills, Jun-Sep 45, prepared by MD legal staff for Interim Committee, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 032.1

(Atomic Legislation), MDR. 42

 Except as otherwise indicated, section based on

MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4, pp. 7.1-7.17, DASA; Groves,

Now It Can Be Told, pp. 409-12; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 465-81 and 531-619; Truman,

Memoirs, 1:523-51 and 2:5-16. Most of the diplomatic documents pertinent to the efforts at international control may be found in the U.S. Department

of State, General: Political and Economic Matters, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic

Papers, 1945, Vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 1-99; ibid., General:

The United Nations, Foreign Relations of the United

States, Diplomatic Papers, 1946, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp.

1197-259.
570 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

and production would not be released

to the rest of the world until adequate

means of control had been established. After reading the President's

statement, Prime Minister Clement

Attlee promptly endorsed it, and on

13 August he publicly stated his support of the "preparation of plans for

the future control of the bomb . . . to

the end that its production and use

may be controlled and that its power

may be made an overwhelming influence towards world peace."

 43

In a memorandum to Truman on

11 September,44 Secretary Stimson

advised the President that the best

policy for international control would

be for the United States, with British

support, to make a direct approach to

the Soviet Union, proposing joint arrangements for limiting use of the

bomb and encouraging development

of atomic power for peaceful and humanitarian purposes. A few days later,

at a meeting of the President's Cabinet, Vannevar Bush and Under Secretary of War Patterson joined with

Stimson in support of direct negotiations with the Soviets. Other members of the Cabinet, however, opposed sharing the secrets of atomic

energy with the Soviet Union and the

rest of the world.

The American government, however, was under continuing pressure

from the British to institute international control measures as quickly as

possible. From the standpoint of the

British, who wanted to implement the

Hyde Park aide-memoire provision assuring them full collaboration "in developing Tube Alloys for military and

commercial purposes . . . after the

defeat of Japan . . ." and to secure a

revision of the 1943 Quebec Agreement provision that restricted their

access to information pertinent to the

industrial and commercial applications of atomic energy, these international measures were essential not

only to ensure that the atomic bomb

would be used in the interest of world

peace but also to facilitate new

agreements on a postwar atomic

partnership.45

Taking cognizance of the British

desire for prompt action, President

Truman in his 3 October message to

Congress stated emphatically that a

discussion on an international control

policy could not wait until the United

Nations Organization began functioning. Negotiations must begin at once

with the United Kingdom and

Canada, and then subsequently with

other nations, for the purpose of

working out "arrangements covering

the terms under which international

collaboration and exchange of information might safely proceed."

 46

Consistent with this objective,

Truman at the end of the month accepted Prime Minister Attlee's request for a meeting with him and Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon

Mackenzie King.

In preparation for this conference,

scheduled to open in Washington on

11 November, both Secretary of State

Byrnes and Secretary of War Patterson (who had replaced Stimson on

43

 Telg, Attlee to Truman, 11 Aug 45, with text of

the Prime Minister's statement released on 13

August, reproduced in U.S. Department of State,

General: Political and Economic Matters, 1945, Vol. 2,

p. 40. 44

 The full text of this memorandum is reproduced in Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp.

541-46.

45

 Aide-memoire, 18 Sep 44, FDR. 46

 Truman, Memoirs, 1:530.
THE ATOMIC AGE AND ITS PROBLEMS 571

27 September) consulted extensively

with Bush and Groves. When Bush,

on his own initiative, visited Byrnes

on 3 November to urge adoption of a

definite policy on international control, the Secretary asked him to prepare a written statement of his views

of what needed to be discussed by the

three heads of state. Sensing a lack of

preparation by the State Department

for the upcoming conference, Secretary Patterson had members of his War

Department staff draw up proposals

to be discussed. Both Groves and

Bush were called in for consultation

by Byrnes on the eighth and by Patterson on the tenth to revise the War

Department proposals. When the

actual conversations on atomic energy

began, Truman and Byrnes advanced

the proposals set forth in the statement Bush had prepared for the Secretary of State and the British agreed

to them as an agenda without presenting any counterproposals. Byrnes

then called in Bush on the twelfth to

assist in preparation of the conference communique.

On 15 November, the three political leaders announced their conclusions on atomic energy in the

Truman-Attlee-King Declaration.

They agreed that an open exchange

of the fundamental scientific aspects

of atomic energy with other nations

of the world was desirable to facilitate

its development for peaceful purposes; however, to ensure against its

use for destructive purposes, they acknowledged that a limited exchange

of the specialized aspects necessary

for industrial application must be enforced until such time as the United

Nations could establish international

controls. To achieve these controls,

they recommended that the United

Nations set up an international

organization to function under its

auspices.

The three leaders also directed that

steps be taken to work out a new

basis for Anglo-American collaboration in atomic energy matters in the

postwar period. They delegated the

task of preparing a suitable directive

to Patterson and Sir John Anderson.

Patterson called in Groves and Harrison to advise him, and the two, working with members of Sir John's staff,

prepared two memorandums issued

on 16 November. The first memorandum stated that there should continue

to be full and effective cooperation

between the three states in atomic

energy matters, that the Combined

Policy Committee and Combined Development Trust should be perpetuated,47

 and that the committee should

work out an appropriate basis for

future collaboration. The second document, "Memorandum of Intention,"

set forth detailed guidelines for the

committee to follow in developing a

new agreement to replace the Quebec

Agreement.

For the period of several months,

the Combined Policy Committee endeavored to work out suitable terms

of a new Anglo-American agreement.

It turned over to a subcommittee—

composed of British embassy staff

member Roger Makins, Canadian

Ambassador Lester B. Pearson, and

General Groves—the task of drafting

a report with scientific recommendations for inclusion in a new agreement. When completed, the subcommittee's report called for the rescind47

 The establishment and work of these international advisory groups are discussed in detail in

Chs. X and XIII.
572 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

ing of the provisions in the Quebec

Agreement that had restricted British

development of atomic energy for industrial and commercial purposes and

proposed that each signatory state develop the means for full and effective

interchange of information required

for its atomic activities; agree not to

disclose information or enter into

negotiations with outside states

concerning atomic energy without

prior discussion and policy determination; undertake measures not only

to control uranium and thorium deposits within its own borders but also,

through established international ore

control agencies, to acquire foreign

ore deposits; and coordinate and consult with each other before using nuclear weapons against other states.

Subcommittee members did not necessarily agree on all points outlined in

the submitted report. General Groves,

for example, noted that inclusion of

many of the suggested provisions,

especially those on full and effective

interchange, would give the agreement the effect of a secret military

treaty in violation of Article 102 of

the United Nations Charter.

On 15 February 1946, the Combined Policy Committee considered

the subcommittee's proposals for a

new agreement. Committee members

were inclined to agree with Groves

that many of the recommended provisions would violate Article 102. One

member suggested that this conflict

with the United Nations Charter be

avoided by continuing Anglo-American cooperation on atomic matters

under terms of the Quebec Agreement. But Lord Halifax, the British

ambassador who had replaced Sir

Ronald Campbell on the committee, objected that the wartime agreement did not meet postwar requirements, especially on exchange of

information.

At the next committee meeting on

15 April, Halifax shifted his position.

The United Kingdom would be willing, he said, to accept the proposal

for continued collaboration under the

Quebec Agreement and the Declaration of Trust in the area of raw materials, provided that these two documents were amended to meet postwar

requirements as outlined in the subcommittee's proposals. This compromise was unacceptable, however, to

the American members (Byrnes, Patterson, and Bush) because they did

not think it would eliminate the conflict with Article 102. Finding itself in

a deadlock, the committee turned the

problem back to the heads of state.

Truman and Attlee were unable to

make further progress toward the full

and effective cooperation they had set

as a goal. In fact, Attlee's strongly

worded plea to President Truman in

June 1946 went unanswered, because

Congress was about to enact domestic

legislation placing additional restrictions on release of atomic information

that cast further doubt on the feasibility of any kind of interchange.

From May until the end of 1946,

Anglo-American cooperation on

atomic energy continued to function

under the Quebec Agreement and the

Declaration of Trust. Practically

speaking, collaboration was limited

essentially to the area of raw materials. In late July, for example, the

Combined Policy Committee approved the Groves-Makins-Chadwick

formula for allocating in 1946 the

larger share of the available supply of

uranium ore to the United States so
THE ATOMIC AGE AND ITS PROBLEMS 573

that the Manhattan Project had a sufficient amount to meet the needs of

its bomb production program. It also

adopted a Combined Development

Trust proposal designed to ensure a

fair allocation of the costs of raw material received by each country

through the Trust since V-J Day.

As the date neared for a civilian

agency to take over control of the

program in the United States, Attlee

wrote to Truman that he felt the time

was opportune to resume discussion

of cooperation. The President promised to take up the question in the

near future, but reminded the Prime

Minister that Combined Policy Committee discussions had revealed considerable differences in interpreting

the 16 November memorandum by

the two countries and that new legislation for domestic control in the

United States contained provisions

that would further complicate

collaboration.

Many factors had contributed to the

breakdown of efforts to establish effective Anglo-American cooperation.

Among them were the lingering

American distrust of the British

dating back to wartime incidents, the

continuing problem of security (revelations in early 1946, for example, of

espionage in the Canadian program

that pointed up once again the inherent threat in information interchange), and the determination of the

United States not to jeopardize

achievement of international control

through the United Nations with too

close a relationship to the British.

In the efforts of the United States

in late 1945 and in 1946 to establish

in the United Nations an effective

system for the international control of

atomic energy, members and former

members of the Manhattan Project

played a considerable role in assisting

the State Department, the agency responsible for developing America's

proposals. Foreign ministers of the

Soviet Union, the United Kingdom,

and the United States met in Moscow

from 16 to 20 December 1945 and

agreed, as enunciated in the TrumanAttlee-King Declaration of 15 November, to form a United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy,

with representatives from each state

on the organization's Security Council, and from Canada when it was not

a member of the Council. On 24 January 1946, the United Nations General Assembly approved the British resolution authorizing establishment of

the Commission on Atomic Energy

and scheduled its first meeting

in New York City for June. In

March, President Truman nominated

Bernard M. Baruch, the well-known

financier and long-time adviser to

American presidents, to be the representative for the United States

on the commission.

Meanwhile, the Secretary of State

had established a special committee

to advise him on the interchange of

atomic information with other countries. He named Dean Acheson, the

Under Secretary of State, chairman of

the committee, and appointed John J.

McCloy (who had resigned as Assistant Secretary of War in November

1945 to return to the practice of law),

Bush, Conant, and Groves as members. At its first meeting on 14 January, Acheson suggested that, because

the members of the committee were

busy officials who could devote only a

limited amount of time to preparation

of such a plan, the committee should
574 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

appoint a panel of consultants to assemble the pertinent data and draw

up proposals. General Groves objected, pointing out that he, Bush, and

Conant were familiar with the problems involved.

But the special committee decided

in favor of a panel. The six members—David E. Lilienthal of the Tennessee Valley Authority, who served

as chairman, Chester I. Barnard of

New Jersey Telephone, Harry A.

Winne of General Electric, Charles A.

Thomas of Monsanto Chemical, and

J. Robert Oppenheimer, who had left

Los Alamos and returned to the University of California, Berkeley—submitted a draft report to the committee in early March. This draft, after

considerable revision, became the

basis for the Acheson-Lilienthal

report, a plan for step-by-step cooperation of the United States with the

other nations of the world in establishing international controls over

atomic energy. The report, released

on the twenty-eighth, served as a

working paper and a basis for public

discussion. The United States delegation to the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy presented the

essential points of the plan in June,

and these became substantially the

principles finally accepted by the

commission on 30 December. During

the extended deliberations, Bernard

Baruch relied heavily upon many

members and former members of the

Manhattan Project, including Groves,

who served as his consultant; Tolman,

who acted as his scientific adviser;

and a scientific panel made up of

Robert F. Bacher, an experimental

physicist who had served in various

capacities at Los Alamos, Arthur

Compton, Oppenheimer, Thomas and

Urey.

Postwar Domestic Aspects

"No matter what international

policy may be eventually worked out

for the United States and the world,"

General Groves told a congressional

committee, peacetime control of

atomic energy "is necessary to protect

America's tremendous investment in

atomic research and development and

to insure that this development will

go steadily forward."

 48

 To achieve

this end, members of the Manhattan

Project in late 1945 and early 1946

actively participated in the planning

and ongoing discussions of the various legislative proposals under

consideration.

Shortly after V-J Day, the Interim

Committee sent the President its revised Royall-Marbury bill on atomic

energy, and the President immediately circulated the draft measure to the

various government agencies likely to

be affected by its provisions so that

they could review it. Assured by the

committee's provision that any legislation enacted should be subject to re48

 Quotation from Groves's 28 Nov 45 opening

statement in Atomic Energy Hearings on S. Res. 179, p.

32, with pertinent paragraphs reproduced in App. X

of Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 441-42. Except as

otherwise indicated, section based on Groves, Now It

Can Be Told, pp. 389-98; Hewlett and Anderson,

New World, pp. 482-530; U.S. Congress, Senate,

Special Committee on Atomic Energy, Atomic Energy

Act of 1946: Hearings on S. 1717, 79th Cong., 2d

Sess., 22 Jan-8 Apr 46 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946); and on HB Files, especially Fldrs 6 (S-1 MPC), 15 (Hist of Atomic Bomb,

Apr 45), 63 (Working Committee, 1945-46), 65-69

and 72-74 (Interim Committee), 82 (Atomic Energy

Bill-1945), 88 (Analyses of Bills), 89 (Amendments,

Analyses, etc., of May-Johnson Bill, 1945), and 100

(A-1 Interim Committee-Min of Mtgs), MDR.
THE ATOMIC AGE AND ITS PROBLEMS 575

vision at the end of a two-year period,

most of the agencies gave their approval to the draft bill very quickly.

Only the State Department, which

was deeply involved in the question

of international control, threatened to

hold up its approval for an indefinite

period. But because most of the leaders associated with the wartime

atomic energy project strongly felt

there should be no delay in establishing a clear national policy, Secretary

Patterson secured the President's permission to proceed without that agency's approval and to introduce into

Congress what came to be known as

the May-Johnson bill.49

On 3 October, the President in his

message to Congress emphasized the

need for prompt action on the measure to ensure preservation of the

enormous investment in atomic

energy, to provide direction for continuing research, and to establish adequate controls over raw materials.

That same day, Congressman Andrew

J. May introduced the War Department's bill. When the hearings on the

bill opened in the House Military Affairs Committee on the ninth, Secretary Patterson in a prepared statement explained to the committee why

the Army was anxious to turn over responsibility for atomic energy to a

peacetime organization: "The War

Department has taken the initiative in

proposing that it be divested of the

great authority that goes with the

control of atomic energy, because it

recognizes that the problems we face

go far beyond the purely military

sphere. The atomic bomb is the most

devastating weapon we know, but the

means of releasing atomic energy

which it employs may prove to be the

greatest boon to mankind in the

world's history. The wisest minds in

our Nation will be required to administer this discovery for the benefit of

all of us."

 50

Also appearing before the committee were Groves, Bush, and Conant.

Committee members questioned each

of them concerning the unusually

broad powers to be given to the

atomic energy commission proposed

in the bill. Groves, who first restated

the Army's desire to be relieved of

the burden of administering the

atomic energy program, posited that

the powers were necessary for the

commission to cope with its vast responsibilities. Bush granted that Congress would be giving up control of

atomic energy, except for appropriations and its right to revise the basic

act, but considering the enormous

hazards, he believed rigid federal control was an absolute necessity.

Conant, too, expressed the view that

the commission must be able to exercise extraordinary controls for reasons stated clearly in the bill itself:

"The misuse of such energy, by

design or through ignorance, may inflict incalculable disaster upon the

Nation, destroy the general welfare,

49

 The Interim Committee bill, in view of the

military potentialities of atomic energy and preparation of the measure under the guidance of the War

Department and Manhattan Project, was remanded

to the military affairs committees of both Houses.

Congressman Andrew J. May, representing a Kentucky district, headed the House Military Affairs

Committee and Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado was the ranking member of the Senate Military

Affairs Committee.

50

 Quotation from Patterson's 9 Oct 45 opening

statement in U.S. Congress, House, Military Affairs

Committee, Atomic Energy Hearings on H. Res. 4280,

79th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 and 18 Oct 45 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 7.
576 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

imperil the national safety, and endanger world peace."

 51

 At the conclusion of the testimony, the committee prepared to end the hearings and

report the atomic energy bill back to

the floor of the House.

But adverse reaction in the Senate

Military Affairs Committee, and from

the press and public, indicated the

measure would arouse considerable

opposition. When Senator Edwin C.

Johnson introduced the bill in the

Senate committee, Senator Arthur H.

Vandenberg of Michigan, the committee's minority leader, challenged it as

dealing with a subject beyond the

competence of a standing committee

and therefore requiring consideration

by a special joint committee of Congress. He had already introduced a

joint resolution proposing formation

of such a committee. By a parliamentary maneuver, he was able to hold up

further consideration of the bill until

the House of Representatives voted

on his resolution.

Meantime, newly formed associations of atomic scientists at the Metallurgical Laboratory and at the Clinton

Engineer Works had mobilized a

press campaign against the bill on the

grounds that it was an attempt by the

Army to railroad legislation through

Congress without the extensive hearings before an impartial committee

such an important subject deserved.

They also gave voice to the suspicion

that the bill represented an attempt

by the War Department and the Navy

to secure control of the postwar

atomic energy organization, pointing

especially to the provision that would

permit military officers to serve in the

chief administrative posts without

adequate supervision by the part-time

commissioners. Many scientists, too,

called attention to the severity of the

penalties provided in the bill's security provisions (ten years in prison and

a $10,000 fine), seeing in them evidence of an attempt to place undue

restrictions on scientific employees in

the postwar atomic program. Members of the Interim Committee's scientific panel, who had earlier endorsed the May-Johnson bill, expressed alarm at the heavy penalties

for unauthorized release of classified

information.

These developments marked the

beginning of a prolonged legislative

battle. During the remainder of 1945,

a coalition of scientists, legislators,

and government officials exerted a

growing opposition to the May-Johnson bill, which had at first the effect

of preventing the backers of that

measure from securing its rapid enactment and led ultimately to its displacement by a bill more acceptable

to the groups in the coalition. Becoming increasingly aware of the growing

criticisms of the May-Johnson bill,

President Truman privately withdrew

his endorsement, leaving the way

open for substantial changes in the

measure. And in the Senate, support

grew for Vandenberg's proposal that

a special committee be established to

deal with atomic energy matters.

When his resolution for setting up a

joint committee of both Houses failed

to secure the required votes, Brien

McMahon, a young senator from

Connecticut, led a movement for creation of a special committee in the

Senate. Passage of a resolution subse51

 Quotation from Conant's opening statement in

ibid., p. 51. Conant was quoting from the May-Johnson bill, Declaration of Policy, Section 1 (a).
THE ATOMIC AGE AND ITS PROBLEMS 577

quently established the Special Committee on Atomic Energy, with McMahon as chairman.

Serving with McMahon were Senators Vandenberg, Johnson, Richard B.

Russell, Tom Connally, Harry F.

Byrd, Millard E. Tydings, Warren R.

Austin, Eugene D. Millikin, Bourke B.

Hickenlooper, and Thomas C. Hart.

Edward U. Condon, the physicist who

had worked at Los Alamos briefly

during the war but departed because

of his objection to security measures,

joined the committee as its scientific

adviser and James R. Newman, a

lawyer with an extensive knowledge

of science, as its special counsel. In

late November, while Newman

worked with Manhattan and other

government officials to draft a substitute measure to replace the MayJohnson bill, the committee commenced a series of almost daily public

hearings with the objective of informing its members and the American

people on the scientific aspects of

atomic energy. It closed the hearings

on 20 December, when Senator

McMahon introduced his new bill,

and reconvened them in late January

1946.

As the attention of the country focused on atomic energy, opposition

grew toward any legislation likely to

give an undue amount of influence to

the military in atomic activities and

place too restrictive controls on nuclear research and scientists. The

movement, an aspect of widespread

postwar weariness with things military, received extensive support

among scientists employed on the

Manhattan Project, who were by then

effectively organized as the Federation of Atomic Scientists.

In February, Secretary Patterson

and General Groves testified before

the Senate Special Committee, urging

passage of legislation generally along

the lines of the May-Johnson bill.

Both objected strongly to the provisions in the McMahon bill that virtually excluded the armed services from

participation in the military application of atomic energy. Groves, for example, contended that no shift in emphasis on atomic energy as a military

weapon was possible until there were

no longer wars between nations. Both

also felt that the security provisions of

the McMahon bill, based upon the

Espionage Act, were inadequate for

an area as sensitive as atomic energy.

Secretary Patterson thought the

McMahon bill placed too many restrictions on research in nuclear science. Groves continued to express

preference for the May-Johnson bill's

provision that the members of the

commission be part-time, rather than

full-time as provided by the McMahon

measure, because he believed more

capable men could be secured for

part-time service. He also objected to

the McMahon bill's exclusion of active

military members from the commission and he favored the May-Johnson

bill's provision of a single executive

rather than a commission performing

the executive function.52

52

 Patterson's 14 Feb 46 opening statement

before the Senate Special Committee on Atomic

Energy may be found in Atomic Energy Act Hearings on

S. 1717, pp. 389-90; the original version of the

statement, as prepared by the Secretary's office, is

in HB Files, Fldr 92 (Drafts of Secy War Testimony), MDR. Groves's 27 Feb 46 opening statement

may be found in Atomic Energy Act Hearings on S.

1717, pp. 467-68; the original version of the statement, as prepared by Groves's office, is in OCG

Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 13 (Legislation),

MDR.
578 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Although the Special Committee

had reported the McMahon bill to the

Senate on 19 April, it did not come to

the floor of the Senate until 1 June.

After only three hours of debate and

a few minor amendments, the measure passed with no dissenting votes.

The bill went to the House Military

Affairs Committee on the fifth and,

after brief hearings (11-13 June), to

the House of Representatives. The

House passed the bill with major

changes on 20 July, but most of the

amendments were removed in a subsequent conference session. President

Truman signed the measure on 1

August as the Atomic Energy Act of

1946. Under terms of the act, the

Army's responsibility for direction

and control of atomic energy in the

United States was to pass to a civilian

agency, the United States Atomic

Energy Commission. This legislation

also created the Military Liaison Committee and the General Advisory

Committee, which were to provide,

respectively, coordination and support on matters relating to future

military and scientific and technical

applications.53

For the wartime leaders of the

Manhattan Project, the long-delayed

enactment of the Atomic Energy Act

marked another significant step in

their efforts to solve the problems

they faced in peacetime control of

atomic energy. Already they had

achieved success in the program for

release of public information, accomplished without endangering the nation's security. But many were convinced that provisions in the new legislation were likely to be inadequate

from the standpoint of security and

ineffectual for the future military application of atomic energy. Many also

were disappointed in the limited success attained in reaching workable

agreements for international control

of atomic energy. They had willingly

made available their special knowledge to the American, British, and

Canadian political leaders endeavoring to achieve such agreements

through diplomatic negotiations and

the new United Nations Organization.

These efforts, however, clearly revealed that substantive progress in international exchange of information

and control of atomic energy would

become possible only when ways were

found to remove the numerous and

persistent causes of fundamental distrust among the nations of the world.

53

 As spelled out in the Atomic Energy Act of

1946 (Public Law 585, 79th Congress), the Atomic

Energy Commission was to consist of five civilian

presidential appointees who would serve full time

administering the program; the General Advisory

Committee, nine civilian presidential appointees

who would meet at least four times a year; and the

Military Liaison Committee, representatives of the

War and Navy Departments whom the Secretaries

would detail in such numbers as deemed necessary.
CHAPTER XXVIII

The Army and the Atomic Energy

Program, 1945-1947

In the months leading up to the

end of the war, the Army's involvement in the Manhattan Project had

expanded rapidly as all of its efforts

converged on completing its atomic

mission and saving the lives of thousands of fighting men. With the attainment of the wartime objective, the

project's military leaders expected

that the Army's administration of the

atomic energy program would be

promptly terminated and strongly recommended that the government

adopt this course of action. In October, while appearing before the

House Military Affairs Committee,

General Groves once again advanced

this point of view, stressing that the

Army's "responsibility for directing

all activities relating to the release

and use of atomic energy . . . should

not be continued today." Yet his solution of vesting control "in the most

representative and able body our

democratic society is capable of organizing" was not immediately possible,

and the Army was left with no alternative but to continue in a prolonged

and often frustrating caretaker role.1

A Postwar Trusteeship

In carrying out what Groves later

termed its "trusteeship," the Army

not only would contribute significantly to preserving much of the wartime

program but also, in spite of widespread opposition to its influence,

would have an opportunity to leave

its imprint on the character of the

peacetime program. "The War Department will always have a vital interest . . . in atomic energy," Groves

told the Senate's Special Committee

on Atomic Energy, and "in the field

of practical administration and operation the Army can furnish invaluable

assistance."

 2

While Congress and the country

debated the issue of a successor organization during late 1945 and early

1946, the Army experienced a difficult period of transition because of a

number of critical operational and administrative problems at Manhattan's

production and research facilities. Es1

 Quotations from Groves's 9 Oct 45 opening

statement in Atomic Energy Hearings on H. Res. 4280,

p. 9, with pertinent paragraphs reproduced in App.

IX of Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 440-41. A

copy also may be found in HB Files, Fldr 66, MDR. 2

 Quotations from Groves's 28 Nov 45 opening

statement in Atomic Energy Hearings on S. Res. 179, p.

31, with pertinent paragraphs reproduced in App. X

of Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 441-42.
580 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

pecially challenging was the serious

manpower problem that resulted

from the process of postwar demobilization. "Because of the current uncertainty," Groves had warned the

Senate committee in November 1945,

"we are losing key people whose services should be retained. Until that uncertainty is resolved by the establishment of a national policy, . . . [the

project will experience an] appreciable loss of the present efficiency of

the vast combination of plants, scientific talent, and engineering skill."

 3

Project Operations and Problems

In the weeks immediately after the

surrender of Japan, while Manhattan

District teams were collecting data on

the effects of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings and tracing the

progress of Japanese scientists in the

field of atomic energy, General

Groves and his staff were preparing

to convert the atomic program to a

peacetime status. As perceived by

Groves, the Army's responsibility

during the transitional period would

be keeping the wartime program

functioning efficiently, closing down

those elements that were no longer

needed, completing construction

projects already in progress, and

maintaining as far as feasible an

effective working organization in

face of the eroding pressures of

demobilization.

To facilitate the Army's interim

stewardship of the atomic program,

Groves and his staff drafted a plan for

postwar project operations.4 Under

this plan, fissionable materials production at the Clinton and Hanford

Engineer Works would be reduced by

about 15 percent, thus cutting operating costs more than 30 percent and

achieving an appreciable savings in

uranium; weapons production at the

Los Alamos Laboratory would continue, but at a somewhat lower rate, with

the objective of building a stockpile

of twenty bombs. Project operations,

Groves emphasized, would proceed at

this curtailed rate only until Congress

reached a decision on America's

future atomic energy policy. In late

August, following the Military Policy

Committee's approval of his plan, the

Manhattan commander submitted it

to the Secretary of War and the Chief

of Staff for their endorsement. After a

close review, Stimson and Marshall

concurred with the provisions of the

plan.

An obvious first step to implementing Groves's plan was to close down

less efficient production units, to

achieve the most economical use of

money, manpower, and materials. In

early September, the District shut

down the thermal diffusion plant at

Clinton and placed the Alpha racetracks of the electromagnetic plant on

standby. Additional Beta facilities

under construction would be ready in

November to provide much more efficient enrichment facilities than the

unreliable Alpha Calutrons. Furthermore, upper stages of the gaseous

3

 Quotation from Atomic Energy Hearings on S. Res.

179, p. 32. See also Statement by General Groves

on Dissolution of Manhattan Engr Dist, 14 Aug 47,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 319.2 (Misc), MDR.

4

 For details of Groves's plan see Memo, Groves

to Chief of Staff, 23 Aug 45, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 2, Tab A, MDR. Groves appears

to have based his plan on Draft Memo, Groves (prepared by Nichols) to Secy War, 13 Aug 45, OCG

Files, Gen Corresp, Groves Files, Fldr 17, Tab K,

MDR.
THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, 1945-1947 581

diffusion plant, which had proved to

be the most efficient producer of

partly processed uranium feed, had

become operational in mid-August,

making available higher assay feed for

the Beta enrichment process. The

District also decided to complete construction of the plant's K-27 side-feed

extension unit, scheduled to be ready

for full operation by early 1946.

At Hanford, the District directed

Du Pont to continue operation of all

three production piles but to shut

down one of the two chemical separation plants. It also closed the last of

the three heavy water plants that the

project had built in the United States;

two had ceased operation before V-J

Day. The plant at Trail (British Columbia) continued in operation, but

the District recommended that by January 1946 partial control be turned

over to the Canadian firm (Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company)

operating it.

In contrast to Clinton and Hanford,

the future of postwar operations at

Los Alamos was more problematic because of the combination of production activities with an extensive research and development program.

Under Groves's plan, bomb production at Los Alamos was to continue at

least until completion of an adequate

stockpile of weapons. But the laboratory was no longer the base of operations for bomb production. Soon

after the end of the war, the engineering group of the laboratory's ordnance division had decided to consolidate much of its weapon assembly activities at Sandia Base, located directly

east of Kirtland Field on the site of

Albuquerque's original airport at the

southern edge of the city. Beginning

in September 1945, to support bomb

production activities at Sandia, essential technical and military personnel

from Los Alamos and all project personnel and facilities from Wendover

Field transferred to the Albuquerque

site. Finally, in early 1946, most of

the remaining members of the engineering group relocated there.5

Another problem in Los Alamos

operations was the progressive erosion of its scientific and technical personnel. Because of the uncertainty of

the laboratory's future, many wartime

scientists and technicians prepared to

resign and return to civilian pursuits.

Some, of course, would have departed under any circumstances; the war

was over and they had jobs waiting in

universities, scientific laboratories, or

industry. Others were tired of the

security restrictions or disliked the

isolation and unfavorable living

conditions.

To deal with this personnel problem, General Groves and Oppenheimer, who was himself returning to

the University of California at Berkeley, met with the scientists and technicians in the weeks following the end

of the war. During these meetings the

5

 The immediate postwar history of the bomb

production groups at Los Alamos and Sandia Base

is covered in some detail in Frederic C. Alexander,

Jr., History of Sandia Corporation Through Fiscal Year

1963 (Albuquerque, N.Mex.: [Sandia Corp.], 1963,

pp. 1-14. See also MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2, "Technical,"

Supp., pp. VIII.1-VIII.7, DASA. In the transition

period from July 1945 to July 1947, the total

number of nuclear components for bombs produced

was about eighteen (seventeen implosion, one gun),

which included those for the test device exploded at

Trinity, the two bombs used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the two exploded in Operation CROSSROADS. An estimated twenty-nine mechanical assemblies for implosion bombs were available in June

1947. See David Rosenberg, "U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, 1945 to 1950," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 38

(May 82): 25-30. The above figures are derived

from Table, p. 26.
582 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

OPPENHEIMER CONGRATULATING THE

TROOPS. In one of his last official acts,

the laboratory director participated with

Col. Gerald R. Tyler, post commander,

in an awards ceremony at Los Alamos.

two leaders assured the staff members

that the laboratory would continue to

be a center of weapons research, that

security would be less strict, and that

the work schedule would be more relaxed. Even the newly appointed interim laboratory director, Comdr.

Norris Bradbury, joined in the efforts

to arrest the outflow of personnel. At

a briefing in October, he outlined a

program of the activities he hoped

would be sufficiently attractive to

hold some of the scientific staff—

reengineering implosion weapons, research on the feasibility of the hydrogen bomb, further Trinity-type tests,

and study of constructive uses of

atomic energy. But despite these efforts, the laboratory by early 1946

was seriously short of both scientific

and technical personnel.6

Manhattan's other research and development centers experienced difficulties similar to those at Los Alamos.

Sensing that a time of uncertainty

would follow employment of the

bomb, project scientists had long

been proposing possible areas for

continued research and development

in the field of atomic energy. They

suggested, for example, exploring

atomic energy as a source of power

for both military and civilian applications, producing radioactive isotopes

for scientific research and industrial

uses, and improving devices to

employ the tremendous explosive

energy of fission. But the Army hesitated to start any research program

that would constitute long-range commitments for the still to be established successor agency to the Manhattan Project.7

6

 This account of developments at Los Alamos

from August to December 1945 is based on Hewlett

and Anderson, New World, pp. 625-27; Groves, Now

It Can Be Told, pp. 377-79; MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2,

Supp., passim, DASA. Commander Bradbury, a

physicist, served for four years at the Naval Proving

Ground (Dahlgren, Virginia) before coming to Los

Alamos in 1944 to head the field test program for

the implosion bomb. He subsequently worked on a

variety of other programs at the laboratory. On the

interim director's efforts see Ltr, Bradbury to

Groves, 3 Nov 45, 322 (Los Alamos); Ltr, Bradbury

to Lt Col Stanley L. Stewart (Los Angeles), 14 Nov

45, 600.12 (Los Alamos); Ltr, Bradbury to Groves,

23 Nov 45, 600.12 (Projs and Prgms). All in Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, MDR. For Groves's views on replacing Oppenheimer see Draft Memo for Record,

Groves, 13 Sep 45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 001,

MDR. On the departure of the British scientists

from Los Alamos see Ltr, Chadwick to Groves, 9

Jan 46, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Chadwick,

J.), MDR.

7

 On proposed postwar programs in atomic

energy see committee reports of meetings at the

Metallurgical Laboratory in the fall of 1944, which

may be found in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 334

(Postwar Policy-CEW), MDR. See also Rpt, ScientifContinued
THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, 1945-1947 583

Although most of the project's research and development facilities had

to devote their time to the generally

less attractive and challenging business of winding up wartime research,

some managed to launch their own

investigations into aspects of atomic

energy that held broader promise for

the future. At the Clinton Laboratories, scientists continued wartime investigations into the effects of radiation on animals and undertook recovery of uranium from wastes held

in storage solutions, but also began

two new programs: the production of

radioactive isotopes, and the design

and development of a heterogeneous

pile using enriched uranium. At the

Metallurgical Laboratory, while operating under an interim organization,

scientists kept busy supporting the

Hanford project, but also were able

to give some time to such programs

as the development of a breeder reactor for producing nuclear fuel.8

Of all the project's research and development centers, the Radiation Laboratory succeeded best in switching

from wartime activities to fundamental scientific research. It had been a

well-established research center

before the war (since 1935) and could

again take up suspended tasks (such

as completing the 184-inch cyclotron,

stopped in 1941) and new projects

(such as building a synchroton, an apparatus for imparting charged particles with higher speeds than were

possible in the cyclotron). Ernest

Lawrence, continuing as director of

the laboratory, even managed to persuade a reluctant General Groves to

approve use of some government

funds to carry on these scientific construction projects.9

As the Army was curtailing project

operations and winding up its research and development programs,

the process of postwar demobilization

became a serious threat to its effective administration of the program

during the interim period. In an

effort to maintain present efficiency,

the district engineer in October 1945

requested all organizations in the

project to make a study of their anticipated personnel problems and to

submit plans for making the necessary

adjustments. In the next eight or nine

months, he noted, many military personnel would become eligible for release. Some in this category could

continue in a civilian capacity in their

present assignments, while others

ic Panel, sub: Proposals for R & D in the Field of

Atomic Energy, 2 vols., 28 Sep 45, HB Files, Fldr

113, MDR; Ltr, Compton to Secy Comm Henry A.

Wallace, sub: Policy Re A-Energy, 27 Sep 45,

Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 312.1 (A-Energy), and

Ltr, Bradbury to Groves, 23 Nov 45, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Projs and Prgms), MDR. On

the production and release of radioactive isotopes

for scientific research see the materials in Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 441.2 (Isotopes), MDR. 8

 The term breeder reactor was broadly applied to

any nuclear chain reactor in which fertile material

(U-238, for example) could be converted into more

fissionable material than it consumed. Looking to

the future use of atomic energy as a source of

power for producing electricity and propelling naval

vessels, nuclear scientists could perceive the value of

developing a means for steadily increasing the

stockpile of fissionable material. The breeder would

maximize utilization of fertile, nonfissionable material by converting it into nuclear fuel that could be

used for the production of power. For a detailed explanation of the breeder reactor see Glasstone,

Sourcebook on Atomic Energy, pp. 572-74, pars., 15.44-

15.52.

9

 This paragraph and the preceding one based on

Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 627-28. The

Metallurgical Laboratory operated under an interim

organization because Arthur Compton had left to

become chancellor of Washington University in St.

Louis, Missouri.
584 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

would become available for reassignment to other installations. Planning

well in advance of these inevitably

disrupting shifts of personnel, the district engineer advised, was the only

way to prevent a serious decline in

the efficiency of project operations.10

Personnel attrition was especially

heavy among Manhattan's commissioned officers. During the war, the

military officer complement was comprised almost exclusively of noncareer

reservists; at the war's end, most were

eligible for immediate discharge. For

replacements, Groves decided he

would need about fifty regular officers. Under ordinary circumstances, a

request for this number could readily

be filled, but the Manhattan commander advanced special requirements that complicated the requisition. He specifically stipulated that

only the most highly qualified officers

meeting very strict selection standards

be assigned to Manhattan as replacements, for officers of lesser capabilities could not work successfully with

scientists and would not be able to

acquire the technical knowledge

needed to perform effectively on the

project.

The replacements were needed

quickly, and because there was little

time for extensive investigation into

their qualifications, Groves turned to

graduates of the United States Military Academy as the most likely

source of candidates. This policy soon

brought protests from the War Department General Staff, which could

see no reason why the Manhattan

Project should have first choice of the

best-qualified officers in the Army.

General Groves sought the support

of the new Chief of Staff, General

Eisenhower, for this selection policy,

but the latter sided with the General

Staff. Groves then turned to Secretary

of War Patterson, who finally resolved

the matter in his favor. The Manhattan commander, Patterson directed,

was "to have as many officers as he

decided he needs and of the quality

he thinks he needs, and I want him to

have complete freedom of choice."

 11

During the Army's postwar stewardship, the number of commissioned officers fell from a September 1945

peak of more than 700 to a December

1946 low of 250. But the decline was

generally proportionate to the overall

reduction in employment on the

project during the transition period

(thus, contractor employment fell

from eighty thousand to a little over

forty thousand in the same months).

Similarly, enlisted personnel declined

from over five thousand to somewhat

more than two thousand. While there

was the anticipated turnover in officer

personnel characteristic of any period

of demobilization after a war, a surprisingly large percentage of the wartime officers in key positions stayed

on until at least the latter part of

1946, and many of those who did

10

 MD Cir Ltr, sub: Org Adjustments, 27 Oct 45,

Admin Files, MD Directives, Ser. 46, Control, MDR.

11

 As quoted in Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p.

376. A good example of the quality of regular officers Groves was able to secure was Col. Frederick J.

Clarke, an engineer officer, who, in early 1946, replaced Colonel Matthias as area engineer at Hanford. Clarke, a graduate of the United States Military Academy, held important assignments in the

Army Service Forces during the war, and before

completing his career in the Army, he served as the

engineer commissioner for the District of Columbia

(1960-63) and as the Engineers chief (1969-73).

See Corps of Engineers, Engineer Memoirs: Interviews

With Lieutenant General Frederick J. Clarke (Washington, D.C.: OCE Historical Division, 1979), pp. v and

93-106.
THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, 1945-1947 585

SECRETARY OF WAR ROBERT P. PATTERSON (left) meeting with General Groves on

postwar problems

resign continued with the atomic

project in a civilian capacity.12

Serious losses of personnel also occurred among operational and research employees, including most of

the nonmilitary scientists and technicians. From a total often thousand in

September 1945, this group declined

to under three thousand by December

1946. Other contract employees—

chiefly those operating the production facilities and maintaining services

at Clinton and Hanford—also fell in

numbers, but at a somewhat slower

rate. In the same period, the decline

at Clinton was from about forty-five

thousand to twenty-five thousand and

at Hanford from ten thousand to less

than five thousand. At the New

Mexico site, the always small operating work force remained at a constant

level of fifteen hundred to two thousand during late 1945 and most of

1946, then rose rapidly in November

and December to over five thousand

as the Sandia Base built up its

personnel.13

Destruction of Japanese Cyclotrons

Illustrative of the serious breakdown in the operating efficiency of

12

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, "Personnel," Apps. A1

(Chart, Manhattan Proj Contractor Employment,

Aug 42-Dec 46) and A13 (Chart, MD Mil Personnel,

Aug 42-Dec 46), DASA; Org Charts, U.S. Engrs

Office, MD, 10 Nov 44 and 6 Nov 46, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 020 (MED-Org), MDR. 13 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 8, App. A1, DASA.
586 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

the Army in the first hectic months of

its postwar trusteeship was the unfortunate decision to destroy the Japanese cyclotrons.14

 With the war over,

the process of demobilization began

to diminish the ranks of the project's

key personnel. Despite concerted efforts to procure only highly competent men, the experienced were replaced in some instances by the inexperienced. This was the case at

Groves's personal headquarters in

Washington, where the staff officer

who prepared the directive to destroy

the cyclotrons was, in Groves's opinion, not sufficiently familiar with the

project's operating procedures.

Manhattan's discovery of the Japanese cyclotrons in the weeks immediately following the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings was significant, for it

confirmed the wartime judgment of

project scientists that, in the area of

atomic energy, Japan had not progressed beyond the stage of laboratory research. The country had too few

scientists trained in nuclear physics

and lacked both the sources of uranium and the necessary industrial

capacity to produce fissionable

materials for development of atomic

weapons.

A project survey team had found

cyclotrons at three of the major scientific research institutions in Japan:

two at the Institute for Physical and

Chemical Research in Tokyo, two at

the Osaka Imperial University, and

one at the Kyoto Imperial University.

After Japan's surrender, scientists at

these institutions requested permission from the headquarters of General MacArthur, recently appointed Supreme Commander for the Allied

Powers (SCAP), Japan, to resume operations of these cyclotrons for various research projects. SCAP authorities promptly granted a permit for

operation of those at the Institute for

Physical and Chemical Research, although they subsequently limited

their employment to investigations in

biology and medicine.

Meantime, in early September, the

War Department General Staff had

issued instructions directing destruction of all enemy war equipment,

except that which was to be saved for

examination because of its new or

unique character. The instructions

clearly stated that "equipment not essentially or exclusively for war which

is suitable for peacetime civilian uses

should be retained."

 15

 On 30 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expanded these instructions, directing commanders in the Pacific area and China

to seize any facilities for research in

14

 This account of the destruction of the Japanese

cyclotrons is based on the following sources: Correspondence and related items in HB Files, Fldrs 7

and 70, MDR; Correspondence, including MacArthur's denial of responsibility for destruction of the

cyclotrons and Secretary of War Patterson's acceptance of that responsibility, in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 413.6 (Destruction of Japanese Cyclotrons),

MDR; Ltrs, Dean Acheson (for Secy State) to Sir

Frederic W. Eggleston (Australian Minister to U.S.),

10 Dec 45, and Col R. L. Vittrup (for Secy War) to

State Dept, Attn: Japan-Korea Economic Division,

sub: Request for Info on Cyclotrons in Japan, 29

Dec 45, in U.S. Department of State, The British Commonwealth [and] The Far East, Foreign Relations of

the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Vol. 6

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,

1969), pp. 1011 and 1014-15; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14,

"Intelligence & Security," pp. 5.1-5.4; Groves, Now

It Can Be Told, pp. 187 and 367-72; Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book

Co., 1964), pp. 286-87; Compton, Atomic Quest, p.

24; Yoshio Nishina, "A Japanese Scientist Describes

the Destruction of His Cyclotrons," Bulletin of the

Atomic Scientists 3 (Jun 47): 145 and 167.

15

 As quoted in Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p.

368.
THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, 1945-1947 587

atomic energy and related fields and

to take into custody any individuals

engaged in nuclear research.

When a copy of the 30 October directive reached General Groves, he

called in an officer from his headquarters staff and went over its contents with him, with the objective of

making certain that the five Japanese

cyclotrons were brought under control. The Manhattan commander did

not specify precisely how they were to

be secured. The staff officer, interpreting his instructions from Groves

to be that he was to take steps to

have the cyclotrons destroyed, on

7 November prepared a message to

General MacArthur ordering that this

be done as soon as they were no

longer needed by Allied scientific

teams to obtain technical and experimental data. Because the message was

to go out under the Secretary of

War's name, Groves's office cleared it

through John W. Martyn, Patterson's

administrative assistant, who, viewing

it as concerned only with a routine

matter, did not specifically call it to

the Secretary's attention.16

On 24 November, SCAP headquarters reported to the Joint Chiefs of

Staff that it had started destruction of

the cyclotrons, which it had seized on

the twentieth, citing as authority only

the 30 October directive. Although

copies of the report went to the offices of nine different officials, including that of General Groves, apparently no one in authority actually saw it.

In retrospect, Groves attributed the

failure of policymaking officers in

Washington to question the destruction on the widespread inexperience

prevalent in subordinate staffs as a

result of the postwar readjustment.17

SCAP headquarters first got an inkling that there was some confusion

in policy within the War Department

on the matter of the Japanese cyclotrons when it received a request on

28 November to send one of the cyclotrons to the United States for

study. General MacArthur personally

informed General Eisenhower of the

conflicting instructions, but received

no reply to his cable.

Meanwhile, the story of the destruction of the cyclotrons had come out

in the American press. A dispatch

from Tokyo carrying a date line of

24 November attributed the action to

orders from General MacArthur.

However, another story on 29 November, quoting sources in MacArthur's headquarters, stated that the

decision was not made by SCAP, but

by a "higher authority" in Washington. The occupation government had

reluctantly carried out these

instructions.18

Faced with inquiries from the press,

the War Department cabled MacArthur's headquarters that it had never

sent the instructions to destroy the

cyclotrons. The department conceded, however, that its failure to comment on MacArthur's message of

16

 General Groves notes in his memoirs (see ibid.,

p. 369) that the staff officer who oversaw preparation of the message had only recently been assigned

to the atomic project. He thinks that if the officer

had been more familiar with the project's operating

procedures, he would have questioned Groves's apparent desire to have the cyclotrons destroyed. The

destruction order thus would have been brought to

Groves's personal attention, and he would have had

it remanded. The draft cable message is attached to

Memo, Maj Amos E. Britt (for Groves) to Martyn,

sub: Destruction of Cyclotrons in Japan, 7 Nov 45,

HB Files, Fldr 7, MDR.

17

 Groves. Now It Can Be Told, p. 369. 18

 New York Times, 24 and 29 Nov 45.
588 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

24 November had contributed to the

misunderstanding. MacArthur replied

that the special instructions had come

from the Secretary of War, pointing

out that he had personally informed

Eisenhower of their apparently conflicting nature but had never received

a reply. MacArthur felt he had to

answer the untrue charges, which

continued to appear in the press, that

the occupation government had made

the decision to destroy the cyclotrons.

The War Department immediately

sent him assurances that he had acted

correctly and the misunderstanding

had occurred entirely because officials

in Washington had not coordinated

outgoing messages.

Having thus accepted full responsibility for mismanagement of the

matter, the War Department had next

to seek some way to allay the continuing widespread criticism in the press.

Patterson and Groves finally agreed

upon release of a frankly worded

statement to the press, signed by the

Secretary, accepting full responsibility

for the unfortunate incident:

General MacArthur was directed to de- stroy the Japanese cyclotrons in a radio

message sent to him in my name. The

message was dispatched without my

having seen it and without its having

been given the thorough consideration

which the subject deserved. Among other

things, the opinion of our scientific advis- ers should have been obtained before a

decision was arrived at. While the officer who originated it felt

that the action was in accord with our es- tablished policy of destroying Japan's war

potential, the dispatch of such a message

without first investigating the matter fully

was a mistake. I regret this hasty action

on the part of the War Department.19

The press, apparently not expecting

such an open admission of error on

the part of the War Department, soon

lost interest in the matter of the Japanese cyclotrons. Unfortunately, however, the incident would provide additional fuel for the more vociferous

critics of the department's atomic

policies in the immediate postwar

period.

Reorganization and New Commitments

Faced with a continuing attrition in

personnel, the need to prepare programs for fiscal year (FY) 1947, and

other urgent administrative problems,

the Army decided in early 1946 to

abandon the "hold-the line" policy and

make long-range commitments necessary to keep the project a viable and

efficient operation. For example,

Groves advised Bradbury at Los

Alamos that "it has . . . become necessary for me to make definite plans,

despite the fact that this will commit

to some extent at least any future

control body." Similarly, in a prepared brief for Groves, General Nichols warned that the Manhattan Project

must begin making some firm commitments to avoid dissolution of its

many research programs. Hence, a

first order of business under the new

policy was to make certain changes in

the administrative organization of the

project, to facilitate planning and to

oversee the day-to-day operations.20

19

 WD Press Release, 15 Dec 45, HB Files, Fldr 7,

MDR.

20

 Quotations from Ltr, Groves to Bradbury, 4 Jan

46, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 600.12 (Atomic),

MDR. Memo, Nichols to Groves, 2 Feb 46, OCG

Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 20, Tab U, MDR.

Nichols's promotion to the temporary rank of brigadier general became effective on 22 Jan 46 but was

terminated on 30 Jun 46.
THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, 1945-1947 589

The hold-the-line policy had occasioned very few changes in the internal administrative organization of the

postwar Manhattan Project up until

1946. The relationship, too, with the

War Department had continued more

or less on the same basis as during

the war, with Groves having a good

deal of autonomy in his administration and having access to the department through the Chief of Staff and,

when necessary, to the Secretary of

War himself. The War Department, in

consultation with Groves and Bush,

had replaced the Military Policy Committee with a Military Advisory Board,

comprised of three Army and three

Navy officers responsible for coordinating activities of the War and Navy

Departments with those of the Manhattan District. At the same time, the

War Department had established an

ad hoc reviewing committee to indoctrinate selected officers in the organization and work of the Manhattan

Project and to submit recommendations for development of appropriate

relationships between the project and

the War Department. Groves served

as a member of this last-named committee, which had met a number of

times in late 1945.21

The wartime ad hoc reviewing committees and the Military Policy Committee had provided invaluable planning assistance to Manhattan, but

project leaders soon realized that the

new Military Advisory Board, with

only military members, was hardly

suitable for the task of preparing a

viable atomic program for FY 1947.

To correct this deficiency, General

Nichols in late January secured

Groves's approval for establishment

of an Advisory Committee on Research and Development. He enlisted

the aid of Richard Tolman and Ernest

Lawrence, who soon formed a group

consisting of Robert F. Bacher,

Arthur H. Compton, Warren K.

Lewis, John R. Ruhoff, Charles A.

Thomas, John A. Wheeler, and

Tolman himself.22

The new committee met for the

first time in early March at the Manhattan Project office in Washington,

joined by General Nichols and representatives of organizations wanting to

secure sponsorship of programs. The

committee proffered various research

and development proposals, noting

especially the need for expanding the

number of agencies performing research in atomic energy. It recommended continued subsidization of

the University of California program

and emphasized that university laboratories should devote their efforts

primarily to unclassified research but,

where necessary, should also carry

out classified research, with the basic

objective of adding to scientific

knowledge. For fundamental research

requiring equipment too costly to be

purchased by most university or private laboratories, the committee favored the establishment of national

laboratories. Finally, it supported the

21

 Memo, Brig Gen William A. Borden (New Developments Div Dir, WDSS) to Gen Thomas T.

Handy (Dep Chief of Staff), sub: Integration of WD

Requirements With Manhattan Proj Opns, 4 Oct 45;

Memo, Borden to Chief of Staff, same subject, 12

Oct 45; Memo, Brig Gen H. J. Hodes (Asst Dep

Chief of Staff, GSC) to Lt Gen J. E. Hull (Asst Chief

of Staff, OPD, WDGS) et al., sub: Ad Hoc Committee, 20 Oct 45. All in Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

334 (Committees and Mil Advisory Board), MDR.

22

 Memo, Nichols to Groves, 22 Jan 46, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 334 (Advisory Committee on R

& D), MDR; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, p.

633.
590 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

development of high-temperature and

fast-fission piles, as well as other reactor projects related to commercial aspects of atomic energy, at government-operated facilities, such as the

Clinton Engineer Works and Argonne

and Metallurgical laboratories.23

The Manhattan District's strong endorsement of the committee's recommendations is evident from the considerable amount of funding allotted

for research and development in the

FY 1947 budget. The committee had

proposed expenditures from $20 to

$40 million, but the District's budget

provided more than $72 million, divided between construction (68 percent) and operating expenses (32 percent). While the largest amounts went

to the project's laboratories at Argonne and Clinton, substantial funds

were earmarked for programs at a

number of universities. In July 1946,

Congress voted the necessary funds

to finance the research and development budget.24

Of the various proposals, Groves

devoted his greatest effort to establishment of the national laboratories.

The committee had suggested one

laboratory in each major region of the

country. Universities and other research organizations in the region

would provide a board of directors to

recommend research projects and

prepare the annual budget. The committee proposed that the first of these

laboratories should be the Argonne

Laboratory at Chicago and another

located somewhere in the northeast.

The University of Chicago in midApril 1946 agreed to operate the

soon to be established Argonne National Laboratory (1 July), which

would be formed from the existing

Metallurgical and Argonne laboratories, and representatives of twentyfour participating institutions in June

submitted data pertinent to the policy

to be followed in its organization and

operation. The Manhattan District

then announced that it would negotiate a formal contract with the University of Chicago. While the participating institutions secured security clearances for their scientists, what was left

of the Metallurgical Project staff at

Argonne initiated the research program for the new laboratory. Much of

this program, of necessity, consisted

of continuing projects already in

progress at the old Argonne Laboratory, including design of a breeder reactor and investigation of graphite expansion in the piles at Hanford.25

In July 1946, nine universities in

the northeastern part of the United

States—Columbia, Cornell, Harvard,

Johns Hopkins, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Pennsylvania,

Princeton, Rochester, and Yale—

banded together as the Associated

Universities, Inc., to support a national laboratory in that region. Groves

announced that this laboratory would

be located at the site of the Army's

Camp Upton on Long Island, but disagreement among the universities as

to the extent that the government

23

 General Nichols reported to General Groves on

what the Advisory Committee had proposed in

Memo, Nichols to Groves, 14 Mar 46, Admin Files,

Gen Corresp, 334 (Advisory Committee on R & D),

MDR. 24

 Hewlett and Anderson, New World, p. 635.

25

 For a detailed account of the establishment of

the Argonne National Laboratory see MDH, Bk. 1,

Vol. 4, "Auxiliary Activities," pp. 2.5-2.20, DASA.

For correspondence and other documents pertinent

to its organization see Admin Files, Gen Corresp,

080 (Argonne-Univ of Chicago) and 600.913

(Rpts-Fire and Accidents), MDR.
THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, 1945-1947 591

should control research activities at

the new institution, designated the

Brookhaven National Laboratory, delayed a start in its program until early

1947.26

The committee also had recommended national laboratories elsewhere in the country, especially on

the West Coast. But the heads of a

group of universities in southern California did not take affirmative action

on information forwarded to them by

the District in November until the

end of the year. Their proposal therefore became a matter for later decision by the new Atomic Energy

Commission.27

A national laboratory in the southeastern region was unnecessary, because an organization had evolved at

Clinton that, by early 1946, was serving a purpose similar to that of the

other national laboratories. The Monsanto Chemical Company, the prime

contractor for the Clinton Laboratories, had invited the University of

Tennessee at Knoxville to conduct

graduate courses for its employees as

a means of securing and holding the

technically trained personnel it

needed for its operations. Expanding

upon this plan, the University of Tennessee convened a meeting of representatives of other southeastern universities. Out of this conference came

an agreement that personnel from

these institutions could participate in

the graduate training at Clinton and,

in addition, make use of the research

facilities there. During 1946, District

officials and representatives of the

various universities involved took

steps to formalize the relationship. In

October, the associated institutions

received a charter from the state of

Tennessee as the Oak Ridge Institute

of Nuclear Studies, and in the last

months of the year, they were proceeding with negotiations for a contract with the Manhattan District.28

In addition to providing for the

continuation and expansion of the

project's research and development

programs, Groves and his staff had to

keep production operations functioning smoothly and efficiently. From an

administrative standpoint, one of the

first postwar problems they had to

deal with was extending major operating contracts. Most of these contracts

had been scheduled to terminate six

months after the cessation of actual

hostilities, but shortly thereafter Manhattan had secured supplemental

agreements to fix the expiration date

as 30 June 1946, with options for

government renewal for one year. In

March, Groves obtained approval

from the Secretary of War to exercise

these options and to negotiate the

necessary contract extensions to 30

June 1947. He informed the Secretary

that funds for this purpose were already available, but that additional

appropriations would be necessary to

prevent a cessation of production and

research operations at some time

before mid-1947. He also notified the

Secretary that one major contractor,

the Du Pont Company, had indicated

an unwillingness to continue and

would have to be replaced.29

26

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4, pp. 2.20-2.38, DASA. 27

 Memo, Nichols to Groves, 14 Mar 46, MDR;

MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4, pp. 2.38-2.39, DASA.

28

 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4, pp. 10.1-10.12, DASA. 29

 Memo, Groves to Secy War, 11 Mar 46, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 008 (WD), MDR.
592 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Subsequent efforts by Patterson

and Groves to persuade Du Pont to

continue at the Hanford Engineer

Works failed. Groves then negotiated

a contract with the General Electric

Company, similar in most respects to

Du Pont's. The major exception was

General Electric's insistence that a

provision be placed in the contract

that would permit the company to be

relieved of its obligation in the event

that the atomic energy legislation enacted by Congress imposed conditions not acceptable to the firm. The

new contract provided for the operation of Hanford, construction of

certain new facilities there, and for

construction and operation of a government-owned laboratory at the

Knolls, some five miles distant from

the company's home plant at Schenectady, New York. This laboratory,

which was separate from the new

Brookhaven National Laboratory,

would provide the company with facilities for pursuing its interest in the

development of atomic power.30

The Hanford production facilities

turned over to General Electric had

major operational problems. The

most serious was the expansion of the

graphite moderators in the three production piles, the result of heavy neutron bombardment (the so-called

Wigner Effect). Du Pont's plant manager had called this phenomenon to

the attention of the district engineer

in February 1946, pointing out that

there was visible bowing of the tubes

containing the uranium slugs and predicting that, because no effective way

had been discovered to combat this

development, the operating life of the

piles certainly was limited. Groves

and Nichols had followed Du Pont's

suggestion to shut down one pile to

ensure that, should the other two

become inoperative, one would be

available to maintain the essential

production of polonium (used as a

neutron source in atomic bombs),

which could not be stored because of

its short half-life. When General Electric took over, two piles were in operation and the oldest unit, the B Pile,

was on standby.31

Deficiencies in the Hanford separation process were not as serious as

those in the pile operation, and Du

Pont, with assistance from the Metallurgical Project scientists, had made

more progress in finding a solution

for them. The drawback of the bismuth phosphate method was that,

after extraction of the plutonium, it

left the residue of uranium in a state

from which it could not be readily recovered. Consequently, much valuable uranium suspended in the process

solution was drained off to be stored

unused in huge underground tanks.

Chemists at the Metallurgical Laboratory had developed another separation process that promised not only

to be a more efficient method of removing the plutonium from the process solution but also to leave the fission products and uranium in more

easily recoverable states. In August

1946, after engineering and cost stud- 30 ies had demonstrated the feasibility of Ltr, C. E. Wilson (Gen Electric president) to

Groves, 28 May 46; Memo, Groves to Secy War,

sub: Change of Opn and Management Contractor at

HEW, 31 May 46; Ltr, Nichols to Lilienthal, 4 Nov

46. All in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 161 (Electric),

MDR.

31

 Ltr, R. M. Evans (HEW Opns Mgr, Du Pont) to

Nichols, 20 Feb 46, Admin Files, Gen Coresp. 410.2

(Metals), MDR; MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 6, "Operations,"

pp. 4.19-4.20, DASA.
THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, 1945-1947 593

this process, Du Pont had begun development of a demonstration unit

and pilot plant, with the goal of eventually testing the process in a

semiworks.32

The K-25 and K-27 production

units at Clinton were operating more

successfully than anyone had anticipated. Plant engineers therefore concluded that the two diffusion units by

themselves might achieve as high a

concentration of U-235 as the Beta

tracks of the electromagnetic plant. In

May 1946, the Carbide and Carbon

Chemicals Corporation made careful

studies to ensure that there was no

danger of the concentration level

reaching a critical mass in the diffusion plant and that the corrosive effects of the feed material, uranium

hexaflouride, were not soon going to

destroy the operating surfaces of the

process equipment. The Manhattan

District then authorized Carbide and

Carbon to raise product concentration on an experimental basis, with

the objective of obtaining performance data that could be used to justify

ultimately shutting down the relatively inefficient and hard-to-maintain

Beta tracks of the electromagnetic

process.33

By way of contrast to Clinton and

Hanford, where none of the operating

problems seriously interfered with

continued production of fissionable

materials, deteriorating conditions at

Los Alamos during 1946 threatened

to halt the continued stockpiling of

atomic weapons.34 Poor morale was a

major factor, caused by an uncertain

future for the laboratory, a lack of

even the basic amenities of a peacetime community, and an intolerance

of the military and security aspects of

community life.

Groves, determined to improve

morale, directed that such measures

as were necessary to keep Los Alamos

active to meet the defense requirements of the country were to be taken

as quickly as possible. "The transition

from war to peacetime community

conditions will start immediately," he

told Bradbury. He outlined a program for community development

that became the blueprint for major

improvements in the utilities, including a million-gallon steel storage tank

to ensure an adequate supply of water

at all times; for constructing three

hundred permanent housing units;

and for increasing recreational facilities to make life at the isolated site

less irksome.35

While the community development

program was being implemented,

General Nichols worked on another

program to improve and expedite

stockpiling operations at Los Alamos.

Concerned about the slow rate of

weapons development, Nichols proposed to turn over to outside contractors full responsibility for fabrication

of most bomb components, making

32

 The so-called redox solvent extraction process

was based on the principle of alternating between

the plutonium oxidation state and higher states to

separate plutonium from uranium and then removing the fission products with other organic solvents,

such as hexone. See MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 6, pp. 4.24-

4.26, DASA; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, p.

630.

33

 MDH, Bk. 2, Vol. 5, "Operations," pp. 4.1-

4.12 and 8.1-8.4, DASA; Hewlett and Anderson,

New World, pp. 629-30.

34

 Except as otherwise indicated, section on Los

Alamos in 1946 based on MDH, Bk. 8, Vol. 2,

Supp., passim, DASA; Groves, Now It Can Be Told,

pp., 381-85. 35

 Ltr, Groves to Bradbury, 4 Jan 46, MDR; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 630-31.
594 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Los Alamos responsible for only the

development of new types of bombs.

The district engineer also recommended creation of a special technical

military unit in the Manhattan District

to do the final assembly work on

bombs.36

One activity diverting many senior

staff members at Los Alamos from

weapons development was Operation

CROSSROADS, the test of atomic

bombs against naval vessels scheduled

to take place in the early summer of

1946 at Bikini Atoll. After devoting

many months to assembling and testing the weapons components, preparing a technical handbook, and furnishing much additional technical

data, laboratory staff members were

detailed to the Bikini site to help prepare for and to observe the two tests

undertaken—Test Able, 30 June, the

explosion of a bomb over a group of

ships at a considerable altitude; and

Test Baker, 25 July, detonation of a

bomb under water. During the tests

Col. Stafford L. Warren of the District's Medical Section supervised special radiation teams who—under the

guidance of officers and men trained

at the Clinton Laboratories, the Universities of Chicago and Rochester,

the Philadelphia Navy Yard, and Los

Alamos—carried out a variety of radiological safety procedures with radiation-detecting instruments.37

In the meantime, John H. Manley, a

long-time and influential scientist on

the laboratory staff, indicated to

Groves and Nichols his support of the

plan to relieve Los Alamos of most of

the activities relating to actual weapons production. Manley objected to

what he felt was a growing interference of the military with the program

at Los Alamos. This, he thought,

could be eliminated by turning over

to a special military unit the production, stockpiling, and protection of

atomic bombs, leaving to the civilian

staff only bomb development. Groves

had already organized a special Army

battalion at Sandia Base to assume

responsibility for surveillance, field

tests, and weapons assembly. He also

had worked out an agreement with

Monsanto for development and fabrication of weapons components in a

plant at Dayton, Ohio. Furthermore,

he had started preliminary planning

for the shift of uranium purification

and its reduction to metal to Clinton

and of similar operations on plutonium to Hanford. Thus, the way was

almost clear for the scientists at Los

Alamos to devote their full efforts to

the design and development of new

weapons.38

While attending to problems associated with postwar project operations, the Army inevitably became

involved in a good many other administrative problems, some routine in

nature. Illustrative of this type of activity was the settlement of various

contractors' war claims against the

project. Typical was a suit brought in

early 1946 by Clifton Products, Inc., a

36

 Memo, Nichols to Groves, 22 Mar 46, Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 410.2 (Metals), MDR. 37

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 384-85; MDH,

Bk. 8, Vol. 2, Supp., pp. I.13-I.17, and Vol. 3,

"Auxiliary Activities," Ch. 8, DASA; Radiology in

World War II, pp. 901-15. The Bikini tests were carried out under the overall direction of the Navy, although the District had technical responsibility for

them.

38

 MDH, Bk. 4, Vol. 6, p. 4.25, and Bk. 8, Vol. 2,

Supp., pp. VII.6-VII.7 and App. 9, DASA; Hewlett

and Anderson, New World, pp. 632-33.
THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, 1945-1947 595

metal processing firm, for losses of

about $18,000 it claimed to have incurred in construction and operation

of a beryllium plant. The company, in

filing its claim with the Appeal Board

of the Office of Contract Settlement,

stated that the Manhattan District was

one of several wartime agencies that

had encouraged it to undertake production of beryllium. The Manhattan

District informed the Judge Advocate

General attorneys preparing the government's defense that the War Production Board, not Manhattan, had

taken the initiative in persuading Clifton to build beryllium production facilities that were primarily for the

benefit of other branches of the

Army. The Appeal Board, nevertheless, decided in favor of Clifton. Consequently, in August 1946, the District's Madison Square Area Engineers Office had to negotiate a final

financial settlement with the firm,

agreeing upon payment of some

$5,000 "for losses sustained."

 39

Disposition of surplus property was

another routine activity that absorbed

a good deal of time. Property disposal

was a matter of considerable interest

to the general public and therefore

also to members of Congress. Typical

of the problems that arose were those

relating to the priority rights of veterans in the purchase of surplus government property. For example, Col.

Elmer E. Kirkpatrick, Jr., now serving

as deputy district engineer, had to

assure Senator Edwin C. Johnson of

Colorado that in the sale of Manhattan District materials and equipment

at Grand Junction, where the project

had secured uranium from vanadium

tailings, "veterans are being given all

possible consideration under the laws

and regulations governing the sale of

war contractor inventories. . . ." In

another instance, Groves himself had

to assure the two senators from Tennessee, Kenneth D. McKellar and

Tom Stewart, that Roane-Anderson's

sale of surplus property at Clinton

would take into account the special

rights of veterans. Complaints from

constituents claimed that the firm had

been disposing of property to the

highest bidder without reference to

veterans' rights. Groves pointed out

that this disposition procedure was

legal and had been done in the interest of expediting reduction of inventories as quickly as possible, but assured them that, in the future, every

effort would be made to observe veterans' rights.40

A crucially important function that

devolved upon the Army was the

technical information program for individuals and groups with a need-toknow about the new source of energy

and its military and industrial applications. The secret circumstances under

39

 On the claim filed by Clifton Products see

Memos, Capt John L. Davies, Jr. (Mad Sq Area

Engrs Office) to Nichols, 9 Jan 46, and Lt Col

Cooper B. Rhodes (Mad Sq Area Engrs Office) to

Groves and Nichols, 28 Aug 46, and also Ltr

(source of quotation), Groves to Appeal Board, 30

Aug 46, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 156 (Clifton

Products), MDR.

40

 Quotation from Ltr, Kirkpatrick to Johnson, 1

Mar 46, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 400.7 (Disposition of Equip), MDR. See also Telgs, Knoxville Post

No. 2, American Legion, Dept. of Tenn., to McKellar and Stewart, 5 Aug 46, Incls in Ltrs, McKellar

and Stewart to Groves, 9 Aug 46; Ltr, Groves to

McKellar and Stewart, 14 Aug 46. All in Admin

Files, Gen Corresp, 400.703, MDR. See memo routing slip attached to the 14 August letter for additional comments by Groves, who wrote that the District's procedure on the sale of surplus property had

provided some justification for the complaints and

that corrective action would now be taken to ensure

full observation of veterans' rights.
596 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

which atomic energy had developed, combined with its relative newness as

a major field of scientific knowledge,

placed upon a comparatively small

group of military and technical experts the formidable task of educating

and indoctrinating a vast number of

military men, government officials, industrial engineers, business executives, scientists and technicians, medical personnel, and a great many other

people. Groves was often called upon

to brief the Secretary of War, Chief of

Staff, and other officials in the military services, and to speak before

conferences of military officers. Frequently, too, he and many project

members were called to testify before

the committees of Congress considering domestic legislative proposals and

to assist those government officials

charged with shaping postwar policies

for the international control of atomic

energy.41

The Final Act: Transfer to

Civilian Control

With the President's signing of the

Atomic Energy Act on 1 August 1946,

the United States Atomic Energy

Commission was created as the civilian successor agency for the Army.

This commission, to consist of five

full-time presidential appointees,

would oversee the domestic atomic

energy program by assuming responsibility for most of the activities of the

Manhattan District, including the production, ownership, and use of all fissionable materials in the United

States; for sponsorship of the extensive research and development program in government laboratories, universities, and elsewhere; for control

and release of restricted scientific information; for enforcement of security and safety; and for military application of atomic power.

Yet enactment of this long-awaited

legislation did not immediately relieve

the Army of its stewardship of the domestic program. The contributing factors were many. The President experienced extended delays in securing

the individuals he wanted to serve as

commissioners, whose names he did

not announce until the end of October. Once appointed, the new commission requested General Groves to

delay the official act of transfer until

1 January 1947. In retrospect, the

Manhattan commander remembers

the period from August through December 1946 as one of the most difficult of his entire time as head of the

project, because "everyone knew that

I was in a caretaker's position, and

they had no assurance that my views

would be those of the Commission.

After the commissioners were finally

appointed, it was quite evident that

my views would not be accepted without a long-drawn-out delay."

 42

41

 On the military application of atomic energy

see OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 1, Tabs

A-D, MDR, especially Tab D for Memo, Groves to

Chief of Staff, sub: New Wpns Development, 12 Feb

46, and OCG Files, Gen Corresp, Groves Files, Fldr

8, MDR, for Talk, Groves to Mil Conf (Fort Belvoir,

Va.) Attendees, sub: Hist of Manhattan Proj, 23 Sep

46. On the indoctrination of engineers see Groves,

Now It Can Be Told, pp. 387-88. One of those who

took the training offered at Oak Ridge was Capt.

Hyman G. Rickover, who subsequently was assigned

to direct the Navy's program for development of the

atomic submarine.

42

 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 395. Except as

otherwise indicated, section on the transfer of the

atomic energy program from the Manhattan Project

to the Atomic Energy Commission based on Memo,

Aurand to Secy War, sub: Mtg With Groves, 5 Jul

46, 471.6 (Atomic Bomb); Memo, Groves to Secy Continued
THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, 1945-1947 597

During this difficult period, there

was little the War Department and

the Manhattan District could accomplish beyond making plans for

transferring project control until the

President appointed the new commissioners. Secretary Patterson, in particular, was anxious to have the transfer go smoothly and took steps to

provide for continued Army liaison

with the commission. At his request,

General Groves and Maj. Gen. Henry

S. Aurand, the General Staff's director of research and development, discussed tentative measures for dealing

with the problems that would arise

when the military personnel assigned

to the Manhattan District would have

to be absorbed by the Army. From

their discussions evolved the proposal

to set up within the War Department

an atomic energy committee, comprised at least in part of those Army

officers who would also be assigned

to the commission's Military Liaison

Committee.

The President announced the five

members of the Atomic Energy Commission on 28 October. To the post

of chairman, he named David E. Lilienthal who, as head of the Tennessee

Valley Authority, had gained considerable knowledge of project activities

at Clinton and had served as a

member of the State Department

panel on international control of

atomic energy. For the other four positions, the President selected Robert

F. Bacher, a Cornell physicist who

had played a leading role at Los

Alamos; Sumner T. Pike, editor of the

Des Moines Register and Tribune and a

Pulitzer Prize winner; William W.

Waymack, a former member of the

Securities and Exchange Commission;

and Lewis L. Strauss, a Navy reservist

who had served during the war in the

Bureau of Ordnance and as an assistant to the Secretary of the Navy.

While awaiting official announcement of his appointment, Lilienthal

had formed a temporary administrative staff comprised of individuals that

had worked together with him on

atomic energy matters. He selected

Herbert S. Marks, director (acting) of

the War Production Board's Power

Division before becoming Dean Acheson's assistant at the State Department; Joseph Volpe, Jr., a former

military officer on the legal staff in

General Groves's Washington headquarters; and Carroll L. Wilson, a

wartime assistant to Vannevar Bush at

the Office of Scientific Research and

Development. Myriad housekeeping

arrangements for the new commission

required the immediate attention of

Marks, Volpe, and Wilson, who

worked out most of the details with

Lt. Col. Charles Vanden Bulck, chief

of the District's Administrative Division. Pressed by the commissioners'

impending arrival in early November,

Vanden Bulck expedited all requests

from the staff for funds, for office

space in the New War Department

Building, which was adjacent to

War, sub: Mil Liaison Committee, AEC, 17 Jul 45,

352.13; Ltr, Secy War to Groves, 15 Sep 46, 319.2

(Misc); DF, Maj Gen Lauris Norstad (Plans and

Opns Dir, WDGS), sub: WD Atomic Energy Committee, 19 Sep 46, 334 (Mil Liaison Committee);

Memo, Groves to Secy War, sub: WD Atomic

Energy Committee, 18 Sep 46, 334 (Atomic Committee on AE); Memo, Groves to Chief of Staff, sub:

Turnover to AEC, 31 Dec 46, 352.13; Ltr, Groves to

Lilienthal, 20 Dec 46, 201 (Lilienthal, D. E.); Memo,

Brereton to Groves, sub: Comments on Proposed

Memo to Secy War, 26 Dec 46 (Org-AFSWP); Draft

Ltr, Groves to Lilienthal, 28 Dec 46, 319.2 (Misc).

All in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, MDR. Hewlett and

Anderson, New World, pp. 620-24 and 634-55.
598 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Groves's headquarters, and for clerical support.

In early November, after winding

up personal affairs and relocating to

Washington, the commissioners collectively channeled their energies and

talents to prepare for the transfer of

the atomic program from military to

civilian control. As a first measure,

they directed their staff to arrange

briefings and inspection tours of the

District's various installations. Lilienthal, joined by Bacher and Pike, visited District headquarters at Oak

Ridge on the fourth. Nine days later,

accompanied by Marks, Volpe, and

Wilson, all five commissioners undertook a tour of the major atomic reservations and research facilities. By the

time they returned to Washington on

the twentieth, they were considerably

more familiar with the character and

problems of the Manhattan Project

and were ready to proceed with carrying out the formal transfer.

Meanwhile, the Army had moved

ahead with steps to facilitate the

transfer. From a list of candidates

prepared largely by the Manhattan

commander, the Secretaries of War

and the Navy had selected three

members for the commission's Military Liaison Committee—Air Force

Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, as chairman; Rear Adm. Thorvald A. Solberg, who had participated in the Operation CROSSROADS tests; and Rear

Adm. William S. Parsons, who had

seen long service on the atomic

project's Los Alamos technical staff—

that would administer any military

functions transferred from the Manhattan District.43

 Groves, who had

designated Nichols to function as his

point of liaison with the commission,

also attempted to secure the appointment of the district engineer to fill

the commission post of director of

the Division of Military Application.

But the commissioners expressed a

desire for a clean break with the past

military administration of the project.

Moreover, because they disagreed

with Nichols's view that the division

should function as a "line" rather

than a "staff" organization, as well as

with his strong advocacy of military

custody of atomic weapons, they requested the Secretary of War to

submit other nominees for the position. Their rejection of Nichols was

evidence of an enduring suspicion

that the Army was still trying to retain

a dominant influence in the field.

This mistrust, a legacy of the prolonged legislative fight over the issue

of military versus civilian control, exacerbated what might otherwise have

been essentially a formality.44

Consistent with provisions of the

Atomic Energy Act, the commission

in early December informed General

Groves that it planned to take over

full responsibility for the atomic

project as of 1 January 1947. As of

that date, the Manhattan District was,

without exception, to transfer all

43

 Subsequently, both Generals Groves and Nichols served as Army members of the Military Liaison

Committee—Groves from 2 Feb 47 to 29 Feb 48

and Nichols from 29 Feb 48 to 1 Feb 51. 44

 On Nichols's rejection as nominee for the position of director of the Division of Military Application see Nichols, Comments on Draft Hist "Manhattan," Incl to Ltr, Nichols to Chief of Mil Hist, 25

Mar 74, CMH, and Hewlett and Anderson, New

World, p. 653. On the issue of custody of weapons

see Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, p. 585. This

issue remained in dispute until September 1952,

when an agreement was reached that the military

would control the greater share of the stockpile of

atomic weapons.
THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, 1945-1947 599

property and functions of the project

to the commission, which subsequently would retransfer such property and

functions deemed more appropriate

for armed services control. Groves

and Nichols promptly and firmly objected to this proposed procedure.

Their reasons were straightforward:

Certain properties—for example, all

ordnance works (except the heavy

water facilities), Sandia Base at Albuquerque, and weapons storage sites—

should not be transferred even temporarily; the raw materials function

should remain under Army control

until the commission became a

member of the Combined Development Trust; and intelligence operations and records should be

transferred directly to the new Central Intelligence Group, not via the

commission.

In spite of Groves and Nichols's

objections, the commission indicated

that it intended to adhere strictly to

the concept of transfer and retransfer.

Regardless of this resolute stance,

Nichols met with the commission on

several occasions in mid-December

and sought—but without success—to

secure a modification of its position, fighting particularly hard for

military custody of atomic weapons.

On the last-named issue, Nichols

seems to have achieved some measure

of success, for at the end of the

month the commission informed the

Secretary of War that, while it was not

willing to give up its basic insistence

on a simple, all-inclusive transfer, it

would consider some concessions. As

its concessions, the commission

agreed to accept only nominal transfer of properties relating to weapons,

ordnance parts, and fissionable materials; to consider arrangements for retransfer of these properties to Army

control not later than 1 March 1947;

and to resolve the question of membership in the Combined Development Trust. On the issue of intelligence, it refused to take action until it

had more information.

The last days of December were

unbelievably hectic for the commission, which participated in a series of

hurried conferences at the State and

War Departments in an attempt to

clear the way for agreement on the

unresolved aspects of the raw materials and intelligence issues. At the

State Department, it worked out an

arrangement that involved eventual

disbandment of the Combined Policy

Committee (its continued existence

appeared to be in serious conflict

with provisions of the Atomic Energy

Act) and membership in the Combined Development Trust, provided

that Congress was informed of this

hitherto secret wartime agency. At the

War Department on the thirtieth, Lilienthal briefed the Secretary of War

on the commission's arrangement

with the State Department. Patterson

was satisfied and thereupon agreed to

transfer the Army's raw materials

function. After discussing the remaining points in dispute on intelligence,

Lilienthal determined the Secretary's

position was immutable. Pressed by

the 1 January deadline, the commission chairman resorted to a compromise. He agreed that the function

temporarily should remain with the

Army, provided that the commission's

staff was given an opportunity to examine all the records.

The last formal procedure in the

transfer occurred at the White House

on the afternoon of 31 December.
600 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

TRANSFER OF CONTROL TO THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION. Seated, left to right:

Carroll L. Wilson, President Harry S. Truman, David E. Lilienthal. Standing, left to right:

Sumner T. Pike, Colonel Nichols, Secretary of War Patterson, General Groves, Lewis L.

Strauss, William W. Waymack.

Four of the five commissioners

(Bacher was inventorying weapons at

Los Alamos) and Carroll Wilson, recently appointed general manager of

the commission, joined with Patterson, Groves, and Nichols in President

Truman's office to witness the final

act: the signing of the executive order

that legally ended the Army's stewardship of the atomic energy program

and turned over peacetime control

and development of the atom to a

commission of five men.45

For a period of sixteen months following the end of the war, the Army

had carried out the often perplexing

and thankless task of administering,

45

 The Manhattan Project officially came to an

end with the signing of the executive order and

transfer of the atomic program to the Atomic

Energy Commission, although the Manhattan District was not abolished until 15 Aug 47 (see MDH,

Bk. 1, Vol. 1, "General," p. F2, DASA). Early in

1947, the Secretaries of War and the Navy established the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

(AFSWP), effective 31 Dec 46, to assume all of the

functions of the Manhattan Project that had not

been transferred to the commission. Organized as a

joint agency in anticipation of the unification of the

military services, the AFSWP was responsible for

their participation in the development of atomic

energy for military purposes. On the establishment

of the AFSWP see Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp.

398-400; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, pp.

131-32; and Draft WD Cir, sub: AFSWP, 7 Feb 47,

and Ltr, Col J. W. Brown (Secy, Gen Staff) to

Groves, sub: Appointment of Groves as AFSWP

Chief, 28 Feb 47, both in Admin Files, (Gen Corresp, 322 (Org-AFSWP), MDR.
THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, 1945-1947 601

on an interim basis, an atomic organization undergoing the severe stresses

and strains of transition from a war to

a peacetime status. Compounding the

problems of what was inherently a

difficult assignment was the widespread disagreement among the

American people as to precisely what

kind of organization was best suited

to develop and control in peacetime

so significant a new source of energy.

By mid-1946, many Americans were

disappointed and disillusioned because the "golden atomic age,"

widely predicted when news of the

wartime atomic energy program was

first made public, had failed to materialize, and the tendency was to blame

the Army for this. Yet, as General

Groves pointed out in retrospect, the

Army had accomplished during its

trusteeship what was perhaps most essential to the long-range future of

atomic energy in the United States. It

had preserved and turned over to its

new civilian administrators "a good

organization—one ranked among the

top industrial organizations of the

country—and [achieved] the orderly

demobilization of its forces to fit into

the organization of the Atomic

Energy Commission."

 46

46

 Quotation from Statement by General Groves

on dissolution of Manhattan Engr Dist, 14 Aug 47,

MDR.
EPILOGUE

An Atomic Legacy

The advent of the atomic age—and

its concomitant legacy of not only

great benefits but also great risks—

emanated from the Manhattan

Project. In the history of technological development in the Western

world, America's atomic energy program constituted a unique episode:

Through an integrated synergy of science, industry, and the military, the

men of Manhattan created a revolutionary new device, the atomic bomb,

unleashing for the first time the

power within the atom.

Ever intrigued by the phenomenon

of the atom, particularly its vast stores

of energy, men in past centuries had

frequently endeavored to discover

means to release this power. These

efforts consistently failed, however,

and the potential of the atom remained a matter of theory, a hypothesis graphically realized only in the

imaginative world of science fiction.

Ongoing research by a small group of

European physicists in the early years

of the twentieth century finally culminated in the late 1930's with Hahn

and Strassmann's demonstration of

the feasibility of fissioning the atom,

the key to tapping its enormous

energy. But repressive political and

ideological conditions abroad occasioned many of these physicists to

forego their scientific investigations

and to seek refuge in America. There,

World War II provided them the opportunity to apply their research—to

transform atomic theory into a material reality—as they collaborated with

American scientists, engineers, and

industrialists under the direction of

the United States Army on the project

to produce the world's first atomic

weapon.

During the course of this unprecedented undertaking, the Army had a

significant role in orchestrating

almost every aspect of atomic development—from the design, construction, and operation of large-scale production plants to strategic planning

for the employment of the atomic

bomb. Until 1942, its participation in

the atomic energy research carried on

largely by the refugee and American

scientists at various government and

university laboratories under the auspices of the Office of Scientific Research and Development and its predecessors was sporadic and peripheral.

Yet the scientific leaders of the OSRD

program, having full cognizance of

the military potentialities of atomic

energy, had anticipated that the

Army, or an equivalent agency, eventually would have to assume a leading
AN ATOMIC LEGACY 603

part in its development. The juxtaposition of a number of factors in the

winter of 1941-42, including the

sudden entrance of the United States

into World War II, the prevailing

belief that the Germans were moving

ahead with their own atomic investigations, and the rapid approach of

the American program to the pilot

plant stage, convinced them that this

time had come. Hence, in early 1942,

they advised the President to take the

measures necessary to bring the Army

into the program on a major scale.

As a first step, Army Chief of Staff

General George C. Marshall selected

Brig. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer of the

Services of Supply to establish liaison

between the Army and the atomic

program. General Styer, working with

the OSRD leaders, particularly Vannevar Bush and James B. Conant,

drew up plans for bringing the Army

more fully into the program. Approval of these plans in June 1942 by the

Top Policy Group—the President,

Vice President, the Secretary of War,

Marshall, Bush, and Conant—marked

the start of the Army's managerial

role in the most revolutionary enterprise of its time.1

The program approved in June

turned over to the Army three important tasks: design, construction and

operation of plants to produce fissionable materials; organization of a

special laboratory to design, manufacture, and test atomic weapons; and

responsibility for security for the

entire project. Under the provisions

of the program the Army was to work

in close coordination with the OSRD,

which would continue to administer

the research and development aspects, and to use the funds and the

facilities of its Corps of Engineers in

carrying out its new assignment.

To discharge these tasks, the Army

selected Col. James C. Marshall, an

engineer officer with broad construction experience and a reputation for

high professional competence, as

manager of the atomic energy program. During the summer of 1942,

Marshall, drawing chiefly upon Corps

personnel, facilities, and practices for

administering large-scale construction

projects, laid the groundwork for the

Army's atomic infrastructure. He

formed a new engineer district, with

headquarters temporarily in New

York City, and appropriately named it

the Manhattan District. But by September, the project's military and civilian leaders had come to realize that

development of an atomic weapon

was going to require an enterprise of

far greater scope and complexity than

they earlier had anticipated. Consequently, they agreed to the appointment of an Army officer who would

be assigned overall responsibility for

not only the District but also all other

aspects of the wartime atomic program. To fill this key position, the

Army designated Col. Leslie R.

Groves, a career engineer officer who,

while serving in the Corps' Construction Branch, had consistently demonstrated an exceptional ability to complete difficult large-scale construction

projects. At the same time, the

project leaders also created a Military

Policy Committee, comprised of

Bush, Conant, Styer, and Rear Adm.

William R. Purnell, representing the

Navy, to broadly control and oversee

1

 Ltr, Bush to President, 17 Jun 42, and Incl, HB

Files, Fldr 6, MDR.
604 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

the Army's management of the

program.

The assignment of Groves had an

immediate and significant influence

on the subsequent development of

the atomic energy program. As a professional manager, Groves, newly promoted to brigadier general, was energetic, hard-working, and aggressive to

a fault, single-minded yet adaptable

when flexibility was necessary, and

well equipped both by education and

experience to oversee and direct a

highly technical and complex construction project under the often difficult conditions existing in wartime.

Skillfully using his dual position as, in

effect, the executive secretary of the

Military Policy Committee and chief

administrative officer of what came to

be known as the Manhattan Project,

Groves quickly established dominant

control over the rapidly expanding

program. In late 1942 and early 1943,

making maximum use of the authority

granted from the War Department to

use existing facilities of the Corps of

Engineers (such as the Real Estate

Branch), of other branches of the

Army (such as the Medical Corps and

Military Intelligence Division), of

other government agencies (such as

the United States Employment Service and Tennessee Valley Authority),

Groves succeeded—despite severe

shortages and competition from other

wartime programs—in securing the

priorities, land, materials, tools, manpower, and other requirements essential to the Manhattan Project's continued development. The Manhattan

commander's adoption and implementation of this management practice of securing, whenever feasible,

assistance from other military and civilian agencies made it possible for

him to organize and direct effectively

the multifarious activities of the

project, aided only by a headquarters

staff that was extremely small by wartime standards.

Contributing also to Groves's success as the top manager of the

Manhattan Project was the skill and

dedication of his team of middle managers—including District Engineer

Marshall and, following the relocation

of the Manhattan District headquarters to Oak Ridge, his replacement,

Col. Kenneth D. Nichols; Lt. Col.

Franklin T. Matthias, in charge of

the Hanford Area Engineers Office;

and the four key scientific directors:

J. Robert Oppenheimer of the Los

Alamos Laboratory, Arthur Compton

of the Metallurgical Project, Ernest

Lawrence of the Radiation Laboratory, and Harold Urey of the SAM Laboratories. Faced with the vast scope

and complexity of the atomic program, the task of each project manager was to keep the diverse activities of

his installation focused on Manhattan's primary goal: production of an

atomic weapon. Working in close coordination with Groves in Washington, each manager established specific

project objectives, organized operational functions, measured performance and compliance with schedules,

and motivated and developed personnel resources to administer the farflung research, construction, and production aspects of an enterprise

which, at its height of activity, employed a work force of nearly

129,000.

A relatively small proportion of this

work force, some thirty-six hundred

military and civilian personnel assigned directly to Manhattan or its
AN ATOMIC LEGACY 605

university contractors, comprised the

project's administrative core element.

Members of this group found themselves with responsibilities for carrying out a great variety of activities.

Many assignments were quite similar

to those they had experienced as employees of the Corps of Engineers or

other government agencies. These included monitoring the negotiations

and implementation of contracts and

subcontracts; expediting procurement

of materials and manpower; assisting

in site selection and acquisition; enforcing security, health, and safety

regulations; and overseeing the construction and administration of the

atomic communities in Tennessee,

New Mexico, and Washington State.

Other assignments, however, were

new and unlike anything hitherto undertaken by uniformed or civilian employees of the Army. These included

overseeing the worldwide search and

exploration for deposits of uranium,

thorium, nickel, and other vital raw

materials required by the project;

working as scientists and technicians

in research laboratories; serving as

diplomatic agents in treaty negotiations with foreign governments; and

making significant contributions to

planning for the peacetime control

and use of atomic energy at home

and abroad.

Participation in the atomic energy

program was by no means limited to

personnel assigned only to the Manhattan District or the Corps of

Engineers. Many of the Army's key

officials, staff components, and subordinate elements became involved in

the program and contributed to its ultimate success. For example, the Secretary of War himself assisted in

maintaining essential liaison between

the Manhattan Project and the President and Congress and played an important role in planning for the tactical employment of the bomb and the

postwar control of atomic energy.

The staff of the Under Secretary of

War proved indispensable to Manhattan in solving numerous manpower

procurement and labor problems.

The Ordnance Department made

available existing munitions plants

that facilitated development of heavy

water production works. The Signal

Corps installed vital communications

systems that ensured adequate coordination of complex activities at the

widely separated and isolated installations. Military Police and Military Intelligence units performed key

security functions. The Medical Corps

furnished the personnel for the health

and medical facilities. And when the

atomic bombs were ready for combat

employment, the Army Air Forces

provided the B-29 aircraft and crews

for delivering them on enemy targets.

There are few who would question

that the development of atomic

energy and atomic bombs under the

Army's direction was one of mankind's greatest technical and military

achievements—one that the Army

shares, of course, with American science and American industry. The nation's political leaders in the early

months of America's participation in

World War II had concluded that the

Army was the organization best

suited, and perhaps the only one able,

to undertake the responsibility for administering a program of the magnitude and difficulty of the Manhattan

Project. The events of the summer of

1945 proved the soundness of their

choice, for the Army carried out its
606 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

unenviable mission with success that

certainly matched its achievements on

the battlefields of World War II. General Groves succinctly summarized

the breadth and significance of this

accomplishment in his farewell message to the men of Manhattan:

Five years ago, the idea of Atomic

Power was only a dream. You have made

that dream a reality. You have seized

upon the most nebulous of ideas and

translated them into actualities. You have

built cities where none were known

before. You have constructed industrial

plants of a magnitude and to a precision

heretofore deemed impossible. You built

the weapon which ended the War and

thereby saved countless American lives. With regard to peacetime applications, you have raised the curtain on vistas of a

new world.2

Undeniably, in the history of technology, the Manhattan Project stands

as a spectacularly successful venture,

having demonstrated to the world the

kind of technical miracles possible

when, through skillfully applied management techniques, the resources of

science and industry are brought to

bear single-mindedly on the resolution

of extremely complex technological

problems. But there are those who

have suggested that the Army's participation in the project was not necessary

at all—that science alone, with civilian

industry's help, would have been able

to build the fissionable materials production plants and to perfect the

bomb. Some have even indicated that

the Army's entry into the atomic program brought a bureaucratization,

perhaps most dramatically exemplified in the policy of compartmentalization, that unnecessarily restricted

and slowed the development of the

bomb. These Army policies left an

aftermath of resentment and suspicion, which found expression after

the war in a long and bitter controversy over enactment of legislation

for peacetime control of atomic

energy. And the American public's ultimate solution was to give a civilian

agency, the United States Atomic

Energy Commission, the dominant

control over the new source of

energy.

In compliance with the people's

mandate—a decision that represented

probably not so much a criticism of

the Army's role in the Manhattan

Project, as it did a continuing adherence to the traditional American

belief in subordinating the role of the

military in peacetime—the Army on

31 December 1946 passed on to the

Atomic Energy Commission primary

responsibility for the future development and control of atomic energy.

And even as the Army completed its

final act, some of the correlative benefits and risks of the atomic legacy

that it had done so much to create

were already discernible. Hiroshima

and Nagasaki had revealed the power,

and the horror, of an atomic bombing, forecasting the urgent need for

an international alliance to control

nuclear weapons that, if left uncontrolled, threatened the existence of

civilized society. But the fissioning

process that had made possible the

release of the enormous energy

within the atom also gave promise of

providing vast amounts of heat for

generating electricity and useful radioactive isotopes for industrial and

medical application. In the years

2

 Quotation from Groves's farewell message to

Manhattan Proj, 23 Dec 46, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 316, MDR.
AN ATOMIC LEGACY 607

ahead, while having a lesser role in

atomic matters as a member of the

commission's Military Liaison Committee and, subsequently, the Armed

Forces Special Weapons Project, the

Army—as an integral institution of

American society—would continue to

share in the atomic legacy.

Appendix—Einstein's Letter

Albert Einstein

Old Grove Rd.

Nassau Point

Peconic, Long Island

August 2d, 1939

F. D. Roosevelt

President of the United States

White House

Washington, D.C.

Sir:

Some recent work by E. Fermi and L. Szilard, which has been communicated to me in manuscript, leads me to expect that the element uranium may be

turned into a new and important source of energy in the immediate future.

Certain aspects of the situation which has arisen seem to call for watchfulness

and, if necessary, quick action on the part of the Administration. I believe

therefore that it is my duty to bring to your attention the following facts and

recommendations.

In the course of the last four months it has been made probable—through

the work of Joliot in France as well as Fermi and Szilard in America—that it

may become possible to set up a nuclear chain reaction in a large mass of uranium, by which vast amounts of power and large quantities of new radium-like

elements would be generated. Now it appears almost certain that this could be

achieved in the immediate future.

This new phenomenon would also lead to the construction of bombs, and

it is conceivable—though much less certain—that extremely powerful bombs

of a new type may thus be constructed. A single bomb of this type, carried by

boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together

with some of the surrounding territory. However, such bombs might very well

prove to be too heavy for transportation by air.

The United States has only very poor ores of uranium in moderate quantities. There is some good ore in Canada and the former Czechoslovakia, while

the most important source of uranium is the Belgian Congo.

In view of this situation you may think it desirable to have some permanent contact maintained between the Administration and the group of physicists working on chain reactions in America. One possible way of achieving
610 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

this might be for you to entrust with this task a person who has your confidence who could perhaps serve in an unofficial capacity. His task might comprise the following:

a) to approach Government Departments, keep them informed of the further development, and put forward recommendations for Government action,

giving particular attention to the problems of securing a supply of uranium

ore for the United States.

b) to speed up the experimental work, which is at present being carried on

within the limits of the budgets of University laboratories, by providing funds,

if such funds be required, through his contacts with private persons who are

willing to make contributions for this cause, and perhaps also by obtaining the

co-operation of industrial laboratories which have the necessary equipment.

I understand that Germany has actually stopped the sale of uranium from

the Czechoslovakian mines which she has taken over. That she should have

taken such early action might perhaps be understood on the ground that the

son of the German Under-Secretary of State, von Weizaecker, is attached to

the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut in Berlin where some of the American work on

uranium is now being repeated.

Yours very truly,1

(signed) A. Einstein

1

 Original of letter and inclosures filed in FDR.
Bibliographical Note

Unpublished Sources

Archival Collections

Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic

Bomb is based primarily, although not

exclusively, upon the archival records

created by the Manhattan Project

from 1942 to 1948. Physical control

of the bulk of these records is divided

between two federal agencies—the

National Archives and Records Service (NARS) and the Department of

Energy (DOE). A useful guide to

records in the custody of NARS is its

Inventory of the Records of the Manhattan

Engineer District, 1942-1948 (Washington, D.C., November 1956). As yet,

DOE has not published a similar

guide for its records, but each of its

records centers maintains a catalog of

its holdings. All footnote citations include sufficient data for locating Manhattan Project archival records in

their respective depositories, indicated by a final two-, three-, or fourletter abbreviation that is fully identified in the Guide to Archival Collections. For reasons of brevity, in each

chapter only the initial citation of a

document gives the full reference

data (MPC Rpt, 15 Dec 42, OCG

Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25,

Tab B, MDR); subsequent citations

are shortened references that contain

the essential identifying elements, followed by the appropriate depository

code (MPC Rpt, 15 Dec 42, MDR).

The Manhattan District records at

NARS fall into several major categories, of which three are of particular

interest. Relating primarily to highlevel policymaking matters are the

records of General Groves's Manhattan Project headquarters in Washington, D.C., designated the Office of

the Commanding General Files; and

those of Secretary Stimson's office,

designated the Harrison-Bundy Files

(for George Harrison and Harvey

Bundy, Stimson's principal assistants).

Relating primarily to the Army's practices and problems as administrator

of the Manhattan Project are the General Administrative Files.

The Office of the Commanding

General Files are comprised of letters,

memorandums, directives, diaries, reports, and similar materials that concern a variety of topics—including organization, research, production,

stockpiling, weapon testing, domestic

and international control, security,

and foreign personnel. Of special

value is the diary of Col. (later Brig.

Gen.) James C. Marshall, the first district engineer, which records in detail

the early months (June-October

1942) of the Army's administration of

the atomic bomb project, and the
612 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

aide-memoire notebook of Groves,

which covers the activities of the commanding general from May 1943 to

May 1945. This file group, however,

does not include the similarly useful

office diary (1942-46) of Groves,

which is retired in NARS Record

Group 200.

The Harrison-Bundy Files contain

the letters, memorandums, and cables

on atomic energy that were exchanged between the Secretary of

War, his assistants, the Under Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, various scientists, and appropriate representatives of the British and Canadian

governments. In addition to correspondence, the files include minutes

of the meetings of the Military Policy

Committee, the Combined Policy

Committee, and the Interim Committee; a documentary diplomatic history

of the Manhattan Project prepared at

the direction of General Groves; and

various drafts of bills for domestic

control of atomic energy drawn up by

War Department personnel, copies of

speeches, press releases, and reports

to Congress.

The General Administrative Files

consist primarily of correspondence

between the District's military and civilian personnel and the project's scientists and engineers, as well as between individuals in the War Department and the various field offices of

the District. In addition, these files

contain copies of the District's circular letters, memorandums, and bulletins, touching upon such matters as

audits, civilian and military personnel,

contracts and claims, costs, finance,

insurance, labor relations, organization, equipment, safety, transportation, priorities, and property.

Other categories of Manhattan District records at NARS pertain to a

number of disparate project activities.

The Investigation Files include correspondence, memorandums, and proceedings related to personnel security

and criminal investigations. The

Fiscal and Audit Files contain useful

information concerning operating

costs at specific installations and data

compiled for budget planning. The

Foreign Intelligence Files are comprised of letters, messages, and reports of the District intelligence offices established in early 1944 in

London, Paris, and Frankfurt.

Besides the formal collection of

Manhattan District records, NARS

also has other extensive materials pertinent to the wartime atomic bomb

project, including Office of Scientific

Research and Development (OSRD),

congressional, and Department of

State records. Those from OSRD are

essential for the history of the project

before the Army's entrance into it in

1942 and for the views of scientists,

especially Vannevar Bush and James

B. Conant, on such subjects as postwar planning for control of atomic

energy. The hearings on enactment of

postwar legislation by the Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy in

1945-46, as well as other congressional records, include considerable

historical information concerning development of the wartime project.

State Department records contain important data on American policy relating to postwar international control

measures.

At the time of the writing of this

volume, most of the day-to-day administrative, construction, and operational records of the Manhattan
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 613

Project (such as contracts, construction completion reports, security and

personnel records, and periodic reports on research and development

programs, plant operations, and community functions) were located in the

DOE facility at Germantown, Maryland, and in the several DOE- or contractor-operated records centers at

DOE field installations. Most of these

records, however, will eventually be

retired to the appropriate regional

depositories in the NARS system.

By far the largest and most important collection of DOE records was in

the Oak Ridge Operations Office. It

contained not only the central mail

and records files of the Manhattan

District headquarters but also those

of a number of other important subordinate elements of the project (for

example, the Washington Liaison

Office and the District's area offices

in New York City). Here also were the

records on the design, construction,

and operation of the electromagnetic,

gaseous diffusion, and thermal diffusion plants, as well as the plutonium

semiworks, and on the planning,

building, and administration of the

Oak Ridge community. Of special

value were the construction comple- tion reports of Stone and Webster,

M. W. Kellogg and Kellex, Du Pont,

and other major contractors, and the

diary (1943-46) of Col. E. H. Marsden,

executive officer in the district engineer's office. Records in the Hanford Operations

Office documented the story of the

plutonium production plant. Du Pont,

the major contractor, produced voluminous historical reports on site development and plant and community

construction and operations. The area

engineer, Col. Franklin T. Matthias,

recorded the Army's role at Hanford

in a detailed diary (1943-46).

The bulk of the source materials on

scientific and technological developments in the atomic bomb program

were in DOE's major contractor-operated research centers. These include

the Argonne National Laboratory at

Lemont, Illinois, which has the files of

the Metallurgical Project; the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley, California; and the Los Alamos

Scientific Laboratory at Los Alamos,

New Mexico. The records of the SAM

Laboratories at Columbia University

were in the Oak Ridge Operations

Office.

Personal Papers

In the years since the end of World

War II, the personal papers of many

of the statesmen, military leaders, and

scientists who played important roles

in development of the atomic bomb

have become available for historical

research. Papers of Franklin D.

Roosevelt and Harry L. Hopkins are

in the Roosevelt Library at Hyde

Park, New York, as well as some of

those of Vannevar Bush pertaining to

the atomic project. Harry S. Truman's

papers are in the Truman Library at

Independence, Missouri. Those of

Henry L. Stimson, including the indispensable personal diary (1939-45),

are in Yale University's Sterling Memorial Library in New Haven, Connecticut. Most of General Groves's

personal papers are in the National

Archives, as are those also of Lyman

J. Briggs, director of the National

Bureau of Standards (1932-46). The

Manuscript Division of the Library of

Congress has the J. Robert Oppen-
614 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

heimer papers and a substantial portion of those of Bush. Papers of

Enrico Fermi and some of those of

James Franck, the British scientist, are

in the University of Chicago Library

and those of Ernest O. Lawrence are

in the Bancroft Library, University of

California at Berkeley. The voluminous diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, the Canadian political

leader, are in NARS and contain

many entries concerning wartime

atomic energy development.

Manuscript Histories

There are several manuscript histories that cover all or important aspects of the atomic bomb project.

The most extensive and comprehensive is the Armed Forces Special

Weapons Project's "Manhattan District History," prepared at the direction of General Groves and under the

general editorship of Gavin Hadden,

a longtime civil employee of the

Corps of Engineers. Conceived as the

official history of the Army's role in

the project, it consists of historical

narratives prepared by each of the

programs and activities of the Manhattan Project in accordance with a

general plan of organization and list

of topics to be treated. Many of the

narratives are amply supplemented

with appropriate supporting documents, bibliographies, charts, statistical tables, engineering drawings,

maps, and photographs. The "History" is arranged in some thirty-six volumes grouped in eight books, with

detailed general indices to names of

persons, agencies, and subjects.

Copies of the "History" are located in

NARS and in DOE's Germantown facility. In 1962, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory published an unclassified version of a major portion of that

part of the "History" that covered its

activities from 1943 to 1947 (Manhattan District History: Project Y, The Los

Alamos Project, LAMS-2532, 2 vols.).

Extensive extracts from the "History"

also are published in Anthony Cave

Brown and Charles B. MacDonald,

eds., The Secret History of the Atomic

Bomb (New York: Dial Press/James

Wade, 1977).

Other manuscript historical accounts cover specific aspects of the

project. On the international activities

of the atomic program, there is the

"Diplomatic History of the Manhattan

Project," compiled by members of

General Groves's staff. Brief narrative

sections, intended to justify involvement of Manhattan personnel in the

international field, are supported by a

useful selection of pertinent documents. Copies are held by DOE, the

State Department, and NARS (in the

Harrison-Bundy Files).

Several manuscript histories provide information on the extensive

support that the Manhattan Project

received from other elements of the

Army's wartime staff. In this category

are Richard M. Leighton's "History of

the Control Division, ASF, 1942-

1945" (in two volumes); several

manuscript histories pertinent to military intelligence activities, including

Bruce W. Bidwell's "History of the

Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff"

(Part 5), Capt. C. J. Bernardo's

"Counterintelligence Corps History

and Mission in World War II," the

Army Service Forces' "History of the
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 615

Intelligence Division" (in four volumes), and the Office of the Provost

Marshal General's "The Loyalty Investigations Program"; and the Army

Service Forces' documentary "History

of the Research and Development Division, 1 July 1940-1 July 1945, with

Supplement to 31 December 1945"

(in three volumes). Also, a section in

Vernon E. Davis's "Organizational

Development: Development of the

JCS Committee Structure" (Volume

2) describes how the atomic program

was coordinated with the other armed

services. Copies of all these manuscript histories are in NARS.

Some of the many hundreds of

firms that were under contract to the

Manhattan Project prepared accounts

of their activities that are more comprehensive and detailed than the

usual contractor's completion report.

Of considerable importance are those

of the Du Pont Company on the

design and construction of the Clinton semiworks and on the building

and operation of the Hanford Engineer Works. Useful, too, are the histories produced by Roane-Anderson

concerning its management of the

town of Oak Ridge and of passenger

transportation at the Clinton Engineer Works. Copies of contractor histories are in the appropriate DOE

field records centers.

Interviews and Correspondence

Recollection of participants recorded in interviews and correspondence gave the author information that

often supplemented the official archival records. Except where otherwise

indicated, copies of interview notes

and correspondence with the following persons are on file in the U.S.

Army Center of Military History: Col.

Keith F. Adamson; Col. Whitney Ashbridge; Col. Maurice E. Barker; James

Phinney Baxter 3d; Maj. Samuel S.

Baxter; Lt. Col. Benjamin R. Bierer;

Lt. Col. Robert C. Blair; Harvey H.

Bundy (in Columbia University Oral

History Collection); Elkin Burckhardt;

Charles W. Campbell; Lt. Gen. Frederick J. Clarke (in Corps of Engineers,

Engineer Memoirs: Interviews With Lieutenant General Frederick J. Clarke); Karl

P. Cohen; Winston Dabney; Col. Peer

de Silva; Brig. Gen. John H. Dudley;

Maj. Harold A. Fidler; Col. Mark C.

Fox; F. A. Gibson; Lt. Gen. Leslie R.

Groves; Lt. Gen. Richard H. Groves;

Edith E. Hagg; Norman Hilberry; F.

E. Jochen; Col. Elmer E. Kirkpatrick,

Jr.; Col. Harry A. Kuhn; Brig. Gen.

James C. Marshall; Col. Franklin T.

Matthias; Pat McAndrew; Maj. William R. McCauley, Jr.; Francis

McHale; Maj. John H. McKinley;

Edwin M. McMillan; Duncan McRae;

Capt. William J. Morrell; Lt. Col.

Edgar J. Murphy; John Musser; S. H.

Nelson; Charles E. Normand; Jean

O'Leary; Harry Parker; David Piccoli;

Maj. Gen. William N. Porter; Robert

Y. Porton; W. B. Reynolds; Frederick

J. Roach; Brig. Gen. Jacquard H. Rothschild; Alexander Sachs; Brig. Gen.

Haig Shekerjian; S. Sobol; Henry

L. Stimson (in Columbia University

Oral History Collection); N. D.

Sturgis; Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer;

Edna Summerfield; Gerold H. Tenney;

Hanford Thayer; Brig. Gen. Paul W.

Tibbets, Jr. (in Columbia University

Oral History Collection); Lt. Col.
616 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

James E. Travis; Harry S. Truman;

Col. Gerald R. Tyler; Lt. Col. Charles

Vanden Bulck; Raymond K.

Wakerling; and T. Cortland Williams.

Published Sources

U. S. Government Publications:

Primary Materials

In the years since the end of World

War II, a substantial amount of primary source material relating to development and employment of atomic

energy has become available in publications of federal agencies. The public

pronouncements of President Harry S.

Truman on atomic energy are conveniently assembled in Harry S. Truman:

Containing the Public Messages, Speeches,

and Statements of the President, 1945 and

1946, Public Papers of the Presidents of

the United States (Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office, 1961-62).

Comprehensive coverage of international aspects up to the beginning of

1947 is provided in the Department of

State's carefully edited Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic

Papers, series. Pertinent are The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference),

1945, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1960) and General: The United Nations, 1946, Vol. 1

(Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1972). On the preparation of

domestic legislation and the question

of military versus civilian control, the

United States Senate has published its

hearings held in late 1945 and early

1946: U.S. Congress, Senate, Special

Committee on Atomic Energy, Atomic

Energy: Hearings on S. Res. 179, 79th

Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 27 November

1945-15 February 1946 (Washington,

D.C.: Government Printing Office,

1945-46), and Atomic Energy: Hearings

on S. 1717, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.,

22 January-8 April 1946 (Washington

D.C.: Government Printing Office,

1946).

In 1954, the United States Atomic

Energy Commission published the

transcript of the hearing that its personnel security board conducted into

the matter of continuing J. Robert

Oppenheimer's security clearance.

Besides data on security, the testimony recorded in this transcript, much

of it given by participants in the Manhattan Project, provides extensive historical information on many other aspects of the World War II atomic

energy program. A detailed record of

research in nuclear technology

achieved under government contracts

during World War II is provided in

the multivolumed National Nuclear

Energy Series, prepared under the

sponsorship of the Manhattan District

and its successor civilian agencies, the

Atomic Energy Commission, the

Energy Research and Development

Agency, and the Department of

Energy. There are some one hundred

volumes in the series, arranged in ten

divisions.

The effects of the atomic bombing

of Japan are covered in detail in several of the hundreds of reports prepared by the United States Strategic
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 617

Bombing Survey on the effects of

aerial attacks in Europe and the Pacific in World War II. These reports are

organized into two broad categories,

Europe and the Pacific, and numbered consecutively within each category. Four reports within the Pacific

category are concerned with the

atomic bombing of Japan. Report 3,

The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima

and Nagasaki, issued as an unclassified

publication in mid-1946, briefly summarizes all aspects in layman's terms.

Report 13, The Effects of Atomic Bombs

on Health and Medical Services in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, also unclassified and

published in March 1947, provides

detailed data on the medical consequences. Report 92, The Effects of the

Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, issued in

May 1947, and Report 93, The Effects

of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, issued

in June 1947, each in three volumes,

were originally classified secret (subsequently downgraded) and furnish,

in great detail, data on the physical

effects of the atomic bombings. All of

these reports were published by the

Government Printing Office in Washington, D.C.

The Manhattan District also issued

the results of its own survey, "The

Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and

Nagasaki," June 1946, and "Photographs of the Atomic Bombings of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki," June 1946.

The official account of Operation

CROSSROADS, the atomic bomb tests

conducted by U.S. Joint Task Force

One at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific in

July 1946, is contained in its historical

report Atomic Bomb Tests Able and Baker

(Operation Crossroads), 3 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Task Force

One, 1947).

U.S. Government Publications:

Secondary Accounts

Among the most useful of secondary accounts on the development of

atomic energy and related activities in

World War II are those in historical

series officially sponsored by the U.S.

armed forces and by various government agencies. The author found the

following especially valuable.

War Department

An indispensable source on the

wartime project, and a classic in the

literature dealing with the development of atomic energy, is the War

Department's official report that was

published shortly after the bombings

of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August

1945.

Smyth, H. D. A General Account of the

Development of Methods of Using

Atomic Energy for Military Purposes

Under the Auspices of the United

States Government, 1940-1945.

Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office, 1945.

In September 1945, Professor

Smyth's institution, Princeton University, issued a slightly modified version

of this account, with the addition of

an index and photographs.

Smyth, H. D. Atomic Energy for Military

Purposes: The Official Report on the

Development of the Atomic Bomb

Under the Auspices of the United

States Government, 1940-1945.

Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1945.
618 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Department of the Army

Each of the following volumes in

the U.S. Army in World War II series

provides important information on

some historical aspect of the wartime

Army that related to the Manhattan

Project.

Brophy, Leo P., and Fisher, George J.

B. The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War. Washington,

D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1959.

Cline, Ray S. Washington Command

Post: The Operations Division. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951.

Coll, Blanche D.; Keith, Jean E.; and

Rosenthal, Herbert H. The Corps

of Engineers: Troops and Equipment.

Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office, 1958.

Dziuban, Stanley W. Military Relations

Between the United States and

Canada, 1939-1945. Washington,

D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1959.

Fairchild, Byron, and Grossman, Jonathan. The Army and Industrial

Manpower. Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office,

1959.

Fine, Lenore, and Remington, Jesse

A. The Corps of Engineers: Construction in the United States. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1972.

Green, Constance McLaughlin;

Thomson, Harry C.; and Roots,

Peter C. The Ordnance Department:

Planning Munitions for War. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955.

Matloff, Maurice. Strategic Planning for

Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944.

Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office, 1959.

Millett, John D. The Organization and

Role of the Army Service Forces.

Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office, 1954.

Palmer, Robert R.; Wiley, Bell I.; and

Keast, William R. The Procurement

and Training of Ground Combat

Troops. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948.

Smith, R. Elberton. The Army and Economic Mobilization. Washington,

D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1959.

Thompson, George Raynor; Harris,

Dixie R.; Oakes, Pauline M.; and

Terrett, Dulany. The Signal Corps:

The Test. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957.

Treadwell, Mattie E. The Women's Army

Corps. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954.

Watson, Mark S. Chief of Staff: Prewar

Plans and Preparations. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1950.

In the World War II series Medical

Department, United States Army, the

following volumes provide data relating to the organization and activities

of the medical element in the Manhattan Project.

Armfield, Blanche B. Organization and

Administration in World War II.

Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office, 1963.

McMinn, John H., and Levin, Max.

Personnel in World War II. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963.

Warren, Stafford L. "The Role of Radiology in the Development of

the Atomic Bomb." Radiology in
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 619

World War II. Edited by Kenneth

D. A. Allen. Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office,

1966.

Department of the Navy

In the Navy's semiofficial series

History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, the story of

the ill-fated Indianapolis, which carried

atomic bomb parts to Tinian, and the

achievement of victory and peace in

the Pacific are dealt with in the following volume.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. Victory in the

Pacific, 1945. Vol. 14. Boston:

Little, Brown and Co., 1960.

Army Air Forces

Two volumes in The Army Air

Forces in World War II series, edited

by Wesley Frank Craven and James

Lea Cate, include materials pertinent

to that arm's participation in the

atomic bombing of Japan.

Europe: Argument to V-E Day, January

1944 to May 1945. Vol. 3. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1951.

The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June

1944 to August 1945. Vol. 5. Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1953.

The special military unit that carried out the atomic bombing of Japan

is depicted in the following volume.

509th Pictorial Album: Written and Published by and for the Members of the

509th Composite Group, Tinian,

1945. Edited by Capt. Jerome J.

Ossip. Chicago: Rogers Printing

Co., 1946.

Office of Scientific Research

and Development

Several volumes in the historical

series Science in World War II contain substantial sections on atomic

energy, with emphasis on the OSRD's

role.

Baxter 3d, James Phinney. Scientists

Against Time. Boston: Little,

Brown and Co., 1946.

Stewart, Irvin. Organizing Scientific Research for War: The Administrative

History of the Office of Scientific Research and Development. Boston:

Little, Brown and Co., 1948.

Thiesmeyer, Lincoln R., and Burchard, John E. Combat Scientists.

Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,

1947.

Department of Energy

Hewlett, Richard G., and Anderson,

Oscar E., Jr. The New World,

1939-1946. Vol. 1. University

Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962. This volume,

the first in the Department of Energy's history of the former

Atomic Energy Commission,

comprises a detailed narrative of

atomic developments from 1939

through 1946, with emphasis on

the scientific aspects.

____, and Duncan, Francis. Atomic

Shield, 1947-1952. Vol. 2. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State

University Press, 1969.

National Bureau of Standards

Cochrane, Rexmond C. Measures for

Progress: A History of the Bureau of

Standards. Washington, D.C.: Na-
620 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

tional Bureau of Standards, U.S.

Department of Commerce, 1966.

Bureau of the Budget

Bureau of the Budget. The United

States at War: Development and Administration of the War Program by

the Federal Government. Washington, D.C.: Committee of Records

of War Administration No. 1,

War Records Section, Bureau of

the Budget, 1946. This is the

first of the bureau's historical reports on administration in World

War II.

Civilian Production Administration

Civilian Production Administration,

Bureau of Demobilization. Industrial Mobilization for War: History of

the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies, 1940-1945, Program

and Administration. Washington,

D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1947. This is the first

volume in a projected history of

the War Production Board.

Foreign Government Publications

Foreign governments have sponsored a number of official publications about atomic energy developments in World War II. The author

found the following useful in preparing his account of the Manhattan

Project.

United Kingdom

Crowther, J. G., and Whiddington, R.

Science at War. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1947.

Gowing, Margaret. Britain and Atomic

Energy, 1939-1945. London: Macmillan and Co., St. Martin's

Press, 1964. This volume is the

official history of the British wartime atomic energy program.

_____, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952.

2 vols. New York: St. Martin's

Press, 1974. This work, written

with the assistance of Lora

Arnold, is the continuation of the

official history of the British

atomic energy program.

Hall, H. Duncan, and Wrigley, C. C.

Studies of Overseas Supply. History

of the Second World War.

London: Her Majesty's Stationery

Office, 1956. J. D. Scott wrote

one of the chapters in this

volume.

Japan

The Committee for the Compilation of

Materials on Damage Caused by

the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima

and Nagasaki, ed. Hiroshima and

Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and

Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings.

Translated by Eisei Ishikawa and

David L. Swain. New York: Basic

Books, 1981. This report, commissioned by the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was compiled

by a committee of thirty-four Japanese specialists, with the aim of

achieving as definitive an account

as possible of the nature and

extent of the damage wrought by

the atomic bombings of 6 and 9

August 1945.

Office of Civil Defense, Office of the

Secretary of War (Japan), and

Technical Management Office,
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 621

U.S. Naval Radio. Analysis of Japanese Nuclear Casualty Data. Compiled by L. Wayne Davis et al. Albuquerque, N.Mex: Dikewood

Corp., April 1966.

Personal Accounts, Memoirs, and

Collected Papers

Of the many personal accounts,

memoirs, and collected papers of participants in the Manhattan Project or

in events related to the development

and employment of the atomic bomb,

the author has found the following

volumes to be most useful.

Arnold, H. H. Global Mission. New

York: Harper and Brothers, 1949.

Bush, Vannevar. Pieces of the Action.

New York: William Morrow,

1970.

Compton, Arthur Holly, Atomic Quest:

A Personal Narrative. New York:

Oxford University Press, 1956.

Conant, James Bryant. My Several

Lives: Memoirs of a Social Inventor.

New York: Harper and Row,

1970.

Fermi, Enrico. United States, 1939-

1954. The Collected Papers of

Enrico Fermi. Edited by Emilio

Segre et al. Vol. 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.

Fermi, Laura. Atoms in the Family: My

Life With Enrico Fermi. Chicago:

University of Chicago Press,

1954.

Goldschmidt, Bertrand. The Atomic Adventure: Its Political and Technical

Aspects. Translated from the

French by Peter Beer. Oxford,

England, and New York: Pergamon Press and Macmillan Co.,

1964.

Goudsmit, Samuel A. ALSOS. New

York: Henry Schuman, 1947.

Groves, Leslie R. Now It Can Be Told:

The Story of the Manhattan Project.

New York: Harper and Brothers,

1962.

Leahy, William D. I Was There. New

York: Whittlesey House,

McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1950.

Ley, Willy, ed. and trans. Otto Hahn: A

Scientific Autobiography. New York:

Scribner's Sons, 1966.

Lilienthal, David E. The Journals of

David E. Lilienthal. 5 vols. New

York: Harper and Row, 1964.

Volumes 1 and 2, covering the

years from 1939 to 1950, include

references pertinent to the Manhattan Project.

MacArthur, Douglas. Reminiscences.

New York: McGraw-Hill Book

Co., 1964.

Oppenheimer, J. Robert. Robert Oppenheimer: Letters and Recollections.

Edited by Alice Kimball Smith

and Charles Weiner. Cambridge,

Mass.: Harvard University Press,

1980.

Pash, Boris T. The ALSOS Mission.

New York: Award House, 1969.

Pickersgill, J. W. The Mackenzie King

Record, 1939-1944. Vol. 1. Toronto: University of Toronto

Press, 1960.

____, and Forster, D. F., The Mackenzie King Record, 1944-1948. Vols.

2-4. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968-70. The above

four volumes comprise the substantially edited diary of William

Lyon Mackenzie King.

Speer, Albert. Inside the Third ReichMemoirs. Translated from the

German by Richard and Clara
622 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Winston. New York: Macmillan

Co., 1969.

Stimson, Henry L., and Bundy,

McGeorge. On Active Service in

Peace and War. New York: Harper

and Brothers, 1947.

Strauss, Lewis L. Men and Decisions.

Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday

and Co., 1962.

Szilard, Leo. "Reminiscences." In The

Intellectual Migration: Europe and

America, 1930-1960. Perspectives

in American History. Vol. 2.

Cambridge, Mass.: Charles

Warren Center for Studies in

American History, Harvard University Press, 1968.

Teller, Edward, and Brown, Allen.

The Legacy of Hiroshima. Garden

City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co.,

1962.

Tibbets, Paul W., Jr. The Tibbets Story.

New York: Stein and Day, 1978.

Truman, Harry S. Memoirs. 2 vols.

Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday

and Co., 1955-56.

Biographical Studies

Most of the biographical studies of

participants in the World War II

atomic energy program are of scientists or political figures. The author

found that the following volumes provide some insight into the Army's role

in the program.

Allison, Samuel K. "Arthur Holly

Compton." In National Academy of

Sciences: Biographical Memoirs. Vol.

38 (pp. 81-110). New York: Columbia University Press, 1965.

Baker, Liva. Felix Frankfurter. New

York: Coward-McCann, 1969.

Bernstein, Jeremy. Hans Bethe: Prophet

of Energy. Cambridge, Mass.:

Basic Books, 1980.

Biquard, Pierre. Frederic Joliot-Curie:

The Man and His Theories. New

York: Paul S. Eriksson, 1965.

Blumberg, Stanley A., and Owens,

Gwinn. Energy and Conflict: The

Life and Times of Edward Teller.

New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,

1976.

Childs, Herbert. An American Genius:

The Life and Times of Ernest Orlando

Lawrence. New York: E. P. Dutton

and Co., 1968.

Clark, Ronald W. Einstein: The Life and

Times. New York: World Publishing Co., 1971.

____. Tizard. Cambridge, Mass.:

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1965.

Davis, Nuel P. Lawrence and Oppenheimer. New York: Simon and

Schuster, 1968.

Fermi. Laura. Illustrious Immigrants: The

Intellectual Migration From Europe,

1930-1941. Chicago: University

of Chicago Press, 1968.

Goodchild, Peter J. J. Robert Oppenheimer, Shatterer of Worlds. Boston:

Houghton Mifflin Co., 1981.

Harrod, R. F. The Prof: A Personal

Memoir of Lord Cherwell. London:

Macmillan and Co., 1959.

Huie, William Bradford. The Hiroshima

Pilot: The Case of Major Claude

Eatherly. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1964.

Kunetka, James W. Oppenheimer: The

Years of Risk. Englewood Cliffs,

N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982.

Latil, Pierre de. Enrico Fermi: The Man

and His Theories. New York: Paul

S. Eriksson, 1966.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 623

Libby, Leona Marshall. The Uranium

People. New York: Crane, Russak,

1979.

Michelmore, Peter. The Swift Years: The

Robert Oppenheimer Story. New

York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1969.

Moore, Ruth. Niels Bohr: The Man, His

Science, and the World They Changed.

New York: Alfred A. Knopf,

1966.

Moorehead, Alan. The Traitors: The

Double Life of Fuchs, Pontecorvo, and

Nunn May. London: Hamish

Hamilton, 1952.

Morison, Elting E. Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of

Henry L. Stimson. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960.

Rozental, S., ed. Niels Bohr: His Life

and Work as Seen by Friends and Colleagues. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1967.

Rouze, Michel. Robert Oppenheimer: The

Man and His Theories. New York:

Paul S. Eriksson, 1965.

Segre, Emilio. Enrico Fermi, Physicist.

Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1970.

Ulam, Stanislav; Kuhn, H. W.;

Tucker, A. W.; and Shannon,

Claude E. "John von Neumann,

1903-1957." In The Intellectual

Migration: Europe and America,

1930-1960. Perspectives in

American History. Vol. 2. Cambridge, Mass.: Charles Warren

Center for Studies in American

History, Harvard University

Press, 1968.

Books on Other Aspects

Alexander, Frederic C., Jr. History of

Sandia Corporation Through Fiscal

Year 1963. Albuquerque, N.Mex.:

Sandia Corp., 1963.

Bar-Zohar, Michel. The Hunt for

German Scientists. Translated by

Len Ortzen from the French La

Chasse aux Savants allemands. New

York: Hawthorn Books, 1967.

Batchelder, Robert C. The Irreversible

Decision, 1939-1950. Boston:

Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962.

Bentwich, Norman. The Rescue and

Achievement of Displaced Scholars and

Scientists, 1933-1952. The Hague:

Martinus Nijhoff, 1953.

Bernstein, Barton J., ed. The Atomic

Bomb: The Critical Issues. Critical

Issues in American History.

Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,

1976.

Beyerchen, Alan D. Scientists Under

Hitler: Politics and the Physics Community in the Third Reich. New

Haven: Yale University Press,

1977.

Brodie, Bernard and Fawn. From

Crossbow to H-Bomb. Rev. and enl.

ed. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana

University Press, 1973.

Butow, Robert J. C. Japan's Decision To

Surrender. Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1954.

Church, Peggy Pond. The House at

Otowi Bridge. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,

1959.

Churchill, Winston S. The Second World

War: The Grand Alliance. Boston:

Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950.

____. The Second World War: The

Hinge of Fate. Boston: Houghton

Mifflin Co., 1950.

____. The Second World War: Triumph

and Tragedy. Boston: Houghton

Mifflin Co.; 1953.

Clark, Ronald W. The Birth of the

Bomb. New York: Horizon Press,

1961.
624 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

____. The Greatest Power on Earth: The

International Race for Nuclear Supremacy. New York: Harper and

Row Publishers, 1980. The original British edition was published

under the title The Greatest Power

on Earth: The Story of Nuclear Fission (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1980).

DeWeerd, H. A. British-American Collaboration on the A-Bomb in World

War II. Santa Monica, Calif.:

Rand Corp., 1963.

Dietz, David. Atomic Science, Bomb and

Power. New York: Dodd, Mead

and Co., 1954.

Du Pont de Nemours and Company,

E. I. Du Pont's Part in the National

Security Program, 1940-1945. Wilmington, Del.: Du Pont, 1946.

Eggleston, Wilfrid. Canada's Nuclear

Story. London: Harrap Research

Publications, 1966.

Feis, Herbert. The Atomic Bomb and the

End of World War II. Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1966.

This is a revised edition of a

work originally published under

the title Japan Subdued: The Atomic

Bomb and the End of the War in the

Pacific (1961).

Giovanitti, Len, and Freed, Fred. The

Decision To Drop the Bomb. New

York: Coward-McCann, 1956.

Glasstone, Samuel. Sourcebook on

Atomic Energy. 3d ed. Princeton,

N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1967.

Goldschmidt, Bertrand. The Atomic

Complex: A Worldwide Political History of Nuclear Energy. Translated

from the French by Bruce M.

Adkins. La Grange, Ill.: American

Nuclear Society, 1982.

____. Les Rivalités atomiques, 1939-

1966. Paris: Fayard, 1967.

Groueff, Stephane. Manhattan Project:

The Untold Story of the Making of the

Atomic Bomb. Boston: Little,

Brown and Co., 1967.

Hecht, Selig. Explaining the Atom. 2d

ed. New York: Viking Press,

1954.

Hempstone, Smith. Rebels, Mercenaries

and Dividends: The Katanga Story.

New York: Frederick A. Praeger,

1962.

Herken, Gregg F. The Winning Weapon:

The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War,

1945-1950. New York: Alfred A.

Knopf, 1981.

Irving, David. The Virus House.

London: William Kimber, 1967.

The American edition was published under the title The German

Atomic Bomb: The History of Nuclear

Research in Nazi Germany (New

York: Simon and Schuster, 1968).

Johnson, Charles W., and Jackson,

Charles O. City Behind a Fence:

Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 1942-1946.

Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1980.

Jungk, Robert. Brighter Than a Thousand Suns: A Personal History of the

Atomic Scientists. Translated by

James Cleugh. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1958.

Kopp, Theodore F. Weapon of Silence.

Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1946.

Kramish, Arnold. Atomic Energy in the

Soviet Union. Stanford: Stanford

University Press, 1959.

Kunetka, James W. City of Fire: Los

Alamos and the Atomic Age, 1943-

1945. Rev. ed. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,

1979. The original edition was

published under the title City of

Fire: Los Alamos and the Birth of the
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 625

Atomic Age, 1943-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,

1978). Lamont, Lansing. Day of Trinity. New

York: Atheneum, 1965.

Lang, Daniel. Early Tales of the Atomic

Age. New York: Doubleday and

Co., 1948. Lapp, Ralph E. Atoms and People. New

York: Harper and Brothers, 1956.

Laurence, William L. Men and Atoms:

The Discovery, the Uses and the

Future of Atomic Energy. New York:

Simon and Schuster, 1959.

____. Dawn Over Zero: The Story of the

Atomic Bomb. 2d ed. enl. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,

1977.

Martin, Roscoe C., ed. TVA: The First

Twenty Years. Knoxville: University

of Tennessee Press, 1956.

McKee, Robert E. The Zia Company in

Los Alamos: A History. El Paso,

Tex.: Carl Hertzog, 1950.

Meigs, Montgomery C. "Managing

Uncertainty: Vannevar Bush,

James B. Conant and the Development of the Atomic Bomb,

1940-1945." Ph.D. dissertation,

University of Wisconsin-Madison,

1982. This thesis is available

from University Microfilms in

Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Nathan, Otto, and Norden, Heinz,

eds. Einstein on Peace. New York:

Simon and Schuster, 1960.

Nelson, Donald M. Arsenal of Democracy: The Story of American War Production. New York: Holt, Rinehart

and Winston, 1958.

Newcomb, Richard F. Abandon Ship!

Death of the U.S.S. Indianapolis.

New York: Holt, Rinehart and

Winston, 1958.

The Pacific War Research Society. The

Day Man Lost: Hiroshima, 6 August

1945. Tokyo, Japan, and Palo

Alto, Calif.: Kodansha International, 1972.

Purcell, John. The Best-Kept Secret: The

Story of the Atomic Bomb. New

York: Vanguard Press, 1963.

Robinson, George O., Jr. The Oak

Ridge Story. Kingsport, Tenn.:

Southern Publishers, 1950.

Schoenberger, Walter Smith. Decision

of Destiny. Athens, Ohio: Ohio

University Press, 1970.

Seaborg, Glenn T. The Transuranium

Elements. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958.

Sherwin, Martin J. A World Destroyed:

The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,

1975.

Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevelt and

Hopkins: An Intimate History. New

York: Harper and Brothers, 1948.

Smith, Alice Kimball. A Peril and a

Hope: The Scientists' Movement in

America, 1945-47. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.

Stern, Phillip M. The Oppenheimer Case:

Security on Trial. New York:

Harper and Row, 1969.

Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation. A Report to the People:

Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation in World War II. [Boston]:

Stone and Webster, 1946.

Thomas, Gordon, and Witts, Max

Morgan. Enola Gay. New York:

Stein and Day, 1977.

Thompson, Paul W. What You Should

Know About the Army Engineers.

New York: W. W. Norton and

Co., 1942.

Van Arsdol, Ted. Hanford: The Big

Secret. Richland, Wash.: Columbia

Basin News, 1958.
626 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Wheeler, Keith, and the Editors of

Time-Life Books. The Fall of Japan.

Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life, 1983.

Wyden, Peter. Day One: Before Hiroshima

and After. New York: Simon and

Schuster, 1984.
Guide to Archival Collections

To reduce the length of the footnotes, the following abbreviations

were used to indicate the specific archival collection for each document

cited.

ANL Records of the Argonne National Laboratory

U.S. Department of Energy

Lemont, Illinois

ASF Record Group 160

Records of Headquarters Army Service Forces

Records of the Office of the Commanding General, 1941-46

National Archives and Records Service

Washington, D.C.

CMH Records of the Center of Military History

Department of the Army

Washington, D.C.

DASA Record Group 374

Records of the Defense Atomic Support Agency

National Archives and Records Service

Washington, D.C.

DS Records of the U.S. Department of State

Washington, D.C.

FDR Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

Hyde Park, New York

HLH Papers of Harry L. Hopkins

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

Hyde Park, New York

HLS Henry L. Stimson Collection

Sterling Memorial Library

Yale University

New Haven, Connecticut

HOO Records of the Hanford Operations Office

U.S. Department of Energy

Richland, Washington
628 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

JCS Record Group 218

Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff

National Archives and Records Service

Washington, D.C.

LASL Records of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory

U.S. Department of Energy

Los Alamos, New Mexico

LC Library of Congress

Washington, D.C.

LRG Record Group 200

National Archives Gift Collection

Papers of Leslie R. Groves

National Archives and Records Service

Washington, D.C.

LRL Records of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory

U.S. Department of Energy

Berkeley, California

MDR Record Group 77

Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers

Records of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-48

National Archives and Records Service

Washington, D.C.

OCEHD Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers,

Historical Division

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Washington, D.C.

OCO Record Group 156

Records of the Office of the Chief of Ordnance

National Archives and Records Service

Washington, D.C.

OROO Records of the Oak Ridge Operations Office

U.S. Department of Energy

Oak Ridge, Tennessee

OSRD Record Group 227

Records of the Office of Scientific Research and Development

National Archives and Records Service

Washington, D.C.

SFOO Records of the San Francisco Operations Office

U.S. Department of Energy

San Francisco, California
GUIDE TO ARCHIVAL COLLECTIONS 629

SHRC Records of the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

USS Record Group 46

Records of the United States Senate

National Archives and Records Service

Washington, D.C.

List of Abbreviations

AAF Army Air Forces

ACS Assistant Chief of Staff

Act Acting

Admin Administrative; Administrator

AEC Atomic Energy Commission

AEM Architect-Engineer-Manager

AFL American Federation of Labor

AFSWP Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

Agri Agriculture

ANMB Army and Navy Munitions Board

Ann(s) Annex(es)

AR Army Regulation

ASF Army Service Forces

Asst(s) Assistant(s)

ASTP Army Specialized Training Program

Att Attachment

Attn Attention

Atty Attorney

Bldg Building

BPA Bonneville Power Administration

Br Branch

Budg Budget

Bull(s) Bulletin(s)

Bur Bureau

Cdr Commander

CDT Combined Development Trust

CE Corps of Engineers

Cert(s) Certificate(s)

CEW Clinton Engineer Works

CG Commanding General

CIC Counterintelligence Corps

CINCAFPAC Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific

CINCPOA Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas

CIO Congress of Industrial Organizations

Cir Circular

Cmd Command
632 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

CO Commanding Officer

Co Company

Comm Commerce

Conf Conference

Cong Congress

Constr Construction

Corp Corporation

Corresp Correspondence

CPC Combined Policy Committee

CPFF Cost Plus Fixed Fee

CWS Chemical Warfare Service

DASA Defense Atomic Support Agency

Def Defense

Deliv Delivery

Dep Deputy

Dept Department

Det Detachment

DF Disposition Form

Diff Diffusion

Dir Director

Dist District

Div Division

DSM Development of Substitute Materials

Engr(s) Engineer(s)

Env Envelope

Equip Equipment

ETO European Theater of Operations

ETOUSA European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

Ex Executive

Fab Fabrication

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

Fwd Forward

FY Fiscal Year

G-1 Personnel

G-2 Intelligence

Gen General

GO General Orders

GOCO Government Owned, Contractor Operated

Govt Government

Gp Group

GSC General Staff Corps
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 633

H House

HB Harrison-Bundy

HEW Hanford Engineer Works

Hist History

HQ Headquarters

Hwy Highway

IBM International Business Machines

ICC Interstate Commerce Commission

Intel Intelligence

Incl Inclosure

Ind Indorsement

Insp Inspector; Inspection

Instl(s) Installation(s)

Instr(s) Instruction(s)

Interv Interview

Intro Introduction

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JNW Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment

Just Justice

K-25 Gaseous diffusion project

K-27 Gaseous diffusion extension unit

Lab Laboratory

LASL Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory

Ldr Leader

Ltr Letter

Mad Madison

Maint Maintenance

Man Managing

Mat Materials

MD Manhattan District

Med Medical

MED Manhattan Engineer District

Memo Memorandum

Met Metallurgical

Mfg Manufacturing

Mgr Manager

MID Military Intelligence Division

Mil Military

Min Minutes

MIS Military Intelligence Service

Misc Miscellaneous

MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
634 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

MP Manhattan Project; Military Policy; Military Police

MPC Military Policy Committee

Ms Manuscript

MSA Madison Square Area

Mtg Meeting

Mtn(s) Mountain(s)

Natl(s) National(s)

NDRC National Defense Research Committee

NLRB National Labor Relations Board

No Number

NWLB National War Labor Board

OCE Office of the Chief of Engineers

OCG Office of the Commanding General

OCO Office of the Chief of Ordnance

OCS Office of the Chief of Staff

ODT Office of Defense Transportation

OEM Office of Emergency Management

Off(s) Officer(s)

OIC Officer in Charge

OIG Office of the Inspector General

OPD Operations Division

OPMG Office of the Provost Marshal General

Opn(s) Operations

OQMG Office of the Quartermaster General

Ord Ordnance

ORD Ohio River Division

Org(s) Organization(s)

OSG Office of the Surgeon General

OSRD Office of Scientific Research and Development

OWU Office of War Utilities

P-9 Heavy Water

PED Provisional Engineer Detachment

PD Pacific Division

PR Press Release

Prelim Preliminary

Prgm(s) Program(s)

Prod Production

Proj(s) Project(s)

Promo(s) Promotion(s)

Prov(s) Provision(s); Provisional

Pub Public

Rad Radiation

R & D Research & Development
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 635

Re Regarding

Rec(s) Record(s); Recording

Reg(s) Regulation(s)

Rels Relations

Res Resolution

Rev Revision; Revised

Rpt(s) Report(s)

S Senate

S-1 OSRD's uranium program

S-50 Liquid thermal diffusion project

SCAP Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

Scty Security

Sec Section

Secy Secretary

SED Special Engineer Detachment

Sen Senator

Ser Series

Sess Session

SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force

SMI Safeguarding Military Information

SOS Services of Supply

Spec Special

Sq Square

Sup Superseding

Supp Supplement

Supt Superintendent

Surg Surgeon

Svc Service

SW Southwest

SWD Southwestern Division

TA Tube Alloys

TAG The Adjutant General

TEC Tennessee Eastman Corporation

Tech Technical

Telecon Telephone conversation

Telg Telegram

Therm Thermal

Trans Transportation

Treas Treasury

TVA Tennessee Valley Authority

Und Under

Univ University

USASTAF United States Army Strategic Air Forces

USN United States Navy
636 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

USSBS United States Strategic Bombing Survey

WAAC Women's Army Auxiliary Corps

WAC Women's Army Corps

WD War Department

WDGS War Department General Staff

WDSS War Department Special Staff

West Western

WMC War Manpower Commission

WPB War Production Board

Wpn(s) Weapon(s)

WW I World War I

WW II World War II

X-10 Plutonium project

Y-12 Electromagnetic project

ZI Zone of Interior
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War Department

Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944

Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943

Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945

The Army and Economic Mobilization

The Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground Forces

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops

The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service Forces

The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western Hemisphere

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense

Guarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in the Pacific

The Fall of the Philippines

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive

Victory in Papua

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls

Campaign in the Marianas

The Approach to the Philippines

Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

Triumph in the Philippines

Okinawa: The Last Battle

Strategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy

Salerno to Cassino

Cassino to the Alps
638 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

The European Theater of Operations

Cross-Channel Attack

Breakout and Pursuit

The Lorraine Campaign

The Siegfried Line Campaign

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge

The Last Offensive

The Supreme Command

Logistical Support of the Armies, May 1941-September 1944

Logistical Support of the Armies, September 1944-May 1945

The Middle East Theater

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India Theater

Stilwell's Mission to China

Stilwell's Command Problems

Time Runs Out in CBI

The Technical Services

The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War

The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field

The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat

The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany

The Corps of Engineers: Construction in the United States

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation,

Zone of Interior

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean

and Minor Theaters

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War

The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply

The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany

The Signal Corps: The Emergency

The Signal Corps: The Test

The Signal Corps: The Outcome

The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations

The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 639

Special Studies

Chronology, 1941-1945

Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945

Rearming the French

Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt

The Women's Army Corps

Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors

Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces

The Employment of Negro Troops

Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb

Pictorial Record

The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Japan



Index

Aachen, Germany, 288

Abelson, Philip H., 36, 172-76, 180

Acheson, Dean, 573

Acheson-Lilienthal report, 574

Ackart, E. G., 199

Adams County, Wash., 110, 332

Adamson, Lt. Col. Keith F., 19-22, 24

Adelman, Arthur, 20

Adler, Edward, 154-57

Advisory Committee on Nuclear Research, 26-27

Advisory Committee on Research and Development,

589-91

Advisory Committee on Uranium, 21-23, 26. See also

Office of Scientific Research and Development,

S-1 Executive Committee and S-1 Section;

Uranium, Committee on; Uranium, Section on.

African Metals Corporation, 65, 79, 300-301, 304,

308, 310. See also Union Miniere du Haut

Katanga.

Agreement and Declaration of Trust, 297-98, 301n,

304, 572

Air Engineering Squadron, 603d, 521

Air Force

Eighth, 288

Twentieth, 523, 528, 530

Air Service Group, 390th, 521

Air Transport Command, 217, 408-09

Akers, Wallace A., 99, 229-33, 237, 245

Alabama Ordnance Works, 108, 191, 343

Alamogordo Army Air Field, N.Mex., 478, 507, 511,

517. See also Project Trinity, bomb test.

Albuquerque District, 84-85, 466, 468-69, 486

Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company

electromagnetic project, 130, 133, 136-37

gaseous diffusion plant, 158, 160

unionized, 371

Allison, Samuel K., 488

Alma Trailers, 437

Alpha racetracks, 120, 128-29, 132, 134-39, 142,

144, 580

ALSOS mission

in Italy, 281-82

in London, 282-84

organization of, 280-81

in Western Europe, 285-91

Amberg, Julius M., 337, 340

American atomic energy program. See Manhattan

Project.

American Cynamid, 314

American Federation of Labor, 351, 370-71

American Industrial Transit, Inc., 446

American Red Cross, 428, 443

Anacostia Station, D.C., 173

Anchor Ranch Proving Ground, N.Mex., 506-07

Anderson, Herbert L., 8n

Anderson, Sir John

agreements with French scientists, 249-52

Anglo-American collaboration, 228-29, 235, 237,

239, 244, 248, 561, 571

control of Congo ore deposits, 297-98, 300

thorium supplies, 305

Anderson County, Tenn., 70, 78, 320, 326, 403

Anglo-American collaboration

achievement of in 1940-41, 29, 31

breakdown of in 1942, 227-32

Combined Policy Committee, 239, 241-43, 245-

47, 252

French repatriated scientists, 248-52

new negotiations in 1943, 232-40

postwar planning, 564-67, 570-73

Quebec Agreement, 241-42, 245, 247, 249

and security, 230

Applied Physics Laboratory, 508

Argonne Forest, Ill., 47, 67-68, 71-72, 96, 111-14,

185, 194, 221, 247

Argonne Laboratory, 113, 200, 342, 350, 385, 590.

See also Metallurgical Project.

Argonne National Laboratory, 590

Aristotle, 3

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, 600n

Army Air Forces, 490, 495, 519-23

Army Command Administrative Network, 395

Army Groups

6th, 287-88, 290

12th, 288

20th, 288

Army and Navy Munitions Board, 57-61, 67, 81

Army Service Forces, 116, 208n, 358, 365. See also

Services of Supply.

Army Specialized Training Program, 358, 497

Arneson, 1st Lt. R. Gordon, 555

Arnold, General Henry H., 519-21, 523, 528-29

Arnold, Samuel T., 350, 492

Ashbridge, Lt. Col. Whitney

Los Alamos construction, 469, 475, 477

Los Alamos post commander, 425, 487, 497-98,

500-501

Ashworth, Comdr. Frederick L., 524, 529, 540-42

Associated Press (Albuquerque), 514, 517
644 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Associated Universities, Inc., 590-91

Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad, 397, 478

Atkinson, Guy F., Company, 406

Atlee, Clement, 570, 572-73

Atomic bombing of Japan

AAF role in, 519-23

American casualties in, 547

overseas bases for, 523-28

preparations for, 519-23, 534-36

Senate hearings on, 548-50

target choices for, 528-30

USASTAF directive for, 534

Atomic communities. See Clinton Engineer Works;

Hanford Engineer Works; Los Alamos

Laboratory.

Atomic energy

international control of, 569-74

postwar legislation, 574-78

postwar planning, 562-68

Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 578, 596, 598-99

Atomic Energy Commission. See United States

Atomic Energy Commission.

Atomic fission

concept, historical evolution of, 3-8

military application of, 11-12

and uranium, 8-11

Auger, Pierre, 249-50, 252

Aurand, Maj. Gen. Henry S., 597

Austin, Warren R., 577

B-29's, 510n, 520-23, 528

Bacher, Robert F., 574, 589, 597-98

Bacon, Francis, 3

Badger, E. B., and Sons, 49, 58

Badoglio, Marshal Pietro, 281

Bainbridge, Kenneth, 478, 515

Bakelite Corporation, 151, 155, 160. See also Union

Carbide and Carbon Corporation.

Ballistic Research Laboratory, 487

Bandelier National Monument, N.Mex., 469

Bankers Trust Company, 302

Bard, Ralph A., 530

Barker, Maj. Maurice E., 20

Barkley, Alben W., 272

Barnard, Chester I., 574

Barnes, Sir Thomas, 297

Barnes, W. L. Gorell, 298

Barrier R & D, 154-57

Baruch, Bernard M., 573-74

Bateman, George C., 299

Batista Field, Cuba, 523

Baxter, John P., 145

Baxter, Capt. Samuel S., 435-37, 443

Bayway, N.J., 133

Beams, Jesse W., 10, 36

Bear Creek Valley, Tenn., 130

Becquerel, Henri, 4

Belgian Agreement. See Tripartite Agreement.

Belgian Congo and uranium ore, 8, 14, 24-25, 79-

80, 292, 295-96, 310, 312

Bell, Daniel W., 67

Bell Telephone Laboratories, 151, 155

Benbow, Maj. Horace S., 247

Benton County, Wash., 110, 332, 451

Beta racetracks, 128-29, 132, 135, 139, 142, 580

Bethel Valley, Tenn., 204, 206

Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 160

Betts, Brig. Gen. Edward C., 297-98

Beverly Junction, Wash., 405, 408n

Biddle, Francis, 338, 340-41

Bikini Atoll tests. See Operation CROSSROADS.

Bissell, Maj. Gen. Clayton L., 285

Bissingen, Germany, 287, 290

Black Oak Ridge, Tenn., 78-79, 320n, 433-34, 443

Black oxide, processing of, 310-12, 314-16

Blair, A. Farnell, 437

Blair, Lt. Col. Robert C., 443

Blair Road, CEW, 403-04

Bloch, Capt. Edward J., 438

Blok, Arthur, 248

Bock's Car (B-29), 540-41

Bohemian Grove, Muir Woods, Calif., 70-72, 74,

79, 96

Bohr, Niels, 4, 7, 13, 564

Bomb components stockpile, postwar, 581n, 593-94

Bomb models, 508

Bombardment Squadron (VH), 393d, 521-23

Bombardment Wing, 313th, 526

Bomber Command, XXI, 526

Bonnet, Maj. William A., 137

Bonneville Dam, Wash., 110, 392

Bonneville Power Administration, 69, 110, 378-81,

387-88, 391-94

Bowen, Rear Adm. Harold G., 24, 26

Boyd, George E., 318

Boyle, Robert, 3

Bradbury, Comdr. Norris, 582

Brazier, B. E., 476

Breeder reactor, 583

Brereton, Lt. Gen. Lewis H., 598

Brewster, Owen, 335n

Bridges, Styles, 273

Briggs, Lyman J.

development of atomic energy program, 21-24,

26-27, 34, 38, 44

liquid thermal diffusion process, 173-75

Brindisi, Italy, 281

British atomic project. See Tube Alloys.

British Mission to Japan, 545

British scientists

electromagnetic research, 124-25, 147

gaseous diffusion process, 10, 29-30, 35, 153,

155-56, 230-31

interchange policy, 271, 304

Brookhaven National Laboratory, 591-92

Brown, Edward J., 354

Brown oxide, processing of, 315-16

Brown University, 119n
INDEX 645

Bruce, E. L., 437

Bruns General Hospital (Santa Fe), 425

Brush Beryllium Company, 313

Building and Construction Trades Department,

AFL, 351, 370-71

Bundy, Harvey, 46, 60, 77, 242, 298, 337, 349, 513

Anglo-American collaboration, 228, 237, 240,

248, 251-52

postwar planning, 560, 567-68

Bureau of Mines, 313, 427

Bureau of Ordnance (Navy), 495, 501, 505

Bush, Lt. Harold C., 480-81

Bush, Vannevar, 47, 53-54, 56, 174, 285, 335

Anglo-American collaboration, 227-31, 234-40,

248, 250, 296

Army control of atomic program, 73-74, 76-77

bombing of Japan, 514, 516, 530

Combined Policy Committee, 241-43, 246

development of atomic program, 30-35, 37-39

establishment of Manhattan District, 40, 44, 46

Los Alamos program, 87, 494

Military Policy Committee, 77, 227, 335, 494, 589

NDRC and OSRD, 26-28, 30-31

postwar planning, 556, 563, 565-71, 573-75

priority ratings, 59-61

scientific personnel procurement, 345, 349

security system for Manhattan District, 261, 273,

277

Top Policy Group, 31, 34, 73

Byrd, Harry F., 336, 577

Byrnes, James F., 374, 530, 533, 570-71, 573

C-54's, 527, 536

California Institute of Technology, 499, 501, 510

Calutrons, 119-20, 122, 132-33, 136

Calvert, Maj. Horace K., 256, 258, 282, 286

Campbell, Sir Ronald I., 305

Canada

joint control of Congo ore, 296, 298

ore resources, 25, 299, 310-12, 314

Canadian atomic project. See Evergreen.

Canadian Radium and Uranium Corporation, 62,

79, 312

Cannon, Clarence, 274

Cantril, Simeon T., 411n, 415

Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation

barrier fabrication, 151, 156

labor activities at, 372, 374, 376

operation of gaseous diffusion plant, 106, 165-67,

170, 398, 418, 593

See also Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation.

Carnegie Institution, 8, 24, 36, 173, 487

Carnotite ores, 311, 314

Carpenter, Walter S., Jr., 98-99, 337

Carteret, N.J., 133

Casablanca meeting, 233-34

Cascade design, single, 152-53, 155-59, 169

Celle, Germany, 289

Censorship, 277-79

Centrifuge process, 10, 23, 47, 50-51, 71, 149n

Chadwick, Sir James, 5-6, 8n, 100, 514

Combined Policy Committee, 242n, 243-47

postwar planning, 560-61, 572

Chain reaction, 7-10

pile process, 51-52, 102-04, 190-91

uranium-graphite system, 11, 21, 23, 28

Chalk River, Ontario, 246-47

Chambers Chemical and Dye Works, 202, 315. See

also Du Pont, E. I., de Nemours and Company.

Chemical Warfare Service, 20, 132

Cherwell, Lord (Frederick Lindemann), 235-37,

533, 566

Chevalier, Haakon, 264

Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad,

332, 405-08, 451

Chrysler Corporation, 160, 166, 371

Churchill, Winston S., 31-32, 298, 518, 533

Anglo-American collaboration, 228, 233-39

postwar planning, 564-66

Quebec Agreement, 240-42

Clark, Joseph P., 374

Clarke, Col. Frederick J., 584n

Clay, Brig. Gen. Lucius D., 57-60, 433-34

Clayton, William L., 530

Clifton Products, Inc., 594-95

Clinch River, Tenn., 47, 71, 78, 160-61, 320n, 390,

433, 442

Clinton, Tenn., 78, 179, 204, 326, 433

Clinton Engineer Works, 78-79, 91, 128, 576, 590

Army-Du Pont cooperation at, 206

atomic communities, 432-48

communications and transportation at, 394-99,

401-05, 408

electrical power for, 380-82, 386, 388-91

health program at, 415-16, 418-19, 421-24

labor shortage at, 351-54

labor relations at, 372-74

labor turnover and absenteeism at, 363-66

land acquisition for, 322-28

plant construction at, 130, 134-40, 159-65,

179-80, 205-08, 580-81, 585, 593

plant operation at, 140-48, 165-71,

180-83, 208-10

safety program at, 427-30

site selection for, 78-79, 435-40

work stoppages at, 370-71, 375-76

Clinton Home Building, 437

Clinton Laboratories, 200, 350, 544

construction of, 204-08

medical research at, 415

operation of, 208-10, 583, 591, 594

See also Metallurgical Project.

Cockcroft, Sir John D., 5-6, 246-47

"Codes of Wartime Practices for the American Press

and American Broadcasters," 277

Cohen, Karl P., 150, 152, 177

Collins, Lt. Col. John K., 352-53, 365

Colorado Plateau, 8, 80, 311-12, 314
646 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Columbia River, Wash., 110-11, 210, 212, 215, 332,

405, 450, 455-56, 460, 478

Columbia University, 27-28, 415

barrier fabrication, 154-57

gaseous diffusion research, 105, 149-50, 153-54,

159

Combined Development Trust, 90n, 571, 599

foreign ore acquisition, 286, 302-06, 573

joint control of Congo ore, 298-301

legality of, 297-98

Combined Policy Committee, 90n, 239, 241-43,

245-47, 252

Anglo-American cooperation, 571-73

foreign ore acquisition, 296, 299-300, 303, 572-

73

patent problems, 247-48

technical subcommittee on interchange, 242-47

Communications, 394-97

Community management

at Hanford and Richland, 460-64

at Los Alamos, 474-77

at Oak Ridge, 443-48

Compartmentalization policy, 410

and Congress, 272-74

at Los Alamos Laboratory, 491, 495

for safeguarding military information, 268-72

Composite Group, 509th, 521-24, 526-28, 534,

536, 538

Compton, Arthur H., 44, 62, 271, 275, 350, 509,

583n

chain reaction, 102-03

development of atomic energy program, 30, 34,

36, 38

establishment of Los Alamos, 83-84, 86-87

interchange arrangements with British, 243, 246

pile process, 185, 190, 194-97, 221

Plutonium project, 47, 51-52, 95-101, 199-200

plutonium semiworks, 111-14, 208

postwar planning, 556, 563, 574, 589

Compton, Karl T., 530-33

Conant, James B., 28, 118, 261, 284, 350

Anglo-American collaboration, 227, 230-35, 239-

40

Army control of atomic program, 73, 77

bomb development, 503, 506-07, 509-10, 513-

14, 516

Combined Policy Committee, 241-42, 244, 246

establishment of Los Alamos, 83, 86-87, 467

establishment of Manhattan District, 44-45

Interim Committee, 530, 532

isotope separation processes, 36-39

liquid thermal diffusion process, 174, 177

Los Alamos weapon program, 486, 490, 494, 496,

501

plutonium project, 97-101, 114

postwar planning, 563, 565-67, 569, 573-76

priority ratings, 58-59, 61

Smyth Report, 556, 558, 560-61

Top Policy Group, 31, 33-34

Condon, Edward U., 271, 492, 577

Conklin, Frederick R., 146

Connally, Tom, 577

Consodine, Lt. Col. William A., 298, 555

Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company, 47,

49, 581

Contractor policies, 275-76, 370-71, 417-18, 428,

461

Contractor war claims, 594-95

Cook, Walter W., 476

Cook County Forest Preserve, Ill., 47, 68

Coolants, 190-93, 212, 215

Copper, 61, 66

Cornelius, Maj. William P., 161

Cornell University, 27, 590

Corps of Engineers. See Engineers, Corps of.

Counterintelligence Corps Detachment, 256, 260-

68, 272

Counterintelligence operations, 255-57, 259-63

Craig, General Malin, 519n

Creedon, Frank R., 137

Crenshaw, Lt. Col. Thomas T., 53, 64, 71, 118,

307-08, 317-18, 437

Cyclotrons, 35, 52, 86, 119, 122, 583

Cyclotrons, destruction of Japanese, 585-88

Dahlgren, Va., 508

Dale Hollow Dam and Reservoir, Tenn., 320

Dalton, John, 3

Davalos, Capt. Samuel P., 478, 500

Davis, Clifford C., 325

Davis, Laurence W., 354

Day, H. J., 201

Decatur, Ill., 370-71, 376

Declaration of Trust. See Agreement and Declaration

of Trust.

Deep Water, N.J., 202, 315

Defense Plant Corporation, 133

Delimitations Agreement, 255

Dennison, David M., 528

Department of Agriculture, 27, 324, 329

Department of Interior, 380

Department of Justice, 322, 325, 333, 336-38, 341-

42

Department of Labor, 427

Department of State, 568, 571, 573, 575, 599

Department of the Treasury, 67, 301

Derry, Maj. John A., 520, 528

Descartes, Rene, 3

Desert training area (Army), near Rue, Calif., 478n

de Seversky, Maj. Alexander, 545, 548-50

de Silva, Lt. Col. Peer, 527

Diebner, Kurt, 290

Dill, Field Marshal Sir John, 241-43

Division of Military Application, AEC, 598

Doan, Richard L., 318

Donner Laboratory, 118, 122. See also University of

California (Berkeley).

DSM (Development of Substitute Materials)

project, 43-44, 67, 71
INDEX 647

Dudley, Maj. John H., 84, 328

Dunning, John R., 8n, 10, 30, 51, 150

Du Pont, E. I., de Nemours and Company, 64, 104,

154, 371

Chambers Chemical and Dye Works, 202, 315

Clinton Engineer Works

semiworks construction at, 204-08

Oak Ridge housing at, 441-42

Engineering Department, 199, 206

feed materials production, 314-17

Hanford Engineer Works

Army collaboration at, 202-04

community construction at, 452-59

community management at, 460-63

plant construction at, 211-18, 352, 354

plant operation at, 219-22, 391-92, 591-93

safety and health programs at, 413, 420, 424,

428

site selection for, 109-10, 450-51

transportation and communications at, 395-

96, 398-99, 401n, 403, 406-07

Metallurgical Laboratory collaboration, 194-97,

452, 454

Metallurgical Project collaboration, 203-04

plutonium project, 96-99, 101, 105-06, 108-12,

114, 190-94, 198-99, 210

TNX Division, 113, 198-99, 202-03, 210, 217

Durand and Sons, A. A., 454-455

East Fork Valley, Tenn., 434

Eastman, Joseph T., 408

Eastman Kodak Laboratories, 119n

East Town, CEW, 435-36, 439, 443

East Village, CEW, 436, 439, 458

Echols, Maj. Gen. Oliver P., 520

Eden, Anthony, 235

Einstein, Albert, 6, 13-14, 21, 23

Eisenhower, General Dwight D., 284, 297, 584

Eldorado Gold Mines, Ltd., 8, 25, 62, 64, 79-80,

296n, 311

Eldorado Mining and Refining Company, 308, 310-

311, 313-14

Electric power, 377, 393

contracts and agreements for, 386-88

distribution of

at Clinton Engineer Works, 388-91

at Hanford Engineer Works, 391-93

requirements and sources of, 377-82, 385, 388

Electromagnetic (Y-12) process, 10, 34-35, 37, 71,

104-05, 117-18, 176-77

Army administration, 118-26

construction procurement, 130-33

failure of great magnets, 266-67

hazards control program, 418-19

plant construction, 130, 134-40

plant design and engineering, 126-29

plant operation, 140-48, 580

research and development, 50-53, 119-20

Electromagnetic (Y-12) process—Continued

War Department contracts, 120-23, 126, 134,

140, 145

Electro Metallurgical Company, 64, 310, 316-17

Elliott Company, 154

Engel, Albert J., 273-74

Engineer Combat Battalion, 1269th (less Company

B), 290

Engineers, Corps of, 40-41, 89

Engineers offices

Beverly Area, 308, 310

Boston Area, 127, 130, 434

California Area, 53, 64, 118

Chicago Area, 68, 185-87, 201-02

Clinton Area, 200-201, 346, 368, 395-96

Colorado Area, 308

Hanford Area, 200-201, 457, 463

Iowa Area, 308, 310

Los Angeles Area, 499

Madison Square Area, 91, 143, 308, 312-14, 316-

18, 416, 595

Murray Hill Area, 294-95, 308

New York Area, 91, 133, 151, 160, 166

Santa Fe Area, 466

St. Louis Area, 308, 310

Tonawanda Area, 308, 310

Wilmington Area, 201-02, 308, 310

Enlisted Reserve Corps, 354, 359

Enola Gay (B-29), 536-37

Espionage. See Security.

Espionage Act, 261, 577

Ether process, 62

European Theater of Operations, 280

Evans, R. Monte, 199

Evans, Maj. Thomas J., Jr., 178

Evergreen (code name for Canadian atomic

project), 246-47

Expert Tool and Die Company, 508

Farm Security Administration, 323

Farrell, Brig. Gen. Thomas F.

bombing of Japan, 528, 534-35, 538, 540, 542-

44, 549

problems at CEW, 147-48

Project Trinity preparations, 511-12, 514-16

"Fat Man," 508, 522, 527, 536, 538, 540-41

Federal Bureau of Investigation, 255

Federal Prison Industries, 334

Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and

Technicians (CIO), 264

Federation of Atomic Scientists, 577

Feed materials program

organization of, 307-10

procurement for, 310-14

production of, 314-17

quality control, 317-18

Feis, Herbert, 65

Felbeck, George T., 165
648 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Fercleve Corporation, 180-83, 374, 418

Ferguson, H. K., Company, 178-80

Fermi, Enrico, 113, 531

atomic energy research, 6-7, 8n, 9-12, 21-24, 30

bomb development, 488, 503n, 509

chain reaction, 21, 23, 102-04

pile process, 184n, 190-92, 194, 221

Ferry, Capt. John L., 416

Fidler, Capt. Harold A., 118, 122-23, 125-26

Field Artillery Armory, 124th, 186

Fifth Army, 281

Fine, Paul C., 558

Finletter, Thomas K., 65

First War Powers Act of 1941, 430

Fisher, Col. William P., 528

Flaherty, Lt. (jg.) John J., 374

Fontana Dam, N.C., 381

Ford, Bacon, and Davis, 161, 163, 166, 442

Foreign intelligence operations. See ALSOS mission.

Fort Loudoun Dam, Tenn., 390-91

Foster and Creighton, 437

Fox, Lt. Col. Mark C., 137, 178, 180

Franck, James, 272, 532-33

Franck report, 532-33

Franklin County, Wash., 110, 332

Franklin Institute, 415

Frazier, Brig. Gen. Thomas A., 279

French repatriated scientists, 248-52

Friedell, Lt. Col. Hymer L., 411-12, 415, 544

Frijoles Canyon, N.Mex., 469

Frijoles Lodge (near Los Alamos), 469

Frisch, Otto R., 7, 290

Fuchs, Klaus, 266

Fukushima, Japan, 528

Fuller Lodge (Los Alamos), 471

Funding

for Combined Development Trust, 301-02

for electromagnetic process, 121-23

for Manhattan Project, 49-50, 56-57, 115-16,

272-74, 590

for NDRC-OSRD program, 22, 24-25, 38-39

Furman, Maj. Robert R., 282, 286, 536, 544

Fusion bomb development, 503n

Gable Mountain, Wash., 111, 331n

Galileo, 3

Gallaher Bridge Road, Tenn., 403-04

Gamble Valley, CEW, 441

Gary, Tom C., 101

Gaseous diffusion (K-25) process, 149-51, 171

Army administration, 149-50

extension plant (K-27), 390-91, 581, 593

plant construction, 159-65

plant design, 152-59

plant operation, 165-71, 580-81, 593

research and development

barrier, 154-57

by British scientists, 10, 29-30, 35, 153, 155-

56, 230-31

Gaseous diffusion (K-25) process—Continued

research and development—Continued

at Columbia and Kellex, 10, 34, 36, 38, 101,

104, 149-50, 153-55, 157, 159

General Advisory Committee, AEC, 578

General American Transportation Company, 313

General Chemical, 314

General Electric Company, 129-30, 592

George, Lt. Col. Warren, 132, 135

Gerlach, Walther, 290

Germany

ALSOS missions against, 280-82, 285-91

Groves's concern about, 509n

intelligence information on, 253

interest in heavy water, 23, 66

interest in nuclear research, 12-14, 23-24, 27,

253, 280

special intelligence activities against, 282-85

U.S. race with, 35-39

Giles, Lt. Gen. Barney McK., 524

Giroux, Carl H., 110, 380, 382

GOCO plants, 370, 373-74

Goettingen, Germany, 289

Goldschmidt, Bertrand, 249-50

Goudsmit, Samuel A., 285-86, 290

Grafton, Capt. James F., 68, 186, 201

Graham's Law, 152

Grand Coulee Dam, Wash., 110, 379n, 381, 392

Grand Junction, Colo., 308, 595

Grant County, Wash., 110, 332

Graves, George, 199

Great Bear Lake, Canada, 8, 311-12

Great Britain

proposed international control measures, 564-67,

570-73

raw materials acquisition, 295-96, 303-06

See also British scientists; Anglo-American

collaboration.

Great Northern Railroad, 407

Great Sand Dunes National Monument, Colo., 478n

Green, William, 373

Green salt, processing of, 315-16

Greenewalt, Crawford H.

pile process, 195, 199, 203-05, 221-22

plutonium project, 100-101, 104, 112

Greenglass, David, 266

Gross, Maj. Gen. Charles P., 80

Groves, Maj. Gen. Leslie R., 41, 55, 74n, 79, 103, 427

ALSOS mission, 280-89, 291

Anglo-American collaboration, 227, 229-31, 233,

240

bombing of Japan, 519-21, 523-24, 526-27, 533-

34, 537n, 538, 541-43

bombing targets, 528-30, 532

CEW community development, 433-34, 443-44

communications and transportation systems, 396,

403-04, 407-08

contract negotiations, 105-07, 166, 443-44, 591-

92

destruction of Japanese cyclotrons, 587-88
INDEX 649

Groves, Maj. Gen. Leslie R.—Continued

development of the bomb, 503-04, 506-07, 509-

10

electric power procurement, 377, 380-83, 385,

387

electromagnetic process, 118, 125-26, 128-29,

134-36, 138, 145-46

establishment of Los Alamos, 83-87

French repatriated scientists, 249-52

gaseous diffusion plant, 155-57, 159, 165, 171

health programs, 411, 420-21

HEW community development, 453, 455, 457,

461-62

interchange with British, 243-47

liquid thermal diffusion process, 174-78, 180-81

Los Alamos Laboratory administration, 485-86,

489-92, 494-96, 499-501

Los Alamos community, 467, 469, 475

Manhattan Project, organization and funding of,

73-77, 89-90, 115, 588-90

manpower conservation, 364, 370, 372-74, 376

manpower procurement, 347-54, 356, 358, 361-

62

Oppenheimer security clearance, 261-62

ore exploration and joint control of, 293, 296,

298-306

pile process, 188-91, 194, 196-97

plutonium project organization, 96-101

plutonium production, 198, 202-03, 206, 208,

210, 220-23

postwar policy planning, 563, 569, 571-75, 577

press releases, 554-55

priority ratings, 61, 81-82

production operations, postwar, 579-82, 584,

591-95

Project Trinity, 511-17

security systems, 256-58, 260, 263-64, 266-68,

270-72, 274, 277-78

site selection, 47, 69-70, 78-79, 83-88, 108-11,

434

Smyth Report, 556-61

transfer of Manhattan Project to AEC, 597-601

Guam, 524, 534, 538

Guarin, Maj. Paul L., 294, 304-05

Gueron.Jules, 249-50

Gun-assembly method, 489

Gun-type bomb, 504-06, 508-10, 520

Gunn, Ross, 12, 27-28, 172-73

Gunnison Housing, 437

Hadden, Gavin, 341

Hahn, Otto, 7, 8n, 13, 290

Haigerloch, Germany, 290

Halifax, Lord, 572

Ham, Maj. R. C., 282

Hambro, Sir Charles J., 299-300

Hamilton, J. D., 121n

Hamilton Field, Calif., 536, 544

Handy, General Thomas T., 537n, 541

Hanford, Wash., 110, 114-15, 211, 332, 339-41,

391-92, 450-51, 453, 460-62

Hanford Engineer Works, 91, 267, 274, 278

Army-Du Pont administration of, 202-04, 210-12,

214, 216-17

atomic communities, 450-64

communications and transportation at, 394, 396-

99, 401-02, 404-09

electrical power for, 381-82, 387-88, 391-93

health program at, 420, 424

labor shortage at, 214, 216, 218, 351-54

labor turnover and absenteeism at, 363-66, 370

land acquisition for, 331-41

plant construction at, 210-18

plant operation at, 219-23, 580-81, 585, 592-93

safety program at, 428-29

work stoppages and union activities at, 370, 375

Happy Valley, CEW, 442

Harman, Col. John M., 86-87, 328-29, 486-87, 497

Harmon, Lt. Gen. Millard F., 524

Harriman, Tenn., 320

Harrington, Willis, 98

Harrison, Brig. Gen. Eugene L., 290

Harrison, George L., 251, 299, 302

bombing of Japan, 513, 517, 530, 533

postwar planning, 560-61, 568-69, 571

Harshaw Chemical Company, 168, 310, 314, 316

Hart, Thomas C., 577

Harvard University, 27, 590

Hawkins, David, 494n

Health program, 410-12

clinical medicine services, 420-26

industrial medicine research, 416-20

medical research, 414-16

organization of, 412-14

Heavy water (P-9), 11, 23, 29, 34-35, 51

British interchange on, 229, 231, 235

and Canadian project, 246-47

as a coolant, 190-91

production of, 58-59, 61, 66-67, 72

research, 196-97

Hechingen, Germany, 287, 290

Heisenberg, Werner, 8n, 290-91

Helium, 312-13

Hempelman, Louis H., 416-17

Hercules Powder Company, 508

Hernandez, Clinton N., 446

Hickenlooper, Bourke B., 577

Hilberry, Norman, 98, 103, 113-14, 200, 222

Hill, Capt. Thomas B., 526

Hirohito, Emperor, 542

Hiroshima, Japan, 537-38

bombing of, 537-38

survey teams at, 544-45, 548

Hitler, Adolf, 280

Hoberg, Maj. Henry G., 446

Hodgson, Lt. Col. John S., 137, 139, 447

Holmes, Hal, 336

Hooker Electrochemical Company, 166, 310, 314,

371
650 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Hooper, Rear Adm. Stanford C., 12

Hoover Dam, Ariz., 110

Hoover, Comdr. Gilbert C., 20-22, 24

Hopkins, Harry, 233-37

Horb, Germany, 290

Houdaille-Hershey Corporation, 156-57, 160, 371

Hough, Maj. Benjamin K., Jr., 127, 150

House committees. See U.S. Congress, House of

Representatives.

Housing

at Clinton Engineer Works, 435-42

at Hanford Engineer Works, 455, 457-60, 462

at Los Alamos, 468-71, 475, 477

Howard, Nathaniel R., 278

Howe, Clarence D., 241-42

Hubbard, Jack M., 515

Huffman, J. R., 247

Hughes, Arthur L., 492

Hull, Cordell, 297

Hull, Lt. Gen. John E., 519n

Hutchins, Robert Maynard, 115

Hyde Park

aide-memoire, 565-66, 570

summit meetings, 227-28, 241, 564-65

Implosion bomb, 489, 504, 506-10, 512, 516-17,

519-21

Imrie, Capt. Mathew, 476

Indianapolis, 536

Industrial hazards, 416-19

Industrial Personnel Division, ASF, 348, 351

Institute for Physical and Chemical Research,

Tokyo, 586

Insurance program, 430-31

Interchange, Anglo-American. See Anglo-American

collaboration.

Interchemical Corporation, 151

Interim Committee

composition and function of, 530-33

postwar legislation on atomic energy, 90n, 568,

574, 576

press releases, 538, 554-56

scientific panel, 531-33, 576

International Association of Chiefs of Police, 428

International Association of Machinists, 374

International Association of Plumbers and Pipe

Fitters, 354

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,

372, 374

International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers,

372, 374

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 459

International Nickel Company, 154n, 156

Interstate Commerce Commission, 407, 459

Interstate Roofing Company, 160

Inyokern, Calif., 507

Iowa State College, 27, 64, 193, 316-18, 343, 487,

505

Ismay, Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L., 284

Isotopes, 5, 8-11, 23, 28-29, 32-33

Iwo Jima, 526, 535-36

Japan

bombing of Hiroshima, 537-38

bombing of Nagasaki, 538

surrender of, 541-42

See also Atomic bombing of Japan.

Jeffers, William, 407

Jemez Mountains, N.Mex., 328, 465

Jemez Springs, N.Mex., 84

Jennings, John, Jr., 324-26

Joachimsthal (Jachymov), Czechoslovakia, 283

Johns Hopkins University, 8, 27, 119n, 126, 145,

314, 590

Johnson, Capt. Allan C., 61, 380-81, 385, 434

Johnson, Edwin C., 575n, 576, 595

Johnson, Herschel V., 305

Johnson, John A., 437

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 82, 586-87

Joint Commission for the Investigation of the

Atomic Bombing of Japan, SCAP, 545

Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment,

JCS, 39, 44, 73, 77

Joliot-Curie, Frederic, 8n, 12, 66, 249-50, 252, 286

Jones, J. A., Construction Company

gaseous diffusion plant, 106-07, 160-61, 163-65,

167, 383, 398, 404

Oak Ridge community, 442-43

Jones, Couillan, Thery, and Sylliassen, 454

Jornada del Muerto valley, N.Mex., 465, 478, 516

"Jumbo," 508n, 512

k factor, 190-92

Kadlec, Lt. Col. H. R., 203

Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, Berlin, Germany, 12, 287-

88

Kapitza, Peter, 564n

Keith, Percival C.

Anglo-American collaboration, 233, 243

gaseous diffusion plant, 151, 156, 165, 170-71

Kellex Corporation

barrier R & D, 154-57

gaseous diffusion plant

design of, 106, 150-51, 153, 158-59, 170,

383

construction of, 160-63, 165-66

Kelley, Maj. Wilbur E., 132, 141, 146-47

Kellogg, M. W., Company, 49, 51, 102, 106, 150-51

Kelly, Joseph A., 312-13

Kennewick, Wash., 456, 460

Kinetic Chemicals, 314

King, Admiral Ernest J., 526, 534

King, William Lyon Mackenzie, 235, 570

Kingston, Tenn., 78, 326

Kingston Demolition Range (Clinton Engineer

Works), 78, 319
INDEX 651

Kirkpatrick, Col. Elmer E., Jr., 526-27, 534, 536,

540, 542, 595

Kirtland Field, N.Mex., 408, 581

Kistiakowsky, George B., 350, 506, 511

Klein, August C., 53, 127, 136

Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, 592

Knoxville Airport, Tenn., 408

Kobe, Japan, 528

Kokura Arsenal, Japan, 529, 536, 538

Kolm, 305

Kowarski, Lew, 8n, 66, 249

Krug, J. A., 385, 387

Kruger, Willard C., and Associates, 466-68

Kyle, Col. William H., 274, 560

Kyoto, Japan, 529-30

Kyoto Imperial University, Japan, 586

Lancaster (British aircraft), 510n, 520

Land acquisition

Clinton Engineer Works, 319-22

Congressional investigation of, 325-27

cost of, 327-28

local opposition to, 322-24

Hanford Engineer Works, 331-33

condemnation trials for, 336-42

cost of, 342

local opposition to, 334-36

Los Alamos, 328-31

other sites, 342-43

Landrum, C. U., 339

Lansdale, Col. John, Jr., 298, 306

Counterintelligence system, 255, 257, 263

Operation HARBORAGE, 289, 341

Lanthanum fluoride, 193-94

L'Arcouest, France, 286

Latimer, W. M., 121n

Lattice pile, 28, 30

Laurence, William L., 514, 554-55

Lavender, Capt., Robert A., 248

Lawrence, Ernest O., 28, 30, 38, 44, 66, 514, 531,

583, 589

electromagnetic process, 34-35, 47, 52-53, 70,

118-21, 123, 125, 128-29, 138

Los Alamos site selection, 84-85, 87

pile process, 99-101

Leahy, Admiral William D., 561, 564, 565n, 566

Lee, Frank G., 299

Lee, Rear Adm. Willis A., Jr., 44, 77

Leith, Charles K., 299

LeMay, Maj. Gen. Curtis, 526, 534, 536

Lewis, Warren K., 563, 589

liquid thermal diffusion process, 174-77

plutonium project, 101, 197, 490

Lewis reviewing committee, 101-02, 104-05, 117,

149, 174

Lilienthal, David E., 381, 386, 574, 597-99

Lincoln, Brig. Gen. George A., 519n

Lindau, Germany, 289

Linde Air Products Company, 151, 160, 310, 314-

16. See also Union Carbide and Carbon

Corporation.

Liquid thermal diffusion (S-50) process, 31n, 36

full-scale development of, 174-78

Navy R & D on, 149n, 172-75, 177-78

plant construction, 179-80

plant design, 178-79

plant operation, 180-83, 580

Littell, Norman M., 336-41

"Little Boy," 522, 535-38. See also "Thin Man."

Llewellin, Col. John J., 241-43, 305

Lockhart, Jack, 554

Los Alamos Laboratory

accidents at, 420n

administrative organization, 491-93

atomic communities, 465-81

censorship at, 278-79

communications and transportation at, 395-98,

400-401, 404, 408

electrical power for, 385, 388

espionage at, 265-66

Groves's efforts at, 485-86, 500-501

health and safety programs at, 416-17, 419-20,

424-26, 428-29

interchange with British scientists, 231, 245

land acquisition for, 328-31

manpower recruitment for, 347-48, 353,

358, 487, 501-02

post administration, 496-502

postwar operations, 580-82, 585, 593-94

site selection for, 82-88, 478

special reviewing committee, 490-91

technical organization, 493-96

weapon construction at, 507-10

weapon design at, 503-07

weapon planning at, 488-91

weapon testing at, 511-18

Los Alamos Ranch School for Boys, 84, 329,

465-66, 472

Lotz, John R., 55-56, 69

Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 397, 404-05, 433

Ludwigshafen, Germany, 288

MacArthur, General Douglas, 530, 534, 543-44,

587-88

Mackenzie, C. J., 232, 235, 243, 246-47

Maddy, James R., 426-27, 429

Mahon, George H., 274

Maizuru, Japan, 528

Makins, Roger, 560-61, 571-72

Mallinckrodt, Edward, 62

Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 62, 64, 310, 315-17

Manhattan (code name for American atomic

project), 43-44

Manhattan District, 40-41, 80, 595

administrative organization, 88-91, 256-59,

308, 346-47, 412-13, 420, 437-38
652 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Manhattan District—Continued

and the AEC, 596-97, 600n

area offices. See Engineers offices.

deferment policies, 367-69

establishment of, 41-46

labor relations activities, 363-66, 370-75

and plant operations, 142-43, 150-51, 160, 166

Oak Ridge community development, 434-40,

443, 445-46

Production Control Committee, 169

relations with Los Alamos, 468-69, 477

report on bombing effects, 545-46

security systems, 254-59, 274-77, 279

Manhattan Project

and atomic energy legislation, 574-78

and the bombing of Japan, 521-23, 543-47, 550

end of, 599-600

funding for, 115-16, 272-74, 590

major installations. See Clinton Engineer Works;

Hanford Engineer Works; Los Alamos

Laboratory.

organization of, 88-92, 588-90

origins of, 19-39

policymaking bodies. See Interim Committee;

Military Policy Committee; Top Policy Group.

postwar operations, 580-85, 588-96

priority ratings for, 80-82

public relations program, 553-62

Soviet interest in, 265-66, 564

Manley, John H., 527, 594

Manpower conservation, 375-76

labor turnover, 363-66

procedures for grievance hearings, 374-75

security, 366-67, 369, 371-72

Selective Service System, 366-69

union activities and work stoppages, 369-76

Manpower procurement, 344-45, 361-62

of civilian employees, 355-57

of industrial labor, 350-55

of military personnel, 357-61

organization for, 345-48

of scientific and technical personnel, 348-50

Marbury, William L., 568

Mariana Islands, 521, 523

Marks, Herbert S., 380-81, 597-98

Marsden, Lt. Col. E. H., 112, 308n

Marshall, General George C., 42, 98, 273, 580

ALSOS mission, 280-81, 289

Anglo-American collaboration, 234, 239-41

atomic energy program, 26, 31, 34, 37, 39, 73-74,

76

bombing of Japan, 524, 528, 534, 541, 543

Marshall, Col. James C., 19, 31n, 39, 55-56, 88n,

115, 255, 307, 356, 426

electromagnetic program, 118, 128, 133

establishment of Manhattan District, 40-42, 45-46

financing of atomic project, 49-50, 56-57

Oak Ridge community development, 434-35

plutonium program, 96, 113, 185, 194, 205

priority ratings, 57, 59, 61

research and development, 50, 52-53

Marshall, Col. James C.—Continued

site selection, 47, 68-70, 78, 434

Martin, Joseph W., Jr., 273

Martyn, John W., 587

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 64, 308,

314, 317-18, 487, 590

Materiel Squadron, 1027th, 521

Matthias, Lt. Col. Franklin T., 276, 375

Hanford Engineer Works

community development, 452-55, 457-60

electrical distribution system, 391-93

land acquisition, 110, 333-34, 336-38, 342

transportation, 405-06, 409

plutonium project, 201-02, 210-21

May, Andrew J., 325, 575

May-Johnson bill, 575-77

McCloy, John J., 378, 567, 573

McCormack, John W., 273

McGrady, Edward, 374

McKee, Robert E., 371, 469, 471, 498

McKellar, Kenneth D., 595

McLeod, Capt. Robert J., 256, 258

McMahon, Brien, 576-77

McMahon bill (Atomic Energy Act of 1946), 577-78

McManama and Company, 455

McMillan, Edwin M., 8n, 84, 100

McNarney, Lt. Gen. Joseph T., 285

McNeil Island Penitentiary, Wash., 334

Mead, James M., 335n

Mead Committee. See U.S. Congress, Senate.

Medical Corps, 413, 416, 422, 425, 544

Meitner, Lise, 7, 290

Menke, Capt. Bernard W., 258

Merritt, Capt. Phillip L., 80, 307

Metal Hydrides, Inc., 62, 64, 310, 316-17

Metallurgical Laboratory, 47, 342, 347, 350, 385,

487, 576

chain reaction, 102-03

Du Pont collaboration, 194-97, 452, 454

espionage at, 265

feed materials processing, 313, 317-18

health programs, 410n, 415, 419n

pile design and engineering, 185-93

plutonium program, 35-36, 52, 65-66, 72, 86,

95-101, 113, 510, 583, 590, 592

See also Metallurgical Project; University of

Chicago.

Metallurgical Project, 371, 563, 590

Council, 204

Du Pont collaboration, 203-04

plutonium program, 199-200

transfer of physicists, 501

See also Argonne Laboratory; Clinton

Laboratories; Metallurgical Laboratory.

Metals Reserve Corporation, 311

Middlesex, N.J., 80

Miles, J. B., 204

Military Advisory Board, 589

Military Appropriations Act of 1944, 116

Military Intelligence Service, WD, 255
INDEX 653

Military Liaison Committee, AEC, 578, 597-98

Military Police Company (Aviation), 1395th, 521

Military Policy Committee, 77, 80, 266, 293, 557,

580

administration of Manhattan Project, 89, 115, 589

Anglo-American collaboration, 227, 231-32, 234-

35, 242-43, 245

bombing mission, 524-526

Hanford land acquisition, 335-37

implosion program, 507-08, 510n

Los Alamos, 87, 494

plutonium project, 99, 105-07, 109, 184-85, 191,

194, 198, 203

postwar policy on atomic energy, 563

production methods, 117, 139

raw materials, 293, 295-96

Millikin, Eugene D., 577

Mills, Rear Adm. Earle W., 563

Mitchell, Dana P., 492

Mohler, Fred L., 21

Monsanto Chemical Company, 210, 508, 544, 591

Moore, Lacey, 406

Moore, Thomas V., 185

Moran, Maj. John J., 166

Morgan, J. E., and Sons, 469, 471

Morgantown Ordnance Works, W.Va., 107-08, 191,

343

Morgenthau, Henry, 67, 302

Morrison-Knudsen Company, 371

Moses, Brig. Gen. Raymond G., 44

Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph

Company, 395-96

Munnecke, Wilbur C., 200

Muroc Army Air Field, Calif., 508, 520

Murphree, Eger V., 34, 36, 38, 44, 51, 101

heavy water program, 197

liquid thermal diffusion process, 174-77

Murray, Philip, 373

Nagaoka, Japan, 528

Nagasaki, Japan, 530, 536

bombing of, 538, 540-41

survey teams at, 544-46, 548

Nash Building, 150-51, 155

National Academy of Sciences, 30, 32-33

National Bureau of Standards, 21, 23-24, 27, 62,

64-65, 173, 308, 316-18, 419n, 487

National Carbon Company, 65-66, 313

National Defense Research Committee, 26-31, 33-

34, 254, 490, 505

National Electrical Contractors Association, 354

National Homes, 437

National Labor Relations Board, 345, 372-73

National laboratories, 590-91

National Research Council, 253, 345

National Roster of Scientific and Specialized

Personnel, 358, 492

National Safety Council, 428-30

National War Labor Board, 355, 364, 372

Naval Construction Brigade, 6th, 524

Naval Depot, Yorktown, Va., 508

Naval Gun Factory, Wash., D.C., 505-08

Naval Ordnance Plant, Centerline, Mich., 508

Naval Proving Ground, Dahlgren, Va., 508

Naval Research Laboratory, 12-13, 22, 24, 31n,

173-74

Naval Technical Mission to Japan, 545

Neddermeyer, Seth H., 506

Nelson, Lt. Col. Curtis A., 501

Nelson, Donald, 59, 81, 381

Neptunium, 28

Netherlands East Indies, 306

Newman, Brig. Gen. James B., Jr., 544

Newman, James R., 577

New Mexico Power Company, 331n, 388

Newton, Isaac, 3

New War Department Building, 42, 89, 597

Nichols, Col. Kenneth D., 42, 46-47, 53, 55, 88,

380, 509, 543

Anglo-American collaboration, 233, 241

electromagnetic construction, 133-36, 139, 146

feed materials program, 307-08

gaseous diffusion plant, 160, 169

Hanford production plant, 109, 218, 220, 592

liquid thermal diffusion process, 174, 177-78, 182

manpower conservation, 369, 374

Oak Ridge community development, 437, 443-44

plutonium project, 98, 112-14, 185, 194, 202, 209

postwar commitments, 588-89

priority ratings, 57-60

reorganization of atomic project, 75-76

security system, 258

silver procurement, 66-67

site selection, 68, 71

Smyth Report, 559-60

transfer of Manhattan Project to AEC, 598-600

uranium procurement, 62, 65, 79, 292, 295

weapon stockpiling, postwar, 593-94

Nickel barrier, 154-57

Nickel chromium, 312

Nier, Afred O., 10

Niigata, Japan, 529, 540

Niihama, Japan, 528

Nimitz, Admiral Chester W., 524, 526, 535

Nitrogen, 4, 133

Nolan, Capt. James F., 420, 425-26, 536

Norris, Edward, 154-57

Norris Dam, Tenn., 390-91

Norsk Hydro plant, Rjukan, Norway, 23, 66, 280

Norstad, Brig. Gen. Lauris, 524, 528

Northern Pacific Railroad, 405, 407, 460

Norton, William J., 126

Oak Ridge, Tenn., 79, 88, 201, 361, 382, 389-91,

421-23, 427-30, 435-40, 443-44, 448

Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies, 591

O'Brien, Col. John J., 78, 110, 324
654 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

OCTAGON Conference, 564

O'Driscoll and Grove, 437

Office of Censorship, 278-79, 514, 554

Office of Defense Transportation, 404-05, 407-08,

459

Office of Naval Intelligence, 255, 280

Office of Scientific Research and Development, 28,

36-37, 39, 254

Army collaboration, 46-50, 66-67, 69, 71-72

Committee on Scientific Personnel, 345, 349

electromagnetic program, 118, 119n, 120-21

health and safety measures, 410-11

and the Manhattan District, 40, 44-47, 49

materials procurement, 292, 307, 315-16

S-1 Executive Committee, 77-81

Anglo-American relations, 228-30

electromagnetic process, 117, 126

gaseous diffusion process, 51

liquid thermal diffusion process, 174-75

Manhattan Project administration, 71-72, 89-

90

organization of, 44-46

plutonium project, 52-53, 96-97, 101, 107

procurement, 58-59, 65-66

S-1 Section, 33-35, 44, 62, 292

Office of Strategic Services, 280

Office of the Surgeon General, 412, 422

Office of War Utilities. See Power Division, WPB.

Ohio State University, 151

Ohly, John H., 373

Okinawa, 541

O'Leary, Jean, 89

Oliphant, Marcus L. E., 124, 147, 242n, 243, 245

Olympic Commissary Company, 461

O'Meara, Capt. Paul E., 435, 437

Omura Naval Hospital, Japan, 544

Oolen, Belgium, 25

Operation CROSSROADS, 594

Operation HARBORAGE, 289-90

Operation PEPPERMINT, 284-85

Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 52, 71, 271, 574

decision to use the bomb, 531-32

electromagnetic process, 128

implosion bomb design, 503, 506-07, 509-15

liquid thermal diffusion process, 175-76

Los Alamos Laboratory

establishment of, 82-84, 86-88

organization of, 491-96, 499-500

postwar personnel attrition, 581-82

recruiting of scientists, 347, 350

weapon planning, 488-91

Los Alamos operating community, 466-67, 475,

481

Radiation Laboratory espionage reports, 264

security clearance for, 261-62

Orange oxide, processing of, 315

Oranienburg, Germany, 287-88

Ordnance Department, 23-24, 108, 495

Osaka Imperial University, Japan, 586

Pacific and National Hut, 470

Pacific Power and Light Company, 381-82, 391-93,

451

Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company, 394,

396

Page, Arthur, 554-55

Pajarito Plateau, N.Mex., 465, 478

Parsons, Lt. Col. William B., 258

Parsons, Rear Adm. William S., 499, 501, 598

bomb development, 504, 506, 508

liquid thermal diffusion process, 175

preparations for atomic bombing, 521, 527, 535-

38

Pasco, Wash., 110, 405-06, 456, 460

Pash, Lt. Col. Boris T., 261-62, 281-82, 286, 288-

90

Patent rights, 247-48

Patterson, Robert P., 74, 78, 111, 302, 354-55, 374,

584, 597, 600

electric power requirements, 381, 386-87

land acquisition, 319, 325, 331, 338, 340

Manhattan Project appropriations, 273-74

postwar atomic policy, 570-71, 575, 577

Patterson-Brown Plan, 354

Peabody, A. O., 398

Pearson, Lester B., 571

Pegram, George B., 8n, 12, 24-25, 34-35, 44

Pehrson, G. A., 457-58

Peierls, Sir Rudolph E., 8n, 242n, 243, 245

Penn Salt, 314

Penney, William G., 528

Personnel

for ALSOS mission, 281, 285-86

attrition, postwar, 581-85

for Clinton Laboratories, 208

for electromagnetic plant, 141-42

for gaseous diffusion plant, 151, 166-67

for Hanford production plant, 214, 218-19

for Los Alamos, 487, 492-93, 497-98, 501-02

for Manhattan District security force, 258

medical, 412-14, 422, 425

See also Manpower conservation; Manpower

procurement.

Persons, Brig. Gen. William B., 337

Peterson, Maj. Arthur V., 114, 188, 194, 196-97,

201-02, 208-09, 283-84

Philadelphia Navy Yard, 175-76, 594

Physical Review, 14

Pierce Foundation, John B., 435

Pike, Sumner T., 597-98

Pile (X-10) process, 184-85, 419

Army-Du Pont administration, 202-04

chemical separation process design, 193-94

Clinton Laboratories

plant construction, 205-08

plant operation, 208-10, 583, 591, 594

design and engineering for, 184, 187-94

Du Pont-Metallurgical Laboratory collaboration,

194-98
INDEX 655

Pile (X-10) process—Continued

Hanford Engineer Works

plant construction, 212-18

plant operation, 219-23, 581, 585, 592-93

research and development, 51-52, 99,

102-05, 184-85

Plutonium (Pu-238, -240), 28-30, 32-34, 36, 38,

99, 283, 488-90, 504-05, 508-09, 514

Pond, Ashley, 465

Port Hope, Ontario, 62, 64, 79-80, 313-14

Port Richmond, N.Y., 65

Postwar Policy Committee, 563-64

Potsdam Conference, 555

Potsdam Declaration, 541

Power Division, WPB, 380, 382, 384, 387-88, 597

Prefabricated Engineering Company, 458-59

Press releases. See Manhattan Project, public

relations program.

Price, Byron, 278

Priest Rapids Branch. See Chicago, Milwaukee,

St. Paul and Pacific Railroad.

Priestly, Kenneth, 123

Princeton University, 8, 27-28, 47, 52, 590

barrier corrosion research, 151, 154

feed materials research, 308, 317-18

Priority ratings

for labor, 352-53

for tools and materials, 80-82

for weapon development, 50, 57-61

Prisoner-of-war camps, 537, 547

Procurement, 130-33, 206, 217, 455, 486, 491, 499-

500

of copper, 61, 66

of electric power and equipment, 377-80, 393

of feed materials, 310-14

of graphite, 22-23, 61, 65-66, 312-13

of heavy water, 61, 66

of raw materials. See Raw materials program.

of silver, 66-67, 133

of thorium ore, 292-95, 300, 303, 305-07

of uranium ore, 62, 64-65, 79-80, 286-87, 292-

95, 300, 303, 310-11

Procurement and Assignment Service, 413

Project Alberta, 496, 542

Project Camel, 499, 501, 510

Project Trinity, 496, 503, 581n

bomb test, 514-19

establishment of base camp, 478-81

origin of code name, 465n

preparations for, 511-14

"Prospectus on Nucleonics," 563

Provisional Engineer Detachment, 469, 473-74,

497-98, 502, 507

Public Roads Administration, 403-04

Pumps, design of, 157-58

"Pumpkins," 511

Purdue University, 86, 119n, 126, 145, 314, 487

Purnell, Rear Adm. William R., 77, 174, 350, 524,

526, 534

QUADRANT Conference, 240-41

Quebec Agreement, 241-42, 245, 247, 249

British proposed revision of, 570-72

uranium resources, 296n, 299n

Rabi, Isidor I., 488

Racetracks. See Alpha racetracks; Beta racetracks.

Radiation, 3-4, 415-16

Radiation Laboratory, 35, 125, 343, 411n

espionage at, 261, 263-65

research and development, 120-26, 128-29, 138,

141-42, 583

See also University of California (Berkeley).

Radioactive lead, 312-13

Radioactive warfare, 283-84

Radioactivity, 543-44, 547, 562n

Radium, 8, 25, 312-13

Radium Chemical Company, 312

Railroads, 404-08

Ramsey, Norman F., 349

Raw materials program

acquisition in foreign areas, 299-306

international ore exploration, 292-95

joint control of Congo ore, 295-97

Rayburn, Sam, 273-74

Rea, Lt. Col. Charles E., 420

Read, Granville M., 199, 203

Reader's Digest, 548

Real estate branches

Corps of Engineers, 70, 78, 324, 331, 340, 342

Ohio River Division, 70, 320-21, 404

Pacific Division, 331-34

Southwestern Division, 328, 331

Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 311n

Redox solvent extraction process, 593n

Reybold, Maj. Gen. Eugene, 19, 40, 42-43, 55, 75,

115, 319, 326

Rice, Calif., 478n

Richards, Maj. Gen. George J., 273

Richland, Wash., 110, 212, 332-33, 392, 401, 406,

428, 430, 450-51, 456-60, 462-64

Rickover, Capt. (USN) Hyman G., 596n

Rjukan (Norway) plant, 280. See also Norsk Hydro

plant.

Road systems, 400-404

Roane-Anderson Company, 371, 427

Oak Ridge community administration, 444-47

operation of CEW communications and

transportation, 397-98, 401, 404

Roane County, Tenn., 70, 78, 320, 326, 403

Roberts, Richard B., 21

Robins, Brig. Gen. Thomas M., 41-42, 55, 70, 77,

110

Roentgen, Wilhelm, 4

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 73, 80, 98, 115, 197

Anglo-American collaboration, 31-32, 46, 228-29,

232-33, 236-38, 240, 251

approved briefing congressional leaders, 272-73
656 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Roosevelt, Franklin D.—Continued

control of Congo ore deposits, 297-300

government support of atomic energy program,

13-15, 19, 26, 28, 31-32, 39

Hanford land acquisition, 335-36

Los Alamos security, 494

Navy exclusion from atomic program, 31, 174

postwar planning, 564-66

Quebec Agreement, 241-42

Rose, Edwin L., 490

Rosenberg, Ethel and Julius, 265

Rossell, Maj. Paul F., 438

Rowe, Hartley, 496

Royall, Brig. Gen. Kenneth C., 568-69

Royall-Marbury draft bill, 568-69, 574-75

Ruhoff, Lt. Col. John R., 146, 589

feed materials program, 307-08, 311

uranium procurement, 64-65, 79

Russell, Richard B., 577

Rutherford, Ernest, 4-6

S (Sawmill) site, 507

S-1 Executive Committee. See Office of Scientific

Research and Development.

S-1 Section. See Office of Scientific Research and

Development.

Sabotage, measures against, 266-67

Sachs, Alexander

Congo ore acquisition, 24-25

government support of atomic program, 13-15,

19-24, 26, 28

Safety program

insurance plans, 430-31

occupational and community aspects, 428-30

organization of, 426-28

Salton Sea Naval Air Station, Calif, 521

SAM (Special Alloyed Materials) Laboratories, 150,

153-54, 156, 167, 343

Sandia Base, N.Mex., 581, 585, 594, 599

San Luis Valley, Colo., 478n

San Nicolas Island, Calif, 478n

Sapper, Maj. William L., 112, 201-03

Schulman Electrical Company, A. S., 389

Schult Trailers, 437

Schwellenbach, Judge Lewis B., 331, 337, 339-40,

342

Seaborg, Glenn, 99, 173, 185

Secrecy, 26, 44-45, 56

Security

bodyguards, 267-68

censorship, 277-79

Clinton Engineer Works, 447

communications, 395-97

compartmentalization policy, 268-72

Counterintelligence program, 255-57, 259-63

espionage activities, 263-66

French repatriated scientists, 249, 252

Hanford Engineer Works, 461, 463

informing Congress, 272-74

Security—Continued

Los Alamos, 474, 480, 491-92, 494-95, 513-14,

517

measures against sabotage, 266-67

organization and administration of, 254-59, 274-

76

Selective Service System, 344, 346, 366-69, 376

Senate committees. See U.S. Congress, Senate.

Seneca Ordnance Depot, N.Y., 80

Sengier, Edgar, 25, 64-65, 79-80, 292, 295, 300

Separation methods, 9-11, 21, 23, 28-30, 34-37,

193-94. See also by process names.

Service Commands

4th, 395-96

6th, 358

8th, 358, 361, 474, 497, 502

9th, 396, 408

Service Command Unit, 4817th, 361, 474

Services of Supply, 19, 40, 57, 116n, 358, 486. See

also Army Service Forces.

Shane, Charles D., 492-93

Shasta Dam, Calif, 70, 110

Shekerjian, Lt. Col. Haig, 20

Shinkolobwe mine, Belgian Congo, 8, 25, 64, 295-

96, 300

Short, Dewey, 325

Shurcliff, William S., 558

Signal Corps, 377, 395-96, 544

Silver Spring, Md., 508

Simon, Sir Francis E., 242n, 243

Site selection

Chalk River pilot plant, 246-47

Clinton Engineer Works, 78-79, 435-40, 450-51

Hanford Engineer Works, 108-11

Los Alamos Laboratory, 82-88, 478

other installations, 46-49, 65-71

Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, 435-36, 438-39, 441

Slotin, Louis, 420n

Smith, Harold D., 34

Smith, Hoffman, and Wright, 458

Smith, Lincoln G., 558

Smith, Capt. Ralph C., 500

Smith, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell, 284

Smyth, Henry D., 196, 556-63

Smyth Report, 556-61

Snyder, J. Buell, 274

Sobell, Morton, 265

Soda salt, processing of, 314-15

Solberg, Rear Adm. Thorvald A., 563, 598

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 116, 338, 348

establishment of Manhattan District, 42-43

organization of atomic energy program, 74-75, 77

Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company,

396-97

Southern Railway, 320n, 397, 404, 433

Soviet Union

espionage activities, 265-66

postwar atomic explosion, 566n

proposed atomic relations with, 564, 570

Spaak, Paul H., 300
INDEX 657

Spaatz, General Carl A., 288, 537n

Sparkman, John, 325

Special Engineer Detachment, 141, 151, 166, 180-

81, 208, 349, 358-59, 367, 469, 497-98, 502,

507

Special Engineer Detachment (Provisional), 13th,

258

Spedding, Frank H., 145, 185

Speer, Albert, 291

Speer Carbon Company, 65-66, 313

Spokane Army Air Field, Wash., 409

Spokane, Portland, and Seattle Railroad, 405, 407

Spokesman-Review (Spokane, Wash.), 279

Sproul, Robert G., 126

Stadtilm, Germany, 288-89

Standard Oil Development Company, 27, 36, 51,

65, 79, 96

Stanford University, 487

Stark, Admiral Harold R., 26

Staten Island cache, 64-65, 79-80, 292

Stearns, Joyce C., 528

Steel, procurement of, 61, 218

Steel-bomb process, 64

Stettinius, Edward R., Jr., 306

Stevens, Maj. Wilber A., 500, 507

Stewart, Irvin, 44

Stewart, Lt. Col. Stanley L., 499, 501

Stewart, Tom, 595

Stagg Field, University of Chicago, 103, 194

Stassfurt, Germany, 287

State, County, and Municipal Workers of America,

371

Stimson, Henry L., 67, 98, 126, 580

ALSOS mission, 280, 289

Anglo-American collaboration, 229, 232, 234,

237-40, 251

atomic energy program, 39, 73, 77

bombing of Japan, 529-30, 532, 537n, 541, 545

briefing congressional leaders, 573-74

Combined Policy Committee, 241-42

deferments, 367-68

establishment of Manhattan District, 45-46

Hanford land acquisition, 335-37

joint control of Congo uranium, 296-98, 300, 302

manpower recruitment, 349, 353-54, 357

postwar planning, 565-68, 570

press release on bombing, 553, 556

priority ratings, 61

Project Trinity, 517-18

Smyth Report, 560-61

Top Policy Group, 31, 33-34

Stine, Charles, 98, 100

Stone, Robert S., 200, 410n, 411, 415

Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation, 42,

49, 52, 68-71, 79, 185, 428n

acquisition of feed materials, 307, 311

as an AEM, 55-56, 59, 61, 95-97, 99, 106-07

CEW communications and transportation, 396,

398, 404

CEW housing construction, 433-37, 439, 441,

443

Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation—

Continued

electromagnetic plant

construction of, 130, 132-37, 139, 389-90

design and engineering of, 124, 126-29

Stowers, Lt. Col. James C., 151, 156, 160, 166

Strasbourg, France, 287, 290

Strassmann, Fritz, 7, 8n, 290

Strauss, Lewis L., 597

Strong, Maj. Gen. George V., 26, 255-56, 277, 280-

81

Styer, Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D., 19, 37-38, 46, 59,

206, 381

Combined Policy Committee, 242-43

establishment of Manhattan District, 40, 42-43, 45

foreign ore acquisition, 300

manpower procurement, 350, 354, 356

reorganization of atomic energy program, 74-77,

81-82

Sundt Company, M. M., 398, 466, 468-69, 474

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force,

289-90

Surplus property, 595

Suzuki, Kantaro, 542

Swanson, Maj. Melvin O., 438

Sweeney, Maj. Charles W., 540

Syracuse District, 19, 42, 356

Szilard, Leo, 8n, 10-11, 190

compartmentalization policy, 270-71

development of atomic energy program, 24, 26

efforts to secure U.S. government support, 12-14

uranium-graphite system, 11, 21-22

Taber, Rep. John, 274

Tailfingen, Germany, 290

Taranto, Italy, 281

Taylor, Hugh S., 47, 49

Taylor, Capt. Thomas W., 438

Technical Detachment, 1st, 521, 527, 535, 542

Technical Service Unit, 9812th, 361, 497-98

Teller, Edward, 8n, 11, 13, 271, 503n

development of atomic energy program, 21-22

Los Alamos weapon program, 487

Tennessee Eastman Corporation, 119n, 126

hazards control program, 418-19

labor relations, 371, 374

operation of electromagnetic plant, 107, 124, 134

140-48, 398

Tennessee Valley, 55, 71, 78-79

Tennessee Valley Authority, 108

electrical power from, 378-83, 386, 389-91

site selection, 46-47, 68-69, 432

"Thin Man," 508. See also "Little Boy."

Thomas, Charles A., 210, 509, 514, 574, 589

Thomas, Elmer, 273

Thomas, W. I., 177

Thomson, George P., 8n

Thomson, J. J., 4
658 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

Thorium ore. See Procurement, of thorium ore.

Tibbets, Col. Paul W., Jr., 521, 529, 537-38

Tilley, John N., 199

Tinian, 524, 526-27, 536, 538, 540-44

TNX Division. See Du Pont, E. I., de Nemours and

Company.

Tojo, General Hideki, 542

Tolman, Richard C., 197, 271, 350, 529, 589

Combined Policy Committee, 242-44

liquid thermal diffusion process, 176-77

Los Alamos weapon program, 490, 503n, 507,

510, 512-14

postwar planning, 558-60, 563, 574

Top Policy Group, 31, 34-35, 45-46, 80, 89, 232,

267, 296

Toyama, Japan, 528

Trail plant, British Columbia, 47, 53, 58-59, 61, 66-

67, 72, 107, 343, 388, 581

Transportation

air, 408-09

Corps, 377, 398-401, 405

motor vehicles, 400-402

organization for, 399-400

problems of, 397-98

railroads, 404-08

road networks, 402-04

Travancore, India, 305-06

Travis, Maj. James E., 203

Traynor, Maj. Harry S., 45n, 297-98

TRIDENT Conference, 235

Trinity. See Project Trinity.

Tripartite Agreement, 300-301

Troop Carrier Squadron, 320th, 521

Truman, Harry S., 337, 518

appointments to AEC, 596-97

bombing of Japan, 533, 541, 556

domestic control of atomic energy, 575-76, 578

future control of the bomb, 569-74

postwar planning, 561-62

Truman-Attlee-King Declaration, 571, 573

Truman Committee. See U.S. Congress, Senate.

Trytten, M. H., 492

Tube Alloys (code name for British

atomic project), 99, 228-29, 223, 236, 304, 565,

570

Tularosa valley, N.Mex., 478n

Turner Construction Company, 444

Twaits, Morrison, and Knudsen, 458

Tydings, Millard E., 577

Tyler, Col. Gerald R., 498, 501

Ube, Japan, 528

Underhill, Robert M., 121-23

Uniform Vehicle Code, 429

Union activities, 369-75

Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation, 96, 106,

165, 293. See also Bakelite Corporation; Linde

Air Products Company; Union Mines

Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation—Continued

Development Corporation; United States

Vanadium Corporation.

Union Mines Development Corporation, 293-95,

299n, 303. See also Union Carbide and Carbon

Corporation.

Union Miniere du Haut Katanga, 8, 25, 286, 300-

301, 310. See also African Metals Corporation.

Union Pacific Railroad, 405, 407, 460

United Nations

Article 102 of charter, 571-72

Commission on Atomic Energy, 573-74

United States Army Strategic Air Forces, 288, 530

United States Atomic Energy Commission, 67n,

342, 376, 578, 591, 596-600

United States Bullion Depository, West Point,

N.Y., 133

United States Employment Service, 141,

351-53, 366

United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 545, 547-

48, 550

United States Vanadium Corporation, 311. See also

Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation.

University of California (Berkeley), 348, 371, 428n,

487, 589

Board of Regents, 120

electromagnetic program, 119-23

Los Alamos prime contractor, 86-87, 467-68,

475, 486-87, 491, 499, 512

nuclear research, 8, 27-28, 52, 83, 185, 193

See also Donner Laboratory; Radiation Laboratory.

University of California (Davis), 119, 123

University of Chicago, 68, 86, 121, 590, 594

nuclear research, 27-28, 52, 83

plutonium program, 185-87, 193-94, 210

plutonium semiworks, 114-15, 398

See also Metallurgical Laboratory.

University of Illinois, 86, 487

University of Minnesota, 27, 86, 487

University of Pennsylvania, 590

University of Rennes, France, 286

University of Rochester, 411-12, 415-16, 421, 487,

544, 590, 594

University of Rome, 282

University of Strasbourg, 287

University of Tennessee, 142, 591

University of Virginia, 23-24, 27, 51

University of Washington, 415

University of Wisconsin, 86, 487

Uranium (U-233, -234, -235, -238), 8-11, 23-25,

28-29, 32-33 and bomb development, 504-06, 508, 510

British research on, 231, 235

electromagnetic process, 128, 142-44

explosive potential of, 488-89

gaseous diffusion process, 149, 152, 169, 171

Lewis reviewing committee report on, 104-05

liquid thermal diffusion process, 173, 175-77, 182

Uranium, Committee on, 26-28, 253. See also

Uranium, Section on.
INDEX 659

Uranium, Section on, 28, 556. See also Office of

Scientific Research and Development, S-1

Section.

Uranium Committee. See Advisory Committee on

Uranium.

Uranium-graphite system, 11, 21, 23, 28

Uranium hexafluoride, 152, 154, 173, 175

Uranium ore. See Procurement, of uranium ore.

Uranium tetrachloride, 143

Uravan, Colo., 376

Urey, Harold C., 24, 26, 30, 34-35, 44, 87, 243, 574

gaseous diffusion process, 34, 36, 38, 51, 101,

150, 155

liquid thermal diffusion process, 174-75

U.S. Congress, 327, 576, 579-80, 590, 595

atomic project briefings, 272-74

hearings on atomic bombings, 548-50

House of Representatives, 273-74, 324, 576, 578

Appropriations Committee, 273-74

Military Affairs Committee, 75, 325, 575,

578-79

postwar atomic legislation, 572, 574-78

Senate, 273, 336, 578

Appropriations Committee, 273

Mead Committee, 341

Military Affairs Committee, 575-76

Special Committee on Atomic Energy, 548,

577-80

Truman Committee, 279, 335, 337

U.S. Navy, 12-13, 22, 24, 31n, 172-75, 177-78, 255,

524, 535, 545, 576, 594n

Vanadium, 311

Vanadium Corporation of America, 311

Vance, Maj. John E., 306

Vanden Bulck, Lt. Col. Charles, 43n, 357, 597-98

Vandenberg, Arthur H., 576-77

Van Fleet, J. R., 293

Van Vleck, John H., 490

Vargas, Getulio, 306

Ventures, Ltd., 299n

Vitro Manufacturing Company, 308, 314

Volcano Islands, 540

Volpe, 1st Lt., Joseph, Jr., 278, 306, 597-98

von Halban, Hans, 8n, 66, 235, 243, 246-47, 249-

50

von Neumann, John, 506, 528

Wabash River Ordnance Works, Ind., 108, 191, 343

Wakayama, Japan, 528

Wallace, Henry A., 31, 34, 39, 46, 234

Wallgren, Mon C., 336-37

Walton, E. T. S., 5-6

War Department Miscellaneous Group, 521

War Manpower Commission, 351-54, 364-65, 370,

461

War Production Board

electric power requirements, 380-83, 387-88, 393

priorities, 57, 353

procurement, 67, 80

Warren, Col. Stafford L., 91n, 594

bombing survey team, 544, 549-50

health program, 411-15, 421, 425-26

Washington Liaison Office, 81-82, 89, 91, 130, 178,

180n, 310, 349, 377, 380

Washington Post, 279

Watson, Maj. Gen. Edwin M., 19-20, 22-23

Watson, William W., 247

Watts Bar Dam, Tenn., 390

Waymack, William W., 597

Weapon development and testing. See Los Alamos

Laboratory.

Weaver, Brig. Gen. Theron D., 60, 81-82

Webster, W. L., 248

Wegener, A. L., 374

Weil, George, 103-04

Weisskopf, Victor, 12

Welsh, Col. Arthur B., 412

Wendover Field, Utah, 507, 521-22, 526-27, 581

Wensel, H. T., 44

Wesson, Maj. Gen. Charles M., 23

Western Defense Command, 261, 263-64

Western Union Company, 397

Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company,

62, 64, 124, 129-30, 153

Westinghouse Research Laboratories, 51, 487

West Stands. See Stagg Field, University of

California.

Wheeler, John A., 8n, 203, 589

Whitaker, Martin D., 112, 114, 208, 210

White, Wallace H., 273

White Bluffs, Wash., 110, 211-12, 332, 392, 405,

450-51, 456

Wickard, Claude, 329

Wigner, Eugene

nuclear research, 8n, 11, 13, 21-22, 24

pile process, 190, 192, 195-97

Wigner Effect, 592

Williams, Roger, 101, 113-14, 199, 203, 221

Williams, Maj. Walter J., 137

Wilson, Carroll L., 597-98, 600

Wilson, E. Bright, Jr., 197, 490

Wilson, Robert R., 528

Wilson, Col. Roscoe C., 520-21

Winant, John G., 249-51, 297-98, 300

Winkleman, D. W., Company, 160

Winne, Harry A., 574

Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, 358

Women's Army Corps, 277, 357-58, 397, 473

Woolworth Building, 151

Work stoppages and absenteeism, 206, 370-71,

375-76

Wright, Brig. Gen. Boykin C., 298

Wuerttemberg, Germany, 287, 289
660 MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB

XAX development plant, 134-35, 142

Xenon, 221-22

Yakima, Wash., 110, 337-39, 402

Yakima County, Wash., 110

Yaku-shima, Japan, 540

Yale University, 308, 315

Yancey, E. B., 199

Yokkaichi, Japan, 528

Yontan Field, Okinawa, 541

Zinn, Walter, 8n

Zirconium oxide, 133

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1985 O - 438-183 : QL 3